EU Enlargement and the Transatlantic Alliance: A Security Relationship in Flux 9781626373419

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EU Enlargement and the Transatlantic Alliance

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EU Enlargement and the

Transatlantic Alliance A SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN FLUX

edited by Sven Biscop Johan Lembke

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

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Published in the United States of America in 2008 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2008 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data EU enlargement and the Transatlantic alliance : a security relationship in flux / Sven Biscop & Johan Lembke, editors. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-58826-578-4 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Membership. 2. European Union. 3. United States—Foreign relations—Europe. 4. Europe—Foreign relations— United States. I. Biscop, Sven. II. Lembke, Johan, 1969– UA646.3.E77 2008 355'.031091821—dc22 2007041071 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

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Contents

Foreword, Robert E. Hunter

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1 A Transatlantic Security Relationship in Flux

Sven Biscop and Johan Lembke

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Part 1 European Security Strategy 2 NATO and the ESDP: Complementing or Competing?

Sven Biscop

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3 The European Defense Agency and

Transatlantic Burden Sharing Nick Witney

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4 The ESDP and Homeland Security

Esther Brimmer

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Part 2 The Impact of Eastward Enlargement 5 Poland: Empowering or Undercutting EU Collective Security?

Kerry Longhurst

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6 The Czech Republic: Searching for a Balanced Profile

Radek Khol

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7 Bulgaria: Empowering the Alliance and the Union

Plamen Pantev

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CONTENTS

8 Turkey: The Potential Impact of EU Membership

Oya Dursun-Özkanca

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Part 3 The European Neighborhood in a Transatlantic Context 9 The Future of Transatlantic Security:

A New Strategic Triangle? Jan Hallenberg

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10 The European Neighborhood Policy

Hiski Haukkala

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Part 4 Conclusion 11 European Enlargement and the Future

of Transatlantic Relations Sven Biscop and Johan Lembke

List of Acronyms Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

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187 189 203 205 215

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SINCE THE COLD WAR, COMMENTATORS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE

Atlantic have asked whether, in time, the United States would shift its focus away from Europe and toward some other part of the globe—Asia, it seemed, during the 1960s; the Middle East from the late 1980s onward. This question weighs particularly heavy on Europe, given that its security has depended so heavily on the United States. The Europeans seek not only a continued military presence and nuclear guarantee, but also, at a more fundamental level, they hope the United States will continue to perceive its security as being wrapped up in the Continent. Even with the collapse of the Soviet Union and European communism, most Europeans still want the United States to remain as a “European power,” not only because of the unfortunate history of the twentieth century, but also because of the uncertainty about what the twenty-first century will bring. For example, Russia’s resurgence threatens to deepen its division with Europe over its rightful place in European affairs. It is striking, indeed, that during the height of conflict with the United States over the invasion of Iraq, virtually no one in Europe called out “Yankee, go home,” as happened from time to time during the Cold War, notably over Vietnam. The difference is that, when there seemed to be a direct Soviet threat, there was little risk that the United States, mindful of its own security requirements, would actually “go home.” Today, however, with drastically fewer threats in Europe and a growing list of security issues in other regions, the United States might very well heed the call to “go home”—or at least to “go elsewhere.” In response to concerns about US steadfastness, the EU member states have been developing plans for corporate foreign and defense policies, embracing efforts that go beyond mere rhetoric. A succession of treaties designed to promote the further development of the EU—Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, the aborted EU constitutional treaty—have advanced the role of two initiatives, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) vii

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and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The EU, however, is not content to focus exclusively on policy within its own borders. It is also looking eastward, in part because of objective security concerns and in part out of a desire not to become isolated from the global strategic agenda of the United States. Though few European states became engaged in Iraq, several made economic contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan—not so much out of a clear understanding that what happens in that far-off country could directly impact on European security, but so as not to be seen by the United States as irrelevant to its own strategic future. Yet, Europe’s desire to play a greater role in foreign and security policy comes not only from doubts about whether the United States will continue to play the role of protector in terms that make sense to Europeans and their interests and values; it derives also from the natural evolution of the European Union. Like China, Europe is seeking international stature that is commensurate with its size and strength. In theory, these twin developments—a shift in US security priorities and the EU’s desire for a more independent and global foreign security policy—should be complementary and reinforcing. The United States still remains the provider of last resort for Europe’s security and global security more broadly. Also, the EU (with its component nations) has interests to pursue that are not fundamentally in conflict with those expressed by its key transatlantic ally. Indeed, in all the years since the end of the Cold War, no one has been able to construct a credible scenario in which all the members of the EU would want to take a serious military or foreign policy action to which the United States would object. The contrary may not be true (witness the US invasion of Iraq), but the United States has had no reason to see in European activities anything that would be at odds with the basic US strategic vision. Of course, the United States has from time to time expressed concerns about the growth of European security institutions, especially the ESDP. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under US leadership, still refers to the ESDP as an “initiative” rather than as a “policy,” thus seeking to preserve the fiction that it is “separable but not separate” from NATO. There was also the risible US opposition to the EU’s proposal to create a small military planning staff in a Brussels suburb. And, of course, there remains debate, fostered by a few EU members, about whether the EU’s Headline Goal Task Force (“rapid-reaction force”) and later the EU’s battle groups should have primacy over NATO when it comes to deciding which institution should conduct a military operation (and, in the process, have first claim on European military forces for that purpose). Far more important have been two other developments. First, the United States has for several years made less use of NATO as a forum for discussing its most basic security concerns, including concerns that could

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reasonably impact its European allies. (This was most notable at the onset of the Iraq War, although it had begun sometime before that.) The United States should now clearly understand that while it can make war by itself, it cannot make peace by itself—NATO does not have the centrality for the United States that it did even a few years ago. Perhaps that was inevitable, but it does call into question whether there is still a significant and natural forum for discussion and decision regarding issues of “security” (itself an elastic concept in the post–Cold War era). And that question adds impetus to the ambitions on the part of some Europeans for their institutions to play a more significant, independent role in foreign and defense policy. The most dramatic moment in this evolution came in February 2005, when the German federal chancellor (speaking through his defense minister) called for the greater use of NATO by the United States for strategic conversations; and, following a period of widespread misunderstanding on the part of many US commentators (who thought the chancellor was arguing against such a role for NATO), the US administration has made at least a nod in this direction. The second development is the changing perceptions among Western states about the relative importance of different security challenges and how best to address them. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has focused on the war on terror as well as on the Middle East and potential threats to its interests, notably Iraq and Iran. The policy of “dual commitment” cannot be attributed only to the current US administration, but also to the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and, indeed, even to the Iran hostage crisis of 1979–1981. In Europe, there has more recently been an increased concern about the potential threat of terrorism, augmented by “domestic” factors, such as the need in almost all Western European societies to meet the challenge of aging populations and reductions in birth rates by increasing the importation of foreign labor (largely from the Arab world). There has also been an evolution in European thinking about other potential threats, as enshrined in the ordered priorities of the December 2003 European Security Strategy: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. A list of US security priorities would indeed not be that different from the EU’s ordered priorities. The differences are likely to be more in assessments about the intensity of the threats and, more particularly, what to do about them. To oversimplify, the European approach tends to emphasize efforts to deal with causes of terrorism, regional conflicts, and state failure, as well as to apply remedies to their effects. The United States, by contrast, has been more concerned with applying power to counter terrorist acts and to place a higher priority on preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Only following the initial phases of the wars in Afghanistan

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and Iraq has the United States been moving toward a more European view of the “holistic” nature of dealing with broad challenges to “security,” defined in a comprehensive manner. Rarely in the course of history have nations, and collections of nations, devised grand strategies and then acted within the tenets of those strategies. Even when approaches have developed long pedigrees (as in the British balance-of-power approach to European security), these have emerged from practice rather than theory. There have been two rare exceptions. First was the restructuring of NATO during the 1990s, when the tasks of a grand strategy were perceived first rather than used as a way of explaining what had been done by happenstance or trial and error. Something similar could also be said about the development of the pan-European foreign policy and security experiments that have led to the CFSP and the ESDP—the theory, which began with the European Movement of the 1940s and the Coal and Steel Community (and the abortive European Defense Community), was part of an overall concept of the best means to prevent another major conflict or world war. What is slowly happening now, however, is less about implementing a grand strategy (such as NATO having a major role in the security of its members, or the EU advancing a security perspective for reasons of building the institution itself), than about responding to events. It is about analyzing the interaction between these events and the differing perceptions, policies, and approaches across the Atlantic. Finally, it is about experience and experimentation more than theory and implementation. Thus the United States can again see the need to look at nonmilitary instruments of power and influence as indispensable for achieving its objectives, in the Middle East and elsewhere, and can increasingly see that helping to ameliorate the causes of insecurity and crisis, including terrorist acts, is as important as responding to their effects. The Western alliance, in particular (which is more than NATO), is thus taking on renewed importance for the United States. For Europeans, meanwhile, there is some greater appreciation of the potential role for military power. Beyond the Continent, there is also increasing recognition that a more assertive ESDP does not preclude a leading role for NATO. Most of the heat of the NATO-ESDP debate has dissipated, as developments in the Middle East and Afghanistan have underscored the seriousness of what the Western states collectively would face if there were failure in either organization. This is not to argue, however, that there will be a new narrowing of differences in strategic perspective across the Atlantic (with Canada more on the European “side” than the US “side” regarding perceptions about threats and appropriate responses). This could be seen in the inability of the United States to gain the degree of commitment it sought from allies at the

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November 2006 Riga NATO summit regarding global partnerships. For most European states, anything that smacks of potentially taking NATO beyond Afghanistan is still too much. Nor is it clear that the United States is yet ready to make substantial changes in its own strategic outlook about key issues in order to garner increased European support. Iran dramatically illustrates this point. European diplomacy has been directed as much or even more to ensuring that the United States will not go to war with Iran than to gaining Iran’s acquiescence to full nuclear inspections and the cessation of activities that might presage the creation of nuclear weapons. Nor is there a meeting of transatlantic minds on the importance of moving decisively toward resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What is clear is that there needs to be a new conversation about the future of the transatlantic relationship. In one area—economics—this relationship is both robust and complementary and could not possibly be severed without vital damage to all. But in the strategic area, as seen in its broadest sense, that conversation is at the moment far less vigorous, open, and thoughtful than it needs to be. The conversation should be conducted on a holistic basis and include the development of a new strategic partnership between the United States and the European Union—in areas of health, education, job creation, governance, development, and the thousand other things that can help shape international society in productive ways in the years ahead. The conversation also needs to include finding the appropriate roles for both NATO and EU institutions, such that all parties can come as close as possible to reaching, at a minimum, complementary world visions that foster positive interaction and minimize the negative. This is the way for the Western states to meet effectively the overall challenges of the global future. This volume, edited by two of Europe’s most thoughtful analysts, makes a critical contribution to that effort. It breaks down the subject into its major parts, examining each in turn, and then brings them back together for a comprehensive and holistic analysis. The insights revealed here promise to sustain and develop a robust transatlantic relationship that deals with “security” in the broadest and deepest sense. — Robert E. Hunter

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A Transatlantic Security Relationship in Flux

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Sven Biscop and Johan Lembke

THIS VOLUME FOCUSES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENLARGE-

ment of the European Union and the changing transatlantic security relationship. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as the backdrop for this changing relationship, the analysis is situated in the context of changing security priorities of the United States, the growing role of the EU and its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the area of foreign and security policy and in global security, and the issue of coordination between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the military alliance for the Euro-Atlantic community. The contributors seek to answer two overall questions: What is the interplay between EU enlargement and a fluctuating transatlantic security relationship? And will the accession of new EU members reinforce this partnership or increase the EU’s assertiveness as an independent foreign policy actor? The book provides a policy-oriented analysis of the mutual impact of, on the one hand, the shifting nature of the transatlantic partnership and NATO, and on the other hand, European developments and EU enlargement, two issues that have both been amply covered (see, e.g., Poole 2003; Gnesotto 2004; Smith 2004; Sloan 2005; Brimmer and Fröhlich 2005; Dannreuther and Peterson 2006; Ilgen 2006). The connections between these developments and their wider implications, however, have not yet been addressed in a coherent and systematic way. This book seeks to contribute to scholarship on EU security and transatlantic relations by responding to this gap. The book also contributes to the growing interest in the EU as an emerging security actor on the international scene, in the uncertainty of the relationship between the EU and NATO leading up to the sixtieth anniversary of the alliance in 2009 and beyond, and in the transatlantic security relationship in flux. 1

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The volume grew out of a major conference with international experts at Texas A&M University in College Station in early March 2006 titled “The Future of Transatlantic Security Relations.” Some of the book’s contributors participated in this conference, which was sponsored by the EU Center of Excellence with support from the European Commission, the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, and the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation at Texas A&M University in partnership with the US Army’s Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series and the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. The intention of the conference was to develop a deeper awareness and understanding of key transatlantic security issues facing the United States and the European Union at a critical time in international affairs. Participants examined both foreign and defense policies as well as the potential for forging a new consensus on US and European foreign policy and military strategy, planning and operational activities, and initiatives for expanding regional and out-of-area security, stability, peacekeeping, and power-projection roles and missions.

The Changing Nature of the Transatlantic Security Relationship The general themes that run through this entire volume are the enlargement of the European Union; the development and credibility of the EU as a foreign policy actor; the growing presence of the EU as a security actor on the world stage; the changing relationship between the EU, NATO (the Atlantic Alliance), and the United States; and the implications of developments in these areas for the transatlantic security relationship. This introductory chapter elaborates on the changing nature of the transatlantic security relationship in view of developments in the United States and in the European Union. The Atlantic Alliance has offered and continues to offer the United States a strong role in European security affairs. Europe for its part has been relying on the US military for its security. The alliance still serves as the ultimate guarantor of Europe’s territorial defense. It has demonstrated flexibility and remains the cornerstone of US influence in Europe, and there are those who want to see it as an even more central forum for a continuing political dialogue and military cooperation. The United States supports the development of European capabilities, instruments, and investments that are in line with US national and global interests. However, transatlantic security relations are being transformed by an altered US military presence in Europe and the global redeployment of US forces, a shift in the US global security orientation toward the Middle East and Asia, and a redefinition of the role of NATO in overall US military planning. At the same time, in the 2003 European Security Strategy, the EU

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has expressed the ambition to become a global player and is further enhancing its capacity to act as a credible security player that is more effective in projecting stability and security beyond Europe. Partly motivated by the shifts in US strategy, this constitutes a major new structural factor in transatlantic relations and in international affairs more generally. Without doubt, the transatlantic economic relationship remains the cornerstone of the world economy. The relatively balanced economic bonds between Europe and the United States have grown deeper and stronger since the end of the Cold War, and far exceed the commercial relationship of any other two continents (Hamilton and Quinlan 2006). Regarding foreign policy and international security overall, the message at the official level is that a strong transatlantic relationship continues to rest on shared goals and values. In the view of the 2006 US National Security Strategy, the transatlantic partnership remains wide and deep: “Europe is home to our oldest and closest allies. Our cooperative relations are built on a sure foundation of shared values and interests. This foundation is expanding and deepening with the ongoing spread of effective democracies in Europe, and must expand and deepen still further if we are to reach the goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. These democracies are effective partners, joining with us to promote global freedom and prosperity” (White House 2006, p. 38). This message is echoed by EU heads of state and government, and by the European Commission. For example, John Bruton, ambassador of the European Commission to the United States, has remarked: “Few bonds in the world today are stronger than those between the European Union and the United States. Our relationship is unparalleled in its breadth and depth and unique in its potential to advance peace, democracy and human dignity around the globe” (Bruton 2006). The same positive view of the transatlantic partnership is expressed in the 2003 European Security Strategy: “The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world” (Solana 2003). Looking beyond the rhetoric, however, it quickly becomes clear that, particularly in the field of security, the transatlantic relationship is in flux and has been ever since the end of the Cold War. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the embodiment of the transatlantic security partnership, has since successfully reoriented itself from a defense to a security organization, the EU is emerging as a strategic actor in its own right. Obviously, the United States remains by far the predominant actor in the transatlantic security relationship and indeed in the world, but the EU member states have embarked on an ambitious project to strengthen and progressively integrate their policies, actions, and assets in the foreign, security, and defense realm. As NATO and the EU are now active in the same field of global crisis management, the result has been an uneasy relationship and often outright

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competition between the two organizations, which are still seeking a balance between them. Difficulties are exacerbated by a growing strategic divergence between the European Union and the United States, as evidenced by a comparison of the respective security strategies. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to find consensus on the future role and tasks of NATO, as evidenced by the meager results of the most recent summit of alliance heads of state and government in Riga on November 29, 2006, despite the ambitious proposals put forward by the United States. The United States welcomes a role for the European Union in sharing part of the burden of international security. But, having since World War II pursued an approach aimed at impeding the emergence of a centralized and autonomous European geopolitical pole of power in the international system, Washington is at the same time suspicious of this development, especially because, globally, the system seems to have begun evolving toward multipolarity. Simultaneously, the centrality of Europe to US foreign and security policy has declined, with Washington focusing increasingly on the “Greater Middle East” and Asia, exactly because of the rise of new potential poles such as China. Against this background of a transatlantic security relationship in flux, the EU has successfully enlarged, first to twenty-five member states in 2004, and then to twenty-seven in 2007 with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, and thus twenty-one countries are now members of both the EU and NATO. The central issue that this volume addresses is the interplay between EU enlargement and a fluctuating transatlantic security partnership. The new EU member states are generally more Atlantic-oriented than many countries that were members of the EU before the 2004 enlargement. Their accession could thus reinforce the already-existing intra-EU divide between “Atlanticists” and “Europeanists,” with a slowing down of the development of the EU’s strategic actorness as a result, or it could tilt the balance in favor of the Atlanticists. Either way, the consequence would be a reinforcing or at least a block on the unraveling of NATO. Alternatively, enlargement could strengthen the EU’s assertiveness as an independent foreign policy actor. If the new member states can be successfully integrated, and if their views and policies shift toward the Europeanist side through a process of socialization and Europeanization, their added weight would greatly enhance the power of the EU as a pole in global affairs.

The United States and NATO The Atlantic Alliance, with collective defense and the promotion of international security as its core functions, has demonstrated flexibility in its transformation process. It has become more involved in longer-term mis-

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sions with countries from different parts of the world, adopting more politically induced strategies to shape the context of its operations. As part of efforts to extend strategic relations, partnerships, and its geographical scope, NATO is also set to deepen its ties with Nordic, Asian, and Australasian countries, and the United States is promoting the inclusion of new members such as Ukraine. The operations and presence of NATO in Afghanistan through the International Security Assistance Force, which the alliance assumed command of in 2003, marked a major new type of undertaking in terms of the strategic distance from its traditional areas of operation and the nature of intervention. In recent years NATO has in addition to its role in Afghanistan also participated in smaller-scale operations such as international aid efforts, including air and naval support to the United States following Hurricane Katrina, and the airlift of supplies to Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake there, as well as logistical and training assistance missions, such as to the African Union in the Darfur crisis. The Euro-Atlantic community is facing a range of different types of challenges, from regional conflicts, state failures, organized crime, environmental hazards, illegal migration, drug trafficking, and critical infrastructure protection (including the protection of energy supply and electronic networks), to the production and transfer of fissile material, the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons, and cross-border terrorist activities, such as Salafijihadist terrorism. The alliance remains the bedrock of US influence in Europe and, according to the 2006 US National Security Strategy, a vital pillar of US foreign policy. The United States supports the development of European capabilities and policies, including in an EU framework, on the condition that they are in line with US national and global interests and do not result in the emergence of Europe as an autonomous and centralized geopolitical force. Complementarity with NATO and avoidance of duplications are at the core of the US view on the security and defense role of the European Union. For the United States, the alliance must thus remain the primary forum for strategic debate on all issues of security and defense. Yet in practice, this is no longer always the case. At the 2005 Munich security conference, then–German chancellor Gerhard Schröder stressed, “NATO is the robust anchor of our security and defense policy. Today, it must also lead our political and strategic discussions, even if the challenges we now face are completely different from those during the Cold War” (Atlantic Times 2006). But he clearly added that, for the alliance to continue in this role, it must take into account and make the necessary functional adjustments to the increasing role and importance of the EU. Shifts in US policy are affecting NATO as well. The United States is restructuring its forces and base structure in Europe as part of a global base

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realignment and closure program to better meet the reality of new threats, and is repositioning diplomatic forces from Europe to other parts of the world too. This incremental change includes a shift of bases eastward and the establishment of forward positions in the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. At a strategic level, such realignment in Europe reaffirms the US commitment to retain influence in the wider Europe and to maintain long-term security and regional stability farther east, while also increasing US geostrategic flexibility. At a more practical level, this gradual change could support a more downsized model for facilities and services, and a rotational model for deployment of forces. The permanent US military presence in Europe, including in Western Europe, constitutes a political declaration to long-standing allies, including support for German-US relations. Through its military presence in Europe, the United States has expressed its continued commitment to its allies, and at the same time has provided itself a vehicle for direct influence with regard to the EU. A significant shift eastward could also be interpreted as a quest for “coalitions of the willing” rather than a united Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, eastward realignment could be seen as an effort by both the United States and the alliance more broadly to promote coalitions outside Western Europe needed to respond to the complexity of security and international engagement in the twenty-first century. US realignment and the update of existing and establishment of new military installations farther east, however, are not intensely debated at NATO headquarters. Rather, eastward alignment is viewed as a rational effort as part of the wider modernization of the alliance.

The European Union as a Strategic Actor The 2003 European Security Strategy outlines a very ambitious agenda: redrawing the multilateral architecture in order to ensure effective global governance and, within that framework, stabilizing states and regions via intrusive bilateral partnerships. As the strategy states, the EU is inevitably a global player with twenty-seven member states, over 450 million people, and a quarter of the world’s gross national product. To be a true global power, the EU must further strengthen its emerging strategic culture—that is, muster the political will, including in demanding situations, to make decisions true to its strategic objectives and to put to use all necessary instruments to implement them. In this the EU can only succeed if all member states come to recognize what really is an evident truth: individually, no member state (including the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) has sufficient impact to safeguard its interests. A balanced partnership with the United States, global economic governance,

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strategic partnerships with China and India, and so forth, require the weight of a united European Union. This development of an EU foreign and security dimension was prompted by the disappearance of the Soviet threat, which allowed for the development of autonomous European policies, distinct from those of the United States, and by Europe’s confrontation with its own grave limitations when forced to deal with the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Starting with the 1993 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), which envisaged the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU set an increasingly clear, ambitious, and arguably distinctive security agenda. These efforts led to the inclusion of “hard” security in the EU’s purview through the Petersberg Tasks that went into force in 1999 in the Amsterdam Treaty (autonomous EU humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement or crisis management operations), the launch the same year of the ESDP as an integral part of the CFSP to enhance security and stability in regions bordering the EU and beyond, and the adoption of the 2003 European Security Strategy (the first-ever strategic document guiding the full range of EU external policies through a holistic approach, integrating security and the other dimensions of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy). The EU has seen progress with military capabilities, including the development of rapid-response battle groups and a growing demand for civilian ESDP missions, and has undertaken a range of ESDP operations. In addition, it has become active in the areas of foreign and security policy more generally, beyond the EU. In other words, the European Union can legally undertake all military operations except for collective territorial defense. At the same time, it is continuing to build the institutions and capabilities that will allow it to fulfill those ambitions. The European Union has long been a global economic power, as well as the world’s largest donor of development aid if the European Commission and the EU member states are combined; since 1999, the ESDP has added deployable military and civilian capabilities to the EU toolbox. The 2000 Nice Treaty institutionalized the Political and Security Committee as the linchpin of the CFSP. Though the idea to transform the office of the High Representative for the CFSP, created in Amsterdam, into an EU foreign ministerial position has been frozen by the impasse on the draft constitutional treaty, the EU has nevertheless created its European Defense Agency. The arrival of a new actor on the security scene has major implications for the European as well as for the global security architecture. It leads to immediate questions with regard to the division of labor between the EU and the other European security organizations—NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—and the compatibility of their security strategies. This debate again has immediate conse-

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quences for the relationship between the European Union and the United States, because the alliance has left the “out-of-area debate” behind it and, like the EU, can now explore global partnerships and operate across the globe (as is the case in all EU policy fields because the EU treaties never had geographic limits). Furthermore, the European Security Strategy accords a central role to the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, as the core of the collective security system, to which the EU therefore aims to contribute. Even though the European Union has far from realized these ambitions, and its member states are all too often still divided, the trend toward increased EU autonomy constitutes a new structural factor in transatlantic relations. Furthermore, through the development of its civilian and military capabilities, the EU is becoming more and more capable. Europe truly is a global actor (Bretherton and Vogler 2005). Inevitably, this evolution will impact on the transatlantic partnership. A more capable EU will demand a greater say in decisionmaking, especially since its priorities and policies no longer always coincide with those of the United States. A simple comparison of the security strategy documents highlights the different worldviews and, consequently, the different approaches to dealing with the world’s challenges. At question are whether a reconfiguration of NATO is in order, to take this evolution into account, and whether the direct EU-US relationship should be strengthened, the answers to which are intimately linked with the issue of EU enlargement. The success of EU enlargement in spreading democracy, economic transformation, and stability has in recent years been overtaken by a sense of enlargement fatigue in many parts of Europe, and by a lack of political vision and political will, as witnessed, for instance, regarding the accession of Turkey. Following EU enlargement to the Black Sea with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, it is possible that the EU may enlarge to include Croatia and the Western Balkans in the future, but it is much more uncertain whether countries such as Moldova or Ukraine will ever become full members of the EU (although these countries, and countries in the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus, may become members of NATO, which will further enhance the need for coordination between the EU and the latter), not to mention Turkey.

Structure of the Book This volume is organized into four parts. Part 1 focuses on the European Security Strategy—complementarity versus competition, transatlantic burden sharing, and homeland security—and assesses the EU’s capacity to fulfill its global security objectives expressed in the 2003 European Security

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Strategy. Part 2 focuses on how eastward enlargement has impacted both the European Union’s development as a strategic actor, as well as the transatlantic partnership, through four country case studies of EU accession: Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Each case study addresses a set of identical questions: How does the country view the transatlantic security relationship? How does it view its own particular contribution (including as an actor in the wider region in which it is located)? What are its policies on military operations, military capabilities, and the defense industry in general in light of NATO and the ESDP? What are its views on territorial and societal security? Following this analysis of differences and similarities among selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region, Part 3 offers a perspective on the wider European neighborhood in a transatlantic context. Concluding the volume, Part 4 provides a forward-looking commentary on European enlargement and the future of transatlantic relations.

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IF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AT THE TIME OF

the 2002 Prague summit assertively shook off the limitations imposed by the “out-of-area debate” and looked forward to an ambitious worldwide role, the alliance in 2007 seems to have lost confidence. The nervousness concerning the lack of a civilian crisis management dimension (especially in light of the civilian dimension of the European Security and Defense Policy), the compulsion to enhance its profile by participating in ever new types of missions in ever new parts of the world, and the permanently strained relationship with the European Union appear to be symptoms of an existential unease and a loss of direction. Even the most avid Atlanticists— in particular—have noticed. Consider the introduction to a high-profile report by a Spanish think tank presided over by former prime minister José María Aznar: What really endangers the cohesion of the alliance and provides the key to whether the organization really has a future is the loss of the organization’s raison d’être, the lack of a mission that can be shared by all of NATO’s members (FAES 2005, p. 11). Two summit meetings, under the heading of “NATO transformation,” were planned to find a remedy (one took place in Riga on November 28–29, 2006, and the other is scheduled for April 2008). Proposals that have been put forward are a “global partnership” that will bring together democratic states from all over the world, common funding of operations and capabilities, and a role in civilian crisis management and peacebuilding. Yet the question is whether these summits can give a renewed sense of direction and confidence to the alliance without addressing the real cause of the loss of a common purpose. That root cause is a new structural factor in transatlantic relations and the world order: the emergence of the EU as a 13

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strategic actor in its own right, with its own policies and priorities, and with ever-growing ambitions and capabilities. The EU and NATO already have twenty-one out of twenty-seven and twenty-six members, respectively, in common. And collective defense apart, they also have the same functional and geographic scope: peace support operations (or “Petersberg Tasks” and “non–Article 5 operations”) across the globe. As long as the relationship between them has not been settled, no “NATO-to-NATO” summit can provide a lasting answer to the questions that the alliance is facing, because every initiative, including the upcoming summits themselves, will be seen in the light of EU-NATO competition.

Permanent Debate on Structural Change Competition is the inevitable consequence of the functional and geographic overlap between the two organizations unless they confront the structural shift in the transatlantic balance that increasing EU “actorness” represents. The EU’s required degree of autonomy in the field of foreign and security policy is at the core of the debate. This debate goes straight back to the foundation of the EU and to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, set out by the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. The very creation of the CFSP was to a large extent motivated by the concern that after the end of the Cold War the United States—and thus NATO—could no longer be relied on to resolve every security issue that confronted Europe. The eruption of civil war in the former Yugoslavia proved as much. Washington initially saw the conflict as a European problem to be solved by the Europeans. Only after it became disastrously clear that, for lack of foreign and security policy structures, “the hour of Europe” had not yet come, did the United States intervene. When in 1997 Albania descended into anarchy, Washington again made it clear that neither the United States nor NATO would volunteer as “global policeman,” assuming correctly that Europe should bear first-line responsibility for peace and security in its own backyard. In the absence of automatic US intervention, a capacity for autonomous EU action is a necessity. In combination with the obvious shortcomings of existing European capabilities, as evidenced in Kosovo in 1999, this was the motivation for the creation of the CFSP, and then the ESDP, which replaced the now near-defunct Western European Union as the EU’s own military arm. An autonomous capacity, instead of relying exclusively on a US-led alliance and on the United States itself, also becomes a necessity when US intervention is no longer automatically considered legitimate and opportune. Of this the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was rejected by a number of key EU member states and by the public almost throughout the Union, pro-

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vides an evident example. In the wake of the invasion and the upsurge of global terrorism that it has provoked, there is a lingering fear that a US administration that considers itself engaged in a “long war” (US Department of Defense 2006, p. v) could draw its allies into further risky adventures with negative consequences for the security and the image of the EU. Linked to this is the concern that NATO would be instrumentalized to support a US policy that is not shared by all allies, a fear to which the recent tendency to put all NATO activities under the heading of the fight against terrorism, even when the link is not very obvious, might be seen to lend credibility. Europe does not feel at war. These fears highlight the fact that the post–Cold War period has indeed produced a strategic divide between the European Union and the United States, whose interests, policies, and priorities no longer always coincide. This is made clear by a simple comparison of the European Security Strategy (2003) and the US National Security Strategy (2002 and 2006, with the latter being a slightly toned-down but essentially similar version of the much debated 2002 document). The National Security Strategy, even though it devotes more space to such issues as democracy, human rights, and trade, instrumentalizes all these dimensions of foreign policy in support of the single overall objective of the fight against terrorism and proliferation. It puts great emphasis on military action against these threats, including, if necessary, action taken “preemptively” or de facto even preventively, “before they are fully formed,” as stated in the cover letter to the 2002 National Security Strategy. The United States pictures itself as the pillar of a unipolar world, reserving the right to act unilaterally and via ad hoc coalitions, and operating via the United Nations only when it is in its interest. The European Security Strategy, on the contrary, advocates a holistic approach that seeks to integrate all instruments, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military, into a structural policy of prevention and stabilization operating through partnerships and rule-based “effective multilateralism” (Biscop 2005b). In such an approach, the use of force is an instrument of last resort that in principle can only be reverted to with a mandate from the UN Security Council. Clearly the European Union and the United States view the world differently: according to the United States, the world is “dangerous”; according to the European Union, the world is “complex,” as a European diplomat worded it. That the European Security Strategy was adopted is, in itself, the clearest indication of the dilution of the consensus on a common purpose between all NATO allies. The European Security Strategy sets forth a very ambitious agenda: redrawing the multilateral architecture in order to ensure effective global governance and, within that framework, stabilizing states and regions via intrusive bilateral partnerships. It resolutely opts for the EU as a global rather than a regional actor. As the European Security Strategy

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states, the EU, with twenty-seven member states, over 450 million people, and a quarter of the world’s gross national product, is inevitably a global player. Whether it will also be a global power—that is, whether it will proactively influence the world—depends on the strengthening of its emerging strategic culture: the political will, including in demanding situations, to take decisions true to its strategic objectives and to put to use all necessary instruments to implement them. During the Cold War and before Maastricht, the idea of Europe as a power in its own right was irrelevant, as all allies fundamentally subscribed to NATO’s strategy in view of the dominating threat of the Soviet Union, while the European Economic Community and the Western European Union lacked the capacity anyway to play such a role (Cohen-Tanugi 2003, p. 73). Since then however, the EU has not only increasingly fostered the ambition, but also been continuously developing its capacity to be a global strategic actor, especially since the creation of the ESDP. That constitutes a new structural factor in transatlantic relations. But because this development coincided with NATO’s reorientation toward global peace support operations, it is also the core of a permanent debate that has haunted policymaking ever since the early 1990s. Because today’s missions and peace support operations are in effect operations of choice that depend on political assessment, rather than defense against existential threats, as during the Cold War, this strategic divide has immediate operational consequences for NATO. It is difficult to see, for example, in which scenario all allies would agree on deploying the NATO response force (NRF) for a high-intensity operation, which is its primary purpose. Differences and disputes between allies are manageable as long as they are addressed within the framework of genuinely shared strategic objectives, but in the absence of such a framework they have the potential to become debilitating (Council on Foreign Relations 2004, p. 8).

A Blurred Debate The way in which the transatlantic relationship in general and NATO in particular are organized has not taken into account this structural change. The issue of autonomy continues to cloud relations and policymaking. From the beginning it was envisaged that “where NATO as a whole is not engaged,” the EU can act either with or without the use of NATO assets as provided for by the “Berlin Plus” arrangement. Actual initiatives to provide the EU with the necessary capabilities for the latter scenario have always caused friction, however. Among the EU member states, the United Kingdom, especially, has always been very fearful of the ESDP duplicating or undermining NATO. Even though London, together with Paris, was

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instrumental in launching the ESDP in 1998, its motivation was to enhance the performance of European military capabilities, which the British acknowledged for the other member states was only possible through European cooperation, for both budgetary and political reasons. When it came to political decisionmaking however, London was much more reluctant, preferring enhanced European military capabilities to be used in a NATO framework rather than by an autonomous EU, although inevitably— as the British soon found out—the ESDP evolved in the latter direction (Biscop 1999). Although it is not explicitly expressed in the ambiguously worded “Berlin Plus” arrangement, there is still a common view on the US side, and a corresponding concern on the European side, that NATO enjoys a “right of first refusal.” If interpreted strictly, this means that the EU can only act when NATO formally adopts a decision not to. This rigid mechanism does not answer well to all contingencies, nor is it possible to lay down so rigorous a set of procedures as to preclude different interpretations of what each organization is permitted to do (Brenner 2002, p. 75; Burwell et al. 2006, p. 22). Operation Artemis, an EU operation without the use of NATO assets, proves as much. The decision to launch the operation (June 5, 2003), which the United States apparently fiercely criticized at NATO’s Madrid summit two days before, was taken following a request by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In such cases, the spirit of the alliance calls for transparency, and the EU did offer other allies the possibility to participate, but making such operations conditional on formal NATO assent would inordinately detract from the autonomy of both the EU and the UN. Furthermore the United States was not interested in contributing to peace support operations in Central Africa in the first place, and had voted in favor of the mandating resolution in the Security Council. NATO does not exercise a right of first refusal with regard to national operations undertaken by the allies and should not do so vis-à-vis the EU either. The fear of the exercise of a de facto “right of first refusal” can only stimulate European allies not to consult, to the detriment of alliance cohesion. Operations in Darfur since the summer of 2005 provide another example. Following requests by the African Union, both the EU and NATO mounted missions in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), alongside each other, a scenario that “Berlin Plus” does not provide for. Darfur can also be seen as an example of the negative effects of EU-NATO competition. After all, AMIS is a fairly limited support mission, providing airlift, training, and advice at headquarters level, but no frontline forces. From a military point of view and in light of scarce resources, dividing the mission between the EU and NATO is unnecessary, inefficient, and probably less effective, even if successful staff-to-staff contacts have been established. But for political reasons, key EU and NATO players sought

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visibility through a peace mission. A new arrangement that would allow for more flexibility and thus defuse the antagonistic relationship between the EU and NATO is in order. But if the need to reequilibrate the transatlantic partnership is evident, ambiguous attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic are blurring the debate. The United States, on the one hand, wishes to preserve the primacy of NATO as the forum for decisionmaking on security and defense. Apparently, it seeks to widen the remit of NATO as a political forum, by moving beyond the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond the politico-military sphere. Issues such as the rise of China would then also be discussed in the North Atlantic Council. The “global partnership” initiative can be seen in this light. Bringing such countries as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, India, and perhaps even Pakistan, Colombia, and Israel into NATO’s orbit could in fact be seen as leading toward the creation of an alternative center of power next to the UN (FAES 2005, p. 44; Kamp 2006, p. 10). This again can be linked to earlier ideas on an “international organization of democracies” (Brecher 2003), an “association of democratic nations” (Hoffmann 2003), or a “coalition of reasonably democratic states” (Buchanan and Keohane 2004) that could legitimately proceed to use force if a Security Council mandate were not forthcoming. This obviously contradicts the EU idea of “effective multilateralism,” with the Security Council as the sole arbiter on the use of force, and would leave little room for an autonomous EU strategy. As a result of these different views, at the 2006 Riga summit the idea was downplayed against a priority on increased operational relations, with countries—potentially—contributing troops to NATO operations on a case-by-case basis. The United States further promotes NATO as a vehicle for the transformation of the armed forces of its European allies, with the aim of increasing their “usability,” and continuously urges European countries to spend more on defense. The concepts of transformation are to be fed into European thinking by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT). The ACT is largely inspired by the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) (both located in Norfolk, Virginia), which has over 11,000 employees compared to the ACT’s 700 (De Neve and Mathieu 2005, p. 134). The actual implementation is to happen by rotating successive forces through the NATO response force, with a certification phase leading to a six-month standby period followed by a “standing down.” With 21,000 troops in each phase, the NRF requires a total of 63,000. At the same time, when it comes to actual military operations, the United States seems to prefer ad hoc coalitions of the willing over NATOled operations. The aversion to “warfare by committee” goes back to US complaints over cumbersome decisionmaking during the Kosovo campaign.1 As a senior Pentagon official explained, “If anyone thinks that the

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United States is ever going to use the North Atlantic Council to run another major military campaign, they must be smoking pot” (quoted in Grant 2004, p. 67). The initial operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan are a case in point. Even though, after September 11, 2001, the alliance for the first time in its history invoked Article 5, a highly symbolic gesture that was very much welcomed in Washington, US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld declined any direct military support. This rejection, under the motto “the mission defines the coalition,” badly damaged the cohesion of the alliance. The March 2003 invasion of Iraq was undertaken by a coalition of the willing as well, which was expanded afterward for the stabilization force. Again the United States requested political support for the intervention, notably in the Security Council, but in February 2003 requested only indirect military support from NATO, which led to a deep rift in the alliance. The transformation of European forces will therefore rather contribute to turning NATO into a comprehensive toolbox from which coalitions of the willing can be generated according to needs. That the United States itself does not contribute to the NATO response force seems to confirm this. The NRF is primarily a useful capability development mechanism serving to enhance the toolbox, and to guarantee interoperability rather than an operational force. In that light it does not really matter if strategic differences between allies would block its deployment for high-intensity missions, for which the United States prefers coalitions of the willing anyway. Only in the postconflict stabilization and reconstruction phase, and for other lower-intensity operations, are NATO operations envisaged, for example in Afghanistan, where NATO took over command of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force. Enhanced European capabilities thus do not result in an enhanced share in decisionmaking. On the one hand, the United States seeks to maintain control over EU operations via the lingering idea of a “right of first refusal,” and seeks to guide all decisions on security and defense issues to the North Atlantic Council, where it rejects any idea of a European caucus, rather than to the European Council of the EU. On the other hand, the North Atlantic Council itself is being sidelined, because for high-intensity missions Washington certainly prefers to operate via directly controlled coalitions of the willing. The United States thus promotes NATO, as opposed to the ESDP, and denigrates it at the same time. As Leslie Lebl notes, “many Americans increasingly refer to NATO as ‘them’ instead of ‘us’” (2006, p. 120). That this ambivalent situation has endured is due to the fact that the EU is very much internally divided (Dassù and Menotti 2005) and therefore remains ambivalent itself. Despite the aspirations expressed in the European Security Strategy, no real choice has yet been made on the nature

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of the transatlantic partnership and on the level of ambition and the degree of autonomy of the EU as strategic actor vis-à-vis NATO and the United States. The real intra-European divide over Iraq did not concern the substance and principles of policy. Based on an assessment of past policies, it can safely be argued that all EU member states agree that, in principle, the use of force is an instrument of last resort that requires a UN Security Council mandate. The real issue at stake was the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If the United States reverts to the use of force in a situation in which the EU in principle would not do so, or not yet, what then has priority for the EU: steering an autonomous course based on its own principles, or supporting its most important ally? In a crisis, as long as some member states will look to Washington and others to Brussels before deciding on the action to be taken, it will differ from case to case whether the EU as such will be a player. This divide also translates into uncertainty regarding the scope of the operational capabilities of the EU. Although its battle groups, for example, have been configured to deal with the full range of Petersberg Tasks—that is, including crisis management—senior officials of certain member states deny that they will ever implement high-intensity operations. The EU thus continues to swing between Atlanticism and Europeanism. This perpetuum mobile remains the fundamental obstacle to a fully cohesive and resolute CFSP/ESDP.

Rebalancing the Alliance: Two Pillars A more flexible arrangement within NATO ought to be able to reconcile these divergent trends, satisfying both those who want to maintain the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance and those who seek room for an autonomous role for the EU and for the United States. There are now two main pillars within NATO: the United States and the European Union. This is a logical consequence of the development of the EU as an ever more deeply integrated entity, and is reflected in the establishment of formal EUNATO relations. It might not please those who are a member of neither; the non-EU European allies certainly perceive an “ESDP-ization” of NATO (Knutsen 2002; Missiroli 2002b), while a Canadian diplomat once described the alliance as “US-dominated euro-centrism,” but the two-pillar approach can no longer be denied. A rebalanced NATO must therefore be a two-pillar NATO (Biscop 2005c). Rather than some sort of “right of first refusal,” each pillar should have a “right of initiative.” As global strategic actors in their own right, each equipped with the full range of foreign and security policy instruments, the European Union and the United States are the first-line policymakers. If they judge that a non–Article 5 situation or a request from the United

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Nations or another actor requires a certain military response, they should have the authority—within the bounds of international law, of course—to initiate it. In view of the spirit of solidarity and transparency, they should inform and consult their allies in the North Atlantic Council before taking action. A meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee at which NATO and the EU sit as equals could be the forum. Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, containing the obligation to consult, thus acquires a pivotal role (von Plate 2003, p. 21). But this consultation should not be considered a request for authorization. Rather, if both pillars agree on the assessment of the situation and the required response, and if both agree to contribute substantially to the actual military operation, the mission can be implemented under the NATO flag via the existing political and military structures of the alliance. If, however, they do not agree on the action to be taken, or if one pillar prefers not to contribute to the action, the other pillar simply maintains its initial authority to launch the operation autonomously under the EU or US flag. A very similar view is taken by the Atlantic Council of the United States in a recent report: When European Allies that belong to both NATO and the EU decide, after full consideration of US views, that the EU is the more appropriate lead institution—and when the mission does not require a significant or sustained US military contribution—the United States should accept the result. . . . When a mission is expected to involve a major sustained US combat contribution, NATO will be the natural lead institution. (Burwell et al. 2006, p. 22)

In view of the flexibility that would thus be created, a two-pillar constellation would not require enhanced common funding of operations. For its autonomous operations, each pillar, if required, could still request the use of NATO assets according to prearranged mechanisms, such as “Berlin Plus.” The United States would thus also have to agree to a “Washington Plus” with the alliance. A pillar can still choose to invite other individual allies to participate in its autonomous operations. As far as the European Union is concerned, the existing mechanisms for participation of non-EU members of NATO in EU operations could remain valid; that is, they will be automatically invited to participate in operations that make use of NATO assets. For EU-only operations, it belongs to the discretionary authority of the European Council to invite them or not. In both cases, the states concerned will take part in the daily running of the operation on an equal footing with the EU member states, but political control and strategic direction will remain with the European Council and the Political and Security Committee. One could deplore such an ad hoc approach, but because of the complete functional and geographic overlap between the European Union and

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NATO, a fixed division of labor is simply impossible. For example, the often suggested “soft-hard” division of labor (Moravcsik 2003), which is implicitly present in many critiques of the EU, would be unworkable in practice. The EU as well as the United States needs the whole range of instruments in order to effectively respond to multidimensional contingencies. Besides, there is always a risk that operations at the low end of the violence scale will devolve into conflict as the situation on the ground changes; the initiating pillar must then have the means to respond. An EU “hard security” capacity is needed if action is to be taken when NATO/US assets are unavailable. Without a “hard” capacity, the EU would have to count on the willingness of the United States to solve all of its problems, which it cannot, and should not, do. Nor should the EU automatically do the “mopping up” after a “hard” US intervention, especially if it did not agree with the need to intervene in the first place. Such a division of labor would easily lead to resentment on the US side as well, which would have to face much greater risks and assume a much larger share of the burden than the EU; it would thus also prove politically divisive, because Europeans and Americans would less frequently share common tasks and experiences (Council on Foreign Relations 2004, p. 12). Another option, to dispense with the consensus rule and allow operations under the NATO flag by a selected number of allies, as was suggested in some US circles following the 2003 crisis (Michel 2003), would reduce NATO to a mere toolbox for utterly ad hoc coalition-making, and would ultimately lead to the irrelevance of the alliance. A two-pillar constellation implies a pragmatic attitude for choosing the framework that is most suitable according to the situation at hand. The advantage would be that nonparticipation in a non–Article 5 operation initiated by the other pillar—for example, because of political objections, as in the invasion of Iraq—would no longer need to give rise to accusations of breaching transatlantic solidarity. Much mutual recrimination could thus be avoided, such as the US Senate resolution recommending that the president look into the possibility of establishing a procedure to suspend the NATO membership of allies that “no longer comply with the NATO principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” (Michel 2003, p. 4). The NATO emblem could only be used for operations to which all allies consent. At the same time, mere ad hoc coalition-making would be avoided. Building in the necessary flexibility would prevent divergences between allies on issues of “day-to-day policy” from endangering the organization as such, while the alliance as a community of values expressed in a collective defense commitment would be preserved. Solidarity in the event of an effective Article 5 situation naturally would still be complete and unquestionable. Article 5 should be interpreted strictly, though, so as not to detract from the value of this ultimate security commitment. NATO would thus

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remain the foundation of collective defense and the ultimate guarantor of the security of all allies. The European Union and the United States are the real policymakers, each with a global policy of their own across the range of international relations. In the politico-military sphere, NATO is the forum at their disposal to consult and through which, if they agree, to act jointly. Because of its very nature as a military alliance, NATO’s remit is necessarily limited. It is therefore less suitable as a forum for discussing multidimensional issues with implications far beyond the politico-military sphere, such as the role of China and India, relations with the Arab world, or Islamic fundamentalism (Flanagan 2005). NATO does not have the instruments to deal with such issues, while using NATO as the main vehicle to address them might send the wrong message to third countries that perceive NATO strictly as a military alliance. In that light, and in view of the necessity to safeguard and to strengthen the authority and effectiveness of the UN Security Council as the legitimate core of the collective security system, a “global partnership” does not appear to be a priority for NATO, and would probably detract from its core business, unless perhaps it were to focus only on military dialogue in view of potential ad hoc operational cooperation. Existing NATO partnerships, notably the Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialogue, can continue as effective instruments of “defense diplomacy,” complementing the European Neighborhood Policy. The forum for discussing wider multidimensional issues is direct EUUS dialogue. The “transatlantic gymnich,” which informally brings together ministers of foreign affairs from all EU and NATO countries and is mostly NATO-driven, is a useful supplement to that core partnership and serves as a platform where non-EU allies can input their views. But because the core partnership is that between Washington and Brussels, it would only be logical that at the “transatlantic gymnich,” and indeed in NATO itself, the EU speaks with one voice. Such would be the natural evolution of the CFSP/ESDP. Therefore the Atlantic Council recommends that “the United States must prepare for the prospect of a more unified approach among EU members in NATO” (Burwell et al. 2006, p. 20).

