Ethnicity, Politics, and Public Policy: Case Studies in Canadian Diversity 9781442674677

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments
Part One: Cultural Diversity and Societal Responses
1. Diversity in Canada
2. Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities, Concerns, and Policy Recommendations
3. Break North: Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada
Part Two: Ethnic Match and Minority Origin Professionals
4. 'You Show Up, You're Blue7: The Challenges Facing Visible Minority Police Officers
5. The Challenge of Ethnic Match: Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services
6. The Role of Minority Educators: Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools
7. Wife Abuse and Ideological Competition in the Muslim Community of Toronto
Part Three: Ethnicity, Race, and Politics
8. Black Insiders, the Black Polity, and the Ontario NDP Government, 1990-1995
9. The Canadian Jewish Polity and the Limits of Political Action: The Campaigns on Behalf of Soviet and Syrian Jews
10. Immigration and the Canadian Federal Election of 1993: The Press as a Political Educator
Epilogue: Expanding the Research Agenda
Contributors

Citation preview

ETHNICITY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: CASE STUDIES IN CANADIAN DIVERSITY Edited by Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld

Canada has become a nation in which ethnic pluralism must be balanced with national unity. Focusing on information derived from case studies - documents, interviews, and participant observation - the te essays in this collection introduce the reader to specific problems that arise in an ethnically diverse society. The various essays address a wide range of issues. Original research into visible minority police, Haitian teachers in Quebec schools, and the matching of worker and patient/client ethnicities within health and social services sheds light on the complex situations faced in an increasing pluralistic society. The intersection (or absence) of ethnic polities and ethnic political representation is also examined. An essay presenting the heterogeneous nature of the Canadian Hip-Hop scene counters reductive stereotypes, while studies of female genital operations and wife abuse in Muslim culture suggest ways of understanding traditions that radically break with the social norms of a liberal-democratic society in order to create and implement policy. This richly textured volume offers a comprehensive illustration of the problems and prospects of pluralism, effectively mirroring the diversity of the issues that arise when theories and goals of cultural sensitivity confront current Canadian realities. HAROLD TROPER is a professor in the Department of Theory and Policy Studies, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education/University of Toronto. MORTON WEINFELD is a professor in the Department of Sociology, McGill University.

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EDITED BY HAROLD TROPER AND MORTON WEINFELD

Ethnicity, Politics, and Public Policy: Case Studies in Canadian Diversity

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

www.utppublishing.com University of Toronto Press Incorporated 1999 Toronto Buffalo London Printed in Canada ISBN 0-8020-4165-5 (cloth) ISBN 0-8020-8027-8 (paper)

Printed on acid-free paper

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Ethnicity, politics, and public policy : case studies in Canadian diversity ISBN 0-8020-4165-5 (bound)

ISBN 0-8020-8027-8 (pbk.)

I. Ethnicity - Canada - Case studies. 2. Ethnic attitudes - Canada - Case studies. 3. Multiculturalism - Canada - Case studies. 4. Canada - Ethnic relations - Case studies. I. Troper, Harold Martin, 1942- . II. Weinfeld, Morton. FC105.M8E831999 F1035.A1E831999

305.8'00971

C98-931673-4

'Nothing At All' © 1991 LeFrak-Moelis Music/Warner-Chappell Music (ASCAP). Written by Wesley Williams, Anthony Davis, and Peter Davis. 'Canada Large': Words and Music by Phillip Gayle, Richard Rodwell, and Michelle McCullock. © 1991 MCA MUSIC PUBLISHING, A Universal Music Company. Tet Publishing, First Priority Music Publishing. Internaional Copyright Secured. All Rights Reserved. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council.

Contents

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Vll

Part One: Cultural Diversity and Societal Responses

1

1 Diversity in Canada HAROLD TROPER AND MORTON WEINFELD 3 2 Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities, Concerns, and Policy Recommendations ALISSA LEVINE 26 3 Break North: Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada REBECCA J. HAINES

54

Part Two: Ethnic Match and Minority Origin Professionals

89

4 'You Show Up, You're Blue': The Challenge Facing Visible Minority Police Officers DIVA BORTOLUSSI 91 5 The Challenge of Ethnic Match: Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services MORTON WEINFELD 117 6 The Role of Minority Educators: Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools PHILIPPE COUTON 142 7 Wife Abuse and Ideological Competition in the Muslim Community of Toronto SHAHEEN AZMI 164 Part Three: Ethnicity, Race, and Politics 191 8 Black Insiders, the Black Polity, and the Ontario NDP Government, 1990-1995

ADAM LEWINBERG

193

vi Contents 9 The Canadian Jewish Polity and the Limits of Political Action: The Campaigns on Behalf of Soviet and Syrian Jews HAROLD TROPER 224

10 Immigration and the Canadian Federal Election of 1993: The Press as a Political Educator LIANE SOBERMAN 253 EPILOGUE: EXPANDING THE RESEARCH AGENDA 283 CONTRIBUTORS 291

Preface and Acknowledgments

The story is told of a city slicker who gets lost in the country. Unable to find his way home, he asks a farmer for directions. The farmer thinks about the question for a while, then replies, 'Start somewhere else. You can't get there from here.' When it comes to answering questions about ethnic and racial pluralism in Canadian society, we have no choice. We have to start from where we are. The case studies included in this volume offer something of a street-level portrait of where we are today and how deeply issues of ethnicity and race affect Canadian society. Acceptance of ethnic and racial diversity is one of the defining features of Canadian society. Indeed, it has become a home-grown cliche to assert that 'the United States is a melting pot, Canada is a mosaic.' But what does this really mean? How does that mosaic operate in the actual day-today workings of Canadian society? Ethnic diversity is about more than pizza or roti or folk dancing in ethnic church basements - although we do not belittle the importance of ethnic food and festivals for many Canadians, including ourselves. It is about how Canadians organize their society and how individual Canadians order their lives. Understanding ethnicity demands that we examine our notions of society and what we mean when we speak of community, of citizenship, and of shared values in our ethnically diverse nation. We must also accept the need to negotiate between sometimes irreconcilable positions: respect for ethnocultural particularism and defence of line-in-the-sand values to which all Canadians are expected to adhere. As the case studies contained in this volume make clear, it is often easier to ask questions about ethnic and racial diversity than it is to find definitive answers. What legal and medical responses to female genital operations are appropriate? What stresses do visible minority police

viii Preface and Acknowledgments officers, teachers, or health and social service professionals face in representing the needs of their own origin group? Are minority politicians or public servants obliged to represent their group's interests in the corridors of power? If the answer is yes, how should they balance this obligation against the universal demands of their office? What is the role of the state in mediating, regulating, or policing inter-cultural and racial encounters in a democratic and pluralist society like that of Canada? Should the media and political parties self-limit rhetoric that might inflame ethnic and racial divisions? Should public debate be sanitized to avoid giving offence? The case studies presented in this volume represent a second generation of scholarship on pluralism in Canada. The first generation shared an implicit conception of immigrants and minorities as objects acted upon by Canadian society. Reflecting the times, this research was preoccupied with issues of cultural loss and socio-economic inequalities resulting from prejudice and discrimination. Today, racial and ethnic minorities are no longer seen as passive objects. They are active subjects, partners in redefining Canadian society. Ethnic minorities are also recognized as players in the public policy domain. These studies, originally part of a research project supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, grew out of a recognition that debate on the nature of racism and diversity in Canada suffered from a lack of 'hard' case studies that would illustrate the thick complexity of new public policy issues. A team of student researchers drawn from McGill and the University of Toronto identified a variety of research topics. Each became the 'property' of one member of the research team. While we, as project directors, worked closely with and guided the researchers, in the final analysis each student researcher commanded his or her own research and writing. During the course of the project a research colloquium was held at Queen's University to facilitate an interchange among the participants from the two universities. In addition, earlier versions of most of these studies were presented to sessions at the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association meetings in Gimli, Manitoba, in 1995 and Montreal in 1997, and at other academic conferences. Given the central Canadian home base of the study directors and other team members, the case studies in this volume inevitably draw heavily on the Ontario and Quebec experience. We were struck, however, by the common challenges that emerge when dealing with a largely immigrantdriven diversity, despite considerable differences in the social and political context of the two provinces. Based on the feedback these case studies

Preface and Acknowledgments ix have generated to date, we are also convinced that the kind of questions addressed in these studies will speak to the experience of diversity in both Western and Atlantic Canada. We hope future research will test these assumptions. Several notes on method. The studies in this volume represent a blend of historical and sociological methods and are not limited by rigid methodological strictures: it is our view that the study of ethnicity demands multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches. Furthermore, these studies are essentially qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. All but one involve interviews, and several rely on analysis of original documents from various sources, as well as ethnographic observations. In most cases, they are also pioneering efforts. To our knowledge they deal with topics that, despite a growing body of advocacy and scientific writing on pluralism in Canada during the past twenty-five years, had previously been neglected or under-researched. Of course, these studies cannot and do not pretend to be definitive. On the contrary, they are admittedly exploratory. In several cases they rely on interviews with small samples, chosen of necessity in ways not purely random, as dictated by the specifics of each case. And as exploratory studies they invite further research. As a diverse research team we had to address the important issue of Voice' and the challenge of mainstream researchers studying minority members or groups. The individual researchers involved in these studies included both insiders and outsiders to the particular ethnic or racial groups under discussion. We welcomed this diversity as an asset. However, social science has recognized both the advantages and disadvantages of insiders and the outsiders studying a community (Collins 1986; Merton 1972). An insider may not be ready to question accepted practices, or may be reluctant to criticize, but he or she may also contribute a deeper understanding of the subject. An outsider may misunderstand, be easily misled, or harbour unconscious, perhaps voyeuristic, prejudices. However, the outsider may also bring a fresh, non-partisan perspective. The ethnic or racial identity of the researcher also affects interviews undertaken in the course of the research: respondants may tailor their responses to the expectations of the person asking the questions. Minorities may overstate their experience of discrimination to insiders while understating it to outsiders, or vice versa. Moreover, concern about confidentiality (fear of communal gossip) may incline interviewees from small minority groups to respond more openly to a sympathetic interviewer from outside the group.

x Preface and Acknowledgments Most recently, debate has stressed additional problems that mainstream researchers may encounter or inadvertently raise in their study of minority groups (Stanfield and Dennis 1993). Some suggest that minority groups have been the objects of study and misrepresentation by mainstream academics for far too long, and that minorities have seldom, if ever, benefited from that research. It has also been argued that racism may, directly or indirectly, intrude into the supposedly scientific discourse of social scientific studies of ethnicity and race (Stanfield 1993). While these warnings should not prohibit mainstream researchers from undertaking the study of minority groups, they do indicate a need for much greater sensitivity. We feel the studies in this volume meet this challenge. Our work builds on a career-long dedication to the study of ethnic and racial diversity in Canada, and a public commitment to valuing cultural diversity and the immigration that has sustained it. We also believe that academic research is best when it builds bridges rather than walls. We accept the old notion that there are benefits to research conducted by both insiders and outsiders. One need only recall the dramatic impact that Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 classic, An American Dilemma, had on the field of American race relations, and how it brought the social sciences squarely into the struggle for racial and ethnic equality. It was Myrdal's research that helped Americans to realize that the so-called Negro problem was in fact a white problem, a problem of white racism. With appropriate sensitivity and empathy, competent researchers can and should study individuals and groups other than their own (Anderson 1993). White scholars have made and continue to make important contributions to the study of Canadian pluralism, while a growing number of minority researchers have added their voices to the scholarly discourse. The field is all that more enriched. The potential for bias and distortion on the part of researchers cannot, however, be ignored. We and our researchers - whether insiders or outsiders - have struggled with this issue throughout. To try to minimize any distortions, researchers have taken care to ensure that they rely on the views of the actors themselves, whether expressed in their own words or in documents. In point of fact, this volume is not directly about the causes or correlates of racism. It takes as given the historical legacy and ongoing tragedies of racism in Canada. Ethnic and racial inequality provides the backdrop, the context for the collection. The essays in this volume seek to explore the ways in which minority groups, minority actors, and the contemporary Canadian state seek to overcome and change this reality,

Preface and Acknowledgments xi whether by promoting cultural sensitivity (and specifically, 'ethnic match/ as it is called in the volume) or by empowering minority polities and minority cultures. As argued in the opening chapter, the options available to Canada in general and minorities in particular are not clear cut, nor are they without their own internal complexities and contradictions. This volume is divided into three parts. Part One is entitled 'Cultural Diversity and Societal Responses/ Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld open this section with a discussion of the concepts of ethnic match and the ethnic polity, and the challenges of social integration and cohesion. In addition to establishing a working framework for analysis it also introduces a thesis that runs throughout the entire volume: neat, formulaic solutions to the challenges of dealing with diversity in a liberaldemocratic society do not exist. Life is too complicated, too much given to ragged edges, to be neatly tied together in any single package. Solutions to society's ills can only be found through a sustained public commitment to deal honestly with pluralism in all its complexity and with full regard for the common values that hold our society together. Alissa Levine focuses on the controversial issue of female genital operations: excision, infibulation, and refibulation. These operations, frequently damned as odious cultural practices, are described and placed in their social contexts. Levine also explores the extent to which these procedures are practised in Canada, through revealing interviews with immigrants from the respective source countries as well as with Canadian health-care professionals. Legal and educational strategies for eradication are discussed, and Levine points to the seeming inconsistency of a Western society that, while condemning these practices, tolerates other surgical and physiological procedures that relate to women's sexuality and that may lead to harmful effects. Rebecca Haines explores the world of rap and Hip-Hop music in Canada. This music, which originated in black communities, now serves as a bridge between black and white teens and young adults. The music and its supporters, however, remain marginalized. The study reports interviews with young rappers and their fans to gain their perspectives and self-definition. Haines analyses the lyrics of twelve top Canadian rap albums to explore themes of racism and identity. She concludes with a discussion of policy dilemmas involving the Canadian music industry and the issue of cultural appropriation. Part Two of the volume, entitled 'Ethnic Match and Minority Origin Professionals/ presents four case studies dealing with the challenges facing minority origin professionals in the delivery of public services to

xii Preface and Acknowledgments clients from their own group. Diva Bortolussi explores the position of visible minority officers in urban Canadian police forces. In North America it is increasingly believed that minorities will receive better or fairer service from minority police officers; the idea has achieved its clearest Canadian expression on certain First Nation reserves. Through confidential interviews with minority police officers in Ottawa and white officers in Montreal, this study investigates the reactions of both sets of officers to the expectations of minority communities and those of other officers. The range of views discovered suggests caution in making sweeping assumptions about the work of minority officers and how they are viewed by their respective communities of origin. Morton Weinfeld studies a sample of minority origin professionals in health care and social services to explore the meaning of 'culturally sensitive' services. The possible advantages of this form of ethnic matching include a common language, cultural competence, and trust. Here, too, tension between universalistic approaches to the various professions and the special ties that can link professionals to clients or patients of their own communities can be discerned. Philippe Couton's essay focuses on the experience of Haitian teachers in Montreal. The substantial Haitian population in that city has posed special challenges for Montreal schools. Two new innovative programs have sought to offer a more Haitian-focused learning environment and to emphasize the role of Haitian teachers. Couton examines the struggle of these Haitian teachers to balance their position as de facto role models with their role as professional educators. Shaheen Azmi analyses a sample of Toronto Muslims, from religious clerical leaders to professional social workers, to present the full range of Islamic perspectives on the highly controversial issue of spousal abuse and violence. Like Levine's study of female genital operations, it confronts the fact that prevailing Canadian norms are but one perspective. Azmi's analysis of Islamic pluralism in Toronto warns against facile generalizations about 'the' Muslim view on spousal abuse or other complex social policy issues. Part Three of the volume, 'Ethnicity, Race, and Politics/ investigates both the politics of ethnic communities and the Canadian political context. Adam Lewinberg explores a series of initiatives on the part of the Ontario government of the early 1990s designed to serve the needs of black Ontarians. In developing these initiatives, the difficulties in identifying the representative and effective leaders of the black community soon became apparent. Individual blacks, most of whom served as 'insid-

Preface and Acknowledgments xiii ers' within government, played a special role mediating between government and community, sometimes without satisfying the expectations of either constituency. Relying on interviews with these insiders as well as others, Lewinberg's study reveals the political problems inherent in attempting to steer a course between the politics of ethnic communities and the often difficult roles of community members working either for community organizations or government. A major issue on the agendas of many ethnic polities in Canada is the transnational concern for beleaguered group members living elsewhere. This concern sometimes demands rallying Canadian community members in support of kith and kin abroad and lobbying the Canadian government to intervene on behalf of the oppressed. Harold Troper offers a study in contrasts, comparing the formative stages of the Canadian Jewish campaign on behalf of Soviet Jews with that on behalf of Syrian Jews. The plight of Syrian Jewry never reached the salience of that of Soviet Jewry, either within the Canadian Jewish community or as an agenda item for lobbying the government. Troper explains why even the most compelling ethnic cause may fail to garner support unless it has a commanding Canadian context. Finally, Liane Soberman suggests how and why immigration policy and the related issues of racism and multiculturalism emerged as public issues in the 1993 federal election campaign. Her study concentrates on the role of the Canadian press in both reporting on and helping to create a public issue out of what had previously been a taboo subject in Canadian politics. Soberman analyses the intersection of events linked to the Reform party and the treatment of the immigration issue on the part of Canadian newspapers, as the election campaign progressed. We would like to thank the Social Science and Humanities Research Council for its financial assistance. One does not want to imagine what would become of social science and humanities scholarship in Canada without the continuing support of the SSHRC. Additional sources of financial support came from FCAR and CQRS in Quebec, the McGill Chair in Canadian Ethnic Studies, and the Department of History and Philosophy of Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. Research assistance was provided by Zlatko Anguelov, Lorna Hutchison, Ho Hon Leung, Tanya Paxton, Joan Simalchik, and Yeshim Ternar. We are indebted to Moira Cascone, Gerry Tulchinsky, Avi Hyman, Dwight Boyd, Clive Beck, and the 1995 and 1997 Conference Planning Committees of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association for their contributions to this

xiv

Preface and Acknowledgments

volume. We are also grateful for the truly caring support of Ron Silvers, Cathy Lace, and David Levine, and we thank colleagues at the Joint Centre of Excellence on Research on Immigration and Settlement in Toronto and Immigration et Metropoles in Montreal for their feedback and helpful commentary. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers chosen by the University of Toronto Press to read this volume in manuscript form. Their comments and suggestions helped us to strengthen our final draft. Virgil Duff, Margaret Williams, Anne Forte, and Allyson N. May of University of Toronto Press deserve thanks for their faith and assistance in making this volume possible. We also appreciate Mohammad Javam's generosity. At various points during this project many other colleagues offered valued help and advice; we are grateful to them all. We are also of course grateful to the young and promising scholars who contributed to this collection, and we would like to thank them for their scholarship and patience. In the final analysis, the intellectual rigour and hard work of the contributors made this volume possible. We trust their efforts are vindicated by the results. As in all that we do, we remain indebted to our families for making us understand what is really important. Finally, it should be noted that this volume represents the editors' second major scholarly collaboration. Our first was successfully completed ten years ago, when we published Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada. No doubt some would argue that once every ten years is enough. REFERENCES

Anderson, Margaret L. 1993. Studying across Difference: Race, Class, and Gender in Qualitative Research. In John H. Stanfield II and Rutledge M. Dennis, eds., Race and Ethnicity in Research Methods. Newbury Park: Sage, 39-52. Collins, Patricia Hill. 1986. Learning from the Outside Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought. Social Problems 33:14-32. Merton, Robert. 1972. Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge. American Journal of Sociology 78:9-17. Stanfield II, John H. 1993. Methodological Reflections: An Introduction. In Stanfield and Dennis, eds., Race and Ethnicity in Research Methods, 3-15. Stanfield II, John H., and Rutledge M. Dennis, eds. 1993. Race and Ethnicity in Research Methods. Newbury Park: Sage.

PART I: CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND SOCIETAL RESPONSES

This section explores the sources of and responses to socio-cultural diversity. The task of blending cultural diversity with integration remains of paramount importance - and the political empowerment of ethnic communities through mobilization and development of the organizational base of the ethnic polity is central to the cause of pluralism in Canada. The belief that Canada's diversity must be reflected in all policy domains, and within the ranks of politicians, policy makers, and professionals, continues to evolve. Canadian society is marked by considerable cultural variation quite apart from that caused by ethnic and racial difference. Regional, religious, rural-urban-suburban, and other lifestyle differences are as pronounced as any differences stemming from ethnic origin. In fact, at the end of the twentieth century, a pre-existing conformist consensus as to the nature of fundamental Canadian values seems to be eroding. Nowhere is this erosion more evident than in those values, related norms, and behaviours that surround issues of gender relations, sexual mores, and the family. Conservative perspectives, often grounded in traditional Christian beliefs, have been challenged by newer, more egalitarian liberal values, which emphasize sexual freedom and gender equality while de-emphasizing the role of women as sole or even primary caregivers for children. This change in values has implications for both immigration and ethnic relations. Not long ago, piety and respect for 'family values' would have been considered valuable traits among immigrants and minorities. Now, however, many recent immigrants from non-Western countries, who adhere to more traditional or religious cultural practices, are perceived as being out of step with the newer liberal-egalitarian values package. This is quite a shift from an earlier period in which some immi-

2 Part I grant groups were viewed as excessively liberal or even tinged with leftwing, radical social and political views that were seen as a potential threat to Canadian society. As Canadians continue to struggle between the contending poles of liberal and conservative value systems, newly arrived ethnic and racial minorities are caught in the middle. Consensus on the meaning and central elements of Canadian 'high' culture has also disappeared over the past few decades. In earlier periods, extending through the 1950's, it was clear that the dominant influences in literature, art, and music were those nurtured by Europe, particularly English and French civilization. The Canadian 'canon' in these areas was ethnically and racially exclusive. Cultural forms that deviated from the mainstream were ignored or labelled as exotic - and inferior - and limited to minority markets and audiences, or to the avant garde among majority Canadians. Here, too, the change is palpable. The influence of First Nations and non-European origin artists, and of their art, has begun to penetrate the cultural barriers. In English-speaking Canada, Jewish writers and poets were among the first to challenge the hegemonic control of Anglo-Saxon writers, during the postwar period. They have subsequently been joined by other, largely immigrant European, Asian, and Caribbean origin writers whose work - in style and in theme - has energized the Canadian literary scene. Music, fine arts, and popular culture are moving in the same direction. Black influence is no longer relegated to the margin, but has become increasingly accepted by white Canadian mass publics, often despite lingering elite or governmental resistance. Toronto's Caribana festival is reportedly as large as any cultural event in the city and its audience crosses ethnic and racial lines. Greater blurring of pop cultural boundaries has resulted in a similar erosion of the social and racial boundaries separating youth culture audiences. Commercial success has also stimulated new (and predominantly academic) debates on cultural appropriation and exploitation. But these new controversies are signs of the increasing acceptance of cultural diversity in artistic spheres, which is far more preferable to the pre-existing artistic uniformity and segregation.

1

Diversity in Canada HAROLD TROPER MORTON WEINFELD

As the 1990s drew to a close, three closely related anniversaries, all of watersheds in Canadian history, passed almost unnoticed. The first, in 1996, was the hundredth anniversary of large-scale non-western European immigration, Clifford Sifton's legendary 'stalwart peasants in sheep skin coats.' For all that historians have written about the duality of the Canadian culture and polity - French and English, with a nod in the direction of the Aboriginal contribution - it was this turn-of-the-century recruitment of 'non-traditional sources of immigration' that set the national course toward the multiculturalism that shapes so much of the Canadian urban landscape of today. The following year, 1997, marked the fiftieth anniversary of the declaration of a distinct Canadian citizenship. Prior to 1947 those living permanently in Canada were defined by an externally based imperial citizenship, as British subjects resident of Canada. In the wake of the Second World War and the growing disfunctionality of the British imperial connection, the logic of imperial citizenship was rethought. The name most associated with the adoption of Canadian citizenship and the all-inclusive nature of that citizenship is Paul Martin, the postwar Liberal government's secretary of state. As Martin later recalled, his conversion to the notion of a separate Canadian citizenship was the consequence of an official visit to liberated Europe in 1945. While in France, he asked to visit the Canadian military graveyard at Dieppe. Walking amid the rows of graves, some still fresh, with wooden markers, he confessed to being struck by the range of names found among the Canadian fallen, names that spoke to the pluralism of origins making up Canadian society. As Martin put it, 'Of whatever origin, these men were Canadians.' They had fought and died for Canada. They deserved to be remembered as Canadi-

4 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld ans, and Martin became parliamentary champion of an inclusive Canadian citizenship (Martin 1983). It took several years and several compromises, including the parallel retention of British subject status for Canadian citizens to overcome resistance from those who cherished the British bond, but Canadian citizenship became a reality on 1 January 1947. The newly minted Canadian citizenship proved more than symbolic. The introduction of an inclusive and singular citizenship was the necessary first step in the process of implementing an expansive web of federal and provincial human rights legislation. For the first time, the state addressed the legal equality of all, irrespective of heritage, time of arrival in Canada, religion, languages spoken, and of any proprietory claim that any group might make to being more Canadian than any other. Canadian citizenship and subsequent human rights initiatives opened a new era in equality before the law, openness in civic society, and equality of access to public institutions. Of course, racism and prejudice continued to bubble beneath the surface, but the Canadian state had signalled its commitment to the legal tolerance, if not acceptance, that most Canadians now take for granted. This leads to the final anniversary, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the federal government's multiculturalism policy. When it was first announced in 1971, multiculturalism was not universally embraced. It was not welcomed by Quebec nor by a lingering band of Anglo-conformist drumbeaters, and some people believed that the new policy would ghettoize and marginalize Canadians into ethnic enclaves. Recall the dark warnings of sociologist John Porter that multiculturalism bordered on a conspiracy of the privileged to entrench their power in a hierarchy of ethno-cultural exclusivity. The 'WASPs' would rule while ethnics danced in church basements (Porter 1972). Despite its detractors, however, multiculturalism was widely acclaimed, especially in urban, English-speaking Canada, as a timely and progressive response to the changing social realities of Canadian society. As proclaimed by the federal government, multiculturalism articulated a public vision of Canadian identity grounded in cultural pluralism. Like citizenship, it challenged entrenched assumptions that British and French cultural traditions were vested with special status in Canada. The 1971 multicultural policy statement made English and French the two official national languages but celebrated respect for pluralism as the true basis of Canadian identity. In the twenty-five years since multiculturalism was proclaimed, the celebration of pluralism in Canada, of the diversity that a hundred years of immigration has brought, and the

Diversity in Canada

5

expansive welcome represented by the granting of Canadian citizenship has been tempered by a realization that the course of pluralism is not always smooth. Maintaining an open and democratically pluralist society requires work and commitment. The peopling of Canada has been an exercise in diversification. The First Nations formed a patchwork quilt of cultural, religious, and linguistic differences across the continent, and the subsequent arrival of the European settlers initiated a two-hundred-year struggle between two imperial powers - France and Britain - for dominion over this land. But while two conflicting imperial interests vied with one another, new waves of European immigration reflected a broad range of regional differences brought from various countries. In the new world, values, traditions, and cultural patterns were not so much preserved intact as reshaped and redefined. In some instances whole new cultural entities came into being, such as the union of European and Native we know as the Metis. Turn-of-the-century European immigration, systematically encouraged to meet the labour needs of a gradually expanding economy and to fill a vast agricultural hinterland, brought into Canada hundreds of thousands of settlers from across central, southern, and eastern Europe. Added to this rich cultural mix were small groups of black and Asian settlers who struggled to find a place for themselves (Burnet and Palmer 1988). In spite of this pluralism of origins, cultural diversity was not always valued. As recently as the interwar years, a bedrock Anglo-Canadian elite, no more racist than their times, pressed the government to restrict the entry of those dismissed as racially or culturally undesirable. In Quebec, influential voices attacked immigration as corrosive of French Canadian values and joined the chorus of those who demanded closure of Canada's borders to 'foreigners.' The government responded. In the mid-1920s, as the demand for unskilled and agricultural labour fell off, immigration barriers along racial lines were put in place. Non-whites were barred, the inflow of Jews and most southern Europeans was choked off, and the immigration of eastern Europeans was increasingly restricted (Abella and Troper 1982). What to do with those strangers already inside the Canadian gate? Make them into Canadians. Cultural diversity was seen as a problem to be resolved rather than a feature of Canadian life to be cherished, and gatekeepers pressed ahead in Angloconformist terms, attempting to turn 'them' into 'us' as quickly and painlessly as possible. And if the immigrant generation was too set in its ways, then their children would be remade.

