Europe as a Multiple Modernity : Multiplicity of Religious Identities and Belonging [1 ed.] 9781443857819, 9781443856331

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Europe as a Multiple Modernity

Europe as a Multiple Modernity: Multiplicity of Religious Identities and Belonging

Edited by

Martina Topiü and Srdjan Sremac

Europe as a Multiple Modernity: Multiplicity of Religious Identities and Belonging, Edited by Martina Topiü and Srdjan Sremac This book first published 2014 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2014 by Martina Topiü, Srdjan Sremac and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-5633-9, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5633-1

CONTENTS

Preface ...................................................................................................... viii R. Ruard Ganzevoort Acknowledgements .................................................................................... xi Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Europe as a Multiple Modernity Martina Topiü and Srdjan Sremac Part I: Europe after the Holocaust Chapter One ............................................................................................... 22 European Identity and Religion: Identity, Alterity or Plurality? Bérengère Massignon Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 35 A European Intifada? On the New Form of an Old European AntiSemitism in a New Millennium Martina Topiü Part II: Religion in National Debates Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 72 “Adjusting Frequencies”: Negotiating Belonging among Young Kurds in Finland Mari Toivanen Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 92 Religion in Education: The Faith School Debates in Contemporary Britain Atsuko Ichijo Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 109 The Place of Religion in Education in France Géraldine Bozec

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Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 126 Imam Hatip Schools: Symbolic Fault Lines of the Religious-Secular Divide in Turkey Ayhan Kaya and Ayúe Tecmen Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 149 Young Muslims in The Netherlands in Focus: Understanding Tariq Ramadan Mohammed Hashas and Jan Jaap de Ruiter Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 194 Religion and National Identity in Greece: The Identity Card Crisis and the Islamic Mosque Issue Alexandros Sakellariou Part III: Religious Identities in Everyday Life Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 214 Brazilian Undocumented Migrants and Their Choice of Pentecostalism in The Netherlands Rangel de Oliveira Medeiros Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 228 Roma and Conversion to Protestantism: An Example of Southeast Serbia Dragan Todoroviü Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 252 National Identities and Internal Boundaries: An Ethnographic Approach to the Religious Issue in Sweden Emir Mahieddin Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 274 Estonian Women’s Identity after Conversion to Islam Age Ploom Chapter Thirteen ...................................................................................... 298 The Religious and National Identity of Muslim Converts in Britain Leon Moosavi

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Part IV: Religion and Identity in the Media Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 320 Europe’s Disputed Symbolic Boundaries: Identity, Religion and Turkey’s EU Membership Carlo Nardella Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 339 Media Representation of Serbian and Croatian Identities: Selected Examples from the Serbian Kurir and the BBC Violeta Cvetkovska-Ocokoljiü, Srdjan Sremac and Tatjana Cvetkovski Concluding Remarks ............................................................................... 358 Are Contested Identities in the Public Sphere Sacred or Secular? Srdjan Sremac and Martina Topiü Contributors ............................................................................................. 362

PREFACE R. RUARD GANZEVOORT1

The project “Europe” has never been without challenges, but one could say that ours is a time of exceptional demand. The economic and financial crisis is but one of the fundamental threats to the whole notion of European unity. Another is the fact that the raison d’être of European unity, until recently, was founded on the horrific history of WWII. Nie wieder Krieg—“never again war”—served as a compelling argument for several decades, but this formula slowly but surely lost its convincing power when peace became a taken-for-granted reality. We have to redefine and renegotiate the values and merits of working toward one united Europe, regardless of the specific legal and political structure it might obtain. In doing so, our issues are no longer found within the European sphere only, but in geopolitical relations especially. On a global scale, Europe may continue to be one of the key players, but probably only when it finds ways of overcoming its internal tensions and building a shared purpose and identity. The present crises, thus, request a renewed search for the “soul of Europe.” One should not be mistaken, however. The soul of Europe is not a monolithic entity, and there is no simple way to define it. European identity is a plural concept. This has probably always been the case, but it is clearly the nature of our present situation. Even modernity is not a welldefined phenomenon, but a series of pathways of change. Similarly, European modernity should not be reduced to one specific type, recurring traits notwithstanding. The ways in which modern European societies and identities are construed differ from country to country and from time to time, and even within one society we can find highly variegated modes and models. Conflict is always right around the corner. Add religion and the picture becomes even more complex. Personal identities are construed at the intersections of nationality, ethnicity, religion, family, and much more. One’s position in each of these arenas, in the centre or at the 1

Member of the Upper Chamber of the Dutch Parliament for the Greens (GroenLinks), and Professor of Practical Theology at VU University Amsterdam.

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margins, largely defines how the identity elements are negotiated. But like the other sources, religion appears with myriad faces. Sometimes it serves to bolster a specific national identity, while at others it helps to bridge two or more identities and overcome tensions. In the end, this diversity requires us to study how individuals and groups navigate complexities to create a world identity they can live in. The soul of Europe can be understood only if we start by understanding the soul of Europeans. The present volume offers precisely this kind of study. Acting in a dual role as a theologian and politician, I am grateful to researchers and editors for bringing together this rich material. As an empirical theologian I am encouraged once more to not look at religious traditions and official doctrines in order to understand the role and meaning of religion in contemporary society. Religion is found at the crossroads of identity struggles, politics and ordinary life. It cannot be distinguished entirely from other elements of culture, nor reduced to them. Additionally, more than in previous eras individuals identify as belonging to two or more religious traditions. It is precisely these complexities that make religion so interesting for a theologian. It would be very meaningful to interpret the material offered here to answer the question of what is sacred to people and how the relation with that “sacred” impacts on their life, identity construction, and social and political choices. As a politician my main interest lies in how all these identity issues affect the development of sustainable societies on the local, national, European, and global levels. It seems fair to say that religious/ethnic/ national identities are important contributors to societal cohesion, but that they also fuel many conflicts. This should come as no surprise for anyone who knows a little history or sociological theory. Different, though, in post-secular Europe is the deinstitutionalized, globalized and mediatized nature of contemporary religion. This means that we are dealing now with much more fluid shapes of religion and unexpected actors governing the field. As a consequence we have to rethink the church-state separation that is at the heart of modern societies. Rethink, but not abandon. If religion is still a vital force in the world—and Europe for that matter—but religious organizations are less dominant, what does that mean for our efforts of managing religious elements in our societies? Obviously, there is a significant lack of synchronicity when it comes to the development of the religious field even within Europe. This volume testifies to the major differences between post-Christian and postcommunist countries. Even in my own country, The Netherlands, the role of religion varies greatly from modern urban spaces to traditional rural areas, and from secular autochthones to more religious newcomers (both

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Christian and Muslim). This lack of synchronicity also means that, in some places, the deinstitutionalization of religion has gone much further than in others and that there may also be realms of re-institutionalization. There are different political styles and strategies to deal with all this diversity. Some opt for politics based on power exchange regarding the interests of different groups, and this is clearly part of the political process. More important to my mind is politics based on ideals and worldviews. We have to negotiate the various ideals of what the world could and should be and our visions of Europe. It is in these conversations that we will discover, or better construct, the soul of Europe. The research presented in this volume offers many insights into the complex intersections of religion, identity and nationality. It allows us to build the kind of conversations we need for our European future. If we learn how to accommodate the multiplicity of identities and modes of belonging, then we will also build our much-needed community.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors would like to thank the contributors for accepting to work on this project. This includes authors we knew before putting this project forward, but also (perhaps even more) the authors who answered our call for papers, published at the European Sociological Association’s official mailing list. We would also like to thank the editors of Cambridge Scholars Publishing for kind communication and assistance while putting this project forward. We would also like to thank the reviewers for endorsing the manuscript. Finally, this project would not be possible without proofreading. In regard to that, we owe a world to Peggy van Luyn who devoted her time to proofread the manuscript. Martina Topiü and Srdjan Sremac

INTRODUCTION1 EUROPE AS A MULTIPLE MODERNITY MARTINA TOPIû AND SRDJAN SREMAC The current volume Europe as a Multiple Modernity: Multiplicity of Religious Identities and Belonging presents a study of religious identities in Europe conducted through the analysis of fifteen case studies. The reason for selecting these cases lies in the variety of geographical positions, as well as in a variety of historical legacies and state dominances. With this selection of cases we wanted to follow the multiple modernities theory, and show in practice (through the chapters presented in the book) how the theory works. The very essence of the theory of multiple modernities is the variety of approaches and concepts that all form modernity, although what it means to be modern varies and differs from case to case. This book is not a definitive view on the notions of religious, European and the modern; it is rather a contribution to the ongoing debate on these issues that focuses on one aspect of the multiple modernities theory, that is the human self-reflexivity and human agency or on the sense of belonging and self-construction of identities. In that we are analysing fifteen case studies from various European countries in an attempt to understand modernity by examining religion and its influence that has been central to social sciences since Auguste Comte, and significantly entered into sociological research after Durkheim’s studies in religion (Wilson 1982; Fasnafan 2012). Although many authors in this volume take a sociological stance in their discussions, the volume hopes to contribute to other fields in the social sciences and humanities, such as, for example, political science. If it does so, then it will fully fulfil its purpose. 1

The title “Europe as a multiple modernity,” which is also the title of the volume as a whole, is inspired by the draft title of A. Ichijo's volume “Europe, Nations and Modernity” (2011), originally entitled “Europe as Modernity.” The editors would like to express their gratitude to Alexandros Sakellariou for his helpful comments on the earlier draft of this introduction.

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Introduction

Modernity as a Concept and a Problem The issues of religion and modernity in Europe prevail in academic debates in the social sciences. Auguste Comte ([1832–42] 1988) discussed what can be called the modernization of science by envisaging a sociology that will be rational and positive and will lead people to critically think rather than obey magic and religion.2 With this view, Comte predicted modernity; however, he did not predict leaving the modernity that some authors claim to happen as the human society entered postmodernity. Postmodernity rejected the possibility of scientific competences to fully resolve problems (Topiü 2012), and modernity is considered to be the grand narrative as many, particularly postmodernists, argue (for example, see Lyotard 1984). In this view, science based on positivist assumptions clearly failed in offering answers and solutions to human problems. For example, sociological understanding of modernity consists of understanding that the modern world emerged from the European political and economic revolution that occurred due to the cultural changes from the Renaissance, Reformation and the Scientific Revolution. The discussions on divisions between pre-modern and modern are central to sociological academic inquiry up to the present (Smith 2006). Because of this, understanding modernity is seen through Europe, and Europe is seen through modernity; however, modernity theory is consequentially seen (particularly by multiple modernists, post-colonialists, structuralists and postmodernists) as Euro-centric (Bhambra 2011; Mouzelis 1999). This is mainly because modernity is seen as singular and centred on the Western Europe while the “others” are left out of the discussion, as if the modernization did not reflect upon them directly, but through the domination of the West that experienced changes from the era of modernity. These non-Western societies are evaluated according to the Western development (Eisenstadt 2000; 2002; Kaya & Tecmen 2011; Arnason 2006).

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Comte ([1832–42] 1988) discussed three phases that human society will go through: theological, metaphysical and positivist. In the first, the human spirit believes in forces that are equal to people and the human spirit is still in childhood in terms of its development. Abstract forces such as nature characterize the second, metaphysical phase, and this is religiously founded. The third phase is characterized by the human shift toward positivism, and this means knowing its nature. This phase is also a phase when sociology will become positive and objective (see also Fiamengo 1987; Knoblauch 2004; Haralambos & Holborn 2002).

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Modernity is generally understood as a turning point when humans turned toward faith in science and technology, human development, industrialization and faith in the rational as competent to solve problems. Modernity also means objectivity of academic research, that modernity embraces the positivist assumptions founded by Comte, according to which academic research should rely on direct, objective observations rather than conditions that cannot be directly observed, such as emotions and feelings (Haralambos & Holborn 2002). According to Giddens (1991), Beck (1986) and Bauman (2001), the emergence of modernity has changed every-day life since it questions tradition, and this has opened a space for the creation of new identities. Therefore, not only institutions and politics changed, but everyday life as a whole has changed. Giddens (1991) believes that because of detachment from tradition societies faced fragmentation and pluralism of action that brought about the condition of reflexive modernity that, consequentially, caused reflexive identities. Giddens (1991) understands this situation as a late modernity. On the other hand, some have argued that modernity as a concept has been seen in Europe every time the “consciousness of a new epoch formed itself through a renewed relationship to the ancients-whenever, moreover, antiquity was considered a model to be recovered through some kind of imitation” (Habermas 1983, 4). The idea of being modern in this view “changed with the belief, inspired by modern science, in the infinite progress of knowledge and in the infinite advance towards social and moral betterment” (Ibid.). When it comes to sociology, the issue for the analysis has been centred on the “processes of economic growth, differentiation, rationalization, individualization, urbanization, and so on, as central dynamics of a theorized process of modernization. Anthropology, likewise, was defined as a discipline per se, until near the end of the last Century, by the very constitutive idea of the existence and interest of ‘traditional,’ pre-modern tribes, societies, and cultures—in contrast to the societies of modernity” (Smith 2006, 1). The questions that the opponents of European modernization theory posed are the questions of a plurality in considering modernization in Europe and elsewhere, but also of the positivist nature of the European singular modernity. This is related to the explanatory possibility that is one-sided in its positivist nature while the opponents advocate “reflexivity, deconstruction, and interpretation, and with arguments for the necessary demise of grand narratives” (Bhambra 2011, 654).

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Two central concepts challenged the modernity theory. Bhambra recognized these concepts as the “third wave cultural historical sociology” and the “multiple modernities paradigm” (2011, 654). The first concept is making an attempt to historicize modernity and the way it is understood by examining the complex history that constitutes modern social transformations, while the multiple modernities concept includes in its analysis other histories assuming modernity in plural and not just in singular.

Theory of Multiple Modernities Because of the apparent failure of grand narratives or of the large modernization theory that promised to give answers with its positive character, in which it clearly failed, a new theory has emerged. The theory of multiple modernities offered by Israeli sociologist Shmuel N. Eisenstadt advocated by some academics dealing with this issue (e. g. Spohn 2009; 2001) offers a different view that presents removal from the positivist and exclusivist nature of the modernity theory. The theory of multiple modernities developed as a “civilisational analysis employed by scholars of comparative sociology and historical sociology in their attempt to understand the patterns of development of modernity, as well as the relationship between the West and the East” (Boldt et al. 2009, 9). The multiple modernities theory is seen as an opponent to the modernization theory because the former argues that we must consider modernity in plural and refuse to differentiate West from the East, or we should stop looking from West to East to explain what happened because this is Euro-centric. Europe is, in this view, seen as one constitutive element of modernity, but modernity that is seen in a plurality of different developments and modernizations (Bhambra 2011; Martinelli 2007; Boldt et al. 2009). With this, Europe can be interpreted as a multiple modernity, and these multiple modernities constitute one great European modernity. Europe is, however, as Bhambra (2011) argues, taken as a reference point for examining alternative modernities since European origins of modernity cannot be denied. The method of multiple modernists is then a comparative, historical sociology that typically defends this theory by showing different development paths. This theory argues that we can identify modernity paths in every European country just that these development paths do not necessarily follow the Western path, nor do they have to do so (Eisenstadt 2000; 2001; 2005; 2005a; Delanty 2006; Arnason 2006). In this view, the difference does not actually make a

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difference to modernity in its original form (see Bhambra, 2011, 655), and modernity therefore presents a multiplicity of political and cultural programs (Eisenstadt 2000; 2001; 2005; Delanty 2006; Arnason 2006; Martinelli 2007; Kaya & Tecmen 2011). The theory of multiple modernities constitutes different collective identities (Eisenstadt & Giesen, 1995), and these identities are then subject to negotiation and re-negotiation (Eisenstadt 2000). This means that Eisenstadt sees the concept of multiple modernities through the vision of the contemporary world as a “story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programmes” (2000, 2). Actions are in this vision taken by social actors that have different views on what modernity means in the society. In this sense, modernity cannot be considered through a prism of the West only (Eisenstadt 2002), because actions that are undertaken are different from one society to another, and what constitutes modernity is, thus, different (Eisenstadt 2000). Part of the modernity programs are often protests and rebellions, and these movements aim towards the creation of an active participatory society that will be compact in its actions (i.e. it will also include its periphery). Modernity also means emancipation, equality, freedom, justice, autonomy, solidarity, identity and a term that Eisenstadt (2002) calls “sovereignty of reason.” Modernity is inevitably connected with conflict between the traditional society that denies modernity as a term and the West as its core, and modern society that enforces rationalism and the enlightenment, or: “in other words, it is possible for different societies and subcultures to be truly modern and yet not end up looking like, say, France or Sweden with regard to religion, culture, morality, and views of science and metaphysics” (Smith 2006, 2). The theory of multiple modernities, according to Eisenstadt (2000), goes against the theory of modernity enforced by sociologists such as, for example, Marx, Durkheim and Weber, in that all theories of modernity assumed that the “cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world” (Eisenstadt 2000, 1). Modernity as a concept developed in the West and contested by the theory of multiple modernities included “distinct ideological as well as institutional premises” (Eisenstadt 2000, 3) in that it developed reflexivity “around basic ontological premises of structure of social and political authority—a reflexivity shared even by modernity’s most radical critics,

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who in principle denied its validity” (Ibid.). Modernity as a cultural program entailed the autonomy of a man and a removal from traditional political and cultural autonomy. This modernity then brings strong emphasis on autonomous participation of societal members in the society in terms of constituting social and political order. This would also include free access of the societal members to these orders (Eisenstadt 2000). Becoming modern, as already noted, also means being detached from the magic where religion also fits in, and this is due to the irrationality of magic and, thus, religion as well. Being modern thus means being rational and critical, and this would then also mean being detached from the traditional. The theory of multiple modernities argues that there is an apparent lack of explanatory power in this conventional approach, and outlines that the most salient aspect of modernity is the centrality of human agency and human reflexive nature and self-criticism. This means that being modern means being a self-reflective agent, and this is particularly convenient for researching identities. Eisenstadt (2000; 2001) in this sense advocates the “intensive reflexivity” and the “autonomy of man.” Human agency and reflexivity also imply, as Eisenstadt argues, interpretation and re-interpretations of social reality, and this brings about a multiplicity of visions of the modern world and autonomy. The latter means that individuals actively participate in: “constitution of the social and political order, while also producing conflicts between different agents. Modernity is, therefore, also characterized by antinomies that emerge in the confrontation between different interpretations of freedom vs. control, in the contestation between different religious movements, through the conflict between different groups of social actors” (Boldt et al. 2009, 11).

Religion and Modernity Religion and modernity are inextricably linked to each other, for modernity is seen as directly opposite to the religious. However, consensus has never been reached on who is modern and what it exactly means to be modern, and especially not when religion and religious identity are concerned. Sociological theories: … believed that modernity was unavoidably destructive of religion, belief in spiritual realities and objective universals, non-naturalistic metaphysics, and “traditional” cultures and perspectives generally. Modernity always contained acids that are necessarily secularizing, disenchanting, and fostering of a naturalistic and materialist outlook. By theoretical definition, religious faith and belief in such things as natural laws became cognitively

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deviant, and were expected certainly to fade away with the progress of time and the advance of modernity.3 (Smith 2006, 1)

Because of the dominance of the modernity theory, religion has often been discussed through secularization theory. Casanova (2006, 7) distinguishes three connotations of secularisation or secularisation as “the decline of religious beliefs and practices in modern societies, often postulated as a universal, human, developmental process,” and this aspect is the most commonly debated. On the other hand, secularization can be understood as “the privatization of religion, often understood both as a general modern historical trend and as a normative condition, indeed as a precondition for modern liberal democratic politics.” Finally, secularization can be understood as “the differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, science), usually understood as ‘emancipation’ from religious institutions and norms.” This last concept is, as Casanova (2006, 7) points out, a “core component of the classic theories of secularization, which is related to the original etymological-historical meaning of the term within medieval Christendom.” European sociologists tend to see secularization as the decline of religious beliefs, and consequentially as a decline in the significance and power of religion in both society and with individual beliefs, and these concepts are related to the general process of modernization (Casanova 2006; Bruce 2002; Hefner 1998). In Europe this is of particular relevance for there is no agreement on the secularity and meaning of religion here. For example, Davie (2000; 1994) states that the relationship between Europe and religion can best be characterized by “believing without belonging,” while Hervieu-Léger (2004, quoted in Casanova 2006) states that it is quite the opposite, and that the European situation is “belonging without believing.” This means that in the first sense Europeans are believers without actually belonging to institutional Churches, because of which the participation in institutionalized worship decreased. In the other case, it means that Europeans officially belong to institutional churches for they are officially declared as believers, but they do not truly believe or cherish their religion, nor actively participate in worshiping. Europe is seen through the decline of religious activities and religious worshiping, and the process of secularization is linked with the process of modernization. If looking to Europe as opposed to the USA then it appears 3

Durkheim (2001) understood religion through the notion of the society. In Durkheim’s view society is the true force of religion because all religious activities come from the society (see also Knoblauch 2004; Topiü 2012).

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that Americans are profoundly more religious and religiously affiliated than the Europeans; however, America cannot be called less modern because of it (Berger 2001; Casanova 2006; Sherkat & Ellison 1999). Europe is, on the other hand, more secularized than the USA, but this does not mean that its identity is freed from religion for it is based on Christian identity, and this applies even to the most secularized western European societies (Spohn 2003, 282). Peter L. Berger, a former advocate of secularization and modernization theory, withdrew from advocating the former, claiming it simply does not work because the relationship between religion and modernity is by far too complex and, thus, the decline of religious beliefs (Berger 1999). Berger argues that not only has secularization failed, and that societies are not facing a decline in religious beliefs, but on the contrary: “religious communities have survived and even flourished to the degree that they have not tried to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of a secularized world. To put it simply, experiments with secularized religion have generally failed; religious movements with beliefs and practices dripping with reactionary supernaturalism (the kind utterly beyond the pale at self-respecting faculty parties) have widely succeeded” (1999, 4). Secularization is, for Berger (2001, 1): … a process in which religion diminishes in importance both in society and in the consciousness of individuals. And most sociologists looking at this phenomenon have shared the view that secularization is the direct result of modernization. Put simply, the idea has been that the relation between religion and modernity is inverse—the more of the former, the less of the latter. Different reasons have been put forward for this relation. Most often it was ascribed to the ascendancy of modern scientific thinking, making the world more rationally comprehensible and manageable, and thus, supposedly, leaving less and less space for the supernatural.

Casanova (2006, 13) points out that the theory of multiple modernities —because it advocates the existence of certain traits that are shared by all societies, but that these traits do not necessarily mean that everything has to be shared and equal—puts the emphasis “on the relevance of cultural traditions and world religions for the formation of multiple modernities.” In this, the theory of multiple modernities takes religion as an issue that can be researched to question modernities and does not necessarily reject a certain level of religiosity as pre-modern or traditional, but it questions the development of religious beliefs and analyses them inside a multiple modernity theory. The multiple modernities theory, therefore, does not

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necessarily insist on secularisation. As Spohn argues, the theory of multiple modernities: “presupposed that western modernity is only one among other types of modernity evolving in the various civilizations of the world. The concept of multiple modernity thereby assumes that traditions are not simply dissolved by modernization or globalization, but rather that particularly religious and imperial traditions remain constitutive dimensions of modern societies” (2003, 268). Eisenstadt (1994; 1999; 1999a; 2000), as a main advocate of the theory of multiple modernities, argues that religious traditions are reconstructed regardless of the secularization process and that religion as such remains a constitutive basis in all societies. This view is also in line with criticism of the secularisation theory in the Sociology of Religion (Bruce 1992; Casanova 1994). If looking from the comparative multiple modernities perspective, Europe can be explained through multiple political, socio-economic, religious and cultural programs, as well as diverse religious and cultural lives that exist in different forms in different countries (Eisenstadt 1987; Spohn 2009). On the other hand, European secularization should be seen through multiple modernities because European collective identities “are not simply secular or post-secular but consist of multiple religious, as well as secular components” (Spohn 2009, 361, see also Martin 2005; Casanova 1994; Davie 2000; 1994). As Eisenstadt (2000; 2003) argues, secularization has often been followed by the sacralization of the collective identities, such as the state, the nation or the people.

Scope of this Volume In this book we understand modernity through all the elements it normally entails, as explained above; however, we particularly explore the individual projections of religious identities. In this we are exploring modernity through human self-reflexivity and agency with an attempt to explain the variety of discourses humans are situated within, and to see whether and how they distinguish the religious from the everyday, be it national, European or personal. With self-reflexivity we mean religious attitudes and the possibility of people in Europe to organize their lives as a multiplicity of identities and the negotiation and re-negotiation of identities in everyday life, as argued by Eisenstadt. This means that we are exploring human identities and the organization of the everyday life through questioning what role religion plays in it, and whether religious identities can be incorporated in the everyday, “modern” life. Additionally, the founding concept of the book is the assumption that Europe can be

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Introduction

analysed in terms of its distinctive development paths, and in this we agree with Eisenstadt on the Euro-centrism of the classical modernity theory. Contrary to the classical modernity theory we believe that all European countries can be put into one analysis, and that Europe can be considered as “a multiple modernity.” Our starting position is the classical position of the Sociology of religion, according to which religion plays a pivotal role in everyday life and motivates human action. However, we are exploring how this works in practice, in present Europe, and how European citizens, be they native or newcomers, self-reflect on religion. Human self-reflexivity can also mean the possibility of rational and independent thinking and understanding of the world. In this latter view, human self-reflexivity means people are able to independently observe the world and differentiate it from the religious, as well as to detach from its influences. In this humans are able to be modern and religious, and faithful and critical, at the same time. This volume is divided in three sections. The first is entitled “Europe after the Holocaust” and contains two chapters. The role of these two chapters is to provide an insight into the notions of alterity and plurality in Europe after the Holocaust with the intention to open a discussion on Europe, and the ongoing debates on the notion of the religious. The first chapter, written by B. Massignon, discusses the plurality of religious positions in the EU. By arguing that the EU gave up enforcing the Christian roots of Europe in favour of the plurality of religions, it appears that the EU actually gave up enforcing alterity and one-sided views on who is and what it means to be European. This policy does not exclude religious beliefs, but “transforms the ways in which religious belief is publicly expressed.” In this way, European identity is inclusive of pluralism and religious and human rights and religious groups contribute to the definition of a European identity, but they do not define the European norms. This means that the EU is accepting the multiplicity of religions in Europe and that the founding decision of the EU Constitution relies on the assumption of multiplicity and plurality, and furthermore this means that the European identity has been re-interpreted in favour of the human agency and reflexivity of the decision makers. The EU policy in terms of religion is, thus, founded on the multiplicity assumption and Europe is, with this policy, making an attempt to detach itself from the horror of one-sided projections of alterity enforced during World War II. Contrary to the first chapter, the second, written by M. Topiü, discusses the re-emergence of Anti-Semitism in Europe, with an example from France. The chapter shows how European politics work the other way around if the politics towards World War II are reinterpreted and

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renegotiated. The chapter discusses how new discourses on Anti-Semitism are constructed and negotiated, and how people reflect on them. In this, the chapter also analyses Muslim and Jewish positions in France, and the situation clearly shows how religion motivates human action, since AntiSemitism largely relies on religious stereotypes that have existed for more than 2,000 years. However, old stereotypes have been re-negotiated and used in a new form, and this re-negotiation constitutes a new reality in Europe. This new reality exists in parallel with the EU’s framework of plurality and inclusivity. The second part of the book is entitled “Religion in National Debates” and encompasses six chapters. The role of this part is to show how identities are negotiated and renegotiated in various countries that, although different in terms of their development, still face similar problems and have similar national debates. In the first chapter M. Toivanen analyses multiple identities of the Kurdish youth in Finland. It appears that young Kurds hold multiple identities as Kurds, Finnish citizens, new Finns and foreigners. As Finnish citizens they are trying to integrate and live Finnish lives, but at the same time they are trying to meet the expectations of their Kurdish community. However, being a Finn is not an option for they are not Finns, but at the same time they are neither fully Kurdish either since they are integrated in the Finnish society. Being a Kurd in Finland is thus associated with being a Muslim, while, in reality, Kurds are “modern” Muslims, or they are trying to become so while at the same time hiding their “modern” attitudes from their traditional families. Furthermore, being a Kurd is more about culture than religion, and this is contested by young Kurds because their fellows Finns do not correctly understand this. In this situation, young Kurds are interpreting and reinterpreting their identities and a sense of belonging through multiple identities associated with their religious and ethnic identification, the discourse of inclusion and exclusion, and the position of “Other” in Finnish society. European identity also appears in their sense of belonging and construction of their distinctive identities because young Kurds tend to identify with the civic European identity expressed through citizenship status, but not with a European cultural identity that they see through the birthrights they do not hold. The lack of an appropriate homeland, for Kurds have no state, also causes difficulties for their position because of which their “Finnishness” as well as their “Kurdishness” is constantly being re-negotiated. A. Ichijo, who analysed the faith school debates in the United Kingdom, wrote the next chapter. Ichijo tries to make sense of how religion and religious education are understood by various individuals in

12

Introduction

Britain. The faith school debate in the UK proved to be centred on the issue of whether religion should be included in the education system, and consequentially what the role and position of religion in the education system and the society is or should be. Representatives of various religious denominations see faith schools as a parental choice where parents should be independent in deciding whether they want their children to attend religious schools. This view is shared by some minority representatives who believe that faith schools should be their own choice due to the fact that the UK has an official religion, but everyone has to pay taxes. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that faith schools are an obstacle to integration and understanding of each other and the diversity that British society represents. With this discussion we see multiple identities emerging in one multicultural society. Because the state has a liberal and multicultural policy, a debate on the faith schools and their integrative aspect has emerged, and a variety of positions are being undertaken by a variety of factors, which self-reflect on their own role and position in the society, in both wide and narrow senses. G. Bozéc analyses the same issue as A. Ichijo in her chapter, i.e. the position of religion in education in regard to the headscarf issue in France. Education has been a central battlefield in France since the French Republic, but this time the question is centred on the interplay between religion and identity, and the national as well as European. Through the qualitative analysis of discourses present within the civil society, the chapter reveals conflicting views on the meanings of the nation and Europe and the place of the religious dimension within national and European frameworks. The predominant discourse is the distrust of religion that is now intertwined with the issues of immigration and integration. Whether the state would fund private schools run by religious denominations became a subject of national discussion where certain individuals or minority representatives, as in the British case, claimed that the school should be a parental choice, thus arguing for the existence of public schools run by religious denominations. However, the headscarf issue has recently become the central issue, meaning that the place of Islam is now highly contested in French society, and in particular within discussions on the place of religion in education. Discourses emphasize the importance of national cohesion and unity, and there is a clear denial of subgroups within the national public sphere. Religion is here seen as a threat to individual autonomy. Discourses surrounding the French case clearly demonstrate how various actors self-reflect on their own position in society and their religious identities.

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The next chapter, written by A. Kaya and A. Tecmen, deals with the Imam Hatip schools in Turkey. As the chapter suggests, Turkey is often treated as the European “other” due to its Muslim majority; however, debates on the role of religion in the public space, in an officially secular Turkey, are something that rules both academic and public discourse. By juxtaposing the official discourse of using religion and secularism to control the people, the discourse of the religious denomination to impose Imam Hatip schools from the early age (through middle school education and not during the high school) and civil society discourse, the chapter shows the various positions that the individuals and representatives undertake in Turkey on this matter. Debates on Imam Hatip schools illustrate divisions on the religious-secular divide in Turkey, as well as a social divide between moderate Islamists and secular fundamentalists, which can be perceived as a by-product of modernization. The debates on religious education and the role and position of religion in the society are then related to Europeanization seen as a synonym for modernization. In the Turkish case, modernization/Europeanization are associated with secularism and rationalism, but at the same time modernization represents an ongoing process that relies on social contestations and tensions. Because of the instrumentalism of religion in Turkey, actors take a different position and express different views divided on the lines between secularization and Islamisation, and this comes as a consequence of state dominance. At the same time the Turkish example demonstrates that Turkey is also faced with the same debates as Western societies, although it is a country often discussed as “other,” which confirms our multiple modernities concept, arguing that what it means to be modern differs from case to case. The following chapter is co-written by M. Hashas and J. J. de Ruiter and discusses the position of young Muslims in The Netherlands in regard to Tariq Ramadan’s theory that envisages a European Islam proposing an idea that Muslims can be Muslims and Westerners at the same time, or that values of the host Western society can be lived and respected while at the same time preserving Islam. In their study, Hashas & de Ruiter explore the attitudes and self-reflection of young Muslims in The Netherlands, a country that has for a long time been a destination for migrants, and a country with a large Muslim population that has brought controversies regarding the aspect of integration. The study shows that young Dutch Muslims still have difficulties with accepting loyalty to the country in which they live, as Ramadan suggests. At the same time, respondents revealed moderate attitudes on wearing the hijab that they think should be optional and not mandatory, and that woman should be given equal rights.

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Introduction

On some other issues that are often contested in the West, respondents also expressed positive attitudes and, therefore, this study suggests that young Dutch Muslims tend toward accepting liberal Islam. However, at the same time they do not fully understand it and a way toward acceptance is still open. Moreover, this study clearly shows the self-reflection of respondents who critically observe the world, and reflect on their own lives. A. Sakellariou analyses religion and national identity in Greece in the following chapter, in which he emphasises the identity card crisis and the Islamic mosque issue. The subject of this chapter is to study the relationship between religion and national identity in Greek society within the European context, demonstrating the discourses surrounding these two debates. In the first case the EU requested the removal of religious affiliation from the ID card. This caused a reaction from the Greek Orthodox Church that insists on the link between national and religious affiliation in Greece. An issue with the building of a mosque in Athens also caused a serious debate because the Greek Orthodox Church demonstrated its unwillingness to accept the visibility of other denominations and their places of worship in public spaces. The Greek Orthodox Church demonstrated their willingness to respect the Constitutional right to belong to any faith as long as this was not visible to the public since what is visible clearly has to be Christian. The EU, which funds the Greek Orthodox Church in some aspects, is seen as jeopardizing the Greek identity with its multicultural and secular policies. However, at the same time the Greek Orthodox Church insists that Europe is Christian, something that Europe itself denied when Christianity was removed from the European Constitution. Greek discourses on these two issues reveal the fear of the Church losing its strength in the Greek society if Greek society becomes more multicultural. At the same time, discourses reveal the apparent failure of the secularisation theory due to the strength of the Church in stopping integration and efforts for peaceful co-existence, in which the Church has the support from the public. Even though Greece is often considered one of the core European countries due to its rich history and old civilisation, this chapter makes us question whether Greece is modern. The third part is entitled “Religious Identities in Everyday Life” and encompasses five chapters. The first is written by R. de Oliveira Medeiros who, using his own experience in living in The Netherlands, discusses attitudes of undocumented Brazilian migrants in The Netherlands and their sense of belonging. Brazilian undocumented migrants face difficult conditions upon their arrival in The Netherlands; however, going to Church gives them a sense of belonging due to the fact that they can meet

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fellow Brazilians and speak their own language there. The usual Brazilian social structure and social order disappear here and migrants are faced with a different system and different life habits, and are therefore forced to adjust to the new conditions. At the same time, a new concept and understanding of what is right and what is wrong, in terms of religion, emerges. Drawing from Freston’s (2008) findings, this chapter argues that there is also a Theology of the undocumented in The Netherlands. This chapter demonstrates the dominance of the state where people, due to the influence from society, are surrounded with change to their social structure and behaviour, as well as having to renegotiate their sense of belonging and their identities. Just like the Dutch Muslims, as presented in the previous section in the chapter on The Netherlands, Brazilian migrants are negotiating and reinterpreting their identities in a (liberal) Dutch society. D. Todoroviü is responsible for the next chapter wherein he analyses the position of Roma citizens in southeast Serbia who have converted to various faiths, but mostly to Evangelicalism, and their self-reflection on everyday life and religious identities. The life conditions of the Roma population have improved and transformed their relationships, resulting in refraining from antisocial behaviour, completing elementary school and the continuation of secondary education, marrying after reaching a more adult age, etc. The Protestantization, or more precisely Evangelicalism, has also brought emancipation in terms of customs they use to cherish, and in that they have modernized their ways of worshiping. This chapter, through the discourse analysis and in-depth interviews, provides a view on the modernising aspect of religious conversions and the reflective attitudes of converts who, with new faith, have also accepted a new lifestyle and everyday habits. E. Mahieddin in his analysis, similar to the one from The Netherlands on undocumented migrants, discusses the self-projection and prayer from Pentecostal believers in “Swedish Jerusalem” whose projections of self are socially conditioned through their process of socialization. The so-called second modernity, in this view, appears to influence all spheres of social life, including the religious. However, Pentecostals do not only adapt to Swedishness but are also transforming it, and religion is, in this view, a resource for contestation. A. Ploom’s chapter analyses the religious attitudes of Estonian women who have converted to Islam. This chapter clearly demonstrates the failure of both secularization and modernization theories because what applies to one does not necessarily apply to the other, but that does not mean that the latter is less modern. An in-depth analysis of the attitudes of Estonian women converts clearly demonstrates how female converts to Islam

16

Introduction

combine their new faith with their ordinary, secular Estonian lives. While this study clearly demonstrates the role of the secular state (since Estonia is a highly secular state due to its Communist inheritance), it demonstrates even more the possibility of humans to act as agents capable of controlling their own lives and to self-reflect upon them while, at the same time, accepting the notion of religion in everyday life. L. Moosavi wrote the following chapter in which he also deals with converts to Islam; however, this case study is from the UK. What appears in the British case is a sense of dual belonging and fostering of the national English identity after converting to Islam. In that, the English who have converted to Islam state they feel more British and more proud of their nation after the conversion due to the religious freedom they have in the UK. On the other hand, they see their conversion as a possibility to build bridges and increase mutual understanding and tolerance. This is the attitude of the majority; however, there is a minority that feels they cannot be fully British anymore due to the animosity toward Islam in the UK, and due to the fact that converts to Islam are seen as traitors. This analysis clearly demonstrates human self-reflexivity and agency in which Britons are converting to obtain another identity and then self-reflect on it and on the British society, to fully and independently observe the world. The last part of the volume encompasses two chapters and deals with religion in the media, and this is also the title of this section. The first chapter is by C. Nardella and discusses the role of religion in the construction of the Turkish European identity in the Italian press with emphasis on the Pope’s visit to Turkey. The news coverage in Italy gave weight to two different imagined communities that implied a specific ideological “unity of us.” One imagined community is represented through the vision of the EU seen as a set of nations founded on Christian values, and this definition defines Europe, as opposed to Islam, seen as an external enemy. On the other hand, the EU is represented through the pluralized universe that considers Islam as an internal reality rather than an external issue. Religion is, for these discussions, a powerful discursive resource because it provides symbolism that represents anything but abstract and irrational systems of interests. In discussions on Turkey’s candidacy to the EU, religion and culture bear the central role where religion clearly becomes a cultural element performing identity functions. Much of the discourse in the Italian press is placed on the history and remembrance, and less on the actual theology. This analysis clearly demonstrates the central role of religion in stereotyping and depicting the potential “other”; however, it also demonstrates the plurality of discourses present in the Italian media and society.

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Finally, the last chapter, co-written by V. Cvetkovski-Ocokoljiü, S. Sremac and T. Cvetkovska, offers an analysis of the Serbian media and the BBC, and the way they project Croatian and Serbian identities. Similar to the Italian case, this analysis also reveals how identities are projected through religion, in that Serbs are seen through Serbian Orthodoxy while Croats are seen through Catholicism. The latter is the case in the Serbian media, while in the case of the BBC these two countries are depicted through the conflict from the 1990s, candidacy for the EU membership, as well as Serbia’s ongoing dispute with Kosovo. In this sense, a dichotomy emerges. While Serbs stereotype and determine Croats as Catholics, ascribing to them collective, religious characteristics, the BBC clearly distinguishes and stereotypes according to the conflict with which it associates news from Serbia as newsworthy only when a conflict occurs. Looking into the way the Serbian media portrays Croats it appears that the predominant discourse is religiously founded and, therefore, the Serbian media contribute to the existing prejudices against the Croats with which they are not creating an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence, but rather create an atmosphere of stereotyping. On the other hand, British news coverage is associated with the secular nature of British society, for the BBC does not express interest in the religious affiliations of Serbs and Croats, but rather places the discussion on current political events and, to some extent, on former conflicts in the region; however, the BBC also contributes to stereotyping, though not in the religious sense.

References Arnason, J. (2006). “Civilizational Analysis, Social Theory and Comparative History.” In Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory, Delanty, G. (ed.). London: Routledge, 230–241. Bauman, Z. (2001). The Individualized Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Beck, U. (1986). Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Berger, P. L. (2001). Religion, Culture, Sociology. Peter L Berger Speech on the Sociology of Religion. Washington: Winter 2001. Vol. 62, No. 4, 443. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004& res_dat=xri:pqd&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&genre=arti cle&r_dat=xri:pqd:did=000000099605020&svc_dat=xri:pqil:fmt=text &req_dat=xri:pqil:pq_clntid=55791 (accessed February 6, 2012). —. (1999). “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview.” In The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World politics, Berger, P. L. (ed.). Washington D. C. & Grand Rapids: Ethics

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and Public Policy Center and William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Bhambra, G. K. (2011). “Historical Sociology, Modernity, and Postcolonial Critique.” American Historical Review 116 (3): 653–662. Boldt, T., Bozec, G., Duchesne, S., Ichijo, A., Salvatore, A. & Strath, B. (2009). Theoretical framework (WP2): Theory of multiple modernities and European identities, FP7 Project Report, Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME), SSH-CT-2009-215949. Bruce, S. (2002). God Is Dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford: Blackwell. —. (1992). Religion and Modernization. London: Routledge. Casanova, J. (2006). “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective.” The Hedgehog Review, Spring & Summer 6, 7–22. —. (1994). Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Comte, A. ([1832–42] 1988). Introduction to Positive Philosophy. Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Davie, G. (2000). Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. (1994). Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing Without Belonging. Oxford: Blackwell. Delanty, G. (2006). “Modernity and the Escape from Eurocentrism.” In Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory, Delanty, G. (ed.). London: Routledge, 266–278. Durkheim, E. ([1912] 2001). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Oxford University Press. Eisenstadt, S. N. (2005). “Modernity in Socio-Historical Perspective” In Competing Modernities: Pluralism versus Homogeneity, Ben-Rafael, E. & Sternbug, Y. (eds.). Leiden: Brill, 31–56. —. (2005a). “Collective Identity and the Constructive and Destructive Forces of Modernity.” In Competing Modernities: Pluralism versus Homogeneity, Ben Rafael, E. & Sternbug, Y. (eds.). Leiden: Brill, 635–653. —. (2003). Multiple Modernities and Comparative Civilisations. Leiden: Brill. —. (ed.) (2002): Multiple Modernities. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. —. (2001). “The Civilisational Dimension of Modernity: Modernity as a Distinct Civilization.” International Sociology 16 (3): 320–340. —. (2000). “Multiple Modernities.” Daedalus 129 (1): 1–29. —. (1999). “Multiple Modernities in an Age of Globalization.” The

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Canadian Journal of Sociology/ Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 24, (2): 283–295. —. (1999a). The Paradoxes of Democracy. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. —. (1994). The Political System of Empires. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. —. (1987). The European Civilization in Comparative Perspective. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. Eisenstadt, S. N. & Giesen, B. (1995). “The Construction of Collective Identity.” European Journal of Sociology 36: 72–102. Fasnafan. (2012). The Sociological Perspective on Religion. http://fasnafan.tripod.com/religion.pdf (accessed January 27, 2012). Fiamengo, A. (1987). Saint Simon i Auguste Comte. Zagreb: Naprijed. Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self Identity. Self and Society in the late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1983). “Modernity as Incomplete Project.” In The Antiaesthetic, Foster, H. (ed.). Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 3–15. Haralambos, M. & Holborn, M. (2002). Sociologija: teme i perspektive. Zagreb: Golden marketing. Hefner, R. W. (1998). “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age.” Annual Review of Anthropology 27: 83–104. Ichijo, A. (ed.). (2011). Europe, Nations and Modernity. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kaya, A. & Tecmen, A. (2011). “The Role of Common Cultural Heritage in External Promotion in Modern Turkey: Yunus Emre Cultural Centres.” Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University, Working papers of the European Institute, No. 4/EU/4/2011, 7–22. Knoblauch, H. (2004). Sociologija religije. Zagreb: Demetra. Lyotard, J-F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Martinelli, A. (2007). “Global Modernisation and Multiple Modernities.” In Modernity at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 188–204. Martin, D. (2005). Secularization: Towards a Revised Theory. Aldershot: Ashgate. Mouzelis, N. (1999). “Modernity: A Non-Eurocentric Conceptualization.” British Journal of Sociology 50 (1): 141–59. Sherkat, D. E. & Ellison, C. G. (1999). “Recent Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion.” Annual Review of Sociology 25: 363–94.

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Smith, C. (2006). “On Multiple Modernities: Shifting the Modernity Paradigm.” Unpublished paper, University of Notre Dame. www.nd.edu/~csmith22/documents/MultipleModernities.pdf (accessed June 1, 2011). Spohn, W. (2009). “Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging Europe A Multiple Modernities Perspective.” European Journal of Social Theory 12 (3): 358–374. —. (2003). “Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective.” Current Sociology 51 (3/4): 265–286. —. (2001). “Eisenstadt on Civilizations and Multiple Modernities.” European Journal of Social Theory 4 (4): 499–508. Topiü, M. (2012). “Diskursi o religiji i pomirenju u Hrvatskoj: modernost i postmodernost.” In Opasna sjeüanja i pomirenje: Kontekstualna promišljanja o religiji u post konfliktnom društvu, Grozdanov, Z., Kneževiü, N. & Sremac, S. (eds.) Rijeka: ExLibris. Wilson, B. (1982). Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

PART I: EUROPE AFTER THE HOLOCAUST

CHAPTER ONE EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND RELIGION: IDENTITY, ALTERITY OR PLURALITY?1 BÉRENGÈRE MASSIGNON

Introduction The notion of alterity is an integral part of an analysis of identities and the way they are constructed. European national identities have often made reference to religion through a transfer of sacred attributes, the object of a secular kind of veneration. What is the situation for a post-national geopolitical entity like the European Union? To the extent that the Union is attempting to present itself as a political community, it finds itself obliged to define its identity, its shared values and its borders. The dialogue between the European Commission and religions has, since the era of Jacques Delors, been an important focus of efforts. Along the lines of the Treaty of Maastricht that marked a new stage in European integration, the President of the European Commission opened a dialogue with churches, and then with other religions and secular humanism. With the completion of the single European market by 1992, the definition of a European citizenship and the embryonic beginnings of a common foreign policy, the European Union stopped being a purely economic and technocratic construct. From then on, issues of ethics, citizenship and society tied to European integration arose, as Jacques Delors stated before the German churches in a speech that was to gain symbolic dimensions: “If in the next ten years we haven’t managed to give a soul to Europe, to give it spirituality and meaning, the game will be up.”2 1

This article is an extended and translated version of an article published in French: “Identité européenne et religion: altérite ou pluralité ?,” in La religion de l'autre. La pluralité religieuse entre concurrence et reconnaissance, Lamine, A.S., Lautman, F. & Séverine Mathieu S. (eds.). Paris: L'Harmattan, 261–272. 2 Speech of Jacques Delors to representatives of the German churches on February 4, 1992. Archives of Foward Studies Unit, European Commission.

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However, nearly ten years later, in 2003, the reference to the Christian roots of Europe in the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty remained problematic, as did references to Europe’s religious heritage during the Convention on the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 1999. Unlike the United States, where Robert Bellah (1967) has analysed the existence of a civil religion, or Arab Muslim states that attempt to overcome their divisions by referring to a globalised Ummah, as Olivier Roy (2002) has shown, Europe refuses to use religion as a trait with which to define itself. Through this contribution, we will try to analyse why. It seems as though Europe suffers from a symbolic deficit and has trouble employing the discourses of identity, and in this reverses alterity. It tries to resolve the difficult question: “How is it possible to integrate without excluding?” Meanwhile, religious organisations are becoming active and offer their definition of Europe. They position themselves between reaffirmations of identity and interreligious alliances. To what extent are European institutions receptive to these discourses? Official initiatives aim to implement structures of interreligious dialogue in order to integrate religious diversity into a European framework defined as multidenominational, multicultural and multiethnic. They also endeavour to define a shared ethos in reference to human rights. The line of argument is built around two pairs of notions: identity/alterity, and alterity/plurality. First of all, by using an analysis of the debates on the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty and on Turkey’s candidacy to the Union as the foundation, we will try to show why Europe prohibits itself from defining its identity via any reference to religion. We wonder if the reason that the European Union is unable to conceive of an identity is its inability to come to terms with alterity. To get past this stumbling block, we will show that Europe, as a post-national political community, is perhaps inventing a new form of community life based on the rhetoric of plurality, which replaces a dual mindset where identity asserts itself to the detriment of a rejected, indeed demonised, alterity.

Unthinkable Alterity—Impossible Identity? Europe—Two Conceptions of Nationhood with Different Ways of Treating Religious References The debate on the Preamble to the European Constitution illustrates the difficulty of founding a multinational whole endowed with a sense of shared belonging. Two ideas of Europe confronted each other, associated with two different modes of constructing national identity: that of the “spirit-nation” and that of the “contract-nation” (Jaffrelot 1991). One is

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substantialist and culturalist and is based on the remembrance of shared heritages, while the other is contractualist and universalist and is seen in the perspective of a joint future project. One leads to a reuse of religious systems, as a civilisational marker giving a circumscribed identity to Europe, while the other promotes a “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 1992) and a space of common laws (Laïdi 2005) that would result in a Europe without predetermined borders.3 On one hand, there are those in favour of references to Europe’s Christian roots. Their argument is that such references will be a factor in winning citizens over to the future Constitution, especially in the former Eastern bloc countries. The allusion to this historical fact will allow a sense of unity and specificity to develop in the European project. On the other hand there are the choices that were made in the Constitutional Treaty defining European identity around the values of human rights. Different elements make it possible to underline the European Union’s symbolic deficit. The EU maintains a specific relationship to history. National histories attempt to trace the national community back to the earliest possible period (“our ancestors the Gauls”4). By contrast, the European Union’s temporal horizon is a short one (Bellier & Wilson 2000)—that of the founding fathers (The Schuman Declaration 1950). However, the wording of the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty, as proposed by the President of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, gave deep roots to the European Union. This wording was ultimately eliminated from the Convention members’ final draft. This version stated: “Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe which, nourished first by the civilisations of Greece and Rome, characterised by the spiritual impulse always present in its heritage and later by the philosophical currents of the Enlightenment …” (May 2003). Next, the symbols of the Union (flag, anthem, motto) were adopted later (1986) and borrowed from the Council of Europe. Moreover, Marc Abélès (2000, 38) notes that the adopted anthem had no words, like the space left empty in the middle of the circle of twelve stars, summing up the Union’s symbolic deficit. Symptomatically, during the Convention it became very difficult to incorporate the symbols of the Union into the Constitution (Duhamel 2003, 144). Nonetheless, in the modified treaty the references to them will be removed (the modified treaty presented to the heads of state and government of the twenty-seven member states in a signing ceremony on December 13, 2007 in Lisbon, then submitted to 3 4

For Zaki Laïdi, Europe is not only a market, but also a shared realm of law. The stereotypical first phrase in French history books.

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each member state for ratification) at the joint request of the British and the Dutch, who see in those references the risk that the European Union could set itself up as a super-state. Finally, the refusal of any reference to Christianity was interpreted by some as a case of historical amnesia explaining the breakdown of the European project. George Weigel (2005), an American philosopher who was close to the late John Paul II, contrasts the metaphor of the cathedral, rich in architectural symbolism—an image of Europe as Christendom— with that of the cube, geometrical and abstract, functional but hollow at the centre, an image of contemporary Europe refusing to recognise its Christian roots in its Constitution, for it might then risk excluding some groups.

European Integration—The Refusal of Nationalism and of a Certain Definition of Alterity The refusal to refer to the Christian roots of Europe in the Preamble to the Constitution must be seen in the context of European history. Europe invented a specific political structure—the nation-state. However, the figure of alterity generates tensions when community membership is intended to be exclusive. In a way, the nation-state has been an essential and decisive step in the dramatisation of alterity, whose political aspects cannot be ignored. Insisting upon the allegiance of the subject-comecitizen before anything else, the nation-state has at the same time been a factor in emancipation as well as exclusion; within the national community, the individual is a citizen before being the “Other,” the bearer of private differences that have become secondary, incidental, indeed repressible; but outside of the community, the “Other” suddenly becomes a stranger that is an essentially foreigner (Badie & Sadoun 1996, 18). Europe has made Nation; it has also been unmade by the Nation (Jean Boissonnat 2005). The two world wars were set off by heightened and intractable nationalist tendencies whose ultimate form was presented by Nazism, with its myth of the pure Aryan race. European integration was carried out in opposition to a kind of nationalism that has its roots in a traditional image of the national community as something natural, confronted by an alterity considered immutable and foreign. It might be a reason why, during the Convention, the partisans of references to the Christian roots of Europe presented their viewpoint in an inclusive way, not an exclusive one; but it was not enough. They referred to the “roots of Europe, notably Christian ones.” The European People's Party even proposed two compromised expressions: one referring to the “Judaeo-

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Chapter One

Christian” roots of Europe, the other taking up the Preamble to the Polish Constitution which brings together believers and non-believers.

The Affirmation of a Post-National Community and the Long Remorse regarding the Shoah5 The experience of Nazism explains the refusal of any significant definition of identity, even an inclusive one. Paradoxically, this refusal of nationalism, defined by a radical alterity, introduces a religious reference at its margin—the European Commission recognises the importance of the Shoah in its reflections on European identity. On February 19, 2004 a seminar took place in Brussels jointly organised by the European Commission, the European Jewish Congress and the European Conference of Rabbis, entitled “Europe, against antiSemitism for a Union of Diversity.” The Commission’s President, Romano Prodi (2004), presented the Shoah as the antithesis of the European project of peace and union in diversity: The horror of the Shoah and the terrible loss of life caused by the Second World War deeply marked Europe's founding fathers too. They set out to make sure the Europe of the 1930s and 1940s could never return. The European idea was based on the determination to make sure the Europe of the future would be different—a Europe of peace, tolerance and respect for human rights. A Union of diversity where differences are accepted and perceived as enriching the whole … That is why racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism are a clear violation of all the Union stands for … Europe's cultural and ethnic diversity is one of its strengths. And along with the Union's founding values, our cultural diversity and multi-ethnic character can vaccinate us against fresh manifestations of anti-Semitism and new forms of prejudice.

Auschwitz has been raised to the rank of a memorial place of the European project, particularly in the perspective of the Union’s enlargement process. The summary of the seminar stated: “Now that 5

The Hebrew word “Shoah” means catastrophe and eradication. It is to be preferred to the word “Holocaust” which has a religious significance and means “sacrifice.” This word was used before the seventies, especially by French commentators and historians, affected by the horrors of the crematory ovens. Recently, a controversy has arisen around the utilisation of the word “Shoah” in French history textbooks because it implies the uniqueness of the Jewish genocide by the Nazis. To have an idea about this debate, see Claude Lanzmann, Le Monde, August 31, 2011.

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Auschwitz will soon be part of EU territory, constituting an eternal monument to the terrible past, the Union has a shared means at its disposal for fighting anti-Semitism.”

Alterity or Plurality? In the absence of reflection on alterity, is the European Union preventing itself from envisioning its identity? This would be a hasty conclusion. The European Union constitutes the precise example of a new way of expressing community life. The European Union as a post-national community is not to be considered in relation to the “Other,” but to others. It therefore defines itself not in relation to an alterity, but to plurality.

The European Union—Plurality rather than Alterity The Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights mentions the cultural, philosophical and spiritual heritage of Europe in the singular, whereas the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty refers to “heritages” in the plural.6 A dual conception of alterity that, in substance, opposes “us” and “them” is replaced by a conception of plurality presenting a vision of community life that is no longer qualitative but quantitative. Moreover, this quantitative vision shares affinities with market capitalism, the fundamental basis of the European project as a common market. For the philosopher Thierry Leterre (1996, 73): Plurality presupposes the experience of objects in their multiplicity; the experience of multiplicity presupposes that each object has an equal footing, that their encounter is on level ground. Plurality is a concept of quantity; alterity belongs to the register of relations and of difference.

For Jean-Marie Donégani and Marc Sadoun (1996, 115), the definition of identity through plurality is characteristic of open, liberal societies: “It is in the organisation of fundamental separations that the open nature of this system is revealed, as well as its assumption of a plurality as the functioning principle of political and social relations.” For them (1996, 119), the liberal approach then elicits a minimalist vision of the “Other”: “Making each reference to the Other, it leads to a minimalist, purely numerical conception of difference where individuals 6 The quite controversial Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights said in the singular: “Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage ….”

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are not distinguished through any particular trait, but only by the fact of being multiple.” This way of constructing identity is translated politically in two ways: the celebration of religious diversity, and the assumption of human rights as the foundation of community life.

The Policy of the European Commission on Religion— Organising Religious Pluralism The European Union, therefore, is not built in opposition to others. Its interest in inter-religious dialogue stems from this position, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001. Instead of the “clash of civilisations” (Huntington 1996), the European Commission proposes a dialogue between civilisations. The integration of Turkey into the European Union would be an exemplary political expression of this. Inter-religious dialogue has been an essential element of intercultural dialogue within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ever since its beginnings (the interreligious meeting in Toledo alongside the Barcelona conference in 1995). In addition, via numerous debate forums representing different levels of religious pluralism, the European Commission has organised an informal but structured dialogue with churches, religious communities and non-religious philosophical groups. The largest of these dialogues, the biannual briefings, bring together eighty or so representatives of religions including religious orders, as well as religious NGOs.7 This extensive forum allows for a representation of diversity within each religion, whereas the European states often prefer dealing with religions on a one-to-one basis. To a certain extent, the regulation of religious belief by European institutions is more pluralist than in the member states, a characteristic that is also found in the way interest groups are represented in Brussels (Massignon 2007). Therefore, can European institutions take into account all the positions that religious groups have on European identity?

7 The European Commission recognises the diversity of Protestant churches, of Islam and of Jewish organisations. For a list of religious organizations invited to the European Commission in chronological order, see the appendices of the book by Bérengeré Massignon Des dieux et des fonctionnaires. Religions et Laïcités au defi de la construction europénne, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2007.

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The Positions that Religions have on Europe— United Front or Exclusionary Reaffirmations of Identity? In order to gain legitimacy in the emerging European public sphere, each religion is led to present its contribution to European history in new terms, along the lines of the European Union’s motto “united in diversity” that condenses the ideal of a political community founded on the values of pluralism. The European Protestant churches call attention to their fundamental ecclesiastical plurality and their practice of intra-Protestant ecumenicalism. During the European Protestant Assembly in Budapest (March 24–30, 1992), Keith Jenkins (1993, 107), general secretary of the Ecumenical Commission for Churches and Society (EECCS), said: “We could give the European Community the gift of the ecumenical model of unity within a reconciled diversity.” Similarly, in his speech of April 19, 1994 to the European Parliament, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I interpreted the European motto “united in diversity” in light of his Trinitarian faith: “Let the meaning of Europe be one person feeling his way towards another, in a spirit of attentiveness, respect and responsibility. Diverse unity, united diversity, perhaps in the image of an Absolute that is itself Communion. Finally, Catholics and Protestants who often join forces in their lobbying in Brussels reaffirm the analogy that exists between ecumenism and the European project based upon peace and reconciliation between memories. For Hugues Déléstraz, s.j. (1987, 46): “This religious, and indeed specifically Christian, origin of reconciliation lends weight to the Churches as the European Commission’s privileged intermediaries for giving a soul to Europe.” The affirmation of a European Islam also involves the recognition of the value of pluralism, associated directly with the Koran. Article 14 of the Islamic Charter of the Zentralrat der Muslim in Deutschland says: In the transition from modernity to postmodernity, Muslims hope to make an important contribution to overcoming crises, notably the religious pluralism recognised in the Koran, the rejection of any form of racism or chauvinism and also the healthy lifestyle of a community that refuses any kind of alienating dependency.

However, by drawing on religious history to legitimise the participation of religions in European integration, some religious groups associate themselves with assertions of identity tinged with exclusionary elements.

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From the beginnings of the European project, the Popes have defined a “geopolitics of the Saints,” symptomatic of the will to sanctify Europe by marking eras symbolically. Pope Paul VI designated Saint Benedict as the patron saint of Europe, and John Paul II named Saints Cyril and Methodius as joint patron saints in line with his pan-European vision uniting East and West, Latin and Slavo-Byzantine cultures, at the risk of negating the Reform that deeply influenced the Western European conception of politics and religion (Luneau 1989). On October 1, 1999, during the opening Mass of the Special Assembly of the Synod of European Bishops, the Pope designated three joint patron saints of Europe. Among them8 was Edith Stein, a Jewish philosopher who converted to Catholicism and joined the Carmelite order, dying in Auschwitz. However, the Jewish community severely criticised her beatification, seeing it as a Catholic appropriation of the Shoah. More recently, the proposal has been made to beatify Robert Schuman, one of the Founding Fathers of European integration and a fervent Catholic, a member of the Christian Democratic movement. Founded on August 15, 1988, the Institut Saint Benoît (Europe’s first patron saint) set itself this goal. A process of beatification was initiated on June 9, 1990. Protestant fears regarding the European Union are centred on the negative myth of “Vatican Europe,” accompanied in the recent past by a more or less explicit denunciation of John Paul II’s project of reevangelising Europe. Keith Jenkins (1993, 100–101), general secretary of the EECCS, emphasises this: I suspect that one of the reasons why Protestants feel obliged to speak with one voice and to have a shared vision of Europe comes from the Pope’s call for a re-evangelisation of Europe. Many Protestants see in this desire to return to a medieval order in which the Church—in this case the Roman Catholic Church—would play a dominant role.

The Orthodox churches of Greece, Russia and Romania often present Orthodox civilisation as an alternative to permissive European civilisation (Massignon 2005). The Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church has called9 for a united front of religions in order to influence the attitude of international organisations in the struggle against “materialist, syncretic, agnostic or atheist prejudices.” 8

The others are Saint Catherine of Siena and Saint Brigitta of Sweden. This text was written in opposition to two resolutions of the Council of Europe in October 2005 that recommended the comparative study of religions in school instead of a strictly denominational approach; Europaica 81 (December 16, 2005).

9

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Some ecumenical or inter-religious alliances aim to create a critical coalition with which to confront Western liberalism. Relations have grown increasingly close in Brussels, as well as at the Council of Europe, between European Catholic organisations and the Orthodox churches in order to counteract liberal legislation on the level of morals. In a less typical manner, a group of experts made up of Muslim intellectuals— including Tariq Ramadan, close to the Muslim Brotherhood—has seen the admission of Orthodox countries into the Union as a way of weakening the Western reference to the separation of church and state: First of all, the enlarged EU will move beyond the traditional relationship between Western Judeo-Christian culture and Islam by incorporating people of Orthodox religion and culture: in addition to strengthening the role of Orthodoxy within the EU and beyond, this incorporation will transform the dialogue into a “trialogue.” Furthermore, Orthodoxy sometimes leads to behaviour, which is surprisingly similar with that of Islam, particularly in relation to secularisation which will have a major impact on, even radically change, the relationship between the enlarged Union and the Arab-Muslim world, and more broadly the EuroMediterranean dialogue. Such similarities could raise awareness of their long history and common destiny while helping to relativise and then transcend differences. (EC report, December 2, 2003, 8)

In this way, interreligious dialogue initiated by the religions themselves may run counter to the liberal ethos.

The Ideal of Human Rights—A Brother rather than the Other? The use of religious references is ambivalent depending on whether they celebrate pluralism, human rights and unity between peoples, on one hand, or whether they legitimise an exclusionary model of identity on the other. It is, therefore, hard for European institutions to build the identity of the European project upon religious positions regarding Europe, especially if these positions conflict with its democratic, liberal and pluralist ethos. More than a community of values, the European Union appears as a realm of norms that every European country makes its own according to the principle of legal pluralism regulated by the authority of the European Court of Justice. A unified horizon comes into view, not based upon a history, but in the name of an abstract ideal, that of human rights. As Durkheim points out, complex modern societies have but one thing in

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common: “their common membership in humanity” (Durkheim [1911] 1993, 45). Nonetheless, the discourse of human rights is not that of alterity but of similarity. The plural identity of Europe leads to the emphasis on human rights as the minimum basis of shared values. The heads of government, assembled during the intergovernmental conference of 2004, chose to refer to a plurality of “religious and humanist heritages” not in themselves, but as the source of human rights: “Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.”10 Similarly, the values of the Union are defined along those lines, in article I-2: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights … These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” The definition of the Union’s borders is not geographical but refers back to these values. Article I-58, paragraph 1, on the criteria of eligibility and the membership process states: “The Union shall be open to all European States which respect the values referred to in Article I-2, and are committed to promoting them together.” Human rights also guide the Union’s relations with the rest of the world (article I-3, paragraph 4). The European ideal of human rights and pluralism is not just the smallest common denominator; it is also a normative constraint that influences those who wish to participate in the European game, religious groups in particular. Thus, the European hierarchies of the Catholic and Protestant churches did not question Turkey’s candidacy to the Union by stressing the Christian nature of Europe, but by confronting Turkey with the Copenhagen criteria: human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Each of them puts forward the nonrespect of religious freedom in Turkey and their churches’ lack of status on Turkish soil. Pope Benedict XVI took up this argument during his trip to Turkey in the autumn of 2006. In this way, the European Union establishes itself as an unprecedented post-national political community. Its identity is built upon the promotion of a plurality without bringing 10

The Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty, defined by the Convention members, saw in the heritage of religion the source of human rights: “Getting inspiration from … as well as the respect of law.”

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alterity into consideration. This way of conceiving community life does not exclude a priori religious belief, but instead transforms the ways in which religious belief is publicly expressed. The complex relationships between European identity and religions are symptomatic of a reorganisation of the relationships between religions and late modernity. As Jean-Paul Willaime (1990) points out, by refusing to make politics an end in itself, the secularisation of politics reintroduces religions into the public sphere as the vector of an ethical civil religion likely to restore social interrelations in crisis. There is no restoration of the power of religions over political society, given that religions are asked to adopt, to the best of their ability, the language of human rights as the foundation of democratic society. Religious definitions of European identity are legitimate as long as they are inclusive and consecrate the values of pluralism and human rights. Religious and philosophical groups can contribute to the definition of European identity, but do not define the fundaments of European norms.

References Abélès M. (2000). Virtual Europe. In An anthropology of the EU. Building, Imagining and Experiencing the New Europe, Bellier, I. & Wilson, T. M. (eds.). Oxford/New York: Berg. Badie, B. & Sadoun, M. (1996). Introduction. In L’autre. Etudes réunies pour Alfred Grosser, Badie, B. & Sadoun, M. (eds.). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 17–20. Bellah, R. N. (1967). “Civil Religion in America.” Daedalus 96, (1): 1–21. Bellier, I., Thomas, M. & Wilson, T. M. (eds.). (2000). An anthropology of the EU Building, Imagining and Experiencing the New Europe. Oxford/New York: Berg. Boissannat, J. (2005). Dieu et l’Europe. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. Deléstraz, H. (1987). La réconciliation, un acte politique, Objectif Europe, Vol. 46. Duhamel, O. (2003). Pour l’Europe. Le texte intégral de la Constitution expliqué et commenté. Paris: Seuil. Durkheim, E. (1993). L’éducation, sa nature et son role (1911). In Education et sociologie, Durkheim, E. (ed.). Paris: PUF. Habermas, J. (1992). “Citizenship and National Identity: some Reflections on the Future of Europe.” Praxis International 12 (1): 1–19. Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Islamic Charter. (1994). The Zentralrat der Muslim in Deutschland.

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Jaffrelot, C. (1991). Les modèles explicatifs de l’origine des nations et du nationalisme. Revue critique. In Théories du nationalisme, Delannoi, G. & Taguieff, P. A. (eds.). Paris: Kimé. Jenkins, K. (1993). “Pouvons-nous parler d’une même voix?” Foi et Vie LXXXXII (2). Laïdi, Z. (2005). La norme sans la force. L’énigme de la puissance européenne. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Leterre, T. (1996). “L’Autre comme catégorie philosophique: remarques sur les fondements métaphysiques et logiques de l’altérité.” In L’autre Etudes réunies pour Alfred Grosser, Badie, B. & Sadoun, M. (eds.). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 67–83. Luneau, R. (ed.) (1989). Le rêve de Compostelle. Vers la restauration d’une Europe chrétienne? Paris: Le Centurion. Massignon, B. (2005). Les représentations orthodoxes auprès de l’UE: entre concurrence inter-orthodoxe et dynamiques d’européanisation, Balkanologie (IX) 1–2, 265–287. —. (2007). Des dieux et des fonctionnaires. Religions et laïcités face au défi de la construction européenne. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes. Prodi, R. (2003) A Union of minorities. http://www.medea.be/files/European_Coimmission_seminar_on_antise mtism_20_2_2004.doc (accessed February 20, 2004). Report by the High-Level Advisory Group established at the initiative of the President of the European Commission, December 2, 2003, Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/publication/euromed_re port68_en.pdf (accessed December 2, 2003). Roy, O. (2004). L’islam mondialisé. Paris: Seuil. Sadoun, M. & Donégani, J-M. (1996). “Altérité et altération du libéralisme.” In L’autre. Etudes réunies pour Alfred Grosser, Badie, B. & Sadoun, M. (eds.) Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 115–134. Weigel, G. (2005). The Cube and the Cathedral, Europe, America, and politics without God. New York: Basic Books & Perseus Book Group. Willaime, J-P. (1990). “Etat, Ethique et religion.” Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie LXXXVIII, 189–213.

CHAPTER TWO A EUROPEAN INTIFADA? ON THE NEW FORM OF AN OLD EUROPEAN ANTI-SEMITISM IN A NEW MILLENNIUM MARTINA TOPIû

“… May every conscience remember that anti-Semitism is always wrong and is always dangerous, may every voice speak out against anti-Semitism, and may all of us have the civic courage to take action against antiSemitism and other forms of intolerance whenever and wherever they arise.” (U.S. Department of State report, 2008)1

Introduction After the Holocaust, Europe started to unite to end conflicts and build large multicultural societies. Holocaust survivors started to recuperate and (slowly) re-integrate into European societies. However, even though the Holocaust happened in the past century, Anti-Semitism never fully disappeared from Europe. According to recent polls, it is as present as ever. On the other hand, when some Jewish NGOs, intellectuals and activists point toward the increase in Anti-Semitism and define the latest events as the so-called “new” Anti-Semitism, their opponents, predominantly from the European Far Left as well as the far left-oriented Jews, label them as too reactionary and in some instances even pseudointellectual. This chapter therefore discusses the classic and the so-called “new” Anti-Semitisms that have entered the public domain, pointing to apparent 1

This report was written and prepared in 2004, and in 2005 submitted to the US Congress. However, the report was published in 2008 and has since been enriched with information on events that occurred after 2005.

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differences between the two types of this defamation. This so-called “new” Anti-Semitism is also discussed in relation to Anti-Americanism and Anti-Zionism.2 Finally, the chapter discusses Anti-Semitism in France, a country with the largest Jewish and Muslim population in Europe. While many proponents of the “new” Anti-Semitism point towards its new shape and to Muslims as new perpetrators of anti-Semitic attacks, this chapter argues that there is nothing new in the current Anti-Semitism, but considers it as the continuation of an old European Anti-Semitism, just adapted to new conditions. The chapter also argues that while Muslims certainly act as perpetrators of anti-Semitic assaults and propagators of Anti-Semitism, it is wrong to point the finger at Muslims and take them as the focus of the analysis. This is because (a) these analyses may easily end up as Islamophobia and blaming Muslims for everything that goes wrong in the relations between Jews and non-Jews, and (b) this type of analysis shifts focus from the real problem, that of the persistent Anti-Semitism of the so-called Christian world that poses solid logistics for its enforcement.

Anti-Semitism as a Problem Anti-Semitism, in the form we know it today, has existed for approximately 2,000 years (Stern 2006); however, definitions vary and seem to be adaptable to new conditions, changing over time. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, Anti-Semitism is: “… hostility toward or discrimination against Jews as a religious, ethnic, or racial group” (U. S. Department of State report 2008, 6). This definition has been used since 1882, but it gives a broad perspective on what Anti-Semitism means and to whom it is directed. On the other hand, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), later renamed the European Fundamental Rights agency,3 has also given a working definition of Anti-Semitism as a: “… certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of Anti-Semitism are 2

The term Zionism was coined by Nathan Birnbaum in 1890. At first, the Zionist movement sought the right to return to their homeland, the land of Israel (Jewish Virtual Library 2012). 3 I will quote the report from this agency through its name when each report has been issued. This means that the report from 2004 will be quoted as (EUMC 2004), while the report from 2012 will be quoted as (FRA 2012). I will also refer to the name of this agency as it has been known during the time each report has taken place.

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directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities” (EUMC 2004). Anti-Semitism originates from the times before the founding of Israel, and conflicts over the land have continued after it (according to the Jewish Holy documents this was after being freed from Egyptian slavery),4 and some of its worst manifestations are found in destructions of the first and the second Temple (Kaplan 1993; 1996). Religious Anti-Semitism is seen as the oldest form of Anti-Semitism existing since Biblical times. This is because the arrival of Christianity brought about continuous Anti-Semitism since these two religions were competing in the Roman Empire. Since Christianity declared a new contract with God through the mediation of Jesus, with the growth of Christianity Jews were prosecuted, forced to live in ghettos, and were framed as those who murdered Jesus. This has for a long time been one of the core elements of Anti-Semitism, and this prejudice is still circulating among anti-Semitic circles (Stern 2006).5 The discrimination of Jews, after Christianity was established, continued with special taxes, distinctive clothes, limited possibilities for employment and periodical pogroms and expulsions. Jews have been accused of water poisoning, snatching Christian children to use their blood for Passover,6 and during the Crusades were tortured and forced to convert to Christianity (the Spanish Inquisition even tortured converted Jews). Pogroms and discrimination

4

This is now celebrated as Sukkot, a holiday commemorating Jewish travel through the desert on their way to Israel. During that time, according to the Jewish Holy documents, they made “sukkot” (plural from Hebrew “sukka”) or little arbours where they stayed for Shabbat. In today’s Israel, arbours are made from palm trees. For more information on Jewish holidays see, for example, Strassfeld (1985). 5 This has also spread through popular culture. One widely known example is the Mel Gibson film The Passion of Christ that lifted a lot of dust for showing the Jews as the assassins of Jesus. As Stern (2006) points out, the Jews have fallen into a trap when complaining about this movie, which only contributed to free advertising for a film that, otherwise, would maybe not have received a large amount attention due to it’s story, which has been told before numerous times. 6 Passover (Pesah in Hebrew) is a major Jewish holiday that commemorates days when Jews left Egypt and started their long journey that eventually ended with finding Israel. In popular culture, due to the influence of the mass media, Pesah has become best known for the cup of wine left on the table for Elijah should he come to take the Jews to Israel. For more information on Pesah, its meaning and complex rituals, see Strassfeld (1985).

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culminated with the Holocaust during World War II.7 Anti-Semitism, therefore, has strong Christian roots typically connected to Christianity as a religion (Salzborn 2010). However, as Stern (2006) pointed out, in the Christian world, religious Anti-Semitism decreased due to the conclusions of the Vatican congress that defined Anti-Semitism as a sin. Nonetheless, while Anti-Semitism decreased it never entirely disappeared, and particularly not from Europe (Bergmann & Wetzel 2003; EUMC 2004; FRA 2012). One of the most dangerous documents that fuelled animosity toward Jews in Europe is the book entitled Protocols of the Elders of Zion written in 1897 by Philip Stepanov. The book is fraudulent, discussing the socalled elders or Jews who are planning to conquer the world through economic wars, materialism as a replacement for religion, despotism, takeover techniques, world-wide wars, etc. However, because of the new wider circulation of this book, as well as the growth of the Internet, old prejudices and stereotyping re-entered the public domain. That book is a European project that is now spreading to the Arab world where it is being newly published and widely distributed. From the Arab countries it spreads easily, through the use of Arabic mass media and the Internet, to the Muslim Diaspora. The “Protocols” particularly underline a view that Jews are still keen to conquer the world, and this notion brings about a conspiracy theory that is, as some researchers suggest, meant to “alleviate the psychological trauma and humiliation of successive Arab defeats at the hands of Israel and the West” (Wistrich 2002, 2; Evans 2002). Nonetheless, the “Protocols” have also been broadcast in a series in Egypt, and the Arab viewers were exposed to what has been presented as a “central strategy ‘that to this very day, dominates Israel’s policy, political aspirations, and racism’” (Wistrich 2002, 2; U. S. Department of State report 2008; Bergmann & Wetzel 2003; Evans 2002).8 This practice

7

For more details on the Holocaust see Davidowicz (1986; 1976). In the Arab media, and subsequently through the rest of the world, the Jews are depicted as equal with the Nazis and portrayed as murderers keen to destroy the Muslims so that they can take over the world. Additionally, the Jewish faith is presented as immoral, often depicted through blood rituals from ancient AntiSemitism when Jews were accused of the blood sacrifices of Christian children, and for which they were prosecuted. As Wistrich points out, the “aim is not simply to morally delegitimize Israel as a Jewish state and a national entity in the Middle East, but to dehumanize Judaism and the Jewish people as such. No objective observer remotely familiar with this cascade of hate currently attaining new heights of defamation can doubt that it is profoundly anti-Semitic” (2002, 2).

8

A European Intifada?

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results in hatred toward Jews among European Muslim Diasporas that brings about uneasiness in already turbulent Jewish-Muslim relations. However, there are several types of Anti-Semitism. Stern (2006) offered a typology and identified three types of Anti-Semitism: religious, racial and political. Religious Anti-Semitism is classic Anti-Semitism related to the Jewish fate that was prosecuted by its Christian competitors, as already explained. On the other hand, racial Anti-Semitism relies on the culture of Christian Anti-Semitism. Stern (2006) argues that at the end of the nineteenth century it became common to treat Jews as a special race, although Jews are, in his view, an ethno-religious group.9 The most radical example of this racial practice is Nazi Germany that treated everyone who had a Jewish background as a Jew. The stereotyping from Christian AntiSemitism was widely used for the purpose of destruction of one whole group. Finally, political Anti-Semitism or anti-Zionism came after the creation of the modern state of Israel in 1948, and denies Jews any right to their own legal sovereignty as a nation. This Anti-Semitism exaggerates its criticism of Israel as with no other state in the world, and denies its right to existence. Stern also points out that while religious or racial Anti-Semites do not want to have Jews nearby, political Anti-Semites claim to have nothing against individual contacts with Jews, but with collective Jewish identity expressed through the modern state of Israel.

The “New” Anti-Semitism—Conflicting Positions Before discussing the so-called “new” Anti-Semitism and its perpetrators, it is necessary to consider certain statistics on Anti-Semitism since the turn of the Millennium, and the correlation between the increase in Anti-Semitism and Israeli policy. According to various statistics there has been an increase in global Anti-Semitism since 2001, and this particularly applies to Europe where some Jews have left their homes and moved to safer places due to the growth of Anti-Semitism (Baum 2009; Pew Reports 2008; 2008a; 2008b; Webman 2012). The Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism (CFCA) and Community Security Trust (CST) made an overview of the ten worst antiSemitic incidents during 2012. In that, two incidents from France and 9

There are some disagreements about this. Some insist Jews are only a religious group due to the fact they absorb converts as part of their people; however, there are also views that Jews are, if not converted, an ethnic group with dual origin of Sephardic and Ashkenazi.