Forces and Headquarters for the EU Pillar The issue of autonomy does not just impact on the strategic level but also clouds the debate on capabilities. This is especially true with regard to the command and control structure, because it is intimately linked to the degree of autonomy an actor can achieve. As long as the use of NATO operational headquarters under “Berlin Plus” is the only option available to the European Union for larger-scale operations, EU autonomy remains under

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the control of the United States (and the other non-EU allies), because even though the arrangement “guarantees” access, the North Atlantic Council must approve the actual use of NATO assets on a case-by-case basis. There is therefore no certainty that NATO assets, which are not unlimited, will always be available when the EU requests them (EU Institute for Security Studies [EUISS] 2004, p. 109). This is why the “chocolate summit” proposal by Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg (April 29, 2003), to set up an EU operational headquarters, provoked such sharp reactions from the Atlanticist side of the spectrum, which seeks to maintain this control. In the end, a compromise was brokered that provided the European Union with three options: NATO assets under “Berlin Plus,” for which purpose an EU cell has been established in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE); one of the national headquarters made available by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Greece; or, if no national headquarters are identified, the Civilian-Military Cell that has been added to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). This compromise does not present a lasting solution, however. Providing for the “multinationalization” of national headquarters for the duration of an operation demands significant energy and resources. Additional space and facilities must be provided at each of these headquarters, and a large pool of officers from the twenty-seven EU members must be trained to function in all headquarters in order for them to be able to work effectively from the first day of an actual operation. Furthermore, there is a risk of proliferation of national headquarters because of the associated prestige and influence, which creates a new intra-EU duplication problem. At the same time, the effective availability of national headquarters remains questionable, as is demonstrated by the EU response to the UN request to mount a “deterrent force” during the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006. Because both France and the United Kingdom declined to lead the operation, Germany ultimately had to assume the burden, but did so with extreme reluctance. The availability of the EU-owned asset, the Civilian-Military Cell, is guaranteed, but rather than a fully fledged headquarters it is a small core that has to be built on for each specific operation, which creates an additional training requirement. With an operations center of just five permanent staff, even as a core its capacity remains limited to small-scale (battle group–sized) operations. Inevitably, the “headquarters debate” will resurface. The most efficient way to provide the EU with a guaranteed command and control capacity would clearly be to increase the permanent element of the Civilian-Military Cell. A fully fledged EU operational headquarters would offer all member states, including those incapable of establishing a national structure, the chance to participate, stimulating the harmonization of doctrine, a sense of joint ownership, and the emergence of a European esprit de corps, while

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avoiding additional unnecessary intra-EU duplication. This solution does constitute duplication with NATO, in particular with SHAPE, but not an unnecessary one in view of the need to safeguard EU autonomy. Besides, one also must look at the numbers employed by SHAPE and the NATO command and control structure in general; although very effective, efficiency seems low, despite ongoing reforms. If EU-NATO duplication must be overcome, however, by “thinking outside the box” and in the context of a two-pillar configuration, other solutions can be imagined. Objectively, the United States does not need SHAPE; its national command and control structures allow it to undertake all operations autonomously. It is the Europeans who need a multinational command and control capacity in view of the limitations of scale and budget at the level of individual states. One could therefore envisage, for instance, a merging of existing EU and NATO capabilities into a jointly owned EU-NATO operational planning and command center (LindleyFrench and Algieri 2004, pp. 40–42). Or one could even imagine a scenario in which NATO’s “whole European command could be placed under the authority of the EU” (Lanxade 2004, p. 18). Rather than a NATO-owned SHAPE, which the EU can use if the North Atlantic Council authorizes it, an EU-owned SHAPE would place the capacity where it is really needed, providing of course for permanent involvement of the United States and other non-EU allies for operations under the NATO flag. The alternative proposed by the Atlantic Council, to combine the two military committees and elements of SHAPE and the EUMS under the aegis of NATO (Burwell et al. 2006, pp. 16–17), even if political control would alternate between the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee according to the case at hand, would seem to underestimate the importance of the strategic divide and the need for more flexibility and autonomy for each pillar in order to overcome it. A two-pillar system at the political level must be reflected in the command and control structure. In all of these scenarios, therefore, the Europeanization of NATO’s command structure should be put onto the table again. Because each country has but a single set of forces, there is much less debate on the armed forces themselves, contrary to the strategic debate on when and how to deploy them (Binnendijk, Gompert, and Kugler 2005, p. 3). All countries agree that transformation from territorial defense to expeditionary operations must continue, and that this will automatically strengthen both the ESDP and NATO, as these national capabilities can be deployed for both, as well as in a UN, national, or ad hoc framework. Making Europe more capable thus certainly will not be at the expense of NATO as some observers fear (Cimbalo 2004). Because of the functional overlap between them, NATO and the European Union have obviously identified the same shortfalls that need to be filled in order to achieve trans-

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formation. The Allied Command Transformation and the European Defense Agency (EDA) thus try to steer countries in the same direction. Evidently, the Europeans have the longest way to go. The military effort of the EU member states should not be underestimated, as it often is.2 If contributions to operations in all of the frameworks above are taken into account, the twenty-seven EU member states together permanently deploy 70,000–80,000 troops, including on some high-intensity operations. At €180 billion (about US$265 billion) their combined defense budget is the world’s second largest, equivalent to China, Russia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, India, and South Korea combined (Howorth 2004). After the United States, the EU is the biggest military power. There is a gap, however, between this effort and the total armed forces of the EU-27, a consequence of the fragmentation of that €180 billion over twenty-seven member states, which results in huge inefficiencies. The EU-27 have almost 2 million men and women in uniform, but only about 10 percent of that total is estimated to be deployable, and only one-third of that 10 percent can be deployed at any one time in view of rotation. As shown above, these are the numbers of troops that the member states are effectively deploying today. But the formal objective of the ESDP also remains limited to the capacity of deploying a maximum of 60,000 troops, as per the original 1999 Headline Goal. Together the five “illustrative scenarios,” on which the EU Military Staff bases the definition of capability requirements, concern only 200,000 troops. Setting aside this quantitative limit and abandoning the customary comparison with the United States, though in consultation with it and other non-EU allies, the political objectives of the European Security Strategy should be translated in a realistic military level of ambition based on the full military potential of the EU-27 and on the responsibilities of a global actor of such weight. Which forces do the EU-27 want to have available at any one time for rapid response in crisis situations? Which forces do they want to contribute to long-term peacekeeping operations, in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, but also at the request of the United Nations, for instance in Africa? Which over-the-horizon reserve does that require? Which capacity for territorial defense must be maintained? Essentially, however, this is a political choice. On the basis of that choice, capability requirements for a comprehensive military capacity at the aggregate level of the EU-27 could be drawn up by the EU Military Committee (EUMC); the European Defense Agency could then guide the member states as to how to meet those (Biscop 2005a). No longer would each member state separately have to invest in a wide range of capabilities organized at the national level, often in small and therefore inefficient quantities. Within the EUMC framework, top-down coordination by the EDA would allow those that are willing to opt for specialization—that is, abandonment of certain capabilities altogether—and

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pooling (offering a capability only through contributing to a multinational formation). Only the larger member states, which have a sufficient scale by themselves, should logically continue to offer a broader range of nationally organized capabilities. A three-tier set of forces would thus emerge: capabilities that each member state continues to organize on a national basis, such as infantry battalions; capabilities organized nationally only by the large member states and in a number of multinational clusters, such as fighter squadrons; and capabilities organized at the level of the EU-27, such as space-based assets. Top-down coordination is the only way to end the fragmentation and useless duplication within the European defense effort and generate more “usable” forces within the current combined budget of the EU-27. Such far-reaching integration is only possible in the framework of the wider political project of the European Union, and not in the exclusively intergovernmental context of NATO, although the integrated capabilities could of course still be deployed for NATO operations. This fact has implications for the configuration of a two-pillar alliance. First, enhanced common funding of capabilities is recommendable in the framework of the European Union, where deeper integration can potentially generate optimal efficiency, rather than in that of NATO. Second, the European Defense Agency would have first-line responsibility for guiding the EU member states toward the capability requirements defined by the EUMC. The Allied Command Transformation would continue to coordinate alliancewide interoperability and could remain a useful forum for the mutual exchange of lessons learned and best practices with regard to transformation. For the purpose of NATO defense planning however, which would constitute a second tier, the ACT would have to deal with the resulting integrated European capabilities as a whole. In order to coordinate, the European Defense Agency and the Allied Command Transformation should establish a direct relationship instead of having to operate via the general EU-NATO Capability Group, the current rather sterile forum for overall coordination between the alliance and the ESDP. It should be noted that the EDA combines the authority for capabilities, procurement, research and technology, and the defense market, and therefore potentially can have a larger impact on states’ decisions than the ACT. Ultimately, both the EDA and the ACT face the same problem: how to convince states to forgo exclusively national decisionmaking and take into account supranational guidelines. Finally, the position of the NATO response force would need to be assessed. Currently, the rotation schemes for the NRF and the EU’s battle groups are coordinated so as not to conflict. The question remains, however, whether or not the forces on standby in the framework of the NRF, during those six months, can be called on for operations in any other frame-

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work. If a crisis were to occur in which NATO as a whole would not intervene but the European Union would, and in which the latter would then not be able to call on its member states’ forces in the NRF, the European Union would be deprived of a relatively large portion of its most deployable capabilities. Presumably a pragmatic solution would be found, though. Besides, it should not be forgotten that even during the standby phase, there is no automatic transfer of authority to NATO; if the North Atlantic Council decides to deploy the NRF, each ally with forces on standby must authorize deployment individually (Quille et al. 2005, p. 43). Some authors recommend that the United States start contributing to the NATO response force (Binnendijk, Gompert, and Kugler 2005, p. 7), which would make sense from the perspective of the effectiveness of NATO-led operations. If, however, the United States were not to contribute in the future either, then in a two-pillar constellation the NRF could just as well be made answerable to the European Union (EUISS 2004, p. 102) and merged with the “battle group” scheme.

Civil-Military Integration In the meantime, the European Union has taken the lead in building integrated civil-military crisis management structures in which both the European Commission and the European Council Secretariat are represented, notably the Situation Centre and the Civilian-Military Cell; furthermore, a concept for civilian-military planning has been elaborated. Efforts are under way to improve the availability of police, civil protection, magistrates, and other civilian experts for civilian ESDP operations. As a consequence of the European Union’s leading role, EU expertise is increasingly in demand—for example, for the monitoring mission in Aceh that became operational on September 15, 2005. The next challenge for the European Union is to forge the link between the progressively integrated crisis management capabilities in the second pillar and the long-term policies in the first pillar, such as aid and trade, notably in the postconflict phase of stabilization and reconstruction, and to defuse potential tensions between ESDP missions—for instance, in the area of security sector reform and European Commission–run capacity-building missions. The clearest indication of the EU’s success in this field is perhaps the desire by some in NATO and the United States to recuperate its achievements and gain access to EU civilian and civil-military capabilities. Faced with the necessity that even high-intensity military operations must incorporate a civil dimension from the start, to which is added the fact that many interventions currently in demand are of a primarily or even exclusively civilian nature, the alliance has realized that it will need to adapt or risk obsolescence. In their strategic vision for confronting the military chal-

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lenge, the alliance’s two strategic commanders stress “the need for a concerted and co-ordinated political, military, civil and economic approach” (NATO 2004, p. 4). The ACT is developing a concept for the alliance’s role in peacebuilding or “stabilization and reconstruction,” and has called for an “effects-based approach to operations” that “encompasses all of the instruments of political, economic, civil and military power that can be brought to bear by the Nations of the Alliance, and potentially beyond in partnership with other international organizations and agencies” (NATO 2005, p. 6). The very welcomed relief operation in Pakistan following the earthquake of October 8, 2005, including the airlifting of supplies and deployment of medical units and engineers from the NATO response force, must also be seen in this light. The same holds true for the NATO support operation in New Orleans in September 2005 following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall there, an operation that also saw the deployment of NRF capabilities. As a military alliance, however, NATO is limited in what it can do in this area. The idea has therefore been raised to create an “inverse Berlin Plus” that would give NATO access to the European Union’s civilian and civilmilitary capabilities (Flournoy and Smith 2005, p. 70). “It is time, therefore, to stop asking what NATO can do for the EU, and begin asking what the EU can do for NATO” (Dobbins 2005, p. 47). In any case, such an arrangement could only cover the crisis management capabilities under the ESDP; the development and trade competencies of the European Commission cannot be delegated. First, however, NATO should decide on its role. Given the nature of the alliance and the availability and expertise of other actors, it would not appear efficient for NATO to launch itself into an entirely new field and take on primarily or exclusively civilian operations. That was also the conclusion of the Riga summit, where heads of state and government decided that NATO should not develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, but seek cooperation with other partners. What must be provided for, then, is the incorporation of a civilian dimension into NATO-led military operations. Just like the armed forces, the deployable civilian capabilities are national assets; what the European Union has done is to create the concepts and (integrated civil-military) structures at the EU level that allow these assets to be deployed on EU missions. If the alliance seeks to deploy civilian capabilities to complement its military operations, it would therefore need to appeal to individual allies to put those at its disposal and either create its own civilian-military command and control structure or have recourse to that of the EU under an “inverse Berlin Plus.” The latter option does not seem recommendable: the added value of the EU structures is their integrated, civil-military nature; given their configuration, putting them at the disposal of NATO to run NATO-led civilian missions alongside a NATO military headquarters would be difficult to organize. The first option would raise a whole new “inverse” duplication debate.

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Rather than an “inverse Berlin Plus,” the alliance would benefit from a partnership agreement with the European Union. When the European Union and the United States decide to jointly launch a military operation under the NATO flag, and thus jointly decide the desired end-state, such an agreement could provide for close collaboration with the relevant EU bodies from the initial planning of the mission in order to incorporate, from the beginning, the civilian activities required during and after the operation, which could be implemented on the ground by EU-led civilian capabilities (for example, an EU civilian operation alongside the NATO operation, rather than individual states’ contributions). In a two-pillar framework, a similar partnership could in effect be concluded with the United States. The rejection of a soft-hard division of labor has implications for the United States as well; while the United States possesses the most effective warfighting capacity in the world, important capability deficiencies will need to be addressed with regard to lower-intensity missions and the civilian dimension of operations.

Conclusion The North Atlantic Treaty Organization still has a role to play. The alliance is based on a community of values. The principles enshrined in the Treaty on European Union—liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law—are common to all allies. It is logical, therefore, that the sense of community that is thus created, and that has been strengthened through mutual contributions to one another’s security in the course of history, continues to be translated into a collective defense commitment as long-term insurance against threats to the very survival of any of these like-minded states, even when no such threat is imaginable in the near future. Europe and North America can thus be said to constitute a true “security community.” It is because of the communality of values that Europe, even though not all EU member states line up behind the United States on every occasion, still remains the most solid ally of the United States (Cohen-Tanugi 2003, p. 54); the motivations of other states that join ad hoc coalitions of the willing are often more of a tactical or opportunistic nature and therefore less steadfast. Second, NATO has proven its efficacy as an operational organization for non–Article 5 missions; it is therefore the obvious and most efficient permanent framework to use when all allies agree on the need to intervene militarily. Third, NATO is an instrument for the permanent enhancement of military capabilities in terms of usability and interoperability. But the existence of a community of values does not in itself guarantee an effective partnership and alliance. Without political transformation, the

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defense transformation sponsored by NATO is unlikely to succeed (Binnendijk and Kugler 2004). The root cause of the current unease must be addressed, which requires a reequilibration of NATO, in order to take into account the structural change that has taken place in the transatlantic relationship: the rise of the European Union as a global strategic actor. Without such reconfiguration, the allies are unable to agree on fundamental decisions on NATO’s future role, precisely because all ideas and proposals will continue to be seen in the light of EU-NATO competition. The Riga summit demonstrated as much: for lack of basic strategic consensus, all ambitious projects were watered down to the extent that the summit ended up being the shortest ever—lasting just from dinner until lunch. The European Security Strategy rightly notes that the transatlantic relationship, of which NATO is “an important expression,” is “irreplaceable,” but emphasizes that “our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA” (Solana 2003; emphasis added). Burden sharing and power sharing are inextricably linked (Hulsman 2000). In its December 2000 strategic document “Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A US Strategy for the 21st Century,” the Bill Clinton administration recognized that “development of a foreign and security policy for the EU is a natural, even an inevitable, part of the development of broader European integration,” and expressly stated that “real cooperation requires a two-way street” (US Department of Defense 2000). The United States cannot expect a greater defense effort on the part of the EU member states without allowing them a greater say in the running of the alliance, and vice versa. In the end, increasing the performance of Europe’s military capabilities will unavoidably change the political constellation, especially in view of the EU’s enhanced international actorness. A two-pillar alliance would at the same time make use of European capabilities and provide for the flexibility that would allow for the European Union—and the United States—to play their proper roles on the international scene. Introducing the two-pillar notion could be the subject of a revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept, which at the same time could be amended to dispense with the vague references to NATO’s out-of-area role in favor of an unambiguous statement of alliance missions. First and foremost, however, it is up to the EU to live up to the ambitions of the European Security Strategy and overcome its internal divides. The strong pillar that a unified European Union de facto constitutes cannot then be ignored.

Notes I thank Johan Lembke (Texas A&M University), Richard Whitman (University of Bath and Chatham House), and various colleagues from the Belgian Federal Public

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Service Foreign Affairs for their comments and suggestions, from which this chapter has greatly benefited. 1. The FAES report seems to agree with this choice: “America knows that the War on Terror can be waged more effectively if it does not need to negotiate through collective decision-making mechanisms” (2005, p. 17). 2. James Dobbins, for instance, appears to ignore the considerable contribution from certain EU member states in Iraq: “the United States cannot count upon substantial European support in any of the actual or potential major conflicts that preoccupy American defence planners” (2005, p. 39). Leslie Lebl even states that “the very real possibility exists that most European militaries will abandon any serious war-fighting capability” (2006, p. 121).

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The European Defense Agency and Transatlantic Burden Sharing

3

Nick Witney

IN THE EARLY 1960S, PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY MADE HIS WELL-

known plea for a fair transatlantic sharing of the defense burden. More than forty years later, the same plea is still being made. The increasing demands of the crisis management missions of the twenty-first century, far away from the Cold War front line in Central Europe, have exposed among European countries the military shortfalls for conducting expeditionary operations. It is true that, in the recent past, Europe has undertaken its first successful military and civilian operations in the context of the European Security and Defense Policy in the Balkans, Africa, and elsewhere. But they have been either small-scale operations or, in most cases, conducted in a relatively benign environment. Europe still lacks the military capabilities to conduct riskier operations; it continues to struggle with insufficient means to transport its forces over great distances and to sustain larger-scale missions for a longer period. Attempts in recent years, such as the Prague Capabilities Commitment (NATO) and the European Capabilities Action Plan (EU), have produced limited success in solving European military capability shortfalls. 1 The European Defense Agency has been established to improve Europe’s military capabilities needed for the ESDP through a new, integrated and coherent approach, tying together at the European level capability planning, research and technology, armaments cooperation, and the defense industry. This chapter provides background about the European Defense Agency and describes what it is (and what it is not), since it is a new initiative and often not well understood. It also assesses the EDA’s chances for success and makes the point that the agency is almost destined to achieve its objectives in due course. Specific sections deal with the EDA’s 33

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early successes and its priorities in the shorter term. Throughout this chapter the point is made that the agency’s agenda serves both US as well as European interests, and therefore, if successful, it can only strengthen transatlantic relations.

Startup The European Defense Agency is a very young agency, rather small and confronting a big agenda. The story begins in June 2003, when the EU’s heads of state and government, meeting in Thessaloniki at the end of the Greek EU presidency, decided that they wanted to see the establishment, by the end of 2004, of “an intergovernmental agency in the field of defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments.” This was the principal political decision to create the agency, which then had to be “translated” into a legal act (a “joint action,” in the parlance of EU affairs) for the formal establishment of the EDA. It took a further year of intensive work to arrive at the point where the twenty-five EU member states could agree on a concept and a blueprint for the agency: size, cost, responsibilities, purpose, and strategic aims. But consensus was achieved and the EU Council of Ministers adopted the joint action on July 12, 2004, establishing the agency as a legal entity. The next step consisted of recruiting staff to enable the agency to start functioning. The first skeleton staff arrived just in time to allow the agency to begin its activities by the end of 2004, as was called for by the Thessaloniki European Council’s deadline. However, with its limited staff the agency had nothing more than what the military would call initial operational capability by early 2005. Full operational capability was not achieved until the summer of 2005 when recruiting up to the initial ceiling of eighty staff members, drawn from eighteen different nationalities, was completed. At the same time the agency moved into its own premises in Brussels.

Mission The European Defense Agency’s mission, defined in the Joint Action of July 12, 2004 (2004/557/CFSP), is as follows: “to support the Council and the member states in their effort to develop defense capabilities for crisis management operations, to sustain ESDP as it stands now, and will develop in the future.” It prescribes four functions: (1) to work on European military capability development, (2) to promote cooperative defense research and technology in Europe, (3) to promote armaments collaborations, and (4) to strengthen the technological and industrial bases of European defense.

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Three points of the mission statement need further explanation. First, the agency exists to support the member states. It is not some sort of Brussels-based supranational authority that attempts to tell the member states what to do in matters of defense. The EDA is to act as a “conscience” and as a “catalyst”; it is to be an incubator of ideas and initiatives. But if Europeans truly want to improve their game and get their act together on defense (which is perhaps a less formal version of the mission statement), then they have to make the necessary decisions, individually and collectively. The EDA cannot do it for them. Second, the focus is on military capabilities. Yes, the agency has important functions related to, for example, the defense industry. But the leading light, the star it steers by, is the aim of building Europe’s military capacity—or, more bluntly stated, of trying to ensure that Europe gets a better output from its defense investment. Finally, the capabilities are those required by crisis management operations. These are essentially deployed, multinational operations—for example, the European intervention in Congo in 2003, the more recent mission in the same country in support of the United Nations during the 2006 elections, or the EUFOR mission as a follow-up to NATO’s peace support operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Neither the agency, nor the ESDP of which it is a child, are concerned with the “classical” defense; that remains NATO’s province. Such a clear demarcation of responsibilities is one of the keys to deconfliction and complementarities between what the EDA is trying to do and NATO’s role in capability improvement.

Functions The European Defense Agency’s functional responsibilities cover four areas and, therefore, a very wide range of activities. How can an agency hope to make an impact on such a wide agenda with a staff of ninety people, an annual budget of only US$27 million,2 and no power to direct or enforce compliance? There are two responses to that question. First, to use Teddy Roosevelt’s term, the EDA has a “bully” pulpit. Its key asset is a unique governance arrangement with a steering board, chaired by Javier Solana, the EU’s Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and attended in person by all the European defense ministers.3 In 2006 the steering board met four times at the ministerial level, and between these meetings, it met in other compositions with the top national officials for armaments, research and technology, and military capability planning. This ensures a persistent and continuous dialogue with the highest levels of decisionmaking in all the European defense ministries. The second reason for optimism is simply that the tide of events is set in the agency’s direction. There are both operational (military) and economic imperatives that make greater consolidation and coher-

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ence of European defense efforts inevitable—a theme that will be further addressed below. Another point concerning the functions of the EDA is coherence. Though the four functional areas represent a wide agenda, combined they will be a “strong force” to guide European countries in improving their capabilities. Too often in the past, the military, the research and technology experts, the armaments procurement specialists, and the defense industry worked in their own worlds, losing track of what was happening elsewhere. In the EDA, all these actors are brought together in an integrated approach so the military planners will not miss technology opportunities in a modern world where civil technology is developing much faster than military technology. In addition, research and technology and industry will take into account the future military users’ requirements early in their planning processes and not when it is too late. For the first time, the agency is bringing together all the relevant actors at the European level, with the aim of replacing stove-piped planning with a coherent, integrated process. The EDA has its limits, however. All four functions on its agenda concern not so much the job to be done, itself, but the tools to do that job. The EDA has no involvement in the conduct of military operations themselves, nor does it play any part in the wider policy issues of European defense. But it has the privilege of interesting itself in, and seeking to integrate, almost every other defense agenda that relates to making Europe a more effective actor with regard to defense and security.

European Security Strategy So, if the European Defense Agency’s role is to help ensure that Europe has the defensive tools necessary to do the job, what exactly is that job? Happily, there is a relatively clear and succinct answer to this question, contained in the European Security Strategy, which was adopted by the EU at the end of 2003. It defines the security environment at the start of the twenty-first century: the replacement of the old defense certainties by the new threats and challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, state failure, and organized crime. The European Security Strategy points out that with nearly half a billion people and a quarter of the world’s gross national product, Europe has no choice but to be a global actor and indeed has a responsibility to play its part in the promotion of international stability and conflict resolution. It notes that to discharge this responsibility, Europe must be at once more active, more capable, and more coherent. Moreover, it stresses the importance of working with partners: “The Transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a

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formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA” (Solana 2003). When President George W. Bush went to Brussels in February 2005 and observed that the United States supports a strong Europe because it needs a strong partner, he reciprocated exactly that sentiment.

Europe’s Military Capabilities Sometimes, Americans underestimate what Europeans already do for the common cause of building global security. True, Europe spends less than half what the United States spends on defense, but the amount is still near a quarter of global defense spending. In recent years, the Europeans have maintained a fairly consistent level of troop deployment—about 70,000— beyond the Continent: from Afghanistan to the Balkans, to sub-Saharan Africa, and to Aceh in Indonesia. By early 2007, seven years after the ESDP was conceived, Europe had undertaken fourteen operations, many of them, interestingly, as much or more civil than military in character. This is not trivial, but it is also far short of what it could and should be. A troop deployment of 70,000 is not negligible, but it is a tiny proportion of Europe’s total uniformed force of about 1.8 million. More than US$265 billion spent annually on defense is also not insignificant; however, it does not go as far as it should when more than half this sum is consumed by personnel costs. In addition, Europeans are still investing less than 20 percent on research and development and equipment procurement. Yes, European militaries need to transform and are lagging behind the United States in recognizing and acting on that need. For most, NATO’s new Allied Command Transformation will play a leading role in that process. But, with a rather different focus, the European Defense Agency will be pushing in the same direction. So, if Europe wishes to live up to its ambitions and be an effective partner for the United States, it needs quite simply to spend more on the challenges of the future and less on the legacies of the past. It needs to pool the efforts and resources of its many different member states in doing so. This is fundamentally what the EDA is trying to bring about. Understood in this way, one can perhaps see why it is bound to succeed, because for European militaries, perhaps even for the US military, the future will be expeditionary and multinational. It makes no sense for different national contingents deployed on such operations to employ different guns requiring different ammunition, different vehicles requiring different spare parts, and different radios that do not allow cross-communication. Interoperability is fundamental, and all European militaries accept (and the agency wholly endorses) that NATO standards and NATO architectures for such things as

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information exchange and communication are the indispensable foundation for ensuring interoperability into the future. If the EDA succeeds—that is, if Europeans do increasingly get their act together on defense—then the result will be not only entirely compatible with NATO’s efforts and purpose, but also strongly supportive of the transatlantic relationship, positioning Europe to be the sort of partner that the United States will need in the century ahead. A major report recently published by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies came to the same conclusion: “Stronger European defense capabilities are ultimately good for both sides of the Atlantic” (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2005, p. 24). Even more important for Europeans, there really is no viable alternative to European defense integration or, one could say, to more pooling of defense efforts and resources.

The Defense Industry: Empowering Europe Without a “Fortress Europe” This operational imperative to cooperate is reinforced by an economic one. The hard fact is that, though the sum of European defense spending is substantial, there is no single national defense budget in Europe, not even the biggest, that remains capable of sustaining a fully competent technological and industrial–based defense on a national basis. The defense industry matters in Europe, just as it does in the United States. It is important to the wider economy, sustaining hundreds of thousands of jobs. The defense industry is vital to the political consensus that supports the role and the purposes of Europe’s armed forces, but it is simply unsustainable as a collective of separate national entities. Thus, for both operational and economic reasons, Europeans are fated to cooperate, to converge their thinking on the capability needs of the future and merge those into consolidated requirements and joint orders; to encourage the supply side of the defense industry to secure its future by restructuring and consolidating; and to bring the demand and the supply sides together into a genuinely continental defense equipment market, where none at the moment exists. Given the EDA’s industrial and technological functionalities, some critics are asking whether the agency will attempt to create what is sometimes tagged a “fortress Europe.” No, it will not. Yes, the agency is pushing for convergence and consolidation of both the demand and the supply side of the European defense equipment market, and for the creation of something closer to a genuine market where the two sides can meet. But this objective affects the internal European market. The agency will not express “European preference,” nor will it campaign for denying European buyers access to US defense companies. Sometimes, however, the concern is expressed in a slightly more

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sophisticated form. The EDA enterprise is not about trying to turn Europe into a protected market. However, the agency’s mission concerns the health of the defense technological and industrial base in Europe. It advocates rationalization and restructuring of the supply side in Europe, elimination of industrial duplication, an evolution toward specialization and recognition of centers of excellence, and acceptance of greater degrees of mutual dependence. European policymakers and industrialists should think increasingly of a European defense technological and industrial base, and not just the sum of its many national parts. Surely, the criticism goes, this means, implicitly, subscribing to a future in which Europe will constitute one defense industry base and market, and the United States will constitute another. Is that really what Europe wants? Here the response is that we have to deal with the world as we find it. The fact is, the way things are today, Europeans find it hugely difficult to conduct meaningful defense industry cooperation across the Atlantic. Despite certain welcome exceptions, the terms of transatlantic defense trade are notoriously unbalanced. The most favorable statistics suggest that in recent years the United States has been selling to Europe four times what it has bought in return. The problem is not just market access. The biggest impediments to doing defense business together are the controls and limitations placed on technology exchange. It is not for the European Defense Agency to criticize how the United States chooses to manage access to its defense market or to control technologies that its investment has created. The United States spends the most, it calls the shots. Given the way it calls those shots, though, it is both natural and necessary that Europeans, increasingly feeling the need for industrial and technological partners and economies of scale, should focus on working more closely together. Indeed, perhaps it may be only by doing this, and by creating on the European side a stronger and more integrated technological and industrial base for defense, that one day Europe will be able to put transatlantic defense trade relations on a more sound, equitable basis—to the ultimate benefit of both sides. It is in this context that the EDA’s participating member states have agreed on the characteristics of a strong future European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), including the need to identify key technologies for which Europe should be less dependent on non-European sources. In 2007 the agency launched a strategic debate on the future of the EDTIB, involving all important actors (member states, industry, etc.).

The Code of Conduct The first year of the European Defense Agency’s existence produced a major breakthrough on the European defense equipment market. After

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extensive and detailed preparations by the agency and its participating member states, and with great support from the European Commission, defense ministers agreed on a code of conduct concerning defense procurement, on November 21, 2005. The code was duly implemented on July 1, 2006. It will encourage cross-border competition for defense procurement, which is exempt from the normal rules of the European common market.4 It covers defense procurement contracts with a value over €1 million (US$1.5 million). The code is politically (not legally) binding, and twenty-two of the EDA’s participating member states have joined on a voluntary basis.5 The high participation in joining and implementing the code—of which the agency will keep track through a monitoring and reporting system—reflects the political will of member states to transform the European defense equipment market. The code is supported by other instruments designed to ensure that smaller companies lower down the supply chain can also benefit from cross-border opportunities, and that security of supply can be ensured when purchasing from abroad. If the code of conduct lives up to expectations, the market could be transformed. In the past, the exemption of defense procurement from the rules governing public sector purchases in the EU’s single market allowed national preference and single bidders to become the norm and cross-border competition to remain the exception. Now, cross-border competition should become the norm, with exemption the exception. A milestone has been reached. The code will have the effect of opening up big segments of the defense procurement of each member state to industries based in the territories of all the others where protected national markets have previously been the rule. The EDA’s aim is to get each member state to accept bids to satisfy its defense equipment requirements from other European countries, and then to evaluate them on par with bids from its own national suppliers. Procurement opportunities are being advertised on an electronic bulletin board on the agency’s website (www.eda.europa.eu), to which everyone has access. None of these changes have any impact on the ability of companies from the United States or other third countries to bid for business. Whether the member states also wish to invite a US actor (or other third-party actor) onto the field in any competition will remain, as now, entirely a matter for those individual states to decide.

Research and Technology: Looking Ahead Despite the success of launching the code of conduct, the European Defense Agency cannot rest on its laurels. The EDA has also been looking hard at its agenda to see where the next decisive contribution could be

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made. Fortunately, EU heads of state and government have helped to provide an answer. At their informal summit at Hampton Court in October 2005, during the United Kingdom EU presidency, the EU leaders asked for ways to improve defense capabilities by increasing levels of research spending, finding opportunities for research collaboration, and tackling capability gaps. Based on “initial orientations” of Javier Solana, presented to the European Council in December 2005, the agency started to focus its work on the “Hampton Court Agenda,” first and foremost on defense research and technology. As Javier Solana noted in his orientations, this is an important area in which to try to bring about change: “National defense investment programs are difficult to re-orient. Long procurement cycles and financial pressure make it tough both to rebalance toward new capability needs, and to switch from national to collaborative approaches. But the place to focus is on [research and technology], both because such programmes are more flexible than major equipment programmes, and because successful collaborations require convergence at the earliest stages of exploitation of new requirements and possibilities” (Solana 2005, attachment I). The EDA is pursuing the Hampton Court Agenda on several tracks where the end of the Austrian presidency in June 2006 served as an important deadline. First, the agency has assembled accurate data on defense research and technology spending, showing that in 2005 the twenty-four participating member states spent collectively just over €2.2 billion (US$3 billion) on defense research and technology. That represented approximately 1.1 percent of their total defense expenditure, which was well below the levels seen in the United States. Only about 12 percent of this EU research and technology money was spent collaboratively.6 Clearly, these figures prove that Europe should increase its collective spending on defense research and technology. Second, the agency is trying to increase ad hoc collaborations in which a group of countries decide to pool efforts in a particular area without necessarily asking all member states to participate or to finance the activity. During 2006, the agency and its member states developed a groundbreaking new form of investment to encourage such ad hoc collaborations. Unlike previous collaborations on defense research and technology, which involved governments negotiating financial and industrial shares for each individual project, the new Joint Investment Program (JIP) established a common funding budget, as well as a management committee, representing the contributors, to oversee the selection and financing of individual projects. The votes of the contributors are to be weighted according to the size of their contributions, though decisions will be taken by consensus wherever possible.

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In November 2006 the EDA’s steering board approved the first threeyear JIP on force protection, which will focus on a limited number of specific research and technology priorities driven by agreed capability requirements for future operations: collective survivability, individual protection, data analysis, secure wireless communication, and mission planning and training. A total of eighteen countries, plus Norway, have agreed to take part, pledging over €54 million (US$68 million). Third, a European defense research and technology strategy is being developed, bringing together nationally derived approaches and priorities with a top-down, jointly developed view of where member states collectively should be going and which technologies should especially be preserved or developed in Europe. Naturally, the research and technology strategy will be based on future capability requirements, but at the same time take into account issues of defense industry policy. In other words, establishing European priorities requires the agency to ask which research and technology priorities look most important from the perspective of future ESDP operations. In addition, it requires the EDA to ask which technologies, for reasons of autonomy or simply by reason of their economic importance, should be preserved and developed in Europe. Finally, connected to all of this is the financial question. Europe will have to look at how defense resources can be redeployed to defense research and technology. Logically, this will involve cutting wasteful duplication, particularly in infrastructure, such as matériel test and evaluation. Furthermore, allocating more than 50 percent of the total European defense expenditure to personnel will simply become impossible in the future. Another financial aspect is to derive the maximum from the investments made in other areas. In the past, technology was often “spun in” from defense to the civil sector; these days, civil technology often “spins out” into the defense world. So Europe needs to look increasingly at complementarities between civil and military research, particularly in areas like communications and space. There is plenty of scope for such partnerships, given that the EU is already funding a great deal of relevant research activity in the civil sector.

Capability Priorities Europe’s research and technology efforts cannot exist in a vacuum, and as with everything else on the EDA’s agenda, the capability requirements for future military operations are the starting point. Here again, Europe’s leaders have been clear about what the short-term capability priorities are: command, control, and communications (C3); air-to-air refueling; and strategic lift. Command, control, and communications (or better command, control,

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communications, computing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [C4ISR]) have been a European capability shortfall for years. Europe has seen improvement in procedures and concepts, but not much progress in the necessary hardware and software. The EDA has identified several priorities, for both the shorter and the longer term. In satellite communications, better intra-European coordination is needed to obtain access to available commercial satellites. Development of common ground terminals, in the medium to longer term, is a crucial step for increasing interoperability. Next-generation communication satellites (post-2015) should be planned on a European scale, rather than on a national scale by several states. Another important step by the EDA in terms of C4ISR capability is to test the viability of a collective European approach to developing a next-generation software-defined radio as a joint civil-military endeavor. This brings together computing and communications technologies and could eventually allow military radio systems that can securely deliver voice, data, and video in a variety of formats. It has the potential to enable forces to communicate at and between all levels, a key requirement not only for military operations but also for interoperability between the military and civil actors in crisis management operations. In a further positive example of ad hoc collaboration, Finland, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden announced in November 2006 plans to establish a €100 million (US$128 million) program of research into software-defined radio, to be conducted under the auspices of the EDA. This five-country initiative is focused on the medium term. In parallel, the EDA and European Commission have launched studies on longer-term military and civilian requirements, respectively. All these activities are complementary and aim to ensure not only military interoperability—including with the United States and NATO—but also civil-military interoperability. On air-to-air refueling, defense ministers of ten European countries launched a new initiative in October 2005. 7 Air-to-air refueling, a wellknown European shortfall, is a key enabling capability both for the deployment of forces and equipment, and for sustaining air operations. The increasing distances between Europe and the most likely theaters of operation put even greater demands on air-to-air refueling assets. Only a few European countries have strategic tankers or will acquire some in the years to come. However, even when new purchases are taken into account, Europe will face a considerable shortfall. So there is ample scope to look at innovative solutions such as private financing, pooling of assets, or joint procurement. The third capability priority, partly linked to air-to-air refueling, is strategic lift (sea and air). Again, it is a key enabler for military crisis management operations. Creating rapid-response forces, like the EU battle groups, makes no sense when these forces cannot be transported quickly to

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operational areas thousands of miles away from their home bases. As well, natural disasters, like the 2004 Pacific Rim tsunami and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, have shown a need for huge transport capacities for humanitarian purposes. As with military operations, both strategic assets (airplanes) as well as tactical assets (helicopters) are needed. Improving all aspects of strategic lift requires, again, innovative solutions for both the short and the longer term. Better use of available large transport aircraft— through increased coordination, pooling, or leasing of civil assets—will reduce the shortfall in the near term. In the longer term, additional procurement, perhaps on a pooled basis, would be a possibility. 8 The A-400M transport aircraft, which six European nations already had planned to acquire by 2006,9 would be a prime candidate. New assets, whose potential will need to be explored, include heavy-transport helicopters—as the successor to the only helicopter type available now, the Chinook—and highspeed ferries.

Long-Term Vision Although these short-term capability priorities are important, European defense goals must look far into the future. The European Defense Agency has undertaken major research to generate an initial long-term vision for European defense capacity and capability needs. This research has involved officials and experts from governments, defense bodies, academia, and industry across Europe, and the EDA aims to give planners a shared and stimulating analysis of some of the major trends that will shape Europe’s future. This long-term vision provides shared views on the future world in which ESDP operations will take place, and on what kind of capabilities will be needed to conduct those operations successfully. Given the lead times typically involved in developing defense capability, decisions that Europe takes—or fails to take—today will affect whether it has the right military capabilities, and the right capacities in Europe’s defense technological and industrial base, in the third decade of the twenty-first century. The long-term vision paints a sobering picture of an older and relatively less prosperous Europe in twenty years’ time, in a less stable world. Defense will need to adapt to accelerating technological challenges and to changing attitudes toward the use of force, placing greater emphasis on the careful and precise use of military power. ESDP operations are likely to be expeditionary, multinational, and multi-instrumental. Intelligence will be critical for confronting opponents with radically different tactics, aims, and values. In such circumstances, the military will be only one of a range of instruments applied to achieve campaign goals. Complementarities of civil and military effort will determine success. The long-term vision, broadly

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endorsed by the EDA’s steering board, will be the basis for the agency’s work across all of its agendas—developing a strategy for European defense research and technology and related priorities, and strengthening the European defense technological and industrial base. The long-term vision will form the basis for more detailed descriptions of future capability and capacity needs, such as a capability development plan that was elaborated by the EDA in 2007.

Conclusion The European Defense Agency, together with its participating member states, is addressing many capability shortfalls while taking into account the potential offered by research and technology and by industry to create merging agendas. If successful—and the agency must succeed—Europe’s capabilities will improve, allowing for an increased European role in crisis management. Greater integration of European defense industrial and technological efforts may actually contribute to a more mature and balanced transatlantic defense relationship, just as assuredly will a greater European capability to shoulder its share of the burden of responsibility for global stability and security. As described in the European Security Strategy, an effective and balanced partnership with the United States remains irreplaceable. As the strategy says, “This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence” (Solana 2003). The European Defense Agency, as the instrument to improve Europe’s military capabilities, will therefore contribute to more balanced transatlantic burden sharing, as called for by John F. Kennedy more than forty years ago, and to a better relationship between Europe and the United States.

Notes 1. Little has changed since 2003, when the Council of the European Union, based on analysis of the EU Military Committee, concluded that “the EU now has the operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls. These limitations and/or constraints are on deployment time and high risk may arise at the upper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity, in particular when conducting concurrent operations” (Council of the EU, Conclusions, General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels, May 19–20, 2003). The “Petersberg Tasks” of the EU encompass “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” Separation of warring parties, if necessary by use of force, is considered as a potential scenario. 2. These are 2005 budget and staff numbers. The EDA’s 2006 budget showed a moderate increase, in both staff (ninety-four) and budget (US$32.5 million). 3. The EDA has twenty-six participating member states: all EU member states

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except Denmark, which has an opt-out for European defense. 4. EU member states can invoke Article 296 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, which exempts defense procurement from the common European market rules. EDA data gathered in 2005 confirmed that member states invoke Article 296 for the majority of their defense procurement. 5. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 6. European Defense Agency, “European–United States Defence Expenditure in 2005 (Brussels: EDA, 2006). 7. Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. 8. NATO has launched a C-17 pooling initiative, which might provide a useful model for a comparable A-400M pool in the future. 9. Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

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4

Esther Brimmer

THIS CHAPTER CONSIDERS THE IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC

relations of the evolving strategic role of the European Union at a time when the United States is placing a greater emphasis on homeland security. I argue that the heightened US interest in homeland security makes Washington more supportive of EU coordination in security areas, based on an expanded notion of security that transcends borders. However, despite this acceptance of an expanded EU role in societal security, the United States still sees the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the leading transatlantic institution for territorial defense. I explore the possible role of the ESDP in this area, placing homeland security in the larger context of societal security, and examining specific tasks for which the ESDP might be used and their implications for transatlantic relations.

The EU’s Evolving Strategic Role At its core, European integration is about security. Following the precepts of functional integration, European leaders created the European Coal and Steel Community and other institutions to tie Germany and France together economically and, thereby, make another war between them unthinkable. Meanwhile, after 1955, NATO enfolded Germany into the transatlantic defense architecture. US leaders worked with both to build the NATO alliance and to support the European Union. NATO defended the EuroAtlantic region while the EU fostered the societal links among former adversaries. Thus the United States has long been supportive of the EU as a

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security organization, especially when focused on the socioeconomic side of security (Brimmer 2002). Still, while the United States has been a supporter of European integration for six decades, it has long been ambivalent about European security mechanisms outside the NATO framework. In a sense, US support for the EU’s role in homeland security is an extension and updated manifestation of the US interest in the European Union as a security, but not a defense, actor. In the 1990s, the EU’s role began to change. Alarmed by the tragedies in the Balkans and the lack of European military capability independent of the United States, the United Kingdom and France led the effort to create the European Security and Defense Policy. Their efforts culminated in the St. Malo agreement of 1998. The ESDP’s Headline Goals provide a structure for EU contributions to military and civilian conflict management mechanisms. Although the various member states value EU security policy differently, the ESDP provides one of the frameworks for action by the European Union. The EU does deploy military forces under its own aegis. Member states (and Norway) have pledged assets to the new battle groups. The battalion-size battle groups became fully operational in 2007. The ESDP embodies an innovative combination of civilian and military assets useful in an era of complex emergencies. Thus, through the ESDP the European Union can deploy military forces, civilian police, and civilian administrators, and can sustain diplomatic engagement. A more active EU foreign policy poses challenges and offers benefits to the United States. On the one hand, another well-funded international actor could pursue policies that may diverge from those of the United States. On the other hand, the EU could help the United States bear the burdens and costs of international leadership. As liberal democracies with market economies, the European Union and the United States share basic common interests in the structure of international society, which with adequate attention could lead to complementary policies. US attitudes toward the ESDP have evolved since 1998. The United States wants Europeans to take greater responsibility for international security issues. For decades, US leaders have pressed their European counterparts to increase defense spending and improve capabilities, but in the NATO framework. Initially, many Americans were concerned that the ESDP might detract from European NATO members’ efforts to meet their NATO capability standards, or that Europeans within the Union would be less committed to the defense needs of non-Union NATO allies such as Turkey. Increasingly, some Americans view the ESDP as a way for Europeans to help carry the burdens of international leadership, including deploying military assets. Moreover, the Headline Goals that combine civilian, military, administrative, and rule of law mechanisms seem espe-

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cially appropriate, as a mix of skills are needed in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. This increasing US appreciation for the EU’s possible contribution to international peace and security provides a foundation for US interest in EU mechanisms for homeland security. Into this complex mix of transatlantic attitudes comes what Americans call “homeland security.” While Europeans use different terms such as “societal security” or “social resilience” for related but subtly different concepts, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic are trying to understand what role the transatlantic community plays in safeguarding their societies from threats in the terrorism-dominated post–September 11 environment. Thus, while European security policies are evolving and US approaches to the ESDP are less polemical, but still ambivalent, there may be scope for greater transatlantic cooperation in this area. If the EU can help with international security, could it also contribute to a new priority: transatlantic homeland security?