6 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld While immigrants and their children did integrate, most did so on their own terms. Simply stated, in spite of the best efforts of various missionaries of Anglo-conformity - school teachers, social workers, and editorial writers - immigrants and their children were determined to live their lives to suit themselves. Even as many immigrants and the children of immigrants often found comfort in long-cherished cultural symbols language, religion, a storied past - and formed ethnic bonds with one another in Canada, they also became Canadians. They struck their own balance, and in the process created forms of ethnic identity that were and are Canadian. Ethnicity cannot be regarded strictly as a foreign cultural import; it is a product of Canada, created by Canadians trying to order their lives in a way that is meaningful to them in their Canadian context (Harney 1988). Ethnogenesis, the creation of ethnic entities in Canada, has been a feature of Canadian life in recent decades. In the wake of the Second World War, with a rapidly expanding economy and a shortage of labour, Canada's door was opened to European immigrants previously rejected as unacceptable. This influx was paralleled by a public policy retreat from the kind of overt and legally sanctioned racism that had previously dominated Canadian civic culture. And as Canadian governments, federal and provincial, instituted human rights legislation, racial and ethnic restrictions were expunged from immigration legislation and practice. The last racial barrier to immigration was removed in 1967 and immigration from what were previously regarded as 'non-traditional' sources showed a dramatic increase. (For an overview of postwar Canadian immigration and immigration policy, see Troper 1993; Hawkins 1988; Whitaker 1987; and Avery 1995.) In 1971, for the first time, the majority of immigrants entering Canada were of non-European heritage; today over 70 per cent of Canada's immigrants are non-European. The expansion in ethnic and racial diversity has changed the face of urban Canada, the preferred destination of immigrants in our own era. The change, while dramatic, is not uniform from coast to coast. According to the 1996 census, 17.4 per cent of all Canadians were born outside of Canada and 53 per cent of these were born outside of Europe. Atlantic Canada and Quebec, with the exception of Montreal, have far fewer foreign born than other areas of the country; cities have far more foreign born than small towns or rural areas. Approximately 90 per cent of all the foreign born are living in Canada's fifteen largest urban centres: almost 18 per cent of Montrealers, 35 per cent of Vancouver residents, and 42 per cent of those living in Metropoli-

Diversity in Canada 7 tan Toronto were born outside of Canada. And they are increasingly people of colour (Mitchell 1997). Canada has been remade. Across Canada, the specific ethnic mix varies from place to place. Those of southern European origin are more likely to be found in Toronto and Montreal, Ukrainians - particularly Canadian born - have tended to settle in the West. Francophone minorities Haitians, Vietnamese, or North Africans - are inclined toward Montreal, Anglo-Caribbeans to Toronto. Chinese and other Asian Canadians may be more numerous in absolute terms in Toronto, but they are proportionately more concentrated in the greater Vancouver area. This diversity of origins shows no sign of lessening. In this new reality, simple-minded notions of Anglo-conformity still attract those uneasy with the direction and rapid pace of demographic change. Some - but not all - who seek to cut back on immigration levels may yearn for days of racial and ethnic homogeneity. But those days are gone, if they ever really existed. The force-feeding of a singular cultural vision is a non-starter. It did not work in the past, and there is no reason to assume that it would work today. Canada is charting a different course. Canadians are now in the difficult process of negotiating new ways to preserve liberal-democratic values within a national community respectful of an unprecedented pluralism of origins and cultures. It is important to stress, however, that racism, in its modern variations, remains a fact of Canadian life. The expressions of racism in Canada today differ from the more extreme, crude, and often legally sanctioned forms of the past. Racism's brutal side bursts through in violent encounters involving police and First Nations or immigrant minorities, or in the stinging assault of hate speech propounded by dedicated racists (Barrett 1987). But racism today tends to be less obvious if no less pernicious. Systemic 'impersonal' discrimination and correlates of social class and economic concentration, together with a polite discrimination by employers, landlords, and policy makers continues to degrade minorities and undermine equal opportunity (Li 1988; Reitz 1990). Coded racism may also lurk in discussions of immigration levels or of what constitutes reasonable accommodation and equal treatment for minorities in various policy domains (Henry et al. 1995). The struggle against racism, together with the changing demographic and cultural make-up of Canada, serves as a backdrop for the discussion of three central challenges facing Canadian society today. The first concerns cultural and social integration. The second deals with the concept of 'ethnic match' as a way of delivering services equitably and efficiently

8 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld in a variety of policy domains. The third is the emergence of the 'ethnic polity' as representing a deepening of structural pluralism in Canadian life. Challenges of Cultural and Social Integration The social integration of ethnic minorities is generally most acute for the immigrant generation. By the second and third generation, the processes of Canadianization - seductive as well as coercive - have done much to dilute immigrant cultures and identities. But to say they have been diluted does not mean that they have been erased or that Canada has not been transformed by these cultures and identities. Indeed, the changing nature of Canadian pluralism results from the interactions between ethnic and racial minorities and forces in the wider society. Liberal-democratic societies generally posit two goals for their diverse communities. The first is that of equal opportunity and, increasingly, equal results. This requires equal participation in all dimensions of social life. The goal of equal opportunity has also stimulated the decades-long struggle for equality and civil rights for minorities. Most recently, it has rested on the assumption that excluded minorities wished nothing more than the opportunity to participate in all that mainstream society had to offer. This may or may not be true of all groups. One of the issues facing liberal-democratic societies is self-exploration - they must determine whether and how they are equipped to deal with pluralism. How much pluralism is too much? One conception of liberal democracy suggests that the ideal is a minimal state. If a citizen pays taxes and breaks no laws, the state ought not to care about the degree of his or her integration. Imagine a nation of hermits. If the state has no business in the bedrooms of the nation, does it belong in its ethnic halls? But life cannot be lived solely within a community of choice; some higher degree of societal cohesion is required. Thus the contrasting conception of liberal democracy, or more exactly a society, would seek maximal participation the engaged citizen making informed choices and helping to shape the future of his or her society. Lots of evening meetings. What is the role of the state in stimulating citizen participation? Should equal participation evolve on its own, however slowly, or should it be actively encouraged or even mandated in law? In recent years the state has used its powers to legislate employment equity as a tool to achieve proportional representation in employment. Increasing the proportions of minorities in various professional fields can achieve a desired policy

Diversity in Canada 9 outcome, namely, equalizing opportunity and increasing upward mobility for previously victimized minorities. It can also result in a backlash accusations of reverse discrimination, too much government social engineering, and racial and gender queue jumping, and demands for a reaffirmation of a colour- and gender-blind meritocracy as the only acceptable standard by which hiring should be done. Some jurisdictions, such as Ontario under the Mike Harris government, have witnessed a wholesale retreat from mandated equity. The second goal or attribute of the liberal-democratic state is that of a positive affirmation of the value of diverse cultures. Gone are the days of forced assimilation through Anglo-conformity, or even official cultural snobbism that devalued non-European cultures. Ethno-cultural groups are now assured that their cultural heritage has value, and they are free to retain as much of it as they can and desire. This is certainly the case in the private domain. Ethnic groups can speak their own languages; listen to their own music; wear ethnic dress (except in some Royal Canadian Legion Halls); buy and read their own newspapers and books; watch homeland movies on cable, video, or in theatres; and enjoy ethnic programs on radio and television and now through the Internet. They can eat their own foods; worship according to their traditions; teach their children their ethnic heritage; travel back and forth to the homeland (assuming the homeland permits it); communicate by phone, fax or e-mail with the homeland or other relatives; form ethnic associations of all kinds; and socialize with and marry within their group. All of these activities are viewed as within the private sphere. But the distinctions between the private and public spheres are becoming increasingly blurred. It is in the grey area between these two spheres that tough policy decisions are often called for and made. For example, should the government subsidize or regulate any of the activities listed above? To what extent should public services and policy domains accommodate cultural specificities? Should public schools provide language and cultural instruction for all minorities, or make sure that the holidays and culinary traditions of every minority group represented in a school are respected? Perhaps only 'where numbers warrant?' Often the answers are not yes or no, but how, or in what degree. Some analysts approach these questions from a framework rooted in political theory. They attempt to blend the imperatives of individual rights and freedoms within a societal framework typified by the existence of social groups. In other words, the problem for these theorists is to construct a theory and politics of liberalism that can accommodate,

10 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld perhaps even welcome, group or collective rights (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1992). This challenge is even harder when the written and unwritten law of the land - as in Canada - grants collective rights to some groups (Catholics and Protestants, French and English speakers, First Nations) but not to others. Thus the Canadian constitution, our laws, and the policies that flow from them, must attempt to resolve apparently contradictory tensions between different individuals, groups, and cultural imperatives within a single state and society. One of these policies is multiculturalism, which includes federal, provincial, and municipal commitments to cultural diversity. The commitment has raised expectations that the state will act to protect or strengthen ethno-cultural life in Canada. While some lament that the government has not lived up to this 'promise/ others are outraged at the suggestion of public support, let alone the allocation of public funds to subsidize ethnic survivalism, and its possibly extreme cultural manifestations, in Canada. In opposing public support some argue that it only reinforces old-world social and cultural practices and modes of thought that are incompatible with the values, or perhaps even laws, fundamental to Canadian society. Once immigrants come to Canada, it might be argued, they and their children are duty bound to embrace Canadian norms. Multiculturalism has been decried as socially divisive, regressive, simply decorative, and impractical (Fleras and Elliott 1992, chs 4 and 6). A related issue that has arisen in Canada is the way in which so-called ethnic cultural forms in music, art, and literature should be treated by guardians of the cultural gates. Certainly, many applaud the democratization of the canon and welcome artists of varying origins to the ranks of the Canadian cultural elite. But while ethnic origins may not be a problem, cultural styles often are. It is difficult to conceive of a Canadian artistic culture that would embrace all of the ethnic or cultural forms present in Canada. There is a strong bias against too much innovation and pluralism within what is often seen as a hegemonic pattern of acceptable cultural styles and norms (Li 1994). Unlike the breakthrough experienced in the world of literature, 'ethnic art' is still too often relegated to the cultural sidelines, dismissed as more craft than art. Folk dancing is quaint, but it is not ballet. Rap is vibrant, but is it Canadian music? As a result, ethnic artists may only feel welcomed so long as they are not too ethnic in their art. Diversity is acceptable in terms of personal origins, but not in terms of cultural performance. The issues of pluralism in the arts do not end there. Even if space can be made - and often it is not - for cultural styles that differ from the European

Diversity in Canada 11 mainstream, the issue of cultural appropriation can also arise. When ethnic art forms, or even foods, are 'discovered/ they may cease to be a private and unifying preserve of the ethnic community. While some may celebrate the enrichment of the larger culture, others may resent what they see as appropriation of cultural treasures by outsiders. Still others may take offence if ethnic art, once the domain of the ethnic artist, is diluted or 'refined' to make it acceptable to mainstream tastes. And who benefits? The profits from the art may flow into non-ethnic commercial institutions, or non-minority artists may seize upon themes or styles of a distinct ethnic character to form the basis of their own creation. The more that a given minority group is seen to depart from the conventions of western European liberal-democratic culture and traditions, the more do challenges to social integration emerge. This is another way of indicating that, despite the well-meaning rhetoric of politicians and often of ethnic community leaders, the two basic processes of equal participation and cultural survival are often in conflict, both for groups as a whole and for members within groups. Consider the example of the Hutterites. This group has historically made the retention of its unique cultural and religious heritage a priority. It pursues this objective by minimizing its participation in the institutions of the host society. In this case, it is the community that rejects equal participation as commonly defined. As a result few, if any, traditional practising Hutterites will be found on university faculties or in corporate boardrooms. Most Canadian ethnic groups are not Hutterites, and most do desire equal participation. Many ethnic community members also want to make certain that their specificity, whether it is the colour of their skin, their accent, or an aspect of their culture, will not impede their participation in Canadian society. Thus, Canadian institutions of all sorts are called upon to accommodate diversity. While Canadians may argue about what constitutes reasonable accommodation, the direction of change is clear. Even with the best of intentions, Canada is involved in a balancing act. Seeking to accommodate diversity in as many domains as possible, considerations of principle jostle with those of practicality. Consider the following hypothetical case. Suppose there were Canadian soldiers who were also devout Muslims, assigned duty in the Far North. They would insist that they be provided with food rations that met their religious requirements and allowed to pray five times a day. Should or could the Canadian armed forces reasonably accommodate the religious priorities of these particular Canadian soldiers? If not, why not, and what does that

12 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld say about the limits of pluralism? Consider another case. The publicly funded Catholic school system of Ontario argues that the Catholic nature of its mandate and program requires it to reserve the right to hire only Catholic staff. Should Catholic school boards be allowed to discriminate against non-Catholics in hiring staff? Would it make a difference if the Catholic school boards were not publicly funded? There are no easy or comprehensive answers, and it is precisely these sorts of questions that have been multiplying. The reason for the increase is twofold. The first is the expansion of the welfare state. Early in this century, ethnic groups, like all Canadians, had to look to their own pockets, families, and charitable institutions to supply needed services. Faced with waves of immigration, immigrant and ethnic communities created large networks of ethnically based welfare-type organizations. Ethnic churches also played a crucial role in immigrant integration. Thousands of young people attended ethnic-sponsored schools. Hospitals, largely sustained by religious orders and groups, strove to meet the specific cultural needs of immigrants. Ethnic self-help and fraternal organizations sheltered members both from the worst excesses of the free market and from the hostility of the majority group (Harney and Troper 1975). As the state expanded its reach into these previously private areas, however, more and more citizens of minority backgrounds - like all citizens - come to rely on public institutions to meet their needs. And private agencies, as well as the media, have increasingly been subjected to regulation. But does the expanding public mandate accommodate ethnicity? Consider the example of the Fredonians, a fictional people created by the Marx Brothers for one of their films. If Fredonians had immigrated to Canada we might understand how ethnic, Fredonian-sponsored institutions in Canada would rise to meet Fredonian needs. Almost certainly mainstream institutions, with clients from many origins, would also extend their services to Fredonians. But how much should a mainstream agency be expected to bend to accommodate Fredonians? Should it bend at all? Herein lies the second reason why questions about ethnicity in Canadian society have proliferated - fairness, as expressed in the civil rights and egalitarian revolutions of our time. The notion of equal treatment for all citizens by public institutions has come to mean that services in many public domains must meet the needs of minority citizens as completely as they do those of the majority. We hardly need reminding that equal treatment does not necessarily mean identical treatment; equal access may mean steps, ramps, or elevators. But unequal treatment or secondrate services are unacceptable and often illegal. This has led to a concern

Diversity in Canada 13 in all policy domains that services provided be culturally sensitive. Access to culturally sensitive services is thus increasingly seen as an element of equal, non-discriminatory treatment. As it happens, the case for cultural sensitivity can also be made on grounds of efficacy. In periods of fiscal restraint, cultural sensitivity may yield economic benefits to a system of service delivery. To the extent that devolution of services from large bureaucratic institutions to those which are closer to the needs of people is considered cost efficient, ethnospecific services might yield fiscal benefits as well as equity. For example, consider a hospital or clinic that makes a misdiagnosis of a minority patient because of linguistic or cultural barriers. It may be forced to pay for additional treatment as the mistake is rectified. Better to get it right the first time. Ethnic Match Providing culturally sensitive services can be systematized according to the schema presented in Table 1.1. This model can apply to a wide range of policy domains: health care, social services, education, policing and justice, arts and culture, media, and politics. In each of these policy domains - which together affect so much of the daily lives of Canadians arguments have emerged about the need to deliver services to minorities in ways that are both equitable and efficient. These arguments include the advantages for minorities of increasing minority representation among the various professionals delivering these services. The assumption is that minority consumers of services will be better served. Note that an argument rooted in perhaps outmoded liberal approaches to integration might be the reverse: social harmony would be increased (and racism decreased) if minority professionals could serve majorities, and vice versa. This inter-group contact might serve to break down stereotypes and barriers. Yet the assumption usually made in current discourse on the subject, shaped by the concern for cultural sensitivity, is that minority professionals are best used to provide services to and serve as role models for their own group. Much of the policy-related writing on this issue has been based on conviction rather than scientific or evaluation studies of alternate approaches, such as whether employment equity efforts or programs designed to promote cultural sensitivity actually work. In Canada, specifically, we do not yet have a corpus of studies over these domains that can confirm advantages in objective, long-term outcomes.

14 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld Most attempts at evaluation focus on the basic outcome measure, measuring, for instance, changes in the proportions of minorities hired, the simple fact of changes in a school curriculum, or alteration of administrative procedures. But the case to be made for preferential hiring or developing culturally sensitive services extends beyond the basic need to overcome the systemic racism that is assumed to be responsible for lower rates of minority employment: the goal is also change in the life circumstances and life chances of minority group members. Yet little scientific work has been done on the quality of service outcomes for the respective constituencies where minority personnel have been hired. What has happened to crime rates, arrest rates, complaints about police brutality? Are minority students improving, objectively, in their school performance? What impact is there on the health of minorities? These kinds of studies are a major and admittedly sensitive research undertaking. One area that demands increased attention is that of ethnic match. The term ethnic match can be used to denote an array of program alternatives. The term is taken from an American study that focused on the effects of same-origin mental health workers on the mental health of minority patients (Sue et al. 1991), and it can be conceptualized along three different dimensions, as seen in Table 1.1. (For a fuller discussion of ethnic match see Weinfeld 1997.) The first has to do with the ethnic origin of the personnel who deliver the service. Perhaps the needs of Fredonian patients, clients, students, voters, or customers are best served by another Fredonian, or a Fredonian Canadian. Why? First, the Fredonian service provider might be expected to be free of any taint of anti-Fredonian racism, either direct or subtle, when treating a fellow Fredonian. Second, the Fredonian would likely possess a high degree of culturally relevant knowledge, which would enhance the service provided to a fellow Fredonian. Is this necessarily the case, or the case all the time? It is worth pondering whether Fredonian or any other ethnic origin personnel share in a desire to see their professional efforts linked tightly to the care of their own group, or whether they might seek a broader, heterogeneous constituency. In other words, as trained professionals - doctors, lawyers, social workers, teachers - might they not feel that they are well able to treat anyone, regardless of origin? Very little has been published examining the actual attitudes or experiences of minority origin professionals, particularly as they serve those of their own group. The second dimension has to do with the sponsorship of the organization providing the service. Is the service being delivered by an ethno-

Diversity in Canada

15

TABLE 1.1 Possible Configurations of Ethnic Match in Public Policy Domains

Range of configurations 1 . (maximal match)

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. (minimal match)

Professional: Is the ethnic origin of the professional of caregiver the same as the recipient of service?

Organization: Is the organization or institution providing the service under the auspices or control of the recipient's ethnic community?

Practice: Is the actual content of the practice of the service reflective of or sensitive to the ethnic culture of the recipient?

yes yes yes no yes no no no

yes yes no yes no yes no no

yes no yes yes no no yes no

specific organization? Is the organization financed (in whole or in part) and run by an ethnic community? Most major cities in Canada are full of ethno-specific institutions, ranging from day-care centres to old-age homes, churches to ethno-specific newspapers and TV channels, community centres to grocery shops. Raymond Breton, who labelled this phenomenon as 'institutional completeness/ suggested that the degree of immigrant social integration into the host society would be affected by the availability of ethnic institutions (1964). In fact, the very notion of the integration of immigrants or ethnic minorities is something of an oxymoron. Immigrants who arrive as adults almost never fully integrate into the host society or even directly into the larger ethnic community of which they are a part. If anything, integration is a 'nested' phenomenon. Most immigrants integrate first into a sub-community - based on family, region, clan, tribe or subculture - of their own ethnic community and, if they exist, into the associations of that sub-community. In earlier periods of Canadian history immigrants often found themselves drawn first into regionally or religiously based self-help organizations. Today, as in the past, integration into a subcommunity often precedes integration into the full ethnic community. This is the case with newer waves of immigrants such as Africans, Asians, and Hispanics. An adult Ibo migrant to Toronto may seek out other Ibo before she looks for Nigerians, Africans, or blacks in general. It is rare for an adult immigrant, especially if non-English or French speaking, to have the confidence, background, and opportunity necessary to

16 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld seek full integration into a mainstream community and its institutions. That is a project for the second generation, if not the third. In other words, it may well be that a layered array of ethnic institutions actually facilitates a process of integration over time, rather than inhibiting it. Interestingly, a dense network of ethnic organizations does not lessen commitment to Canada. Just the opposite may be the case. For example, non-English and non-French-speaking immigrants embrace Canadian citizenship in proportionately much higher numbers than do immigrants from the United States or Britain. It is also widely assumed that an ethnic organization will be more responsive to the needs and concerns of an ethnic clientele than mainstream organizations. This assumption requires verification. Little is known about the way in which ethnic organizations are run, how agendas are set, or about their linkages to the ethnic community. The third and perhaps most important dimension of ethnic match is the actual practice itself. If practice is informed by ethno-specific knowledge, it might be taught to anyone and applied in any setting; the origin of the professional becomes far less important. A culturally sensitive or anti-racist curriculum and teacher; a therapist whose technique includes awareness of the cultural peculiarities of the patient; a court or judicial system that tailors its deliberations and sentencing to the needs of a cultural community - all are examples of culturally sensitive practice. What happens when the ethnic mix is not fixed, where new cultural communities continue to enter? Is it possible to keep up with ethnospecific knowledge? This is the Canadian dilemma. There are scores of cultures represented in Canada, each requiring study in itself. With the best of intentions, it may be difficult to communicate a full range of facts and sensitivities about each culture in, say, a university course or in a service seminar offered to professionals. But we can take a first step in a long process by exhorting and training professionals to be open-minded, tolerant, and aware of diversity. Each of these three dimensions can be seen as measuring variance from greater to lesser degrees of ethnic match. Moreover, each of the dimensions can vary independently of the other. Table 1.1 presents a grid that describes a range of ethnic match from minimal to maximal. The latter would refer to a case of a Fredonian Canadian receiving service from a Fredonian professional, in a Fredonian organization, according to Fredonian traditions, and in the Fredonian language. Finally, much recent debate has focused on the perceived deep cultural clashes between traditional practices of ethnic groups and those which

Diversity in Canada 17 are normative in Canadian society. Many ethnic cultures clearly countenance behaviours and activities that are frowned upon or even illegal in Canada. Often these relate to the family and the protection of women and children. These cultural differences pose the sharpest test to the flexibility of Canadian society. Here we move beyond simply providing service to issues of law and restraint and of social respect for different value systems. Thus our concern with the theoretical issue of limits to cultural pluralism shades into the practical concern for ethnic match and culturally sensitive practice. While there are some extreme cases, and they must be dealt with, our sense is that the vast majority of Canadians, including those of the ethnic groups in question, share the values of hard work, esteem for education, risk taking, respect for law and authority and for the family, that continue to typify Canada. At root, the debate about different ethnic cultures is a subset of a more generic issue. Modern society includes various subcultures and communities that remain outside the mainstream, from religious communities to youth cultures of various sorts. Even within 'mainstream' society we find a range of religious expressions, some of a fundamentalist bent, which espouse highly conservative positions on issues of gender and the status of women. Indeed, earlier debates on Christian Scientists or Jehovah's Witnesses and children's medical care have anticipated the current concern about ethnic cultures and culturally sensitive practice. The real question is how much pluralism Canadian society can tolerate, if not embrace. The Ethnic Polity The term 'ethnic polity,' as developed by Elazar (1995) and Breton (1991), refers to the organized political dimensions of any ethnic community or ethnic group. It includes the processes and structures by which ethnic groups mobilize, empower themselves, make collective political decisions, and interact with external political units. These decisions most often deal with meeting the various needs of individual members of the group, which can include political, economic, religious, recreational, social, cultural, educational, and self-defence needs. Some groups will have a well-developed polity. These groups either have a long tradition of limited self-government, face or have faced deliberate exclusion, or have been in Canada for a relatively long time and in sufficient numbers: one thinks of the Jews, Chinese, Ukrainians, and Italians. Other groups may have a weaker set of institutions.

18 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld The degree to which a particular ethnic polity shapes the lives of minority Canadians will vary from group to group and among individuals within each group. This is not always apparent to the casual and sometimes not even to the practised observer. Most often there is a significant, if not a majority constituency within ethnic publics that is concerned with issues of ethnic governance. However, ethnic participation in organizations may be low. In an extreme case, ethnic organizational leaders may be generals without troops. The study of ethnic polities is nevertheless crucial for any understanding of ethnic life, and, specifically, the intersection of ethnicity and policy issues. Given that ethnic polities exist, it is important to understand how they operate. Unlike the state, they are voluntary polities. By and large, they have no formal coercive power over individuals; they cannot force people to join. In the end, most groups are confined to informal pressure to produce desired conformity to group dictates, although in extreme cases individuals can be expelled from ethnic organizations. Such pressure is not unique to ethnic groups; it is found in every social group, from bridge clubs to churches. How do these ethnic polities determine their collective agendas? Who makes decisions, in whose interests, and how? Why do some items become priorities on communal agendas while others do not? To what extent are ethnic polities more or less democratic than the conventional governmental polities, such as Canada or the provinces? With some exceptions (Troper and Weinfeld 1988) there are few detailed studies of the workings of ethnic polities in Canada. But such in-depth investigations are required in order to begin to answer such questions. It is particularly important to understand if and how the agenda of the ethnic polity functions in tandem with or in opposition to broader political constraints. We would of course want to distinguish between democratic process and substantive outcome. For example, an ethnic polity may not be democratic in the electoral sense, but it is our view that ethnic political bodies are not substantively less representative of the desires and interests of their (voluntary) members than are federal or provincial legislatures. First, given that our parliaments are composed primarily of middle and upper-middle class, educated white men, can they truly be said to reflect the entire population? The poor and the marginal never enjoy equitable representation. Second, real power in society is often held and exercised by people outside of elective office, mainly the bureaucratic or corporate elite. The same is true of ethnic polities, where leader-

Diversity in Canada 19 ship positions are often held by elites, and where money can and often does buy influence and power. Ethnic polities may also offer scope for dynamic, charismatic individuals to pursue specific objectives: ethnic polities are less formal, less bureaucratic, and operate at a smaller scale than national or provincial governments. Canadian governments are elected through formal democratic procedures. Usually, however, the winning party will hold office with less than 50 per cent of the votes cast and an even lower percentage of eligible voters. How 'representative' is such a government? Some parties hold power that is greater, and some less, than their popular vote would warrant. (Think of the Commons representation and popular Canadian vote of the Canadian political parties after the 1993 and 1997 elections.) This is unlikely to occur within ethnic polities, which often make no pretense of holding fair elections. They may instead have an elitist inner circle from which leaders are selected, or they may approximate a quasifederal model, which tends to produce outcomes of proportional representation. But those who accede to formal leadership positions in ethnic organizations often do, in fact, reflect the views of members who are interested, given the voluntary nature of these polities in total. They are certainly more likely to be in touch with constituents than proverbial mainstream political leaders who do not know the price of milk and eggs in the supermarkets of their home ridings. The question is often posed: who really speaks for the ethnic group? How do we know that ethnic political leaders reflect the wishes of the ethnic rank and file? The answers to these questions are important to government officials who must often choose among competing ethnic organizations and spokespersons when seeking to consult the views of an ethnic group. This has been a constant concern in ethnic group history (Breton 1991; Troper and Weinfeld 1988). At times a powerful minority within the ethnic group has control of the organization, stifling the view of the majority. Dissenting voices in ethnic polities have periodically been excluded from mainstream bodies. These rump groups sometimes establish competing organizations; over time, if successful, they may challenge, replace, or amalgamate with the ethnic 'establishment.' But the more sophisticated polities recognize early the value of cooptation over exclusion, largely because of a concern for maintaining group cohesion vis-a-vis the external world. The agendas of ethnic polities, as shaped by their leaders, are not carved in stone. They are generally subject to pressure from below and may change with time. An immigrant generation concerned with the

20 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld bread-and-butter issues of settlement and eliminating discrimination may give way to second and third generations concerned with issues of status and ethno-cultural recognition within the larger society. If dissenting or new voices are unable to push their concerns to centre stage, that may reflect either the entrenched power of dominating elites or the fact that the constituency for the particular concern is weak, or both. The Environment of the Ethnic Polity The ethnic polity is embedded within a given ethnic community and must be responsive to it. If the ethnic group is fragmented, as they frequently are, so too will be the polity, and a form of elite accommodation may occur within governing structures. Many recent arrivals from Somalia, for example, have organized along family or clan lines, often to the dismay of those who call for a single, strong black polity to address what they see as common concerns for all those of African descent. Sometimes communities are divided along political lines - right, left, and centre - or by time of arrival. But, whether one political voice or many, it is clear that the function of the ethnic polity is not only to organize the political life internal to a group, it must also represent the interests of that group externally to the state and, if need be, to other groups and to society at large. The legitimacy of the key political organizations of the ethnic polity often derives from the state, which grants formal or informal recognition to various ethnic political organizations as the official representatives of their groups. This is often done on ceremonial occasions, such as 'photoop' meetings of government officials and ethnic group leaders or the presenting of briefs to government officials, and the operation is a delicate one. Dissenters within an ethnic group can often question the legitimacy of the ethnic organization that claims to represent them. At times government will be faced with competing organizations claiming to represent the group. This dilemma is not unique to ethnic organizations and ethnic politics, since the same thing can happen for any group seeking to lobby the government. By their nature, however, ethnic polities tend to be particularly racked by factional dissent. What is more, we live in a time when lobbying activity is widely regarded as suspect, assumed to distort rather than facilitate the democratic process. The Canadian political system has been slower than that in the United States to embrace a legitimate role for lobbies. In Canada, an elitist tradition of governance has looked askance at popular input in the

Diversity in Canada 21 decision-making process, particularly when it has come from non-English and non-French-speaking immigrant groups (Olsen 1980; Pross 1992). Ethnic lobbies (that is, ethnic organizations that seek to influence government) may be doubly damned. In earlier periods ethnic minorities were routinely suspected of being potential traitors, of possessing loyalties to another homeland, another faith, or an alien ideology that conflict with their loyalty to Canada. Japanese Canadians were interned during the Second World War because of such fears. During the Cold War, many of those who immigrated to Canada from the countries of eastern Europe swept into the Soviet orbit felt dispossessed of a homeland and supported crusades for national liberation. So too have members of other immigrant and ethnic groups in Canada, such as Sikhs, the Irish, Tibetans, and Armenians. With old-world agendas casting a long shadow over the ethnic polities of the new world, questions of divided loyalty or accusations of compromising the national interest of Canada are often raised against ethnic groups, as if objectively defined Canadian national interests are somehow distinct from the democratic wishes of the Canadian people. The threat of having their loyalty to Canada questioned or of being seen as unwelcome meddlers in the affairs of real Canadians can have a chilling effect on ethnic participation in the lobbying process and, for that matter, on all political participation. This has been the case with respect to the Jewish community and Canadian Middle East policy (Goldberg and Tarus 1989; Stanislawski 1981). Ethnic polities in Canada today, however, function more and more like lobby groups. This raises other questions. First, to what extent do ethnic polities internalize rejection of overtures to government as a sign of rejection of the group's legitimacy in Canadian society or even of racism? For example, if Canada articulated a policy on a Middle East question that would displease either Jewish or Arab groups in Canada, to what extent would the government or government officials responsible for the policy stand accused of harbouring anti-Jewish or anti-Arab sentiments? Or, to take examples from recent Canadian policy debate, are minority groups and other commentators right to regard political calls for lower levels of immigration or prioritizing foreknowledge of English or French as coded expressions of racism? Whether related to foreign or domestic issues, ethnic polities that attempt to shape or reshape government policy are for the most part acting on a different plane from other interest groups. Rather than being driven by economic interests, ethnic polities couch their arguments in the discourse of human rights and, by implication, of possible prejudice and

22 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld discrimination. Whatever their message, ethnic polities confront problems of delivering that message in a way that will have a positive impact. But ethnic groups often find avenues for effective articulation of their position limited. The one area in which the ethnic agenda is most likely to find a receptive, if self-interested, ear is in the often-volatile area of party and electoral politics - the stampede to capture the ethnic vote. (For a discussion of ethnicity and politics in Canada, see Megyery 1991.) Of course, ethnic politics takes place in different arenas. One is the participation of ethnic minorities in the general political and governing process. This is most easily seen at the municipal or local levels, where distinct and effective ethnic voting blocs may be found. But it also includes the complex interaction of ethnic leaders with the personnel of government, both elected officials and public servants. And members of ethnic communities are not only supplicants approaching government from the outside; increasingly, they are found on the inside as well, as politicians and perhaps public servants of minority origin. Black and Lakhani (1997) have found that the 1993 federal House of Commons included seventy-one members of single, non-ethnic, and non-French origin and twenty-seven of mixed origin. There may be conflicting demands on such individuals, particularly as they are called upon by their heritage community to advocate on the community's behalf while being asked, at the same time, by their political or bureaucratic masters to pacify the group. Similar strains affect ethnic leaders who are consulted regularly by governments. Too much cooperation with government agendas may lead to a charge by communal militants of 'selling out,' of being an 'Uncle Tom' or 'Judenrat.' Too much activism in the name of one's ethnic group can lead to political marginalization and ineffectiveness. Another major factor defining the environment of the ethnic polity is the mainstream media (Fleras 1994). Some analysts see the media as reflecting existing social realities and tensions. To a certain extent this is true. But the media also have a built-in, commercially driven bias to seek out sensational, confrontational stories to report, particularly in areas of minority concerns. Stories like 'All planes land safely' or 'Most immigrants adjusting to Canadian life' do not grab readers. Media stories that touch on immigration and ethnicity too often focus on the sensational or salacious. This tendency, some worry, creates an unwelcoming climate in which to advance an ethnic agenda. For example, how should the media treat alleged connections between ethnicity and crime? When, if ever, does reporting the race or origin of a suspect or victim of crime become important? The issue for the media is

Diversity in Canada 23 how to report these stories without tarring the victims and the criminals with the same brush. Similarly, if political movements or parties seek to capitalize on anxieties about immigration or multiculturalism, media coverage can raise or lower the impact of these efforts, and thus help to shape the public agenda. Conclusion Our examination of the issues of integration, ethnic match, and the role of the ethnic polity reinforce our central argument that at the dawn of a new millennium the challenge of integrating diversity with Canadian liberal democracy presents a set of dilemmas for which no fixed or elegant solutions are likely. 'Multiculturalism/ chanted like a mantra by so many, is more an ideal than a blueprint. So too is 'managing diversity/ They offer little in the way of practical guidance in the search for negotiated solutions to problems where issues are grey rather than black or white. The process of negotiation will take place within various policy and institutional domains and may be adjudicated - temporarily but never finally - with the intersection of the judicial and political systems. Understanding how ethnicity works in Canada cannot be acquired solely from top-down theorizing or advocacy writing about the possibilities of integrating group rights into the liberal-democratic Canadian framework. Useful as this might be, progress in understanding will also require micro-level empirical studies of complex cases of ethnic interaction. The approximate and fortuitous conjuncture of the hundredth anniversary of a pro-active policy directed at previously non-traditional sources of immigration, the fiftieth anniversary of Canadian citizenship, and the twenty-fifth anniversary of Canada's multicultural policy frames the challenges and opportunities that Canadian diversity provides. Diversity in Canada requires a mix of sometimes contradictory policy positions that will at best result in an uneasy equilibrium. The equilibrium point may differ for different policy domains and among different groups, and it will almost certainly shift with time. If there is a solution, it likely lies in the process of struggling constantly to re-establish that equilibrium. The absence of neat, fixed resolutions is not a cause for despair; it must be seen as a source of Canadian strength. REFERENCES

Abella, Irving, and Harold Troper. 1982. None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys.