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Ukraine found a place on this unfortunate list. The others happened in various other countries (Iran, Yemen, Germany, Hungary, USA and Canada) (CFCA-CST 2012). Out of all European countries, emphasis in these statistics is placed on France and Norway. In the first case, this is because the latest poll revealed that more than 40% of French people hold anti-Semitic attitudes (CFCA 2013), and these views are the continuation of what has been going on in France since the turn of the new Millennium, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Norway, on the other hand, has a place in discussions on Anti-Semitism due to its strong anti-Israeli stance, and the fact that its authorities do remarkably little to combat this issue. In contrast, in the Norwegian case, the problem is not only that its Muslim population enforces these views, it is primarily the Norwegian media and the politicians who create the anti-Semitic atmosphere in the country (CFCA 2012). Even the OSCE warned that an outspoken antiIsraeli stance is fuelling Anti-Semitism in Norway, and called the Norwegian police to do more to combat hate crimes (CFCA 2012). When it comes to the highest number of anti-Semitic incidents in Europe, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) report shows a similar story, in which the highest number of anti-Semitic incidents was recorded in France, Hungary and Sweden (ADL 2012). In all cases, the reason is the reluctance of authorities to acknowledge Anti-Semitism as a reason for assaults; however, it is notable to mention that only Hungary has the rightoriented coalition on power where the Far Right party Jobbik also participates in ruling the country. In the French and the Swedish cases, the governments are left-oriented. According to the report from the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA 2012), anti-Semitic incidents occurred in the majority of countries of the EU in the period from 2001 to 2010/2011 (depending on the availability of the national data), and the increase in Anti-Semitism is visible; however, it oscillates from year to year. As the Report correctly observes, the number of anti-Semitic attacks decreased from 2009 when operation Cast Lead was performed by Israel, but this means that the number of anti-Semitic attacks decreased to the number that existed before that operation, and not that anti-Semitic incidents as a whole are decreasing (FRA 2012, 51). Reports from the EU-funded agencies are also acknowledging the problem of the outspoken criticism of Israel and its influence on the increase of Anti-Semitism, and this increase particularly occurs when something happens in the Middle East (EUMC 2004; FRA 2012). The Arab/Muslim world remains steadily anti-Semitic insisting on old anti-Jewish prejudices according to which Jews control the world, the media, etc. (CFCA 2012a). These prejudices then, through mass

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communication and so-called “word of mouth,” spread to the Muslim Diaspora, and this fosters Muslim Anti-Semitism. Because of the general hostility towards Jews (due to Israeli policy), the perpetrators rarely face any consequences.10 Since the existence of Israel as a direct neighbour is the first problem radical Arabs are confronted with, the majority of hatred and propaganda is pointed towards Jews with an ultimate goal for Israel to disappear from the world map, and for this purpose Anti-Semitic propaganda spreads around the world. Its sole purpose is to decrease the support of the West of Israel and to dehumanize Jews (Evans 2002; Wistrich 2002). The origins of this policy were laid down by Hamas (the Palestinian terrorist organization officially known as the “Islamic Resistance Movement”11) that, in 1988, claimed that the Zionist/Jewish policy is to rule the region and then the whole world. Hamas accuses the Jews of controlling the wealth and the mass media, fuelling the French and Russian revolutions and causing World War I and World War II, all leading to the creation of a Zionist state of Israel. This policy presents the continuation of an old stereotype ascribed to Jews, according to which they are planning to control the world. This new prejudice is now placed on Israel, and Islamic Anti-Semitism is considered as a new problem that 10

However, it is notable to mention that Jews and Muslims do not have a history of conflict. Throughout history, Muslims did not interpret the Koran negatively (Wistrich 2002). In recent times, however, the Koran is interpreted in a way that suggests the Jews rejected Mohammad as their prophet solely on the basis that he was not a Jew, which is incorrect because the fundamentals of the Jewish faith, as set in the “Principles of the Faith” written by Maimonides, strongly ban the acceptance of any prophet as the Messiah if strictly determined conditions are not met (Kaplan 1993; Kaplan 1996; 2002). At the same time, Jewish faith, as set by Maimonides, strictly bans the recognition of any prophet to be higher than Moses (Kaplan 1993) who wrote the Torah (Kaplan 1996; 1993; Kushner 1997). This has nothing to do with other faiths but with the fact that the Jews are waiting for the Messiah to come to save them and to take them to the world of justice, and the prophets are not Messiahs. They are seen as righteous people, with Moses being the first and the highest due to his first relationship with God, unknown to anyone else before him. Therefore, the issue in Jewish faith is not about prophets but with the Messiah, and since prophets such as Mohammad and Jesus were declared to be Messiahs without proving so in accordance to the Jewish religious laws they were rejected, but not sentenced (Kaplan 1996; 1993; Kushner 1997). 11 The US recognized Hamas as a terrorist organization and the officials placed it on its terrorist list. Therefore, Israel has the support of the USA in refusing peace talks with Hamas since Hamas took control of the Gaza strip. However, the US support is serving as “evidence” of the “fact” that the Jews control the USA.

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has a particular strength (Salzborn 2010; Webman 2012). Much Islamic Anti-Semitism is centred on what Hamas declared in its Covenant, its founding declaration, officially entitled “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement” from 1988. The document (Hamas 1988)12 states in the preamble that: Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it (The Martyr, Imam Hassan al-Banna, of blessed memory). Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious. It needs all sincere efforts. It is a step that inevitably should be followed by other steps. The Movement is but one squadron that should be supported by more and more squadrons from this vast Arab and Islamic world, until the enemy is vanquished and Allah's victory is realised.

In the main body of the Covenant, Hamas continues to express hatred toward Israel and Jews. For example: The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him. Only the Gharkad tree, (evidently a certain kind of tree) would not do that because it is one of the trees of the Jews. (related by alBukhari and Moslem). (Article 7) There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors. The Palestinian people know better than to consent to having their future, rights and fate toyed with. (Article 13) The Zionist invasion is a vicious invasion. It does not refrain from resorting to all methods, using all evil and contemptible ways to achieve its end. It relies greatly in its infiltration and espionage operations on the secret organizations it gave rise to, such as the Freemasons, The Rotary and Lions clubs, and other sabotage groups. All these organizations, whether secret or open, work in the interest of Zionism and according to its instructions. They aim at undermining societies, destroying values, corrupting consciences, deteriorating character and annihilating Islam. It is 12 All quotations from the document are quoted without changes to the original text.

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behind the drug trade and alcoholism in all its kinds so as to facilitate its control and expansion. (Article 28) Their plan is embodied in the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying. (Article 32)

Islamic Anti-Semitism today clearly presents a threat; however, development of this Anti-Semitism would not be possible if there was no significant support from the Far Left. The Far Left,13 as Spencer (2010; 2012) outlines, has the historical issue of acknowledging Anti-Semitism as a problem. This happened before and during the Holocaust, and it is happening at present when the “deeply misleading charge of genocide against Israel from radical Islamists has the effect of simultaneously stripping the concept of genocide of its fundamental meaning and allowing for the resurgence of antisemitic projections” (Spencer 2010, 133). As Bauer (2007, 4.) argues: “the Palestinians cannot overcome Israel with terrorism or rockets, nor can Israel annihilate the Palestinian population; it remains a bloody and difficult conflict, but not a genocide.” Spencer argues that on the eve of the Holocaust: … no significant left-wing organization or theorist before or during the Holocaust appears to have grasped the radical, genocidal character of Nazi antisemitism as it was being developed. While they did provide some opposition (albeit a divided and consequently ineffective one) to the rise of the Nazis, neither of the two major Marxist organizations of the time, the Social Democratic Party or the Communist Party, grappled directly with Nazi anti-Semitism. (Spencer 2010, 136)

This policy of ignoring the mass elimination of the Jews in Nazi Germany continued even after one million were murdered when some members of the social sciences argued that the Jews were not central in the Nazi policy, and that Nazi Germany would not allow the complete destruction of Jewry (Neumann 1944; Spencer 2010). The Far Left also has a historical problem in dealing with the Holocaust, often analyzed in general terms and compared with other 13

Spencer discusses the Left in general; however, I do not think that the Left that has a problem with Anti-Semitism, but rather the Far Left. An average Left always objects to Anti-Semitism, just as they object to all other defamations.

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fascist regimes, while it ignores the question of Anti-Semitism at the core of the Holocaust (Spencer 2010). In addition, the Far Left often argues that what “we need is to think much more broadly and generally. We need to think not so much about the Holocaust, not so much about antisemitism, and not so much about Jews but about genocide, about racism, and about all its victims” (Spencer 2010, 140). As Spencer (2010) argues, at the core of the Nazi project was to destroy all Jews wherever they could be found and, thus, this was the main focus of that regime, where Anti-Semitism was turned into an official genocidal ideology. Issues of the radicalization of Anti-Semitism in a new Millennium have been recognized by scholars researching Anti-Semitism, but also by the European Union. As already mentioned, the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union issued a report on Anti-Semitism in 2012 for a period between 2001 and 2011. This Agency offered the eighth update on the problem of Anti-Semitism in the EU. As is the case with other reports offered by this EU-funded body, this report also recognizes that Anti-Semitism is alive, and that, as such, presents the problem (FRA 2012). However, it identifies so-called “secondary” Anti-Semitism that, as the report acknowledges, some call the “new” Anti-Semitism. A previous report from this agency presented a version identifying Anti-Semitism and offering a working definition. This is in line with recent debates on Anti-Semitism. When it comes to the problem of Anti-Semitism, there are two conflicting sides. On the one hand there are those who think Anti-Semitism is a problem that never fully disappeared and is on the rise again. On the other there are those who believe that Anti-Semitism is a matter of the past while, in the present, Islamophobia has taken over and thus presents the real problem (Fine 2009; 2012; 2012a). The latter group also opposes the working definition of Anti-Semitism, making attempts to force the EU to withdraw it. Fine (2009), drawing from Bunzl (2007), also defines these two groups that he calls “alarmists” and “deniers,” where the first are also the so-called “new Anti-Semitism theorists” and the second are their critics belonging to the Far Left.14 The “alarmists” see Anti-Semitism as a return of an old AntiSemitism in a new, well hidden form, while the “deniers” see AntiSemitism in present-day Europe as anachronistic and delusory. In Bunzl’s words: On the one hand are what some have called the “alarmists.” They tend to see the recent rise in anti-Semitic violence as an immediate and massive 14 Bunzl and Fine also use the general term Left; however, I am again using the term Far Left to explain their arguments.

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threat, not only to Europe’s Jews but to Jews worldwide. This is not really surprising, since anti- Semitism appears to them as a kind of historical constant. Holocaust guilt may have suppressed it somewhat in the last few decades. But now, Israel’s policies in the struggle with Palestinians are giving Europe renewed licence to openly despise the Jews. For alarmists, anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are close to indistinguishable, any critique of the Jewish state carrying potential residues of the longest hatred … Their opponents in the debate on the new anti-Semitism tend to be critics of the Israeli and American governments, and they generally make their home on the Left of the political spectrum. In the course of the debate, they have been called “deniers,” although the term is rather inaccurate given that none of them actually dispute the reality of anti-Semitism. They do, however, question its current salience. Rejecting the idea that criticism of Israel is inherently anti-Semitic, they discount a whole set of phenomena/pro-Palestinian demonstrations, angry attacks on Israel’s government, etc./alarmists regularly invoked to buttress their case for Europe’s anti- Semitism. (Bunzl 2007, in Fine 2009, 465)

Bunzl’s analysis is helpful as he also points out that the so-called “deniers” overreact in ignoring the resurgence of Anti-Semitism, and that radicalized Islam is a “potential new source of antisemitism” (Fine 2009, 466). What needs to be noted about this “new theory of Anti-Semitism” is that it sees overreacting to the criticism of Israel and anti-Zionism as an expression of the new Anti-Semitism. This does not mean that this “theory” considers every criticism of Israel as anti-Semitic, but it does define conditions under which criticism of Israel can be an expression of Anti-Semitism. On the other hand, the so-called “deniers” see the mere mentioning of Anti-Semitism as a way of defending Israel from criticism, and as an expression of Islamophobia, because radical Islam and radicalized Muslims and Arabs are blamed for this “new” Anti-Semitism. These critics of the “new” theory also claim that the “new Anti-Semitism theorists” are not sensitive to the sufferings of others, and that they are exploiting the Holocaust as a uniquely Jewish tragedy, serving only to justify Israeli actions (Fine 2012a; Bunzl 2007). The problem with “deniers” is the unclear defining of those they criticize. As Fine (2009) observes, it is always “they” who are enforcing this or that agenda. Because of that, we may add it seems as if “they” are the Jews, and this brings about the increase in Anti-Semitism and the development of a new conspiracy theory. “Deniers,” among others, claim that the “alarmists” are:

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Chapter Two … exaggerating the incidence of antisemitism in Europe; stigmatizing as antisemitic whole categories of people (immigrants, Muslims, the left, European liberals, the European Union itself); indifference to other forms of racism, especially against Muslims; dismissal of concepts that address other forms of racism such as “Islamophobia” and “anti-racism”; invoking the charge of antisemitism to obstruct legitimate criticism of Jewish communities and especially Israel; misappropriating the memory of the Holocaust for political purposes; treating antisemitism as a single, undifferentiated and timeless phenomenon from whose clutches Europe can never escape; isolating the critique of antisemitism from any broader social agenda; and dissolving the differences between an alliance against Zionism and an alliance against Jews. (Fine 2009, 467)

Nowadays, as Fine (2009; 2010) also observes, it has become difficult to even talk about Anti-Semitism because they who warn about the problem of Anti-Semitism are immediately accused of protecting Israel, even if the person expresses no intention to do so. The person is immediately accused of spreading Israeli propaganda and are “lectured” that Israel aggressively spreads such propaganda, even though the international media are full of anti-Israeli coverage, often being incorrect, tendentious and bigoted. The hostility toward Israel goes so far that the world’s mainstream media ignore when something happens to Israel, and to state that Israel spreads propaganda is itself propaganda. For example, rockets were targeted towards Israel from the Gaza strip for quite some time in 2012 before Israel responded. International media did not express much interest in that, but as soon as Israel responded to attacks from Hamas the media were full of criticism. Additionally, if someone even tries to raise a voice against this practice and expresses critical views of the other side, they are immediately faced with aggressive criticism of Israeli policy. For example, when Harold Evans (2002) wrote an article focusing on the one-sided views of Israeli policy, he received a commentary from Ghoussoub & Machover (2003) wherein his views were fully confirmed, but he was also accused of not mentioning the Palestinian side of this endless story of conflict. This response was a clear attempt to make the Israeli position relative, because if one is writing about the problems Israelis are facing that does not mean they have to write about the problems Arabs are facing due to the Israelis. This is the classical example of justification of why bad things happen to Jews/Israelis, and it has to be pointed out that there has always been “a reason” why Jews faced prosecution, such as numerous pogroms and ultimately the Holocaust. Nowadays they can face up to assaults, and this time “the

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reason” is their support of Israel, even though not all Jews support Israeli policy. The situation did not change since Evans faced these accusations; on the contrary, it worsened. Some researchers have shown that AntiSemitism and anti-Semitic attacks increase when something happens in the Middle East (Kaplan & Small 2006; Baum & Rosenberg 2010). Recently, this view has been confirmed by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency that stated its analysis of anti-Semitic incidents in the EU in a period between 2001 and 2011, showing that: “This is a strong indicator reinforcing the notion that events in the Middle East often act as trigger events, whereby people are emboldened to express antisemitic sentiments more openly. Hence, these trigger events are often translated into antiIsraeli sentiment targeting Jewish populations as a whole” (FRA 2012, 51). However, as already mentioned, what is particularly worrying is that whenever someone even mentions the problem of Anti-Semitism they are immediately silenced with criticism of Israel. The prevailing attitude is what Bunzl stated, and that is that talking about Anti-Semitism is distracting attention from the Islamophobia that has taken over from AntiSemitism as the “new” form of racism (Fine 2009). These views are supported by programmes of the European Far Right that target Muslims; however, as Fine (2009) correctly observes, it would be worth the effort to see to what extent these parties abandoned Anti-Semitism. Many agencies reported that recent Anti-Semitism is wrapped up in an anti-Zionist form, and these agencies made an attempt to distinguish where legitimate criticism of Israel stops and Anti-Semitism begins (EUMC 2004; FRA 2012). These divisions were brought to the conflict over defining Anti-Semitism, where the first group accepted the definition offered by the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC 2004), while the second rejected it. In 2012, the EUMC/FRA issued a new report defining Anti-Semitism as so-called “secondary” AntiSemitism, outlining that some call this Anti-Semitism “new” AntiSemitism (FRA 2012). The reasons why the “deniers” rejected the definition from 2004 vary from general opposition to the problem of AntiSemitism as a problem of the present to accusations that this definition only serves to justify the Israeli policy.

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The “New” Anti-Semitism—A Definition As mentioned above, Anti-Semitism has been defined by EUMC (2004), and according to that “working definition”15 Anti-Semitism is: “…a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” The “definition” also states that Anti-Semitism can be found in the policy toward Israel: “Such manifestations could also target the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. Anti-Semitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for ‘why things go wrong.’ It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits” (EUMC 2004). According to the same definition, contemporary examples of AntiSemitism are present in all aspects of everyday life and include calls for the extermination of Jews, creation and spreading of conspiracy theories against the Jews (particularly on how they control the media, economy, world governments, crimes they have supposedly committed, etc.), accusing all Jews of imaginary crimes or collectively blaming the Jews for the wrongdoing of one Jewish person, accusing the Jews for crimes committed by non-Jews, Holocaust denial and accusations of Israel and the Jews for inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust, as well as accusations of being more loyal to Israel and other Jews than to their own nations in which they are settled. What is mostly striking, and thus most dangerous, is the Anti-Semitism that comes because of the alleged crimes of Israel. As reported by EUMC (2004), Anti-Semitism can manifest itself in regard to Israel, and this AntiSemitism includes: • Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g. by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor. • Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.

15 The research on Anti-Semitism was conducted in 2002 and published in 2003, and the official working definition was drawn in 2004 and released in 2005.

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• Using the symbols and images associated with classic anti-Semitism (e.g. claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis. • Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis. • Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

This definition also emphasizes that criticism of Israel similar to the criticism of other states cannot be considered Anti-Semitism. This would mean that an Anti-Semitic person criticizes Israel when Israel allegedly does something wrong, but ignores similar acts worldwide. New work from this agency, published in 2012, continues with similar definitions of contemporary Anti-Semitism (“secondary” Anti-Semitism). The 2012 report defines “secondary” Anti-Semitism as accusations according to which the Jews manipulate Austria and Germany by exploiting their guilt for World War II, are responsible for the economic crisis that Europe has been faced with since 2008, and “characteristic of all forms of secondary anti-Semitism is that they relate directly to the Holocaust and that they allow speakers to avoid expressing open(ly) antiSemitic sentiments” (FRA 2012, 3). Additionally, this new report serves as a follow-up for the EUMC (2004) report, and in that it acknowledges that Israel-Palestine relations play an important role in “the development and expression of antiSemitism in the contemporary period” (FRA 2012, 4). This has led, according to the report, to the terms “new Anti-Semitism” and “antiZionism,” and “this form of anti-Semitism is expressed in a system of beliefs, convictions and political activities focused around the conflict in the Middle East” (FRA 2012, 4). This means that Israeli Jews are considered as ultimately responsible for the failure of the peace process, and the whole conflict has been presented as a conflict between good and the evil where Israel is assigned the role of evil. The report also clearly acknowledges that this radical view affects all Jews in the world, and accepts these actions as the new Anti-Semitism: “This credo has repercussions for Jewish people elsewhere, with the Jewish population as a whole sometimes becoming the target of this new form of anti-Semitism. Other contemporary manifestations of anti-Semitism include the denial and/or trivialisation of the Holocaust” (FRA 2012, 4). Equalization of Jews and Israelis is the most problematic component of contemporary Anti-Semitism because Jews live elsewhere, not only in Israel, and not every Jew is an Israeli citizen. On the contrary, the majority of Jews outside of Israel are not Israeli citizens and have little or no connection with Israel. This means that when Israelis and Jews are equalized, all Jews throughout the world suffer from the consequences of

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anti-Israeli propaganda. The policy of dehumanizing Israel therefore affects all Jews. This policy is particularly present in today’s Europe that is pro-Arab and, in some cases, obsessed with Israel and its policies. In this, Jewish communities in Europe are being intimidated with open calls from politicians to criticize Israeli policy and distance themselves from Israel, and this is not criticism of Israel, but Anti-Semitism (Rosenthal 2011). With this policy, Jews are identified with Israel and collectively blamed for something for which they hold no responsibility. This is why some have endorsed the term “new Anti-Semitism” to capture the resurgence of Anti-Semitism in the contemporary world, and Europe in particular. This Anti-Semitism is indeed largely centred on “criticizing Israeli policies and Zionism by intertwining such criticism with anti-Semitic motifs and by challenging the right of the State of Israel to exist. It expanded old Anti-Semitism to include certain forms of antiZionism and certain anti-Israel attitudes and practices” (Webman 2012, 224). Researches have shown that those who eagerly express anti-Israeli views tend to be anti-Semitic too. These people hold Israel as the only possible problem for the conflict in the Middle East and for the impossibility of reaching a peace agreement with the Arabs (Kaplan & Small 2006; Wistrich 1990; 2004). It is particularly striking that those who blame Israel alone for the impossibility of reaching the peace agreement ignore the Convention of Hamas that seeks the destruction of Israel, and the fact that Fatah, which in comparison to Hamas appears to be moderate, glorifies suicide bombers. Anti-Semitism is, therefore, being hidden behind anti-Zionism, and the problem is that this is coming from the European Far Left and not, as is the case with classic Anti-Semitism, from the European Far Right that caused the Holocaust, and that is, nowadays, more openly centred on European immigrants of Muslim/Arab descent. As Markovits points out, the Far Left16 can be anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic due to its World War II history, while the Right cannot (Gerstenfeld 2004). This is because the Far Left declares itself to oppose any imperialism and to be human-rights oriented. Some authors warn that being openly anti-Israeli has become a mainstream trend in Europe and that, from the news coverage, it is obvious where the sympathies are (Gerstenfeld 2004). This obsession with blaming Israel for everything that goes wrong in the Middle East went so far as to 16

Markovits also discusses the Left in general terms, and does not distinguish between Left and the Far Left. I am, again, using the term Far Left when presenting his arguments.

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accuse Israelis of not raping Palestinian women because of Jewish racism towards Muslims (Markovits & Brahm 2008). With this, a new guilt has been assigned to Israel, and this is then spread around as a form of new hatred toward Jews who are too racist to have any contact with non-Jews. In this view, since the Israeli army cannot be accused of raping Palestinian women, a new “cultural theory” is being developed according to which the Israeli army does not commit war crimes due to racism (Markovits & Brahm 2008). However, blaming Jews for everything that goes wrong is something that has existed since the pogroms and eventually led to the Holocaust. This time it is Israel that is blamed for everything that goes wrong in the Middle East, but the policy is the same—there is again “a reason” why Jews are mistreated. This is in direct connection with another new form of Anti-Semitism, as also recognized by the EUMC (2004)—the myth that Jews throughout the world are more loyal to Israel than to the countries where they live17 (see also Kaplan & Small 2006). As the EUMC document notes, AntiSemitism is also a denial of self-determination for Jewish people, and in this respect self-determination without a state, together with the history of mass slaughter that the Jews faced, seems rather incompatible. As Kushner (1997) points out, had there been an Israel during the time of the Holocaust, perhaps there would have been no Holocaust. This means that Israel is, for the majority of Jews, a sense of security that if a new catastrophe comes they would have a place to hide. And this is, then, why the majority of Jews are sensitive toward Israel; not because they have any other connections with it, and most certainly not because they are not loyal to the countries in which they live. Anti-Semitism legitimized by Israeli politics is also being legitimized with the framing of Israel as a Nazi, fascist and racist state, which is enforcing apartheid. The comparison of Israel and Nazi Germany is, 17

Since Israel is a part of the Jewish religion, attitudes and the level of attachment to the state of Israel also differ within Jewry. This is because there are three main factions in Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative and Reform, and a new faction is slowly emerging in the USA (Reconstructionist Judaism). All of these factions are, however, divided to sub-factions, and this particularly applies to Orthodox Judaism. While Orthodox, and to some extent Conservative, Judaism express strong attachment to the present state of Israel as home and consider themselves Jewish Diasporas, Reform Judaism usually (but not always) expresses support towards the state of Israel, but does not consider itself a Diaspora. There are other segments of the position of Israel in Judaism, but this chapter cannot go into detail for the issue is too complex.

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however, a means for legitimizing reluctance toward Israel and its politics and an effective means of gaining support, and this is yet again recognized as an anti-Semitic practice (EUMC 2004). After sixty years of repeating the horror of Holocaust and being taught that something like this should never happen again, all of a sudden the “homeland” of the people who faced this horror of the Holocaust is that of those who are now being framed as committing it, historically. When presented to the wider audience this is a horror, for, indeed, who else should be sympathetic to the Holocaust type of torture if not the Jews themselves? An average consumer of this propaganda does not ask themselves whether Israelis have gas chambers and concentration camps (Stern 2006; Spencer 2010), and therefore this propaganda works exceptionally well and many in the world are hostile to Israel and consequentially to all Jews. It is notable that it is the Far Left that charges Israel of this policy while at the same time ignoring the centrality of the annihilation of the Jews in the policy of the Nazi Germany. In that, the Far Left argues that the genocide of the Jews was not central to the Nazi policy, and thus it appears that the Holocaust is not to be placed on a special position in the history of the world’s genocides, but that we should consider it universally and in comparison to other policies of destruction. On the other hand, the Far Left also argues that Israel is committing genocide over Palestinians and compares Israel to Nazi Germany. This is incomprehensible because if the Far Left argues that annihilation of Jews was not central to Nazi policy, then following this it would appear that annihilation of the Palestinians is not central to Israeli policy if Israel is to be compared to the Nazis. This would be a logical follow-up to the argumentation, however the Far Left insists on sanctions and boycotts of Israel whereas it remains silent over the Anti-Semitism that still exists in Europe, and again, as in history, refuses to acknowledge the problem. On the contrary, the Far Left insists that charges of Anti-Semitism are only serving to distract attention from the Israeli policy (Fine 2010). Another problem, as Fine (2010) also recognizes, is that some critics of Israel who overreact in their accusations of Israel offer their own Jewish identity as a “proof” that criticism against Israel cannot be anti-Semitic. This is a policy of diminishing any voice that tries to raise an issue of growing Anti-Semitism in the world, and that tries to point out that overreacting in criticism of Israel and no other country in the world is Anti-Semitism. For example, some researches claim that since 1948, when Israel was founded, 7,900 Arabs and 1,500 Israeli Jews have died in conflicts, and this has attracted criticism ever since. On the other hand, Jordan in 1970 killed several thousand Palestinians, Algeria killed 100,000 Muslims, and

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Sudan killed 400,000 non-Muslims. Recently, President Assad killed 5,000 Syrians in a conflict from March to December 2011 (Baum & Rosenberg 2011). None of these conflicts and atrocities has attracted as much attention as conflicts in which Israel has been involved. This indeed brings us to the conclusion that Israel is treated differently to other countries in the world, and this can be considered as Anti-Semitism regardless of what opponents claim, be they Jewish or not. The charge of the genocidal character of Israel primarily came from the Arab world, and particularly from Hamas and Hezbollah, and these ideas have been embraced by the West, and the Far Left in particular. Spencer (2010) correctly argues that there is no evidence that Israel seeks to annihilate the Palestinians as a group. The Holocaust in this sense cannot be compared to whatever might be happening in Palestine, because while the Jewish population decreased due to the Holocaust, the Palestinian population grew, despite the alleged Israeli actions, and Palestinian children have not been snatched and given to Israelis, as was the case with Australian Aborigines. Israelis also do not have gas chambers or trains taking Palestinians to concentration camps, etc. (Stern 2006; Spencer 2010). Similarly, Spencer (2010) argues that there is no meaningful comparison between Gaza and the Warsaw Ghetto, because the Nazis did not withdraw from Warsaw, but sought to destroy the remaining Jews before their capitulation. On the other hand, Israel withdrew from Gaza, and whatever “the number of casualties inside Gaza, whether civilian or armed, it is clearly not the case that the population has been annihilated. There are, moreover, no slave-labour camps nor are there any extermination camps there or anywhere else in Israel/Palestine” (Spencer 2010, 147). Additionally, Litvak & Webman (2009) have conducted a study on the Holocaust in the Arab world where they explored various discourses. In that, some Arabs have argued that the Holocaust did not happen, while in some other instances there are expressions of regret for Hitler’s failure to finish the job. Other discourses present accusations that the Jews have provoked the Germans, the Jews have collaborated with the Germans, that Zionism is equal to racism, that Naqba is equal to the Holocaust, etc. In this last instance, Litvak & Webman (2009) argue that this change, where it exists, is a political decision meant to accept the Holocaust, not because of its importance, but because of the attitude that this is the way to have Naqba recognised as identical to the Holocaust. As Spencer (2010, 144) argues: “it has always been disturbing that sections of the Left have colluded with such arguments.” At the same time, a policy of Holocaust denial and conspiracy theories that the Jews are responsible for both world wars and the Holocaust itself

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are mere inventions, created to obtain the ultimate goal of creating the Zionist state of Israel,18 are spreading around. In some instances it is acknowledged that the Holocaust did happen, but the Jews are accused of exaggerating the numbers of atrocities. Also, there is a relativism of the Holocaust that is increasingly becoming a problem (Rosenthal 2011). This means that the Holocaust is compared to other conflicts and atrocities that came out of it, and every conflict is then called a Holocaust. Holocaust denial works particularly well in countries where the politics, as well as the majority of the population, are not willing to accept any responsibility for committing the Holocaust.19 This relative aspect of the Holocaust, as presented in the West, then finds support in countries where the Holocaust is denied, or it is denied that a certain country was also a perpetrator of it. At the same time, the Holocaust denial or trivialization also works exceedingly well within the radical part of the Muslim Diaspora that lives up to the stereotype, and this causes a lack of sympathies with the Jews and escalates into violence. The EU’s report on Anti-Semitism recognizes this remarkably well: Precisely at this point, extreme right-wing propaganda becomes employable ideologically for radical Islamist groups in their struggle against Israel, for the victim status and Israel’s right to exist are challenged by the “Auschwitz lie.” Here a learning process has taken place in which “revisionist” thought has been adopted by some people in the Arab world. The influence of these ideas is supported by a number of Western Holocaust deniers like Jürgen Graf, Gerd Honsik and Wolfgang Fröhlich who fled prosecution in their homelands and found asylum in Arab countries, and last but not least by Roger Garaudy who was hailed as a 18

Wistrich states that “One finds a growing readiness in the Arab world to believe that the Jews consciously invented the ‘Auschwitz lie,’ the ‘hoax’ of their own extermination, as part of a truly diabolical plan to achieve world domination. In this super-Machiavellian scenario, the satanic archetype of the conspiratorial Jew—author and beneficiary of the greatest ‘myth’ of the twentieth century— achieves a gruesome and novel apotheosis” (2002, 7–8). 19 For example, Croatia was a Nazi ally during World War II and committed one of the most severe slaughters of Serbs and Jews with the ultimate goal of entirely destroying both groups. However, the responsibility was never fully acknowledged. In its constitution, Croatia declares itself as anti-fascist, and antifascism is declared as of the highest value of Croatia. But in practice the Catholic Church openly advocates ethnic exclusiveness based on the Catholic faith. Some Catholic priests publicly deny the Holocaust and praise the notorious Ustasha World War II regime; however, although this is anti-constitutional and against a whole set of relevant laws nobody calls them to responsibility (Topiü & Todoroviü 2011).

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hero throughout the Middle East when he faced prosecution by the French government for inciting racial hatred. Via Arab-language media (newspapers, satellite TV and internet) in Europe these notions reach a small section of the Arab speaking population in European countries. (Bergmann & Wetzel 2003, 5)

All of this means that the Jews are being denounced because of the Israeli policy, and the connection between Anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli sentiments: … lies in this opportunity for a perpetrator-victim role reversal. In particular there is an attempt by the right-wing to compare Israeli policies with the crimes perpetrated against Jews throughout history in order to minimize or even deny the guilt and responsibility of their own nations. The fact that the Middle East conflict is taking place in the Holy Land of the Christians has led in a number of countries to a revitalisation of antiJudaist motives by church leaders, and confessional and some liberal newspapers.20 (Bergmann & Wetzel 2003, 5)

The most radical critiques of the European Anti-Semitism outlined that the European participation in enforcing of this “new” Anti-Semitism, and the fact many European countries are so largely pro-Arab and hostile towards Israel, possibly come from the possibility of freeing Europe from guilt for the Holocaust (Gerstenfeld 2004). At the same time, an old antiSemitic stereotype continues to spread regarding the alleged Jewish control of the American economy and the media, as also recognized by the EUMC (2004). However, new conspiracy theories are also directed toward Israel. One would ask how it is possible for the Jews/Israel to conquer the world (as stated in the “Protocols”) while having simultaneously conquered it already (by controlling the USA), but, when this is packed into a larger propagandistic speech/article or is spread through so-called word of mouth, it gets into the heads of consumers and ends up in stereotyping and Anti-Semitism. Nonetheless, Israel has also been accused of responsibility for the 2001 9/11 attacks in the USA (Stern 2006; Bergmann & Wetzel 2003; Wistrich 2002; Evans 2002), and in the story being spread around the public domains Jews were informed on the attack and, therefore, fled the towers prior to the attack. Shifting responsibility for everything that goes wrong

20

This report accuses the Far Right for these policies, and not the Left.

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to Jews is an old form of Anti-Semitism that is being adjusted to the current situation.21 However, although the EU and the US Congress recognized these issues, there is one world institution that has become a main part in the spreading of anti-Semitic propaganda and one-sided politics on Israel that has never been applied to any other country in the world. It is the United Nations, which supposedly makes efforts to combat racism, but such efforts are sometimes themselves racist. For example, an event that demonstrated such a practice is the conference in Durban in South Africa in 2001 that the US Delegation left as a means of protest (Wistrich 2002; Stern 2006).22 This conference produced: … perhaps the most brazenly anti-Semitic document at any international gathering since 1945. Led by Arab, Palestinian, and Muslim organizations, they repeatedly accused Israel of genocide against the Palestinian people, ethnic cleansing, and being a purely “racist apartheid state.” The so-called Israeli-perpetrated Palestinian “Catastrophe” was labeled at the Durban NGO forum as a “third holocaust.” A key paragraph condemning anti21

Prior to offering the “working definition” of Anti-Semitism in 2004, the EUMC firstly ordered a study in 2003 in regard to the Anti-Semitism in Europe, co-written by Bergmann & Wetzel (2003). The EUMC study recognized that Anti-Semitism is permanently present in Europe in one way or another (hidden or open); however, it outlines that the attacks on New York and Washington on 9/11 gave AntiSemitism a “new strength and power of seduction.” The study also acknowledges the rumours that Israel is responsible for attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, and that this type of rumour and “conspiracy theories are spreading over the Internet, which provides a cheap vehicle for the distribution of hate” (Bergmann & Wetzel 2003, preface). All of these stereotypes and prejudices come predominantly from Arab propaganda, and the consequence is an increase in antiSemitic attitudes and attacks (US Department of State report 2008; Stern 2006; Wistrich 2002; Bergmann & Wetzel 2003). 22 The conference against racism in Durban started on Saturday, and the request for a change of schedule was denied. Above everything, a preparation meeting was held in Tehran and thus Israeli NGOs could not participate. The result of the Tehran meeting is a document that accused Jews all over the world of racism and Israel of apartheid. A discussion was also held on the “issue” of whether the Holocaust should be spelled with lower or upper case with an official note “acknowledging” that certain countries claim that the Jews invented the whole thing, as if this is a legitimate view on the Holocaust. It was that conference where Arabs officially declared themselves as Semites and, therefore, incapable of being anti-Semitic (Stern 2006). In that sense, as Stern (2006) points out, does it mean that the book Protocol of the Elders of Zion is anti-Semitic when published in Soviet Union but okay when published by the Arabs?

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Semitism was deliberately eliminated from the discussions, but in an act of pure Orwellian doublespeak, “Zionist practices against Semitism” were now elevated into a major form of contemporary racism. (Wistrich 2002, 5)23

That conference also issued a pamphlet accompanied by a photograph of Hitler, displayed in the exhibition centre. The pamphlet stated: “If I had won the war there would be no … Palestinian blood lost” (Wistrich 2002, 5). The conference on racism organized by the United Nations held in 2011 was boycotted by fourteen countries24 as a means of protest against Anti-Semitism, predominantly visited by the radical Arab representatives including the notorious Iranian president who, among other things, proposed moving the Israeli state to Europe. The turn of the new millennium brought an increase in Anti-Semitism due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Palestinian Intifada on Israel. All of these events also brought an increase of Anti-Semitism in Europe and affected the Jews settled there (Bergmann & Wetzel 2003; FRA 2012). It is notable that extremist Far Right parties did not play a significant role in this new wave of Anti-Semitism; instead, it was the Far Left and radical Islam that are somewhere on the Left. It appeared as if the radical Islamist terrorism was a consequence of the Middle East conflict and Israel alone was held responsible for this. The US, according to these views, were held responsible for radical Islam due to its supposedly biased support, which comes from the alleged Jewish dominance in the US (Bergmann & Wetzel 2003). This is an old conspiracy theory, as already explained. Because of this, anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism are strongly interconnected, although they are based on assumptions where Israel is only seen as aggressive, colonialist and imperialist (Gerstenfeld 2004; Rosenfeld 2003; Kaplan & Small 2006; Markovits & Brahm 2008). Anti-Americanism is often associated with the European identity because European nationals do not have much in common, but when opposed to the USA then they are on the same side. In that, France and Germany are the leaders due to their desire to create a united Europe that 23 Because of the open Anti-Semitism, twenty-three EU countries sent low-level delegations and the conference was boycotted by Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland and the United States, while the delegation of the Czech republic discontinued its participation after the first day. 24 The same ten countries that boycotted the 2009 conference did so again in 2011, and this time Austria, Bulgaria, France and the UK joined them.

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will compete with the USA in world politics (Meunier 2005). However, what is similar between anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism is the amount of prejudices and stereotypes. Markovits points out: “These attitudes express a dislike for the American as well as the Jewish essence, character, way of life, symbols, and people. They say more about those who hold the prejudice than the objects of their ire and contempt” (in Gerstenfeld 2004). Both groups, Jews and Americans, are seen as the very essence of modernity and, thus, as “money-driven, profit-hungry, urban, universalistic, individualistic, mobile, rootless, and inauthentic” (Gerstenfeld 2004), as well as strongly attached to capitalism. All of these characteristics disable both groups in the attachment to tradition and values, something Europe claims to cherish. Since Jews, due to the pogroms, immigrated on mass to America long before the Holocaust, America has always been perceived as “Judaized” and, therefore, when talking about the American Jewry we often hear rumours about Jewish Hollywood, Jewish jazz, Jewish Wall Street, and the Jews are, in this view, assigned to hold much more power than they do, as do the Americans when it comes to world politics (Gerstenfeld 2004). Assigning Jews as holding more power than they have had been a historical issue that eventually led to the Holocaust in Europe (Gerstenfeld 2004; Meunier 2005; Pew Report 2005). Therefore, when the present AntiSemitism is enforced it is also points towards the USA as the biggest Israeli ally and also towards the American citizens that are meant to disregard their Jewish fellow citizens and oppose any support of Israel. The notion of accusing Israel of terrorist attacks on 9/11 and singling it out as the only problem for peace in the Middle East is a dangerous project meant to undermine the position of the American Jewry, well integrated into American society. This undermining is then meant to enable the destruction of Israel, and this could, as many believe, lead to a new Holocaust. In this sense, Arab propaganda, in its present shape, serves as a new form of Intifada pointed towards all Jews, but, naturally, primarily to Israel in that this time, due to the Israeli military strength, it is done through the usage of mass communication and a large amount of spin. This spin is well organized because it primarily relies on the tactic of accusing the Jews and the Israelis of enforcing their propaganda due to their influence. People, particularly in Europe, repeat this view without asking themselves how it is that international media coverage and the public space in general are so full of criticism of Israel if the Jews control the media, and if they are so successful in enforcing pro-Israeli propaganda. The latter, again, particularly applies to the European media,

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and Anti-Semitism is a bigger problem in Europe than the USA. For example, while Anti-Semitism in Europe has grown in the past decade, in 2011 it reached a historic low in the USA (YNetNews 2012), and so far anti-Jewish propaganda has been rather unsuccessful in the US.

Anti-Semitism in France France has been selected as a case study due to the fact that it has the largest Jewish population in Europe, and due to the trend of permanent increase in Anti-Semitism since the turn of the new millennium (Mayer 2007). France has been a secular country since 1905, and the principle of laicism is predominant in French politics. In that, France does not keep any information on the religious affiliation of its citizens in the national census, and the state policy toward religion is based on the Law of separation of the Church and state. Consequentially, France does not have full records of anti-Semitic attacks (FRA 2012). France is also considered as one of the core European countries that contributed to the creation of a united Europe. Indeed, and as the Greek financial crisis clearly demonstrated, France is keen to maintain its strong role in Europe, as well as build a stronger Europe that will be a competitor of the USA in world politics. France is, however, also considered as the most anti-American country (Miller & Molesky 2004; Meunier 2005) due to its aspirations in world politics. France is also, indicatively, a country with the largest problem of Anti-Semitism in Europe. Although polls showed that the French consider the Jews to be well integrated in the society and fully French, they also show antagonism toward them (Dreyfus & Laurence 2002; Goldberg 2008), and this trend has been on the rise since the turn of the new millennium. In 2012, statistics have shown that more than 40% of the French hold anti-Semitic beliefs (FRA 2012; CFCA 2013a). France has the largest Jewish population in Europe (Smith 2003; Dreyfus & Laurence 2002; Bergmann & Wetzel 2003), and its deep antiSemitic roots25 seemed to disappear after the Holocaust (Smith 2003; Dreyfus & Laurence 2002; Bergmann & Wetzel 2003). However, at the turn of the new millennium, France faced a radical increase in Anti25

The most famous affair on the wrongful prosecution of someone because of their Jewish background is the French “Dreyfus affair” that happened between 1894 and 1906 when Captain Dreyfus was accused of selling military secrets to Germans (Goldberg 2008).

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Semitism and anti-Semitic attacks. This is, as the statistics reveal, because, aside from having the largest Jewish population, France also has the largest Muslim population in Europe (Smith 2003; Dreyfus & Laurence 2002; Stern 2006; Poller 2011). Some authors call this increase a “harrowing confirmation of a trend that many say is gathering momentum: a resurgent European AntiSemitism, coming, not from its traditional source among Europe’s rightwing nationalists, but from the Continent’s growing Islamic community, egged on by the political left” (Smith 2003, 1; see also Stern 2006). This is, therefore, very different from the historical Anti-Semitism run by the radical fascist parties in France (Smith 2003; Dreyfus & Laurence 2002). According to the testimonies of the French Jews, the political climate is too pro-Arab and the incidents became more common from 2001 when Israel started the peace talks with Arabs, because support for the Palestinian cause is much higher in Europe than in the USA, and Europe remains more pro-Arab than the US (Smith 2003; Stern 2006; Rosen 2010). Anti-Semitic incidents in France dramatically increased when Israel faced the Intifada that was successfully stopped by its army, but when the peace talks started in 2001 a conflict was brought to Europe, and France in particular (Smith 2003, 1; see also Dreyfus & Laurence 2002; Stern 2006; Bergmann & Wetzel 2003). French Jews accuse the French authorities of closing their eyes to violence while officially expressing condemnation (Stern 2006; Dreyfus & Laurence 2002; Bergmann & Wetzel 2003). Another factor is the large Muslim/Arab population in France that played a role in the election campaign of the Socialist Party that took an extraordinarily pro-Palestinian side to gain Muslim votes (Dreyfus & Laurence 2002), and therefore anti-Israeli and consequentially anti-Jewish (since these two are equalized) attitudes, which resulted in the escalation of violence toward the Jews from the side of Muslims whose position, in French society, is very often questioned (Dreyfus & Laurence 2002). Although violence is not approved of, there is no will for successfully resolving it, particularly when it comes to bullying in schools (Smith 2003; Bergmann & Wetzel 2003). Poller (2011) states that the pro-Arab French authorities call Palestinian terrorists militant, citing the jihadist flotilla that attacked Israeli army humanitarians, while the terrorist attacks on Israel are justified with “injustice,” and all of this creates the anti-Israeli atmosphere reflected by the French Jews. According to some reports, many Jews left the country for Israel or the USA due to the increase in violence and harassment from Muslims that

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authorities, primarily those in schools where Jewish children are bullied, disregarded as anti-Semitic and ignored it, although it happened repeatedly (Smith 2003; Bergmann & Wetzel, 2003). In this, Muslim bullies are called “youth,” even if they are thirty-five years old (Poller 2011), whereas attacks in schools are framed as fights (Smith 2003). Additionally, Israel framed France as the “worst Western country” and feared that the French Jews might be in great danger (Dreyfus & Laurence 2002). This has happened and some estimates are showing that French Jews are leaving the country (Bergmann & Wetzel 2003; Poller 2011). What is particularly worrying is that this trend continues, as Poller (2011) points out, although the tensions in the Middle East are lower. The radical increase in tensions between the Muslims and the Jews eventually led to something that did not occur in any other country. Some Jews even publicly demonstrated in favour of Israel in opposition to Muslim demonstrations against the Israeli state. In those demonstrations, Muslims called Israel the assassin while, on the other hand, the Jews pointed out that they sing the Marseillaise, something which is unlikely for the Muslims who jeered it26 (Dreyfus & Laurence 2002). This means that both communities identify as Jews and Muslims through their group belonging, but also through Israel and Palestine. This is something that is, when it comes to the Jews, quite unusual. Although the existence of Israel and its safety forms a part of the religion, the Jews do not normally interfere too much in this kind of activity. According to some estimates, “swastikas, slogans and physical assaults against Jews in Europe had reached a frequency not seen since the 1930s when Fascism was on the rise. But in the vast majority of the cases today, the assailants are young Muslims of North African heritage whose parents emigrated to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s” (Smith 2003, 1; U. S. Department of State report 2008). Dreyfus & Laurence (2002, 7), as a sign of hope, pointed out the efforts of Muslim leaders that publicly criticized violence against the Jews because of the Israeli politics, pointing out very clearly that the “Jews of 26

This is because at a football match between France and Algeria, Muslims jeered the French national anthem, causing dissatisfaction among the French (Dreyfus & Laurence 2002). This is also a historical discourse, for the French Jews always felt French and were loyal to France. Durkheim, one of the fathers of Sociology, was a loyal French Jew who tried to distinguish France and French anti-Semitism from the German and the Russian examples. One of the distinctive characteristics of France was that the Jews were allowed to hold all social positions such as, for example, military service, which was not the case in Germany and Russia (Durkheim 1975; Goldberg 2008; Gartner 2001).

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France are not the soldiers of the Israeli Army.” The situation is, however, far from being resolved. On the contrary, had Greece not stopped the second flotilla from trying to violate the international blockade of the Gaza strip there would have been a new conflict in Israel that would have manifested in Europe. Normalization was also envisaged by the EUMC’s report (Bergmann & Wetzel 2003, 59) that stated certain activities like the “feeling of hope with regard to both the growing tolerance towards the Jews and to their ‘normalisation’ in French society.” This view was backed up with a campaign where Muslim youths were warned that burning a synagogue is equal to burning a mosque. When the EUMC report was written, the situation seemed promising. However, these estimations were wrong as attacks on Jews reached a peak in 2009. The French government, since 2004, has invested fifteen million Euros to increase the security of Jews in France and this, according to the French statistics, brought about a decrease in anti-Semitic attacks in 2010 (Shefler 2011). Nonetheless, although nothing significant happened during 2011, anti-Semitic attacks continued in France, although, according to the official French statistics and global monitoring, to a much lower extent (ADL 2011; Shefler 2011). Although official statistics showed a decrease in anti-Semitic attacks in 2011, the first statistics for 2012 show a new increase of 58% (The Local 2013; CFCA 2013). For example, in March 2012 there was a shooting in a Jewish school in France (New York Times 2012), and even though the perpetrator was caught this is not a sign of hope, because a study reveals a high level of anti-Semitic beliefs in France, and the official statistics are still not reliable sources of what happens due to the fact of French authorities’ refusal to acknowledge hate crimes due to religion or race (FRA 2012). Since statistics are showing an increase in anti-Semitic attacks in France in 2012, it is worth mentioning that these attacks happened regardless of the situation in the Middle East. For example, aside from the school shooting in March 2012, in September 2012, among other assaults, a kosher store was bombed, and in September there were no activities in the Middle East. On the contrary, Jews are leaving the country and some claim that attacks are being under-reported due to the refusal of the authorities to classify them as anti-Semitic, as well a fear of Jews reporting anti-Semitic attacks. As one commentator boldly commented in a news article: HAHAHA! The cause for the decrease is the always more violent antiSemitism that causes frightened people to under-report and unfrightened people to over-accept anti-Semitism. Taking the example of the flotilla where Israelis were attacked as a possible cause of an increase of anti-

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Semitism in France is at best ludicrous. French anti-Semitic publications on the Internet have increased significantly but are hosted by countries who do not criminalise racism, such as the USA. "The cause for the decrease is the police"… That may be true! By rejecting anti-Semitism as the cause of an incident, the police can certainly decrease the reporting of anti-Semitism. Not the real thing of course. If you break the thermometer, the temperature will not be so cold!27 (Millis 2011)

Conclusion As this analysis has demonstrated, it is obvious that Anti-Semitism exists and poses a threat to the existence of Jews in Europe. However, the reluctance from the Far Left to accept this problem while creating hysteria during every conflict in the Middle East do not help to ease the situation and the growing tensions. On the contrary, they foster Anti-Semitism. However, even though Muslim-Jewish relations are extraordinarily turbulent and probably worse than ever, as this discussion has also demonstrated, it is entirely wrong to point the finger at Muslims for the resurgence of Anti-Semitism. This is primarily because that type of analysis may lead to Islamophobia and in blaming Muslims for everything that goes wrong in Jewish and non-Jewish relations. Even though Muslims may form the majority of perpetrators of anti-Semitic assaults, these are not the actions of all Muslims and of Muslims alone.28 What is problematic, and as such should be a focus of the analysis and every activism, is the reluctance of authorities in Europe to accept the resurgence of Anti-Semitism, as well as their own bias when it comes to Israel. This bias, then, creates animosity toward the Jews. What is also problematic is the role of the media and the one-sided views and hysteria it creates when something happens in the Middle East. It is not the Muslims who hold power in Europe, and it is not the Muslims who form the majority of journalists who write biased and bigoted reports. The point of the French example is to demonstrate that whereas it is mostly Muslims who commit anti-Semitic assaults, it is the (French) authorities that refuse to acknowledge Anti-Semitism as a problem, and that refuse to investigate and prosecute such assaults. Additionally, the party that mobilised Muslim voters in France could have used other arguments to gain the support of Muslims, such as, for example, an 27

The comment is quoted in its authentic form, as posted on the website. For example, in Germany, Muslims form a minority of attackers when it comes to anti-Semitic assaults (see FRA 2012). 28

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increase of employment and a promise to work more toward the inclusion of Muslims in the French society, and not a radical anti-Israeli stance. Therefore, it is the so-called Christian world that acts as a perpetrator of the major part of contemporary Anti-Semitism, tolerating abuses of the Jews and creating an atmosphere of unbearable pressure and insecurity. We may disagree with Markovits, but his thoughts are surely something to think about. He boldly asserts that Germans have not forgiven Jews for Auschwitz, and Europe as a whole has not forgiven America for the fact that it resolved the horror of World War II instead of Europe itself (Gerstenfeld 2004). The fact that the Jews force Europe to remember the Holocaust brings forward a question of whether Europe remembers the Holocaust because it wants to or because it has to. Has it been too easy to accept Israeli Jews as perpetrators of crime and representatives of evil? Is the collective guilt for the horror of the Holocaust that Europe possibly never digested a reason for the present Intifada, expressed in an anti-Israeli stance, and the AntiSemitism that comes as a result? As Reck points out: “To remember is not a decision that you simply take one day and then start to implement. To remember is to come to an agreement with yourself to lead a different life. It is to consent to a process which will never come to an end and which will unfold a transformatory power that puts itself at risk and will never again accept frontlines and borders” (2010, 1). Due to the activities of the European Commission and the fact that not all countries experience the same level of Anti-Semitism as France, it would be an over-reaction to state that Europe is generally hostile to Jews and keen to exterminate them from its continent. However, Anti-Semitism is a problem that Europe currently has, and there might be some truth in what Markovits states. Indeed, instead of asking whether Europe has decided to remember and lead a different life, as Reck wonderfully puts it, we should first ask whether Europe has forgiven itself.

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—. (1993). Maimonides’ Principles: Fundamentals of Jewish Faith. New York: Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America/National Conference of Synagogue Youth. Kaplan, E. H. & Small, C. A. (2006). “Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in Europe.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (4): 548– 561. Kushner, H. S. (1997). Živjeti! Kako žive i misle Židovi. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus. Litvak, M. & Webman, E. (2009). From Empathy to Denial: Arab Responses to the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press. Markovits, A. & Brahm, G. (2008). “Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections by David Hirsh.” The Yale Initiative of the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism Working Paper Series 2007, 100 pp. Democratiya 12: 33–48. Mayer, N. (2007). “Transformations in French anti-Semitism.” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 1 (1): 51–60. Meunier, S. (2005). Anti-Americanisms in France. N. J.: Princeton University. http://ducis.jhfc.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/archive/documents /Meunier.pdf (accessed January 5, 2012). Miller, J. & Molesky, M. (2004). Our Oldest Enemy: A History of America's Disastrous Relationship with France. New York: Doubleday. Millis, J. (2011). “Anti-Semitism down in France.” The Jewish Chronicle Online, March 2, 2011. http://www.thejc.com/blogs/joe-millis/AntiSemitismsemitism-down-france (accessed December 25, 2011). Neumann, F. L. (1944). Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933–1944. New York: Oxford University Press. Pew report (2008). Views of religious groups. http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/09/17/chapter-1-views-of-religiousgroups/ (accessed March 2, 2013). Pew report (2008a). Xenophobia on the continent. http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/10/30/xenophobia-on-the-continent/ (accessed March 2, 2013). —. (2008b). Unfavorable views of Jews and Muslims on the increase in Europe. http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/09/17/unfavorable-views-of-jews-andmuslims-on-the-increase-in-europe/ (accessed March 2, 2013). —. (2005). Global Opinion: The Spread of Anti-Americanism Trends 2005. http://www.people-press.org/files/2011/02/104.pdf (accessed January 23, 2012).

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Poller, N. (2011). “A French Intifada.” The Middle East Quarterly XVIII (1). http://www.meforum.org/2822/french-intifada (accessed December 25, 2011). Reck, N. (2010). “The Eccentric Heart of the Christian Faith.” Paper presented at a conference on Jewish-Christian relations commemorating the 1910 World Mission Conference in Edinburgh. The conference was organized by the Irish school of Ecumenics and the Journal CONCILIUM, and held at the Trinity College Dublin between June 16–18 2010. Paper sent to the author of this article by N. Reck in person via email on August 26, 2011. Rosen, S. J. (2010). “The Arab Lobby: The European Component.” The Middle East Quarterly XVII (4). http://www.meforum.org/2774/arablobby-europe (accessed January 15, 2012). Rosenfeld, A. H. (2003). Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism: A New Frontier of Bigotry. New York: The American Jewish Committee. Rosenthal, H. (2011). Global Trends in Anti-Semitism. Remarks before the 2011 South Florida Luncheon of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC February 1, 2011. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2011/161746.htm (accessed January 5, 2012). Salzborn, S. (2010). “The Politics of Antisemitism.” Journal for the study of Antisemitism 2 (1): 89–115. Shefler, G. (2011). “Anti-Semitic attacks dropped 50 percent in 2010.” The Jerusalem Post, February 3, 2011. http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=210474 (accessed January 22, 2012). Smith, C. S. (2003). “French Jews Tell of a New and Threatening Wave of Anti-Semitism.” The New York Times, March 22 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/22/world/french-jews-tell-of-a-newand-threatening-wave-of-Anti-Semitismsemitism.html?pagewanted=all (accessed December 25, 2011). Spencer, P. (2012). “European Marxism and the question of Antisemitism.” European Societies 14 (2): 275–294. —. (2010). “The Left, Radical Antisemitism, and the Problem of Genocide.” The Journal for study of Anti-Semitism 2 (1): 133–153. Strassfeld, M. (1985). The Jewish Holidays: A Guide and Commentary. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers. Stern, K. S. (2006). Anti-Semitism Today: How It Is the Same, How It Is Different and How to Fight It. New York: American Jewish Committee. NY Times. (2012). “Jewish School Shooting in France.”

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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/world/europe/jewish-schoolshooting-in-france.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed February 22, 2013). The Local. (2013). Anti-Semitic Attacks Soar by 58 Percent in France. http://www.thelocal.fr/page/view/anti-semitic-attacks-soar-by-58-infrance#.USfz72CChRk (accessed February 22, 2013). Topiü, M. & Todoroviü, D. (2011). “Religious Identities in Croatia and Serbia: Failure or Advantage in Building the European Identity?” In Antropologija religije i alternativne religije, Sinani, D. (ed.). Belgrade: Filozofski, fakultet, 67–123. U. S. Department of State report. (2008). “Contemporary Global ANTISEMITISM: A Report provided to the United States Congress.” Washington: United States Department of State. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/102301.pdf (accessed January 15, 2012). YnetNews (2012). “Anti-Semitism Reaches Historic Low in US.” http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4300759,00.html (accessed March 1, 2013). Webman, E. (2012). “Discourses on Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in Arab media.” European Societies 14 (2): 222–239. Wistrich, R. S. (2004). “Anti-Zionism and antisemitism.” Jewish Political Studies Review 16 (3–4): 27–31. —. (2002). Muslim Anti-Semitism: A Clear and Present Danger. New York: The American Jewish Committee. http://www.jewishfederations.org/page.aspx?id=77823 (accessed October 10, 2011). —. (ed.). (1990). Anti-Zionism and antisemitism in the contemporary world. London: Macmillan.

PART II: RELIGION IN NATIONAL DEBATES

CHAPTER THREE “ADJUSTING FREQUENCIES”: NEGOTIATING BELONGING AMONG YOUNG KURDS IN FINLAND1 MARI TOIVANEN

Introduction This research is conducted in the context of increasingly politicized debates over migrant youth with Middle-Eastern and North-African backgrounds, particularly over those self-described or perceived as “Muslims.” Controversial debates over Muslim youth have been spurred by recent incidents with local authorities, including riots in Athens protesting the alleged destruction of the Koran by a Greek policeman in 2009, youth riots in Parisian suburbs in 2005, protests in the aftermath of the murder of Theo van Gogh in The Netherlands in 2004, and the controversy of the cartoon of Prophet Muhammad in Denmark also in 2004. More recently, certain high-level European politicians have publicly denounced the failure of “multiculturalism,” implicitly referring to the failed integration of Muslims in their national territories. In the 2011 Finnish Parliamentary elections, numerous members of the right-wing party True Finns (Perussuomalaiset) were elected, among them Jussi Halla-aho, notorious for his anti-immigration stance, and who was earlier charged with incitement to racial hatred for linking Islam to paedophilia in his blog. Needless to say, immigration and “multiculturalism” are now fiercely debated in the Finnish media and politics, as well as in other public forums. 1

"This chapter is part of the PhD project entitled 'Negotiations of belonging among young Kurds in Finland' by Mari Toivanen, University of Turku. The chapter has not been published in any publication; however, when the PhD will be completed it will be published in the University of Turku’s PhD database with restricted access.

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Two distinct discourses related to immigration and globalization are distinguished in the Finnish context; one concentrates on the nation’s need to become more international and open toward the rest of the world, whereas the other portrays immigration as something to be controlled and tamed, with immigrants guided to become part of the mainstream society (Huttunen 2002). “Immigrant” in this sense seems to be often understood as a refugee-originated person (from Somalia, Iraq or Iran), who is visibly different (Säävälä 2007), and carries a different meaning compared, for instance, to the North-American context. Furthermore, although persons affiliated with Islam form a minority of immigrants in Finland, they seem to be in the centre of immigration debates (see Martikainen et al. 2008). These underlying intimations suggest the role of “culture” and “religion” as fundamental construction blocks in the rhetoric of national identity politics, constructing the image of “we” as opposed to “they.” The understanding of “we Finns,” as a homogeneous collective with identifiable cultural attributes, resonates in immigration discourses (Lepola 2000) where the “immigrant” is often portrayed as the “Other.” With the increasing visibility of immigrants in Finnish society2 (politics, media, public space), the critics of multiculturalism voice concerns over the alleged incompatibility between immigrants' religious practices and the liberal values of the Finnish nation-state. A longitudinal study on the Finnish nationals’ perception of practicing Islam reveals that in 2003 one quarter of Finns considered that “Finland shouldn’t allow the practicing of Islam because it threatens our culture” (Jaakkola 2009). It is argued that the Finnish media and public discourse construe the Muslim population through the prism of religion, but seem to neglect the generational, socio-economic and other divergences within Muslim groups (see Martikainen et al. 2008; Sakaranaho 2006). The tendency to focus on religion, Islam per se, instead of discussing Muslims as individuals leads to the rhetorical construction of the “Other” characterized as oppositional and mutually exclusive (see Maasilta et al. 2008; Taira 2008; Raittila & Maasilta 2008). It seems that, in a quest for explanatory models, cultural traditions and religious practices are used interchangeably, with religion being employed in a cultural-deterministic fashion. Perceptions of the “Other” are reflected in representations, such as media discourses and social interactions (Löytty 2005) with those individuals or groups deemed, often on the basis of physical features, as the “Other.” 2

The estimated number of Muslims in Finland is around 37,000–41,000 in 2006 (Martikainen et al. 2008). The countries of origin are mainly Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Somalia, among others (Statistics Finland 2010).

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A part of the media coverage and discussions, opinion forums echo the “clash of civilizations” theory (see Huntington 1997), according to which Western and Islamic civilizations are considered culturally incompatible. This view portrays not Muslims but the Islamic culture embraced by Muslims as a threat to Western democratic values (Ibid.). Other contrasting perspectives accentuate the significance of contextual factors, which shape Muslim identities in the Western world. Proponents of this approach underline that the increased visibility of Muslim communities and organizations in European cities ought to be interpreted as mirroring the changing relationship between Muslims and societies of settlement instead of as an increased level of religiosity (Vertovec & Rogers 1998). This particularly applies to younger Muslim generations, whom several studies indicate to have adopted a more individualized relationship toward religion compared to their parents’ generation (Jacobsen 2011; Vertovec & Rogers 1998). In this sense, it is justified to question how Kurdish youth with migrant backgrounds position themselves in terms of religious identifications, (national) belonging and ethnicity. How are the perceived constructions of “Otherness” reflected in negotiations and enactments of belonging? What role do religious/ethnic identifications play in this process? For instance, does the rhetoric of nation-state identity politics and immigration discourses echo in their articulations of ethnicity? I will first discuss how various discourses have shaped the comprehension of “Finnishness” and the construction of the “Other” in the Finnish context. Following this, I will discuss the theoretical openings of “belonging” before moving to the empirical analysis on the narrations of belonging among foreign-born but homegrown Kurdish youth.

“Finnishness” Reconfigured In the twentieth century a significant part of the image construction process of the young Finnish nation-state, similar to elsewhere, concentrated on downplaying the cultural diversity of the population and emphasizing the similarities (Lepola 2000). Portraying the essence of “Finnishness” in popular literature, arts and music reflected the attempt of a young republic to identity itself as different from its neighbours, particularly the Swedes and Russians (Lehtonen et al. 2004; Löytty 2005). “The imagined community” (Anderson 1996) of Finns was long portrayed as white, heterosexual, Finnish-speaking people affiliated to the Lutheran state church (Leponen 2000). The idea of “Finnishness” was constructed

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around three powerful notions—home, fatherland and religion (koti, isänmaa and uskonto)—,which still resonate in contemporary politics.3 The image of Finland gradually transforming into a “multicultural” society implicitly gives the impression that the Finnish population was perceived as rather “monocultural” prior to the 1990s (Lehtonen et al. 2004). The Finns were considered a culturally homogeneous people until the arrival of increasing numbers of immigrants in the 1990s, and have for some time been the object of deconstruction. However, historical constructions and perceptions of national identities are reflected in Finnish immigration-related discourses (Clarke 1999), although it seems that the understanding of who personifies the “Other” has shifted. Having no prior colonial migration (for “colonial involvement” see Keskinen et al. 2009), the country was rather ill prepared to receive physically and culturally distinct ethnic groups when labour migrants and refugees started arriving in the 1990s from Russia, Estonia, Somalia, Turkey, Iraq and Iran among others. Simultaneously hit with a severe recession in 1991–1992, attitudes towards the newcomers rapidly hardened, particularly towards migrants from the Middle East region and Somalia, now constituting the largest Muslim communities in the country. Magdalena Jaakkola’s study of Finns’ attitudes towards migrants demonstrates that after two decades a majority of respondents (61%) dislikes the idea of further migration of Kurdish people to Finland (only Arabs and Somalis score higher), as well as the idea of intermarriage with Kurds (71%), with only the Roma people and Somalis scoring higher percentages. In general, however, attitudes towards immigrants have softened during the 2000s (Jaakkola 2009). Anti-immigrant discourses have also shifted from race-centred argumentation to denouncing the “incompatibility of cultures” (for “cultural racism” see Horsti [2005]), thus echoing Huntington’s thesis. Above all, the value-laden term “immigrant” (maahanmuuttaja) is often used to refer to refugee-originated groups from the Middle East and Somalia, although they comprise a fairly small part of immigrants in Finland.4 It seems, therefore, that while for the twentieth century the national “Other” of Finland was the former Soviet Union/Russia (Löytty 3 “Home, fatherland and religion” was the electoral slogan of the Christian Democratic Party (KD) in the parliamentary elections of 2011. The party leader claimed that their political agenda was based on Christian values, not on religion per se (http://www.kd.fi/KD/www/fi/vaalit/Eduskuntavaalit2011/index.php). 4 Foreign nationals originally from Iraq (2.8%), Iran (1.7%) and Somalia (3.2%) form a relatively a rather small percentage (7.8% together) of all foreign nationals in Finland (3.1%) (Statistics Finland 2010).

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2005), on entering the twenty-first century the “Other” was personified by immigrants of Middle Eastern or Somali origins, most commonly labelled as “Muslims.” Stephen Howe argues that since 9/11 a reinvention of Islam has taken place: “A vast act of ethnic cleansing has happened silently, almost without remark.” He refers to how previously named “ethnic groups” have now been lumped together under the umbrella term “Muslims” (Howe 2011). Similarly, the linguistic shift to culturally different, mostly defined as “Muslim other,” seems to have taken place in Finland. Emerging themes include determining the border conditions for national belonging and memberships, including negotiating the role of religion in the public sphere in allegedly secular European societies. Similar to several Western European cases (AlSayyad & Castells 2002), the issue of Islam and the religious identifications of Muslims mingles with debates deeming national identities as being under threat. The questions of belonging and who is entitled to it resonate in debates over how to position the “Other” in terms of “us.” Constructing the significatory boundaries for national identities swells between the poles of exclusive, biological definition and a more inclusive understanding without constraining an individual’s choice of belonging to the nation in terms of specific religio-cultural features. I argue that the process of negotiating belonging among homegrown (either self-described or otherdescribed) “Muslims” mirrors the reconfiguration of and contestations over the border conditions for national identities.

To Belong or Not to Belong—That is Not the Question Belonging is considered, first and foremost, as a set of processes, essential to the way in which human relationships are conducted (Skrbiš et al. 2007). Three adjectives seem to describe constructing a sense of belonging: strategic, context-specific and relational. Strategic. Practices that foster ethnic and religious identifications form an essential part of constructing a sense of belonging. They can function as markers of difference/sameness employed by individuals to claim or assert positioning in terms of his/her social environment. For instance, critical discourses on Islam and the “other” can create an atmosphere against which religious/ethnic identifications are used as tactics for claiming space (Scheibelhofer 2007). On the other hand, the strategic use of identity markers allows an individual to assert positionality by “fitting in.” This

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implies that there is a strategic aspect of belonging; i.e. how it is displayed, articulated and enacted. Context-specific. People negotiate social relations in terms of norms and practices and how they should behave in different contexts, connected to structures of opportunities and exclusion (Anthias 2009a). Approaches that depart from the essentialist and static understandings of identity emphasize the use of social markers of difference either as a culture of resistance or a manifestation of belonging, which produce different meanings depending on context. For instance, the Muslim headscarf can be argued to function as a visible identity marker or an instrument for resistance identity-building (Koyuncu Lorasda÷Õ 2009). Relational. The dynamics of identifying oneself include one’s own perception of who he/she is and where he/she belongs. Above all, they entail how others perceive and ascribe you (Anthias 2009b), thus revealing the relational aspect of constructing belonging. Youths with migrant backgrounds, instead of allegedly being trapped between their parents’ culture and the culture of the society of settlement, are navigating and positioning themselves in terms of various discourses and contesting the boundaries of perceived identity categories. Identity constructions are argued to be relational to an individual’s social locations (gender, ethnicity, generation), particularly in cases when categorical formations of boundaries and hierarchies produced in relation to them impact individuals’ positioning. When a sense of belonging is linked to a sense of inclusion/exclusion the question is no longer of mere identification but of being accepted as a member of a community (Anthia 2002; 2009b), or distancing oneself from it. This study employs the analytical framework of Floya Anthia for studying modes of “belonging” (2002). She argues that migrant youths’ experiences are shaped by “intersections” of gendered and “ethnicized” practices and discourses, as well as by other elements that form social boundaries. The intersectional approach is considered as a way to deconstruct or challenge the subjectivities where individuals are positioned by essentializing discourses and practices. The stories of migrant youth about their lived experiences can best be understood as narratives of (dis)location, which shed light on the claims and attributions that youths make of their own position in the world, of what they belong to (or to what not), as well as of the social resources they have at their disposal (Ibid.). More specifically they unravel how individuals position themselves in

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terms of social categories (ethnicity, gender, generation, religion, etc.) at a specific point in time and space to articulate ethnic and religious identifications. In this study I analyze how the Kurdish youth construct a sense of belonging vis-à-vis essentialist discourses, understandings of cultural/ national identities, and perceptions of “Otherness” as understood in the Finnish context, which is understood as relational and occurring at the level of representations and social interactions (Löytty 2005).

Methodology The common feature of ethnographic methods is that they attempt to describe and analyse the social interaction of “other” people (Utriainen 2002), although ethnographic fieldwork in a multicultural setting and youth studies ought to be sensitive to different kinds of “otherness” (age, gender), instead of interpreting social interactions merely through “ethnicity” (Honkasalo 2005). Having these observations in mind, ethnography can still provide a description of youths’ personal experiences within a certain time and space context (Hautaniemi 2003). This ethnographic analysis draws conclusions from data consisting of eighteen open-ended thematic interviews conducted with Kurdishspeaking youth (seven women and eleven men). Eleven identified themselves as Muslims and the remaining seven as religious, without specifying any particular affiliation. At the time of the data collection (2009–2011), they were aged between nineteen and twenty-seven. They were born in Iraq or Iran and had lived in Finland for a minimum of eight years. The interviewees were reached through the snowball technique, networks and key persons in the community. All the interviews were audio-recorded with consent and later transcribed. Interviewees’ names have been anonymized. The interview themes included experiences at school, work and the public space, transnational contacts, language use, citizenship, identity, belonging and home. Several Kurdish families arrived in Finland in the 1990s, most often with a UNHCR quota refugee status (UNHCR 2001). Although Kurds from the Iraqi side form the largest part of Kurds living in Finland, several Iranian Kurdish families spent years in Iraqi or Turkish refugee camps before arriving. As a result, many Iranian Kurdish children were born in refugee camps, including several interviewees who were born in a refugee camp on the IraqiJordanian border. In 2010 the Kurds formed the sixth largest foreignlanguage group in Finland with a total number of 8,032 persons. As for the generational aspect, nearly 40% of Kurdish-speakers are aged between 15–

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29 (Statistics Finland 2010). For empirical clarity they would be categorized as belonging to the generation-in-between migrants, as they migrated as children (Rumbaut 2007). Concepts such as honour, shame, reputation and family are used to describe the fundamental characteristics of Kurdish culture, although there exist great individual differences concerning the importance attached to these values (Wahlbeck 2005), particularly among the younger generations. I analyzed the empirical data with a theme analysis that concentrated on extracting identifiable themes and patterns from the data (Aronson 1994). These were feelings of “otherness,” particularly based on physical appearances, alternative identifications, negotiations between cultural and religious customs, and gendered and ethnicized practices.

Positioning and Politics of Visibility The marginalized position of Kurds in the MENA region is argued to have influenced the construction of Kurdish identities as the “other” in contrast to “Turkish,” “Arabic” and “Persian” national identities (Natali 2005). Although the Kurdish generation-in-between in Finland has grown up in differing social and cultural contexts compared to their parents, their “narrations of location” reflect the diversity of identifying oneself as “Kurdish” and positioning toward other constructions of “Kurdishness”: In Iran, Kurds have two cultures, depending on if you come from the countryside or the city. And then, there is a different culture depending on whether you are an Iranian, Iraqi or Turkish Kurd. And, Iran has always been more open-minded; we look at the world differently than Iraqi Kurds. (Rebuar, 27) We don’t follow religious stuff; culture is our thing, whereas for them religion is a big part of their lives … We consider them as Kurdishspeaking Arabs and, therefore, we don’t like them. (Delnia, 20)

The process of identifying oneself as “Kurdish” can be argued to entail a double-layer of perceived “otherness” and a double sense of belonging to a minority, both “back home” and in Finland (for the “politicized belonging” of Kurdish youth, see Toivanen [2012]): The only reason why Kurds go abroad is because they don’t have their own country. Wherever they are, they are refugees. For instance, I have been called many times a nigger and a refugee, but I haven’t influenced where I

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The “other” can be constructed in terms of physical appearances (Rastas 2007; Haikkola 2010; Eliassi 2010), religious dress code, or audible differences like accent (Hopkins 2007). In this study, “otherness” was narrated through categories such as “refugee,” “immigrant,” “foreigner,” “Muslim,” “Kurdish,” “non-Finnish,” and mostly based on physical markers: Before it was like a taboo to be a nigger and a bus driver, but now it’s all over the place. I remember when I was small, everybody was like, oh damn, some Bin Laden is driving again … but now people don’t talk about it. (Shoresh, 25)

The experienced differentiation may also lead to feelings of being excluded from the surrounding society, thus increasing the significance of religious and ethnic identifications as a reaction to the sense of exclusion (Anthias 2009b). Youth negotiate ethnic identifications in terms of social representations of the “other,” for instance in the media and social interactions (Löytty 2005; Haavisto 2011): We are like foreigners. When a Finn comes along, he doesn’t say, you Russian and you Kurdish, but you foreigners, so that we have kind of the culture, country that is called “foreigner” … Yes, and it includes everyone, Somalis, Russians, Kurds, Turks …. (Rangin, 23) In the army, I felt proud to look like a foreigner … I was selected to walk in front of the whole company with the armament and look everybody in the eyes. It was like right back at you, there was no other foreigner there. (Azad, 21)

Kurdish youth position themselves in terms of social representations of “otherness,” including “foreignness” that has been a typical classification of people in Finland (Lepola 2000). Everyday encounters reflect discourses of constructing and defining the “other” and can, therefore, be argued to set boundaries for feelings of belonging among those who are identified as “other” (Anthias 2002; 2009b). In some cases interviewees identified themselves as “foreigners” (Haikkola 2010) instead of with the valueladen terms “immigrant” or “refugee” that were contested. Also the term

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“new Finn” (uussuomalainen5) has been used rather loosely to differentiate recent immigrants from people who have lived in the country for longer. The narrations of youth, who positioned themselves in terms of these categorizations, echoed integration discourses: I feel myself as Kurdish, and a new Finn … It means that you have lived here for a long time and you know the Finnish culture and you are integrated … If you are integrated, you hang around with Finns, you have a Finnish citizenship and especially have completed the conscription, you are a new Finn. (Rebaz, 24)

The discourse on ideal integration and immigration-critical rhetoric6 was reflected in youths’ narrations, particularly concerning immigrants and refugees, as they distanced themselves from these categorizations. In addition, religious and local identifications seemed to be more flexible and inclusive for some interviewees, without necessitating birthright-based legitimacy claims: Well, there is no contradiction if I say that I’m Muslim because I consider myself Muslim. But, if I say that I’m Finnish, that’s not completely true. I’m not a Finn, if you think that a Finn is born in Finland, or that his parents are Finnish-speakers or Finns, but if I say that I am a Kurd, and I have been living here all my life, I don’t feel myself so Kurdish. This is a tough question, but I haven’t stressed over it. (Rezan, 22)

In this way it can be argued that the perceived identity categories are both challenged and constructed in narrations that define the borderlines for a “good” and a “bad” immigrant, as well as who is an “authentic” Kurd. Narrations emphasized the necessity of knowing “one's roots and own culture,” which some Kurdish youth in Sweden had rejected (Eliassi 2010) by trying to be more “European” (by speaking Swedish and appearing to be liberal). A sound identity based on “Kurdishness” was argued to provide a source of strength in the case of discrimination, and to prevent feelings of out-of-placeness: For example, a child of migrant background has been here since birth or arrived young, lost connection to his culture, language and lives only in the Finnish society. He is as Finnish as other Finns, but differs from the mainstream population by his looks. So he imagines he is Finnish, and part 5 6

As opposed to a “mainstream Finn” (kantasuomalainen). In the country, you should behave accordingly (maassa maan tavalle).

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Chapter Three of this society, but if one day he faces discrimination, not because of his language, his actions, but his appearances, then he asks himself “who am I?” … Then he won’t get depressed because he knows who he is, his cultural background and identity. (Armanji, 26)

Youths’ positioning in terms of identity categorizations (Kurdish, Muslim, foreigner, immigrant, refugee) shed light on the relational aspect of identifying oneself. This process took place through negotiations over “legitimate” cultural identities (Eliassi 2010) and various subcategories of the “Other.”

Finnish? … European? The “narrations of location” reflect a level of consciousness concerning the criteria for “Finnishness” determined by their surroundings in terms of birthright (jus solis) or physical appearance: I really see myself as a guest. I am a Finnish citizen, I’ve had Finnish girlfriends, Finnish guy friends, I feed Finns, I give three times more in taxes than an average Finn, seriously. But, still, I don’t manage to see myself as Finnish, because there are certain characteristics in “Finnishness” that will never draw to us … No matter how much time you spend with Finns, or in general with Christians, they won’t feel that, hey, he’s close to my heart. (Shoresh, 25)

Narrations indicated that making claims the Finnish citizenship, in contrast to “Finnishness” as cultural identity, was considered more legitimate for foreign-born youth. In a few cases, citizenship status entailed an emotional attachment in contrast to the practical dimension of increased mobility. Narrations of “Europeanness” became relevant only when linked to the practicality of a European citizenship instead of emotional attachment. Narrations also indicated that the membership criteria for identifying oneself as “Finnish” have been problematic. These narrations highlight the issue of visibility and citizenship: As a matter of fact, a while ago when I had breakfast at work, a colleague asked me whether I was Finnish, and I answered in my own way saying that I was a Finnish citizen. Then he applauded me, and said that I was the first foreigner to answer him correctly, that I didn’t say that I was Finnish, but a Finnish citizen. (Jawa, 23)

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The only difference is that now one can move outside Europe … Even if I had the citizenship, it doesn’t change me a bit, like now I am Finnish because I have Finnish citizenship … Like it doesn’t change at all the appearances. (Kawa, 19)

In some cases, citizenship status was used to contest the labelling of “immigrant” or “refugee” by others. In contrast, the label “foreigner” was seen as based on physical difference and used by youth themselves to argue that they were “not Finnish but foreigners with Finnish citizenship.” In the case of rejection or lack of legitimacy of identifying oneself with the national or cultural identity (“Finnish”), alternative identifications emerge, including “foreigner” (Haikkola 2010) or local (Open Society 2009), and religious identifications gain importance (Vertovec & Rogers 1998). On the other hand, the notion of “European identity” has been debated to represent one eventual venue for individual identifications that would, if not replace, then supplement identification with the nation-state. In this study, themes such as values of democracy, free speech and respect for law emerged in narrations concerning “Europe” and “Europeanness.” Young Kurds’ sense of “Europeanness” more resembled the description of “civic European identity,” meaning adherence to a political system whose rules, laws and rights influence their everyday lives, in contrast to “cultural European identity” as shared European heritage, history and culture (Bruter 2003).

“Adjusting Frequencies” One day I told my mom, when we were talking about this Muslim thing and terrorist attacks, that this is exactly why I have exited the religion, this is why I don’t believe in Islam. Then my mom looked at me and asked: you believe in God at least? I said that yes, but not in any contemporary religion. Then my mom was like ok, as long as you believe in God. (Rebuar, 27)

Most interviewees identified themselves as Sunni Muslims, and the rest as generally believing in God, without defining particular affiliation. In contrast to the “clash of civilizations” thesis by Huntington (1996), in some cases Kurdish youth seemed to be more concerned over the clash between Kurdish cultural and Islamic traditions instead of opposing two different religious systems or cultural traditions (for instance “Finnish” vs. “Kurdish”):

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Chapter Three I don’t think they should be mixed up; culture and religion are completely different things. Most people in our country, like men, don’t participate in children’s education a lot, and then it is explained that it’s because they are Muslims. But, the problem is not in Islam but in that man and culture that you have in Kurdistan. There are a lot of customs against Islam, but if you don’t know, you say that it’s because of Islam because it is more discussed than Kurdishness. (Azad, 21)

Certain interviewees clearly distanced themselves from what were considered old-fashioned cultural customs, including excessive patriotism and racism towards Arabs. Instead, most interviewees defended Islam, considered that it was being used as an easy scapegoat for patriarchal cultural customs, particularly concerning ideas of honour, reputation and gender inequality. This process has led to pick-and-choose strategies concerning what sort of “Kurdishness” they wished to identify themselves with (Fangen 2007). Positive “Kurdishness” (and also being a Muslim) entailed characteristics such as a strong sense of brotherhood (vs. excessive patriotism) and respect for family and parents, contrasted with lack of respect within Finnish families (Haikkola 2010). Kurdish youths’ narrations reflected that their expected behaviour is to a certain extent dictated by parental control and the Kurdish community, compared to the Finnish youth having reached the age of adulthood, particularly as far as dating and alcohol use are concerned. Some interviewees expressed that abstinence in terms of alcohol, dating, overall socialization with the opposite sex and wearing the hijab (headscarf) for girls were in line with their religious beliefs, as others expressed adopting a more individualized relationship toward religious guidelines (Jacobsen 2011). Most interviewees emphasized that this was highly dependent on the family, and not on the community itself. Kurdish youths’ “narrations of location” indicated attempts to “fit in” by downplaying “ethnicity,” which led to the strategic use of codeswitching in order to “adjust frequencies” and behave properly. This codeswitching strategy to appear more/less “Finnish” or “Kurdish” can be perceived as strategic enactment of belonging dependent on context. In the company of mainly Finnish-born friends, some explicitly expressed that they had to “adjust frequencies,” i.e. appear more “liberal” and “Finnish” to be able to fit into the crowd: When I have been with a Kurdish person, I have adjusted the frequency to Kurdish, like the same as the Kurdish one has … when I’m with a Finnish person, then I act Finnish. (Azad, 21)

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Yeah, so with Finns you try to pretend to be more liberal than you are, and with Kurds you try to pretend that you understand and respect everything … that’s why you shouldn’t do this. (Rangin, 23)

On the contrary, with their parents, relatives and parents’ friends, some acted more “Kurdish,” occasionally facing contestations over their degree of “Kurdishness”: I don’t want my parents to know that I drink alcohol because they would be angry, and I, like, respect them. (Heresh, 21) Then she said, “Who do you think you are? Don’t forget that you are Kurdish and I have come to ask your help … Don’t act Finnish to me. Don’t be Finnish, don’t sell your own culture.” Then I told her that she was way out of line. (Rebuar, 27)

This study demonstrates that the Kurdish generation-in-between youth in Finland is embedded in a range of structures and relations presuming certain behavioural norms (Anthias 2009a). The use of a particular identity markers depending on context (pick and choose strategies) points out the strategic aspect of negotiating belonging, and how they position themselves in terms of expected behaviour and gendered expectations.