Societal Security The terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid, and London have focused policymakers’ attention on the threat posed by Al-Qaida and others. Decisionmakers in both the United States and Europe have tended to direct resources to the physical protection of their territories. Traditionally, territorial security meant defending the nation from attack by the organized military of another country. In the post–September 11 era—shaped by the presence of Al-Qaida and the absence of a hegemonic threat like the Soviet Union—“homeland security” plays a dominant role in territorial security in the United States and some European countries. These countries are no longer primarily concerned about classic military invasion; instead they must address vulnerabilities that could be exploited by terrorists seeking to undermine their societies. This type of terrorist threat creates new security needs. Al-Qaida and others do not want to take over a country, nor do they fight for succession or local autonomy as many local terrorist groups have done. They want to challenge Western society to change its policies in the Middle East and elsewhere. Yet ever since September 11 the nature and goals of these groups have metastasized. As Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon point out, local and international grievances intermingle in the agendas of decentralized terrorist cells (2005, p. 21). These terrorists pose a threat not only to territory. Securing physical assets alone will not provide adequate safety. Not all vulnerabilities are at the border or in critical infrastructure. Therefore, homeland security needs to be embedded in this larger notion of

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societal security (Brimmer 2006, pp. 23–42). A comprehensive view of “homeland security” realizes that this term means defending the critical connections of society, which entails both protecting physical assets and bolstering social cohesion. No country that is deeply integrated into the global economy can defend all aspects of societal security by itself, because key globalized connections span borders. The European Union and the United States are both crucial players in the management of transatlantic societal links, because they regulate key industries that provide those connections, such as telecommunications and transportation. However, the transatlantic societal links run much deeper. They are part of a web of liberal democratic values. Not only do European and US companies earn significant profits from transatlantic foreign direct investment, but Europe and the United States also contribute to the wider well-being of liberal democracy. The vitality of the social links in each country in the transatlantic community contributes to the overall well-being of that community. Thus the way of life being defended transcends borders, and that lifestyle is not possible without those international links. The United States cannot defend its homeland security if the transatlantic community is not safe. The United States learned this fact the hard way after two world wars in the twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, with its new threats, the United States still cannot divorce its security from that of the countries in Europe. Europeans need to understand that the reverse is still true, even without the Cold War. Al-Qaida and others attack the countries that represent the status quo, making many countries vulnerable. Effective homeland security needs to be embedded in societal security and have an international component, of which defense of the transatlantic community is an important part. Ultimately leaders want to prevent, manage, and recover from crises. Leaders need to build resilient societies to accomplish these goals. Resilient societies have both enough physical protection to deter or withstand attack, and enough social cohesion to manage, recover, and rebuild. Without social cohesion the public will not trust first-responders who tell them to act or evacuate, or politicians who develop plans for recovery. The response to Hurricane Katrina (2005) demonstrates the tragedy of a lack of adequate social cohesion. The European Union is responsible for many elements that are included in societal security. Thus, transatlantic societal security needs to include the EU. The fact that the EU engages aspects of societal (and homeland) security makes the United States more interested in EU capabilities. As noted above, the EU has always addressed societal security, but now societal security is more important on a range of issues relevant to the antiterrorism campaign.

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The ESDP and Societal Security The objectives of homeland security can be expressed as prevention, response, management, and recovery. The bulk of the work on the ESDP and homeland security has focused on mechanisms of crisis management and response. Yet even within each of these phases, homeland security needs to address both physical protection and social cohesion. EU member states initially developed the ESDP to enhance their security capabilities outside the territory of the Union itself. The Madrid bombings (2004) and London bombings (2005), as well as heat waves, floods, the Pacific Rim tsunami (2004), and Hurricane Katrina (2005), combined to convince European leaders that they needed a range of tools, including at the EU level. Disaster management is primarily a national responsibility, but large-scale catastrophes have international impact and require international support. After all, Europeans died at the World Trade Center and in the Pacific Rim tsunami. Safeguarding Europeans may mean responding to a natural disaster or helping people far from European shores. Driven by this realization, there has been an evolution in the ESDP: leaders have become willing to consider using, within the EU, mechanisms designed for international response. In his March 6, 2006, remarks to EU defense ministers, EU SecretaryGeneral and High Representative Javier Solana focused on ESDP contributions to physical protection and to crisis response in particular (Solana 2006a). He highlighted short-term measures, “broader work regarding the use of ESDP assets,” and steps to improve the EU’s “reaction capability.” In the area of short-term action, he stressed improving “strategic lift coordination” to enable the EU to move relief faster three ways: by using the EU’s strategic movement coordination unit, the multilateral coordination centers in Athens and Eindhoven, and the voluntary agreement by some countries to provide assets to a strategic air lift interim solution (SALIS), which was created in October 2005. High Representative Solana cited medical issues, logistical support, and dealing with nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical threats as critical areas in which ESDP assets could make a contribution to disaster response (Solana 2006a). He also noted that the European Council had created a steering group under the aegis of the EU presidency to help EU decisionmaking bodies become better prepared. Work on coordinating transportation assets for civilian crises continued during 2006 (Solana 2006b). Solana’s remarks and other EU documents assert that ESDP assets could be used in several different phases of a crisis but are concentrated on crisis response and management. The following examination of possible roles for ESDP assets in prevention, response, management, and recovery

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highlights the point. The structures are the same irrespective of the source of the crisis. The EU instruments address both natural and human-made disasters—what Americans would call an “all-hazards” approach. A 2005 report by the EU presidency and the European Council’s counterterrorism coordinator notes: While the London bombings in July provided momentum for this work, the emergency and crisis co-ordination arrangements proposed in this paper are not specific to counter-terrorism. Rather, they would provide a generic arrangement applicable to and which may be triggered by all types of crises, such as natural disasters, industrial accidents, or a flu pandemic, as well as terrorist attacks. They are also designed to provide coordination capability across all areas of EU activity to be used in response to emergencies both inside and outside the Union. (Council of the European Union 2005, p. 2)

In December 2005 the Council elaborated a “conceptual framework on the ESDP dimension of the fight against terrorism,” which identified key areas including prevention, protection, response/consequence management, and supporting third countries. Prevention

Preventing human-made crises, such as terrorist attacks, includes stopping people and constraining their access to materials. The first step is deterring those who might want to perpetrate a terrorist act. Many leaders assume that terrorists cannot be deterred (White House 2002, 2006). Unlike most officials, most terrorists do not have a territory where a return strike can be made in retaliation for an attack. Moreover, suicide bombers want to die for their cause, so the threat of direct retaliation on them holds no menace. Yet the idea of dissuasion may prove useful. Policymakers can reduce vulnerabilities, creating an environment in which the potential terrorist is persuaded not to act because he or she cannot achieve the desired effects. Understanding and analyzing threats would be important in this phase. The ESDP could help organize intra-EU intelligence sharing. The most relevant ESDP element might be the Civilian-Military Cell, which can plan the EU’s approach to assessing opponents’ intentions and creating a climate of dissuasion. Solana often cites the cell, which brings together civilian and military planners to bridge a divide that too often hampers national authorities, as a key ESDP asset. Other useful tasks include managing borders, including flows of people, goods, and services; defending vital infrastructure; and enhancing law enforcement cooperation. Potential terrorists may reside in the EU or may come from outside. The Schengen agreement, enabling the free flow of

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people among participating states, makes it very difficult to track movement within the EU. Watching who and what enters the EU becomes increasingly important. However, this is the realm of customs agents and other authorities, not the purview of the ESDP. The EU has created a new border agency, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States (FRONTEX), headquartered in Warsaw. Cooperation on border management is more likely to happen in FRONTEX than within the ESDP. Similarly, militaries, police, and even private security guards are instrumental in protecting vital infrastructure. There are channels besides the ESDP for EU support in this delicate area in which national governments guard their prerogatives. For the most part, the European Commission takes the lead for the EU in the area of “justice and home affairs,” as is the case for enhancing law enforcement cooperation. In addition, the 2004 Hague program called for greater EU cooperation in cross-border crisis management and other aspects of justice and home affairs. The EU plays an increasingly important role in cooperation with national governments, but not necessarily through the ESDP. Crisis Response and Management

The most important area in which the ESDP can contribute to transatlantic homeland security is crisis response and management. The ESDP was conceived to give the EU tools for managing security crises outside Union territory. Therefore, it is not surprising that this policy is most applicable in the crisis response and management phase. As noted above, in his March 2006 speech, High Representative Solana listed two categories of ESDP assets that can contribute to crisis response: those that enhance functional cooperation (medical aid, logistical support, and assistance with nuclear, chemical, and biological agents), and those that enhance situational awareness to help leaders manage cooperation (the EU Military Staff, the Civilian-Military Cell, the Satellite Centre, and the Situation Centre). These assets help provide analysis of the crisis (situational awareness), reliable and comparable catalogs of response capabilities, and the means to move those capabilities to the location of the crisis. ESDP mechanisms facilitate the gathering of information on member state capabilities for crisis response. ESDP assets are derived from member state contributions to the Headline Goals through the capability-pledging processes. The process could be used to create a framework for the European Union to document national assets useful for crisis management and response at home as well as beyond its territory. The ESDP contains targets for civilian as well as military assets, which is particularly relevant for homeland security requirements that need both

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types of resources. One of the most difficult areas for policymakers is determining the balance between civilian and military roles in domestic crisis response. While the United States, Canada, and all the members of the EU and NATO are liberal democracies with civilian control of the military, each recognizes that the military may have specialized assets vital to domestic response such as search and rescue personnel, special equipment for flood management or earth-moving, or large transport planes for delivering relief supplies. Yet all liberal democracies rightly have limits on how and when the military may be used in domestic situations. Disasters such as Hurricane Katrina reopened the question, in many countries, on the extent to which the military should assist with disaster relief, whether in response to human-made or natural disasters (Dalgard-Nielsen 2006; Korb 2006). In most governments, crisis response assets are divided at the national level among several ministries, such as interior, defense, and emergency management. There may also be local or regional authorities responsible for first-responders. Bringing together experts across bureaucratic lines can be difficult. Depending on leaders’ choices, EU assets could increase complexity or could help organize EU member state crisis response measures in a way that integrates civilian and military resources. Thus, ESDP mechanisms can be very useful for identifying, in advance of a disaster, which member states have what resources. Too often after a crisis, leaders scramble to understand what is happening, what relief is needed, and who can provide it. ESDP structures could be a source of relevant information to leaders when pertinent data are needed in a timely fashion. However, European leaders would need to decide in advance to augment the Headline Goals and the ESDP process with assets that help in the crisis relief process. Also, local and national leaders, who are directly responsible for disaster response, would need to be aware that resources might be available at the EU level. The fact that the ESDP is managed by the Council of the European Union, which is more directly responsible to the national governments (compared to the European Commission), means that national governments might be more inclined to use the ESDP channel. Meanwhile, the EU needs to be able to provide relevant information in a timely manner in the event of a crisis. Recovery

The European Union can also help its member states recover and rebuild after a disaster. Again, national leaders could draw on ESDP mechanisms to understand which states could offer aid. However, national governments are more likely to draw on the much larger financial resources of the European Commission for recovery aid. An important EU contribution to recovery is not tangible. Within the

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2003 European Security Strategy and other expressions of European policy is the notion of “solidarity.” The idea of a “solidarity clause” among EU member states has occasioned transatlantic tension. Most US observers do not want the notion of EU solidarity to weaken collective defense commitments under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, the concept of solidarity can express a commitment to societal security among EU member states. This commitment can help bolster the political will to provide recovery assistance to a fellow EU country. From the transatlantic perspective, this needs to be inclusive. The notion of EU solidarity should contribute to a notion of advancing security in the Euro-Atlantic region rather than an exclusivist approach, which says that member states only feel solidarity with other EU countries.

The ESDP and Other Mechanisms While this chapter focuses on the European Security and Defense Policy, this mechanism is one of a larger range of EU tools. The ESDP is under the purview of the European Council. The European Commission also has a rich array of assets that contribute to societal and homeland security, in the areas of prevention, crisis response and management, and recovery. Many different aspects of EU policy touch on preventing humanmade and natural disasters. Conflict prevention ideas are interwoven into the Council-led European Security Strategy and into European Commission projects. Human-made crises include terrorist attacks. As many analysts and officials have noted, the EU has taken several steps to try to prevent terrorism and dissuade terrorists’ potential supporters (Wilkinson 2005; Lindstrom 2005), including diplomatic efforts to expand alternatives to violence, development assistance to reduce frustration and increase the prospects of better futures for the disaffected, and constraints on terrorism financing. Meanwhile, important work in the area of justice and home affairs contributes to the significant increase in antiterrorism law enforcement cooperation within the European Union, such as the EU arrest warrant. In addition, for many in the green movement, EU efforts on climate change and environmental protection can be viewed as contributing to reducing the likelihood of “natural” disasters. From this perspective, human actions distort the environment, increasing the chances of floods, heat waves, or storms. Environmental protection is seen as forestalling an acceleration of “natural” disasters. Highlighting the security implications of transnational crises from epidemics to environmental degradation has become a distinctive component of the EU’s international action (Missiroli 2005; Elbe 2005).

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Like the European Council, the European Commission has developed several new mechanisms for crisis response and management, including civil protection and the civilian response teams, the new European Centre for Disease Control, and the Monitoring and Information Centre. The European Commission leads the Community Civil Protection Mechanisms. Civil protection is defined as “immediate relief in the first hours and days of a disaster,” which includes “search and rescue, emergency medical assistance, fire fighting, shelter, food and water” (European Commission 2005d). National governments contribute experts who work in response teams. These teams can also be deployed to help with crisis management within the European Council’s common foreign and security policy. The Monitoring and Information Centre is the hub of European Commission data collection on national civil protection instruments. It also receives information on military capabilities from the EU Military Staff’s database. The European Commission is also working on the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) to link EU and national information systems (European Commission 2005d, para. 2.2). Following the Pacific Rim tsunami crisis, the European Commission worked to enhance its own Rapid Response and Preparedness Instrument for Major Emergencies (European Commission 2005d, para. 2.1). These European Commission mechanisms, like the ESDP tools, enable leaders to develop situational awareness and to rally civilian support to respond to disasters. The European Commission has launched its Solidarity Fund to help with disaster recovery. As it noted in 2005, the Solidarity Fund builds on existing mechanisms, but expands the scope of response “from natural disasters—as before—but also industrial/technological disasters, public health emergencies and acts of terrorism” (European Commission 2005f, p. 5). Bolstering public health emergency response tools supports homeland security and the physical side of societal security (Brimmer 2006, p. 36). These European Council and European Commission measures need to be seen as a whole. The EU can provide a useful level of action, but, as in other areas, must try to integrate capacities housed in different parts of the Union. Swedish security analyst Bengt Sundelius describes the EU as the “intermestic” layer linking the transborder elements of domestic and international security (2005a, p. 68).

The ESDP and Transatlantic Societal Security The transatlantic community is bound together by a complex web of economic, political, social, security, and defense ties. Companies on both sides of the Atlantic invest in each other’s countries, pushing globalization in this

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region faster and deeper than in any other. Transatlantic homeland security must protect these vital links. The EU is a pillar of transatlantic societal security. EU mechanisms help sustain both physical protection and social cohesion. From the transatlantic perspective, Americans need Europeans to be partners on the full range of actions—prevention, crisis response and management, and recovery. The EU’s unique mix of assets could make it a key player in EuroAtlantic homeland security. Yet it is still finding its role. As both Antonio Missiroli and Bengt Sundelius explain, there is significant overlap among EU institutions in dealing with crises, potentially undermining effectiveness (Missiroli 2005; Sundelius 2005a). Both the European Council’s ESDP and the European Commission’s civil protection policies seek to rally EU assets on disaster response. On the one hand, the EU and its member states need to decide how they want to organize intermestic homeland security on the eastern side of the Atlantic. On the other hand, crisis management remains a national-level, not an EU-level, issue. Primary responsibility resides in the particular country, but can be augmented by the intermestic institutions. Still, leaders need to choose which functions they want handled by the European Council and which by the European Commission. It is not yet clear whether the multiplicity of institutions will create beneficial layered response or wasteful overlap. The challenge is to advance homeland security cooperation at the intermestic level without undermining classic territorial defense. Most Americans believe that among international bodies, NATO is best placed to continue to provide territorial defense in the Euro-Atlantic area. Over the decades, NATO militaries have established a system of rules, exchanges, joint projects, and habits of interaction that keep open clear channels among allies. After Hurricane Katrina, some NATO militaries were able to use the well-maintained links to facilitate aid to the United States. Providing aid to the United States was not easy, as the latter was more accustomed to sending instead of receiving assistance. Still, creative use of existing informal and formal connections facilitated European aid to the United States after this disaster (Richard 2006). In the new security environment, first-responders may need to request aid from another country. Properly revamped, existing alliance relationships could open channels for real aid to real people in a timely manner. NATO mechanisms, in cooperation with foreign ministries, could provide the links between local responders and international actors with relevant expertise and equipment. The United States has a voting seat at the table, making NATO a more attractive organization in which to work. US policymakers have tended to see NATO as a military alliance complemented by the North Atlantic Council as a forum for political-military discussion. Some European lead-

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ers focus on NATO as a military grouping and the EU as an expression of security. At first glance, transatlantic societal security seems set to stage another round of the debate about NATO-EU relations. Yet the exigencies of antiterrorism organization have made some US policymakers more interested in practicality than political theology. They want to know about the availability of assets to help the United States prevent or respond to crises in the Euro-Atlantic region. This spirit has infused US-EU law enforcement cooperation, which improved markedly following September 11. Homeland security could follow a similar pattern. Societal security makes the United States interested in the EU’s “functional security” and the intermestic level. This notion blends the international and domestic. Much of the EU’s new societal defense and security activities occur in this space. Indeed, the solidarity clause makes sense as a way to express the bond at this level. The concept of solidarity is both potentially powerful and perplexing. The idea creates a security link among EU member states. Non-Union NATO allies have been concerned that this commitment could undermine Article 5, the collective defense provision of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, enlarging our understanding of security shows that the notion of solidarity could bolster efforts to build transatlantic security. In the post–September 11 atmosphere, US policymakers have come to understand that the European Union can help law enforcement and other forms of antiterrorism cooperation. The EU arrest warrant and the US-EU extradition treaties are examples. If solidarity means faster EU-wide implementation of antiterrorism measures and greater willingness to help fellow member states reduce vulnerabilities, then US policymakers may be more likely to accept the notion of EU solidarity within the transatlantic sphere.

Conclusion The principal contributions of the European Security and Defense Policy to transatlantic homeland security lie in two areas: crisis response and management, and integration of civilian and military resources. Building on these assets would enhance the EU’s unique role in homeland and overall societal security. US policymakers’ increased interest in practical EU measures to support international homeland security could make them more accepting of the ESDP in this area. To the extent that Washington sees the ESDP as enhancing “security,” whether homeland or societal, it is more likely to be in agreement. This approach combines a post–September 11 practicality with a modern manifestation of traditional US support for the European Union as an intra-European security measure resolving historical animosities.

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As long as the European Union is working on societal or homeland security, it is less likely to encounter transatlantic storms. However, as it tries to move closer to the classic defense of the territory of the North Atlantic countries, it will encounter greater resistance from Washington. Multilateral cooperation on territorial defense is still the purview of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Moreover, if the United States wants to engage Europeans on defense, it will begin in NATO. To the extent that military assets are needed to support intra-European civilian crisis response, the ESDP could have a greater role. However, the ESDP will need to be coordinated with the numerous European Commission civil protection programs. In a transatlantic context, the discussion of military assets and homeland security will draw in NATO. The connections among homeland, societal, and international security are evolving. This is a new policy area without deeply entrenched habits; perhaps there is scope to forge a new relationship between the ESDP and NATO resources as everyone grapples with how to meet the demands of safeguarding the transatlantic community.

Note I thank Medlir Mema and Carrie Schenkel for their research assistance.

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The Impact of Eastward Enlargement

PART 2

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Poland: Empowering or Undercutting EU Collective Security?

5

Kerry Longhurst

THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 2004 TO TEN NEW

members, including eight former communist states from Central Europe, has had an indelible effect on a range of EU policy areas and institutions. In the sphere of foreign and security policy, the new members from Central Europe brought into the EU a strong attachment to the notion of national sovereignty, a desire to continue and extend the enlargement process, and last but not least, a fervent Atlanticist perspective based on the belief that the United States remains the ultimate guarantor of Europe’s security. As the largest (by far) of the recent newcomers and the sixth largest member state in the enlarged EU, Poland was almost predestined to have a more noticeable role in the realm of foreign policy compared with the other new member states from the region—a singularity that showed itself already in the context of the accession process. Moreover, Poland’s brand of Atlanticism, its hard-nosed approach to Russia, and its commitment to bring Ukraine closer to Europe, were all characteristics that made it abundantly clear that Poland’s EU entry was of consequence and could be expected to have a particular impact upon the EU’s foreign and security policy profile (Zaborowski and Longhurst 2007). For all of these reasons, any review of the implications of enlargement for the EU’s foreign and security policy arguably cannot proceed without a full consideration of Polish perspectives. Since gaining independence in 1989, and acquiring NATO membership in 1999, Poland has consistently demonstrated that it will not be a bystander in matters relating to Euro-Atlantic security, but will seek to influence and shape institutions and policies. To this end, as well as supporting US policy in Afghanistan and Iraq, Warsaw has been a keen con63

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tributor to collective peacekeeping missions both inside and beyond Europe’s borders, including the EU-led mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Poland has also sought to play the role of “regional leader” by acting as chief advocate of reforms in Eastern Europe and particularly in support of Ukraine’s anchorage in the West, including its membership in NATO and the EU. Finally, unlike most other EU newcomers, who reformed their defense sectors to develop a niche specialization, Poland sought to maintain a large armed force equipped with wide-ranging military capacities. Several “drivers” or core assumptions lie behind and guide contemporary Polish strategic thinking. Importantly, these assumptions are underpinned by a robust domestic consensus, which continues to endure despite the almost record-breaking number of governments since the end of communism (Zaborowski and Longhurst 2007): • A strong determination on the part of successive post-1989 Polish governments not to be treated as a second-class EU member state. To have a stake in decisions which affect Poland’s security and to be taken seriously as a middle-ranking EU power and to have its voice heard; • The view that national sovereignty remains sacrosanct, a stance that feeds into a vision of European integration advancing in the direction of a Europe of nation-states; • A belief in the utility of the use of force in international relations and the need to back up economic and political tools by the threat of military power; • A consensus on the role of the United States as Europe’s ultimate security guarantor, a traditional NATO-first stance matched by a rather skeptical approach toward Europe’s capacities in the security and military domain; • An uncompromising approach toward Russia based on realpolitik, and heavily laden with history; • A desire to stabilize and bring closer to Europe the former Soviet States in Poland’s eastern milieu, a fundamental priority which gives rise to a strongly proenlargement posture within the EU.

The European Union as a Security Actor: The Emergence of a Polish Perspective Since Poland embarked on the road to EU membership in the early 1990s, both the international environment and the EU have been transformed. One of the most far-reaching and consequential aspects of this transformation was the gradual emergence of the European Union as a foreign and security policy actor. For Poland this development has not always been easy to take in. In the accession process the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy chapter was closed quickly and easily with all Central European states, Poland included (Dehaene and Dunay 2001, p. 11; Cameron and

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Primatarova 2003; Duke 2004). However, as the foreign policy role of the EU became more ambitious at the end of the 1990s, the CFSP and the nascent ESDP were to become contentious issues in the context of enlargement. The Skepticism of an Outsider

In the early stages of ESDP development and prior to EU enlargement in 2004, Poland was preoccupied with its status as an “outsider.” Its approach toward the ESDP project was also overtly skeptical because of its Atlanticist credentials. Thus, while Warsaw wanted to enter the decisionmaking domain, Polish policy overall remained less than enthusiastic about the ESDP. Like other Central European states, Poland saw the functions of NATO and the EU inflexibly at this time, as contained in discrete “boxes.” In one box NATO performed the task of delivering hard security guarantees, while in another box the EU delivered on the political, social, and economic aspects of foreign and security policy (Dehaene and Dunay 2001). Given this context, Poland was not enthused when the functions of the EU began to transform and, as it seemed, encroach on the remit of the alliance. At the same time, however, with EU enlargement on the horizon, Poland and the other soon-to-be member states did not want to be in a position where they were seen to overtly challenge the ESDP, and therefore the EU, head on, and thus tried to steer the evolution of the ESDP according to Atlanticist preferences (Dehaene and Dunay 2001, p. 20). When NATO enlarged in March 1999, it seemed that the days of exclusion for Central Europeans from core decisions in European security were finally over. However, only three months later it appeared that this was to be reversed when, against the backdrop of the war in Kosovo, the Cologne European Council articulated plans to create an autonomous ESDP as the military arm of the CFSP. Initially the ESDP would have “consulted” the non-EU European NATO states, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey, but essentially would have “excluded” them from the decisionmaking process. Unsurprisingly, Poland was troubled and unconvinced, echoing the kind of concerns held by the Bill Clinton administration (“no decoupling, no duplication, and no discrimination”). While Helsinki marked significant progress in the realization of the EU’s security ambitions, it also served to exacerbate the concerns of the six non-EU European NATO member states. Although at the conclusion of the Cologne European Council summit it was stressed that they would be able to contribute militarily to EU crisis management missions, this formula lacked any real decisionmaking implications and thus kept the six at a distance. Furthermore, the summit did not differentiate between the six and Russia and Ukraine; the notion that Russia should have an equal say in European security was clearly always going to be unacceptable to Poland and other former Soviet satellite states. This impasse was not tackled until

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the Feira European Council summit in June 2000, at which time Poland put forward a proposal for the fuller involvement of the six in the ESDP. Supported by the United Kingdom, most of Poland’s proposals were subsequently agreed to, and as a result, modalities for “15 + 6” discussions were created with the express purpose of discussing ESDP issues between EU member states and the non-EU European NATO members. Despite this development, the Polish perspective toward the ESDP continued to be reserved and to be guided by both a “NATO-first” policy and the drive to avoid discrimination. Becoming America’s Protégé

It seemed to be of little consequence to Warsaw when both the EU’s ambitions to become a security actor and NATO as platform for collective action fell foul to US unilateralism in the war on terror; indeed, Poland emerged as one of the key allies of the United States after the attacks of September 11 (Financial Times 2001). Polish support for US policy, and its flip side, the resolve to limit development of the ESDP, were further strengthened by the subsequent efforts of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France to take forward a coordinated agenda for the EU to respond to the events of September 11 (The Economist 2001). Although this initiative eventually ran aground, the notion of an exclusive Western European directoire stealing the EU foreign policy agenda was unacceptable to the Poles and helped reaffirm Polish Atlanticism, and ultimately bolstered Warsaw’s resolve to join the US-led “coalition of the willing.” When the US administration shifted its focus toward Iraq and regime change, Warsaw’s policy remained consistent with that of Washington.1 Polish policy toward Iraq essentially flowed from the belief at the heart of Polish thinking that the United States remained the ultimate guarantor of Poland’s security (Wagrowska 2004). Consequently, in the context of the emerging transatlantic and intra-European rift in the run-up to the war, Poland sided with the United States and expressed this view alongside others in the “letter of the eight” of January 2003 (Statement of the Eight Heads of State 2003). Followed in quick succession by the “letter of the ten,” these statements affirmed transatlantic solidarity between the signatories and the United States, helped endorse the US route to war in Iraq, and essentially appeared to unseat the Franco-German motor as the traditional driving force behind EU foreign policy. After Iraq: The Growing Relevance of the European Union

The diminution of multilateral forums and the lack of a coherent European voice after 2001 seemed to expose the impotence of EU foreign policy,

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calling into question the whole ESDP project. Moreover, early initiatives led by France and Germany to regroup and take the ESDP forward did not initially inspire broad support from across the EU, and only served to entrench the prevailing “old/new Europe” divide. From a Polish point of view, the idea of establishing a collective defense alliance within the EU through “closer cooperation”—as proposed by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg in April 2003—was unacceptable. Similarly unacceptable was the notion of “structured cooperation,” which was believed to be a Franco-German attempt to sideline the pro-US new EU member states by establishing military criteria they could never hope to meet. However, paradoxically perhaps, given the general disarray at this time, from around May 2003 the ESDP was taken forward in significant ways and began to cohere through EU-led military deployments and the formulation of the European Security Strategy. Crucially, on many of these developments and innovations, Polish policy came around to an increasingly positive and constructive disposition. A range of mutually reinforcing factors contributed to this emerging change in the Polish posture. First, the experience of Iraq and the sense that, despite standing by the United States, there were to be no substantial material or political rewards for Poland for participating in the campaign, undermined Warsaw’s earlier confidence. Second, Poland’s proximity to the EU was drawing closer. As membership came into view, Poland’s previous skepticism toward the ESDP, which was a direct result of its “outsider” status, began to alter. Third, the ESDP was being proved in action—a development that contributed to a change in Polish perspectives. Whereas at its inception the ESDP remained largely declaratory, an ambition with still-undefined priorities, over the course of 2003 it became clearer what type of foreign and security policy actor the EU could become.2 An upshot of this was that in Warsaw, as well as in other Central European capitals, the functions of NATO and the EU were no longer viewed in terms of distinct “boxes,” as had been the case a few years earlier. Importantly, the growing relevance of EU security policy in the face of rising concerns over Iraq in Poland brought into focus the significant overlap and blurring of functions that was now occurring between the roles of NATO and the EU. A Less Hard-Nosed Type of Skepticism

As Olaf Osica (2002) points out, Poland’s policy toward Iraq was a high point or “crossroads” in Polish Atlanticism. Subsequently, a reappraisal began to occur in Warsaw, like in many other European capitals, which led to a willingness to set about improving Europe’s collective capacities and voice in security matters. Alongside the proliferation of EU-led missions, the institutional elabo-

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ration of the ESDP was being taken forward in the context of the Convention on the Future of Europe. While disagreements over Iraq were threatening to dismember EU foreign policy, the convention was debating how to organize the CFSP/ESDP in the face of the forthcoming enlargement. In the early phase of convention deliberations in 2002, the contributions from Polish governmental and parliamentary representatives to the CFSP and defense working groups reflected constant themes in Polish foreign policy, namely that the ESDP should not be developed to rival NATO, but rather as an “inclusive” entity allowing equality for all participating states. Poland was particularly forthcoming in the CFSP area and supported all major initiatives put forward by Jean-Luc Dehaene’s working group, including the idea of a “double-hatted” foreign minister with enhanced authority and a foot in the European Council and the European Commission. Warsaw also supported the notion of empowering the EU with a legal personality and establishing an EU diplomatic service (Huebner 2003). Finally, in opposition to many other candidate states, Warsaw also endorsed the idea of developing an EU security strategy (Cameron and Primatarova 2003). In the context of Michel Barnier’s working group on the ESDP, Warsaw’s position was more mixed. The idea that NATO should remain the dominant security institution in Europe prevailed, while at the same time Polish delegates supported the enhancement of the EU’s autonomous planning capacities and backed the British proposal to install a European planning cell at the NATO headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe [SHAPE]) in Mons, Belgium. Poland also supported the creation of an EU armament and research agency and the inclusion of a mutual defense clause and a solidarity clause; however, some reservations emerged in the context of discussions concerning the idea of enhanced cooperation. Significantly, there was a clear recognition among the Polish convention delegates that the EU needed its own defense capabilities, which, although complementary with NATO, should be capable of deployment autonomously of the United States (Cameron and Primatarova 2003). The growing embrace of the CFSP and ESDP by Poland was apparent with regard to the 2003 European Security Strategy. The reception of this strategy demonstrated a discernible shift, as noted above, from skepticism to a realization that the EU could be a credible security actor. In particular, it was the combination of political role and economic carrot without neglecting the importance of the military stick that appealed to Warsaw. The Poles were also satisfied with what appeared to be the prospect of the EU becoming a global actor and not shying away from international activity, including the use of force. In fact, a view in Poland prevailed that the provisions envisaging the use of force should be strengthened, thus potentially disengaging EU action from a UN Security Council mandate. Warsaw

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also pushed, unsuccessfully, for the inclusion of a separate paragraph on transatlantic relations (Osica 2004). No Longer an Outsider

Poland’s weary attitude toward the idea of flexible or enhanced cooperation among a group of bigger member states began to evolve as soon as it realized it could actually become one of the “ins.” Iraq had demonstrated that Poland could play in Europe’s “first league”; with Poland now a fully fledged EU member state, its anxieties of being an outsider began to melt away. Meanwhile, some older member states came to see Warsaw as a natural member of a European avant-garde. Together, these factors prompted a turnabout in Poland’s attitude toward the idea of structured/enhanced cooperation, with expectations being voiced that Poland should be among the elite group of member states taking the EU forward. Poland also welcomed the European Council’s suggestion to create battle groups, and teamed up with Germany to form a joint battle group (with indications that the group would likely be joined by Slovakia, offering 200–300 troops). However, Poland’s ability and desire to “play with the big boys” may be limited in the longer term because of the country’s size and relative economic weakness. With just under 40 million inhabitants, Poland is the biggest new member state; however, in the context of an EU of twentyseven members it is barely a medium-size power. Furthermore, as one of the new member states from eastern Central Europe, Poland is also poor, and because of this Warsaw will continue to opt for a larger budget for the EU— a stance that conflicts with the (older) richer and bigger member states. This combination of Poland’s size and its economic disadvantage also means that, unlike the big four, Poland is not a “natural intergovernmentalist,” nor necessarily a fervent supporter of a stronger Council of Ministers. Poland’s aptitude to play in the EU’s top league is also dependent on its military capabilities and capacity to reform its armed forces. So far, Poland lacks the necessary strategic airlift capacities that are needed for it to act as a “framework nation” in EU missions. Although the number of Polish troops based in Iraq and other parts of the world is considerable by European standards, in most cases Poland relies on other countries’ transport capacities.3 Shaping the Eastern Milieu In line with the “drivers” of Polish security thinking identified earlier, Polish foreign and security policy has placed an immense amount of political capital and resources into pursuing the objective of stabilizing Poland’s eastern neighborhood. There are three core components of Poland’s eastern

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policy: relations with its near neighbors (especially Ukraine), the further enlargement of the EU, and relations with Russia. Anchoring the East in the West

The regional role that Warsaw has attempted to carve out eastward is what distinguishes Polish policy from that of virtually all other former communist states in Europe. As such, Poland’s strengths in this area represent a major asset in Warsaw’s bid for the status of major European power. As already noted, Poland has played a particularly active role in supporting Ukraine’s integration with the EU and its inclusion in various regional institutions, such as the Central European Initiative, the Central European Free Trade Area, and the regular meetings of Central European presidents. Poland has also sought to nurture a more active EU approach toward Belarus and Moldova, and to this end proposed the establishment of an EU eastern dimension as early as 1998 (Cimoszewicz 2003). The Polish government repeated this call in a nonpaper on eastern policy in December 2002 that outlined the idea of creating a “European space of political and economic cooperation within a wider Europe” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 2002). The proposal favored the introduction of conditionality as part of the EU’s relations with Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. And depending on their progress in domestic reforms and democracy building, the proposal spoke about the desirability of completing association agreements with the Eastern European nations covered by the European Neighborhood Policy. It was also argued in the paper that, in the future, the EU should recognize the “European choice” of Ukraine and actually offer it the prospect of membership. Poland’s efforts at promoting the Europeanization of its eastern environment have not, however, found an equally passionate response in Brussels. Most member states (the only exceptions being Lithuania and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom and Sweden) have not, thus far, supported the further integration of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova with the EU. Ukraine

An independent and pro-Western Ukraine is the most important priority of Poland’s policy toward its eastern neighborhood. Although Poland’s Ukrainian policy appeared to be a success by 2005, in the sense that Kiev appeared to be on a pro-Western course, this has not always been the case, nor is it certain that this trend will endure. The initial postcommunist period in Polish-Ukrainian relations was full of declarations in favor of developing a “special relationship.” Polish president Lech Walesa routinely referred to the famous words of Josef

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Pilsudski—“Without an independent Ukraine, there cannot be an independent Poland”—while Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk stated in one of his first addresses that cooperation with Poland was more important for Ukraine than its relations with Russia. However, little action ensued and until 1994 both states remained more preoccupied with Russia than with each other (Wolczuk 2003, pp. 144–145). This situation started to change in the mid-1990s. With Poland’s NATO membership secured and its EU membership being only a question of time, Warsaw could focus on developing a true regional niche for itself and closer relations with Ukraine was the most obvious way to begin. At the same time, Ukraine ended its pariah status by signing a trilateral agreement with Russia and the United States that led to its denuclearization and also enabled Poland to pursue a more active policy toward Kiev. The outcome was intensive bilateral cooperation and Poland’s lobbying in favor of securing Ukraine’s ties with Central European institutions, widely perceived as a first step toward integration with the EU. Close cooperation also emerged in the military field with the establishment in 1995 of a joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion (POLUKRBAT) comprising the Ukrainian Mechanized Border Regiment and the Polish Fourteenth Brigade (Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland 2003). Trade exchange between Poland and Ukraine rose sixfold between 1992 and 1997, and Kiev and Warsaw also began looking into the prospect of constructing a pipeline to transport Caspian oil to Poland and farther west. Finally, just as Poland joined NATO, Warsaw successfully lobbied for the strengthening of Kiev’s ties with the Atlantic Alliance, which eventually came in the form of the Ukraine-NATO Charter, signed in Madrid in July 1997 (NATO 1997). Such successes in the mid-1990s were followed, however, by a period of uncertainty. While Poland was consolidating its domestic reforms and integrating with NATO and the EU, Ukraine continued to pursue a policy of balancing between Russia and the West, progressively favoring the former over the latter. During Leonid Kuchma’s second term, Ukraine’s economic reforms were stymied. Even more worrying was the growth of authoritarianism and human rights violations. In September 2000, Kuchma was accused by former bodyguard Mykola Melnychenko of engineering the assassination of antiestablishment journalist Georgiy Gongadze. At the same time, allegations were made that Ukraine was breaking the terms of the United Nations embargo by selling arms to Iraq (Rzeczpospolita 2002c). As a consequence, Poland was faced with the choice of either cutting its relations with Kiev or continuing working with Kuchma, thus risking a rift in its relations with the European Union and the United States. Eventually, after consulting Brussels and Washington, Poland acted as facilitator between the Kuchma regime and the Ukrainian opposition, with the aim of bringing about a peaceful change of guard in Kiev. To this end a

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conference, “Ukraine in Europe,” was organized in Warsaw in October 2002, which brought together the Ukrainian government and opposition as well as the High Representative for the EU, Javier Solana (Rzeczpospolita 2002a, 2002b). Washington’s reconciliation with Kiev was also enhanced through the contribution of 1,500 Ukrainian troops to the Polish-led stabilization force in Iraq. Crucially, however, as long as Kuchma remained in power, Ukraine’s relations with Poland and the West, in general, remained ambivalent. The Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” of November–December 2004 brought Poland back as a key player in Eastern Europe. Poland’s involvement in bringing about a peaceful solution was of great significance. Individual Polish politicians, including former president Lech Walesa, traveled to Kiev to support the pro–Viktor Yushchenko camp and speak at demonstrations. At the same time, then-president Aleksander Kwasniewski used his contacts with Kuchma to secure his permission for international mediation. Subsequently, Kwasniewski won over EU High Representative Javier Solana, who was initially reluctant to engage, and also convinced French and German leaders to support the mission (Financial Times 2004b). According to his own account, the Polish president also played a role in stopping the march of pro–Viktor Yanukovich miners, which was likely to lead to violence (Polityka 2004). In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Polish-Ukrainian relations were in better shape than ever. The new Ukrainian government was strongly oriented toward integration with the West, and set on ending its dependence on Russia. Poland emerged as the major supporter of Kiev’s proWestern orientation and established itself as the most consistent and most outspoken advocate of Ukraine’s EU membership (Financial Times 2004a). Poland’s role vis-à-vis Ukraine enhanced Warsaw’s international status considerably, and within the EU Poland is arguably perceived as a state with an ability to shape its regional milieu. There are, however, at least two major caveats regarding the further strengthening of Warsaw’s bridging role vis-à-vis Kiev. One of the main reasons why Poland is an attractive partner for Ukraine is Warsaw’s position in the EU and its advocacy of Kiev’s integration with the EU. However, in the current antienlargement climate there is little appetite in the EU for taking in Ukraine, even from a long-term perspective. Poland’s influence and position vis-à-vis Ukraine would be affected should this situation endure. Second, there is a price to pay for Poland’s involvement eastward. Poland’s role in the Orange Revolution led to a deterioration of relations with Russia, with serious economic implications. The Orange Revolution also provoked some nervous reactions in those states in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that remain authoritarian; Belarus was quick to point the finger at Poland as a major “stirrer” in the region.

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As a state that has only recently gone through a transition, and has a history of domination in the area, Poland is limited in its means and suitability for democracy promotion in its eastern milieu. Realizing this, Poland sought to internationalize its agenda and to secure the support of the European Union and the United States. So far the United States has proven far more responsive to calls from Poland, and it is clear that Warsaw’s and Washington’s views on the future development of the CIS are in harmony. Yet Warsaw is aware that the EU is actually better suited to turn Ukraine as well as Belarus around and put them on the path to democracy. In order to achieve this, though, the Polish position holds that the EU has to be prepared to mobilize its most powerful tool: the promise of actual membership. Enlarging the European Union

The issue of enlarging the European Union beyond Romania and Bulgaria is an entrenched dividing line among the current membership and has, after the stalling of the constitutional process, become a highly contentious issue. The year 2005 witnessed calls from some member states for a complete halt to the enlargement process, while for others the breakdown of the constitutional ratification process was a chance for renewal and expansion. From a Polish perspective, the collapse of the constitution presented an opportunity to press ahead with the enlargement agenda and to bring a larger number of states into the enlargement dynamic. The question of whether or not to enlarge, as currently framed, has become inextricably wrapped up in the broader question of the future of European integration, arguably in a far more fundamental way than ever before. The established categories of “deepening versus widening,” which provided the discursive framework for the most recent and previous enlargements, have been supplanted by deliberations based on whether a state qualifies as being “European,” and whether an integration “end-point” needs to be set to delimit the future size and scope of the EU. This is of particular consequence for Poland as a frontline EU state with a consistently far-reaching and ambitious proenlargement policy. Poland’s enlargement policy flows from a vision of the EU as a dynamic and open entity, coupled with the need, as discussed above, to build a more ambitious EU eastern policy and to bring EU-Russian relations onto a more concrete footing. Previous Polish foreign minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz set out the official and sustained position of the Polish government toward EU enlargement in September 2004: “Europe should not be perceived exclusively in its geographical aspect, we are not just dealing with a single continent—but rather with a group of states sharing the same values and wanting to work for common goals. Poland wants EU enlarge-

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ment to continue and be treated as a priority in the future. The European Union must send out a strong message that it is open to further integration” (quoted in EU-25 Watch 2004, p. 115). This position (which continues to be upheld by the current Polish government) means that Poland is perhaps the most vociferous and passionate proenlargement member state in the current EU. Poland’s adept diplomacy and high-profile role during and after the Ukrainian Orange Revolution certainly helped bring Kiev more centrally onto the EU’s radar than was the case hitherto. Polish diplomacy was also influential in bringing German perspectives around to a more positive posture. Although German policy stops short of actually advocating Ukraine’s EU membership, a prevailing view in Berlin is that, compared with Turkey, which should not be considered for EU membership, Ukraine does at least qualify as being European and “one of us.” By all accounts, however, and as already noted, there is no real appetite beyond Poland and Lithuania for Ukrainian membership in the EU.

Conclusion One of the key questions posed by this book concerns the effects of enlargement of the European Union on EU foreign and security policy perspectives and capacities, and, in turn, the effects of this enlargement on transatlantic security relations. The 2004 enlargement of the EU brought into the EU foreign and security policy agenda a large number of states with new and more diverse policy priorities. Poland is a prime example of a new NATO and EU member that brought in novel perspectives and concerns and, importantly, has already made an impact. It is also accurate to say that proximity to and eventual membership in the EU have also shaped Polish perspectives and policies. In the context of acceding to the EU, Polish security policy became increasingly “Europeanized.” Whereas Polish perspectives toward the ESDP were overtly critical while Poland was an outsider, in the run-up to enlargement Poland had moved from being a “critical observer” to “prudent participant” in the ESDP (Osica 2004), and had begun to make the shift from being “America’s protégé” to resembling something closer to a constructive European state. Poland’s interests eastward contributed to the changing Polish attitude toward the CFSP. Warsaw is aware that without the intervention of High Representative Javier Solana, the outcome of the crisis in Ukraine could have been very different and quite contrary to what Poland desired. Similarly, aware of its own weakness vis-à-vis Moscow, Warsaw has also long called for a common EU approach toward Russia. The current situation of France and Germany pursuing bilateral coalitions

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with Russia, and striking deals over issues affecting the security of Poland and other new member states, has been a major factor in convincing Warsaw that a more coherent and more centralized CFSP is indeed in its interest. The same logic applies to Poland’s enlargement policy and its priority of keeping the enlargement dynamic alive. In this area, Warsaw is pushing hard for a bolstering of the European Commission’s role as the chief player in the enlargement sphere. The points above notwithstanding, on balance, Polish policy remains predicated on a NATO-first standpoint and the firm belief in the vitality of the transatlantic relationship more broadly. When EU and NATO enlargements shifted the center of gravity of the transatlantic relationship eastward, and in doing so reinvigorated Atlanticism, Poland made a considerable contribution to this shift. Though it is accurate to say that Polish Atlanticism is “on the move” and increasingly cautious of US unilateralism, Warsaw’s attachment to Washington remains quite solid, and the Kaczynski government continued to pursue Poland’s entry into the US missile defense system as the “key European partner” of the United States (Guardian Online 2005). The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 brought in strategic priorities, conceptions of sovereignty, attitudes to the use of military force, and perceptions of the role of the United States in European affairs that in many ways differed from the assumptions held by many existing EU member states. Using Poland as an example to appraise the effects of these factors on the Euro-Atlantic security agenda reveals a mixed picture. Enlargement in 2004 has had the effect of substantially expanding the European Union’s CFSP objectives, especially by bringing an “eastern front” to the agenda. The new members, including Poland, have also “Europeanized” their perspectives in a number of areas, a change that should help enable the EU to further institutionalize its CFSP/ESDP. At the same time, through enlargement, Atlanticism has also been empowered, thus leading to an amplification of the traditional and long-standing divide between Europeanists and Atlanticists.

Notes 1. Developments between the two countries since Afghanistan had bound Polish foreign policy even closer to that of the United States when at the end of 2002 the US Congress approved a loan of US$3.8 billion for Poland to purchase forty-eight F-16 military aircraft from Lockheed Martin (New York Times 2003). 2. The EU became engaged in three missions in 2003—in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and the Democratic Republic of Congo—and Polish troops were involved in each case. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, an EU-led police mission, launched in January 2003, took

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over from the UN International Police Task Force and aimed at establishing local law enforcement capabilities to aid the stabilization of the region. The Polish contribution amounted to twelve police officers, roughly equivalent to the Greek and Danish contributions. In FYROM, at the end of March 2003, the EU launched its first-ever military mission, Operation Concordia, which took over from NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony. Led by France as the “framework nation” and utilizing NATO assets and capabilities, Concordia was the first and successful test case of the “Berlin Plus” agreement. Again, Polish troops were present, numbering seventeen, on a par with Spanish and Swedish contributions. The third mission of 2003 was Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This short mission, again led by the French, was significant because it took the EU outside Europe and its periphery, demonstrating that the Union could “go global” but also that the United Nations now viewed the Union as a serious security actor. Although arguably controversial, limited in scope, and heavily reliant on the leadership of a larger “older” EU state as well as NATO assets, the ESDP missions in 2003 represented a breakthrough and have been followed up by further EU deployments involving both EU and third states. 3. According to opinion polls in 2004, 41 percent of the Poles were in favor of increasing defense spending, by far the highest such proportion in Europe (next in line was the United Kingdom, registering 28 percent) (Transatlantic Trends 2004).