24 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld Avery, Donald H. 1995. Reluctant Host: Canada's Response to Immigrant Workers, 1896-1994. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Barrett, Stanley R. 1987. Is God a Racist? The Right Wing in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Black, Jerome H., and Alan S. Lakhani. 1997. Ethnocultural Diversity in the House of Commons: An Analysis of Numerical Representation in the 35th Parliament. Canadian Ethnic Studies 29(1):1-21. Breton, Raymond. 1964. Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Social Relations of Immigrants. American Journal of Sociology 70:193-205. - 1991. The Governance of Ethnic Communities. New York: Greenwood. Burnet, Jean, and Howard Palmer. 1988. Coming Canadians: An Introduction to a History of Canada's Peoples. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Elazar, Daniel J. 1995. Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry. 2nd ed. Philadelphia and Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society. Fleras, Augie. 1994. Media and Minorities in a Post-Multicultural Society: Overview and Appraisal. In John Berry and Jean Laponce, eds., Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 267-92. Fleras, Augie, and Jean Leonard Elliott. 1992. Multiculturalism in Canada: The Challenge of Diversity. Scarborough: Nelson Canada. Goldberg, David H., and David Taras. 1989. The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. Harney, Robert. 1988. So Great a Heritage as Ours: Immigration and the Survival of the Canadian Polity. Daedalus 117(4):51-98. Harney, Robert, and Harold Troper. 1975. Immigrants: The Portrait of the Urban Experience. Toronto: Van Nostrand Rhinehold. Hawkins, Freda. 1988. Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern. 2nd ed. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. Henry, Frances, Carol Tator, Winston Mattis, and Tim Rees. 1995. The Colour of Democracy: Racism in Canadian Society. Toronto: Harcourt Brace. Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Li, Peter S. 1988. Ethnic Inequality in a Class Society. Toronto: Wall and Thompson. - 1994. A World Apart: The Multicultural World of Visible Minorities and the Art World of Canada. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 31(4):365-91. Martin, Paul. 1983. A Very Public Life: Far From Home. Ottawa: Deneau, 1:437-53. Megyery, Kathy. 1991. Ethno-cultural Groups and Visible Minorities in Canadian Politics: The Question of Access. Ottawa: Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, Supply and Services, and Dundern Press. Mitchell, Alana. 1997. Faces of Canada Changes. Globe and Mail, 5 November 1997. Olsen, Dennis. 1980. The State Elite. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Porter, John. 1972. Dilemmas and Contradictions of a Multi-Ethnic Society. Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada 10:193-205. Pross, Paul. 1992. Group Politics and Public Policy. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Reitz, Jeffrey G. 1990. Ethnic Concentrations in Labour Markets and Their Implications for Ethnic Inequality. In Raymond Breton, Wsevolod W. Isaiw, Warren E. Kalbach, and Jeffrey G. Reitz, Ethnic Identity and Equality: Variants of Experience in a Canadian City. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Stanislawski, Howard. 1981. Canadian Jewry and Foreign Policy in the Middle East. In

Diversity in Canada 25 Morton Weinfeld, William Shaffir, and Irwin Cotler, eds. The Canadian Jewish Mosaic. Rexdale: John Wiley and Sons, 397-414. Sue, S., D.C. Fujino, L.T. Hu, D.T. Takeuchi, and N.W. Zane. 1991. Community Mental Health Services for Ethnic Minority Groups: A Test of the Cultural Responsiveness Hypothesis. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 59(4):533-40. Taylor, Charles. 1992. The Politics of Recognition. In Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 25-73. Troper, Harold. 1993. Canadian Immigration Policy since 1945. International Journal 68 (1993):255-81. Troper, Harold, and Morton Weinfeld. 1988. Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians, and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada. Toronto: Viking/Penguin. Weinfeld, Morton. 1997. Dilemmas of Ethnic Match. In W.W. Isajiw, ed., Multiculturalism in North America: Comparative Perspectives on Interethnic Relations and Social Incorporation. Toronto: Scholars' Press, 245-60. Whitaker, Reg. 1987. Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys.

2

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities, Concerns, and Policy Recommendations ALISSA LEVINE Introduction Opponents of multicultural policy routinely contend that entrenching multiculturalism may lead to a slippery slope through which unacceptable cultural practices will gain legitimacy in Canada. In other words, some features of foreign cultures will test the limits of Canadian multiculturalism, with implications in a number of policy domains. No practice has incited more apprehension than excision and infibulation of female genitalia. Many Canadians fear that these customs have been imported by the more recent waves of immigration. Indeed, immigration from mainly African countries, where excision and infibulation are commonplace, has put the issue of female genital operations (FGO) on the public agenda. It is estimated that over 130 million women and girls alive today have undergone various forms of FGO, ranging in severity from partial excision of the clitoris to complete excision of the clitoris, small (inner) lips, and large (outer) lips (WHO 1997, 5). The vast majority of these women underwent the operation well before puberty, when they were too young to understand the consequences and helpless to resist the knife. The negative consequences of FGO have been well documented. Westerners point to the loss of orgasmic potential as the most devastating result of amputation of the clitoris: clitoridectomy has been seen as analogous to penisectomy. However, removal of the clitoris and small lips not only denies sexual pleasure; infections and scar tissue resulting from the procedure often cause long-term physical pain and medical complications. The removal of the clitoris, the small lips, and part or all of the large lips leads to more extensive physiological complications. These

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 27 are suffered throughout the woman's life, and may be especially acute during urination, menstruation, defloration, coitus, and childbirth. The painful, less well-recognized physical complications of the procedures are what operated women invariably allude to when asked about gynaecological problems. In this study, I will begin by discussing physiological and cultural definitions of FGO. Genital operations must be viewed in the larger context of the treatment of Western and non-Western women throughout the world. The focus of my research is on the practice in groups originating in non-Western societies. However, Western medicine has also been involved in genital surgery and direct sexual reproductive control. Moreover, indirect control of female appearance, sexuality, and fertility in the Western world can be seen as analogous in many ways to genital surgery. A subsequent section will review the various explanations offered for the practice of FGO. The most plausible one is seldom, if ever, recognized by its practitioners in non-Western societies. It involves the notion that a woman's body and her sexual desire and ability to reproduce ought be physically controlled by others, either men or other family members. I will also explore the link between Canadian foreign policy and the issue of excision and infibulation in African countries. Canada's position regarding FGO affects both aid policy and policies relating to refugee determination and admittance to Canada. Finally, I will discuss the practice of FGO in Canada. This will include practical, theoretical, strategic, and legal considerations. What customs and beliefs are likely to continue in immigrant groups? Are excision and infibulation occurring in Canada? If so, which strategies for eradication would be most effective? Methodology This paper relies heavily on interviews conducted between March 1995 and April 1996. Forty immigrant community workers were questioned about their experiences with the practices; fifteen immigrants and visiting students from practising countries, seven physicians, and four nurses were also interviewed. Lasting about an hour each, the confidential interviews of immigrants and health care professionals were conducted in the home or office of the respondent or, when this was not possible, by telephone. Given the highly sensitive nature of the subject matter, care has been taken to protect the identities of respondents, where applicable, by minimizing identifying information. Initial contacts were established using a variety of sources. Foreign

28 Alissa Levine students at McGill University were interviewed, some of whom provided the names of acquaintances or family members who had immigrated to Canada. Community workers and researchers referred colleagues, fellow activists, and immigrants, and conferences, such as the Reflexions sur les mutilations des organes genitaux feminins (Montreal, 26-27 January 1996) proved an invaluable meeting place for community and healthcare workers involved in the issue. In sociological study that involves people of diverse origins, researchers must confront the issue of appropriation of voice, sometimes referred to as the insider-outsider debate (see pp. x-xi, above). Qualitative research has the advantage of ostensibly presenting issues from the respondent's perspective and even in her own words. Yet it may conceal authorial bias (Lincoln 1995, 49; Naples 1996,103): 'Authors decide whose stories (and quotes) to display and whose to ignore' (Herz 1996,7). Some might suggest that the researcher reveal her socio-demographic profile, implicitly or explicitly identifying possible biases (Herz 1996,7). But a biased researcher might omit personal details that would be pertinent to evaluation of her research. Moreover, two researchers with identical socio-demographic profiles might have radically different perspectives. In my view it is the method, not the personal history of the researcher, that sustains the scientific credibility of the research. There may also be benefits to approaching an issue from the outside. Novel insights may spring from those who encounter a culture for the first time, since they take nothing for granted (Brown 1977,58). And respondents may be more willing to reveal secrets to those outside their community. In my interviews, some respondents were insistent that I not reveal their country of origin, lest others in the community learn that they had spoken to me; they may have been hesitant to speak to a researcher from their own community. The insider-outsider distinction also fails to take into account the multiplicity of voices within each of us: 'Our consciousness is simultaneously inner and outer. There is no firm dividing line between our selfawareness and lived experience with others' (Christian 1995,129). Naples also refers to the unfortunate 'neglect of the interactive process' by which insider and outsider identities fuse together (1996,101). When interviewing Ethiopian Jews, I benefit from a certain insider status because of my Jewish heritage. But my whiteness simultaneously marks me as an outsider. Much of the debate on insiders and outsiders leaves little appreciation of these shifting roles and the constant interaction between the two. Throughout this chapter, alternating between these two statuses will allow us to develop a cross-cultural understanding of FGO.

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 29

Figure 2.1 Intact female genitalia

A Physiological Definition of Excision and Infibulation The human embryo's erectile tissue grows into a penis in the male and a clitoris in the female. Thus the sexual function of the clitoris should come as no surprise. But the analogy does not stop there. Like the penis, the clitoris includes a prepuce, or foreskin (see Figure 1). It has therefore been argued that a female parallel to male circumcision is both practicable and acceptable - if the penis can be circumcised, why not the clitoris? (Horowitz et al. 1995,188). Others argue that the intent and outcome of this procedure - including scarring of the surrounding tissue - render female circumcision unacceptable (Toubia 1994, 712; Abdalla 1982,8). Although it may be feasible to circumcise only the clitoral hood forming the foreskin, such surgery is rare among those ethnic groups that practise FGO. Instead, various parts of the female genitalia are amputated. What is sometimes considered theoretically analogous to male circumcision actually involves much more extensive surgery. In an attempt to summarize the typologies, many authors distinguish between true circumcision, different degrees of excision, and at least two types of infibulation, an intermediate and a more severe type. We have

30 Alissa Levine

Figure 2.2 Excision

chosen to use a simpler classification. Because it is not found among practising communities identified thus far, true circumcision - circumcision proper - will not be considered here. For our current purposes, I have divided the operations into three categories: excision, infibulation, and reinfibulation. Excision lessens or denies sexual pleasure and possibly desire. It entails removal of part or all of the clitoris, accompanied by partial or complete amputation of the small lips surrounding the clitoris. Excision renders erogenous stimulation difficult. Complete removal of the clitoris and the small lips (see Figure 2.2), apparently the most common procedure, prevents women from achieving orgasm (El Dareer 1982,90; Winter 1994,957; Hosken 1994,46; Thiam 1978,103). Infibulation (see Figure 2.3) has as its goal obstruction of the vaginal passage. Virginity is supposedly secured through the cutting and pasting or sewing together of the large lips. The degree of cutting varies, but the result is always an artificial tightening of the vaginal opening, often to pinhole size. While excision supposedly acts as a sexual deterrent by lessening or eliminating pleasure, infibulation is intended as a physical

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 31

Figure 2.3

Infibulation

deterrent to sexual penetration by rendering it difficult or impossible, and by threatening great pain to both the female and the male. Infibulation is almost always accompanied by excision; I found only one exception to this rule, limited to a single tribe in Kenya (Sanderson 1981, 22-3). The division of the initial operations into two types is suggestive of the two outcomes of sexual activity: pleasure and reproduction. Obviously, with capacity for pleasure attenuated or eliminated, the emphasis is placed upon women's reproductive role. A third operation, known as reinfibulation, involves renewed sewing of the infibulated woman, especially following childbirth. That is, the scar tissue consisting of the remnants of the large lips is retightened. In this way, the vaginal opening is reduced and even returned to pinhole size. The woman therefore undergoes cutting and resewing procedures throughout her childbearing years (El Dareer 1982, 56; Sanderson 1981, 100-1). In addition, 'complete closure of the aperture is also done on a woman who is divorced, so that she literally becomes a virgin once more' (El Saadawi 1980, 40). As long as a woman is married, she must be penetrable. But if her husband divorces her, she may be resewn until

32 Alissa Levine she is married to another. This next husband will also acquire a closed bride. The physical effects of the operations are numerous and often severe. Immediate complications can include haemorrhaging, shock due to extreme pain, various local infections, tetanus, and even death. Long-term complications, too numerous to list exhaustively, include painful urination and menstruation, genital cysts and infections, painful defloration and coitus, infertility due to a closing of the vaginal opening or vaginal infection, and prolonged and obstructed childbirth (El Dareer 1982, 29, 38-40; Sanderson 1981, 34-44). Infibulation often requires mechanical opening (cutting) for intercourse to occur, and always requires further opening prior to childbirth. A Cultural Definition Cross-culturally defined, as a general rule, excision and infibulation are rites of passage that are often erroneously perceived as physically analogous to male circumcision. While they may mark the beginning of acceptance into the adult society, genital operations rarely coincide with the onset of puberty. They are, however, perceived as conferring sexual identity on the child. In order to construct a female or a male, genital surgery must remove the penile tissue in the girl and the sexually ambiguous prepuce in the boy. Gender is thus not only a social but also a physical construct among numerous practising groups. In many societies, the operation is accompanied by special ceremonies, including songs, dance, and ritual seclusion. Gifts of clothing and jewellery are offered to each initiate (El Dareer 1982, 23-5). The rituals surrounding the operations are, however, becoming rarer. Significantly, even when the ritual ceremonies are abandoned, excision and infibulation may persist (Abdalla 1982,12). Operations that occur in hospitals under anaesthesia are not accompanied by ceremony (Dorkenoo and Elworthy 1992, 7; Hosken 1994, 8). That excision and infibulation may persist even when the ritual sanctification of them has been abandoned implies that their practice may not be a central feature of the given culture, but rather a persisting custom. For some analysts, this suggests that prohibiting the practice in Canada does not create a serious limitation on the freedom of the respective ethnic groups. However, it is also possible that the importance of the procedure may well persist even after the loss of accompanying rituals, in much the same way that some Jews will continue to have their male children circumcised without the attendant religious rituals.

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 33 Practising Groups While not associated with religious rites, female genital operations are practised by Animists, Catholics, Protestants, Coptic Christians, Jews, Muslims, and various native tribes in the sub-Saharan region of the African continent, as well as in parts of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Latin America and - through immigration - probably also in Canada, the United States, Australia, and western Europe (Dorkenoo 1994, viii-xi). Popular Western identification of the practice with Muslim groups may be due to the large number of Muslims in the practising African areas and to the severity of the operation known as infibulation associated with some of the Muslim groups, even though it is also practised by nonMuslims (El Dareer 1982, 21). Putting the Issue into Perspective Excision and infibulation are not limited to non-European societies. They are a part of Western medical history. In the second half of the nineteenth century, some European and American doctors resorted to the procedures, ostensibly for medical purposes. The most renowned of these was Dr Isaac Baker Brown, a member of the Obstetrical Society of London: 'In the 1860s, [Brown] went beyond clitoridectomy to the removal of the labia [lips]. As he became more confident, he operated on patients as young as ten, on idiots, epileptics, paralytics, even on women with eye problems. He operated five times on women whose madness consisted of their wish to take advantage of the new Divorce Act of 1857' (Showalter 1987). But these procedures never became a routine component of the treatment of Western women and girls. Moreover, genital operations in the Western world were usually confined to removal of the clitoris and small lips, since their purpose was to reduce or eliminate female sexual desire. Thus a German physician, Gustav Braun, reported the results of an excision he had performed, during which the clitoris and most of the small lips were amputated: "the states of arousal, which had occurred very frequently and at the least provocation, ceased entirely after the surgery" (Braun in Moussaieff Masson 1986,138). The operation was a success. While excision and infibulation are now condemned in the Western world, some writers have suggested that women suffer from 'psychic' or 'psychological clitoridectomy' (Steinem 1983, 293; Walker 1992, 169). The terms refer to society's insistence on the importance of the everelusive vaginal orgasm (Masters and Johnson 1966) and the correspond-

34 Alissa Levine ing devaluation, denial, or ignorance of clitoral orgasm. As well, women have been taught to be inhibited and ashamed of their sexuality. Thus, 'women may be mentally castrated by the restrictions on sexuality in Western society' (Ussher 1991,26). Beyond excision, whether physically or psychologically imposed, Western societies have in the past experimented with their own form of infibulatory surgery on women (Hosken 1994, 292). The medieval chastity belt served the same purpose as the most severe infibulations, resulting in strict control over female sexual and reproductive capacity. Although designed to restrict access to the victim's reproductive organs, normal urinary, bowel, and menstrual functions were also impeded. To allow the continuation of normal bodily functions in the absence of her husband, the wife's belt was fashioned with a slit or a few small holes. The contraptions employed were thus not only highly restrictive but also terribly unhygienic. A Contemporary Analogy One obstetrician-gynaecologist interviewed in this study pointed out that a surgical tightening of the vaginal opening - perineoplasty - is occasionally requested by Canadian women, including those of white European origin. The operation may be performed after the woman has given birth a few times: 'It's not an uncommon practice ... for women to request what we call perineoplasty, after they've given birth [because] they want everything to be sewn tighter so the opening is not as flaccid. And we don't happen to call that reinfibulation. We just call it perineoplasty ... So you see, the cultures overlap.' A gynaecologist cited in the literature offered the same cross-cultural analogy: 'European women have their introitus tightened without having the vulva cut. It needs a small operation in the fourchette; cut and stitch' (in El Dareer 1982,59-60). The comparison of perineoplasty with reinfibulation is perhaps the best example of cultural similarities in genital surgery. It may be that the standard of a tight vaginal opening is common to diverse cultures and thus imposed, explicitly or implicitly, on diverse groups of women. It may also be that the tightening procedures known as perineoplasty and reinfibulation both procure greater sexual sensitivity for the male partners of the women concerned, or for the women themselves, a point to which I will return in discussing the issue of reinfibulation. It has also been pointed out that plastic surgery is a partly analogous form of unnecessary intervention: 'Western women ... mutilate their bodies in order to have some standard of beauty as well. Women in the

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 35 West will have their breasts made bigger, made smaller, they'll have liposuction; that's mutilation, too/ insisted the same doctor who discussed perineoplasty. Yet some medical personnel emphasize that plastic surgery for aesthetic purposes is not comparable to genital surgery. One nurse interviewed argued that cosmetic surgery is a more acceptable practice than female genital surgery because the former 'doesn't really affect the functioning of your body. To me, clitoridectomy [excision of the clitoris] is like an amputation, really.' Procedures like breast reduction or enlargement can, however, affect bodily functions. Of course, the medical personnel interviewed recognized that plastic surgery is freely chosen by adult women, not imposed upon a child, as excision and infibulation are. Indeed, the issue of consent may ultimately enable us to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable forms of unnecessary surgery. But even a seemingly voluntary decision to have plastic surgery may be influenced by societal pressures, according to some of the professionals interviewed: 'We're just not comfortable with our bodies, and want to live up to a specific vogue image, and so have things altered to fit that image,' offers one nurse. And an obstetrician adds, 'Western women are subjected to these very strong pressures where they really have a very strong need to undergo plastic surgery.' Other Western societal controls over female sexuality and image are less blatant, though also potentially health and life-threatening. These include the Western obsession with weight control, leading many adolescent girls and women to starve themselves and others to constantly diet and monitor their physical appearance. Anorexia and bulimia are often inextricably linked to body image and to what some perceive as the ideal female form. Women also take up cigarette smoking in order to lose weight or stay slim, thereby greatly increasing their chances of developing cancer. Given the practices described above, it could be argued that Western women suffer the physiological consequences of sexist ideals as much as their non-Western counterparts. But female genital operations have emerged as the major focus of policy concern, perhaps because they can easily be targeted as culturally foreign to the usual Canadian customs. Accounting for Female Genital Operations Explicit Reasons

Cultures in which FGO are common have produced a variety of rationales to legitimate the procedures. For example, FGO are meted out as punish-

36 Alissa Levine ment among the Moba tribe of Togo, usually in response to a refusal by the girl to marry the man of her parent's choice (Froelich 1949, 2). In the Western world the procedures were undertaken as a means not of controlling all women, but of subduing those deemed to suffer from nymphomania or other medical or psychological conditions considered problematic. Excision and infibulation as sanctions against female defiance or disobedience are not, however, the rule. Instead, they are seen as preventive and even necessary measures among almost all the groups that practise them. In many societies it is consistently argued that FGO are simply traditional and so must continue; that they are done for religious purposes; that, without them, a girl will not find a husband; that they provide greater pleasure for the husband; and that they preserve virginity through decreased desire and increased fear of penetration (El Dareer 1982, 71-6; Sanderson 1981, 45-62). In certain communities, infibulation is even considered an efficient means of protecting women against rape (Shermarke 1995, 6; Hosken 1994, 74). The allegation that infibulation provides greater pleasure for the husband is apparently mistaken. A survey was conducted of three hundred Sudanese men who had at least two wives, one of whom had undergone excision and infibulation, while the other had undergone only excision. All of the men stated a sexual preference for the wives who had undergone the less severe operation (Shandall 1967). I was also interested in determining whether men have a preference between intact women and women who have undergone excision. What effect would removal of the clitoris and small lips have on a woman's sexual response and, indirectly, on that of her partner? The following comments by two male respondents of African origin residing in Canada suggest that it is very harmful. Both men refer to their experiences with excised women, whom they euphemistically refer to as circumcised, and intact women. The first respondent commented: 'There is a lot of difference between women that are circumcised and women that are not circumcised. Like in relation to sexual intercourse, women who are not circumcised, as soon as you start playing with them ... in that area, they become sexually active. Women who are circumcised, it takes a lot of time for them to be sexually active. Like getting the emotion for it.' Similar experiences were related by the second respondent: 'The lady that is not circumcised, she is more sexually active and more romantic, you know ... The one that is circumcised, you know ... she always complains about not having much feeling.' These comments reveal a complex web of psychosexual response. It might appear that impaired female sexuality could

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 37 affect attitudes and responsiveness in sexual relations. It is nonetheless significant that FGO do not lead to abstinence. Many, including a Toronto teenager interviewed in a recent documentary, believe that reduced sexual enjoyment is a disincentive for premarital sex, and therefore an argument in favour of excision (Why Not Productions Inc. March 1995). Yet the two African men interviewed in this study had premarital sexual relations with excised girlfriends. As well, a Canadian nurse who worked in an African country where excision is the rule remarked that many of the unmarried women were 'very sexually active/ In addition, despite the operations to which they had all been subjected, '[q]uite a few of the schoolgirls were quite [sexually] active' (telephone interview). The rationale that the operations preserve virginity is questionable, as seen from the testimony cited above. Sexual activity, particularly among teenage girls and young women, is not simply a product of the female's sexual desire and the prospect of orgasm. Moreover, infibulation actually renders premarital sex more accessible. The large lips may be resewn a number of times to conceal previous sexual activity (Sanderson 1981, 53; Hosken 1994,92). Implicit Reasons

An important underlying explanation for the persistence of excision and infibulation is ignorance (Koso-Thomas 1987,12-13). Illiteracy is seen as a major obstacle to fighting the practice, just as increased levels of education lead to decreased severity - and even outright rejection - of the operations (Koso-Thomas 1987,60; El Dareer 1982,22,87,100). But, while specific figures are not available, FGO reportedly persist even among the educated urbanites in practising areas (El Dareer 1982,96). Two of the most compelling implicit rationales for continued excision and infibulation revolve around the issues of control and status. A family's honour and the bride price both depend on the daughter's chastity. The money received by a young woman's family when they sell her into marriage and the desire of the new husband to obtain a virginal bride appear to result in attempts to curb female sexuality by means of drastic genital operations. Many community workers and researchers insist that FGO are imposed by patriarchal social systems. If men agreed to marry unoperated brides, excision and infibulation might be eradicated. In terms of intra-group integration, it cannot be denied that intact girls and women are generally ridiculed, often ostracized, and never married to

38 Alissa Levine members of their ethnic group. It remains to be seen whether the immigrant experience in Canada will alter this pattern of rejection. In most practising societies, FGO are performed by older women, attended by the girl's female relatives and other female friends of the family. Why do women perpetuate this tradition? In the societies involved, the intact girl is bereft of status. Excision and infibulation confer status and even authority. In a society that subordinates women to male authority, the young girl represents the only being over whom the female relatives may exercise any power. Compliance in and propagation of FGO may also be linked in part to the operated woman's desire for vengeance (Lightfoot-Klein 1989,122; El Dareer 1982, 81; Weil-Curiel (1992) in Winter 1994, 965). A nurse interviewed in my study, who worked with immigrant women in Paris, repeated the explanation given to her by many of these: 'I had to suffer, so why shouldn't my daughter?' Thus, the subjugated subjugate and the pecking order continues. Female collusion in the operations may also be rooted in a desire to have woman's role as reproducer recognized and honoured. The only adult role available to a woman, that of mother, is consequently seen as resulting not from a pleasurable physical act but from an onerous duty. Women are perhaps perpetuating the practices in order to underline their important role as childbearers, as well as to confer this essential role upon their daughters. Finally, while some report that the procedure known as reinfibulation (resewing of the large lips) is done exclusively to provide greater sexual pleasure for the male (El Dareer 1982, 91), reinfibulation may also allow greater sexual pleasure for the previously infibulated female. I will review the evidence for this argument below. The various rationales outlined above in general find no constituency among the Canadian public and Canadian policy makers. But before moving to the issue of FGO within Canada and domestic policy options, I will review the implications in the fields of foreign and refugee policy. Foreign Policy and Refugee Status Canadian foreign policy is linked to excision and infibulation in practising countries in at least three important ways. The first of these involves educational programs (such as those provided through CUSO) to combat illiteracy and provide basic education. I have already noted that an increase in female literacy tends to lead to decreased levels of excision and infibulation.