Gendered Negotiations Code-switching and pick-and-choose strategies suggest situations where young Kurds conducted negotiations over what would be regarded as morally acceptable behaviour in regards to the larger community: I also tell the young people, don’t do certain things that are too much for our parents, and if you do, don’t tell them because it is not being a hero if you tell your parents that you took a girl home from the disco and fucked with a blonde. (Shoresh, 25)

The religious guidelines were mostly considered as a matter of conscience rather than as a set of strict rules and regulations. In a similar way, Islam was perceived as a way of life instead of representing a mere belief system or doctrine to follow. In terms of the strategic aspect of identifications, in negotiating between what was considered a cultural tradition and a religious guideline, individual interpretations of the Koran

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were perceived to grant women gender equality, rather than maintain patriarchal cultural traditions (Vertovec 1998). Most interviewees, who made a clear distinction between cultural traditions and religious guidelines, considered religion as substantially more modern: In religion, all men and women are equal, but culture has influenced it in a way that women would be of lesser value, and then you can see it in families in different ways … very many, even though Muslims, do things against Islam, which have more the influence of culture and old traditions, and then outsiders think it’s the religion. (Shilan, 19)

The idea of what constitutes a “proper” Muslim was contested (Hopkins 2007), and negotiations over issues concerning dating the opposite sex and alcohol use were taking place. Female interviewees expressed less space for negotiation in terms of dating before marriage compared to male interviewees, but not in terms of choice of spouse: My parents said that the most important thing is that I want to get married to the person. Some people don’t have that option, and they are told, here is your future husband, but my parents consider my decision very important, and I have said that, of course, he has to be Kurdish, and a Muslim, and good to me … That’s a good thing in my family because many people don’t have that possibility. (Awin, 19) My family, fortunately, I am so grateful that my parents are open-minded … Of course, there would be less cultural differences if the other would be Sorani or Badini-speaker, more with Arabic person, even more with a Somali and the most with a Finn. My parents will say their opinion, but finally it is my decision if I consider them. (Shilan, 19)

Explanations for different attitudes concerning dating (particularly for Kurdish women but also for men) were linked to concepts of honour and reputation, instead perceiving them as religious customs. The importance of reputation was particularly emphasized by both female and male interviewees and in relation to family honour and women's integrity. As argued by Talip Küçükcan (1999), gossip can be considered a tool of social control, setting the borders for the proper conduct through fear of loss of family reputation and honour: It is more acceptable among boys (to get married to somebody nonKurdish), but not among girls. Reputation is really important to Kurds.

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You gotta be careful what you are doing, who sees you … people start to make things up right away. (Awin, 19) Well, basically dating is forbidden for both sexes, but I have gotten the idea that boys can do more than girls because girls hold the family’s honour … that if a girl does something, it ruins the family’s reputation. (Rezan, 22) That’s why I don’t mix with the Kurdish community. They always tie parents to the child. If the child does something bad or wrong, they get parents involved and spread the word … That’s why I try to avoid them. (Heresh, 21)

The loss of honour and reputation seemed to affect both sexes, particularly in terms of marriage arrangements, when families made enquiries as to the reputation of the other partner. Concerning the choice of partner(s) in dating, rules seemed to be more flexible for male interviewees, also concerning dating with several partners before marriage and people from other ethnicities (mainly Finnish). On the other hand, male interviewees’ presence with Finnish women had spurred reactions that echoed gendered nation-state rhetoric (Keskinen 2010): You can still see old men that think like that. I have been with Finnish girls many times, and some old guy came next to me and said, “goddamit boy, don’t steal our girls” …. (Shoresh, 25)

Kurdish youth narrated belonging(s) from various intersecting locations, including generation, ethnicity, religion and gender. Their positionality, at the intersections of narrated locations, revealed that negotiations over gendered expectations take place in terms of the Kurdish community, but also in terms of “Finns.”

Conclusion Some years ago the former French president Nicholas Sarkozy stated that French identity is based on Christian values, and received a mass of criticism in a country proud of its secular traditions. This example demonstrated that the question of national identity, not to mention the existence of such a “European identity,” is a highly controversial debate, and often revolves around the perceived “Other,” i.e. Muslims and the role of Islam in Europe and their questioned sense of belonging. This issue is

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particularly pertinent among youth with migrant backgrounds (selfascribed or other ascribed Muslims) who can be characterized as professing multiple belongings. The aim of this study is to demonstrate how Kurdish youth with migrant backgrounds construct a sense of belonging and negotiate religious and ethnic identifications in terms of various discourses of inclusion and exclusion, particularly of the “Other” in the Finnish context. Themes that emerged from the data included positioning in terms of being labelled as “Other,” often resulting in “pick-and-choose” strategies enacted varyingly, depending on context. The intersection of social location of ethnicity and particularly gender (Anthias 2009b) shed light on the gendered behavioural expectations of Kurdish youth, and negotiations over cultural and religious guidelines in the identity construction process. As argued in this chapter the construction process of belonging is foremost strategic, relational and contextual. Furthermore, this study suggests that national, ethnic and supranational identities can co-exist as different layers. The importance attached to the idea of “European identity” was articulated through citizenship status, suggesting that the Kurdish youth identified with the civic European identity instead of the cultural European identity (Bruter 2003). The importance attached to national identification echoed a similar line of reasoning, where identifying oneself as culturally “Finnish” or “European” was mainly deemed legitimate through birth right, but that long residence in the country entitled youth to consider themselves as “partially Finnish.” In contrast, identification as “Kurdish” and alternative identifications (Finnish citizen, foreigner, Muslim) seemed to be more flexible identification categories, shedding light on the myriad and complex nature of identifications, as narrated by one interviewee: In Bulgaria, I was asked “where do you come from?” I said I am a Finn, a pirate Finn, because it is true. I have only lived here. It is difficult if I say I am Kurdish. Well, where from? Iran. Where were you born? In Iraq. Where in Iraq? In a refugee camp. Actually home is no official place … If I say Kurdish, it is enough. (Asa, 22)

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Clarke, K. (1999). Breaking the Bounds of Bifurcation: The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Finnish Vocational Social Care Education. Tampere: University of Tampere. Fangen, K. (2007). “Breaking up the Different Constituting Parts of Ethnicity. The Case of Young Somalis in Norway.” Acta Sociologica 50: 401–414. Floya, A. (2002). “Where do I Belong? Narrating Collective Identity and Translocational Positionality.” Ethnicities 2: 491–514. —. (2009a). “Thinking through the Lens of Translocational Positionality: An Intersectionality Frame for Understanding Identity and Belonging.” Translocations: Migration and Social Change 4: 5–20. Haikkola, L. (2010). Etnisyys, suomalaisuus ja ulkomaalaisuus toisen sukupolven luokitteluissa. In Maahanmuutto ja sukupolvet, Martikainen, T.; Haikkola, L. (eds.) Helsinki: SKS. Haavisto, C. (2011). Conditionally one of “Us”: A Study of Print Media, Minorities and Positioning Practices. Helsinki: Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki. Hautaniemi, P. (2003). “Nuoruus nopea, etnografia hidas.” Nuorisotutkimus 4: 55–57. Honkasalo, V. (2005). “Methodological Considerations on doing Ethnographic Fieldwork in Multicultural Surroundings.” In Mixed methods in youth research. Helsinki: Finnish Youth Research Network. Hopkins, P. (2007). “‘Blue Squares,’ ‘Proper’ Muslims and Transnational Networks. Narratives of National and Religious Identities amongst young Muslim Men living in Scotland.” Ethnicities 7: 61–81. Horsti, K. (2005). Vierauden rajat. Monikulttuurisuus ja turvapaikan hakijat journalismissa. Tampere: Tampere University Press. Howe, S. (2011). “Aftershock. 9/11 Ten Years On.” New Humanist 126 (5). Huntington, S. P. (1997). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaining of the World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Huttunen, L. (2002). Kotona, maanpaossa, matkalla: kodin merkitykset maahanmuuttajien omaelämäkerroissa. Helsinki: SKS. Jaakkola, M. (2009). Maahanmuuttajat suomalaisten näkökulmasta. Asennemuutokset 1987–2007. Helsinki: Helsingin kaupungin tietokeskus. Jacobsen, C. M. (2011). Islamic traditions and Muslim youth in Norway. Leiden: Brill.

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Keskinen, S., Salla, T., Sari, I. & Mulinari, D. (eds.). (2009). Complying with Colonialism. Gender, Race and Ethnicity in the Nordic Region. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Keskinen, S. (2010). Borders of the Finnish Nation. Media, Politics and Rape by “Foreign” Perpetrators. In Media in Motion. Cultural Complexity and Migration in the Nordic Region, Eide, E. & Nikunen, K. (eds.). Farnham: Ashgate. Koyuncu, L. B. (2009). “The Headscarf and ‘Resistance Identity Building’: A Case Study on Headscarf-Wearing in Amsterdam.” Women’s Studies International Forum 32: 453–462. Küçükcan, T. (1999). Politics of Ethnicity, Identity and Religion. Turkish Muslims in Britain. London: Ashgate Publishing. Lepola, O. (2000). Ulkomaalaisesta suomenmaalaiseksi. Monikulttuurisuus, kansalaisuus ja suomalaisuus 1990-luvun maahanmuuttopoliittisessa keskustelussa. Helsinki: SKS. Löytty, O. (ed.). (2005). Rajanylityksiä. Tutkimusreittejä toiseuden tuolle puolen. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Maasilta, M., Rahkonen. J. & Raittila, P. (2008). Islam suomalaisissa joukkoviestimissä. Tampere: CityOffset Oy. Martikainen, T., Sakaranaho, T. & Juntunen, M. (2008). Islam Suomessa: muslimitarjessa, mediassa ja yhteiskunnassa. Helsinki: SKS. Natali, D. (2005). The Kurds and the State. Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey and Iran. New York: Syracuse University Press. Nezar, A. & Castells, M. (eds.). (2002). Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam. Politics: Culture and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization. Lanham: Lexington Books. Open Society Institute. (2009). Muslims in Europe. A report on 11 EU cities. New York, London, Budapest. Raittila, P. & Maasilta, M. (2008). Silmäyksiä Islamin esittämiseen suomalaisessa journalismissa. In Islam Suomessa: muslimit arjessa, mediassa ja yhteiskunnassa, Martikainen, T., Sakaranaho, T. & Juntunen, M. (eds.). Helsinki: SKS. Rastas, A. (2007). Rasismi lasten ja nuorten arjessa: Transnationaalit juuret ja monikulttuuristuva Suomi. Tampere: Tampere University Press. Rumbaut, R. G. (2007). “Ages, Life Stages and Generational Cohorts.” In Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Portes, A. & Dewind, J. (eds.). New York: Berghahn Books. Sakaranaho, T. (2006). Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-Reading Finland and Ireland. Leiden: Brill.

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Scheibelhofer, P. (2007). “His-Stories of Belonging: Young SecondGeneration Turkish Men in Austria.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 28 (3): 317–330. Skrbiš, Z., Loretta, B. & Poynting, S. (2007). “Introduction—Negotiating Belonging: Migration and Generations.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 28: 261–269. Statistics Finland. (2010). http://pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/vaerak_fi.asp (accessed September 21, 2011). Säävälä, M. (2007). “How Do Locals in Finland Identify Resident Foreigners?” Finnish Yearbook of Population Research 43: 115–130. Taira, T. (2008). Islamin muuttuva julkisuuskuva: tapaustutkimus Helsingin Sanomista 1946-1994. In Islam Suomessa: muslimit arjessa, mediassa ja yhteiskunnassa, Martikainen, T., Sakaranaho, T. & Juntunen, M. (eds.). Helsinki: SKS. Toivanen, M. (2012). “Politicized Belonging among Iranian Kurds in Finland.” In Methodological Nationalism – Transnational Reality: Crossing Civic Cultural Borderlines, Ahponen, P.–L. (ed.). Helsinki: SKH. UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2001). “Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Geneva: UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research. Vertovec, S. & Rogers, A. (eds.). (1998). Muslim European Youth. Reproducing Ethnicity, Religion, Culture. London: Ashgate Publishing. Wahlbeck, Ö. (2005). Kurds in Finland. In Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World, Melvin, E., Carol, R. E. & Skoggard. I. (eds.), 1004–1010. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.

CHAPTER FOUR RELIGION IN EDUCATION: THE FAITH SCHOOL DEBATES IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN ATSUKO ICHIJO

Introduction Questioning the legitimacy of conventional secularisation theory is no longer an act of dissent. Some of its once-prominent proponents, including Peter Berger, have been engaged with the re-examination of its utility, and competing views, such as the desecularisation theory, have been proposed (Berger 1999; Martin 2005). This chapter is agnostic in relation to the secularisation-desecularisation debate. Its aim is not to verify or falsify either of these theories. Instead, the chapter aims to achieve a better understanding of the place of religion in contemporary society by examining the ways in which the issue—the place of religion in society— is discussed and made sense of by a variety of actors. In particular, the chapter focuses on the so-called faith school debates in England. The narrowing of the focus from Britain to England is necessary due to the decentralised nature of the British education system, and the complex state-religion relationship in the contemporary United Kingdom. While two of the three constituent nations of the UK have their own established church (the Church of England in England and the Church of Scotland in Scotland), there is no established church in Wales. The issue of the place of religion in society, therefore, necessarily manifests as an issue peculiar to each constituent nation. This chapter acknowledges that focusing on the English case as a representative of contemporary British society carries the risk of being accused of conflating England with Britain or the UK, but maintains that the only way of approaching the issue of the place of religion in society, especially in education in the contemporary UK, is to

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focus on how the issue emerges and is experienced in each constituent nation. In discussing religion in society the UK is often seen as representing “Northern European religiosity,” which is marked by low religious participation in terms of church attendance and performing payer (Norris & Inglehart 2004, 84). It is accepted that the UK as a whole has been showing a sign of marked secularisation as far as Christianity is concerned since the 1960s. However, it is not yet clear if the same tendency can be confirmed amongst minority religions. While the statistics on Christians’ behaviour continue to support the secularisation thesis, Grace Davie has challenged the adequacy of applying the secularisation theory to Britain by introducing the concept of “believing without belonging” to point to changes in religious behavioural patterns (Davie 1994). The UK is not a secular state with two established churches in three of its constituent nations, with the Queen heading one of them (Church of England), while at the same time being seen as more secular compared to the United States in which politicians routinely evoke God. This chapter investigates the ways in which the issue of religion in education manifests itself in this chaotic context.

Methodology The data discussed in this chapter was collected through a series of indepth interviews conducted with representatives of civil society organisations and private individuals in 2010. The fieldwork was conducted for an FP7 project “Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME),” which investigates various expressions of European identities in nine countries in and around Europe.1 Fifteen interviews with representatives of civil society organisations were conducted and twentysix private individuals were also recruited. The respondents were asked questions about four issues in education (the rise in university tuition fees, the faith school debate, citizenship education and the expansion of academies), which were identified as key points of contestation in the field of education in the UK over the past ten years. The interviews were recorded with their consent and then transcribed.2 1 IME is a collaborative research project funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) under the Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities (SSH-CT-2009-215949). Project website: http://fass.kingston.ac.uk/research/european/ime/ 2 Further details of the fieldwork are available from the author upon request.

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The analysis of the interview data is, in the first instance, guided by the grounded theory, a theory for qualitative analysis of discourse originally proposed by Glaser & Strauss in 1967. Although grounded theory has now evolved beyond its original framework, it is still seen as providing a useful set of basic strategies for discourse analysis (Pidgeon & Henwood 2004). Following the “spirit” of the grounded theory approach shared by a number of scholars, the material is first analysed to capture the “emergent,” that is, the insights that emerge from the repetition of observation, note-taking and categorising (Glaser 1992; Glaser & Strauss 1967). This will minimise the researcher’s imposition of his/her own preconceived categories and will also allow a deeper contextualisation of the analysis by repeatedly checking the categorised, emerging, converging and changing. When the “emergent” is captured the perspective of critical discourse analysis is adopted, which “takes consideration of the context of language use to be crucial,” because political utterances are part of the historically and culturally determined political process (Wodak 2001a, 1). In particular, the analysis looks for the argumentation strategies employed by the interviewees as suggested in critical discourse analysis in order to understand what place Europe, nation and modernity have in their understanding of the world, since argument strategies are content related devices that lead to a conclusion and a statement of one’s position (Wodak et al. 1999, 34; Wodak 2001b, 73–77).

The Case Study Background Full time education between the age of five and sixteen is compulsory across the UK, and in England primary and secondary education is provided by a mixture of the state and private sectors. It is estimated that about 93% of English pupils attend state-funded schools while the rest attend independent schools, which are provided by the private sector. While there is no clear figure available, anecdotal evidence suggests that the majority of ethnic-minority children attend state-funded schools. When the place of religion in education becomes a topic for public debates it usually refers to the situation in state-funded schools. State-funded schools can come in various forms. If they are entirely under the control of local authorities they are called “community schools”; others are classified as “voluntary controlled schools,” “voluntary aided schools” and “foundation schools,” depending on the degree of independence

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from local authority control. So-called “faith schools,” more formally known as “schools with a religious character,” are found in the latter three categories. According to the Department of Education (2010), as of January 2010, there are: ·616 secondary schools with a religious character (18% of all secondary schools), educating 565,120 secondary pupils (17% of all secondary pupils) ·6,216 primary schools with a religious character (37% of all primary schools) educating 1,206,540 primary pupils (29% of all primary pupils). Of all faith schools, around 68% are Church of England schools and 30% are Catholic schools. There are fifty-four non-Christian denominational schools, comprising thirty-eight Jewish schools, eleven Muslim schools, three Sikh schools and one each for Greek Orthodox and Hindu schools (Department of Education 2011). The school governance structure and practice in England is highly decentralized, with the local authority in the decision-making position. Furthermore, the power of the school head is comparatively stronger than in other countries and many issues are dealt with on a school-to-school basis. This has been pointed out as one of the reasons why the wearing of a religious symbol (both by pupils and teachers) in schools in England has not become salient as a national issue but has tended to be treated as a local issue, in contrast to the French case in particular (Jokkpe 2009). In England, therefore, when the place of religion in schools is debated, the focus is more on public funding of faith schools than on religious symbols in schools.

The Faith School Debate—Civil Society Actors’ Views The fieldwork was successful in soliciting responses on the faith school debate. This may be to do with the fact that there was a surge of public debate on secularism and the role of religion in society triggered by a series of TV programmes presented by vocal atheist Richard Dawkins3 3

Richard Dawkins’ Age of Reason series broadcast in August 2010 on Channel 4 (http://www.channel4.com/programmes/themes/richard-dawkins-age-of-reason). He was also a prominent supporter of the so-called atheist bus campaign, which included putting an advert with words “There’s probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life” on London buses in January 2009.

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and the papal visit in September 2010 in which the Pope warned against the rise of an “aggressive form of secularism” in the developed world, a statement which the Archbishop of Canterbury supported. From the supporters of public funding of faith schools, two interviews with those who were engaged with providing education in the Church of England were carried out. Two further interviews with the members of the education committee of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and one with a Jewish organisation took place. In regard to the critics of public funding of faith schools, one interview with a think tank that has a pivotal role in bringing together voices opposing the state funding of faith schools was carried out, as well as one with an educational trade union that has an official policy on faith schools. A further two interviews with humanist organisations were also carried out. The supporters of public funding of faith schools mobilised a variety of argumentation techniques in articulating their position. One of the ways of approaching this was to refocus the topic on faith schools in general and to cite “freedom of choice” as the major justification. This could be presented as a universalistic idea of “parental choice,” in that parents should have the final say in how their children should be brought up. The Jewish organisation representative summed it up concisely: “It’s about choice, really. It’s about parents having the option open to them if they want to take it.” This was echoed by a representative of the MCB who also runs a Muslim faith school: “… and it is the parental choice, the parents and the freedom of choice.” Another representative of the MCB also cited “parental pressure” in explaining why the MCB’s education committee is dealing with faith school issues. All three support the existence of faith schools because they believe parental choice should be respected in a free country. A minor difference in the way the argument is framed is that while the Jewish organisation representative did not explicitly assert the organisation’s support for integration, both MCB representatives prefaced their responses with an endorsement of integration, as opposed to assimilation. Clearly, this reflects different positions that the two faith communities occupy in the contemporary UK. The “parental choice” argumentation could be further elaborated as a parental wish to bring their children closer to their own tradition. For instance, in the words of the Jewish organisation representative: But then of course within any faith there’s also people that don’t agree with faith schools. Not every Jewish parent chooses to send their child to a Jewish school, and we completely respect that. But our position … is that any parent has the right to provide their child with the education that they

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wish for, for them. And, for a lot of parents in our community that choice is that they want Jewish schooling, and they want them to be brought up in the values and ethos and the traditions of Judaism. Especially if, those parents perhaps don’t feel comfortable, don’t feel they have the knowledge themselves to impart it. They’d rather their child was in a school where they are going to be able to give them that element that they can’t give themselves.

In this type of argumentation, the “wish” and “need” to preserve a group’s tradition, is given legitimacy, suggesting the presence of a discursive structure, which gives priority to the group’s need over the individual’s, a point which humanists would challenge. At the same time, the “need to preserve our tradition” argument is accompanied by a conviction that without making conscious efforts minority groups’ tradition would disappear, which is a dreadful thing that must be countered. In this type of argumentation, therefore, respect for the autonomy of a family could be modified with a “groupist” or familial thinking that gives some preference to the group over the individual to prevent a total permeation of individualism. Another approach is to present faith schools as insignificant and not constituting any threat to the host society. Both the Jewish and Muslim interviewees cited that the number of “their” faith schools was small with which they made an attempt to negate the perception presented to them that faith schools were seen as problems. The Church of England (CoE) representatives, with about 5,000 schools under their control in England, could not mobilise the number argument in supporting the existence of faith schools in general. Probably reflecting its established status, the CoE interviewees did not evoke the parental choice argument, either. When the two CoE interviewees laid out their views as to why faiths schools were not a problem, both evoked history and its legacy; that the CoE started providing free education in the early nineteenth century and remained its sole provider until 1870, when the state started to take on some of the provisions; that their school buildings are built on the Church’s estate, and that they are so entrenched in the current provision of education in England. The implication here is that CoE schools exist because of history, not as a tool for the Church’s proselytising mission; in other words, they are a “given,” not a product of active and conscious endeavours by the Church. In expanding on this, both emphasised the “open” nature of Anglicanism. One described it as: “the Church of England is good at offering an open faith.” Because Anglicanism is an “open” faith, it is suggested, CoE schools are open to pupils from other faiths, which is one of the reasons why CoE schools do

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not constitute a problem and should continue to exist. The other respondent gave some more consideration to the established nature of the CoE meaning that: … it doesn’t fight for space, so it’s not pushy though it can wield power if it needs … I would think you could find a strand of reticence which runs through some English religious traditions so that religious people wouldn’t always want to make it explicit that they had a religious faith.

In the CoE representatives’ argumentation, faith schools are not a problem because their schools are open and benign and because they are an expression of history. This reasoning was, incidentally, endorsed by the Jewish and Muslim interviewees, in that CoE schools are largely seen as good at giving enough space to pupils of different faiths. This rather passive argument for supporting faith schools in general and CoE schools in particular is then complemented by a line of justification that focuses on the positive aspect of CoE schools, not as a preserver of a particular tradition but as a provider of space where spirituality or “the rumour of God” is respected, and where the spiritual journey of each pupil is encouraged, thus meeting what is perceived as the basic, fundamental aspect of human development. The argument here is that because CoE schools cater for the fundamental human need for spirituality, CoE schools are good. In advancing this line of argument, both CoE interviewees shift from “religion” to “spirituality,” a feature that is not found in the Jewish and Muslim interviewees’ responses. This could be another consequence of the CoE’s status as the established church in England. When the interviewees were prompted to refocus on the state funding of faith schools, Jewish and Muslim interviewees mobilised the concept of equality to justify it. The Jewish interviewee agreed when asked if each faith community had the right to educate their members’ children in their tradition, and a MCB representative cited the fact that the UK was not a secular state, in that the head of the state was also a head of a national church (of a constituent part of the UK, to be precise), was a reason why state funding of Islamic schools would be justified. The argumentation here is that each faith community should be treated equally, a discursive framework that is recognised as legitimate in the contemporary UK. One of the CoE interviewees tackled this question by evoking a different aspect of the equality argument:

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So where does state funding come from? It comes from people’s taxes. Do you think I don’t pay taxes? Because I do. So if, I, as a tax payer, say “Actually I’d really like a school like this,” and I think that’s what the current government are responding to. I pay my taxes, so do all these Muslim families, so do all these Jewish families; therefore, it is our money … the public funding issue is one that I think is quite easy to answer because we are all tax payers.

Taxpayers ought to be treated equally and they have the right to demand how their tax is used. What is evoked here is the equality of citizens, the principle that each individual is treated equally. There is a subtle shift from highlighting groups’ rights, as found in the Jewish and Muslim interviewees’ responses, to emphasising the individual’s rights. In addition to the equality argument, the Muslim interviewees suggested that state funding of faith schools could be justified as a way of redistribution of wealth as seen in the following excerpt: We thought it was a good idea because they would get state funding, so they would get better standards that way. Some of the standards of the equipment and so on are not very good. We also thought that regulation in a way would be good, because they would have rigorous inspection regimes and so on. So, that would be a way of helping parents that wanted a faith school to achieve that with a better standard.

Another MCB respondent stated that Muslim schools were run by charities that were generally poor, and the government’s support was therefore welcome. Both arguments are built on an understanding that the socio-economic standing of the Muslim population in the UK is comparatively low, a fact which is inevitably reflected in their schooling. Public funding in this case is seen as the government’s help to redress some disparities that can be found among different ethnic groups, a form of social justice which, in the two interviewees’ words, Muslim citizens are entitled to demand and receive because they are British citizens. Those who question the state funding of faith schools also articulated their views from a range of positions, but on the whole the contour of their arguments was more clearly defined compared to that of the supporters. Criticism of the state funding of faith schools can be made from fundamental principles. For instance, the two humanist organisation representatives presented two argumentations: the separation of church and state and respect for human autonomy. The former is articulated as follows: “We feel that there is absolutely no obligation for the state to help perpetuate religious beliefs. And, that at the state should be absolutely

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neutral, as between different religious beliefs or non-religious beliefs even more importantly.” The latter, unreserved respect for the individual’s autonomy has been elaborated as follows by another humanist: “ … we were opposed to any indoctrination of children, education into a faith. We saw this as a breach of the autonomy of the children … our attitude is they should be given the facts, introduction, sympathetically, historically, so and so forth, but not sort of drawn into a particular belief, even with their own families.” In the first instance, therefore, opposition to the state funding of faith schools is justified as opposition to infringement of the individual’s inalienable right to self-determination. State funding should not be allowed because the state should not interfere with an individual’s conscience, and even the parents should not impose their values on their children if they respect them as autonomous human beings. This “principled” argument, based on the notion of fundamental human rights, is then further developed, with other actors who are critical of the state funding of faith schools such as trade unions and think tanks, into a wider version of a right-based argument founded on more practical concerns. Here, two “wrongs” are highlighted: problems with the admission policy and problems with employment policy. In terms of admission the critics argue that publicly funded schools should accept all children without discrimination, but faith schools are allowed to discriminate in favour of children of their faiths to produce a more homogeneous pupil body in the school. This point is strongly refuted by the CoE interviewees especially, who point out that many of their schools have a majority of Muslim or Hindu pupils, depending on their locations. However, the ability to reserve a certain quota for their “own kind” is defended by all supporters of public funding of faith schools, and in this regard the opponents’ argument is that selective admission policy, however calibrated, would constitute discrimination based on religious beliefs, which should not be tolerated in the contemporary UK. Critics of the state funding of faith schools are also concerned with the possibility of discrimination in employment policy, and cite examples of staff of different faiths (or no faith) hitting a glass ceiling early in their career, and the difficulties in filling the post of head teacher because of the faith requirement. In both instances, faith schools are “allowed” to implement certain discriminatory practices, even though they are maintained by public money, and the critics see this as gross infringement of citizen’s rights to equal treatment by the state. The rights argument is then complemented by a concern with the possible effect of faith schools on community cohesion and integration. In

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sharp contrast to the supporters of faith schools, who argue that each faith and ethnic community has the right to provide education in their own tradition, the critics do not see it as appropriate in promoting integration, community cohesion and mutual understanding. The critics are concerned that faith schools would inevitably encourage segregation and, therefore, be detrimental for integration and community cohesion. Behind this is the recognition that “we now live in a plural and mixed society,” and faith schools, because of their propensity to segregate people according to faith or ethnicity, would not bring benefits to the society. There is an undercurrent that runs through this argumentation of assigning a status of a site of local community reproduction and maintenance to state schools. The critics of faith schools see schools in the community as where integration starts and community cohesion is strengthened. It appears that this argumentation contains a subtle tension between the fundamentally individualist orientation as expressed in the unreserved affirmation of respect for children’s autonomy and co-opting in the social cohesion agenda that focuses on different groups’ welfare in bringing about a more cohesive whole.

The Faith School Debate—Private Individuals The questions regarding the faith school debate solicited more diverse responses from private individuals than the interviews with civil society actors. This is in part because the topic “the faith school debate” was interpreted in several ways. Some interpreted the question as being about the public funding of faith schools as intended by the interviewer, while some interpreted it as a question of whether religious schools should be allowed in the contemporary UK, while others thought the question was about whether religion should be taught in schools. This serves as another example of “lay” understanding being more diffuse than that of “experts.” Opposition to faith schools in general was expressed in a manner that bore similarity to the humanist opposition. Mary, a young charity worker, evoked her atheist stance in articulating her opposition to faith schools in general: As someone that … is an atheist, and quite a strong atheist and believer in teaching children reason and, you know, trying not to brain wash people … I think faith schools can be quite dangerous places … I don’t know, “dangerous” is too strong … It goes back to the equality thing and giving children the same start and the same ideas in life … I think it can give people a bit too much power to push their own objectives. It’s hard though because obviously if you’re a very devout religious person you want to

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Mary’s statement contains the desire to protect children’s autonomy, concern over the curriculum content and the possible impact on integration, all of which are cited by civil society actors as the reasons why they are critical of state funding of faith schools. Rod, a webmaster, also alluded to the humanist view of the role of education as the cultivation of the critical faculty of children: I don’t like faith schools at all. The problem with them is not so much that they’re teaching religion … Whereas I think the faith schools … it keeps you in your community. On a defensive level that might be positive, but I think overall it’s detrimental, and one of the things about education isn’t just the things that you are taught, but it’s the things that you learn and pick up on the way. So I think with faith schools you could probably find yourself not having anything you know or your parents have told you challenged, and I think one of the things about education is to be challenging. So I’m not sure myself whether faith schools are that challenging.

Both respondents cited the perceived negative impact of religion on the development of children’s critical faculties as their opposition to faith schools, and both alluded to the possible negative impact faith schools may have on social cohesion. Others opposed to faith schools based on the principle of the separation of church and state. Masood, a practicing Muslim, dismissed the argument that faith schools could sometimes be beneficial in giving a sense of security to a minority community: I'm absolutely 120% against faith schools … I think they're awful, absolutely awful … I mean for society … The one thing that I really, really like about … the school that my children go to is …. it's a very secular education, … (and at the school assembly) there was absolutely no religious element to it, everybody was equal … I also don't have a problem with the government providing funding for, for example, local religious groups after school. So, for example, mosque groups having sessions that are funded by the government that allow the open mosque to put on lessons on a Saturday or Friday after school outside of the school setting to teach

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people about learning the Qur'an or Islam. And, I don’t think that they should just be confined to Muslims, I think if I'm a Muslim and I would like to know a little bit about Judaism I should be able to go to a synagogue and attend a class or some kind of, you know, so I don’t have a problem with the government funding a particular education in faith, not faith schools but in Mosque groups, after school, I mean not within school. A school setting is for everybody, it should be secular, it should be nonreligious. I don’t have a problem with religion, but it has to have its own place.

According to Masood, religion has its own place in society but not in schools open to the public. Schools have to be secular so that they are open to everyone. Masood also suggests that individuals’ right to learn about religion or pursue their own faith should be protected but in a private sphere. The issues of equality of access and the social justice aspect of education are mobilised to support his affirmation of the separation of church and state. Concern over integration as a reason for being critical of faith schools came through more strongly in private individuals’ responses. Cindy, who identified herself as a Christian, explained the reason why she did not send her daughter to a CoE school in their area: I would rather our daughter was taught (about different religions), and also we are living in a multicultural Britain. We worried as well that she would have an unbalanced introduction, and I like the fact that she can understand what it is to be a Muslim and what it is to be an atheist and all that sort of stuff as well, I like that, as well. I like the fact that she is sympathetic. She understands that our neighbours can’t have sausage rolls when they come round, and I have to be careful about the sweets we give them in case they’ve got pork gelatine in them.

Cindy’s mother-in-law, Cathy, a healthcare manager, expressed a similar concern: I do know that there is always a rush for places in Catholic schools because they are considered very good because they are considered quite strict, as well. But there are lots and lots of individual faith schools cropping up everywhere so people are learning in different ways and different things, which in a way is a shame. We talk all the time about social integration, and we are one multicultural country for instance, they always talk about London as multicultural London, but if you are segregating people then that is not quite so, I don’t feel that really covers it … In a way, I can understand it because they want to maintain their culture, they want to maintain their language and their customs, I quite understand it but when

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Chapter Four do they ever get to mix with the other children? It’s almost selfsegregation. Which is a shame because we are supposed to be multicultural and I think we should enjoy, and learn about each other’s customs. But, if they are all in different parts and different schools, how are we all going to learn and accept and respect other cultures and customs.

While sympathetic to the perceived plight of some ethnic minorities in being forced to conform, Cathy is concerned with the possible impact of faith schools on social cohesion and the health of multiculturalism. The subtle difference between Cindy’s and Cathy’s arguments is that Cindy appears to be focused on the necessity for the majority population to be open-minded and understanding, while Cathy appears to be more worried about various minority groups segregating themselves. This may be a generational effect—Cindy, who grew up with the promotion of multiculturalism, may have internalised it more deeply than Cathy, who watched her son grow up with this new orthodoxy. Not all respondents regarded the faith school debate as an important issue, though they acknowledged that others saw it as a major concern. They did not see major problems with the existence of faith schools as such as long as the schools accepted children of different faiths, ensuring certain equality in access, and as long as the children were taught evolution and respect for other faiths, and given proper sex education. Provided these caveats were met, these respondents argued, faith schools could be beneficial in ensuring the ethnic minority’s sense of security, which was unconditionally seen as positive, and also provide discipline which was seen to be in short supply in today’s Britain. While the former indicates a generalised support for diversity and formal equality (everyone has the right to preserve his/her own culture), the latter reflects a concern over the state of contemporary British society, and the decline of respect and discipline. In this regard, rampant commercialism has often been suggested as the cause of the problem. Because of pressure on parents to provide consumer goods to their children and to work long hours to maintain a certain level of income, according to these respondents, families could no longer provide discipline and teach respect to children, and as a result the schools were now tasked to do the job a family should be doing. Faith schools or religious schools were widely seen as strict and as providing good discipline by these respondents, and in this respect, they did not see any reason to oppose them.

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Conclusion The investigation into the ways in which various actors understand how the faith school debate is understood and articulated in contemporary England has provided a variety of insights. First, it appears that the two levels of discourse—civil society actors and private individuals—on faith schools share an overall framework and some discursive building blocks showing a degree of congruence between the two. At both levels, respondents articulate their positions vis-à-vis the social cohesion agenda in which they place social cohesion as a particularly important goal to achieve. Regardless of whether they support the social cohesion agenda or not, all respondents are aware that it is the most important discursive framework, and they reason their stance towards faith schools in reference to it. When they articulate their position, they appear to mobilise similar sets of ideas as building blocks of their responses—multiculturalism, support for diversity, equality, critique of rampant commercialism and respect for autonomy. The two levels of discourse, therefore, appear to share many features, which suggest that there is a broad consensus on how to conduct the debate on faith schools. In other words, it seems there is a degree of discursive coherence in terms of the faith school debate in contemporary England/Britain. The different ways to discuss faith schools in contemporary England/ Britain also offer some insights as to the contestation of the place of religion in society. The interview data suggests that there is little desire, on either side of the debate, to develop the debates about the public funding of faith schools into a fundamental discussion about British society. The debates are not about whether religion is good or useful in contemporary society, or which religion is appropriate for Britain, or about eliminating religion from society. Even the humanist respondents do not advocate a complete removal of religious activity from schools; they want equal treatment of all faiths, including atheism and humanist philosophy, as academic subjects. Private individuals also support the teaching of religions in schools as a way of encouraging mutual understanding and, with persuasion, often support the existence of faith schools because of their better discipline and as stalwarts against aggressive commercialism. In other words, the overall tone of debates is not fundamentalist and has a more colloquial expression, and is lukewarm. Probably reflecting their non-confrontational tone, the debates about faith schools or place of religion in society in general have not produced any concrete legislation, unlike in France and Belgium in which the wearing of a full-face veil in the public has been banned. In fact, when the French parliament voted for

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the so-called “burka ban,” the UK immigration minister branded the idea “un-British” because it would not fit a UK that is a “tolerant and mutually respectful society,” and “not aggressively secular” (BBC News 2010). In effect, he proclaimed that Britain is tolerant and free from anything aggressive, in contrast to the perception of stronger extremism in the Continental countries. The mechanism that appears to diffuse possible tension is multiculturalism. As the data suggests, the interviewees’ articulate their responses firmly within the framework of multiculturalism, in which they suspend judgement on the quality and superiority of different cultural traditions. The respondents then mobilise a set of universally accepted values such as freedom of conscience, freedom of choice, the principle of equality, social justice and respect for an individual’s autonomy to articulate their positions. Therefore, support for the state funding of faith schools is not about which religion is the true faith but about upholding parental choice, ensuring the maintenance of different traditions, addressing socio-economic disadvantages of religio-ethnic minorities, and creating space for children to develop themselves in a spiritual environment. Opposition to the state funding of faith schools is partly based on the principle of the separation of church and state, and this is a fundamental argument. However, as long as religion remains in the private sphere no one is bothered, and the bulk of opposition is justified in reference to the obligation to treat all faiths equally, to ensure all children have equal access to schools, and to prevent the unfair treatment of school staff on the grounds of religion. In short, it appears that the mechanisms that prevent fundamental confrontations are working well in contemporary Britain. Why the debate about faith schools in contemporary Britain appears as less heated than in other European countries may be to do with the perceived benign nature of the Church of England, as many respondents observed in the fieldwork, which creates enough space for inter-faith dialogues to avoid entrenchment and polarisation of different religious traditions. It may also be to do with the highly decentralised structure of school governance in England preventing any issues about religion in education from elevating to the national level. This decentralised nature reflects the evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, pattern of the nationand-state-building process in England (and Britain as a whole). It may also be to do with an early adoption of multiculturalism as a way of managing ethnic and racial relationships in the post-war UK. As in the case of many social phenomena, consideration of historical background and conditioning

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appears to go a long way to explaining the nature of public debate on the place of religion in education in the contemporary UK.

References Ballion, R. (1991). La bonne école. Evaluation et choix du collège et du lycée. Paris: Hatier. Baubérot, J. (1990). Vers un nouveau pacte laïque ? Paris: Seuil. Birnbaum, P. (2003). La France imaginée: déclin des rêves unitaires? Paris: Gallimard. Brouard, S. & Tiberj, V. (2005). Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébine, africaine et turque. Paris: Presses de Sciences-po. Bozec, G. (2010). Les héritiers de la République. Eduquer à la citoyenneté à l’école dans la France d’aujourd’hui. Political Science PhD Dissertation, Sciences Po Paris, France. Bozec, G. & Garcia, N. (2010). Identity Construction Programmes of the State and the EU: The French Case (WP5 Report from FP7 IME project). Submitted to the European Commission in June 2010. Bozec, G. & Duchesne, S. (2011). “Europe as a Missed Opportunity: Looking Backwards to Modernity in France.” In Europe, Nations and Modernity, Ichijo, A. (ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Déloye, Y. (1994). Ecole et citoyenneté. L’individualisme républicain de Jules Ferry à Vichy. Paris: Presses de la FNSP. Duchesne, S. (1997). Citoyenneté à la française. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Estivalèzes, M. (2005). Les religions dans l’enseignement laïque. Paris: PUF. Fetzer, J. & Soper, J. C. (2005). Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hafiz, C. & Devers, G. (2005). Droit et religion musulmane. Paris: Dalloz. Hervieu-Léger, D. (2003).. “Pour une sociologie des ‘modernités religieuses multiples’: une autre approche de la ‘religion invisible’ des sociétés européennes.” Social Compass 50: 287–295. Laborde, C. (2010). Français, encore un effort pour être républicains! Paris: Seuil. Levinson, M. (1997). “Liberalism versus democracy? Schooling private citizens in the public square.” British Journal of Political Science 27: 333–360.

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Maurer, S. (2006). Muslim Worship in France: Practical Stakes and Response of Public Actors. New York: International Center for Migration, Ethnicity and Citizenship. Mayeur, J. (1997). La question laïque. XIXe–XXe siècle. Paris : Fayard. Molokotos Liederman, L. (2001). “Pluralism in Education: the Display of Islamic Affiliation in French and British Schools.” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 11. Spohn, W. (2009). “Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging Europe, a Multiple Modernities Perspective.” European Journal of Social Theory 12: 358–374. Throssell, K. (2010). “Un berceau bleu, blanc, rouge: le nationalisme ordinaire et l’enfance.” Raisons politiques 37: 27–38.

CHAPTER FIVE THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN EDUCATION IN FRANCE GERALDINE BOZÉC

Introduction This chapter investigates the relationship between religion and identity in France through recent policies and debates related to education. Debates over religion and secularity became less intensive in the decades following the Second World War. However, they have reappeared as acute controversies from the 1980s onwards in relation to a new context. The place of Islam within French society, and the new forms and place of religion in a deeply secularized society, the evolving role of the French central state and the idea of Republic have raised new issues. As it was the case in the past when the French Republic was created, education has been a central battlefield in the contemporary discussions on religion and identity matters in France. This study focuses on the debate about the wearing of the headscarf in public schools. The “headscarf issue” has been the most controversial issue related to religion in the field of education over recent decades, and has had a high profile in French public debates. While they are linked to immigrants’ integration issues, discussions on the headscarf also reveal more general conceptions of the links between religions, and national and European identities. This chapter analyses the controversy on the headscarf in public schools, focusing on the most recent period (the 2000s). The background and the discourses of state actors when adopting the law of 2004 that banned the “ostentatious” religious symbols from public schools are presented. The chapter then focuses on the discourses found in the French civil society amongst both civil society organizations and lay citizens. These discourses reveal the conflicting views on the meanings of the nation and Europe and the place of the religious dimension within the

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national and European frameworks. However, there is a clear predominant narrative that articulates a traditional separatist approach, which is distrustful of religions and which is now connected with concerns about immigration and integration. Europe is little considered in this narrative, except as conveying alternative models that are perceived negatively.

Methodology The study is based on a qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with representatives of civil society organisations and lay citizens. In line with qualitative research’s basic requisites, in both cases the sample was built so that conceptions and interviewees’ profiles could be as diverse as possible. Regarding civil society organisations, policy documents and media statements were analysed in the first stage in order to identify the most vocal actors in the debate on laïcité and religious symbols in public schools in the 2000s. A lot of attention was paid to the selection of actors with different views in the debate. In addition, we selected organizations that differ in their nature and their general orientations, notably: - In terms of organisations: professional (education unions), nonprofessional organisations (parents’ organisation, educational movements, humanist and anti-racist organisations, religious organisations) - Political/ideological orientations: religious/secular organizations; organizations politically diverse, close to the left, or close to the right, etc. -

Represented categories: teachers in primary or secondary education; head-teachers; parents, etc.

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Table 1. Type of actors of the French civil society included in the study Type of actors Education unions (primary/ secondary)

Short description - SNPDEN: the major head-teachers’ union in secondary education, politically diverse. - SE-UNSA: represents mainly primary education teachers; it is the heir of the former primary education union (SNI) which was predominant from the 1920s to the 1990s; overall close to Socialist circles. - SNES: main teachers’ union in secondary education; also includes non-teacher school staff; covers more ultra-left trends compared to the SE-UNSA.

Parents’ organisations

- FCPE: the main French organisation of pupils’ parents; originally also comprised teachers, now independent from teachers’ organisations but shares some main orientations with them (defence of public education and of laïcité); politically diverse but overall close to the left.

Educational organisations

- Ligue de l’Enseignement (League for Education): created in 1866 to advocate for public education, the republican regime and democracy; intervenes in outside-school activities (artistic, cultural, sports); also takes a position on general educational issues.

Religious actors

- General Secretary of Catholic Education: coordinates policies related to Catholic schools; also takes position on general education issues. - UOIF: one of the main Muslim organisations; it advocates for a “happy medium Islam” (promotion of a traditional religion based on the return to genuine sources and defence of the integration of Islam into a democratic society).

Humanist/ secular organisations

- Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH, League for Human Rights): founded in 1898; struggles for the respect for human, social and economic rights; takes a stand on education, citizenship and immigration. - MRAP: created in 1949 (with another name) by former members of anti-racist and French Resistance organisations; specialised in the defence of immigrants’ rights, anti-racism and the fight against discriminations (mainly related to origins).

112 Other1

Chapter Five - Haut Conseil à l’intégration (HCI, High Council for integration): consultative public body, attached to the Prime Minister, on issues related to the “integration” of immigrants and people with immigrant background; gathers representatives of civil society organizations, private companies, the academia, political institutions (MPs, mayors, etc.).

As regards lay citizens, the sample was constructed in order to get a diversity of profiles, especially in terms of origins (those with an immigrant background or not), social class, level of education, religion (Muslims/Catholic/Jewish/no religion) and political orientations (left/right).

The Case Study Background Contemporary debates on religions and identities have to be related to the historical, institutional and societal framework in which they are situated in France. The relationships between the French state and churches and the meanings of secularity in France—known as laïcité2— are the product of a long and complex history. The French Revolution of 1789 opened a longstanding period of conflicts between Catholic institutions and movements on the one hand, and supporters of political liberalism and the Republic on the other. The Catholic clergy and Catholicism were considered by republican and liberal elites to be linked to the Ancien Regime, since they defended the Monarchist cause and a hierarchical political and social order. The fight for the Republican regime and the struggle for a secular political order were thus deeply bound up in France throughout the nineteenth century and the first decades of the 1

Four university organisations were included in the sample as the study also investigates other educational debates (such as university reforms). Their discourses are not included in this analysis since the law of 2004 that banned religious symbols only concerns primary and secondary schools. 2 This specific French term, which is not translatable into other languages, is an indicator of some French specificities in the secularization process in France. However, some European convergence also exists (Willaime). The manner in which this term is used by French actors to evoke a strong and valuable specificity, which has to be maintained, to criticize it or minimize it by referring to common realities in Europe, is telling as it reveals conflicting interpretations of the relationships between religion and identity.

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twentieth century (Birnbaum 1993; Déloye 1994; Hervieu-Léger 2003). The public education system was one of the major fields of political and secular conflicts since it was considered a key space for civic socialization and a microcosm of the legitimate public body (Déloye 1994). A compulsory, free and secular public school system was set up under the Third Republic in the 1880s. It was seen by republican elites in power as a weapon against their opponents to establish an enduring republican regime and diffuse republican, secular values. In 1905, in a conflicting context opposing republican elites to Catholic monarchists and other antirepublican movements, a law established the separation between the state and Church. Along with the laws of the 1880s, this law is the legal basis that rules many aspects of the current laïcité and of the current functioning of public schools in particular. Public schools are entirely secular: teachers are not members of the clergy and must not promote any religion nor display their personal religious beliefs. Religious education is excluded from school curricula; the school curricula of the 1880s replaced it with a “civic and moral education,” and “citizenship education” currently exists in public education. The 1905 law sets out that the French state does not “recognize” any religion, which means that no Church has the status of official religion and does not fund any Church. Religious organisations and religious institutions are free to organize themselves, and cannot receive any form of public funding.3 One specificity of France is the pro-active and highly conflictive dimensions of secularization enforced intentionally, and sometimes in a rather radical manner, by republican state elites. This results in a high degree of separation between religion, on one hand, and the state and public space on the other (Hervieu-Léger 2003; Spohn 2009). Secularity in France often means more than the simple neutrality of the state towards religions, and the principle of equality between religions; it often implies that religions are excluded from the public space and public institutions instead of being allowed an equal footing. These features of secularity in France are connected to three key characteristics of the French route to social and political modernity (Willaime 2004). First, Catholic institutions and movements were involved in political struggles and were at the beginning key opponents to this modernity. Second, and correlatively, anti-clerical and also antireligious thoughts have been important and influential in France. Lastly, the supremacy of the central state over civil society has played a role in the 3

Except when they take another status, other than religious organizations, in order to carry out cultural or educational activities. See below regarding the public funding of Catholic schools.

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secularization process; even during the Ancien Regime the state was fighting to assert its hegemony against competing social forces, and the Catholic Church in particular. It was conceived and concretely acted on as an encompassing force, aiming to unify the society and to affirm prevalent common norms and identity. The relationships between the state and religions were thus characterised by a high degree of conflict, rather than cooperation. Although the degree of separation between the religious and political orders is high in France, there remain some exceptions to this strong separatist model. The current laïcité is also the result of a series of compromises (Baubérot 1990; Mayeur 1997), and the present situation is also marked by the French Catholic past (Hervieu-Léger 2003). In the education field, the religious dimension has not entirely disappeared from the French public school system. First, Catholic chaplaincies still exist in French public high schools. Second, in Alsace-Moselle, a region that was reattached to France only after World War I (thus, after the laws of the 1880s on education and the 1905 Law on the separation between state and the churches), public schools provide a religious education, but which is optional. In addition, the relationship between the republican state and the Catholic Church was progressively appeased. Catholic movements ended in rallying to the Republic and to the prevalence of the secular order. Against this background, the French state started to accommodate some Catholic demands. The public funding of private-owned schools, most of them Catholic, was allowed by a law in 1959 and other subsequent regulations. This legislation was meant to take into account Catholic claims at the beginning, but applies to all types of private-owned schools that ask for public funding.4 Public secular schools are, however, largely prevalent in France, and more than 80% of the school population is enrolled in public schools. The debates over religions and secularity have been prominent over the last three decades. The public funding of private schools was strongly contested by secular organisations and public education unions at the beginning, and they denounced the funding of a private system that can 4

Because of the historical importance of Catholicism in France most publicfunded private schools are Catholic. There are about two hundred publicly-funded Jewish, four Protestant and two Muslim schools (the rest are non-denominational publicly-funded private schools). Most publicly-funded Catholic schools do not have an exceptionally strong religious identity. Research suggests that the religious aspect is often secondary in parents’ choice for these schools compared to concerns related to pupils’ achievement (Ballion 1991). This profile is not true for Jewish schools, most of them having a strong denominational dimension.

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select pupils in opposition to public schools that gather all pupils. They also disapproved that the secular state could support a faith; this being Catholicism, since most private schools were Catholic. This issue brought up thorny discussions and even demonstrations in specific political contexts in the early 1980s and again in the mid-1990s. The left wing government that came to power in 1981 after several decades of right wing governments intended to create a unified secular education public service, whose rules were not clearly defined and were highly discussed. Secular actors, education unions in particular, were strong advocates of such a project. On the other side, Catholic institutions and also many pupils’ parents defended public-funded private schools on behalf of “freedom in education” and parental free choice. For many parents this was mainly not for religious reasons as they wished to have the choice of a private school if this was perceived to be better for their children’s school success (Mayeur 1997). A powerful demonstration occurred in June 1984 and this demonstration sought to defend the public-funded private schools. The Socialist President, François Mitterrand, finally decided to withdraw the project and the government resigned. The event marked a turning point since the sharp contestation of the very existence of publicly funded Catholic private schools decreased from this date in French public debates. Secularist organizations and education unions remained opposed to the principle of public funding for Catholic schools, but they became more aware that the power relationships and the general mindset of French society did not allow such an ambitious reform as the destruction of a system created in 1959 and approval of public funding for private schools. Catholic schools have been more and more considered as a “given.” Since this date, however, these actors have remained extremely vigilant about the advantages granted to private schools by the state. The issue emerged again in 1994 due to the right-wing government’s attempt to reform and improve the funding and functioning rules for publicly funded private schools. Secularist organizations and advocates of public education firmly denounced the project and organized massive demonstrations. Again, the project was withdrawn. From 1994 onwards, budget measures favourable to private schools have been regularly denounced by secular actors and education unions, but no new attempt for deeply reform the system occurred and this question has lost its controversial nature and is much less central than before in French public debates. The place of religions in school curricula has also brought up discussions over recent decades. However, a secular/religious line did not shape these discussions. Indeed, those actors who initiated the debate in favour of an increased knowledge about religions were secular ones. State

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actors of the Ministry of Education and some civil society actors such as the educational organisation the Ligue de l’Enseignement have argued that history and the present world could not be understood without knowledge about religions. They have advocated for a developed teaching about religions in various subjects (history, literature, philosophy). This has also been perceived as a means of favouring tolerance between children of different beliefs and thus has also been described in terms of citizenship education. Knowledge of Islam in particular has been seen as a means of increasing awareness about this religion, and thus as favouring greater tolerance and a sense of France’s diversity. The recent curricula, in particular in history, were modified to grant more room to issues related to religions (Legris 2010). However, it is mainly the history of religions that are currently studied; the actual practices and even more the spiritual messages and the philosophical meanings of religions are seldom tackled in the curricula (Estivalèzes 2005). Some education unions have showed reluctance towards these attempts since they refuse to make religions so momentous a topic and remain distrustful about the intentions of the Catholic Church when defending more room for religions in the school curricula. They fear that what the Catholic Church actually defends has more to do with religious messages than with secular knowledge. Nevertheless, neither of these two questions related to religion in the field of education has been highly controversial over the last decade. The most contentious recent debate on the place of religion in education has concerned the wearing of the headscarf in public schools. This reflects the fact that the place of Islam in French society has, in general, been much debated in recent years.5 Again, public education has been one of the major battlefields of such debates. The controversy on the wearing of the headscarf in public schools is not a new issue, and is not only connected to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism worldwide. It has been at stake from the late 1980s onwards in relation to increasing discussions on immigrants’ integration. The controversy started in 1989, and was launched periodically when the right were in power. 5

Besides the sphere of education this issue has recently aroused other acute debates as well as new laws. In September 2010, a new Law was passed prohibiting any clothes covering the face in public spaces (including the streets), targeting the wearing of the niqab by Muslim women. In 2010–2011 the government and right-wing actors also raised the question of Muslim prayers that take place in the streets, in particular in Paris, that they wished to forbid. Lastly, the government launched in 2011 a new “debate on laïcité,” in which the issue of Islam was put at the forefront.

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The first “headscarf affair,” known as the “Creil affair,” started in 1989 when three Muslim girls wearing headscarves were refused entry to a classroom in a secondary school of Creil (a city located to the north of Paris). They were finally expelled from the school following a decision of the head-teacher, who argued that religion has no place in a secular school. This localized conflict gave birth to a national controversy that recurred until the 2000s. In the first stage, there was no clear national regulation on the issue. Indeed, the Conseil d’Etat (the highest administrative court in France) adopted, in 1989, a rather liberal stance, recognizing the right for pupils to demonstrate their religious beliefs inside public schools under some conditions.6 Following other “headscarf cases,” François Bayrou, right-wing Minister of Education of the time, issued a 1994 circular going further in the rejection of the display of religious symbols. On behalf of national unity, it stressed the risk of “break-up of the nation in separated communities” and invited schools to modify their regulations in order to ban “ostentatious” religious symbols. In practice, the issue was dealt with locally and on a case-by-case basis, leading to a variety of practices. The aim was to make girls remove their headscarves, at least when they were in the classroom, and this was achieved through various means (negotiation with families, prohibition of any type of headgear in the local school regulations, etc.). The controversy was then relaunched in 2003 with wide media coverage of a new case. Nonetheless, the situation proved to be somewhat appeased in schools since 150 litigations were recorded in the first years of the 2000s (compared to 450 in the early 1990s). Most of them were resolved by dialogue, expulsions not being over 10 per year (Hafiz and Devers 2005, 202). However, the new right-wing political majority was firmly committed to reasserting a strict separatist conception of the French principle of laïcité. A special committee was created in 2003 with the goal of working on the application of this principle in different sectors, including education. The committee’s report suggested banning the wearing of religious symbols in public schools amongst other measures, such as the granting of an official holiday for pupils for Yom Kippur and

6

It was allowed as long as it did not disturb the “public order,” the “normal functioning” and safety rules of schools, and did not infringe on pupils’ “freedom of conscience” and “dignity.” Of course, such restrictions could be interpreted in different ways. The absence of clear rules was precisely an argument that was put forward by supporters of the adoption of a national law on the issue.

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the Eid al-Adha. Eventually, only the proposal related to the ban of religious symbols was adopted through a law in March 2004.7

Conflictive Narratives within French Civil Society— Divisions on the Meaning of the Nation and on the Relationships between Individual Autonomy and Religion The state actors justified the Law from 2004 (Chirac 2003; Ferry 2004; Fillon 2004) and other supporters by the singularity of the school space where pupils’ freedom of conscience has to be protected from the potential intrusion of other pupils with different beliefs and from the pressures of families and the community. This demonstrates a rather paternalist state approach to the issue—teenagers’ individual emancipation from others’ influence has to be enforced by the state (Bozec & Garcia 2010; Bozec & Duchesne 2011; Maurer 2005; Laborde 2010). This reaffirms the central role of the state in regulating citizens’ behaviours and identities and in limiting the influence of civil society groups over individuals. In state actors’ discourses the references to national unity are also central. State actors refer to a republican tradition based on the consideration of individual citizens instead of groups. National unity is associated with the refusal of subgroups within the nation. The French nation gathers citizens as individuals, detached from their groups of belonging. This conception of the nation is presented as being threatened by the so-called communautarismes, a vague and untranslatable term laying the blame on “communities” without defining precisely what they are. This idea leads to casting doubt on the behaviour of some segments in ethno-religious minorities who are implicitly presented as having no will to be integrated into the common civic space embodied by the public school space (Bozec & Garcia 2010; Bozec & Duchesne 2011). The state actors’ recent positions on religions show some ambivalence. The reaffirmation of a strict separatist conception of laïcité in education, but also regarding the wearing of the niqab in public spaces, coexists with other discourses and actions, more open to the consideration of religions. 7 The following circular of May 2004 remained quite ambiguous on the implementation of the ban: it mentioned all “symbols that are clearly revealing a religious identity,” and explicitly referred to the “Islamic headscarf, however it is called, the skullcap and a cross whose size is obviously excessive.” In this way, the circular does not resolve the problems of interpretation—head-teachers still have to assess whether other dresses have an obvious religious dimension or not, such as the bandanna. Many schools resolved the problem by banning all headgear.

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Nicolas Sarkozy played a decisive role (as former Minister of Interior) in the establishment of the French Council for Muslim Worship in 2003– 2004. He also made references in his public speeches to the positive role of religions and the necessity of a dialogue between them and the Republic. However, he particularly emphasized the importance of Catholicism, whereas his positions on Islam are more ambivalent, and the separatist conception of laïcité is much more asserted when Islam is concerned.

Anti-Clericalism and the National Unity The discourses of a part of the investigated civil society organizations show some views similar to that of recent governments. The idea of national unity and the distrust towards subgroups (religious and ethnic ones in particular) can also be found in the discourses of education unions of the public primary and secondary education sector, in particular. The nation is defined here as based on shared political values inherited from the revolutionary and republican tradition, and individual citizenship and laïcité are core reference points. Pupils as future citizens must respect the laïcité rule and leave their religious beliefs and symbols outside. Regardless of their national origin, ethnic belonging and religion, they must endorse common national political values. The headscarf is also interpreted as coming from communal and family pressure and as being dangerous for others’ freedom of thought (non-practising Muslim and nonMuslim pupils). The emphasis on national unity also goes hand in hand in with these discourses on the defence of the child’s freedom of thought. However, these education unions also oppose right-wing governmental discourses and actions on behalf of the republican credo itself. They argue that the current state actors infringe on the laïcité rule and the principle of equality between religions. Recent budget measures have favoured Catholic private schools, and some state actors do display their Catholic faith or develop unprecedented relationships with Catholic institutions and representatives. They also denounce the permanence of a religious Catholic dimension in public schools in Alsace-Moselle or the limitation of school holidays to Catholic festivals. The anti-clerical tone of such discourses is obvious—they reaffirm a strict separatist conception of laïcité. In this argumentation, the current fight against the headscarf is equated to the historical—and still relevant—struggle for laïcité against Catholicism. Europe is not a strong and positive reference in these narratives. These actors refuse a greater rapprochement of European countries regarding

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public education and the place of religion within it. The French model of laïcité is indeed clearly preferred compared to multicultural patterns (the British case is a particular negative reference in these discourses) or to countries that do not apply a strict separation between the state and religions.

Anti-Discrimination Discourses The discourses of civil society actors are not homogeneous, however. A part of the investigated civil organizations—the human rights organization Ligue des droits de l’homme, the left-oriented pupils’ parent organization FCPE, the educational movement Ligue de l’Enseignement, the anti-racist organization MRAP—shows a different narrative on the nation, seen here as a place for universalized shared rights and common institutions. The idea of equality is placed at the forefront and interpreted in a different way compared to the discourses of education unions, whereas in these discourses it means a strict exclusion of all religions— Catholicism and Islam—from the common public space, referring to the right to education for all pupils. The 2004 law on religious symbols is considered from an anti-colonialist and anti-discrimination point of view, and is seen as a stigmatisation of Muslims and in practice led to the exclusion of some Muslim girls from the public education. In the opinion of these actors, many current public discourses are disseminating the implicit view that the French state should “domesticate” populations with immigrant backgrounds through repressive measures. The headscarf is not seen in a univocal manner, as necessarily stemming from the pressure of authoritarian communities and families or the influence of fundamentalist groups. It may result from a constraint, but may also reveal teenagers’ desire to provoke and assert themselves, their cultural practices (inherited from family traditions and freely endorsed by individuals to affirm their attachment to a group), their profound religious feelings, and so on. Generally speaking, the growing religious claims in France and in other European countries are widely interpreted by these actors as resulting from the actual socio-economic and political exclusion of ethnic minorities from mainstream society. Therefore, these actors rather insist on equal rights and anti-discrimination, and regarding the headscarf they often advocate for more accommodating solutions (removal in the classroom only, for example). Actually, like other actors, these interviewees have the view— sometimes implicit, sometimes clearly asserted—that the headscarf is not liberating for girls and is a means of controlling decency, the body and

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sexual freedom. However, the equal access of all pupils to public education and the refusal to “emancipate by force” predominate in these discourses. The references to the republican tradition are not central here, and when present they are used to contrast the ideal of equality with the reality of facts, i.e. the exclusion of some pupils from public education that resulted from the 2004 law. All national, European and international texts on human rights and anti-discrimination are central reference points in these narratives. They serve as a basis to consider Europe as grounded on common political principles (equality between religions, religious freedom and tolerance), which are applied specifically in each national case. The French laïcité is not considered to be of greater value than other national ideals.

The Recognition of Religions Although there are oppositions within the organized civil society in France, one should note two common views. A persistent mistrust toward religion can be found in the secular actors’ discourses. Religious groups and religious institutions are still perceived as potentially dangerous for the individual autonomy. The representative of the Ligue de l’Enseignement is the only actor who clearly asserts that religion and emancipation are not incompatible and who claims a better recognition of religious actors in the public debate. Given the French route to political and social modernity, marked by a central conflict between Monarchist Catholics and republican elites, religion is particularly viewed with suspicion by most secular actors. The discourses of religious actors are, without surprise, very different on this point. The representatives of the Muslim organization UOIF and the Secretary of Catholic Schooling put forward their collective identity, the values and bonds religions generate, and the legitimacy of their voice in the public sphere in France. Here, the argumentation is also based on the defence of laïcité, but the interpretation of this principle sharply contrasts with the one developed by secular actors. The public sphere should not gather citizens as individuals detached from their groups; but should allow for the expression of religious beliefs and religious differences. The divide between the private and the public sphere is of low significance here; these religious actors claim for a genuine recognition of the individual’s religious identity in all spheres of one’s life, including education. They insist on a concrete individual, but defined specifically through the major prism of religion. In doing this they try to combine the

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modern claim for individual self-determination and the centrality of religion. In the discourse of the representative of Catholic Schooling, the argumentation is ambiguous since the view against a laïcité that ignores religion is more critical when Catholicism is concerned than when Islam is at stake. He firmly denounces the non-recognition of the Christian past of France and Europe as one crucial element of culture, while being more cautious on the public expression of Islam, and also stressing the risk of the influence of fundamentalist groups. In the discourses of the representatives of the Muslim organization (the UOIF), the equality and anti-discrimination argument is exceedingly important but is formulated in a decidedly different way compared to secular organizations—it is directly and predominantly connected to religion and religious practices (not only to the right to public education). As “citizens like everyone else,” Muslim girls and women should have the right to practice their religion. The 2004 law is mainly seen as a “restriction of religious freedom” imposed on Muslims and is thus considered as “discrimination.” The ideas of individual freedom and selfdetermination are also linked to the freedom to practice one’s religion. The interviewees talk about their freedom—as women—in choosing to wear the headscarf, and generalize the argument to other Muslim women and girls. This “autonomous” discourse, connected to religion, contrasts with the assertion that the headscarf is also a “religious prescription.” The idea of “obedience to God,” instead of obedience to family or men, is used to try to get through this tension. This enables the continued assertion of the centrality of self-determination in the human world while maintaining the prevalence of religion and the authority of God. The idea of diversity is salient in the discourse of this minority organisation. The display of all types of religious symbols in public schools is perceived in terms of “diversity,” and its acceptance would create a genuinely “diverse school.” The interviewees referred to the example of the Christmas tree, which is seen as a religious symbol, and use an equality argument—since this symbol of Catholicism is often present in public schools, there is no reason for not accepting the wearing of the headscarf.

Lay Citizens’ Discourses— National Unity is also at the Forefront Lay citizens’ views also emphasize national unity. Regardless of citizen profiles, political orientations insist on the necessity for all pupils to respect national values inherited from the past, amongst which is laïcité.

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Laïcité is interpreted as the exclusion of religions from public schools and the public sphere in general. Religious differences are not allowed to enter the public space too overtly since they would mean a risk of division of the national community. In line with the discourses of other types of actors, religions are considered as divisive elements. What interviews with lay citizens also reveal is that the national tradition is interpreted mostly in terms of laïcité and secularity, but also—more secondarily and unconsciously—in terms of Catholicism. Indeed, in the narratives Muslims tend to be described as newcomers who should “adapt” to “French” rules to be integrated. The discourses are much more critical as far as Muslim religious claims are at stake than when Catholicism is concerned, and they also focus on the effort needed from religious minorities. It is worth noting that such a view is also particularly strong amongst the interviewees with an immigrant background and who are Muslim as they make the assimilation discourse their own. A minority of lay citizens demonstrate a view of the nation somewhat similar to that of anti-racist, human rights and educational organizations. They appear here as an inclusive group based on common institutions and shared rights. These interviewees are highly critical of the idea of a nation as a common identity, which they consider as risking the closure of the national community. They put into question the 2004 law as a way of stigmatizing Muslims and as problematic with regard to the right to education for all pupils. They also demonstrate a different view of individual freedom and individuality since individual choices are more recognized, and the headscarf is seldom interpreted as a result of a family’s or community’s pressure. These interviewees, however, represent a remarkably small minority, with very specific features. While they are not always politically active, all belong to intellectual or artistic milieus, are rather interested in political issues, vote left wing or ultra-left wing, and have libertarian values. Such a view of the headscarf issue—which insists on equality between all religions and which is more open to religious differences—is also found in a few other interviews, but this comes with a great amount of tension and hesitation. These interviewees value individual freedom in the field of religion and think that all religions must be respected, but they also demonstrate a fear that relationship to religion—to Islam—is based on community pressure. Their discourses also reveal confusion between equality and uniformity as most of the interviewees firmly believe that a necessary precondition for equality is that individuals are different in the public sphere as little as is possible (Levinson 1997; Bozec 2010; Throssell 2010).

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Conclusion The investigation of French actors’ narratives regarding religion and education revealed the existence of conflictive interpretations. However, one narrative predominates which emphasizes the importance of the national cohesion and unity and refuses the recognition of subgroups within the national public sphere. This argumentation goes hand in hand with the defence of individual self-determination. The discourses of French actors also reveal a specific conception of religion as predominantly conceived—except for religious actors and the Ligue de l’Enseignement—as a potential danger for individual autonomy. What is peculiar to the current period is that this combative and strict conception of laïcité—which refuses the presence of religions in the public sphere—is reasserted against a minority religion, whereas it was historically held in a context in which the majority religion— Catholicism—exerted a strong control over society and intended to regulate the public sphere. The presence of Islam is hence reactivating a secularist discourse against a deeply different background in terms of power relationships.

References Ballion, R. (1991). La bonne école. Evaluation et choix du collège et du lycée. Paris: Hatier. Baubérot, J. (1990). Vers un nouveau pacte laïque ? Paris: Seuil. Birnbaum, P. (2003). La France imaginée : déclin des rêves unitaires ? Paris: Gallimard. Brouard, S.; Tiberj, V. (2005). Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébine, africaine et turque. Paris: Presses de Sciences-po. Bozec, G. (2010). Les héritiers de la République. Eduquer à la citoyenneté à l’école dans la France d’aujourd’hui. Political Science PhD Dissertation, Sciences Po, Paris: France. Bozec, G. & Garcia, N. (2010). Identity Construction Programmes of the State and the EU: The French Case (WP5 Report at FP7 IME project). Submitted to the European Commission in June 2010. Bozec, G. & Duchesne, S. (2011). “Europe as a Missed Opportunity: Looking Backwards to Modernity in France.” In Europe, Nations and Modernity, Ichijo, A. (ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Déloye Y. (1994). Ecole et citoyenneté. L’individualisme républicain de Jules Ferry à Vichy. Paris: Presses de la FNSP.

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Duchesne, S. (1997). Citoyenneté à la française. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Estivalèzes, M. (2005). Les religions dans l’enseignement laïque. Paris: PUF. Fetzer, J. S. & Soper, J. C. (2005). Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hafiz, C. & Devers, G. (2005). Droit et religion musulmane. Paris: Dalloz. Hervieu-L. D. (2003). “Pour une sociologie des ‘modernités religieuses multiples’: une autre approche de la ‘religion Invisible’ des sociétés européennes.” Social Compass 50 (3): 287–295. Laborde, C. (2010). Français, encore un effort pour être républicains! Paris: Seuil. Levinson, M. (1997). “Liberalism versus democracy ? Schooling private citizens in the public square.” British Journal of Political Science 27 (3): 333–360. Maurer, S. (2006). Muslim Worship in France: Practical Stakes and Response of Public Actors. New York: International Center for Migration, Ethnicity and Citizenship. Mayeur, J-M. (1997). La question laïque. XIXe–XXe siècle. Paris : Fayard. Molokotos L. L. (2001). “Pluralism in Education: the Display of Islamic Affiliation in French and British Schools.” Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations 11 (1). Spohn W. (2009). “Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging Europe, a Multiple Modernities Perspective.” European Journal of Social Theory 12 (3): 358–374. Throssell, K. (2010). “Un berceau bleu, blanc, rouge: le nationalisme ordinaire et l’enfance.” Raisons politiques 37: 27–38.

CHAPTER SIX IMAM HATIP SCHOOLS: SYMBOLIC FAULT LINES OF THE RELIGIOUSSECULAR DIVIDE IN TURKEY AYHAN KAYA AND AYùE TECMEN

Introduction Turkey, as a European Union candidate, presents a unique case in understanding the role of religion in Europe. As a secular and predominantly Muslim country, Turkey is also perceived to enrich Europe’s heritage while also giving way to debates over the role of Islam in Europe and the EU. Turkey, identified as the “other” in certain discourses, has its own domestic debates over the role of religion in the public sphere. In this context, Imam Hatip schools present themselves as the embodiment of the religious-secular divide in Turkey. The symbolic fault lines created via these debates further the discussions on the role of religion in the field of education and contribute to the concerns about how to consolidate the religious revival in Turkey with the secular tradition of the state. Therefore, the positioning of religion in the field of education is particularly important in understanding the role and functioning of religion in a secular state. In this study, we will provide an overview of the regulatory framework governing the Turkish education system with reference to the roots of Imam Hatip schools as well as the rules and regulations regarding religious education. We will provide a literature review of the academic works on the relations between the functioning of religious schools within the education system, which extends to arguments regarding how to consolidate Islam with secularism. Prior to that, we will discuss the relevance of the notions of laicism and secularism to the Turkish political culture. Tracing the etymological roots of these two terms, which are used interchangeably in Turkey, it will be claimed that the obsession of the

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Kemalist elite with religion in the process of nation-building has, in a way, blocked the secularization of the state and society, leading to the reinforcement of binary oppositions between secularism and Islam, or progressives and conservatives. Methodologically, we will consult the official website of the Turkish Ministry of National Education, policy documents and academic works on the reformation of the education system. To complement our literature review we will also refer to the findings of the fieldwork we conducted in the framework of the 7th Framework Project entitled “Identities and modernities in Europe: European and national identity construction programmes and politics, culture, history and religion” (SSH-CT-2009215949).1 In particular, we will draw upon our findings and analysis of the expert interviews conducted with scholars and civil society representatives between November 2010 and February 2011.2 The data collected through the interviews were evaluated on the basis of the interlocutors’ reflections on religion, secularism and religious education. These interviews were analyzed through the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method (Wodak 2002; 2010). CDA is a method of discourse analysis focusing on the investigation of the relations between discourse and social/cultural developments in everyday life. It views discursive practice as an important form of social practice contributing to the constitution of the social and cultural world, including social identities and relations.

Laicism, Secularism and Education—Ruling the Masses Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, education became an important instrument in modernizing the Turkish society in line with the Western model, while emphasizing the role of unity and solidarity in the nation-building process (Üstel 2004). The early Republican period 1

The project entitled “Identities and modernities in Europe: European and national identity construction programmes and politics, culture, history and religion” (IME) investigates the notions of national identity, European identity and modernity via case studies. Reports pertaining to the Turkish case are available at http://fass.kingston.ac.uk/public/ime/. For further information on the Turkish path to modernity and the religious-secular divide see Kaya & Tecmen (2010a; 2011b); for further information on the education reforms in Turkey see Kaya & Tecmen (2010b). 2 For the interview guide, interview template and Ethics Committee consent form see Kaya & Tecmen (2011a).

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was a time of rapid political reformation and social transformation. In the early 1920s the reformation of the education system was one of the primary concerns of the Turkish state. Özdalga (1999) and Bayar (2009) assert that the reforms in this period focused on establishing a statecontrolled form of education instead of one run by the ulema,3 and unifying education to minimize the perceived damages of foreign and Christian minority schools through the establishment of a unified curriculum, raising the level of literacy, and fostering secularist and nationalist values. To that effect, the reformation process aimed to produce a Turkish identity, which eclipsed Muslim identity, via the establishment of a laicist state structure (Berkes 1954; 1978; Gökalp 1976; Heper 1993; Zürcher 2003). Following the French model of laicité, the choice of the early Republicans regarding the integration of the principle of Laicism into the Turkish Constitution in 1937 indicates that the Kemalist elite was not preoccupied at all with the elimination of religion from the public space. On the contrary, they affirmed the fact that Turkish society was religious in essence. The main rationale behind the principle of Laicism was not to wage a war against Islam, but to provide the people with the power to challenge the Islamic clergy, a rising authority since the late eighteenth century. Laicism derives from the French word lai (or laique, in contemporary usage, lay people in English), meaning “of the people” as distinguished from “the clergy.” Hence, laicism underscores the distinction between lay members of a church and its clergy (Davison 2003). In other words, as Davison (2003) put it very well: [Laicism] “rescued Islam” as a matter of “belief” and “conscience” by institutionally supporting, financing, and promulgating a different version of Islam and its view of relation to power and social life. The separation of religion from its previous position of influence [in the Ottoman Empire] constituted a shift in Islam’s institutional and legitimation position, not its formal, full elimination. (2003, 341)

In this sense, rather than antagonizing Islam, laicism simply means empowering the individual believers vis-à-vis the clergy. Furthermore, laicist ideology has also made it possible for the Kemalist elite to politically and culturally instrumentalise Islam to unify the nation through the institutions of the Ministry of Education and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). The perception that Laicism (Laiklik in 3

Ulema is an Arabic word which refers to the scholars of Islamic law.

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Turkish) was “anti-religious secularism” ignores the regime’s religious policy and fails to consider the existence of different versions of political Islam in Turkey, one of them enshrined in power until very recently and others outside it. The terms laicism and secularism are often used interchangeably in Turkey. However, both terms have different etymologies, institutional histories and normative theoretical implications. Secularism derives from the Latin saeculum, meaning “generation” or “age,” and originally meant “of the world,” as opposed to “of the church.” Hence, secular differentiates between matters of religiosity and matters of the world. In this sense, the secularization of a society simply refers to the “diminution of the social significance of religion” and “the growing tendency to do without religion” (Bruce & Wallis 1994; Davison 2003). A secular state then refers to a “religion-free” state, a kind of state that does not apparently comply with the modern Turkish state. Davison (2003, 344) draws attention to Laicism as an obstacle to secularization, as it has so far made the state instrumentalise religion as a tool to control the masses.

Religious Education in Turkey The Kemalist revolution was partly a reaction to the rising impact of the religious authority called Shayhulislam, the head of the ulema (clergy) for the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire (Erúahin 2008). Kemalists were convinced that the ulema reached the climax of its power dominating both religious authority and legal authority in parallel with the political decay of the Ottoman Empire in the world (Davison 2003). One of the first things that the republican political elite did in the aftermath of the declaration of the foundation of the Republic in 1923 was to abolish the Caliphate and Sharia in 1924, paving the way to the separation of religious and legal authority. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) was established in 1924 “to administer all mosques, to appoint, or to dismiss, all imams (preachers), hatips (orators), vaizs (preachers), sheiks (leaders of dervish houses), muezzins (callers to prayer), and all other employees of a religious character.”4 This institutional structure has comprised what Serif Mardin (1977) called “official Islam” in the modern Turkish Republic.

4

Article 4 of the Law on the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. For further information see the official website of the Directorate, http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/tanitim.asp?id=4.

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In parallel with the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs to control the religious space, the nation-builders also established a new national education system in order to secularize education, which was previously religion-based. The Law on the Unification of Education was also introduced in 1924, empowering the Ministry of National Education to establish a Faculty of Divinity at the Darulfunun (later Istanbul University) to train state employees to be employed as preachers, orators and prayers in the realm of religion. The Ministry also opened separate schools (ayrÕ mektepler) to serve as lower-ranking religious schools for the same purpose. However, these schools were closed down in 1933, and were replaced with the opening of Koran courses in 1934. Andrew Davison (2003) eloquently demonstrates that the Kemalist state has never lost its interest in supporting opportunities for religious instruction. Religious education started to be phased out in the urban areas in the 1930s and 1940s, while it continued to be taught in village schools until the early 1940s. Religious education was reintroduced by the populist Democratic Party in the late 1950s, first as an extracurricular elective course and then as a requirement for which parents could request exemption. After the 1980 military coup, the course was made compulsory in courses on Religious Culture and Morality. The policy pattern including the Imam Hatip schools indicates that the state has always been engaged in promoting an education system merging religious and secular education under the principle of laicism to make sure that individual prayers will be subject to the hegemony of the modern state. In contemporary Turkey, religious education in the Turkish primary and secondary schools is pursued within three different institutions: (1) vocational schools, i.e. schools training imams and hatips5; (2) Koran schools6; and (3) schools providing basic education as part of the normal curriculum (Özdalga 1999, 422). It is, however, the Imam Hatip schools that have become a source of debate in the Turkish education system, since these religious high schools function within a secular education system (Türkmen 2009). While the Koran courses and mandatory religion courses also exist within a secular education system, Imam Hatip schools are discussed in reference to political Islam and the state’s control over 5 Imam is the name given to the religious leader of an Islamic community, and hatip is the name given to an Islamic preacher. 6 Although we will not go into detail about Koran courses, we should note that these courses are either established and controlled by the state or established by private persons thus remaining outside the state controlled education system. These private courses are also debated in reference to the Fethullah Gülen Movement and the Sufi orders. For further information on Koran courses, see Atasoy (2003/2004).

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religious education. Unlike the other components of religious education, these schools are considered to be an “alternative” to the secular high school system. It is this separation that contributes to the employment of Imam Hatip schools in discussions regarding the religious-secular divide. As Türkmen (2009) argues, Turkish “secularism is analyzed through its relationship with Islam. Turkish secularism is commonly understood to be based not on the exclusion of religion from the political system since its inception but, rather, on the control and reinterpretation of Islam by the state (81–82). In that sense, debates on secularism and religion often assume that these two notions have an antagonistic relation thus leading to social and political contestation. Since Imam Hatip schools are an integral part of the Turkish education system, the following issues surrounding these schools are essential in understanding the reflections of the concerns regarding the inclusion of Islam in education: (a) Debates on whether Imam Hatip schools are occupational or religious schools; (b) the extension of compulsory primary school education from five years to eight years in 1997, leading to the closing down of the “middle school” level of Imam Hatip schools and the motivations behind this regulation;7 and (c) a decreasing number of graduates who choose to enrol in theology faculties and/or occupy religious functionary positions. Imam Hatip schools are also reflective of the dichotomy between the Kemalist and Islamist ideologies. In fact, these discussions surrounding the Imam Hatip schools have always been made with reference to the Kemalist understanding of secularism and the exclusion of religion from the public sphere. Subsequently, these debates extended to the 1920s and the establishment of the Turkish national identity on the basis of the principle of laicism. As Waxman (2000) argues, the overarching debates revolving around Islamism and its role in Turkish national identity: posits a dichotomous and essentially adversarial relationship between secular Kemalist nationalism and Islam. The project of Kemalist nationbuilding is seen as antithetical to Islam, and the fortunes of both are tied up 7

In 1997, the duration of compulsory primary education was extended from five to eight years. Prior to 1997, primary education comprised five years of primary school (ølkokul) and three years of middle school, or junior high school (Ortaokul). After completion of the fifth year the Primary School Diploma (ølkokul DiplomasÕ) was awarded, and the Middle School Diploma (Ortaokul DiplomasÕ) was awarded at the end of the three-year middle school education. These two diplomas have since been combined and replaced by a single diploma, the Primary Education Diploma (Ilkogretim DiplomasÕ), awarded to those students who successfully complete the eight-year elementary education program.