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The Czech Republic: Searching for a Balanced Profile

6

Radek Khol

ON MAY 1, 2004, THE CZECH REPUBLIC TOGETHER WITH SEVEN

other states in Central and Eastern Europe entered the European Union and successfully completed the major strategic goal it had pursued since the Velvet Revolution of November 1989—full membership in both NATO and the EU. However, in some respects it joined a different organization than to which it applied. The EU had evolved into a more robust actor on the international scene, with particular focus on enhancing its security and military capabilities and structures within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy. This chapter analyzes how the Czech Republic perceives and is adjusting to this development, and how it may influence the direction the EU is taking in international affairs, with particular attention to relations between the European Union and the United States. The Czech Republic was seen as part of the “new” Europe supporting US policies and visions more wholeheartedly than the rest of the Continent. For the US audience, in particular, it was for some time convenient to look for and stress similarities across the group of new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe, especially among those with the most visible profile and potential to contribute in political and military terms—the Visegrad countries that pioneered the way by joining NATO in March 1999 (for a group analysis of Visegrad countries, see Stastny 2002; Khol 2003c). Yet the very fact of EU membership, combined with the recent experience of adjusting to and aligning with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy actions, affected the foreign and security policy profiles of all of these Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic. While there are clear and important similarities among the Central and Eastern European countries that have acceded to the EU, this group is far 77

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from homogeneous. A thorough analysis must therefore look into the individual characteristics and interplay of domestic factors that distinguish each (for a comprehensive analysis of foreign and security policy preferences shared by these new EU member states, see Missiroli 2002a, 2004–2005; Dunay, Sedivy, and Saryusz-Wolski 2002; Sedivy 2004). In the Czech case, these include the basic structure of the political system, party preferences toward main issues of European policy, consensus-based versus fragmented approaches of major players, and historical factors. Also in the Czech case, the ESDP is a divisive issue for political parties. A consensusbased foreign policy regarding this matter was long sought and carefully crafted. Yet some major objections concerning direction, scope, and limits of the ESDP vis-à-vis NATO remain within the major right-wing opposition party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Czech policy in this area could be revisited with a new government. The accession of new member states like the Czech Republic will also have implications for the EU’s external projection (Balfour 2005; Rasmussen 2005). These new EU members contribute to more complex decisionmaking and plurality of interests with a need for balancing them (the Balkans and Africa, for example), and have already shown that they intend not to be just passive recipients of policies and deals by EU great powers. At the same time, they also affect the EU toolbox, bringing specific knowledge of specific regions (the Balkans, Eastern Europe), countries, and reform processes, together with a willingness to contribute their resources and assets (civilian, military, nongovernmental). The Czech Republic certainly belongs to those EU member countries that articulate their views and actively contribute to shaping the international security situation. Being a member of both NATO and the EU will offer it further opportunities, a solid strategic bedrock to build upon, as well as a guiding institutional framework (primarily through NATO’s Strategic Concept and the European Security Strategy). These institutions also act as important frameworks for initiating and facilitating concrete cooperation toward enhancing various crisis management capabilities on both bilateral and multilateral bases (through initiatives such as the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the European Capabilities Action Plan, NATO’s response force [NRF], and the EU’s battle groups).

The Czech Approach to the ESDP and Transatlantic Relations Since its inception in 1993 (upon creation of the Czech Republic, following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia), Czech foreign and security policy followed two constant themes: EU membership and NATO membership. In the

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security domain, NATO, through its collective defense function and involvement of the United States, was regarded as a primary guarantor of Czech security, while the EU acted as a major institution for economic cooperation and was therefore not seen as a direct competitor. The emergence of the ESDP in 1999 in many ways complicated the original Czech expectations about a clear division of roles between the EU and NATO in foreign, security, and defense policy areas. The simple model of complementarity and noncompetitive cooperation between the EU and NATO, and the gradual merging of the Western European Union into the EU while serving as a bridge toward NATO, significantly changed the strategic positions of both organizations and the Czech approach toward them (Khol 2004c). The Czech Republic was surprised by the rapid development of the ESDP into a major issue on the EU agenda during 1999. It was not only digesting its first experience of full NATO membership, but was also struggling with the side-effects of the Kosovo air campaign, which challenged the official security policy discourse in the republic and caused a deep split among the political elites and the public. The Czech Republic’s first formative experience with the ESDP was as an outsider (which, paradoxically, ran parallel with and contrasted the hopes of the new Czech membership in NATO), but it eventually achieved an insider position on major security issues (Khol 2002; Khol and Handl 2002). Being aware of its rather weak institutional position in the entire framework of the Euro-Atlantic debate on the ESDP, Czech policy understandably focused primarily on the issue of participation for non-EU European allies inside the ESDP, and the role of the alliance in general (Sedivy 2001). The Czech Republic’s institutional status—being a full NATO member, but only an EU candidate—influenced its basic policy approach toward the ESDP for several years to come. NATO membership was no doubt fundamental for the Czech Republic in shaping its security policy thinking and priorities, and in reforming its armed forces (Sedivy and Lunak 1998). Its experience with the process of NATO enlargement was heavily influenced by US policy. Direct support from President Bill Clinton and Czech-born secretary of state Madeleine Albright contributed to the Czech Republic declaring itself as belonging to the informal pro-Atlanticist group—both in the alliance and in Europe as a whole (for an insider account of NATO enlargement, see Asmus 2002). NATO quickly dominated the Czech security discourse, and its position has been strengthened among the Czech political class (even more so within the Czech defense establishment) because it has provided the main forum for the socialization of Czech security policymakers since the mid-1990s. A clear pro-Atlanticist profile was therefore dominant in Czech security policy for most of 1999–2002, although the evolving Czech perspective on EU membership has gradually had an impact on the republic’s overall foreign and security policy profile.

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Since late 2002, Czech policy conduct vis-à-vis the ESDP had been based on balancing its aspirations of a prospective EU member state and its interest as a current NATO member (Khol 2003a, 2004a). Although there was a rational interest in keeping the United States engaged in Europe, thus balancing major European powers, the pro-US lobby is certainly not as strong in the Czech Republic as in Poland. There was a great deal of sympathy in the republic for European frustration with US “arrogance” during the Kosovo air campaign, reflecting partially the deep split among the Czech public on this issue (Sedivy 1999; Hutchinson 2000; Vachudova 2001). Czech policy has also been progressively welcoming toward both the military and nonmilitary dimensions of the ESDP, which together provide more options for crisis management operations and help to fill the gap in conflict prevention and postconflict reconstruction tools with police units and civil administration personnel. Czech policy also perceives this strong emphasis on the nonmilitary dimension of the ESDP as more natural for the EU than for NATO, and this dimension partially prevents strong competition between the two organizations. The Czech approach therefore finds an interest primarily in strengthening the alliance through the ESDP by providing better European capabilities for crisis management. At the same time, on the institutional level, the Czech Republic prefers close relations between the EU and NATO based on noncompetitive structures and an open and transparent consultation and cooperation process. During 1999–2003, the Czech government sought flexible solutions for its participation in the ESDP, stressing the positive contributions it could make (Raik and Palosaari 2004). Various suggestions regarding how to influence the EU’s development of the ESDP in a pragmatic way were largely shared with Norway, which, as an EU noncandidate state, was institutionally in a worse situation. In general, Czech policy thus followed a less dogmatic approach than in the case of Turkey or even Poland. Between 1999 and 2003, Czech policy made use of several channels for influencing EU debates and decisions on the ESDP—not just the institutional basis of NATO in talks using a NATO-EU format, but also through the joint initiative of the Visegrad Three (NATO members since 1999) and the United Kingdom beginning in February 2000, and through bilateral talks with Germany, France, and the United States. The Czech Republic prefers close cooperation and consultation among the EU and NATO, which was only reinforced by its experience as a nonEU European ally between 1999 and 2004. There is therefore a strong Czech desire to keep the EU-NATO relationship functioning as smoothly as possible, built on the complementarity of both organizations. Czech policy supports a practical approach focused on improving European capabilities rather than building new, big institutions. This is also mirrored in the preference for as little duplication as possible with NATO, and translates into a

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desire to intertwine defense planning and, as much as possible, capability development processes in NATO and in the EU. Prague naturally welcomed the March 2003 “Berlin Plus” arrangement (with a clear preference for it to be used for the majority of EU-led operations) following the signature of a declaration of strategic partnership between the two organizations in December 2002. It hopes that both organizations can broaden their security dialogue to issues that transcend narrowly defined crisis management (Czech National Security Council 2004).1 From the beginning of Czech policy formulation toward the ESDP, different views and emphases emerged between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Czech Ministry of Defense is traditionally more strongly oriented toward NATO, which it regards to be a betterknown structure with a proven military record and a stable institutional platform for safeguarding Czech security interests and establishing full participation rights. In the initial years, the Ministry of Defense was also lukewarm about ESDP commitments because of the awareness of the demanding tasks connected with meeting regular target force goals in the NATO defense-planning framework. These are still perceived as the overall military priority, especially given the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO response force initiatives adopted at the NATO Prague summit in November 2002. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, tends to be more sensitive to the Czech position as an EU member state (previously a candidate state), stressing broader political consequences of EU membership, responsibilities connected to it, and the high value attached to the ESDP project within the EU. The position of the Czech Ministry of Defense has never followed the rather dogmatic Turkish position of opposing ESDP development at all cost, especially through blocking the conclusion of NATO-EU talks on the “Berlin Plus” arrangement.

The Political Milieu In recent years the general view in the Czech Republic toward the newly developed ESDP has been fairly positive across the political spectrum. A significant majority of Czech political parties view the ESDP as a natural stage in further European integration and as the next stage in strengthening the CFSP. The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), which led the previous minority government in the period 1998–2002 and after the 2002 elections, formed a center-left-wing coalition government and is especially positive about the CFSP/ESDP ambitions of the EU. This position is not surprising, given its foreign policy preferences during the 1990s and the fact that the ESDP was brought about mainly by left-wing governments in the EU. In comparison with previous governments, Prime Minister Vladimir

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Spidla (2002–2004) was especially vocal on the idea and openly in favor of a more ambitious CFSP/ESDP and a stronger Europe in world affairs. The general idea of a stronger external and security profile for the EU is also shared by two smaller coalition partners, the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) and the Freedom Union (US-DEU), and even more so by the Greens (SZ) as the newly emerged important player in Czech domestic politics. The Civic Democratic Party, the main right-wing opposition force and the other party that maintains a high profile on the issue, is much more negative toward the ESDP. Not only is it the bastion of self-proclaimed Euroskepticism in the Czech Republic, but it also currently has a strong and consistent pro-US and Atlanticist stance in security policy. Sharing this view on the issue is former chairman and Czech president Vaclav Klaus (elected February 28, 2003), who is an outspoken critic of deeper European integration in general, including in the security and defense field (Klaus 2004a, 2004b, 2004c).2 Some fairly skeptical and at times even alarmist arguments are therefore presented from this direction, even though some of the arguments clearly shadow attacks on the ESDP from US and UK Republican and Conservative politicians, and refer sometimes to the situation in a rather distant past. This internal political division thus indicated a possible shift in policy emphasis following recent elections in June 2006 (which the Civic Democratic Party won) and seemed likely to be a majority force in any future government. Yet elections produced a deadlock in parliament when the Civic Democratic Party and its likely coalition partners the Christian Democrats and the Greens came to control 100 seats, exactly the same number as the Social Democratic Party and the Communists. In this setting, no major changes in Czech security policy are likely, as any coalition partner (such as the Christian Democrats or even the Social Democratic Party in a “grand coalition” scenario) will have a moderating effect on the Civic Democratic Party and prevent radical U-turns in this area. The Civic Democratic Party twice attempted to form a government, and its chairman, Miroslav Topolanek, was named an acting prime minister on September 4, 2006 (Oxford Analytica 2006). His government filled some key posts with experts who were not members of any political party (such as new defense minister Jiri Sedivy and foreign minister Alexander Vondra), but it did not succeed in October in a vote of confidence, due to the above-mentioned deadlock, and remained only an acting government without a strong political mandate.

The Czech Position on the European Security Strategy The Czech Republic welcomed the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003 and regards it as well-balanced in assessing the

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new security environment and new threats (Winkler and Kurfurst 2004). Czech officials grappled with similar questions during the process of updating the republic’s own security strategy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2003),3 which was eventually approved by the Czech government only two days before the European Council approved the European Security Strategy. The Czech voice was also heard during three international seminars (Rome, Paris, Stockholm) organized to discuss the original June 2003 draft presented by Javier Solana at the Thessaloniki EU summit. Czech policymakers were actively involved in the debate on the concept of preemptive and preventive engagement, both as a theoretical tool used in drafting the European Security Strategy and as a practical reaction to the US use of the “preemption” concept. Czech foreign policy expressed its support for the logic of preventive engagement and comprehensive strategies aiming at conflict prevention (including, inter alia, bolstering the rule of law, economic assistance, and military operations). The Czech Republic went even further when it supported US policy during the Iraq crisis in spring 2003, which was based on the concept of preemption, although it can now be argued that the US attack was rather an example of a “preventive” strike, as no immediate threat posed by weapons of mass destruction was found in Iraq. The Czech approach therefore saw Solana’s original proposal from June 2003 as acceptable when it referred to “preemptive engagement.” As the term proved controversial for some other EU member states, the Czech Republic agreed to the new version, which deliberately adheres to the use of “preventive engagement” instead.4 In the Czech view, the challenge of the European Security Strategy really lies in its implementation, in the potential lack of necessary political will to act, and in the weak European strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and (when necessary) robust intervention. The Czech Republic welcomed the development and gradual adoption of a number of EU action plans linked to the strategy, especially those concerning the fight against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It supports concrete areas where the European Security Strategy is now being implemented, such as the comprehensive EU policy in Bosnia, the strategic partnership with the Mediterranean countries and the Middle East, the fight against terrorism, and effective multilateralism. In the final text, the Czech Republic would also prefer to see longer and more substantial references to NATO, stressing the “strategic partnership” between the two organizations and the need for maintaining a strong transatlantic link. The European Security Strategy is clearly compatible with recent major Czech strategic documents (its December 2003 security strategy and its June 2004 military strategy), but the general Czech public and political elites have not discussed it in any detail and are not greatly aware of it. Even the Czech expert discussion on its content and wider repercussions for Czech security

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policy has so far been quite limited. This also reflects broader issues of security policy that largely focus on territorial security, while deeper discussions of societal security and similar nonmilitary or nontraditional issues are largely missing from Czech public discourse, which is still dominated by a narrow approach.

Balancing Atlanticist and European Security Policy Profiles Since entering the European Union in May 2004, the Czech Republic has clearly faced a long-term challenge to its security policy. It relies on an instinctive policy to avoid situations where Prague would be forced to choose between the United States (and, generally, NATO solidarity) and the European Union. It thus prefers a careful balancing act between Atlanticist and European security policy profiles. For Washington, it is beneficial that Prague belongs clearly to the group of Central and Eastern European countries that lend it political support on important issues (like the global struggle against international terrorism) or even offer direct participation in USled military operations that represent a serious problem for major European powers like Germany or France, as clearly illustrated in Iraq. The Czech long-term perception of the United States as a strategic ally and as a relatively benign yet distant hegemon does not, however, translate into automatic support of US policy in every contentious issue. Such a onedimensional policy would relegate the Czech Republic to the position of mere satellite. Official Czech policy has therefore clearly sided with the EU stance on several issues, like the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court (although the Czech Republic is the only EU country that has not ratified the ICC treaty because of strong opposition from some political parties such as the Civic Democratic Party). Moreover, Czech public opinion has been negatively affected by the prolonged dispute over strict US visa policy, which is seen to be biased and not in line with the status of the Czech Republic as a close ally. On the practical side of Czech security and defense policy, the Atlanticist preference nevertheless still fully commands the scene. NATOled or US-led international operations are still regarded as a top priority: Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan represent the absolute majority of deployment of Czech armed forces abroad (in 2006: Kosovo, 500 troops; Iraq, 97 troops; Afghanistan, 61 troops, increased by another 50 troops for the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Fayzabad and 120 special forces troops deployed in northeastern provinces during Operation Enduring Freedom). On the other hand, the participation issue, which the Czech Republic fought hard for in the 1999–2004 period within the ESDP, has translated into a

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slowly growing European profile as well. It is especially reflected in Czech participation in all EU-led operations (both military and police) in the Balkans: Concordia and Proxima in Macedonia, the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Althea in Bosnia.5 Yet given the smaller overall size of those operations and Czech participation in them, EU-led operations represent only a minor part of Czech active contributions to crisis management operations (in 2006, still just about a hundred military and police officers for EU-led operations, compared to more than 840 for NATO and US-led operations). The crucial test of Czech Atlanticist resolve took place during the 2003 Iraq crisis, when Prague had to choose between either Washington and London or Paris and Berlin. Czech policy toward the Iraq War encountered several interesting twists and controversies, reflecting deep divisions over this issue among Czech politicians as well as over the “balancing approach” (Gabal 2003). On the one hand, Czech president Vaclav Havel signed the “letter of the eight” in support of alliance solidarity with the United States shortly before the end of his mandate (in a position of a lame duck), but his successor, Vaclav Klaus, made clear he would not have signed the letter. Later, while meeting the new US ambassador in Prague, Klaus even allegedly expressed his doubts over US motives for the war (not surprisingly, this incident soured his relations with the George W. Bush administration). Yet in practice, the Czech government supported the USled coalition beginning in the summer of 2002, through the deployment of a nuclear, biological, and chemical defense unit in the Persian Gulf area, and later through direct participation in operations. As part of the US-led multinational coalition, the Czech presence in Iraq has since been maintained (the field hospital in Basra was later replaced with a military police unit tasked with training new Iraqi forces). The Czech position was explained in a more restrained tone to the domestic audience, however, stressing that the defense unit and field hospital were essentially noncombat units, serving the civilian populations of both Kuwait and (later) Iraq. Careful selection of words from the Czech foreign minister even suggested that Prague was on the side of the US-led coalition, without being officially part of it. This reflected heated debates within the Czech parliament on limits set by its resolution on the mandate specifying conditions of deployment and use of Czech military units in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East area (Pachta and Král 2005). Surprisingly for many, it was the Czech center-left-wing coalition government (led by the Social Democrats) that in the end succeeded against all odds with an argument for an active profile and direct participation in the Iraq operation. This stance clearly diverged from policies taken by other left-wing European political parties. Prague distanced itself from European skepticism of US action, criticized the French-German attempt to forge an

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anti-US stance with European cover, and briskly dismissed attempts by French president Jacques Chirac to silence Central Europeans over this issue. Shortly after the end of major military operations in Iraq, however, Czech official policy supported steps toward reforging the transatlantic partnership and mending the deep split over the Iraq War, rather than playing on intra-European differences (Sedivy and Zaborowski 2005). The Iraq crisis nevertheless marked another important changing pattern, in Czech public opinion. As in other Central and Eastern European countries, US policy toward Iraq was highly unpopular with the Czech public, who also cared about the weapons of mass destruction argument and the UN Security Council mandate. As both conditions were not met, Czech public support for a military solution dramatically deteriorated. In December 2002, 52 percent of the public expressed strong support for enforcing Security Council resolutions with military force if secret weapons of mass destruction were discovered in Iraq. In March 2003, support for war without a Security Council mandate hovered around 10 percent, while opposition to action without such a mandate rose to 80 percent. In a similar fashion, the Czech public also opposed sending Czech troops to Iraq in a combat role, and later turned skeptical even toward continued deployment of the nuclear, biological, and chemical defense unit and field hospital (between January and March 2003, support dropped by about 10 percent, to around 50 percent). Public opinion in the Czech Republic, partially influenced by the Iraq crisis, also turned toward a much warmer view regarding the EU as a security and military player. A Eurobarometer opinion poll conducted in summer 2003 recorded Czech support for a common defense and security policy (79 percent), European rapid-reaction forces (65 percent), and a much more positive role for the EU in maintaining peace in the world (74 percent, compared to only 47 percent for the United States). 6 Concerning a European defense policy decisionmaking role attached to various institutions, the Czech public was more cautious (and most sensitive to the preservation of the role of national governments among all new Central and Eastern European member states), with 30 percent supporting national governments, 15 percent supporting NATO, and 37 percent supporting the EU (European Commission 2003b). A later Eurobarometer poll still showed a significant level of support from the Czech public for the main components of the ESDP. There is a clear pattern of stable support of an absolute majority of polled Czech citizens for this dimension of European integration, which is perceived as a natural part of the EU’s development and of Czech membership in the EU (European Commission 2004a; European Commission 2005a, esp. pp. 63–73). On the other hand, the string of perceived unilateral or questionable policies (the Iraq War, the detention center at Guantanamo Bay) seriously undermined the US position among the Czech public. The recent

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experiment with US military support for the creation of democracy in Iraq as a model for the entire Middle East contributed to a very cautious Czech approach toward democracy promotion through militarily forced regime change. On a general level, support for democracy and human rights by other means was otherwise vigorously fostered, and has become one of the top priorities for Czech foreign and security policy over recent years, including the concrete cases of Cuba and Belarus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2004). During the summer of 2006, following political deadlock connected with results of parliamentary elections in June 2006, an unlikely security policy topic stormed the public debate and revealed an interesting divide in the Czech security policy consensus. Reports in the US media of a Pentagon request for US$56 million in the fiscal year 2007 budget, in preparation for constructing a European interceptor site, attracted the attention of the Czech public to the topic of US missile defense. Washington had approached both Prague and Warsaw informally about participating in the missile defense project, and received a positive answer that led to the commencement of technical consultation on the matter. In July 2006 a US expert team inspected possible sites, following up on consultations undertaken by the Czech Republic and Poland on this matter since 2002. During the summer of 2006, these reports precipitated very heated political and public debate. Washington is making steady progress in turning missile defense into a project reaching beyond US territory. After securing cooperation and funding from Japan, it wants to establish a firm foothold in Europe to improve its coverage against Iran, seeking suitable locations for a third interceptor site (the only one outside the US mainland) and several early-warning tracking stations. Poland and the Czech Republic are at the top of the Pentagon’s list. The likely trajectory of ballistic missiles coming from Iran or the Middle East against European or US targets would cross or come close to their territory. Washington wants to start preparatory work now in order to have an interceptor site ready by 2011 at the latest. In the ensuing Czech debate, several issues were touched upon. First, stationing of foreign troops is a sensitive issue, since the country suffered from German and later Soviet invasions (the 1968 invasion resulted in the permanent stationing of well over 100,000 Soviet troops in the country). Second, the host country would have to deal with debris falling on its territory after impact with an incoming missile, bringing traces of weapons of mass destruction. The US system maintains full operational control over the interceptors in US hands, and the host country would have limited influence over how and when they were fired against incoming missiles. Third, unproven missile defense technology may not provide real protection. The host country might face an increased risk of counterstrike or pre-

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ventive strike against the interceptors or radars, either from countries possessing ballistic missiles or from those threatened by a US-led military intervention under cover of the missile defense system. A worsening of relations with Russia is likely: Russian officials, including Chief of General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, have expressed strong objections to a US military presence in Central Europe. They perceive it as a further NATO encirclement of Russian territory, undermining its strategic position. Finally, NATO comes into play, as the Czech Republic expressed an interest in a NATO active-layered ballistic missile defense system to protect deployed NATO forces, which would certainly be easier to present to the Czech public and parliament. A NATO missile defense feasibility study was presented in early May 2006, but no political decision has yet been taken. The new government is led by the Civic Democratic Party, which was long the only political party to support the US missile defense project. Its likely coalition partners, the Christian Democrats and the Greens, are more hesitant, and the Greens may even become openly hostile, as they harbor lingering resentment toward the United States, as expressed in their strongly worded rhetoric against the George W. Bush adminstration and US unilateralism during the election campaign. The Social Democratic Party, together with the Communists, prefers a referendum on the missile defense issue, which would in fact kill any such proposal, as the Czech public has so far clearly expressed negative reactions. The Civic Democratic Party–led government may thus hope for a “split” solution, whereby the interceptor base would be located in Poland and a radar station on Czech soil. US midterm elections further complicated the picture, as the Democrats were openly critical of the missile defense project and sought to significantly reduce its funding. The planned interceptor base in Europe may be an easy target for missile defense budget cuts.

Priorities of the Czech Approach Several specific priorities of the Czech approach regarding the scope and direction of the ESDP can be identified. The Czech Republic takes a rather pragmatic approach based largely on the British-inspired interpretation of the ESDP as a vehicle for strengthening European military capabilities and for reinvigorating the Atlantic alliance through a more viable European pillar. Prague strongly prefers capability-oriented initiatives and is wary of building new, big, and consequently costly institutions within the ESDP framework. Overall, it supports a broad EU-NATO dialogue using the “Berlin Plus” arrangement whenever possible, in order to avoid costly duplication and support close cooperation between the two organizations.

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There is also a clear preference for an informal division of roles in conducting military operations where NATO would be responsible for large-scale and demanding high-end crisis management or combat operations, and the EU for lower-end crisis management and peacekeeping operations. The EU is seen as particularly well equipped to carry out police operations or missions requiring the combination of military and civilian tools or long-term postconflict stabilization efforts. Prague now fully accepts the need for strengthening the EU as an active player on the international scene, equipped with all necessary tools for crisis management and conflict prevention, including military means and structures to underpin them. Yet there is a particular view on how this process should evolve and along which path. Prague stresses preference for the EU to become first an effective actor in and around Europe, using its comparative advantages that arise from access to a wide spectrum of resources and policy tools, including a unique set of political and economic instruments as well as those covering civilian and military crisis management, conflict prevention, and development aid. In comparison to NATO, the EU has a powerful incentive: better access to its internal market and even the eventual perspective of membership in the EU. However, Czech policy is not very enthusiastic toward the rapid prospect of the EU as a truly global actor. Prague does not support such grand schemes for the EU to become one of the poles in a multipolar world, as vigorously promoted by Paris. It shares suspicion that such plans are driven mainly by desire to counterbalance the United States. This skeptical approach also translates into limited support for seeking military autonomy for the EU (in terms of both structures and assets) at all costs, because autonomy is not seen as a supreme value in itself, nor are expenditures associated with autonomy interpreted as wise and necessary. This stance was evident in the strong opposition of the Czech Ministry of Defense to the original 2004 plan for an autonomous EU operational headquarters. It was interpreted as a wasteful duplication of capabilities available through NATO, and as a step undermining the alliance. The final version, which was interpreted as an acceptable compromise, allowed for the creation of a small civil-military planning cell with a nucleus operation center (rather than a standing military headquarters) linked to both the EU Planning Cell in SHAPE and to the NATO liaison officers with the EU Military Committee.

Czech Military Contributions From the very beginning, the Czech Republic wanted to be seen as an active country that is both willing and able to contribute to the ESDP and to EU-led missions. In line with this policy, it declared its contribution to the

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EU Headline Goals at the capability-commitment conference held in November 2000 in Brussels (and updated its commitment in 2001 for the capability-improvement conference, and then again in 2003). The Czech contribution consists of a mechanized infantry battalion, a special forces company, a helicopter unit (four Mi-17s), a field hospital or medical battalion, a chemical-protection company, and a center for humanitarian and rescue operations. These units are fully professional and also represent a portion of the Czech units assigned to the NATO high-readiness forces. As a general principle, these units are “double-hatted” for both NATO- and EUled operations. In addition, some of these units can also be used for peacekeeping missions under UN command. The total size of the Czech contribution is above 1,000 personnel, with a long-term rotation up to one year secured for the mechanized infantry battalion. All other declared forces are of specialized nature and their participation in EU-led operations can currently be sustained for only six months. The Czech contribution to the European Headline Goals is comparable with those of Austria, Belgium, and Ireland.7 The Czech Republic’s reform of its armed forces was aimed at full professionalization and achievement of initial operational capabilities (ready for deployment) by 2006, and at potential qualitative improvement and quantitative broadening of the Czech contributions to the European Headline Goals by 2010. The Czech Republic is now focused on improving interoperability, deployability, and sustainability of its military units in multinational operations abroad. During the period 2006–2010, the Czech Republic could declare additional assets and capabilities for EU operations, such as a military police unit, a passive radar system unit (codename Vera), transport aircraft (with Medevac capability), an Mi-24 combat helicopter unit, and a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense battalion (with deployable headquarters, mobile labs for chemical, biological, and radiological analysis, a decontamination platoon, etc.) (Obrana a strategie 2004, esp. pp. 57–64). The modernization of the Czech armed forces partially sets the country apart in the Central and Eastern European region, where it was the first to decide on a radical shift toward an all-volunteer force, in the summer of 2001. In December 2004, the Czech armed forces ended conscription in favor of a fully professional military geared toward balancing territorial defense with strong expeditionary warfare capabilities. The Czech Republic was the first Central and Eastern European country among NATO allies to complete this move, which was based on arguments of strategic rationale, economic advantages, and political pressure (Sedivy 2005; Kominek 2005). The fully professional Czech military is now better prepared for missions abroad (though there were serious constitutional limitations on the use of conscripts abroad), to be conducted mainly under NATO and the EU, and is

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able to retain highly qualified personnel (with skills gained in operating sophisticated weapons). Resulting cuts in the overall size of the armed forces (from 65,000 in 2003 to a target strength of around 35,000 personnel—26,200 military and 8,800 civilian—in 2006), and closure of military bases (reduced from sixtyfive to twenty-seven main bases), were later complicated by reduced funding when the defense budget was cut below 2 percent of gross domestic product, where it was likely stay for the foreseeable future. Yet the departing Social Democratic Party–led government prepared further radical cuts in defense spending for the 2007 budget that would result in a decrease below 1.6 percent of gross domestic product. The new Civic Democratic Party government, and especially new defense minister Jiri Sedivy, vigorously protested and tried to secure additional funding (or in fact limit the proposed cuts), otherwise the Czech military would be unable to meet its NATO commitments and would be unable to contribute significantly to missions abroad. Sedivy also suggested a new law on defense spending that would guarantee a minimal level for a four-year period and allow for far more secure defense planning (similar to the French system). The eventual outcome of budgetary battles remains to be seen. On reaching its full operational capabilities (2010–2012), the Czech military will be a well-rounded force bolstered by several niche capabilities (nuclear, biological, and chemical defense; military medicine; and passive radar systems) (Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic 2003a). All of these specialized functions will be made available to both NATO and the EU, filling some of their capability gaps. Yet the Czech military does not offer just highly specialized units, but also bigger units for major NATO- and EU-led operations. This is reflected in its long-term commitments, through a strengthened mechanized infantry battalion for the Kosovo Force (400 Czech troops integrated with 100 Slovak troops deployed since March 2002), a military police company for the Multinational Force in Iraq (deployed since December 2003, when it replaced the field hospital operating in Basra province), and a special forces company for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (deployed in 2004 and 2006). Growing skills and abilities of the Czech military were reflected in Kosovo in summer 2005, when it was tasked for the first time with taking over the command of a larger multinational formation deployed in the field (in fact, the Czech Republic was the first “new” NATO member from Central and Eastern Europe entrusted with such a role). Beginning in August 2005, the Czech Republic (with a strengthened presence of 500 troops) acted for one year as a lead nation of the multinational brigade center, which, following the reorganization of the Kosovo Force mission, functioned as the multinational task force center beginning in January 2006, with Czech command of Finnish, Irish, Latvian, Slovak, and Swedish units (KFOR update).

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The Czech Republic and EU Battle Groups The active Czech approach to the ESDP is also reflected in its treatment of the EU battle group project, launched in 2004. Czech officials were initially rather ambivalent toward the initiative and the way it was prepared by France and Great Britain. Their directoire style, of working on the idea for about a year without any consultation with other EU partners, undermined confidence in British policy being always a sufficient guarantee and useful beacon for the Czech position vis-à-vis the ESDP. But both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense quickly agreed that the Czech Republic should participate in this demanding new EU project in order to further its political ambitions and more closely align itself with the EU core on defense issues. Important questions were raised concerning with whom and how quickly the Czech military could establish a battle group. Talks with Germany (after the United Kingdom was approached as the first choice and declined, already having committed itself to other battle groups) as a potential lead nation in a trinational battle group, together with Austria, were eventually completed in November 2004. The German-CzechAustrian battle group was officially declared at the EU pledging conference (the Czech Republic would contribute an infantry unit of 350 troops, together with all necessary combat support services). This battle group was supposed to fill one slot for 2009 (Lidove Noviny 2004; Tyden 2004; Pravo 2004). In 2005, however, Germany decided for internal reasons to change the priority attached to this battle group and postpone its formation and availability until 2011. Czech policymakers then decided to launch a new battle group (1,500 troops), as a lead nation together with Slovakia, to be available for the second half of 2009 (Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic 2005). This Czech-Slovak joint military venture draws on a well-established practice of Visegrad multinational military cooperation that succeeded in supporting Slovak membership in NATO and translated into a highly acclaimed Czech-Slovak battalion deployed as part of the Kosovo Force. However, other recent examples of military cooperation in the Visegrad format did not end with similar positive results (Khol 2003b). A Czech-Polish-Slovak peacekeeping brigade project was launched in September 2001, and a multinational brigade headquarters located in Topolcany, Slovakia, was inaugurated in May 2002. However, shortly before reaching full operational status in December 2005, the three participating states decided to disband the peacekeeping brigade as incompatible with the high-readiness demands of the new NATO response force. The new Czech-Slovak battle group was seen early on as meeting challenging requirements for high-readiness (fifteen days maximum) and strategic transport assets. Its profile closely resembled that of the NATO

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response force, which remains an overall priority for the Czech Ministry of Defense. The Czech military operated within the NRF from July 2006 to June 2007, once again acting as a lead nation of a NATO multinational defense battalion, based on its successful prior multinational and leadnation performance from December 2003 to December 2004 (Khol 2004b). There were also constitutional limitations, concerning parliament’s strong role in approving deployment of Czech armed forces abroad, that clashed with the need for rapid deployment of both the NRF and the EU battle groups. The recent change of parliamentary procedures gave the Czech government enough flexibility in deployment of Czech forces within both frameworks. The last overall challenge for active deployment of the Czech military abroad is a financial one. Several rounds of defense budget cuts, administered as a part of broader austerity measures, may severely limit Czech activities. The challenge will be even more daunting if the current practice of parallel deployment in three different theaters of operation (Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan) continues and unforeseen contingencies arise. The Czech Republic has also taken an active role in the European Capabilities Action Plan, participating in four out of fifteen active working groups: nuclear, biological, and chemical defense; special operations forces; strategic airlift; and medical capabilities. These broadly correspond with the Czech Republic’s declared niche capabilities, or with strategic assets that Czech armed forces seriously need (strategic airlift), and as such are pursued by both NATO and the EU. Czech policy supports close linkages of these efforts.

Defense Clauses of the EU Constitutional Treaty In the Czech general political debate a significant degree of attention was paid to CFSP/ESDP-related sections in the draft EU constitutional treaty (Kohout 2003). The mutual defense clause in the original proposal from the convention had especially worrying implications for the Czech Republic regarding NATO, and the major Czech right-wing opposition party, the Civic Democratic Party, strongly criticized it as a concrete example of further dangerous integration of the security and defense dimension of the EU. A clear demand for keeping national veto in these matters was spelled out across the Czech political spectrum. A final watered-down version of the constitutional treaty that entirely dropped a separate clause and protocol on mutual defense was deemed acceptable. Even more complex was the issue of permanent structured cooperation in the defense area. The Czech Republic was particularly concerned with the unclear definition of the entry criteria and possible subjective manipulation. It preferred the use of objective criteria, a higher threshold on the minimum number of member states

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needed to launch the permament structured cooperation, unanimous decisionmaking procedures, and the principle of inclusiveness. The final version of the protocol (which leaned toward capability-based entry criteria, reasonable inclusiveness, and ensured transparency) was therefore an acceptable compromise. The Czech government declared it would like to take part in permanent structured cooperation if it could meet the criteria, so as to remain in the EU mainstream. In other areas, the Czech government was in favor of greater use of qualified majority voting in the CFSP proper (not for issues with military implications), supported the formal establishment of the Council of Defense Ministers, and welcomed the creation of an EU foreign minister to be supported by a newly created EU external action service (its exact composition, scope of activity, and financing remained unclear, however, from the Czech viewpoint). While the EU constitutional treaty debate stalled after negative results of French and Dutch referendums, some institutional innovation took place in the ESDP context with the creation of the European Defense Agency, and may complement the high-profile initiative of EU battle groups. The creation of the EDA in 2004 was welcomed only after some hesitation based on the focus of its activities, and was driven by the rationale of participation in the EU mainstream. Czech policy, influenced by skepticism from the Ministry of Defense, preferred the creation of a small agency oriented toward the improvement of capabilities and coordination of existing mechanisms in this area. It opposed French plans for directing defense procurement from the EU level (financed from the EU budget), setting clear preferences for “buying European,” and creating a new large bureaucracy with executive powers vis-à-vis national capitals in armaments matters. The Czech Republic was satisfied with securing participation of its representative in the preparatory establishment team of the EDA, and with its relatively modest size. Following the startup phase, the EDA began to fully function in 2005 and produced its first major result on November 21, 2005—a new code of conduct for the European defense equipment market, to be applied beginning July 1, 2006, for all contracts worth more than €1 million (US$1.5 million). The code of conduct may affect Czech procurement practices, and the Czech defense industry in general, in several ways. Most important, the required opening of procurement practice on the national level and steps toward greater transparency will affect current practice when the majority of contracts are negotiated only with selected domestic suppliers and are not open to outside bids. Information on these contracts will have to be passed to the EDA, which will monitor them, although there are no penalties envisaged, and the new code of conduct is legally nonbinding, thus resting only on peer pressure from other governments. The current Czech policy, which requires offsets for major contracts awarded to foreign suppliers, will remain in place. It was one of the impor-

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tant factors in December 2003 that contributed to a victory by BAe Systems/Saab in its bid for a new supersonic fighter aircraft, the JAS-39 Gripen, over Belgium’s bid (with US support) for the F-16 in a contest over equipping the Czech air force and replacing Soviet-era MiG-21s (based on a ten-year lease of fourteen aircraft in the years 2005–2015, with the total contract worth approximately US$0.9 billion) (Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic 2003b). Although it was seen as a political choice for a European over a US weapon system, there was no clear pattern of ideological preference for US or European products demonstrated in further Czech procurement choices. The Gripen aircraft is to be armed with US missiles. In January 2006 the major Czech procurement project for wheeled armored personnel carriers resulted in a victory of the Pandur, produced by SteyrDaimler-Puch (owned by the US company General Dynamics), over the AMV, produced by Finnish Patria (the contract, for 199 armored personnel carriers with an option for another 35 in several modifications, was worth approximately US$1.1 billion) (Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic 2006). Czech defense is a fledgling industry that is restructuring and downsizing due to shrinking defense markets abroad and changing priorities of modernization pursued by the Czech military that affect attitudes toward defense trade in general and the Czech position in the transatlantic dimension. Because the Czech defense industry no longer produces all major weapons platforms (based on indigenous or license designs), there is a marked long-term transition toward attaining a position for the Czech Republic as a major arms importer. On completion of the modernization project, all forthcoming major procurement projects (supersonic combat aircraft, armored infantry vehicles) will rely on foreign suppliers. This trend is likely to continue, and the Czech defense industry will be relegated to subcontracting specialized equipment for nuclear, biological, and chemical defense, as well as defense electronics and communications, passive radar systems, and military trucks (Behr and Siwiecki 2004, pp. 15–23). The Czech government will likely follow its preference for open defense trade and access to both US and European technologies in order to obtain the best-quality products at reasonable prices. High hopes from the late 1990s for major US and European investments, which would have helped to restructure the Czech defense industry, did not materialize. The major case of Boeing investing, in 1998, a minority stake (35 percent) in Aero Vodochody, the main aircraft producer for the Czech Republic (both military and civilian aircraft), led to a disappointing experience, with no foreign contracts being secured by Boeing for its flagship product plane, the L-159 ALCA (currently in service only in the Czech air force). In October 2004 the Czech government bought out Boeing’s minority stake in Aero Vodochody, after which the latter began looking for a new strategic partner (Kominek 2005, pp. 28–29).

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Czech Geographical Priorities Czech security policy can be expected to follow its geographical priorities for active support and participation in ESDP crisis management operations. Several regions are plausible for Czech engagement in EU-led operations: the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus. Czech security policy is clearly connected with the active profile that the republic seeks for its foreign policy within the CFSP, its comparative advantages, and the long-term attention paid to them. Thus the first Czech regional priority for the near future is likely to remain the Western Balkans. The Czech Republic has consistently supported EU efforts in the region. Between 2003 and 2006 it actively contributed military and police personnel to all EU-led operations conducted in the Western Balkans: the EU military operation (Concordia) and EU police advisory mission (Proxima) in Macedonia, and the EU military operation (Althea) and EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (soon to be supplemented by the biggest-ever civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo, which will take over from the UN mission there once the final status of Kosovo has been agreed upon). Czech participation in Operation Althea is an interesting example in several respects. First, it caused an intensive political debate during parliamentary ratification of deployment when the right-wing Civic Democratic Party blocked the move due to concerns about dangerously overstretching Czech deployments abroad and the priority of NATO operations elsewhere. On the other hand, arguments presented by the ruling coalition government stressed that the biggest EU-led operation so far is to be conducted under the “Berlin Plus” arrangement, thus ensuring very close cooperation with NATO, which is something that Czech policy constantly has called for (Kovanda 2004). In the end, the deployment of ninety-eight troops was approved, which also opened the way for the Czech Republic’s first-ever operational military cooperation with Austria (a joint guard unit). The operation also provided specialized capabilities such as Mi-17 transport helicopters, which Europe lacks in sufficient numbers. Another part of the Czech political debate focused on Czech support for ESDP operations. Once again, the right-wing opposition rang the alarm over possible Czech participation in EU-led operations in Africa and extensive use of EU funds to support them. The original strong stance was later softened, and Prague stressed that it would not prevent others from launching operations in Africa, given the special bonds shared by France, Britain, and several other EU states with their former colonies. However, Prague expects these states to support EU operations in other regions where the interests of new EU members may be more acute, such as the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The Czech Republic shares with many other new Central and Eastern

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European EU member states a specific perspective on Russia, which is still seen as undemocratic and potentially threatening (either directly, or more likely indirectly, through export of instability and as a source of energy dependency for the EU).8 A recent crisis over the strangling of energy supplies from Russia to Europe only reinforced this point. In 2005 the Czech Republic relied on Russia for 71 percent of its oil imports and 78 percent of its natural gas imports (Czech Statistical Office 2005). Prague sees EU policy toward Russia as sometimes naive and plagued by special deals, extensive frameworks for cooperation, and special status awarded to Russia without any reference to its progress in building democracy, the rule of law, and a market economy. Prague, together with other new EU states, wants equal standards to be applied and enforced, comparable to EU policies in other regions or vis-à-vis candidates for further enlargement (for an analysis of Visegrad countries’ relations with Russia over the 1990s, and with the EU, see Pelczynska-Nalecz et al. 2003). Similar to its NATO policy, Prague refuses any Russian veto over potential ESDP operations in neighboring states and regions. In trade issues there is still the lingering question of Russia’s Sovietera debt, which was partially bought by third parties and is partially being repaid in raw materials and military spare parts and new equipment (especially Mi-171S and Mi-35 helicopters). A significant trade deficit with Russia remains, reflecting the Czech Republic’s significant imports of Russian oil and natural gas, and the difficult return of Czech companies to the Russian market following the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the early 1990s. The changing visa regime had a stark impact on bilateral relations when the Czech Republic adopted EU visa policy in 2001. Czech diplomats became aware of special initiatives in this area by Germany, France, and Italy, and were critical of the softer visa regimes that Germany and Italy applied to holders of Russian passports. The Czech Republic’s entry into the EU, combined with the new pragmatic Russian foreign policy supported by President Vladimir Putin, resulted in a recent improvement of Czech-Russian relations. Being now a member of both NATO and the EU, the Czech Republic feels strategically secure and is open to building normal bilateral relations with Russia, which is promising new markets for Czech products. The new Russian diplomatic offensive culminated in the first official visit of the Russian president to the Czech Republic, which took place in early March 2006 (Kratochvil, Cibulkova, and Benes 2005). Vladimir Putin thus reciprocated the autumn 2003 visit of newly elected Czech president Vaclav Klaus, who significantly departed from the approach of his predecessor, Vaclav Havel. Klaus refrained from criticizing Russia for the war in Chechnya, and for the state of its democracy, and concentrated only on future development of CzechRussian relations (Izvestija 2003).

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Further EU enlargement is widely supported across the Czech political spectrum, given the positive effects that accession talks had on Bulgaria and Romania (and Croatia may follow shortly afterward). All these candidates must meet all the accession criteria, however, whether political and economic, human rights, or anticorruption. Overall, Prague considers the EU enlargement process as contributing significantly to the stabilization of the Western Balkans, a long-term priority for Czech foreign and security policy. Moreover, successful entry of countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia may serve as a useful example for other countries in Southeast and Eastern Europe that are experiencing a difficult transition to fully functioning democracy and market economy. Countries such as Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ukraine may also be inspired, all of which are regarded as places where the Czech Republic may use its specific knowledge, historical ties, and long-term activities of the nongovernmental sector either in the bilateral setting or through the CFSP framework. EU enlargement will no doubt strengthen the group of EU countries that are focusing on completing the stabilization of the Western Balkans and are willing to use their military, police, and financial resources to support EU-led missions there. EU membership for Turkey is a more hotly debated issue, and the official Czech position is now split. While the Social Democratic Party openly favors Turkish EU membership, and all of its recent prime ministers made clear steps in this direction (Gross 2004), other coalition partners express different opinions. The Czech Christian Democrats share the skeptical view of other European Christian Democratic parties, and prefer Turkey to stay outside the EU. Liberal Czech parties remain ambivalent, but Josef Zieleniec (the liberal parties’ member of the European Parliament and a former foreign minister) hinted at a possible special status for Turkey that would bring about close cooperation, but short of full EU membership. Czech president Vaclav Klaus, on the other hand, openly supports Turkey’s EU accession in this matter (Klaus 2005a, 2005b).9 Czech public opinion is lukewarm about the prospect of Turkish EU membership. Interestingly, this was the first example of an enlargement issue that galvanized public debate. Several nongovernmental organizations launched a campaign against Turkey’s membership in the EU, citing the country’s poor human rights record, its maltreatment of women, and cultural and religious differences. In the security and defense dimension, Prague acknowledges that Turkish membership would affect the EU geostrategically, bringing it in closer contact with the unstable Middle East (including direct border contact with Iraq and Iran), but also empower the ESDP with significant Turkish military capabilities. But security will not be the ultimate argument that decides Turkish membership, especially if the Czech public is consulted in a referendum.

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Conclusion Enlargement will no doubt affect the European Union as a strategic actor in international affairs. It will markedly influence concrete preferences on the CFSP/ESDP and its major projects, although most new EU member countries are still adapting to institutional and policy challenges. Prague, together with Warsaw or the Baltic capitals, will no doubt strengthen the Atlanticist group within the enlarged EU and foster all efforts for reengaging the United States with Europe, but it will not block ESDP initiatives. Acceptance of the EU’s ambition to become a strong security actor now seems rooted across Czech political space, and no radical reconsideration is likely in overall Czech policy, although the ESDP is likely to remain a somewhat divisive issue. The experience of actual EU membership will likely contribute to the ongoing balancing between Atlanticist and European profiles in Czech foreign and security policy. Moreover, Prague, of its own choice, has been rapidly transforming its military into an all-volunteer force, which may increase its already active profile as a contributor to both NATO- and EUled operations. It may offer sizable contingents of well-equipped infantry units and specialized capabilities for demanding rapid-reaction tasks, as well as for long-term peacekeeping operations, adding its significant civilian expertise to complex stabilization and postconflict reconstruction missions, for which the EU is particularly well suited. The enlarged EU may certainly become empowered and able to contribute to international security as a stronger partner for the United States. Czech territorial preferences, however, are clear as far as support for these crisis management deployments abroad is concerned, with the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus ranking high, whereas Africa ranks low. The same applies to obvious differences shared by the majority of the new Central and Eastern European EU member countries over the EU’s overall approach to Russia, where calls for consistent and evenhanded policy may change the current patchy pattern of EU-Russia relations. To a certain extent, the Czech experience can be viewed as instructive for new EU members such as Bulgaria and Romania, and even for countries from the Balkans and Eastern Europe that have more distant EU membership prospects. They may follow a similar path, balancing their EU and NATO security profiles, allowing their EU membership to be shaped and influenced by prior experience with NATO membership, and attaching particular importance to the issue of full participation in the EU mainstream. Smaller or medium-size European states will look for valuable contributions through role specialization and niche capabilities, thereby gaining more influence over the ESDP. Although these new and future members will face similar dilemmas and constraints, the predictive value of the

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Czech experience is nevertheless limited and depends on the power of external factors on particular domestic situations and political landscapes, and on decisions taken by political leaders vis-à-vis developments in the ESDP and NATO, and in transatlantic relations more generally.

