European Economic Elites: Between a New Spirit of Capitalism and the Erosion of State Socialism [1 ed.] 9783428531813, 9783428131815

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Schriften zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Band 84

European Economic Elites Between a New Spirit of Capitalism and the Erosion of State Socialism

Edited by Friederike Sattler Christoph Boyer

asdfghjk Duncker & Humblot · Berlin

FRIEDERIKE SATTLER / CHRISTOPH BOYER (Ed.)

European Economic Elites

Schriften zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte

Herausgegeben von Margrit Grabas, Werner Plumpe, Reinhold Reith, Dieter Ziegler

Band 84

European Economic Elites Between a New Spirit of Capitalism and the Erosion of State Socialism

Edited by Friederike Sattler Christoph Boyer

asdfghjk Duncker & Humblot · Berlin

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

Alle Rechte, auch die des auszugsweisen Nachdrucks, der fotomechanischen Wiedergabe und der Übersetzung, für sämtliche Beiträge vorbehalten # 2009 Duncker & Humblot GmbH, Berlin Druck: Berliner Buchdruckerei Union GmbH, Berlin Printed in Germany ISSN 0582-0588 ISBN 978-3-428-13181-5 Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem (säurefreiem) Papier ∞ entsprechend ISO 9706 *

Internet: http://www.duncker-humblot.de

Acknowledgements The present volume stems from the international conference “European Economic Elites between a New Spirit of Capitalism and the Erosion of State Socialism” which took place at the Center for Research on Contemporary History (Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, ZZF) in Potsdam in November 2007. Many have contributed to the success of this conference, which was conducted in close cooperation with the Chair of European Contemporary History at the Paris Lodron University of Salzburg and financed by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG). Special thanks go to the knowledgeable speakers, engaged debaters and thoughtful moderators from fourteen European and other countries and last but not least to the many helpers “behind the scenes”; of all those who provided for the smooth preparation, realisation and wrap-up of the conference, we would like to name Angela Dittrich, Franziska Timm and Albrecht Wiesener. We would also like to express our sincere thanks to the Director of the ZZF, Professor Dr. Martin Sabrow, for his support towards an open, creative atmosphere at the Center, which was very beneficial to the conference, and for his support regarding the funding of this volume. The Rector of Salzburg University, Professor Dr. Heinrich Schmidinger, and the Salzburg Centre for European Union Studies under the direction of Vice-Rector Professor Dr. Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann similarly contributed substantial grants towards the print costs and thereby enabled the publication of this volume. Once again we wish to thank all the speakers of the conference “European Economic Elites” for the stimulating discussions during the long publication process of this volume and for their readiness to let the output of these discussions enter into the written revision of the contributions – all in the knowledge that we were not comfortable, but rather demanding editors. Colleagues at the department “Economic and Social Changes during the 20th Century” at the ZZF made the effort of commenting critically on our draft of the interpretative framework. Special thanks go to Dr. Ralf Ahrens, Rüdiger Gerlach, Professor Dr. Rüdiger Hachtmann, Dr. Peter Hübner, Dr. Matthias Judt, Dr. Monika Mattes, Andrzej Novak, Professor Dr. André Steiner and Dr. Winfried Süß. Finally during the editing process, Marc Banditt rendered important, unbeatably thorough assistance. We thank Giles Bennett of the Institute of Contemporary History (Institut für Zeitgeschichte, IfZ) in Munich for his skilful translation of the introduction and the English language editorial work. Last but surely not least it is

6

Acknowledgements

our pleasant “duty” to thank Professors Dr. Margrit Grabas, Dr. Werner Plumpe, Dr. Reinhold Reith and Dr. Dieter Ziegler for the inclusion of this volume in the series “Schriften zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte”. June 2009

Friederike Sattler (Potsdam) and Christoph Boyer (Salzburg)

Contents In Lieu of an Introduction: Big Structures, Large Processes and Huge Comparisons – A Frame of Interpretation European Economic Elites between a New Spirit of Capitalism and the Erosion of State Socialism By Friederike Sattler / Christoph Boyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

Economic Elites in the Twentieth Century: Overviews from Western and Eastern Perspectives Economic Elites in the Twentieth Century – Germany and its Western Neighbours By Dieter Ziegler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

Hungarian Economic Elites in the Twentieth Century By Ágnes Pogány . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

Formations and Profiles in Western Europe: Between Cohesion and Fragmentation Die bemerkenswerte Persistenz der staatlichen grands corps bei der Rekrutierung der Wirtschaftseliten in Frankreich Von Hervé Joly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Business Elites in Italy and the Failure of the National Planning Policies as a Vision of Development By Fabio Lavista . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Elites and Economic Modernization in Portugal (1945 – 1995): Authoritarianism, Revolution and Liberalism By Manuel Loff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 The Swiss Business Elite between 1980 – 2000: Declining Cohesion, Changing Educational Profile and Growing Internationalization By Thomas David / Stéphanie Ginalski / Frédéric Rebmann / Gerhard Schnyder . . . . . . 197

8

Contents Formations and Profiles in Eastern Europe: Between Erosion and Transformation

The Agrarian Elite in Hungary before and after the Political Transition By Zsuzsanna Varga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 Social Factors Conditioning the Recruitment of the Hungarian Economic Elite at the End of the 1990s By György Lengyel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Elitentausch? Die betrieblichen Führungskräfte in Ostdeutschland seit den 1980er Jahren Von Marcel Boldorf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 Transformation of Economic Elites after the Fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia By Libuše Macáková / Eduard Kubu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

Challenges and Responses: Strategies during the Third Industrial Revolution Wirtschaftseliten und Wissenstransfer in der DDR und Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 – 1990: Beispiele aus den „wissensbasierten“ Industrien Von Manuel Schramm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 Dispiriting Decade. Structural Crisis, Managerial Failure, and the Fall of the House of Flick, 1975 – 1985 By Kim Christian Priemel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323 Der politische Unternehmer – Ein österreichisches Beispiel Von Christian Dirninger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347 Private Business Lobbying in a Corporatist Society – The Case of Norway By Trygve Gulbrandsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375

Change of Values, Interpretations and Legitimations „Sozialistische Manager“ und betriebliche Sozialpolitik in der DDR und Polen. Anmerkungen zu einem Vergleich Von Peter Hübner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 The Problems of a Business Elites’ Image and Reputation. The Example of Poland By Krzysztof Go ata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427

Contents

9

Enterprising self. Neue soziale Differenzierung und kulturelle Selbstdeutungen der Wirtschaftselite in Litauen Von Asta Vonderau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449

On the Way towards a Transnational Business Elite? Bringing Private Insurance Back In. The Geneva Association as a Transnational Insurance Think Tank (1973 – 2000s) By Matthieu Leimgruber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473 The Transnational Capitalist Class – Theory and Empirical Research By Leslie Sklair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497

Appendix Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525 List of Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581 Index of Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585 Index of Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590

Abbreviations Please note that abbreviations of company names are not included; they are listed in the index of companies. ACDP

Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, St. Augustin

ADELA

Atlantic Development Group for Latin America

AF

Akademikernes Fellesorganisasjon [Federation of Norwegian Professional Associations]

AG

Aktiengesellschaft

AGM

Annual General Meeting

APEC

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASAP

Associazione Sindacale Aziende Petrolifere [Oil Companies Association]

ASEC

Applied Service Economics Center

AT

Austria [Österreich]

BDI

Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie [Federation of German Industries]

BE

Belgique [Belgien]

BR

Brasil [Brasilien]

CAC 40

Cotation Assistée en Continu-40 [wichtiger Börsenindex am Finanzplatz Paris]

CBI

Confederation of British Industry

CBOS

Centrum Badania Opinii Spo ecznej [Centre for Public Opinion Research]

CCI

Commissione Centrale Industria [Industrial Central Committee]

CDS / PP

Centro Democrático e Social / Partido Popular [Democratic and Social Centre / People’s Party]

CEA

Comité européen des assurances [European Insurance and Reinsurance Federation]

CECA

Centro di Studi e Piani Economici [Economic Studies and Plans Centre]

CENSIS

Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali [Sociological Research Centre]

CEO

Chief Executive Officer

CFO

Chief Finacial Officer

CH

Confoederatio Helvetica [Switzerland]

CIAI

Comitato Industriale Alta Italia [Northern Italy Industrial Committee]

CIPE

Comitato Interministeriale per la Progammazione Economica [Economic Planning Intragovernmental Committee]

Abbreviations

11

CIRIEC

Centro Italiano di Ricerche e d’Informazione sull’economia delle Imprese Pubbliche e di Pubblico Interesse [Italian Research and Information Centre on the Economy of Public Holdings and Public Utilities]

CISL

Confederazione italiana sindacati lavoratori [Italian Catholic workers union]

CLNAI

Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italia [Northern Italy National Liberation Committee]

CME

Coordinated Market Economy

CNC

Computerized numerical control

CNPE

Commissione Nazionale per la Programmazione Economica [National Economic Planning Commission]

CoB

Chairman of the Board

COMECON

Council of Mutual Economical Aid

Confindustria

Confederazione Italiana dellÍndustria [Confederation of Italian Industry]

COPCON

Comando Operacional do Continente Operational [Command for Continental Portugal]

CR

Conselho da Revolução [Council of the Revolution]

CRZZ

Centralna Rada Zwiazków Zawodowych [Zentralrat der Gewerkschaften]

CSSR

Ceskoslovenská socialistická republika [Tschechoslowakische Sozialistische Republik]

DAX 30

Deutscher Aktienindex [wichtiger Börsenindex am Finanzplatz Frankfurt am Main]

DC

Democrazia Cristiana [Democratic Christian Party]

DDR

Deutsche Demokratische Republik [German Democratic Republic]

DE

Deutschland [Germany]

DGS

Direcção-Geral de Segurança [General-Directorate for Security]

DL

Decreto-Lei [Decree-Law]

DM

Deutsche Mark

DNS

Desoxyribonukleinsäure

ECA

Economic Cooperation Administration

EEC

European Economic Community

EFR

European Financial Services Roundtable

EFTA

European Free Trade Association

ENA

École nationale d’administration [Verwaltungshochschule in Paris bzw. Strasbourg]

ENI

Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi [National Hydrocarbons Agency]

ENS

École normale supérieure [Elitehochschule in Paris]

ERP

European Recovery Program

ES

Espan´a [Spain]

ESCP

École supérieure de commerce de Paris [Handelshochschule in Paris]

ESF

European Services Federation

12 ESSEC

Abbreviations École supérieure des sciences économiques et commerciales [Handelshochschule in bzw. bei Paris]

EstG

Einkommensteuergesetz [Income Tax Law]

ETHZ

Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich

EU

Europäische Union / European Union

EWG

Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft

EWR

Europäischer Wirtschaftsraum

F&E

Forschung und Entwicklung

FAO

Food and Agriculture Organization [of the UN]

FAZ

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

FDGB

Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund

FDI

Foreign Direct Investment

FFSA

French Federation of Insurers

FR

France [Frankreich]

FRG

Federal Republic of Germany

G-30

Group of Thirty

GA

Geneva Association

GATT

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GB

Great Britain

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GDR

German Democratic Republic

GFCF

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

GmbH

Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung

GPRI

Geneva Papers of Risk and Insurance

GVA

Gross Value Added

Ha

Hectares

HEC

Hautes études commerciales [Handelshochschule in bzw. bei Paris]

HSG

Hochschule St. Gallen

HSH

Handels- og Servicenc´ringens Hovedorganisasjon [Federation of Norwegian Commercial and Service Enterprises]

HSWP

Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party

HWP

Hungarian Workers’ Party

IAS

International Accounting Standards

IE

Republic of Ireland

IFRS

International Financial and Reporting Standards

IG

Interessengemeinschaft

IIS

International Insurance Society

IMF

International Monetary Fund

INSEAD

Institut Européen d’Administration des Affaires [Europäische Business School in Fontainebleau bei Paris]

Abbreviations

13

Intersind

Associazione Sindacale Intersind [State Owned Enterprises Association]

IPSOA

Instituto Post-universitario di Studi sull’Organizzazione Aziendale [Graduate Organizational Studies Institute]

IRI

Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale [Institute for Economic Recovery]

ISPA

International Scientific and Professional Association

IT

Italia [Italy]

IWF

Internationaler Währungsfond

Km

Kilometre

Kolchos LDC

Kollekti:wnoje chosja: jstwo [Kollektivwirtschaft] Kommunisti:tscheskij sojs molodjo: schi [Kommunistischer Jugendverband] Least Developed Countries

LO

Landsorganisasjonen i Norge [Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions]

MBA

Master of Business Administration

Komsomol

MEDEF

Mouvement des Entreprises de France [French Employers’ Federation]

MES

Movimento de Esquerda Socialista [Left Socialist Movement]

MF

Military Forces

MFA

Movimento das Forças Armadas [Armed Forces Movement]

MNC

Multinational Company

MOL

Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archive]

MP

Member of Parliament

M. phil.

Magister Philosophiae

MSZMP

Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt [Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party]

MUD

Movimento de Unidade Democrática [Democratic Unity Movement]

MUDJ

Youth association of MUD

MUNAF

Movimento de Unidade Nacional Anti-Fascista [National Unity Anti-Fascist Movement]

NAFTA

North American Free Trade Agreement

NC

Numerical control

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

NHO

Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon [Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry]

NL

Nederland [Niederlande]

NMH-BA

Neue Maxhütte i. L., Betriebsarchiv, Sulzbach-Rosenberg

NO

Norge [Norwegen]

Normale sup

École normale supérieure [Elitehochschule in Paris]

NRD

Niemiecka Republika Demokratyczna [Deutsche Demokratische Republik]

NWS

Neues Wirtschaftssystem

NZZ

Neue Züricher Zeitung

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OEEC

Organization for European Economic Cooperation

14

Abbreviations

OLS

Ordinary Least Squares

OPEC

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

ÖVP

Österreichische Volkspartei

PCI

Partito Comunista Italiano [Italian Communist Party]

PCP

Partido Comunista Português [Portuguese Communist Party]

PDG

Président-directeur général [Präsident-Generaldirektor an der Spitze französischer Großunternehmen]

PhD

Philosophiae Doctor

PIDE / DGS

Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado / Direcção-Geral de Segurança [International Police for State Defence / General-Directorate for Security]

PLI

Partito Liberale Italiano [Italian Liberal Party]

PLN

Polski z oty [Polish z oty]

PM

Primeiro-Ministro [Prime-Minister]

PPD / PSD

Partido Popular Democrático / Partido Social-Democrata [People’s Democratic Party / Social-Democratic Party]

PRD

Partido Renovador Democrático [Democratic Renovator Party]

PRI

Partito Repubblicano Italiano [Italian Republican Party]

PRL

Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa [Volksrepublik Polen]

PS

Partido Socialista [Socialist Party]

PSDI

Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano [Italian Social Democratic Party]

PSI

Partito Socialista Italiano [Italian Socialist Party]

PSLI

Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani [Socialist Party of the Italian Workers]

PT

Portugal

PVAP

Polnische Vereinigte Arbeiterpartei

PZPR

Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza [Polnische Vereinigte Arbeiterpartei]

R&D

Research and Development

RGW

Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe

RWWA

Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Köln

SAPMO-BArch

Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv

SBZ

Sowjetische Besatzungszone

Sciences Po

Institut d’études politiques de Paris [Politikwissenschaftliche Hochschule in Paris]

SED

Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands

SEDES

Sociedade de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social [Society for the Study of Economic and Social Development]

SMI

Swiss Market Index [Switzerland’s blue-chip stock market]

SOE

State-owned Enterprise

Abbreviations

15

SoÚ AV CR

Sociologicky´ Ústav Akademie Ved Ceské Republiky [Institute of Sciology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic]

SPD

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands

SPÖ

Sozialistische Partei Österreichs

STEM

Stredisko empiricky´ch vy´zkumu [Center for Empirical Research] Shareholder Value

SV SVIMEZ

Associazione per lo sviluppo del Mezzogiorno [Association for the Development of the Southern Italy]

SWE

Sweden

TCC

Transnational Capitalist Class

TEO

Transnational Environmental Organization

TH

Technische Hochschule

TKA

ThyssenKrupp Konzernarchiv, Duisburg

TNC

Transnational Corporation

TV

Television

UDF

Union Démocratique Fédéral [Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union]

UdSSR

Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UN

União Nacional [National Union]

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNICE

Union des Industries de la Communauté européenne [Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe]

UNIO

Hovedorganisasjonen for universitets- og høyskoleutdannede [Union of Education]

UNRRA

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

USA

United States of America

USD

US-Dollar

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VEB

Volkseigener Betrieb

VR

Volksrepublik

VRP

Volkrepublik Polen

WTR

Wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution

WW

World War

X

École polytechnique [Polytechnische Hochschule in Paris]

YS

Yrkesorganisasjonenes Sentralforbund [Confederation of Vocational Unions]

ZK

Zentralkomitee

ZUS

Zak ad Ubezpieczen´ Spo ecznych [Social Insurance Institution]

In Lieu of an Introduction: Big Structures, Large Processes and Huge Comparisons – A Frame of Interpretation With reference to Charles Tilly (1929 – 2008), border crosser between history and sociology

European Economic Elites between a New Spirit of Capitalism and the Erosion of State Socialism By Friederike Sattler / Christoph Boyer I. European economic elites under current public criticism For quite a number of years, economic elites in Europe have been confronted with vehement public criticism. On the one hand managers of large enterprises, often with an old and glorious tradition, announced enormous profits, sometimes only five minutes before the present-day financial and economic crisis erupted in late autumn of 2007; on the other hand they simultaneously proclained mass-layoffs and relocations, and thus saw and still see themselves up against the reproach of having lost all feeling of social responsibility. To justify their adaptation to the demands of capital markets and their growing inclination to worship the god of shareholder value, these managers usually argued, at least till the beginning of the devastating crisis, by pointing to the needs and pressures of global competition, a competition which has undoubtedly put an increasingly severe strain on Western economies and their elites since the early 1970s. This challenge has become even more intense after the fall of Communism and in the course of the transformation process. The question has been raised whether these managers, who are allegedly being pressured into adopting the Anglo-Saxon model of financial capitalism, have recklessly thrown overboard an economic and business culture which had been a proprium of continental Europe, a culture which had been characterized by its ability to maintain the social balance and bring the imperatives of business in line with the needs of society. Were the managers simply forced to adapt to the technical and economic change triggered by the third industrial revolution and globalization? Or were they perhaps also driven by personal greed? Be this as it may – increasing unemployment, stagnating or even partially decreasing real wages and the new poverty arising right at the core of European welfare states are increasingly being seen as unjust. Thus, “the market” is not only about to lose the loyalty of the man (and the woman) in the street – the politicians are also less and less inclined to get into a position in which they see themselves as exploited by business interests as “de-regulators”; in this respect, a considerable number of critical voices has arisen during the last two or three years. Although most of the critics were not able to anticipate the emerging financial and economic crisis, they were basically proven

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right. In the meantime, the crisis has forced the governments of the industrialized as well as those of many threshold and developing countries to make huge and hitherto unprecedented efforts in order to prevent the complete breakdown of the global economy by nationalizing commercial banks, by providing fresh equity capital as well as loans and by granting generous state guarantees to both the financial sector and the “real economy”. But if we were mostly focussing on the considerable amount of gross moral turpitude when we look at European economic elites trying to meet the challenges of globalization and technical change, and if we were to assume that greed and antisocial autism play the decisive role, we would be in danger of missing a truly adequate interpretation of the matter. In order to explain the decisions and the behavior of the leading managers, we should interpret them in broader socio-economic contexts. In other words: We ought to look at the options the managers had as well as at their available room for maneuver; and we should always take the macroenvironment of European industrial societies into account, an environment which has been subject to profound changes in the last third of the 20th century. This was the “amoral” guideline of the conference “European Economic Elites between a New Spirit of Capitalism and the Erosion of State Socialism”, which took place in November 2007 at the Center for Research on Contemporary History (Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung) in Potsdam. The results are presented in this volume. Apart from this leitmotif, the conference was guided by a second principal premise: The crisis “after the boom”1 was not a problem peculiar to “the West”. It was, on the contrary, a pervasive problem of European industrial societies, regardless of their political, economic and social system. In other words: The democratic, Keynesian neo-corporatist welfare states of Northern, Central, Western and – since the middle of the 1970s – Southern Europe on the one hand and the countries of dictatorial state socialism in Eastern Europe with their centrally planned and administered economies on the other hand faced basically identical challenges: accelerated technological, economic and social change, primarily caused by the third – i. e. the electronic – industrial revolution, exasperated by the context of globalization. Since the 1970s, these challenges have brought about manifold and complex problems of adaptation for which, in the West as well as in the East, system- and, moreover, country-specific solutions had to be found. It is important to note that the process of accelerated change also had considerable effects on the economic elites, on their social physiognomies and their qualification profiles, on their options and actions, on the degree of homogeneity of the elite corps, on its value systems, on the ways and methods of generating legitimacy, on self-images and on perceptions from the outside. During the 1980s, business 1 See Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Nach dem Boom. Brüche und Kontinuitäten der Industriemoderne seit 1970, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 55 (2007), 4, pp. 559 – 581; Anselm Doering-Manteuffel / Lutz Raphael, Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970, Göttingen 2008.

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elites in Western Europe, though or even because they were challenged by the massive criticism of civil society, succeeded in developing a “new spirit of capitalism” – to cite Luc Boltanski’s and Ève Chiapello’s allusion to Max Weber in their famous book on French management discourses.2 Despite all the grave structural problems which remain unsolved to this day, the capitalist economies of “the West” have shown a considerable degree of flexibility and mobility. On the whole, they have more or less successfully adapted to the world markets; they have also opened up new sources of legitimacy – this is true notwithstanding the fact that the actual global crisis causes severe doubts as to whether the alleged “triumph of capitalism” will be a truly sustainable phenomenon. In contrast to the West, the socialist countries of Eastern and Eastern Central Europe which had also been affected by the third industrial revolution and by globalization, even though with less intensity than the West,3 were not able to mobilize the necessary capacities for reform. The structural rigidity of the planned economies and their inability to bring about a thorough and enduring liberalization of the socio-political sphere led to the erosion and, finally, to the implosion of state socialism. The paths to the end were similar, yet not identical in the countries in question. If we look more closely, we realize that, for instance, the GDR and Czechoslovakia were characterized by a rigid clinging to power by the Communist parties – whereas, during the 1970s and 1980s, the state parties in Poland and Hungary already began to gradually withdraw from “their” economies and societies. First elements of a market economy and of a civil society, backed by a new (petty) bourgeoisie, began to penetrate the public sphere. These developments paved the way for the transformation to post-socialism during the 1990s.4 In these contexts, in Poland as well as in Hungary, the initial and still relatively reluctant signs of a new entrepreneurial spirit were to be observed. Setting out from these premises, the conference took a strictly comparative view of the European industrial societies during the late 20th and the early 21st centuries. Bringing together “the two sides of Europe” – and their economic elites – implied absorbing and processing the considerable amount of relevant research literature in the fields of history, political science, sociology and economics. The conference – and, in consequence, the volume presented here – had the opportunity to profit from the abundant research with respect to the history of European business elites in the first two thirds of the 20th century in Western Europe.5 Another important 2 See Luc Boltanski / Eve Chiapello, Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme [The New Spirit of Capitalism], Paris 1999. 3 Cf. the insightful essay of Jacek Kochanowicz, Globalization and Eastern Europe: 1870 – 1914, 1970 – 2000, in: Économique appliqué LV (2002), 2, pp. 179 – 205. 4 See for example: Iván Szelényi, Urban Inequalities under State Socialism, New York 1983; Iván Szelényi, Socialist Entrepreneurs. Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary, Madison 1988; Ákos Róna-Tas, The Great Surprise of the Small Transformation. The Demise of Communism and the Rise of the Private Sector in Hungary, Ann Arbor 1997. 5 Any attempt to give a complete survey of the existing literature would be doomed to failure. The most important inter- and transnational comparative studies include the following

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point of departure was transformation research, i. e. the rich literature dealing with political, social and economic change in Eastern and Eastern Central Europe during the 1980s and from the early 1990s onwards.6 Transformation theories proved to be useful – despite their inherent inclination to ignore the historical path dependencies relevant for the long-term development of economic elites.

II. The socio-economic transformations of late 20th century Europe Since the early 1970s of the 20th century, the industrial countries of Europe have experienced groundbreaking alterations of their technological basis and their demographic, economic and social structures. Last but not least, a transformation has taken place in the sphere of politics which, in the context of globalization, has broken up the hard shell of the nation state and has led to a visible erosion of its political steering capacities. Both macro-models, i. e. the democratic, Keynesian neo-corporatist welfare state as well as state socialism, see themselves confronted with the challenge of transtitles: Youssef Cassis, Business Elites, London 1994; Michael Hartmann, Topmanager. Die Rekrutierung einer Elite, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 1996; Ezra N. Suleiman, Le recrutement des élites en Europe [The Recruitment of Elites in Europe], Paris 1997; Eric Bussière / Michel Dumoulin (eds.), Milieus économiques et intégration européenne en Europe occidentale au XXième siècle [Economic Milieus and the European Integration Process in Western Europe in the 20th Century], Arras 1998; Michel Bauer / Bénédicte Bertin-Mourot, National Models for Making and Legitimating Elites: A Comparative Analysis of the 200 Top Executives in France, Germany, and Great Britain, in: European Societies 1 (1999), 1, pp. 9 – 31; Paul Windolf, Corporate Networks in Europe and the United States, Oxford / New York 2002; Mino Vianello / Gwen Moore (eds.), Women and Men in Political and Business Elites. A Comparative Study in the Industrialized World, London 2004; Youssef Cassis / Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou (eds.), Country Studies in Entrepreneurship. A Historical Perspective, Houndmills / New York 2006; Mairi Maclean / Charles Harvey / Jon Press, Business Elites and Corporate Governance in France and the UK, Houndmills / New York 2006; Michael Hartmann, Eliten und Macht in Europa. Ein internationaler Vergleich, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2007. 6 See for instance: John Higley / Jan Pakulski / Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe, London 1998; Gil Eyal / Iván Szelényi / Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists. Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe, London / New York 1998; Magarditsch A. Hatschikjan / Franz-Lothar Altmann (eds.), Eliten im Wandel. Politische Führung, wirtschaftliche Macht und Meinungsbildung im neuen Osteuropa, Paderborn et al. 1998; Peter Hübner (ed.), Eliten im Sozialismus. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR, Köln / Weimar / Wien 1999; John Higley / György Lengyel (eds.), Elites After State Socialism. Theories and Analysis, Lanham et al. 2000; Gil Eyal, The Origins of Postcommunist Elites: From Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia, Minneapolis / London 2003; Heinrich Best / Michael Hofmann (eds.), Unternehmer und Manager im Sozialismus / Entrepreneurs and Managers in Socialism (= Historische Sozialforschung / Historical Social Research 30 (2005), 2 [Sonderheft / Special Issue No. 112]), Köln 2005; Helmut Steiner / Pál Tamás (eds.), The Business Elites of East-Central Europe, Berlin 2005.

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forming a “classical” Fordist industrial society on the technological basis of the second industrial revolution into something new – a “something” the contours of which are not yet to be seen very clearly.7 This process may be conceptualized as “crisis”. The term “crisis” does not so much refer to “dramatic moments of decision”: In our context, “crisis”8 means a conglomerate of maybe – at first sight – rather unobtrusive but in fact increasingly serious deficits of the steering, production, reproduction and legitimization mechanisms of a political and socio-economic system. Such deficits may be caused either by internal or external determinants or by a combination of both. Moreover, the term “crisis” also encompasses the – perhaps prolonged and protracted, more or less successful – attempts at “repairing” the deficits. The single components of a crisis may be connected and interrelated in different ways and manners. There may be one main root, or the crisis may be caused by the contingent coincidence of more than one cause. Trying to repair the deficits by tackling the components of the crisis one for one may be an under-complex strategy which results in aggravating the problem; but holistic approaches may be doomed to failure as well if they are not up to the complexity of the situation. Crises may have a long incubation period, i. e. they may remain “under cover” for quite a long time. They may end in the decay and échec of the system – or in its overall transformation. And crisis situations may also trigger off restructuring processes which alter the system in important respects but preserve the core of its identity. “Our” crisis seems to be a theme with two principal variations: the crisis of the Western democratic, Keynesian neo-corporatist welfare state on the one hand, and the crisis of the Eastern and Eastern Central European state socialisms on the other. This is, of course, a very crude bipolar pattern, but for the sake of the argument this ideal-type construction will do. Talking about “variations of a theme” implies that – from a higher level of abstraction – socialist and capitalist crises are not different in category or kind. Both are triggered by fundamentally similar challenges.9 Only the responses are shaped by the system, i. e. they are “socialist” or “capitalist”. Nevertheless: There are subcutaneous homologies as well as functional equiva7 There is an intense debate among German historians in which way the transformations of the early 1970s should be conceptualized. Apart from “crisis”, other prominent approaches prefer to speak about either “Umbruch” (radical change) or “Epochenschwelle” (epochal threshold). In this context see the stimulating considerations of: Winfried Süß, Der keynesianische Traum und sein langes Ende. Sozioökonomischer Wandel und Sozialpolitik in den siebziger Jahren, in: Konrad J. Jarausch (ed.), Das Ende der Zuversicht? Die siebziger Jahre als Geschichte, Göttingen 2008, pp. 120 – 137, especially pp. 132 – 134. 8 For the term “crisis” and the underlying theory, see: Walter L. Bühl, Krisentheorien. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Übergang, Darmstadt 1988; Walter L. Bühl, Sozialer Wandel im Ungleichgewicht. Zyklen, Fluktuationen, Katastrophen, Stuttgart 1990. 9 Cf. also Margrit Grabas, Der Beitrag Schumpeters zur Erklärung von Stabilität und Instabilität der sozio-ökonomischen Entwicklung: Dargestellt an der Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR, in: Francesca Schinzinger (ed.), Unternehmer und technischer Fortschritt, München 1996, pp. 211 – 244.

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lents between these responses. Because these clandestine bridges exist, it is possible to compare different responses to what amounts to the same problems. To realize this is an essential precondition for understanding the history of Europe during the late 20th century. 1. The two macro-models of post-1945 European history We begin with a sketch of the status quo ante, in other words with the “trente glorieuses”10, the “boom”11 or the “golden age”12. The two macro-models in post1945 European history, i. e. the Northern, Central and Western European democratic, Keynesian neo-corporatist welfare state on the one hand and the Eastern and Eastern Central Europe state socialism on the other hand stem from the very same root. This holds true, despite the sharp competition and fierce conflict of the Cold War: Basically, both models were responses to the crisis of liberal capitalism in the late 19th century which they both tried to overcome by means of a relatively high level of state intervention as well as political and societal regulation. If we leave aside the prehistory of the inter-war and the pre-1914 period, the origins of the Western model are rooted in the post-war reconstruction process.13 From here, the path led to the fully fledged classical Fordist industrial society 10 Jean Fourastié, Les Trente Glorieuses, ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975 [Thirty Glorious Years, or the Invisible Revolution from 1946 to 1975], Paris 1979. 11 Hartmut Kaelble (ed.), Der Boom 1948 – 1973. Gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Europa, Opladen 1992. 12 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 1914 – 1991, London 2004. 13 There is a vast body of relevant literature, cf. e. g.: Fritz W. Scharpf, Sozialdemokratische Krisenpolitik in Europa. Das “Modell Deutschland” im Vergleich, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 1987; Fritz W. Scharpf / Vivien A. Schmidt, Introduction, in: Fritz W. Scharpf / Vivien A. Schmidt, Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Vol. I: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness, Oxford / New York 2000, pp. 1 – 20; Fritz W. Scharpf / Vivien A. Schmidt, Economic Changes, Vulnerabilities and Institutional Capabilities, in: Scharpf / Schmidt, Welfare and Work (fn. 13), pp. 21 – 124; Anton Hemerijck / Martin Schludi, Sequences of Policy Failures and Effective Policy Responses, in: Scharpf / Schmidt, Welfare and Work (fn. 13), pp. 125 – 228; Fritz W. Scharpf / Vivien A. Schmidt, Conclusions, in: Scharpf / Schmidt, Welfare and Work (fn. 13), pp. 310 – 336; Göttinger Graduiertenkolleg, Die Zukunft des europäischen Sozialmodells, Arbeitsbericht 2002 and Fortsetzungsantrag, http:// www. uni-goettin gen.de/de/inst/2978.html (accessed on 21. 6. 2009); Stefan A. Schirm, Internationale Politische Ökonomie. Eine Einführung, Baden-Baden 2007, pp. 65 – 185; Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes (fn. 12), pp. 403 ff.; Barry Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945. Coordinated Capitalism and beyond, Princeton (NJ) / Oxford 2006, pp. 198 – 413; Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, London 2005, pp. 451 – 800; Iván T. Berend, An Economic History of Twentieth Century Europe, Cambridge / New York 2006, pp. 263 – 326; Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism. Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century, New York / London 2006, pp. 339 – 472; Eric Thun, The Globalization of Production, in: John Ravenhill (ed.), Global Political Economy, Oxford / New York 2007, pp. 346 – 372; Bernard Wasserstein, Barbarism and Civilization. A History of Europe in our Time, Oxford 2007, pp. 554 – 793. The contributions to Jarausch, Das Ende der Zuversicht? (fn. 7) are instructive, too.

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which reached its peak during the 1960s. The economic boom of the trente glorieuses enabled full employment; it also meant relative affluence for the masses. It opened the gates for a large-scale distributive social and consumer policy and it provided the basis for a profound change of the value systems in Western European societies, i. e. for a hitherto unknown rise of individualism and an astounding pluralism of life-styles. During the trente glorieuses, the physiognomies of Western European societies became more similar in many respects – this was not only an outcome of the boom, but it was also caused by the remarkably intensified supranational integration process and an increasingly densely woven net of transnational interrelations. The “Western paradigm” combined “politics of productivity”14, a relatively far-reaching regulation of the economy, politics and society as well as the neo-corporatist inclusion of interest groups. The economic boom eliminated or at least alleviated social tensions. It is important to note that the post-war Keynesian economies were basically national economies. They were – to a certain degree – protected by the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton-Woods system; to a certain degree it was possible to compensate for differentials in productivity by devaluation or revaluation. International capital flows were more or less controlled; the national capital markets were regulated. In short: The exit-options were limited. Employers, employees and tax payers could not easily evade the obligations of the national welfare state. These trends were reflected in the Keynesian Zeitgeist, i. e. in a marked optimism regarding the necessity, the benefits as well as the feasibility of regulation and state intervention.15 The Western model amalgamated a great variety of autochthonous European traditions with US-American influences. After 1945, the United States pressed for the liberalization of encrusted structures everywhere in Europe. The result was a kind of “embedded liberalism” which combined regulation on the supranational, i. e. European level (e. g. in the field of agriculture), and on the national level (cf. e. g. public services or the labor markets). Eastern and Central Eastern European state socialist countries were classical European industrial societies as well. Some of them, like the GDR or Czechoslovakia, became socialist as already industrialized countries. Others, like Poland and Hungary, were industrialized in the course of “building socialism”. The “socialist paradigm” consisted of the primacy of politics – the one-party state – in combination with a centrally planned and administered economy. Socialism was, above all, 14 Charles S. Maier, Two Sorts of Crisis? The “long” 1970s in the West and the East, in: Hans Günter Hockerts, with the assistance of Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (eds.), Koordinaten deutscher Geschichte in der Epoche des Ost-West-Konflikts, München 2004, pp. 49 – 62. See also: Matthias Kipping / Ove Bjanar (eds.), The Americanization of European Business. The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models, London / New York 1998; Dominique Barjot (ed.), Catching up with America. Productivity Missions and the Diffusion of American Economic and Technological Influence after the Second World War, Paris 2002. 15 On the changeful international reception of Keynes during the 20th century, see: Margrit Grabas, Große Nationalökonomen zwischen Glorifizierung und Verachtung – Rezeptions-, Wissenschafts- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Historische Sozialforschung / Historical Social Research 27 (2002), 4, pp. 204 – 241.

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a mega-project of social transformation: It pushed the industrial working class into the center of society. Yet again, autochthonous elements were combined with an imported, i. e. the Soviet model. This model was more repressive than the benevolent hegemony of the United States, and it seems to have been less attractive and less successful precisely because of that. Eastern economic integration in COMECON was significantly weaker than the integration process in the West, yet socialist societies were confronted with fundamentally similar problems of regulation – they only solved these problems with sometimes or partially different methods. Socialist social policy for instance was only gradually different from Western social policy. This was true, irrespective of the qualitative difference between democracy and dictatorship. In both systems, social policy was centered on working life and on the professional biography of the individual. In both systems, the goals of social policy were to be egalitarian or at least equalizing. Both systems transcended, at least to a certain degree, “classical” social policy by instead fostering mass consumption – with the intention to produce mass loyalty – as an indispensable resource in the “struggle of the systems”.

2. The emerging crisis of the macro-models during the 1970s Owing to a number of mutually interrelated causes, the paths of these macromodels led into a crisis, the first contours of which became perceivable in the early 1970s. Only during the following decades did a new physiognomy become more and more clearly visible. a) The “West” The crisis in the West was basically caused by two short term factors: Firstly, the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. “Bretton-Woods” implied the tying of national currencies to the US-Dollar with qualified, yet strictly limited flexibility; it also entailed tying the US-Dollar to the gold standard. From the 1960s onwards, as a prelude to the financial and economic globalization, the international mobility of capital as well as the volume of the transnational money and credit business rose.16 In consequence, the U.S. lost some of its overriding economic importance, while simultaneously Japan and Western Europe, based on their relatively strong position in world trade, were gaining significance. In other words: The US-Dollar faced persistent devaluation. Ultimately, the U.S. decided to throw off the chains of Bretton-Woods. This implied the end of fixed exchange rates between the more important industrialized nations. The demise of the Bretton-Woods arrangement 16 See Harold James, Rambouillet, 15. November 1975. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft. 20 Tage im 20. Jahrhundert, München 1997; Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital. A History of the International Monetary System, Princeton (NJ) 2008, pp. 91 – 133; Stefano Battilossi / Youssef Cassis (eds.), European Banks and the American Challenge. Competition and Cooperation in International Banking under Bretton Woods, Oxford 2002.

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was not contingent, but it was a corollary of its own success with regard to the intensification of international trade and the growing relative strength of e. g. Germany and Japan in this context. Secondly, and truly coincidentally with the end of Bretton-Woods, the first oil crisis of 1973 has to be taken into account – a crisis which led to significantly rising oil prices.17 Because the Western governments tried to deal with the new situation without implementing austerity measures, the consequence was inflation. Because the rising oil prices “swallowed” purchasing power, they were also responsible for a decline in demand and, as a consequence, rising unemployment. Inflation and unemployment, as the signum of the 1970s, were fatally interconnected in the stagflation dilemma: On the one hand, deficit spending, when used as a weapon against unemployment, pushed up inflation. On the other hand, monetarist instruments used as a weapon to fight against inflation pushed up unemployment. After the second oil crisis in the 1980s, which was not just a simple repeat of the first, macroeconomic conditions improved again and three long term factors became relevant; they determine the further socio-economic development of Western societies to this day: Most importantly, the exceptionally high growth rates of the post-war reconstruction period were definitively levelling off; from now on, Western European economies and societies faced a persistent decrease of growth rates; they were even confronted with stagnation. Secondly: A switch from extensive to new intensive patterns of growth in the context of the third industrial revolution became observable. Had the 1970s still been characterized by a slump of innovations and by the conservation of old industries, now, i. e. from the 1980s inwards, new technologies, mainly based on microelectronics – i. e. computers and their software, later on the worldwide web – raised capital intensity and productivity enormously. Traditional industrial businesses now experienced growing pressure and traditional industrial employment shrank. Simultaneously, the rise of the new industries and the expanding service sector were only partly capable of compensating for these job losses. The consequences were persistent mass unemployment and the rise of precariousness. Thirdly: The waning of “classical” wage labor was to a considerable degree caused by shifts in the international division of labor fostered by the U.S. policy of pushing up interest rates.18 Multinational enterprises tried to compensate for their losses by exploiting international wage differentials. The expansion of multinational companies was furthermore enabled and supported by the gradual liberalization of capital flows, the enormous growth of foreign direct investment, rising volumes of international trade and last but not least by inno17 See Jens Hohensee, Der erste Ölpreisschock 1973 / 74. Die politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen der arabischen Erdölpolitik auf die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westeuropa, Stuttgart 1996. 18 This policy should not be interpreted as a paradigmatic tendency towards neo-liberal monetarism, but as a pragmatic means to fight inflation.

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vative and technologically advanced means of transport and communication.19 Employment started to emigrate – and it respectively immigrated, as it were, to cheaper places of production. To a certain degree, this “migration” even penetrated the iron curtain and reached Eastern and Central Eastern European low wage countries like Hungary.20 To date, the Western European welfare states have been more or less severely damaged by globalization; yet it would be going much too far to say that they have been eliminated. As regards social standards, the race to the bottom which had been predicted has not yet taken place, despite the overall intensification of global competition, especially since the beginning of the 1990s, when Eastern European markets and those beyond opened up. There was – and is – growing pressure on the fundamentals resulting from growing demands caused by mass unemployment – demands which, for reasons of political stability, could not be reduced radically. On the other hand, there was an erosion of the financial basis of the welfare state, caused by the erosion of industrial employment. Long-term mass unemployment led to the formation of a new underclass. Thus, the rather tight cohesion of European post-war civil societies – pacified by the welfare state – has become looser; increasing inequality had and has a tendency to exclude “useless” or “superfluous” segments of the population – with considerable risks for the credibility of democracy. Whereas the wealth of the affluent part of society might theoretically be able to compensate for these symptoms of a new austerity, the political constellation practically forbids equalizing redistribution. Up to now, the problems have most frequently been “solved” by shifting them into the future, i. e. by a rise in public debt – and there is hardly any reason to believe that the current financial and economic crisis will put an end to this strategy of postponement.

b) The “East” State socialist economies were only marginally touched by the collapse of Bretton-Woods, but the first oil price shock also put them under considerable pressure – even though there was a certain time lag due to the oil producing capacity within the bloc, i. e. in the Soviet Union and Romania.21 Regarding long-term factors, the 19 Cf. Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism. From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-first Century, Oxford 2005; Alfred D. Chandler jr. / Bruce Mazlish (eds.), Leviathans. Multinational Corporations and the New Global History, Cambridge 2005. 20 See Patrick Artisien-Maksimenko (ed.), Multinationals in Eastern Europe, Basingstoke 2000; Patrick Artisien-Maksimenko / Matija Rojec (eds.), Foreign Investment and Privatization in Eastern Europe, Basingstoke 2001; Jutta Günther / Dagmara Jajesniak-Quast (eds.), Willkommene Investoren oder nationaler Ausverkauf? Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Ostmitteleuropa im 20. Jahrhundert, Berlin 2006, especially the contribution of Adam Török / Ágnes Gyorffy, Ungarn in der Vorreiterrolle (pp. 253 – 274). 21 See Eichengreen, The European Economy (fn. 13), pp. 299 – 301. Cf. also the instructive comparative essays of Harm G. Schröter, who scrutinized the impact of the oil price

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state socialist countries were, similarly to the West, confronted with the decline of the fairly comfortable growth rates of the post-war reconstruction period. The East was also challenged by the third industrial revolution, but here, the transition from classical Fordist industrial society to something new, maybe a post-Fordist society, was slowed down by the barriers to innovation and development inherent in central administrative systems. These systems showed a tendency towards autarky; to a large extent they were not able to use and process the incentives resulting from international technological and economic cooperation.22 Despite all economic “intensification”, the modernization gap between state socialism and the West became broader and deeper during the 1970s and 1980s. Subsequently, the terms of trade for the socialist countries in the global markets deteriorated. There was another important factor: At the turn of the 1970s, most socialist countries embarked on a course of enormously intensified social and consumer policy.23 This was a consequence of the échec of the reforms in the 1960s. Social policy and mass consumption were meant to produce the loyalty reforms had not been able to produce. On the one hand, this proved to be an ingenious stabilizing strategy. On the other hand, the ultima ratio strategy of consumerism pushed state socialism into a structural dilemma between economic and social objectives. Consumption permanently demanded too much of the economy; raising the levels of consumption on the one hand implied cutting investment on the other. This overstretch resulted in a structural inclination to import resources; but, as a consequence of the ever deteriorating terms of trade, it became more and more difficult to finance these imports by exports. The result was an enormous growth of international indebtedness of most socialist countries during the 1970s and 1980s. It entailed a loss of sovereignty vis-à-vis the West and the international financial markets which paved the way to the break-down of 1989. The final crisis of state socialism – which, in the cultural and political sphere, found an expression in a growing de-legitimation and in an almost complete loss of the utopian potentials of shocks on both the East and the West German chemical industry: Harm G. Schröter, Ölkrisen und Reaktionen in der chemischen Industrie beider deutscher Staaten. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung wirtschaftlicher Leistungsdifferenzen, in: Johannes Bähr / Dietmar Petzina (eds.), Innovationsverhalten und Entscheidungsstrukturen. Vergleichende Studien zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung im geteilten Deutschland 1945 – 1990, Berlin 1996, pp. 109 – 138; Harm G. Schröter, Handlungspfadverengung bis zur “Selbstzerstörung”? Oder: Warum die chemische Industrie der DDR im Vergleich zu der der Bundesrepublik zwischen 1965 und 1990 so hoffnungslos veraltete, in: Lothar Baar / Dietmar Petzina (eds.), Deutsch-deutsche Wirtschaft 1945 – 1990. Strukturen, Innovationen und regionaler Wandel, St. Katharinen 1999, pp. 304 – 325. 22 Cf. Kazimierz Z. Poznanski, Poland’s Protracted Transition. Institutional Change and Economic Growth 1970 – 1994, Cambridge 1996; Olaf Klenke, Ist die DDR an der Globalisierung gescheitert? Autarke Wirtschaftspolitik versus internationale Weltwirtschaft – Das Beispiel Mikroelektronik, Frankfurt a. M. 2001. 23 For the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia see: Peter Hübner / Christa Hübner: Sozialismus als soziale Frage. Sozialpolitik in der DDR und Polen 1968 – 1976. Mit einem Beitrag von Christoph Boyer zur Tschechoslowakei, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2008.

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socialism – can be interpreted as a manifestation of the failed adaptation of the centrally planned and administered economies to the globalization process which had gained speed since the 1970s. After 1989, the search for responses to the challenges of globalization was continued on the Western path. The conversion of the political systems in Eastern Europe starting in 1989 was interconnected with a far reaching process of liberalization and privatization. It ended up in a transformation of the former centrally planned systems into market economies. The newly emerging “varieties of capitalism” on the whole followed the European model to a wider extent and only to a lesser degree adhered to the American variant.24 Here is a sketch of the average development path: After the initial shock and after a drastic slump of production, the post-socialist economies were re-stabilized, growth set in again and foreign trade was on a large scale redirected towards the European market. On the whole, the principal systemic deficiencies of the state socialist economic order have been eliminated by this transformation, in the first place by dismantling the innovation blockades inherent in the centrally planned economy which had hampered the adaptation of the East to the third industrial revolution and prevented the full integration of the Eastern Central European countries into the global market. Inasmuch and at first sight, 1989 was a clear caesura on the Eastern path of development. But things look slightly different after giving it a closer look. Beyond and contrary to the manifest and in many respects indisputable success story of the liquidation of socialism, the notorious socio-economic asymmetries of longue durée between Europe-East and Europe-West re-emerged – or, maybe more exactly: persisted – after 1989. If state socialist dictatorship can be interpreted as a strategy of development aimed at mitigating the historical inner-European WestEast bias, then it has to be seen that state socialism had in fact catapulted the agrarian countries of the region into industrial modernity – but this had always been a crippled and, compared to the West, relative modernity, for instance regarding productivity, technological innovation and material achievements (not to mention civil society as the epitome of cultural modernity). After the end of this “distorted” socialist modernity, the historical bias between the center and the periphery, i. e. between the West and the East of Europe, as well as the traditional manifestations of economic dependence became more obvious again. The banking networks of Eastern Central Europe, e. g., were built by German, Austrian or other Western European banks. But above all, the Eastern Central European economies very soon became the “prolonged workbench” of multinational companies. They offered a big pool of relatively cheap, yet at the same time well trained and disciplined labor 24 Cf. Dorothee Bohle / Béla Greskovits, Neoliberalismus, eingebetteter Neoliberalismus und Neo-Korporatismus: Sozialistische Hinterlassenschaften, transnationale Integration und die Diversität osteuropäischer Kapitalismen, in: Dieter Segert (ed.), Postsozialismus. Hinterlassenschaften des Staatssozialismus und neue Kapitalismen in Europa, Wien 2007, pp. 185 – 205.

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“right in front of the house door”; this enabled a considerable cutback of production costs in a manufacture process which was more and more organized in global contexts. Neglecting all distinctions between the divergent development paths of the Eastern European countries,25 it can be said that, from the 1990s of the 20th century onwards, a race to the bottom has indeed taken place in the East regarding social standards, resulting in the formation of a peripheral zone of business-friendly governments where trade unions are weak and salaries are lower than in the West, but investment is higher and – admittedly – so are economic growth rates. This implies that, given a closer look, the Eastern European development path is characterized by striking long-term continuities: It appears to lead from the periphery back to the periphery,26 only since recently it does so under the cloak and within the framework of “Europe”.27 In this context, it is essential to note that the economic problems of post-socialist societies are, as it were, arranged in different layers which are intertwined in reality but can be separated analytically. Firstly, the transaction costs, i. e. the necessary and probably unavoidable frictions of the institutional change as such, are to be mentioned. But secondly, the problems appear to be intensified by the above-mentioned old – and new – peripheral status of the region, i. e. the historically rooted relative underdevelopment which was not entirely overcome during the socialist era. Additionally, a third and very important layer of problems results from the fact that the former state socialist countries changed over to the Western European path and founded democracies and market-economies in a period in which the Western path itself and the system of socio-economic and political coordinates as such and at large had considerably changed under the impact of globalization.28 It is certainly true that Western economies and societies were also exposed to globalization. But they had been able to live through a long phase of economic growth, stabilization and consolidation in the relatively “happy” Keynesian trente glorieuses;

25 There is already a rich literature on the specific development paths of the countries in question. The main difference seems to be the one between Poland and Hungary on the one hand and Czechoslovakia / the Czech Republic on the other. In the Czech case, economic and social turbulences were, for reasons not to be discussed here, avoided to a much greater extent than in Poland and Hungary. Cf., in very strict selection: Mitchell Orenstein, Transitional Social Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland, in: Sociologicky´ casopis 3 (1995), 2, pp. 179 – 196; Alfio Cerami, Central Europe in Transition: Emerging Models of Welfare and Social Assistance, MPRA Paper No. 8377 (posted on 22. 04. 2008); Pieter Vanhuysse, Czech Exceptionalism? A Comparative Political Economy Interpretation of Post Communist Policy Pathways, 1989 – 2004, in: Sociologicky´ casopis 42 (2006), 6, pp. 1115 – 1136; Tomasz Inglot, Welfare States in East Central Europe, 1919 – 2004, Cambridge / New York 2008. 26 Cf. Iván T. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944 – 1993. Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery, Cambridge 1998. 27 This is the line of argument in Perry Anderson’s furious, still rather new but already classical essay “Depicting Europe”, in: London Review of Books, 20. 09. 2007. 28 Cf. Michael Ehrke, Das neue Europa: Ökonomie. Politik und Gesellschaft des postkommunistischen Kapitalismus, in: Europäische Politik 9 (2004), pp. 1 – 12.

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they had been able to build modern and innovative production capacities ready for international competition as well as social security systems which suffered from certain cutbacks from the 1970s onwards, but were able to protect the population against the risks of globalization to a large extent.

c) Comparative perspective As mentioned above, the bipolar pattern (“East – West”) is quite crude, but it is useful as a frame of reference which enables comparisons. Below the level of the macro-models, there is a great variety of sub-variants shaped by specific national, regional and local power structures and political cultures, mentalities and value orientations – “special circumstances” which cause “deviations” from the overall path. This perspective opens the gates to a broad field of comparative research into the “varieties of capitalism”.29 In this context, the strategies, the social profiles, the qualifications and the social integration mechanisms of the economic elites are of central importance. We will have to return to this point. As regards subcutaneous similarities and functional equivalents, it is important to note that both macro-models were challenged by the third industrial revolution. But socialist attempts at “intensification” always took place within the framework of a central administrative economy; therefore, all socialist reforms tended to be half-hearted and short-winded. Economic reforms which contained the danger of transcending the power system, i. e. endangering the supremacy of the party, were taboo; so was unemployment. The price to be paid for these structural rigidities was intrinsic stagnation and foreign indebtedness, in the long run the breakdown of the system. The West reacted by relatively quick and thorough technical and economic change. Here, the price to be paid – i. e. the functional equivalent – was mass unemployment (combined with the taboo of giving up full employment as a political goal) followed by growing social insecurity. Secondly, a growing structural tension between the capacities of the welfare state and its economic and financial basis existed in both systems. There was, moreover, a growing tension between the capacities of the welfare state on the one hand and the demands of the population on the other. There were great expectations – which could not be markedly or even radically reduced. In both systems, the elites were doomed to seek mass adherence through mass consumption. Thirdly: The room for maneuvre of both the capitalist as well as the socialist national state was signifi29 Most significant contributions to this lively debate are: Michel Albert, Capitalism contre Capitalism [Capitalism versus Capitalism], Paris 1991; Eyal / Szelényi / Townsley, Making Capitalism (fn. 6); David Stark / László Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe, Cambridge 1998; Herbert Kitschelt et al. (eds.), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Cambridge 1999; Peter A. Hall / David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford 2001; Segert, Postsozialismus (fn. 24).

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cantly reduced. The latter was penetrated and at least partially deprived of power by the international financial markets; in the end, it was paralyzed by the overwhelmingly superior economic performance of the West. Western governments were also paralyzed or at least weakened by multinational companies and the global financial system and seemingly handed considerable parts of their economic and political power over to transnational business elites. In both cases, there were determinants outside the system which could no longer be controlled by the “national high commands”. With a bird’s eye view and from a higher level of abstraction, socialist and capitalist states, economies and societies have been confronted with rather similar challenges. Their answers were certainly different – but not different in category or kind. Ergo one cannot speak of a “capitalist” or “communist” crisis; the crisis seems to be common to all European industrial societies. Technically speaking, after the end of Communism in 1989 / 90, the countries of Eastern and Eastern Central Europe have moved over to the Western development path. The Western model has proved to be more successful in adapting to the challenges of the third industrial revolution and globalization; so far, it has undoubtedly achieved better results. But the question is open if this will hold true for the longue durée of the 21st century. This also implies a re-interpretation of “1989” which reduces, at least to a certain degree, the importance of this global turning-point.

III. Economic elites and socio-economic transformation in the late 20th century 1. Elite concepts Dealing with European economic elites in the context of the two macro-models, one crucial question arises almost immediately: Is it possible to speak of “elites” in both cases, irrespective the different contexts in Western and Eastern Europe? The classics of elite theory – Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels – were convinced that a universal access to the elite problem is possible because the rivalry between elites and counter elites is eternal. Struggle for mass leadership is a social and political universal constant, as it were; it is independent from the nature of the political system. But this theorem has been shaken: For modern sociologists in Western Europe, the relations and, even more, the tensions between “elites” and “democracy” were and still are of far greater importance than the universal approach: “Does democracy need elites and is it able to bear them?” This was the main question for sociologists like e. g. Otto Stammer, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Wolfgang Zapf in Germany. In addition to the traditional research questions – the ruling class and the sources of their power – problems such as the patterns of recruitment, qualifications and career paths, social openness / closure, and, last but not least, the problem of demo-

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cratic legitimacy became relevant; functional differentiation and social integration became the new leading theoretical categories.30 Quite typically, only very few elite studies refer to the authoritarian regimes in Portugal, Spain and Greece. Thus, since the 1960s, the predominant approach of Western elite research has been the study of “functional elites”, focusing on “formal parameters” like qualifications and career patterns, at the same time neglecting qualitative aspects such as personal competences, mentalities and value orientations beyond the political sphere. Functionalists have also tried to abstain from being “normative” – with the long term effect of provoking today’s intensive public criticism of the loss of ethical values among the elites.31 Behind the Iron Curtain, in the Eastern European societies under Soviet hegemony, elites were considered to be a mere remnant of bourgeois society. Nevertheless, the ruling Communist parties also needed leading personnel for the top ranks of the “new society”, to run the party, the state and its administration, to control and to run not only the economy but practically all spheres of society. They tried to meet these needs by building up a “cadre nomenclature”. The nomenclature was meant as a safeguard for the power of the Communist party in all sectors, segments and niches of society. As a result of this raison d’être of the cadres, their recruitment, their education, and their deployment in the bureaucratic apparatus were to be planned centrally. The intended and, in the end, the actual outcome was a completely new stratum in the respective societies: The cadres belonged to an “administrative service class” (administrative Dienstklasse), which was politically loyal and technically qualified at the same time. Since the late 1950s, careers outside the nomenclature system were almost inconceivable. The existence of the monolithic nomenclature system fostered and still fosters doubts as to whether the concepts of modern “Western” elite sociology are applicable to socialist societies. But there seems to be a way out in respect to these conceptual problems: The sociologist Stefan Hornbostel has plausibly argued that both Western and Eastern systems have their foundations in modern bureaucracies and that modern bureaucracies require functional elites.32 In the meantime, a considerable number of empirical studies has corroborated and consolidated this interpretation. They allow for even further-reaching conclusions: It is certainly true on the one hand that, as a consequence of the ruling ideology, state socialist societies were characterized by a relatively high degree of – forced – political integration. But, on 30 For an overview of recent theoretical and empirical sociological debates, see: Stefan Hradil / Peter Imbusch (eds.), Oberschichten – Eliten – Herrschende Klassen, Opladen 2003. 31 This is a hypothesis formulated by Herfried Münkler / Matthias Bohlender / Grit Straßenberger, Einleitung, in: Herfried Münkler / Grit Straßenberger / Matthias Bohlender (eds.), Deutschlands Eliten im Wandel, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2006, pp. 11 – 24, here p. 8. 32 See Stefan Hornbostel (ed.), Sozialistische Eliten. Horizontale und vertikale Differenzierungsmuster in der DDR, Opladen 1999. For both an informative overview and review of elite research in Eastern Europe: Heinrich Best / Ulrike Becker (eds.), Elites in Transition. Elite Research in Central and Eastern Europe, Opladen 1997.

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the other hand and simultaneously, as a result of the growing pressure for external economic adjustment from the late 1960s onwards, socialist societies were pushed on a path of intensive economic growth on the basis of new technologies and new, sciences-based industries. It has already been said that they did not get very far on this path. But raising the level of socio-economic complexity implied raising the level of functional differentiation once again. Thus, homogenization for political reasons led – in the long run and to a certain, if relatively moderate extent – back to social re-differentiation.33 This was, ironically enough, the unintended outcome of the story. In particular, subcutaneous tensions between the political power elite in the stricter sense of the concept and the economic or politico-economic elites in a narrower sense – i. e. the elite segment which ran the economy – arose in the 1980s. In the end, and as a response to these problems, certain functional elements were added to the socialist system – elements which were, at least in principle, contrary to the logic of this system: for example, horizontal informal arrangements or compensatory networks. It can be argued that this tendency towards a re-differentiation of the economic subsystem was the first step on the route towards a renaissance of more independent economic elites. This did not happen everywhere and with equal intensity. But at the least we are able to trace this process in Poland and Hungary during the late 1980s. To sum up: Bureaucratic rule is at the core of Western as well as Eastern politics. Processes of functional and social differentiation can be observed in socialist as well as in Western democratic societies. This diagnosis should encourage us to tackle comparisons which transcend the frontiers of the systems. Democracies cannot work without efficient leadership groups – “whatever they are called, however they are educated and recruited, and whenceever they get their legitimation”.34 Obviously, dictatorship of the authoritarian or socialist kind cannot function without them either. Following this system-transcending perspective and preferring a broad historical approach that comprises economic as well as social and cultural aspects, the present volume uses a very general definition of the term “economic elites” to describe a probably ubiquitous phenomenon: It is used to designate a subset of the elites in a society; the members of this subset hold leading positions in the economy imbued with considerable capabilities to define, shape and move things; and they are – not in all, but in many cases – closely interconnected by social networks. It is not possible to precisely delimitate this subset in relation to other segments of the elites, for instance the political-administrative, military, scientific, mediarelated or cultural elites – there is considerable overlap. Thus the economic elites comprise a more or less coherent group of persons or individual persons active as 33 Cf. Frank Ettrich, Differenzierung und Eliten im Staatssozialismus, in: Historische Sozialforschung / Historical Social Research 28 (2003), 1 / 2, pp. 31 – 56. 34 Paul Noack, Elite und Massendemokratie. Der Befund und die deutsche Wirklichkeit, in: Hatschikjan / Altmann, Eliten im Wandel (fn. 6), pp. 15 – 32, here p. 32.

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bearers, users and administrators of economic and thus at least indirectly also political and social power within businesses, but also in the corporative or state administration of the economy (such as associations and chambers) on the one hand, or within the apparatus of centrally administered economies and at the plant level or above on the other hand. Handling economic power usually entails considerable social prestige, yet cases of economic failure can quickly lead to a loss of status. Most contributions in this volume will first cover the economic elites as “objective associates” due to their position; in a second step they may also be interpreted in a larger sense as “subjectively assigned”, i. e. as persons perceived – by participants and bystanders – as belonging to the ensemble of the owners, users and administrators of leading positions in the economy. This does not necessarily imply that these persons or groups associated with or assigned to the economic elites have to be understood as members of a “true” achievement elite in a normative sense, i. e. as such persons distinguished by genuinely outstanding capabilities and actually accomplished “achievements” (and not merely by “successfully” having reached an elite position). The contributions to this volume cover (sometimes repeated) institutional upheaval and substitution of elites in different Western and Eastern European societies; they also assume a close interdependence between the economic elites and their respective institutional environment: On the one hand, they suppose that the political and economic institutions generate economic elites specific to their respective supply of positions through selection and socialization. On the other hand, these elites represent the institutions by which they have been selected and socialized. Simultaneously the opposite is also being inferred, namely that the respective bearers of the positions at least potentially possess the personal resources, value system and social networks, if not to control, then at least to influence and redesign their institutional environment.35

35 This is contrary to Karl Ulrich Mayer’s pronounced thesis formulated in view of the cross-social elite of the current Federal Republic of Germany: he disputes “that members of the leadership personnel or prominent persons can resort to personal resources, value systems and social networks which are not derived from their institutional environment and their participation through their position.” For “an actual description of current society”, Mayer therefore recommends not to develop any ambitious elite models and instead urgently advocates verifying whether control of German society is not instead characterized by functionally and institutionally differentiated subsystems, the executives of which primarily embody and represent the ideas of their institution (next to their always present interests in self-promotion, career, prestige and increases in income). Thus according to Meyer, talk of “real” elites is out of the question. It would doubtlessly be rewarding to check his thesis, but for the contributions in this volume, which also cover other European societies and historical contexts, it is too closely focussed. Compare Karl Ulrich Mayer, Abschied von den Eliten, in: Münkler / Straßenberger / Bohlender, Deutschlands Eliten im Wandel (fn. 31), pp. 455 – 479, here p. 466.

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2. European economic elites: some “long lines” of development If one looks at the development of European economic elites from a long-term perspective covering the late 19th far into the 20th century, as for instance Dieter Ziegler and Ágnes Pogány do in the present volume, one observation is particularly prevalent: For a long time, the extent to which economic elites engaged in selfrecruitment – in other words, the high degree of closure against social climbers – was notably high both in Western as well as in Eastern European societies. One of the fundamental reasons for this is the successful transformation of privileged positions of feudal-aristocratic as well as of bourgeois origin, sometimes over many generations in the same family, into just as privileged positions in the commercial-industrial as well as the modern banking and finance sectors during the socio-economic structural change of the first and second industrial revolutions. During these periods and supported by material – agrarian, but especially commercial, industrial and financial – resources, an in many cases noteworthy accumulation of economic power occurred, often closely connected with an increase in political clout, social prestige and cultural capital in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense. It was possible to pass on such “vested rights” within families from generation to generation. In particular, company founders and their families, who tried to retain ownership and control of their growing companies themselves, even if this called for ever growing demands on strategic, functional and operative management, provided for a high degree of self-recruitment and of continuity for the economic elites by preferring to draw on family members and trusted persons.36 The emerging family dynasties were strongly centered on the “patriarch” and developed into the supporting pillars for instance of the French classe dominante, the Anglo-Saxon upper class and the German Großbürgertum. The social connections of these new economic upper classes with the feudal-aristocratic elites remained strongest where large-scale land holdings and agriculture retained their importance the longest, ergo in the agrarian economies of South-Western, Southern, East-Central and South-Eastern Europe such as in Portugal, Spain and on Sicily, but also in Poland and Hungary. The lifestyle of this new industrial economic elite was also – at least partially – orientated towards the pre-modern, agrarian-feudal world, for instance when established Hungarian industrialists of urban petite bourgeoisie origin acquired landed property to conduct prestigious hunting invitations to extend their social networks. Yet the high extent of self-recruitment cannot only be attributed to the inherited material wealth accumulated over generations within certain families as such; this wealth also provided markedly improved preconditions for the acquisition of indi36 Cf. Andrea Colli, The History of Family Business 1850 – 2000, Cambridge 2003; Harold James, Family Capitalism: Wendels, Haniels, Falcks, and the Continental European Model, Cambridge (Mass.) 2006; Michael Schäfer, Familienunternehmen und Unternehmerfamilien. Zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der sächsischen Unternehmen 1850 – 1940, München 2007.

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vidual education and qualifications as well as the internalization of certain value systems and cultural codes which allowed for the rehearsal and simultaneously the external signalling of personal membership in the economic elite and thus had a reinforcing effect. The ever increasing division of ownership and management in large concerns made social origins from higher, well-off strata with their quasi automatically improved preconditions for higher education and successful socialization in the elites come to the fore even more. Yet, there was no complete substitution of family-run by manager-run capitalism in Europe; it seems as if there will be a durable co-existence of both forms, albeit with a certain shift from owner-run to manager-run concerns.37 Not just in France, Germany and Italy, but also for example in Scandinavia, the influence of the most important family dynasties on industrial concerns remains markedly high to this day.38 One aspect in which the individual European countries differ greatly was and still is the actual organization of the education and socialization of professional managers. In France and Britain exclusive educational institutions such as the grandes écoles, the public schools and especially elite universities play an important role. They distinguish themselves by elite performance demands and high fees. Both prerequisites do not make an upper class parentage necessary, but at least it is very conducive. Where such exclusive institutions of education do not exist, in many cases strongly excluding procedures are practiced at the universities, for instance in Spain. In addition to their selective function, exclusive institutions of education as well as excluding selection procedures serve an important function of socialization: They lay the foundations for the emergence of an esprit de corps and personal, trust-based networks which often show a lifelong persistence and provide a sizeable contribution to the social homogenization and integration of the economic elites. These “old boy” networks – to this day there are hardly any “girls” among them39 – also serve as informal power networks in which the career possibilities of the succeeding generation of candidates are in a way decided. The reach of these networks differs in the individual countries: In Britain for example, they are mostly limited to the economy, whereas in France and Spain they also include the state administration as well as state-owned and private companies; in this manner they support osmosis between these two fields – and thus also promote homogeneity of the elites, which is important to pushing through their interests in society. 37 Cf. Randall K. Morck (ed.), A History of Corporate Governance around the World. Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, Chicago 2005. 38 Cf. Haldor Byrkjeflot et al. (eds.), Scandinavian Management Revisited. Nordic Industrial Elites Facing the Democratic Challenge, Bergen 2001; Jette Schramm-Nielsen / Peter Lawrence / Karl Henrik Sivesind, Management in Scandinavia: Culture, Context and Change, Cheltenham 2004. 39 Cf. Mino Vianello / Gwen Moore (eds.), Gendering Elites: Economic and Political Leadership in 27 Industrialized Societies, Houndmills / New York 2000; Vianello / Moore, Women and Men (fn. 5); Susan Vinnicombe et al. (eds.), Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: Research and Practice, Basingstoke / London 2008.

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It is striking that chances to rise into the economic elites are also considerably higher for persons with an upper middle or upper class background than for those from working or lower middle class backgrounds even in countries which do not traditionally possess exclusive educational institutions for the elites, such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg as well as Germany, Austria and Italy.40 And this seems to be true even independently of formal degrees of education, the importance of which generally grew at least until the middle of the 1990s.41 If one compares the doctorate cohorts of 1955, 1965 and 1975 in the Federal Republic of Germany for example, the relative chances of graduates from the upper middle and upper bourgeoisie to rise to a leading business position even improved over time. For upper middle class graduates they were 70 percent, for upper bourgeoisie even 150 percent higher than for those completing their doctorate who had a working class or lower middle class background.42 Essentially this can be attributed to the recruiting practices of the companies themselves. It is disputed whether a stratumspecific habitus, which particularly favors candidates from the same upper middle class background as the selectors,43 or merit criteria play the mayor role.44 A third, intermediary position assumes that the attribution of achievement contains an increasing amount of “habitus components” in periods of accelerated changes in 40 Cf. for instance: Gerbert G. Beekenkamp, President-directeuren, posities en patronen. Een studie naar de rekrutering van de leiders van de 250 grootste ondernemingen in Nederland [President-directeuren, Positions and Patrons. A Study on the Recruitment of the Leading Personnel of the 250 Biggest Companies in the Netherlands], Amsterdam 2002; Michael Hartmann, Der Mythos von den Leistungseliten. Spitzenkarrieren und soziale Herkunft in Wirtschaft, Politik, Justiz und Wissenschaft, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2002; Alberto Rinaldi, Entrepreneurs and Managers (1913 – 1972), in: Renato Giannetti / Michelangelo Vasta (eds.), Evolution of Italian Enterprises in the 20th Century, Heidelberg / New York 2006, pp. 239 – 263. 41 Cf. Michelle Jackson / John Goldthorpe / Colin Mills, Education, Employers and Class Mobility, in: Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 23 (2005), 1, pp. 3 – 33. 42 Hartmann, Mythos (fn. 40), pp. 202 – 205; Mayer, Abschied (fn. 35), p. 475. 43 This is the main argument of Michael Hartmann. See for instance: Michael Hartmann, Class-specific Habitus and the Social Reproduction of the Business Elites in Germany and France, in: The Sociological Review 48 (2000), 2, pp. 241 – 261. 44 Mayer emphasizes this in Abschied (fn. 35), pp. 476 / 477 (he uses Hartmann’s data, but interprets it in a different way). Werner Plumpe and Christian Reuber also argue that staff selection for executive positions in large German concerns primarily follows rational and entrepreneurial reasoning and also takes the internal company record of the applicant into account; they do not consider class-specific habitus decisive. Cf. the conference report by Marie-Christine Potthoff on the conference “Bürgertum und Bürgerlichkeit im 20. Jahrhundert in internationaler Perspektive”, which took place between October 26th and 28th 2007 in Loccum: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=1922 (accessed on 11. 3. 2009). In his study on the course of professional careers of engineers and business economists in Switzerland, Felix Bühlmann also emphasizes that they are primarily founded on personal achievements and follow regulated, hierarchical patterns within the company. Cf. Felix Bühlmann, The Corrosion of Career? Occupational Trajectories of Business Economists and Engineers in Switzerland, in: European Sociological Review 24 (2008), 5, pp. 601 – 616.

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society.45 Switzerland deviates somewhat from the described pattern; its economic elite is less socially exclusive.46 The economic elites of Scandinavia also display greater social openness. This is probably connected with the large number of state or cooperative businesses there, the recruiting practice of which favors candidates from the working class and the petite bourgeoisie.47 Even the World Economic Crisis and the Second World War were not capable of lastingly impairing the high self-recruitment rate of European economic elites – this is true quite independently of whether a country stayed neutral during the War, whether it was occupied by Germany and pressured into economic collaboration or not and finally, whether it was among the winners or losers of the War. Even in Germany, which was particularly racked by political and societal upheaval during the first half of the 20th century, there was no marked change of the elites (especially not in the economic field) in the West at the end of Nazi rule; however, the Jewish members of the German economic elite had been almost completely ousted.48 Also, neither the interventions of the National Socialists nor the denazification proceedings initiated by the Allies exhibited any important long-term effects. The only ones who were once again excluded from the economic elite were the upstarts of the Nazi period who had owed their rise to their close connections to the Nazi Party and simultaneously did not possess an upper middle class background.49 Despite the political caesura of 1945, the social physiognomy of the economic elites, their bourgeois family background and their bourgeois attitude towards life were conserved in almost all Western European countries. This mostly seems to be 45 Cf. Martin Diewald, Was ist Leistung, was ist Schließung? Anforderungen an Eliten und deren Rekrutierung, in: Weiterentwicklung der Reichtumsberichterstattung der Bundesregierung. Dokumentation des Experten-Workshops am 29. November 2006 in Berlin. Veranstaltung des Bundesministerums für Arbeit und Soziales. Durchführung und Dokumentation: Institut für Sozialforschung und Gesellschaftspolitik (ISG) in Kooperation mit DIW Berlin, Köln 2007, pp. 117 – 131. 46 Cf. Sandra Rothböck / Stefan Sacchi / Marlis Buchmann, Die Rekrutierung der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und wissenschaftlichen Eliten in der Schweiz, in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 25 (1999), pp. 459 – 496. 47 Cf. for instance: Peter Munk Christiansen / Birgit Møller / Lise Togeby, Den danske elite [The Danish Elite], København 2001; Trygve Gulbrandsen et al., Norske makteliter [Norwegian Power Elites], Oslo 2002. 48 Cf. Volker R. Berghahn, Unternehmer und Politik in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt a. M. 1985; Hervé Joly, Großunternehmer in Deutschland. Soziologie einer industriellen Elite 1933 – 1989, Leipzig 1998; Dieter Ziegler (ed.), Großbürger und Unternehmer. Die deutsche Wirtschaftselite im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2000; Volker R. Berghahn / Stefan Unger / Dieter Ziegler (eds.), Die deutsche Wirtschaftselite im 20. Jahrhundert. Kontinuität und Mentalität, Essen 2003; Martin Münzel, Die jüdischen Mitglieder der deutschen Wirtschaftselite 1927 – 1955. Verdrängung – Emigration – Rückkehr, Paderborn 2006. 49 As an instructive example see Ralf Ahrens, Der Exempelkandidat. Die Dresdner Bank und der Nürnberger Prozess gegen Karl Rasche, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 52 (2004), 4, pp. 637 – 670.

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due to the professional demands of functional elites. Additionally it becomes clear that exclusivity based on adequate education and socialization as well as distinction towards other social strata had produced a deeply rooted esprit de corps, which was neither seriously affected by shifts towards proletarianization during the interwar period nor by the levelling tendencies of the redistributive welfare state after 1945. It was precisely this esprit de corps which achieved a high degree of social homogeneity and cohesion within the economic elites, usually accompanied by a rather limited mobility between the different elite sectors of society, particularly between the economy and politics. In countries with high regional divergence of economic stages of development such as in Spain with its traditional dominance of the Catalonian and Basque economies as well as in Italy with its highly industrialized North and the agrarian South, homogeneity and cohesion were of course less pronounced than in other countries. The outlined tendencies towards a high self-recruitment rate and the relatively tight-knit social closure of the economic elites can also be found in Eastern and Eastern Central Europe since the late 19th century – albeit with some peculiarities.50 In the incomplete national societies of the region, the economic elites were often not autochthonous and instead belonged to ethnic and religious minorities; this was particularly true for German and Jewish entrepreneurs, for instance in Poland or in Austria-Hungary.51 Often they held key economic positions there and therefore often came into a position of resentment-charged distance towards majority society. However they overwhelmingly cooperated with the autochthonous economic elites in common elite networks. This is particularly true of the economic elites in the multi-national Habsburg Empire.52 These networks were neither ethnically nor religiously homogeneous: Nevertheless, their members enjoyed intensive mutual business contacts and also moved in the same private circles. Even in the age of growing economic nationalism, stratum-specific cultural imprinting and especially common economic interests prevailed over ethnic and religious cleavages.53 After the First World War there were certain power shifts in the new Eastern Central European national states towards the economic elites of the majority populations – yet the fundamental consensus and the far-reaching socio-cultural homogeneity of the economic elite persisted during the inter-war 50 Cf. Vera Bácskai (ed.), Bürgertum und bürgerliche Entwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa, 2 Volumes, Budapest 1986. 51 Iván T. Berend, Decades of Crisis. Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, Berkeley / Los Angeles / London 1998, pp. 32 – 40. 52 Cf. Christoph Boyer, Nationale Kontrahenten oder Partner? Studien zu den Beziehungen zwischen Tschechen und Deutschen in der Wirtschaft der CSR (1918 – 1938), München 1999; Boris Barth et al. (eds.), Konkurrenzpartnerschaft. Die deutsche und die tschechoslowakische Wirtschaft in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Essen 1999. 53 Cf. Helga Schultz / Eduard Kubu (eds.), History and Culture of Economic Nationalism in East Central Europe, Berlin 2006; Ágnes Pogány / Eduard Kubu / Jan Kofman (eds.), Für eine nationale Wirtschaft. Ungarn, die Tschechoslowakei und Polen vom Ausgang des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, Berlin 2006.

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period. The Czechoslovak example for instance shows that national political faults could be over-arched by supranational interests, action and profit coalitions of the entrepreneurial elites.

3. Economic elites in the context of the two early post-war macro-models a) The Western macro-model The democratic, Keynesian neo-corporatist macro-model proved to be extremely conducive to the continuity, stability and cohesion of the economic elites. This configuration had developed during Western European reconstruction and was based on a traditionally strong corporatism – for instance in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, but also in the Scandinavian countries – and had developed a bent towards more liberalization through the support of the American European Recovery Program (ERP), but simultaneously retained a regulative paradigm explicitly orientated towards social reconciliation of interests and the reduction of social tensions. Within this given framework, the room for maneuvre for the economic elites was not so much structured by cartels, but still exhibited close capital and personal connections between companies, which was expressed by a high density of interlocking directorates between the boards of directors, supervisors and administrators. These network structures mirrored the high concentration of ownership and a close interconnection of banks and industrial concerns in most Western European countries; Britain and the Netherlands with their wide distribution of shareholding in the population were a marked exception. Especially in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, the banks were at least intermediately involved in the leadership of industrial share complexes through proportionate board of directors’ seats. The high density of the networks served as a mutual control mechanism; the remarkable stability of the relationships simultaneously favored the formation of personal trust. The flip side of such a trust-based control mechanism was and is the tendency towards the formation of cliques, the potential neglect of the interests of small shareholders and sometimes even favoritism towards corruption. Since Keynesian neo-corporatist societies and their economies were nation-state entities, so were the networks of their economic elites. In some cases such as in the “alpine redoubt” Switzerland, as the article by Thomas David et al. shows, a clear intention to exclude potential non-Swiss and particularly “Teutonic” network partners is visible. In some Western European countries, in which there was a high degree of state intervention in the economy which sometimes even included extensive state shareholdings in companies, the economic elites were not only closely connected with each other, but also with the respective state elites. This was particularly true for France, where the graduates were educated together for both the civil service and the economy at the grandes écoles as a sort of noblesse d’État,54 to which both the

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state and economic functional elites belonged. Changing from the civil service to the economy with its many state-run enterprises and vice versa were part of an old tradition, as Hervé Joly shows in his article; the survival of this practice was favored by the fact that the prestigious state grands corps could not offer enough open positions for all the graduates of the exclusive grandes écoles. As Christian Dirninger’s contribution shows, a similarly high state affinity of the economic elites existed in Austria, but here it was less founded on common paths of education and rather on extensive state ownership of leading concerns; additionally the influence of the national bank on the commercial banks was very strong. The Austrian elite networks and the corporatist elite consensus covered the government and parliament, nationalized industry, the national bank and the state influenced banking system as well as the “social partnership” (Sozialpartnerschaft) of the employer and employee organizations. In post-war Italy the situation was somewhat different: Here the rise of an economic planning elite can be observed; as the article by Fabio Lavista shows, it had its social basis both in state-run as well as in important privately owned big enterprise. Initially in the interest of reconstruction, but later also in the development of the Italian South, this well interconnected planning elite was generally open to state interventionism; it approved of a strong role for state enterprises in the execution of national and regional economic planning. However, it only represented part of the Italian economic elite, which as a whole was far more heterogeneous than for example the West German economic elite. An even more divergent variant of the Western macro-model is authoritarian corporatism as practiced in Spain and Portugal until the democratic revolutions of the mid-1970s. Within the context of an authoritarian state-planned modernization after the Second World War, a rather sleek, very technocratic and socially closed off economic elite arose. Unlike the “old” industrial countries of Western Europe, the modernization strategy of the state was less aimed at reconstruction, but rather towards catching up with industrialization. In Salazar’s Portugal, state intervention and capital concentration allowed the rising technocratic “modernizers” of urban bourgeois origin to eclipse the traditional bourgeoisie, as Manuel Loff describes in this volume. Each under state control, the industrial, financial and banking as well as the military elites were closely interconnected; initially they also included the large-scale landholders. During the final years of Salazarism, the so-called “Salazarism without Salazar” under Marcello Caetano, the young, ambitious industrial technocrats came even more to the fore, while they withdrew for a time in the revolutionary era; after the revolution they were able to assert their positions with surprising success and were able to rise even further during the “normalization” of the late 1970s.

54 Pierre Bourdieu, La noblesse d’État. Grandes écoles et esprit de corps [The Nobility of the State. Grandes Écoles and the Spirit of the Corps], Paris 1989.

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b) The Eastern macro-model While it can be said that the long lines of development were all in all undisturbed in the West by the caesura of 1945, the disruptions and replacement processes were much more marked in Eastern Central Europe, the forming zone of influence of state socialism, as the contributions of Ágnes Pogány, Zsuzsanna Varga as well as Libuše Macáková and Eduard Kubu vividly show. At first uniformly referred to as “people’s democracy”, this actually quite varied socialist transformation under Soviet hegemony in most affected countries included the extensive nationalization of industry and banking as well as the collectivization of agriculture; both were linked with a rigid denazification and cleansing of collaborators, which was also used as a political tool. The old bourgeois economic elites, the position of which was already weakened by the extermination of the Jewish bourgeoisie and the expulsion of the ethnically German bourgeoisie after the end of the Second World War, often decided to emigrate. Those who remained soon faced political and economic discrimination as well as legal persecution and social relegation. Thus an ideologically and conceptually founded, decided breach with the old elites was brought about in the state socialist countries; it was not abruptly executed, but successively resulted in the installation of a new economic elite which was part of the “administrative service class” of state socialism. Lasting survival was hardly possible for the old economic elites in the altered institutional context of Eastern European state socialism. Communist cadre policy was the driving force behind the – in comparison to the West – far reaching changing of elites in the state socialist countries, which had to – and ultimately did – “produce” a politically dependent administrative service class of economic cadres; they were loyal to the regime and qualified specifically for the centrally planned economy which was to be established. The most important commonality of the new required profile in all its national incarnations consisted of as much of a “proletarian” origin and socialization of the candidates as possible. Another key feature was the readiness to submit to the systematically organized continuous selection, education, formation and control process resulting from the comprehensive claim to power of the regime. For the same reason political reliability of the economic cadres was more important than their professional expertise – which was however always called for subcutaneously and allowed some “old” experts to preserve their positions for a while. Additionally the members of the economic elites had to exhibit a distinctly proletarian, non-bourgeois habitus, especially those whose origins did not meet the new social requirement profile, but who for pragmatic reasons remained in their positions for the time being. The emergence of a proletarian habitus was for instance brought about by deliberately low wages, which during the first years of transformation were below the wage level of skilled industrial workers. The economic elites were able to compensate for these losses of status at least partially through their relatively auspicious position in the informal networks of the planned economy, for example through better procurement chances in the grey and black markets. Heightened

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consumption and luxury goods of Western provenance were even purposefully used for social distinction. Already since the late 1950s and early 1960s, approximately parallel to the economic reform attempts of this time, the requirement profile towards the socialist economic elites changed and subsequently – concurrently with general generational change – so did their actual composition.55 If one tries to find the common denominator, the main target of the socialist reforms consisted in the transition from extensive growth, which had also marked the economic reconstruction of the post-war period here, but lost ever more of its drive, to intensive growth supported by new technologies and higher capital and work productivity. In the state socialist countries, one was conscious of the challenges posed by the technological changes in the Western industrialized societies early on.56 Accordingly the efforts in the Eastern Central European countries in the field of academic education were extensive; since the late 1950s, they bore the heading of “mobilization of the productive power of science”. The changes connected with the reforms were undoubtedly the most distinctive and lasting in Hungary: Here the “classical” communist economic cadres who had reached their positions during the socialist transformation were already replaced bit by bit by new individuals during the implementation of the social compromise enacted by János Kádár after the 1956 revolution – a trend which was strengthened after the economic reforms of 1968. Now, management skills and professionalism based on economic and technical expertise were just as important for the selection of the new economic leadership as political loyalty. The economic policy of Kádárism, which was directed at improving the standard of living, meant that the question of the professionalism of the leading personnel commanded much attention not just in the field of industry, but particularly in agriculture as a supporting pillar of Hungarian exports (and the connected acquisition of foreign currency). Those willing to rise through the ranks were no longer hindered by bourgeois or traditional farming origins, as Zsuzsanna Varga’s contribution on the development of the agrarian sector in Hungary shows. c) The comparative perspective If one attempts to identify commonalities between the economic elites in Western and Eastern Europe during the post-war period, first one has to emphasize that they were not active in completely different worlds; ultimately, both macro-models came from one and the same root, despite the declarations that they were polar opposites: Both were answers to the problems of liberal capitalism as it had emerged during the late 19th century; both tried to manage and balance or even eliminate 55 For the background of the reform policies cf. Christoph Boyer (ed.), Zur Physiognomie sozialistischer Wirtschaftsreformen. Die Sowjetunion, Polen, die Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, die DDR und Jugoslawien im Vergleich, Frankfurt a. M. 2007. 56 See Radovan Richta et al., Civilization at the Crossroads: Social and Human Implications of the Scientific and Technological Revolution, Sydney 1967.

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the capitalist crisis cycle. Both models sought to regulate, plan and transform society – albeit to a different degree. They wanted to advance industrial modernization and create prosperity for wide segments of the population; they converted these visions into politico-economic as well as socio-cultural strategies and programs. In both macro-models, this meant relatively close proximity to the state and a commitment of the economic elites to the “common good” – even if this was very differently defined. During the first post-war decades, not only the economic cadres dependent on the state parties of the Eastern European states, but also the Western economic elites in the democratic and authoritarian states were more open to the idea of planning and state interventionism than they had been before the two World Wars. For the economic elites this simultaneously meant a strong orientation of their actions towards the respective national framework. This was particularly true for the Eastern European economic elites, as COMECON proved to be only mildly integrative and traditional economic nationalism turned out to be highly persistent. But it was also at first true for the Western European economic elites, despite progressing integration through the EEC. Within the respective national borders, the economic elites – whether in the West or East – shared a relatively homogeneous social profile and they were – even though in very different ways – closely interconnected: via close capital and personnel interlinkage, particularly between banks and industry on the one hand, and via a central planning and control hierarchy and “public property” on the other hand. 4. Economic elites between a new spirit of capitalism and the erosion of state socialism a) Economic elites and the crisis of the Western macro-model With the crisis of the democratic, Keynesian neo-corporatist macro-model which emerged during the 1970s, and the subsequent “neo-liberal” turnaround in economic and financial policy of the 1980s especially connected with the names of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the framework and room for maneuvre also changed considerably for the companies and the economic elites in the Western market societies. As a trend, the state withdrew from economic control measures through planned programs as they had been practiced especially in France and Italy; this becomes particularly clear in the contributions by Hervé Joly and Fabio Lavista. In many Western European countries companies which had hitherto been state-owned were now privatized, also with the goal of speeding up structural change in favor of new branches of the economy which relied on innovative technologies.57 As Christian Dirninger demonstrates in his article on the Austrian case, the crisis of Austro-Keynesianism during the early 1980s led to the dismantling of 57 Cf. the instructive case study by Laurent Commaille, Das Ende des “französischen Modells”. Die Eisen- und Stahlindustrie im späten 20. Jahrhundert, in: Morten Reitmayer / Ruth Rosenberger (eds.), Unternehmen am Ende des “goldenen Zeitalters”. Die 1970er Jahre in unternehmens- und wirtschaftshistorischer Perspektive, Essen 2008, pp. 129 – 145.

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hitherto practiced anti-cyclical economic and financial interventionism; simultaneously this was the start of a broad privatization wave. In some Western European countries there were some – temporary – opposite reactions however: In Portugal during and immediately after the Carnation Revolution or in France under François Mitterrand’s government, some important large-scale enterprises were nationalized again or for the first time, so that state influence on the economy grew again. Generally this was also a test of political loyalty for the leading managers – and if they did not pass it, it could result in their replacement; this is particularly true for Portugal, where, as Manuel Loff describes, the revolution shook up the traditional oligarchic stratification of society and extended the recruitment base of the new “revolutionary economic elites” towards non-bourgeois circles. All in all however one can probably speak of a denationalization of the Western European economy during the 1980s which accelerated even further during the 1990s and also asserted itself in France and Portugal; here in particular one can observe managers changing over from the public to the re-privatized sector. In Portugal for instance it was the “Young Turks” of the Marcelismo of the late dictatorship who were initially supposed to form a bridge between private big enterprise and the authoritarian state bent towards industrial modernization; later they entered into key positions in public administration and state-owned businesses, but now they returned to the re-privatized or private economy. It has to be emphasized that the denationalization of the economy was accompanied by tough struggles of competing interests and went along with a change in paradigm regarding the very role of the state: The controlling and supplying state, which had at first guaranteed a still considerably high social benefits quota, ever more changed into an organization the primary purpose of which was seen in the activation of entrepreneurial initiative and personal responsibility in society. Many big businesses reacted to the – since the late 1960s – fading growth dynamic with a strategy of intensified product-related as well as geographic diversification. Just like in the United States since the 1920s, so-called conglomerates now also arose in Western Europe; they hoped to be able to deal with the crisis by the extension of their operating range as well as their product line-up, particularly into areas outside their particular sector of industry.58 In the field of organization this trend towards diversification led to a transition from a model of central corporate 58 Cf. Gareth P. Dyas / Heinz T. Thanheiser, The Emerging European Enterprise. Strategy and Structure in French and German Industry, London 1976; Ronnie Lessem / Fred Neubauer, European Management Systems. Towards Unity out of Cultural Diversity, London 1994; Roland Calori / Philippe de Woot (eds.), A European Management Model. Beyond Diversity, New York 1994; Jack Hayward (ed.), Industrial Enterprise and European Integration. From National to International Champions in Western Europe, Oxford 1995; Youssef Cassis, Big Business. The European Experience in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 1997; Margarita Dritsas / Terry Gourvish (eds.), European Enterprise: Strategies of Adaptation and Renewal in the Twentieth Century, Athens 1997; Richard Whittington / Michael C. J. Mayer, The European Corporation. Strategy, Structure, and Social Science, Oxford 2000; Harm G. Schröter, The European Enterprise. Historical Investigations into a Future Species, Berlin 2008. For a general definition of conglomerates, see: Stefan Laucher, Erfolgsfaktoren von Konglomeraten, Wiesbaden 2005, p. 1 und pp. 75 f.

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control, which relied only on a few larger functional units, to a model of similarly tight, but decentralized, divisionalized company management – companies now subdivided themselves according to the various product groups and geographical markets into smaller, generally more independent divisions; increasingly whole businesses or companies were bought up and integrated, even if they had little to do with the core competences of the concern.59 This development was obviously intensified by American consulting agencies who had been able to extend their business area on the Western European markets enormously since the 1960s; they did so comparatively early for instance in Britain, in other countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany they were only successful during the 1970s.60 However with this new multi-divisional organization structure, the companies also created units easily ready for future restructuring; similarly prospective buyers, investment bankers and financial investors were able to enter into the picture here.61 As was to become clear in the United States already during the late 1970s and in Western Europe since the middle of the 1980s, many of the diversified, divisionalized big concerns were not up to the challenges posed by the third industrial revolution and growing global competition, especially from Japan. By either restructuring again or by dissolution they contributed to the increasing “liquefaction” of the traditional business landscape and generated business for international investment bankers and investors as well as management consultants.62 Permanently flexible, quick-to-adapt organizational structures became the ideal of company organization. An instructive example for the disintegration of a major West German company is presented by Kim Christian Priemel in his article about the Flick concern. Priemel shows how a collection of factors caused its downfall, among them the fact that the responsible management only realized much too late that it was necessary to fundamentally reorganize and modernize the heavy industry concern due to the ongoing economic structural changes. The company management tried to catch up in an increasingly economically difficult environment by using concepts that fit the Zeitgeist well, i. e. they aimed at increasing the product line-up and the geo59 As instructive case studies cf. Geoffrey Jones / Peter Miskell, European Integration and Corporate Restructuring: the Strategy of Unilever, c. 1957 – c. 1990, in: Economic History Review 58 (2005), 1, pp. 113 – 139; Pierre-Antoine Dessaux / Jean-Philippe Mazaud, Hybridizing the Emerging European Corporation: Danone, Hachette, and the Divisionalization Process in France during the 1970s, in: Enterprise & Society 7 (2006), 2, pp. 227 – 265. 60 Cf. Matthias Kipping, American Management Consulting Companies in Western Europe, 1920 to 1990: Products, Reputation, and Relationships, in: Business History Review 73 (1999), 2, pp. 190 – 220; Christopher D. McKenna, The World’s Newest Profession. Management Consulting in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge 2006. 61 Cf. Daniel Baudru / Stéphanie Lavigne, Investisseur institutionnels et gouvernance sur le marché financier français [Institutional Investors and Governance in the French Financial Market], in: Revue d’économie financière 48 (2001), 3, pp. 91 – 105. 62 Cf. Gerald F. Davis / Kristina A. Diekmann / Catherine H. Tinsley, The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, in: American Sociological Review 59 (1994), 4, pp. 547 – 570.

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graphical diversification of the concern, but it did not rise up to the needs of the concern that had to be integrated and the measures quickly led to new difficult restructuring issues, which ultimately could not be dealt with. The entrepreneurial strategies in dealing with the crisis which had been rising since the 1970s also show one other general tendency apart from stronger diversification: Research and development as well as the transfer of knowledge between the economy and universities became ever more important in view of the technological challenges of the third industrial revolution. As Manuel Schramm shows in his contribution, this was generally recognized early on by West German company managements.63 Still companies and their managers did not succeed in fundamentally improving the transfer between the economy and universities, which had experienced an enormous expansion throughout Western and especially Northern Europe during the 1960s. Apart from big businesses – and obviously because of their current return to key competences – middle-sized and small businesses were able to survive and even more, they began to prosper again in almost all Western European industrial societies since the 1970s; obviously this was connected to their comparative advantages regarding flexibility and productivity.64 They were needed by the major concerns, who produced standardized bulk commodities, as suppliers and formed downright complementary networks. Also they were able to survive by adhering to niche strategies in smaller markets. The most important reason for the renaissance of smaller and middle-sized companies is probably the economic structural change, as their comparative advantages were particularly strong in the new and service industries: quick decision-making, high achievement motivation of the owners and the employees, quick adaptation to changes in the market and flexible specialization. Their high contribution to employment also made them interesting for state-run job market support programs. But if one takes a closer look, smaller and middlesized companies were a highly divergent lot, covering traditional retailers and export-orientated quality producers as well as highly innovative, quickly expanding computer and software producers. What consequences did these changes have for the economic elites? Firstly, the economic structural change generally led to a drop in positions and the influence of the representatives of the old industries, particularly in the mining, steel, shipbuilding and textile industries, while representatives of the new, technologically advanced industries, especially in the field of microelectronics, gained growing fields 63 Cf. also Manuel Schramm, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft in DDR und BRD. Die Kategorie Vertrauen in Innovationsprozessen, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2008. 64 Cf. Gary Loveman / Werner Sengenberger, The Re-emergence of Small-scale Production. An International Comparison, in: Small Business Economics 3 (1991), pp. 1 – 37; Hartmut Berghoff, Abschied vom klassischen Mittelstand. Kleine und mittlere Unternehmen in der bundesdeutschen Wirtschaft des späten 20. Jahrhundert, in: Berghahn / Unger / Ziegler, Die deutsche Wirtschaftselite (fn. 48), pp. 93 – 113; Francesca Carnevali, Europe’s Advantage: Banks and Small Firms in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy since 1918, Oxford 2005.

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of activity and therefore also additional weight. This is true for associations as well as for the political sphere and it increasingly upset the established and well balanced negotiation structures of corporatism. The practiced patterns of corporatist communication did not prove persistent in view of the mentality of the participants, and the polarization between the trade unions and the economic elites increased distinctly; in Germany for instance, it did so to a larger degree and earlier than in Norway.65 At the same time costs and rationalization put pressure on the companies and contributed to the change of the concept as well as the requirement profile of executive managers. Simply put one could say that the traditional profile of corporatism, which had been orientated towards a social reconciliation of interests, was ever more questioned and that general business management qualifications were now sought more than technical qualifications in many companies, especially in cases where mergers, takeovers and ever new restructuring had to be dealt with. However if one looks at technical qualifications more closely, an important distinction arises: While traditional engineering qualifications actually lost importance, new qualifications in information technologies, which were not limited to the level of products and production processes, but also contained considerable innovation potential on the level of company organization, gained a whole new standing. Juridical qualifications experienced a general loss of importance, also leading to a loss of significance of the overall conservative and state-friendly attitude of this occupation group as a uniting mentality of the economic elites and other social elites.66 Intensified competition and the necessity of stronger orientation towards the market did not pass over owner-operators and their management personnel (who were often recruited from among their family and friends) in middle-sized companies.67 Hitherto they had guarded their independence, but now, in order to keep up and to be able to invest in new, capital-intensive technologies, they had to open up not only to banks, venture capital companies and risk capital providers, but also to external economically trained management personnel and consultants. In this way short-term profit thinking also entered into this field. Simultaneously the heirs of many owner families were less and less eager to forgo their own life-plan beyond the traditions of the family – a growing concern for the continuity of companies and often the first trigger for a sale to one’s own manager or going public. The dissolution of divisionalized big companies, the additional trend towards the “liquefaction” of traditional company structures through digitalization and the waves of company launches in information technology, financial services, the 65 Cf. Trygve Gulbrandsen / Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, Consensus or Polarization? Business and Labour Elites in Germany and Norway, in: Comparative Social Research 23 (2007), pp. 103 – 135. 66 Michael Hartmann, Vermarktlichung der Elitenrekrutierung? Das Beispiel der Topmanager, in: Münkler / Straßenberger / Bohlender, Deutschlands Eliten im Wandel (fn. 31), pp. 431 – 454, here pp. 433 – 440; Mayer, Abschied (fn. 35), p. 463. 67 Cf. Katharina Bluhm / Rudi Schmidt (eds.), Change in SMEs. Towards a New European Capitalism?, Houndmills / Basingstoke 2008.

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media and consulting – all this led to a de-concentration of the traditionally closeknit capital and personal networks between banking and industrial concerns, which had also served as mutual control mechanisms regarding the managements of big businesses.68 Thomas David et al. demonstrate in detail how this dissolution process of the “classical network” worked in the Swiss case. The significance of conventional industrial credit business – which had often been connected with mutual capital participation – decreased for the banks; it was eclipsed by the rise of more internationally aligned investment banking according to the Anglo-Saxon model. The increasing alignment of banks and industry to the capital markets joined together with the changing of the entrepreneurial model hitherto predominant in continental Western Europe: Corporatism with its bent towards the social reconciliation of interests declined in favor of a new model of the manager which was orientated towards the capital markets. The current short-term development of the value of the company at the stock exchanges – shareholder value – moved to the center of attention. Long-term increases in value, technical quality, stable investor relationships as well as permanently secure job prospects for the employees became less important goals. To put it bluntly, the managers of Western European big businesses, who often only had been active in their positions since the generational change of the late 1960s, saw themselves less and less as executive employees and ever more as “brokers” of their company.69 An important reason for the accelerated change of the model of the Western European economic elites lies in the “pan-European” transformation problems of the 1990s which resulted from the collapse of the communist block and from intensified globalization. These problems increasingly challenged the previous practices of business management and control via grown, mostly nationally integrated networks of capital and individuals. Control of businesses by their principal stockholders – apart from family dynasties, these were mostly other public companies – provided relatively effective protection against external takeover attempts, but it also led to the broadening of the power of managers.70 For it was the employed managers of big businesses, who acted as the members of the supervisory and administrative boards within this model and thus executed owner control over other companies. For the critics this gain in power through tight networks of interlocking directorates was extraordinarily alarming. Thus they vehemently – and with growing success – called for the dissolution of traditional network structures. They considered control over the companies and their managers via the markets 68 Cf. – for the German example – Martin Fiedler, Zur Rolle des Vertrauens in der “Deutschland AG”: Verflechtungen zwischen Finanz- und Nichtfinanzunternehmen im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1 (2005), pp. 93 – 106. 69 Cf. – for the German example – Werner Plumpe, Das Ende des deutschen Kapitalismus, in: WestEnd. Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 2 (2005), 2, pp. 3 – 26, here p. 16. 70 Cf. Paul Windolf, Die neuen Eigentümer. Eine Analyse des Marktes für Unternehmenskontrolle, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 23 (1994), pp. 79 – 92; Jürgen Beyer, Managerherrschaft in Deutschland? “Corporate Governance” unter Verflechtungsbedingungen, Opladen 1998.

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– those for shares, those for managers and those for corporate control (the existence of which remains disputed to this day however) – much more efficient.71 Within the new neo-liberal context the networks founded on trust-based, mutual social control were ever more execrated as wheeling and dealing. In the United States, this change in the perception, evaluation and organization of corporate control already occurred during the 1980s and it continued in most Western European industrialized countries during the early 1990s, when criticism of the seemingly so powerful, but “incompetent” managers reached new heights in the face of the truly compelling transformation processes.72 What were the more extensive repercussions of the dissolution of the traditional capital interdependence and the personal networks on the social composition of the economic elites? The spread of the new model orientated towards shareholder value was mainly carried out by the economically trained managers of the financial and controlling departments of the companies. It is interesting that, parallel to the spread of this model, precisely these managers often rose to the position of chief executive in the executive boards at the company headquarters, closely followed by rising numbers of managers from the marketing and sales departments; often these businesses had reconstituted themselves as holding companies. In France for instance, as Hervé Joly’s article demonstrates, this development showed itself in the rising proportion of inspecteurs des Finances in corporate management, while the proportion of members of the engineering and technical grands corps fell since the late 1990s. Hitherto one had only encountered these experts in the financial sector and as financial directors of industrial concerns; now they advanced to the topmost position of président-directeur général (PDG). Such a change in favor of managers “orientated towards the financial markets” is also being discussed in view of Germany73 – and it seems to be coming about.74 71 Simultaneously they contributed to a shift in public debate away from the actual topic “How is it possible to control companies best?” to “Lame ducks in pinstripes” (Günter Ogger), i.e. the question of the personal inability and misconduct of managers. See Jürgen Beyer, Vom Netzwerk zum Markt? Zur Kontrolle der Managementelite in Deutschland, in: Münkler / Straßenberger / Bohlender, Deutschlands Eliten (fn. 31), pp. 177 – 198. 72 See Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control, Cambridge (Mass.) / London 1990; Michael Useem, Executive Defence: Shareholder Power and Corporate Reorganization, Cambridge 1993; Michael Useem, Investor Capitalism. How Money Managers are Changing the Face of Corporate America, New York 1996; Gerald F. Davis / Mark S. Mizruchi, The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial Banks in the U.S. System of Corporate Governance, in: Administrative Science Quarterly 44 (1999), 2, pp. 215 – 239; Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets – An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First Century Capitalist Societies, Princeton (NJ) 2001; Windolf, Corporate Networks (fn. 5); Jürgen Beyer, Deutschland AG a.D.: Deutsche Bank, Allianz und das Verflechtungszentrum des deutschen Kapitalismus, in: Wolfgang Streeck / Martin Höpner (eds.), Alle Macht dem Markt? Fallstudien zur Abwicklung der Deutschland AG, Frankfurt a.M. 2003, pp. 118 – 146; Paul Windolf (ed.), Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. Analysen zum Wandel von Produktionsregimen, Wiesbaden 2005. 73 See Hans-Joachim Gergs / Rudi Schmidt, Generationenwechsel im Management ostund westdeutscher Unternehmen. Kommt es zu einer Amerikanisierung des deutschen Ma-

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These general lines of development, which exhibited many variants in the respective countries, had a lasting effect on the cohesion of the national elites and their networks. It decreased due to the extensive privatization of hitherto stateowned enterprises, the deregulation especially of the capital markets, the disentanglement of the national banking-industry-complexes, the establishment of new strategic company alliances reaching far beyond the national framework and growing anonymization under the pressure of globalized markets – independently of the fact whether the cohesion of the economic elites was rooted in a strong cartel tradition (such as in Germany, Austria and Switzerland) or whether, as in France or in Scandinavia, it was founded on the decisive influence of the state on the recruitment of the economic elites. The declining importance of national markets and the extension of the operating range at first on the Western and then also on the new Eastern European markets or on the global markets contributed to the Europeanization and internationalization of the economic elites, both regarding their composition as well as the reach of their networks. The numbers of global players among the initially mostly nationally defined companies rose markedly during the course of the 1990s, especially through foreign direct investment as well as mergers and takeovers. The networking of these companies on the international level, through capital participation as well as through personal connections, appropriately gained importance; a growing number of transnational company associations strengthened this trend, as Matthieu Leimgruber makes clear for the case of the Geneva Association of the insurance industry. On the flip side, Europeanization and internationalization of the companies contributed to the further loosening and weakening of the national elite networks. For communicational, but probably also for socio-cultural reasons foreigners remained under-represented in the respective national networks of the economic elites at first. A prominent example for this is Switzerland, as Thomas David et al. demonstrate. All the same, a creeping erosion of national club mentalities can be determined. French big concerns for instance have less and less of a French character when it comes to shareholders, markets, employees and even managers. Hervé Joly shows how the traditionally close connection between the economic elites and the French state has loosened during the last few years, which may lead to the easier admission of foreigners to the French economic elites in the future. While change is overall emphasized, it is necessary to state that the social exclusivity in the recruitment of the economic elites has changed little until the present and that the national networks of the Western European economic elites have by all nagementmodells?, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 54 (2002), 3, pp. 553 – 578; Markus Pohlmann, Der Generationswechsel und die neue “Weltklasse” des Managements. Anmerkungen zum Zusammenhang von demographischem und gesellschaftlichem Wandel, in: ISO-Mitteilungen 2003, No. 2, pp. 50 – 64; Martin Höpner, Was bewegt die Führungskräfte? Von der Agency Theorie zur Soziologie des Managements, in: Soziale Welt 55 (2004), 3, pp. 263 – 282. 74 See Beyer, Vom Netzwerk zum Markt? (fn. 71), p. 192.

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means not been dismantled completely. In Norway for instance, the national integration of the economic elites is still very high due to the common world-view and the trust in the institutions.75 In view of the very hard pressure of globalization, the French model of elite recruitment has remained remarkably stable according to the results of the article by Hervé Joly. This is particularly true when compared to the British model, which underwent a distinctive change between 1995 and 2005: During this time the traditional elite educational institutions have considerably lost significance; their graduates can now mostly be found among the chief executives of banks and insurances, but their numbers are declining here, too (while the percentage of foreigners is rising heavily). The reasons obviously lie in the almost complete disappearance – due to takeovers and mergers – of the traditional British private company and an altered academic landscape with a larger number of competing top universities.76 A demonstrative example for continuities – the successful transformation of a personal network and the retention of a certain world-view despite repeated changes in the institutional framework – is Austria. The portrait of the former Austrian finance minister Hannes Androsch by Christian Dirninger shows how Androsch managed to transfer his personal network of relationships as well as his personal world-views from the etatist-corporatist politico-economic environment of Austro-Keynesianism at first to the state-influenced banking sector and then to the milieu of the “self-privatizing” manager without any marked disruptions. An additional continuity in the change can be seen in the fact that the political lobbyism of the economic elites has not lost any important influence on the national level, which could be expected in view of the otherwise faded model of corporatism. In his contribution, Trygve Gulbrandsen shows how the opposite is true for the traditional and even today very corporatist society of Norway: Both owner-operators as well as manager-entrepreneurs conducted and still conduct very active lobbying in Norway, yet their strategies do not differ in any important way. Classical lobbying has however been supplemented by a more extensive mutual penetration of the economy and politics in many Western European countries – a trend that can be viewed both from the perspective of the politicization of the economy as well as from the perspective of politics becoming more economic. b) Economic elites and the crisis of the Eastern macro-model After the failure of the more or less extensive economic reforms of the 1960s, which looking back can be seen as a – failed – attempt to switch to a more indirect, 75 Cf. Trygve Gulbrandsen, Ideological Integration and Variations within the Private Business Elite in Norway, in: European Sociological Review 21 (2005), 4, pp. 329 – 344; Trygve Gulbrandsen, Elite Integration and Institutional Trust in Norway, in: Comparative Sociology 6 (2007), pp. 190 – 214. 76 See Hartmann, Eliten und Macht (fn. 5), pp. 116 – 122. Cf. also Maclean / Harvey / Press, Business Elites (fn. 5).

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i.e. monetary form of control and to relocate certain transactions from the central planning bureaucracy to – real or simulated – markets while sustaining the power monopoly of the communist state parties, the 1970s in almost all socialist countries marked a return to stronger centralization of the planning bureaucracy, however with highly divergent concepts regarding the details. The renewed state socialist sea-changes in economic and social policy shared the attempt to improve the social and consumption-orientated supply for the respective population as quickly as possible without losing sight of the middle- and long-term goals of modernizing the national economies based mostly on Western technologies; clear differences existed for instance regarding the future role of the private economy (which was almost completely eliminated in the GDR, was given what at least amounted to a durable guarantee of existence in Poland and was assigned an important role in supplementing the state economy in Hungary) and the degree of the borrowing of money on the international credit markets (for example it was strictly limited in Czechoslovakia, whereas it was treated relatively generously in Poland). Fundamental similarities existed of course in the ways and methods of rearranging the organization of production: The formation of integrated large combines was generally accelerated in the hope of better limiting or even reducing the cost disadvantages inflicted by central planning on the economy. These “large economic organizations” can be understood as divisional organizational units within the architecture of the command economy, but – unlike the Western European multidivisional concerns – at their core they adhered to a functional organization structure; still, they were given considerable autonomy and partially, such as for instance in the GDR, they were topped off with the nationalization and integration of small and middle-sized private companies.77 They were able to bring the advantages of their size to bear in some areas such as research and development as well as acquisition, production and distribution, but they were still not subject to any effective market pressure to improve product innovation and stronger focus on the customer. Especially regarding the prioritized knowledge transfer between the universities and combines, the combines showed considerable weaknesses, as Manuel Schramm shows in his contribution on the example of the GDR, for they remained far too integrated into the central planning hierarchies and were unable to catch up with the international innovation networks that emerged due to globalization. When the oil crisis and the resulting intensified competition on the world markets also reached the Soviet sphere of control, causing higher prices for energy and raw 77 For instance this concerned the planning of one’s own production program, the balancing of goods, the “changing of the profile” of the subordinate plants and the coordination of the economic processes in and between the combines. See A. Darska, Le système des entreprises pilotes en Pologne [The System of Pilot Enterprises in Poland], in: Revue d’études comparatives est-ouest 6 (1975), 2, pp. 73 – 135; Viktor N. Cerkovec, The Enterprise in the System of Socialist Social Production, in: Problems of Economics 22 (1980), 10, pp. 3 – 21; Hannelore Hamel, Sozialistische Unternehmenskonzentration und Managerverhalten. Die Kombinatsbildung in der DDR als Effizienzproblem, in: Günter Hedtkamp (ed.), Anreiz- und Kontrollmechanismus in Wirtschaftssystemen, Vol. 1, Berlin 1981, pp. 67 – 97, here pp. 70 – 74.

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commodities as well as rising interest for Western loans, the formation of combines was promoted further on, more or less energetically. Behind all this was the expectation that the new managers, mostly younger and with better professional qualifications than their predecessors – they mostly had enjoyed a university education – who had been brought into their positions already during the economic reforms or the forced combine foundations, would – within their enlarged room for maneuvre – exhibit more pronounced entrepreneurial qualities.78 After 1970 in Poland for example under Edward Gierek, ambitious young men rose to responsible positions in large state-owned concerns; they had often completed their studies with one of the renowned Polish economists who were already quite open to post-Keynesian and neo-liberal thinking of American provenance at that time. They strengthened the previously ascertainable trend of the replacement of executives with a purely technical education by those with an economic, juridical or social science degree, a trend which was soon weakened again, so that the dominance of technical courses of education was ultimately never broken.79 The young “social climbers” were less interested in political ideas and ideologies, but much more in their own careers and their material prosperity. They increasingly saw themselves as a distinct social group, the members of which – although they were dependent on the political elite in power – were able to articulate and pursue their own interests. Increasingly this new technocratic elite of state socialist society emulated the lifestyle of the West European middle class. In Poland the managers also met up with the heads of the local political and administrative elites in their local “directors’ clubs” to discuss common interests and feed them into the political decision-making process at a higher level. However, a durably sustainable horizontal integration of the elites never emerged. Rather, the fronts between the different interest groups in Poland hardened during the early 1980s. The official hierarchies provided the executives of the combines and plants with seemingly clear formal-bureaucratic procedures. In view of the inadequacies of the 78 See Akós Róna-Tas / József Böröcz, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Presocialist and Socialist Legacies among Business Elites, in: Higley / Lengyel, Elites after State Socialism (fn. 6), pp. 209 – 228. 79 See Halina Najduchowska, The Selection of General Directions of Industrial Enterprises and the Changing Role of the Industrial Enterprise, in: International Studies of Management and Organization 3 (1973), 3, pp. 9 – 41; Marian J. Kostecki, The Managerial Cadres of the Polish Industry: Research Report, in: The Polish Sociological Bulletin 40 (1977), 2, pp. 85 – 96; Witold Morawski (ed.), The Sociology of Industrial Management in Poland (= International Journal of Sociology 10 [1980 / 81], 4); Waldemar Kuczynski, Le chemin de retour. L’évolution des opinions sur le marché et la propriété en Pologne, 1956 – 1982 [The Way Back. The Evolution of Opinions Concerning “Market” and “Property” in Poland, 1956 – 1982], in: Revue d’études comparatives est-ouest 6 (1990), pp. 29 – 39; Krzysztof Porwit, Looking Back at Economic Science in Poland, 1945 – 1996. The Challenge of System Changes, in: Hans-Jürgen Wagener (ed.), Economic Thought in Communist and Post-Communist Europe, London / New York 1998, pp. 80 – 157.

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central planning system which grew with the unresolved challenges of the third industrial revolution despite reinforced combine formation and other attempts of reform, management was forced to become ever more active outside the provided framework.80 More and more during the 1980s, the responsible managers at the combine and plant level used their extended disposal and usage rights regarding “the people’s property” to also engage in informal economic coordination with other combines, plants and institutions of the local environment, which often included the city and municipal administrations, who for instance could dispose of housing, but also with handicraft or agricultural cooperatives as well as kindergartens, schools and other social institutions.81 Crisis management and the ability to engage in cooperative action in informal power and exchange relationships gained a lot of significance. The managers did not gain access to the semi-legal and illegal markets within the command economy through money, but almost exclusively through their own concrete compensation goods or the promise of granting undue advantages to their exchange partners. By engaging in this barter system, the managers allowed for the creation of “compensatory networks” and contributed to the spread of the shadow economy.82 During the 1980s – and especially in Poland and Hungary – a gradually growing “second economy” emerged, which was supported by initially often illegal, but increasingly legalized small producers or service provider collectives and private businesses.83 80 See Peter Hübner, Durch Planung zur Improvisation. Zur Geschichte des Leitungspersonals in der staatlichen Industrie der DDR, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 39 (1999), pp. 197 – 233. 81 See Jacek Tarkowski, Local Influences in a Centralized System: Resources, Local Leadership and Horizontal Integration in Poland, in: Sidney Tarrow / Peter A. Katzenstein / Luigi Graziano (eds.), Territorial Politics in Industrial Nations, New York 1978, pp. 213 – 244; Jacek Tarkowski, Poland: Patrons and Clients in a Planned Economy, in: Jerzy J. Wiatr (ed.), Local Politics in Poland. Twenty Years of Research, Warszawa 1986, pp. 66 – 90; Jacek Tarkowski, A Centralized System and Corruption: The Case of Poland, in: The Asian Journal of Public Administration 10 (1988), 1, pp. 48 – 70; Ma gorzata Mazurek, Filling the Gap between Plan and Needs: Social Networks in the Local Government System in Communist Poland, in: Annette Schuhmann (ed.), Vernetzte Improvisationen. Gesellschaftliche Subsysteme in Ostmitteleuropa und in der DDR, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2008, pp. 103 – 120. 82 For the theoretical and conceptional background: Friederike Sattler, Unternehmerische und kompensatorische Netzwerke. Anregungen der Unternehmensgeschichte für die Analyse von wirtschaftlichen Netzwerkstrukturen in staatssozialistischen Gesellschaften, in: Schuhmann, Vernetzte Improvisationen (fn. 81), pp. 139 – 155. For a comparison of compensatory networks in the GDR and Poland: Friederike Sattler, Unbewältigte wissenschaftlich-technische Herausforderungen. Zur Ausbreitung kompensatorischer Netzwerke in der DDR und in Polen während der 1970er Jahre, in: Reitmayer / Rosenberger, Unternehmen (fn. 57), pp. 191 – 208. 83 See Dieter Cassel et al. (eds.), Inflation und Schattenwirtschaft im Sozialismus. Bestandsaufnahme, Erklärungsansätze und Reformvorschläge für die Volksrepublik Polen, Hamburg 1989; David Stark, Coexisting Organizational Forms in Hungary’s Emerging Mixed Economy, in: Victor Nee / David Stark (eds.), Remaking of the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe, Stanford (CA) 1989, pp. 137 – 168; Maria W. Los (ed.), The Second Economy in Marxist States, London 1990; E. Ulrich Cichy, Wirtschaftsreform

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Against this background, a highly diversified, quasi late socialist economic elite emerged during the second half of the 1980s – most distinctly in Hungary, but also elsewhere; its members later formed the core of the post-socialist economic elite. This is true in spite of all the institutional changes during the system transformation after the events of 1989. In Hungary the first of the two most important segments of this forming late socialist economic elite consisted of the small and soon also middle-sized business entrepreneurs of the expanding “second economy”. Often these entrepreneurs were still active in the state economy and had a regular job, but simultaneously they explored new grey zones, in other words, they aimed at acquiring a second income in the networks of the prospering shadow economy, with which the functional insufficiencies of the command economy could be compensated for at least rudimentarily.84 The second segment of the late socialist economic elite consisted of the managers of the legal, so-called “first economy”, which however – and this is an important difference between Hungary and the other state socialist countries – no longer consisted solely of state-owned businesses, but also included a growing percentage of legalized commercial private businesses. During the 1980s, Hungary did not balk at abolishing the centrally planned targets, making its own currency freely convertible and joining the International Monetary Fund as well as the World Bank – in this way, it was once again reconnected with the world markets. The state-owned combines were broken up and geared towards foreign trade; often they undertook joint ventures with Western companies. This far-reaching liberalization and the abolition of measures of legal discrimination also resulted in the re-foundation of ever larger private businesses. This again led to a demand for modern managers with better educational qualifications, higher professional competence (including adequate mental and habitual profiles), entrepreneurial initiative and a readiness to take risks; aspirations towards further education, thriftiness and diligence were also appreciated. As the contributions of Ágnes Pogány, György Lengyel and Zsuzsanna Varga show, there was a twofold recourse in this process both in industry and agriculture. First to be mentioned is the rediscovery of cultural and symbolical family capital: Remarkably often there was an entrepreneurial family tradition up to the grandparents among the new managers, which had then broken off; inter-generational transmission of certain economic values occurred here, for instance rational thinking, instrumental und Ausweichwirtschaft im Sozialismus. Zur Rolle der Ausweichwirtschaft im Reformprozess sozialistischer Planwirtschaften, dargestellt am Beispiel der DDR, Polens und Ungarns, Hamburg 1990; Ákos Róna-Tas, The Second Economy in Hungary: The Social Origins of the End of State Socialism, Ann Arbor 1990; Simon Johnson / Gary Loveman, Starting Over in Eastern Europe: Entrepreneurship and Economic Renewal, Boston (Mass.) 1995; Róna-Tas, The Great Surprise (fn. 4). 84 It is estimated that at the beginning of the 1980s, no less than three fourths of all Hungarian households received an additional income from the second economy, which amounted to approximately 20 percent of the gross national product. See Alejandro Portes / József Böröcz, The Informal Sector and Capitalism and State Socialism: A Preliminary Comparison, in: Social Justice 15 (1988), 3 / 4, pp. 17 – 28, here p. 18.

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thought and individualism. Secondly, the new managers could benefit from connections to the formal and informal network structures of late socialism, which turned out to be important social capital; likewise these people were often members of the state party, but only rarely were they so-called apparatchiks. During the system transformation after 1989, these different capital resources of late socialism could obviously be converted easily into new, market economy capital, similarly to the exchange of pre-industrial to industrial capital of the economic elites in the past. So far we have described this process in a more detailed fashion for Poland and Hungary, i. e. for state socialist countries in which the communist state parties became subject to a sort of erosion process during the 1980s and thus successively and gradually withdrew from the economy and society. In these countries the private sector could begin to unfold, compensatory networks reached ever further and contributed to the expansion of the seeds of a market economy and a civil society into the public sphere, so that a smooth transition into system transformation became possible. It is important to note that all of this was not true to the same degree in other state socialist countries. The economic structures became more and more encrusted wherever the safeguarding of the power of the Party was most important and its comprehensive claim to regulate and control was neither given up or challenged, as for instance in the GDR and Czechoslovakia – here the compensatory networks remained limited and subcutaneous. This cannot be called open erosion, as these were seemingly ultra-stable party states. And still: During the 1980s, there was a certain amount of circulation in favor of managers with higher education and a more professional outlook even in the GDR and Czechoslovakia – some of this change was also generational. Personal continuities from the late socialist to the post-socialist period can also be observed here. As will be explored in more detail below, the future post-socialist economic elites generally came from the core of late socialist society and not from among the former political dissidents or returnees from exile, for these were literally “outsiders” who did not possess sufficient social, cultural or symbolical capital which could have been exchanged for new (market) economic capital during the transformation. What consequences did the system transformation have for the economic elites? For a while, there was a general, sometimes drastic reduction of economic activity during the remodelling of the centrally planned economies, which was caused by the shrinkage of the domestic markets and the completely altered foreign trade situation due to the collapse of COMECON and the fact that the Western markets were difficult to access in the beginning. Many of the former combines and plants did not survive the first crash phase of the transformation. The connected loss of leadership positions was mitigated by gains through privatization and restructuring of the previously highly concentrated production units, the leadership hierarchies of which had however often been oversized. The number of leadership vacancies also rose through start-up companies in industry and – supported by the restoration of ownership lost during collectivization – especially in agriculture.

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After generally fluctuating first down, then up, the stock of economic leadership positions in the post-socialist countries was subject to distinctive re-groupings due to the changed politico-economic framework and the economic structural changes in trying to catch up with the globally integrated industry and service societies of Western Europe. The “old” socialist directors with their habitus coined by the command economy were only capable of meeting the qualitatively changed requirement profiles to a limited extent, as Marcel Boldorf shows in his article on East German managers. Almost all of them lacked genuine entrepreneurial skills – both in shortterm situation-bound as well as in long-term strategic decision-making: clear orientation towards the market, high readiness to take on risks and a strong proactive streak for instance regarding innovations, distinctively competitive thinking, cost, efficiency and yield consciousness and ultimately also the necessary international contacts. These were qualifications which, while not every Western European manager was able to offer them, were very much in demand in times of an ever increasing dynamic of globalized capitalism. The “old” socialist managers encountered the fewest problems when dealing with the management of “classical” TayloristFordist processes of industrial mass production with high vertical integration, as their background predisposed them for the technical and organizational side of operating procedures; in this regard, they even exhibited a specially honed skill for improvisation. This is especially true for the two comparatively old industrial societies of the GDR and Czechoslovakia resp. the Czech Republic, as the contributions by Marcel Boldorf as well as by Libuše Macáková and Eduard Kubu show. The “old” socialist managers who, despite lacking sufficient market economic qualifications, initially remained in leadership positions at least in the second row in stateowned, but also in privatized companies, proved to be a stumbling block for transformation itself. Their specific qualifications, which initially offered positive consequences, proved to be a problem in the long run – which then served as a moving force for the change of the initially mostly unchanged recruitment practices. Compared to the Western European managers, the socialist managers possessed a higher expertise in pragmatic in-house conflict management. This was not only due to their much less exclusive social origins and their mental affinity to the value system of the workers, but also due to the necessity of a constant, often informal reconciliation of interests between the political authorities and the expectations of the employees, which could be quite exacting regarding the social policies. In the present volume, Peter Hübner’s comparative analysis of the GDR and Poland demonstrates how the handling of close-meshed social policy specifications from above and the rather narrow room for maneuvre at the plant level by East German and Polish managements exhibits more commonalities than differences – despite divergent cultural imprinting. The socialist managers were, in other words, obviously better qualified to act in static political and institutional contexts and simultaneously achieved a social reconciliation of interests. While this was still an advantage on the regional, national and European level from the new commercial perspectives of the “subsidy landscape” immediately after 1989 / 1990, already

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these qualifications changed into disadvantages in the medium-term perspective – parallel to the dissolution of classical Western European corporatism, which sped up enormously through the transformation processes after the end of communism – for their result was the preservation of areas of production which were generally unprofitable according to the new standards. This persistence of more technocratic and less market orientated behavior became ever more counterproductive for the survival of companies in a globalized environment. If one tries to understand the socio-structural change of the state socialist economic elites during the transformation of industry and agriculture, all in all a remarkably uniform picture emerges for the various countries: The change in personnel on the top floors of the economy was much slower than in the field of politics, even though it was not just the political, but also the economic system which was fundamentally changing. In the economy, the generation of cadre-managers who had only entered their positions in the socialist industrial and agricultural enterprises during the 1980s had a particularly easy time in moving on to capitalism. During privatization they obviously profited considerably from a structural advantage, which resulted from their professional experience, their better understanding of in-house processes and their participation in existing formal and informal networks, which now became vitally important for the procurement of loans. Often they successfully undertook a management buy-out, i.e. started a successful independent career in the private economy. This assessment that the economic elites changed gradually and slowly and not in any way abruptly is even more true, the more the politico-economic system had already eroded before 1989, i. e. it was more true for Hungary and Poland than for the GDR and Czechoslovakia. As György Lengyel shows in the Hungarian case, this trend towards “unhurried change” of the economic elites was intensified by those private businesspeople who had already been able to become active during the late socialist period and were now able to profit from their experience and their better integration into personal network structures. Previous membership of the Communist Party, being counted among the economic elite and finally the actual access to material resources were also advantages in the other former state socialist countries, particularly by those members of the old economic elites who set up new businesses after 1989. As discussed before, it was also important to be able to fall back on entrepreneurial family traditions – i. e. social, cultural and symbolical capital particularly of the grandparents’ generation. The rather slow change of the economic elites did thus not only affect the privatized large concerns, but also the small and middlesized companies, not to mention the state-owned plants which continued operation for quite some time, as for example in Poland, compared with countries with an early strictly neo-liberal policy, such as the Czech Republic. However during the course of 1990s, it was mostly the younger managers with successful re-training or without any previous professional past in state socialism who had extremely successful careers in the service and finance industries due to new, often economic, academic degrees, and often became quite or extremely rich.

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For them, the connections in politics and the administration via the elite networks, which had been so important during the privatizations of early post-socialism, played less and less of an important role. As György Lengyel shows for Hungary, simultaneously they intensified the growing trend towards social exclusivity in the recruitment of the economic elites through their quick careers which were clearly limited to certain sectors of the economy. However, this exclusivity was and still is much less pronounced than in Western European and also most of the socially more open Scandinavian countries. Differently than was perhaps expected, these slowly changing post-socialist economic elites were not fragmented elites. They were distinguished by transmitted and new social differences, through their divergent origins in different social milieus of late socialism (from technocrats to dissidents) as well as whether they were manager- or owner-entrepreneurs. While they possessed very different views and values, for instance regarding their party-political and politico-economic orientation, all of them ultimately agreed to the new rules of democracy and the market economy – this was certainly a consequence of the long, creeping de-legitimation of communism itself. Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi and Eleanor Townsley speak of how amazingly quickly the members of the new economic elites had agreed on a new “manager ideology”.85 An important politico-economic bone of contention, which did not however lead to a deeper fragmentation in view of this basic consensus, was the question of the details and tempo of privatization policy. In Hungary for example there was a strong discrepancy between the managers of the (in the beginning still mostly state-owned) large banks, who due to their origin, income and economic power were not interested in any change of the status-quo, and the managers in other sectors, who hoped to profit from speedy privatization.86 New social differentiation and positioning within the economic elites also entailed a new image of oneself from within the elites as well as a new outside image – both from one’s own society as well as from the new, no longer bipolar, “panEuropean” environment. This is not just about different views and perspectives, but also about active, performative (self-)portrayal, the strategies used and their respective effects. As Krzysztof Go ata demonstrates using Poland as an example which can probably be generalized unproblematically, there are many layers involved in the change of the (exterior) image of the new post-socialist economic elites. Firstly, there is a, so to say, pre-socialist layer of views which is shaped by the general mistrust within Eastern and Eastern Central European agrarian societies towards private merchants, industrialists and bankers, who were perceived as potential “fraudsters”, “exploiters”, “speculators” and “usurers”, which was in turn intensified through ethnic conflicts, anti-Semitism and nationalism. Secondly, there was a layer of negative attitudes against “private capitalists” produced during socialEyal / Szelényi / Townsley, Making Capitalism (fn. 6). See György Lengyel / Attila Bartha, Hungary: Bankers and Managers after State Socialism, in: Higley / Lengyel, Elites after State Socialism (fn. 6), pp. 163 – 177. 85 86

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ism, precisely in an area where free space for formal and informal private initiative had opened up during late socialism and a new stratum of nouveaux riches had arisen which was able to profit from black market deals in foreign currency and their relationships with foreign capital. Such views, together with xenophobic sentiments, boosted the denunciation of post-socialist manager- and owner-entrepreneurs as “speculators”, “bogeymen” and “exploiters” who continued to live at the expense of the working class and the average employees. Thirdly and finally, another layer of attitudes, which had only formed during the transformation itself, came into play: Owner- and manager-entrepreneurs were not only going through a trying period in respect of their abilities to create economic values and secure jobs, they were also being blamed – together with the defunct political regimes and the new political elites – for precisely their good connections to the old as well as the new political elites and the enormous social costs of the transformation, which were expressed by high rates of inflation, mass unemployment and impoverishment. Economic success and personal wealth seemed to be “politically contaminated” and simultaneously socially irresponsible – a notion which was intensified by the mass media, who scandalized criminal individual cases. Economic crises intensified these impressions, while economically advantageous developments counteracted them. This – clearly negative – exterior image of the post-socialist economic elites is quite the opposite of the remarkably quick and successful change of their self-image, i.e. self-interpretation and presentation as successful individuals. Asta Vonderau investigates this process using Lithuania as an example. The old socialist manager, who had always successfully moved as part of a larger collective within centrally controlled, Taylorist-Fordist standardized company environments, could, if he understood how to advance his career within the politically pre-determined structures and simultaneously trick the deficient economy with flexible shadow-economic activities, be someone who had mastered both codes and was able to apply them correctly in every situation; this homo sovieticus was now compared with a new, neo-liberal post-socialist manager. His identity model entailed a self-controlled, flexible and mobile individual who was no longer dependent on a collective body. Responsibility for a “successful” life was similarly individualized and privatized and was mostly no longer subject to the social environment. “Success” is generally expressed by a certain lifestyle, which is as a rule expressed through heightened consumption as well as a distinct “European” taste to try to set it apart from illegal, mafia-like, Philistine and non-Western connotations. This self-image, which is strengthened through conspicuous consumption, is supplemented by an appropriate interpretation of one’s own curriculum vitae. It is remarkable that one’s own past is generally not covered up; rather the experiences, relationships and qualifications gathered during the stagnating socialist command system, such as the ability to act quickly and appropriately to a situation and the business acumen schooled by the shadow economy, are seamlessly integrated into the new self-image. These experiences, relationships and qualifications are now considered to be valuable social, cultural and symbolical capital, proof of high adaptability in East-

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ern and Western structures as well as a comparative advantage on the path to success on the free markets of global capitalism. Classical Western models of the entrepreneurial individual are not simply copied; instead independent, hybrid forms of subjectivity equally based on past and present experiences are being constructed – ideal qualifications, one could summarize, to be admitted to the new transnational economic elites.

c) The comparative perspective Briefly looking back to the trente glorieuses before the beginning of the crisisridden change of the 1970s, the Western and Eastern economic elites shared the following extensive system-transcending commonalities: Both were characterized by relative proximity to the state, were principally more open towards the idea of national economic planning and state intervention in the economy than they had been before the two World Wars and they were exhibiting a commitment – although very differently defined – towards the “common good”. Their social profile was comparatively homogeneous; in the West social exclusivity remained pronounced, while there was a conscious break with it in the East. The operating range of the economic elites was mostly restricted to the nation state; within this framework the economic elites were – in very different ways – interconnected with each other as well as with the political elites. The national elite network was more or less strictly closed off towards the “outside world”. The “exit options” of the economic elites were, in other words, limited; just like employees and consumers, entrepreneurs and managers mostly operated within a nation state framework, in which they also had to fulfill their responsibilities towards the welfare state. The economic elites also adapted to the relatively high level of political control on a mental level: Characteristically there was quite a lot of “belief in control”, which was based on the background of a technocratic and optimistic Zeitgeist; one could point to a sizeable measure of extensive growth which still relied on the technologies of the second industrial revolution. These physiognomies blurred under the growing influence of the third industrial revolution and globalization since the 1970s. The new technological and economic challenges soon also entailed social challenges for both political systems, which endangered the social reconciliation of interests – based on corporative arrangements here, and on the political dictate of the consensus there – and which ultimately led the state socialist countries towards system transformation. The – system- and country-specific – reactions to the challenges of transition from a classical Fordist industrial society to an electronic service society determined the development of the economic elites in both systems regarding their options for action as well as the change of their education and qualification profiles, their social differentiation and integration mechanisms, their discourses and their values as well as their legitimation, their self-image and their image from the outside. One has to take into account that the extent of the options for action and change were defined

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through the respective systemic foundations in both macro-models: The degrees of freedom of the Western macro-model were and are, both regarding their normative foundations as well as their diversity and the adaptability of the institutional arrangements, generally higher than those in the Eastern macro-model. With this background, the comparison of the Western and the Eastern Central European economic elites delivers both differences as well as commonalities: The Western as well as the Eastern economic elites responded to the challenges of the third industrial revolution and the conspicuous weakening of the growth dynamic of the first post-war decades with an increase of the research and development activities and by attempting to join up with the international innovation networks which arose due to globalization (the centers of which mostly lay outside of Europe). The “Western path” of testing new, diversification-orientated entrepreneurial strategies led to the increased formation of large, multi-divisionally organized companies. The major concerns who came into being in this manner however did not prove to be viable in the long term. Their dissolution contributed to an extensive “liquefaction” of company structures since the mid-1980s, which considerably encouraged the business of investment bankers, financial investors and ultimately also that of management consultants – and thereby also contributed to an ever increasing alignment of the responsible managers towards the international capital markets. In Eastern Europe the economic elites reacted with a strategy of accelerated combine formation at the behest of “politics” and in the hope of gains of efficiency and productivity. Soon the integrated socialist combines exhibited considerable strategic weaknesses concerning their ability to innovate and their economic adaptability, yet the created combine structures were not fundamentally revised. The extent of the flexible networks which were compensating for the weaknesses of the “dinosaurs” was comparatively limited in the GDR and Czechoslovakia; in Poland and Hungary however, these “auxiliary constructions”, which were able to rely on rural domestic economies and an increasing number of legalized small businesses, gained a comparatively large importance. Yet in all socialist countries, the dissolution of the combines and the “liquefaction” of the company structures (which was then aided by digitalization) as well as the waves of founding new companies in the fields of information technology, financial services, the media and consulting were only fully realized after the political sea-change of 1989 / 90. Yet despite all such differences, one can observe a notable common development when looking at the Western and Eastern European economic elites, which was connected with the third industrial revolution and the growing worldwide competition: the open retreat or creeping erosion of national state control and intervention in the economy. Hereby, the immediate framework of the economic elites was enlarged considerably, both in the West as well as the East. To put it bluntly: The nation state “resigned” in this context (while it remained very present in others such as the welfare state), because – confronted with the ever intensifying integration of the national economies into the global markets – it was less and less possible to

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clearly draw the outer limits of the democratic, Keynesian neo-corporatist welfare states of Western Europe as well as the non-democratic, centrally administered and planned state socialisms of Eastern Europe. In the West on the one hand, the consequences of this development included the gradual de-concentration of the national elite networks of politics and the economy as well as the dissolution of the capital and personal networks interconnecting the economic elites; on the other hand, it also meant the growing inclusion of the economic elites into transnational operation contexts and networks. All of this was connected with a change less of the education and recruitment patterns, but more of the qualification profiles, the criteria of rationality and the patterns of operation of the economic elites, which more and more referred to a new, capital market orientated model of corporate governance. Within the relatively rigid economic institutions of the state socialist Eastern European countries, the transition from classical Fordist industrial society to an electronic and digital service society was limited until 1989; in this sense the Iron Curtain actually worked as a barrier against dynamic capitalism, but it did not by any means offer a “perfect” antidote against the necessity of economic modernization, not least in the interest of a pacifying social and consumption policy. Because this modernization could not be accomplished just using internal resources and, as described, as at least some snippets of Western provenance were imported in the shape of machines and plants, but also in the form of technical know-how as well as economic knowledge, a certain shift of the field of activity away from the old to the new industries and of qualifications away from the engineering and technical fields to the new information technological as well as social sciences occurred for the economic elites. On the other hand, there was also a starting point – albeit at first tentatively – to seek integration into transnational activity contexts and a beginning realignment of thinking and behavior towards “marketization” and a turn towards the emulation of a Western middle class lifestyle. The socialist managers also increasingly saw themselves as a nascent, separate social group with its own interests, albeit still dependent on the regime, which implied distance from the orientation towards “the common good” exhibited by the socialist “administrative service class”. It was at least partially possible to exhibit genuine entrepreneurial, risk and market orientated competence, even if at first only in the gray areas of the “second economy” and within an area which the late socialist state surrendered only with reluctance. Yet at least subcutaneously, socially and functionally more differentiated economic elites germinated during late socialism. All in all these tendencies were more noticeable in the slowly eroding state socialisms of Hungary and Poland than in the seemingly ultra-stable, but ultimately imploding state socialisms of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Also, the strategy of “imported modernization”, which allowed for these developments, was not only costly and increased state debt immensely, but it also ultimately failed on all fronts: The modernization deficit in comparison to the West became ever larger, while the dependence on foreign trade on the world markets

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rose more and more. One could even speak of an increasing paralysis of state socialism caused by the global markets, especially the capital markets. The road towards this final crisis was connected with enormous losses of sustainability and belief in the future particularly within the economic elites. Thus it is even more remarkable that the members of these late socialist economic elites were able to seamlessly continue the search for solutions for the demands of globalization without a fundamental changing of the guard after the ultimate failure of state socialism in 1989 and despite all the institutional changes due to the system transformations – now they continued on a path laid out by Western Europe: a market economy based on private property. However this economic order was at the time already wrapped in bouts of change itself as it transformed from a comparatively comfortable national state based corporative Keynesian into a financial market orientated, globalized capitalism. This change had to be completed in a much quicker transformation process by the Eastern European economic elites. Even if this was connected with social upheaval and sometimes tempestuous scandals, the consolidation of the post-socialist economic elites has – all in all – been completed according to the example of the Western European economic elites and has led to a strong convergence. The social exclusivity in the recruitment of the Eastern Central European economic elites has moved more towards the patterns of Western European economic elites during the second half of the 1990s, obviously also by falling back on bourgeois traditions from the time before 1945, yet remains lower in Eastern Central Europe than in the West. The connections of the economic elites to politics and the administration have also loosened in Eastern Central Europe since the second half of the 1990s, but are obviously still closer than in the West.

5. Transnational business elites? These clear convergences, which are being additionally supported by the process of European integration, as well as the extending operation ranges of many large, but also of middle-sized companies, which were able to expand onto the Western and Eastern European as well as the global market during the 1990s, doubtlessly contributed to the internationalization of the European economic elites. But how strong was this tendency? Has it already created truly transnational European economic elites separated from the national context? Two main lines of interpretation are currently being offered by research: On the one hand, the still very much national education and recruitment patterns of the economic elites are being emphasized; on the other hand, the growing number of transnationally active companies and institutions are being referred to as the new “habitat” of the already genuinely transnational professional careers. While the adherents of the first interpretation do not question the distinct increase of transnationally active, mutually interconnected companies and economic

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interest groups, they still argue that the persons working there are nevertheless very much shaped by their national education and recruitment patterns; in their view this significantly inhibits transnational communication and cooperation and does precisely not lead to the emergence of new – European or even global – group identities and loyalties.87 According to them, the importance of decisively European or international elite education institutions such as INSEAD in Fontainebleau near Paris is still limited in comparison to traditional national institutions. In Europe, the general boom of business schools that can be observed since the late 1990s is mostly concentrated on Britain and has additionally not really contributed to a professionalization of managers.88 The MBA degree still only plays a secondary role in the selection process for leading positions in large European industrial and financial concerns. Further criteria, with which the degree of Europeanization or internationalization of the economic elites can be empirically verified and critically questioned, are the number of foreign executives and the degree of practical experience working abroad by the non-foreign executives. According to these factors the French economic elite is still hardly touched, while the German and British economic elites are already strongly influenced by Europeanization and internationalization.89 Italy and Spain are far behind all three countries in both regards. Only in some smaller European countries, in which a disproportionate number of multinational concerns are active and in which the supply of local top executives is simultaneously relatively limited, such as in Switzerland, the Netherlands and also the Eastern Central European countries, there is a strongly internationalized top management. A certain prioritization for Europeans from respective neighbouring countries can be discerned, but Americans are also well represented. The representatives of the second interpretation accentuate the operative ranges of the economic elites, which have grown considerably during the last two decades and now extend far beyond the national framework, and not just in economic, but also in political and cultural dimensions.90 The most important criterion to mea87 Cf. Michel Bauer, Vers un modèle européen de dirigeants? Comparaison Allemagne / France / Grande-Bretagne [Towards a European Model of Corporate Directors? A Comparison of Germany, France and Great Britain], Paris 1996; Bauer / Bertin-Mourot, National Models (fn. 5); Michael Hartmann, Auf dem Weg zur transnationalen Bourgeoisie? Die Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft und die Internationalität der Spitzenmanager Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Großbritanniens und der USA, in: Leviathan 27 (1999), 1, pp. 113 – 141; Michael Hartmann, Nationale oder transnationale Eliten? Europäische Eliten im Vergleich, in: Hradil / Imbusch, Oberschichten (fn. 30), pp. 273 – 297. 88 Cf. also Haldor Byrkjeflot, Management Education and Selection of Top Managers in Europe and the United States, Bergen 2000; Robert R. Locke / Katja E. Schöne (eds.), The Entrepreneurial Shift. Americanization in European High-Technoloy Management Education, Cambridge 2004; Rakesh Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands. The Social Transformation of Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton (NJ) 2007. 89 See Hartmann, Eliten und Macht (fn. 5), pp. 204 – 213. 90 Cf. Kees van der Pijl, The Sovereignty of Capital Impaired: Social Forces and Codes of Conduct for Multinational Corporations, in: Henk Overbeek (ed.), Restructuring Hegemony

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sure the extension of the operative range of the economic elites empirically is the degree of personal and capital interconnection of companies. The studies so far show that not only are transnational capital interconnections increasing, but that the executive boards of large companies also overlap more and more on a personal level; compared to the global level, the density of the networks was already high in Europe during the mid-1990s.91 Here it is once again useful to point out the article by Thomas David et al. in this volume, which shows the Swiss example of how this development was connected with the dissolution process of the national entrepreneurial networks. Another piece of evidence for the extension of the operative range of economic elites on the European and global level is the growing number of transnational interest groups such as the European Roundtable of Industrialists, the World Economic Forum or the Mont Pelèrin Society, to name three prominent cases.92 How much they actually contributed to the formation of transnational European or global economic elites still has to be investigated for each individual organization however. In the present volume Matthieu Leimgruber demonstrates how growing transnationalism could be tried out and organized effectively in the Geneva Association of the insurance business. Despite their differences, the results of both interpretations show how difficult it is to separate processes of Europeanization from those of globalization. It therefore seems problematic to speak of transnational European economic elites despite all observable convergences between West and East European economic elites during in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-liberalism in the 1980s, London 1993, pp. 28 – 55; Rosabeth Moss Kanter, World Class. Thriving Locally in the Global Economy, New York 1995; Leslie Sklair, Social Movements for Global Capitalism: The Transnational Capitalist Class in Action, in: Review of International Political Economy 4 (1997), 3, pp. 514 – 538; William I. Robinson / Jerry Harris, Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class, in: Science and Technology 64 (2000), 1, pp. 11 – 54; Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, Malden / Oxford / Carlton 2001; Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class and Global Politics: Deconstructing the CorporateState Connection, in: International Political Science Review / Revue International de Science Politique 23 (2002), 2, pp. 159 – 174; Kees van der Pijl, Two Faces of the Transnational Cadre under Neo-liberalism, in: Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (2004), 2, pp. 177 – 207. 91 See William K. Carroll / Meindert Fennema, Is there a Transnational Business Community?, in: International Sociology 17 (2002), 3, pp. 393 – 419; Jeffrey Kentor / Yong Suk Jang, Yes, There Is a (Growing) Transnational Business Community: A Study of Global Interlocking Directorates 1983 – 1998, in: International Sociology 19 (2004), 3, pp. 355 – 368. 92 Cf. Michael Nollert / Nicola Fielder, Lobbying for a Europe of Big Business. The European Roundtable of Industrialists, in: Volker Bornschier (ed.), State Building in Europe. The Revitalization of Western European Integration, Cambridge 2000, pp. 187 – 209; Michael Nollert, Transnationale Wirtschaftseliten: Das Netzwerk des European Roundtable of Industrialists, in: Ronald Hitzler / Stefan Hornbostel / Cornelia Mohr (eds.), Elitenmacht, Wiesbaden 2004, pp. 91 – 102; Jan-Christoph Graz, How Powerful are Transnational Elite Clubs? The Social Myth of the World Economic Forum, in: New Political Economy 8 (2003), 3, pp. 321 – 340; Bernard Walpen, Die offenen Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft. Eine hegemonietheoretische Studie zur Mont Pèlerin Society, Hamburg 2004.

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the 1990s. Future research will therefore have to deal with the question of whether transnational global elites are emerging. For further historical research, the sociologist Leslie Sklair has offered a both stimulating as well as challenging interpretative model with his concept of a Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC).93 He understands and describes it in the sense of a global power elite – in this he deviates from the other contributions in this volume, which cover functional and position elites – and he differentiates four “fractions” with respective characteristics regarding their economic base, political organization and common culture and ideology: The corporate fraction, the political fraction, the technical fraction and finally the consumerist fraction. According to Sklair, the members of the TCC are characterized by their interests, which are primarily directed at the global economy and hardly any more at national or local contexts; according to him their lifestyles are becoming ever more similar and rely on related patterns of academic education, which increasingly takes place in business schools, as well as on the consumption of luxury goods and services; they see themselves as citizens of the world as well as citizens of their country of origin. Sklair emphasizes that the TCC is not only well interconnected through interlocking directorates, but also fosters connections into civil society, for instance in welfare work, sport and culture. In this manner it literally succeeds in making its global business society’s business. The TCC allegedly has begun to monopolize the symbols of modernity and to transform all areas of social life according to its image. This concept bears a significant empirical burden of proof. Sklair has already accomplished instructive case studies of the tobacco industry, the ecological crisis and contemporary architecture. Surely, his theses are provocative – but they simultaneously stimulate innovative perspectives of the European economic elites which obviously have been more than the sum of the national elites of the “Western” and “Eastern” Europe countries for some time. Sklair’s potentially controversial contribution therefore stands for the open outcome of this volume, which does not want to and cannot present the summa of knowledge on this matter and instead wishes to encourage further research.

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Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (fn. 90).

Economic Elites in the Twentieth Century: Overviews from Western and Eastern Perspectives

Business Elites in the Twentieth Century – Germany and its Western Neighbours By Dieter Ziegler I. The overall picture: high rates of self-recruitment in the European business elite When historians and sociologists analyse a national or international business elite, they have a completely different understanding of the term ‘elite’ than, for example, historians of pre-modern eras who investigate the nobility of their period of research as an elite defined by kinship; instead they encounter a functionally defined elite, composed of persons who hold posts defined as elite positions such as board chairmanships of the largest companies of a certain national economy. On the other hand, they normally reject any naïve notions that the persons holding such positions deserve their elite status simply due to their outstanding ability. Undoubtedly, a modern economy cannot permit persons to be in responsible positions simply because they were born into such a station. But it is also clear that the chances to achieve an elite position in a market economy were and are not equally distributed within society. The rate of self-recruitment in the business elite – whatever definition we choose – is extremely high in all Western European countries with France, Great Britain, Spain and Germany at the top of the list (see table 1). Table 1 Western European business elite: social origins 2005

Bourgeoisie Educated Classes1 Lower Middle Class2

FR

GB

ES

DE

IT

CH

Swe

57,0 30,3 12,7

53,2 31,2 15,6

55,0 30,0 15,0

51,7 33,3 15,0

51,6 16,1 32,3

31,8 22,7 45,5

28,6 21,4 50,0

1

including landowners and army officers, 2 including working class descendants. Source: Michael Hartmann, Eliten und Macht in Europa, Frankfurt a. M. 2007, tab. 7.2., p. 220.

The obvious question arising from this fact is how the mechanism worked and works by which the national bourgeoisie manages to reserve the highest ranks in the economy for their own descendants. Early in the 20th century, the answer can easily be found in the ownership structure of even the largest companies. As long

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as a family controls a certain firm, it tries to install a dynasty of family members who occupy the most important positions in the company. But family ownership among the largest firms declined in all European and North American countries and was to a large extent superseded by manager-directed joint stock concerns, with widely dispersed share capital. However, establishing a dynasty of general managers in a corporation which does not belong to the general manager’s family is extremely difficult. Therefore, at least in the second half of the 20th century, we can find that it is not dynasties who explain the high self-recruitment rate. It is not the son of the general manager succeeding his father, but a member of the same extremely small social group: the classe dominante as French sociologists call it, the ruling class or upper middle class of the Anglo-Saxon world or the Großbürgertum in Germany.

II. The main causes of self-recruitment within different Western European countries 1. Britain The way by which the French, the British and – to a lesser extent – also the American bourgeoisie monopolize the top ranks in the economy, is the education system. Their respective education systems are characterized by small elite institutions with an outstanding reputation nationally and internationally. High tuition fees and very strict entrance examinations guarantee a very exclusive social composition of the students and later a highly effective ‘old boy’ network. The best-known promotion feature can be found in Britain in the form of certain ‘public schools’, particularly the so-called Clarendon Nine (Charterhouse, Eton, Harrow, Merchant Taylors, Rugby, Shrewsbury, St. Pauls, Westminster and Winchester), schools which are, in fact, private institutions and have to be regarded as an unique institution in Europe. In combination with a degree from one of the two highly esteemed universities of Oxford and Cambridge the public schools functioned as a bottleneck by which entrance into the highest ranks of the military and diplomatic services and into the business elite were regulated during the whole 20th century. About two thirds of the chairmen of the largest British industrial corporations and banks between 1905 and 1971 were educated at a public school with chairmen of clearing banks (86 percent) and merchant banks (76 percent) at the top of the list. Among those chairmen who were university graduates (46 percent) about the same proportion attended Oxford or Cambridge (37 percent).1 1 Philip Stanworth / Anthony Giddens, An Economic Elite: A Demographic Profile of Company Chairmen, in: Philip Stanworth / Anthony Giddens (eds.), Elites and Power in British Society, Cambridge 1974, pp. 81 – 101, here pp. 82 – 86. See also John Scott / Catherine Griff, Directors of Industry: The British Corporate Network 1904 – 1976, Cambridge 1984.

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By their extremely high tuition fees, which have reached £ 25.000 p. a. in recent years, the public schools provide for a highly exclusive composition of their pupils. In the 1960s, the share of the children of former Etonians among the pupils at Eton was at about 60 percent. The attempts to level the social composition of these institutions by the introduction of a system of grants (‘Assisted Place Scheme’) in the 1980s have not achieved the desired effect so far. Although the tuition fees at Oxford and Cambridge do not have a similarly prohibitive character, the social composition of the Oxbridge graduates is highly exclusive, too. Public school and other private school leavers have a clear advantage in the entrance examination. Those leaving state-funded schools lack a similarly costly school infrastructure (equipment, teacher-pupil ratio etc.) compared to the facilities of the privately funded schools. Up to 50 percent of the school leavers from these private-funded institutions pass the exams, so that even today, former public school pupils are highly overrepresented in Oxford and Cambridge – and the higher esteemed the College, the more exclusive the composition of its students.2 2. France With regard to exclusiveness, the French education system is quite similar to the British, but the promotion feature is different because of the very close connection between the private and public sectors of the economy and government bodies. The Grandes Écoles, institutions for higher education, which are strictly separated from the university system, are characterized by a very rigorous selection procedure and high tuition fees.3 In contrast to the university system, the Grandes Écoles are generally focused on a single subject area, mainly engineering, business or humanities. The majority of these institutions were founded after the French revolution or in the 19th century in order to recruit most of France’s high-ranking civil servants, organized in the so-called Grands Corps. The four most prestigious Grandes Écoles are École nationale d’administration (ENA), founded in 1945 in order to open up and to democratise the higher civil service, École normale supérieure (ENS), the most prestigious school for humanities, École polytechnique, the most prestigious engineering school and École des hautes études commerciales (HEC), a business school and the only private institution in this group with tuition fees of 20.000 A p. a. in recent years. 2 Fritz K. Ringer, Education and Society in Modern Europe, Bloomington 1979; David Ward, The Public Schools and Industry in Britain after 1870, in: Journal of Contemporary History 2 (1967), 3, pp. 37 – 52; Hartmut Berghoff, Public Schools and the Decline of the British Economy 1870 – 1914, in: Past and Present 129 (1990), pp. 148 – 167; John Scott, Who Rules Britain?, Cambridge 1991; Asa Briggs, Politics and Reform. The British Universities, in: Franz Bosbach et al. (eds.), Prinz Albert und die Entwicklung der Bildung in England und Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert, München 2000, pp. 119 – 127; Geoffrey Walford, Introduction, in: Geoffrey Walford (ed.), British Private Schools. Research on Policy and Practice, London 2003, pp. 1 – 8. 3 For the French Grandes Écoles, please also refer to Hervé Joly’s contribution.

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In the 1950s, about one third of the general directors of the 100 largest French corporations had graduated from the École polytechnique. Since the majority of these École polytechnique graduates were admitted to one of the Grands Corps afterwards, many members of the French business elite started their career within the civil service; this is the main difference between the two patterns of recruitment. While in Britain moves between a government body and private business used to be rare exceptions, it is rather the norm among French business elite members. During the last quarter of the 20th century, the share of Grandes École graduates among the business elite was still very high, but was declining. The fact that institutions for higher education expanded during the second half of the 20th century probably in France had no impact, because the Grandes Écoles remained very small institutions with between 50 and 300 beginners per year. The reason for this emerging tendency of decline is probably the French policy of privatizing stateowned corporations, which was implemented during the 1990s and loosened the very tight connection between the Grands Corps and big business.4

3. Spain The Spanish recruitment pattern resembles the French pattern as regards the close connection between government bodies and the public and private sectors of the economy. During the Napoleonic Wars in the early 19th century, the French occupation reorganized the higher administration in Spain and remodelled it after the French Grands Corps. Despite the Spanish restoration after the defeat of the French, the Spanish corps remained extremely influential throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. In contrast to the French post-1945 attempts of reform and democratisation, the Franco regime even strengthened the extraordinary role of the corps. Up to 1983, members of the corps were allowed to hold high business positions simultaneously to their career as a civil servant. Despite the socialist governments’ attempts of democratisation and at loosening the close ties between the public sector and business during the 1980s, switching between the high civil service and big business is still very frequent. By the end of the 20th century, about 20 percent of the members of the Spanish business elite had a high public administration past. However, in contrast to the French and British systems, the Spanish system of higher education lacks elite institutions such as the Grandes Écoles or elite universities such as Oxford and Cambridge. The applicants for a corps career come from the universities all over the country without any particular privileged institution.5 4 Pierre Bourdieu, La noblesse d’État. Grandes écoles et ésprit de corps [The State Nobility. Grandes Écoles and Esprit de Corps], Paris 1989; Michael Hartmann, Soziale Öffnung oder soziale Schließung? Die deutsche und die französische Wirtschaftselite zwischen 1970 und 1995, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 26 (1997), 4, pp. 296 – 311; Michael Hartmann, Eliten und Macht in Europa, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2007. 5 Hartmann, Eliten und Macht (fn. 4), pp. 102 – 107.

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Whether the expansion of higher education in Spain, which had started much later than in Britain, France and Germany, will result in a drop of the high self-recruitment rate of the Spanish bourgeoisie, is not yet clear. So far however, there are hardly any signs of change.6

III. The German business elite in the 20th century 1. High stability, but long-term changes in social composition In Germany, we can expect a quite different situation, because neither are there schools or universities comparable to the Grandes Écoles or Oxbridge, nor do special institutions of higher administration such as the French or Spanish government corps exist nor have they ever existed. Neither has a private, not state-funded school education ever been fashionable among sons and daughters of the German bourgeoisie. The outcome, however, is not very different from Germany’s western neighbours (see table 1). In his pioneering and not yet outdated study on the ‘transformations of the German Elite’ between 1919 and 1961, the German sociologist Wolfgang Zapf characterized the German business elite as the “next to the higher clergy ( . . . ) least flexible elite group”.7 Recent research has confirmed this verdict, as the revolution of 1919 had virtually no impact on the composition of the economic elite at all. After the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933, several managers and entrepreneurs of Jewish origin were expelled from their positions, but their successors – apart from the fact that they were Reich citizens as defined by the Reich Citizenship Law of 1935 – exhibited no diverging social features compared to their predecessors. A career primarily based on political reasons was the exception even in the public sector (at least until 1942). The traditional economic elite after 1933, in general, behaved loyal towards the regime, so that there was no reason for the National Socialists to replace the ‘old men’ with ‘new men’. Only during the latter half of the Second World War did young and socially mobile men from the middle classes rise into the higher ranks of big business. However, even these so-called ‘Speer-Jünglinge’ did not substantially change the social composition of the business elite.8 6 By the late 1960s, about 90 percent of the members of the Spanish business elite descended from either the bourgeoisie or from the educated classes (see Carlos R. Alba, Bürokratie und Politik. Hohe Beamte im Franco-Regime, 1938 – 1975, in: Peter Waldmann et al. (eds.), Sozialer Wandel und Herrschaft im Spanien Francos, Paderborn 1984, pp. 211 – 235) compared to about 85 percent at the beginning of the 21st century (see table 1). 7 Wolfgang Zapf, Wandlungen der deutschen Elite. Ein Zirkulationsmodell deutscher Führungsgruppen, München 1966, p. 127. 8 Paul Erker, Industrieeliten in der NS-Zeit. Anpassungsbereitschaft und Eigeninteresse von Unternehmern in der Rüstungs- und Kriegswirtschaft 1936 – 1945, Passau 1994; Dieter Ziegler, Kontinuität und Diskontinuität der deutschen Wirtschaftselite 1900 bis 1938, in: Die-

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The caesura of 1945 did not leave its marks either. At first, several managers especially from the armaments industry and from the great banks were dispelled and often also arrested by the Allied authorities. But after the end of so-called deNazification, the majority of the members of the former elite returned to their original positions, provided that they had survived and were by now not too old for such a responsible position. The proportion of those businessmen who were forced to give up their positions permanently after the War was certainly not higher than the proportion of those businessmen who were dismissed from their posts for ‘racial’ reasons after 1933. Both pragmatic considerations of the western Allies, especially the British, who relied on the old experts in order to stabilize the post-war economy on the one hand, and the fact that the Nazi economic elite largely consisted of technocrats and not of party careerists on the other hand, may have contributed to ending the attempts to cleanse the higher ranks of big business. During the early Federal Republic, government and society had almost no problems with having the old Nazis around at all.9 The few reliable ‘party soldiers’ in top management positions of big industry had largely been social climbers, who had never succeeded in becoming socially accepted members of the business elite. This may also explain their professional and ultimately often corresponding social decline during the 1950s.10 Although Germany has not experienced any change of its business elite during the 20th century, long-term changes in the social composition of the business elite cannot be denied. In the early 20th century, the dynastic element, predominant during the 19th century, was still going strong (see table 2a). By the end of the century, this category had almost completely disappeared. Although systematic research on this issue is still lacking, we can suspect that the relative decline of family businesses and the steady rise of managerial capitalism were responsible for this trend. ter Ziegler (ed.), Großbürger und Unternehmer. Die deutsche Wirtschaftselite im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2000, pp. 31 – 53; Martin Fiedler / Bernhard Lorentz, Kontinuitäten in den Netzwerkbeziehungen der deutschen Wirtschaftselite zwischen Weltwirtschaftskrise und 1950, in: Volker R. Berghahn / Stefan Unger / Dieter Ziegler (eds.), Die deutsche Wirtschaftselite im 20. Jahrhundert. Kontinuität und Mentalität, Essen 2003, pp. 51 – 74; Martin Münzel, Die jüdischen Mitglieder der deutschen Wirtschaftselite 1927 – 1955. Verdrängung – Emigration – Rückkehr, Paderborn 2006. 9 Volker R. Berghahn, Unternehmer und Politik in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt a. M. 1985; Hervé Joly, Großunternehmer in Deutschland. Soziologie einer industriellen Elite. 1933 – 1989, Leipzig 1998; Tim Schanetzky, Unternehmer: Profiteure des Unrechts, in: Norbert Frei (ed.), Karrieren im Zwielicht. Hitlers Eliten nach 1945, Frankfurt a. M. 2001, pp. 73 – 126; Jonathan Wiesen, West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past 1945 – 1955, Chapel Hill 2001. 10 Two examples are Walter Rohland, head of Vereinigte Stahlwerke during the War (see: Manfred Rasch, Walter Rohland zwischen Kaiserreich und Bundesrepublik. Eine biographische Skizze, in: Manfred Rasch, Findbuch zum Nachlass Walter Rohland, Duisburg 2001, pp. 1 – 62) and Karl Rasche, head of Dresdner Bank during the War (see: Ralf Ahrens, Der Exempelkandidat: die Dresdner Bank und der Nürnberger Prozess gegen Karl Rasche, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 52 [2004], 4, pp. 637 – 670).

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However, despite the secular character of this development, the one-and-a-half decades between the world economic crisis and the breakdown of National Socialism in Germany functioned as a catalyst. The banishment of the Jewish members of the economic elite, who had based their position largely on family businesses, certainly accelerated the tendency of decline for business dynasties which had already been under way before the crisis.11 Table 2a German business elite: social origins 1906 – 1938 1906 “Dynasty“ Father: merchant Father: shopkeeper Father: industrialist Father: craftsman Father: landowner Father: farmer Father: higher civil servant Father: lawyer, doctor

33 4 0 4 4 0 0 4 2

Total Unidentified

51 24

1927

65% 8% 8% 8%

8% 4%

51 16 3 10 1 1 1 15 13 111 48

46% 14% 3% 9% 1% 1% 1% 13% 12%

1933 35 9 2 9 2 2 0 10 15 84 34

42 % 11 % 2% 11 % 2% 2% 12 % 18 %

1938 13 4 1 8 2 0 1 6 10

29 % 9% 2% 18 % 4% 2% 13 % 22 %

45 44

Source: Ziegler, Kontinuität (fn. 8), tab. 2, p. 45.