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 39 Some argue that Canada is also guilty of non-intervention. For example, vaccination programs were established despite initial community opposition in many areas. Yet the United Nations' World Health Organization and UNICEF have, in the past, been reluctant to intervene on the issue of FGO (Dorkenoo and Elworthy 1992; Hosken 1994, 330-6). For years, the extensive negative health effects were not even discussed, because excision and infibulation were perceived as cultural practices that could not - and perhaps should not - be discouraged. By actively intervening on certain health issues and not others, countries belonging to the UN might be accused of having contributed to sexist outcomes. The effects of excision and infibulation are, after all, mainly endured by girls and women. A second serious policy consideration involves the funding of health projects in areas where excision and infibulation are practised. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has no policy on the practices. Thus, for example, CIDA funding for hospitals in countries where excision and infibulation are commonplace is not conditional upon assurances that genital operations will be forbidden on CIDAfunded premises (telephone interview with CIDA, Health Division, March 1995). Although most of the procedures are conducted by midwives, it has been reported that a small percentage of doctors and nurses in many, if not all, practising countries agree to perform the operations (Hosken 1994). The most significant foreign policy issue of this type uncovered in my study involves the alleged use of UN equipment and medicine to perform the operations. United Nations' supplies and nurses have reportedly been employed in the operation in Sierra Leone. A visiting student from that country confirmed that this has been going on for a few years now. The student explained that nurses have consented to perform the operations for two reasons. First, since efforts to eliminate FGO have failed, some UN nurses, concerned about the dangers of allowing untrained operators to perform such delicate procedures, ostensibly intervened out of concern for their patients' health. By supplying antibiotics, operating with antiseptic and sanitized instruments, and using their medical knowledge to operate more safely, they believe that they are sparing the girls the untrained knife of the traditional excisor. But not all nurses operate solely out of concern for the girls' well-being; there are also monetary considerations. The UN does not pay its local personnel sufficiently, and many nurses turn to the operations as a form of supplemental income, explained our informant. It should be stressed that the

40 Alissa Levine nurses who allegedly perform the operations are usually hired at the local level by the UN. It is possible that those higher up in the UN hierarchy are unaware of the situation. Nonetheless, as a contributing country to UN activities, Canada should be aware of how medical funds are being spent. Similar concerns have appeared in American writing on the subject: '... the training, tools, drugs and equipment imported to implement health and family planning programs are used to mutilate children ... Since the mutilations are ignored by the program sponsors, the obvious assumption by the local participants and health workers trained by US AID is that the modernization of the operations is an improvement, especially since some money can be made by doing them' (Hosken 1994, 364). A third policy issue links FGO to refugee determination. We spoke to a Canadian immigrant whose two daughters still live in his native Sierra Leone. The two were scheduled to undergo excision during a group ceremony involving all the girls of the village of the appropriate age. Their father desperately wanted to bring his children and their mother to Canada before the ceremony, in order to spare his daughters the numerous adverse effects of the operation. Canada accepts refugee claimants for reasons of persecution on the basis of gender in their countries of origin (Supreme Court of Canada 1993; Young 1994) and has considered a threat of excision and infibulation as sufficient grounds for refugee status. In fact, a ground-breaking decision by the Immigration Review Board (10 May 1994) allowed a child refugee status in Canada on the premise that she would be subjected to infibulation if returned to Somalia, where it is the norm (Ramirez and McCaffrey 1994). The board ruled that the ten-year-old refugee claimant was doubly victimized. First, because her parents are divorced, the child's estranged father would be granted custody of her under Somalia's sharia laws. Second, the mother would be helpless to prevent her daughter's imminent infibulation. The daughter thus belonged to two disadvantaged social groups: 'It is by reason of the fact that she is a female and a minor that the claimant fears persecution in the form of female genital mutilation in Somalia today/ wrote the IRB in justifying its decision to recognize the girl as a Convention refugee. Excision and Infibulation in Canada Since the operations are performed on girls at a very young age, immigrant children and even those born in Canada to immigrants from prac-

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 41 tising countries may be at risk. While many traditions do not extend beyond the first generation of immigrants, excision and infibulation may affect the generation of immigrant children. The growing number of refugees and immigrants from practising areas is forcing us to address the issue of excision and infibulation within Canada. Potentially thousands of female children are currently at risk. Existence and Extent of Excision and Infibulation

In determining whether excision and infibulation are being practised in Canada, I rely upon information provided by immigrant community and health care workers, as well as immigrants themselves. While there is no consensus on just how extensive the practises are, many respondents and informants agreed that FGO are a problem among certain immigrant groups in Canada. Most of those interviewed believe that immigrant groups who practised them in their countries of origin should be considered as possible perpetrators of the offences in Canada. According to one Montreal gynaecologist, virtually all female children of immigrants from practising societies are at risk of undergoing genital operations. For her part, the president of the Ontario Coalition Against the Sexual Mutilation of Women, Malubungi Mueni, estimated in a telephone interview that female immigrant children as well as the daughters of immigrant women who were themselves excised or infibulated, have a 75 to 80 per cent chance of being subjected to genital surgery, either in this country or on a return visit to their country of origin. Mueni bases her estimate on extensive experience with the concerned immigrant communities, and claims that the daughters of female immigrants, as well as their mothers, have admitted that the practice continues in Canada. A Sierra Leonean interviewed reported similarly high estimates, noting that if the situation in Canada is anything like that in the United States, children of immigrants from practising societies are in danger of being subjected to the operations. The respondent based his estimate on experience with fellow Sierra Leoneans who immigrated to the United States. Almost all of his community of two to three hundred who left Freetown to settle in America return to their country of origin when their daughters are at the age to be 'circumcised/ During the Christmas and summer holidays, the town is filled with former Sierra Leoneans who return to have their daughters excised in a group ceremony. Because of the festivities surrounding the ceremony, and because the operation itself

42 Alissa Levine is illegal in the United States, parents prefer to have their daughters operated on outside of America (personal interview with the author). One woman intimated to us that she had received a phone call from another Canadian immigrant in which the latter revealed her plans to leave Canada temporarily in order to have her daughter operated upon abroad. Some of the women interviewed in the documentary video 'Our Daughters' Pain: Female Genital Mutilation in Canada' (Why Not Productions 1995) reported having acquaintances who had been operated on in Canada or knew girls who were at risk of having the operation. Marianne Shermarke, social worker with the Service d'aide aux refugies et aux immigrants (SARIM), met in March 1995 with fourteen Montreal immigrant delegations from countries in which FGO are practised. While none of the representatives admitted to having excised or infibulated their daughters in Canada, Shermarke reported that 'some said they knew people who'd had it done' and 'some of them knew people who would like to [do it] in the future to their children' (telephone interview). The delegations from the immigrant communities explained that pressure to subject their daughters to the procedure came from extended family members living in Canada and those still residing in their countries of origin (Shermarke 1995, 6). The most disturbing report of the practice comes from a nurse interviewed for this study; a colleague of hers claims to know a Canadian doctor who has performed in-office excisions in Montreal. The implications are staggering. As the nurse exclaimed: 'When I hear that anywhere here in Montreal one doctor could be doing ten or fifteen [excisions] in a day, over a matter of months, that's astounding. And if that one doctor is doing it, there are others.' Reinfibulation One Canadian obstetrician-gynaecologist interviewed admitted to having performed a reinfibulation, at the insistence of her patient. It must be stressed that the patient in question had already undergone an infibulation years before she arrived at the hospital, unmarried and pregnant. The doctor described the procedure that was undertaken: 'We incised the skin to perform an abortion, and then resewed it back together to the original state, as per the patient's request, because they have to go through marriage without [evidence of] previous sexual activity.' Asked if she intended to perform reinfibulation in the future, the doctor replied: Tf the patients want it, I feel strongly one should go along with their

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 43 beliefs ... I would not do the amputation of the clitoris ... but once they've been through the experience.' The doctor is not alone in the conviction that reinfibulation should be performed upon the request of an adult patient. Despite not knowing whether reinfibulation is legal, another obstetrician-gynaecologist interviewed claimed to be prepared to reinfibulate if asked to do so. Two nurses also considered that reinfibulation should perhaps be allowed, on a case-by-case basis. The issue of reinfibulaton might deserve special consideration. After all, it is not practised on young girls but on grown women. And these women, although they might oppose the initial operation, may nonetheless favour reinfibulation. Reinfibulation is prevalent even among educated urban groups in the countries of origin. One clue concerning why reinfibulation is practised lies in the explanation given by an infibulated woman herself: 'In most cases women accept the pain [of reinfibulation] because the result will bring them more pleasure ... All you have left is a hole, and this hole at a certain degree of tightness gives pleasure to a woman by her husband's penis rubbing against the sensitive area inside. He gets pleasure from the tightness. With use, this tightness of damaged tissue begins to give' (woman interviewed in Lightfoot-Klein 1989,120). Despite attendant health hazards, women may be consenting to the procedure in the interests of enhancing their own sexual relations. Does reinfibulation provide greater pleasure for the previously infibulated woman? The only reinfibulated woman interviewed who responded to this question admitted: 'Somehow, I agree.' This same woman had nonetheless actively campaigned against the initial operations of excision and infibulation in her country of origin. It could thus be argued that it is reasonable for a woman who has already undergone an infibulation to request renewed tightening after childbirth and even every few years, as her inelastic scar tissue loosens. Canadian physicians are divided over this issue. The Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada (SOGC) has published a policy statement condemning female circumcision, excision, and infibulation. Dr Andre Lalonde, vice-president of SOGC, argued that reinfibulation should be considered a form of infibulation, and should not, therefore, be practised by any doctor in Canada (written communication with the author, April 1995). The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario has specifically forbidden reinfibulation by Ontario physicians (27 January 1992). Yet not all doctors agree that reinfibulation is an unacceptable

44 Alissa Levine practice, or that the SOGC warns against it. While adamantly opposed to most excision and infibulation procedures, the two Montreal obstetrician-gynaecologists mentioned above contend that reinfibulation should be performed by physicians upon insistence by their patients. If reinfibulation really does provide greater sexual pleasure to the previously infibulated woman, it would perhaps be inhumane not to permit the procedure in Canadian hospitals by qualified doctors. Perineoplasty (tightening of the vaginal opening) is already an accepted procedure. The argument in favour of medicalization of reinfibulation revolves around issues of hygiene and safety: the woman who is operated in hospital would have less of a chance of developing an infection, for example. Similar arguments were made regarding abortion. The medicalization of the initial excision and infibulation is, however, rejected by all those interviewed. Groups fighting for the abolition of FGO categorically oppose their medicalization. They point out that such a move would amount to tacit acceptance, and even approval, of the operations. One nurse interviewed in this study related her reaction to a colleague who had referred a patient to a Canadian doctor who performs excisions: 'What if someone came to you and said, "Well, this person stole something and we want to have their hand cut off"; would you send them to a doctor that you thought would cut their hand off because it was going to be a sterile intervention? I mean isn't there a third possibility, not just the two possibilities - that you either do it in a manner that is not clean or you do it in a manner that is clean. Isn't there somewhere else here that we should be looking, as health care professionals?' The third possibility, eradication of the practises, will be discussed below. Strategies for Eradication Education and Resocialization

The case of Ethiopian Jewish immigrants to Canada is an example of the possibility of changing communal practices in the space of one generation. Ethiopian Jews practised both male circumcision and female excision. Although female 'circumcision' for Ethiopian Jewish girls took place, like male circumcision, a few days after birth, Ethiopian Jews now in Canada reported that it was not accompanied by any celebration. The lack of ritual perhaps explains why the procedure has apparently not continued among Ethiopian Jewish immigrants in Canada. Ethiopian Jews who settled in Israel also appear to have abandoned the tradition,

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 45 although there is speculation that the practice may persist 'in isolated cases' in that country (Westheimer and Kaplan 1992, 88). The Jews with whom I spoke who had been born in Ethiopia admitted the procedure was performed upon all female members of their community until the time they left Ethiopia in the 1980s. A recent text by a former Ethiopian Jewish leader confirms the practice (Yayeh 1995, 40-1). It was therefore surprising to discover that Canadian Jewish community leaders who have worked closely with Ethiopian Jewish immigrants were either unaware of the procedure or informed me that excision had not been practised by Jews in Ethiopia for generations. Thus, if the procedure has indeed been abandoned by Ethiopian immigrant Jews in Canada, it would not appear to be as a result of any direct Jewish community intervention. So how could it have been eradicated? Two factors may have been essential. The first is the lack of supporting ritual; the second is the fact that the Ethiopian Jews were assimilated into a well-established Jewish community, which had embraced Western opposition to FGO. Of course, the lack of celebration of the procedure among female Ethiopian Jews is not typical of all practising groups. Most surround the operation in rituals, including initiation rites and even 'secret societies/ But it is important to emphasize that these rituals are not connected to religious rites. The practices are not prescribed by any world religion. Although they may sometimes be defended on cultural grounds, excision and infibulation cannot be defended on religious ones. Excision and infibulation are not prescribed by any world religion. The Ethiopian Jewish case suggests the possibility of resocialization, even without overt initiatives directed against FGO. Unfortunately, many of the other African immigrant groups do not have a well-established host sub-community, such as the Jewish communities in Montreal and Toronto. But it would seem that the persistence of the custom is unlikely to be multi-generational. This does not mean that the appropriate means of discouraging excision and infibulation involve imposing all 'Canadian' or Western values on immigrant communities. Clearly, some immigrants to Canada perceive excision and infibulation as essential to their culture. What appears to be common to most groups that practise them, or have practised them in the past, is a lack of ease with human sexuality. But in making the case against FGO, celebrating the joys of (female) sexuality and orgasm may not be the most appropriate line of argument. It would only offend and alienate many of the practising cultures, for whom female sexuality is a highly taboo subject.

46 Alissa Levine It has been argued that FGO have persisted because they are not discussed openly. This helps to explain why scarification and tattooing were successfully eliminated without much opposition by the practising groups on cultural grounds, whereas genital operations continue (El Dareer 1982, 98). To be able to discourage excision and infibulation without offending or alienating the immigrants involved, culturally sensitive educational forums for discussion are needed. In fact, most of the respondents who were against FGO agreed on the general strategies that should be adopted to combat them. Asked to choose between education and legislation as a means of combating excision and infibulation in Canada, the immigrants and visiting students from countries in which FGO are practised invariably said that education was more important or argued that education and legislation were equally important. Legislation alone was seen as futile. Malubungi Mueni states: 'Je prefere la prevention a 1'intervention/ listing a host of educational programs on the subject that have been undertaken in Ontario. Mueni thinks that other provinces should be following Ontario's lead, educating susceptible immigrants about the physiological dangers of the operations without entering the murky waters of cultural relativism. She believes that by informing immigrants and children from practising communities of their negative effects, the procedures will be largely discouraged. Mueni also said that she does not believe that second generation Canadians will practise excision or infibulation on their female offspring (telephone interview with the author). It became apparent during a one-day forum for discussion held in March 1995 that many immigrants had been unaware of the physiological dangers of excision and infibulation. Few had heard that health problems such as infertility and infection result from the procedures. Social worker Marian Shermarke, author of the report of the proceedings (Report on the Montreal Consultation on Female Genital Mutilation) emphasizes that participants from practising countries 'unanimously agreed that the message should focus on the health consequences' (1995, 8). It may seem unbelievable to a Westerner that many ethnic groups have not made the connection between the operations and the resultant negative health effects. But we must remember that, in practising societies, there is no control group. No woman is left intact. The health problems experienced by women are not automatically associated with genital operations. Many assume the gynaecological problems from which they suffer are the lot of all women and do not, therefore, associate their suffering with the genital operations they have undergone.

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 47 It is also important to recognize the role religion may play in combating the practices. Many African Muslims undergo excision and infibulation in the belief that it is required by Islam. Muslim immigrants to Canada might greatly benefit from learning the opinion of the majority of Islamic authorities, who insist that excision and infibulation are not required by their faith. Struggling to overcome the betrayal and disillusionment experienced when they learn that the operations are not religious rites, the Canadian Muslim immigrants I interviewed suggested that religious leaders should campaign against the practices. While those most directly affected do not generally perceive legislation to be the best deterrent, it is nonetheless seen as mitigating against the practises. Until now, immigrants have not been systematically informed of the illegality of the procedure under international and national laws, which helps account for the fact that no one consulted by Shermarke was aware that FGO are illegal in Canada. Even three of my physician respondents were unaware of the various professional and legal sanctions. The immigrant participants at the March 1995 consultation recommended that information concerning the illegality as well as the health risks of excision and infibulation be provided in a culturally sensitive manner to the communities concerned. The use of brochures and workshops and the cooperation of community leaders and professionals working with immigrants were recommended. Ethnic matching of counsellors with clients was suggested as an appropriate means of providing sensitive health care and information on the subject. Additionally, it was suggested that the term 'mutilation' not be employed. However, clitoridectomy, excision, and infibulation were all seen as appropriate terms to describe the operations in question (Shermarke 1995,16-17). Legal Clarification under Canadian Law

After stating in 1994 that no new law was necessary to combat excision and infibulation in Canada, the Justice Department appears to have changed its mind. In 1996 Bill C-27 was proposed to amend the Criminal Code. The new bill, passed 26 May 1997, explicitly prohibits what is termed 'female genital mutilation/ A subsection has been added to section 268, which deals with aggravated assault: 'excision, infibulation or the total or partial mutilation of the large lips, the small lips or the clitoris of a person constitute a wound or mutilation' (Minister of Justice 1997). Provisions in Quebec and Ontario child protection laws were interpreted by then Justice Minister Allan Rock as providing further recourse. For

48 Alissa Levine example, the state may take a child into custody if parental intent to cause bodily harm is suspected under section 79 of the Quebec Youth Protection Act. Sections 38-41 and 76-78 of the Quebec laws, dealing with the security and development of a child, also apply. Recourse under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

We have uncovered no legal opinions rendered on the rights of parents to operate on their daughters. It is possible that section 27, the multiculturalism section, of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms might be invoked to defend FGO. Parents would have to claim that the maintenance and promotion of their cultural heritage would be impossible without performing FGO on their girls. In a partially analogous case, the Canadian Supreme Court awarded temporary state custodianship of a child for the purpose of providing blood transfusions when her parents opposed the procedure on religious grounds. In January 1995, the Supreme Court ruled that wardship of a minor may be granted on a caseby-case basis, and temporarily, to allow crucial medical procedures to be undertaken (Supreme Court of Canada, January 1995). In this instance, the infant's parents used the freedom of religion clause in section 2 of the Charter to argue that they should be allowed to follow their religious beliefs in withholding a blood transfusion for their child. Since we have already shown that FGO, unlike blood transfusions, are not prescribed by any religion, the freedom of religious expression clause does not apply. In any case, the parents' position did not prevail. The preceding case does, however, emphasize the difficulties that would inevitably arise in adopting a purely legal remedy. While state intervention was required to ensure that a medical procedure might be employed if necessary, guardianship of the minor was granted only for a temporary period. Excision and infibulation are not required medical procedures, nor would temporary guardianship solve the problem. Parents who attempted to claim that section 27 rendered excision or infibulation legal would probably be defeated in court. Section 1 of the Charter, which limits the exercise of rights when they clash with basic principles of a free and democratic society (including those outlined in the Criminal Code of Canada), would most likely be employed to counter section 27. Although no criminal trial related to excision or infibulation in Canada has yet occurred, in France several trials of parents and perpetrators have led to a few convictions and jail or suspended sentences (Winter 1994). Many argue that a 'protrial position is ... inadequate within the present

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 49 context/ since limited access to literacy and work training programs for immigrant women are seen as the main obstacles to eradication (Winter 1994, 971). The French experience cautions against placing undue emphasis on legal intervention at the expense of educational programs. Other Recommendations

Various Canadian organizations have published policy recommendations on the issue of FGO. These include the Conseil du statut de la femme du Quebec (October 1995), the Commission des droits de la personne du Quebec (21 December 1994), the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (CACSW) (March 1994), and the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada (September 1992). The recommendations made to the Government of Canada by CACSW recognize the importance of various educational approaches, but also emphasize the need for specific legislation against excision and infibulation. Yet the new legislation does not specifically refer to the practice of reinfibulation. As mentioned, some doctors and nurses do not currently interpret their professional associations' policy statements as prohibiting this renewed sewing procedure. Guidelines governing procedures undertaken by medical personnel should be clarified. Further research and consultation with the women concerned must be conducted in order to determine whether or not reinfibulation should be practised in Canada. Physicians and nurses alike must be informed about the positions of Canadian medical associations. Education of immigrants regarding the illegality of excision and infibulation is not specifically recommended by CACSW. Immigrants from practising countries should be informed that excision and infibulation are in violation of Canadian and international human rights laws (Drapeau and Wolde-Giorghis 1994). While literacy and higher education in general contribute to a decline in excision and infibulation, it should not be assumed that educated Canadian immigrants have abandoned the practices. Malubungi Mueni stresses that even educated immigrants subject their daughters to the procedures (telephone interview with the author). Therefore, despite the fact that FGO have been characterized as chiefly a rural, illiterate phenomenon, it would be unwise to assume that immigrants from major urban centres are immune to them. Educational intervention in Canada should be aimed at immigrants from practising areas, both educated and uneducated, rural and urban.

50 Alissa Levine Even though the CACSW recommendations are well reasoned and fairly thorough, they do not indicate which policy initiatives should be made a priority. Education about the negative consequences of FGO is of fundamental importance. Other erroneous beliefs surrounding the practices should be countered through information seminars addressed to immigrant communities. The role of religious leaders should not be overlooked in this process. The development and implementation of educational programs specifically aimed at combating excision and infibulation would be most effective in the short term. Prosecuting the mothers and grandmothers of the victims is less desirable. Conclusion Inherent in the recommendations made above, and indeed in the entire study, is the assumption that Canadian society (as well as most individuals in the immigrant groups involved) find excision and infibulation unacceptable. In combating racism and destructive paternalistic tendencies, it will be important to point out that genital operations were once part of Western medical practice and to consider analogous procedures and related issues. Women in any society or community can suffer because of an overstated reaction to their sexuality, eroticism, and sexual pleasure. In traditional societies these subjects are seen as taboo. In modern Western societies, they may be alternately exalted and degraded. In either case, women are deprived of information vital to their health and well-being. This applies not only to certain newly arrived immigrant groups, but to the whole of Canadian society. The issue of FGO in Canada thus falls beyond the outer limits of what is acceptable in our multicultural, liberal-democratic society. Both education and legal reform have a role to play in eradicating these practices. Policy makers must remain vigilant regarding foreign aid practices that may tacitly encourage FGO in foreign countries. And the Canadian community of health care professionals must outline and enforce policies on FGO of all types. Opponents of multiculturalism, however, have seized upon the practice of FGO as illustrating the dangers of diversity in general. Even more than the Hijab, it symbolizes the subjugation of women by traditional cultures, compounded by physiological harm, and mobilizes opposition from both conservative and liberal circles. There is little quantifiable evidence about the prevalence of FGO among

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 51 Canadian-born girls from the at-risk populations. While the practice must be strongly opposed in the short run, in the long run it is unlikely to persist in Canada. In the origin countries grassroots campaigns against FGO led by operated women have been mounted. Many of these countries have passed laws in an effort to discourage the procedures. It would perhaps be more accurate to view the Canadian and the Western world's position on excision and infibulation as reflecting - not initiating - growing global awareness of, and reaction to, the consequences and implications of the procedures for women and their families. Perhaps a public debate on FGO would prove beneficial for all Canadian women. If it were discovered that more women suffer from eating disorders, lung cancer, and various forms of plastic surgery in an attempt to conform to Western society's ideal of the perfect female form than from excision and infibulation, how would we react? Perhaps one day African or Asian researchers will devote their energies to studying the alarming amount of suffering of women and their daughters trying to conform to Western society's image of the ideal female body. NOTE The author would like to thank Lorna Hutchison for the drawings reproduced here. REFERENCES Abdalla, Raqiya Haji Dualeh. 1982. Sisters in Affliction: Circumcision and Infibulation of Women in Africa. London: Zed Press. Bartunek, Jean, and Meryl Reis Louis. 1996. Insider/Outsider Team Research. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. Brown Richard H. 1977. Point of View. In A Poetic for Sociology: Toward a Logic of Discovery for the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 49-76. Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women. March 1994. Recommendations to the Government of Canada on Female Genital Mutilation. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 1982. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 1, 2, and 27. Christian, Clifford. 1995. The Naturalistic Fallacy in Contemporary InteractionistIntrepretive Research. In Studies in Symbolic Interaction 19, Norman K. Denzin, ed., 125-30. Conseil du statut de la femme du Quebec. October 1995. Les mutilations genitales des femmes: une pratique qui doit disparaitre. Quebec: Government of Quebec. Dorkenoo, Efua. 1994. Cutting the Rose. Female Genital Mutilation: The Practice and its Prevention. London: Minority Rights Group Publications. Dorkenoo, Efua, and Scilla Elworthy. April 1992. Female Genital Mutilation: Proposals for Change. London: Minority Rights Group International. Drapeau, Maurice, and Ha'ilou Wolde-Giorghis. 21 December 1994. Les Mutilations

52 Alissa Levine sexuelles: une atteinte illicite a I'integrite de la personne. Catalogue 111-2. Montreal: Commission des droits de la personne du Quebec. El Dareer, Asma. 1982. Woman, Why Do You Weep? Circumcision and Its Consequences. London: Zed Press. El Saadawi, Nawal. 1980. The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World. London: Zed Press. Froelich, J.P. 1949. Les Societes d'initiation chez les Moba et les Gomme du Nord Togo. Journal de la Societe des Africanistes 19:2. Herz, Rosanna. 1996. Ethics, Reflexivity, and Voice. Qualitative Sociology (Special Methods Issue) 19(l):3-9. Horowitz, Carol R., J. Carey Jackson, and Mamae Teklemariam. 19 January 1995. Female Circumcision. Correspondence, New England Journal of Medicine. 332:188. Hosken, Fran P. 1994. The Hosken Report. Genital and Sexual Mutilation of Females. 4th ed. Lexington, Mass.: Women's International Network (WIN) News. Koso-Thomas, Olayinka. 1987. The Circumcision of Women: A Strategy for Eradication. London: Zed Books. Lightfoot-Klein, Hanny. 1989. Prisoners of Ritual: An Odyssey into Female Genital Circumcision in Africa. New York: Harrington Park Press. Lincoln, Yvonna S. 1995. The Sixth Moment: Emerging Problems in Qualitative Research. In Studies in Symbolic Interaction 19, Norman K. Denzin, ed., 37-55. Masters, W.H., and V.E. Johnson. 1966. Human Sexual Response. Boston: Little Brown. Minister of Justice. 26 May 1997. Bill C-27. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (child prostitution, child sex tourism, criminal harassment and female genital mutilation). Canada: House of Commons of Canada. Moussaieff Masson, Jeffrey. 1986. A Dark Science: Women, Sexuality, and Psychiatry in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Naples, Nancy A. 1996. A Feminist Revisiting of the Insider/Outsider Debate: The Outsider Phenomenon in Rural Iowa. In Qualitative Sociology (Special Methods Issue) 19(1):83-106. Ramirez, J. and J. McCaffrey. 10 May 1994. B. (P.V.) (Re). Convention Refugee Determination Decisions, C.R.D.D. No. 12, Nos. T93-12198, T93-12199, T93-12197. Toronto: Immigration and Refugee Review Board of Canada Convention Refugee Determination Division. Sanderson, Lilian Passmore. 1981. Against the Mutilation of Women: The Struggle to End Unnecessary Suffering. London: Ithaca Press. Shandall, A.A. 1967. Circumcision and Infibulation of Females. Sudan Medical Journal 5: 178-212. Shermarke, Marian A.A. March 1995. Report on the Montreal Consultation on Female Genital Mutilation. Showalter, Elaine. 1987. The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture, 18301980. New York: Penguin Books. Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada (SOGC). September. 1992. Policy Statement No. 12. Statistics Canada. 1993. Immigration and Citizenship. 1991 Census. Catalogue 93-316. Steinem, Gloria. 1983. Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Supreme Court of Canada. 1995. Richard B. and Beena B. v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, The Official Guardian for Sheena B., and infant, and The Attorney

Female Genital Operations: Canadian Realities 53 General for Ontario and the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Quebec. [1995] 1 S.C.R. 1. Supreme Court of Canada. 1993. Canada (Attorney Genereal) v. Ward. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689. Thiam, Awa. 1978. La Parole aux negresses. Paris: Editions Denoel/Gonthier. Toubia, Nahid. 15 September 1994. Female Circumcision as a Public Health Issue. New England Journal of Medicine 331:712-16. Ussher, Jane. 1991. Women's Madness: Mysogyny or Mental Illness? New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Walker, Alice. 1992. Possessing the Secret of Joy. New York: Pocket Books/Washington Square Press. Westheimer, Ruth K., and Steven Kaplan. 1992. Surviving Salvation: The Ethiopian Jewish Family in Transition. New York: New York University Press. Why Not Productions Inc. March 1995. Our Daughters' Pain: Female Genital Mutilation in Canada. Toronto, Ont. Winter, Bronwyn. 1994. Women, the Law, and Cultural Relativism in France: The Case of Excision. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 19(4):939-74. World Health Organization. 1997. Female Genital Mutilation. A Joint WHO/UNICEF/ UNFPA Statement. Geneva: World Health Organization. Yayeh, Qes Asres. 1995. Traditions of the Ethiopian Jews. Thornhill, Ont. Kibur Asres. Young, Margaret. March 1994. Gender-Related Refugee Claims. Ottawa: Library of Parliament.

3

Break North: Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada REBECCA J. HAINES

Ladies and Gentlemen I'm about to introduce a smooth groove that I just produced So don't dance or prance, move your head to the rhythm As we scan this land that we live in is plagued with racism C-A-N-A-D-A-Canada I'm watching it decay everyday Young minds are being mentally crushed and mushed in Thanks to men like Rushton and others Who wanna smother a dream of a black mind, revolutionary regime We've gotta redeem ourselves from shame By removin' all stains and the chain on the brain We gotta roll with force 'cause the Klan also move in the Great White North We gotta hurdle the system 'cause hate penetrates Multiculturalism Listen -1 want an explanation Why are Mohawks being kicked off of their reservations? And put in misery. You're stealin' the land to create sportin' facilities The Native man of the land is who 'ya killin' And then got the nerve to celebrate Thanksgivin' Claimin' every man is equal I hate to see what y'all got planned for my people I tell my brothers and sisters to read the signs To open your eyes 'cause it's time to get together No time to stall 'cause without togetherness we got nothing at all Maestro Fresh Wes, 'Nothin' at All'

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 55 Introduction Derived from the period of slavery in the United States, the term 'break north' is a term rich in historical meaning. It was originally used to describe the flight of southern slaves to northern American cities and their illegal escape across the border to Canada via the Underground Railroad. Citing the use of this term in lyrics by Chuck-D of Public Enemy, Greg Tate writes that 'breaking north alludes to the direction in which fugitive slaves hauled ass from the plantations' (1992,129). If the word 'north' is strongly associated with Canada, the term 'break' is also representative of two vital forms of expression in Hip-Hop culture: breakdancing and break-beat sampling, the technique of musical innovation that makes rap distinct from other music. The inevitable cultural transmission between Canada and the United States has facilitated rap's break north into the black communities of the 'Great White North/ where the mass commercialization of rap has fully entrenched a once small and struggling musical genre within the youth subcultures of Canadian cities. Inspired by their southern neighbours, black Canadian youth have appropriated Hip-Hop as a form of cultural expression and articulation of their marginalization within Canadian society. However, it is not just black youth who are embracing Hip-Hop; the rebellious attitude of rap music and the aesthetics of Hip-Hop street style have attracted significant numbers of white and other non-black followers and fans, in both the United States and Canada. The relationship between so-called minority cultures - with the term culture used here to denote artistic creation and that of the Canadian white majority is an uneasy one, yet the process of cultural interchange and diffusion is inevitable in a country as diverse as Canada. This study explores the social conditions and consequences of that process. Canadian rap music provides an excellent case study of the transformation that results when a cultural product shifts from the position of a marginalized, minority-group production (completely ignored by the Canadian mass media and culture industries) to become part of the mainstream culture and everyday life for many different Canadian young people. While increased commercial success is often desirable, because the musical skill, artistic talent, and the views and concerns of black youth articulated through rap are expressed to a wider public audience, it is inevitably accompanied by the drawbacks of mainstream dilution and distortion. Looking at the production and consumption of rap music by non-black youth in Canada can also provide some new

56 Rebecca J. Haines insights into the debates about appropriation of culture. But it must be recognized that Hip-Hop is an American-based subculture that Canadian youth have appropriated and adapted, incorporating aspects of black American culture to suit their particular circumstances. In the United States the mass marketing of Hip-Hop culture resulted in many studies by black (Baker 1993; Rose 1994), Latino (Fernando 1994), and white authors (Cross 1993; Toop 1991). These writers have done much to establish rap as a form of legitimate cultural expression and as a cultural product of the black diaspora, but we have yet to account for the significant levels of non-black participation within Hip-Hop culture. The failure of writers, white and non-white, to address this issue could result from what bell hooks (1992) sees as a tendency of (white) academics writing on black subjects to focus on issues of race and cultural difference in others without a corresponding 'critical interrogation of whiteness/ Thus this study seeks to explore, among other issues, the fascination with black youth culture as it exists among teens of different races. While by no means a complete history of Canadian Hip-Hop, this study will provide an overview of what has been going on in the Canadian rap scene. It draws on qualitative interviews with young people involved with Hip-Hop culture and an analysis of Canadian rap lyrics to discuss patterns of anti-racism within youth culture. Rap music can be an important mechanism by which black youth in Canada educate themselves and others about issues pertaining to their community. Increasingly, it has also provided a forum for young people of different races to come together and form cross-racial ties, over the airwaves of college radio stations across Canada and at underground house parties, concerts, and community events. Finally, an understanding of the link between ethnicity/race and popular culture helps to illuminate several issues of cultural policy in Canada. The Roots of Hip-Hop Culture Music is just one of the three vital components of Hip-Hop culture, as the 'Hip-Hop Holy Trinity' also consists of break-dancing and graffiti art. The inception of Hip-Hop dates back to roughly the mid-seventies, when New York disc jockeys began scratching and mixing a variety of rock, disco, and R&B records, creating dance tracks that catered to the breakdancing movement among black and Latino inner-city youth. DJ Kool Here of the South Bronx was one of the first DJs to talk over records on the microphone at parties and clubs, and soon the addition of an 'MC who