Notes The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. 1. The Czech Republic was the first new EU member from Central and Eastern Europe to adopt such a detailed framework document on the ESDP. 2. See also Civic Democratic Party 2003 (the chapters on foreign, security, and defense policy), and Modrá ¸sance 2004 (contributions by Jan Zahradil and Petr Ne¸cas, on the Civic Democratic Party’s shadow foreign and defense ministers, respectively). 3. For the Czech approach to use of force, see esp. art. 42. 4. Explicit support for broad use of preemptive doctrine is controversial domestically, however, with the left-wing Social Democratic Party and the KSCM (Communist Party) supporting a strong role for international law and the United Nations, and with the pacifist wing of the Christian Democrats worrying about relaxing norms that prohibit or limit war. 5. Czech personnel participation in the EU missions in the Western Balkans: Concordia, two; EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, six; Proxima, four; and Althea, sixty-five. 6. The Czech Republic was still the most skeptical among new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe, having the highest rate of opposition to those measures: 18 percent against a “European army,” and 14 percent against a common defense and security policy for the EU. 7. Here only Belgium can serve as a truly useful comparison for Czech contributions, since it is a member of both the EU and NATO, while Austria and Ireland are members of the EU only and therefore see their military contributions to the ESDP as having top priority. 8. Then–Czech president Vaclav Havel even declared in his May 2001 speech at the Bratislava conference of NATO candidate states (“Vilnius Ten” group) that Russia was not part of Europe or the West and should be treated as a distinct partner. For perspectives of other new EU member states, see Raik and Palosaari 2004, pp. 23–40. 9. Vaclav Klaus tied the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU to his fight against “ever closer union,” whereby widening will prevent deepening the EU.

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Bulgaria: Empowering the Alliance and the Union

7

Plamen Pantev

BULGARIA SIGNED ITS ACCESSION TREATY TO THE EUROPEAN

Union in Luxembourg on April 25, 2005. As an EU member, the Black Sea state of Bulgaria will help fill the geopolitical gap between Hungary and Greece and further solidify the “arc of stability” in Southeast Europe. Thus, practically, Bulgaria will become part of the most advanced political, social, economic, cultural, and security “integration community” of states of the modern world. Bulgaria formally joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on March 29, 2004, and became political and military ally to the most powerful democracy of the world, the United States, as well as to twenty-four other democratic states of Europe and North America. Bulgaria’s historical, geopolitical, and geostrategic destiny and performance attracted support from the rest of the alliance and Union members from the south of the Continent, though the consent of all the others mattered for the final decisions on its membership. Bulgaria experiences a complicated neighborhood—the Western Balkans. After the end of the Cold War, its geopolitical situation largely determined bilateral relations and thinking in a cooperative framework when dealing with its environment to the east: the broader Black Sea area. Bulgaria bears specific features, capacities, and accents in its domestic transformation and security and foreign policy. First, the processes of democratization in Bulgaria took a strong hold in the beginning of the 1990s. The departure in Bulgaria from a totalitarian past was resolute and resulted in the fast creation of a functioning civil society and democratic media. The break with the past in Bulgaria did not bear violent features. This specificity in the transition from “real socialism” to democracy in Bulgaria provided a lesson for the societies and states that broke away from 101

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the Soviet Union, have access to the Black Sea coast, and are located near the South Caucasus region. The respective model of transition has a specific impact on the policy of Bulgaria toward transition states in the wider Black Sea area—not directly, due to the strong Soviet legacy and Russian influence and pressure, but as an example and “promise” for the future. Second, Bulgaria is involved in a mixture of cooperative and competitive geoeconomic interests in the Black Sea basin. Some of the interests can be more regulated in the context of the implementation of the Law of the Sea convention (1982), while interests connected with the transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Russia have modest potential for conflict. The question as to where the routes for transporting the oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia should go via the Black Sea— Bulgaria or Romania—may lead to certain economic frictions between the two countries. But such eventual tensions are manageable. Third, the geopolitical and geostrategic proximity of Bulgaria to the borders of Turkey and Greece definitely has a strong focus in issues concerning the eastern Mediterranean region. Fourth, without overemphasizing the issue, the problems in the Western Balkans in the 1990s had a strong direct negative impact on Bulgaria, especially in economic terms. The long sanctions regime against the former Yugoslavia caused high losses to the Bulgarian economy and further deprived it transportation routes to the west, compared, for example, to Romania, which had open borders with democratically developing countries in Central and Eastern Europe. For many years, there was a lack of cooperation in solving the construction of a second bridge over the Danube River on the western part of the border between the two countries, an issue that created obstacles to Bulgaria’s trade with its partners in Central and Western Europe. The construction of the bridge started in 2006. Fifth, Bulgaria signed a bilateral treaty on shared military facilities with the United States on Bulgarian territory. The processes of Bulgaria’s accession to NATO and the EU coincided with the country’s historical effort of transitioning from totalitarianism to democracy, a functioning market economy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedoms. The period of transition evolved in parallel with the difficult and responsible task of putting an end, together with NATO, the EU, and other democratic nations, to the bloodiest conflicts in Europe after World War II: in the former Yugoslavia, and in the Balkans (the “powder keg” of the Continent and the world). All these developments marked the painful start of Southeast Europe’s shift from belated economic, infrastructure, technological, and political modernization to becoming a component of the most developed part of the world and human civilization—the Euro-Atlantic community of nations (Pantev 1995, pp. 9–17; Clement and Pantev 1999, pp. 69–116).

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Understanding the integration of Southeast Europe into both the EU and NATO in the beginning of the twenty-first century necessitates taking into account these specific domestic, regional, and global perspectives. The motivation of Bulgaria’s behavior regarding the European Security and Defense Policy and its transatlantic engagements could evolve only in the context of these interacting local and transnational developments. For Bulgaria to survive and succeed as a nation, it has no alternative but to adequately adapt to the processes of globalization and its demanding requirements. European integration is the major vehicle for carrying out this task, and the strategic alliance with the United States means working cooperatively together with the most technologically advanced nation of the world, the leader in the processes of globalization. As a state with a long history, Bulgaria realizes that a fundamental precondition to adapting to these macro-sociological tendencies is preserving security at the national, regional, and global levels. This is unachievable for any single country in the world. That is why, from the start of its membership in both NATO and the EU, the strengthening of the transatlantic link has been so precious to Bulgaria. It will not succeed in its contributions to the European integration process unless the vitality and effectiveness of the transatlantic connection are preserved. Another motivation for promoting the transatlantic link is the ambition to contribute to improving the quality of European integration and to enable the global community to cope with the most difficult pending issues, especially fighting terrorism. As a small Balkan and western Black Sea country, Bulgaria has the capacity to provide specific contributions in both respects (Pantev 2001a, pp. 115–132; Pantev 2002b, pp. 85–88). This chapter is guided by four objectives. The first is to offer a Bulgarian perspective on the transatlantic security relationship and how the EU enlargement process influences the changes that are taking place (mainly by analyzing the Bulgarian experience). The second objective is to explore the strategic significance of EU enlargement to Bulgaria and the Black Sea region: the risks that it will face, the strategic opportunities that will open for the EU and its objectives regarding eastward expansion, and how Bulgaria can contribute to the strength of the EU. The third objective is to explain the Bulgarian perspective on the European enlargement project and its dilemmas, as well as how enlargement influences the country’s visions of its security (territorial, societal, homeland) and defense. The fourth objective, finally, is to analyze the implications of EU enlargement to Bulgaria for the ESDP and the transatlantic engagements of the country. I argue that Bulgaria’s EU and transatlantic obligations are complementary in the areas of military operations and capabilities, and the defense industry.

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The EU’s Enlargement to Bulgaria The European integration process has always been both a geopolitical and a social phenomenon; the ongoing wave of EU enlargement makes no difference. Regional and functional integration on the European continent, which always takes into consideration the territories and populations that join the integration nucleus of countries, has matured significantly in past decades, and carries the capacity to involve various countries, economies, and geographic configurations. It has never been a chaotic activity or an automatic process, but a well-calculated political, strategic, economic, and civilization effort (Bertelsmann Foundation 2000; Pantev 2001b, pp. 118–138; Kempe and van Meurs 2003, pp. 11–75). The post–Cold War and post–September 11 developments led to the prioritization of security considerations in the forward movement of European integration. The Black Sea region, including the territories of its western coast, has been part of a peripheral area around the EU. With the gradual accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, and after their full membership in NATO, the Black Sea region turned into a geopolitical and geostrategic center (Asmus and Jackson 2004, p. 80). Why so? First, Southeast Europe will for an indefinite period be the border territory of the EU where the pressure of terrorism and new security threats from the Black Sea–Caspian Sea region and the Middle East will first be experienced in a geopolitical sense. This issue has a broader Euro-Atlantic meaning, discussed below. Second, Southeast Europe, especially its western region, is an area to which the extension of the civic, democratic, and security space of Europe is still “unfinished business.” The problems that the EU has to deal with include the status of Kosovo and Serbia, the prospects of Montenegro, the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, the progress of Albania, and the various challenges of post-totalitarianism in the Balkan countries. Moreover, the Balkan region is also known for its recurring conflicts (Pantev 2002a). The experience of Western European integration after World War II, which put an end to the historical hostilities between Germany and France, is expected to bring a similar effect to Southeast Europe. The integration of Southeast Europe into the EU—a strategic goal that was adopted, though barely, by the EU in 2003—could signal the end of regional conflicts that can escalate into violent clashes, thanks to the buildup of a functioning regional security community where disputes could be solved peacefully without resorting to force. Finally, Southeast Europe is a region that has experienced a delayed modernization of economies, infrastructures, technologies, political relationships, and institutions. The Cold War and the periods well before it have been “used” to divide the countries, peoples, and economies in the region rather than connect them

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and bring them to maturity and progress. The EU cannot bear for long such a situation in its own house. The only consistent vehicle of security, progress, and social, political, and economic homogenization is integration into the EU. Today there is no single country or entity in the region that is not part of a specific relationship (albeit with different levels of intensity) with the EU, whether through membership or the road to accession. Faced with various security challenges, the EU has the opportunity to further legitimize itself as a meaningful and effective global actor. It is no surprise that the European Security Strategy mentions as a priority the stability of the Balkans and the problems of the South Caucasus on the eastern shores of the Black Sea, which in due course also will be a neighboring region (Solana 2003). Another significant opportunity that the enlargement of the EU to Bulgaria and the Black Sea would present is closer proximity to the countries addressed by the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). A solid position of the EU on the western Black Sea coast would provide better chances for interacting with Russia, Ukraine, and the three South Caucasian states—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The EU may utilize its own experience and the lessons learned by Bulgaria in tackling the problems that persist in, and are shared across, the South Caucasus: the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, market economy, and rule of law, the actual and potential ethnic, religious, and border conflicts, and the need to overcome a belated economic, technological, infrastructure, and political modernization. The declared will of Georgia and Ukraine to join the EU may not be an imminent political issue for Brussels. However, the experience of Southeast Europe is that the promise of membership in the EU is a major driving force of the transformations that took place and continue in this region; this experience also needs to be taken into account regarding the wider Black Sea region. The collected experience of Bulgaria as a coordinating NATO country in Georgia since 2004 might well be utilized for the EU approaches to the eastern Black Sea countries. Furthering security sector reform in Ukraine with Bulgarian help also adds to the broader tasks of democratizing Ukrainian society and state institutions. The EU borderline with the Russian Federation has been extended after the last wave of enlargement with the membership of Bulgaria and Romania. After the enlargement wave to the Baltic Sea, the EU will also have new borders and relationships with Russia via the Black Sea. Being in touch with Russia in both the north and the south of Europe will provide the EU a better opportunity to test the validity of its approaches to Russia and the creation of a common economic space. Russia is a self-sufficient state with no ambitions of joining the EU, and one can hardly expect the Black Sea to ever turn into an inner lake of the EU. However, the larger practice of interacting with Russia may provide the EU with the experience and knowledge of establishing more realistic and mutually profitable bilat-

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eral relations with Russia based on the concrete calculation of foreign policy interests and not on concepts of “common space” or the ENP. Though there are well-grounded economic arguments in favor of Moscow’s position of insisting to change the price of natural gas, Russia will continue for political reasons to promote its case of “energy supplier on whom many depend” (recall the gas crisis with Ukraine in the first days of 2006, which alerted all Europeans who rely on Russian oil and gas supplies). This can hardly be considered an issue arranged in a stable way or in a definite or predictable period. The ENP relative to Russia has still to be elaborated, and the new Black Sea perspective would give new chances to the EU to meet Russia in a new compromise and agreement. Following EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania, another important opportunity for the EU would be linked to the long negotiations with Turkey for membership, which started in October 2005. The EU countries neighboring Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria, will have a special role in the long-term preparation of Turkey for membership. Their role will not replace the well-developed EU technology of accession negotiations, but will improve the perceptual capacity of the two negotiating sides: the EU and Turkey. A special suggestion to the Turkish side could be the need to continuously tailor the negotiating pattern with the EU and to adopt a problem-solving approach rather than a bargaining approach. Not being able to do that would be reflected in the quality and the length of the accession negotiations. The EU, on the other side, should remain focused on the complexity of balancing the secularism of the state and society in Turkey while implementing the principle of democratic civilian control over the security sector (Fluri, Gustenau, and Pantev 2005; Centre for European Security Studies 2005). While insisting, as EU members, on the implementation by Turkey of all political and economic criteria for membership (the Copenhagen criteria), Greece and Bulgaria have a special position in preserving the vibrancy of the message that Turkey is part of the bigger package of stabilizing the Balkans. Furthermore, Bulgaria could play a significant role in improving the position of the EU for energy supplies (Bordonaro 2006) and energy security, including electricity. The fact that the EU would be on the coast of the Black Sea adds value to the functioning “blue stream” gas pipeline—a Russian-Turkish-Italian project worth US$3.2 billion (750 miles [1,213 kilometers] long, with a capacity of half a trillion cubic feet [16 billion cubic meters] per year). A major concept for the EU in the construction and functioning of oil and gas pipelines in the Black Sea region is the diversification of sources and reduction of the dependency on Russian hydrocarbon energy inflow. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline serves this main purpose and also provides oil to Western European markets. Bulgaria shares the interest of lessening the dependence on Russian oil and gas by connect-

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ing itself with sources from Central Asia. This issue became even more topical after Russia’s pressure on Ukraine to change its financial and political attitude on the gas issue in the beginning of 2006. Bulgaria also received a Russian warning of an upcoming change in the price of gas despite contractual agreements. Some analysts perceived this pressure as part of the efforts to strengthen the bargaining position of Russia in the bid for the construction of the second modern nuclear plant at Belene in Bulgaria on the Danube River by 2010, but it seems the gas issue has its own value and weight and is not necessarily tackled by the Russian side in the context of the interaction of the various energy systems of Bulgaria. Bulgaria plays a significant role as a transit country for energy routes to the EU from the Caspian region across the Black Sea. Russian oil supplies to Greece, which aim to bypass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits, would start transiting Bulgaria at the port of Burgas on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast before reaching the Greek port of Alexandroupolis on the Aegean Sea. Russian supplies of natural gas cross Bulgarian territory to Balkan countries west of Bulgaria and to Greece and Turkey. The “Nabuko” project, a strategic gas pipeline that originates in Iran and crosses Turkey, would transit Bulgarian territory before reaching Central European states, ending in Austria, and eventually farther west. The AMBO oil pipeline project (the United States, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, and Italy) is expected to provide Central Asian oil via Burgas, Skopje in Macedonia, and Vlora in Albania on the Adriatic Sea, and then to Italy. Another gas pipeline, originating in Azerbaijan and headed to Italy via Turkey and Greece, is expected to have its extensions to Bulgaria too. These are modest but significant steps toward realizing the diversification of Bulgaria’s energy resources. In terms of electricity strategy, Bulgaria has been a stabilizing factor in the field of electricity power supplies for nearly two decades. For years, Bulgarian electricity export has covered 50 percent of the electric energy deficit of the Balkans, including during dramatic periods in the region. As part of the country’s package agreement to join the EU, Bulgaria closed two out of six reactors at the nuclear plant in Kozloduy, a small town on the Danube River in northern Bulgaria. This power station has supported nearly half of Bulgaria’s total electricity production (and more during harsh winters, which are not rare in the Balkans). According to the bilateral agreement with the EU, Bulgaria assumed the obligation to close two more reactors at the end of 2006 before joining the EU (the nuclear plant remained, with two functioning reactors). This reduced electricity capacity needs to be compensated by other electric power sources until the country’s second nuclear power station, with two planned reactors, at Belene (located on the banks of the Danube River) can be constructed. American Energy Systems, a US company, was

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already engaged in a major project of reconstructing and modernizing an electricity production plant, using lignite coal, at “Maritza-Iztok 1” in the central-southern part of the country (a project worth US$1.2 billion, with a power output of 670 megawatts). Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and later Turkey and Romania (as well as Germany and the United States), showed an interest in investing in the Belene nuclear power plant. The role of electricity has been an overlooked aspect of the general security situation, but electricity has always been a significant component of the overall stabilizing role of Bulgaria in the entire region, and its neighbors have counted on the supply of electricity from Sofia during both normal and difficult times. An enlarged EU should take into account this source of stability in Southeast Europe, while integrating the energy systems of the new member states. The eastward enlargement of the EU has different strategic objectives. From a Bulgarian and Southeast European point of view, the integration of Bulgaria and the region aims above all at completing the buildup of Europe, a process that started after World War II and stalled during the Cold War. It is indispensable to deal with all strategic challenges and exploit to the fullest the strategic opportunities of Southeast Europe in order to make Europe “whole and free.” In addition, the eastward enlargement of the EU aims at ending the recurring periods of “balkanization,” or fragmentation of the Balkans, by including all the countries of the region in the mainstream of European integration (Gallagher 2005, pp. 166–195). This would bring to an end the traditional violent means in solving the different conflicts that neighboring countries often face in their relationships. As a centrally situated country in the Balkans and located on the western coast of the Black Sea, with successful experience in constructing an ethnoreligious model of tolerance and coping with the transition from Stalinist socialism to democracy, Bulgaria is a key actor in performing this task. Moreover, EU enlargement aims at countering in a decisive way the networks of organized criminality to which the periods of society transition and several wars in the former Yugoslavia gave birth. During the years of transition, Bulgaria also experienced the impact of Russian, Turkish, Albanian, Kurdish, and other criminal networks. The preparation for membership in both NATO and the EU, and the effective bilateral cooperation with members of the alliance and the EU, served as a key antidote in crushing the influence of organized criminality in the country. Finally, the EU will have direct access to the Black Sea with new tasks, roles, engagements, and opportunities. As a Black Sea power, at close proximity to the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea and the broader Middle East (Oliker and Szayna 2003; Pantev 2003, 2005c), the EU will meet new demanding issues and questions (ambitions, capacity, and interests) related to the frontiers of EU enlargement and the time limits for further EU expansion.

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Dilemmas of Enlargement: A Bulgarian Perspective Bulgaria is a latecomer to the EU integration and enlargement project. This Southeast European and Black Sea country has fully accepted the principles and norms and the incremental character of functional integration. This can be proven by the agreement that Bulgaria signed on the different accession chapters to the EU. The implementation of the acquis communautaire is the foundation of the upcoming new national existence and attitude as an EU member. With the deepening of the country’s involvement in the tissue of the integration relationships, Bulgaria will need to generate and share visions and concepts on how to proceed with the further expansion of the EU and what its security and defense policy should be. This is crucial for preserving a balanced and realistic understanding about the future of the nation, the implementation of its obligations as a member of the EU, and its other external relations and engagements, especially as a NATO member and US ally. Two major conceptual preconditions shape the contents, limits, and visions of the EU enlargement project and the attitude to the neighboring areas as reflected in the ENP: the concept of national sovereignty and its modern interpretation, and the role of transatlantic ties in influencing the contents and directions of EU enlargement. Opinions on both these concepts—the role of national sovereignty in an integration community and the tightness of the transatlantic link—form two spectrums with varying levels of intensity. These concepts influence the visions of the EU as a global actor with fixed borders and a well-protected zone of security and prosperity, and as an expanding space of democracy. The first vision heralds an EU with clear territorial borders and strict requirements for membership, while the second one is of a loose integration community of standards, criteria, norms, and rules. The two visions are not yet reconciled at the level of a comprehensive and systemic model. They influence, in a contradictory pattern, the complicated decisionmaking processes on various issues related to the functioning of the EU, and reflect a variety of national opinions and a step-by-step process toward final results. This is why we witness differing positions and attitudes to the issues of the “frontiers” and “timing” of EU enlargement and the concept and the details of the ENP, and why some representatives of EU countries call for a “strategic pause” in the enlargement process while others would consider such a pause to be a grave political mistake for the EU. The very fundament of the launch, progress, and assessment of the EU project should depend on the feedback and opinion of informed European citizens. This requires purposeful education and involvement of EU member state citizens in the difficult issues of integration and enlargement, including the complex issues of foreign policy, security, and defense.

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The emphasis, however, has more often been on formal “information” about results and the blaming of Brussels for certain domestic failures by national governments, which has impeded the formation of fair, educated, and well-informed feedback from citizens on EU integration and enlargement. The EU has a vibrant mechanism to partly compensate for these deficiencies—the political decisionmaking process of the jointly acting member states (including at the summit level). There is a potential of preventing the deficiencies from occurring and upgrading the conceptual basis of EU policymaking. The new EU member states could contribute more significantly to coping with these issues. An analysis of the implications of EU enlargement for Bulgaria in the Black Sea region and its transatlantic engagements and the ESDP represents an effort in this direction.

Transatlantic Engagements The enlargement of the European Union to Bulgaria will have manifold effects on its transatlantic engagements. First, as an EU member and a NATO member, Bulgaria will contribute to the enlargement of the zone of democracy, security, and progress. Eastward expansion’s attraction of a democratic civic space to and from the western Black Sea coast, to the north and east coasts, will assume new geopolitical parameters and augment the capacity of Bulgaria in implementing its transatlantic engagements. For example, Ukraine joined the Southeast European Defense Ministerial (SEDM) on December 8, 2005, which is a regional security arrangement of Italy, Greece, Turkey, the United States, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Croatia (initiated by Bulgaria in 1996 in the context of the “Sofia Process” for security and cooperation in Southeast Europe). Ukraine will assist the SEDM in meeting future security challenges. It is interesting to note that Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro are observers and potential future members of the SEDM. Romania was active in the creation of the Commonwealth of the Democratic Choice, in Kiev on December 2, 2005, which comprises a group of Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Caspian Sea countries that seek to exchange ideas on democratic transformations (including Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Macedonia, and Slovenia). The membership of Bulgaria in the EU provides a new and more influential position for the Union in a region of strategic significance. It is a notorious fact that the east-west and the north-south strategic corridors cross each other in the Caspian Sea–Black Sea region (Pantev et al. 2003–2005). The north-south strategic corridor originates in the Russian and Scandinavian north of Europe, crosses Russia and the South Caucasus,

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and reaches the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean through Iran and India with an already functioning but modest railway connection. The energy and trade addition to the transport infrastructure shapes a solid basis for more active political cooperation. The east-west strategic corridor, or “new way of the silk,” stretches from Japan via Northern China, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the Black Sea, to Western Europe and North Africa. The corridor is part of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (Traceca) projects of the EU, comprising trade, energy, economic, political, and border security elements. The two strategic corridors have the potential of stimulating both competitive and cooperative political attitudes. It is in the interest of the transatlantic community to encourage cooperative tendencies and neutralize conflicting ones. As a power on the western Black Sea coast, the EU will have the opportunity to exert a stronger influence. The situation and the political decisionmaking in Bulgaria as an EU member will have a direct impact on the interests of the EU and its transatlantic partners, and the completion of the reform processes in Bulgaria and improvement of its administrative and judicial effectiveness are important for both the Union and the alliance. Second, the accession of Bulgaria to the EU will confirm to the Western Balkan nations that the policy of gradual integration of the whole region of Southeast Europe is a consistent and unwavering process. This is very important in light of the continuous need for stabilization and progress of this region, an issue that, ever since the beginning of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, has never ceased to be a focal point for the United States and NATO. Any doubt in the countries of the Western Balkans that the EU enlargement process would come to a halt may have a destructive effect on the tremendous efforts and investments in the stability of the region carried out by the EU, NATO, the United States, and countries in the region. As a member of the EU, Bulgaria has a great advantage in pushing forward the enlargement process, as all non-EU countries from the region have already established some forms of relationships and accession to the EU: negotiating for membership (Croatia, Turkey), establishing “candidate” status without negotiating for accession (Macedonia), implementing stabilization and association agreements (Albania), or negotiating stabilization and association agreements (Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro). Greece and Slovenia are already EU members, and have special contributions for the enlargement of the EU to the Balkan Peninsula. Integration in the EU has become synonymous with security and stability in the Balkans, and this political achievement must not be compromised. Third, enlargement to Bulgaria will allow the EU to include a Southeast European country that has shaped its own profile as a devoted member of the counterterrorist coalition and a close ally to the United States, with which it has developed “special pragmatic” relations in recent

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years (Pantev 2006, pp. 191–215). Bulgaria has been part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan; it increased its troops there from 80 to 400 in 2007 and assumed the responsibility of protecting the Kabul airport. Afghanistan was the first test ground for the Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe (SEEBRIG) with significant Bulgarian participation (which was stationed in Constanza on the Romanian Black Sea coast until early 2006). A Bulgarian general had the command of the Balkan brigade, which comprised 400 soldiers, as well as of the whole “Kabul” division, during this important NATO mission in Afghanistan. Bulgaria also participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom through protection functions, replacing US troops at the Ashraf camp for Iranian refugees (45 miles [70 kilometers] north of Baghdad), and it has participated in the NATO mission in Iraq for training Iraqi security servicemen. Moreover, Bulgaria cooperated in the Balkan region in preventing and neutralizing the activity of Al-Qaida terrorists, and participated in the stabilization forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo. The cooperation and coordination of activities with EU and US special services (with NATO and on a bilateral basis in the region) enjoy strong political and public support in Bulgaria. The last presidential elections in Bulgaria in October 2006 (in which the anti-European and anti–Atlantic Alliance nationalist candidate was defeated, by a vote of 76 to 24 percent) showed that the policy of EU integration, NATO membership, and close ties with the United States are well accepted and assimilated by the broader society. There is also a range of issues related to societal or “homeland” security. For example, thanks to bilateral Bulgarian-US cooperation, all 8,258 sources of nuclear radioactivity at 522 sites in Bulgaria have been placed under permanent control and protection. Thirty-six of these sites have been assessed as potential targets of terrorists. US special services experts helped decisively in improving the physical protection of the nuclear power plant at Kozloduy and other nuclear sites. All these achievements in the area of developing elements of the Bulgarian “homeland” security system will be shared with the EU partners. Bulgaria joins the EU as a country that shares military facilities with the US armed forces. These facilities are called “forward operating sites” or “cooperative security locations” and will not be clones of the “main operating bases,” such as the one in Ramstein, Germany. In December 2005, Romania concluded a bilateral agreement with the United States that allows the stationing of US forces on Romanian soil. In March 2006, Bulgaria completed negotiations and signed in April that year a similar agreement with the United States. The redeployment of US forces around the world represents the implementation of the new US basing policy and forms part of the US global military posture review. The sharing of military facilities will improve the parties’ joint ability to respond to crises, and will allow for more effective joint training and operations. The US-shared military facili-

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ties in Bulgaria can be used as temporary bases for several thousand troops on short assignments. The home bases for the troops will remain in the United States or Germany. About a hundred US personnel will be on longterm assignment in the region as part of an Eastern European task force. The US basing plan in Bulgaria will involve about 2,500 US troops on sixmonth rotations, with a possibility of doubling the number during the rotation periods. Bulgaria has become an integral part of the new external border of the EU to the east. Apart from giving an answer to terrorism in the Black Sea basin, especially in connection with the transportation of hydrocarbon energy supplies, the shared military facilities will also be in position to respond to other threats. These threats include illegal migration and human trafficking, and the smuggling of drugs and weapons. Though Turkey is preparing for EU membership, it would be an extremely difficult task to put in order the approximately 1 million illegal migrants living in this country. Most of the 75,000–100,000 migrants transiting Turkey are illegal, and many of them try to go west via Bulgaria. This is an issue that requires cooperation by all Black Sea states, as migrants seek soft intermediary destinations before going west. The backup of the US military bases in dealing with this issue will be a major guarantor of stability for the EU’s eastern frontiers. Bulgaria’s EU membership gives an additional impetus to the drafting of an EU strategy for managing criminality in Southeast Europe. Transatlantic cooperation is indispensable for effectively dealing with multifaceted threats. Fourth, the enlargement of the EU to Bulgaria will introduce a fresh impetus to transatlantic solidarity through a balanced and fair interpretation of EU–North American relations. The EU membership of the Southeast European nation will help dispel doubts about fading transatlantic amity and help prevent downgrading of the security interests of the transatlantic partners, including by closing the perceptual gap on certain priority security challenges. NATO has been undergoing a process of adaptation and effective transformation to respond to present-day needs, and the organization is perceived by Bulgaria as a guarantor for stabilizing the transatlantic link. The democratization role played by both the EU and NATO is still crucial for the progress of the formerly totalitarian political space of Eastern, Central, and Southeast Europe and the Black Sea basin.

The ESDP There are skeptical views, especially among the older EU member states, that enlargement to the east would only increase the already existing structural problems in the EU, including in the areas of foreign, security, and defense policy. More problems would occur in connection with the defini-

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tion of the foreign political objectives because of different interests, and concerns remain as to the levels of administrative efficiency and political stability in some of the new member states. In addition, the decisionmaking and implementation processes with existing and new EU members, including Bulgaria and Romania, also constitute a major problem (Dehousse and van den Brule 2003). There are those who share a similar skepticism, highlighting the fact that intergovernmentalism and unanimity tend to prevail in foreign and security policy of the EU (Forsberg 2004). Others, who also note certain deficiencies of the ESDP, prefer to underline the achievements of EU enlargement and the constitutional treaty (not ratified by France and the Netherlands), especially the presentation of military means together with civilian means as some of the tools of EU foreign policy under the respective constitutional texts (Ribulis 2005, pp. 21–41). I agree with the conclusions of an expert on ESDP, Ingo Peters, who wrote: “The evolution of ESDP has been an incremental process based on compromises among members of the European Community and later the European Union. The integration of security and defense policy has always been contested within the European Community/European Union, not the least because of different concepts of the nation-state, different ideas and preferences about the finality of the integration process, and different stances on appropriate relations with NATO and the United States” (2004, p. 395). Thus the ESDP inevitably reflects (1) a level of internalization of the global needs in the field of security and the global responsibilities the EU can assume, (2) the stage of maturity of the integration process in Europe, and (3) the capability of working together with the transatlantic partners in achieving the common or identical interests and goals (Pantev 2005b, pp. 4–7). What change does Bulgaria bring, practically and conceptually, in dealing with security issues as a new EU member? Will the transatlantic relationship be influenced by the participation of Bulgaria in the EU and the ESDP? The development of Bulgarian perceptions on the evolution of the ESDP has never been a clear-cut and easygoing process. The conceived complexity of the issue of defense integration in the EU context, its dynamic interaction with transatlantic relations, and the evolving global security situation have been important factors for the national orientations in an uneasy process of systemic social, political, economic, and defense transformation of the country after the end of totalitarian socialism. Although in 1990 Bulgarian opposition leaders formulated in the public domain the need for Bulgaria to become a member of NATO, the intellectual, political, and security elite as well as the broader public were still at the very beginning of transforming social mentality and reshaping national security thinking. The rate of required change and adaptation in the security field has mattered dramatically for Bulgaria, and any retardation in its modernization

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and participation would have had serious negative consequences for its successful integration into NATO and the EU. It is important to go back to these issues from the perspective of the present state of affairs in the EU-NATO and EU-US domains. Ever since its gradual involvement in and understanding of EU and NATO integration, Bulgaria has not treated the two relationships in a conflicting way. In a period when, for domestic political reasons, there existed tendencies to oppose integration into the EU and accession to NATO, two studies by Bulgarian authors introduced an encompassing and sober discussion on these issues (Pantev, Ratchev, and Tsachevsky 1995; Pantev, Ratchev, and Ivanov 1996). They argued that the clear desire of Bulgaria to become a member of the EU would require compatibility of the country’s reforming defense establishment with the evolving ESDP and NATO standards. The studies did not register significant philosophical, operational, institutional, and armaments contradictions in Bulgaria’s efforts in adapting to the requirements of the ESDP and the Partnership for Peace. The excellent performance of Bulgaria in the Partnership for Peace program has been logically linked to the aims of the ESDP, to which it was legally linked through its European association agreement with the EU. The overlapping influences of EU enlargement for Southeast Europe (the role the Western European Union played for years to prepare its “associate partners” for membership behavior in both the EU/ESDP and NATO) and the United States, and the promise of future membership in NATO, contributed to the positive image of all these actors in a difficult period for Bulgaria. The positive experience of the involvement of NATO, the United States, and the EU in the conflicts in the region represented a historically unique phenomenon of the roles of great powers in shaping the destiny of Southeast Europe. The Bulgarian society is not contesting the philosophical consistency of being a member of NATO and the EU as well as a reliable ally to the United States. This represents a natural step based on the independent and sovereign historical experience of Bulgaria for more than a decade, a period of difficult and responsible decisions in the areas of national security and foreign policy. This period is seen as the foundation of current and future policies with Bulgaria as a member of NATO promoting the enhancement of transatlantic ties for the fight against terrorism, while preserving its credibility as a member of the EU. Bulgaria does not reconcile opportunistically its EU and NATO memberships and special pragmatic relations with the United States. Regarding the concepts for a unipolar and multipolar world, the position of Bulgaria is that Europe and the United States constitute the “one-pole system,” with the ESDP adding strength to the transatlantic community, a notion that has its critics both in Europe and in the United States. However, the “one-pole system” concept (which stems from an analysis of global, transcontinental,

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regional, and subregional developments) leads to the conclusion that the pressing needs of the global security agenda, especially the fight against terrorism, make this “Bulgarian” interpretation a realistic one. Furthermore, it is a fact of life that the United States is expanding its presence and influence, and that the EU is in a process of phased enlargement. Both processes are elements of the expanding civic and security space of democracy for which the United States and the EU hold historical and moral responsibilities. Furthermore, we find a lot of similarities and overlapping or identical positions in the US National Security Strategy (2002 and 2006) and the European Security Strategy (2003)—despite the different practical significance for the respective decisionmaking processes of the two documents. There is a similar realization that the nature of the threats facing the United States and Europe is global, and the first line of defense would be very often somewhere abroad (Pantev 2005a, pp. 82–84). Bulgaria’s practical participation in the ESDP comprises 300 soldiers, 120 of them engaged in the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2003, Bulgaria formally declared its voluntary contributions to the EU Headline Goals. At the end of 2005, Bulgaria agreed in principle to participate in an EU-led battle group of 1,500 troops, The particular Balkan battle group comprised forces of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, and Romania. It was on stand-by in the second half of 2007. According to the EU, the battle groups are to be used for limited time and with limited scope (humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping). They are not to replace the gendarmerie and police in coping with riots, and need to be able to take up positions ten days after a decision is taken. Bulgaria’s conceptual position on the ESDP and its role in transatlantic relations has another significant argument. While the ESDP is in a formative process, the United States and NATO are implementing intensive transformation tasks of their defense organization. In all cases the focus is on (1) elaborating and adopting adequate and effective strategies, (2) acquiring the respective capabilities to be able to implement these strategies, (3) taking the most appropriate position in the world to be able to influence the security environment and utilize the existing capabilities, and (4) reassessing the basing needs of the respective forces (Michel 2005, pp. 78–83). The ESDP, NATO, and the United States have already realized that postconflict rehabilitation capacity has become crucial for the success of intervention in and management of all phases of a conflict more generally. Developing capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction is an important component of the overall potential of intervening and influencing the course of developments in a particular conflict, and is just as indispensable as being able to work together, since no country or organization can achieve its objectives by acting alone. EU-NATO cooperation in the “Berlin Plus” agreement format for the EU’s military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Althea)

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was used in supporting the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Darfur. The EU, NATO, and the United States also work closely together in dealing with the complicated issue of Iran’s nuclear plans (mainly military aspects).

Conclusion Bulgaria views its engagements with the EU and the ESDP, and with NATO and its “special relations” with the United States, in a logical and mutually reinforcing pattern. The experience of cooperation among these influential international actors in the Balkans during the 1990s and beyond, and the historical shift in this region, have been reflected in and continue to be part of the national policy of Bulgaria. The combination of efficient “top-down” engagement with the Balkans from the outside and the “bottom-up” initiatives and efforts from within the region produced positive and practical results and lessons from intra-European and transatlantic relations that were absent in the earlier history of this part of Europe. The enlargement of the EU to Bulgaria and the western coast of the Black Sea will definitely have an empowering effect on Bulgaria, the EU, and the United States, and on the ESDP and NATO. Bulgaria has realized that the effectiveness of this empowerment is contingent on the level of transatlantic solidarity, which in turn will have a direct positive effect on the transformations of societies and states and the global security situation more generally. The role of the leading actors in the system of international relations is well understood by Sofia, which sees the strengthening of the transatlantic partnership as a major responsibility whereas it also sees the EU as an integrated supranational entity with a rising global role. Bulgaria is confident that its role in reconciling its EU and transatlantic engagements is constructive for both sides of the Atlantic. Bulgaria’s accession to the EU is not taking place at the expense of the country’s transatlantic partnership. On the contrary, both are viewed as mutually reinforcing the position of the value system they both represent (democracy, freedom, security, and prosperity). The enlarged EU with Bulgaria aboard will empower the European integration process, its broader influence, as well as the transatlantic alliance (the indispensable factor for progress, modernity, and security in the global world).

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Turkey: The Potential Impact of EU Membership

8

Oya Dursun-Özkanca

SINCE THE EARLY YEARS OF THE COLD WAR, TURKEY HAS ALWAYS

been well embedded in transatlantic security frameworks. It has been a key NATO member since 1952, and a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe since 1973; since 1992 it has been an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU), an institution that became the military wing of the European Union. Turkey’s strategic geopolitical positioning as a bridge between Europe, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the South Caucasus makes it an indispensable actor in European security and transatlantic relations. The September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent fight against terrorism highlighted Turkey’s strategic significance for transatlantic actors once again. Hence the emerging security threats of the current era and the shifting regional focus of both sides of the Atlantic call for a closer incorporation of Turkey into transatlantic security frameworks. We are at a crossroads regarding the future formation of the European Security and Defense Policy and transatlantic security relations. The effects of the past and upcoming rounds of EU enlargement on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and transatlantic relations have yet to be seen. Now that Turkey has been considered for full EU membership since October 2005 (and is still being considered), its relationships with the EU, NATO, and the United States have acquired new dimensions. The possibility of its accession has brought the salience of Turkey to the forefront, with far-reaching implications for developments in the ESDP and transatlantic relations, and for the stability of the entire Balkan, Caucasus, Middle East, and Mediterranean regions. Although there are points of agreement between both sides of the 119

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Atlantic on the issue of Turkish accession to the EU, there are vital differences between the United States and several European countries on the issue. Traditionally, the United States has supported Turkish EU membership. One of the biggest concerns of the EU in deciding whether to include Turkey as a member originates from the fear that Turkey might serve as a Trojan horse for US interests from within the EU. However, the alreadychanging balance of power within the enlarged EU may render such concerns void. It is in this context that Turkey is searching for its place in the Euro-Atlantic community. Whether Turkey maintains its position as a stabilizing force in the region and remains as a bridge between the East and the West depends on the support it receives from transatlantic actors about its EU accession. This chapter considers the impact of Turkey’s eventual EU accession (or not) on transatlantic relations and European security frameworks. It examines the factors that make Turkey strategically significant for the EU, NATO, and the United States, surveys the past, present, and future of Turkey-NATO-ESDP relations, and analyzes the impact of several alternative Turkish EU accession scenarios on transatlantic security relations. I argue that the EU and the United States should employ a carrot and stick policy in order to keep Turkish foreign policy in line with the preferences and common interests of the transatlantic actors and to not alienate Turkey from its path toward Westernization.

Turkey’s Strategic Significance for the Euro-Atlantic Community Turkey once was considered as being located on the periphery of NATO and Europe; with the new security environment, though, it is now considered to be at the heart of the transatlantic strategic focus (EurActiv 2005b). Since Turkey is an influential actor playing a vital political and military role in the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Central Asia, its position on almost any given international issue is relevant for the future of the CFSP and transatlantic security. There is danger in alienating Turkey from the Euro-Atlantic alliance, given the country’s strategic significance for transatlantic actors and its potential contributions to the ESDP and transatlantic security. Turkey occupies the crossroads of three continents, controlling key intersection points of political, strategic, and economic interactions between major regional and global powers. It borders regions that are abundant with strategically significant natural resources like natural gas and oil. The EU has faced an energy bottleneck due to Russia’s unsteady energy policies, which has underlined the strategic importance of Turkey’s

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position as a secure and reliable connection point between the Caspian energy corridor and Europe. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline for the transport of Caspian hydrocarbon resources through Turkey to European markets was officially started in May 2005. Maintenance of the security of such transactions is an important Turkish contribution to European stability and prosperity. Almost all central developments in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War—such as the Balkan tragedies and the subsequent reconstruction efforts in the region, the EU and NATO enlargement processes, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process—called for some level of involvement from Turkey. Turkish cooperation is of a greater significance in any transatlantic effort to effectively address the newly emerging security challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iranian nuclear ambitions, human trafficking, drug smuggling, and organized crime. Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül (2002) illustrated this point by attracting attention to the fact that eighteen out of nineteen potential crisis situations identified by NATO would involve Turkey one way or another. As a long-lasting member of NATO and a secular EU candidate country with a majority Muslim population, Turkey has an important role to play in terms of its military capabilities and expertise, and in its contributions to the projection of democracy, freedom, the rule of law, and human rights in the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa. Turkey’s participation in the Gulf War, UN operations in Somalia and Bosnia, and NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan prove that it shares broad security concerns with the United States and the EU in the post–Cold War era. For instance, Turkey took over command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan twice, for a total duration of fourteen months in three years. Consequently, Turkish membership in the EU would provide a stronger connection between NATO and the EU/ESDP, and help reinforce strategic relations between these significant actors. The European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council in December 2003, revealed that the EU is eager to play a role outside Europe. Turkey can effectively contribute to this European goal. Turkish accession to the EU would increase the latter’s hard and soft power capabilities, and would enhance the strategic significance of the EU as a global actor (Aktar 2005). With over 300 civilian police currently deployed in UN peacekeeping missions throughout the world, Turkey is among the leading UN contributors of civilian police. Through its relevant experience and capabilities in contributing to security, stability, and intercultural communication in both the Balkans and the greater Middle East, Turkey has a potential to strengthen the ESDP.

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As the single NATO member bordering Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and as a country that began membership negotiations with the EU, Turkey could help improve the success of transatlantic initiatives in the broader Middle East. Turkey has an immense potential role to play as mediator or facilitator between the West on the one hand, and Iran and Syria on the other. Turkey has already taken an active role in improving bilateral relations with Syria. It has supported efforts of the EU to obtain long-term guarantees from Tehran on the implementation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its nuclear safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Turkey’s national interest meets those of the transatlantic actors in its opposition to the development of another nuclear power in the Middle East. Turkey has volunteered to play an active role as a regional actor, enjoying the confidence of both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While Turkey has a strong relationship with Israel, it also maintains solid ties with the Palestinians; the accession of Turkey could enable the EU to play a stronger role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In terms of hard power, Turkey could offer the EU a large number of well-trained forces for peacekeeping and disaster relief missions. The Turkish armed forces could provide a substantial advantage for a more ambitious ESDP. The Turkish military is highly specialized in high-intensive combat, due to more than twenty-five years of experience in the fight against insurgents from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). For an EU that aspires to become a truly strategic actor through projecting power outside the European continent, Turkey’s military capabilities and geographical location could serve as vital assets. While the average defense expenditure of NATO countries is less than 2 percent of gross domestic product, for Turkey it is over 4.5 percent. This investment is crucial not only for the maintenance of security in Turkey, but also for that of the European continent. Turkish contributions could further make the EU capable of engaging in effective military and civilian peacekeeping in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the South Caucasus. Turkey has participated in the EU-led police missions in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It has also participated in several missions in the Balkans (such as the UN Protection Force, the Implementation Force, the Kosovo Force, and the Stabilization Force/Althea). Turkey announced its intention to contribute to the battle group concept of the EU at the military-capability conference held in Brussels in November 2004. Together with Italy and Romania, Turkey pledged to form a combat group in the second half of 2010 and declared its intentions to contribute to the 2008 civilian Headline Goal, which aims at further improvement of civilian crisis management capabilities. The new European

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Defense Agency arrangements also acknowledge the special role of Turkey despite its status as a non-EU member of NATO. Turkish officers were involved in the EU planning team in Operation Althea, a “Berlin Plus” operation conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkey is also a visible actor in Southeast Europe. It is a member of the Southeast European Cooperation Process, a regional framework for cooperation among Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia. It is an active member of the coordination committee of the Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial Process as well as a member of the political-military steering committee of the Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe. Turkey also contributes to the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and to the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (European Commission 2005g). Being a key actor in the Black Sea region, Turkey also proposed the idea of creating the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, established in 1992. It sought to promote peace and stability in the region through maintaining strong economic relations among the member states. In the security field in the Black Sea, Turkey again took the lead in the formation of a readily deployable naval task force (BLACKSEAFOR), and initiated Operation Black Sea Harmony on March 1, 2004. Furthermore, Turkey is a leading power in the Middle East region. As an EU member, Turkey would increase the soft power of the EU in the Middle East due to its geographical and cultural proximity to the countries in the region. Turkey’s religious, cultural, and historical affiliations have proven to be priceless assets in peacekeeping exercises in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Turkish peacekeeping forces can combine efficiency with cultural sensitivity and thus provide a well-rounded asset that no other European nation can match (Jenkins 2004). As US undersecretary of defense Eric Edelman notes: “For all those who believe democracy cannot work in [the Middle East], who think the task of spreading democracy is too daunting or isn’t worth it, Turkey is the refutation” (2005). The Turkish model could help spread democracy to the Middle East and contribute to regional security in this destabilized region. Turkey’s EU membership would also strengthen the EuroMediterranean partnership. Since July 2005, Turkey has jointly chaired, with Spain, the UN Secretary-General’s “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative, a project designed to advance religious tolerance and reaffirm humanity’s interdependence. Arab countries are closely following the developments concerning EU-Turkey relations to see whether the EU will include a majority Muslim country as a member and hence fulfill its claims for multiculturalism.