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Chapter Six in a “zero-sum game,” whereby the success of Kemalist nationalism entails the diminution of Islam, and vice versa. Such a characterization, however, greatly over-simplifies the relationship between Kemalist nationalism and Islam … [T]he process that has been occurring has not simply been one of the rise of Islamism and the concomitant decline of Kemalist nationalism. Rather, it is a dual process involving the Islamization of Turkish nationalism, and the nationalization of Islam …. (2000, 4–5)

Similarly, Yesim Bayar (2009, 363) also argues that the Kemalist education model was not based on secular assumptions, but was rather an attempt to integrate religious and secular teaching. One can even trace the roots of religious assumptions in the mindset of the military elite, who established an ethno-culturally and religiously homogenous Republic in the 1920s and 1930s through a set of migration, citizenship and settlement policies. For instance, an Islamic element was very visible in the selection of those subject to population exchange schemes in the 1920s. It was not the linguistic but the religious affinity, which permitted the GreekMuslims to migrate to Anatolia while excluding Turkish-speaking Christians in Moldova (Gürbey 2009, 374). Similarly, the citizenship rights of those remaining non-Muslims were reduced even more with the introduction of the Law on State Employees (Memurin Kanunu) in 1926, which made being Turkish, that is, Sunni-Muslim, a precondition for being a state employee in a way that institutionalized the dominance of one religious group over the state (Gürbey 2009, 374). While the arguments of Waxman (2000), Bayar (2009) and Gürbey (2009) provide an important insight into the interrelated and influential relations between Kemalists (secular circles) and Islamists (religious circles), the debates surrounding Imam Hatip schools still maintain the adversarial relationship between these two circles. Özdalga (1999) clarifies the opposing views on religious education embodied in Imam Hatip schools with the following assertion: Radical Kemalists see the Imam Hatip schools as a threat to the very foundation of the secular republic. Where the Islamists see the Imam Hatip schools as a way to save a valuable cultural and national heritage, the secularists see only reactionary tendencies. Where the Islamists see the Imam Hatip schools as a contribution to the building of a civil society, the secularists see only the threat of anti-secular and therefore non-democratic forces. Where the Islamists see the Imam Hatip schools as way for women to earn an education, perhaps even a profession, the secularists see only women who veil, thereby undermining their own freedom and emancipation. Also, where the Islamists envision a path to a

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meaningful life cast in piety, the secularists see only stupidity and superstition. (1999, 428)

In view of the diverging opinions on religious education vis-a-vis the state’s role in regulating religious education and the intensifying antagonism between religion and secularism in Turkey, in the next section we will investigate the role of Imam Hatip schools as one of the various representations of the religious-secular divide in Turkey. In doing so, we will first provide a comprehensive overview of the regulatory developments on Imam Hatip schools with reference to laws and regulations. Concurrently, we will analyse the ideological contestations that these schools present in correlation with the socio-political dynamics of the country. Subsequently, we will consider the arguments revolving around political Islam with reference to the proliferation of Imam Hatip schools and the integration of graduates into different aspects of social life, thereby challenging the Kemalists’ restriction of religion into the private sphere.

Recurring Introduction of Imam Hatip Schools into the Education System The first major step towards the establishment of the secular Turkish education system was the Law on Unification of National Education No. 430, put into force on March 3, 1924 (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu).8 The Law abolished madrasahs9 and unified all educational institutions remaining within the borders of the Republic under the Ministry of National Education (Dölen 2009; Öncü 1993). The Law was a reflection of the “new state ideology developing a unified curriculum and education system that would articulate a particular cultural and moral identity—a Turkish identity—to be shared by the (Turkish) citizens of the new nation” (Shively 2008, 683). Çakmak (2009) elaborates that: In 1923, the Ministry of National Education took over the administration and control of all existing religious schools and their means of support in the form of endowments and funds … With the 1924 law mandating the unification of all education, religious education was brought under the 8

For the full text of the Law on Unification of National Education No: 430 (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) see the official website of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of National Education, www.meb.gov.tr/. 9 Madrasah is an Arabic word, which literally means a place where both religious and secular learning/studying is done.

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Chapter Six strict control of the state, and the government centralized education and developed a single curriculum under the auspices of the regime. It meant the abolition of public religious education as well as religious education provided by various religious orders. Co-education was introduced and female suffrage was granted. The aim was to dissolve the Ottoman-Muslim culture and build a secular culture. (2009, 827)

To that effect, the overarching emphasis on secularism in the systematic transformation of the political and social sphere in line with Western civilization confined religion and representations of religious beliefs to the private sphere. Accordingly, “secularism was a strategy for erasing religion as a means of political resistance to the modernization process” (Çakmak 2009, 828), because the Kemalist elite saw education as a means to cultivate civilizational modernity, social cohesion, solidarity and cultural affinity through unity and adherence to a secular nation-state. Prioritizing laicism was intended to avert ethno-religious pluralism because of the requirement for the survival of a strong Turkish nation-state to prevent disintegration. In the 1930s and 1940s the regime’s attitude toward religion had become extremely repressive, but after the introduction of multiparty politics in 1946 both the ruling and opposition parties started to court the Muslim vote, and the CHP (Republican People’s Party) itself became more tolerant towards religion in 1947. The party reintroduced elective religious education in schools and training establishments for preachers. Ankara University announced the establishment of a Faculty of Divinity, and in 1949 the tombs and shrines were allowed to reopen. At the same time, the CHP tried to guard against any religious reaction in politics by enacting Article 163 of the penal code (removed in 1991), which strictly prohibited propaganda attacking the secular character of the state (Bayrakdar 2006, 233). According to Türkmen (2009, 85), in 1924 Imam Hatip schools opened with thirty students, but they were closed in 1931 after the number of students dropped to ten, and in 1949 “ten-month Imam Hatip courses” were introduced under the control of the Ministry of Education to overcome the resounding criticism of secularism by Islamist conservatives who formed a close cooperation with the Democratic Party (DP) (Cakmak 2009, 830). The period of DP rule in the 1950s is also known to be a period of populism (Zürcher 2003) leading to the reintroduction of Imam Hatip schools, as well as compulsory religion courses and Theology Faculties

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into the education system. Under the DP government, Imam Hatip schools as well as Theology Faculties were established in accordance with Article 4 of the Law on the Unification of Education (1924). The Law primarily unified all educational institutions while aspiring to put forth a single curriculum based on the establishment of the unitary state and maintenance of Ataturk’s principles (Rutz 1994, 94). Scholars underline that the establishment of Imam Hatip schools in the 1950s coincides with the growing need for religious leaders (Reed 1955; Pak 2004a) because the policies between the 1920s and 1950s aimed to prioritize secularism in education, and the production of religious personnel was highly restricted. According to Reed (1955), in 1951, nineteen Imam Hatip schools were established by Adnan Menderes, the leader of the ruling DP, due to a shortage of religious leadership.10 Reed maintains that the unification of education and the closing of madrasahs contributed to this shortage (1955, 151). Conversely, Zürcher (2003) maintains that the inclusion of religion in education was not a result of necessity but rather a political move initiated by the populist and rightwing Democratic Party leadership that came to power in 1950 elections. The choice of the DP was in favour of setting up a political alliance with the rural population that was previously neglected by the CHP-rule. The military coup of 1960 broke up this alliance and accused the Democratic Party leadership of exploiting the religious sentiments of the Turkish people. Reed rightfully argued that the main question after the establishment of Imam Hatip schools was if these schools were able to avoid the pitfalls of a dualism springing from Allah's demand for ultimate submission to his omnipotent will and the urgent requirements of the sovereign Turkish Republic upon its loyal citizens (Reed 1955, 163). While Imam Hatip schools remained an integral part of the Turkish education system between the 1950s and the 1980s, the reintroduction of Islam into politics gave way to debates over the function of these schools within the secular education system. New Muslim intellectuals who emerged in the 1980s demanded a redefinition of secularism, an enlargement of the borders of civil society, limitations on state control over social affairs, and recognition of popular Islam that occupies a different place than political Islam (Pak 2004b, 332). The military coup in 1980 was important in the consolidation of Turkish and Islamic characteristics of national identity. The neo-liberal coup and the 1982 Constitution were designed to combat left-wing social 10

For the statistics on the number of Imam Hatip schools and students between 1923 and 2008, see Çakmak (2009, 831–838).

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movements in the 1970s, and the new Constitution favoured a Turkish and Islamic alliance using a popular religious nationalism flavour in the country. The idea was a neo-liberal one, aiming at the revival of a religionbased community formation in Turkey, as opposed to a centrifugal working class alliance (Kaya & Tecmen 2010a, 17). Subsequently, as a result of the reliance of the official state ideology on “Turko-Islamic synthesis” (Atasoy 2003/2004; Güvenç 1996; Kaplan 2002), discourses of the Turkish political elite started to emphasize the Islamic identity of the Turks and the significance of religious values (Waxman 2000, 16). In the period of neoliberal politics, Islam became an integral part of the national identity constituting a significant rupture from the strictly secular identity politics of the political elite. Furthermore, Kaplan (2002) asserts that In the fifth five-year government plan (1985–89), these [religious] parliamentarians established the magnet “Anatolian Imam Hatip” high schools. Its graduates can theoretically enrol in military academies, like their counterparts from the secular-track Anatolian high schools. The military has successfully countered this move by periodically identifying and expelling students with religious beliefs. (2002, 123)

Anatolian Imam Hatip schools (Anadolu ømam Hatip Lisesi)11 are reflective of the relationship between the secular military establishment (an extension of the reformist Kemalist elite) and the religious circles. In effect, the military has established itself as the embodiment and protector of laicism in Turkey, and thus excluded religious ideologies from the institution. The way in which Imam Hatip graduates were legally compelled to continue their education in Theology faculties ensured that graduates would not be able to partake in military education. The Anatolian Imam Hatip schools eliminated this regulatory barrier, which further challenged the exclusion of religion from the military.

Imam Hatip Schools in the 1990s—Questioning State Control over Religious Education While the state’s control over religious education remained an imperative concern until the end of the 1990s, the catalyst that intensified 11 Anatolian Imam Hatip schools are reknown with the employment of English language as the medium of education.

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the debates on Imam Hatip schools in particular, and the state control of religious education in general, came in 1997. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council (MGK) gave an ultimatum to the Welfare Party and True Path coalition government to refrain from Islamist politics, and this led to the collapse of the coalition government (Cizre & ÇÕnar 2003). Furthermore, the MGK meeting on February 28 gave rise to a new period in which the MGK took significant measures to exclude the conservative and religious citizens from political, social and economic spheres of life and to restore the “laicist” regime. In this period, the MGK held a meeting with the Higher Education Council and the university presidents/chancellors, and warned them to not allow the female students with headscarves on to campus (CEDAW 2010). Hence, it should be stated that the measure of the MGK in the aftermath of the February 28 semi-coup opened up a new period, known as the February 28 Process, in which the concept “public sphere” was dramatically constrained, and the state-centric secularism became restrictive towards religious activities with a fundamentalist tone. Against this backdrop, compulsory education was increased from five to eight years after the enactment of Law No. 4306,12 published in the Official Gazette No. 23084 dated August 18, 1997, thereby closing all sixth, seventh and eighth grades, which formerly constituted the “middle school” sections. Consequently, only the high school sections of the Imam Hatip schools remained open.13 According to KavakçÕ (2010, 73), the eight-year mandatory education plan was simply a response to the assumption that Imam Hatip schools were the “backyard” of the Islamist movement. In other words, Imam Hatip schools were mainly discussed in association with religious lobbies and tarikats (religious orders), which were considered threats to the secular nature of the state and society. Nonetheless, Özdalga (1999, 425) maintains that while there was a general agreement to raise mandatory education, contestations persisted between those who, in support of the military, pressed for the “eight years” formula, and those who, like the pro-Islamist Welfare Party and the True Path Party, defended a “five + three years” formula. The latter would enable five years of primary secular 12

For the full text of the Law No. 4306 see the official website of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of National Education, www.meb.gov.tr/ 13 The Helsinki Summit of 1999, where Turkey attained the status of candidate for membership, was a turning-point in EU-Turkey relations because the signing of the Accession Partnership in 1999 meant that Turkey was expected to adopt the legal framework of the EU, acquis communitaire. Reformation of the field of education to implement the eight-year compulsory education plan was carried out in the scope of the harmonization efforts.

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education and three years of Imam Hatip religious education, while the former would enable eight years of secular education and the possibility of Imam Hatip education from grade nine and onwards. Due to the closing down of these levels, individuals can only enrol in the high school level of Imam Hatip schools. Accordingly, Nachmani (2003) and Pak (2004a) maintain that one of the primary reasons that religious circles object to this law is that it is preventing children from becoming acquainted with religion at an early age. Pak (2004a) further notes that the opponents to the education reform bill asserted that it had been aimed at diminishing the size of the student body at Imam Hatip schools, which the laicists perceived as a potential threat to the secular establishment. In congruence with disputes over the role of religion in Turkish national identity, in the aftermath of Law No. 4306 the role of the educational system as an instrument to secularize the society was called into question. For that reason, Pak (2004a) argues that the Imam Hatip schools epitomize the attempted control of the reproduction of religious knowledge by the government throughout modern Turkish history. The contestations stemming from the state’s control over Imam Hatip schools and the functioning of religious education are often complemented by debates regarding the role of religion in the articulation of Turkish identity. Moreover, some scholars argue that the restrictions on and concerns over Imam Hatip schools were based on the proliferating number of students enrolling and graduating each year. Article 32 of the Basic Law on Education (1973) clearly declared that the aim of the Imam Hatip schools was to raise preachers (imam) who would occupy religious positions upon graduation. However, the popularization and the politicization of the masses have brought about the involvement of different ideologies in education. Consequently, one can argue that the dual educational policies, both nationalist and religious, have increased the gap between policy actors in the national education system (Ercan 1999, 32). To that effect, Nachmani asserts that, by the late 1990s, these schools were producing 53,000 graduates, while the number of imams needed was only 2,300 (Nachmani 2003, 97). These statistics are in line with the report written by ÇakÕr, Bozan & Talu (2004), which asserts that: The first serious objection to the free choice of Imam Hatip graduates came from TÜSIAD (the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association). According to their research conducted in 1988, approximately 32 percent of graduates of Imam Hatip schools picked faculties of law as their first choice in university entrance exams, proving more popular than religious based alternatives. (2004, 46)

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The elimination of the “single-track” rule for Imam Hatip graduates yielded to numerous debates along with the religious-secular divide. The reintegration of Islam in the Turkish national identity in the 1980s led to the generation of debates revolving around political Islam. Erkan & Akçayöz (2003) assert that Imam Hatip schools are located at the heart of discussions on political Islam and note that the production of graduates that surpass the need for religious personnel is a factor in the strengthening of political Islam (Serter 1997, 47–58 cited in Erkan & Akçayöz, 2003, 186). Most importantly, the scholars categorize the groups involved in these debates in three categories: (1) those who oppose the proliferation of these schools for various reasons; (2) those who support the proliferation of these schools; and (3) those who do not focus on the number and capacity of these schools, but rather emphasize that their structure does not comply with the principle of laicite (Erkan & Akçayöz 2003, 186). In the light of this information, Law No. 4306 also foresaw certain restrictions on the Imam Hatip graduates’ academic achievements in the central examination system. Discussions around the opportunities provided for regular (secular) high school graduates and Imam Hatip graduates in the central examination system and the restrictions on their access to higher education in faculties other than theology became a political and a social debate which intensified even further in the late 1990s. To that effect, Özdalga (1999) argues that: The 1997 reform, casting all junior high school education in the same mold, that is, abolishing the first part of the Imam Hatip education and making it more difficult for students graduating from Imam Hatip schools to enter other university programs than those offered by the Faculties of Theology, has been more like a restatement of the program put in force twenty-five years ago. (1999, 426)

Since the institution of Imam Hatip schools in the 1950s, Imam Hatip graduates were only permitted to continue their higher education in theology faculties. Then, in 1974, Imam Hatip graduates were permitted to enter any university department/faculty, subject to their qualifications in the central university examination. However, in 1999 the laws were changed back so that Imam Hatip students who wanted to enter faculties other than that of theology would be penalized on the university entrance exams. This resulted in a substantial drop in enrolment in Imam Hatip schools (Shively 2008, 701–702). As the discrepancy between Imam Hatip graduates enrolling in law faculties and political science departments, and those preferring to enrol in

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Theology faculties increased, in 1999 Imam Hatip schools were reclassified as vocational schools. As a consequence these schools were subject to a lower coefficient at the central examinations, which aimed to limit the scope of undergraduate schools available to Imam Hatip graduates. This was an informed attempt to reduce the popularity of these schools by giving them a competitive disadvantage in terms of higher education. In effect, these schools present an important tangible case study into the state control over religious education. Imam Hatip schools function under the strict guidelines established by the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Drawing upon the state’s executive role over these schools, Rutz (1999) contends that the state’s hold over religious education, which is reflected in the functioning of Imam Hatip schools, is reflective of the state’s efforts to safeguard the laicist ideology. In reference to Howe (2000, 7), Pak notes that: … the forms of religious knowledge are carefully fashioned, legitimized, and distributed through a deliberate course of action to generate a “state Islam” that minimizes any possibility of jeopardizing the secularist principle. Vocal Islamists displeased with the stringent state control over the Imam Hatip schools have contested that “it is not the business of government to teach Islam.” (2004a, 94)

AkpÕnar (2007, 162) contends that the reason that secular circles have opposed Imam Hatip schools is because pupils enrolled at Imam Hatip schools are first and foremost cultivated as religious persons and only secondarily as citizens. In that sense, it is important that Turkish citizenship is highly reliant on individuals’ responsibilities and duties to the state and to Turkish society. We should underline that the formal definition of Turkish citizenship varies from territoriality and ethnicity (Kiriúçi 2000), as well as oscillating between political and ethnicist logic (Ye÷en 2004; KadÕo÷lu 2007). Citizenship is traditionally perceived as a unifying element in the nation-building process. However, the conventional conception of Turkish citizenship can no longer play its unifying function, nor is it capable of translating abstract status to concrete rights (Keyman & øçduygu 2003, 231). Therefore, educational institutions, which do not educate on individuals’ responsibilities to the state constitute a flaw in the Turkish education system based on the Kemalist ideology. To that effect, state’s control over religious education is an essential method of “domesticating” religion and guaranteeing that it remains relatively harmless (Shively 2008, 683).

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Imam Hatip Schools—An “Alternative” Form of Education? The rising number of graduates enrolling in faculties other than theology has transformed Imam Hatip schools into an alternative education system where they receive religious education and are incorporated into various university departments for careers in engineering, law and medicine. They enter the job market as professionals and civil servants (Atasoy 2004/2005, 144). Accordingly, this system was producing religious individuals who were integrated into different aspects of social life, thus contesting the Kemalists’ exclusion of religion and religious beliefs from the public sphere. In fact, as Özdalga (1999) notes, it is the way in which Imam Hatip schools and the secular education system foresee different types of people that constitutes a fundamental problem in the consolidation of these two entities. She notes that: According to the spirit of the Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu, public educational institutions in Turkey should not graduate different types of educated people, but basically one type. Having two types of Lycee instruction—one secular and the other religious—means returning to the situation in the late Ottoman Empire, when the old medreses competed with modern, secular schools, a situation the founders of the modern Turkish republic sought to eliminate. (1999, 428)

While the scholars’ observations on the “alternative” nature of Imam Hatip schools are often employed in arguments against Imam Hatip schools, the fieldwork that we conducted in the scope of the FP7 project titled Identities and Modernities on Europe (IME) (SSH-CT-2009-215949) revealed that similar justifications can also be made to explain the existence Imam Hatip schools. For instance, one interlocutor, who is a faculty member at a foundation university in Istanbul, asserted that: In some ways, they [Imam Hatip schools] have become a kind of temporary solution to the detrimental effects of the modernization process. People do not send their children to these schools so they can be imams but rather so that they can become lawyers, politicians etc. … In a way, these are solutions to public demand founded by politics. Imam Hatip schools provide students with occupations without ostracizing religion. (Personal interview, Istanbul, December 2, 2010)

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In correlation with the argument of the inability to meet the public demand for religious education, one interlocutor, who is working in the Turkish Ministry of National Education, underlined that there is a need for these schools. He argued that: There is a need for these schools because the society’s needs with regards to religious education are not permitted to be met by other options such as courses, private schools, communities, and NGOs. The correct solution is to renounce religious education in civil space, and to ensure state control. (Personal interview, Ankara, December 26, 2010)

Nonetheless, our interviews have revealed that the fundamental dispute regarding the Imam Hatip schools is about their status within the education system. In other words, ideological differences aside, these schools are problematic when they are perceived as “alternatives” to the secular system rather than as a component of the education system vis-a-vis their status as occupational schools. In effect, these discourses place Imam Hatip schools outside the general system, thus labelling the students and graduates as the “other.” For instance, one interlocutor, who is a program officer at a civil society organization, indicated that these schools are in fact occupational schools and that they are logical educational institutions, since every individual does not have access to higher education (Personal Interview, Istanbul, January 20, 2011). It is also apparent that in some cases, Imam Hatip schools also constitute “alternatives” in the context of the headscarf debate. As such, one interlocutor, who is associated with the CHP and the former chairperson of a women’s association in Turkey, maintained that: The discussions on occupational schools get blocked at Imam Hatip schools; I think this issue is being taken advantage of in terms of politics. The politicization of Imam Hatip schools stems from the education system. Those who wear the headscarf cannot go to a University so they prefer these schools. I believe both Islamists and laicists have equally taken advantage of this issue. (Personal interview, Istanbul, December 1, 2010)

Indeed, as previously noted, the representation of religious beliefs in the public sphere is a wide-ranging debate. Imam Hatip schools constitute one of the many views intertwined under the overarching debate on how to consolidate the religious elements of the society with the secular tradition of the state. In terms of the representation of religion with regard to Imam Hatip schools, our fieldwork revealed that while the increasing number of

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Imam Hatip graduates is a wide-ranging concern, experts’ approaches to these schools depend heavily on how they perceive these schools’ role within the entire education system. We observe that those who perceive these schools as occupational schools are more accommodating towards them and those who oppose these schools argue that Imam Hatip schools do not consolidate religion and secularism, but rather threaten the secular state tradition. In terms of the representation of religion with regard to Imam Hatip schools, the interlocutors that we interviewed revealed diverse opinions. What is revealed by the interviews is that expert opinions depend heavily on how they perceive the role of these schools within the entire education system. In that regard, we see that the enrolment of Imam Hatip graduates in departments other than Theology has become a visible concern for secular groups, whereas those who perceive these schools as occupational are more accommodating towards Imam Hatip them.

Conclusion This chapter claims that the debates about secularism, laicism and Islam have always been ideologically loaded in Turkey. The ideological nature of these debates is not because of the elimination of religion from public space by the Kemalist elite, but actually because of their constant attempts to instrumentalise Islam in the name of controlling and disciplining the Turkish nation. It was also uncovered that laicism and secularism have always been used interchangeably by the Turkish public as well as by the elite in a way that leads to confusion. It is this confusion, which has made the conservative elite portray the Kemalist principle of laicism as a negation of Islam in order to gain political ground in a revanchist manner against the statist and Kemalist elite. The political divide present at the top of the Turkish State is now being turned into a social divide between moderate Islamists and secular fundamentalists, involving a wide variety of political and non-political actors such as the political parties, parliament, judiciary, army, academia, non-governmental organizations, media and business circles. The debates about the Imam Hatip schools and the headscarf issue have become the symbolic faultlines epitomizing this divide. Similar to the divide during and after the Democratic Party rule in the 1950s, the recent social and political divide in Turkey has both internal and external sources. The divide actually seems to have economic reasons as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has so far represented the interests of newly emerging middle class groups with a rural origin and

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conservative background who are competing against the established middle and upper middle classes with an urban and Kemalist background. The divide also springs from the fact that the legitimate political centre is now accessible to several social groups including, not only, laicists, republicans, Kemalists and liberal business circles, but also Muslims, Kurds, conservative business circles and several other groups. This ideological divide symbolized by Imam Hatip schools is also reinforced by some international sources, such as the internal crisis of the European Union, the enlargement fatigue of the Union, the ongoing instability in the Middle East, the changing American interests in the region, the rise of political Islam as a reaction to the ongoing Islamophobia in the world, and the global evocative ascendancy of civilizationist/culturalist/religious discourse. While we predominantly investigated the debates surrounding Imam Hatip schools as illustrations of the growing religious-secular divide in Turkey, it is also important to underline the importance of the political and social contestations taking place along these lines. These contestations can be perceived as reflections of increased civil and civic participation by political and social actors. Subsequently, the social divide between moderate Islamists and secular fundamentalists, which we have investigated in reference to Imam Hatip schools, can also be perceived as a by-product of modernization. In the Turkish literature on modernity, Europeanization is often used interchangeably with modernization owing to the assumed Euro-American hegemony in classical modernization theories. Conventionally, in the Turkish case Europeanization has been associated with secularism and rationalism, and the transformations it entails are mainly represented in the structural transformations of the political and legal systems. However, the religious-secular divide that we have seen in the Turkish case has transcended to a social phenomenon where the actors are highly involved in the restructuring of the society and in restructuring the political arena via the representation of their demands for religious education. In that sense, the debates evolving around Imam Hatip schools are also representative of the ongoing modernization process in Turkey that relies on social contestations and tensions rather than a top-down reformation process that Europeanization has come to represent. Eventually, this chapter also pointed to a disputable spot raised by both scholars and interlocutors, that is the way in which debates revolving around the issues of religion and secularism have been detectable in the field of education. This is the most decisive debate dividing the Turkish public between the so-called “Laicists” and “anti-Laicists.” The main

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points raised in this regard have been the headscarf and Imam Hatip schools issues, which were located by the interlocutors around a fault-line dividing those who place these issues within the framework of politicization of religious claims and those who place them within the framework of human rights. It has also become evident that the politicization of various issues such as the Imam Hatip schools, headscarves, Alevism and non-Muslim minorities results from the fact that the Turkish public has never discussed the issue of “freedom of faith” in a democratic platform away from the impact of ideological confrontation. Religion has always been instrumentalised by the Kemalists and antiKemalists along with their own interests. Hence, it could be concluded that the instrumantalisation of a kind of an “official Islam” by the Kemalist regime has made religion open to exploitation in a way that reinforced the hegemony of Sunni Islam at the expense of non-Sunni Muslim groups and non-Muslim groups.

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KavakçÕ, M. I. (2010). Headscarf Politics in Turkey: A Postcolonial Reading. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kaya, A. & Tecmen, A. (2010a). Turkish Modernity: A Continuous Journey of Europeanization, FP7 Project entitled Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME), SSH-CT-2009-215949, WP4 “The state of the art: various paths to modernity.” Turkish Case Report submitted to the European Commission in January 2010. —. (2010b). “External and Internal Promotion: Europeanization of Turkey.” FP7 Project entitled Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME), SSH-CT-2009-215949, WP5 “Identity construction programs of the state and the EU: Case Study Phase I.” Turkish Case Report submitted to the European Commission in June 2010. —. (2011a). “Identity construction programmes of non-state, professional and collective actors: Turkish Case.” FP7 Project entitled Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME), SSH-CT-2009-215949. WP6 Identity Construction programmes of non-state, professional and collective actors: Case study phase II. Turkish Case Report submitted to the European Commission in April 2011. —. (2011b). “Turkish Modernity: A Continuous Journey of Europeanization.” In Europe, Nations and Modernity, Ichijo, A. (ed.) London: Palgrave Macmillan. Keyman, F. E. & øçduygu, A. (2003). “Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses.” Citizenship Studies 7 (2): 219–234. Kiriúçi, K. (2000). “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices.” Middle Eastern Studies 36 (3): 1–22. Mardin, ù. (1977). “Islam and the Secular State in Turkey.” International Social Science Journal 29 (2): 279–297. Nachmani, A. (2003). Turkey: Facing a New Millennium: Coping with Intertwined Conflicts. Manchester University Press: Manchester. Official Website of the Turkish Republic Ministry of National Education. www.meb.gov.tr (accessed January 24, 2012). Öncü, A. (1993). “Academics: The West in the Discourse of University Reform.” In Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities, Heper, M., Öncü, A. & Kramer, H. (eds.). London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Özdalga, E. (1999). “Education in the Name of ‘Order and Progress’: Reflections on the Recent Eight Year Obligatory School Reform in Turkey.” The Muslim World LXXXIX (3–4). Pak, S. Y. (2004a). “Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey.” Comparative Education 40 (3): 321–341.

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—. (2004b). “Articulating the Boundary between Secularism and Islamism: The Imam Hatip Schools of Turkey.” Anthropology and Education Quarterly 35 (3): 324–344. Reed, H. A. (1955). “Turkey's New Imam Hatip Schools.” Die Welt des Islams, New Series 4 (2/3): 150–163. Rutz, H. J. (1999). “The Rise and Demise of Imam Hatip Schools: Discourses of Islamic Belonging and Denial in the Construction of Turkish Civic Culture.” Polar 22 (2): 93–103. Serter, N. (1997). Dinde Siyasal Islam Tekeli (Monopoly of Political Islam in Religion). Istanbul: Sarmal Yayinevi. Shively, K. (2008). “Taming Islam: Studying Religion in Secular Turkey.” Anthropological Quarterly 81 (3): 683–711. Türkmen, B. (2009). “A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of ‘Religious Culture and Morality’ Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29 (3): 381–397. Üstel, F. (2004). Makbul Vatandaú'Õn Peúinde: II: Meúrutiyet'ten bugüne vatandaúlÕk e÷itimi (In Pursuit of the Ideal Citizen: Civic Education from Constitutional Monarchy to Today). Istanbul: øletiúim YayÕnlarÕ. Waxman, D. (2000). “Islam and Turkish National Identity: A Reappraisal.” The Turkish Yearbook XXX. Wodak, R. (2002). “The Discourse-Historical Approach.” In Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. (eds.) London: Sage. —. (2010). The Discourses of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Ye÷en, M. (2009). “‘Prospective-Turks’ or ‘Pseudo-Citizens’: Kurds in Turkey.” The Middle East Journal 63 (4): 597–615. Middle East Institute. Zürcher, R. Z. (2003). Turkey: A Modern History. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers.

CHAPTER SEVEN YOUNG MUSLIMS IN THE NETHERLANDS IN FOCUS: UNDERSTANDING TARIQ RAMADAN MOHAMMED HASHAS AND JAN JAAP DE RUITER

Introduction This chapter focuses on the construction of Islam by young Muslims living in The Netherlands. It does so by firstly discussing the ideas of what a European Islam could or should be, based on the thoughts of Tariq Ramadan. In 1971, the Moroccan scientist and religious scholar Ali Ibn AlMuntassir El-Kettani (1941–2001), known to some as a leading activist in the Islamic Minority Studies (cilm al-aqalliyat), visited The Netherlands among the 165 countries he toured to discover the situation of Muslim minorities. In his publication Muslims in Europe and America, published posthumously in 2005 in Arabic, he states the following: In The Netherlands, there is no discrimination against the Muslim immigrants. Only the Dutch converts feel discomfort. Muslim needs are understood and catered for by the authorities. Islamic marriage is allowed, and pupils are allowed to be taught Islam in Dutch schools, sometimes by Turkish or Arab teachers; there are no Islamic schools in The Netherlands. (2005, 299–300)

In 1973, Muslim immigrants accounted for approximately 150,000 of the total Dutch population, i.e. 1.1% of the whole population; Turks made up 60,000, and the Moroccans 50,000, in addition to other nationalities and ethnicities with an Islamic background.

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In 2010, the Moroccan-Dutch researcher and ex-member of Dutch Parliament Sam Cherribi wrote from the United States about an (judging by the title) uneasy situation in an uneasy context—In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed. He wrote that 907,000 Muslims in the country, according to the 2009 statistics, shifted from being labelled minority Muslims and Islam in The Netherlands, as they had been by Al-Kettani, to Dutch Islam by Cherribi himself. This comprises 6% of the population, of which Moroccans are the second largest community (314,000) after the Turks (329,000). In 2009, The Netherlands had a population of 16,485,787 (Harchaoui 2010, 7–9). Cherribi outlines three main developments since the 1960s which have led to the resurgence of fear of religion in European societies, including The Netherlands: (1) the emergence of political Islam discourse from the inside to the outside of the mosque; (2) the crisis of models of integration and multiculturalism, and; (3) the globalization of Europe’s Muslim “problem,” which quickly spread after 9/11 and was mixed with the US discourse of the “war on terror” and involvement in the Middle East. For Cherribi, “Islam in Europe has shaped the present image of Islam in the world” through a model he calls “the trifecta of coercion,” by which he means the “coercion of Europe’s Muslim migrant community from below, from within, and from above” (Cherribi 2010, 5). Coercion from below is how one’s migrant origin and status affect one’s future development in society regarding the pressure to make a living, to succeed in one’s profession and to have a place in one’s community, for example. The second part of the trifecta is coercion from within, which refers to the pressure within the Muslim European individual as well as within his or her community nurtured by the conflict of messages from society at large and the Muslim religious establishment. As to coercion from above, it is twofold and exerted by official Islam through the embassies of Islamic countries and government programs as well as by radical unofficial Islam through messages of Muslim transnationalism and anti-Western activism (Cherribi 2010, 5). After 9/11 and the death of upcoming right wing politician Pim Fortyn on May 6, 2002, Cherribi (and his community) felt that despite “(my) years of devotion to the Dutch system and culture, despite (my) public service to Holland, despite (my) very real, official citizenship—that (my) Dutchness was questioned by the crowd … when they looked at me, they saw a Moroccan” (Cherribi 2010, 8). It seems, then, an “uneasy context” for Muslims, and so it seems for the native Dutch in particular, and for the Europeans in general. Tijani, of Moroccan origin, sees the same, and speaks of the dangers of “double standards” and

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“hidden enmity” against the Muslim community in the country, very much fuelled by the media (Boulaouali 2006, 155–156, 188). In this context, understanding Tariq Ramadan’s project of European Islam makes a lot of sense. The controversy built around him in the French context by Caroline Fourest (2008), Ian Hamel (2007), Aziz Zemmouri (2005), Lionel Favrot (2004) and Paul Landau (2005), along with some others including French President Nicolas Sarkozy, is, to our understanding, an over-reading and misunderstanding of his works. Ramadan has his contesters in The Netherlands as well, which is something that ended his contract with the Rotterdam Municipality as a Special Consultant before due time (Ramadan 2010a). This chapter, which is the result of fieldwork, measures the MoroccanDutch youth openness and reactions to some of Ramadan’s main ideas. The idea defended here is that Ramadan’s project of a European Islam is compatible with the way the young Moroccan-Dutch Muslims live and perceive Islam, which makes such a project equally compatible in its general reformed perception with the liberal democratic values of the Dutch society. The chapter is scheduled as follows: the first parts condense the main theological and socio-political ideas on the European Islam of Tariq Ramadan. Following this, the results of the fieldwork conducted among sixty Dutch Muslims of Moroccan origin in seven cities all over the country are presented, being the answers to a collection of questions on the selected issues. Part three closes with our comments on the data, compares them with the current situation and suggests how they could be further developed and distributed as a means of understanding the Muslim community needs and challenges.

Tariq Ramadan’s Reformist and Pluralist Project of European Islam General outlines Tariq Ramadan’s interest in the question of Islam in the West rose after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Salman Rushdie Affair in 1989, and the case of the French foulard also in 1989 (Ramadan 2009, 8). In this climate, he felt he “needed change and to return to the sources of my faith and spirituality,” and “decided to engage in that process of mediation between universes of references, cultures, and religions” by fully accepting “my Muslim faith and my Western culture and I claimed that

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this is possible and that common values and hopes are more essential and more numerous than differences” (Ramadan 2009, 14). Besides the broad interest in “building bridges” between two worlds of references, the West and Islam, he mainly focuses on European societies where he aims to show, “in theory and in practice,” that one can be both fully Muslim and Western, and that beyond different affiliations “many common principles and values” are shared, and “through which it is possible to ‘live together’ within contemporary pluralistic, multicultural societies where various religions coexist” (Ramadan 2009, 21). Ramadan’s hybrid background, that embraces both the Islamic and European traditions, convinces him that there is an ideological, political and cultural crisis in both worlds, out of which his objective is “to shape a European Islamic Identity” (Ramadan 1999a, 101). Ramadan situates his project of reforming Islam in the tradition of earlier reformists, pioneered by Jamal Ad-Din Al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), Rachid Ridha (1865–1935), Sa’id AnNursi (1878–1960), ‘Abd Alhamid Ibn Badis (1889–1940), and Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938). His Aux Sources du renouveau Musulman: D’alAfghani à Hassan al-Banna—un siècle de réformisme islamique (1998) is devoted to re-reading these major reformists, including the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood under the spiritual leadership of his grandfather Hassan Albanna (1906–1949), whose heritage he refines from the misreadings he says have been attached to it. Unlike the “liberal Islamic reformists” that do not make much use of the Islamic tradition (mainly the Koran and the Sunnah), Ramadan is more appreciative of the “traditionalist reformists” (mujaddidun wa islahiyun). Taha Hussein (1889–1973), Ali Abd Arazique (1888–1966), Hassan Hanafi (1935–), Rachid Mimuni (1945–1995), Abdellah Laroui (1933–), and Mohamed Arkoun (1928–2010) are, for him, among the liberal reformists. For the traditional reformists, besides the pioneers of the Arab Renaissance of the nineteenth century (al-nahda), he also adds scholars like Abd al-Rahman Alkawakibi (1855–1902), Muhammad Al-Shawkani (1759–1834), Muhammad Al-Ghazali (1917–1996), Malek Bennabi (1905–1973) and Yussuf Alqaradawi (1926–) (Ramadan 1999a, 93–94). Ramadan distances himself from the other five “tendencies” that shape the current Islamic discourse in Europe and the world. The “Scholastic traditionalism” tendency believes that the doors of ijtihad have been closed since the tenth century. The tenets of this school are adopted, for example, by the Taliban, and are also common among some IndoPakistanis in the UK to create an “Islamic subculture” that is different from the Western society. “Salafi traditionalism” is not that much

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different, and for this tendency interpretation leads to heresies (bidac). Wahhabism is its embodiment. “Political Salafiyya,” on the other hand, yearns for an Islamic state and represents less than 0.5% of Muslims in Europe. “Liberal reformism” embraces Western values and considers the Koran to be a human book. Liberal reformists claim that modernity calls for a break with tradition, while Ramadan defends democratic pluralism and human rights without being a modernist, but from a Koranic point of view. As to the “Sufism” tendency, which enjoys ascetical practices, it takes the heart as the main way to closeness with God. The “Salafi reformism” tendency is where Ramadan belongs. It is a continuation of the al-nahda legacy, considering that the doors of ijtihad are open, and the tradition should be, and is, the way ahead for genuine reformism (Ramadan 1999a, 139–145; Ramadan 2004, 24–30). This clinging to tradition, according to Gregory Baum (2006), has given the floor to French secularists to accuse “Brother Tariq” of “doublespeak” and of being a “fundamentalist in disguise” (Fourest 2006, 120; Favrot 2004, 11). Baum, however, believes that “Ramadan is not a radical” (Baum 2006, 147).

Reforming the Sharia Ramadan takes reforming Sharia, commonly translated as Islamic Law, as the base of his project. Mainly in the West, references to Sharia “appear as obscurantist confinement, medieval stubbornness, and fanaticism,” which invoke jihad, amputated hands, floggings, repression of women, and the killing of the apostates (Ramadan 2001, 47). The idea of Sharia in the West calls up all the “darkest images of Islam,” to the extent that many Muslim intellectuals do not dare now refer to the concept for fear of frightening people or arousing suspicion of their work (Ramadan 2004, 31). The notion of Sharia has, according to Ramadan, been equally betrayed by the Muslims themselves. Sharia is not just Islamic Law, as commonly held; it is not the mere act of “establishing rules,” but rather means “the path that leads to the spring” (Ramadan 1999a, 139–145; Ramadan 2004, 24–30), or “the path that leads to a source,” or “the source” (Ramadan 2000, 48). This implies “all the prescriptions of worship and social injunctions which are derived from the Quran and the Sunna.” The acts of worship, al-cibadat, the five pillars of Islam, are precise and the rules of practice are fixed and codified, except in a few cases. For the social affairs, al-mucamalat, the domain of interpretation, is vast and flexible according to space and time, and it is up to the jurists to

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interpret the sources accordingly, through ijtihad, the third nominal source of Islamic Law after the Koran and the Sunnah (Ramadan 2000, 48). Sharia, or “the way to faithfulness,” rests on three sources: the Koran, the Sunnah, and the state of the world, which ijtihad summarizes. This way to the source, the divine, the Revelation, is never confused with the source, Allah Himself, because it remains a mere effort to understand him. If the latter is absolute in time and space, the former, i.e. the way or Sharia, is in constant change in time and space, immersed in the condition of humankind, which is imperfect but is in search of the ideal and perfection. This means that by travelling through this nonstop evolution of thought and interpretation of the divine, one should never claim that one has attained the “truth of the universal.” This teaches, first of all, “humility” (Ramadan 2004, 37). The humility attained on “the way” of Sharia is what means that this new understanding of Islam is based, in practice, on ethical social interaction. In other words, the manifestation of Sharia, or Islam, does not depend on formalism only but on real practices in society, and applying the hudud (penal code sanctions, see below) for thievery, adultery or apostasy is a narrow understanding of Sharia. Islam is, first of all, a way of life, a social project, and Sharia is its way of being. Ramadan writes that “to apply the Sharia from the starting point of an institutional penal code is tantamount to taking the wrong way twice,” first because the timing and social context are different, and second because the Koran makes “social justice the priority of all legal activity” (Ramadan 2000, 50). This “social project” that Sharia fundamentally stands for echoes the spirituality and morality of “the genuine” and “true Muslim” who, the Koran says, “attains to Faith and does good work”; “Behold, God enjoys justice and excellence (sincerity)” (Ramadan 1999a, 21–24). Sharia here takes from “the essential and primary axis of caqida (the science of faith), fiqh (law and jurisprudence) and tasawwuf (mysticism)” (Ramadan 1999a, 45). Though for Muslim culama’ (scholars) these different branches of scholarship still stand in isolation, for Ramadan they should not, but should converge, otherwise narrow classifications and divisions of Islam into “Islams” would happen (Ramadan 1999a, 54). Besides being a Muslim through shahada (testimony that God is One and Mohammad is His last Messenger), how to be a Muslim through Sharia, the way, is the most transcendent phase where faith, spirituality, ethics and basic Islamic practices all work together for the well-being of the self, and also for the social collective being (Ramadan 1999a, 46). This is another way of

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stressing the social aspect of Sharia before the jurisdictional practices (the hudud). Ramadan’s enlarged understanding of Sharia originates from his belief in a need for a “radical reform” of the Islamic sources. Against “adaptation reform” he proposes “transformation reform.” While the former “means observing the world, noting its changes then coming back to the texts to suggest new readings, alleviations, or exemptions in their implementation,” the latter “aims to change the order of things in the very name of the ethics it attempts to be faithful to, in other words, to add a further step [by] going from the texts to the context to act on the context and improve it, without ever accepting its shortcomings and injustices as matters of fact (to which one would simply have to adapt).” This understanding of the context requires “deep knowledge” on all the existing human and exact sciences (Ramadan 2008, 32–33). This reading of the context, with constant reference to the texts and the ethics they teach, should bring culama’ an-nusus (scholars of the texts) and culama’ al-waqic (scholars of the context) to work together (Ramadan 2008, 121– 129). This cooperative reading of the context entails “questioning not only the practice of fiqh but also, more essentially, the sources and fundamentals of that fiqh (usul al-fiqh)” (Ramadan 2008, 34). This reform aims at making Muslims contributors to the world, “to become a proposing force to reform the world we live in,” as they did centuries ago, and not remain mere consumers, as they are now (Ramadan 2008, 34). Referring to the way social sciences work, and how they develop their “constant facts” from observations of behaviours and practices over time and space, Ramadan affirms that the context, al-waqi’, should be an established source of law, from which the zanni (speculative) in the text could be reinterpreted, again according to time and space, culture, history and even ideology, before it takes another meaning, based on “autonomous critical thinking and human rationality,” that “The Universe must be considered as an autonomous and complementary source of legal elaboration” (Ramadan 2008, 102–107). That happens by approaching the divine book, the Koran, as well as the universe that he considers a second book “on the same level” and as “complementary.” Al-waqic should be looked at equally as a fundamental source of law, to be added to the Koran and Sunnah, the tradition of the prophet Mohammed. This complementarity aims at integrating the various social and exact sciences in the making of law; i.e., specialists have to cooperate with the culama’ an-nusus (texts/scriptures scholars) who cannot follow up with the scientific changes because of their complexities and deepness. This way, caqidah and cibadat keep their strength through their

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focused culama’, and the social affairs are kept updated by the concerned specialists. Such a “new geography of the sources of law … clearly and deliberately entails shifting the center of gravity of religious and legal authority” (Ramadan 2008, 124, italics in original). Religious scholars do not remain the only guardians of the scriptures and their sole interpreters. It is only through this “holistic approach,” that aims at understanding the sources in light of new contexts and updates that “a global, coherent, and liberating reformist thought [can] appear” (Ramadan 2008, 124). In view of what is stated above, Muslims in Europe in particular are required to take their context, their universe, as the base for understanding their religion. Even though Ramadan can be regarded as part of a chain of Islamic thought and reformism that started in the 1870s (al-nahda), there is still a lot that distinguishes him from the other schools in this trend. The main distinctive feature is his visible presence in the same context and within the same community of believers who are thirsty for assertive voices in defence of religion in a new land that is Christian, secular and liberal. Building an Islamic identity in such a context is both challenging and demanding, not only because the religious authorities in the countries of origin, i.e. the Arab-Islamic countries, may not appreciate a European Islamic discourse that may be different from theirs, but also because the space where such a discourse is preached and disseminated developed a historical enmity towards Islam in particular (and vice versa), and with any public presence of religion in general. To make of Islam a religion that is up to date and able to accommodate human advances in sciences, and coexist with liberal and democratic values in the West and in Europe in particular, Ramadan is calling for a European Islam, fed by a European Islamic culture, where individuals are both European and Muslim. Unlike some multicultural scholars who defend the Muslim presence in Europe and support their visibility as a minority of equal citizenship (Modood et al. 2006, 4), Ramadan believes in equal citizenship and equal treatment to all Europeans, irrespective of their religious differences. The idea is not integration or toleration, but recognition as equals in rights and duties (Ramadan 2009, 77). For this project to be understood and lived some common questions are raised about Islamic law and Islamic (cultural) practices. These concern mainly loyalty and citizenship, women, worship practices and religious customs, to which we refer below.

Citizenship Dar al-Islam (abode/land of Islam) and dar al-Harb (abode of war) are two concepts often invoked in the debate of Islamic presence in a land that

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historically belongs to Christendom. Ramadan’s study of the sources tells him that these concepts are found neither in the Koran nor in the Sunnah, the main Islamic sources, in which principles are descended for the whole universe (lil-calamin), for all times and across all frontiers (Ramadan 2004, 63). The two distinct abodes were developed later by scholars for two reasons. First, by identifying the Islamic territories the ulama were able to indicate both what the prime conditions were for an area or a nation to be considered Islamic, and also what regulations should govern political and strategic relations established with other nations and empires. Second, this binary vision allowed them to clarify the legal matters between the situation of Muslims living within the Muslim world and that of Muslims living abroad, or of those who travelled a lot, like merchants who needed specific regulations. This binary was mostly distinguished by four elements: the population living in the country, the ownership of the land, the nature of the government, and the laws applied in the land. However, these features have been weakened with time throug dar al-dacwa where the Muslims can live in peace, but Ramadan avoids any classification that aims at making Muslims look foreign to the countries where they live, in this case Europe, because that “perpetuates the idea that we are not in our own society” (Ramadan 2004, 67). “In our world, it is no longer a matter of, for example, the colonial era, and now by internalization and globalization of both values and lands. Despite some differences in definitions the two terms have lost their distinctiveness. For example, even the Muslim majority countries cannot be considered “unique and closed worlds” that comprise the land of Islam (Ramadan 2004, 62–76; Ramadan 1999a, 123–134). Imam Al-Shafii (767–820) proposes a lighter term, dar al-cahd (the abode of treaty), and Faysal Mawlawi proposes relations between two distinct ‘abodes.’ It is rather a question of relations between human beings belonging and referring to different civilizations, religions, cultures and ethics” (Ramadan 1999a, 148). For simplification, and away from the “binary vision” of the world, Ramadan suggests dar al-shahada (abode of testimony) as the most appropriate way of expression of identity and faith for the Muslims and their presence in Europe, or anywhere else, since that does not have any political or ideological significance (Ramadan 2004, 74–75). The significance it has is that of “exacting responsibility to contribute … to promoting good and equity within and through human brotherhood” (Ramadan 1999a, 150). This condition of shahada (testimony) is met in Europe because the five fundamental principles or conditions it observes are enjoyed by the practicing Muslims: (1) the right to practice Islam; (2) the right to knowledge; (3) the right to found organizations; (4) the right to

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autonomous representation; and (5) the right to appeal to the law. In other words, the general legal conditions in Europe answer the basic needs of Muslims (Ramadan 1999a, 135–138). The abode of testimony approach aims at looking at Muslims not as a minority but as equal citizens, constant residents, and European Muslims.

Loyalty The abode of testimony raises the issue of loyalty of Muslims to the worldwide Muslim community, commonly referred to as ummah (nation). Should the Muslims in Europe seek allegiance to the larger ummah in the Islamic world or not? Like the Christian spiritual centrality that the Church of Rome presents, the Muslims cannot distance themselves from the Islamic world where one of their pillars is practiced at least once in life, i.e. al-haj (pilgrimage) to the Ka’ba in Mecca, in Saudi Arabia. The AAqsa in Jerusalem is also one of the three main prayer destinations for Muslims, and is frequently cited in their Islamic reference. Being emotionally tied to these locations does not mean that they are supposed to be politically or legally bound by the countries where these sacred spaces are located. European Muslim protests for the Palestinian issues, or their protests against the cartoon affair in Denmark, the veil affair in France, and PVV (Freedom Party) leader Geert Wilders’ speech against the Koran as a fascist book, have contributed to the idea that Muslims belong more to the Muslim umma than to Europe. The questions that emerge are “are the European-Muslims trustworthy?” and “are they loyal to Europe, which ‘hosts’ them?” Because the notion of Islam that Ramadan holds is more focused on faith, ethics and social justice than for a state as such, or a Muslim lobby in Europe, as some have understood him (Hamel 2007, 24; Landau 2007, 211), his idea of Muslims belonging to the landscape of Europe becomes clearer with his defence of loyalty of the Muslims to the countries where they belong. The notion of umma for him is not based on geography but on faith; Muslims all over the world belong to the same umma, i.e. the same nation of faith, the Islamic umma. What they share is historical references, and most importantly the same religious principles that made the creed. Apart from this, every Muslim has to be loyal to the country that binds them through nationality, citizenship or contract, as this passage makes clear: “Implementing the Sharia, for a Muslim citizen or resident in Europe, is explicitly to respect the constitutional and legal framework of the country in which he is a citizen … Loyalty to one’s faith and conscience

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requires firm and honest loyalty to one’s country: the Sharia requires honest citizenship within the frame of reference constituted by the positive law of the European country concerned” (Ramadan 1999a, 172, italics in original). As to the question of what comes first, citizenship or faith, and whether one should say, for example, that they are British, French, Dutch or Muslim first, Ramadan believes that these are “actually pointless” because they depend on the context, be it philosophical, social or political, and do not convey the right way of interaction with citizens who are supposed to be equal. In a way, such questions just keep the debate on Muslims as a minority and as a “fifth column” (Ramadan 1999a, 163). This loyalty, however, allows for the Muslim citizen, as any other citizen, to ask for their rights if they are not met and to use “the conscience clause” if need be. For example, a citizen may desist from participating in an unjust war or colonialism and may also refrain from dealing with banks that trade in interest. In other words, Muslims in Europe have to respect the law and the principles of their faith, and at the same time strive for more rights that they can get within the same large European and Western mindscape: “This by no means signifies that the Muslims are seeking to throw away the foundations of the nation or to appeal to ‘particular laws for the Muslims’ as we have heard here and there.” For the secular laws that are seen as being threatened by the Muslims, Ramadan repeatedly states that secularism in its original meaning protects religion and does not ban it from the public sphere. For Ramadan, the French law of December 11, 1905 for the neutrality of the state towards religion is neither respected nor understood but is rigidly applied to Muslims. The latter do not complain about it, but instead call for its fair application (Ramadan 1999b, 17–18).

Women and Gay Rights Connected to the question of secularism is the issue of women in Islam. The human rights enjoyed in Western democracies are not what Islam objects to: “Islam has no problem with women, but Muslims do clearly appear to have serious problems with them” (Ramadan 2009, 62). Discourse about women, according to the studied scholar, has been widely influenced by patriarchal cultures so that some cultural practices that were not “Islamic” have come to be justified. For instance, female circumcision, forced marriages and honour crimes are not Islamic, even though certain scholars may have attempted to provide religious justification for them (Ramadan 2009, 64). The imposed veil (hijab) and niqab/burqa are also

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cultural practices and are not Islamic. Muslims are more familiar with Sharia through the family law, i.e. heritage law, where women are generally treated less equally. Against this misrepresentation of the Islamic message of social justice, Ramadan suggests some kind of institution that defends women in cases of abused divorce and unequal heritage division. The aim is for more equality amongst the two sexes. Family law has been among the most abused sections of Islamic law, and it is time to change the way they have been considered and practiced (Ramadan 2008, 207– 210, 220–221). Women, along with men, have to fight against patriarchal, patronizing discourses that belittle womanhood, and bring meaning back to “being, dignity, development, freedom, equality, justice, balance, love, and welfare” (Ramadan 2008, 216–217). Still in the human rights context, and this time for the case of homosexuality, which has caused great fury in The Netherlands especially, Islam, like the other divine religions, does not allow it, chiefly because it would be against the normal course of nature and destabilize human continuity and social stability. However, because the law grants homosexuals their rights to demonstrate and associate, this right has to be respected. More importantly, it is the human relations that should be valued most, even before the law, and society has to develop adequate measures to integrate individuals who affiliate themselves with such a group: “Though I have reservations about homosexual couples marrying or adopting children, I do not hesitate to fight against the homophobic discourse or measures of which they may be the victims and to get involved in all common causes by their side” (Ramadan 2009, 103). Apostates or renegades (al-murtaddun), like homosexuals, have also been harassed and threatened and sometimes killed in Europe. Such statements do not abide by the law nor do they respect individuals’ choices (Ramadan 2009, 103).

Hudud Sanctions In a seemingly unprecedented move in Muslim scholarship, Ramadan publicly called for a moratorium on the death penalty, corporal punishment, and stoning in the Muslim world in March 2006. Even though such a call concerns the Muslim world, its effects had a positive influence on some literalist imams who preach in European mosques (Ramadan 2008, 274–277). Despite this daring step, Ramadan’s France 2 TV debate with Nicolas Sarkozy on the topic of “God and the Republic” (Cent minutes pour convaincre, France 2 TV, November 20, 2003; Zemmouri 2005, 345–357) rekindled the storms of criticism the former has been

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showered with, and pushed many to accuse him of doublespeak, ambiguity and inconsistency in his reformist ideas. What his critics were expecting was a total rupture with the scriptures on those matters; freezing the penal codes did not seem sufficient, and banning them once and for all was what some of the critics of Ramadan expected from him, which he did not do simply because his call was a fatwa, a mere opinion by an Islamic scholar, and did not come from a high authority in Islamic hierarchy, which does not exist in Sunni Islam. This still does not seem to be a good argument, but in an interview with Aziz Zemmouri (2005) Ramadan says that it is not the West or Western readings that should impose the total banning of the hudud, but that this should happen gradually from within the Islamic tradition. As for his personal opinion, he tells Zemmouri that in the end these hudud should be definitively banned.

Final Considerations The issues Ramadan’s perspective referred to above from need a more engaging education system open to other fields like politics, ethics, sciences, business and ecology. This chapter does not go into detail about these points, for, at this stage, if the main conceptions discussed above are understood, the rest should also be implicitly clear. A contextual reading of Sharia, Islamic ethics and spirituality, the stress on social justice before thinking of the Islamic penal code, and the subject of women all make it clear that the Muslim in Europe is required to be engaged in their society, abide by its laws, and strive for more rights where needed. Education here takes on a primary importance. The project of European Islam cannot work without integrating these new ideas into Muslim and non-Muslim schools, in mosques, in associations and the like (Ramadan 2002, 34–35). A “responsible engagement” of European Muslims should contribute to a “European Islamic culture” where Islamic ethics and identity could be seen and recognized respectfully and equally in politics, sciences, business and ecology. This demands, according to Ramadan, a lot of effort from both Muslims and non-Muslims, and may take up to fifty years before this issue is no longer spoken about and becomes part of the past. Even though European Islam is already a reality it still remains a work in progress for the coming decades, considering the difficulties and controversies that still surround it.

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The Study This study focuses on Muslims living in The Netherlands. It was considered important that they were born in the country, or migrated to it while very young, so as to make sure that they had spent most of their lives in a European environment. For the sake of keeping the ethnicity factor neutral as much as possible we sought the cooperation of Muslims from a Moroccan background. When suitable candidates were found we proposed our questionnaire that could be answered in Dutch, English or Arabic. The reason behind opting for an additional English version was that one of the researchers of this study does not speak Dutch. The fieldwork asks basic questions that correspond to the main points referred to in Ramadan’s project. The idea behind this choice stems from the fact that the problem discussed is at the grassroots level, and if the basic questions of religious practices are not dealt with then any advanced debate would be futile or end up with unsatisfactory results. This basic attempt to make the ideas of Ramadan heard and reacted upon puts the debate on the right track and makes scholars aware of what the ordinary citizens and believers think of their faith in a society that they claim is also theirs, and in which they choose to live without direct conflict with the laws that govern them. The questionnaire started with some personal questions on issues like age, gender, country of birth, nationality or nationalities, level of education and the like. Then a section under the heading “Islam and Dutch values” followed, consisting of seven questions. The following section was labelled “Tariq Ramadan’s project for European Muslims” and contained three questions, the last being split into fourteen sub-questions. The last section, “The Netherlands in focus,” consisted of ten questions, some being split into sub-questions. The answers to most questions were given on a scale on which the respondents could indicate to what extent they agreed with the statements. In section 3.2, containing the results of the questionnaire, the exact expression of the statements and the accompanying scales are mentioned. The various tables contain the absolute numbers each answer is given, the percentage distribution, and the means and standard deviation; in some cases, due to considerations of space, only means and standard deviations are given. In many cases the respondents were encouraged to provide comments on their choices to the questions, which they did many times. In this chapter we maintained the sometimes, ungrammatical order of the comments as much as possible, but the order of presentation of results has changed. We present the section “The Netherlands in focus” second

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thus leaving the section on Tariq Ramadan’s ideas last, as this section is the most important for this chapter. The fieldwork was conducted over a period of about three months during the summer and fall of 2010.

The Subjects Sixty persons participated in the study, fortyone (68.3%) of them male and nineteen (31.7%) female. Their mean age was thirty-one years and ten months. The youngest was nineteen and the oldest fifty-seven. For the distribution of age see Table 3.1. Table 3.1. Age distribution of the respondents N

%

1

19–25 years old

19

31.7

2

26–35 years old

23

38.3

3

36–45 years old

14

23.3

4

46–57 years old

4

6.7

60

100.0

Total

Table 3.2 shows that little more than half of the respondents were born in Morocco, one was born in Turkey, and the rest in The Netherlands. All of those who were not born in The Netherlands came to the country when children. Table 3.2. Country of birth of the respondents N

%

1

Morocco

33

55.0

2

Netherlands

26

43.3

3

Turkey

1

1.7

60

100.0

Total

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The group of respondents demonstrates a relatively high level of education. Nearly 80% have a higher educational grade, as shown in Table 3.3. Table 3.3. Educational grades of the respondents N

%

1

Secondary

3

5.0

2

Vocational

9

15.0

3

High

45

75.0

Unknown

3

5.0

60

100.0

Total

Most respondents preferred the English version of the questionnaire. Only ten used the Dutch version. A quarter of the respondents used the Arabic version. Table 3.4. Language of questionnaire chosen by the respondents N

%

1

English

35

58.3

2

Arabic

15

25.0

3

Dutch

10

16.7

60

100.0

Total

All questionnaires were processed in an SPSS file by both researchers, who together speak all three languages under consideration. Many respondents gave comments to the various questions, presented below. The comments in Arabic and Dutch have been translated into English.

Section I of the questionnaire “Islam and Dutch values” The first part of the questionnaire contained questions on “Islam and Dutch values” and was intended to get an idea of the opinions of the participating respondents on the complex relationship between religion, Islam and national values, in this case in the Dutch society.

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Table 3.5 gives the results of the judgement of the statement “Islam can coexist with Dutch values.” The mean of the question, 2.00, indicates that the answers match exactly with answer 2 “agree.” Only a minority of 12% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement. Table 3.5. Opinions on “Dutch values—Islam can coexist with Dutch values” N

%

1

Strongly agree

24

40.0

2

Agree

22

36.7

3

Neutral

7

11.7

4

Disagree

4

6.7

5

Strongly disagree

3

5.0

60

100.0

Sd

1.1199

Total Mean

2.0000

The following comments were registered on the first statement. Table 3.5.1. Comments on the statement “Islam can coexist with Dutch values” (C = code respondent) C

Comment

2

I think Islam can be practiced in The Netherlands but Dutch values don't match the values we know in Islam. For example, nudity can be seen on Dutch television, prostitution, drugs and alcohol are legal and part of everyday life of people living in The Netherlands (and nowadays also of Muslims). Of course, there are also very good Dutch values like respecting freedom of speech, equal rights for all people and the social care system. However, eventually, I don't think that pure Islam can coexist with Dutch values, taking into consideration the “negative” values.

8

It is possible for Islam to adapt to many aspects of Dutch values, among which fair justice for all and other issues.

10 Islam is able to adapt everywhere in the world.

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22 If they would respect us in settling our holy faith and our culture. 24 Islam is a religion of all times and places. 28 Given the differences between the Islamic values and Dutch values. 29 Islam is a religion valid for all times and places. 35 It depends on what culture comes along with Islam. The culture can coincide with Dutch values. 37 Islam is already compatible with Dutch values, so you do not have to reform the Islamic values. 39 As far as there can be no separation of church and state. 47 I think nowadays it gets harder. 51 Religion has no boundaries. One can see that most religions have universal norms and values. The comments in Table 3.5.1, somewhat critical as they are, seem to have a common base in the sense that it is postulated that Islam is a flexible religion and should be able to adapt to all circumstances in all places. As it was considered possible that respondents would react negatively to the preceding question, the following statement was also suggested to the respondents: “If Islam is not compatible with Dutch values, it should be reformed to do so.” Table 3.6 shows that most respondents do not agree with this, and the mean is close to answer 4, “disagree.” Around 25% strongly agree that Islam should change in such a case. The reading of this table should take into account the previous table results; if about 75% of the respondents agree in the previous table that Islam can co-exist with Dutch values, in this table about 60% are in disagreement about Islam being compatible with Dutch values, and thus in agreement that it should be reformed, having mostly said that it can co-exist with such values. This means that there is consistency in the replies the respondents give to this follow up question. If, for them, Islam can co-exist with such values and has the potential for that, it should then be reformed.

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Table 3.6. Opinions on “If Islam is not compatible with Dutch values, it should be reformed to do so” N

%

1

Strongly agree

4

7.4

2

Agree

10

18.5

3

Neutral

6

11.1

4

Disagree

16

29.6

5

Strongly disagree

18

33.3

54

100.0

Sd

1.3217

Total Means

3.6296

Table 3.6.1 gives an overview of the comments on this question. Some, like respondent 2, state that changing Islam is not permitted, while others, like respondent 3, take a more practical attitude, arguing that in a foreign country you cannot reform the law of such countries, or respondent 28 who states that Muslims just have to do their best and see how far they can live their lives as Muslims in a non-Muslim context. Respondent 39 observes that due to the specific context in The Netherlands, i.e. the separation between the church and state, Islamic law just does not stand a chance. Table 3.6.1. Comments on the statement “If Islam is not compatible with Dutch values, it should be reformed to do so” C

Comments

2

Islam should stay the way it is; changing any aspect of Islam can be seen as bid’a (innovation).

3

As we are visitors in this country, we will never be accepted as Dutch citizens. There are hadiths regarding this issue and never was it mentioned that we have to reform a country when we choose it as our residence. Not in the past and not now.

10 There are differences and similarities everywhere. 22 Dutch Islam where a harsh war is conducted against Islam and the Muslims.

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24 Inna-naa jacalnakum shucuuban wa-qaba’ila li-tucarafu inna akramakum cinda allahi atqakum (O mankind, We have created you from a male and a female; and We have made you tribes and subtribes that you may know one another. Verily, the most honourable among you, in the sight of Allah, is he who is the most righteous among you (Quran, Surat Al Hujurat 49:13). 28 The Islamic generations have to do what is necessary in order to adopt as much as possible Islamic values. 37 Integration of the Muslims (people from Morocco and Turkey) is an issue of the last decade. In the seventies and eighties nobody of the politicians used the term integration. 39 The separation of church and state means that there exist a number of Islamic laws that cannot be exerted. In a further question the respondents were asked what aspects should be reformed in Islam to be more compatible with Dutch values. They were given six options: (1) Sharia Penal Law; (2) Human Rights; (3) Women’s Rights; (4) Morality; (5) Economic Ethics and (6) Other issues, to be filled out by the respondents. The results were as follows: Sharia Penal Law mentioned fourteen times; Human Rights mentioned seventeen times; Women’s Rights mentioned fourteen times; Morality mentioned seventeen times; Economic Ethics mentioned fourteen times, and Other Issues mentioned fifteen times. The respondents did not indicate in what way the various laws and the like should be altered and thus for a good understanding of their attitudes it is important to observe that they obviously consider Islamic law(s) as susceptible to change, although a minority of respondents states this. More interesting may be the comments the respondents gave to this question, presented in Table 3.7, showing that altering Sharia is generally not perceived as a good or even permitted idea. Interestingly, respondent 29 declares that “Rights are all present and guaranteed in Islam,” so maybe the respondents theoretically condone the modification of Sharia but have reservations in actually doing so. Such a hesitant attitude about reforming Sharia generally disappears in the later sections when the ideas of reform that Tariq Ramadan speaks of are agreed upon, despite some noted neutrality on two or three issues we refer to later. This will later show that as individuals they are cautious about articulating their views on theological matters, but when a theologian is close to their ideas or the idea of the society they live in, they then show clear signs of agreement about reforming aspects of Islamic practices.

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Table 3.7. Comments on the question “What aspects you think should be reformed in Islam to be more compatible with Dutch values?” C

Comment

3

No, Dutch law is not better than God’s law, therefore we need to follow the Sharia and respect Dutch law. If these are in conflict, then there is always a way for you to solve this conflict by immigrating to another country.

22 Islam consists of all sides of the issue. 24 Muslims are for 100% integrated in The Netherlands but they (the Dutch) refuse to accept them. 29 Rights are all present and guaranteed in Islam. 35 All these things, when following other guidelines than the Koran itself, lead to problems. 37 It is not possible to introduce the Sharia in a non-Muslim country. Therefore you should have to reform it. 39 Not the Islamic community, but common life with other people in a society is a measure of respect and tolerance of the background of each citizen. 49 Nothing. The frustration that is evoked has nothing to do with values but with opportunities. 51 The idea to alter a religion doesn't sound appealing. I say no alterations. You believe in it, or you don't. Subsequently, three questions were asked on the issue of integration. First it was asked if The Netherlands have done enough for the integration of Muslims from a political point of view (Table 3.8) and a social point of view (Table 3.9), and then the respondents were asked if the Muslims themselves did enough to integrate (Table 3.10). The mean of the question on the political integration policies of the Dutch authorities is 3,5424 (see Table 3.8), laying between answer 3 “neutral” and answer 4 “disagree.” The respondents tend to be quite negative in this respect. Only around one fifth of the respondents gives an overtly positive judgement of the Dutch integration policies.

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Table 3.8. Opinions on “The Netherlands has done enough for the integration of Muslims politically” Scale

N

%

1

Strongly agree

2

3.4

2

Agree

10

16.9

3

Neutral

13

22.0

4

Disagree

22

37.3

5

Strongly disagree

12

20.3

59

100.0

Sd

1.1036

Total Mean

3.5424

The comments on this statement are also generally critical, as shown in Table 3.8.1 below, although respondent 39 indicates that the government is not to blame as the state does not have an active role in propagating the integration of the religion of religious groups. Table 3.8.1. Comments on the statement “The Netherlands have done enough for the integration of Muslims politically” C

Comment

1

Dutch people are in general not very open to other cultures. Therefore you see people in The Netherlands socializing with their own ethnicity and religious groups.

10 Integration is hardly a success. 22 Because Dutch politics are based on the separation of church and state. 24 As long as The Netherlands do not recognize Islam as a religion as did France and Belgium, there are many things that cannot be realized and then you have to make the comparison with the other religions, like Judaism and Christianity. 32 They could do more against discrimination of Muslims.

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39 In principle the freedom of religion is enshrined in the constitution and therefore Muslims like others have the freedom to profess their religion without the State interfering in it. 49 They did not have any policy about integration the moment it was needed. Table 3.9 gives an overview of the answers to the question of whether the Dutch government has done enough for the integration of Muslims socially. Here the judgement is a bit milder as the mean is closer to answer 3 “neutral” than to answer 4 “disagree.” Around one third are positive about this social policy, but nearly 50% are somewhat negative. Table 3.9. Opinions on “The Netherlands has done enough for the integration of Muslims socially” N

%

1

Strongly agree

2

3.3

2

Agree

19

31.7

3

Neutral

11

18.3

4

Disagree

18

30.0

5

Strongly disagree

10

16.7

60

100.0

Sd

1.1735

Total Mean

3.2500

The comments on the social integration of Muslims in Dutch society are nearly all critical. Hardly any positive point is taken into consideration, as shown in Table 3.9.1.

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Table 3.9.1. Comments on the statement “The Netherlands has done enough for the integration of Muslims socially” C

Comment

2

The project of integrating foreign Muslims into Dutch society has started much too late, for which the Dutch society is now facing its consequences. This started with the arrival of the migrant workers in the previous century.

10 The position of Muslims is still not right. 22 Because Holland did not provide opportunities sufficiently enough for the integration of Muslims. 28 Holland has not done what it should have done. 39 Islam is rooted in social life. 49 No, the immigrants did not since they were supposed to leave. 51 The nation state of Holland has formed it in its constitution. And not only for Muslims. How this works out in practice is another story. The reverse question was then asked, i.e. “have the Muslims themselves done enough to integrate in The Netherlands?” The mean of the answers is 2.78 and thus close to answer 3, “neutral.” Around 40% is quite positive on this matter, while a quarter are (very) negative on it. It seems, then, that the reactions of the respondents are quite divided on this question. Table 3.10. Opinions on “The Muslims have done enough to integrate in The Netherlands” N

%

1

Strongly agree

4

6.7

2

Agree

22

36.7

3

Neutral

19

31.7

4

Disagree

14

23.3

5

Strongly disagree

1

1.7

60

100.0

Total

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N

%

1

Strongly agree

4

6.7

2

Agree

22

36.7

3

Neutral

19

31.7

4

Disagree

14

23.3

5

Strongly disagree

1

1.7

Sd

.9754

Mean

2.7818

173

The comments on this statement as expressed in Table 3.10.1 show a critical attitude of the respondents towards themselves. The comments mostly read “Yes, Muslims should have taken more effort to learn the language; there are still obstacles to overcome but there are also Muslims that really succeeded in integrating in The Netherlands.” Table 3.10.1. Comments on the statement “The Muslims have done enough to integrate in The Netherlands” C

Comment

2

The Muslims can also be Dutch so integrating then is not an issue. However, if we speak of Muslims from other countries like Morocco, Turkey, Somalia, Pakistan etc. then we can say that there is a language problem with especially the first generation of Moroccans and Turks because the assumption was that they would return to their country. So, they never took the time to learn the language. We can say that they should have done more to learn the language and be proactive in that. Furthermore, we see a big problem with Moroccan youth in The Netherlands, caused by different factors, one of them being that they feel socially oppressed. In my opinion, this feeling has two sides of the tail and the Moroccan youth causing the problems should stop doing so and start building up a normal and successful life in The Netherlands or elsewhere.

3

It is not this side of the board that matters but what the guy is doing in society. If everybody cooperates with each other, the outside will be less important than the inside of the people.

10 Given the differences in culture, yes.

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24 Not sufficiently, and if so how can Islam obtain trust? 28 Muslims are in a crisis position between Dutch and Islamic culture. 35 However hard it might be, there still are problems to be solved. 39 For a group of Muslims, the step towards an integration of the western state of justice, values of democracy is too large to combine with the way Islam wants to be experienced. 47 Depends on the person. 49 The second and third generation foreigners are well integrated, the problem which arises right now has to do with the “newcomers” and not with the already resident Muslims. Because they are already integrated. In that case, a phase of disintegration is going on with the current harsh policy against Muslims. 51 There are too many differences within the Muslim groups to say this. There is a large group which has, and a large group which hasn’t. The question of the present section was on the feeling of being integrated as Dutch according to the various generations, i.e. the first, the second and the third, the first being the one that came to work in The Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s. For the sake of brevity we only give the means and standard deviations as they show more than enough. For generation 1 the mean is 3,7083 (Sd 1,0097), implying that the respondents answered on average between answer 3 “neutral” and 4 “disagree” on the question of whether generation 1 can be considered as integrated Dutch Muslims. For generation 2 the mean is 3,0200 (Sd 1,1155), implying that they are more neutral in considering this generation as Dutch Muslims, while the mean for generation 3 is 2,1765 (Sd 0,7404), which shows unmistakably that the last generation is considered to be the most Dutch Muslim. Table 3.11 presents the various comments on the question on the three generations. It shows that the reactions are again quite sober. Respondent 3 thinks that with the growing criticism of Muslims the third generation runs the risk of feeling much less at home in the Netherlands than the first and second generations. Originally, respondent 2 referred to the Dutch converts to Islam, a growing group but not part of this study.

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Table 3.11. Comments on the questions on the three generations being Dutch Muslim 1

About the first and second generation of migrant workers, I don’t think they consider themselves Dutch, even if they have a Dutch nationality. A lot of third and fourth generation Muslims call themselves Dutch Moroccan/Turkish/Pakistani Muslims.

2

There are a lot of Dutch Muslims nowadays who converted to Islam. Alhamdullilaa. They of course consider themselves Dutch Muslims.

3

I think our parents are more Dutch than the second or third generations, as we are only getting criticism from everyone and never experience how it was before. For the fourth generation I think there is no reason for them to see an outsider.

10 If the position of Muslims improves in society, you get an automatic approximation towards Dutch culture. 18 I don’t think they actively feel/think like that. 24 The third generation is looking for its identity because of the failing negative politics that are applied to them. 28 Integration is a word the goal of which is as yet incomprehensible. 29 What is the meaning of the word integration? It is a word, which lacks a clear meaning. 39 With time will Muslims in The Netherlands and Europe know how to find their way in living in harmony in The Netherlands? Finally, a question was asked on the perceived measure of influence of the countries of origin, Morocco and Turkey in particular, on the process of integration. The statement was formulated as follows: “The influence of the countries of origin (like Morocco and Turkey) among Muslims in The Netherlands is a barrier to their successful integration in Dutch society.” Table 3.12 presents the results of this statement. Nearly 40% of respondents agree with it, around a quarter is neutral and a little more than a third disagrees. The image is, as such, divided. Table 3.12.1 contains various and sometimes contradicting comments on this question.

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Table 3.12. Opinions on “The influence of the countries of origin (like Morocco and Turkey) among Muslims in The Netherlands is a barrier to their successful integration in Dutch society” N

%

1

Strongly agree

5

8.5

2

Agree

18

30.5

3

Neutral

14

23.7

4

Disagree

12

20.3

5

Strongly disagree

10

16.9

59

100.0

Sd

1.2539

Total Mean

3.1111

Table 3.12.1. Comments on the statement “The influence of the countries of origin (like Morocco and Turkey) among Muslims in The Netherlands is a barrier to their successful integration in Dutch society” C

Comment

2

The influence of those countries is not big enough to form a barrier.

10 Economically to invest in the country of origin. 24 The solution to all problems. 39 But a lot do not realize that it should not be at the expense of the liberties of another citizen. Equality among citizens is more important here than absolute religious freedom. 43 Especially with job applications. 49 Most of the second and third generation Muslims even speak the language of the host country, so how should the country of origin influence them?

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Section II—The Netherlands in Focus This section takes into consideration the image of Muslims in Dutch society, both from their point of view and from the Dutch point of view. Table 3.13 gives an overview of the reactions to the statement: “The Muslims in The Netherlands, whether they are born abroad, or in the country, or are Dutch converts to Islam, are all looked at the same way.” Nearly 60% of the respondents agree with this statement, having the feeling that the Dutch regard all Muslims as one homogeneous community. Table 3.13. Opinions on “Muslims are looked at the same way in The Netherlands” N

%

1

Strongly agree

15

25.0

2

Agree

20

33.3

3

Neutral

9

15.0

4

Disagree

8

13.3

5

Strongly disagree

8

13.3

60

100.0

Sd

1.3943

Total Mean

2.6182

Table 3.13.1 presents the different comments of the respondents on this issue. These are relatively mild in nature, stressing the observation that, in principle, all people are equal.

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Table 3.13.1. Comments on the statement “Muslims are looked at the same way in The Netherlands” C

Comment

2

People are known for generalizing and putting a mark on groups of people. Not only Dutch people but people in general do this. Everywhere you go you will see those kinds of people but there are also people who look further than that and that are socially developed and intelligent enough to know that all people are different.

18 Today people don't differ. Muslim = Muslim. 24 Incapacity to understand things and ignorance concerning Islamic values and added to that there is racism and prejudices that are the cause of this. 28 Some look at the colour of a human being firstly before anything else. 35 When Dutch converts do not follow the culture, there is a big difference. 39 Equality between citizens is a natural matter. The differences in rights and duties are sometimes made between a Dutchman and a non-Dutchman, that is, between having the nationality or not. Even for municipal elections, no distinction is made between legal residents and a Dutchman. So religion does not play a role. The next question concerns the issue of Islamophobia. The respondents were asked if Islamophobia was non-existent, hidden, apparent or increasing in The Netherlands. Table 3.14 shows the results. Table 3.14. Opinions on “Islamophobia in The Netherlands” N

%

1Inexistent

2

3.4

2Hidden

10

16.9

3Apparent

20

33.9

4Increasing

27

45.8

59

100.0

Sd

.8336

Total Mean

3.2778

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For one third of the respondents Islamophobia is apparent, and for nearly half of them it is even increasing. Table 3.14.1 gives some remarks of the respondents on this feature. Reference is made, among other things, to the rise of the PVV party (Partij voor de Vrijheid, or The Party for Freedom) of Geert Wilders. Table 3.14.1. Comments on Islamophobia in The Netherlands C

Comment

2

Just look at the coming up of PVV leader Geert Wilders.