More recent sociological research has clearly shown that any attempt of founding a dynasty by managers of big business, which had occasionally been successful during the interwar years and during the ‘economic miracle’ of the 1950s, failed during the last quarter of the century. This means that the insignificant importance of dynasties in the business elite today cannot be explained by the decline of family businesses among the biggest enterprises alone, but also by changed patterns of recruitment in joint stock companies of scattered ownership.12 11 Peter Hayes, Big Business and ‘Aryanization’ in Germany 1933 – 1939, in: Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 3 (1994), pp. 254 – 281; Martin Fiedler, “Arisierung” der deutschen Wirtschaftselite. Ausmaß und Verlauf der Verdrängung der jüdischen Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsmitglieder in deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1933 – 1938), in: “Arisierung” im Nationalsozialismus, Jahrbuch 2000 zur Geschichte und Wirkung des Holocaust, Frankfurt a. M. 2000, pp. 59 – 83; Ziegler, Kontinuität (fn. 8), pp. 31 – 53; Hervé Joly, Ende des Familienkapitalismus? Das Überleben der Unternehmerfamilien in den deutschen Wirtschaftseliten des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Berghahn / Unger / Ziegler, Wirtschaftselite (fn. 8), pp. 75 – 91. 12 Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, Eliten, Macht und Konflikt in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen 1992; Michael Hartmann, Topmanager. Die Rekrutierung einer Elite, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 1996; Hartmann, Eliten (fn. 4); Wilhelm Bürklin et al., Eliten in Deutschland. Rekrutierung und Integration, Opladen 1997.

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Dieter Ziegler Table 2b German business elite: social origins 1970 – 1995 1970 Lower middle class Father: businessman Father: landowner Father: higher civil servant Father: lawyer, doctor

14 46 4 10 8

Total Unidentified

82 14

17% 56% 5% 12% 10%

1995 11 47 4 16 6

13% 56% 5% 19% 7%

84 13

Source: Michael Hartmann, Kontinuität oder Wandel? in: Ziegler, Großbürger (fn. 8), tab. 2, p. 80.

The decline of dynasties among the membership of the German business elite did not result in a narrowing of the importance of the family background. The social exclusiveness of the business elite remained largely untouched throughout the whole century. During the first half of the 20th century, the German business elite consisted almost completely of persons of upper middle class descent, sons of businessmen in particular, but with a rising tendency towards sons of higher bureaucrats and professionals of the educated classes (lawyers or physicians).

2. Changing educational profile This pattern of social origins can partly be explained by the rising importance of higher education for a business career that might lead to an elite position. This also explains the on average rising educational level of the sons of businessmen from the end of the 19th century on at the latest (see table 3a and table 3b). However, the transformation of the business elite into a graduate profession cannot by itself explain the unchanged and continuously narrow social recruiting base, because if education were the decisive factor, the expansion of higher education would have resulted in a widening of the recruitment patterns towards the lower middle class during the 1960s at the latest. Yet table 2b shows the opposite. With the exception of state-owned enterprises where the lower social exclusiveness of the political elite prevented a similar social confinement, the importance of sons of the upper middle class among the German business elite (women did not play any role in the German business elite during the whole century) even rose during the last quarter of the 20th century.

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Table 3a German business elite: education 1906 – 1938 1906 Apprenticeship University exam – M. phil. – Ph.D. – Law – Ph.D. in law – Engineering – unspecified Army Officer

24 26 1 – 20 4 4 4 1

Total Unidentified

50 25

1927

48% 52% 2%

54 78 8 4 51 29 17 2 2

40% 8% 8% 8% 2%

40 % 58 % 6% 3% 38 % 22 % 13 % 2% 2%

134 25

1933 28 71 6 3 39 24 22 4 2

1938

28% 70% 6% 3% 39% 24% 22% 4% 2%

101 17

24 50 3 2 32 24 13 2 1

32 % 67 % 4% 3% 43 % 32 % 17 % 3% 1%

75 14

Source: Ziegler, Kontinuität (fn. 8), tab. 3, p. 47. Table 3b German business elite: education 1970 – 1995 1970 Apprenticeship University exam – Economics – Law – Engineering Ph.D.

10 70 22 27 21 38

Total Unidentified

80 16

1995 13% 87% 28% 34% 26% 48%

6 82 33 27 22 46

7% 83 % 37 % 31 % 25 % 52 %

88 9

Source: Michael Hartmann, Kontinuität oder Wandel? in: Ziegler, Großbürger (fn. 8), tab. 2, p. 80.

3. Patterns of socialization within the bourgeoisie and the educated classes The reason for the continuously high social exclusiveness of the business elite in Germany is convincingly explained by the sociologist Michael Hartmann, who focussed on the patterns of socialization which are characteristic for the bourgeoisie and the educated classes. They create personality features which are seen as indispensable for a position in the top ranks of big business and which go beyond the specialist knowledge of the social climbers: general educational values which are

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not incorporated by even the highest school education: ‘taste’, an entrepreneurial and business-rational (‘materialistic’) attitude as well as sovereignty, if not superiority in appearance and dealings make up the ‘distinction’, which distinguishes the descendants of the upper middle class in comparison to the other social classes.13 The complex question, whether the particular middle class attitude (Bürgerlichkeit) of the 19th century – the ‘bourgeois’ century – disappeared or only changed its form and content during the 20th century, is heavily disputed among German social historians, especially as regards the petit bourgeoisie and the educated classes.14 As far as the business elite is concerned, however, research is more unanimous in asserting that, the mere fact, that the vast majority of members of the business elite lost the asset of economic independence during the 20th century by their transformation into managers with no significant shareholding in the company by which they are employed, had no impact on the way the bourgeoisie sees itself. The managers’ origin was the upper middle class and they had consequently experienced a bourgeois education and socialization. Additionally, income and fortune had been sufficient to secure a bourgeois lifestyle at all times, and finally, no difference between the public perception of an owner-entrepreneur and that of a manager exists. Secondly, the importance of education as a binding orientation among businessmen has even increased during the 20th century, while in the 19th century education was largely seen as a professional necessity and was limited to technical education (for industrialists) or commercial education (for bankers and merchants). From the point of view of the educated classes, the majority of the business elite had been seen as rich, but also uneducated and ‘primitive’ at least until the late 19th century. By the late 20th century, the educated classes no longer had any reason any longer to think so. Lastly, bourgeois achievement-orientation and devotion to work was not weakened. It is noticeable in this respect, that even during the ‘Third Reich’, political merits had only in a few exceptional cases been sufficient to be co-opted into the higher ranks of (private) big business, and in almost all of these exceptional cases, the party careerists were not accepted socially and were barely admitted to the private sphere of the achievement-oriented old elite.15 13 Hartmann, Topmanager (fn. 12); Michael Hartmann, Class-specific Habitus and the Social Reproduction of the Business Elite in Germany and France, in: The Sociological Review 48 (2000), 2, pp. 241 – 261. For the broader context see Pierre Bourdieu, La distinction: critique sociale du jugement [Distinction. A Social Critique of Judgement], Paris 1980. 14 Jürgen Kocka, Das europäische Muster und der deutsche Fall, in: Jürgen Kocka (ed.), Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, Vol. 1, Göttingen 1988, pp. 9 – 75; Hartmut Kaelble / Hasso Spode, Sozialstruktur und Lebensweise deutscher Unternehmer 1907 – 1927, in: Scripta Mercaturae 24 (1990), pp. 132 – 178; Klaus Tenfelde, Stadt und Bürgertum im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Hans Ulrich Wehler (ed.), Wege zur Geschichte des Bürgertums, Göttingen 1994, pp. 317 – 353; Christina von Hodenberg, Der Fluch des Geldsacks. Der Aufstieg der Industriellen als Herausforderung bürgerlicher Werte, in: Manfred Hettling / Stefan Hoffmann (eds.), Der bürgerliche Wertehimmel. Innenansichten des 19. Jahrhunderts, Göttingen 2000, pp. 79 – 104. 15 For the persistence of ‘bourgeois’ values see Cornelia Rauh-Kühne, Zwischen “verantwortlichem Wirkungskreis” und “häuslichem Glanz”. Zur Innenansicht wirtschaftsbürger-

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IV. Conclusion: New tendencies during the second half of the 20th century? At the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, the tension between the social exclusion practiced by the educated classes towards the lower middle classes as well as the working class on the one hand and the universal demand for equal citizenship, which had characterized the middle classes in the 19th century, on the other hand, became more exacerbated again. This is undoubtedly true for the recruitment strategies and the marriage patterns of the sons and daughters of businessmen; yet this is not particular to the second half of the 20th century. However, the fact is new that the vast majority of the business elite became extremely reluctant to disclose information about their private life, especially regarding their social origins and religious belief. This must be interpreted as such, that the bourgeoisie did no longer accept impermeable class boundaries as an appropriate feature of societal structuring because it contradicts achievement-orientation and that they did not want their position to be seen as a result of their social origin (instead of their achievements). It is not yet clear, whether this change of attitude is true for the middle classes of the Federal Republic as a whole, since the border area between the bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie is not explored in this paper. The most significant longterm characteristic and probably the most important difference between the bourgeoisie on the one hand and the educated classes and the petit bourgeoisie on the other hand was the fact that the fear of proletarisation, which had panicked the German middle classes during the interwar years had no real (i. e. material) background for the business elite. Additionally, the business elite had experienced a loss of societal exclusivity as well, but the levelling of boundaries between the segments of the German society because of the appearance of the welfare state – a second reason for middle class fear during the interwar years – was no real danger to the business elite. Undoubtedly, the crisis of the middle class life-style probably had a far-reaching effect on class awareness in all segments of the middle class with the exception of the bourgeoisie. The long-term consequences of this feeling of crisis combined with the National Socialist ‘People’s Community’ and the ‘Americanisation’ of West German society – not to mention the destruction of the bourgeoisie in the GDR – are not yet clear. This may be one of the most pressing demands for future research in business (entrepreneurial) and social (middle class) history.

licher Familien im 20. Jahrhundert, in: Ziegler, Großbürger (fn. 8), pp. 215 – 248; Hans Ulrich Wehler, Deutsches Bürgertum nach 1945: Exitus oder Phoenix aus der Asche?, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 27 (2001), 4, pp. 617 – 634.

Hungarian Economic Elites in the Twentieth Century By Ágnes Pogány* I. Introduction There was and still there is a growing interest in the history of businessmen in Hungary. Since the end of the 1970s, much research was undertaken in this field. We know already quite a lot about the merchant bankers of Budapest or about the owners of the biggest steam flour and sugar mills of the late 19th and early 20th century. While West European social historians studied the history of the deprived working classes in the 1980s, Hungarian historians rediscovered the bourgeois roots of the Hungarian society while uncovered the forgotten figures of the past, the entrepreneurs and wrote the stories of large business dynasties.1 Although there is a growing knowledge on the history of the business fortunes or on the composition and recruitment of the business elites in the long 19th century, we know much less about the social and economic processes of the short 20th century. Especially the period 1945 to 1989 is a neglected field of study. We know hardly anything about the leaders of the former socialist companies, the worker-directors, the cadre-managers or the ‘red barons’ although they were prominent and influential figures shaping the economic processes in that time. * The author wishes to express her gratitude for the financial support granted by the Hungarian Research Fund (OTKA) in the framework of the research project K 60693 that helped to prepare this paper. 1 See e. g. Károly Vörös, Budapest legnagyobb adófizetoi 1873 – 1917 [The Biggest Taxpayers of Budapest 1873 – 1917], Budapest 1979; Péter Hanák, A tokés vállakozótól a hivatásos menedzserig [From the Capitalist Entrepreneur to the Professional Manager], in: Századok 116 (1982), 3, pp. 577 – 583; László Varga, A hazai nagyburzsoázia történetébol [From the History of the Domestic Haute Bourgeoisie], in: Valóság 26 (1983), 3, pp. 75 – 89; László Varga, Egy finánctokés karrier. A Weiss család és Weiss Manfréd [A Finance-Capitalist Career, The Weiss Family and Manfréd Weiss], in: Történelmi Szemle 25 (1983), 1, pp. 36 – 66; Károly Halmos, Vállalkozói csoportok a századfordulón Magyarországon [Entrepreneurial Groups at the Turn of the Century in Hungary], in: Szociológia 16 (1987), 3, pp. 433 – 441; György Kövér, Simon Krausz. Egy magánbankár a huszadik században [Simon Krausz. A Private Banker in the 20th Century], in: Valóság 30 (1987), 9, pp. 56 – 62; György Lengyel, Vállalkozók, bankárok, kereskedok, A magyar gazdasági elit a 19. században és a 20. század elso felében [Entrepreneurs, Bankers, Merchants, The Hungarian Business Elite in the 19th Century and in the First Half of the 20th Century], Budapest 1989; Vera Bácskai, A vállalkozók elofutárai, Nagykereskedok a reformkori Pesten [The Forerunners of Entrepreneurs, Wholesale Merchants in Vormärz Pest], Budapest 1989.

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The political and economic transformation after 1989 made the research on the business elites significant again. In these years, several hypotheses were drawn up concerning the possible outcomes of the political and economic changes and about the composition of the new business elites. Sociologists investigated the recruitment and social background of the emerging business leaders and tried to draw conclusions on the likely formation of a new group at the top of the society. Historical research was much scarce in this respect, it has failed to analyse the long-run social processes and to draw the consequences until now. The position of the business elites at the top of social hierarchy was assured by the possession of three main assets: economic power, social prestige and political influence.2 Neither of them was achieved easily and all of them were lost many times during the 20th century. The traumas of two world wars, the great depression, the Holocaust and the nearly complete nationalization of private enterprises after 1945 and, finally, the collapse of the state socialism mark the main cleavages in this narrative. II. The Hungarian business elite between the two world wars In 1914, Hungary was still an agricultural country, where nearly two third of the population worked in the agriculture. In comparison, Hungary belonged to the poorer third of Europe. The amount of the GDP per capita was only 43 percent of the British and 55 percent of the German one, but it slightly exceeded that of Spain, Romania or Poland.3 In the last third of the 19th century, the industrialization gathered speed and several industrial regions emerged. By 1914, a 22.000 km long railway network and an integrated banking system encompassed all parts of the country. Urbanisation also accelerated, nearly one million inhabitants lived in the capital city before World War I. The transformation of the agriculture and urbanisation gave a good basis for development in the food processing and engineering industries. Budapest became the second biggest flour milling centre of the world after Minneapolis and the production of railway vehicles and agricultural machines became also significant. By 1914, industry produced one third of national income already. By the beginning of the 20th century, Hungarian entrepreneurs managed to establish themselves as an accepted part of the society. From the end of the 18th century, generations of business families accumulated wealth and social prestige that could guarantee them a secure place in the higher echelons of the society. In the interwar years, the biggest wealth was owned by large landowners and by big business. One can find aristocrats, entrepreneurs and house-owners on the list of top fortunes in the 1920s and 1930s.4 2 Yousef Cassis, Big Business, The European Experience in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 1997, p. 189. 3 Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820 – 1992, Paris 1995, pp. 194 – 198; Angus Maddison, The World Economy. Historical Statistics, Paris 2003, pp. 60 f.

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The business elite of interwar Hungarian society consisted of the owners and leading managers of the biggest companies, the heads of the big Budapest banks. In the last decades of the 19th century, big joint stock companies evolved which were no more administered by the members of the owner family but full-time salaried managers. Although the managers themselves had not huge private wealth, their high wages outstanding living standard and consumption guaranteed their acceptance in the new business elites. The life style, fortune and yearly income of the business elite rivalled that of the traditional ruling class. It was not exceptional that the incomes of a banker or of an industrial magnate were even higher than that of an aristocrat. One can find the descendants of the long established business dynasties at the top of the business elite. The history of some of the Hungarian entrepreneurial families could be traced back to the end of the 18th century or to the beginning of the 19th century. Several of the largest companies were still managed by the heirs of the founding families such as the industrialist csepeli Weiss or budai Goldberger family. Not only the heirs to business dynasties took over the family firms from their fathers but it also happened in other cases. Influential leading managers of the large banks or industrial companies left their chairs to their sons. Pál Bíró inherited the general manager’s post of the biggest Hungarian industrial company (Iron Works of Rimamurány-Salgótarján) from his father Ármin Bíró and Ferenc Chorin, the head of the big coal mining firm of Salgótarján (Salgótarjáni Koszénbánya) left his position to his son as well just like his presidential chair at the influential lobbying organization, the Hungarian Manufacturers’ Association. The respected and powerful Hungarian General Credit Bank, the bank of the government since 1873, was also managed by dynasties of bankers. Pál, the son of the legendary Zsigmond Kornfeld, became one of the heads of the Credit Bank following the death of his father. Three generations of the Ullmanns also served at the top of the Credit Bank. Managing director Gyula Klein established himself a new banker dynasty together with his three sons, Ferenc, István and Pál already in the 1920s. Sons followed their fathers even in the lower ranks of service in the bank.5

4 See for example: Dezso ö Zentay, Beszéloü számok [Talking Numbers], Vol. IV, Budapest 1936; Dezsoö Zentay, Beszéloü számok [Talking Numbers], Vol. IX, Budapest 1941. 5 György Kövér, Bankárok és bürokraták. A Magyar Általános Hitelbank igazgatósági tanácsa és igazgatósága, 1876 – 1905 [Bankers and Bureaucrats, The Council of Directors and the Board of Directors of the Hungarian General Credit Bank 1876 – 1905], in: Aetas 20 (2005), 1 – 2, pp. 93 – 115; György Ránki, The Hungarian General Credit Bank in the 1920s, in: Alice Teichova / Philip L. Cottrell (eds.), International Business and Central Europe, 1918 – 1939, Leicester 1983, pp. 355 – 373; Ágnes Pogány, Bankárok és üzletfelek. A Magyar Általános Hitelbank és vállalati ügyfelei a két világháború között [Bankers and Clients, The Hungarian General Creditbank and her Business Partners between the Two World Wars], in: Replika. Társadalomtudományi folyóirat, 1997, 25 (March), pp. 55 – 67; György Tallós, A Magyar Általános Hitelbank története [The History of the Hungarian General Creditbank], Budapest 1995.

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1. Composition and recruitment Founders of the large corporations had similar social origin. A significant precondition to business success was a privileged family background. Social networks based on family ties were utilised in order to mobilize finance, talents and information as social networks were considered as the most secure basis for conducting business even in the case of the large corporations during the first half of the 20th century.6 The business elite was a closed social group in Hungary, similarly to other countries in the interwar period. There was precious little chance to get to the upper crust merely with the help of individual gift and diligence but without powerful family support. In their overwhelming majority, business leaders have been recruited among the privileged classes – landowners, businessmen senior civil servants, professionals. Nobody had descended from the peasantry that represented the majority of the Hungarian society and a working class background has remained exceptional within the business elite. The massive increase in the number of salaried managers widened only modestly the social background from which businessmen were recruited. In 1937, 38 percent of the business leaders were themselves sons of businessmen. 30 percent of bankers came from a family of high social prestige (landowners and senior civil servants).7 One of the special features of the Hungarian recruitment patterns was that the proportion of businessmen having an intellectual background was high even in international comparison. The great depression led to the collapse of many business ventures and caused a change in the composition of the business elite. Between 1927 and 1937, already 40 percent of the business leaders were replaced. Elite circulation was intensified from the late 1930s. As a consequence of anti-Semitic discriminatory measures of the Hungarian government during the Second World War, Jewish businessmen were removed from the top of many private enterprises and lobbying organizations. The evolving war economy also contributed to the replacement of the business elite as many industrial firms were put under military or government control in order to oversee war production. Between 1937 and 1943, 55 percent of the multi-positional elite (bankers, top managers and leaders of employers’ organizations with three or more positions on boards of directors or boards of supervision) were replaced.8 Due to these changes, the ratio of businessmen with a business family background decreased from 38 to 26 percent. On the other hand, the ratio of business leaders with a landowner or civil servant father increased to 37 percent and the proportion of professionals’ sons increased to 21 percent. Career patterns had also changed. 6 John F. Wilson, British Business History, 1720 – 1994, Manchester / New York 1995, p. 25. 7 Lengyel, Vállalkozók, bankárok (fn. 1), pp. 100 – 108. 8 György Lengyel, A multipozicionális gazdasági elit a két világháború között (Fejezetek egy történetszociológiai kutatásból [The Multi-positional Elite between the two World Wars (Chapters from a Research of Historical Sociology)], Budapest 1993, p. 64.

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While in 1937 half of the members of the business elite started work in the private business and 36 percent of them in the state or military administration, the ratio of the latter rose to 44 percent by 1943.9 Hungarian business elite was many-sided taking into account its origin and denomination. The beer brewer Dreher family came from Austria, the flour-mill owner and beer brewer Haggenmachers from Switzerland. Gudbrand Gregersen the founder of a huge building company arrived from Norway, the Havel dynasty from Bohemia. The highly successful Jewish family csepeli Weiss originated in Moravia, The sugar industrialists and private banker Hatvany-Deutsch family moved from Koszeg, a town in West-Hungary to Arad and later to Pest during the following generations. According to the research of György Lengyel, the proportion of Jews in the Hungarian multi-positional elite was about 25 percent, the ratio of Germans around 20 percent and approximately half of the businessmen were Hungarians between the two world wars.10 Entrepreneurs belonging to various ethnic and confessional groups co-operated with each other well, they were members of the same lobbying organizations, worked together in the various economic committees of the Parliament. Some of them were even elected to the Upper House. The social contacts were not reduced to common business or political activity, the families of the business elite attended the same dinners, evening parties and opera performances, they spent their summer holidays at the same spas and seaside resorts. Although anti-Semitic discourse and sentiments gathered space from the early 1920s, in the Hungarian society, big Jewish entrepreneurial families were not socially discriminated until 1944. Erzsébet, the daughter of György Ullmann, took part in the most exclusive balls of the time, the Opera ball and the balls at the aristocratic Park Club, even during the first years of the Second World War and had several dance partners among the young aristocrats. But she was present on the ball of the protestant industrialist family Haggenmachers as well. The most influential politicians, prime ministers, diplomats and other important figures of the political economic and cultural life were present on the dinner parties and shootings of Ferenc Chorin, György Ullmann or Móric Kornfeld. Members of the traditional aristocracy just as the families of the business life visited the country houses of the Jewish magnates frequently.11

Lengyel, A multipozicionális (fn. 8), p. 70. Ibidem, pp. 40 f. 11 Balázs Ablonczy, Mérey Erzsébet és Mérey György élettörténete [The Life of Elisabeth and György Mérey], Manuscript, Budapest 2007; Daisy Strasserné Chorin / András D. Bán Az Andrássy úttól a Park Avenue-ig. Fejezetek Chorin Ferenc életébol (1879 – 1964) [From the Andrássy Street to Park Avenue, Chapters from the Life of Ferenc Chorin (1879 – 1964)], Budapest 1999, pp. 28 f., 33 f.; Móric Kornfeld, Trianontól Trianonig, Tanulmányok, dokumentumok, közreadja Széchenyi Ágnes [From Trianon to Trianon, Essays, Documents, published by Ágnes Széchenyi], Budapest 2006, pp. 59 f. 9

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2. Education and competence According to the investigations of György Lengyel, Hungarian businessmen were among the most educated ones in international comparisons. 78 percent of entrepreneurs born between 1860 and 1890 had a higher education, 11 percent attended only secondary schools. 44.5 percent of them undertook a study-tour abroad. The following generation born after 1891 was even more competent. 95 percent of the younger generation of businessmen being active in the interwar years had a university degree and 28.7 percent of them took part in study trips in foreign countries. Being on the job training and practice – that was a significant form of education even in the second half of the 19th century, had practically disappeared after 1920. The ratio of businessmen with higher education is similar to the French data and is much higher than in many other countries in Europe or in the United States.12 Law degrees were most popular at the beginning of the 20th century but technical and economic higher education became more general later.13

3. Puritanism and luxury consumption The acquisition and multiplication of business fortunes was legitimized by the ambition to preserve or even to improve the social standing of the family. Some of the successful businessmen were ennobled and part of them got even the title of baron from the emperors Franz Joseph and his son Charles IV. in the last decades of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Several businessmen bought extended landed estates as well. Jenoá Dreher, president of the Dreher-Haggenmacher First Hungarian Beer Brewery, lived with his family on a large estate in a luxury country house of Martonvásár that he had bought from the archduke Joseph of Habsburg in 1897. The sugar manufacturer family Tornyay-Schosberger had several large landed property in Hungary. The Hatvany family was the owner of a landed estate of 4.000 cadastral yoke in Hatvan where they lived in a big Baroque mansion.14 The public opinion but even some historians consider this lifestyle as a sign of the decline of the entrepreneurial spirit and the abandonment of bourgeois values. The theses of gentryfication and feudalisation of the business elites were much debated and were rejected in many respects in the British and German case. As 12 Lengyel, Vállalkozók, bankárok (fn. 1), pp. 122 – 125; Cassis, Big Business (fn. 2), pp. 132 – 136. 13 György Lengyel, A magyar gazdasági vezetés professzionalizációjának két hulláma [Two Waves of Professionalisation of the Hungarian Economic Management], in: Szociológiai Szemle 1994, 3, pp. 3 – 14, here pp. 8 f. 14 Halmos Károly, A Hatvany-Deutsch dinasztia. A Nagyvállalkozók és befekteto ák nemzedékei [The Hatvany-Deutsch Dynasty, Generations of Big Entrepreneurs and Investors], in: Marcell Seboák (ed.), Sokszínû kapitalizmus. Pályaképek a magyar toákés fejloádés aranykorából [Multi-coloured Capitalism, Carriers from the Golden Age of Hungarian Capitalist Development], Budapest 2004, pp. 84 – 97.

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Dolores L. Augustine-Perez puts it: “As industrialists, merchants and bankers moved into the upper echelons of the social hierarchy, they came to accept the established status symbols. This was not a form of self-abasement but rather a means of documenting and legitimizing their new social status.”15 The situation was very similar in Hungary as well. The majority of wealthy businessmen did not abandon their entrepreneurial activities after ennoblement and was not absorbed into the aristocracy, although there was some intermarriage between the two segments of the social elites. Most of them also preserved their business mentality. Landed property was not only the display of wealth and power. Acquisition of agricultural properties served business purposes as well. Some families, like the Hatvanys or the Schosbergers, bought landed estates in order to increase the efficiency of their firms. Highly rational and modernized agricultural production on their estates served their industrial activity in food processing (sugar and flour mills, tinned food and fodder production). The Weiss family acquired real properties in order to spread risks of their ventures in times of depressions; they obtained real estates to invest their idle money.16 Real estate could serve as collateral in case of borrowing and an easy to sell asset in case of illiquidity. The domain in Derekegyháza bought by Manfréd Weiss served the recreation of the larger family. Friends and relatives were invited, and the son in law of Manfréd Weiss, Ferenc Chorin jr. invited his friends, business partners and influential politicians there for hunting twice a year. György Ullmann, his wife and children were passionate hunters who also invited reputed guests to their shootings on their estate in Béla five or six times in every summer. Shooting was a good opportunity to discuss business and politics and to strengthen the links of trust and co-operation.17 In spite of their big fortunes, many entrepreneurs had a leaning towards selfrestraint and Puritanism. The multimillionaire Manfréd Weiss had allegedly only three suits. Thrift and soundness was well compatible with the consumption culture of the upper middle class. Accumulated wealth and high incomes made philanthropy and patronage of the arts possible. These activities became the pillars of selfesteem and social legitimation. Wealthy businessmen supported welfare institutions, schools and churches, patronised writers, poets, painters and sport clubs.

4. Business elite and economic anti-Semitism The Hungarian society was marked by a growing social discontent and distributional conflicts during the interwar period. The loss of the war, trauma of the ensuing Peace Treaty, hyperinflation and the Great Depression caused increasing 15 Dolores L. Augustine-Perez, Very Wealthy Businessmen in Imperial Germany, in: Youssef Cassis (ed.), Business Elites, Aldershot 1994, pp. 595 – 617, here p. 597. 16 Varga, Egy fináncto úkés karrier (fn. 1). 17 Strasserné Chorin / Bán, Az Andrássy úttól (fn. 11), p. 38; Ablonczy, Mérey Erzsébet (fn. 11).

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Anti-Semitism and the criticism of wealthy Jewish bankers and entrepreneurs. Some economists and politicians considered that the expropriation and redistribution of the accumulated Jewish wealth could secure the needed financial base for a social and economic modernization.18 From 1938 on, anti-Semitic laws and decrees were passed by the Hungarian Parliament and government.19 The bills’ principal objective was to reduce the number and the influence of the Jews in the Hungarian economy and society. The first bill maximised in 20 percent, the second one in 6 percent the ratio of Jews in many professions. Not only the number of Jewish employees but the amount of their wages got also restricted, many licences to practice trade and industry were withdrawn as well. By the end of 1942, 222.000 people lost their living including family members.20 None of the discriminative bills were, however, completely fulfilled. As long as state enterprises dismissed or pensioned their Jewish employees, private firms sought the back door to escape restrictions. Black economy flourished, a ‘Strohmann’ system was established in that many people who had lost their jobs could modestly maintain their existence. In order to fulfil the quota prescriptions of the anti-Semitic measures, fictive employees were hired at the companies. All this happened frequently under the silent consent of the authorities that were interested in the unhindered functioning of the war economy. Small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, journalists and actors, employed intellectuals were those who were most seriously touched by the discriminative legislation. The Jewish part of the economic elite was hurt only modestly until 1944. They had to leave the Upper House of the Parliament, the boards of the professional organizations, banks and joint stock companies but retained their firms and private wealth.21 18 Krisztián Ungváry, “Árjásítás” és “modernizáció”. Adalékok Imrédy Béla miniszterelnöki mûködéséhez és a zsidótörvények geneziséhez [“Aryanization” and “Modernization”. Contribution to the Activity of Béla Imrédy as a Prime Minister and to the Genesis of the Jewish Bills], in: Századvég 9 (2002), 4, pp. 3 – 37, here pp. 3 f.; Ágnes Pogány, Economic Anti-Semitism in Hungary after Trianon, in: Helga Schultz / Eduard Kubu (eds.), History and Culture of Economic Nationalism in East Central Europe, Berlin 2006, pp. 219 – 230. 19 László Karsai, A magyarországi zsidótörvények és rendeletek, 1920 – 1944 [Hungarian Jewish Laws and Decrees, 1920 – 1944], in: Századok 138 (2004), 6, pp. 1285 – 1304; Yehuda Don, The Economic Dimensions of Antisemitism: Anti-Jewish Legislation in Hungary 1938 – 1944, in: East European Quaterly 20 (1987), 4, pp. 447 – 465, here pp. 448 f. 20 Randolph L. Braham, A népirtás politikája, A Holocaust Magyarországon [The Politics of Genocide, The Holocaust in Hungary], Vol. 1, Budapest 1997, pp. 122 f., 151 f.; Ungváry, “Á;rjásítás” és “modernizáció” (fn. 18), pp. 7, 17 – 19. 21 Karsai, A magyarországi zsidótörvények (fn. 19), p. 1297; Gábor Kádár / ZoltánVági, Aranyvonat. Fejezetek a zsidó vagyon történetébol [Gold Train. Chapters from the History of the Jewish Wealth], Budapest 2001, pp. 23 f.; Ungváry, “Árjásítás” és “modernizáció” (fn. 18), pp. 20 f.; Viktor Karády, A magyar zsidóság helyzete az antiszemita törvények idején [The Situation of the Hungarian Jews during the Period of Anti-Semite Legislation], in: Medvetánc (1985), 2 – 3, pp. 41 – 91.

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Before 1944, the Hungarian governments opposed the complete plunder of the Jewish fortune in spite of the increasing pressure of Nazi Germany and demands of the extreme right political movements. Conservative principles and practical considerations made Regent Horthy and his advisors distrustful to the ‘total settling of the Jewish question’.22 The radical and immediate displacement of the Jews from the economy was regarded very dangerous and unworkable because it could have led to the complete breakdown of the economy and society. Following the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, these considerations were swept away.23 The replacement of the business elite accelerated and the deprivation of the fortune began in April 1944 when the Prime Minister issued a decree according to that Jews had to declare and hand over all their wealth exceeding the value of ten thousands pengo. Jewish companies, shops stockpiles and real estates were seized by the Hungarian state and became redistributed to ‘Christian’ persons. The dispossession was made complete by the decree of Szálasi in November 1944 stating that “all of the Jewish wealth was taken over by the state as the fortune of the nation.”24 That meant the total deprivation of the business and private wealth, the economic liquidation of the Hungarian Jewish enterprises. Many businessmen were arrested and taken to concentration camps. Some of the business leaders could only escape by offering their firms to the German authorities, like the Weiss-Chorin family in order to leave for Portugal.25 Others were less fortunate, could not flee and many renowned businessmen died in the last months of World War II as Leó Goldberger and Jeno Vida.

III. The Hungarian economic elite after the Second World War The liquidation of the Hungarian business elite took a radical turn again following the summer of 1947. From that time on, the Hungarian government accelerated the program of nationalization. The Central Bank and big commercial banks were put under state control in August 1947 and taken into state ownership in November the same year. In March 1948, every company that employed more than hundred workers were also nationalized. By the end of 1949, state ownership became almost 22 Krisztián Ungváry, “Nagy jelentoségû szociálpolitikai akció” – adalékok a zsidó vagyon begyûjtéséhez és elosztásához Magyarországon 1944-ben [À Welfare Action of Big Importance’ Data on the Collection and Distribution of the Jewish Wealth in Hungary in 1944], in: Évkönyv X, Budapest 2002, pp. 287 – 321. 23 Karsai, A magyarországi zsidótörvények (fn. 19) p. 1302. 24 Kádár / Vági, Aranyvonat (fn. 21), pp. 30 – 38. 25 Strasserné Chorin / Bán, Az Andrássy úttól (fn. 11), pp. 43 – 46; Braham, A népirtás politikája (fn. 20), pp. 532 – 546; Elek Karsai / Miklós Szinai, A Weiss Manfréd vagyon német kézbe kerülésének története. [The History of the Fall of Manfréd Weiss’ Fortune into German Hands], in: Századok 95 (1961), 4 – 5, pp. 680 – 719; Kádár / Vági, Aranyvonat (fn. 21), pp. 155 – 168.

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complete, even the majority of small-scale enterprises ceased to be private. Private entrepreneurship disappeared; business and private fortunes were deprived without compensation. A part of the former business elite emigrated abroad, others were relocated by force to the countryside and former business leaders often became manual workers.26 Nationalization was accompanied by political and legal discrimination, open infringement of the laws and show trials. Leading managers of foreign owned companies were accused of trumped-up charges like sabotage and espionage to justify the takeover of foreign property to the outside world and to avoid the payment of compensation for the foreign shareholders. Imre Geiger and Zoltán Radó, managers of the Standard Company, were sentenced to death. Simon Papp general manager of the US owned Oil Company MAORT was imprisoned in another showtrial.27 1. The worker-director The former leading managers were replaced by new directors at the top of the nationalized companies in 1948. The new heads were called worker-directors because the majority of them were factory workers before their nominations. During these years, 20.000 former workers and peasants were put to leading economic positions of industrial companies, state farms or other state owned economic units in cities and in the countryside. Their most important task was the perfect execution of the central directives.28

a) Recruitment composition and education The social background of the newly formed economic elite differed fundamentally from its predecessor. The process of professionalisation that had begun in the first half of the 20th century was broken and new recruitment patterns emerged.29 Economic leaders were considered as political cadres which had to carry out the instructions from above. Political reliability became most important when workers directors were selected. Cadre officers investigated the reliability of the possible cadre they had to verify the trustworthiness of the future leader on the basis of his political education and views, his ability to develop politically-ideologically and 26 Iván Peto / Sándor Szakács, A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története, 1945 – 1985 [Four Decades of Domestic Economy, 1945 – 1985], Budapest 1985, pp. 80 – 82, 95 – 103. 27 Lajos Srágli, A MAORT, Olaj – Gazdaság – Politika [The MAORT, Oil – Economy – Politics], Budapest, 1998; Lajos Srágli, American Capital and the Hungarian Oil Industry, in: The Hungarian Quarterly 42 (2001), No. 162, pp. 71 – 84. 28 Tibor Valuch, Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század második felében [The Social History of Hungary in the Second Half of he Twentieth Century], Budapest 2001, pp. 134 f. 29 Lengyel, A magyar gazdasági vezetés (fn. 13), pp. 3 – 14.

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his whole former life. Information was gathered from family members, neighbours and fellow workers, classmates from the school years, etc.30 Education and professional knowledge were only secondary in importance, loyalty dominated clearly. The overwhelming majority of the new economic leaders were members of the Communist Party (Hungarian Workers Party) that guaranteed loyalty of the members. Competence and professional skills became negligible, two thirds of the new directors finished only six classes or less of elementary school. The worker-directors did not have the necessary knowledge for the management of large companies and the completion of some cram-courses was no help at all. Whereas 75 percent of the state companies’ directors had a working class background, only 50 percent of the top management in the ministries came from a worker’s family. Civil servants in the state administration responsible for strategic decision-making in the economy were selected along more complex criteria. Loyalty and trustworthiness were indispensable even at this level. More than 80 percent of the top leaders of the ministries were members of the party. Competence and professional routine got more importance on the higher echelons of state administration, two thirds of the ministerial officers worked as professionals or white collar workers before, 25 percent of them were in public service already before World War II. 95 percent of the public servants who had been active in the 1950s had secondary or higher education.31 Although reliability was the most important point, suspicion and campaigns of alertness prevailed in the whole economy. As a consequence, economic leaders were permanently rotated on both levels of economic management (companies and ministries). 30 – 40 percent of the economic leaders were substituted yearly on average. There was a growing demand for the new cadres in the state administration as well.32 Worker-directors who were unable to oversee the complex production processes often employed the former managers or owners of the enterprise ‘the irreplaceable reactionaries’ on a subordinated post in order to give advice and assistance. Chief engineers had also a significant role in the management of the companies. The majority of them had a university degree and more than 50 percent of them had a professional or civil servant background. Although 25 percent of the chief engineers were not members of the party, they were allowed to be on a leading post.33

30 György Gyarmati, A káderrendszer és a rendszer kádere az ötvenes években [The System of Cadres and the Cadres of the System in the 1950s], in: Valóság 34 (1991), 1, pp. 51 – 63, here pp. 51 f. 31 Lengyel, A magyar gazdasági vezetés (fn. 13), p. 9. 32 Valuch, Magyarország (fn. 28), p. 135. 33 Lengyel, A magyar gazdasági vezetés (fn. 13), p. 10.

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2. Cadre-managers From the early 1960s, the composition of the Hungarian economic elite began to change. Following the slow consolidation of the Kádár-regime, the political oppression started to diminish, a process of depoliticization took place. The private sphere and the personal consumption became important again. In order to achieve economic growth, the rising living standard and an increasing satisfaction of the consumption demands of the population had reshaped the model of the planned economy. Following the economic reform of 1968, enterprises ceased to receive obligatory economic orders from above to fulfil, instead they got a relative independence in setting prices, managing their production and investments. Central economic authorities retained their controlling mechanisms through indirect and informal methods, however. Due to these changes, the selection mechanisms of company directors and other leading managers had changed. The new generation of the cadre-managers who replaced the worker-directors had to comply with three criteria: economic expertise and management skills became also important beside political loyalty. Leaders of companies and co-operatives remained part of the ‘nomenclature’ that meant that the nomination to or dismissal from these posts was in the competence of special party organs well into the middle of the 1980s. In 1984, a new company law was passed by the parliament that introduced bids for the posts of company managers.34 a) Recruitment The recruitment patterns and social features of the Kádár-era’s economic elite differed fundamentally from that of its predecessor in the early 1950s. Although the party decisions of 1957 stated that non party members are allowed to work on every post except in the party organization, party membership retained its role, as a demonstration of political trustworthiness. Even in the late 1980s, 80 percent of the economic elite were member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Working class background ceased to be significant however, when determining the reliability and acceptability of the future manager. The economic elite became more open in the 1970s and 1980s, the proportion of business leaders with a professional background increased considerably. By the middle of the 1980s, 40 percent of the managers had a white-collar worker father, 14.3 percent among them came from a professional background. The proportion of directors with a working class origin 34 Valuch, Magyarország (fn. 28), pp. 129, 134 f.; György Lengyel, A magyar gazdasági elit társadalmi összetétele a huszadik század végén [The Social Structure of the Hungarian Economic Elite at the End of the Twentieth Century], Budapest 2007, pp. 52, 59 f.; Petr Mateju / Eric Hanley, Die Herausbildung ökonomischer und politischer Eliten in Ostmitteleuropa, in: Magarditsch A. Hatschikjan / Franz Lothar Altmann (Hg.), Eliten im Wandel, Politische Führung, wirtschaftliche Macht und Meinungsbildung im neuen Osteuropa, Paderborn 1998, pp. 145 – 171, here pp. 150 – 152; István Szakadát, Káderfo(r)gó, A hatásköri listák elemzése [The Catching / Rotation of Cadres, An Analysis of the Nomenclature], in: Társadalmi Szemle 47 (1992), 8 – 9, pp. 97 – 120.

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decreased to 25 percent.35 By the end of the 1980s, the proportion of the top managers with a professional background increased even further due to the change of generations in the higher positions of the economy. b) Education A new wave of professionalisation begun, the significance of higher education and competence increased considerably even on the company level. Nearly 75 percent of the leading managers of the firms, and more than 90 percent of the top economic administration had higher education in the late 1980s. The majority of the economic elite had a technical or economic degree.36 Although the level of competence increased significantly, the proportion of economic elite members speaking at least one foreign language was very low. In 1983, it was only 25 percent and by 1987, it increased slightly to 32 percent.37

3. Red barons One of the big deficiencies of historical research is that we know hardly anything about the persons who lead the state socialist companies. Although there is a so-called cadre-statistics, it does not contain many details and gives only an overall picture. Even biographical encyclopaedias are too laconic. Micro-level investigations on the top managers, on their individual career patterns, families, life styles, homes or mentality are also missing. After the economic reform of 1968, enterprises got more autonomy in their economic activity; especially big firms could strengthen their position against central and local bodies. These companies had a privileged situation among the others, they were given individual treatment and many special advantages by the central authorities. Due to their good bargaining position and great economic weight, they had a better access to bottleneck goods, such as convertible currencies, central investment funds or Western imports, were often exempted from general economic restrictions and were granted special favors in production and marketing. These enterprises were powerful enough to block economic reforms when it turned to threaten their favorable position from the early 1970s on and successfully defended their privileges during the economic depression of the late 1970s and 1980s. 35 György Lengyel, A gazdasági elit a 80-as években és az átmenet idoszakában [The Economic Elite in the 1980s and during the Transition], in: Rudolf Andorka / Tamás Kolosi / György Vukovich (eds.), Társadalmi riport [Social Report], Budapest 1992, pp. 201 – 221, here pp. 201 – 203. 36 Lengyel, A magyar gazdasági vezetés (fn. 13), pp. 11 f. 37 János Kisdi / Rózsa Kulcsár, A hatalom gazdasági elitje az elmúlt évtizedben [The Economic Elite in the Last Decade], in: Statisztikai Szemle 69 (1991), 10, pp. 789 – 797, here pp. 796 f.

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The powerful heads of these favored big enterprises were called red barons. Ede Horváth, the general manager of the Rába Hungarian Waggon- and Engineering Factory of Gyor, was a typical and well-known member of the socialist economic elite. He started his carrier as a skilled worker in GyoÁr before World War II. He became famous as a Stakhanovist in 1951, was appointed director of the MachineTools Works of Gyor and in 1963, he became the head of the merged Waggon Works as well. He kept his seat well until 1989. Horváth can be considered as one of the most successful socialist entrepreneurs and lobbyists. He managed to increase the economic significance of his company at a great deal by several big investments and mergers. He was not only the general manager of one of the biggest enterprises in Hungary but had important political functions as well that enhanced his influence further. He was a member of the parliament, assistant later ordinary member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party.38 The economic elite of the state socialism consisted not only of the red barons or influential leaders of the biggest agricultural co-operatives. Bankers were also an integral part of it. The well-educated and competent young bankers speaking foreign languages fluently working in the central office of the National Bank of Hungary stood also on the top. During the 1980s, when the mono-bank system was liberalized and several commercial banks were established, they gained leading positions at the head of the new banks.39

4. The “New Entrepreneurs” A characteristic feature of the existing socialism was the permanent, although reduced, presence of the small private business even in the most dogmatic, Stalinist period. The state owned sectors, the big bureaucratic companies were not able to meet all of the demands of the population. Small scale private firms were necessary to secure a more balanced functioning of the economy. Until the early 1980s, mostly the traditional forms of small-scale business (artisans, small shopkeepers, various forms of public catering) were widespread. Another popular form of private enterprises was public ownership combined with private activity and initiatives, like the household plots of the agricultural co-operative members or the so-called ‘gebin’ restaurants where private entrepreneurs hired the state owned restaurants or pubs. The traditional private enterprises remained small and secured only limited incomes. Most of them had one worker or only members of the family worked in 38 Valuch, Magyarország (fn. 28), p. 135; János Tischler, “A gyo Ári csata” – 1965 [The “Battle of GyoÁr” – 1965], in: BeszéloÁ10 (2005), 5, pp. 63 – 69; István Szakadát, Vörös bárók [Red Barons], in: Pál Tamás (ed.), Modernizációs szigetek [Islands of Modernization], Budapest 1992, pp. 224 – 257. 39 Éva Várhegyi, Bankvezeto Ák kiválasztása a nyolcvanas-kilencvenes években Magyarországon [The Selection of Bank Managers in Hungary in the 1980s and 1990s], in: Szociológiai Szemle (1996), 3 – 4, pp. 33 – 54.

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them. Strict regulations concerning the number of persons to be employed, the amount of electricity or number of machines to be used limited the growth potential of these firms. Due to these regulations, only very few entrepreneurs were able to get into the elite of highest living standard, most of them could achieve only an income that slightly exceeded the average of the society. The majority of the businessmen did not abandon their state job at all, but had a double income and pursued private business in their leisure time. Private activities were often not legalized but belonged to the grey or black zones of the economy.40 In the early 1980s, as a consequence of the deepening economic crisis, the official attitude to private sector began to change. From 1981 – 1982, the legal discrimination of the private enterprise was brought to an end, new company forms were launched and more liberal regulations were passed. It became possible to appear in activities being forbidden before. Private business could only complete missing state activities earlier, from the 1980s it could even compete with it and offer services that were done before by public companies. By 1988, private enterprises were allowed to employ up to 500 persons. As a result, a bigger, managerial type of private companies was established that exceeded the size of the traditional small scale family firms.41 As a consequence of the liberalization, a new entrepreneurial group emerged within the Hungarian society that was strikingly different from the traditional small businessmen. They were much better educated what proved to be a significant precondition to business success. According to the research done by Tibor Kuczi and Ágnes Vajda, legal business and technical expertise were the most important capitals for the new type of entrepreneurs. Two third of the persons in their sample had professional qualification, 50 percent of them had at least two and 20 percent had more than three certificates. The family background was very important in the recruitment. The majority of the new entrepreneurs had well educated fathers, 25 percent of the fathers had a secondary school or university degree and about 30 percent of them worked as a professional or on a leading post. Only 20 – 25 percent of the new entrepreneurs had a lower class background. The family proved to be important in other aspects as well. The new entrepreneurs came from families which had already entrepreneurs earlier, 11 percent of the fathers and 40 percent of the grandfathers had experience in private business before. The generation of the grandparents that was active before 1945 seems to be more important than the parents which had less possibility to private business after the Second World War. In these families, the tradition of rational calculation and risk taking, aspiration for inde40 Mihály Laki, Kisvállalkozás a szocializmus után [Small Business after the Socialism], Budapest 1998, pp. 14 – 26, 41 – 44, 52 – 58; Valuch, Magyarország (fn. 28), pp. 172 – 187. 41 Mihály Laki / Júlia Szalai, Vállalkozók vagy polgárok? A nagyvállalkozók gazdasági és társadalmi helyzetének ambivalenciái az ezredforduló Magyarországán [Entrepreneurs or Bourgeios? The Ambivalence of the Economic and Social Position of Big Entrepreneurs in Hungary of the Turn of the Millenium], Budapest 2004, p. 116; Valuch, Magyarország (fn. 28), pp. 177 f.

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pendence were probably still alive and certain values important for entrepreneurship were passed on the younger generations. There was a model and mentality that proved significant in the conduct of business.42 In terms of material well-being, 10 percent of the new entrepreneurs can be reckoned into the elite, every tenth had a big enough flat, a car made in Western Europe and a holiday home. In the case of the traditional small business, however, only 4 percent of the owners could achieve the same level of living.43 A part of the new entrepreneurs proved to be successful even after 1990. Although the dominant group of the new business elite consisted of the younger generation of the state owned companies’ former cadre-managers, 10 percent of it came from the new entrepreneurs of the late Kádár-regime, who founded their companies in the early 1980s and acquired knowledge about market success in those years. Gábor Széles or Gábor Bojár – two leading figures of today’s Hungarian business life – represent this type of entrepreneurs.44 The last decade of the state socialism proved to be decisive in the formation of the new business elite after 1990. Entrepreneurs in the second economy or managers in the first one accumulated professional skills and knowledge built up social networks during the state socialism that was indispensable when forming the new business world of the 1990s. They could convert the social capital acquired in these years successfully in the emerging market economy or during the process of privatization.45 IV. Conclusion The 20th century business elite had a turbulent history in Hungary. In the first half of the century, it was a socially closed but not homogenous group which consisted of the inheritors of old established family firms and the top managers of the biggest companies and banks. Their way of life and incomes could rival that of the traditional aristocracy. The Second World War, the Holocaust and the complete 42 Tibor Kuczi / Ágnes Vajda, A kisvállalkozók társadalmi összetétele [The Social Structure of Small Entrepreneurs], in: Tibor Valuch, Magyar társadalomtörténeti olvasókönyv 1944-toúl napjainkig [Reader of Hungarian Social History from 1944 to the Present], Budapest 2004, pp. 605 – 620, here pp. 608 – 613. 43 Ibidem, pp. 618 f. 44 András Csite / Imre Kovách, Gazdasági elit: útban az osztályhatalomhoz [Economic Elite: On the Way to Class Power], in: Társadalmi Szemle 53 (1998), 4, pp. 16 – 33, 27; Laki / Szalai, Vállalkozók vagy polgárok? (fn. 41), p. 114; Gábor Bojár, Graphi-sztori, Egy magyar mini multi története [Graphi-Story, the History of a Hungarian Mini Multinational], Budapest 2005. 45 Csite / Kovách, Gazdasági elit (fn. 44), p. 27; Laki / Szalai, Vállalkozók vagy polgárok? (fn. 41), p. 114; Ákos Róna-Tas / József Böröcz, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: Presocialist and Socialist Legacies among Business Elites, in: John Higley / György Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism. Theories and Analysis, Lanham et al. 2000, pp. 209 – 228, here pp. 217 – 223.

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nationalization of private capital as a consequence of the political takeover decimated the former business elite and deprived their fortune. After 1947, a new business elite emerged that was subordinated to the centrally directed planned economy. The most important aspect of recruitment became political loyalty. Following the reform of 1968, expertise and management skills gained importance but political trustworthiness retained its significance. In the Kádár-era, a second economy appeared which provided new opportunities for entrepreneurship and enrichment. In the post-socialist period, a new business elite took shape which was formed partly from the younger generations of the cadre-managers of the socialist companies and partly from the private businessmen of the late Kádár-era. Their social background, education, experiences, social connections and private wealth accumulated during the former decades proved decisive in their business success from the 1990s.

Formations and Profiles in Western Europe: Between Cohesion and Fragmentation

Die bemerkenswerte Persistenz der staatlichen grands corps bei der Rekrutierung der Wirtschaftseliten in Frankreich Von Hervé Joly* I. Die Tradition der grands corps Die Geschichte der Rekrutierung der französischen Wirtschaftselite kann, zumindest mit Blick auf die Großunternehmen, als eine Geschichte des Eindringens unterschiedlicher administrativer Korps, der so genannten grands corps, in die Leitungen dieser Unternehmen geschrieben werden. Hohe Beamte, die mit der Aufsicht über bestimmte wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten betraut waren, neigten dazu, in den entsprechenden Unternehmen auch die Geschäftsführung zu übernehmen. In manchen Wirtschaftszweigen, die seit dem 18. Jahrhundert vom Staat betrieben wurden, waren immer schon „Staatsingenieure“ für die Geschäftsführung vorgesehen: Dies war etwa der Fall in den Werften der Marine, in den militärischen Sprengstoff- und in den Tabakfabriken. Schon seit 1794 wurden jedes Jahr einige Absolventen der militärischen Hochschule Polytechnique in diese staatlichen Branchen entsandt, um dort die technischen Leitungsfunktionen zu übernehmen: Marine-Ingenieure (ingénieurs du Génie maritime) traten als Offiziere in die Werften ein, Sprengstoff-Ingenieure (ingénieurs des Poudres) ebenfalls als Offiziere in die Sprengstofffabriken und Ingenieure der Staatsmanufakturen (ingénieurs des manufactures de l’État) als Zivilbeamte in die Tabakfabriken. Dies blieb aber nicht nur Usus in den wenigen staatlichen Branchen des liberalen Staats im 19. Jahrhundert. Auch in den – staatlich konzessionierten – privaten Minen, in denen die staatliche Grubenverwaltung lediglich die Aufsicht über die Produktion wahrnahm, waren in immer größerer Zahl ehemalige staatliche Grubeningenieure (ingénieurs du corps des Mines, das Äquivalent der deutschen Bergassessoren) anzutreffen, die von den Aktionären der Bergwerksgesellschaften für leitende Funktionen bestellt worden waren. In den bis 1937 privaten Eisenbahngesellschaften, die von der staatlichen Baubehörde hinsichtlich des Ausbaus des Schienennetzes und des Betriebes beaufsichtigt wurden, waren ebenfalls zahlreiche, ehemalige staatliche Bauingenieure (ingénieurs des Ponts et chaussées, das Äquivalent zum deutschen Baurat) beschäftigt, die dort technische Verantwortung trugen. Die staatlichen Grubeningenieure * Der Autor dankt den Herausgebern für ihre Unterstützung sein „französisches Deutsch“ in ein gutes Schriftdeutsch zu verwandeln.

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(die sogenannten X Mines1) und die Bauingenieure (X Ponts) waren Absolventen der École polytechnique, mit einer anschließenden Zusatzausbildung an den entsprechenden spezialisierten Hochschulen (École supérieure des mines de Paris und École nationale des Ponts et chaussées, ebenfalls in Paris2). Die X Ponts waren auch in den privaten Baukonzernen und in den Unternehmen der Elektrizitätswirtschaft vertreten. X Mines traten, wie dies in der Logik der Sache lag, nicht nur an die Spitze von Bergbauunternehmen, sondern auch von Eisenkonzernen. Und die ingénieurs du Génie maritime waren nicht nur in den militärischen Werften anzutreffen, sondern sie übernahmen auch Leitungsfunktionen in den privaten Werften. Doch nicht nur bei den an der militärischen École polytechnique ausgebildeten staatlichen Ingenieuren war diese Praxis des Wechsels in die private Wirtschaft anzutreffen. Auch die Angehörigen der anderen Verwaltungskorps, für die sie meist nach Absolvierung juristischer Studien durch spezielle Aufnahmeprüfungen (concours) rekrutiert worden waren (bevor im Oktober 1945 die École nationale d’administration (ENA) gegründet wurde), übernahmen nicht nur Leitungsfunktionen in den Ministerien, sondern auch in Unternehmen. Insbesondere die „Finanzinspektoren“ (inspecteurs des Finances), die in der Regel wichtige und verantwortungsvolle Aufgaben im Finanzministerium übertragen bekamen, wurden ebenfalls für Leitungsfunktionen in Unternehmen des Finanzsektors rekrutiert, für deren Aufsicht sie zuständig waren, also besonders in Großbanken. Aber auch in industriellen Großkonzernen übernahmen sie die Leitung der Finanzressorts. Diese Praktiken des – erfolgreichen – Wechsels der Verwaltungseliten in die Privatwirtschaft setzten sich in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts auf breiter Front durch.3 Traditionell wurde sie pantouflage4 genannt. Wie hat sich nun, erstens, diese Praxis im Lauf des 20. Jahrhunderts bis heute weiterentwickelt? Welche Rolle spielten dabei einerseits die historischen Fluktuationen im öffentlichen Sektor (die verschiedenen Verstaatlichungswellen, später die Privatisierungen), andererseits der wirtschaftliche Strukturwandel (Rückgang der traditionellen Branchen zugunsten moderner)? Wie kann man, zweitens, die Persistenz dieser Entwicklung und den Erfolg bestimmter Verwaltungskorps erklären? Welche Wirkung hatte diese Praxis auf die betroffenen Staatsverwaltungen bzw. Großunternehmen? X ist die übliche Abkürzung für die École polytechnique. Diese Hochschulen bildeten auch Zivilingenieure (ingénieurs civils) aus, die – obwohl sie zahlreicher waren und sofort Karriere in der Wirtschaft machten – viel weniger Chancen hatten, leitende Positionen zu erreichen. 3 Für eine historische Synthese vgl. Christophe Charle, Le pantouflage en France (vers 1880 – vers 1980) [Die pantouflage in Frankreich (um 1880 – um 1980)], in: Annales 42 (1987), 5, S. 1115 – 1137. 4 Nach „pantoufle“ [Pantoffel], im Argot der Polytechnique die Bezeichnung für die Kosten des Studiums, die ein Absolvent dem Staat zurückzuerstatten verpflichtet war, falls er nicht die Verwaltungslaufbahn einzuschlagen gedachte. 1 2

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II. Die allgemeine Entwicklung der pantouflage im 20. Jahrhundert Es gibt zwei Wege, den Umfang der pantouflage zu messen: Mit Blick auf die Verwaltung ist der Anteil der Angehörigen eines Korps, die in die Wirtschaft wechselten, relevant; von Bedeutung sind hier auch das Lebens- und Dienstalter zum Zeitpunkt des Wechsels. Mit Blick auf die Unternehmen interessiert der Anteil der Unternehmensleiter, die diesen Weg zurückgelegt haben. Die Verwaltungshistoriker haben sich häufig des erstgenannten Kriteriums bedient. Aus der Sicht der Unternehmens- und der Unternehmergeschichte kommt eher das an zweiter Stelle genannte Kriterium in Betracht, wobei dort, wo es darum geht, die relativen Erfolgschancen der Betroffenen zu messen, nach wie vor auch das erste von Bedeutung ist. Um die im folgenden genauer zu beschreibenden Hauptentwicklungslinien schon an dieser Stelle kurz zu skizzieren: Die verschiedenen Verstaatlichungswellen (1936 – 1937, 1945 – 1946, 1982) ebenso wie später, ab 1986, die Privatisierungen zogen weniger Veränderungen der pantouflage nach sich, als man annehmen könnte. Von wesentlich größerer Bedeutung war offenkundig die Anpassungsfähigkeit der Angehörigen der staatlichen grands corps an die Herausforderungen des wirtschaftlichen Strukturwandels der letzten Jahrzehnte: Wären sie in ihren traditionellen Branchen geblieben, wie beispielsweise die deutschen Bergassessoren im Bergbau,5 so hätte ihr Einfluss, das kann man annehmen, einen starken Rückgang erlebt. Doch sie fanden andere Wege. 1. Die Positionen vor den Verstaatlichungen Am erfolgreichsten waren die Angehörigen der grands corps in den privaten – jedoch auf der Grundlage öffentlicher Konzessionen arbeitenden – Eisenbahngesellschaften. Von den 24 Generaldirektoren6 der sechs großen privaten Regionalgesellschaften (nach der Pleite der Compagnie des chemins de fer de l’Ouest im Jahr 1908 waren es nur noch fünf7) zählten zwischen 1900 und 1937, dem Jahr der Gründung der Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF), 19 zu den X Ponts. Hinzu kamen vier X Mines. Lediglich zwei (in der Gesellschaft ParisOrléans beschäftigte) Generaldirektoren gehörten nicht diesen grands corps an. Sie waren aber doch ehemalige Absolventen der École polytechnique: Der eine 5 Zum Vergleich der Karrierewege von X Mines und Bergassessoren: Hervé Joly, Die Ingenieurs du Corps des Mines und die Bergassessoren. Ein Vergleich industrieller Eliten, in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1993 / 1, S. 45 – 68. 6 Da es bei der Compagnie du Nord keinen Generaldirektor gab, wurde der Betriebsdirektor als der wichtigste Direktor in das Sample aufgenommen. 7 Die entsprechenden Eisenbahnstrecken wurden anschließend von der staatlichen Compagnie des chemins de fer de l’État, die vorher nur Nebenstrecke betrieben hatte, übernommen.

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von ihnen hatte unmittelbar nach Absolvierung dieser Anstalt den Staatsdienst quittiert, der andere hatte seine Karriere als Artillerieoffizier begonnen. Beide Korps, die X Ponts und die X Mines, waren auch in den verschiedenen technischen Leitungen der Eisenbahngesellschaften sehr gut vertreten, entsprechend ihrer jeweiligen früheren staatlichen Tätigkeit: So fanden sich die X Mines eher in den unter der Aufsicht der staatlichen Services des mines stehenden Material- und Antriebsabteilungen (direction du matériel et de la traction), die X Ponts eher in den unter der Aufsicht der staatlichen Services des Ponts et Chaussées stehenden Streckenführungs- und Bauabteilungen (direction de la voie et des construction). In den Betriebsabteilungen (direction de l’exploitation) waren beide Corps in einem ausgewogenen Verhältnis vertreten.8 Ihre Position – und generell das Monopol der polytechniciens auf den Leitungsebenen – war in keinem anderen Wirtschaftszweig so stark ausgeprägt. Gab es in den Bergwerksgesellschaften auch X Mines, so war doch der Konzentrationsgrad der Branche im Vergleich zu dem im Eisenbahnsektor zu niedrig, als dass er ein ähnliches personelles Monopol ermöglicht hätte: Der corps des Mines rekrutierte im Schnitt fünf Ingenieure pro Jahr, von denen gut die Hälfte in die Wirtschaft wechselte.9 Selbst wenn sie alle im Bergbau Karriere gemacht hätten (was jedoch nicht der Fall war), hätte dies nicht für die Besetzung aller wichtigen Positionen in den Bergwerksgesellschaften ausgereicht. Denn in Frankreich gab es bis 1945 zahlreiche Kohlenbergwerksgesellschaften, meist allerdings nur von lokaler Bedeutung,10 die selbständige Unternehmen waren, also nicht zu einem Montankonzern gehörten. Nach 1900 wurde ungefähr ein Zehntel dieser Unternehmen von einem X Mines geleitet, meistens aber nur für die Amtszeit eines einzigen Generaldirektors. Nur für die Mines de Lens11 (1919 – 1935 und 1935 – 1945) und für die Mines dÁnzin (1910 – 1936 und 1936 – 1940) in Nordfrankreich waren zwei Leiter zu verzeichnen. Die große Ausnahme mit vier aufeinander folgenden Leitern stellten die Mines de la Grand’ Combe bei Nîmes (Gard) dar. 8 Georges Ribeill, Le rôle des Polytechniciens dans le développement des chemins de fer en France [Die Bedeutung der Absolventen der École polytechnique für die Entwicklung der Eisenbahnen in Frankreich], in: Bruno Belhoste et al. (Hg.), La France des X. Deux siècles d’histoire [Das Frankreich der X. Zwei Jahrhunderte Geschichte], Paris 1995, S. 239 – 251, hier S. 245. 9 Zur Geschichte des corps des Mines im 19. Jahrhundert: André Thépot, Les Ingénieurs des mines du XIXe siècle. Histoire d’un corps technique d’État. 1810 – 1914 [Die Bergbauingenieure des 19. Jahrhunderts. Geschichte eines staatlichen technischen Korps. 1810 – 1914], Paris 1998. 10 Nach den Unterlagen der Betriebsstättenkartei des Office central de répartition des produits industriels unter dem Vichy-Regime gab es 1943 noch 33 Kohlenbergwerksgesellschaften mit über 1.000 Beschäftigten, darunter 17 über 5.000 und zehn über 10.000. Vgl. die Datenbank des Verfassers, erstellt auf der Grundlage der einschlägigen Bestände der Archives nationales (F12, 9422 bis 9548). 11 Die Mines de Lens war die größte der lokal bedeutsamen Bergwerksgesellschaften und hatte 19.363 Beschäftigte.

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Doch die X Mines waren auch in den großen Metallbergwerksgesellschaften vertreten. Bestes Beispiel ist hier die Firma Penarroya (tätig im Sektor der Nichteisenmetalle, ursprünglich in der Bleiproduktion in Spanien): Hier war nach der Gründung im Jahr 1981 durch Frédéric Ledoux (1837 – 1927) ab den 1930er Jahren eine ununterbrochene Reihe von Generaldirektoren aus den Rängen der X Mines tätig. Ähnlich hatte in der 1865 gegründeten Compagnie des minerais de fer magnétiques de Mokta-el-Hadid (Algerien) deren Gründer Jean-Adolphe-Alphonse Parran (1826 – 1903) mehrere Nachfolger aus den Reihen der X Mines. Obwohl die Bergwerksgesellschaften hinsichtlich ihrer Kapitalstruktur unabhängig waren, gelangten aufgrund der technischen Vernetzungen und der wirtschaftlichen „Außenbeziehungen“ dieser Unternehmen auch mehrere X Mines an die Spitze von Eisenkonzernen,12 so etwa bei Châtillon-Commentry: Hier wurden die Jahre 1891 – 1946 mit zwei Leitenden „abgedeckt“, ebenso – zwischen 1904 – 1940 – bei Nord-Est, ähnlich bei Marine-Homécourt, mit einer ab 1911 ununterbrochenen Folge von drei Leitenden. Denain-Anzin zwischen 1930 – 1941 und Schneider zwischen 1897 – 1906 und 1921 – 1948 verzeichneten, abgesehen von den aus der jeweiligen Familie stammenden Geschäftsführern, jeweils drei Generaldirektoren aus den Reihen der X Mines. Die auffallende Ausnahme unter den Großkonzernen war Wendel: Hier war anscheinend die Eigentümerfamilie sehr misstrauisch gegenüber den X Mines.13 In der Bauwirtschaft waren vor allem X Ponts vertreten. Allerdings war der Konzentrationsgrad dieser Branche lange Zeit niedrig. Sie war von Familienunternehmen dominiert, in denen die X Ponts nur wenige Chancen hatten, an die Spitze zu gelangen. Selten gehörten sie zu den Gründern der großen Firmen der Branche; solche Gründer waren eher private Ingenieure (École centrale, écoles des arts et métiers u. ä.).14 Aus der Kategorie der X Ponts soll lediglich Eugène Freyssinet (1879 – 1962), bekannt als Erfinder des Spannbetons, erwähnt werden. Er war zwischen 1914 und 1928 Mitgeschäftsführer der Baufirma Limousin & Cie, Procédés Freyssinet. Allerdings war er kein wirklicher Unternehmer; er setzte seine Laufbahn dann auch als unabhängiger Techniker fort. Die meisten in der Bauwirtschaft tätigen X Ponts waren leitende Ingenieure oder Manager in bereits existierenden Unternehmen, insbesondere in den wenigen Firmen der Branche, die schon seit längerem nicht mehr unter der exklusiven Kontrolle einer Familie standen, so etwa die Grands travaux de Marseille (GTM) mit Charles Rebuffel (1861 – 1942), der 12 Die genannten Persönlichkeiten hatten, je nach Konzern und Zeitabschnitt, unterschiedliche Titel, bis 1940 meist administrateur délégué oder directeur général. Manchmal gab es gleichzeitig mehrere Leiter, die ein- und denselben Titel hatten. 13 Philippe Mioche, La Sidérurgie et l’État en France des années 1940 aux années 1970 [Die Eisenindustrie und der Staat in Frankreich von den 1940er bis zu den 1970er Jahren], thèse de doctorat d’État, université de Paris IV Sorbonne, 1992, S. 337. Die Firma Aciéries de Longwy (ab 1953 Lorraine-Escault) hatte ebenfalls keinen X Mines in ihrer Leitung. 14 Vgl. Dominique Barjot, La Grande Entreprise française de travaux publics (1883 – 1974) [Das französische Großunternehmen der Bauwirtschaft (1833 – 1974)], Paris 2006.

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schon ein Jahr nach der 1891 erfolgten Gründung des Unternehmens als technischer Abteilungsleiter rekrutiert wurde. Zu nennen sind auch mehrere seiner Nachfolger als Generaldirektor. Anzuführen sind ferner die Firmen Société française d’entreprises et de dragages et de travaux publics mit Jean Rigal (1898 – 1969), Constructions des Batignolles usw. Auch in der neuen Elektrizitätswirtschaft waren die X Ponts erfolgreich. Diese Branche arbeitete mit von den Services des Ponts et Chaussées erteilten Konzessionen. Dem Anschein nach bestand sie aus vielen kleinen Unternehmen; allerdings gehörten viele von ihnen zu denselben Holdings. Aufgrund ihres hohen Kapitalbedarfs gab es in diesem Wirtschaftszweig, abgesehen vom Durand-Konzern (mit der Holding Énergie industrielle) nur wenige Personalgesellschaften bzw. Familienunternehmen. In den von Managern geleiteten Aktiengesellschaften waren die X Ponts sehr gut vertreten: Zu erwähnen sind hier Namen wie etwa Gabriel Cordiers (Énergie électrique du littoral méditerranée, Generaldirektor ab 1902), Albert Petsche (Lyonnaise des eaux et de l’éclairage, Generaldirektor ab 1909) u. a. m. Der ebenfalls prominente Nachfolger Petsches an der Spitze der Lyonnaise, Ernest Mercier, gehörte zwar nicht dem corps an, er hatte jedoch seine Karriere als Ingenieur im Staatsdienst als ehemaliger X Génie maritime begonnen. In den privaten nichtmilitärischen Werften waren die X Génie maritime sehr erfolgreich. Bei den insgesamt zehn Großunternehmen dieser Branche mit mehr als 1.000 Beschäftigten bekleideten sie eine leitende Funktion in nicht weniger als acht Fällen. Oft stammte nur ein Leiter aus dem X Génie maritime, manchmal, etwa im größten dieser Unternehmen, Chantiers et ateliers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët), waren aber auch mehrere Ingenieure dieser Provenienz nacheinander als Leiter tätig. In den Großbanken fand das Eindringen der inspecteurs des Finances etwas später statt. An erster Stelle ist hier die 1864 gegründete Société générale zu nennen, mit zwei im Jahr 1873 rekrutierten inspecteurs des Finances als dem ordentlichen bzw. stellvertretenden Generaldirektor.15 Beide blieben nicht lange in ihren Stellungen: Der erste verließ bereits 1877 die Bank, um eine leitende Position beim Crédit foncier égyptien zu übernehmen, der zweite ging 1880 in die Verwaltung zurück. Im selben Jahr trat jedoch ein anderer inspecteur des Finances als Generaldirektor in das Unternehmen ein; er amtierte bis 1890. Nach einem „Interregnum“ bis 1919 folgte ein neuer inspecteur, der bis 1925 als Generaldirektor tätig war. Ein weiterer inspecteur des Finances amtierte von 1935 bis 1944, ab 1941 als président-directeur général (PDG).16 Emmanuel Chadeau, Les inspecteurs des Finances au XIXe siècle (1850 – 1914). Profil social et rôle économique [Die inspecteurs des Finances im 19. Jahrhundert (1850 – 1914). Sozialprofil und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung], Paris 1986, S. 20 f. 16 Nach einem Gesetz des Vichy-Regimes vom November 1940, das im Prinzip die Konzentration der Funktionen des Verwaltungsratsvorsitzendes (président du conseil d’administration) und des Generaldirektors (vorher oft administrateur délégué genannt) in den Händen des président-directeur général (PDG) vorsah. 15

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Im Comptoir national d’escompte de Paris (CNEP) gelangten die inspecteurs des Finances etwas später an die Spitze, nämlich erst ab Ende der 1920er Jahre. In der Banque nationale de Crédit (BNC) und – nach dem Konkurs der BNC 1931 – ihrer Nachfolgegesellschaft, der Banque nationale de crédit industriel (BNCI) waren sie, abgesehen von einem Direktor, der ab 1913 im Amt war, nicht in der Generaldirektion vertreten.17 Häufiger waren sie im Crédit Lyonnais präsent – allerdings auch hier bis 1945 nicht an der Spitze, sondern lediglich in der Position des Generalsekretärs (in zwei Fällen), als Leiter der finanzwissenschaftlichen Abteilung oder in der allgemeinen Buchhaltung. Eine wahre Bastion war der Crédit industriel et commercial, der als Spitzeninstitut einer Reihe von Regionalbanken fungierte: Die gesamte Leitungsebene der Holding (und hier sowohl der Vorsitzende des Verwaltungsrats als auch der Generaldirektor) war bereits ab 1885 eine Domäne der inspecteurs des Finances. Zu erwähnen ist auch die große Kolonialbank Banque de l’Indochine, in der die inspecteurs ab 1920 mit einem Generaldirektor vertreten waren. In der Geschäftsbank Paribas tauchte der erste inspecteur des Finances 1937 auf; er amtierte ab diesem Jahr als Generaldirektor. Auf’s Ganze gesehen kann man natürlich nicht sagen, dass die inspecteurs des Finances in den privaten Banken sämtliche leitenden Funktionen innehatten; für eine so kleine Berufsgruppe (durchschnittlich fünf Angehörige eines jeden Jahrgangs wurden rekrutiert) stellten sie jedoch einen bemerkenswerten Anteil. Selbst wenn die Eisenbahngesellschaften mit einem Fast-Monopol der Ponts et Chaussées eine Ausnahme blieben, war die Vertretung der grands corps in denjenigen Wirtschaftszweigen, die aufgrund ihrer Tätigkeit traditionell mit der Verwaltung verbunden waren, bedeutend. Abgesehen von den Banken und der Bauindustrie erlebten viele dieser Branchen in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts jedoch entweder einen wirtschaftlichen Rückgang (Bergbau, Eisenindustrie, Werftindustrie) und / oder eine durch die Verstaatlichung bewirkte Konzentration in staatlichen Monopolgesellschaften (Bergbau, Bahnen, Elektrizitätswirtschaft). Welche Auswirkungen hatte dieser Wandel für die Karrierewege der Angehörigen der grands corps? Hätte ihnen die Möglichkeit, in die Wirtschaft zu wechseln, weiterhin nur in ihrem jeweiligen Wirtschaftszweig offen gestanden, so hätten sich ihre Karriereperspektiven und ihre Chancen, Positionen im Topmanagement zu erreichen, mit Sicherheit wesentlich verringert. Doch es gelang ihnen, wie im Folgenden gezeigt werden soll, sich neue Karrierewege und Aufstiegschancen zu eröffnen.

17 In der BNCI waren sie zeitweilig (1935 – 1937) durch einen Vorsitzenden des Verwaltungsrats vertreten.

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2. Die Diversifizierung der grands corps außerhalb der traditionellen Branchen Die Praxis der Diversifizierung wird besonders deutlich im Aktionsradius der corps des Mines. Im Unterschied zu den deutschen Bergassessoren drangen die X Mines sehr früh in andere Branchen ein – meistens in solche, die, wie etwa die Eisenindustrie und der Bergbau, in technisch-wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht eng mit dem Bergbau verbunden waren. Eine solche Verbindung lag etwa auch vor im Fall der anorganisch ausgerichteten Chemieindustrie, denn für diese war die Kohle der wichtigste Rohstoff: Ab 1920 hatte Kuhlmann einen X Mines als Generaldirektor, später auch Saint-Gobain für die Chemiesparte.18 Jenseits der traditionellen Eisenindustrie eröffneten sich auch in der Nichteisen-Metallurgie, besonders im Aluminiumsektor, neue Berufsmöglichkeiten für Angehörige des corps: Alais Froges & Camargue (AFC, später Pechiney) und Ugine19 rekrutierten ab den 1930er Jahren Generaldirektoren aus dem corps des Mines. Auch die Ölindustrie war in dieser Hinsicht ein wichtiger Bereich: Die 1924 gegründete Compagnie française des pétroles (CFP), mit ihrer gemischt privat-öffentlichen Kapitalstruktur wurde ab 1928 permanent von einem X Mines als Generaldirektor (PDG) geführt.20 Ähnliches war zeitweise der Fall in der französischen Tochtergesellschaft des BP-Konzerns: Hier amtierten von 1954 bis 1979 zwei X Mines hintereinander. Ebenso wurden in den meisten Fällen die neuen, in Süd-Ost Frankreich und in den afrikanischen Kolonien tätigen staatlichen Gesellschaften, etwa die Société nationale des pétroles dÁquitaine, später Elf und die Régie autonome des pétroles, von X Mines geführt. Diesen standen auch in anderen Wirtschaftszweigen, etwa in der Textilund Papierindustrie sowie bei den Banken, neue berufliche Möglichkeiten offen; allerdings handelte es sich hierbei eher um Einzelfälle ohne weiterreichende Bedeutung. Auch die X Ponts „landeten“ in anderen Branchen als der Bauindustrie, der Eisenbahn und der Elektrizitätswirtschaft. Besonders erfolgreich waren sie in der Elektroindustrie, die bis 1945 mit Thomson-Houston bzw. der Compagnie générale d’électricité (CGE) z. T. auch in der Elektrizitätswirtschaft tätig gewesen war. Bei Thomson-Houston etwa amtierten ab 1899 nacheinander vier X Ponts als Generaldirektoren; zu nennen ist in erster Linie der berühmteste von ihnen, Auguste Detoeuf (Thomson-Houston / Alsthom21), Generaldirektor ab 1925. Bei der CGE waren sie aber lange Zeit nicht sonderlich erfolgreich, nach einem 1920 gescheiterten Versuch, im Korps der X Ponts einen Nachfolger für den Gründer Pierre Azaria zu 18 Saint-Gobain hatte bis 1952 eine besondere Organisation mit zwei getrennten Produktionssparten – Glas und Chemie – ohne gemeinsame Generaldirektion. 19 Beide waren Mischkonzerne mit den Produktionszweigen Aluminium und Chemie sowie, im Fall von Ugine, auch Edelstahl. 20 Erst 1984 gab es eine Unterbrechung, mit einem inspecteur des Finances als PDG. 21 Alsthom wurde 1928 gegründet, um die Aktivitäten der Starkstrombranche von Thomson-Houston und der Alsacienne de constructions mécaniques zusammenzufassen.

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finden.22 Erst 1963 wurde mit Ambroise Roux ein X Ponts zum Leiter des Konzerns bestellt. Andere Mitglieder des corps waren im Maschinenbau, in der Eisenindustrie und anderen Orts zu finden; auch hier handelte es sich jedoch um Einzelfälle. Die X Génie maritime ihrerseits begnügten sich nicht mit den Werftunternehmen. Über die Werftbranche von Schneider hinaus wurden sie im gesamten Konzern tätig, und auch ganz generell in der Maschinenbaubranche. Überraschenderweise wurde außerdem die Leitung des Zuckerkonzerns Say zu ihrer Bastion. Die inspecteurs des Finances wiederum waren außerhalb des Finanzsektors früh bei Saint-Gobain, in den Eisenbahngesellschaften und anderen Orts zu finden, allerdings fast ausschließlich in der Leitung der Finanzressorts; die Möglichkeit des Aufstiegs bis zur Generaldirektion bestand für sie offenkundig nicht. Die Breite des Spektrums der beruflichen Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten im Finanzsektor (inklusive einiger Versicherungsunternehmen) war hier also gleich dem Spektrum der Chancen insgesamt.

3. Die Vorteile der Verstaatlichungen für die grands corps Die pantouflage war in der französischen Privatwirtschaft bereits lange vor den Verstaatlichungswellen von 1936 / 1937, 1945 / 1946 und schließlich 1982 üblich. So hatten beispielsweise alle fünf großen privaten Regionaleisenbahngesellschaften bereits vor der umfassenden Verstaatlichung des Eisenbahnwesens von 1937 einen ehemaligen Staatsbeamten als Generaldirektor (zwei von ihnen entstammten den X Mines, drei den X Ponts). Auch zwei der vier 1945 verstaatlichten Großbanken (das waren Crédit Lyonnais, BNCI, Société générale und CNEP), nämlich die Société générale und die CNEP, wurden schon zuvor von inspecteurs des Finances (als PDG und Generaldirektor) geleitet. Und selbst die zunächst weiterhin nicht staatlichen Geschäftsbanken Paribas und Suez (sie wurden erst 1982 verstaatlicht) wurden von einem inspecteur des Finances bzw. einem Angehörigen des corps des Mines geleitet. Als die letzten beiden großen privaten Eisenkonzerne 1978 scheiterten und unter die Kontrolle des Staates gerieten, hatte Usinor ebenfalls bereits einen X Mines als PDG. Nur bei Sacilor (vorher Wendel-Sidelor) führten die Erben der WendelDynastie die Praxis der Ausschließung fort. Auch die fünf im Jahr 1982 verstaatlichten Großunternehmen hatten bereits zuvor Angehörige eines grand corps als PDG: Bei Saint-Gobain und Pechiney waren dies jeweils ein inspecteur des Finances, bei Rhône-Poulenc und CGE herrschte ein X Ponts und bei Thomson ein X Génie maritime. 22 Yves Bouvier, La Compagnie générale d’électricité. Un grand groupe industriel et l’État. Technologie, hommes et marchés (1898 – 1992) [Die Compagnie générale d’électricité. Ein großer Industriekonzern und der Staat. Technologie, Menschen und Märkte (1892 – 1992)], thèse de doctorat d’histoire, université Paris IV Sorbonne, 2005, S. 207 f.

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Die Verstaatlichungen selbst änderten an dieser privilegierten Stellung der grands corps kaum etwas. Sie führten, kaum überraschend, nicht zu einer Abschwächung ihrer Präsenz, sondern eher zum Gegenteil. Die 1937 gegründete SNCF etwa wurde und wird bis heute fast ausnahmslos von ehemaligen Beamten geleitet; bezeichnenderweise haben sich hier aber die X Mines mit sieben Angehörigen gegenüber den X Ponts mit nur zwei Angehörigen in den Vordergrund geschoben. Die letzteren haben ihren Vorteil in der Privatwirtschaft mit der Verstaatlichung verloren. Eine Ausnahme für die SNCF stellt lediglich der Zeitraum von 1946 bis 1949 dar, als sie von einem polytechnicien, der nie im Staatsdienst tätig gewesen war, geleitet wurde. In der 1946 gegründeten öffentlichen Anstalt Charbonnages de France, einem einheitlichen Verband von neun Regionalrevieren (mit dem Bassin de Nord-Pasde-Calais und dem Bassin de Lorraine als den beiden wichtigsten) errangen ebenfalls die X Mines die dominierende Position, die sie im zuvor eher klein- und mittelbetrieblich strukturierten privaten Bergbau nie erreicht hatten. Sie hatten nicht weniger als neun der elf Generaldirektoren- bzw. PDG-Posten (ab 1987)23 inne – und zwar bis 1996. Eine der beiden Ausnahmen war, zwischen 1982 und 1986, ein X Ponts. Die zweite Ausnahme betraf, zwischen 1949 und 1952, einen ingénieur civil des mines de Paris (Zivilingenieur), gleichzeitig der einzige Generaldirektor, der kein ehemaliger Beamter war. In den Regionalleitungen der Charbonnages de France war die Stellung der X Mines weniger stark und dauerhaft: Im Bassin de Nord-Pas-de-Calais waren von 1946 bis 1993 lediglich drei von zehn (der letzte ging schon 1968), im Bassin de Lorraine von 1946 bis 2004 sogar nur zwei von zehn X Mines (der letzte ging 1975) tätig. Diese Daten illustrieren, dass die Angehörigen der X Mines noch immer eine kleine Elite bilden, die sich eher für die zentralen, also höchsten Positionen, nicht für regionale Leitungsfunktionen interessieren. Mit dem starken Rückgang des Bergbaus in den 1970er Jahren – der letzte Schacht wurde im Jahr 2004 in Lothringen geschlossen – haben sie sich aus diesem Wirtschaftszweig insgesamt immer mehr zurückgezogen. In der Elektrizitätswirtschaft wurde 1946 eine zentrale öffentliche Anstalt ohne eigenständige Regionalstrukturen aufgebaut: die Électricité de France (EDF). Diese Rahmenbedingungen ermöglichten es den X Ponts, eine gewichtigere Position zu erlangen als in der bis dahin durch mehrere nationale Konzerne und regionale Unternehmen strukturierten privaten Elektrizitätswirtschaft. In der EDF stellten sie bis 1987 fünf von sechs Generaldirektoren, mit der einzigen, aber wichtigen Ausnahme von Marcel Boiteux (1967 – 1979).24 Hinsichtlich der übrigen leitenden 23 Bis 1987 waren die Funktionen des Verwaltungsratsvorsitzendes und des Generaldirektors getrennt; letzterer war der „echte Geschäftsführer“ der Firma. 24 Diese Führungsfigur, die eine wichtige Rolle in der Ausrichtung des Konzerns auf die Atomkraft spielte, war Absolvent der École normale supérieure in Paris. Als Mathematiker ausgebildet, hatte er – völlig untypisch für die Karriereverläufe in der französischen Wirtschaftselite – seine eigene Laufbahn als Wissenschaftler im Centre national de la recherche scientifique begonnen.

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technischen Positionen nahmen die X Ponts ebenfalls eine Fast-Monopolstellung ein. Erst in den letzten zwanzig Jahren geht die Entwicklung mit der Berufung von ingénieurs civils wie dem derzeitigen PDG, einem polytechnicien, der nicht X Ponts geworden ist, oder von Absolventen der École nationale d’administration (ENA), den so genannten énarques, in eine andere Richtung. In den 1945 verstaatlichen vier Großbanken konnten die inspecteurs des Finances ihre Position ebenfalls weiter stärken: Zwar wiesen die Présidents (PDG) der Anfangsjahre – etwa zwischen 1946 und 1959 in der CNEP und zwischen 1949 und 1955 im Crédit Lyonnais – andere Profile auf: Bei ihnen handelte es sich um Juristen, die keine Beamtenlaufbahn absolviert hatten, oder auch um Angehörige anderer Beamtenkorps. In der BNCI findet sich zwischen 1957 und 1960 ein ehemaliges Mitglied des Staatsrats, in der Société générale zwischen 1946 und 1958 ein ehemaliges Mitglied des Rechnungshofs als Président. Später jedoch sind kaum mehr Ausnahmen zu verzeichnen: Im Crédit Lyonnais waren von den staatlicherseits zwischen 1955 und der Privatisierung im Jahr 1999 ernannten neun PDG sechs inspecteurs des Finances. Bei der Société générale waren zwischen 1958 und 1987 alle fünf, bei der CNEP / Banque nationale de Paris (BNP)25 fünf von sechs PDG ebenfalls inspecteurs26. Lediglich unter den Generaldirektoren, die nicht zu PDG ernannt worden waren, finden sich Ausnahmen, d. h. professionelle Bankmanager, die nicht zu den grands corps zählten und sich mit dieser weniger prominenten Position begnügten. Bei Renault, dem einzigen industriellen Großunternehmen, das nach der libération wegen Kollaboration seines Gründers, Besitzers und Firmenchefs verstaatlicht worden war, fanden die Angehörigen der grands corps lange Zeit keine Möglichkeit der beruflichen Betätigung in der Unternehmensleitung: Zum ersten PDG wurde hier ein externer ingénieur civil, Absolvent der École centrale de Paris und ehemaliger Widerstandskämpfer ernannt; sein Nachfolger war ein früherer hoher Beamter, der jedoch keinem der grands corps angehörte. Es folgten bis 1985 zwei PDG, die im kaufmännischen Bereich eine unternehmensinterne Laufbahn absolviert hatten. Der Regierungswechsel von 1981 zu Gunsten der Sozialisten um François Mitterand und die Verstaatlichungen von 1982 hatten anfänglich eine geringfügige Schmälerung der Position der grands corps zur Folge. Ursache dafür waren einige Ernennungen „politischer Manager“. An der Spitze des Crédit Lyonnais wurde, dank seines sozialistischen Parteibuchs, ein professioneller Banker installiert, der eine hausinterne Laufbahn absolviert hatte. Die Leitung von Rhône-Poulenc übernahm der Zivilingenieur Loïc Le Floch-Prigent, der einige Jahr hindurch, ohne verbeamtet zu sein, in einer Wissenschaftsverwaltung gearbeitet hatte, bis er 1981, ebenfalls dank seines Parteibuchs, zum Direktor des Kabinetts des Industrieministers ernannt wurde. Im Eisenkonzern Sacilor wurde 1982, ebenfalls aufgrund seiner Die BNP war das Ergebnis der 1967 vollzogenen Fusion von CNEP und BNCI. Einzige Ausnahme war von 1979 bis 1982 Jacques Calvet, ein ehemaliger Richter beim Rechnungshof. 25 26

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sozialistischen Sympathien, ein branchenzugehöriger Industrieller (mit kaufmännischem Abschluss der Handelshochschule Hautes études commerciales (HEC) in Paris).27 PDG der CGE wurde ein Diplomat. Andere Ernennungen hingegen bewegten sich im herkömmlichen Rahmen: Der inspecteur des Finances Roger Fauroux verblieb auf seinem Posten als PDG von Saint-Gobain, einige seiner Kameraden aus demselben Korps wurden an die Spitze von Thomson bzw. Paribas und Suez gestellt. Der X Mines Georges Besse wurde PDG von Pechiney. PDG der CGE wurde bereits 1984 wieder ein X Ponts. 1985 trat, als Retter in der Krise, mit Georges Besse zum ersten Mal ein Angehöriger eines grand corps als PDG an die Spitze von Renault. In eine andere Richtung weist die 1983 erfolgte Ernennung des sozialistischen Berufsbankiers Jean Peyrelevade („nur“ ein X Aéro28), bis dahin stellvertretender Direktor des Kabinetts von Regierungschef Pierre Mauroy, zur Spitze von Suez. Mit dem neuerlichen Regierungswechsel von 1986 kamen diese politischen Experimente allerdings an ein rasches Ende. Die neue liberale Regierung entließ die „sozialistischen“ PDG von Crédit Lyonnais, Rhône-Poulenc, Sacilor und Suez. Der Crédit Lyonnais und Suez holten inspecteurs des Finances zurück. An die Spitze der fusionierten Eisenkonzerne Usinor und Sacilor trat ein X Mines. In die Gegenrichtung weisende politische Sympathien spielten auch eine Rolle bei der Ernennung eines polytechnicien ohne Beamtenkarriere, Jean-René Fourtou29, als PDG von Rhône-Poulenc, ebenso im Fall des professionellen Bankers und engen Freunds von Regierungschef Jacques Chirac, Michel François-Poncet, zum PDG von Paribas. Alle anderen einschlägigen Unternehmen hatten vor dem Beginn der ersten Privatisierungswelle einen Angehörigen der grands corps als PDG.

4. Privatisierungen ohne größere Auswirkungen für die grands corps Die erste Privatisierungswelle zwischen 1986 und 1988 betraf u. a. zwei Großkonzerne der Industrie (CGE und Saint-Gobain), eine große Filialbank (Société générale) und zwei Finanzkonzerne (Paribas, Suez). Abgesehen von Paribas hatten alle genannten Unternehmen einen Angehörigen der grands corps als PDG (einen X Mines bei Saint-Gobain,30 einen X Ponts bei der CGE31 sowie inspecteurs des Finances in den restlichen genannten Fällen). Er war seit 1981 als Berater des Industrieministers tätig. Ein polytechnicien, der seinen Berufsweg in der Luftfahrtverwaltung begonnen hatte. 29 Er hatte vorher Karriere bei der Unternehmensberatungsgesellschaft Bossard gemacht und galt als Sympathisant oder gar Mitglied der seinerzeitigen Union pour la démocratie française (UDF). 30 Der 1986 ernannte Nachfolger des inspecteur des Finances Roger Fauroux war JeanLouis Beffa. 31 Der noch von den Sozialisten ernannte X Ponts wurde allerdings von einem anderen, den bürgerlichen Parteien näher stehenden X Ponts ersetzt. 27 28

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Mit der zweiten Welle der Privatisierung zwischen 1993 und 1997 und im Zuge der Rückkehr der konservativen, bürgerlichen Parteien an die Macht wurden u. a. vier Industriekonzerne (Rhône-Poulenc, Elf-Aquitaine, Pechiney, Usinor-Sacilor) vollständig oder teilweise (Renault) privatisiert; hinzu kam eine Großbank (BNP). Außer im Fall des Konzerns Rhône-Poulenc, der von dem „polytechnicien ohne Staatsdienst“ Fourtou geleitet wurde, standen an der Spitze aller anderen Unternehmen inspecteurs des Finances (Elf-Aquitaine, Renault, BNP) oder X Mines (Pechiney, Usinor-Sacilor). Die Rückkehr der Sozialisten an die Regierung 1997 hatte keinen Stopp der Privatisierungspolitik zur Folge: Thomson wurde in zwei Teile (Thomson Multimedia und Thales) zerlegt, die ab 1998 in mehreren Stufen privatisiert wurden, der Crédit Lyonnais wurde 1999, nach seiner Sanierung, zu 50 Prozent über die Börse und zu 30 Prozent an mehrere Großinvestoren verkauft; der Staat blieb mit 20 Prozent am Aktienkapital beteiligt. Welche Veränderungen sind in der französischen Unternehmenslandschaft seit den Privatisierungen zu verzeichnen? Pechiney verschwand 2003, nach der Übernahme durch den kanadischen Konzern Alcan; Suez ging 1997 mit der Lyonnaise des Eaux und 2008 mit dem staatlichen Gaz de France (GDF) zusammen, Paribas bzw. Elf 2000 fusionierten mit BNP bzw. Total 32, Rhône-Poulenc bildete 1999 mit dem deutschen Chemiekonzern Hoechst AG die Firma Aventis, die 2004 Opfer einer feindlichen Übernahme durch ihren französischen Konkurrenten Sanofi wurde. Usinor-Sacilor (ab 1998 nur Usinor) wurde 2002 nach Zusammenlegung mit luxemburgischen und spanischen Firmen zu Arcilor und schließlich 2006 in die britisch-indische Mittal-Gruppe integriert. Im Kontrast hierzu wurden die zwei Hauptzweige der CGE (Schwach- bzw. Starkstrom) 1998 in die beiden eigenständigen Firmen Alcatel und Alstom33 zerlegt. Alcatel fusionierte 2006 mit dem amerikanischen Unternehmen Lucent. Der Crédit Lyonnais wurde im Juni 2003 mehrheitlich von der Genossenschaftsbank Crédit Agricole aufgekauft; sie übernahm auch die zwanzigprozentige staatliche Beteiligung. Kurz und gut: Im letzten Jahrzehnt hat sich die französische Unternehmenslandschaft völlig gewandelt. Die Anzahl potentieller, für die Angehörigen der grands corps zur Verfügung stehender PDG-Positionen ist im Zuge dieser Fusionen und Übernahmen geschrumpft: Arcelor-Mittal hat einen indischen PDG, Alcatel-Lucent eine Amerikanerin (die im Juli 2008 entlassen und inzwischen von einem holländischen Manager ersetzt wurde). Inspecteurs des Finances stehen jedoch nach wie vor an der Spitze von BNP-Paribas, in der Société générale (wo nach der finanzielle Katastrophe Anfang 2008 der amtierende inspecteur durch einen jüngeren Kollegen ersetzt wurde) und bei Saint-Gobain (als Nachfolger des X Mines Beffa). Alstom hat einen X Minus und Thales einen X Ponts als PDG, der PDG von 32 So der neue Name der früheren Compagnie française des pétroles, in der der Staat bereits 1992, unter der sozialistischen Regierung, seine Minderheitsbeteiligung fast vollständig aufgegeben hatte. 33 So nach einer Änderung der alten Orthographie „Alsthom“.

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GDF-Suez ist ein énarque und damit ein ehemaliger Beamter, der allerdings nicht zu den grands corps gehört. In einigen Firmen finden sich jedoch auch andere Profile: Die achtzigjährige Tradition der X Mines bei Total kam 2007 mit der Ernennung eines aus dem Unternehmen kommenden kaufmännischen Managers (ein Absolvent der École supérieure de commerce de Paris) an ihr Ende. Der neue PDG von Thomson (vorher Thomson-Multimedia) ist ein französisch-amerikanischer Manager, der an der Georgetown University in Washington ausgebildet wurde.34 Der PDG von Renault ist ein polytechnicien, dem aufgrund seiner libanesischen Staatsangehörigkeit der Eintritt in den französischen Verwaltungsdienst verwehrt war; Sanofi-Aventis und Crédit agricole rekrutieren traditionell „im Haus herangewachsene“ Manager als PDG.35 Vor diesem Hintergrund könnte der Gesamteindruck schwindenden Einflusses der grands corps entstehen; allerdings ist diese Tendenz noch nicht so deutlich, dass man definitive Schlüsse ziehen könnte. Die grands corps hatten nicht nur Erfolg in den ehemaligen verstaatlichen Branchen bzw. Unternehmen, sondern auch in Branchen und Unternehmen, die privat blieben. Die Baubranche beispielsweise erlebt seit zwanzig Jahren eine starke Konzentrationsbewegung, in deren Zug die meisten Familienunternehmen verschwunden sind. Neben dem relativ jungen, zu Anfang der 1950er Jahre gegründeten, allzeit unter der Kontrolle der Gründerfamilie stehenden Bouygues-Konzern fusionierten mehrere ältere Unternehmen zu zwei weiterhin privaten Großkonzernen (Vinci und Eiffage) unter der Leitung angestellter Manager; derzeit werden sie von X Ponts geführt.36 Lange Zeit war dieses corps auch in den nach wie vor privaten Wasserversorgungskonzernen (Lyonnaise des eaux37 und Générale des eaux) stark vertreten; nach den Unternehmensdiversifizierungen aus der Wasserwirtschaft in andere Branchen hinein und den Fusionen mit Suez bzw. Universal (unter dem Namen Vivendi) ging der Einfluss dieses corps jedoch zurück. Der Automobilkonzern Peugeot hatte im Zeitraum von dreißig Jahren, d. h. zwischen 1977 und 2007, drei PDG aus den grands corps bzw. staatlicher Provenienz auf (X Ponts, ENA Rechnungshof 38 und X Mines); der Zementkonzern Lafarge (1989 – 2003) wies mit einem X Mines, der Hotelkonzern Accor mit einem inspecteur des Finances (1997 – 2005) ein ähnliches Profil auf. Abgesehen von den Familienunternehmen (Bouygues, Michelin, Danone, Auchan usw.) gibt es eigentlich nur wenige Großunternehmen, in denen nicht die Rekrutierung PDGs staatlicher Provenienz Usus ist: Als Ausnahmen zu erwähnen wären Air liquide, L’Oréal oder Essilor. 34 Sein Vorgänger schied im April 2008 aus; er war Absolvent der HEC und der Harvard Law School. 35 Allerdings hat Sanofi-Aventis jetzt einen extern rekrutierten deutsch-kanadischen Generaldirektor und im Vorstand des Crédit agricole finden sich mehrere inspecteurs des Finances. 36 Bei Eiffage ist allerdings der im Mai 2008 designierte Nachfolger des derzeitigen PDG ein ingénieur civil (Absolvent der École centrale de Paris). 37 Eigentlich Lyonnaise des eaux et de l’éclairage. Der Name wurde nach der Verstaatlichung des Strom produzierenden Unternehmenszweigs 1946 verkürzt. 38 Jacques Calvet, vorher PDG der BNP.

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Die Messung des exakten Anteils der Angehörigen der grands corps an den französischen Wirtschaftseliten ist und bleibt schwierig. Das Ergebnis beinhaltet immer subjektive Elemente, denn es hängt ab vom gewählten Sample. Einer 1985 entstandenen Studie zufolge entstammte ein Viertel der PDG der 200 größten französischen Unternehmen einem grand corps.39 Eine weitere, 1993 entstandene Studie derselben Soziologen nimmt nur die Muttergesellschaften,40 die während der gesamten Periode in der „Gruppe der 200“ verblieben waren, in den Blick, d. h. nur 84 Unternehmen. In dieser Gruppe stieg der Anteil der Angehörigen von grand corps in der Leitungsposition des PDG von 32 (1985) auf 38 Prozent (1993).41 Was die industriellen Muttergesellschaften anlangt, so korrelierte hier der Anteil der grands corps negativ mit dem Umfang des Samples: Lag ihr Anteil an den Führungskräften 1993 in den 71 größten Unternehmen bei 40 Prozent, so waren es in den 30 größten über 50 und in den 20 größten über 60 Prozent; bei den zehn größten Firmen erreichte dieser Anteil sogar volle 100 Prozent.42 Die Rekrutierungspraxis zu Gunsten der grands corps fällt also nur dann massiv ins Auge, wenn eine sehr schmale Elite fokussiert wird; jedoch handelt es sich bei den betroffenen Unternehmen dann sozusagen um die „echten“ Konzerne, die den Grad der Konzentration in der Wirtschaft abbilden: Die Anführer der Liste sind mit jeweils mehreren zehntausenden von Mitarbeitern sehr viel größer als die „Schlusslichter“ mit einigen tausenden von Beschäftigten. Noch höher wäre der Anteil, wenn man die Firmen unter Familien- oder ausländischer Führung, die hinsichtlich der Besetzung der Position des PDG für die Mitglieder der grands corps kaum in Frage kommen, aus dem Sample herausnehmen würde. (Bei den Firmen unter Familieregie ist der Erbe an der Spitze fast nie Mitglied eines grands corps, bei den PDG der Tochtergesellschaften von ausländischen Konzernen sind die Mitglieder der grands corps ebenfalls kaum vertreten, zum einen weil ihnen die Position des PDG hier nicht angeboten wird oder weil sie diese wegen der fehlenden Autonomie selbst als uninteressant betrachten). Einer eigenen, noch unveröffentlichten Studie zufolge befand sich unter den PDG 43 der CAC 40-Unternehmen44 im Jahr 2004 rund ein Drittel an Personen, die aus den grands corps stammten (von insgesamt 32 Personen waren dies 11 bzw. sogar 14 Personen, wenn man andere ehemalige Beamte, polytechniciens oder énarques, die nicht in 39 Michel Bauer / Bénédicte Bertin-Mourot, Les 200. Comment devient-on un grand patron? [Die 200. Wie wird man ein großer Patron?] Paris 1987, S. 183. 40 Tochtergesellschaften französischer und ausländischer Konzerne wurden also nicht berücksichtigt. 41 Michel Bauer / Bénédicte Bertin-Mourot, L’accès au sommet des grandes entreprises françaises 1985 – 1994 [Der Zugang zur Spitze der großen französischen Unternehmen 1985 – 1994], Paris 1995, S. 50. 42 Ebenda, Grafik S. 65 (die es leider nicht ermöglicht, präzisere Zahlen anzugeben). 43 Oder directeur général wenn es nicht neben ihm, auf der Grundlage eines Gesetzes von 2001, einen nicht geschäftsführenden Vorsitzender des Verwaltungsrats gibt. 44 Der CAC 40 ist das Äquivalent des DAX 30 an der Pariser Börse. Der Name geht zurück auf das Börsensystem Cotation Assistée en Continu.

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die engeren grands corps45 eintraten, mit berücksichtigt). Bis 2007 hat sich ihr Anteil auf ein knappes Viertel reduziert: Von insgesamt 27 Führungspersonen stammten nun nur noch sechs Personen aus den grands corps; bezieht man andere staatliche corps mit ein, etwa die ingénieurs de l’armement, die ingénieurs des Telecom etc., dann erhöht sich diese Zahl allerdings auf 14. Diese erstaunlich persistente, wenn auch leicht schwächer werdende Praxis der Personalrekrutierung zugunsten der grands corps in den großen börsennotierten französischen Unternehmen kam aber nicht nur bei den absoluten „Spitzenmanagern“, also den PDG, zum Tragen. Nimmt man den gesamten Vorstand dieser Firmen, das comité exécutif, in den Blick, so belief sich der Anteil der Angehörigen von grands corps im Jahr 2004 auf 17 Prozent (im weiteren Sinn, also einschließlich der anderen staatlichen corps, sogar auf 30 Prozent) der hier anzutreffenden französischen Manager und im Jahr 2007 auf immer noch 15 bzw. 25 Prozent.46 Auch in der umfangreicheren Gruppe der Vorstandsmitglieder ist der Anteil der grands corps also keineswegs unbedeutend, vor allem, wenn man in Erwägung zieht, dass auch solche Positionen im Unternehmen in die Rechnung eingehen, die fast nie von Angehörigen der grands corps besetzt werden (etwa die Leitung der Personalabteilung oder der Unternehmenskommunikation). Diese bemerkenswerte, seit einem Jahrhundert währende Kontinuität allumfassender Privilegierung der grands corps bei der Rekrutierung der Spitzenmanager schließt Umschichtungen bei den internen Proportionen nicht aus. So läßt sich ein Rückgang der Angehörigen der technischen grands corps zugunsten der énarques, insbesondere der inspecteurs des Finances konstatieren. Waren diese früher nur im Finanzsektor und in den Finanzvorständen anderer Konzerne zu finden, so begegnen sie ab den 1970er Jahren, wahrscheinlich aufgrund der höheren Brisanz von Finanzfragen vor dem Hintergrund der allgemeinen Wirtschaftskrise, auch an der Spitze von Industriekonzernen mit Ingenieurstradition. Bereits erwähnt wurde, dass Saint-Gobain und Pechiney vor der Verstaatlichung von 1982 einen Finanzinspektor als PDG hatten. Auch in der damals vom Staat kontrollierten Ölbranche wurden die inspecteurs Albin Chalandon bei Elf (1977) und François-Xavier Ortoli bei Total (1984) als PDG ernannt. 1987 wurde ein inspecteur Generaldirektor der SNCF. 47 Nicht mehr viel zählen, auf ’s Ganze gesehen, die ursprünglichen Spezialisierungen: Die Angehörigen der grands corps sind inzwischen sämtlich Allroundmanager, die Leitungsfunktionen in allen Branchen übernehmen können. Die grands 45 Dazu zählen X Mines, X Ponts und X Armement (1968 gebildet durch die Zusammenlegung von X Génie maritime und anderer militärischer Korps) für die polytechniciens sowie Finanzinspektion, Staatsrat und Rechnungshof für die énarques. 46 Nicht in Frankreich ausgebildete Manager ausländischer Herkunft wurden nicht berücksichtigt. 2004 umfasste das Sample 338 Manager, 2007 waren es 349. 47 Er blieb aber nicht mal ein ganzes Jahr im Amt, da er nach einer Zugkatastrophe zurücktreten musste.

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corps, besonders die inspecteurs des Finances und die X Mines, konkurrieren um eine große Zahl von PDG-Positionen. Dabei müssen die X Mines häufig als Verlierer betrachtet werden, weil die meisten ihrer alten Bastionen geschleift sind: Der Kohlebergbau ist in Frankreich nicht mehr existent; die Konzentration in der Eisenindustrie hat eine einzige Gesellschaft hervorgebracht, die jetzt einer ausländischen Familie gehört; die Aluminiumindustrie mit Pechiney hat ebenfalls ihre Selbstständigkeit im nationalen Rahmen verloren; es gibt nun mehr einen einzigen nationalen Ölkonzern usw. Dafür hatten die inspecteurs des Finances, ohne ihre traditionell dominierende Position in der Finanzwirtschaft zu verlieren, Erfolg in neuen Branchen. Auch die X Ponts haben sich in den Baukonzernen sowie bei EDF und SNCF gehalten.

III. Die privilegierte Position der grands corps: Erklärungen und Folgen Je nachdem, welchen Maßstab man anlegt, besetzen die grands corps eine mehr oder weniger große Anzahl, in keinem Fall jedoch die Majorität der leitenden Positionen in den französischen Großunternehmen. Immer aber ist es angeraten, ihren Erfolg mit Blick auf die sehr niedrigen absoluten Zahlen zu gewichten. Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich bei ihnen, in quantitativer Hinsicht, um eine der kleinsten, von einem Hochschulsystem hervorgebrachten Eliten der Welt. Die Aufnahmeprüfung für die École polytechnique zu bestehen, war immer sehr schwer, denn sie vergibt – gemessen an der Zahl der potentiellen Bewerber – nur wenige Plätze. Bis 1870 brachte die École an die 150 Absolventen pro Jahr hervor, bis 1945 waren es ca. 200 bis 250, von da an rund 300 und heute etwa 400 Absolventen im Jahr. Ungeachtet dieser Zuwächse stellten die polytechniciens aber stets nur einen sehr kleinen, bis 1972 ausschließlich aus Männern bestehenden Anteil48 eines Altersjahrgangs dar. Gemessen am spektakulären Anstieg der Studentenzahlen seit einem Jahrhundert nahm ihr Anteil langfristig sogar ab. In den 1870er und 1880er Jahren bestanden etwa 4 Prozent der Abiturienten die Aufnahmeprüfung zur Polytechnique,49 Anfang der 1930er Jahren waren es nur noch 1.5 Prozent und heute sind es lediglich 0.008 Prozent der bacheliers d’enseignement général (sogar nur 0.014 Prozent, wenn man die bacheliers techniques et professionnels mit einrechnen würde, die in diesem Zusammenhang aber nicht von Belang sind). Die Auslese wurde also mit Blick auf eine strikt limitierte Anzahl von Studienplätzen 48 1972 wurden zum ersten Mal sieben Frauen in die École polytechnique aufgenommen; noch heute liegt der Anteil von Frauen bei lediglich 16 Prozent. 49 Natürlich wagten sich nicht alle Abiturienten an den concours heran. Die Erfolgsquoten lagen z. B. zwischen 1831 und 1870 bei 27 Prozent. Vgl. Bruno Belhoste, La formation d’une technocratie. L’École polytechnique et ses élèves de la Révolution au Second Empire [Die Formierung einer Technokratie. Die École polytechnique und ihre Schüler von der Revolution bis zum Zweiten Kaiserreich], Paris 2003, S. 45.

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immer strenger und durch eine sehr schwere Aufnahmeprüfung, den so genannten concours, geregelt. Der concours ist die Endstation einer zweijährigen Vorbereitungsklasse (classe préparatoire), die oft in einem Pariser Elite-Gymnasium absolviert wird. Allerdings – die harte Arbeit lohnt sich: Generell sind die Chancen der polytechniciens, in das Spitzenmanagement der französischen Wirtschaft aufzusteigen, bis heute viel größer als diejenigen der Absolventen anderer technischer Hochschulen, die nur „Zivilingenieure“ ausbilden (dies gilt sogar für die centraliens aus der École centrale de Paris, deren concours ebenfalls rigoros selektiert, die aber immer nur als zweite Wahl nach den polytechniciens gelten.). Unter den polytechniciens selbst waren und sind die Chancen ebenfalls sehr ungleich verteilt: Bis 1918 machte die große Mehrheit, weit mehr als die Hälfte der Absolventen, Karriere in der Armee, als Artillerie- oder als technische Offiziere; nur etwa 2.5 Prozent eines Ausbildungsjahrgangs (fast durchweg die vier oder fünf besten Absolventen) schafften den Zugang zum corps des Mines, etwa 8 Prozent traten in den corps des Ponts ein (meistens die 15 bis 20 Nächstfolgenden in der Rangliste der Abschlüsse) und weitere 8 Prozent traten in den corps du Génie maritime ein. Lediglich die verbleibenden etwa 10 Prozent eines Jahrgangs verließen unmittelbar im Anschluss an die Ausbildung den Staatsdienst, um sofort eine Karriere in der Wirtschaft zu beginnen. Nicht diese aber waren die in den Unternehmen Erfolgreichsten, sondern diejenigen, die vorher den Umweg über hohe Positionen in der Zivilverwaltung genommen hatten. Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, mehr noch nach dem Zweiten, traten immer weniger polytechniciens in die Armee ein. Die Zahl der in den zivilen Staatskorps zur Verfügung stehenden Stellen blieb aber ziemlich stabil (lediglich ab den 1960er Jahren war ein leichter Anstieg zu verzeichnen, und zwar um bis zu zehn Stellen pro Jahr für die X Mines und um bis zu 30 Stellen für die X Ponts); eine immer größere Anzahl von polytechniciens trat folglich unmittelbar nach Abschluss der Ausbildung eine Stelle in der Wirtschaft an. Doch die Chancen für die grands corps, ins Spitzenmanagement aufzusteigen, blieben größer als diejenigen der gleich in die Wirtschaft wechselnden polytechniciens. Das galt besonders für die sehr schmale Elite der X Mines, und dies trotz – oder gerade wegen – des Umwegs über die Verwaltung. Auch die inspecteurs des Finances stellen nach wie vor eine zahlenmäßig sehr kleine Elite dar: Es gibt hier etwa fünf bis sieben Stellen pro Jahr. Die einzige wesentliche Veränderung nach 1945 war für sie, dass der spezielle concours durch die Auslese über neu gegründete ENA ersetzt wurde. Alle ca. 100 énarques pro Jahr treten auf den oberen Etagen in die Verwaltung ein, aber nur die Besten haben die Möglichkeit, inspecteurs des Finances50 zu werden. Die Stellen werden also – entsprechend dem Modell der Polytechnique – an die, gemessen an 50 Die Hierarchie ist aber nicht so rigide wie in der Polytechnique, wo die Besten sich fast immer für den corps des Mines entscheiden; bei der ENA hat der Staatsrat als Corps eine ähnliches Prestige. Die inspection des Finances gilt jedoch als besser geeignet für eine spätere Karriere in der Wirtschaft.

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ihrem Abschluss, jeweils leistungsstärksten Absolventen vergeben. Haben sie hier Erfolg, zieht das mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit weitere Erfolge nach sich: Die Chancen, in die Unternehmensspitze aufzusteigen, sind für diesen Kreis sehr viel größer als für die anderen énarques. Diese Praxis ist Teil eines umfassenderen Syndroms: der in Frankreich eklatant ungleichen Verteilung der Chancen, nach Absolvierung einer Ausbildung in die Wirtschaftselite aufzusteigen. In Deutschland hat der Träger eines Doktortitels größere Chancen, Spitzenmanager zu werden, als ein einfacher Diplom-Ingenieur, Jurist oder Kaufmann.51 Diese wiederum haben deutlich weiter reichende Möglichkeiten als die Absolventen einer Fachhochschule oder als ehemalige Lehrlinge ohne weitere akademische Ausbildung. Außerdem existiert – bisher – keine fixe Hierarchie der Hochschulen. In Frankreich hingegen hat die immer ähnliche, sich kontinuierlich wiederholende Wahl der renommiertesten Schulen durch die formal besten Schüler nach den Aufnahmeprüfungen eine solche stabile Hierarchie etabliert. Gemeint ist damit zum einen das starke Gefälle zwischen den grandes écoles, die ihre Studenten durch die concours auslesen, und den Universitäten, die alle anderen Studienanfänger aufnehmen. Zwischen den grandes écoles selbst, die ihre Studenten aus den Vorbereitungsklassen auswählen, etablieren die concours zum anderen eine noch subtilere Hierarchie. Denn in jeder Fachrichtung (seien es die wissenschaftlichen, seien es die kaufmännisch orientierten Vorbereitungsklassen) verlaufen die Auswahlvorgänge fast immer nach ein- und demselben Muster: Wer die Aufnahmeprüfung der Polytechnique und der Centrale Paris bzw. der Handelshochschule (HEC)52 und der École supérieure des sciences économiques et commerciales (ESSEC)53 besteht, entscheidet sich aus Prestigegründen fast immer für die jeweils erstere der beiden. Und wer die Aufnahmeprüfung für die Centrale Paris und eine Ingenieurschule in der Provinz bzw. für die ESSEC und eine Handelshochschule der Provinz besteht, entscheidet sich ebenfalls immer für die jeweils erstgenannte. Die Pariser Hochschulen und diejenigen technischen Unterrichtsanstalten, die eine allgemeine Ausbildung anbieten, genießen durchweg Vorrang vor denjenigen in der Provinz bzw. den Spezialhochschulen (etwa denen für Elektrotechnik, Chemie o. ä.). Erstere fungieren eher als Managementhochschulen, letztere dagegen als kaufmännische oder Ingenieur-Hochschulen. Diese Hierarchie spiegelt sich auch in den sehr ungleichen Chancen der Absolventen, in das Spitzenmanagement aufzusteigen, wider: In dieser Hinsicht haben die Studenten der Universitäten, abgesehen von den Juristen, kaum irgendwelche 51 Vgl. für eine historische Perspektive: Hervé Joly, Großunternehmer in Deutschland. Soziologie einer industriellen Elite 1933 – 1989, Leipzig 1999. Die neueste Zeit wird durch die Studien des Soziologen Michael Hartmann in den Blick genommen: Vgl. u. a. Michael Hartmann, Topmanager. Die Rekrutierung einer Elite, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 1996; Michael Hartmann, Der Mythos von den Leistungseliten. Spitzenkarrieren und soziale Herkunft in Wirtschaft, Politik, Justiz und Wissenschaft, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2002. 52 Die HEC wurde 1881 in Paris gegründet; ihr Sitz ist heute in Jouy-en-Josas bei Paris. 53 Die ESSEC wurde 1907 in Paris gegründet, ihr Sitz ist heute in Cergy-Pontoise bei Paris.

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realen Chancen – und die Diplomierten der „kleineren“ grandes écoles der Provinz nur unwesentlich größere. Die Absolventen der besten Pariser Hochschulen übernehmen die meisten Stellen; und hier wiederum haben die in der Hierarchie oben angesiedelten einen großen Vorsprung (etwa, was die Ingenieure angeht, die Polytechnique gegenüber den Centrale, oder, im kaufmännischen Bereich, die HEC gegenüber der ESSEC).54 Laut der aktuellen Liste der Vorstandsmitglieder der CAC 40-Unternehmen55 sind 17.2 Prozent von ihnen Absolventen der Polytechnique, lediglich 2.9 Prozent von ihnen „entstammen“ der Centrale Paris (bei annähernd identischen Absolventenzahlen pro Jahrgang). 9.2 Prozent von ihnen sind Absolventen der HEC, gegenüber 4.6 Prozent Absolventen der ESSEC und 2.9 Prozent Absolventen der École supérieure de commerce de Paris (ESCP).56 Die aggregierten Prozentanteile der Absolventen aller anderen Ingenieurhochschulen (außer Polytechnique und Centrale Paris) – insgesamt 18 Prozent der Vorstandsmitglieder – machen zusammen kaum mehr aus als der Anteil der Polytechnique allein. Und die aggregierten Prozentanteile der Absolventen aller anderen Handelshochschulen (außer HEC, ESSEC und ESCP) stellen mit 4 Prozent der Vorstandsmitglieder ebenfalls viel weniger dar als HEC allein. Alle Universitäten zusammen bilden lediglich 13.7 Prozent der Spitzenmanager aus. Die ENA allein liegt hier bei 12.9 Prozent.57 Wenn man Polytechnique-, HEC- und ENA-Absolventen addiert, so eröffnen sich für weniger als 1.000 Studenten pro Jahrgang über 40 Prozent der Spitzenpositionen. Wenn man zusätzlich die wenigen tausend Absolventen einiger weiterer Pariser Hochschulen der „zweiten Reihe“ (Centrale, Mines, Ponts, ESSEC, ESCP, Sciences Po, Normale sup) pro Jahrgang zusammenrechnet, so eröffnen sich für diese Absolventen insgesamt weit über die Hälfte (nämlich 62.5 Prozent) aller Spitzenpositionen. Dies heißt natürlich nicht, dass alle Absolventen der Polytechnique oder der ENA bzw. alle Mitglieder der grands corps Spitzenmanager werden. Was letztere 54 Dieser kaufmännische Ausbildungsweg hat sich bei den wirtschaftlichen „Eliten der Eliten“ erst ab den 1960er Jahren durchgesetzt. Vorher war die Rekrutierung nicht so rigoros selektiv wie in den technischen grandes écoles. Diese privaten Hochschulen, die hohe Gebühren erheben, stellten eher Auffangbecken für die Sprösslinge des Besitzbürgertums mit Abiturergebnissen mittlerer Güte dar. Die HEC selbst leidet bis heute darunter, dass sie, anders als die Polytechnique, keinen direkten Zugang zu den staatlichen grands corps bahnen kann. Vgl. Marc Meuleau, Les HEC et l’évolution du management en France. 1881 – années 1980 [Die Absolventen der Hautes études commerciales und die Entwicklung des Managements in Frankreich. 1881 bis in die 1980er Jahre], thèse d’État, université Paris X Nanterre, 1992, 4 Bde. Dieser Zugang eröffnet sich den Absolventen nur auf dem Weg über die ENA. Sie rekrutiert ihre Studenten nicht direkt aus den Vorbereitungsklassen sondern mittels einer speziellen Aufnahmeprüfung, die überhaupt nur für Inhaber eines Hochschuldiploms (Licence oder ein Äquivalent, heute Master) zugänglich ist. Die traditionell beste Vorbereitung hierfür ist das Institut d’études politiques in Paris (kurz: Sciences Po), ebenfalls eine Hochschule, die mit eigenen Aufnahmeprüfungen ihre Studenten rigoros ausliest. 55 Vgl. hierzu meine eigene, oben erwähnte ungedruckte Studie von 2007. 56 Die ESCP wurde 1819 gegründet. 57 Und Sciences Po ohne ENA-Abschluß bei 6 Prozent.

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angeht, so bleibt ein Teil von ihnen in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. Diejenigen, die in die Wirtschaft wechseln, stellen bei den X Mines58 und den inspecteurs des Finances59 traditionell eine gute bzw. eine knappe Hälfte und bei den zahlreicheren X Ponts60 eine Minderheit von rund 40 Prozent dar, selbst wenn man die Abordnungen in die öffentlichen Unternehmen und die Austritte in die private Wirtschaft zusammenrechnet. Es handelt sich hier auch nicht um eine – für den Staat womöglich problematische – Flucht aus dem Staatsdienst. Die traditionelle Verwaltung hat schlicht und einfach nicht ausreichend leitende Stellen anzubieten für diesen Kreis von Personen, die nach überaus strikten Kriterien ausgelesen worden sind – nicht zuletzt nach dem Kriterium „weit überdurchschnittlicher Ehrgeiz“. In der Hierarchie der Ministerien für Industrie- bzw. für öffentliche Arbeiten sowie im Finanzministerium steigen die X Mines, die X Ponts und die inspecteurs des Finances rasch auf. Jenseits des Alters von 40 bis 45 Jahren können sie sich aber nicht alle Hoffnung auf die Position eines Ministerialdirektors machen. Ein Überwechseln in die Wirtschaft wird in diesen Fällen von der Verwaltung nicht als negativ angesehen, im Gegenteil: Herkömmlich wird sie durch zeitweise Beurlaubungen gefördert. Im Fall eines Misserfolgs in der Wirtschaft besteht so für den Beamten die Möglichkeit, auf seine Stellung im Staatsdienst zurückzukehren. Zudem gelingt nicht allen Angehörigen der grands corps, welche in die Wirtschaft wechseln, der Eintritt in den Vorstand eines Großunternehmens. Zwar werden sie nur selten von mittelständischen Unternehmen rekrutiert; manche jedoch begnügen sich mit Unternehmen der „zweiten Liga“, solchen also, die nicht zu der größten der Branche gehören. Andere sind z. B. in Beratungsfirmen oder Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaften tätig, die zwar einflussreich sein können, aber, gemessen an der Beschäftigtenzahl, eben keine Großunternehmen sind. Was die Wege in die Wirtschaft angeht, so hat es immer mehrere gegeben: Die privaten Unternehmen selbst rekrutieren die jungen Beamten meist im Alter zwischen 32 und 35 Jahren, also nach höchstens zehn Jahren Verwaltungsdienst. In den öffentlichen Unternehmen war durch direkte staatliche Ernennungen zu Generaldirektoren oder PDGs eine größere Anzahl späterer Rekrutierungen zu verzeichnen. In jedem Fall machen die Betroffene eine Karriere eigener Art: Der Aufstieg zur Spitze verläuft für sie immer rascher als für andere Ingenieure, Juristen oder Betriebswirte. Oft rekrutiert ein Unternehmen lediglich jeweils einen Angehörigen eines grand corps pro Generation. In einem Großunternehmen beginnt dieser 58 38.1 Prozent der X Mines machten Karriere ausschließlich in der staatlichen Verwaltung (nach eigenen Berechnungen für die Jahrgänge 1870 – 1939 der Polytechnique; dabei wurden nur die Karriereverläufe in Unternehmen bis zum 60. Lebensjahr berücksichtigt, nicht zweite Karrieren nach der staatlichen Pensionierung). 59 52.7 Prozent der inspecteurs des finances machten Karriere ausschließlich in der staatlichen Verwaltung (nachgewiesen für die Jahrgänge 1870 bis 1939; später war ihr Anteil offenkundig geringer). 60 60.7 Prozent der X Ponts machten Karriere ausschließlich in der staatlichen Verwaltung (nachgewiesen für die Jahrgänge 1870 – 1925).

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seine Laufbahn nicht als „normaler“ Akademiker. Nach einer Art „Entdeckungspraktikum“ (stage de découverte) übernimmt er unverzüglich eine leitende Stellung. Geht alles gut – natürlich bleibt immer ein Risiko, das aus der „Unverträglichkeit der Charaktere“, den wirtschaftlichen Wechselfällen oder denen der Personalentwicklung resultieren kann – so ist der Weg zum Vorstand meist vorprogrammiert. Dies gilt besonders für die Angehörigen der beiden elitärsten grands corps, die X Mines und die inspecteurs des Finances.61 Die Angehörigen der grands corps spielen in einer anderen Liga als die anderen leitenden Angestellten. Obwohl die erstgenannten ihren Karriereweg in den Unternehmen später beginnen, erreichen sie den Vorstand oft in jüngerem Alter; sie haben dann auch die besten Aussichten auf den Vorsitz. Natürlich besteht hier die Gefahr, dass die Konkurrenten entmutigt werden oder aber eifersüchtig, denn bei ihnen kann der Eindruck entstehen, dass die Würfel längst gefallen sind und echte, d. h. persönliche Leistungen nicht zählen. Wie lassen sich die Privilegien der grands corps erklären? Diese sind zwar die absoluten Spitzenprodukte des Ausbildungssystems – allerdings gemessen an Kriterien, die mit den Erwartungen der Wirtschaft nicht besonders gut kongruieren. Ist vielleicht ihre Tätigkeit im Staatsdienst entscheidend? Während der ersten Jahre ist sie nicht besonders interessant: X Mines und X Ponts sind in den lokalen Vertretungen ihrer Ministerien tätig, die inspecteurs des Finances werden in die Verwaltungen in der Provinz entsandt, um dort die Buchhaltung zu kontrollieren (solche missions de contrôle dauern in der Regel jeweils nur einige Wochen, ziehen sich für den einzelnen inspecteur des finances aber über etwa vier Jahre hin; sie zählen, weil die örtlichen Beamte nicht selten Vorbehalte gegenüber den jungen Inspektoren hegen, zu den eher unangenehmen, wenn auch lehrreichen Erfahrungen). Erst nach einigen Jahren können die Angehörigen der grands corps interessantere Positionen in der Zentrale übernehmen, und etwa als Ministerialdirektoren oder im Kabinett eines Ministers (cabinet ministériel) einschlägige Erfahrungen sammeln und Beziehungen knüpfen, die für eine weitere Karriere in der Wirtschaft nützlich sein können. Manche verlassen jedoch, ohne Schaden zu nehmen, den Staatsdienst, bevor sie diese Erfahrungen akkumuliert haben. Oft gibt es keinen klaren Zusammenhang zwischen Verwaltungs- und Unternehmenstätigkeit. Wesentlich wichtiger erscheint, dass die grands corps als Machtnetzwerke fungieren und funktionieren, die ihren Mitgliedern Karrierechancen bieten. Die besten beruflichen Gelegenheiten werden denen offeriert, die die community für die besten hält. Die Älteren befördern dabei vorzugsweise die Jüngeren in diejenigen Positionen, die sie vorher selbst inne gehabt haben. Dies ist das System der Repro61 Lediglich für die X Ponts bzw. vorher die X Génie maritime sieht bzw. sah die Lage anders aus: An ihren traditionellen „Landeplätzen“, d. h. Eisenbahngesellschaften, Bauunternehmen und Werften, werden bzw. wurden so viele Angehörige pro Generation rekrutiert, dass nicht jeder einer Vorstandsposten erreichen konnte. Manche mussten bzw. müssen sich daher mit „unteren leitenden“ Stellen im technischen Bereich begnügen.

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duktion von beruflichem Nachwuchs, das den von Pierre Bourdieu so apostrophierten „Staatsadel“ hervorgebracht hat.62 Die Karriereprivilegien der grands corps in der Wirtschaft haben die Privatisierungen überlebt. Fraglich bleibt allerdings, ob dieser „französische Sonderweg“ die zunehmende Internationalisierung der französischen Wirtschaft überleben werden. Die französischen Großkonzerne sind, was Aktionäre, Beschäftigte, Märkte und eben auch Manager angeht, immer weniger französisch. Die Verbindung mit dem französischen Staat zählt immer weniger. Es gibt Anzeichen dafür, dass das Spiel sich für eine größere Zahl von Mitspielern öffnen könnte und dass persönliche Leistungen für den beruflichen Erfolg künftig mehr zählen wird. Die Resistenz des alten Modells bleibt ungeachtet dessen bemerkenswert.

62

Pierre Bourdieu, Der Staatsadel, Konstanz 2004 (frz. Original: Paris 1989).

Business Elites in Italy and the Failure of the National Planning Policies as a Vision of Development By Fabio Lavista I. Introduction Immediately after the Second World War, the urgencies of the economic reconstruction and the necessity to achieve foreign aid pushed a large part of the Italian business elite to converge on a common vision of the future development of the country. A view grounded on the diffusion of organizational capabilities, the enhancement of programming skills and, generally speaking, the spreading of managerial practices. Both the technical staffs of the large-sized enterprises and the state owned companies’ managerial elite, on the basis of their specialization, firstly suggested reform proposals aiming to establish some sort of technical government of the economic life,1 then they tried to set up planning systems to selectively drive the Italian recovery. These technicians had been trained during the interwar years when the first successful implementations of scientific management were realized2 and the institutional framework of public holdings was designed, as a consequence of the banking rescues of the 1930s.3 After the conflict, their experiences in the technical manage1 On these attempts see Duccio Bigazzi, “L’ora dei tecnici”: aspirazioni e progetti tra guerra e ricostruzione [“The Age of Technicians”: Aspirations and Plans between War and Reconstruction], in: Giuseppe De Luca (ed.), Pensare l’Italia nuova: la cultura economica milanese tra corporativismo e ricostruzione [Projecting a Renewed Italy: The Economic Culture in Milan between Corporativism and Reconstruction], Milano 1997, pp. 379 – 431. 2 On the production management in Italy in the interwar period see Giulio Sapelli, Organizzazione, lavoro e innovazione industriale nell’Italia tra le due guerre [Organization, Labor and Industrial Innovation in Italy between the Two World Wars], Torino 1978 and Duccio Bigazzi, Modelli e pratiche organizzative nell’industrializzazione italiana [Models and Organizational Practices of the Italian Industrialization], in: Franco Amatori et al. (eds.), Storia d’Italia. Annali 15. L’industria [History of Italy. Annals 15. The Industry], Torino 1999, pp. 895 – 994. 3 See Franco Amatori, Italy’s Futile Search for a Third Way, in: Pier Angelo Toninelli (ed.), The Rise and the Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in the Western World, New York 2000, pp. 128 – 156 and Fabrizio Barca / Sandro Trento, La parabola delle partecipazioni statali: una missione tradita [The Parable of State Owned Enterprises: A Betrayed Mission], in: Fabrizio Barca (ed.), Storia del capitalismo italiano dal dopoguerra ad oggi [The History of Italian Capitalism from the Postwar Period to the Present], Roma 1997, pp. 185 – 236.

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ment of large enterprises that were moving towards mass production, as well as the task to rule entire industrial sectors, through the main public holdings, indicated economic planning as a means to rapidly achieve high industrial development rates and to ease the social consequences of economic growth. As we will see, the international economic aid administrations pushed towards the same direction, but the mentioned vision of development – based on an established planning activity in order to industrialize the whole country – was not widely shared on all social levels. Fierce opposition came from the majority of the industrialists who soon publicly depicted the planning institutions as an incongruous influence of the state in the economic life. Their main representatives, who ruled their most important association, the Confederazione Italiana dell’Industria (Confindustria), were earnest supporters of a more traditional vision of the Italian economic development: a model based on the export of agricultural products and light-industrial goods, the intervention of foreign investors, the migrant remittances and the tourist trade,4 a framework that would have maintained the Italian industry in what they considered its “natural” condition of “craftsmanship”.5 On the other side, the trade unions regarded economic planning as an attempt to limit their political autonomy, especially in terms of wage claims; as a consequence of this, they did not fully support the planning proposals, although the latter were often grounded on the possibility to achieve a productivistic alliance between the technicians and the workers. Last but not least, the implementation of national economic planning boosted the political struggle between the administrations in charge of designing the country’s economic policies. As a consequence of this opposition, economic planning was not established, or it was only partially set up, at least till the beginning of the 1960s when the first centre-left coalitions, based on the alliance between the Democratic Christian Party (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) and the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI), were formed. The agreement between these political organizations was, in fact, grounded on two main points: the nationalization of the electrical industry and national economic planning. However, the political weakness of the proposal – mainly due to the scarce conviction with which the right-wing of the DC accepted it and to the resurgence of the post-war contrasts – led to significant delays in the plans design and approval. These, in conjunction with the difficult 4 On this model see Franco Bonelli, Il capitalismo italiano. Linee generali di interpretazione [The Italian Capitalism. General Lines of Interpretation], in: Romano Ruggero / Corrado Vivanti (eds.), Storia d’Italia. Annali 1. Dal feudalesimo al capitalismo [History of Italy. Annali 1. From Feudalism to Capitalism], Torino 1978, pp. 1193 – 1255. 5 On the post war debate about the Italian economic development see Duccio Bigazzi, Mass Production or “Organized Craftsmanship”? The Post War Italian Automobile Industry, in: Jonathan Zeitlin / Gary Herrigel (eds.), Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in Post-War Europe and Japan, New York 2000, pp. 269 – 297 and Giuseppe Berta, Nord. Dal triangolo industriale alla megalopoli padana 1950 – 2000 [The North. From the “Industrial Triangle” to the Po Valley Megalopolis, 1950 – 2000], Milano 2008, pp. 7 – 36.

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economic trends of the subsequent decade and the related social and political crisis, determined the failure of the planning activities itself. This failure also meant the crisis of the management elite that set up after the Second World War and that would have encountered growing difficulties in promoting its vision of development. The weakness of the planning project lead to its failure and its lack of success, in turn, faded economic planning from the political discourses or – at least – transformed it in a tool useful to enlarge politics interference in economic life, with significant distortions in term of destination of public investments. The paper aims to analyze these developments, stressing in particular the role played by the managerial elite of large-sized enterprises, both public and private. During the years, economic planning was considered, in fact, at the centre of the political agenda, even if with different degree of importance and under different perspectives, that could not always be easily isolated: as a reflection about the centralized Soviet planning experience, as a new reading of Keynes’ work, as an attempt to import New Dealist policies, as a rethinking of the Fascist Corporativism and of its failure, as a part of the social doctrine of the Catholic church and, last but not least, as a reflection about the role of the state owned enterprises.6 The economic planning represented also – in a negative or positive term – one of the main attempts to design on more democratic and rational basis the Italian economic structure – an attempt that was led mainly by the managerial elite of large-sized enterprises. II. Post-war economic plans In the summer of 1944, the United States administration granted the Italian government a credit in dollars in order to import consumer goods, raw materials and all industrial products essential to keep the Italian basic industries alive. To enjoy this credit the Italian authorities, jointly with the Allied Commission, had to draw up in the first months of 1945 a so called “First Aid Plan”, a list of the goods that the southern regions would have needed during that year, assuming that the war would have continued. In the spring of the very same year, when, in fact, the conflict ceased, a new importing plan was set up – again under the supervision of the Allied Commission – by the economic branch of the Northern Italy National Liberation Committee (Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italia, CLNAI), the institution which had driven the resistance against the Nazi occupation in the north of the country: the 6 On the debate about economic planning in second world war Italy see Piero Barucci, Ricostruzione, pianificazione, Mezzogiorno. La politica economica in Italia dal 1943 al 1955 [Reconstruction, Planning, Mezzogiorno. The Italian Economic Policy from 1943 to 1955], Bologna 1978 and Simonetta Bartolozzi Batignani, La Programmazione [Planning], in: Giorgio Mori (ed.), La cultura economica nel periodo della ricostruzione [The Economic Culture of the Reconstruction Period], Bologna 1980, pp. 103 – 167.

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“1945 Transitional Plan”, followed up few months later by the “1946 General Industrial Importing Plan”.7 All these planning activities, necessary to achieve international grants, continued during the years of the European Recovery Program (1947 – 1952),8 producing a relevant amount of knowledge on the Italian industry and, moreover, suggesting the possibility to centralize and plan the process of national economic recovery. A crucial role in this junction was played by the Institute for Economic Recovery (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, IRI), the main public holding established in 1933. Its technical structures, formed during the interwar years in order to manage the IRI’s multisectoral activities, started again to play the role of technical consultant for the Ministry of Industry since the last months of the war.9 It was not by chance that during the summer of 1948, Pasquale Saraceno, the chief of the IRI’s economic studies office, an economist close to the left-wing of the Democratic Christian Party, published the first proposal for an Italian longterm economic plan for the years 1949 – 1952. It was a forecasting analysis, aiming to provide information about the sector on which the government should have focussed its investments in order to solve the main economic problems of the country: the high unemployment rates, the poor level of the national income and the backwardness of the southern regions – a plan that would have been used in order to draw up the long-term program of investments that the Italian government had to present to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at the end of the same year in order to get international economic aid. “In the present conditions of the Italian economy”, Pasquale Saraceno explained in his report to the Italian government, a plan had “not to be considered as a tool to convert a general guideline into more and more detailed regulations; it [had] to be a point of reference for the existing public intervention which, otherwise, [resulted] often in inadequate, superfluous or even contradictory and irrational policies. The 7 See Ministero dell’Industria e del Commercio: Piano di massima per le importazioni industriali dell’anno 1946 [General Industrial Import Plan for the Year 1946], Roma 1945. 8 On the Marshall Plan and its development in Italy see Charles S. Maier, The Two Post War Eras and The Condition for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe, in: The American Historical Review 86 (1981), 2, pp. 327 – 367; Pier Paolo D’Attorre, Il piano Marshall. Politica, economia, relazioni internazionali nella ricostruzione italiana [The Marshall Plan. Politics, Economics, International Relations during the Italian Reconstruction Period], in: Passato e presente volume 1985 (1985), 7, pp. 31 – 63 and Carlo Spagnolo, La stabilizzazione incompiuta. Il piano Marshall in Italia (1947 – 1952) [The Incomplete Stabilization. The Marshall Plan in Italy (1947 – 1952)], Roma 2001. 9 It is interesting to note that the majority of the people who worked in the technical offices of the Rome-based Institute after the Second World War, was also involved in its activities during the interwar years. On the role of the IRI in the design of the first aid plans see Ferruccio Ricciardi, Il “management” del “governo della scarsità”: l’Iri e i piani di ricostruzione economica (1943 – 1947) [The Management of the Regime of the Scarcity: the IRI and the Plans for Economic Reconstruction (1943 – 1947)], in: Studi storici 46 (2005), 1, pp. 127 – 154.

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plan [was] an instrument to influence the orientation of private enterprises and to drive the state-owned ones” or – in other words – “to make economical the move of the private enterprises towards some general economic targets fixed in advance [and] to have the activities, that the private entrepreneurs would not have carried out, done by the the public holdings”.10 The possibility of designing a plan for the Italian recovery, mainly with the aim to reach given production capacities according to a fixed timetable, was taken into consideration also outside the public enterprises. The project, in the first years after the Second World War, was shared with a large part of the managerial elite of the main private industrial companies. Planning the country’s recovery, for people who were in charge of large-sized industrial complexes and who were aware of the international developments of managerial sciences and practices, meant the possibility of solving the economic problems created by the war and by the crisis of the fascist regime and to remedy the social imbalances of the Italian development, fostering a widespread process of industrialization. To produce detailed surveys on the conditions of the Italian industry and to propose its re-organization by the selective assignment of the international aids, initially provided by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and then by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), was seen by the managerial elite of the main Italian enterprises as an opportunity to redesign the national industrial specialization, favoring in the meanwhile the diffusion of modern managerial practices.11 The managerial control of the enterprise was, in fact, considered as the main condition not only for the economic recovery, but also for the modernization of the Italian social structure, in consonance with some of the liberal ideals of the officers of the ECA which – at least in the early years of existence of this administration – promoted a vision of economic and social development strictly linked with a move towards more democratic industrial relationships.12 In this perspective, the participation was particularly significant, since the end of the war, of a fair number of technicians and managers in the work of the Northern Italy Industrial Committee (Comitato Industriale Alta Italia, CIAI) and then of the Industrial Central Committee (Commissione Centrale Industria, CCI), the institutions established by the Italian government – the first in 1945, the second one year later – to concretely manage, together with the IRI’s economic studies office, the requests of international funds.13 10 Pasquale Saraceno, Elementi per un piano economico 1949 – 1952. Relazione al Comitato Interministeriale per la Ricostruzione [Elements for an Economic Plan 1949 – 1952. Report to the Interministerial Committee for Reconstruction], Roma 1948, pp. 22 – 25. 11 This was not necessarily true for the owners of the companies. 12 On the ECA and the transformation of its policy in relation with the Korean war see Jacqueline McGlade, From Business Reform Programme to Production Drive. The Transformation of US Technical Assistance to Western Europe, in: Matthias Kipping / Ove Bjarnar (eds.), The Americanization of European Business. The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models, New York 1998, pp. 18 – 32.

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However, these reform attempts – and mainly the planning proposal – faced the fierce opposition of the greater part of the industrialists, who considered the CIAI and the CCI as an improper interference of the state in economic life or, at most, a cheap means to achieve technical and financial aids. The Confindustria trying to replace these administrations with its sectoral branches since 1945, started a virulent press campaign against “the nature of the plan and its antidemocratic genesis”, determined – in its opinion – by the fact that the plan had been designed by the government, without the direct involvement and the supervision of the representatives of the industry. CIAI and CCI, according to the newspapers closer to the Confindustria, were only a means to “increase bureaucracy and control over functions which – on the contrary – could have got the best results exclusively when free trade would have been fully realized”14. In the end, the opposition against the planning proposals reduced the extent of the latter and the persons involved in the mentioned committees, after a few years, abandoned their public engagement and started again to work in private or public enterprises. But these institutions achieved some partial results, anyway. First of all, despite the political opposition, they promoted the circulation of managerial practices, both by facilitating the formation of national and international networks of technicians and by acting as communication mediators for those small and medium sized enterprises that were unable to set up direct links with the main centres of managerial knowledge. Secondarily, they fostered the debate on the tools to favor economic development. In this way, the planning proposals were not completely set aside: in the subsequent years they made a comeback in relation to the necessity to find a possible remedy to the backwardness of the southern regions. In December 1946, the Association for the Development of Southern Italy (Associazione per lo sviluppo del Mezzogiorno, SVIMEZ) was established in Rome by Rodolfo Morandi, a leader of the Socialist Party (PSI), at that time Italian Minister of Industry and Commerce, together with some of the main protagonists of the history of state owned enterprises during the interwar years, who now were in charge of the main Italian eco13 On the work of CIAI and CCI see Giuseppe Maione, Tecnocrati e mercanti. L’industria italiana tra dirigismo e concorrenza internazionale (1945 – 1950) [Technocrats and Merchants. The Italian Industry between Dirigisme and International Competition (1945 – 1950)] Milano 1986. 14 I controlli industriali nell’Alta Italia [Industrial Controls in Northern Italy], in: Il Sole, 08. 08. 1945. On the political opposition against CIAI and CCI see Luigi Ganapini, I Pianificatori liberisti [The Liberal Planners], in: Marcello Flores et al. (eds.), Gli anni della Costituente. Strategie dei governi e delle classi sociali [The Years of the Constituent Assembly. Strategies of the Governments and the Social Classes], Milano 1983, pp. 77 – 127; Camillo Daneo, La politica economica della ricostruzione 1945 – 1949 [The Economic Policy of the Reconstruction 1945 – 1949], Torino 1975 and Mariuccia Salvati, Stato e industria nella Ricostruzione. Alle origini del potere democristiano (1944 / 1949) [State and Industry in the Reconstruction Period. The Origins of the Christian Democratic Power (1944 / 1949)], Milano 1982.

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nomic institutions, including the cited Pasquale Saraceno. The aim of the Association was to study the economic conditions of the southern parts of the peninsula and to design feasible plans to modernize those regions, in the belief that they could catch up with the more developed North only by means of an intense industrialization process.15 During the late 1940s and the 1950s, the SVIMEZ continuously monitored the economic trends of the Italian Mezzogiorno, suggesting public and private interventions and exerting pressure on governments in order to overcome possible political obstacles to these interventions. One of its main contributions in the first half of the 1950s was the design of the so called Vanoni’s Scheme, the “Decennial Plan to Increase Income and Employment” presented to the Parliament by the Minister of Finance, Ezio Vanoni, in 1954. In a rather different political situation, characterized by the crisis of the centrist alliance,16 which had ruled the country in the previous decade, and by the redefinition of the internal balance in the Democratic Christian Party,17 planning again seemed to be a remedy to the imbalance caused by the rapid economic growth of those years. But the approach to the problem was completely different: “the Scheme was not interested in the development of the industrial sectors considered as strategic, it would like to understand the way the national economic system worked in order to define the necessary interventions to achieve the objectives posed by the same 15 Till that moment, all the proposals for the economic intervention in the South of Italy were based on two opposite assumptions: that free trade, with some help of the State, would have solved the backwardness problems of those regions or – on the contrary – that only a political revolution could have changed the economic trend of the southern areas. The novelty of SVIMEZ’s approach lay in its insistence on industrialization and in its economical-statistical attitude. See Vera Zamagni / Mario Sanfilippo (eds.), Nuovo Meridionalismo e intervento straordinario. La Svimez dal 1946 al 1950 [Nuovo Meridionalismo and Extraordinary Intervention. The SVIMEZ from 1946 to 1950], Bologna 1988. 16 From 1947 – when the left-wing political parties were excluded from the government – to the beginning of the 1960s, all the executives that followed one another were based upon alliances between the Democratic Christian Party, the Liberal Party (Partito Liberale Italiano, PLI), the Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano Italiano, PRI) and the Socialist Party of the Italian Workers (Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani, PSLI), a group that had left the Italian Socialist Party in 1947, criticising the closeness of the latter to the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI). 17 During that year, Amintore Fanfani succeeded Alcide De Gasperi as Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party, bringing forward a more determined intervention of the same party in the society in the name of a “thriving democracy” and of the christian-social principles. See Francesco Malgeri, Cambiamenti sociali e mutamenti politici: il partito di maggioranza [Social and Political Changes: The Majority Party], in: Pier Luigi Ballini / Sandro Guerrieri (eds.), Le istituzioni repubblicane dal centrismo al centro-sinistra (1953 – 1968) [The Republican Institutions from the Years of Centrism to the Center-left Governments (1953 – 1968)], Roma 2006, pp. 334 – 350. On the crisis of the centrist alliance see also Giovanni Orsina, Il sistema politico: lineamenti di un’interpretazione revisionistica [The Political System: An Outline of a Revisionist Interpretation], in: Ballini / Guerrieri, Le istituzioni (fn. 17), pp. 309 – 333.

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plan”.18 Which were: the complete utilization of the labor supply; the filling of the gap between Southern and Northern regions, and the adjustment of the balance of payments. By that time, the economic post-war recovery had come to the end. It finished faster than expected because of the technological progress in industry and the increase in agricultural productivity, but it posed some structural problems to deal with in the following years. The impossibility to achieve further international aid brought the stability of the balance of payments into question, while the ongoing international liberalization of trade and the possible increases in wage levels suggested fostering investments in order to nourish the economic growth. The Vanoni’s Scheme forecast at least an annual increase of 5 percent in national income and indicated some sectors as “propulsive”, in which should have been concentrated the state intervention in the future: the agriculture, the public utilities and the public works. Furthermore, according to its Keynesian inspiration, the Scheme proposed “a countercyclical action linked with the plan”, by means of the increase or the decrease of public investments in other so-called “regulator” sectors: the building industry and the reforestation one.19 In this way, with the adoption of the decennial scheme, the government would have directly or indirectly assumed overall responsibility for the global economic development of the country.20 The document, however, during the subsequent years, did not find wide practical applications, going no further than its mere role of guideline, without any binding function. Its main success was to revitalize the debate on planning on the eve of a political shift which would have set the planning activities high on the agenda.

III. The managerial roots of national economic planning Undoubtedly, the SVIMEZ’s works and the Vanoni’s Scheme had a great influence on the subsequent national economic planning of the 1960s, but what we want to stress here is that the work of managers and technicians within public and private large-sized enterprises had a strong influence, too. After the failure of the planning attempts of the late 1940s, as we have seen, a large part of the members of the committees in charge of compiling the imports requests to the ECA, started again to work in their companies of origin where, in many cases, they tried to implement a new planning system, as suggested by the 18 Pasquale Saraceno, Esperienze di programmazione: 1944 – 1963 [Planning Experiences: 1944 – 1963], in: Nord e Sud 13 (1966), 75, pp. 21 – 38, here p. 24. 19 Ibidem. 20 On the Vanoni’s Scheme see Barucci, Ricostruzione (fn. 6), pp. 257 – 271 and Manin Carabba, Un ventennio di programmazione 1954 – 1974 [Twenty Years of Planning 1954 – 1974], Bari 1977, pp. 1 – 26.

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contemporaneous management theories, which insisted on the positive effects of long range planning on the enterprises’ economic performances.21 There is a less analyzed continuity between these experiences and the institution of national planning during the centre-left governments: continuity in terms of cultural background, because it was from these managerial planning attempts that national planning drew its inspiration, but also continuity in term of the people involved. The technicians, who cooperated during the 1960s and the 1970s with the State Budget Ministry, the institution in charge of designing national long-term plans, came, in fact, from previous engagements in the economic studies offices of the major Italian enterprises. They simply were involved in the design of public policies as soon as the political balances made it possible again. The centre-left alliance was grounded on the convergence of the left-wing of the Democratic Christian Party (DC), among which the mentioned Pasquale Saraceno and Amintore Fanfani, the Italian Republican Party (PRI), led by Ugo La Malfa, the Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI)22 and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) on a shared reformist program. The aim was to solve the Italian main economic and social distortions like the poverty of the southern regions, the backwardness of the Italian agriculture or the unbalance between private and public consumptions created by the rapid and uncontrolled growth of the end of the 1950s, the so-called Italian “economic miracle”.23 In particular, the socialists insisted on the necessity to reduce the power of the economic monopolies, represented mainly by the electrical industrialist,24 and to implement a system of national planning in order to realize the reform program. The debate on the economic and social reforms not only involved political parties but also the main economic institutions, among which a major role was played by 21 See for example William Platt / Robert Maines, Pretest You Long-Range Plans, in: Harvard Business Review 37 (1959), 1, pp. 119 – 127. This study – published in the Harvard Business Review at the beginning of 1959 – analyzed the performances of 400 American enterprises between 1939 and 1957 and it concluded that the growth rate of a firm was strictly correlated with the implementation of long-range planning techniques, the commitment to research and development and – last but not least – a planned policy of investment widening. 22 The former Socialist Party of the Italian Workers (see fn. 16). 23 On the forming of the centre-left governments see Paul Ginsborg, Storia d’Italia dal dopoguerra ad oggi. Società e politica 1943 – 1988 [The History of Italy from the Postwar Period to the Present. Society and Politics 1943 – 1988], Torino 1989, pp. 344 – 408. In particular on the debate about economic planning see also Valdo Spini, I socialisti e la politica di piano (1945 – 1964) [The Socialists and the Planning Policy (1945 – 1964)], Firenze 1982, pp. 155 – 212. 24 On the debate that led to the nationalization of the electrical industry see Giorgio Mori, La nazionalizzazione in Italia: il dibattito politico-economico [The Nationalization in Italy: The Political-economic Debate], in: La nazionalizzazione dell’energia elettrica. L’esperienza italiana e di altri paesi europei. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi del 9 – 10 novembre 1988 per il XXV anniversario dell’istituzione dell’Enel [The Nationalization of Electrical Energy. The Experience of Italy and other European Countries. Minutes of the International Conference (9th to 10th November 1988) on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the Founding of Enel], Bari 1989, pp. 91 – 115.

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the large-sized enterprises that deeply modernized their activities during the 1950s and the state-owned ones. In this perspective, it is interesting to analyze the development of three companies: Olivetti from Ivrea, the Institute for Economic Recovery (IRI) which – as has been said – was involved in the industrial policies design since the end of the Second World War, and the National Hydrocarbons Agency (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, ENI), a holding established in 1953 to manage public activities in the fields of oil an gas and to design the national energy policy. Olivetti was, at that time, the major Italian producer of office equipments and it had been one of the first large Italian companies to introduce scientific management in the interwar period; an enterprise particularly aware of the evolution of the contemporaneous managerial and organizational theories.25 In 1956 in Milan, where the sales management had been established some years before, a small office was created in order to conduct surveys on the company’s marketing strategy. Franco Momigliano, an industrial economist who in the previous years managed the industrial relation offices, was put in charge of this new function which soon began to produce forecasting analyses for the sales management. At the very beginning, they conducted analyses on the variations of market absorption levels, in order to suggest changes in the marketing strategies useful to achieve the expected results. Soon, they broadened their research field, starting to study the better placement of new industrial plants, initially for the Olivetti’s head offices and then in more general terms. They researched the more efficient industrial placements comparing the different economic and social conditions that a company could have found in various geographical areas. At the same time, they began to go into the question of the legislation on incentives to investment and its effectiveness in relation to different placement opportunities.26 During the subsequent years, using econometric models elaborated within the same office and taking advantage of the first mainframes produced by Olivetti,27 25 On Olivetti in the interwar period see Valerio Ochetto, Adriano Olivetti, Milano 1985. More in general on the Olivetti’s managerial and political cultures see Giuseppe Berta, Le idee al potere. Adriano Olivetti tra la fabbrica e la comunita [Ideas coming to Power. Adriano Olivetti between Factory and Local Community], Milano 1980 and Giuliana Gemelli, Un esperimento in vitro: l’IPSOA di Torino [An Experiment in Vitro: IPSOA of Turin], in: Giuliana Gemelli (ed.), Scuole di management: origini e primi sviluppi delle business schools in Italia [Schools of Management: Origins and Early Development of Business Schools in Italy], Bologna 1997, pp. 55 – 106. IPSOA stands for Instituto Post-universitario di Studi sullÓrganizzazione Aziendale [Graduate Organizational Studies Institute]. 26 See for example Olivetti Historical Archive, Fondo Franco Momigliano, 151, Politica degli incentivi alla localizzazione industriale con particolare riferimento alle ricerche svolte per conto del Minsitero del Bilancio, 07. 11. 1964; Olivetti Historical Archive, Fondo Franco Momigliano, 151, Gli interventi dell’operatore pubblico ai fini di orientamento delle localizzazioni industriali, nel quadro di una politica di programmazione nazionale, 06. 07. 1965 and, moreover, Olivetti Historical Archive, Fondo Franco Momigliano, 975, Ricerca sul grado di convenienza all’insediamento delle industrie in relazione ai vigenti incentivi diretti – contributo a una riforma del sistema di incentivazione alla localizzazione industriale, April 1965.

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the team headed by Franco Momigliano applied its forecasting framework to the international activities of the entire group, analyzing the suitability of the subsidiaries’ commercial strategies. In 1963, they studied for example – it was one of the main surveys in this field – the consequence of the signing three years before of the Treaty of Montevideo, with which Argentina, Brazil, Chili, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay established the Latin American Free Trade Association. It was very important for a group which had invested a lot in the previous years in the South of America to understand how the new international agreement could have affected its performances. The Momigliano’s group, whose function was in the meantime formalized with the creation of a central economic studies office, provided various simulations of the liberalization process with different timing and the relative industrial and commercial plans that Olivetti should have adopted.28 All these experiences lead to the formulation, during the second half of the 1960s, of the first Olivetti’s long-term general plans, that – as a document of the economic studies offices clearly stated – were radically different from the previous budgeting activity: “the plan [was] a tool to check the quantitative and qualitative consequences of a decision process and to optimize the corporate policy, while the budget [implied] a clear pre-fixed policy, the consequences of which were more or less known in advance; the latter was useful to set the instruments in order to im27 On the econometric models used by Olivetti’s economic studies offices and on the use of computers see Olivetti Historical Archive, Fondo Franco Momigliano, 82, Convegno nazionale sulle applicazioni del calcolo elettronico nelle ricerche econometriche, Milan, 21 – 23. 09. 1961, and in particular the paper presented by Franco Momigliano and Giovanni Angelo Bocca, Un modello di previsione a livello nazionale e a livello aziendale della domanda di un bene strumentale and Malesani P., La biblioteca programmi dei calcolatori elettronici Olivetti al servizio dell’econometrica. More in general on the first Olivetti’s activities in the computer sector see Corrado Bonfanti, Mezzo secolo di futuro. L’informatica italiana compie cinquant’anni [Half a Century of Future. The Italian Computer Science is Becoming Fifty Years Old] in: Mondo digitale v. 2004 (2004), 3, pp. 46 – 48 and Giorgio Sacerdoti / Sergio Ranci, Gli aspetti industriali dell’informatica italiana: i primi progetti e l’avvio dell’attività produttiva [The Industrial Aspects of the Italian Computer Science: The First Projects and the Beginnings of Production Activities], in: Anna Cuzzer (ed.), La cultura informatica in Italia. Riflessioni e testimonianze sulle origini 1950 / 1970 [The Computing Culture in Italy. Reflexions and Testimonies about the Origins 1950 / 1970], Torino 1993, pp. 107 – 160. On the subsequent developments see Giuliana Gemelli / Flaminio Squazzoni, Informatica ed elettronica negli anni sessanta. Il ruolo di Roberto Olivetti attraverso l’archivio storico della società Olivetti [Computer Science and Electronics in the Sixties. The Role of Roberto Olivetti According to the Olivetti’s Historical Archive], in: Giuliana Gemelli (ed.), Politiche scientifiche e strategie d’impresa: le culture olivettiane ed i loro contesti [Politics of Science and Business Strategies: The Olivetti’s Culture and their Contexts] (= Quaderni della Fondazione Olivetti, No. 51), 2005, pp. 257 – 308; Lorenzo Soria, Informatica: un’occasione perduta. La Divisione elettronica dell’Olivetti nei primi anni del centrosinistra [Electronics: A Lost Opportunity. The Olivetti’s Electronic Division in the Early Years of the Center-left Governments], Torino 1979 and Pier Giorgio Perotto, Programma 101 [Programm 101], Milano 1995. 28 See Olivetti Historical Archive, Fondo Studi Economici, 10.48., Le prospettive della integrazione economica con l’America Latina e i problemi che essa propone, in generale, ad un operatore economico, Milano, 1963.

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plement the plans and to define the parameters for the management control”. As a consequence, in terms of logic and timing, the budget came after the plan.29 In the meantime – trough the same Momigliano, who was close to the Socialist Party and in particular to Antonio Giolitti, in those years one of the main supporter of national economic planning – some members of the central economic studies office began to cooperate as consultants with the technical offices of the State Budget Ministry, which – as we will see – was in charge of national economic planning since 1962. According to a later Olivetti’s study, if corporate planning was a tool to drive management decisions in large sized enterprises, national planning would have put on big business “new strain”. Some plan’s objectives could, in fact, have conflicted with the “spontaneous trend of the system, introducing new elements in the economic (and political) calculation of large sized enterprises”. But on the other hand, national economic planning was an interesting challenge that could have given new development opportunities to big business.30 As far as state owned enterprises were concerned, the continuities between the two cases considered – IRI and ENI – and the subsequent national economic planning originated from the new management practices established along the 1950s in the two public institutions, too. At IRI, during that decade, an Economic Studies and Planning Office was established. Under the supervision of Pasquale Saraceno, this office – which inherited the function of the previous Studies and Techno-Economic Plans Office of the post-war years – was in charge of the long-term planning of the entire public holding. The decision to undertake a wide range of planning activities was strictly linked with two political changes of those years. First of all, the approval by the Italian government of the Vanoni’s Scheme; secondarily, the creation in 1956 of the State Owned Enterprises Ministry, through which the new Democratic Christian Party’s leadership decided to intervene deeply in the Italian economy. The State Owned Enterprises Ministry was created in order to coordinate public interventions, as suggested by the Scheme. But, in fact, it was also a means to separate the state-owned enterprises from the Confindustria and, implicitly, to make more independent the national economic policy.31 29 See Olivetti Historical Archive, Fondo Studi Economici, 29.140, Direzione Studi Economici e Programmazione, Programma per la redazione preliminare di un piano pluriennale consolidato del gruppo Oliveti 1969 – 1976 (studio 29 / 68), 1968. 30 See Olivetti Historical Archive, Fondo Franco Momigliano, 819, La pianificazione, 1973. 31 After few years, respectively in 1958 and 1960, the IRI’s enterprises and the ENI’s ones where gathered together in two different bargaining agencies: the Intersind (Associazione Sindacale Intersind, State Owned Enterprises Association) and the ASAP (Associazione Sindacale Aziende Petrolifere, Oil Companies Association); see Giulio Sapelli (ed.), Impresa e sindacato: storia dell’Intersind [Business and Trade Unions: The History of the Intersind], Bologna 1996 and Andrea Ciampani, Per una storia dell’Asap: regolazione sociale e pluralismo della rappresentanza sindacale imprenditoriale nella storia dell’Italia contemporanea [Towards

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So, it was not by chance that the first IRI’s plan for the years 1957 – 1960 was characterized by the same timing of the Vanoni’s Scheme that scheduled a starting up phase exactly in that four-year period. As clearly stated in an internal note of the IRI, written in May 1956, “a good reason to implement long-term planning [was] the adoption by the Italian government of a decennial income and employment development scheme, based on the increasing of investments, especially in industry”. Considering that – continuing the note – “the scheme [outlined] specific investments plan in the so-called ‘propulsive’ sectors” and considering also that the public utilities were among them, an IRI’s long-term plan represented “the translation into practice of the economic policy designed by the planning document approved by the Italian government”. IRI had, in fact, relevant holdings in the “propulsive” businesses: in the electro-technical industry, in telecommunications, in radio and television broadcastings and in the shipping sector. Moreover, it had a main role in the steel industry and in the mechanical one which were both essential to the further economic development of the country and to the the stability of the balance of payments.32 The role of the public holding in the Italian economy justified the proposal of long-term planning that, at the same time, was also suggested by some IRI officials’ visits that took place between 1953 and 1955 in countries, which had experimented with some sort of economic planning (i. e. the United States, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland). These journeys “not only confirmed that planning was one of the main function of the top management, but also registered the deep conviction of the local management that planning was the main cause of their success”33. At the end of 1956, the first long-term plan of the IRI, for the years 1957 – 1960, was presented to the cabinet. The introduction to the document explained that the investment policy of the public holding, once that the post-war reconstruction had ended, would have rapidly increased in every sector: “given the weight of public enterprises in the Italian economy, the growth rate of the group would have been higher than the average growth rate of national income forecast by the Vanoni’s Scheme”34. a History of ASAP: Social Regulation and Pluralism of Business Representation in the History of Contemporary Italy], in: Annali di storia dell’impresa 11 (2000), 1, pp. 527 – 569. In general, on the evolution of the Italian state owned enterprises see Barca / Trento, La parabola (fn. 3), pp. 185 – 236 and Amatori, Italy’s Futile Search (fn. 3). 32 See IRI Historical Archive (Rome), Ufficio Studi, Piani quadriennali, Programma quadriennale 1957 / 60, Relazioni e note sul piano quadriennale, Nota preliminare su un programma del gruppo IRI nel quadriennio 1957 – 1960, 09. 05. 1956. 33 IRI Historical Archive (Rome), Ufficio Studi, Piani quadriennali, Programma quadriennale 1957 / 60, Relazioni e note sul piano quadriennale, Considerazioni operative sul piano quadriennale IRI, 10. 12. 1956. 34 IRI Historical Archive (Rome), Ufficio Studi, Piani quadriennali, Programma quadriennale 1957 / 60, Iri. Programma quadriennale 1957 – 60.