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 57 rapped lyrics over the tracks became a regular feature of this distinct new style of music. In 1979 the single that announced rap's arrival in the commercial music industry was released by the Sugarhill Gang on Sugarhill records. "Rapper's Delight' became the first rap single to obtain wide air-play on radio stations, but for the most part the mainstream markets still dismissed the music as just another fad. Yet by 1982, Afrika Bambaataa's 'Planet Rock' and Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five's 'The Message' had sold over 500,000 copies each, establishing rap as a popular and marketable form of music. By the late eighties, the crossover success of a trio from Hollis Queens, RUN-DMC- the 'Godfathers of rap' - signalled rap's arrival in both black and mainstream American musical spheres. The lateeighties produced hardcore groups such as Public Enemy and N.W.A., whose albums went gold despite a lack of support from commercial radio. By 1988 there were also a number of pop-rap crossover records, such as Tone Loc's 'Wild Thing' - the first rap record to top the Billboard Singles chart, moving over two million units (Dyson 1993, 4-8). In the nineties Hip-Hop has truly arrived in mainstream culture, with multi-platinum album sales, Hip-Hop-inspired television shows, movies, and massdistributed rap magazines. While there is no doubt that rap has emerged as an extremely successful commercial music, tracing the 'roots and routes' of rap to historic black cultural expression and practices can be a complex and confusing process (Gilroy 1993). In order to simplify this issue, it is easiest to characterize elements of rap music as being connected in multifaceted ways to musical, linguistic, and religious traditions in the black diaspora. In forging a link between today's Hip-Hop and the history of AfricanAmerican music, those who have argued against critics who dismiss rap as 'noise' most often relate rap music to black musical development in North America. Rap is characterized along the same lines as gospel, spirituals, and the blues, in that it serves as a creative response to historical conditions of oppression and articulates the frustrations of racism and discrimination in society (Craddock-Willis 1989). Moving beyond the American context, other writers point to the historical influence of African and Caribbean rhythms, and the similarities between elements of African-American rap and Jamaican dancehall reggae (Fernando, Jr 1994). Another historical black tradition at work within rap music is seen in the emphasis on vernacular culture, as African-American oral expression has links to the storytelling and emphasis on orality found in African cultures. Prominent African-American literary scholars such as Henry

58 Rebecca J. Haines Louis Gates, Jr (1988) and Houston A. Baker, Jr (1990,1993) have argued that rap is a descendant of black oral and verbal practices such as signifying, shucking and jiving, toasting, and playing the dozens. An esteemed literary professor and an expert witness for the defence in the 1990 obscenity trials of the Florida-based rappers, 2-Live Crew, Gates has lent very public legitimacy to rap music. Gates based his defence of the rappers on claims that their sexually explicit rap lyrics were an extension of the black cultural tradition of the carnivalesque as entertainment, rather than the type of pathological misogyny and obscenity that the media characterized their lyrics as representing (Baker 1993). Baker asserts that black working-class and ghetto culture results in a language and expression that is culturally distinct from the American mainstream. His corresponding argument that it was the verbal skills and ghetto talk of public figures like H. Rap Brown and Malcolm X 'that gained them the national spotlight through their ability to hold the stage verbally in the ghetto/ can easily be applied to the modern-day street-corner men, rappers (1990,112-13). While there are clear links between rap and street culture, the call and response style evoked in rap also stems from African-American religious traditions. The role of the rapper can be paralleled to that of the black preacher, as they both utilize a charismatic and rhythmic speaking style to engage their congregation or audience (Dyson 1993,12). Rap music in its many forms is part of the cultural tradition of passing on stories, news, history, and fables from one generation to the next and, like all storytelling, it can be entertaining and comical or educational and moralistic (Powell 1991). While the boroughs of inner-city New York are usually cited as the official birthplace of Hip-Hop, the rise of West Coast 'gangsta' rappers has made the case for a history of Hip-Hop that also includes the development of rap music in black communities in the southern California districts of Compton, Long Beach, and Oakland. But whether their allegiances are to Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, or Watts, California, almost all rappers and their lyrics pledge love and loyalty to the city streets, the ghettoes, and the 'underground' communities (Kelley 1994). The ghetto plays such a central role in most rap that those artists who have a different background may still boast of 'growin' up in the 'hood.' For example, Vanilla Ice, a white crossover rapper, constructed a false story of ghetto upbringing in order to add legitimacy to his abilities as a nonblack rapper. Not all members of the Hip-Hop nation are examples of rags-to-riches success stories, but one of the predominant themes in rap

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 59 music is that of the young black male with blocked opportunities who becomes a rapper as an alternative to criminal involvement. While rap may have emerged as the voice of the black underclasses, some of the lyrical content and public imagery has generated a great deal of public debate. In the early 1990s, the protest surrounding rapper IceT's heavy metal release 'Cop Killer/ the criminal charges brought against rappers such as Dr Dre and Snoop Doggy Dogg, and the death of former N.W.A. rapper Eazy E from AIDS brought rap to the forefront of racial and cultural politics in the United States. More recently, media publicization of the so-called East vs. West Coast gangsta rap wars and the assassinations of two of Hip-Hop's superstars, Tupac Shakur and the Notorious B.I.G. (aka Biggie Smalls), have led to increased concerns over violent lyrical content and the degree to which Hip-Hop artists are responsible for portraying a positive image through both their music and their private lives. As a result of negative attention from the mainstream media, when the average outsider to Hip-Hop culture thinks of rap, the image that most likely comes to mind is that of the 'gangsta rapper': a foul-mouthed, sexist, gun-toting hoodlum. As bell hooks has argued, 'a central motivation for highlighting gangsta rap continues to be the sensationalist drama of demonizing black youth culture in general and the contributions of young black men in particular' (hooks 1994,115), while the range of viewpoints and the diverse stylistic range within rap is ignored. Certainly, Hip-Hop can be criticized for lyrics and imagery that promote guns and violence and condone sexism and misogyny. But rap has also played an undeniably important role in disseminating messages about the conditions of black urban life that are not available through the channels of the mainstream media. It was in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots in 1992 that scholars, politicians, and social activists were finally forced to listen to rappers such as Ice Cube from N.W.A., who had not only been articulating unbearable police harassment and brutality, but also predicting a rebellion in racially divided Los Angeles communities, with lines such as the following, from the often-quoted song, 'Fuck da Police': A young nigger on the warpath And when I finish it's gonna be a bloodbath of cops dyin' in LA.

In addition to its emergence as a voice for underclass blacks and an important forum in which African-Americans can formulate a critique of

60 Rebecca J. Haines racist oppression, Hip-Hop is also rapidly becoming a soundtrack to youth culture in the nineties. Rap's movement into the realm of mass culture can be seen as responsible for the increased prominence of racial issues and identity politics in popular commercial music. This shift raises important questions about audiences, representation, and cultural authenticity which have resulted from Hip-Hop culture's crossover into the mainstream economic markets and cultural communities. The rise of rap to mainstream popularity has been compared to the evolution of the blues, jazz, rhythm and blues, and rock 'n' roll as forms of black music that have attracted many white followers and, subsequently, imitators. While there has yet to be an in-depth examination of white and other non-black participation in Hip-Hop culture, the American media have coined the label 'wigger' to describe white youth who appropriate the Hip-Hop style and 'wannabe' black. It was no coincidence that the rise in popularity of gangsta rap was paralleled by a huge increase in white consumption of rap music, as 'street culture has always been a good sales pitch for pushing vicarious thrills on the mass market' (Toop 1991, 22). For young non-blacks involved with rap-based subcultures, identity has in some ways become an issue of dress and music, not an exclusively racially based classification. Cultural identification becomes a matter of choice and situation, rather than one of shared historical and lived experiences (Bernstein 1995). Along these lines, some critics conceive of rap as the product of hybridized American culture, a process of give and take between racial groups rather than one of theft (Ross 1989, 68). Yet at the same time, it is crucial not to overlook either the conditions of racism or the history of discrimination within the recording industry, which have historically benefited white imitators and erased or marginalized black musical innovators (Stephens 1992, 66; Rose 1994, 5-6). Documenting the Hip-Hop scene in Los Angeles, Brian Cross argues that while rap is a product of the black community, it is also a response to integration, as Hip-Hop culture draws on elements of gang, pachuco, skate-boarder, Black Muslim, and Rastafarian cultures (1993, 63). David Toop's detailed history of rap also argues for the multicultural character of the Hip-Hop nation (1991,187). The economic success of rap music in the past decade has produced a fair number of white rappers, some of them more accepted than others within the Hip-Hop nation. The mass commercialization of Hip-Hop culture has also encouraged the development of substantial audiences on an international level, in countries such as Japan, Germany, South Africa,

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 61 France, and the United Kingdom, and it has extended the reach of HipHop culture to smaller cities in the United States and, north of the border, to Canada. 'Break North': An Introduction to Canadian Hip-Hop Canadian rapper Maestro Fresh Wes's 1989 release, 'Symphony in Effect/ had platinum sales in Canada and made him the first black person to achieve this level of success in the history of the country's recording industry. This album established rap music as marketable in Canada and paved the way for other artists to receive record deals, when record companies had formerly ignored Canadian rap. Soon after, the Torontobased duo The Dream Warriors broke into the international market with the eclectic style of their Island Records debut, 'and now the legacy begins/ The predecessor to both of these artists, and the first Canadian rapper 'on wax/ was a female Jamaican-Canadian rapper, Michee Mee, who released the twelve-inch single 'Elements of Style' in 1985, on a British-based label, Records (Nazareth 1988b; Perron 1995). Yet rap music and Hip-Hop culture have been a part of black Canadian youth culture dating back to the late seventies, coinciding with rap's development in the United States. The proximity of Toronto and Montreal to the Hip-Hop mecca, New York City, has always resulted in musical influences from the United States in the underground club and party networks. In a way similar to Hip-Hop's development in large American inner cities, Toronto has been the major site for Canadian rap music, in addition to the urban centres of Montreal and Vancouver, and the black communities in Ottawa, Windsor, and Halifax. In Toronto, Hip-Hop culture has flourished in downtown housing projects such as Regent Park, Lawrence Heights, and Flemingdon Park, as well as having a substantial presence in the suburban Caribbean immigrant communities of Rexdale, Scarborough, and Mississauga and within North York's Jane-Finch corridor. Young blacks in Canada built a subculture based on incorporating and adapting black American culture to suit their particular circumstances, when 'the dominant white culture offered them nothing that was familiar or attractive' (Bailey 1988,19). As will be seen in the analysis of lyrical content, a notable difference from American rap is the traditionally stronger influence of reggae music and Caribbean language, due to large Jamaican communities in the major Canadian Hip-Hop centres of Toronto and Montreal. There are also black (Dubmatique) and white (M.R.F - Mouvement Rap Francophone) French-

62 Rebecca J. Haines speaking rappers from Quebec, who find Hip-Hop the ideal medium for expressing their sense of linguistic and cultural marginality within Canadian society (Kelly 1991). The South Asian dance music scene in Canada has produced Bhangra artists such as Indian Lion, Punjabi By Nature, and MC Rootz, whose music and style are heavily influenced by HipHop culture (Srivastava 1994). Unfortunately, the development of Canadian rap music has paralleled the American situation in that the negative stereotypes and association of Hip-Hop with violence also persists in Canada. The Hip-Hop scene, parties, clubs, and concerts have always been heavily monitored and policed. In addition to the difficulty in arranging for American artists to perform in Canada, finding a venue is often a problem. In the late eighties, following a few incidents of violence at Hip-Hop concerts, popular venues such as the Concert Hall and The Party Centre in Toronto temporarily barred all rap shows, as a result of pressures from local police (Dyer 1989). In Montreal, clubs that cater to a majority black clientele and play rap and other black music are heavily monitored and often raided and shut down by local authorities. These types of situations, in which black youth are perceived to be violent and threatening, and therefore find themselves and their events more heavily policed only serve to escalate tensions between the police and the black community. Given these circumstances, and the difficulty for Canadian rappers to gain recognition without substantial support from the media, commercial radio, and record companies, many in the Hip-Hop nation wonder if rap can survive in the chill of the Great White North. Methodology With one very recent, but important exception (Walcott 1997), there have been few scholarly accounts of Hip-Hop in Canada, suggesting that black youth culture has yet to be considered as significant a cultural force as it is in the United States and Britain. In one attempt to characterize Canadian youth subcultures, the author only briefly mentions that black youth in urban centres such as Montreal have adopted the American cultural practices of rapping and break-dancing (Brake 1985). More detailed ethnographic accounts of black Canadian youth are provided by Patrick Soloman's Black Resistance in High School (1992) and Frances Henry's comprehensive account of the Caribbean community in Toronto, which includes a brief section on black youth culture (Henry 1994,17281). Other major work on youth includes the influences of music and

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 63 popular culture, but focuses on the juvenile delinquency aspects of subcultural participation rather than cultural production (O'Bireck 1996; Tanner 1996). Therefore, in order to obtain a preliminary understanding of some of the young people involved with rap music and Hip-Hop culture in Canada, and especially to understand cross-racial participation within Hip-Hop culture and white appropriation of rap music, it was necessary to conduct in-depth interviews in addition to experiencing the phenomenon through regular participation. The interviews were conducted between March 1994 and March 1995. Contacts were obtained through friends and acquaintances of the author, a loose network of people involved in the Hip-Hop and club scene in Montreal. The subjects consisted of a struggling, white solo rapper in an interracial rap group, a solo black rapper, a black rapper from an aspiring black group, a semi-professional duo of biracial rappers, and three fans (two black and one white). The subjects were all male Montrealers between eighteen and twenty-three years of age. To protect anonymity and confidentiality, the respondents are not identified by name in what follows. Their perspectives may apply to counterparts in other Canadian cities, although this should be established with further research. No female rappers or fans agreed to be interviewed; further research might seek to compare male and female views on the issues explored here. As a white researcher I was aware that my interactions with the interviewees would be affected by the racial dynamics between us. Interviewing can be influenced by race, class, and gender positions, and by power disparities between the researcher and 'the researched' (Stanfield 1993). My decision to focus on the interracial aspect of Hip Hop culture, my interviewing of white, black, and multiracial respondents, and my participation in a multiracial milieu, resulted from a desire to prevent the 'othering' of myself. I do not agree with the essentialist notion that you 'have to be the thing in order to study the thing'; both insiders and outsiders can contribute valuable perspectives. But I am well aware of the historic and ongoing imbalances that have led to white social scientists dominating research on race and ethnicity. White researchers must critically interrogate whiteness and resist racism within academia in their work (hooks 1992). But their ability to contribute to understanding, particularly on issues of interracial cultural and social mixing, remains. As a previous participant within this social circle in Montreal, I had credibility with all the interviewees. Prior to this research, I was a casual acquaintance of the people I interviewed, knowing them through mutual friends, and by attending parties, clubs, and events related to Hip-Hop.

64 Rebecca J. Haines Rappers Speak When asked to answer the general question of why young people are attracted to Hip-Hop, some respondents felt that it had to do with the rebelliousness and non-conformist identity found within rap music: 'The difference with rap is that it is one of the few musics that says, 'Okay, if you like me come and listen. If you don't, Fuck off.' And I think that's very attractive to people. There's a lot of kids, especially around 16 or so, they want to be that - FUCK OFF! I don't need you.' What was even more telling was the answer from a white respondent to the question of how he interprets the explicitly anti-white lyrics found in some rap, which echoes the message of the Nation of Islam. Not only did he understand the pro-black sentiments, he seemed to fully sympathize with and support the desire for black separatism: Tee Cube says that all white people are the devil. You can talk to them and stuff - but they're still the devil. Which is their Black Muslim religion, so if you want to say that, that's cool. There's some parts I admire ... When they talk to black people, I respect that - even if it is white people buying their album - they don't have to talk to them, that's not who they're making it for.' However, in terms of the respondents' own personal lives these issues were not always so easily reconciled. For white rappers involved with Hip-Hop, it was evident that the issue of cultural appropriation and wanting to be black was one which they had struggled with considerably. For example, a young rapper admitted that when he was younger, he took pride in the fact that his friends did not consider him 'white/ but later on he began to negotiate his identity in relation to his black friends and his passion for rap music: They used to call me, my black friends in high-school to go, 'Oh, yeah, the white nigger.' And I used to be, 'Oh, yeah, yeah. I'm getting respect.' But now, there's this one girl who says, 'Oh, you're not white - you're black, you're black.' I'm like, I'm white. I like "Wayne's World," I like ... I'm as white as you can get, I like to rap.' For white rappers and fans, a contradiction emerged between proclaiming solidarity with black friends through Hip-Hop and yet simultaneously avoiding the tendency to 'front' or 'trying to be somebody that you are not.' All of the non-black respondents felt that it was their awareness of their precarious position as white insiders to a black subculture that separated them from the wannabes and posers. They saw the wannabes as being trendy rather than deeply committed in their appropriation of a black style and street personality: 'Definitely it's more of a trend now. You always see these Point St. Charles kids with their Sharks

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 65 caps down past their eyes and stuff like that. The real people who are into real Hip-Hop don't even dress like that. If you saw me on the street, you would just think I was like some regular, regular white guy, you know. And then I drop some fuckin' lyrics on you and you're like, "oh shit, this guy raps, I would have never have known."' In attacking the wannabes and those that 'front like they're black,' the non-black rappers were able to stress that they were not guilty of appropriating black culture. Their experiences growing up in multiracial schooling and neighbourhood environments legitimated their attraction to and participation in Hip-Hop culture and separated them from those who were just being fashionable. As white consumers of black fashions, youth who dress in a Hip-Hop street-style can be ostracized by other whites in addition to being rejected by many blacks. Clothing and fashion are central to Hip-Hop culture, as indicated by one interviewee's remark that 'Rap is music, but Hip-Hop is a fashion and a way of life.' Several of the respondents pointed out that in Montreal the manner in which people dress can indicate where their cultural/musical allegiances lie. For example, Jamaican youth from the Montreal neighbourhoods of Lasalle or Little Burgundy who listen to reggae sport the street-oriented 'roots' style (i.e., red, gold, and green colours; mesh shirts; corduroy suits), while Haitian Hip-Hoppers from the South Shore prefer higher-priced designer fashions, such as the Nautica and J.J. Farmer labels. Yet the manner in which Hip-Hop culture has appropriated designer sportswear and athletic apparel further complicates this issue, as black youth have transformed the 'white' fashions of Timberland hiking boots and high-priced Polo and Tommy Hilfiger wear into signifiers of Hip-Hop style. An interesting occurrence in this area has been the popularity of official NHL hockey jerseys among the Hip-Hop crowd in the past few years. American Rappers have taken a style symbolic of Canada (and of a sport that is considered white) and reclaimed it as part of the b-boy wardrobe. When Snoop Doggy Dogg made his debut appearance on the Arsenic Hall Show wearing a Toronto Maple Leafs jersey, it was probably not due to his love of hockey. In fact, it is widely rumoured among the Hip-Hop nation that many rappers have adopted the Toronto jersey because of the similarity between the Maple Leaf and the cannabis leaf, which serves to endorse a pro-marijuana stance. In the video for his single, 'Anything For You/ shot on-location in Jamaica, the white Canadian reggae artist Snow is seen wearing the same jersey, perhaps in an attempt to proclaim his Canadian roots among the all-black cast of his video. The complicated

66 Rebecca J. Haines process by which these clothing styles become markers of cultural identification makes it difficult to determine whether the young white teenager in suburban Toronto sporting the same jersey is expressing identification with a 'white' or 'black' Canadian identity. However, it was somewhat surprising that some of the black respondents were not as quick to condemn the wannabes as the white subjects were. Rather than expressing anger at the white parodying of the black experience, blacks interviewed expressed a neutral attitude toward this group: 'My point is that - wannabes. I laugh at them. They could be black or white. I see a lot of black kids wearing the beads and stuff and the Patrick Ewings, just because that's what they are. They look stupid! And I laugh at them [blacks]. But I don't think its far to call them [whites] wannabes, because they don't know what they want to be yet ... Oh, yeah - those kids with the Raiders caps. Well, it doesn't really bother me. Everyone goes with the flow ... Everybody wants to be in fashion, go along with it... I don't really penalize people and say, "Oh, they want to look black," or this and that. That's garbage!' This accepting attitude can be sharply contrasted to the frustration voiced by many black Hip-Hoppers at white 'culture vultures' who steal black styles. One black respondent stated that he would never have a white rapper in his group or as one of his dancers, and resented the fact that, 'It seems like in Montreal you either have to have a white guy in your group or be French to make it.' In addition to their hostility toward the wannabes, the white rappers openly rejected other white rappers, often more strongly than black rappers did: 'White guys with that style, whether they listen to rap or reggae and they hang out with black people, there's always a beef between two white guys that don't know each other that well. It's like a competition to see who can be the baddest white boy [white male]. I don't really pass judgment. If you're hard, you're hard. If you're not, you're not. I say equal opportunity' (black male). In order to establish their credibility vis-a-vis their black peers white rappers attacked other white rappers who they felt were insincere. This also helped to establish their credibility as being 'down' with HipHop, an exception to the rule that 'white men can't rap.' Along the same lines, white males also exhibited animosity toward white females involved with Hip-Hop culture. One derogatory name used to describe these girls was 'mudhoneys/ their style was perceived as aimed at attracting black males rather than expressing a deep involvement with Hip-Hop culture or a love of rap music. Interestingly, disrespect for the white girl 'who tries to act black' led one white male to date

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 67 exclusively out of race: 'I usually end up going with either black or mixed girls, just because the white girls that have anything in common with me are such little punks. They have a giant ponytail up there, their tight shit, and their Docs ... They go after - all you have to be is black. It makes me sick. It's funny. I just laugh at them.' But there was also an awareness that others might perceive white rappers as using an interracial relationship to bolster their credibility: 'The way I see it, they'll see me go out with a black girl and say, "Oh, he just wants to be down." Hey, I like women. If the girl is purple and she looks good and I like her, I'll go out with her.' The issue of interracial dating came up frequently throughout the interviews and evoked a considerable range of responses. While none of the respondents appeared to be opposed to romantic relationships between blacks and whites, they were also wary of the societal double standards surrounding interracial romance. Describing a situation in which he and his black girlfriend were harassed, a white rapper concluded that '[t]he thing is especially black men, it's fine for them to go out with white girls, but they don't want to see a black girl with a white guy. Especially not a fine one/ Another rapper, who has a black father and a white mother, argued passionately against dictating who someone should become romantically involved with based on the colour of his or her skin. He drew an interesting parallel between the interracial dating debate and the issue of French language retention in Quebec: 'It's the same thing with the language laws here, man. Force people to speak French and you'll preserve French? No way, man! You can tell people they have the option of speaking French and a lot of people will do it, you know? But don't force people to go out - don't force black guys to go out with black girls because they have to - morally. I don't think so, man. Go out with who you want to, man/ One non-black rapper of Native Canadian and non-white European origin stressed his pride in a Metis heritage to counter those who labelled him as 'an average white guy/ His non-white background appeared to be a salient factor in his identification with his biracial rapping partner and other black friends. When asked if he was worried that his white appearance might hinder his rap group's professional aspirations, the non-black responded: 'Well I'm sure that I'll have the usual questions [if the group were to become famous], why this, why that. And "okay you're saying you're Native Indian because you don't want to say you're white?" Just check my background, and I don't have to say stuff about, Oh, "My Mom this," or "My Dad that." My Mom dates a black man, but I don't have to prove that. I don't have to say, "Oh, I grew up around black guys/"

68 Rebecca J. Haines Apart from the competition among whites for status and acceptance by their black peers, there are also tensions between different groups within the black community, as several of the black respondents pointed out. These divisions can be exacerbated by the language divisions that exist in Quebec. One young, anglophone black who was born in Barbados described how this split was manifested in his CEGEP (junior college): 'If you go to schools, you'll see people from Barbados and Jamaica and Trinidad, and they'll be chillin' all together. But there's only some Haitians that mix - most of the Haitians, they separate. I can't really say all Haitians. But, if you go to Vanier, there's a cage, probably two times the size of this room ... On one side there'll be English [speaking] blacks on the other side is all Haitians.' This antagonism sometimes leads to violence at clubs and parties that cater to a Hip-Hop clientele. The same respondent cited tensions between blacks that led to many of the incidents, which in his experience were more of a problem in Montreal than in Toronto: 'Down here, people are like - Jamaicans and Haitians. Most of the fights are between them. And like people, you know, when if you step on somebody's shoe - I'd just say sorry, and that's it. The guy might look at me funny, but I'd just walk away. There's some people who don't think like I do. "Who you lookin' at - you want to start something?" That's how most fights get started. I don't really go out that much that 'cause of that stuff.' While black and white youth coming together through music is in many ways a positive occurrence, it is important to keep in mind that although involvement with rap music and Hip-Hop culture may be strong during adolescence and result in specific attitudes about racial tolerance and cross-cultural understanding, these can be shed as easily as the wannabe style. As young people grow older, music, dance, and fashion become less central to their identity and how they position themselves in the world. At least one interviewee pointed out that musical preferences and styles change with age: 'The white friend who played me Hip-Hop for the first time is now a skinhead. It was so funny, man. It freaked me out. I'm on the metro [subway] and I'm looking at this guy fuckin' skinhead, punk-ass bitch! Then I look and go [makes a face of shock], that fuckin' guy is A! He played me rap for the first time! What are you a skinhead for, you punk!' In other ways, it was obvious that the medium of rap performance and the public status as an entertainer can also lead indirectly to certain forms of anti-racist practice. One rapper who was formerly a gang member describes how he met up with a skinhead with whom he had previously

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 69 had a confrontation:'... when I was in a gang we used to fight skinheads. It was the thing that we'd do - go hunting racist skinheads. And one day we got caught in an ambush with skinheads - two cars full of skinheads, with baseball bats. And we were winning! We had these guys, and a guy hit me with a bat from behind ... [then later on] we're getting ready to do the show, I'm walking through the crowd, and he's right there!... So I get up on stage and I say, "Listen, who here is down with racism?" And everyone is like "Boo!" I go well, "There's this racist skinhead in the crowd. If you can pick him out, throw him out." And everyone is like, "Yeah!"' Despite actions such as these, almost all of the subjects expressed aversion to 'being political' and putting explicit messages in their lyrics. One rapper claimed that he started off rapping about serious issues but, 'It started giving me headaches,' while others simply preferred to rap about 'partyin/ drinkin' and havin' a good time.' There seemed to be the sense from the rappers that once they were established professionally, then there would be a forum to teach or to become a role model. But for now, the primary concern was with trying to get a record deal and break into the professional arenas. The strongest theme running through all of the interviews was the incredible difficulty of pursuing a professional rap career in Canada. The respondents cited the smaller black community and market for black music in Canada compared to the United States, a lack of appropriate Canadian rap producers and recording studios specializing in Hip-Hop, the financial cost of recording and promoting a demo tape, as well as a lack of support from the Canadian recording industry and music business, as strikes against struggling young musicians: T think it's gonna take one group or one or two groups to come out and make it really big, and then the [American] record companies are gonna go - "Damn, let's go up there and sign people."' Despite these obstacles, a handful of artists have managed to become relatively successful - at least successful enough to sign a recording contract. Canadian rappers such as Michee Mee, the Dream Warriors, Maestro Fresh Wes and The Rascalz, and Ghetto Concept have all managed to 'blow up' and gain considerable local recognition. The interviews described above provide some insights into the HipHop milieu and the interactive dynamics of gender and racial difference that shape the rap scene. By shifting to the recorded materials of established rappers it is possible to analyse more fully how black youth in Canada utilize rap to express a positive sense of identity. Rather than

70 Rebecca J. Haines examining the personal autobiographies of these artists, the next section will explore their lyrics in order to gain a better sense of who professional Canadian rappers are and what messages they are trying to convey. The Content of Canadian Rap Music Although there are many different genres and styles of rap and the lyrics deal with a considerably wide range of topics, one theme that runs through all of Hip-Hop culture is the notion of 'representin' - literally representing your neighbourhood, city, crew, clique, or posse on a record. These representations can also be racially and ethnically specific, in the case of, say, Puerto Rican rappers, or they can refer to blacks in relation to the rest of society. By examining rap recordings as lyrical texts and social artifacts we can see whether or not Canadian rap artists have adopted this music to express a sense of identity as their American counterparts have. Twelve Canadian rap albums were selected for detailed study, based on the materials available at the time of this analysis (April 1995). An attempt was made to select artists who are fairly well known and distributed by major record labels in addition to the lesser-known artists distributed by independent labels. The sampling was also intentionally stratified to include a female artist, non-black artists as soloists or as part of a racially mixed group, and artists from the major cities of Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, and Vancouver. Four types of references were of concern: references to race, ethnicity, specific location, and Canada. The twelve artists, and their albums, were as follows: Maestro Fresh Wes, The Black Tie Affair Michee Mee and L.A. Luv, Jamaican Funk-Canadian Style HDV, Higher Deeper Values Various Artists, Cold Front Rap Compilation Split Personality, I don't know The Dream Warriors, and now the legacy begins Snow, 12 Inches of Snow Upstate, You Must Have Heard ... Kish, Order From Chaos Da Freshmen, All About Girls Finesse & Showbiz, 64 Crayons Organized Rhyme, Huh!? Stiffenin' Against the Wall The albums are listed in order of the greatest number of identity refer-

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 71 ences. The first three albums, which contained 58 per cent of the total such references, happen to be by black artists. This suggests that for black rap artists, music is a significantly more important means by which to transmit messages about identity than it is for their non-black counterparts. But no conclusions should be drawn without sampling a greater variety of recorded and non-recorded musical productions. We turn now to a more detailed examination of content, including entire portions of the songs. The examples are presented according to the four categories of identity described above. They are supplemented by other examples and background information about the artists who make up Canada's HipHop nation. Lyrics about Race Although his Japanese-Canadian background was for the most part erased in his record company's marketing of him as a white rapper, Kish (Andrew Kishino) points out that he is of 'The Asian persuasion' at one point on his album. In a humorous verse from 'I Rhyme the World,' Kish pokes fun at Afro-centricity in rap music and illustrates the significance of his Asian heritage: Last stop was the Motherland [black voice-over] 'Yo, Kish you went to Africa?' Nah, Japan!

There are also lyrics that exhibit a plea for racial equality. In the song, 'My Definition of a BoomBastic Jazz Style' the Dream Warriors speak out against stereotypes: Your definition of me is definitely wrong Why must I try to lie and build an alibi When all you ask is just for me to be me?