24 Analysis of the subjects that are in The Telegraaf newspaper, they are significant. 29 Political reforms have made Islam a way to reach goals. 51 A Muslim is a Muslim in Dutch society, but a Moroccan Muslim is slightly worse. In the following question respondents were asked what worries Dutch people most when it comes to Muslims and Islam. Thirteen possible causes were presented and they judged them on a five-point scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). We limit ourselves, due to considerations of space, to presenting the means and standard deviations only. Table 3.15 presents these figures. Table 3.15. Causes of Dutch worries of Muslims and Islam Cause

Means

Sd

Mosques

1.8833

1.04300

Slaughtering

2.8421

1.37308

Delinquency

1.8947

.85949

Unemployment

2.3276

1.04944

Male circumcision

3.0702

1.19313

Female circumcision

2.1964

1.32692

Honour killing

2.3729

1.17295

Hijjab

2.0169

1.05849

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Burqa

1.7544

1.16926

Beard

2.1695

1.06920

Marriage rituals

2.7069

1.25668

Dual citizenship

2.4310

1.06148

Possible causes, with an average beginning with 1, are burqa (1.75), mosques (1.88) and delinquency (1.89). These means are between answer 1 (strongly agree) and 2 (agree), although they are closer to answer 2 than answer 1. Eight possible causes have averages between 2 and 2.99 and can thus be located between answer 2 (agree) and 3 (neutral). The issue the closest to answer 4 (disagree) is on the hijab (2.01), followed by beards (2.16), female circumcision (2.19), unemployment (2.32), honour killing (2.37) and dual citizenship (2.43). Marriage rituals (2.70) and slaughtering practice (2.84) are close to answer 3 (neutral), and male circumcision is the only cause that has a mean higher than 3 (neutral). Most possible causes presented seem to influence the Dutch fear of Islam and Muslims. As a follow up, an interesting question was raised to find out where this fear comes from, according to the respondents. Again, some possible causes were presented: (1) fear of Islam as a religion; (2) fear of the numbers of Muslims and converts; (3) fear of Islamic symbols; (4) fear of Islamic terrorism; (5) fear based on history; (6) fear of/caused by the media. Table 3.16 gives an overview of the means and standard deviations of the five point scales on the six types of fear mentioned. Table 3.16. Types of fear Type of fear

Means

Sd

Fear of Islam

2.6538

1.34142

Fear of numbers

2.2264

1.20322

Fear of symbols

2.7500

1.31171

Fear of terrorism

1.5926

.85822

Fear based on history

3.2353

1.22618

Fear caused by media

1.5091

.85792

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It is clear that the respondents blame the media in particular for fear of Muslims and Islam. On the five-point scale, the media variable produced a mean of 1.51 and is exactly between answer 1 (strongly agree) and 2 (agree). The next variable in line is fear of terrorism with a mean of 1.59. The demographic factor, the fear of numbers, is also quite strong with a mean of 2.23. Islam as a religion provokes less fear with a mean of 2.65, close to answer 3 (neutral), as do Islamic symbols (2.75). Only one variable is above value 3, and that is the fear caused by the shared history of Islam and Europe as expressed in Muslim Spain, the Crusades, the Ottoman Empire in Europe and the like, with an average of 3.23. Respondents were invited to eventually fill out another factor, which some did. Their comments are presented in Table 3.16.1. It is clear that populist movements, like the Freedom Party of Geert Wilders, are seen as reinforcing the existing fear of Islam in The Netherlands. Table 3.16.1. From where does the fear of Muslims and Islam in The Netherlands originate? Other causes. C

Comment

2

Populist politicians like Le Pen, Bush, Blair, Pim Fortuyn, Sarkozy and Geert Wilders.

18 People like Geert Wilders. 41 Politics. Geert Wilders. 47 Politics (Wilders).

Section III—Tariq Ramadan’s Project for European Muslims In Section 2 of this chapter the ideas of Tariq Ramadan on a European Islam are presented and commented on. In a separate section of the questionnaire, some of these ideas were offered to the respondents in order to obtain their judgement on them. The first question asked the subjects if they were aware at all of the thoughts of Ramadan. Table 3.17 shows that a little over 50% had knowledge of them, while less than half of the group did not. That did not stop us from asking for the opinion of all of the subjects on the various ideas of Ramadan, and on top of that we presented these in the questions to the respondents.

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Table 3.17. Are you aware of Tariq Ramadan’s Islamic reformist discourse? N

%

1

Not aware

27

47.4

2

Aware

30

52.6

57

100.0

Total

Table 3.18 contains the feedback of the respondents on the following statement: “Tariq Ramadan believes that Sharia should take into account the Western context. Therefore, its adoption in Europe is possible, as long as it abides by European laws.” The mean answer is remarkably neutral. Around 45% of respondents are positive, 34% are somewhat negative and around one fifth are neutral. It does not provide us with a clear-cut idea of what the respondents think, and they seem somewhat divided. Table 3.18. Opinions on “Tariq Ramadan believes that Sharia should take into account the Western context. Therefore, its adoption in Europe is possible, as long as it abides by European laws” N

%

1

Strongly agree

6

10.3

2

Agree

21

36.2

3

Neutral

11

19.0

4

Disagree

10

17.2

5

Strongly disagree

10

17.2

58

100.0

Sd

1.3155

Total Mean

3.000

The respondents gave some comments on this introductory question as can be seen from Table 3.18.1. The comments express a certain cautiousness concerning these ideas.

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Table 3.18.1. Comments on Tariq Ramadan’s ideas C

Comment

2

I am not very updated about the plans of Tariq Ramadan.

4

How can you reform a European law when we Muslims do not even get along with each other? How can we take a stand about issues while others in the same society can fully disagree with each other? Such things as Sharia can only be applied in a Muslim country.

10 I find it difficult that Sharia can be applied in the West. 24 Islam is a religion of all times and places. 28 It is not possible to apply Islam in a sensible way. 35 God has never authorized anyone to make laws besides those commanded by him, God be glorified. 41 Sharia is only for Muslims. So non-Muslims have nothing to fear. 43 Keep legislation and religion separated! 49 I think Tariq Ramadan has created a kind of new scholarship to work on. But in reality something is going on. As one could see with the youth upraises in Paris suburbs by Muslim youth. The issue was work and education opportunities and not Islam. Nobody cared about Islam. The projection on Islam is just a veil to cover the real issue of discrimination. 51 I do not think Sharia has to be followed at all in the West. In the questionnaire, fourteen ideas of Ramadan were presented to the respondents and they were asked to react to them through a simple scale consisting of three options: (1) agree; (2) neutral; (3) disagree. Fourteen statements were put forward and were presented as follows. 14.1 Loyalty is to the country where one belongs, not where one comes from. 14.2 Gay marriage should be respected as a choice in Europe, though it is not allowed by Islam. 14.3 Freedom of religion is granted. 14.4 Wearing the headscarf/hijjab should not be obligatory, but a matter of choice. 14.5 Burqa is cultural, not Islamic.

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14.6 Polygamy should not be allowed in Europe. 14.7 Besides the Islamic inheritance code, women should be given equal rights through state institutions. 14.8 Arranged marriage is a cultural, not Islamic practice. 14.9 Hudud sanctions like stoning should be temporarily frozen. 14.10 Islamic banking should be respected as a choice. 14.11 Islamic sciences do not contradict the general frames of science and reason. 14.12 Abortion is possible in particular cases. 14.13 Euthanasia is generally forbidden. 14.14 Literature and art that do not follow Islamic ethics should be respected. Table 3.19. Views on fourteen opinions of Tariq Ramadan (scale: 1 = agree; 2 = neutral; 3 = disagree) Mean

Sd

1

Loyalty

1.8077

.79307

2

Gay Marriage

1.7368

.83509

3

Freedom of religion

1.1607

.49642

4

Hijab

1.4737

.80412

5

Burqa

1.6538

.78926

6

Polygamy

1.9273

.85753

7

Inheritance

1.5556

.79305

8

Arranged marriage

1.5091

.74219

9

Hudud

1.7091

.80904

10 Banking

1.1579

.49242

11 Sciences

1.2727

.55958

12 Abortion

1.6667

.85217

13 Euthanasia

1.6316

.83733

14 Literature

1.5263

.73449

The evaluations of the respondents are discussed below.

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Loyalty is for the country where one belongs, not where one comes from. This statement receives one of the highest means, 1.807, close to answer 2 “neutral,” i.e. 34.6% for neutrality and 42.3% for agreement. This shows that the respondents face trouble in accepting the idea that their “new” country is the country they should be loyal to, as Ramadan suggests. Here, Ramadan faces some distrust, which is still to be overcome. Gay marriage should be respected as a choice in Europe, though it is not allowed by Islam. Gay marriage is a hot issue in Europe and elsewhere. It does not yield much support from the respondents but it is interesting to note that the mean is lower at 1.7386 than the one of the first statement on loyalty. Is there an inclination in the respondents that they agree on this issue, at 50.9%, as it is of less importance than the loyalty issue? Freedom of religion is granted. On this issue the majority of respondents are very much positive with a mean of 1.1607. Undoubtedly, the respondents apply this statement to themselves as Muslims but it could also be postulated that they see the importance of it for believers of all religions as they experience this in Europe. Wearing the headscarf/hijjab should not be obligatory, but a matter of choice. A majority tends to agree with this statement with a mean of 1.4737. The issue is the subject of a heated debate but the respondents show a remarkable flexibility in this respect. The Burqa is cultural, not Islamic. Most respondents tend to interpret the burqa as a cultural artefact and not as an expression of Islamic identity, with a mean of 1.6458. They are less outspoken on this subject than in the preceding question of the headscarf. Polygamy should not be allowed in Europe. The question on polygamy yields the highest mean, 1.9412, and thus the highest measure of refusal. The respondents are divided. They tend not to agree but stick to a safe neutral answer. Maybe they are cautious in expressively condemning an Islamic rule. Besides the Islamic inheritance code, women should be given equal rights through state institutions. In the present issue the respondents show more outspoken opinions than in the preceding one with a mean of 1.6122. They show themselves to be in favour of giving women equal rights in inheritance issues, which is basically not in conformity with Islamic law. Arranged marriage is a cultural practice, and not Islamic. Most respondents agree with this statement with a mean of 1.5000, and in that sense they express a remarkably liberal view.

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Hudud sanctions like stoning should be temporarily frozen. With a mean of 1.7059 the respondents show that they tend to be neutral on this question. Is the word “Hudud” influencing them as a very Islamic concept clearly stated in the Koran that cannot be discussed or reformed? One notes some ambivalence or fear of voicing an opinion on some matters plainly stated in the Koran, though at times free views are expressed, as in the case of women’s equal rights. Islamic banking should be respected as a choice. This statement is scored as closest to answer 1, at 1.1538, and as such the respondents very much agree with it. The statement is that Islamic banking should be a choice and as such respected, and this does not exclude other forms of banking and in this respect the answer of the respondents is a safe choice. Islamic sciences do not contradict the general frames of science and reason. This statement also receives a somewhat positive judgement with a mean of 1.2157. Abortion is possible in particular cases. It is remarkable to observe that the respondents are not categorically opposed to abortion in particular cases with a mean of 1.6038. A majority are in favour of it. Euthanasia is generally forbidden. This statement gains some support from the respondents with a mean of 1.6038. Literature and art that do not follow Islamic ethics should be respected. With a mean of 1.5192 we again observe a somewhat liberal attitude of the respondents concerning the ethical question.

Discussion and Conclusion In general, the results of this study are optimistic and speak of a European Islam as a viable idea, despite the challenges it still faces. Table 3.5 shows that 76.7% of respondents are in the agreement zone, agreeing and strongly agreeing that Islam can co-exist with Dutch values, despite the fact that Islamophobia is worryingly increasing, as 45.8% of the respondents state, while 33% say it is apparent, as shown in Table 3.12. The fieldwork part of this study consisted of three main sections: “Islam and Dutch Values,” “The Netherlands in Focus,” and “Tariq Ramadan’s Project for European Islam.” For the first section of the questionnaire, “Islam and Dutch Values,” three attitudes could be tentatively outlined in spite of the diversity that dominates in statistics and comments. First, we noticed that despite the uncertainty revealed by a number of comments over the possible match between Dutch and Islamic values, there is more agreement expressed on the possibility of coexistence of the two value systems, the Dutch and the Islamic ones, as the

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results of Table 3.5 show. The comments throughout this section make it very clear that the two value systems are different but can co-exist: “I think Islam can be practiced in The Netherlands but Dutch values don’t match the values we know in Islam” (comment 2, Table 3.5.1), which means that the respondents were more practical on the matter. It is not compatibility that interests them most but coexistence; they seem very aware of the different value systems, and they do not deny this or the possibility of living with both. This explains why some respondents state that there is no need to reform Islam, as that “can be seen as a bid’a (heresy)” (comment 2, Table 3.6.1). As a way out of the uncertainty of whether or not to reform Islam and to avoid reforms that can be seen as heresies, a respondent suggests that “we need to follow the Sharia and respect Dutch law” (comment 3, Table 3.7.1), and another goes further by saying “I say no alterations. You believe in it, or you don’t” (comment 51, Table 3.7.1). This ambiguity and diversity in answers about reforming Sharia become clearer in the later sections related to the reforms Tariq Ramadan proposes; there, the respondents’ current ambiguity disappears, for they generally agree on most of his propositions, which means that when reform comes from a Muslim theologian it could be easy to consent if it remains an issue raised by right wing politics and the media. This attitude questions “integration” and its meaning, and refers to “opportunities” in society and not to religion and values as such (comment 37, Table 3.6.1; comment 49, Table 3.7.1). It also nurtures a feeling of dissatisfaction of the social and political integration policies of the state which are seen to have started “much too late” (comment 2, Table 3.9.1; comment 10, Table 3.8.1), and that this has created “frustration” among the citizens descended from immigration, affecting their behaviour and integration which equally require a critical evaluation, as some respondents state (comment 2, 3 and 24, Table 3.10.1), for the Muslims do not make for a harmonious group to be portrayed as either having failed or succeeded in integrating (comment 47 and 51, Table 3.10.1). Within this same attitude lays the claim that “the problem which arises right now has to do with the ‘newcomers’,” i.e. the newly arrived immigrants and not the Muslims who were born or raised here from an early age (comment 49, Table 3.10.1). These attitudes, as various and divided as they are, find it difficult to agree on whether the first and second generation of Muslims in The Netherlands can be considered as Dutch Muslims. Yet, for the third generation, a very high percentage of the respondents agreed that they consider themselves Dutch Muslims (comment 3.11). Whether these three

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attitudes have been influenced by the countries of origin’s mediation in the integration process, the survey shows that the respondents do not fully side with a particular opinion, and are thus divided about it (Table 3.12). Such indecisiveness might have influenced the respondents’ remarked uncertainty about reforming Sharia, seeing that the countries of origin are not entirely put aside when tackling the issue of integration. The results of the first section of the study, which focuses on values, make more sense when “The Netherlands in Focus” section is looked at. In this section, the results that come out clearly and without signs of indecisiveness underline the high increase in Islamophobia in the country (Table 3.12), and reference was made a couple of times in the comments to the populist Freedom Party PVV and its leader Geert Wilders, who is known for his anti-Islamic discourse and strict immigration policies (Table 3.12.1). Mainly, the media fuels the increase in Islamophobia and fear among the native Dutch (90%), and through fear of terrorism, besides the demographic factor among Muslims. Islam, as a religion or regarding its history, does not seem to pose a problem as such (Table 3.14). In classifying types of fear (fear of Islam, fear of symbols, fear caused by the media, etc.), we noticed that it is the visible aspects of Islam that raise problems, according to the respondents. We suggested fifteen options as aspects of visibility and causes of fear, alongside a free space for comments, and in the main the burqa, hijab, beard and djellaba, mosques and Islamic schools, and youth delinquency rank highly compared to the rest of the options (marriage rituals, male circumcision, etc.) (Table 3.13.1). Interestingly, the respondents, in their comments in this section, do not raise the question of value differences, as was seen in the first section, but focus their attention on the phobic discourses of the populist party of Wilders and shed light on how this is exacerbated by the media. The last section of the survey is mainly on Ramadan’s project of European Islam, how it is received by the Moroccan-Dutch Youth, and what ambiguities it raises. Over all, we noticed that a little more than half of the informants (52.6%) are aware of the details of Ramadan’s project. Despite this fact, however, we noticed closeness in perception of the religious issues Ramadan touches upon. That is, although Ramadan’s ideas are not fully widespread in a more meticulous manner, even among the Moroccan-Dutch educated youth, they generally remain approved of and consented to. In this section we can also sketch out three attitudes that characterize the reactions of the respondents to Ramadan’s project generally within the zone of agreement with his “reformist” ideas, yet certain idiosyncrasies and ambiguities could be marked, as we attempt to do here. The first attitude has to do with the reaction to four main issues,

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i.e. Sharia definition, loyalty, polygamy, and hudud sanctions. The second attitude is more focused on four other points that we single out for this attitude: freedom of religion, the headscarf/hijab, gay marriage, and Islamic inheritance law. The third attitude concerns the rest of the points tabled above: the burqa, arranged marriage, Islamic banking, science and arts, abortion, and euthanasia. With the results presented in our tables above we can say that the first attitude is semi-liberal or semiconservative, the second liberal, and the third quite liberal. We start with the first attitude. For Sharia, a respondent commented “I find it difficult that Sharia can be applied in the West,” while another added: “I do not think Sharia has to be followed at all in the West” (comment 51, Table 3.16.1). Such comments demonstrate that Sharia, unlike what Ramadan has in mind, is still seen solely in terms of Islamic laws and hudud sanctions instead of as comprising ethical and spiritual aspects of Islam. For loyalty, 34.6% of the respondents express neutrality, 21.1% disagreement, and 42.3% agree. Despite the fact that agreement ranked highly, the other percentages for neutrality and disagreement raise curiosity among readers. For the instance of polygamy, 40% of respondents agree on banning it in Europe, 27.3% show neutrality, while 32.7% go for disagreement. For the case of freezing the hudud sanctions, as Ramadan proposes, 50.9% agree on it, 27.3% are neutral, and 21.8% disagree. On these particular cases we underline the following observations: first, this aspect of neutrality could be understood as a sign of discomfort about the discourse of reforming or freezing particular immutable texts of the Koran, and it would take time and effort before such a reformist discourse takes place and finds acceptance without hesitation; second, neutrality should not be read as disagreement, as the latter rated much less compared to neutrality, or to the agreement rates which in most cases rated above 50%; third, and most importantly, we do not consider this neutrality aspect to harm the general findings of the survey, which we consider to go in parallel with the discourse of Ramadan as well as the values of Dutch society. In other words, and compared to the other points of the survey, we noted that the respondents agreed on the main ideas of Ramadan we presented, and the agreement was not less than 50%, except in the case of polygamy and loyalty to the country of residence. Even simpler, there is no disagreement ratio with Tariq Ramadan that goes beyond the ratio of agreement; even in the cases of a high percentage of neutrality, agreement exceeds disagreement rates in all the cases surveyed, including the exceptional cases. In the second attitude we noticed that the participants in the survey liberally and openly expressed their agreement without many reservations

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or neutrality. The agreement percentages here do not go below 50% regarding respect for gay marriages (50.9%), freedom of religion (89.9%), hijjab as a choice (71.9%), and equality in inheritance law (63%). The difference that should be noted between the first attitude and the second is that there is no particular indicator of their choices for difference; we cannot know why there is some uncertainty and neutrality raised on polygamy and hudud sanctions, for instance, while there is less when it comes to inheritance or hijjab, though these issues are bound by immutable Koranic texts that explicate how they should be dealt with. The first attitude shows signs of respect to the Koranic sanctions, or is simply unable to take a bold reforming step that changes or freezes some immutable Koranic texts and the Sunna, which make Sharia orthodox laws, while the second attitude seems liberal in the sense that it tries, for example, to show that there is a need to refom Sharia for the sake of more equality among men and women when it comes to inheritance law, though, again, inheritance law is also well defined and expounded upon in the Koran. Another difference between attitude one and two is that while polygamy neutrality and disagreement are somewhat high (27.3% and 32.7% respectively), which reveal some doubts and non-acceptance of some aspects of reform suggested by Ramadan, gay marriage, freedom of religion, and freedom of wearing the hijjab are respected as personal choices. The third attitude, which we reserve for the cases of abortion, euthanasia, Islamic banking, Islamic sciences and arts, also seems open to Ramadan’s ideas and agrees to them. This category is between the previous two in the sense that it is not bound by strict and direct Koranic texts as is the case with Islamic sciences and arts, but is bound by general Islamic ethics; at the same time, this attitude is “culture corrective” in the sense that it tries to accept going beyond the cultural aspects that have been added to Islam’s main tenets. This applies to the case of arranged marriages and the wearing of the burqa, which this attitude recognizes as non-Islamic. As to agreement with Ramadan on disagreement on abortion and euthanasia (except in very rare cases which we do not stress in this article), that also falls within some guiding Islamic ethics on the value and right to life. The diverse attitudes outlined above are not simply harmonious, yet a number of general remarks can be enumerated after our study of the reactions of the Moroccan Dutch Muslims to the European Islam project of Ramadan: (a) caution and preliminary fear among the respondents in voicing an opinion on a strictly religious matter defined by Koranic or Sunna texts; (b) consent to reforms once voiced by a theological authority

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like the figure of Ramadan, even if such reforms touch upon immutable texts well defined in the Koran and/or Sunna, as is the case with hudud sanctions and polygamy; (c) consent to reforms that mainly touch upon the individual, even if these reforms question immutable texts well defined in the Koran and/or Sunna, as is the case of wearing the hijjab and freedom of religion; (d) consent to reforms that aim at establishing more equality between men and women even if that alters the orthodox reading of Koranic texts, as is the case of inheritance law; (e) consent to reform cultural practices that are not necessarily Islamic but grown in an Islamic context, like the case of arranged marriages and female circumcision. What is interesting to note is that there is a preliminary readiness, along with caution and fear, to going ahead with certain reform ideas such as those suggested by Ramadan, even if only a small majority of the respondents are aware of his detailed project, as noted in the tables in Section III (showing that 52.6% are aware of the project). This only endorses our previous idea that there are certain Islamic practices that the Dutch Muslims of Moroccan origin do not think of practicing, but still do not dare to discuss or change because they touch on the sanctity of the religious texts. This may also mean that it is not such details that preoccupy them or hinder their integration and feeling of being at home as Dutch. Alternatively, it may also be understood as a reactive identity formation that pushes them to not raise such issues and seek solutions to the integration problems in politics, social and economics, and not in theology-religion. These are horizons that also need to be studied in depth, besides the variety of answers that one small group of informants raises, as this survey shows. Finally, and based on what is stipulated above, we could conclude that a European Islamic identity is in the making and needs to be framed in a clearer manner through a reference, or multiple references, to making it clearer to the European Muslims themselves, and also to the non-Muslims who fear them. This identity can be as diverse as the Islamic community in The Netherlands and Europe in general is. Yet there are core elements that the Islamic community can now share not only among its other variants/groups but among the rest of society. The pluralism of European Islam is an asset that should be benefitted from in a new approach towards this particular religion that has brought about so much debate. More than that, Tariq Ramadan is a prominent voice, among other Islamic voices, that has an established scholarship in the field, and most importantly has grounded supporters and followers among the young Muslims; this should be taken into consideration, a reality which other scholars who also speak

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of reforming Islam do not seem to enjoy at the grassroots level, as is the case with Bassam Tibi and his view of a Euro-Islam (Tibi 2008, 153–160).

References Baum, G. (2006). The Theology of Tariq Ramadan: A Catholic Perspective. Toronto: Novalis Publishing. Boulaouali, T. (2006). Almuslimuna fi al-gharb: bayna tanaqudat alwaqic ‘wa tahaddiyat almustaqbal (Muslims in the West: Between the Contradictions of the Present and the Challenges of the Future). Cairo: Markaz Alhadara Al Arabia. Cherribi, S. (2010). In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed. Oxford: Oxford UP. El-kettani, A. I. A. (2005). Al-muslimuna fi urupa wa-Amrika (Muslims in Europe and America). Beirut: Dar Alkutub Al-‘ilmiya. Favrot, L. (2004). Tariq Ramadan dévoilé: Enquête sur ce islamiste qui sévit dans les banlieues. Lyon: Lyon Mag’ hors série. Fourest, C. (2008). Brother Tariq: The Double Speak of Tariq Ramadan. I. Wieder & J.Atherton (Trans.). New York: Encounter Books. Hamel, I. (2007). La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan: Vers un lobby musulman en Europe? Paris: Favre. Harchaoui, S. (2010) (ed.). The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands. Facts and Figures. Utrecht. http://www.forum.nl/Portals/International/English-pdf/Muslims-in-theNetherlands-2010.pdf (accessed August 20, 2010). Landau, P. (2005). Le Sabre et le Coran: Tariq Ramadan et les Frères musulmans à la conquête de l’Europe. Monaco: Rocher. Modood, T., Triandafyllidou, A. & Zapata-Barrero, R. (2006). Multiculturalism, Muslims, and Citizenship: A European Approach. London & New York: Routledge. Ramadan, T. (1998). Aux sources du renouveau musulman, un siècle de réformisme islamique. Paris: Bayard Editions. —. (1999a). To be a European Muslim. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. —. (1999b). Muslims in France: the Way Towards Co-Existence. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. —. (2001). Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. —. (2002). Musulmans d’occident: Construire et contribuer. Lyon: Tawhid. —. (2003). Débat avec Nicolas Sarkozy: Dieu et la république, France 2, Novembre 20.

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—. (2004). Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford: Oxford UP. —. (2008). Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation. Oxford: Oxford UP. —. (2009). What I Believe. Oxford: Oxford UP. —. (2010a). L’Affaire Rotterdam. Retrieved August 15, 2009 from Tariq Ramadan Website: http://www.tariqramadan.com/L-Affaire-Rotterdam.html —. (2010b). The Quest for Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism. London: Allen Lane. Tibi, B. (2008). Political Islam, World Politics and Europe. London & New York: Routledge. Zemmouri, A. (2005). Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan? Suivi d’un entretien avec Tariq Ramadan. Paris: L’archipel.

CHAPTER EIGHT RELIGION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN GREECE: THE IDENTITY CARD CRISIS AND THE ISLAMIC MOSQUE ISSUE ALEXANDROS SAKELLARIOU

Introduction To study how religion contributed to the formation of the Greek national identity is a captivating but at the same time difficult task, which needs to be looked at from a multidisciplinary perspective. Therefore, the subject of this chapter is the relationship between religion and national identity in Greek society within the European context from a sociological perspective. For that purpose, I am going to focus on two issues, which emerged in the Greek society during the twenty-first century and caused many discussions and conflicts in the public sphere. Of course, it should be clarified from the beginning that even though these two issues emerged at the dawn of the new Millennium, their roots go exceptionally deep in Greek history. The first issue, chronologically, was the identity card crisis, which emerged in 2000 after the decision of the socialist government to omit the category “religion” from the new identity card, a decision that caused a strong reaction from the Orthodox Church of Greece. The second crisis came up one year before the Olympic games of 2004, held in Athens, regarding the construction of an official mosque for Muslims who would visit Greece, but mainly for the Muslim inhabitants, immigrants and locals of the Greek capital. I choose to refer to these two issues in light of the European context for several reasons. First of all, by studying them thoroughly we can understand that religion plays a crucial role in the formation of the Greek national identity; secondly, we can ascertain that the religious field in

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Greece has changed compared to thirty years ago; and finally, because it will help us to understand the relationship between the national and the European identity in contemporary Greece. Therefore, the main questions are: how does religion influence the reconstruction of the Greek national identity? How does the European context affect the reactions against religious otherness? Is peaceful coexistence between natives and “religious others” possible in this “new” multi-religious Greek society within the European context? It is essential to stress from the very beginning that the main object is to examine how the Orthodox Church of Greece as an institution reacted regarding these two issues, firstly because the Orthodox Church of Greece is a powerful state institution, and was the institution which reacted, and secondly because this is not the place for an exhaustive and analytical examination of all the collective and individual reactions recorded during these controversies and which could be characterized as secondary. For these reasons, the Orthodox Church’s official public discourse is going to be the primary material of this analysis. Before I explain how I am going to use the material and the methodology I will follow, it is necessary to stress two fundamental points concerning religion and politics, state-church relationships and the relationship between the East and the West in the Greek society. First of all, it should be underlined that according to the third article of the Greek Constitution, the dominant religion in Greece is the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. This article has caused many controversies and has been the main point of issue on every discussion regarding the state-church relations in Greece. In addition, it should be acknowledged that religion has played a vital role in Greece’s history, which is, of course, not always positive, and this also causes serious disagreements and conflicts, especially concerning its role during the Ottoman Occupation and the Revolution of Independence. However, the issues of religion and politics and the state-church relations must also be examined in light of the relationship between the East and the West within the European context. Western Europe was always considered Orthodoxy’s enemy not only from ecclesiastical circles (Metallinos 1998) but also from theological or philosophical circles (Yiannaras 1992). This negative confrontation is based on two historical facts: the ecclesiastical schism of 1054 and the siege of Constantinople by the crusaders in 1204. These two historical incidents stigmatized Greek Orthodoxy which, since then, has reacted against any political or social innovation from Western Europe. This stance, of course, is also empowered by the fear the Enlightenment caused to all the religious authorities of Europe, and which is confronted by the

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Orthodox Church as a Western achievement far away from the Greek Orthodox tradition, and quite harmful for it. As a consequence, even though Greece belongs to the EU, the Church and some circles that consider themselves the protectors of Greek tradition and uniqueness confront Western Europe with suspicion.

Methodology It has been argued that discourse contributes to the composition of the rules and regulations of social life, as well as of relations, identities and institutions (Fairclough 1992, 65), meaning that discursive practices contribute both to reproduction and change in a society. Therefore, discourse has become an immensely important tool for social scientists in their efforts to study and understand society and social relationships. The task of discourse analysis is thus to examine the dialectical relationship between discourses and the social systems in which they function and expose the way in which language and meaning are used by the powerful to deceive and oppress the dominated (Howarth 2000, 4). Discourse analysis treats a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic material, such as speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events and interviews, as “texts” and “writings” that enable subjects to experience the world of objects, words and practices (Ibid., 10). Discourse analysis is, therefore, a “creative abuse” of the concept of “discourse,” which is now used in a much broader form than its original linguistic sense. It is a technique for studying any meaningful social practice and, thus, any human practice, since every human practice is meaningful for discourse analysts. Discourses are, therefore, systems of meaning bound together by certain particular signifiers and make the social world intelligible to subjects (Chrysoloras 2003, 10). As I mentioned before, the main material for my analysis is going to be the official ecclesiastical discourse of the Orthodox Church of Greece. It is essential to stress that the two issues—the identity card controversy and the Islamic mosque issue—gave an opportunity to the Orthodox Church to produce a substantial body of discourse material. This discourse consists of public speeches, public announcements, encyclical letters, articles and press releases of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church and of the Archbishop of the Church, who is the head of the Synod. This material is derived from books containing the public speeches and other written and oral material of the Archbishop from the official periodical of the Church entitled “Ecclesia,” from publications containing the encyclical letters of the Holy Synod, and from the official website of the Orthodox Church.

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Additionally, I am going to use certain press articles regarding these issues, published in the Greek daily press. The thematic categories of analysis are: (1) Greek uniqueness; (2) Greece and Europe; (3) The two menaces: (i) The West and (ii) Islam; (4) Orthodoxy and Europe; and (5) the Church’s doubletalk concerning Europe and the EU. At this point a clarification is crucial. The presentation of the findings is not going to be exposed following the aforementioned categories. These categories of analysis are going to be incorporated in three sections (the identity card crisis, the Islamic mosque issue and the Orthodox Church and Europe). I made this decision because I thought that the categorical presentation would perhaps confuse the reader and, in addition, would not give me the opportunity to introduce the historical background of the issues examined, which I consider necessary. I chose to add a third section, apart from the two case-studies, with regard to the relationship between the Orthodox Church and Europe, firstly because this issue is a basic part of both the cases analysed, and there is a lot of written material about it, and, secondly, because I wanted to underline the fact that this relationship is important if someone wants to understand and study the Greek national identity and the religious situation in Greece. In my view, the identity card and the mosque issues caused so much reaction because they are interrelated with the reformation of the Greek national identity. Until the 1990s Greek society was homogeneous, with the same language, religion and culture. From then on, the increase of the number of immigrants, who nowadays total about one million residents of Greece, caused a shock to the Greek people, who for their part were not familiar with such a variety of cultures, religions and nationalities. That is why I contend that these two issues, apart from the state-church relations or the EU-church relations, also have to do with the reformation of the Greek national-religious identity, collectively as well as individually, because identity is not something that is invariable. I also assume that the Greece-Europe/East-West issue is in the background of both issues. Concerning the identity card, the West is considered the “enemy” who tries to impose its beliefs, ideology and political decisions on Greek society. At a deeper level, however, what is implied is the Islamic threat, as it is mainly represented by the future accession of Turkey into the EU, meaning that Islam will dominate easier when the Greeks and Europeans have lost their identity. The Islamic threat is clearer when we refer to the mosque issue, but here again the West as an “enemy” is also involved because it is the West that tries to impose the “new” multicultural model on every European society without asking.

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In conclusion, I contend that in both issues examined there is a triple relationship between the European East (i.e. Greek Orthodoxy), the West (mainly the EU, but the US too) and the East as represented by the Islamic menace. The outcome of this relationship is the reforming of the Greek national identity, which of course is still in progress, as Greece is transforming from a closed and homogeneous society into an open society, at least regarding the synthesis of its population. However, as is going to be presented through this work, the goal of a truly open society is at risk because the reactions of some parts of the closed society are still strong.

The Identity Card Crisis Before entering the analysis a brief introduction to the issue seems necessary. When identity cards became mandatory in 1945, all citizens had to include, among other personal details, their religion. This law (87/1945) remained in effect until 1986, when under legislation passed by the socialist government of PASOK the declaration of religion became optional (law 1599/1986). In 1991, the right wing New Democracy party introduced a new law (1988/1991), according to which the declaration of religion again became compulsory. The spark that lit the fire in the relations between the state and the Orthodox Church was the announcement of the Minister of Justice—a law professor and extra-parliamentary member of the government—in 2000, that after the re-election of the socialist party his government intended to omit the category “religion” from the identity card once again. The reason for this announcement was a decision of the Hellenic Data Protection Authority (510/17/15.5.2000), according to which declaration of religion on the identity card is unconstitutional and could lead to acts of discrimination on the part of the state. This was a tremendous shock for the Orthodox Church of Greece, which, after the insistence of the government to fulfil its promise, decided to react vigorously via the circulation of encyclical letters, interviews in the media, the publication of articles, the organization of two rallies in Athens and Thessaloniki, and the organization of a petition in order to press the government to conduct a referendum about the issue. The Holy Synod of the Church stated from the very beginning that “the identity card issue is a fundamental and weighty task; it is not a mere trifle because it is related to the holder’s personality and generally to the traditions of our country” (Holy Synod 2000a). In his public speech during the second rally in Athens, Archbishop Christodoulos argued that: “we are a small religious minority within the EU and we want to stress and declare our

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religious uniqueness in our national identity [i.e. the identity card]” (Christodoulos 2000a). Regardless of this reaction, the two massive rallies and the collection of more than three million signatures, the government did not step back. In one of its final public statements on the issue, the Holy Synod argued: “This issue cannot close because it has to do with our self-awareness and uniqueness, unalienable and necessary elements for the preservation of our identity as People and as a Nation, which is marching with dignity within the EU” (Holy Synod 2001b). As to the allegations that the Orthodox Church promotes the spirit of “euro scepticism” in contemporary Greece, the Holy Synod answered: “the Church from the very beginning was in favour of the European orientation of our country, without this meaning the betrayal of our national and religious uniqueness” (Holy Synod 2000b). In addition, it stated: “… a lot of texts were published concerning the preservation … of our cultural heritage within the melting-pot of globalization and the ‘new order’; additionally there was talk about the innate cultural discourse we can offer to the EU” (Holy Synod 2001a), meaning that the Greek Orthodox tradition should be protected because it can contribute enormously to the European identity. However, apart from anything else, according to the Church there is a secret plan behind such a decision concerning the ID cards. The plan’s its main object is to subjugate the Greek people to the will of foreign interests: “The application of the aforementioned plan intends to transform us into immigrants within our own birth country, lacking the snugness of spirituality that the Orthodox faith gifted to us” (Christodoulos 2000b), and, of course, one of the great fears of the Orthodox Church is the transformation of Greece into a secular state like France (Christodoulos 2001). Due to the government’s intransigence the Church decided to make a political manoeuvre and suggest the optional reference of religion on the identity cards, according to one’s will. The government did not accept this either, following the advice of its legal team, which considered such a proposal to also be unconstitutional. At that point, the Church through the Holy Synod made the following statement: The claim for the optional entry of religion and resistance against the various methodical plans for the de-Christianization of Greece and Europe are and will remain holy obligations for which … the clergy and its hierarchs will fight for, constantly. Undoubtedly, it is a pity because during this period the powers of atheism and the enemies of our tradition—a small

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As we can understand from the above analysis, the identity card controversy caused a serious conflict between the state and the Orthodox Church. The government’s victory was an exception to the rule that in Greece the political power always steps back when the Church has a different opinion and reacts vigorously. The identity card crisis caused serious discussions about the separation between the state and the Orthodox Church, and gave the opportunity to researchers to study the whole issue in light of discourse analysis, politics and religion and nationalism in the Orthodox Church (Stavrakakis 2002; MolokotosLiederman 2007; Chrysoloras 2003). The Orthodox Church’s interest in the identity card suggests that the Church’s main fear is the deChristianization of the Greek and European societies, as well as the loss of its privilege to control and manipulate the state according to its will and interest.

The Islamic Mosque Issue Nowadays, mosques in Greece, which are open to Muslims, exist only in the islands of Rhodes and Kos, and also in Thrace in Northern Greece where, since 1923, the longest-standing Muslim community has lived, the members of which are Greek citizens. It is necessary to mention, however, that there are many mosques within the Greek frontiers, which are historical monuments of enormous cultural and architectural importance. Some of them are open, but used only for cultural purposes or as museums (e.g. in Central Greece, in the city of Trikala), while others are closed and will probably become ruins (e.g. in Northern Greece, in the city of Didymoteicho). However, visitors to Athens can observe that there are two mosques in the historical centre of the city which are not in use, both from the period of the Ottoman Empire. The first is the Mosque of Mohammed the Conqueror, built in 1458, and the second the Mosque of the governor of Athens of that period, called Tzisdarakis, who in order to build it in 1759 destroyed the seventeenth column of the ancient temple of Olympian Zeus of Athens to convert it into lime, which was going to be used for the construction of the mosque, also known as the mosque of the Lower Fountain. The former is closed and only used as a storehouse for the preservation and storage of antiquities, while the latter has been used since

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1918 as a Museum of Greek Folk Art, i.e. as the home of the Museum of Greek Handicrafts (Zoumpoulakis 2002, 105). The mosque in Athens has been under construction since the late 1970s (Tsitselikis 2004, 281–290). In 1978, Khalid, the Saudi Arabian king, asked for the construction of a mosque in Athens and received a positive answer from the Greek Prime Minister of that time. After many discussions, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered a piece of land in Maroussi, a municipality near Athens, but the mayor and the citizens reacted and the whole plan was cancelled. In 1992 another suggestion was made from the Greek government for an estate in Koropi, a municipality far from Athens. At that time the suggestion was rejected by the ambassadors of the Arabic states. After that, the Muslims of Greece found places by themselves—former storehouses, derelict houses and factories, even small apartments, usually in the basements of buildings and in neighbourhoods near the centre of Athens, where many immigrants lived, which they turned into holy places to practice their faith. All these places—some argue that their number surpasses sixty (Imam & Tsakiridou 2003)—function without permission, but the Greek state tolerates them because they are not visible and, in addition, due to their invisibility they do not cause a reaction from the Orthodox Church. According to recent research on mosques in Europe it is argued that there are more than four hundred mosques in Greece (Allievi 2009, 23). It is necessary to clarify that as far as the region of Athens is concerned not a single mosque exists. As we mentioned above, we could call these places places of worship or prayer, but not mosques. Today there are only two “official,” or to be more accurate, socially acceptable places for the Muslims in Athens. The first is located on a floor of a hotel and is used by its customers. The second was recently (2007) built by the Greek-Arabic Educational and Cultural Centre and was financed by a Saudi Arabian businessman in Moschato, a region near the centre of the city in an abandoned factory, but no one can tell that this is a mosque from the outside because it looks like the offices of some international enterprise. The legal history of the mosque issue is also quite intriguing, and it is worth looking at in brief. The first law goes back to 1880 (May 30/June 1, “On the gratuitous allotment of national land for the construction of a Turkish Mosque in Piraeus”) and, according to it, the Greek government allotted a site in Piraeus for a mosque to be built, but this law was never enforced. After the Balkan Wars the issue came up again, and according to the third protocol (article 4) of the Convention of Athens (1913) Greece

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was obliged to build a mosque in Athens and four more in other regions of Greece, wherever necessary. This resolution was also never implemented. In 1934, with law 6244 (Official Gazette, A’ 274, 17/25.8.1934), it was decided that an Egyptian mosque would be built, and it was also decided that an Islamic Foundation be established, i.e. an Egyptian Institute for the scholars of the government of Egypt in Greece. For that reason, the Greek government offered a site in Athens, having as a goal the improvement of Greek-Egyptian relations and, in addition, the improvement of the situation of the Greek community in Egypt. As was expected, this law was also never enforced. After many years of internal and external pressure, with a main argument being the forthcoming Olympic Games of 2004, a new law was passed (2833/30.6.2000, Official Gazette A’ 150, article 7, “On the placement of the Islamic Cultural Centre”), by which the construction of a mosque in Athens jointly with an Islamic Centre for the promotion of Greek-Arabic relations was approved. The placement of the mosque has been cited in a region far from the city centre near the new airport of Athens, and was allotted by the Ministry of Agriculture. After much discussion and the Orthodox Church’s interference, this law also fell into abeyance. A final legal attempt was made in 2006 with another “new” law about the Islamic mosque of Athens (3512/2006, Official Gazette, A’ 264, 15/12/2006). In that law there is no specific reference to the place where the mosque will be built, and it is only mentioned that it is going to be fully controlled by the Greek state. I considered it necessary to expose the history of the mosque issue because it is a good example of the problems other religious communities face in Greece, and because it sufficiently illustrates the living conditions of Muslims in Greece. Let us now examine the reaction of the Orthodox Church. In the case of the 2000 law, the Greek Orthodox Church reacted vigorously against the possibility of the existence of a large mosque near the new airport. Archbishop Christodoulos, on behalf of the Holy Synod, sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of that time, arguing that: “The selection of the place near the new airport and the considered size of the installations [i.e. of the mosque] should be considered as causes of confusion of foreign visitors, who upon their arrival in the Orthodox homeland will immediately see an impressive Islamic mosque” (Holy Synod 2003). The Greek Orthodox Church also did not accept the installation of a Centre of Islamic Studies in any region of Athens, but recognized the right of Muslims to have a holy place, without, however, making any suggestions in that direction. Finally, the Orthodox Church stated that there would be

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many reactions from the citizens of that region, who did not want a mosque near their houses because of their Orthodox convictions. Three days later, with another letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, they suggested the construction of a Holy Temple, i.e. Orthodox, in a visible place near the installations of the new airport, owing to the demand of the majority of Orthodox Christians. It is obvious that the Church wants to make the fact that the Greek society is Orthodox clear, and that no one should doubt that. However, why should the authorities build a large Orthodox temple there? Because, according to the Holy Synod of the Church: “It will be a spiritual shelter in which any of the many visitors who may wish, can have the opportunity to find some moments of spiritual meditation and psychological invigoration, but mainly because it will give a Greek Orthodox picture of the country at this key post through which people from all over the world pass” (Holy Synod 2003). Archbishop Christodoulos, and the Church on the whole, argued that the construction of a mosque is something indispensable, but they were strongly opposed to the construction of an Islamic Centre (Tsatsis 2004, 15). The Archbishop responded after being asked in an interview if he agrees with the construction of a mosque in Athens: … Our position is that none can forbid the believers of a known religion, like Islam, to practice their religious duties freely … But we expressed our disagreement to the parallel construction of a Centre of Islamic Studies because such a goal is superfluous, on the grounds that it surpasses the need for a place for Muslims to meet their religious needs. In addition, it is difficult to control its activities. (Christodoulos 2005)

It is evident that this last comment is an insinuation regarding Islamist terrorists, and one plainly stated in the subsequent years, as we will see. It is particularly interesting to mention that the metropolitan region where the mosque was to be built according to the 2000 law also reacted to its construction with the following statement on the occasion of a universal demand of the inhabitants for the immediate removal of rubbish dumps: “If the government wants to show the international community that we, as a society, are a modernized and civilized nation, we should first remove all the rubbish dumps from our region, which daily contaminate our lungs and humiliate our country internationally, and after that it can construct the Islamic Centre, which contaminates our spirit and our history” (Tsatsis 2004, 51). Fortunately, many other citizens reacted to that statement and characterized it as fundamentalist and an extreme opinion (Tsatsis 2004,

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51), but those of Thessaloniki insisted that it is horrible that in Athens today there are almost 600,000 Muslims, and added that these people are a problem for the country. Besides these letters and official Church statements an editorial in the Official Journal of the Orthodox Church is truly enlightening. In that article, the editor accuses the Greek government of the acceptance of the interference of Saudi Arabia as far as financing the Mosque is concerned. He also accuses the Saudi Arabian regime of totalitarian practices and demands the Greek government ask for countervailing benefits, e.g. the construction of a big Orthodox temple in Saudi Arabia, in order to give permission for the construction of a mosque in Athens. Additionally, he wonders about the purpose of the Cultural Centre and hints that these kinds of centres all over Europe function as places of gathering and communication of every fringe, criminal, and even terrorist personality. Finally, he connects religious fanaticism and fundamentalism with the anticipated Islamic Cultural Centre and asks if good relations with the Arabic states are more important than the national interest and security of the Greek people (Cholevas 2003, 593–4). In the end, that proposed legislature was supposedly rejected due to Muslim reactions, because the future mosque would be unusually far from their houses and so would not be easily accessible. These activities were just a pretext because the Church’s reactions were not less important and were taken under serious consideration by the government. The new Archbishop, Ieronymos, is strongly in favour of the Islamic mosque, stating that everyone has the right to pray to their God: “the universal right of religious freedom is fundamental in every well-governed and democratic state, like the Greek one, and it has to be protected as our Constitution clearly commands” (Tsatsis 2009, 22). However, there are contradictory opinions within the Holy Synod of the Church. In January 2011, after the attack by an Islamist group on the Coptic community of Egypt, the metropolitan of Piraeus circulated an offensive encyclical letter against the Muslims and Islam in general, also arguing against the construction of an Islamic mosque in Athens: The character of Islam was always aggressive, and as it is proved by these Islamist criminal acts, this character remains up to today. The sword and the knife are considered more persuasive than preaching and persuasion … The so-called prophet Mohamed did not establish just a religious community, but also a state with its dominant element being the holy war. (Serapheim 2011)

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As a consequence, according to Serapheim, the construction of an Islamic mosque should not be permitted: Following the above facts … Islam is a doomsday cult, not conforming to the Greek constitution, where according to article 13, religious freedom is established but only for religious convictions, which are not against public order and the moral standards of our society. Islam promotes as a medium for its spread … crime, violence, terrorism and death. As a consequence, the law regarding the construction of a mosque in our country’s capital, which was promulgated, is absolutely unconstitutional, because it recognizes as a known religion which is able to practice its cult unobstructed, a religious conviction which is directly opposed to public order, moral standards and European ideals … The tolerance of such a religious deviation will act like dynamite for social cohesion, and social peace from the moment the prevalent demand of this false religion is the imposition and dominance through violence … That is why we call the government to withdraw this unconstitutional law because otherwise she will be guilty of equal crimes of the fundamentalist Islamists in our country. (Serapheim 2011)

From the above discussion it can be concluded that fear of Islam is a fundamental element not only of the Greek Orthodox Church, but the Greek national identity as well, and this has serious consequences on issues of religious freedom. It is true, though, that not all of the Greek Orthodox Church or the Greek people see Islam as an enemy, but the identification of Islam with Turkey has mainly led to the creation of such misunderstandings, stereotypes and dominant ideologies.

The Orthodox Church of Greece and Europe From the previous analysis, a conclusion that could be drawn is that the Greek Orthodox Church is entirely against the European Union and the West, as well as against Islam, declaring Greece’s uniqueness. However, this is not the case. Even though the Orthodox Church does not accept Western ideas of globalisation, the secular state, multiculturalism and others, the Church’s position is not against the European Union. The Orthodox Church criticizes the West, especially the Western press, for being anti-Greek and anti-Orthodox, and argues that this stance is promoted in Greece by some groups acting as mouthpieces of these European circles (Christodoulos 1997, 21). However, according to the Orthodox Church “without us [Greece] Europe would not exist … Greece saved Europe from the hordes of the barbarians” (Christodoulos 1997, 25).

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Apart from Ancient Greece, though, Christianity is also considered as the founder of Europe. In a book by Archbishop Christodoulos entitled Europe’s Soul, we can find arguments like the following: “It can not be disputed, and it is meaningless to hide the fact that Europe was born within the Church’s yard” (Christodoulos 2004, 29), and he continues in the same spirit: “I argue that Christianity created the European man … before Christianity, the word Europe was just a geographical concept, it signified nothing but a place” (Christodoulos 2004, 31). According to Christodoulos, Europe is not presently following the ideas of the founding fathers of the Union (Christodoulos 2007, 155). This took place because certain foreign power centres are trying to define the European identity, having as their main goal the deletion of its Christian identity from Europe’s character (Christodoulos 2004, 17–18). Some of these people are members of the European Parliament and are characterized as “the anti-Christians of the European Parliament” (Christodoulos 2004, 33). The Church is not against the European Union; it is in favour of the integration of the European Unity (Christodoulos 2007, 156), even though the Archbishop stated that “I don’t want to say that the EU’s integration is wrong. But it is dangerous” (Christodoulos 1997, 46). Therefore, what does the Church fear? According to the Church itself: “What is at risk is not which political party is right or wrong, but the right of the European person not to become a crypto-Christian within its own society” (Christodoulos 2007, 161). As far as the Greek people are concerned, the Church alone is able to provide them with a new identity. The Church should not isolate the Greek from Europe, but it should also not be handed down to Europe (Christodoulos 1997, 48–49). Archbishop Christodoulos, through all these texts and speeches, expresses the main arguments of the Orthodox Church regarding Europe and the EU. Taking for granted that religion was and still is the main element of the European unity, he argued “of course Christianity is not European, but Europe is Christian” (Christodoulos 2004, 53). However, another point should be stressed. When the Archbishop addresses the members of the European Parliament, for example, even though he criticizes the European Constitution, he is not so aggressive against the West and the European ideas (Rizoulis 2011, 61–64), compared to his speeches during the rallies regarding the identity card crisis. This doubletalk on behalf of the Church could be explained in two ways. On one hand, it is a fact that Greece is part of Europe and the EU, and the Church does not have any other political proposition. That means that the fight for Christian values, according to the Church, should happen

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within the European context. On the other hand, the EU funds the Orthodox Church with a great amount of money in order to restore ecclesiastical monuments, monasteries, etc., meaning that “an ideological war” with the EU could have detrimental consequences on the Church’s interests. Having all of the above in mind, it could be argued that the Orthodox Church of Greece does not reject the European idea and the European Union in general. The Church sees Greece within the European framework but without losing its unique identity, meaning its Helleno-Christian identity and tradition. Another goal of the Church is the protection of the Christian character of Europe because this way Greece would be more easily protected within the European context, not only from any kind of innovative and progressive ideas, but from the Islamic menace, which is expressed mainly through the increase of the Muslim immigrant population on the European continent and the future accession of Turkey to the EU.

Conclusion In this chapter I have presented two social issues which emerged in Greek society during the last decade in relation to the European context. Apparently, the general issue of the relationships between Orthodoxy and Europe goes further than the goal of this chapter due to its historical background. In my view, the conclusions that can be drawn from the above analysis are the following. First of all, religion in Greece plays a crucial role and influences the construction and reconstruction of the national identity. This is evident from the huge rallies, i.e. that the Church organized rallies regarding the identity card, and from the gathering of more than three million signatures for the same reason. The Orthodox Church, apart from being a state institution, is part of Greek history, and that means that its public discourse is heard and influences large numbers of people. Secondly, I contend that the European context, of which Greece is a part, affects the reactions against what we could call “religious others” or religious differentiation. When, for example, the EU enforces the removal of religion from ID cards or when it presses for the construction of a mosque, explicitly or implicitly, this causes, on one hand, the reaction of the Church and, on the other, the reaction of certain groups and political parties which are against religious differentiation, or who at least want Orthodoxy to prevail in Greek society. Living in the European context also means that innovative and progressive ideas concerning globalization,

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multiculturalism and secularism are introduced in the Greek society, and this sometimes also causes a reflective and defensive reaction against them. The most crucial question, however, is whether the peaceful coexistence of native Greek Orthodox people and those of other religious convictions is possible, whether immigrants or Greeks of other religious backgrounds. This is an extraordinarily difficult task, and I do not intend to jeopardize a final answer. Nowadays, there are two main conflictive identities in Greece, if I could put it this way: the traditional one and the progressive one, with, of course, many variations. As mentioned before, Greece became an open society for immigrants, especially after the 1990s, but even though many believed that Greece was moving toward the multicultural model by accepting all these people, due to Greece’s own emigration past, today we can observe a total reverse of this movement with high percentages of racist groups in the local elections, with an increase in racist discourse and with racist incidents occurring, especially in Athens. According to the arguments of the opposition there are too many immigrants for Greece, there is no control on their backgrounds, and criminality is also remarkably high. In my opinion, other social circumstances, like the current economic crisis, should be taken into consideration if we want to explain this closing of the Greek society, toward which I assume that Greece is now heading. The economic recession is going to bring back the issue of the national identity and Greece’s uniqueness and homogeneity, which of course never ceased to exist. As far as the Orthodox Church is concerned it follows the same road, even though after the election of the new Archbishop in 2008 there was a turn in its public discourse from identity and national issues to social issues, even though there are other metropolitans who do not agree with this. The social conditions in Greece today are not optimistic, and when a society faces such social problems the scapegoat theory seems applicable, especially if this is combined with a conspiracy based around some unknown political centres that are trying to destroy Greek uniqueness.

References Alievi, S. (2009). Conflicts over Mosques in Europe. London: Network of European Foundations. Cholevas, C. (2003). “To mousoulmaniko sygrotima tis Attikis [The Muslim Cluster of Attica].” Ecclesia 8–9: 593–594.

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Christodoulos. (1997). O tetartos pylonas [The fourth pylon]. Athens: Kaktos. —. (2000a). “Archbishop Christodoulos’s speech in the rally of Athens.” Parakatathiki 12: 22–32. —. (2000b). Diagrafi tou thriskevmatos apo tis tautotites mia nea morfi ithikis parenochlisis [The Removal of the Category ‘Religion’ from the Identity Cards: A New Form of Moral Harassment]. http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/christodoulos.asp?id=150&w hat_main=1&what_sub=6&lang=gr&archbishop_heading=%CA%EF %E9%ED%F9%ED%DF%E1 (accessed September 12, 2011). —. (2001). Synedefksi ston dimosiografo N.Chatzinikolaou tou Mega Channel [Interview to the journalist N. Chatzinikolaou of Mega Channel]. http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/christodoulos.asp?id=165&w hat_main=1&what_sub=6&lang=gr&archbishop_heading=%CA%EF %E9%ED%F9%ED%DF%E1 (accessed September 12, 2011). —. (2004). I psychi tis Evropis [Europe’s Soul]. Athens: Epikoinoniaki Morfotiki Ypiresia tis Ekklisias tis Ellados. —. (2005). Interview in Politka Themata. http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/christodoulos.asp?id=351&w hat_main=1&what_sub=3&lang=gr&archbishop_heading=%C5%EA %EA%EB%E7%F3%DF%E1 (accessed September 12, 2011). —. (2007). Diakonontas ton synchrono anthropo [Ministering Modern Man]. Athens: Papadimitriou. Chrysoloras, N. (2003). Why Orthodoxy? Religion and nationalism in Greek political culture. www.2.lse.ac.uk/.../pdf/1st.../NicosChrysoloras1stLSESymposiumPape r.pdf (accessed September 12, 2011). Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. Howarth, D. (2000). Discourse. London: Open University Press. Holy Synod (2000a). Peri apaleipseos tou thriskevmatos apo tis astynimikes tautotites [On the removal of the category “Religion” from the Identity Cards]. In Holy Synod (2006), Encyclical Letters, 205– 210. Athens: Apostoliki Diakonia. —. (2000b). Peri apaleipseos tou thriskevmatos apo tis astynimikes tautotites [On the Removal of the Category “Religion” from the Identity Cards].

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http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/anakoinothenta.asp?archive=y es&what_sub=announce&etos=2000&id=138 (accessed September 12, 2011). —. (2001a). “Encyclical Letter 2711.” Ecclesia 4: 294–296. —. (2001b). “Encyclical Letter 2722.” Ecclesia 11: 936–937. —. (2001c). Dilosi tis Ieras Synodou tis Ekklisias tis Ellados [“Statement of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Greece”]. Ecclesia 7: 589. —. (2003). Pros ton Ypourgo Eksoterikon shetika me tin Anegersi Temenous stin Attiki [Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to the issue of the Construction of a Mosque in Attiki]. http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/epistoles.asp?archive=yes&w hat_sub=epistoli&etos=2003&id=93 (accessed September 12, 2011). Imam, M.; Tsakiridou, O. (2003). Mousoulmanoi kai koinonikos apokleismos [Muslims and Social Exclusion]. Athens: Livanis. Metallinos, G. (1998). Scheseis kai antitheseis: Anatoli kai dysi stin poreia tou neou Ellinismou [Relationships and Antitheses: East and West in the Course of new Hellenism]. Athens: Akritas. Molokotos-Liederman, L. (2007). “The Greek ID Cards Controversy: a Case Study on Religion and National Identity in a Changing European Union.” Journal of Contemporary Religion 22 (2): 187–203. Rizoulis, D. (2011). Archiepiskopos Christodoulos. I parakatathiki [Archbishop Christodoulos: His heritage], Volume 2. Athens: Dimokratia. Serapheim. (2011). Public Announcement. http://www.impantokratoros.gr/9FB97297.el.aspx (accessed September 12, 2011). Stavrakakis, Y. (2002). Religion and populism: Reflections on the ‘Politicized’ Discourse of the Greek Church. London: The Hellenic Observatory. Tsatsis, Th. (2004). Mplekei chomateres kai islamiko kentro [“He Relates the Rubbish Dumps with the Islamic Centre”]. Eleftherotypia 51. —. (2009). Yper tis anegersis tzamiou o Ieronymos [“Archbishop Ieronymos in Favour of the Construction of the Mosque”]. Eleftherotypia 22. —. (2004). I thriskeftiki eleftheria ton metanaston: I periptosi ton Mousoulmanon [“Religious freedom of immigrants: The case of Muslims”]. In I Ellada tis metanastefsis [Greece of immigration], Christopoulos, D. & Pavlou, M. (eds.), 267–302. Athens: Kritiki. Yannaras, Ch. (1992). Orthodoxia kai dysi sti neoteri Ellada [Orthodoxy and the West in Modern Greece]. Athens: Domos.

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Zoumpoulakis, St. (2002). O Theos stin poli [God in the City]. Athens: Hestia.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank the editors of this volume, Martina Topiü and Srdjan Sremac, for accepting my chapter and for their collaboration during the preparation of the volume. I would like also to thank Dr. Hill, who read an earlier draft of this chapter, for his fruitful comments.

PART III: RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES IN EVERYDAY LIFE

CHAPTER NINE BRAZILIAN UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS AND THEIR CHOICE OF PENTECOSTALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS RANGEL DE OLIVEIRA MEDEIROS

Introduction For some decades Europe has been a popular destination for migrants from countries with a low level of social and economic development (Droogers 2006, 161). For example, in 2000 estimates indicated approximately 56.1 million migrants, including five million with an undocumented status. It is estimated that 500,000 migrants arrive in Europe every year (Van Laar 2006, 9). In 2004 there were 800,000 Christian migrants living in The Netherlands (Droogers 2006, 7). Therefore, it is estimated that in the same year the total membership of Pentecostal churches in that country was between 100,000 and 115,000 (Zegwaart 2006, 62). As for the Brazilian presence in The Netherlands, until 2008 official estimates pointed to numbers ranging from 13,964 to 25,000 (Brasil 2008, 18). At least until the 1990s, the Brazilian presence in The Netherlands was not so significant; however, Brazilians are now among the top ten groups of migrants applying for temporary residence permits (Abrantes 2008, 2). Moreover, other estimates point to the Brazilian presence of 17,000 people, 4,000 of which are undocumented (Bijl 2008, 2). Brazilians are also the nationality from South America with the highest number of migrants to The Netherlands (Miranda 2009, 5), and official estimates for 2009 indicate a total of 17,600 (Brasil 2009, 19). To put these figures in perspective, in the United Kingdom the number of migrants totals 180,000. In Portugal, the number goes up to 137,600, and in Spain up to 125,000. On the other hand, in Denmark and Austria

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there are only 3,000 Brazilian migrants, which puts The Netherlands in an intermediate situation regarding “Brazilians’ preference.” Another important element is the highest proportion of women, at least in the official statistics. In 2005, 71% migrants were women, and they remained in The Netherlands for a longer time, and whereas half of men return to Brazil during the first year of residence, among women the proportion is only between 15 and 20% (Abrantes 2008, 8). There are suggestions that the proportion of undocumented migrants is higher among women (Piscitelli 2008, 784). Certainly, one of the reasons might be the fact that it is easier for them to find employment, particularly as cleaners.

Methodology To describe the situation of Brazilian migrants in The Netherlands I am using a personal experience—the example of my own stay in that country as a temporary scientific migrant. My search for housing clearly illustrates the situation with which Brazilian migrants are confronted on a daily basis. I started to prepare for my stay in The Netherlands at the end of 2007. I was in the middle of my PhD program in Sociology at the University of São Carlos (Brazil), and since the beginning of the program I had been considering spending a term in a foreign university. The first option my supervisor and I thought of was the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. Once we made our choice I started the preparation (a formal request to the University, application for a grant to the Brazilian government), and even without knowing whether my application would be approved I started the bureaucratic procedure for my stay in The Netherlands. After receiving the news that my grant had been approved I was at the final stage of preparations, which included solving the difficult problem of housing. As I was not aware of the reality of the problem, although my Dutch supervisor and the International Office of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam had warned me, I ended up refusing the expensive accommodation offered by the University and made an attempt to find a more affordable place on my own. After two difficult months in Brazil I managed to find one through the relationship site "Orkut"—a room in a house shared with three people, all men and adults. Me, my wife and our small daughter (eighteen months old) would have to sleep in this room. After arriving in Amsterdam and visiting the house I was disappointed. It was a very old apartment with narrow stairs, and the worst part was that it was crowded with rats. I decided that we would have to move out as soon as possible. In the initial period of three months we had to move four times for personal reasons, or due to the bad conditions of the places

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where we stayed. As I was with my wife and my daughter I had to do my best to find a better and safer place, and it was neither easy nor cheap. The tremendous “headache” of searching for accommodation allowed me to make contacts with the undocumented Brazilian migrants living in The Netherlands, and to know their world better. This world became, in part, my world as well, because although I did not have to live with the constant fear of deportation, I shared some of their dramas, such as problems with housing, and the difficulty of finding people I could live with and rely on. Despite these problems, I soon realized that before me there lay a fact that deserved to be studied and, notwithstanding the short time available, my misfortune could be made useful. I started to see my life under these conditions as something beneficial in part, for I was able to have access to information I would otherwise not have if I were only a researcher "visiting" the field. Therefore, I was walking on both sides of the road, living two realities: the one of a "legal" student with a certain cultural background, a high education level and a working knowledge of English, which allowed me to freely walk around the city with no communication problems, and, on the other hand, the reality of living through some of the difficulties that undocumented migrants experience and using a social and financial infrastructure sometimes not so different from theirs. In many ways, this part of the research was immensely rich. Sometimes, my daily life became ethnography and, admittedly, I got emotionally involved with the "object." Sometimes I was helped by this "object," and sometimes I was frustrated. The way I did, or lived, the research was in a certain way inspired by the experience of William F. Whyte in the 1940s, as described by Vidich & Lyman (2000, 34). The ethnographic orientation at the University of Chicago was given a new twist by Whyte, who made what was designed to be a formal research into part of his life experience and called it "participant observation." The Chicago Sociology Department provided Whyte with an opportunity to report in the Street Corner Society (1943a; 1955; 1981) his findings about Italian Americans residing in the North End of Boston. That work, initially motivated by a sense of moral responsibility to uplift the slum-dwelling masses, has become the exemplar of the techniques appropriate to participant observation research. Whyte lived in the Italian neighbourhood and in many but not all ways became one of the "Cornerville" boys. Although he presented his findings about Cornerville descriptively, Whyte's theoretical stance remains implicit. The book has an enigmatic quality because Whyte presents his data from the perspective of his

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relationships with his subjects. That is why Whyte is as much a researcher as he is a subject in his own book—the other had become the brother of the Italian ghetto dwellers. In my experience a walk in the street and casual conversations were sometimes my sources. Learning from an undocumented person who used to go to a certain church as well as their adventures in the "Red Light District"1 was also instructive. The empirical research has so far been carried out in an, at times, unconventional way, including through my own experience with migrants. I had contacts with approximately one hundred people in informal conversations and meetings, sometimes long, sometimes short, which took place during visits, in the street, at the homes I lived in, at the entry and exit of church services, and in informal meetings. Most of the information has been collected in this way. Other information was obtained through websites and relationship sites such as Orkut, wherein each person creates a personal webpage that allows people to leave public or private messages, to publish photos for the friends who are members of the same site, and to participate in communities with different topics. I, for example, have accessed virtual communities of "Brazilians in The Netherlands" or "Evangelical Brazilians in The Netherlands" to see the discussions that took place (through text messages), get information and read reviews. Such sources must be used carefully since many people create fake profiles. On the other hand, it is an interesting way to get information because many people give opinions freely, protected by the impersonality and, sometimes, the anonymity. On this site, people do business, advertise rooms for rent, and exchange a wide variety of information such as recipes, places where you can buy Brazilian products, information on Dutch laws, doctors, jokes, discussions, etc.

Brazilian Undocumented Migrants and Their Dramas— A Profile The Netherlands is one of the favoured destinations for undocumented Brazilian migrants due to the relatively easy entry requirements for entry (compared with the United Kingdom, for example), and the relative tranquillity in staying there illegally. Most of these people who go there 1

The “Red Light District” is a specific place where prostitution is permitted and legalized. In these places, women offer themselves in rooms/windows with a red background and framed with red lights. When they receive a client they close the curtain to avoid those outside seeing them.

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are influenced by relatives or friends who are already there, or were sent there because access was barred in another country and Amsterdam was the previous airport before their final destination. There is no special and strong control in the airport against Brazilians, although certain people stated that their entrance had been denied on previous attempts. There is no surveillance on the daily life of the migrants, or searches to find undocumented residents. The main motive is the possibility to earn enough money for several purposes in Brazil, such as buying a house, starting a private business or supporting a family. There are several reports from the informants about people who managed to save a good amount of money and sent it to Brazil. Upon arrival in The Netherlands they have to find housing and work. As many of them have the help of a relative who is already there, this starting phase is not really dramatic. However, living conditions are in fact hard, especially because in the first months a personal network of contacts to ensure them sufficient work and income is not yet in place. On average, undocumented migrants from Brazil have the following basic profile: low education level (high school at most); they come from the poorest regions of Brazil (north, northeast and the mid-west, and São Paolo and Minas Gerais states); lack of knowledge of Dutch and English, and they are usually looking for jobs as “blue-collar workers,” particularly in cleaning and construction. Most of them are of humble origin, having worked in poorly paid jobs in Brazil; coming to live illegally in Amsterdam in fact represented an improvement in their lives.2 Because they share all of these conditions these people end up knowing each other, attending the same places of amusement, and also the same churches. The experience taught me that certain myths and stereotypes related to the Brazilian society do not stand when faced with the migrant reality. The widespread belief in the Brazilian public opinion that, for example, Brazilian people are "extremely solidary" is questionable as there is a consensus among the migrants I talked to that Brazilians are in general greedy and not reliable. One of the practices I discovered is selling jobs, which works in the following way—someone who works as a cleaner in many places, for 2

This profile contrasts with a large number of legal migrants who are mostly from the middle class. Many of them have a bachelor degree and are there either to work or to study for some time, or to experience living abroad as an au-pair. There is also the category of those who have become legal migrants by getting married to Dutch citizens, usually women who came there as migrants and began relationships with Dutch citizens or naturalized migrants, and thus obtaining Dutch passports, which is a “dream” for many of the undocumented Brazilians.

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instance, and who is about to return to Brazil transfers the job to a friend or acquaintance before quitting, charging for this service. For example, if they earned EUR 300 per week in the job, that is what they charge to transfer it to another person. Besides, some people do not honour their commitments with rent contracts, or charge a high commission when renting something. Thus, certain people rent a house belonging to a legalized person, often a subsidized property owned by a Dutch citizen. They rent the whole property and charge their clients a commission equal to the rent amount per unit and a security deposit that they rarely return. Usually, the tenant does not pay the last rent in an effort to get the money back. Another common practice is to rent the rooms separately for prices that can vary from EUR 250 to EUR 600 per room (I paid around EUR 500), and even under these conditions they still charge a security deposit. To make things worse, in one of the houses I lived in some residents lost part of the rent and their deposit because they had to leave the house, fearing an inspection by the city government. Social relations between the undocumented migrants are very delicate and volatile. The constant change of address that many of them face (given the search for better and cheaper places, fear of deportation and difficulties with other residents in the house) ends up increasing the relationship network, but on the other hand it makes these relationships superficial. I remember that when I left the first house I lived in that I talked to one of the residents, suggesting that we keep in touch and saying that I would be available to help him (sometimes he asked me to speak in English with his bosses), but he told me that in practice this would not happen because people just do not see each other anymore, and end up forgetting each other even though they share the same destiny. "That’s the way it is here in Holland," he said. The cell phone is an essential tool for survival in The Netherlands. It is unthinkable for a migrant not to have one, and many of them buy modern and expensive models, because in proportion to their income they are much cheaper than in Brazil, and some have more than one. In addition to using them to receive calls or text messages from their bosses and friends, they also use them to talk to their families in Brazil. Incidentally, one of the major problems they face is being separated from their families. Many of them leave their children with the grandmother and go to The Netherlands, staying there for years without returning. Others bring their children when they are already grown up. I met a couple that came with two small children, one of whom was three and the other nine. I met another couple that had two children there

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illegally, but with the assistance of a midwife from the Dutch public health service they have been living there for nine years, and go to Brazil every two years. Regarding the language difficulties some of them can learn a few words and expressions in Dutch, such as numbers, main questions, greetings, etc. in order to get around the city by public transport, to agree amounts for services with the employers, etc. Others, over the years, improve their knowledge of Dutch or English and attend courses in schools or take private lessons. Another solution is asking for help from a Brazilian who lives there and who speaks English or Dutch to act as translator, personally in conversations or translating the text messages received by phone.3 Another resource is to place ads offering cleaning or babysitting services in mailboxes, giving the phone number of a friend who speaks Dutch or English, sometimes creating suspicion and accusations that the friend does not give the messages and gets the job for themselves.

The Choice of Pentecostalism The religiosity of the international migrant follows a logic that may be different from that they would follow if they were in their country of origin, although, as Droogers (2006, 161) says: “In migrating, people bring their religion with them. The migration process itself comes with hardships that may reinforce the migrant’s need for a religious home.” In the case of undocumented Brazilians there is a substantial change in many cases of choice and religious experience. Migrant churches, whether Pentecostal or not, offer such a home, addressing the person’s new and often precarious situation, providing not only spiritual but also material help. They serve as moral points of reference in the new situation with all of its options and opportunities. To illegal migrants they may offer an alternative, accepting those who are refused by the officials of the host country, and even offer alternative strategies such as marrying without the state’s consent, but with the blessing of the church. In addition, they often bring some form of continuity with the pre-migration setting, despite the ruptures and changes that are part of the migrant’s experience. They offer a new extended family, a form of artificial kinship of new brothers and sisters. The fact that they serve this function only partly explains their success. In other words, they not only help the migrants in finding their ways through the new power game with its new rules, as played out in the 3

I have done this kind of favour myself for some of them, free of charge.

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new country, they also offer meaning to the new reality, a specific message that characterizes a particular church as unique. Such a church is more than an instant problem-solver, not least because people stay on after the problem is solved. They represent a worldview. Each church, despite serving the same function, will therefore have its own niche in the religious market (Droogers 2006, 161). Droogers’ assertions are fine-tuned to the situation of the undocumented Brazilians with whom I had contact. The emphasis on preaching about prosperity and undocumented status, especially the constant reminder of Brazilians’ common problems (housing, work, the feeling of missing someone), is possibly one of the highlights of the church’s work as an important element of attraction. On the other hand we must be careful when thinking that the church offers a “new extended family.” Many testimonies, conversations and interviews with the informants put enormous importance on family relationships that were cultivated in Brazil. Moreover, the ideas of isolation and difficulty in making and maintaining friendships among compatriots in The Netherlands were virtually unanimous, all of them reporting having few or no truly close friends. Furthermore, even in Brazil most of the informants told me they have not made many friends in the church (Universal Church of the Kingdom of God [UCKG]), except the youngest. Besides the ideas mentioned by Droogers, churches also function as a kind of "little part of Brazil" where people can attend services with preaching, testimonies and liturgy in Portuguese, in addition to interaction with other Brazilians after services. The social backgrounds of these migrants are really important to understanding their religious choice here, as Freston (2008, 190) remarks: What needs to be looked at? Evidently, the composition of the diaspora population can affect the way that the religious field will be transplanted. The social composition in terms of class, age structure, gender, colour, in terms even of the country of destination—all these factors may affect the way that the religious field of the host country is transplanted or not to the diaspora. So one task is to compare the Brazilian diasporic religious field with the religious field in Brazil. Secondly, it can be compared from one country of destination to another (between the United States, Europe, Japan and Paraguay, for example), with a discussion of what might cause the differences. In addition, there is the question of how religion affects migratory flows. Do certain religions encourage migration by offering new perspectives, by providing networks for recruitment, by reducing the economic and psychological costs of emigration, by influencing the choice of destination? And does migration itself affect religiosity? Classically, it

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These questions are important because Brazil has a very syncretistic religious field, and this syncretism can even be found inside religious institutions (Sanchis 1995), just like popular Catholicism, Umbanda and Pentecostal Churches. Beyond the institutions, there is what Droogers (1987) called “Brazilian minimal religiosity.” Even if a person does not belong to a specific institution, s/he still, possibly, has certain fundamental latent beliefs that are widespread in the mass media and Brazilian culture, such as belief in the existence of God and in the agency of spirits. The undocumented Brazilian migrants living in Amsterdam prefer Pentecostal churches, and many of them begin to attend the service there without ever visiting such a church in Brazil. I closely followed the services and meetings in some of these churches, particularly the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG) in Amsterdam. Certainly, the proportion of Brazilian Pentecostals in The Netherlands is much higher than in Brazil, and similar to the situation that Freston found in the USA. On the other hand, one can think of many reasons for the higher percentage of Protestants than in Brazil. Firstly because of the difficulties of the migrant life and problems, which the Protestant Churches are famously good at in helping to overcome (Levitt 2002b). This applies to the psychological challenge of creating and maintaining positive attitudes, to the ethics of hard work and initiative which are essential to success and even to survival, as well as to the practical questions of establishing networks which can assist the migrants in finding places to live and work. As one of the few contexts in which broad networks of (at least relative) trust can be established, these churches make the migrants’ lives easier in a series of practical ways (2008, 192). The fieldwork revealed some features that differentiate the Dutch branch of UCKG from the Brazilian mother church. Because of the presence of Brazilian migrants, there is also a difference in membership. Basically, it is a multicultural membership made up of many migrants from the former Dutch colonies and undocumented Brazilians from several parts of Brazil.

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Ethical Issues about Illegal Migration The illegal condition of these migrants raises a question about how their churches deal with the fact their members are acting against the law, and for this reason they could be seen as sinners. Among the undocumented migrants in the USA, Freston tried to understand what he called “A Theology of the Undocumented4”: One almost never hears an explicit and systematic treatment of this question in public evangelical fora, but from interviews and other sources it is possible to piece together a rudimentary “theology of the undocumented.” This is a mixture of theological, historical and pragmatic arguments, many of which are, of course, not unique to Brazilian immigrants. The theological arguments stress that God created a world without borders. Borders are man-made and should not be absolutized and can therefore be ignored. In addition, Jesus was an illegal immigrant in Egypt, and the migration motif has been part of the biblical history of salvation since Abraham. And the Jews are instructed in the Old Testament to treat the “resident alien” with generosity and respect … And finally, the pragmatic arguments go along the lines of: “we are illegal not because we want to be but because we’re obliged to be. We’re not actually doing anything illegal. We are good citizens working hard, and doing our best to get legalized. We are doing jobs that Americans don’t want and, in any case, as the Americans exploit the whole world, why shouldn’t we be allowed to do these underpaid jobs? And, after all, this is all a game. The government makes laws, which it does not really wish to enforce because the economic effects would be drastic. So the government is really an accomplice is an elaborate game of make-believe. If it really wanted to expel all the illegal immigrants, it knows where they are.” … Most pastors seem to work pastorally from the existing situation. In other words, as they say, “I have to work with my people where they are, rather than from an ideal situation” (2008, 196–197).

The “Theology of the Undocumented” in the Brazilian community features certain differences. For example, obtaining Dutch citizenship or a visa to live legally in The Netherlands is also understood as a blessing, obviously because the illegal condition is undesirable, stressful and puts migrants in precarious conditions. Regarding the reality in Amsterdam, living and preaching showed that the fact of being undocumented and its consequences also suffer a 4 Even in official discussions the term “undocumented” is preferred in comparison to the term “illegal.”

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religious interpretation to explain people’s successes and failures. I can state, borrowing Freston’s term, that there is also “a theology of the undocumented,” but with different characteristics. For example, migrants do not regard being there under these conditions as something illegal, wrong or even sinful. In the many conversations I had and in the testimonies I heard, something like that was never said. On the other hand, other elements appeared, among them: - Divine intercession in the form of release for deportation—i.e. having never been caught by the police, or municipal inspection, and supervision work are often interpreted as clear signs of divine protection and blessings on the person's life. - Good health—many of them have been in The Netherlands for years (I met people who had lived there for nine years, and I knew one lady who lived there for sixteen years), and having good health and the fact they never had to use the health system, or go back to Brazil for a treatment is also seen as a sign of God's direct action. - Financial prosperity—prosperity is understood not in the sense of a rapid enrichment, as it is preached in Brazil, but in the sense that the person has enough work to support themselves and a significant amount of money still remains to send to Brazil. The risk of the lack of money to survive is especially dramatic in the first months. Therefore, getting a good amount of work and remuneration is seen as another sign. - Balanced emotional life—I realized, or rather felt, the emotional neediness of some people in their difficulty in making friends. Having a harmonious love life is another challenge for the people who live there. There were many complaints about homesickness and the lack of friends. - Solving problems in Brazil—another very proper feature of the Pentecostal diaspora context is the belief that the search for God helps in solving various problems left behind in Brazil, mainly those related to those faced by relatives (health, material life, etc.). The famous "Brazilian way of life" operates twice in the lives of Brazilians residing in The Netherlands. As DaMatta observes: “Their world, being interstitial, is that universe where reality can be read and

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organized by means of multiple codes and axes” (1997, 172). The socalled "Brazilian way" works both in social and work relationships, ensuring their stay in the country, profit and survival. It also works in their religiosity, making them reframe the religious discourse received, which in turn has already been adapted to the reality of the migrant.

Conclusion Most of the Brazilians who went to The Netherlands in an attempt to financially improve their lives, as traditionally happens with this kind of expatriate, suffer for having made this choice. The people who were the subject of this research were largely “undocumented.” In spite of their suffering, I preferred not to see them as victims because, despite the pain, going to The Netherlands for most of them was an improvement in their living conditions, or even a complete change in the life of the women who were married and built new families. It was clear that the concept of solidarity within the Brazilian expatriate community considerably changes against other stronger ties that could bring people together if they were in their original context. Another interesting factor that weighed in the manner of how social ties are built is the peculiar situation they face in being “undocumented” migrants in a foreign country. For example, an undocumented Brazilian who has been harmed in some way cannot appeal to sanctions that they could use in Brazil. One cannot file a complaint with the police to seek justice or even solve it “tit for tat,” for the person would be subject to attention from the police and end up being deported to Brazil. Therefore, the expatriate’s vulnerability to scams from local inhabitants, other foreigners, or fellows from the same country is extreme, particularly involving money or housing, making migrants use the religious community as an element that can give them credibility and security. Churches fulfil different functions, as they used to in Brazil: they turn into employment agencies, an institution that lends credibility to its churchgoers, a (precarious) moral pillar for young people away from their families, meeting and recreation places and, of course, provide spiritual support. In the foreign context, it was apparent that the concepts of right and wrong become even more fluid. Taking advantage of the vulnerability of their countrymen or economically exploiting them, which could be considered at least objectionable in their original context, becomes commonplace, and the one who is being exploited soon learns that this is a "necessary stage" through which all of them must pass before reaching a precarious stability, finding both work and relatively fixed housing.

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The typical hierarchy of Brazilian society also changes there. There are two major segments: the documented and the so-called undocumented. In addition, there are also hierarchies within the “undocumented” group, basically those who are more or less integrated, and those who more or less have work contacts and knowledge of the Dutch language, which are the major difference markers. Greater social mobility consists in becoming documented, usually through marriage. Churches had to deal with the uncertainty of the situation imposed by their churchgoers, who, even though they are doing something illegal, i.e. living in the country without permission and violating several laws there, are not actually criminals. Most of them are workers just trying to get more for their work, which is even tolerated by the host society. The idea of crime or sin was never mentioned in conversations or preaching. If the Brazilian spirit could not enter The Netherlands, the "Brazilian way" came in instead, and went to the pulpit.