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As these few words testify, the plan was strictly linked with the investment policy that the Italian government would have implemented through the State Owned Enterprises Ministry,35 but the planning activities originated internally, too. Most IRI’s officials, and, in particular, those who were involved in the economic studies office, were persuaded that planning could have lead to a more efficient management of both the holding and the subsidiaries, creating a continuous exchange of information between the parent company and the controlled ones. A few years later, in this perspective, Booz, Allen & Hamilton – a US consulting firm in the field of organization – was engaged to conduct a survey on the IRI’s planning practices. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, which during the 1950s had played a central role in the reorganization of the Italian public steel sector,36 produced a final report with the aim to define “an appropriate concept and objectives for the IRI, with respect to planning budgeting, reporting and control”, in order to recommend a general ultimate system suitable both for the IRI and its controlled companies. The immediate purpose was to present “a recommended program of action for the year 1961, in order to further improve and expand the use of planning, reporting and control techniques throughout IRI”37. But planning activity went further during the next decade. The economic studies office in the following years would have also collaborated with the State Owned Enterprises Ministry to write its annual planning report and, moreover, would have provided information and knowledge basis for the National Economic Planning Commission established in 1962, again under the supervision of Pasquale Saraceno. If a great contribution to national economic planning came from the IRI, this is true for the ENI, too. The link was probably more subtle, less interwoven with the internal developments of the company, but also in this case came from the economic studies office. For sure, the vision of the industrial development of Enrico Mattei – since the first post-war years the main promoter of a hydrocarbons public holding and then the first chairman of the new state owned enterprise – was close to the reform policy advanced by the centre-left coalitions in the 1960s. But the links between ENI and the national economic planning policies were not limited to some common 35 On the relations between IRI’s first plan and the Vanoni’s Scheme see also Ferruccio Ricciardi, Lezioni dall’America. L’IRI, il piano Marshall e lo “scambio” di esperti con gli Stati Uniti all’inizio degli anni cinquanta [Lessons from America. The IRI, the Marshall Plan and the “Exchange” of Experts with the United States in the Early Fifties], in: Imprese e storia v. 2003 (2003), 27, pp. 33 – 66. 36 On the previous interventions of Booz, Allen & Hamilton see Ferruccio Ricciardi, Un’esperienza di “aziendalismo riformistico”: l’Iri negli anni Cinquanta [An Experience of “Reformist Corporatism”: The IRI in the Fifties], in: Annali di storia dell’impresa v. 2004 – 2005 (2005), 15 – 16, pp. 609 – 630. 37 IRI Historical Archive (Rome), Ufficio Studi, Studi specifici, Studi di Booz, Allen & Hamilton International Ltd., Planning, reporting and control systems in Iri, 1960.

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feelings. A lot of the people who would have entered the administrative structure of national economic planning came from the ENI. First of all, this was Giorgio Fuà, an economist who had previously worked at Olivetti and then – in the second half of the 1950s – was engaged in the public holding as economic counsellor of Mattei himself. But also to be mentioned is the socialist Giorgio Ruffolo, who, in the following years, would have been in charge of the Planning Office of the State Budget Ministry and then, after 1967, would have been named National Economic Planning Secretary. Fuà, as economic counsellor, soon established a team for economic studies and, between 1959 and 1960, became manager of the recently constituted Economic Planning Studies Office. In this new function he was then substituted by Giorgio Ruffolo who became responsible for the Public Relations, Economic Studies and Press Office, as the staff was renamed after 1960. The main task of the ENI’s economic studies office was to analyze the hydrocarbons market and all its problems related to technical issues or to international regulations. They normally produced surveys on costs, prices and profits of the oil production in the Middle East countries, they studied the oil by-products prices fixing methods on the internal market, they forecast the national and international energy consumption and they produced an annual survey on the economic trend of hydrocarbons in comparison to the other energy sources. But – as well as IRI’s economic studies office – they also cooperated with the State-Owned Enterprises Ministry to formulate its planning reports in order to present the annual investment plans to the Parliament.38 Also between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the economic studies office at ENI tried to introduce planning systems. They formulated a so-called “little plan” to design a long-term economic outlook that could unify the development plans of the operative companies of the group.39 At ENI, in fact, some sort of financial planning already existed,40 but, as in the case of IRI, it was merely linked with the investment plans of the State Owned Enterprises Ministry and, in general, there was a lack of harmonization between the plans of the holding and the activities of the subsidiaries and a lack of communications due to the peculiar technical culture of ENI’s controlled companies’ management, too.41 For some years this technical culture did not allow establishing a shared 38 ENI Historical Archive (Rome), U.II.4 – 11, Promemoria per l’on. Presidente sui compiti e l’organico dell’Ufficio studi economici, 19. 10. 1962. 39 On the formulation of ENI’s “little plan”, for an account of one of the protagonists, see Giuliano Graziosi, Un anno all’Eni con Giorgio Ruffolo [One Year at ENI with Giorgio Ruffolo], in: Luciano Cafagna (ed.), Riformismo italiano. Saggi per Giorgio Ruffolo [Italian Reformism. Essays in Honour of Giorgio Ruffolo], Roma 2007, pp. 23 – 33. 40 See for example ENI Historical Archive (Rome), AT.I.5 – 115, Progamma di investimenti del gruppo ENI per il quadriennio 1957 – 1958 / 1960 – 1961. 41 On the ENI’s technical cultures see Daniele Pozzi, Le capacità tecnico manageriali nell’Agip di Enrico Mattei: un processo di accumulazione di lungo periodo [Technical-Manage-

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planning system, since it was seen as a centralized attempt to undermine the credibility of the local management. Notwithstanding these hindrances, the Public Relations, Economic Studies and Press Office, under the supervision of Giorgio Ruffolo, started to analyze the problems related to economic planning, maintaining continuous contacts with other research centres that during those years worked on the same topic, as for example the Italian Research and Information Centre on the Economy of Public Holdings and Public Utilities (Centro Italiano di Ricerche e d’Informazione sull’economia delle Imprese Pubbliche e di Pubblico Interesse, CIRIEC), which was founded in 1956 by a group of state enterprises, economic institutions and university departments. In 1961, the top management of ENI decided to establish its own research centre on planning, initially linking this new institution to the Snam Progetti,42 one of the enterprises of the group, and subsequently supporting the constitution of an independent research centre: the Economic Studies and Plans Centre (Centro di Studi e Piani Economici, CECA), led by Franco Archibugi, the former chief of CECA’s Social Affair Division, a man close to Giulio Pastore, the secretary of the Italian Catholic workers union (Confederazione italiana sindacati lavoratori, CISL).43 This decision was a clear evidence of both the wide freedom of action enjoyed by the ENI’s economic studies office members and the common feeling that existed between the vision of Enrico Mattei and the first centre-left project.

IV. National economic planning In 1962, Ugo La Malfa, the State Budget Ministry of the first centre-left coalition (an alliance between the Democratic Christian Party, the Italian Republican Party and the Italian Social Democratic Party,44 with the external support of the Italian Socialist Party), added to his annual report on national accounting a note on the problems and perspectives of the Italian economic development. In his note, La Malfa, reconsidering the evolution of the Italian economy since the beginning of the 1950s, concluded that the integration of the country in the international markets had allowed the “economic miracle”, but it had also increased the typical dualisms of the Italian economy: that existing between agriculture and the other production sectors and the one that divided the Northern from the Southern regions. rial Capacities in the Enrico Mattei’s Agip. A long-term Accumulation Process], in: Annali di storia dell’impresa v. 2004 – 2005 (2005), 15 – 16, pp. 583 – 608. 42 ENI Historical Archive (Rome), U.III.1 – 42, Appunto per l’on. Presidente, Servizio Relazioni Pubbliche, Studi Economici e Stampa prot. n. 5223, 29. 11. 1961. 43 ENI Historical Archive (Rome), U.III.1 – 42, Proposta di costituzione di una società per gli studi e i piani economici, December 1961. 44 The former Socialist Party of the Italian Workers.

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In the Minister’s analysis, the extraordinary intervention of the previous years – that had been set up by the the public holdings or provided through institutions like the Italian Mezzogiorno Fund (Cassa per il Mezzogiorno), had not been adequate to fill these gaps. As a consequence of these considerations, La Malfa suggested the establishment of a national planning system in order to solve the mentioned imbalances and to provide a more rational employment of the national income. If the Vanoni’s Scheme insisted just on the increase of income, consumption, investment and employment, the La Malfa’s note also stressed the necessity of a qualitative analysis of these possible growths, with the aim to reach at national level better standards of life.45 In order to translate this framework into political actions, a few months after the presentation of the annual report on national accounting in front of the Italian Parliament, the State Budget Minister constituted the National Economic Planning Commission (Commissione Nazionale per la Programmazione Economica, CNPE), with the aim to gather technical experts and both representatives of the workers and the industrialists to discuss a possible long-term plan for the Italian economy. The technical experts would have preliminary drawn up the plan and then the plenary session would have politically bargained on their content. As the La Malfa note shows, the Commission “almost ignored both the problems of single industrial sectors and the general Italian economic mechanism, except for the strong appeal for monetary stability”. The final report of the Commission, presented in 1963, focussed not only on economic growth but also – and mainly – on “the definition of the objective necessary to achieve a balanced civil development”46. In this perspective, topics like school, culture, social security, health care, public services, and recreational activities were analyzed as elements of a possible national social improvement.47 After seventeen years from the post-war “First Aid Plan”, it seemed that the technocratic proposals that during the previous decades failed in achieving their goals could finally be successful. It was not by chance that a lot of the persons were involved in the previous attempts to establish some sort of long-term planning cooperated, either directly or as consultants, with the National Economic Planning Commission and then with the institutions in charge of the design of the first national programs. Pasquale Saraceno, for example, was appointed vice-president of 45 On the La Malfa note see Central State Archive (Rome), Ministero del Bilancio e della programmazione economica, b. 110, f. 667, Ugo La Malfa, Esposizione economica e finanziaria pronunziata alla Camera dei Deputati il 22 maggio 1962, and Carabba, Un ventennio (fn. 20), in particular pp. 27 – 33. 46 Saraceno, Esperienze (fn. 18), p. 25. 47 For a detailed overview of the Commission’s works see: Ministero del Bilancio, La programmazione economica in Italia [Economic Planning in Italy], Vol. 1, Roma 1967, pp. 141 – 413 and Ministero del Bilancio, La programmazione economica in Italia [Economic Planning in Italy], Vol. 2, Roma 1967.

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the Commission – the president was the minister himself – and among the experts there was the cited Giorgio Fuà.48 Unfortunately, despite the long period of preparation, the project was characterized by some weaknesses that undermined it since its very beginning. Among the National Economic Planning Commission the experts’ proposals had difficulties to find backing both from the industrialists and the trade unions. Taking the parallel decision to nationalize the electrical industry into consideration, as well as the feared city-planning reform or the attempt to control and to orient private enterprises’ investments, Confindustria looked at national planning merely as an effort to increase the influence of politics on the economic life: an attempt that it would have tried to stop. On the other hand, the trade unions, especially their left wing, thwarted economic planning because on the one hand, they considered it as a moderate reform project, that aimed only for increasing the efficiency of the economic system without changing its structure, and on the other hand, they were worried about the possibility that the income policy that tried to link the trade-union measures with the plan’s targets could have curbed their independence.49 Both these opposing powers made it difficult for the Commission to reach some practical goals: during 1963, Giorgio Fuà and Paolo Sylos Labini published a report on the works of the Commission itself, trying to suggest some measures in order to start economic planning,50 but the parliamentary approval of the first national plan for the period 1965 – 1969 took about four years. Among the centre-left alliance started, in fact, an intense debate on the reform policy of the first government of the coalition: in addition to the nationalization of the electrical industries and the reorganization of the secondary school,51 both were realized in 1962. Its program would have included also a city-planning reform, aiming to cease property speculation, and an administrative decentralization, through the establishment of regional governments. The Democratic Christian Party’s withdrawal from the political election of 1963 and the worsening of the economic trend, due to the end of the industrial truce that characterized the “economic miracle”, to the rapid increase in demand and to the consequent balance of 48 The other members of the team of experts were: Mario Bandini, Ferdinando Di Fenizio, Libero Lenti, Siro Lombardini, Claudio Napoleoni, Giuseppe Parenti, Giannino Parravicini, Manlio Rossi Doria, Paolo Sylos Labini, Francesco Vito and Bruno Zevi. See Central State Archive (Rome), Carte Pasquale Saraceno, Commissione Nazionale per la programmazione economica (CNPE): composizione, August 1962. 49 On these developments see and Carabba, Un ventennio (fn. 20), pp. 37 – 59. On the positions of the Confindustria and the Unions see also Giuseppe Berta, L’Italia delle fabbriche. Genealogie ed esperienze dell’industrialismo nel Novecento [The Italy of Factories. Genealogies and Experiences of Twentieth Century Industrialism], Bologna 2001. 50 See Giorgio Fuà / Paolo Sylos Labini, Idee per la programmazione economica [Some Ideas for Economic Planning], Bari 1963. 51 In 1962, the secondary school’s courses of studies were unified, allowing every student to be admitted to the university.

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payments disequilibrium, led to a redefinition of the alliance on more moderate positions and to a revision of its reform policy52 that affected also the planning activity. During the first months of 1964, the Plan Office (Ufficio del Programma) – a State Budget Ministry technical unit led since 1963 by Giorgio Ruffolo – was commissioned by the newly appointed Minister, Antonio Giolitti,53 to design a quinquennial plan, grounded on the La Malfa note, that was presented to the CNPE in the summer of the same year. The plan aimed to translate the content of the Minister’s document into practical prescription, through the definition of investment plans for the state-owned enterprises in line with the national plan, by making it obligatory for private large-sized enterprises to communicate in advance to the State Budget Ministry their investment purposes and, lastly, through the redesign of the policies for Southern Italy, considering a new framework that should have included the new city-planning legislation and the establishment of local governments.54 Rapidly the first version of the plan was substituted by a more moderate one, especially in terms of urban and industrial planning, while the concurrent political struggle led to the continuous postponement of its approval: the parliamentary debate on the plan started in June 1965 and definitively ended in July 1967, only with the addition of an “updating note” that shifted the plan to the period 1966 – 1970. In fact, the plan was transformed into some sort of “model of development” with the aim to achieve full employment, to expand the social uses of national income and to boost the industrialization of the southern regions, loosing in the meanwhile any direct link with the contemporaneous economic policies.55 Generally speaking, the convergence between the planning cultures and the centre-left political project was not complete; this lost alliance weakened the planning practice and made it vulnerable; the turbulent background, in fact, initially scaled down the ambitions of the planners, then led to the dismissal of the planning project itself, because of the economic crisis, the growing social struggle and the more and more political use of public investments. In this context, since the very beginning of the national planning experience, an important role was played by the conflicts that arose between the State Budget Ministry, which – as we have seen – was in charge of coordinating the planning activities, and the other institutions responsible for the economic policy: the Treasury and the Bank of Italy.56 These tensions increased, for example, during the de52 A partial city-planning reform and the decentralization process were realized only at the beginning of the 1970s. 53 In December 1963, a new coalition was set up, for the first time with the direct involvement of the Italian Socialist Party, which Antonio Giolitti was a member of. 54 See Ministero del Bilancio, La programmazione economica in Italia [Economic Planning in Italy], Vol. 4, Roma 1967, pp. 3 – 54. 55 See Carabba, Un ventennio (fn. 20).

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bate on the reform of the State Budget Ministry, a reform that followed the approval of the first national plan in 1967. In that juncture, it seemed possible that the State Accounting Department (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato), the administrative unit in charge of the control of state expenditure, could have been moved under the State Budget Ministry itself, but the strong resistance of the Treasury led to the failure of the project. The institutional conflicts, alike the political disagreements, limited the action of the administrations responsible for planning: their main task was reduced to a complex and lumbering process of intragovernmental negotiation. The most evident example of this evolution was probably the attempt to establish a “Unique incentives fund”, according to the national plans. The attempt failed and the State Budget Ministry could not directly control industrial facilitations, leaving the coordination of incentives to the negotiations within the Economic Planning Intragovernmental Committee (Comitato Interministeriale per la Progammazione Economica, CIPE).57 In the end, the lack of direct control over the financial flows, together with the scarce decisional centralization, prevented the planning offices from designing a clear industrial policy, favoring the approval of indiscriminate financing, outside any planning framework,58 and, in the meantime, the more and more political use of public resources,59 with further deep negative effects on the state accounts. These developments not only influenced the efficiency of the state-owned enterprises but had also serious consequences on the private ones, which, for political reasons, in a period of deep economic and social turbulence, could indiscriminately 56 On the Bank of Italy in the year considered see Alfredo Gigliobianco, Via Nazionale. Banca d’Italia e classe dirigente. Cento anni di storia [Via Nazionale. The Bank of Italy and the Ruling Class. Hundred Years of History], Roma 2006, pp. 261 – 342. 57 The CIPE was created in 1967, within the reform of the State Budget Ministry. On the “Unique incentives fund” see Giuliano Amato, Economia, politica e istituzioni in Italia [Economy, Politics and Institutions in Italy], Bologna 1976. On the general tendencies towards negotiation of the Italian administrations see Giorgio Ruffolo, Il libro dei sogni. Una vita a sinistra raccontata a Vanessa Roghi [The Book of Dreams. A Life on the Left Side Told to Vannessa Roghi], Roma 2007, in particular pp. 19 – 30 and Sabino Cassese, Esiste un governo in Italia? [Is there a Government in Italy?], Roma 1980, pp. 21 – 58. 58 For example in the chemical sector; see Vera Zamagni, The Rise and Fall of the Italian Chemical Industry, 1950s – 1990s, in: Louis Galambos / Takashi Hikino / Vera Zamagni (eds.), The Global Chemical Industry in the Age of the Petrochemical Revolution, New York 2007, pp. 347 – 367. 59 For example in the steel sector; see Gian Lupo Osti, L’industria di stato dall’ascesa al degrado. Trent’anni nel gruppo Finsider. Conversazioni con Ruggero Ranieri [The Italian State-run Industry from Rise to Decline. Thirty Years in the Finsider Group. Conversations with Ruggero Ranieri], Bologna 1993. On this aspect see also the IRI’ officials denunciation at the half of the 1970s published in: Fabio Lavista, Considerazioni sul ruolo e le funzioni dell’IRI. Il “documento dei funzionari” del 26. marzo 1975 [Remarks on the Role and Functions of the IRI. The Document of the Functionaries published on March 26th, 1975], in: Annali di storia dell’impresa v. 2006 (2006), 17, pp. 489 – 531.

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profit from facilitations, in order to face the crisis and to avoid increase in the unemployment rates. V. Economic crisis, planning crisis and the fragmentation of the business elites During the 1970s, national economic planning radically changed its operational mode. At the end of the 1960s, the Centro di Studi e Piani Economici was commissioned by the State Budget Ministry to elaborate an econometric model in order to verify the coherence of the 1966 – 1970 plan.60 A few months later, in 1969, a new document was published, “Project 80” (“Progetto Ottanta”)61, as the basis for the next two quinquennial plans 1971 – 1975 and 1976 – 1980. The Progetto Ottanta, a document in line with the previous planning experiences, stressed in particular the problems related to city planning and the territorial organization. But it was never translated into some sort of operational program. The second national plan 1971 – 1975 was, in fact, published only in a preliminary version and it was never discussed by the Italian Parliament. In the end, it was transformed into a mere forecasting analysis. At the beginning of the 1970s, the significant increase in economic and social instability suggested to abandon long term planning and to replace it with both annual and sectoral planning. On the one hand, it seemed that it could be easier – through annual plans – to deal with rapid macroeconomic changes, while on the other hand, it could be possible to increment the coordination of industrial policies. But in this way, sectoral planning lost its links with the more general macroeconomic background and it was soon criticised by the Confindustria which started to support planning models aiming to merely reduce production factors’ costs. In 1978, another three years national plan was presented to the Italian Parliament by the government, the so-called “Piano Pandolfi”.62 It was a long term plan that would have been revised at the end of every year – a document, whose aims were completely different from those of the previous plans, focussing more on goals like the institutional and economic modernization of the country and the reduction of inflation than on social equity. It is not possible here to analyze in details the evolution of economic planning during the second half of the 1960s and during the 1970s. What we want to stress is that the results fell short of the expectation of its promoters and that the main 60 See Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica, Un modello econometrico aggregato per il programma 1966 – 1970 [An Aggregated Econometric Model for the 1966 – 1970 National Plan], Roma 1968. 61 See Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica, Progetto Ottanta. Rapporto preliminare al programma economico nazionale 1971 – 1975 [Progretto 80. Preliminary Report on the National Economic Plan for the Years 1971 – 1975], Roma 1969. 62 The democratic Christian Pandolfi was in those years the State Budget Minister.

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causes of these developments were, for sure, some limits of the project itself and, moreover, the political hindrances that it had to face. It has to be considered, for instance, that the Confindustria would have faintly open up to planned negotiation only in 1969, when the planning policies had quite completely lost their potential, and that the industrialists’ association took these decision mainly because it wanted to avoid the risk of being divested of its role of socio-political intermediary by the direct bargaining between the large sized enterprises and the government.63 On the other hand, as we have seen, there was the resistance of the trade unions which refused the reformist vision of those – among them for example Franco Momigliano – who proposed to link the wage bargaining with the planning policies.64 Last but not least, also to be called to mind is the struggle between the internal components of the two main parties of the centre-left alliance, the Democratic Christian Party and the Italian Socialist Party. In this political background, made more difficult by underlying institutional conflicts, the worsening of the economic trend should have necessarily affected the results of the planning policy. The growing macroeconomic instability reduced the freedom of action of the planners, while the negative economic trend supported those who opposed to the planning experience. The background instability challenged the existence of long-term planning, both at national and enterprise level. The rapidly changing environment made it difficult to set up an effective long-term forecasting analysis. As we have seen, the number of years considered in the plans of the 1970s was significantly reduced and a continuous updating activity was introduced. But it was not only a matter of plans revision. The problem was, whether the long-term planning could have dealt with more and more unstable business trends and, at the enterprise level, with a quickening technological change. The case of Olivetti is also interesting in this perspective. Here, long-term planning lasted till the beginning of the 1980s with a continuous 63 The planned bargaining was introduced in 1967 when the State Budget Minister presented the forecasting report for the following year; see Carabba, Un ventennio (fn. 20), pp. 152 – 156. On the internal transformations of Confindustria and the changes in its policy see Alberto Martinelli, Borghesia industriale e potere politico [Industrial Bourgeoisie and Political Power], in: Alberto Martinelli / Antonio M. Chiesi / Nando Dalla Chiesa (eds.), I grandi imprenditori italiani. Profilo sociale della classe dirigente economica [The Italian Big Businessmen. A Social Profile of the Economic Leading Class], Milano 1981, pp. 235 – 282; Alberto Martinelli / Tiziano Treu, Employer Associations in Italy, in: John Philip Windmuller / Alan Gladstone (eds.), Employers Associations and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study, New York 1984, pp. 264 – 293; Luca Lanzalaco, Dall’impresa all’associazione. Le organizzazioni degli imprenditori. La Confindustria in prospettiva comparata [From Business to Association. The Employers’ Organizations. The Confindustria in Comparative Perspective], Milano 1990 and Marco Maraffi, L’organizzazione degli interessi industriali in Italia 1870 – 1980 [The Organization of Industrial Interests in Italy, 1870 – 1980], in: Alberto Martinelli (ed.), L’azione collettiva degli imprenditori italiani [The Collective Action of the Italian Entrepreneurs], Milano 1994, pp. 137 – 196. 64 On this see Franco Momigliano, Sindacati, progresso tecnico, programmazione economica [Trade Unions, Technical Progress, Economic Planning], Torino 1966.

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set up of pluriennal corporate plans, but it became more a tool that the top management used to analyze the corporate results and developments than an operational one. Since the beginning of the 1970s, Olivetti had started to shift its productions from mechanical to electronic ones and the continuous product evolution gave a growing importance to product planning and to the establishment of budget targets strictly linked with the launching of new products. In 1971, a new management office was set up, the Targets and Planning Office. It was put in charge of product planning and it soon started successfully to compete with the older Economic Studies and Planning Offices and its long-term corporate plans. In the end, it has to be considered that the failures and the limits of economic planning did not simply imply a renewal of management and political practices. Those of the 1970s were, in fact, the last attempts to pursue a wide range of integrated development policies and their failure marked also a turning point in the relationship between the technicians and the politics. In this perspective, it has proved very interesting some considerations of one of the protagonists of that planning season: Giuseppe De Rita, who trained at SVIMEZ, founded the Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali (CENSIS) in 1964, a sociological research centre established in Rome, and cooperated with the State Budget Ministry as consultant. In a letter to Franco Momigliano in January 1972, De Rita, complaining about the difficulties of the planning offices, about the poor conditions of the technical administrations in charge of designing sectoral policies, about the progressive marginalization in the public enterprises of people characterized by political / technical profiles and about the disinvestments of both the state owned and the private enterprises in economic studies offices, wondered about the future of the business elite who worked in – or cooperated with – the national planning administrations. The main challenge was to understand who could have been in the future “the point of reference for a possible new techno-political elaboration”. In fact, the political class seemed less and less suitable, “either because it was refusing its responsibilities, or because it had not the power – that normally was attributed to it – to carry out any technical project”65. De Rita cast doubt on the possibility, for the technical / managerial elite which had attempted to implement national economic planning during the previous decades, to develop further united and organic public action. In those years, a period of individual and fragmented relationships between the business elite and politics started, a period in which it seemed that the possibility to design wide socio-economic policies had been undermined.

65 Olivetti Historical Archive, Fondo Franco Momigliano, 424, letter by Giuseppe De Rita to Franco Momigliano, 13. 01. 1972.

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VI. Conclusion Economic planning was at the centre of the Italian political debate since the end of the Second World War. During the recovery years, an intense debate started about more effective ways to support the national economic development. From a different perspective, some economists and politicians turned their attention to the previous Italian and international planning experiences. In particular, the management and the technical staff of large-sized enterprises supported a vision of the Italian recovery grounded on long-term planning, aiming to solve the economic and social imbalances that characterized the Italian society. Their technocratic aspirations fostered by their managerial culture had to face the fierce opposition of the main political parties that – after the exclusion of the Italian Left from the government in 1947 – converged on a vision of the economic policy focussed on monetary stabilization. In the meanwhile, the resistances of both the industrialists and the trade unions weakened the planning proposal. The debate on planning did not cease: during the 1950s and the 1970s, economic planning was an important tool among the management practices adopted both in private and public large-sized enterprises. And it was also seen as an effective means to reduce the gap between the southern and northern Italian regions. Then, economic planning was at the centre of the agenda of the first centre-left governments. Their reform program was, in fact, grounded on economic planning, considered as a means to establish shared economic policies that could have reduced social and territorial imbalances. The weakness of the centre-left coalitions, mainly due to the scarce support that the political project received by the Democratic Christian Party right-wing, led to the failure of the planning proposal. In this way, not only the reform program was severely undermined but the continuous political and institutional struggle prevented from designing effective industrial and economic policies, with significant negative effects on the Italian subsequent development. As far as the technical and the managerial elites are concerned, the failures of the 1960s and the 1970s marked the beginning of a period of fragmented relationships with the political class. In the following decades, they encountered growing difficulties when they attempted to re-open the dialogue on the design of socioeconomic policies. It seemed that even the possibility to establish a shared reform program was definitively undermined, with consequences that are – even today – difficult to evaluate.

Elites and Economic Modernization in Portugal (1945 – 1995): Authoritarianism, Revolution and Liberalism1 By Manuel Loff Portuguese transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, in the 1970s, set a significantly exceptional example in European political transitional processes of the second half of the 20th century. What could have been expected to be a plain military coup putting an end to a 48-years reactionary colonialist dictatorship at a very definite breaking point (a 13-years Colonial War in three different African territories), evolved into a revolutionary process, both politically and socially, described as the last socialist revolution in Europe. Between April 1974 and November 1975, Portugal seemed to be slipping away from the capitalistic economical paradigm and the politico-military West of the 15 final years of Cold War. A swift rupture was operated at both political and (to a lesser extent) institutional level, while the state intervened in private enterprise in order either to take into the public sector, or at least control, most of the financial sector and what had become self-managed industries whose owners had left the country. After a complex and extremely intense political and social process, which developed from April 1974 to the end of November 1975, those who described themselves as the revolutionary Left (communists and all components of the far-Left: Maoists, Trotskyists, radicalized progressive Catholics), including an important military segment, were ousted from power by an amalgamated coalition of moderate socialists, all right-wing parties, catholic hierarchy, and a hardly compatible variety of military commanders, ranging from moderate left-wing to ultra-right neo-Salazarists, internationally supported by Western European and American governments. By then, decolonization of the Portuguese African colonies was finally carried out, during the politically extremely hot summer and autumn of 19752, under the Cold War complex circumstances. A new Constitution was passed in April 1976, parliamentary elections were held a few weeks later, and were won by the Socialist Party, led by Mário Soares, and general Ramalho Eanes, one of the military commanders of the 25th November coup, was subsequently elected President 1 I have to thank for Bruno Monteiro’s generous and persistent help in finding some of the bibliographical sources which I found essential to this research. 2 The expression Verão quente [hot summer] is currently used to describe that period of political and social confrontation.

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in July, supported by socialists and the two right-wing main parties, the People’s Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrático, PPD) and the Democratic and Social Centre (Centro Democrático e Social, CDS). The democratic normalization process (1976 onwards), as the hegemonic political discourse depicts it, paved the way to the European integration negotiating process (1977 – 85), moulding, after all, a post-authoritarian transitional period altogether a lot more similar to the Spanish one than that very same discourse usually sustains. Apparently, one would expect to see a whole new set of political, social and business elites took over the control of most of political, institutional and economic instruments, in a systemic context in which the state was still at the core of social engineering, with most social groups feeding high expectations either in its transformation or control abilities, depending on the ideological perspective. I will try to show that there were a lot more continuities than breaches between the elites who led the economic modernization process of the 1960s, under the dictatorship, and the ones who did guide Portuguese economic policies in the post-1974 Revolution 30-years long democratic regime.

I. Salazarist authoritarian regime 48-year-long Salazar’s dictatorship, self-designated New State (Estado Novo), resulted from the institutionalization of a military regime (1926 – 33), soon led by a civil elite organized around a Political Economy university professor, António de Oliveira Salazar (1889 – 1970), propelled into power through his successful ability to federate all right-wing Portuguese political factions of the 1920s, from Conservative Republicans to Organic Monarchists, including modern extreme-right activists and a very well articulated group of Catholic Clericalists (to which he belonged to) who became the crux of the new political system. Salazar was appointed Minister of Finance for the second time in 19283 in a military-led Cabinet, and was able to control quite effectively the whole state apparatus and the political process, at least since 1930, (1) leading the creation of the new regime’s single-party (the National Union – União Nacional, UN) in 1930, (2) re-centralizing in Lisbon political control over colonial administrations (Colonial Act, 1930) and re-launching an imperialistic nationalist discourse (or rather endorsing a new colonial paradigm) as a cement holding together economic and political interests supporting the new regime, (3) producing a new constitutional text (1931 – 33), imposing a pragmatic authoritarian platform where both republicans and monarchists could meet4, 3 He left that same office a week after his appointment in June 1926, soon after the 28th May military coup. 4 The republic vs. monarchy debate mobilized Portuguese elite’s political discussions, at least since the 1890 crisis over colonial conflict with Britain, until 1933, when Salazar forced upon the monarchists the continuity of a Republican form of government in order to secure right-wing republican support to the new regime.

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(4) attracting catholic hierarchy to a renewed alliance with the state adapted to 20th century’s social and political conditions. Salazar was formally appointed President of the Council of Ministers in 1932 and remained in office for the following 36 years, until September 1968, when, at 79, a cerebral hæmorrhage incapacitated him and forced an uni-personal dictatorship to find a substitute in Marcello Caetano (1906 – 80, former Minister of Colonies and, in some way, in the 1950s, a vice-president, briefly mistaken for an appointed-successor, driven out of Government by Salazar himself in 1958) for those which would be the final six years of the Estado Novo. Salazar’s sharp ability to bring together all segments of the Portuguese ruling class at a crucial historical stage, as it was mentioned earlier, assured him a long-term adhesion built upon an unprecedented charismatic government, leading an essentially conservative and progress-fearful elite through a complex path made of key economic options between a state-protected economy based on large property agriculture and strong trading lobbies (prevailing from the beginning of the dictatorship until the end of World War II and a state-coordinated industrialization (launched in 1945 – 50) which could hardly prevent its inevitable social consequences (urbanization, growing implosion of an until then sturdy rural society), in spite of all the corporative system rhetoric. Fundamentally, Salazarism meant, for Portuguese elites of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, a clear and safe, self-described as specifically Portuguese, response to the process of social and political massification which in Portugal was maturing in a relatively belatedly form – a precocious political evolution towards a Republican form of government (1910) and a resultant strict separation between state and church, with no correspondence in its social foundations: no universal suffrage was passed until 1975;5 no undeniably massive political and social movements pre-existed the creation of Salazarist single-party, militia, compulsory labor unions and youth organizations; no massive schooling covered the whole territory and the lower classes until the 1940s. In this sense, the expression Salazarism condenses more accurately than Estado Novo the historical meaning of the whole political system dominating Portugal between 1926 – 74, covering not only Salazar’s years (1932 – 68) but the whole dictatorship’s historical experience, fundamentally shaped to the dictator’s persona. Accordingly, historical legacy of what was a wide social elite consensus over the character and over its political paradigm still plays a central role in what may be described as the present day Portuguese dominant social groups’ obvious ambiguity towards the memory of the dictatorship and of their own course throughout 5 Male universal suffrage was passed in 1918, under the charismatic military rule of Sidónio Pais, and enforced for a single election, before being immediately revoked in 1919, when the constitution of 1911 was restored. See: Manuel Loff, Electoral Proceedings in Salazarist Portugal (1926 – 1974): Formalism and Fraud in a 150-year old Context of Elitarian Franchise, in: Raffaele Romanelli (ed.), How Did They Become Voters? The History of Franchise in Modern European Representation, The Hague / London / Boston (Mass.) 1998, pp. 227 – 250.

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the final 15 years of the regime (1960 – 74). Obvious continuity (family ties, class sociability) of a very significant part of pre- and post-1974 social, economic and cultural elites – in fact, a widespread phenomenon of post-dictatorial societies – is an important factor to consider when assessing discourses over the dictatorship years produced in the upper-classes, not only of those who feel close to the ideological nature of the elapsed regime, but more importantly of those who make clear their hostility to it and, at the same time, tend to bail out, so to speak, their own relatives or next of kin – by and large, their class – from the negative core of the past experience. II. A traditionally elitist society Socio-culturally speaking, and in broad terms, the Portuguese special case in Western European context is based upon a clearly distorted social access to cultural modern practices and forms. Schooling, scientific and technical qualification and press reading levels remained until the mid-20th century phenomena as limited as political rights were. A fundamentally broad-minded intellectual elite read, heard or dressed what Paris, London, and even Berlin and Rome, produced in the second half of the 19th and the first third of the 20th centuries, but looked upon the masses they were surrounded by in quite obviously derisive terms. The 1910 – 26 republican experience, in which the state concentrated most of its efforts to break the spine of catholic hegemony over education and cultural Bildung, replacing it, with scarce results, by a liberal rationalistic educational philosophy, was soon replaced by a half-century hard cultural and moral repression, exerted both by the state apparatuses and Catholic Church, leaving very heavy consequences on mass culture representations. One of those, in fact, has specifically to do with the core of this essay: a recurrent discourse on state prestige and symbolic hegemony in society, on legitimatization forms of power exercise through economic wealth, traditional social forms of prestige and professional qualification through schooling. Studies made on the 1960 population census help to perceive an already modern society heavily polarized between an “upper layer, gathering great landowners and employers, technically and scientifically highly qualified professionals, and large enterprise (over 100 workers) executives” representing not more than 1 percent of male active population, and a huge 61 percent composed of “unskilled workers” (21 percent), “autonomous peasants and fishermen” (9 percent) and “wage-earning and family workers in agriculture and fishery” (31 percent). At that turning-point of Portuguese social history, again, not more than 1 percent of all active male Portuguese had a higher education, and only 5 percent had completed secondary education.6 6 See Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Classes sociais [Social Classes], in: António Barreto / Maria Filomena Mónica (eds.), Dicionário de História de Portugal [Dictionary of the History of Portugal], Suplemento [Supplement] (Vol. VII), Oporto 1999, pp. 328 – 337, here pp. 330 f.

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The first generation of Portuguese true sociologists (a scientific domain deliberately banned from Portuguese Acadæmia by Salazarism) who had the chance to work with these social data were relatively surprised with the “oligarchic character” of this high bourgeoisie, nearer to “a group unified through multiple family ties and education rather than to an ‘abstract elite’ whose members merely share leading positions”.7 The dictatorship led by Salazar took over power after a century of liberal modern state-building which have never compromised the high-bourgeoisie grasp of social and economic power, not even in the last 16 years of this historical cycle, the Portuguese First Republic years (1910 – 26). Salazarist authoritarianism proved to be able to develop an intrinsically effective way to seduce and control different segments of a national bourgeoisie frightened with social unrest, representing such contradictory interests as the ones which could be satisfied by a simultaneous exploit of both traditionalist and modernizing discourses. This particular sort of hegemonic elite had been allowed to “decades of undisputed power, affected by both ‘bureaucratization’, i. e. parasitic use of political-administrative structures with some ‘cleptocratic’ shades, and ‘aristocratization’, i. e. a mimetic adoption of ostentatious attitudes and behavior distinctive of an idle aristocracy”.8 From a strict political and institutional point of view, an economically poor Estado Novo (whole public expenditure amounted to 21 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1951 – 52, 20 percent in 1960 – 61, 26.1 percent in 1972 – 73)9 would offer comparatively few opportunities to a modern European elite, although those were probably proportional to the statistically minuscule Portuguese elites of the 1930s and 1940s. A sequential analysis of the authoritarian regime’s strategy to recruit political elites and of the elites / state relation shows a three-component coalition, gathering military, political direct representatives of the upper-classes and catholic scholars, controling state apparatus all throughout the 48 years dictatorship, in four different stages: (1) From the fall of the liberal regime (1926) until the end of WW II (1945), i. e. during the continuing and clear process of fascistization, the military kept an important and inevitable role while political repression fell more heavily over dissidence, bringing into the regime’s institutional ranks a representation of a relatively significant variety of social and regional segments of the bourgeoisie.10 This Hermínio Martins, quoted from Cabral, Classes sociais (fn. 6), p. 336. Ibidem. 9 See Alfredo Marques, Política económica e desenvolvimento em Portugal (1926 – 1959). As duas estratégias do Estado Novo no período de isolamento nacional [Economic Policy and Development in Portugal (1926 – 1959). The Two Strategies of the Estado Novo in the Period of National Isolation], Lisboa 1988, p. 184 (table 6). 10 See Maria Carrilho, Forças Armadas e mudança política em Portugal no séc. XX. Para uma explicação sociológica do papel dos militares [Armed Forces and Political Change in Portugal in the 20th Century. Towards a Sociological Explanation of the Role of the Military], Lisboa 1985. 7 8

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was the stage in which the more reactionary components of the high-bourgeoisie (wealthy landowners and colonial merchants) kept inside of the administration apparatus a more significant number of direct representatives. (2) Postwar years paved the path to an actual industrial revolution: Portugal knew its first real and intense modernizing boost only in the aftermath of WW II, while the rest of Europe was engaged in reconstruction, a process which had inevitable consequences also in the Portuguese case. Urbanization, intensive private and public investment in new productive infrastructures, slow economic internationalization, and mainly state new planning policies opened the gates to the apparent triumph of a first technocratic elite inside Salazarism. The “Development Plans (Planos de Fomento) [implemented by the dictatorship] after WW II,11 industrial growth ( . . . ), expansion of the education system, particularly post-secondary technical and scientific ( . . . ), all these trends converged towards a higher level of social and political participation, though merely illusive in some cases, of a social segment whose main characteristics were higher education, being an active part of the Public Administration’s Technical Departments, of big corporations and liberal professions”12. Not only economic planning, with all its complex bureaucratic organization, offered a vast range of opportunities to a new generation of qualified Salazarist technicians. The post-WW II process of modernizing Portuguese Colonial Administration, adapting in order to resist to the world-wide impact of decolonization, offered a variety of professional, political and business opportunities. As for elite composition, both military and traditional bourgeoisie lost a significant amount of power in favor of these bureaucrats representing the more modern fractions of urban bourgeoisie, namely those connected to industrial capital. Catholic reactionary scholars, essentially close to the dictator’s profile, remained, nevertheless, in control of most political higher decision-making posts. (3) Armed guerrilla activity of national liberation movements in Portuguese African colonies opened a 13-year war cycle (1961 – 74) that changed the whole course of Portuguese modern History. Salazar’s decision to “hold on!” (Aguentar! Aguentar!), to resist to any political change processes, compromised the future of his regime. All state policies had to endorse the war effort, which inevitably jeopardized the impact of the embryonic social policies the regime had been forced to consider when it realized how potentially explosive were the vast and hasty series of social and economic changes. Again, during this period, military elite took control of a very significant part of national resources: all defence policies consumed 48 percent of all ordinary tax revenue in 1973, the last complete year of war; 15 years earlier, before war in Africa started, they were responsible for 36 percent; 11 Four Planos de Fomento [development plans] were adopted by the Estado Novo regime: 1953 – 58; 1959 – 64; 1965 – 67 (Plano Intercalar – Intermediate Plan) and 1968 – 73; a fifth (the fourth Plan excluding the 1965 – 67 one) was ready to be implemented for the 1974 – 79 period when the 25th April 1974 revolution suspended its application. 12 José Manuel Leite Viegas, Elites e cultura política na história recente de Portugal [Elites and Political Culture in Recent Portuguese History], Oeiras 1996, pp. 85 f.

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during this same period, social expenditure in policies such as education and health rose from 18 percent to 28 percent, but they were unbearably insufficient and ineffective; on the whole, defence absorbed 133 billion Escudos from 1961 to 1973, while all public economic investment along the same period did not exceed 62 billion.13 Nevertheless, we were dealing here with a broader military elite, representing a wider range of social groups: from 4.850 officers existing in 1960 in the Army, Navy and Air Force (plus 342 of the Complementary Rank – Quadro Complementar – of the Air Force), the Portuguese Armed Forces had 6.884 officers in 1973 – 74 (plus circa 1.800 – 2.000 more of the same Complementary Rank of the Air Force), i. e. plus 42 percent (plus 69 percent considering these latter).14 Alongside the military, that technocratic segment of the civil elite which were socially rising since the postwar period kept their expectations intact, hoping the regime would have to grant them more visibility to produce the necessary measures to contain social and political unrest. (4) The 1968 Government re-shufflement, with perceived-as-reformer Marcello Caetano replacing a physically incapable Salazar, opens a final six-year stage of this 1961 – 74 war period. Caetano would soon proved impotent to change the political course of the war – presuming he had ever wanted to change it. . . – but he did try to go beyond the modernization project of the 1945 – 68 period, an autarkic industrialism based upon “imports’ substitution”, searching instead for (in vain, as recent history is still proving) a “specialization line of national production in areas in which Portugal had comparative advantage, articulating it with foreign markets, especially European”, granting, on the other hand, “greater importance to social factors” – education, social welfare, health – “disregarding the effective conditions which may have allowed or prevented such aims to be accomplished”. In this sense, “Caetano and the politicians who were close to him”, recruited amidst that technocratic elite made of those “social segments of higher scientific and technical qualification”, seem to “point out towards a social state – subtle form to change the primary meaning of the corporative state – but evading the regime’s democratization and liberalization problem”15. In literature, it is often discussed about connections between what has been described as the modernizing undercurrent embodied by the Marcelist group inside Salazarism, close to which we will find, in the 1968 – 74 years, a “reformist sector” who, after the 1971 – 72 breakup with Marcello, retrieved their political autonomy, and the “so-called modern capitalist interests”. To José Manuel Leite Viegas, it is “an unacceptable simplification” to “mechanically identify” the economic “liberal thought” conveyed by modernizers and “the industrial, finance and trading capital interests”, committed to “develop and modernize 13 See: Américo Ramos dos Santos, Abertura e bloqueamento da economia portuguesa [Opening and Blockades of Portuguese Economy], in: António Reis (ed.), Portugal Contemporâneo [Contemporary Portugal], Vol. V, Lisboa 1989, pp. 109 – 150; Eugénio Rosa, A economia portuguesa em números [The Portuguese Economy in Statistics], Lisboa 1975. 14 See: Carrilho, Forças Armadas (fn. 10), pp. 440 – 442. 15 Viegas, Elites (fn. 12), pp. 101 f.

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its connections with the democratic industrialized countries economy”. The fact remains that “expansion of this politico-social thought was reinforced because it did not collide, and partly adjusted to”16 such interests. Additionally, it has been pointed out that the highest representatives of those modern capital lobby, the owners of the strongest Portuguese industrial corporation, CUF (Companhia União Fabril), the Mello family, “have surely had some influence in [president] Américo Tomá’s – who paid them much attention – decision to appoint Marcello Caetano”17, a close friend of the Mello, to succeed to Salazar, in the Autumn 1969. In this final dictatorial stage, the Marcelist period, so evidently full of contradictions and growingly uncontrolled tension, the authoritarian regime proved its inability to eventually integrate and articulate all these politically pragmatic technocrats, although they were frankly elitist as far as their governance framework was concerned. Politically speaking, “the liberal group of Members of the National Assembly”, the Estado Novo parliament, known as the Liberal Wing (Ala Liberal) – most of whose members would converge in the creation of the right-wing People’s Democratic Party (PPD)18 in 1974 –, integrating the 1969 single party (UN) electoral ticket by a special invitation of Caetano himself, “was virtually the political nucleus publicly recognized as best representing that reformer movement”, although “even at the state political institutions and public administration level, there have been other centres” – for instance, the Central Department for Planning (Secretariado Técnico da Presidencia do Conselho / Departamento Central de Planeamento) – “where political and socioeconomic thought was being elaborated and renovated”19. Already when the whole set of illusions created by Caetano’s promise of “Renovation in continuity” (Renovação na continuidade) were fading away, this growingly exasperated selective group of elitist liberals created in 1970 a society for the Study of Economic and Social Development (Sociedade de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social, SEDES), apparently committed to “create an alternative route between the regime forces and the traditional opposition, ( . . . ) [by then] moving leftwards its gravity centre”20. There was more, nevertheless, to this generation of bright and ambitious young technocrats produced by Lisbon, Oporto or Coimbra’s Economy & Management,21 Ibidem, p. 102. Fernando Rosas, O Marcelismo ou a falência da política de transição no Estado Novo [Marcelismo or the Failure of Transitional Policy in the Estado Novo], in: J. M. Brandão de Brito (ed.), Do Marcelismo ao fim do Império. Revolução e democracia [From Marcelismo to the End of the Empire. Revolution and Democracy], Lisboa 1999, pp. 15 – 59, here p. 45. 18 Francisco Sá Carneiro and Francisco Pinto Balsemão were the two first right-wing Prime-Ministers (1980 – 83) in the democratic period and had been members of the Ala Liberal under Caetano. 19 Viegas, Elites (fn. 12), p. 86. 20 António Reis, A abertura falhada de Caetano: o impasse e a agonia do regime [Caetano’s Failed Opening: Impasse and Agony of the Regime], in: Reis, Portugal (fn. 13), pp. 45 – 60, here p. 53. 16 17

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Engineering and Law Schools. Social change and economic modernization, together with war, produced a surprising change in an extremely elitist university like the Portuguese. In 1962, a student movement left Salazar stunned: a politically, initially very cautious, student strike in Lisbon spreaded to Coimbra and, partially, to Oporto; police invaded Lisbon University against the will of its rector, none less than Marcello Caetano, and violently charges on those who were the sons and daughters of this very narrow and conservative Portuguese bourgeoisie, some of them, naturally, relatives of relevant Salazarist leaders. Since then, university benches became a focal point of the anti-Salazarist fighting and the intensely politicized student movement was able to reach larger segments of society when their activists came out of the university and into corporations, offices, factories, public services, after being forced (in the case of the young men) into two to four years of military service, more than half of those spent in some African war front. Two obvious consequences came out of this process: i) the authoritarian regime became unable to ensure its own generational renovation, at least through the same ways proved effective in the past; when Salazar stepped out of power and was replaced by Caetano, in 1968, the latter had already to deal with a number of young technical managers, often appointed by himself to some second-line economic department position, who did not share any longer some of the essential elements of Salazarist political culture; ii) that portion of those involved in these consecutive Academic crisis22 (expression through which literature describes all sorts of strike movements, symbolic mournings and other forms of students’ protest), although perceived as politically subversive, inevitably took hold of their share of leading positions in private enterprise, and even in state administration, namely in areas in which the modernization process required technical skills and a new attitude employers and state were obviously unable to find outside the university. These men – mostly, although a few women were already opening their way through the political and entrepreneurial elites – were young enough (25 – 40 years old) when in 1974, the democratic revolution came to expect to live most of their adult years ahead of them participating quite freely in public affairs, and the few of them who fought dictatorship in its final years legitimately took credit for public relevance earned in it. Taking the wide ideological range of political activists of the revolutionary period of 1974 – 76 into consideration, a significant number of the leading personalities of the Socialist and far-Left Parties (namely the very pro21 See: Carlos Gonçalves, Emergência e consolidação dos economistas em Portugal [Rise and Consolidation of Economists in Portugal], Oporto 2006. 22 In spring 1962 (Lisbon and Coimbra: demonstrations, police raids, student strikes), in 1965 (Lisbon and Oporto: student strikes, more than 60 student leaders were expelled from university, arrested, tortured, and some sent to African war fronts), in 1967 (two thousand students volunteered, facing a government ban, to help people affected by tragic floods in the Lisbon area), in 1969 (Coimbra: student leaders facing up to the president and members of government were imprisoned, a student general strike, the university was closed down by the government for two months). After 1969, students’ protest became permanent until the fall of the dictatorship.

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lific Maoist), and a less significant part of those of the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português, PCP), had fought, one way or the other, their first political struggle (and, most of the times, single one under the dictatorial regime) as student activists in the 1960s and 1970s. After the 1976 so-called democratic normalization, they sat on a large number of parliamentary and governmental seats ever since. After severely shifting rightwards their ideological views, frequently from Maoist to clearly liberal and conservative positions – for instance, former Prime-Minister (2002 – 04) José Manuel Durão Barroso, presently president of the European Commission –, they won university chairs, managed to edit the most popular media and were called to executive positions in some of the larger corporations operating in Portugal. In fact, as it could be expected, all those who became either Head of Government (eleven Prime-Ministers) or of State (four Presidents of the Republic, two of them having been Prime-Minister before) under the 1976 constitution (thus, excluding the two presidents and three Prime-Ministers of the Provisional Governments under military rule during the 1974 – 76 revolutionary process) were members of this post1945 modern bourgeois elite, university produced, except for the last three PrimeMinisters – J. M. Durão Barroso, 2002 – 04, Pedro Santana Lopes, 2004 – 05, and José Sócrates, 2005-today, all three were born in 1956 – 57 and about to start their degree in 1974, even if the first of these had started his political activity still under the dictatorship. Table 1 Portuguese statespersons under the 1976 constitution with political / professional activity before 1974 Personalities Year of birth

Political posts

Other relevant activities

Mário Soares 1924

Min. Foreign Affairs, 1974 – 75; Min. of State, 1975; PM, 1976 – 78 and 1983 – 85; President of Republic, 1986 – 1996

Historian and lawyer; opposition activist, first PCP (until 1952), then LiberalRepublican (1952 – 64), finally Socialist (Socialist Action and PS, 1964-); secretary PS, 1973 – 85; series of arrests, deportation to S. Tomé (Africa, 1968), exile in France (1970 – 74); Member of national and European Parliament (1999 – 2004); creates Mário Soares Foundation, 1991.

António Ramalho Eanes 1942

President Republic, 1976 – 86

Military officer; several missions of war in African colonies; head of Program Department national Television (RTP), 1974 – 75; head of operations in 25th November 1975 military coup; President of Democratic Renovator Party (PRD, 1986 – 87)

Nobre da Costa 1923

Min. Industry and Engineer; Companhia Portuguesa de Technology, 1976 – 77; Siderurgia, 1953; EFACEC, 1969. PM, 1978

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Carlos Mota Pinto 1936

Min. Trade and Tourism, 1976 – 77; PM, 1978 – 79; Deputy PM and Min. National Defence, 1983 – 85

Lawyer; professor at Law School, University of Coimbra; Member of Constitutional Assembly, 1975 – 76; President of PSD, 1984 – 85.

Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo 1930

Min. Social Affairs, 1974 – 75; PM, 1979 – 80

Engineer; CUF (Head of Project Dep.), 1954 – 1960; young Catholic leader, 1956 – 58; Corporative Chamber, 1969 – 1974; Executive Council UNESCO, 1976 – 1980; Presidential candidate 1986 (7 percent of the votes); Member of European Parliament (with PS), 1987 – 89.

Francisco Sá Carneiro 1934

Assistant Min. PM, 1974; PM, 1980

Lawyer; Member of National Assembly (Liberal Wing), 1969 – 73; President of PSD, 1974 – 75 and 1976 – 80.

Francisco Pinto Balsemão 1937

Assistant Min. PM, 1980; PM, 1980 – 83

Lawyer; press and (after 1992) TV businessman; Member of National Assembly (Liberal Wing), 1969 – 73; Member of Parliament (1979 – 87); President PSD, 1981 – 83.

Aníbal Cavaco Silva 1939

Min. Finance and Plan, 1980; PM, 1985 – 95; President of Republic, 2006 –

Economist; Professor of Economics and Finance Institute at Technical University Lisbon, then Catholic University, 1966 –; President PSD, 1985 – 95.

Jorge Sampaio 1939

Under-Sec. State International Cooperation, 1975; President Republic, 1996 – 2006

Lawyer; student leader, 1960 – 62; opposition activist until 1974; Left Socialist Movement (MES, far-Left) activist, 1974 – 78; Member of Parliament, 1979 – 89; Secretary PS, 1989 – 91; Mayor of Lisbon, 1989 – 96.

António Guterres 1949

PM, 1995 – 2002

Engineer; young Catholic non-antiSalazarist militant; Assistant Professor at Technical High Institute Lisbon; Member of Parliament, 1976 – 83 and 1985 – 95; Secretary PS, 1992 – 2002; Vice-President, then President of Socialist International, 1992 – 2002; UN High-Commissioner for Refugees, 2005 –.

José M. Durão Barroso 1956

Under-Sec. State Internal Administration, 1985 – 87; Sec. State For. Affairs and Cooperation, 1987 – 92; Min. For. Affairs, 1992 – 95; PM, 2002 – 04

Lawyer; Maoist activist (Revolutionary Movement for the Reconstruction of Proletariat’s Party), 1973 – 78; Assistant Professor Law School at University Lisbon, then (private) Lusíada University; President of PSD, 1999 – 2004; President of European Commission, 2004 –.

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Nevertheless, in this group of the eleven most relevant statespersons in the last 31 years of Portuguese history – four either socialists or considered to be left-wing, five Social-Democratic Party (PSD) members or considered to be right-wing, two right-wingers (Ramalho Eanes and Nobre da Costa) hard to classify because of very ambiguous political contexts they operated in – who had started their professional or political activity under the authoritarian regime, only three (Soares, Sampaio and Barroso) had been actually engaged in political activity openly against the dictatorship, one of which at 17 years of age when the regime fell. Of the other eight characters, another two (Sá Carneiro and Balsemão), although having politically collaborated with the regime’s single party, carried out an attempt to renovate and liberalize it, cutting their ties with it (1973) soon before it fell. The remaining six (one military officer, five civilians), 25 to 50 year-old when the dictatorship broke down, had either collaborated with the regime, serving in official posts (Eanes had been an effective and committed officer in the Colonial War,23 Pintasilgo had been a member of the regime’s upper chamber and performed special United Nations missions for Caetano), worked discreetly at the university when repression fell harder over the student movement (Mota Pinto, Cavaco Silva, Guterres), or had been working in high executive positions in the biggest industrial corporations (Nobre da Costa and already mentioned Pintasilgo).

III. A time for change: economic development and social tension in the 1960s and 1970s A sort of flashing glance at Portuguese society in those final 15 years of dictatorship, running from the 1958 – 62 permanent political crisis to the 1974 military uprising which ended it, suggests the perception of a permanent movement: a large, a very large part, indeed, of the population moved from one place to the other, slowly in a first stage but growingly faster. Most of them were, as usual in these circumstances, men, and mainly young male adults, in a rush to change radically their lives, running from the deep country rural areas to coastland (sub)urban areas (Metropolitan Lisbon, mainly, and Oporto, secondarily), but mostly emigrating to Europe – France (62 percent) in the first place, but also West-Germany (13 percent), Luxemburg – the U.S. East Coast, Canada, Venezuela, but not Brazil anymore, as most Portuguese emigrants would have done in the previous hundred years. If they had not done it before they went to the Army, they were to bear a whole new weight of state interference in their lives, heavier than in any other moment in Portuguese History: since 1961, Salazar’s Government was pushing young men into war in Angola, and after 1963 to Guinea, and after 1964 to Mozambique, forcing them to endure a two year military service, quickly doubling 23 As almost every military officer who joined the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas, MFA) before it overthrew the dictatorship. Eanes, in any case, did not join the MFA before the 25th April 1974 triumphant coup.

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it into four years in 1968 when military administration was already scraping the barrel for potential soldiers. Politically, the Colonial War years (1961 – 74), the final years of the regime, were lived in Metropolitan Portugal, especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Caetano’s period), as the regime’s violent agony. Growingly confronted by a consolidated industrial working class, strengthened by the massive emigration which pushed up wages and provided for comparatively better social conditions, the regime had to face new urban young activists who reinforced communist underground organization, but also a new far-Left that, after 1963, broke up with the PCP in ideological disputes that reproduced at a Portuguese scale both the SinoSoviet rupture and the Guevarist urge for armed struggle against the dictatorial establishment. Demographically, the thirteen long years of the colonial armed conflict, holding permanently no less than 250 thousand military active in three different African colonies, represents a definite landmark in social change processes in Portuguese modern history. Never in Portuguese history so many people have seen their lives and social experiences changed in such a short period. Portugal became the only country in Europe to lose population in the 1960s (from 8.9 million in 1960 to 8.6 million in 1970) due to a massive emigration (1.4 million from 1960 to 1973, over 40 percent illegally). The end of the war and the inevitable subsequent decolonization process produced the opposite result, thus, confirming the negative impact of the conflict: in 1981, the population census registered already 9.8 million people, half a million of which were so-called retornados (Portuguese brand of the French pieds noirs) who fled from the newly independent States of Africa (a significant part of whom Capeverdian and of Hindustani origin) in 1974 – 76. Another 100.000 were repatriated soldiers from the African war fronts, and 182.000 other were returning emigrants, mostly from Europe. The fact remains that inwards and outwards migrations produced a cutback, in only ten years (the 1960s), from 20 percent to 35 percent (according to each specific area) of the population of the Eastern North-to-South strip of Portugal, and (sub)urbanized a conspicuous part of the Portuguese. After 150 years of systematically unsuccessful socio-economic modernization expectations (more than actual planning, virtually absent from the political culture of the Portuguese elites until the 1950s), rural Portugal, a deeply conservative, mostly (Northern and Central areas) religious, educationally unqualified society, who had embodied until then the core of Portuguese historical identity, and had severely played down the country’s rhythm of change – that Portugal was irrevocably disappearing, mostly through sheer de-population. Until then, over-dimensioned agricultural Portugal would not represent, in 1973, more than a fourth of the active population (around 800.000 people), producing not more than one eighth of the GDP, whilst thirteen years earlier, in 1960, they were still almost 45 percent of the active population, producing twice (25 percent) of that part of the GDP. It had been, in fact, a low-technology and low-productivity industrialization which, after the 1950s, propelled such a sig-

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nificant change, finally paving its way through Portuguese economy, bringing together half of the GDP in the mid 1970s, at the moment in which democracy replaced the authoritarian regime. The service sector was already, nevertheless, the one generating more employment in Portugal (27.7 percent in 1960, 37.3 percent in 1970, almost 1.2 million people, a little bit ahead of the industrial sector), but its scarce productivity (still attracting mostly unskilled workers to unqualified jobs, offering mostly a sort of services coherent with a still very traditional and servile society) provided a comparatively low share of the national wealth (38.4 percent of the GDP in 1960, 36.1 percent in 1970). Nevertheless, a change had started before the 1960s. Salazar had already introduced – or was forced into it by a whole complex of circumstances – a significant change in his economic policies in the 1950s. At the end of WW II, a number of factors concurred to push the regime into a significant change in its economic policies, with all the obvious consequences deductible from an authoritarian regime context: (1) A significant amount of capital had been amassed by different social groups all throughout the war, especially by those few who could benefit from the neutrality status of Portugal, eventually profiting from its geographical position and political ambiguity of its Government (formally stuck to an old diplomatic alliance with Britain, thus, attracting some benevolence from the Anglo-Americans; ideologically perceived as pro-Axis until 1943, developing a swift and economically efficient trade-relationship with Nazi Germany). (2) Defeat of Nazi Germany and the Allied victory under an antifascist coalition flag strengthened the “most emblematic and lasting” united opposition movement assembled under the Portuguese dictatorship.24 A clearly radicalized relevant fraction of a new urban working class, growingly impressed and mobilized by the Communist Party (PCP), had, thus, to be, from the dictatorship’s point of view, disciplined and tamed through a different set of economic and social policies. (3) A new stage was opening in international economy, especially in the West, where economic international co-operation and planning procedures were keynesianly being laid down has the best remedies to face both reconstruction and competition, at least ideological, from the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union. “After WWII”, as Alfredo Marques underlines, “a second strategy pops into the [regime’s] agenda. Its configuration takes place, mainly, during the 1950s and it 24 Fernando Rosas, Unidade antifascista [Antifacist Unity], in: Fernando Rosas / José Maria Brandão de Brito (eds.), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo [Dictionary of the History of the Estado Novo], Vol. 2, [No place specified] 1996, pp. 991 – 996, here p. 992. Sequentially, it brought to life the National Unity Anti-Fascist Movement (Movimento de Unidade Nacional Anti-Fascista, MUNAF) in 1943 – 45. Then it reunited in the Democratic Unity Movement (Movimento de Unidade Democrática, MUD, 1945 – 48) and its youth association (MUDJ, 1946 – 48), finally created a broad movement supporting the very first presidential opposition candidate (General Norton de Matos, 1948 – 49).

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culminates in the last years of the decade, the moment the Second Development Plan (Plano de Fomento) is enacted”. According to Marques, “the global aim to which [this strategy] points out is the constitution of a developed and autonomous capitalism ( . . . ), aiming to economic growth and structural transformation. Its driving force lies, nevertheless and contrary to the extroversion strategy emerging in the 1960s” – Salazarist economic policy’s third stage – “in the internal market, thus an endogenous dynamic being predominant over the external impulse of capital accumulation. This all happens in a context of national autonomy”. Such a strategy was based on “active support to the constitution of a new industrial capital, mainly through capital concentration and centralization”, in which, naturally, “State plays a new and decisive role”. Interestingly enough, and reversing the trend in all other political and symbolic features of the Estado Novo’s evolution, “in the whole history of the Portuguese dictatorship”, this “set of economic policy measures” are those which remind, in some of its aspects, the interventionism of “paradigmatic” European dictatorships (German and Italian). Anyway, the whole process of carrying out this strategy soon headed to “a total failure”.25 What could be described as what had become an inevitable industrialization process under state control developed along three parallel lines through which Salazar’s regime tried to respond to a new stage in Portuguese history: (1) An intense state intervention in economy through central planning, attracting to a new alliance new sections of the bourgeoisie on the grounds of economic nationalist rhetoric, trying to make sure they would be as state-dependent as had been the “Agrarian-Industrial Alliance” mentioned by Alfredo Marques who both supported and was “intimately connected” to the regime, “emerging in the last years [of the 1920s], its apogee [being] achieved at the end of the 1930s and during the next decade”.26 (2) A “new gasp of the corporative system in the mid-1950s”27 – the 1956 second corporative legislation impulse, paving the way to new corporations created between 1957 and 196628 – offered Salazar, not only the bureaucratic means to control social and economic change, and to try to promote the one pattern of change admitted by the regime, but also the possibility to renovate the bureaucratic Marques, Política (fn. 9), pp. 25 f. Ibidem, p. 24. 27 Howard Wiarda, Corporativismo [Corporatism], in: Baretto / Mónica, Dicionário (fn. 6), pp. 421 – 425, here p. 423. 28 Six in 1957, two in 1959, three in 1966; after twenty years of a “halt to which the evolution of our corporative system was brought to”, as Adérito Sedas Nunes puts it in 1954 (see: Adérito Sedas Nunes, Situações e Problemas do Corporativismo [Conditions and Problems of Corporatism], Lisboa 1954, p. 38). The first corporative wave spread throughout the 1930s, under a clear Fascist spell: after the 1933 constitution establishing a “Corporative state”, instating the Câmara Corporativa as its second chamber, Salazar passed the National Labor Statute (Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional, a clear Portuguese adaptation of Mussolini’s Carta del Lavoro – see DL No. 23,048 and 23,050, 23. 09. 1933). 25 26

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elites, attracting a whole “series of catholic intellectuals and academics”29 who would be, together with Salazarist young technocrats, the nucleus of a new Estado Novo leading generation, committed to economic modernization without questioning political authoritarianism. In addition, this new corporative discourse that spread all the way through every sectorial policy represented another Salazarist attempt to smarten the 1930s typically fascist Third Way (anti-liberal capitalist, anti-socialist) rhetoric, and to claim a paternalistic social concern from above towards growingly anxious and dissatisfied working classes. The whole logic under which Salazar himself overlooked the most massive process of social change the country underwent was still completely reactionary. At the very moment in which thousands were starting to abandon rural Portugal and flooding into Lisbon and Oporto suburbs – and soon after into Paris’ or the Rheinland’s, for instance –, the dictator praised agriculture in opposition to industry, “because of its greater stability, its natural roots in the soil and closer connection with food production, constituting a basic assurance of life itself and, due to the moral values it impresses into the soul, an endless source of social resistance” of those who “will not let themselves be obsessed with illusions of getting rich through indefinite means, but aspire, above all, for a sufficient life, healthy, deep-rooted to the earth, although modest”.30 (3) A slow, controlled, often contradictory31 but steady choice for what a probably too condescending view would describe as an “opening to Europe” in the 1960s, abandoning the 1940s-1950s project of “a nationalistic and autarkic development in favor of economic liberalization and European integration”.32 The fact that Salazar chose to concede to the economic managers inside his administration and to accept Portuguese status as a founding member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in 1960, as well as his Government signing (April 1962) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), more than a starting point of a significant change process, should be read as a result of that contradictory process initiated with Salazar’s similar concession in the 1947 – 48 process of adhesion to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, turned into Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, in 1960), tardily Wiarda, Corporativismo (fn. 27), p. 423. Salazar, 1953, quote in: Fernando Rosas, O Estado Novo (1926 – 1974) [The Estado Novo], in: José Mattoso (ed.), História de Portugal [History of Portugal], Vol. 7, [No place specified] 1994, p. 457. 31 See details in Fernanda Rollo, Salazar e a Construção Europeia [Salazar and the Construction of Europe], in: António Costa Pinto / Nuno Severiano Teixeira (eds.), Portugal e a Unificação Europeia, [Portugal and the Unification of Europe], revista “Penélope” No. 18, Lisboa 1999, pp. 51 – 76. 32 David Corkill, O desenvolvimento económico português no fim do Estado Novo [Portuguese Economic Development at the End of the Estado Novo], in: Fernando Rosas / Pedro Aires Oliveira (eds.), A transição falhada. O Marcelismo e o fim do Estado Novo (1968 – 1974) [Failed Transition. Marcelismo and the End of the Estado Novo (1968 – 1974)], [No place specified] 2004, pp. 213 – 232, here p. 215. 29 30

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benefiting from the Marshall Plan funds. According to Rollo, the OEEC integration “has represented not only one of the first steps towards [economic] opening, and moreover to Portuguese economy’s internationalization, but the ‘Marshall aid’, through mechanisms it put into motion, ( . . . ) concurred to what was still an incipient industrialization process, ( . . . ) paving the way to new forms to look at economic policies through economic planning materialized in a series of ‘development plans’ [Planos de Fomento], promoting a new technical elite formed in contact with and working inside a number of international institutions (first of them all, the OEEC), an additional knowledge on the workings of international trade and an intensive learning on how to deal with the new instruments of the international monetary and financial system that came out from BrettonWoods”33. From this point of view, the formal creation of a Portuguese Economic Area (Espaço Económico Português)34, although reinforcing the same trend towards bureaucratic planning and economic rationalization, offering, again, a number of opportunities to a new generation of qualified bureaucrats recruited into the ranks of a growingly agonizing regime, was never an effective alternative to a clear Europeanization of Portuguese foreign trade, while “the relative position of the trade with former colonies is not only weak but it suffers an expressive cut: in 1958 and 1968 it represented 20 percent of [Metropolitan Portugal] foreign trade, while in 1973 it could no longer exceed 12 percent”35. Table 2 GDP growth rate (1960 – 80) Period

GDP growth rate (%)

1960 – 65

6.44

1965 – 70

6.20

1970 – 75

4.37

1975 – 80

5.06

1960 – 70

6.32

1970 – 80

4.72

Source: António Barreto (ed.), A situação social em Portugal, 1960 / 1995 [The Social Situation in Portugal], Lisboa 1996, table 5.05. Rollo, Salazar (fn. 31), p. 64. See Decree-Law (Decreto-Lei, DL) No. 44,016, 08. 11. 1961. Manuel Ennes Ferreira, Espaço Económico Português / Mercado Único Português [The Portuguese Economic Area / The Integrated Portuguese Market], in: Fernando Rosas / J. M. Brandão de Brito (eds.), Dicionário de História do Estado Novo [Dictionary of the History of the Estado Novo], Vol. I (A – L), [No place specified] 1996, pp. 312 – 315. 35 Santos, Abertura (fn. 13), pp. 140 f. 33 34

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Portugal / EU 15 (GDP per capita) (%)

1970

53.2

1973

61.2

1975

60.6

1980

58.5

1985

55.7

1990

64.2

Calculations according to data in: OECD Factbook 2006: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. Table 4 Labor / Gross National Income (1960 – 90) Year

Labor / Gross National Income (%)

1960

44.84

1965

43.80

1970

44.51

1973

43.71

1975

59.30

1976

57.79

1980

44.52

1990

41.82

Source: António Barreto (ed.), A situação social em Portugal, 1960 / 1995 [The Social Situation in Portugal], Lisboa 1996, table 5.09.

Social and economic change was obvious at the end of the 1960s, while the war was pushing the dictatorship into a blind alley, and a highly contradictory one: economy was growing, emigration and military draft was opening new job opportunities for women, education rates were finally heading up, but political dissatisfaction and social unrest had never been so evident since 1945. Additionally, Caetano’s short period in power was a stage of “strong expansion of a ‘monopolistic nucleus’” of the larger capital corporations, the Magnificent Seven36: 36

Ibidem, pp. 116 – 120.

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Table 5 Portuguese main financial corporations (the Magnificent Seven) (1973) Corporation

CUF

Espírito Santo

Champalimaud

BPA37

Borges

BNU 38

Burnay

Companies under control

112

20

14

70

40

22

22

Share of Banking System (commercial)

10.6%

15.1%

14.4%

13.2%

4%

Share of Insurance market

22%

11.4%

12.9%

1.8%

1.5%

Colonial investment

banking trade shipping

Sugar coffee oil insurance banking

banking insurance cement chemicals

banking beer cotton

banking oil beer

Connection to foreign capital

Billerud Pedriney UK R. Noled RÿnScheldeVerone Brocades Ludlow ICI

F.N. City Bank Firestone Schlumberger Rockefeller ITT STAB Interfood

(Negotiating connections in Latin America)

W. Moreira G. Tire Sales and Mitsui Rubber Ytong St. Gobain

11.8%

3.7%

5%

1.6%

banking banking insurance diamonds agriculture sugar cellulose cashew mining Launoit Léon Levy AngloAmerican Corp. Danish capital

Soc. Gén. Belgique IT Chrysler CETEC Westinghouse

Source: Santos, Abertura (fn. 13), p. 119.39

Inescapably described as an oligarchy, intrinsically associated to an authoritarian state who, in the words of the post-1974 period largest individual fortune in the country, Belmiro de Azevedo, “solved ‘Labor Relations’ troubles for us”40, and who conceived most of its post-WW II economic policies counting on their actual Banco Português do Atlântico. Banco Nacional Ultramarino. 39 A monographic description of these financial corporations and their industrial investments in: Maria Belmira Martins, Sociedades e grupos em Portugal [Societies and Groups in Portugal], Lisboa 1973. 40 Interview to Mónica, in: Maria Filomena Mónica, Os grandes patrões da indústria portuguesa [The Big Entrepreneurs of Portuguese Industry], Lisboa 1990, p. 138. 37 38

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support and allegiance, these Magnificent Seven were enormously favored by the 1945 – 60 autarkical industrialization, preparing themselves to face the controlled internationalization Portuguese economy underwent along the 1960s and 1970s, carefully choosing their foreign partners (British, French, German, some Belgian and U.S.). Foreign investment, central to processes of technological transfer, was now attracted through different sorts of administrative, tax and bureaucratic means right from the beginning of Caetano’s rule, at the end of the 1960s. “Strategy outlined in that period focused on a double association: one between national and foreign capital who jointly played the role of the [economic] system’s engine; another between [national capital] and a net of small and middle companies, ( . . . ) who on the whole would build up the main branch of the national capital”41. Nevertheless, the foreign investment’s role in Portuguese economy modernization process should not be overrated: so clearly “scarce” until 1968, although having increased significantly as soon as the war started in Africa, in 1961, “it did not get”, according to Ramos dos Santos, “globally speaking, a strategic control over Portuguese economy”42. At any rate, foreign direct investment amounted at the beginning of the 1960s to “around 10 percent of private capital middle- and long-term investment”, but it would rise to “almost a fourth” of it in 1973. Thus, Luís Salgado de Matos considers the “penetration of foreign companies in the [Portuguese] economic web” to be “very strong”: out of the “100 largest Portuguese industrial companies, 42 had foreign capital participation, and the same happened with 16 out of the 50 biggest commercial companies”43. These Magnificent Seven economic groups “have initially developed” an industrial expansion strategy, “creating or buying companies in productive sectors, [but] from 1968 – 1969 onwards they point out to new directions: service, real estate and tourism companies, investment and stock market management societies. In the final years [of the dictatorship] there was also a growing presence in trading business and media”44. Each of them, at any rate, evolved differently: in an industrial / financial capital equation, (i) the older (and also two of the three largest) corporations (CUF, Champalimaud) had rooted in industry “their starting point and accumulation ground, extending later their activity towards finance”; (ii) the reverse course, from finance towards industry and services, was followed by prototypically 41 Américo Ramos dos Santos, Grupos económicos / Conglomerados [Economic Groups / Conglomerates], in: Rosas / Brito, Dicionário (fn. 34), pp. 406 – 409, here pp. 406 f. 42 Santos, Abertura (fn. 13), p. 119. 43 Luís Salgado de Matos, Investimento estrangeiro [Foreign Investment], in: Rosas / Brito, Dicionário (fn. 34), pp. 491 – 495. Santos mentions “around 270 companies [at the end of 1973] participated or controlled by multinational companies”: 150 focused on mining or imports substitution; 95 on the exports market, taking profit from local low costs; 14 on pharmaceutical and chemical imports and distribution; 20 on real estate speculation, see: Santos, Abertura (fn. 13), pp. 118 f. 44 Ibidem, p. 118.

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state-well-connected Espírito Santo corporation (the third of the three biggest), as well as one of the best examples of Oporto area financial tycoons, Pinto de Magalhães, one of the second league corporation leaders, though deeply interconnected with the Magnificent Seven; (iii) “hybrid expansion processes” were developed by BPA or the Borges’ group. Corporation strategies towards internal and colonial markets and their relation with foreign capital was also diversified: (1) Espírito Santo and Burnay were “solidly articulated with foreign capital”, followed, after 1968 – 69, by CUF; (2) BNU, Espírito Santo and Champalimaud were “deeply rooted or articulated with colonial exploitation” and openly lobbied for the prosecution of the war effort in Africa; (3) on the contrary, CUF and Borges “based their expansion process essentially on protected metropolitan economy, relatively independent from foreign capital”45. Capitalistic concentration, together with a financial system huge expansion, was, thus, the mot d’ordre under Marcello Caetano’s rule 1968 – 74: bank deposits grew from 132 million Escudos in 1968 to 328 million in 1973, two-thirds of which were under control of the Magnificent Seven, an amount which had tripled in those five years; a growing proportion of the financial system gains came from stock-market speculation, “without which it would be impossible to understand the great monopolistic acceleration” of that period; in 1972, 16.5 percent of the industrial companies produced 73 percent of all industrial goods.46 Eventually, “grosso modo, in April 1974 Portuguese economy was dominated by 44 families, most of which controlled [these] seven large financial groups”, and through them holding control over two-thirds of private investment, 75 percent of the banking system, 55 percent of the insurance market, “four of the most important industrial activities concerning productivity, profit rate and technology (beer, tobacco, paper and cement); ( . . . ) all industrial basic activities (iron and steel, chemicals, shipbuilding and maintenance, heavy metalworks and mechanics); ( . . . ) most of shipping”; on the whole, these included “the largest eight industrial companies and five of the main export companies”47. These speedily growing financial corporations became a strategic standpoint for professional, as well as political, opportunities to the younger members of the urban bourgeois elite of the 1960s and 1970s. In the first place, they were the natural field of operation for all those 44 families, 14 of which were the “dynamic basis of the monopolistic nucleus”48. But furthermore, “there was a growing interpenetration of [these financial corporations] and the state, in which a new technocracy beSantos, Grupos económicos (fn. 41), p. 408. Ibidem, p. 407. 47 Santos, Abertura (fn. 13), pp. 116, 118. 48 See Santos, Grupos económicos (fn. 41), p. 408. These were: Mello; Espírito Santo; Champalimaud; Quina; Mendes de Almeida; Queirós Pereira; Figueiredo (Burnay); Feteiras; Bordalo; Vinhas; Albano de Magalhães; Domingos Barreiro; Pinto de Magalhães; Brandão de Miranda. 45 46

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comes predominant, circulating between different executive positions inside the corporations, and in some cases between corporations and the state apparatus”49. In fact, some of the most characteristic features of the institutional and social role of this new technocratic elite, emerging in modernizing Portugal in the second half of the century, is that it obviously benefited from both capitalistic concentration and state intervention, and had a central role both under Salazar’s and Caetano’s authoritarian state and during the revolutionary 1974 – 76 period and, when the revolutionary experience was brought to an end, to what hegemonic ideology describes as the normalization process of the late 1970s and 1980s. Tracking down individual itineraries of some of these elite members throughout the final 15 years of the dictatorship and the first 20 of the democratic regime, it is quite evident, the pragmatism of choices and strategies of both individuals and these corporations, and even of the authoritarian state in its final stage. Apparently, one could have opposed the regime in university rallies, then get a job at some planning or strategy department in a corporation whose interests and policies were interdependent from the state’s, and finally be appointed to some second-rank economic policy-design administration department before the 1974 revolution. If this professional and institutional tour – and an obviously political one, although many would deny it – would have been successful, and not too compromising, it would be highly probable to find these same individuals in socialist, right-wing or so-called technical administrations after 1976. IV. Elites and Revolution After 13 years of war fought in three African territories, almost a whole generation of young Army captains in his late twenties-early thirties organized themselves in an Armed Forces Movement (MFA) while carrying, in fact, most of the military effort’s burden, and engaged on a conspiracy, initially on professional grounds, which evolved through the Autumn 1973, Winter 1973 – 74 and, becoming impossible to refrain by either military hierarchy or the political police, got definitely politically menacing to the regime in February 1974. On 25th April 1974, with almost not a single shot fired by the rebel forces (only the political police resisted by force and shot dead four civilians who approached its Lisbon headquarters), the regime fell into the hands of politically inexperienced young officers who, simultaneously, called two of the most graduated Army generals (António de Spínola, immediately appointed president by his fellow high-ranking officers, and Francisco da Costa Gomes, who became Chief-Commander of the Armed Forces and replaced Spínola as president in October 1974) to get hold of power, asked democratic opposition leaders to participate in government and, most of all, opened wide the gates for political participation, improvising a transitional process to democracy which turned fastly into a social, political and cultural Revolution. 49

Santos, Abertura (fn. 13), p. 118.

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The previously prepared MFA program was soon most evidently surpassed by a surprisingly strong popular movement, shaping a revolutionary experience apparently astonishing in Western Europe since the beginning of Cold War. Massive political participation became an identifiable sign of the revolutionary period (1974 – 76), historically unimpaired before and after it. This political mobilization would prove to be substantially ephemeral in the long run, but the truth remains that no other electoral process in Portugal attained the participation level (91.2 percent) of the 1975 election of the Constitutional Assembly when, for the very first time in Portuguese history, universal suffrage was introduced, allowing every citizen over 18 to vote. The two years that separate the 1974 military coup from the 1976 approval of the democratic constitutional text opened in Portuguese modern history the most complete and archetypical revolutionary cycle, “historically [representing] the deepest and most threatening shake suffered by an oligarchy which had always ruled in Portugal, undamaged and self-assured”50. Inside this chronological specific stage, an even more intense revolutionary period may be drawn between the aborted Spínola’s right-wing coup of 11th March 1975 and the victorious anti-communist one of 25th November that same year, following which an important number of left-wing military officers were arrested for some months and all major military and political departments still led by left-of-socialists were taken into the hands of right-wing or moderate socialist officers and civil leaders. From a semantic point of view, social reality was now described with very different words and metaphors, fastly dyeing all public discourse with clearly Marxist and radical-democratic shades, produced in almost every level and instance of society and culture, coming from almost all sorts of legal political forces, right-wing (PPD, liberal, and CDS, conservative christian-democratic) included. Mass mobilization was soon achieved mainly by social and political movements of the revolutionary Left (communists and far-Left, more effective achieving it than the socialists until the Summer of 1975), forcing, under what became an evident left-wing cultural and ideological hegemony, to use Gramsci’s concept, all active leading characters of political change (military necessarily included) to define as a Revolution the historical process launched by the military coup. Thus, nationalist, colonial rhetoric, confessional and ultraconservative imagery from the Estado Novo’s halfcentury, as well as technocratic modernization discourses, were substituted in political discourse by revolutionary vocabulary opposing Revolution to Reaction or calling out for People’s Power, a Popular Unity of Chilean shades, demanding land’s ownership for those who work it (A Terra a quem a trabalha!), soon amplified to the principle of political and social organization of all power to the workers (O Poder aos trabalhadores!). In the specific field of PCP vs. Maoist organizations’ dispute, the latter recuperated Stalinist concepts of the 1930s such as Social fascism or Social imperialism to designate PCP strategy at a national and international level. 50 Fernando Rosas, Portugal século XX (1890 – 1976). Pensamento e acção política [20th Century Portugal. Political Thought and Political Action], Lisboa 2004, p. 138.

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An antiauthoritarian military coup as was the MFA’s 25th April 1974 promptly converted into a revolutionary political break with the past and inevitably produced an almost general political and institutional elite replacement. First of all, the new political order was probably expected to act very severely against those responsible for repressive action under the dictatorship. It became soon quite evident that it was not going to be the case. The main consequences, from this point of view, were not massive imprisonment and / or legal prosecution against political leaders or police and military chiefs. It all came to what in those days was called the purging (saneamento) of the state apparatus, a lustration process. At the beginning, the military authorities decided the “purging of the Armed Forces ranks”, both of military51 and civil servants,52 and of “state administration, corporative and economic coordination bodies”,53 as well as of all “public services and companies, local administrations and all other public right entities”.54 Heavily pressed by the resentful masses, Provisional Government, the first of which was exceptionally led by a civilian (Palma Carlos, May-July 1974), soon replaced by a military (left-wing general Vasco Gonçalves, August 1974-August 1975), strove for formal procedures, supervised by Ministerial Committees of Purging (Comissões Ministeriais de Saneamento)55 and a General-Directorate for Reclassification and Purging (DirecçãoGeral de Reclassificação e Saneamento) created within the General-Staff of the Armed Forces.56 A whole new decree was passed a few days before Spínola’s and his ultra-right-wing allies 11th March 1975 attempted putsch, clearly specifying four kinds of civil servants who should be immediately “considered dismissed from Civil Service”: (1) Presidents of the Republic and Heads of Government between 1926 and 1974 (among which remained alive only the last two in office: Américo Thomaz and Marcello Caetano); (2) members of the political police and all those who had taught in its schools; (3) informers of the political police57, or all those who “voluntarily contributed to assist in its repressive action”; and (4) the so-called former “vigilant agents” working inside universities and every “civil servant or agent responsible for any sort of information service for repressive purposes”, and members of “special forces of the militia”58, the Portuguese Legion (Legião Portuguesa).59 DL No. 190 / 74, 30. 04. 1974. DL No. 775 / 74, 31. 12. 1974 and No. 497 / 75, 12. 09. 1975. 53 DL No. 193 / 74, 09. 05. 1974. 54 DL No. 277 / 74, 25. 06. 1974. 55 DL No. 366 / 74, 19. 08. 1974. 56 DL No. 36 / 75, 31. 01. 1975. 57 Lists of almost all those active in 1974 were burnt by DGS chiefs [Direcção-Geral de Segurança, General-Directorate for Security] in the first hours of the 25th April coup. 58 DL No. 123 / 75, 11. 03. 1975. 59 For all these documents see: José-Pedro Gonçalves (compiler), Dossier 2a, República, Vol. 1: “25 / 4 / 1974 – 25 / 4 / 1975”, pp. 417 f., 420 – 423, 429 – 434, 440 – 445, 448 – 455, and Vol. 2: “25 / 4 / 1975 – 25 / 11 / 1975”, pp. 1056 – 1062, Lisboa, respectively 1976 and 1977. 51 52

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As for the purging of the armed forces, the military authorities made public in the months following to the deposition of the dictatorial regime that until October 1974 “the Navy [had been] purged of 103 officers and, in the end of that year, 300 different ranks officers had been dismissed”60. In fact, probably more have been removed from the ranks after the political and military anti-communist change of direction in the end of 1975, a process which underwent for several years, until, at least, the constitutional reform of 1982 which suppressed the Council of the Revolution (Conselho da Revolução). In the Ministry of Justice, not more than “42 in a group of 500 magistrates had been punished until mid-1975, 28 of which for having participated in decisions over political crimes and the rest for having worked with the censorship [department] and the political police, or having been members of the Government during the previous regime. ( . . . ) At the end of 1974, eight months after the coup, around 4.300 civil servants had been submitted to procedures of purging”61, which does not mean, obviously, that they were expelled or even merely suspended from Civil Service. On the whole, however, “huge delays in the legal purging procedures reduced its effect and made possible speedy reintegration after a short number of years. ( . . . ) Most of these high officials, including ‘former political police agents’, would be reintegrated between 1976 and 1980, though most of them did not return to the strategic positions they formerly held”.62 Even more revealing is the fact that no hard stance was taken in the case of the highest-rank leaders of the authoritarian regime. By the end of the 1970s, they were made to know that the authorities would not raise any impediment to their return to the country. Former president Thomaz did so and quickly around him rose the idea of publishing in the early 1980s his autobiography with the provocative title of Last Decades of Portugal 63, as if the nation he had formally presided over had ceased to exist. The former Head of the Government, Marcello Caetano, refused to return and, having regained his academic career in Rio de Janeiro, died in Brazil in 1980, not before having published two self-explanatory autobiographical 60 António Costa Pinto, Enfrentando o legado autoritário na transição para a democracia (1974 – 1976) [Confronting Authoritarian Legacy in the Course of the Transition to Democracy], in: J. M. Brandão de Brito (coordinator), O país em revolução. Revolução e democracia [The Country in Revolution. Revolution and Democracy], Lisboa 2001, pp. 359 – 384, here p. 367. 61 Ibidem, p. 368, quoting data from O Século (Lisboa), 19.04 and 27. 02. 1975. 62 Pinto, Enfrentando (fn. 60), pp. 369 f. The author quotes the “1976 – 1977 – 1978” report of the above-mentioned Commission. See António Costa Pinto, O legado do autoritarismo e a transição portuguesa para a democracia (1974 – 2004) [The Legacy of Authoritarianism and Portuguese Transition to Democracy, 1974 – 2004], in: Manuel Loff / Maria da Conceição Pereira (eds.), Portugal: 30 anos de Democracia [Portugal: 30 Years of Democracy], Oporto 2006, pp. 57 – 70, for some details on its proceedings. 63 Américo Thomaz, Últimas décadas de Portugal [Last Decades of Portugal], 2 Vols., Lisboa 1980 – 1983.

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testimonies.64 Almost every other former political leader, government member or high official, if having left the country in the 1974 – 75 period, returned freely to Portugal in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Practically all of them were reintegrated in the higher ranks of the Civil Service and were generously repaired for having been submitted to the purging procedures. Very few of them were actually arrested in the tensest moments of the revolutionary period and a single one sent to court and sentenced.65 As far as Marcello Caetano’s Cabinets are concerned, eight of their members regained some governmental office sometime after the first years of democracy, both in socialist and right-wing cabinets, revealingly. A ninth member of the last dictatorial government, Caetano’s Secretary of State for Budget, became president of the Supreme Court 14 years after the Revolution (1988 – 90). Finally, a former Secretary and Minister under Salazar, Adriano Moreira (Overseas, 1960 – 62) was frequently elected as Member of the Parliament for the CDS, and eventually became its leader (1986 – 87).66 The same party was able to elect to Parliament a former Caetano’s Secretary (Housing), Nogueira de Brito. Most importantly, a very significant number of all these were either founders or administrators of the main Portuguese industrialists’ association, the Confederação da Indústria Portuguesa, “an institution which owes largely to the cadres of Marcello’s period”67. The first eleven months of the revolutionary period (April 1974 – March 1975) have been a classical case of clash between different political projects to build up a new political and social order in the aftermath of the fall of a dictatorship. All sorts of conservatives, including former liberal elites of the Marcelismo, were being pushed to the right by the radicalization of the political process, and especially almost every relevant member of the business elites, amalgamated behind general Spínola, appointed provisional President right after 25th April 1974, and tried to refuse to accept a self-determination process for the colonies (a political battle they lost in July 1974) and structural changes in economic policies. A first military clash was avoided on 28th September 1974, when the spinolistas prepared a series of public demonstrations associated with military mobilization, but Spínola was 64 Marcello Caetano, Depoimento [Deposition], Rio de Janeiro 1974, and Marcello Caetano, Minhas memórias de Salazar [My Memories of Salazar], Lisbon 1977. See also: Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, Marcello Caetano. Confidências no exílio [Marcello Caetano. Revelations in Exile], 10th ed., Lisboa / São Paulo 1985. 65 According to a research led by two journalists in 1993: José Pedro Castanheira / Valentina Marcelino, Os homens de Marcello: onde estão e o que fazem[Marcello’s Men. Where Are They and What Are They Doing], in Expresso-Revista (Lisboa), 24. 04. 1993, pp. 22 – 29), out of 36 ministers, Secretaries of State and Under-secretaries of State, only 5 (Marcello Caetano and the ministers for Defence, Home Affairs and Army, and the Under-Secretary of the Army) were arrested for some time, leaving the country soon after being released to, together with 17 others. 66 He kept some relevant institutional offices thereafter, especially in academic activities. 67 Castanheira / Marcelino, Os homens (fn. 65), p. 27.

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forced to resign two days later. Radicalization to the left was intensified, namely through property occupation and socialization, following workers’ movements demanding for new rights, higher wages,68 but also for responsibilities for oppressive and penalizing actions undertaken before what was evidently perceived as a liberation process launched by the 25th April. Strong popular pressure for lustration inside private companies started achieving its aims at the end of 1974 and was particularly boosted by the 11th March 1975 reactionary coup, led by Spínola and its military accomplices who had took refuge in Franco’s Spain, in a desperate attempt to stop the revolutionary process. This whole political and social process evolved under a severe economic crisis: 1973 oil crisis impact, stagflation (inflation at 7.8 percent in 1973, 20.5 percent in 1974, 27.9 percent in 1975; GDP growth fell from 11.2 percent in 1973 – an exceptional year, at any rate –, to 1.1 percent in 1974 and –4.3 percent in 1975), acute cutback of the exports (–12 percent in 1974, –14 percent in 1975) and, obviously, of investment (–7.7 percent in 1974, –12.3 percent in 1975).69 Business elites’ response to a social movement that they could no longer control using state coercion, as it always happened under the Estado Novo dictatorship, was a classic one: lock-out strategies, decapitalization and illegal export of capitals (through “mechanisms of under-declaration of receipts and over-declaration of exported goods’ prices”70). At the end of this course of action, hundreds of them fled abroad, mainly to seek refuge in dictatorial Franco’s Spain and Brazil, or in Apartheid’s South Africa and Rhodesia, sometimes in Britain and Switzerland, where they were able, often with official or semi-official support, to recreate a part of their former wealth. At any rate, not more than 2 percent of all industrial owners were purged out of their companies, although 19 percent “abandoned [their] positions”, according to Harry Makler71. At an early stage of the process, in August 1974, leading owners and managers of the most significant private companies (including most of the Magnificent Seven) launched an Entreprise / Society Movement (Movimento Dinamizador Empresa / Sociedade), trying to establish themselves in an uncertain social and political terrain where their class interests were less and less ensured. Eventually everyone of them backed Spínola’s efforts to halt a clear swing to left on Portuguese 68 Real wages grew 12 percent in 1974, 9 percent in 1975, see: Emanuel Reis Leão, Das transformações revolucionárias à dinâmica europeia [From Revolutionary Transformations to European Dynamics], in: António Reis (ed.), Portugal Contemporâneo [Contemporary Portugal], Vol. VI, Lisboa 1992, pp. 173 – 224, here p. 177. See table 1 for the exceptional growth of labor remuneration in the GDP. 69 Ibidem, pp. 177 – 179. 70 Ibidem, p. 179. 71 Harry M. Makler, The Consequences of the Survival and Revival of the Industrial Bourgeoisie, in: Lawrence Graham / Douglas L. Wheeler (eds.), In Search of Modern Portugal. The Revolution and its Consequences, Madison 1983, pp. 251 – 295.

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politics, financed the creation of some improvised ephemeral right-wing organizations,72 and those who were adequately organized, offered their logistics to prepare the 28th September 1974 and 11th March 1975 conspiracies to reverse the revolutionary social changes. When the whole political process seemed lost from their point of view, in Spring 1975, those who have led the Magnificent Seven, together with a representative section of Northern Portuguese middle-range businessmen, became active supporters of those few armed movements organized from within and out of Portugal to counteract the revolutionary experience,73 as well as of legal right-wing parties and, under those specific circumstances, Soares’ Socialist Party. The most relevant characters amongst them used all sorts of business and class connections to rebuild their fortunes. The case of two of the Magnificent Seven was recently described by two journalists, Filipe Fernandes and Hermínio Santos who, 30 years after, wanted to narrate “the wild life of businessmen and mangers in the hot years following 25th April 1974”74. The “core managers” [núcleo duro] of the Espírito Santo corporation who had fled the country the first semester of 1975 met that summer in Toledo (Spain) “to follow a business plan conceived and drawn by those who had been arrested”. First task was to “lobby amongst the international community on the situation of arrested businessmen in Portugal”, including contacts with President Giscard d’Estaing, banker David Rockefeller or Prince Bernard of the Netherlands. Secondly, they tried to disperse their activities throughout Brazil, London, Lausanne and Luxemburg, “relying on a large support from international banking, offering credit lines to the [Espírito Santo] family”. They were soon back to business in London under Citibank’s protection, got hold of a Brazilian bank more than legislation allowed them to, benefiting from special Government exemptions, created a fortune management society in Switzerland and a Espírito Santo International Holding in Luxemburg. Most of them went back to Portugal already in 1976. 72 The Progress and Liberal Parties (Partido do Progresso and Partido Liberal), the Portuguese Federalist Movement (Movimento Federalista Portugues). 73 Portuguese Liberation Army (Exército de Libertação de Portugal), Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal (Movimento Democrático de Libertação de Portugal, led by António de Spínola), operational Maria da Fonte Plan (Plano Maria da Fonte). Filipe S. Fernandes / Hermínio Santos, Excomungados de Abril. Os empresários na Revolução [Excommunicated in April. Entrepreneurs in the Revolution], Lisboa 2005. Dom Quixote gathers some information on the financing role of these exiled industrialists and bankers. On the ultra-right anti-revolutionary terrorism in 1975 and 1976, see: Josep Sánchez Cervelló, A revolução portuguesa e a sua influência na transição espanhola (1961 – 1974) [The Portuguese Revolution and its Influence on the Spanish Transition], Port. ed., Lisboa 1993; Eduardo Dâmaso, A invasão spinolista [The Spinolist Invasion], Lisboa 1999. 74 The whole of Fernandes and Santos book is a journalistic manifesto against those “two years of collective drunkenness” (according to corporation lawyer Daniel Proença de Carvalho), i. e. the revolutionary 1974 and 1975 years, praising those representatives of some “of the most respected families in the country” (Fernandes / Santos, Excomungados [fn. 73], pp. 15, 56) who felt it better to leave the country.

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Of the two brothers who held control over CUF, José Manuel de Mello, “the moment he understood where the Revolution was heading to, decided to ( . . . ) consider emigration with some of his direct associates”. Two different groups left the country for Brazil and Switzerland, creating in both countries, with local capital connections (including Arab capital in the latter), technology, shipbuilding and trading companies. Mello boasted to Fernandes and Santos about being at the time in “good relations with Margaret Thatcher”. Although “he never lost touch with remarkable Portuguese who were in the political struggle frontline against leftwing forces, one of whom was Mário Soares”, Mello waited for 1979 to return definitely to Portugal.75 When 15 years later, sociologist Maria Filomena Mónica interviewed some of them, together with the more prominent new Northern Portuguese industrialists and some of the members of what was speculated to have turned out as a “new Portuguese entrepreneurial class”, practically “unknown men” before 1974, whose companies remained fundamentally untouched by revolutionary legislation and took advantage from the destruction of the oligarchic Magnificent Seven, they all blamed harshly the “revolutionary excesses” of 1975 for all sorts of harm done to Portuguese economy, although none ever believed a communist regime could or would be imposed on Portugal. According to one of the younger interviewees, Portuguese “are very individualistic: they all want their piece of land and their house”76. Virtually all shared globally positive (“undoubtedly, the greatest character of the present century”, António Raposo de Magalhães), or at least condescending (“Salazar had some liberal aspects”, “I have never thought Salazar was, in fact, a execrable dictator because in this country people always had some freedom of speech”, Belmiro de Magalhães)77 views on Salazarist dictatorship. Nevertheless, those who had not been members of the very strict Magnificent Seven corporation oligarchy would naturally point the finger out at the regime’s economic restrictions to a free competition market they apparently would give preference to: State policies of “industrial restraint [condicionamento industrial] asphyxiated everything. There was always trouble to the new ones who wanted to do something productive” (Américo Amorim). But in some cases there was a clear perception of what the marcelist period meant: while “under Salazarism one would still have some reliability, so to speak”, because, “although there were some special advantages for certain people, at least they were not flagrant”, “marcelismo favored very few people. ( . . . ) Marcello yielded to pressure exerted by certain economic groups, the only ones who eventually got advantage” (Francisco de Almeida Gar75 See further details in Fernandes / Santos, Excomungados (fn. 73), pp. 109 – 114, here p. 131. English expressions in Italic. 76 José António Barros, interviewed by Mónica, in: Mónica, Os grandes patrões (fn. 40), p. 260; see also opinions by Américo Amorim, Queiroz e Mello and Belmiro de Azevedo: Ibidem, pp. 63 – 65, 91, 122. 77 Ibidem, pp. 104, 119.

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rett).78 Unsurprisingly enough, according to Jorge de Mello (brother of José Manuel), the only representative of the pre-1974 Magnificent Seven (one of the main owners of Mello family controlled CUF) interviewed by Mónica in the late 1980s, “it was not the most advanced [evoluídos] businessmen who needed protection from political power, it was political power who needed to keep businessmen dependent from politicians’ decisions”; these state industrial policies, “more than an economic demand, were convenient to political power to exert a permanent control over economy”. Amidst the late 1980s industrialists, nothing could be further away from Américo Amorim’s explanation for the 1975 nationalization process we will soon look upon. “Those groups”, the so-called Magnificent Seven, “were not dynamic, they did not earn money all by themselves. They needed protection from the system”, i. e. the authoritarian state. From the point of view of one of the two Portuguese individual largest fortunes since the 1980s until the present day, “the way this whole thing was taken by assault in 1975 was a result of the fact that these people had left the country. If ours had not been a 15 to 20 families [controlled by] country, but of 50.000 businessmen, scattered throughout several geographical areas, I assure you that it would not have happened. ( . . . ) It was their own wealth which scared them and pushed them out of the country”79. Finally, Mónica heard some of them (Belmiro de Azevedo and Jorge de Mello) praise the Spanish transitional model as a superior form of negotiating a gradual liberalization process,80 an attitude which would become absolutely consensual in all conservative and liberal Portuguese elites in the turn of century. An interesting phenomenon took place inside the state economic departments: one fraction of that same University-produced elite of the 1960s and 1970s, intimately associated with the marcelist project of economic modernization without political change, was substantially (but only temporarily) wiped out of the state apparatus and replaced by another fraction, clearly more to the left (communists, socialists, progressive Catholics), most of whom would lead economic departments in future socialist administrations (1976 – 78, 1983 – 85, 1995 – 2002). These leftwingers would, nevertheless, work together with a number of pragmatic technocrats who were kept in place, people who had obviously subscribed to Caetano’s economic policies but would not object significantly to the Provisional Governments economic policies while the revolutionary period lasted, and would soon be heading the same departments, both in right-wing administrations (PSD / CDS administrations, 1980 – 83, 1985 – 95, 2002 – 05) and in those of the so-called presidential initiative (three cabinets directly appointed by President Eanes, 1978 – 80). Another relevant change resulted from the sudden immigration of the so-called retornados, i. e. the Portuguese settlers and some of the so-called assimilated Afri78 79 80

Ibidem, pp. 65, 166. Mello and Amorim interviewed by Mónica, in: Ibidem, pp. 206 f. Ibidem, pp. 121, 211, for instance.

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cans who fled from the newly independent states (a significant part of whom Capeverdian and of Hindustani origin) in 1974 – 76. Mostly politically conservative and deeply resentful against the decolonization process, they represented themselves as more liberal and open-minded and their business elites would claim a significant role in right-wing administrations in the 1980s and 1990s. Literature on the Portuguese elites’ political culture along the modernization process which extended from the last 1940s to the 1970s tend to identify “a wide consensus in the economic sphere” of both opposition forces (communists but also socialists and moderates who gravitated around the latter) and liberal reformers who participated in the economic policy-conception of Marcelism: “to dismantle the corporative area”, towards which official policy was aiming already in the final years of the dictatorship, “to control and to stimulate productive activities, economic and social planning, and to increase salaries”. In contrast, “deeper reforms aiming to change the overall structure of private ownership and [to promote] state direct intervention in goods and services production” remained clearly a matter of conflict. “Political conditions” under the dictatorship “not always allowed these differences” among opposition and reformist forces “to become visible”, but they were inevitably “aggravated after 25th April 1974 and were the cause of intense political clash”81. With the democratic revolution, a new political actor rushed decisively into the political arena: the MFA, who militarily prepared the fall of the dictatorship, was led by a generation of young “petit-bourgeois captains, with their vague and contradictory ideology, their appeal to an abstract ‘people’ and their attempt to overcome political parties and to build a revolutionary democracy sustained on ‘people’s power’ and their leaders charisma”82, and soon (June 1974) refused to dissolve as was demanded by all right-wing forces (former regime supporters, the spinolistas aggregated around the provisional President and most of the Liberal reformists who had collaborated and then got disappointed with Caetano and had converged towards the newly formed PPD). Alongside the opposition movements who occupied most of the political debate once the dictatorship came to an end – communists, socialists, progressive Catholics, and far-left Maoists and Guevarists –, the MFA emerged as “a metamorphosis of the military institution to achieve its insubordination and the collapse of the dictatorial regime”, but also, and somehow surprisingly for the military themselves, “to run the complex and convulsive following period”, finding it inevitable to “‘mobilize’ a special politico-military intervention unit”83, the Operational Command for Continental Portugal (Comando Operacional do Continente, COPCON), led by charismatic, bewildering and passionate Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. Viegas, Elites (fn. 12), p. 104. Dawn Linda Raby, A resistência antifascista em Portugal. Comunistas, democratas e militares em oposição a Salazar, 1941 – 1974 [Antifascist Resistance in Portugal. Communists, Democrats and the Military in Opposition Against Salazar, 1941 – 1974], Port. ed., Lisboa 1990, p. 284. 81 82

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As Fernando Rosas brightly underlines, the MFA conspiratorial action “breaks the hierarchical chain of command of the Military Forces (MF), subtracting them from the traditional control of the state and state appointed commanders, thus paralyzing or eliminating the normal purpose of the MF as a central organism for state violence, i. e. as the spinal column of state power”. Secondly, “this deliquescent military power weakens, pulverizes and paralyzes all remaining state institutions” because these “lack political unity or military force to sustain resistance against the revolutionary wave which spreads throughout the country”. To make things worse, from the state’s perspective, “the MFA, in spite of several hesitations and contradictions, will tend to stand behind the revolutionary process, its delegates assuming, in almost every more complicated or conflicting circumstances, normal ministerial bureaucracy”84. Consequently, the revolution meant, from its very starting point, a new twist upon the thread with which Portuguese elites had been socially manufactured for the previous 30 years: (1) Not only industrial capital had opened its way in the 1950s through a ruling class made of rich landowners and traditional trading and financial interests, and (2) an urban young technocratic enlightened bourgeoisie had proved to be essential to the new economic prospects of the 1960s and 1970s, but now (3) a new and completely different elite layer – young military, socially representing a significant part of society, unexpectedly drove into power – was about to play a decisive (although quite ephemeral) role for the following couple of years, claiming to have a legitimate right to carry out (in fact, to support) major changes in Portuguese society, economic organization and political system. In any case, the Portuguese elites’ hegemony over society as a whole, and over all major social processes, had been shattered. Eventually, for the first time in Portuguese modern history, it was mainly the pressure from down under that forced, pushed or prevented policies to be adopted and decisively guided political action. Most observers of the Portuguese Revolution warn against any interpretation of the state action during this revolutionary period as if it had been the outcome of a standard political choice procedure, as if its actors could have used their state prerogatives in a context in which popular movements had not been as central in the whole social process as history shows they were. Again, as Fernando Rosas reminds us, that was “the deepest and most threatening shake suffered by an oligarchy which had always ruled in Portugal, undamaged and self-assured”85. 83 José Medeiros Ferreira, Portugal em transe (1974 – 1985) [Portugal in a Trance (1974 – 1985)], in: José Mattoso (ed.), História de Portugal [The History of Portugal], Vol. 8, [No place specified] 1993, p. 224. 84 Rosas, Portugal século XX (fn. 50), pp. 135 – 136. 85 Ibidem, p. 138.

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Finally, when social tension produced inevitable politico-military consequences such as the 28th September 1974 and mostly the 11th March 1975 armed attempts to stop revolutionary change, a radical step forward was taken in economic policies: three days after the latter of these two unsuccessful military right-wing coups, the newly institutionalized Council of the Revolution (Conselho da Revolução, CR) passed a resolution pressing the Provisional Government to adopt a series of legal measures86 through which, from March to December 1975, 244 companies were nationalized. “Two main objectives” were aimed with such a policy: “the destruction of the main economic and financial groups” – the Magnificent Seven – “and centralization into state hands of the key-areas of Portuguese economy”87. Consequently, all non-foreign capital banks and insurance companies were nationalized in March 1975, thus, achieving an indirect nationalization of quite a number of industrial and service companies. The same logic (avoid international problems, not touching any foreign company) was to be followed in the months to come, when the Provisional Government decided to proceed with the nationalization of major companies operating in the oil (April), shipping, harbours and transportation (April, June and December), steel (April), electric power (April), cement (May), paper manufacture (May), tobacco (May), glass (August), mining (August), heavy chemicals (August), beer (August), ship building (September), agriculture (November), radio and television (December) businesses. At the end of the process, the Portuguese State held a productive public sector in national economy globally similar to the French, West-German or British, but clearly less prominent than the Italian: Table 6 Public companies in some European national economies (1978) GVA public companies / GDP

GFCF public companies / National economy GFCF

Public companies’ workers / Active population

Portugal

19.8 %

30.0%*

6.5%

Italy

24.7 %

47.1%*

25.4 %

France

12.9 %

30.7%

–

F.R.G.

10.4 %

11.9%

9.1%

U.K.

11.4 %

20.8%

8.0%

Country

GVA = Gross Value Added; GFCF = Gross Fixed Capital Formation. * Investment. Source: Maria Manuela António et al., O sector empresarial do Estado em Portugal e nos países da CEE [State Owned Business in Portugal and the Countries of the EEC], Lisboa 1983, p. 178. 86 87

List of all nationalization decrees on in Viegas, Elites (fn. 12), p. 123, table 4.1. Leão, Das transformações revolucionárias (fn. 68), p. 174.

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In fact, only in the financial system area Portuguese public property’s weight (83 percent of all banking, insurance and real estate operations in 1979) was clearly higher than in any other Western European case (63.1 percent of bank deposits in Italy, 46.8 percent of bank employees in France). The proportion of Portuguese public owned companies operating in power industries (71.4 percent in Portugal vs. 100 percent in Greece, 94 percent in France, 92.5 percent in Italy or 84 percent in the UK) and transforming goods industries (9.3 percent in Portugal vs. 13.1 percent in Italy, 6.5 percent in France) was either inferior or quite similar to other European cases. A strong left swing in governmental and MFA leadership eventually produced an “economic model” based upon the nationalization of “big corporations”, an agrarian reform which was already in progress through the occupation by peasants of the huge land properties of the southern part of the country (Alentejo and some Ribatejo and Beira Baixa areas), a “statist centralization of economic planning, a social distributive policy operating upon salaries, prices, social security, credit and public investment”88.

V. Post-Revolution (new?) elites In spite of most political and media discourse produced after 1976, there was – at least, apparently – a wide consensus in 1975, as far as the nationalizations were concerned, among all segments of the 1950s and 1960s newly qualified elite we have been talking about, from which all socialist and liberal (PPD / PSD) leading economists and, generally speaking, economic policy-makers had been recruited, as well as most of Communist Party ones. From a moderate or conservative point of view, it was clearly preferable state intervention in private companies whose owners were being systematically questioned and even harassed by relentless workers’ movements, than to leave it in the hands of the workers’ committees who usually took charge of the management the moment the owners fled the country, taking money and equipment away with them. In fact, as José M. L. Viegas sustains, when socialists and liberals started confronting the 1975 MFA revolutionary stance, they were questioning what they perceived as “a threat to the democraticparliamentary model and to political pluralism, rather than nationalizations”, which were actually “comparable with similar processes that had taken place in other Western European countries, except as the financial sector was concerned”89. In fact, communists, socialists and “the more radical wing of liberal reformists” of the Caetano period (namely those assembled around SEDES, most of them PPD organizers in 1974) endorsed, at the end of the dictatorship, “a strong state intervention in the economic area”, “consolidating and amplifying state’s ownership” in 88 89

Viegas, Elites (fn. 12), p. 139. Ibidem, p. 140.

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economic activity, “reinforcing strategic economic planning” and “state control over monopolistic and strategic areas in Portuguese economy”. If one takes a wider view over socioeconomic policies, “public investment in education, socialization of medical practice, social welfare universalization, state policy on salaries and income, globally aiming to reduce social inequality” enjoyed an even wider political consensus, including, apart from all left-wing parties and most Liberal reformists, “some independents who, later on, will describe themselves as Christian-Democratic”90. Apart the fact that they all still shared a political culture in which the state was expected to plan and to intervene in national economy in order to ensure social engineering, and the fact that they represented a middle-class political clientele obviously resentful against dictatorship oligarchy, which the nationalizations came to deprive from their disproportionate control over economy, socialists (PS) and liberals (PPD) had an additional reason not to object to nationalization policy. In fact, nationalization also allowed to “allot power to a new and amplified clientele, based upon political parties and its influence”91. PS and PSD were already in 1975 and 1976 the two most voted parties92 and they could well expect to hold control of Portuguese administration for the next decades – which, unsurprisingly, they actually did. Their leaders and economic policy decision-makers would be the ones to run over these state-owned companies for the next fifteen years, but also the ones who decided when and how to privatize them at the end of the 1980s and especially during the 1990s. Hard criticism fell in the next decades over the kind of management strategies carried out by the executive managers of state-owned companies, a new and powerful elite group emerging from a sudden change introduced by the revolutionary process in such heavy and rigid structures as private property and elite recruitment. These new managers were initially (1975 – 76) recruited amidst relatively young technocrats, coming forward at the end of the short marcelist cycle still unblemished by too compromising forms of commitment with the dictatorship technocratic development policies or with the Magnificent Seven oligarchy. 13 years later, socialist João Cravinho, Minister for Industry and Technology in 1975 and a typical member of the young technocratic elite of the 1960s,93 would state that manIbidem, pp. 250 f. António Luciano Sousa Franco, A economia [The Economy], in: António Reis (coord.), Portugal 20 anos de Democracia [Portugal: 20 Years of Democracy], [No place specified] 1993, pp. 170 – 293, here pp. 189 f. 92 1975: PS: 37.9 percent; PPD: 26.4 percent; 1976: PS: 34.9 percent; PPD: 24.4 percent. Since then, they have been always the two most voted parties, gathering from a minimum of 50.7 percent of the popular vote in 1985 to a maximum of 79.7 percent in 1991. 93 Young left-wing anti-Salazarist activist, he got a Yale PhD in the 1960s, worked for industrial corporations and was appointed collaborator of the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency of the Government during some of the Marcello Caetano years. Relevant member of the Radical-Left movement MES created in 1974, he moved to the PS at the end of the 1970s. In 90 91

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agers of the newly state-owned companies “had to be recruited almost entirely from third-rank technical executives” of the nationalized corporations: “The first rank executives went practically all to Brazil”, together with the capitalist owners themselves; “in the second rank, some stayed, some went away, and it was the third rank who offered the raw material”, the people who got the management positions “and were highly promoted”.94 At the end of the 1980s, José de Abreu, one of the “big Portuguese industrialists” interviewed by sociologist Maria Filomena Mónica, self-described as “an active freedom fighter” against the left radicalization process of the revolution years, had “no complaints against nationalized banks” because “on the whole”, he felt, “they had not underwent through any significant turmoil: high rank officials and staff had kept their jobs”95. When the revolutionary process was definitely brought to an end in 1976, socialists (PS), Liberals (PPD / PSD), and secondarily Christian-Democrats (CDS), were to fill in all Portuguese political power ranks until the present day. “Politicians, ‘public managers’, local administrators, leaders and agents appointed by party leaderships, scattered by the thousands on top of a public administration headed by growingly incompetent officials, dependent on the power who appoints them on sheer party criteria, and who assigns them budget and personnel, all these, through licences, subsidies and public expenditure, allocating over 50 percent of the GDP, decide on all key economic areas (from credit to media and basic industries), under a monopoly and protection logic”96. Among those who, on the left, and namely in the Communist Party and some minority fractions of the Socialist Party, defended state ownership of some of the most strategic areas of economic activity, but also among those who, on the right, very soon after the nationalization process started to call for privatization, there is nevertheless some consensus over three main explaining features for the “economic and financial deterioration of most of nationalized companies” throughout the first 15 years following the 1975 legislation: “[i] contradiction between companies’ interests in the market and national policies, [ii] Government policy indefinition and, lastly, [iii] the economic and financial crisis”97 Portugal underwent through that historical period. The setback of the revolutionary process, at the end of 1975, produced a strong political and ideological shift to the right, especially towards economic liberalism, 1995 – 99, he returned to the government, under socialist PM Guterres, as Minister for Social Infrastructure, Planning and Territorial Management. Appointed in 2007 member of the Board of Directors of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 94 Cravinho interviewed by Diário Popular, quote in: Fernandes / Santos, Excomungados (fn. 73), p. 90. 95 José de Abreu interviewed by Mónica, in: Mónica, Os grandes patrões (fn. 40), pp. 240, 249. 96 Franco, A economia (fn. 91), p. 190. 97 Viegas, Elites (fn. 12), p. 208.

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which was about to sweep the West at the end of the 1970s. Inside the political elites of the three ruling parties – PS and right-wing PPD / PSD and CDS – became clear a reversion to pre-1960s Portuguese elites ideological patterns. Not only the CDS had voted against the 1976 constitution, and had particularly fought against all its economic and social chapters, but the largest right-wing party, the PPD (paradoxically renamed Social-Democratic – PSD – in 1977) “joined the CDS to condemn an excessively statist constitutional economic order”, soon “radicalizing its position in a liberal trend, not only on the whole of economy but also on social areas, contradicting some principles and guidelines of the [PPD] established in 1974, with ideological antecedents” rooted before the dictatorship’s fall. With more political consequences for the near future, and “coherently with the conceptions of a new technical and professional elite who joined the [Socialist] Party after the revolutionary process”, socialist 1976 – 78 administration “passed liberalizing legislation in the economic and social areas”98, and the altogether peculiar Grand Coalition 1983 – 85 Government (a PS / PSD Cabinet led by Mário Soares, known as the Central Bloc) endorsed a definite consensus between the two main parties rotating in power, each representing most of the left- and right-wing voters, on social and economic liberalization. By that time, administration and the new business elites (both private and stateappointed) agreed upon gradual denationalization policies and articulated wide and clear liberal principles of economic organization and management. António Sousa Franco, a social-democratic politician highly critical with the whole nationalization process,99 recalls, however, that “the critique of state direction over the economy often tends to forget that it is deeply rooted in the Portuguese State tradition since [19th century’s] Liberal regime’s consolidation, as a false remedy – and also as a determinate cause – for insufficient dynamism of private productive enterprise, tardy industrialization and lack of renovation of production organization and technology”100. Another scholar, José M. L. Viegas, who studied Portuguese elites political culture on the state economic responsibilities, confronted himself in interviews he made to elite members in the first half of the 1990s, as well as in “today’s political discourse on the 1974 / 76 events”101, with what he described as “interpretations Ibidem, p. 207. Professor at the University of Lisbon and Catholic Universty’s Law Schools, he was a PSD dissident in 1978. He was appointed Finance Minister in a socialist cabinet led by António Guterres (1995 – 99). He died while campaigning for European Parliament in 2004, heading socialist ticket. 100 Franco, A economia (fn. 91), p. 193. 101 Probabably the best examples can be found in PM Cavaco Silva (an economy professor at the conservative Catholic University) speeches during his three terms leading the Government (1985 – 87; 1987 – 91; 1991 – 95) when he recurrently discussed the “revolutionary legislation legacy”: Cumprir a Esperança [Transforming Hope into Reality], Lisboa 1987; Construir a Modernidade [Building Modernity], Lisboa 1989; Ganhar o futuro [Winning the 98 99

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produced by political agents with no factual confirmation”. He summarized them in three main items: “i) ‘defence and extension of a state-owned productive entrepreneurial sector is an ideological prejudice of communists and socialists’ – [while,] in fact, ( . . . ) part of the liberal and reformist groups” active under the final years of the dictatorship “advocated state direct control over large economic and social areas, invoking a number of reasons reflected in the PPD [1974] program and even, particularly in some social areas, in the CDS program”. Viegas also evokes the fact that “in the other Western European countries, extension of a productive entrepreneurial stateowned sector was caused by economic nationalism and the search for economic growth, not as result of socialist or communist policies”; “ii) ‘nationalizations in Portugal gave birth to a state-owned sector incomparable in dimension with any other Western European country’ – [while,] in fact ( . . . ), nationalizations in Britain and in France, as well as the dimension of the stateowned sector in countries like Austria, outline situations comparable with the Portuguese”; “iii) ‘countries like Western Germany based its prosperity upon liberal policies, particularly with no state intervention in private companies’ – [while,] in fact, during the economic reconstruction period in post-war Germany, not to mention the Nazi period, the state intervened in a number of companies, in the infrastructure level, in finance, in services, in the productive sector, although pursuing a pattern different from those imposed in Britain, France or Portugal”. Why would these elite members so daringly produce such un-historical (and another adjective could be well placed here. . . ) interpretations? According to Viegas, to “reconstruct their political past coherently with what they want to show in the present situation and [because they subscribe to] strategies adopted to conceal interests and contradiction in [ideological] positions they once [gave their support to] in a specific historical moment”102. Portuguese Government was negotiating since 1977 European Community integration, which was finally agreed upon in 1985 and turned effective the 1st January of the following year, decisively determinating Portuguese economic policies and promoting a new ideological paradigm. Finally, the 1982 and 1989 constitutional reforms, especially the latter, voted by a socialist-liberal-christian-democratic large majority, leaving only the communists apart,103 dismantled virtually all of what Future], Lisboa 1991; Afirmar Portugal no Mundo [Consolidating Portugal in the World], Lisboa 1993. 102 Viegas, Elites (fn. 12), pp. 245 f. 103 The electoral coalitions led by the PCP, including remains of pre-1974 anti-Salazarist organizations and the new, and very small, Ecologist Green party, got around 18 percent of the popular vote between 1979 and 1983 (18.8 percent in 1979, 16.9 percent in 1980, 18.2 percent in 1983), and started to lose support in the mid-1980s (15.6 percent in 1985, 12.2 percent in 1987, 8.8 percent in 1991). Parliamentary and presidential election results in 2005 and

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had been the constitutional socialist architecture, which, in fact, had remained substantially unaccomplished after its approval in 1976. Meanwhile, a considerable ideological adjustment had been introduced in the Socialist Party programmatic discourse. In 1985, a puzzling election, right after the Portuguese integration treaty was signed, produced the most divided Parliament of post-1974 democratic regime: a right-wing party, the PSD, had won the election with less than 30 percent of the popular vote, while three left-wing parties (socialists, communist-green coalition and the newly created Democratic Renovator Party (Partido Renovador Democrático, PRD), each getting 15 – 21 percent of the votes) held a parliamentary majority unable to back a coalition Government. Cavaco Silva, a political and moral conservative and an economic liberal, led a minority PSD administration who started to administer the flood of European resources pouring into Portugal very generously – amounting to around 25 percent of all public investment and, in 1993, to 3 percent of the GDP104 – after a 13-year economic recession cycle. For the first time since 1976, an incumbent administration could face confidently elections, and in 1987, also for the first time since 1975, under a proportional representation method, a single party – PSD – was able to get an absolute majority in parliament, replicated in 1991. Those ten consecutive years (1985 – 95) in which Portugal was led by Cavaco Silva’s administration, the Cavaquismo, may be read as some sort of democratization of Marcello Caetano’s authoritarian modernizing project for Portugal, what sociologist Villaverde Cabral, in the first place, but also historians Fernando Rosas and Vasco Pulido Valente, and Sousa Franco himself, have been calling a “democratized marcelism” (marcelismo democratizado): European integration would have, according to this interpretation, “made real an expansion myth replacing the colonial one”, allowing Portugal to “revisit some old acquaintances” Franco found in Portuguese History: “another external source of wealth – ‘Europe’ as if Portugal was not European . . . ; a third version of the infrastructure policy ( . . . ) as the main substance of a ‘modernizing reformism’ (see Pombal’s enlightenment105, Fontismo106 and Salazarism)”. The one feature which turned Cavaquismo particularly close to the Estado Novo’s dictatorship political paradigm, especially as elite-recruiting is concerned, was its very obvious determination to build up “a strong power, centralized, aggregating around the Government a rigid social and political bloc [bloco situacionista] – who has in its nucleus the power and interests amassed by the ruling party, which grow2006 still confirm these last results, although a concurrent Radical-Left movement – the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda) re-emerged on the left, its representation ranging from 2.5 percent to 6.5 percent of the popular vote since the late 1990s. 104 See Franco, A economia (fn. 91), p. 283. 105 Reference to the Marquis of Pombal rule (1750 – 77), under King Joseph I. 106 Reference to policies implemented in the 1850s-1860s-1870s by Fontes Pereira de Melo, a modernizing Liberal, though politically conservative.

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ingly controls, in different practical forms, autonomous social forces, plurality, consensus, dialogue, political alternation”. This new authoritarian reformism was determined to assemble “a new social basis – supported on a confined set of party politicians, scarcely renovated and lacking quality, and the ‘nouveau-riches’, very seldom productive businessmen, living preferably on public concessions, real estate speculation, Èuropean funds’, and underground economy”. This highly critical assessment of the politically most successful experience of post-1974 Portuguese democracy – self-depicted as a successful democracy (democracia de sucesso) – produced still under the experience itself (a couple of years before Cavaco stepped out of power), described quite acutely, nevertheless, what the turn of the century would confirm to be a systematically replicated pattern of “renovation” of what Franco called the “dominant personnel”: this new political and administrative elite, “invoking pragmatism, establishes itself behaving in servile way” in a period of “stable single-party and personalized power”, highly concentrated on the Prime-Minister, with a “technocratic, businesslike” attitude, its younger members profiting from “an ephebocracy”, i. e. a dominant party system in which young and ambitious activists are called to get governmental experience in decision-making positions.107 On the whole, Franco sums up the Cavaquismo as “the search for an enduring hegemony of power and its identification with the new political class” – “class” is the concept he actually chose – “and the nouveauriches, in a wide populist and clientele-based perspective, supported by the old myth of Portuguese sebastianist108 right-wing: the ‘providential man’”109. European integration and a comparatively long liberal-conservative rule – in this sense, the 1985 – 95 Cavaquismo, following a 1980 – 85 period in which PSD had been in power inside right-wing or PS / PSD coalitions, is quite parallel to contemporary lengthy right-wing administrations in Britain (1979 – 97), Germany (1982 – 98) or the U.S. (1981 – 93) – smoothed hegemony of what has been described as an “economicist and ideology-devaluating pragmatism”110 and, apparently, gave Socialist Party a decisive impulse towards an ideologically liberal turn in its dis107 All critical observers of present PM, blairite socialist José Sócrates, elected, also with a single-party absolute parliamentary majority in February 2005, perceive his political model as a replica of Cavaco Silva’s. Incidentally, the latter got elected President of the Republic a year later, January 2006, and the two, representing competing parties, seem to get along better than any other pair of PM and PR in Portuguese democratic history. 108 Sebastianism is described to be the specifically Portuguese version of a political, cultural or spiritual messianism, based on the historically often re-elaborated character of young King Sebastian who disappeared in 1578, at 24, in a disastrous northern Morocco military campaign. His death / disappearance paved the way, two years later, to the crowning of Philip II of Spain as King of Portugal. In the early decades of the 17th century, popular mythology evoked the possibility of Sebastian’s messianic return to Portugal, in some symbolically misty beach, an episode obsessively re-enacted by Nationalist intellectuals of the 19 th and 20 th centuries. 109 Franco, A economia (fn. 91), pp. 258 f. 110 Viegas, Elites (fn. 12), p. 257.

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course, thus, “consolidating” what Viegas perceived as a wide “ideological swing in the party elites as far as state intervention in economy is concerned”, produced in the 1980s. The role of Vítor Constâncio, another economist of the 1960s and 1970s generation,111 as Secretary of the PS (1986 – 89) has been underlined because of his personal commitment in introducing substantial changes in the PS program at its VI. Congress, in 1986. Nonetheless, the 1985 parliamentary election PS program presented to the voters already stated socialist resolution to re-examine all constitutional “rules with a philosophical and ideological substance which provokes division among the Portuguese”112. Three years later, in 1988, socialists decided to sign a political agreement with majoritarian PSD to reform the 1976 Constitution in order to de-constitutionalize nationalization policies and any remaining reference to socialization of property, purging the constitutional text of what socialists themselves described as an “unilateral ideological essence”, with “a strong partisan mark”.113 One of the most enlightening attitudes to typify that specific elite group of stateowned company managers has to do with their attitude towards privatization of the very same companies they were heading through Government appointment. All along the 1980s, even before socialists joined the right-wing parties consensus on privatization, it became clear that the so-called public managers plea for “the need for radical denationalization solutions”, “while taking legitimate or illegitimate profit from state-owned companies, deteriorating its productivity and competitivity, [imposing] high charges on tax-payers through the state budget”114. In a 1992 political elites’ inquiry, sociologist José M. L. Viegas sent to 1.024 party, administration, culture, economy and unions’ leading members, public managers (gestores públicos) very clearly shared with “private owners and managers” a “total agreement” opinion (67 percent and 70 percent, respectively) in face of privatization of state-owned companies, an attitude shared by “social and cultural elites” (69 percent), “high-ranking administration officials” (56 percent) and “government members” (88 percent).115 Finally, a vast privatization program evolved throughout Cavaco Silva’s rightwing administration, mostly after 1989 constitutional reform,116 and António Gu111 Born in 1943, he was appointed Secretary of State for State Budget and Planning in three of the six Provisional Governments of the 1974 – 76 period. He worked for the Bank of Portugal in different stages since 1975, and was appointed its Governor in 1985 – 86 and again from 2000 to this day. 112 PS 1985 election program, quote in: Viegas, Elites (fn. 12), p. 200. 113 Quotes from socialist MP, in: Ibidem, p. 201. Symbolically, concepts present in 1976 constitutional text such as “classless society” were replaced by “free society” (art. 1), and “to abolish exploitation and oppression of men by other men” (art. 9) set as one of the “fundamental responsibilities of the state” was simply revoked. 114 Franco, A economia (fn. 91), p. 194. 115 Presumably government members at the moment of the inquiry, i. e. of Cavaco Silva’s. See: Viegas, Elites (fn. 12), pp. 210, 213, 214 (Table 7.2).

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terres socialist administration (1995 – 2002). At the end, as it happened all throughout world capitalist economies, the state abandoned a lot more economic areas than the ones nationalized in 1975. A 50-year long historical cycle of state intervention in economy was being shut down while, curiously enough, the most successful political power projects (Cavaquismo in the 1980s and 1990s; post-2005 arrogant-perceived Sócrates’ ruling style) were being built upon a clear reinforcement of state symbolic power instruments. Again, historical similarities may seem surprising: a socially incompetent state, deliberately deprived from most of its economic instruments, pretends to appear sort of decisionist, muscled. . . 1930s Salazarism, except for its quintessential brutal repression, was not very far from this picture. From the more strictly private business elites point of view, early 1990s privatizations tended to somehow rectify an immediate consequence of the 1975 nationalizations: as the capitalist concentration had clearly been more evident in Lisbonbased companies – six of the Magnificent Seven huge corporations had most of its investments and companies under control in the Lisbon industrial belt – and as this would turn out the most politically active area for the more radical left-wing revolutionary forces in 1974 – 75, pressure to socialize and actual nationalizations would affect a lot more Lisbon and Southern companies than Oporto and Northern ones. At the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, when growingly liberalizing measures were being taken by socialist or right-wing governments, the most creative and strong segments of private capital remained in the hands of Northern Portugal industrialists, basically unaffected by nationalizations. The two largest Portuguese personal fortunes at the end of the century belonged to two leaders (Belmiro de Azevedo and Américo Amorim) of Oporto area based corporations. In Filomena Mónica’s inquiry to 16 of the most significant Portuguese industrialists at the end of the 1980s, some of them acknowledged the existence of a widespread nouveaurichisme (Henrique Neto), “not really” composing a new “elite” according to industrialist association leader Rocha de Matos, but a net of “many medium and small entrepreneurs”, some with “no roots in the industry”, but merely “young lads who went to school and started to idealize ( . . . ) they could become industrialists”117. Nevertheless, the 1990s privatizations process allowed the richest families of pre-democratic Portugal (the Mello family, Champalimaud and, mainly, the Espírito Santo family, holders of the three largest corporations amongst the Magnificent Seven) to get hold of most of their 1975 nationalized assets. For the Espírito Santo corporation, “everything went so well that today [we are] ‘more important than [we 116 See Law No. 11 / 90 (05. 04. 1990) and DL No. 380 / 93 (15. 11. 1993) and 65 / 94 (28. 02. 1994), but also, prior to constitutional reform, Laws No. 72 / 88 (26. 05. 1988) and 84 / 88 (20. 07. 1988). See: Ibidem, pp. 204 f., Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for list of all privatized companies between 1989 and 1993. 117 See Mónica, Os grandes patrões (fn. 40), pp. 185, 229 f.

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were] before the Revolution’, CEO António Ricciardi admits”118. When the process was launched, in 1989, out of the Lisbon and Oporto’s Stock Exchange 200 operating companies, 75 were “original families strongholds”119. Out of the 174 Portuguese biggest fortunes in 1992, 35 belonged to families as such; amongst them, one would find 6 of those 14 families who had gotten hold of the pre-1974 Magnificent Seven.120 From Filomena Mónica’s point of view, the Portuguese “bourgeoisie which developed in these last decades is not as independent from power as some think: it suffices to look at the names of politicians on management doors of famous companies; to look attentively to the way some [state-owned companies] have been sold; to examine contacts made prior to privatizations; verify the vulnerability of Portuguese main industrial sector [– textiles –]; to observe what sort of public one would find at a Cabinet Minister waiting-room; to study the logic of public aid to industrial investment”121.

Fernandes / Santos, Excomungados (fn. 73), p. 112. According to “Os Patrões na Bolsa”, in: Exame (Lisboa), September 1989, quoted in: Mónica, Os grandes patrões (fn. 40), p. 28. 120 See footnote 48. See: Vasco Pulido Valente, Os nossos ricos, in: O Independente (Lisboa), 10. 07. 1992, quoting Fortuna magazine, July 1992 issue. 121 See Mónica, Os grandes patrões (fn. 40), p. 51. 118 119

The Swiss Business Elite between 1980 – 2000: Declining Cohesion, Changing Educational Profile and Growing Internationalization1 By Thomas David / Stéphanie Ginalski / Frédéric Rebmann / Gerhard Schnyder I. Introduction Until the 1980s, Switzerland could be classified as a corporatist, cooperative or coordinated market economy where non-market mechanisms of coordination among economic actors played a major role in the organization of the economy.2 Corporate governance structures in Switzerland were characterized by concentrated ownership and strong interrelations between big banks and non-financial companies. Companies did not rely on financing through capital markets but much more on bank loans and self-financing and were largely isolated from market pressures.3 Moreover, Switzerland exhibited a high degree of cartelization in the domestic product market. After the Second World War, Swiss competition policy remained very weak and permissive towards anti-competitive private practices. Swiss firms producing for the domestic market were sheltered from international competitive pressure through cartels. The Swiss were even declared “the unmatched world champions of cartels”.4 However, during the 1990s, the Swiss corporatist capitalism came under pressure. The government launched an “economic revitaliza1 This paper was realized as part of a research project financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant no. 100012 – 113550 / 1). We would like to thank the participants of the conference “European Economic Elites. Between a New Spirit of Capitalism and the Erosion of State Socialism”, held in Potsdam, 01. / 02. November 2007, as well as Martin Lüpold, André Mach, Frédéric Widmer, Matthieu Leimgruber and Elisabeth Spilman for very helpful comments on a first draft. 2 Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca (NY) 1985; Harm G. Schröter, Small European Nations. Cooperative Capitalism in the Twentieth Century, in: Alfred D. Chandler / Franco Amatori / Takashi Hikino (eds.), Big Business and the Wealth of Nations, Cambridge 1999, pp. 176 – 204; Peter A. Hall / David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford 2001. 3 Thomas David et al., De la “Forteresse des Alpes” à la valeur actionnariale: histoire de la gouvernance d’entreprise suisse au 20e siècle [From the “Fortress of the Alps” to Shareholder Value: History of Swiss Corporate Governance in the 20th Century], Zurich 2009 (forthcoming). 4 Schröter, Small European Nations (fn. 2), p. 149.

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tion program” that aimed to liberalize and deregulate the Swiss economy. Its success was not overwhelming, but it resulted in a series of economic policy reforms that had been unthinkable for decades.5 In parallel, corporate practices changed in fundamental ways as companies became more receptive to claims for liberalization of their corporate governance structures. These changes indicate that economic activity began to be increasingly governed by market mechanisms. In this paper, we analyze an important aspect of the traditional insider-oriented model of Swiss capitalism, which underwent important changes in recent years, i. e. the network of interlocking directorates between Swiss companies. Up to 1980, this network was characterized by a high density, which facilitated the cooperative and personal relationships between economic actors and notably between banks and non financial companies.6 By enhancing trust and creating an “infrastructure for social control”, interlocking directorates acted as a mechanism of control and helped reduce opportunistic behavior by imposing a certain “code of ethics” on the members of the business elite.7 In this sense, the high degree of cooperation among the small and concentrated core of the business elite facilitated self-regulation by private actors which has traditionally played a central role in Switzerland by complementing and substantiating the minimal requirements of the legal framework.8 However, from the 1980s onwards, we observe a pronounced disintegration of the Swiss network, which accelerated during the 1990s. Similar transformations have been observed in many other countries and are explained by changing strategies of banks and non-financial companies due to increasing market pressures, which lead to a decreasing propensity of these firms to interlock. In fact, corporate interlocks are – so the argument runs – fundamentally contrary to a market-oriented business system, which favors anonymous market relations over personal relations. In this chapter, while acknowledging the importance of market pressures and increasing competition for the explanation of the transformation of the interlock network, we propose to go beyond the widespread functionalist view of these transformations. Instead of seeing the changing corporate strategies towards interlocks as 5 André Mach, La Suisse entre internationalisation et changements politiques internes. La législation sur les cartels et relations industrielles dans les années 1990 [Switzerland between Internationalization and Internal Political Changes. The Legislation on Cartels and Industrial Relations in the 1990s], Basel 2006. 6 Gerhard Schnyder et al., The Rise and Decline of the Swiss Company Network During the 20th Century, Working Paper, Université de Lausanne: Institut d’études politiques et internationales (IEPI), 2005. 7 See Paul Windolf, Unternehmensverflechtung im organisierten Kapitalismus. Deutschland und USA im Vergleich 1896 – 1938, in: Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 51 (2006), 2, pp. 191 – 222. 8 André Mach et al., Transformations of Self-Regulation and New Public Regulations in the Field of Swiss Corporate Governance (1985 – 2002), in: World Political Science Review 3 (2007), 2, pp. 1 – 29.

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a quasi-natural, “logical” or “the only possible” reaction to a new environment, we argue that more attention has to be paid to agency. In fact, change has ultimately to be explained by changing preferences of the people who govern the firms. We therefore focus on transformations in the Swiss business elite9 in order to understand the disintegration of the network. The change in preferences of the business elite concerning interlocks is in large part due to a “generational” change, in the sense that a new generation of managers have acceded to the boards of Swiss companies. Two elements should be emphasized concerning this process. First, the educational background of these elite changed. More and more senior managers were experts in corporate finance, rather than lawyers or engineers with firm-related skills. These managers were more open to finance- and market-oriented management practices. Secondly, the growing internationalization of Swiss firms implied also that larger numbers of foreigners sat on the board of Swiss firms. These foreign directors were less integrated in the Swiss business elite and held fewer mandates with Swiss companies. The paper is structured as follows: we begin with a brief description of the evolution of the Swiss company network between 1980 and 2000. We subsequently analyze the structural changes which explain the decline of the interlocking directorates’ network. In the third part, we look at the changes in the composition and profile of the Swiss business elite. The fourth section concludes.

II. The disintegration of the Swiss company network (1980 – 2000) 1. 1910 – 1980: The heyday of the “Fortress of the Alps” In 1980, the Swiss business community was characterized by a very tight network of interlocking directorates.10 As illustrated by the overall network density, which measures the number of observed lines in the network as a proportion of the theoretical maximum of lines,11 this network emerged during the first two decades of the 20th century (see figure 1). Indeed, in the years following the First World 9 By business elite, we mean the persons who can influence significantly decisions and future orientations of the firms. See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York 1956, and, more recently, Julie Froud et al., Rethinking Elite Research, Working Paper No. 12, University of Manchester: Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC), 2006. 10 A network is composed by nodes and lines. In our case, the nodes represent the biggest Swiss companies, and the lines the ties between them. We consider there is a tie, or a line, between two companies if a person sits on the board of directors of both companies. In this analysis of the Swiss interlock network, we used a sample of the 100 largest Swiss companies for seven dates in the 20th century: 1910, 1929, 1937, 1957, 1980, 1990 and 2000. For a further presentation of the sources and methodology used for this network analysis, see Schnyder et al., Rise and Decline (fn. 6). 11 I. e. n…n 1†=2, where n is the number of nodes in the network.

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War, the Swiss economy became more fully integrated internally and at the same time increasingly independent from external influence.12 The reduction in foreign influence was in particular due to the retreat of German financial and industrial firms from Switzerland because of the desolate situation of the German economy after the First World War. The involuntary retreat of German businessmen was accelerated by the efforts of the Swiss business elite to introduce defense mechanisms against foreigners, such as a limitation on the number of board seats that foreigners could hold. This gave the Swiss financial sector the opportunity to tighten its links with other Swiss firms. In parallel, the Swiss “financial centre”13, which had been favored by Swiss neutrality in the First World War, became internationally important in the 1920s. By 1930, a quite concentrated and encompassing national network (as opposed to several loosely connected regional networks before the 1930s) had thus emerged. During the following decades (1930 – 1980), the process of network integration continued. The further consolidation of the network from the end of the 1930s to 1980 was due to one paramount factor: The Swiss business elites wished to avoid outsiders’ influence on decision-making within the firm. Several categories of outsiders were considered to be a threat to the company: foreign investors, minority shareholders, workers, the government and political parties from the left. The perceived threat of a loss of autonomy by the business elite augmented their willingness to adopt efficient self-regulation mechanisms of insider control. Interlocks were one means by which cohesion and trust among the members of the elite was fortified, making such mechanisms efficient. Furthermore the cooptation of historical shareholders and banks on the board allowed management to control the majority of voting rights at the general annual meeting. As a result, one major event of Swiss economic life from the end of the Second World War up to the 1980s was – despite its dependence on international markets for exports and imports – the introduction by a very cohesive business community of selective protecSchnyder et al., Rise and Decline (fn. 6). In the financial sector, we include the largest banks, but we take also into account finance companies (such as Motor AG) and investment trusts – with which the largest banks had very close ties or which were controlled by the former (see Malik Mazbouri, L’émergence de la place financière suisse, 1890 – 1913. Itinéraire d’un grand banquier [The Emergence of the Swiss Financial Centre, 1890 – 1913. Career of a Great Banker], Lausanne 2005; Luciano Segreto, Du Made in Germany au Made in Switzerland. Les sociétés financières suisses pour l’industrie électrique dans l’entre-deux-guerres [From Made in Germany to Made in Switzerland. The Swiss Finance Companies for the Electricity Industry in the Interwar Period], in: Monique Trédé (ed.), Electricité et électrification dans le monde [Electricity and Electrification in the World], Paris 1992, pp. 347 – 367. We also include insurance companies, some of which collaborated very closely with banks from the time of their foundation: the Crédit Suisse founded Rentenanstalt and the predecessor of the UBS – the Bank in Winterthur – established Winterthur Versicherung (see Peter Rusterholz, The Banks in the Centre: Integration in Decentralized Switzerland, in: Frans N. Stokman / Rolf Ziegler / John Scott (eds.), Networks of Corporate Power, Cambridge 1985, pp. 131 – 147; Joseph Jung, Von der Schweizerischen Kreditanstalt zur Credit Suisse Group. Eine Bankengeschichte, Zürich 2000. 12 13

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tionist measures aimed at preserving the Swiss character of large corporations.14 This combination of well-organized economic interests with protectionist and other “non-liberal” practices made the Swiss economic system into what was often referred to by the international financial community as “the fortress of the Alps”15. However, from the 1980s onward, this fortress began to be threatened.

Source: Gerhard Schnyder et al., Rise and Decline (fn. 6), p. 13.

Figure 1: Overall density of the Swiss company network

2. 1980 – 2000: The decline of the network The evolution of the Swiss company network was characterized by a phase of disintegration during the years 1980 – 2000. Thus, the inclusiveness of the network, i. e. the number of connected firms (in percent of the total number of firms) dropped from 93.7 percent in 1980 to 86.1 percent in 2000. As a consequence, the number of isolated firms (i. e. with no connection) almost doubled between 1980 and 2000 (from 6.31 percent to 12.04 percent), suggesting a loosening of ties between companies. The number of marginal firms (defined as firms with only one or two neighbors) increased from 17.1 percent to 28.7 percent over the same period. The fact that the number of isolated firms grew from 1980 onwards but the number of marginal 14 Thomas David / André Mach, The Specificity of Corporate Governance in Small States: Institutionalization and Questioning of Ownership Restrictions in Switzerland and Sweden, in: Michal Federowicz / Ruth Aguilera (eds.), Corporate Governance in a Changing Economic and Political Environment. Trajectories of Institutional Change, Houndmills / Basingstoke 2004, pp. 220 – 246. 15 Robert A. Monks / Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, Cambridge 1995, p. 320.

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firms only from 1990 onwards, seems to indicate that the network started to disintegrate at its fringes, with less well-connected firms losing their ties first. The overall network density confirms this disintegration (see Figure 1): it fell from 7.11 percent in 1980 to 6.95 percent in 1990 and 3.58 percent in 2000, which represents the lowest percentage for the entire 20th century. Half of the ties that existed in 1980 (543) had disappeared twenty years later (242 ties in 2000). a) Actor centrality The general cohesion measures show an important change in the network structure. However, these admittedly rather rough indicators do not allow us to understand the nature and the reasons of the changes. Hence, it is important to look at how the position of the individual companies within the network changed. Table 1 shows the ranking of the ten most central companies according to Freeman degree centrality.16 The most striking observation concerns the position of the large banks. From 1910 to 1980, the financial sector was clearly overrepresented among the most central companies. Several reasons explain the large number of connections between the large banks and other companies. Links between banks and industrial companies are usually considered to guarantee lenders a certain control over the companies in which they invest.17 Yet, in Switzerland, bank-industry ties were often mutual so that the thesis of bank-control does not seem to aptly or completely pertain to the Swiss case. An additional reason for the presence of bankers on the board of industrial companies may be that the cooptation of representatives of banks who held important numbers of proxy votes from their clients allowed the company to secure a majority of votes during the Annual General Meeting (AGM). As underlined by Georg Gautschi in a report on the Swiss Stock Corporation Law: “Representatives of banks are less often integrated [on the board of industrial companies] for their importance as lenders than because of the fact that they control voting rights of clients with shares deposited with the banks or voting rights of investment funds they control”.18 16 Degree centrality, or Freeman degree, quantifies the number of ties a node has with other actors, or in other terms, the number of “neighbors”. Degree centrality is a local centrality measure since it does not take into account the centrality of the actors to which a node is linked. In other words, an actor can have many ties with its neighbors but still be at the periphery of the network as a whole. Other centrality measures exist, in particular betweenness and closeness centralities (cf. John Scott, Social Network Analysis. A Handbook, London 2000, pp. 85 – 87). The results based on the three centrality measures are not very different and do not change the argument of the paper. It is the reason why we give indication only on the Freeman degree. 17 John Scott, Theoretical Framework and Research Design, in: Stokman / Ziegler / Scott, Networks of Corporate Power (fn. 13), pp. 1 – 19. 18 Georg Gautschi, Bericht und Vorschläge zu einer Revision des Schweizerischen Aktienrechts von 1936, Zürich 1966, p. 194, unpublished report, our translation, in: Archives Fédérales E 4110 (B) 1989 / 197, Vol. 32. See also Federal Cartel Commission / Commission fédé-

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However, the centrality of banks began to decrease after 1980. At this date, five of the ten most central companies belonged to the financial sector. In 2000, only two financial companies remained in the ranking. It is particularly interesting to note that the Crédit Suisse (CS) was the only large bank which was among the most central companies in 2000, whereas UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland) had disappeared (having only five ties in 2000) although its predecessors, SBS (Société de Banque Suisse) and UBS (Union de Banques Suisses),19 had, ten years earlier, cumulated 67 ties. Table 1 Top ten companies according to Freeman degree centrality 1980

1990

2000

UBS 33

SBS 34

CS 16

Swissair 32

UBS 33

Rieter 12

BBC 31

Swissair 28

Sulzer 12

SBS 26

CS 22

Nestlé 11

AIAG 26

Alusuisse 22

Holcim 10

CS 24

BBC 19

Swissair 10

Sulzer 22

Nestlé 18

Sulzer Medica 9

Nestlé 20

Ciba-Geigy 18

Winterthur 9

Winterthur 20

Motor 17

Xstrata 9

Motor-Columbus 20

Forbo 16

Dätwyler, Bâloise, GF, Sika, Scintilla 8

In bold: enterprises belonging to the financial sector.

The analysis of the most central persons, the so-called big linkers, confirms the decline of the central position of the financial sector. Table 2 shows the evolution of the total number of seats which the chairmen of the boards (CoBs) and the chief executive officers (CEOs) of the three large Swiss banks (two in 2000) held. While the top bankers in Switzerland held in 1980 on average 13.4 board seats, they held only 3.8 seats in 2000. While our data does not allow us to distinguish the direction of ties,20 this evolution shows clearly that the decline in bank centrality is certainly rale des cartels, Die Konzentration im schweizerischen Bankgewerbe, Bern 1979, p. 89; Michael Nollert, Interlocking Directorates in Switzerland: A Network Analysis, in: Swiss Journal of Sociology 24 (1998), 1, pp. 31 – 58; Michael Nollert, Unternehmensverflechtungen in Westeuropa. Nationale und transnationale Netzwerke von Unternehmen, Aufsichtsräten und Managern, Münster et al. 2005. 19 At the end of 1997, the SBS and the Union de Banques Suisses (French name for UBS) decided to merge, giving birth in 1998 to the Union Bank of Switzerland. 20 In the field of interlocking directorates, the direction of a tie between two companies is usually defined as follows: if a director is an executive of company A and a “normal” board

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in large part due to the fact that banks do not send their top-executives to other companies’ boards anymore (out-degree). Table 2 Total of board seats held by the CEOs and Chairmen of the three largest banks (1980 – 2000)

UBS

SBS

CS

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

CoB

19

8

13

6

1

CEO

18

15

5

4

2

CoB

8

8

7

7

–

CEO

–*

–

6

10

–

CoB

10

11

8

8

5

CEO

12

14

6

1

7

67

56

45

36

15

13.4

11.2

7.5

6

3.8

Total Mean per person

* SBS did not have any permanent CEO at the time. Source: Register of directors, published by Orell Füssli Verlag AG, Zurich (various years).

In short, all general indicators of network cohesion show that an extensive disintegration has taken place between 1980 and 2000, and even more so between 1990 and 2000. The decline profoundly altered the structure of the network and an important social infrastructure for coordination was hence considerably weakened.21

III. 1980 – : The decline of organized capitalism The results above show that the very clear decline in network integration from 1980, and especially from 1990 onwards, was to a considerable extent due to the decreasing involvement of banks in industrial companies, an involvement that had constituted the backbone of the Swiss company network for the greatest part of the member of company B, the tie is directed from company A to company B. In other words, company A “sent” this director to company B, which is usually associated with the exercise of some form of power of company A over company B. See e.g. William K. Carroll / Meindert Fennema, Is There a Transnational Business Community? in: International Sociology 17 (2002), 3, pp. 393 – 419. 21 It should be noted, however, that the impact of this structural “disintegration” of the network on its functional characteristics – e.g. its conductivity for information – appears to be limited so far as is indicated by the small-world statistics. See Eelke M. Heemskerk / Gerhard Schnyder, Small States, International Pressures, and Interlocking Directorates: The Cases of Switzerland and the Netherlands, in: European Management Review 5 (2008), 1, pp. 41 – 54.

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20th century. As we show in the next section, this evolution was related to the growing “securitization” of corporate finance.

1. Changing strategies of Swiss banks: investment banking and decreasing involvement in industrial companies The disinvestment of banks from their role in industrial companies is a feature that has been observed in several countries,22 and has been particularly pronounced in Switzerland as well. The concentration within the banking sector is one factor that explains the decreasing number of bank ties with other companies. Thus, the example of UBS and SBS illustrates the fact that ties disappeared because boards of companies with many ties were merged into one single board, which naturally reduced the total number of ties. However, it would be misleading to consider the very clear decline in bank ties simply as an effect of this concentration. The most important explanatory factor is a conscious strategic choice of disengagement from industrial companies on the part of the banks. The decline in the centrality of Swiss banks can be seen as one aspect of a larger transformation process within the banking industry. All major Swiss banks have undertaken considerable strategic re-orientations during the last twenty or so years, which have made them increasingly reluctant to entertain personal ties with non-financial companies. This changing strategy was closely linked to the effects of globalization and financial deregulation, which deeply affected the banks’ activities.23 Three important causes for the banks’ change in strategy can be identified: first, the securitization of corporate finance, second, an increased competition among financial corporations from different branches, and third, increased international competition within the banking industry. These three transformations of the economic and regulatory environment of banks entailed three key responses from banks: the securitization of financial intermediation (which induced the largest banks to develop their investment banking activities), the expansion of banking activity into the insurance business (Bancassurance strategies), and the expansion of banks into foreign markets and a modification of the activities linked to this expansion. We will focus here on the first factor – the securitization of corporate finance.24 22 Cf. for the U.S. case Gerald F. Davis / Mark S. Mizruchi, The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial Banks in the U. S. System of Corporate Governance, in: Administrative Science Quarterly 44 (1999), 2, pp. 215 – 239, and for the German case Martin Höpner / Lothar Krempel, The Politics of the German Company Network (= Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, MPIfG Working Paper 03 / 9), Köln 2003. 23 Davis / Mizruchi, Money Center (fn. 22). See also Dominique Plihon, Les banques: nouveaux enjeux, nouvelles stratégies [The Banks: New Challenges, New Strategies] (Les études de la Documentation française. Economie), Paris 1999.

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Indeed, the most important factor that pushed banks to adopt new strategies is what one could call the “securitization” of corporate finance. In effect, banks drew more and more on securities rather than on credits as means of financial intermediation. This trend pertained both to the financing of bank endeavors (emission of shares by the bank itself) and bank investment activities in shares of other companies. This shift modified the nature of financial intermediation. Dominique Plihon thus appropriately speaks of a passage from balance-sheet intermediation to market intermediation.25 This reorientation was also connected to the credit business’ loss of potential. Large listed companies increasingly financed their activities directly over the capital market and developed their own cash management (in-house banking). The expansion of direct financing is illustrated by the impressive evolution of the capital market in Switzerland (cf. Table 3). As a result, like in other countries, industrial companies were no longer as dependent on financial intermediaries as they might have been in the past.26 The loss of borrowers (and thus of clients) reduced the interest incomes of banks and pushed them to look for more profitable avenues, such as investment banking and asset management.27 Table 3 Evolution of market capitalization in Switzerland as percent of GDP (1975 – 1999) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 30

42

91

69

126 144 220 247 279 309 246 177 207 210 272

Sources: 1975 – 1990: OECD Financial market trends, Paris (various issues); 1995 – 2005: Richard T. Meier / Tobias Sigrist, Der helvetische Big Bang. Die Geschichte der SWX Swiss Exchange, Zurich 2006, p. 225.

The strategic reorientation of banks is reflected in their balance sheets: an ever larger percentage of bank income stems from capital market operations, while the relative part of revenues from interests has declined. In 1955, 72.6 percent of Swiss banks’ income was interest income. Fee and commission income, on the other hand, only amounted to 22.5 percent of the income and trading income was insignificant. In 1980, 50.3 percent of total revenues were interest income, against 27.9 percent fee and commission income and 16.0 percent trading income. By 2000, this repartition of revenues had considerably changed: only 35.7 percent of the income was derived from interest but 40.5 percent was earned through fees and commissions and 24 For the expansion of Swiss banks into foreign markets, see section IV.2. on the internationalization of business elite; for the expansion of banking activity into the insurance business, see Heemskerk / Schnyder, Small States (fn. 21). 25 Plihon, Les banques (fn. 23). 26 Ibidem. 27 See Davis / Mizruchi, Money Center (fn. 22) for the U.S.

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18.3 percent through trading.28 Fee and commission income and trading income had, thus, become the most important sources of revenue for Swiss banks. 2. Consequences of the strategic reorientation of Swiss banks and companies for the domestic company network The decreasing involvement of Swiss banks in domestic companies largely explains the disintegration of the network structure described above. Indeed, one consequence of the strategic reorientation of major Swiss banks was their decreasing willingness to entertain close ties with industrial companies. In the investment banking sector, close ties to industrial firms are generally perceived as a problem of conflicting interests, which of course puts into question the credibility of the bank as an investment consultant. Consequently, the more Swiss banks expanded their activities into investment banking and asset management, the less they were disposed to be represented on the boards of industrial companies.29 Another way in which changing bank strategies impacted the network can be seen in the decreasing importance of credits as a means of financial intermediation. Under the “credit monitoring assumption”, banks can be expected to see a decreasing need for representation on industrial companies’ board of directors as the amount of credits allowed decreases. These factors imply that banks and industrial companies no longer considered interlocks between the banking and the industrial sectors as desirable or advantageous. With the decreasing importance of bank loans for industrial companies and for bank income, an important incentive for creating interlocks disappeared on “both sides”. Many studies show that the changing strategies of banks were an important factor explaining the disintegration of interlock networks. While acknowledging the importance of this factor, we argue, in this paper, that only the consideration of a more general change in the profile of the business elite allows us to fully understand the changes in network cohesion.

IV. The changes within the business elite in Switzerland: 1980 – 2000 In this section we focus on two main aspects of the sociological profile of the Swiss business elite. First, we show that the educational background of this elite has changed during the late 20th century. Whereas the status of law and of technical Data of the Swiss National Bank, Bern (various annual reports). See Davis / Mizruchi, Money Center (fn. 22), p. 236 for the U.S. and Jürgen Beyer, Vom Netzwerk zum Markt? Zur Kontrolle der Managementelite in Deutschland, in: Herfried Münkler / Grit Straßenberger / Matthias Bohlender (eds.), Deutschlands Eliten im Wandel, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2006, pp. 177 – 198, here pp. 187 – 190, for the German case. 28 29

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education decreased in the education of senior managers, financial expertise and Anglo-Saxon style educations – such as the Master of Business Administration (MBA) – became more and more valued throughout the 1980s and 1990s. As a consequence, managers became more open to finance-oriented corporate practices. These new practices led to a profound shift in Swiss corporate governance towards a shareholder-orientation. They explain in part the decreasing involvement of banks in the Swiss network, but they also led to profound changes within industrial companies (abandonment of protectionist mechanisms; extensive restructuring). The latter changes imply a decline not only in the ties created by banks, but also of ties between industrial firms, strengthening the disintegration of the interlocking directorates’ network. Secondly, the growing internationalization of Swiss firms has also meant that greater numbers of foreigners came to sit on the boards of Swiss firms. These foreign directors were less integrated within the Swiss business elite and held fewer mandates within Swiss companies. Moreover, this internationalization went hand in hand with the transnationalization of the corporate network: the growing importance of the interlocking network between large, international companies resulted in the decreasing importance of the domestic network. 1. The changes in the educational background In order to study the changes in the top managers’ social profile of the largest Swiss firms, we have analyzed the educational background of the top managers working in the 33 largest Swiss companies in 1980, 1990 and 2000. We chose the 30 largest firms for the sectors of industry and services on a financial basis (market capitalization and turnover), and the three main banks, namely SBS, UBS and CS.30 Next, we selected the top managers of each company. In Switzerland, the de facto most important organ of a company is the Board of Directors, caring at the same time for its strategic and operational management. In practice, however, the board usually delegates the current executive direction of the firm to an Executive Board headed by a CEO. Except for banks, there is, however, no legal obligation for a strict separation between the strategic management of a company on one side and its operational management on the other side. Consequently, the board structure of Swiss firms can vary in important ways, and so does the composition of the top management. Thus, following the French tradition of the Président-Directeur Général (PDG), the chairman of the board often carries out an executive function too. Moreover, the Swiss practice knows a particular type of executive directors 30 As the Swiss financial sector is highly concentrated, it made sense to limit our sample to these three institutions, which are by far the most important banks in Switzerland during the 20th century. See for example Youssef Cassis / Fabienne Debrunner, Les élites bancaires suisses, 1890 – 1960 [The Swiss Banking Elites, 1890 – 1960], in: Revue Suisse d’histoire 40 (1990), 3, pp. 259 – 273, here p. 264. As the SBS and the UBS merged at the end of 1997, our sample contains only two banks for the year 2000.

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who are called “administrative-delegates”. For this reason, we decided to include as top managers in our sample the chairman of the Board of Directors, the administrative-delegates and the CEO of each company. We selected the two most important persons for each firm and year. As a result, our sample comprises an average of 60 persons per year.31 The following tables show the evolution of the Swiss top management’s educational background for the period 1980 to 2000. Table 4 Evolution of the education background of Swiss top managers (in %) Year

Basic education

Higher education

Postgraduate education

Number of persons

1980

100

92.8

53.6

56

1990

100

89.3

64.3

56

2000

100

93.0

50.1

57

Source: our database.

As we can see, all of the top managers of our sample achieved a secondary education level, which indicates either an apprenticeship (15 percent on the average for each year) or compulsory school (85 percent on the average for each year). Most of them went on to a university (including Institutes of Technology), and more than half of them went through postgraduate education (PhD, MBA, etc) after having graduated. Unsurprisingly, we can thus observe that Swiss top managers were in general highly educated (Table 4). But table 4 doesn’t show any clear trend between the different levels of education for the three years. Tables 5 and 6 below exhibit, however, a clear trend concerning different types – not levels – of education for the 1980 – 2000 period.32 Table 5 Type of university degrees held by Swiss top managers (in %) Year

Technical

Law

Economics & Business

Other

Number of persons

1980

28.8

48.1

28.8

–

52

1990

30.0

30.0

38.0

2.0

50

2000

30.2

20.8

43.4

5.7

53

Source: our database. In some cases, information was missing. As in some cases one person has followed two different tertiary and / or two different postgraduate educations, the addition of percentages per year may be higher than one hundred. 31 32

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Thomas David / Stéphanie Ginalski / Frédéric Rebmann / Gerhard Schnyder Table 6 Type of postgraduate education of Swiss top managers (in %)

Year

Technical

Law

Economics & Business

Other

Number of persons

1980

6.7

76.6

23.3

3.3

30

1990

19.4

36.1

47.2

–

36

2000

10.3

13.8

72.4

6.9

29

Source: our database.

Two points emerged from the evolution of the graduate and postgraduate educations of the Swiss top managers for the period 1980 – 2000: First, we see a clear decrease in legal education for both levels. In 1980, almost half of the top managers having taken a degree had studied Law. In 2000, they were only 20 percent. This decrease is even stronger when we look at postgraduate education: in 1980, more than 70 percent of all postgraduate students held a PhD in Law, whereas twenty years later, they were only 14 percent.33 Secondly, we find at the same time that these proportions are almost reversed for the education in Economics and Business studies: in 1980, the proportion of Swiss top managers having achieved this kind of education was 29 percent at the level of graduate education, and 23 percent at the level of postgraduate education. In 2000, these proportions were reaching 43 percent and 72 percent respectively. Looking at the background education of the managers of the 500 most important companies in Switzerland for the year 2004 only, Thomas Dyllick and Daniel Torgler drew the same conclusion of a dominating role of Business and Economics studies at the expense of Technical and Law degrees.34 The significant increase in the number of managers having pursued postgraduate education in Economics or Business administration is striking. This evolution was in large part due to the number of Swiss top managers having obtained a MBA: three persons in 1980, seven in 1990 and 15 in 2000. These figures confirm other studies showing that in Switzerland, financial expertise and typical Anglo-Saxon style educations – such as MBAs – have become more and more valued throughout the 1980s and 1990s.35 The educational profile of senior managers has hence considerably changed over the last twenty or so years. 33 The same evolution can be observed in Germany. See Michael Hartmann, Vermarktlichung der Elitenrekrutierung? Das Beispiel der Topmanager, in: Münkler / Straßenberger / Bohlender, Deutschlands Eliten (fn. 29), pp. 431 – 454, here p. 437. 34 Thomas Dyllick / Daniel Torgler, Bildungshintergrund von Führungskräften und Plazierungsstärke von Universitäten in der Schweiz, in: Die Unternehmung 61 (2007), 1, pp. 71 – 96. 35 François Barrial, Evolution du profil sociologique de l’élite managériale suisse entre 1980 et 2000 [Evolution of the Swiss Managerial Elite’s Sociological Profile between 1980 and 2000], Mémoire de licence non publié, Université de Lausanne 2006; Eric Davoine, Formation et parcours professionnel des dirigeants d’entreprise en Suisse [Education and Career of Managers in Switzerland], in: Revue économique et sociale 63 (2005), 3, pp. 89 – 99.