Elsewhere on their album the rappers specify that, 'Black is the pigmentation of our rhymes.' The white Vancouver duo Finesse & Showbiz use the metaphor of sixty-four crayons to show their respect for all shades and races of people as they rap that 'Colour, like beauty is only skin-deep' and seek to unite people through music, asking for 'All the colours' to get on the dance floor. On a more socially conscious level, Maestro Fresh Wes addresses the issue of cultural awareness and racial equality in the song

72 Rebecca J. Haines 'Nothin' at All': Cross-cultural pride is what I'm tryin' to strengthen and lengthen And while you're swingin' to my melody Just last year the Miss Canada was ebony To the black, the white, yellow and brown Maestro Fresh Wes is down

HDV is one rapper whose racial politics are more militant and definitely not integrationist. He addresses interracial marriage and racial tensions between blacks and insults those blacks who are ashamed of their race and wish to be white (the Oreos who 'drink bleach' and are black on the outside but white on the inside). He berates blacks for marrying out of race and producing what he calls 'zebra-children.' A voice-over in the song 'House Niggas' illustrates HDV's view on this type of person's mentality: First of all my name is Thom-ass I didn't come to this country by plane or by boat I was born here. I am not an immigrant or black I'm coloured. My girlfriend Lori-Anne, she's Caucasian

Also addressing a racial issue within the black community, Michee Mee brings up the issue of shadism and the discrimination against fairerskinned blacks on 'Canada Large': When I first came out many thought I was soft 'cause I'sa light-skinned girl With my hair-back cut off

As well, on the independent release, 'You Must Have Heard,' rapper Dice-B challenges his partners on the use of the word 'Nigga' in their music, an issue that is much-debated within the Hip-Hop community. Although they all agree that the word has a different meaning and effect when used by white people, he cautions that 'Word is power' and urges them not to use the word lightly. Lyrics about Ethnicity White reggae dancehall rapper Snow (Darrin O'Brien) declares 'Heritage Irish/No not Jamaican' on his album, as if to clarify any possible confu-

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 73 sion as to how he mastered the Jamaican reggae-style and language. Interestingly, the choice of the moniker Snow connotes not only his whiteness but also 'Canadian-ness' and refers to drug culture (cocaine) as well. In the song 'Informer' Snow provides further clarification of his background: But inna a de dance they say where you come from People dem say you come from Jamaica But me born and raised Canadian, So me want y'all fe know Pure black people dem is all a man know

In this sense, Snow is providing a justification of his rapping abilities based on the fact that although he is a white Canadian, he grew up surrounded by black people, in addition to the fact that he lived in a low-income housing project. Thus it is not only black youth who proclaim pride in their poor economic backgrounds when class position takes prominence over race and ethnicity. The claim to low-income status as the basis of a shared claim with black youth to marginalization was also used by a Scarboroughbased trio of white dance-rap artists who coined themselves 'Brothers from the Ghetto.' Finesse & Showbiz even go as far as to say, Tt ain't where 'ya from it's where 'ya at.' Sampling a line from the American rapper Rakim, they imply that although they are neither brothers nor from the ghetto, they can relate to the mentality of Hip-Hop culture. But overwhelmingly, Caribbean culture and ethnicity predominate in Canadian Hip-Hop. Numerous artists, including the Dream Warriors, Split Personality, Rumble, Devon, and Rasta Survivor incorporate elements of Caribbean culture, language, and reggae styles into their music. Michee Mee manages to express pride in both aspects of her heritage, suggested by the title of her album alone, 'Jamaican Funk-Canadian Style,' and lyrics such as: I'm not mistaken, I'm Jamaican, By the way that's my musical style ...

and Lookin' for Jamaicans? Toronto's got 'nuff Yeah we eat curry goat and all that stuff...

The first Canadian rapper to receive a record deal, Michee Mee has also

74 Rebecca J. Haines worked with some of the top musicians in the Jamaican dancehall scene. Her album includes duets with Shabba Ranks, Pinchers, and Lady Patra, with production by Michael 'Home T Bennett and Clifton 'Pioneer' Dillon. Similarly, Canadian reggae singer George Banton collaborated with Maestro Fresh Wes on the aforementioned song, 'Nothin' at All.' Having been banned from entering the United States on the basis of his previous criminal convictions and other pending charges, Snow recorded his second album, 'Murder Love/ in Jamaica, where he was able to work with dancehall superstars such as Ninjaman, Junior Reid, and singer Nadine Sutherland. Another interesting example of cultural incorporation is the song 'Ludi' by the Dream Warriors. At the beginning, rapper King Lou dedicates the song to his mother, who told her son she wanted him to make a song, 'something brand new so she could dance to, too.' Rapping over an oldtime ska-beat, he explains how to play the Caribbean game of Ludi and goes on to name off all of the islands to which the song is dedicated. Lou recognizes the importance of these family ties in maintaining his heritage as he raps: I know communication Bridges the generation gap So, Mommy hold tight, seen.

The incorporation of elements of Caribbean heritage and reggae music reflects the strong identification some Canadian rappers have with their ethnic heritage, in addition to locating themselves in the North American context. Lyrics about Location

Just as American rappers locate themselves in connection to the innercity housing projects and ghettos in which they grew up, the Dream Warriors are not afraid to admit that they were '[b]orn and raised in Jane & Finch Corridor' in the song 'Follow Me Not.' Similarly, their labelmates Split Personality make numerous references to being 'Jane & Finch Ruff necks.' Their album also contains a skit between songs, which makes a mockery of people who are afraid of the young black males who hang out on the corners and in the buildings, listening to stereos and rapping. These rappers are reversing the negative stereotype that comes from living in a housing project and instilling pride in their listeners, who are

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 75 from the same neighbourhood or who live in a similar one. In the space of a single verse, Michee Mee lists the black communities and housing projects in the Metropolitan Toronto area in the song 'Canada Large': As you know, good things grow in Ontario Like in Mississauga, Thornhill, Brampton, and Scarborough And bad-men to find them is a cinch Jungle, Regent Park, Martingrove, Flemingdon and Jane & Finch

KGB from the Cold Front Rap Compilation also state that they are '[b]rothers comin' outta Toronto - TO.,' while Ottawa-based Organized Rhyme are '[c]omin' out the Nation's Capital,' Finesse & Showbiz are from 'North of the Border/ and Split Personality brag '[w]e're fom the North Pole but we got so much soul.' Lyrics about Canada

A distinct pride in place and in being Canadian also surfaces in lyrics that defend rapping abilities against American competitors. The title of a 1994 release from Maestro Fresh Wes, 'Naaah, Dis Kid can't Be From Canada?!!' asserts that the Maes's music is in the same league as that of American rappers. On 'We're Coming to America/ Michee Mee and L.A. Luv directly confront their American competition: Some say we try to imitate many Americans But like a true Canadian I know I can, I know I can Be original and mash up de dance

While they may express pride in their country and seek to prove that Canada has distinctive and talented rap artists, Canadian rappers do criticize the injustices they see in Canadian society, in the media, in the educational system, and at the hands of law enforcement agencies. Sweet Ebony from the Cold Front Rap Compilation speaks out against the negative media portrayal of minorities when, on 'With This' he raps, "The image of blacks isn't one we've chosen/ and on his album 'Higher Deeper Values/ HDV refutes the popular stereotype that 'All black people sell drugs, especially Jamaicans.' Maestro Fresh Wes very openly questions the system in his rhymes about the portrayal of blacks by the Canadian media. On 'Nothin' at All/ he states that it was prejudice that resulted in a lack of media attention for black boxer Egerton Marcus

76 Rebecca J. Haines when he brought home a medal from the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, Korea. He feels that 'If Egerton was white he'd be a household name/ like Shawn O'Sullivan was when he returned from the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. Maestro is also very vocal about his refusal to grant interviews to prejudiced reporters who 'make me look illiterate/ He feels the media send the message: That indirectly blacks are underachievers This affects both white and black youth 'cause fabrication defects the truth

KGB speak out somewhat indirectly against police harassment and targeting of the black community in Toronto. Their record, 'Letters of Three,' contains a dedication at the conclusion to Michael Wade Lawson, who was the cousin of the KGB group-member, rapper 10K. The seventeenyear-old was fatally shot in the back of the head by a Peel Regional Police Officer during a 1988 high-speed car chase in Metro's west-end, creating a public outcry from the black community. The acquittal of the officer responsible for the shooting served to heighten tensions between the police and blacks in Toronto, which culminated in 'Yonge Street riots/ shortly after the Los Angeles riots in 1992. Referring to the Lawson shooting, Maestro Fresh Wes raps: 'We're even getting popped for speedin' in Toronto 'cause that's the way of the beast [police]/ Rapping over a sample from Aretha Franklin's 'Respect/ all-girl group Nu Black Nation also draw a parallel between police brutality toward blacks in the United States and Canada and corruption on both sides of the border within the 'RCMP, FBI, CIA, OPP.' Montrealbased Upstate also express their frustration with a police force notorious for poor relations with the black community in a skit in which one rapper states, 'I'm tired of the police always harassing us. It's always like that in this city... Only the black people though/ In a much more militant and explicit manner, HDV names the corruption he sees in a capitalist system where 'it's a network of pimps and politicians got the most in the bank/ Blaming former prime minister Brian Mulroney for 'fucking up the country/ he portrays himself as just another product of the system, out to get paid by any means necessary. HDV draws on his real-life experiences (he spent time in jail for his involvement with drug trafficking and prostitution) in his music and uses 'pimping' as a metaphor for all of the different levels of exploitation in society. In an interview with the Canadian dance music publication

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 77 Streetsound, HDV also made it clear that his messages are for both black and white listeners: 'There's lots of whites living in Canada's ghettos. They're going through the same thing I did. I'm speaking to everyone. HDV ain't about being racist' (Levine 1990,28). The rapper openly mocks the status quo, which finds the outspokenness of young black males threatening. His album begins with a skit of a radio call-in show, in which an irate white parent states: T really don't appreciate your radio station playing that type of 'blackie' music. I am a decent, suburban, tax-paying parent and I don't want my kids listening to that stuff!' While they may be exaggerated on HDV's album, these types of threats are very real. In 1994, in the aftermath of the Just Desserts shooting incident in Toronto, the offices of the local rap label Groove-a-lot Records received death threats from white supremacist groups reacting to the misinformed headline, 'Rapper on the Run/ in local newspapers. In fact, the young man involved in the incident was not a rapper or professionally involved with Hip-Hop, but part of a local reggae DJ set. As the rapper and community activist Motion pointed out in a recent film documentary on Toronto's rap scene, this type of negative media bias toward Hip-Hop is part of the mainstream's 'fascination with abomination' (Munger 1994). Whether they are satirizing the negative stereotypes of black people (HDV), criticizing the injustices and racism they find in Canadian society (Maestro), negotiating the perils of a low-income existence (Split Personality), or expressing pride in a Caribbean and Canadian heritage (Michee Mee, the Dream Warriors), what all black Canadian rappers have in common is that rap provides them with a forum to express their identities as minority youth in Canada. For white youth, in contrast, rap appears to be a medium for simply making music and 'having fun' rather than dealing with serious issues. While they may coopt the musical style and even the tone and slang vernacular, this content-analysis has shown that white artists and rap groups are less likely to address topics of race and ethnicity, the politics of location and Canadian identity. The result is music drained of its political and social contexts. The music becomes 'bleached' and made safe for mainstream white audiences, as white rappers fail to grapple with the issues of identity or provide the relevant political and social commentary of their black counterparts. It is essential to ensure a forum in which black youth can make this music, so that rap remains a valuable educational tool and expressive instrument for youth of all backgrounds.

78 Rebecca J. Haines Policy Implications and Questions Evaluating the ways in which youth in Canada have adopted Americanbased Hip-Hop culture to express their own identity and marginality forces us to rethink our conception of black and white subcultures as segregated and self-preserving entities. Yet as the young people in this study so poignantly articulated, racism plays a major role in shaping the lives and experiences of young black Canadians. We need detailed studies of the link between black Canadians, Canadian music, and the Canadian recording industry. Cultural policies in the world of music both shape and reflect the pattern of identity of black youth and race relations within Canada's youth culture. While the following discussion is rooted in this particular case study, the policy issues raised may well apply to other cases of artistic creativity and cultural contact in Canada involving minority groups and cultures. The Canadian Recording Industry

The Canadian recording industry should consider increasing its support for and promotion of local Canadian rap talent, rather than participating in the 'Americanization' of Canadian culture by importing AfricanAmerican artists for the Canadian market. It is difficult for Canadian rappers to compete with the 'authentic' black experience expressed by rappers south of the border and the Canadian recording industry has done little to make the competition any easier. Canadian rap artists experience the ongoing struggle of Canadian artists generally for local recognition and market share in the presence of the American giant. John Adams, who has been a long-time fixture in the Toronto rap scene, argues that it is not a lack of talent or ability that has prevented Canadian rappers from 'blowing up' as large as their American counterparts have; rather, local record companies have failed to provide the support and resources for Canadian rap artists to truly showcase their talents: 'Most of the time, major labels put out terrible records, make cheap and lousy videos and if there's any promotional budget, it's a tenth of what a rock band might get. Hip-Hop's last on the priority list. So of course, no one's going to buy the records' (Perron 1995, Hll). Similar to Michee Mee's initial deal with New York label First Priority Music (the album was later distributed by WEA in Canada) most rappers have had to circumvent Canadian independent labels and major label

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 79 subsidiary branches and sign directly with American or British companies. In the Canadian music industry artists are increasingly signing directly with U.S. offices (Straw 1993, 64). The situation is particularly difficult for rappers, who lack the local support that country, folk, or alternative music may have gained in Canada. This difficulty has been the case for almost every major Canadian rap debut this far, including Maestro Fresh Wes (LMR/Attic), the Dream Warriors (4th & B'way/ Island), and Snow (East West/Atlantic). Frustration with Canadian labels has resulted in Canadian rappers targeting the U.S. majors rather than attempting to get signed domestically. In 1996, EMI, a major American distributor, signed on to back a local Canadian label, Ivan Berry's Beat Factory Records, which specializes in Canadian 'urban' music - R & B and Hip-Hop. This may give Canadian talent more American exposure, but the general problems remain. As Sharon Kavanaugh, producer of the Muchmusic dance program, 'Electric Circus,' points out: 'There has yet to be a major domestic signing in rap that went on to international success. Everyone that's made it to now - Maestro, Dream Warriors, Main Source, Snow - they were all signed abroad. Made in - and broken from Canada; that's the key to stylistic breakthrough. Then, the dominos will fall in place' (Caudeiron 1994,1). Some Canadian Hip-Hoppers have taken matters into their own hands by recording and releasing their music through their own 'indie' labels. Up-and-coming Hip-Hop indie labels include Figure 4 records, founded by the Vancouver-based group, The Rascalz, and two Toronto-based labels, Steppin' Bigga, managed by John Adams, and Black Employed Records, founded by Howard Nicholson (a.k.a. Born Swift) of Da Grass Roots production team. Speaking about his motivation to approach the music industry through the independent-label channel, Nicholson aptly summarizes the feelings of many Canadian rap performers in stating, 'As young Black people this music is our voice. Corporate Canada cannot tell us how hip hop should be directed' (Higgins 1995,15). An individual responsible for furthering the careers of numerous Canadian artists and promoting dance music in Canada is Daniel Caudeiron (LeBlanc 1992). In his view, 'Canada is largely a consumer-oriented market for music, with safe, Top-40-WASP-oriented radio stations operated by people who believe the releases should conform to what is most likely to succeed - the music which is easily disposable and readily saleable' (Nazareth 1988a, 14). However, there is ample evidence to support the growing popularity of rap and dance music. For example, the sales increase in rap music sold in Canada (which, along with urban dance

80 Rebecca J. Haines music, accounts for 47 per cent of the sales of Canada's leading music retailer) proves that there is widespread public interest and a considerable market for black music such as rap in Canada, especially in the major cities (Nunes 1990b). As well, a 1991 survey of the musical tastes of teenage Canadians presented by Decima Research chairman Allan Gregg revealed that rap was the favourite musical genre among teens, closely followed by dance music. Gregg claimed that young people support rap because it 'is the first music that breaks racial stereotypes in Canada' (Ross 1991, 10). Just as the growing mainstream popularity of rap music in the United States opened the door for the success of white rappers such as The Beastie Boys, Third Bass, and Vanilla Ice, Canadian rappers Snow and Organized Rhyme were among some of the first artists to receive local record deals. The usual objections and accusations of cultural appropriation have been made against these and other non-black rappers. The white, Ottawa-based trio, Organized Rhyme, met with some hostility within the Canadian Hip-Hop community despite their alliance with black label-mates the Dream Warriors. The first local rapper to be signed by a major Canadian label was the Japanese-Canadian Kish, whose debut release sold over 44,000 units. Kish also encountered resentment, which was partially the result of A&M's strategy of marketing him as a 'white' rapper in order to sell him to mainstream audiences. Speaking about the circumstances that eventually led to his release from his contract with A&M, Kish commented that '[t]he really pathetic thing is that they [the record company] weren't really aware of the fact that I was Asian. They saw me as solely white ... People were saying, "He's not black, therefore he is white, therefore we can market him as a white guy, therefore he must do the kind of music that's gonna get him airplay on commercial radio stations'" (Marshall 1994). But the non-black Canadian rapper who has engendered the greatest debate thus far is Snow, for his appropriation of the Jamaican dancehall style. In 1993 Snow's single, 'Informer,' was a huge crossover hit in North American markets. Born Darrin O'Brien in Toronto, to parents of Irish descent, Snow was influenced by his Caribbean friends and the dancehall reggae he heard at basement parties. After testing his skills in the neighbourhood, he recorded a demo with the help of a friend, Jamaican-born DJ Prince, and began shopping for a record deal. It was no coincidence that Snow received his American record deal at a time when many popular Jamaican recording stars were beginning to cross over to North American markets and increasingly signing deals with American labels.

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 81 Also significant is Snow's criminal history, which was used by his record label to market him as more authentic, having participated in crime and served time in jail. But not everyone bought into Snow's story, despite his claims to identification with black culture and his criminal rap-sheet. Toronto Rapper HDV referred to him as a fraud, and dub-poet Clifton Joseph offered a more cutting critique. Paralleling Snow's music to the appropriation of voice in literature, he stated that Snow's success is the result of 'the racist superstructure [that] will facilitate a white person way quicker than the black originators of the music' (Aisenberg-Lewis 1991,27). In light of these circumstances, the Canadian recording industry should seek to do even more to develop Canadian rap and Hip-Hop talent. At the same time, they must be wary of marketing these artists in ways that deny or obfuscate their identity. Cultural Appropriation

The criticisms brought against white rappers such as Snow are rooted in the issue of cultural appropriation. Cultural appropriation takes place when 'a domineering culture goes on to benefit materially from and lay claim to the history and discovery of another culture and its cultural products' (Williams 1992, 17). In Canada, accusations of cultural appropriation have for the most part focused on the use of First Nations' cultures by white writers and artists, who claim Native culture as part of their own Canadian heritage (Lutz 1990,168). Authors W.P. Kinsella and Anne Cameron have borne the brunt of the attack in Canadian literary circles, but criticism has broadened to include writers and artists of colour in every artistic domain. The protests at the 1989 PEN gala in Toronto, the anti-racist policies of the Women's Press, the demonstrations against the 'Into the Heart of Africa' exhibit at the Royal Ontario Museum, the 'Writing Thru Race' conference controversy, and the objections raised to the mounting of the musical production, 'Showboat,' have all caused media stirs and considerable public outcry. Make no mistake, the issue of cultural appropriation has arrived at the forefront of cultural politics in Canada. The battle over cultural appropriation is currently being waged in the absence of genuine political and social equality. Until significant levels of 'respect, sensitivity and equal opportunity' have been achieved the issue will remain one of 'cultural theft' rather than the possibility of dialogic interaction between cultures (Dawes 1993,13). The goal must then be to

82 Rebecca J. Haines ensure ethno-racial minorities the right to represent themselves, in their own voices, rather than superficially parading the existence of 'ethnic difference' as proof of Canadian multicultural diversity. The battle to 'represent' is not unique to the Hip-Hop nation; it can be connected to the history of minority peoples' fierce struggle to maintain control and ownership of their cultural production in the face of mainstream exploitation. As the interviews have revealed, the issue of cultural appropriation also looms large in the daily lives of Canadians struggling to create a meaningful identity for themselves. Substantial numbers of white working-class and middle-class youth seek to participate in - or appropriate - Hip Hop culture, either as true believers or as 'wannabes.' This phenomenon deserves further research. The participation may range from attending largely black parties or clubs to cases of young white women bearing the children of black partners as a symbol of their trans-racial identity (Haines 1997). Anti-racist outcomes from this contact are one possibility. But racial tensions may also arise, particularly over issues such as interracial dating. The degree of 'reverse integration' that this type of subcultural participation can entail is significant (Adams 1991, 10). Rather than being pressured to assimilate into the dominant culture, the minority culture is held up as prestigious by young whites seeking black approval to integrate into a black cultural group. Studying how young people formulate and negotiate their identities through mass-mediated popular culture can offer us important insights into the attitudes of the next generation of Canadians. The concerns of those worried about cultural appropriation are difficult to translate into policy guidelines. Certainly, there is no large constituency for official censorship. But radio and television stations, recording companies, and artistic funding agencies must be alert to issues of authenticity on the one hand, and cultural bridge-building on the other. Culture and Power

Cultures in Canada compete on an uneven playing field. The struggle to establish a dance radio station in Toronto best illustrates how politicians and policy makers have failed to respond to the needs of black musicians and performers in Canada. In the absence of a major commercial radio station with a dance/R&B format, the Toronto community has had to rely on broadcasts from the Buffalo-based station WBLK (Bailey 1988,19). An attempt to establish a twenty-four-hour dance music radio station in

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 83 Toronto in 1990 failed. In August of that year the CRTC reached a split decision in favour of adding a country and western station to the last available frequency on the FM dial. CRTC 90-685 was one of the most controversial rulings ever handed down by the commission. Three of eight members - most notably chairperson Keith Spicer - dissented from the majority opinion. In a copy of his dissenting opinion published in the Toronto Star, Spicer stated that the decision in favour of a 'traditional North American' country music station 'ignores the principle of broadcasting diversity at its most fundamental: the need to serve today's multicultural, multiracial Toronto.' Spicer was not alone in feeling that the failure to support dance music represented a missed opportunity for Canadian policy makers to help incorporate ethnic minorities into the 'evolving mainstream' (Spicer 1990). There was significant media attention and opposition to this decision, as many felt that the CRTC had missed a vital opportunity to showcase Canadian talent and cater to Toronto's growing dance music market. This station could have provided radio more reflective of the growing ethnic diversity of Toronto, a city with large African, Caribbean, and Latin American communities. Official appeals to the decision were launched by the three dance music applicants, among them Robert J. Wood of the Milestone Communications group, who had his third bid to bring dance music radio to Canada rejected. Music industry professionals also united to appeal the decision, and subsequently formed the Committee for Dance Music Radio. This group of Canadian recording artists recorded a single and video, 'Can't Repress The Cause' (a take-off on the initials of the CRTC) to mobilize public support (Nunes 1990a). Another appeal was launched by a coalition of twenty-four community organizations, including the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, the Japanese Canadian Citizens, the Federation of Canadian Sikhs, and the League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith of Canada. In a collective statement, the coalition urged federal cabinet members to use their power under section 14 of the Broadcast Act to force the CRTC to reconsider its ruling, stating that '[t]he licensing of a country FM station over a dance music format in the largest, most cosmopolitan and racially diverse broadcasting market in Canada was considered perverse' (Abraham 1990, A6). Despite these wide-ranging pressures and thousands of letters from the public, the federal cabinet refused to intervene and the initial decision was upheld (Harris 1990). While those who supported the decision argued for the popularity of country music and cited market research that indicated a stronger country audience, many critics felt the decision was tainted with

84 Rebecca J. Haines racism and a constituted 'slap in the face' to Toronto's black community (Quill 1990; Harris 1990). Sadly, similar events took place once again in August of 1997. In decision 97-362, the CRTC awarded the last available station - 99.1 FM to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), in order to convert CBL Toronto, an English-language AM station, to an FM station (CRTC 1997b). This was despite yet another strong proposal mounted by the Milestone Communications group for a 'dance' radio format, to include R&B, reggae, gospel, rap, soca, jazz, soul, hi-life, and Latin musical genres. In addition to a diverse musical format, Milestone pledged that it would devote an annual amount of $350,000 to the development of local talent, ensure a forum for Toronto's undiscovered musical talent, and strive to provide positive images of minority youth (Coburn 1997; Hunter 1997; Milestone Communications 1997). Notably, the decision was contested by two of the five CRTC commissioners, who felt that the Milestone group would have better served the needs of Toronto's multicultural community. In his dissenting opinion, CRTC Commissioner William Callahan stated that licensing the Milestone group 'would provide the opportunity for members of a large and diverse segment of the Toronto multicultural community to reflect their cultures on their own terms and in their own way, and a particular voice for Toronto's black music, artistic and business communities.' Commissioner Gail Scott concurred with Callahan's opinions and argued that the Milestone application 'offered a superior "use" of the frequency particularly as it relates to meeting the needs of the multicultural and aboriginal markets in this unique and diverse community' (CRTC 1997a). The continuing struggle over the dance music radio issue highlights the fact that rap and other black music are still not considered to be valuable additions to Canadian culture. While funding exists for ethnoracial minorities in the artistic fields of literature, theatre, and the visual arts, similar programs are not widely available to young black musicians. In Toronto, the city with the largest Hip-Hop scene, rap music has traditionally remained fairly underground, centring around the three campus radio stations of CKLN-FM (Ryerson Polytechnical University), CHRY-FM (York University), and CIUT-FM (University of Toronto). In Montreal, DJ Mike Mission and Ken-Dawg host the Masters at Work rap show on McGill's campus radio station, CKUT-FM, and similar programs are heard on community radio stations in Fredericton, Kingston, Ottawa, Guelph, Calgary, and Vancouver (Adams 1991). The hosts and DJs on these rap radio programs serve the important function of keeping

Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in Canada 85 their listeners up to date with the latest American releases, playing music not heard on commercial radio. They act as information sources on local parties, performances, events, and community news. They highlight local talent and support Canadian rappers, who have been profoundly neglected by a Canadian recording industry largely indifferent towards all forms of homegrown black music (Nazareth 1988b). The fact that rap is mainly limited to community radio stations and a few commercial stations suggests that it is not considered an important part of 'Canadian' music. This can only be interpreted as an act of exclusion, as 'the persistent refusal of mainstream Canadian airwaves to play rap music places musical blackness outside the national narratives' (Walcott 1997, 32). While Communications Canada did provide funding for the Cold Front Rap Compilation released on Attic records in 1991, this is a rare exception to the otherwise ambivalent attitude toward Canadian rap. It is to be hoped that rap and Hip-Hop will gain support within the Canadian cultural mainstream. Yet if and when such success comes, the dangers of cultural appropriation and cultural sanitization of the music will likewise increase. REFERENCES

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Afrika Bambaata. Planet Rock. Lipservices, Shakin' Baker Music, 1982. Da Freshmen. All About Girls. Duke Street Records, 1994. Dream Warriors, and now the legacy begins. 4th and Broadway, 1990. Eric B. and Rakim. Paid in Full. 4th & Broadway, 1987. Finesse & Showbiz. 64 Crayons. Johnny Jet, 1992. Ghetto Concept. Certified. Groove-a-lot, 1994. Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five. The Message. Sugarhill Records, 1981. HDV. Higher Deeper Values, isba Records, 1993. Ice-T and Body Count. Body Count. Warner, 1991. Kish. Order From Chaos. A&M, 1991. Maestro Fresh Wes. Symphony in Effect. LMR/Attic, 1989. - The Black Tie Affair. Attic, 1991. - Naaah, Dis Kid can't Be From Canada?!! Attic, 1994. Michee Mee. 'Elements of Style.' Justice Records, 1985. Michee Mee and L.A. Luv. Jamaican Funk - Canadian Style. First Priority Music, 1991. N.W.A. Straight Outta Compton. Ruthless, 1988. Organized Rhyme. Huh!? Stiffenin' Against the Wall. BoomBastic Music, 1992. Public Enemy. It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold us Back. Def Jam, 1988. The Rascalz. Cash Crop. Figure 4 Records, 1997. RUN-DMC. Raising Hell. Profile, 1986.

88 Rebecca J. Haines Snow. 22 inches of snow. Atlantic Records, 1993. [Various artists]. Cold Front Rap Compilation. Attic Records, 1991. Snoop Doggy Dogg. Doggystyle. Death Row, 1993. Split Personality. / Don't Know. Boombastic Music, 1994. Sugarhill Gang. Rapper's Delight. Sugarhill Records, 1979. Tone-Loc. Loc-ed After Dark. Delicious Vinyl, 1988. 2-Live Crew. As Nasty as they Wanna Be. Luke Records, 1989. Upstate. You Must Have Heard. Blacklight Music, 1994. Vanilla Ice. To the Extreme. SBK, 1990.

PART II: ETHNIC MATCH AND MINORITY ORIGIN PROFESSIONALS

It is a given that Canadian social institutions must adjust to the increasing diversity of the population. But how, and to what degree? Does pluralism simply require respect for difference, or must concrete steps be taken to modify institutions to make them more culturally sensitive? And given the historic evolution and constitutional precedents in Canada, what are the limits for accommodating groups other than French or English, Catholic or Protestant? Should a 'where numbers warrant' criterion be utilized, and if so, how? Professionals of minority origin - whether employed in education, law enforcement, justice, health care, social services, the media, business, or even politics - play crucial, if under-researched, roles in the development of a successful pluralistic society. What is the nature of that role? Equity for minorities is defined by some as including the proportional representation of minorities in key occupational sectors. Statistical under-representation is seen as perpetuating a legacy of historic racism, or growing out of a combination of demographic and cultural factors which, in the end, result in systemic racism. Whether the racism is overt or covert is of little matter. Under-representation is condemned ipso facto. The immediate beneficiaries of proportional representation will be minority clients, patients, consumers, students, and other service recipients. Minority origin professionals, free of subtle racism, will be able to provide more culturally sensitive services. The career prospects of minority origin professionals will also be enhanced, as subtle or not so subtle barriers to promotion and general success are eliminated. Laudable as these goals may be, many questions remain to be answered, particularly with respect to assumptions about the potential results of matching of ethnic professionals with same-origin service re-

90 Part II cipients. How, for example, should minority professionals reconcile professional obligations with their ethno-cultural attachments or obligations, should the two collide? Do minority professionals in fact see 'matching' as a career asset or liability? Usually the idea of the 'role model' is used to suggest the positive impact on disadvantaged minority youth that would flow from ethnic matching. But minority professionals may also prove invaluable as role models for the majority group. It is possible - although this issue is under-researched - that the placement of minority professionals may yield the greatest anti-racist pay-off when ethnic 'mismatch' occurs, that is, when minority professionals treat majority group members, who include potential racists and holders of racist stereotypes. Finally, is an absolute ethnic match ever possible, given the heterogeneity of gender, class, region, and subculture inherent within most, if not all, ethnic and racial groups? These and other questions remain to be examined in the context of day-to-day practice. The following section explores the front-line experiences of minority origin professionals in a variety of policy domains.