References Abrantes, M. (2008). Immigrant Workers in Times of Flexicurity. VI Annual Meeting of RedGob: Euro-Latin American Network of Governability for Development Migration, Social Cohesion and Governability, Lisboa. Bijl, R. V. et al. (2005). Integratiekaart 2005. De Maatschappelijke Integratie van Migranten in de Tijd Gevolgd: Trend- en Cohortanalyses. The Hague: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, Min. van Justitie. Brasil. (2008). Brasileiros no Mundo: Estimativas. Brasilia: Ministério das Relações Exteriores. —. (2009). Brasileiros no Mundo: Estimativas. Brasilia: Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Da Matta, R. (1997). Carnavais, malandros e heróis. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco. Droogers, A. (1987). “A Religiosidade Mínima Brasileira.” Religião e Sociedade, ISER. Vol. 14, No. 2. —. (2006). “The Power of the Spirit and the Spirit of Power.” In Fruitful in this Land. Pluralism, Dialogue and Healing in Migrant Pentecostalism, Droogers, A., Van Der Laan, C. & Van Laar, W. (eds.). Geneva: Boekencentrum, Zoetermeer, and WCC Publications. Freston, P. (2008). “The Religious Field among Brazilians in the United States.” In Becoming Brazuca: Brazilian Immigration to the United

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States, Braga, L. J. & C. Jouët- Pastrè (eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 189–190. Miranda, M. E. (2009). Brazilian Migrants in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. Piscitelli, A. (2008). “Looking for new worlds: Brazilian women as international migrants.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 33 (4): 784–793. Sanchis, P. (1995). “O campo religioso será ainda hoje o campo das religiões?” In História da Igreja na América Latina e no Caribe. 1945–1995. O debate metodológico, Hoornaert, E. (ed.). Petrópolis: Vozes. Van Laar, W. (2006). “Introduction: It’s Time to get to Know Each Other.” In Fruitful in this Land. Pluralism, Dialogue and Healing in Migrant Pentecostalism, Droogers, A.; Van Der Laan, C.; Van Laar, W. (eds.). Geneva: Boekencentrum, Zoetermeer, and WCC Publications. Viditch, A. & Lyman, S. (2000). “Qualitative Methods: Their History in Sociology and Anthropology.” In Handbook of Qualitative Research, Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. (eds.). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. Zegwaart, H. (2006). “Pentecost Behind the Dykes.” In Fruitful in this Land. Pluralism, Dialogue and Healing in Migrant Pentecostalism, Droogers, A.; Van Der Laan, C.; Van Laar, W. (eds.). Geneva: Boekencentrum, Zoetermeer, and WCC Publications.

CHAPTER TEN THE ROMA AND CONVERSION TO PROTESTANTISM: AN EXAMPLE OF SOUTHEAST SERBIA1 DRAGAN TODOROVIû

Introduction The Roma are a multi-religious and multi-confessional people living in the Balkans who have lost their authentic native faith on their historical path, embracing the religion of the majority. In Serbia they are the successors of Christianity and Sunni Islam,2 but their traditional Christian or Islamic religious-confessional being has been seriously disturbed by the influence of Protestantism, with lasting implications for their identity (Ĉorÿeviü 2009). Reluctance and mistrust used to be indicators of the behaviour of official religious structures and church dignitaries of various proveniences towards Roma as believers. The problem lay in the disinterest of church institutions and high priests, those that the congregation looked up to. Orthodox churches and the Islamic Religious Community never established specific bodies for preaching amongst Roma,3 while the local clergy kept away from Roma ghettoes, where 1

Prepared as a part of the project Sustainability of the Identity of Serbs and National Minorities in the Border Municipalities of East and Southeast Serbia (179013), carried out at the University of Niš – Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, and supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. 2 There are Shia Islam Roma in Niš and several places in the south of Serbia (Ĉorÿeviü & Todoroviü 2009). 3 Only Catholics have the Special Board for the Care of Roma, and the care of migrants is organized since the Second Vatican Council, institutionalized in the Code of Canon Law (1983). It states that the host country is obligated to assure

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everyday activities took place. Driven by the expressed lack of care, the confessional brethren looked down on them at prayers in churches or religious processions, sometimes even with outbursts of religious intolerance (Todoroviü 2007). A qualitative step forward was not made until a more active presence of the Protestant worldview was established in the last two decades of the previous century, first in Bulgaria and Macedonia, and more recently in Southern Serbia. The local Protestant churches have proved to be well-organized communities, with elaborated mechanisms of integration and inclusion of members into the life and practice of the church, strong social and material reasons for conversion and attachment, and the concept of non-national communities which advocates equality and brotherhood (Ĉorÿeviü 1987).

Protestantism and Roma The spreading of Protestantism in Serbia represents a complex and farreaching phenomenon. A decade and a half ago, the “modern religious and spiritual supermarket” (Barker 1999, 52) introduced religious pluralism and the need for coexistence and acquaintance with traditional and nontraditional religious structures in the Serbian society. Believers and nonbelievers were all of a sudden overwhelmed with various religious worldviews, slowly becoming the objects of increased influence of minority, primarily Protestant, religious communities. Into the religious area of Serbia, especially its southeast parts, where traditional religions and confessions were predominant (Orthodoxy, Islam), “small religious communities”—Adventists, Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, Methodists, Mormons—entered in a three-fold fashion: (a) Through evangelization (among religiously uneducated and spiritually hungry individuals, who cling from the state of non-believing to one of the numerous possibilities offered on the religious “market”) (b) Conversion (of traditional believers whose belief is confined to practicing few of the religious rites of their “forefathers,” i.e. baptisms, weddings, funerals) (c) Proselytism (“buying of souls” among the ardent believers of traditional religions whose knowledge of their own religious tradition and rituals

migrants and Roma the rights to their language and spiritual heritage. Finally, the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People recently passed the Guidelines for the Pastoral Care of Roma (2008). For more on the attitudes of church dignitaries and representatives of Romani elite as believers, see Živkoviü, Todoroviü, Jovanoviü & Ĉorÿeviü (2001).

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Sociologically speaking, they are using the dissatisfaction with the lives of people in the modern society and the flaws of the main religious communities, which are not sufficiently dedicated to genuine spirituality. The obvious “void in the soul” of the contemporary person is skilfully filled by none other than the Protestant religious organizations through their teaching, spontaneous piety and forms of collectiveness where one can experience human closeness and spiritual peace. The variety of reasons that favour the conversion of Orthodox believers, Catholics and Muslims to Protestantism can be systemized into four groups: socioeconomic, theological, cultural and political. Following the suggestion of the renowned Serbian sociologist of religion and Romologist Dragoljub B. Ĉorÿeviü: “There is no more urgent business for sociologists of religion than the study of Protestantization of Roma … since this phenomenon is so complex, far-reaching and determining that it comprises everything that the modern sociology of religion should deal with” (2007, 145). The research undertaken was into the process of Protestantization of Roma, that is into the newer process of massive inclusion of the Serbian Roma into small religious communities of Protestant provenience, particularly in the territory of southeast Serbia.

Methodology The research was conducted on a sample of sixty baptized believers of Roma ethnicity belonging to several Protestant religious communities in the territory of southeast Serbia (Christian Baptist Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Christian Adventist Church and Evangelical Pentecostal Church). The sample also encompassed fourteen Roma and non-Roma leaders of the above religious communities, and six religious leaders of the majority religions (Serbian Orthodox Church and Islamic Community). The data was collected using the in-depth interview method on the basis of a standardized procedure with Roma believers and non-Roma and Roma leaders of Protestant religious communities in southeast Serbia. The interviews were conducted between December 2008 and March 2009.

Protestantism in Southeast Serbia Sharing the fate of their brothers and sisters throughout the Balkans— where the representatives of traditional churches, and public opinion

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supported by common stereotypes and thorough ignorance, have referred to them most often as “sects”—members of small religious communities have mainly retreated into closed, tight circles comprising a few believers, only sporadically raising their voices in the last half a century in the public life of Serbia, merely as objects of outbursts of religious intolerance. That is how old (at least five decades) the history of Protestant religious organization in the south of Serbia is (Todoroviü 2010). Leskovac is the heart of that movement. In the early 1950s, Mrs. Vera Davidoviü, an Evangelical Christian believer, came with her husband from Belgrade to Leskovac. A decade later, two sister communities emerged from that common core of believers: the Evangelical Pentecostal Church and the Christian Baptist Church.

Baptists in the South of Serbia The missionary spiritual work of Baptists in this region started in Leskovac in 1964; today, the community gathers in Deligradska street in the vicinity of the post office and the fire station. Around 1970, they were joined by certain believers from Niš who were gathered into a religious community in 1980 by ýedo Raleviü, retiring for health reasons from the position of full-time missionary worker in Macedonia. As a recognized religious community, the Christian Baptist Church in Niš has existed since 1985 and managed a charitable organization called “Love The Neighbour.” In Bela Palanka is, as far as it is known, the only Roma Baptist community, led by Bojan Kurtiü. In Šainovac near Doljevac, there is a group of thirty Roma children and teenagers, with whom the elders from Niš have worked devotedly for a number of years. In the town of Prokuplje, and in nearby Berilje, there are several friends of the church among the Serbs and Romanian Roma, and even the first baptized believers. There are also several Serbian families of believers in Pirot.

Adventists in the South of Serbia The Christian Adventist science was first preached in Niš by literary Evangelists and colporteurs from Novi Sad in 1920 (Ĉurišiü 2009). The first church was formed in March 1923 and regular Saturday and Sunday services began, later moving to the house of prayer in 21 Seventh of July street in 1948, which was refurbished and renovated in September 1975. Through the activity of the believers of the church in Niš, two new churches were accepted into the sorority of Southern District churches: the church in Prokuplje in 1994 and the church in Pirot in 2004. The

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humanitarian organization “Adra” is a recognizable symbol of Adventists in Niš. In Leskovac there is also a Christian Adventist Church in the vicinity of the former Health Dispensary. For years the believers of Serbian and Roma nationality gathered together in it until the Roma established their own community in Vinarce, near Leskovac, in 2000. Most often, local village Roma come to town. The situation is similar in Vranje. Above the bus station, as early as the end of the 1970s, there was also a building where believers gathered before moving close to where the post office is located today. In the Roma mahala4 in Vranje, the Roma Adventist Church was built in 2004 to make it more accessible to Roma believers who found it difficult to travel to the centre of the town. Adventists have also existed for several decades in Donje Brijanje where a church was raised in the backyard of Života Mirkoviü, where mostly local Roma and those from other neighbouring villages gather. In Dragovac, a village near Bojnik, Adventists have a beautiful new building where Serbs and Roma gather from the local area.

Jehovah’s Witnesses in the South of Serbia The believers of the Christian religious community of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Niš gather into two Assemblies, Niš-South and Niš-North, organizationally connected to the area to which Vranje, Leskovac, Prokuplje, Aleksinac, Kruševac, Zajeþar, Bor, Negotin and Kladovo also belong. Baptized members and friends have had the opportunity to meet twice a week in the Kingdom Hall in 3 Skopljanska Street since 2005. The preaching service in the streets of Niš is performed by brothers and sisters of Serbian and Roma ethnicity. Assemblies of Jehovah’s Witnesses also exist in Leskovac (in the unpaved part of Duboþica Street, next to the Trade School) and Vranje, while there are praying groups in Aleksinac, Prokuplje, Bojnik and Pirot.

Pentecostals in the South of Serbia The first Evangelical Christians in Leskovac, apart from the abovementioned Vera Davidoviü, were the married couple Mitkoviü, ûirilo and Miroslava, with ûirilo later becoming the first pastor in Leskovac. In 1964, a building was purchased in 22 Maksima Gorkog Street while an old pre-war villa was also acquired in the early 1980s, which was the family 4

Mahala is an area where Romani population lives.

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house of tradesman Dimitrijeviü at number 21. At that time another building in Lebane was bought. The old number 22 building served for Roma worship before a tent was set up in the “Slavko Zlatanoviü” quarter, a donation from the French Roma Sinti, well known across Europe as the “Church under the Tent.” In 2005 the church was divided into the Protestant Evangelical Church “Community of Roma” and the Spiritual Centre of the Evangelical Church “Light.” Since 2007 the Chinese believers have also started conducting their worship in Leskovac, and another group in Niš began its work last year. Apart from Leskovac and Lebane, communities were also established in the surrounding villages. Today, there are groups of Roma believers, Pentecostals, in Bošnjace, Žitni Potok, Razgojna and Peþenjevce, as well as Dubovo, near Bojnik. Groups of believers worship in rented facilities in Vranje and Vranjska Banja. There are also prayer groups and missionary stations in Prokuplje, Surdulica, Vladiþin Han, Bela Palanka, Pirot and Bujanovac. The Evangelical Church “Good News” has existed in Niš since 1996, and has owned its own building at 82 Episkopska Street since 2005. As a separate community, in a mahala at the Jewish cemetery in 11 Mramorska Street, the Protestant Evangelical Church, the Spiritual Centre “Community of Roma,” functions with around thirty baptized believers and around one hundred sympathizers.

The Impact of Protestantisation amongst Roma in the South of Serbia Observing Orthodox and Islamic Customs The current relationship between Roma believers in Adventism and among Jehovah’s Witnesses was of interest in line with the palette of previous syncretistic habits rooted in Orthodoxy and Islam. As the interviewees stated: You can become a Jehovah’s Witness when you have accepted those tenets in your heart … Nobody knows about it as I haven’t told anyone, but I have accepted it in my heart, and then I started to act like that, and I started to live like that. Now, when you see those changes, you are publicly allowed to announce that. And that’s it, all in all, the baptism is a public commitment to God. (P. D., 58, Jehovah’s Witness, Žitkovac /Niš/)

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Chapter Ten Everything is rejected. Look here, we’re not doing this because we want to be exclusive; we’re doing it because we’re listening to God’s wisdom. For example, if I’m not celebrating my saint’s day today, I’m practically putting that money in my pocket; I’m saving. Because today, for example, one saint’s day costs around 200–300 Euros, it can’t be organized with less than that, and that’s the minimum. But, if I quit celebrating my saint’s day, I will simply save some money, be able to buy something for my child for those 300 Euros, or I’ll provide sustenance for myself for the next couple of months with the 300 Euros. That is the wisdom that God is passing on to us through His words in the Bible. That’s why we’re giving up on that. In fact, the roots of those holidays and customs lie in the pagan times, and that’s why we have given up on all of it. Because there’s a verse in the Bible that says that God will destroy the false religion and all of those belonging to it. (Z. S., 35, Jehovah’s Witness, Vranje) We have no holidays. We don’t celebrate anything; only when a child’s having birthday, we celebrate it in the church. There are no saint’s days, no George’s Day. There is nothing. Our holiday is Saturday. We go to the church on Saturday; that’s when we rest; that’s when our community with God is the greatest. We have it every day, but that is a special day when we meet with God, with our closest in the church. Otherwise, we have no other holidays. (S. A., 50, Adventist, Niš) Adventists celebrate the seventh day each week. And, that’s their holiday, the biggest and the only one because that’s the holy day according to the Scripture out of all other days. It has nothing to do with some months or some years. It only says that God created everything in six days and that the seventh day is the resting day, and that He sanctified and blessed that day. (M. û., 48, Adventist, Vranje)

Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses are small religious communities with firm moral and religious standards. The “researchers of the Bible” are known for not celebrating any private, state or religious holidays, except for observing the Lord’s Supper once a year. For the “Sabbath worshippers” only the sixth day in the week bears the halo of sanctity. Therefore, both of them reject the celebration of Christ’s birth and resurrection, considering them non-Biblical relics. The same relation stands for other holidays in the religious cycle of the Orthodox and Muslims (celebrating the saint’s day5 and visiting relatives and friends 5

Getting acquainted with the set of questions considering the religious practice of present believers before the new religious choice, almost all of the interviewees

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during religious processions, observing Ramadan and Kurban Bayram, circumcision of children, performing prayer five times a day, and so on). For example: Christmas and Easter are celebrated. We make dinner for Christmas, and the godfather brings a cake to our place. That’s our deal. He’s supposed to bring the cake over on, for example, George’s Day or Vasilica. I told him: “Listen, godfather, I go to church and believe in God,” and he goes to church now too … Those holidays are most important to us, and we don’t except any other. And it has been so to this day. (D. D., 29, Pentecostal, Leskovac) The same as in Orthodoxy. But, we have activities respecting the significance of Christmas as a holiday. Children gather, Christmas songs are sung, there’s a programme that shows things through plays, singing, choir songs, recitals, some specific citations are told from the Bible. For example, about the birth of Jesus Christ. So, all those events from the Bible are taken out, and we have a really nice gathering, but all in the grace of God. No eating and drinking! Maybe a glass of juice, or a piece of cake. If a woman, for example, if my wife can do it, there’s no obligation: she’ll make a pie, a cake, and bring it with her, but it’s no obligation. (ý. K., 50, Pentecostal, Leskovac) Yes, they’re celebrated in church. In the family, we buy fruit for Christmas and put it on the table. For Easter, we watch the film “Jesus” in the church, pray and dedicate that day to God. There are organized celebrations of Christmas and Easter in the Union Hall in Leskovac. Roma come, but Serbs come also, they take a look, ask what’s with the ruckus, etc. It has an effect on them, and we should be doing that more often in the centre of the town. That way more people would come to the church …. (N. K., 15, Pentecostal, Leskovac)

The birth and resurrection of Jesus Christ represent unique holidays in the majority of Christian confessions. In Orthodoxy and Catholicism these are usually days of resting, when one exchanges gifts with their dearest (even over-indulging in food and drink). For Evangelical believers from Leskovac, such a profane celebration, burdened by commercialization and stated that the celebration of one or more saints was a common practice in Roma homes. This did not imply observing the saint's day according to the Orthodox principles, but a regular celebration of the date in one's family history closely related to a survived illness or survived accident. The saint's day bread and meal were usually prepared, without lighting the candles or inviting the priest. This practice was abandoned after the conversion to Protestantism.

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consumerism, represents an illusion of religiosity, since it lacks the establishment of a personal connection with God. That is why they insist on the genuine religious context: (1) Private family celebration with food that is eaten during the fasting period (2) Congregating in the church, in the presence of other brothers and sisters. Thus, for example in the “Union Hall” in Leskovac, ceremonies dedicated to celebrating Christmas and Easter have become common in the last few years, including the performance of the youth choir, drama section and children’s group.

Observing Traditional Roma Holidays For centuries, the Roma people outside of Protestantism have preserved their own cultural identity from disappearing by nurturing the specific, so-called Roma holidays (Vlasuljica, George’s Day, Bibija). This former cornerstone of “Romaness” has been losing its importance with the conversion to Protestantism, although not with the same intensity and scope among the members of certain religious communities (Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses, on one hand, and Baptists and Pentecostals on the other). The interviwees stated: Yes. Especially Christmas, now that we are believers and all. And Easter. Then, George’s Day and Vasilica. They’re celebrated also. I already spoke to ýeda about it. I asked him to show me in the Bible. When he showed me in the Old Testament that lambs were offered, then it was much clearer to me, and I think that it is not anything bad to do it on that day … I mean, not some excessive celebration, but that’s for that. (D. M., 34, Baptist, Niš) No. But there are some customs that are retained. We don’t condemn it, as God says: “Judge not, that you be not judged.” We will always call for them not to do it, but the decision is still their own. Whatever one does, one day one will come unto God … The biggest problem is, for example, when George’s Day or Vlasuljica are to be celebrated, and they don’t butcher that day, but three or four days prior to that. Not a lot of people are doing that, but there are some who are neither on this side or that side. (M. B., 18, Pentecostal, Leskovac)

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… I’m gonna be honest with you now. We keep turkeys every year. You know, we keep turkeys. But we don’t bring that “badnjak” at all. We butcher those turkeys ten, fifteen days before Vasilica, we butcher them, slaughter them, and put them in the freezer there. And as I’ve told you, that is the dinner that we eat. (K. A., 50, Pentecostal, Vranjska Banja /Vranje/) We’ve given up on everything, both Vlasuljica and St. Nicholas. We don’t celebrate anything except God! But, for example, we buy a lamb, but we butcher it three or four days before George’s Day. Before the George’s Day, we’re not making a sacrifice, we know that … And, we eat it immediately. Selim comes, we sit and talk … It means nothing to me. And, while they’re doing it, we praise God in the church. (A. D., 62, Pentecostal, Bošnjace /Leskovac/) It is celebrated. For example, my child wants to visit his uncle. And now, he says: “Daddy, they have, and we don’t,” and what is that, and why? That is how it’s celebrated, but without the cake, without candles, not like the Orthodox do. (N. A., 37, Pentecostal, Prokuplje)

In Roma homes where all family members have been imbued with the spirit of Protestantism, the new religious and social discipline is observed. Adventists and Witnesses excel in their effort to leave the world behind them and adopt the newly proclaimed lifestyle, utterly in line with the strict Biblical tenets, where there is no place for old celebrations. However, lonely and isolated believers, lacking support from their families and the surroundings, find it hardest to persevere. Although willing to practice self-restraint in the secular areas of life, the power of the traditionalistic collective forces them to participate, even if only mechanically. A significant position is occupied by women who have been organizing the ceremonies from the cycle of customs since ancient times, and since then they have carried the burden of obeying the authority of man without objection. Evangelical Pentecostals, contrary to Adventists’ or Jehovah’s Witnesses’ demands for a fundamental change of the direction of life, express the skill which has helped them to achieve such an explosive progress in almost all corners of the Earth—accommodation to local tradition or culture of the given ethnicity (Ĉorÿeviü 2009). They: (1) encourage converts to follow the pious behaviour and demand fuller understanding of church principles, but (2) do not insist on the momentary break-up with the sinful habits and vices since they are aware that many would fall off the chosen path in that case, without reaching the full range of religious experience. The Bible

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teaches that “everything is allowed, but not everything is beneficial,” and it is up to believers to try and stick to that principle. It is not easy to shake off the centuries-old habits from the mahala, especially those upon which the cohesion of the centuries-long survival of Roma is based, and put on a “new suit” overnight. It is hard to explain to crying children why there is no honking of geese, gobbling of turkeys and bleating of lambs in their backyards, and it is rather rude to welcome guests, even random passersby, for “Gypsy New Year” and “George’s Day.” Thus, a compromise has been made, modus vivendi, until all conditions are met to break off the shackles of the past and new hosts arrive with new tendencies—kurban is modestly observed several days before the official date, and the children are not refused an encounter with at least a number of events, all with the aim of not participating in the central celebration. The Evangelical elders do not indulge in fiery invitations from the pulpit, calling upon a crude separation of believers from their family circles to undermine the inherited authoritarian patterns and reasoning. On the contrary, they teach, especially young women, to respect the reputation of their husbands and fathers-in-law, but also strive to free them from the inner prejudice towards the “new religion”; that is, they invite them to visit the well-attended worship themselves, “under the tent” or a firmer roof, any which way. Pentecostals know that they can expect the full effects of missionary work only with the second or third year of converts, children and youth who will pass through the entire machinery of religious work, from pre-school and teenage classes to distributing religious literature in mahalas during the days of evangelization.

Observing the Rites and Beliefs from the Pagan Cycle Incantations against bad luck, dousing heartburn, fortune-telling and palmistry, predicting the future from cards or various beans, throwing spells and charming are all ancient symbols of the Roma identity, especially for female Roma who perform these tasks in the form of a craft, for money or goods. Respondents from Protestant Roma homes have all denied any connection with such phenomena since they have come to know Christ.6 Pentecostal children are brought before the Lord only a few days after birth while the elders pray for their health. 6

Nenad Durmiševiü, a Pentecostal leader from Bošnjace near Leskovac, was exceedingly surprised to learn that one of the sisters, a former follower of the Christian teachings, once known for incantations against bad luck, accepted some worried parents with a child in their arms into her home, begging her to perform

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There are also no stories of fairies, witches, vampires and other supernatural beings, along with the telling of good and distressing dreams, relics of yore, used to make the long winter nights shorter and scare children into staying at home. There is also no kurban (animal sacrifice) being offered,7 nor are Roma or non-Roma cult places visited, as used to be the case.8

Children’s Education and Marriage The stereotypical image of education of successors dominant among older believers is incomplete elementary school. The youth are aware of the need to raise the education to a higher level. By acquiring and using the language of the majority they qualify for reaching recognized social positions, but also for performing actual roles in the religious communities of tomorrow (religious teachers, evangelizators, etc.). The endurance of patriarchal patterns of the regulation of sexual and marital relationships in the family circle was also observed: Never. How can I advise an immature child in the 21st century to marry early, bring him a wife and make it a normal family? I’m fighting as much as I can to eradicate that. (M. B., 61, Baptist, Gornji Komren /Niš/) We won’t give such advice. When she feels she’s mature enough to take on the responsibility of a life in marriage, let her do it then. I wouldn’t advise her to do it at the age of seventeen. We have the obligation, as parents, to raise that child, to support her to finish school, and then, when she becomes a mature person, to marry. Not when she’s fifteen or sixteen as it happened to us. That was our disaster. (S. B., 37, Jehovah’s Witness, Taskoviüi /Niš/)

her ritual against stomach ache. However, she immediately repented for it, Nenad recalled joyfully, asking him to pray for her to never do that again. 7 Vesna Demiroviü from Vranjska Banja remembered how a man working in Germany caused a disturbance among believers, holding a feast and performing the ritual sacrifice of a ram on his doorstep, having promised to do that after a dream prophecy concerning him producing a male heir. She, and the rest of the believers from the mahala, did not attend the celebration, despite being duly invited. 8 Perica Kurtiü from the Leskovac mahala Podvrce spoke openly of the fact that, for almost three decades, tenants brought earthenware with water and a candle on late Thursday afternoons to a corner in the family house designated as a tekija. Once he converted, deacons and pastors from the church prayed above that spot, and he threw all of the props in the river.

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Chapter Ten I wouldn’t. My opinion is, for example that he should finish secondary school, have necessary conditions for life and then marry. It all depends on the children, how motivated they are to study. (P. K., 38, Pentecostal, Leskovac) No. I tell that to my daughter; she’s twelve. It used to be a custom to get married at thirteen, fourteen and fifteen. I tell her at least when she’s eighteen or nineteen. She firstly has to finish school. At least primary school, and if I have the means, I will send her to further schooling. (D. D., 32, Pentecostal, Vranje)

Underage boys and girls marrying early represent a sore in the general emancipation of Roma, alongside discontinued institutionalized education. The tradition of an imposed norm concerning physically mature but socially and psychologically unready teenagers entering into marriage, often with no free will, is observed more and more as a social anomaly, regardless of its integrative role in the Roma past. The opinion that a subordinated role of women is cemented with their lives potential reduced to giving birth, bringing up children and doing housework, can today be found everywhere. The newly-adopted religious view offers a different perspective to believers when it comes to evaluating customs and legal norms, namely: not supporting premature marriages; seeing no difference between male and female children, and condemning the practice of contracting, buying or kidnapping the bride. The protective relationship towards heirs in their early youth is predominant, with a wish for providing them with an opportunity to enjoy childhood, alongside regular schooling and acquiring at least minimal education. The knowledge of practical crafts, as potentially secure financial sources, is found to be most adequate. Believers at a young age are particularly critical towards the relics of ancient habits in the present, and they represent the offspring of the profiled religious relationship towards unwanted social behaviour. However, the upper limit for entering into marriage is in most cases connected with the completion of the secondary school, i.e. reaching adulthood. The choice of the heart is accepted in the selection of the spouse. Christian science teaches that sexual intercourse prior to obtaining the holy secret of marriage is considered as adultery, letting young people know that risky sexual behaviour may lead to health complications, but also to moral stumbling and a poor reputation in the community.

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Wedding Customs Wedding customs in the Roma community vary, and are strongly intertwined with the tradition. For example: When I organized it, we were Christians. We took only one day for our son’s marriage. Then, we went to the town hall to set the date, to register, and when that was done we went to the town hall where a speech was given. After that, we usually go to the Kingdom Hall, there’s a Biblical speech given, and then we go to a restaurant and mingle. Naturally, we have lunch and some barbeque, alcohol is given only as much as it is decent. Guests are dressed in suits as you saw them in the Kingdom Hall. That’s how they looked at the wedding. We call friends and relatives to be present there, even though they’re not believers. My relatives were there, my cousins, my family and my friends, and they had a chance then to see how we do it. It was a unique opportunity. They liked it; the music was good, and everything was okay. (T. V., 57, Jehovah’s Witness, Leskovac) Well, I organized the wedding when my daughter was getting married. We organized it without any alcohol. We ate, and we drank, temperately. I didn’t call that music that is used today, but the music was from Skopje, and they played spiritual songs. And that was in accord, a harmony, a great joy, there were food and drinks, there was singing, and there was the wedding in the church, bride and groom on their knees, and the priest who asked for the blessing for that marriage … It is one thing if you enter church once in twenty years only on the day of your wedding, and another if you study the Holy Scripture every Saturday, every Sunday and every other day, are one with Jesus Christ, and He says that we are his brides, and he is our groom, that he will come for us, that we should be clean, that we should wait for his return, etc. Where you don’t have that, there’s no marriage, no family, and we can see what’s happening to marriages. (M. û., 48, Adventist, Vranje) Let me take an example from my son and my daughter-in-law. It was different for me because they were baptized in the church in Leskovac, in the tent. It was all the same; it was just that we went to Leskovac for the wedding. Yes, they were believers, but they didn’t get drunk. We all drank, but nobody got drunk. There are tapes, everything was recorded, there was this ceremony that was just wonderful. They were the second couple that was wed in such a manner. (Z. D., 48, Pentecostal, Prokuplje) If I were to get married, if I took a believing husband, I would call all those who believe in God. I wouldn’t even call my family, I would celebrate with my fellow believers. I will get married in the church and the town hall

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Chapter Ten with my husband. And after that, we will go to the tavern, of course. I would like to have God’s music, I would like our brother to plays there, I would like him to play God’s songs. I would love that. (S. A., 15, Pentecostal, Vranjska Banja /Vranje/)

Wedding customs have always represented the richest ceremony in the life cycle of Roma. By conducting week-long common activities, the positions of women and men, the economic power of the family, complex relationships among relatives, and other things were presented. Entering into marriage was followed by a number of magical rites dedicated to happiness, well-being, harmony and increasing offspring. Despite the disappearance and reshaping of numerous archaic folklore elements in the clash with everyday life, the tradition has been handed down from generation to generation, and the picture of the past has been preserved among newer generations. Entering into marriage among Protestants, especially Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses, represents a clear cut with the past. The kidnapping of the bride, illegal marriages, underage marriages, drinking, smoking, and reckless behaviour are rejected as immoral acts and deviations from the strict principles of being in the community with Jesus Christ. The following are insisted upon: (1) Additional support to a marriage recognized before a registrar in the town hall with a church marriage. The pastor blesses the marriage before God, but only if the spouses are entering into it as virgins. (2) Music not being too loud and secular contents amended by spiritual songs. (3) Decent physical appearance of the wedding guests and appropriate behaviour. (4) Alcohol consumption being reduced to minimum quantities (Adventists reject it altogether). Both Baptist and Pentecostal Roma take care of their behaviour within the communities they represent so that members of other religions can make judgements of the validity of the messages delivered during evangelization on the basis of such behaviour. They are wary of alcohol and emphasize the fact that God does not ban anything, but that it is on believers to restrain from all sorts of improper behaviour and exaggeration.

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Pre-funeral, Funeral, and Post-funeral Customs Collecting in itself the ancient memory of the religious background of previous generations, the Roma culture of death has withstood the test of time and changes for the longest period. The closing of a biological cycle was marked through numerous, precisely-determined and repeated rituals while the living were reminded of their roots in Orthodoxy or Islam. It was of interest to observe whether the conversion to Protestantism produced some changes in the specific social act of dealing with death. The acceptance of Protestantism, above all the teaching of Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses, carries in itself the reduction of religious obligations caused by the death of a loved one: (1) Dressed in new clothes, the deceased is laid in the coffin (2) The procession comprising relatives and friends follows him/her to the “eternal destination” and lowers him/her into the grave (3) As the belief in an afterlife is no longer present, a great sorrow for the deceased is considered redundant (4) Candles are not lit (5) Food is neither offered nor left behind (6) Graves are not marked with crosses or pyramids, apart from the basic information on the tombstones (7) The procession is not offered to take their place three times at the previously laid out table (8) There are no post-funeral meals organized. The interviewees explain this practice in more detail: It is completely different today. A sick person is not bothered too much. If financial help is needed, we will provide it because money is necessary in such situations. Then, there’s encouragement based in the Bible, and otherwise, we talk about what is necessary. Sometimes it means a lot to a person to merely talk to someone, when one can’t talk to the family. When there is a death, we of course have a casket, the person is dressed accordingly, the grave is already dug, nothing is put in the casket, like my mother put a lot of things in my father’s coffin, even a radio. The family cries, even Jesus wept when Lazarus died; these are hard feelings that a man can’t help. The elder gives a speech on what that person was like, what he or she did during their lifetime and, finally, based on the Scripture, comforting words are spoken and something is read. There is a special speech given for the funeral, it’s nothing that was written prior to death, but the priest prepares it. There’s no music. There are flowers and a wreath; we do that too. The family goes back to their house where they

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Chapter Ten live, and if someone wants to go with them they do it to encourage the family, to have a cup of coffee and to talk for a little while. There are no candles, no forty days, six months, a year; a person can visit the grave if they feel something on that day, but that’s not a rule. There are no free meals. (R. K., 42, Jehovah’s Witness, Niš) Today, in the Adventist world there is only the custom that on that day, when a person dies, the priest comes, sings a couple of songs, gives a short speech on the life of the deceased. And after that, there’s a lunch and nothing else, no seven days, no forty days, no half a year, no year, candles aren’t lit. (Ž. M., 62, Adventist, Donje Brijanje /Leskovac/) I’ll tell you this. Three months ago, my grandpa travelled to that other world. When entering the house, there were no candles, only flowers. Black clothes were worn, black suits, scarves and the like, for the people, anyone who wanted it from his family. We, Adventists, do not wear black, candles aren’t lit, not many things are put in the coffin and, of course, all those necessary things, meaning, seven days, forty days, half a year; we observe nothing of that. We prepare the deceased and send them on their journey with one or two or three songs if there is a bigger choir, and if not, two or three people, maybe five, sing a couple of songs, those are special songs meant for such occasions. The elder is also there, the leading church elder, his helpers, brothers and sisters who monitor everything and help when help is needed. (G. A., 45, Adventist, Žitoraÿa /Prokuplje/)

The family takes care of the grave, keeps it clean, and if there are no heirs, the church members take on that obligation. Visits to the grave are not prohibited, and flowers can be brought during such occasions. There is no discrimination of Protestants concerning the choice of the grave lot. The deceased are buried at the existing Roma graveyard or a Serbian graveyard if Roma and Serbs are being buried together:9 9

On the last day of February 2009, the commemoration and funeral of MiodragMija Stankoviü, the founder of the Pentecostal movement in Leskovac and the whole of southeast Serbia, was held. The “Union Hall” was full of people who were addressed by the leading religious persons from the entire Serbia with guest delegations from several European countries and America. Neither cold weather nor melted snow could prevent almost a thousand citizens from paying their last respect to Mija. It was the author’s first experience of a funeral of a Protestant believer conducted in the manner described by the respondents during the interviews.

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For example, women inside and men outside. What is available is served. Elders are there, some talk of God, some of what that person was like. And, when the deceased is taken away, it is different, there’s no Muslim priest to say his prayers, to speak, but the elder talks about what kind of woman she was, Christian and all, he prays for the family. He conveys the word of God to those around him. A shroud is bought, the person is wrapped in it, boards are inserted as before. Everything is the same, except there are no candles. Now people are served, while before it was for the soul. It isn’t mentioned any more, it is just put on the table. You give and take freely, you don’t have to say that it’s for the soul of the deceased. There’s a lunch after the funeral, for those who dug and the family. There are seven days, six months, but the barbecue is forbidden, which is the main thing for us. There are no kebabs and burgers. And, there are some who do nothing. And there are some who have kept something, like rich in food and drink. There are believers who do that. (D. D., 29, Pentecostal, Leskovac) There are no Muslim customs as it used to be: three days, a week, forty days, a year, and those enormous luncheons at those specific dates, which cost a lot, and for whom? We pay our respect to the deceased, but not in that manner … There are no candles, but the elder comes to offer big encouragement, no matter to whom. The person is buried clothed, but again wrapped in that white stuff. Boards are also inserted, but there’s no priest, no food for the soul. When we want to go, I don’t take anything for food, maybe only some water or juice, for myself. There’s no lunch after the funeral, maybe some juice, but there’s no obligation. (ý. K., 50, Pentecostal, Leskovac) We were here at a funeral of a sister who was a believer. It was different. They didn’t light candles, Selim was at the funeral. He did it all as it was supposed. There was no music. Candles weren’t lit. Everything else was the same, wrapping in white cloth. There was some brandy, but people didn’t drink, God knows why … People were served only at the cemetery. (K. A., 50, Pentecostal, Vranjska Banja /Vranje/)

Elementary links with Islam among former members of the Muhammad’s faith, most evidently concerning the burial of the deceased, linger in Evangelical Christianity, reconfirming the stated ability of the Pentecostals to adapt to local traditions: (1) The wrapping of the body in ceremonial linen is retained (even though it is first dressed in clothes) (2) Lowered into the grave, the corpse is protected by diagonally inserted boards

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(3) Candles are not lit (4) If some sweets, juices or drinks are served, they are taken silently, without stating that they are intended “for the soul” of the deceased (5) Lunch is often served after the funeral, especially for tired travellers who have come from afar (6) Additional funeral meals are sometimes allowed, but an ensuing abundance is not advised—there is no barbecue of prepared burgers and other meat specialties.10 The funeral is conducted in a dignified atmosphere. As far as Adventists are concerned, a small group of believers or an entire choir may sing a few religious songs. A significant role is played by the preacher whose presence is expected. Before the deceased is taken out of the family home, as well as in the graveyard itself, and based on the Scripture, the elder provides words of encouragement and reminds those present of the second coming of Christ. This is also an opportunity to confirm the strength of faith and the correctness of the religious choice made before the non-converted, if there are such people in the audience.

Antisocial Behaviour and Inclination Toward Vices The influence of Protestant teaching on the changes in the wellestablished habits from the ghettoized life in the mahalas was also considered, such as physical confrontation between married partners, conflicts with the police, smoking and excessive alcohol consumption, enjoying gambling and drugs, and other vices: I think it’s pretty good. It’s not great there are those who are still studying it, who are still not familiar enough with it, but it’s good. I have a great relationship with my husband, and before I knew the truth, it was a disaster. We were supposed to split. I don’t want to talk about it because we should not remember what is past, just go forward. It was very bad. (Z. Z., 68, Jehovah’s Witness, Vinarce /Leskovac/)

10

During the conversation with the Pentecostal Perica Kurtiü from Leskovac, he complained about his mother, an old lady with a wrinkled face and baggy eyes, who silently listened to the conversation seated next to the burning stove. She was the only one of all the tenants still not converted. And why was that? Because she worried that there would be no one left to visit the grave of her deceased husband and bring out the gifts of food during the significant dates in the year (George’s Day, Vasilica).

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Well, how can I put it … Sometimes I yell at him, sometimes he yells at me … No alcohol, no smoking. (Lj. Z., 45, Adventist, Vinarce /Leskovac/) Oh, a lot has changed. If mom says something to dad, it’s all said in love, not like before with all the cursing and swearing. There’s a great inscription in our house: “There is no swearing in this house.” A lot has changed. I can’t describe how well we get along with each other, we pray, we love each other, and we love God. (A. A., 20, Pentecostal, Leskovac) No. Well, ok, we drink from time to time, but not to get drunk. I like to have a glass or two of wine, and that’s it. (ý. K., 50, Pentecostal, Leskovac) My son drinks two, three beers, I drink one or two brandies. I drink maybe a brandy or two in five months. (N. B., 61, Pentecostal, Leskovac) No. When there’s a birthday, I drink a beer or two for example, but I don’t get drunk so that I would not know what I’m doing. (I. M., 37, Pentecostal, Leskovac) We smoke and smoke. Although we shouldn’t, we still do. We smoke very often. Even though, we know it’s a conscious sin now, we’re committing a conscious sin. (K. A., 50, Pentecostal, Vranjska Banja /Vranje/)

The greatest achievement in the religious Roma homes is the harmonious human relationship. Scornful looks, raised voices in conversation, mean words and swearing, and physical confrontations verging on incident have been replaced by: (1) An agreement between spouses on daily obligations (2) Decent behaviour towards the neighbourhood and relatives (3) Love for children, and (4) Family harmony producing prosperity and appreciation of the surroundings. In the cases of need, burglaries are not an option and no crime is committed. Conflicts between certain families are: (1) Solved with the pastor as intermediary

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(2) Not solved through confrontations with bloody conclusions and police intervention.11 Believers find it especially enjoyable when non-believing Roma meet them in the street or visit them in their homes, asking for advice on everyday situations since they have noticed a change in their reasoning and acting—faith supported by deeds speaks volumes of the correctness of treading Christ’s path.12 Even though they deal successfully with the prevention of serious crime—gambling, drugs, prostitution, violent crime—Pentecostal leaders have their hands full of petty vices, which can be seen from the replies of the believers. Moderate alcohol consumption on festive occasions—celebrations, gatherings, weddings—are accepted with understanding, but smoking is undesirable. Pastors recognize the smoking vice, especially in the elderly, as the one hardest to fight.

11

The Roma pastor Šerif Bakiü proudly emphasized the following during the interview: “The number one, not only in my opinion, but also according to the Leskovac PD and the municipal structure and people in the town, is the fact that a crime has been reduced significantly, dropping substantially, as far as crime among Roma is concerned, and as far as fights and arguments are concerned. For there are eight thousand Roma in Leskovac, and around five and a half thousand in the Podvrce quarter alone, where I live … Crime is the number one for me. I am so delighted that you can walk through the mahala today, and see groups and groups. It is in the Roma mentality for people to go out, to talk to each other, but without arguments. And even when it comes to that, it is remarkably quickly delineated so that it does not grow into a fight. I don’t want to exaggerate, but there is at least one child from each family that goes to church. It’s a great blessing, and people respect us immensely. Crime has dropped totally since I was a member of the Society of Roma when we went each year to talk with the chief of police, and he always showed us: ‘Here, every morning when I come in, there are some twenty complaints lying around: breaking and entering, motor vehicle thefts, brawls, etc. But there are no complaints against Roma any more. And I know well that since the church started influencing Roma, a lot of good things have happened here.’ That’s why I’m telling you about all those things that are happening.” 12 Here is how Aleksandar Ajdareviü, a twenty-year-old with a tempestuous past, describes the effects of change after his conversion: “As I said already, I was very problematic. But now people respect me and appreciate me more, invite me to prayers with them, something they would have never done before. I feel much better with Christ.”

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Conclusion The fact that individual male and female Roma were shyly joining the communities of Protestant believers in southeast Serbia, two or even three decades ago it was not possible to foretell that it would grow into an unstoppable, large-scale conversion in the meantime. This is particularly true in the case of Pentecostals who have almost a thousand believers, and at least a thousand more friends of the church in the above area. The Roma religious corpus, which has grown in a relatively short period of time, started worshipping separately in joint temples, and the Protestant Evangelical Church “Community of Roma” from Leskovac has already given birth to several sister, pure-Roma churches in the region. Adventists also have independent Roma prayer homes in large numbers. In them, the Roma become the majority of the above minority religions and religious communities. Serbs are counted upon, but their absence from the pews does not produce a feeling of lower value and of not being accepted within the observed religious-confessional circle. Habits rooted in Orthodoxy and Islam (celebrating Christmas, Easter and saint’s days, i.e. Ramadan and Kurban Bayram, mutual visits with the majority population during religious processions, inviting Orthodox and Muslim priests to one’s own home, circumcision of children, praying five times a day) are entirely rejected among Roma Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses. By observing the birth and resurrection of Christ, Baptists and Pentecostals join in the celebration of unique holidays of the other two Christian confessions, albeit with much less pomp, and insist much more on establishing a private community with God (through special sermons, singing Christian songs, children’s programmes with Biblical content, etc.). The “researchers of the Bible” and “Sabbath worshippers” turn their backs on the former unavoidable dates from the Roma past (Vlasuljica, George’s Day, Bibija). The “life according to the Scripture” leaves no space for old ceremonies. Pentecostals show much more sense for adapting to the local tradition. They encourage Roma converts to follow pious behaviour, but do not insist upon the immediate break-up with sinful habits. They teach that “everything is allowed, but not everything is beneficial,” and that it is up to the believers to try and follow that principle. Thus, until all conditions are met to break off the shackles of the past and new hosts arrive with new tendencies, kurban is modestly observed at Vasilica and George’s Day several days before the official date, and the children are not refused an encounter with at least a number of events, all with the aim of not participating in the central celebration.

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Improved domestic hygiene and promotion of healthy lifestyles have transformed family relationships and harmonious relationships with relatives and neighbours, and giving up on antisocial behaviour, completing elementary school and continuing secondary education, and entering into marriage only after reaching adulthood are all measurable indicators of the progressive emancipation of the Roma from Protestant Religious Communities in southeast Serbia.

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—. (2007). Ⱦɪɭɲɬɜɟɧɚ ɭɞɚʂɟɧɨɫɬ ɨɞ Ɋɨɦɚ [Social Distance from Roma]. Niš and Novi Sad: Filozofski fakultet u Nišu and Stylos. Živkoviü, J., Todoroviü, D., Jovanoviü, V. & Ĉorÿeviü, D. B. (2001). Ɋɨɦɫɤɟ ɞɭɲɟ [Romani Souls]. Niš: Univerzitet u Nišu.

CHAPTER ELEVEN NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND INTERNAL BOUNDARIES: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH TO THE RELIGIOUS ISSUE IN SWEDEN EMIR MAHIEDDIN

L'existence des voisins est la seule défense des nations contre une perpétuelle guerre civile. —Paul Valéry (1931)

Introduction Europe is a quest and a controversy. Easily identifiable when compared to their neighbours, Europeans seem to experience a difficulty when trying to define themselves by concrete content. The debate about the religious roots of Europe is typical for this controversial quest for a European identity, for unity beyond the diversity of its nations. Defining this European identity thus appears as a competition between the parties involved and the question being raised in this chapter is part of this competition to which politicians, historians, journalists and theologians have already tried to contribute (Manaranche 2003; Duhamel 2004; Veyne 2005; Boissonat 2005; to cite only a few). Some assert that the history of Europe is the history of God in Europe, others that God made Europe, or that the debate itself is a paradox trying to deny an obviousness, or on the contrary that Europe is everything but an entity with religious grounds, or in a more nuanced approach, that although the European patrimony consists of much Christian legacy, religion remains only a component of the society and not its basis, though it is hard to go beyond the illusion of “roots” (Veyne 2005). In initiating a sociology of Western Europe, H. Mendras (1997) isolated two features, among four working in a system, to

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determine what Europe is—the idea of nations and individualism, which would be rooted in evangelical Christianity, or in brief nations and religion. This implies that investigating these two areas of the continent’s cultural landscape might help to purvey a better comprehension of the European identity, and it is the articulation between these two features of European modernity that I intend to problematize in this chapter. Beyond its theoretical, historical or memorial dimensions, what is the daily reality of Europeans when it comes to the way they experience the interaction between national identities and religiosities? In what ways do people mobilize religion as a resource of production and reproduction, or transformation, of national identities? I propose to ground this reflection on a case study of the Swedish context, relying on the observation of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christians, which constitute religious minorities in the Nordic countries. After exposing the methodology of my research, in the first part I will develop a consideration of the Pentecostal and Charismatic representations of space and territory within the frame of what is known as “spiritual mapping” and “spiritual warfare theology,” and I will try to identify what this can imply for the role of religion in nationhood. In the second part I will describe how these representations can be crystallized in the public arena, namely on a March for Jesus day. In the third part, after having described how the mentioned religious groups represent the nation to themselves, I intend to show, through the same case study, how nationhood impacts a religious liturgical style.

Methodology Nation is often an embarrassing object for anthropologists whose main method is ethnography through the observation of small details of individual daily lives. Although it is an implicit idea of social sciences (some call it “methodological nationalism”) it is hard to confront the direct observation of individuals whose main scientific tools are two eyes, a pen, and nations whose existence runs at a very large scale. Anthropologists indeed do not have the same privileges as demographers or statisticians to produce their knowledge, this panoptic vision being permitted by the reduction of reality into numbers and charts (Latour 2007) in order to deduce the general features of a given nation (Appadurai 2005). In this chapter, I have instead tried to develop a praxeology of the nation observed in daily situations at a micro level through the discourse and practices of the individuals who talk about and experience it, taking into account the representations they have of their own experience and the

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conditions of possibility of existence of these representations, using some historical data for this aim. Thus, I privilege an approach of nation through discourses of bodies on a daily basis rather than a general historical evolutionary frame that appears, nowadays, to be traditional in the study of nationhood, an achievement of the modernisation process, breaking the chains of “traditional bonds” in the nineteenth century, reaching its acme during the first half of the twentieth century and supposedly initiating a decline since then. On the contrary, some see our contemporary period as a “return of nationalisms” after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the multiplication of nation-states on the territories of the former Soviet Union; others see it as a moment of important crisis for the nation-state given its weakening due to the globalisation process (Hobsbawm 1992). Instead, I propose an approach of the nation hic et nunc based on data taken from a seven-month ethnographic fieldwork among Pentecostal Christians in a city that is sometimes referred to as “Sweden’s Jerusalem,” Jönköping. Indeed, in spite of all the requiems composed by some authors for the idea of nation, one should consider that nation-states are just transforming, not disappearing or regaining territory, and that they are objects one understands better in their fluidity rather than stability. Ethnography, through its attention to detail, is able to procure the accuracy of the nation being made, thought of (or unthought of) and experienced day by day. Here, I certainly do not to pretend to be exhaustive on the topic or even that the data collected are representative for all the religious groups in Sweden, but merely that the observation of a small collection of individuals can be a good indicator of the social dynamics at stake in nation building through religiosity, and even more when the considered group is culturally marginalized.

Constructing the Nation through Spiritual Warfare May 17, 2010—Pentecostal Church of Jönköping The morning-prayer group has gathered as every weekday at 8:00 am to praise God and pray to Him to consider what is happening on Earth and, if possible, to intervene in human daily lives. In the middle of this session, after a man bore witness to his experience of the mysteries of God’s plans and before an intercession, Bosse, a sexagenarian man leading this meeting counting about twenty persons in a small praying room of the church, remembered that on Saturday an important event was forthcoming. Not only was it the weekend of Pentecost, but the Christians of Sweden were going to demonstrate for Christ in Stockholm, and he asked his

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fellows to pray for that day. Everybody was in a posture of prayer, and here and there we heard some believers speaking in tongues, some mumbling, and Bosse leading the prayer: “Hear us Lord for the March for Jesus. Thank you for giving us this day when Christians will walk on the capital for Jesus … May this walk be a victory for your Kingdom, for this nation and its people.” This prayer was uttered several times during the weeks preceding the demonstration; in some way, they constituted, on a spiritual level, the preliminary phase of a high moment for Swedish Christianity. On the Internet, a website dedicated to the event, collected and published online articles and interviews about it over a few months before the march. On the hosting page of this website a chronometer indicated how many days, hours, minutes and even seconds were left before the launching of this major event, as a countdown before an attack. One can notice that the prayer mentioned above, although showing no intention of involving any physical violence, resembled for some a military encouragement in a period of warfare (“walk on the capital,” a “victory for the nation,” etc.). Indeed, it might be a warfare that Bosse is referring to, but against whom exactly? This March for Jesus is not typical for Swedish Christianity. It is part of the Global Jesus March Movement, initiated by Charismatic Christians for whom cities are cursed places, concentrations of social and spiritual plagues witnessing a powerful demonic agency.1 Practicing what is now referred to as “spiritual mapping” they try to identify which a demon holds power over a given territory. Their goal, through prayer and mobilisation of Christian communities, is to win back the spaces abandoned to the “forces of Evil,” thus reinvesting secular territories symbolically and religiously (Fer 2010, 62–69).2 In our case this means Stockholm, and given the political importance of this city the Swedish nation as a whole. From the capital the 1

Harvey Cox relates it to what he identifies as a “third wave theology” which appeared in the United States in the 1980s and whose leading figures, notably Peter Wagner and Timothy Warner, stated that “Satan does indeed assign a demon or corps of demons to every geopolitical unit in the world, and they are the principalities and powers against whom we wrestle.” Wagner, for his part, asserted that “Satan delegates high ranking members of the hierarchy of evil spirits to control nations, regions, cities, tribes, peoples, groups, neighborhoods and other significant networks of human beings throughout the world” (Cox 2001, 284). 2 Marches for Jesus have been recorded since the 1950s, indicating “a desire to displace the battle against evil from the privacy of individual torment to the public space of social contestation” (Fer 2010, 63). In 1953, 32,000 people gathered in Stockholm to listen to Einar Ekberg, a church singer, in Kungsträgården. This record has not yet been beaten.

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people of Jesus intend to reach the whole country. During the demonstration I observed a bishop from the Church of England, Graham Dow, who was invited to give a short, vibrant speech on the occasion, saying “This is spiritual warfare!”, for which he was warmly applauded by the crowd. If this March for Jesus movement is global, the actors observed seemed to honour the national level, probably more significant for them than the planetary scale on a daily basis. The victory to be gained over the nation would be a trophy for Christ, not the whole world. However, this warfare does not imply a battle between natives and foreigners to protect Sweden from an external “invasion,” but a struggle for conquering the nation involving Swedes “in a war” against other Swedes, an opposition that is seldom considered as relevant when one talks about national identity— believers against non-believers, engaged Christians against secularists and atheists. This opposition sometimes implies a broader meaning. I once heard a Swedish preacher talking about evangelisation, telling his audience that cities were the new jungles and their inhabitants (non-believers) were the new savages to Christianity. In other words, God’s workers are on the side of culture, the atheist being rejected on the side of nature according to a classical opposition of identity construction (Lévi-Strauss, 2001 [1952]). The mission, thus, appears as a domestication of nature, a process to civilise “barbarians.” If this opposition is usually used to separate locals from foreigners, it is interesting to note here that it is used by Swedes to refer to their fellows. The vocabulary of warfare and military metaphors is not uncommon in the Pentecostal milieu (Coleman 2006, 50; 2007, 214). Ingrid, an old woman at the Pentecostal Church, reported the story of a Norwegian preacher who, while travelling to the USA, met a Catholic bishop on the plane. During the conversation the first asked the second if he had ever experienced the Holy Spirit. “Theoretically,” replied the bishop. The preacher waited for the plane to land and once at the airport told his new friend that henceforth he would really know the Holy Spirit. He could not please himself with “a weapon from the seventeenth century”—he needed the “atomic bomb, the weapon of the twentieth century,” he said, referring to the Holy Spirit. He directed his hand toward the clergyman who suddenly “fell in the Spirit.” Glad of this new discovery, the latter told the preacher he was eager to travel back to his church in Germany and bring the good news. This example using military words to refer to Christian practices is just one among many others. Beyond these metaphors, words in general are considered by Charismatic Christians to be a source of power (Coleman 2007). Prayer

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thus appears as a powerful weapon against the “forces of Evil” as well as a working tool to transform the world. To quote Waldo César: “Space is the Pentecostal vocation, the word its instrument of conquest” (2001, 36), a representation of themselves that implies the construction of a whole institutional and verbal dispositive in order to conquer a given space (Sweden for our case), from day to day work at an individualistic level, to conquer every single soul for Christ, to major punctual events at a holistic level and to which I propose to give an insight in the next section of this chapter. However, first let us take a pause in this ethnographic exploration and draw some primary deductions on what these features of Pentecostal representations tell us about what a nation is, and what part religion can play in it. Nations are often considered as related to actual or imagined homogeneous cultural communities (Anderson 2002), whether they would be the modern expression of antique ethnicities (Smith 1996; 2010) or recent political constructions from the nation-states (Anderson 2002; Gellner 1999). The case described above shows that nations are spaces of identities in conflict. Comparable to ethnic groups (Weber 1995, 189; Amselle & M’Bokolo 1999; Jaffrelot 2006), as described by the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth in his classical study of ethnicity (1969), they are empty “organisational shells” to be constantly refilled with varied symbolic and material content and different socio-cultural dimensions in order to maintain their boundaries (Barth 1969, 212–213). Thus, the ethnographer does not have to take into account the sum of the “objective” differences but only the ones the actors consider to be relevant (Ibid., 211). The crucial point to investigate in order to understand how identities maintain themselves, asserted Barth, becomes the boundary (1969, 213). However, as the Swedish Pentecostal representations of a Sweden to conquer intend to show, nations themselves are crossed by internal boundaries. Perhaps we must take these internal fissures into account to understand the process of selection of relevant features for the definition of the national identity. However homogenous they can appear, especially in the Nordic countries where the myth of national unity is constantly nurtured,3 nations are spaces of conflict, whose social poetics (Herzfeld 2009) are always questioned and rebuilt on new values and features in order to maintain the external boundaries of the group. A national identity is never a “finished” product. 3 This narrative of homogeneity is based on supposed common ethnicity, religion and a political culture of consensus. It is even subsumed in a supra-national unity, Norden (the North, including Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland), whose unity was constructed in the nineteenth century while nationalist rhetoric was subsuming the whole of Europe.

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The nation’s symbolic construction is always at stake, giving birth to conflicting definitions carried out by different groups of actors trying to impose their own ideas of nationhood on the whole people. Expressing this, a member of Parliament, Annelli Enochson, president of an informal political Christian group at the Riksdag,4 giving a speech on the March for Jesus day, told the crowd: “Together, we can change and build Sweden!” Is it necessary to indicate that nobody understood that the country was in ruins? Metaphorically, this sentence expressed the will to build the same nation in a different way—a Christian way. The example of Charismatic Christians, which is particularly expressive when it comes to the conflictual dimension of the construction of nationhood, through the vocabulary and metaphors of warfare they use, is far from unique. It reveals a general feature of nation building, that of its contested dimension (Zimmer 2003).5 Nation is a space of competition, and national imaginary is an issue to struggle for. This spiritual warfare led by Christians consequently appears more as a symbolic struggle for the definition of the legitimately and illegitimately national, a definition of the pure (the Good, and Jesus side by side with God) and the impure (the Evil) in the nation, than a participation in an unquestioned unity, the product of a long, ineluctable process of historical maturation, theoretically relying on implicit diffusionist terms a posteriori, giving place to a teleological conception of national history. The historical continuity of nations as “subjects” is an illusion constructed by discourse in order to legitimate one’s opinion with memory and inscribing it in the ‘nature’ of a national culture, making it immutable (Balibar 1998), thus rejecting minorities at the margins of society. 4

The Swedish Parliament. Oliver Zimmer considers modernist theories of nationhood to be too mechanist and “developmentalist,” trying to think of the nation building as a “one way street” where a centre progressively integrates its periphery in a “high culture” using the instruments of mass education, language standardization and various means of communication. The historian Ann Berg (2006), applying Zimmer’s conflict analysis to nineteenth-century Sweden, shows that at least two modes of “Swedishness,” two contradictory conceptions of nationhood parallel to political lines of opposition, were competing against each other to win the struggle for national imaginary. The Swedish historian Henrik Edgrens (2005) came to similar conclusions in his study of Stockholm’s newspapers in the nineteenth century. The Pentecostal case seems to show that such social conflicts around the representation of “Swedishness” are not over, since Swedish Christians would like to conquer Sweden for Jesus, in other words to put “more Jesus and more Holy Spirit,” as one of my informants said, into “Swedishness.”

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Beside the words expressing the conflicting conceptions of nationhood, the struggle for national imaginary can take absolutely concrete and material forms. In the section that follows, I propose a brief ethnography of the March for Jesus that Bosse referred to in his prayer. This event has double interest for our topic: first, on such a day, the nation seems more present to the actors than ever; second, it represents a time of crystallization of tensions in the battle opposing what I suggest calling “nationities.” By “nationity” I mean a conception of the nation bearing its own definition of the modes of autochthony, which do not necessarily correspond to the modes legitimated by state institutions, with which a given group can be in conflict, without, however, expressing any claim for whichever kind of autonomy or independence, but simply a prerogative on political instruments to diffuse its own national imaginary. These premises, in order to gain a benefit from it, be it material and/or symbolic, as these alternative modes of being are autochthonous, once recognized by state power, and consequently instituted as the truth of a nation, could become de facto for a new order from which the social category defending a given type of nationity would gain advantages, this new order being in complete adequacy with its already existing style of life. Among the resources offered by state control is the redoubtable efficiency of symbolic production. Through its institutions and its agents, the state diffuses its arbitrary representations to the most intimate actions and thoughts of the subjects living in its territory. In spite of the imperfect reception of this state policy, and the resistance any subject can demonstrate towards state socialisation, any given activity, even the representation of God, as we shall see in the third section of this chapter, can be influenced by the performativity of state language and policy. However, let us go back to ethnography to see how this conflict between nationities can be crystallized at a given time and in a given space.

May 22, 2010—When the People of Jesus “Took” Stockholm On Saturday May 22, 2010, Swedes from all over the country were heading towards Stockholm city by car or bus trips organised by their congregations. For many it was important to be there, to show that there are Christian forces in the country and that they intend to be visible, and that they intend to make the body of Christ visible. At first, people gathered in different places of the city centre where preachers were holding outdoor speeches in public gardens (Humlegården and Vasaparken), and on Sergel square close to the central station. The latter

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had probably not been chosen for its urban centrality only—it is also a symbolic place for the late success of charismatic Christianity in Sweden. Indeed, Carl-Erik Sahlberg, a Lutheran priest from the national Church of Sweden (Svenska Kyrkan) had a call a few years ago to drive a bus across the city and help people suffering from alcoholism and drug addiction to “come back to life” through faith in Jesus Christ. This evangelical bus and the social work, managed by an ecumenical group, a form of action that is common in the evangelical milieu, led pastor Sahlberg to gain notoriety and his church, Klarakyrkan, soon became full of visitors, giving space for a new revival (väckelse) in the very political centre of the country that is renowned to host the most secularised society in the world. Sahlberg represents a tendency inside the national Church known as Charismatic Lutherans. Since the 1970s, indeed, many so-called “historical Churches,” starting with the Catholic Church, beneitted from a movement of religious renewal inspired by Pentecostal theology, emphasising the role of the Spirit in liturgy as well as daily life. Sergelstorg, located about two hundred yards from Klarakyrkan, was one of the main targets of the cleric’s work, being a place representative for urban insecurity by hosting drug dealers and addicts. “Sergel” became a symbol for the battle of Christianity against the forces of delinquency and criminality, or in other words a battle of Good against Evil. Around 2:00 pm the groups of people, gathered to hear sermons at different spots in the city, simultaneously started their march towards Kungsträgården, in the heart of Stockholm, in three different and wellorganised corteges to the sound of songs of praise, some broadcast in Arabic.6 At the sides, some were watching carefully that no one demonstrated on the pavements and remained on the roadway so that the procession did not lose visibility through the dispersal of individuals. Crossing the streets of Stockholm from the inside of a Christian crowd demonstrating for Jesus, one does not wait for a long time to understand the opinion of a majority of Stockholmers about Evangelical and Pentecostal churches, and maybe about religion in general. The demonstrators streamed through the city centre under the gaze of disapproving faces and mocking youngsters shouting ironic “alleluias,” with individuals carefully avoiding the few volunteers who were trying to give out a Christian newspaper explaining what the March for Jesus is. The procession that I followed went through the city, and after fifteen 6

A strong community of Middle-Eastern Christians, some of whom have converted to Pentecostalism, living in the suburbs of Stockholm, was well represented at the demonstration that day, hence this curious feature of Arabic songs of praise being displayed in the middle of Stockholm.

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minutes came across another procession coming from Humlegården, following a car equipped with speakers diffusing songs of praise in Swedish, which quickly took over the songs in Arabic. Echoing the spiritual warfare theology, some individuals in the crowd wore red t-shirts on which one could read Jesus Folket intar Stockholm (“The People of Jesus Take Stockholm”). On Kungsträgarden square the organizers established a temporary market. T-shirts printed with the logo of the “March for Jesus 2010” and Christian books and leaflets were sold by occasional traders. The crowd finally stopped in front of a huge stage surrounded by screens, projectors and a sound system set up on the morning for the occasion. The first person to speak was the president of the organisation committee of this major event for Swedish Christianity, Lennart Möller. He explained the importance of the date of this march, almost chosen under duress: “We tried to organise it at the beginning of May as in the two preceding years, but the Stockholm city hall administration only had one date available for such a demonstration.” He added that they were disappointed at first, but that they soon realised that it was the weekend of the Pentecost in the Gregorian and Julian calendars (used by Orthodox Christians), and just three days after Chavouot in the Jewish liturgical calendar. Never had the three “Pentecosts” been so close to each other: “God must have something to tell us today; we believe that on such day, God wants something special to happen!” As we can see, more than space and territory, which they try to reinvest symbolically through prayer, the sentences uttered by Lennart Möller indicate a symbolic work on time, which is quite common in the temporality of Pentecostalism based on a strong relationship between the transcendental and daily life. For Lennart Möller, the weekend of May 22 is not inscribed in an ordinary historical and temporal time, but is a day to understand in a prophetic representation of the time continuum, overcoming the conventional human timeframe, and this ordinary day for a majority of Swedes is filled with strong millennial expectations of change. This conception of time is located beyond the quantitative experience (chronos) that any secular can have. The experience of time at Pentecost is a qualitative one (kairos), being time deepened by particular prophetic moments which appear as opportunities to grasp. It is part of “an eschatological view of abbreviating time and conquering all the space in the world” (César 2001, 35). It was then Tjebbo van den Eijckhof’s turn to give a speech. He is one of the organisers of this day and prepared it over many months while crossing all the regions of Sweden to convince Christians to travel to

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Stockholm for the march. While addressing the audience, pictures from his trip around the country were displayed on a huge screen. Tjebbo has lived in Sweden since 1984, first coming as a volunteer worker for Youth with a Mission. He now lives there and considers himself a Swede. He reminded listeners that Swedes love their nation through love for their region: “This love was given by God, as the boarders of nation to make salvation possible.” With the talent of a showman he called the name of every single region, a call answered by the representatives of each. Sometimes, we could just hear one person or just a few people shouting from the back of the crowd, provoking some laughs in the front. The regions were unequally represented but were “there,” and by the magic of this incantation the whole nation was present, allowing Tjebbo to assert that by means of a common metonymy in nationhood a few can represent many: “Today our whole nation stands in front of God!”, and paraphrasing Churchill on D-Day: “And this is not the end. This is just the beginning!” After giving the crowd the good news that there were 25,000 people gathered in Stockholm that day to represent Christ, Tjebbo invited the audience to kneel and pray for Sweden, thus giving way to the major offensive step of this day (since word prayers are weapons). It could seem paradoxical to the observer that what was “the whole nation” a few minutes before returned to being just a part of it praying for the whole. However, is it not just a consequence of the modalities by which humans are present in their world in a mode of cognitive relaxation, being capable of fluidity and lateral attention to details, even when performing a ritual in which everyone is supposedly deeply involved (Piette 2009). This small variation of posture indicates that belonging to a nation permits being part of it as well as excluding the self from it from one moment to another and vice-versa, allowing a double movement of identification to the group and the legitimate will of transformation of a group that one wishes to be different. Nations appear to be collectives, constantly imagined on one side of the head without being permanently thought of. The March for Jesus, as any event referred to as “national,” is interesting in its dimension of huge, temporary collaborative work elaborated in a punctual collective action to build the presence of the Swedish nation in one place during one day. On this particular day, nation was made more cognitively significant and consequently more present to the subjects involved through the deployment of a massive human, material, linguistic and symbolic dispositive. This dispositive is cognitively close to the one settled to interact with a present, absent being that Christians are familiar with—God. We do not

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refer here to the transcendent God, or to its potential existence (which is not an anthropological question per se), but to an ethnographic God that the researcher can consider as made active through its situational presence by the means of various types of mediations (Piette 1999; 2003). If religion has something in common with nationhood, on a theoretical ground, it is that neither of these two domains can be said to have a monopoly, or a precedency, when it comes to building the presence of an absent entity. Nevertheless, if religious groups with transnational characteristics, such as the Pentecostals, attempt to change the nation from the inside, as we have seen above, and no matter how efficient their contestation is, they are still influencing themselves by the national context in which they grow. Quite surprisingly, the observation of nonvisible beings is a good start in grasping the impact of the national context on the selection made by Christian subjects to building a transcendental presence in an immanent world. In other words, it is a way to understand human groups at their boundary with the divine; a boundary they contribute to drawing through their religious activity.

A “European Jesus?” In his recent work, the French anthropologist Albert Piette (1999; 2003) has developed an original approach to religious phenomena.7 According to him, humans think of and build a network of objects and activities to relate to non-visible entities, such as God, which allows the ethnographer to speak of a God who is present in a situation, that is to say in a socially defined frame of interactions. For the purpose of his study he suggested putting the socio-cultural patterns in brackets. I propose reopening these brackets to analyse the impact of a given national context on the choices made by the believers in the mediations to make God present.8 What does the “God” the Swedish Pentecostals and Charismatics worship look like? How is His presence expressed through the activity of human beings? The aim here, via the investigation of the building of this presence through contextual elements, is to highlight the diversity that exists in transnational religious movements, thus allowing us to question the specificity of the Swedish religious context, and in a broader reflection the European one. Is there “a Swedish” or “a European God?” 7

An approach he developed in collaboration with Bruno Latour (2009) and Elizabeth Claverie (2003). 8 Such an approach has also been developed when it comes to theology in the Studies in Spirituality (Josefsson 2005).

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Answering these questions requires a comparative perspective on Pentecostalism. The first obstacle for such a perspective is the common idea that as a transnational, or global, religious movement, it is the same everywhere, which is more constitutive of the Pentecostal ideology than a reality. The first time I visited a Pentecostal Sunday service in Sweden I was surprised by the fact it did not resemble the services I had read about in the bibliography devoted to the studies of Pentecostalism. The latter religious movement is known for the importance it gives to the manifestation of charismata—the spiritual gifts given by God to human beings through the intervention of the Spirit. It usually involves ecstatic bodily gestures, shaking bodies jumping on the spot, moved by the Holy Spirit, people falling on the ground, or just speaking in tongues during prayer. One could understand these charismata as various mediations selected to build the presence of God, in Albert Piette’s theoretical terms. However, the “pattern” given by the worshippers in Jönköping appeared to be different, as no charismatic gifts were displayed—neither healing nor prophecy, no visions, no speaking in tongues; the only gift “deployed” was preaching, which did not distinguish this Pentecostal congregation from historical ones, such as the Lutheran Church. At most the difference was a question of style—the preaching felt more spontaneous than in a classical protestant church, and the music was more “modern,” so to speak, as instead of the “traditional” church organ, pop music was broadcast and played with instruments that would not have a place in a “regular” Swedish church. Indeed, Pentecostals are known to use styles of music deemed profane by other religious groups (Cox 2001, 142–143). What was going on in this Pentecostal congregation? Why did they seem so different from all the descriptions given of them in other continents such as Africa or Latin America? What had happened to the ecstatic liturgical style the Pentecostals are renowned for? The fact is, Swedish Pentecostals pray in tongues, heal, and display charismata in their spiritual life, but in private. Thus, this happens in some groups, and sometimes only in the strict intimacy of two persons, or with a single individual in interaction with the Lord, where the Spirit pours out and one allows oneself to speak in tongues. In addition, it is a question of “allowing” oneself, as if it were a matter of courtesy. When I asked some people about their relation to speaking in tongues, all of them expressed the embarrassment they would have if they heard speaking in tongues in the presence of someone who is not familiar with it. In general, all of them avoid it; they don’t want to scare non-believers or non-Christians. Indeed, it appears that in recent decades, Sunday services have progressively constituted themselves as a public space, where

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strangers and guests are always expected. The leaders of the service have a system for this potential first visitor seeking communion in their church. A corner of the coffee room is intended to host this possible newcomer to get to know them in order to make them feel as being among friends, or even with their “family.” At the front doors, some people are always assigned to welcome people with a smile and shake hands with the worshippers, whether they know them or not. Many times, some people greet me because they have never seen me before, and invite me to feel at home. To the profane, and especially the atheist anti-religious person, this could seem to be a cynical communication strategy, a theatrical performance to convert en masse, but the truth is that it is the result of work on the self. Many times, I have heard church leaders challenging their fellows to demonstrate to others the love Christ has shown, in order to represent him the way he was, to make him present again and again, in other words to “presentify” Him to the world through work on the self, no matter how hard it may seem to shy people. The idea is to constitute oneself as mediator—the Christians talk about a servant (tjänare) of God—and to try to interpret His will for the self whose signs are given in the environment, everything being a potential message from the Holy Spirit. Christians are thus involved in a hermeneutic of the world and their own life, and the correct interpretation is validated by the sentiment of harmonious feeling (att det ska kännas rätt), consequently favouring an intuitive relation to the world relying on the inspiration by the Spirit; in other words, they “presentify” the absent God through charismatic mediation (Piette 1999, 125). However, this hermeneutic activity relies on the idea of harmonious feeling with God and with the self; regimes of feeling, sentiment or emotion are always the result of socio-cultural constructions to which individuals are socialized. This does not mean they are fully determined by their environment as the feeling of righteousness can be the result of a struggle with the self and of a dialogical communication with God, where the subject tries to negotiate his or her mission, but as noticed by many this non-acceptance of fate is a classical trope in the narrative used in the Pentecostal process of subjectivation. It is thus the socio-historical context of implantation of a given religious group that the researcher must investigate to understand how Christians behave locally, and it is there that one can find explanations for the particularity of Swedish Pentecostalism. The question of glossolalia, as a type of mediation to “presentify” the Spirit, is particularly revealing for our concern. Considering the words, a Pentecostal believer once told me he felt a sort of “stress,” a “need” or an “urge” to pray in tongues; it was something that just “came out,” as he

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said. Another told me, in the same range of ideas, that he could not speak in tongues on command. Thus, it appeared that this type of mediation could be categorized as an impulse. Speaking in tongues, and other charismata, are experienced by the concerned subjects as impulses from the Spirit, and given their emotional dimension it seems correct to analyse their deployment in a sociological and cultural perspective. Quite amusingly, the relegation of these spiritual impulses recalls, in some way, “the process of civilization” described by Norbert Elias (1973) when it comes to the treatment of bodily impulses progressively hidden behind the curtains of private life along with the modernisation process; as if the Swedes were trying to domesticate what Harvey Cox (2001) called this “primal spirituality,” characteristic for Pentecostalism. One can easily doubt the linearity and the supposedly evolutionary dimension of such a process, but metaphorically we could think of a “process of civilisation” being at stake in Swedish Pentecostalism. Parallel to that, the economy of sin and the regime of sanction to the sinner (which is also a domain of mediation to build divine presence in the community, since a Christian acts as “small Christ” to represent Him) have also been displaced, apparently from the 1960s onward. This displacement led from the so-called “catalogue of sins” (syndakatalogen) preventing Pentecostals from drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes, going to the movies, practicing violent sports such as ice hockey, etc., to the paradigm of love and forgiveness where social sanction almost does not exist. In Durkheimian terms, one could say that the Swedish Pentecostal churches went from a form of “mechanic solidarity” to an “organic solidarity” (Durkheim 1930). Such a process has nothing to do with a purported universal law of sociological evolution towards modernity or the Weberian idea of an automatic “routinisation” of a sect on its way to becoming an institutional church.9 To understand how Swedish Pentecostalism got to its contemporary situation without presupposing any paradigmatic or ideological principle, the socio-historical contingences that have led to building the Swedish religious and political field in recent decades should be considered. The idea here is to interpret this change as a new choice in the infinite possibilities of mediation to make God present to the world, thus staying relatively close to the “indigenous” categories. The European principle according to which each nation had one religion, cujus regio, ejus religio, has forged the Swedish religious history in the long term. Thus, the Lutheran Church was a State church until the late twentieth century, and even though it has lost this status it is still a 9

See Sahlberg (1977).

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national church (folkkyrka) to which many Swedes seem to be attached (given the relatively high statistics of participation to the rites of passage, although they are decreasing in number and are secularizing in content). Consequently, a high number of Swedes are socialized to religion through the institutional work of the Swedish Church, which regime of emotion is turned towards interiority; i.e., individuals are directed to experience their communion with God in intimacy. Bodily gestures in this High-Church oriented institution are also very controlled, sober and minimalist. This particular regime of emotions and its corporal ethos are intended to define an idea of “religiously correct” for a majority of Swedes, and harshly correspond to the Pentecostal corporal hexis or emotional regime as observed in the rest of the world. Beyond that, the Lutheran reformation was very offensive in Sweden and the clerics led a strong policy to get rid of the devotional and magic aspects of popular religious life as they were developed by the Catholic tradition (with its saints, pilgrimages, apparitions, etc.), in order to “rationalise” spirituality and the relationship to God. In other words, when Pentecostalism, as we saw, intends to develop charismatic mediations of the Spirit to presentify the Lord, Lutherans mainly count on the apostolic mediation of the priest10 and his knowledge of rituals and scripture. This idea of “correct religiosity,” as experienced by a majority of the population, seems to act as a constraint on the Pentecostal worshippers when they are in public, hence the reaction according to which one is careful towards their fellow and tries to avoid the deployment of charismata, in order not to scare others. This effect was intensified by two sets of changes in the Swedish context. The relation of Pentecostals to public space was altered due to the increase of the role of mass media from the 1960s onwards. Many times, Pentecostal churches and related revival movements, such as Maranata in the 1960s and the Word of Life in the 1980s, were the target of media denouncing them as sectarian movements brainwashing their worshippers or making them subjects of trivia and polemics (notably because of their liturgical style, being very different from the religiosity of the majority as stated above, and because of their values challenging the social-democratic secularist political values of “Swedishness”). Taking the gaze of their fellow Swedes as constraint, Pentecostals intended to “dicharismatize” their liturgy, progressively evacuating the use of spiritual gifts. The institutionalization of the Pentecostal movement is also a probable cause of the changes I mentioned. The creation of the Christian-Democratic 10

Lutheran clergymen are called “priests” (präster) in Sweden, and not pastors, like in the protestant tradition. This might be a legacy of the long Catholic settlement in the country until the Reformation in 1527.

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party (Kristdemokraterna) by the spiritual father of the Pentecostal movement, Lewi Pethrus, in 1964 is quite significant of its new implication in Swedish public life, a new situation which probably led to a research of credibility towards the outside in a broadly atheist society. This was reinforced by the national state policy consisting in giving financial subventions to religious organisations, thus improving the public control over the church ideology and style. When it comes to the representation of sin and the regime of its sanction, the Pentecostal movement was merely submitted to a general sociological change at stake in the whole of Europe at the turn of the 1960s and 70s, which the sociologist Philippe Portier referred to as a change from a first to “second modernity” (Portier 2010, 254). The growth of individualism consecutive to major changes in the general production apparatus and to the change of sociability in urban areas, from traditional group solidarity to complex networks based on selective affinity, engendered an impossibility to accept the authority of equals. This probably led Pentecostals to abandon their sanction to sinners, whose ground was a literalist lecture of biblical laws, and exclusion from the community. Moreover, the general opinion inside the movement was tired of the debates concerning potentially sinful “hats and haircuts” (Aronsson 2005), and privileged a theology based on love and forgiveness. Thus Jesus, or God, whom the Pentecostals tried to presentify as a judge and punisher towards the sinner, became, through the work of His servants, a loving and forgiving God, sometimes inverting His traditional gender, adopting, in discourses and sermons, both male and female traits. Indeed, He is sometimes compared to “a nursing mom protecting her children,” or to a lover whose heart is broken when humans do not respond to His gentle advances. This is a pattern that Harvey Cox (2001) also observed in Italian Pentecostalism, giving the impression that there might be a God whose faithful people presentify in a “European way.” Indeed, when compared to the mediations adopted in other cultural contexts, where exclusion from the community is still a relevant way to sanction the sinner, or where one can observe very ecstatic modes of expression of the presence of the Spirit (notably in some African or Latin American countries),11 European Pentecostalism appears to have a common style that Cox refers to as an “erotic mysticism” (2001, 204). Hence, my question, which would still need a large empirical survey to find an answer, is: is there a “European Jesus”? In other words, do European Pentecostals presentify the Christ through mediations of their own, maybe in a more .

11

See Corten & Mary (eds.) (2000), and Corten & Marshall-Fratani (eds.) (2001).

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private way than others because of their implantation in a particular religious and socio-historical context of contemporary Europe, known for their secularity?

Conclusion The question of a common cultural pattern of mediations to presentify the divine in Europe can be enlarged to the whole of Christianity in Western Europe. In effect, while Swedish Pentecostalism was starting its transformation, consecutive to major social changes, common to all the national societies on the continent, Catholicism was also implementing an internal reform, starting a process of change with the Second Vatican Council which is not yet over (Kenis et al. 2010), and was thought of as an answer to the new spiritual needs of the European society. Western European Christianity seemed to negotiate its place in the new society born from the general social restructuring that started after the Second World War, by changing the type of its mediations. Almost at the same time, in 1959, the Swedish Lutheran Church considered giving the right to ordinate female pastors (Havel 1959), and Christ could, thus, be represented by a woman, challenging a thousand years of male apostolic mediation. The so-called second modernity appeared to influence all spheres of social life, including religious activity. The latter was transformed by the believers in an adaptation resulting from a subjectivation work taking into account the new beams of constraint given by their respective national contexts, which they discover everyday through media, daily experience and state policy. They are also adjusting their faith, theology and discourse to the national habitus in order to feel an adequacy between the divine and the social, responding to a demand on a religious market, as well as endorsing the ever-changing patterns of selfeducation and the private status of religion in Europe. However, the relation between a given religiosity and national identity is not merely a ‘one way street.’ As I have tried to demonstrate, Pentecostals do not only adapt to “Swedishness” by working on themselves, but also intend to change “Swedishness” from the inside on a daily basis, organizing national events to transform Sweden. Religion is, in this case, a resource for contestation. This does not mean it is a way to hold a political discourse from the backdoor. As we have seen, its internal logic (its own temporality and representation of space), although invisible or inaudible to the seculars and atheists, remains relevant, even when it comes across political representation, such as the construction of national identity.

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Behind the holistic discourse of nations as frank fellowships (including discourses about Europe, although it is a supranational community) hide struggles and competitions about symbols. The idea of nation, as the idea of Europe, is vague enough to assemble everyone in a similar entity without producing agreement of content on its identity. ‘Europeanness’ is still an emerging identity and will maybe always be so. Religion, in this process, is just a symbolic resource in a work of definition and transformation of the world. Invoking a Christian patrimony is, in this sense, a symbolic activity intended to define the grounds of a community by a process of selection and exclusion in a fight for legitimacy in the definition of autochthony. The real Europeans would be those who can refer to mythical Christian ancestors. The role of social sciences, therefore, is not to corroborate any of these interpretations with the authority conferred by an academic position, but to remain neutral by witnessing the dynamics of identity construction without taking the side of any ideology. However, if there were any advice to give to the Prince it would be to lead an enlightened policy, leaving civil society the possibility of evolving in a plural system of modes of subjectivation and identity construction, by using a plastic language in our founding texts and thus avoiding symbolic exclusion, which would be resented by some as implacable violence from the state.