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This evolution explains why a growing part of the Swiss business elite became more open towards Anglo-Saxon management ideas and in particular to the shareholder value theory in the late 20th century.36 As a result, like in other European countries, Swiss companies in the banking and industrial sectors started during the 1990s to orient their strategies more and more towards the satisfaction of shareholder interests. This is illustrated by changes in the Swiss governance system such as the increased levels of transparency and the simplification of the capital structure.37 Swiss companies increasingly applied International Accounting Standards (IAS, now IFRS for International Financial and Reporting Standards), showing a growing commitment to transparency. They also began to abandon voting right distortions and replace multiple share categories by a single share. These changes are illustrated in figure 2, which shows that the number of Swiss companies that apply IAS accounting rules and that have simplified their capital structure has increased in a very significant way. These changes, which implied the abandonment of traditional mechanisms of control over firms by corporate insiders, are the expression of a profound shift in Swiss corporate governance away from the traditional insider-oriented system towards a more shareholder-oriented model.38 36 It is interesting to note that we can observe the same trend in Germany, whose managerial culture is often compared to the Swiss one. Recent studies of the German case find that more and more managers were trained as financial experts rather than lawyers and engineers, which has had a direct effect on the increasing shareholder value orientation of corporate strategies. Cf. Martin Höpner, Was bewegt die Führungskräfte? Von der Agency-Theorie zur Soziologie des Managements, in: Soziale Welt 55 (2004), 3, pp. 263 – 282. For a discussion of some of Höpner’s conclusions, see also Hartmann, Vermarktlichung (fn. 33). The increasing importance of managers with an economic educational background had an impact on the decline of the German company network, as Beyer shows for 2003: “Those companies that are directed by a manager with a degree in economics are significantly different from the average. They interlock less than others [ . . . ]. This suggests that managers with a degree in economics, in particular those active in the finance and controlling departments of companies, were ready to abandon the formerly established coordinated practices of management and control.” See Beyer, Netzwerk (fn. 29), p. 194. 37 For other changes, see Schnyder et al., Rise and Decline (fn. 6). 38 For an in depth analysis of this transformation: Gerhard Schnyder, Comparing Corporate Governance Reforms: Law, Politics and the Social Organization of Business in the Case of Switzerland, 1965 – 2005, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Lausanne, 2007. Principal-agent theory applied to corporate governance would lead us to expect that managers are opposed to Shareholder Value Orientation of their company, because they would lose part of their power due to increasing external controls over corporate insiders. However, Höpner has shown, for the German case, that different reasons may lead managers to favor shareholder value orientation. In fact, increasing shareholder value orientation went usually together with an important increase in managers’ compensation since most of the time the increasing variable parts of compensation (notably stock options) did not replace but complete the fixed parts. See Martin Höpner, Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen? Shareholder Value, Managerherrschaft und Mitbestimmung in Deutschland. Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2003, pp. 123 ff. See also Schnyder, Comparing, (fn. 38), for the Swiss case.

212

Thomas David / Stéphanie Ginalski / Frédéric Rebmann / Gerhard Schnyder Introduction of IAS and Single Share Single share (cumulated) IAS (cumulated)

120

100

number of companies

80

60

40

20

0 1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Sources: Single share: Thomas Burkhalter, Einheitsaktien. Ihre Einführung und Existenz im Lichte der Diskussion um Corporate Governance, Zürich 2001; Roger M. Kunz, Vereinfachung der Grundkapitalstruktur und Liquidität der Beteiligungspapiere, in: Finanzmarkt und Portfolio Management 11 (1997), 1, pp. 35 – 50; IAS: KPMG, Accounting and Business in Switzerland, Zurich 2002.

Figure 2: Number of Swiss companies applying IAS rules and having introduced a single share category during the 1990s

The changes at the level of corporate governance towards an increasing shareholder orientation are paralleled by very extensive restructurings of major Swiss companies during the 1990s. Numerous restructurings, disinvestments, concentration on the core business, and mergers have taken place during the 1990s. In part these restructurings were linked to the crisis of the early 1990s which brought several large companies to the brink of breakdown. However, in part, these changes aimed also at reducing costs and increasing profitability in view of an increasing return on invested capital and followed hence a financial (shareholder-oriented) rather than an industrial logic.39 The diffusion of the shareholder value orientation among Swiss companies explains also the disintegration of the network structure. The new shareholder orientation of Swiss companies implied a shift away from the traditional insider corporate governance system towards a more Anglo-Saxon style shareholder model. In the latter, personal entanglement between companies is perceived as a sign of crony capitalism rather than as an important mechanism of coordination. There39

David et al., “Forteresse des Alpes” (fn. 3).

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213

fore, companies that wanted to attract investors on the capital markets would be expected to be inclined to reduce their ties with other companies in order to convince investors of their commitment to a liberal model of capitalism. The second aspect of the increasing shareholder-orientation, i. e. restructuring and concentration through mergers, had also an important impact on the decreasing number of interlocks. The increasing concentration in different sectors of the Swiss economy led to the disappearance of some of the most central companies in the network due to mergers. We have already mentioned the example of the merger between UBS and SBS into the new UBS in 1998, which quite considerably reduced the number of ties entertained by this company. The same holds true for the merger between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz into Novartis: whereas Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz cumulated 29 ties in 1990, the new company Novartis had in 2000 merely four ties with other companies. Yet, this very pronounced decline in the number of ties is too marked to be only explained by the mathematical effect of a reduction in board positions on the number of possible ties. In fact, companies that were implicated in mergers during the 1990s were always eager to restructure in order to increase profitability. It comes, hence, as no surprise that the companies created through a merger were among those who were most eager to please shareholders’ interests, and as such, it is not surprising that they dramatically cut their ties with other companies. In addition to the changes in educational background mentioned above, AngloSaxon consultancy firms – and first and foremost McKinsey – played also a prominent role in the reorientation of Swiss companies towards shareholder value goals. Indeed, some of the most prominent top CEOs who belonged to this new generation of top managers promoting Anglo-Saxon methods in Switzerland were former managers of McKinsey. After having achieved a PhD in international management at the University of St. Gallen (HSG), Peter A. Wuffli, born in 1957 in Zurich, joined McKinsey in 1984 as management consultant, and became in 1990 a partner of McKinsey Switzerland. Four years later he was hired by the SBS as Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and he became the CEO of the new UBS after the merger. During the first years of his second mandate, Wuffli helped the main Swiss bank to reach highest profits rates. In order to adapt to the stock market, he undertook a “dynamic rightsizing” of the bank, which resulted in a concentration on the core business and massive layoffs (4 percent of the employees for the year 2002).40 When he had to face criticism for keeping on layoff despite the high benefits of UBS (14 billions Swiss Fr. in 200541), Peter Wuffli declared: “We need high profits in order to remain internationally attractive for investors”.42 After graduating in Economics at the University of St. Gallen (HSG), Lukas Mühlemann obtained a MBA in the US (Harvard University). He worked for 40 41 42

Le Temps, 17. 04. 2003. Le Temps, 30. 04. 2008. Sonntags Zeitung, 13. 02. 2005, our translation.

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McKinsey from 1977 to 1994. In 1994, he became CEO of the re-insurance company Swiss Ré. During this mandate, he made an unmistakable commitment to the shareholder value idea: “From the shareholder’s point of view, performance means price increase and dividend payouts. And the conditions for this are short-, medium- and long-term income growth and a return on equity, which includes a substantial premium exceeding the risk free income. This is the task of the management, when it achieves this, it is well considered, commended and hopefully well paid.”43

In 1996, he joined the CS, the second largest bank of Switzerland, where he was until 2002 chairman of the Board of Directors as well as CEO. He was the main promoter of the bancassurance strategy, which led ultimately to the merger between the Winterthur Insurance and the CS. This transformation reflected the strategic reorientation of the Swiss bank, oriented towards a concentration in the financial sector on the one hand, and the decreasing involvement of the bank in the industrial sector on the other. When Mühlemann had to face strong criticism for having laid off a large number of employees, he answered, paraphrasing Milton Friedman, that “our social responsibility is to maximize our profits”.44 Thomas Wellauer shows a similar profile. Although he achieved a PhD in engineering at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (ETHZ), the Zurich Institute of Technology, he completed this technical education with a master’s degree in management. He started up his career at McKinsey, working there for twelve years, became later a CEO of Winterthur Insurance, and, after the merger with CS, CEO of CS Finacial Services. He now holds a top executive position at Novartis, a main Swiss chemistry company. However, this kind of profile does not relate only to banks: many top managers of Swiss industrial companies also belonged to this “new generation.” For example, Fred Kindle, CEO of ABB since 2004, was again a former employee of McKinsey. This citizen of Switzerland and Liechtenstein graduated from the ETHZ and then completed his education with an MBA from Northwestern University (US). In 1992, he was hired by Sulzer, one of the biggest Swiss industrial companies, where as CEO he started to restructure the company resolutely: downsizing, concentration on the “core business” and massive layoff were pro-shareholder measures which aimed at making Sulzer more profitable.45 He kept on following a shareholder-value oriented strategy after his move to ABB, making “efficiency and capital management” as well as the increase of the profit margins his main objectives.46 43 Lukas Mühlemann, Wertsteigerungskonzepte zur Performance-Beurteilung des Managements, in: L’Expert comptable Suisse 95 (1995), 12, pp. 1047 –1050, here p. 1047, our translation. 44 Libération, 04. 10. 1997, our translation. 45 Kindle laid off 2000 employees during his mandate. See Schnyder, Corporate Governance Reform (fn. 38), especially p. 205. 46 Le Temps, 07. 09. 2007.

The Swiss Business Elite between 1980 – 2000

215

Paul Choffat also completed a “traditional” education in Law (PhD of the University of Lausanne) with an Anglo-Saxon business education (MBA from the Lausanne International Institute for Management Development). After a spell at McKinsey, he worked for several prestigious Swiss industrial companies (Landis & Gyr, Von Roll, Novartis), and was from 1996 to 1999 CEO at Fotolabo. During that time, Fotolabo laid off 350 employees (out of 1050) in order to concentrate on the core business and increase the profitability of the company. As a result, the company’s share price increased by 10.5 percent.47 All these former “McKinsey-boys” had – and still have – a tremendous influence on the functioning of the Swiss economy. One Journalist of the NZZ Folio – the monthly supplement of the Neue Züricher Zeitung (NZZ) – stated in 1998: “When there is a restructuring in Switzerland, when a company is transformed and jobs are cut, McKinsey takes always a part in the background”.48

2. The internationalization of the business elite in Switzerland Since the 1980s, an increasing global orientation of large Swiss enterprises and the declining importance of the national market occurred. This is the case, for example, in the banking sector,49 where competition not only increased at the domestic level between different branches of the financial sector, but also at the international level between banks from different countries. Deregulation of international financial markets, and especially European integration, with the creation of the Single European Market, increased competition between financial corporations in a crucial way. In order to stay competitive at the international level and to become “global players”, Swiss banks needed to obtain a critical size, which was not feasible through internal growth alone. Therefore, acquisitions, mergers and strategic alliances abroad became important instruments in the banks’ new outlook.50 Swiss banks expanded their activities abroad at the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, especially in the investment banking sector, through acquisitions of foreign banks. At the end of the 1980s, CS acquired First Boston51 and SBS purchased O’Conner Associates and Warburg. Furthermore, in 1991, UBS bought the Chase Investors Le Temps, 27. 03. 1998. NZZ Folio 01 / 1998, our translation. 49 For the internationalization of the industrial sector, see David et al., “Forteresse des Alpes” (fn. 3). 50 Vera Schaub, Konzernpolitik im Schweizer Bankbereich. Eine Darstellung der Determinanten und Ausgestaltungsmöglichkeiten unter Berücksichtigung ausgewählter Schweizer Bankkonzerne, Bern 1992, p. 243. 51 The CS daughter CSFB was one of the most active promoters of Shareholder Value in Europe. See Frédéric Lordon, La “création de valeur” comme rhétorique et comme pratique. Généalogie et sociologie de la “valeur actionnariale” [The “Creation of Value” as Rhetoric and as Practice. Origins and Sociology of “Shareholder Value”], in: L’Année de la Régulation 4 (2000), pp. 117 – 171. 47 48

216

Thomas David / Stéphanie Ginalski / Frédéric Rebmann / Gerhard Schnyder

Management Corps, a large U.S. asset management company. CS made a similar move in 1990 by acquiring 80 percent of the voting rights in BEA Associates Inc. A consequence of the growing internationalization of banks’ activities was an increasing internationalization of boards and the management. Indeed, we see that greater numbers of foreigners obtained mandates on the board of Swiss companies. In 1980, foreigners represented less than 4 percent of the directors included in our sample. In 2000, this proportion was almost 25 percent. Recently, Eric Davoine estimated that 50 percent (110) of the managers of the Swiss Market Index (SMI) firms were foreigners, probably one of the highest percentages in Europe.52 Table 7 shows the distribution of nationalities for our sample. Table 7 Nationality of top managers in Swiss Companies 1980

1990

2000

44 / 1

38 / 2

41 / 2

German

1

2

2

Austrian

0

0

2

English

0

0

2

Swedish

0

0

2

Italian

0

1

2

Swiss

French

1

0

1

Others

0

3

2

Total of foreigners

2

6

13

n/a

12

11

2

Total

59

57

58

Source: our database. Note: Swiss: Swiss Citizens / binational (Swiss and other nationality).

Our sample is too small to draw conclusions on the different nationalities represented in the 33 largest Swiss companies. However, a similar study based on the 500 top Swiss Companies led by Dyllick and Torgler shows that in 2004 foreign managers, representing 28 percent of all managers, came mainly from Europe (75 percent) and in the second place from America (21 percent). With 34 percent, Germany represented the first country sending managers to Switzerland, followed by the USA (18 percent) and by France (9 percent).53 52 53

Davoine, Formation et parcours professionnel (fn. 35). Dyllick / Torgler, Bildungshintergrund von Führungskräften (fn. 34), pp. 78 f.

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217

The increasing number of foreigners sitting on the board of Swiss companies corroborates the assumption of a growing internationalization of the Swiss business elite. This evolution may also explain the decline of the Swiss network. Indeed, these foreign directors were less integrated in the Swiss business elite and therefore held on average fewer board mandates of Swiss companies than their Swiss colleagues.54 In fact, sociological factors, such as friendship ties or acquaintance through shared experiences such as university studies or armed forces service had in the past played a non-negligible role in explaining the cooptation of certain directors on the board of Swiss companies.55 Foreign directors lacked such a sociological insertion in the Swiss business elite and had therefore fewer chances to be co-opted on a board. One member of the Swiss business elite – Philippe de Weck, a former general manager of UBS and “big linker” – expresses this clearly by explaining interlocking directorates explicitly by a certain “club mentality” of the Swiss business elite: “[I]t is correct that there is in human nature a certain tendency to form clubs and that this tendency is maybe stronger in Switzerland than elsewhere. [ . . . ] And we also have clubs of boards of directors. This tendency is maybe more pronounced in the German-speaking part of Switzerland than in the French-speaking part. In several parts of German-speaking Switzerland, the mentality of the population is still very much affected by the guilds. One can feel that there has been an age-long tradition of trade guilds. And the natural tendency of clubs is to be somewhat closed. In my opinion, this is the reason why, during the years of the economic boom between 1950 and 1970, a certain club mentality developed – certainly without deliberateness – concerning board of directors. I meet you here, so why don’t you come there; I know you, I know how you think; if we take someone else, I won’t know him, maybe it won’t work out with him, etc.”56

Sergio Marchionne is a well-known example of foreigners who belonged to the Swiss business elite. Born in Italy, Marchionne first obtained a degree in Law and then an MBA in financial and business administration in Canada. He successively carried out various executive tasks in important Swiss companies. After successfully completing a merger between Alusuisse and Alcan in 1999, he played a leading role in the restructuring of Lonza (Swiss chemical industry), which resulted in a very good performance of the firm’s share price.57 Marchionne became at the same time administrative-delegate and CEO of the Swiss multinational company (MNC) Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS), where his ambitious plan to in54 On this point, see also Winfried Ruigrok / Simon Peck / Sabina Tacheva, Nationality and Gender Diversity on Swiss Corporate Boards, in: Corporate Governance 15 (2007), 4, pp. 546 – 557. 55 For a general discussion of such factors, see Mark S. Mizruchi, What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates, in: Annual Review of Sociology 22 (1996), pp. 271 – 298. 56 Philippe de Weck, Un banquier suisse parle. Entretiens avec François Gross [A Swiss Banker Talks. Conversations with François Gross], Fribourg 1983, p. 93, our translation. 57 Le Temps, 24. 01. 2002.

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crease the shareholder value and the profit margins of the company filled the Board of Directors with enthusiasm.58 The following year, Marchionne became administrative-delegate for Fiat. Marchionne successively carried out executive tasks in Swiss companies, rather than cumulate them at the same time. He played a more important role in improving the share price of each company than in strengthening the ties of the companies in the network. Another reason for the declining number of interlocks between Swiss companies derived from the growing transnationalization of the corporate network. Jeffrey Kentor and Yong Suk Jang showed an increasing overlap of boards of the world’s largest companies.59 Even though their data and analysis present some problems,60 their findings indicate that large Swiss firms were among the best integrated in the transnational network of the top 500 fortune companies in 1998. William K. Carroll and Meindert Fennema’s more prudent study of 176 large companies also points to the growing integration of Swiss firms in the transnational corporate network.61 If they find little growth of transnational ties between 1976 and 1996, they still demonstrate that within Europe, ties between companies grew denser. Moreover, Swiss companies seem to have been much better integrated in 1996 than twenty years previously. They find that – as Dutch and French firms – Swiss companies doubled the number of transnational ties between 1976 and 1996.62 According to Carroll and Fennema the (modest) progress in the integration of the transnational network does not imply a fragmentation of national networks as the ties between companies from the same country persist. However, this claim is based only on an analysis of ties between companies from the same country in their sample, i. e. the largest companies of each country. For instance, there are country clusters among German firms in their sample, i. e. the German companies within the core of the transnational network are heavily mutually interlocked. Yet, if the most central Swiss firms in the transnational network (i. e. those with three or more ties to the top 176 companies world-wide: BBC (later ABB), Crédit Swiss and Novartis) are linked to one another, our analysis suggests that this stability of ties between the largest companies does not allow one to draw conclusions for the national network as a whole. In fact, the stability of these ties between the largest Swiss companies does not necessarily mean that relations to other, smaller Swiss companies remained stable as well. On the contrary, the growing importance of the interlocking network between large, international companies resulted in the decreasing imNZZ, 03. 05. 2002. Jeffrey Kentor / Yong Suk Jang, Yes, There Is a (Growing) Transnational Business Community: A Study of Global Interlocking Directorates 1983 – 1998, in: International Sociology 19 (2004), 3, pp. 355 – 368. 60 For detailed criticism see William K. Carroll / Meindert Fennema, Problems in the Study of the Transnational Business Community. A Reply to Kentor and Jang, in: International Sociology 19 (2004), 3, pp. 369 – 378. 61 Cf. Carroll / Fennema, Is There a Transnational Business Community? (fn. 20). 62 Ibidem, pp. 402, 410. 58 59

The Swiss Business Elite between 1980 – 2000

219

portance of the domestic network.63 Ties among the largest Swiss companies and other transnational corporations can hence be expected to be more resilient to change than ties with minor domestic companies. In conclusion, we see that the changes that contributed to the disintegration of the interlock network in Switzerland were the result of companies’ strategic changes, which in turn were to a considerable extent linked to a generational change within the business elite. In particular, the evolution of the educational background and the increase in business and economics studies may explain the fact that Swiss managers were more open towards shareholder value orientation, which also implied an abandonment of the traditional coordinated ways of doing business. In addition, the internationalization of this elite contributed to the disintegration of the network, as foreign managers were less integrated in the Swiss business elite on the one hand, and because of the growing integration of Swiss firms in the transnational corporate network on the other.

V. Conclusion As we have shown, several factors explain the decline of organized capitalism in Switzerland and the disintegration of the company network that took place during the last two decades of the 20th century. First, we have seen that the decline of the domestic network was in large part due to the decreasing involvement of Swiss banks in industrial companies, an involvement that had constituted the backbone of this network for the greatest part of the 20th century. The main reason for this withdrawal was the “securitization” of corporate finance: banks drew more and more on securities rather than on credits as means of financial intermediation. With the decreasing importance of bank loans for industrial companies and for bank income, the incentive for creating interlocks disappeared on both sides. Another factor of the decreasing involvement of the banks was the expansion of their activities into foreign markets, in order to face international competition on financial markets. The explanation based on the importance of financial market-based activities and decreasing importance of the traditional lending business is compelling. It reflects the process of globalization that took place in Switzerland as in other countries during the last two decades of the 20th century. However, in this paper, we go beyond these meso-level explanations by looking at the micro foundations of the network, i. e. the attributional characteristics of the people who compose the boards of the different companies. Our study of the changes in the educational profile of top managers in Swiss companies shows that these sociological factors are also a 63 See for Nestlé: Yoann Pfluger, Le conseil d’administration de Nestlé (1910 – 2004) [The Nestlé’s Board of Directors (1910 – 2004)], Mémoire de licence non publié, Université de Lausanne, 2007.

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relevant explanation for the decreasing integration of the network. The abandonment of the traditional mechanisms of control was indeed actively promoted by some business actors. Secondly, the fact that a growing part of the top managers in Swiss companies achieved an education in business or economics studies (such as MBA for example) contributed to the fact that they became more open toward a shareholder value orientated strategies. Indeed, people having achieved that kind of degrees were trained as financial experts rather than lawyers and engineers, which also implies that they may be more open to impersonal, anonymous market relations among economic actors, rather than the traditional personal, coordinated relations. Finally, the internationalization of Swiss business elite also contributed to the decline of the domestic network. We showed that during the last two decades of the 20th century, greater numbers of foreigners came to sit on the board of Swiss enterprises. Due to a lack of sociological insertion, these foreign managers were less integrated among Swiss business elite, and would therefore hold fewer mandates in Swiss companies. In addition, the growing integration of Swiss firms in the transnational corporate network contributed to the declining importance of the domestic network.

Formations and Profiles in Eastern Europe: Between Erosion and Transformation

The Agrarian Elite in Hungary before and after the Political Transition By Zsuzsanna Varga I. Introduction The aim of the present paper is to examine the main tendencies, continuities and changes in the history of the Hungarian agrarian elite during the second half of the 20th century. The three great structural transformations that took place in this period – the land reform in 1945, the collectivization between 1949 and 1961 and the process of compensation and privatization following 1990 – had a significant impact on the economical and social characteristics of the agrarian elite as well as on their possibilities to assert their interests. After a short historical introduction, the study focuses on two essential periods; the socialist era and the time after the political transition. As is commonly known, the results of Hungarian agriculture from the beginning of the 1970s on generated marked attention of not only the socialist but also the capitalist countries. The special character is well indicated by the fact, that while in other socialist countries there still were shortages of foodstuff, Hungarian agriculture was able to satisfy the requirements of three different kinds of market: the domestic market, the market of the Council of Mutual Economical Aid (COMECON) and the market of the capitalist countries.1 Based on more than ten years of research, I can say that one of the main reasons for this remarkable achievement lies in the special relationship between those in political power and the agrarian population. The Hungarian agrarian elite, therefore, can only be truly examined within the framework of this special relationship. The first part of this article explores the role the agrarian elite played in the exceptional results achieved by agriculture. This part is based on archival research and oral history; it attempts to show the mediator-role of cooperative leaders be1 From the late 1970s, Hungary’s meat and corn production ranked among the first five in the world. In 1980, the country ranked second in the per capita meat production, preceded only by Denmark. Five years later, Hungary came second in corn production, after Canada, and fourth in meat production after Denmark, the Netherlands and Australia. In the mass production of hen’s eggs, the country ranked second after the Netherlands. A magyar mezogazdaság nemzetközi összehasonlításban [The Hungarian Agriculture in International Comparison], ed. by Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Budapest 1985, pp. 22 – 26.

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tween the one party state and the peasants. The analysis devotes great attention to the conflicts between the heavy industrial and agricultural lobbies during the 1970s. The study argues that by the change of system a new and young group of cooperative managers with up-to-date knowledge emerged. The second part of this paper focuses on the transition of the agrarian elite. It is important to emphasize that the transition in agriculture in the 1990s was marked by sharp ideological and political debates in Hungary. The analysis suggests that we can recognize two different groups within the agrarian elite of the 1990s. Firstly, the owners of the largest family farms, and secondly, the managers of the transformed agricultural organizations. Many of the latter are owners themselves. As an interesting tendency, we can recognize members of the former socialist agrarian elite within the ranks of both groups. It should be stressed that due to the lack of a comprehensive empirical study2, this part of the article could not present exact data on the social composition, educational background and financial situation of “old” and “new” members of the agrarian elite. It attempts to outline some general trends. The interviews, press material, parliamentary and committee records used and the hypotheses developed on their basis lead to a number of questions that require further examination. II. Historical background since the inter-war period Between the two World Wars, about half of the agricultural land in Hungary was made up of large estates and medium-sized farms of feudal origin. The other half consisted of peasant farms. The dual structure of Hungarian agriculture had a significant impact on the characteristics of rural society and especially the agrarian elite.3 2 While there was significant empirical research on the economic elite going on in the 1990s, there was a lack of sufficient financial resources for research on the development of the agrarian elite. For some examples of recent publications on the economic elite, see: György Lengyel, A magyar gazdasági elit társadalmi összetétele a huszadik század végén [The Social Composition of the Hungarian Economic Elite at the End of the 20th Century], Budapest 2007; Erzsébet Szalai, Gazdasági elit és társadalom a magyarországi újkapitalizmusban [Economic Elite and Society in Hungarian New Capitalism], Budapest 2001. 3 During the first half of the 20th century, Hungary was, to an extreme, a country of large estates. In 1935, 30 percent of the total agricultural land consisted of large estates with more than 1000 cadastral yokes (575 hectares) and landowners with estates larger than 100 cadastral yokes (57.5 hectares) owned 48 percent of the land. In contrast, more than 45 percent of the peasant population unquestionably belonged among the agrarian proletariat, and if we include owners of less than 5 cadastral yokes (2.88 hectares) of land, 70 percent of the total peasant population lived entirely or largely from wage labor. Only 30 percent of the entire peasant population were able to make a living from their lands without undertaking wage labor. This distorted structure of land distribution remained unchanged until 1945. Miklós Szuhay, Evolution of Hungarian Agriculture during the Inter-War Years (1918 – 1945), in: Péter Gunst (ed.), Hungarian Agrarian Society from the Emancipation of Serfs (1848) to the Re-privatization of Land (1998), New York 1998, pp. 177 – 198, here pp. 177 – 179.

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The traditional agrarian elite consisted of aristocrats with a landed property greater than one thousand cadastral yokes (575 hectares) as well as gentry owners of medium-sized estates. Their leading role was not only due to their large landed properties (they were called latifundiums) but also due to the resulting political influence. Even though recent studies have shown their gradual decline during the 1930s, they are still considered a significant group with political clout during that era.4 It is well known that the owners put economic civil servants in charge of managing their estates or that they leased them out to leaseholders who had the necessary capital. This is why they were largely absent from the countryside. An elite of rural society thus emerged, consisting of men of the clergy, teachers, notaries and the richest farmer families.5 The village population considered these wealthy farming families the true elite, since they owned the biggest part of the land. For a long time the area of landed property had been the measure of wealth within the rural population. It is no accident that the village mayor was often elected from these families. The year 1945 is a landmark in both agricultural and social terms. The decree on land reform (600 / 1945 of 17th March 1945) ordered that all estates covering an area larger than 1.000 cadastral yokes (575 hectares) be expropriated including all livestock and implements. This development meant that the landowning classes (big and medium-sized estate owners) lost almost all their economical power.6 Their former political influence declined as well since, due to a transformation of the political institutions, the representatives of the aristocratic and gentry classes were excluded from parliament and the state administration. All these changes had terminated the duality of the agrarian elite which put the wealthy farmers in a dominant position. The land reform itself, in fact, seemed to favor this group by setting the limit of exemption at 200 cadastral yokes (115 hectares) for estates owned by peasants compared to 100 cadastral yokes (57.55 hectares) for the noble estates.7 During the execution of the repartition of land, however, this limit, reinforced by an act, was not always taken into account. The next challenge the agrarian elite had to face came in 1948 when the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HWP) made it clear that agriculture was not going to be ex4 The interests of the owners of large estates were promoted partly in the Upper House of the Parliament, partly in the Hungarian National Agricultural Association (OMGE), which was the most well organized and influential body for agricultural interest protection until as late as 1945. Ignác Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, Budapest 1999, pp. 155 – 169. 5 The category of rich peasants (owning between 20 – 100 cadastral yokes / 11.5 – 57.5 ha) included merely 6.5 percent of the entire peasant population. Their influence was felt through the Smallholders’ Party and through the Cooperative Store and Marketing Cooperative of the Hungarian Farmers’ Alliance, commonly known in Hungary as “Hangya” (Ant). Péter Gunst, Hungarian Agrarian Society during the Inter-War Period (1919 – 1945), in: Gunst, Hungarian Agrarian Society (fn. 3), pp. 199 – 253, here pp. 203 – 208. 6 Sándor Szakács, From Land Reform to Collectivization (1945 – 1956), in: Gunst, Hungarian Agrarian Society (fn. 3), pp. 257 – 298. 7 The two categories were distinguished on the basis of the owner’s birth.

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empt from the acceleration of Sovietization. 8 Collectivization and, simultaneously, a massive campaign against wealthy farmers were launched. Partly due to their financial independence, their success, and their elemental attachment to the land, and partly due to their influence over other sections of the village population, these peasant strata exhibited the most extensive resistance to collectivization. This social class, renamed “Kulaks”, became “Public Enemy No. 1” in the countryside.9 The measures taken during the campaign against “Kulaks” were various: they included economic and administrative means as well physical force, imprisonment and deportation to labor camps.10 The campaign against Kulaks was so successful that by 1953, three fourth of all land owned by “Kulaks” had been offered to the state. By that time, the majority of their implements and tools had become state property, too.11 Their economic base declined dramatically and, as a result, they were excluded from the local governments that had been reorganized back in 1950.12 The newly established councils were all led by reliable party members. Furthermore, it is important to mention that denominational schools were secularized, which meant that a great number of school teachers were replaced by new ones. Party secretaries and council presidents had be8 On the subject of agrarian policies during the 1950s in both English and Hungarian, see: Gyula Erdmann, Begyujtés, beszolgáltatás Magyarországon 1945 – 1956 [Compulsory Deliveries in Hungary, 1945 – 1956], Békéscsaba 1993; Martha Lampland, The Object of Labour. Commodification in Socialist Hungary, Chicago / London 1995, pp. 144 – 160; József Nagy, A kulákkérdés és megoldása az 1948 – 1953-as években [The “Kulak” Question and its Solution, 1948 – 1953], in: Múltunk 44 (1999), 3, pp. 41 – 97; Szakács, From Land Reform (fn. 6), in: Gunst, Hungarian Agrarian Society (fn. 3), pp. 257 – 298; Zsuzsanna Varga, Agrarian Development from 1945 to the Present Day, in: János Estók (ed.), History of Hungarian Agriculture and Rural Life, 1848 – 2004, Budapest 2004, pp. 221 – 252. 9 Hungarian National Archive (Magyar Országos Levéltár, MOL) M-KS 276. f. 54. cs. 14. o. e. A Titkárság eloterjesztése a “kulák” meghatározására [Proposition of the Secretariat on the Definition of the “Kulak”] 14. 10. 1948. 10 The taxes and compulsory delivery quotas imposed on the “Kulaks” (land tax, agricultural development contribution, house tax, property tax, general income tax, social security contributions, etc.) were set so high that in practice they could not be met. Failure to deliver, however, meant the imposition of default supplements and punitive interest, while inability to pay could result in the auctioning off of property, imprisonment or internment. Those, for example, who failed to deliver produce on time, were said to have committed a “public supply crime”. MOL M-KS 276. f. 53. cs. 48. o. e. Jegyzokönyv a PB 1950. március 23-i ülésérol [Minutes of the PC of HWP] 23. 03. 1950. Agenda 2. A Mezogazdasági és Szövetkezeti Osztály jelentése a kulákság korlátozásáról [Report of the Agricultural and Cooperative Department on the restriction of “Kulaks”]. 11 Iván Peto / Sándor Szakács, A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története 1945 – 1985. I.: Az újjáépítés és a tervutasításos irányítás idoszaka 1945 – 1968 [The History of Four Decades of Domestic Economy, 1945 – 1985, Vol. 1: The Period of Rebuilding and Command Economic Planning, 1945 – 1968], Budapest 1985, pp. 204 – 212. 12 Local public administration bodies were reorganized in 1950: the old forms of self-government were abolished, to be replaced by village, town (district), rural and county councils. Although the new local organizations of state power were elected, they were only formally independent. The hierarchy of the HWP was established in parallel with the state structure.

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come important figures of the newly established elite, followed by leaders of collective farms and machine-tractor stations. Many members of this new elite came from a poor peasant background or were sent to the countryside from towns as reliable party workers.13 Due to their lack of experience and expertise, these new leaders and managers could not expect any respect from the local population. The radical economical and political changes of the 1950s turned the countryside upside down; consequently, the rural society had not had a real, respectable elite group for years. Nevertheless, we can find proof for the resourcefulness of rural society. In October 1956, the days of the revolution, village communities organized themselves within a very short time. They did not wait for central directives but took the fate of their communities into their own hands.14 At the same time, however, they clearly declared to the government the issues where they expected urgent measures. The demands of the villages can be divided into two categories. First there were those demands which coincided with the Revolution’s fundamental goals. Among the second category were those related to the grievances of the peasants. When we examine these, we see that they called for the wholesale rejection of Stalinist agrarian policies. There were differences in the emphasis and in the phrasing of these demands, but in essence they were the same all over. They demanded the end of forceful collectivization, the restoration of expropriated land, the abolition of compulsory deliveries and the scaling-down of taxes. III. Collectivization Hungarian style: new mediators and informal bargaining in the early Kádár-era As it is generally known, the revolution in 1956 is an important turning point in Hungary’s history.15 After 4th November 1956, following the removal of the Imre 13 András Meszticzky, Elnökök, szakvezetok, munkavezetok a termeloszövetkezetekben [Presidents, Managers and Professional Leaders in Agricultural Cooperatives], in: Szövetkezeti Kutató Intézet Évönyve 1975 [Yearbook of the Cooperative Research Institute 1975], Budapest 1976, pp. 279 – 333. 14 Before the political transition, historiography drew a rather static picture of the events that took place on the countryside in 1956. Briefly, it suggested that there was “essentially nothing important going on in the villages”. Studies published in the last few years agree that the levels of political activity in the countryside and the towns differed only slightly. This showed in the various forms of democratic self-government, which meant new organizations of power (national councils, revolutionary and national committees). A separate military force, the national guard, was set up, too, and new leaders of local governments were elected. See more on this: Attila Szakolczai / László Á. Varga (eds.), A vidék forradalma, 1956 [Revolution in the Countryside, 1956], Vol. I, Budapest 2003; Attila Szakolczai (ed.), A vidék forradalma, 1956 [Revolution in the Countryside, 1956], Vol. II, Budapest 2006. 15 For an introduction to the history of the Kádár-era in English see: Iván T. Berend / György Ránki, The Hungarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, Sydney / London 1985; Lajos Izsák, A Political History of Hungary 1944 – 1990, Budapest 2002; Romsics, Hungary (fn. 4); Nigel Swain, Hungary. The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism, London / New York

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Nagy Government and the crushing of armed resistance with Soviet assistance, the new government, headed by János Kádár faced a serious crisis of legitimacy. The Kádár regime, while using brutal means to settle with its political enemies, also sought to placate society from the outset. In doing so, it proved most effective to improve the standard of living, as personal consumption had been restricted to a very low level before 1956 to pay for the forced development of heavy industry and military production. The prominence of the standard of living for policy after 1956 gave strategic importance to raising agricultural production and encouraging agricultural producers. While during the first half of the 1950s, the country’s Communist Party pursued aggressive, strife-inducing agrarian policies, the post-1956 Kádár regime tried to minimize and even to resolve the many conflicts it encountered in its dealings with Hungary’s agricultural producers. This trend manifested itself already in November 1956. The new government had to realize that confrontation with the producers of the country’s food supply, just when a general strike was paralyzing industrial production, could have disastrous consequences. This fact explains the new regime’s apparent readiness to remedy the peasantry’s most conspicuous grievances. The most significant measure taken was the abolishment of obligatory delivery.16 A further measure with a wide impact was the permission to quit agricultural cooperatives, implemented at the end of November. By doing so, the government fulfilled an important demand the farmers had made earlier. All these measures marked a new period in the relationship between the political leadership and farmers. This attitude also continued during the next period, albeit with an uneven intensity. A good example for this is the history of the final phase of collectivization which was also essential for the formation of the socialist agrarian elite. In the first half of the 1950s, the Hungarian Communist Party made two attempts to collectivize peasant farms but failed both times.17 Thus, the collectiviza1992; Rudolf L. Tokés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession, 1957 – 1990, Cambridge 1996. 16 The abolition of the compulsory delivery system removed one of the pillars supporting the whole system of plan direction in agriculture and Hungary was among the first socialist countries to make the move. As peasants were no longer obliged to part with their produce, the state could only buy if it offered a realistic price. Instead of using economic compulsion, the state established commercial relations with the agricultural producers, peasants and cooperatives, and tried to induce in them an interest to sell. This meant that market forces applied, albeit to a limited extent, in one of the main sectors of the post-1956 Hungarian economy. See: Törvények és rendeletek hivatalos gyujteménye, 1956 [Official Collection of Laws and Ordinances, 1956], Budapest 1957, pp. 62, 68 f., 263 – 265. 17 There is considerable literature that looks at different waves of collectivization in Hungary, see: Ferenc Donáth, Reform és forradalom [Reform and Revolution], Budapest 1977; Sándor Orbán, Két agrárforradalom Magyarországon. Demokratikus és szocialista agrárátala

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tion launched in 1958 / 1959 involved a great risk. On the other hand, the stakes were high as well: the party leadership led by János Kádár had to prove their efficiency to Moscow since the collectivization process coincided with similar efforts in other socialist countries. The collectivization was preceded by a great debate within the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP). Two platforms emerged.18 The leaders of the Ministry of Agriculture held highly dogmatic views, and on every question insisted on pre-1956 ideas. On the other hand, the party’s agricultural department vehemently criticized pre-1956 agrarian policy. Working alongside the Central Committee, Lajos Fehér, who headed the Department of Agriculture, intended to avoid past errors and respect peasant interests when setting out the HSWP’s agrarian political line.19 Amidst the preparations for the relaunch of collectivization, representatives of the dogmatic, left-wing views came to the fore in agrarian policy. After just one year, however, the economic and social problems arising in the agrarian sector became so severe that the leadership was compelled to initiate corrective measures.20 As a symbolic gesture, the dogmatic minister of agriculture, Imre Dögei, was dismissed. His successor was Pál Losonczi, the head of a cooperative with a spirit of enterprise. Furthermore, during the session of the Political Committee held on 16th February 1960, the party announced the essence of the correction.21 The party leadership tolerated and acknowledged the idea that the agricultural cooperatives should apply methods adapted to their conditions, differing from the Soviet kolkhoz kulás 1945 – 1961 [Two Agrarian Revolutions in Hungary: Democratic and Socialist Agrarian Transformation, 1945 – 1961], Budapest 1972; Pál Romány, The Completion and Partial Dismantling of Collective Agriculture, in: Gunst, Hungarian Agrarian Society (fn. 3), pp. 299 – 327. 18 For more information on the debates between the both sides, see: Levente Sipos, Reform és megtorpanás. Viták az MSZMP agrárpolitikájáról (1956 – 1958) [Reform and Balking. Debates on the Agrarian Policy of the HSWP, 1956 – 1958], in: Múltunk 36 (1991), 2 / 3, pp. 188 – 197; Zsuzsanna Varga, Politika, paraszti érdekérvényesítés és szövetkezetek Magyarországon, 1956 – 1967 [Politics, the Assertion of Agrarian Interests and Cooperatives in Hungary, 1956 – 1967], Budapest 2001, pp. 43 – 51. 19 Lajos Fehér (1917 – 1981) was a secretary of the Central Committee responsible for the agricultural sector. Later his task was to supervise agriculture as a vice Prime Minister, thereby becoming one of the leaders of the agrarian lobby. 20 The mechanisms of defence and the strategies of survival developed in the Rákosi-era showed a quick revival in the course of the third wave of collectivization. Due to the low income levels, the best of the village workforce (young people, men of working age) sought employment outside the cooperatives. And, on top of it all, a manpower of a few hundred thousands leaving the agricultural sector, was not easily replaced with means of mechanization. See moe on these problems: Tibor Valuch, Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század második felében [The Social History of Hungary in the Second Half of the 20th Century], Budapest 2001, pp. 189 – 200. 21 MOL M-KS-288. f. 5 / 170. o. e. Jegyzokönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1960. február 16 – ai ülésérol. [Minutes of the Political Committee of the HSWP, 16. 02. 1960].

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model. From this ‘bargaining’ position, the cooperative members managed to get leave to keep more stock on the household farms, undertake share-cropping on the collective farm, receive their premium in kind etc. This corrective turn was the result of several different factors. The priority of the political leadership was to end collectivization while minimising the recession in agricultural produce which was supposed to serve as the basis for the policy of improved standards of living. This was, alas, a pressure they had to yield to. In this situation, the agrarian politicians with reformist ideas used the experience gathered in the old, “surviving” cooperatives as an example. These were the cooperatives that had survived the waves of dissolution in both 1953 and 1956. The main reason for their survival was the fact that they had developed inner regulations that suited both the interest of the members and the local conditions better than the the original kolkhoz model. Many of the surviving cooperatives changed over to payment in produce, introducing share-cropping or similar systems of remuneration.22 The introduction of share-cropping satisfied both the members and the leadership equally. By being given a direct share of the crops, members obtained their bread grain for the entire year, as well as the forage they needed to feed their household animal stock. The advantage for the cooperative leadership, on the other hand, was that labor-intensive crop maintenance and harvesting were carried out well and on time. The correction was a sign that the HSWP, albeit under pressure, gave in to some of the farmers’ demands. A certain kind of dialogue had started between the representatives of the political power and the cooperatives. Most of the party leadership, however, considered this as a merely transitional situation. Nevertheless, as my research clearly shows, this dialogue was not terminated after the completion the collectivization23, but had in fact become stronger and wider.24 It became an integral part of the pragmatic agrarian policy of the Kádár-era. 22 For more detailed information on the history of “surviving” cooperatives, see the documents from the Village Department (later: Department of Agriculture) of the Central Committee of the HSWP. MOL M-KS-288.f. 28 / 1957 / 1. o. e. Feljegyzés a tsz-ek helyzetérol és legfontosabb problémáiról [Notes on the Situation of Agricultural Cooperatives and their Eminent Difficulties], 10. 01. 1957; Jelentés a mezogazdaság helyzetérol. [Report on the Situation of Agriculture], 26. 01. 1957; Jelentés a parasztság különbözo rétegeinek problémáiról és a falusi pártmunkáról [Report on the Problems of the Various Strata of the Rural Population and on Party Work Done in Villages], 18. 02. 1957. 23 The statistical data reflect the turnaround as follows: in 1961, there were 271 state farms, approximately 4.200 cooperatives, and almost 165.000 registered individual farms. The cooperatives owned almost 70 percent of the country’s ploughland, and employed threequarters of the total number of agricultural workers. 24 This mentioned tendency appears in both national and local archival sources. MOL M-KS-288.f. 28 / 1962 / 3. o. e. Jelentés az FM Kollégiuma részére a termeloszövetkezetek 1961 évi zárszámadásáról [Report to the Ministry of Agriculture on the Annual Accounts of Cooperatives of the Year 1961], 28. 03. 1962; 288. f. 28 / 1962 / 4. o. e. Tájékoztató jelentés a PB számára a termeloszövetkezetek 1961 évi zárszámadásáról [Informative Report to the Political Committee on the Annual Accounts of Cooperatives of the Year 1961]; 288.f. 17 / 6. o. e. Fehér Lajos 1961 évi anyagai. Az FM Szövetkezetpolitikai Foosztály feljegyzése a pénz-

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This development was largely due to the massive emergence of a new mediator between the representatives of political power and the farmers; these were the presidents of the cooperatives, and they could do so because the conception of the cooperative president as head of farm management changed. During the 1950s, the typical farm president was a political cadre, usually of ‘worker’ origin, who was placed there by the party to ensure that the collective farm followed the Soviet kolkhoz pattern and delivered the required produce to the state. During the third wave of collectivization, the party showed readiness to accept successful farmers of middle-peasant or ‘kulak’ origin as cooperative farm presidents. Whereas during the 1950s, the party had practically appointed the ‘elected’ presidents of the cooperatives by delegating loyal party members, during the course of the final phase of collectivization, the party organizations withdrew and let the local communities elect the head of their own cooperatives. This development had well experienced and generally respected local farmers take over the leadership.25 “Natural selection”, which the party leadership had given way to, produced a special group within the socialist economic elite.26 Thus it was the cooperatives which became dominant within the structure of Hungarian socialist agriculture and not the state farm; above all, this is why the cooperative leaders played a significant role within the agrarian elite. When I use the term “socialist agrarian elite”, I mostly focus on cooperative leaders (management) which includes not only presidents, but agronomists, heads of animal husbandry and heads of horticulture. During the 1960s, a new generation of presidents, together with a new stratum of technical experts and middle management, began to appear. beni díjazást alkalmazó tsz-ek vezetoinek értekezletérol [Lajos Fehér’s Material from the Year 1961. Note of the Cooperative Department of the Ministry of Agriculture on the Meeting of Cooperative Managers Applying to Cash Payments], 29. 11. 1961; 288.f. 28 / 1962 / 9. o. e. Megyénkénti jelentések a termeloszövetkezetek anyagi ösztönzése és vezetése területén történt változások hatásairól [Reports from Counties on the Impact of the Changes in the Remuneration of Cooperatives]; 288.f. 28 / 1963 / 37., 38., 39. o. e. A megyei párt és tanácsi vezetokkel folytatott megbeszélések a mezogazdasági termelés és irányítás fontosabb kérdéseirol [Discussions with County Party and Local County Leaders on the Essential Issues of Agricultural Produce and Management]; 288.f. 28 / 1963 / 13. o. e. Jelentés a Földmuvelésügyi Minisztérium Kollégiumához a termeloszövetkezetek jövedelemrészesedési és munkadíjazási tapasztalatairól [Report to the Ministry of Agriculture on the Experience with the Distribution of Income and Remuneration in Cooperatives]. 25 The changing conception of the cooperative president as head of farm management is explored in much greater depth in the first chapter of my monograph, Politika (fn. 18). This chapter is based on the documents of the Academy of Agricultural Cooperative Presidents. This unique collection can be found in the Archive of the Agricultural University (Gödöllo). 26 Sociological research was dealing with this tendency already from the early 1970s. For a sample of this work in both English and Hungarian, see Chris Hann, Tázlár: A Village in Hungary, Cambridge 1980; Ferenc Kunszabó, Elnöktípusok a termeloszövetkezetekben [Types of Presidents in Agricultural Cooperatives], Budapest 1974; Nigel Swain, Collective Farms Which Work?, Cambridge 1985.

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The agrarian elite in Hungary had been shaped by a dual pressure. On the one hand, there were the organizations of the party-state and on the other, there were the members of their own cooperative. This was exactly what made them the ideal mediator. This special role often led to conflicts with local state or party organizations.27 Nevertheless, there were certain influential party members in the highest ranks of the leadership (at the Agricultural Department of the Party and in the Ministries) who could make the party leadership accept that initiatives coming from the ground up would not weaken or disintegrate the cooperatives; on the contrary, they could strengthen them.28 This led to the cooperatives expanding their scope of activities year by year. The Hungarian party and state leadership first only tolerated, but later even supported the functioning of cooperatives which differed from the Soviet kolkhoz model and adjusted themselves more to local conditions. This pragmatic approach was not the result of conscious planning but was implemented as a by-product of random decisions made in response to the developments in the countryside. The political decision-makers did play a role in it, just as the initiatives of the cooperatives and their membership did. Policy came about as an interaction of pressures from above and below. As a result of the dialogue between the country’s leaders and its agrarian society, we can observe a cautious and gradual deviation from the Soviet model in Hungarian agriculture, from the early 1960s on.29 We have to emphasize however, that this departure from the kolkhoz pattern was never openly admitted by the Hungarian leadership. Kádár and his associates did not want to get into an ideological dispute with the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party; they were satisfied with implementing procedures that were at variance with Soviet agrarian practices.

27 I had the opportunity to trace such conflicts back in a case study on the example of a cooperative in the county Hajdú-Bihar: Zsuzsanna Varga, A Hajdú-Bihar megyei mezogazdasági termeloszövetkezetek érdekérvényesítési küzdelmei a korai Kádár-korszakban [Assertion of Agrarian Interests of the Cooperatives in Hajdú-Bihar County in the early Kádár Era], in: A Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Levéltár Évkönyve, XXIV. [Yearbook of the Hajdú-Bihar County Archive], Debrecen 1997, pp. 239 – 268. 28 Initiating and implementing the corrective policy was increasingly well organized by an agricultural lobby, in which Lajos Fehér, Ferenc Erdei, János Keseru, Erno Csizmadia and János Hont were prominent. 29 For the Hungarian model of collective agriculture, in English see: Romány, The Completion (fn. 17), pp. 329 – 345; Varga, Agrarian Development (fn. 8), pp. 254 – 270.

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IV. Political power and the agrarian elite in the 1970 / 1980s 1. Conflict between the heavy industrial lobby and the agrarian lobby During the first half of the 1960s, the agricultural cooperatives had amassed very valuable practical experience of the market, financial incentives and the role of enterprise autonomy. It is therefore no accident, that significant agricultural reform measures were taken in 1966, two years prior to the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism.30 Agriculture became a special domain of Hungarian economy where the market-style and incentive-oriented reforms could come into force early and on a wide range. From the end of the 1960s on, it was agriculture that broke new ground in opening towards Western Europe. This was also indicated by the admission to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as well as the accelerating importation of western technology. It is not surprising that the agrarian sector adjusted fastest to the New Economic Mechanism. Within the agrarian sector, the cooperatives adjusted the fastest and the most successfully to the modification of the political and economic environment.31 The positive impact of agrarian reform was felt in society as a whole through the improving food supply and in the appearance of former shortage goods that were produced in the ancillary plants of the cooperatives. Besides the rapid and balanced growth in consumption, one of the great achievements of the period between 1966 and 1972 was the improvement of the trade balance. Thus, both the population and the state budget benefited from the rapid development of cooperative farming. However, the beginning of the 1970s still saw the emergence of an anti-cooperative campaign. The criticism of the cooperatives was part of a wider process, which led to the deceleration of the economic reform in 1972 and to the strengthening of dogmatic (neo-Stalinist) forces within the party leadership.32 The 1968 economic reform had 30 For more detailed information on the New Economic Mechanism, see: Iván T. Berend, The Hungarian Economic Reform, Cambridge 1990; Paul G. Hare / Hugo K. Radice / Nigel Swain (eds.), Hungary: A Decade of Economic Reform, London 1981; Zsuzsanna Varga, The “Modernizing” Role of Agriculture in the Hungarian Economic Reform, in: Christoph Boyer (ed.), Zur Physiognomie sozialistischer Wirtschaftsreformen. Die Sowjetunion, Polen, die Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, die DDR und Jugoslawien im Vergleich, Frankfurt a. M. 2007, pp. 201 – 218. 31 While following the reform, agricultural production increased by an annual 5.5 percent, the increase on cooperative farms was 9.4 percent: Mezogazdasági Statisztikai Zsebkönyv 1975 [Agricultural Statistical Handbook 1975], Budapest 1976, pp. 11 – 14. 32 For issues raised by interpretation of the conservative offensive early in the 1970s, see: Iván T. Berend, A magyar reform sorsfordulója az 1970-es években. [The Turning Point of the Hungarian Economic Reform in the 1970s], in: Valóság 31 (1988), 1, pp. 1 – 26; György Földes, Hatalom és mozgalom (1956 – 1989) [Power and Movement, 1956 – 1989], Budapest 1989, pp. 97 – 126; Tibor Huszár, Kádár János politikai életrajza (1957. november – 1989. június) [The Political Biography of János Kádár, November 1957 – June 1989], Budapest 2003;

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its opponents from the very beginning. One such group with opposed interests were the big industrial companies, the trusts.33 The heavy industrial lobby enjoyed the support of the higher echelons of the trade union leadership, the central planning apparatus, and the non-experts in the central and county economic policy party apparatus.34 Made complacent by permanent subsidies, the big industrial companies felt that their former privileges were being challenged by the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism, especially when it became clear that, in the second phase of the reform, the monopolistic large companies (trusts) were to be divided up into efficient small and medium-sized companies. In addition to the plan for institutional transformation, new requirements emerged: apart from political reliability, an increasing emphasis was placed on expertise. The directors of the industrial companies were also concerned that the agrarian lobby, which had strengthened in the meantime, was stating its interests more and more clearly. Thus, for example, the agrarians criticized the irrationally high price and poor quality of the machinery, equipment and industrial raw materials produced for agriculture, as well as the excessive gap between the prices of agricultural and industrial products.35 There was no opportunity for open clashes of interest, since under the system of one-party-rule, conflicts were expressed in the ideological sphere. In spite of the fact that the 1968 reform had recognized the equality of state and cooperative ownership, at the beginning of the 1970s the debate was relaunched as to whether coGyörgy Péteri, From Purge to Scandal: The MEGÉV-affair and Changing Political Style in Communist Hungary, in: János M. Rainer / György Péteri (eds.), Muddling Through in the Long 1960s. Ideas and Everyday Life in High Politics and Lower Classes of Communist Hungary, Trondheim 2005, pp. 109 – 134. 33 Due to the primacy of the development of heavy industry during the 1950s and 1960s, this branch of the economy had received the most investments. The enormous metallurgical and machine industrial plants etc. were in a privileged position, and their directors formed a strong lobbying group. The heavy industrial lobby relied, among other things, on the ideological axiom that the working class was entitled to the leading role in the building of Socialism. This provided them with privileges, not only regarding the acquisition of resources but also in every major decision. 34 The anti-reform forces were led by Béla Biszku, Zoltán Komócsin and Sándor Gáspár. At this time, Béla Biszku was the “second man” in the party leadership, Zoltán Komócsin was the secretary of foreign affairs in the Central Committee of the Party and Sándor Gáspár was the head of the Central Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions (SZOT). 35 These issues emerged particularly sharply during the preparation of the fourth five-year plan, to be launched in 1971. In 1970, there was a fierce behind-the-scenes struggle over the distribution of investment resources. The industrial and heavy industrial lobby complained that in the course of the previous five-year plan, agriculture had received a larger proportion of investments than at any time previously (18 percent); thus, they now wanted to ensure the preservation of their formerly privileged position. For the investment question, see: Ágnes Ungvárszki, Gazdaságpolitikai ciklusok Magyarországon, 1948 – 1988 [Economic Policy Cycles in Hungary, 1948 – 1988], Budapest 1989, pp. 49 – 60.

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operative ownership – along with household plots and ancillary activities – was in fact equal with state ownership. Similar ideological debates took place on the issue of interest relations.36 In reality, these ideological debates were a preparation for the attack on the cooperatives. Referring to the interests of industrial workers, antireformist forces increasingly and vehemently criticized the fact that the income level of the members of the cooperatives had reached and by 1971 even somewhat surpassed that of the workers. Yet all this would not have been sufficient to launch an attack against the cooperatives since, as mentioned earlier, both the population and the state budget had benefited from the development of agricultural production. What came to be of decisive importance was the fact that, in the meantime, the international assessment of the reform had changed. Following the events of August 1968, that is the armed intervention in the reform process in Czechoslovakia, Hungary was not simply left on its own with its reform. In the meantime, the evaluation of the New Mechanism in the Eastern bloc had become increasingly unfavorable.37 Taking advantage of the external political pressure, primarily from Moscow but also from Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, the internal opposition to the reform forced the HSWP’s Central Committee to decelerate the New Economic Mechanism at its session on 14 / 15th November 1972.38 Although the reform was not publicly denounced, and its most important elements were not withdrawn, in response to pressure from the industrial and heavy industrial lobby restrictive measures were introduced that hit the agricultural cooperative sector particularly hard. The arsenal for the attack against the cooperatives ranged from ideological debates, administrative restrictions and the increased siphoning off of income to police and legal procedures.39 Police and legal procedures were initiated against several cooperative leaders, during the course of which certain general practices that were contrary to the concepts of the opposition to the reform were exaggerated, while certain people who were involved in these practices were penalized in an effort to set an example to deter 36 These debates can very well be retraced in the reviews Társadalmi Szemle [Social Review], Pártélet [Life In the Party], as well as the daily paper Népszabadság [People’s Freedom]. 37 For an introduction to the history of socialist economic reforms, see: Boyer, Zur Physiognomie sozialistischer Wirtschaftsreformen (fn. 30); György Földes, Kötélhúzás felsofokon. Kádár és Brezsnyev [Rope-Pulling of the Highest Degree. Kádár and Brezhnev], in: Árpád Rácz (ed.), Ki volt Kádár? [Who Was Kádár?], Budapest 2001, pp. 103 – 113, here pp. 109 – 111. 38 MOL M-KS-288. f. 4 / 119 – 120. o. e. Jegyzokönyv a Központi Bizottság 1972. november 14 – 15-én tartott ülésérol [Minutes of the Central Committee of the HSWP, 14. / 15. 11. 1972]. 39 For more on ideological, economic and legal dimensions of the offensive against agricultural cooperatives, see: Zsuzsanna Varga, Political Trials Against the Leaders of Cooperatives in the 1970s, in: Hungarologische Beiträge 17 (2005), pp. 159 – 187.

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others. On more than one occasion, they took steps against those who had embraced the goals of the New Economic Mechanism and who had made efforts to achieve more profitable farming, to enhance efficiency, and to introduce market-oriented attitudes. Thus, these show trials targeted the most ambitious leaders, who outshone their peers with their creativity and enterprising skills.40 Following the mass-scale retributions after the 1956 revolution which were concluded in the early 1960s, this was the most far reaching wave of political retaliations in Hungary. The police and legal procedures against cooperative leaders made it clear that illegal show trials had not disappeared from the arsenal of practices of the “soft dictatorship”. Aggravations, the withdrawal of resources, the increased outward intervention into their functioning, the enforced fusion of cooperatives as well as the ongoing slander of successful cooperative leaders was followed by unfavorable consequences that appeared within a few years. The spectacular decline in household produce in 1973 and the loss in subsidiary activity within the cooperatives affected the food supply very badly. Since the legitimacy of the Kádár-regime had largely depended on the fulfilment of the policy of living standards, the party leadership started to gradually revoke the former restrictive measures: from the middle of the 1970s onwards, they had slackened the aggravations.41 These measures were motivated not only by the aforementioned social and political considerations, but also by the impact of the oil crisis. Due to a sudden rearrangement of the pricing conditions of the international market, the national budget was in need of agrarian exports as a certain way of obtaining foreign currency. At the time of the great price explosion in 1973 / 1974, the prevailing political principles in Hungary included the commitment to COMECON and the forced development of heavy industry. A decision made by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party in December 1974 clearly shows that the leadership had realized the importance of the changes on the international market.42 However, they insisted on their former economic policy since they believed that cheap oil and natural gas from the Soviet Union would ensure Hungarian independence from the world market. After 1975, however, it turned out that the Soviet Union had changed the former calculation of the prices, which meant that socialist countries also had to pay more for oil. From 1976 on, the dominant opinion within 40 These so called “president trials” are explored in much greater depth in the second part of my article: Political Trials against the Leaders of Cooperatives in the 1970s (fn. 39). My paper was based on archival research and oral history and attempted to examine the precedents, characteristics and consequences of these trials. 41 The decision of the Political Committee of the MSZMP in February 1976, as well as a number of subsequent governmental and departmental orders on the situation and the possible extension of household plots, showed a return of rationality and pragmatic policy. See: MOL M-KS 288. f. 5 / 684. o. e. Jegyzokönyv a Politikai Bizottság 1976. február 10-ei ülésérol [Minutes of the Political Committee of the HSWP, 10. 02. 1976]. 42 MOL M-KS 288. f. 4 / 131 – 132. o. e. Jegyzokönyv a Központi Bizottság 1974. December 5-ei ülésérol [Minutes of the Central Committee of the HSWP, 05. 12. 1974].

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the party leadership was that Hungary should be oriented more to the conditions of the world market. This also led to the revision of the former agrarian policy.

2. Changes in the socialist agrarian elite From the early 1970s until the late 1980s, Hungarian agriculture and the Hungarian food industry were able to double their exports.43 These exports made it possible for Hungarian industry, which required imports of raw materials, energy and technological equipment but which had weak exporting capacity – especially on markets using convertible currency – to remain functional. Furthermore, agriculture’s convertible export activity played a major role in debt servicing.44 Due to the country’s increasing economic burdens and external debt-repayment dues, siphoning off of agricultural income by the state increased. When examining the balance of the subsidies and drains affecting the agrarian sector it can be said that this balance deteriorated drastically in the first half of the 1980s, predominantly due to the increased draining of income.45 In this critical situation, the cooperatives began to search for solutions to improve farming results. The workforce became increasingly valuable, and the significance of interest enhancers to stimulate more economic and professional labor increased. Greater emphasis was placed on the creation of genuine ownership interest in order to stimulate the increase of assets, as well as on the need to establish forms of farming and organization that amalgamated various properties of different sizes. As a result of this recognition – and by making use of existing traditions and positive experiences – the further development of organizational and interest systems accelerated. 46 Attentive to economic rationality, the cooperatives attempted to function like enterprises and created different bodies for this within the cooperative. Nevertheless, within the framework of large-scale production, these new forms of organization and interest were bound to come up against some difficulties, most importantly, the unclear conditions of proprietorship and interests. The agrarian elite, thus, sought to solve matters on a local level even though they required decisions made on the highest level. Professional drafts had been made 43 Sándor Szakács, A reform kérdése és a termelés, 1968 – 1985 [Reform Question and Production, 1968 – 1985], in: Agrártörténeti Szemle 31 (1989), 1 – 4, pp. 66 – 68. 44 György Földes, Az eladósodás politikatörténete, 1957 – 1986 [Political History of Indebtedness, 1957 – 1986], Budapest 1995, pp. 77 – 109. 45 Éva Szabóné Medgyesi, A vállalati gazdálkodás néhány problémája a mezogazdaságban [Some Problems of Company Management in Agriculture], in: Statisztikai Szemle 64 (1986), 11, pp. 1065 – 1076. 46 These kinds of criticism can be seen in the publications of National Council of Agricultural Cooperatives.

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and even made their way to the Central Committee of HSWP, however, the political decision-making was lagging behind.47 Even if the contents of these drafts made in the final hours of socialism have since become insignificant, they may be instructive to historians. They may be relevant to our subject since they tell us much about the conceptions the former agrarian elite had about on the future. The drafts contained initiatives coming from the grass roots, practically outlining the frameworks of agrarian reform. The essence of this proposed reform was the enhancement of the competitive potential and, perhaps more importantly, the adjustment to the requirements of western markets. It may sound strange at first that the socialist agrarian elite formulated the need for moving close to the western world. However, a closer look at the participants may offer us some explanation. The 1970s saw the replacement of those managers of cooperatives who had been appointed in the times of collectivization.48 As a result, from 1968 onwards, when cooperatives were officially considered as autonomous socialist enterprises, the cooperative president would no longer be a former successful peasant but someone with university or technical college education. It should be stressed that after the introduction of a new Cooperative Law in 1967, the election of new presidents from amongst the membership became secret. The transformation of the farm president and other managers as a distinct group of professionals was further accelerated by the mergers of agricultural cooperatives. With growth in the average size of farms, with mechanization and an extended division of labor, management structure became more complex.49 The management of big estates of several thousands of hectares including up to four or five villages required special expertise. This could be delivered by new graduates of 47 For a sample of these reform materials: MOL M-KS-288. f. 38 / 74. o. e. A Mezogazdasági és Élelmezésügyi Minisztérium és a Termeloszövetkezetek Országos Tanácsának eloterjesztése az MSZMP KB Szövetkezetpolitikai Munkaközösségéhez a mezogazdasági szövetkezetek muködése továbbfejlesztésének egyes kérdéseirol [A Joint Proposititon of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food and the National Council of Cooperatives to the Cooperative Team of the Central Committee of the HSWP on Certain Developmental Issues of Agricultural Cooperatives, 05. 06. 1986]; M-KS-288. f. 15 / 538. o. e. A Mezogazdasági és Élelmezésügyi Minisztérium eloterjesztése az MSZMP KB Gazdaságpolitikai Bizottság számára az élelmiszertermelés fejlesztésének programjáról [Proposition of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food to the Economic Committee of the Central Committe of the HSWP on the Food Produce Development Project March 1987]; M-KS-288. f. 5 / 1049. o. e. Az MSZMP KB Gazdaság- és Szociálpolitikai Osztály javaslata a Politikai Bizottságnak az agrárpolitika megújításának koncepciójára [Proposal of the Economic and Social Political Department of the Central Committee of the HSWP to the Political Committee on the Reform Concept of Agrarian Policy, 17. 01. 1989]. 48 For more on the cooperative leaders, see the publications of the Cooperative Research Institute: Tibor Simó, A termeloszövetkezeti elnökök társadalmi mobilitása [Social Mobility of Cooperative Presidents], Budapest 1975; Meszticzky, Elnökök (fn. 13), pp. 279 – 333. 49 The average size of cooperative farms in 1967 was 1.463 hectars, in 1975 2.839 hectars. See: Béla Fazekas, A mezogazdasági termeloszövetkezeti mozgalom Magyarországon [The Movement of Agricultural Cooperatives in Hungary], Budapest 1976, p. 228.

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agrarian academies and faculties. In the mid-1970s, 43 percent of all presidents had higher educational qualification (In 1960, this ratio was only 4 percent). At the same time, the number of experts with higher educational qualification among specialist management increased from 28 percent in 1960 to 75 percent in 1974.50 Thus, we see, a new and young group of cooperative managers with up-to-date knowledge emerging by the 1980s.51 Most were young, between 35 and 45 years of age, and the overwhelming majority had both university degrees and 10 – 20 years of production experience in their own cooperatives. They were not politically imposed outsiders serving the interests of the metropolis. They were local people, highly qualified individuals tied existentially to the good of the cooperative. Of course, most were party members, but there is a world of difference between the party member of the 1970s and 1980s and the party apparatchik of the 1950s. After the New Economic Mechanism in 1968, expertise and professional skills had grown more important. When filling vacancies in top manager positions, loyalty towards the party alone would not do; adequate professional training was also required. These managers, partly due to their experience gathered during visits abroad clearly saw that only structures capable of quality produce would be able to stand their ground in competition with international markets.52 It should be stressed that by the time of the “change of system” collective farm management was, therefore, very different from that of the 1950s.

V. The agrarian elite after the political transition 1. Compensation, privatization At the time of the political transition, it seemed that agriculture would be the economical sector to adapt most easily to the conditions of market economy. In reality, this is the sector that showed the most controversial and actually least sucFigures taken from the publications of the Cooperative Research Institute (see: fn. 48). For educational qualifications, age distribution and career mobility of cooperative farm management in the late 1980s, see the survey: Vezetok a nyolcvanas években [Economic Leaders in the 1980s], ed. by Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Budapest 1991. For the background of the survey and some of its published results, see: János Kisdi / Rózsa Kulcsár, A hatalom gazdasági elitje az elmúlt évtizedben. [The Economic Elite in the Last Decade], in: Statisztikai Szemle 69 (1991), 10, pp. 789 – 797. 52 Cooperative managers gained their experiences abroad mostly at the time when they had already taken a leading position. They usually visited a Western European country as part of a state or party delegation where they had the opportunity to study the local farms for one or two weeks. These already established relations could later be easily continued individually, too. The same applies to relations with the U.S. In 1969, for instance, a large delegation from Hungary came to the United Sates. This study trip lasted over a month, resulting in concrete forms of cooperation between the John Deere Company and certain agricultural cooperatives and state farms in Hungary. See the reports of party and state delegations composed for the Economic Committee of HSWP. MOL M-KS-288. f. 15. cs. 50 51

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cessful development. In the 1990s, agricultural production was 20 to 30 percent lower than the levels of 1989 – 1991.53 While growth in industry began in 1994, and in other sectors of the national economy in 1996 – 1997, the agrarian sector faced a continuing and comprehensive crisis. First of all, it should be stressed that in the early 1990s, the economic environment took a very unfavorable turn. The traditional market of the COMECON had collapsed. The most serious problem was that the Soviet partner had become insolvent. Since it was completely uncertain when Hungary would receive these outstanding payments, we had left this market. At the same time, access to the western markets proved very difficult.54 In the period under examination, the domestic market for this branch narrowed, since massive unemployment and the drastic decline in personal incomes led to a fall in food consumption. The politico-economic situation of the agrarian branch was also unfavorable. The high inflation that characterized the 1990s had an impact on agriculture as well. There was a drastic widening of the gap between the prices of agricultural and industrial products. The subsidies formerly paid to agriculture fell drastically.55 The main reason for the longest and most severe crisis of Hungarian agriculture, however, was that the transition of the structure of production and ownership had become the subject of political and ideological debates. In the absence of a wellconsidered and consistent agrarian-political concept, many problems arose from the interlinking of two genuine economic and social demands: on the one hand, the unavoidable change in the structure of agricultural ownership, and on the other hand, compensation for the unjust damage inflicted on private property by the previous regime. The parties of the first post-socialist government launched a radical transformation of the proprietorship and the entire system of the agrarian sector. This transformation led to a weakening of the former agrarian elite in the assertion of their interests: Thus, the elite itself fell to pieces. In order to understand this process, we must consider the main facts and characteristics of the transition in agriculture. The conversion of state and cooperative ownership into private ownership was at the centre of the drastic agricultural changes of the 1990s. According to data from the end of the 1980s, 31.8 percent of all cultivatable land was held by state farms 53 A mezogazdaság strukturális változásai a kilencvenes években. Statisztikai áttekintés [The Structural Changes of the Hungarian Agriculture in the 1990s. Statistical Overview], ed. by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Budapest 2003, pp. 9 – 13. 54 Anikó Juhász / János Kartali / Hartmut Wagner, A magyar agrárkülkereskedelem a rendszerváltás után [The Hungarian Agricultural Foreign Trade after the Economic and Political Change of the Early 1990s], Budapest 2002, pp. 3 – 12. 55 For more on the economic situation of Hungarian farms, see: Anna Burgerné Gimes / Krisztina Tóth, A mezogazdasági üzemek gazdasági helyzete [Economic Situation of Hungarian Farms], Budapest 1999, pp. 16 – 42; Gábor Udovecz, Jövedelemhiány és versenyképesség a magyar mezgazdaságban [Shortage of Income and Pressure of Competition in the Hungarian Agriculture], Budapest 2000, pp. 12 – 34.

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and companies, 61.0 percent belonged to cooperatives and 7.2 percent to individual and subsidiary farms. The state, as well as individual and subsidiary farms, did not only have a right to utilization, they – the state and the individuals – also had the ownership. Concerning the cooperatives, right to utilization and ownership were separated in a form called mixed ownership (i.e. the land had been given out for cultivation). 3.8 percent of the land cultivated by the cooperatives was state property, 61.1 percent was common, cooperative property and 35.1 percent was individual property of the members licensed for common cultivation.56 In 1988 / 1989, the land question had become a symbolic issue of agrarian policy, since all the political parties had quite dissimilar views on it.57 The Hungarian Socialist Party, the successor of the former communist party suggested that agriculture be restructured, but at the same time that the system of large collective farms be preserved. However, at the time of the political transition, the party’s political influence was so small, that they had no significant impact on the transition of agriculture. The Alliance of Free Democrats, the strongest liberal party, had the intention to carry out privatization in every sector of the economy, including agriculture. However, they had no definitive conception how to realize this. The Independent Smallholders Party (officially the Independent Smallholders’, Land Laborers’ and Citizens’ Party)58 a historical party for farmers and smallholders, held the opinion that land should be returned to all those who had owned it back in 1947. Thus, they wanted re-privatization, which means giving back every former owner the exact part of land which he had previously owned. This itself was very controversial, not mentioning the fact that many of the former owners had died in the meantime. Their heirs, however, largely consisted of workers and intellectuals living in towns. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, the winner of the first free elections after the political transition and the leading party of the first government, also had the intention to privatize but did not argue in favor of re-privatization. However, they 56 For more on the land ownership and land use in socialist Hungary, see: Levente Sipos, A hazai földtulajdoni és földhasználati viszonyokról, 1945 – 1989 [Land Ownership and Land Use in Hungary, 1945 – 1989], in: Agrártörténeti Szemle 33 (1991), 1 – 4, pp. 493 – 509. 57 For some examples of party-programs, see: József M. Kiss / István Vida (eds.), Magyarországi pártprogramok, 1988 – 1990 [The Party-Programs in Hungary, 1988 – 1990], Budapest 2005, pp. 281 – 291, 477 – 479, 355 – 357, 556 – 561. 58 This party was formed in 1930. It sees itself as a peasant party and as an historical national party based on the Christian value system, close to the Christian democrats, which stands for a social market economy based on the primacy of private property. Its program essentially remains a continuation of its program of the 1930s: bourgeois freedoms, a market economy with entrepreneurial freedom and a special emphasis on small industrialists, petty traders, and peasants. The elections in 1945 gave them clear majority but later, the communist party, strengthened by support from the Soviet Union, disbarred them from political power. After the political transition, they were one of the first to reorganize.

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needed the support of the Smallholders’ Party in their coalition so they drew up a plan of compromise. This meant a special process of privatization combined with compensation. This was the plan that finally went through. In 1991 / 1992, four compensation laws were passed in order to make reparation for the unjust damage inflicted on private property owners by the previous regime.59 Full re-privatization, that is, the restoration of original assets, could not take place due to economic, political and technical reasons. Partial compensation was carried out by the issuing of securities (compensation vouchers), which were given to former owners and their heirs. The compensation vouchers were on-demand option rights or bonds issued by the state, which could be exchanged at face value for state assets that were scheduled to be privatized. Compensation vouchers could be used during the privatization of state and cooperative assets, or to purchase land. They could also be used to purchase state and local council flats or to establish a life annuity. As a result of compensation, an extremely fragmented structure of land ownership emerged. 3.3 million ha were distributed among approximately two million persons who were entitled to compensation.60 One-fifth of the population became land-owners. The new owners received an average of 1 – 2 ha. Furthermore, ownership and the use of land largely became separated. This resulted from the fact that the fundamental transformation of land-ownership relations led to a significant expansion of the circle of landowners, regardless of whether they had ties with agriculture or whether they intended to continue agricultural production on the newly acquired land. They usually let their land by lease. The economic organizations (cooperatives, limited-liability companies) take the land via lease while according the land law of 1994 they are not allowed to buy agricultural land. Thus land ownership and the land use became largely separated. The central components of Hungary’s land privatization strategy were not only the compensation laws, but also the Cooperative Law (I / 1992) and the Transitional Cooperative Law (II / 1992).61 Besides their compensation-related tasks, the cooperatives had to undertake the assignment of assets, in the course of which land and material property used by the cooperatives had to be divided among members, em59 Legal rules and the resolutions of the Constitutional Court are collected in one volume, see: Edit Petri, Kárpótlás és kárrendezés Magyarországon, 1989 – 1998 [Compensation and Settling of Losses in Hungary, 1988 – 1998], Budapest 1998. 60 A mezogazdaság strukturális (fn. 53), pp. 49 – 51. 61 For more on this topic, see: Nigel Swain, Agricultural Privatisation in Hungary (= University of Liverpool, Centre for Central and Eastern European Studies, Working Paper No. 32, Rural Transition Series), Liverpool 1994; Zsuzsanna Varga, The Hungarian Agrarian Sector: Changes, Problems and Possibilities, in: David Turnlock (ed.), Privatization in Rural Eastern Europe. The Process of Restitution and Restructuring, Cheltenham / Northampton 1998, pp. 145 – 168.

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ployees, former members and their heirs in the form of proprietary and business shares. Any individual with a valid claim can opt to take land or equipment out of the collective; and anyone who has been a member (not necessarily a working member) of a collective for five years, or the heirs of such individuals, have a right to shares in the new cooperative. On the other hand, all cooperative members and employees have the right to cooperative property and land (to the value of 30 gold crowns for members and 20 gold crowns for employees), even if they did not contribute land in the first place. Assets had to be assigned so that members could become genuine owners. This was indispensable for the emergence of new cooperatives based on free association. In accordance with the I-II / 1992 laws, three categories of cooperative member were defined: active members (including the management), old-aged pensioners, and external business share owners (former members and their heirs). The principles of the assignment of assets were decided by cooperative assemblies. Finally, business shares were divided as follows: 10 percent on the basis of the assets originally contributed; 20 percent on the basis of duration of membership; 38 percent on the basis of the number of years worked; 27 percent on work performance; and 5 percent on other principles.62 Of the 263 billion forints of cooperative assets in 1992, four-fifths were assigned to active cooperative members (42 percent) and retired members (39 percent), and almost one-fifth (19 percent) to external business-share holders. In the course of the campaign, 640.000 active and retired cooperative members and a further 484.000 external business-share holders received cooperative property.63 Based on the measures of agrarian policy reviewed so far, we can declare that although the program of the Antall-government did not theoretically differentiate between individual and common forms of produce, many laws and decrees clearly had an anti-cooperative flavor. The same applies to the system of agricultural subsidies. This policy was initiated by the Smallholders’ Party. The restoration of small peasant farms had been an essential part of their political program and they reckoned that the liquidation of socialist big farms was a precondition for this. They considered the former socialist agrarian elite the main enemy whom they called the “green barons”. The term is ideological and derogatory. It refers to the upper management of the collective farm establishment and is loaded with the implication that they rule over the farms for their own aggrandisement and enjoy their position of power and authority purely because of their links with the party and the nomenklatura. This is something of an oversimplification on both scores and is rooted in 62 For a survey of economic characteristics of agricultural cooperatives since the change of economic system, see: Erzsébet Tóth, Az átalakult mezogazdasági szövetkezetek gazdálkodásának fobb jellemzoi, 1989 – 1998 [Economic Characteristics of Agricultural Cooperatives since the Change of Economic System, 1989 – 1998], Budapest 2000, pp. 23 – 29. 63 Ibidem, pp. 29 – 34.

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the commissar image of the collective farm manager which ceased to be the norm in the 1950s. Even a quick look in the parliamentary records of the period between 1990 and 1994 reveals a number of emotion-driven speeches by MPs of the Smallholders’ Party.64 These speeches pointed out how the influence and the intertwinings of the “green barons” counteracted with the formation and the strengthening of “healthy peasant farms” in the countryside. 2. “Green Barons” and family farms in agricultural production65 After the discussion of the objectives and the measures taken under the agrarian policy of the first post-socialist government, we shall now turn to the examination of the economic and social consequences of compensation and privatization. During the 1990s, the agrarian sector experienced the highest number of lay-offs in the Hungarian national economy. At the same time, the proportion of agricultural wage earners in the 1990s fell from 18 to 6 percent. The main reason for the huge fall was that (with the transformation of Socialist large farms) two-thirds of large-farm workplaces were abolished; the number of agricultural employees thus fell by almost 650.000. In 2005 almost 240.000 people were employed in agriculture; of these, the proportion of employees approached 60 percent, while that of cooperative members was barely 10 percent. The proportion of agricultural entrepreneurs, together with members of their families who worked with them, was around 30 percent. The size of the full-time agricultural laboor force is exceeded many times by those who are involved in agrarian production part-time.66 Former landowning peasants submitted claims for the return of their former landed property in large numbers. However, this ageing stratum – for obvious reasons – returned to production only temporarily.67 Others – mostly claimants of working age whose rights to land were based on inheritance – fearing unemployment and impoverishment, or due to the loss of their former workplace, seized those few hectares of arable land which promised self-sufficiency and perhaps 64 For evidence of such speeches and parliament debates, see the second chapter of Zsuzsanna Varga, Mezogazdasági szövetkezetek Magyarországon a rendszerváltás után [Agricultural Cooperatives in Hungary after the Change of System], Budapest 2004, pp. 40 – 57. 65 For an introduction to the recent sociological literature of rural transition in 1990s, see: Leo Granberg / Imre Kovách (eds.), Actors on the Changing European Countryside, Budapest 1998; Imre Kovách (ed.), Hatalom és társadalmi változás. A posztszocializmus vége. Szociológiai tanulmányok [Power and Social Change. The End of Post-Socialism. Sociological Studies], Budapest 2002. 66 See more on this: A mezogazdaság strukturális (fn. 53), pp. 13 – 3, as well as recent figures taken from the database of the Ministry of Agriculture. 67 József Alvincz / Tibor Varga, A családi gazdaságok helyzete és versenyképességének javítási lehetoségei [The Situation of Family Farms and Possible Ways to Improve Their Competitveness], Budapest 2000, pp. 5 – 41.

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some income. Because of mass unemployment – which was especially high in the countryside – these households established new ways of combining the income from small-scale agricultural production and other sources (early retirement, unemployment benefit etc.). However, in these small-scale farms, established out of necessity, both professional knowledge and capital were generally lacking.68 In the case of economically bankrupt or disbanded cooperatives, members were left with no alternative but to attempt private farming. A very wide stratum was reduced to this necessity, since the number of those employed on large farms fell by 80 percent. These people were able to rely on the land they were given during the transformation of the cooperatives. According to the law, an area of land with the value of 30 gold crowns each had to be provided for members of the cooperatives, while employees were to receive land with a value of 20 gold crowns each.69 The small farms of between 2 and 3 hectares, owned by cooperative members and employees who were made unemployed, face an uncertain future, since they have scarcely any means of production or finance. All this gave rise to the dramatic transformation of rural society: massive impoverishment on the one hand and the enrichment of a few on the other.70 Only the stratum of working-age people, whose determination was coupled with adequate capabilities, was capable of launching genuine agricultural enterprises. In this respect, besides professional skills, the possession of material goods (land, buildings, machines) and liquid financial means was of decisive importance.71 After leaving the cooperatives, it was frequently the case that a larger family, occasionally joined by relatives who were not cooperative members but who owned external land and business shares, together established a company of legal or nonlegal entity together. It was also frequent for the leaders of the disbanding cooperatives – and their narrow circle of relatives and friends within the cooperative and the village – to obtain land of the members and production equipment of the cooperative as assigned to the members, by buying up for a low price the land, business shares and compensation vouchers allotted to the members. In this way, they established capital-rich individual and joint enterprises. At the time of the change of the political system, it appeared that the best opportunities were open to those small agricultural producers who, in the 1980s, had spe68 This is hardly surprising since small-scale produce was entwined with agricultural cooperatives prior to 1989. The cooperatives provided the seeds, the expertise and they took care of marketing as well. The members already taking part in the division of labor of a big farm did not have the extensive knowledge the peasants used to have. 69 Tóth, Az átalakult mezogazdasági (fn. 62), pp. 29 – 34. 70 For evidence of mass impoverishment in the countryside, see: László Laki, A szegénység közelebbrol [Poverty at a Close Range], in: Kovách, Hatalom (fn. 65), pp. 113 – 131. 71 On the changes in capital and ownership conditions in Hungarian agriculture, see: Ádám Balogh / Lajos Harza, A vagyon – a tulajdon és a tokeviszonyok változása a mezogazdaságban [Changes in Capital and Ownership Conditions in the Hungarian Agriculture], Budapest 1998, pp. 26 – 30.

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cialized in commodity production on household plots and ancillary farms, and who had accumulated sufficient capital in the form of funds, skills and relationships to become individual entrepreneurs.72 Interestingly, however, the largest small producers of the 1980s who continued farming in the 1990s were overtaken, in terms of both the volume and profitability of production, by those with a university education, whose private farming activities began after 1990. The large, specialist private farms are typically headed by former members of the erstwhile managements of the cooperative.73 Owners of traditional farms with a mixed-product structure are largely former agricultural physical laborers. The concentration of land and production during the second half of the 1990s accentuated the differences between the two basic types of farm – the traditional, mixed-product structure and the Western-style specialized, entrepreneurial private farm. Despite the radical change of ownership within domestic agriculture, large and medium-sized business organizations are still important economic factors.74 Until 1990, large farms cultivated almost 90 percent of agricultural land. This proportion had halved within ten years, but until 1996, it exceeded the percentage cultivated by individual farms. The lands and tools of state farms and cooperatives that were regarded as socialist large plants represented the most important resources for privatized agriculture after the change of political system. According to the calculations of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute, based on 1997 prices, 1.000 billion forints of capital were drained from agriculture.75 The majority of cooperatives and state farms were disbanded, and their place was taken by a wide variety of farming forms. In place of the 136 state farms and 1.246 agricultural cooperatives registered in 1988, there were 4.400 business organizations engaged in agricultural activities, and somewhat more than 1.000 cooperatives in operation in 2000.76 These organizations continue to play a significant role in service and integration today. In 2000, the company-based or state-owned business organizations involved in agriculture owned 32 percent of the country’s cultivation area and 64 percent of its forestland. 56 percent of the companies used less than 100 hectares, and 11 percent 72 István Harcsa, Paraszti gazdaságok, mezogazdasági vállalkozók [Peasant Farms, Entrepreneurs in Agriculture], Budapest 1994, pp. 3 – 38. 73 Sándor Laczka / Iván Oros / Miklós Schindele, Magánvállalkozás alakulása a mezogazdaságban [The Development of Private Enterprise in Agriculture], Budapest 1994, pp. 40 – 69; Ieda Osamu, A szövetkezeti gazdálkodás és a vidéki társadalom átalakulásának folyamata Magyarországon: A kettosvezetésu integráció a mezogazdasági termelésben [The Re-Transformation of Cooperative Farming and Rural Society in Hungary: Dual Leadership of Integration in Agricultural Production], in: Aetas 22 (2007), 2, pp. 191 – 214. 74 For more on this topic, see: Tóth, Az átalakult mezogazdasági (fn. 62), pp. 23 – 29; Varga, Mezogazdasági (fn. 64). 75 Balogh / Harza, A vagyon (fn. 71), pp. 18 – 22. 76 A mezogazdaság strukturális (fn. 53), pp. 38 – 48.

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more than 1.000 hectares of the cultivation area. The former cultivated 4 percent of the total arable land of these companies, and the latter 80 percent.77 Despite the more or less variable results of crop production, the best results were achieved in this form of farming. The indications in animal husbandry were also positive. The 1.246 cooperatives that existed in 1988 were divided into almost 2.200 successor organizations and many individual farms throughout the 1990s. One typical type of successor organization was the cooperative (55 percent) and another the limited-liability company (24 percent).78 Among the successor organizations, it is the co-operatives that have relatively larger areas of land, while farms of other company structure posses a significantly smaller area. So far, I have primarily focused on the relations between the post-socialist agrarian elite, representatives of political power and the new structure of ownership. Within the agrarian elite of the 1990s, we can see two different groups. Firstly, the entrepreneurs who own the largest family farms and secondly, the managers of the transformed large farms and cooperative leaders. As an interesting tendency, we can recognize members of the former socialist agrarian elite within the ranks of both groups. It is a unique paradox of modern history that although the Smallholders’ Party left no stone unturned to weaken, in fact even, wreck this elite group during its two periods in government (between 1990 and 1994 as well as between 1998 and 2002), in the middle and long run people with this sort of background seem to be among those benefiting from the transformation of agriculture. There are a number of factors that account for the success of this elite group. As was mentioned, the agrarian elite saw a dynamic transformation in the 1980s; among other developments, it grew more professional and became younger. This group of young technocrat managers gained a significant amount of experience in market and redistribution structures during the late Kádár-era. This, along with a complex web of relations with the leaders of economic administration was instrumental in the successful adaptation to market conditions. Due to their cultural and social capital, they were able to get involved in the privatization of agriculture coming to an end around 1996 / 1997. The relationship between the technocrats and the entrepreneurs was characterized more by disagreements than by cooperation. However, from the end of the 1990s on, both groups attempted to gain control over local and regional politics. These efforts were clearly motivated by the urge to prepare for the situation after accession to the EU, that is, to gain control over development resources.

77 78

Ibidem, pp. 31 f. Tóth, Az átalakult mezogazdasági (fn. 62), pp. 23 – 29.

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VI. Conclusion The rather turbulent history of the last century has left its mark on Hungarian agriculture. Basic conditions of proprietorship and produce have gone through three extensive and some minor changes in the second half of the century. Radical distribution of land in 1945, launching the first wave of collectivization in 1949 and enabling members to quit cooperatives in 1953, which many members in fact did. 1955 saw a restart of collectivization, 1956 the disintegration of the majority of cooperatives. The third and final collectivizational campaign started in 1959. And finally, following the transformation of the political system and as a result of compensation and privatization, de-collectivization came. The key element behind each change was the state and each shift had a significant impact on the composition of the elite, too. At certain times the state emerged as a destructive force, while at others it served as the producer of a vast elite. An indication of the depth of the problem is the unceasing debate on the optimal structure of ownership and the distribution of landed property. There was, thus, an unprecedented number of interventions from above. Nevertheless, in spite of the developmental interruptions, one can still discern certain long-term tendencies. One of them is a unique duality spanning the history of 20th century Hungarian agriculture; the one of large estates versus small farms. In the period between the two World Wars, this pitted against each other large estates of feudal origin on the one hand and peasant farms on the other. Large estates were eliminated by the land reform in 1945 and a few years later, collectivization launched a vicious attack on small peasant farms. However, the “superiority of socialist forms of farming” did not come true in practice. There were a number of sectors (for example: labor-intensive vegetable, fruit and grape production, egg production, pig farming) where large farms proved unable to meet market requirements. Small-scale produce delivered by household plots and ancillary farms had not only survived, but had in fact become widespread. The dichotomy, albeit this time within the structure of socialist agriculture, was resurrected despite the intentions and efforts of the state. Things took a radical turn after the political transition. The first freely elected government decided that the functioning of private peasant farms was to have priority. Parallel to this, they did all they could to weaken and even eliminate large farms. Even though the conditions of ownership changed dramatically, large farms have survived and have come to play an important part. The former dichotomy, albeit in yet another shape, has survived once again despite political efforts. This structural duality is a deeply rooted and peculiarly Hungarian specialty that had an impact on the inner structure of rural population including the agrarian elite. During the first half of the 20th century, the agrarian elite included the class of big landowners as well as – especially in smaller local communities – a group of wealthy peasants. In 1945 land reform eliminated the existential basis of the aris-

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tocracy overnight. However, wealthy peasants could enjoy no more than a few years of being the sole elite group in the rural population. From 1948 / 1949 on, it was they who were assaulted by the communist government. The party applied various measures in order to restrict and then later destroy their economic and political influence. This development left the rural population without an elite for some time. The next change happened at the beginning of the 1960s, the final period of collectivization. The Kádár-government had realized that they badly needed the expertise and diligence of wealthy peasants, so they let them take part in the management of agricultural cooperatives. In a new form they retrieved their former position on the top of the rural hierarchy. As part of their special self-rehabilitation, many of them had their children go to universities and colleges during the late 1960s. Next to the offsprings of formerly poor and moderately wealthy peasants, it was they who took over the management of agricultural cooperatives during the 1970s. At that time, cooperatives had already switched over to professional, industrial-like production. A further important development was the emergence of an elite of well-educated agricultural professionals engaging in scientific research. This elite group developed a growing influence on political decision makers and became a strong lobby group. A further characteristic of the agrarian elite of the socialist era had its roots in the special relationship between small and large farms. With the growing importance of small-scale produce for the market, a successful group with entrepreneurial skills had gained strength. They had become an important part of the agrarian elite due to their economic performance and their income. However, this was the group whose significance had always been disparaged by the party leaders. Through a variety of restrictive measures – the limitation of landed property size, the restriction of the procurement of instruments of production – the socialist government made sure that this successful group was no competition for the large farms. The bipolarity of the agricultural structure after the political transition has again given rise to the dichotomy of the agrarian elite. On the one side, we find the owners of the largest family farms, on the other, the managers of the transformed agricultural organizations. The main question remains how the Hungarian agrarian elite reacts to the emergence of new competitors, the foreign agrarian entrepreneurs (from Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France etc.) after 2011.79 This 79 During the accession talks to the EU, the Hungarian Government – referring to the land act LV / 1994 – requested a ten-year ban, beginning as of the date of accession, on the sale of land in Hungary to domestic and foreign legal entities and foreign natural persons. In essence, the explanation was that since land prices in the EU are between 5 and 40 times higher than in Hungary, there was concern that speculative capital would inundate the Hungarian arable land market. The following agreement was concluded: foreigners who are not resident in Hungary do not have the right to purchase arable land for a period of seven years following accession; however, foreign citizens who can prove that they have been habitually resident for

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group is already present in Hungary, however, their true significance and influence can only be estimated. After 2011 however, when the derogation restricting the purchase of agricultural land by foreigners will have been lifted, the actual conditions of ownership will become clear. That is perhaps the challenge that can change the competitive and even hostile relationship between the two groups of the Hungarian agrarian elite.

at least three years in Hungary, and who have been working in the country as individual agricultural entrepreneurs, can purchase the land already rented by them at the time of accession in 2004. See: Varga, Agrarian Development (fn. 8), pp. 290 – 294.

Social Factors Conditioning the Recruitment of the Hungarian Economic Elite at the End of the 1990s By György Lengyel I. Introduction This paper is a part of a book – published in Hungarian – dealing with the social composition of the economic elite before and after the transformation. It is based on empirical research I carried out in Hungary between 1990 and 1998 among members of the economic elite.1 By economic elite I mean those who are able to significantly influence production processes of the national economy with their personal decisions. Decision-making competence was operationalized by using top institutional positions as the criterion. Besides the top leaders of the largest banks and enterprises, the top leaders of the economic ministries and members of the economic committees of Parliament were taken into account. The 1998 sample consisted of four segments. We interviewed 72 top leaders (above the level of head of department) of three economic ministries (industry, agriculture, finance), 58 members of three parliamentary committees (economy, agriculture, finance), 34 top leaders of 35 banks and 76 top leaders of the 100 greatest companies according to turnover. In the banks and corporations, the positions of CEOs, deputy CEOs and presidents were taken into account during the selection. At the end of 1997, a general population survey had been conducted with comparable questions. We could match the two surveys and analyze them together. The sociological literature has ascribed distinguished importance to the social factors that influence the recruitment of the elite. One of the most widespread methods is to analyze the recruiting tendencies within a certain elite. Such analyses focus on the temporal changes of recruitment. The classic studies of Reinhard Bendix and Frank W. Howton as well as Charles Wright Mills checked for the impact of origins and qualifications on entry into the elite using reputational samples of the American historical economic elites.2 Special attention was devoted to see how social class affected admission into the elite.3 1 György Lengyel, A magyar gazdasági elit társadalmi összetétele a 20. század végén [The Social Composition of the Hungarian Economic Elite at the End of the 20th Century], Budapest 2007. 2 Reinhard Bendix / Frank W. Howton, Social Mobility and the American Business Elite, in: Seymour M. Lipset / Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, Berkeley /

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The comparison of economic elites of different nations has been covered in far fewer works.4 Recent research – based on the conceptual framework of Pierre Bourdieu – has compared the recruitment of German and French business elites using two samples of 100 each, measuring the temporal change in the effect of class reproduction.5 The analysis has revealed that in both countries some twofifths of the economic elites came from the gehobenes Bürgertum and the classe dominante, respectively. In France, tertiary education and competitive exams were of decisive importance. Nine-tenths of the French business elite were graduates of tertiary education; 70 percent of theses were graduates from the grands écoles which enjoy higher prestige than the universities. The level of education of the German elite was similar but it was not concentrated on elite institutions. German universities conveyed specialized abstract knowledge, while the French institutions laid the stress on personality formation, brilliance of the mind, quick perception, responsibility, managing skills, and a stress on elite consciousness. In Germany, the primary criteria were personality traits which put those descending from the gehobenes Bürgertum into advantageous positions. In France, Bourdieu’s class-specific habitus derived mainly from the selective mechanism of exclusive higher education (favoring upper class students). In Germany, however, the family background of the gehobenes Bürgertum provided the members with an advantage via the habitus. Interviews with personnel managers reveal that the top leading posts were mainly filled by scions of the gehobenes Bürgertum as they had the greatest chance to possess the codes and qualities that distinguished the haute bourgeoisie. They were self-confident, optimistic and self-assured, internalized the codes of “social distinction”, the attribute that characterized Los Angeles 1967, pp. 117 – 143; Charles Wright Mills, The American Business Elite: A Collective Portrait, in: Journal of Economic History 5 (1945), pp. 20 – 44. 3 Eva Etzioni-Halevy, The Relationship between Elites and the Working Class: On Coupling, Uncoupling, Democracy and (In)Equality, in: John Higley / Jan Pakulski / Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe, Houndmills / Basingstoke 1998, pp. 251 – 276; Mladen Lazic, Prisoners of the Command Economy. The Managerial Stratum and the Disintegration of “Actually Existing Socialism”, in: György Lengyel / Claus Offe / Jochen Tholen (eds.), Economic Institutions, Actors and Attitudes: EastCentral Europe in Transition (= Sociological Working Papers, Vol. 8) Budapest / Bremen 1992, pp. 169 – 180; Arne Mastekaasa, Social Origin and Recruitment to Norwegian Business and Public Sector Elites, in: European Sociological Review 200 (2004), 3, pp. 221 – 235. 4 Hartmut Kaelble, Hosszú távú változások a gazdasági elit kiválogatódásában. Németország összehasonlítása az Egyesült Államokkal, Nagy-Britanniával és Franciaországgal az ipari forradalomtól napjainkig [Long Term Changes in the Recruitment of the Economic Elite. Comparison of Germany with the United States, Great Britain and France from the Industrial Revolution to our Days], in: György Lengyel (ed.), A vállalkozó [The Entrepreneur], (= Szociológiai Füzetek, 28), Budapest 1982, pp. 75 – 102; Youssef Cassis, Big Business. The European Experience in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 1997. 5 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, London 1986; Michael Hartmann, Class-specific Habitus and the Social Reproduction of the Business Elite in Germany and France, in: Sociological Review 48 (2000), 2, pp. 241 – 261.

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the upper strata of the German business life. Outwardly, the role of habitus was to signal that the person emanated “credibility” in the sense of both trust and creditworthiness. A small set of research does not study the self-recruitment of the elite, concentrate on its temporal changes or its national characteristics, but instead compares them with data of the general population.6 The advantage of this approach is that it provides a possibility to measure the net chances of getting into the elite. Implicit or indirect comparisons were also carried out by most works cited above as these deliberations help to determine the peculiarities of elite recruitment and social make-up. However, relatively few investigations compared the elite and the general population in the strict sense. Below, I attempt such a comparison, analyzing the economic elite sample of 1998 and the sample of the economically active population taken in 1997. At first, I check for the mutual and joint influence of schooling and social background on the basis of Robert D. Putnam’s models. Then, I will study the individual and combined effects of gender and origin, qualifications and party membership, as well as career patterns on the chances of joining the elite.

II. The Hungarian economic elite at the end of the 1990s – in comparison with the general population 1. Schooling and social background In his book on the comparative research of elites, Robert D. Putnam illustrates the correlations between origin, qualifications and elite status using four simple models.7 Firstly, qualifications and family background seperately influence access to the elite. Secondly, origin affects qualifications and, thereby, influences access to the elite. Hence, the effect of origin can only be indirect. As a historical example – the author mentions the Chinese mandarin meritocracy – this illustrates the importance of performing well at education rather than its level. Thirdly, origin influences schooling and entry into the elite separately. Most elite members are educated but the educated members of the lower classes have little chance to reach the elite. This – as Putnam notes – is rare in modern societies. He refers to the British and Moroccan elites, where the members of the upper class were generally, but not in every case educated and access to the elite was conditional on upper class origin rather than education. Finally, in the fourth model, origin affects both education and admission into the elite. In addition to education, family background exerts 6 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Englewood Cliffs (NJ) 1976; Vicsek Lilla, Vezetési esélyek 1993. Az osztályszármazás és a nemi hovatartozás jelentosége a vállalati felsovezetové válásra [Chances to Manage 1993. Relevance of Class Origin and Gender in the Recruitment of Top Managers), Budapest 1998. 7 Putnam, The Comparative Study (fn. 6) p. 30.

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both direct and indirect effects. Hence, the members of the upper class are also overrepresented among the educated elite members, unlike in the second model. It might be enlightening to check the validity of these models on the Hungarian data. The figures of the economically active population and the economic elite are checked in statistical tables. Then, both samples are combined to create an elite variable and one for education and origin. The size of the sample and the special composition of the elite called for dichotomous variables: higher qualifications on the one hand and middle-class origin on the other. Origin was measured by answers to the question, whether the respondent had entrepreneurs in his / her family (among the parents or grandparents). The first model was checked by two cross tables and association indices. Both elements proved true: strong positive correlations prevail between access to the elite and higher education and access to the elite and origin. As mentioned earlier, 97 percent of the elite had diplomas, while in the economically active population one-sixth had higher education. At the same time, it was also true that the economic elite had an entrepreneurial family background more than any other social group, including the entrepreneurs themselves. Table 1 Were there entrepreneurs among the parents or grandparents? (Answers by the elite and groups of the economically active population, 1997 / 98) Yes, in %

N

Elite

51.7

240

Economically active population

19.3

767

– leaders

21.7

60

– entrepreneurs

36.4

66

– intellectuals

23.6

72

– other white-collar workers

22.8

114

– skilled workers

15.1

232

– semi- and unskilled workers

10.8

194

Cramer’s V = 0.35****.

This is obviously related to the fact that a far from negligible portion (estimated at more than a quarter) of the newly established entrepreneurial class is comprised of “forced entrepreneurs”„ i. e. those who fled from unemployment in the mid1990s.8 Over half of the elite, a quarter of the middle class and an eighth of the 8 György Lengyel, Social Capital and Entrepreneurial Success. Hungarian Small Enterprises between 1993 and 1996, in: Victoria E. Bonell / Thomas B. Gold (eds.), The New Entrepreneurs of Europe and Asia. Patterns of Business Development in Russia, Eastern Europe and China, London 2002, pp. 256 – 277.

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lower class reported having entrepreneurs among their parents or grandparents. The positive correlation between the grandparents’ entrepreneurship and elite status was also pointed out by a study analyzing the elite research of Iván Szelényi, Szonja Szelényi and Donald Treiman.9 A similar but weaker correlation was found between the parents’ entrepreneurial (self employed) past and elite status, which was most probably caused by the fact that the bulk of the economic elite of the 1990s was born after the post-1945 nationalizations. To check the second model, we studied the association between origin and education. It also proved significant. A similarly strong and significant correlation was found between education and elite position. In our three-dimensional table, we first studied the effect of schooling among those from the working class, then among the middle class. It was found that in the general population sample, 15 percent of those who had no entrepreneurial forefathers had university diplomas, while the corresponding rate was 25 percent among those who had entrepreneurs among the ancestors. In the corresponding subgroups of the elite, a decisive majority – over 95 percent – received a university education. It cannot be contended, however, that origin exerted its influence only indirectly, through schooling, and hence in the group of higher education graduates those coming from the lower classes had the same chance as the middle-class members to enter the elite. The third model – which places the stress on the filtering effect of origin – evidently has no validity in the Hungarian economic elite, although in the 1990s, a closing process could be registered. The connection between origin and access to the elite was far from deterministic. It therefore seems probable that out of the two factors of origin and qualifications, the latter had greater effect on entry into the elite. Indeed, the logistic regression models constructed to test the fourth model verify that, although both factors had significant impact on access to the elite, the effect of tertiary education considerably exceeded the impact of origin. Table 2 Chances of entering the elite according to the factors of schooling and origin in 1997 / 98 Variable Schooling (tertiary =1, other = 0) Origin (entrepreneur among parents or grandparents = 1, other = 0)

B

Wald

sign.

Exp(B)

4.8

166.6

.0000

124.5

161.9

.0000

2.8

1.1

Constant

–4.7

N

1007

rate of correctly ranged cases 86.3%

9 Ákos Róna-Tas / József Böröcz, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: Presocialist and Socialist Legacies among Business Elites, in: John Higley / György Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism. Theories and Analysis, Lanham et al. 2000, pp. 209 – 228.

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According to these factors, schooling considerably enhanced the explanatory force of the model. Compared to it, origin only moderately contributed to the enhancement of the explanatory force and only slightly decreased the effect of qualifications yet it undoubtedly had a significant effect by itself. Given identical qualifications, persons with an entrepreneurial background had significantly higher chances to enter the elite. 2. Gender and social background Analyzing the combined data of the Hungarian economic elite and the population, Lilla Vicsek constructed similar models to Robert Putnam’s. Unlike Putnam, Vicsek wished to check the mutual effect of gender and class origin upon chances of access to enterprise management. She had it no easier than Putnam, but after thoroughly studying the literature, she concluded that the interaction of the two factors had to be checked, instead of just testing their relative explanatory force. She found no interactive effect between gender and class origin; her major conclusions are summed up in the following. She presumed that both gender and class background strongly differentiated the chances of accessing to the top management of companies and out of the two factors, gender was the stronger differentiating one. She also assumed that these explanatory factors would remain significant and their interrelation would also remain unchanged when qualifications, career and other control factors were involved in the analysis. She verified her hypothesis with logistic regression models. Looking at individual effects, she found that gender had a significantly greater impact on becoming a top manager in the examined period. She also found that these effects remained significant after the inclusion of the control variables of age, schooling and career. After filtering out the compound effects, the odds ratio for men to rise to the top management was over four, whilst that of the middle class was below two. Our investigations have also confirmed that both gender and origin significantly influenced access to the elite at the end of the 1990s. The inclusion of gender did not considerably lessen the impact of origin. As for the relative weight of gender and origin, we found that, taken separately, their effect was about the same. The odds ratio of entering the economic elite was over four for both men and people with an entrepreneurial family background. Checking Putnam’s models, we found that schooling and origin were strongly correlated with the impact of the former being very powerful. When the control variables of education and career are included, the impact of origin slightly decreases but remains significant, while the effect of gender hardly lessens. Thus, after the filtering out of composition effects, the odds ratio for men was still about four while for entrepreneurial middle-class candidates it was about two and half. The investigations, therefore, reinforce one another in their basic hypotheses: both gender and origin had a significant influence on getting into the economic elite in Hungary in the 1990s. After filtering the compound effects, the odds ratios

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257

of the two surveys were similar. Yet the findings are somewhat different regarding the original relative impact of the two factors; the divergences are attributable to at least to three causes. Two of these touch on methodological questions that might also have implications on contents. Table 3 Chances of getting into the elite tested by the variables of gender and origin in 1997 / 98 Variable

B

Wald

sign.

Exp(B)

Gender (male = 1, female = 0)

1.6

58.7

.0000

4.7

Origin (entrepreneurs among parents or grandparents = 1, other = 0)

1.4

74.6

.0000

4.2

Constant

–2.8

N

1007

rate of correctly ranged cases 78.9%

First, sampling was different in the two investigations. The data studied by Lilla Vicsek came from the representative sample of top leaders of the 3.000 companies with the largest turnover investigated by Iván Szelényi and Donald Treiman. In addition to enterprise managers, our database also includes bankers and economic politicians. In banks and ministries – as noted earlier – women and leaders of middle class origin are overrepresented in comparison to enterprises. This alone might modify the findings. It has to be added – although this probably has less direct influence on the results – that in 1993, Vicsek’s basis for comparison was the adult population while our data of 1997 / 98 uses the economically active population as the reference group. What justified the latter was that, regarding the labor market status of the elite, they must be taken for active, although there are some members – for example in the parliament’s economic committees – who are over the economically active age. Secondly, the two investigations operationalized the questions of origin and career patterns differently for technical reasons. Just to point out the major deviation: although both researchers wished to measure the effect of middle-class origin, Lilla Vicsek used the phrase “non-working class origin”, and I formulated “entrepreneurs among the parents, grandparents”. The latter was a must because in the 1997 file on the economically active population, there was no data referring to intergenerational mobility. It is, however, quite possible that the fact that the effect of origin is equal to the effect of gender in our research is attributable to the fact that within middle-class origin, we inquired after a specifically entrepreneurial tradition. Middle-class origin formulated as non-working class descent is obviously a broader category, as it also implies intellectuals and white-collar workers among whom entrepreneurship is less probable. That such phrasing also includes upperclass members causes few problems as neither of us excluded it and the frequency

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of such cases in a general population sample is low. In view of Putnam’s arguments, upper-class descent can also be a watershed in accessing the elite in an international comparison. But the limitations on the family background data for the economically active population in the data base I used do not allow for such analysis. Both types of classification can be carried out on the 1998 sample of the economic elite but it can only make a moderate contribution since it shows the deviations within the elite and not between the elite and the economically active population. The elite members coming from a non-working class background make up nearly three quarters of the elite. Their rates significantly vary by segment: in the business elite it was above average and among the economic politicians below average. Those having entrepreneurs among their parents or grandparents represented half of the elite, and though there were segmental differences, these were not significant. The third possible cause for deviations is the distance in time. This tallies with the earlier analyzed observation that the intergenerational mobility patterns of the economic elite showed a tendency of slowing down and closing over the 1990s.10 This closing tendency also resulted in the growth of the relative weight of descent. This conclusion can only be drawn if two reservations are also observed. Analyzing the distribution of gender and origin on our own 1993 sample, we found that the rate of women in the whole of the elite was over one-fifth, while the rate of elite members with non-working class background was 70 percent. Thus, for the whole of the elite the distribution of the two variables was closer to each other at that time than in the second half of the decade. In the enterprise segment, however, women had a one-tenth share and managers from non-working families accounted for twothirds. Thus, the deviation among the segments was primarily significant for the representation of women. 3. Competence and loyalty All analyses so far have shown that tertiary education as a probable indicator of competence exerts a very strong influence on chances of rising into the elite. Not it is necessary to scrutinize how the other factor that had equal importance during the state socialist period – membership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, then the key indicator of loyalty – changed by the end of the 1990s. It has been 10 György Lengyel, Two Waves of Professionalization of the Hungarian Economic Elite, in: Elise S. Brezis / Peter Temin (eds.), Elites, Minorities, Economic Growth, Amsterdam et al. 1999, pp. 93 – 104; György Lengyel, Die Zirkulation der ungarischen Wirtschaftselite in den 1990er Jahren: Verlangsamung und Abschluss, in: Hans-Joachim Veen / Daniela Ruge (eds.) Alte Eliten in jungen Demokratien?: Wechsel, Wandel und Kontinuität in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Köln 2004, pp. 267 – 283; György Lengyel, Cadres and Managers. Changing Patterns of Recruitment of Economic Leaders in a Planned Economy, in: Heinrich Best / Michael Hofmann (eds.), Unternehmer und Manager im Sozialismus / Entrepreneurs and Managers in Socialism (= Historische Sozialforschung / Historical Social Research 30 (2005), 2 [Sonderheft / Special Issue No. 112]), Köln 2005, pp. 25 – 49.

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shown that active political affiliation marked by party membership already lost its selective role for the economic elite around the time of the system change. That, however, does not necessarily mean that former party membership ceased to play a role in informal selective mechanisms. It has been shown that highly trained cadres with managerial experience were overrepresented among former party members, which may have contributed to the fact that about half the economic elite at the end of the 1990s were former party members. Its weight was not as important as that of education but it probably had an autonomous effect. Table 4 Chances of access to the elite measured by the variables of qualifications and party membership in 1997 / 98 Variable

B

Wald

sign.

Exp(B)

Qualifications (tertiary =1, lower =0)

4.7

155.9

.0000

110.6

Former HSWP membership (yes =1, no = 0)

1.8

46.1

.0000

6.1

Constant

–4.7

N

1012

rate of correctly ranged cases: 86.4%

This presumption is verified by calculations. In addition to the decisive effect of tertiary education, former party membership also enhanced the chances of getting into the elite about sixfold when the joint effect of the two factors is examined. Even when career and demographic factors were controlled, both significant effects persisted and just slightly slackened. It may help us understand the phenomenon more if we take into account the fact that at the time of the survey a government with a socialist majority was in power which in theory could have influenced the economic political segment. However the effect cannot be demonstrated, as in the field of economic policy and among the business leaders, there was a slightly above average rate of former party members while in the banking sector, the rate was below average and the correlation is not significant. In addition to competence, former party membership thus autonomously increased the chances of rising into the elite, even after the screening out of demographic and career pattern differences. Let us return to the question whether a cadre past implied advantages for broader strata of the population in the late 1990s or not. Comparing the average income of former party and non-party members in the 1997 sample of the economically active population, one finds that former membership in the state party did not imply considerable net income advantages. The net monthly income of former party members exceeded the average by one-third, a statistically insignificant deviation partly because former party members were only a relatively small share of the economically active population. In contrast, people with tertiary education earned

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nearly double the average income, while those with managerial experience had one and a half times as much; both findings are statistically significant. Table 5 Net income among tertiary education graduates and those with managerial experience among former HSWP members, as compared to the economically active population in 1997 Net monthly income in main job (%)

Rate of tertiary education graduates (%)

Rate of people with managerial experience (%)

N (N inc.)

Economically active population

100.0

100.0

100.0

772(687)

Former HSWP members

129.1

168.1

131.4

60(51)

It is, however, well known that the qualifications and career structures of party members differed from those of the average populace. That, in turn, would further corroborate the influence of party membership as the booster of net income. There are, however, two things to be considered. First: with the filtering out of cross effects, the significance of variables of relatively small weight can also be controlled. Second: the measuring of income implies several problems. Obviously, as the question is delicate, the data is inaccurate because of declined or distorted answers. It is less obvious that the distribution of incomes did not satisfy the conditions of normal distribution which characterize the dependent variable of a regression model. Therefore, by taking the logarithm of incomes for the dependent variable, the following regression equation can be used to check the issue. Ln (JÖV) = 0.5*ISK + 0.3*NEM + 0.3*VEZ + 0.2*KÁDER + 9.9 (N = 645, R square = 0.25) Where Ln (JÖV) = logarithm of net income from full-time job, ISK = 1, tertiary, 0, lower than tertiary education, NEM = 1, male, 0, female, VEZ = 1, having managerial experience, 0, not having managerial experience, KÁDER = 1, former HSWP membership, 0, not member.

It has been found that former party membership had a demonstrable positive impact on income when controlled by managerial experience and schooling. Thus, having a cadre past did imply income advantages by itself among the economically active population. This advantage was not as great as that of tertiary education and managerial experience, but it was significant. Analytic strategies often resort to the decomposition of an effect, showing the influence of the background variables concentrated in a variable. Here, the procedure was quite the contrary: we have proven that an originally seemingly insignificant factor did have significant impact in explaining the income differences. What enhances the appeal of this conclusion is that it sheds light on a hidden effect: in the second half of the 1990s, former party

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membership did considerably differentiate incomes among the group of identical schooling, gender and managerial experience in the whole of the economically active population. Besides, as was shown earlier, former party membership increased the chances of getting into the economic elite. Within the elite, however, spread by income was influenced neither by former party membership nor by schooling, the latter probably because the vast majority had higher education, so incomes were not adjusted to it. 4. Career patterns It was revealed by previous analyses that the career patterns of the economic elite were mostly continuous despite the system change. This is why members of the elite typically rose to their position step by step rather than through big up- and downswings. Besides, the rate of intrasegmental careers increased within the elite during the 1990s – segments being defined as clusters of enterprises, banks and policy making institutions. Comparing the late-1990s data of the elite and the economically active population, one finds that in one-sixth of the economic elite and one-eighth of the economically active population, there were skips in the career, but the table correlation is not significant. What the elite and earners in general reported of the ebb and flow in their careers, however, reveals a significant difference: as against two-fifths of the economically active population, less than one-third of the elite registered up- and downswings in their careers. Table 6 Characteristics of the career patterns among the active earners compared to the elite in 1997 / 98 Rate Ebbs and tides Intersegmental N/ of disjunct experienced in careers (%) N (segment) careers (%) the career (%) Economically active population

12.8

44.0

52.1

725 / (605)

Economic elite

17.2

30.8

25.4

239

Strength of connection (Phi, sign) Phi = .05 ns Phi = .11**** Phi = .24*****

At first sight, one sees a peculiar contradiction between this finding and the fact that disjunct careers were overrepresented in the economic elite. This contradiction may be eliminated by the fact that the connotations of the two questions might be quite different: while the leaps in the elite careers can be associated with tides, they do not necessarily imply low ebbs as well. In the logistic regression model in which the dependent variable was access to the elite, the disjunct nature of the career also proved to be a significant indicator. Just like the majority of the active earners, most elite members felt that their careers were continuous, yet the career factors considerably differed between the

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elite and the economically active population. Among the career characteristics, the distribution of inter- and intrasegmental careers demands special attention. More than half of the economically active population pursued intersegmental careers, compared to a quarter of the elite. After controlling for cross effects, we found that the economic elite experienced leaps more often and relapses less frequently than the average of the economically active population. The chances of getting into the elite were weakened by both a conjunct career and an undulating career. Moreover, controlled by demographic, social origin and schooling data, the high rate of intersegmental careers which saliently characterized the elite according to the tables primarily conveyed the effect of external factors, first of all qualifications, and, thus, lost its significance. Table 7 Chances of accessing the elite controlled by the variables of the career pattern in 1997 / 98 Variable

B

Wald

sign.

Exp(B)

.7

9.03

.003

2.1

–1.1

38.5

.0000

.33

Ebbs and tides (1 = yes, 0 = no)

–.7

15.9

.001

.5

Constant

–.3

Character of career (conjunct = 0, disjunct = 1) Intersegmental career (yes = 1, no = 0)

N

rate of correctly ranged cases 72.4%

814

5. Combined effects Our model estimating the chances of access into the economic elite took the variables of gender, age, origin, school qualifications, former HSWP membership and career pattern into consideration. All these factors largely and significantly influence the chances of rising into the elite, jointly providing a relatively good prediction model. The correctly ranged cases amount to 90 percent. Both gender and origin proved important in the selection of the elite but it needs to be stressed again that school qualifications were more important than the rest by many orders of magnitude. From among the screening indicators of competence and loyalty, the former proved to be of decisive importance. All this confirms that the decisive element of selecting someone for the elite was tertiary qualifications. It exceeded the effect of all other explanatory factors by far. The second most important factor was membership in the former party, the Socialist Workers’ party, which was a probable indicator of loyalty in the late planned economy. Half of the economic elite but less than one-tenth of the economically active population used to be party members. It is known that overall the party membership was more educated than the population in general. In spite of

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263

that, former party membership remained an autonomous explanatory factor in the period of the transitional economy even when it was controlled by education. Gender had the same effect on access chances to the elite as former loyalty. The importance of family background was nearly two-thirds of that of gender and former party membership in determining the chances to get into the elite. Table 8 Chances of access to the elite predicted by the variables of competence, loyalty, origin, demographic factors and career pattern in 1997 / 98 Variable

B

Wald

sign.

Exp(B)

Education (1 = tertiary, 0 = other)

4.5

123.5

.0000

89.5

Former HSWP membership (yes =1, no =0)

1.5

20.9

.0000

4.3

.9

10.2

.001

2.5

Gender (1 = male, 0 = female)

1.4

19.9

.0000

3.9

Age (below 50 = 0, 50 and above = 1)

1.1

14.6

.0001

2.9

Character of career (conjunct = 0, disjunct = 1)

1.3

9.6

.001

3.5

Ebbs and tides (1 = yes, 0 = no)

–.8

6.5

.01

.5

Previous segment (the same segment = 0, other segment = 1)

–.5

3.1

.08

.6

Origin (entrepreneurs among parents or grandparents = 1, other = 0)

Constant N

–5.6

rate of correctly ranged cases: 90.8%

812

As for demographic factors, age above 50 significantly enhanced the odds of rising into the elite which is noteworthy because the economic elite was considerably rejuvenated in some segments right after the system change. This fact notwithstanding, over half the economic elite, and only a sixth of the economically active population, were above 50. Although the basis of comparison was the economically active population, there were considerable deviations such as the distribution of age groups. Large leaps were not characteristic of elite careers, but disjunct careers enhanced the chance of making it into the elite. Intersegmental and undulating careers decreased the chances of rising, but intersegmental mobility lost its significance when the aggregate effects were measured.

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III. Conclusion Returning to Michael Hartmann’s French-German comparison cited at the beginning of the paper, one may conclude that the Hungarian economic elite of the 1990s was closer to the French type – not in the sense that the system of competitive exams and the rigorous hierarchization of tertiary institutions made the class effect indirect, but because qualifications, the possible indicator of competence, had a much greater effect upon the chances of entering the elite than any other factor. Class, thus, exerted its influence indirectly through the filter of education. However, it also retained some autonomous effects which brings it closer to Putnam’s fourth model reckoning with both the autonomous class effect and class effect via education. The other legacy of the state socialist past – party membership as a possible indicator of loyalty – also had a strong impact on getting into the elite even when the effect of the variables of education, career, age and gender was filtered out. It is noteworthy that in looking at the economically active population by occupational groups, one could not help noticing what Putnam called the law of growing disproportion: the higher the occupational group, the higher the rates of men, tertiary graduates and those with a middle-class background. This observation also applied to the economic elite. Instead of tertiary education the type of education and kind of course were more sensitive gauges of the differences within the elite.

Elitentausch? Die betrieblichen Führungskräfte in Ostdeutschland seit den 1980er Jahren Von Marcel Boldorf I. Einführung Dieser Beitrag widmet sich der personellen Kontinuität der Führungskräfte ostdeutscher Unternehmen nach der Vereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten. Die Führungskräfte gehörten einer Funktionselite an, d. h. sie hatten ihre leitende Stellung durch fundierte fachliche Kenntnisse erreicht. In einer Marktwirtschaft bezeichnet man sie als Manager, die für die Unternehmen wichtige Entscheidungen treffen. In diesem Zusammenhang ist zu diskutieren, ob eine rein technokratische Herkunft, sei es durch eine technische oder eine ökonomische Spezialisierung, in den 1990er Jahren für die Wahrnehmung strategischer Aufgaben ausreichend war. Nach einer quantitativen Untersuchung des Gewichts der ehemaligen DDR-Führungskräfte im vereinigten Deutschland wendet sich die Untersuchung qualitativen Aspekten zu. Unter diesem Schlagwort stehen die Sozialisation, die Qualifikation sowie generell die Eignung der Manager in einer veränderten Umwelt auf dem Prüfstand. Zur Gruppe der Führungskräfte zählten nicht nur die Betriebsleiter, sondern alle technischen und kaufmännischen Leitungspositionen, z. B. die Fachdirektoren oder die Ingenieure. Dieser Personenkreis traf unternehmerische bzw. strategische Einzel- oder Teilentscheidungen, wobei die wirtschaftliche Unternehmensentwicklung von der Summe solcher Entscheidungen abhängig war. Demnach war von Bedeutung, dass jede Führungskraft bei ihren Entschlüssen und Maßnahmen auf den betriebswirtschaftlichen Nutzen achtete und strategisch dachte.1 Nach diesem Verständnis wird die Performance größerer Unternehmen nicht allein von Entscheidungen an der Spitze bestimmt, sondern der Erfolg hing vom Know-how aller beteiligten Führungskräfte ab. Dieser Logik folgend können ostdeutsche Unternehmen nach der Wende auch nicht als fremdgesteuert angesehen werden, selbst wenn „westliche“ Investoren die Kapitalmehrheit besaßen oder es sich um Filialen westdeutscher Konzerne handelte. 1 Vgl. Evelyn Preusche, Betriebliche Akteure zwischen Plan- und Marktwirtschaft. Arbeitsbeziehungen in ostdeutschen Industriebetrieben nach der Wende, München / Mering 1997, S. 61.

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Die zeithistorische Forschung hat die Frage nach den wirtschaftlichen Kontinuitätslinien bislang weitgehend ausgeblendet. Die ersten Betrachtungen fokussierten in den frühen 1990er Jahren auf die Wirtschaftsprobleme der kurz zuvor zusammengebrochenen DDR. Sie thematisierten die Auslandsverschuldung, die daraus resultierende Notwendigkeit zur Kreditbeschaffung und den Fehlschlag der staatlichen Subventionspolitik.2 In dieser Zeit rechneten auch einige vormals führende DDR-Wirtschaftspolitiker, z. B. der langjährige Vorsitzende der Plankommission Gerhard Schürer, relativ schonungslos mit dem planwirtschaftlichen System ab.3 Daneben setzte sich ein überschaubarer Kreis von Historikern mit der Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR bis zum Ende ihrer Staatlichkeit auseinander, wobei die Epochengrenze der Jahre 1989 / 90 nicht überschritten wurde.4 Mit zunehmendem zeitlichem Abstand rückten einzelne wirtschaftshistorische Studien den Vereinigungsprozess selbst und die Politik der Treuhandanstalt in den Vordergrund.5 Auf die sensible Frage der Kontinuität gingen solche Abhandlungen weiterhin kaum ein – mit der Ausnahme eines Beitrages von Gernot Gutmann, der auf die Folgewirkungen der in der DDR-Wirtschaftsordnung angelegten Blockaden hinwies.6 Jüngst beschrieb Jörg Roesler in einer Art Sachbuch die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft während der drei letzten Jahrzehnte des 20. Jahrhunderts, die er insgesamt von einer strukturellen Schwäche gegenüber einem sich verschärfenden weltweiten Wettbewerb charakterisiert sieht.7 Diese Sichtweise erweiterte er um eine Betrachtung, die sich mit der politischen Einflussnahme der Treuhandanstalt auf die personelle Situation in den Führungsetagen der ehemaligen DDR-Kombinate auseinandersetzt. 8 In Ermangelung einschlägiger zeithistorischer Arbeiten bezieht dieser Beitrag verstärkt Forschungsergebnisse anderer Wissenschaftsdisziplinen ein: Es werden 2 Vgl. z. B.: Hans-Hermann Hertle, Staatsbankrott. Der ökonomische Untergang des SEDStaates, in: Deutschland-Archiv 25 (1992), 10, S. 1019 – 1030. 3 Vgl. Hans-Hermann Hertle, „Das reale Bild war eben katastrophal.“ Gespräch mit Gerhard Schürer, in: Deutschland-Archiv 25 (1992), 10, S. 1031 – 1039. Schürer war ab 1963 Mitglied des Zentralkomitees der SED und seit 1965 Vorsitzender der Staatlichen Plankommission. Beide Funktionen übte er bis 1989 aus. 4 Als umfassendste Darstellung bisher: André Steiner, Von Plan zu Plan. Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR, München 2004. 5 Eckhard Wandel, Transformationsprobleme bei der Wiedervereinigung, in: Hans-Jürgen Gerhard (Hg.), Struktur und Dimension (Festschrift für Karl Heinrich Kaufhold zum 65. Geburtstag), Bd. 2: Neunzehntes und Zwanzigstes Jahrhundert (= Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beiheft 133), Stuttgart 1997, S. 310 – 338, hier S. 310; Karl Eckart / Jörg Roesler (Hg.), Die Wirtschaft im geteilten und vereinten Deutschland (= Schriftenreihe der Gesellschaft für Deutschlandforschung, Bd. 69), Berlin 1999. 6 Gernot Gutmann, In der Wirtschaftsordnung der DDR angelegte Blockaden und Effizienzhindernisse für die Prozesse der Modernisierung, des Strukturwandels und des Wirtschaftswachstums, in: Eberhard Kuhrt et al. (Hg.), Die Endzeit der DDR-Wirtschaft. Analysen zur Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Umweltpolitik, Opladen 1999, S. 1 – 60. 7 Jörg Roesler, Ostdeutsche Wirtschaft im Umbruch 1970 – 2000, Bonn 2003, S. 5. 8 Jörg Roesler, Die Stunde der Generaldirektoren? Ein zu Unrecht vergessenes Moment der „Wende in der Wirtschaft“, in: Deutschland-Archiv 38 (2005), 3, S. 443 – 454.

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vor allem soziologische Studien über wirtschaftliche Führungskräfte9 bzw. ökonomische Eliten10 sowie die Ergebnisse der betriebsorientierten Transformationsliteratur11 berücksichtigt.

II. Konkurrierende Problemfaktoren In den ökonomischen Analysen wird die übereilte Währungsumstellung als Hauptgrund für den raschen Einbruch der ostdeutschen Wirtschaft angeführt. Die Einführung der Deutschen Mark, d. h. einer konvertiblen Währung, führte auf einen Schlag zum Wegfall der osteuropäischen Länder als Absatzgebiet. Die Sowjetunion, aber auch Polen oder die Tschechoslowakei hätten ostdeutsche Produkte nun zu hohen DM-Preisen kaufen müssen. Vor diese Wahl gestellt, entschieden sich die früheren osteuropäischen Handelspartner für Produkte aus den westlichen Industriestaaten. Des Weiteren entfielen die günstigen Rohstoffzufuhren für die ostdeutsche Industrie auf der Basis des RGW-internen Verrechnungssystems. Sichtbar wird der Zusammenbruch in der ostdeutschen Außenhandelsstatistik: Der Exportwert in mittel- und osteuropäische Länder sank von 29,8 Milliarden DM (1990) auf fünf Milliarden DM (1994).12 Von dieser Entwicklung war vor allem die verarbeitende Industrie der DDR betroffen. Im Laufe der Vereinigungskrise lösten sich die vertikal integrierten Kombinate des Industriesektors auf, und eine Vielzahl dieser Großbetriebe brach zusammen. In mehreren Publikationen wird der Zusammenbruch der DDR-Wirtschaft mit der verfehlten Politik der Treuhandgesellschaft in Verbindung gebracht.13 Indes ist kaum zu belegen, dass der Prozess der Privatisierung langfristig für das Zurückbleiben des Wachstum im Beitrittsgebiet verantwortlich zu machen ist. In strukturschwachen Branchen sind Betriebsübernahmen durchaus üblich. Sie unterliegen zwar einer Logik eines Verdrängungswettbewerbs, sind aber von Seiten der Investoren mit der Hoffnung verbunden, Synergieeffekte zwischen dem Stammbetrieb 9 Preusche, Betriebliche Akteure (Fn. 1); Heinrich Best / Michael Hofmann (Hg.), Unternehmer und Manager im Sozialismus / Entrepreneurs and Managers in Socialism (= Historische Sozialforschung / Historical Social Research 30 (2005), 2 [Sonderheft / Special Issue No. 112]), Köln 2005. 10 Markus Pohlmann, Die Industriekrise in Ostdeutschland. Zur Rolle der ökonomischen Eliten und ihren Unternehmenspolitiken, in: Deutschland-Archiv 38 (2005), 3, S. 417 – 424. 11 Hans Merkens, Der Transformationsprozeß vom volkseigenen Betrieb zum marktwirtschaftlichen Unternehmen. Verlauf, Probleme und Schwierigkeiten aus systemtheoretischer Sicht, München 2000; Torsten Wolf / Harald Hungenberg, Transition Strategies. Cases from the East German Industry, Basingstoke 2002; Gerhard Winfried Dittrich, Staats- und Marktversagen: Strategien ostdeutscher Unternehmer im Kontext der Wiedervereinigung, Linz 2003. 12 Joachim Bergmann / Rudi Schmidt, Industrielle Beziehungen. Institutionalisierung und Praxis unter Krisenbedingungen, Opladen 1996, S. 221. 13 Stellvertretend: Paul Windolf, Die Transformation der ostdeutschen Betriebe, in: Berliner Journal für Soziologie 6 (1996), 4, S. 467 – 488.

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und dem erworbenen Unternehmen zu erzielen. Somit ist nicht per se erkennbar, warum die Veräußerung der ostdeutschen Industriebetriebe von vorn herein zu ihrer Degradierung als „verlängerte Werkbank“ oder „Experimentierfeld“ führte, können doch bei den Käufern andere Interessen angenommen werden.14 Im Übrigen fehlte es häufig an Kaufinteressenten: Rund 30 Prozent der Betriebe des verarbeitenden Gewerbes mussten wegen mangelnder Rentabilität geschlossen werden.15 Insgesamt überführte die Treuhandanstalt 17.000 ehemalige Staatsbetriebe zwischen 1990 und 2003 in privaten Besitz.16 Im Zuge der Privatisierung durchlebte die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft einen grundlegenden Wandel der Betriebsstruktur. Zwischen 1990 und 1993 ist eine bedeutende Zunahme der kleinen und mittleren Betriebe zu verzeichnen, deren Zahl sich von 100.000 auf das Viereinhalbfache erhöhte.17 Schließlich bildete sich eine Betriebsstruktur heraus, die noch stärker als in Westdeutschland durch kleinere Betriebsgrößen geprägt war: 2001 gehörten in Ostdeutschland von den Betrieben des produzierenden Gewerbes 58,3 Prozent der Größenklasse bis 49 Beschäftigte an, während es im Westen nur 50,5 Prozent waren.18 Allerdings waren gewisse Berufsgruppen mit unternehmerischem Potential in Ostdeutschland nur schwach vertreten. Die „Zerschlagung des ökonomischen Mittelstandes“19 kann als ein Resultat der Kollektivierungs- und Verstaatlichungskampagnen gedeutet werden, die in der DDR ab 1952 den Agrarsektor und ab 1958 das Handwerk erfassten. In den sechziger Jahren konnten sich in Gewerbe und Handel zwar halbstaatliche Betriebe etablieren, welche in das Wirtschaftsreformprogramm einbezogen wurden und den Mittelstand durchaus förderten, doch fand diese Entwicklung mit einer Verstaatlichungskampagne zu Beginn des Honecker-Regimes 1972 ein Ende.20 Das danach noch existierende private und genossenschaftliche Ebenda, S. 474. Udo Ludwig, Licht und Schatten nach 15 Jahren wirtschaftlicher Transformation in Ostdeutschland, in: Deutschland-Archiv 38 (2005), 3, S. 410 – 416, hier S. 411. Die Treuhandbilanz von 1994 wies die Schließung von 3.718 der 12.354 gezählten Betriebe in der gewerblichen Wirtschaft aus. 16 Heinrich Best, Cadres into Managers. Structural Changes of East German Economic Elites before and after the Reunification, in: Historische Sozialforschung / Historical Social Research 30 (2005), 2 [Sonderheft / Special Issue No. 112], Köln 2005, S. 6 – 24, hier S. 18 f. 17 Ulrich Heilemann / Klaus Löbbe, The Structural Renewal of Eastern Germany: Some Initial Observations, in: Paul Welfens (Hg.), Economic Aspects of German Unification, 2. Aufl., Berlin et al. 1996, S. 9 – 38, hier S. 20. 18 Bernd Martens, Der lange Schatten der Wende. Karrieren ostdeutscher Wirtschaftseliten, in: Historische Sozialforschung / Historical Social Research 30 (2005), 2 [Sonderheft / Special Issue No. 112], Köln 2005, S. 206 – 230. Die Ergebnisse stimmen weitgehend überein mit Windolf, Transformation (Fn. 13), S. 471 f. 19 Gutmann, Wirtschaftsordnung der DDR (Fn. 6), S. 43 f. 20 Vgl. – auch zum Folgenden – Frank Ebbinghaus, Ausnutzung und Verdrängung. Steuerungsprobleme der SED-Mittelstandspolitik 1955 – 1972, Berlin 2003; André Steiner, ReKapitalisierung oder Sozialisierung? Die privaten und halbstaatlichen Betriebe in der DDR14 15

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Handwerk wurde auf Reparaturen und andere Dienstleistungen reduziert und eng in die zentrale Planwirtschaft eingebunden. Die letzten Reste privater Klein- und Mittelbetriebe verschwanden schließlich im Zuge der Kombinatsreform 1978 / 1980. Zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre war der berufsständische Mittelstand daher kaum vorhanden, es fehlte an Handwerkern, Kaufleuten, Selbstständigen und den Angehörigen der freien Berufe. Dass solche Erwerbspersonen, die sich häufig durch die Fähigkeit zur effizienten Nutzung von Leistungsanreizen auszeichneten, in Ostdeutschland rar waren, bildete auf längere Sicht eine Entwicklungsbarriere. Dennoch schien die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft trotz des starken Schrumpfens in der Krise 1990 / 91 zunächst rasch zum Westteil des Landes aufschließen zu können. Dieser Konvergenzprozess brach 1995 / 96 unvermittelt ab. Seit diesem Zeitpunkt zeichnete sich die Wirtschaft der östlichen Bundesländer durch eine anhaltende Wachstumsschwäche aus, die sie für ein Jahrzehnt auf eine Leistungskraft von ungefähr 60 Prozent des westdeutschen Bruttoinlandsproduktes festlegte. Die Problematik des langfristigen Zurückfallens gegenüber dem Westteil Deutschlands wird in der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschung unter zwei Aspekten diskutiert: (a) den Lohnkosten, was vielfach als „Mezzogiorno“-Problem bezeichnet wird, (b) der mangelnden Produktivität der Subventionen, d. h. einem Problem der Wirtschaftspolitik. Das erste Argument hebt auf die zu hohen Lohnabschlüsse nach der Wende ab. Nach diesem Verständnis wäre die anhaltende Wirtschaftsflaute im Osten eine weitgehend hausgemachte Fehlentwicklung, die in der Arbeitsmarktpolitik unmittelbar nach der deutschen Vereinigung wurzelte.21 Das zweite Argument geht von der Verwendung der umfangreichen West-Ost-Transferleistungen aus und konstatiert eine Fehllenkung der Subventionen.22 In vielen Fällen schrieben z. B. die Kommunen und Länder Gewerbebauten aus oder unterstützten prestigeträchtige Großprojekte. Überhaupt gab das produzierende Gewerbe kapital- und technologieintensiven Vorzeigeprojekten den Vorzug, die eine geringe Wertschöpfung aufwiesen und nur zur Schaffung weniger Arbeitsplätze beitrugen.

Wirtschaftsreform der sechziger Jahre, in: Christoph Boyer (Hg.), Sozialistische Wirtschaftsreformen. Tschechoslowakei und DDR im Vergleich, Frankfurt am Main 2006, S. 191 – 266; Margrit Grabas, Der wechselvolle Verlauf der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in der DDR – Zusammenspiel von akkumuliertem Innovationspotential und institutionellen Diffusionsblockaden, in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1995 / 2, S. 149 – 162, hier S. 157 und S. 160. 21 Hans-Werner Sinn, Zehn Jahre deutsche Wiedervereinigung – Ein Kommentar zur Lage der neuen Länder, in: ifo-Schnelldienst 53 (2000), 26 / 27, S. 10 – 22, besonders S. 18; Katja M. Gerling, Subsidization and Structural Change in East Germany, Heidelberg 2002. 22 Werner Smolny, Produktivitätsentwicklung in Ostdeutschland. Bestandsaufnahme und Ansatzpunkte einer Erklärung, in: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 223 (2003), 2, S. 239 – 254.

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III. Gewicht und Rolle der DDR-Führungskräfte im vereinigten Deutschland Die wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussion dreht sich stark um die Interpretation makroökonomischer Größen und bezieht sich kaum auf die personelle Situation in den Unternehmen. Eingangs ist deshalb zu untersuchen, wie sich die Betriebsschließungen und die berufliche Fluktuation im Vereinigungsprozess auf die Zusammensetzung der ostdeutschen Unternehmenseliten niederschlugen. Infolge der Schrumpfung der ostdeutschen Wirtschaft im Zuge der Privatisierung fielen während der ersten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre ungefähr zwei Drittel der Führungspositionen weg, die 1989 noch existierten.23 Jedoch spiegelte der Rückgang der Leitungskräfte zu einem großen Teil auch die Beseitigung der überdimensionierten Leitungshierarchien wider.24 Darüber hinaus ist anzunehmen, dass ein gewisser Teil der Parteikader ihre Leitungsposition freiwillig oder möglicherweise sogar auf Druck der Belegschaften aufgab.25 Für die Forschungspraxis haben diese Modalitäten die Konsequenz, dass man kaum Aussagen über den Verbleib der alten Führungskräfte machen kann, sondern sich auf Aussagen zur Herkunft des neuen Managements beschränken muss. Die nach 1990 entstehende Elite setzte sich teils aus verbliebenen, teils aus neu hinzugekommenen Führungskräften zusammen. Mitte der 1990er Jahre waren die ostdeutschen Managerposten zu knapp einem Viertel von Personen besetzt, die vor 1990 in der Bundesrepublik gelebt hatten. Der Anteil der Leitungskräfte westdeutscher Herkunft nahm in der Folge allerdings zu. Um 2003 lässt sich nachweisen, dass von den Führungskräften im ostdeutschen verarbeitenden Gewerbe 30 Prozent aus den alten Bundesländern stammten, wobei der Anteil der Übersiedler aus dem Westen mit dem Stellenwert der Leitungsfunktion stieg.26 Gleichwohl ist die Beharrungskraft der ehemaligen Betriebseliten beachtlich. Als seltene Ausnahmen können Fälle wie die Übernahme zweier Ostberliner Warenhäuser durch die westdeutschen Konzerne Kaufhof und Hertie gelten, in denen das gesamte Spitzenmanagement ausgetauscht und durch Zugewanderte aus dem Westen ersetzt wurde.27 Meist war die Einsetzung von Managern aus der alten Bundesrepublik im Privatisierungsprozess nur durchsetzbar, wenn ein Eigentümerwechsel stattgefunden hatte oder westliche Unternehmen mit der Geschäftsführung betraut worden waren. Die Mitgliedschaft in der SED war sicherlich nicht aufstiegsförderlich, bedeutete aber keineswegs in allen Fällen einen Abbruch der Karriere.28 Als Ergebnis lässt sich festhalten, dass noch zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts ca. 70 Prozent der Angehörigen ostdeutscher Unternehmensgeschäftsführungen in der Zentralplanwirtschaft der DDR sozialisiert worden waren. 23 24 25 26 27 28

Best, Cadres into Managers (Fn. 16), S. 18. Preusche, Betriebliche Akteure (Fn. 1), S. 58. Windolf, Transformation (Fn. 13), S. 479. Best, Cadres into Managers (Fn. 16), S. 19. Merkens, Transformationsprozeß (Fn. 11), S. 91. Windolf, Transformation (Fn. 13), S. 476 f.

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Noch deutlicher treten die personellen Kontinuitäten zu Tage, wenn man die gehobenen Leitungspositionen unterhalb der Geschäftsführungsebene einbezieht. Auf dieser Ebene stammten 2003 rund 82 Prozent der Stelleninhaber aus dem alten Kadersystem der DDR.29 Von einem Austausch der alten DDR-Wirtschaftselite im Transformationsprozess kann demzufolge nur die Rede sein, wenn man dies auf die Spitzenpositionen in Bürokratien und Verwaltungen bezieht. In den Unternehmen blieb der „Elitenimport“ aus der alten Bundesrepublik aber relativ begrenzt, was das „Zerrbild einer wirtschaftlichen Kolonialisierung Ostdeutschlands“30 korrigiert. Diesem Befund entsprachen auch die Eigentumsverhältnisse in der ostdeutschen Industrie: Nach Arbeitgeberbefragungen von 1996 und 2004 befanden sich 74 bzw. 79 Prozent der privatwirtschaftlichen Betriebe in ostdeutschem Eigentum.31 Das Bild der Kontinuität bestätigt auch ein Blick auf die Unternehmensebene. Zum Beispiel wurde ein früherer VEB-Generaldirektor nach der deutschen Vereinigung zum Vorstandsvorsitzenden des Nachfolgebetriebes Pharma AG.32 Andere betriebliche Studien belegen, dass dieser Fall keineswegs ungewöhnlich war. Selbst wenn die alten Direktoren entlassen wurden, rückten Führungskräfte aus dem zweiten Glied nach, woraus sich ein allgemeines Karrieremuster ableiten lässt.33 An diese punktuell gewonnenen Erkenntnisse schließen sich quantitative Forschungen zum Generationswechsel im Management der Unternehmen an. Die empirische Basis einer 2002 von Bernd Martens durchgeführten Studie ist eine statistische Erhebung zur obersten Leitungsebene von ostdeutschen Unternehmen des verarbeitenden Gewerbes, d. h. vornehmlich der Industrieunternehmen mittlerer Größe zwischen 50 bis 1.000 Mitarbeitern.34 Für die hier verfolgte Fragestellung sind besonders Martens’ Ergebnisse zur Teilgruppe der aus der DDR stammenden Unternehmensleiter interessant. Wenn 29 Best, Cadres into Managers (Fn. 16), S. 19. Vgl. auch Windolf, Transformation (Fn. 13), S. 475, der 85 Prozent Manager ostdeutscher Herkunft auf den obersten Leitungsebenen schätzt (für 1994). 30 Pohlmann, Industriekrise (Fn. 10), S. 419. Während diesem Befund Pohlmann zuzustimmen ist, fehlt es im Hinblick auf die „ökonomischen Eliten“ an einer Begriffspräzision. 31 Ludwig, Licht und Schatten (Fn. 15), S. 411. Von diesen Werten weichen frühere Untersuchungen erheblich ab: Windolf, Transformation (Fn. 13), S. 470 – 472, geht davon aus, dass sich 62,7 Prozent der Betriebe in westdeutschem und weitere 9,5 Prozent in ausländischem Besitz befanden. Seine Stichprobe (N = 1.247) basiert auf der Auswertung eines von ihm nicht näher spezifizierten „Handbuchs ostdeutscher Betriebe“. Es ist zu vermuten, dass das lokal gegliederte Handbuch der Großunternehmen aus dem Hoppenstedt Verlag (Darmstadt) gemeint ist. Somit läge allein eine Analyse der Großbetriebe vor, was die erhebliche Abweichung zu erklären vermag. 32 Vincent Edward / Peter Lawrence, Management Change in East Germany. Unification and Transformation, London / New York 1994, S. 109 f. 33 Vgl. Merkens, Transformationsprozeß (Fn. 11), S. 91. 34 Martens, Der lange Schatten der Wende (Fn. 18), S. 206 – 230. Die Studie entstand im Rahmen des Jenaer Sonderforschungsbereichs 580 „Gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen nach dem Systemumbruch“.

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man die Karriereverläufe der Geschäftsführer ostdeutscher Unternehmen im zwölften Jahr nach der deutschen Vereinigung bilanziert, stellt man insgesamt erheblich mehr Kontinuitäten als Brüche fest.35 Zwar war der Anteil der Alteingesessenen oder „Standfesten“, wie Martens sie bezeichnet, d. h. Geschäftsführern, denen der Chefaufstieg schon lange vor 1990 gelang und die in dieser Position verblieben, mit 8,1 Prozent des Samples relativ klein. Die größte Gruppe – rund ein Drittel der Stichprobe – bestand aus Leitungskräften, die im gleichen Betrieb verblieben, aber infolge des Regimewechsels einen Karrieresprung machten. Offensichtlich eröffnete ihnen der Zusammenbruch der DDR die Möglichkeit, in die Unternehmensspitze aufzurücken. Nach diesem Karriereschritt behaupteten sich die meisten dieser Führungskräfte bis zum Befragungszeitpunkt 2002 auf der erreichten Position. Diesem Schema entspricht auch eine weitere Gruppe so genannter Wendegewinner, die bereits in der DDR der 1980er Jahre einen Betriebswechsel vollzogen und in der Chefposition verblieben (13,3 Prozent). Somit nahmen rund 53 Prozent der ostdeutschen Manager sowohl vor als auch nach der Vereinigung durchgehend die Direktoren- oder Geschäftsführerfunktion in demselben Betrieb ein. Hinzu gesellten sich mit einem Anteil von 20 Prozent jüngere Nachwuchskräfte, die bereits auf längere Karriereverläufe in DDR-Kombinatsbetrieben zurückblickten, aber erst im Zuge der Vereinigung in die Leitungsposition aufstiegen. Die verbleibenden 27 Prozent setzten sich jeweils zur Hälfte aus zwei Typen von DDR-sozialisierten Aufsteigern zusammen: einerseits den Einsteigern in einen meist neu gegründeten Betrieb, andererseits den Betriebswechslern, die selbst eine Firma gründeten. Die Feststellung einer starken Kontinuität innerhalb der betrieblichen Eliten wird durch Untersuchungen bestätigt, die in ostdeutschen Betrieben die Existenz „alter Seilschaften“ ausfindig machen.36 Eine Vielzahl ehemaliger planwirtschaftlicher Kader überstand die Periode des Regimewechsels unbeschadet, auch wenn eine fast ebenso große Gruppe erst nach der Vereinigung in gehobene Positionen gelangte. Aber selbst in diesem zweiten Kreis war das Kriterium einer langen Betriebszugehörigkeit häufig von entscheidender Bedeutung. Offenbar wussten frühere DDR-Führungskräfte trotz der Privatisierung ihre Fähigkeiten zu nutzen, die viel stärker als in einer Marktwirtschaft auf betriebsinterne Handlungsabläufe und betriebliche Innenkenntnisse ausgerichtet waren, um sich in ihrer Leitungsposition zu behaupten. Letztlich entsprach dieses Muster dem deutschen Karrieremodell, das von langen Verweilzeiten im beschäftigenden Unternehmen und einen beruflichen Aufstieg ohne Arbeitsstellenwechsel geprägt war.37

Zum Folgenden: Ebenda, S. 218 – 225. Walter Heering / Klaus Schroeder, Transformationsprozesse in ostdeutschen Unternehmen: akteursbezogene Studien zur ökonomischen und sozialen Entwicklung in den neuen Bundesländern, Berlin 1995, S. 226 f. 37 Martens, Der lange Schatten der Wende (Fn. 18), S. 217. Vgl. auch: Hervé Joly, Kontinuität und Diskontinuität der industriellen Elite nach 1945, in: Dieter Ziegler (Hg.), Großbürger und Unternehmer, Göttingen 2000, S. 54 – 72. 35 36

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IV. Prägende Sozialisationsmerkmale der ostdeutschen Manager Den folgenden Überlegungen liegt die Prämisse zugrunde, dass das in den Betrieben vorhandene Humankapital, d. h. der Stand des produktionsrelevanten Wissens und des Know-hows, für die Wirtschaftsentwicklung von großer Bedeutung war. Zu Recht kann auf einer allgemeinen Ebene festgestellt werden, dass sich die DDR-Bevölkerung hinsichtlich der formalen Bildung kaum vom westdeutschen Durchschnitt unterschied.38 Wichtiger als die Breitenbildung oder auch die Qualifikation der Arbeitskräfte scheint jedoch, inwiefern die wirtschaftlichen Führungskräfte Ostdeutschlands über strategische und genuin unternehmerische Fähigkeiten verfügten. In dieser Diskussion39 wird auf Persönlichkeitsmerkmale von Führungskräften hingewiesen wie ihre soziale Herkunft, Bildungsqualifikation, berufliche Ausbildung und betriebliche Sozialisierung. Für die betriebliche Entwicklung während der 1990er Jahre war beispielsweise entscheidend, inwieweit die Manager und Unternehmer angesichts der gewachsenen Erfordernisse der Rendite- und Effizienzkalkulation über fundierte betriebswirtschaftliche Kenntnisse verfügten. Für eine qualitative Analyse ist die grundsätzliche Klärung der Frage relevant, wie sich die Manager, die aus einer sozialistischen Planwirtschaft stammten, von denen unterschieden, die in einem marktwirtschaftlichen System sozialisiert worden waren. Jörg Roesler geht davon aus, dass die Problembewältigungsstrategien innerhalb von Unternehmen in Ost und West relativ ähnlich seien. Das System der industriellen Produktion fuße auf der tayloristisch-fordistischen Massenproduktion, die systemübergreifend dieselben Anforderungen an das wirtschaftliche Führungspersonal stelle. Diesem Gedanken folgend, schreibt er den DDR-Kombinatsleitern eine hohe technische Qualifikation, große Organisationsfähigkeiten und eine persönliche Durchsetzungskraft zu.40 Sie zeichneten sich zudem durch Anpassungsfähigkeit an wechselnde Produktionsbedingungen, Phantasie und Kombinationsvermögen aus. M. Rainer Lepsius folgend bezeichnet er die Kombinatsdirektoren als „Könige der Improvisation“ und keinesfalls lediglich als Verwalter der ihnen zugedachten Aufgaben.41 Nur einen Aspekt, den Lepsius hervorhebt, klammert Roesler geflissentlich aus: den feststellbaren Mangel an ökonomischer Qualifikation. Smolny, Produktivitätsentwicklung in Ostdeutschland (Fn. 22), S. 251. Vgl. zu dem Forschungsansatz: Barbara Koller, Psychologie und Selektion. Die Entwicklung der persönlichkeitsbezogenen Anforderungsprofile an die Wirtschaftseliten seit den sechziger Jahren, in: Volker R. Berghahn / Stefan Unger / Dieter Ziegler (Hg.), Die deutsche Wirtschaftselite im 20. Jahrhundert. Kontinuitäten und Mentalitäten, Essen 2003, S. 337 – 351, hier S. 337 f. 40 Roesler, Stunde der Generaldirektoren (Fn. 8), S. 453. 41 Ebenda, mit Verweis auf: M. Rainer Lepsius, Handlungsräume und Rationalitätskriterien der Wirtschaftsfunktionäre in der Ära Honecker, in: Theo Pirker et al. (Hg.), Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion. Wirtschaftsführung in der DDR. Gespräche und Analysen, Opladen 1995, S. 347 – 362, hier S. 358 – 361. 38 39

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Im Hinblick auf die formale akademische Bildung der Führungskräfte offenbart der Ost-West-Vergleich erhebliche Differenzen. Die starke technische Ausrichtung der Betriebsleiter in der DDR verstärkte sich als Effekt der Vereinigung.42 Noch 2003 verfügten in Ostdeutschland 68,2 Prozent der Unternehmensleiter über einen technischen und nur 22,4 Prozent über einen ökonomischen Studienabschluss. In den westlichen Ländern hatten gut 40 Prozent eine wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Universitätsbildung absolviert, wobei sich die traditionelle technisch-ingenieurwissenschaftliche Prägung des westdeutschen Managements allmählich auflöste. Die abweichende Entwicklung in Ostdeutschland lässt sich durch den häufig stattgefundenen Aufstieg von Fachdirektoren zu Betriebsleitern erklären. Nach der Vereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten galten Techniker und Ingenieure häufig ideologisch als weniger belastet, was ihrer betriebsinternen Karriere während des Privatisierungsprozesses zugute kam.43 Zurecht distanziert sich deshalb der Soziologe Rudi Schmidt „von der nach der Wende in beiden Teilen Deutschlands – teils aus Zweckoptimismus, teils aus Naivität – recht verbreiteten technokratischen Deutung von der weitgehenden Funktionsidentität des Betriebsleiters, bzw. von dessen Rollenindifferenz in unterschiedlichen Wirtschaftssystemen“.44 Der Arbeitsalltag eines sozialistischen Managers unterschied sich nämlich in vielen Punkten von demjenigen seines kapitalistischen Namensvetters. Die Funktion des VEB-Direktors lässt sich als „Konfliktvermittlungsinstanz“45 beschreiben. Er musste Interessendivergenzen moderieren, die sich aus den unterschiedlichen Interessenlagen der betrieblichen Entscheidungsträger ergaben. An potentiellen Konflikten war nicht nur das technische und wirtschaftliche Leitungspersonal beteiligt, sondern auch politische Instanzen wie die Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung und die Betriebsparteiorganisation. Die daraus resultierenden flachen Hierarchien wurden am Beispiel der chemischen Industrie der DDR eingehend untersucht.46 Zwar führte die Bildung der Kombinate zu einer Straffung der Leitungsstrukturen, aber die Fähigkeit zur Aushandlung blieb vor allem in den Außenbeziehungen des Betriebes relevant. Als politisch Agierender suchte der Kombinatsdirektor die für seinen Bereich erwirkten Vorteile gegenüber der Kontrolle der staatlichen Verwaltungen und der SED abzusichern. Martens, Der lange Schatten der Wende (Fn. 18), S. 210 f. Markus Pohlmann / Hans-Joachim Gergs: Manager in Ostdeutschland – Reproduktion oder Zirkulation einer Elite?, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 49 (1997), 3, S. 540 – 562, hier S. 551. 44 Rudi Schmidt, Die zwei Welten der ostdeutschen Manager, in: Historische Sozialforschung / Historical Social Research 30 (2005), 2 [Sonderheft / Special Issue No. 112], Köln 2005, S. 231 – 237, hier S. 231. 45 Ebenda, S. 234. 46 Georg Wagner-Kyora, Karbidarbeiter in der Bargaining-Community. Klassenlage und Identitätskonstruktion, in: Renate Hürtgen / Thomas Reichel (Hg.), Der Schein der Stabilität. DDR-Betriebsalltag in der Ära Honecker, Berlin 2001, S. 191 – 216. 42 43

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Auch ökonomisch betrachtet befand sich der DDR-Betrieb je nach seiner Stellung in der Wertschöpfungskette – als Lieferant oder Empfänger von Vorleistungen – in einer Aushandlungsposition. Die wichtigste Maßgabe für das Produktionsergebnis setzte die Erfüllung des Plansolls. Mit dem Anreiz der Nachfrage, der in der Marktwirtschaft entscheidend war, hatten die Führungskräfte eines Betriebes oder Kombinates nur in Ausnahmefällen zu tun, z. B. beim Besuch auswärtiger Messen.47 Im DDR-System sozialisierte Führungskräfte waren deshalb mit der plötzlichen Einführung der Marktwirtschaft in mehrfacher Hinsicht überfordert. Aus den Leitern sozialistischer Betriebe wurden zwar Manager, doch es fehlte ihnen an der Kenntnis wichtiger unternehmerischer Fähigkeiten und Strategien.48 Die marktwirtschaftlichen Anforderungen an das unternehmerische Können verlangten von allen Führungskräften die Disposition, „bei jeder Entscheidung, jeder Maßnahme auf den betriebswirtschaftlichen Nutzen zu achten und strategisch zu denken“.49 Im Gegensatz dazu zeugten die 1995 bei einer Befragung geäußerten Selbsteinschätzungen zum Eintritt in die Managerfunktion nach der Privatisierung weitaus mehr vom Selbstverständnis eines Arbeitnehmers als von unternehmerischer Eigeninitiative. Die Palette der Aussagen reichte von „das Schicksal hat es so gefügt“ über „habe mich immer schon schwierigen Aufgaben gestellt“ bis zum spontanen Ergreifen der sich bietenden Gelegenheit, weil ansonsten eine Entlassung zu befürchten war. Häufig reagierten die Führungskräfte lediglich auf Anfragen der neu konstituierten betrieblichen Interessenvertretungen, manchmal willigten sie nur widerstrebend ein. Eine Reihe früherer Betriebsdirektoren ließ sich zur Legitimation von den Belegschaften wählen.50 „Runde Tische“ entstanden auch in den Unternehmen, um die weitere Gestaltung der Produktion zu besprechen. All diese Punkte deuten eher auf ein betriebszentriertes als auf ein marktorientiertes Selbstverständnis der Führungskräfte hin. In den Außenbeziehungen werden diese Verhaltensmuster besonders deutlich, wenn betont wird, dass die Verhandlungen mit der Treuhandanstalt stark an das frühere Auftreten der Leitungskräfte gegenüber den staatlichen Planbehörden erinnerten.51 Von Überforderung zeugten auch die Bemühungen ostdeutscher Geschäftsführer zur Erschließung neuer Märkte. Zwar gab es in der DDR der 1980er Jahre bereits einen nicht unwesentlichen Teil der Betriebe, die über die staatliche Handelsorganisation in den Westen exportierten, doch ging die Mehrzahl der Industrieexporte in die östliche Hemisphäre. Zum Beispiel bestimmten sowjetische BedarfsfordeSchmidt, Zwei Welten (Fn. 44), S. 236. Vgl. Preusche, Betriebliche Akteure (Fn. 1). Die Studie basiert auf einem 1995 abgeschlossenen Forschungsprojekt an der Universität Chemnitz, das Interviews mit betrieblichen Führungskräften zahlreicher privatisierter Betriebe, vor allem in der für Ostdeutschland bedeutenden Maschinenbaubranche, durchführte. 49 Ebenda, S. 61. 50 Merkens, Transformationsprozeß (Fn. 11), S. 94. 51 Preusche, Betriebliche Akteure (Fn. 1), S. 65. 47 48

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rungen in einer ganzen Reihe von Kombinaten des Maschinenbaus das Produktsortiment, während so gut wie keine Maschinen nach Westen exportiert wurden.52 In den 1990er Jahren suchten die exportorientierten Maschinenbaubetriebe entweder nach Nischen auf den westlichen Märkten oder nach Absatzmöglichkeiten in asiatischen Ländern. Zum Aufbau dieser neuen Handelsbeziehungen waren marktwirtschaftliche Kenntnisse vonnöten, sei es bei der Vermarktung von Produkten oder bei der Entwicklung von Werbestrategien. Viele der neuen Aufgaben erforderten persönliche Fähigkeiten im kommunikativen Bereich, z. B. Fremdsprachenkenntnisse, sowie ein selbstbewusstes Auftreten im Umgang mit interessierten Geschäftspartnern. Die befragten Manager schätzten ihre Ausgangsvoraussetzungen in Bezug auf diese Punkte selbst als defizitär ein.53 Ökonomisch ausgedrückt, waren für die Such- und Informationskosten für ostdeutsche Betriebe, die der alten Führungsschicht vertrauten, ungleich höher als für ihre etablierten westlichen Konkurrenten. Darüber hinaus waren die Marken der westdeutschen Unternehmen international besser eingeführt, sie gehörten informellen Netzen an oder verfügten sogar über eine politische Lobby. Im Industriesektor der DDR vollzog sich die notwendige Anpassung unter scharfen Weltmarktbedingungen, vor allem in Branchen wie der Textilindustrie. Die mangelnde Übung im Plansystem, sich neuen Bedingungen anzupassen und strategisch auf neue Herausforderung zu reagieren,54 wirkte sich verhängnisvoll aus. Auf diese Mängel wies schon 1992 mit Günter Schabowski ein Praktiker der Planwirtschaft hin, als er über Geringschätzung von Individualität und spontaner Kreativität als Kennzeichen des sozialistischen Wirtschaftssystems schrieb.55 Diese Erkenntnisse vermögen die hohe Zahl der Insolvenzen in der ersten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre zu erklären. Jedoch wirkten die skizzierten Strukturprobleme auch in den Betrieben nach, die am Markt verblieben. Es ist fraglich, ob sich die von den Führungskräften zu DDR-Zeiten geforderte Improvisationsfähigkeit ohne weiteres auf die strategischen Entscheidungen, die in den 1990er Jahren zu fällen waren, übertragen ließ. Ein wesentliches betriebsinternes Umstrukturierungsproblem betraf den Abbau der großen Fertigungstiefe, durch die sich vor allem die Kombinate ausgezeichnet hatten. Unter den Knappheitsbedingungen und im Sinne der problemlosen Planerfüllung versuchten die DDRBetriebe, einen möglichst großen Teil der Zwischenprodukte und Ersatzteile selbst zu produzieren. In den Betrieben des Maschinenbaus dienten z. B. drei Viertel der Gesamtleistung der Herstellung der benötigten Einzelteile und nur ein Viertel der Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1990, S. 279; Steiner, Von Plan zu Plan (Fn. 4), S. 203. Preusche, Betriebliche Akteure (Fn. 1), S. 59. Vgl. auch die umfangreiche Feldforschung: Karin Breu, East German Managers in Transition. A Study into Individual Change in Transformative Contexts, München 2000, S. 25. 54 Steiner, Von Plan zu Plan (Fn. 4), S. 226. 55 Günter Schabowski, Die Abstoßung der Utopie. In der DDR erlitt der Marxismus sein deutsches Fiasko, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 43 (1992), 8, S. 459 – 476, hier S. 464. 52 53

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Montage.56 Was unter DDR-Verhältnissen eine rationale Reaktion auf die fortwährenden Engpässe war, bewirkte eine Neigung zu einer mitunter zeit- und materialaufwändigen Do-it-yourself-Strategie.57 Dieses Produktionsregime wurde auch als „reproduktive Geschlossenheit“ bezeichnet und führte häufig zu einem Dilettantismus.58 Die im planwirtschaftlichen Rahmen erlernte Fähigkeit zur Improvisation konnte sich unter Marktbedingungen als Nachteil erweisen. 1990 erkannten die Geschäftsführungen vieler Betriebe, dass die Reduktion der Fertigungstiefe ebenso wie Verfahrensinnovationen unumgängliche Erfordernisse für die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit seien. Sofern derartige Umstellungen erfolgten, führten sie zu einer bis dahin nicht gekannten Abhängigkeit von Zulieferern. Vielen Leitungskräften mangelte es an Kenntnissen, wie z. B. Strategien des Outsourcings zu nutzen waren. Zudem verfügten sie kaum über die Fähigkeiten zur Marktanpassung und zur flexiblen Reaktion auf neue Herausforderungen. Es war eben ein wesentlicher Unterschied, ob man ein „Virtuose bei Überwindung von Engpässen“59 war oder sich marktstrategisch behaupten musste.