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The Turkey-NATO-ESDP Connection Thanks to its NATO membership, Turkey was at the center of the EuroAtlantic security framework throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s. Drawing on the lessons learned from the Balkan tragedies, the EU increasingly took steps to become an independent security actor. Consequently, NATO faced the threat of weakening its importance vis-à-vis the EU in the late 1990s. At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the EU member states announced their determination to play a role on the international stage and declared that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.” At the Helsinki summit in December 1999 the EU member states defined the guidelines of the ESDP. The objective was to “create an autonomous capacity for the EU to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.” The European Council of Feira developed this security and defense project further, and the Nice summit declared the introduction of the ESDP. As a result, NATO was no longer the only institution managing security and defense on the European continent. As a non-EU member of NATO, Turkey was and still is concerned about the decline of NATO’s role vis-à-vis the ESDP in the European context. This concern should be expected to last until Turkey becomes a full member of the EU. The official Turkish position regarding the formation of an independent ESDP before the “Berlin Plus” agreement was best summarized by former Turkish ambassador Onur Öymen: “Since NATO was so successful in maintaining peace and security in Europe, we should think twice about embarking on new projects that might possibly erode the strength of the Western Alliance. . . . NATO should stay as the most important security organization in Europe and not simply one, among several, important organizations” (Öymen 2000). Turkish reaction was mainly due to the fear of loss of influence in crisis management activities as a result of more operations being conducted under the ESDP framework, rather than under the NATO command structure, where Turkey enjoyed equal status with the rest of the allies. For that reason, Turkey threatened to veto the “Berlin Plus” agreement between the EU and NATO. In 1997, following the Western European Union’s Berlin and Erfurt ministerial councils, Turkey obtained the right to participate fully in all Petersberg missions carried out by the WEU (a right obtained by all other WEU associate members as well).1 Although the United States was willing to see the EU acquiring an independent military capability from the perspective of burden sharing on

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the European continent, it shared Turkey’s concerns regarding the development of an autonomous ESDP at the expense of the existing NATO framework. Accordingly, at the Washington summit in April 1999, European allies confirmed the “three Ds” (no decoupling of US and European security, no duplication of NATO assets, and no discrimination against non-EU members). Nondiscrimination against non-EU members was proposed especially to alleviate Turkey’s concerns that it might be excluded from the newly emerging European security frameworks. In 2004, the accession of ten new states to the EU made the memberships of NATO and the EU more or less identical, leaving Iceland, Norway, and Turkey as the three non-EU European members of NATO. These countries are allowed to participate in the crisis management activities conducted under the ESDP framework when the operations employ NATO assets and capabilities. Even in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets, these countries are encouraged to take part, alongside other interested third countries, following a unanimous decision by the European Council (Grant 2001). With the opening of EU accession negotiations in October 2005, Turkey’s uneasiness about an autonomous European security infrastructure developing outside NATO was somewhat assuaged. The prospect of EU accession provides strong incentives for Turkey to approach such European ambitions with more tolerance, and to adopt a more compromising attitude toward several of its foreign policy issues that have been seemingly intractable since the foundation of the republic. Moreover, Turkish foreign policy is increasingly being conducted in line with that of the EU, not only substantially but also stylistically. The EU now has a stronger prospect of leading Turkey in the desired direction, and a huge potential to influence the dynamics of the Middle East, Caucasus, and Mediterranean regions. Nevertheless, since its EU accession is considered an “open-ended” process rather than an automatic or a guaranteed one, Turkey still approaches developments regarding the ESDP with a certain level of skepticism. Because the uncertainties related to Turkish accession continue, Turkey will most likely remain skeptical of any autonomous ESDP initiatives. As such, it would be the preference of Turkey to keep collective defense under the NATO framework as long as it remains a non-EU NATO member. Turkey’s ambivalence toward the ESDP reflects a certain amount of ambivalence toward the EU in general, an issue that needs to be dealt with during the accession negotiations. One instance that contributed to Turkish mistrust of European allies occurred during the debates leading to the Iraq intervention. On February 10, 2003, Turkey invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that members “will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independ-

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ence or security of any [NATO country] is threatened.” Turkey was the only NATO member within the range of a possible nuclear, biological, or chemical attack from Iraq. A decision was taken to put Article 4 into effect only after seven days of crisis, with France, Belgium, and Germany opposing Turkey’s demands. The initial refusal of these three countries to allow NATO to act in the name of Turkey’s territorial defense in the event of an attack by the Saddam Hussein regime has deepened Turkish distrust of several European allies. The credibility crisis subsided after approval from these three countries, but it almost tore the Atlantic Alliance apart. Another source of skepticism originates from Turkey’s concerns that Greece might exert influence on the EU to act against Turkish interests, especially on the issue of the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. The picture became more complicated with the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004. Not only did the EU admit a de facto divided island into the EU, but it also punished the northern part of the island, which had approved by referendum adoption of the plan that Kofi Annan prepared for resolution of the Cyprus conflict. This has exacerbated Turkish bitterness toward the EU. It will take the EU considerable time and effort to convince Turkey that the ESDP and other European policies will not work against Turkish national interests. Nevertheless, since the formal accession negotiations opened with Turkey, the road ahead has become less problematic in terms of obtaining Turkish support for independent ESDP programs. Turkey is expected to become keener to take part in ESDP operations in order to demonstrate its willingness to invest its resources for common European enterprises on security issues.

Turkish EU Accession and Transatlantic Relations: Strategic Security Dilemmas Turkey signed the Ankara agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963, and applied for European Community membership in 1987; but not until December 1999 did it become an official EU candidate. On October 3, 2005, a significant door was opened for Turkey for possible EU accession. The EU started concrete accession negotiations with Turkey and opened negotiation chapters in June 2006. The accession of Turkey into the EU provides a window of opportunity for both Turkey and transatlantic actors. However, there are several strategic security dilemmas affecting Turkey’s relations with the EU, NATO, and the United States that are centered on the prospects of its EU accession. According to Ömer Ta≈spınar, “It is not a coincidence that one of the worst periods in Turkey-EU relations was also one of the best times in the Turkish-American partnership” (2005a, p. 7). Whenever relations between

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one side of the Atlantic and Turkey are under strain, the other side improves its relations with Turkey as a counterbalance. This is not to argue that the EU and the United States are alternative options for Turkey, but rather that they are complementary. Turkey currently maintains a middle road between the EU and the United States in terms of its foreign policy orientation, and it should not be put in a situation where it is required to choose between different sides of the Atlantic (Ta≈spınar 2005b). Turkey can even provide means for narrowing the differences between allies across the Atlantic, and enhance strategic cooperation between Europe and the United States. Moreover, it is in the interest of both the United States and the EU to ensure incorporation of Turkey into the fight against contemporary security threats. Since transatlantic differences are not as stark as they were during the initial stages of the Iraq intervention, it is unlikely that Turkey will soon find itself needing to align its foreign policy with only one side of the Atlantic. There are three possible scenarios for Turkey in its bid for EU accession: it may become a full member of the EU, it may become tied into European frameworks through other means such as “strategic” or “privileged” partnerships, or it may be refused membership in the EU. Scenario 1: Turkey Becomes a Full Member of the EU

Full accession of Turkey to the EU is considered by many to be a realistic possibility in ten to fifteen years. EU membership would mark the ultimate step in Turkey’s efforts toward becoming a Western democracy. But how would an EU-member Turkey influence the future of the ESDP and transatlantic security relations? With Turkish accession, the population of the EU would increase by about 75 million people and annual income would increase by about €400 billion (US$600 billion). Inclusion of a majority Muslim secular country as a full member would allow the EU to present itself as a multicultural union to the rest of the world. This would be particularly valuable to the EU given contemporary tensions throughout the world, exemplified by the publication of controversial cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed by Danish and several other European newspapers. Turkish membership would enhance the EU’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim world and hence would increase the leverage and credibility of the EU in the greater Middle East as well as in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. As an EU member, Turkey would more closely align its policies with those of the EU and would normalize its relations with neighboring countries. Turkey would be better able to engage in regional stability as well as in confidence-building measures with its neighbors. Such improvements in Turkish foreign policy behavior have already begun.

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One of the most tangible examples of such change concerns the Cyprus conflict. The existence of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus, on an EU member country’s territory, poses one of the biggest strategic dilemmas for the EU regarding Turkish accession. Turkey still refuses to grant formal diplomatic recognition to Cyprus, although it has accepted to extend the customs union agreement to the newly admitted EU countries. Though the European Union has significant bargaining power, a significant window of opportunity for reaching a viable resolution to the long-lasting Cyprus conflict was lost with EU accession of the island prior to unification. Nevertheless, the opening of EU accession talks with Turkey may prove to be another opportunity (probably the last) for urging the parties involved in the Cyprus conflict to take constructive steps toward a compromise. The Turkish government has already taken further steps on the Cyprus issue since the start of its accession negotiations with the EU. In January 2006, Turkey proposed an action plan involving the opening of its ports and airports for Greek Cypriot use in exchange for the opening of Turkish Cypriot ports and airports for international traffic. The action plan also called for the lifting of economic isolation and social and cultural (including sports) sanctions on the northern part of the island. However, the Greek Cypriots did not approach the proposal with much sympathy. The resolution of the Cyprus conflict is among the priorities set by the current Finnish presidency of the EU. Currently, the EU expects Turkey to “ensure full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport” (European Commission 2006, p. 11). The EU is disappointed that Turkey has not yet opened its ports to Cypriot vessels and planes. This point was further underlined by EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn and German chancellor Angela Merkel. Rehn identified the current attempts to resolve the Cyprus conflict as the “last opportunity” for Turkey, and warned that failure to resolve the conflict might result in a suspension of accession talks with Turkey (EurActiv 2006). Merkel warned Turkey about the implementation of the Ankara agreement and argued that “a very, very serious situation arises regarding the continuation of the accession talks” (Beunderman 2006). Responding to the latest European Commission report on the Cyprus conflict, Turkish prime minister Recep Erdoπan maintained that “unless an embargo on [Northern] Cyprus is lifted, [the Turkish] stance [on the Ankara agreement] will not change” (Mahony 2006). Thanks to the carrot of EU membership, Turkey’s relations with Greece have continued to develop positively in recent years. Turkish EU membership could work as a strong safety belt, alongside its NATO mem-

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bership, for the prevention of possible tension between Turkey and Greece/Cyprus. Turkey has increasingly embraced the legal, financial, diplomatic, and multilateralist settings in order to pursue its foreign policy interests (Grant 2001; Tocci 2003). Turkey improved its relations with Iran and settled its water conflict with Syria within a relatively short time, stayed outside of the Iraq War, increased its dialogue with its own Kurdish minority, dramatically expanded economic trade and military cooperation with Israel, and became directly involved in Palestinian economic development. For instance, Turkey took over the Erez industrial zone in the Gaza Strip, an enterprise that will contribute to the economic development and political stability of Palestine. The start of accession negotiations with Turkey has significant repercussions for US foreign policy in the Middle East. After its accession to the EU, an economically developed Turkey would enhance EU military-strategic capabilities and positively contribute to burden sharing within the EuroAtlantic community. With Turkey inside the EU, transatlantic partners could work together more effectively to provide stronger incentives for democratic and economic reform in the broader Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia. Turkey could play an active role as a mediator on issues at the heart of the transatlantic agenda, like the situation in Iran, reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq, a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, stability in the Balkans, Chechen problems, and the Azeri-Armenian conflict. Therefore the United States has traditionally supported full EU membership for Turky, and has consistently pressed the EU to accelerate Turkey’s accession process. The United States seeks a strong and reliable partner in the Middle East, and also to further reinforce the Atlanticist nature of the EU, a goal achieved only partially through the latest round of EU enlargement in 2007. Recruitment of close allies like Turkey within the expanding EU would enable the United States to employ some checks and balances to have a better say in the future direction of the ESDP and the CFSP. Additionally, the inclusion of Turkey within the emerging European security structures would help reducing transatlantic differences. On the other hand, there are several neoconservatives in the United States who openly argue against the desirability of Turkish membership in the EU, hoping to keep Turkey firmly on the US side. They deplore what they see as Turkey adopting a more European line of thinking about Iraq and the broader Middle East at the expense of relations with the United States and Israel (Ta≈spınar 2005a). Until Turkey becomes a full member of the EU, it might be expected to continue participating in ESDP operations only selectively (European Commission 2005g). Turkey would contribute more regularly and diligently to ESDP operations after its full accession to the EU, without any con-

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sideration of the geographical location of conflicts. This possibility of Turkey, as an EU member, assigning more value to ESDP frameworks at the expense of NATO, is a concern for the United States, as it would result in a decrease of the overall influence of NATO and the United States in the Middle East. At the same time, as an EU member Turkey would be able to influence ESDP developments more directly, providing a stronger connection between NATO and the EU/ESDP and helping to reinforce strategic relations between these transatlantic actors. The policy outcome of such a scenario is beneficial for all transatlantic parties involved. EU membership is desirable from the Turkish perspective because it would allow the country increased political influence in both developing the ESDP and shaping of the dynamics of Turkey’s regional neighborhood. From the EU perspective, Turkish membership would allow increased EU soft power in the Middle East and more effective and efficient response mechanisms in humanitarian crises on the European continent and elsewhere. Finally, from the US perspective, Turkish EU membership would result in a more reliable strategic partnership between the United States and Europe, as well as increased burden sharing across the Atlantic. However, some in the EU are uneasy about importing the strategic or security-related problems created by Turkey’s borders with unstable neighbors such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as well as its neighbors in the South Caucasus. Some are additionally concerned about possible US interference with the EU’s ambitions to emerge as a viable competitor to US power. Scenario 2: Turkey Becomes a “Strategic Partner” of the EU

There are a number of obstacles that might hinder the prospects of Turkey’s full accession to the EU. According to the European Commission, “The pace of reforms [in Turkey] has slowed down” (2006, p. 11). The Commission is especially concerned about Turkey’s human rights and freedom of expression record (2006, p. 16). Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which makes insulting “Turkishness” punishable, has led to the prosecution of many journalists and writers, and has thus received much criticism from the EU circles. In August 2006 there was a change in the leadership of the Turkish military: Ya≈sar Büyükanıt, a very vocal critic of the government and the EU policies, became the new chief of the general staff. The November 2006 report by the European Commission also criticizes the current state of civilmilitary relations in Turkey. Turkey must not only fulfill the Copenhagen criteria and fully adopt the acquis communautaire, but also win over the hearts and minds of European citizens. Already, France and Austria have announced that they

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will hold public referendums on Turkish accession. Looking at European public opinion surveys, one can easily observe that the prospect of Turkish accession does not receive the warmest welcome in some parts of Europe. According to Eurobarometer survey results, in 2005 a clear majority of European citizens (55 percent) were opposed to Turkish EU membership (European Commission 2005b). Levels of support are especially low among Austrians, Cypriots, the French, Germans, and Greeks. European reluctance on the issue of Turkish accession is also somewhat illustrated by the outcomes of the EU constitutional referendums held in the summer of 2005 in France and the Netherlands. Throughout the constitutional referendum campaigns, the constitutional treaty was closely associated with the issue of Turkish accession to the EU. The EU needs to confront the reasons for rejection of the constitutional treaty, including foreign and defense policy reform and further rounds of enlargement as major components. For further rounds of enlargement, the EU should incorporate the foreign policy interests of its new member states and candidate countries. There are fewer incentives for European policymakers to include Turkey as a full member in the EU. Much of the EU’s concern originates from cultural differences, religion being the most important. The EU, prior to its decision on Turkish membership, needs to firmly confront its identity issues. Moreover, many in Europe are concerned about the impact on the EU of digesting Turkey’s population of 75 million. In comparison, one may recall the debates raised by the accession prospects of Poland, whose population is only half that of Turkey. As a major trading partner of the EU member states, Turkey is already a member of the customs union. This is a significant factor that economically decreases the desirability of Turkish membership in the eyes of the EU. Strategically speaking, Turkey is already an associate member of the WEU, and a member of NATO. As such, some argue that Turkey does not have a powerful positive bargaining chip in negotiations with the EU for full membership, given its contribution to EU defense and security. After its accession, one of the biggest concerns in Europe is that Turkey would demand to have its concerns attended to regarding issues such as Cyprus and Armenia, which may not always coincide with the interests of the rest of the EU members. Hence, during the accession negotiations period, Turkey will have to prove that it can maintain solidarity with the EU. In return, Turkey would expect that it become closely incorporated into ESDP structures (such as the European Defense Agency) and that its security concerns (particularly concerning the Kurdistan Workers Party gradually become the EU’s security concerns. Turkey is currently seen by some in the EU as a buffer zone between Europe and one of the most destabilized regions of the world, the Middle

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East. Therefore, another EU concern is that, if Turkey is admitted membership, EU borders would expand farther eastward, to potentially unstable countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Territorial expansion to the east would mean a corollary increase in EU defense expenditures. The EU would need to become more sensitive to events in this neighborhood, and be expected to act more proactively through its CFSP and ESDP. While EU membership for Turkey might increase the momentum for an ambitious transformation of the ESDP (unlike any other round of EU enlargement), Turkish accession would require the EU to invest more in security and defense matters, at the expense of investment in significant domestic programs like social welfare. Last but not least, the digestion of the ten new member states admitted to the EU in May 2004, and the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania, raise questions about EU engagement in further ambitious rounds of enlargement. Several politicians in Europe, such as Nicolas Sarkozy, suggest that the optimal choice for the EU is to engage Turkey as a “strategic partner,” in order to reap the benefits of its contributions without having to suffer the negative effects. The strategic partnership alternative is also implied by the negotiating framework for Turkey, which states: “While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond” (European Commission 2005e, p. 1). At this point, US support for full Turkish membership in the EU enters the scene. If the EU should choose to go against the will of its transatlantic partner, it will risk alienating Turkey as well as widening the transatlantic gap created by the Iraq intervention. It is not clear whether Turkey would be content with acquiring a “strategic” or “privileged” partnership status that falls short of full EU membership. Any EU decision to grant a strategic partnership to Turkey would likely result in a nationalist backlash. Scenario 3: Turkey Is Rejected Membership in the EU

Regardless of how realistic eventual Turkish EU accession is, it is in the EU’s interest to use a carrot and stick approach to keep Turkey in line with the European stance on international issues. For the EU to enhance its credibility in the eyes of the Muslim world, it needs to honor its promises and include Turkey as a member. If not, this would decrease the EU’s leverage in the Middle East. Because Turkey has negative bargaining power regarding its EU accession, membership rejection is possible, which would risk destabilizing Turkey and gravely damaging US interests in Europe and transatlantic interests in the Middle East. As former NATO Secretary-

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General Lord Robertson (2000) stated, since Turkey has a great potential to play the role of an agent of positive change, “any attempt to deprive Turkey of this unique role, any misguided attempt to marginalize her, would be self-defeating [for Western strategic interests].” Turkey’s alienation from the ESDP process in particular, and from the EU in general, would seriously set back the maintenance of European security. Turkey would be both reluctant to coordinate action with the allies in a future crisis in the region, and hesitant to allow European allies the use of Turkish military assets and intelligence resources in such a crisis. Any Petersberg-type crisis prevention or crisis management operation by European allies would be more likely to result in relative failure without Turkish support. Turkey may choose to walk away from the table as a result of possible rejection by the EU of its membership aspiration. An EU rejection would certainly cause Turkey to question its path toward further Westernization, and would strengthen the fundamentalist, nationalist, and antidemocratic forces that have been mounting in Turkey in recent years. The Turkish public has already begun to show signs of unrest concerning the accession talks. Pope Benedict’s remarks on Islam on September 15, 2006, received a tremendous negative reaction in Turkey. Protests against EU membership especially increased following passage of a bill by the French National Assembly that made it a crime to deny the Armenian genocide. According to a recent poll, in 2006 only 32 percent of Turks thought that “Turkey must certainly enter the EU,” compared to 67 percent in 2004 (Milliyet, October 24, 2006). A recent issue of The Economist (2006b) also attracted attention to the increasing levels of Euroskepticism in Turkey with a catchy headline: “Is the West Losing Turkey?” At a time when Western strategic interests are increasingly centered on the Middle East, it is in the interest of the Euro-Atlantic community to have reliable allies like Turkey in the region. Turkey’s isolation would be truly unsettling for the common interests of the transatlantic actors. A very significant window of opportunity would be lost for both European and US strategic interests in the event of eventual nonmembership of Turkey in the EU. Alienation of a long-standing and strong ally of the West in this geopolitically strategic region becomes particularly dangerous in the contemporary delicate stage of the US-Turkish relationship, especially following the Iraq intervention, which strained the strong historical bonds between the United States and Turkey. In February 2003, after weeks of ambiguity, the Turkish parliament failed to pass a resolution to allow the United States to use Turkish bases for a second-front attack against Iraq, and US troops were instead redirected to Kuwait. Since then, tensions have continued to rise, with the US administration strongly warning Turkey not to intervene in Northern Iraq independent of US command.

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Western European countries that have been traditionally skeptical of Turkish membership in the EU appreciated the independent and democratic decision of the Turkish parliament on the Iraq intervention. This has led to warm reactions from several European countries that were opposed to the war, and added a positive ambiance to Turkish-EU relations. The tension in Turkish-US relations reached its peak when members of the Turkish special forces in Iraq were arrested in a rather humiliating manner by US troops on July 4, 2003. Following this incident, Turkey emerged from the transatlantic conflict over Iraq as one of the most anti-US countries in Europe. Despite these developments, Turkish-US relations started to heal rapidly. Turkey hosted the eighth meeting of Iraq’s neighboring countries in Istanbul in April 2005. Shortly afterward, Turkey started a training program on electoral systems and the workings of democratic institutions for Iraqi diplomats and representatives of Iraqi political groups (European Commission 2005g, p. 130). With the shift in transatlantic focus toward the issue of Iranian nuclear ambitions, there were strong signs that Turkish-US relations were normalizing, given high-level bureaucratic and diplomatic visits by US military and intelligence agency officials to Turkey. If Turkey is rejected membership by the EU and the tensions in US-Turkish relations persist, nationalism and xenophobia could become viable alternatives in Turkey (EurActiv 2005b). Under such a scenario, Turkey’s multilateral approach to its own security and defense problems could be replaced by a unilateral one. The outcome of this third scenario would be the least desired one for the sake of transatlantic security interests. This becomes more evident when one takes into account recent developments in the “Danish cartoon” row. The EuroAtlantic community indisputably needs the support of Turkey as a democratic, secular, and stable majority Muslim country in order to signal to the East that the current state of affairs does not mean a confirmation of the “clash of civilizations” argument.

Conclusion Debates prior to the 2003 Iraq intervention brought transatlantic relations to one of the lowest points in its history. The transatlantic rift put Turkey in the difficult position of having to choose sides. It was perhaps the first time in the history of Turkish foreign policy that the European Union and the United States risked becoming mutually exclusive alternatives (Ta≈spınar 2005a). Posing transatlantic actors as alternatives for Turkish foreign policy does not serve the causes of democracy, human rights, and economic development.

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The transatlantic gap that resulted from the Iraq debate and intervention seems unlikely to recur on the issue of Iran. Both sides of the Atlantic agree on the overall objectives for this most significant item on the contemporary transatlantic agenda. They agree that Iranian ambitions for nuclearization pose grave threats to the international order, and that the issue should be referred to the UN Security Council. This helps Turkey avoid the dilemma of having to choose sides within the Euro-Atlantic community. In addition, the changing balance of power within the enlarged EU offers promise for alleviating some concerns in the EU regarding Turkish accession. With the inclusion of new countries from 2004 onward, the foreign policy orientation of the EU has become more aligned with the preferences of the United States. A further round of enlargement to include Turkey would help empower the EU to better cooperate with the United States in the contemporary international context. During 2007, alarming signals of increased skepticism in Turkey toward both the European Union and the United States arose. Several politicians in Turkey may be tempted to play the skepticism card to gather electoral support, but this is a very dangerous political game. The new security environment certainly necessitates increased and enhanced dialogue between Europe, the United States, and Turkey. They need to overcome their differences and misperceptions of one another. From a security point of view, it is in the strongest interest of the transatlantic parties to keep Turkey within the community of Western liberal democracies. As a democratic and secular member of the EU, Turkey could provide an indispensable added value to transatlantic security. If Turkey is admitted to the EU, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Middle East would become more stable. Turkey should continue to maintain close relations with both the European Union and the United States, and incessantly pursue its regional aspirations to act as a European actor endowed with both hard and soft power. Now that EU accession negotiations have been opened, Turkey is likely to have a larger say in the future of the ESDP. Turkish EU membership would provide a stronger connection between NATO and the EU/ESDP, and help reinforce their strategic relations. The policy outcome of such a scenario is in the interest of all the transatlantic parties involved. Turkey would exert increased political influence in both the development of the ESDP and the shaping of regional dynamics in its neighborhood. The EU would have increased soft power in the Middle East and be able to respond more effectively and more efficiently to humanitarian crises. Finally, the United States would have a more reliable strategic partnership across the Atlantic, allowing it to decrease the costs of maintaining the international order.

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Note 1. Associate members of the Western European Union are European non-EU members of NATO. At that time in 1997, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Iceland, and Norway were granted associate member status.

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The European Neighborhood in a Transatlantic Context

PART 3

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The Future of Transatlantic Security: A New Strategic Triangle?

9

Jan Hallenberg

THIS CHAPTER ASKS WHETHER OR NOT IT MAY BE FRUITFUL FOR

the analyst to look at the state of current and future transatlantic security relations from the perspective of what is here called the “new strategic triangle.” The concept of a strategic triangle was most famously applied to the study of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, the concept was asserted to cover global security relations among these three great powers. On this point, there is a contrast with our current application of the concept. Here it is only intended to cover the relationships among three actors in the greater transatlantic region: the United States, the European Union, and Russia. In any analysis of transatlantic security relations, the United States must be studied. The importance of the EU in the greater transatlantic region during the current era is such that it also must be included. Roy Ginsberg has aptly phrased the conundrum that the observer faces looking at the EU and trying to assess its international role: “Observations and generalizations of the EU’s role and place in international politics vary widely, owing no doubt to the ambiguity and controversy of a polity that is neither a state nor a territory with fixed borders, wide and sharp theoretical differences brought out by the question of whether a group of states can have a common foreign policy, and different measures used to evaluate the outcomes of foreign policy decision making within the EU” (2001, p. 3). This chapter concurs with Ginsberg in his conclusion that there are too many complications in the current structure of what he calls “European foreign policy making” to find a single theory or model that is applicable to the study of the EU as an international actor. However disconcerting such a standpoint may seem to the scholar or analyst of international security 139

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affairs, what matters most is that the EU system produces what Ginsberg calls foreign policy outputs or outcomes, and that these have consequences for international security relations, which means we need to take the EU into account when we study current and future transatlantic security relations. The practical implications of this are discussed later in the chapter. Perhaps the inclusion of Russia in this context is the most controversial choice. I believe, however, that Russia still has a crucial role in the region covered here in terms of traditional security issues, particularly in relation to the United States (Weitz 2005, pp. 8–12). In addition, the strong and growing Russian role as a supplier of energy to the EU in particular means that it should be incorporated into any analysis of this kind. The concept of a strategic triangle is used to judge to what an extent future transatlantic security relations may become characterized by a more even balance among central actors in what is here called the “greater transatlantic region” (Hyde-Price 2002, p. 5). That leaves the question of how to define the existence of the strategic triangle. In a previously published piece, I have provided a definition: “The criterion for the existence of a strategic triangle is essentially a very simple one: do all three actors, in formulating their policies in a given issue-area, take each other into consideration or not. If they do, a triangle exists, if they do not, there is no triangle. According to this criterion, formalized contacts are not sufficient to create a triangle” (Hallenberg and Karlsson 2006, p. 2). The analysis assumes that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will play a secondary role in future transatlantic security relations. Toward the end, however, this chapter brings NATO back into the analysis. What if NATO does remain a crucial actor in transatlantic security relations; is there still a chance that these relations will become more rebalanced? In the concluding section, the likelihood of each of the two alternative scenarios coming true in the medium term is assessed. The conventional way of looking at transatlantic security relations is to start the analysis by looking at how Europe fits into the global agenda of the United States. Thereafter, the analyst probably looks at the role of NATO both in and of itself and as an instrument for US policy. Finally, some lamentation about the dismal state of the European Union as an actor in security and defense policy might follow. For a US readership, conceiving contemporary transatlantic security relations in terms of a strategic triangle may seem outrageous. How can anyone question the totally dominant role of the United States in transatlantic security? This chapter makes the argument that at least on some issues or under some circumstances a different conception of transatlantic security relations may illuminate the current situation and future prospects for these relations. During the Cold War it was perfectly obvious that the global strategic triangle involved interactions among three great powers, the three strong

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nation-states. In this case, there are two nation-states involved as well as one actor that has very different characteristics from the other two: the European Union. Since this is the case, this chapter by necessity has to devote some space to discussing the actor capacity of the EU in the present context.

The Actorness of the European Union During the past several years, one of the perennial points of discussion for scholars studying the transatlantic security relationship has been what to make of the European Union. There are several questions involved in this debate. To focus on the EU itself one question arises: What are we to make of the Union; is this strange entity really an actor in its own right in international security relations? A second question concerns how we are to understand the relationship between the EU and the United States. When we discuss their relationship in the modern world, say with a concentration on the post–September 11 period, how are we to approach this relationship analytically? As argued by Magnus Ekengren and Kjell Engelbrekt in a recent study, the “actorness” of the EU should be discussed not primarily in terms of “capability,” as has traditionally been done in the past, but rather in terms of “capacity.” They go on by stating that “‘capacity’ has an aggregate quality that its individual components may actually lack. Furthermore, capacity does not exclusively concern capabilities that are constantly at the disposal of an actor, but constitute resources that can potentially be mobilized for a particular end.” Ekengren and Engelbrekt also add “cohesiveness” to their analysis of the actorness of the EU: Cohesiveness, meanwhile, is contingent on a significant degree of similarity in perceptions of values, identities, interests or threats. Needless to say, it is highly unlikely that all of the mentioned kinds of perceptions will ever fully coincide. Yet cohesiveness is therefore an appropriate term for that “sticking-together” proclivity that actorness requires, not least when the going gets tough in world politics and other players seek to weaken the unity of EU member states. (2006, p. 20)

Viewing the EU in this manner leads to the conclusion that a union of twenty-seven members with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania undoubtedly has a greater capacity than does a union of fifteen members. The problem with the actorness of the EU concerns its “cohesiveness.” Even cohesiveness is not necessarily an issue that on all types of issues makes the actorness of the EU problematic. The fact that the EU has become larger means that cohesiveness will be problematic on some, probably even most, issues. At times, however, the EU has in the past demonstrated that it is able to act

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coherently. There is really no reason to expect that this quality will totally disappear in an enlarged union. The corollary is that on those (few) issues in the security arena on which the EU is able to be cohesive, it is likely, due to its recent growth in capacity, to be even more influential after the addition of new members from 2004 onward than was the case before that.

The United States in the Greater Transatlantic Region If the assessment of the nature and character of the European Union is crucial to evaluating whether or not the notion of the strategic triangle can be applied to the study of transatlantic security relations, then the role of the United States in this context is perhaps even more crucial. One reason why the United States is vital in assessing the viability of the notion of the strategic triangle is that this country is the only one of the three actors under study here that has the option to refrain from playing a role in the greater transatlantic region if it wishes to do so. The EU and Russia are both based on the European continent and have and will continue to have important security interactions in coming years, whether they wish to do so or not. In the case of the United States, however, it is at least in principle possible to envision that Washington elects not to play any direct role in transatlantic security. Since it is a superpower with truly global interests, it alone among the three actors treated here retains the option of opting out of European security. A second reason why the United States is crucial to any assessment of the viability of the strategic triangle as a notion is even more important. Since it is uniquely powerful, Washington retains another option not available for the EU or Russia: it can refuse to take the interests of the other two parties into account when it formulates its security policies toward and within the greater transatlantic region. One way of addressing the role of Washington in transatlantic security relations as seen from a triangular framework is by looking at what is called the debate on US “grand strategy” and by assessing the role of transatlantic security within each alternative strategy. There are several ways of classifying the alternatives available here. This analysis is based on a recent chapter written by Peter Dombrowski and Andrew Ross. The authors have a previous article published by Ross, in cooperation with Barry Posen, in International Security as the starting point of their analysis. Posen and Ross “identified four alternative strategies: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security . . . and primacy. We add ‘empire’ to the original menu of choices” (Dombrowski and Ross 2006, p. 150). It would carry too far to delve more deeply into the sophisticated analysis of Dombrowski and Ross here. The crucial result of their analysis in terms of this chapter is: “Liberal internationalists are much more

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inclined than the realist advocates of selective engagement and primacy to embrace enthusiastically the new, emerging strategic triangle. America’s relationship with Europe’s leading institutions, the EU and NATO, would be more evenly balanced” (Dombrowski and Ross 2006, p. 155). It is unlikely, if the US grand strategy is characterized by neoisolationism or selective engagement, that Washington would choose to interact with its putative partners in the strategic triangle in a way that acknowledges that the two other parties are roughly equal to the superpower. Such an acknowledgment is, to be sure, even more unlikely if the strategy were either primacy or empire. An appraisal of the development of the US-EU relationship after the reelection of President George W. Bush, and also continuing after the period analyzed by Dombrowski and Ross, gives some indications of a US willingness to upgrade the value of a direct dialogue with Brussels, at least in a general sense. The fact that the president, in a first for a US president, visited the European Commission at its headquarters in February 2005, is an indication that the second Bush administration has come to the conclusion that direct contacts with the EU may lead to some positive consequences for the relationship between the United States and Western Europe, which has been problematic particularly since the start of the Iraq War in March 2003. Since the spring of 2005, the United States has also been more active than before in its acceptance of how the “EU-3”—the governments of France, Germany, and Britain—have carried out negotiations to attempt to prevent Iran from carrying out its development of nuclear power reactors in a fashion that may lead to the development of nuclear weapons (Kerr 2006, pp. 24–26). Even the support that Washington has given to the EU-3 in their negotiations with Tehran has not led to any agreement between the parties. Indeed, Iran’s announcement in January 2006 that it was restarting its enrichment of uranium aggravated the crisis, with several parties fearing that Iran was clearly undertaking a program that would result in its acquiring nuclear weapons. The UN Security Council has been grappling with the issue since the summer of 2006 without agreeing on any stronger resolution that demands that Iran cease at least some of the activities related to its nuclear program. Part of the problem in agreeing on such a resolution relates to disagreements between, in particular, the United States and Russia. Finally, in looking at relevant developments within the United States after the reelection of President Bush, a few words must be said about what his second secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, calls the “transformational diplomacy” that Washington is undertaking, particularly since his reelection (Rice 2006). This potentially vast undertaking to transform the world in the direction of more democracy and more democratic states, “with the ultimate goal of the end of tyranny” (Bush 2005), may have important

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implications for the subject under study here. In a speech given in January 2006, Secretary Rice spelled out an aspect that has such implications: To advance transformational diplomacy, we are and we must change our diplomatic posture. In the 21st century, emerging nations like India and China and Brazil and Egypt and Indonesia and South Africa are increasingly shaping the course of history. At the same time, the new front lines of our diplomacy are appearing more clearly, in transitional countries of Africa and of Latin America and of the Middle East. Our current global posture does not really reflect that fact. For instance, we have nearly the same number of State Department personnel in Germany, a country of 82 million people that we have in India, a country of one billion people. It is clear today that America must begin to reposition our diplomatic forces around the world, so over the next few years the United States will begin to shift several hundred of our diplomatic positions to new critical posts for the 21st century. We will begin this year with a down payment of moving 100 positions from Europe and, yes, from here in Washington, D.C., to countries like China and India and Nigeria and Lebanon, where additional staffing will make an essential difference. (Rice 2006)

In one sense, this assessment, together with the actions outlined in it, indicates a lesser emphasis on the greater transatlantic region at least during the remainder of the second Bush presidency. This aspect will be taken into consideration later in the chapter when evaluating the chances for a rebalanced relationship among the three actors studied here. Since 2006, however, the emphasis on the transformative elements of the new US foreign policy strategy has decreased, to a large extent because of the deteriorating situation in Iraq.

Russia in the Greater Transatlantic Region There are some parallels between the European Union and Russia as actors in the security realm in the greater transatlantic region. Even if they come at the problem from quite different starting points, both actors have to develop a new strategy for the activities within the region, strategies that, when implemented, will strongly influence the role they will eventually play in this arena. The EU is a new actor that since the late 1990s has been entering an area of policy, security, and defense in which it has not been active before. For such a political entity, the development of a strategy is part of the process of becoming an actor. Russia shares the need to develop a strategy for transatlantic security with the EU, but it arrives at this need differently than does Brussels. Being the “inheritor” of a former superpower, the Soviet Union, Moscow must

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handle the legacy of the superpower, while also fashioning a new approach to a section of the world that is truly crucial to a state centered in Moscow, whether that state is called the Soviet Union or Russia. As my colleague Charlotte Wagnsson has pointed out, the similarities that the two actors have in this respect serve to make their relations even more intriguing. The two parties have been carrying out discussions on security issues at regular bilateral meetings since 1999 (2006, p. 105). More generally, Russia has, in the period after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, moved from first a state that was fairly peripheral at least in terms of global security into one that after September 11 plays an important role in global security and a crucial role in transatlantic security relations. Iver Neumann offers a succinct overview of this development, providing a starting point for the analysis of Russia in the transatlantic strategic triangle: First, the US Afghan campaign meant that US securitization brought to the fore an area where Russian security was already securitized, namely terrorism. Second, this development shifted security attention away from sectors where Russia was only a peripheral player towards one where it was well equipped to play a role—conventional warfare. Third, this conventional warfare was planned for and played itself out in a geographical area . . . where Russia was eminently poised to participate. Fourth, the nature of the newly forged relationship with the USA was such that Russia still had enough room for maneuver to avail itself of a classic balance-of-power gambit whereby it threw its weight in with France and Germany against the USA in the run-up to the Iraqi campaign, thus further heightening its visibility by emerging from the shadow of the USA. (2005, p. 21)

In other words, Russia under President Vladimir Putin seized the opportunity offered by the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States to grasp an important role for itself as a global partner to Washington in the global war on terror. It is obvious that this strategy, as well as the later alignment with France and Germany over how to handle the Iraq crisis in 2002–2003, is of great importance for the assessment of the role of Russia in current transatlantic security relations. It is probably true to say that Russia’s strategic alliance with the United States, which Moscow in some respects still adheres to in the global war on terror, provides it an arena in which the EU is not able to play a real role. This, in turn, at least indirectly affects triangular transatlantic security relations. Russia has once again become a global strategic player and can in this arena ally itself with the United States, which it has to some extent done. This is a strategy that is not really available to the EU, because in terms of traditional security—the ability for war-fighting if need be—it is still a military pygmy compared to both the United States and Russia.

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Relations in the Greater Transatlantic Region: Dyads and (Nascent) Triangles There are several important dyads within what is here called the “greater transatlantic region.” The United States and Russia, as presented above, certainly have important relations in the security field, even if the absolute centrality of these relations from the US-Soviet days of the Cold War is no more. Russia and the European Union have to coexist and interact in the new Europe that is constantly under construction. These relations have both economic and, more strictly, security implications. The United States and the EU have immensely important economic ties, and even in terms of more old-fashioned security Washington seems to be beginning to understand that EU-Brussels is a necessary interlocutor. Economic Issues

One sense in which the European Union is already an actor in its own right in the greater transatlantic region is in the economic field. The importance of economic links for security policy in a more strict sense can be debated. However, when the economic ties between the United States and the EU are as immense as they are, it is impossible to deny that they are important even for security relations in a more narrowly defined sense. Any assessment of security relations between parties in a specific dyad must include the economic ties between them. A simplified distinction can be made between three different ways of estimating the importance of the relationships between two actors in the economic field. The first area for economic relations is trade. The old saying is that states trading with each other do not go to war with each other. If that is the first step on a ladder of growing trade interdependence between two actors as their mutual trade increases, then the volumes of trade that exist between the United States and the EU in the present era indicate a trade relationship that has gone way beyond this stage. The second area in which economic relations between two actors can be assessed is monetary relations. Here, the relationship between two parties is more problematic than is the case with trade. Third, the economic relationship between two actors can also be measured through investment stock and flow in terms of foreign direct investment. In this context, “stock” denotes the total book value of the companies that are active in a certain market, while “flow” denotes the value of new investment during a single year. When such mutual investments exceed a certain threshold, they must also be expected to have consequences for other aspects of political relations, including those of security more strictly seen. The strength and depth of the trade relationship between the United

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States and the EU has already been indicated. According to recent data, if intra-EU trade is excluded, then Brussels is Washington’s most important trading partner, and vice versa, each representing roughly 20 percent of the other’s total trade. It seems that any deeper analysis of the importance of such a trade relationship is not really necessary. The immense volumes of trade that such large shares represent are so important to both parties that they are, in terms of the assessment of economic links introduced by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye nearly twenty years ago, both sensitive to the immediate consequences in which a large disruption of such trade would almost immediately result, as well as vulnerable to the effects of such a disruption even after the affected party has tried to adjust to the immediate shock of a disruption in trade (1989, pp. 11–16). It should be obvious even to the casual observer that an economic relationship that is as deep and broad as that between the United States and the EU must have implications for security as well, no matter how strictly security is defined. The second most important dyad in terms of economic links among the three parties is that between the EU and Russia. This does not have nearly the breadth and strength of the link between the United States and the EU, but it is important nevertheless. For Russia, the EU is the most important trading partner, representing some 50 percent of total Russian merchandise trade in 2004. This is certainly enough to make Russia both sensitive to trade disruptions over the shorter term, as well as vulnerable to such disruptions even after attempting to do something to handle the situation. On the EU side, it is the fact that nearly 60 percent of imports are classified as “mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials” that indicates that both parties are so strongly tied economically that they would be both sensitive as well as vulnerable to any political problems that spilled over into the economic sphere. Even if the EU-Russia economic relationship is thus not of the same character as that between the EU and the United States, the former relationship must be seen as approaching the latter in terms of its importance in tying the two parties very intimately to each other. The leastimportant economic ties among the three parties are those between Russia and the United States. Current ties between the two parties in this field do not even approach those of the US-EU and EU-Russia dyads in terms of political strength and importance at the present time (Hallenberg 2006, pp. 176–178). A final assessment of economic ties among the three parties includes them all. It is at the present time and for the near-term future hard to see that economic linkages among the three are sufficiently strong to call this even an emerging economic triangle of any great importance. There is, however, one possible development that may alter this situation: an eventual Russian entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). This has been under discussion for several years, and current indications are that this

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could finally be realized in the near future (Buckley, Beattie, and Callan 2006). One complication was added to Russia’s previous problems of living up to the requirements of a market economy governed by the rule of law and transparent regulations in relevant matters: the dispute between Russia and Ukraine in early 2006 on the delivery of gas from the former to the latter. The behavior on the part of the Russian authorities was such that it fed into previous suspicions about Russian preparedness to live up to the many requirements put upon a prospective member of the WTO (Minder 2006). If all the problems on the thorny route for Moscow to become a member of the WTO are finally overcome, it is conceivable that Russia as a member of the WTO could develop and broaden its economic relations also to the United States. The ambiguous results of Russia’s first chairmanship of the Group of Eight, the leading industrial nations, in 2006, did not really contribute to any deepening of the political or economic relations between Russia and the United States. Perhaps the final successful conclusion of more than thirteen years of talks on Russian accession to the WTO will provide a strong incentive for deepened economic relations among Russia, the United States, and the European Union. Disturbing signs about increasing Russian economic nationalism serve to balance this optimistic assessment (Milov 2006). Traditional Security Issues

The security relationship between Moscow and Washington is less central today as compared to what it was during the Cold War. Still, it is easy to forget how many security issues still remain on the common agenda of Russia and the United States. For one thing, the two remain by far the most important nuclear weapons powers. This means that they have common interests as well as conflicting interests. An aspect of that is arms control in nuclear weapons; another is the spread of weapons of mass destruction. As mentioned, they have also interacted importantly when it comes to the global war on terror since September 11. For all these reasons, as well as several additional ones, Moscow and Washington are still locked into a security relationship that is at least very important to Washington while it is crucial to Moscow (Weitz 2005, pp. 8–12). While the security relationship between Moscow and Washington remains of huge significance to both parties, it is less easy to characterize the strict security relationships in the other two dyads. Russia is, as stated previously, economically dependent on particularly trade links with the European Union. In the more old-fashioned types of security issues, however, Moscow plays the card always available to the other two parties in their relationships to Brussels; it goes to the respective national capitals rather than to the EU as such (Wagnsson 2006, p. 110). This makes the con-

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ception of a strategic triangle in the field of strategic security relations problematic. The fact that Washington to some extent does the same thing in its relationship to the European states complicates matters still further. So does the fact that the United States has another arena in which it can and does interact with most European states: NATO. A further complication for the attempt to concentrate the analysis on security relations among the three parties to the greater transatlantic region is that the United States and Russia also have security interaction on a broader global scale. This is an arena in which the EU at present plays a miniscule role. Diplomatic Issues

This cursory overview of whether the notion of the strategic triangle can be applied to recent and current security relations among the United States, Russia, and the European Union has so far yielded the preliminary result that there is really very little, if anything at all, of this in what I here call “strictly security” issues (nuclear forces, arms control, and conventional arms). In the economic field there is a modicum of such triangular interaction on the issue of Russian membership in the WTO, but not much else. In the third issue area covered here—everything else, or “diplomatic issues”—there are at least two or three recent examples in which the conception of the strategic triangle can indeed be fruitfully applied. The clearest of these cases is the political turmoil that surrounded the presidential elections in Ukraine in late 2004. Bertil Nygren has analyzed the process that occurred in late 2004 in and around Ukraine and its presidential elections (2006, pp. 141–142). The elections ended up as a contest between essentially two candidates: the favorite of the old regime, Viktor Yanukovich, strongly supported by Russia and Putin, and Viktor Yushchenko, supported by the United States and the EU, albeit in a way that was much less directly interfering than was the Russian behavior. The contest went to a second round since no candidate received 50 percent during the first round. The counting of the results of the second round proved contestable. Putin congratulated Yanukovich on his victory in a manner that subsequently proved to have been spectacularly premature. After interventions from individual leaders in the EU, as well as from representatives of the United States, it was decided that the second round had to be undertaken again. This time Yushchenko, the candidate of the West, won clearly. It is not possible to analyze the developments in the Ukrainian presidential elections in any depth here. Suffice to say that I agree with Robert Kagan’s characterization of what happened in the respects focused on in this chapter: “In the unfolding drama of Ukraine, the Bush administration and the European Union have committed a flagrant act of transatlantic

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cooperation” (Kagan 2004, p. B7). I am convinced that this is indeed an example of what is here called “the workings of the strategic triangle.” Washington, Brussels, and Moscow were clearly interlinked in their reactions to the events unfolding in Ukraine. The gradual escalation over the Iranian nuclear program since 2006 may provide a second example where the three parties interact, even if it is perhaps a stretch to include this crisis in the analysis of developments in the greater transatlantic region. The fact that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons has obvious direct implications for transatlantic security relations warrants its inclusion here. As mentioned above, the United States and the EU have already cooperated in the effort to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Both parties tried to get Russia to support them in taking a harder line against Tehran, with the possibility of international sanctions decided by the UN Security Council. The issue of a possible Iranian project to acquire nuclear weapons has been mentioned as a testing ground for the future of security relations, particularly between the United States and the EU. This raises not just issues of coordination between Washington and Brussels, but also the question of what can be called the “fundamental” security strategies followed by the two parties. One way of characterizing this is to distinguish between “soft power,” the strategy of the EU, and “hard power,” which the United States always retains as at least one option among its strategies. The Economist, in its own way, has discussed the European approach to this issue: For true believers in soft power, the point is not to support but to supplant brute force. It is a better way of managing global tensions: a rival star, not a best supporting actor. To those who think like this, the talking can never stop. Some Europeans still say that military action is inconceivable and threats of sanctions are unhelpful. This seems a characteristic European cast of mind. Nothing is ever decided. The European project is never finished. And even if something seems to have been tried and failed there is always a chance to try—and fail?—again. (2006a)

The problem of Iran’s plans for nuclear development had and will continue to have clear impact on transatlantic security relations. One evident contrast between the European strategy and the thinking in leading foreign policy circles in the United States is provided by Senator John McCain, a front-runner for the nomination as Republican presidential candidate in 2008: “There is only one thing worse than the United States exercising a military option. That is a nuclear-armed Iran” (quoted in Brooks 2006). The dispute over Iranian nuclear behavior is another issue that is impossible to conclusively assess here. It should suffice to say that the outcome of this crisis will impact transatlantic security relations of the future. A situation where Iran would acquire nuclear weapons and where the

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United States in different ways would accuse the other two actors in the transatlantic triangle (Russia for contributing to it and the EU for not doing enough to prevent it) would clearly complicate future security relations both between Washington and Moscow and between Washington and Brussels. Such an outcome would make the United States more skeptical about cooperating with either Moscow or Brussels on such security issues. Conversely, a successful effort that prevents Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons would work in favor of stronger transatlantic security ties. The third case in which the three parties have interacted on a security problem with clear implications for the greater transatlantic region is the Middle East peace process. The so-called road map for Israeli-Palestinian peace was issued in September 2002 by the “Quartet”: the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations. The original sketch for peace contained in the road map envisioned a three-step process toward peace. The crucial aspect of the plan in terms of the analysis here is the fact that the United States chose to ally itself with both Russia and the EU, as well as with the UN, in its pursuit of a peace process and eventually a peace between Israelis and Palestinians (Powell 2002; Solana 2006b). This US acknowledgment, in principle, of a role for both Russia and the EU in cooperation with Washington in working for peace in a region of obvious strategic importance for all three parties, has not been followed by any extensive efforts at subsequent cooperation, however. An in-depth study of the vagaries of the Middle East peace process is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is sufficient to note that, particularly as far as the United States is concerned, its use of the Quartet as well as of the road map for peace in its Middle East policies has been limited to issuing occasional communiqués some four to five times per year. Signs emanating from Washington in early 2006 did not point in the direction of any strong role in its Middle East policy for either the Quartet or for the road map for peace (Dinmore 2006). The war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 did not lead to any decisive interaction among the members of the Quartet.