References Amselle, J-L. & M’Bokolo E. (1999 [1995]). Au cœur de l’ethnie. Ethnies, tribalisme et État en Afrique. Paris: La Découverte. Anderson, B. (2002 [1983, 1991]). L’imaginaire national. Réflexions sur l’origine et l’essor du nationalisme. Paris: La Découverte. Appadurai, A. (2005 [1996]). Après le colonialisme. Les conséquences culturelles de la globalisation. Paris: Petite Bibliothèque Payot. Balibar, E. (1998). “Y a-t-il un ‘néo-racisme’ ?” In Race, nation, classe. Les identités ambiguës, Balibar, E.; Wallerstein, E. (eds.), 27–41. Paris : La Découverte. Barth, F., (1995[1969]). “Les groupes ethniques et leurs frontières.” In Poutignat P. & Streiff-Fenart J. (eds.), Théories de l’ethnicité. Paris: PUF, pp. 205–251. Berg, A. (2006). “Kampen om nationen?” Paper framlagd pâ den Utbildingshistoriska konferensen, Stockholm. http://www.skeptron.uu.se/utbhist/p-berg-anne-20060928-29-kampenom-nationen.pdf Boissonat J. (2005). Dieu et l’Europe. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.

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César, W. (2001). “From Babel to Pentecost. A Socio-HistoricalTheological Study of the Growth of Pentecostalism.” In Between Babel and Pentecost. Transnational Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America, Corten, A. & Marshall-Fratani, R. (eds.), 22–40. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Claverie, E. (2003). Les guerres de la vierge, une anthropologie des apparitions. Paris: Editions Gallimard. Coleman, S. (2007[2000]). The Globalisation of Charismatic Christianity. Spreading the Gospel of Prosperity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. (2006). “When Silence Isn’t Golden: Charismatic Speech and the Limits of Literalism.” In The Limits of Meaning. Case Studies in the Anthropology of Christianity, Engelke, M.; Tomlinson, M. (eds.), 39– 61. New York, Oxford: Berghan Books. Corten, A. & Marshall-Fratani, R. (eds.) (2001). Between Babel and Pentecost. Transnational Pentecostalism in Africa and Latin America. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Corten, A. & Mary, A. (eds.) (2000). Imaginaires politiques et pentecôtismes. Afrique/Amérique latine. Paris: Karthala. Cox, H. (2001). Fire from Heaven. The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Da Capo Press. Detienne, M. (2008). Où est le mystère de l’identité nationale. Paris: Panama. —. (2010). L’identité nationale, une énigme. Paris : Gallimard. Duhamel, A. (2004). “L’Europe et les religions.” In Le Christianisme, quel impact aujourd’hui?, Duhamel, A., Joxe, P., Abel, O., Lustiger, J.-M. & Ricœur, P. (eds.), 31–50. Paris: Editions de l’Atelier. Durkheim, E. (1930). De la division du travail social. Paris: PUF. —. (1975[1905]). “Débat sur le nationalisme et le patriotisme.” In Textes, III, Durkheim, E. (ed.), 178–186. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Edgrens, H. (2005). “Publicitet för medborgarmannavett. Det nationellt svenska i Stockholmstidningarna 1800–1831.” Ph.D thesis Uppsala. Elias, N. (1973[1969]). La civilisation des mœurs. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. Fer, Y. (2010). L’offensive évangélique. Voyage au cœur des réseaux militants de Jeunesse en Mission. Genève: Labor & Fides. Gellner, E. (1999[1983]). Nation et Nationalisme. Paris: Bibliothèque Historique Payot. Havel, J. E. (Jan–Jun 1959). “La question du pastorat féminin en Suède.” Archives de sociologie des religions 4 (7): 116–130.

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CHAPTER TWELVE ESTONIAN WOMEN’S IDENTITY AFTER CONVERSION TO ISLAM AGE PLOOM

Introduction According to the Gallup survey (2010), Estonia is one of the least religious countries in the world. In this small country, public opinion is characterized by prejudice against Islam (Saar Poll 2010) where the media portray it negatively as a threat to the state, independence and women’s individual liberties. This chapter investigates why, in spite of such a hostile atmosphere, the number of Estonian women who have chosen to become Muslims has increased in recent years. The article is based on interviews held in February 2010 with six Estonian women who have converted to Islam. It proceeds by analysing these choices, and the emergence of their new identities. These identities combine Islamic and Estonian Christian culture and traditions, and can be analyzed in terms of how two different paradigms have intertwined to affect these women and their attitudes toward the society.

Religious Situation in Estonia Estonian culture has a Christian background. According to Article 40 of the Estonian Constitution, everyone may freely belong to any Church or religious association, and there is no state church in Estonia (Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus 1992). The predominant position of Lutheranism is based on a centuries-long tradition and many people still believe that this is the Estonian state church (Ringvee, Institutional organization 2009). Article 12 of the Estonian Constitution declares that no one may be discriminated against on the basis of nationality, race, colour, sex,

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language, origin, creed, political or other persuasions, financial or social status, or other reasons (Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus 1992). According to the Census from January 1, 2000, the Estonian population totals 1,121,582 people, out of which 31.8% declared that they follow one religious tradition. The biggest Church is the Lutheran Church with 152,237 members, followed by the Orthodox Church with 143,554 members. As a matter of comparison, Estonian Islamic Congregations have 1,387 members (Statistikaamet 2000). The framework for religious associations as legal entities is jointly set by the Act on Churches and Congregations (1993; 2002). Religious associations receive their legal capacity after registration at the Courts on the basis of the Act on Churches and Congregations. The requirements for a religious association to become a legal entity are the same for all denominations, and there is no distinction between religious associations on the grounds of membership numbers or the length of historical presence in the country. The minimum membership required for registration is twelve with full legal capacity (Ringvee & Eurel 2011). As of September 24, 2010 there are ten churches, nine congregational associations (totalling 470 congregations), seventy-three individual congregations, seven nunneries and one monastery registered in the Registry of Churches at the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Siseministeerium 2010). In addition to these registered organizations, certain religious associations have registered themselves as faith-based associations, others as non-profit organizations, as well as certain associations which have deemed it unnecessary to register with the state (Ringvee, Institutional organization 2009). The Estonian Sunni Congregation is a part of these seventy-three individual congregations (Siseministeerium 2010).

Estonia as the Least Religious Country In 2011, Estonia had the honour to be in the BBC’s final part of its “Extreme world,” where journalists examined the importance of religion in people’s lives. A Gallup survey (2010) found that 84% of adults worldwide still see religion as an important part of their daily lives, a figure that has remained unchanged for the past four years. The survey was conducted in 114 countries in 2009, and it showed that in ten countries, including Bangladesh, Niger, Yemen and Indonesia, at least 98% of the population stated that religion is important in their daily lives. The most religious countries are relatively poor. By contrast, in countries with a much higher life standard only about 47% of the population stated religion as being important in their daily lives. The least religious

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countries surveyed included Denmark on 19%, Sweden on 17% and Estonia on 16% (BBC 2010). Why is Estonia the least religious country and what are the reasons? One glimpse at Estonia’s recent history is sufficient to find answers to these questions. Estonia spent fifty years under Soviet occupation where one of the central aims of the cultural policy was to destroy people’s religious identities. Following the Soviet annexation of Estonia in 1940, the religious life of Estonians came under fierce attack (Ringvee 2009). The government closed churches and used buildings for community needs, such as gyms and places to keep animals or crops, and believers were expelled from universities or lost their jobs. It was forbidden to give religious education in schools from 1940 until 1980 (Schihalejev 2009, 42). The Department of Theology at the Tartu State University, where both Lutheran and Orthodox ministers were educated, was closed. The Estonian Apostolic-Orthodox Church was turned over to the Russian Orthodox Church’s Patriarchate. The activities of numerous religious organizations were prohibited, and religious periodicals were banned. Churches and religious organizations were strictly regulated; religious activities could transpire only in prescribed locations. Additionally, it was seen as shameful and punishable to be a member of a church. In this way, Soviet cultural policy destroyed religious identities. Nowadays, we can state that the atheistic system has been successful, and the majority of the younger generation is estranged from religion. During the second half of the 1980s, when the Soviet Union moved toward collapse, control over religious life weakened and people began to express interest toward religion again (Ringvee 2009). However, the damage had already been done, and the religious roots have been cut off. God is not part of everyday life, people do not know how to pray, why it is important, and even “who God is.” Everybody knows, from textbooks, that the world began with the Big Bang and that people developed from monkeys. Nowadays, young people value social authority, recognition and the possibility to have power to make decisions. Social status gives the opportunity to know the right people and have power (Niit 2004, 53). Society encourages people to devote their lives to developing careers, earning money, buying expensive things and living without deeper meaning. Because of these reasons, many people agree to sacrifice good relationships for the goal of social status (Puur 2004, 74–75). In the Estonian society it is considered ridiculous to believe there is a God because this view is not seen as helpful to achieving better things (e.g. God cannot help you buy a better car than your neighbour).

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Methodology Public opinion is characterized by prejudice against Islam and religion in general; however, there are women who decided to devote their lives to God. Some of them have decided to convert to Islam. Their decision raises questions, such as how they found Islam and did they change their lifestyles after conversion? Did they transfer something from the Estonian culture and Christianity to Islam that makes it possible to say that Estonian Muslim women are a mix of Estonian culture, Christianity and Islam? To find the answers to these questions, interviews were held in February 2010 with six Estonian women aged between nineteen and fortynine who have converted to Islam. The aim was to put together a sample of women from different backgrounds, ages and education levels in order to show an overview of Estonian Muslim women’s beliefs, behaviours and thinking. The responses from the interviewed women are consecutively marked as “Respondent 1,” “Respondent 2,” and so on. Three interviewees have a university degree, one has a High school diploma, one an Elementary school diploma, and one has not completed Elementary school. The longest period of being a Muslim is sixteen years and the shortest is seven months. Three are married to Muslim men (two Moroccans, one Algerian), one is engaged to a Muslim man (Egyptian), and two have children with Estonian men from previous marriages. Each woman received a four-page open-ended questionnaire divided into four sections: background, family, lifestyle and beliefs, and were asked to answer questions in their own words. From their responses, keywords have been brought out to create a coding network to show: (1) what kind of Estonian and Christian traditions they have transferred to Islam, and (2) whether Estonian Muslim women are different from Muslim women in general.

Results Faith in Estonians lives A Saar Poll survey “Faith in our lives” conducted in 2010 asked 1,009 people all over Estonia, aged between fifteen and seventy-four, questions about what they believe in, and what kind of religious habits they have. The survey also asked them to describe different situations and their opinions about various situations. They divided people’s answers into three categories: (1) People to whom faith is important, (2) People to whom faith is not so important, and (3) People to whom faith is not

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important at all. Table 1 below presents the results of the survey describing Estonian religious life and habits. Table 1. Importance of faith in Estonia Faith is important I’m a believer I’m an atheist I’m a member of a certain church or congregation

42.7% 1.9% 47.9%

Faith is not so important 8.3% 3.9% 12.5%

Faith is not important at all 1.6 % 20.7% 4%

In childhood someone 30.5% 11.9% 2.3% informed me about faith and God The informer was grandmother 63.9% 59.4% 54.2% The informer was mother 62.3% 57.9% 47.5% I’m baptized 84.6% 58.9% 34.8% I pray every day 24.3% 1.9% 0.8% I don’t pray at all 27% 71.1% 91.7% I go to church every week 14.3% 0.5% 0% I never go to church 26.4% 50.5% 80.5% I go to church to find peace of 51% 28.5% 18.0% mind I go to church because it’s my 27.7% 7.3% 5.9% Christian need and duty Religious education has to be a 67.9% 68.5% 61.6% voluntary subject in high schools Religious education has to be a 18.9% 6.4% 4.9% main subject in high schools I have a friendly attitude 86% 61.7% 31% toward Christianity I have a friendly attitude 18.6% 10.4% 4.5% toward Islam Source: Saar Poll (2010); author’s table presenting the compilation of the Saar Poll’s results

Therefore, an interesting fact appears in that people who do not find faith important at all still prove they are believers. It seems to be a dilemma—how can someone be a believer and, at the same time, declare that faith is not important at all. Therefore, do these people really understand what the statement “I’m a believer” means, or do they think

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that if they are baptized that means they are believers? The same dilemma appears when someone declares themselves to be an atheist. In that case, how can it be possible that “faith” is important to that person? Are faith and being a believer not connected with each other? The fact that the percentage of members of churches or congregations is higher than the percentage of believers shows that certain people are just on the lists of churches or congregations. The reason can be a desire or a wish to have a marriage ceremony in church, or to become a godparent. Previously, to become a godparent or to have a marriage ceremony in church, people had to be baptized, and through this process they also became members of churches. However, what happens if one has a childhood dream to marry in church? Is it possible that one agreed to let her or himself be baptized even if she or he is not a believer? Or, if the best friend is asked to become a godparent and if the person is not baptized, he or she will do it to make her or his friend happy. Also, to become baptized was very popular in the first years of independence in the 1990s. This was the time that people regained freedom to go to church without being afraid of prosecution. Looking at the percentages of people’s habits of praying and going to church, it obviously appears that Estonians still do not value God, churches and faith. Going to Church on Sunday mornings is just one way to spend free time, but it does not have a connection with everyday life or with becoming a better person. Why it is valuable to go to church, pray or be thankful to God has not been widely taught. Normally, people begin to pray when they are in trouble, have tried everything else and being unable to see any other solution, etc. Therefore, Estonians go to Church because they are looking for peace and for solutions to problems, but not as much as Christians who believe it is their duty (Saar Poll 2010). This kind of thinking is a part of the influence from the Russian time that successfully cut off Estonians’ religious roots (Ringvee 2009). At the beginning of the 1990s there was again an opportunity to teach religious education in schools. According to the Elementary Schools Act (Põhikooli õppekava 2010) and the High Schools Act (Gümnaasiumi õppekava 2010), religious education in public school is a voluntary subject, and schools are required to conduct religious education if there are at least fifteen students of the same study age. According to the Saar Poll survey “Faith in our lives” (2010), more than 60% of respondents from all categories ([1] Faith is important, [2] Faith is not so important, and [3] Faith is not important at all) agreed that religious education has to be an optional subject in high schools. However, there are only a few schools in Estonia that offer religious education to pupils. According to the Estonian

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Ministry of Education and Research’s statistics (November 10, 2010), 103 Elementary Schools (18% of the total number of the Elementary Schools) teach religious education (EHIS 2010). In spite of the Soviet ideology meant to destroy people’s religious identities, Estonians still have a good attitude toward Christianity even though they are not religious, but as regards Islam the figures are much lower. A survey called “World’s Values” (2001) demonstrated that Estonians have a low tolerance and a skeptical attitude toward foreigners (Realo 2004, 36). However, whatever is new and strange and does not fall within the societal rules normally falls within hate (Sarv 2010, 12). Western societies see Islam and Muslims as dangerous for their cultures and values, and it is an overall European trend to criticize this religion (Roald 2004, 61). Most literature, movies, TV shows, newspapers, magazines and websites show Islam in a negative way (Roald 2004, 65), mainly pointing out terrorism and the unfair treatment of women (Roald 2004, 69). However, although according to the Gallup survey Christianity is the biggest religion in the world with approximately 2.1 billion followers or 32% of the world population, Islam is second with 1.6 billion members, representing 23% of the world population in 2009 (BBC 2010). After all the negative propaganda there has to be a reason why people still convert to Islam.

Estonian Muslims Historically, Islam in Estonia is connected with the local Tatar minority. A sizeable Tatar community came to Estonia in the nineteenth century. In 1928, the Estonian Islamic Congregation was founded (Plaat et al. 2005, 7–8). Besides the Tatars, that congregation also unites the Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs and Uzbeks. In 1995, a second Islamic congregation was founded—the Estonian Muhammedian Sunni Congregation (Ringvee 2009). According to the 2000 Census there are twenty-eight Estonian women who declare as Muslims (Statistikaamet 2000). The number is now higher; however, a new Census is due.

Estonians and the Christian traditions—What Estonian Muslim Women have transferred to Islam According to the interviews in February 2010 with six Estonian women who have converted to Islam, one can see which Estonian and Christian traditions Estonian Muslim women have transferred to Islam and how their thinking is different from Muslim women in general.

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After completing the conversion process the most important and symbolic act is to choose a new Islamic name (Allievi 2006, 129). Changing the name means changing identity and being born again as a new person (Bourque 2006, 239), as well as taking religions obligations and responsibilities (Allievi 2006, 124): I have not changed my name officially, and I don’t see any point in doing it. There is no law that requires changing the official name to the Islamic name. Prophet Muhammad ordered to change the first name if this name means something bad, like Harb that means War. This was famous men’s name in pre-Islamic time, so men who converted to Islam normally changed their name to Salam (peace). (Respondent 6)

Koranic and Sharia Laws require covering from the neck to anklebones and the upper elbows (Hattstein 2008, 73). The Laws also require: … and tell the believing women to lower their gaze (from looking at forbidden things), and protect their private parts (from illegal sexual acts), and not to show off their adornment except only that which is apparent (like both eyes for necessity to see the way or, outer palms of hands or one eye or dress like veil, gloves, head, cover, apron, etc.), and to draw their veils all over Juyubihinna (i.e. their bodies, faces, necks and bosoms), and not to reveal their adornment except to their husbands, or their fathers, or their husband’s fathers, or their sons, or their husband’s sons, or their brothers or their brother’s sons, or their sister’s sons, or their (Muslim) women (i.e. their sisters in Islam), or the (female) slaves whom their right hands possess, or old male servants who lack vigour, or small children who have no sense of feminine sex …. (24:31b) (King Fadh Complec 1990)

Women’s clothes have to be spacious and modest and hide the body (Breuilly et al. 1999, 80). There is no opportunity for women to swim or to enjoy sunbathing, as they are taboo: I don’t veil because I don’t like to be recognized as a Muslim on the streets and get ridiculed. I would like to stay neutral. (Respondent 3) Yes, I’m going to the sun and to swim. (Respondent 4) I’m not exposing myself to the sun because I have a very white skin and I burn within seconds. I swim with normal swimming clothes. I have never

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By wearing Islamic clothes and veils, women do not have to care anymore about their figure or what other people think about them because only God and their husband’s opinion are important. It is a woman’s duty to look good for her husband (Bourque 2006, 242), and that is why she puts on make-up or a headdress at home (McGinty 2006, 102): I do not put make-up when I am at home, but when I go out, I put on something descrete. (Respondent 1) When I am going out, I put make-up such as mascara, light lipstick and seldom black eye liner. (Respondent 5)

The responsibility of Muslim women is to take care of the home and the upbringing of children (Haddad 2006, 34). Motherhood and being a housewife are highly appreciated (Bourque 2006, 240). Three Estonian Muslim women are working as a school teacher, a kindergarten teacher and a dentist. All are active in the community and have hobbies, even though this is not allowed in Islamic countries: I sing in a choir, go to handicraft courses and aerobic trainings. I also like to go to walk in the nature and take photos. (Respondent 1) I take part in events in the kindergarten, if they ask me. My favourite hobby is music; I like music instruments and I often play them at home. (Respondent 2) I sing in a choir, attend the language school, and I am taking part in a handicraft course. I am taking different training. My favourite hobbies are travelling, roller-skating, reading and walking. (Respondent 3) I like to walk, swim and read. I attend a language school. (Respondent 4) Photography was and still is my favourite hobby. (Respondent 5)

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Now I am pregnant so I am going to yoga, and I am taking part in the family school. Normally, I have so little time that I cannot take part in any courses or trainings. My favourite hobby is reading. Before, I also took part in aerobic, but now I don’t have time for that anymore. I also like to make handicrafts. My husband doesn’t decide what can be my hobbies or, how I spend my free time. (Respondent 6)

In Islamic law women are not allowed to travel alone; they have to have male guards who have to be at least ten years their senior (Roald 2004, 156–157): Normally, I travel alone, or with my children. (Respondent 1) I haven’t travelled alone until now, but I don’t see it will be problem if I will have to. (Respondent 3) I have travelled alone several times, and my husband has stayed at home. (Respondent 6)

Circumcision is not a part of Estonian culture and it is not necessary to regulate this matter with laws. Only Jews and Muslims are circumcised (Aasaru 2011): I am not going to let my boy get circumcised. I respect this custom, but I don’t see the need to follow it without medical sickness because it is easy to clean yourself under foreskin. (Respondent 2)

Normally parents raise children in the same religious tradition: I am trying to introduce faith to my child, but he has to have the interest because if I force him, then praying will look more like a punishment than a blessing. (Respondent 3)

Normally, Estonian Elementary and High schools have mixed classes, and at the same time Islamic tradition demands that boys and girls attend classes separately:

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Chapter Twelve It is natural for my child to go to the mixed class where boys and girls study together, but gymnastics has to be separated. (Respondent 2) I am happy with mixed classes; I don’t see any problem with it. (Respondent 3)

Women are allowed to let their children go to art classes where they have to paint naked people. In the Islamic tradition, the naked body is taboo: Yes, I let my child going to the art classes to paint naked people because naked bodies are a God’s creation. (Respondent 3)

In Islamic countries, state and religion are connected with each other, and everyday errands are a part of the religious life. Islamic schools are religious schools where pupils get religious education. In Estonia, state and religion are separated. Very few schools give religious education, and even then it is an optional subject. It is necessary to know about other religions, but at the same time there has to be an opportunity to choose one religion that child can learn deeply. (Respondent 1) It wasn’t very long ago when religious education was compulsory in schools. Nowadays, Estonians think it is totally incomprehensible, sometimes even ridiculous, that people believe in God and pray. I think, if we have religious education as a part of schools subjects again, it will change a lot for children’s worldview and the criminality level will go lower in the society. In Finland, religious education is a part of the school curriculum so why can’t we have it here too? In Islamic countries there are also different schools for Muslims and Christians, and if you want to put your child through school, you have to fill in the application where you have the question on which religious traditions your child follows. It gives an opportunity for children to choose the religion, and what is right and natural for her or him. If parents are Muslims, then the child will not study Christianity, but she or he will study religion, what she or he has already done at home. (Respondent 2) I think it’s good to know different religions. If you travel to other countries, that will help you understand different cultures. (Respondent 4)

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I think it’s a good idea because there are families where parents don’t speak about God and different religions. If there is a religious education in school, it will be a big opportunity for pupils to find religion they would like to follow. (Respondent 5) I don’t know the right answer because when I went to school we didn’t have religious education. But, at the same time, I believe if pupils learn different religions in schools they will have a wider worldview. People need to know why she or he has chosen a certain faith, instead of blindly following parental religion. (Respondent 6)

Estonian children’s hobbies usually depend on the place of residence and income of the family (Sotsiaalministeerium 2009, 108). Islamic laws do not play a role regarding Estonian Muslim children’s choices of hobbies: I don’t know about any training or courses that are against Islamic laws and, therefore, my children can take part in everything, whatever they choose. (Respondent 3)

It is forbidden to eat pork (Jawal 2006). The Holy documents state: “He has forbidden you only the Maitah (dead animals), and blood, and the flesh of swine, and that which is slaughtered as a sacrifice for others than Allah (or has been slaughtered for idols on which Allah’s Name has not been mentioned while slaughtering)” (2:173a) (King Fadh Complec 1990): If my child is at his friend’s birthday party and they don’t give anything else to eat than potato salad with pork sausages, then my child can eat that, but he needs to remove these sausage pieces from the plate. (Respondent 4)

Nightclubs are not a part of Muslim culture, and it is not common for Muslim girls to spend their time there drinking, looking at men, wearing “provocative” clothes, dancing in a front of men, etc.: If my child will want to, then she can go to a nightclub and she will not need to ask the permission from me. (Respondent 6)

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In Islamic countries, family is the cornerstone of the society. Allah gave the order to marry and raise children (Dodge 2003, 8). The Holy documents state: “O mankind! Be dutiful to your Lord, Who created you from a single person (Adam), and from him (Adam). He created his wife (Eve), and from them both He created many men and women; and fear Allah through whom you demand (your mutual rights), and (do not cut the relations of) the wombs (kinship). Surely, Allah is Ever an all-Watcher over you” (4:1) (King Fadh Complec 1990). It is the duty of the parent to choose a husband or a wife for their child. Marriage is the union between two families and two people (Breuilly et al. 1999, 76): It will be only my child’s decision whom she or he will like to live together with, and whom she or he will feel happy with. (Respondent 2)

In Islam, the man is the head of the family and is responsible for the financial situation (Wohlrab-Sahr 2006, 84): We decide together how to spend money, but if I’ll earn then I’ll decide how I will spend it. (Respondent 4) Normally, I decide how to spend the money because I know better how much we spend for taxes, food, etc. (Respondent 6)

The man has the right to physically punish his wife. The Holy documents state: “Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient (to Allah and to their husbands), and guard in the husband’s absence what Allah orders them to guard (e.g. their chastity, their husband’s property). As to those women on whose part you see ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next) refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly, if it is useful); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance) (4:34b)” (King Fadh Complec 1999): Violence never brings anything good to a relationship, and also it’s not a solution for problems. People have mouth to speak, and they do not have to use violence. (Respondent 2) I think violence is not allowed in marriage. (Respondent 4)

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In Islamic law, polygamy is allowed. The man can marry four women at the same time if he can take care of all of them in the same way, and if he treats them equally (Levy 2000, 100). A traditional Islamic country seeks a guarantee that every woman has a family security (Breuilly 1999, 7). The Holy documents state: “And if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphan-girls then marry (other) women of your choice, two or three, or four; but if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one or (the slaves) that your right hands possess. That is nearer to prevent you from doing injustice (4:3)” (King Fadh Complec 1999): I don’t like it, and I can’t accept that I have to share my husband with other women. Surely, I do not agree to be a second or a third wife to my husband. (Respondent 1) I have discussed it with him when we were engaged, and we both think it’s madness. Every person has only one heart; one heart can’t love two or more women equally. (Respondent 2) I support polygamy in the crisis situation. For example, after war when there are less men than women. But, I would never agree with having another woman in my marriage. (Respondent 3) My husband will never take another wife because he believes in only one true love. (Respondent 5)

Divorce is allowed, but Islamic culture does not respect this kind of decision (Meshab et al. 1990, 47). Prophet Muhammad has said: “Marry, but do not divorce because the throne of Allah will vacillate after that” (Breuilly et al. 1999, 76–77). Additionally, the Holy documents state: “If you fear a breach between them twain (the man and his wife), appoint (two) arbitrators, one from his family and the other from hers, if they both wish for peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation. Indeed, Allah is Ever All-Knower, Well. Acquainted with all things (4:35).” Besides that, “if they decide upon divorce, then Allah is All-Hearer, All-Knower” (2:227) (King Fadh Complec 1999). In 2007, 7,022 couples married and 3,802 divorced in Estonia (Sotsiaalministeerium 2009, 22). In 2007, there were also 24,000 families where only one parent took care of the children. In comparison to 2001,

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when the number was 32,400, the number of single parent families has gone from 16% to 14% (Sinisaar & Tammpuu 2009): Divorce is allowed, and I think woman have to have children, but the man has to give the money to his ex-wife to raise their children. (Respondent 1) Divorce is allowed, and children have to stay with the mother. (Respondent 5) If two people can’t live together then it’s not a good idea to continue with that marriage. It is better to divorce and finish the torture of the children. If children are small, they need to stay with their mother, but if they are older, they should have an opportunity to choose with which parent they would like to stay. (Respondent 6)

Islam dictates certain rules on what men and women have to follow to communicate with each other (Van Nieuwkerk 2006, 8). There is no opportunity for women to have male friends who are not a part of the family: I didn’t give up my male friends after I converted to Islam, but when I communicate with them I follow certain rules: I veil myself and I don’t hug them. (Respondent 1) I agree to visit a male doctor because health is more important. I can see a parallel with Islamic laws where it is written if a Muslim is in the desert and if the only food is pork and the drink is wine, a Muslim has to choose to eat and drink and not to die. In this case, life is more important than to follow Islamic laws in this case. (Respondent 6)

After the Reformation reached Estonia, Lutheranism developed into the largest religious affiliation. According to the 1934 census, about 874,000 individuals, approximately every third Estonian, belonged to the Lutheran Church and that is the reason why, sometimes, it has been erroneously viewed that this church was, and still is, the “state church” (Ringvee Lutheranism 2009). The Soviet occupation failed in destroying centuries-old Christian traditions such as Christmas, Easter, St. John’s Day, St. Catherine’s Day and St. Martin’s Day, even though Estonians might not properly understand these customs. On Christmas Eve, people

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traditionally go to the church even if they are not believers, and after returning home they have a Christmas dinner. Starting from the beginning of the last century, Santa Claus has come during Christmas Eve to bring gifts to children (ERM 2011). Elves, who bring gifts to children over advent, became famous through Finnish TV during the 1970s (Kübar & Pajula 2000). From the nineteenth century onwards it became a tradition to paint eggs with onionskin during the Easter time to celebrate new life as an allusion to Jesus’ resurrection. Saint John’s day was named after John the Baptist and, traditionally, Estonians make a fire, sing, dance, play music, have a barbeque and go to find the blossom of fern on that night. On Saint Catherine’s and Saint Martin’s Days, Estonians disguise themselves as beggars and visit homes to bring good luck. Estonians love Saint John’s day and painting eggs during Easter, but few of them know where exactly these traditions came from and what they are actually celebrating (Heidmets et al. 2002, 22–23). It is interesting to see what Estonian women who have converted to Islam think of these customs: In Grandmother’s place, dwarfs bring gifts to children. (Respondent 1) Christmas is a family celebration. How can I have something against spending valuable time with my family and with the people I love? Nowadays, everybody’s lifestyle is fast and full of duties, many people work abroad and we meet each other rarely. Christmas is the time when everybody comes home. And, I don’t know any child who has anything against getting presents. I don’t believe in Christmas, but it’s my family’s tradition. St. Catherine’s and St. Martin’s Day are just interesting and fun days for children. (Respondent 2) We—my husband and our children—celebrate Estonian National Holidays like my parents do. For example, we have Christmas dinner, but Santa Claus hasn’t come for a long time, but still everybody needs to read poetry to get a gift. My children met Santa Claus in kindergarten. During Easter time, we paint eggs with different colors, and on St. John’s Day we sit around the fire and have a barbeque. (Respondent 6)

In Islamic tradition, Friday afternoon prayer is the most important religious activity (Waines 2003, 128). Friday for Muslims is like Sunday for Christians or Saturday for Jews.

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In Islam, there is only one God who does not have a son and who does not act through another divine person (Anderson 2008, 44). The Holy documents state: “No son (or offspring) did Allah Beget, nor is there any God along with Him (23:91a)” (King Fadh Complec 1990). Islam believes that Christians have deformed God’s message (Gordon 1991, 45) because they let their own words and thoughts mix with God’s message, and do not follow Allah’s teaching (Lewis & Churchill, 2008, p. 22). The Koran is the uppermost direction for people’s lives (Morgan 2010, 18), regulating the everyday life of Muslims from their birth until death (Subbamma 1988, 1): I believe in the same God who created the earth and the sky. I didn’t change my belief, but I changed religious rituals from Christianity to Islam. I feel that I believe in the same God in front of whom Jesus Christ bowed. I read about it for the first time from the Bible when I converted to Islam. Everything that Jesus told, I agree with—there is only one God and Jesus just brings His message. But, mainly I’m a fan of the Sermon on the Mount. Jesus is for Muslims the Last Judging Day’s Messiah. I feel, just now, when I’m a Muslim that I follow Jesus’ words exactly. (Respondent 3) I think that people who are not Muslims, but who make good things in their life and help another people will go to Paradise. (Respondent 1) I appreciate all believers no matter which religion they are from, but it is the matter of how they live their lives, and how much they are devoting their lives to God. Believers without benefaction and good thoughts are the same as unbelievers. Islam doesn’t condemn other religions because God has sent his prophets to the world through history. Some of them are mentioned in the Koran, like Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, etc. But, there are many prophets who are not mentioned, that’s why a real Muslim who fears God, respects other religions because probably God’s messenger brought also the message to this religion. Many religions have changed this message, and have written something in addition or taken something off. That is a reason why God again and again has sent new messengers with the same message to the world. The message has never changed, and all religions have it written into their dogmas: Don’t do this to another person, what you don’t want him or her to do to you. (Respondent 3)

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I don’t think anything bad about others religions, I accept all of them. I respect Christians if they respect me. But, there is one thing that I don’t like—that they visit homes and on the streets they offer books and want to speak about religion. (Respondent 5) God sent a messenger of Christianity before to Islam. Christians are the ancestors of Muslims or their older brothers. There are many common things between Christianity and Islam so it will be easy to have a dialog between these two religions in the Estonian society. (Respondent 6)

Estonia is considered a country with a low tolerance toward Islam. The respondents comment on this: At the moment I live in Estonia, but I have planned to live in Egypt very soon. I like the culture and the lifestyle there. Most of the people are Muslims, and this is the reason why it is easier to live there because there is too much malignancy here. (Respondent 1) As a Muslim, I would like to live in an Islamic country; the Emirates or Indonesia would be ideal for me. I would like to live in an Islamic country because Muslim’s everyday life is connected with God, and this is also the case with me. I would like to be more with people who think the same way as I do. When I visited Egypt, I felt God’s peace and harmony everywhere, and people are trying to keep it inside them. For this reason, it is harder for me in Estonia because here we have different values, and it is a taboo to talk about God. (Respondent 3) I myself can live here, but for children it is better to go to live somewhere else. (Respondent 4) Yes, I have a plan to go away from here, maybe to Morocco or to England. People are more open and friendly over there than here. (Respondent 5)

Conclusion Estonian women who have converted to Islam have transferred Estonian and Christian’s ideas to Islam. They did not find Islam through the Estonian Muslim community. From their answers, it appears they

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never mention the Tatars who are the major Muslim religious group in Estonia. Estonian women have found Islam because they have lived abroad, communicated with Muslims, and have made an attempt to find an answer to the question of who God is. The internet has played an important role in research about Islam and finding Muslim friends. Most of the women have Christian backgrounds but are confused by dogmas like the Holy Trinity, and who Jesus Christ was. Christianity has appeared to be too complicated for them, being full of mysticism and the irrational. They did not find answers to their questions from Christianity, and this is the main reason why they continued looking for God, and the truth and purpose of life, through other religions. After their own research, they found what they were looking for in Islam. Estonian women who converted to Islam have multiple identities— they are Muslims, but at the same time they are Estonians. They follow the five steps in Islam: credo, praying five times a day, giving to charity, celebrating Ramadan and they want to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca, but at the same time they follow the Estonian tradition which is forbidden in Islam, such as sunbathing and swimming in a normal swimming suit that shows their bodies, as well as celebrating traditional Christian holidays that they see through the Estonian culture, and not as religious festivities. Some of these women have chosen Islamic names but have not changed their names in their passports. They use their Islamic names only when they communicate with other Muslims. Muslim women can be recognized on streets by their clothes and veils. In order to avoid the situations where people make decisions about them only on the basis of their personal appearance, certain Muslim women have chosen not to cover themselves. It is natural for Estonian women to put make up on before going out. Some Estonian Muslim women still have this custom because they were used to doing so before converting to Islam, and this is seen as a means of achieving self-confidence. Estonian Muslim women have hobbies such as sunbathing, going to aerobic training, walking alone in nature, travelling, etc.—things that are not allowed in Islamic countries. They did not change their hobbies after conversion to Islam because they still like the same things, and this is the part of their identities. From the answers we saw that, even though they are Muslims, they still have Estonian cultural backgrounds that influence their thoughts. They do not agree with circumcision or forcing their children to follow their religion, banning their children from going to nightclubs, etc. The

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child is the only one who chooses his or her future marriage because he or she will know what kind of person he or she would like to live with. Estonian Muslim women see husbands as equals. As most husbands are not Estonians, women make decisions on how to spend their money because they know better how much something costs, etc. None of them agree to tolerate violence in their marriages, and if that happens it would be a possible reason for divorce. Women celebrate Christian holidays because they have grown up with Estonian culture. Christmas is a very special time for Estonians when the whole family gathers together for Christmas dinner, and Santa Claus brings presents to children. A holy day in Estonia is Sunday whereas Friday is an ordinary working day. From the answers, we can see that Estonian Muslim women do not celebrate Friday in a special way. One of them still feels Sunday is a holy day for her. Estonian Muslim women are very tolerant. One of them has nothing against her child painting naked bodies in art classes even if nudity is against Islamic laws. She pointed out that the naked body is also God’s creation. Estonian Muslim Women respect Christianity and this shows that they are very tolerant in comparison to the Estonians from the Saar Poll “Faith in our lives” survey (2010). According to the survey, among people to whom faith is very important the percentage of those who have a good attitude toward Islam is only 18.9%. Estonian Muslim women even think it would be a good idea to have a dialogue between these two religions as it would surely help to increase tolerance. Another thing that came out is giving children religious education in schools, which helps to give them a wider worldview, which can be the opposite from the media’s negative propaganda, according to which Islam supports terrorism and the unfair treatment of women (Roald 2004, 69). From the answers it appears that women who have a university degree are more tolerant and open-minded than women who have a lower education. Educated women found meaning or what God wanted for them and do not follow Islamic laws blindly. Women with a lower education have more conservative views, and follow the laws more strictly. This has a bad influence on their daily social lives and they feel that society is intolerant and does not respect their religious choice, and that is the reason they would like to leave Estonia and go to live in another country. Estonian converts are more independent than Muslim women in general. Estonian Muslims like to make decisions in how they live their lives and what kind of customs and traditions they follow. They have

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transferred Estonian Christian culture and traditions to Islam, and that is why they are different from Muslim women in general.

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Realo, A. (2004). Individualism ja Kollektivism Eesti Moodi. Eesti ja Eestlased Võrdlevas Perspektiivis. Kultuuridevahelisi Uurimusi 20. Sajandi Lõpust. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus. Riiklike Perepoliitika Meetmete Analüüs. (2008). Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs Website. http://www.sm.ee/fileadmin /meedia/Dokumendid/Sotsiaalvaldkond/ko gumik/Analuuus.pdf (accessed April 7, 2011). Ringvee, R. (2000, motified 2009). Etnic Religious Minorities. Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia Website. http://www.estonica.org/en/Culture/Religion/Ethnic_religious_ minorities (accessed April 6, 2011). —. (2000, motified 2009). General Presentation: Estonia. Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia Website. http://www.eurel.info/EN/index.php?_pais=63&rubrique=726 (accessed April 5, 2011). —. (2000, motified 2009). Institutional Organization. Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia Website. http://www.estonica.org/en/Culture/Religion/Institutional_ organisation/ (accessed April 4, 2011). —. (2000, modified 2009). Recent Historical Background of the Religious SituationinEstonia. Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia Website. http://www.estonica.org/en/Culture/Religion/Recent_historical_backgr ound_of_the_religious_situation_in_Estonia/ (accessed April 5, 2011). Roald, A. S. (2004). New Muslims in the European Context: The Experience of Scandinavian Converts. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. Saar Poll. (2010) Usust Meie Elus. Kiriku ja Religiooni Uuring. Saar Poll, Social and market research Website. http://www.saarpoll.ee/UserFiles/File/Kiriku_uuring_SLAIDID(1).pdf (accessed April 5, 2011). Sarv, T. (2010). Peksta ja Kallistada. Arvamuslugusid Eestist ja Eestlastest. Tallinn: Eesti Ajalehed AS. Schihalejev, O. (2009). Estonian Young People, Religion and Religious Diversity: Personal Views and the Role of the School: [doktoritöö – doctore thesis]. Tartu: Tartu University Press. Sinisaar, H. & Tammpuu, P. (2009). Ühe Vanemaga Pered: Probleemid, Vajadused ja Poliitikameetmed. Ministry of Social Affairs, Researches and Analyses in Social Sector Website. http://www.sm.ee/fileadmin/meedia/Dokumendid/Sotsiaalvaldkond/ko gumik/yhevanemagaperedtrykki.pdf (accessed April 4, 2011).

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Statistika (2010). Eesti Hariduse Infosüsteem Website: http://www.ehis.ee (accessed April 6, 2011). Subbamma, M. (1988). Islam and Women. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers. Translation of the meanings of THE NOBLE QURAN in the English Language (2010). King Fadh Complec for the printing of the Holy Quran. Madinah, Saudi Arabia Van Nieuwkerk, K. (2006). “Gender and Conversion to Islam in the West.” In Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West, Van Nieuwkerk, K. (ed.). Austin: University of Texas Press. Waines, D. (2003). Sissejuhatus Islamisse. Tallinn: Avita. Wohlrab-Sahr, M. (2006). Sumbolizing Distance: Conversion to Islam in Germany and the United States.In Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West, Van Nieuwkerk, K. (ed.). Austin: University of Texas Press.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN THE RELIGIOUS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY OF MUSLIM CONVERTS IN BRITAIN LEON MOOSAVI

Introduction Recent estimates suggest that there are around 80,000 Muslim converts in Britain (Brice 2010, 10–12). Similar patterns are found in numerous other European countries where tens of thousands more people have converted to Islam. This significant number of converts is partly related to the increased exposure that Islam has had since 9/11, which occasionally leads to people adopting Islamic teachings. It is also testament to the persistence of religion in the lives of many Europeans who, despite what is often assumed, have not dismissed religion as an irrational and ancient dogma, but rather seek purpose and direction in alternative spiritualities. In this chapter I explore the religious and national identities of British Muslim converts in a context where questions are often asked about whether Muslims can reconcile loyalty to both their faith and the nonMuslim European nations they live in. I will argue that some people who convert to Islam do prioritise their Muslim identity over their British identity to some extent. Yet, I will also argue that it is more common for them to remain committed to their British identity after converting to Islam, and in fact, in some instances, their conversion to Islam can enhance their loyalty, allegiance and sense of belonging towards Britain.

Methodology The arguments offered in this chapter are based on extensive research conducted with British Muslim converts in 2008 to 2009. Thirty-seven Muslim converts were interviewed using a semi-structured approach. The interviewees were recruited through my own personal contacts, through

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posters that were distributed to around 150 mosques, through Islamic organisations, through snowball sampling and finally through an emerging research tool—Facebook. Diverse cohorts of interviewees were recruited which included fifteen men and twenty-two women aged between eighteen and seventy-four. The majority of the interviewees identified as “white” but there was also six “mixed-race” converts and four “black” converts. Overall, five had no qualifications, fourteen had school/college qualifications and eighteen had university qualifications. A variety of occupations were represented in the cohorts including students, nurses, teachers, lecturers, office workers, engineers, manual workers, and managers. Others were self-employed, retired, unemployed, or full-time parents. The interviewees’ length of time as a Muslim ranged from just two months to thirty years, with an average of five and a half years as a Muslim amongst all interviewees. The thirty-seven interviews enabled me to gain precious insights into the converts’ experiences and perspectives. They were dynamic conversations in which the converts shared many of their heartfelt emotions and talked candidly about their interactions with other people. Admittedly, the interviews were contextual interactions where knowledge was coproduced by both the interviewer and the interviewee (Armbruster 2008, 6–7; Rapley 2007, 16; Sands et al. 2007, 356). However, that does not mean that they did not provide valuable inroads into British Muslim converts’ lives. In technical terms, despite inevitably suffering from interviewer-bias, interviews can still provide both internal and external validity, where what we hear from the interviewees is true for them and even true for others (Appleton 1995, 996; Bryman 2004, 28–29). This chapter, therefore, offers one possible account of converts’ lives and should not be taken as an exhaustive depiction, but nonetheless is one that I am confident is both valid and reliable.

Case Study There is a distinct concern in numerous European nations that Muslims residing there are potentially disloyal, a so-called fifth column or the “enemy-within.” In Britain, these fears of a lack of loyalty solidified during The Satanic Verses episode in 1989, continued with the First Gulf War in 1990, and were reignited at various points such as during the 2001 riots that involved Muslims in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, as well as after 9/11 and 7/7 (Allen 2010, 43–44; Bagguley & Hussain 2005, 209– 210; McGhee 2008, 8, 29–30, 82–85; Poynting & Mason 2007; Seddon et al. 2003, v; Weller 2008, 155–165, 194–196). Yet, these concerns about

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Muslims as a threat to the nation can be traced back much further to a Medieval perception of Islam as a threat to Europe, which developed when Muslims began conquering lands close to and within European territory (Matar 2009, 214–215). This legacy has resulted in a widespread suspicion about the loyalty of Muslims in European nations, so much so that one British poll found that only 36% of the British public regard Muslims as loyal to Britain (Gallup 2009, 20; Gardham 2009; Green 2009) while another poll found that only 28% of the British public believe Muslims in Britain want to integrate into British society (PEW 2011, 55). The concern that Muslims do not have loyalty to Britain has led to a climate whereby Muslims are often called upon to integrate (meaning assimilate according to many commentators) into European nations, adopt European values and pledge their allegiance to the nation (Archer 2009, 74; Kundnani 2007; McGhee 2008, 134–135; Modood 2005, ix). This perception of Muslims as disloyal extends to Muslim converts who have equally been viewed as having inadequate allegiance to the European nations they live in. This perception of converts has been well explained with regards to several European countries including Denmark (Jensen 2008), Germany (Özyürek 2009), and Sweden (McGinty 2007, 475–476). The British Muslim converts I interviewed also explained that it was a perception they often encountered as they were regularly told that they were “traitors” for converting to Islam. They encountered this hostility that doubted their commitment to Britain from strangers who verbally abused them, but also from relatives and friends who were less aggressive, but still comprehended their conversion to Islam in terms of betrayal. Laura, a thirty-five year-old mental health nurse, explained how she believes people see her as a traitor: [A Muslim convert] might be seen as almost being a traitor against your own country, you know because there’s so many people who have a problem with Muslims, and then you’re there being English and you’re going over to the “dark side” if you like! … So many people don’t like Muslims, hate Muslims, and then there’s me, obviously English, and I’ve [supposedly] gone away from my own culture or whatever. (Laura)

Converts to Islam are, therefore, often perceived as having abandoned the nation by converting to Islam and relinquished any loyalty they had towards the nation. There is a long history behind such feelings towards Muslim converts as traitors. Indeed, during the colonial era, Britons who converted to Islam were seen as “renegades” who undermined the Empire and effectively committed treason (Dalrymple 2002, 17–20; Gilliat-Ray

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2010, 17–18; Zebiri 2008, 32–33). Today, they are still seen as renegades, but are now labelled as traitors. This perception of Muslim converts as threats to the nation has been reinforced by high-profile politicians who have suggested that Muslim converts are likely to engage in terrorism against the nation. For instance, Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of British anti-terror laws (Elias 2008), Alard du Bois-Reymond, the Director of the Swiss Office for Migration (Slater 2010), and Wolfgang Bosbach and Günther Beckstein, two senior members of Angela Merkel’s political party in Germany (Özyürek 2009, 91), have all singled out Muslim converts and warned of the specific danger they pose to their respective nations. Muslim converts have also been explicitly understood in this manner in the British government’s counter-terrorism policy (Home Office 2011, 87), and a key European report on “radicalisation in European’s Muslim communities” (Emerson 2009, 16), both of which contain specific references to Muslim converts’ supposed susceptibility to engaging in extremism and/or terrorism. The news and entertainment media have also played a role in encouraging this perception of Muslim converts as it is common for them to be depicted as threatening, traitorous and extreme. Indeed, Kevin Brice found that 76% of news stories about Muslim converts between 2001 and 2010 related converts to terrorism and/or fundamentalism (Brice 2010, 14). One example of this imagining of converts is found in the British film Four Lions (2010), a comedy which mocks an amateur terrorist cell’s attempts to plan a terrorist attack in Britain, in which one of the main characters is a Muslim convert called Barry who is portrayed as the most dangerous of the terrorist cell, who has an obsession with violence. A wide range of news features that reinforce this image have also manifested in articles such as in Al-Qaeda’s White Army of Terror (Elias 2008), Pakistan Discovers “Village” of White German al-Qaeda Insurgents (Nelson & Hall 2009), West Fears Converts Who Become Bombers (UPI 2010), White Britons “Called Steve and Gerry Killed Fighting for Al Qaeda in Pakistan” by U.S. Drone Missile (Gardner & Faulkner 2010) and Osama Bin Laden’s Anti-U.S. Strategy: Exploit Minority Converts (Thomas 2011). As well as European politicians and European media encouraging converts to be seen as disloyal to the nation, some fringe extremist Muslims have also been complicit in generating this idea by calling upon other Muslims to attack European nations and declaring that all nonMuslim Europeans are the enemies. My own findings are in sharp contrast to the popular imagining of Muslim converts as traitors to the nation. All of the Muslim converts I interviewed showed signs of being decent citizens who respected others,

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helped others, worked hard, educated themselves, raised families, paid taxes, obeyed the law, and so on. Furthermore, the majority of the interviewees told me explicitly that since converting to Islam, they had not become hostile to the nation or felt that becoming Muslim meant they had to abandon any attachment to Britain. Their sense of belonging remained intact, and in some instances had even been enhanced by converting to Islam, as was the case for Sumayyah, a twenty-four-year-old A Level student: Well, I suppose I’m very proud to be British now that I’m Muslim. Before, I didn’t really think of it. Before, I was Muslim I just thought about myself, but now I’m Muslim, and I’m very proud to be a British Muslim because … I just am! Now I’m very proud to be a British Muslim, yeah, yeah I am … [Since converting to Islam, people have asked me:] “Why are you so British?” and things like this. Yeah, it’s like they don’t want you to be so English and I’m like: “Well you know, I am very English and I’m very happy to be English,” and they kind of look at it as if it’s a bad thing because I’m so British … It’s like sometimes, I’ll invite some Muslim woman to my house and I’ll make them fish and chips or something just to show them … But yeah, I like to think of myself as British but you know … I’m gonna keep my culture …. (Sumayyah)

Sumayyah’s comments convey the way in which some consider conversion to Islam as entailing a departing from the nation. Sumayyah is quite clearly comfortable in reconciling her Muslim identity with her British identity. She does not do this indifferently and ambivalently, but actively contests those who challenge her attachment to the nation in order that she may retain her sense of Britishness. One way she does this is by appropriating the stereotypically British food of fish and chips. Significantly, she even cooks it at home for her friends even though it is a dish that is most commonly associated with being bought from chip shops. Sumayyah’s feelings about where she belongs do not give credence to those who believe converts should be seen as traitors who wish to abandon the nation after converting to Islam. The same can be said about Sofia, a twenty-two-year-old office worker, who held similar views to Sumayyah in that she also seemed to not only be proud of being British, but actively asserted this aspect of her identity after converting to Islam: I’m kind of more protective of [being British since I converted to Islam] … So I’ll be sitting there and someone will be saying something about food and I’ll say: “Yeah, but it’s all about the roast dinner and you guys have got to catch up!” In that sense it makes me think it’s special what I’ve got

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being Muslim and having another part of my background. So it’s reinforced it in that way. (Sofia)

Like Sumayyah, Sofia also mentions food whilst explaining that becoming Muslim made her more likely to identify as British. For Sofia, it is not fish and chips that represent Britishness, but rather it is another stereotypical British meal of a roast dinner, which she celebrates as a way of illustrating to her lifelong Muslim friends that she still considers herself British and is not ashamed about that. In both examples, food operates as a marker of banal nationalism that allows each interviewee to assert how they position themselves in relation to national membership. Through their choices of fish and chips and roast dinners, rather than curry and samosas, they label themselves as having more affiliation to Britain than to Pakistan or anywhere else. It is their cultural knowledge of what the appropriate food to consume for one who belongs in the nation is, and their proud declaration that they abide by this knowledge, that they display in order to make their allegiance to the nation clear. Sumayyah and Sofia both offer unambiguous and typical examples that show how it is not only possible for Muslim converts to remain attached to the nation after converting to Islam, but even to become more conscious and dedicated to reinforcing their belonging within the nation. The Muslim converts I interviewed also expressed their affinity with the nation in other ways. For instance, they praised Britain for accommodating Muslims and permitting freedom of religion, in contrast to other countries where there is religious authoritarianism which would have hindered their ability to change their religion and practice it. For example, Dean, a forty-one-year-old unemployed electrician, remarked: We’ve got freedom of speech in this country, we’ve got freedom of religion, which in a lot of countries you haven’t, so I think Islam and Muslims in this country, yes, it’s a good country to be in. (Dean)

Similarly, Sumayyah said she feels she belongs in Britain because: We have mosques, we’re allowed to pray, we have halal meat, we’re allowed to play Qur’an very loud and things … So I think it’s a nice place to be Muslim because we’re allowed to put mosques up anywhere. (Sumayyah)

These comments from Dean and Sumayyah, which were echoed by several other converts, reveal a favourable assessment of the nation in

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contrast to others. They show the beginnings of a patriotism that celebrates the nation for its virtues that other nations do not have. Significantly, positive attributes, such as freedom of religion, were attributed to Britain as a nation rather than being a feature of some quarters of society. Moreover, these comments were often appended with harsh criticisms of Muslim-majority societies who were scathed for failing to allow freedom of religion. Generally, in the Muslim converts’ direct comparisons between Muslim nations and the British nation, they often ranked Britain as superior and more deserving of their respect. The Muslim converts also frequently extended this celebration of the nation to British citizens, whom several of the converts see as inherently virtuous. Aaron, a twenty-one-year-old admin assistant, suggested that the non-Muslim Britons often personify Islamic characteristics more than Muslims, and that Muslims should learn these noble characteristics from non-Muslim Britons: I see some non-Muslims who are better Muslims than some of the Muslims I know. I can’t judge people but I know some Muslims who don’t pray, who drink, who do drugs, this and that, and I know some Christians1 who are pretty much Muslims if you know what I mean. (Aaron)

Like several other interviewees, Aaron championed non-Muslim Britons in a manner that a patriot would champion the people of their nation. His preference of some non-Muslim Britons over Muslims shows that his commitment to other people is not based on whether they are categorised as Muslim or non-Muslim, but rather on whether they embody noble characteristics that he believes can be found amongst Muslims and non-Muslims. It is because many of the converts had the same perception that they remained friendly with non-Muslims whom they knew from before their conversion to Islam. Several of the converts were still loyal to their non-Muslim friends, wanted to be a positive influence in their lives and even believed converting to Islam meant they are obliged to be even better friends in the same way many felt more dutiful to the nation after their conversion. For most Muslim converts, conversion to Islam does not result in an abandonment of the nation or even feelings of animosity towards it. Rather, the converts showed signs of patriotism that included attachment to the nation, admiration of it, and a desire to belong. None of this 1

The interviewees often used “non-Muslim” and “Christian” interchangeably, although they are not equivalent.

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sentiment was at the expense of a firm adherence to Islam. In fact, some of the most devout converts I interviewed were also the most defensive of being loyal citizens to the nation. The converts were, therefore, comfortable identifying with a hybrid identity as “British Muslims.” They had what Nasar Meer (2010) refers to as “twoness.” They fused two identities together, believed they were compatible, and in some instances mutually reinforcing, by which I mean they believed being a good Muslim meant being a good Briton and vice versa. The Muslim converts’ hybridity contests the presumed incompatibility between holding a Muslim identity and a European national identity concurrently. This notion of hybridity, whereby the Muslim converts have multiple attachments simultaneously, is evident in the way in which they frequently referred to themselves as some type of conduit between Muslims and non-Muslims. They desired to be “bridge builders,” whereby they mediate and seek reconciliation between Muslims and non-Muslims in this era when they are alleged to clash frequently. Several other researchers have also found this desire to be common amongst Muslim converts (Al-Toma 2008; Haddad 2006, 43; Jensen 2008, 401; Nieuwkerk 2006a, 5; Zebiri 2008, 84–86). Bakri, a forty-four-year-old holistic therapist, expressed a desire to “build bridges” before I had even suggested it to him: I think again it’s about building bridges between communities. Equally I’ve had a lot of people coming and asking me about … Like non-Muslims coming and asking me about Islam. I’ve had it from the other side too when people say: “But why do [non-Muslim] people do that? Why do English people do that and this, that and the other?” (Bakri)

As with the numerous other converts who expressed a desire to fulfil this role of “bridge building,” Bakri demonstrates a dual belonging as one would only care to build bridges between two entities if both sides of the bridge were deemed as important. The converts who took up this role of “bridge building” show their concern for the nation in seeking to create harmony within it. Bakri acts as an ambassador to the nation on behalf of Muslims to whom he wants to explain Islam, but also as an ambassador for the nation to the Muslims he educates about non-Muslim Britons. The converts here show a dual loyalty that Laura explained as follows: I suppose you’ve got like a foot in both camps, haven’t you? (Laura)

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This tendency to defend Britain and non-Muslim Britons was common as several of the converts informed me that they regularly dispute with Muslims who make disparaging generalisations about non-Muslim Britons, showing again how the converts can be defensive of the nation. They were notably hurt when the nation was written off which prompted them to call into question the criticisms that were made. Alison, a twentyyear-old undergraduate student, also explained how she took on that role: If I’m with my Muslim friends and they say something about the way nonMuslims act, I’ll be quick to say: “You can’t judge them in that way, you can’t make those assumptions, you can’t think of them as that.” (Alison)

Like Bakri, Alison is also defensive of non-Muslim Britons, and in being so reveals her affinity towards the nation and its citizens. In her research on Muslim converts, Laura Zahra McDonald also found this hybridity and merging of identities in the tendency she observed for Muslim converts to begin using “Islamic names,” but also to continue using their non-Muslim British names too (McDonald 2008). Like the converts I interviewed, these converts seemingly added to their existing identity rather than replaced it, and were satisfied harmonising dual loyalties. Overall, the converts willingly testified as loyal to Britain, and belonging within the nation. Aaron’s comments show just how deep the patriotism could be: Just because it’s not a Muslim State, it’s still a beautiful, wonderful country … because the history of it is amazing, just the actual country itself, most of the people are lovely. You find it hard to find anywhere else like this in the world to live in because you’re so free to practise your religion … At the end of the day, if something did happen in this country, then you’re still gonna fight for this country … If someone attacked this country, and attacked my family, attacked my community, me as a Muslim, I’d be fighting alongside the non-Muslims against those who are trying to damage the community and trying to invade the country … At the end of the day, I am as much of a British citizen as the next guy. (Aaron)

While I have thus far demonstrated that Muslim converts can be imagined as disloyal to the nation for converting to Islam, even though many of them articulate a belonging to the nation, it is important to acknowledge that there have been numerous examples of Muslim converts around the world who have adopted radical hostility towards “the West” in recent years and proudly attacked “Western” nations and their citizens.

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These “small minority of converts are attracted to radical or militant Islam, although these have received a high profile in the media, creating the impression that they are more numerically significant than is in fact the case” (Zebiri 2008, 47). The most notorious of these extremist converts are Adam Gadahn (spokesman for Al Qaeda), Zachary Chesser (sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for threatening South Park cartoonists in 2011), Richard Reid (attempted a shoe-bombing on an aeroplane in December 2001), Germaine Lindsay (a suicide bomber on 7/7, 2005), and Nicky Reilly (attempted a suicide bombing in Britain in 2009). This handful of extremist converts are a minor fraction of the tens of thousands of Muslim converts in Britain, or the hundreds of thousands of Muslim converts worldwide, but the amount of news media coverage they receive can result in the perception that this type of treachery is more common than it is. While the converts I interviewed were overwhelmingly comfortable as “British Muslims,” as I have already explained, there were some comments in the interviews that suggest that converting to Islam did diminish some of the converts’ loyalty to Britain that are important to investigate. For example, Rizwan, an unemployed fifty-five-year-old, was adamant that his Muslim identity comes before his British identity: I’m British and I’m a Muslim; a Muslim first though. I don’t … To me, my first person [sic] is Allah and I’m a Muslim. If I say that I’m British first and Muslim second, I can’t, I don’t see how that would work. (Rizwan)

It is interesting that Rizwan ranks his allegiance in such a manner because asking Muslims in Britain whether they place their Muslim identity or British identity first is seen as the acid test of whether one is a loyal enough or not. Rizwan’s comments may be read as a direct confession of not being loyal enough to the nation, something that some are deeply troubled by. Indeed, minorities in contemporary Britain are not expected to voice such views because we live “[a]t a time when being a good Briton equals being a proud Briton … [when] all citizens, but especially minorities, are expected to reiterate their allegiance to Britishness and their pride in the nation” (Fortier 2008, 35). Elsewhere, Peter, a thirty-five-year-old warehouse operator, expressed some discontent with British society after converting to Islam because he saw British culture as the antipathy of what it meant to be a Muslim, which led him to even considering leaving Britain to live in a Muslimmajority society:

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Peter is antagonistic towards the nation because he perceives it to be engulfed in vice and sin. It is almost as if the nation has betrayed Peter and his Islamic morality, which leads him to respond by rejecting the nation. He seems to undergo what Tina Gudrun Jensen found some Danish Muslim converts to do, which is a “self-imposed exclusion” (2008, 396) based on a perception of Danish culture as being about “eating pork, drinking alcohol, participating in parties and sexual promiscuity” (2008, 395). In undertaking this “self-imposed exclusion,” Peter shows that he has considered whether he belongs in Britain and concluded that he belongs elsewhere, showing an emerging sense of having an affinity with other nations than the one he was born and raised within. His conversion to Islam has initiated a distancing from the nation as he believes the more of a “good Muslim” one wants to be, the further away from the nation one has to move, both literally and metaphorically. Michael, a twenty-eight-year-old software programmer, echoed Peter’s desire to quit Britain after converting to Islam when he told me: For me personally, I’d like to immigrate to a different country. (Michael)

His reasons were similar to Peter’s in that he thought he could be a better Muslim elsewhere and face less restrictions and distractions. The most blatant interviewee who admitted that his allegiance to Britain had diminished after converting to Islam was Zach, a twenty-fiveyear-old trainee teacher, who answered simply but confidently with “Dramatically” (Zach) when I asked him if his loyalty to Britain had decreased since becoming a Muslim. He made his loyalties clear when he said:

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First and last, I belong to the Muslim ummah and that’s it really. (Zach)

Unlike Rizwan, Zach did not rank a British identity second; he did not rank it at all. He also said: My loyalty has changed hugely actually [since I became Muslim] … For a long time I wanted to be in the Armed Forces … And so I was supportive of my nation generally. It’s only since becoming a Muslim that I’ve really become aware of the realities that exist in the world and that the way that the media portrays world events is not as it truly is … This has just opened my eyes in another way, completely. And, because of this I cannot hold allegiance to Britain in the same way. It’s a colonialist nation … or, at least it was and still holds that legacy. And it supports a similar activity in its support of the United States. So … you know, it’s a sort of matter of conscience isn’t it? You can’t support a nation which promotes so much injustice. (Zach)2

Some might say that Zach deserves to be labelled a “traitor” because he admits that his conversion to Islam led to him relinquishing his allegiance to Britain. However, while this conclusion may be appropriate based on this passage, other views expressed by Zach reveal a rather different understanding. For example, Zach also believed that British people were generally admirable, that it was important to be law-abiding and that Muslims should seek to improve British society. While he was rather enthusiastic in expressing his disloyalty then, he had remained in Britain, had not made any plans to leave (three years since the interview he is still here), he did not boycott non-Muslims in any way, and he was 2

Admitting such a position in post-9/11 and post-7/7 Britain, where a lot of counter-terrorism investigation focuses on Muslims, is not an easy position to take, especially to a researcher whom one does not know well. I do not think it was a coincidence that Zach was the only Muslim convert to unashamedly admit having no loyalty towards the nation and that he was the only interviewee who was my personal friend and neighbour prior to me requesting an interview. In other words, he knew I was not a spy and could trust me, allowing him to be honest about his thoughts on this sensitive issue. Therefore, the sentiments expressed by Zach may be more popular amongst Muslim converts than I got a sense for in the interviews. However, I do not mean to suggest that any of the interviewees who were positive about their allegiance to Britain were just saying what they thought I wanted to hear, especially because there were instances when positive comments were made convincingly and passionately in an atmosphere that I would like to think was infused with trust.

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generally a decent and peaceful citizen who contributed to the local economy and was striving to assist wider society by training to be a secondary-school teacher. This type of lifestyle was common amongst all those converts who verbally positioned themselves as having shifted away from Britain and non-Muslim Britons. None were actively seeking to harm the nation or its citizens but were actually attached to the nation in some way and making a contribution to its prosperity. For instance then, returning to Rizwan, his comments make it clear that he does still identify as British even if it does come second. For Michael, even though he wanted to leave Britain for a Muslim-majority society, he still explained that he had an affinity towards Britain: Wherever you’re born, from whatever country you’re born from, home is still home, isn’t it? And this is my home … As much as you try … home is home. (Michael)

Most striking, though, is the way in which Peter defended his Britishness in another part of the interview, despite his earlier comments: Well sometimes when you hear people say this country is bad and all this and that, and they complain about everything, what I say to Muslims and anyone: “If you don’t like it, don’t stay here. Go somewhere else because we’re free to go anywhere we want.” It’s not just about living in this country, we all moan about work, but in all truth if it was that bad we wouldn’t be there. You’d just move on, wouldn’t ya? And that’s the thing … If people looked at things realistically, come on … It’s not bad living in this country compared to other parts of the world … I am proud to be British … But that’s the thing, it don’t matter what anybody tells me. I’m who I am and I’ve always felt British and I always will be. Nothing can change that. I was born in this country. If I’m British, Pakistani, half-caste or whatever, at the end of the day, I’m British. (Peter)

Peter went from saying earlier: [Muslims cannot be truly at home in Britain] because of the society and culture of the country … there would be better countries [than Britain to live in as a Muslim]

to saying I am proud to be British … I’ve always felt British and I always will be.

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He offers a fascinating example that shows the way in which identity and belonging can be confused, contradictory and in flux. He is similar to some of the other converts who had various attachments that ebbed and flowed, some of which they were not always aware of when asked directly about them. Their identities and belongings were constantly renegotiated and while these reconciliations are not always straightforward or without tension, they almost always result in the converts feeling both Muslim and British. This multilayered sense of self is vital to emphasise because those who discuss the belonging of Muslims in Britain often assume Muslims must choose either loyalty to Islam or loyalty to the nation. This simplicity does not reflect the experiences of many for whom identity is much more dynamic, shifting in emphasis not only on a daily basis, but even minute by minute as happened within the interviews I conducted. Anyone who believes that converts “defect to the other side” after converting to Islam needs to be reminded that they may “defect back” at any moment, or more accurately, may always retain a degree of loyalty whether they are prepared to admit that or not. More importantly though, those who may at first be seen to be disloyal and betraying the nation, may actually only be doing so to the extent that they express disquiet about aspects of the nation and its governance, perhaps reflecting their concern for the nation that they hope to see glorified after improvement. These converts have a cautionary belonging that requires clarification, but a belonging nonetheless, as is evident in Justin’s comments: [Muslims can be at “home” in Britain] without a doubt. Erm … yes. I mean, British culture, British life, yeah, no problem. Obviously as Muslims we don’t feel happy about the foreign policy aspects that the British government has towards people living in Muslim lands …. (Justin)

This type of indirectly patriotic critique of the nation is monumentally different from the holistic rejection, which the anomalous terrorists named earlier embark on with their indiscriminate violence against anyone and anything that seems to have a connection to the nation. Muslim converts may dissent against the nation, but this is typically only verbal posturing, and in practical terms many remain loyal, or they dissent against the nation in a manner which is about its betterment rather than its destruction. My findings echo other research that has consistently made the same observations about Muslims in general,3 and Muslim converts more 3

A selection of this research is as follows: Ahmed (2009, 47–50, 59–60); Ameli (2002, 137–138), Bagguley & Hussain (2005); Gale & Hopkins (2009, 16); Gallup

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specifically,4 as loyal and well-integrated citizens. These contributions are supported by numerous polls that have shown that Muslims are well integrated into British society and are loyal citizens. For example, the following has been revealed about Muslims in Britain: 86% feel they belong in Britain (Gale & Hopkins 2009, 11–12), 82% identify themselves as loyal to Britain (Gardham 2009; Green 2009), 80% are proud to be a British citizen (Dunt 2011), 78% self-identify as British (Gourlay 2009), and 93% are against political violence, while large majorities support integration, including working with the police to expose terrorists and voting in elections (ICM 2005). These figures consistently find that around 80% of Muslims in Britain consider themselves as loyal to Britain and feel as though they belong there. These polls should not be read as implying that 20% of Muslims in Britain are disloyal, but rather, this minority may just feel less patriotic than the majority of Muslims in Britain, or express their belonging in different terms.

Conclusion The tens of thousands of Europeans who have converted to Islam, and the many others who will convert to Islam in the future, demonstrate the way in which religion continues to articulate a central presence in European societies. That these people are prepared to undergo monumental changes in their lifestyles and deal with various challenges in doing so shows just how important the quest for religious meaning can be. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that Muslim converts’ sense of belonging to the nation is not one-dimensional or uncomplicated. Some enthusiastically pledge allegiance to the nation while others are more critical and cautionary about their patriotism, but are still indirectly attached to the nation, and are ultimately “British Muslims.” There is no reason why similar patterns would not be found amongst Muslim converts in other European nations. Many of the converts I interviewed had a form of loyalty that resonates with the life of Abdullah Quilliam, a nineteenth century solicitor who converted to Islam. Quilliam’s allegiance to Britain and Britons was complex and almost contradictory as he was disloyal to some extent, but also firmly loyal. For instance, he was viewed with (2009, 8–9, 20); Gilliat-Ray (2010); Haddad & Smith (2002); Naguib (2002); Penn & Lambert (2009); Roy (2004), Seddon et al. (2003); Soros (2009). 4 A selection of this research is as follows: Al-Qwidi (2002, 214–217); Al-Toma (2008); Brice (2010); Haddad (2006, 40); Jensen (2008, 396–397); Kose (1996, 13, 135); McDonald (2005, 149–155); McDonald (2008); Nieuwkerk (2006b, 106); Zebiri (2008, 98).

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suspicion and accused of treason due to his allegiance to the Ottoman Khalifa and for his opposition to British military escapades overseas (Geaves 2010, 65, 102–103; Gilliat-Ray 2010, 41; Kose 1996, 14; Nielsen 1995, 5; Zebiri 2008, 35–36). However, Quilliam’s biography (Geaves 2010) is riddled with examples that show him to be an active polymath who was dedicated to contributing his skills, knowledge and energy towards bettering Britain and assisting non-Muslim Britons, especially the poor and marginalised. He co-operated with non-Muslims in a host of projects and inter-faith events, earning the respect of many who admired him as a distinguished British gentleman. Quilliam’s “dual loyalty to the British monarch and the Muslim caliph” (Geaves 2010, 172) meant that “Abdullah Quilliam showed that it was possible to be a Muslim who was highly critical of some aspects of British foreign policy, yet still remain intensely patriotic to one’s country of birth” (Geaves 2010, 189). He was similar to the Muslim converts I interviewed in that he felt comfortable belonging in Britain, being an active contributor towards the nation and working with non-Muslim Britons even though he was occasionally critical of the nation. Laura captured the typical belonging of the converts when she said: I don’t feel any more or less British to be honest. I’m still British, just different. (Laura)

In future, more attention needs to be given to the way in which Muslims are labelled as outsiders in an Islamophobic fashion that can actually be more detrimental to their sense of belonging than anything else. This discourse which considers Muslim converts as desiring to penetrate Britain en masse must, therefore, be challenged as sensationalism rooted in an exaggerated and inaccurate portrayal of Muslim converts.

References Ahmed, S. (2009). Seen and Not Heard: Voices of Young British Muslims. Leicester: Islamic Foundation. Al-Qwidi, M. (2002). Understanding the Stages of Conversion to Islam: The Voices of British Converts. Leeds: The University of Leeds. Al-Toma, B. (2008). “New Muslims—Cultural Mediators and Bridge Builders.” The Future of Islam in Britain: New Muslims Perspective. University of Birmingham.

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Allen, C. (2010). Islamophobia. Farnham: Ashgate. Ameli, S. R. (2002). Globalization, Americanization and British Muslim Identity. London: ICAS Press. Appleton, J. V. (1995). “Analysing Qualitative Interview Data: Addressing Issues of Validity and Reliability.” Journal of Advanced Nursing 22: 993–997. Archer, L. (2009). “Race, ‘Face’ and Masculinity: The Identities and Local Geographies of Muslim Boys.” In Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities, Hopkins, P. & Gale, R. (eds.), 74–91. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Armbruster, H. (2008). “Introduction: The Ethics of Taking Sides.” In Taking Sides: Ethics, Politics and Fieldwork in Anthropology, Armbruster, H. & Laerke, A. (eds.), 1–22. New York: Berghahn Books. Bagguley, P. & Hussain, Y. (2005). “Flying the Flag for England? Citizenship, Religion and Cultural Identity among British Pakistani Muslims.” In Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure, Abbas, T. (ed.), 208–221. London: Zed Books. Brice, M. A. K. (2010). A Minority within a Minority: A Report on Converts to Islam in the United Kingdom. Faith Matters. Faith Matters Website. http://faith-matters.org/images/stories/fm-reports/a-minority-within-aminority-a-report-on-converts-to-islam-in-the-uk.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011). Bryman, A. (2004). Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalrymple, W. (2002). White Mughals: Love and Betrayal in EighteenthCentury India. London: HarperCollins. Dunt, I. (2011). Surprise Poll Shows Widespread Muslim Support for Gay Rights. Politics. 27th June. Politics Website. http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2011/06/27/surprise-poll-showswidespread-muslim-support (accessed July 19, 2011). Elias, R. (2008). “Al-Qaeda’s White Army of Terror.” The Scotsman. January 13. Scotsman Website. http://news.scotsman.com/latestnews/AlQaeda39s-white-army-ofterror.3667425.jp (accessed March 16, 2011). Emerson, M. (2009). Ethno-Religious Conflict in Europe: Typologies of Radicalisation in Europe’s Muslim Communities. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. Fortier, A-M. (2008). Multicultural Horizons: Diversity and the Limits of the Civil Nation. London: Routledge.

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Gale, R. & Hopkins, P. (2009). “Introduction: Muslims in Britain—Race, Place and the Spatiality of Identities.” In Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities, Hopkins, P. & Gale, R. (eds.), 1–19. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Gallup (2009). The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations. Euro-Islam Website. http://www.euro-islam.info/ wp-content/uploads/pdfs/gallup_coexist_2009_interfaith_relations_uk _france_germany.pdf (accessed July 19, 2011). Gardham, D. (2009). More Muslims Identify Themselves as British Than Rest of Population. The Telegraph. May 7. Telegraph Website. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/5287105/More-Muslimsidentify-themselves-as-British-than-rest-of-population.html (accessed April 28, 2011). Gardner, D. & Faulkner, K. (2010). “White Britons ‘Called Steve and Gerry Killed Fighting for Al Qaeda in Pakistan’ by U.S. Drone Missile.” The Daily Mail December 17. Daily Mail Website. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1339036/2-white-Britonskilled-fighting-Al-Qaeda-US-drone-missile-attackPakistan.html?ITO=1490 (accessed April 27, 2011). Geaves, R. (2010). Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quilliam. Markfield: Kube Publishing. Gilliat-Ray, S. (2010). Muslims in Britain: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gourlay, C. (2009). “UK Muslims Are Europe’s Most Patriotic.” The Times December 13. Times Online Website. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6954571.ece (accessed April 28, 2011). Green, C. (2009). “Patriotic, Respectful and Homophobic: A Portrait of British Muslims’ State of Mind.” The Independent May 8. Independent Website. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/patrioticrespectful-and-homophobic-a-portrait-of-british-muslims-state-ofmind-1681062.html (accessed April 28, 2011). Haddad, Y. Y. & Smith, J. I. (2002). Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible. Oxford: AltaMira. Haddad, Y. Y. (2006). “The Quest for Peace in Submission: Reflections on the Journey of American Women Converts to Islam.” In Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West, Nieuwkerk, K. V. (ed.), 19–47. Austin: University of Texas. Home Office (2011). Prevent Strategy. Home Office Official Website.

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http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/ prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary (accessed July 21, 2011). ICM (2005). Muslim Poll – July 2005. Guardian Website: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2005/07/26/ Muslim-Poll.pdf (accessed April 28, 2011). Jensen, T. G. (2008). “To Be ‘Danish’, Becoming ‘Muslim’: Contestations of National Identity?” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34: 389–409. Kose, A. (1996). Conversion to Islam: A Study of Native British Converts. London: Kegan Paul International. Kundnani, A. (2007). “Integrationism: The Politics of Anti-Muslim Racism.” Race & Class 48: 24–44. Matar, N. (2009). “Britons and Muslims in the Early Modern Period: From Prejudice to (A Theory of) Toleration.” Patterns of Prejudice 43: 213– 231. McDonald, L. Z. (2005). Islamic Feminisms: Ideas and Experiences of Convert Women in Britain. York: University of York. —. (2008). “Conversion, Identity and Social Activism: Making Space for British Islam.” The Future of Islam in Britain: New Muslims Perspective. Birmingham: University of Birmingham. McGhee, D. (2008). The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights. Maidenhead: Open University Press. McGinty, A. M. (2007). “Formation of Alternative Femininities Through Islam: Feminist Approaches Among Muslim Converts in Sweden.” Women’s Studies International Forum 30: 474–485. Meer, N. (2010). Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The Rise of Muslim Consciousness. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Modood, T. (2005). Foreword. In Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure, Abbas, T. (ed.), viii–xii. London: Zed Books. Morris, C. (2010). Four Lions. United Kingdom: Optimum Releasing. Naguib, S-A. (2002). “The Northern Way: Muslim Communities in Norway.” In Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, Haddad, Y. Y. & Smith, J. I. (eds.), 161–174. Oxford: AltaMira. Nelson, D. & Hall, A. (2009). “Pakistan Discovers ‘Village’ of White German al-Qaeda Insurgents.” The Telegraph September 25. Telegraph Website. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/6226935/Pa kistan-discovers-village-of-white-German-al-Qaeda-insurgents.html (accessed April 27, 2011).

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Nielsen, J. S. (1995). Muslims in Western Europe. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Nieuwkerk, K. V. (2006a). “Introduction: Gender and Conversion to Islam in the West.” In Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West, Nieuwkerk, K. V. (ed.), 1–16. Austin: University of Texas. —. (2006b). “Gender, Conversion and Islam: A Comparison of Online and Offline Conversion Narratives.” In Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West, Nieuwkerk, K. V. (ed.), 95–119. Austin: University of Texas. Özyürek, E. (2009). “Convert Alert: German Muslims and Turkish Christians as Threats to Security in the New Europe.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 51: 91–116. Penn, R. & Lambert, P. (2009). Children of International Migrants in Europe: Comparative Perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. PEW (2011). Muslim-Western Tensions Persist. July 21. Pewglobal Website. http://pewglobal.org/files/2011/07/Pew-Global-Attitudes-MuslimWestern-Relations-FINAL-FOR-PRINT-July-21-2011.pdf (accessed July 25, 2011). Poynting, S. & Mason, V. (2007). “The Resistible Rise of Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim Racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2001.” Journal of Sociology 43: 61–86. Rapley, T. (2007). “Interviews.” In Qualitative Research Practice, Seale, C., Gobo, G., Gubrium, J. F. & Silverman, D. (eds.), 15–33. London: Sage. Roy, O. (2004). Globalised Islam: the Search for the New Ummah. London: Hurst & Co. Sands, R. G., Bourjolly, J. & Roer-Strier, D. (2007). “Crossing Cultural Barriers in Research Interviewing.” Qualitative Social Work 6: 353– 372. Seddon, M. S., Hussain, D. & Malik, N. (2003). British Muslims: Loyalty and Belonging. Markfield: The Islamic Foundation. Slater, J. (2010). “Muslim Converts Raise Fears in Switzerland.” Swiss Info. April 17. Swiss Info Website. http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss_news/Muslim_converts_raise_fears _in_Switzerland.html?cid=8693278 (accessed April 27, 2011). Soros (2009). Muslims in Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities. Soros Official Website. http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publication s/muslims-europe-20091215/a-muslims-europe-20110214.pdf (accessed July 19, 2011).

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Thomas, P. (2011). “Osama Bin Laden’s Anti-U.S. Strategy: Exploit Minority Converts.” ABC News May 7. ABC News Website. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/osama-bin-ladens-anti-us-strategyexploit-minority/story?id=13547780 (accessed July 19, 2011). UPI (2010). “West Fears Converts Who Become Bombers.” UPI News February 15. UPI Website: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/02/15/West-fearsconverts-who-become-bombers/UPI-53431266251352/ (accessed March 16, 2011). Weller, P. (2008). Religious Diversity in the UK: Contours and Issues. London: Continuum. Zebiri, K. (2008). British Muslim Converts: Choosing Alternative Lives. Oxford: Oneworld.

PART IV: RELIGION AND IDENTITY IN THE MEDIA

CHAPTER FOURTEEN EUROPE’S DISPUTED SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES: IDENTITY, RELIGION AND TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP CARLO NARDELLA

Introduction Islam has an increasing influence on how European societies perceive themselves. One of the key factors contributing to this perception is the growing volume of immigration from Muslim countries to European ones (Allievi 2002; Dassetto 1994; Saint-Blancat 1999). Another factor that has a strong influence is Turkey’s application for membership in the European Union (EU). The following chapter explores the role of religion in the media coverage of Turkey’s EU membership. Turkey, a country with a large and predominantly Muslim population, has been knocking at Europe’s door since 1987. After its application was officially accepted in December 1999, Turkey made significant efforts in the field of judicial, economic and administrative reform by implementing the necessary adjustments required for EU membership (Benhabib & Isiksel 2006). These efforts were rewarded in December 2004, when the European Commission decided to launch accession negotiations. The tumultuous relationship between Turkey and the European Union is a pivotal case in any debate about the relationship between Europe and Islam (Fokas 2007, 13). Moreover, the discourse on the admissibility of a Muslim majority country allows us to explicitly discuss things that have thus far been almost exclusively dealt with as implicit items on the European Union’s agenda: identity and culture (Amiraux 2007, 200).