V. Längerfristige Ursachen für die betrieblichen Defizite In den 1990er Jahren entsprach das erfolgreiche kleine oder mittlere Unternehmen nicht mehr so stark wie im Mittelabschnitt der Bonner Republik dem klassischen Typus des mittelständischen Familienunternehmens.60 Im Zuge der Öffnung der Finanzmärkte waren vor allen Dingen effiziente Methoden einer modernen Betriebsorganisation gefragt.61 Unter diesem Aspekt kann die niedrige Produktivität der ostdeutschen Betriebe des verarbeitenden Gewerbes mit der Fragen der Betriebsorganisation in Zusammenhang gebracht werden. Der Technisierungsgrad war im Osten zwar durchaus hoch, doch führte er nicht zu einer höheren Arbeitsproduktivität. Auf Mängel hinsichtlich der Betriebsorganisation weist eine Analyse der „qualified white-collar workers“ im verarbeitenden Gewerbe hin, d. h. der beruflich qualifizierten Angestellten, die organisatorisch relevante Posten bekleideten. In den ostdeutschen Betrieben betrug ihr Anteil an der Gesamtzahl der Arbeitnehmer nur 19 Prozent, während er im Westen bei 25 Prozent lag. Preusche, Betriebliche Akteure (Fn. 1), S. 57. Gutmann, Wirtschaftsordnung der DDR (Fn. 6), S. 37. 58 Windolf, Transformation (Fn. 13), S. 473. Vgl. auch: Peter Hübner, Durch Planung zur Improvisation. Zur Geschichte des Leitungspersonals in der staatlichen Industrie der DDR, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 39 (1999), S. 197 – 233, hier S. 224 f. 59 Windolf, Transformation (Fn. 13), S. 473. 60 Hartmut Berghoff, Abschied vom klassischen Mittelstand. Kleine und mittlere Unternehmen in der bundesdeutschen Wirtschaft des späten 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Berghahn / Unger / Ziegler, Die deutsche Wirtschaftselite im 20. Jahrhundert (Fn. 39), S. 93 – 113, hier S. 113. 61 Zum Folgenden: Lutz Bellmann / Martin Brussig, Productivity Differences between Western and Eastern German Establishments. Labour Productivity – Firm and Organisational Behaviour – Establishment Panel, Nürnberg 1999. 56 57

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Offensichtlich wurde in den ostdeutschen Ländern an qualifizierten leitenden Angestellten gespart, was die Mängel im organisatorischen Bereich erklärte. Daran änderte auch der vorhandene technisch-fachliche Qualifikationsstand der Belegschaften nichts. Zu Recht wird der sehr hohe Anteil an „skilled workers“, d. h. der Facharbeiter (51,7 Prozent im Osten gegenüber nur 32,6 Prozent im Westen), ebenfalls als Erbe der DDR-Zeit interpretiert. In Bezug auf die fehlenden qualifizierten Angestellten fielen aber die Betriebe unter 200 Beschäftigten gegenüber dem Durchschnittswert noch einmal ab: Kein einziges der 1999 in einem Sample erfassten Unternehmen erreichte die 19-Prozent-Marke.62 Dies gab sogar zu Spekulationen Anlass, ob womöglich eine zu geringe Betriebsgröße für den Produktivitätsrückstand Ostdeutschlands mitverantwortlich sein könnte. Die Erkenntnis, dass sich die Personalstruktur der Betriebe durch einen Mangel an qualifizierten leitenden Angestellten auszeichnete, sind zur Feststellung eines niedrigen ökonomischen Ausbildungsgrades in den Leitungspositionen und den sozialisationsbedingten Mängeln im Management komplementär. Die Performance der Unternehmen während der 1990er Jahre hing von weiteren Faktoren ab, die in der Betriebsgeschichte zu suchen sind. Eine Studie über sieben ostdeutsche Unternehmen – darunter das oft untersuchte, aber auch außergewöhnliche Beispiel der Jenoptik (früher Carl Zeiss Jena) – sucht in der Zeit vor 1989 nach Gründen für ihr erfolgreiches wirtschaftliches Abschneiden.63 Die Betriebsergebnisse nach der Vereinigung gestalteten sich umso besser, je ausgeprägter bereits zu DDR-Zeiten folgende betrieblichen Merkmale waren: (a) Teilnahme am internationalen technischen Wettbewerb, (b) Exportorientierung nach Westen, (c) Kooperation mit westlichen Partnern, (d) Existenz eigener Forschungs- und Entwicklungsabteilungen, (e) Vorhandensein eines Markennamens. Der Rückstand gegenüber dem internationalen technologischen Niveau war von Branche zu Branche unterschiedlich: In den alten Industrien, z. B. dem Profilwalzwerk Bad Düben, das zudem eine eigene Forschungs- und Entwicklungsabteilung unterhielt, war er weniger gravierend als in der Mikroelektronik, z. B. dem Dresdner Robotron-Werk. Eine in den 1980er Jahren begonnene Kooperation mit dem Westen verhalf der Florena Cosmetic GmbH zur schnellen Markteinführung ihrer Produkte, denn ihr Vorgängerbetrieb hatte als Lizenznehmer der Baiersdorf AG bereits für die Intershops der DDR produziert. Die Bedeutung des Markennamens belegt der Fall einer ehemaligen Klosterbrauerei, die sich auf regionalen Absatz orientierte und mit ihrer Erzeugung im traditionellen Verfahren rasch eine gute Wettbewerbsposition erlangte.64 Weitaus schwieriger waren die Startbedingungen für die Betriebe, die nicht über einen derartigen Entwicklungsvorsprung verfügten. Verschiedene Autoren konstatieren für eine Reihe von Unternehmen, die unrentabel wirtschafteten, das Fort62 63 64

Ebenda. Wolf / Hungenberg, Transition Strategies (Fn. 11), S. 188 – 193. Dittrich, Staats- und Marktversagen (Fn. 11), S. 224 f.

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bestehen von „Gesetzen der Organisation, die bereits im Sozialismus galten“ bzw. „Verhaftung in der sozialistischen Lebenswelt“.65 Im Fall eines Milchverarbeitungsbetriebes, dem Rechtsnachfolger eines Kombinats in derselben Branche, werden folgende Indikatoren angeführt: Ignorieren der Bedeutung frühzeitiger Marketingaktivitäten, Verspätung bei der personellen Verstärkung des Managements, zu „gigantische“ Planung von Investitionen in Produktions- und Verpackungsanlagen ohne Sicherung der Finanzierung, zu langfristig angelegte Schließung überzähliger Betriebsstätten, zu langsamer Personalabbau. Zur Bestätigung der These der organisatorischen „Verhaftung“ kann auch das Beispiel eines Tiefkühlkostbetriebes dienen. Drei Agrargenossenschaften hatten dieses Unternehmen nach der deutschen Vereinigung gegründet, um zusätzliche Absatzwege für Obstund Gemüseerzeugnisse zu erschließen. Trotz einer guten Kapitalausstattung verschlechterte sich die Wettbewerbsposition zusehends, weil die Geschäftsführung große Schwierigkeiten mit der Umsetzung neuer Strategien hatte. Diese betrieblichen Einzelbeispiele runden das Bild ab, das über die mangelhaften Managerfähigkeiten im ostdeutschen Gewerbe entworfen wurde. Das Argument der Verhaftung in früheren Gewohnheiten kann sogar mit der Subventionspolitik der 1990er Jahre in Verbindung gebracht werden. Zu DDR-Zeiten herrschte in den Betrieben eine weiche Budgetbeschränkung vor, d. h. eventuell entstehende finanzielle Löcher wurden von staatlicher Seite gestopft. In der Finanzbuchhaltung der volkseigenen Betriebe herrschte deshalb oft ein fehlendes Kostenbewusstsein vor. Darüber hinaus gab es Betriebe, die trotz defizitären Wirtschaftens aufgrund ihrer Unentbehrlichkeit in der Produktionskette weitergeführt wurden, z. B. aus Gründen der Autarkie oder wegen einer kombinatsinternen Zulieferungsfunktion. Manche Führungskräfte brachten derartige Erfahrungen in die privatisierten Betriebe ein, sodass in den 1990er Jahren eine „Subventionsmentalität“ festgestellt werden kann.66 Die staatlichen Transferleistungen von West nach Ost flossen für zahlreiche Unternehmen über einen längeren Zeitraum regelmäßig und reichlich. Die behördliche Kontrolle über die örtliche Verwendung arbeitete, wie bei einer öffentlichen Ausgabenüberwachung häufig feststellbar, nur bedingt effektiv. Sie erfolgte mit zeitlicher Verzögerung und konnte keinesfalls alle Kapitalwege nachvollziehen. Wie vorher die Planwirtschaft stellte die Subventionspolitik ausreichende Mittel zum Erreichen der Betriebsziele zur Verfügung, sodass bei den Geschäftsführern der ohnehin vorhandene Mangel an Kostenbewusstsein verstärkt wurde. Ihnen bot sich ein Bild der Kontinuität, das die „weiche Budgetbeschränkung“ aus der Zeit der Planwirtschaft in modifizierter Form fortsetzte. Was betriebswirtschaftlich angesichts der geringen Kapitalkosten durchaus eine rentable Entscheidung sein konnte, stellte sich in volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht als Rechnung dar, in der die Kosten die Erträge überstiegen. Dies führte in vielen 65 Merkens, Transformationsprozeß (Fn. 11), S. 217. Dittrich, Staats- und Marktversagen (Fn. 11), S. 228 – 233. 66 Smolny, Produktivitätsentwicklung in Ostdeutschland (Fn. 22), S. 250.

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Branchen zur Fehlleitung der Investitionen in: (a) kapital- und technologieintensive Vorzeigeprojekte, (b) den Erhalt unrentabler Produktionsbereiche, (c) den Bau von Büro- und Gewerbebauten, für die zunächst kein Bedarf bestand.67

VI. Schlussbemerkung Trotz des raschen institutionellen Wandels der Jahre 1989 / 90 wirkten in Ostdeutschland die dem planwirtschaftlichen System immanenten Mängel langfristig nach. Angesichts des hohen Grades an personeller Kontinuität zeichnete sich eine Vielzahl ostdeutscher Betriebe durch Defizite in der Unternehmensleitung aus, sodass ökonomische Erfordernisse häufig nicht erkannt wurden. Die präsentierten Erklärungsansätze reichen von der Verschiedenheit der Managertypen bis zu Strukturmerkmalen der ostdeutschen Unternehmen wie dem quantitativen Befund, dass es zu wenige ökonomische befähigte Führungskräfte und Angestellte gab. Die Sozialstruktur der Akteure bewirkte, dass für ökonomische Probleme vielfach technokratische Lösungen gesucht wurden.68 Bemerkenswert ist in dieser Hinsicht sicherlich, dass die Subventionspolitik selbst zur Verlängerung planwirtschaftlicher Defizite beitragen konnte, weil es ihr an Sensibilität für Anreizstrukturen fehlte. Sicherlich wirkten auch andere Faktoren auf die Performance der ostdeutschen Unternehmen ein, sei es die wenig zurückhaltende Lohnpolitik oder wirtschaftspolitische Fehler wie die Fehlleitung der Subventionen. Allerdings ist der „Managerfaktor“ nicht zu verachten, weil hinsichtlich des Leitungspersonals starke Kontinuitäten festzustellen sind. Die Ergebnisse dieses Beitrags weisen auf kulturelle Faktoren hin, die in wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Analysen meist ausgeklammert werden, z. B. die Prägung der Führungskräfte durch ihre Sozialisation, die sich daraus ergebende mentale Disposition und die fehlende unternehmerische Eignung, die damit in Zusammenhang steht.

67 Vgl. auch Sinn, Zehn Jahre deutsche Wiedervereinigung (Fn. 21), S. 17, der auf den Leerstand neu erstellter Bürogebäude und Wohnimmobilien sowie auf den Fall der Immobilienpreise nach dem Auslaufen des Fördergebietsgesetzes hinweist. 68 Pohlmann, Industriekrise (Fn. 10), S. 422.

Transformation of Economic Elites after the Fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia By Libuše Macáková / Eduard Kubu I. Introduction This article examines the transformation of the economic elites after the fall of communism in 1989 and includes a brief overview of the origins of the post-socialist elites during the period of state-run socialism. The term social elite, of course, not only posseses an economic dimension but also exhibits political and cultural dimensions and it stands for one of the most significant social groups. Social elites are primarily understood as the foremost stratification groupings, which enter into complicated interactions with the social system, its economic and political institutional structures, as well as the sphere of culture and its structures. They include political-administrative, economic, and cultural-ideological elites. The most general characteristic of the members of an elite is social status, which usually includes a certain position of power or social and political influence, a fairly high level of education and a large degree of information at one’s disposal, a highly specific complex form of work and work performance as well as high income, wealth, a certain lifestyle, prestige, an asset referred to as “social capital”, etc. In addition to wealth and power, the qualifications and performance as well as the success and social recognition derived from them are also contributory factors in the formation of an elite.1 This article explains the creation and development of the new economic elites in the process of transformation after the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia in November 1989. It is also concerned with the development of the internal structures of economics elites. The study is based on many analyses and research dedicated to the creation and further development of new economic elites in Czechoslovakia and later (after 1992) in the Czech Republic after the fall of communism.2 1 Pavel Machonin / Milan Tucek, Zrod a další vy ´voj novy´ch elit v Ceské republice [The Rise and Further Development of New Elites in the Czech Republic], Sociologicky´ Ústav Akademie Ved Ceské Republiky (SoÚ AV CR), Sociological Papers SP 02:1, Praha 2002, p. 10. 2 See for eample: Ed Clark / Anna Soulsby, The Re-Formation of the Managerial Elite in the Czech Public, in: Europe-Asia Studies 48 (1996), 2, pp. 285 – 303; John Higley / György Lengyel, Elites after State Socialism. Theories and Analysis, Lanham et al. 2000; Jaroslav Huk, Predstavitelé spolecensky´ch elit v Ceské republice a Slovenské republice [The Repre-

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It also utilizes the investigation of the Center for Empirical Research (Stredisko empiricky´ch vy´zkumu, STEM),3 which is a rare open resource covering a systematic empirical investigation of elites after 1994. Further data and information has been drawn from qualitative investigations and examinations, experiences of the authors and other reliable oral sources.

II. Czech economic elites in state socialism In order to explain the formation and development of the economic elites after the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia in November 1989, we must go back to the period just after World War II. This war and its aftermath completed the work of destruction of the previous composition and standard of the Czechoslovak economic elites. Those who remained in management positions of enterprises during the war had to leave because they were accused of collaborating with the Nazis. The pressure from below leading to nationalization meant a fundamental change of economic elites and a growing degradation of their quality. During the transitional period between 1945 and 1948, people were appointed to the posts of general managers and to posts on the boards of directors of large nationalized enterprises not only due to professional qualifications but also because of political considerations. It is an eloquent illustration that of the eleven government-appointed general managers in the industrial sectors, two were Communists, three were Social Democrats, three were members of the National Social Party, one was from the People’s Party and two were without party affiliation.4 Some of those in the managements of ensentatives of Social Elites in the Czech and the Slovak Republic], Praha 2001; Eric Hanley et al., The Making of Post-Communist Elites in Eastern Europe. A Comparison of Political and Economic Elites in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (= Working Papers 96: No. 3), Praha 1996; Libor Konvicka, Elity [The Elites] 1994, Praha 1995; Libor Konvicka, Predstavitelé spolecensky´ch elit v Ceské republice a Slovenské republice. Záverecná zpráva 1998 [The Representatives of Social Elites in the Czech and the Slovak Republic. Final Report 1998], Praha 1999; Pavel Machonin, Social and Political Transformation in the Czech Republic, in: Czech Sociological Review 30 (1994), 2, pp. 71 – 87; Pavel Machonin / Milan Tucek, Structures et acteurs en République Tchéque depuis 1989 [Structures and Actors in the Czech Republic since 1989], in: Revue d’études comparatives est-ouest 25 (1994), 4, pp. 79 – 109; Pavel Machonin / Milan Tucek, La génesis de las nuevas e1ites en la República Checa [The Emergence of New Elites in the Czech Republic], in: Cuadernos del Este (1996), No. 18, pp. 9 – 22; Pavel Machonin / Milan Tucek, Ceská spolecnost v transformaci [The Czech Society in Transformation], Praha 1996; Machonin / Tucek, Zrod a další vy´voj (fn. 1); Petr Mateju, Elite Research in the Czech Republic, in: Heinrich Best / Ulrike Becker (eds.), Elites in Transition. Elite Research in Central and Eastern Europe, Opladen 1997, pp. 61 – 76; Ivan Szelényi / Donald J. Treiman, Vy´voj sociální stratifikace a rekrutace elit ve vy´chodní Evrope po roce 1989 [The Development of Social Stratification and Recruitment of Elites in Eastern Europe after 1989], in: Sociologicky´ casopis 27 (1991), pp. 276 – 298; Jirí Vecerník, Staré a nové ekonomické nerovnosti: prípad cesky´ch zemí [Old and New Economic Inequalities: The Example of the Czech Lands], in: Sociologicky´ casopis 31 (1995), 3, pp. 321 – 334. 3 See Konvicka, Elity (fn. 2); Konvicka, Predstavitelé spolecensky ´ch elit (fn. 2).

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terprises were experts nominated by political parties; some of them were persons nominated by the Central Board of Trade Unions and by trade union boards in individual enterprises. It became apparent that some political parties had problems nominating qualified experts; they simply did not have them in their ranks. This was particularly true for the only non-socialist party in the Czech lands, the Czechoslovak People’s Party.

1. Economic elites after the establishment of the Communist dictatorship in 1948 After the Communist dictatorship had been established in 1948, an era of predominace of political qualifications for holding economic posts began. Qualifications were not assessed according to professional education but according to loyalty to the Party and to the “ideas of socialism”. Persecution of the intelligentsia and the members of the old elites who were labelled as class enemies, the appointment of workers to executive positions and the application of Soviet economic patterns in economic practice as well as the implementation of a Soviet-style education system completely interrupted the continuity of the managerial traditions associated with a market economy. Only the continuity of the lack of educated experts remained.5 The audit of the qualifications of economic executives carried out in 1964 yielded frightening results. Among 31,910 persons, 61.1 percent had only received a primary education; 10.4 percent exhibited an incomplete secondary profession-specific education and 8.8 percent had completed secondary general education, for a total of 80.3 percent. Only 11.2 percent of the white-collar workers had completed secondary profession-specific education and, astonishingly, a mere 8.4 percent had achieved university education. If we consider only the directors of manufacturing organizations from the list mentioned above, the situation gets better, but only a little: 38.8 percent of them had received a primary education; 21.1 percent of them exhibited an incomplete secondary education; 6 percent of them had completed a general education and 20.7 percent of them a secondary profession-specific education. Only 13 percent of managing directors graduated from a university and of those, 11.1 percent graduated from a technical university.6

4 Václav Lhota, Znárodnení v Ceskoslovensku [The Nationalization in Czechoslovakia]: 1945 – 1948, Praha / Svoboda 1987, p. 202. 5 As concerns the issue of Czech economic elites in the transformation of the economy of the new Czechoslovak state after 1918, you can find more details in Eduard Kubu, Tradice a zkušenost terciární sféry – vy´znamny´ faktor hospodárské transformace po první svetové válce [Tradition and Experience of the Tertiary Sector – An Important Factor of the Economic Transformation after World War I], in: Ekonomická Revue 2 (1999), 2, pp. 12 – 21. 6 Analysis of the qualifications of the economic executives in the new system of national economy management. National Archive in Prague, the Archive of the Central Commitee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, collection 1014, file 2, archivale unit 6, pp. 3 – 33.

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2. Economic elites before the “velvet revolution” – the 1970s and 1980s Managing directors and other executives in major economic enterprises and other institutions represented a special category in the social hierarchy before the November change of regime. All managing directors of medium-sized and large economic institutions were approved according to real-socialism appointment principles. In the system of a planned socialist economy, the production enterprises based on planning were fulfilling a number of functions which were not directly related to production and, as a result of this, the managing directors of enterprises had considerable power, even at a district level. In many respects, they had more discretion than the current managers in the management of an enterprise and they also had other forms of influence on economic and public life at their disposal. A major production enterprise was not only an employer but was also the owner of the apartments of some of its employees, and was responsible for sport and cultural institutions; it often participated in municipal investment projects etc. Consequently, the managing directors of such enterprises were not only managing hundreds, thousands or tens of thousands of employees but they also had the power to influence affairs in their district. They were members of the district elites and, if they were managing directors of large enterprises, they were even members of the national elite. The position of the managing directors of larger enterprises was comparable to that of the leading officials in the state administration. The managing directors of the really large enterprises were among the members of higher-level party bodies (regional or national), though they were subordinated to these bodies and were held responsible by them for the actions they took as the leaders of enterprises. In some cases, usually in the case of highly industrial districts of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, these managing directors could sometimes be more significant than the officials of district national committees or even the secretaries of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In connection with this description of the elite position of the managing directors of socialist enterprises, it is appropriate to mention that in the case of production enterprises, the managing directors were not the best paid employees. The highly skilled or high-performing workmen had the highest salaries. However, the managing directors gained their benefits from the positions they held. Together with the secretaries of the district committees of the Communist Party, the leading officials of the Youth Union and the leading officials of the public administration, these managing directors were highly influential people. Everybody tried to accommodate their wishes and they, in turn, were able to be very helpful to some people. The members of the economic elite certainly enjoyed an above-average standard of living and it was easier for them to cope with the scarcity of consumer goods and services. However, the group with the highest income, the most property and easiest access to deficit goods and services were the people who were active in the grey economy, especially various “moneychangers”, vegetable retailers, waiters

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etc., i. e. those who had something under their counter or who could simply enrich themselves by stealing. The dismal situation of the standard of economic education and the lack of experience regarding private economic activity led to pessimism regarding the possible formation of a social group that could work as the “social bearer of post-socialist development”.7 The strong pressure of the state-socialist system was not only limiting the scope and development, but in Czechoslovakia even the mere existence of small legal private businesses. Prior to 1989, there were virtually no officially permitted private economic activities in Czechoslovakia; the property of households and individuals was severely restricted by prior expropriation merely to what was referred to as “personal possessions” and the levelling of official incomes was one of the strongest in Europe.8 Except for a handful of markedly successful persons, some of the officials involved in the state-socialist structures and the group of “successful” persons active in what was referred to as the “grey economy”, there was no numerous group of people with the necessary qualifications who had significant or even medium-level financial resources. Therefore, there was no “upper” or even “upper middle” class and a “new middle class” existed only to a very limited extent, if we do not want to include the skilled workmen who were paid excessive wages.9 The fact, that there were no groups who would be in official economic positions, so, as to be capable of taking a leading position in the following social transformation does not mean that there were no social groups interested in the forthcoming changes. Pavel Machonin and Milan Tucek, when analyzing data from 1984, identified social groups “whose education, cultural standards and, in most cases, the nature of whose work were substantially “higher” than their level of income, their participation in management or possibly their position of power in general. There were such groups both at the higher and at the lower middle average status level”.10 In these groups, there was a significantly lower proportion of members of the Communist Party than in the economically active population as a whole and therefore these groups were less politically active. These factors, along with others (such as the age barrier), prevented these people from advancing to higher managerial and professional positions with adequate higher incomes. The key factor in the development of pre-November economic elites was the change of generations in the posts of the managing directors of enterprises which 7 Alain Touraine, Zrod postkomunisticky ´ch spolecností [The Rise of the Post-Communist Society], in: Sociológia / Slovak Sociological Review 23 (1991), 3, pp. 301 – 318; Georges Mink / Jean-Charles Szurek, Adaptation and Conversion Strategies of Former Communist Elites, Paris 1992. 8 Jirí Vecerník, Problémy prijmu a zivotní úrovne v sociální diferenciaci [Problems of Income and Standard of Living under Conditions of Social Differentiation], in: Pavel Machonin (ed.), Ceskoslovenská spolecnost [The Czechoslovak Society], Bratislava 1969; Vecerník, Staré a nové ekonomické (fn. 2). 9 Machonin / Tucek, Structures et acteurs (fn. 2). 10 Ibidem, p. 82.

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took place during the 1980s (especially during the second half of the 1980s). One reason was the necessity to replace those “blue-collar cadres” who had managed enterprises since the 1950s, but another reason was also the party’s new official tactics. At that time, even the party leaders realized that mere political directives would not increase the performance of the economy and professional qualifications were now taken into account in the appointment of managing directors of enterprises. Gradually, more graduates of technical or economic universities became the managing directors of enterprises during the 1980s. After completing their studies, they usually started to work in lower management jobs in production and were gradually advanced to higher posts in the hierarchy of the enterprise up to the post of general manager. Certain hope was attached to people who had been persecuted during the era of socialism and to some groups of people who had emigrated. However, it became apparent that those persecuted and those who had lived in exile for many years were mostly too old or too firmly rooted in their new exile environments to be able to become the members of the new economic elite. Only some of them or their children as well as those who emigrated after 1968 gained more prominent posts after 1989, if they were willing to accept the new conditions they found after their time abroad. The social base for the emergence of the next, post-socialist elite was, thus, actually present primarily in what was referred to as “the second society” and was also present covertly to a certain degree in the official society of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

III. The disintegration of the pre-November economic elites in Czechoslovakia and the formation and development of elites during the social transformations 1. The formation of economic elites in the first half of 1990s The definition by Vilfredo Pareto of two fundamentally different paths of development of the elite stratum in society (“circulation” and “slow transformation”11) became the basis for analysing the formation and development of elites during social transformations after the destruction of socialism in the countries of the former Soviet block. The main topics of discussion in this field among Czech sociologists and political scientists concern these two paths of development of the elite components in Czech society after 1989.12 It is obvious, that after the collapse of the communist regime complete reproduction of elites or complete circulation of elites 11 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society. A Treatise on General Sociology, New York 1963, pp. 1427 – 1432. 12 Szelényi / Treiman, Vy ´voj sociální stratifikace (fn. 2), pp. 279 f.; Mateju, Elite Research (fn. 2), pp. 63 – 65.

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did not take place, so that the elite circulation and reproduction processes can only be understood as certain specific ideal types. However, defending the elite and their respective interpretation of circulation and reproduction processes has become a part of the ideologies of political parties. The extreme right-wing political parties often emphatically point to what they perceive as a reproduction of the elites in the new capitalist regime, the members of which were previously involved in state-socialist structures; they consequently criticize the presence of former members of the socialist elites in important positions in the public administration. They call for a “second revolution” that would remove these persons previously involved in socialist structures from their current positions. The left-wing parties, conversely, emphasize the negative aspects of the circulation of the elites previously involved in socialist structures under the new post-communist regime; according to their proclamations, the competent members of the Communist Party were removed from their posts and irresponsible persons now work at the top of the governmental power hierarchy.13 In reality, the reproduction of the former elites in the new economic elites as the link between the former socialist elites on one hand and the present post-communist elites on the other hand is very strong. These links are represented by those persons formerly involved in state-socialist structures, who adapted to the new situation, or they manifest in the use of inherited economic and social capital by family members of the persons who were previously involved in state-socialist structures. This way of formation of post-communist elites was based on the ability of those previously involved in state-socialist structures to take advantage of various benefits stemming from their positions in the last decades of the socialist system – particularly through formal and informal contacts connected with their political and economic posts. The persons involved in state-socialist structures had two main ways of adapting to the new regime: They could retain their positions in the administration or they could transform their former political privileges into economic privileges. On the other hand, the transition to a market economy in the Czech Republic was closely linked to changes in the composition of the elites. The monopoly of communist power, relying on the human resources management practiced at that time, prevented the circulation of elites until 1989. It was not until the fundamental changes after 1989 that it became possible to change the mechanisms of creating or incorporating new people in the elites. The old officials had to leave their posts and were replaced by new people who did not work in governmental and public institutions prior to 1989. As a result, the process of transition to the market economy in the Czech Republic exhibits some features of the circulation of elites. The theory of cultural capital also provides an explanation of the creation and development of the current economic elites in the Czech Republic.14 This theory 13

Hanley et al., The Making of Post-Communist Elites (fn. 2).

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sees the root of affiliation to political and economic elites in the passing of cultural capital from generation to generation. The negligible effect of private ownership in the regime of real-socialism meant that the elites lost the possibility to use the economic capital as one of the usable means of passing on their social status to their successors. Similarly, after the leading role of the Communist Party ceased to exist, the people in power in the state-socialist structures lost the possibility of passing on their privileges stemming from their involvement in the socialist structures to members of their family. Under the regime of real-socialism, a substantial part of the elites was able, to a certain degree, to ensure a quality education or satisfactory jobs for their children. In the post-November situation, it was exactly this social group that had the greatest opportunity to hold the leading posts in their professional fields or in public administration. Consequently, the current post-communist elites contain, to a considerable degree, the social groups capable of retaining their privileges in various political and economic regimes. This development of parts of the newly established economic elites in the Czech Republic is confirmed by the theory of what is referred to as the “grey zone”, elaborated by Jirina Šiklová, a sociologist.15 The grey zone was an extensive social group, whose members often worked in posts directly involved in state-socialist structures which were marked in the human resources management files as posts for pro-regime persons. This group is mainly characterized by higher education and developed professional skills. The new post-communist situation gave this group an advantage in the Czech labor market as well as in other areas of public life. During the era of real-socialism, many members of the grey zone were informal friends of dissidents or at least their supporters but they never openly criticized the policy of the Communist Party. As opposed to dissidents, this minimum political engagement protected the grey zone from job-related sanctions as well as from personal persecutions. In addition to that, long-term work in jobs corresponding to their professional specializations enhanced their professional skills, which are highly appreciated today. Empirical investigations confirmed that the former Czechoslovak management members who were involved in state-socialist structures of the 1970s and 1980s have retained their privileges even in the new capitalist regime to a considerable degree,16 in spite of the fact that in the period from November 1989 to January 1993, i. e. the beginning of the newly created sovereign Czech state, a complete replacement of the political elite took place. This replacement was a result of out14 To a considerable degree, this theory overlooks the influence of economic, political and social factors on the composition of elites. This approach rejects the meaningfulness of empirical investigations, which examine the links between the persons previously involved in state-socialist structures and the post-communist elites. 15 Jirina Šiklová, The “Grey Zone” and the Future of Dissent in Czechoslovakia, in: Social Research 57 (1990), 2, pp. 347 – 364. 16 Hanley et al., The Making of Post-Communist Elites (fn. 2).

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side political pressures, but was mainly a result of internal socio-economical processes and strong political activity of domestic officials.17 After the coup in November 1989, the committees of Obcanské fórum (Civic Forum) and Verejnos’ proti násiliu (Public Against Violence) seized power in Czechoslovakia. Civic Forums which were formed in nearly all municipalities as well as in many institutions were conducting highly authoritative negotiations with governmental bodies, the managements of economic organizations and public institutions. Civic Forums demanded and usually achieved the removal of persons from leading economic posts, which were labelled as “old structures”. Those removed were mostly transferred to rank-and-file positions; some of them resigned of their own accord even before that. Subsequently, it became apparent that, especially in the case of the economic elites, these removals or retreats from top positions were only temporary. The activities of the Civic Forums culminated in the first half of 1990 and then faded out approximately until the end of that year. Those who were compelled to leave or voluntarily left their positions and did not retire were mostly looking for jobs in the private sector. They either started their own companies or they were able to find a managerial post in some other private company. Some tried both possibilities: They had started as businessmen but later became managers and, vice versa, some managers started their own businesses. The decisive factor, that allowed the pre-November economic elites to maintain a certain degree of influence even during the post-November period, was the change of generations in the posts of the managing directors of enterprises that took place in the 1980s. The fast replacement of the national power elites prevented a mass conversion of the Czechoslovak managerial pro-regime officials involved in the state-socialist structures into a new capitalist class. In spite of that, a substantial part of the former Czechoslovak managerial pro-regime officials took advantage of their positions and retained their privileges even under the new social circumstances. According to the results of an empirical survey covering 1509 respondents, approximately 40 percent of the current economic elite previously held the posts of managing directors or their deputies already under the old regime; more than half of the respondents from this group were in a higher managerial positions (i. e. with at least ten subordinates) before November 1989.18 It is symptomatic that most of the new managing directors working in enterprises after 1989 had held the posts of a deputy to a managing director or as a director of a lower-level enterprise unit before the change of regime, and were only waiting for “their opportunity”.19 The share of the “socialist managers” in the newly emerging private sector was considerably lower than in the new governmental sector: From among the managing directors of Czech private companies, only 60 percent already held a managerial 17 18 19

Machonin / Tucek, Zrod a další vy´voj (fn. 1). Machonin / Tucek, Ceská spolecnost (fn. 2). Clark / Soulsby, The Re-Formation of the Managerial Elite (fn. 2).

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position in 1988, while from among the managing directors of the post-communist Czech state-owned enterprises, more than 73 percent held a managerial position already in 1988.20 There were several ways in which officials, formerly involved in the state-socialist structures, started their businesses and they were often combined in practice. One method for a manager of a state-owned enterprise was to set up a private company. In some cases, such a manager did this by himself; sometimes, companies of this kind were incorporated through a dummy incorporation. The assets of the state-owned enterprise were then transferred to this company and the state-owned enterprise was run down. Of course, only some of the economic managers had an opportunity to start their own businesses in this way. The second route was privatization by the managers of the enterprise. This was fairly complicated and could take on several forms: In the simplest form, the managers of a state-owned enterprise submitted a proposal for a privatization project to the ministry to which the enterprise was subordinated. This project envisioned, that the enterprise would become a limited liability company or a joint-stock company through an official act. The existing managers would assume the leading positions in such a company. As soon as the project was approved by the ministry, the managers became the owners of such an enterprise. A fairly narrow group of persons was able to use this procedure. The most widespread method was to acquire a loan for a business plan. The former officials from the state-socialist structures usually started less significant businesses, sometimes only sole-partner businesses, and they were not always successful in their business activities with the result that the existence of some of these incorporated companies was only short-lived. The results of surveys and the opinions of those familiar with the situation at the district level after 1989 allow us to deduce that more than half of the members of the former economic elites (from those who did not retire) found their jobs in the private business sector in the 1990s. Some of them even moved up in the hierarchy of an enterprise over time and, in exceptional cases, succeeded in regaining the post from which they had been removed after the coup. In spite of the above-mentioned facts, the current economic elites for the most part do not consist of the members of the former economic elite, because it was mostly those people who were “in the right place” at that time who became the most successful businessmen. “The right place” was usually a position, in which it was possible to manage state-owned assets for one’s own benefit uncontrollably or without oversight. Some people “were doing business” and were benefiting from their social contacts established during the era of socialism in what is referred to as the “grey economy”: These people had advantages over others because they simply legalized their previous activities. Often, they retained a part of their activities in the grey zone even under the new circumstances. 20

Hanley et al., The Making of Post-Communist Elites (fn. 2).

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In this context, it is appropriate to remember the significance of cultural capital in the adaptation of the elites of the state-socialist structures to the new capitalist circumstances. At the first stage of the transition, a university diploma was no guarantee of a person’s suitability for doing business. When the market environment was being formed, competition between people with and without university diplomas was nearly non-existent. What was important was the difference between competent and less competent persons and also the difference between those willing to take risks and the rest. An originally favorable position was not, in itself, the decisive prerequisite for advancing up the social ladder of the newly emerging society, but it could be helpful to advancement thanks to the related contacts and knowledge. An account given by one of the representatives of the former elites involved in the state-socialist structures, who is now a major businessman in the construction industry, is a typical example of such a situation, as one of our oral sources demonstrates: “I had to leave the national committee and so I started my own business. I am a civil engineer; in the committee, I was the head of the construction department so I decided to try to set up a construction company. I had some money of my own; I borrowed some money but, most importantly, I knew all the teams of masons in the district.”

Various factors contributed to success: They included benefits from cultural capital (qualification as a civil engineer), social capital (knowledge of the working teams of masons), the willingness to take risks (the decision to start a business and take a financial loan) and previous self-discipline (financial savings). His position among the officials of the state-socialist structures was only a common denominator of all these factors. Had he been a mere work foreman during the era of socialism, he would probably have remained in this position because nothing would have forced him to make any changes. This circumstance is worth highlighting: The officials involved in the state-socialist structures were mostly “thrown” into new economic currents against their will and were unprepared. 2. The formation of economic elites in the second half of the 1990s Simultaneously with the replacement of political and administrative elites after 1989, certain changes also started to take place among the economic elites in the 1990s. They first started with the incorporation of small and, later on, larger enterprises; initially this was a spontaneous activity, but it was soon supported by official actions: restitutions, small-scale privatization and, later on, by participation in specifically Czech large-scale privatization. During the subsequent development of what was already a national market economy, managers and bankers in particular were gaining the elite positions. In the period up to approximately the mid-1990s, a number of transformations in the economic-social structure took place, which was important for the formation of elites. There was an emergence of a fairly numerous stratum of middle-class businessmen (with a large number of employees or with significant capital) who reached their positions through the restitution of major

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properties, by succeeding in minor commercial activities in their current businesses and by setting up new private enterprises, while using easily available highrisk loans, as well as by using the resources gained from the grey economy during the era of the previous regime. However, it is obvious that – in principle – middle-class business, save for some exceptions, cannot play the decisive role in the formation of a national elite. This is especially the case because it cannot be compared, in this respect, with the positions of the managers and the members of the management bodies of large enterprises of all kinds – whether such enterprises emerged from domestic large-scale privatization or due to the import of foreign capital, or, most often, from a combination of both. The most important components of the economic elite were not formed until the next wave of privatization, now with the participation of foreign capital, in the second half of the 1990s and in the following years. The representatives of foreign companies, many of whom were of foreign nationality, became the pre-eminent persons of the Czech national economy. Today, the richest people in the Czech Republic include a number of fairly young people, who got into highlevel business and accumulated considerable wealth through their successful business activities (especially financial business activities) performed at the medium level. The main and most numerous component of the economic elites is made up of high-ranking economic officers of enterprises and large-scale industries, mostly in modern rather than traditional services (including particularly the financial, commercial, informational, legal, technological and other services); also included are the owners and co-owners, especially the holders of large blocks of shares, as well as the members of supervisory boards, boards of directors and other similar bodies. The right-wing governments lead by Václav Klaus as well as the interim government of Josef Tošovsky´ and the minority government of the Social Democrats under Prime Minister Miloš Zeman, believed that their most important mission was to privatize or possibly partly privatize a large part of the national economy, particularly the large state-owned companies or state-owned joint-stock companies.21 In order to carry out such privatization, three intertwining methods were used, which have given rise to specific components of the economic elite: First, to a limited extent, the privatization was carried out in the sectors and companies engaged in the business of construction and the operation of infrastructure as well as in what was referred to as “natural monopolies”. Although Zeman’s minority government in particular tried to take daring steps in this respect (with efforts to privatize the Czech power engineering industry as a whole), other segments of the economy will probably remain in the ownership or co-ownership of the state or under its 21 Lubomir Mlcoch, Restrukturalizace vlastnicky ´ch vztahu institucionální pohled [The Reconstruction of Property Relations: An Institutional View], in: Lubomir Mlcoch / Pavel Machonin / Milan Sojka, Ekonomické a spolecenské zmeny c ceské spolecnosti po roce 1989 (alternativní pohled) [Economic and Social Change in the Czech Society after 1989. An Alternative Perspective], Praha 2000, pp. 21 – 96.

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strong control. The railroads technical infrastructure (the so called “transport route”), water and mineral resources, nature reserves and military training areas can be referred to as examples. It is also appropriate to expect a significant participation of the state in the quaternary sector, too: education, public mass media, academic, university as well as sector-specific research, health care and welfare, management of cultural institutions and public cultural services. The defence industry and the financial management of the army will remain a government interest, and so will agriculture and the construction of apartments to a certain degree. Thus, in these sectors, sub-sectors and enterprises, there will be an elite of the economic governmental and half-governmental bureaucracy (representing a certain combination of a political and economic elite), which also includes the administration of government agencies engaged in managing or controlling the economy. So far, this category also includes the managements of large enterprises, which have not yet been privatized and which are expected to be privatized in the future.22 Therefore, it is obvious that we will have to expect that the future economic elite will include both the sphere of free business (owners, managers and members of the bodies representing the owners) as well as a significant share of economic bureaucracy and members of the boards and managers of state-owned enterprises. Second, while the right-wing governments used non-standard privatization methods on a large scale, especially coupon privatization, the most extensive and important privatizations were carried out by means of the standard methods of a direct sale of the shares to domestic and particularly to foreign investors. The beginning of these privatizations is associated with the activities of the Czech government in the early 1990s – a classical example is the undoubtedly successful privatization of Škoda in Mladá Boleslav.23 This was followed by rapid privatizations (approximately until 1996), mostly proposed by those who were in charge of the management at that time, and carried out for their benefit. In a number of cases, this involved a combination of coupon privatization with direct sales, quite often made possible by not always honest loans from banks. Some of these privatization projects yielded good results, but some ended in failure, sometimes due to the mere haste with which the privatization process was implemented. Excessive speed in the implementation of the large-scale privatization process was a characteristic feature of the privatizations carried out by means of standard methods as well as of the privatizations carried out by means of the coupon method. The standard methods of privatization have been used again in recent years. However, a more prudent course has been taken in most of the recent privatization projects, with emphasis on economic and technological-restructuring (refurbishment) aspects and with greater attention paid to the selection of potential buyers and significant financial revenues for the state treasury: All these aspects have contributed to the fact that, 22 In the case of electric power generation and distribution, these efforts have encountered similar objections as in the case of natural resources. 23 Gerlinde Dórr / Tanja Kessel, Restructuring via Internationalization. The Auto Industry’s Direct Investment Projects in Eastern Central Europe, Berlin 1999.

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as a result, persons with certain professional economic qualities and with a high degree of responsibility, whether they are Czech or foreign representatives, have become members of the economic elite.24 Ultimately, the quality of these additions to the economic elite, even from such controversial privatization projects, which were implemented under time pressure and as a consequence of past neglect and irregularities – for example, the privatization of Investicní a Poštovní Banka – will probably be beneficial. However, it will only be possible to carry out a final assessment of the results of the privatization projects implemented since 1998 after several years and the quality of the economic elites created by such projects will become apparent in their future economic success or, as the case may be, their failure. Third, another frequently used privatization method was introduced into the Czech transition by the first government of Václav Klaus (1992 – 1996). It was referred to as coupon privatization, and was based on the idea of quickly creating Czech national capital in an environment which lacked capital. This was also associated with the idea of rapidly creating Czech economic elites. With the unexpected significant role of privatization funds, which were linked to banks, as well as with the activities of asset-strippers such as Viktor Kozeny´, the coupon method really did make unprecedented fast privatization possible. On the other hand, the quality of the results of this type of privatization was lower than the quality of the results achieved by standard methods. In a large number of cases, the enterprises got into wrong hands when former state-owned company managers and other former officials from the state-socialist structures or some outsiders among the politicians, governmental officials, or in some cases even unqualified daredevils or adventurers became the new owners or managers of this wealth.25 With respect to the enhancement of the economic elite, the coupon privatization was often a failure – some of the representatives of the largest Czech companies got into their positions as a result of the coupon privatization combined with enigmatic loans from traditional as well as newly and hastily emerging banks. When the methods they used to manage their companies were assessed, numerous critical comments were voiced, pointing out that obsolete management methods, often continued from the time of the past regime, were being used. In connection with the increase of economic competition and the partial improvement in the enforceability of the law in the late 1990s, the economic empires of some of the members of these new economic elites quickly collapsed. This was mainly the case with people from the managements of large enterprises which had been privatized at least partly by coupon privatization as well as members of the managements of several large banks. Subsequently, there was a whole series of similar bankruptcies among medium-sized or small enter24 This is not to say that there were no mistakes or doubtful cases in the current wave of privatization. 25 Compare with: Mlcoch, Restrukturalizace (fn. 21) and Pavel Machonin, Teorie modernizace a ceská zkušenost [Theories of Modernization and the Czech Experience], in: Mlcoch / Machonin / Sojka, Ekonomické a spolecenské (fn. 21).

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prises. Even some of the enterprises privatized through the Czech version of standard privatization methods ended in bankruptcy. Only the new, more prudent regulations governing property-related matters and the newly agreed participation of foreign capital brought about a gradual remedy. The specifically Czech methods of privatization made it possible to take illegal and immoral actions, most often labelled by a newly coined Czech word “tunnelling” (asset-stripping). All this happened in combination with insufficient legal regulation of the privatization processes as well as the economic and financial policy of the respective governments characterized by incompetent interventions by individual ministries and other governmental agencies. All these generally understood phenomena disqualify those, who achieved social advancement in this manner, for the period of the normally working economy under the rule of law.26 And therefore, even at present and in the near future, we can expect more collapses linked to insufficiently legally regulated privatization procedures and corresponding changes in the composition of the economic elites. As opposed to the political elite, the transformation of the economic elite has taken much longer than the neo-liberals had originally expected, and it is still not completed. It is true that managers working in industry had qualifications with a predominantly technological focus from the period of state socialism, but they were less familiar with the economic and financial matters and with the new organizational possibilities. Posts in the finance sector, in information technology and other sectors of modern services were more frequently filled with young people, who conversely lacked working management experience. With regard to the high share of industry in the Czech economy, the change of economic elite was not as fast as that of the political elite. However, a gradual change is taking place, which is being accelerated by a number of structural alterations.27 In addition, staff fluctuations have been implemented as a result of the departure of politically discredited officials and those who were responsible for the on-going wave of bankruptcies in both industrial and financial companies. Now, the most significant changes are those in connection with the increasing share of foreign capital in Czech enterprises. There is an inflow of top-quality foreign specialists; at the same time, young graduates are coming in and the existing experts are trained to embrace new organization and management methods. The increased inflow of foreign capital and the related exchange of elites as well as the increasing pressure of the EU have resulted in a faster approximation of the Czech economy to West-European standards than was the case during the large-scale privatization in the 1990s.

Machonin, Social and Political Transformation (fn. 2). I. e. preferential development of the tertiary sector and better prospects in management structures for economists and information technologists. 26 27

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3. The fragmented, yet consensually united economic elite after 1989 In conclusion, we draw attention to the work of John Higley and his collaborators,28 who hold the opinion that an “idiocratic” elite, i. e. a monolithic politicalorganizational elite, free of outside competitors, which was present for example in the Czech Republic between 1939 – 1945, 1948 – 1956 and 1970 – 1984, is typical of state-socialist or early post-socialist regimes. Conversely, divided elites are characteristic of a situation, in which there is a conflict between the backward-looking authoritarian regime, which is confronting a newly-formed opposition. The beginnings of such a structure can be observed in the Czech Republic between 1956 – 1969 and 1985 – 1989. This type emerged fully in November 1989 and in 1990. In an unconsolidated, i. e. still developing democracy, we most frequently encounter fragmented elites, while a consensually united elite is symptomatic of a consolidated democracy or possibly of the rule of law. This does not exclude a plurality of activities, opinions and programs but this type of elite is united by a consensus concerning the democratic “rules of the game”. It is not possible to describe the nascent Czech economic elite using the model of a divided elite, in spite of the fact that a part of this elite came from the ranks of former officials involved in state-socialist structures and from the ranks of Communist Party officials, because even these members of the newly formed economic elite have come to support the transition processes. Not even the relationship between the economic officials linked to the two large political parties is problematic in any significant manner. There is certainly strong competition between agriculture, industry, finance, information technology and other sectors, as well as competition among enterprises in the same area of business, among large and mediumsized enterprises, among enterprises owned by foreign and domestic entities, and among enterprises oriented towards the same market. In all these respects, the economic elites are fragmented to a certain degree. Their pragmatically motivated tolerance towards the ruling political structures, combined with a certain distance to the events on the political scene, speak in favor of their consensus on the fundamental issues of economic and political development. The downfall of dishonest companies and controversial owners and managers in recent years mostly resulted in an unification within the economic elite as well as in a streamlining of their relationship with the political elite. IV. Conclusion The article intended to examine questions concerning the creation and development of the new economic elites in the process of the Czech transformation from socialism to the market economy. There were three hypotheses under consideration 28

Higley / Lengyel, Elites (fn. 2), p. 7.

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about how new elites were created: through reproduction, circulation, or the replacement of the old elites in their entirety with new elites. The tendency towards both continuity, i. e. the reproduction of the former economic elite and discontinuity with allowances made for individuals and families returning to traditional family lives, co-exists in the post-socialist history of the Czech Republic. The degree to which these two tendencies mix takes a specific form, depending on the particular segment of the social elites. Although it is obvious that the formation of the economic elite is not yet finished, it can be said that the foundations of the social elite of the new Czech state were basically formed as early as sometime around 1995 and 1996. Politicians, big and (successful) medium businessmen, important bankers, managers and economic bureaucrats, experts belonging to important and preferred groups of financiers, lawyers, information experts, opinion leaders, show business and sports celebrities as well as high-ranking administrative officials have become the dominant members of this elite. Since the beginning of its formation, the new economic elite, however, was strongly stigmatized by its link to the state socialist past, by insufficient legal regulation and the ineffectual implementation of privatization as well as by immoral or possibly illegal ways of achieving social advancement.

Challenges and Responses: Strategies during the Third Industrial Revolution

Wirtschaftseliten und Wissenstransfer in der DDR und Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 – 1990: Beispiele aus den „wissensbasierten Industrien“ Von Manuel Schramm I. Einleitung Dem Wissenstransfer aus Hochschulen kam in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts entscheidende Bedeutung für die Innovationstätigkeit und damit auch Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Betrieben und Unternehmen zu. Das gilt nicht nur für die westlichen Markt-, sondern auch für die sozialistischen Planwirtschaften. Zur Bewältigung des technologischen Wandels („Dritte Industrielle Revolution“) waren die Wirtschaftseliten in West und Ost (Unternehmer, Betriebs- oder Kombinatsleiter) nämlich zunehmend auf wissenschaftliches Wissen angewiesen. Dieses konnte zwar theoretisch auch in der unternehmenseigenen Forschung und Entwicklung hergestellt werden. Häufig jedoch war diese überfordert, da im Laufe des 20. Jahrhunderts immer neue Wissensgebiete (z. B. Mikroelektronik, Biotechnologie) integriert werden mussten. Daher war die Einstellung der Wirtschaftseliten zum technischen Wandel an sich („Wissenschaftlich-Technische Revolution“) und zur Kooperation mit Forschungseinrichtungen alles andere als nebensächlich, sondern konnte entscheidend zum wirtschaftlichen Erfolg oder Misserfolg der Unternehmen bzw. Betriebe, und mittelbar auch ganzer Volkswirtschaften, beitragen. Der Aufsatz untersucht die Einstellungen von Wirtschaftseliten zum Wissenstransfer aus Hochschulen und anderen öffentlich finanzierten Forschungseinrichtungen zwischen 1945 und 1990 im deutsch-deutschen Vergleich anhand ausgewählter Beispiele aus so genannten „wissensbasierten“ Industrien wie der chemischen Industrie, dem Maschinenbau, der elektrotechnischen und der feinmechanisch-optischen Industrie. Einen Schwerpunkt bildet das Aufkommen neuer Technologien in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, welche die traditionellen Forschungs- und Entwicklungsabteilungen der Unternehmen zu überfordern schienen. Natürlich war technischer Wandel an sich nicht neu, aber das Aufkommen der Mikroelektronik und der neuen Biotechnologie führten zur Integration neuer Fachgebiete in die Forschung und Entwicklung in bis dahin unbekanntem Ausmaß. Zum Teil fällt dies mit Entwicklungen zusammen, die als Übergang von „fordistischer“ Massenproduktion zu „postfordistischen“ Produktionsweisen (flexible Spezialisierung, Verwissenschaftlichung der Wirtschaft, Bedeutungszunahme des tertiären Sektors) beschrieben werden. Der technische Wandel stellte beide deutsche Staaten prinzipiell vor ähnliche

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Probleme.1 Dass er letztlich im Westen besser bewältigt werden konnte als im Osten, ist bekannt. Dafür waren aber nicht nur systemspezifische Faktoren der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft verantwortlich, sondern auch mentale Barrieren hinsichtlich des Wissenstransfers auf Seiten der DDR-Wirtschaftseliten. Die „langen“ 1970er Jahre, also der Zeitraum von den späten 1960er bis zur Mitte der 1980er Jahre haben in der Zeitgeschichtsschreibung neuerdings verstärkte Aufmerksamkeit gefunden. Im Hintergrund stehen weit reichende Annahmen und Hypothesen über die Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts im Allgemeinen und die Entwicklung der sozialistischen Staaten im Besonderen. Laut Charles Maier waren die „langen“ 1970er Jahre nämlich durch eine transnationale ökonomische und moralische Krise gekennzeichnet, die auch vor den Blockgrenzen nicht Halt machte und die sozialistischen Staaten genau so wie die kapitalistischen traf.2 Die ökonomische Krise bestand in der Ablösung der fordistischen Industriegesellschaft und im Übergang zur post-industriellen Gesellschaft, der den Niedergang traditioneller Industriezweige mit sich brachte. Die moralische Krise fand in den Protesten um 1968 zwar ihren sichtbaren Ausdruck, erschöpfte sich darin aber nicht, sondern war laut Maier Anzeichen und Ergebnis eines tieferen Wertewandels. Während die westlichen Gesellschaften in den 1980er Jahre diese doppelte Krise teils mehr, teils weniger erfolgreich meistern konnten, war sie im Osten angeblich für den Untergang des Sozialismus verantwortlich.

II. Die Einstellung der Wirtschaftseliten zu Hochschulen und Wissenschaft in den 1950er / 60er Jahren 1. DDR In der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit standen nach der weitgehenden Demontage in vielen Betrieben der Wiederaufbau und die Wiederaufnahme der Vorkriegsproduktion im Vordergrund. Dieser Vorgang dauerte im Allgemeinen ungefähr bis zur Mitte der 1950er Jahre. Was das für einen traditionell forschungsintensiven Betrieb bedeutete, soll im Folgenden am Beispiel Carl Zeiss Jena verdeutlicht werden. Damit ist nicht gesagt, dass dieser Betrieb für die Entwicklung der gesamten Industrie der DDR typisch war. Unterschiede existierten sowohl zwischen Industriezweigen als auch zwischen einzelnen Betrieben. Dennoch lässt sich dieses Beispiel verwenden, um einige Grundprobleme forschungsintensiver Betriebe in der SBZ und frühen DDR aufzuzeigen. Carl Zeiss Jena war seit 1948 nicht mehr Stiftungs-, sondern volkseigener Betrieb (VEB). Wie sehr dort Forschung und Entwicklung dem Wiederaufbau nach1 Charles S. Maier, Two Sorts of Crisis? The „long“ 1970s in the West and the East, in: Hans Günter Hockerts, unter Mitarbeit von Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Hg.), Koordinaten deutscher Geschichte in der Epoche des Ost-West-Konflikts, München 2004, S. 49 – 62. 2 Ebenda.

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geordnet waren, geht aus einer rückblickenden Bemerkung des Werkleiters Hugo Schrade von 1962 hervor. Er behauptete, es habe aus Mangel an Personal zwischen 1946 und 1956 keine Forschung und Entwicklung betrieben werden können. Eine geregelte F&E-Tätigkeit habe es erst ab 1956 wieder gegeben.3 Das dürfte so pauschal kaum zutreffen. Vielmehr ist davon auszugehen, dass zumindest bestehende Geräte weiterentwickelt wurden. Sicher ist, dass das Forschungs- und Entwicklungspotential bei Carl Zeiss in der ersten Hälfte der 1950er Jahre geringer war als später. Zwischen 1955 und 1961 stieg der Anteil des F&E-Personals an der Gesamtbelegschaft von 6,9 Prozent auf 11,9 Prozent.4 Seit dem Ende der 1950er Jahre unterlagen die Beziehungen zwischen Hochschulen und Industrie einem immer stärkeren Druck zur Formalisierung. Dies zeigte sich schon in der Einführung der Vertragsforschung 1958, die bei den betroffenen Professoren auf wenig Gegenliebe stieß.5 Der Ausbau der F&E-Kapazitäten in der zweiten Hälfte der 1950er Jahre bedeutete aber noch keine Überwindung der mentalen Barrieren, die zum Teil bis in die 1960er Jahre bestehen blieben. Dass beispielsweise die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Carl Zeiss und der Universität Jena alles andere als spannungsfrei verlief, zeigen die Protokolle der so genannten „Geraer Gespräche“, welche die SED-Bezirksleitung Gera mit Wissenschaftlern der Universität 1964 durchführte. Dort beklagten die Wissenschaftler nicht nur die unzureichende Ausstattung ihrer Institute mit Geräten und die fehlende Zeit für Forschungsarbeit.6 Auch die Kooperation mit Industriebetrieben kam zur Sprache. Rektor Drefahl sah als Haupthindernis auf Seiten der Betriebe die Vorstellung, man habe im Prinzip genug wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse und brauche nur Investitionen, um diese in die Produktion umzusetzen. In Wahrheit sei der wissenschaftliche Vorlauf völlig unzureichend.7 Der Parteisekretär von Carl Zeiss, Jochen Weimar, widersprach dieser Auffassung nicht, sondern gab zu, die Hilfe der Universität sei notwendig. Nur müsse die Zusammenarbeit eben erst gelernt werden.8 In den Betrieben, so der Vorwurf von Wissenschaftlern und SED-Bezirksleitung, herrsche eine wissenschaftsfeindliche Haltung vor. Davor war auch ein traditionell wissenschaftsbasierter Betrieb wie 3 Universitätsarchiv Jena S XIX / 1 36, Bericht über die Beratung im VEB Carl Zeiss Jena am 02. 07. 1962, S. 3. 4 Edith Hellmuth / Wolfgang Mühlfriedel, Carl Zeiss Jena – widerspruchsvoller Weg in die Planwirtschaft, in: Rüdiger Stutz (Hg.): Macht und Milieu. Jena zwischen Kriegsende und Mauerbau (= Bausteine zur Jenaer Stadtgeschichte 4), Rudolstadt / Jena 2000, S. 327 – 368, hier S. 351. 5 Vgl. Manuel Schramm, Die Beziehungen der Universität Jena zu Carl Zeiss 1945 – 1990, in: Uwe Hoßfeld / Tobias Kaiser / Heinz Mestrup (Hg.), Hochschule im Sozialismus. Studien zur Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena (1945 – 1990), Bd. 1, Köln / Weimar 2007, S. 650 – 668, hier S. 653 f. 6 Thüringisches Staatsarchiv Rudolstadt Bezirks Partei Archiv SED Gera IV / A-2 / 9.02 / 599, fol. 79, 87, 132, 143. 7 Ebenda, fol. 117. 8 Ebenda, fol. 120.

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Carl Zeiss nicht gefeit. Parteisekretär Weimar führte als Beispiel an, im Betrieb würde man häufig als Argument hören, die Zeiss-Geräte müssten nicht Weltspitze sein, sie erfüllten 70 Prozent der geforderten Funktionen und seien viel billiger als die anderen. Das sei eine sehr schädliche Theorie.9 Diese „wissenschaftsfeindliche“ Haltung, die letztlich aus der Ausrichtung der Betriebe auf kurzfristige Planerfüllung zu Lasten der mittel- und langfristigen Investitionen resultierte, fand sich auch in anderen Betrieben. Ende der 1950er Jahre kam es etwa beim VEB Jenapharm zu Diskussionen über die Arbeitsteilung zwischen der F&E- und der Produktionsabteilung. Der schwelende Konflikt fand seinen Ausdruck in einem Artikel der Werkzeitschrift „Jenapharmspiegel“ 1959, der bemängelte, es gebe zwischen Forschung und Produktion „keine richtige sozialistische Zusammenarbeit“. Ein Mitarbeiter der Forschungsabteilung nahm dies zum Anlass, seine Frustration in dem Entwurf eines Briefes an die Werkleitung zu Papier zu bringen. Dort äußerte er im Hinblick auf die Produktionsabteilung den Eindruck, „das Bedürfnis auf Grund von z. B. falschem Ehrgeiz oder von materiellen Erwägungen ausgehend als Sieger aus irgendeiner Auseinandersetzung hervorgehen zu wollen, scheint unseres Erachtens zu einer Grundkonzeption in diesem Betrieb geworden zu sein“. Der Werkleitung warf er vor, den Produktionsleiter „als wichtigsten Mann im Betrieb“ nicht verärgern zu wollen und sich deswegen in Auseinandersetzungen immer auf die Seite der Produktionsabteilung zu stellen.10 Diese Beispiele belegen die schädlichen Auswirkungen der produktivistischen Ideologie in der frühen DDR, also der Orientierung an kurzfristiger Planerfüllung und quantitativ messbaren Produktionsergebnissen. Das ging auf Kosten der Forschungs- und Entwicklungstätigkeit, die bis zur Mitte der 1950er Jahre vernachlässigt wurde. Selbst nach dem notwendigen Ausbau der F&E-Abteilungen wurde deren Tätigkeit dadurch eingeschränkt, dass die Betriebsleiter im Konfliktfall meist zugunsten der kurzfristigen Planerfüllung entschieden. Die Reformen der 1960er Jahre, insbesondere die Rede von der „Wissenschaftlich-Technischen Revolution“ müssen vor diesem Hintergrund als Versuch gesehen werden, solche Defizite zu beheben und die F&E-Tätigkeit der Betriebe zu intensivieren.11 Inwieweit ging die Vernachlässigung der Forschung und Entwicklung auf systemspezifische Gründe zurück, und inwieweit war sie das Ergebnis von kontingenten Fehlentscheidungen der Wirtschaftselite, d. h. in diesem Fall der Betriebsleiter? Prinzipiell war die vorrangige Orientierung an der Planerfüllung im System der Zentralplanwirtschaft angelegt. Das heißt aber nicht, dass die Betriebsleiter keine Handlungsspielräume gehabt hätten. Diese scheinen jedoch bis in die 1960er Jahre eher selten zugunsten von Forschung und Entwicklung genutzt worden zu sein. Ebenda, fol. 124. Thüringisches Staatsarchiv Rudolstadt Jenapharm 2478, ohne Titel, 09. 04. 1959. 11 Vgl. Uwe Fraunholz / Manuel Schramm, Hochschulen als Innovationsmotoren? Hochschul- und Forschungspolitik der 1960er Jahre im deutsch-deutschen Vergleich, in: Jahrbuch für Universitätsgeschichte 8 (2005), S. 25 – 44. 9

10

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2. BRD Im Gegensatz zu der eben geschilderten weitgehenden Vernachlässigung des Wissenstransfers in der frühen DDR waren sich zumindest die großen bundesdeutschen Unternehmen der Bedeutung der Hochschulkontakte bewusst. Bei Siemens & Halske (S&H) existierten z. B. seit März 1952 Verbindungsleute und seit Juni 1954 Kommissionen für die Technischen Hochschulen und Ingenieurschulen.12 Im März 1956 wurde bei den Siemens-Schuckert-Werken (SSW) das Referat Technischer Nachwuchs geschaffen.13 In den folgenden Jahren entstand bei SSW ein Patensystem für die Technischen Hochschulen, wobei jeder TH in Deutschland und darüber hinaus den Technischen Hochschulen in Graz, Wien, Zürich und Istanbul jeweils ein „Pate“ bei Siemens zugeordnet war, der die Kontakte zu der Hochschule koordinieren und pflegen sollte. Diese Strukturen hatten aus der Sicht des Unternehmens primär den Zweck, begabte Ingenieure frühzeitig an Siemens zu binden. Darüber hinaus sollten das Image des Unternehmens gepflegt und bestehende Aktivitäten besser koordiniert werden. Forschungsleiter Ferdinand Trendelenburg hielt zudem persönlich Kontakt zu den für Siemens wichtigsten physikalischen Instituten.14 Über diese Kontakte ist zwar nichts Näheres bekannt, jedoch ist es offensichtlich, dass es für den Forschungsleiter eines elektrotechnischen Konzerns wichtig war, auf dem neuesten Stand der wissenschaftlichen Entwicklung zu bleiben. Die wichtigsten Ansprechpartner für Forschungskooperationen waren zu dieser Zeit jedoch die deutschen Technischen Hochschulen. Das zeigt eine Aufstellung der Mitarbeiterverträge der SSW aus dem Jahr 1960.15 Zu dieser Zeit existierten 19 solcher Verträge mit Professoren und Dozenten. Sie belegen zunächst wiederum die Bedeutung der Technischen Hochschulen, die an zwölf dieser Verträge beteiligt waren, gegenüber vier Verträgen mit Universitäten und nur einem Vertrag mit einem Forscher der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. Alle Verträge außer einem waren mit Forschern in Deutschland abgeschlossen worden, und die einzige Ausnahme bildete ein Professor der TH Graz. Die Forschungsgebiete gehen aus den eher allgemein gehaltenen Vertragsthemen nicht immer eindeutig hervor. Die meisten gehörten in das Gebiet der Energietechnik und behandelten Themen wie Turbogeneratoren, Reaktortechnik oder Untersuchungen an Turbinenschaufeln. Das reflektiert die Schwerpunktsetzung der SSW in der Starkstromtechnik. Gleichzeitig ist aber dennoch eine durchaus bemerkenswerte Bandbreite der Forschungsthemen festzustellen, die bis hin zu Fragen der theoretischen Festkörperphysik reichte. 12 13

Siemens-Archiv München 8561, Schreiben vom 29. 09. 1960. Ebenda, 9287, Aus der Arbeit des Referates Technischer Nachwuchs der SSW, 1956 –

58. Ebenda, 9290, Schreiben vom 27. 01. 1961 und vom 19. 03. 1958. Ebenda, 9290, Aufstellung über Mitarbeiterverträge mit Hochschulprofessoren und Dozenten von Ingenieurschulen, 20. 09. 1960. 14 15

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Siemens kooperierte nicht nur mit Einzelnen oder Gruppen von Forschern an Hochschulen, sondern nahm auch gezielt Einfluss auf die Struktur bundesdeutscher Universitäten. Ein Anliegen von Siemens in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren war besonders der Ausbau der Ingenieurschulen, während die Expansion der Hochschulen nicht für nötig gehalten wurde. Im Gegenteil klagte z. B. Heinz Goeschel von der Forschungsabteilung der SSW 1955 über eine falsche Relation zwischen Hochschul- und Ingenieurschulabsolventen, die im Maschinenbau und in der Elektrotechnik 1: 2 – 1: 2,5 (Hochschule / Ingenieurschule) betrage, während der Bedarf eher ein Verhältnis von 1: 4 – 1:10 nahe lege.16 Daneben versuchte Siemens, bestimmte, für vernachlässigt gehaltene Fachrichtungen gezielt zu fördern. So bemühte sich Hans Ferdinand Mayer, der Leiter der Abteilung für Zentrale Entwicklungsaufgaben bei S&H, Anfang der 1960er Jahre um die verstärkte Förderung der Feinwerktechnik. Die Verankerung dieser technischen Fachrichtung im Maschinenbau war allerdings fehlgeschlagen, so dass Siemens eine Eingliederung des Faches in die Elektrotechnik unter der Bezeichnung Elektromechanik anstrebte. Berlin, Darmstadt und Stuttgart bemühten sich um einen entsprechenden Lehrstuhl und Studienschwerpunkt. Die Fakultät Elektrotechnik der TH Darmstadt richtete 1961 eine neue Studienrichtung Elektromechanik ein, für deren Lehrstuhl S&H drei Kandidaten vorschlug.17 Wohl nicht zufällig fielen in diese Zeit auch an der TH Stuttgart Überlegungen zum Aufbau eines feinwerktechnischen Schwerpunktes, die letztlich 1967 in der Einrichtung des Instituts für Konstruktion und Fertigung in der Feinwerktechnik ihren Ausdruck fanden. 1964 verlieh die TH Stuttgart auf Antrag der Fakultät Maschinenbau dem Leiter des Zentrallabors von S&H, Hans Panzerbieter, einen Ehrendoktortitel. Der Rektor der TH, Weise, würdigte in seiner Festansprache die enge Zusammenarbeit der Nachrichtentechniker seiner Hochschule mit Siemens.18 Enge Beziehungen pflegte Siemens nicht nur zur TH Stuttgart, sondern auch zur Universität Erlangen. In dieser Stadt und im nahe gelegenen Nürnberg hatte SSW nach dem Krieg seine F&E-Labors aufgebaut, während S&H München als Standort des Zentrallabors ausgewählt hatte.19 Dies führte nicht nur zu einer Kooperation der SSW mit den naturwissenschaftlichen und medizinischen Einrichtungen der Universität Erlangen (seit 1961 Erlangen-Nürnberg) im Bereich der Medizintechnik, sondern auch zum Aufbau einer technischen Fakultät an der Universität in den 1960er Jahren.20 Ebenda, 9286, Heinz Goeschel, Der Ingenieur im Großbetrieb, Vortrag 1955, S. 15 f. Ebenda, 8561, Bericht über die Sitzung des ATN am 27. 06. 1961 u. am 19. 07. 1962. 18 Ebenda, WP, Verleihung Ehrendoktor an Hans Panzerbieter, TH Stuttgart 1964, Ansprache des Rektors A. Weise, S. 7. 19 Karlheinz Kaske, Forschung und Entwicklung im Weltunternehmen Siemens, in: 25 Jahre Forschungszentrum Erlangen der Siemens AG. Festveranstaltung 18. 06. 1990, S. 2 – 6, hier S. 3 f. (Siemens-Archiv München 15492). Vgl. Wilfried Feldenkirchen, Siemens. Von der Werkstatt zum Weltunternehmen, München et al.1997, S. 284 f. 16 17

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Der Siemens-Konzern verfügte mithin in den 1950er / 60er-Jahren über recht enge Kontakte zu deutschen Hochschulen, die unterschiedliche Formen annahmen. Das Unternehmen bemühte sich, diese Kontakte zu halten und zu pflegen bzw. dort anzubahnen, wo sie nicht schon vorhanden waren, auch ohne den Nutzen aus diesen Verbindungen direkt quantifizieren zu können. Das zeigt die Bedeutung, die der Siemens-Vorstand in dieser Zeit der einheimischen Wissensbasis beimaß. Ein anderes Beispiel für das relativ engen Zusammenwirken von Hochschulforschung und Industrie bietet das Chemische Institut der Universität Heidelberg in den 1950er Jahren unter seinem Leiter Karl Freudenberg. Dessen Industriekontakte gingen freilich schon auf die Zwischenkriegszeit zurück. Seine Lignin-Forschungen interessierten auch die Zellstofffabrik Waldhof in Mannheim, der er seine Ergebnisse vorlegte, um die Möglichkeit der wirtschaftlichen Verwertung prüfen zu lassen. Nach Freudenbergs eigenen Angaben ist dabei nicht viel heraus gekommen außer einem Patent zur verbesserten Produktion von Vanillin. Gleichzeitig wurde Freudenberg auch in der Zwischenkriegszeit von der BASF unterstützt.21 1938 avancierte Freudenberg zum Leiter eines Vierjahresplan-Instituts für Holzforschung, das im Kontext der nationalsozialistischen Autarkiepolitik stand. Nunmehr legte er seine Forschungsergebnisse dem Reichsamt für Wirtschaftsausbau vor. Inhaltlichen Einfluss auf die Forschungsthemen nahm das Amt angeblich nicht.22 Die Kontakte Freudenbergs zur BASF gingen also bereits auf die Zwischenkriegszeit zurück. Die engen Beziehungen nach dem Krieg bedeuteten somit nur die Fortsetzung eines tradierten Musters. Gerade in der chemischen Industrie, wo ja schon im späten 19. Jahrhundert enge Verbindungen zu den Hochschulen bestanden,23 dürfte dies keine Ausnahme gewesen sein. Somit hatten die bundesrepublikanischen Wirtschaftseliten einen Vorteil gegenüber denen der SBZ / DDR, da dort der personelle Bruch nach 1945 deutlich stärker ausfiel, was das Anknüpfen an alte Beziehungen natürlich erschwerte. Die Beziehungen zur BASF charakterisierte Freudenberg in einem Schreiben an Vorstandsmitglied Walter Reppe 1950 folgendermaßen: „Wir lieferten Ihnen viel Nachwuchs, Sie boten und bieten uns Hilfe aller Art und über allem steht der wissenschaftliche Verkehr und manche Anregung ist hinüber und herüber gegangen.“24 20 Alfred Wendehorst, Geschichte der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1743 – 1993, München 1993, S. 243 f. 21 Karl J. Freudenberg, Rückblicke auf ein langes Leben. Lebenserinnerungen des Chemikers Karl Johann Freudenberg 1886 – 1983, Heidelberg 1999, S. 211. 22 Ebenda, S. 231 f. Eine wissenschaftliche Arbeit zu diesem Vierjahrplan-Institut steht noch aus. Vgl. allgemein Helmut Maier (Hg.), Rüstungsforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Organisation, Mobilisierung und Entgrenzung der Technikwissenschaften, Göttingen 2002. 23 Vgl. Peter Borscheid, Naturwissenschaft, Staat und Industrie in Baden 1848 – 1914, Stuttgart 1976; Walter Wetzel, Naturwissenschaften und chemische Industrie in Deutschland. Voraussetzungen und Mechanismen ihres Aufstiegs im 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1991. 24 Universitätsarchiv Halle rep. 14 / 142, Schreiben vom 06. 03. 1951.

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Als Bindeglied für den wissenschaftlichen Verkehr diente die „Chemische Gesellschaft“, deren Vorsitzender Freudenberg war und an deren Sitzungen regelmäßig Vertreter der BASF teilnahmen.25 Besonders eng war der Kontakt Freudenbergs zu Carl Wurster (ab 1952 Vorstandvorsitzender der BASF)26 und eben Walter Reppe, denen er anlässlich seiner Emeritierung 1956 besonders dankte. Die Bedeutung der finanziellen Hilfe der BASF war nach Angaben Freudenbergs hoch, da das Institut an Sachmitteln ungefähr das Fünffache des vom Staat bezahlten Etats einwerben musste, was nur zum Teil über die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft möglich gewesen wäre.27 In den 1950er Jahren unterstütze die BASF das Chemische Institut finanziell, auch wenn die genaue Höhe der Spenden aus den Akten nicht zu entnehmen ist. Anfang 1955 bedankte sich Freudenberg bei der BASF für eine Spende von 10.000 Mark, die offensichtlich ohne konkrete Zweckbindung eingegangen war. Der Institutsdirektor wollte den vier Privatdozenten jeweils einen Betrag für ihre Forschungsarbeiten zukommen lassen und den Rest des Geldes für die Bibliothek verwenden.28 Bereits 1949 hatte die BASF dem Institut Chemikalien im Wert von 1.652 Mark kostenlos überlassen.29 Auch stellte die BASF dem Institut Geräte zur Nutzung zur Verfügung.30 Im Gegenzug konnte Freudenberg der BASF geeignetes Personal empfehlen, so beispielsweise als das Unternehmen 1951 Studenten zur Erfassung der ausländischen Patentliteratur benötigte.31 Außerdem gewährte er 1950 Vertretern des Unternehmens Einsicht in erteilte und angemeldete Patente vor allem aus der Lignin- und Holzchemie.32 Konkrete Innovationen scheinen daraus aber nicht hervorgegangen zu sein, oder zumindest ist darüber nichts überliefert. Die beiden hier angeführten Beispiele lassen sich durchaus verallgemeinern. In den 1950er Jahren, und zum Teil auch darüber hinaus, waren die Kontakte zwischen Hochschulen und Industrie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland recht eng, allen Verlautbarungen über das Humboldt’sche Bildungsideal zum Trotz, das bekanntlich die Zweckfreiheit von wissenschaftlicher Forschung postulierte. Die Kontakte beruhten zum Teil auf älteren Verbindungen (Freudenberg), zum Teil waren sie Ergebnis gezielter Kontaktpflege (Siemens).

Ebenda, Schreiben vom 09. 12. 1957. Raymond G. Stokes, Von der I.G. Farbenindustrie AG bis zur Neugründung der BASF (1925 – 1952), in: Werner Abelshauser (Hg.), Die BASF. Eine Unternehmensgeschichte, München 2002, S. 221 – 358, hier S. 232 f. 27 Universitätsarchiv Halle rep. 14 / 142, Schreiben vom 29. 09. 1956. 28 Ebenda, Schreiben vom 24. 01. 1955. 29 Ebenda, rep. 13 / 17, Schreiben der BASF vom 12. 04. 1949. 30 Ebenda, rep. 14 / 142. 31 Ebenda, rep. 13 / 17, Schreiben der BASF vom 07. 09. 1951. 32 Ebenda, rep. 14 / 142, Schreiben der BASF vom 24. 08. 1950. 25 26

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3. Vergleichsaspekte Der Unterschied zu der im vorhergehenden Abschnitt geschilderten Entwicklung in der DDR ist offensichtlich. Es ist nahe liegend, ihn auf den Systemunterschied zwischen Marktwirtschaft und Zentralplanwirtschaft zurückzuführen. Ein großer Teil der vorhandenen wirtschaftshistorischen Literatur tut genau das und betont die mangelnden Anreize, die mangelnde Autonomie der Betriebe und andere systembedingte Faktoren als Ursachen der Innovationsschwäche der DDR-Wirtschaft.33 Diese Perspektive ist zwar nicht falsch, aber doch verkürzt, denn sie unterschätzt die Handlungsspielräume von Wirtschaftseliten in beiden Systemen. In der DDR waren die Betriebs- und später Kombinatsdirektoren nicht nur passive Befehlsempfänger der übergeordneten Behörden wie Ministerien und Staatliche Plankommission, auch wenn man sich über den Begriff „sozialistische Manager“ streiten kann.34 Umgekehrt gilt für die Marktwirtschaft, dass Märkte häufig nur sehr unvollkommene Informationen und Anreize hinsichtlich Forschung und Entwicklung bieten. Das strukturelle Problem liegt darin, dass Forschung immer ein Prozess mit ungewissem Ausgang ist, so dass schwer vorherzusehen ist, ob und wann sich F&E-Ausgaben für Unternehmen rentieren. Für zusätzliche Unsicherheit sorgt die Zeitverzögerung zwischen der Investition in Forschung und Entwicklung und der Produktionsaufnahme, durch die ein neues Produkt möglicherweise auf eine völlig veränderte Marktsituation trifft.35

III. Neue Technologien (1970er / 80er Jahre) 1. CNC-Steuerungen Das Aufkommen der Mikroelektronik und der neuen Biotechnologie in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren führten zur Integration neuer Fachgebiete in die unternehmenseigene Forschung und Entwicklung in bis dahin unbekanntem Ausmaß. Somit standen die Wirtschaftseliten in beiden deutschen Staaten vor neuen Herausforderungen hinsichtlich des horizontalen Wissenstransfers. Dieser Abschnitt geht auf zwei neue Technologien der 1970er und frühen 1980er Jahre ein: Die neue 33 Hans-Jürgen Wagener, Zur Innovationsschwäche der DDR-Wirtschaft, in: Johannes Bähr / Dietmar Petzina (Hg.), Innovationsverhalten und Entscheidungsstrukturen. Vergleichende Studien zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung im geteilten Deutschland 1945 – 1990, Berlin 1996, S. 21 – 48; Johannes Bähr, Institutionenordnung und Wirtschaftsentwicklung. Die Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR aus der Sicht des zwischendeutschen Vergleichs, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 25 (1999), 4, S. 530 – 555. 34 Heike Knortz, Innovationsmanagement in der DDR 1973 / 79 – 1989. Der sozialistische Manager zwischen ökonomischen Herausforderungen und Systemblockaden, Berlin 2004. Vgl. auch Renate Hürtgen / Thomas Reichel (Hg.), Der Schein der Stabilität. DDR-Betriebsalltag in der Ära Honecker, Berlin 2001. 35 Jens Beckert, Grenzen des Marktes. Die sozialen Grundlagen wirtschaftlicher Effizienz, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 1997, S. 78 – 97.

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CNC-Technologie im Werkzeugmaschinenbau und die molekulare Biotechnologie in der chemischen Industrie. Eine der wichtigsten Innovationen im Maschinenbau nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg war die Einführung der so genannten numerischen Steuerung (numerical control, NC).36 Sie entstand Ende der 1940er Jahre in den USA in einem Zulieferbetrieb der Luftfahrtindustrie und sollte die Bearbeitung komplexer Werkstücke ermöglichen. Im Kern beruht sie darauf, dass die Bearbeitungsinformationen in Zahlen kodiert und der Maschine mitgeteilt werden. Dazu verwendete man anfangs Speichermedien wie Lochkarten und Lochstreifen. Die numerische Steuerung ermöglicht die Wiederholbarkeit der Werkstückbearbeitung bei hoher Genauigkeit. Schon bald zeigte sich, dass sie zur Automatisierung der Klein- und Mittelserienfertigung geeignet war. Einer breiteren wirtschaftlichen Anwendung standen zunächst jedoch die hohen Programmierkosten entgegen. Auf breiter Front setzte sie sich erst in den 1970er Jahren durch, als es durch die Miniaturisierung der elektronischen Bauelemente gelang, Kleinrechner und Mikroprozessoren in die Steuerung zu integrieren. Diese Steuerungen bezeichnet man als CNC-Steuerungen (computerized numerical control).37 a) DDR In der DDR galt der Maschinen- und Anlagenbau in den 1950er Jahren als Schlüsselbranche für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Investiert wurde zunächst vor allem in den Schwermaschinenbau. Der Rationalisierung und Automatisierung des Produktionsprozesses schenkten die DDR-Planer zunächst weniger Aufmerksamkeit.38 Der Einstieg in die NC-Technologie gelang in den späten 1950er und in den 1960er Jahren aber dennoch recht gut.39 Bei der Entwicklung flexibler Fertigungssysteme schnitten DDR-Betriebe Anfang der 1970er Jahre auch im internationalen Vergleich gut ab.40 Allerdings lagen die Anteile des DDR-Werkzeug36 Vgl. zur NC-Entwicklung: Günter Spur, Vom Wandel der industriellen Welt durch Werkzeugmaschinen. Eine kulturgeschichtliche Betrachtung der Fertigungstechnik, München / Wien 1991, S. 511 – 542; Hartmut Hirsch-Kreinsen, NC-Entwicklung als gesellschaftlicher Prozeß. Amerikanische und deutsche Innovationsmuster der Fertigungstechnik, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 1993, S. 53 – 57; David Noble, Forces of Production. A Social History of Industrial Automation, New York 1986; Sascha Schröder, Innovation in der Produktion. Eine Fallstudienuntersuchung zur Entwicklung der numerischen Steuerung, München / Wien 1995. 37 Spur, Wandel (Fn. 36), S. 552 f.; Hirsch-Kreinsen, NC-Entwicklung (Fn. 36), S. 58 – 61. 38 Wolfgang Mühlfriedel / Klaus Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie in der DDR bis 1965, Berlin 1989, S. 245 f., 251. 39 Jörg Roesler, Im Wettlauf mit Siemens. Die Entwicklung von numerischen Steuerungen für den DDR-Maschinenbau im deutsch-deutschen Vergleich, in: Lothar Baar / Dietmar Petzina (Hg.), Deutsch-Deutsche Wirtschaft 1945 bis 1990. Strukturveränderungen, Innovationen und regionaler Wandel. Ein Vergleich, St. Katharinen 1999, S. 349 – 389, hier S. 364. 40 Dieter Specht / René Haak, Der Beitrag des Werkzeugmaschinenbaus zur flexiblen Fertigungsautomatisierung in Deutschland, in: Bähr / Petzina, Innovationsverhalten (Fn. 33), S. 251 – 280, hier S. 266 f.

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maschinenbaus im Außenhandel schon zu Beginn der 1970er Jahre unter 5 Prozent.41 In den 1970er und 1980er Jahren fiel der DDR-Maschinenbau technologisch immer weiter hinter den westdeutschen zurück.42 Der Grund lag hauptsächlich im verpassten Einstieg in die CNC-Technologie, die durch die Integration der Mikroelektronik eine ganz neue Herausforderung darstellte. 1976 begann der VEB Numerik mit der Entwicklung von CNC-Steuerungen. 1979 war mit der CNC 600 das erste Labormuster fertig gestellt. Der zentrale Mikroprozessor dieser Steuerung, von Robotron entwickelt, war eine Imitation eines Intel-Prozessors aus dem Jahr 1972.43 Für das Werkzeugmaschinenkombinat „Fritz Heckert“ (FHK) begann das CNC-Zeitalter 1980 mit der Überführung eines CNC-Bearbeitungszentrums in die Serienproduktion.44 Allerdings besaß die CNC 600 zu diesem Zeitpunkt nur einen eingeschränkten Funktionsinhalt. In einer zweiten Etappe sollte bis Anfang 1982 der volle Funktionsinhalt erreicht werden. Die für 1984 / 85 geplante CNC 700 sollte dann den Anschluss an das internationale Niveau herstellen. Laut einer neuen Konzeption des Ministeriums für Elektrotechnik und Elektronik vom März 1980 jedoch wurde die Weiterentwicklung der CNC 600 verschoben. Die technischen Entwicklungen sollten erst mit der CNC 700, also Mitte der 1980er Jahre, realisiert werden. Der Anschluss an das internationale Niveau verzögerte sich dadurch noch weiter und war erst für 1987 vorgesehen. Mit dieser Situation, so kommentierte ein Mitarbeiter des Kombinats, werde das Weltniveau bis 1985 und darüber hinaus nicht erreicht. Schon 1981 / 82 sei für eine Reihe wichtiger Erzeugnisse des Kombinats der notwendige Funktionsinhalt nicht mehr gewährleistet.45 1982 besaßen 80 Prozent der in das nichtsozialistische Wirtschaftsgebiet exportierten Werkzeugmaschinen konventionelle, d. h. keine NC-Steuerungen. Von den verbleibenden 20 Prozent waren wiederum 98 Prozent mit aus dem westlichen Ausland importierten Steuerungen ausgerüstet. Die in der DDR entwickelten CNC-Steuerungen waren nicht exportierbar. Die Gründe im Fall der CNC 600 beinhalteten: schlechtes Marketing, Servicemängel, ungenügendes technisches Niveau, ungenügende Bereitschaft des Herstellerbetriebs zur Modifizierung, Dokumentationsmängel und unvorteilhafte ökonomische Regelungen zum Erlös. Eine durchgehende Ausrüstung der Maschinen mit westlichen Steuerungen erschien aufgrund der geringen Devisenrentabilität nicht lohnend.46 Die Gebrauchswerterhöhungen der Maschinen hingen nach Schätzung des Forschungszentrums Werk41 André Steiner, Von Plan zu Plan. Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR, München 2004, S. 181. 42 Raymond Bentley, Research and Technology in the Former German Democratic Republic, Boulder (Col.) 1992, S. 45 f. 43 Roesler, Wettlauf (Fn. 39), S. 365 ff. 44 Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Chemnitz, Fritz Heckert-Kombinat (FHK) K 293, Vorlage für die Dienstberatung des GD, 05. 08. 1980, S. 2. 45 Ebenda, FHK K 3103, Situation auf dem Gebiet der Steuerungstechnik, 09. 06. 1980. 46 Ebenda, FHK K 1231, Problemmaterial, 02. 07. 1982, Anlage 2.

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zeugmaschinenbau zu 60 Prozent von der Mikroelektronik ab.47 Ende der 1980er Jahre lagen die DDR-Steuerungen ungefähr zwei Generationen hinter den westlichen Entwicklungen zurück.48 Damit verabschiedete sich die DDR um 1980 über kurz oder lang vom Weltmarkt in einem Bereich, der eigentlich „Hauptstütze des Exports“49 hätte sein sollen. Es ist zu betonen, dass dies nicht nur Folge der mangelhaften Elektronikentwicklung in der DDR war, obwohl diese natürlich gleichfalls eine Rolle spielte. Auch mit importierten westlichen Steuerungen war jedoch, wie oben dargestellt, der DDR-Werkzeugmaschinenbau auf den westlichen Märkten nicht mehr konkurrenzfähig. Ein Grund dafür war sicher auch der fehlende Impuls für Innovationen von den Hochschulen. Anfangs lief die NC-Entwicklung völlig an den Hochschulen vorbei, die zunächst auch kein sonderliches Interesse an entsprechenden Forschungsaufgaben zeigten. Später scheiterte die Übernahme von Forschungsergebnissen an den Betrieben und Kombinaten, welche die wichtigen Forschungsthemen für sich reservierten und den Hochschulen nur marginale Aufgaben übertrugen. Man sollte annehmen, dass angesichts dieser negativen Entwicklung ein erhöhter Bedarf an Wissenstransfer bestand. Aber die Kombinatsleitung des Werkzeugmaschinenkombinats „Fritz Heckert“, allen voran Generaldirektor Rudi Winter, sah das keineswegs so. Im Jahr 1979 war die Gründung eines Akademie-Instituts für theoretische und experimentelle Mechanik in Karl-Marx-Stadt vorgesehen. Während die Technische Hochschule dies in der Hoffnung auf den Zugang zu besserer Rechentechnik und speziellen Prüf- und Testverfahren begrüßte, lehnte Generaldirektor Winter die Ansiedlung ab. Als Begründung gab er an, das Institut würde ihm nur die guten Wissenschaftler abwerben. Der technische Rückstand seiner Branche beruhe auf der unzureichenden Industrieforschung, die es zu stärken gelte. Den Vorteil der Präsenz des Instituts hätte einzig die TH, für das im eigenen Kombinat angesiedelte Forschungszentrum des Werkzeugmaschinenbaus versprach er sich davon nichts.50 Hier wird deutlich, dass die Wissenschaftler an Hochschulen und Akademie-Instituten von der Industrie meist eher als Rivalen denn als Partner wahrgenommen wurden. b) BRD In der Bundesrepublik avancierte der Siemens-Konzern in den 1970er Jahren zum bedeutendsten Steuerungshersteller. In die Entwicklung numerischer Steuerungen für Werkzeugmaschinen stieg Siemens in den späten 1950er Jahren ein. Das Unternehmen konnte auf vorhandenem Know-how aus der Fernschreibtechnik, Ebenda, S. 2. Raymond G. Stokes, Constructing Socialism. Technology and Change in East Germany, 1945 – 1990, Baltimore / London 2000, S. 153; Specht / Haak, Beitrag (Fn. 40), S. 278 f.; Roesler, Wettlauf (Fn. 39), S. 365. 49 Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Chemnitz FHK K 1231, Problemmaterial, S. 1. 50 Ebenda, SED-BL IV / D-2 / 9.02 / 494, Schreiben Elster an Lorenz, 16. 11. 1979. 47 48

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Messtechnik und Elektronik aufbauen.51 Die ersten NC-Steuerungen von Siemens basierten zunächst noch auf der Relaistechnik. Den Übergang zu Transistoren schaffte Siemens 1964 mit den ersten Sinumerik-Steuerungen.52 In den frühen 1960er Jahren richteten sich die Forschungsanstrengungen bei Siemens besonders auf Fragen der Positioniergenauigkeit und der Präzision der Messsysteme. Die NCSteuerungen waren jedoch nur ein Forschungsthema von vielen ohne strategische Bedeutung. Zudem liefen die Entwicklungsarbeiten der Siemens-Schuckert-Werke und von Siemens & Halske zunächst unkoordiniert nebeneinander.53 Bereits 1963 begann Siemens eine Kooperation mit dem japanischen Steuerungshersteller Fanuc. Zunächst ging es dabei um die Fertigung von patentgeschützten Schrittmotoren, für die Siemens 1965 eine Lizenz erwarb. 1967 schloss Siemens auch einen Vertriebsvertrag für komplette Steuerungen der japanischen Firma.54 In den 1960er Jahren erfolgte die Produktion von NC-Steuerungen noch in kleinen Serien. Siemens verkaufte bis 1970 über 650 Sinumerik-Steuerungen, 1986 waren es dagegen bereits 25.000.55 Der zunächst geringe Verkaufserfolg lag an der geringen Nachfrage nach den relativ teuren und aufwändigen NC-Steuerungen. Technisch allerdings schien das Problem der Automatisierung einzelner Werkzeugmaschinen Anfang der 1970er Jahre bereits befriedigend gelöst. 1973 kam die Sinumerik 580 als CNC-Steuerung mit einem Siemens-Rechner auf den Markt.56 1976 entstand dann als Gemeinschaftsentwicklung von Fanuc und Siemens die Sinumerik 7 mit einem eigens entwickelten Mikroprozessor der dritten Generation, der bereits 1977 die Sinumerik 8 folgte.57 Nach eigenen Angaben war Siemens 1977 der größte europäische Hersteller von numerischen Steuerungen und verfügte in Deutschland über einen Marktanteil von 50 Prozent.58 Siemens gelang es also in den 1970er Jahren durchaus, sich auch international als erfolgreicher Steuerungshersteller zu positionieren. Allerdings geschah das auf der Grundlage einer Kooperation mit dem japanischen Hersteller Fanuc. Schröder, Innovation (Fn. 36), S. 163 – 167. Roesler, Wettlauf (Fn. 39), S. 354, 359 f.; Schröder, Innovation (Fn. 36), S. 163 – 167. 53 Ebenda, S. 169. 54 Ebenda, S. 175; Peter Wiehn / Helmut Winkler, Numerische Steuerungen FANUC, in: Siemens-Zeitschrift 47 (1973), Beiheft 1, S. 30 – 35, hier S. 30. 55 Franz Kuplent, Weiterentwicklung und zukünftiger Einsatz von NC-Maschinen, in: Werkstatt und Betrieb 103 (1970), S. 13 – 22, hier S. 13; Siemens-Archiv München 68. LR 514, Siemens-Mitteilungen 1 / 86, S. 10. 56 Jürgen Meyer / Gerhard Sautter, Sinumerik 580, eine freiprogrammierbare numerische Steuerung, in: Siemens-Zeitschrift 47 (1973), Beiheft 1, S. 65 – 69. 57 Roesler, Wettlauf (Fn. 39), S. 365 f.; Schröder, Innovation (Fn. 36), S. 174 f.; KlausRüdiger Hoffmann / Christian Seeliger, Einsatz des Mikroprozessors bei der numerischen Steuerung von Werkzeugmaschinen, in: Werkstatt und Betrieb 110 (1977), S. 497 – 500, hier S. 499 f.; Klaus-Rüdiger Hoffmann / Siegfried Strembski, Sinumerik-System 7, ein CNC-System mit Mikroprozessor, in: Siemens-Zeitschrift 51 (1977), S. 586 – 592. 58 Die neue NC-Generation von Werkzeugmaschinen, in: Siemens-Zeitschrift 51 (1977), S. 582 – 585, hier S. 585. 51 52

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Das Beispiel deutet schon an, was im nächsten Abschnitt anhand der Biotechnologie noch deutlicher wird. Im Lauf der 1970er und 1980er Jahre stellte sich heraus, dass die Wissensbasis der westdeutschen Unternehmen in den forschungsintensiven Branchen trotz der insgesamt guten Beziehungen zu den deutschen Hochschulen nicht mehr ausreichte. Die Wirtschaftseliten versuchten daher verstärkt, wissenschaftliches und technisches Know-how aus dem Ausland zu importieren. 2. Biotechnologie Biotechnologie bezeichnet nach einer Definition der OECD die Anwendung wissenschaftlicher und technischer Prinzipien zur Stoffumwandlung durch biologische Agenzien mit dem Ziel der Bereitstellung von Gütern und Dienstleistungen.59 In der Forschung hat sich eine Dreiteilung durchgesetzt, die zwischen traditioneller, moderner und neuer Biotechnologie unterscheidet.60 Die neue oder molekulare Biotechnologie entstand am Anfang der 1970er Jahre mit der Entdeckung neuer Techniken zur DNS-Rekombination oder (etwas später) Zellfusion. Die Gentechnik ist demnach ein Teil der neuen Biotechnologie. Mit der molekularen Biotechnologie entwickelte sich diese von einer Nischen- zur Spitzentechnologie, in die große wirtschaftliche Erwartungen gesetzt wurden. In den USA entstand bereits in den 1970er Jahren eine eigene Biotechnologie-Industrie, deren wirtschaftliche Bedeutung freilich zunächst gering blieb.61 a) DDR In der neuen, molekularen Biotechnologie konnte die DDR wenige Erfolge für sich verbuchen. Zwar war die biologische und biomedizinische Forschung in den 1980er Jahren durchaus auf der Höhe des internationalen Standes der Wissenschaft. Sie litt jedoch unter dem Fehlen geeigneter Geräte und Materialien.62 Die DDR-Staats- und Parteiführung versuchte schon seit der zweiten Hälfte der 1970er Jahre durch administrative Beschlüsse und Maßnahmen, biotechnologische Produktionsmethoden in der Industrie zu verbreiten. Dies gelang jedoch nur sehr unzureichend, da die chemische Industrie wenig Interesse an diesen Entwicklungen zeigte und Investitionsmittel nur begrenzt vorhanden waren. Letztlich spielten hier Robert Bud, The Uses of Life. A History of Biotechnology, Cambridge et al. 1993, S. 1. Luitgard Marschall, Im Schatten der chemischen Synthese. Industrielle Biotechnologie in Deutschland (1900 – 1970), Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2000, S. 16; Tor-Magnus Enari, From Beer to Molecular Biology. The Evolution of Industrial Biotechnology, Nürnberg 1999, S. 117 f. 61 Sheldon Krimsky, Biotechnics and Society. The Rise of Industrial Genetics, New York 1991, S. 21 – 42. 62 Rainer Hohlfeld, Between Autonomy and State Control. Genetic and Biomedical Research, in: Dieter Hoffmann / Kristie Macrakis, Science under Socialism. East Germany in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge 1999, S. 247 – 265, hier S. 254 f. 59 60

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systembedingte Hindernisse wie die mangelnde Flexibilität der Planwirtschaft und die Abkoppelung von internationalen Märkten eine wichtige Rolle.63 Den Status einer „Schlüsseltechnologie“ erlangte die Biotechnologie in der DDR erst am Beginn der 1980er Jahre. In den Wirtschaftsplänen der DDR erfolgte eine entsprechende Erwähnung 1983.64 Schon vorher war beispielsweise im Ministerium für Hoch- und Fachschulen von einem „wesentlichen Rückstand“ der DDR in der Biotechnologie die Rede, den es im Hinblick auf ihre Stellung unter den ersten zehn Industrieländern der Welt aufzuholen gelte.65 Noch 1985 stellte der Leiter der Forschungsabteilung des Chemiekombinats Bitterfeld (CKB) Kochmann fest: „Die bisherige Nutzung der Biotechnologie in der DDR ist überwiegend durch Verfahren und Erzeugnisse charakterisiert, die seit Jahren und Jahrzehnten im internationalen Maßstab angewandt und produziert werden ( . . . ). Das Problem besteht darin, daß die neuen produktivitätsbestimmenden Techniken wie Gentechnik, Enzymtechnik, Immuntechnik und Zellkulturtechnik ( . . . ) noch nicht beherrscht werden und die dazu erforderlichen kadermäßigen und materiell-technischen Voraussetzungen weitgehend fehlen.“66

Es mangelte nicht nur an Geräten, auch die Personaldecke war zu dieser Zeit noch sehr dünn. 1985 schätzten Experten des Bezirks Halle, dass in der gesamten DDR nicht mehr als 100 Personen etwas von Biotechnologie verstünden.67 Das Chemiekombinat Bitterfeld nahm die Forschung auf dem Feld der Biotechnologie erst 1981 auf. Der Anstoß dazu kam durch eine Staatsplanaufgabe des Ministeriums für chemische Industrie, also nicht durch eigene Initiative. Das Kombinat sollte mit Hilfe von Kooperationspartnern eine breite Grundlagenforschung betreiben, um auch international eine führende Stellung zu erreichen. Kern der Arbeiten war die Forschung an organischen Säuren wie Zitronensäure und Gluconsäure.68 Zitronensäure findet als Säuerungsmittel in der Lebensmittelindustrie breite Anwendung. Sie wird schon seit den 1920er Jahren nicht mehr aus Zitronen gewonnen, sondern auf mikrobiologischer Grundlage, in der Regel unter Verwendung des Schimmelpilzes Aspergillus niger.69 Die DDR war mangels eigener Zitronensäureproduktion gezwungen, diese für Devisen aus dem westlichen Ausland zu importieren.70 Rainer Voß et.al., Ostdeutsche Biotechnologie im Umbruch, Berlin 1992, S. 20 – 24. Ebenda, S. 23 – 25. 65 Universitätsarchiv Halle rep. 7 / 1361, Konzeption zum Beitrag des Hoch- und Fachschulwesens zur Entwicklung der Biotechnologie 1982. 66 Landesarchiv Merseburg, Chemiekombinat Bitterfeld (CKB) 7632, Vorlage für die Beratung der Kombinatsleitung am 04. 03. 1985, S. 5 f. 67 Ebenda, CKB 7631, Aktennotiz 08. 01. 1985. 68 Ebenda, CKB 7631, Stand und Perspektive der biotechnologischen Forschung im VEB CKB, 18. 12. 1985. 69 Bud, Uses (Fn. 59), S. 47. 70 Landesarchiv Merseburg CKB 5292, Vorlage für Ministerrat, Gesamtkonzeption zur Produktion und Versorgung der DDR mit Zitronensäure, 1983. 63 64

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Im Bitterfelder Kombinat wurde 1981 eine Abteilung Prozessmodellierung und Biotechnologie eingerichtet, die 1985 elf Mitarbeiter hatte.71 Die Aufwendungen für Forschung und Entwicklung betrugen 1983 2,8 Millionen Mark und 1984 4,15 Millionen Mark, wobei für die Wissenschaftskooperation je 0,75 Millionen Mark (27 Prozent bzw. 18 Prozent) vorgesehen waren.72 Nach einer Einschätzung der Abteilung aus dem Jahr 1983 waren die Voraussetzungen für den Einstieg in die Biotechnologie in der DDR im allgemeinen gut, es habe nur eine Lücke zwischen Grundlagenforschung und praktischer Anwendung gegeben, da die großen Chemiekombinate dort bis dahin keine Forschungs- und Entwicklungs-Aufgaben hatten. Jedoch würde die traditionelle Synthesechemie langfristig auch weiterhin den Hauptweg zur Erzeugung von Chemieprodukten darstellen.73 Nach vielen Verzögerungen konnte erst im Mai 1989 eine kleintechnische Versuchsanlage zur Produktion organischer Säuren im Chemiekombinat Bitterfeld ihren Testbetrieb aufnehmen. Aber selbst dann galt nur die Produktion von Gluconsäure als absehbar, nicht jedoch die von Zitronensäure, wie ursprünglich geplant. Selbst dazu war der Import von Anlagen aus Österreich nötig, da der VEB Chemieanlagenbau Grimma nicht liefern konnte oder wollte.74 Zur Produktion von Gluconsäure war im Kombinat ein neues Verfahren entwickelt worden.75 Ökonomisch jedoch lohnte sich die Produktion von Gluconsäure kaum. Im nichtsozialistischen Wirtschaftsgebiet konnte damit keine Marktlücke bedient werden, so dass der Export nur über Verdrängungskonkurrenz mit einer unterdurchschnittlichen Rentabilität hätte funktionieren können.76 Die seit Mitte der 1980er Jahre angestrebte Kooperation mit der Universität Halle brachte ebenfalls wenig Hilfe. Obwohl seit dem Beginn der 1980er Jahre die Hinwendung zur Biotechnologie sowohl an der Universität Halle als auch im nahe gelegenen Bitterfelder Chemiekombinat erfolgt war, kam es erst seit 1985 / 86 zu einer wirklichen Zusammenarbeit. Ein formeller Kooperationsvertrag wurde 1986 geschlossen.77 Mit diesem Vertrag, der eine Zusammenarbeit in verschiedenen, eher vage definierten Gebieten der Biotechnologie vorsah (u. a. Farbstoffdirektsynthese, Bioprozesstechnik, Biomathematik, Bioanalytik), sollte nach Meinung der SED-Bezirksleitung ein „Führungsbeispiel“78 gegeben werden. Bis dahin liefen 71 Landesarchiv Merseburg CKB 7631, Stand und Perspektive der biotechnologischen Forschung im VEB CKB, 18. 12. 1985. 72 Ebenda, Fragespiegel zum Stand und der Entwicklung der Biotechnologie, 21. 10. 1983. 73 Ebenda, Arbeitsprogramm zur Biotechnologie im VEB CKB, 1983, S. 3. 74 Ebenda, CKB 7633, Komplexinformation zum Stand und zur Entwicklung der Biotechnologie im VEB CKB, S. 5, 8 f. 75 Ebenda, CKB 7632, Hans-Peter Richter, Vortrag für Seminar der Europäischen Wirtschaftskommission in Varna, Sept. 1986, S. 4. 76 Ebenda, CKB 7633, Dietze betr. Investition Gluconsäure, 18. 07. 1988. 77 Ebenda, Diskussionsbeitrag Hans-Peter Richter betr. Entwicklung der Wissenschaftskooperation auf dem Gebiet der Biotechnologie zwischen dem VEB CKB und der MLU Halle, 1988.

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die Forschungsarbeiten parallel und offenbar auch weitgehend ohne gegenseitige Kenntnisnahme. Jedenfalls beklagten sich Mitarbeiter der Biotechnologie-Arbeitsgruppe des Chemiekombinats noch 1986, das Kombinat sei über den Aufbau des Biotechnikums an der Universität Halle nicht informiert.79 Gleichzeitig musste der Direktor des Biotechnikums Rolf Schulze 1986 einräumen, dass die Naturwissenschaftler an seiner Einrichtung auf die Überführung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse in technische Lösungen unzureichend vorbereitet seien.80 Der Direktor Forschung der Universität Halle beklagte in demselben Jahr, die Kombinate hätten allgemein Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten und wären selten bereit, Themen der anwendungsorientierten Grundlagenforschung zu finanzieren.81 Die Forschungskooperation zeitigte ebenfalls nicht die gewünschten Resultate. Hannes Hörnig, Leiter der Abteilung Wissenschaft des ZK, bezeichnete 1988 die chemische Industrie in punkto Abstimmung der Wissenschaftskonzeption mit den Hochschulen gar als „negatives Beispiel“.82 Die SED-Bezirksleitung machte das Kombinat für die schlechten Resultate verantwortlich, da in Bitterfeld die notwendigen Investitionen für die geplante kleintechnische Versuchsanlage 1987 / 88 nicht realisiert werden konnten.83 Umgekehrt beurteilten die Forscher und Entwickler des Chemiekombinats den Beitrag ihrer Kollegen von den Hochschulen als gering. Nach einer Bestandsaufnahem im März 1988 hatte das CKB 150 Leistungsverträge abgeschlossen, die das F&E-Potential um immerhin 25 Prozent erhöhten. Die beteiligten Wissenschaftseinrichtungen lieferten große Unterstützung in der Grundlagenforschung, es ließen sich jedoch keine zahlenmäßigen Effekte nachweisen.84 Der ökonomische Nutzen der universitären Vertragsforschung, so gestand selbst Rektor Zaschke 1988 selbst ein, sei schwer einschätzbar, da es sich überwiegend um Grundlagenforschung handle, die sich nicht direkt in die Produktion überführen lasse.85 Angesichts der mageren Bilanz von 8 Jahren Forschung auf dem Gebiet der Biotechnologie machte sich innerhalb des Bitterfelder Kombinats 1989 eine gewisse Resignation breit. Kennzeichnend dafür ist die Einschätzung des Leiters der Forschungsabteilung Kochmann aus dem Dezember 1989: 78 Ebenda, SED-BL IV / E-2 / 3 / 257, Zur Realisierung des Beschlusses des Politbüros des ZK der SED vom 10. 09. 1985, S. 6. 79 Ebenda, CKB 7632, Vorlage für das Sekretariat der Kreisleitung der SED, 14. 02. 1986, S. 13; Information betr. Sekretariatssitzung am 21. 02. 1986 zu Problemen der Biotechnologie, 13. 03. 1986. 80 Universitätsarchiv Halle rep. 7 / 1392, Aktennotiz Schulze, ohne Datum. 81 Ebenda, rep. 7 / 1394, Analyse der mit den Kombinaten abgeschlossenen Leistungsverträge, 10. 06. 1986. 82 Landesarchiv Merseburg SED-BL IV / F-2 / 9.02 / 318, fol. 113. 83 Ebenda, SED-BL IV / F-2 / 9.02 / 313, fol. 125; IV / F-2 / 9.02 / 318, fol. 87. 84 Ebenda, CKB 1115, Stellungnahme zum Vorbereitungsmaterial Leistungsangebot Wissenschaft und Technik, 24. 03. 1988. 85 Universitätsarchiv Halle rep. 7 / 1362, Bericht über Erfahrungen, Probleme, Schlussfolgerungen bei der Gestaltung der Kooperationsbeziehungen, 14. 11. 1988, S. 6.

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„Ich zweifle an, daß die vielen in der DDR geschaffenen biotechnologischen Kapazitäten für unser Kombinat weitere überführbare Neuheiten bringen. Die Sache wird wohl so ausgehen wie mit der Mikroelektronik; man kann zwar mitreden, ist aber niemals konkurrenzfähig.“86

b) BRD Der Einstieg in die neue molekulare Biotechnologie erfolgte bei den westdeutschen Chemiefirmen ebenfalls mit Verspätung gegenüber der US-amerikanischen Konkurrenz. Auch entwickelte sich in der Bundesrepublik bis 1990 im Gegensatz zu den USA keine eigene Biotechnologie-Industrie. Obwohl die Biotechnologie seit 1968 Gegenstand staatlicher Förderung war, erfolgte der Einstieg der deutschen Chemiekonzerne in den 1980er Jahren durch Technologietransfer aus den USA.87 Als Gründe für das Zurückbleiben der Bundesrepublik in der Biotechnologie werden der mangelnde Technologietransfer aus den Hochschulen, der unterentwickelte Risikokapitalmarkt, das deutsche Patentrecht und die höheren Forschungs- und Entwicklungsaufwendungen der USA in diesem Bereich genannt.88 Um diese Aspekte näher zu beleuchten, soll im Folgenden auf den Bayer-Konzern näher eingegangen werden. Der Beginn molekularbiologischer Forschungs- und Entwicklungs-Aktivitäten bei Bayer lässt sich in den späten 1970er Jahren nachweisen. Zunächst ging es hierbei um monoklonale Antikörper, die durch neue Zellfusionstechniken möglich wurden und neuartige Möglichkeiten der Diagnose und Therapie eröffneten.89 Monoklonale Antikörper waren 1975 in Großbritannien entdeckt, dort aber nicht patentiert worden.90 Eine eigens zu monoklonalen Antikörpern eingesetzte „task force“ bei Bayer empfahl in ihrem Bericht 1979 die Einrichtung einer zellbiologischen Forschergruppe, die sich vor allem mit der Entwicklung von rationellen Produktionsverfahren für die Antikörper beschäftigen sollte.91 Diese Aufgabenstellung wurde jedoch 86 Landesarchiv Merseburg CKB 7634, Stellungnahme zur Schutzrechtsstrategie zum Gebiet Biotechnologie für den Perspektivzeitraum 1990 – 1995 und bis zum Jahre 2000, 29. 12. 1989. 87 Susanne Giesecke, Von der Forschung zum Markt. Innovationsstrategien und Forschungspolitik in der Biotechnologie, Berlin 2001, S. 19, 149 – 155; Ulrich Dolata, Politische Ökonomie der Gentechnik. Konzernstrategien, Forschungsprogramme, Technologiewettläufe, Berlin 1996, S. 85 – 106. 88 Giesecke, Forschung (Fn. 87), S. 123, 214 f., 230; Viola Peter, Institutionen im Innovationsprozess. Eine Analyse anhand der biotechnologischen Innovationssysteme in Deutschland und Japan, Heidelberg 2002, S. 231 f. 89 Rolf D. Schmid, Taschenatlas der Biotechnologie und Gentechnik, Weinheim 2002, S. 144 f. 90 Bud, Uses (Fn. 59), S. 205. 91 Unternehmensarchiv Bayer 323 – 59, Horst D. Schlumberger, Zellbiologie als Teil der modernen Biotechnologie, Januar 1981, S. 3.

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rasch als zu eng erkannt. In einem internen Forschungsbericht empfahl daher Horst Schlumberger vom Wuppertaler Pharma-Forschungszentrum den Aufbau einer zentralen zellbiologischen Forschungsgruppe, die sich allgemeinen Fragen der Zellkulturtechniken widmen sollte. Dies bilde die Grundlage für die Herstellung monoklonaler Antikörper und anderer spezifischer Zellprodukte. Nach Meinung von Schlumberger könnte dies sowohl als Ergänzung als auch als Alternative zu Techniken der genetischen Rekombination dienen. Die Kosten veranschlagte er mit insgesamt 8 Millionen DM über die nächsten fünf Jahre.92 Was den möglichen Standort der zentralen zellbiologischen Forschergruppe anging, so empfahl Schlumberger Wuppertal als am besten geeignet, da dort die meisten biotechnologischen Kapazitäten vorhanden seien. Das amerikanische Tochterunternehmen Miles hatte dagegen die Ansiedlung in La Jolla, Kalifornien, favorisiert. Schlumberger räumte zwar ein, dass „ein wesentlicher Teil des spezifischen ,know hows‘ bei den Joint Ventures von Miles liegt“. Für Wuppertal als Standort der zellbiologischen Forschergruppe sprach aber, dass dort die unbedingt notwendige Membrantechnologie vorhanden sei. Außerdem könnten bei einer Ansiedlung in Wuppertal die anfallenden Erkenntnisse schnell in andere laufende Forschungsprogramme des Pharma-Forschungszentrums einfließen.93 In den Folgejahren wurde tatsächlich in Wuppertal eine zellbiologische Forschergruppe aufgebaut, die neben allgemeinen Arbeiten zur Zellkultur auch an monoklonalen Antikörpern arbeitete. 94 Dies zeigt, dass Bayer zu Beginn der 1980er Jahre zwar einen Rückstand in der neuen Biotechnologie aufzuholen hatte, aber mit den eigenen Forschungskapazitäten in Deutschland und den USA durchaus auf vorhandenem Wissen aufbauen konnte. 3. Vergleichsaspekte Was die wichtigsten neuen Technologien der 1970er und 1980er Jahre, Mikroelektronik und Biotechnologie, anging, so war die Ausgangslage in den beiden deutschen Staaten zunächst recht ähnlich. Da die technologische Dynamik in dieser Zeit von anderen Staaten wie den USA oder Japan ausging, waren die Betriebe und Unternehmen im West- wie Ostteil Deutschlands zunächst damit beschäftigt, ihren Rückstand aufzuholen. Das traf besonders auf die molekulare Biotechnologie zu, deren kommerzielle Nutzung sich um 1980 einigermaßen überraschend abzeichnete, während die Elektronikentwicklung schon vorher wirtschaftliche Relevanz besaß. In der Bundesrepublik führte das dazu, dass sich die eingespielten Beziehungen zu den einheimischen Hochschulen lockerten und die Unternehmen sich bei ausländischen Firmen oder Forschungseinrichtungen nach verfügbarem Knowhow umsehen mussten. Dieser Weg blieb den DDR-Betrieben aus politischen wie außenwirtschaftlichen Gründen weitgehend verschlossen. 92 93 94

Ebenda, S. Vf., 2. Ebenda, S. 27. Ebenda, Pharma-Bericht 12737, 22. 05. 1984.

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Die Reaktion der Wirtschaftseliten in dieser Situation bestand aber nicht in einer Intensivierung der Beziehungen zu inländischen Forschungseinrichtungen, die bis dahin nur mangelhaft ausgenutzt worden waren. Vielmehr versuchten die Betriebe und Kombinate wie schon in den Jahrzehnten zuvor, ihre eigenen Forschungskapazitäten auszubauen und den Anschluss an die internationale Entwicklung aus eigener Kraft zu bewerkstelligen. Als diese Strategie in den 1980er Jahren erkennbar gescheitert war, machte sich Resignation breit. Was sich in dieser Phase verhängnisvoll auswirkte, war weniger das planwirtschaftliche System an sich, obwohl es zweifellos die Effizienz verringerte, sondern die relative Abschließung gegenüber dem Westen, die einen Technologietransfer schwierig machte.

IV. Ergebnisse Die Ergebnisse zeigen deutliche Unterschiede in den Einstellungen der Wirtschaftseliten in den beiden deutschen Staaten hinsichtlich des Wissenstransfers. In der DDR der 1950er Jahre bestand das größte Problem in der generellen Geringschätzung von Forschung und Entwicklung seitens der Betriebsleitungen. Priorität hatte hier ganz überwiegend die kurzfristige Erfüllung der Produktionspläne. Im Lauf der 1960er Jahre begann sich diese Einstellung wohl auch in Folge der von der Staats- und Parteiführung propagierten „Wissenschaftlich-Technischen Revolution“ zu ändern. Forschung und Entwicklung erhielten einen höheren Stellenwert. Allerdings waren gerade die Generaldirektoren größerer Kombinate in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren bestrebt, die Industrieforschung auszubauen anstatt externes Know-how in Anspruch zu nehmen. Hierin manifestierte sich der an sich durchaus bekannte Hang der volkseigenen Betriebe zur Binnenautarkie, also der möglichst weit gehenden Integration aller Stufen der Produktion (sowie Forschung und Entwicklung) in einem Betrieb oder Kombinat. In der Bundesrepublik verlief die Entwicklung deutlich anders. Hier kann man davon ausgehen, dass gerade in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren recht gut eingespielte Beziehungen zwischen Hochschulen und Industrie existierten. Zumindest die großen Unternehmen, aber auch viele kleinere, waren sich der Bedeutung dieser Kontakte durchaus bewusst, auch wenn der unmittelbare wirtschaftliche Nutzen kurzfristig gering ausfiel. In den 1970er und 1980er Jahren lockerten sich die Beziehungen zwischen den bundesdeutschen Hochschulen und Industrieunternehmen tendenziell. Schuld daran waren aber weniger die Veränderungen an den Hochschulen als die Globalisierung von Forschung und Entwicklung, die zur verstärkten Erschließung ausländischer Wissensquellen führte. Schwieriger fällt es, die Ursachen für die, trotz gemeinsamer Traditionen, unterschiedliche Entwicklung in Ost und West zu benennen. Im Osten Deutschlands machten sich offensichtlich die Beschränkungen der Planwirtschaft bemerkbar, und zwar weniger in materieller als in mentaler Hinsicht. Die oft kurzfristige Orientierung am Ziel der Planerfüllung führte vor allem in der frühen DDR zu einem

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geradezu forschungsfeindlichen Klima in den Betrieben. Ob dazu auch soziale Ressentiments gegenüber der alten Intelligenz beigetragen haben, kann hier nicht abschließend beantwortet werden. Jedenfalls wirkten sich die hierarchischen Strukturen auch der späteren DDR-Gesellschaft nachteilig auf den horizontalen Wissenstransfer aus, da sie der Bildung von Vertrauen zwischen Hochschulen und Betrieben nicht förderlich waren. Allerdings hatten die Betriebsleiter immer genug Spielräume, um auch anders zu handeln. Die mangelnde Nutzung der einheimischen Wissensbasis durch die DDR-Wirtschaftseliten war nicht allein durch das planwirtschaftliche System bedingt. Vielmehr spielten mentale Prägungen eine Rolle, die sich schon in den 1950er Jahren signifikant von denen im Westen unterschieden. Hier scheint der Elitenwechsel nach 1945 zusammen mit dem veränderten gesellschaftlichen Umfeld ausschlaggebend gewesen zu sein. Auf der anderen Seite muss auch bemerkt werden, dass der technologische Wandel der 1970er und 1980er Jahre allein auf der Grundlage der einheimischen Wissensbasis kaum hätte gemeistert werden können. In dieser Zeit war vielmehr die relative Abschließung gegenüber dem Westen das entscheidende Hindernis. Für die Bundesrepublik gilt es zunächst das Fortdauern von zum Teil älteren Beziehungen zwischen Hochschulen und Wirtschaftseliten zu konstatieren, die überwiegend an konkrete Personen gebunden waren. Das hatte den Vorteil, dass bundesdeutsche Unternehmen häufig direkten Zugriff auf die Forschungsergebnisse der einheimischen Hochschulen hatten und bisweilen sogar deren Struktur und Forschungsschwerpunkte mitbestimmen. Andererseits lauerte darin auch eine Gefahr, die in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren offensichtlich wurde: Die Unternehmen waren zu abhängig von der einheimischen Wissensbasis. So drohten die Unternehmen wichtige Entwicklungen zu verpassen, die sich anderswo abspielten (z. B. in der Biotechnologie). Die bereits erwähnte Globalisierung der Forschung und Entwicklung stellte eine Reaktion auf diese Gefahren dar.

Dispiriting Decade. Structural Crisis, Managerial Failure, and the Fall of the House of Flick, 1975 – 1985 By Kim Christian Priemel I. Crisis? Whose crisis? The 1970s are en vogue but, at least from the historians’ perspective, there are few people who seem to like them. Tony Judt has even labelled them the “the most dispiriting decade of the twentieth century”1, though other years might have a stronger claim to that title. While the rising tide of European terrorism marked the political landscape and the advent of punk rock antagonised both bourgeois sentiment and the ageing hippies on the musical and lifestyle front, the most significant dimension of change took place in the realm of economy. Here, the 1970s marked “a watershed in the development of western capitalist economies”.2 Not only did the “Golden Age”3 after 25 years of continuous economic growth – in terms of GDP, employment, welfare, and consumerism – come to an end, the third industrial revolution (if industrial it was) overthrew the very system of production that had prevailed in large parts of Europe since the age of high industrialization. 4 It was precisely this regimen of mechanised, scale-oriented, and mostly uniform mass production which was superseded – rather than simply done away with – by the new driving forces of computerised automation, information technology, flexible just-in-time production and a spread of service sector activities, all four trends interwoven tightly with one another. As Eric Hobsbawm put it, “[t]his was the age not of Henry Ford but of Benetton”.5 It was still mass production but in a new key. Economic historians have convincingly argued that the phenomena of stagnation and decline were the inevitable results of a return to the secular trends of economic Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, London 2007, p. 477. Derek H. Aldcroft, The European Economy 1914 – 2000. With the assistance of Steven Morewood, 4th edition, London 2001, p. 188. 3 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914 – 1991, London 1994, p. 223. 4 For early diagnoses of the third industrial revolution and its impact see Alain Touraine, La société post-industrielle [The Post-Industrial Society], Paris 1969; Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting, London 1974. 5 Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes (fn. 3), p. 404. 1 2

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growth.6 However, that did not make them any less threatening to the contemporaries, politicians, economists and businessmen along with the vast majority of working people. To them, the 1970s were indeed a difficult and deeply disturbing decade. They were marked by decreasing, in some cases even negative growth rates, by rising unemployment and accelerated change in the mode of production while, at the same time, cuts in welfare hurt those who depended on public aid most directly. The high-flying expectations of sustained, engineerable economic growth were thoroughly sobered by the crisis as successive efforts to stimulate investments and employment failed. Feelings of risk and insecurity prevailed.7 Much attention has been paid to state actors on the one hand and macroeconomic, mostly international aspects of the downturn on the other, i. e. the fall of Keynesian demand-management, the demise of Bretton-Woods, the two oil crises, and increased competition on global markets (the latter being in turn a major reason for the disintegration of the international monetary system).8 The national dynamics of the 1970s’ crisis, however, resulted from the combination of these broad developments with more specific factors such as inflationary tendencies in prices and incomes, shrinking investment, and a lag in rationalization and innovation that also characterized significant parts of the West German economy.9 These were, to some extent, self-inflicted wounds since management failure accounted for much of the said deficits. Private business was not merely hit by the crisis as if it had been attacked by some mysterious foe from outside, but it generated at least some of the problems itself, mostly by sticking to the ‘boom mode’ of production, investment, and marketing. Therefore, it is of prime importance to shed some light on individual reactions to as well as on strategies and tactics before and during the crisis in order to learn more about the interaction of structural challenges and management contingencies. Business elites played a key role in this scenario and for that reason, management decisions will be at the heart of the following reflections. Taking the example of the Flick-Konzern, the Federal Republic’s foremost industrial combine at the start of the 1970s and one of the major protagonists of the so-called economic 6 Cf. Harm G. Schröter, Von der Teilung zur Wiedervereinigung 1945 – 2004, in: Michael North (ed.), Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Ein Jahrtausend im Überblick, 2nd rev. edition, München 2005, pp. 356 – 426, here pp. 388 f.; Alexander Nützenadel, Stunde der Ökonomen. Wissenschaft, Politik und Expertenkultur in der Bundesrepublik 1959 – 1974, Göttingen 2005, pp. 297 f., 304 – 306. 7 This has been brilliantly shown by Tim Schanetzky, Die große Ernüchterung. Wirtschaftspolitik, Expertise und Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik 1966 bis 1982, Berlin 2007. 8 Cf. Aldcroft, European Economy (fn. 2), pp. 189, 192, Anthony Sutcliffe, An Economic and Social History of Western Europe Since 1945, London / New York 1996, pp. 199 – 204. 9 See Schanetzky, Ernüchterung (fn. 7), pp. 46, 165; Judt, Postwar (fn. 1), pp. 452 – 455, 458; Werner Abelshauser, Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945, München 2004, pp. 308 – 314, 423 – 433; Schröter, Teilung (fn. 6), pp. 399 f.; André Steiner, Bundesrepublik und DDR in der Doppelkrise europäischer Industriegesellschaften. Zum sozialökonomischen Wandel in den 1970er Jahren, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 3 (2006), 3, pp. 242 – 262.

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miracle after the war, the crisis will be analysed as a multi-faceted set of structural problems, path dependencies, and interpersonal dynamics. Since the late 1960s, the industrial works belonging to the Flick combine came under increasing pressure to reorganize and modernize while the holding had to reconceptualize its investment strategy. Moreover, severe difficulties lay ahead which resulted from the family business character and the intricate principal-agent relations as a consequence of the fifty-year reign of founding father Friedrich Flick. These different constellations intertwined and posed an existential challenge to the combine’s top management. How the Flick executives contributed and reacted to the crisis phenomena, if and what they learned from the downturn, and what strategies of adaptation they chose will be shown in an empirically based analysis. Thus, the paper inquires into the responsibility for the crisis and the efficiency of management under these conditions.

II. What’s happened so far, 1952 – 74 At first sight, the crisis of the Flick-Konzern corresponded to the generational change at the top level. The founder, Friedrich Flick, passed away in 1972, and many a commentator seemed convinced that the legendary tycoon had presided over an era of uninterrupted expansion, had led a life of pure success and had finally bequeathed a first-rate, consolidated industrial combine to his heir, Friedrich Karl Flick.10 However, this fabulous reputation was not only less than accurate in regard to the founder’s overall career – there had been major crises in 1925, 1932 and 1945 which Flick had only survived by taking drastic measures11 –, it also failed to explain the troubles the combine’s management faced by the time of his death. As in the case of macroeconomic development, the combine’s crisis was rooted deeply in the previous boom period.12 In fact, the roughly two decades between the re-emergence of the Flick combine as an industrial power after 1952 and the crisis of the early 1970s can be sub-divided into an era of meteoric rise which lasted up to 1965 and a subsequent decade 10 Empire with fingertip control, in: Business Week, 03. 02. 1968; Max Kruk, Der scheue Konzernarchitekt. Friedrich Flick und sein Lebenswerk, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 05. 08. 1972; Friedrich Flick. Der Mann und sein Werk, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 28. 07. 1972. 11 Alfred Reckendrees / Kim C. Priemel, Politik als produktive Kraft? Die »Gelsenberg-Affäre« und die Krise des Flick-Konzerns (1931 / 32), in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte (2006), 2, pp. 63 – 93; Kim C. Priemel, Finis Imperii: Wie sich ein Konzern auflöst, Informationsströme und Verfügungsrechte im Flick-Konzern 1945 / 46, in: Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 95 (2008), 1, pp. 1 – 24. 12 Cf. Gerald Ambrosius / Hartmut Kaelble, Einleitung: Gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Folgen des Booms der 1950er und 1960er Jahre, in: Hartmut Kaelble (ed.), Der Boom 1948 – 1973. Gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Europa, Opladen 1992, pp. 7 – 30, here pp. 9 f., 13 f.

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of fading momentum and stagnation which came to an end with the sale of Daimler-Benz in late 1974. In the first period, Flick had literally risen from ashes like the phoenix of lore.13 Having lost three quarters of the combine’s industrial property to Soviet reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of the war14, Flick and his staff had made the best of the situation when the Western Allies had pressed for the deconcentration of the coal and steel industries after 1948. Indeed, the very decartelization program had played a decisive role in the renewal of the Flick empire and had proven to be “a blessing in disguise”.15 Forced to sell his large coal mines at the Ruhr anyway, Flick had hastened to find investors in order to mobilize liquid means. By 1953 / 54 Flick’s holding, the Friedrich Flick Kommanditgesellschaft (FFKG) had sold off most of the Ruhr properties and now had some 250 million German marks (DM) to spend. These were reinvested as rapidly as prudently. The holding company acquired shares in those sectors which would take the lead in the German reconstruction period, i. e. chemical industry, car building, and mechanical engineering. By 1960, the FFKG held majorities in major firms such as Feldmühle and Dynamit Nobel (paper, plastic, and chemicals), Buderus and Krauss-Maffei (cast steel processing, buses, trains, and armaments production) while retaining a strong hold in the iron- and steel sector (Eisenwerkgesellschaft Maximilianshütte, Metallhüttenwerke Lübeck, Stahlwerke Südwestfalen, large parts of the Buderus combine).16 The biggest asset, however, was a 39 percent stake in Daimler-Benz, a huge success after 1945 and somewhat the pride of German industry. Despite the formal status of a minority owner, Flick effectively controlled Daimler-Benz, in conjunction with the Quandt family and Deutsche Bank, since the mid-1950s. His ambition, however, transcended mere investment, profitable though it was. Simultaneously and secretly the FFKG first acquired the shares of the renowned motor and car manufacturers Maybach and Auto Union and then integrated both companies into Daimler-Benz. The idea behind these moves was to form a car builder of international proportion,17 on a par with the likes of General Motors and Ford. To turn the vision into reality, Flick reached out for a deal with the other German vehicle giant, Volkswagen, offering a strategic partnership via Auto Union. In the end, the dream of creating a global player came to nought. In 1965, instead of engaging in a partnership, Volkswagen took over Auto Union completely, thus free13 For one of many phoenix-metaphors see: The Durable Mr Flick, in: Forbes Magazine, 01. 02. 1969, p. 41. 14 Priemel, Finis Imperii (fn. 11), pp. 16 – 22. 15 Obituary: Herr Friedrich Flick. Millionaire industrialist, in: The Times, 22. 07. 1972. 16 Cf. Kim C. Priemel, Flick. Eine Konzerngeschichte vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik, Göttingen 2007, pp. 697 – 702, 716 – 728. 17 In 1959, Flick also made a bid for BMW, although the driving force in this venture may have been Herbert Quandt; Daimler-Benz AG, Company report 1959, p. 14; Jürgen Seidl, Die Bayrischen Motorenwerke (BMW) 1945 – 1969. Staatlicher Rahmen und unternehmerisches Handeln, München 2002, pp. 204 f., 220 f., 237.

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ing Daimler-Benz from the heavy losses the smaller car builder had accumulated, but without getting any closer to establishing the envisioned automobile trust.18 That notwithstanding, Daimler-Benz remained the single most important investment of the FFKG and its high returns made it the combine’s cash cow. In 1965, the car builder reported a turnover of almost DM 4.5 billion with net profits exceeding DM 85 million which allowed for a dividend of 18 percent.19 In contrast to the failed trust project in the car industry, Flick’s consolidating moves in the steel sector proved more successful. In 1965, the majorities of two Buderus affiliates (Hessische Berg- und Hüttenwerke [74 percent] and Stahlwerke Röchling-Buderus [50 percent]) with iron ore mines, blast furnaces and quality steel plants, were taken over from the Hessian state and the Röchling Group. The economic rationale behind this step was rather doubtful for neither of the companies did exceptionally well, and especially the mining sector was highly vulnerable to market pressure. From another perspective, however, the buy-out of the other investors made some sense: since 1959, the FFKG had gone to great lengths to get rid of minority shareholders and monopolize property rights in its subsidiaries wherever possible. Flick had made use of all available means, both friendly and coercive, ranging from acquisitions at the stock exchange to legally enforced squeeze-outs. These efforts had been by and large successful, though at the price of high obligatory dividends that the FKKG had had to guarantee.20 Thus, 1965 marked a clear turning point for the Flick combine but an ambivalent one for that matter. On the one hand, the holding company had consolidated its subsidiaries and most of these were paying handsome dividends in the last years prior to the recession of 1966 / 67 which would signal the end of the boom. On the other hand, the grand idea of a car trust had not materialised and strategic momentum had been lost by increasing stakes in yesterday’s industries. This was mirrored on the internal level. Here, the long-standing conflict between Friedrich Flick and his eldest son Otto-Ernst came to an end. For more than a decade, the dominant founder and his supposed successor had quarrelled over Otto-Ernst’s claim to participation in the strategic decision-making of the combine, alienating father and son and eventually leading to a much-reported legal confrontation from which Flick senior emerged triumphant. As a result, in 1965, Otto-Ernst ceded all entitle18 Daimler-Benz AG, Company reports 1964, p. 21, and 1965, p. 30; cf. Heidrun Edelmann, Heinz Nordhoff und Volkswagen: Ein deutscher Unternehmer im amerikanischen Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2003, pp. 258 – 260; Wilfried Feldenkirchen, “Vom Guten das Beste”. Von Daimler und Benz zur DaimlerChrysler AG. Die ersten 100 Jahre (1883 – 1983), München 2003, pp. 315 – 319; Max Kruk / Gerald Lingnau, 100 Jahre Daimler-Benz. Das Unternehmen, Mainz 1986, pp. 233 – 236; Hans-Rüdiger Etzold / Ewald Rother / Thomas Erdmann, Im Zeichen der vier Ringe, Vol. 2: 1945 – 1968, Bielefeld 1995, pp. 285 – 293. 19 Daimler-Benz AG, Company report 1965, p. 51. 20 Cf. Hans Pohl, Buderus 1932 – 1995. Bd. 3 der Unternehmensgeschichte, Wetzlar 2001, pp. 168 – 172; Hermann Bössenecker, Bayern, Bosse und Bilanzen. Hinter den Kulissen der weiß-blauen Wirtschaft, München et al. 1972, p. 196; Priemel, Flick (fn. 16), pp. 732 – 734.

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ments to the inheritance to his children, thus making way for his younger brother Friedrich Karl as the only remaining successor from the ranks of the family in the middle run.21 That this was but a second-best solution was no secret inside the combine. Flick sen. had little confidence in the entrepreneurial talents of his son and so did most members of the family and the top management. In an equally revealing and embarrassing episode some years before, Friedrich Karl’s mother, Marie Flick, had confided to a small circle of trustees and relatives that her youngest son, who had also been present, was neither gifted nor inclined to hard work and would therefore need advisers to guide him through his future responsibilities.22 This was precisely what her husband had in mind. Since the 1950s, Flick had increased the number of top managers as a reaction to both the expansion of the combine and the family strife. By 1960, five new plenipotentiaries had been brought into the FFKG top quarters at Düsseldorf.23 More decisive, however, was the administrational step which Flick took in 1963 / 65. In addition to the previously highest management level of plenipotentiaries, a new group of partners with voting rights but no property was installed. Starting with Flick’s cousin and longtime companion Konrad Kaletsch in 1963 and soon followed by Otto A. Friedrich, Wolfgang Pohle and Eberhard von Brauchitsch in 1965, this implied a paradigm shift. For the first time in fifty years, Flick granted voting rights in his top holding to non-proprietors. That these four men were supposed to secure continuity and stability was further stressed by the fact that Flick reserved the right to dispose of the partners to himself: his heir, Friedrich Karl, would have no right to fire any of these men.24 1965 proved to be a year of peripeteia for the Flick-Konzern. In the previous two decades, it had turned from a largely heavy industrial combine to a more diversified group of industrial, mostly manufacturing companies. Most of these had pros21 Verhandlung im Schenkungsprozeß Flick gegen Flick, in: FAZ, 12. 01. 1965; Otto-Ernst Flick muß seinen Anteil zurückgeben, in: FAZ, 15. 04. 1965; Rechtsstreit im Hause Flick beendet, in: FAZ, 10. 09. 1966; Wieder Friede im Hause Flick, in: Handelsblatt, 12. 09. 1966; Eberhard von Brauchitsch, Der Preis des Schweigens. Erfahrungen eines Unternehmers, Berlin 1999, p. 78. 22 Note re: Negotations with Mr Friedrich Flick on 17th June 1958, 20. 06. 1958 [O.-E. Flick], ThyssenKrupp Konzernarchiv Duisburg (TKA), Ruhr-Consulting GmbH / 424. 23 Brauchitsch, Preis (fn. 21), pp. 72 f.; Joachim Feyerabend, Die leisen Milliarden. Das Imperium des Friedrich Karl Flick, Düsseldorf / Wien 1984, p. 136. 24 Cf. Volker R. Berghahn / Paul J. Friedrich, Otto A. Friedrich, ein politischer Unternehmer. Sein Leben und seine Zeit, 1902 – 1975, Frankfurt a. M. 1993, p. 329; Flick-Konzern: Für die Ewigkeit, in: Der Spiegel, 04. 12. 1963; Die Flick KG erweitert ihre Leitung, in: FAZ, 09. 02. 1965; Flick hat sein Wirtschafts-Imperium neu organisiert, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 20. 02. 1965; Friedrich Flicks jüngster Majordomus, in: Die Zeit, 19. 03. 1965. Pohle and Friedrich might be called ‘threshold agents’ as they linked the spheres of politics and business. Falling short of Christian Dirninger’s criteria for a “political entrepreneur”, they still may have been from the same kin.

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pered in the boom period and had, thus, vindicated Flick’s investment strategy. Internally, the holding had made some cautious moves to transform from an entrepreneurial firm which was strongly focused on the founder to a somewhat more managerial company. In the following decade, however, these developments came to a halt. Little change in terms of investment and management happened prior to the founder’s death in 1972 and the sale of Daimler-Benz two years later. If the larger economic framework in which the Flick combine operated had remained the same, this might have been perceived as a sign of reliability and steadiness. However, in the light of the fading boom on the one hand – 1966 / 67 saw the first West German recession in more than 15 years25 – and the impact of the electronic, proto-digital revolution along with the rise of the service sector on the other, the supposed stability had more in common with stagnation. A series of missed chances meant that the Flick combine failed to take on the challenge of the new technologies and changing consumer markets. Thus, expansion into the high technology of nuclear power plants was intensely discussed but in the end, no such project materialised for fear of excessive financial burdens.26 Likewise, the road towards further diversification was not taken. Quite on the opposite, a majority stake in the German retailer and tour operator, Neckermann, which Flick had acquired in the 1950s was re-sold.27 Another major sale affected Stahlwerke Südwestfalen, one of the remainders of Flick’s iron past. In 1968, the shares were put up for sale and the revenue, some DM 110 million, was reinvested in the modernization of the Maxhütte’s works despite the fact that Südwestfalen had fared much better in the previous decade than the Bavarian steelmaker.28 The questionable rationale of these decisions, however, was hardly noticed at the time. The Economist, though still believing in the strategic genius of Friedrich Flick, was among the small number of commentators who had picked up on the weak spots of the combine: “The disadvantage of the diversification which Flick has gone in for is that interests, though widely spread are also thinly spread. [ . . . ] And this is dangerous in an age when the top firms in any market are more powerful than ever. Equally, though he has diversified boldly, he may not have been bold enough.”29 Nützenadel, Stunde (fn. 6), pp. 296 – 298; Schröter, Teilung (fn. 6), pp. 388 f. Note to Mr. Flick, 17. 10. 1966 [O. A. Friedrich]; Letter from Brauchitsch to Friedmann, 19. 03. 1966, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, St. Augustin (ACDP) I-093 – 094. 27 For an informed though, unsurprisingly, biased account see: Josef Neckermann, Erinnerungen, aufgezeichnet von Karin Weingart und Harvey T. Rowe, Frankfurt a. M. / Berlin 1990, pp. 282 – 284, 287 – 291. However, Neckermann would also come into financial trouble by the end of the 1970s and was taken over by the Karstadt group. 28 Note to Mr. Flick, 18. 09. 1963; Letter from Flick to Burkart, 21. 09. 1963; Mr. Kämpfer. Re: Sale of SW, 24. 04. 1968, Neue Maxhütte i. L., Betriebsarchiv, Sulzbach-Rosenberg (NMH-BA). 29 Germany’s other private colossus, in: The Economist, 25. 03. 1967. Cf. Empire with fingertip control, in: Business Week, 03. 02. 1968. 25 26

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These strategic deficits in the combine’s industrial outlook were to make themselves felt by the turn of the decade, i. e. before external factors such as the end of the international monetary system of Bretton-Woods, the oil price crisis, and the severe recession of the first half of the 1970s hit. By 1970, the Flick-Konzern had already plunged into a crisis which owed more to the longer trajectory of its own ageing process, both in regard to the focus on the ‘older’ industries and to Flick’s preference for long-time companions in management and family succession. While the latter problem was more specific though not exclusive to family enterprises, the former highlighted a general trend. A large faction of West German industrial firms had failed to take notice of structural change, technological innovation and its implications, and the increasing volatility of consumer demand. Moreover, German business had reacted procyclically to the symptoms of these developments such as tightening markets, falling net profits and a decreasing rate of productivity growth by reducing investments as early as 1965. Although real growth rates in 1969 and 1970 climbed to 8.1 and 4.9 percent respectively once more, business had little time to relax with inflation rising markedly, too.30 In the case of the Flick combine, these trends led to severe financial problems as most of its subsidiaries reported increasing losses. Buderus had to close several plants between 1971 and 1975 and was unable to pay any dividends to the FFKG.31 So were Maxhütte and Feldmühle, the latter previously one of the combine’s cash cows. By 1972, operational losses accumulated to DM 36 million. Worse, while the FFKG could relinquish claims to dividends from Feldmühle, this was no option in the case of Buderus, Krauss-Maffei and Dynamit-Nobel where dividend guarantees had been given to shareholders in the early 1960s. This put a strain on the holding’s finances and official revenue (before taxes) decreased from DM 91 million (1969) to nil (1971).32 In order to reduce costs, the FFKG management resorted to standard procedures, i. e. mass-scale lay-offs and cuts in expenditure. These measures helped to improve the holding’s liquidity but would have hardly sufficed without the payments from Daimler-Benz. The Stuttgart-based car builder braved the impending crisis even in the face of increasingly volatile demand for automobiles and rising export prices due to the falling dollar, and kept paying dividends to Düsseldorf when most other major subsidiaries had ceased to do so.33 30 Vgl. Deutsche Bank AG, Company report 1970, pp. 19 – 23; Daimler-Benz AG, Company report 1970, p. 10; Flick: Investitionen werden durchgeforstet, in: Handelsblatt, 14. / 15. 05. 1971; Schanetzky, Ernüchterung (fn. 7), pp. 42 f.; Rainer Metz, Säkulare Trends der deutschen Wirtschaft, in: North, Wirtschaftsgeschichte (fn. 6), pp. 427 – 500, here p. 471. 31 In fact, Buderus would not pay any dividend for the next five years; instead the FFKG had to balance two digit million deficits. Buderus-Bilanz. Verlust für Flick, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 16. 07. 1976. Cf. Rainer Haus / Hans Sarkowicz, Feuer und Eisen. 275 Jahre Wärme von Buderus, München / Zürich 2006, pp. 162 f. 32 Re: Group “Friedrich Flick”. Company report 1971, 15. 08. 1972, Stiftung RheinischWestfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Köln (RWWA) 74 – 97 – 9. 33 Ibidem; Re: Company report 1972 by the Flick Group, 07. 08. 1973, RWWA 74 – 97 – 9; Daimler-Benz AG, Company reports 1970 (p. 9), 1971 (p. 18), 1972 (pp. 11, 15).

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Money drawn from the cash cow in Stuttgart helped to alleviate the short-term financial worries but that was hardly a solution to the underlying structural challenges. The FFKG portfolio had to be reorganized, most obviously in regard to the steel crisis of the mid-1970s,34 while the chemical and manufacturing firms needed to undergo modernization as well as rationalization if they were to work competitively.35 Here again, the effects of structural change and the contingency of management decisions met: The necessary restructuring of the combine required investment on an unprecedented scale. These means could not be raised by the holding company where family ownership limited the available funds. Transforming the organization into a listed joint-stock company was no option as this would have meant a break with the tradition of exclusive control over the combine’s structure and strategy. Therefore, credits were the only solution left. However, external debts had reached its limits by the early 1970s. In the year of the founder’s death, longterm debts totalled DM 1.67 billion and thus nearly amounted to the tangible fixed assets of DM 1.74 billion.36 Accordingly, scepticism about the combine’s prospects became more prominent, and an external analyst summarized the state of affairs poignantly: “Friedrich Flick has left his widely spread group in a period of falling returns on capital, decreasing investments, and insufficient depreciations rather than at the peak of its profit situation”.37 Once more, these strategic problems corresponded to troubles in the structure of management. In his literally last move, Friedrich Flick had shifted the power relations inside the family by providing his grand-sons from Otto-Ernst’s family rather than his immediate heir Friedrich Karl with additional voting rights in the holding. The “final insult” to his younger son helped to alienate the family branches but failed to secure the inclusion of the third generation into the combine’s management.38 This was not the only way in which Flick’s plans were frustrated. His idea of a managerial board to provide guidance to his son was undermined by biology; apart from Brauchitsch, all of the partners passed away between 1971 and 1978.

34 Cf. Gloria Müller, Strukturwandel und Arbeitnehmerrechte. Die wirtschaftliche Mitbestimmung in der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie 1945 – 1975, Essen 1991, pp. 371 – 375, 386 – 397. 35 Re: Company report 1972 by the Flick Group, 07. 08. 1973, RWWA 74 – 97 – 9; KraussMaffei-Bilanz. Warten auf das Jahr der Katze, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 26. 07. 1976; Zurück zum Rad, in: Der Spiegel, 02. 12. 1974. 36 Re: Company report 1972 by the Flick Group, 07. 08. 1973, RWWA 74 – 97 – 9. 37 Konzernstelle. Re: Group “Friedrich Flick”. Company report 1971, 15. 08. 1972, RWWA 74 – 97 – 9. 38 Hans O. Eglau, Friedrich Flicks Heimlichkeiten, in: Die Zeit, 15. 09. 1972. Quote from: Business Diary in Europe: Flick’s posthumous surprise, in: The Times, 04. 09. 1972.

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III. From bad to worse: Daimler and the aftermath, 1975 – 78 It took but three years for the failure of Flick’s provisions to show. When the FFKG announced its intention to reduce shares in Daimler-Benz from 39 to 10 percent in late 1974, many a commentator reckoned that the decision was motivated by F. K. Flick’s desire to mobilize means straight away (some DM 300 million) in order to buy out Otto-Ernst’s children with whom he did not get along well.39 Thus, the sale clarified the distribution of property rights inside the family and was expected to close ranks among the FFKG managers after Friedrich Karl’s nephews had strayed from the family firm’s clandestine, low-profile tradition by giving rather outspoken interviews to the media.40 However, these family affairs alone could not account for a massive step such as the sale of the combine’s major asset. More important was the intention to launch a liberating coup, overcome the financial impediments and tackle the fundamental structural problems of the combine. The spectacular deal with the Deutsche Bank, which was to take over the Daimler shares for a sum of nearly DM 2 billion on 31st December 1975,41 was expected to provide the liquid means which the FFKG needed to reshuffle its portfolio and make investments in its subsidiaries. The dimension of the move was aptly shown in the change of the combine’s turnover. Including Daimler-Benz, it topped the list of West German private business – without the car builder the Flick-Konzern fell back to the 20th rank.42 Beyond the sheer scale, the transaction also had a distinctive political edge after rumours had spread that Flick intended to sell all of his Daimler shares to Reza Shah Pahlavi. Given that the Shah had already acquired a stake in the archetypical icon of German business, Krupp, and that another Daimler shareholder, the Quandt family, had sold their 10 percent share to Kuwaitian investors in the year before, any such deal could not but trigger political controversy. In particular, against the background of the oil crisis, a sell-out of German assets to Arabian and Persian ‘oil sheikhs’ epitomised a fundamental shift in international economic relations.43 The alternative which was eventually chosen, to sell the shares to the Deutsche Bank, therefore seemed to be a patriotic move by all of the share- and stakeholders involved. The FFKG could claim that they had favored a German buyer even though 39 Industrie-Familien: Der große Ausverkauf, in: Der Spiegel, 20. 01. 1975; Flick-Konzern. Wir wollen nicht Kasse machen, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 31. 01. 1975. 40 Gesunder Egoismus schafft neue Werte, in: Der Spiegel, 19. 03. 1973; Zum Unternehmer erzogen. . . , in: Die Zeit, 31. 01. 1975. 41 Deutsche Bank AG, Company report 1975, p. 33; cf. Hans E. Büschgen, Die Deutsche Bank von 1957 bis zur Gegenwart. Aufstieg zum internationalen Finanzdienstleistungskonzern, in: Lothar Gall et al., Die Deutsche Bank 1870 – 1995, München 1995, pp. 579 – 877, here pp. 657 f., 696. 42 Die zwanzig größten Unternehmen, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 15. 04. 1976. 43 Krupp-Verkauf. Der Kaiser füllt die Kasse, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 29. 10. 1976; Industrie-Familien: Der große Ausverkauf, in: Der Spiegel, 20. 01. 1975.

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the deal had been less profitable than the alleged alternative; the Deutsche Bank prided itself with having gone to great lengths to save German assets; and the Federal Government in Bonn supported the transaction by putting aside worries over the growing power of the major banks and by being supportive on the tax issue. No wonder, much of the press coverage was full of praise for that concord of responsible management and well-measured statesmanship.44 Behind the scenes, however, things looked much different. Neither were the suspected negotiations between Flick and the Shah ever confirmed nor was the issue as significant as the media would have it. In fact, Brauchitsch repeatedly disclaimed what he called “false historiography”. According to Friedrich K. Flick’s right hand, the Deutsche Bank had had an option on the Daimler shares anyway, dating back to some older agreement between Flick sen. and Hermann J. Abs, the near-almighty head of West Germany’s biggest bank. Even more straightforward, Brauchitsch pointed out that the whole idea of a Persian offer had been staged in order to quell public and particularly political opposition to the transaction.45 The details of the deal remained dubious in the end, but Brauchitsch deliberately underrated the Flick combine’s own part in the patriotic staging of the sale. The FFKG management had a vested interest in a positive public image and in good relations to the German authorities. As any other sale, the transfer of the Daimler shares to the Deutsche Bank was subject to federal and state taxation whose claims were likely to amount to more than a billion DM, thus eating away half of the proceeds which were needed for the combine’s reorganization. However, if the “new dress for the eighties”46 which the Flick-Konzern intended to tailor with the help of the revenue from the Daimler deal was to fit the combine’s ambitions, the remaining sum would hardly suffice and could not make up for the loss of the most valuable and prestigious asset nor for the industrial power Daimler-Benz had stood for.47 In other words, the whole transaction was only sensible on the premise that the fiscal authorities granted extensive tax relief. These calculations went beyond wishful thinking. The federal law on income tax included a clause (§ 6 b EStG) under which proceeds could be exempted from taxation if and insofar as reinvest44 Daimler-Benz AG, Company report 1974, p. 18; Deutsche Bank buys control of Mercedes, in: The Times, 15. 01. 1975; Schneller als der Schah, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 17. 01. 1975; Deutsche Banken. Nicht immer ist ein Ulrich zur Stelle, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 24. 01. 1975; Wir bekamen unzählige Briefe, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 24. 01. 1975. Cf. Ausverkauf der deutschen Industrie?, in: Die Zeit, 06. 12. 1974. 45 See the extracts from Brauchitsch’s notes which were published in: Retter des Vaterlands, in: Der Spiegel, 13. 01. 1986. Cf. Brauchitsch, Preis (fn. 21), pp. 129 – 131, 138 f., 145. 46 Quote from: Flick. Ist im Ausland, in: Der Spiegel, 23. 08. 1976. 47 Officially, Flick and Brauchitsch claimed that the Daimler shares had been less profitable than commonly assumed. However, judging from Daimler’s performance in the crisis years and from the return on investment the new investments would bring in the event, this reasoning seems to have been rather artificial; Daimler-Benz AG, Company reports 1974 (pp. 15 f.) and 1975 (pp. 15 – 17); Hinnehmen, daß Dinge nicht gut sind, in: Der Spiegel, 20. 01. 1975.

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ments were in the interest of the German economy. This clause had been successfully tried in the course of the sale of Stahlwerke Südwestfalen.48 However, there were two prerequisites which had to be met in order to apply successfully for tax relief. First, the decision whether or not an investment was deemed to be in the national interest lay with the Federal Economics Ministry, i. e. good relations with the German authorities were essential. Second, reinvestments needed to be undertaken within two years after the contract came into effect. By drawing up the agreement one year in advance, the FFKG had effectively prolonged this period to three years,49 but nonetheless the schedule implied that the strategic moves towards reorganization had to be made consequently and without delay. This was exactly what the holding management purported to have in mind as Brauchitsch publicly declared that, of course, they had not sold Daimler-Benz without a plan.50 What this plan looked like, though, remained obscure as time went on. At least, the start happened to be promising. In the eleventh hour before the German steel crisis would peak, the Flick combine managed to get rid of two of its remaining iron and steel works, Metallhüttenwerke Lübeck and Maxhütte, which were sold in 1975 and 1976 / 78 respectively, thanks to the initiative of younger managers such as Hanns-Arnt Vogels.51 Likewise, financing of overdue modernization measures by the subsidiaries was a sound enough step. Then again, the DM 435 million paid to Dynamit Nobel, Feldmühle and Buderus were small money in comparison to the DM 2.3 billion drawn from the sales of Daimler-Benz, Maxhütte and Lübeck.52 What everyone was waiting for was the big move which would give a clue about what the FFKG management had had in mind when selling off Daimler and which would show the direction in which the combine was heading.53 However, when that long-expected move was finally made, it proved to be a disappointment. In late 1975, the FFKG announced that the holding had acquired a 12 percent stake in W. R. Grace & Co., an American holding company with a diversified port48 Letter by Eisenwerkgesellschaft Maximilianshütte to Bayerische Treuhand, 24. 04. 1968; Re: Sale of shares in Stahlwerke Südwestfalen AG, 03. 01. 1977, NMH-BA. – A similar provision in the federal Law on Foreign Investments (§ 4) allowed for tax relief on foreign investments if these fulfilled the said requirements. 49 Flick-Konzern. Wir wollen nicht Kasse machen, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 31. 01. 1975; Ab nach Monte Carlo, in: Der Spiegel, 29. 09. 1975. 50 Hinnehmen, daß Dinge nicht gut sind, in: Der Spiegel, 20. 01. 1975. 51 Cf. Leben und Arbeit in Herrenwyk. Geschichte der Hochofenwerk Lübeck AG, der Werkskolonie und ihrer Menschen, ed. by Museum für Kunst und Kulturgeschichte der Hansestadt Lübeck, 2nd edition, Lübeck 1987, pp. 334 – 336; Dietmar Süß, Kumpel und Genossen. Arbeiterschaft, Betrieb und Sozialdemokratie in der bayerischen Montanindustrie 1945 bis 1976, München 2003, pp. 369 – 379; Mut zu schweren Aufgaben, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 28. 01. 1983. 52 Proceeds from the Lübeck and Maxhütte transactions accounted for some DM 370 million. Ein Bein in München, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 17. 12. 1979; Mut zu schweren Aufgaben, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 28. 01. 1983. 53 Business Diary in Europe: Dutch mark time / Flick’s poser, in: The Times, 05. 01. 1976.

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folio and one of the world’s one hundred biggest firms.54 Early on doubts were raised whether the DM 290 million had been invested prudently since Grace was heterogeneous in its activities, structure, and strategic outlook; its returns, though reliable, were far from outstanding. According to the FFKG, the prime motivation behind the decision was the intention to transfer technology from Grace’s chemical branch to Dynamit Nobel. Details on what sort of technology the Flick management had targeted, however, never became known. When the partnership between Grace and Flick was scrutinised years later, it showed that the professed reasons for transfer had largely been made up for the sake of § 6 b EStG, i. e. in order to present a benefit to the West German economy. A true transatlantic cooperation never materialised. 55 That notwithstanding, the FFKG even expanded its engagement with Grace by investing another DM 500 million in 1978. Still, what property rights these shares actually offered remained doubtful as Peter Grace, though controlling but a mere 4 percent of the stock capital, remained in full charge of all decisions. This reinforced widespread suspicion that, with the deadline for reinvestments in sight, Flick lacked alternatives and resorted to investments which required little entrepreneurial responsibility.56 Similar doubts were raised when the other two major investments became known in 1978. Again, both seemed to result from belated decision-making and shortrange visions. Although US-Filter Corp., a provider of chemical production technology, did offer some links to Flick’s German companies, it would be resold only two years later, proving wrong all pretensions of long-term collaboration.57 Even more surprising than these overseas investments was the decision to buy a stake in the Gerling-Konzern Versicherungs-Beteiligungs-AG, one of the Federal Republic’s foremost insurance companies. Gerling, itself a family firm led by Hans Gerling, had come under strong pressure in the early 1970s to be stabilized by a consortium of its industrial customers which had acquired 51 percent of the shares.58 In 1978, the FFKG acquired a majority of shares of the said consortium and, thus, became the most important shareholder in the Gerling group. While at first, this seemed to be a coup in the tried tradition of the Flick-Konzern, i. e. clandestine, ruthless, and successful, a closer look revealed significant deficiencies in the project. How Gerling was supposed to be integrated into the Flick empire and who inside the FFKG management was competent to deal with the insurance business remained Die 100 größten Firmen der Welt, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 22. 08. 1975. Flick-Affäre. Heiße Luft, in: Der Spiegel, 27. 05. 1985; Flick-Strategie. Chemie-Zukunft für 100 Millionen Dollar, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 03. 10. 1975. 56 Flick-Konzern: Wahlkampf-Emotion, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 05. 11. 1976; Flick / Grace. 500 Millionen nach Amerika, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 13. 10. 1978; Verwandte Seelen, in: Der Spiegel, 23. 04. 1979. 57 Note. Re: Telephone call with Nemitz, 30. 10. 1972, RWWA 74 – 97 – 9; Ein Bein in München, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 17. 12. 1979; Flick. Nachversteuerung, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 17. 07. 1981. Cf. Feyerabend, Milliarden (fn. 23), pp. 97 – 99. 58 Gerling-Neuordnung. Es ist einfacher geworden, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 03. 03. 1978. 54 55

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unanswered questions. Of more immediate concern was Hans Gerling’s stiff resistance against the hostile takeover. He instantaneously responded by taking legal action to safeguard his lifetime achievement with the intention to make sure he would remain in charge of running the family firm. The legal grounds of these claims were rather weak, but time was clearly on his side. The FFKG had to secure the deal before the end of the year by all means if the combine wanted to apply for tax relief under § 6 b EStG. This self-created pressure made the combine vulnerable to Gerlings demands, and eventually F. K. Flick und Brauchitsch were forced to compromise on the question of property rights which remained by and large with Gerling.”59 In the end, the FFKG had managed to reinvest the Daimler proceeds just in time to meet the deadline. The ‘concept’ which Brauchitsch had boasted publicly in 1975, however, did not live up to the expectations. The direction the combine was going to take remained a puzzle as the reinvestments were both geographically and strategically scattered and did by no means compensate for the loss of DaimlerBenz. A coherent program behind the acquisitions was hard to discern, all the more as the three major new entries seemed to have been chosen arbitrarily and hastily, if not in an outright panic with the increasing pressure of time. The best that could be said about the reinvestments was that they were in line with the mainstream of contemporary business reactions to the structural crisis of the 1970s, namely the internationalization and cross-sectoral diversification of portfolio management. This, however, fell by far short of a genuine vision of what the Flick combine was supposed to look like in the middle run. IV. Disillusion and dissolution, 1978 – 85 If these shortcomings raised doubts on the managerial qualification of F. K. Flick and his staff – the older generation headed by Kaletsch as well as the younger one under Brauchitsch’s lead – to handle the challenges of the third industrial revolution, the trajectory of the Daimler-Benz sale did not stop there. The tax dimension of the deal which had guided the choice of reinvestments would not only haunt the FFKG management for years but eventually proved to be a boomerang delivering the final blow to the combine as well as triggering a deep crisis in the Federal Republic’s political scene. Some DM 1.8 billion, so the applications submitted to the German authorities read, were to be exempted from taxation. The intention to claim tax relief for the reinvestments had become known in the immediate aftermath of the Daimler deal and had provoked some prophylactic criticism among the 59 Flick. Gestörtes Verhältnis, in: Der Spiegel, 10. 05. 1978; Flick / Gerling. Coup unter Zeitdruck, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 14. 04. 1978; Gerling. Taktvoll und sensibel, in: Der Spiegel, 08. 05. 1978; Gerling. Herr im Haus, in: Der Spiegel, 17. 07. 1978. Quote from: GerlingKonzern. Flick die Suppe versalzen, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 10. 11. 1978. In contrast, some commentators contended that Flick had had the upper hand, cf. Flick-Gerling in Settlement, in: The Times, 04. 11. 1978.

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West German public due to the extraordinary sums in question.60 That the Flick Combine enjoyed a reputation of secretive tactics, intransparent methods and doubtful business ethics also helped to spark a debate in which the legitimacy of the FFKG’s claims was questioned. As early as 1976, accusations of corruption circulated in the German media.61 Despite these early admonitions, the Bonn ministries approved of tax relief for some DM 1.5 billion in the following years, and by 1980, the venture seemed to have been a complete success. This might have been the end of the affair had not a party funding scandal, which affected some 700 German firms and engaged the attention of a great number of prosecutors at that time, intervened.62 In 1982, the rumour that there had been a link between donations by the Flick Combine and tax relief granted by German ministries became breaking news. The result was a fullyfledged scandal which lasted well into the mid-1980s and interrupted or ended the careers of several prominent politicians. Initially completely separate issues, the party funding scandal and the Flick tax case were soon merged and became practically indistinguishable. The Flick affair was born.63 As investigations revealed, the Flick Combine had paid some DM 26 million to the major political parties between 1969 und 1980, with the lion’s share falling in the post-Daimler years.64 Not only did these endowments follow the patterns exposed by the party funding scandal, involving criminal methods of tax evasion and money laundering, they also bordered on bribery. The broader funding scandal centred on the question of the extent to which parties and private business were tied together financially as well as on their shared disrespect for the law.65 The specific 60 Deutsche Banken. Nicht immer ist ein Ulrich zur Stelle, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 24. 01. 1975; Flick. Liebevolle Behandlung, in: Der Spiegel, 19. 01. 1976. 61 Fittingly, the FFKG changed its legal form in 1977 in order to circumvent legal requirements to provide information on the course of affairs and to avoid industrial co-determination, thereby increasing the clandestine character of the combine’s actions. Mitbestimmung bei Flick. Wirtschaftswoche-Gespräch mit Flick-Manager Eberhard von Brauchitsch, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 02. 12. 1977; Mit Schmiergeld-Charakter, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 12. 11. 1976. 62 Parteispenden. Mehrfach gestört, in: Der Spiegel, 18. 01. 1982; The World in Summary. Trouble for One, Trouble for All, in: New York Times, 07. 03. 1982. 63 For the details of the scandal there is wealth of contemporary literature, most of it wellresearched and reliable, though at times exaggerated in its tone: Feyerabend, Milliarden (fn. 23); Hans Werner Kilz / Joachim Preuss, Flick. Die gekaufte Republik, Reinbek 1983; Hubert Seipel, Der Mann, der Flick jagte. Die Geschichte des Steuerfahnders Klaus Förster, Hamburg 1985; Rainer Burchardt / Hans-Jürgen Schlamp (Hg.), Flick-Zeugen. Protokolle aus dem Untersuchungsausschuß, Reinbek 1985; Otto Schily, Politik in bar. Flick und die Verfassung unserer Republik, München 1986. For brief systematic summaries see Thomas Bartholmes, Die “Flick-Affäre” – Verlauf und Folgen, Speyer 2003, and Christine Landfried, Parteifinanzen und politische Macht. Eine vergleichende Studie zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland, zu Italien und den USA, 2nd edition, Baden-Baden 1994, pp. 152 f., 188 – 207. 64 Detailed figures are given by Landfried, Parteifinanzen (fn. 63), pp. 152 f., 187 f., and Schily, Politik (fn. 61), pp. 54 f., 60 – 66. 65 Parteienfinanzierung. Zwang zur Geldwäsche, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 08. 01. 1982.