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'You Show Up, You're Blue7: The Challenges Facing Visible Minority Police Officers DIVA BORTOLUSSI 'I've had as many problems in the black community as a lot of white officers have had in the black community. I get treated the same way as any white officer does. If they've got a problem with the police, then its the police they've got a problem with, regardless of what colour you are You show up, you're blue, you're wearing a blue uniform, they have a problem with you' A black police officer in Ottawa. Introduction Since the early 1990s, employment equity plans have been implemented by a host of police services across Canada; these include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Ottawa Carleton Regional Police, and the police organizations in Montreal and Toronto. In addition to redressing past discriminatory hiring practices, which have created inequities in the employment of members of several minority groups, these policies have been based on the assumption that in order to better serve, understand, and be accepted by Canada's ethnically and racially diverse society, police services must be reflective of that society (Lewis 1989). A representative police force might also ameliorate policeminority group relations (Armour 1989; Walker 1985; Wiltshire 1994). The argument is that minority officers interact more effectively with members of their own minority groups, and that the enhanced service delivery they are able to provide will improve the legitimacy of the police among minority groups (Cashmore 1991; Depew 1986; Jacobs and Cohen 1978; Jaywardene 1979/80). In short, 'matching' minority police with minority communities (or offenders) will increase both efficiency and fairness.

92 Diva Bortolussi The strained relationship between the police and several minority groups in Canada, and the need to improve those relations, has already been established (Cryderman and Fleras 1992; Mclntyre 1992). Periodic, publicized cases of police shootings and harassment of black youth in Toronto and Montreal, like the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles, are sensational incidents, but the tensions exist on an ongoing, daily basis. This study will explore how minority police officers cope with the stresses that may arise with citizens of both minority and majority group origin, as well as with majority origin (i.e., white/European) police officers. While some studies might focus on the perceptions of the public, the present study explores the perceptions of police officers themselves on the specific issue of the interaction of minority officers with minority offenders. The first section will review American and Canadian studies of the attitudes and behaviours of minority police officers and related issues. The second section will outline the findings gathered from two series of interviews, the first conducted with ten visible minority police officers in the Ottawa area, and the second with five white officers from Montreal. The minority officers were questioned about their effectiveness in policing minority communities, their behaviour in policing these communities, and how they feel they are perceived by minority communities. Similar themes were examined with the white police officers. Since a very small number of respondents were interviewed, the findings from these 'ministudies' must be considered exploratory in nature. Review of American Studies Because very few Canadian studies have been done, and because the possibility exists that the American experience may prefigure the Canadian by one or two decades, American research is worth reviewing in some detail. Most of the American studies date from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s. During this period of time - spurred by urban race riots of the sixties - questions concerning the roles and effectiveness of black officers in black communities, as well as public attitudes toward the police, arose on the public agenda. Many urban police forces instituted affirmative action programs at that time. Surprisingly, studies from the late 1980s and early 90s are scarce. What is perhaps even more surprising is the lack of a consistent pattern of findings. Some attitudinal studies based on interviews with black officers point clearly to the possible advantages that might follow from increasing the

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numbers of minority police (Alex 1969; Bannon and Wilt 1973; Beard 1977; Dulaney 1984; Hunt and McCadden 1980; Kelly and West 1973; Kelly and Farber 1974; Walker 1983). The major reason cited in these studies was greater understanding of and empathy with black communities and black culture, which would translate into more effective and more equitable policing. An additional factor was the declared motivation of some black officers to improve the living conditions in these communities. As one study summarized the views of its black officers: 'They pointed out that by being part of the black experience, the black officer can work better with black people because he understands the subculture and its problems' (Bannon and Wilt 1973,23). This is a classic exposition of the logic of 'ethnic match.' But other studies failed to produce comparable findings. Lasley (1994) surveyed 2,800 police officers in Los Angeles and concluded that 'diversification of existing officer populations on the basis of ethnicity ... most likely, will not result in increased police sensitivity toward the public' (95). Leinen (1984) interviewed forty-six black New York City policemen. The majority of officers interviewed defined their role in traditional police terms - 'fighting crime, apprehending felons and maintaining order' (197) - and did not perceive themselves to be more effective crime fighters than white police officers. Perhaps cynically, 'most felt that police, regardless of color, were virtually ineffective in terms of protecting the public from criminal victimization' (216). Another study of black and white officers in Pittsburgh concluded that hiring more black police officers was not the answer to the problems between the police and ghetto residents. Both blacks and whites tended to adopt the police norms and the black officers also expressed a loss of identity with the black community, largely as a result of the income and prestige received from their work (Mast 1970, 455). A study done by Cashmore (1991) similarly found that the attitudes of black officers came to resemble those of white police officers, and concluded that 'progress in the police force necessarily whitens' (105). It described the recruitment of blacks into police services as a vehicle of advancement, as a way out for aspiring middle-class blacks. Jacobs and Cohen (1978) concluded that black police officers were less prejudiced than white officers, but were forced to 'accommodate their affinity for their own race with the requirements of law enforcement and their desire for acceptance on the force. Consequently some black officers hold negative attitudes toward some segments of the minority community' (172). Finally, Beard (1977) found that only 10 per cent of the black officers questioned believed that black

94 Diva Bortolussi citizens were cooperative and friendly, but 49 per cent believed white citizens to be cooperative and friendly. Several early studies examine the behavioural differences between black and white police officers. Here too there is no consistent pattern of findings. Reiss (1971) found that black and white officers were more likely to use physical force against members of their own race. But in another study he found that black officers used unjustified force more often than white officers, and especially against black citizens (1972). In a 1966 study of police officers in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., Black (1980) found that l>lack officers show more concern than white officers about black victims, a pattern that may result in a higher likelihood of arrest when black officers handle blacks who victimize other blacks' (140). Matching minority officers with minority populations can in theory lead to two outcomes, depending on the motivations of the officers. Greater compassion for minority victims (of minority offenders ) may result in more aggressive policing. Or greater empathy for minority offenders might lead to a softer approach by minority officers. In contrast, no behavioural differences between black and white police officers were found by Fyfe (1981) and Geller and Karales (1981), who provide evidence that black officers fire weapons at the same rate as white officers, when assignment and off-duty status are held constant. But Bannon and Wilt (1973) and Cooper (1981) found that black policemen were frequently tougher in black neighbourhoods, and with black offenders, than were white police officers. However, they offered different explanations for this behaviour. The former study found that the black officers in question were concerned about making the community safe for friends, family, and neighbours (24). Cooper, on the other hand, suggests the officers wanted to demonstrate that they showed no favouritism towards blacks in order to gain acceptance from white officers (110). Most of the men questioned by Leinen (1984) also responded that they were not harder on black offenders, and 'many of these same men went so far as to state that during most "routine" arrests, policemen of both groups [black and white] tend to respond to the black offender in an emotionally detached, even-handed manner' (230). In terms of other performance differentials, Leinen (1984) found that black officers stopped and talked with members of the black community, made themselves available, were not apprehensive about approaching and interacting with blacks, and were 'more likely to attempt to mediate problems without resorting to provocative behaviour, unnecessary force, or arrest' (267-8). However, he found white and black officers equally ineffective in

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combating crime and reducing victimization, and concluded, 'the basis for improving police effectiveness in the ghetto does not lie exclusively or even predominantly in saturating these areas with black cops' (272). How do black citizens feel about black police officers? Bannon and Wilt found that '[t]he general consensus was that about 95 percent of all blacks have a high regard for black policemen' (1973, 23). But that finding is challenged by other research. Alex's study (1969) found that although middle-class blacks generally had a positive view of black officers, lowerclass blacks regarded these officers with suspicion, hostility, and resentment, seeing them as traitors and the agents of white society. Leinen's study (1984) found persistent negative attitudes toward the police among black citizens, 'despite the steadily growing number of younger, presumably more understanding, sympathetic black police' (189). According to Cooper (1980, 117), although there is animosity toward all police in ghetto communities, black officers evoke stronger hostility, as they are regarded as having forsaken their people. Jackson and Wallach's study in Baltimore (1973) found that black citizens did not necessarily prefer black police officers to white police officers. Using data collected from fourteen American cities, Decker and Smith (1981) found that minority recruitment by police had little if any effect on black perceptions of the police. The conclusions drawn from these studies must be regarded as tentative. The studies reviewed examined the period from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s and their findings may not reflect the current perceptions of minority police officers. It is also important to note that there are no objective studies assessing outcome measures, such as trends in crime rates or solution rates, to gauge the actual impact of greater minority police representation. Nevertheless, it appears from this review of the literature that the effectiveness of black officers in policing blacks or black communities remains questionable. Black officers did not consistently feel that they were more effective than white officers in policing black communities, nor did they possess values and attitudes indicative of greater effectiveness. In addition, black and white police officers revealed few significant perceived and reported performance differences. The studies also report the existence of hostile attitudes on the part of black citizens towards black officers. Finally, the effectiveness of black police officers in policing black communities and reducing negative attitudes towards the police was curbed, at least in part, by the occupational subculture of the police (Mast 1970; Alex 1969; Leinen 1984; Cooper 1980; Jacobs and Cohen 1978;

96 Diva Bortolussi Decker and Smith 1981; Lasley 1994). 'Black police may exist in a state of dual loyalty. As blacks, they relate to and are committed to some extent to the black community. But as law enforcement officers, they are committed to an additional set of values and obligations. Frequently these dual commitments require the selection of one over the other. It may be that the police subculture is ultimately where the loyalty of the black police officer is lodged' (Decker and Smith 1981,389). Review of Canadian Studies Canadian efforts, and studies, have focused on increasing the proportion of First Nations officers with responsibilities over First Nations citizens. Nothing has been published on visible minority officers in Canadian cities. Since the 1970s, attempts have been made to increase Native involvement in the delivery of police services to Canadian Native communities. The 'indigenization' of police services has been pursued in order to improve the quality of police services delivered to these communities and ameliorate Native-police relations (Griffiths 1988; Griffiths and Yerbury 1984). The result has been the creation of non-Native-controlled policing services, such as the Indian Special Constable (ISC) programs attached to both the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), and of Native-controlled, reserve-based police services, such as the Amerindian Police and the Dakota Ojibway Tribal Council (DOTC) Police (Jarvis 1994). Native policing initiatives provide the only available resource for examining the role and effectiveness of minority officers in Canada; no published studies on minority officers other than Natives have been found through searches of several databases. This is perhaps due to the fact that employment equity plans have only very recently been implemented by urban police services, rendering minority officers within these services a new and unstudied phenomenon. Van Dyke and Jamont (1980), having interviewed thirty-eight Indian Special Constables (ISCs) with the RCMP 'F' division in Regina, found that the fifth most frequent reason given for joining the force was 'wanting to help Indians' (11). This desire was also found among a majority of officers of the Dakota Ojibway Tribal Council police (Depew 1986, 64), and among nearly all of the Ontario Indian constables interviewed for the Social Policy Research Associates study (1983a, 83). In general, Native officers felt that they were able to provide better police services than nonNative officers and cited a desire to help their community as a motivation

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for joining the force (Woods 1982,106-8; Social Policy Research Associates 1983a, 97; Van Dyke and Jamont 1980, 78). Of the officers questioned by Van Dyke and Jamont, a majority felt that they received positive support from the communities they policed, and 68 per cent reported having 'no difficulties at all in terms of relationships with those [people] in the communities' (95). In contrast, 50 per cent of the Amerindian police officers interviewed reported a lack of cooperation from the community for their operations (Gordon Woods 1982, 117). Perhaps the most prevalent finding among Dakota Ojibway Tribal Council police officers was their belief that more was expected of them compared to officers of other police services. Native officers felt they had to function as 'part social worker, taxi driver, alcohol worker, ambulance driver, peacekeeper and dog catcher' (Social Policy Research Associates 1983b, Appendix B, 1). Indian offenders were also reported as asking for 'breaks' or 'special deals' from Native police officers, and the officers routinely encountered community hostility and social isolation, similar to the experience of American black officers (Bryant et al. 1978; Finkler 1976; Woods 1982, 110; Social Policy Research Associates 1983b, Appendix D, 13-14, Appendix B, 13; Van Dyke and Jamont 1980, 79, 105). Almost all of the programs reviewed here were rated positively by the Natives that they served and used extensively by community members (Depew 1986; Woods 1982; Social Policy Research Associates 1983b). Respondents typically described Native officers as more tolerant, efficient, and understanding. The findings of these evaluations indicated that Natives joined police services in order to help members of Native communities, and that they felt they were more effective in policing Native communities than nonNative officers. However, at times Native officers were perceived with some hostility and they experienced some problems when policing their home reserves, similar to those experienced by officers in any rural community where suspects may be acquaintances or relatives. Native officers were expected to treat Native suspects more leniently. Finally, it also appears that more positive community perceptions of Native police officers are established in communities policed by Native-controlled, reserve-based police services (Griffiths 1988,158). The studies examined provide little insight into whether Native officers actually behave differently than their white counterparts when policing Native communities. Moreover, the reported findings do not necessarily reflect the experience of other minority officers or Native officers policing in urban settings.

98 Diva Bortolussi Native-controlled, reserve-based police services are not duplicated in Canada for any other minority group. Whether they should or could be so duplicated is beyond the scope of this study. Non-Native minority policing has been largely neglected in the Canadian literature. One unpublished study (Ungerleider 1993) reviewed efforts by police in Ottawa and Vancouver to improve race relations. That study included interviews with a few Asian and black officers, as part of the larger sample. The study found that by and large the white Ottawa officers 'distrust' employment equity. A black officer expressed some anxieties and concerns about the way he is perceived as a result of employment equity policies; two minority respondents reported cases in which members of their own group sought lenient treatment. The issue of the attitudes of minority officers was tangential in those programs and in the study. There are no published Canadian studies of the views of minority police officers on the efficacy of 'ethnic match' as applied to policing, nor any which investigate the opinions of majority (white) officers on the advantages of ethnic matching in policing and whether it provides a possible justification for employment equity programs. The following study seeks to begin to explore these issues within a Canadian context. The Views of Minority Officers The Ottawa Carleton Regional Police department services a population of approximately 900,000. As established by the 1991 census data for the region, English and French are the mother tongues of a very large majority of the residents in the region; Arabic, Chinese, and Italian were the three other languages most frequently recorded. The most frequently reported (single) origins among residents, after British and French, were Italian, Canadian, Chinese, German, and Lebanese. Examining the population by place of birth, the census data established the existence of a substantial immigrant population of over 134,000, drawn largely from the United Kingdom (23,920), other European locations (42,110), the United States (7,055), the Caribbean and Bermuda (8,075), Central and South America (5,845), Africa (8,470), India (5,210), and other Asian locations (33,140). Eliciting the cooperation of the police service in order to carry out this study proved difficult. Only with the aid of a constable from a neighbouring police service, who contacted a staff sergeant at the Ottawa police department, did the Ottawa service agree to cooperate. However, once

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the study was approved, the department offered complete cooperation and assistance. With the help of an acting sergeant, the respondents were randomly selected on a voluntary basis and interviews were conducted with ten visible minority police officers. These officers were called in off the street, when available, therefore participating in the study while on duty; the interviews took place in a boardroom at police headquarters. It cannot be determined whether the responses of the minority officers were affected by the fact that I, the researcher, was white (and a woman). All of the respondents had volunteered to be interviewed, and in every case the interviewees appeared to speak confidently and openly, reassured by the guarantee of anonymity. (It is for this reason that officers are not identified by specific racial category in the analysis.) In addition, it cannot be assumed - as this study will also suggest - that minority officers hold their racial origin as their primary identification. Identity as an officer also looms large. Indeed, antipathy to minority police, as seen in American research, can on occasion come from minority communities themselves. Thus the officers could be as concerned about a possible civilian or own-group bias against the police as about any difference of race (or gender). My ability to establish a degree of empathy with the police and with the difficult nature of their work helped to enhance the rapport with the subjects. Six of the ten officers interviewed were black, with origins ranging from Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Barbados; the four remaining officers were of various ethnic backgrounds - Middle Eastern, East Indian, Chinese, and South Asian. The ten respondents ranged in age from twenty-four to forty-seven years, and they had between one to nineteen years of experience in the force. Together, these respondents comprise 20 per cent of the visible minorities employed by the Ottawa police. One of the respondents had no experience policing members of his minority group and was therefore unable to answer a majority of the interview questions. As a result, the findings from this interview have not been included in the following analysis. It is interesting to note, however, that this respondent, despite being a police officer for several years and possessing the ability to speak his language of origin, was not once called upon to interact, in a professional sense, with members of his minority group. Five of the nine remaining respondents felt they were more effective than white police officers when policing members of their own minority groups. Two of these believed that their knowledge of the language was an important factor in rendering them more effective. As has been found

100 Diva Bortolussi elsewhere (see the chapter by Weinfeld in this volume), a common language offers more than a simple medium of communication; it can also create a relationship of trust and confidence. ... as soon as they know that you speak the same language, it's almost like they respect you more and they'll look at you as an authority more. If there are two of us, a white officer and myself, and the person speaks Arabic and I speak to that person in Arabic, it's like the other officer is no longer there, they're just totally ignored. The full attention is now on me because, well, a lot of it is surprise because there aren't very many of us and they're like "Wow you speak Arabic." The other thing is almost like relief, like "oh good now I can speak and I don't have to worry about how I'm talking or if I say something the wrong way" because a lot of them do have trouble speaking English. I'll be a lot better than a male white only because I can catch the language and because they won't feel as intimidated and they're thinking well "You're one of us." You also catch things. Like, you know, if they started talking and if they're really stressed out they'll start talking back in their own language even though they know English. Sometimes an officer is like "wait a second, hold on," and it may seem more aggressive.

The importance of a common language has been found in other public service domains, such as health care and social service; thus it is not surprising to find it cited by police officers as well. The three other officers who felt that they were more effective than white officers believed that their presence facilitated police-minority group interactions by making the police more approachable. As one black officer noted: The blacks in this community have not, historically, had a good relationship with the police. When they see a black officer it gives them a better feeling to interact with that black officer than interacting with a white officer. Definitely so. Because of the type of relationship that blacks and white officers have had. They've been disadvantaged, they've always felt that they've been picked on, they've been talked down to, treated differently and they're encouraged when they see a black officer.' One other respondent stated, 'It makes it easier for them. It gives them a reason to come up and talk to us. I think if it was two white guys they'd just walk by and say the police are here, but they look twice and come up and talk.' Four of the respondents, however, did not feel that they were more effective than white officers when policing members of their own minority groups. These officers suggested that a police officer's ability and skill, not his or her race, were the issues of importance, and that ethnic

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match did not contribute to more effective policing. One officer said: 'I think that the officer that is going to be effective, whether they're black or white, is somebody who that member of the community feels is there for them, is concerned about their needs. A white officer could be just as concerned as a black officer is about somebody of a different culture. It depends on how much of yourself you're willing to give to that person.' These dissenting views are similar to those reported in some of the American studies. It should be noted here that none of the respondents reported being assigned to work in areas or districts of the city largely populated by members of their own minority groups. Ottawa does not have the pattern of racial segregation or ethnic areas (Little Italy, Chinatown) that is found in other, larger cities. As the respondents observed, members of most minority groups are dispersed and not concentrated within specific areas in Ottawa. Seven of the respondents felt that minority offenders did not give minority officers as hard a time, or a harder time, than they gave white police officers. They did not resent them as traitors to the group. Thus it is not surprising that these officers felt that they treated minority offenders equally in every way, being neither harsher nor more lenient with them. All respondents stressed the need for equality of treatment; all expressed concern about the need to apply the law uniformly to members of all groups. Only two officers suggested the possibility of minority offenders giving them a tougher time: T know there have been incidents where I've arrested a black offender and then the white officer talks to him and he's calm with the white officer but he gives me a problem. One time in particular, the white officer asked "What's the problem with the black police officer that arrested you?" He said, "My bones are blacker than he is." So that's the kind of attitude. I wouldn't say the black community as a whole has that attitude towards the police at all. I'd say he's one of the vocal minority.' This officer made it clear that, despite the negative attitude sometimes expressed toward him, he did not treat minority offenders in a harsher manner. The second officer admitted that while not treating minority offenders differently in a physical sense, he was verbally more aggressive with them, particularly when he spoke to them in their language of origin. This officer also replied that he was stricter with, and felt less tolerance for, offenders of his minority group. 'Sometimes its kind of embarrassing to come in with a person and the person is speaking the same language as you and you bring them into cells and people have the perception that all of a sudden you know them just because you speak

102 Diva Bortolussi the same language. So its kind of embarrassing to bring this person in. Sometimes so you don't want to bring them in but you do because of what they've done.' When the nine respondents were asked if they treated citizens (not solely offenders) of their respective minority groups differently than a white officer would, seven answered no. Of importance here is that these respondents did not report feeling more comfortable approaching and interacting with members of their minority groups than a white officer would, nor did they report initiating casual interactions with these citizens. One respondent claimed, 'Colour is not an issue with me.' A second officer put it simply: 'I treat everybody the same. I can't say that the white officer would treat the black person any differently than I would.' Two officers felt that there would be a difference in the way they would approach a minority citizen. The first said, T'd probably approach them which may be a bit harder for a white officer. Especially if it's an older person. Almost guaranteed if you see an older person they will not speak English or if they do its very broken. So for me, walking up to them is just not a problem. Even if it is just to say hi, which I do.' The second felt that as a black officer it would be easier for him to approach members of the black community than it would be for a white officer, suggesting that the barrier to trust is removed because he is a black officer. This respondent also felt that his knowledge of black culture would lead him, in some situations, to react in a more understanding manner than a white officer would. In other words, the basis for an ethnic or racial match is a combination of both a basic trust and cognitive cultural competence. Three officers who spoke their ethnic language believed that they provided 'better service' to members of their minority groups. One officer stressed language again. Tf I can speak to them, if I can ease them a little bit by speaking to them in the same language they'll feel more comfortable with me then yes, better service is provided.'Another stated, T'm sure if it is a domestic dispute and I needed to calm somebody down, the victims or the people involved would probably feel more comfortable, they would probably relate to me more.' Another officer replied, 'They can call me. I mean that's maybe the one benefit I'll give them is that you can call me if you have any problems and I'll speak to you directly in the language. Otherwise we'll all do the same job.' Two respondents indicated that their presence could result in the perception of better service provision in instances when the presence of minority officers, requested by members of a minority public, is provided. Speaking in reference to members of the black community, one

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stated 'They may view it as more specific to their needs. Basically you have to deal with the needs of the person that you're dealing with. If the complainant requests a black officer then a black officer goes. If they request a female then the female goes.' I was unable to determine whether this type of matching was a simply a custom that evolved in the service, or a firm rule or guideline. It is also unclear as to whether such patterns of formal or informal matching are found in other forces. But one presumes that the efforts to hire minority officers in part anticipates the deployment of these officers in the policing of their communities. Two other officers interpreted 'better service' as pertaining to the carrying out of police duties, with race not being a factor taken into consideration. One officer commented, T'm only a new officer so I wouldn't really know all the nuances that go along with policing. The older officer might provide a little bit better service with his experience than I could.' Three respondents replied with an unqualified 'no' when asked if members of their respective minority groups placed expectations on their job performance that were not placed on white officers. According to these officers, members of their respective minority groups did not expect them to provide special treatment or to perform differently than white officers. Four others, however, felt that members of their respective minority groups did expect more lenient treatment. Stops for traffic violations were cited as the most common situation in which demands for lenient treatment occurred. The remaining two respondents went even further. They felt that members of the black community expected black officers to produce change, to ameliorate general police relations with the black community. 'I think they expect for us to make change for them in the way that they get along with police officers. There are those that aren't pleased with police-black relations. I think that when a black officer comes on they want that black officer to change things, to make things better for them.' Another added, 'They would expect a different kind of treatment. Their expectations of me as a black officer are different than their expectations of a white officer.' The following illustration was provided: Canada Day two young men were fighting, one black and one white. They were both on the ground, they were locked together. What happens? A white officer jumps on the black guy, handcuffs him. He's helped by another white officer. Two officers are on the black guy. The white kid just eases out and stands up, and would have been lost in the crowd because he was moving away. I ended up grabbing him. Nobody says what caused the fight. What was the reason the

104 Diva Bortolussi officers jumped on the black guy? Well guess what. The black youths around were in an uproar. Here we go again, the black guy gets arrested. A fight with two guys, nobody could determine what happened, what caused the fight. A guy is led away in handcuffs, I had to get the white guy and if he's not going to be charged, neither one is going to be charged. I would have separated the two and tried to find out what happened, not jumped all over the one guy.

When the officers were asked how they were treated and perceived by ordinary members of their minority groups (as opposed to criminals or suspects) the responses provided were largely positive. 'People will see your name tag and they get all excited and say it's great to see you/ Speaking in reference to both the older and younger members of the South Asian community, this respondent added 'They think it is great. They love seeing it/ Similarly, one officer reported experiencing positive reactions from, and interactions with, both younger and older members of the black community. Two others felt that they received admiration and support and were well treated by older members of the black community. However, they felt they were sometimes perceived as sellouts by younger members, similar to the charges occasionally directed at black police officers in the United States: 'It's not unusual to have a black youth call you perhaps an oreo cookie or Uncle Tom/ Ironically, an Asian officer reported the reverse trend, being widely accepted and receiving support and positive feedback from younger members of the Asian community, but indicating that some older members of the community were less inclined to be encouraging. Policing, it was explained, was 'not highly looked upon in the old culture/ Older Asians might see a career in law enforcement as less desirable than one in medicine, science, or business. This black/ Asian difference is but one example of why it may be difficult to generalize about or to establish a common pattern among minority officers and their origin communities. Three officers, feeling that they were not wholly accepted and well treated by members of their groups, attributed this to their being police officers generally, not specifically minority police officers or possible 'sellouts/ As one put it: 'There was an incident, a large black population gathered around a very difficult situation. Because I was one of the black officers there, in fact I was the first black officer on the scene, the public singled me out and started yelling racist comments to me. I don't think they're really upset at me. They're more upset at the job, the uniform, and what I in turn represent/ It is necessary to note, however, that none of the

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respondents indicated that negative perceptions of them or negative reactions toward them, by members of their minority groups, were widespread or intense. In fact, the officers portrayed such incidents as deviations from the norm and did not give them serious consideration. No respondent suggested that hostility or even discontent was by any means characteristic of minority police officer relations with members of minority communities. When asked how they were treated and perceived by white citizens, eight officers reported not having had any negative experiences and feeling at ease with and accepted by white citizens. The consensus is reflected by one officer: 'They see the uniform before they see the colour of your skin.' Only one officer held a very different perception, stating that name calling and the use of ethnic and racial slurs was widespread. He concluded that 'The public still has that perception that it is a white, male occupation. It's still out there.' When asked how they were treated and perceived by their white colleagues, four reported having no problems and felt that they were treated fairly and equally. These respondents felt they were perceived by their white colleagues as police officers, not as visible minorities. 'Once you have the uniform, you're just an officer. There's no colour, race or any barriers.' One respondent felt that being a visible minority officer aided his relationship with his colleagues: T know a lot of them have thanked me when we've gone to calls where I've been able to communicate with them [offenders] so things have de-escalated. There was one officer who was fighting with a guy and asked for assistance. I went running, and when I found him I started speaking to him in Arabic and it worked, the guy calmed right down. The other officer came over and said that was excellent. He said "I was so glad you were here, this would have been a big scrap. You were able to calm him right down." So there's respect from the officers.' The experiences of the other officers were quite different. Two officers reported the presence of mixed feelings from their colleagues, ranging from support from some and resentment from others: 'Some will say you're only here in this job because you're a minority. Others will say you deserve to be here.' Two other respondents felt that the attitudes of their white colleagues changed over time: 'At first I'd say overall its sort of like "Oh, this is the employment equity thing" and so I had to go out there and prove myself. It takes a little while to get the trust of others.' The second claimed: 'It's changed over the years. When I first came they questioned my size, my ability to do the job. When I first joined a lot of

106 Diva Bortolussi guys had questions as to if I backed them up on a call would I be able to handle the physical work. Now I think, after four years, I've shown that I can do the work. I've had people say "I'm worried about you in such and such a situation." But now, I'm able to do the job and I think that they know that when I go to back them up I'm able to do it.' Regardless of how white officers might feel about employment equity, or how minority officers might feel about possible collegial prejudice, eight of the minority officers felt that, on balance, being a visible minority was an asset in terms of pursuing a career, specifically in terms of getting promotions. This observation was bittersweet. The most significant and strongly voiced perspective was a negative reaction toward 'fast tracking' or the using of visible minority status as a basis for promotion. All of the officers spoke out strongly against promotions based on anything other than merit: As far as I'm concerned I'd rather have somebody helping me that is better at the job, that got hired because of their qualifications not because they fit any other criteria to fill the position. I would like to think when and if I get promoted it is warranted because you still have to work with the same guys that you got promoted over. I don't agree with it personally. I think its really wrong. I don't want to be involved in that. At all. I was recommended by a teacher to go and speak to students at the schools and they thought it was a great idea because they can get a visible minority to get in and do that and I said no because I want to get in and do that because I'm good at speaking to children and I do it well but they wanted it for another reason. I didn't like that so I didn't do it. It is definitely an asset but it can also be considered a liability. It is an asset because of the fact that it is important that minorities be represented in every facet of the organization; these people will make decisions and they're going to have to be somewhat understanding of the people beneath them, so they have to represent the people beneath them. But it is also a negative because the people that may move up there may not be qualified and in so being will not get the respect of the people beneath them or above them.