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Indeed, there have been very few other occasions to explicitly address the cultural common heritage of Europe (Ibid.).1 Over time, the debate about Turkey’s membership has become the discursive site where most of the othering of Europe against Islam has been performed (Rumelili 2004; Ye÷eno÷lu 2006). Actually, the tradition of representing Islam as Europe’s other dates back to the age of the Ottoman Empire (Neumann 1999). However, since the post-1945 age of integration—including much of the Cold War period—this representation has remained latent (Diez 2004, 328). Empirical research conducted in Germany over the past decade has proved that the historical construction of Turkey as Europe’s other is still alive and kicking. An analysis of German parliamentary debates shows that the delegates of the major German political parties, including left-wing parties such as SPD and the Green Party, have represented Turkey as an Islamic country linked to fundamentalism and terrorism and, as a result, as a threat for Europe (Hülsse 2006, 312). An analysis of Eurobarometer data subsequently confirmed that the reservations shared by the German political elite about Turkey’s integration into the European Union reflected a widespread perception among citizens not only in Germany, but also in Austria, Denmark, France and Greece (Ibid., 313). In addition to the state public authority and civil society, the creation of the European identity is also influenced by the media (Della Porta & Caiani, 2006). It is the media that have an effect on public opinion by altering the perceived importance of specific issues (Nelson et al. 1997). Recent studies have demonstrated that the way in which the news media frame the potential membership of Turkey in the EU has a relevant impact on public support for Turkish membership (de Vreese et al. 2011). Other research, comparing the press of different countries, identified important differences in the media coverage of Turkey’s bid to become a member of the EU from one country to another (Koenig at al. 2006; Negrine et al. 2008). For example, in some European countries the public debate reflects significant concerns about differences between Europe and Turkey (e.g. France and Greece), while others much less so (i.e. Great Britain) (Negrine et al. 2008). There is also a lot of variation between European countries when it comes to the nature of the issues discussed: while issues of identity (Who are we? / What is the EU?) are prominently covered in the 1

The Turkish case as a part of another discussion on the role of religion in European identity construction arose from the debates about the preamble of the European Constitution. The point at issue was whether the preamble should mention Christianity as a key component of the European legacy (see Schlesinger & Foret 2006; Foret 2009).

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French press, it is not an issue in the British press. The British coverage tends to be much more focused on specific issues, such as human rights, and to a much lesser degree on an abstract notion of identity or the meaning of Europe (Ibid.). Most intriguing of all is that religion, as a theme, seems to find little resonance in the overall media coverage of Turkey’s EU membership. Since the relationship between European symbolic borders and religion tends to receive so little attention, even within the debate about the Turkish membership, this essay focuses on a portion of this debate in which this relationship has arisen explicitly. The Italian news coverage of Pope Benedict XVI’s November 2006 visit to Turkey, which took place shortly after the publication of the European Commission’s annual report on progress made by Turkey in preparing for EU membership, offered an interesting case study. The intersection of the Pope’s visit and the question of Turkey’s membership in the Italian press produced a broad discussion about the European Union’s enlargement by giving considerable weight to the role played by religion in establishing a shared European identity. This study carries out a detailed analysis of all articles that mentioned Turkey published by Il Giornale and La Repubblica—two Italian newspapers with high circulation that differ in political affiliation—over the period in which the Pope's visit to Turkey remained front-page news, i.e. from November 26 to December 2, 2006. In addition to Pope Benedict XVI's first trip to a predominantly Muslim country, the other main event in this newsweek was the controversy over the continued reluctance of Turkey to open its ports and airports to Cyprus, an internationally recognized state and a full member of the EU since 2004. This refusal complicated Turkey’s relations with the EU and as a consequence produced a slowdown in its accession negotiations. The study examines how this news coverage represented Turkey and the European Union. It employs content analysis to identify the issues at stake and asks how these issues are connected. The analysis also shows who takes part in the debate and their positions on the main issues. From this point of view, the study explores the selected media coverage by focusing both on its aesthetic structures (relevant issues) and its production centres (social actors engaged). The study adopts a constructionist approach concerned with representations as both systems of signs capable of expressing meaning and systems of power connected with specific relations of force (Hall 1997). This approach proposes to analyse representations as sources for the production of social knowledge (and identity) by taking into account how and by whom these representations were constructed through different discursive practices.

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The introduction of this theoretical perspective shows that representations are not only formal constructs characterized by an underlying structure of rules and codes, but also discursive formations sustained by specific social actors whose behaviours are oriented by particular interests, beliefs and expectations (see also Bourdieu 1991, 163–170). As a general rule, there is an uneven distribution of power among the different social actors who take part in the construction of a representation. This is certainly true for the actors involved in this case study (mass media, Turkish government, the European Commission, the Vatican, civil society actors, etc.). The mass media, for example, are more than just common carriers of the public debate: “in addition to providing the channels to which other actors get their messages across, media elites promulgate their own views through partisan political analysis and through editorial endorsements of policies and candidates” (Price 1992, 82). This suggests that the mass media have a crucial role in defining not only opportunities and constraints for the (other) actors, but also framing the overall situation (Callaghan & Schnell 2001). This study therefore seeks to cast light on a matter of exceptional concern that remains largely unexamined about European identity and its relation to religion. Actually, the selected media could raise many questions, for example questions concerning the Pope’s behaviour in front of the media during his visit or the legitimacy of the European Union’s intervention to resolve the contentious issue between Turkey and Cyprus. The chapter limits itself to those directly linked to the central topic of this research. How was religion used in the debate on EU-Turkey relations? Was it used only as a source of difference? Or, on the contrary, did it allow the Italian media to represent Europe as a context in which different elements can coexist? The study concludes by dealing with the role performed by religion in the discussion on Turkey and the European Union. Why is religion used to speak about Europe and its borders? How can this use be conceptualized?

Methodology The sample for analysis included articles published in La Repubblica and Il Giornale in the period November 26 to December 2, 2006, namely during the media coverage of Pope Benedict’s visit to Turkey. These two newspapers were chosen not only because of their high circulation, but also because they have different political affiliations—La Repubblica is generally considered a liberal newspaper, while Il Giornale is more conservative.

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The relevant articles were retrieved from these newspapers’ online archives using specific search strings constructed to identify the articles containing references to the Pope’s trip and/or references to Turkey's EU accession. The total number of articles included in the sample was 65, with a total of 31 articles in La Repubblica and 34 articles in Il Giornale. The study used ATLAS.ti, a textual analysis software package, to code text passages and facilitate comparison within and across the newspapers. Through this software, the issues contained in each article were coded, explored in greater depth and then modified to further clarify major issues. These practices continued to be implemented until new issues were no longer being identified. The most frequently encountered issues were subsequently grouped into networks of issues. Each network was created by defining one main issue to which the other issues were logically and discursively linked. An issue was defined as a set of meanings that provides a basis for discussion in which participants can express different opinions. This definition implied that a certain issue is always introduced and maintained by one or more social actors who are mentioned in the articles or implicitly referred to as the authors of the articles (e.g. correspondents). The analysis also grouped the actors involved in the selected media coverage according to their social role, thus creating homogeneous categories (e.g. political actors, religious actors, media actors). Associating the social actors to these categories allowed a better understanding of their positions on each issue as well as the identification of their discursive strategies and interests without losing sight of how each actor contributed to the whole debate.

Papal Coverage and the European identity Benedict XVI’s arrival to Turkey The media coverage of pope Benedict XVI’s visit to Turkey had begun before he had even arrived. On November 26, a few days before the trip, both Il Giornale and La Repubblica covered a demonstration organized in Istanbul by a group of people linked to a Turkish Islamist party. The protesters expressed their anger at the controversial remarks on Islam made by Benedict during a speech held at Regensburg two months before.2 2

The speech in question was delivered on September 12, 2006 by the Pope at the University of Regensburg, Germany. This speech, which contained a quotation from a fourteenth-century Christian emperor who had linked Islam with violence, was

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The articles raised serious security concerns and described the measures taken for the Pope’s protection with words and expressions very similar to those usually adopted to describe the arrangements made for the arrival of the U.S. President in an unfriendly country during a diplomatic visit. The two newspapers repeated the news of the anti-papal protests the very next day, although the demonstration had very little impact and attracted a small number of protesters. The concern about Pope Benedict’s safety and the uncertain outcome of his trip continued, therefore, to attract journalists’ attentions. In addition to the articles presenting the Pope as a head of a state and describing his visit to Turkey as a political event, other articles published in Il Giornale and La Repubblica started to frame the Pope’s visit in a different way. These articles focused on (1) the exclusively religious nature of the trip, (2) the status of the relationships between Muslims and Christian minority communities in Turkey, (3) the importance of the dialogue between Catholics and Orthodox Christians, and (4) the marginal role of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkish politics. On November 28, the news of the Pope's arrival in Turkey and his meeting with Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan earned front-page coverage in the two newspapers analysed. Mostly thanks to this meeting, made possible by a last-minute change of Erdogan’s plans, Il Giornale and La Repubblica started to devote more space to what was happening in Turkey (see Fig. 1, which shows a clear increase in the number of articles published since November 28). The direct result of this increase of interest was that the news coverage shifted from the Pope's safety to issues more directly linked to Turkey, especially its integration into the European Union. This means that, in addition to an increase in the number of articles, there was also an increase in the number of issues discussed. More specifically, Il Giornale and La Repubblica gave an especially prominent position to: (a) the increasing diplomatic tensions between Turkey and Cyprus, (b) the failure of the negotiations sponsored by the European Commission to bring about a reconciliation between the two sides, and (c) this failure’s potentially negative effects on the effort to bring Turkey closer to Europe. The social actors who addressed these new issues included Turkish and European political leaders, Christian and Muslim religious figures, as well as political and religious commentators. This discussion gave life to a broader debate on Turkey’s admissibility in Europe, which clearly emerged on November 29, as shown in Fig. 2. regarded as offensive to Islam and its Prophet Mohammed, and caused angry reactions across the Muslim world (see Valenzano & Menegatos 2008; Coury 2009).

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Fig. 1. Intensity of coverage, expressed in the number of articles per day (November 26, 2006–December 2, 2006) 18 16

number of articles

14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 26

27

28

29 days

30

1

2

BENEDICT'S SAFETY

PROTESTS BEFORE POPE'S VISIT

REGENSBURG SPEECH

= main issue

TOT. ART. = 13

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN TURKEY

CATHOLIC-ORTHODOX RELATIONS

NATURE OF THE TRIP

POPE'S TURKEY TRIP

CATHOLIC-MUSLIM RELATIONS

TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP

CYPRUS ISSUE

EU-TURKEY TALKS

Europe’s Disputed Symbolic Boundaries 327

Fig. 2. The network of issues linked to the Pope's visit on November 29, 2006.

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Representations of Turkey and the European Union The connection between apparently unrelated facts, such as the Pope’s trip and Turkey’s talks with European negotiators, was established because of an unexpected statement in which the Pope expressed support for Turkey’s bid to join the EU. This statement, released during the meeting with Turkey's prime minister, came as a complete surprise because it reversed a declaration Benedict made in 2004, when as a cardinal he argued that Turkey should not be admitted into the European Union. Interestingly, most social actors who commented on Benedict’s reversal used religion as an argument either for opposing Turkey's EU membership prospects or for justifying them. This unique combination of political and religious factors that characterized the stories in Il Giornale and La Repubblica produced two different portrayals of Turkey and Europe. (a) Il Giornale Il Giornale, mostly read by a conservative audience, depicted Turkey as a country of contradictions and the European Union as a homogeneous entity with a shared cultural identity. This newspaper represented Turkey’s limits in three ways. (a) It highlighted the shortcomings of Turkey’s democracy, including efforts to restrain freedom of speech and unfulfilled recognition of minority rights. (b) It emphasized the contradictions and discontinuities of Turkey’s modernization project, especially the incompatibility between the secular state and a Muslim-majority society, and the role of the Turkish army in the preservation of the secular integrity of the country. (c) It evoked the Ottoman cultural heritage with the aim to subsume Turkey under the label of “Muslim country.” It also evoked ancient Christian-Muslim conflicts by recalling historical events like the Ottomans' attempt to expand their empire in Europe and the defeat of Muslim Turks at Lepanto and Vienna in 1571 and 1683. The depiction of Turkey as a religiously homogenous country, unable to change, hardened the image of Europe as an essentially Christian “club.” This media frame was actually in line with the European conservative view that, at that time, saw the negotiation of privileged partnership agreements with the Turks, rather than accepting an Islamic state as one of its full members, as more natural to the European Union.

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(b) La Repubblica Designed to appeal to a liberal and left-leaning audience, La Repubblica constructed and promoted an entirely different frame. It described Turkey as a secular democracy and a modern country anchored at the crossroads of East and West. At the same time, this newspaper represented Europe as a multicultural system increasingly characterized by a religiously pluralistic identity. To support this depiction of Europe, La Repubblica made reference to the historically strained relations between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches by evoking historical memories of conflicts and misunderstandings dating back to the era of the Crusades, particularly the East-West Schism of 1054 and the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204. The recalling of bitter historical enmities between Catholics and Orthodox provided the newspaper with some reference to support the assertion that Christians have always been lacking a real unity and that no European identity would arise from religion. Moreover, great emphasis was also placed on religious pluralism, presented as a daily reality throughout the European Union, where adherents of different faiths are free to express their religious beliefs. At this point in the coverage the discursive meanings assigned to the events started to differ considerably according to the newspapers’ political affiliations, priorities and constraints. In short, the media frameworks resulting from these two systems of representation provided two kinds of solutions to the problem of Turkey’s relations with Europe (i.e. privileged partnership vs. absorption/integration) and, at the same time, symbolized the European boundaries by identifying the EU either as a community that joins an elite of Christian countries or, alternatively, as a political structure based on the cooperation of countries sharing different religious traditions. Within these frameworks, religious arguments were used to construct identities and relationships, that is to say to define Europe’s insiders and outsiders.

The Configuration of the European Boundaries The news published on November 30 marked another significant step— for the first time in the media arena the definition of Turkey’s relations with Europe became a crucial concern, receiving as much attention as the Pope’s visit. The latter rapidly rose to prominence when an al-Qaeda terrorist group issued a statement on an Islamic militant Web site, denouncing Benedict’s trip as part of a “crusader campaign” against Islam. A reason for the great importance accorded to Europe's integration problems was that the European Union had decided to suspend Turkey’s

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EU membership bid to punish the Turkish government for not opening its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic. The news of the possible suspension of Turkey's membership bid introduced new issues and questions: can the rejection of Turkey lead to a wider cultural gap between this country and the West? And could this rejection contribute to the conflict between the Christian West and the Muslim East? On the other hand, by integrating Turkey into Europe how might the EU succeed in building a multicultural and peaceful society? The debate became quickly polarized. On one hand, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who were strongly against the Turkish bid, urged Turkey to show respect of the role of Cyprus and the EU-Turkey customs union. On the other hand, the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero reaffirmed their support for Turkey's membership bid by emphasizing the importance of a strategic alliance with the EU. The shift from the original story to the representation of Europe and its symbolic boundaries was so evident that Turkey’s EU membership became the most important issue at stake (see Fig. 3). On December 1, Il Giornale and La Repubblica paid particular attention to two other major public events: the Pope’s meeting with Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew I and his special visit to Istanbul's Blue Mosque. The meanings and values attached to these events strengthened the images of Turkey and Europe that had been developed up to that point. In particular, Il Giornale presented the Pope's talks with the spiritual leader of the Orthodox Christians as a sign that the two ancient branches of Christianity, split nearly one thousand years ago, had been finally reconciled. It also placed great emphasis on the fact that the Pope and the patriarch signed a common declaration on the relationship between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, in which they committed themselves to preserving Europe’s Christian roots. La Repubblica, on the other hand, described the Pope’s tour of one of the world's most important mosques as a memorable moment of his trip. What made this event highly significant was a symbolic gesture made by the Pope at the site: during his tour, Benedict stood in silent prayer facing Mecca alongside senior Muslim clerics. The Pope’s prayer was interpreted as a conciliatory gesture toward Muslims and a sign that a new vein of dialogue between Christians and Muslims could be opened. This gesture also brought the story of the Pope’s visit to a happy end, who on that same day returned to Rome.

EU AS 'CHRISTIAN CLUB'

MULTICULTURALISM IN EUROPE

= main issue

TOT. ART. = 16

CRITICISM OVER TURKEY

TURKEY'S PROGRESS

CULTURE AND HISTORICAL TIES

IMPACT OF INTEGRATION

TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP

EU-TURKEY TALKS

CYPRUS ISSUE

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN TURKEY

CATHOLIC-ORTHODOX RELATIONS

CATHOLIC-MUSLIM RELATIONS

POPE'S TURKEY TRIP

NATURE OF THE TRIP

BENEDICT'S SAFETY

REGENSBURG SPEECH

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Fig. 3. The network of the issues linked to the Pope's visit on November 30, 2006.

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On December 2, the last day of coverage, the newspapers announced that in response to Ankara's refusal to recognize Cyprus, the European Union had decided to suspend negotiations with Turkey. This temporary pause shows how the issue of the European borders and the concurrent issue of European identity were entirely unresolved at that time. In spite of this, one conclusion can however be drawn: religion was used to construct different images of Europe by emphasizing on one hand the importance of the European Union’s Christian roots and, on the other, the rapid expansion of religious pluralism within many EU member states. In this way religion provided an answer to the need for expressing a set of political ideas that were in fact not necessarily connected to faith.

Negotiations, Actors and Alliances Assessing the content of the media coverage about Pope Benedict’s visit to Turkey allows for the identification of the main social actors involved in the debate and some of the interests behind their discursive practices. Focusing on these actors can not only provide a better understanding of the media narrative’s structure but also makes it possible to show that the definition of Europe’s symbolic boundaries is actually the result of a negotiation among different agents with specific interests. The trip represented a great opportunity for Pope Benedict to strengthen the Vatican’s relationship with a predominantly Muslim country, especially after the comments against Turkish membership in Europe he had made as a cardinal being fresh in Turks’ minds. Benedict’s main discursive strategy was to keep religion clearly separate from the political domain. Indeed, the Pope and his spokesman often reminded journalists that the visit to Turkey was primarily designed as a pilgrimage and that Benedict's only concern was for further reconciliation and dialogue with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. Speaking as a religious leader and not as a diplomat, the Pope could actually reverse his prior position, telling prime minister Erdogan that he wished for Turkey's entry into the European Union without being directly involved in complex political issues. Recep Tayyip Erdogan played an important role in the development of the media narrative. Through his actions and declarations he tried to avoid disruption of Turkey's EU accession talks. From this point of view, Erdogan took advantage of the presence of the Pope (and foreign journalists) in his country to inform public opinion abroad that Turkey was making considerable efforts in resolving its dispute with Cyprus. His decision to meet the Pope on his arrival at Ankara, despite pressure from

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his conservative constituency, could be seen as the key element of this strategy. The European Commission was the actor that contributed most of all to shift media attention away from the Pope’s trip. Acting as referee for the dispute over Cyprus, the European Commission’s statements gradually moved the public debate on Turkey’s EU aspirations and, as a consequence, helped to raise the issue of Europe’s symbolic boundaries. Two other actors who entered the debate with the aim of distracting the public's attention from the Pope’s visit were the group of Turkish nationalists who hit Istanbul's streets to protest the imminent arrival of the Pope and the al-Qaeda terrorist group who denounced the papal visit as part of a "crusader campaign" against Islam. These collective actors tried to bring Turkey's accession process to a halt by representing the country as an Islamic stronghold. The journalists who described and commented on what happened during the week of coverage were also actively involved in the debate. On one hand they organized the mass-mediated public space by determining the other actors’ forms of participation. On the other, they focused on particular events based on their respective newspapers’ political affiliation. The discursive strategy adopted by Il Giornale journalists was to highlight Turkey’s main limitations. La Repubblica journalists instead focused more on Turkey’s efforts in implementing freedom of expression, minority rights and religious dialogue. Interestingly, history was used as a means to justify these accounts. The ancient conflict between the Ottoman Empire and European armies served to underline Turkey’s Islamic roots while the schism between Eastern and Western Churches was used to show the high level of differentiation and lack of unity existing within the Christian community.

Conclusion This study has shown how the Italian media coverage of the Pope’s 2006 visit to Turkey, along with a series of other events, started a broad discussion on European identity. Identity can be defined as a nevercomplete process operating across difference, namely a construction implying “the binding and making of symbolic boundaries, the production of ‘frontier-effects’” (Hall 1996, 3). It helps to consider European identity as a process defined and redefined over time, rather than a static set of qualities as it is often treated in common sense language. In general, this identity work employs various resources, both material and symbolic, to represent what Europe is and, first of all, what it may become.

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The representations of Europe identified by this study come from religion. In analytic terms, religions are approached here as large, varied repertoires of symbols that social actors may use “to symbolize group boundaries and define the group’s relation to a larger outside world” (Lichterman 2008, 86; see also Lamont & Molnar 1992). This approach allows a definition of identity work as a process characterized by two main dimensions: the simultaneous production and recognition of a “we” and the affirmation of a difference between that “we” and the rest of society (Melucci 1996). As sorts of “maps” (Lichterman 2008), these representations based on religion say something about who is a member of the European community and who is not. It is thus necessary to recognize that the issue of Turkey’s membership was crucial to encouraging the discussion of Europe’s symbolic boundaries. According to Stuart Hall’s (1997) approach, representations always entail a work of production, namely the presence of social actors oriented by specific interests who actively intervene in the production process to give a certain meaning to reality (Hall 1997). The social actors who became involved in the analysed period of news coverage used religion to give weight to two different “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983). Each of these communities implies a specific ideological “unity of us.” On one hand, there is a conception of the European Union as a set of nations founded on Christian values. This conception defines what is European in opposition to Islam, which is considered an external enemy. This is in many ways a classic representation since European identity as a Christian concept has been historically developed in opposition to the Ottoman Muslim “other.” On the other hand, the study reveals that today another, perhaps new, trend exists, at least in Italy where the arrival of nonChristian immigrants seems to have made religion a more important symbolic boundary (Bail 2008). This new trend consists in representing the European Union as a pluralized universe for the arrival of Muslim immigrants and also because of the historical differences characterizing the various Christian churches. This second conception of Europe considers Islam as an internal reality rather than an external geopolitical issue, and it suggests that the definition of what is European has to be found in the coexistence of different groups by accepting the rules of the game defined in Brussels. Both of these conceptions of Europe depend on social actors, with particular interests, who make specific choices (to say this rather than that, to say this in relation to that, etc.) based upon the more or less pragmatic aim of satisfying those interests. From this point of view, referring to religion allows the actors to intervene on a multiplicity of concrete

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issues—from the EU enlargement process to immigration policy—by justifying their positions as matters of principle rather than through a series of logical and rational arguments. In this sense, religion is an essential discursive resource because it provides a way to symbolically represent anything but abstract and irrational systems of interests. To put it differently, religion offers support to political activity without expressing that activity in political terms. This social use or, better, “political use” of religion highlights its malleability and ambivalence, since it allows various actors to achieve their goals, even if those goals are very different from each other. As Amiraux notes, in discussions on Turkey’s integration into the European Union, religion and culture tend to overlap. Religion intervenes first of all in cultural terms rather than in terms of religion or worship (2007, 184). In the analysed case study, religion clearly becomes a cultural element performing an identity function. Religion’s cultural value is visible not only in the definition of Europe as a homogeneous and monolithic Christian block, but also when Europe is depicted as an integrated society, based on a peaceful dialogue among different beliefs and various profiles of believers. Indeed, theology is absent from most of the news coverage while much emphasis is placed on remembrance and history. What really matters about religion seems to be the existence of a given element, namely a tradition, a heritage or a social model that groups can appropriate (see Hervieu-Léger 1993). This consideration recalls the interpretation, advanced by Marcel Gauchet (2004) and subsequently adopted by others (Guizzardi 2009), concerning the dual role of religion in an age of secularization, especially in contemporary Europe, of proper religious adherence and identity.

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Hülsse, R. (2006). “Cool Turkey: Solving the Image Problem to Secure EU Membership.” Mediterranean Politics 11 (3): 309–327. Koenig, T., Mihelj, S., Downey, J. & Bek, M. B. (2006). “Media Framings of the Issue of Turkish Accession to the EU.” Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 19 (2): 149–169. Kirisci, K. (2008). “Religion as an Argument in the Debate on Turkish EU Membership.” In Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession, Jung, D. & Raudvere, C. (eds.) New York, NY: Palgrave. Lamont, M. & Molnár, V. (2002). “The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences.” Annual Review of Sociology 28: 167–195. Lichterman, P. (2008). “Religion and the Construction of Civic Identity.” American Sociological Review 73 (1): 83–104 Maréchal, B., Allievi, S., Dassetto, F. & Nielsen, J. (eds.). (2003). Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Melucci, A. (1996). Challenging codes. Collective action in the information age. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Nelson, T. E., Clawson, R. A. & Oxley, Z. M. (1997). “Media Framing of a Civil Liberty Conflict and its Effects on Tolerance.” American Political Science Review 91: 567–583. Negrine, R., Kejanlioglu, B., Aissaoui, R. & Papathanassopoulos, S. (2008). “Turkey and the European Union: An Analysis of How the Press in Four Countries Covered Turkey’s Bid for Accession in 2004.” European Journal of Communication 23 (1): 47–68. Neumann, I. (1999). Uses of the Other. “The East” in European Identity Formation. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Price, V. (1992). Public Opinion. Newbury Park: Sage. Rumelili, B. (2004). “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation.” Review of International Studies 30 (4): 27–47. Saint-Blancat, C. (1999). L’islam della diaspora. Roma: Edizioni Lavoro. Schlesinger, P. & Foret, F. (2006). “Political Roof and Sacred Canopy? Religion and the EU Constitution.” European Journal of Social Theory 9 (1): 59–81. Shakman Hurd, E. (2006). “Negotiating Europe: the Politics of Religion and the Prospects for Turkish Accession.” Review of International Studies 32: 401–418. Strazzeri, I. (2007) Riconoscimento e diritti umani: grammatica del conflitto nel processo di integrazione europea. Perugia: Morlacchi.

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Valenzano, J. M. & Menegatos, L. (2008). “Benedict the Bifurcated: Secular and Sacred Framing of the Pope and Turkey.” Journal of Media and Religion 7 (4): 207–230. Ye÷eno÷lu, M. (2006). “The Return of the Religious. Revisiting Europe and its Islamic Others.” Culture and Religion 7 (3): 245–261.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF SERBIAN AND CROATIAN IDENTITIES: SELECTED EXAMPLES FROM THE SERBIAN KURIR AND THE BBC VIOLETA CVETKOVSKA-OCOKOLJIû, SRDJAN SREMAC AND TATJANA CVETKOVSKI

Introduction This chapter offers a study of the representation of Croatia in the Serbian daily newspaper Kurir and the representation of Serbia and Croatia in the BBC News. The question is how much the events of the war in the 1990s reflect on the media situation in the above-mentioned two countries and in the wider auditorium through the BBC News. Additionally, another question is how restored religion, which had been abused during the war by politicians, influenced the formation of new identities in Serbia and Croatia. The chapter offers a theoretical (historical) background about the formation, development and dissolution of Yugoslavia. The slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” reflects the fact that the former Yugoslavia represented a multicultural and multilingual environment where individuals and groups lived and functioned together, respecting the rights of others. These communities were an integral part of the multinational communist federation. However, separation of the republics and their transformation into states after the bloody conflicts, national radicalism and the instrumentalization of religion, especially in the Serbian Orthodox Church and Croatian Roman-Catholic Church, demanded radicalization of ethnic-national identities and religious values and symbols. Thus, revival of religious identities became a dynamic category and a restoration of archaic symbolism. These identities often eschew pluralism and display

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intolerance for groups perceived as competitors to radicalized attempts to secure hegemony (Hoover 2003, 35). In a period of bloody dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, negating and underestimating of others’ cultural and religious identities were the main driving forces behind political conflicts. This is where the attitude on religious exclusivity of one’s own group originated from, often at the expense of other groups from the neighbourhood. The increase of religiosity and ritual activities and instrumentalization of religion by politicians contributed to the fact that religion became a primary determinant in the formation of the identity. Thus, an Orthodox religion mixed with strong feelings of nationalism in Serbia appeared as a response to the crisis of identity caused by the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Today, increasing diversity is recognized in the cultural, ethnic, religious and racial language of nationality that unifies people from different backgrounds through respecting the rights of others. However, in the Serbian case the main question is about the collective responsibility. Is there a collective responsibility for war crimes, and can they be separated from the nation? Also, this question raises another of whether criminals can be detached from the people in whose name they committed the war crimes. And what is the role of the media in the representation of the collective responsibility?

Theoretical Background The dissolution of the Yugoslav national homogenization was based on religious affiliation through the public expression of religiosity. This was particularly the case in Serbia and Croatia. Religious expression did not have a direction and deeper cognitive dimension in the first decade of its growth, but it was mostly conditional and a nominal expression of Christianity. Renewed religion was marked with awakening national identity and national consciousness, and it was at the core of national beings. Religious affiliation of both Serbia and Croatia were the signified connection with (endangered) territory, national roots and traditions. In Serbia and Croatia, religion is an urgent determinant in shaping the social, cultural and national identity. These two nations have experienced a return to religion through the bloody conflicts that have been further encouraged by the fear of losing territory and a potential mutual forcible conversion (Orthodox vs. Catholic). The function of contemporary Serbian culture can be defined as an attempt to homogenize national society, but also as a self-fulfilment and

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functioning, interwoven with other existing and imaginary communities. Today, Serbian cultural identity becomes a dynamic category that develops through critical reflection of the culture. However, Serbia has not needed a new model of cultural pluralism. Had Serbia learned from the past, it could have found answers in the former Yugoslavia in which the peoples of different nationalities and religions respected and supported each other. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established in 1918 in the name of national self-determination. In this period the new state was not ethnically, socially or religiously homogeneous. This kingdom was substantially diversified and characterized by different political and cultural heritages. According to Batakoviü (1995), King Alexander I sacrificed democracy for preserving the state unity. He abolished the constitution, dismissed the parliament, banned all parties with national affiliations, and declared a single Yugoslav nation in a centralized Yugoslav state. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1929 became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, or the first Yugoslavia. The post-World War II communist Yugoslavia, with the marshal Josip Broz Tito as its leader, declared that the base of the new state would be the principle of freedom and equality of all constitutive nations. He also declared that other ethnic groups would be guaranteed all minority rights based on the “Brotherhood and Unity” of all Yugoslav peoples. This Leninist-type federation (Batakoviü 1995) was based on conformity with a new social and totalitarian vision. Six federal republics and two provinces with internal borders made one country under the name of Yugoslavia. The effort in creating a common Yugoslav culture was the base for merging the Yugoslav nations into a new entity. In 1960 Tito himself said that in Yugoslavia it was no longer important whether someone was a Serb, a Croat or of some other nationality. However, in 1964, he abandoned the idea of creating a single Yugoslav nation and stressed that the policy of Yugoslavism was an excuse for assimilation and bureaucratic centralism, “unitarism” and (Great Serbian) hegemony (Batakoviü 1995). Suppressed discontent that began afterwards eventually led to the disintegration of the (second) Yugoslavia. Separation of the republics of Yugoslavia and their transformation into new independent states was accomplished in very belligerent and bloody circumstances. In that quite aggressive period, everybody forgot the slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” which indeed reflected the fact that the former Yugoslavia had represented a multicultural and multilingual environment

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where individuals and groups had lived and functioned together, respecting the rights of others. The political crisis in Serbia, as well as in other republics, which began in the 1980s and culminated in the 1990s in a bloody conflict between the republics, was a response to an attempt to establish renewed national identity based on Serbian tradition (religion). In that period, Europe was establishing a model of community in a multicultural environment while in the former Yugoslavia precisely this diversity became a significant point of the conflict that broke out after Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. Changes in the confessional religiosity of people at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s in the territory of Yugoslavia gradually increased, especially in the three republics with similar languages (Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). This rapid development of religiosity as a major determinant of differences was deeply tied with the awakening of national consciousness. Negating and underestimating the cultural identity of others were, at the same time, the main driving forces behind political conflicts. A new form of ritual activity replaced communist public demonstrations and celebration, and brotherhood and unity was replaced with bigotry and disregarding the identities of others. From the powerful media and governments “in the name of patriotism, intolerance toward dissent has been propagated, freedom of speech has been restricted and an arbitrary consensus imposed” (Banks et al. 2005, 23). However, the word diversity “describes the wide range of racial, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious variation that exists within and across groups that live in multicultural nation-states” (Banks et al. 2005, 17). For nations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, this was a driving force for the bloody conflict. In the period of dissolution, the Serbian identification code was based on religion as an essence of the national being, and it was encouraged through the public communication. Thus, “Orthodox religion mixed with a strong feeling of nationalism, appears in Serbia as a response to the crisis of identity caused by the dissolution of Yugoslavia” (Cvetkovska Ocokoljiü & Cvetkovski 2010, 92). Awakening feelings, according to the principle of tribal defence of the territory, were not occurring from villages to towns. Towns as centres of political and media power in Serbia contributed to the awakening of tradition and religion. As Maleševiü points out: “With a strong media support, in Serbia, that wave soon turned into total fascination of the society with the pursuit of its roots, forgotten customs and the real symbols of identity“ (Maleševiü 2006, 100).

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The old regime of the former president, Slobodan Miloševiü, who was one of the politicians most responsible for conflicts, war and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, was terminated when Zoran Ĉinÿiü (Democratic Party) became Prime Minister of Serbia in 2001. Since then, Serbia has changed from the model of national homogenization, which was based on religious affiliation, and has begun to orientate toward the values promoted by the European Union, respecting the cultural, ethnic and religious diversity. Today, Serbia as a multiethnic and multi-confessional community, officially declares its firm orientation toward the European integration. Also, the ideology of ethnic nationalism is retreating before the term of conciliarity that encompasses all nations and national minorities in one state. In support of this statement, on April 27, 2006, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia passed the Law on Churches and Religious Communities.1 The main provisions of this Law are freedom of religious denominations, prohibition of religious discrimination and limitation of the expression of religious (and other) freedoms in the public sphere.

Methodology Simon (2003, 64) states, “there is no safe way to begin to discuss the Balkans. Even the term Balkans proves troubling.” In accordance with this statement, Simon quotes Strife’s perspective about the crises in the former Yugoslavia as an ancient and religious hatred: “Serbs against Croats, Serbs and Croats against Bosnians, Eastern Orthodox Christians against Catholics, and Christians against Muslims. The Balkan seems to contain nothing but rival ethnic groupings” (Simon 2003, 65). Simon claims that the habit of describing the region in ethnic terms is continuing. As we have already mentioned, this chapter deals with a comparative qualitative analysis of news (2010–2011) in a daily newspaper Kurir [Messenger] related to neighbourly relations between Croatia and Serbia. The survey was conducted on the basis of titles and short sentences that are recognized immediately through searching keywords “Croat” and “Catholic.” The following examples are given in order to gain insight into the creation of relations between Serbs and 1

(April 27, 2006). The Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Clause 1, 2 and 3). In Ancillary Herald RS XXXVI, Svetosavlje Digital Library. Svetosavlje Digital Library. http://www.svetosavlje.org/biblioteka/zakoni/zakon-o-crkvama.htm (accessed June 15, 2009).

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Croats in the media today (i.e. the newspaper Kurir), and typical Serbian stereotypes about Croats. According to Dovidio and Gaertner (1986): “stereotypes operate when members of groups are assigned characteristics that have been generalized to the entire group and serve to reinforce prejudice … It is ‘selectively unjustified negative behaviour toward members of the target group’” (Banks et al. 2005, 20). Additionally, this chapter deals with a content analysis in qualitative and quantitative terms in online news from the BBC from January 1, 2005 until September 26, 2011. In this, comparative analysis can be seen as quantitative data about the world’s interests in Serbia and Croatia. The survey was conducted on the basis of titles and short sentences that are recognized immediately through searching keywords (Serb, Croat and the EU). Short sentences that appear below the title and images enable the recipient to acquire an immediate insight into specific news. In this way, information will remain directly in the mind of a reader, forming the image and opinion on a particular topic. This is a model of metonymy, when a segment of reality is used to replace the entire unit, and propaganda is usually applied in order to create prejudice. The quantitative survey of news on the BBC News between Serbia and Croatia was conducted at the level of each year, and based on news related to war events of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, in which two countries (Croatia and Serbia) are concerned. The quantitative results indicate that the largest number of news that mentions Serbia and Croatia is marked by the war from the 1990s. This study also deals with the quantitative results (Serbia) obtained based on the news related to the war events of the 1990s and the Kosovo conflict that occupies the BBC News space intended for Serbia. Depending on the structure and substance of the news, the image of Serbia can be very different. The quantitative results indicate that the largest amount of news that mentions Serbia and the EU is related to the war crimes (1990s) or high-risk, potential conflict situations (Kosovo) in the context of the “newborn state” and the disintegration of Serbia. This chapter deals with critical and selective reading of the online materials (newspapers) in order to choose which readings are useful and relevant in an applied process in the following text. The survey deals with analysis of symbolism and words according to the EU and Serbia. The survey gives individual and usual examples of the BBC News in regard to relations between the EU and Serbia, i.e. in connection with war crimes during the 1990s. Additionally, the EU membership and war crimes will appear through the resonant character of Ratko Mladiü.

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Case study I—Serbo-Croatian (Media-Metaphorical) Question in Daily Newspapers Kurir Rhetorical tropes, particularly metonymy, analogies and metaphors, are present in any significant act of persuasion. O’Shaughnessy claims “the importance of rhetoric is that it persuades because it gives vivid definition—to fluid situations, to what would otherwise be vague or abstract since on so many matters individual opinion is tentative or confused” (2004, 78). Media propaganda is primarily focused on feelings that are, among other things, based on past events and experiences. Connection with certain images that one has experienced, regardless of the new context, will still retain the old impulses and signals. The long-term, suppressed feelings, replacing the current (reactive) ones, are particularly suitable for political manipulation. This part of the research was carried out on news in the Serbian daily newspaper Kurir related to neighbourly relations between Croatia and Serbia and gives an insight into the contemporary relationship between Croatia and Serbia from the Serbian perspective. The study concluded the established essential economic2 and cultural ties with Croatia. Relations related to the matter of religion between these two Christian nations are still very unsure. The following examples describe this fluctuating relationship: (1) “Šešelj: In the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Orthodox Christian Serbs fought with Catholic and Muslim Serbs.”3 (2) “Serbian Patriarch Irinej argued for a reconciliation of the Orthodox and the Roman Church!: ‘God’s will is that the Orthodox and the Catholics return to itself, and that the roads that are separated once again return to them, Patriarch Irinej said’.”4 2

While the economic ties between Serbia and Croatia are growing, the Croats are still treated as a hidden enemy. (March 22, 2011). Pakleni plan Hrvata: “Hrvati osvajaju srpsko tržište lekova.” [Infernal plan of Croats: “Croats win Serbian drug market!”]. Kurir. http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/drustvo/hrvati-osvajaju-srpsko-trziste-lekova81355.php (accessed June 12, 2011). 3 (March 7, 2011). Seselj: u SFRJ ratovali Srbi pravoslavci, sa Srbima katolicima i muslimanima. Kurir (from Agency Beta). http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/seselj-usfrj-ratovali-srbi-pravoslavaci-sa-srbima-katolicima-i-muslimanima-78799.php (accessed June 12, 2011). 4 R. K. (September 13, 2010). Patrijarh Irinej za pomirenje s katolicima. Kurir. http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/patrijarh-irinej-za-pomirenje-s-katolicima49813.php (accessed June 12, 2011).

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Chapter Fifteen (3) “Catholics still glorify the Ustashes!”5 (4) “The Roman Catholic church does not give the church to the Serbs.”6 (5) “After baptizing, no remorse. Croats: Serbs, accept the apology!: ‘Director of the Croatian Bureau for Statistics admitted there was a pressure on the Serbs to be, rather than as the Orthodox themselves, as Uniates’.”7

The second case, in the two examples, describes the aspiration of both nations to join the EU, but from the Serbian point of view: (1) “Croatia provokes Europe: ‘Croats in protest against the government of Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor set fire to the EU flag. Politicians fear it may slow down the European integrations ….’—‘Belgrade: Not in the EU? Croatian citizens are not satisfied with the government of Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor, but with the possible entry into the European Union either’!”8 (2) “Croats in the EU? O, God, help us!”9

In these examples, the historical competition between Croats and Serbs is clearly visible, regardless of whether it is a conflict, trade or membership in the EU. The next example emphasizes the language connection (similarities): (1) “Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin are one language: ‘U.S. diplomats even in the summer of 2009 found that the Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Muslim are not four’ [but one language] ….”10

5

(December 30, 2010). Katolici i dalje slave ustašu. Kurir. http://www.kuririnfo.rs/vesti/katolici-i-dalje-slave-ustasu-67307.php (accessed June 12, 2011). 6 (December 30, 2010). Rimokatolici ne daju crkvu Srbima. Kurir (Source: Agency Tanjug). http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/rimokatolici-ne-daju-crkvu-srbima-72740. php (accessed June 12, 2011). 7 Jovanoviü, J. (April 6, 2011). Posle pokrštavanja nema žaljenja. Hrvati: Srbi, izvinite! Kurir. http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/hrvati-srbi-izvinite-83921.php (accessed June 12, 2011). 8 (March 15, 2011). Hrvatska provocira Evropu. Kurir. http://www.kuririnfo.rs/m/vesti/politika/hrvatska-provocira-evropu-78329.php (accessed June 12, 2011). 9 Rakoviü, G. (March 20, 2011). Hrvati u EU?! Neka nam je Bog u pomoüi. Kurir. http://www.kurir-info.rs/m/vesti/hrvati-u-eu-neka-nam-je-bog-u-pomoci81025.php (accessed June 12, 2011). 10 (February 13, 2011). Srpski, hrvatski, bošnjaþki i crnogorski jedan jezik. Kurir. http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/srpski-hrvatski-bosnjacki-i-crnogorski-jedan-jezik74902.php (accessed June 12, 2011).

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The latest example, in a specific way, confirms the theory that if Serbs and Croats are not in conflict, they appear united against a third party that is discriminating the two groups: (1) “Bakir: Serbs are fascists, murderers and criminals!: ‘Hosts and guests of the show “60 Minutes” shown on television of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian and Croatian politicians called the worst names, but no one responds’!”11

What is visible in these examples is the common Serbian stereotype about Croats. In other words, “when group boundaries are created in contexts of competition or conflict, differences between groups become salient and negatively valued” (Banks et al. 2005, 20).

Case study 2—The EU and the Balkan (Serbo-Croatian) Question in the BBC news The propaganda through media is primarily focused on feelings that are, among other things, based on past events and experiences. In accordance with a system of remaining, or through analogies, via highly resonant scenes or persons (Kelner 2004), propaganda can easily induce emotional echoes, which can act like a deep prejudice. According to Klein (1998), “while metaphors structure our thinking and condition our sympathies and emotional reactions, they may also seriously deceive by embedding a false analogy of an actual process” (quoted from O’Shaughnessy 2004, 70). In the remaining part of the text we will present the results of the quantitative survey. Table 1 shows quantitative results of the survey on the BBC News at the level of each year. Based on the data analysis it can be concluded that the interest in Serbia was extremely high in comparison to the neighbouring Croatia. The quantity of the news may not be positive for Serbia. Depending on the structure and substance of the news, the image of Serbia can be very different. Table 2 shows quantitative results obtained based on the news related to war events of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia in relation to Serbia and Croatia. The results indicate that both Serbs (67.08%) and Croats (56.73%) are marked by the war from the 1990s, even though it has been more than twenty years since the war broke out. 11

(March 21, 2011). Bakir: Srbi su fašisti, ubice i kriminalci! Kurir. http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/bakir-srbi-su-fasisti-ubice-i-kriminalci-81158.php (accessed June 12, 2011).

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Table 1. Quantitative survey about Serbia and Croatia 2005–2011 (BBC News) Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan. 1–Sept. 26)

Number of news (Serbia) 186 219 151 262 154 109

Number of news (Croatia) 10 15 16 27 16 29

146

33

Table 2. Quantitative survey about Serbia and Croatia post-war news12 2005–2011 (BBC News) Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan. 1–Sept. 26)

Post-war news (Serbia) 146 (78.49%) 151 (68.95%) 69 (45.66%) 135 (51.53%) 104 (67.53%) 76 (69.72%) 128 (87.67%)

Post-war news (Croatia) 27 (84.38%) 22 (75.86%) 8 (50%) 21 (77.77%) 11 (68.75) 5 (33.33%) 7 (70%)

Table 3 shows a quantitative survey of the news on the BBC related to the war in the 1990s (post-war news), and news related to the situation in Kosovo13 (high risk or traumatic news). The survey results suggest that the post-war news (67.08 %) appear frequently, but there is a significant amount of news about Kosovo (24.60%) that occupies the BBC News space intended for Serbia.

12

The term “post-war news” was applied to all news related to the war of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia (war crimes, criminals, fugitives, traumas, exile, etc.). 13 See Trosanovski & Smilevski (2008) for detailed information (comparative qualitative and quantitative analysis) about Kosovo news in 2008 daily newspapers, in eleven countries in southeast Europe.

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Table 3. Quantitative survey from BBC News about post-war Serbia and traumatic news (2005–2011) Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan. 1–Sept. 26)

Serbia (post-war news) 146 (78.49%) 151 (68.95%) 69 (45.66%) 135 (51.53%) 104 (67.53%) 76 (69.72%) 128 (87.67%)

Kosovo (traumatic news) 42 (22.58%) 41 (18.72%) 71 (47.02%) 100 (38.18%) 27 (17.53%) 21 (19.27%) 13 (8.90%)

Table 3a. The quantitative survey of BBC News related to the war and trauma (2005–2011) Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Jan. 1–Sept. 26)

Serbia (post-war news) and Kosovo (traumatic) news 148 (79.57%) 192 (87.67%) 140 (92.72%) 235 (89.69%) 131 (85.06%) 97 (88.99%) 141 (96.58%)

Table 3 and Table 3a show the quantitative results (Serbia) obtained based on the news related to war events of the 1990s and the Kosovo conflict. Overall, the results indicate that the image of Serbia as a place of conflict has not changed since 2005. Moreover, in 2011, for a period of ten months, a percentage of 96.58 of negative (traumatic) news about Serbia was recorded. The total sum of the results indicate that the middle section of the situation in Serbia was marked with 88.61% of the traumatic, postwar or potential war (high risk) events.

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Table 4. The quantitative survey of BBC News related to the words Serbia and the EU (2005–2011)

Year

Number of news with EU and Serbia

Number of post-war and high-risk news (EU and Serbia)

2005

14 (7.53%)

13 (92.86%)

2006

19 (8.68%)

17 (89.47%)

2007

19 (12.58%)

16 (84.21)

2008

33 (12.60%)

30 (90.90%)

2009

10 (6.49%)

9 (90%)

2010 2011 (Jan. 1– Sept. 26)

5 (4.59%)

5 (100%)

Number Number of postof highwar news risk news (war (Kosovo) crimes) (EU and (EU and Serbia) Serbia) 12 1 (7.70%) (92.30%) 17 0 (0%) (100%) 10 6 (37.5%) (62.5%) 10 20 (33.33%) (66.67%) 6 3 (66.67%) (33.33%) 3 (60%) 1 (20%)

4 (2.74%)

3 (75%)

3 (100%)

0 (0%)

Table 4 shows the quantitative results from the BBC News, based on news related to the EU and Serbia. What is the connection between them, and what is the kind of analogy that arises from this news? From the quantitative analysis presented in the Table 4, it appears that the percentage of news that mentions the EU and Serbia is very low (7.89 %) compared to the total number of news about Serbia (1,227). The quantitative results (88.92 %) indicate that the largest percentage of news mentioning Serbia and the EU is related to the war crimes (of the 1990s) or high-risk, potentially conflictual situations (Kosovo). The texts are showing individually, usual examples from the BBC News in regard to relations between the EU and Serbia, i.e. in connection with the war crimes committed during the 1990s. Additionally, the EU membership and the war crimes will appear through the resonant character of Ratko Mladiü. The following examples are the selected cases of the BBC news:

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(1) “Serbia’s press welcomes the EU move: ‘Mr Rehn points out that leading war crimes suspects Radovan Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb leader, and his military chief Ratko Mladic …’.”14 (2) “Belgrade steps toward joining the EU: ‘… figures involved in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s remain essential. Chief among these sought criminals are the former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic …’.”15 (3) “Serb FM eyes sacking over Mladic: ‘… the EU suspended talks because of the failure to deliver Genenar Mladic to the UN tribunal. The former Bosnian Serb military chief is charged with …’.”16 (4) “Balkan EU candidates face cause: ‘… and prosecute those responsible for apparently ethnically motivated crimes. Bias against Serb defendants still needs to be fully addressed …’.”17 (5) “War crime suspect ‘in UN custody’: ‘Serb figures Radovan Karadziü, Ratko Mladiü and Stojan Zupljanin, and former Croatian Serb leader Goran Hadzic. The EU has been putting pressure …’.”18 (6) “EU positive on the Balkan entry bids: ‘International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by helping to arrest fugitives such as the Bosnian Serb wartime leaders, Ratko …’.”19 (7) “EU puts off Serbia bid decision”: ‘EU ambassadors have put off a decision on establishing closer ties with Serbia until the former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic is extradited’.”20 (8) “Croatia gets the EU entry timetable: ‘… become a candidate member next year will be held out to Serbia, if it can deliver fugitive Bosnian Serb wartime general Ratko Mladic to the …’.”21 (9) “Peacekeepers search Mladic hunts: ‘European Union peacekeepers in Bosnia have been searching houses belonging to relatives of the former Bosnian Serb military leader, Ratko Mladic’.”22 14

(April 13, 2005). “Serbia’s press welcomes EU move.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4440149.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). 15 (April 18, 2005). “Belgrade steps toward joining EU.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4456683.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). 16 (May 6, 2009) “Serb FM eyes sacking over Mladic.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4980560.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). 17 Lungescu, O. (August 11, 2006). “Balkan EU candidates face cause.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6128098.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). 18 (June 6, 2007) “War crime suspect in UN custody.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6761059.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). 19 (June 11, 2007). “EU positive on Balkan entry bids.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7080895.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). 20 (July 29, 2008). “EU puts off Serbia bid decision.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7080895.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). 21 (November 5, 2008). “Croatia gets EU entry timetable.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7710904.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). 22 (February 10, 2009). “Peacekeepers search Mladic hunts.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7880960.stm (accessed July 10, 2011).

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Chapter Fifteen (10) “EU scraps visas for the Balkan states: ‘… on the capture of the last two remaining major war crimes suspects, former Bosnian Serb army chief General Ratko Mladic and the former Croatian Serb …’.”23 (11) “Serbia submits the EU membership bid: ‘Yugoslavia (ICTY), based in the Hague. Chief among them is the former Bosnian Serb military commander, Ratko Mladic. Earlier this month the …’.”24 (12) “Balkan hopefully meets the EU leaders in Sarajevo: ‘… from the Bosnian war of the 1990s before it can join the EU. Former Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic tops the list. Macedonia’s progress toward …’.”25 (13) “Mladic’s arrest moves Serbia one big step closer to the EU.”26 (14) “Croatia cleared for the EU membership in 2013: ‘Serbia is expected to start membership talks next year, after the last month’s arrest of the former Bosnian Serb army chief Ratko Mladic on war crimes …’.”27

Based on the thematic analysis conducted by the BBC News, it can be seen that, especially in the case of Serbia, the reporting and on war and high-risk events are extremely large (88.61%). This type of reporting creates and deepens the readers’ prejudices against Serbia. Since we can state that “prejudice consists of ‘negative attitudes towards a social group’ (Stephan 1985, 600), the Serbian case is in a seriously unfavourable position. Questions about Serbia and the EU are marked with personality of former Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladiü. In this way, information will remain directly in the mind of people that form the image and opinion on a particular topic based on the media coverage. This is, nonetheless, a model of metonymy when a segment of reality is used to replace the whole unit, and the propaganda is usually applied in order to create prejudice. As O’Shaughnessy rightly points out: “Daily communication lives through metaphors, but behind the metaphors lies the ideology” (O’Shaughnessy 2004, 70). 23

(December 1, 2009). “EU scraps visas for Balkan states.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8387938.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). 24 (December 19, 2009). “Serbia submits EU membership bid.” BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7080895.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). 25 (February 6, 2010). “Balkan hopefuls meet EU leaders in Sarajevo.” BBC News Europe. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10213031 (accessed July 10, 2011). 26 Knight, L. (May 26, 2011). “Mladic arrest moves Serbia one big step closer to EU.” BBC News Europe. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13561423 (accessed July 10, 2011). 27 (October 6, 2011). “Croatia cleared for EU membership in 2013.” BBC News Europe. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13725558 (accessed July 10, 2011).

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Conclusion In the period of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the identity of the entire nation (in the context of individual republics) was reduced to the dimension that equals national and religious affiliations. Former cultural pluralism retreated from the newly independent, strengthened republics that wanted their own ethnic-national identity and their own values and symbols. In this way, (in Serbia) a desire to preserve cultural, national and religious specificity turns into fear of neighbours, and to a deadly fear of Western culture. Certain cultural symbols were important for identity formation (as a necessary part of the national integration), but as already noted, identity is ascribed by others and asserted by individuals. Nonetheless, it is difficult to determine the point at which individual choice in the formation of identity and collective responsibility begins. These usually “ascriptive identities (e.g., ethnicity, tribe, race, religion, language, etc.)” (Toffolo 2003, 3) were in the function of nation state formation. However, cultural identity developed under the influence of religion, and nationality can also be developed through critical reflection of culture. Thus, identity becomes a dynamic category that achieves its stability through the constant review of the state. It is an individualistic category of belonging to a group, which involves a certain feeling of belonging, but also freedom of choice and changes of identity. Throughout the nineties the impact of politics on the creation of national identity through the Orthodox religion created a new form of ideology that can be determined in Serbia. Orthodox religion mixed with a strong feeling of nationalism and appeared in Serbia as a response to the crisis of identity caused by the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Today in Serbia, as well as in Croatia, increasing diversity is recognized in the cultural, ethnic, religious and racial language of nationality that unifies people from different backgrounds through respecting the rights of others. However, the trauma of war is not forgotten. Old prejudices had been encouraged by politicians and the media as a powerful centre through which politics creates a collective feeling of group hostility towards the outside world. According to Balibar, the democratic constitution of people in a nation has inevitably resulted in the systems of exclusion, or “it is a division into ‘minorities’ and, even more profoundly, into populations that are considered indigenous and those that are considered foreign, heterogeneous, racially and culturally stigmatized” (2003, 36). It is not surprising that certain Serbian daily news continues with negative stereotyping, and inflaming religious and ethnic intolerance

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toward Croatia, given that the consequences of war were harsh for both sides. However, what is surprising are the survey results coming from the analysis of the BBC news reports in regard to Serbia, where Serbia is treated only inside negative news framing, and the media coverage of the BBC news continues to apply the old model of media framing that fosters prejudice and stereotyping. Additionally, it is visible (in regard to the amount of news in each year) that the interest in events in Serbia is much higher than the interest toward events in Croatia, a twenty-eighth EU Member State. The results from the BBC News survey related to the war events of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, in relation to Serbia and Croatia, indicate that both Serbs (67.08 %) and Croats (56.73 %), after more than twenty years since the war, are marked by it. Beliefs about Serbian nationalism are rooted in the memories of the Balkan wars, but through daily news these memories are continuously being renewed. Today, the old prejudices in Serbia suppress the desire for a better life in the form of the European Union. However, given the results of the research conducted in the BBC News that mention the EU and Serbia, it is evident that the connection between them is marked by the war from the 1990s and conflict with Kosovo.28 The quantitative results (88.92 %) indicate that the largest amount of news has an atmosphere of war, and real or potential conflicts. One can develop an opinion that the only connection between the European Union and Serbia is the violence from Serbs against other nations and minorities. Regardless of the fact that the present Serbian government is largely pro-European oriented, a view of Serbia, from the perspective of the media, was equally marked by wars and violence. Relations between Serbia and the EU (the way it is presented in the BBC News analogies) do not indicate a potential membership and partnership of Serbia with the EU, but continue repressive measures against the people who are accused of carrying out the genocide.

28

Licht, S. (November 14, 2008). Europe should shed Serbia stereotypes, Euobserver. Licht says: “There is no doubt that the formal separation of Kosovo from Serbia (it has been under international rule from June 1999) and the recognition of this new state by the US and the majority of the European Union member states remain a genuine trauma for the Serbian people.” http://euobserver.com/15/27101 (accessed August 20, 2011).

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http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/patrijarh-irinej-za-pomirenje-s katolicima49813.php (accessed June 12, 2011). Serb FM eyes sacking over Mladic (May 6, 2009). BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4980560.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). Serbia’s press welcomes EU move. (April 13, 2005). BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4440149.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). Serbia submits EU membership bid. (December 19, 2009). BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7080895.stm (accessed July 10, 2011). Seselj: u SFRJ ratovali Srbi pravoslavci, sa Srbima katolicima i muslimanima. (March 7, 2011). Kurir. http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/seselj-u-sfrj-ratovali-srbi-pravoslavacisa-srbima-katolicima-i-muslimanima-78799.php (accessed June 12, 2011). Srpski, hrvatski, bošnjaþki i crnogorski jedan jezik (February 13, 2011). Kurir. http://www.kurir-info.rs/vesti/srpski-hrvatski-bosnjacki-i-crnogorskijedan-jezik-74902.php (accessed June 12, 2011). Stephan, W. G. (1985). “Intergroup relation.” In Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 3, Lindzey, G. & Aronson, E. (eds.), 599–658. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. The Law on Churches and Religious Communities. (Clause 1, 2 and 3). (April 27, 2006). Ancillary Herald RS XXXVI. Svetosavlje Digital Library Website. http://www.svetosavlje.org/biblioteka/zakoni/zakon-o-crkvama.htm (accessed June 15, 2011). Toffolo, Cris E. (2003). “Introduction.” In Emancipating Cultural Pluralism, Toffolo, C. E. (ed.). Albany: State University of New York Press. Trosanovski, M. & Smilevski, T. (2008). Kosovo and the Media. Skopje: Macedonian Institute for Media. MIM Website. http://www.mim.org.mk/attachments/095_media-coverage-kosovoang.pdf (accessed June 8, 2011). War crime suspect in UN custody. (June 6, 2007). BBC News Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6761059.stm (accessed July 10, 2011).

CONCLUDING REMARKS ARE CONTESTED IDENTITIES IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE SACRED OR SECULAR? SRDJAN SREMAC AND MARTINA TOPIû

Over the last decade the role of religion in a post-secular public sphere has gained more attention. It is obvious that nowadays religious institutions and communities of faith have acquired unpredicted political importance, and Western societies are searching for an adequate understanding of religion. As Jürgen Habermas rightly pointed out, political revitalization of religion is at the heart of Western society (Habermas, 2004) that poses a key question: how do these religiouspolitical discourses inform our current thinking about identities and belonging in the public sphere? Implied in any discussion concerning religion and society are issues relating to identity. Today, many societies face difficult questions, namely how to deal with the emergence of ethnoreligious identities that possibly create tensions among communities and how to prevent the appearance of abuse of those identities (Paige 2011). This is particularly the case in unstable states and fragile societies that still suffer the consequences of conflict or are potential flashpoints for future skirmishes. Observable in such countries or regions is the proliferation of new ethno-religious/political identities and at the same time a formal religiosity and neo-traditionalism (mostly in the form of a revitalization of “national identity”). It thus comes as no surprise that, in many cases, this accumulation of identities creates deep-rooted religious and ethnic schisms that are almost impossible to resolve (van der Borght et al. 2002). Therefore, religious and ethnic multiplicity can be a source of cultural dynamism and reconciliation, as well as conflict and strife (Foley 2011). Likewise, the interplay of ethnic and religious identities has received much empirical and theoretical attention in social sciences. The present volume Europe as a Multiple Modernity: Multiplicity of Religious Identities and Belonging brings together a diverse group of international scholars who examine the European religious landscape through an identity

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lens. This volume reveals how concrete practices through which religious orientation and post-secular models of politics and society engage with one another. The main questions dealt with by this volume break down into two categories. The first concerns the multiplicity of contested social and religious identities in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Europe. The second involves the correlation between identity transformation, religious identification and belonging. The relationship between religion and multi-cultural citizenship in Europe is extraordinarily complex and multi-faceted (Levey & Modood 2009; Grace 2002; Habermas & Ratzinger 2006). In line with this, the contributors in this volume challenged current assumptions about the relationship between European secularism, religion, multi-ethnicity and liberal democratic practice, and examined how these are embedded in different historical and political contexts (Estonia, Finland, Great Britain, The Netherlands, France, Serbia, Greece, Turkey and Sweden). Nevertheless, as the contributors point out, the issue of the social role of religion in present-day Europe raises a number of questions. How do religious and identity transformation processes interact? What is the role of religion in the current political panorama of Europe? Does the concept of post-secularity allow a suitable understanding of religion in the public sphere? Or, are we witnessing the ultimate subordination of politics to religion or the final separation of religion from politics? What is the relation between religious identifications, (national) belonging and ethnicity? More specifically, how are the perceived constructions of “Otherness” reflected in negotiations and enactments of belonging? These questions imply that within any given ethno-religious context there will not be one national or religious identity, but rather contesting constructions. Therefore, it is obvious that modernization did not entail secularisation. Moreover, it is evident that religion is alive in the public sphere and has avoided marginalisation to the private sphere. Indeed, the hijab controversy in France and Germany and the countless other various ethno-religious debates throughout Europe raise the question of whether these are signs of a religious revitalisation of secular Europe. Religion is most visible in such structures of cultural multiplicity where religious and social identities overlap with ethnic and/or political fractures. The essays in this volume clearly show that religious identities are important because they are basic elements of our social life and its reproduction. However, cultural identity that developed under the influence of religion and ethnicity can also be developed through continuous critical reflection of culture. Thus, identity becomes a vibrant category that achieves its stability through the constant re-examination of

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the culture. It is an individualistic category of belonging to a group that involves a certain feeling of belonging, but also a freedom of choice and personal reconstruction along with re-examination of identity. The contributors also discuss how minority groups tend to identify themselves in broader socio-religious and cultural perspectives in order to protect and construct their own identities. For example, as Mari Toivanen (77) pointed out, “young people with migrant backgrounds, instead of allegedly being trapped between their parents’ culture and the culture of the society of settlement, are navigating and positioning themselves in terms of various discourses, and contesting the boundaries of perceived identity categories.” Another significant issue examined is the role of mediated discourses in the process of (re)construction of political and religious identities while also revealing in an empirical way how this relation is actually initiated, contested and maintained in everyday life. The authors exhibited how collected data from media discourse unveils the complex relation between identity and the media, and indicates how the media becomes a significant agent for identity transformation, community reconciliation and/or conflict. Therefore, mediated discourses move religion into focus as a resource of importance in post-secular societies, but also as a source of tension and conflict (Ziebertz & Riegel 2008). By focusing on multiplicity of religious identities and belonging, this volume intended to stimulate and challenge further research on the relation of religion and the public sphere. Drawing on multiple disciplines, the volume engaged in the complex relationship between ideals and concrete practices in the competing religious marketplace of Europe. With contributions from a range of methods, Europe as a Multiple Modernity: Multiplicity of Religious Identities and Belonging also serves as genuine primer in the field of Sociology of Religion.

References Levey, B. G. & Modood, T. (eds.) (2009). Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davie, G. (2002). “Setting the Scene: The Parameters of Faith in Europe.” In Europe: The Exceptional Case. London: Darton, Longman, and Todd. Foley, E. (ed.) (2001). Religion, Diversity and Conflict. Zürich/Berlin: Lit Verlag. Habermas, J. (2004). Der gespalteneWesten: KleinepolitischeSchriften. SuhrkampVerlag: Frankfurt/Main.

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Habermas, J.; Ratzinger, J. (2006). The Dialectics of Secularization—On Reason and Religion. San Francisco: Ignatius Press. Paige, A. (ed.) (2002). Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice in Divided Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van der Borght, E., van Keulenand, D. & Brinkman E. M. (eds.) (2002). Faith and Ethnicity Vol I. Zoetermeer: Meinema. Ziebertz, H-G. & Riegel, U. (eds.) (2008). Europe: Secular or PostSecular? Zürich/Berlin: Lit Verlag.

CONTRIBUTORS

GERALDINE BOZÈC holds a PhD in Political science from Sciences Po with a thesis on the French education system (2010). She worked at several international research projects including European projects FP7 Identities and Modernities in Europe (2009–2012), Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants’ Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks and Public Policies (LOCALMULTIDEM 2006–2008) and Teacher Education Addressing Multiculturalism in Europe (TEAM 2004–2006). She has also participated as a researcher in local French projects including “Etude cohorte sur les trajectoires sociales des engagés volontaires de l’armée de terre française” (OSC 2003–2004) and “Public Participation and the Pension Policy Process: the Citizen and Pension Reform” (2000–2001). So far she has published several book chapters and journal articles, including (with S. Duchesne) “Europe as a Missed Opportunity: Looking Backwards to Modernity in France” in Europe, Nations and Modernity (2011); “Engagement” in Dictionnaire historique de la Cinquième République (2008); “Recent Policy Changes in France: Immigrant Integration and Citizenship: Ambiguities and Resistances,” Canadian Diversity (2008) (with C. Mays); and “The Pension Reform Process in France,” Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research (2000). She has participated in several international conferences including the 18th Conference of Europeanists, Barcelona, 2011; Rethinking Integration: the Transatlantic Challenges of Migration and Ethnic Groupness in Contemporary Democracies, CEVIPOF, Paris, 2008; Amours et désamours entre Européens: pour une sociologie politique des sentiments dans l’intégration européenne, Grenoble, 2007, and Conférence générale de l’European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Pise, 2007. TATJANA CVETKOVSKI was born in Belgrade where she completed her elementary and high school education. She holds Bsc and MSc degrees from the Faculty of Organizational Sciences in Belgrade, and a PhD from the Graduate school of Business Studies, Megatrend University in Belgrade. From 1998 to 2000 she worked at the Faculty of Organizational Sciences as an associate endowed for research. From 2000, she has been working at Megatrend University, and from 2011 as a full-time professor

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at the Graduate school of Business Studies. She has participated in several research projects. For many years she was a member of the annual Organizing Committee of project management symposiums at the Serbia and Montenegro Project Management Association (YUPMA). She participated in the organization of many seminars at the Faculty of Organizational Sciences in Belgrade. She is the author of several books and monographs, and more than one hundred papers published in journals and national and international conference proceedings, as well as themed collections. From 2006 she has served as an associate dean of undergraduate studies at the Graduated school of Business Studies in Belgrade. In 2009 and 2010 she was a visiting professor at the Upper Austria University of Applied Sciences, School of Management, Steyr, where she gave lectures on "Human Resources Management in Serbia" (2009) and "Intercultural Communication Problems—Business Communication in Serbia" (2010). At the Graduated school of Business Studies, at different levels of study, she is researching and teaching in the fields of organizational behaviour, business communication and human resources management. MOHAMMED HASHAS is currently affiliated with The Centre for Ethics and Global Politics where he is enrolled as a PhD candidate at LUISS University, Rome, Italy. He is working on a thesis entitled “The Idea of European Islam.” He holds an MA in literary and cultural studies from Mohamed I University in Oujda, Morocco, and a second MA in European Studies from LUISS in Rome, Italy. His MA thesis entitled Immigration and EU Integration Policies was published by LAP Publisher for Young Scholars in 2010. His recent research fellowships include Babylon Centre for Study of the Multicultural Society at Tilburg University in The Netherlands (Summer 2010) and The Centre for European Islamic Thought in Copenhagen University in Denmark (2011– 2012). He contributes opinion articles to Alquds Al-Arabi in London, Aljazeeratalk in Doha, and Resetdoc in Rome. ATSUKO ICHIJO is a Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Kingston University, UK. She holds the first PhD in Ethnicity and Nationalism awarded by the University of London, and her main research interests are nationalism and modernity. She co-ordinated an FP7 project “Identities and Modernities in Europe” (2009–2012) and is a member of the editorial team of Nations and Nationalism. Her publications include Scottish Nationalism and the Idea of Europe (2004), The Balancing Act (2008); When is the Nation?: Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism (2005), Entangled Identities

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(2005). She has also edited Europe, Nations and Modernity (2011). Her recent journal articles include “Sovereignty and nationalism in the twentyfirst century: the Scottish case,” Ethnopolitics (2009). AYHAN KAYA is a Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University; Director of the European Institute specialised in projects on European identities such as “Euro-Turks in Germany, France, Belgium and The Netherlands” and the “Circassian diaspora in Turkey, and the construction and articulation of modern diasporic identities.” He received his PhD and MA degrees from the University of Warwick, UK. His most recent book is Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey (2013). His other works include the comparison of contemporary integration, citizenship and integration regimes of Germany, France, Belgium and The Netherlands (Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization, 2009); Contemporary Migrations in Turkey: Integration or Return (co-written with others), Belgian-Turks (2008, cowritten with Ferhat Kentel), Euro-Turks: A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the EU (2005, co-written with Ferhat Kentel, Turkish version by Bilgi University). He is also the author of Sicher in Kreuzberg: Constructing Diasporas, published in two languages, English (2001) and Turkish (2000). He has authored various articles on Berlin-Turkish youth cultures, ethnic-based political participation strategies of German-Turks, Berlin-Alevis, historian debate in Germany, and identity debates and Circassian diaspora in Turkey. He also translated Ethnic Groups and Boundaries by Fredrik Barth and Citizenship and Social Classes by T. H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore. He has co-edited several books including Issues Without Borders: Migration, Citizenship, Human Rights, Global Justice, Gender and Security (2003, in Turkish), Majority and Minority Politics in Turkey: Citizenship Debates on the way to the European Integration (2005); and his latest edited work (with Bahar ùahin) is Roots and Routes: Migratory Processes in Turkey (Kökler ve Yollar: Türkiye’de Göç Süreçleri) (2007). He received the Turkish Social Science Association Prize in 2003, the Turkish Sciences Academy (TÜBA-GEBøP) Prize in 2005, the 2005 Sedat Simavi Research Prize, as well as the Euroactive European Prize. He has participated in two different FP7 projects entitled “Modernities and Identities in Europe” and “Pluralism and Tolerance in the EU,” as well as in another project entitled “the Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe.”

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EMIR MAHIEDDIN is a PhD candidate in social and cultural anthropology at the University of Provence, MMSH, Aix-en-Provence, France. He is currently a tutor in anthropology at the University of Provence, and is a member of the IDEMEC (Institut D’Ethnologie Européenne Méditerranéenne et Comparative). He has been awarded a doctoral scholarship by the French Ministry of Research (2009–2012) to conduct a study dealing with Pentecostalism and Evanglical churches in Sweden. BÈRENGÈRE MASSIGNON is a graduate of Sciences Po-Paris with a PhD in Sociology from the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Sorbonne, Paris). She is a researcher with the GSRL (Groupe Sociétés, Religions et Laïcités), a joint research unit between the CNRS and the EPHE. She teaches the geopolitics of religion at Sciences Po-Paris, and she also works as a Lecturer at the Catholic Institute of Paris (Sociology and Political sciences). As a post-doctoral student, she took part in a three-year project funded by the European Commission on the teaching of religious facts in Europe (REDCo). She is a consultant for the Prospective Direction of the French Foreign Ministry and has worked as the Religious Affairs Adviser of this Ministry. During that time she prepared a report on religious signs in Europe for the Parliamentary Commission Stasi (2004). Her research is focused on the relationships between religion and politics in late modernity with an insight on multiple secularities within globalization taking the European Union and France as a field. She has published several articles and two books: Gods and Bureaucrats. Religions Facing the Challenges of European Integration (2007), and Europe, With or Without God? Heritages and New Challenges (2010, with journalist Virginie Riva). RANGEL de OLIVEIRA MEDEIROS holds a PhD in Sociology from the Universidade Federal de São Carlos in Brazil (Sponsored by CNPq Brazil). He is currently teaching Sociology and Political Science at FMP – Palhoça – SC – Brazil. The chapter written for this volume originated as a part of his PhD theses. The fieldwork was conducted in 2009 when he was at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam as a guest researcher. The research and the thesis were part of the research group Religion, Politics and Globalization hosted by Universidade Federal de São Carlos. This work is also part of the project Exporting Latin American Pentecostalism and the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, and the ‘Re-Christianization’ of Europe (Center for the Study of Latin American Pentecostalism, University of Southern California).

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LEON MOOSAVI received a PhD in 2011 from the Sociology Department of Lancaster University, UK. His thesis examines the experiences of Muslim converts in Britain in relation to Islamophobia, belonging and “race.” He currently works as a Lecturer in Sociology at Liverpool University, UK. He has discussed his research in numerous academic conferences in Switzerland, Latvia, Birmingham, Leeds, Lancaster, Exeter, Sunderland, Cardiff and Manchester. Some of his preliminary findings have been published in The Sociology of Islam: Secularism, Economy and Politics (2011). Other publications deriving from his PhD research are also imminent in an edited book collection entitled Reflections on 9/11: The Legacies and Impacts of a Decade of Urgent History, as well as in The Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association Journal and the Performing Islam Journal. He has contributed to discussions in the news media on topics relating to his research with BBC television, BBC radio, The Guardian and Press TV. CARLO NARDELLA is a postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Applied Psychology (FISPPA) at Padua University, Italy. He received his PhD in Sociology in 2012 from Milan University, Italy. His primary research interests include sociology of culture, media and religion, power and social change, as well as content analysis. He has written papers on the presence of religious symbols in advertising, marketing and religion, and healing rites. His work has been published in the Journal of Contemporary Religion and recognized by awards from the British Sociological Association and the Italian Sociological Association. He holds MA and BA degrees from the University of Padua, and has been a visiting PhD student at the University of Pennsylvania and the Catholic University of Leuven. He has also held lectureships at the University of Pennsylvania, USA (2010) and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium (2009). VIOLETA CVETKOVSKA OCOKOLJIû holds a PhD in cultural studies from Megatrend University in Belgrade, Serbia. She also holds BSc and MSc degrees in Economy (Megatrend University, Belgrade), and a degree in industrial design (Polytechnic Academy, Belgrade). In 2008, she was appointed as an assistant professor at the Megatrend University, Belgrade in the Faculty of Culture and the Media. So far she has published two monographs on culture and the media and, as author and co-author, more than seventy academic papers. She has also participated in many international conferences (in Serbia, Cuba, Spain, Turkey, Greece,

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Romania and Italy) in the fields of Visual Culture, Communication, Religion, Media and the Economy. AGE PLOOM is a PhD candidate at the Tartu University, Estonia. Her research is located at the intersection of culture, society and religion. She has authored the papers “Woman’s religious calling as a nun in Orthodox Church” and “Islamic identity of Estonian women.” She conducted research in the field of Estonian women and Islam in 2010, arguing that Estonian women, who have converted to Islam, have a changed perspective of the world, but at the same time dimensions of Estonian and Christian culture traditions have been transferred into an Islamic perspective of the world. Age’s current research includes both theoretical and empirical research on “Estonianized Islam” that differs from Islam in general, and analyzes the cultural differences. Before the Tartu University, where she is presently writing her thesis, she obtained degrees from the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, Baltic Methodist Theological Seminary and EELK Theological institute. She has also gathered empirical data on religios practices from Morocco and Greece while working as a historical and cultural guide. JAN JAAP de RUITER is an assistant professor at Tilburg University in The Netherlands (MA 1985; PhD 1989). He is interested in the status and position of the Arabic language and Islam in Western European countries. He has published extensively on both subjects and is active in the debate on Islam in The Netherlands. Some of his publications include the edited volume Langues et cultures en contact: le cas des langues et cultures arabe et turque en France et aux Pays-Bas (2008), “Morocco’s Languages and Gender: Evidence from the Field,” International Journal of the Sociology of Language (2008), “The Position of Muslim Migrants in the European Union: Emancipation or Marginalization?,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2000). More information on his academic and public work can be found at: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/nl/webwijs /show/?uid=jj.deruiter / www.janjaapderuiter.eu/cms ALEXANDROS SAKELLARIOU holds a PhD in Sociology of Religion from the Department of Sociology, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens (2008, Thesis: Dictatorships and Orthodox Church in Greece During the 20th Century: Political, Economic and Ideological Relations under Regimes of Emergency). He also holds an MA in Sociology from the Department of Sociology, Panteion University of Athens. He is currently working as a researcher on a four-year European

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Commission research project entitled MYPLACE, Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement (http://www.fp7-myplace.eu). He is currently a post-doctoral researcher at the Panteion University, Department of Sociology, where he is studying the forms of atheism in contemporary Greek society. He is also the scientific associate of the Greek Historical Evangelical Archive, a non-profit organization focused on the collection and preservation of archival material regarding Protestantism in Greece. He is a member of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion (I.S.S.R.), and of the International Sociological Association (I.S.A.). His academic interests include Sociology of Religion (politics and religion, Church-State relations, religious communities in the Greek society, religious freedom, religion and globalization), Sociology of Youth, Political Sociology and Sociology of Gender. He has presented and published papers on these issues in both Greece and overseas. SRDJAN SREMAC is a postodoctoral research fellow at the Department of Theology, VU University Amsterdam and a research member of the Amsterdam Centre for the Study of Lived Religion. He holds a PhD in Theology from VU University Amsterdam. He also holds a BA degree in Theology and an MPhil (Research Masters, VU) in Religious Studies. He published more than forty articles and has also authored or co-edited several books such as The Phenomenology of Conversion (2007, in Serbian), Conversion and Context (2009, ed. in Serbian), Religious Imagination and the Contemporary Media (2010, ed. in Serbian), Dangerous Memories and Reconciliation: A Contextual Exploration of Religion in the Post-Conflict Society (2012, ed. in Serbo-Croatian), and Addiction and Spiritual Transformation. His broad research interests include practical (empirical) theology, the narrative psychology of religion, biographical-reconstructive research, spiritual transformation, addiction and spirituality, religion and sexuality, lived religion of marginalized groups, and religion and pop culture. AYSE TECMEN graduated from the Emory University in the USA with a BA in Political Science and received her MA degree in European Studies with highest honours from Istanbul Bilgi University. She is currently a PhD candidate at Bristol University, UK. She is also working at the Istanbul Bilgi University as an FP7 Programme project assistant under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya where she is co-writing research reports for the Turkish case. She actively takes part in the organization of Summer Academies on EU-Turkey relations, and the organization of seminar series on sustainable development in the Black Sea region. Her

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field of interest includes culture, identity formation, cultural tourism, and transport policy, with reference to air transport liberalization. DRAGAN TODOROVIû is an assistant professor at the University of Niš, Faculty of Humanities and Social sciences, Serbia. He is teaching in courses on General Sociology and Historical Sociology. He holds a PhD in the Sociology of Religion from the University of Belgrade (2011) and an MSc in Sociology of Religion from the University of Niš (2006). Since 2002 he has served as a general secretary of the Yugoslav society for academic research of religion from Niš. From 2009 until 2013 he served as a member of the presidency of the Serbian sociological association, and in 2013 he was appointed president of the Sociological Association of Serbia. He was awarded The Zoran Djindjic Prize for the best Masters' thesis in the field of philosophical and sociological sciences in 2006. His academic interests include Historical Sociology, Sociology of Religion and Romology. So far he has published a number of books including Sociology and History (2003, with Lj. Mitroviü); Romas and Others—Others and Romas (Social Distance) (2004, with D. B. Djordjeviü and L. Miloševiü); Romani Narratives about Pre-death, Death and After-death Customs (2005); Romological School of Niš: Bibliography 1996–2005 (2006); Societal Detachment from the Roma People (Ethnical-religous Relations) (2007); Jemka has Risen (Tekkias, Tarikats and Sheiks of Niš Romas) (2009, with D. B. Djordjeviü). He has also edited a number of volumes including Roma Religious and Religious Customs (2003, with D. B. Djordjeviü); Evangelization, Conversion, Proselytism (2004); Islam in the Balkans in the Past, Today and in the Future (2007, with D. B. Djordjeviü and Lj. Mitroviü); The Quality of Interethnic Relations and the Culture of Peace in the Balkans (2008, with D. B. Djordjeviü); Pilgrimages— Between Holy and Secular (2011, with D. Radisavljeviü-ûiparizoviü), and Orthodoxy from an Empirical Perspective (2011, with M. Blagojeviü). MARI TOIVANEN has graduated from Paris IV Sorbonne, and is currently a PhD candidate in Network for Research on Multiculturalism and Societal Interaction operating at the University of Turku, Finland, where she has also taken part in the research project Multiculturalism as a New Pathway to Incorporation. Toivanen’s PhD dissertation focuses on various aspects of negotiating belonging among youth with migrant backgrounds, thus, intending to contribute to the growing body of academic literature on the younger generations with migrant backgrounds coming of age in the Northern Europe. Her research interests include

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identity, belonging, transnationalism, Kurdish studies, generation-inbetween and multicultural youth. MARTINA TOPIû completed Masters degrees in Political science and Journalism at the Faculty of Political science, University of Zagreb (both in 2003). After graduation she worked as a journalist for the national print media. In 2007 she completed a postgraduate course in Media and Globalization at City University London, UK (2005–2007), and in 2013 she was awarded a PhD in Sociology (University of Zagreb, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences). From 2007 to 2013 she worked as a research fellow at the University of Zagreb. In 2013, she co-founded Centre for Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Zagreb, Croatia. So far she has worked on several research projects including “UNESCO media development indicators” (2008–2009) and an FP7 project “Identities and Modernities in Europe” (2009–2012). She has extensively published in the fields of Nationalism, Identity studies, Religion, Culture, Media studies, and Jewish studies. She has also published two books: a monograph Croatia’s Media System according to the UNESCO’s Media Development Indicators (2011, with Z. Peruško, T. Perišin, G. Viloviü and N. Zgrabljiü Rotar), and an edited volume Cultural diplomacy and Cultural imperialism: European perspective(s) (2012, co-edited with S. Rodin). Her research interests include Nationalism, Identity studies, Modernity studies, Sociology of Religion, Cultural Sociology, and Jewish studies (Anti-Semitism and Zionism, in particular).