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flavour of the Flick scandal, however, resulted from the perception that a private company had literally bought politicians in order to safeguard its financial interests. The correlation between the donations and the tax applications was plain enough: there was a clear chronological parallel and the payments that went along with the respective submissions were aptly termed “convoys” by FFKG managers.66 When the leading West German news magazine, Der Spiegel, uncovered these connections in early 1982, the public outcry was massive. The affair would make it to six cover stories of the Spiegel and would dominate headlines for the next three years, helped by a much reported parliamentary committee which inquired into the details of the Flick tax case and brought to light abundant evidence, both original documents and oral testimonies.67 Efforts by the coalition government in Bonn to end the party funding scandal by way of a flat amnesty, and the alleged amnesia of prominent protagonists such as Helmut Kohl before the parliamentary committee made things only worse.68 These back-to-business tactics failed due to the continuing interest in the matter by a vocal faction of West German society which pressed for investigation and dominated the discourse on the relation between politics, parties, and private business and their impact on the commonweal. Thus, the Flick affair also showed the degree to which public and published opinion had become pluralised over the last decades and their potential for agenda-setting. To some degree, this was also the result of the proclaimed march through the institutions by the student generation of the 1960s whose members had moved up the ladder in the media business by then.69 Another major reason for the strong emotions the scandal incited was the larger framework of the economic and social crisis which marked the early 1980s. In 1980 / 81, the West German economy had plunged once more, and unemployment had risen dramatically. When economic growth re-surged after 1983, it was only Cf. Schily, Politik (fn. 63), pp. 124 – 127, Kilz / Preuss, Flick (fn. 63), pp. 145 – 148, 152 f. See the extracts in Schily, Politik (fn. 63), and Burchardt / Schlamp, Flick-Zeugen (fn. 63). The scandal also attracted international attention, cf. The World. Bonn Minister Stands Accused, in: New York Times, 04. 12. 1983; Scandal along Flick’s road to riches, in: The Times, 26. 10. 1984. 68 Amnestiegesetz. Den Wind unterschätzt, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 18. 05. 1984; Burchardt / Schlamp, Flick-Zeugen (fn. 63), pp. 127 – 140, 200 – 216; Seipel, Der Mann, der Flick jagte (fn. 63), pp. 153 – 159, 169 – 177. 69 Cf. Christina von Hodenberg, Konsens und Krise. Eine Geschichte der westdeutschen Medienöffentlichkeit 1945 – 1973, Göttingen 2006. For an early account on the relations between media and busines see Helge Pross, Das Bild des Unternehmers, in: Helge Pross (Hg.), Kapitalismus und Demokratie, Frankfurt 1972, pp. 59 f.; Das Unternehmerbild der Deutschen, 3. Teil, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 04. 11. 1983. For a different analytic emphasis: Christian Kleinschmidt, Das “1968” der Manager: Fremdwahrnehmung und Selbstreflexion einer sozialen Elite in den 1960er Jahren, in: Jan-Otmar Hesse / Christian Kleinschmidt / Karl Lauschke (eds.), Kulturalismus, Neue Institutionenökonomik oder Theorienvielfalt. Eine Zwischenbilanz der Unternehmensgeschichte, Essen 2002, pp. 19 – 31; Werner Plumpe, 1968 und die deutschen Unternehmen. Zur Markierung eines Forschungsfeldes, in: Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 49 (2004), 1, pp. 45 – 66. 66 67

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business which benefited. Corporate profits rose markedly but had little impact on unemployment. To a thoroughly disillusioned public it seemed that politicians, economists and businessmen alike had first shown little competence in handling the crisis and then had abandoned the boom period’s consensus of shared efforts and shared gains. The widening gap between business interests on the one hand and societal tenets on the other called into question the key contention upheld by German business organizations as well as in the FFKG’s tax applications: what was good for business was good for the economy.70 In the light of the Flick affair, this argument seemed far-fetched if not completely discredited. And the fact that several of the scandal’s protagonists, notably the Christian and Liberal Democrats who had recently established a new government, were at the same time engineering a roll-back policy in regard to the welfare state under the label of a “moral turn”, alienated a considerable portion of the West German public from the political and economic elites which were perceived as leaving behind the bulk of society and serving their own ends. “Everyone is supposed to cut the coat according to the cloth, except for one”, i. e. the Flick combine, as the Spiegel would have it.71 Attacks on what was believed to be a “baksheesh-republic”72 were neither limited to left-leaning and liberal commentators nor did they aim exclusively at politicians. The public image of the German business elite – already on the way down in the aftermath of the mid-1970s’ economic crisis – was further damaged by the scandal as polls showed. Under the impression of the party funding and Flick affairs, a full three quarters of those asked supposed that private companies directly influenced politics by means of financial donations. Selfishness, exaggerated profits, a lack of care for the environment, and corruption were increasingly associated with private business.73 In 1983, Allensbach, a leading German opinion polling institute, concluded that the social atmosphere in which business operated had cooled down significantly over the previous seven years and was marked by “lessened appreciation and increased criticism”. Negative correlations clearly outdid positive ones, and charges of greed and exploitation had become much more popular than a decade earlier. Most obviously, business influence on politics now worried a majority of West Germans (55 percent against 42 percent in 1976).74 70 Cf. Schanetzky, Ernüchterung (fn. 7), pp. 228 – 238; Schröter, Teilung (fn. 6), pp. 398 f.; Andreas Rödder, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1969 – 1990, München 2004, pp. 86 f.; Judt, Postwar (fn. 1), p. 460; Andreas Wirsching, Abschied vom Provisorium 1981 – 1990 (= Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 6), Stuttgart 2006, pp. 25 f. 71 Steuern. Groteskes Ding, in: Der Spiegel, 31. 08. 1981 [my translation; KCP]. Cf. Landfried, Parteifinanzen (fn. 63), p. 234; Wirsching, Abschied (fn. 70), pp. 29 – 33, 49 – 55, 68 – 72; Rödder, Bundesrepublik (fn. 70), pp. 64 f. 72 Flick-Affäre: Erst einmal überleben, in: Der Spiegel, 05. 12. 1983. 73 For a comparison see the Allensbach surveys of 1976 and 1977; Meinungsumfrage. Lob für die Unternehmer, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 20. 08. 1976; Unternehmer-Image. Wenig Schmiergeld, viel Gewinn, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 02. 09. 1977. Cf. Landfried, Parteifinanzen (fn. 63), p. 235. 74 Das Unternehmerbild der Deutschen, Teil 1, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 21. 10. 1983.

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In the Flick scandal, this trend was literally personified as it provided both a name and a face (or rather two: those of F. K. Flick and Brauchitsch) to the diffuse notion of the capitalist villain.75 This picture did not only fit easily with the public; it was also deliberately reinforced by influential sections of German private business which were keen on focusing the debate on the case of Flick, hoping to limit the scope of criticism directed at themselves. Several prominent entrepreneurs and managers spoke out against the FFKG’s behaviour and carefully distanced not only their own companies from the incriminated combine but German industry at large. Instead of rallying behind Flick or at least behind Brauchitsch, who had been the official president-designate of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) up to the scandal, they did their utmost to stress that the Flick case had been nothing but a lamentable exception to the rule.76 Such criticism went far beyond atmospheric disturbances as it hurt the reputation of the FFKG’s nominal head, F. K. Flick, and isolated him visibly. The heir, who had never been seen as an entrepreneur in his own right anyway, now lacked access to essential networks among fellow businessmen as well as in the realm of politics. No politician who entertained any further ambitions would come to Flick’s support, and advice from colleagues and collaborators was scarce. This situation was considerably aggravated when Flick decided to fire nearly his complete staff of top managers, thus literally emptying the floors of the combine’s headquarters. In 1983, under the impression of the public relations disaster which was accompanied by unsatisfactory returns,77 Brauchitsch and Vogels were sacked. The third leading manager, Klaus Götte, decided to leave the sinking ship and followed his colleagues within weeks.78 The dismissals might have been some desperate attempt by the owner to regain initiative and to free himself from the responsibility for the crisis which was strongly identified with Brauchitsch’s name. However, they also put on display the degree of internal disruption and discord that characterized the holding’s management in its last stages. Flick had long since failed to coordinate, direct and control his young and ambitious team of executives. He had neither been able to formulate a coherent corporate policy nor had he shown himself up to the task of reforming the combine’s governance altogether. Instead of giving his managers more leeway in strategic decision-making, he had stuck to the strongly persoIbidem. Flick – Ein Mann kauft die Republik, in: Der Spiegel, 29. 10. 1984; Manager und Märkte, in: Die Zeit, 12. 03. 1982; Die Kriminalisierung ist unangemessen, in: Der Spiegel, 10. 12. 1984. 77 The operating losses were balanced to some extent by earned interest, dividends from other investments, and the re-sale of US-Filter; Flick. Wohlhabender geworden, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 16. 07. 1982; Flick. Dem Erbe droht der Ausverkauf, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 26. 11. 1982. 78 Flick Group Changes Leaders After Scandal, in: New York Times, 03. 01. 1983; Flick krempelt Management um, in: Der Spiegel, 15. 03. 1982; Flick. Dem Erbe droht der Ausverkauf, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 26. 11. 1982; Hanns Arnt Vogels. Mut zu schweren Aufgaben, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 28. 01. 1983. 75 76

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nalised style of his father’s era without the latter’s gifts, his legendary reputation, and his commanding physical stature. Flick’s decision to replace the three managers by Hans-Werner Kolb, the longstanding head of Buderus who was close to retirement and hardly the one to press for organizational reform or innovative strategies, did nothing to change the impression of directionless tactics.79 Improvements in the combine’s finances, which set in by 1983 due to increased revenue from the subsidiaries, were unable to change the picture more than temporarily. These short-term successes largely resulted from steps taken by the previous management and the general economic recovery, as analysts wryly concluded.80 What was to become of the FFKG’s important pillars in manufacturing such as Buderus, Krauss-Maffei and Dynamit Nobel which faced hard times81, however, remained an unresolved question. The only subsidiary which so far had been brought back on track successfully was Feldmühle, again helped by an industry-wide upturn.82 In the light of these developments, reports that Flick was willing to sell out came hardly as a surprise. As early as autumn 1982, there were rumours that the heir wanted to put up for sale parts of or even the whole combine. Although this might have been mere stock market gossip, at that point it backed up once more the widely held impression of Flick jun. as an accidental, weak proprietor who felt more at home with the jet set and for whom the leadership of the combine proved too great a task.83 Flick himself denied any intention to sell out until 1985,84 just months before news were confirmed that the Deutsche Bank, again, would take over the holding’s assets and sell them at the stock exchange. The turnout reached an unknown scale in German stock market history. The remaining 10 percent stake in Daimler-Benz alone was sold at a price of DM 3.8 billion, while the shares in Buderus, Feldmühle, and Dynamit Nobel accounted for another DM 2 billion.85 Männer aus der zweiten Reihe, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 14. 01. 1983. Flick-Konzern. Trotz Sturm gewachsen, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 12. 08. 1982. 81 US sale helps German group, in: The Times, 14. 07. 1982. 82 Ibidem; Krauss-Maffei. Sorgen nach 1987, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 17. 02. 1984; Papierindustrie. Qualität zahlt sich aus, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 30. 07. 1982; Papierindustrie. Rekord nach der Flaute, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 23. 03. 1984. 83 Muß Flick 450 Millionen nachzahlen?, in: Der Spiegel, 22. 11. 1982; Flick. Dem Erbe droht der Ausverkauf, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 26. 11. 1982; Flick. Starker Freund, in: Der Spiegel, 21. 03. 1983; Flick-Affäre. Eine fatale Wirkung, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 06. 01. 1984; Flick – Ein Mann kauft die Republik, in: Der Spiegel, 29. 10. 1984. 84 Cf. the Stern interview with F. K. Flick from January 1985, reprinted in: Seipel, Der Mann, der Flick jagte (fn. 63), pp. 183 f. 85 These figures excluded the Gerling and Grace shares since these were subject to options and were therefore not marketed by the Deutsche Bank; Deutsche Bank AG, Company reports 1985, pp. 53 f., u. 1986, pp. 39, 53; Grace nutzt sein Vorkaufsrecht, in: FAZ, 12. 12. 1985; Deutsche Bank / Flick. Das Milliardenspiel, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 13. 12. 1985; Büschgen, Deutsche Bank (fn. 41), pp. 658 f., 758 f. 79 80

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The decision to bring the seventy-year history of the Flick combine to an end was widely explained with the weariness and ineptitude of its owner. The Spiegel’s conclusion that the Deutsche Bank had “delivered Friedrich Karl Flick from his inheritance”, was as unkind as it was representative.86 Some more informed commentators, however, also depicted another major reason for the ultimate dissolution, rooted in the West German law of inheritance. Flick sen. had established a range of foundations before his death in order to both balance the voting rights inside the family and to benefit from reduced taxation. While the former objective had been made obsolete by the buy-out of Otto-Ernst’s children in 1975, the latter backlashed a decade later. In 1974, a new tax had been introduced which simulated the case of inheritance for family foundations in intervals of 30 years at a rate of 35 percent. In the case of the FFKG, these payments were due in 1988 and 1990 respectively. Friedrich Karl Flick reacted by dissolving two of the three foundations and transferring the FFKG shares to his personal property. This move, of course, was subject to taxation as well, at a rate of a full 50 percent, against which Flick resorted to legal action. Prospects were bad from the start but, at least in theory, the law suit might have provided some additional time to find out what other options there were of coming to terms with the German fiscal authorities. However, the simultaneity of the scandal proved too big a liability. With media attention still focused on the proceedings of the parliamentary committee, few commentators believed that any politician or public servant would move in Flick’s support – particularly in a matter of tax relief.87 Eventually, this meant that Flick had to face three-digit million charges in the middle run, on top of which subsequent demands from the Daimler deal, which was revised by the fiscal authorities simultaneously, might be added.88 Seen from this perspective the decision to dissolve the combine was hardly inevitable but understandable given the trouble the tycoon’s son had had with his inheritance so far and that which was lying ahead. Personally, the decision did little harm to him anyway. There was no reputation left to lose, and financially he was at any rate on the safe side. Thanks to the proceeds of the transaction in 1985, he would remain one of the richest people in the world up to his death in 2007.

86 Quote from: Flick. Ende eines Imperiums, in: Der Spiegel, 09. 12. 1985; Interview Friedrich Karl Flick: “Mein Geld ist in Wien”, in: Manager Magazin, 01. 08. 1998. 87 Cf. Familienstiftungen. Alle 30 Jahre zur Kasse, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 15. 04. 1983; Flick. Angst vorm Fiskus, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 20. 01. 1984; Flick-Konzern. Probleme programmiert, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 16. 11. 1984. 88 Muß Flick 450 Millionen nachzahlen?, in: Der Spiegel, 22. 11. 1982.

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V. Conclusive remarks: slow learners and path dependencies At first sight, the finale of the Flick-Konzern seemed to be a surprisingly simple affair. With one stroke of the pen seven decades of industrial activity which had marked twentieth-century economic history more than probably any other German enterprise had done, belonged to the past. The rather smooth transfer of property, however, should not distort the picture. Prior to the sale, there had been a full decade of prolonged and profound crisis, starting from a phase of stagnation, then taking the road of disintegration and finally leading to ultimate dissolution. A combination of problems lay at the heart of the crisis which, though taking a distinctively ‘Flickian’ shape, was representative of a greater number of (West German) combines and, to a certain extent, of the Federal Republic’s industrialist economy at large. Thus, it was not by chance that the first inklings of the troubles to come were felt in the second half of the 1960s. The fading boom, the return of sharp economic fluctuations and the shifting sectoral relations, which grew to prominence in the aftermath of the 1966 / 67 recession, coincided with a growing awareness inside the FFGK that the combine’s heavily industrialist shape needed reorganization and modernization. Under the impression of a rapidly deteriorating financial situation, the higher echelons of the Flick management slowly understood that they had failed to prepare for structural change in the good times of the past and now were forced to adapt quickly in a much less convenient economic climate. In this, the Flick managers were not alone but more or less in tune with a large number of West German (and probably also of Western European) executives. So was their crisis management. The strategies the Flick management resorted to reflected middle-ofthe-road concepts of diversification and seemed to reflect a naïve belief in the reliability of stylish labels such as the internationalization and cross-diversification of the portfolio. Though these ideas might (or might not) have appealed to financial investors, the fact that they were little practical for an industrial combine which had some claim to organizational coherence, does not seem to have attracted the FFKG’s attention. This is not to say that corporate management caused the crisis following the third industrial revolution. But the depth, the long-term impact, and the pervading sense of insecurity left by the crisis owed a lot to belated and slow learning as well as to the prevalence of misguided strategic responses to the crisis among contemporary managers. Still, not all, not even the majority of industrial enterprises went bankrupt or were dissolved as happened in the case of the Flick combine.89 This radical conclusion of the combine’s history was due to a combination of the above-mentioned 89 For examples of successful restructuring one might turn to the Haniel holding or Mannesmann; Horst A. Wessel, Kontinuität im Wandel. 100 Jahre Mannesmann 1890 – 1990, Düsseldorf 1990, pp. 381 – 401, 446 – 499; Harold James, Familienunternehmen in Europa. Haniel, Wendel und Falck, München 2005, pp. 271 – 277, 330 – 333.

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structural forces on the one hand and more intrinsic difficulties on the other. These included prominently the FFKG’s character as a family firm with its wellknown side-effects in terms of finance and successorship; growth had exceeded the capacities of family resources and management capacities. Therefore, the Daimler deal, whose effects were at the heart of the disastrous decade, had been intended to solve the growing financial problems, reinfuse liquidity, and thus increase the holding’s room for maneuvre. In principle, this was not a bad idea; the FFKG management – to simplify the matter slightly – just decided to sell the wrong company. The ill-advised decision to give away the Daimler shares, most likely the one asset whose prospects looked most promising in the mid-1970s, was closely linked to the issue of successorship. By the time of Friedrich Flick’s death, the family was already deeply divided as a consequence of the long conflict between the founder and his older son from which the younger brother Friedrich Karl had profited. These infightings were on the one hand continued between uncle and nephews, leading to the buy-out in 1975, while on the other hand the obvious lack of trust the founder had had in his younger son’s managing skills meant that the heir started from a weak position. In addition, the councillors which Flick sen. had left to guide his son did not prove to be up to the task, due to age, lack of competence, or both. Although there is practically no information on the question of whose idea the Daimler deal actually was – that of F. K. Flick, Kaletsch, or Brauchitsch –, there is some evidence that internal criticism by the third generation and some younger executives was ignored.90 This resulted by and large from the fact that Flick sen., despite his last efforts to make provisions for the future in a sort of “management by testament”91, had bequeathed a heavily centralized and equally personalised mode of governance to his son which provided for little internal (or external) checks and balances. Another trait inherited from the era of Friedrich Flick was the affinity to ‘political’ solutions. More than once in his career, the founder had relied on political and state support in order either to expand his influence and property or, more obviously, to survive existential crises.92 The Daimler transaction was clearly in line with these precedents. It did not only quote freely from the long German story of scenarios in which the phantom menace of Überfremdung played a key role (and to which Flick sen. had contributed some major chapters)93, it directly counted on fis90 Industrie-Familien: Der große Ausverkauf, in: Der Spiegel, 20. 01. 1975; Flick-Konzern. “Wir wollen nicht Kasse machen”, in: Wirtschaftswoche, 31. 01. 1975. Cf. Thomas Ramge, Die Flicks. Eine deutsche Familiengeschichte über Geld, Macht und Politik, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 2004, pp. 204 f. 91 Thomas Fischermann, Management by Testament, in: Die Zeit, 29. 11. 1996. 92 Cf. Priemel, Flick (fn. 16). This was / is, of course, neither specific to the case of Flick nor to German industry as Trygve Gulbrandsen’s findings show for Norway. However, Friedrich Flick’s career was peculiarly replete with instances of political support, thus singling him out to some extent from his fellow industrialists.

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cal support for an otherwise pointless undertaking. And, as had been done successfully in the past, the road to political support was to be paved with cash. That apparently everyone in the holding’s upper echelons failed to see the sign of the times, i. e. the heightened public sensibility for the connections between private business, party politics, and state action, proved to be one of the most devastating shortcomings of the whole venture. Hence, responsibility for both the business crisis and the public relations disaster cannot be limited to the unfortunate heir Friedrich K. Flick, although his limitations became ever more obvious the longer the scandal lasted. Flick’s managing staff, notably his ambitious lieutenant Eberhard von Brauchitsch, had been part and parcel of the decision-making processes, maybe even driving forces up to 1983. Otherwise, it would seem hard to explain why Brauchitsch, Vogels and, at least partially, Götte had not left the FFKG earlier despite the strategically questionable reinvestment policy of the late 1970s. Nor is Friedrich Flick – “reputed to be the greatest industrial organizational and financial genius of the twentieth century in Germany”94 – to be spared responsibility for the demise of his lifetime achievement. The industrialist structure and the centralized, personally dominated governance along with the prolonged family strife proved to be path-dependent liabilities whose impact was felt throughout the thirteen years following his death. From the perspective of his son, Friedrich Karl, these years and especially those between the sale of Daimler and the dissolution of the combine were, by any means, a dispiriting decade.

93 Ibidem; cf. Gerald D. Feldman, Foreign Penetration of German Enterprises after the First World War. The Problem of Überfremdung, in: Alice Teichova / Maurice Lévy-Leboyer / Helga Nussbaum (eds.), Historical Studies in International Corporate Business, Cambridge / Paris 1989, pp. 87 – 110. 94 Business Diary. The Riches of Friedrich Flick, in: The Times, 27. 08. 1968.

Der politische Unternehmer – Ein österreichisches Beispiel Von Christian Dirninger I. Der politische Unternehmer im Transformationsszenario Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich in exemplarischer Weise mit einem spezifischen Typus der Wirtschaftselite, der seit den 1980er Jahren in zunehmendem Maße anzutreffen ist. Es ist dies der aus einer politischen Funktion in die Position eines Unternehmers bzw. Wirtschaftsmanagers wechselnde Politiker (speziell Wirtschaftspolitiker). Insofern soll vom „politischen Unternehmer“ die Rede sein und in exemplarischer Weise dessen spezifisches Entwicklungsprofil, also dessen spezifisches Ziel- und Handlungsmuster in Betracht genommen werden.1 Dabei kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass der Übergang vom (wirtschafts)politischen in das wirtschaftliche (unternehmerische) Handlungsfeld in mehrfacher Weise mit der seit den 1980er Jahren ablaufenden Transformation der „westlichen“, marktwirtschaftlichen Wirtschaftsordnungen einerseits und der sich nach 1989 / 90 vollziehenden Transformation der mittel- und osteuropäischen Volkswirtschaften andererseits in Zusammenhang steht. Das zeigt der in diesem Beitrag betrachtete Beispielfall sehr deutlich. Hinsichtlich der Transformation der „westlichen“, marktwirtschaftlichen Wirtschaftsordnungen erscheinen dabei vor allem zwei Punkte von besonderer Bedeutung. Zu nennen ist zum einen der mit der Krise der keynesianisch-korporatistischen Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik ab Mitte der 1970er Jahre einsetzende und sich in der Folge verstärkende Rückzug des Staates als ablaufpolitische, volkswirtschaftliche Steuerungs- und Lenkungsinstanz, was insbesondere in einer „monetaristischen“ Wende in der Finanzpolitik Ausdruck findet. Hervorzuheben ist zum anderen die sich ab Mitte der 1980er Jahre dynamisierende Privatisierungspolitik, die sowohl staatliches (öffentliches) Eigentum an marktorientierten Unternehmen (insbesondere im Industrie- und Bankensektor) als alsbald auch staatliche (öffent1 Der im Grunde biographische Ansatz versteht sich als Annäherung an das Forschungsfeld „Wirtschaftseliten“ im zeitgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang generell sowie in der österreichischen Wirtschaftszeitgeschichte speziell und in dieser Weise als Vorbereitung für einschlägige umfassendere, in weiterer Folge auch vergleichend angelegte Forschungen. Analog auf Bundesländerebene: Christian Dirninger, Der „politische“ Wirtschaftsmanager, in: Herbert Dachs u. a. (Hg.), Wolfgang Radlegger. Ein Mitgestalter seiner Zeit, Wien / Köln / Weimar 2007, S. 85 – 153.

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liche) Betriebe und Leistungen im Infrastrukturbereich und in der Daseinsvorsorge betrifft.2 In Österreich vollzog sich dieser ordnungspolitische Wandel in mehreren Stadien. Der etatistische Korporatismus der 1950er und 1960er Jahre wandelte sich zunächst in den „Austrokeynesianismus“ der 1970er und frühen 1980er Jahre, der in flexibler Weise nachfrage- und angebotsorientierte finanzpolitische Interventionen mit Geld-, Währungs- und Lohnpolitik kombinierte. Der Austrokeynesianismus wiederum wurde ab der zweiten Hälfte der 1980er Jahre schrittweise von einer „konservativen Wende“ abgelöst – nach der Devise „mehr Markt – weniger Staat“. Und diese erfuhr mit dem Antritt einer rechtskonservativen Regierung ab 2000 und deren Bemühen zur nachträglichen Anpassung an den „neoliberalen“ Mainstream nochmals eine deutliche Verstärkung.3 Die spezifische Bedeutung für den hier interessierenden Typus von Wirtschaftselite, den politischen Unternehmer, liegt zum einen darin, dass er zunächst in seiner (wirtschafts)politischen Funktion und in der Folge in seiner unternehmerischen Funktion in unterschiedlicher Weise Akteur in diesem ordnungspolitischen Wandel war und ist. Und sie liegt darin, dass er infolge seiner vormaligen wirtschaftspolitischen Funktionen in gewisser Weise in seiner ordnungspolitischen Disposition geprägt ist und infolge seiner personellen und institutionellen Verflechtungen mit dem wirtschaftspolitischen System in besonderer Weise konditioniert und informiert ist, etwa hinsichtlich der Abläufe und Strategien der Privatisierungspolitik. In Bezug auf die Transformation der mittel- und osteuropäischen Volkswirtschaften ergibt sich der Zusammenhang insbesondere aus den aus der (wirtschafts-) politischen Tätigkeit stammenden Kontakten und Kenntnissen der jeweiligen Verhältnisse. In zeitlicher Hinsicht erscheinen hier sowohl das Endstadium der planwirtschaftlichen Zentralverwaltungssysteme in den späten 1980er Jahren als auch die erste Phase des Umbruches im Zuge der raschen Etablierung marktwirtschaftlicher Struktur- und Funktionsmechanismen bis Mitte der 1990er Jahre von vorrangiger Bedeutung. In sachlicher Hinsicht ergaben sich im Zuge der Formierung und 2 Derek H. Aldcroft, The European Economy 1914 – 2000, London / New York 2002, S. 211 ff.; Daniela Graf / Fritz Zaun (Hg.), Zur Rolle des Staates. Im Spannungsfeld zwischen Nationalstaat und Globalisierung, Wien 2000; Christoph Butterwege, Herrschaft des Marktes – Abschied vom Staat?, Baden-Baden 1999; Marko Kothenbürger / Hans-Werner Sinn / John Whally, Privatization. Experiences in the European Union, Cambridge 2006; Christian Dirninger, Der Bourgeois als Erlöser. Beobachtungen zur Privatisierungspolitik aus wirtschaftshistorischer Perspektive, in: Nikolaus Dimmel / Josef Schmee (Hg.), Politische Kultur in Österreich 2000 – 2005, Wien 2005, S. 232 – 242. 3 Christian Dirninger u. a., Zwischen Markt und Staat. Geschichte und Perspektiven der Ordnungspolitik in der Zweiten Republik, Wien / Köln / Weimar 2007; Fritz Weber / Theodor Venus (Hg.), Austrokeynesianismus in Theorie und Praxis, Wien 1993; Johannes Hawlik / Wolfgang Schüssel, Mehr privat – weniger Staat. Anregungen zur Begrenzung öffentlicher Ausgaben, Wien 1983; Emmerich Tálos (Hg.), Schwarz-Blau. Eine Bilanz des „Neu Regierens“, Wien 2006.

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Gestaltung marktwirtschaftlicher Institutionen und dem dabei gegebenenfalls benötigten bzw. nachgefragten „westlichen“ wirtschaftspolitischen Erfahrungswissen für den politischen Unternehmer in dem rasch wachsenden Konsultationsmarkt entsprechende Betätigungsfelder. Ebenso aber auch in dem dort bestandenen beträchtlichen Privatisierungspotenzial. Für den politischen Unternehmer in Österreich bestanden dabei in gewisser Weise spezielle Bedingungen, die im Wesentlichen aus einer spezifischen Nähe zu den Transformationsländern im mittel- und osteuropäischen Raum resultieren. Diese spezifische Nähe konstituiert sich, abgesehen von bzw. in Verbindung mit der räumlichen Nähe aus zumindest drei Faktoren. Erstens aus einer aus der ehemaligen Zugehörigkeit der „Nachfolgestaaten“ zum gemeinsamen Wirtschaftsraum der Habsburgermonarchie abgeleiteten „historischen“ Nähe, die jedoch oft in Unkenntnis oder Missachtung darin verborgen liegender Spannungsfelder und Konkurrenzverhältnisse, etwa zwischen seinerzeitiger cisleithanischer Vormacht und transleithanischen Abhängigkeit (beispielsweise am Kapitalmarkt), thematisiert wurde und wird. Zweitens aus einer aus der Positionierung in der Zeit des Kalten Krieges abgeleiteten „Brückenfunktion“ oder, wie es vielfach auch bezeichnet wurde „Drehscheibenfunktion“ Österreichs zwischen West und Ost. Und drittens durch spezifische Handelsbeziehungen und wirtschaftspolitische Beziehungen in der Zeit der Reformen und partiellen Öffnung der östlichen Zentralverwaltungssysteme in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, und, damit in Zusammenhang, durch personelle Kontakte und Netzwerkbeziehungen.

II. Der Beispielfall Diese in allgemeiner Weise skizzierte Einbindung des politischen Unternehmers in das allgemeine Transformationsszenario soll nun im Folgenden anhand eines konkreten österreichischen Beispiels in exemplarischer Weise beleuchtet werden. Verbunden wird dies mit dem Versuch einer Modellierung dieses spezifischen Typus von „Wirtschaftselite“ und der Herausarbeitung von Ansatzpunkten für eine vergleichende Betrachtung. Das konkrete Beispiel betrifft den in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten sowie nach wie vor zu den führenden Wirtschaftseliten in Österreich zählenden ehemaligen österreichischen Finanzminister Hannes Androsch.4 Bereits vor seiner Tätigkeit als Finanzminister (1970 – 1981) war Androsch, basierend auf seiner beruflichen Ausbildung als Steuerberater und Wirtschaftsprüfer sowie einem Wirtschaftsstudium, maßgeblich an der Erstellung des im Jahr 1968 beschlossenen wirtschaftspolitischen Programms der SPÖ beteiligt gewesen, das eine grundlegende Modernisierung der ordnungspolitischen Orientierung der da4 Im Hintergrund steht auch die Absicht der Erarbeitung einer wirtschaftspolitisch-biographischen Studie, für die dieser Beitrag Ansatzpunkte und Grundlagen schaffen soll; Liselotte Palme, Androsch. Ein Leben zwischen Geld und Macht, Wien 1999.

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mals noch „Sozialistischen Partei Österreichs“ markierte.5 Darauf aufbauend agierte Androsch als Finanzminister mit einem expliziten umfassenden, wirtschaftspolitischen bzw. volkswirtschaftlichen Gestaltungs- und Steuerungsanspruch der Finanzpolitik, der auch wesentliche Teile der Geld- und Währungspolitik umfasste und auf einem stark verzweigten Netzwerk in einem etatistisch-korporatistisch geprägten wirtschaftspolitischen System basierte. Dieses hatte sich in der Nachkriegszeit herausgebildet und setzte sich aus einer starken Position der Sozialpartnerschaft und deren Elitenkonsens sowie dessen enger Verbindung mit den wirtschaftspolitischen Entscheidungsträgern in Regierung, Parlament und Nationalbank zusammen.6 Dieses, trotz Föderalismus in der Tendenz zentralistische Willensbildungs- und Entscheidungssystem umfasste als einen wesentlichen wirtschaftspolitischen Aktionsbereich auch eine umfangreiche verstaatlichte Wirtschaft. Innerhalb dieser Konstellation hatte das Finanzministerium bzw. der Finanzminister seit der Mitte der 1960er Jahre eine zentrale Steuerungsposition erlangt, die von Androsch in den 1970er Jahren in extensiver Weise gestaltet und gehandhabt wurde. Dieser umfassende Gestaltungs- und Steuerungsanspruch des Finanzministers spielte dann in der zweiten Hälfte der 1970er Jahre eine wesentliche Rolle in wachsenden innerparteilichen Konfliktlagen in der seit 1971 mit absoluter Mehrheit regierenden SPÖ. Androsch konnte sich zwar auf sein inzwischen etabliertes und intensiv gepflegtes Netzwerk im politischen Elitensystem stützen, wobei sich insbesondere eine „Achse“ zur Gewerkschaftsführung und dem Präsidium der Nationalbank gebildet hatte. Letztendlich aber behielt der Parteivorsitzende und Bundeskanzler Bruno Kreisky, der sich in seinem Führungsanspruch von Androsch, der seit 1976 auch die Funktion des Vizekanzlers bekleidete, immer stärker konkurrenziert sah, in dem zunehmend auch in den persönlichen Bereich gehenden Konflikt die Oberhand und bewirkte 1981 das Ausscheiden von Androsch aus der Regierung.7 Im Zusammenhang mit parteipolitischen Vereinbarungen wechselte Androsch sodann an die Spitze der mehrheitlich im Staatsbesitz befindlichen CreditanstaltBankverein, der damals größten Commerzbank in Österreich (1981 – 1988). Er befand sich dort an einer der wesentlichen Schaltstellen der volkswirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Österreichs mit vielfältigen Verbindungen in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Raum.8 Dabei kam dem bankwirtschaftlichen Management aufgrund der 5 Julian Uher, Entstehung und politische Durchsetzung des Wirtschaftsprogramms 1968, in: Weber / Venus, Austrokeynesianismus (Fn. 3), S. 37 – 62. 6 Herbert Dachs (Hg.), Die Zweite Republik, 3. erw. u. völlig neu bearb. Aufl., Wien 1997. 7 Barbara Liegl / Anton Pelinka, Chronos und Ödipus. Der Kreisky-Androsch-Konflikt, Wien 2004; Robert Kriechbaumer, Die Ära Kreisky. Österreich 1970 – 1983 in der historischen Analyse, im Urteil der politischen Kontrahenten und in Karikaturen von Ironimus, Wien / Köln / Weimar 2004, S. 485 – 491; Beppo Mauhart, Ein Stück des Weges gemeinsam. Die Ära Kreisky / Androsch – das „Goldene Jahrzehnt“ – in Texten und Bildern, Wien 2006. 8 Oliver Rathkolb / Theodor Venus / Ulrike Zimmerl (Hg.), Bank Austria Creditanstalt. 150 Jahre österreichische Bankengeschichte im Zentrum Europas, Wien 2005, S. 383 ff.

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traditionell sehr hohen Fremdfinanzierungsquote der Unternehmensfinanzierung in Österreich sowie der damals noch sehr dominanten Position des Staatskredits am heimischen Kapitalmarkt beträchtliche volkswirtschaftliche und wirtschaftspolitische Bedeutung zu. Darüber hinaus lag insbesondere im Umgang mit den umfangreichen, vor allem industriellen Unternehmensbeteiligungen der Bank (und damit einem gleichsam indirekt verstaatlichten bzw. teilverstaatlichten Bereich) ein wesentliches strategisches, unternehmerisches Handlungsfeld mit ebenfalls beträchtlichen wirtschaftspolitischen Implikationen. So waren damit eine große Zahl von Arbeitsplätzen und volkswirtschaftlich relevante Standortfragen verbunden. Dies im Rahmen einer zunehmenden Krisenanfälligkeit der österreichischen Industriestruktur und deren betriebs- und volkswirtschaftlich erforderlichen Umstrukturierung insgesamt. Aber auch die währungs- und geldpolitische Komponente, die für Androsch auch als Finanzminister immer eine vorrangige Rolle gespielt hatte – immerhin war er in dieser Funktion der Architekt der bis zur Einführung des Euros beibehaltenen „Hartwährungspolitik“ – bildete einen Fokus seines Bankmanagements. Die Fortsetzung bzw. Nachwirkung des Kreisky-Androsch-Konfliktes fand in steuerrechtlichen und gerichtlichen Vorgängen Niederschlag9 und war letztlich dafür verantwortlich, dass Androsch im Jahr 1988 die Position des Generaldirektors der Creditanstalt-Bankverein verließ. In den folgenden Jahren baute er ein unternehmerisches Tätigkeitsfeld als Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensberater in der damals zunehmende Nachfrage findenden Consultingbranche auf. Die wirtschaftspolitische Erfahrung, entsprechende Netzwerkverbindungen sowie ein an der Gestaltung ordnungspolitischer Transformation orientiertes unternehmerisches Interesse begründeten dabei eine Schwerpunktsetzung im Bereich der „Wende im Osten“, aber auch im Rahmen der Weltbank im Bereich der Entwicklungshilfe. Als in der ersten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre in Österreich, wo es bis dahin noch einen großen verstaatlichten Sektor gegeben hatte, die Privatisierungspolitik in ihre erste Umsetzungsphase kam, begann Androsch mit dem Erwerb von entsprechenden Unternehmensanteilen und damit mit dem Auf- und Ausbau eines bis heute beträchtlich angewachsenen und differenzierten unternehmerischen Beteiligungskomplexes. Basierend auf dem somit begründeten und erweiterten Tätigkeitsfeld als Investor-Unternehmer wurde er zu einer führenden Figur in der unternehmerischen Wirtschaftselite in Österreich mit maßgeblich direktem und indirektem Einfluss auf den wirtschaftspolitischen Diskurs und immer wieder auch auf die wirtschaftspolitische Gestaltung. Die Basis dafür bilden die Bedeutung der „beherrschten“ Unternehmen sowie die nach wie vor starken Netzwerke im politischen und wirtschaftlichen System auf nationaler wie auf internationaler Ebene. Konkreten Niederschlag findet Androschs Einfluss auch in einer immer wieder in zahlreichen Publikationen, Wortmeldungen in Tagesmedien, Vortragstätigkeit etc. etab9 Dazu das Dossier von Herbert Schachter, Steuersache Doktor Androsch, in: Kriechbaumer, Die Ära Kreisky (Fn. 7), S. 493 – 542.

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lierten starken medialen Präsenz. Diese festigte in weiten Kreisen den Nimbus einer wirtschaftspolitischen Autorität, verknüpft mit einer von Androsch durchaus gepflegten Rolle als wirtschaftspolitischer elder statesman. Dazu kommt, dass Androsch als Finanzminister und „wirtschaftspolitischer Steuermann“ der für die österreichische Gesellschaft sowohl in einer positiven (Ausbau des Sozialstaates, Vollbeschäftigung, monetäre Stabilität) wie in einer negativen Wahrnehmung (Zunahme der Staatsverschuldung) nach wie vor überaus bedeutsamen „KreiskyÄra“, aber auch durch den die politische Landschaft des Landes nachhaltig prägenden Konflikt mit dem legendären Partei- und Regierungschef („Sonnenkönig“) nach wie vor eine Persönlichkeit von öffentlichem Interesse und auch in diesem Sinne weiterhin von politischer Bedeutung geblieben ist. Eine Rückkehr in die Politik war zwar lange Zeit immer wieder ein Thema der medialen Öffentlichkeit und mancher parteipolitischer Überlegungen, aber, vor allem seitens Androschs selbst, nie mehr eine realistische Option. Andererseits aber tritt er seit dem Ende der 1990er Jahre zunehmend als nach wie vor signifikante Aufmerksamkeit erregender kritischer Kommentator der Wirtschaftspolitik im Land auf, aber auch als wirtschaftspolitischer Berater und gelegentlich auch als Kritiker der SPÖ, der er nach wie vor als Mitglied angehört. Auf der Basis des in der medialen Öffentlichkeit immer wieder mit Interesse verfolgten und kolportierten unternehmerischen Erfolges und dem daraus resultierenden persönlichen Vermögenszuwachs etablierte Androsch seit den späten 1990er Jahren Tätigkeitsfelder mit allgemeiner wirtschafts- und gesellschaftspolitischer Bedeutung. Dabei ergibt sich immer wieder der Eindruck, dass dahinter in gewisser Weise die Intention der Kompensation als mangelhaft beurteilter Anstrengungen und fehlender sachlicher Kompetenz der institutionalisierten Politik und damit in Verbindung eine gewisse Lust an der unternehmerischen Gestaltung öffentlicher Anliegen steht. Dies betrifft, meist in unmittelbarer Verbindung mit jeweiligen unternehmerischen Ertragsinteressen die Setzung von Initiativen und Maßnahmen in der Entwicklung regionaler Wirtschaftsstruktur, beispielsweise im Salzkammergut. Dies betrifft weiters die Frage der Eigentumsstruktur in der nationalen Volkswirtschaft, wobei Androsch bei grundsätzlicher Befürwortung von Internationalisierung, Europäischer Integration und Globalisierung die Sicherung von strategischem Eigentum in österreichischer Hand als eine explizite Zielkomponente formuliert. Dass sich dabei unternehmerisches Beteiligungsinteresse an Privatisierungen und Unternehmensverkäufen mit volkswirtschaftlichen Perspektiven eng verbindet, ist nahe liegend und evident. Dies auch dadurch, dass Androsch immer wieder entsprechende österreichische Beteiligungskonsortien initiiert oder vorschlägt, etwa jüngst die Schaffung eines „Austro-Fonds“ zur Bildung von strategischem Eigentum im industriellen Bereich oder sich an politisch brisanten Unternehmensverkäufen, wie jüngst dem Notverkauf der BAWAG (Bank für Arbeit & Wirtschaft) durch deren bisherigen Eigentümer, den Österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbund, wenn auch nur mit einem vergleichsweise kleinen Anteil, beteiligt.

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Die Neigung zur unternehmerischen Gestaltung öffentlicher Anliegen betrifft des Weiteren Initiativen und Maßnahmen in Forschung & Entwicklung im Rahmen der eigenen Unternehmensgruppe, aber auch in öffentlichen Einrichtungen, wie beispielsweise dem in der österreichischen Technologieforschung wichtigen Forschungszentrum Seibersdorf als vom zuständigen Minister bestellter Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrates, als Vorsitzender des Universitätsrates der Montanuniversität Leoben oder in Form einer namhaften Stiftung im Rahmen der Akademie der Wissenschaften. Die Neigung zur unternehmerischen Gestaltung öffentlicher Anliegen betrifft aber schließlich auch Initiativen und Maßnahmen in der Wissenschaftspolitik und in der Kulturpolitik, wobei sich ein gewisser Fokus auf die Bewusstseinsbildung im Hinblick auf die „Erfolgsstory“ der Zweiten Republik feststellen lässt. Diesbezüglich ist die auf Basis eines privaten Konsortiums initiierte und finanzierte große Ausstellung zum 60-jährigen Bestand der Zweiten Republik im Jahr 2005 im Schloss Belvedere in Wien ein prominentes Beispiel für ein in strategischer Weise im öffentlichen Raum angesiedeltes und inszeniertes unternehmerisches Mäzenatentum.

III. Vom Beispielfall zum Modell Versucht man die Positionierung von Hannes Androsch als Teil der österreichischen Wirtschaftselite über den gesamten angesprochenen Zeitraum hinweg in struktureller Hinsicht zu erfassen, so ergibt sich vor dem Hintergrund des eingangs skizzierten ordnungspolitischen Wandels gleichsam eine zeitliche Zweiteilung, deren Übergang am Beginn der schrittweisen Umsetzung der Privatisierungspolitik Mitte der 1990er Jahre liegt. Wobei anzumerken ist, dass diese Zweiteilung – auch als These – sehr grob ist und natürlich noch weiter differenziert werden muss. Für den ersten Zugang aber mag sie genügen. Bis zum Beginn der Privatisierungspolitik bestand, neben einigen von der Unternehmensgröße her gesehen bedeutsamen, meist aus alten Unternehmensfamilien stammenden Eigentümer-Unternehmern, ein wesentlicher bestimmender Teil der österreichischen Wirtschaftselite aus Managern und Funktionären im Bereich der verstaatlichten Wirtschaft (Banken und Industrie). Bis zur Errichtung der ÖIAG als Holdinggesellschaft in den 1960er Jahren reichte dies unmittelbar in die zuständigen Ministerien, insbesondere in das „Bundesministerium für Verkehr und verstaatlichte Betriebe“ unter Karl Waldbrunner („Königreich Waldbrunner“), also in den unmittelbaren Bereich der institutionellen Politik.10 Aber auch danach blieb der politische Einfluss im Wege der staatlichen Eigentümerfunktion ausgeprägt hoch. Der Finanzminister war dabei funktionell, institutionell und personell viel10 Fritz Weber, 40 Jahre verstaatlichte Industrie in Österreich, in: ÖIAG-Journal (Österreichische Industrieverwaltungs-Aktiengesellschaft) 2 / 86, S. 3 – 28; Edmond Langer, Die Verstaatlichungen in Österreich, Wien 1966; Hannes Androsch / Anton Pelinka / Manfred Zollinger (Hg.), Karl Waldbrunner. Pragmatischer Visionär für das neue Österreich, Wien 2006.

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fältig eingebunden. In spezifischer Weise war das dann auch der Generaldirektor der mehrheitlich im Staatsbesitz befindlichen Creditanstalt-Bankverein mit deren industriellem Beteiligungskomplex. Ab Beginn der Privatisierung, also dem schrittweisen Abbau des staatlichen Banken- und Unternehmensbereiches, bildete sich durch den Erwerb entsprechender Beteiligungen eine bisher eigentlich nicht vertretene Gruppe in der österreichischen Wirtschaftelite mit jedoch rasch wachsender Bedeutung. Durch Management-Buyout oder Beteiligungserwerb traten nunmehr vermehrt BeteiligungsEigentümer in Erscheinung, die in unterschiedlicher Weise mehr oder weniger verschachtelte Beteiligungskomplexe aufbauten.11 Innerhalb dieser Gruppe nahm der ehemalige Finanzminister und CA-Generaldirektor im Zusammenhang mit den oben angesprochenen Verankerungen im politischen und im wirtschaftlichen System rasch eine besondere Position ein. Hinsichtlich der Ausgeprägtheit und Intensität politischer und unternehmerischer Komponenten stellt Hannes Androsch einerseits eine singuläre Erscheinung dar, kann aber andererseits vielleicht gerade deshalb Ansatzpunkte zur Typen- bzw. Modellbildung liefern.12 Eine, seine Tätigkeit als führender Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitiker und seine nachfolgende Tätigkeit, zunächst als Banker, dann als Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensberater und schließlich als Investor-Unternehmer, verbindende Betrachtung führt zu einer erkenntnisleitenden These. Diese postuliert eine Prolongierung (wirtschafts)politischer bzw. ordnungspolitischer Konzeption und Handlungsweise vom institutionalisierten politischen System in den unternehmerischen Ziel- und Handlungsbereich. Davon ausgehend, ergeben sich für den dergestalt konditionierten Typus des „politischen Unternehmers“ einige Fragestellungen. So etwa, inwieweit die unternehmerische Tätigkeit und das unternehmerische Selbstverständnis durch eine implizite wirtschaftspolitische Programmatik determiniert ist, inwieweit eine spezifische Mitgestaltung des volkswirtschaftlichen und ordnungspolitischen Transformationsprozesses intendiert und feststellbar ist, in welcher Weise betriebswirtschaftliche Strategien und volkswirtschaftliche Perspektiven verknüpft werden, wie mit den zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft unterschiedlichen Handlungsspielräumen und institutionellen Strukturen umgegangen wird und welche Rolle dabei spezifische Netzwerkstrategien spielen. Ausgehend von der Frage, inwieweit – bezogen auf Veränderungen des allgemeinen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Entwicklungsrahmens – Entwicklungsphasen feststellbar sind, soll im Sinne des Versuches einer Modellierung des Typus’ des politischen Unternehmers, als erster Schritt – bezogen auf den konkreten 11 Ingrid Dengg / Martina Forsthuber, Österreichs neue Milliardäre, in: TREND 2 / 2003, S. 64 – 91. 12 Ein weiteres Beispiel wäre der ehemalige Parteiobmann und wirtschaftspolitische Sprecher der ÖVP, Josef Taus. Siehe: 75 Jahre Josef Taus. Gestalter, Politiker und Freund (= Gesellschaft & Politik. Zeitschrift für soziales und wirtschaftliches Engagement 44 [2008], Heft 1A).

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Beispielfall – ein Ablaufschema dargestellt werden, in dem eine Verbindung zwischen der Tätigkeit in der politischen Funktion und der nachfolgenden unternehmerischen Tätigkeit hergestellt wird. Diesem Ablaufschema liegen zwei Annahmen zugrunde. Erstens wird davon ausgegangen, dass der Typus des politischen Unternehmers durch ein aus einer politischen und einer unternehmerischen Komponente bestehendes Ziel- und Handlungsmuster geprägt ist, wobei diese Komponenten in den jeweiligen Funktionen und Entwicklungsphasen unterschiedlich gewichtet und kombiniert sind. Und es wird zweitens davon ausgegangen, dass es eine bestimmte, von beiden Komponenten geprägte individuelle ordnungspolitische Disposition gibt, die im Rahmen der politischen Tätigkeit formiert bzw. auch formuliert und praktiziert wird und die dann in der nachfolgenden unternehmerischen Tätigkeit als eine relevante Handlungsmaxime weiterwirkt bzw. variiert wird. Es ergibt sich daraus ein spezifisches Entwicklungsmuster, das einerseits in den allgemeinen, ordnungspolitischen Wandel eingebunden ist und dabei andererseits in jedem einzelnen Fall spezifisch ausgeprägt ist, worin nicht zuletzt auch so etwas wie ein Persönlichkeitsfaktor in der konkreten, realen Ausformung des Typus zum Tragen kommt. Bei dem hier in Betracht stehenden, exemplarischen Fall des ehemaligen Finanzministers und Vizekanzlers und nunmehrigen „Industriellen“ Hannes Androsch erscheint diese individuelle ordnungspolitische Disposition grundsätzlich auf zwei Prinzipien zu beruhen.13 Zum einen, ausgehend vom Erfahrungshorizont der Wiederaufbauzeit ein grundsätzliches Verständnis von marktwirtschaftlicher Ordnung, die aber wirtschaftspolitisch, durchaus auch staatsinterventionistisch, zu gestalten ist. Andererseits aber ist ein Grundprinzip dieser Gestaltung die Schaffung unternehmerischer Freiheit bzw. unternehmerischer Freiräume, zugleich aber auch eine individuelle Verpflichtung, zur „selbstverantwortlichen“ Nutzung von Freiheit und Freiräumen, womit eine Absage an den „Versorgungsstaat“ verbunden ist. Aus diesen Prinzipien abgeleitet, erscheint eine Verbindung von gesamtwirtschaftlichem und gesamtgesellschaftlichem Gestaltungswillen und Gestaltungsanspruch einerseits und persönlichem Erfolgs- und Karriereinteresse andererseits, welches in der unternehmerischen Tätigkeit eng an ein betriebswirtschaftliches Ertragsinteresse gebunden ist bzw. sich in ein solches verwandelt. Insofern lässt sich hier auch ganz gut der Bezug der individuellen ordnungspolitischen Disposition des politischen Unternehmers zum ordnungspolitischen Wandel erkennen bzw. analytisch erfassen. Davon ausgehend, ergibt sich im Fall Androsch ein exemplarisches Entwicklungsmuster, das hier nur in einigen wesentlichen Punkten skizziert werden kann und in der weiteren Arbeit am Thema weiter auszuarbeiten sein wird.

13 Lässt sich aus zahlreichen schriftlichen und mündlichen Äußerungen heraus destillieren und wurde in einem ausführlichen Interview am 04. 10. 2007 bestätigt

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IV. Exemplarisches Entwicklungsmuster 1. Formierung (bis Ende der 1960er Jahre) In der bis Ende der 1960er Jahre reichenden „Formierungsphase“ der individuellen ordnungspolitischen Disposition wurde die unternehmerische Komponente in Androschs Ziel- und Handlungssystem durch die Herkunft aus einem Elternhaus mit Steuerberatungskanzlei, ein betriebswirtschaftliches und volkswirtschaftliches Studium sowie eine einschlägige berufliche Qualifikation als Steuerberater und Wirtschaftsprüfer begründet. Die politische Komponente formierte sich im Zuge der Funktionen in der „sozialistischen“ Schüler- und Studentenvertretung und in Folge in Parteifunktionen bis hin zum Abgeordnetenmandat im Nationalrat, sowie in der bereits erwähnten maßgeblichen Beteiligung an der Modernisierung der wirtschaftspolitischen Konzeption der SPÖ im Rahmen des wirtschaftspolitischen Programms 1968. In diesem Zusammenhang formierten sich somit die wesentlichen Leitlinien von Androschs individueller ordnungspolitischer Disposition im Grunde aus drei Wurzeln bzw. Determinanten: Erstens die sozialdemokratische, parteipolitische Sozialisation und die Erfahrungen in politischen Institutionen von der Bezirksorganisation bis zum Parlament. Zweitens eine ordnungstheoretische Prägung durch intensive Beschäftigung mit den Konzepten des Ordoliberalismus und der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, insbesondere den Schriften und Konzepten von Walter Eucken und Ludwig Erhard, den Sozialstaatskonzepten (insbesondere Beveridge) und der Theorie von John Maynard Keynes bzw. dem Keynesianismus sowie dessen Projektion auf die Erfahrungswelt des Wiederaufbauwachstums. Drittens die betriebswirtschaftliche Professionalisierung sowohl im Rahmen des betriebswirtschaftlichen Studiums als auch in der, wenn auch nur kurzen, Praxis der Steuerberatung und Wirtschaftsprüfung. Die dergestalt konstituierte, individuelle ordnungspolitische Disposition politisierte sich in der zweiten Hälfte der 1960er Jahre nachhaltig in eine gestaltungs- und umsetzungsorientierte Richtung. Dabei verband sich ein starker Drang nach institutionalisierter finanz- und wirtschaftspolitischer Handlungsmacht mit einem, teilweise sehr selbstbewusst vorgetragenen, sachlichen Kompetenzanspruch. Die maßgebliche Mitwirkung beim wirtschaftspolitischen Programm 1968, wo Androsch die eine politische Vorrangstellung begründende Position eines Berichterstatters an den Parteirat zukam, war eine entsprechende Plattform. In einem im Frühjahr 1968 erschienenen Zeitschriftenartikel mit dem Titel „Wenn ich Finanzminister wäre“ übte er scharfe Kritik an der von der damaligen ÖVP-Alleinregierung betriebenen Finanzpolitik, listete eine Reihe dringend zu ergreifender Reformmaßnahmen auf und resümierte: „Gemessen an dieser traurigen Situation unserer Finanzen wird es mutiger und energischer Schritte bedürfen, um eine Sanierung herbeizuführen.“14 14 Hannes Androsch, „Wenn ich Finanzminister wäre“, in: Neues Forum XV (März / April 1968), S. 270.

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Androschs finanzpolitischer Gestaltungswille war deutlich von der sich damals im Rahmen des keynesianischen Mainstreams, im finanzwissenschaftlichen und finanzpolitischen Diskurs, etablierenden Konzeption der finanzpolitischen „Globalsteuerung“ und des „magischen Vierecks“ geprägt. In diesem Sinne war er insbesondere von den Schriften von Richard A. Musgrave beeinflusst. In Zusammenhang damit waren für Androsch auch die entsprechende Entwicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die dortige, zentrale wirtschaftspolitische Führungsrolle des Wirtschafts- bzw. Finanzministers von maßgeblichem Interesse. Jedoch lehnte er eine gesetzliche Festschreibung der antizyklischen, konjunkturstabilisierenden Staatsintervention nach dem Muster des bundesdeutschen „Gesetzes zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft“ (1967) ab, sondern plädierte nachdrücklich für die Offenhaltung wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischer Interventionsspielräume und anlass- und problembezogener instrumenteller Kombinationen im Sinne eines flexiblen policy mix. Indem dabei die Bedachtnahme auf Ermöglichung marktorientierten unternehmerischen Handelns und betriebswirtschaftlicher Erfordernisse eine Rolle spielte, kam in spezifischer Weise die unternehmerische Komponente in der individuellen ordnungspolitischen Disposition zum Tragen. Spätestens hier wird die Positionierung Androschs im, in ordnungspolitischer Hinsicht, stärker marktwirtschaftlich orientierten „rechten“ Flügel der SPÖ verankert. Dass er sich mit seiner wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen Konzeption, die ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der wirtschaftspolitischen Modernisierungskonzeption der SPÖ war, letztlich innerparteilich durchsetzte, fand nach dem Wahlsieg der SPÖ im Jahr 1970 insofern Niederschlag, als er mit 32 Jahren Finanzminister wurde, was in der damaligen, noch weitgehend vom Anciennitätsprinzip beherrschten politischen Kultur ein Novum war. 2. Der Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitiker (1970 – 1981) In der Zeit als Finanzminister war klarerweise die politische Komponente im Ziel- und Handlungssystem eindeutig dominant. Andererseits aber blieb die unternehmerische Komponente insofern durchwegs eine wesentliche Determinante in Androschs Zielsetzungen und Handeln, als Strategien, Entscheidungen und Maßnahmen des Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitikers immer mit Blick auf deren Auswirkung auf der betriebswirtschaftlichen Ebene getroffen und umgesetzt wurden und dem unternehmerischen Freiraum eine spezifische Funktion im volkswirtschaftlichen Entwicklungssystem zugedacht wurde.15 Insofern kann davon gesprochen werden, dass sich in dieser Zeit die individuelle ordnungspolitische Disposition im Rahmen der Ausübung der Funktion des Finanzministers gleichsam institutionalisiert hat. In der Ausübung dieser Funktion verband sich der Anspruch auf eine wirtschaftspolitische Führungsrolle der Finanzpolitik mit einem, auf expliziter De15

Interview vom 04. 10. 2007.

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monstration von einschlägiger Sachkompetenz und auf ausgeprägter Netzwerkbildung im politischen System, insbesondere mit den Spitzenfunktionären der Sozialpartnerschaft, der Nationalbank und den Großbanken, gestützten Anspruch auf persönliche leadership. Dieser Führungsanspruch bezog sich auch auf die Geldund die Währungspolitik, indem der Finanzminister Androsch der maßgebliche Architekt der „Hartwährungspolitik“, also der weitgehenden Bindung des österreichischen Schilling an die D-Mark wurde, sowie mit der Neufassung des Kreditwesengesetzes wesentliche Liberalisierungsschritte im Bereich der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft einleitete. Hannes Androsch formulierte sein handlungsorientiertes Leitbild gelegentlich folgendermaßen: „Die Finanzpolitik ist die Orgel, auf der die wirtschaftspolitische Musik gespielt werden kann, soferne dafür die nötigen Register gezogen werden.“16 In ordnungspolitischer Hinsicht wird damit ein umfassender wirtschaftspolitischer Steuerungsanspruch der Finanzpolitik postuliert, wobei sich Androsch diesbezüglich durchaus mit seinem Vorgänger im Amt, dem Finanzminister der ÖVP-Alleinregierung Stephan Koren, verbunden sah.17 Geht man von dieser Metapher aus, so kann als „Orgel“ letztlich das institutionelle Setting wirtschaftspolitischer Gestaltung verstanden werden, das seit der Nachkriegszeit entwickelt worden war und in dessen Zentrum das Bundesbudget bzw. die Finanzpolitik in der zweiten Hälfte der 1960er Jahre hinein gewachsen war. „Musik spielen“ bzw. „Register ziehen“ meint wohl zum einen eine explizit wirtschaftspolitische Gestaltung der finanzpolitischen Instrumente und zum anderen ein Dirigieren des funktionellen, institutionellen und vor allem auch personellen Netzwerkes zwischen Regierung, Parlament, Sozialpartnerschaft und Nationalbank sowie auch eine entsprechende Akzentuierung des wirtschaftspolitischen Diskurses auf den Ebenen der Politik, der Medien und der Wissenschaft. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es auch ein Kennzeichen der Handhabung des Finanzressorts durch Androsch, dass er, stärker als seine Vorgänger, als Kommunikator der Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik und der für diese gegebenen Rahmen- und Entwicklungsbedingungen in der Öffentlichkeit aufgetreten ist. Seine Reden innerhalb und außerhalb des Parlaments sowie schriftliche Äußerungen zur Finanzpolitik gehen in der Regel von Erläuterungen der allgemeinen Entwicklungszusammenhänge aus und leiten daraus die Begründung spezieller finanzpolitischer Maßnahmen und Strategien ab.18 Auf die ursprüngliche Absicht, in der nunmehrigen SPÖ-Alleinregierung ein eigenes Wirtschaftsministerium zu errichten, wurde verzichtet, da dessen Funktion weitgehend in einem wirtschaftspolitisch gehandhabten Finanzministerium zu inte16 So bei einem Zeitzeugengespräch der Dr. Wilfried Haslauer-Bibliothek (Salzburg) im Mai 2005. 17 Hannes Androsch, Zwei Jahrzehnte wechselvoller Verbundenheit, in: Werner Clement / Karl Socher (Hg.), Stephan Koren. Wirtschaftsforscher und Wirtschaftspolitiker in Österreich, Wien 1989, S. 183 – 205. 18 Beppo Mauhart / Hans Dipold (Hg.), Hannes Androsch, Staat, Steuern und Gesellschaft. Wirtschaftspolitik als Gesellschaftspolitik in der Welt von morgen, Wien 1978.

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grieren war, was dann auch der Fall war. Androsch hat diesen Anspruch auf wirtschaftspolitische leadership auch über das ganze Jahrzehnt seiner Ministerschaft hinweg aufrechterhalten und wenn nötig auch eingefordert, was zunehmend Konfliktpotenzial in der Regierung und in der Partei evozierte. Dabei ist deutlich erkennbar, dass hinter den personalen Komponenten dieses Konfliktpotenzials auch zunehmend ordnungspolitische Divergenzen standen.19 In besonderer Weise und in besonderem Ausmaß ist dieser gesamtwirtschaftliche und gesamtgesellschaftliche Steuerungsanspruch der Finanzpolitik im Zusammenhang mit der Stagflationskrise Mitte der 1970er Jahre zum Tragen gekommen, als mit einer massiven antizyklischen Krisenintervention bisher nicht gekannten Ausmaßes Vollbeschäftigung und auch Preisstabilität erhalten werden konnten, zugleich aber in der Folge eine budgetäre Konsolidierung sowie erhebliche strukturpolitische Eingriffe notwendig erschienen. Dass die entscheidende Schlüsselkompetenz dafür bei der Finanzpolitik liegen musste, erschien unbestritten. Bezug nehmend auf die diesbezüglichen wirtschaftspolitischen Strategiedebatten, die in einen intensiven Diskurs über die wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Entwicklungsperspektiven und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten eingebettet waren, führte Androsch in einem Referat im Februar 1976 vor der Österreichischen Handelskammer in Zürich unter anderem aus: „Welche konkrete Form diese Diskussionen auch immer annehmen werden, der Wirtschaftspolitik und der Finanzpolitik als einer ihrer wichtigsten Teilbereiche kommt dabei immer eine tragende Rolle zu. . ..Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik ist aus dem Gesichtswinkel dieses Ansatzes letztlich Gesellschaftspolitik, weil die Weiterentwicklung des sozialen Systems von den wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen Maßnahmen in erheblichem Maße determiniert wird.“20

Dabei wurde aber ein Vorrang der mittel- und längerfristig orientierten Umgestaltung der Wirtschaftsstruktur vor kurzfristiger antizyklischer Intervention und sozialpolitischer Kompensation wirtschaftlicher Wachstumsdefizite intendiert. In Bezug darauf ging es insbesondere um drei für die weitere Entwicklung der Wirtschaftsordnung grundsätzliche Zusammenhänge: Den Staatsanteil in der Wirtschaftsstruktur, insbesondere im Bereich der Industrie, den grundlegenden volkswirtschaftlichen Stellenwert der staatlichen Infrastrukturpolitik und das Verhältnis von „öffentlich“ und „privat“. Dabei lief die grundsätzliche Orientierung bei Androsch auf eine gesamtwirtschaftliche Verantwortung der öffentlichen Hand für eine möglichst günstige Gestaltung der Entwicklungsbedingungen für privatwirtschaftliches, unternehmerisches Handeln hinaus, wobei aber der Anspruch der wirtschaftspolitischen Gesamtsteuerung durch den Staat außer Zweifel gestellt wurde. In einem Referat in Alpbach im August 1977 führte er aus: „Es besteht die Notwendigkeit, den Selbststeuerungskräften des Marktes gebührenden Raum zu schaffen. Diese unsichtbaren Kräfte sollen dort unterstützt und gefördert werden, 19 20

Mauhart, Ein Stück des Weges gemeinsam (Fn. 7). Abgedruckt in: Mauhart / Dipold, Hannes Androsch (Fn. 18), S. 94.

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wo sie ihre Wirkung haben. Marktwirtschaft ist jedoch von sich aus nie sozial, denn sie neigt dazu, den Stärkeren noch stärker und den Schwächeren noch schwächer zu machen. Aus der Verantwortung für die Wirtschaft heraus muß deshalb neben die unsichtbare Hand des Marktes die sichtbare des Staates treten, da sich sozialer Nutzen eben nicht über den Markt abwickelt und daher auch nicht Berücksichtigung finden würde.“21

In diesem Sinne wurde auch den von oppositioneller Seite – vor allem auch im Hinblick auf die expansive Entwicklung des Staatshaushaltes – immer wieder erhobenen Forderungen nach Rückbau des staatlichen Interventionismus eine klare Absage erteilt: „Das Erhalten der sozialen und liberalen gesellschaftspolitischen Grundwerte bedingt ein Abgehen von der in der Geschichte so verhängnisvollen Doktrin der möglichst weitgehenden wirtschaftlichen Abstinenz des Staates.“22 Unter dieser Prämisse wurde aus der Warte der Finanzpolitik der entscheidende Ansatzpunkt in einer bedarfsorientierten, funktionellen Verknüpfung von Konjunkturpolitik und Strukturpolitik gesehen. In der Gestaltung dieses Verhältnisses lag zugleich ein zentrales Kriterium für das Verhältnis von öffentlicher Hand und Privatwirtschaft. Und dieses sollte in besonderer Weise in der Rolle der Infrastrukturpolitik zum Tragen kommen. Androsch brachte seine diesbezüglichen Vorstellungen in der bereits zitierten Rede vor der österreichischen Handelskammer in Zürich 1976 folgendermaßen zum Ausdruck: „Infrastrukturpolitik, so wie ich sie verstehen möchte, verfolgt nicht mehr und nicht weniger als das Ziel, die bestmöglichen materiellen und immateriellen Voraussetzungen für einzelwirtschaftliche Leistung zu schaffen. Dies selbstverständlich unter Wahrung der Grundsätze der Sparsamkeit und Wirtschaftlichkeit in den öffentlichen Haushalten und selbstverständlich auch mit der Bereitschaft, obsolet gewordene Bereiche auszuscheiden. Die öffentliche Hand hat in der modernen Industriegesellschaft jene Aufgaben zu erfüllen, die der Markt nicht oder nur unzureichend oder in vielen Fällen aus der Natur der Sache heraus nur zu extrem höheren Kosten erfüllen kann . . . Infrastrukturpolitik soll also nicht als konzentrierte Anstrengung verstanden werden, dem Leviathan immer mehr und mehr einzuverleiben, sondern als das stete Bemühen, die einzelwirtschaftlichen und öffentlichen Aktivitäten so zu harmonisieren, dass die Verbesserung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit als zählbares Ergebnis dabei herauskommt . . . Die öffentliche Hand kann in der Kombination konjunktur- und strukturpolitischer Maßnahmen maßgebliche Impulse zur Überwindung wirtschaftlicher Schwierigkeiten setzen. Sie kann eines freilich nicht: Unternehmerische Initiativen und Entscheidungen tragen.“23

Im Zusammenhang damit erscheint auch die im Jahr 1979 von Androsch veranlasste budgetäre Ausgliederung der staatlichen Salinenbetriebe in eine separate, staatseigene Kapitalgesellschaft (Salinen-AG) als ein erster früher Schritt in Richtung Privatisierungspolitik. Insgesamt steckte in dieser wirtschaftspolitischen Konzeption von Finanzpolitik ein ordnungspolitisches Profil, das mit einem keynesianisch-wohlfahrtsstaatlichen 21 22 23

Abgedruckt in: Ebenda, S. 124. Abgedruckt in: Ebenda, S. 111. Abgedruckt in: Ebenda, S. 100, 102.

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Konzept des „sorgenden Staates“, wie es von maßgeblichen Teilen der SPÖ präferiert wurde, nicht deckungsgleich war, sondern dem marktwirtschaftlichen, unternehmerischen Element eine konstitutive Bedeutung zumaß. Insofern erscheint auch der immer wieder auf die 1970er Jahre angewendete, auf den damaligen Leiter des Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung Hans Seidel zurückgehende Begriff des „Austrokeynesianismus“ in keiner Weise eindeutig, sondern schillernd und disparat. Er wird daher von Androsch selbst auch nicht als adäquat angesehen.24 Vielmehr wurde, basierend auf dem wirtschaftlichen Gesamtsteuerungsanspruch der Finanzpolitik, im Stil eines wirtschaftspolitischen Pragmatismus ein aus angebots- und nachfrageorientierten Elementen und einer Kombination von Budget-, Währungs- und Einkommenspolitik bestehender policy mix mit einem hohen Maß an Flexibilität in Strategie und Maßnahmen angestrebt und auch praktiziert. Dies entspricht auch durchaus dem Bild, das die inzwischen schon zahlreichen Analysen des Austrokeynesianismus ergeben.25 In der konkreten Umsetzung dieses policy mix spielte der Kooperationsmechanismus und die Netzwerkbildung zwischen Finanzpolitik, Sozialpartnern sowie der Nationalbank hinsichtlich Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft und Währungspolitik eine wesentliche instrumentelle Rolle, wobei der Finanzminister hier eine entscheidende dirigierende und koordinierende Position einnahm. Für den dabei maßgeblichen Elitenkonsens waren ohne Zweifel die personellen Achsen zwischen dem Finanzminister, der Gewerkschaftsführung und der Leitung der Nationalbank, insbesondere zwischen Hannes Androsch, Anton Benya und Karl Waldbrunner und auch das grundsätzliche Einverständnis mit Stephan Koren in dessen Funktion als Präsident der Nationalbank ab 1977 von wesentlicher Bedeutung. Als durchgehendes Charakteristikum der Flexibilität dieses policy mix in der Umsetzung des wirtschaftspolitischen Steuerungsanspruches der Finanzpolitik erscheint, dass er, ausgehend von der Veränderung der Rahmen- und Entwicklungsbedingungen bzw. der wirtschaftspolitischen Anforderungspotenziale, in inhaltlicher und instrumenteller bzw. institutioneller Hinsicht durch einen Wandel der Prioritäten geprägt war. Es lassen sich diesbezüglich drei Phasen unterscheiden. In einer ersten, bis 1974 / 75 andauernden Phase, die durch die konjunkturelle Überhitzung und das Ende des langfristigen Wachstumspfades der Nachkriegszeit gekennzeichnet war, lagen die Prioritäten bei der Sicherung der monetären Stabilität nach innen und außen, bei der finanzpolitischen Gestaltung der in den ersten Jahren der SPÖ-Alleinregierung in Gang gesetzten sozialpolitischen Offensive und bei der Umgestaltung des Steuersystems. Die zweite Phase stellt die in der Mitte des Jahrzehnts ausgebrochene Stagflationskrise dar, in der die Prioritäten im Zuge einer akuten Krisenintervention in der kurzfristigen antizyklischen, konjunktur24 Hannes Androsch im Gespräch mit Fritz Weber in: Weber / Venus, Austrokeynesianismus (Fn. 3). 25 Peter Mitter, Austrokeynesianismus. Festschrift für Hans Seidel zum 65. Geburtstag, Heidelberg 1990.

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politischen Gegensteuerung und der Erhaltung der Vollbeschäftigung bei gleichzeitiger Absicherung der äußeren und inneren Geldwertstabilität lagen. In der dritten, sich nach der Bewältigung der akuten Krisenlage bis an den Beginn der 1980er Jahre erstreckenden Phase bestanden die Prioritäten bei der finanzpolitischen Steuerung des policy mix in der Haushaltskonsolidierung zur Schaffung bzw. Erhaltung von wirtschaftspolitischen Handlungsspielräumen, in einem, angesichts eines deutlich angewachsenen Leistungsbilanzdefizits, notwendig erscheinenden volkswirtschaftlichen Strukturwandel im Wege der Investitions- und Konsumsteuerung und einem Festhalten an der Hartwährungspolitik sowie einer Redimensionierung der wachsenden finanziellen Ansprüche des Wohlfahrtsstaates.26 Waren die Prioritätensetzungen in den ersten beiden Phasen innerhalb des Regierungslagers grundsätzlich unbestritten, so ergaben sich in der dritten Phase in zunehmendem Maße Strategiekonflikte, hinter denen bedeutende ordnungspolitische Differenzen standen. Es waren dies auch die wesentlichen sachlichen Punkte, die, neben persönlichen Konfliktzonen, jenen bereits erwähnten innerparteilichen Konflikt, speziell jenen mit dem Bundeskanzler, bestimmten, der 1981 zum Ausscheiden Androschs aus der Bundesregierung führte. In der ordnungspolitischen Komponente dieses Konfliktes kam insbesondere auch die Charakteristik des politischen Unternehmers zum Tragen kam. Ein wichtiger Ansatzpunkt für den ordnungspolitischen Strategiekonflikt innerhalb der Regierungspartei SPÖ lag im Problem eines sich abzeichnenden latenten „Zwillingsdefizits“. Zum einen gab es einen sprunghaften Anstieg des Haushaltsdefizits, infolgedessen der Staatsverschuldung, und zum anderen ein stark zunehmendes Leistungsbilanzdefizit. Im Grunde standen – schematisch vereinfacht – zwei Konzeptionen einander gegenüber. Auf der einen Seite (Bundeskanzler) eine auf Beschäftigungssicherung ausgerichtete weitere, zumindest zum Teil nach dem Muster des deficit-spending finanzierte Expansion des finanzpolitischen Handlungsspielraumes, verbunden mit der Fortführung der beschäftigungspolitischen und nunmehr auch regionalpolitischen Instrumentalisierung der verstaatlichten Wirtschaft, was etwa in Beschäftigungsgarantien in Krisenregionen zum Ausdruck kam, und ein zumindest graduelles Abgehen von der Hartwährungspolitik im Sinne einer wechselkursbedingten Exportförderung einforderte. Auf der anderen Seite (Finanzminister) eine tendenzielle Eindämmung der sprunghaft angestiegenen Verschuldung des Bundeshaushaltes, um Spielraum für eventuelle spätere, neuerliche konjunkturpolitische Interventionen zu schaffen, verbunden mit einem Abgehen von der beschäftigungspolitischen Instrumentalisierung der verstaatlichten Wirtschaft, zugunsten von forciertem Strukturwandel und einer strikten Beibehaltung der Hartwährungspolitik zur Absicherung der Preisniveau- und Wechselkursstabilität sowie als Druckmittel für forcierten innovationsorientierten Strukturwandel, insbesondere im verstaatlichten, aber auch im privaten Industriesektor. Dies bezog sich v. a. auf die Leistungsbilanz. 26 Fritz W. Scharpf, Sozialdemokratische Krisenpolitik in Europa. Das „Modell Deutschland“ im Vergleich, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 1987.

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In dieser Weise hatte Androsch dem Konzept des sorgenden, lenkenden Staates ein Konzept der Aktivierung unternehmerischer Initiative, Kalkulation und Verantwortlichkeit als volkswirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsfaktor, insbesondere auch in der verstaatlichten Wirtschaft, entgegengestellt. Dies jedoch ohne den strategischen Führungs- und Lenkungsanspruch der Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik und damit auch des Finanzministers zurücknehmen zu wollen. 3. Der politische Banker (1981 – 1988) Der Umstieg aus dem Regierungsamt an die Spitze der mehrheitlich staatseigenen Creditanstalt-Bankverein (CA-BV), dem damals bedeutendsten österreichischen Geld- und Kreditinstitut, erfolgte im Zuge eines parteipolitischen „Deals“. In der Funktion als leitender Manager (Generaldirektor) dieses Unternehmens mit Industriebeteiligungen von erheblicher volkswirtschaftlicher Bedeutung scheint sich eine Art Gleichgewichtszustand von politischer und unternehmerischer Komponente im Ziel- und Handlungssystem des politischen Unternehmers ergeben zu haben. Dabei wurden Zielsetzungen und Handlungsstrategien des Bankers durch ein Spannungsfeld zwischen bankwirtschaftlichem Management einerseits und betriebswirtschaftlichen Umstrukturierungs- und Sanierungserfordernissen im Bereich der Industriebeteiligungen andererseits bestimmt. Dies wiederum mit Bedachtnahme auf die volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen und die damit verbundenen wirtschaftspolitischen Implikationen. Zum einen deshalb, weil die mehrheitlich im Staatseigentum befindliche Bank und damit auch deren Leiter einen der Kristallisationspunkte des politischen Interessensgeflechtes und zum anderen eine der wesentlichen Steuerungspositionen in Bezug auf die Entwicklung und Struktur der österreichischen Volkswirtschaft darstellte. Das spezifische Verhältnis von politischer und unternehmerischer Komponente im Ziel- und Handlungssystem des politischen Unternehmers sowie die spezifische Ausprägung von dessen individueller ordnungspolitischer Disposition kommt in exemplarischer Weise im Zusammenhang mit der in der Mitte der 1980er Jahre offensichtlich gewordenen akuten Krisenlage einiger wesentlicher Unternehmen im industriellen Beteiligungskomplex der Bank zum Tragen.27 Und zwar dergestalt, dass Androsch eine nachhaltige Auseinanderhaltung von bankbetrieblichem und industriebetrieblichem Management anstrebte und letztlich auch erreichte. In diesem Sinne galt es zu verhindern, dass die notwendigen beträchtlichen Sanierungs- und Restrukturierungskosten der Bank angelastet wurden, sondern zu erreichen, dass diese vom Staat bzw. vom Staatshaushalt übernommen wurden. Es sollte das verhindert werden, was bei der zweiten großen, mehrheitlich im Staatsbesitz befindlichen Bank, der Länderbank, in deren industriellen Beteiligungen 27 Franz Kubik, Creditanstalt-Bankverein: Von der führenden Bank des Landes zur internationalen monetären Visitenkarte Österreichs, in: Rathkolb / Venus / Zimmerl, Bank Austria Creditanstalt (Fn. 8), S. 415 – 436, hier S. 420 f.

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ebenfalls existenzielle Krisenlagen aufgetreten waren, passiert war, indem die industriellen Unternehmenskrisen in Form von Kreditausfällen bei der Bank in existenzbedrohendem Ausmaß schlagend geworden waren. Im Unterschied dazu konnte Androsch, letztlich im Wege des effizient funktionierenden politischen Netzwerkes, eine im Parlament einstimmig beschlossene Sanierungs- und Restrukturierungsfinanzierung aus dem Staatshaushalt erreichen. Die Restrukturierung und Sanierung der industriellen Unternehmen wurde, mit entsprechendem Druck seitens des Aufsichtsratsvorsitzenden, der Androsch aufgrund der Beteiligungsverhältnisse in den meisten Fällen war, auf die Ebene interner betrieblicher Maßnahmen konzentriert.28 Dass die Strategie durchaus erfolgreich war, bestätigte im Jahr 1988 ein im Ergebnis sehr positiver Prüfungsbericht des Rechnungshofes, der aufgrund des mehrheitlichen Staatseigentums die für die CA-BV zuständige Prüfungsinstanz war. Dort wurde u. a. festgestellt, „dass – was den Beteiligungsunternehmensbereich der CA-BV betraf – es dem Bankvorstand vor allem im Zeitraum 1981 bis 1986 zufolge nachdrücklich gesetzter Maßnahmen gelungen war, die Belastungen der Bank aus diesem Bereich, wenn auch unter Inanspruchnahme öffentlicher Zuschussleistungen, entscheidend zu verringern.“29 In dieser funktionellen Separierung von Bankmanagement und Industriemanagement kann in langfristiger, historischer Perspektive die Einleitung der sukzessiven Auflösung eines seit dem 19. Jahrhundert wesentlichen Elementes der österreichischen Wirtschaftsordnung gesehen werden. Nämlich der engen eigentumsbezogenen Verflechtung von Banken und industriellen Unternehmungen, was dann in der Folge im Zuge der Privatisierungspolitik ab Mitte der 1990er Jahre forciert wurde. Kam in diesem nicht unwesentlichen Bereich der ordnungspolitischen Transformation des österreichischen Wirtschaftssystems die individuelle ordnungspolitische Disposition bzw. der ordnungspolitische Pragmatismus des politischen Unternehmers Hannes Androsch in spezieller Weise hinsichtlich des Verhältnisses von bankwirtschaftlichem Kalkül und unternehmerischem Risiko zum Tragen, so war dies aber auch in allgemeiner Form im Rahmen des in den 1980er Jahren das politische System beherrschenden, kontroversen ordnungspolitischen Diskurses der Fall. Dabei wurde einerseits von maßgeblichen Teilen der SPÖ und der Gewerkschaft die Fortsetzung eines interventionistischen Kurses postuliert, andererseits vom Wirtschaftsflügel der ÖVP und den Arbeitgebervertretungen ein prononciert marktwirtschaftlicher Privatisierungskurs eingefordert. Androsch trat hier dezidiert dem in seiner Partei in hohem Maße vorhandenen Ansinnen entgegen, in den Bahnen des Austrokeynesianismus der 1970er Jahre weiterzufahren. Er hielt dies, weil den inzwischen geänderten wirtschaftspolitischen Anforderungspotenzialen und den gegebenen finanzpolitischen Handlungsspielräumen nicht mehr entsprechend, 28 Betraf insbesondere Maschinenfabrik Andritz AG , Jenbacher Werke AG, Stölzle-Oberglas AG, Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG, Maschinenfabrik Heid AG, siehe: CA-Geschäftsbericht 1987, S. 49. 29 Rechnungshof Zl 0221 / 2-II / 6 / 88, S. 12.

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für einen falschen Weg. Und er kommunizierte diese Ansicht auch in vielfacher Weise im öffentlichen Raum in Publikationen, in Vorträgen und den Medien und er fand dabei aufgrund seines weiterhin ungebrochenen hohen öffentlichen Bekanntheitsgrades und seiner nach wie vor bestehenden Popularität durchaus viel Gehör. Abgesehen von der inhaltlichen Dimension etablierte sich hierbei eine Facette der politischen Komponente des politischen Unternehmers Hannes Androsch, die in den weiteren Entwicklungsphasen eine zunehmende Bedeutung erlangen sollte. Nämlich die des kritischen, in der Formulierung nicht selten auch polemischen Kommentators der wirtschaftspolitischen Verhältnisse im Speziellen und auch der politischen Verhältnisse im Allgemeinen. In diesem Sinne blieb er, auch nach seinem, wiederum vor allem aus politischen Gründen, erzwungenen Abgang aus der Funktion des Generaldirektors der Creditanstalt-Bankverein, eine politische Persönlichkeit mit Einfluss und oft polarisierender Wirkung. 4. Der strategische Berater (1988 – 1994 / 95) In dieser nunmehr außerhalb des staatlichen sowie staatsnahen Institutionensystems liegenden, genuin unternehmerischen Funktion wurde die unternehmerische Komponente im Ziel- und Handlungsmuster des politischen Unternehmers naturgemäß stärker bzw. dominant. Abgesehen von den für Androsch in vielfältiger Hinsicht belastenden Nachwirkungen der innerparteilichen Konfliktfelder und abgesehen von den weiterhin bestehenden und gepflegten Netzwerken im politischen System, verlagerte sich die politische Komponente des Ziel- und Handlungsmusters in Verbindung mit den unternehmerischen Aktivitäten nunmehr vorwiegend auf außerösterreichische Bereiche. Zum einen auf die Bedingungen, Erfordernisse und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten in der Dynamik der Umbruchs- und Transformationsprozesse in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern. Zum anderen auf Fragen der Entwicklungspolitik im Rahmen einer Konsolententätigkeit bei der Weltbank für Entwicklungsprogramme in Botswana 1988 / 89. Die Aktivitäten Mittel- und Osteuropa begannen 1989 mit der Gründung der Androsch International Management Consulting GmbH (AIC). Dieses Unternehmen bildete dann auch die institutionelle Basis für die ab 1994 / 95 etablierte Karriere als Investor-Unternehmer. Charakteristisch für den politischen Unternehmer erscheint, dass Androsch bei der Planung und Umsetzung von unternehmerischem Engagement in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Transformationsländern, neben den jeweiligen ökonomischen Verhältnissen, der Berücksichtigung historischer und politischer Rahmenbedingungen besonderen Stellenwert beimaß. In diesem Sinne veröffentlichte er auch in Buchform einen darauf bezogenen umfangreichen „Investitionsleitfaden Osteuropa“.30 30 Hannes Androsch, Investitionsleitfaden Osteuropa: eine Jahrhundertchance. Historische, politische und ökonomische Rahmenbedingungen, Länderanalysen, Leitfaden für private Investoren, Förderprogramme für Investoren, Wien 1996.

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Hinsichtlich der konkreten mittel- und osteuropäischen Consulting-Aktivitäten ergaben sich wesentliche Ansatz- und Anknüpfungspunkte aus der Zeit des Finanzministers und insbesondere aus der Zeit des CA-Chefs. Von besonderer Bedeutung waren hierbei die Beziehungen zu Ungarn und die Kenntnis der dortigen Verhältnisse. So war etwa die Creditanstalt-Bankverein in den 1980er Jahren an der Central-European International Bank Ltd. in Budapest beteiligt gewesen. Diese spezifischen Beziehungen und Kenntnisse Androschs hatten bewirkt, dass er bereits kurz vor der politischen Wende, also noch in der Endphase des zentralverwaltungswirtschaftlichen Systems von ungarischer Seite kontaktiert worden war, in der Gestaltung der zu erwartenden Intensivierung des Transformationsprozesses mit beratender Kompetenz mitzuwirken. Wesentlich dabei erscheint, dass der Transformationsprozess in Ungarn schon seit einiger Zeit im Rahmen der Reformmaßnahmen des Staatswirtschaftssystems in Gang befindlich gewesen war und nunmehr ein starker Schub in diese Richtung zu erwarten war, eine Entwicklung, mit der Androsch bestens vertraut war. Durch die Auswirkungen des im güterwirtschaftlichen Bereich in Ungarn seit 1968 wirkenden „Neuen Wirtschaftssystem“ (NWS) hatte sich infolge der damit etablierten marktwirtschaftlichen Elemente zunehmend ein spezifisches Spannungsfeld aus der wachsenden Diskrepanz betriebswirtschaftlicher Elemente im Güterkreislauf und einem weitgehenden Festhalten am zentral-planwirtschaftlichen Geldwirtschafts- und Finanzierungssystem ergeben. Die sich in wachsendem Maße stellende zentrale Anforderung aber war, im Hinblick auf die infolge der marktwirtschaftlichen Elemente effektiv wirksam werdende Geldmengenexpansion und deren inflatorische Gefahr eine spezifische (systemkonforme) Form einer „Politik des knappen Geldes“ zu finden. Ebenso waren adäquate Formen der Investitionsfinanzierung erforderlich. Dazu waren aber entsprechende Veränderungen in dem nach wie vor bestehenden „Monobank-System“, bei dem es keine bankwirtschaftliche Konkurrenz und keine Trennung zwischen Zentralbankfunktionen und Geschäftsbankfunktionen gab, notwendig, sowie die Etablierung von bestimmten Kapitalmarktinstitutionen. Im Verlauf der 1980er Jahren war mit entsprechenden Schritten begonnen worden.31 Diese Änderungen betrafen insbesondere eine gewisse Eigenständigkeit des Geld- und Finanzsystems dergestalt, dass kapitalmarktähnliche Veranlagungsmöglichkeiten geschaffen wurden, die einen Teil der wachsenden Geldmenge von einer direkten Umwandlung in Güternachfrage (und damit inflationäre Effekte) in kapitalmarktmäßige Veranlagung ablenkte und damit zugleich Finanzierungspotenzial für den Staatshaushalt und auch für die Unternehmensfinanzierung bereitstellte. So wurde 1983 die Ausgabe von Anleihen durch Banken (in Funktion als Emis31 Andreas Wass von Czege, Ungarns „Neuer ökonomischer Mechanismus“ – Reformmodell oder Krisenmanagement?, in: Rolf Schlüter (Hg.), Wirtschaftsreformen im Ostblock in den 80er Jahren. Länderstudien: Sowjetunion, DDR, Polen, Rumänien, Tschechoslowakei, Bulgarien, Ungarn, Paderborn 1988, S. 187 – 208.

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sionsbanken) eingeführt und ab 1984 auch ein Sekundärmarkt für Anleihen etabliert. Als jedoch 1988 die Staatsgarantie abgeschafft wurde und die Zinsbegünstigung gegenüber Einlagen wegfiel, brach dieser Anleihemarkt wieder zusammen. Des Weiteren wurde ab 1986 in einem Teilbereich eine Zweistufigkeit des Bankensystems nach dem Muster der im „westlichen“ System üblichen Gliederung in „Zentralbank“ und „Geschäftsbank“ eingeführt und damit die Transformation des herkömmlichen „Monobank-Systems“ in Gang gesetzt.32 Knapp vor dem Ende des kommunistischen Regimes gab es dann 1988 / 89 noch einmal einen Reformschub in Form einer deutlichen der Lockerung der staatlichen Kontrolle des Bankwesens und der Aufhebung der Beschränkungen im Geschäft mit privaten Haushalten. In dem Zusammenhang erhielten die Sparkassen eine Geschäftsbankkonzession. Weiters kam es zu Erleichterungen für die Geschäftsbanken im Devisengeschäft. Und es wurden durch die institutionelle Zusammenführung der Anleihemärkte für Haushalte und Unternehmen, durch die Einführung von Schatzwechsel als Anlage- und Finanzierungsinstrument sowie durch ein Gesetz über privatwirtschaftliche Körperschaften, mit dem die Aktiengesellschaft als Unternehmensform und die Aktie als Anlage- und Finanzierungsinstrument etabliert wurden, wiederum Kapitalmarktstrukturen geschaffen sowie durch die Einführung des Sekundärhandels die Institution einer Wertpapierbörse vorbereitet. Der Systemwechsel nach der „Wende“ von einem grundsätzlich „staatswirtschaftlichen“ zu einem „volkswirtschaftlichen“ Finanzierungssystem nach westlichem Muster erfolgte dann in Form einer Auflösung der staatlichen Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft im Wege einer Herauslösung aus dem planwirtschaftlichen staatlichen Finanzierungssystem, einer Beseitigung der noch vorhandenen Teile des planwirtschaftlichen „Monobank-Systems“ und einer Überleitung in ein privatwirtschaftliches System mit dementsprechenden Refinanzierungsformen, Liquiditätsregulativen, Kreditbesicherungen und Haftungsinstitutionen. Die damit vollzogene Entflechtung von Staatsfinanzen und bankwirtschaftlichem Geld- und Kreditsystem beinhaltete auch dessen prinzipielle Unabhängigkeit hinsichtlich Geldschöpfung, Zinspolitik und Geldmengensteuerung. Im Bereich der staatlichen Finanzwirtschaft begann sehr rasch ein Umbau der staatlichen Haushaltsstrukturen mit stark restriktiver Tendenz, deren Gründe vor allem in dem durch die Preisfreigabe einsetzenden überaus starken Inflationsdruck sowie in dem Anpassungsdruck an den monetaristischen Fiskalismus im EWR lagen. Besonders ausgeprägt war dieser fiskalische und monetaristische Konsolidierungskurs in Polen. Dort wurde sehr nachdrücklich ein vom IWF vorgegebenes Sanierungs- und Privatisierungsprogramm umgesetzt.33 32 István Székely, Die Reform des ungarischen Finanzsystems, in: Europäische Wirtschaft Nr. 43 (März 1990): Wirtschaftlicher Wandel in Ungarn und Polen, hg. von der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Generaldirektion Wirtschaft und Finanzen, S. 117 – 136, hier S. 123.

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In diesen somit sehr komplexen Anforderungen bei der Gestaltung des Systemwechsels bzw. Umbruches, der sich in der ersten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre nach der „Ostöffnung“ in zum Teil schockartiger Weise mit entsprechenden wirtschaftspolitischen Problemszenarien vollzog, fand der mit entsprechender Sachkenntnis ausgestattete unternehmerische strategische Berater Hannes Androsch ein reiches Betätigungsfeld. Die individuelle ordnungspolitische Disposition des politischen Unternehmers äußerte sich dabei einerseits in einer begründeten Skepsis gegenüber radikalen marktwirtschaftlichen Umbruchskonzepten und -strategien. Zum anderen in Empfehlungen zur wirtschaftspolitisch instrumentellen Gestaltung unternehmerischer Freiräume und marktwirtschaftlicher Funktionsmechanismen sowie individueller wirtschaftlicher Eigenverantwortlichkeit im Sinne eines adäquaten policy mix bzw. im Sinne eines wirtschaftspolitischen Pragmatismus. Parallel zu derartiger consulting-Tätigkeit im mittel- und osteuropäischen Transformationsgeschehen richtete sich die unternehmerische Orientierung Androschs in der ersten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre zunehmend auf den offensichtlich in Österreich in Gang kommenden ordnungspolitischen Wandel, indem dort nunmehr die Privatisierungspolitik mit dem Verkauf bzw. der Börsennotierung staatlicher Unternehmensanteile in ihre erste konkrete Umsetzungsphase eintrat. Die politische Komponente des Ziel- und Handlungssystems des politischen Unternehmers lag hierbei zunächst wiederum einerseits in der ausgezeichneten Kenntnis der einschlägigen Verhältnisse aus der Zeit als Finanzminister und CA-BV-Generaldirektor und andererseits in den entsprechenden Netzwerken sowie den für die Finanzierung von Beteiligungskäufen relevanten Kontakten im heimischen Bankensystem. Die unternehmerische Komponente lag in den Möglichkeiten, sich durch den Erwerb entsprechender Unternehmensanteile ein neues unternehmerisches und vermögenswirtschaftliches Standbein aufzubauen.

5. Der politische Investor (ab 1994) Die von Hannes Androsch seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre entwickelte und ausgebaute Tätigkeit als Investor-Unternehmer, wobei eben der Erwerb von Unternehmensanteilen im Rahmen der Privatisierungspolitik die entscheidende Basis darstellte, veränderte die Konstellation von unternehmerischer und politischer Komponente im Ziel- und Handlungssystem des politischen Unternehmers wiederum in spezifischer Weise. Der sukzessive Auf- und Ausbau einer industriellen Beteiligungsgruppe ist natürlich primär der unternehmerischen Komponente zuzurechnen. Hier liegt ja auch die persönliche Zukunftsperspektive. Die Hauptelemente des inzwischen beträchtlich gewachsenen und differenzierten Beteiligungskom33 Stanislaw Gomulka, Reform und Haushaltspolitik in Polen 1989 – 1990, in: Europäische Wirtschaft Nr. 43 (März 1990): Wirtschaftlicher Wandel in Ungarn und Polen, hg. von der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Generaldirektion Wirtschaft und Finanzen, S. 139 – 149.

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plexes stammen somit auch aus der ersten Privatisierungsphase. Das ist 1994 der Erwerb von Anteilen an der im staatlichen VOEST-Konzern befindlichen Leiterplattenfirma AT&S (Austria Technologie & Systemtechnik AG) und 1997 an der von Androsch selbst als Finanzminister im Jahr 1979 aus dem Staatshaushalt ausgegliederten Österreichischen Salinen AG und in Verbindung damit von Anteilen an der privatisierten Dachstein-Seilbahn AG und an dem Flugzeugtechnikzulieferer FACC (Fischer Advanced Composite Components AG). Zugleich aber kommt die politische Komponente in mehrfacher Weise ins Spiel. Erstens im Wege der aus der Zeit als Politiker und CA-Generaldirektor stammenden und weiter entwickelten Kontakte und Netzwerke, wobei Androsch ein intensives und zugleich extensives „networking“ betreibt und dieses Netzwerk durchaus einen informellen Faktor im heimischen politischen System darstellt. Hierzu gehört aber auch die Tatsache, dass in die Zeit der Regierungsfunktion und der CA zurückreichende und zum Teil intensivierte Konflikte und Polarisierungen Hindernisse bei Akquisitionsprojekten bildeten, wie dies beispielsweise bei dem von Androsch geplanten Erwerb der staatlichen Donau-Dampfschifffahrtsgesellschaft (DDSG) der Fall war, der aufgrund von Widerständen in der Regierung nicht zustande gekommen ist. Zweitens erscheint es als eine Charakteristik des politischen Unternehmers Androsch, dass das Interesse am Erwerb von Unternehmensbeteiligungen in gewissem Ausmaß mit dem Anliegen und auch entsprechenden Maßnahmen, gemeinsam mit Partnern, wie etwa regionalen Banken, regionale Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungsstrukturen zu sichern oder zu stärken verbunden wird, wie dies etwa im Salzkammergut oder der Obersteiermark der Fall ist. Drittens manifestiert sich die politische Komponente darin, dass das Interesse am Erwerb von Unternehmensbeteiligungen gelegentlich mit der Intention der Sicherung von strategischem Eigentum in österreichischer Hand oder zumindest eigentumsgestütztem heimischem Einfluss argumentiert wird. In einem Wirtschaftsmagazin wurde dazu pointiert festgestellt: „Ob Steyr Daimler Puch, Semperit, Lenzing, Böhler Uddeholm, VA Stahl oder Voestalpine – bei so gut wie jedem prominenten Deal dieser Republik präsentiert sich der Ex-Minister nun an vorderster Käuferfront. Er selbst begründet dieses Engagement mit patriotischen Motiven: ,Ich will verhindern, dass wieder Unternehmen ohne Not ins Ausland wandern, nur weil die Regierung schnell Geld braucht. Jeder andere österreichische Kernaktionär wäre mir genauso recht‘.“34

In besonderer Weise ließ sich diese Facette der politischen Komponente kürzlich vor dem Hintergrund der Dynamik internationaler Unternehmensakquisitionen durch große internationale Kapitalgesellschaften und der vom SPD-Vorsitzenden Franz Müntefering in diesem Zusammenhang ausgelösten „Heuschrecken-Debatte“ beobachten. Dies indem Beteiligungsinteressen an größeren industriellen Un34

Dengg / Forsthuber, Österreichs neue Milliardäre (Fn. 11), S. 71.

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ternehmungen mit dem Vorschlag der Schaffung eines „Austro-Fonds“ verbunden wurden, mit dem heimisches Kapital aufgebracht werden sollte, um Beteiligungen an für die österreichische Wirtschaftsstruktur wichtigen Industriebetrieben im Land zu halten. Internationalisierung sei wichtig, so die Argumentation Androschs, aber es könne auch nicht sein, „dass wir Gastarbeiter im eigenen Land werden“.35 Diese wirtschaftspolitischen Bezüge sind aber immer eng mit der unternehmerischen Komponente im Ziel- und Handlungssystem des politischen Unternehmers gekoppelt. So stellt die Ertragslage, die Kostenstruktur und damit die Möglichkeit der Erzielung unternehmerischen Gewinnes stets einen zentralen Punkt in der individuellen ordnungspolitischen Konzeption dar, denn, so ein von Androsch in diesem Zusammenhang immer wieder geäußerter Satz „der Verlust ist der größte Feind der Arbeitsplätze“. Viertens lässt sich ab Mitte der 1990er Jahre und ganz besonders seit der Jahrtausendwende eine deutliche Verstärkung der Präsenz des politischen Unternehmers Hannes Androsch im politischen Diskurs erkennen, meist als kritischer Kommentator der Regierungspolitik sowie als ein wegen seines weiterhin hohen Bekanntheitsgrades und weithin anerkannten Rufes als wirtschaftspolitischer Fachmann, vermehrt auch als Zeitzeuge, vielfach angefragter Vortragender und Podiumsdiskutant. Hier nützt er auch immer wieder die Möglichkeit, wie schon in seiner Zeit als Politiker, als Erklärer und Kommunikator wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung und wirtschaftspolitischer Zusammenhänge zu wirken. Damit in Zusammenhang tritt er auch immer wieder als Buchautor in Erscheinung.36 Hinsichtlich des allgemeinen ordnungspolitischen Diskurses lässt er durchaus gewisse Präferenzen für eine Neupositionierung des Keynesianismus (etwa im Sinne von Peter Bofinger) und eine Ablehnung prononciert marktliberaler Position, wie sie von Hans Werner Sinn vertreten wird, dessen Postulate er als „bereits überholt“37 betrachtet, erkennen. In jüngerer Zeit betätigte er sich, wie eingangs erwähnt, auch als Initiator zeithistorischer Projekte, wie etwa einer großen Ausstellung zum 60-jährigen Bestehen der Zweiten Republik. Damit wird explizit die Zielsetzung der Schaffung eines, insbesondere auf den Wohlstandszuwachs bezogenen Österreichbewusstseins verbunden. „Ich will, dass unsere Kinder und Enkel stolz sind auf die Erfolgsstory der Zweiten Republik. Und sie auch verstehen.“38 Dass er sich dabei selbst als Teil dieser „Erfolgsstory“ versteht, ist nicht zuletzt auch eine spezifische Facette des politischen Unternehmers Hannes Androsch. Eine ebensolche ist eine dem „Selbstver35 Zitiert nach Richard Wiens, „Industrieperlen hier halten“, in: Salzburger Nachrichten 28. 02. 2007, S. 15. 36 Z. B: Hannes Androsch, Warum Österreich so ist, wie es ist. Eine Synthese aus Widersprüchen, Wien 2003; Hannes Androsch, Afloat on a Turbulant Ocean. A Reflective View of Austria in the 20th Century, Innsbruck / Wien / Bozen 2007. 37 Im Interview, 04. 10. 2007. 38 Zitiert nach Werner Scheidl, „Eine Polit-Story mit Happy Ende“, in: Die Presse, 24. 11. 2006, S. 18.

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ständnis als der Gesellschaft verpflichteter Citoyen“39 zugeschriebene Rolle als Mäzen in Wissenschaft und Kunst. V. Zusammenfassung des analytischen Ansatzes Der in diesem Beitrag unternommene Versuch eines biographisch-exemplarischen Zuganges zum Thema „Wirtschaftseliten“ und innerhalb dessen der Fassung des Typus des „politischen Unternehmers“ setzt auf mehreren Betrachtungsebenen an und verbindet diese in einer im Grunde induktiven Vorgangsweise. Dies ist zunächst die politische und unternehmerische Karriere des ausgewählten Beispielfalls, des früheren österreichischen Finanzministers und nunmehrigen InvestorUnternehmers Hannes Androsch. Das ist sodann die Konstruktion eines in dieser Karriere erkennbaren spezifischen Entwicklungsmusters des politischen Unternehmers. Die dritte Betrachtungsebene liegt in der Einbindung in ein allgemeines Transformationsszenario. Die vierte Ebene schließlich bildet der Versuch einer vom konkreten Fall ausgehenden und inspirierten Modellierung der Entwicklung des politischen Unternehmers bzw. dessen Zielsetzungs- und Handlungssystems. Dies sollte auch Ansatzpunkte für Vergleiche schaffen. Im Beitrag wurde versucht, diese vier Ebenen in analytischen Schritten miteinander zu verbinden, wobei, entsprechend dem dabei zugrunde gelegten Erkenntnisgang von der eben angeführten, gleichsam hierarchischen Struktur abgegangen wurde. Begonnen wurde mit der Kennzeichnung des seit den 1970er Jahren ablaufenden allgemeinen Transformationsszenarios in „West“ und „Ost“, in dem maßgebliche Determinanten der Konstituierung und Entwicklung des politischen Unternehmers liegen. Die im folgenden Abschnitt skizzierte Karriere des für den exemplarischen Zugang ausgewählten Beispielfalls des ehemaligen Finanzministers Hannes Androsch spiegelt somit auch wesentliche Aspekte dieses Transformationsszenarios. Zunächst die Intensivierung des im Grunde keynesianischen wirtschaftspolitischen Gestaltungs- und Steuerungsanspruches der Finanzpolitik im Rahmen eines gerade in Österreich ausgeprägten etatistisch-korporatistischen Systems. Sodann ab der zweiten Hälfte der 1970er und in den 1980er Jahren die Krise des „Austrokeynesianismus“ und die einsetzende Wende hin zu einem Rückbau des antizyklischen wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen Interventionismus und zum Beginn der Privatisierungspolitik. In der Karriere von Androsch fand dies insbesondere in dem ordnungspolitischen Strategiekonflikt der späten 1970er Jahre und der nachfolgenden Leitung der mehrheitlich im Staatsbesitz befindlichen Großbank mit umfangreichen Unternehmensbeteiligungen und damit eminenter volkswirtschaftlicher Bedeutung in den 1980er Jahren Niederschlag. Die „Wende“ im Osten war dann, ebenso wie die ab Mitte der 1990er Jahre in Österreich Platz greifende Privatisierungspolitik, entscheidender Faktor für den Auf- und Ausbau 39 Hannes Androsch, zitiert nach dem Artikel „Citoyen“ (ohne Autor), in: Salzburger Nachrichten, 22. 06. 2004, S. 13.

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einer vielfältigen und durchaus erfolgreichen unternehmerischen Karriere. Diese koppelte sich aber nie von der politischen bzw. wirtschaftspolitischen Entwicklung ab, sondern blieb immer wieder auf diese bezogen. Insgesamt kommt bei Hannes Androsch sehr deutlich von Beginn an eine spezifische Mischung und innerhalb dieser eine sich wandelnde Gewichtung einer unternehmerischen und einer politischen Komponente des individuellen Zielsetzungs- und Handlungsmusters zum Tragen. Die Tendenz geht dabei eindeutig in die Richtung einer relativen Zunahme der unternehmerischen Komponente. Andererseits aber bleibt die politische Komponente in den Zielsetzungen und Handlungen des Bankmanagers, des Wirtschaftsberaters und des Investor-Unternehmers durchwegs relevant. Sie ist aber nicht dogmatisch sondern durch eine, letztlich an den Bedingungen und Erfordernissen des westlichen und östlichen Transformationsszenarios orientierte Flexibilität gekennzeichnet. Die Annahme der Mischung und der sich wandelnden Gewichtung einer unternehmerischen und politischen Komponente im Zielsetzungs- und Handlungsmuster des vormaligen Politikers und nachmaligen Beraters und Unternehmers bildet den konzeptiven Angelpunkt für den im nächsten Abschnitt vollzogenen gedanklichen Schritt vom Beispielfall hin zur Modellierung des Typus des politischen Unternehmers. Als zentrales Kriterium, in dem auch ein wesentlicher Ansatzpunkt für vergleichende Analysen liegt, erscheint dabei die aus beiden Komponenten bzw. deren Mischung geprägte individuelle ordnungspolitische Disposition. Dies wiederum vor dem Hintergrund und in Bezug auf das allgemeine Transformationsszenario. Die Herausarbeitung dieser sich aus einer wandelnden Gewichtung einer unternehmerischen und politischen Komponente konstituierenden, individuellen ordnungspolitischen Disposition ergibt ein exemplarisches Entwicklungsmuster, das im letzten Abschnitt des Beitrages dargestellt wird. Dieses ergibt für den ausgewählten Beispielfall Hannes Androsch das Bild eines, sowohl in der politischen wie in der unternehmerischen Funktion, betriebs- und volkswirtschaftliche Dimensionen verbindenden Zielsetzungs- und Handlungsmusters. Dies bedeutet auch, dass Androsch, auch Jahrzehnte nach seiner politischen Tätigkeit nach wie vor eine Größe in der politischen Szenerie und eine wirtschaftspolitische Autorität geblieben ist. Neben dem evidenten und anerkannten unternehmerischen Erfolg scheint dabei ein spezifisches Selbstverständnis des politischen Unternehmers von spezieller Bedeutung. Einerseits ein hoher Stellenwert individueller Verantwortlichkeit und unternehmerischer Initiative innerhalb „sozialer Marktwirtschaft“. Andererseits die Überzeugung von der Relevanz wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischer Gestaltung. Als ein spezifischer rezenter Ausdruck der individuellen ordnungspolitischen Disposition von Androsch erscheint dabei zum einen eine in gewissem Maße praktizierte Funktion als Kritiker und Mahner angesichts diesbezüglich georteter Defizite der institutionalisierten Politik. Zum anderen ein über den engeren wirtschaftspolitischen Bereich hinausgehendes, öffentliche Aufgaben kompensierendes Engagement, etwa in forschungs- und kulturpolitischen Belangen. Hannes Androsch ist

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somit ohne Zweifel ein ausgeprägter Vertreter des hier insinuierten Typus des politischen Unternehmers als Element der Wirtschaftselite. Die weitere, vor allem auch vergleichend angelegte Forschungsarbeit sollte eine zeitgeschichtliche Einordnung in ein breiteres, differenziertes Spektrum von Variationen dieses Typus im europäischen Rahmen ermöglichen.

Private Business Lobbying in a Corporatist Society – The Case of Norway By Trygve Gulbrandsen I. Introduction 1. Background and research questions In Norway, as in many other European countries, top leaders within private business are ideologically among the strongest opponents against the present authority and responsibilities of the state.1 In practice, however, the business leaders acknowledge that the government takes decisions which are of vital economic importance to their interests. In line with this perception, they spend considerable resources in order to influence these decisions. Observations like these have motivated scholars in several countries to study the political strategies of private business firms. Researchers within political science and sociology have examined forms and extent of private business efforts to affect the opinions of decision-makers in the political system.2 They have investigated 1 Trygve Gulbrandsen / Frederik Engelstad, Elite Consensus on the Norwegian Welfare State Model, in: West European Politics 28 (2005), 4, pp. 899 – 919. 2 Matthew Bond, Elite Social Relations and Corporate Political Donations in Britain, in: Political Studies 55 (2007), 1, pp. 59 – 85; John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict in the Coal Industry, Cambridge 1989; Val Burris, Director Interlocks and the Political Behaviour of Corporations and Corporate Elites, in: Social Science Quarterly 72 (1991), 3, pp. 537 – 551; Val Burris, The Two Faces of Capital: Corporations and Individual Capitalists as Political Actors, in: American Sociological Review 66 (2001), 3, pp. 361 – 381; Val Burris, Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites, in: American Journal of Sociology 111 (2005), 1, pp. 249 – 283; David Coen, The European Business Interest and the Nation State: Large-firm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States, in: Journal of Public Policy 18 (1998), 1, pp. 75 – 100; David Coen, Empirical and Theoretical Studies in EU Lobbying, in: Journal of European Public Policy 14 (2007), 3, pp. 333 – 345; Michael C. Dreiling, The Class Embeddedness of Corporate Political Action: Leadership in Defense of the NAFTA, in: Social Problems 47 (2000), 1, pp. 21 – 48; Rainer Eising, The Access of Business Interests to EU Institutions: Toward Elite Pluralism?, in: Journal of European Public Policy 14 (2007), 3, pp. 384 – 403; Marie Hojnacki / David C. Kimball, Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress, in: American Political Science Review 92 (1998), 4, pp. 775 – 790; Mark S. Mizruchi, The Structure of Political Action: Interfirm Relations and their Consequences, Cambridge (Mass.) 1992.

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the circumstances and factors which seem to induce business leaders to engage in political action.3 And there have been carried out research projects focussing upon the effects of the political actions.4 As several scholars have demonstrated, lobbying is the most widely used instrument when business enterprises seek to influence public policies.5 In spite of this fact, there has, according to Wendy L. Hansen and Neil J. Mitchell, been relatively little systematic analysis of business lobbying.6 This chapter focuses upon the lobby activities of the private business elite in Norway.7 Norway has a corporatist system of decision-making. Interest groups are 3 Several scholars have studied the specific factors or circumstances which can explain variations in the political strategies of the business firms and in their effects upon political decisions. One theoretical perspective which inspired early contributions was neoclassic microeconomic theory. George Joseph Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation: Citizen and the State, Chicago 1975, assumed that businesses invest in political capabilities in order to maximize the rents that they receive through government policies that restrict competition. In line with this assumption it has for instance been hypothesized that firms’ political activities would be related to the degree of government regulation and the extent of the companies’ government sales. Both of these hypotheses have been supported in empirical analyses, see Wendy L. Hansen / Neil J. Mitchell, Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics, in: American Political Science Review 94 (2000), 4, pp. 891 – 903. Other researchers, for instance Wendy L. Hansen / Neil J. Mitchell / Jeffrey M. Drope, The Logic of Private and Collective Action, in: American Journal of Political Science 49 (2005), 1, pp. 150 – 167, have examined political action in the context of Mancur Olson’s theory on collective action and the free-rider obstacle to such action. This theory has motivated the researchers to examine the effects of size and market structure, for instance the degree of concentration, on political action. See Kevin B. Grier / Michael C. Munger / Brian E. Roberts, The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978 – 1986, in: American Political Science Review 88 (1994), 4, pp. 911 – 926; Hansen / Mitchell / Drope, Logic (fn. 3). 4 Mark Alan Smith, American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy, Chicago 2000. 5 Jeffrey M. Drope / Wendy L. Hansen, Does Firm Size Matter? Analyzing Business Lobbying in the United States, in: Business and Politics 8 (2006), 2, Article 4; Holly Brasher / David Lowery, The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity, in: Business and Politics 8 (2006), 1, Article 1. 6 Hansen / Mitchell, Disaggregating (fn. 3). 7 In many of the previous studies of private business political action the individual firm has been the unit of analysis. In a study of political campaign contributions, Val Burris found that contributions from individual capitalists followed a logic which was different to that of the corporate political action committees. His finding demonstrates that it is important as well to examine the political behavior of the top leaders in private businesses, see: Burris, The Two Faces of Capital (fn. 2). David M. Hart emphasizes that the chief executive officer (CEO) determines when the interests of he firm warrant entry or exit from the political process. In spite of this, little is known about the political behavior of the corporate executives. In line with this observation he suggests that scholars pay more attention to the effects of the attitudes, behavior and recruitment of corporate executives upon the political strategies of the business firms, see: David M. Hart, “Business” Is Not an Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in American National Politics, in: Annual Review of Political Science 7 (2004), 1,

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involved in preparing and implementing public policies, and the main organizations in the labor market cooperate on a broad range of matters. This system has given private business leaders ample opportunities for meeting politicians and public officials and for presenting the views on salient political issues. There is, however, little knowledge about to what extent and how the members of business elite have made use of these opportunities to promote their interests. While there have been conducted several studies on lobbying in Norway (see more below), very few of them have focussed specifically upon the political action of private business.8 To fill this gap I will in this chapter address the following questions: To what extent do Norwegian business leaders engage in political lobbying? What business leaders are particularly active as lobbyists and what characterizes their lobby strategies? Are there variations as to how they approach decision-makers in the political system? And what may explain such variations? In order to answer these questions the business leaders’ lobbying will be studied in two ways.9 Firstly, I will register whether they have attempted to affect the outcome of political decisions of particular significance to their company. This kind of lobbying may be termed specific or case based lobbying. Secondly, I will survey to what extent the members of the private business elite have had regularly contact with politicians and senior public officials. I choose to describe this form of lobbying as “networking” or general lobbying. In this chapter, an examination is made of the extent to which any variations in the business leaders’ lobby strategies can be traced back to their roles and posipp. 47 – 69. In this article my interest is in the concrete lobby strategies of the top business leaders. These leaders are the units of my analyses, not the companies they are representing. 8 One exception is a survey of James E. Alt et al., Asset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms: Lobbying for Subsidies in Norway, in: International Organizations 53 (1999), 1, pp. 99 – 116. They examined whether lobbying for subsidies in Norway is related to the degree of which the firms’ assets are specific or mobile. 9 In previous studies private firms lobbying has been measured in different ways. In their study Hansen and Mitchell counted the number of representatives in Washington as well as the number of consultants or counsel offices retained by the corporation in the capital. Cf. Hansen / Mitchell, Disaggregating (fn. 3). These data were used to measure the potential for lobbying by each firm. Brasher / Lowery, The Corporate Context (fn. 5) measure annual total spent on lobbying through contract lobbying firms, the total spent by the company itself through in-house lobbying efforts, the number of issues for which the firm lobbied during the year, and whether firms engaged in the influence production process through registering to lobby. Drope / Hansen, Does Firm Size Matter (fn. 5) also based their analyses on lobbying expenditure data. A quite different study, see: Hojnacki / Kimball, Organized Interests (fn. 2), uses data from a survey study to examine the dyadic interaction between lobbyists and committee members in the House of Representatives within four selected policy areas. In previous Norwegian studies information on the frequency of contact with political decisions-makers has been used as a measure of lobbying. Similar information has been employed in a European study to measure the “access” of business associations and firms to EU-institutions, see: Eising, Access (fn. 2).

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tions in the business community and to their previous political and occupational experiences. Based upon suggestions in previous literature, I will discuss (a) whether business leaders who belong to an “inner circle” in the business community lobby more and / or differently than “ordinary” members of the business elite; (b) whether large owners (owner capitalists) act differently from professional managers (managerial capitalists); (c) to what extent previous experience of working in politics or public sector or of participating in public boards impinge upon the lobby strategies of the business leaders. The hypotheses developed in this discussion will be subsequently analyzed empirically with the aid of data relating to the top leaders of the largest private enterprises in Norway. These data were collected through a large and unique survey study of a ‘sample’ of Norwegian economic, political and social elites, the Norwegian Leadership Study, which was carried out in the year 2000. This study was an important part of the Power and Democracy Project, a five year project commissioned by the Norwegian parliament. The Leadership Study was conducted by the Institute for Social Research in collaboration with the Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway. 2. Theory and hypotheses a) “Inner circle” and lobbying According to Michael Useem, there is an ‘inner circle’ within private business.10 This ‘inner circle’ consists of business leaders who hold multiple posts in the boards of other enterprises and who are members of central business organizations and round-tables. These leaders have sights beyond the immediate interests of their own enterprise and have an eye for the collective interests of private business. They have become representatives of ‘class-wide’ interests on behalf of the whole business class or community. They actively lobby political authorities in order to ensure that political decisions pay heed to the interests of private business. Useem demonstrates that the inner circle in the USA emerged as a response to the perception among prominent business leaders during the 1960s and early 1970s that general political conditions for private business had become very unfavorable. The radicalization of students and intellectuals during these years turned significant parts of the public opinion against private business. The Democratic governments in the same period passed several pro-labor and pro-environments laws, counter to the perceived business interests. The ensuing political mobilization of the business community in both, the USA and Great Britain, during the 1970s forced public policy in a more conservative direction. In spite of this Useem claims 10 Michael Useem, The Inner Circle. Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K., New York 1984.

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that business leaders of the inner circle basically accept political compromise and are less concerned about an intransigent defence of the interests of private business than ‘ordinary’ leaders. Recent empirical studies in the USA have, however, called Useem’s claims into question. In a study of campaign contributions in connection with the presidential election in 1980, Val Burris, for instance, found that the corporate elite contributed fairly heavily to both Republicans and New Right candidates, and were strong early supporters of Ronald Reagan.11 The Swedish historian Niklas Stenlås has maintained that in the first half of the 20th century, in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) inner circle orders existed for the promotion of general business interests.12 These institutions and their members organized political activism and coordinated coherent political strategies among a host of various organizations and enterprises. It is, however, uncertain whether such inner circle orders or networks still are present within the Norwegian business community today. Sigmund Grønmo and Trond Løyning have shown that there is a core of top leaders with several posts on the boards of large enterprises in Norway.13 Their study contains no information, however, on the extent of which this core group of business leaders takes part in the formulation of class wide interests and policies and represents such interests towards public authorities. Given that there is an inner circle of private business leaders in Norway, what are their strategies of political action? How do they lobby the political institutions? Following Useem’s analysis, we should expect that they are more active lobbyists than “ordinary” business leaders. Not only do they represent their own firms, but they also contact politicians and officials on behalf of issues that are common to the whole business community. As a result, I expect that top leaders in the Norwegian Leadership Study who have inner circle characteristics more frequently than other leaders lobbied last year, and that they contacted more bodies and politicians to promote their views. I. e. I expect that they exhibit a broader lobby strategy than other business leaders. In addition, since they represent the whole business community, I suggest that they will target top level politicians more often than business leaders whose political actions concern more narrow interests. According to Useem, a defining characteristic of inner circle members is that they hold at least three posts in boards of other private enterprises. I will also use this as criterion of inner circle membership. In the Norwegian business community, there are other positions which are regarded by the private business elite itself as Burris, Director Interlocks (fn. 2); Burris, The Two Faces of Capital (fn. 2). Niklas Stenlås, The Rise of Political Activism in Scandinavian Big Business 1900 – 1950, in: Haldor Byrkjeflot et al. (eds.), The Democratic Challenge to Capitalism, Bergen 2001, pp. 265 – 289. 13 Sigmund Grønmo / Trond Løyning, Sosiale nettverk og økonomisk makt [Social Network and Economic Power], Bergen 2003. 11 12

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holding more power or as more important when the collective interest of private business is formulated. In private conversations top leaders frequently mention being a member of the election committee of a large company and being a member of the board of a national business and employer organization as powerful positions within private business. Accordingly, I will use holding such positions as alternative indicators of affiliation to the inner circle of the Norwegian business elite. b) Owners versus managers A large part of private firms in Norway, as in other countries, are owned and managed by the founder, his / her family or descendants. Even if most of the founder led and family owned businesses are small, some of them are large and visible participants in private business. Within economics and economic sociology, several scholars have documented that it makes a difference for both the organization and productivity of an enterprise whether it is controlled and governed by its owners or by the employed top managers. The question is whether owners also behave differently from managers as to political action. Following property rights theory, owners should be expected to be more active lobbyists than managers.14 According to this theory, owners are residual claimants. The size of the residual which the owners may claim, i. e. the profits, is related to the costs incurred by public regulations and taxes. The private economic well-being of the owners can, then, to some extent be determined by the government. Against this background it can be expected that owners oppose public policies which raise costs and reduce the profitability of their firms. I expect them, therefore, to be more motivated than professional managers to attempt to influence the outcome of political decisions which will affect their economic interests negatively. There are, however, very few studies which have systematically compared the political actions of owners of firms and employed managers. It is therefore difficult to ascertain whether the mentioned hypotheses receive support from empirical research. Useem has claimed that owners only act politically when the issues pertain to their narrow economic self-interest, as for instance inheritance and capital taxes.15 They do not take active part in lobbying on behalf of business concerns that extend their own immediate interests. Such wider interests may be related to economic policy issues, labor protection and environmental regulations. As a result owners, according to Useem, come out as rather passive political actors compared to the representatives of managerial capitalism, i. e. professional CEOs and chairmen of 14 Armen A. Alchian / Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, in: American Economic Review 62 (1972), 5, pp. 777 – 795. 15 Useem, The Inner Circle (fn. 10).

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the boards of the largest enterprises. A different view has been presented by Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland and Bernard Yeung.16 They observe that in many countries, wealthy families control large economic assets in private enterprises through pyramidal owner structures. They suggest that old owner families use this control to manipulate their countries’ political systems in order to get protection from competitors. Neither Useem nor Morck, Stangeland and Yeung have, however, attempted to corroborate their assertions about owner families’ lobbying with systematic empirical data. Michael P. Allen and Philip Broyles have investigated the political actions of wealthy families in general, independent of their ownership positions in private enterprises.17 They found that the visible segments of the wealthy tend to contribute to political campaigns most often. When, however, such families at the same time were large owners in corporations subject to governmental regulations, they tended to contribute to political campaigns less often than other families. This study underscores the variability within the business elite. Allen has compared political campaign contributions to the Republican Party of large owners and elite managers during the New Deal.18 He found that the managers were more likely than members of owner families to contribute to the Republican Party. c) The significance of previous experiences in the political system Experience from a particular sector or institution may affect a business leader’s choice of lobby strategy. Because of the corporatist nature of the system of political decision-making in Norway (see more below), many business leaders have experience as members of boards, committees and councils within the state sector. 20 percent of the employed CEOs in our study, 17 percent of the chairmen of the board and 11 percent of the owners have had or have such posts. The experience they acquire from participating in the discussions and decisions in one or more corporatist bodies probably gives the business leaders valuable insight into how the political decisionsmaking system is functioning. I believe this insight affects the way the top leaders in private firms manage their lobby activities. I expect that business leaders with experience from corporatist bodies, compared to other leaders, involve themselves more frequently in lobbying and that their lobby strategy is more diversified. 16 Randall K. Morck / David A. Stangeland / Bernard Yeung, Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease, in: Randall K. Morck (ed.), Concentrated Corporate Ownership, Chicago 2000, pp. 319 – 369. 17 Michael P. Allen / Philip Broyles, Class Hegemony and Political Finance: Presidential Campaign Contributions of Wealthy Capitalist Families, in: American Sociological Review 54 (1989), 2, pp. 275 – 287. 18 Michael P. Allen, Capitalist Response to State Intervention: Theories of the State and Political Finance in the New Deal, in: American Sociological Review 56 (1991), 5, pp. 679 – 689.

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Operating in the complex landscape of the corporatist system in Norway, with its numerous formal and informal relations, requires considerable knowledge of politics and political decision-making. Well aware of this situation, many of the employer and industry associations have regularly recruited top leaders and aides who previously had worked in the state sector or within politics. Many of the large business firms have also recruited leaders with a political background or who have worked for instance in one of the ministries. The Leadership Study showed that 8 percent of the CEOs, presidents and vice-presidents in the large enterprises previously had worked at least one year full time within politics. Some prominent examples include previous top politicians from the Norwegian Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet). 17 percent of the CEOs and 25 percent of the chairmen of the boards had occupational experience from public sector. Hervé Joly19 demonstrates that in France, it is common that top leaders in private business start their career in the civil administration. And according to Christian Dirninger20, business leaders with a background from politics may become political-entrepreneurs who continue to have influence within the political system. David M. Hart calls attention to the fact that CEOs sometimes are hired because of their political capabilities.21 He maintains that firms that reward the acquisition of policy-relevant knowledge and skills act politically differently from those that do not. In line with his argument, I expect that the lobby strategies of members of the business elite, who have previously worked within politics or public sector, are different from those of business leaders without such experience. Particularly, given their first hand knowledge of how political decisions are prepared and implemented, I expect that their lobby strategy is more diversified. That is, I expect that they target more political and public bodies and actors, and that they keep regular contacts with politicians more frequently than other leaders. II. Contexts 1. The economy: Norwegian capitalism Norway is a small country on the periphery of Europe. It is not even member of the EU. It has an open economy as witnessed by high import and export ratios. The Norwegian economy has traditionally been based upon extraction and processing of natural resources, as for instance paper, pulp, fish and oil. Private business in Norway has a dual structure. On the one hand, there is a large number of small, unlisted and geographically scattered firms, the majority of them owned by the founders or their families. 99.5 percent of Norwegian companies 19 20 21

See Hervé Joly’s article in this volume. See Christian Dirninger’s article in this volume. Hart, Business (fn. 7).

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have less than 100 employees. On the other hand, there is a limited number of large, listed enterprises with a more dispersed ownership. In 2002, the value of the companies listed on the Oslo stock exchange amounted to 31 percent of the nation’s GDP. A unique feature of Norwegian economy is that the state has traditionally been an active participant in the economy and remains a large owner at the present time. In 2003, the state owned 40 percent of the total stock listed at the Oslo stock exchange. This dual structure with the state as a “senior partner” to private business can be traced back to the beginning of the industrialization in the second half of the 19th century. At that time, Norway had a weak bourgeoisie, and private companies were small with limited financial capacity. In spite of a liberal orientation, the state had to step in to safeguard the emerging industries, investing heavily in the infrastructure and assisting the establishment of a national banking system. The state had, thus, to compensate for the absence of an “organized capitalism”, i. e. large enterprises and owners actively developing new production and new industries. This model has been described by leading historians as the “Norwegian system”22 or as the Norwegian sonderweg23 to modernization. The model matured through the large industrial projects which took place during the first decades of the 20th century and was further strengthened during the economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s. It was finally consolidated as the social democratic governance model after World War II when the state shouldered a strong responsibility for post-war industrial development. During the first decades of the post-war period, the state acted as an active entrepreneur, initiating and establishing several new enterprises. The entrepreneurial state also manifested itself when the government gradually put itself at the head of the development of the oil industry in the 1970s. At the beginning, Norwegian authorities realized that in order to extract the oil resources, they needed to collaborate with multinational oil companies commanding the necessary expertise, technology and capital. During the first years, these multinational oil companies, therefore, were granted considerable influence upon the petroleum policy, for instance on the rules pertaining to allotment of licences. The oil crisis early in the 1970s, instigated by OPEC, foreboded a more coldly atmosphere between the nation states and the multinational oil companies. A sign of this changed atmosphere was that all oil exporting countries (except USA) established state owned oil companies. In line with this new international trend, Norway altered its policy significantly. The political authorities decided to “norwegianize” the oil activity. Statoil (the national oil company) was established in 1972, and in 1974 the government took a confrontation with the multinational oil companies on the level 22 Jens Arup Seip, “Det norske system” i den økonomiske liberalismens klassiske tid (1850 – 1870) [“The Norwegian System” in the Period of Classic Economic Liberalism (1850 – 1870)], in: Historisk tidsskrift 39 (1959), 1, pp. 1 – 58. 23 Francis Sejersted, Demokratisk kapitalisme [Democratic Capitalism], Oslo 1993.

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of taxation of the companies’ oil revenues. Norwegian enterprises were invited to take part in the extraction of oil and to become contractors for the oil industry.24 During the latest decades, the state’s involvement in business has changed character: the government has removed regulations in several areas, including the housing, credit and power markets. The housing market was deregulated in 1984 and the deregulation of the credit market was implemented through a succession of reforms between 1984 and 1986. These two deregulations were implemented by governments led by the Conservative party, which came to power after the socialdemocrats lost the election in 1981. The power market was deregulated in 1990. Public enterprises have been privatized, and the state has become a much more passive owner, first and foremost preoccupied with earnings and shareholder value on the one hand, and with guaranteeing national ownership in a few selected industries on the other hand. Privatization has taken place in various forms and for various reasons. Some publicly owned enterprises have been wholly or partially privatized, as for instance Statoil, Telenor, (the national telecom company) and Arcus (producing alcohol). The first two enterprises are now quoted on the stock exchange with the state as a majority owner. The main reason for these two prominent cases of privatization was a perceived need to increase the strategic and decision-making flexibility of the enterprises. They operated in global markets where national regulations have been removed and the competition has become much stronger. Other state institutions have been disengaged and converted into public corporations. Notable examples are NRK (The Norwegian National Broadcasting), Statkraft (The State Power) and Posten (The Post Office). Again, one motivation for these changes was to give the management in these institutions more leeway to adapt to the pressures from freer and more global markets. Another motivation was to distinguish better between the roles of the state as producer of public services and as regulator. A purpose that was not quite explicitly recognized but nonetheless significant was to relieve the central authorities from the burden of governing these institutions in detail. The active intervention of the Norwegian state in the economy laid the foundation for frequent contacts between the top leaders in private business and politicians and senior civil servants, particularly after World War II. These contacts became channels for political governance, but also for lobbying on the part of the business leaders. The business leaders who participated in this network of privatepublic contacts were for the most part professional, employed leaders, i. e. managerial capitalists. The Norwegian historian Francis Sejersted has described the first decades after World War II as the heyday of managerial capitalism in Norway.25 24 Francis Sejersted, Sosialdemokratiets tidsalder. Norge og Sverige i det 20. århundre [The Social Democratic Era. Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century], Oslo 2005. 25 Ibidem.

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An empirical examination of the relations between private enterprises, public bodies and public committees in 1985 and 1990 indicates that there even at the end of the 20th century was an extensive network between the state and private business.26 Large owner capitalists were only present within the shipping industry. The merchant fleet was for decades a national pride in Norway and an important source of business and employment in related industries. For these reasons, the owners of the most important shipping companies could traditionally enjoy a favorable treatment from public authorities. With this exception, however, few owner capitalists had access to the economic-political network between private business and the state. Moreover, owner capitalists had for a long time a rather low legitimacy in the Norwegian society. To many people, and particular to the members of the strong labor movement and the Norwegian Labour Party, which was in office the first two decades after the World War II, owners of private businesses were symbols of an outdated and authoritarian and paternalistic capitalism. Even within the ranks of managerial capitalists owners did not, until recently, receive much approval. 2. Politics: The state and Norwegian corporatism The national authorities of the Norwegian state include the Norwegian parliament – the Storting – and the state bureaucracy. The Storting has representatives from two socialist and five non-socialist parties.27 The state bureaucracy includes a relatively small central administration – the ministries – and a large number of directorates and inspectorates. As mentioned above, in the 19th century the civil servants of the Norwegian state acted as managers and overseers of the collective interests of the emerging nation. The state bureaucracy and its top leaders became a pillar in the society, creators and stewards of the basic institutions in the nation. Grønmo / Løyning, Sosiale nettverk (fn. 13). The socialist parties include: (1) The Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) which today is a mildly ‘left of centre’ party and which has been the largest political party in Norway since 1927. (2) The Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) which has proclaimed itself to be a ‘third-way’ party, i. e. neither communist nor social democratic. During recent decades the party has made environmental protection part of its platform. On the non-socialist side we find: (1) The Conservative Party (Høyre) which, in terms of their voters’ social profile, has been and still is the party of the well-off. Ideologically, it currently advocates a liberal market philosophy, individual responsibility, and limited state interference. (2) The Liberal Party (Venstre), which originally propagated a ‘social-liberal’ ideology, but which today represents a liberal ideology close to that of the Conservative Party. (3) The Christian People’s Party (Kristelig Folkeparti) is a Christian-democratic type party, like the centre-right parties on the European mainland, possible more to the centre than to the right. (4) The Centre Party (Senterpartiet) was originally a party of farmers, but during during recent decades has become a party in defence of general rural interests. (5) The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) is a populist party which entered Norwegian politics in 1973 on a low-tax, anti-state-involvement platform. It has recently supplemented its traditional platform with a strong advocacy for using more ‘oil money’ to the benefit of the sick and elderly. 26 27

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This role and the ensuring obligations created an ethos of moderation and loyalty to the constitution, which is still alive. According to Alan Siaroff, analyses of corporatism have tended to involve two different uses.28 The first is corporatism as a system of interest representation. In line with this concept, Peter Munk Christiansen and Hilmar Rommetvedt define corporatism as an administrative model which covers the participation of organized interests through membership of public boards, councils, committees, through consultations, hearings, other formalized contacts, and often supported by a variety of informal contacts between bureaucrats and organized interests.29 Corporatism in this sense has its centre in the state. The other use is corporatism as a “type of organized or coordinated capitalism where power to make important economic policies is transferred from the parliament and government to semi-private organizations”.30 Or in the words of Franz Traxler: “Corporatism is characterized by interest associations taking responsibility for public policy – namely wage moderation”.31 The organizations or associations involved in this policy making are typically peak employer and labor organizations. Corporatism in this second meaning has its centre in the industrial relations system. Norway is corporatist in both senses of the concept. The strong integration of organized interests into political and administrative decision-making in Norway started in the late 19th century and was expanded during the first half of the 20th century. The strongly increasing public regulations of the private sector following the two world wars and the economic crisis of the 1930s prepared the ground for the integration of organized interests into a large number of policy areas. After the World War II, the organizations came progressively to hold a legitimate and institutionalized right to be involved in more or less all phases of political and administrative decision-making.32 This is illustrated by the number of public boards etc. with representation from interest organizations. In 1951, there were 145 such corporatist bodies, in 1965 242, and in 1983 542. From the 1980s, however, corporatism has declined somewhat, an indication of which is that in 1994 the number of corporatist bodies had decreased to 357. This 28 Alan Siaroff, Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning and Measurement, in: European Journal of Political Research 36 (1999), 2, pp. 175 – 205. 29 Peter Munk Christiansen / Hilmar Rommetvedt, From Corporatism to Lobbyism? Parliaments, Executives and Organized Interest in Denmark and Norway, in: Scandinavian Political Studies 22 (1999), 3, pp. 195 – 220. 30 Frederic L. Pryor, Corporatism as an Economic System: A Review Essay, in: Journal of Comparative Economics 12 (1988), 3, pp. 317 – 344, here p. 317. 31 Franz Traxler, The Metamorphoses of Corporatism: From Classical to Lean Patterns, in: European Journal of Political Research 43 (2004), 4, pp. 571 – 598, here p. 571. 32 Trond Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk 1920 – 1990 [Corporatism in Norway 1920 – 1990], Oslo 1994.

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reduction was the result of a deliberate attempt on the part of the government to reduce the complexity of public sector organization. The corporatist industrial relations in Norway are characterized by centralized and nation wide employer and labor organizations which are actors in a multitiered bargaining system. In this system, centralized concertation has been complemented by workplace structures of participation, negotiations and cooperation in productivity growth and industrial restructuring throughout the post-war period. The central concertation between the main organizations has several times been extended to include the state in tripartite incomes policy agreements with elements of fiscal and social policy. The extensive cooperation between the main parties in the labor market and the state constitutes a significant pillar in the particular Norwegian version of “coordinated market economies” (CMEs).33 This “cooperative capitalism” emerged as a solution to the specific challenges facing a small and open economy as the Norwegian one.34 It grew out of historical conflicts between labor and capital, conflicts which were threatening to the social order and to private business and which have been tamed through a series of compromises. These compromises became sources of various corporatist institutions and arrangements which today are the essence of the Norwegian political system. The Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (Nœringslivets Hovedorganisasjon, NHO) is the largest employers’ confederation in the private sector. NHO comprises about 16.000 firms with approximately 490.000 employees in 2001.35 The firms are members both of NHO and one of the 21 branch associations, which combine the roles of employers’ associations and industrial interest organizations. NHO exerts strong central authority over member associations on bargaining strategies, industrial action and the conclusion of collective agreements. The confederation is strongest in manufacturing. Its density is particular high in chemicals and metals.36 The other major employer confederation in the private sector is the Federation of Norwegian Commercial and Service Enterprises (Handels- og Servicenœringens Hovedorganisasjon, HSH). In additions, there are significant employer organizations in financial services, insurance, private health and welfare services, and agri33 Peter A. Hall / David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford 2001. 34 Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca (NY) 1985. 35 Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke / Stein Evju / Hans Otto Frøand, Det kollektive arbeidslivet. Organisasjoner, tariffavtaler, lønnsoppgjør og inntektspolitikk [The Collective Working Life. Organizations, Wage Agreements, Wage Settlements, and Income Policy], Oslo 2003. 36 Jon Erik Dølvik / Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke, Norway: The Revival of Centralized Concertation, in: Anthony Ferner / Richard Hyman (eds.), Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, Oxford 1998.

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culture. In 2001, organized enterprises in total covered about 58 percent of private sector employment, up from about 50 percent in 1995.37 In an international context, the union density in Norway is fairly high, 53 percent in 2000.38 This is a slight decrease from 1990 and 1995 when union density was 57 percent and 56 percent respectively. The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LO) has always been and is still the dominant union force. It has a traditional hegemony among blue-collar workers in core manufacturing industries and organizes a substantial proportion of employees in public sector. The other confederations are The Union of Education (Hovedorganisasjonen for universitets- og høyskoleutdannede, UNIO) with nine unions and 255.000 members, the Federation of Norwegian Professional Associations (Akademikernes Fellesorganisasjon, AF) representing 122.000 members organized in 15 unions, and the Confederation of Vocational Unions (Yrkesorganisasjonenes Sentralforbund, YS) consisting of 22 unions with 197.500 members. While union density in Norway has been relatively stable over the whole postwar period, LO’s share of members has, however, fallen. Despite the relative decline in membership, LO unions are still able to dominate the bargaining rounds. LO itself has a centralized power structure, exerting strong centrally authority over member unions. In contrast to the decline of corporatism in the state sector, the corporatism between the main parties in the labor market is highly intact and alive. Moreover, it must be characterized as balanced.

III. Lobbying in Norway 1. Lobbying during the latest decades Lobbying is not new in Norway. At the end of the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century, representatives of strong interest groups regularly contacted senior officials in the ministries or cabinet members directly in order to promote their interests.39 As described above, after World War II, lobbying was a common phenomenon, accompanying the more formalized contacts within the corporatist system. According to Harald Espeli40, Peter Munk Christiansen and Hilmar Rommetvedt41, the extent of lobbying directed at the Storting (the Parliament), the cabinet and the state 37 38 39 40 41

Stokke / Evju / Frøland, Det kollektive arbeidslivet (fn. 35). Ibidem. Harald Espeli, Lobbyvirksomhet på Stortinget [Lobbying in the Parliament], Oslo 1999. Ibidem. Christiansen / Rommetvedt, From Corporatism to Lobbyism (fn. 29).

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bureaucracy has increased during the latest decades. At the same time, the lobbyists seem to have concentrated more of their attention on the elected representatives in the Storting. During the first decades after World War II, the interest organizations emphasized contacts with the officials in the state administration.42 Since the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a distinct increase in political activities targeted at the decisions in the Storting.43 But at the beginning of the 1990s, the interest groups still had more contact with the public administration than with the Storting. There are probably several reasons for the increase in political lobbying in general and in lobbying towards the parliament in particular. One reason is that the public authorities, as demonstrated above, from the end of the 1970s reduced the number of corporatist boards, councils and committees.44 Many of these boards and committees were originally assigned to prepare or implement political decisions. When these bodies were closed, the organizations lost political influence. As a compensation for this loss, several interest organizations have instead invested in more direct and informal relations with relevant politicians and officials. Another explanation of the increased targeting of the parliamentarians is that the Storting during the latest decades has acquired more power compared with the cabinet and the administration.45 This development is particularly due to the fact that since the 1970s, several cabinets have only had a minority basis in the Storting. This situation has increased the significance of the Storting as a decision-making arena. At the same time, political conflicts in the Storting have become more pronounced, as evidenced by more frequent dissent in the reports from the parliamentary committees and by the fact that the cabinet in this period has lost more votes in the Storting than previously. This increased “politicization” is to some extent a result of more administrative resources allocated to the party groups and the committees in the Storting. These resources have strengthened the elected representatives’ capacity for controlling the government. Against this background, external interest groups, including private businesses, have been compelled to direct more of their political activity towards the members of parliament. 42 Bjørn Erik Rasch / Hilmar Rommetvedt, Makt og demokrati i norsk parlamentsforskning. Makt- og demokratiutredningen, rapport 2 [Power and Democracy in Norwegian Parliamentary Research. The Power and Democracy Study, Report No. 2], Oslo 1999. 43 Hilmar Rommetvedt / Ståle Opedal, Miljølobbyisme og næringskorporatisme? Norske miljø- og næringsorganisasjoners politiske påvirkning [Environment Lobbyism or Business Corporatism? The Political Influence of Norwegian Environment and Business Organizations], in: Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift 76 (1995), 3, pp. 279 – 302. 44 Nordby, Korporatisme (fn. 32); Trond Nordby, Samvirket mellom organisasjoner og stat: Norge. Makt- og demokratiutredningen, rapport 4 [Cooperation between Interest Organizations and the State: Norway. The Power and Democracy Study, Report No. 4], Oslo 1999. 45 Christiansen / Rommetvedt, From Corporatism to Lobbyism (fn. 29).

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The increase in political lobbying is, however, also related to more general changes in the working conditions of politicians.46 More volatility in the electorate and a sharper competition between the political parties have forced the politicians to appear more frequently in the mass media in order to obtain publicity for themselves and their political party. At the same time, they are more exposed to vigilant attention of the media and to their constant demands for comments and initiatives. As a result, politics has become more intense and instantaneous. Under such conditions, requests from lobbying interest groups may give the politicians an opportunity to demonstrate initiative and political vigor. But also changes outside the political system can have affected the extent of lobbying. As a result of basic changes in the economy, several new employer and labor organizations have emerged. On the labor side, new organizations are a result of a growth of jobs demanding academic qualifications. In the public sector, this growth has been spurred by the expansion of welfare services, in the private sector by technological progress and the appearance of the knowledge economy. The new organizations were at the beginning not included in the established corporatist bodies. The main organizations on both sides of the basic divide between labor and capital – LO and NHO – claimed the posts in these bodies for themselves, referring to their size and dominant positions as justification. Excluded from the corporatist channel of political influence, the new organizations, for instance Akademikernes Fellesorganisasjon (AF) and Yrkesorganisasjonenes Sentralforbund (YS), were instead compelled to concentrate upon direct political contacts and lobbying to promote their views. At the turn of the century, however, the new organizations have been admitted to many significant corporatist bodies. Moreover, the large number of attempts to influence public policy from all sorts of institutions and companies may indicate that there are limits to the capacity of nation wide organizations to represent their members’ interests. In most such organizations, there are at any time a plethora of different opinions and interests. The top leaders have to balance the various interests and opinions and carve out concerted and collective policies. However, it can be difficult to elicit the support of all members for a collective stand on difficult issues. And the individual members on their part may find that it take too much time and energy to mobilize their interest organization to represent their particular interests. As a result, to many members it may look more convenient to go on their own and communicate directly with the relevant political authorities. An indication of the relevance of the preceding ideas appeared in a study by Ole Berrefjord and Per Heum.47 They found that in the period from 1976 to 1988, large enterprises had reduced the extent of contacts with the main interest organizations Ibidem. Ole Berrefjord / Per Heum, Non-Market Governance of Business in a Market-Based Economy: The Case of Norway, in: Sven-Erik Sjøstrand (ed.), Institutional Change. Theory and Empirical Findings, New York 1993, pp. 319 – 337. 46 47

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in their respective industries. They also reported a decline in the number of private business leaders who stated that their firms were dependent upon the services of their interest organizations. Berrefjord and Heum explained this development with the increasing concentration within private business. As the large businesses had become bigger and more dominating within their respective sectors, they had also become more capable of exerting political pressures upon the public authorities on their own. 2. The Norwegian Leadership Study a) Data and methods The Leadership Study involved face-to-face interviews with 1.710 leaders of twelve main sectors or elite groups of Norwegian society and was conducted during 2000 and 2001.48 The twelve sectors were: (1) The church, (2) the state administration, (3) culture, (4) mass media, (5) private business, (6) cooperative enterprises, (7) public business enterprises, (8) civic organizations, (9) universities and research institutes, (10) police and the judicial system, (11) military services, and (12) politicians, i. e. members of the Storting, leaders of the political parties and members of the cabinet and their political secretaries. The original sample numbered 1.969 holders of high positions in these sectors, so the response rate of 87 percent was exceptionally robust, perhaps even unprecedented for a survey of national elites. Of the 1.710 leaders who were interviewed, 54 were top leaders of employer and industry associations, 297 were CEOs, presidents, vice-presidents and chairmen of the boards of the largest private enterprises in Norway. 9 percent of the leaders of business enterprises in our sample are owners. The response rate among the private business leaders was 74.8 percent. In order to get information about the business leaders’ lobbying activities, they were first asked if they last year had attempted to influence the outcome of a political decision which was of vital importance to their firm. 59 percent of the leaders confirmed that they had lobbied last year. This group of leaders were then shown a list of fourteen groups of decisionmakers and political bodies within the Storting, the cabinet, and the public bureaucracy as well as leaders and bodies outside the political system and then asked if they had approached one or more members of any of these groups or bodies. For each group or body which they confirmed to have contacted the business leaders were given various follow up questions. Business leaders who for instance reported that they had contacted parliamentary leaders, leaders of standing committees in the Storting or ordinary members of the Storting, were for instance asked to which political party and which committee these politicians belonged. Leaders who had approached members of the cabinet were requested to report for which ministry or ministries these cabinet members were responsible. And business leaders who had 48

Trygve Gulbrandsen et al., Norske makteliter [Norwegian Power Elites], Oslo 2002.

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communicated with officials in the ministries were invited to report in which ministries these officials worked. On the basis of the answers to these questions, I constructed an index measuring how many different groups of decision-makers or bodies they had contacted. This index gives an impression of how diversified their lobby strategy is. Next, I constructed two indicators of “top level” lobby strategy based upon information on whether they had communicated with parliamentarian leaders or cabinet ministers. To capture the more regular political network of the business leaders, we gave them a list of thirteen groups of leaders in the Norwegian society, among them members of the Storting, the government, and top leaders in the public administration. The business leaders were then asked how frequently they had had contact with members of these groups in connection with their work. They were given four options: (1) weekly or more frequently, (2) monthly, (3) less frequently, or (4) never. On the three indicators of membership in the “inner circle” of the business community: 79 percent of the business firm leaders reported that they had been member of three or more boards in other enterprises, 18 percent had been member of the election committee of a private firm, and 19 percent had been member of the board of a national business or employer organization. CEOs or chairmen of the board with a dominant ownership position in the enterprise or representing a family with such an ownership position were defined as owners. Ownership of at least 33 percent of the shares was set as the criterion for a dominant ownership position. The owners are compared with employed CEOs and chairmen of the boards with no or small ownership shares. 9 percent of business leaders in our sample are owners, 24 percent are professional chairmen of the board, and 67 percent are employed CEOs. The leaders were asked if they previously had worked full time at least one year in other sectors. They were then asked to report how many years they had worked in each of a number of sectors. Close to 7 percent of the private business leaders had worked one year or more in politics, 18 percent in public administration. I have used the number of years in politics and in the public administration as separate variable in the analyses. In the analyses, I have as control variables included the size and the industry of the firm of the business leaders. The information about the firms’ industry is on two digit level. Firm size was measured by the number of employees. The average number of employees was 4.225.

b) Findings The first row in table 1 shows the percentage of the owners, professional chairmen, employed CEOs and top leaders in employer and industry associations re-

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spectively who last year attempted to influence the outcome of a political decision. The table demonstrates that the top leaders in the employer and industry associations are the most active lobbyists in private business. Nearly all of them made an attempt last year to affect the outcome of a political decision. This finding is not surprising. These associations have a particular role as representatives of business interests within the Norwegian corporatist system. Table 1 illustrates then that business political action is significantly conditioned by the institutional-political context in Norway. Table 1 also demonstrates that many of the top leaders of the individual enterprises as well engage in lobbying. Employed CEOs are more active lobbyists than both owners and chairmen of the board. 63 percent of them contacted decision-makers in the political system last year with the purpose of presenting their opinions, while about half of the large owners did the same. Below it will be checked if these differences are statistically significant. Table 1 Political lobbying among top leaders in private business

Attempted to influence a political decisions last year (percent)

(Employed) Top leaders of employer and CEOs and industry vice-presidents associations

Owners

(Employed) chairmen of the board

48

50

63

94

N

27

72

198

54

Average number of decisionmakers or decision-making bodies contacted in the particular case

4.4

5.1

5.8

7.9

Number of leaders

27

34

124

51

When the top leaders in private business decide to engage themselves in political lobbying, how do they go about it? The third row in table 1 shows that they proceed on a wide front. They approach several decision-makers or decision-making bodies at the same time in order to present their views. Again, top leaders in the business organizations are lobbying wider than the other top leader groups. They contact as many as eight different decision-makers or bodies when they want to control the outcome of a particular decision. Employed CEOs approach six different political actors or bodies. Owners are least diversified in their lobby strategy, communicating with four decisions-makers. Table 2 exhibits results of multivariate analyses where the lobbying of the top leaders of the individual businesses enterprises is related to the various explanatory and control variables (The top leaders of the business associations are excluded in the following analyses). The first column shows whether the business leaders’ decision to involve themselves in lobbying last year was related to their status within

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the business community, their leadership position within the firm and their experience from the political system (controlled for size and industry of the company). In this analysis, only one of the hypotheses formulated above was supported: Business leaders who are or have been members of a public board, committee or council lobbied last year more frequently than leaders without such posts (only significant on the 10 percent level). However, top leaders, whose positions within the business community could indicate that they belong to an inner circle, were not more prone to lobby than business leaders without such positions. Owners are not more likely to involve themselves in lobbying than employed top leaders, and previous occupational experience from politics and public sector does not matter either. In the first column in Table 3, a model of the leaders’ propensity to contact members of the cabinet (including their parliamentary secretaries) is presented. As mentioned above, contacting members of cabinet is seen as an indication of a “top level” lobby strategy. As hypothesized above, the probability of approaching cabinet members is significantly (on 10 percent level) higher among business leaders who have posts on three or more boards in other firms (i. e. inner circle membership) than among leaders with less posts. Moreover, this form of high-level lobbying seems to be affected by their previous experience with the corporatist system for decision-making. As expected top leaders who have been member of one of the many corporatist bodies are more likely to meet members of cabinet than leaders without such experience. In addition, the chief executives and directors of the biggest firms target members of cabinet more than other leaders. The second column reports results concerning the second indicator of top level lobbying: to what extent the business leaders have sought out any of the leaders of the political parties in the Storting in order to influence their decisions. The first finding to notice in this column is that employed CEOs less often than owners have contacted leaders in the parliament. This finding indicates that owners emphasize a top-level approach when they engage in political lobbying. I have also checked if these owners preferred to meet leaders of conservative parties to leaders of socialist parties. But there are no differences as to the political affiliation of the targets of the owners. Next, business leaders who have worked within politics also are more inclined to go directly to leaders in the Storting when they want to obtain decisions which are favorable to their firm or industry. To what extent do the business leaders cultivate regular contacts with politicians and top leaders in the political system? In order to have an impact upon the decisions in the ministries or in the Storting, it is probably not sufficient to start lobbying when a particular issue or case is placed on the agenda. The ability to influence political decisions requires that the lobbyist already has acquired the necessary knowledge about how the decision-making process is organized. Who is responsible for considering the particular case or the political question of interest to the business leader and for suggesting a solution? Where are the important decisions

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Table 2 Percentage of business leaders who lobbied last year and the number of decision-makers contacted

Intercept Three posts on boards of private firms Member of an election committee Member of the board of an employer association Group of business leaders (compared to owners) Chairmen of the board CEOs Member of a public board or committee Occup. experience from politics (no. of years) Occup. experience from public administration (no. of years) Number of employees Industry (compared with manufacturing): Energy production Construction Trade Hotels and restaurants Transport Finance Business services R2 Number of leaders

Lobbied last year. Logistic regression

No. of decision-makers or bodies contacted. OLS-regression49

–0.286 (0.556) –0.116 (0.319) 0.121 (0.345)

3.133 (1.487)** 0.716 (0.750) –0.050 (0.812)

0.430 (0.326)

0.867 (0.729)

–0.086 (0.470) 0.500 (0.432) 0.603 (0.343)*

0.624 (1.291) 1.490 (1.171) 1.432 (0.726)**

0.027 (0.065)

0.309 (0.136)**

0.113 (0.072) 0.00002 (0.00002)

–0.079 (0.132) 0.00003 (0.00003)

–0.239 (0.743) –0.195 (0.584) –0.466 (0.410) –0.401 (1.455) 0.319 (0.455) 0.372 (0.413) 0.172 (0.349)

1.061 (1.837) –1.788 (1.388) –0.159 (1.030) 0.073 (3.913) 0.300 (1.034) 0.082 (0.930) –0.130 (0.824)

0.02

0.02 171

** Statistically significant at level 0,05.50 * Statistically significant at level 0,10. 49 Regression analysis helps us to study the form of relationship between two variables in a graph presenting the data points. In linear regression it is estimated a direct line “through” the data points in the graph. The procedure in OLS-regression (ordinary least squares-regression) is to minimize the sum of squares of the vertical distances between the data points and the estimated regression line. Logistic regression is applied when the dependent variable is a categorical variable. 50 Statistical analyses start with a hypothesis that there is no co-variation between two characteristics (e. g. social background and voting) in a population of for instance business leaders. This is called the null-hypothesis. Statistical significance indicates the degree to which this null-hypothesis is rejected, i. e. to what extent the co-variation between the two characteristics is more than accidental. For instance, significant at level 0.05 means that there is only a 5 percent probability that the co-variation is accidental, or in reverse that there is a 95 percent probability that the co-variation is not accidental.

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taken? Such knowledge is essential for the planning of where to direct the lobby activities. The lobbyist must also be able to assess how the case or issue relates to other political issues on the agenda. In addition, the influence of the lobbyist may depend upon the extent of which he or she finds understanding and is met with trust by the contacted decision-makers. Table 3 Top-level lobbying. Logistic regression analysis

Intercept Three posts on boards of private firms Member of an election committee Member of the board of an employer association Group of business leaders (compared to owners) Chairmen of the board CEOs Member of a public board or committee Occup. experience from politics (no. of years) Occup. experience from public administration (no. of years) Number of employees Industry (compared with manufacturing): Energy production Construction Trade Hotels and restaurants Transport Finance Business services Number of leaders

Targeted members of cabinet

Targeted leaders of the party groups in the Storting

0.044 (0.930* 0.869 (0.457)* 0.053 (0.532)

0.135 (0.879) 0.420 (0.457) 0.203 (0.471)

0.101 (0.459)

–0.032 (0.429)

0.385 (0.791) 0.187 (0.717) 1.190 (0.563)**

–1.129 (0.748) –1.223.(0.682)* 0.699 (0.424)*

0.216 (0.163)

0.188 (0.097)*

0.040 (0.090) 0.00009 (0.00005)*

0.007 (0.076) 0.00002 (0.00002)

–0.937 (1.295) –0.673 (0.961) –1.127 (0.662)* 13.290 (1373.2) –0.612 (0.671) –0.797 (0.644) –0.948 (0.533)*

0.338 (1.028) –1.881 (1.132)* –0.090 (0.604) 13.640 (1252.0) –0.160 (0.590) 0.121 (0.529) –0.309 (0.482)

171

171

** Statistically significant at level 0,05. * Statistically significant at level 0,10.

Obtaining the necessary knowledge about the political system and the understanding on the part of the decision-makers may require that the lobbyist for some time has had regular contact with the potential decision-makers. Influence is not an isolated event or process, but probably unfolds best in ongoing relationships. To what extent then do the business leaders uphold such contacts with the political

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decision-makers? Table 4 shows the percentage of leaders within each group who the year before at least once a month had been in contact with members of the Storting and the Government and with senior civil servants. Table 4 The frequency of contact with various groups of decision-makers in the political system. Percentage reporting to have had contact monthly or more frequently Owners

Chairmen of the board

CEOs

Contact with members of the Storting

11

18

20

Contact with members of the cabinet

4

6

8

Contact with top leaders in the public administration

11

18

28

Number of leaders

27

72

198

When we compare the findings in this table with the ones in the table 1, a striking pattern appears: While a large part of the business leaders have been active lobbyists in single cases or issues, few of them see politicians and top leaders in the public administration regularly. Moreover, CEOs and vice-presidents meet with members of the Norwegian parliamentarians and top bureaucrats more often than owners do. Table 5 presents the results of multivariate analyses of the frequency of which the business leaders keep in touch with parliamentarians, members of cabinet and top officials in the state administration respectively. In these analyses, the variable “being or having been member of a corporatist body” is excluded, since it is part of such assignments to have regular contact with politicians and top officials. Another striking pattern shows up in this table: Business leaders with central positions in the business community (belonging to the inner circle) have more frequent contact with all three groups of decision-makers than business leaders without such positions. Top leaders who hold at least three posts on boards in other companies communicate more often with both members of the Storting and cabinet and with top leaders in the state administration. Business leaders who are members of the election committee of a large company have more regularly contact with parliamentarians and members of cabinet than other leaders. And those members of the business elite who have posts on the board of a national business and employer organization meet members of the Storting more often than leaders without such posts. These findings seem to indicate, in line with Michael Useem’s theoretical ideas, that in the business community in Norway there is in fact an inner circle of business leaders who systematically cultivate relationships with significant decision-makers in the political system.

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Trygve Gulbrandsen Table 5 Frequency of contact with (1) members of the Storting, (2) members of the cabinet, (3) top leaders in the state administration. OLS-regressions. Standard error in parentheses Regular contact with members of the Storting

Intercept 1.545 (0.170)*** Three posts on boards of private firms 0.262 (0.093)*** Member of an election committee 0.335 (0.101)*** Member of the board of an employer association 0.335 (0.101)*** Group of business leaders (compared to owners) Chairmen of the board –0.112 (0.146) CEOs 0.074 (0.134) Occup. experience from politics (no. of years) 0.094 (0.017)*** Occup. experience from public administration (no. of years) 0.046 (0.018)** Number of employees –4.049E-7 (0.05E-5) Industry (compared with manufacturing): Energy production 0.198 (0.224) Construction –0.157 (0.176) Trade –0.239 (0.123)* Hotels and restaurants –0.250 (0.453) Transport 0.153 (0.145) Finance 0.202 (0.120)* Business services 0.016 (0.105) R2 Number of leaders

0.22 296

Regular contact with members of the cabinet

Regular contact with top leaders in the state administration

1.372 (0.153)***

1.554 (0.173)***

0.287 (0.085)***

0.281 (0.096)***

0.301 (0.093)***

0.168 (0.105

0.063 (0.087)

–0.125 (0.098)

–0.104 (0.132) –0.009 (0.121)

–0.050 (0.149) 0.265 (0.136)*

0.063 (0.016)*** 0.029 (0.017)* 0.8E-5 (0.000064)*

–0.46 (0.206) 0.046 (0.162) –0.131 (0.113) 0.370 (0.416) –0.004 (0.123) 0.021 (0.110) –0.123 (0.096) 0.14 297

0.037 (0.018)** 0.072 (0.019)*** 0.000002 (0.000005)

0.557 (0.232)** 0.206 (0.182) –0.075 (0.128) –0.317 (0.469) 0.057 (0.139) 0.145 (0.125) –0.014 (0.109) 0.13 295

*** Statistically significant at level 0,01. ** Statistically significant at level 0,05 * Statistically significant at level 0,10.

Next, column 3 in table 5 demonstrates that employed top leaders, “managerial capitalists”, maintain more contacts with top leaders in the state bureaucracy than owners. Again in line with Useem, but contrary to what should be expected from property rights theory. The contact pattern of the business leaders is particularly affected by previous occupational experience within the political system and public administration. The

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more years they previously have worked within these two sectors, the more frequently they see politicians in the Storting and cabinet and top officials in the state administration. These findings support the hypotheses derived from the institutional perspective discussed above. In addition, business leaders in the biggest firms seem to be more eager to keep in touch with members of the cabinet than leaders in smaller companies. Business leaders within the financial sector have more regularly contact and leaders within trade have less contact with parliamentarians than business leaders within manufacturing industries. Top leaders within energy production keep more regularly in touch with senior officials in the state administration than their colleagues within other industries. c) Discussion The findings reported in this paper demonstrate that private business lobbying in Norway is extensive. The leaders of the employer and industry associations are the spearheads in private business political action. On behalf of both more general as well as concrete business interests, they engage in a whole range of actions in order to influence political decisions. The top leaders in the individual enterprises involve themselves less frequently in concrete lobbying. But because there are a large number of big firms, the total of private business lobbying directed towards politicians and officials in Norway is considerable. An important purpose of this paper has been to discuss and check empirically the relevance of three different theories or explanations of variations in the lobby strategies of individual business leaders. These theories focus upon respectively: (1) the relevance of membership in the inner circle of private business, (2) the behavior of owners compared to employed managers, and (3) the significance of previous experiences in the political system. The analyses presented above show that all three theories received some empirical support. (1) Business leaders who have positions in the business community, which according to Useem are characteristic of membership in the inner circle, are more active attempting to influence public policy than other leaders. Admittedly, only one of the three variables measuring inner circle status was significantly related to only one of the indicators of lobbying. As shown above, members of the business elite who have at least three posts on the boards of other firms target members of cabinet more often than their fellow business leaders. But more importantly, they seem to spend more time on maintaining regular contacts with significant decision-makers both in the Storting, the cabinet and the state administration. In other words, the leaders belonging to the inner circle concentrate more on networking and general lobbying than “ordinary” business leaders. This is exactly what should be expected from members of an inner circle. They should give priority to general political issues, and they design long-term oriented

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strategies for dealing with politicians. They should emphasize establishing relationships with significant decision-makers where information and ideas may move both ways and where mutual trust may develop. Such ongoing relationships may ease later negotiations and pave the way for political compromises in controversial issues. In contrast to this, as I mentioned above, most of the lobbying which the “ordinary” business leaders in our survey have reported is about relatively narrow issues pertaining only to the individual firm or branch. The question remains, however, whether those top leaders who hold central positions in the business community really belong to an inner circle, that is, whether there in fact is an active inner circle. As mentioned above, Useem describes this inner circle as a group of business leaders who intentionally comes together in order to identify common interests and formulate united policy positions.51 That similar positions lead to similarity as to political action, is not, however, a sufficient evidence of the presence of such a policy elite. A central position, for instance as a member of the board of national employer organization, can give business leaders an incentive to invest more in political lobbying. But there need not be any previous deliberations or coordination between them as to the particular interests they are promoting. It has to be left to further research to find out whether the members of the inner core actively discuss and define collective business concerns and act on behalf of these when they are lobbying According to Sigmund Grønmo and Trond Løyning, the extent of interlocking directorates in the Norwegian economy has decreased between 1970 and 2000.52 Moreover, they found that the core of the network of these interlocking directorates was smaller at the end of the century than at the beginning of the period which they studied. These findings may indicate that there has been a certain fragmentation of a formerly existing inner circle. (2) The analyses presented in this paper have produced mixed results as to the political action of large owners. In several respects, their lobbying does not differ significantly from the lobby activities of managerial capitalists. Lobbying is as common among owners as among the other groups of business leaders. Moreover, their lobby strategies have many similarities. Both large owners and employed business leaders contact several different decisions-makers at the same time. They approach both members of the Storting, the Government and top leaders in the state administration. There are, however, also some significant differences as to lobby strategy between the owners and the other leaders. The owners give a stronger priority to the Storting as a target for their lobby activities. They contact parliamentary leaders more frequently than employed business leaders, and they give less priority to maintain ongoing relations with leading officials in the state administration. 51 52

Useem, The Inner Circle (fn. 10). Grønmo / Løyning, Sosiale nettverk (fn. 13).