A Strategic Triangle in Transatlantic Security Affairs? This chapter has so far explored an alternative way of looking at transatlantic security relations. A situation where the relations among the United States, the European Union, and Russia resembled a strategic triangle would be a more balanced relationship than the present one, in which Washington is overwhelmingly dominant. As shown, on limited occasions, interaction has existed for which the notion of the strategic triangle seems to fairly well capture the relationship among the three parties. Perhaps the

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interaction concerning the controversial presidential election in Ukraine in late 2004 is the best example of such a triangular relationship. In this case, the United States and the EU cooperated in an effort to support what they regarded as the true process of democracy, while Russia from the same perspective tried to support the party in power, contravening the will of the people. This case of three actors who each clearly acknowledge the importance and role of both of the other two parties is currently the exception rather than the rule in transatlantic security affairs. What then are the conditions under which a more evenly balanced transatlantic security relationship might take hold, whether in the form of a strategic triangle or more generally? One precondition is an administration in Washington that accepts that the conduct of its security policy in the greater transatlantic region must take the interests and roles of the other two parties into account. One schematic way of looking at the chances for this is presented by Dombrowski and Ross in their analysis of the changes for the “triangle” under different conceptions of US grand strategy. I accept their conclusion that it is really only when a US administration pursues something resembling liberal internationalism that the preconditions for the linkages assumed by the notion of the strategic triangle can prevail. It is perhaps too far to go for a foreign analyst to state that the chances for such a worldview on the part of a new administration in Washington are greater with a Democrat as president than with a Republican. At the very least, there appear to be more liberal internationalists among the Democrats being mentioned as possible nominees for the Democratic Party in 2008 than is the case for the Republican hopefuls. A victory for the Democrats in the 2008 presidential election may perhaps give some indications of whether it is really easier for the United States and the European Union to cooperate when the Democrats are ruling Washington. A more balanced transatlantic security relationship also requires an EU that is a more coherent and stronger actor and that is accepted as such by both Washington and Moscow. What then are the chances for this to occur? Seen overall, this is an immense question and beyond the scope of the analysis here. If we confine ourselves to the EU as an actor in the transatlantic security arena, however, there are some points that indicate that the EU may indeed become stronger or improve its “actorness,” as it is sometimes called in the literature. One reason for saying this is that the enlarged EU after 2007 certainly has greater capabilities than it did before. Whether or not this can make up for the greater problems in terms of cohesiveness resulting from the enlargement, the judgment is in the eye of the beholder (for a more comprehensive analysis of the EU as an international actor, see Engelbrekt and Hallenberg, forthcoming 2008). However, a second and related point would indicate that a positive development for EU actorness in the near-term future is likely. Maria

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Strömvik has pointed out that a perceived competition between the United States and the EU (on the part of the latter and its member states) has led to new steps in foreign policy cooperation. Strömvik’s research does not explicitly cover the European Security and Defense Policy, so it may be something of a stretch to make the same point regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy. For the sake of the argument, however, I will carry the point over to the ESDP. One relevant conclusion from her research on the development of the EU’s CFSP is that “we may now, with a relatively speaking high degree of confidence, conclude that there has been at least one recurrent trend in the development of the EU’s collective foreign policy. The EU’s foreign policy cooperation has intensified during (or soon after) transatlantic disagreements over international security management” (2005, pp. 179–180). Strömvik carries this analysis also into the realm of the ESDP. It should be underlined, once again, that this analysis of the EU and its development in the foreign policy and security and defense policy spheres is not shared by all, but it does represent one strain of both the research and policy debates in Europe. The viewpoint alluded to here is very well expressed in a speech given by the late Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh in July 2003: For the first time this spring, the EU has become so strong in its common foreign policy that when the UN asked the EU to act it could send troops to the Congo to preserve peace there. And this is also an important example of what the EU may come to mean outside the borders of Europe. And I think that it is important that all those who worry about a world they call unipolar, where only one country determines the agenda, where only the United States makes the decisions about what is right and wrong, that they can see that the EU should not be formed as counterweight or counter pole to the United States but that we need more dedicated powers, dedicated voices and that sometimes a strong EU will have a contrary opinion to that of the United States, but that the EU is needed to balance the United States. (Lindh 2003)

The sentiment expressed in this speech represents a current in European thinking about the EU and its possible global role generally and in relation to the United States in particular. It is obvious that the possibility to realize the sentiment expressed by Lindh in practical politics, particularly on issues where military strength is needed, can be debated. What is important is that the sentiment exists and explains at least some of the strivings of the EU in the fields of foreign, security, and defense policy. Overall, then, I find it more likely than not that the EU will continue down the path of developing more cohesion in its CFSP, and that this development will also characterize the defense aspects of the cooperation. A new analysis of these matters in, say, 2015 would likely find a more balanced relationship between the United States and the EU in security relations in

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the greater transatlantic region (for a similar assessment, see Posen 2006). To some extent, it is likely that Moscow will also tend to recognize the EU as an actor in its own right in this delimited sphere, but the extent to which this is done is also dependent on developments in and around Russia. It is obvious that Russia in the middle of the first decade of the twentyfirst century has important relations with both Washington and Brussels. In the case of Washington, the essence of these relations is to a large extent of a more traditional security kind, such as regarding nuclear weapons and arms control. In addition, the two powers cooperate broadly in the global war on terror. However, it can be debated to what an extent these relations are really anchored in any strategic triangle framework. Instead, they seem to be the legacy of the superpower relationship that characterized the Cold War. In such issues, the EU hardly intrudes at all on the dyadic relations between Washington and Moscow. One possible exception might be the issue of stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Economic relations would seem to be a candidate for tying all three actors together in a triangular relationship. This is to a large extent the case for relations between Moscow and Brussels, albeit in an asymmetric way. The former is dependent on general economic transactions with the EU, while the latter—or at least some of its member states—is fairly or highly dependent on Russia for its energy imports. The relationship between Washington and Moscow in the economic sphere, however, is less important. For the United States, Russia is marginal as an economic actor. There seems to be some chance of the economic ties becoming stronger if Russia were to join the WTO, as has become more likely after the US-Russia agreement concluded in November 2006. If this indeed occurs, it is probable that the economic ties among the three may increase rapidly. It is another matter if this means that they validate the notion of the strategic triangle. Developments since late 2005 further indicate that President Putin regards Russia’s strong position in the delivery of energy to other countries as not only a positive thing for Russia’s economic strength, but also a weapon in his arsenal of tools for rebuilding his country’s power position after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Bringing NATO into the Picture Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been a large volume of scholarship, both more strictly academic and more policy-oriented, on NATO and its current and future role in transatlantic security. One way of summarizing this scholarship is by distinguishing between three strands of research, each based on its own conception of international relations more generally and security policy more specifically.

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A first school of thought is the realist one. Here, the dominant assessment, particularly in the early period, was that since the threat that formed the basis for NATO’s founding was gone, the alliance was bound to disintegrate (Mearsheimer 1990). A second school of thought is neoliberalism and its institutional theories. Celeste Wallander concluded, for example, that “while NATO’s post–Cold War structure has evolved from its Cold War general and specific assets for coping with instability and mistrust, it has clearly shed its specific assets for dealing with the Soviet threat. Thus, as a test case—one clearly still in the making—NATO’s persistence through its adaptation to new conditions is consistent with the hypothesis derived from my institutional model” (2000, p. 732). As exemplified by Wallander, the authors writing in this vein tended to more positively assess NATO’s future than did at least the early realist writings on the organization. An institution that was already working, they stated, and that provided continued benefits to its members, may have a stronger propensity to continue to exist than the realists believed. A third school of thought, constructivism, went even further in positively assessing NATO’s chances for survival. In the words of Iver Neumann, they “argued that NATO had survived against the odds since a Western self-understanding had evolved whereby membership in NATO had become a naturalized part of what it meant to be a part of Western civilization” (2005, p. 19). In more recent scholarship, some self-professed realists have claimed, for example, that “NATO’s continuity is made possible not because NATO happens to be an institution with particular features or because the United States wants to control European security affairs via NATO: rather, NATO’s core is a political commitment to transatlantic cooperation generated by geopolitical interests” (Rynning 2006, p. 169). One tentative conclusion from this admittedly cursory review is that the three strands in the study of international relations are perhaps converging and tentatively concluding that NATO, having survived repeated strains since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, has now found a new role in the transatlantic security framework. Sten Rynning labels the outcome in the form of the reformed NATO “coalitions.” By this he means that the alliance of old is no more. It has been superseded by a more flexible organizational “framework for cooperation that builds on pluralism” (2006, p. 168). Any analysis of a complex international organization such as the EU or NATO always must be tentative, as new events and processes may create new strains on the organization. Indeed, Rynning presciently states that “NATO is likely to experience repeated crises, it always has, but the crises are unlikely to do fundamental damage because the objective and subjective conditions for the Alliance’s existence continue to come into alignment” (2006, p. 168). These words from an expert should certainly be kept in mind when

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assessing the latest of the many crises that have beset NATO, such as the deployment of its troops into southern Afghanistan (under the auspices of the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF]). The contentious issue has been the extent to which this task should be seen either as a commitment under UN auspices to stabilize a “failed state,” or as a commitment on the side of the United States to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. The United States leads a second external military force in the country (Operation Enduring Freedom) dedicated to the second purpose. During 2006–2007 other NATO members increased their forces in the ISAF, while the United States put under the ISAF umbrella half of its forces that were previously outside it. Even if the NATO forces have encountered difficulties in Afghanistan in several senses, it is far from certain that this new crisis is a harbinger of the future decline of the organization. The more pessimistic conclusion is far from proven at this stage.

Conclusion In analyzing current and future transatlantic security relations, this chapter has found only one true case of the type of triangular interaction among the United States, Russia, and the European Union as expected by the analytic framework: the actions by the three parties surrounding the presidential elections in Ukraine in late 2004. Negotiations with Iran over that country’s likely plans to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as efforts of the Quartet (the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations) to search for peace between Israelis and Palestinians, are two examples of interaction existing to some extent, but of a less developed nature compared to the case of Ukraine. While it is not inconceivable that other instances of what may perhaps be called triangular interaction may occur in the future, it seems that, for the notion of the strategic triangle to truly become the most applicable way of understanding transatlantic security relations, at least four developments would be required. First, for the strategic triangle to become operative, Washington would need to pursue a grand strategy in which the other two parties in the triangle were granted a legitimate role. As mentioned above, this would likely require an administration that pursued some version of liberal internationalism. It is speculated that the pursuit of such a strategy would be more likely if there were a Democratic president in the White House. It is very difficult to make an educated guess about the chances of this happening. The success of the Democratic Party in elections to Congress in November 2006 is no guarantee that a Democrat will be elected president in 2008. Second, the EU would need to become a more cohesive actor in foreign, security, and defense policy for the triangle to come into effect. While

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many analysts have overestimated the negative role for foreign and security policy based on the fact that the EU constitutional treaty was voted down in 2005, it did prevent some of the strengthening of the EU in that policy sphere that would have followed from ratification of the treaty. Some strengthening of the EU as a global actor is continuing despite the ratification failure, but it is likely that the treaty in some form or other would need to be adopted before the EU can make any substantial strengthening of its role in this policy sphere. Third, Russia would also need to change for the triangle to work as envisioned. One aspect is that Russia needs to become more economically entangled with the United States for the triangular logic to take tighter hold. Another is that Russia would probably need to refrain from pursuing its tendency toward increasing the role of the state in the Russian economy (particularly in the energy sphere), and its tendency toward use of its strength in this sphere as a policy tool, if the other two parties are to interact with Russia in the positive and trusting manner envisioned by the triangle logic. Fourth, for the triangle to become operative, the role of NATO would need to diminish markedly. Even a cursory look at some of the scholarship on NATO makes this seem unlikely, at least in the short to medium term. The fact that NATO intermittently goes through various crises has, at least so far, not seriously threatened its important role in European security affairs. It thus seems likely that transatlantic security relations will continue largely as they have been developing during perhaps the past decade. The United States will gradually upgrade the role of other regions in its global strategy, while slowly letting the importance of the greater transatlantic region diminish from this overall perspective. While doing so, however, Washington will try to continue reshaping NATO for a different role, prominently in security issues outside the greater transatlantic region. This development may be threatened by new crises within NATO, of course, not least when the new, more global role is played out in practice, but it is unlikely that the foundation for NATO will be threatened in the short to medium term. The European Union will thus have to continue to interact with a United States that will continue to choose the circumstances under which it will regard Brussels as a legitimate interlocutor. One pertinent development in this respect concerns the role of the new members in both NATO and the EU (after 2002, 2004, and 2007) as they find their roles in these two organizations. At the present time, it is most likely that the states of Central and Eastern Europe (and the new members on the Black Sea) will continue to pledge allegiance to the United States and thereby to NATO when they contemplate where their focus on security and defense will lie in the future. It is not inconceivable, however, that over time this allegiance will gradually move to the EU, particularly if NATO is rent by disagreements.

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For Russia, there are possibilities to further integrate its policies into what resembles a transatlantic security triangle. Moscow would need to accomplish at least two things for this to happen. The first is that Russia, in cooperation with the present WTO members, would need to finalize its membership in the global trade organization. Such a development has been rendered much more achievable given the November 2006 agreement between Russia and the United States, even if all the obstacles to Russian membership have not yet been overcome. However, the strengthening role of the Russian state in the economy, particularly in the energy sector, threatens Russia’s relations with both the United States and the EU. It is difficult to know what will happen concerning these two issues during the coming years, but there are few, if any, recent signs that President Putin is willing to change his approach on the second issue.

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Hiski Haukkala

FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THIS VOLUME, THE QUESTION OF THE

European Neighborhood Policy is an intriguing one. Strictly speaking, the ENP is not a security policy as it has been traditionally understood. In fact, very little has been said of security per se in the official European Union documents related to this approach (European Commission 2003c, 2004b, 2005c). This applies especially to the realm of “hard” military security, which has been practically absent from the initiative. There are of course understandable bureaucratic reasons for the current state of affairs. The ENP has been made part of the remit of the European Commission, which has been largely excluded from the questions relating to military crisis management issues that fall under the domain of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and the multifaceted machinery that has been built during and under his mandate. In essence, the EU’s approach to its neighborhoods both in the east and in the south can be summed up by saying that, compared with the traditional forms of foreign and security policy, the ENP portrays a much more varied stability policy approach (Missiroli 2004). It is a hybrid policy driven first by the effects of the eastern “big bang” enlargement in May 2004 and the consequent emergence of not only new members but also new neighbors with ideas and demands of their own about the EU’s future role in the region. Second, the ENP is also influenced by the felt need to integrate and coordinate the EU’s own but previously separate strands of proximity policies toward its immediate peripheries. As such, the ENP brings together the eastern and southern neighborhoods under the same logic and common modus operandi of regional integration (short of full EU membership), pacification, and stabilization. 159

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In this respect the ENP is a policy well suited for a “postmodern” actor in the vein of Robert Cooper (2003) or a “normative power Europe” as has been suggested by Ian Manners (2002). As such, the overall aim of the ENP is to promote a democratic and prosperous “ring of friends” around the EU’s perimeter (Prodi 2002). This is to be achieved by a gradual convergence with the EU’s norms and values and the consequent integration into the European single market. It is easy to see how by realizing such a goal the EU would reap a security benefit through not only containing but also actively engaging and solving the multitude of security problems—both hard and soft—in its neighborhood. As such, the ENP also has links to the “harder” side of EU foreign policy, the CFSP, and the European Security and Defense Policy. Here the obvious starting point is the European Security Strategy (2003), which explicitly makes the “stability of the neighborhood” one of the key security concerns of the EU (see Biscop 2005b for an excellent overview and discussion of the document). Therefore, discussing the ENP here in the context of security is not out of place at all. The ENP also has high relevance in the context of transatlantic relations. By accentuating the EU’s role especially in its eastern neighborhood adjacent to Russia, the new neighborhood policy offers a way for developing a mutually beneficial division of labor across the Atlantic. For the EU, this could offer a chance to make good on its earlier rhetoric about “the hour of Europe” in the early 1990s. At stake is the EU’s capability for robust actorness and projection of its normative power beyond the current list of accession candidates. For the United States, this could result in a lessened need for attention and resources in the region, which could be put to better use in other troubled hot spots of perhaps greater strategic importance to the United States than Eastern Europe. Finally, the ENP could on the one hand offer a template that could (within certain limits, of course) be copied by the United States in other parts of the world. On the other hand, it could also turn out to be that it is the EU and its ENP that could learn from the combination of hard and soft power the United States is at times so adept at using. The United States is no stranger to many-sided soft security approaches. Since 1997 it has experimented with such a policy in Northern Europe, first under the aegis of the Northern European Initiative and since 2000 under the rubric of the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (Haukkala 2004; Browning 2001; see also the overviews in Evans 2005 and Asmus 2004). The basis for complementarity and the search for mutually beneficial synergies already exist. These are the main themes and questions this chapter seeks to address. It is divided into four parts. First, it assesses the strategic importance of the EU neighborhood, both in the east and in the south. Second, it discusses the EU’s response—the ENP. Third, it examines the impact that the ENP is

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likely to have on the transatlantic agenda. It is here that the ENP can be seen as opening interesting new avenues, especially when one keeps in mind the new US initiative for “transformational diplomacy” that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice launched in January 2006. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of two alternative futures. On the one hand, it can be said that the ENP actually complements the US agenda for the region quite well (promoting burden sharing and stability) and can thus be seen as potentially becoming an effective tool in developing a transatlantic division of labor. On the other hand, it is equally if not more obvious that at least in its present form the ENP will not be a panacea, as it suffers from conceptual problems (strategic deficit) and risks remaining underfunded and underprioritized in the EU context in the years to come. This could have the negative effect of resulting in increased liabilities for the EU, which could in effect force the United States to again become much more engaged with the EU neighborhood in the future.

Strategic Challenges in the EU Neighborhood The post–Cold War era has witnessed a period of hectic development of first European foreign and security, and later more robust crisis management and defense-related policies. On the one hand, these policies have been driven by the internal imperatives of European integration. There has been a perceived need to complement the economic union with a political one that would include the military dimension as well. On the other hand, though, it is equally clear how, throughout the 1990s, it was occasional chaotic events in the EU’s own neighborhood that acted as catalysts for and a consequent benchmark against which its attempts at developing an effective foreign policy and (military) crisis management capability have been measured. The starting point here is of course the humiliation during what was supposed to be “the hour of Europe” at the beginning of the 1990s. Then the EU’s inability to respond to the escalating crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina in any meaningful and effective manner resulted in a general disillusionment over its ability to act as an effective force in stabilizing its own backyard (Regelsberger and Wessels 1996, p. 29). The events in the former Yugoslavia had the sobering and welcome effect of narrowing the infamous “capability-expectation gap” in the EU’s external aspirations, although often by narrowing the expectation side (Hill 1998). In 1999 it was once again the Balkans, together with the largely negative experiences during the war in Kosovo, that led both the EU and the United States to realize how wide the gulf between operational capabilities had become between the different shores of the Atlantic Ocean (Bozo 2003). As a consequence, since the war in Kosovo the EU has engaged

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itself in an impressive scramble for autonomous capability in the field of military crisis management, including both the institutional as well as the operational side of force projection. These processes have perhaps raised, more than solved, tricky questions, including the transatlantic division of labor, the marching order between the EU and NATO and their respective expeditionary rapid-reaction forces, and the famous question of the “three Ds” (no duplication, decoupling, or discrimination) in the way and manner put forth by former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright in 1998 (for a fuller account of these issue, see Howorth and Keeler 2003). But it is not only the events (as the famous quote attributed to Harold MacMillan has put it) that drive the EU’s neighborhood policies. There are also more structural causes behind the EU’s external actions vis-à-vis its neighborhood. The round of eastern enlargement in 2004 and the successive experiences of both new members and new neighbors, together constitute the key factor that has resulted in the perceived need for new policies as the EU becomes more exposed to and increasingly engaged with some of the most volatile regions in the world, including the post-Soviet sphere and especially the South Caucasus. Regarding the eastern dimension, the EU has been catapulted somewhat unwillingly into taking more responsibility for the fortunes of the region. This entails three strategic challenges for the EU: (1) the problems and threats posed by the neighbors themselves, (2) the increasingly awkward Russia factor, and (3) the implications of these challenges for relations with the United States. One can argue, slightly simplistically, that the EU’s neighborhood policy par excellence has traditionally been that of the accession process. One only need look at the previous rounds of enlargement in order to grasp how the EU has—like any empire—engulfed and assimilated new countries into its structures and institutions. The tough conditionality built into the accession process has worked in the EU’s favor, and it has become perhaps the most effective foreign policy tool at the EU’s disposal when it wields its normative power in Europe (Haukkala 2006; see also Vachudova 2005). Recently, however, there have been growing signs that the perpetual enlargement engine that the EU has come to represent is not only a source of power but also and perhaps even primarily a cause for concern. The number of member states (twenty-seven including Bulgaria and Romania as of 2007) has already stirred up much debate on whether the EU can remain operational in the future. It seems evident that any further increase in the number of member states, especially when one bears the quality of aspirant members in mind, would put the EU’s internal governance and decisionmaking capacity under enormous strains. The stakes are indeed high, as by overextending itself the EU could jeopardize not only its future development but also previous achievements of European integration. This fear has been voiced by former European Commission president Romano

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Prodi, who remarked that “we cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale” (Prodi 2002). Keeping these internal constraints in mind, in the post–big bang enlargement era the EU must operate in an exceptionally challenging external environment. This is especially so in the east, where it faces a double task. First, it needs to devise a new neighborhood policy that (while perhaps relinquishing enlargement) will still retain the stabilizing and beneficial logic of accession. Second, it needs to develop a new policy within the “bigger picture” of the other important players in the region, as the EU can no longer avoid taking a stance on a broad range of issues that pertain to Russia’s priority sphere of interests, while it simultaneously must remain attentive to what the United States and NATO are doing in the region. The difficulty of the double task is further exacerbated by the fact that all of the countries in the new eastern neighborhood present the EU with their own challenges. This means that the EU’s traditional drive toward uniform policies will not suffice, and that the emphasis will need to be on genuine differentiation in the future. The EU’s eastern neighborhood offers a versatile menu of challenges and a real test to its ability to differentiate between its partners. The EU is faced with chronic “frozen” conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan and within Georgia (over Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Moldova (over the breakaway and self-declared “Republic of Transdniestria”), an ever more isolated and repressive dictatorship of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, and the increasingly strained and ailing modernization of Ukraine and the westward drive pursued by President Viktor Yushchenko. In addition to these main challenges, the EU is also faced with a host of soft security threats (such as smuggling of illegal contraband, humans, and small arms, illegal immigration, and environmental problems). Moreover, it needs to combat what amounts to one of the deepest gulfs in living standards in the world (along with the US-Mexican border and the Mediterranean), which of course happens to be the other part of the EU’s difficult neighborhood, that in the south. All of these smaller challenges feed from and back into the larger political dynamics in the region, making the EU’s eastern neighborhood a volatile maelstrom of challenges where no easy solutions or victories can be expected (Batt 2003; Gromadzki and Sushko 2005; Haukkala and Moshes 2004; Leonard and Grant 2005; Lynch 2003, 2005). The challenges for the EU are further complicated by the strong Russian presence in the region. Russia, on its own initiative, has been excluded from the ENP, but it is nevertheless a player (in one form or another) in all of the frozen conflicts in the region. Moscow has deployed “peacekeepers” widely in the region, who merely serve to freeze the undesirable status quo in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

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(Baev 2003, p. 48). The increasingly independence-minded kleptocracy of Igor Smirnoff in Transdniestria relies on support from the remnants of the Russian Fourteenth Army stationed in the region. Russia also is using its growing economic leverage to influence developments. It is largely the political and economic support from Moscow that helps President Lukashenko hold on to power in Belarus. Also, the increasingly tough “gas diplomacy” that Russia has exerted over its customers and pipeline transit countries in the region adds another flavor to the variegated dish that is being prepared for the EU in the east. The challenges facing the EU in the south by no means pale in comparison. The Mediterranean, which forms the focal point of the EU’s southern dimension, embraces one of the most challenging hot spots of regional security (or should one say insecurity?) in the form of the Middle East. In addition to the “high politics” associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the nuclear brinkmanship of Iran (not to mention the questions concerning the future of Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria), the EU is confronted with the equally difficult questions of modernizing societies, reinvigorating economies, and battling illegal immigration and other soft security threats all along its southern perimeter (for more about the obstacles facing the EU in the south, see Biscop 2003, 2005b; Lesser 2005; Ortega 2003).

The EU’s Response: The European Neighborhood Policy The European Union’s response to the aforementioned demands and challenges has come in the form of the European Neighborhood Policy. This policy has not of course emerged from a vacuum, but builds on (and to a certain extent extends) the existing policies and institutionalized mechanisms that the EU already has in place with its neighbors. This is especially the case in the south, where the EU has, for historical reasons, already enjoyed a dense network of bilateral relations and, since 1995, multilateral relations under the auspices of the Barcelona Process and the MEDA aid program, a principal financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. With some qualifications the same applies to the east. This has been manifested in the system of wide-ranging partnership and cooperation agreements (PCAs) that the EU concluded for a ten-year period with Belarus (signed in 1995), Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (in force since July 1999), and Ukraine and Moldova (in force since March and July 1998, respectively).1 Unlike the so-called Europe agreements, which were concluded with the countries in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s, the Barcelona Process and the PCAs do not contain any references to the prospect of full EU accession as the final aim of the relation-

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ship. These EU mechanisms envisage a multifaceted cooperation, ranging from economic and cultural issues to political dialogues concerning human rights and security in and around Europe, which would culminate in the creation of a free trade area. But to date the EU’s partnership-driven stability approach has proven to be less than wholly satisfactory (Biscop 2005b, p. 39; Haukkala and Moshes 2004, p. 14). The PCA with Belarus, for example, has not been ratified. Even when ratified, the problems in the implementation of the PCAs have been chronic, yet the EU has been under constant barrage for a speedy deepening of the relationship toward association and even full accession for the countries concerned. Until recently, the EU’s usual line when commenting on these demands has been that the PCAs contain much unused potential, which should be fully exploited before new and deeper contractual arrangements are considered. The same conclusion can be drawn also from the south, where the Barcelona Process has largely failed to meet the expectations on both sides of the Mediterranean, and where the dialogues related to this framework process seem to result in little more than mutual irritation (for a recent critique, see Youngs 2006). For example, the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean summit in Barcelona in November 2005 failed to attract the presence of most of the invited Arab leaders. In press reports, the mood of the gathering was described as having been “fractious” and the whole meeting “lackluster . . . where the most contentious issues have been ‘fudged’” (EurActiv 2005a). From the EU’s vantage point, the ENP can be seen as having essentially three functions. First, it is a response to the growing calls from its neighbors for closer forms of partnership and integration, while staving off the question of further enlargements. The European Commission’s ENP strategy paper is unequivocal when stating that “it offers a means to reinforce relations between the EU and partner countries, which is distinct from the possibilities available to European countries under article 49 of the Treaty on European Union” (European Commission 2004b, p. 3).2 Second, the ENP has the internal function of bringing the previously separate policies and instruments together under “common objectives and principles.” It represents the latest step that the EU has taken in order to improve its sometimes clearly inadequate coherence as an international actor. This is reflected in the adoption of the European neighborhood and partnership instrument that entered into effect in 2007, which will bring the previously separate forms of external funding (such as INTERREG, TACIS, CARDS, and MEDA) under the same budget, programming period, and tendering rules (European Commission 2003a). Finally, the ENP seeks to reinvigorate the ailing partnership-driven processes both in the east and in the south. Compared with the earlier forms of cooperation, the ENP has much more robust conditionality built into it.

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At the heart of the initiative is thus the EU’s offer of enhanced relations and closer integration based on shared values between the EU and its neighbors. The mechanism is simple: in return for effective implementation of reforms (including aligning national legislation with the EU acquis communautaire), the EU will grant closer economic integration to its partners. The approach is twofold. First, the EU wants to tap the full potential of the already-existing PCAs, namely the gradual harmonization of legal norms with the EU acquis and the creation of a free trade area, and second, only then go beyond this with new arrangements that are yet to be largely specified (see, for example, European Commission 2005c, p. 5). The socalled neighborhood action plans, which are the main vehicles for developing cooperation, are supposed to contain clear objectives and spell out the benchmarks that have to be met in order for countries to obtain increased market access and other benefits from the EU. In short, the modus operandi of the ENP can be seen as being highly similar with the accession process, with the important difference that the “golden carrot” of accession is not on the table. However, a central problem in the ENP emerges with this crucial difference. This is so especially in the east, where one may ask whether it is realistic to expect countries to embark on radical economic and societal restructuring only to qualify as a part of the “ring of friends” in the EU neighborhood. The EU’s response is that the issues put on the ENP agenda are beneficial to its neighbors regardless of the question of eventual (although at the moment highly unlikely) EU accession. But this is beside the point. The fact that the EU was much more generous in supporting and acknowledging the calls for “European belonging” in Central and Eastern Europe is not lost to the eastern neighbors. The EU’s current offer has left a somewhat bitter aftertaste on the lips of its neighbors. This has been the case particularly in Ukraine, which (official upbeat rhetoric notwithstanding) has been deeply dismayed at being put into the same basket with countries along the southern shores of the Mediterranean (Gromadzki and Sushko 2005, p. 6). In the south, however, the gravity of the situation is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that accession is not generally seen as an important issue there. Even in the Mediterranean the EU cannot escape the fact that it has to be able to deliver tangible benefits to its neighbors in order to entice them into embarking on radical internal restructuring along the lines currently envisaged by the ENP.

Toward an Effective Transatlantic Division of Labor? As already suggested, the ENP is a hybrid policy uniquely suited for a “normative power Europe.” This is only partially the case, however.

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Henning Tewes has observed that in fact all powers are to varying degrees normative (cited in Diez 2005, p. 620). This applies especially in the case of the United States, which is equally—if not more—normative compared to the EU (see Diez 2005, esp. pp. 621–623). This observation makes it pertinent that instead of emphasizing the differences between the two most significant normative powers in the world today, we should perhaps look for points of complementarity, best practices, and synergies that could result from an effective division of labor between them. The United States undoubtedly has a clear self-interest in the EU neighborhood. In the first instance, however, the US interest is mainly restrictive, as it would prefer a permanently stable region that would ease the level of US responsibilities and commitments in that corner of the world. Especially since September 11 (but also well before that), US grand strategy has set its sights elsewhere, primarily to the greater Middle East and to Southeast Asia in anticipation of the rising might of China and India (as manifested in the troop reductions in Western Europe). Eastern Europe is currently of only secondary importance to the United States. Second, and flowing from this, the United States expects that the EU will share its burden in dealing with possible problems and crises emanating from the region (for a good overview of the role of burden sharing in transatlantic relations, see Lindstrom 2005). It seems clear that the United States is increasingly unwilling to come to Europe’s rescue like it did twice during the 1990s over the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Third, the United States could be seen as having one geostrategic interest that the EU as a more civilian power is clearly lacking: keeping the Russian influence in check in the region. It is somewhat paradoxical, however, that it is through these interests and key differences between the two powers that the EU can actually count on a continued US presence and engagement in the region in the future, a fact that makes it meaningful to discuss these issues also in the long-term perspective. These three US interests and tendencies will have the positive impact of bringing the two major Western powers into concert in the EU’s immediate neighborhood. This could result in mutual synergies, but it will also result in an admittedly difficult and at times perhaps even painful process of devising and agreeing on the actual modalities and divisions of labor through which the two actors can cooperate effectively in stabilizing the EU neighborhood. It is clear that the EU should take the leading role and assume a greater responsibility for the destinies of countries in its neighborhood, especially of those in Eastern Europe. The adoption of the ENP can be seen as the first tentative step in that direction. However, the policy (at least in its present form) remains woefully inadequate as an effective policy response to the whole gamut of different challenges, problems, and even threats that are on offer in the EU neighborhood. The reason for this stems from the fact that

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in essence the EU is facing the paradoxical situation where it is turning inward economically while it is simultaneously being asked to markedly step up its international presence (Niblett 2005, p. 56). This overall tendency is also reflected in the case of the ENP. The wrangling over the next budgetary period (2007–2013) showed how the EU’s budget—external action included—will more likely shrink than increase in the face of the new challenges. Moreover, the overall longer-term malaise in European economic performance will be reflected in the allocation of resources. The euro-zone economy is stalling, and the EU is no longer generating the kind of resources that it could use to throw its substantial economic weight around, especially beyond its own borders. It is equally dubious whether the EU is able to provide its neighbors with the kind of market access that would be required. The French and Dutch rejections of the constitutional treaty in 2005 reflect the rise of antiliberalism and neoprotectionism in the EU. It is unlikely that the vested interests within the EU will allow the European Commission to further open up the EU’s internal market to products from the east and the south that would be most competitive there (Grabbe 2001, p. 8; Milcher and Slay 2005, p. 9). In essence, we may therefore witness a revisitation of the capability-expectations gap all over again in the EU’s new neighborhood in the future. To make matters more difficult, these structural weaknesses can at least potentially be further exacerbated by the usual points of EU-US contention, which mainly stem from differing conceptions regarding what the EU has dubbed “a rule-based international order” and the role of legally binding obligations and multilateralism in realizing such an order. A further point of aggravation has been the differing understandings of the roots of international terrorism and, consequently, what the best ways are to deal with those roots. Luckily for the ENP, however, most of these questions are of secondary importance in this context. In fact, its regional transformational focus gels rather well with the recent US initiative of “transformational diplomacy” launched in January 2006. Upon introducing the new initiative, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted that the new US objective is “to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people—and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system” (Rice 2006). The 2006 US National Security Strategy reiterated and reaffirmed these goals (White House 2006, esp. p. 33), which are well in line with the ENP. Moreover, the contours of the policy, as they have been outlined by the US State Department, betray a much richer understanding of the roots of regional unrest compared to the earlier notions attached to the US war on terror, and acknowledge the need for a multifaceted stabilization approach akin (once again) very much to the ENP (US Department of State 2006). Previously, however, and despite the similar challenges facing the EU

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and the United States in their own southern neighborhoods, they have adopted almost completely different policy responses in the Mediterranean and Latin America (Lesser 2005). With regard to the southern Mediterranean and the greater Middle East, things have been slightly different, with both the EU and the United States pursuing highly similar objectives and policies while nevertheless implementing them almost entirely separately (Biscop 2005b, p. 51). It is indeed the south that will remain the test case in terms of developing a transatlantic consensus in the future, because the region is not entirely void of transatlantic conflict potential. In fact, three different EU-US constellations can be envisaged in the future: (1) the two acting in concert (as has been the case with the Iranian nuclear ambitions), (2) the two adopting different, even competing approaches (as has been the case with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), and (3) the EU splitting up, with some member states opting for the US-led approach and others seeking to oppose or undermine it (as was the case in the run-up to the war in Iraq in 2002–2003). It is obvious that only the first constellation provides the grounds for fruitful division of labor as well as maximum transatlantic policy impact in the field. Therefore it is hoped that the US transformational diplomacy initiative will open the door for exploring the extent to which the approaches across the Atlantic complement each other, and whether one or the other party will be able to devise policy responses that could act as best practices and be successfully exported and implemented elsewhere in the world. Even the prospect of such a development would have a positive impact, as it would move the focus away from acrimonious bickering over the differences, and toward looking for mutually beneficial solutions. Such an attitude would be instrumental in repairing some of the substantial amount of transatlantic china porcelain that has been broken over the past five years since the US invasion in Iraq.

Conclusion It is clear that the European Union and the United States do share a common interest in the stability of the Union’s immediate neighborhood, both in the east and in the south. By building on this foundation, the two parties could bring significant added value to each other’s endeavors in the future. For example, the military modernization and stabilization of the region, now largely spearheaded by NATO, is easily complemented by the EU’s multiple soft security approaches under the rubric of the European Neighborhood Policy. In order for this to work, however, the two parties must refrain from competing initiatives, and strive for a conscious identification of joint projects and an effective division of labor.

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The complementarity already goes beyond the realm of (soft) security, though. By assuming greater responsibility, especially over its eastern neighborhood, the EU can carry its own share of the transatlantic burden. The EU is already effectively doing so in the Balkans, where it has relieved the United States from peacekeeping as well as crisis management duties, and has also taken the lead in the civilian management and stabilization of the region since November 2000. The recent US initiative on transformational diplomacy opens a door to a further and more fruitful transatlantic division of labor. By departing from the much more black-and-white notions of the US war on terror, this transformational diplomacy actually comes very close to the EU’s own approach in its neighborhood policy. This creates the added possibility of also sharing best practices and the development of successful operational templates, which can then be put to good use by either party in other corners of the world. A word of caution is in order here, however. The realization of these beneficial prospects is dependent on two conditions. First, the United States must be willing to approach these issues with an open mind and in a spirit of genuine partnership. Washington must not only talk the talk but also walk the walk in terms of transformational diplomacy. Once those structures are in place, the United States will be in a much better position to take advantage of the opportunities and synergies discussed above. Second, and more important, the EU will need to make the ENP work and deliver on its promises vis-à-vis its own neighborhood. Despite the rhetoric and the ambitious conceptual work done by the European Commission, it is not at all guaranteed that the ENP will succeed (for an outright bleak analysis of the policy, see Smith 2005). The viability of the ENP is put at risk largely by internal developments (or rather the lack of them) within the EU itself. The first task for the EU is to ensure “that the financing . . . is adequate to support the ambitions of this policy,” as the European Commission has put it (2005c, p. 4). But the question boils down to more than just the aid component of the ENP, as it can be argued that trade in the form of increased market access to the European single market is much more crucial in enabling the EU’s neighbors to develop into prosperous modern economies and societies than any aid the EU could possible muster. Even if the EU manages to make the ENP robust enough on the incentive side (which is still doubtful), there is another internal challenge that awaits the ENP: the internal coordination related to the policy. The question of consistency is perhaps more pertinent in the case of the ENP than in most other areas of the EU’s external relations. Being organized on a geographical rather than a sectoral basis, the ENP touches on almost all the directorates-general of the European Commission. This has resulted in institutional innovation within the European Commission, with the estab-

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lishment of the ENP interservice group and the meetings of directors-general (European Commission 2005c, p. 3). Even if internal coordination within the European Commission were made effective (and this is a big “if” in itself), the challenges would not end here. Ultimately, the success of the ENP will depend on interinstitutional ties and mechanisms within and throughout the EU’s own highly multifaceted and variegated foreign policy machinery. In order to work effectively, the ENP must be able to transcend all three pillars of the EU (the European Community, the CFSP, and Justice and Home Affairs) and cope with the full amount of players, offices, institutions, and member states associated with the making of a “European foreign policy.” If these challenges are not tackled effectively, there is a danger that the ENP will manage only to increase the EU’s presence in, for example, the volatile region of the South Caucasus, without increasing its capacity for robust actorness. Without a commensurate increase in the EU’s external policies, and especially without a clear and rapid link with its harder arm (the CFSP and the ESDP), the ENP can only result in increased liabilities for the EU (compare Haukkala 2004). If the European Commission, through its ENP, gets the Union engaged in a serious hot conflict between, for example, Russia and Georgia or even Russia and Ukraine, are the European Council, the High Representative for the CFSP/ESDP, and the EU battle groups up to the task to play their role in pacifying the region that the EU has declared to be in its immediate interest and responsibility?3 Would the EU have the political will to act decisively in such a scenario? These are grave questions that are difficult to answer in the affirmative with confidence. It could well be that the EU’s new stance in its neighborhood will fail to live up to its promise after all. It thus could be that the hopes of a clear transatlantic division of labor and increased burden sharing could be a mere mirage, and that the United States might find itself in a situation where it is asked to ride to the rescue of a Europe that has managed to make a mess of its latest hour yet again.

Notes This chapter is the result of my participation in a project titled “Russia’s European Choice: With or Into the EU?” undertaken by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and funded by the Finnish Academy. It was written during my visit as a temporary lecturer to the Department of Politics at the University of Stirling, Scotland. I thank the Finnish Academy (Grant no. 112184) as well as the Department of Politics in Stirling for making that visit possible. 1. Nine PCAs had been concluded with the countries of the former Soviet Union by 2008. The EU has halted the ratification process of its PCA with Belarus due to President Alexander Lukashenko’s unconstitutional coup in 1996. On the

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same grounds, the country has been excluded from the implementation of the ENP as well. 2. This is in fact a toned-down version. In the first communication on the topic, the European Commission was even blunter, stating that the ENP was meant for countries “that do not currently have the perspective of membership of the EU” and its task is to “provide a framework for the development of a new relationship which would not, in the medium term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union’s institutions” (2003c, pp. 4–5). 3. This is not as farfetched as one might at first imagine. Rounds of bullets were frequently exchanged between Georgian and Russian troops over the breakaway region of South Ossetia during 2005, and again during a serious political crisis in September–October 2006, when rhetoric over the alleged spy scandal between the two countries escalated. The specter of armed conflict was also in the air between Ukraine and Russia in 2003 over the island of Tuzla in the Kerch Strait in the Sea of Azov.

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Conclusion

PART 4

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European Enlargement and the Future of Transatlantic Relations

11

Sven Biscop and Johan Lembke

THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IS IN FLUX. IN THE

wake of the Cold War there is a confluence of developments that have implications for international affairs and, in particular, transatlantic security relations. These developments include the diminished security dependence of Europe on the United States, the global repositioning of US military and diplomatic forces, the gradual transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization toward a broader global security agenda, and the efforts to enhance the capacity of the European Union to act as a more credible and effective actor in projecting stability and security beyond Europe. NATO allowed Europeans a stable framework in which they could build an economic and political community. The alliance remains the primary multilateral and multinational organization and engagement mechanism for transatlantic security relations and collective defense. It is also the main vehicle for US influence on European security affairs. As long as the United States sees and uses NATO as the major security organization, the EU and its new members will not try to develop an alternative in the foreseeable future. There is disagreement regarding whether NATO’s cohesion and importance as an institution and instrument for alleviating and resolving differences—in a time when defense is the subset of security and not the other way around—have weakened in recent years (for example, by membership enlargement, change of purpose and increased politicization, weaker transatlantic security community and decreased use of integrated force planning, and uncertainty over whether the alliance will be less cohesive and effective with heightened threats). The alliance has embarked on new types of missions in terms of the nature of intervention (with a growing 175

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civilian agenda) and the strategic distance from the traditional geographic scope of the organization. The nuclear deterrence of the alliance could also become a more central element in the future, as there may be more nuclear powers outside the alliance. The evolution of the alliance could be seen as a Gratwanderung (tightrope walk), with the players working their way forward without falling down. The United States will continue to consider NATO as the leading Euro-Atlantic institution for territorial defense. The EU, as part of its transformation into a collective military and security actor in its own right, is making efforts to strengthen its cohesiveness and capacity, and to support more flexibility in the relationship between the EU and NATO; this is in order to respond to the ongoing shift in transatlantic security relations. A more flexible “two-pillar” alliance could provide the framework in which a relatively more autonomous role for the EU could be reconciled with maintaining the transatlantic defense community. In the foreseeable future, the EU will not be an alternative to NATO and should avoid competition and defining itself in opposition to the United States (Chapter 2). The question is whether the EU will be able to generate the capacity (and political will) to make strategic decisions to conduct EU-led larger-scale operations and expeditionary missions in response to significant international and regional security challenges. This would involve not only postconflict stabilization and reconstruction missions, but also major combat operations and military interventions earlier on during crises and in demanding environments. The increasing demand for crisis management far away from Europe has exposed the military shortfalls on the Continent for conducting expeditionary operations. The EU will continue its efforts to explore new command, control, and planning capabilities and mechanisms in order to embark on military and crisis management operations and bolster its strategic culture and political preparedness to make difficult decisions. In addition, it will develop required instruments to support decisions (such as capabilities to sustain larger-scale expeditionary missions), foster more defense armaments cooperation across national boundaries and a stronger and more coordinated defense technological and industrial base in Europe, and support more coordination in homeland security (or societal security) affairs (Chapters 3–4). While the EU will continue to interact with the United States on terms accepted by the latter in order to serve as a legitimate partner in transatlantic security relations, enhanced capacities could allow the EU to exert more influence, in a peaceful manner, over US planning and decisions on military intervention. The EU could, as a strategic actor, also provide complementary roles in the event that US resources and room to maneuver are restrained due to large-scale operations in various parts of the world, or if the legitimacy of the United States were to be ques-

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tioned in a certain part of the world or during a certain time period and the legitimacy of the EU were considered more positively. The enlargement of the EU has implications for European foreign and security policy, transatlantic security relations, and the role of the EU in international affairs, and thus needs to be an integral element in an analysis of the evolution of the Union. While the Atlanticist element in the EU has been strengthened with the new member states following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, there is uncertainty whether enlargement will strengthen or undermine the capacity of the EU in the longer term to act as a coherent and international strategic actor. The new members of the EU have balanced their EU and NATO profiles in security policy and have pursued a pragmatic combination of Atlanticist and European security policy approaches. They have seen NATO as the core military guarantee and the main organization for large-scale and demanding high-end crisis management or combat operations, and they have seen the European Security and Defense Policy as a relatively less effective mechanism but a viable future instrument for lower-end crisis management and postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. They support the idea of a stronger EU as an economic and political actor on the global scene, and support a strong and sound relationship with the United States, but oppose any efforts to undermine the role of NATO as the central collective security organization for the Euro-Atlantic community. The new EU member states are trying hard to push the EU foreign policy agenda more in an easterly direction and would like to see countries in the EU’s eastern neighborhood rejoin the family of European nations. All the new members of the EU bring specific knowledge of regions in the EU’s immediate neighborhood, and thereby bring important assets to Europe as a collective. While there are many similarities among the new members of the EU through its eastern enlargement, the differing historical experiences, geographic locations, sizes, and material capabilities of the new members result in differing perceptions of external threats and the relative importance of hard security, geographic priorities regarding the European neighborhood, the depth of pro-Atlanticism, and approaches toward the larger EU countries and the Russian Federation. The differences in perceptions and priorities among the new EU members have helped to impede the promotion of a “grand strategy” among them for the EU as a collective. Poland and the Czech Republic share the formative experience of preparing for and becoming full members of NATO and being non-EU European NATO allies in the period from 1999 until they joined the EU in 2004. The geographic location of Poland and its historical experience help to explain the relatively consistent “instinctive Atlanticism” in Polish cul-

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ture and its deep-rooted commitment to the United States and the latter’s role as a security guarantor. They also help to explain Poland’s long-lasting and continuing perception of potential vulnerability to external aggression and regional instability, and its perception of Russia as a potential external threat (Chapter 5). Poland is the largest country, in terms of both its territory and its population, in Central and Eastern Europe. It made it clear early on that it would seek to set the agenda regarding European foreign and security policy, and to carve out larger foreign policy responsibilities in Europe. It is a regional actor and has striven to be perceived as, and play the role of, a middleranking power in the EU. Poland has been a brick in the great power games and within the spheres of influence of Germany and Russia in particular, and has been concerned that the larger EU countries may engage in “strong arming” to impose their wishes upon it. The proximity to Russia makes perceptions of external threats and the importance of hard security in Poland relatively intense, and it wants buffer zones between itself and the Russian Federation. Poland, which also almost completely depends on oil imports from Russia, has a fundamental and understandable interest in balancing Russia’s influence in Europe, as well as Russia’s preferred strategy for influencing the EU through bilateral relations (such as its “strategic partnership” with Germany). It would like to see the EU play a more decisive role in checking the influence of Russia, and has started to support a more centralized European foreign and security policy with more military and security muscle to complement economic and political mechanisms. Polish foreign and security policy remains based on a relatively deep commitment to the United States and NATO, and to US foreign policy and the continuation of US involvement in Europe. At the same time, it wants an EU with a more coherent and influential voice in international security matters, and its strategic preferences will likely become more oriented toward the EU given the possibility that the Union could become a credible international security actor. A perceived or real lack of influence on US intervention policy could over time also strengthen the EU orientation of Poland and other new EU member states. The Czech Republic is a relatively small EU member country and does not have the same weight as Poland in Central and Eastern Europe (it could be viewed as more representative of the majority of the new EU member states). While Czech foreign and security policy is aimed at supporting a strong transatlantic security relationship, it has been somewhat less deeprooted than Poland’s commitment. Its policy orientation and profile are more amenable to shifts in governments and political constellations (Chapter 6). Arguably, given its relatively weaker influence in the European Union, particularly as it affects the EU agenda, the Czech Republic is skeptical of the idea of the EU as a more autonomous strategic actor in the mili-

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tary-security realm, although, given its smaller size and dependence on the EU, it also might align more with larger EU member states in future differences with the United States. Bulgaria has pursued a balanced approach toward the EU and NATO, and its accession to the EU is expected to empower both organizations (Chapter 7). Turkey, a regional actor with more weight in the Black Sea region, has evolved into a relatively pro-Western country, and has strongly allied itself with the Euro-Atlantic community. It served as the southeastern flank of NATO during the Cold War, and also as an important partner in promoting the goals of the organization. As a non-EU member, Turkey remains concerned about any decline of the role of NATO at the expense of autonomous European military structures (Chapter 8). Each of the new members aspire to play a role as regional experts and regional providers of stability as part of their foreign policy profiles, and their geographic priority areas in the EU’s eastern neighborhood range from Russia to the Black Sea and Balkan regions. Poland has focused relatively more attention on the northern parts of the Black Sea region. The overall priority for the eastern dimension in its foreign policy is an independent and pro-Western Ukraine, and the formation of a belt of democracies from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea as a means to reduce the ability of Russia to interfere in and exert pressure over countries along this belt. The Czech Republic and Bulgaria have focused more on the Western Balkans, between Hungary and Slovenia in the north and Greece in the south. Bulgaria, which borders Greece and Turkey, focuses relatively more attention on the eastern Mediterranean region. Bulgaria wants to be perceived as an important actor and play a prominent role in the process of enlarging the zone of democracy, security, and progress in Southeast Europe. It has viewed EU membership for Turkey as important for the stabilization of the Western Balkans. The relationship between Turkey and Russia, however, may raise concerns among neighboring countries such as Bulgaria (and Romania) and reinforce a desire for the involvement of external powers such as the European Union and the United States in balancing the influence of Turkey and Russia as the large regional powers in the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. The strategic relationship between the European Union, the United States, and Russia will be of pivotal importance for the evolution of the transatlantic security relationship (Chapter 9).