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401

These mixed findings imply that some of the theoretical ideas about the owners’ lobbying which were discussed above are not quite relevant as explanations of the observed patterns. Being receivers of the economic residual in private firms may motivate owners to see to that the operation of their firm is as efficient as possible. It is more doubtful, however, whether this economic incentive also impinges upon the owners’ political lobbying. The owners’ particular lobby strategy appears to be best elucidated by referring to their power position and to a changed ideological climate in the Norwegian society. There are relatively few large firms in the Norwegian economy which are controlled by their founders or their inheritors, and where the owner(s) at the same time holds the position as CEO or chairman of the board. The owners of these few firms have considerable power. By their sheer size, the firms are important for employment and for revenues, forcing political authorities to pay heed to the owners’ interests and demands. Moreover, several of these large owners are significant shareholders in other large Norwegian enterprises as well, thus having acquired a say in the strategic decisions in these enterprises. Compared to employed CEOs and chairmen of the board large, owners remain longer in office. Probably this situation increases their opportunities to develop valuable relations to other top leaders in private business and to get access to positions of power within the business community, both of which will buttress the power which is derived from their ownership. The large owners’ power opens the doors to centres of political decision-making, and the self-confidence which the power bestows on them moves them to enter these circles in order to promote their interests. As a result, the owners’ lobby strategy becomes focussed upon political top-level contacts. But why have the political decision-makers been willing to let the owners in and listen to their arguments? One reason is that there during the latest decades has been an increase in the number of large owners, forcing the political authorities to pay more heed to their opinions. This development is due to a concentration in sectors like retail, hotels and property management, spurred by deregulations in the respective markets and a reduction in capital taxes at the beginning of the 1990s. Another reason is that the stock market today plays a more significant role in the Norwegian economy than a couple of decades ago. As a result, the political authorities have had to accommodate to the demands of international investors and to international norms of good “corporate governance”. The owners’ access to the decision-makers in the political system is also, however, a product of the general changes in the ideological environment which have taken place since the beginning of the 1980s. In Norway, as in several other western countries, market liberalism has become progressively more entrenched. The market is increasingly seen as a legitimate and effective mechanism for governing and regulating private as well as public activities. Private ownership of the means of production is a basic element in the market capitalism. Owners of private firms then have come to epitomize the

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Trygve Gulbrandsen

market liberalism, the agents through which the market produces its alleged economic benefits. This change in ideological climate was to some extent triggered off by the failure of Keynesian policies and central planning to solve the problems that arose in the wake of the oil crisis in the beginning of the 1970s. (3) The results of the statistical analyses are particularly convincing as to the significance of previous experiences in the political system for the form of lobby strategy pursued by the business leaders. Both, occupational experience from politics and public sector and experiences as formal representatives of business interests in corporatist bodies, result in both, more lobbying and more top-level contacts. Such experiences seem also to motivate the leaders to maintain regular contacts with important decision-makers. There is no information about the career background of previous generations of leaders in private business. Anecdotal evidence indicates, however, that it has become more common to emphasize experience from politics or civil service as a valuable asset when recruiting to top positions in the private sector. This development bears in itself witness to the significance which private business attaches to political decisions. These findings illustrate that it is important to pay heed to the political-institutional context to be able to understand the lobbying strategies prevailing among the members of the business elite. The corporatist system of decision-making in Norway has involved a sizeable minority of the business leaders in public boards, committees and councils where they have participated in preparing or implementing political decisions. Through this participation they have acquired firsthand knowledge about how the political system is functioning. Moreover, they have probably also made personal acquaintance with politicians and senior officials whom they later can contact for information or for promoting their interests. Both, the knowledge and the personal contacts, improve the business leaders’ ability to operate as lobbyists within the political system. Knowing that experience from the political system is an asset for lobbyists, those responsible for recruiting new business leaders emphasize occupational experience from politics or the state administration as a valuable qualification. The new leaders, on their part, attempt to live up to the expectations from the principals. On the basis of their experiences they develop lobby strategies that are more diversified than the ones followed by the other business leaders.

IV. Conclusions Private business lobbying in Norway is extensive. In spite of their opposition to state intervention, business leaders lobby actively for public subsidies or regulations giving themselves favorable market conditions or protection. Business leaders basically seem to be characterized by a ‘both-and’ orientation. They want the best

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403

out of the state. At the same time, they advocate for more elements from a liberal market model of political governance. In this article I have distinguished between specific lobbying directed at particular decisions in the political system and networking where the business leaders cultivate regular contact with significant decision-makers. When the leaders engage in lobbying, it is usually in the form of specific lobbying. They attempt to influence the outcome of decisions which pertain to the specific, often narrow, interests of their own firm. It is less common to spend time and resources on networking. Networking as a lobby strategy is particularly used by business leaders who by virtue of their positions in the business community belong to an inner circle within the business elite. Owners of large enterprises direct more than other leaders their lobby strategies towards the top echelons of the political system. They go directly to cabinet ministers and parliamentary leaders when they want to express their opinions on political issues concerning their own firm. Business leaders who previously have worked within politics or the civil administration exhibit a more diversified lobby strategy than leaders without such experiences. The same pattern is visible among business leaders who have been members of one of the many boards and committees which are characteristic of the Norwegian corporatist system of decisions-making.

Change of Values, Interpretations and Legitimations

„Sozialistische Manager“ und betriebliche Sozialpolitik in der DDR und Polen. Anmerkungen zu einem Vergleich Von Peter Hübner I. Einleitung Die Beziehung zwischen Unternehmens- bzw. Betriebsmanagement und Sozialpolitik ist ein Kapitel für sich. Man kennt die Bilder des frühen Industriezeitalters, auf denen in oft etwas verdruckster Konstellation Gehrock- und Zylinderträger zusammen mit den in grau-blauem Drillich posierenden Adressaten betrieblicher Sozialwohltaten zu sehen sind.1 Immerhin: Nicht gerade wenige Fälle gelten als geschichtsnotorisch, in denen sich der „Chef“ an Ort und Stelle, in der Werkstatt etwa, nach den Lebensumständen und Sorgen seiner Beschäftigten und ihrer Familien erkundigte. Solche Szenen gehören zu einer noch immer lebendigen europäischen Unternehmenskultur.2 Daraus bezog auch jener Personenkreis, der im Folgenden als „sozialistische Manager“ bezeichnet wird, zumindest zum Teil seine traditionalen und mentalen Ressourcen.3 Historisch sind das „klassische“ wie auch das 1 Klaus Türk, Konstruktionen und Diskurse – Das Industriebild als gesellschaftsgeschichtliche Quelle, in: Sabine Benecke / Hans Ottomeyer (Hg.), Die zweite Schöpfung. Bilder der industriellen Welt vom 18. Jahrhundert bis in die Gegenwart, Berlin 2002, S. 34 – 39. 2 Mirko Degener, Unternehmenserfolg und soziale Verantwortung: Unternehmenskultur und Human-Ressource-Management und der Einfluß auf den ökonomischen Erfolg und das subjektive Erleben der Beschäftigten, Berlin et al. 2004. 3 Vgl. zur DDR u. a. Heinrich Best / Michael Hofmann (Hg.), Unternehmer und Manager im DDR-Sozialismus / Entrepreneurs and Managers in Socialism (= Historische Sozialforschung / Historical Social Research 30 (2005), 2 [Sonderheft / Special Issue No. 112]), Köln 2005; Heike Knortz, Innovationsmanagement in der DDR 1973 / 79 – 1989. Der sozialistische Manager zwischen ökonomischen Herausforderungen und Systemblockaden, Berlin 2004; für Polen siehe u. a. Tomasz Zukowski, Fabryki-urzedy. Rozwazania o adzie spo eczno-gospodarczym w polskich zak adach przemys owych w latach realnego socjalizmu [Fabrikangestellte. Überlegungen zur sozialökonomischen Ordnung in polnischen Industriebetrieben in den Jahren des Realsozialismus], in: Witold Morawski (Hg.), Zmierzch socjalizmu pan´stwowego. Szkice z socjologii ekonomicznej [Niedergang des Staatssozialismus. Skizze zur ökonomischen Soziologie], Warszawa 1994, S. 160 – 174; Maciej Tymin´ski, PZPR i przedsiebiorstwo. Nadzór partyjny nad zak adami przemys owymi 1956 – 1970 [PZPR und Betrieb. Die Parteiaufsicht über die Industriebetriebe 1956 – 1970], Warszawa 2001; Dorota Jagodzin´ska-Sasson et al., PZPR w fabryce: studium wroc awskiego „Pafawagu“ w poczatku lat piec´dziesiatych, oprac. pod kier. Marcina Kuli [Die PZPR in der Fabrik: Eine Studie zum Bres-

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„sozialistische“ Management im Industriezeitalter zu lokalisieren, vor dem Kulturbruch, der die in quarterly results denkenden Anhänger der Sharholder-Value-Philosopie auf die Bühne rief.4 Die im Folgenden verwendeten Begriffe des „sozialistischen Managers“ und der „betrieblichen Sozialpolitik“ bedürfen vielleicht einer knappen Erklärung. Der Manager-Begriff fand in den Ländern des sowjetischen Blocks, darunter auch in der DDR und in der Volksrepublik Polen (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL) keine offizielle Verwendung. Er tauchte zwar zeitgenössisch in ironisierender oder pejorativer Konnotation auf, doch geschah dies in einer Weise, bei der man bewusst auf die Diskrepanz zwischen Schein und Sein aufmerksam machen wollte. Gemeint war in der Regel das Leitungspersonal staatlicher Wirtschaftseinheiten, insbesondere der Betriebe. Unter „betrieblicher Sozialpolitik“ wurden im Allgemeinen, nicht ohne anfängliche Irritationen um den Terminus „Sozialpolitik“, die Organisation der Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen und die Realisierung staatlicher Sozialpolitik im Betrieb verstanden. In beiden Fällen sind Differenzen zu den ursprünglichen Begriffen des Managements im Sinne einer leitende Aufgaben erfüllenden Personengruppe, die Interessen des Arbeitgebers gegenüber der Arbeitnehmerschaft vertritt, und der betrieblichen Sozialpolitik als Teil allgemeiner Unternehmenspolitik, offensichtlich. Diese Differenzen ergeben sich nicht nur aus unterschiedlichen Funktionszusammenhängen, durch die sich das „sozialistische Management“ und die betriebliche Sozialpolitik im Sozialismus von ihren „kapitalistischen“ Gegenstücken abhoben. Sie haben auch mit der ambivalenten Position des Leitungspersonals in staatlichen Betrieben sozialistischer Planwirtschaften zu tun. Zwischen den politischen Führungs- und wirtschaftlichen Planungsinstanzen einerseits und den Beschäftigten des jeweiligen Betriebes andererseits zu agieren, hieß auch, in einem repressiven politischen System mit strikten wirtschaftlichen Vorgaben und unter den Bedingungen eines engmaschigen Arbeits- und Sozialrechts den betrieblichen Erfolg zu organisieren. Inwieweit es Versuche gab, aus diesen Zwängen auszubrechen, und ob daraus, wie es das Thema der Tagung vermuten lässt, ein „neuer Geist des Kapitalismus“ erwuchs und die „Erosion des Staatssozialismus“ beschleunige, wäre noch zu erörtern. lauer „Pafawag“ in den frühen 1950er Jahren, erarbeitet unter Leitung von Marcin Kula], Warszawa 2001; Ma gorzata Mazurek, Socjalistyczny zak ad pracy. Porównanie fabrycznej codziennos´ci w PRL i NRD u progu lat szes´c´dziesiatych [Der sozialistische Betrieb. Ein Vergleich des Fabrikalltags in der VRP und der DDR an der Schwelle der sechziger Jahre], Warszawa 2005. Siehe auch die Beiträge von Ma gorzata Mazurek und Michel Christian in: Sandrine Kott / Marcin Kula / Thomas Lindenberger (Hg.), Socjalizm w zyciu powszednim dyktatura a spo eczenstwo w NRD i PRL [Sozialismus im Alltag der Diktatur und die Gesellschaft in der DDR und der VRP], Warszawa 2006. 4 Zur Gegenströmung vgl. Bruno Palier, The Re-orientation of European Social Policies Toward Social Investment, in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft (IPG) 13 (2006), 1, S. 105 – 116.

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Über Status und Funktion der „sozialistischen Manager“ ist in den letzten Jahren an verschiedenen Stellen und in unterschiedlichen Zusammenhängen nachgedacht worden.5 Allerdings spielte dabei die Frage, wie sich das Problem in einem ostdeutsch-polnischen Vergleich spiegelte, eine allenfalls untergeordnete Rolle.6 Die Ergebnisse einschlägiger Forschungen zeigen zumindest zweierlei: (1.) Die DDR und die PRL stellten im Ostblock keine Sonderfälle dar, ein entsprechender Vergleich zwischen anderen Ländern dieser Region würde kaum andere Ergebnisse liefern. (2.) Der wesentliche Gewinn dürfte in einer differenzierteren Sicht auf die Zusammenhänge von historischer Pfadabhängigkeit und oktroyierten Systemzwängen liegen. Eine indirekte Bestätigung dieser Befunde lässt sich unschwer auch nicht-komparativen Studien zum sozialpolitischen Wirken des Betriebsmanagements in der DDR und der PRL entnehmen.7 Genau genommen fächert sich das Thema dieses Beitrages in mehrere Vergleichsebenen auf: Da ist zum einen das Management im DDR-PRL-Vergleich, zum Zweiten kommt – ebenfalls im ostdeutsch-polnischen Vergleich – die betriebliche Sozialpolitik als Institution hinzu, und drittens schließlich geht es um einen Vergleich der sozialpolitischen Management-Praktiken im Betrieb. Ohne dass dies hier im Einzelnen auszuloten wäre, sind vier Aspekte etwas näher auszuführen, aber auch das nur skizzenhaft bis thesenartig: a) das Verhältnis von staatlicher und betrieblicher Sozialpolitik; b) der Umgang mit sozialen Erwartungen und Forderungen; c) das Konfliktverhalten; d) die sozialen Wertorientierungen des Managements. Allerdings spricht manches dafür, den komparativen Ansatz nicht überzustrapazieren. Denn die Wirtschafts- und Sozialsysteme beider Staaten waren strukturell gleich oder zumindest doch ziemlich ähnlich. Innerhalb der DDR und der PRL fan5 Peter Hübner (Hg.), Eliten im Sozialismus. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR, Berlin / Weimar / Wien 1999; Heinrich Best / Michael Hofmann (Hg.), Unternehmer und Manager im Sozialismus (= Historische Sozialforschung 30 (2005), 2, Sonderheft), Köln 2005. 6 Peter Hübner, Arbeitskampf im Konsensgewand? Zum Konfliktverhalten von Arbeitern im „realen“ Sozialismus, in: Hendrik Bispinck et al. (Hg.), Aufstände im Ostblock. Zur Krisengeschichte des realen Sozialismus, Berlin 2004, S. 195 – 213; Peter Hübner, Norm, Normalität, Normalisierung: Quellen und Ziele eines gesellschaftspolitischen Paradigmenwechsels im sowjetischen Block um 1970, in: Potsdamer Bulletin für Zeithistorische Studien Nr. 28 / 29 (2003), S. 24 – 40; Peter Hübner / Christa Hübner, Sozialismus als soziale Frage. Sozialpolitik in der DDR und Polen 1968 – 1976, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2008; Mazurek, Socjalistyczny zak ad pracy (Fn. 3). 7 Peter Hübner, Durch Planung zur Improvisation. Zur Geschichte des Leitungspersonals in der staatlichen Industrie der DDR, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 39 (1999), S. 197 – 233; Peter Hübner, Menschen-Macht-Maschinen. Technokratie in der DDR, in: Peter Hübner (Hg.), Eliten im Sozialismus (Fn. 5), S. 325 – 360; Jeannette Z. Madarász, Working in East Germany. Normality in a Socialist Dictatorship, 1961 – 1979, New York 2006; Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus. Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany 1945 – 1990, Cambridge (Mass.) / London 2007; Tymin´ski, PZPR i przedsiebiorstwo (Fn. 3); Ma gorzata Mazurek, Spo eczen´stwo Kolejki: Polska 1956 – 1981 [Die Gesellschaft des Schlangestehens: Polen 1956 – 1981], Warszawa 2009.

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den sich, was die betriebliche Sozialpolitik betrifft, deutlich ausgeprägte regionale Differenzierungen, die denen zwischen beiden Ländern kaum nachstanden. Man kann sie etwa zwischen Betrieben in den alten sächsischen Industriestandorten und solchen im Norden der DDR antreffen.8 Sie betrafen nicht so sehr die technische Ausstattung und die Betriebsabläufe als vielmehr die Sozialisation der Beschäftigten und die im Umfeld vorherrschenden sozialen Milieus. Ähnliches ließe sich über die Unterschiede zwischen Polen „A“ und “ B“ oder auch zwischen den ehemaligen Teilungsgebieten sagen.9

II. Zum Verhältnis von staatlicher und betrieblicher Sozialpolitik Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis des betrieblichen Leitungspersonals zur Sozialpolitik im Betrieb schließt notwendigerweise auch die nach Verhältnis von staatlicher und betrieblicher Sozialpolitik ein. Für die Verbindung beider war der in den staatssozialistischen Ländern vorherrschende Status der Betriebe als staatliches Eigentum entscheidend. Dies prädestinierte sie geradezu als wichtige Träger der staatlichen Sozialpolitik. Wenn das Feld der betrieblichen Sozialpolitik im Wesentlichen die durch gesetzliche Regelungen fixierten Aufgabenbereiche 1.) Arbeiterversorgung, 2.) kulturelle Aktivitäten, 3.) gesundheitliche und soziale Betreuung der Beschäftigten, 4.) Betriebssport und Jugendbetreuung, 5.) Kinderbetreuung, 6.) Ferienbetreuung und Naherholung und 7.) Wohnungswirtschaft umfasste, so ergab sich allein schon hieraus eine große Schnittmenge zwischen betrieblichen Sozialmaßnahmen und staatlicher Sozialpolitik.10 8 Zu diesem Problem siehe Jan Palmowski, Regional Identities and the Limits of Democratic Centralism in the GDR, in: Journal of Contemporary History 41 (2006), 3, S. 503 – 526. 9 Marek Sobczynski, Structure of the Country, in: Marek Koter (Hg.), Inner Divisions (= Region and Regionalism 1), University of Lódz, Silesian Institute in Opole, Lódz / Opole 1994, S. 103 – 116; Jerzy Holzer (Hg.), Pozostalosc granicy rozbiorowej w swiadomosci i kulturze materialnej ludnosci gminy Golub-Dobrzyn [Überreste der Teilungsgrenze im Bewußtsein und in der materiellen Kultur der Bevölkerung der Gemeinde Golub-Dobrzyn], Warszawa 1980; Marek Koter / Mariusz Kulesza, Geographical and Historical Grounds of Formation of Borders of Former and Present-Day Poland, in: Marek Koter / Kristian Heffner (Hg.), Changing Role of Border Areas and Regional Policies (= Region and regionalism 5), University of Lódz, Silesian Institute in Opole, Silesian Institute Society, Lódz / Opole 2001, S. 165 – 179. 10 Hierzu ausführlicher Peter Hübner, Betriebe als Träger der Sozialpolitik, betriebliche Sozialpolitik in der SBZ, in: Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, hg. vom Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung und Bundesarchiv, Bd. 2 / 1: 1945 – 1949. Die Zeit der Besatzungszonen. Sozialpolitik zwischen Kriegsende und der Gründung zweier deutscher Staaten. Bandverantwortlicher: Udo Wengst, Baden-Baden 2001, S. 920 – 943; Peter Hübner, Betriebe als Träger der Sozialpolitik, betriebliche Sozialpolitik, in: Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, hg. vom Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und soziale Sicherung, Bundesarchiv, Bd. 8: Deutsche Demokratische Republik 1949 – 1961: Im Zeichen des Aufbaus des Sozialismus, hg. im Auftrag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte

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Die Konsequenzen waren weitreichend. Eine Schlüsselfunktion in der sozialistischen Arbeitsgesellschaft wuchs dem Betrieb durchaus nicht nur aus seiner Eigenschaft als Produktionsstätte zu. Denn in ihm kreuzten sich – zumindest dem Anspruch nach „planmäßig“ – Produktion und Distribution. Der mangelwirtschaftliche Ver- und Zuteilungsprozess fand in den Betrieben eine seiner wichtigsten Schaltstellen. Das war in der DDR nicht anders als in der PRL. Dasselbe traf auch auf den Handlungsrahmen der Betriebsleitungen zu. Dieser wurde durch die zwischen den späten 1940er Jahren und 1989 erlassenen arbeits- und sozialrechtlichen Vorschriften sowie die mit den Gewerkschaften im Rahmen von Betriebskollektivverträgen getroffenen Vereinbarungen deutlich markiert und ziemlich eng gezogen.11 Einem sozial engagierten Führungspersonal mochte dies oft als Hemmnis und Gängelei erschienen sein. Andererseits fungierte die starke Reglementierung ebenso wie die frühzeitige Verrechtlichung auch als Orientierungshilfe, die nicht nur Entscheidungen erleichterte, sondern dem „sozialistischen Management“ auch einen gewissen Schutz gegenüber sozialen Forderungen aus den Reihen der Beschäftigten bot. In der Praxis erwies sich betriebliche Sozialpolitik zum größeren Teil als Umsetzung staatlicher Vorschriften, zumeist in der „Verpackung“ der Betriebskollektivverträge. Der „Rest“ blieb Entscheidungen vorbehalten, die in der Regel innerhalb der Betriebsleitungen, also in Anwesenheit von Partei- und Gewerkschaftsfunktionären, getroffen wurden. Auch in diesem Punkt war die strukturelle Ähnlichkeit zwischen Betrieben der DDR und der PRL groß. Gleichwohl registrierten nach Polen reisende FDGBFunktionäre eine divergierende Tendenz. Während sie in der DDR, zumindest formal, von einer unbestrittenen Führungsrolle der SED auch auf der Ebene der betrieblichen Sozialpolitik ausgingen, bemerkten sie in Polen eine etwas unorthodoxe Ausdifferenzierung: Ende der 1960er Jahre gab eine Delegation aus dem Bereich der IG Bergbau und Energie der DDR die Erklärung ihrer polnischen Gastgeber etwas ratlos so wieder: der Arbeiterrat sei für die Produktion zuständig, die GeMünchen-Berlin von Dierk Hoffmann / Michael Schwartz, Baden-Baden 2004, S. 729 – 773; Peter Hübner, Betriebe als Träger der Sozialpolitik, betriebliche Sozialpolitik, in: Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, hg. vom Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung und Bundesarchiv, Bd. 9: Christoph Kleßmann (Band-Hg.), Deutsche Demokratische Republik 1961 – 1971. Politische Stabilisierung und wirtschaftliche Mobilisierung, Baden-Baden 2006, S. 721 – 762; Peter Hübner, Betriebe als Träger der Sozialpolitik, betriebliche Sozialpolitik, in: Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, hg. vom Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung und Bundesarchiv, Bd. 10: Christoph Boyer / Klaus-Dietmar Henke / Peter Skyba (Band-Hg.), Deutsche Demokratische Republik 1971 – 1989. Bewegung in der Sozialpolitik, Erstarrung und Niedergang, BadenBaden 2008, S. 703 – 738. 11 Instruktive Überblicke zur DDR bieten Wera Thiel, Arbeitsrecht in der DDR. Ein Überblick über die Rechtsentwicklung und der Versuch einer Wertung, Opladen 1997; Ingrid Deich / Wolfhard Kothe, Betriebliche Sozialeinrichtungen, Opladen 1997. Für Polen vgl. Zbigniew Salwa, Prawo pracy w zarysie [Arbeitsrecht im Überblick], Warszawa 2007; Zbigniew Salwa, Prawo pracy i ubezpieczen´ spo ecznych [Arbeitsrecht und Sozialversicherung], Warszawa 2007.

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werkschaft für die Sozialpolitik und die Partei für die Politik.12 Diese im Verlauf der 1960er Jahre entstandene Situation schien aus der Sicht von DDR-Repräsentanten der frühen Honecker-Ära zu einer Schwächung der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR), und zur tendenziellen Entideologisierung der Gewerkschaften zu führen. Mit einigem Misstrauen betrachtete man auch die polnische Arbeiterselbstverwaltung, obwohl sie viele Ähnlichkeiten mit den Ständigen Produktionsberatungen in der DDR aufwies. Umgekehrt festigten nicht wenige Vertreter der SED und des FDGB sowohl in der Ulbrichtals auch in der Honecker-Zeit aus polnischer Perspektive ihren Ruf als dogmatische Besserwisser. Das traf allerdings weniger auf das Betriebsmanagement zu als auf die für die Kontakte mit der PRL zuständigen Apparate-Funktionäre.13 Es gab viele Gründe für eine wechselseitige Wahrnehmung betrieblicher Sozialpolitiken als Elemente oder spezifizierte Ausformungen der jeweiligen staatlichen Sozialpolitik. Einer der stärksten war die Verankerung des Politikfeldes im Arbeitsrecht der beiden Länder. Diese enthielt detaillierte, im Laufe der Jahre durch zahlreiche Änderungen ergänzte Vorgaben für die betriebliche Sozialpolitik. Den Betriebsleitungen blieb wenig Spielraum. In der DDR war die wichtigste Leitlinie mit dem Arbeitsgesetz von 1950 schon frühzeitig vorgegeben worden. Das Gesetzbuch der Arbeit von 1961 brachte in sozialpolitischer Hinsicht wenig Neues; das von 1977 hingegen orientierte sich strikt an der sogenannten „Hauptaufgabe in ihrer Einheit von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik“.14 Im Hinblick auf die betriebliche Sozialpolitik zog sich trotz mancher Akzentverschiebungen eine starke Kontinuitätslinie hindurch. Auch in der PRL ließ sich hingegen über die Jahre hinweg eine allmähliche Verdichtung und Präzisierung des rechtlichen Regelwerkes beobachten, das 1974 in einem Arbeitsgesetzbuch, dem Kodeks pracy, zusammengefasst wurde.15 Hier allerdings schlug Giereks extensive Sozialpolitik voll durch. Bei allen Unterschieden im Detail, besonders deutlich bei der Sozialversicherung, erfuhr die Stellung der Beschäftigten im Arbeitsrecht beider Länder eine zunehmende Stärkung, während die Position der Betriebsleitungen relativ schwächer wurde. Als ein maßgebendes Faktum dabei erwies sich in beiden Vergleichsfällen das arbeits- und verfassungsrechtlich verankerte Recht auf Arbeit, das Arbeiter und Angestellte faktisch unkündbar mach12 SAPMO-BArch DY 30 / IV A 2 / 6.11 / 11, Gewerkschaftskomitee VVB Kraftwerke, 08. 07. 1969: Bericht der Studiendelegation zum Zentralvorstand der Gewerkschaft der Energiearbeiter der VR Polen vom 23. – 28. 06. 1969, S. 4. 13 Schöne Beispiele hierfür bietet Mieczys aw F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1969 – 1971 [Politische Tagebücher 1969 – 1971], Warszawa 2001, S. 73 f. und passim. 14 Peter Hübner, Arbeitsverfassung und Arbeitsrecht, in: Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, Bd. 9 (Fn. 10), S. 149 – 186; Peter Hübner, Arbeitsverfassung und Arbeitsrecht, in: Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, Bd. 10 (Fn. 10), S. 147 – 197. 15 Ausführlich hierzu: Zbigniew Salwa, Prawo pracy PRL w zarysie [Arbeitsrecht der Volksrepublik Polen im Überblick], Warszawa 1989.

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te.16 In diesem Umstand scheint ein wesentliches Kriterium für das Verhalten des Managements gelegen zu haben, denn es lohnte sich im Streitfall kaum, auf den eigenen und vielleicht richtigen Positionen zu beharren. Die betriebliche Sozialpolitik erwies sich immer wieder als wichtige Schaltstelle, an der – gewissermaßen durch falsche Bedienung – Arbeitskonflikte entstehen konnten, wo sie aber auch zu vermeiden bzw. zu lösen waren. So weit zu sehen, blieb das „sozialistische Management“ um einen sorgsamen Umgang mit diesem Instrument bemüht.17 Man kann anhand der Quellen auf eine beachtliche soziale Sensibilität schließen. Offensichtlich kannten viele Angehörige des „sozialistischen Managements“ die Schwierigkeiten des Lebens in „kleinen Verhältnissen“ recht gut, teilweise aufgrund ihrer sozialen Herkunft, teilweise wohl auch, weil man im gleichen Viertel wohnte, im sozialen Gravitationsfeld von Arbeitern und Angestellten.

III. Soziale Erwartungen und Forderungen Der Umgang des „sozialistischen Managements“ mit sozialen Erwartungen und Forderungen im Betrieb lässt gemeinhin darauf schließen, wie man die Interessenund Lebenslagen der Beschäftigten wahrnahm. Die Pioniere betrieblicher Sozialpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert standen in dieser Hinsicht vor allem unter dem Einfluss christlicher Soziallehren, der Philanthropie oder auch sozialistischer Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen. Sie handelten deshalb keineswegs nur reaktiv als Antwort auf heraufziehende Konflikte, sondern öfter plan- und absichtsvoll gestaltend. Das Entstehen von Stiftungen seit dem ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert gibt einen Hinweis auf solche Praktiken.18 Während dem auf jeden Fall persönliche Entscheidungen auf der Eigentümerseite oder auch des Managements vorausgingen, wird man das angesichts der zentralen Planung und der weitgehenden rechtlichen Vorschriften in der DDR, der PRL und anderen Ländern des sowjetischen Blocks nicht ohne weiteres unterstellen dürfen. Hier wirkte sich die ambivalente Position des Leitungspersonals aus. Auf der einen Seite bürdete das Prinzip der Einzelleitung den jeweiligen Direktoren die letztendliche Verantwortlichkeit für die Einhaltung der Arbeits- und Sozialgesetze 16 Peter Hübner, Fortschrittskonkurrenz und Krisenkongruenz? Europäische Arbeitsgesellschaften und Sozialstaaten in den letzten Jahrzehnten des Kalten Krieges (1970 – 1989), in: Christoph Boyer (Hg.), Vom Keynesianismus und Staatssozialismus zum . . . ? [ = zeitgeschichte 34 (2007), 3], S. 144 – 150, hier besonders S. 146 – 148. 17 Brzostek B azej, Robotnicy Warszawy. Konflikty codzienne (1950 – 1954) [Die Arbeiter Warschaus. Alltägliche Konflikte (1950 – 1954)], Warszawa 2002; Brzostek B aej, Za progiem: codziennos´c´ w przestrzeni publicznej Warszawy lat 1955 – 1970 [Jenseits der Türschwelle: Alltag im öffentlichen Raum Warschaus in den Jahren 1955 – 1970], Warszawa 2007; Hübner, Arbeitskampf (Fn. 6). 18 Einen guten Überblick bietet: Walter Euchner et al., Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland: Sozialismus – Katholische Soziallehre – Protestantische Sozialethik: ein Handbuch, hg. von Helga Grebing, Essen 2000.

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auf, andererseits hatten sie in erster Linie für die Erfüllung der Produktionspläne zu sorgen, auch sie waren Gesetz. Dies zwang zu ständigen Balanceübungen. In den nicht wenigen Fällen allerdings, wo man die letzten Ressourcen für die Planerfüllung mobilisieren musste, kippte das Interesse nahezu regelmäßig zuungunsten der Sozialpolitik. Auf den ersten Blick erschien das als eine grobe Ignoranz gegenüber den Beschäftigten, und so wurde es oft auch kritisiert. Auf den zweiten Blick freilich enthielt die scheinbar unsoziale Entscheidung einen sozialen Kern, denn von der Planerfüllung hingen vielfach die zentralen Zuweisungen für betriebliche Kultur- und Sozialfonds, vor allem aber Löhne und Prämien ab. Insofern gab es durchaus Argumente für eine „produktionsorientierte“ Entscheidung.19 Nicht zu unterschätzen ist aber auch ein vorherrschendes Belegschaftsinteresse an einem möglichst hohen Arbeitseinkommen. Dieses ließ sich durch betriebliche Sozialmaßnahmen kaum beeinflussen, wohl aber durch „Maloche“ – selbst unter schlechten Arbeitsbedingungen, wenn es sein musste. Vor diesem Hintergrund heben sich drei Faktoren deutlich ab: Der Katalog sozialer Erwartungen und Forderungen in den Betrieben wurde angeführt durch (1.) Löhne, (2.) Versorgungs- und Preisstabilität bei Nahrungsmitteln, Kleidung und Tarifen sowie (3.) die Bereitstellung von Wohnraum. Das waren die typischen Schwerpunkte, bei denen einerseits die staatliche Sozial- und Konsumpolitik ineinander griffen, wo sie sich aber auch mit der betrieblichen Sozialpolitik verzahnten. Aber obwohl hierbei zentrale, mittlere und lokale Akteure am Werk waren, blieb der Einfluss des „sozialistischen Managements“ im Wesentlichen auf die Betriebe begrenzt. Sein Anteil bestand gegenüber den zentralen oder semizentralen Leitungsebenen eher im Versuch, die dortigen Entscheidungsprozesse durch Anfragen, Forderungen, Beschwerden usw. zu beeinflussen. Eine andere Möglichkeit ergab sich aus der Kooperation mit lokalen Verwaltungen, um Ressourcen des Betriebes gegen solche der Kommunen zu tauschen, zusammenzulegen oder sie auf andere Weise zu koordinieren. Die Palette reichte von Kindergartenplätzen über medizinische Betreuungsangebote, Handels- und Kultureinrichtungen bis hin zum Wohnungs- und Straßenbau. Aus dieser schon in den 1950er Jahren geläufigen Praxis kristallisierte sich in der DDR im Verlaufe der 1960er Jahre das Konzept der „territorialen Rationalisierung“ heraus. In Polen zielte die Sozialplanung auf vergleichbare „Bündnisse“ ab. Unter dem Eindruck der 1970er Krise allerdings expandierten in der PRL die an den Lohnfonds gekoppelten Sozialfonds der Betriebe sehr rasch.20 Als eine Komponente des Übergangs vom „Geldhunger“ der 1960er Jahre zum „Warenhunger“ der Gierek-Ära dürfte diese Entwicklung eher kritisch zu betrachten sein. Soweit es die zeitgenössischen Quellen und die einschlägige Sekundärliteratur erkennen lassen, handelte das Management in der betrieblichen Sozialpolitik oft 19 Vgl. Peter Hübner, Konsens, Konflikt und Kompromiß. Soziale Arbeiterinteressen und Sozialpolitik in der SBZ / DDR 1945 – 1970, Berlin 1995, besonders S. 77 – 89; 239 – 245. 20 Wydawnictwo Interpress (Hg.), Polen, Warszawa 1977, S. 692.

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jenseits des unvermeidlich Nötigen. Man hatte es hier einerseits mit einer Art Betriebsegoismus zu tun, andererseits schienen entsprechende Aktivitäten auch für ein positives Betriebsklima und die Stimmungslage der Beschäftigten wichtig zu sein. Wenn sich dabei mancher Verantwortliche als „König der Improvisation“ fühlte, traf das die Sachlage durchaus.21 Ihre Motive dürften sich einerseits aus einer zumeist recht guten Kenntnis der sozialen Lage von Arbeitern und Angestellten hergeleitet haben. Zugleich aber wird man so etwas wie sportlichen Ehrgeiz nicht ausschließen dürfen. Erfolge in der betrieblichen Sozialpolitik waren prestigeträchtig. Bei der Perzeption sozialer Problemlagen und Aufgaben durch das Betriebsmanagement spielten aber auch begrenzende Faktoren eine maßgebliche Rolle: Erstens waren die gesellschaftspolitisch aufgewertete Position der Arbeiterschaft als „herrschende Arbeiterklasse“ und deren dosierte soziale Privilegierung in Rechnung zu stellen, und dies gerade im Hinblick auf die betriebliche Sozialpolitik. Damit zusammenhängend war, zweitens die Regelungsdichte des Arbeits- und Sozialrechts zu beachten. Wie erwähnt, hatten Betriebsleitungen im Falle von Arbeitskonflikten keine starke Position. Drittens schließlich bildete über den gesamten Zeitraum hinweg, von den ausgehenden 1940er Jahren bis zum Ende der 1980er Jahre, die Einbindung der betrieblichen Sozialpolitik in den Betriebsplan eine zentrale Achse der Problemwahrnehmung. Das Betriebsergebnis entschied letzten Endes, inwieweit die zumeist in Kollektivverträgen festgelegten Sozialmaßnahmen, angefangen von Kindergartenplätzen, über Betriebsferienheime, gesundheitliche Betreuung, sanitäre Einrichtungen, Betriebsessen bis hin zum Wohnungsbau, realisiert werden konnten. Auch die Höhe des den Betrieben gutgeschriebenen Prämienfonds hing davon ab. Damit waren drei Handlungsachsen abgesteckt, die vom betrieblichen Leitungspersonal immer im Blick behalten werden mussten. Anders gesagt, verbanden sich diese Barrieren und die gleichwohl existierenden Improvisationsmöglichkeiten zu einer Konstellation, die den Betriebsleitungen ein gutes Gespür für die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen betrieblicher Sozialpolitik abverlangte. Es gehörte zu den praktischen Risiken des Betriebsalltags, wenn diese Grenzen in diese oder jene Richtung überschritten wurden. Auf die hier lauernden Konflikte ist im folgenden Abschnitt näher einzugehen. Zunächst aber interessiert etwas anderes: Wenn man die für den Betrieb und seine Beschäftigten relevanten sozialund wirtschaftspolitischen Interessen einmal als ein Gesamtsystem betrachtet, befand sich dieses nicht nur in einer labilen Balance, es driftete zudem auch noch trotz einer bemerkenswerten Zunahme der betrieblichen Sozialausgaben in die Gegenrichtung. Der Grund hierfür ist in einem hohen industriellen Investitionsbedarf zu sehen. Dieser ergab sich zunächst aus dem extensiven Industrialisierungskurs der 1950er Jahre, um im Verlauf des folgenden Jahrzehnts in den Sog 21 Wolfgang Biermann, Man mußte ein König der Improvisation sein, in: Theo Pirker et al. (Hg.), Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion. Wirtschafsführung in der DDR. Gespräche und Analysen, Opladen 1995, S. 213 – 235.

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der dritten industriellen Revolution zu geraten. Die letzten Jahre der Ära Gomu ka und Ulbricht standen ganz im Zeichen dieser Entwicklung und damit eines Zielkonflikts zwischen Sozialpolitik und Modernisierungsinvestition.22 Auf der betrieblichen Ebene führte das zu der Konsequenz, dass nicht so sehr wegen des Mangels an finanziellen Mittel als vielmehr wegen fehlender Projektierungs-, Bau-, Ausrüstungs- und Montagekapazitäten häufig die Sozialinvestitionen in den Betrieben gestreckt oder auch gestrichen wurden. Auffällig daran, aber nicht überraschend, ist die zeitliche Parallelität solcher Entwicklungen in der DDR und der PRL. Derartige Phasen finden sich zu Beginn und in der Mitte der 1950er Jahre, in der zweiten Hälfte der 1960er und dann in mehreren Schüben seit Mitte der 1970er Jahre. Im Prinzip hatte man es hierbei mit einer Pendelpolitik zu tun, die zwischen „Akkumulation“ und „Konsumtion“ als den beiden Schlüsselkategorien sozialistischer Planwirtschaften ihren Weg suchte. Das hinerließ deutliche Spuren in der betrieblichen Sozialpolitik, doch entzündeten sich nennenswerte Konflikte weniger an volkswirtschaftlichen Ungleichgewichten als vielmehr an der schwieriger werdenden Versorgungslage, an der Lohnfrage und an der Preispolitik. In Polen sollte diese brisante Gemengelage im Dezember 1970 und im Juni 1976 zu schweren gesellschaftlichen Konflikten führen, denen sich die Periode der „Solidarnos´c´“ und des von der PZPR-Führung verhängten Kriegsrechts anschloss.23 In der DDR blieb die SED bemüht, an ihrer in den frühen 1970er Jahren formulierten Sozialpolitik festzuhalten, allerdings um den Preis eines wachsenden Investitionsdefizits, das der Wirkung der polnischen Krise in letzter Konsequenz kaum nachstand. Diese Niedergangszenarien „zum Tode“24 hin sind in der neueren Literatur mehr oder weniger detailliert beschrieben worden. Ein beachtenswerter Umstand blieb dabei aber ziemlich unterbelichtet: Sowohl in der DDR als auch in der PRL funktionierte die betriebliche Sozialpolitik, wenn auch unter manchen Schwierigkeiten, bis zum Schluss. Allerdings wird man daraus nicht ohne weiteres folgern können, das „sozialistische Management“ habe sich in dieser Hinsicht als besonders handlungsbereit erwiesen. Mehr spricht dafür, dass die sozialpolitische Praxis der Betriebe in der Krise der 1980er Jahre einem bereits routinierten Ablauf folgte, der wenig neue Entscheidungen verlangte. 22 Janusz Kalin´ski, Przemiany strukturalne w gospodarce polskiej w latach 1944 – 1970 [Die strukturellen Umgestaltungen in der polnischen Wirtschaft in den Jahren 1944 – 1970], Warszawa 1993, S. 126; André Steiner, Die DDR-Wirtschaftsreform der sechziger Jahre: Konflikt zwischen Effizienz- und Machtkalkül, Berlin 1999, S. 41 – 425, 476 – 489. 23 Hierzu u. a. Andrzej Friszke / Dariusz Stola / Jerzy Eisler, Kierownictwo PZPR w czasie kryzysów 1956, 1968 i 1970 [Die Führung der PZPR in den Krisen 1956, 1968 und 1970], Warszawa 2000; Jerzy Eisler, Grudzien´ 1970: geneza, przebieg, konsekwensje [Dezember 1970: Genese, Verlauf, Konsequenzen], Warszawa 2000; Jerzy Eisler (Hg.), Czerwiec 1976 w materia ach archiwalnych [Der Juni 1976 in Archivmaterialien], Warszawa 2001, hier besonders Einleitung, S. 11 – 72; Hartmut Kühn, Das Jahrzehnt der Solidarnos´c´. Die politische Geschichte Polens 1980 – 1990, Berlin 1999; Mieczys aw F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1958 – 1990 [Politische Tagebücher 1958 – 1990], 10 Bde., Warszawa 1998 – 2005. 24 Manfred Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917 – 1991. Entstehung und Niedergang des ersten sozialistischen Staates, München 1998, S. 885.

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Hierbei mag auch Resignation im Spiel gewesen sein, zumal den Leitern polnischer Betriebe unter Kriegsrecht militärische Aufpasser zur Seite gestellt wurden. Die Frage nach der Handlungs- und damit Konfliktbereitschaft des „sozialistischen Managements“ reicht jedoch weiter: Wie weit und mit welchen Motiven sollte bzw. wollte es sich exponieren? Beträchtlich ist die Zahl der Beispiele für riskantes Improvisieren zugunsten des Betriebes, doch finden sich keine Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass bewusst und gezielt jene rote Linie überschritten wurde, hinter der ein kalkulierter Konflikt mit dem Parteiapparat programmiert war. Dieses Verhalten dürfte sich weniger aus Konfliktscheu als vielmehr aus einer Kosten-Nutzen-Rechnung erklärt haben. IV. Konflikte und Konfliktverhalten Die betriebliche Sozialpolitik bot vielfach Anlass und Gelegenheit für Misshelligkeiten und Streit, doch ging es dabei meist um kleinteiligere Themen. Das Potential für große Konflikte fand sich hier kaum. Überdies war auch das betriebliche Leitungspersonal nicht sonderlich konfliktbereit. Es befand sich ja auch zwischen Baum und Borke. So lag es eher an den Arbeitern, kaum an den Angestellten, wie massiv sie ihre Forderungen vortrugen bzw. wie sich die Eigendynamik des Konflikts entwickelte. Allerdings registrierte man auch in der Arbeiterschaft sehr genau die graduellen Abstufungen zwischen einfacher Beschwerde und offenem Konflikt. Im Prinzip galt die betriebliche Sozialpolitik nicht als ein Feld, auf dem sich größere Auseinandersetzungen und Proteste lohnten. Das „sozialistische Management“ jedenfalls stand den sozialen Erwartungen und Forderungen der Arbeiterschaft in der Regel relativ nahe. Dies hing sicher auch von der Einsicht ab, dass die betriebliche Leitungsebene im Falle eines Konfliktes nichts zu gewinnen hatte. Noch wichtiger dürfte aber der eigene soziale Erfahrungshintergrund gewesen sein. Hier machten sich die Konsequenzen einer seit den 1950er Jahren anhaltenden Elitenrekrutierung geltend.25 Die sozialen Aufstiege in das Betriebsmanagement erfolgten zu dieser Zeit und auch noch in den 1960er Jahren besonders aus den qualifizierten Kreisen der Arbeiterschaft sowie der kleinen und mittleren Angestellten. Man könnte in Anlehnung an den Soziologen Wolfgang Engler von einer „Verarbeiterlichung“ des Interessenhorizontes sprechen.26 Der biographische Kontext begünstigte ein mehr oder minder ausgeprägtes Verständnis für die sozialen Bedürfnisse und Anliegen der Arbeiterschaft. Und dieser ging es vor allem um einen „gerechten Lohn“, der Leistung an25 Vgl. u. a. Przemys aw Wójcik (Hg.), Elity w adzy w Polsce a struktura spo eczna w latach 1944 – 1956 [Die Machteliten in Polen und die Sozialstruktur in den Jahren 1944 – 1956], Warszawa 1992; Przemys aw Wójcik (Hg.), Elity w adzy w Polsce a struktura spoeczna w latach 1956 – 1981 [Die Machteliten in Polen und die Sozialstruktur in den Jahren 1956 – 1981], Warszawa 1994; Hübner, Eliten im Sozialismus (Fn. 5). 26 Wolfgang Engler, Die Ostdeutschen. Kunde von einem verlorenen Land, 2. Aufl., Berlin 2000, S. 173.

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gemessene Prämien, akzeptable Arbeitszeitregelungen und die Verbesserung der Arbeitsbedingungen, um eine stabile und in der Tendenz reichhaltiger werdende Versorgung mit Nahrungsmitteln, Kleidung, technischen Konsumgütern, Wohnraum und ähnliche „große“ Themen. Die Übergänge in den Bereich der betrieblichen Sozialpolitik waren fließend, so dass auch die betriebliche Sozialpolitik mal mehr, mal weniger von dem sozialen Forderungsdruck erfasst wurde.27 Die Konstellation führte geradezu zwangsläufig zu einem Spannungsverhältnis zwischen der tendenziellen Affinität des Leitungspersonals zu den sozialen Anliegen ihrer Mitarbeiter einerseits sowie den betriebs- und volkswirtschaftlichen Rationalitätskriterien andererseits. So gesehen, verlief die potentielle Bruchlinie nicht zwischen Management und Arbeiterschaft, sondern quer durch die Leitungsebene oder, genauer, durch die dort vorherrschende Motivstruktur. In dieser Voraussetzung dürfte ein Grund für die relativ moderaten Konfliktverläufe zu suchen sein, wie sie für die DDR eher typisch waren. In der PRL, wo es zu viel schwereren Konflikten kam, waren Betriebsleitungen normalerweise ebenfalls um Konfliktvermeidung bzw. um Deeskalation bemüht. Ihre Position war in dieser Hinsicht mit der ihrer DDR-Kollegen vergleichbar. Im Allgemeinen sah sich das Management in beiden Fällen eher in einer Scharnier- oder Mittlerfunktion zwischen den Bedürfnissen der Betriebsbelegschaften und dem Parteiregime. Inwieweit das die schwache Position der Gewerkschaften kompensierte, wäre eine andere Frage. Ein Vergleich der in der DDR und in der Volksrepublik Polen ausgetragenen Arbeitskonflikte zeigt neben vielen Ähnlichkeiten und Übereinstimmungen, in denen sich auch traditionales Konfliktverhalten spiegelte, einen auffälligen Unterschied. Im polnischen Fall setzte sich immer wieder ein deutlich härterer Konfliktstil durch.28 Nicht ohne Grund wird die Geschichte der sozialen und politischen Konflikte in der Volksrepublik Polen durch die sehr emotionalen und teils gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen der Jahre 1956, 1970, 1976 und 1980 / 81 dominiert.29 Darin bestand zwar eine gewisse Parallele zum Jahr 1953 in der DDR, doch setzte sich dort gerade wegen des 17. Junis der konsensverhüllte Konfliktstil durch. Eric Hobsbawm hat auf ein Bedingungsgefüge aufmerksam gemacht, das Polen von allen anderen Staaten des sowjetischen Blocks unterschied: „erstens war die öffentliche Meinung in überwältigendem Maße durch die gemeinsame Abneigung gegen das Regime und einen antirussischen (und antisemitischen) und sehr bewußt römisch-katholischen polnischen Nationalismus geeint; zweitens hatte die Kirche eine unabhängige, landesweite Organisationsstruktur wahren können; und drittens Hierzu ausführlich P. Hübner / Ch. Hübner, Sozialismus als soziale Frage (Fn. 6). Vgl. W odzimierz Borodziej, Gewalt in Volkspolen: 1944 – 1989, in: Osteuropa 50 (2000), S. 1365 – 1384. 29 Andrzej Paczkowski, Strajki, bunty, manifestacje jako „polska droga“ przez socjalizm [Streiks, Aufruhr, Kundgebungen als „polnischer Weg“ durch den Sozialismus], Poznan´ 2003. Sehr illustrativ für die späte Phase: Kühn, Das Jahrzehnt der Solidarnos´c´ (Fn. 23). 27 28

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hatte die Arbeiterklasse ihre politische Macht seit Mitte der fünfziger Jahre in Intervallen immer wieder durch massive Streiks unter Beweis stellen können“.30 Im Hinblick auf das Konfliktverhalten ergab sich daraus jene konfrontative „WirSie“-Konstellation, die für die Gesellschaft der Volksrepublik charakteristisch war.31 Mit dem „Wir“ grenzten sich die regimekritischen oder auch -feindlichen Gruppierungen gegen „Sie“, die anderen, die Vertreter der Staatsmacht, der „Kommune“ ab. Die gesellschaftliche Bruchlinie war hier nicht nur aus sozialen Gründen schärfer gezogen als in der DDR, sie gewann ihre Brisanz auch aus einem spezifischen Staatsverständnis. Dieses war entscheidend von der Geschichte der polnischen Teilungen bestimmt. Der Staat erschien vor deren Hintergrund als Instrument der Fremden, der Okkupanten und ihrer Kollaborateure. Gegen den Staat zu sein war Vorbedingung des Patriotismus. Daraus erwuchs ein beträchtliches Identifikationspotential, das im polnischen Widerstand gegen die deutsche Besatzung 1939 – 1945 ebenso zum Tragen kam wie in den Konflikten zur Zeit der Volksrepublik. In den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, so lautet ein Befund, habe sich das „Wir“ als „zweite Gesellschaft“, faktisch also als Gegengesellschaft konstituiert.32 Es gab aber keinen Gegenstaat. Hier machte sich wohl auch „das Fehlen eines positiven Staatsverständnisses“ bemerkbar, von dem Stefan Garsztecki sprach.33 Eine Vorstellung von der Spannweite, die zwischen „Wir“ und „Sie“ lag, vermitteln die von Teresa Toran´ska veröffentlichten Interviews mit ehemaligen PZPR-Funktionären und bekannten Oppositionellen.34 Die Position der Betriebsleitungen blieb von der Schärfe dieses Gegensatzes nicht unberührt. Die erwähnte Affinität gegenüber den Arbeiterinteressen nutzte dem Management in Konfliktsituationen wenig; ob man wollte oder nicht, sah es sich unter „Sie“ eingeordnet. Militante Konfliktformen waren damit jedoch nicht vorprogrammiert, zumal die katholische Kirche gegen Gewaltausbrüche, gleich von welcher Seite sie ausgingen, immer wieder mäßigend zu argumentieren versuchte.35 Das blieb zwar 30 Eric Hobsbawm, Das Zeitalter der Extreme. Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, 4. Aufl., München 2000, S. 388 f. 31 Jolanta Polakowska-Kujawa, Soziale Konflikte in Polen und die Legitimierung der Macht: Wandlungen im gesellschaftlichen Bewußtsein in den Jahren 1945 – 1994, in: Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung 1996, hg. von Hermann Weber, Berlin 1996, S. 69 – 83. 32 Helmut Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit und soziale Bewegungen. Fallstudien über Bürgerbewegungen in Polen und der DDR, Opladen 1996, S. 69. 33 Stefan Garsztecki, Die polnische politische Kultur – Kontinuität und Wandel, in: Zdzisaw Krasnodebski / Klaus Städtke / Stefan Garsztecki (Hg.), Kulturelle Identität und sozialer Wandel in Osteuropa: das Beispiel Polen, Hamburg 1999, S. 131 – 168, hier S. 157. 34 Teresa Toran´ska, Oni [Sie], Warszawa 1985 [dt.: Die da oben: polnische Stalinisten zum Sprechen gebracht, Köln 1987]; Teresa Toran´ska, My [Wir], Warszawa 1994. 35 Vgl. hierzu Leonid Luks, Katholizismus und politische Macht im kommunistischen Polen 1945 – 1989. Die Anatomie einer Befreiung, Köln / Weimar / Wien 1993; Nikolaus Lobkowicz / Leonid Luks, Der polnische Katholizismus vor und nach 1989. Von der totalitären zur demokratischen Herausforderung, Köln / Weimar / Wien 1998.

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nicht ohne Erfolg, aber es löste das bestehende Gewaltpotential auch nicht auf. Manches spricht dafür, dass politische Auseinandersetzungen oder soziale Konflikte mit hoher politischer Aufladung schneller in gewalttätige Aktionen münden konnten als „reine“ Arbeitskonflikte. Dies wurde vor allem für die Volksrepublik Polen relevant. In der DDR hingegen setzten sich nach dem Juni 1953 Konfliktformen durch, die zumindest äußerlich mehr oder weniger „entpolitisiert“ wirkten.36 Hierbei spielten offensichtlich unterschiedliche kulturelle Prägungen eine Rolle. Arbeitergruppen, die sich nach einer abrupten Lösung aus den Traditionszusammenhängen agrarischer Gesellschaften plötzlich in ungefestigten industriellen Milieus wiederfanden, neigten erkennbar stärker zu radikalen Formen der Konfliktaustragung.37 Auf viele Betriebe der PRL traf das zu, so etwa in der Werftindustrie. Andere Beschäftigtengruppen, die bereits länger in einem durch industrielle Arbeit geprägten Umfeld sozialisiert waren und die oft auch qualifizierte Tätigkeiten ausübten, zeigten sich für Kompromisse offener und überhaupt im Konfliktverhalten moderater. Das oberschlesische Bergbaurevier ließe sich hierfür exemplarisch anführen. Im Vergleich der DDR und der PRL fallen divergierende demographische Entwicklungslinien auf, deren Auswirkung auf die Konfliktkultur nicht zu unterschätzen ist. In beiden Fällen hatte die Dekomposition des klassischen Arbeitermilieus während der Zwischenkriegszeit und in die Zersplitterung der Arbeiterbewegung zur politischen Radikalisierung beigetragen.38 Andererseits ging der zwischen 1918 und 1945 in mehreren Phasen ablaufende, in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Gesellschaften jedoch unterschiedlich intensive Modernisierungsschub39 nicht so tief, dass er die traditionalen Arbeitermilieus völlig umgepflügt hätte.40 Mehr noch, die Sozialstruktur der Bevölkerung im mitteldeutschen Gebiet, der späteren DDR, war zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen und vor allem während des Zweiten Weltkrieges im Vergleich zu anderen deutschen Regionen „proletarischer“ geworden.41 Nicht zuletzt deswegen bildete das traditionale Facharbeitermilieu42 im 36 Vgl. Christoph Kleßmann, Arbeiter im „Arbeiterstaat“ DDR. Deutsche Traditionen, sowjetisches Modell, westdeutsches Magnetfeld (1945 bis 1971), Bonn 2007, S. 743 – 753. 37 Péter Gunst, Agrarian Development and Social Change in Eastern Europe, 14th – 19th Centuries, Aldershot et al. 1996, passim. 38 Günter Mai, Einleitung und Auswertung. Arbeitsplatz und Arbeitsorganisation 1918 bis 1939, in: Klaus Tenfelde (Hg.), Arbeiter im 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1991, S. 17 – 31, hier S. 28. 39 Für den Zeitrahmen 1918 bis 1945 plädiert z. B. Hans Mommsen, Noch einmal: Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 21 (1995), 3, S. 391 – 402, hier S. 393. 40 Zur Entwicklung in der Bundesrepublik vgl. Josef Mooser, Abschied von der „Proletarität“. Sozialstruktur und Lage der Arbeiterschaft in der Bundesrepublik in historischer Perspektive, in: Werner Conze / M. Rainer Lepsius (Hg.), Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Beiträge zum Kontinuitätsproblem, Stuttgart 1986, S. 143 – 186. 41 Dietrich Storbeck, Soziale Strukturen in Mitteldeutschland. Eine soziologische Bevölkerungsanalyse im gesamtdeutschen Vergleich, Berlin 1964, S. 153.

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Zeitraum zwischen 1945 und Mitte der 1960er Jahre noch immer ein wichtiges konstitutives Element der Nachkriegs-Arbeiterschaft.43 Sein Gewicht war auch deshalb besonders groß, weil die hohen Kriegsverluste der Männerjahrgänge zwischen 1915 und 1928 eine demographische Lücke gerissen hatte, zu einer Überrepräsentanz älterer, meist gut ausgebildeter und sehr junger, aber über weit weniger Berufserfahrung verfügender Arbeiter sowie zu einer beschleunigten Erweiterung weiblicher Erwerbsarbeit führte. Verschärft wurde dieser Effekt noch durch die Fluchtbewegung vor allem jüngerer qualifizierter männlicher Fachkräfte in die Westzonen bzw. in die Bundesrepublik.44 Eine Abwanderung älterer Arbeiter erfolgte nicht im gleich starken Maße. Für die Konfliktfähigkeit der Arbeiterschaft bedeutete dies, dass mit den Verlusten an jüngeren Arbeitern die typische Spitzenformation schwächer wurde, die sich in Arbeitsstreitigkeiten exponierte. Ältere Arbeiter und die wachsende Zahl erwerbstätiger Frauen neigten eher zum Konsens und zu Kompromisslösungen. Anders war die Situation in Polen. Hier setzte ein rapides Bevölkerungswachstum ein. Die Einwohnerzahl stieg von 1950 rund 25 Millionen auf über 37 Millionen in den späten 1980er Jahren. Allerdings wuchs hier die Zahl der Arbeiter und Angestellten im gleichen Zeitraum nur von 10,3 auf 12,8 Millionen.45 Selbst wenn man einen hohen Anteil von Kindern und Jugendlichen an der Gesamtbevölkerung berücksichtigt, blieb im Landesmaßstab eine beträchtliche Arbeitskraftreserve bestehen. Seit den 1960er Jahren suchte die polnische Regierung dadurch Entlastung zu schaffen, dass Frauen nicht zuletzt durch sozialpolitische Angebote vom Eintritt ins Berufsleben abgehalten wurden. Auch Arbeitszeitbeschränkungen und Beschäftigungsangebote in der DDR und der CSSR sollten das polnische Beschäftigungsproblem entschärfen. Das Konfliktverhalten und die Konfliktfähigkeit der Arbeiterschaft dürften im Unterschied zur DDR von einer deutlich niedrigeren Frauenbeschäftigungsquote und einem höheren Anteil junger Jahrgänge unter den Arbeitern beeinflusst worden sein. Hinzu kam, dass der durch die Industrialisierungspolitik bedingte Arbeitskräftebedarf in Polen weitaus stärker aus dem ländlichen Raum befriedigt 42 Michael Hofmann / Dieter Rink, Die Auflösung der ostdeutschen Arbeitermilieus. Bewältigungsmuster und Handlungsspielräume ostdeutscher Industriearbeiter im Transformationsprozeß, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 26 – 27 (1993), S. 29 – 36, hier S. 31. 43 Das findet sich besonders in lokalen Fallstudien bestätigt. Vgl. Michael Hofmann, Die Kohlearbeiter von Espenhain. Zur Enttraditionalisierung eines ostdeutschen Arbeitermilieus, in: Michael Vester / Michael Hofmann / Irene Zirke (Hg.), Soziale Milieus in Ostdeutschland. Gesellschaftliche Strukturen zwischen Zerfall und Neubildung, Köln 1995, S. 91 – 135; Michael Hofmann, Die Leipziger Metallarbeiter. Etappen sozialer Erfahrungsgeschichte. Milieubiographie eines Arbeitermilieus in Leipzig, in: Ebenda, S. 136 – 192. 44 Helge Heidemeyer, Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ / DDR 1945 / 49 – 1961. Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Bau der Berliner Mauer, Düsseldorf 1994, S. 52, 187. 45 Statistisches Jahrbuch DDR 1988, Berlin 1988, Anhang S. 3*, 6*.

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wurde, als das in der DDR der Fall war. Hier fände die These vom Zusammenhang kultureller Entwurzelung und Radikalität des Konfliktverhaltens einen Ansatzpunkt.46 Gestützt würde sie z. B. durch einen Vergleich der Streiks von 1970 / 1971 in den Städten Szczecin und ódz´. Die Szczeciner Werft war im Dezember 1970 einer der wichtigsten Ausgangspunkte der Streikwelle. Hier nahm der Konflikt auch eine besondere Schärfe an, und zwar im Agieren der Arbeiter ebenso wie bei den Partei- und Staatsorganen. In der alten Industriestadt ódz´ hingegen verlief die Konfrontation eher nach dem Muster gewerkschaftlicher Lohnkämpfe. Inwieweit dieser Unterschied aus den Herkunftsmilieus der Betriebsbelegschaften erklärt werden kann, wäre eingehender Nachfrage wert. Zumindest wurde die Erwerbsbevölkerung Szczecins durch ein seit 1945 entstandenes Zuwanderermilieu dominiert, dessen kulturelle Wurzeln im Gebiet um Lwów lagen. In solchen Fällen bedeutete der Bevölkerungs-“Transfer“ immer auch einen Kulturbruch. Die Ausgangssituation für solche Problemlagen hat Gregor Thum am Beispiel von Breslau / Wroc aw herausgearbeitet. 47 Angesichts der Unterschiede im Konfliktverhalten der Arbeiterschaft erscheint es wenig überraschend, wenn sich auch das „sozialistische Management“ im Konfliktfall verschieden positionierte. Eine andere Frage ist, ob es unterschiedlich handelte. Was die Positionierung anbelangt, so scheint es, dass sowohl die DDRals auch die PRL-Manager bei drohenden oder akuten Auseinandersetzungen eine Scharnier- oder Mittlerfunktion bevorzugten, nicht zuletzt, um eine Eskalation des Konflikts zu vermeiden. Auf einem anderen Blatt steht die zur Politisierung drängende Eigendynamik sozialer Konflikte, wie sie häufiger in Polen zu beobachten war. Auf diese Weise gerieten Betriebsleitungen unvermeidlich in dieselbe Schusslinie wie die Gremien der PZPR und des Zentralrats der Gewerkschaften (Centralna Rada Zwiazków Zawodowych, CRZZ). Dieser Automatismus mochte in der DDR nicht so ausgeprägt sein, gleichwohl deutete sich auch hier eine Frontbildung an, bei der das Management auf der Seite der Partei- und Staatsmacht zu finden war. V. Soziale Wertorientierungen des Managements Das leitet über zum Problem sozialer Wertorientierungen des Managements. Auch wenn die betriebliche Sozialpolitik in wichtigen Segmenten staatliche Sozialpolitik war und generell vielen Reglementierungen unterlag, boten sich aber doch und gerade in diesem Bereich Spielräume, die individuelle und wertgeleitete Entscheidungen des Leitungspersonals voraussetzten. Zwar kann die Frage nach den hierfür relevanten ethischen Grundsätzen an dieser Stelle nicht erörtert werden, doch lohnt ein Blick auf den Wertehaushalt der ostdeutschen und der pol46 Vgl. Gunst, Agrarian Development (Fn. 37); siehe auch Edmund Lewandowski, Charakter narodowy Polaków i innych [Der Nationalcharakter der Polen und der anderen], Warszawa 1995. 47 Gregor Thum, Die fremde Stadt. Breslau 1945, Berlin 2003.

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nischen Gesellschaft, auch wenn er vielleicht sehr pauschal sein mag.48 Die Annahme, im jeweiligen Management-Handeln so etwas wie ein Hintergrundleuchten der protestantischen Ethik in der DDR und der katholischen Soziallehre in der PRL zu vermuten, mag schwer zu widersprechen sein. Jahrhundertealte religiöse Prägungen verschwinden nicht in wenigen Jahren aus einem, wenn auch arg durcheinandergewürfelten, gesellschaftlichen Umfeld. Dies einmal vorausgesetzt, erscheint es spannender zu fragen, inwieweit sich das Leitungspersonal in seinen sozialpolitischen Entscheidungen von marxistisch-leninistischen Grundsätzen, leiten ließ. Scheinbar bot die Gesetzeslage keinen Spielraum für Alternativen: In den Verfassungen war die gesellschaftliche Führungsrolle der SED bzw. der PZPR festgeschrieben. Die Mehrheit des Leitungspersonals gehörte einer dieser Parteien an und unterlag damit auch der Parteidisziplin. Die Arbeits- und Sozialgesetzgebung, also auch die betriebliche Sozialpolitik, hatten sich an den Parteiprogrammen zu orientieren. Und auch die Rekrutierungskriterien des „sozialistischen Managements“ sorgten für eine Disposition, die für Eigenwilligkeiten im Leitungshandeln nicht nur wenig Raum bot, sondern die sich mehr oder minder auch auf politische Überzeugungen stützen konnte. Angesichts solcher Voraussetzungen wird eine Quellenlage erklärungsbedürftig, die ziemlich eindeutig auf einen bemerkenswerten Pragmatismus des Leitungspersonals in Entscheidungs-, vor allem aber in Konfliktsituationen hindeutet. Man hielt sich nach Möglichkeit an die jeweils geltenden Gesetze und wirtschaftlichen Rationalitätskriterien, schöpfte aber auch Improvisationsgelegenheiten aus, wenn dies dem Betrieb und seinen Beschäftigten zum Vorteil geriet. Hierbei kamen oft Personen-Netzwerke zum Zuge, deren Akteure eher als Sozialtechnokraten, denn als Partei- oder Staatsfunktionäre zu beschreiben sind. In beachtlichem Umfang organisierten sie Ressourcentransfers für soziale Zwecke. Formelle und informelle Tauschoperationen, teils um mehrere Ecken, dienten der Beschaffung von raren Ersatzteilen und Materialien ebenso wie dem Bau und dem Unterhalt betrieblicher Sozialeinrichtungen. 49 Wenn sich die „Könige der Improvisation“ hierbei in ihrem Element fühlten, bedeutete das aber noch lange nicht, dass sie Sozialpolitik nach Gusto betrieben. Bei Lichte betrachtet, nutzten sie nur das in den Volkswirtschaften der DDR und 48 Hierzu liegen einige beachtenswerte Einblicke in die polnische Problematik vor: Józef Tischner, Etyka solidarnos´ci oraz Homo sovieticus [Die Ethik der Solidarität und der Homo sovieticus], Kraków 1992; Janusz Reykowski, Zmiany systemowe a mentalnos´c´ spoÄeczen´stwa [Systemveränderungen und gesellschaftliche Mentalität], in: Janusz Reykowski (Hg.), Wartos´ci i postawy Polaków a przemiany systemowe: szkice z psychologii [Die Werte und Einstellungen der Polen und die Systemveränderungen: eine psychologische Skizze], Warszawa 1993, S. 9 – 48. Für die DDR vgl. M. Rainer Lepsius, Handlungsräume und Rationalitätskriterien der Wirtschaftsfunktionäre in der Ära Honecker, in: Pirker, Plan (Fn. 21), S. 347 – 362. 49 Annette Schuhmann (Hg.), Vernetzte Improvisationen. Gesellschaftliche Subsysteme in Ostmitteleuropa und der DDR, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2008, insbesondere die Beiträge von Peter Heumos, MaÄgorzata Mazurek, Christoph Boyer und Peter Hübner.

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der PRL geltende Prinzip der Einzelleitung, um Steuerungsdefizite des Wirtschaftssystems zu kompensieren und damit auch soziale Konflikte im Betrieb zu vermeiden. War dies nicht mehr möglich, bevorzugte man betriebsinterne Konfliktlösungen. Dazu gehörte die Bereitschaft, sozialen Belangen einen hohen Stellenwert beizumessen, gegenüber Erwartungen an einen „gerechten Lohn“ flexibel zu sein und bei den vielen als „sozial“ definierten Eigenmächtigkeiten der Beschäftigten die Augen auch zudrücken zu können. Alles das war jedoch nicht gleichzusetzen mit einem weiterreichenden Autonomieanspruch der Betriebsleitungen. Vielmehr versuchten sie lediglich, dem (staatlichen) Auftrag als Organisatoren der Planerfüllung unter möglichst wenigen Komplikationen nachzukommen. Insofern war es auch kein Widerspruch, wenn man sich in einigermaßen verfahrenen Situationen dann doch auf zentrale Anweisungen und notfalls auf die direkte Intervention „von oben“ verließ. Zahlreiche Auftritte Edward Giereks in Betrieben der PRL folgten einem solchen Szenarium. In der DDR ergaben beispielsweise viele der von Betrieben an den Wirtschaftssekretär des ZK der SED, Günter Mittag, gerichteten Schreiben ein ähnliches Bild, bis hin zur eindringlichen Bitte, nicht durch Dezentralisierung „den Effekt der zentralen Leitung“ verloren gehen zu lassen.50 Bei so viel Pragmatismus könnte es scheinen, als ob die Frage nach den Wertorientierungen falsch gestellt sei. Doch gerade ein Blick auf die betriebliche Sozialpolitik zeigt, dass das Management – Ausnahmen bestätigten auch hier die Regel – relativ stark von den Interessenlagen der lohnabhängigen „kleinen Leute“ beeinflusst blieb. Dies deutete zumindest auf eine Affinität zum Wertehaushalt der Arbeiterbewegungen des 20. Jahrhunderts hin. In der Transformationsperiode der frühen 1990er Jahre sollte sich diese Haltung allerdings stärker ausdifferenzieren.

VI. Fazit Trotz der sehr unterschiedlichen Handlungsszenarien wies die betriebliche Sozialpolitik in der DDR und der PRL sehr viele Ähnlichkeiten auf. Das lag zum einen an der politischen Voraussetzungen und deren Orientierung am sowjetischen Vorbild. Zum anderen begünstigten die systemischen Rahmenbedingungen der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft adäquate Denk- und Handlungsweisen des Betriebsmanagements. Die deutlichsten Unterschiede zeigten sich in Konfliktsituationen, vor allem während der polnischen Krisen von 1970, 1976 und 1980. In solchen Situationen standen polnische Betriebsleitungen als Krisenmanager im Spannungsfeld des bereits erwähnten „Wir-Sie“-Schemas. Ihre DDR-Kollegen hingegen gerieten seit Mitte der 1970er Jahre zunehmend in die Rolle von heimlichen Insolvenzverwaltern. Es bleibt die Frage nach den Handlungsräumen und deren Nutzung. Die betriebliche Sozialpolitik gehörte trotz aller Vorschriften und Einschränkungen zu den 50 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30, 3285, Bl. 7 – 9, hier 8: VEB Vereinigte Holzindustrie Finsterwalde – Betriebsparteiorganisation der SED – an Günter Mittag, 29. 05. 1981.

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Aufgaben, die dem „sozialistischen Management“ einige Manövriermöglichkeiten bot, sowohl durch Aktivität als auch durch Unterlassen. Die hierzu nötige Kunst der Improvisation und das Entstehen von Beschaffungsnetzwerken gehören sicher zu den interessanteren Seiten sozialpolitischer Praxis im staatlichen Betrieb. Eigenmächtiges Handeln des Managements diente meist dem Zweck, einen Engpass zu überwinden, indem Ressourcen außerplanmäßig akquiriert wurden. Solche Wege wählte man auch, um die sozialen Interessen der Beschäftigten in dieser oder jener Weise zu befriedigen. Damit blieb das Leitungspersonal aber in erster Linie den im Betriebsplan festgelegten Zielen verpflichtet. Ein „neuer Geist des Kapitalismus“, der es auf eine „Erosion des Staatssozialismus“ anlegte, lässt sich darin nicht erkennen. Aber vielleicht gewinnt man im historischen Urteil darüber größere Sicherheit, wenn das Handeln der auch in der Transformationsperiode der 1990er Jahre noch aktiven Manager in den Blick genommen wird.51 Das wäre jedoch Gegenstand einer anderen Betrachtung.

51 Vgl. Thomas Pfahler, Unternehmenskultur zwischen Plan und Markt in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Bern / Stuttgart / Wien 2006. Siehe auch die Beiträge von Marcel Boldorf und Krzysztof Go ata in diesem Band.

The Problems of a Business Elites’ Image and Reputation. The Example of Poland By Krzysztof Go ata I. Introduction “If there is to be capitalism in Poland, then at least let the capitalists be poor” was a dictum among leftist politicians during the early economic transformation. Some even wondered if it was possible to build capitalism in Poland without capitalists, but concluded with regret that capitalists were indispensable to build the new economic system. The economic transformation, which consisted of a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy beginning during the early 1980s, produced the new term ‘entrepreneur’. It was intended to serve as a response to the pejorative notion of ‘private trader’ which was used to refer to the remnants of a free market within the socialist economy. In line with the definitions in the Polish literature on public relations, this paper assumes that a person’s image is “the impression made on others”,1 while a company’s image is “a picture created in the awareness of people who interact with the company in a direct or indirect way”.2 English literature on the subject provides a much more extended definition. Anthony Davis says that an image is “a complex intellectual or sensual interpretation, the way of perceiving someone or something; a product of the mind resulting from deduction based upon available premises both real and imagined, determined by impressions, beliefs, ideas and emotions”.3 This definition expands on a thesis popular in literature on the subject, that an image is different from reality. Fraser P. Seitel elaborates that building a positive company image takes time and that one stumble will suffice for public opinion to shift towards a negative outlook on the company. Seitel says “( . . . ) a company image is a tender good”.4 Investing in image creation is an investment in the future as “( . . . ) most companies claim that a positive image is of importance to long-term success”.5 It would therefore not be 1 Barbara Rozwadowska, Public Relations. Teoria. Praktyka. Perspektywy [Public Relations. Theory. Practice. Prospects], Warszawa 2002, p. 268. 2 Ewa Ma gorzata Cenker, Public Relations, Poznan ´ 2000, p. 4. 3 Anthony Davis, Public Relations, Warszawa 2007, p. 47. 4 Fraser P. Seitel, Public Relations w praktyce [Public Relations in Practice], Warszawa 2003, p. 65. 5 Ibidem.

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a mistake to identify a company with its entrepreneur and apply the remarks above to the respective entrepreneur. Working on an entrepreneur image is therefore also an investment in the future. The contemporary image of entrepreneurs in Poland has been affected by several factors: The most important include historical experience, the social costs of the transformation from a centrally planned to a free market economy, business scandals during the initial years of transformation, the political climate of the free market economy, formal and informal relations between politicians and entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial public conduct and finally society’s economic awareness and approval of the market economy rules as well as Poland’s economic situation. Some of these factors affecting the public perception of entrepreneurs are subject to the following analysis.

II. The evolution of the concept ‘entrepreneur’ The concept of the private entrepreneur is not defined in a uniform manner. Research conducted by the Public Affairs Institute suggests that, according to public opinion, an entrepreneur is someone who owns his / her own company, manages it and employs people.6 Ownership of a company is a prerequisite for being an entrepreneur.7 According to the majority of the respondents, individuals who manage companies but do not own them are not deemed to be entrepreneurs. The same applies to company shareholders who live of a dividend rather than work in the company. In Poland, ownership still tends to be identified with management, although slowly we are witnessing a process of handing down management to hired managers, while the owners retire to supervisory boards. Public opinion polls allow us to separate the most characteristic features of a Polish entrepreneur. The image of an entrepreneur is dependent on the respondents’ place of residence and their attitude towards the effects of the transformation process. The table below shows the features indicated by private and state-owned company employees. Private company employees tend to have a much better opinion of entrepreneurs. For state-owned company employees, an entrepreneur is an unfamiliar individual who remains out of touch with them.

6 See Barbara Rogulska, W as´ cicie, pracodawca, obywatel – rekonstrukcja wizerunku prywatnego przedsiebiorcy [Owner, Employer, Citizen – Reconstruction of a Private Entrepreneur’s Image], in: Lena Kolarska-Bobin´ska (ed.), S´wiadomos´c´ ekonomiczna spo eczen´stwa i wizerunek biznesu [Society’s Economic Awareness and the Image of Business], Warszawa 2004, pp. 104 – 131, here p. 104. 7 The respondents also regard company owners, i. e. those employing people but not directly involved in management, as entrepreneurs. They also regard as entrepreneurs those who are engaged in business activities but who do not employ others.

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Poland lacks the entrepreneurial ethos and respect for people creating new jobs; there is no admiration for economically successful people.8 On the one hand, under in the former political and economic system a ‘private trader’ was synonymous with a hustler who takes advantage of obscure connections, and is ‘stealing from the working class’. On the other hand, a person selling goods for a profit9 was referred to as a ‘speculator’. This notion was popular both in the 1950s and 1980s. Court records tell many stories of people who e. g. used to buy fish directly from fishermen and resold it (for a profit) in various cities and were then taken to court. A lot of coverage was devoted to the case of a baker from a village near Rzeszów, who would buy bread in the countryside and sold it for a profit in the city. Some of the ‘accused’ were sent to prison while others were ‘only’ fined. Table 1 The private entrepreneur’s image Entrepreneurs features

Opinions in private companies (%)

Opinions in state-owned companies (%)

Affluent

71

72

Thrifty

72

59

Has little time for family

67

59

Well educated

54

43

Invests in the company

56

36

Usually observes the law

47

32

Well-mannered

43

24

Honest

37

21

Takes care of the employees

33

22

Modest, does not regard himself superior

33

15

Lives off his own work

31

20

Source: Kolarska-Bobin´ska, S´wiadomos´c´ ekonomiczna spo eczen´stwa, pp. 110 f.

8 Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, president of Pekao S. A. and former prime minister said: “If Bill Gates turned up here nobody would ask him: ‘How did you become so successful?’; rather, people would think: ‘What lies behind it, what kind of establishment?’” See Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Gospodarka kwitnie dzieki przedsiebiorcom [The Economy Prospers Owing to Entrepreneurs], in: Gazeta Wyborcza, 15. 03. 2007, p. 28. 9 It is worth remembering that in the academic handbooks on the ‘Political economics of socialism’ the concept of ‘profit’ was only applied to capitalism; in socialism it was replaced by the ‘maximum satisfaction of social needs’.

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In the mid-1970s, the administration of Edward Gierek, the then 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, wanted to save socialism and hence approved of establishing companies with foreign capital of Polish citizens living abroad. The enforced legal regulations seemed to prevent citizens of the Polish People’s Republic from becoming capitalists.10 Capitalism had no chance of being effective in the socialist environment, as what the authorities really wanted was a ‘planned free market’. The requirement of holding a license to conduct business activities and financial settlements at the official USD / PLN rate of exchange contributed to corruption and fraud in companies with foreign capital. Party members and the media were outraged about the fact that such companies would buy raw materials from state-owned companies rather than import them.11 At the time propaganda could just not swallow competition between capitalist and socialist companies for access to raw materials and semi-finished goods. This affected another perception of the entrepreneur, namely that as a person taking advantage of connections and ambivalent relationships, becoming rich ‘at the expense of the working class’. Despite the non-existence of a political climate conducive to the development of this sector of the economy, a significant number of companies with foreign capital operated effectively in the distribution sector. The fortunes of many individuals, whose names are now listed among the ‘wealthiest Polish people’, stem from such companies. Many famous contemporary entrepreneurs started their business activities during the 1970s in companies with foreign capital of Polish origin. Since access was provided to state archives, we can assert the emergence of another face of companies with foreign capital. It turned out that the companies had been of special interest of the political police. The Secret Service was interested not only in the owners, but also in the employees who had to apply for the labor office’s referral in order to work in a private company.12 The Service would also be interested in foreigners co-operating with the companies. The secret police would follow the more significant transactions and cash flows. Our knowledge of the observation of companies with foreign capital is not yet complete; we do not know how many companies would grew due to the Secret Service’s support. The question arises, whether the contemporary image of entrepreneurs has been affected by the fact that they started their business activities in companies with foreign capital. Most probably, there is no research to give an unambiguous answer, although ‘a company with foreign capital of Polish origin’ seems to have become a historical concept related to the final years of the centrally planned economy in Poland.

10 See Joanna Solska, Myd o, powid o i czujne oko [This and That and a Watchful Eye], in: Polityka, 25. 11. 2006, p. 46. 11 Ibidem, p. 47. 12 Ibidem, p. 46.

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The existence of two currency exchange rates resulted in the emergence of a ‘black marketeers’ i. e. individuals who dealt with illegal cash exchange. The concept of companies with foreign capital was an excellent opportunity to ‘launder money’. All it took was finding a person abroad who intended to establish a company in Poland and become his or her proxy. How many pioneers of Polish capitalism come from companies with foreign capital and how many of them were active in the then illegal exchange of hard currency? It is worth noting that until 1989 Poland hosted two economic universes: the official economy with its shortages, empty shop shelves as well as rationing (e. g. food products or cars) and the unofficial economy. To put is simply, the unofficial differed from the former in respect to prices, less acute market shortages (especially of food products) as well as widely-accepted hard currency transactions (primarily in US-Dollar and Deutsche Mark).13 Specific people would operate in both economic universes; after the economic transformation, most of them became private entrepreneurs. Hence, a large number of them were ‘rooted’ (with all the related consequences) in the unofficial economic universe of the socialist era. This is particularly true for the initial period of the Polish transformation of 1989 – 1995. The economic transformation, as started off by Leszek Balcerowicz’s reforms, provided a golden opportunity for changing the entrepreneur’s image. Market economy rules liberated businessmen from associations of being ‘a small private trader’ or a profiteer. The free market transformed market stalls into small and big shops, while state-owned trade was the first to disappear. Small workshops changed into full-fledged production works, creating new jobs. Run-down vans gave rise to transport companies, which competed effectively with the stateowned over-expanded establishment. One of the chief claims put forward by Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government – ‘Take your life into your own hands’ – brought about its best and fastest results in the economic field. The concept of the entrepreneur changed its public meaning and moved closer to that existing in traditional market economy systems. The scheme below shows the evolution of the concept of the entrepreneur:

13 Andrzej Korbon´ski, The “Second Economy” in Poland, in: Journal of International Affairs 35 (1981), 1, pp. 1 – 13; Maria W. Los, Dynamics of the Second Economy in Poland, in: Maria W. Los (ed.), The Second Economy in Marxist States, London 1990, pp. 27 – 49.

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Scheme 1: From socialism to capitalism

The onset of the Polish economic transformation generated numerous and extreme emotions. They primarily stem from the depth of the transformations in Central and Eastern Europe. One could not agree more with Wac aw Wilczyn´ski that “( . . . ) the era of qualitative changes towards political democracy, the time of building up a healthy economic system at the turn of the 20th century has been referred to as the era of the system’s transformation”.14 Special emotions have accompanied the assessment of concepts, such as privatization, unemployment and foreign investment.15 The most extreme opinions pertain to the first listed issue.16 A comprehensive understanding of the reasons, the course and consequences of the economic processes instigated by Leszek Balcerowicz’s17 reforms, necessitates a comprehensive analysis exceeding this study.

14 Wac aw Wilczyn´ski, Polski przelom ustrojowny 1989 – 2005. Economia epoki transformacji [The Change of the Polish System 1989 – 2005. The Economy in the Transformation Period], Poznan´ 2005, p. 9. 15 Jan Winiecki (ed.), Five Years after June – The Polish Transformation 1989 – 1994, London 1996. 16 For negative opinions on proprietary transformation, see Jacek Tittenbrun, Z deszczu pod rynne. Meandry polskiej prywatyzacji [It never Rains but Pours. Meanders of Polish Privatization], Poznan´ 2007. A different opinion is demonstrated by Jan Szomburg, The Political Constraints on Polish Privatization, in: George Blazyca / Janusz M. Dabrowski (eds.), Monitoring Economic Transition. The Polish Case, Avebury 1995, pp. 75 – 85. 17 Leszek Balcerowicz, 800 dni. Szok kontrolowany [800 Days – Managed Shock], Warszawa 1992 and Leszek Balcerowicz, Pan´stwo w przebudowie [A State under Reconstruction], Krakow 1999.

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Yet by rejecting two extreme interpretations, on the one hand that transformation was accompanied solely by economic success and the minimization of the social costs of the reforms or on the other hand that transformation was accompanied by a sell-out of Polish property, the unlimited expansion of the foreign capital, Polish businesses going belly-up and mass unemployment, we have a good opportunity for a fair appraisal of the changes in Poland. All of this is important, as the economic phenomena during the last decade of the 20th century significantly affected society’s economic knowledge and, consequently, its perception of private entrepreneurs.

III. The entrepreneur, a stock character in business scandals The media played an important role in propagating the new economic rules. Witold Gadomski asserts that the media present the most famous entrepreneurs in three contexts: while providing neutral information on their companies, while covering social events as well as when reporting swindles and scandals.18 The first type of information primarily appears in the business press or in business columns in newspapers and weeklies. One should bear in mind that the business press in Poland does not enjoy wide circulation;19 hence possibilities of reaching the readers are limited. Readers of so-called women’s magazines are much more numerous but they tend to construct an entrepreneur’s image through his / her social life, interests, ways of spending free time, love of luxuries etc. Readers of this type of magazines are not interested in the creation of new jobs, new transactions or the search for new markets; they rather follow entrepreneurs’ family lives, social relations, holiday destinations, restaurants where they meet friends or hold business talks. These readers are less interested in the content of a commercial contract than in the dishes served at the party celebrating the transaction.

18 See Witold Gadomski, Mit polskiego oligarchy [The Myth of the Polish Oligarch], in: Piar.pl, January / February 2005, p. 15. 19 The best proof can be found in the small sales figures of economic daylies (Puls Biznesu and Parkiet) and economic magazines (Forbes and Manager Magazyn). There is no significant economic weekly on the Polish market. Business columns in newspapers are not particularly popular among readers, e. g. the majority of Gazeta Wyborcza readers admit to only thumbing through business columns.

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In compliance with the rule that good news does not make news, it is much easier to sell stories about scandals and swindles than information about the growing number of private companies, new jobs or the opening up of new markets. In the first years of transformation, media would extensively cover activities of individuals who were being investigated or even being imprisoned by prosecutors. An analysis of the media coverage could lead to the false conclusion that the main protagonists of the economic transformation included Bogus aw Bagsik, Janusz Baranowski, Piotr Bykowski, Aleksander Gawronik, Kazimierz Grabek, Lech Grobelny, Janusz Lekszton´ or Miros aw Stajszczak, to name a few. Before they came into collision with the law, these individuals occupied the highest ranks of the ‘list of the wealthiest Poles’, published by Wprost weekly since mid-1990s.20 It was the first magazine in Poland to publish such a list. The fist media coverage of the wealthiest Poles was generated in the planned economy era, while the first list of the 25 wealthiest Poles was published in September 1990. After a month the list was extended to 50 names; the first ‘100 wealthiest Poles’ list was made in February 1991. It would be difficult to find any of the pioneers of capitalism on contemporary ‘wealthiest’ lists; their companies are not among the leaders of the Polish economy. Many of them were imprisoned for economic offences (chiefly tax offences, duty swindles, defrauds). Some of them remain confined. During the first stage of transformation, a figure of speech was coined which adversely affected the image of entrepreneurs. It said: “The first million comes from theft”. The media were especially interested in irregularities accompanying the privatization of state-owned companies. A similar mechanism applied: the media would be more interested in individual cases of e. g. the underestimated value of a company put up for sale or the political connections of the buyers of state-owned assets than in the hundreds of companies emerging and becoming successful in the new business environment as a result of privatization. Lower confidence in entrepreneurs partaking in the biggest privatization transactions affected the whole circle, which was then heavily criticised by the general public.

20 The list of the wealthiest evoked emotions, especially in the initial years. Many people would do anything not to be included because they generally believed that the first readers would be the prosecutors. According to these “wealthiest” individuals, publishing information on their wealth violated their privacy and posed a threat to them and their family’s safety. For some, inclusion in the list was a proof of being one of the representatives of the young capitalism. Some substantianted their business position in banks and with foreign partners due to their presence on the list of the wealthiest.

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IV. Economic growth and the entrepreneur’s image One of the factors influencing the archetypical entrepreneur’s image in society is the country’s general economic situation and the respondents’ specific financial position. One can state that the better the overall economic situation, the more palpable the symptoms of improvement, the more approval of wealth and the wealthy. An improved economic situation positively affects the entrepreneur’s image as a person who owns and manages his / her own company, employs people and stands out due to his / her large disposable income. This is confirmed in research conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion Research (Centrum Badania Opinii Spo ecznej, CBOS) from 1992 to 1999 and in 2004. “The economic growth which originated from in the mid-1990s produced growing affluence in the country while the group of the wealthy became bigger ( . . . ). The image of the wealthy improved and attitudes towards wealth became more favorable. However, phenomena like economic stagnation which occurred during the past few years and the impoverishment of some Polish people due to unemployment ( . . . ) have changed our attitudes towards wealth and the wealthy.”21 The mood accompanying the wealthy deteriorated at the turn of 21th century. A recession (minimum GDP growth in 2000), the high and long-term social costs of transformation, the collapse of thousands of small companies and the growing readiness to admit that it takes a lot to become a Rockefeller have changed the social perception of the wealthy. Jealousy and envy replaced admiration and respect for risk-taking.22 Sociologists perceive the problem in a broader perspective. Our dislike of entrepreneurs is topped off with our disrespect for them and our shrinking approval of our own entrepreneurship. We do not perceive ourselves as active participants of the market as we generally prefer the less stressful ‘contract jobs’.23 The entrepreneur’s image is developed by factors determined by the rate of becoming wealthier and the source of wealth. CBOS’s respondents answered the question: what allows some people make to make a considerable amount of money

21 W odzimierz Derczyn´ski, Bogactwo i ludzie bogaci w opiniach Polaków [Wealth and the Wealthy as Seen by the Poles], Warszawa 2004, p. 1. 22 See Stanis aw Zunderlich, Bogacze na stos, [Eat the Rich], in: Newsweek Polska, 07. 03. 2004, p. 46 and Gadomski, Mit polskiego [The Myth] (fn. 18), p. 13. 23 See Joanna Solska, Koniec kapitalizmu, czyli chcemy pracowac ´ byle nie na swoim [The End of Capitalism or We Want to Work but Not in Our Own Company], in: Polityka, 23. 09. 2006, pp. 4 – 12.

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in a relatively short time? The respondents’ task was to choose the three most crucial factors out of eleven possible options. In October 1992, these included: disrespect for the law and avoidance of the law, taking advantage of legal loopholes as well as courage and risk-taking. In December 1994, the sequence remained the same. In January 1997, the respondents indicated: courage and risktaking, diligence and total devotion to one’s job, talent and skills as well as disrespect for and avoidance of the law. In January 1999, the respondents tended to primarily list positive traits: courage and risk-taking, diligence and total devotion to one’s job as well as talent and skills. This survey indicated the influence of economic stagnation and the general climate associated with wealthy people. In January 2004, the respondents named the following sources of wealth: courage and risk-taking, disrespect for and avoidance of the law as well as taking advantage of legal loopholes.24 A survey conducted in 2004 shows that public opinion less and less referring to positive sources of wealth: diligence and devotion (a drop by 12 percent), courage and risk-taking (a drop by 8 percent), talent and skills (a drop by 7 percent), to the advantage of negative sources, for example bribing public officials (a rise by 7 percent).25 A large majority of the respondents of the latest survey (68 percent) claim that wealth cannot be attributed to honest work. The growing importance of ‘ruthlessness towards other people’ is certainly worth noting. This trait was ranked seventh in December 1994, only to move up to rank four in the latest survey. This could be attributed to the persistently high unemployment rate. All negative phenomena accompanying the perception of entrepreneurs were included in some manner in a ranking list published in 2004 by Newsweek Poland, which presented the most hated Polish entrepreneurs.

24 25

See Derczyn´ski, Bogactwo [Wealth] (fn. 21), p. 7. Ibidem, pp. 7 – 9.

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V. The ten most hated (Newsweek Poland 2004) 1. Aleksander Gudzowaty (co-owner of Bartimpex company, acts as an agent in the trade of Russian natural gas and the producing of bio-fuels; co-owner of an insurance company) – dishonest, prone to corruption, takes advantage of the establishment and connections, relations with the criminal world

2. Jan Kulczyk (co-owner of Kompania Piwowarska, Telekomunikacja Polska S. A., Autostrada Wielkopolska, Kulczyk-Tradex (an importer of Volkswagen, Audi and Porsche and Škoda Polska) – owes his fortune to the establishment and connections, prone to corruption and not very honest

3. Zygmunt Solorz (owner of the Polsat TV station, the first private TV channel in Poland; co-owner of the Elektrum power supply company and Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa; owns an insurance company, a pension insurance company and a bank) – establishment connections and luck have contributed to his business position, prone to corruption

4. Wanda Rapaczyn´ska (president of AGORA S. A., publisher of Gazeta Wyborcza, the biggest newspaper in Poland) – prone to corruption, owes her position to the establishment, manipulates the media

5. Ryszard Krauze (co-owner of the Prokom IT company, the Bioton biotechnology company, a property developer, owner of oilfields in Kazakhstan) – the story of his success: connections to the establishment, shiftiness, luck and good education; he is not honest

6. Piotr Niemczycki (vice-president of AGORA S. A., publisher of Gazeta Wyborcza, the biggest newspaper in Poland) – he owes his fortune to knowledge and education, but he manipulates the media and is prone to corruption

7. Mariusz Walter (co-owner of the TVN and the TVN 24 station, the first TV information channel in Central Europe; owns the Onet.pl portal, a chain of cinemas and the Pascal publishing house) – source of his wealth: luck, connections and hard work, manipulates the media

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8. Zbigniew Niemczycki (co-owner of several hotels, a pharmaceutical company, an office condominium and a private airline) – prone to corruption, had luck

9. Henryk Stok osa (owner of the biggest farm in Poland and a meat processing company; right now wanted by virtue of an European Arrest Warrant) – he was lucky but remains unknown

10. Sobies aw Zasada (former rally driver; representative of Mercedes in Poland; co-owner of coaches and trucks factories; wine importer) – source of his riches: a combination of luck and hard work; he is a snob and shows off his affluence

The descriptions above most often contain words such as “the establishment”, “connections”, “corruption”, “snobbery”, “showing off wealth”, “proneness to corruption”, “manipulation” and “luck”, while “education” and “hard work” were less popular. However, it is hard to pinpoint the reasons for a poor opinion of entrepreneurs as the respondents often admitted that the individuals under discussion were unknown to them. It is worth noting that the ‘top ten wealthiest Poles’ list included not only company owners but also managers in a media company.26 Another significant fact is the presence of four individuals from the media sector: the press, television and the internet. The ranking list provoked alarm in business circles; entrepreneurs threatened the weekly with libel suits. The weekly’s editors apologised to anyone who felt hurt by with the ranking list and admitted their mistake i. e. a publication based upon a survey with a sample size of twelve.

26

See Stanis aw Zunderlich, Bogacze na stos [Eat the Rich], (fn. 21), p. 46.

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VI. ‘Wild capitalism’ or ‘political capitalism’? Regardless of whoever exercised power in Poland, the most important issue has always been the division of the national income rather than its production. Wac aw Wilczyn´ski seems to have been quite right when he said: “( . . . ) contemporary Polish politicians are completely disinterested in producing income and only interested in its division”.27 There are always fewer income producers than those willing to take advantage of the benefits of its division while ‘politicians can count votes and hence the state budget will always be of a redistributive nature’.28 In the whole transformation process, those who divided up income (politicians, trade unionists) were always speaking louder than those who multiplied the national income and created new jobs (entrepreneurs). The future of many politicians depended on the intensity of juxtaposing employers (primarily private ones) and employees. Electoral arithmetic combined with ignorance of the essence of market economy mechanisms leaves a large part of the political establishment disinterested in creating a positive image of the entrepreneur. According to a honest assessment of the situation based on statistical data, politicians should support entrepreneurs. Over 3.5 million companies are registered in Poland (and thereby potentially constitute a huge electorate). However, half of them never exhibited any business activities while over 60 percent do not employ anyone. Only 4 percent (145,000) of companies employ more than nine individuals. A large majority of business owners are, in fact, hired employees and their entrepreneur status results from the desire to pay lower social security fees and taxes; it stems from compulsion rather than inherent entrepreneurship and risk-taking. During the whole economic transformation period, politicians and trade unionists have tried to persuade people that Poland is witnessing the wildest variety of capitalism, in which employees are stripped of their rights and in which exploitation and the limitation of trade union rights is comparable to that in the 19th century England or France. However, the proponents of these views cannot explain why ‘wild capitalism’ is facing a systematically growing number of types of business

27 Wac aw Wilczyn´ski, Ekonomia na s uzbie [Economics on Duty], in: Wprost, 18. 03. 2007, p. 58. 28 Robert Gwiazdowski, Których polityków powinni bac ´ sie polscy biznesmeni? Odpowiedz´ jest prosta: wszystkich [Which Politicians Are Dangerous to Polish Businesspeople? The Answer Is Simple: All of Them], in: Dziennik, 31. 07. 2007, p. 21. Entrepreneurs should always be afraid of politicians. This was probably the meaning behind the words of Zbigniew Wassermann, deputy chairman of the Orlen parliamentary special committee, who said during a committee meeting that if he were in Jan Kulczyk’s shoes he would not return to Poland.

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activity which required state permission. While during the early stages of transformation only seven business fields required state licences, right now their number exceeds eighty. The state continues to be the owner of over one thousand businesses, many of them employing only several or hardly more than a dozen persons. Parliament still imposes remuneration ceilings on state-owned companies (so-called state companies salary caps), although the current government intends to withdraw from the related legal regulations. From time to time, politicians encourage introducing salary limitations in private companies. The state stipulates the minimum salary and encumbers employers with other costs. At the same time, in industries where the state is the dominant proprietor, it introduces long-lasting employment guarantees (e. g. in the power sector). One can hardly call an economy ‘wild capitalist’ if the state regulates the areas permissible for city shops by means of legal acts and decides who issues the permits to commission such shops. Administrative decisions affect prices for certain services (e.g. services rendered by notaries). Every individual, whether employed by a state-owned or a private company, is to some extent required to resort to services supplied by the State Insurance Company. Do ‘wild capitalism’ courts analyse or question the validity of private trade contracts? There are more examples of state interventions in the economy. Those who proclaim the current reality of ‘wild capitalism’ also claim to know who is to blame for the situation. Politicians, irrespective of their political persuation, provide one answer: entrepreneurs. While it would hardly be surprising for leftist politicians to adopt such an attitude,29 it is surprising that representatives of conservative parties (conservative more by name than according to the polcies they put forward, especially regarding the economy) are pitting entrepreneurs and employees against each other. The protest of conservative politicians against lowering taxes has hardly anything in common with ‘wild capitalism’ or with conservatism in the European or American sense of the word. In Poland, the rule that every entrepreneur is suspicious pected has been true for many years.30 There is a conviction that honest work will never make you rich and that anyone who demands lower taxes only wants to consume more him- / herself, while ignoring the needs of the state budget which finances the most crucial general social needs. Witold Or owski, former chief of the economic advisors team for President Aleksander Kwas´niewski, was right in saying: “The nation offers a simple, popular recipe to

29 In Poland the left-wing government Leszek Miller actually lowered taxes paid by entrepreneurs from 40 percent to 19 percent. 30 See Marek Magierowski, W kraju, gdzie przedsiebiorca jest podejrzany [A Country Where the Businessman Is a Suspect], in: Rzeczpospolita, 08. 03. 2007, p. 2.

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secure votes: make the rich pay!”31 The policy of pitting employees and entrepreneurs against each other does not lead to social solidarity – quite the contrary. This policy cannot be ascribed to a single political camp. In fact, it has been present during the entire economic transformation period. It tends to be more intense during election campaigns and is present independently of whichever party is in power. Capital is ‘attacked’ by both leftist parties and those who refer to themselves as rightist (although their platforms and economic policies are leftist). Research conducted by the Polish Confederation of Private Employers “Leviathan” shows that entrepreneurs do not approve of a division between a liberal Poland of “capital” and a communitarian and numerous Poland of “labor”, a division so eagerly promoted by the prime minister. Over 80 percent of the questioned managers claim that the division is definitely or rather false.32 Entrepreneurs do not trust the government and harbour many reservations about the anti-liberal ideology promoted by the prime minister and his government. The image of entrepreneurs is affected by their relations with politicians. Media coverage allows for the division of entrepreneurs into two groups: those who do not hide their social and business relations with representatives of the ruling coalition and those who either do not maintain such relations or do not display them, if not keep them secret. The first group is referred to by media as “oligarchs”. It is a clear reference to Russian and Ukrainian businessmen who have come into huge fortunes due to their connections with the state-owned economy and by taking-over privatized assets of the former USSR, but who have also had a powerful influence on the post-Soviet political scene. Russian oligarchs, not only influence politicians, but also courts and, last but not least, the media. They have been a powerful pressure group. Witold Gadomski, a Gazeta Wyborcza journalist, said: “An oligarch who does not pull the strings of puppet politicians and journalists is a caricature of an oligarch.”33 The president of the Polish Confederation of Private Employers added that it was a misunderstanding to compare Poland and Russia, as Polish democracy is stronger and the courts are independent.34

31 Witold Or owski, Polowanie na bogatych [Hunting the Rich], in: Wprost, 15. 07. 2007, pp. 42 – 44. 32 See Bartosz Krzyzaniak, Biznesowi polityka PiS nie w smak [PiS’s Politics Do Not Agree with Business], in: Puls Biznesu, 21. 09. 2007, p. 4. 33 Witold Gadomski, I ty bedziesz oligarcha [You Will Be an Oligarch, too], in: Gazeta Wyborcza, 15. / 16. 09. 2007, pp. 18 f. 34 See Czy trwa polowanie na bogatych biznesmenów? [Are We Witnessing a Wealthy Businessmen Hunt?], in: Gazeta Wyborcza, 07. 09. 2007, p. 5.

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The use of the term ‘oligarch’ for Polish entrepreneurs is highly pejorative and is employed in the context of the entrepreneur’s business with the state. Privatizations of strategic companies (e. g. Telekomunikacja Polska S. A.), state tenders (e. g. computerisation of state institutions), state investments (e. g. construction of pipelines) or interest in strategic sectors (e. g. petroleum), i. e. various levels of contacts between the state and private business, have contributed to the usage of the term ‘oligarch’ in the media. It is often accompanied by questions: why did he win the tender, why is he an agent in this transaction, which politicians support him, are politicians showing their gratitude for pre-election (financial) support? The following individuals have most frequently been referred to as ‘oligarchs’: Jan Kulczyk, Aleksander Gudzowaty, Ryszard Krauze, Zygmunt Solorz.35 Another pejorative term is ‘political capitalism’ which indicates too close relations between politicians, civil servants and entrepreneurs. This expression appeared in the media as early as the mid-1990s, although it was reinforced in the public’s awareness during the proceedings of the Orlen Parliamentary Special Committee. The Media decided that President Aleksander Kwas´niewski and Jan Kulczyk, the wealthiest Polish citizen, were the embodiment of ‘political capitalism’.36 ‘Political capitalism’ is also reflected in politicians’ transfers to private companies when their term of office expires. This is also true for civil servants. Poland more often sees a move ‘from power to riches’ contrary to the American model of ‘from riches to power’. This phenomenon is condemned not only by the media, but also by the general public. This holds particularly true for tycoons, although there are numerous examples of local politicians and local government officials transferring to smaller companies too. The general negative opinion on all entrepreneurs is increased by the fact that often a politician or a civil servant makes decisions in favor of a company where he / she is later employed. A classic example occurred in the National Broadcasting Council, whose chairman granted a TV channel a license to operate and, once dismissed from his job by the president, found employment with the TV channel in question.

35 See Gadomski, Mit polskiego [The Polish Myth] (fn. 18), p. 16. After negative coverage in the media, Aleksander Gudzowaty threatened lawsuits, wrote letters and petitions as well as publicly attacking the media. Ryszard Krauze, accused of ambiguities accompanying computerisation of the Social Insurance Institution (Zak ad Ubezpieczen´ Spo ecznych, ZUS), adopted another approach. He managed to persuade the public that the disorder in the ZUS did not result from Prokom’s errors, but from the incompetence of ZUS managers and the frequently changing law. 36 Jan Pin´ski / Igor Zalewski, System Kwas ´niewskiego [Kwas´niewski’s System], in: Wprost, 05. 09. 2004, pp. 28 – 30.

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Media also speak about ‘political capitalism’ when referring to the changing of company presidents at businesses either owned by the state or with a state majority share. In socialism, holding any managerial function in a company necessitated approval or permission of the relevant party committee. It was impossible to manage large companies employing hundreds or thousands of people without consent of the highest echelons of the Communist party. In compliance with socialist practice, the Communist party ‘delegated’ their entrusted members to any managerial positions in the economy. In the early 1970s, Mieczys aw F. Rakowski, chief editor of Polityka weekly, published an article entitled “A professional but not a party member” which was supposed to herald Edward Gierek’s and his party’s new personnel policy. It was to consist of staffing managerial positions predominantly with professionals (even when they failed to be members of the Polish Unified Workers’ Party) and limiting the number of so-called nomenclature positions – which could only be assumed by Communist party members. However, once announced, the policy was never implemented and soon Gierek’s team embraced – by and large – the old personnel policy. Economic privatization considerably limited the number of state-owned enterprises, although many significant businesses remained state property. After 1989, each change of government has involved changes in executive positions of stateowned companies (management boards and supervisory boards). It is hardly surprising that the media continue to cover this phenomenon as ‘political capitalism’ when reporting on huge businesses including PKO BP S.A. Bank, PKN Orlen (oil refiner and petrol retailer), Lotos (oil concern), KGHM (producer of copper and silver), LOT (Polish airlines), mines, power plants, chemical works, the post offive and the railways. Some of these phenomena blurring the borders of politics and business, which are criticised by the public, are deemed perfectly normal in countries that enjoy developed market economies. The president, prime minister or chancellor embarks on a trip to another country and takes local entrepreneurs with him / her. During talks with the hosts, the politicians discuss issues familiar to entrepreneurs. It is perfectly normal to compete for national business affairs and this type of contact with politicians does not tarnish the image of either the entrepreneurs or of the head of state or prime minister. In the past few years, the Polish president and prime minister were accompanied by numerous entrepreneurs on their trips abroad. The selection criteria were not very transparent.37 The president currently in power

37

See Czy trwa polowanie [Are We Witnessing] (fn. 34).

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rather stays away from private entrepreneurs. The prime minister does not frequent the Economic Forum in Krynica, the biggest business meeting in Central and Eastern Europe, often referred to as ‘the Polish Davos’. State-owned companies, although not all of them, may count on the government’s support. By means of their representatives, business circles call for explicit rules governing the relations between entrepreneurs and top rank politicians.38

VII. “Business in search of a persona” In February 2008, Polityka, Poland’s biggest opinion weekly published an article entitled “Business in search of a persona”.39 The article’s author claims that Polish business does not have a proper representation. Although entrepreneurs may join many organizations, including the biggest ones: the Polish Confederation of Private Employers “Leviathan”, the Polish Chamber of Commerce, the Confederation of Polish Employers or the Business Centre Club, in fact, 98 percent of business people do not belong to any of these organizations. Entrepreneurs are of the opinion that none of these organizations manages to represent their interests. In the late 1990s, a debate started in Poland about introducing an universal business selfgovernment as an institution representing all business people. Without deciding whether such a self-government would have enhanced business’s image or not, or if it would have changed the government’s attitude towards private entrepreneurs, one should state that the debate was soon closed. Concerns about the organization’s economic power (it was intended to be partly financed by the state budget) as well as a dispute about the appointment of the leading authorities and the future of the existing business organizations and clubs resulted in a lack of interest in developing this idea among both business people and representatives of the government. Public opinion polls prove that private entrepreneurs do not enjoy much public trust, even though the economy is based on the private sector, which after 18 years of economic transformation employs more people than the state-owned sector. Although large-scale entrepreneurs may count on some esteem, owners of small shops, workshops and small companies are on the lowest rung of the professional prestige ladder. Lower rank is only accorded to unskilled workers and political activists. There are many reasons for this; these are deeply rooted in our history and

Ibidem. Joanna Solska, Biznes szuka twarzy [Business in Search of a Persona], in: Polityka, 02. 02. 2008, pp. 38 – 40. 38 39

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they are related to the political scene, society’s level of education as well as the social costs of economic transformation (e. g. closing down unprofitable companies, growing unemployment and social impoverishment). There is no doubt that it will take a long time to improve the entrepreneur’s image, but it will also be necessary to understand that capitalism cannot be built without capitalists. Few Polish entrepreneurs have adopted a professional approach to their image. There are many examples of entrepreneurs receiving a lot of media coverage and then suddenly disappearing from public life (for various reasons) as he / she remembers the Russian proverb ‘tisze budiesz, dalsze jediesz’ (the more silent you are, the further you will go) or another saying: ‘big money likes peace, big money likes silence’. It is interesting to note that the owners of media companies, especially owners of TV channels (Polsat / TVN) have not been able to build positive images. In a press interview Jan Wejchert, co-founder of TVN and TVN 24, said: “How are we supposed to fight? We are businessmen.”40 “We are vulnerable, we need to wait it out” is one of the attitudes exemplified by Jan Wejchert – and it is especially common during election campaigns. Some entrepreneurs try to cajole the government (e. g. Aleksander Gudzowaty), while others believe that political attacks cannot touch them (e. g. Micha So owow and Roman Karkosik – among the biggest investors on the Warsaw Stock Exchange). There are two more types of entrepreneurial conduct regarding attacks by politicians. The first consists of leaving the country (clearly following the example of some Russian oligarchs). This solution has been adopted by Jan Kulczyk and Ryszard Krauze. One can also follow the example of Roman Kluska, founder of the Optimus computer company, who ended his business activities, sold the company and now works for charity. Every blackening of an entrepreneurs’ name adversely affects the company’s value, contracting partners’ and banks’ attitudes, which jeopardises investor relations. Political which-hunts on entrepreneurs as we witnessed them in the summer of 2007 had financial repercussions: within one day the biggest entrepreneurs lost dozens, if not hundreds of millions of zloty, when their companies’ shares sank suddenly as a result of various accusations. However, not all entrepreneurs approve of the opinions expressed in the media, even leading to the statement: “Easy?! It’s only an election campaign.”41

40 See Jan Wejchert, W Sejmie po dwóch dniach bym sobie w eb strzeli [I Was in the Sejm and After Two Days I Shot Myself in the Head] in: Przekrój, 06. 09. 2007, pp. 24 – 26. 41 Marcin Zwierzchowski, Spokojnie?! To tylko kampania wyborcza [Easy ?! It’s Only an Election Campaign], in: Rzeczpospolita 15. 09. 2007, p. 5.

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Entrepreneurs point out that still in Poland “( . . . ) anyone who owns private property and is entrepreneurial is a suspect by definition”.42 The arrest of Prof. Janusz Filipiak, president of the ComArch public company, is a striking example. He was detained at the airport on his way back to Poland, handcuffed and interrogated after over a dozen hours of detention. One may subscribe to an opinion expressed by Andrzej Arendarski, president of the Polish Chamber of Commerce, one of the biggest Polish business organizations, that “the system is sick, as it allows for the treatment of individuals, who are not even official suspects, in this way”.43 The situation calls for systemic changes since distrust of business does not merely result from the existing government’s political opinions. In January 2008, during the 1st Employers’ Congress, Prime Minister Donald Tusk promised business people that he would put an end to the spectacular arrests and the aura of suspicion. Prof. Filipiak was arrested three months after the prime minister’s speech.

VIII. Synopsis Historical factors, the business cycle, knowledge of market economy mechanisms and the political situation all affect the image of the Polish businessman. It is hard to decide which of these factors has been the dominant influence on the public’s ultimate image of a private entrepreneur. Eighteen years into errecting a market economy, a private entrepreneur evokes mixed social emotions, ranging from an “admirable successful person” to a “distrusted individual taking advantage of legal loopholes and political connections in conducting business”. Undoubtedly, the role of the historical factors will be increasingly less conspicuous with socialism becoming a historical category covered in books rather than a reality in which they used to exist for the majority of the population. The economic situation is bound to affect the perception of private entrepreneurs strongly. One may assume that in the years to come the following pattern will occur: the bigger the economic boom (and the better the living conditions), the better the public image of private entrepreneurs. The social image of entrepreneurs will be significantly affected by the political situation and the government’s attitude towards the private economy. This has been very curtly put by one businessman: “If the govern-

42 Henryka Bochniarz, Trzeba zmienic ´ podejs´cie do przedsiebiorców [We Need to Change the Attitude towards Businessmen], in: Rzeczpospolita, 18. 04. 2008, p. B3. 43 Zbigniew Zwierzchowski, Biznes wspiera prof. Filipiaka [Business in Support of Prof. Filipiak], in: Rzeczpospolita, 18. 04. 2008, p. B3.

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ment establishes the law while viewing private businessmen with a few cons in mind, nothing will change. Every society has had and will have entrepreneurs breaking the law”.

Enterprising self. Neue soziale Differenzierung und kulturelle Selbstdeutungen der Wirtschaftselite in Litauen Von Asta Vonderau I. Einführung Der vorliegende Artikel beschäftigt sich zum einen mit der Frage, welche Prinzipien sozialer Differenzierung sich im Zuge der postsozialistischen Transformation und der europäischen Integration in Litauen herausgebildet haben und welche kollektiven Bilder eines ,erfolgreichen Individuums‘ in diesem Kontext entstanden sind. Zum anderen geht es darum, wie sich die Vertreter der litauischen Wirtschaftselite innerhalb des neu differenzierten sozialen Raumes positionieren und wie sie sich zu den medialen-öffentlichen Darstellungen des Erfolgs verhalten. Welche Formen von kultureller (Selbst-)Deutung und welche Strategien öffentlicher (Selbst-)Inszenierung werden in diesem sozialen Kontext eingesetzt, um den Status einer (Wirtschafts-)Elite zu erreichen und beizubehalten? Mein Beitrag basiert auf einer qualitativen empirischen Studie. Das hier vorgestellte Material wurde während einer siebenmonatigen Feldforschung in der litauischen Hauptstadt Vilnius gesammelt und besteht aus biographischen Interviews mit Vertretern der Wirtschaftselite (mit Eigentümern, Präsidenten und Direktoren litauischer Konzerne, Unternehmern, hochkarätigen Angestellten transnationaler Firmen, Managern, etc.), aus den Ergebnissen der teilnehmenden Beobachtung ihrer öffentlichen Selbstrepräsentationen sowie aus einer Analyse der Wahrnehmung der Wirtschaftseliten in den medialen Diskursen.1 Zeitlich umfassen die hier thematisierten Prozesse die ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen Transformationen in Litauen seit etwa 1980. Der meiner Forschung zugrunde liegende, ,weiche‘ Begriff der (Wirtschafts-) Eliten dient weniger der Bestimmung einer durch objektive Kriterien klar abgegrenzten sozialen Gruppe, sondern der Beantwortung der Frage, wie sich soziale Akteure als ,Aktivisten des freien Marktes‘, als ,Gewinner‘ oder Verkörperungen eines anstrebenswerten Lebensmodells selbst wahrnehmen und wie sie wahrge1 Die Feldforschung führte ich im Rahmen meines Promotionsvorhabens zum Thema „Kulturelle Modelle von Erfolg und gutem Leben im ,neuen‘ Europa. Beispiel Litauen“ durch.

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nommen werden.2 Ich betrachte meine Interviewpartner als einflussreiche Akteure innerhalb eines sozialen Machtfeldes (Piere Bourdieu),3 dessen Machtkonstellationen und Herrschaftsweisen es zu untersuchen gilt. Daher ist das Interesse an einer genauen begrifflichen Bestimmung der (Wirtschafts-)Elite der Frage nachgeordnet, wie der soziale Status der litauischen Wirtschaftselite im Laufe der Zeit und über gesellschaftliche Brüche und Transformationen hinweg reproduziert und wie ihre Macht symbolisch legitimiert wird.4

II. Transformationen des Selbst Um die aktuellen Selbstdeutungen der Wirtschaftselite verstehen zu können, ist eine Analyse des allgemeinen Wandels der kollektiven Vorstellungen vom Individuum und seiner Rolle innerhalb der Gesellschaft notwendig, ein Wandel, der sich in Litauen und anderen Ländern der früheren Sowjetunion forciert seit dem Ende des Sozialismus vollzieht.5 Wie die amerikanische Kulturanthropologin Elizabeth C. Dunn betont, erfordern unterschiedliche ökonomische Strukturen (wie die einer staatlich regulierten Ökonomie oder eines freien Marktes) ein bestimmtes Selbstverständnis der Individuen und führen zur Herausbildung entsprechender Subjektivitätsmodelle. Sie bringen also Individuen hervor, die sich innerhalb dieser Strukturen auskennen und aktiv werden.6 Entsprechend ist die wirtschaftliche Transformation in Osteuropa nach 1989 nicht nur als Übergang von einem staatlich kontrollierten zu einem freien Markt zu verstehen, sondern auch im Zusammenhang mit dem Entstehen neuer 2 Die von Charles Wright Mills formulierte, relativ offene Definition der Elite mag für die Zwecke dieses Aufsatzes ausreichen: „The elite are simply those who have the most of what there is to have, which is generally held to include money, power and prestige – as well as all the ways of life to which these lead.“ Charles Wright Mills, The Power Elite, London / Oxford / New York 1956, S. 9. 3 Pierre Bourdieu, Die Praxis der reflexiven Anthropologie. Einleitung zum Seminar an der Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris, Oktober 1987, in: Pierre Bourdieu / Loïc J. D. Wacquant, Reflexive Anthropologie, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, S. 251 – 294, hier S. 263. 4 Die soziologische und politikwissenschaftliche Elitenforschung beschäftigt sich vor allem mit der statistischen Bestimmung und Klassifikation von Eliten. Im Blick auf die postsozialistischen Gesellschaften stellt sie sich vor allem die Frage nach den ,alten‘ und ,neuen‘ Eliten und ihrem Wandel. Die ethnologische und kulturanthropologische Elitenforschung hingegen ist meist an der symbolischen (Re-)Produktion des sozialen Elitenstatus interessiert und an den kulturellen Logiken, die sich hinter den Herrschaftsstrategien beobachten lassen. Siehe z. B. Chris Shore / Stephen Nugent (eds.), Elite Cultures. Anthropological Perspectives, London 2002. 5 Ich beschränke mich hier auf den sozialen Kontext Litauens. Viele der oben beschriebenen Prozesse sind aber auch mit Entwicklungen in anderen postsozialistischen osteuropäischen Staaten vergleichbar. 6 Elizabeth C. Dunn, Privatizing Poland. Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor, Ithaca (NY) / London 2004.

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Formen der Subjektbildung zu betrachten und neuer Vorstellungen darüber, was es heißt, ein Individuum zu sein und seinen ,eigenen Platz‘ innerhalb der Gesellschaft einzunehmen. Im Folgenden werde ich den Wandel dominanter Formen von Subjektbildung als ,Transformationen des Selbst‘ bezeichnen, wobei das ,Selbst‘ in Anlehnung an Katherine Verdery als ideologisches, durch konkrete Machtstrukturen erzeugtes Konstrukt verstanden wird, das Individuen durch moralische Normen und andere gesellschaftliche Regeln mit ihrer sozialen Umgebung verbindet und sie somit erst zu Individuen ihrer eigenen sozialen Welt macht.7 Verdery betont, dass das Individuum als Schauplatz vieler möglicher ,Selbst‘-Konstrukte verstanden werden sollte, die in unterschiedlichen Situationen zum Tragen kommen. Ebenso muss betont werden, dass das Spektrum der möglichen Formen der Subjektbildung nicht unbegrenzt ist und nicht gänzlich der freien Wahl der Akteure unterliegt, sondern als Effekt bestimmter historischer Machtkonstellationen sowie gesellschaftlicher Verhältnisse entsteht und sich mit diesen wandelt. Das ,Selbst‘ ist demnach also grundsätzlich sozialer Natur und wird durch die dem Individuum zur Verfügung stehenden Selbstdarstellungsmittel immer weiter ausgestaltet und reproduziert.8 Auch wenn die ,Transformationen des Selbst‘ hier vor allem mit dem strukturellen Wandel in Verbindung gebracht werden, werden sie nicht als ausschließlich ,von oben‘ gesteuerte Prozesse betrachtet, sondern zugleich als solche, die ,von unten‘, durch den Umgang einzelner Akteure mit strukturellen Zwängen gestaltet werden. Auf der alltagsweltlichen Ebene des gesellschaftlichen Lebens kommen diese Transformationen in unterschiedlichen Lebensmodellen, Selbstentwürfen, kulturellen Praxen und symbolischen Repräsentationen zum Ausdruck, die nicht automatisch und gänzlich strukturell reglementiert und kontrolliert sein müssen. Im Folgenden werde ich einige besonders dominante Selbst-Konstrukte analysieren, die in die Logik der herrschenden politischen und ökonomischen Ideologien eingeschrieben sind und öffentliche Leitbilder sowie persönliche Selbst- und Fremdbilder in besonderem Maße prägen, darunter das Modell des Kollektiv-Menschen im Sozialismus oder das des unternehmerischen Individuums im neoliberalen Kapitalismus. 1. Der sozialistische Mensch Das ideologische Projekt des ,sozialistischen Menschen‘ sah das Individuum vor allem als Teil eines Kollektivs, der „people-as-one“.9 Geschlechtliche, ethnische oder soziale Differenzen innerhalb der sozialistischen Gesellschaft galten gemäß der egalitären sozialistischen Ideologie als überwunden. So wurde seitens des so7 Vgl. Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism and What Comes after? Princeton (NJ) 1996, S. 53. 8 Nikolas Rose, Inventing Ourselves. Psychology, Power and Personhood, Cambridge 1998, S. 171, 176. 9 Verdery, What Was Socialism (Fn. 7), S. 93.

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zialistischen Staates versucht, das Leben seiner Bürger durch zentral kontrollierte und standardisierte Produktions- und Konsumabläufe in zeitlicher Übereinstimmung zu organisieren und äußerlich anzugleichen. Die Standardisierung und Kollektivierung stellte ein wichtiges Prinzip sozialistischen Regierens dar und hatte u. a. eine kontrollierende Funktion. So wurde, wie Verdery ausführt, staatlicherseits versucht, die Bevölkerung durch das Verlangsamen, Angleichen und Anhalten der Zeit von möglichen, nicht staatskonformen Aktivitäten abzuhalten.10 Bekanntermaßen funktionierten diese Kontroll- und Regulierungsmaßnahmen nicht reibungslos, und die reale Kollektivierung entsprach nicht immer ihrer ideologischen Absicht: Die so Regierten erfanden alternative Wege der Vergemeinschaftung und Differenzierungsstrategien, die es ihnen ermöglichten, nicht nur innerhalb staatlicher, sondern auch innerhalb schattenwirtschaftlicher ökonomischer Strukturen und informeller Beziehungsnetzwerke zu agieren und die materiellen Defizite ihres Alltages auf diese Weise auszugleichen. Wie die Vertreter der heutigen Wirtschaftselite (von denen einige schon in der sozialistischen Zeit zu den politischen-ökonomischen Eliten gehörten) in den biographischen Interviews betonen, waren die sozialistischen Vorstellungen eines ,erfolgreichen Menschen‘ und eines ,guten Lebens‘ untrennbar mit der Fähigkeit verbunden, die offiziell-formellen und inoffiziell-informellen Aktivitäten auf produktive Weise zu verknüpfen. Vor der Wende hatten viele von meinen Interviewpartnern daher hohe Positionen in den sozialistischen Fabriken und Betrieben inne; sie waren als Mitglieder der Kommunistischen Partei aktiv und zugleich Schlüsselfiguren der informellen und illegalen schattenwirtschaftlichen Netzwerke. Gewissermaßen waren sie also (aus der Perspektive des sozialistischen Staates gesehen) in zwei gegensätzlichen Welten aktiv – der öffentlichen offiziellen und der inoffiziellen privaten11 –, in denen sie verschiedene Verhaltenscodes benutzten und jeweils verschiedenen Aspekte ihres Selbst zum Ausdruck brachten. In der alltäglichen Realität der sozialistischen Gesellschaft standen diese Welten allerdings nicht in einem grundsätzlichen Gegensatzverhältnis zueinander; vielmehr waren sie, nicht zuletzt durch die Lebensentwürfe der sozialen Akteure, miteinander integriert und voneinander abhängig.12 Als Folge der Bestrebungen, die informellen Vorstellungen von ,Erfolg‘ und ,gutem Leben‘ zu verwirklichen, die in der kollektiven Imagination der Menschen in dieser spätsozialistischen Defizitgesellschaft vor allem mit materiellem Wohlstand und dem freien Konsum westlicher Waren assoziiert wurden, und gleichzeitig Vgl. ebenda. Die Bezeichnung ,privat‘ kann in diesem Zusammenhang problematisiert werden, denn besonders gegen Ende des Sozialismus kann auch von der Existenz zweier Öffentlichkeiten (legalen / illegalen; staatlichen / alternativen) gesprochen werden. 12 So war z. B. die staatliche Wirtschaft von den ökonomischen Schattennetzwerken abhängig, die eine zusätzliche Versorgungsquelle darstellten und zur Minderung von Defiziten beitrugen. Ebenso waren die informellen Produktions- und Konsummechanismen von der (illegalen) Nutzung staatlicher Ressourcen und Technik abhängig. 10 11

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innerhalb der staatlichen Strukturen Karriere zu machen und offiziellen ideologischen Maximen gerecht zu werden, entwickelten die sozialistischen Bürger eine ganz spezifische Flexibilität. Diese Flexibilität stellte aus Sicht des amerikanischen Kulturanthropologen Alexei Yurchak eine dominante Subjektivierungsform dar, welche die Beziehung zwischen Individuum und gesellschaftlichen Machtstrukturen der spätsozialistischen Gesellschaft bestimmte: die Herausbildung eines ,situativen Selbst‘, das heißt eines Individuums, das je nach Kontext und Situation seine Verhaltenscodes und Rollen wechselt und verschiedene Aspekte seines Selbst herausstellt oder verbirgt.13 Im Vergleich zum kapitalistischen Individuum war das sozialistische also stärker auf das Kollektiv angewiesen, also auf das Arbeitskollektiv und seine informellen Netzwerke, sowie mit der ständigen Koordination und dem Wechsel zwischen den verschiedenen (öffentlich-formellen / privat-informellen) Sphären seines Lebens beschäftigt, zumal diese beiden Aktivitätsfelder laut der offiziellen Ideologie als unvereinbar galten. Doch es geht im Folgenden weniger darum, diese Idealtypen von Individuen gegeneinander zu stellen, als um eine Darstellung der unterschiedlichen Prinzipien, die für die Konstruktionen des Selbst unter verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Strukturen geltend gemacht wurden. 2. „Der neue Mensch“ nach dem Sozialismus Mit dem Fall des Sozialismus verschwand auch das Image des kollektiven sozialistischen Menschen aus der Öffentlichkeit und situatives Handeln wurde, ebenso wie andere sozialistische Verhaltenscodes, Identitätsentwürfe und Wissensbestände, als altmodisch, verlogen oder gar schizophren abgewertet.14 Mit der Etablierung des freien Marktes und den politischen Ideologien des neoliberalen Kapitalismus wurden neue Identitätsentwürfe und Subjektivitätsmodelle in die postsozialistischen Kontexte importiert und propagiert. Die Strukturen der freien Markwirtschaft verlangten nach einem flexiblen, mobilen, sich selbst-kontrollierenden Individuum, das nicht von einem Kollektiv abhängig ist, sondern alleine und selbständig Verantwortung für sein Leben und seinen ,Erfolg‘ übernimmt. Wie Elizabeth C. Dunn beobachtet, wird das Individuum in einer modernen kapitalistischen Gesellschaft (zumindest im dominanten politisch-ideologischen Diskurs) als Ansammlung von Eigenschaften betrachtet, die weiter entwickelt, optimiert, gesteigert und immer teurer verkauft werden können.15 Es ist privatisiert und individualisiert und in diesem Sinne vielmehr seines sozialen Umfeldes entzogen als sein sozialistisches Pendant. Zwar ist es imstande, flexibel zu sein, verschiedene Rollen zu übernehmen und sich zu verändern, es trennt und verbirgt die verschie13 Alexei Yurchak, Soviet Hegemony of Form: Everything Was Forever, Until It Was no More, in: Comparative Studies in Society and History 45 (2003), 3, S. 480 – 510. 14 Vgl. Dunn, Privatizing Poland (Fn. 6), S. 70 ff. 15 Ebenda, S. 125 ff.

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denen Aspekte des eigenen Selbst jedoch nicht voneinander, sondern nutzt die ,Ressource Ich‘ konsequent und vollständig für seine Aktivitäten auf dem freien Markt. Mit der Abwertung der sozialistischen Identitäts- und Subjektivitätsmodelle Hand in Hand ging die Erwartung, dass die Einführung des freien Marktes und des Privateigentums ganz ,natürlich‘ zur Entstehung eines ,neuen‘ Menschen führen würde. Diese Erwartung wurde und wird von politischen Ideologien neoliberaler Demokratie sowie von modernen Marketingstrategien vorangetrieben und mithilfe der medialen Images eines neuen modernen Menschen (auch eines erfolgreichen Europäers) visualisiert.16 In Litauen ist sie nicht zuletzt von einem nationalen Diskurs getragen, der die sozialistische Vergangenheit als eine von den russischen Besatzern erzwungene, also nicht-litauische Vergangenheit abwertet und die postsozialistische Transformation und die europäische Integration als Rückkehr zu einem ,natürlichen‘ Gesellschaftszustand deutet.17 Erfolgsorientierung, unternehmerischer Umgang mit sich selbst, Selbstverantwortung und andere dem ,neuen‘ Individuum zugeschriebene Eigenschaften werden entsprechend oft als die ,eigentlichen‘ nationalen Charakterzüge der Litauer dargestellt. In der Politik, den Medien und anderen öffentlichen Foren wird die Europäisierung Litauens also fast ausschließlich als eine (vor allem ökonomische) Modernisierung verstanden, die dem Vorbild westlicher Gesellschaften folgt. Dieser gegenwärtig besonders dominante Diskurs einer gradlinigen, von Osten nach Westen verlaufenden Modernisierung lässt für andere Gesellschaftsbilder und Zukunftsszenarien kaum Raum und ignoriert mitunter die spezifischen historischen Entwicklungen einer postsozialistischen Transformationsgesellschaft, und dies selbst dort, wo deren ökonomische und soziale Realitäten sich deutlich von den westlichen Vorbildern unterscheiden. Angesichts der Dominanz einer solch ökonomischen Auffassung von Europäisierung und gesellschaftlicher Transformation sollte nachvollziehbar sein, warum im litauischen Kontext vor allem die Mitglieder der Wirtschaftselite als Verkörperungen der Idee eines neuen, modernen Individuums erscheinen. Selbst wenn in der breiten Bevölkerung einiges Misstrauen gegenüber den ,Reichen‘ existiert und in den Medien gern von Korruption, illegaler Privatisierung und anderen wirtschaftlichen Skandalen berichtet wird, führt dies zwar zum Anprangern einzelner Personen und zu einem Wechsel von einzelnen medial präsentierten ,Helden‘. Das Bild des auf dem freien Markt erfolgreichen Individuums, des homo oeconomicus 16 Diese Art der Naturalisierung der postsozialistischen Transformation wurde von Postsozialismusforschern wie Katherine Verdery oder Zygmunt Bauman wiederholt einer kritischen Betrachtung unterzogen. Vgl. Zygmunt Bauman, Auf der Suche nach der postkommunistischen Gesellschaft – das Beispiel Polen, in: Soziale Welt. Zeitschrift für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 44 (1993), 2, S. 157 – 176; Verdery, What Was Socialism (Fn. 7). 17 Vgl. Siegrid Rausing, Re-Constructing the ,Normal‘: Identity and the Consumption of Western Goods in Estonia, in: Ruth Mandel / Caroline Humphrey (Hg.), Markets & Moralities. Ethnographies of Postsocialism, Oxford / New York 2002, S. 127 – 142.

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und seines ,unternehmerischen Selbst‘, herrscht in den heutigen Erfolgsvorstellungen jedoch eindeutig weiter vor. Trotz der eigentlichen Brüche ihrer Biographien und der eventuellen Problematik ihrer unternehmerischen Aktivitäten werden die Vertreter der Wirtschaftselite in der Öffentlichkeit also als Gewinner und Zukunftsträger der Gesellschaft anerkannt, und man gesteht ihnen zu, die Transformation vom sozialistischen zum kapitalistischen Menschen erfolgreich vollzogen zu haben. Medienberichte insbesondere im Bereich des People-Journalismus neuer Lifestyle-Magazine stellen diese Personen mit Erfolgsgeschichten und Beschreibungen eines erfüllten, komfortablen Lebens als Vorbilder für andere soziale Gruppen dar und auch als Beweis dafür, dass die verbreiteten Erfolgsvisionen auch für andere realisierbar sind, wenn diese nur bereit sind, ihr eigenes ,Selbst‘ zu reformieren und neue Subjektivitätsmodelle und Identitätsentwürfe zu verinnerlichen. Im Gegensatz hierzu werden Selbstentwürfe, die dem Bild eines neoliberalen Individuums nicht entsprechen, öffentlich als Problem des Einzelnen und der Gesellschaft diskutiert und mit dem Erbe einer „sowjetischen Mentalität“ sowie dem stereotypen Bild eines homo sovieticus, einer in der sozialistischen Vergangenheit zurückgebliebenden Person – verbunden.18 III. Neue soziale Differenzierung Mit dem Thema der ,alten‘ (sozialistischen) und der ,neuen‘ (kapitalistischen) Menschen ist eine der gravierendsten Folgen der postsozialistischen Transformation angesprochen – nämlich das Entstehen neuer sozialer Differenzen, die zeitlich markiert sind und auf dem Gegensatz von Vergangenheit und Gegenwart aufbauen.19 Um zu begreifen, wie der komplexe Differenzierungsprozess im Kontext eines umfassenden Strukturwandels vonstatten geht, reicht es nicht aus, die ,Macht der Ökonomie‘ in Betracht zu ziehen, das heißt die Tatsache, dass bestimmte ökonomische Strukturen das Entstehen spezifischer Subjektivitätsformen fördern (der Sozialismus das kollektive oder situative Selbst; der Kapitalismus das unternehmerische Selbst). Es ist vielmehr wichtig, auch die hinter den Effekten ökonomischer Strukturen verborgene ,Ökonomie der Macht‘ genauer zu betrachten, also die unterschiedlichen Prinzipien, nach denen die zeitlichen und räumlichen Dimensionen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens in verschiedenen politischen-ökonomischen Systemen organisiert sind und nach denen Arbeitskraft konstituiert wird.20 Ohne alle 18 Vgl. Asta Vonderau, Erfolgreich im „neuen“ Europa. Kulturelle Selbstdeutung der Wirtschaftseliten in Litauen, in: Turn to Europe. Kulturanthropologische Europaforschungen (= Berliner Blätter. Ethnographische und ethnologische Beiträge, 41), Münster 2006, S. 60 – 70. 19 Vgl. Dunn, Privatizing Poland (Fn. 6). 20 Thomas Lemke / Susanne Krasmann / Ulrich Bröckling, Gouvernementalität, Neoliberalismus und Selbsttechnologien. Eine Einleitung, in: Ulrich Bröckling / Susanne Krasmann / Thomas Lemke (Hg.), Gouvernementalität der Gegenwart. Studien zur Ökonomisierung des Sozialen, Frankfurt a. M. 2000, S. 7 – 40, hier S. 26.

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Facetten des Prozesses durchleuchten zu wollen, möchte ich hier beispielhaft zeigen, wie die Regierungsweisen des neoliberalen Kapitalismus, so etwa die Flexibilisierung und Intensivierung der (Arbeits-)Zeit oder die Gestaltung der Arbeitskraft, sich auf Grundlage der Idee des unternehmerischen Selbst im postsozialistischen Kontext Litauens etablieren und in den Haushalt kollektiver symbolischer (Be-)Deutungen der Gesellschaft integriert werden. Dabei werden Flexibilität, Selbstkontrolle, der unternehmerische Umgang mit sich selbst und andere Charakteristika des modernen Individuums zu differenzierenden Kennzeichen einer ,neuen‘ Elite, während andere, ,alte‘ Verhaltenscodes, Identitätsentwürfe und Subjektivitätsmodelle zu Kennzeichen einer neuen Unterschicht werden. 1. Die Verlierer Die Transformation des Einzelnen von einem kollektivisierten und situativ handelnden zu einem unternehmerischen und selbstverantwortlichen Individuum wurde und wird in Litauen nicht nur als ein Schritt westwärts, hin zu einem demokratischen, kapitalistischen Staat aufgefasst, sondern zugleich als Bedingung, um kollektiven und individuellen Wohlstand zu erreichen. Mittlerweile scheint Einvernehmen in der Öffentlichkeit darüber zu herrschen, dass nur diejenigen, die diese Transformation vollzogen haben, auf dem freien Markt erfolgreich sein und ein wohlhabendes Leben führen können. Da die realen sozialen und ökonomischen Lebensumstände vieler Menschen in Litauen keine Voraussetzungen (und auch keine Notwendigkeit) für solche Transformationen bieten, entstehen neben den schon erwähnten Vorbildern der Gewinner (homo oeconomicus) auch Bilder der Verlierer, also derjenigen, die die Transformation in ein modernes Individuum nicht vollzogen haben. Diese Bilder und die damit verbundenen Menschen bilden den notwendigen Gegenpol der neuen sozialen Differenz und sind daher als Referenzpunkt für die (Selbst-)Identifikationen der ,Gewinner‘ ausschlaggebend. Daher werde ich hier anhand einiger Beispiele erläutern, wie solche Differenzierungen im (Arbeits-)Alltag zum Ausdruck kommen. Die Transformationen des Individuums wurden und werden nach dem Ende des Sozialismus und verstärkt seit dem EU-Beitritt Litauens nicht zuletzt durch Demokratisierungs-, Flexibilisierungs- und Mobilisierungsmaßnahmen vorangetrieben. So wurden beispielsweise in Betrieben und Organisationen unzählige, meist durch internationale Organisationen wie die EU oder die Weltbank verordnete und durch lokale Politiker unterstütze Schulungen, Beratungen, Tests, Auswahlverfahren, Informations- und Werbekampagnen durchgeführt. Im Rahmen solcher Schulungen wurden nicht nur konkrete Arbeitstechniken und fachliches Wissen vermittelt, sondern auch bestimmte Einstellungen. Diese legten es den in den Betrieben arbeitenden Menschen nahe, ihre eigene Persönlichkeit zum unternehmerischen Individuum hin umzugestalten und damit ihr Lebensrhythmus und Arbeitstempo, ihren Körper und ihre materielle Umgebung zu verändern. Die damit angestrebte (Neu)-Konstituierung der Arbeitskraft und die zu erwartende „natür-

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liche“ Transformation zum unternehmerischen Selbst gestaltete sich allerdings nicht ganz reibungslos. Wie Vaclovas, langjähriger Generaldirektor von Vilniaus Vingis, einer europaweit führenden Fabrik für Elektroteile, über die Schwierigkeiten der Modernisierung seines Unternehmens nach der Wende berichtete, wurde insbesondere das in den sozialistischen Jahren antrainierte inkonsequente Handeln der Fabrikarbeiter – ihr situatives Selbst – negativ von den westlichen Experten bewertet. So wurde zum Beispiel ihre Unfähigkeit kritisiert, Probleme und Schwierigkeiten ihrer Arbeit zu benennen, weil ein solches Verhalten die Forderungen nach Selbstkontrolle und Selbstmanagement zu unterlaufen schien. Laut Vaclovas handelte es sich dabei jedoch weniger um mangelndes Verantwortungsbewusstsein oder um eine fehlende Selbstkontrolle der Arbeiter, als um die gewohnten sozialistischen Muster des situativen Handelns, die er folgendermaßen beschrieb: „Wenn die Vertreter des Ministeriums aus Moskau, die das Geld verteilten, zu uns kamen und bei unseren Arbeitern nachfragten, was bei ihnen schlecht sei, dann wussten die Arbeiter, dass sie über schlechte Materialien, veraltete Geräte und ähnliches die Wahrheit sagen mussten. Weil sie wussten, dass der Vertreter Geld für die Lösung solcher Probleme geben konnte. Und wenn der Parteisekretär kam und fragte, was denn bei uns schlecht sei, dann sagten alle: ,Bei uns ist alles gut‘. Weil er nichts geben konnte, nur den Direktor ohne Grund aus dem Posten entlassen, das konnte er. Alle kannten diese Wahrheiten. Jetzt sagen wir schon seit zwei Jahren, dass die Arbeiter nicht lügen dürfen, weil das zu Verlusten führt, aber die Menschen haben noch keine Erfahrung damit. Sie wissen, dass sie nicht lügen dürfen, aber was sie sagen sollen, wissen sie auch nicht.“21

Wie das Beispiel zeigt, wurden die nach den ,alten‘ Verhaltenscodes handelnden Arbeiter als Problem betrachtet und zur Änderung ihres Selbst angehalten, nicht etwa deshalb, weil sie sich sonst in die Produktionsprozesse ihres neuen Arbeitsumfeldes nicht eingliedern konnten, sondern weil sie unkontrollierbar erschienen. Wie Dunn anmerkt, setzen die modernen Kontroll- und Auditmechanismen ein unternehmerisch handelndes Individuum voraus, das sich selbst als Ressource betrachtet und vollständig im Arbeitsprozess einsetzt und bestimmte Aspekte seines Handelns nicht verschweigt.22 Das vermeintliche Problem von Individuen, die den ,neuen‘ Subjektivitätsformen nicht entsprechen, wird in Litauen nicht nur in den jeweiligen Arbeitswelten, sondern überdies auch in verschiedenen öffentlichen Zusammenhängen thematisiert. So werden in den Medien etwa die materielle und geistige Armut, die soziale Passivität und der politische Populismus einzelner Bevölkerungsgruppen beklagt und als mangelnde Integration dieser Akteure in die politisch-ökonomischen Strukturen gedeutet.23 Die Gründe hierfür werden typischerweise nicht in der DyInterview mit Vaclovas S., 25. 05. 2005. Vgl. Dunn, Privatizing Poland (Fn. 6), S. 127. 23 In solchen medialen Berichten wird meist die angenommene Integrationsunwilligkeit der ökonomisch schwächeren Bevölkerungsgruppen wie der Rentner, unqualifizierten Arbeiter oder der Provinzbevölkerung thematisiert. 21 22

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namik dieser Strukturen gesucht, sondern mit der aus dem Sozialismus vererbten homo sovieticus-Mentalität in Zusammenhang gebracht. Die Berichte der Wirtschaftsexperten lassen jedoch erkennen, dass es hier nicht um die selbstverschuldete Nicht-Integration der ,alten‘ (sozialistischen) Menschen, sondern um die oben erwähnte Ökonomie der Macht geht: um die Konstitution einer Unterklasse (der Verlierer) und von billiger Arbeitskraft, die gezielt und gewinnbringend auf dem Markt eingesetzt wird, selbst wenn sie in den öffentlich umgehenden Selbstbildern der erfolgsorientierten Gesellschaft unsichtbar bleibt. Wie Tomas, hochrangiger Manager von Schneider Electronic, des weltgrößten Anbieters für Elektro- und Automatisierungstechnik, im Gespräch berichtete, liegen die Löhne für gering qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte in Litauen so niedrig, dass sie für die Kostenkalkulation eines Auftrags keine Rolle spielen: „Da sitzt irgendein Hansel mit einer wattierten Arbeitsjacke und einem Schraubenzieher in der Hand und bekommt 100 Euro im Monat“, beschreibt Tomas die Arbeitssituation. Er verweist damit auf die unterschiedlichen zeitlichen Welten der auf dem freien Markt etablierten und der nicht-etablierten Menschen sowie auf den unterschiedlichen Wert ihrer Arbeit: Die Zeit der Etablierten wird ökonomisch genutzt und unternehmerisch organisiert und ihre Arbeitskraft gut bezahlt, während die Zeit der nichtetablierten noch wie im Sozialismus starr, langsam und unflexibel bleibt, nicht zuletzt weil ihre Vergeudung nichts kostet. Parallel zur Transformation dominanter Formen der Subjektbildung entstehen also soziale Ein- und Ausschlussmechanismen, die auf einem ideologisch gefärbten und zeitlich markierten Gegensatz aufbauen, dem Gegensatz zwischen dem ,alten‘, stagnierenden, in der sozialistischen Vergangenheit ,zurückgebliebenen‘ Individuum und dem ,neuen‘, flexiblen und modernen kapitalistischen. Typischerweise werden die weniger gebildeten, sozial schwachen und ausgegrenzten Akteure mit dem Bild der ,Verlierer‘ in Verbindung gebracht, und der Grund ihres Misserfolgs auf dem freien Markt ihrer eigenen Verantwortung überstellt.

2. Die Wirtschaftseliten als Gewinner Vertreter der Wirtschaftselite erweisen sich innerhalb der oben beschriebenen sozialen Differenz als Gewinner, die im Gegensatz zu den Verlierern die angenommene Kluft zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart längst überwunden und sich in die neuen ökonomischen und zeitlichen Strukturen integriert haben. Diese Selbstwahrnehmung korrespondiert mit ihrem öffentlichen Bild, in dem sie als Inkarnationen der kollektiven Vorstellungen von Erfolg und gutem Leben erscheinen. Die meisten von ihnen sind heute in der Öffentlichkeit bekannt, nicht nur als Karrieristen und Wirtschaftsspezialisten, sondern auch als Trendsetter und Experten in Sachen Lifestyle und Erfolg. Ihre Lebensgeschichten, ihr Eigentum und ihre Freizeitaktivitäten und sogar die Inhalte ihrer Kleiderschränke werden immer wieder in den Medien beschrieben und als vorbildhaft für andere Mitglieder der Gesellschaft vorgestellt.

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Auch wenn die Vertreter der Wirtschaftselite selbst als Gestalter des ökonomischen Wandels und als Arbeitgeber fungieren, müssen auch sie den spannungsvollen Prozess der Umgestaltung ihres Selbst durchlaufen, was längst nicht nur aus eigener Initiative und Überzeugung passiert. Wie der schon erwähnte Fabrikdirektor Vaclovas berichtete, fühlte er sich zur Modernisierung seiner Fabrik nach der Wende fähig und qualifiziert. Doch erhielt er solange keine hierfür vorgesehene finanzielle Unterstützung seitens westlicher Institutionen, bis er gemeinsam mit den Mitarbeitern seines Unternehmens die von der EU und der Weltbank auferlegten Schulungen, Beratungen und Kurse absolviert hatte. Trotz seiner langjährigen Arbeitserfahrung und der vorzeigbaren Erfolge seines Unternehmens auf dem internationalen Markt sah er sich in dieser Situation dazu gezwungen, sich nicht nur fachliches Wissen, sondern auch ein Image – äußerliches Auftreten, Verhaltensweisen, Lebensstil – anzueignen, das auf den westlichen Märkten einen modernen Geschäftsmann auszeichnet. Selbst wenn die aktuellen Erfolgsvorstellungen unmittelbar mit dem Bild des modernen Individuums und erfolgreichen Geschäftsmannes in Verbindung gebracht werden, ist die öffentliche Wahrnehmung der Wirtschaftseliten nicht ganz so undifferenziert, wie es auf den ersten Blick erscheinen mag. Natürlich gibt es in der litauischen Wirtschaft einflussreiche und außerordentlich wohlhabende Personen, die dem Bild moderner, westwärts orientierter Geschäftsleute und legaler, transparenter Unternehmen nicht entsprechen können oder wollen. Dies sind beispielsweise Vertreter von Wirtschaftsbereichen, die sich weniger auf die westlichen als auf den russischen Markt hin orientieren, die keine öffentliche Sichtbarkeit benötigen und sich mit halblegalen Geschäften (z. B. Autohandel, dem Glücksspiel oder der Altmetallverarbeitung) befassen. Diese Personen werden in der Öffentlichkeit widersprüchlich wahrgenommen, meist jedoch nicht in der Rolle von ,Gewinnern‘ oder Mitgliedern einer ,Wirtschaftselite‘, sondern als ,Neureiche‘24 auf der Schattenseite der Elite. Selbst wenn die tatsächlichen Aktivitäten solcher Personen auf dem freien Markt nicht zwangsläufig illegal sein müssen, unterlaufen ihre Handlungsstrategien, Images und Identitätsentwürfe den in Litauen bestimmenden Ideologie einer westwärts gerichteten Modernisierung und provozieren damit die widersprüchliche öffentliche Wahrnehmung. Die Grenze zwischen der positiv wahrgenommenen Wirtschaftselite und den negativ konnotierten Neureichen wird dabei vor allem aufgrund von Vorstellungen und Images und weniger im Blick auf die tatsächlichen wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten der betroffenen Personen gezogen. Sie ist diskursiver Art und daher fragil und durchlässig. Für Vertreter der Wirtschaftselite, die als moderne Führungskräfte legaler, westwärts orientierter Unternehmen im lokalen und europäischen Kontext wahrgenommen werden (wollen), bleibt die kontinuierliche Konstruktion einer Erfolgsbiographie und Imagepflege deshalb außerordentlich wichtig. 24 Wie ich zeigen werde, verweist die Bezeichnung ,neureich‘ hier vor allem auf den Habitus postsozialistischer (nicht westwärts orientierter) Geschäftsleute und nicht auf die Dauer ihrer unternehmerischen Aktivitäten.

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IV. Erfolgsbiographien In ihrem Bemühen, dem Bild des modernen, flexiblen, sich selbst-regierenden Individuums zu entsprechen und sozialen Elitenstatus zu erlangen, deuten meine Interviewpartner nicht nur ihre eigene Vergangenheit zu neuen Identitäts- und Karriereentwürfen um, sondern verändern auch ihren Lebensstil; sie reformieren ihre materielle Umgebung und modellieren ihren Körper neu. Das Gemeinsame ihrer ansonsten heterogenen Lebens- und Karrierewege besteht in der Vielfalt von Aktivitäten, die sie innerhalb kurzer Zeit mit großem Tempo und in unterschiedlichem Umfang auszuüben vermögen. Um diese Vielfalt zu illustrieren, will ich zwei Geschäftsmänner verschiedener Generationen mit den eigenen Schilderungen ihres beruflichen Werdegangs vorstellen.25 Ich ordne diese Personen der Wirtschaftselite zu, und dies nicht nur, weil sie auf dem freien Markt aktiv und außerordentlich wohlhabend sind, sondern auch weil sie in der Öffentlichkeit als Mitglieder der Wirtschafselite bekannt und anerkannt sind. Antanas Der 40-jährige Antanas begann mit seinen unternehmerischen Tätigkeiten noch vor der Wende, Ende der 1980er Jahre, im zweiten Jahr seines Studiums, als die Gorbachev-Regierung die legale Gründung privater Kleinunternehmen, der so genannten Kooperativen, in der UdSSR ermöglichte. Gemeinsam mit Freunden eröffnete Antanas in einer Diskothek seiner Heimatstadt Kaunas ein Café: „Ich habe Räume angemietet: acht Quadratmeter Küche, sieben Quadratmeter Bar und fünf kleine Tische. Dann habe ich einen Kredit über 1.000 Rubel bei der Bank aufgenommen und 3.000 Rubel von meiner Mutter geliehen. Wir mussten unsere Sachen jedes Mal mit dem Taxi zum Kulturhaus fahren, weil wir kein Auto besaßen. Nicht mal Saft konnte man damals einfach so im Geschäft kaufen, sondern man musste mit dem Geschäftsführer verhandeln. Die Kaffeemaschine haben wir selbst gebaut. . .“.26

Auch wenn es im Kontext der heutigen Verhältnisse primitiv erscheint, war sein erstes Geschäft doch recht lukrativ. Es erbrachte tausendprozentigen Gewinn, was in der damaligen Zeit laut Antanas keine Seltenheit war. Nachdem die Diskothek jedoch von kriminellen Banden bedroht worden war und geschlossen werden musste, sah Antanas sich gezwungen, andere Tätigkeitsfelder zu erkunden. In der Zwischenzeit hatte sich die Sowjetunion aufzulösen begonnen und die Geschäftsmöglichkeiten hatten sich mit der zunehmenden Reisefreiheit verbessert. Bald besaß Antanas das größte Restaurant der Stadt. Er importierte Haushaltsartikel und Kleidung aus Russland und China nach Litauen und stieg in den Fischhandel ein. 25 Die Tatsache, dass ich zwei männliche Vertreter der Wirtschaftselite vorstelle, ist kein Zufall. Die litauische Wirtschaftselite ist in der Mehrheit männlich, was sich auch in meinem empirischen Material wiederspiegelt. Eine genauere Analyse der Genderproblematik ist an dieser Stelle nicht möglich. 26 Interview mit Antanas K., 12. 03. 2005.

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Nicht nur die Umsätze seiner Geschäfte erhöhten sich innerhalb von wenigen Jahren mehrfach, auch die Geographie seiner wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten weitete sich aus: Antanas kaufte Fisch in England, Kanada und Norwegen, verkaufte diesen in Litauen, Russland und Estland und erwirtschaftete dabei acht Millionen Dollar im Monat. Später war er mit dem Bau einer Bank in Kaliningrad beschäftigt. Gegenwärtig ist Antanas Inhaber einer Schokoladenmanufaktur und einer Einzelhandelskette in Vilnius. Sein Plan ist es, zum größten Schokolade-Produzenten Litauens zu werden und auf den europäischen Markt zu expandieren.

Andrius Der 34-jährige Andrius begann seinen beruflichen Werdegang in der ,neuen‘ Gesellschaft. Er studierte direkt nach der Wende an der Technischen Universität in Vilnius. Bald ergab sich die Möglichkeit, in die USA zu reisen, wo Andrius vier Jahre lang Marketing-Management studierte. Andrius hebt hervor, dass er diese Reise dem Einfluss seines Vaters verdankte, einem ehemals hochkarätigen Parteibürokraten und heutigen Unternehmer, da kein Litauer zu dieser Zeit ein amerikanisches Visum erhielt. Nach seiner Rückkehr aus den USA begann Andrius mit selbständigen beruflichen Aktivitäten. Zunächst importierte er Martini; dann eröffnete er einige Restaurants in der Stadt, die bald zu den führenden zählten. Er organisierte Modeshows und gründete eine Werbeagentur, die jedoch während der Russlandkrise27 einging. Andrius arbeitete als Assistent des Direktors der Litauischen Versicherung, zwei Jahre lang in einem skandinavischen Investitionsfond, er beschäftigte sich mit der Produktion von Milch und Eiskrem und wechselte schließlich zu einer Firma für Digitaldruck, während er sich parallel hierzu als Marketing-Consultant und Unternehmensberater betätigte. Dieser Beschäftigung geht er bis heute nach; Andrius besitzt gegenwärtig eine Firma, die Unternehmen Rechts- und Managementberatung anbietet. Vor einigen Jahren hat er zudem mit Investitionen in Immobilien begonnen. Trotz der Generations-, Geschlechts- und anderer Unterschiede scheint eine beständige Neuorganisation des beruflichen Lebens für alle von mir interviewten Vertreter der Wirtschaftselite ausschlaggebend zu sein, um auf dem freien Markt Erfolg zu erlangen und ihren Status über die sozioökonomischen Brüche und den sozialen Wandel hinweg zu erhalten. Die Heterogenität und Dynamik beruflicher Aktivitäten steht der Konstruktion einer Erfolgsbiographie natürlich nicht im Wege. Vielmehr repräsentiert sie eben die notwendigen Eigenschaften des modernen Menschen, durch die meine Interviewpartner sich von anderen sozialen Akteuren zu unterscheiden glauben. Wie Saulius, Präsident eines Konzerns und nachweislich einer der reichsten Männer Litauens, im Interview meinte: 27 Wirtschaftskrise in Russland 1997 – 1998, deren Auswirkungen zu großen ökonomischen Problemen in Litauen führten. Viele der neuen erfolgreichen Unternehmen gingen in ihrer Folge in Konkurs.

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„Jeder Wandel ist schmerzhaft, wenn Du nicht fähig bist, Dich neu zu orientieren. Aber ich würde das nicht als Krise der ganzen Gesellschaft bezeichnen. Für mich ist jeder Wandel gut, er erzeugt eine große explosive Energie, die viele Möglichkeiten eröffnet. Wir leben in dynamischen Zeiten und ich bin sehr zufrieden damit, ich fühle mich wie ein Fisch im Wasser.“28

Flexibilität und Dynamik sind für eine Gewinner-Biographie indessen nicht ausreichend. Hierfür muss auch eine Kontinuität im persönlichen und beruflichen Werdegang hergestellt werden, die dem Modell eines konsequent handelnden unternehmerischen Individuums entspricht und die Passgenauigkeit der jeweiligen Person in der modernen Gesellschaft unter Beweis stellt. Um eine solche Kontinuität des Selbst herstellen zu können, müssen die Gewinner in ihren Selbstdarstellungen Gegensätze von ,Ost und West‘ und von ,sozialistischer Vergangenheit und europäischer Gegenwart‘ überbrücken, Dualismen, welche die sozialen Leitbilder in Litauen prägen und die in der medial vermittelten Öffentlichkeit wirkungsvoll sind.

1. Konstruktionen biographischer Kontinuitäten zwischen Ost und West Der Osten wird im öffentlichen Diskurs Litauens vor allem mit dem Bild Russlands als einen aggressiven, undemokratischen Besatzerstaat und mit der sozialistischen Vergangenheit verbunden. Der Westen hingegen wird meist mit Zukunft, Demokratie, Europa und ähnlichem verknüpft und positiv konnotiert. So stellt die Elitenforscherin Irmina Matonyte fest, dass in der litauischen Wirtschaft und Politik ,Ost‘ und ,West‘ als unvereinbar gelten.29 Das offiziell erklärte Ziel der litauischen Wirtschaft ist es, sich an den westlichen Märkten auszurichten und europäische Standards zu erreichen. Doch trotz solcher Vorstellungen wird rasch offensichtlich, dass die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu Russland und den anderen östlichen Nachbarn für die litauische Wirtschaft essentiell wichtig sind. Es besteht also eine Diskrepanz zwischen der vorherrschenden, politisch begründeten Weltsicht, die eine Orientierung nach Westen beschwört, und den transnationalen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Prozessen, welche die ideologisch blockierten östlichen Grenzen des litauischen Staates kreuzen. Diese Diskrepanz ist für die litauischen Geschäftsleute deutlich spürbar. Offiziell sind sie als erfolgreiche Litauer und Europäer anerkannt, in ihrem beruflichen Alltag aber müssen viele von ihnen sowohl für die östlichen als auch für die westlichen Märkte offen sein, um erfolgreich und konkurrenzfähig zu bleiben. Solche Doppelorientierungen mögen für sie persönlich keine größeren Schwierigkeiten Interview mit Andrius P., 01. 06. 2005. Irmina Matonyte, Posovietinio elito labirintai [Labyrinthe der postsowjetischen Elite], Vilnius 2001, S. 214. 28 29

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bereiten: Im Laufe ihrer Karriere haben die Gewinner gelernt, sich innerhalb staatlicher Institutionen wie auf dem freien Markt zu bewegen und zwischen formellen und informellen Netzwerken, Legalität und Illegalität, zwischen sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Sphären des gesellschaftlichen Lebens zu manövrieren. Die Älteren unter ihnen waren schon in der sozialistischen Schattenwirtschaft aktiv, hatten aber auch hohe Positionen in staatlichen Unternehmen inne und waren in der Kommunistischen Partei oder dem Komsomol tätig. Die Jüngeren berichteten mir mehrfach von Vorteilen und Kompetenzen, die sie durch ihre Eltern oder Großeltern – ehemalige Parteiaktivisten, Direktoren der staatlichen sozialistischen Institutionen oder wichtige Mitglieder informeller Beziehungsnetzwerke (wie Ärzte) – erworben haben. Die im Sozialismus gesammelten Erfahrungen, Beziehungen und Qualifikationen können also durchaus als wertvolles soziales und kulturelles Kapital auf dem Weg zum Erfolg auf dem freien Markt fungieren. Doch sobald es um öffentliche Selbstdarstellung geht, wird eine genaue Selektion und Neuorganisation der sozial sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Aspekte der eigenen Biographie benötigt: weil die sozialistische Vergangenheit zu den problematischen Bezugshorizonten gehört und nicht zuletzt, weil eine Unsicherheit in der Bevölkerung darüber besteht, wie eine ,wirkliche‘, nicht durch die (post-)sowjetische Mentalität ,verseuchte‘ europäische Identität der Gesellschaft und ihrer Mitglieder auszusehen habe. Interessanterweise versuchen die Vertreter der litauischen Wirtschaftselite in ihren autobiographischen Erzählungen nicht, die im Bezug auf aktuelle Leitbilder problematischen Aspekte ihrer Vergangenheit zu verschleiern, sondern führen sie in Kontinuität zur Gegenwart als Begründung für ihren gegenwärtigen Erfolg an. So naturalisieren sie zum Beispiel ihren Geschäftssinn, indem sie ihn als eine angeborene, über Generationen vererbbare Eigenschaft darstellen. Während meines Gespräches mit Marina und Andrius, einem erfolgreichen Unternehmerehepaar, konnte ich so etwa beobachten, dass sie Kontinuitäten zwischen ihrem eigenen geschäftlichen Erfolg und den Aktivitäten ihrer Eltern und Großeltern über verschiedene gesellschaftliche Systeme hinweg herstellen und damit eine Familientradition ihres Unternehmertums konstruieren. Marina erzählte mir, dass ihre Großmutter, die in einer sowjetischen Kolchose gelebt und gearbeitet hatte, „eine Geschäftsfrau im Stil der damaligen Zeit“ gewesen sei. Sie hätte habe die besondere Fähigkeit besessen, mithilfe von Bestechung und anderen damals üblichen informellen Methoden ein Vertrauensverhältnis zu den Direktoren der Kolchose und anderen wichtigen Personen aufzubauen und dadurch zu erreichen, dass es bei ihr zu Hause „immer mehr Milch und Mehl gab als bei anderen.“ Marina meint, dass auch ihr Vater diesen besonderen Geschäftssinn ,geerbt‘ habe. Als Beleg zählt sie eine Reihe wirtschaftlicher Aktivitäten auf, die ihr Vater als älterer, im planwirtschaftlichen System sozialisierter Mann nach der Wende unternommen hat, darunter die Vergabe von privaten Krediten in der Zeit, als es noch kein funktionierendes Bankenwesen gab, oder den Kauf und Verkauf von Immobilien. „Er hat das alles autodidaktisch gemacht, ohne entsprechende Ausbildung und ohne es

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im Ausland gesehen zu haben,“ erklärt Marina die ,Natürlichkeit‘ seiner scheinbar genetisch veranlagten unternehmerischen Kompetenz.30 Auch Marinas Ehemann Andrius will keine Brüche in der unternehmerischen Tradition seiner Familie erkennen. Er unterstreicht, dass sein Vater – ein heute bekannter Unternehmer und zugleich ein ehemaliges Mitglied im Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei – schon immer unternehmerisch erfolgreich und wohlhabend gewesen sei. Geändert hätten sich laut Andrius bloß die Umstände und die Art und Weise, Geschäfte zu machen: „Es hat sich also in meinem Leben, zumindest was das Geschäft angeht, nichts geändert. Natürlich machte man die Sachen damals auf die eine Weise, und heute auf eine andere, weil das System und die Beziehungen anders funktionieren.“31 Wie die hier vorgestellten Personen, so bedienen sich viele ,Gewinner‘ in ihren Darstellungen des Erfolgs auf dem freien Markt des Mythos’ vom ,heroischen Geschäftsmann‘, der das stagnierende sozialistische Kommandosystem einst mit seinem profitorientierten Verhalten und unternehmerischen Sinn unterlief. Auf diese Weise interpretieren sie auch problematische Momente ihrer Biographie, etwa Aktivitäten innerhalb der sozialistischen Parteistrukturen, Spekulation oder Geldwäsche als ,natürliche‘ Ausdrucksweise ihres Geschäftssinns um. Andere meiner Interviewpartner berufen sich zur autobiographischen Legitimation ihrer Vergangenheit auf die im litauischen Kontext verbreitete Vorstellung eines heimlichen Widerstandes. Sie behaupten, durch ihre Familien und ihr informelles Umfeld ein starkes Gefühl für die Ungerechtigkeit und Verlogenheit der sozialistischen Welt vermittelt bekommen zu haben, so dass der Zusammenbruch des sozialistischen Systems nicht etwa eine Krise für sie bedeutet habe, sondern vielmehr die Rückkehr zur Normalität. In den Kontext des Widerstands gestellt, erscheinen die Aktivitäten der Gewinner innerhalb der neuen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Strukturen als quasi logische Folge desselben, und problematische Aspekte der eigenen Biographie können als notwendige Tarnung ihres widerständigen Unternehmergeistes relativiert werden. Beide Selbstdarstellungsstrategien stellen den Interviewten als Menschen dar, der über Generationen und gesellschaftliche Transformationen hinweg eine einheitliche Persönlichkeitsstruktur bewahrt hat, mit deren Hilfe er sich passgenau in die heutige Welt integrieren und erfolgreich darin agieren kann. So wird die Vergangenheit für die Konstruktion und Repräsentation eines konsequent und gewinnbringend handelnden Individuums (eines unternehmerischen Selbst) in den Dienst genommen. Dies heißt natürlich nicht, dass Selbstdarstellungen der Wirtschaftselite in ihrer legitimierenden Funktion immer erfolgreich sind und von anderen sozialen Akteuren kritiklos übernommen werden. In Verbindung mit den offensichtlichen Erfol30 31

Interview mit Marina P., 14. 08. 2005. Interview mit Andrius P., 14. 08. 2005.

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gen der Eliten auf dem freien Markt erscheint ihre Behauptung, schon immer ,andersartig‘ und ,neu‘ gewesen zu sein, überzeugend, zumal die kapitalistische Gegenwart in der kollektiven Vorstellung in Gegensatz zur sozialistischen Vergangenheit gestellt wird und es daher unwahrscheinlich erscheint, dass sozialistische Qualifikationen, Erfahrungen, Subjektivitätsmodelle oder Verhaltenskodes für den Erfolg auf dem freien Markt ebenso anwendbar sein könnten.

2. Die symbolische Verortung im nationalen und europäischen Kontext Während in den diskursiven Selbstdarstellungen der Wirtschaftselite eine biographische Kontinuität hergestellt wird, werden die sichtbaren Seiten ihres Lebens – ihre materielle Umgebung, ihr Lebensstil und ihre Körper – radikal umgestaltet. Im Rahmen meiner Forschung besuchte ich meine Interviewpartner in ihren brandneuen, geradezu sterilen Häusern, in ihren frisch eingerichteten Büros, ich bewunderte ihre modernen Autos und ihre Kleidung, begleitete sie in die neuesten Sportklubs und Restaurants, wo sie ,richtiges‘ Essen zu sich nahmen und ihren Körper aktuellsten Fitnessmoden gemäß trainierten. Sogar die alten Dinge in ihren Wohnungen, wie zum Beispiel eine Sammlung alter Pfeifen oder antike Möbel und Bilder, hatten sie mit Hilfe von Innerarchitekten und anderen Lifestyle-Experten innerhalb der letzten Jahren erworben und jeweils nach den neuesten Einrichtungstrends arrangiert. Wie die alten Verhaltenskodes, so scheinen auch die alten Dinge in der heutigen Welt der Gewinner als unpassend und bedeutungslos, zumindest wenn es um die öffentlichen Repräsentationen des sozialen Status der Wirtschaftseliten geht.32 Dieser zur Konstruktion biographischer Kontinuitäten parallel laufende Bruch mit der materiellen und körperlichen Vergangenheit kann auch mit der symbolischen Differenzierung des postsozialistischen sozialen Raumes in Verbindung gebracht werden, im Zuge deren nicht zuletzt die kollektiven Visionen vom ,erfolgreichen Individuum‘ einen Wandel durchlaufen haben. Wie an den Selbstdarstellungen der Vertreter der Wirtschaftselite zu erkennen ist, war es für sie in den ersten postsozialistischen Jahren besonders wichtig, sich vom situativen, als verlogen und schizophren wahrgenommenen sozialistischen Individuum zu distanzieren und die Transformation des eigenen Selbst in ein modernes, westwärts orientiertes Individuum anzuzeigen. Dafür reichte es häufig aus, auf dem freien Markt aktiv zu sein und einen für die Mehrheit der jungen postsozialistischen Gesellschaft unzugänglichen Wohlstand sowie Kaufkraft zu demonstrieren. In diesem Kontext funktionierten die materiellen Dinge und Pres32 Natürlich ist damit nicht gesagt, dass die materiellen Artefakte aus der Vergangenheit tatsächlich keine Rolle in ihrem Alltag mehr spielen. Hier geht es mir aber vor allem um die symbolischen Repräsentationen der Gewinner, die ausschließlich durch neue materielle Statussymbole zum Ausdruck kommen.

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tigeobjekte (vor allem westliche Konsumwaren) als direkte ,Verlängerung‘ des menschlichen Körpers, die nicht nur die soziale Position einer Person symbolisch markierten, sondern sie direkt konstituierten.33 Mit der zunehmenden Integration Litauens in die westlichen politischen und ökonomischen Strukturen und mit der fortschreitenden sozialen Differenzierung der litauischen Gesellschaft wurde es für die Gewinner zunehmend wichtiger, sich innerhalb der neuen sozialen Ordnung genauer zu verorten. Insbesondere der EUBeitritt Litauens stellte die Vision des erfolgreichen Menschen in einen neuen Kontext. Angesichts der oben erwähnten öffentlichen Diskussionen über das Europäischsein der ganzen Gesellschaft und ihrer Mitglieder stehen auch die Gewinner vor der Aufgabe, ihren Erfolg nicht nur im nationalen, sondern auch im europäischen Kontext geltend zu machen und zu legitimieren, zumindest was ihre öffentlichen Images angeht. Dazu müssen sie sich mit den durchaus widersprüchlichen öffentlichen Wahrnehmungen ihrer Person auseinandersetzen. Ihnen wird nun die Position zuerkannt, Elite in Litauen und der EU zu sein; sie genießen die Anerkennung als neue, moderne Menschen, als Gewinner der Transformation, von denen die zukünftige Entwicklung des Landes in großem Maße abhängt. Doch ihre Aktivitäten können ebenso gut als illegal, mafiös und nicht-westlich gebrandmarkt und sie selbst mit dem negativen Bild des kulturlosen, geldgierigen, in illegale Geschäfte verstrickten, neureichen Litauers in Verbindung gebracht werden, einem imaginierten Menschentypus, der vor allem durch äußerliche Merkmale wie ausgestellten Reichtum, einen auffälligen Kleidungs- und Lebensstil, „nicht-westliches“ Verhalten und anderes bestimmt wird.34 Um ihren Status als Gewinner sowohl im litauischen wie im europäischen Kontext behaupten zu können, sehen es die Vertreter der litauischen Wirtschaftselite also als notwendig an, sich von dem durch die neuen Litauer repräsentierten „money without culture“35 zu distanzieren und sich in die westliche Tradition des ,alten‘, ,kultur-‘ und ,geschmackvollen‘ Wohlstands zu stellen. Wie ich beobachten konnte, war ihr Verhalten im Alltag oftmals eben von dieser Absicht geprägt: So betonten sie zum Beispiel, dass sie nicht mit teuren Autos, auffälliger 33 Jonathan Friedman, Globalization and Localization, in: Jonathan Xavier Inda / Renato Rosaldo (Hg.), The Anhropology of Globalization. A Reader, Oxford 2002, S. 233 – 246, hier S. 242. 34 Die widersprüchliche öffentliche Wahrnehmung der Eliten erscheint weniger unlogisch, wenn man die im gewissem Sinne autopoietische Rolle dieser Akteure als Besteller und Lieferanten des Kapitalismus im postsozialistischen Kontext in Betracht zieht: „They are destroyers as well as builders. They take peaces of the past ant they find them and recombine them into new structures, amazing capital and building new institutions. In the process they are themselves changed and they change the people around them.“ Siehe: Thane Gustafson, Capitalism Russian-Style, Cambridge 1999, S. 119. 35 Steven L. Sampson, Money Without Culture, Culture Without Money: Eastern Europe’s Nouveaux Riches, in: Anthropological Journal of European Cultures (= World View, Political Behaviour and Economy in the Post-communist Transition II, hg. von Christian Giordano / Ina-Maria Greverus), 1994 / 3, S. 7 – 30.

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Markenkleidung und anderen ,typisch postsozialistischen‘ Statussymbolen gesehen werden wollten, weil dies charakteristisch für Kriminelle sei, und sie achteten stets sorgfältig darauf, nicht in Gesellschaft solcher Personen angetroffen zu werden. Die symbolische Positionierung der Wirtschaftselite im europäischen Kontext und ihre Distanzierung von den ,nicht europäischen‘ Neureichen wird also vor allem durch die Demonstration von ,gutem Geschmack‘ vollzogen. Um die eigene Zugehörigkeit zur Tradition des ,alten‘ Geldes markieren zu können, reicht es heute nicht mehr aus, wohlhabend zu sein und materiell viel zu besitzen; vielmehr müssen die materiellen Besitztümer mit den dem sozialen Status entsprechenden symbolischen Praxen verbunden und zu einem angemessenen Lebensstil arrangiert werden. Die aktuelle geschmackliche und soziale Differenzierung der Wirtschaftselite kann als ein Wandel von einer direkten Demonstration des materiellen Wohlstands zu einem eher symbolisch aufgeladenen, differenzierten Verhältnis der Menschen zu den Dingen beschrieben werden, der die Dinge zu Statussymbolen und Investitionen in die eigene soziale Position werden lässt, wie einer meiner Interviewpartner den Prozess beschrieb: „Vor ungefähr zehn Jahren bedeutete Prestige in Litauen Jalousien an den Fenstern, ein Dreier-BMW Jahrgang 1995, ein Mobiltelefon und ein Trainingsanzug von Nike oder Adidas. Es war unwichtig, dass hinter den Jalousien alte Sesseln aus Großmutters Koloniegartenlaube standen, dass das Auto nur geleast war und dass man ein geklautes Mobiltelefon gekauft hatte. [ . . . ] Heute gehört zwar ein Auto zu den Prestigeobjekten, aber das kann von 1991 genauso wie von 2005 sein. Die Kleidung kann man unterschiedlich kombinieren, das kommt auf den eigenen Geschmack an. Aber wenn man Geld hat, dann wird man natürlich nicht zu einem einfachen Schmuckgeschäft gehen, um Schmuck zu kaufen. Die Dinge werden zu Investitionen.“36

Für ihre symbolische Positionierung und Reproduktion ihres sozialen Elitenstatus greifen die Vertreter der Wirtschaftelite somit vor allem auf traditionelle, westliche Statussymbole und Performanzpraktiken zurück. Während meiner Feldforschung lag es im Trend, Mitglied im Rotary- und Lions-Club zu werden und an Wohltätigkeitsveranstaltungen, Kunstauktionen, gepflegten Tanzveranstaltungen oder Weinverköstigungen teilzunehmen. Zu den beliebten Freizeitaktivitäten gehörten Reiten, Golf- und Squashspielen, Tauchen und Fernreisen sowie verschiedenste Arten von Wellness. Zwar sind die meisten dieser Aktivitäten im litauischen Kontext relativ neu (der erste Golfplatz in Litauen wurde im Jahr 2002 eröffnet), doch dienen sie dazu, die Zugehörigkeit zur ,alten und echten‘, litauisch-europäischen Elite symbolisch zu repräsentieren.

36

Interview mit Kestas T., 10. 10. 2005.

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3. Zum kapitalistischen Erfolg durch (post-)sozialistische Erfahrungen Geschmack wird heute somit als ,differenzierendes Prinzip‘ im Sinne Bourdieus für die Repräsentation des sozialen Elitenstatus immer wichtiger.37 Doch während nach außen geschmackvoller Wohlstand westlicher Art präsentiert wird, sind die sozialistischen Erfahrungen von Armut, materiellen Defiziten und Restriktionen nicht vergessen. In den autobiographischen Selbstdarstellungen der Gewinner werden diese Erfahrungen zur Quelle des Erfolgs umgedeutet. Die Interviewten behaupten, sich in der Auseinandersetzung mit den (post-)sozialistischen Erfahrungen eine außergewöhnliche Flexibilität und Fähigkeit des Selbstgestaltens antrainiert zu haben und fühlen sich aus diesem Grund gegenüber Westeuropäern überlegen. Auch das Anpassungsvermögen und das strategische Hervorheben bestimmter Aspekte des eigenen Selbst – Eigenschaften, die eigentlich dem sozialistischen Individuum zugeschrieben wurden – werden bei dieser Aufwertung und Neupositionierung der Wirtschaftselite als besonders wertvolle Fähigkeiten dargestellt. Ebenso wichtig erscheint nicht zuletzt auch ihre Fähigkeit, sich sowohl in den westlichen als auch in den östlichen sozialen Kontexten und wirtschaftlichen Strukturen zu orientieren. Unter den anderen, selbst ernannten Qualitäten der Gewinner wird einer ganz speziellen Eigenschaft, dem so genannten ,Hunger‘, eine besondere Bedeutung zuerkannt. Damit sind eine ungewöhnliche, aggressive Zielstrebigkeit und ein Wille zum Wohlstand bezeichnet, die sich im Kontext der sozialistischen Mangelwirtschaft und postsozialistischen Transformation herausbildeten. Während der Hunger (der zum übertriebenen, undifferenzierten Konsum und zur Demonstration des Reichtums führt) einerseits als typische Eigenschaft der Neureichen gilt, wird er anderseits positiv und als Motor auf dem Weg zum Erfolg umgedeutet. Wie es eine der Interviewten formulierte: „Die neue Generation von Managern und Geschäftsleuten hat eine positive Aggressivität. Sie sind auf eine positive Weise hungrig. Sie sind intelligent und gut ausgebildet, sie wollen kommen, kämpfen und gewinnen. Ihr Wille, Geld zu verdienen, motiviert sie. Ich denke, die Osteuropäer werden sehr schnell hohe Positionen in der Europäischen Union einnehmen und das wird eine Injektion für das alte Europa bedeuten.“38

Ein Individuum, das die Erfahrungen des situativen Selbst besitzt, scheint solchen Darstellungen zufolge in gewissem Maße freier zu sein, weil es nicht an eine Wahrheit gebunden ist, sondern die scheinbaren Selbstverständlichkeiten des sozialen Lebens und die gesellschaftlichen Machtstrukturen hinterfragt. Es wird damit deutlich, dass die Fähigkeit des situativen Handelns im Zuge des autobiographischen Sich-Profilierens der litauischen Wirtschaftselite im europäischen Kon37 Pierre Bourdieu, Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft, Frankfurt a. M. 1991, S. 307. 38 Interview mit Evalda K., 15. 09. 2005.

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text neu gedeutet, in neoliberale Subjektivitätsmodelle eingegliedert und an kollektive Vorstellungen eines erfolgreichen Europäers angepasst wird. Damit positionieren sich die Wirtschaftseliten nicht nur innerhalb des europäischen Kontextes, sondern auch innerhalb des lokalen sozialen Raumes als neue moderne Menschen: als Gewinner. V. Schlussfolgerungen Im meinem Aufsatz habe ich die Strategien kultureller Selbstdeutung und symbolischer Verortung der litauischen Wirtschaftselite im Kontext der postsozialistischen Transformation und der europäischen Integration analysiert. Die Analyse bezog sich vor allem auf zwei Aspekte der Transformation, welche die kulturelle Selbstdeutung der Wirtschaftselite im großen Maße mitbestimmen, nämlich: Die Entwicklung neuer Prinzipien sozialer Differenzierung und das Entstehen neuer Formen der Subjektbildung. Die hier angeführten Beispiele zeigen, wie sich die Differenzierung in ,Verlierer‘ und – ,Gewinner‘ und die Reformierung des Individuums zum unternehmerischen Selbst durch symbolische Repräsentationen und kulturelle Praxen vollzieht und wirksam wird. Im Zuge dieser Transformationen erleben die Vertreter der litauischen Wirtschaftselite gegenwärtig eine Formalisierung ihrer sozialen Rolle, die zu Änderungen in ihrem Selbstverständnis und ihrer Selbstdarstellung führt. Ihre öffentlichen Images, Lebens- und Identitätsmodelle müssen im Spannungsfeld zwischen der dominierenden, westorientierten politischen Ideologie, den öffentlichen Europabildern sowie den transnationalen Märkten und Kapitalströmen gestaltet werden. Sie suchen nach neuen Formen der Selbstdarstellung, die Freiräume für ihre transnationalen wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten lassen und zugleich ihre öffentliche Rolle als moderne und erfolgreiche Europäer unterstützen. Mit ihren Identitäts- und Lebensentwürfen signalisieren sie die eigene Wandlung in ein kapitalistisches auf dem freien Markt erfolgreich agierendes Individuum, welches sie aber auch mit den Eigenschaften eines situativen sozialistischen Selbst versehen, die sie als competitive advantages umdeuten. Deutlich wird, dass trotz der hohen Konjunktur der westlichen Modelle des unternehmerischen Individuums diese Modelle nicht einfach kopiert, sondern in Bezug auf den spezifischen sozialen und kulturellen Kontext gestaltet und ausgehandelt werden. Es entstehen dabei hybride, aus Vergangenheits- und Gegenwartserfahrungen ,gestrickte‘ Formen der Subjektbildung, und die Vergangenheit wird in die Gegenwart integriert.

On the Way towards a Transnational Business Elite?

Bringing Private Insurance Back In. The Geneva Association as a Transnational Insurance Think Tank (1973 – 2000s) By Matthieu Leimgruber* I. Introduction “How and why ( . . . ) insurers and risk managers exercise ( . . . ) power over outcomes, and with what consequences for the world market economy and for the allocation of values among social groups, national economies and business enterprise is a fundamental question for contemporary international political economy”.1

In her insightful essay on the growing influence of non-state actors in international affairs, British scholar Susan Strange has designated insurers, alongside major accounting firms and other “econocrats” as one of the influential, but neglected, interest groups that shape in manifold ways the contours of contemporary globalization. By examining the foundation and activities of the International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics, better known as “Geneva Association” (GA), this article aims to shed some light on the transnational dimensions of this influence. The GA, which was established in 1973 on the shores of the eponymous Swiss lake to serve as a forum and think tank for leading insurance companies, offers us an example of the reorganization of business interests during the post 1970s era. After discussing the context of this reorganization in the first section of this contribution, I turn to the foundation of what one could describe as a genuine International of insurers or, in the words of its long-term secretary general, the “most prestigious assembly of world insurance”.2 The third and fourth sections then pre* The research and writing of this contribution was financed by a grant of the Swiss National Science Foundation entitled “The business of social policy: commercial insurers and the shaping of welfare states in comparative perspective, 1890 – 1970”. I would like to thank Orio Giarini, Reza Jafari, Jean-Christophe Graz, as well as participants to the European Business History conference, the European Social Science History conference, and the 20th century history workshop at the University of Bielefeld, for their comments and remarks on preliminary versions of this paper. 1 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge 1996, p. 122. 2 Orio Giarini, Itinéraire vers la retraite à 80 ans [Towards Retirement at the Age of 80], Paris / Genève 2002, p. 172.

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sent in more details the founding fathers of the GA and its core constituency. I emphasize here the elite profile of the association and its successful expansion during the last quarter of the twentieth century. In the fifth section I use a case study of the research output of the GA to underscore how insurers contributed to shape debates on the “crisis of the welfare state” from the mid 1970s onwards. I underscore here in particular how their critique of expanding social expenditure centered on the need to redraw the boundaries between state and private social provision, with the aim of opening new markets for commercial insurers.

II. Transnational business networks and think-tanks during the 1970s The emergence of neo-liberalism is often linked with the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (1979) and Ronald Reagan in the United States (1981). Yet, the 1970s constituted a crucial decade for preparing the offensive against the Keynesian consensus. During this period, elites in the core capitalist economies were confronted with mounting challenges. Inflation, disappointing growth, spiraling oil prices and exacerbated international competition disrupted the post-war equilibriums of the “golden decades”. Whereas the impact of industrial processes on the environment questioned the rationale of industrial growth, these elites witnessed, with rising anxiety, heightened working class militancy, post-colonial revolutionary upheavals, increased state regulation and finally attempts to introduce a new international economic order at the supranational level. The reaction against these trends gradually coalesced towards a major redefinition of governance priorities towards anti-inflation drives, cost-cutting, the rollback of workers’ organizations, and more generally a strident anti-state discourse and strong preferences for market-based solutions. This shift triggered a redeployment of elite business networks that aimed to answer what political scientist Kim McQuaid has termed “pan-industrial threats” through new forms of organization better suited to develop a “common voice” for capitalist interests, a prerequisite for enacting common action.3 This redeployment was shaped by the reactivation or creation of private foundations and think tanks providing research, policy briefs, and advocacy to sustain a pro-market offensive first among the business community and then the wider public. The 1970s, thus, witnessed the growing influence of older networks such as American Enterprise Institute and the Institute of Economic Affairs (founded in 1943 and 1955 in the United States and the United Kingdom respectively), as well 3 Kim McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power: From FDR to Reagan, New York 1982, p. 289; Kees van der Pijl, The Sovereignty of Capital Impaired. Social Forces and Codes of Conduct for Multinational Corporations, in: Henk Overbeek (ed.), Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-liberalism in the 1980s, London 1993, pp. 28 – 55.

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as the foundation of new forums such as the Heritage Foundation (1973, USA), the Centre for Policy Studies (1974, UK), the Fraser Institute (1974, Canada) or the Institut économique de Paris (1975, France).4 The gathering of leading business executives in elite groups, clubs and networks constituted a key feature of this redeployment. Bypassing traditional employers’ federations, groups such as the Business Roundtable (1976, USA) or the Business Council for National Issues (1976, Canada) served as meeting points for a select membership of key executives from leading industrial and services companies that aimed to give a single, common and effective platform to an “undiluted business elite”.5 This revitalization of national-level business groups had its echoes at the transnational level. In Western Europe the select European Roundtable of Industrialists was founded in 1983 as a counterpoint to the catchall Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE, now Businesseurope).6 The 1970s also witnessed the mounting influence of the Mont Pèlerin Society, a mouthpiece for free-market theories founded in 1947, or the renewed militancy of the venerable International Chamber of Commerce founded in the aftermath of World War I.7 The densification of networking through interlocking directorates enabled the tentative emergence of a transnational elite of corporate directors.8 With the establishment of private consultative and planning bodies operating between states, international organizations and corporations, such as the Trilateral Commission (1973) or the World Economic Forum (1971), new networking and discussion opportunities could be exploited by business elites, academic experts, key civil servants and politicians.9 4 See McQuaid, Big Business and presidential power (fn. 3), pp. 284 – 296; Radhika Desai, Second-hand Dealers in Ideas: Think-tanks and Thatcherite Hegemony, in: New Left Review I / 203 (1994), pp. 27 – 64; William K. Carroll / Murray Shaw, Consolidating a Neoliberal Policy Bloc in Canada, 1976 to 1996, in: Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 27 (2001), 2, pp. 195 – 217; François Denord, La conversion au néo-libéralisme. Droite et libéralisme économique dans les années 1980 [The Conversion to Neo-Liberalism. The Political Right and Economic Liberalism during the 1980s], in: Mouvements 35 (2004), 5, pp. 17 – 23. 5 McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power (fn. 3), pp. 293 f. 6 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration, London 2002. 7 William K. Carroll / Colin Carson, The Network of Global Corporations and Elite Policy Groups: A Structure for Transnational Capitalist Class Formation?, in: Global Networks 3 (2003), 1, pp. 29 – 57; Bernhard Walpen, Die offenen Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft. Eine hegemonietheoretische Studie zur Mont Pèlerin Society, Hamburg 2004. 8 William K. Carroll / Meindert Fennema, Is There a Transnational Business Community?, in: International Sociology 17 (2002), 3, pp. 393 – 419. 9 See Jean Christophe Graz, How Powerful Are Transnational Elite Clubs? The Social Myth of the World Economic Forum, in: New Political Economy 8 (2003), 3, pp. 321 – 340; Kees van der Pijl, Two Faces of the Transnational Cadre under Neo-liberalism, in: Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (2004), 2, pp. 177 – 207; Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, Cambridge 1990.

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Using the Gramscian theoretical framework that is often used in international political economy studies on neo-liberal groups, Canadian scholars William Carroll and Murray Shaw isolate four features of these new nodes of the business community. First, these groups gather “organic intellectuals, ‘deputies’ or members of the capitalist class” whose role is to manage, coordinate and strengthen common links and objectives among the wider capitalist class, and whose intellectual and research work “is functionally predicated on the dominance of capital in human affairs”. Secondly, these groups act as crucial “sites for the construction of political discourses” that can be used to influence business and government circles as well as public opinion. Thirdly, these groups can be understood as “embedded elements of a social network” that links individual businesses with the larger community of business activism in a continuing conversation about aims, tactics and ideas. Finally, these groups operate within a “distinctive organizational ecology” in which both, their advocacy efforts and attempts at consensus building among elite business sectors, occupy specific niches.10 The GA can be considered as an organization situated at the juncture of the features briefly sketched above. Founded in 1973 by half a dozen insurance directors, the association was at first confined to Western Europe but soon extended its reach towards all major international insurance markets. While its membership was always limited to a handful of leading executives (25 in the early 1970s, currently extended to a statutory maximum of 80), which denotes its elite profile, the numerous conferences, workshops and meetings organized and coordinated by the GA constitute key forums for a wider community of insurance professionals, academic scholars, and policy experts. With its many links with other insurance associations at the national and international levels, the GA also functions as a clearinghouse in a wider network of business organizations. Last but not least, the research undertaken by the GA, which focuses both on intra-industry issues and wider advocacy aims, notably in the domain of social policy or financial services regulation, occupies a specific position in the intellectual production of transnational business organizations. Given its global but sectoral scope, as well as its focus on a specific set of issues, the GA straddles the boundaries between individual companies, business organizations, academic and industry experts, and public opinion. As we will see further in this contribution, this middle-ground position gives the organization, despite its rather technocratic outlook, a significant impact in the insurance sector and on insurance-related issues.

10

Carroll / Shaw, Consolidating a Neoliberal Policy Bloc (fn. 4), pp. 196 f.

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III. At the origins of an International of insurers In the mid 1970s, the standing of the GA among the global insurance industry was still uncertain. As many comparable think tanks and elite business clubs, the fate of the GA depended on the resolve of its initiator Fabio Padoa, a Generali Assicurazioni executive, of its first president, the French economist Raymond Barre, and of its secretary general between 1973 and 2001, the Italian researcher Orio Giarini. The role of this triumvirate of core founders and of the social, political and intellectual capital they contributed to the establishment of the GA is detailed below. Born in 1911 and raised in Trieste, Fabio Padoa-Schioppa studied and taught philosophy before joining belatedly Assicurazioni Generali during the 1960s, a company in which his father had also occupied managerial positions. According to Orio Giarini, Padoa’s desire to develop farsighted and innovative research on insurance issues can be partly related to this atypical and late career start.11 Besides these personal motivations, Padoa also chaired, from 1968 onwards, the European Insurance and Reinsurance Federation (Comité européen des assurances, CEA), the trade association representing private insurers in Brussels. The Generali executive was then well situated to witness cross-border issues such as the protracted attempts to create a single market for financial services in the European Economic Community (EEC).12 Fabio Padoa enumerated the motivations that led to the foundation of the GA in a contribution published on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the association. In this article he described the early 1970s as a time of both challenges and opportunities for the insurance branch. Inflation and currency instability tested insurance companies’ long-term operational horizons. The insurance branch also witnessed increasing competition between financial providers, structural changes in the insurance branch itself (introduction of computing, transformation of relations between insurers and insurance brokers etc.), as well as the growing importance of financial services in developed capitalist economies. The impact of industrial activities on the environment, as well as the development of risk management for large industrial undertakings, also represented new challenges for underwriters. Last but not least, these uncertainties and transformations were compounded by what Padoa designated as the “proliferation of social provision measures and increasing state encroachment on the economy”.13 Considering that insurers should 11 Interview with Orio Giarini, Geneva, 24. 07. 2007. For biographical information, see also: Who is Who in the World, 2002 edition, New Providence 2001. 12 The first directives facilitating the cross-border operations of non-life and life insurance companies in the EEC date respectively from 1973 and 1979, whereas a single insurance market emerged only in 1994. See: Marc Bezançon, Le tournant européen [The European Turning Point], in: Risques. Les Cahiers de l’assurance 25 (1996), 1, pp. 117 – 128; Ton van Rietbergen, The Internationalization of European Insurance Groups, Utrecht 1999, pp. 47 f. 13 Fabio Padoa, Genève, dix ans après [Geneva, Ten Years Later], in: Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance [hereafter GPRI] 8 (1983), 28, pp. 179 – 184, 181.

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define a “common voice” and “let their opinion be heard” on these important transformations, Padoa insisted that new forms of interest representation were necessary for the insurance branch. Padoa’s Brussels network enabled him to gather a handful of colleagues with good knowledge of issues related to international insurance and “the intellectual enthusiasm for studying in depth the meaning of their function”.14 On 22nd September 1971, Padoa convened in Paris a small group of executives to discuss the foundation of a new association. Those present at this meeting included the Germans Emil Frey of the Mannheimer Versicherung, (now part of the Austrian group Uniqa), and Ernst Meyer of Allianz, the Belgian Georges Martin of Royale Belge and the French Bernard Pagézy of La Paternelle (now both part of AXA). The founding members of the International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics held their first assembly in Paris in February 1973 (see appendix, Table 1). On this occasion, the association opened its ranks to British, Dutch, Swiss and Austrian underwriters. The twenty initial members of the GA encompassed most of the key players on these important insurance markets.15 Padoa’s knowledge of the Brussels bureaucracy had also enabled him to meet the first president of the Association: the French economist Raymond Barre (1924 – 2007). A renowned professor of economics and close collaborator of the Gaullist Minister of Industry Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, Barre had held the vice-presidency of the European Commission between 1968 and 1972. There, he had been in charge of economic and financial affairs during the period that preceded the 1973 introduction of the first EEC directives on cross-border insurance operations.16 Before his successive nominations as Minister of Foreign Trade (early 1976) and Prime Minister (August 1976 – 1981) under the centre-right Giscard d’Estaing presidency, Barre made a meaningful contribution the GA not only by his thorough knowledge of the intricacies of transnational financial issues and policies, but also by impeccable liberal credentials. He had translated Friedrich von Hayek’s Counter-Revolution of Science (1952) and was a member of the Trilateral Commission, another elite policy planning group founded in 1973.17 If Brussels and Paris had constituted the first meeting places for Padoa and his colleagues, the establishment of the new association in Geneva was linked to the recruitment of the Italian economist Orio Giarini (born 1936) as its secretary gen14 See Fabio Padoa’s interview in: Patrick M. Liedtke (ed.), Ventures in Insurance Economics. 30 Years of the Geneva Association, Geneva 2003, pp. 3 f. 15 Ibidem, pp. 19 f. 16 See Raymond Barre / Jean Bothorel, L’expérience du pouvoir [The Experience of Power], Paris 2007. 17 On Barre’s role in the diffusion of neoliberalism in France, see Denord, La conversion au néo-libéralisme (fn. 4), p. 19. See also: Trialogue. A Bulletin of American-European-Japanese Affairs 3 (1974), available on hhttp: // www.trilateral.org / annmtgs / trialog / trlglist.htmi (accessed on 10. 07. 2009).

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eral.18 After studies in economics in Trieste and Austin (Texas) Giarini had worked in sales promotion and market research for the chemical company Montecatini (1959 – 65). In 1965, he had joined the Geneva branch of the Battelle Memorial Institute. This private non-profit R&D outfit, founded in 1929 in Columbus (Ohio) by a bequest of steel industrialist Gordon Battelle, conducted market and industrial innovation research for private firms and, mainly in the United States, state agencies.19 Giarini had also worked for the secretariat of the Movimento Federalista Europeo, a branch of the postwar civil society network promoting the idea of a federal union of Western Europe, and edited in Trieste a small pro-European newsletter (Rassegna Europea). After publishing a research on the EEC and space exploration the young economist had become associated with industrialist Aurelio Peccei, co-founder of the Club of Rome and an advocate of multinational firms’ role as inspirers of a “transnational society”.20 Giarini had participated in the preliminary meetings that led to the Club of Rome controversial report on the Limits to Growth (1972). Besides Padoa’s insurance contacts and Barre’s political and academic credentials, Giarini’s market-oriented research experience and familiarity with international networks made him a particularly well-suited secretary general for the new association, a position for which he had been tipped off by a Trieste friend acquainted to Fabio Padoa and that he held until 2001. This overview of the founding triumvirate of the GA confirms that this burgeoning International of insurers was connected by personal and thematic threads to the multi-faceted reorientation of business networks of the 1970s. The success and longevity of the GA was far from certain at its onset and its founders at first pledged financial support only for a three-year trial period. Yet, by the early 1980s the association was made permanent: the scope of its membership and the influence of its research output had indeed made it into a lasting fixture among the insurance community.

IV. The “most prestigious assembly of world insurance” From its inception, the GA brought together the largest life, non-life and reinsurance companies of Western Europe. Over three decades, its constituency of hand18 For biographical information, see Giarini, Itinéraire (fn. 2). See also my interview with Orio Giarini, Geneva, 24. 07. 2007. 19 See: hhttp: // www.battelle.orgi (accessed on 14. 03. 2008). 20 Besides his career at Fiat and Olivetti, Peccei was involved in the Committee for Atlantic Economic Cooperation, a precursor of the Trilateral Commission, and the investment consortium ADELA (Atlantic Development Group for Latin America). He considered the Club of Rome as a vessel for discussing how multinational firms could contribute to economic regulation at the global level. See: Robert Golub / Joe Townsend, Malthus, Multinationals and the Club of Rome, in: Social Studies of Science 7 (1977), 2, pp. 201 – 222, especially p. 208. Peccei was also present at the first 1971 meeting of the World Economic Forum, see Graz, How powerful are transnational elite clubs? (fn. 9), pp. 339 f., note 42.

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picked executives expanded to the world stage while retaining a distinct European outlook. This evolution can be followed in table 1 (see appendix), which offers four snapshots of its membership between 1975 and 2005. Besides eight EEC countries, the association included two important insurance markets of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), namely Switzerland and Austria. Significantly, all the companies that joined in 1975 were still members of the association thirty years later. Several of them were either bought by large insurance groups such as Allianz, Generali, or Swiss Re, or had merged to form new groups such as AXA (France), Aviva (UK), Ergo (Germany), Uniqa (Austria), Fondiaria (Italy) or the ING bancassurance group (Netherlands).21 The continuing presence of this core membership is related to the growing weight of European insurers on the global stage. Indeed, the 1973 – 1983 decade which witnessed the emergence of the GA was characterized by the relative decline of US insurers (whose share of global insurance premiums decreased from 57 to 47 percent of the world total) vis-à-vis their European and Japanese competitors (whose share rose from 27 to 34 percent and from 9 to 11 percent respectively). This trend constituted the first stirrings of a long-term shift that would lead European insurers to overtake US ones in the early 2000s. In 2004, Western and Eastern European insurers represented 36.9 percent of the global insurance market, against 36 percent for US underwriters and 22.7 percent for Asian ones.22 The importance of the core European members of the GA is underlined in table 2 (see appendix). In 2005, fourteen of the twenty largest European insurance companies were affiliated to the GA. Moreover, half of these fourteen companies were also listed among the ten world largest insurance companies, whereas one could find another four European GA members (Munich Re, Swiss Re, Hannover Re, and Lloyd’s) among the ten leading global reinsurers. By the mid 1980s, the GA had expanded its membership by enrolling executives from Scandinavian EFTA countries and the new members of the EEC from Southern Europe, as well as North American executives. Over the years, a small number of persons representing insurers’ associations or research institutes also joined the GA, but its membership remained first and foremost composed of high-ranking executives. By the end of the millennium, the GA encompassed companies chartered in the Caribbean island of Bermuda, a fast emerging pole for reinsurance business, as well as Japanese, Australian, South American and Eastern European companies. 21 There were more than 100 insurance mergers in Western Europe in the early 1980s, a trend that continued during the 1990s. See: John D. Hibbard, CIGNA Worldwide, Harvard Business School, Case Study n° 9-589-098, Cambridge 1989, p. 6, quoted by Virginia Haufler, Dangerous Commerce. Insurance and the Management of International Risk, Ithaca (NY) 1997, p. 95. 22 For 1973 – 1983 data, see: Padoa, Genève (fn. 13), p. 180. For 2004 data, see: European Insurance in Figures, CEA Statistics, 24. 06. 2006, p. 17.

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In 2005, the first Chinese insurers joined the GA alongside Taiwanese, South African or Korean companies. Despite this global scope, a brief look at table 3 (see appendix), which presents four snapshots of the board of the GA, confirms once again the weight of a small core of European companies in the association. Between 1975 and 2005, only four insurance groups (AXA, Generali, ING and Swiss Re) were continuously represented on the GA board and provided six out of the eight successive presidents of the association. Finally, in 2005 only three members of the board (two US executives and one from Brazil) out of a total of nineteen did not represent Western European companies. Its top-heavy executive profile distinguishes the GA from other international insurance interest groups. Organizations such as the International Congresses of Actuaries have enabled insurance executives to mingle with professionals and state regulators for over one century.23 However, the technical nature of these Congresses seldom made them suitable forums for discussing policy-related issues. Despite its origins among Brussels insiders, the GA also differed from the Comité européen des assurances, the federation of national insurance organizations which has monitored, since 1953, the development and regulation of the European insurance market.24 As mentioned in the first section of this contribution, the elite and select membership of the new transnational business networks that emerged during the 1970s set them apart from federations where membership was defined on the basis of national origins and whose margins of maneuver were often restrained by corporatist structures. The cross-sector nature of the GA, whose members span the life and non-life insurance branches, as well as reinsurance, also cuts through traditional national or international trade associations limited to one of these domains. From the start, the GA was also better connected than the International Insurance Society (IIS), a New York based non-profit group established in 1965 to serve as a forum for insurance companies and academics. The IIS annual conventions gather several hundred participants drawn from its broad-based membership (with over 900 corporate and individual members in 90 countries), which gives them, according to Orio Giarini, a “fair-like atmosphere” that contrasts with the more focused meetings of the handpicked membership of the GA.25 Indeed, the GA can be characterized as one of the forums that have contributed to the integration and socialization of top insurance executives at both the European and global levels. In this sense, the GA can be compared with the Consultative Group on International Economic and Monetary Affairs, Inc., better known as the Group of Thirty 23 See Martin Lengwiler, Conference or Cartel? The International Congress of Actuaries and the Emergence of a European Market for Private Sickness Insurance (1890 – 1950), paper presented at the European Business History Association, Geneva, September 2007. 24 See: hhttp: // www.cea.eui (accessed on 10. 07. 2009). 25 See: hhttp: // www.iisonline.org / i (accessed on 10. 07. 2009). Interview with Orio Giarini, Geneva, 24. 07. 2007.

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(G-30). This group founded in 1978 gathers an elite constituency (its membership is limited to thirty individuals, whence the name) of business executives, economists, international regulators, finance ministers, and central bankers. According to economic geographers Gordon Clark and Adam Tickell, the G-30 is clearly part of the “supporting infrastructure” of international financial reform, and its discursive practices contribute to influence mainstream opinion towards pro-market solutions in financial regulation and to pre-structure the debates of institutions such as the Bank of International Settlements.26 If the Washington-based G-30 is described as a beacon for Anglo-American perspectives on banking and monetary issues, the GA has retained, despite its global membership, a distinctly European profile. This profile is linked to the origins of the association, the profile of its core membership, and, as we will see in the next section of this contribution, to the attention it devotes to issues such as social policy reform. Now that I have ascertained the elite profile of the GA, I will turn to its intellectual production and advocacy activities. Orio Giarini recounts that Jean-Claude Trichet, then chairman of the Banque de France and current president (as of 2009) of the European Central Bank, told him during a conference of the G-30 that he considered the GA as a “very clever way to defend the long-term interests of the insurance branch”.27 One may indeed argue that the research output of the GA has much contributed to its reputation both among leading insurance companies and professional circles. According to its own count, the GA organized between 1973 and 2003 no less than 232 seminars, colloquia and conferences with a total of over 9.000 participants, published 107 issues of the Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, as well as more than 250 working papers and 560 newsletters.28 Besides this prolific output, the GA has developed numerous contacts between the insurance industry and academic circles, notably through the awarding of book prizes, grants, research ventures and various meetings and lectures. Financed by member fees, its annual budget of around 1.5 million Swiss Francs in 1998 (an amount roughly comparable, in real terms, to the first 1973 budget) covered staff wages (a dozen persons) as well as printing and distribution costs. Members top up this budget by shouldering the costs and logistics of some meetings, by delegating paid experts to help on GA projects.29 In addition to offering a meeting point between high-heeled insurance executives, academics and insurance experts, the activities of the GA have mainly re26 Gordon L. Clark / Adam Tickell, New Architectures or Liberal Logics? Interpreting Global Financial Reform (= Working Paper N° 3 of the ESRC Research Program on Future Governance), Hull 2001. See also: hhttp: // www.group30.orgi (accessed on 10. 07. 2009). 27 Giarini, Itinéraire (fn. 2), p. 160. 28 Liedtke, Ventures (fn. 14), p. 75. 29 General Report on Twenty Five Years of Activity of the Geneva Association, in: GPRI 23 (1998), 88, pp. 376 – 445, here p. 432.

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volved around the dissemination of research findings in five “interfaces” depicted on the GA logo as intersecting with a common field of insurance activities (see Figure 1, in the appendix). The insurance / industry interface covers issues related to the various shades of risk management: the role of insurance in domains such as container transport, space exploration and engineering, risks linked to technology (software security, Y2K and the “millennium bug”, e-commerce, etc.), as well as environmental challenges, climate change and “man-made catastrophes” such as terrorism. The insurance / finance interface deals with bancassurance, financial intermediaries or offshore insurance.30 Under the insurance / others heading, research is conducted on miscellaneous issues such as criminology, the role of planning or accounting methods. Within these three interfaces, the GA focuses in short on insurance best practices and technical matters that are destined to be shared among industry professionals. The insurance / services interface gathers contributions on theoretical issues presented in the Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, a second journal published by the GA since 1990, and activities related to the teaching and popularization of insurance economics in academia and the wider public. This interface also deals with issues linked to financial services regulation and liberalization on the international level. Through its Applied Service Economics Center (ASEC) and its links to the European Services Federation (ESF), the GA has benefited from Geneva secretariat proximity with the GATT (and subsequently the World Trade Organization) headquarters in order to initiate meetings between experts and service sector coalitions representing various countries. Not unlike the G-30 mentioned above, such technocratic business outfits are key parts of the consultation and negotiation machinery for trade and services liberalization that has gained influence during the last decade of the twentieth century.31 Although much more could be said about these diverse activities, I have chosen to focus primarily on the state / social-policy / insurance (or “state, social security and savings”) interface. Indeed, the options debated and advocated in this context highlight a key field of intervention for insurers in contemporary society, namely the shaping of the boundaries between state and markets in social provision.

30 Offshore or “captive” insurance companies are limited purpose companies established to finance risks emanating from their parent group or groups. In the simplest terms, it is an in-house self-insurance vehicle. 31 Belén Balanyá et al., Konzern Europa. Die unkontrollierbare Macht der Unternehmen, Zürich 2001, pp. 225 – 304. See also: Strange, The Retreat of the State (fn. 1), pp. 122 – 134.

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V. Social policy from an insurer’s perspective 1. The “three-pillar doctrine” as a model for pension reform (1975 – 1985): save now . . . The definition of boundaries between social and private insurance, as well as the competition or collaboration between the state and business in covering health, old age and accident risks, are key issues for insurers involved in what historian Jennifer Klein has termed the “business of social policy”, or the development of marketbased social provision.32 These issues had a distinctive urgency for the European companies that constituted the core of the GA. Between 1960 and 1973 average social insurance expenditure had increased from 11.4 to 18.1 percent of GDP in Western Europe, where this growth seemed to represent at the time an accelerating, and even lasting, phenomenon.33 If several early GA members originated from countries such as Germany, France, or Italy where social expenditure, expansion left little space for commercial social provision, they were also aware that their Swiss, British or Dutch colleagues had played a crucial role in the establishment of mixed welfare regimes, in which private insurers still retained large shares of the pension market. Indeed, the Geneva secretariat of the GA knew well that Swiss insurers had been among the key promoters of the so-called “three-pillar doctrine” endorsed during a referendum vote in December 1972, according to which basic pay-as-you-go state pensions (the first pillar) had to be supplemented by funded occupational and personal pensions (the second and third pillars).34 As I have shown extensively elsewhere, the adoption of this model constituted a major achievement for private pension providers and, in particular, for the insurance underwriters which marketed group contracts to private sector employers.35 As I will show now, the timing and content of the GA research on pension provision underscores that the association was undoubtedly one of the channels through which this doctrine was exposed to a wider international audience and, in the context of the neo-liberal critique of pay-as-you-go pensions, became a tenet of the offensive in favor of market-based pension reforms. The first GA working papers contained several contributions devoted to the role of group pensions and personal savings plans in old age provision. These studies, 32 See Jennifer L. Klein, For all these Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America’s Public-private Welfare State, Princeton (NJ) 2003. 33 See Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler Vergleich, Opladen 1988. 34 In pay-as-you-go pensions, payroll contributions are relied on to pay pensions directly while pension funding relies on the interest returns of financial assets. 35 Matthieu Leimgruber, Solidarity without the State? Business and the Shaping of the Swiss Welfare State, 1890 – 2000, Cambridge 2008, chapter 4. Group pension contracts cover employees working in one or several individual firms. In other words, they are pension plans managed by insurers on behalf of employers who are either unable, or unwilling, to set up their own company-based pension scheme.

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prepared by a Basel private research firm and published between 1975 and 1977, stressed that group premiums were growing faster than either individual insurance premiums or national GDPs, yet asserted that insurers nevertheless faced significant challenges in this situation. In countries such as the UK and Switzerland group pensions represented respectively one third and over half of overall insurance premiums, a key indicator of their role in pension provision. By contrast, the prospects for group pensions were less favorable where insurers were crowded out by occupational schemes organized on a pay-as-you-go basis (as in France) or where state pensions left only a narrow space for private supplements (as in Germany).36 In short, there existed a genuine potential for the development of private provision but its implementation faced the competition of state-based social expenditure, which was still experiencing strong growth during the 1970s. A second series of GA working papers was devoted to the interplays between “the state, security and insurance”. In these reports, experts from the Insurance Economics Department of the St. Gallen business school (Switzerland), spelled out in 1977 key arguments related to the emerging discourse on the “crisis in the welfare state”. First, the rapid growth of social expenditure had taken place without much thought about its long-term impact (which could endanger economic and financial stability) and without being strictly limited to basic provision (which was crowding out private schemes). Second, the growing conflict about these aims took place at a time when the “need for security” was on the rise. This situation offered opportunities for private insurers that showed interest in responding to this demand while making an attempt to contain the expansion of state-based solutions.37 These empirical researches were given more solid foundations during the third annual lecture of the GA in 1979, during which the renowned Harvard economist Martin Feldstein spoke on the alleged adverse impact of Social Security on savings.38 The themes raised in this lecture belonged to the ideological backbone of 36 Matthias Bittner / Brigitte Reitz [Prognos AG, Basel], Zur Entwicklung des Kollektiven Sparens in vier Länder bis 1980 (= Geneva Association Working Paper 5 / 1976), pp. 27 f., 50 f. See also: Brigitte Reitz, On the Development of Group Insurance and Collective Saving in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Great Britain, in: Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 3 (1978), November (10. 11. 1978), pp. 50 – 66. These studies were extended to the Italian case, see Antonio Martelli, La situazione e le prospettive del mercato delle assicurazioni collettive in Italia [Market Situation and Perspectives for Collective Insurance in Italy] (= Geneva Association Working Paper 31 / 1979, part I and 32 / 1979, part II). On the development of occupational pensions in these countries, see Emmanuel Reynaud et al. (eds.), International Perspectives on Supplementary Pensions: Actors and Issues, Westport 1996. 37 Matthias Haller / Walter Ackermann, Staat – Sicherheit – Versicherung (= Geneva Association Working Paper 15 / 1977, part I, 19 / 1978, part II and 20 / 1977 part III). See also: Walter Ackermann, State, Security and Insurance. An Analysis of Social Policy Insurance in some Western Industrialized Countries, in: GPRI 3 (1978), November (10. 11. 1978), pp. 3 – 43. 38 This classical paper, the 1979 Frank Paish lecture given at the British Association of University Teachers of Economics, was published in 1981 in Contemporary Economic Analysis, Volume III, London 1981. See also Liedtke, Ventures (fn. 14), pp. 110 – 127.

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the denunciation of social insurance peddled by neoclassical luminaries such as Feldstein during Reagan’s presidency. Two years later, the GA also published a report elaborated by Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Denis Kessler, two junior academics of the Paris-based Centre de recherche économique sur l’épargne. In this working paper the two authors cautiously argued in favor of the development of funding to supplement pay-as-you-go social insurance in France. Published as a book in 1982, this study is often considered as one of the starting points of the French discussion on pension funds.39 If Strauss-Kahn would become a key proponent of the social-liberal wing of the Socialist Party and be nominated in 2007 director of the IMF, Kessler pursued an exemplary career as organic intellectual for French insurance and business circles. After a career in academia (1977 – 1990) Kessler presided the French Federation of Insurers (FFSA, 1990 – 2002), then became a vice-president of the Comité européen des assurances (1996 – 98, 2001 – 02), and was finally nominated as number two of the main French employers’ federation (MEDEF, 1991 – 2002). In addition to this activities in key business organizations, Kessler also held executive positions at AXA before joining the direction of SCOR, a major French reinsurance underwriter. As we will see in the next section of this contribution, Kessler continued to be active in the GA, acting among others as its deputy secretary general (1988), vice-president in charge of scientific research (1990s) and a member of the GA board (early 2000s).40 Summarizing a first decade of discussion on the social policy / insurance interface, Raymond Barre underlined in the 1983 anniversary issue of the Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance that there existed two paths to deal with the crisis of the welfare state in the context of inflation, monetary instability and international competition. Besides reducing the growth of both public and social expenditure and lowering tax rates so as to give more breathing space to entrepreneurs, the first president of the GA emphasized that the state should “limit the extension of risk coverage through national solidarity schemes and facilitate, in addition to the collective protection of fundamental risks weighing on individuals, the development of risk coverage mechanisms based on group and personal insurance”.41 For him, insurers working at the juncture between social insurance and the insurance market had a key role to play in order to convince both policy makers and the public of these highly desirable and parallel reform paths. Arguing that social security had 39 Denis Kessler / Dominique Strauss-Kahn, La capitalisation a-t-elle un avenir en France? [Does Pre-Funding Have a Future in France?] (= Geneva Association Working Paper 48 / 1981). Published in book form as Denis Kessler / Dominique Strauss-Kahn, L’épargne et la retraite. L’avenir des retraites préfinancées [Savings and Retirement. The Future of PreFunded Pensions], Paris 1982. See also: Denis Kessler / André Masson / Dominique StraussKahn, Social Security and Saving: A Tentative Survey, in: GPRI 6 (1981), 18, pp. 3 – 50. 40 Who is Who in France, 2006 edition, New Providence 2005. 41 Raymond Barre, L’Etat et la demande de sécurité dans les sociétés contemporaines [The State and the Quest for Security in Contemporary Societies], in: GPRI 8 (1983), 27, pp. 81 – 87, here p. 85.

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“decreased the freedom of the West European individual”, and that “a transfer towards more self-retained risk for the insured could be a step in the right direction”, two Dutch executives of Nationale Nederlanden (forerunner of ING) also compared the welfare state to an “overloaded ship”. While some people wanted to retain all of its cargo, others were determined to throw away some of it to save the ship from capsizing. Between these two extremes, insurers spoke in favor of a better solution: leading the ship towards a safe harbor where some of its load could then be “sold in a free market” so as to secure the ship and enabling it to pursue its onward journey.42 By the early 1980s, the GA was by far not the only business outfit calling for both austerity measures and market-based reforms in social provision. Alongside the containment and cutback of state social programs, themes such as the need to develop occupational and personal solutions had become a regular fixture of the OECD, notably after a 1980 conference the organization had sponsored on the “crisis of the welfare state”.43 From 1984 onwards, the Comité européen des assurances also developed this theme in several publications and reports.44 By 1990, the three-pillar doctrine made its debut in policy recommendations signed by the European Commission.45 The concept was consecrated in 1994 in a prominent World Bank report entitled Averting the old age crisis, a key blueprint of what Robin Blackburn has described as the “global drive to commodify pensions”.46 In recent years, the European Financial Services Roundtable (founded in 2001), an elite business group whose membership closely overlaps with the GA board, has also been promoting the idea of “pan-European” pension plans, thus giving a transnational dimension to the three-pillar doctrine.47 42 E. K. den Bakker / G. W. de Witt, Social Security in a European Perspective, in: GPRI 8 (1983), 28, pp. 248 – 271, here p. 262. 43 For the proceedings, see: The Welfare State in Crisis (= OECD Report), Paris 1981. See also the Social Policy Studies series published by the OECD from 1982 onwards. 44 See: Die Zukunft sichern, Conference held in Zurich on 28. 08. 1984, published as: Cahiers du CEA n° 3 (1984). See also: L’avenir des systèmes de retraite en Europe [The Future of European Pension Schemes], Cahiers du CEA n° 4 (1986). 45 See: Gaël Coron, Le prisme communautaire en matière de retraites: la diffusion à travers le droit européen de la théorie des piliers [The European Community Prism in Pensions Affairs: The Dissemination of the Pillar Theory in European Law], in: Retraite et société 50 (2007), 1, pp. 250 – 277. 46 Robin Blackburn, Banking on Death or, Investing in Life: The History and Future of Pensions, London 2002, pp. 225 – 236. 47 See the following publications of the European Financial Services Roundtable (EFR): One Europe, One Pension. Affording the Future, Brussels 2002; Pan-European Pension Plans. From Concept to Action, Brussels 2007; Pan-European Pension Plans. Deepening the Concept, Brussels 2005. As of 2005, six members of the GA board (including GA president Henri de Castries form AXA, GA vice-president Michael Diekmann from Allianz and GA treasurer Walther Kielholz from Swiss Re) were also members of the EFR. The association was founded by Per Gyllanhammar, a former Volvo executive who had also acted as one of the founding fathers of the 1983 European Roundtable of Industrialists.

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More research remains to be done to connect the dots between the various occurrences of the three-pillar concept, from its first uses in the Swiss context to its transnational diffusion and adoption. However, an analysis of the GA shows that elite business clubs and think tanks play the role of platforms for translating and mainstreaming reform agendas that are functional to specific business interests. Moreover, the involvement of the GA in such mainstreaming processes did not stop there. By the mid 1980s, the association had defined for itself another distinctive niche in the ecology of the late twentieth century pension reform by promoting a fourth pillar to the three-pillar model. The genesis and content of this still ongoing research program of the GA is detailed below.

2. . . . or work tomorrow: adding a fourth pillar to the retirement temple (mid 1980s-2000s) “[The GA has] advocated a strengthening of the second pillar based on funding and a further development of third pillar resources. Our attention has, however, focused above all on the need in future years for a flexible extension of working-life, mainly on a parttime basis, in order to supplement the income of the existing three pillars. [ . . . ] This reorganisation of end-of-career and the new age-management strategy it implies – in which gradual retirement is destined to play a key role – also corresponds to many of the changes (in quality of work, life cycle, etc) which are specific to our contemporary service economies. The fourth pillar, then, forms part of the Geneva Association’s more general theory that an aging population, rather than a problem, can constitute a positive challenge for our firms, communities and individuals.”48

In Switzerland, the principle of a second pillar of mandatory occupational pensions regulated by the state but managed by private providers, which constituted the heart of the three-pillar doctrine, was approved in December 1972. However, its implementation took more than a decade. The law on the mandatory second pillar was ratified in 1982 and became operational in 1985. The fiscal encouragement of third pillar savings accounts was introduced in the late 1980s. It is in this context that the GA inaugurated a research program in 1986 that constituted the second stage of its advocacy for pension reform, namely the reinsertion of the elderly into a labor force from which they had been dismissed by overly generous early retirement programs introduced in the course of industrial restructuring during the 1970s and 1980s in Europe.49 Over the years, the fourth pillar research program has become a mainstay of the GA activities and its staff has churned out many policy reports and convened several meetings addressing this theme. Besides commissioning more than a dozen working papers on the “fourth pillar”, the interplay between ageing and health, as well as See: hhttp: // www.genevaassociation.org / four_pillars.htmi (accessed on 02. 10. 2007). On the politics of early retirement, see Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Reforming Early Retirement in Europe, Japan and the USA, Oxford 2006. 48 49

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post-retirement work opportunities, the GA has been publishing since 1999 biennial special issues of its Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance focused on the twin challenges of “the future of pensions” and “work beyond 60”.50 Moreover, around 3.000 researchers and organizations receive a bi-annual “fourth pillar” newsletter. In 2005, Geneviève Reday-Muldey, the GA research officer in charge of the program, published a synthesis on the advancement of key policies and practices in the domain of the reinsertion of ageing workers in the workforce, while Orio Giarini, the now retired secretary of the GA, founded in Trieste a new venture, the quarterly journal European Papers on the New Welfare: The Counter Ageing-Society.51 To understand the objectives and leitmotifs of this work, it is useful to read two articles published by Denis Kessler at the onset of the research program.52 In these contributions, entitled “The four pillars of retirement” and “Solutions to the coming crisis in social security: save today or work tomorrow”, the French insurance intellectual (and soon on his way to become an insurance executive) argued in favor of a gradual shift from collective pay-as-you go and funded pensions (first and second pillars) towards individualized savings and part-time post-retirement work (third and fourth pillars). Behind benevolent objectives, such as fighting back the “ageism” which prejudices the employment of elderly workers, offering more “flexibility” to individuals wishing to pursue post-retirement careers, we can recognize the same drive towards the re-commodification of social policy that has become a mainstay of contemporary pension reform. As it had been the case a decade earlier, a crisis-laden line of argumentation (be it of economic, budgetary or demographic nature) was used as a wedge to reorient the horizon of policy debates. In 1999, in the first issue of the Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance entirely devoted to the “fourth pillar”, Kessler again listed the four key features of a global reform drive: (1) the development of fiscal incentives instead of social expenditure, (2) pension financing based on funding instead of pay-as-you-go, (3) “customization” (i. e. individualization) instead of “standardization” of social rights, (4) sound competition among providers of social provision rather than state monopoly.53 Once again, the GA cannot be credited with either inventing or being the sole proponent of such concepts. Since the mid 1990s, labor market and pension reformers in many Western countries as well as in the OECD or the European Commission have begun to question the practice of early retirement, by raising the retirement See: GPRI: 24 (1999), 4; 26 (2001), 4; 28 (2003), 4; 30 (2005), 4; 32 (2007), 4. Geneviève Reday-Mulvey, Working beyond 60: Key Policies and Practices in Europe, Basingstoke 2005. Orio Giarini’s autobiography also contains a chapter on “active retirement”. See: Giarini, Itinéraire (fn. 2). See also hhttp: // eng.newwelfare.org / i (accessed on 15. 04. 2008). 52 Denis Kessler, The Four Pillars of Retirement, in: GPRI 13 (1988), 49, pp. 342 – 349, Denis Kessler, Solutions to the Coming Crisis in Social Security: Save Today or Work Tomorrow, in: GPRI 14 (1989), 55, pp. 122 – 138. 53 Denis Kessler, Social Security and Private Insurance: The Great Change, in: GPRI 24 (1999), 4, pp. 439 – 447, here pp. 444 f. 50 51

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age and introducing incentives in order to improve workforce participation rates among the elderly. As we have seen in this contribution, the GA strives to present the insurance branch as keen on either rebuilding a new partnership between the state and the market (three-pillar model), or contributing to a better apprehension of generational divides in aging societies (fourth pillar). These objectives fit closely with a broader agenda of market-based social policy reforms. Indeed, Kessler’s slogan to “save today or work tomorrow” is now slowly but surely becoming a reality that millions of people will have to face. The summer 2007 issue of the OECD Pensions at a glance report emphasized that measures introduced since 1990 in sixteen OECD countries, ranging from pension cutbacks, higher age thresholds for retirement or less favorable indexation mechanisms, had led to overall cuts amounting to 22 percent of future pension promises (and even 25 percent for women).54 One may only hope that the new uncertainties heralded by these measures will be covered, at least in part, by the personal annuities and group pensions peddled by the proponents of the virtuous potentials of the “risk society”.

VI. Conclusive remarks This analysis of the Geneva Association aimed to situate this organization in the context of the emergence of new transnational business associations during the 1970s. Undoubtedly, this insurance International can neither be described as one of the key think tanks of the neo-liberal galaxy, nor as one of the most prominent transnational elite business group. Indeed, such entities tend to have a more generalist agenda than the specific and sectoral one of the GA. Moreover, we have seen that the association is only one of several transnational networks active in the insurance field. The GA occupies nevertheless a significant position in the ecology of business groups for the very reason that it operates at such an intermediate level. In other words, the influence and impact of the GA are to be found in its positioning alongside junctures, or, in the parlance of the GA, “interfaces”. The GA could be described as a laboratory where one can follow the two-way flow between industry executives and academic researchers, as well as the ascent of prominent research entrepreneurs moving seamlessly from economics towards business organizations and executive positions. The case of French economist and executive Denis Kessler, whose career intersected, at several points, with his activities at the GA is exemplary of such a phenomenon. In retrospect, we also have to take into account the integrative role of the GA during decades when European insurers were experiencing profound and ongoing mutations. Indeed, the association offered, and still offers, a selected group of leading executives a transnational platform within which they can meet and discuss transnational issues. 54

Pensions at a Glance. Public Policies across OECD Countries, Paris 2007, pp. 10 f.

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The GA also serves as a channel for the discussion and dissemination of “best practices” within the insurance industry, as well as for the elaboration and propagation of normative views towards a wider public in domains such as services liberalization or, as demonstrated above, guidelines for social policy reform. This framing and mainstreaming of well-defined narratives leading to specific policy recommendations through decade-long preparation work, is far from negligible. The proliferation of such policy ideas constitutes indeed one of the forces of the neo-liberal stance. Conceptions formulated in highly theoretical or ideological terms have to be translated, adapted and embedded in current practices to become effective. And it is precisely at this juncture, as a platform for the packaging of general ideas such as the “crisis of the welfare state” into specific policy recommendations that business networks such as the GA play a crucial role. Controversies over the boundaries separating the state from the market in the domain of social policy and risk coverage constitute key features of our contemporary societies. As historian Peter Baldwin reminded us, “the battles behind the welfare state lay bare the structures and conflicts of modern society”.55 Accordingly, the contribution of the GA to the publicization and mainstreaming of pro-business pension reforms has been both significant and far reaching. To paraphrase the quotation used at the very beginning of this article, a thorough analysis of such processes then partially answers Susan Strange’s question about “how and why ( . . . ) insurers and risk managers exercise ( . . . ) power over outcomes”.

55 Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875 – 1975, Cambridge 1990, p. 1.

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Appendix: Tables and figures

P = professional research; U = University research; S = scholarships; C = workshops / conferences stars indicate research underway as of late 2003. Source: Patrick M. Liedtke (ed.), Ventures in Insurance Economics. 30 Years of the Geneva Association, Geneva 2003, pp. 77, 80.

Figure 1: The research interfaces of the Geneva Association

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Table 1 A snapshot of the Geneva Association membership by countries, 1975 – 2005

Allianz = companies whose executives were present at the first preliminary meeting in September 1971; * UAP = founding members in February 1973; (-> AXA) = merger and / or acquisition. Source: Patrick M. Liedtke (ed.), Ventures in Insurance Economics. 30 Years of the Geneva Association, Geneva, 2003; Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, various issues.

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Sources: (a) CEA statistics. European Insurance in Figures, n° 24, June (2006), p. 23; b) and (c) International Insurance Factbook, available on: hhttp: // www.iii.org / international / rankings / i (accessed on 20. 11. 2007). (1) bought by AXA in 2006; (2) member through Cologne Re / Gen Re; (3) bought by Swiss Re in 2006.

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Table 3 The board of the Geneva Association, 1975 – 2005

* = 1971 founding committee; p = president; vp = vice-president; tr = treasurer; s = secretary general. Sources: Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, various issues.

The Transnational Capitalist Class – Theory and Empirical Research By Leslie Sklair I. Introduction This paper attempts to rethink the concept of the capitalist class in terms of recent theory and research on capitalist globalization.1 As theories of the capitalist class as the ruling class in one country, those of G. William Domhoff2, R. Connell3 and Michael Useem4 seem to me the most useful starting places, but I argue that globalization has changed the structure and dynamics of this class and here I explore the question of the extent to which the capitalist class, which all the above primarily analyze in state-centrist terms, exercises hegemony in the global system. This argument conceptualizes class in capitalist society in terms of relations to the means of production, distribution and exchange; it resists the neo-Weberian attempt to separate class, status and command (despite the persuasive arguments of John Scott5) and highlights the central role of the capitalist class globally in the struggle to commodify everything. The argument revolves around three working hypotheses logically deduced from the global system theory that is elaborated below. First, I hypothesize that a transnational capitalist class (TCC) is emerging and 1 This paper borrows from several of my previous publications: Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class and Global Capitalism: The Case of the Tobacco Industry, in: Political Power and Social Theory 12 (1998), pp. 3 – 43; Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, Malden / Oxford / Carlton 2001; Leslie Sklair, Globalization. Capitalism and its Alternatives, Oxford 2002; Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class and Contemporary Architecture in Globalizing Cities, in: International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29 (2005), 3, pp. 485 – 500. For useful critical surveys of the literature on the transnational capitalist class see William K. Carroll / Colin Carson, The Network of Global Corporations and Elite Policy Groups: A Structure for Transnational Capitalist Class Formation, in: Global Networks 3 (2003), 1, pp. 29 – 58; Abdul Rahman Embong, Globalization and Transnational Class Relations: Some Problems of Conceptualisation, in: Third World Quarterly 21 (2000), 6, pp. 989 – 1000; Jackie Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy, Baltimore 2008, especially chapter 4. 2 G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs 1967. 3 Robert Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture, Cambridge 1977. 4 Michael Useem, The Inner Circle. Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U. S. and U. K., New York 1984. 5 John Scott, Stratification and Power: Structures of Class, Status and Command, Cambridge 1996.

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is beginning to act as a global ruling class in some spheres; second, that the key feature of the globalization of the capitalist system in recent decades has been the profit-driven culture-ideology of consumerism organized by this class; and third, that the TCC is working consciously to obfuscate the effects of the central crises of global capitalism, namely (1) the simultaneous creation of increasing poverty and increasing wealth within and between countries – the class polarization crisis; and (2) the crisis of ecological unsustainability of the global capitalist system. The global system theory propounded here is based on the concept of transnational practices, practices that cross state boundaries but do not necessarily originate with state agencies or actors. Analytically, they operate in three spheres, the economic, the political, and the cultural-ideological. These are superimposed each on the others rather than separate spheres. The whole is what I mean by the global system. While the global system, in the twenty-first century, is not synonymous with global capitalism, what the theory sets out to demonstrate is that the dominant forces of global capitalism are the dominant forces in the global system. The building blocks of the theory are the transnational corporation, the characteristic institutional form of economic transnational practices, a still-evolving transnational capitalist class in the political sphere and in the culture-ideology sphere, the cultureideology of consumerism. The TCC is not necessarily the ruling class. The assumption on which my argument is based is that the TCC is the ruling class in the global capitalist system, a fairly obvious proposition. That global capitalism dominates the global system as a whole is less obvious, indeed it is a rather contentious claim. Most of the attempts to theorize what might be seen as a global ruling class – notably the international bourgeoisie (more or less a staple of dependency theorists), Atlantic Ruling Class6, corporate international wing of the managerial bourgeoisie7, international corporate elite8, and answers to the question: “Who rules the world?”9 – have given pride of place to those who own and control the transnational corporations. Another source of insight into a global ruling class has emerged from the Gramscian turn in International Relations. Robert W. Cox writes of “an emerging global class structure”10 and Stephen Gill identifies a “developing transnational capitalist class fraction”11. As an attempt to build on this rich literature, the concept of transnational practices and its political form, the TCC, is a step towards consolidating the theoKees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, London 1984. David Becker et al. (eds.), Postimperialism, Boulder (CO) 1987. 8 Meindert Fennema, International Networks of Banks and Industry, The Hague 1982. 9 Walter L. Goldfrank, Who Rules the World? Class Formation at the International Level, in: Quarterly Journal of Ideology 1 (1977), 2, pp. 32 – 37. 10 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, New York 1987, p. 271. 11 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, Cambridge 1990, pp. 94 ff. 6 7

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retical link between globalization and the ruling class and providing some evidence that these concepts have genuine empirical referents. This implies, conceptually, that the state is only one, albeit important, level of analysis and empirically, that state actors are losing power in some key areas of economic, political, and cultureideology decision-making to global actors.

II. Conceptualizing the transnational capitalist class The transnational capitalist class is the characteristic institutional form of political transnational practices in the global capitalist system. It can be analytically divided into four main fractions: 1. Those who own and control the major transnational corporations (TNCs) and their local affiliates (corporate fraction); 2. Globalizing politicians and bureaucrats (political fraction); 3. Globalizing professionals (technical fraction); 4. Merchants and media (consumerist fraction). My argument is that together, these groups constitute a global power elite, ruling class or inner circle in the sense that these terms have been used to characterize the class structures of specific countries.12 The transnational capitalist class is opposed not only by those who reject capitalism as a way of life and / or an economic system but also by those capitalists who reject globalization. Some localized, domestically-oriented businesses can share the interests of the global corporations and prosper, but most cannot and perish. Influential business strategists and management theorists commonly argue that to survive, local business must globalize (for example Rosabeth Moss Kanter13). Though most national and local state managers fight for the interests of their constituents, as they define these interests, government bureaucrats, politicians and professionals who entirely reject globalization and espouse extreme nationalist ideologies are comparatively rare, despite the recent rash of civil wars in economically marginal parts of the world. And while there are anti-consumerist elements in most societies, there are few cases of a serious anti-consumerist party winning political power anywhere in the world.14 12 See Domhoff, Who Rules America? (fn. 2); Useem, The Inner Circle (fn. 4); Scott, Stratification and Power (fn. 5). 13 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, World Class: Thriving Locally in the Global Economy, New York 1996. 14 It has been argued in the context of consumerism and the middle class in Asia, that “the smaller capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie have resisted the internationalization of their economies and are prepared to support governments that take a nationalist and populist line”. See Richard Robison / David Goodman (eds.), The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald’s and Middle-class Revolution, London 1996, p. 13. It is difficult to reconcile this

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The transnational capitalist class is transnational (or global) in the following respects. (1) The economic interests of its members are increasingly globally linked rather than exclusively local and national in origin. As rentiers, their property and shares and as executives, their corporations, are becoming more globalized; as ideologues, their intellectual products serve the interests of globalizing rather than localizing capital. This follows directly from the shareholder-driven growth imperative that lies behind the globalization of the world economy and the increasing difficulty of enhancing shareholder value in purely domestic firms. While for many practical purposes the world is still organized in terms of discrete national economies the TCC increasingly conceptualizes its interests in terms of markets, which may or may not coincide with a specific nation-state, and the global market, which clearly does not.15 Kees van der Pijl traces the point when the “national identity” of the corporations “had to be abandoned” to the 1970s, and while few would go this far there is sufficient evidence to show that the global corporation of today is not the same as the multinational corporation of the past.16 (2) The TCC seeks to exert economic control in the workplace, political control in domestic and international politics, and culture-ideology control in every-day life through specific forms of global competitive and consumerist rhetoric and practice. The focus of workplace control is the threat that jobs will be lost and, in the extreme, the economy will collapse unless workers are prepared to work longer and for less in order to meet foreign competition. 17 This is reflected in local elecwith their consumerist ideology and practices based as they are on imported consumer goods and services. Patricio Silva shows that the “festival consumista” of the Pinochet regime in Chile persuaded the masses that globalizing neo-liberal policies were in their best interests. See Patricio Silva, Modernization, Consumerism and Politics in Chile, in: David Hojman (ed.), Neo-Liberalism with a Human Face? The Politics and Economics of the Chilean Model (= Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, Monograph Series No. 20), Liverpool 1995, pp. 118 – 132. 15 I define “domestic firms” as those serving an exclusively sovereign state market, employing only local co-nationals, whose products consist entirely of domestic services, components and materials. If you think that this is a ridiculously narrow definition for the realities of contemporary economies then you are more than half-way to accepting my concept of globalization. Apart from small localized firms, the exceptions are mainly what are now commonly termed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and quasi-monopolistic utility and services corporations (see any issue of the Fortune Global 500). The facts that (a) SOEs are being run more like TNCs or are being privatized and frequently sold to TNCs; and (b) the quasi-monopolies are being rapidly deregulated, enhance rather than detract from my central thesis. 16 Kees van der Pijl, The Sovereignty of Capital Impaired: Social Forces and Codes of Conduct for Multinational Corporations, in: Henk Overbeek (ed.), Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-liberalism in the 1980s, London 1993, chapter 2, p. 30. 17 This has been termed “the race to the bottom” by radical critics. See David C. Ranney, Labor and an Emerging Supranational Corporate Agenda, in: Economic Development Quarterly 8 (1994), 1, pp. 83 – 91; Jeremy Brecher / Tim Costello, Global Village or Global Pillage:

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toral politics in most countries, where the major parties have few substantial strategic (even if many tactical) differences, and in the sphere of culture-ideology, where consumerism is rarely challenged. (3) Members of the TCC have outward-oriented global rather than inwardoriented local perspectives on most economic, political and culture-ideology issues. The growing TNC and international institutional emphasis on free trade and the shift from import substitution to export promotion strategies in most developing countries since the 1980s have been driven by members of the TCC working through government agencies, elite opinion organizations, and the media. Some of the credit for this apparent transformation in the way in which big business works around the world is attached to the tremendous growth in business education since the 1960s, particularly in the US and Europe, but increasingly all over the world. (4) Members of the TCC tend to share similar life-styles, particularly patterns of higher education (increasingly in business schools) and consumption of luxury goods and services. Integral to this process are exclusive clubs and restaurants, ultra-expensive resorts in all continents, private as opposed to mass forms of travel and entertainment and, ominously, increasing residential segregation of the very rich secured by armed guards and electronic surveillance, from Los Angeles to Moscow, from Manila to Beijing. (5) Finally, members of the TCC seek to project images of themselves as citizens of the world as well as of their places of birth. Leading exemplars of this phenomenon have included Jacques Maisonrouge, French-born, who became in the 1960s the chief executive of IBM World Trade;18 the Swede Percy Barnevik who created Asea Brown Boveri, often portrayed as spending most of his life in his corporate jet; the German Helmut Maucher, formerly CEO of Nestlé’s far-flung global empire;19 David Rockefeller, said to be one of the most powerful men in the United States;20 the legendary Akio Morita, the founder of Sony;21 Rupert MurEconomic Reconstruction From the Bottom Up, Boston (Mass.) 1994. While this is not new – capitalists have always fought against reductions in the length of the working day and increases in wages – its global scope is unprecedented. This has been regularly noted, from the normally globalizing Economist (in “Profits of gloom”, 28th September 1996) which asserted that most of the extra profit generated by information technology and globalization was going straight to the owners of capital at the expense of wages to the Indian Economic Times (4th March 1997) which noted that as globalization makes India richer the peasants get poorer, a theme that is common in the so-called “developing” world. Recent panics in the USA about the dangers of sweatshop-produced toys and other goods imported from China are only its most recent manifestation. 18 Jacques G. Maisonrouge, Inside IBM: A European’s Story, London 1988. 19 Helmut Maucher, Leadership in Action: Tough-minded Strategies From the Global Giant, New York 1994. 20 Gill, American Hegemony (fn. 11). 21 Akio Morita / Edwin M. Reingold, Made in Japan: Akio Morita and Sony, London 1987.

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doch, who actually changed his nationality to pursue his global media interests;22 and Bill Gates, global philanthropist extraordinaire. The concept of the transnational capitalist class implies that there is one central inner circle that makes system-wide decisions, and that it connects in a variety of ways with members of the TCC in each locality, country, and region. Despite real geographical and sectoral conflicts the whole of the transnational capitalist class shares a fundamental interest in the continued accumulation of private profit. What the inner circle of the TCC does is to give a unity to the diverse economic interests, political organizations and cultural and ideological formations of those who make up the class as a whole. As in any social class, fundamental long-term unity of interests and purpose does not preclude shorter-term and local conflicts of interests and purpose, both within each of the four fractions and between them. The cultureideology of consumerism is the fundamental value system that keeps the system intact, but it permits a relatively wide variety of choices, for example, what I term “emergent global nationalisms” (see below) as a way of satisfying the needs of the different actors and their constituencies within the global system. The four fractions of the TCC in any geographical and social area, region, country, city, society, community, perform complementary functions to integrate the whole. The achievement of these goals is facilitated by the activities of local and national agents and organizations which are connected in a complex network of global interlocks. A crucial component of this integration of the TCC as a global class is that virtually all senior members of the TCC will occupy a variety of interlocking positions, not only the interlocking directorates that have been the subject of detailed studies for some time in a variety of countries,23 but also connections outside the direct ambit of the corporate sector, the civil society as it were servicing the statelike structures of the corporations. Leading corporate executives serve on and chair the boards of think tanks, charities, scientific, sports, arts and culture bodies, universities, medical foundations and similar institutions.24 It is in this sense that the claims ‘the business of society is business’ and ‘the business of our society is global business’ become legitimated in the global capitalist system. Business, particularly the transnational corporation sector, then begins to monopolize symbols of modernity and post-modernity like free enterprise, international competitiveness and the good life and to transform most, if not all, social spheres in its own image. While they are all members of a single, global class and share important characteristics, each fraction has its own specific characteristics. These can be analyzed in William Shawcross, Murdoch, Sydney 1992. Frans N. Stokman / Rolf Ziegler / John Scott (eds.), Networks of Corporate Power: A Comparative Analysis of Ten Countries, Cambridge 1985; Mark S. Mizruchi / Michael Schwartz (eds.), Intercorporate Relations: The Structural Analysis of Business, Cambridge 1987; John Scott (ed.), The Sociology of Elites (3 Volumes), Aldershot 1990, Vol. 3: Interlocking Directorships and Corporate Networks. 24 Domhoff, Who Rules America? (fn. 2); Useem, The Inner Circle (fn. 4); Scott, Sociology of Elites (fn. 23), Vol. 1: The Study of Elites (Parts II and III). 22 23

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terms of their economic base, their political organization and their culture and ideology. III. The four fractions of the TCC 1. TNC executives The most important fraction of the TCC comprises the leading executives of the world’s major corporations.25 These executives wield power to the extent that they control parts of the global economy and their actions and decisions can have fundamental effects globally and on the local communities in which their corporations are active in any capacity. This group may also include the leading executives of companies which, while not themselves among the biggest TNCs, are of strategic importance for the global economy. The economic base of these executives is their corporate salaries and their privileged access to shares and other financial rewards in the companies they work for either directly or as members of boards.26 The executives of the transnational corporations are paid relatively large salaries compared with workers in responsible positions in other economic spheres. It is probably true to say that, with the exception of individual sporting and entertainment superstars, corporate executives globally have the highest salaries of any employed group. While there is relatively little research on capitalists in the Third World, what there is supports the view that capitalism is globalizing to a greater or lesser extent everywhere.27 The political organizations of the corporate elite are the peak business associations and bodies that connect business with other spheres (governments, global politics, social issues, etc.) operating at various levels. These include the Business Roundtable in the US28, the CBI in Britain29 and others in Europe30, Japan31 and a 25 There are two main ways to assess which are the major corporations. The Fortune lists are based on annual revenues, a measure of past performance, while the Financial Times lists are based on stock market valuation, a measure of how the market sees future performance. The lists overlap to a high degree. Both are denominated in U.S. dollars and thus, are influenced by currency fluctuations. 26 This bland statement conceals a furious dispute over the managerialism thesis of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means and the classic refutation by Maurice Zeitlin, reprinted in Scott, Sociology of Elites (fn. 23), Vol. 2: Economic Elites and Business Power (Parts I and II). 27 On Sudan: Fatima B. Mahmoud, The Sudanese Bourgeoisie: Vanguard of Development. Khartoum / London 1984; on Pakistan: Anita M. Weiss, Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan: The Emergence of an Industrial Bourgeoisie in the Punjab, Boulder (CO) 1991; on Egypt: Malak Zaalouk, Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The Rise of the New Bourgeoisie, London 1989; on Africa: Paul Lubeck (ed.), The African Bourgeoisie, Boulder (CO) 1987; on Asia: Robison / Goodman, The New Rich in Asia (fn. 14). 28 Philip H. Burch, The Business Roundtable: Its Make-up and External Ties, in: Research in Political Economy 4 (1981), pp. 101 – 127. 29 Wyn Grant / David Marsh, The CBI, London 1977.

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truly global network of inter-linked Chambers of Commerce. The major corporations, not surprisingly, dominate these associations and often are influential in setting the rules for global production and trade.32 The culture and ideology of TNC executives is an emerging consumerism, where global brands and tastes are promoted in the effort to turn all cultural products into commercial opportunities. It is important to distinguish here between the individual preferences and life-styles of executives, which might vary considerably, and the culture and ideology of the class as a class. Irrespective of how individual executives live their lives, there is no doubt that global marketing and selling have become the ideological rationale for the system as a whole. This does not, however, preclude modifying these global formulae to suit local tastes as happens frequently in, for example, the fashion and fast foods sectors. The same can be said for more specific political tastes with respect to the neo-liberal agenda. 2. Globalizing politicians and bureaucrats Few politicians are independently very wealthy, though in most electorally-based political systems, to be successful it is important for politicians to have wealthy backers. The failure of left-wing politicians to sustain programs of genuine reform within (let alone radical challenges to) capitalist hegemony anywhere in the world since the 1970s makes it less difficult to understand why most successful politicians in most countries tend to be globalizing to a greater or lesser extent, even when they hide behind nationalist rhetoric. Politicians from both conservative and social democratic parties commonly come from and return to the corporate sector and globalizing bureaucracies in various capacities. In most representative democracies elected politicians and officials must respond to the interests of their local constituents, but these interests are more often than not defined in terms of the interests of the corporations that provide employment and make profits locally. As one of the most open countries in the world in terms of public access, research on these issues is most advanced in the USA. Research on Political Action Committees33 and local corporate-politician connections34 attest to a phenomenon 30 Jonathan P. Charkham, Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries, Oxford 1994. 31 Leonard H. Lynn / Timothy J. McKeown, Organizing Business: Trade Associations in America and Japan, Washington D. C. 1988. 32 The ultimately unsuccessful negotiations in the mid to late 1990s over a Multilateral Agreement on Investments at the OECD is strong evidence for this line of argument, see Sklair, Globalization (fn. 1), pp. 287 – 290. 33 Useem, The Inner Circle (fn. 4). 34 Philip M. Stern, The Best Congress Money Can Buy, New York 1988; G. William Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance? Case Studies on Policy Making in America, Hawthorne (NY) 1996; Martin Tolchin / Susan Tolchin, Buying into America, Washington D. C. 1993.

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that is probably even more widespread in countries where there is less public scrutiny of such relationships. Empirical research also confirms the important thesis that the corporate sector is well-represented in the higher non-elective offices of state by those who return to the corporations after their periods of public service.35 While there have been several impressive contributions to the literature on government-business relations in capitalist countries there has been little research specifically on the relationships between transnational corporation executives and direct political power.36 Capitalist politicians, and others in non-capitalist parties, like the globalizing bureaucrats, have been increasingly persuaded that their “national interests” lie in the accelerated growth of the global economy through unfettered competition and free trade and that the only way ahead lies in a more or less extreme version of transnational neo-liberalism.37 As politicians, necessarily responsive to the often contradictory vested interests of a variety of constituencies, members of this group rarely adopt a fully-fledged version of the emergent global nationalism of the globalizing bureaucrats. They are characterized more by a rich cultural mix, often reflecting regional factors, especially within federal systems of government. However, at base, they share to a greater or lesser extent the orthodoxies of a globalizing neo-liberalism against the localizing tendencies of their opponents. The focus on globalizing bureaucrats highlights the struggles that take place within all states between the outward-oriented globalizers and the inward-oriented nationalists.38 Different state actors, thus, can be powerful forces both for and against globalization. Struggles between them are expressed in a variety of ways (more or less liberal or restrictive foreign investment regimes and trade policy, official multiculturalism or chauvinism) and through a variety of institutional forms (more or less intrusive foreign economic relations agencies, more or less powerful inter-governmental agencies). 35 Scott, Sociology of Elites (fn. 23), Vol. 1: The Study of Elites; G. William Domhoff (ed.), Power Structure Research, London 1980. 36 The major exceptions are network studies of various types, for example: Domhoff, Power Structure Research (fn. 35); Domhoff, State Autonomy (fn. 34); Useem, The Inner Circle (fn. 4) and Mizruchi / Schwartz, Intercorporate Relations (fn. 23). The related issue of high level corporate executives who actually wield direct political power, as in the prominent cases of Berlusconi in Italy and the ‘Gazprom connection’ in Russia, suggests further fruitful areas of inquiry. 37 Overbeek, Restructuring Hegemony (fn. 16). 38 Robinson has argued that it is necessary to distinguish “nation-state” centrism from “state” centrism and that global system theory needs a fourth set of transnational practices, namely transnational state practices. See William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, Cambridge 1996, pp. 367 f. While I appreciate this point, I still maintain that the only way to avoid state-centrism, which I believe is fatal to any genuine theory of globalization, is to conceptualize the political in terms of the transnational capitalist class. Transnational state practices are the business of globalizing state bureaucrats not the state as such. The struggle between globalizing and localizing state bureaucrats, then, becomes a key site in which the hegemony of the transnational capitalist class is mediated.

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While the major international organizations (notably World Bank, IMF, OECD, World Trade Organization) are still mainly driven by representatives of their most powerful members, it is less clear that, for example, the World Bank can be said to be driven by the “national interests” of the USA. For example, in his detailed account of the life and work of the first President of the World Bank, Robert W. Oliver comments that George Woods was a “New York banker, not a Washington bureaucrat”39, the implication being that bankers, unlike bureaucrats, are driven largely by the profit motive.40 The old Marxist argument that the workers have no nation has to be turned on its head; today globalizing capitalists have no nation and the demands of the global market, not national interests drive the global capitalist system while the working class and the labor movement that purports to represent it, calls on “its” state, politicians and business leaders to protect it against the ravages of globalization. The growth of powerful regional trading blocs like NAFTA, the European Union, and APEC, far from undermining this argument, point to the increasing weakness of nation-states to cope alone with the globalizing agenda. Globalizing bureaucrats fulfil a governance function for the global capitalist system at the local, national, interstate and eventually global levels where individual states are not directly involved. Typically, these people are to be found dealing with or actually working in national, regional and local growth coalitions led by corporate investment; national bureaucracies responsible for external economic relations (exports, FDI in both directions, market-driven aid agencies), and international organizations. The top ranks of the globalizing bureaucracies combine career bureaucrats with retired corporate executives putting their marketing skills to use “in the public service” and the upwardly mobile en route to top TNC jobs.41 Remuneration in the public sector is considerably less than in the TNC sector, except in cases where corruption permits illegal enrichment.42 Salaries and perks for most government employees in most countries appear to be relatively modest in comparison with those in the private corporate sector, however there are frequent opportunities for augmenting earnings from directorships, fees, and other sources, if not concurrently then almost certainly later for senior officials. While public serRobert W. Oliver, George Woods and the World Bank, Boulder (CO) 1995, p. 187. I maintain this, despite the apparent U.S.-Japanese conflict of interest over World Bank policies as analyzed by Robert Wade, Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective, in: New Left Review No. I / 217 (1996), pp. 3 – 36. While Wade makes many telling points, he neglects to consider the argument that it is not the interests of the U.S. and Japanese states that were at issue but the interests of different sectors of big capital as represented by various agents (notably globalizing bureaucrats) in the U.S. and Japan. The doyen of Japanese progressive economists in a chapter on “The march of corporate capitalism” sees a definite “globalization trend” in Japan. See Shigetsu Tsuru, Japan’s Capitalism: Creative Defeat and Beyond, Cambridge 1993, pp. 192 – 204. 41 David Kowalewski / Thomas Letko / Robin Leonard, Revolving Doors, Corporate Performance, and Corruption of Markets, in: Critical Sociology 18 (1991), 1, pp. 93 – 108. 42 This is, of course, not restricted to the poorest parts of the world, as cases involving corporations in the USA, Europe, Japan and South Korea clearly illustrate. 39 40

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vice rules sometimes restrict outside earnings, these do not last forever and they do not cover all the privileges that such positions engender.43 Globalizing bureaucrats frequently move to the business sector, working directly for the corporations whose interests they may have been indirectly serving (or impeding) as public employees. The agencies globalizing bureaucrats work for are, in a sense, their political organizations and in many countries particular local and national government agencies can be identified with, for example, open-door policies, that further the interests of the global capitalist class (whoever else’s interests they may also further). Globalizing bureaucrats also work politically through corporatist agencies that combine representatives of the state, business and labor.44 These agencies, particularly those with regulatory functions, are often dominated by big business. The culture and ideology of state and private sector globalizing bureaucrats tend to be more complex than those of TNC executives. Their dominant ideology appears to be in a process of transformation from state interventionism to a neo-liberalism which privileges the unrestricted operation of the free market. This is the world-view that a country’s best interests are to be found in playing a full part in the accelerated growth of the global economy through unfettered competition by destroying old systems of tariff protection and labor regulation and forcing all firms and their workers to become internationally competitive. The neo-liberal dogma that this can only be fully achieved in an entirely market-driven system provides the economic theory for this strategy.45 The ideology is reinforced daily by cultural practices cohering into what can be termed an emergent global nationalism, a nationalism that seeks to make each country an integral part of the global capitalist system while maintaining its identity by marketing national competitive advantages of various types through its own global brands (American fast foods and entertainment, Japanese cars and electronics, French wines and perfumes, Italian furniture, for example) and tourism (now the most important hard currency earning industry in an increasing number of local and national economies).46 43 Since the substantial wave of de-nationalizations and quasi-privatizations of state-owned enterprises from the 1980s to the present all over the world, a new category of corporate executives has been created. These are often the same people who ran the state-owned enterprises, and their links with the TCC will repay further study. 44 See M. Tolchin / S. Tolchin, Buying into America (fn. 34), on these in city, state and federal governments in the USA and my own discussions of other parts of the world: Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (fn. 1); Sklair, Globalization (fn. 1), passim. 45 It is worth noting the contradiction for globalizing bureaucrats implicit in another dogma of neo-liberalism, that the state should basically never intervene in the economy, and the key role of globalizing bureaucrats in the struggle between capital and labor, invariably favoring big business, in many if not all countries. 46 Brian Wallis shows how art is used to “sell nations” through major exhibitions on Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey. See Brian Wallis, Selling Nations, in: Art in America 79 (1991), 9, pp. 85 – 91. The latter coincided with the ending of a ban on imported cigarettes, permitting

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3. Globalizing professionals Top business professionals, notably corporate lawyers and consultants, command substantial salaries in most countries and it is safe to assume that some of these individuals derive other benefits from the companies with which they routinely do business. These professionals, as a group, have attracted a good deal of attention in recent years. This is largely due to the growth of two phenomena which, while not exclusive to the era of globalization, have accelerated rapidly since the 1960s. These are, first, the business services industries, ranging from information technology to management consulting, financial services and public relations of various types47 and, second, the rise of the think tanks, particularly those associated with the neo-liberal free trade and free enterprise agendas.48 The dominant elites in these institutions are among the most visible members of the TCC. They are organized politically in their own professional organizations, in the corporatist organizations noted above and in think tanks and universities, where they market more or less research-based information and policy to corporations and governments. As they are largely funded by government departments, transnational corporations and private capitalists, their independence is often a matter of dispute. The culture and ideology of these professionals is a complex mix of global nationalism and neo-liberalism. The global networks of business consultants like Arthur Anderson and McKinsey, and Burson-Marsteller, the largest public relations firm in the world, contain many individuals who have worked in business services, government advisory bodies, major corporations, think tanks and sometimes several at the same time. These organizations are of particular interest insofar as some of them have been identified with the propagation of the neo-liberal agenda.49 While the new right thinks tanks are not excessively well-endowed financially, by targeting elite opinion they have much more influence than their modest resources would indicate. They certainly provide a professional forum for both aspiring young and retiring older members of the TCC which is both culturally and ideologically hospitable. What I have termed capitalist-inspired politicians and professionals are certainly working on the front line for the corporate elite. Another context in which globalizing professionals service the interests of capital is as members of what William M. Evan calls International Scientific and Prothe expansion of Philip Morris, a major exhibition sponsor, into Turkey. The marketing of cities is also of great relevance here. See Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class and Contemporary Architecture (fn. 1). 47 Yair Aharoni (ed.), Coalitions and Competition: The Globalization of Professional Business Services, London 1993. 48 Irvine Alpert / Ann Markusen, Think Tanks and Capitalist Policy, in: Domhoff, Power Structure Research (fn. 35), chapter 7; Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: ThinkTanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931 – 1983, London 1995. 49 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable (fn. 48).

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fessional Associations (ISPAs)50 and Peter M. Haas, rather more conceptually, epistemic communities.51 Clearly not all of these are capitalist or globalizing, perhaps most of the leaders of these Associations or communities are hostile to global capitalism, but there is enough evidence of the corroding effects of the corporate sponsorship of research, commercially-motivated networking and academic institution building to suggest that even the most epistemic of communities find themselves from time to time being persuaded of the correctness or relevance of the corporate case for other than strictly cognitive reasons. If these professionals, mainly scientists of various types, can be mobilized in defence of the projects of big business and global capitalism, the impact on public opinion can be considerable.52 4. Consumerist elites (merchants and media) Consumerist elites are generally TNC executives, but they are so important for global consumerist capitalism that they require special treatment. Like other TNC executives, their economic base is in salaries and share capital and their culture and ideology is a cohesive culture-ideology of consumerism. However, the specificity of the members of the media elite lies in their political organization, more specifically their means of political expression through the TV and radio networks, newspapers, magazines and other mass media they own and control. The retail sector, particularly the ubiquitous shopping malls that are springing up all over the world, can in this sense be regarded analytically as part of the mass media. Through the medium of advertising the links between media and merchants and the entire marketing system (raw materials, design, production, packaging, financing, transportation, wholesaling, retailing, disposal) become concrete. In the apparently inexorable increase in the global connectedness of the mass media and consumerism we can chart the ways in which the TCC appears gradually to be imposing its hegemony all over the world. Global system theory argues that consumerist elites play a central role in capitalist hegemony. The practical politics of this hegemony is the everyday life of consumer society and the promise that it can be reality for most people in the world. This is certainly the most persistent image projected by television and the mass media in general. In one sense, therefore, shopping is the most successful social movement, product advertising in its many forms the most successful message, consumerism the most successful ideology of all time.53 William M. Evan, Knowledge and Power in a Global Society, London 1981. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, in: International Organization 46 (1992), 1, pp. 1 – 35. 52 For the role of the epistemic community of scientists working for the tobacco industry and in “green” business see Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class and Global Capitalism (fn. 1); Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (fn. 1), chapter 7–good examples of the TCC in action. 50 51

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Like capitalism, the process of taking the purchase of necessities of consumption out of local marketplaces, redefining this as shopping and relocating it increasingly into the more controlled environments of supermarkets and malls, did not just happen. The transformation of the built environment and of the renegotiation of the meaning of shopping from satisfaction of basic needs for the masses into a form of mass entertainment, a major leisure activity, is one of the greatest achievements of global capitalism. This transformation has been achieved in an amazing variety of ways, from advocacy advertising where large corporations take out expensive adverts to persuade people of the virtues of free enterprise54 to the “commercialized classroom”55, from advertorials where sponsors pay for insertions that look like editorial content in the mass media56 to “the ultimate capital investment”, i. e. strategic philanthropy.57 Advertising agencies have for some time been surveying the global consumer58 and extending the geographical scope of their regular global brand preference rankings. The point of the concept of the culture-ideology of consumerism is precisely that, under capitalism, the masses cannot be relied upon to keep buying, obviously when they have neither spare cash nor access to credit, and less obviously when they do have spare cash and access to credit. The creation of a culture-ideology of consumerism, therefore, is bound up with the self-imposed necessity that capitalism must be ever-expanding on a global scale. This expansion crucially depends on selling more and more goods and services to people whose basic needs (a somewhat ideological term) have already been comfortably met as well as to those whose basic needs are unmet. Consumerist elites play a part in the regular business groups in most countries and globally, but they also have dedicated organizations for their own purposes. Through their ownership and control of TV channels, radio stations, newspapers, magazine and book publishers, advertising agencies, public relations firms, film and video production and distribution networks, shopping centres and other retail 53 Jon Goss, The “Magic of the Mall”: An Analysis of Form, Function, and Meaning in the Contemporary Retail Built Environment, in: Annals of the Association of American Geographers 83 (1993), 1, pp. 18 – 47. 54 S. Prakash Sethi, Advocacy Advertising and Large Corporations, Lexington 1977. 55 Holley Knaus, The Commercialized Classroom, in: Multinational Monitor 14 (1992), 3, pp. 14 – 16. 56 Patricia A. Stout / Gary B. Wilcox / Lorrie Greer, Trends in Magazine Advertorial Use, in: Journalism Quarterly 66 (1989), 4, pp. 960 – 964. 57 Ann Kyle, The Ultimate Capital Investment, in: California Business, 01. 07. 1990, pp. 36 – 41. For a useful Japanese perspective on this issue, see “Corporate Philanthropy”, in: Tokyo Business Today, May 1990, pp. 30 – 34. This item has an interesting list of Japanese corporate donations to universities, a theme that G. William Domhoff, Michael Useem and others discuss for the U.S. and the U.K. For the case of tobacco industry philanthropy, see Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class and Global Capitalism (fn. 1). 58 Basil G. Englis (ed.), Global and Multinational Advertising, Hillsdale (NJ) 1994.

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outlets, they broadcast and narrowcast the culture-ideology of consumerism as the normal environment of everyday life for the vast majority of people in the First World, and increasingly over most of the rest of the world. The global project of capitalist consumerism would not be possible without them, which is precisely the reason why the processes of globalization date from the 1960s onwards, paralleling the technological revolutions that made modern mass media possible. So, in a fundamental sense, the TV channels and mass newspapers and magazines of those who control the media have the same general form as the political organizations of the rest of the TNC executives, with the dramatic and power-enhancing difference that there is a massive ready-made and apparently receptive audience for the messages that they wish to propagate. In order to understand how the TCC organizes itself it is necessary to examine the central problem of class rule in capitalist society: how to ensure the continuation of the private accumulation of profit. All ruling classes in all social systems not characterized by pure democracy have to ensure their power to sustain the normal processes of interaction. So, police forces, courts of law, armies, Gods (religious and / or secular), super-ego, posterity and other mechanisms of social control play their part to defend the integrity of the social system, to permit accommodation to change, and even (on occasion) to ensure the success of unavoidable revolutions in human affairs. While all ruling classes have a siege mentality to a greater or lesser extent, which explains why they have armies and police forces and other agents of physical and social control, there are two specific reasons why the siege mentality of the TCC (or, more accurately, its immediate predecessors) is particularly sensitive. First, the old ideological certainties of the divine rights of kings, emperors, gods, and sacred texts have, of course, seriously diminished in the twentieth century; second, the rise of democratic polities of various kinds in recent decades have exposed ruling classes all over the world to much more public scrutiny, though rarely effective democratic control, than ever before.59 The theoretical-historical foundations of this argument and line of research originate in Antonio Gramsci’s attempt to construct a theory of hegemony and ideological state apparatuses.60 Much of the voluminous Prison Notebooks written from 1929 to 1935 can be read as a continuous critique of the assumption, not difficult to gather from the Marx-Engels classics, that ruling classes generally rule effortlessly until revolutionary upsurges drive them from power and make everything anew. As many scholars, inspired by, sympathetic with and hostile to Marxism have pointed out, the general impression of the Marxist classics is of a rather deterministic sociology, a theory in which men make history but not in circumstances of their own choosing, where the emphasis is on the latter rather than the former. 59 While it is generally agreed that global capitalism delivers more genuine democracy and rule of law than any other large-scale system yet put into practice, the level of cynicism about actually-existing democracies appears to be growing all over the world. 60 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, London 1971.

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It is no accident that Gramsci is associated both with a more cultural and less deterministic interpretation of Marxism and with the concept of hegemony, for they do connect. Gramsci made the connection through the role of the intellectuals in the creation and sustenance of hegemonic forms for the ruling class. He argues: The hegemony of a directive centre over the intellectuals asserts itself by two principal routes: (1) a general conception of life, a philosophy ( . . . ) which offers to its adherents an intellectual “dignity” providing a principle of differentiation from the old ideologies which dominated by coercion, and an element of struggle against them; (2) a scholastic program, an educative principle and original pedagogy which interests that fraction of the intellectuals which is the most homogenous and the most numerous (the teachers, from the primary teachers to the university professors), and gives them an activity of their own in the technical field.61 While much of this still seems quite valid, it suggests too much of a one-way process, the “directive centre” asserting its hegemony over the intellectuals. Research on intellectuals suggests a more dialectical process where distinct groups of intellectuals, inspired by the promise or actual achievements of global capitalism articulate what they perceive to be its essential purposes and strategies, often with support and encouragement from the corporate elites and their friends in government and other spheres, particularly the media. For example, Richard Cockett shows how about fifty intellectuals of various types in the UK carried out an antiKeynesian neo-liberal counter revolution from the 1930s to the eventual triumphs of Thatcher-Reaganism in the 1980s.62 This is not an idealist account of social change in which the power of ideas eventually turns the tide but, on the contrary, a much more subtle argument in which the bearers of powerful ideas which have few powerful adherents work away until the material forces begin to change in their direction (the crises of capitalism and state power in the 1970s feeding the widespread disillusionment with Keynesian and welfare state solutions to these crises and the legitimation crisis in general). Enter Gramsci, again. “A ‘crisis of authority’ is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the state.”63 Gramsci, writing in the 1930s from a fascist prison, saw the latest ‘crisis of hegemony’ resulting from the First World War and the Communist advances since then and would undoubtedly have seen the next crisis of hegemony for international capitalism resulting from the Second World War. Since then, theories of capitalist crisis (fiscal crisis of the state, Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (fn. 60), pp. 103 f. [written in 1934]. Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable (fn. 48), p. 306, says that “the internationalization of the work of the British ‘think-tanks’ was one of the most extraordinary features of economic liberalism as it developed in the 1980s” but discusses the issue only in passing. For a more comprehensive, though less systematic, account see M. Patricia Marchak, The Integrated Circus: the New Right and the Restructuring of Global Markets, Montreal 1991, who argues that many in the new right are very suspicious of corporate capitalism. 63 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (fn. 60), p. 210. 61 62

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crisis of welfare, crisis of de-industrialization, the environmental crisis are just a few of the contenders) have been articulated from all sides. These have generally been seen as crises which need global as well as national solutions.64 The collapse of communism and capitalist triumphalism, paradoxically, has increased the pressures on the capitalist system to solve all the problems of the contemporary world, quickly and globally. My argument is that the global capitalist project is gaining ground as the emerging solution to all these crises and, as befits a hegemonic crisis of the first order, the solution is a new conception of global hegemony, “in other words, the possibility and necessity of creating a new culture”.65 But while Gramsci was thinking of a new socialist order, for the post-communist period this raises the prospect of an “emerging supranational corporate agenda”66 or “transnational neo-liberalism”.67 The devastation of the 1970s’ oil shocks, the subsequent debt crises, corporate restructuring and downsizing (the race to the bottom) and the apparent inability of politicians to deal with these problems in any way other than short-term palliatives, suggests that the local effects of globalization increase the pressures on the transnational capitalist class to deliver what the culture-ideology of consumerism promises, more private possessions leading to better and happier lives for all. However, the pressure is usually refracted through the political system and the attempts of governments to get to grips with the problems of unemployment, deskilling, job insecurity, international competitiveness, law and order, immigration and emigration, multiculturalism. The culture-ideology of consumerism raises expectations that can be satisfied in at least two ways: redistribution of resources (this tends to be the social-democratic localizing solution) and / or increasing the size of the cake to be distributed (the neo-liberal globalizing solution). An unwelcome result of the Thatcher-Reagan neo-liberal experiments in the UK and US and copied widely throughout the world, has been the absolute enrichment of some combined with the relative impoverishment or economic stagnation of many more in rich and poor countries alike.68 This has produced an arrogant over-confidence in the over-privileged and a sometimes violent, sometimes fatalist reaction in the under-privileged. This is, of course, not the first time this has happened. The corporate elite has commonly and with good reason felt insecure, particularly in the foreign countries where they do business, whether from physical asRobert J. S. Ross / Kent C. Trachte, Global Capitalism: the New Leviathan, Albany 1990. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (fn. 60), p. 276 [written in 1930]. 66 Ranney, Labor (fn. 17). 67 Overbeek, Restructuring Hegemony (fn. 16). 68 Robert C. Feenstra argued in the American Economic Review that the real wages of less-skilled workers in the U.S. have fallen dramatically since the late 1970s. This was true for many other countries then, and still is in many cases. See Robert C. Feenstra, Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality, in: American Economic Review 86 (1996), 2, pp. 240 – 245. 64 65

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sault69 or expropriation70. Though both phenomena appear to have declined in the past decades, it is not very surprising that TNCs have routinely taken pre-emptive action to put their case before the public and the authorities with whom they have to deal. For reasons which cannot be dealt with here, big business tends to be unpopular and its claims tend to be treated with a high degree of cynicism, so it often resorts to indirect ways of creating support for its causes and influencing public policy on behalf of its sectional interests.71 One of the most important ideological tasks of big business is to persuade the population at large that the business of society is business and to create a climate of opinion in which trade unions and radical oppositions (especially consumer and environmental movements) are considered to be sectional interests while business groups are not. This is, of course, a large part of the creation and maintenance of global capitalist (I would add, consumerist) hegemony. There is a good deal of agreement among scholars that (as Communist Parties used to do in countries where they were illegal or circumscribed) big business often creates front organizations to propagate its messages. Many apparently straightforward civic organizations are largely run by and funded by the corporate elite.72 Most of the research on these phenomena has been carried out on business groups in the USA and most focuses on the ways in which big business, both domestic73 and foreign74, influences the US government and its various state apparatuses to legislate in the interests of capital. In Latin America the case of the Chicago boys in Chile (and elsewhere) is well-known, and one study of this comes to the measured conclusion: “available data reveal that policymakers have mainly interacted with the leadership of a few carefully selected conglomerates”.75 Thomas N. Gladwin / Ingo Walter, Multinationals under Fire, New York 1980. Michael S. Minor, The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy: 1980 – 1992, in: Journal of International Business Studies 25 (1994), 1, pp. 177 – 188. 71 Peter Dreier, Capitalists vs. the Media: an Analysis of an Ideological Mobilization among Business Leaders, in: Media, Culture and Society 4 (1982), 2, pp. 111 – 132; Andrew Rowell, Green Backlash: Global Subversion of the Environmental Movement, London 1996. 72 Radical publications like Multinational Monitor and others associated with the name of Ralph Nader in the USA frequently ‘expose’ such organizations. Rowell, Green Backlash (fn. 71), demonstrates this globally for the environmental field. William T. Poole used similar evidence to argue, paradoxically, that “Big Business Bankrolls the Left”. See William T. Poole, How Big Business Bankrolls the Left, in: National Review, 10th March 1989, pp. 34 – 39. 73 Mike H. Ryan / Carl L. Swanson / Rongene A. Buchholz, Corporate Strategy, Public Policy and the Fortune 500: How America’s Major Corporations Influence Government, Oxford 1987; Domhoff, State Autonomy (fn. 34). 74 M. Tolchin / S. Tolchin, Buying into America (fn. 34). 75 Eduardo Silva, From Dictatorship to Democracy: The Business-State Nexus in Chile’s Economic Transformation, 1975 – 1994, in: Comparative Politics 28 (1996), 3, pp. 299 – 320, here p. 316. On South Korea see also Ku-Hyun Jung, Business-Government Relations in the Growth of Korean Business Groups, in: Korean Social Science Journal 14 (1988), 1, pp. 67 – 82; on Asia: Andrew J. MacIntyre (ed.), Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, Ithaca (NY) 1994. 69 70

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There have been many excellent studies documenting and analyzing this phenomenon in recent decades, notably on the Council on Foreign Relations76 and its French equivalent77, on the Business Roundtable78, on business leaders in government79, on the Trilateral Commission80. Domhoff makes the case for a pervasive corporate ruling class whose organizations steer the state in various policy directions.81 These findings from research on the USA have been replicated to some extent by research from other countries.82 This fragility at the core of capitalism, the problem of business, is best illustrated in the heartland of capitalist hegemony, the USA. In the 1970s, corporations in the USA deliberately sought “to reverse a dramatic decline in public confidence in big business which they blame on the media”.83 To do this, business mobilized through think tanks, university business journalism courses, awards and prizes to encourage more favorable reporting, detente between business and media, and advocacy advertising and increased TV sponsorship of culture. An important addition to Dreier’s list is the development of “Business Ethics” both as an area of academic research84 and as a set of responses for big business under threat, elegantly exposed in, appropriately enough, an article in Propaganda Review by Luigi Graziano.85 76 Laurence H. Shoup / William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy, New York 1977. 77 G. William Domhoff, Provincial in Paris: Finding the French Council on Foreign Relations, in: Social Policy March / April 1981, pp. 5 – 13. 78 Burch, The Business Roundtable (fn. 28). 79 Michael Useem, Which Business Leaders Help Govern, in: Domhoff, Power Structure Research (fn. 35), chapter 8. 80 Holly Sklar (ed.), Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management, Boston (Mass.) 1980; Gill, American Hegemony (fn. 11). 81 Domhoff, State Autonomy (fn. 34). 82 Scott, Sociology of Elites (fn. 23); E. Silva, From Dictatorship to Democracy (fn. 75). 83 Dreier, Capitalists vs. the Media (fn. 71), p. 111. 84 John Tsalikis and David J. Fritzsche identify over 300 sources. See John Tsalikis / David J. Fritzsche, Business Ethics: A Literature Review with a Focus on Marketing Ethics, in: Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989), 9, pp. 695 – 743. 85 Luigi Graziano, How Business Ethics became “Issues Management”, in: Propaganda Review (Summer) 1989, pp. 29 – 31. Anti-big business sentiment has existed in the U.S. and elsewhere since at least the 19th century. See Louis Galambos, The Public Image of Big Business in America, 1880 – 1940: A Quantitative Study in Social Change, Baltimore 1975; Steven L. Piott, The Anti-Monopoly Persuasion. Popular Resistance to the Rise of Big Business in the Midwest, Westport 1985. See also the envy-based polemic of Ludwig von Mises, The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality, Princeton (NJ) 1956. As early as the 1980s, Seymour M. Lipset / William Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind, New York 1983, argued that the major institutions (business, labor and government) all suffered from a “confidence gap” in the USA. For the view of a still influential capitalist ideologue, see Ayn Rand, America’s Persecuted Minority: Big Business, in: Ayn Rand (ed.), Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, New York 1967, pp. 44 – 62. An excellent collection of recent radical research on corporate spin is William Dinan / David Miller (eds.), Thinker, Faker, Spinner, Spy: Corporate PR and the Assault on Democracy, London 2007, and their website: www.spinwatch.org.

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The reason for all this activity is that the capitalist class always faces the threat of challenge from below. No doubt at some periods, in the USA and elsewhere, big business is more and at other periods less popular than at others, but the point is that capitalist hegemony needs constant support, attention and originality to sustain it.86 This is no less true for capitalism in the global compared with the national context. The parallel developments of cheap global mass media and substantial increases in various forms of global business relations (FDI, strategic alliances, global brands, executive and professional cross-border flows) are simultaneous indicators of the unprecedented global reach of contemporary capitalism and the global exposure of its promises and performance. If the preceding analysis has provided evidence that a TCC is emerging and is beginning to act as a global ruling class in some spheres, it remains necessary to show concretely how this class is related to the crises of global capitalism. I identify two key crises around the central issue of the culture-ideology of consumerism. The first, the economic crisis, deepens as the gap between the richest and the poorest widens locally and globally; the second, the ecological crisis, intensifies with ever-increasing threats to the health and wellbeing of the planet and its inhabitants.

IV. Case Studies In three related case studies I have attempted to demonstrate how and why the TCC has managed to defend itself, prosper and organize to assure its future through its transnational class linkages and its imaginative use of the culture-ideology of consumerism. 1. Tobacco industry The first case study focuses on the TCC in the tobacco industry,87 an industry that presents challenges both theoretically and empirically to the thesis presented here. Theoretically, the power of even a relatively unified transnational capitalist class is threatened by legal restrictions on the advertising, sale and use of tobacco products. Real curbs on the freedom of tobacco companies to advertise their wares wherever and whenever they wish, and a growing move to ban smoking in public places in many countries, restrictions that apply to very few legal products, suggest that the unity implied by the concept of the TCC, and thus the concept itself, are flawed. Recent anti-smoking legislation has led some to believe that the global tobacco industry is on its last legs. However, this has not happened. Though revenues 86 Evidence from other countries on the opposition to big business and capitalist hegemony can be gleaned from the general social movements literature. In an informative book on Australia, Bob Browning claimed that the left is organized in an anti-business global network, a common and not unreasonable claim of capitalist-inspired ideologues. See Bob Browning, The Network: A Guide to Anti-Business Pressure Groups, Victoria 1990. 87 See Sklair, Transnational Capitalist Class and Global Capitalism (fn. 1).

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have not shown very much growth in recent years, annual profits of the Big Four tobacco companies – Altria (formerly Philip Morris), Japan Tobacco, BAT, and Altadis (formerly Imperial Tobacco) – have generally been healthy. According to the Fortune Global 500 listings in 2007, they grew by about 11 percent, 206 percent, 60 percent, and 39 percent respectively between 2005 and 2006. The evidence over the last two decades suggests that, far from challenging the concept of the TCC, analysis of those who own and control the tobacco industry provides telling evidence for the existence of a transnational capitalist class and shows that its members continue to play an important role in serving the interests of global capitalism through building the economic power of their corporations, the political power of their industry and the culture-ideology of consumerism. Members of the tobacco industry corporate elite connect with government through recruitment of globalizing politicians and bureaucrats: all major tobacco corporations have such people on their boards. It is inconceivable that these individuals cut off all their previous connections and expertise in government when they sit on the boards of the tobacco companies. Indeed, announcements of such appointments frequently make direct reference to this expertise as the rationale for the appointment. The same can be said for globalizing professionals and consumerist elites, and the presence of individuals like Rupert Murdoch (News International) and Richard Parsons (Time Warner) on the board of Philip Morris clearly illustrates this connection. While the analysis of the network of board members in any corporation cannot be said to be definitive, it is suggestive. What it suggests in this case is that the corporate elite in the tobacco industry is part of a TCC, drawn from a wide spectrum of prestigious institutions, interlinking the corporate and the non-corporate worlds. The major corporations have a network of connections from the corporate centre through joint ventures, strategic alliances and other business links to local and national government agencies and the people who run them, to the advertising and media industries, to the retail and entertainment sectors and many other social spheres (particularly those who come to rely on their largesse for sponsorship money) wherever they do business in the world. Globalizing politicians, bureaucrats, and professionals have long been friendly to the tobacco industry, very few have taken the real risk of public and militant opposition to it. The reasons are obvious: the tobacco lobby is rich, well-organized and well-connected in most countries, there are many more smokers than militant anti-smokers (even in countries where smoking is banned in public spaces), and those who stand for public office or who depend on the state or the business community for their prosperity generally avoid antagonizing such interests. The major exceptions to this rule in the case of the tobacco industry are those public health officials and medical researchers who have campaigned against the health risks since the 1960s (the major medical associations have mostly come off the fence on the issue), those anti-smoking politicians whose secure electoral bases have saved them from the revenge of the industry (for example, US President Bill Clinton in 1996, though some tobacco money went to the Democrats too), and those lawyers

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who have taken on the task of suing the tobacco corporations for destroying the health of their clients (often on a “no win – no fee” basis). This certainly appears to be a formidable coalition, but in the context of the majority of local and national politicians who stay neutral and all those professionals working directly and indirectly for the smoking interests – lawyers, advertisers, business consultants, industry-funded medical researchers – the sides look less evenly matched. It is also important to balance out the picture of smokers under continual social pressures to give up or to indulge their habit in private rather than public spaces, with the continuing actual and iconic presence of the cigarette in most societies. Actually, there are very few countries where non-smoking regulations are strictly enforced. In the USA, where the anti-smoking movement has gone furthest, although there are widespread advertising bans in the media, characters still smoke in films, plays, photographs, and other representational forms, and this shows little signs of decreasing. The sight of small groups of smokers, huddled together outside buildings, is now common in many countries, no doubt for some people adding to rather than detracting from the attraction of the habit. The key issue is the extent to which anti-smoking politicians, bureaucrats, and professionals have been able to stop cigarettes being marketed, sold, and smoked. Laws and the enforcement of laws on the advertising, sale and consumption of cigarettes vary from country to country and sometimes from city to city. However, available evidence suggests that while advertising restrictions and, to a lesser extent, restrictions on where people can smoke, have gradually been introduced all over the world, the production of cigarettes is still increasing in many markets and, more significantly, the sales of the major global brands have been increasing faster than other brands. Most of this increase has been in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. The promotional culture of smoking is a good example of the transnational capitalist class in action. 2. Ecological crisis My second case focuses on how the TCC has responded to one of the greatest planetary challenges of our age, ecological crisis. Building on Gramsci’s concept of historical blocs I have argued that we can analyze how the transnational capitalist class captured the environmentalist movement by establishing what I have termed the sustainable development historical bloc.88 In 1991 (28th October), Advertising Age, the leading advertising magazine in the USA (and probably the world) listed the connections between the hundred leading national advertisers and environmental groups, detailing cash donations and promotional programs. This text demonstrated how deep the commercial dependence of local environmental groups on the corporate sector was in the USA. The trend has continued to grow since the 1990s and it has not been confined to the USA. The extent to which local, 88

See Sklair, Transnational Capitalist Class (fn. 1), chapter 7.

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grass-roots environmentalist groups can resist the trend to corporate environmentalism and stay out of the sustainable development historical bloc is clearly a very fruitful topic for research. The sustainable development historical bloc was based on the alliances that were forged between members of the transnational capitalist class and their representative organization, and the four groups that make up the transnational environmentalist elite – transnational environmental organization executives and their local affiliates, globo-localizing green bureaucrats, green politicians and professionals, and green media and merchants. The relations between these four groups and the four fractions of the transnational capitalist class can be fruitfully analyzed within the context of global capitalism’s class polarization and ecological crises. While some leading figures in the transnational environmental elite had strong records of criticism and political organization against global capitalism on class and ecological issues, the connections between transnational environmental organizations’ (TEO) executives, international organizations (particularly agencies of the UN), and TNCs (and other capitalist global organizations) certainly increased in the 1990s and continues to increase.89 Although the revolving door between transnational corporations and the green movement may not be as marked as that between the TNCs and state agencies, channels of communication have grown rapidly. By the 1990s most environmental lawyers worked for corporations, not for the NGOs that the original environmental lawyers created to sue the corporations for environmental crimes. The four fractions of the transnational environmental elite, including elements within traditional ‘back to nature’ and ‘conservation’ movements that previously spoke for and nurtured the environment, were transformed as a consequence of the relentless insertion of the whole world into the global capitalist system. It remains an open question whether and to what extent the global environmental elite can mount an effective challenge to protect and enhance environmental, let alone ecological, interests in the face of the unrestrained expansionism and resource profligacy that is inherent to the global capitalist project. The flowing rhetoric of socalled ‘green big business’ contrasts vividly with the everyday reality of businessas-usual, and the feeble political responses of globalizing politicians and bureaucrats to a widely acknowledged ecological crisis in the major democracies let alone the rest of the world, is strong evidence for the continued existence of TCC control over the sustainable development historical bloc. One shudders to think what future generations will make of this period of history if, indeed, there is a long-term future for humanity and the planet.

89 Leslie Sklair, Global Sociology and Global Environmental Change, in: Michael Redclift / Ted Benton (eds.), Social Theory and the Global Environment, London 1994, chapter 10.

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3. Contemporary architecture My current research focuses on contemporary architecture and the built environment in terms of the four fractions of the transnational capitalist class.90 In architecture, those who own and / or and control the major transnational corporations and their local affiliates (the corporate fraction) are the people who own and / or control the major architectural, architecture-engineering and architecture-developer real estate firms. They are of two, minimally overlapping, types: first, the biggest of these firms, and second, the most celebrated and famous architectural firms. In comparison with major global corporations they are small (to gain entry to the Fortune Global 500 requires revenues of more than $10 billion while in architecture the largest firms have revenues of a few hundred million dollars). Few of the top 50 architectural firms are led by iconic architects or build iconic buildings. The cultural importance of celebrated architects, especially in cities, far outweighs their relative lack of financial and corporate muscle. Globalizing politicians and bureaucrats (state fraction) are the politicians and bureaucrats at all level of administrative power and responsibility, in communities, cities, states and international and global institutions who serve the interests of capitalist globalization as well as or in opposition to those who elect or appoint them. In the field of architecture and urban development they decide what gets built where and how changes to the built environment are regulated. They are particularly important for issues of preservation and urban planning, and in competitions for major projects, many of which result in the creation of what are known as architectural icons.91 Globalizing professionals (technical fraction) range from those leading technicians centrally involved in the structural features of new building to those responsible for the education of students and the public in architecture who are allied, through choice or circumstance, with globalizing corporations and the agenda of capitalist globalization. Finally, merchants, media and advertising (consumerist fraction) are those responsible for the marketing of architecture in all its manifestations and whose main task is to connect the architecture industry with the culture-ideology of consumerism. The study of the TCC in this context is important because, as well as the aesthetics of buildings and spaces, the specific connections between the four fractions of the TCC and the production and representation of architecture and the built environment are also necessary to understand how this industry and, by implication, our cities work in the global era.

Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class and Contemporary Architecture (fn. 1). See Leslie Sklair, Iconic Architecture and Capitalist Globalization, in: City 10 (2006), 1, pp. 21 – 47. 90 91

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V. Conclusion This paper has attempted to articulate a set of ideas about a global capitalist class and set out a method to study it. This method assumes that those who own and control the most substantial economic resources (principally the transnational corporations) will be in a position to further their interests to an extent and in ways not available to most other groups in society. However, those who run the TNCs cannot achieve their ends alone. They require help from sub-groups, notably consumerist elites, globalizing politicians, bureaucrats, and professionals, to carry out their work effectively. Global system theory offers an explanation of how the ruling class structure of global capitalism works, how the corporate elite crosses local and national boundaries to become a global manifestations of the TCC in action. Communication between the four fractions of the transnational capitalist class is facilitated in a variety of ways, notably interlocking directorates, cross-memberships of groups in different spheres (business, government, politics, professions, media, etc.) and leadership roles of business notables in non-business activities, think tanks, charities, universities, medical, arts and sports foundations and the like. In these ways the idea that the business of society is business is promulgated through all spheres of society with the consequence that non-business activities become more and more commercialized, as can be clearly demonstrated for social services, the arts, sports, science, education and most other spheres of social life. The membership of the TCC illustrates the extent of these interlocks and crossconnections. Further detailed case studies on resource allocation, material rewards, key decisions, institutional changes and agenda-building, would be necessary to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the TCC, globally, really has acted as a class since the 1960s in all these spheres. My contention is that the theory and method outlined here would be of value in such an endeavour. While capitalism increasingly organizes globally, the resistances to global capitalism can only be effective where they can disrupt its smooth running (accumulation of private profits) locally and can find ways of globalizing these disruptions. No social movement appears in the foreseeable future even remotely likely to overthrow the three fundamental institutional supports of global capitalism that have been identified, namely the TNCs, the transnational capitalist class and the culture-ideology of consumerism. Nevertheless, in each of these spheres there are resistances expressed by social movements – in particular the formidable anti-globalization movement that has been emerging since the 1990s – and other anti-globalization elements in the national and local state apparatus of most countries.92 The TNCs, if we are to believe their own propaganda, are continuously beset by opposition, boycott, legal challenge and moral outrage from the consumers of their products and by disruptions from their workers. The transnational capitalist class often finds itself opposed by vocal 92

Smith, Social Movements (fn. 1).

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coalitions when it tries to impose its will. The problem for global capitalism is that each of its economic, political and culture-ideology victories throws up mass movements and small bands of dedicated opponents to challenge its hegemony. The search for alternatives to capitalist globalization is urgent.

Appendix

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List of Authors Marcel Boldorf, PD Dr., Researcher at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany. He is currently working on the project “Wirtschaftliche Führungskräfte in der SBZ / DDR 1945 – 1958”, financed by the DFG. His most recent publications include: L’épuration des élites industrielles en Allemagne de l’Est (1945 – 1952), [The Cleansing of Industrial Elites in East Germany (1945 – 1952)], in: Marc Bergère (ed.), L’épuration économique en France à la Libération [Economic Cleansing in France during the Liberation], Rennes 2008. Christoph Boyer, Dr., Professor of European Contemporary History, University of Salzburg, Austria. Most recent publications: Zwischen Pfadabhängigkeit und Zäsur. Ost- und westeuropäische Sozialstaaten seit den siebziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Konrad H. Jarausch (ed.), Das Ende der Zuversicht? Die siebziger Jahre als Geschichte, Göttingen 2008; Ed. (together with Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Peter Skyba), Deutsche Demokratische Republik 1971 – 1990: Bewegung in der Sozialpolitik, Erstarrung und Niedergang (= Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, Band 10), Baden-Baden 2008. Thomas David, Dr., Assistant Professor at the Institute of Economic and Social History, University of Lausanne, Switzerland. He actually directs a project (together with André Mach) on the Swiss elites in the twentieth century, financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation. Most recent publications: Transformations of Self-Regulation and New Public Regulations in the Field of Swiss Corporate Governance (1985 – 2002), (together with André Mach and Martin Lupold), in: World Political Science Review 3 (2007), 2; De la « Forteresse des Alpes » à la valeur actionnariale: Histoire de la gouvernance d’entreprise suisse au 20e siècle [From the “Fortress of the Alps” to Shareholder Value: The History of Swiss Corporate Governance in the 20th Century], (together with Martin Lupold, André Mach and Gerhard Schnyder), (forthcoming). Christian Dirninger, Dr., Extraordinary Professor of Economic and Social History, University of Salzburg, Austria. His most recent publications include: Zum Wandel in der ordnungspolitischen Dimension der Finanzpolitik, in: Christian Dirninger et al., Zwischen Markt und Staat. Geschichte und Perspektiven der Ordnungspolitik in der Zweiten Republik, Wien / Köln / Weimar 2007; Strukturwandel in der Geld- und Kreditwirtschaft zwischen Ökonomie und Politik, in: Franz Schausberger (ed.), Geschichte und Identität. Festschrift für Robert Kriechbaumer zum 60. Geburtstag, Wien / Köln / Weimar 2008. Stéphanie Ginalski, Ph.D. student at the Institute of Political and International Studies, University of Lausanne, Switzerland, with a grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation. She is going to publish together with Frédéric Rebmann: Le rôle du Vorort dans le processus de législation sur les cartels (1950 – 1962) [The Role of the “Vorort” in the Process of Legislation on Cartels (1950 – 1962)], in: Alain Cortat (ed.), Entreprises et cartels en Suisse. Krzysztof Go ata, Dr., Senior Researcher at the Poznan University of Economics, Chair of Economic Journalism and Public Relations. Most recent publications: Czynniki kszta tujçe

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wizerunek przedsiebiorcy w okresie transformacji gospodarczej [The Determinants Creating an Enterpreneur Image in the Transformation Period], in: H. Przybylski (ed.), Public relations – teoretyczne i praktyczne aspekty sztuki komunikowania [Public relations – theoretical and practical aspect of Communication], Katowice 2008; Wizerunek medialny przedsiebiorcy w okresie transformacji [Media Image of Enterpreneurs in the Transformation Period, in: Krzysztof Go ata (ed.), Transformacyjne public relations a media masowe [Public Relations and Mass Media in the Transformation Period], Poznan´ 2009. Trygve Gulbrandsen, Dr., Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, Norway. His most recent publications include: Ideological Integration and Variation within the Private Business Elite in Norway, in: European Sociological Review 21 (2005), 4; Consensus or Polarization? Business and Labour Elites in Germany and Norway (together with Ursula Hoffmann-Lange), in: Fredrik Engelstad / Trygve Gulbrandsen (eds.), Comparative Studies of Social and Political Elites. Comparative Social Research 23 (2007), 2. Peter Hübner, Dr. sc. phil., Senior Researcher at the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam, Germany. His most recent publications include: Sozialismus als soziale Frage. Sozialpolitik in der DDR und Polen 1968 – 1976 (together with Christa Hübner), Köln / Weimar / Wien 2008; 1970 und die Folgen. Sozialpolitisches Krisenmanagement im sowjetischen Block, in: Konrad H. Jarausch (ed.), Das Ende der Zuversicht? Die siebziger Jahre als Geschichte, Göttingen 2008. Hervé Joly, Dr., Permanent Researcher of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) at the Laboratoire de recherches historiques Rhône-Alpes (LARHRA), Lyon, France. He has recently finished his habilitation at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) in Paris with a thesis under the title “Diriger une grande enterprise française au XXe siècle: modes de gouvernance, trajectoires et recrutement” [Running a Large French Corporation in the 20th Century: Modes of Governance, Trajectories and Recruitment]. Eduard Kubu, Dr., Professor of Economic and Social History, Charles University, Prague and University of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic. Most recent publications: Ed. (together with Ágnes Pogány and Jan Kofman), Für eine Nationale Wirtschaft. Ungarn, Die Tschechoslowakei und Polen vom Ausgang des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, Berlin 2006; Ed. (together with Jirí Šouša), Financní elity v cesky´ch zemích (Ceskoslovensku) 19. a 20. století [Die Finanzeliten in den böhmischen Ländern (der Tschechoslowakei) im 19. und im 20. Jahrhundert], Praha 2008. Fabio Lavista, Ph.D., Researcher at Bocconi University Milan, Italy. Recent publications: Cultura manageriale e industria italiana: Gino Martinoli fra organizzazione d’impresa e politiche di sviluppo, 1945 – 1970 [Managerial Culture and Italian Industry. Gino Martinoli between Business Organization and Development Policies, 1945 – 1970], Milano 2005; The Controversial Americanization of the Italian Mechanical Industry after the Second World War. The Case of Necchi, in: European Review of History 15 (2008); Economic Planning, Institutional Changes and Industrial Policies in Italy from the End of the Second World War to the Crisis of the Seventies (forthcoming). Matthieu Leimgruber, Dr., Researcher and academic teacher at the Département d’histoire économique of the University of Geneva, Switzerland. His most relevant publications include: Taylorisme et management en Suisse romande, 1917 – 1950 [Taylorism and Manage-

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ment in Rhaeto-Romanic Switzerland, 1917 – 1950], Lausanne 2001; Solidarity without the State? Business and the Shaping of the Swiss Welfare State, 1890 – 2000, Cambridge 2008. György Lengyel, Dr., Professor of Sociology at the Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary. Most recent publications: A magyar gazdasági elit társadalmi összetétele a 20. század végén’ [The Social Composition of the Hungarian Economic Elite at the End of the 20th Century] Budapest 2007; Ed. (together with David Lane and Jochen Tholen), Restructuring of the Economic Elite after State Socialism, Stuttgart 2007; Ed., A magyar politikai és gazdasági elit EU-képe’ [The EU-Image of the Hungarian Political and Economic Elite], Budapest 2008. Manuel Loff, Dr., Professor of Political History at the University of Oporto, Portugal. His most recent publications include: Ed., Portugal 30 anos de Democracia (1974 – 2004) [Portugal. 30 Years of Democracy (1974 – 2004)], Oporto 2006; „O Nosso Século é Fascista!“ O mundo visto por Salazar e Franco (1936 – 1945) [“Our Century is Fascist!” The World as seen by Salazar and Franco], Oporto 2008. Libuše Macáková, Ph.D. CSc., Researcher at the Faculty of Business Administration, University of Economics Prague, Czech Republic. Most recent publications: Mikroekonomie. Repetitorium. Stredne pokrocily´ kurz [Microeconomics. Repetitorium. Course for Advanced Beginners], 5th ed., Slany´ 2007; Mikroekonomie – základní kurs [Microeconomics – Basis Course], 10th ed., Slany´ 2007; (together with Jana Soukupová, Bronislava Horejší and Jindrich Soukup, Mikroekonomie [Microeconomics], 4th ed., Praha 2006. Ágnes Pogány, Dr., Associate Professor at the Centre for Economic and Social History, Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary. Most recent publications: Economic Anti-Semitism in Hungary after Trianon, in: Helga Schultz / Eduard Kubu (ed.), History and Culture of Economic Nationalism in East Central Europe, Berlin 2006; Ein Notenbankpräsident in turbulenter Zeit. Dr. Alexander Popovics (1862 – 1935), in: Harald Wixforth (ed.), Bankiers und Finanziers – Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte, Stuttgart 2007; Ed. (et al.), A felhalmozás míve. Tanulmányok Kövér György tiszteletére [The Act of Accumulation. Studies in Honour of György Kövér], Budapest 2009. Kim Christian Priemel, Dr., Researcher at the Chair for European Economic and Social History, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt / Oder, Germany. His most recent publications include: Flick. Eine Konzerngeschichte vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik, Göttingen 2007; Finis Imperii: Wie sich ein Konzern auflöst, Informationsströme und Verfügungsrechte im Flick-Konzern 1945 / 46, in: Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 95 (2008), 1. Frédéric Rebmann, Doctoral candidate (with a grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation) at the Institute of Economic and Social History, University of Lausanne, Switzerland. He is going to publish together with Stéphanie Ginalski: Le rôle du Vorort dans le processus de législation sur les cartels (1950 – 1962) [The Role of the “Vorort” in the Process of Legislation on Cartels (1950 – 1962)], in: Alain Cortat (ed.), Entreprises et cartels en Suisse. Friederike Sattler, Dr., Researcher at the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung Potsdam and academic teacher at the Universität Potsdam, Germany. Most recent publications: Unternehmerische und kompensatorische Netzwerke. Anregungen der Unternehmensgeschichte für die Analyse von wirtschaftlichen Netzwerkstrukturen in staatssozialistischen Gesellschaften, in: Annette Schuhmann (ed.), Vernetzte Improvisationen. Gesellschaftliche Sub-

584

List of Authors

systeme in Ostmitteleuropa und in der DDR, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2008; Ernst Matthiensen. Ein deutscher Bankier im 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main 2009 (forthcoming). Gerhard Schnyder, Ph.D., Research Fellow at the Centre for Business Research at the University of Cambridge, UK, and at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at SOAS, University of London, UK. Most recent publications: Small States, International Pressures, and Interlocking Directorates: The Cases of Switzerland and the Netherlands (together with Eelke M. Heemskerk), in: European Management Review 5 (2008), 1; De la « Forteresse des Alpes » à la valeur actionnariale: Histoire de la gouvernance d’entreprise suisse au 20e siècle [From the “Fortress of the Alps” to Shareholder Value: The History of Swiss Corporate Governance in the 20th Century], (together with Thomas David, Martin Lupold and Gerhard Schnyder), Zurich (forthcoming). Manuel Schramm, PD Dr., Researcher and Assistant Professor at the Institute for European History, Technical University of Chemnitz, Germany. Most recent publications: Vertrauen in Innovationsprozessen. Die Zusammenarbeit von öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen mit Betrieben und Unternehmen in der DDR und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949 – 1990, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2008; Krise, Stagnation oder Aufbruch? Wissenstransfer zwischen Forschungseinrichtungen und Unternehmen im deutsch-deutschen Vergleich, in: Morten Reitmayer / Ruth Rosenberger (ed.), Unternehmen am Ende des „goldenen Zeitalters“. Die 1970er Jahre in unternehmens- und wirtschaftshistorischer Perspektive, Essen 2008. Leslie Sklair, Dr., Professor emeritus of Sociology, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. Most recent publications: The Transnational Capitalist Class and Contemporary Architecture in Globalizing Cities, in: International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29 (2005); A Transnational Framework for Theory and Research on Globalization, in: Ino Rossi (ed.), Frontiers of Globalization Research, Theoretical and Methodological Approaches, New York 2008. Zsuzsanna Varga, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of History, Loránd Eötvös University, Budapest, Hungary. Most recent publications: Political Trials against the Leaders of Cooperatives in the 1970s, in: Ágnes Pasztercsák (ed.), Hungarologische Beiträge 17 (2005); The Impact of 1956 on the Relationship between the Kádár Regime and the Peasantry, 1956 – 1966, in: Hungarian Studies Review XXXIV (2007), 1 – 2; The Post-Socialist Transformation of Land-Ownership Relations in Hungary, in: Social Embeddedness of Property Rights to Land in Europe (forthcoming). Asta Vonderau, Dr. des., Researcher at the Institute of European Ethnology, Humboldt-University, Berlin. Most recent publications: Leben im “neuen Europa”. Models of Success in the Free Market. The Transformation of the Individual and the Self-Representations of the Lithuanian Economic Elite, in: Ingo W. Schröder / Asta Vonderau (ed.), Changing Economies, Changing Identities in Postsocialist Eastern Europe, Münster / Hamburg / Berlin 2008; Konsum, Lebensstile und Körpertechniken im Postsozialismus, Bielefeld (forthcoming). Dieter Ziegler, Dr., Professor of Economic and Business History, Ruhr-University, Bochum, Germany. Most relevant publications concerning economic elites: Das wirtschaftliche Großbürgertum, in: Peter Lundgreen (ed.), Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte des Bürgertums. Eine Bilanz des Bielefelder Sonderforschungsbereichs (1986 – 1997), Göttingen 2000; Ed., Großbürger und Unternehmer. Die wirtschaftsbürgerliche Elite in Deutschland im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2000; Ed. (together with Volker R. Berghahn and Stefan Unger), Die deutsche Wirtschaftselite im 20. Jahrhundert. Kontinuität und Mentalität, Essen 2003.

Index of Persons Abreu, José de 188 Abs, Hermann J. 333 Acutis, Carlo 495 Alba, Carlos R. 77 Almeida, Mendes de 173 Almeida Garrett, Francisco de 181 Amorim, Américo 181, 182, 194 Amusategui dela Cierva, José María 495 Androsch, Hannes 349 – 372 Antall, József 243 Archibugi, Franco 144 Arendarski, Andrzej 447 Arguelles y Armada, J. 495 Azevedo, Belmiro de 171, 181, 182, 194 Bagsik, Bogusçaw 433 Balcerowicz, Leszek 431, 432 Balsemão, Francisco Pinto 160, 163 Bandini, Mario 146 Baranowski, Janusz 433 Barnevik, Percy 501 Barre, Raymond 477 – 479, 486, 495 Barreiro, Domingos 173 Barroso, José Manuel Durão 162, 163 Bartelds, Hans 495 Battelle, Gordon 479 Baumann, R. 495 Bébéar, Claude 495 Beffa, Jean-Louis 116, 117 Bendix, Reinhard 251 Benya, Anton 361 Bernard [Prince of the Netherlands] 180 Bernheim, Antoine 495 Bíró, Ármin 87 Bíró, Pál 87 Biszku, Béla 234 Bofinger, Peter 370 Bojár, Gábor 100 Bomhard, Nikolaus von 495 Bordalo [Family] 173

Brauchitsch, Eberhard von 328, 329, 331, 333, 334, 336, 337, 340, 344, 345 Brito, Nogueira de 178 Bykowski, Piotr 433 Caetano, Marcello 43, 155, 159 – 161, 164, 165, 170, 172 – 174, 176 – 178, 182, 183, 186, 187, 191 Calvet, Jacques 115, 118 Carlos, Palma 176 Carneiro, Francisco Sá 160, 163, 164 Carvalho, Daniel Proença de 180 Carvalho, Otelo Saraiva de 183 Carvalho, Ruy Octávio Matos de 487, 495 Castries, Henri de 163, 164, 189, 191 – 193, 495 Chalandon, Albin 116 Chirac, Jacques 215 Choffat, Paul 215 Chorin, Ferenc 87, 89 Chorin, Ferenc jr. 91 Christen, P. 495 Clinton, Bill 517 Compton, Ronald E. 495 Constâncio, Vítor 193 Coppola di Canzano, Eugenio 495 Corby, Brian 495 Cordiers, Gabriel 110 Costa, Nobre da 162, 164 Costa Gomes, Francisco da 174 Cravinho, João 187, 188 Csizmadia, Ernoç 232 D’Estaing, Giscard 180, 478 Detoeuf, Auguste 112 Diekmann, Michael 487, 495 Dögei, Imre 229 Drefahl [Rektor] 303 Dreher [Family] 89 Dreher, Jenoç 90

586

Index of Persons

Eanes, António Ramalho 153, 162, 164, 182 Engeström, John 495 Erdei, Ferenc 232 Erhard, Ludwig 356 Eucken, Walter 356 Fanfani, Amintore 135, 137 Fauroux, Roger 116 Fehér, Lajos 229 – 232 Feldstein, Martin 485, 486 Fenizio, Ferdinando Di 146 Feteiras [Family] 173 Figueiredo (Burnay) [Family] 173 Filipiak, Janusz 447 Flick, Friedrich 325 – 331, 344, 345 Flick, Friedrich Karl 325, 328, 333, 336, 340 – 342, 344, 345 Flick, Marie 328 Flick, Otto-Ernst 328 Floch-Prigent, Loïc Le 115 Ford, Henry 323 Fourtou, Jean-René 116 Franco, Francisco 76, 77, 191, 192 François-Poncet, Michel 116 Franz Joseph [Kaiser von Österreich König von Ungarn, König von Böhmen] 90 Freudenberg, Karl J. 307, 308 Frey, Emil 478 Freyssinet, Eugène 109 Friedman, Milton 214, 329 Friedrich, Otto A. 328, 329 Fuà, Giorgio 143, 146 Gáspár, Sándor 234 Gasperi, Alcide De 135 Gates, Bill 429, 502 Gawronik, Aleksander 433 Geiger, Imre, 94 Gérard, J. P. 495 Gerling, Hans 335, 336, 341 Giarini, Orio 473, 477 – 479, 481, 482, 489, 495 Gierek, Edward 56, 412, 414, 424, 429, 445 Giolitti, Antonio 140, 147 Götte, Klaus 340, 345 Goldberger [Family] 87 Goldberger, Leó 93 Gomu ka, W adys aw 416

Gonçalves, Vasco 176 Gorbachev, Mikhail 460 Grabek, Kazimierz 433 Grace, Pete 335 Gramsci, Antonio 175, 476, 498, 511 – 513, 518 Gregersen, Gudbrand 89 Grobelny, Lech 433 Gudzowaty, Aleksander 436, 444, 446 Guterres, António 163, 164, 188, 189 Gutmann, Gernot 266 Gyllanhammar, Per 487 Haggenmacher [Family] 89 Harvey, R. 495 Hattink, Odo 495 Hatvany-Deutsch [Family] 89, 90 Havel [Family] 89 Hayek, Friedrich von 478 Hörnig, Hannes 317 Holsboer, Jan H. 495 Honecker, Erich 268, 412 Hont, János 232 Horthy, Miklós 93 Horváth, Ede 98 Howton, Frank W. 251 Jeanneney, Jean-Marcel 478 Joseph [Erzherzog von Österreich, Palatin von Ungarn] 90 Joseph I. [King of Portugal] 191 Jutzi, Ernesto 495 Kádár, János 45, 228, 229, 232 Kaletsch, Konrad 328, 336, 344 Karkosik, Roman 447 Karl IV. [Kaiser von Österreich, König von Ungarn, König von Böhmen] 90 Karner, Dietrich 495 Keseru, János 232 Kessler, Denis 486, 489, 490, 495 Keynes, John Maynard 25, 131, 356 Kielholz, Walther 487, 495 Kittredge, John K. 495 Klaus, Václav 292, 294 Klein, Ferenc 87 Klein, Gyula 87 Klein, István 87

Index of Persons Klein, Jennifer L. 484 Klein, Pál 87 Kluska, Roman 447 Kochmann, Werner 315, 317 Kohl, Helmut 338 Kolb, Hans-Werner 341 Komócsin, Zoltán 234 Koren, Stephan 358, 361 Kornfeld, Móric 89 Kornfeld, Pál 87 Kornfeld, Zsigmond 87 Kornis, Karl 495 Kozeny´, Viktor 294 Krauze, Ryszard 438, 444, 447 Kreisky, Bruno 350 – 352 Kulczyk, Jan 436, 441, 444, 447 Kwas´niewski, Aleksander 442, 444 Larragoiti Lucas, Patrick Antonio Claude de 495 Ledoux, Frédéric 109 Lekszton´, Janusz 433 Lenti, Libero 146 Liedtke, Patrick M. 478, 482, 492, 493, 495 Lombardini, Siro 146 Longo, A. 495 Losonczi, Pál 229 Lourdes Pintasilgo, Maria de 163 Magalhães, Albano de 173 Magalhães, António Raposo de 181 Magalhães, Belmiro de 181 Magalhães, Pinto de 173 Maier, Charles S. 302 Maisonrouge, Jacques 501 Malfa, Ugo La 137, 144, 145 Marchionne, Sergio 217, 218 Martin, Georges 478, 495 Matos, Luís Salgado de 172 Matos, Norton de 166 Matos, Rocha de 194 Mattei, Enrico 142 – 144 Maucher, Helmut 501 Mauroy, Pierre 116 Mayer, Karl Ulrich 36 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz 431 Mello [Family] 160, 173, 182, 194

Mello, Jorge de 182 Mello, José Manuel de 181 Melo, Fontes Pereira de 191 Mercier, Ernest 110 Mey, Jozef de 495 Meyer, Ernst 478 Miller, Leszek 442 Mills, Charles Wright 251, 450 Mira Candel, Filomeno 495 Miranda, Brandão de 173 Mittag, Günter 424 Mitterand, François 47, 115 Momigliano, Franco 138 – 140, 150, 151 Morandi, Rodolfo 134 Moreira, Adriano 178 Morita, Akio 501 Murdoch, Rupert 517 Musgrave, Richard A. 357 Mühlemann, Lukas 213, 214 Müntefering, Franz 369 Nader, Ralph 514 Nagy, Imre 228 Napoleoni, Claudio 146 Neave, Julius 495 Neto, Henrique 194 Niederhaus, F. 495 Niemczycki, Piotr 438 Niemczycki, Zbigniew 439 Oliveira Salazar, António de 154 Or owski, Witold 442, 443 Ortoli, François-Xavier 120 Padoa-Schioppa, Fabio 477, 495 Pagézy, Bernard 478, 495 Pahlavi, Reza Shah, Shah of Iran 332 Pais, Sidónio 155 Pandolfi, Christian 149 Panzerbieter, Hans 306 Papp, Simon 94 Parenti, Giuseppe 146 Parran, Jean-Adolphe-Alphonse 109 Parravicini, Giannino 146 Parsons, Richard 517 Pastore, Giulio 144 Peccei, Aurelio 479

587

588

Index of Persons

Petsche, Albert 110 Peugeot, P. 495 Peyrelevade, Jean 116 Philip II. [King of Spain and Portugal] 192 Pinochet, Augusto José Ramón 500 Pinto, Carlos Mota 163, 164 Pohle, Wolfgang 328 Pombal, Marquis of 191 Quandt [Family] 326, 332 Quandt, Herbert 326 Queirós Pereira [Family] 173 Quina [Family] 173 Radó, Zoltán 94 Rákosi, Mátyás 229 Rapaczyn´ska, Wanda 437 Rasche, Karl 78 Ratcliff, A. 495 Reagan, Ronald 46, 379, 474, 486 Rebuffel, Charles 109 Reppe, Walter 307, 308 Ricciardi, António 195 Rigal, Jean 110 Rita, Giuseppe De 151 Rockefeller [Family] 434 Rockefeller, David 180, 501 Roesler, Jörg 266, 273 Rohland, Walter 78 Rossi Doria, Manlio 146 Ruffolo, Giorgio 143, 144, 147 Ryan, Arthur F. 495 Sampaio, Jorge 163, 164 Santana Lopes, Pedro 162 Saraceno, Pasquale 132, 133, 135, 137, 140, 142, 145 Schabowski, Günter 276 Schiro, James J. 495 Schlumberger, Horst 319 Schmidt, R. 495 Schrade, Hugo 303 Schürer, Gerhard 266 Schulze, Rolf 317 Silva, Aníbal Cavaco 120, 163, 164, 189, 191 Sinn, Hans Werner 269, 370 Soares, Mário 153, 162, 164, 181, 189

Sócrates, José 162, 192, 194 Solorz, Zygmunt 437, 444 Sošowow, Michaš 447 Sousa Franco, António 187, 189, 191 Spínola, António de 174, 178 – 180 Stajszczak, Mirosšaw 433 Stokšosa, Henryk 440 Stoss, Karl 495 Strauss-Kahn, Dominique 486 Sullivan, Martin J. 495 Sylos Labini, Paolo 146 Széles, Gábor 100 Thatcher, Margaret 46, 181, 474 Thomaz, Américo 176 Tilmant, Michel 495 Tomá, Américo 160 Tornyay-Schosberger [Family] 90 Tošovsky´, Josef 292 Trendelenburg, Ferdinand 305 Trichet, Jean-Claude 482 Tusk, Donald 447 Ulbricht, Walter 412, 416 Ullmann [Family] 87 Ullmann, Erzsébet 89 Ullmann, György 89, 91 Urbanski, E. 495 Vanoni, Ezio 135 Velden, J. van der 495 Vida, Jenoš 93 Vinhas [Family] 173 Vischer, Heinz 495 Vito, Francesco 146 Vogels, Hanns-Arnt 334, 340, 345 Waldbrunner, Karl 353, 361 Walter, Mariusz 439 Wassermann, Zbigniew 441 Weck, Philippe de 217 Weimar, Jochen 303, 304 Weiss [Family] 85, 87, 89, 91 Weiss-Chorin [Family] 93 Weiss, Manfréd 85, 91, 93 Wejchert, Jan 446 Wellauer, Thomas 214 Wendel [Family] 109, 113

Index of Persons Winter, Rudi 312 Wohlrath, Björn 495 Woods, George 506 Wuffli, Peter A. 213 Wurster, Carl 308

589

Zasada, Sobies aw 440 Zaschke [Rektor im Chemiekombinat Bitterfeld] 317 Zeman, Miloš 292 Zevi, Bruno 146

Index of Companies Aachener & Münchener 493, 495 ABB 214, 218, 501 Accor 118 Aciéries de Longwy 109 Adidas 467 AEGON 494 Aetna 495 AFC (Alais Froges & Camargue) 112 AGF (Assurances Générales de France) 493 AGORA 437, 438 AIAG (Aluminium Industrie Aktien Gesellschaft), s. Alusuisse AIC (Androsch International Management Consulting GmbH) 365 AIG (American International Group) 494, 495 Air liquide 118 ALCAN (Aluminum Company of Canada) 117, 217 Alcatel (Alsacienne de Constructions Atomiques, de Télécommunications et d’Electronique) 117 Alcatel-Lucent 117 Allianz 478, 480, 487, 493 – 495 Alsacienne de Constructions Mécaniques 112 Alsthom / Alstom 112, 117 Altadis 517 Altria Group 517 Alusuisse 203, 217 Arcelor-Mittal 117 Arcilor 117 Arcus 384 Arthur Anderson 508 Asea Brown Boveri, s. ABB AT&S (Austria Technologie & Systemtechnik) 369 Auchan 118 Audi 436 Austrian Uniqa 478, 480 Auto Union 326

Autostrada Wielkopolska 436 Aventis 117 Aviva 480, 493 – 495 AXA 478, 480, 481, 486, 487, 493 – 495 Baiersdorf 278 Bâloise 203, 495 Banco Portugues de Investimento 495 Banco Santander 495 Bank of International Settlements 482 Bank of Italy 147, 148 Bank of Portugal 193 Bank Pekao, s. Pekao Banque de France 482 Banque de l’Indochine 111 BASF (Badische Anilin- & Soda-Fabrik) 307, 308 BAT (British American Tobacco) 517 BAWAG (Bank für Arbeit & Wirtschaft) 352 Bayer AG 318, 319 BBC (Brown, Boveri & Cie) 203, 218 BEA Associates 216 Benetton 323 Berkshire Hathaway Re 494 Billerud 171 Bioton 438 BMW (Bayrische Motorenwerke) 326, 467 BNC (Banque Nationale de Crédit) 111 BNCI (Banque Nationale de Crédit Industriel) 111, 113, 115 BNP (Banque Nationale de Paris) 115, 117, 118 BNP Paribas 111, 113, 116, 117, 494 BNU (Banco Nacional Ultramarino) 171, 173 Böhler Uddeholm 369 Booz, Allen & Hamilton 142 Borges 171, 173 Bouygues 118 BP (British Petroleum) 112

Index of Companies BPA (Banco Português do Atlântico) 171, 173 Brocades 171 Buderus 326, 327, 330, 334, 341 Burnay 171, 173 Burson-Marsteller 508 CA-BV (Creditanstalt-Bankverein) 350, 351, 354, 363 – 366, 368, 369 Carl Zeiss Jena 278, 302 – 304 Central-European International Bank 366 CETEC 171 CFP (Compagnie Française des Pétroles) 112, 117 CGE (Compagnie Générale d’Électricité) 112, 116, 117 Champalimaud 171 – 173, 194 Chantiers et Ateliers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët) 110 Chase Investors Management Corps 215, 216 Châtillon-Commentry 109 Ciba-Geigy 203, 213 Citibank 180 CKB (Chemiekombinat Bitterfeld) 315 – 317 CNEP (Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris) 111, 113, 115 CNP (Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Assurances) 494 ComArch 447 Commercial Union 493 Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l’État 107 Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l’Ouest 107 Compagnie des Minerais de Fer Magnétiques de Mokta-el-Hadid 109 Compagnie du Nord 107 Companhia Portuguesa de Siderurgia 162 Constructions des Batignolles 110 Crédit Agricole 117, 118, 494 Crédit Foncier Égyptien 110 Crédit Industriel et Commercial 111 Crédit Lyonnais 111, 113, 115 – 117 CS (Crédit Suisse) 200, 203, 204, 208, 213 – 216 CSFB (Credit Suisse First Boston) 215 CUF (Companhia União Fabril) 160

591

Dachstein-Seilbahn 369 Daimler-Benz 326, 327, 329, 330, 332 – 334, 336, 337, 341, 342, 344, 345, 440 Danone 118 Dätwyler Holding 203 DDSG (Donau-Dampfschifffahrtsgesellschaft) 369 Denain-Anzin 109 Deutsche Bank 326, 332, 333, 341, 342 Dreher-Haggenmacher First Hungarian Beer Brewery 90 Dresdner Bank 78 Durand-Konzern 110 Dynamit Nobel 326, 330, 334, 335, 341 Eagle Star 495 EDF (Électricité de France) 114, 121 EFACEC 162 Eiffage 118 Eisenwerkgesellschaft Maximilianshütte 326 Elektrum 437 Elf, Elf-Aquitaine, Elf 2000 112, 117, 120 Énergie Électrique du Littoral Méditerranée 110 Ergo 480, 493, 494 Erste Allgemeine 493, 495 Espírito Santo 171, 173, 180, 194 Essilor 118 Eureko 494 European Central Bank 482 Everest Re 494 F.N. City Bank, s. First National City Bank FACC (Fischer Advanced Composite Components) 369 Fanuc 313 Feldmühle 326, 330, 334, 341 FFKG (Friedrich Flick Kommanditgesellschaft) 324 – 345 FHK, s. Werkzeugmaschinenkombinat „Fritz Heckert“ Fiat (Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino) 218, 479 Finsider 148 Firestone 171 First Boston 215 First National City Bank 171

592

Index of Companies

Florena Cosmetic GmbH 278 Fondiaria (-Sai) 480, 493 Forbo Holding 203 Ford (Ford Motor Company) 326 Fortis (-Gruppe) 494, 495 Fotolabo 215 G. Tire and Rubber 171 GE Insurance Solutions 494 General Motors 326 Générale des Eaux 118 Generali (Assicurazioni) 477, 480, 481, 493 – 495 Gerling-Konzern Versicherungs-BeteiligungsAG 335, 341 GF (Georg Fischer) 203 Groupama (Groupe des Assurances Mutuelles Agricoles) 494 GTM (Grands Travaux de Marseille) 109 Hannover Re 480, 494 Hertie 270 Hessische Berg- und Hüttenwerke 327 Hoechst AG 117 Holcim 203 Hungarian General Credit Bank 87 IBM (International Business Machines Corporation) 501 ICI (Imperial Chemical Industries) 171 Imperial Tobacco (Group PLC) 517 ING (Internationale Nederlanden Groep) 480, 481, 487, 493 – 495 Intel (Integrated Electronics) 311 Interfood 171 Investicní a Poštovní Banka 294 Iron Works of Rimamurány-Salgótarján 87 IT Chrysler 171 ITT 171 Japan Tobacco 517 Jenbacher Werke AG 364 Jenoptik AG 278 John Deere & Company 239 Karstadt 329 Kaufhof 270 KGHM (Kombinat Górniczo-Hutniczy Miedzi) 445

Kompania Piwowarska 436 Krauss-Maffei 326, 330, 341 Krupp 332 Kuhlmann 112 Kulczyk-Tradex 436 L’Oréal 118 La Mondiale 495 La Paternelle 478, 493, 495 Lafarge 118 Landis & Gyr 215 Launoit 171 Legal & General 494 Lenzing 369 Léon Levy 171 Limousin & Cie., Procédés Freyssinet 109 Lloyd’s 480, 494 Lonza 217 Lorraine-Escault 109 LOT (Polskie Linie Lotnicze) 445 Lotos 445 Lucent 117 Ludlow 171 Lyonnaise des Eaux et de l’Éclairage 110, 117, 118 Machine-Tools Works of Gyor 98 Mannheimer Versicherung 478, 493 MAORT (Magyar Amerikai Olajipari Részvénytársaságot) 94 MAPFRE (Mutua de la Agrupación de Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas de España) 495 Marine-Homécourt 109 Maschinenfabrik Andritz 364 Maschinenfabrik Heid 364 Maybach 326 McKinsey 213 – 215, 508 Mercantile & General Re 493, 495 Mercedes, s. Daimler-Benz Metallhüttenwerke Lübeck 326, 334 Michelin (Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin) 118 Miles 319 Mines d’Anzin 108 Mines de la Grand’ Combe 108 Mines de Lens 108 Mitsui 171 Mittal 117

Index of Companies Montecatini 479 Motor AG 200, 203 Motor-Columbus 203 Munich Re 480, 493 – 495 National Bank of Hungary 98 Nationale Nederlanden 487 Neckermann 329 Nestlé 203, 219, 501 Neue Maxhütte 329, 330, 334 News International 517 Nike 467 Nord-Est 109 Novartis 213 – 215, 218 NRK (Norsk Rikskringkasting) 384 O’Conner Associates 215 ÖIAG (Österreichische IndustrieverwaltungsAktiengesellschaft) 353 Olivetti 138 – 140, 143, 150, 151, 479 Onet.pl 439 Optimus 447 Paribas, s. BNP Paribas Partner RE 493, 494 Pascal Publishing House 439 Pechiney 112, 113, 116, 117, 120, 121 Pedriney 171 Pekao (Polska Kasa Opieki Spó ka Akcyjna) 429 Peugeot 118 Pharma AG 271 Philip Morris 508, 517 PKN Orlen (Polski Koncern Naftowy ORLEN) 445 PKO BP S.A. (Powszechna Kasa Oszczednos´ci Bank Polski Spó ka Akcyjna) 445 Polsat TV (Telewizja Polsat) 437, 446 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa 437 Ponts et Chaussées 105, 106, 108, 110, 111 Porsche 436 Préservatrice Foncière 493 Profilwalzwerk Bad Düben 278 Prokom Software S.A. 438, 444 Prudential 494, 495 R. Noled 171 Rába Hungarian Waggon- and Engineering Factory of Gyor 98

593

RAS, s. Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta Reale Mutua (Assicurazioni) 493 Régie Autonome des Pétroles 112 Reinsurance Group of America 494 Renault, Renault-Nissan 115 – 118 Rentenanstalt, s. Swisslife Rhône-Poulenc 113, 115 – 117 Rieter Holding AG 203 Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta (RAS) 493 Robotron (VE Kombinat Robotron) 278, 311 Royal & Sun Alliance 493, 494 Royale Belge 478, 493, 495 RTP (Rádio e Televisão de Portugal) 162 Rÿn-Schelde-Verone 171 S & H (Siemens & Halske), s. Siemens SAFR (Société Anonyme des Fermiers Réunis) 493 Sacilor 113, 115, 116 Saint-Gobain 112, 113, 116, 117, 120, 171 Salgótarjáni Koszénbánya 87 Salinen-AG 360, 369 Sandoz 213 Sanofi-Aventis 117, 118 Say 113 SBS (Société de Banque Suisse) 203 – 205, 208, 213, 215 Schlumberger 171 Schneider Electronic 109, 113, 458 Schweizerische Lebensversicherungs- und Rentenanstalt, s. Swisslife Scintilla 203 SCOR 486, 495 Semperit AG 369 SGS (Société Générale de Surveillance) 217 Siemens 305 – 308, 312, 313, 335 Sika AG 203 Skandia (Skandia Försäkrings AB) 495 Škoda 293, 436 Snam Progetti (S.P.A.) 144 SNCF (Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français) 107, 114, 120, 121 Société Française d’Entreprises et de Dragages et de Travaux Publics 110 Société Générale 110, 113, 115 – 117 Société Générale de Belgique 171

594

Index of Companies

Société Nationale des Pétroles d’Aquitaine 112 Sony 501 SSW (Siemens-Schuckert Werke), s. Siemens St. Gobain, s. Saint-Gobain STAB 171 Stahlwerke Röchling-Buderus 327 Stahlwerke Südwestfalen 326, 329, 334 Standard Company 94 Standard Life 494 State Farm Insurance Co. 494 Statkraft 384 Statoil 383, 384 Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG 364, 369 Stölzle-Oberglas AG 364 Suez 113, 116 – 118 Sul America 495 Sulzer 203, 214 Sulzer Medica 203 Swiss National Bank 207 Swiss Re 214, 480, 481, 487, 493 – 495 Swissair 203 Swisslife 200, 494 Telekomunikacja Polska 436, 443 Telenor 384 Thalès Group 117 Thomson-Houston 112, 113, 116 – 118 Thomson Multimedia 117, 118 Time Warner 517 Toro 493 Total 117, 118, 120 TVN 439, 446 TVN 24 439, 446 UAP (Unabhängige Allfinanz Partner AG) 493 UBS (Union de Banques Suisses / Union Bank of Switzerland) 200, 203 – 205, 208, 213, 215, 217 Ugine 112 Uniqa (UNIQA Versicherungen AG) 478, 480, 493 Union y el Fenix 495

Unione Italiana di Riassicurazione (UIR) 493, 495 Universal 118 US-Filter Corp. 335, 340 Usinor 113, 116, 117 Usinor-Sacilor 117 VA, s. Voestalpine AG VEB Chemieanlagenbau Grimma 316 VEB Jenapharm 304 VEB Numerik 311 Victoria 493 Vilniaus Vingis 457 Vinci 118 Vittoria 495 Vivendi 118 VOEST (Vereinigte Österreichische Eisenund Stahlwerke) 369 Voestalpine AG 369 Volkswagen (AG) 326, 436 Volvo 487 Von Roll Holding AG 215 W. R. Grace & Co. 334, 335, 341 Warburg 215 Weltbank, s. World Bank Wendel 109 Wendel-Sidelor 113 Werkzeugmaschinenkombinat „Fritz Heckert“ 311, 312 Westinghouse 171 Winterthur 200, 203, 214, 494 World Bank 58, 351, 365, 456, 459, 487, 506 Wüstenrot & Württembergische 493 Württembergische Versicherung AG 493 XL Re 494 Xstrata 203 Ytong (Yxhults Ånghärdade Gasbetong) 171 Zurich Financial Services 493 – 495