The EU Neighborhood The “big bang” wave of enlargement in 2004 resulted in the creation of the European Neighborhood Policy, which acknowledges and focuses on the

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strategic importance of the immediate neighborhood of the enlarged EU (Turkey and the Balkan countries that have an “accession perspective” are not partners in this policy initiative, nor is Russia, as the latter has a strategic partnership with the EU). The strategic goal of this policy is a “ring of friends” united by mutual prosperity, security, and stability through an increased scope and intensity of relations in all policy fields, and through support and encouragement of the partners’ own development and reforms. The policy also has links to the “harder” side (the ESDP) of EU foreign policy (Chapter 10). EU and US instruments and interests will overlap—and at times compete—in the EU neighborhood in the future, especially in the wider Black Sea region and the Middle East. The Black Sea Region

The incremental EU enlargement and the parallel uniting force of NATO enlargement eastward from the Baltic Sea to the western shores of the Black Sea and the Balkan region (with Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia expected to be the next members of NATO), the heightened competition among countries for hydrocarbon resources and transportation routes, and the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into EU and Euro-Atlantic institutions help to promote the Black Sea region as a higher strategic priority for the EU. The wider Black Sea region has become the new eastern border of the EU and has reemerged as an area of geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. It is located geographically at the crossroads between a strategic east-west corridor (Europe and Central Asia) and north-south corridor (Russia, the Caspian Sea, and the Persian Gulf), represents a meeting point for security providers and energy consumers of the west and east, and serves as a gateway to the northern parts of the Middle East. Europe’s energy vulnerability and external energy insecurity will increase. The Black Sea region is a strategic energy corridor to the EU, Turkey, and the Balkan Peninsula, and its significance will increase as a major transit region for energy exports from the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia. The import reliance of the EU on external energy supplies (expected to increase to more than 80 percent for natural gas and more than 90 percent for oil by 2030), and its need to diversify energy sources and import and transport routes, will only further enhance the strategic role of the Black Sea region. The EU’s dependence on Russia as its main energy supplier (expected to represent around 70 percent of imports by 2030), and on its support regarding critical international issues, is significant. At the same time, Russia needs European foreign direct investment, industrial equipment, engineering and technological knowledge, and access to EU internal assets

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and markets. This has shaped the EU’s policy toward Moscow and its description of Russia as a major factor in Europe’s security and prosperity. Russia has exercised energy brinkmanship in its immediate neighborhood since the 1990s based on its great modern riches. The disputes, for instance, between Russia and Belarus in early 2004 and early 2007, and Russia and Ukraine in early 2006, resulted in interruptions of energy supplies to Europe and accelerated the pursuit of a new European energy policy. A more elaborate strategic approach is also needed in terms of European energy security—supply and access to hydrocarbon resources, which undoubtedly shape foreign policy developments and should be part of external EU relations. The EU member states have been unable and unwilling to foster a common European energy policy and speak with one voice in international affairs. The dominance and hegemonic position of Russia over the area stretching from the Baltic States through the Black Sea and to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia have weakened. However, it still has considerable economic, political, and strategic influence and interests in this wider area. The enlargement of the EU and NATO will require the European Union and the United States to refine their strategic approaches toward Russia regarding what it considers as legitimate spheres of influence and geostrategic and geoeconomic interests in the South Caucasus, the wider Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, and Central Asia. The Middle East

Despite their diverging strategic views, the European Union and the United States need each other to make their policies work, and must therefore find an arrangement that allows their partnership to regain effectiveness. This holds true especially for the Middle East, even though European and US strategies differ substantially. For the EU, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the key (though this does not guarantee that the EU will at all times actively pursue resolution of the conflict). As many Europeans warned on the eve of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, no domino-effect of democratization would follow from toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. Significant steps toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are a necessary prerequisite for acquiring legitimacy, without which the promotion of reform does not stand any chance of success. This continues to be the case, as the invasion of Iraq and subsequent events have delegitimized “the West” even further. Ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not provide a magical solution to all of the region’s problems, but it will break the current deadlock and thus create great potential for a new dynamic. For one, existing regimes will no longer be able to abuse the conflict as an excuse for ignoring internal challenges.

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Ending this eternal conflict is naturally a highly commendable objective in its own right. For the United States, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is much less of a central issue, even more so after the invasion of Iraq than before, as the ongoing war has come to dominate its Middle East policy to the detriment of other concerns, including its other ongoing operation, in Afghanistan. The United States continues to steer a much more confrontational course, refusing direct engagement with actors such as Syria and Iran. Despite all these differences, however, the European Union and the United States need each other’s cooperation, because all of the issues in the Middle East are inextricably intertwined. The European Union, having contributed nearly 8,000 troops to the reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon, needs to engage with Syria and Iran in order to build a stable polity in Lebanon that integrates Hezbollah. Certainly, any initiative would carry much more weight if it could be undertaken jointly with the United States. Second, this is even truer with regard to the central issue—for the EU—of Israel-Palestine. Past experience shows that only an initiative undertaken jointly by the European Union and the United States has any hope of success in furthering the peace process, as each has leverage on one of the parties to the conflict. In this regard, too, the involvement of Syria and Iran is vital. Third, with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue, the initially reluctant United States subscribed to the EU-led negotiated approach, perhaps more out of necessity than out of conviction. Washington could regard the adoption of sanctions after these negotiations broke down as a shift toward its position, but in fact a renewed diplomatic initiative is the only way out of the deadlock. Here, certainly, US engagement is indispensable, as it is indeed more generally, given both countries’ vital involvement in all of the region’s security issues. The United States itself needs to engage with Iran and with the other neighboring states of Iraq in order to help stabilize the latter and contain violence within its borders regardless of whether US troops are withdrawn. As a consequence of its focus on Iraq, the United States requires a major increase of European engagement in Afghanistan, in terms of police and civilian deployments and financial assistance as well as troops, to strengthen the weak governance structures and to allow it to continue to concentrate its efforts on Iraq. An increased European presence would only make sense, and should therefore only be agreed to by the EU, if the European Union and the United States agree on the long-term strategy for Afghanistan and if propitious circumstances are created in the wider region. For as long as the war in Iraq continues to fester, radicalization will rise, and the number of acts of violence will grow in Afghanistan, in the other countries of the Middle East, and in Europe itself. Finally, therefore, the

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European Union needs the United States, just as much as the latter needs the former, in order to find a way out of Iraq. These issues are to a great extent dealt with as separate strands by different groups of actors at different levels of coordination, even though in reality all the strands are intertwined and all the actors are mutually dependent. What is needed is a grand strategic bargain between the European Union and the United States on the overall strategy for the Middle East. In due course, a new “grand” conference on the Middle East could result, involving all regional parties, including Turkey and the Gulf states, but first, specific and pragmatic EU-US initiatives should be taken vis-à-vis all relevant parties. In mid-January 2007 US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice returned from a tour of the region just as Javier Solana left for his tour of the capitals—evidently, much more coordination is needed. The question is whether Brussels and Washington can find sufficient common ground and the will to compromise.

Conclusion The United States supported European integration for strategic and economic purposes in the post-1945 period. A strong transatlantic security relationship with the European Union as a more effective international security and political-diplomatic actor, and a robust transatlantic partnership more generally supported by greater modesty and openness on both sides, are in the best interests of both the European Union and the United States. The EU seeks to achieve a single voice, assert a separate identity, and enhance its profile and promote a positive image of itself on the world stage through its Common Foreign and Security Policy. The further development of the EU increases its importance in the eyes of the United States. A stronger relationship with a more effective EU on the international scene, and a more creative approach toward the ESDP on the part of the United States, is needed to develop and implement policies through concerted approaches, even when faced by substantial disagreement on how to achieve outcomes and long-term goals. Europe invests less per soldier, and it has an insufficient amount of (and funds for) professional personnel, advanced equipment, and the strategic assets needed to deploy larger amounts of troops over long distances, compared to the United States. The EU is hampered by its limitations, such as a domination of declarations over action, a lack of qualified majority voting, and the need for doctrines for the use of force, strategic criteria for military intervention, and institutions and coordinated procedures for preventive diplomacy and relations with other countries and partnerships. The

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relationship between the EU and NATO is in flux. Institutional and strategic capacity and coordination between these organizations are weak, and what will trigger common response, deployment, and engagement remains unclear; the relationship remains contentious, dynamic, and unresolved. The relationship between the EU and NATO is not in reality about autonomy or independence of the EU, but about its relative autonomy, though the EU has an ambition to enhance its capacity for crisis management missions beyond Europe. The ESDP has undergone rapid progress, developing in a relatively short period of time a central focus on crisis management beyond Europe. It is based on and pursued through a legal approach for military and civilian action, with links to development, humanitarian, and technical assistance. It is not a common defense policy, and not a common foreign and security policy; rather, it represents a halfway house, a progressive increase in missions, and with a larger and more ambitious role for the EU. Domestic interests, ideas, and institutions, as well as coalition alignment (and compromises, issue linkages, and package deals) within the EU, and the impact of policymaking at the EU level, will direct the evolution of the ESDP and the transatlantic relationship in combination with incremental adjustments in the international system. There are different approaches (competing visions) to the evolution of the EU and transatlantic relations among larger EU member states. The United Kingdom does not want a centralized EU. It believes that the EU should not replicate what other organizations such as NATO do best, and has supported EU enlargement and a strong transatlantic relationship. France wants a strong EU, has the development of the ESDP high on its European agenda, and has a weaker interest in the transatlantic relationship. Germany desires both a strong EU and a strong transatlantic relationship, seeks to be ever more embedded in the European integration project as “a good European” (as it did in the past, such as when it gave up its national currency and promoted it as the anchor in a centralized monetary system to increase long-term monetary stability), and wants to be a full player at the NATO table, while nurturing the special Franco-German relationship and looking eastward for economic opportunity. Poland, with its newly regained sovereignty, has been focused on the strategic security guarantee from the United States, with a relatively weak interest in a stronger EU but supporting EU enlargement and a strong transatlantic partnership. The other new EU member states are pursuing a balanced EU-US foreign policy approach. The relationship between Germany and Poland could become a key factor for the future of the EU and transatlantic relations. Germany supported eastern enlargement and EU membership for Poland (as part of a broader goal of moving the front line toward the east, between the Euro-Atlantic

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community and Russia), and has continued to work closely with Poland; the latter supports further enlargement eastward of both the EU and NATO. The United States cannot help Poland inside the EU, and Poland has concerns about Russia. Germany does not want the area between it and Russia to be an area of contest, and wants Poland as a partner in relations with Russia in a broader context of linking Russia to the EU. Germany and Poland will have an interest in mutual cooperation and a special bilateral relationship. They both support a strong transatlantic relationship, and Poland can further strengthen its promotion of a stronger EU and a more effective ESDP in international affairs. The foreign and policy security profiles of the new European Union members support the EU as a global economic and political actor and the role of the EU in enlarging the European zone of democracy, prosperity, security, and stability. They balance a commitment to the United States and NATO on the one hand, and to the EU and the ESDP on the other. If the real or perceived importance of the alliance is weakened, they will likely further strengthen their support for an effective ESDP and an EU autonomous capability to intervene beyond Europe. While the transatlantic security relationship remains in flux and is in the midst of a structural adjustment, and while there are at times important differences in the approaches and choice of instruments between the European Union and the United States, the overall transatlantic partnership has become more issueoriented and pragmatic in recent years. EU enlargement will reinforce the need for the Union to elaborate a collective and coherent strategic approach toward the wider Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. There is a need for more common thinking and concerted approaches toward these regions by the European Union and the United States.

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Acronyms

ACT AMIS CECIS CFSP CIS EDA EDTIB ENP ESDP EUMC EUMS FRONTEX FYROM ISAF JFCOM JIP NATO NRF PCA SEDM SEEBRIG SHAPE WEU WTO

Allied Command Transformation African Union Mission in Sudan Common Emergency Communication and Information System (European Union) Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Union) Commonwealth of Independent States European Defense Agency European Defense Technological and Industrial Base European Neighborhood Policy European Security and Defense Policy EU Military Committee EU Military Staff European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia International Security Assistance Force Joint Forces Command (United States) Joint Investment Program North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO response force partnership and cooperation agreement Southeast European Defense Ministerial Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Western European Union World Trade Organization 187

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The Contributors

Sven Biscop is a senior research fellow at Egmont–The Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels, and visiting professor of European security at the College of Europe in Bruges. He is a member of the Executive Academic Board of the European Security and Defence College, and editor-in-chief of the journal Studia Diplomatica. Esther Brimmer is deputy director and director of research at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. She has served on the Policy Planning Staff at the US Department of State and as a senior associate at the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Oya Dursun-Özkanca is assistant professor of political science at Elizabethtown College, Pennsylvania. Jan Hallenberg is professor of political science at Swedish National Defence College and adjunct professor at Stockholm University. Hiski Haukkala is a researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki. He has authored several works on EU-Russia relations and the EU’s relations with its eastern neighborhood. Robert E. Hunter is a senior adviser at the Rand Corporation and was US ambassador to NATO under President Bill Clinton. Radek Khol has worked at the General Secretariat of the Council of the 203

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European Union since November 2006. Previously he was a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Prague, and became head of its Centre for Security Analysis in 2001. Johan Lembke is an educator in Sweden. He was formerly director of the European Union Center of Excellence, and senior lecturer at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Kerry Longhurst is a research fellow at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI) in Paris, and a senior lecturer at the European Research Institute at the University of Birmingham. She has published in the areas of European security and transatlantic relations, and is currently conducting a research project on the European Neighborhood Policy. Plamen Pantev is associate professor in the International Relations and International Law Department in Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridsky,” and deputy dean of the university’s Law School. He is founder and director of the Institute for Security and International Studies, Sofia. Nick Witney was the first chief executive of the European Defense Agency.

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Index

ACT. See Allied Command Transformation Aero Vodochody, 95 Afghanistan, viii; and Bulgaria, 112; and Czech Republic, 84, 91; and NATO, 5, 19; need for EU engagement, 182; and Turkey, 121, 123; and US fixation on Iraq, 182 Africa, 5, 17, 96, 121. See also Democratic Republic of Congo African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 17 Air-to-air refueling, 42–43 Albania, 14, 111 Albright, Madeleine, 79, 162 Allied Command Transformation (ACT), 18, 25, 27, 28, 37 Al-Qaida, 49, 50, 112 Amsterdam Treaty, 7 Annan, Kofi, 17, 126 Armed forces: Bulgaria, 116; Czech Republic, 84–85, 90–91, 99; EU battle groups, 27, 92–93, 116, 122; and NATO-ESDP relationship, 25–28; Poland, 64; standby forces, 27–28; Turkey, 122; US forces in the Czech Republic, 87–88. See also EU military capability; NATO response force Armenia, 105, 163, 164 Asia, US’s focus on, 4 Austria, 92

Azerbaijan, 105, 163, 164 Aznar, José María, 13 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, 121 Baluyevsky, Yuri, 88 Barcelona Process, 164–165 Barnier, Michel, 68 Belarus, 70, 72, 164, 165 Benjamin, Daniel, 49 “Berlin Plus” arrangement, 16–17; and Czech Republic, 81, 88, 96; headquarters debate, 23–25; and Operation Concordia, 76 (n2); and Turkey, 124; and two-pillar approach, 21 Biscop, Sven, 1, 13, 175 Black Sea basin: border security issues, 104; Bulgarian interests, 102; as new geopolitical and geostrategic center for enlarged EU, 104, 180–181; northsouth and east-west strategic corridors, 110–111, 180; oil and gas transport, 106–107; terrorism, 104, 112–113; and Turkey, 120, 123. See also Bulgaria Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, 123 “Blue stream” gas pipeline, 106 Boeing, 95 Border protection, 52–53, 104, 132, 163 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 111; EU police mission in, 85, 96, 112, 116,

205

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122, 123; EU’s inability to respond to crisis, 161 Bruton, John, 3 Bulgaria, 101–118, 179; armed forces, 116; democratization, 101–102; economy, 102; electrical power supplies, 107–108; and ESDP, 113–117; EU accession, 8, 99, 104–108; and Greece, 102; and homeland security, 112; interests in the Black Sea basin, 102; NATO membership, 101, 115; oil and gas transport, 102, 106–107; organized crime, 108; participation in peacekeeping missions, 112, 116; perspectives on dilemmas of EU enlargement, 109–110; and regional conflicts, 102; and Turkey, 102, 106; and the United States, 103, 109–113, 115–116; US military presence in, 102, 112–113; and Western Balkans, 111 Burden sharing, 48, 160, 166–169, 176–177 Bush, George W., 37, 85, 88, 143–144 Büyükanıt, Yaflar, 130 CESIS. See Common Emergency Communication and Information System CFSP. See Common Foreign and Security Policy China, 4, 18 Chirac, Jacques, 86 Christian Democrats (Czech Republic), 82, 88, 98, 100 (n4) CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent States Civic Democratic Party (Czech Republic), 78, 82, 88, 91, 96 Civilian-Military Cell, 24, 28, 52, 53 Climate change, 55 Clinton, Bill, 79 Cold War, 14, 16, 121 Command, control, and communications capabilities, 42–43, 176 Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS), 56 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), viii, 7, 14, 68, 153 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 72–73 Commonwealth of the Democratic Choice, 110

Communist Party (Czech Republic), 88, 100 (n4) Community Civil Protection Mechanisms, 56 Constitution. See Draft constitutional treaty Constructivism, 155 Cooper, Robert, 160 Cooperative security, as possible US policy, 142–143 Crisis management: civil-military integration, 28–30, 53; and homeland security, 53–54, 56; and military shortfalls, 176; non-ESDP mechanisms of crisis response, 55–56; overlapping institutions, 57; postconflict rehabilitation, 116. See also Homeland security Croatia, 111 Cyprus conflict, 126, 128 Czech Republic, 77–100; and Afghanistan, 84, 91; armed forces, 84–85, 90–91, 99; balancing Atlanticist and European Security Policy profiles, 84–88; and code of conduct for defense procurement, 94–95; and defense clauses of the EU constitutional treaty, 93–95; defense industry, 94–95; defense spending, 91, 93; ESDP and transatlantic relations, 78–81; ESDP as divisive issue, 78, 81–82; and EU battle groups, 92–93; and European Capabilities Action Plan, 93; geographical priorities, 96–98; and Iraq War, 83–87, 91; and Kosovo, 79, 84, 91, 92; military contributions, 89–91; and NATO, 78–80, 83, 93; participation in peacekeeping missions, 84–85, 91–92, 96, 100 (n5); political parties, 81–82; position on EU enlargement, 98–99; position on European Security Strategy, 82–83, 178–179; priorities for ESDP, 88–89; and Russia, 88, 97; and US missile defense system, 87–88 Czech Social Democratic Party, 81 Darfur crisis, 5, 17 Defense industry, 38–40, 94–95 Defense spending, 37, 41, 45 (n2), 183; Czech Republic, 91, 93; and European concerns about Turkish accession,

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132; Turkey, 122; and the United States, 48 Dehaene, Luc, 68 Democratic Republic of Congo, 24, 64, 76 (n2), 122 Denmark, 46 (n3), 168 Dobbins, James, 29, 32 (n2) Dombrowski, Peter, 142, 143 Draft constitutional treaty, 7, 93–95, 114, 131, 168 Drug trafficking, 5, 104 “Dual commitment” policy, ix Dursun-Özkanca, Oya, 119 Earthquake of 2005 (Pakistan), 5, 29, 44 Economics: and Bulgaria, 102; EURussia relationship, 147–148, 154, 180–181; stalling of euro-zone economy, 168; US-EU relationship, 3, 146–147; US-Russia relationship, 154, 157 EDA. See European Defense Agency Edelman, Eric, 123 EDTIB. See European Defense Technological and Industrial Base Ekengren, Magnus, 141 Electricity, 107–108 Empire, as possible US policy, 142–143 Energy sector. See Electricity; Oil and gas industry Engelbrekt, Kjell, 141 Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe, 160 ENP. See European Neighborhood Policy Environmental hazards, 5, 55, 163 Erdo¤an, Recep, 128 ESDP. See European Security and Defense Policy EU arrest warrant, 55, 58 EU as autonomous global actor, viii; “capability” vs. “capacity,” 141; and cohesiveness, 141, 156–157; Czech position on, 89, 178–179; and economics, 146–148; emergence as strategic actor, 3–4, 6–8, 16, 48; and European Neighborhood Policy, 170; headquarters debate, 23–25; and NATO, 3–4, 14–16; Polish position on, 64–69; prospects for increasing “actorness,” 152–154; and strategic triangle, 141–142, 152–153; and

207

Turkey, 121, 124. See also European Security and Defense Policy; Two-pillar approach to security EU battle groups, 27, 92–93, 116, 122 EU enlargement, 4, 63, 126–134, 175–185; analysis of possible scenarios for Turkish accession, 127–134; and Black Sea basin, 104, 180–181; Bulgarian experience, 104–108; Bulgarian perspectives on dilemmas of enlargement, 109–110; current antienlargement climate, 8, 72–74; and Cyprus, 126; Czech position, 98–99; and European Neighborhood Policy, 179–180; influence of Bulgarian accession on Western Balkans, 111; Polish position, 72–74, 177–178; problems with further accessions, 162–163; prospect of membership as driving force of political transformations, 105, 125, 162; and reduction of regional conflicts, 104–105, 108, 111, 123; strategic objectives of eastward enlargement, 108; and transatlantic ties, 109–113 EU military capability, 37–38, 183; armed forces and US-ESDP relationship, 25–28; Bulgarian contributions, 116; capability priorities, 42–44; Czech contributions, 89–91; level of troop deployment, 37; motivation for increasing, 161–162, 176; need for interoperability, 37–38; need for topdown coordination, 27; shortfalls, 33–34, 45 (n1); US position on, 124–125. See also Defense spending; European Defense Agency EU Military Staff (EUMS), 24, 27, 53 EU-3, 143 EUMS. See EU Military Staff EU-NATO Capability Group, 27 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States (FRONTEX), 53 European Capabilities Action Plan, 93 European Centre for Disease Control, 56 European Coal and Steel Community, 47 European Commission, 28, 55; Bush’s visit with, 143; crisis management and response, 56; and European Neighborhood Policy, 170, 171

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European Council, 55, 65 European Council Secretariat, 28 European Defense Agency (EDA), 25–27, 33–46; capability priorities, 42–44; code of conduct for defense procurement, 39–40; defense industry, 38–40; establishment of, 34, 94; and European security strategy, 36–37; functional responsibilities, 34–36; future focus on research and technology, 40–42; long-term vision, 44–45; mission, 34–35; overview of Europe’s military capabilities, 37–38; participating states, 45 (n3); steering board, 35; website, 40 European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), 39 European Economic Community, 16 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 159–172, 179–180; and accession process, 162; and Bulgaria, 105; described, 159–161; and European Commission, 170, 171; functions of, 165–166; goals of, 160, 180; neighborhood action plans, 166; partnership and cooperation agreements (PCAs), 164–166, 171 (n1); problems with, 166; strategic challenges, 161–164; and transatlantic division of labor, 160, 166–169; viability of, 170 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), viii, 53; and Bulgaria, 113–117; Civilian-Military Cell, 24, 28, 52, 53; combination of civilian and military assets, 48; creation of, 48, 65, 124; and Czech Republic, 78–82, 86; decisionmaking, 17; EU’s evolving strategic role, 47–49; and homeland security, 47–59; motivation for creating, 14; and Poland, 65–66, 67–68; and transatlantic societal security, 56–58; Turkish ambivalence toward, 125–126; US concerns about, 48–49. See also EU military capability; EU Military Staff; Headline Goals; Homeland security; NATO-ESDP relationship; Petersberg Tasks European Security Strategy (December 2003), 3; agenda, 6, 15–16; compared to US National Security Strategy, 15, 116; and Czech Republic, 82–83; and

European Defense Agency, 36–37; and European Neighborhood Policy, 160; list of threats, ix; and NATO, 31; origin of, 7; and Poland, 68; “solidarity” concept, 55; and the UN, 8 European Union (EU): Amsterdam Treaty, 7; breakdown of constitutional ratification process, 73; competing visions for future of, 184; debate over division of labor among security organizations, 7–8; dependence on Russia as energy supplier, 180–181; differing approaches to security priorities of US and EU, ix–xi, 15, 150, 181–183; direct dialogue with United States on wider multinational issues, 23; divide between “Atlanticists” and “Europeanists,” 4, 20; draft constitutional treaty, 7, 93–95, 114, 131, 168; economic relationship with Russia, 147–148, 154, 180–181; economic relationship with United States, 3, 146–147; internal divisions, 19–20; and Iranian nuclear ambitions, 143; and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 181–182; law enforcement cooperation, 55, 58; Maastricht Treaty, 7, 14; Nice Treaty, 7; perception of “complex” world, 15; Schengen agreement, 52–53; “soft power” strategy, 150; “solidarity” concept, 55, 58; and Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004, 149, 156; US military presence in, 6. See also Armed forces; “Berlin Plus” arrangement; Border protection; Burden sharing; Draft constitutional treaty; EU as autonomous global actor; EU enlargement; EU Military capability; European Neighborhood Policy; European Security Strategy; NATO-ESDP relationship; Strategic triangle; US-EU relationship “Fortress Europe,” 38–39 France: and draft constitutional treaty, 168; and EU battle groups, 92; and European Coal and Steel Community, 47; and impetus for ESDP, 16; and Iranian nuclear ambitions, 143; and peacekeeping missions, 76 (n2); vision for future of EU, 184

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Freedom Union (Czech Republic), 82 FRONTEX. See European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border of the Member States Georgia, 105, 163, 164 Germany: and EU battle groups, 92; and European Coal and Steel Community, 47; and Iranian nuclear ambitions, 143; and Poland, 184–185; position on enlargement, 74; vision for future of EU, 184 Ginsberg, Roy, 139 “Global partnership” initiative, 18, 23 Gongadze, Georgiy, 71 Greece, 106, 126, 128–129 Green movement, 55 Greens (Czech Republic), 82, 88 Gül, Abdullah, 121 Gulf War, ix, 121 Hallenberg, Jan, 139 “Hampton Court Agenda,” 41 Haukkala, Hiski, 159 Havel, Vaclav, 85, 97, 100 (n7) Headline Goals, viii, 48, 53, 90, 116, 122 Headquarters debate, 23–25 High Representative, 7 Homeland security, 47–59, 176; and Bulgaria, 112; crisis management and response, 53–56; ESDP’s roles in societal security, 51–55; EU’s evolving strategic role, 47–49; and larger notion of societal security, 49–55; law enforcement cooperation, 55, 58; need for resilient societies, 50; non-ESDP mechanisms of crisis response, 55–56; objectives listed, 51; prevention, 52–53, 55; recovery after disasters, 54–56, 116; and social cohesion, 50, 51; transatlantic societal links, 50; transatlantic societal security, 56–58 Human trafficking, 104, 163 Hurricane Katrina, 29, 50, 51, 53; and NATO, 5, 29, 57 Iceland, 125 Illegal immigration, 104, 163, 164 Infrastructure protection, 5 International Criminal Court, 84

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International Security Assistance Force (NATO presence in Afghanistan), 5, 19, 121, 156 Interoperability of military equipment, 37–38 “Inverse Berlin Plus,” 29 Iran, xi; and benefits of Turkish accession, 122, 129; and EU-3, 143; nuclear ambitions, 135, 143, 150–151, 164, 182; and strategic triangle, 150–151 Iran hostage crisis (1979–1981), ix Iraq War, vii; and coalition of the willing, 19; and Czech Republic, 83–87, 91; intra-European division over, 20; and NATO-ESDP relationship, 14–15; and need for coordinated strategy in the Middle East, 181–183; and Poland, 66–69; and Russia, 145; and Turkey, 133–134 Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 164; and benefits of Turkish accession, 122, 129; and need for coordinated strategy in the Middle East, 181–182; and strategic triangle, 151 Ivanov, Sergei, 88 Ivanov, Tilcho, 115 JFCOM. See US Joint Forces Command JIP. See Joint Investment Program Joint Investment Program (JIP), 41–42 Kagan, Robert, 149 Kennedy, John F., 33 Keohane, Robert, 147 Khol, Radek, 77 Klaus, Vaclav, 82, 85, 97, 98 Kosovo, 96; and Bulgaria, 112; and CFSP creation, 14; and Czech Republic, 79, 84, 91, 92; and ESDP creation, 65; and motivation for increasing capability, 161–162; and Turkey, 121, 123; and US aversion to “warfare by committee,” 18 Kravchuk, Leonid, 71 Kuchma, Leonid, 71 Kwasniewski, Aleksander, 72 Kyoto Protocol, 84 Law enforcement cooperation, 55, 58 Law of the Sea convention, 102

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Lebanon, 182 Lebl, Leslie, 19, 32 (n2) Lembke, Johan, 1, 175 Liberal internationalism, 152 Lindh, Anna, 153 Living standards, 163 London bombings (2005), 51 Longhurst, Kerry, 63 Lukashenko, Alexander, 163, 164, 171 (n1) Maastricht Treaty, 7, 14 Macedonia, 111, 122 Madrid bombings (2004), 51 Manners, Ian, 160 McCain, John, 150 MEDA aid program, 164 Mediterranean, 120, 123, 165 Mediterranean Dialogue, 23 Melnychenko, Mykola, 71 Merkel, Angela, 128 Middle East: and benefits of Turkish accession, 120, 122, 123, 129; and Black Sea–Caspian Sea basin, 104; and European concerns about Turkish accession, 132; separate EU and US policies, 168, 181–183; and strategic triangle, 151; US’s focus on, 4 Migration, illegal, 103, 104 Military capability. See EU military capability Missile defense system, 75, 87–88 Missiroli, Antonio, 57 Moldova, 70, 163, 164 Monitoring and Information Centre, 56 “Nabuko” project, 107 National Security Strategy of 2006 (United States), 3, 168; compared to European Security Strategy, 15, 116 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO response force (NRF), 19, 27, 29 NATO-ESDP relationship, 13–32, 184; armed forces, 26–28; and “Berlin Plus” arrangement, 16–17; civil-military integration, 28–30; debate blurred by ambiguous attitudes, 16–20; debate due to EU’s increasing capacity for autonomous action, 3–4, 14–16; and “global policeman” role, 14–15; headquarters debate, 23–25; and Iraq War, 14–15; NATO’s de facto “right of first

refusal,” 17, 19; overlapping functional and geographic scope, 14; overlapping membership of EU and NATO, 14; problems with “soft/hard” division of labor, 21–22; recommendation for flexible two-pillar approach, 20–23; “three Ds,” 125, 162; and Turkey, 121, 124–126, 135; and US-EU strategic divide, 15 Natural disasters, 5, 29, 44, 51, 56 Neo-isolationism, as possible US policy, 142–143 Neoliberalism, 155 Neumann, Iver, 145, 155 Nice Treaty, 7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 4–6, 19; and Afghanistan, 5, 19, 156; Allied Command Transformation (ACT), 18, 25, 27, 28, 37; Article 4 (obligation to consult), 21, 125–126; Article 5 (collective defense) and EU solidarity, 55, 58; Article 5 vs. non–Article 5 situations, 14, 21–22; and Bulgaria, 101, 115; civil-military integration, 28–30; compulsion to enhance its profile, 13; and Czech Republic, 78–81, 83, 93; and Darfur crisis, 5; debate over division of labor among security organizations, 7–8, 21–22; and disaster relief operations, 5, 29, 57; effects of shifts in US policy, 5–6; efficacy of informal and formal links among allies, 5; and end of Cold War, 14, 16; and EU battle groups, viii; future of, 16, 30–31, 154–157, 175–176; “global partnership” initiative, 18, 23; lack of civilian crisis management dimension, 13; loss of common purpose, 13–14, 16; and missile defense system, 88; non-EU members, 21, 65, 123, 124, 125; nuclear deterrence, 176; operations undermined by “warfare by committee,” 18–19; and Poland, 63, 65, 68, 75; problems with ad hoc coalition making, 22; recent small-scale operations, 5; recommendation for flexible two-pillar approach, 20–23; Riga summit (2006), xi, 4, 13, 18, 31; strained relations with EU, 13; and strategic triangle, 140, 154–157; unsuitability as forum for issues beyond politico-

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military sphere, 23; US’s ambiguous attitudes, 18–20; US’s diminished use of NATO as forum for discussing security concerns, ix. See also “Berlin Plus” arrangement; NATO-ESDP relationship Northern European Initiative, 160 Norway, 79, 125 NRF. See NATO response force Nuclear deterrence, 176 Nuclear power plants, 107, 112 Nye, Joseph, 147 Nygren, Bertil, 149 Oil and gas industry: Black Sea basin as strategic corridor, 180; and Russia, 106, 107, 140, 154, 178; transport issues in Bulgaria, 102, 106–107; transport issues in Turkey, 120–121; Ukraine gas crisis(2006), 106, 107, 148 Operation Althea, 85, 96, 123 Operation Artemis, 17, 76 (n2) Operation Black Sea Harmony, 123 Operation Concordia, 76 (n2), 85, 96 Operation Enduring Freedom, 91, 156 Operation Proxima, 85 Orange Revolution (Poland 2004), 72, 74 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 7–8, 119 Organized crime, ix, 5, 108 Osica, Olaf, 67 Öymen, Onur, 124 Pacific Rim tsunami of 2004, 44, 51, 56 Pakistan, earthquake of 2005, 5, 29, 44 Pantev, Plamen, 101, 115 Partnership and cooperation agreements (PCAs), 164–166, 171 (n1) Partnership for Peace, 23, 115 PCAs. See Partnership and cooperation agreements Peacekeeping missions. See specific countries and operations Peters, Ingo, 114 Petersberg Tasks, 14, 20, 45 (n1), 124, 133 Pilsudski, Josef, 70–71 Poland, 63–76; armed forces, 64; Atlanticism, 63, 64, 66, 67, 75 (n1), 177–178; changing perspective on EU as a security actor, 64–69; eastward

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focus, 70, 177–178, 179; and ESDP, 65–68; and Germany, 184–185; and Iraq War, 66–69; NATO membership, 63, 65; participation in peacekeeping missions, 64, 75 (n2); proenlargement policy, 72–74; and Russia, 63, 64, 72, 178; strategic perspective, 64; and Ukraine, 63, 64, 70–73, 179; and US missile defense system, 75, 87, 88; vision for future of EU, 184 Political and Security Committee, 7 POLUKRBAT, 71 Posen, Barry, 142 Preemptive strikes, 15, 83, 100 (n4) Primacy, as possible US policy, 142–143 Prodi, Romano, 162–163 Putin, Vladimir, 97, 145, 149, 154, 158 Radio systems, military, 43 Rapid Response and Preparedness Instrument for Major Emergencies, 56 Ratchev, Valeri, 115 Realism, 155 Regional conflicts, ix, 5; and Bulgaria, 102; and Czech Republic, 84–85; and European Neighborhood Policy, 163; mitigated by EU enlargement, 104– 105, 108, 111; and motivation for CFSP creation, 14; and Poland, 65, 75 (n2); and Turkey, 106, 121, 122, 123, 135 Rice, Condoleezza, 143–144, 161, 168 Riga summit of 2006, xi, 4, 13, 18, 31 “Right of first refusal,” 17, 19 “Right of initiative,” 20–21 Robertson, General Lord, 133 Romania, 102; and Commonwealth of the Democratic Choice, 110; EU accession, 8, 99, 104; US military presence in, 112 Ross, Andrew, 142, 143 Rumsfeld, Donald, 19 Russia: and Czech Republic, 88, 97; economic relationship with EU, 147–148, 154, 180–181; economic relationship with United States, 154, 157; energy policy, 120, 154, 158, 164, 181; as energy supplier for EU, 180–181; and EU position in Black Sea region, 105–106; and European Neighborhood Policy, 163–164; and Iraq War, 145; oil and gas supplies,

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106, 107, 140, 154, 178; and Poland, 63, 64, 72, 178; and Turkey, 179; and Ukraine, 71–72; and Ukraine gas dispute, 106, 107, 148, 181; and Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004, 149, 156; and war on terror, 145; and WTO, 147–148, 154, 158. See also Strategic triangle Rynning, Sten, 155 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 132 Satellite Centre, 53 Satellite communications, 43 Schengen agreement (freedom of movement among participating states), 52– 53 Schröder, Gerhard, 5 Security. See European Security and Defense Policy; Homeland security; NATO-ESDP relationship; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Societal security; Strategic triangle; US-EU relationship; War on terror; specific countries Sedivy, Jiri, 82, 91 SEDM. See Southeast European Defense Ministerial Selective engagement, as possible US policy, 142–143 September 11, 2001, ix, 19, 49, 66, 145 Serbia and Montenegro, 111 SHAPE. See Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Simon, Steven, 49 Situation Centre, 28, 53 Slovakia, 92–93 Smirnoff, Igor, 164 Social cohesion, 50, 51, 57 Social Democratic Party (Czech Republic), 91, 98, 100 (n4) Societal security, 49–50, 176; and Bulgaria, 112; crisis management and response, 53–56; ESDP’s roles in, 51–55; law enforcement cooperation, 55; non-ESDP mechanisms of crisis response, 55–56; prevention, 52–53, 55; recovery after disasters, 54–56; transatlantic societal security, 56–58 Solana, Javier: and Civilian-Military Cell, 28; and crisis response, 51, 53; EDA steering board chair, 35; and “Hampton Court Agenda,” 41; on

partnership with United States, 31; and Ukraine, 72 “Solidarity clause” among EU member states, 55, 58 Solidarity Fund, 56 Somalia, 121 Southeast European Defense Ministerial (SEDM), 110 Southern European Cooperation Process, 123 Sovereignty, 64, 109 Spain, 51 Spidla, Vladimir, 81–82 State failure, ix–x, 5 Strategic lift (sea and air), 42–44 Strategic partnership, as possible alternative to Turkish accession, 130–132 Strategic triangle, 139–158; developments needed for balanced, 156–158; diplomatic issues, 149–151; dyads and (nascent) triangles, 146–151; economic issues, 146–148, 154; and EU autonomy, 141–142, 152–153; and Iranian nuclear ambitions, 150–151; and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 151; and NATO, 140, 154–156; Russia in the greater transatlantic region, 144–145, 154; traditional security issues, 148–149; and transatlantic security affairs, 151–154; and Ukraine, 149–150, 152, 156; United States in the greater transatlantic region, 142–144 Strömvik, Maria, 153 Sundelius, Bengt, 56, 57 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 24–25, 68 Syria, 122, 129, 182 Taflpınar, Ömer, 126 Terrorism, 5; and Black Sea–Caspian Sea basin, 104, 112–113; and Bulgaria, 112; differing approaches to handling, ix–x, 15, 55; diverse agendas of terrorists, 49–50; prevention, 52–53, 55; and societal security, 49–50; US policies not shared by allies, 14–15. See also War on terror Topolanek, Miroslav, 82 Trade, 146–148 “Transatlantic gymnich,” 23 Transatlantic security. See NATO-ESDP

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relationship; Strategic triangle; Twopillar approach to security; US-EU relationship; War on terror Transformational diplomacy, 143–144 Transport Corridor Europe-CaucasusAsia projects, 111 Tsachevsky, Velin, 115 Tsunami of 2004, 44, 51, 56 Turkey, 119–136, 179; ambivalence toward ESDP and EU, 125–126; analysis of possible scenarios for accession, 127–134; armed forces, 122; benefits of accession, 121–126, 129–130, 135; and Bulgaria, 106; and current climate of enlargement fatigue, 8; Cyprus conflict, 126, 128; EU’s concerns about membership, 120, 130–132; and Greece, 106, 126, 128–129; illegal migrants, 104; increasing Euroskepticism, 133, 135; and Iraq War, 133–134; and NATOESDP relationship, 121, 124–126; as non-EU member of NATO, 123, 124, 125; and oil and gas industry, 120–121; participation in peacekeeping missions, 121, 122; possible effects of rejected EU membership, 132–134; and Russia, 179; as stabilizing force in regional conflicts, 106; strategic security dilemmas related to accession, 126–134; strategic significance for Euro-Atlantic community, 120–123; strategic significance in war on terror, 119; and United States, 126–134; US’s traditional support for Turkish EU membership, 120, 129–130, 132 Two-pillar approach to security, 27, 31, 176; advantages of, 22; armed forces, 26–28; civil-military integration, 30; decisionmaking under, 21; described, 20–23; headquarters debate, 23–25; and non-EU members of NATO, 21; problems with “soft/hard” division of labor, 21–22 Ukraine: and current climate of enlargement fatigue, 72, 74; and EU position in Black Sea region, 105; and European Neighborhood Policy, 166; gas crisis of 2006, 106, 107, 181; and NATO, 5; Orange Revolution, 72, 74;

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partnership and cooperation agreements, 164; and Poland, 63, 64, 70–73, 179; presidential elections of 2004, 149–150, 152, 156; and Russia, 71–72, 106, 107, 181; as Southeast European Defense Ministerial member, 110 UN Security Council, 18, 23, 143 United Kingdom: and EU battle groups, 92; and impetus for ESDP, 16–17; and Iranian nuclear ambitions, 143; London bombings (2005), 51; and NATO-ESDP relationship, 16–17; vision for future of EU, 184 United Nations, 8, 24, 121. See also UN Security Council United States: ambiguous attitudes, 18–20, 48; and Bulgaria, 103, 109–113, 115–116; and Czech Republic, 84–88; differing approaches to security priorities of United States and EU, ix–xi, 4, 15, 150, 181–183; diminished use of NATO as forum for discussing security concerns, ix; direct dialogue with EU on wider multinational issues, 23; “dual commitment” policy, ix; eastward shift of military bases, 5–6; economic relationship with EU, 3, 146–147; economic relationship with Russia, 154, 157; and EU enlargement, 109–113; Europe as most solid ally, 30; and European Neighborhood Policy, 167; “global partnership” initiative, 18; “grand strategy” of, 142–144, 168; “hard power” option, 150; and IsraeliPalestinian conflict, 182; Middle East policy, 182; military presence in Europe, 6, 102, 112–113; National Security Strategy of 2006, 3, 5, 116, 168; and NATO, 4–6; perception of “dangerous” world, 15; Poland’s view of, 63, 64, 66; possible security policies, 142–143; preemptive strikes, 15; preference for ad hoc coalitions of the willing, 18–19; renewed importance of Western Alliance, x; traditional support for Turkish EU membership, 120, 129–130, 132; transatlantic defense trade, 39; transformational diplomacy, 143–144; and Turkey, 126–134; and Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004, 149, 156. See also

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Iraq War; NATO-ESDP relationship; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Strategic triangle; US-EU relationship; War on terror US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), 18 US-EU relationship, 1–9; and burden sharing, 48, 160, 166–169, 176–177; changing attitudes of United States, 48–49; changing nature of transatlantic security relationship, 2–4; economic issues, 3, 146–147; and EU’s emergence as strategic actor, 3–4, 6–8, 48; law enforcement cooperation, 58; and NATO, 4–6; and strategic triangle, 143. See also NATO-ESDP relationship Vietnam War, vii Visegrad Three, 79 Vondra, Alexander, 82

Wagnsson, Charlotte, 145 Walesa, Lech, 70–71 Wallander, Celeste, 155 War on terror, ix–xi, 32 (n1), 119, 145, 148 Weapons of mass destruction, ix–x, 148 Weapons trafficking, 104, 163 Western Alliance, x, 124 Western Balkans, 102, 104, 111, 122. See also specific countries Western European Union (WEU), 16, 119, 124, 131, 136 (n1) Whitney, Nick, 33 World Trade Organization (WTO), 147–148, 154, 158 Yanukovich, Viktor, 72, 149 Yushchenko, Viktor, 72, 149, 163 Zieleniec, Josef, 98

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About the Book

WHAT IS THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN EU ENLARGEMENT AND A FLUC-

tuating transatlantic security partnership? Will the accession of new EU members reinforce this partnership, or instead increase the EU’s assertiveness as an independent foreign policy actor? The authors of EU Enlargement and the Transatlantic Alliance find the answers in this examination of broader EU security strategies, the foreign and security policies of the newer and potential EU members, and changing US priorities. Their perceptive analysis offers a sharp lens through which to understand the current and future state of transatlantic security. Sven Biscop is senior research fellow at Egmont–The Royal Institute for

International Relations in Brussels, professor of European security at the College of Europe in Bruges, and editor in chief of the journal Studia Diplomatica. Johan Lembke is an educator based in Sweden.

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