One officer provided a mixed assessment. This respondent claimed that visible minority officers were an asset to the police service, as they contributed a diversity of perspectives and abilities. But he also suggested that being a visible minority within the service was a liability, as minority officers were required to work harder than white officers in order to prove themselves capable of doing the job. Thus, the majority of

Visible Minority Police Officers 107 officers preferred the ideal of a strict merit-based promotion. But they recognized that being a minority officer could prove advantageous. Two other findings should be noted. With one exception, all of the respondents felt that they were role models for family members and for other members of their minority groups. However, when asked about their reasons for becoming police officers, none of the respondents cited aiding members of their minority groups or ameliorating police relations with members of their respective minority groups. This differs from findings for First Nation and American black officers. Neither the age of the respondents nor their years of experience as police officers help to explain the answers given by the various respondents. Eight of the officers are relatively young, between twenty-four and twenty-nine years of age, with one to six years of experience in the police force. Nor does the degree of involvement with their ethnic culture or community seem to affect their views on police-related matters. (Identification with ethnic background was measured by questions on mother tongue, years lived in Canada, eating ethnic foods, belonging to ethnic organizations, and participating in ethnic festivals.) In fact, even among the officers identifying strongly with their ethnic backgrounds, considerable variation in responses was found. To review, about half of the minority officers believed that they were more effective than white officers, or that they provided better service than white officers, when policing members of their own minority groups. Often this better service derived from a common language or a bond of trust rather than from any explicit actions. Indeed, eight officers reported not treating offenders of their minority groups differently than other offenders, either in a positive or a negative way. Seven of the officers felt that they did not treat citizens of their respective minority groups differently than white officers did. In addition, eight of the respondents reported not experiencing any problems in their interactions with white citizens, and only a minority reported having any problems in the way they were treated and perceived by their white colleagues. These findings do not support the conventional wisdom that minority police officers inevitably deal more effectively with members of their own minority groups, compared to white officers. Of course the perceptions of this small group of minority officers might be mistaken. Perhaps the presence of visible minority officers holds symbolic value: although these officers may not perform differently or more effectively than white officers, their presence may provide a measure of reassurance and comfort for members of visible minorities. Minority citizens may per-

108 Diva Bortolussi ceive that they receive better treatment, or interact better with minority officers. The conclusions drawn from this study may, however, be understood in a very different manner. It is possible that the respondents were not entirely forthcoming about their true perceptions and opinions on minority police-minority group interactions and relations, seeking to minimize the degree of racism or to deny that they might treat types of citizens differently. This becomes particularly understandable if one considers the problems that plagued the police service in Ottawa at the time (Stern 1995). For example, in the spring of 1995, a prominent member of the black community accused three officers, including Chief Brian Ford's son, of racism. In May of 1995, Constable Shawn Wilson committed suicide while waiting for the Special Investigations Unit report probing his role in the drowning death of a black male, Wayne Johnson. It should also be noted that during the week the interviews were conducted, in early July of 1995, both television and newspaper headlines were concerned with the out-of-court cash settlement being negotiated between the police service and the family members of Vincent Gardner, a black male who was shot by police, and later died, during a botched drug raid in 1990. Given this climate, it is possible that the respondents were wary of being candid or frank, and were therefore guarded in their responses. While the mixed pattern of responses is similar to those found in American studies, more research with larger samples is clearly required. The Views of White Officers There are no published Canadian studies that explore the attitudes of white police officers toward officers of minority origin. Ungerleider (1994) has studied the attitudes of police officers in Vancouver, including their views on issues of ethnicity and race as they affect policing. He found that 86.4 per cent agreed that police should be helped 'to improve their ability to work with different ethnic and cultural groups.' At the same time, in interviews conducted with a sub-group of Vancouver police, he found that they did not think of themselves as racist and only a very small minority thought their fellow officers were racist. The present study differs from Ungerleider's work in that it explores the attitudes of white police officers toward non-white officers. Exploratory interviews were conducted with five white police officers belonging to the Montreal police service. Given that the environments of Ottawa and Montreal differ, and that no minority officers were interviewed

Visible Minority Police Officers 109 in Montreal, this exploratory study should be seen as completely independent of the preceding one. The Montreal officers ranged in age from thirty-one to forty-nine years, with between nine and twenty-five years of experience in the force. Three were anglophone; all were bilingual. With the aid of a constable employed by the service, all respondents were randomly selected on a voluntary basis. No difficulty whatsoever was incurred in eliciting the participation of the respondents. It should be noted, however, that although the responses provided were thoughtful and insightful, none of the five officers expressed any great interest or enthusiasm about the subject area (compared with the minority officers from Ottawa). Like Ottawa, Montreal had in recent years experienced a series of highprofile encounters resulting in the deaths of young black men at the hands of white police officers. This history may have inclined the respondents to minimize problems of racism. When asked directly if minority officers should be assigned to work in areas or districts that are largely populated by members of their own minority groups, the respondents were divided. One officer stated, 'It would make sense. It's more efficient. They would understand the culture, the language. I guess their community would be more satisfied.' Similarly, another felt that the result of minority officers policing members of their own minority groups would be a greater trust in the police and a more positive perception of the police role on the part of minority citizens. Two respondents, however, felt that minority officers, when policing members of their own minority groups, were placed in a compromising situation. One stated, 'If they know some of the people then they're put into a situation, "Well hey, ya know, I'm your buddy," or, "OK, I did this wrong but its OK, I'm your buddy."' If it is a perfect stranger they're not at a disadvantage, they're not put in a situation where, "Hey brother, let me go."' The second officer noted that appeals to similarity could result in compromising the neutral position that should be taken by a police officer, and added, 'Similar observations have been made about white officers policing in small towns, I mean regarding the inadequate results of their work, because of their familiarity with the population.' Also recognizing that appeals to similarity could result in a lack of neutrality, one officer suggested that minority officers should not police members of their own minority groups 'in their first years,' adding, 'They first have to learn about police work and dealing with the population in general. When they are more comfortable in their profession, they can police members of their own minority group.'

110 Diva Bortolussi When asked if minority officers are actually more effective than white officers when policing members of their own minority groups, four officers agreed, feeling that the interactions were more comfortable for members of minority groups. One suggested this was especially so if the minority officer spoke the language of his or her minority group. Only one officer answered differently, replying that because - in his view - minority and white officers do not do their jobs differently, and because they do not treat people differently based on race, one group cannot be considered more effective than the other. Four of the respondents felt that they did not treat minority offenders differently than white offenders. They stressed the necessity to treat all offenders alike. As one respondent stated, 'I'm the same with all offenders. My work needs to be done in a way that shows no favouritism in front of either citizens or senior officers who are witnesses on the scene/ Only one officer admitted to treating minority offenders differently from white offenders, stating, 'I'm much more careful with the minority offender/ Interestingly, none of the respondents felt that minority offenders gave them a hard time or a harder time than they gave minority officers. When asked if minority officers were tougher with minority offenders than white offenders, three answered that this was not the case. In the words of one, 'All the minority officers I have worked with were impartial/ Another added, 'However, they do understand the culture better. I worked with a Latin American as my partner. Until I understood the culture I thought what he was doing was kind of violent, but it was just a different method of communicating. What appears as violent is just the way they do things in certain situations/ Two officers stressed the opposite point of view. One claimed, T've never seen any minority officer being harder with minority offenders than any other offenders, in fact they are more patient with offenders of their own minority groups/ He added that minority officers were tougher with offenders of their own minority group only in instances when these officers were insulted based on race, or in situations when offenders appealed to their sense of guilt based on racial similarity. Two respondents felt that minority officers do not treat citizens of their own minority groups differently than a white officer would; in the words of one, T sincerely believe that just like a white officer, the minority officer does his best to be impartial/ In contrast, two officers felt that minority officers more readily approach and interact with members of their own minority groups because, 'Off the bat they have

Visible Minority Police Officers 111 something in common/ Similarly, another stated, 'I'm Italian, and I have the tendency to be more patient with an Italian citizen. I guess it's the same with a visible minority officer and visible minority citizens.' Interestingly, when asked if they treated minority citizens differently than a minority officer would, all five respondents admitted, although to varying degrees, to 'underpolicing,' or being more cautious and guarded in their interactions with minority citizens than were minority officers. (These responses thus differ in emphasis from those just above in which most claimed to treat all offenders equally.) One respondent stated that caution was exercised in order to avoid any negative situations or reactions, such as an accusation of racism, which were more likely to occur when dealing with citizens belonging to a minority group. Another officer referred to an unwillingness to provoke members of minority groups. Yet another officer answered this question by stating, 'You see them in gangs all the time. You don't know if they're up to something bad. Maybe they are, maybe they aren't. But I try not to intervene. I intervene only if I'm absolutely sure I've got the grounds or the evidence needed to do it. I don't feel as restricted in dealing with a bunch of white people. I'd more readily approach them or intervene.' While the issue of under-policing has been one mainly of conjecture, this finding clearly suggests that the phenomenon may indeed exist in Canada. Both overpolicing and under-policing may lead to negative outcomes for minorities, and merit further research. When asked to describe the attitudes of minority citizens toward white police officers, one officer stated that white officers were often accused of racism, frequently being told, 'You're picking on me because I'm black.' Three respondents felt that there was some tension in the relations between white police officers and members of certain minority groups. According to one, 'I would say that we are not well accepted because of the problems we've had with specific minority groups in the past. They think we're prejudiced. Especially members of the black community.' Only one officer perceived no problems, stating 'If they call us they need us so I don't think it's a question of race, or nationality or ethnic origin.' All of the respondents claimed that there were no problems in the way minority officers were treated and perceived by their colleagues. According to one, 'If they pull their weight as police officers, everything is fine. Other officers won't like them if they aren't good workers. But that's the same for all officers, not just minorities.' Similarly, another stated 'They don't have any more problems than a white officer who joins the police force. They all have to go through a period of adaptation.' A third officer

112 Diva Bortolussi made the following statement: 'As a graded officer, I have to make the list of the personnel that works for me. Some show preferences for working with certain people, others ask me to make a change because they don't like the person they're working with. But I have never been asked to make a change when a minority officer was involved. These officers are generally well accepted by the group.' Four of the five officers felt that being a visible minority within the police service was an asset in terms of being promoted (similar to the views of the Ottawa minority officers.) They felt minority officers were 'fast-tracked/ or promoted more quickly than white officers. Interestingly, only one respondent spoke about this advantage in negative terms: 'Of course it's an asset. That's why affirmative action doesn't work. You have to promote people based on their race or colour, not based on their competence. Sooner or later that's going to have its drawbacks.' The five white officers were divided on the issue of whether minority officers were more effective than white officers when policing areas of concentration of their own minority groups, though four of them felt that minority police in general could facilitate police interactions with the minority group. Some pointed out the possibility of divided loyalties of minority officers compromising their position of neutrality as a result. But they claimed that minority officers were well treated by the other white officers. To summarize, the officers felt that whites do not behave differently with minority offenders than with white offenders, and that minority offenders do not give the white officers a hard time or a harder time than they give minority officers. Nor were minority officers perceived as being tougher on offenders of their own minority groups. But they were perceived as being more effective with their own group, and less likely to 'underpolice.' In addition, while the five respondents felt that minority officers were well accepted by members of their own minority groups, they also felt that as white police officers they were perceived - wrongly in their view - by minority citizens as being racist or prejudiced. Conclusions and Policy Considerations Several policy considerations may be drawn from the findings of the interview data. To begin, it is important to note the generally positive relationship that was reported to exist between minority police officers and members of minority groups; this positive relationshp was also recognized by the white officers. As the presence of minority officers appears to ease and facilitate police interactions with members of minor-

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ity groups, the employment of minority officers within police services serving minority communities - ethnic matching - is unquestionably of value. But at the same time, the reports of the minority officers may raise the question of exactly what outcomes are expected by policy makers as a result of increases in minority police representation on urban forces. Studies of the views of both minority and majority citizens about the role of minority police officers are crucial. And as indicated earlier, there are no objective outcome studies of the performance of a police force as whole, as minority representation is increased. Such outcomes could include crime rates, arrest rates, convictions, and citizen complaints. Further studies are needed in order to determine the various roles, apart from the more effective provision of policing, that minority officers may play in ameliorating police-minority group relations. Intensive fieldwork, such as non-participant or participant observations over a protracted period of time, could yield valuable insights into any strains facing minority police officers, whether in relation to minority or majority offenders or to their white colleagues. The cautious, wary attitude white police officers admitted to adopting when interacting with members of minority groups also requires some attention, as the under-policing of minority groups by white officers may have a significant impact on the delivery of police services. The extent to which under-policing occurs and, more importantly, how this affects public safety and crime rates requires further investigation. The possibilities available for instilling confidence in white officers when interacting with members of minority groups should also be considered. Regional and English/French differences should be explored. Another significant finding to be drawn from the interview data concerns minority officer attitudes toward, and perceptions of, employment equity. According to these officers, supposed beneficiaries of the policy, the hiring of visible minority officers by way of employment equity may generate problems in the relations between minority officers and their white colleagues. The minority officers interviewed opposed promotions which were, or were perceived to be, unmerited. This concern ought to be heeded by those framing or implementing employment equity programs. REFERENCES

Alex, Nicholas. 1969. Black in Blue: A Study of the Negro Policeman. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts. Armour, Monica. 1989. Law Enforcement and Policing. Currents: Readings in Race Relations 2(l):33-6.

114 Diva Bortolussi Bannon, ]., and G. Wilt. 1973. Black Policemen: A Study of Self-images, journal of Police Science and Administration 1:21-9. Beard, E. 1977. The Black Police in Washington, D.C. Journal of Police Science and Administration 5:48-52. Bell, Daniel. 1974. Police and Public Opinion. Journal of Police Science and Administration 7(1):196-205. Black, Donald. 1980. The Manners and Customs of the Police. New York: Academic Press. Boggs, Sarah, and John Galliher. 1975. Evaluating the Police: A Comparison of Back Street and Household Respondents. Social Problems 22:393-406. Bordua, David, and Larry Tift. 1971. Citizen Interviews, Organizational Feedback, and Police-Community Relations Decisions. Law and Society Review 6:155-82. Bryant, V., J. Hawkee, and J. MacHan. 1978. Evaluation of the R.C.M.P. Special Constable Program (Option 3b). Ottawa: Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Cashmore, Ellis. 1991. Black Cops Inc. In E. Cashmore and E. McLaughlin, eds. Out of Order? Policing Black People. New York: Routledge. Cooper, J.C. 1981. The Police and the Ghetto. New York: National University Publications. Cryderman, Brian K., and Augie Fleras. 1992. Police, Race, and Ethnicity. 2nd ed. Toronto: Butterworths. Darnton, John. 1970. Color Line a Key Police Problem. In A. Niederhoffer and A. Blumberg, eds., The Ambivalent Force: Perspectives on the Police. Massachusetts: Ginn. Davis, James. 1990. A Comparison of Attitudes toward the New York City Police. Journal of Police Science and Administration 17(4):233-43. Decker, Scott. 1981. Citizen Attitudes toward the Police: A Review of Past Findings and Suggestions for Future Policy. Journal of Police Science and Administration 9(l):80-7. Decker, Scott, and Russell Smith. 1981. Police Minority Recruitment: A Note on Its Effectiveness in Improving Black Evaluations of the Police. Journal of Criminal Justice 8(6):387-93. Depew, Robert. 1986. Native Policing in Canada: A Review of Current Issues. Ottawa: Solicitor General. Dulaney, W. 1996. Black Police in America. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Finkler, Harold. 1976. North of 60. Inuit and the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Northwest Territories: The Case ofFrobisher Bay. Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs. Fyfe, J. 1981. Who Shoots? A Look at Officer Race and Police Shooting. Journal of Police Science and Administration 9:367-82. Geller, W, and KJ. Karales. 1981. Split-Second Decisions: Shootings of and by Chicago Police. Chicago: Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group. Griffiths, Curt. 1988. Native Indians and the Police: The Canadian Experience. Police Studies 11(4):155-60. Griffiths, Curt, and Colin Yerbury. 1984. Natives and Criminal Justice Policy: The Case of Native Policing. Canadian Journal of Criminology 26:147-60. Harding, Jim. 1991. Policing and Aboriginal Justice. Canadian Journal of Criminology 0ulyOctober):363-83. Hunt, Raymond, and Karen McCadden. 1980. Race-Related Attitudes and Beliefs of Police Personnel. Social Development Issues 4(l):31-48. Hyde, Mary. 1992. Servicing Indian Reserves: The Amerindian Police. Canadian Journal of Criminology (July/October): 369-85. Hylton, John, and Rae Matonovich. 1980. Public Attitudes about Crime and Police in Moose Jaw. Regina: Prairie Justice Research, University of Regina.

Visible Minority Police Officers 115 Jackson, Collete, and Irving Wallach. 1973. Perceptions of the Police in a Black Community. In J. Snibbe and H. Snibbe, eds., The Urban Police in Transition. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas. Jacobs, James, and Jay Cohen. 1978. The Impact of Racial Integration on the Police. Journal of Police Science and Administration 6(2):168-83. Jarvis, Julie. 1994. Inventory of Aboriginal Policing Programs in Canada. Part 1: Aboriginal Police Officer Development and Policing. Ottawa: Solicitor General. Jayewardene, C.H.S. 1979/80. Policing the Indian. Crime and/et Justice 7/8(l):42-7. Kelly, Rita, and Martin Farber. 1974. Identifying Responsive Inner-City Policemen. Journal of Applied Psychology 3:259-63. Kelly, R., and G. West. 1973. The Racial Transition of a Police Force: A Profile of White and Black Policemen in Washington, D.C. In H. Snibbe and J. Snibbe, eds., The Urban Policeman in Transition. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas. Lasley, James. 1994. Ethnicity, Gender, and Police-Community Attitudes. Social Science Quarterly 75(l):85-97. Leinen, Stephen. 1984. Black Police, White Society. New York: New York University Press. Lewis, Clare. 1989. The Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force. Toronto: Solicitor General. Mast, Robert. 1970. Police-Ghetto Relations: Some Findings and a Proposal for Structural Change. RACE ll(4):447-62. Mclntyre, Dan. 1992. Race Relations and Policing. Currents: Readings in Race Relations 7(4):2-5. Native Counselling Services of Alberta. 1980. Policing on Reserves: A Review of Current Programs and Alternatives. Edmonton. Reiss, Albert J. 1971. The Police and the Public. New Haven: Yale University Press. - 1972. Police Brutality. In L. Radzinowicz and M. Wolfgang, eds., The Criminal Arms of the Law 2:293-308. Scaglion, Richard, and R. Condon. 1980. Determinants of Attitudes toward City Police. Criminology 17(4):485-94. Sherman, Lawrence. 1980. Causes of Police Behaviour: The Current State of Quantitative Research. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 17:69-100. Skoog, D., L. Roberts, and E. Boldt. 1980. Native Attitudes toward the Police. Canadian Journal of Criminology 22:354-59. Social Policy Research Associates. 1983a. An Evaluation of the Ontario Indian Constable Program. Ottawa: Indian Affairs and Northern Development. - 1983b. National Evaluation Overview of Indian Policing: Executive Summary and Main Report. Ottawa: Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Stern, Leonard. 1995. Trouble Plagues Dispirited Police Force: Leadership, Morale Problems Dog Chief Who Is Grappling to Unite Officers. Ottawa Citizen, 12 May C3. Sullivan, Peggy. 1989. Minority Officers. Current Issues. In Roger Dunham and Geoffrey Albert, eds., Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary Readings. Illinois: Waveland Press. Ungerleider, C.S. 1993. A Report Review of the Ottawa and Vancouver Police Race Relations Initiatives (Final Report). Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada. - 1994. Police, Race, and Community Conflict in Vancouver. Canadian Ethnic Studies 26:91-104. Van Dyke, E.W., and K.C. Jamont. 1980. Through Indian Eyes: Perspectives of Indian Special Constables on the 3b Program in 'F' Division, Regina. Saskatchewan: Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

116 Diva Bortolussi Walker, Donald. 1983. Black Police Values and the Black Community. Police Studies 5(4):20-8. Walker, Samuel. 1985. Racial Minority and Female Employment in Policing: The Implications of 'Glacial' Change. Crime and Delinquency 31(4):555-72. Wiltshire, Keith. 1994. Community Policing: Interesting Practices. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Police Race Relations. Woods, Gordon. 1982. Amerindian Police Program Evaluation. Ottawa: Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

5

The Challenge of Ethnic Match: Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services MORTON WEINFELD Introduction As Canadian society becomes more ethnically and racially diverse, concern has arisen about how to meet the health care and social service needs of the population in a manner that is both fair and efficient. This concern for cultural sensitivity has included an argument that services to minorities could be improved by means of an 'ethnic match' between those needing and those providing the service (Sue 1992; Weinfeld 1997; see also Table 1.1 in the chapter by Troper and Weinfeld in Part One above). One can imagine this ethnic match taking place over three dimensions. The first is matching the ethnic origin of the professional personnel to that of the client or patient. For example, Fredonian clients or patients would be served by Fredonian professionals. The second would be ethnic match of the organizational auspices of the various agencies and the clients. For example, care could be obtained through ethno-specific institutions, such as Chinese Family Services, the Chinese Hospital, or Maimonides Home for the Aged in Montreal. Such institutions exist in substantial numbers in every major city and cover a range of services from day care to old-age homes. Most are financed in whole or in part by the state. Some services deal exclusively with an ethnic clientele, some cater to a mixed clientele. Some have a totally or primarily ethnically congruent staff; still others have a wide variety of origins represented. Third, ethnic match could be reflected in changes in the actual practice employed by the professional dealing with the ethnic minority patient or client. A basic form of such sensitivity is in the area of language compe-

118 Morton Weinfeld tence. This can be achieved either through multilingual staff, or through the availability of translation services. Of course, cultural sensitivity can in practice extend well beyond language. It may entail knowledge and appreciation of cultural beliefs and traditions that relate to all aspects of health care and social service (Ronnan 1994). In theory, this sensitive practice need not depend on the ethnic origin of the practitioner or that of the institution, but it does require some form of training and sensitization of staff to the needs and cultural differences of specific groups of clients or patients. For any case of service delivery, these three dimensions can vary independently, yielding a total of eight ideal types of configurations between maximal and minimal ethnic match. Other analysts have constructed different typologies. Matsuda and Sorenson have identifed four options: mainstream agencies providing generic services; ethno-specific parallel services; a multicultural approach, in which agencies serve a broad cluster of groups (e.g., Asian); and a bridging approach, in which mainstream agencies hire workers from different ethnocultural groups (1991). However, the ethnic match model described above may allow for greater flexibility in classifying the options actually found in the field. Regardless of the preferred model, cultural sensitivity is often acquired by professionals through specialized courses, both in university programs as well as in-service training. This approach conforms to the usual ethos of professionalism in the health and social services. The major alternative is the hiring of minorities who are subsequently matched with minority patients. From some perspectives the hiring of same-origin professionals can be seen as a short cut that automatically guarantees the provision of culturally sensitive services. There has been very little systematic Canadian evaluation research on the degree to which these various options have produced improved outcomes for patients/clients of minority ethnic or racial origins. More common have been descriptions of the perceived problems, such as a general climate of racism, both personal and institutional, or the inequality of access to services by minorities; accounts of experimental programs; and advocacy writing in support of cultural sensitivity (Doyle and Visano 1987; Henry et al., 1995, ch. 6; James 1996; Masi et al. 1993). Even less investigated, in both Canada and the United States, has been the role of health and social service professionals who are themselves of minority origin. American studies have focused on discrimination and related stressors and available supports facing minority professionals (Brabson et al. 1991). Most of the available Candian research documents

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 119 the ways in which minority professionals experience racial discrimination at the hands of supervisors, colleagues, and even patients or clients. Evidence of such inequality has been found in the experiences of black nurses in Ontario and Quebec and young black social work graduates in Nova Scotia (Bambrough et al. 1992, cited in Henry et al. 1995, ch. 6; Calliste 1996; Head 1986). The focus of the present study is on the first dimension of ethnic match, the role of minority origin professionals in serving patients or clients of their own community. Minority origin professionals have been growing in number, as immigrants and children of immigrants achieve the educational levels needed to pursue careers in health care and social service fields. Universities and employers have accepted the value of diversifying their roster of students, professors, and practitioners to reflect the diversity of client populations. But little is known about how such professionals view their positions as possible role models or as service providers to their own communities. One study alludes to the possibility that within a generalized context of racism in mainstream service delivery organizations, minority professionals can be 'ghettoized' so that 'problems with blacks' would be referred to a black professional (Thomas 1987, cited in Henry et al. 1995,157). Some may experience overt or covert discrimination during their training, from fellow professionals, or from clients/patients. Some may experience role strain between ties to an ethnic culture, heritage, or community and professional orientations and responsibilities. Public policies that promote forms of ethnic match may also assume that any achieved matches are real and meaningful. But of course labels such as 'Chinese' or 'black' may hide considerable internal variation. Within-group variation on the basis of region, subculture, social class, language, religion, gender, and sexual orientation may swamp any commonality based on ethnicity, race, or religion. Moreover, it is not clear whether same-origin professionals are necessarily free from prejudicial stereotypes. This research seeks to examine ethnic match from the particular perspective of minority origin professionals. Methodology A series of in-depth interviews were held with forty-five health care and social service professionals in the Montreal area. The professionals were recruited using a purposive and snowball sampling technique, which included using personal contacts and networks as well as available lists of health care and social service professionals. They were of non-British

120 Morton Weinfeld and non-French ethnic origin, and currently work in health care and social service fields. Interviewers used a semi-structured interview schedule, and the interviews lasted an average of one to one and a half hours. The four interviewers were themselves of non-British and non-French ethnic origin. Where possible, they were matched with respondents of similar groups, but this was not possible in most cases, given the range of origins of respondents. The interviews, almost all of which were conducted in English, were taped and transcribed. The primary intent of the interviews was to elicit respondents' reactions to a variety of issues relating to cultural diversity in their practice, including their own attitudes, histories, and experiences. The responses were coded into very broad categories relating to attitudes on issues of ethnic match. The sample was 56 per cent female. The modal age was between forty and forty-nine; about 53 per cent of the sample were married. (Interestingly, of twenty-four cases where the origin of the respondent's spouse or partner was known, one-third were married to someone of a different ethnic origin.) The sample was very diverse in terms of ethnic and racial origin. The breakdown was as follows: European origin (23 per cent), Caribbean or black Africa (27 per cent), Latin American origin (11 per cent), East Asia (18 per cent), South Asia (16 per cent), the Middle East (7 per cent). About 56 per cent were employed in the health sector, while 44 per cent were employed in social services. Only 8 per cent of the sample were born in North America. About 78 per cent described their main affiliation as with a mainstream organization, 15 per cent specified an ethno-specific one, and 7 per cent were either in private practice or their affiliation was unclear. Arguments Supporting Ethnic Match Three arguments in support of ethnic match in the delivery of health care and social services emerged clearly in the course of the study. These were ethnic language competence, cultural competence, and trust. The Role of Ethnic Language Competence

While 38 per cent of the sample expressed no opinion, 51 per cent stressed the crucial role of a common language in enhancing care, and 11 per cent de-emphasized it in comparison to non-linguistic cultural

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 121 factors. The importance of language problems as a barrier to effective care and treatment is clear. Language is important not only as a means of communication but also as a key to deeper cultural understanding. Language is especially crucial for older patients, who feel both physically and psychologically fragile. A health care professional of East Asian origin commented: 'The moment they know I speak their language they ask whether I could see them. I would see them. But there are also Chinese who speak English or French. So they do not necessarily come just to me. But we have some older Chinese clients who could not communicate with anybody... they ask for me.' A physician of East Asian origin amplified the importance of language, but it is unclear if the use of the term 'communicate' denotes something deeper than simple linguistic comprehension. 'Patients say, OK, this doctor can speak my language, I can communicate better with this doctor, I would come and see him or her, and this is quite common among patients who want to see their own doctor from the same country or to communicate well with him. If he cannot communicate with them, this is not good, so not only within our Chinese culture, but Canadian, Ukrainian, Russian, whatever, you have Italian patients who want to see an Italian doctor. My feeling is they come to me because I can communicate with them ... My practice is composed about 35-50 per cent Chinese, and this has been going up recently in the last few years.' Another physician seems to indicate that language stands alone as a facilitating factor. 'As far as I am concerned, [other factors] are not as important. In an early interview with my patients we don't talk about our cultural background in a sense, meaning if we do talk about it we will limit to the medical sense, for example, if you are taking Chinese herbal medicine, 'is it good enough for me? Can I take it doctor?' Note that while the physician cited above begins by emphasizing the role of communication via a common language, he continues by discussing his knowledge of Chinese herbal medicine as a subject of such communication. This knowledge extends beyond language, and is in fact the sort of cultural competence I will discuss below. A Hispanic origin physician emphasized that cultural congruence is a matter only of language. This respondent clearly sees cultural factors as playing no major role in the provision of quality health care, and as such his can be considered an extreme position: 'The culture of the professional matters for the patients necessarily if it is a question of language, but not necessarily in other questions than language.

122 Morton Weinfeld Then it becomes a question of understanding and affinity ... I would say it [referring to ethnic match] matters only if it is a question of language ... If a person speaks only Russian then you have to speak Russian, otherwise it will not go. But if the patient already speaks French or English, he is not totally locked in his Russian culture ... I think a good French Canadian psychiatrist can do extremely well with an Arabic patient.' The linguistic component of ethnic matching may relate to dialect and accent as well as to language in a pure sense. All kinds of languages, from Chinese to Arabic, have regional dialects. Francophones from rural Quebec, the Middle East, Haiti, or France may all speak French, but they do so with distinct differences of accent and idiom. A social worker of Caribbean origin emphasized the importance of understanding specific accents, recalling the case of an elderly Caribbean client whose accent proved difficult for some workers doing a psychological assessment. The social worker also recounted difficulties a white colleague had with Caribbean patients who referred to people as 'aunt' or 'uncle' when in fact they were not related at all. In contrast to the more commonly held views expressed above, a psychologist and counsellor of Latin American origin completely deemphasized the centrality of language when compared to cultural characteristics. 'With Latin Americans I speak in Spanish, of course, it is my language, but sometimes they are from mixed couples, so you have to speak the three languages [English, French, and Spanish]. With the families where all speak Spanish, we speak in Spanish, with the mixed families I try to speak the common language of the couple ... The language is not the main thing ... The personality factor, whether there is transference or counter-transference, there is the attitude. I think, I treat the client according to the culture. I try to know about the culture before they come.' In general, the ability of minority or immigrant patients and clients to use their mother tongue in cases of distress may well enhance the nature of the service. Many urban hospitals rely on pools of interpreters, some available by telephone, to assist in diagnoses as needed. But language is not only a case of easier communication, where the benefits are obvious. The commonality of language may signal a degree of empathy that facilitates the clinical or therapeutic relationship. This suggests that the symbolic role of language should not be overlooked, and that translation alone may be insufficient in cases involving psychological stress or illnesses that have a strong cultural component.

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 123 Cultural Competence One aspect of cultural sensitivity relates to cultural differences that may transcend those of language alone, as seen above. For example, ethnic match may be required even where the service professional and his or her client share a common language, as in the case of a Haitian client and a French Canadian or North African professional. There is enormous ethnocultural and racial variation within language groups. Culturally sensitive services may also be required beyond the immigrant generation, when a foreign language may no longer be a barrier. The elements of culture that play a role in cultural competence can range from mundane customs and behaviours to issues of fundamental values. The continued existence of North American Jewish and Catholic health care and social service institutions suggests a measure of cultural persistence, or perhaps institutional inertia, in meeting the needs of a culturally defined group for which language has ceased to be a decisive barrier for most members of that group. In fact, the first traces of what we now define as culturally sensitive or ethno-specific services in North America were those dispensed by religious groups. Jewish and Catholic health care and social service institutions pioneered in providing de facto culturally sensitive services. For Jews, the motives were partly the diasporic legacy of separate institutions, partly the issue of anti-Semitism directed at Jewish professionals, and partly the concern that the religious and cultural needs of Jewish patients and clients (from kosher food to sympathetic case workers) would not be met by mainstream institutions. Catholics were concerned with threats to Catholic spirituality and family-related issues, prejudice, and the possible attractions of Protestantism. Professional social work journals - The Journal of Jewish Communal Service and the now defunct Catholic Chanties Review - going back many decades and aimed respectively at Jewish and Catholic social service workers, contain articles debating the meaning of 'Jewish' or 'Catholic' values as these can be applied to social work. Early editions of these journals reveal the precursors of contemporary debates as framed in publications such as the Journal of Multicultural Social Work. Similarly, the concern for culturally specific services for African Americans suggests a role for ethnic match - and the persistence of cultural differences - even for non-immigrants and English speakers. In the United States, for instance, African Americans have been present for ten generations, yet there are both linguistic (black English) and cultural patterns that remain distinct, and fear of racial discrimination persists.

124 Morton Weinfeld The large majority of the respondents, 73 per cent, recognized the cultural value of ethnic match, while 13 per cent expressed no opinion and 13 per cent denied any link. But the actual matching of patient and professional requires a formal or informal mechanism, particularly in a mainstream agency. Several respondents indicated quite clearly that, in their particular setting, they were recognized as having specific competence for members of their own group and were referred by their white colleagues to treat those of their group. One Haitian professional reported that all of his colleagues deliberately referred all Haitian patients to him. A Chinese health care professional on a large hospital staff reported similar experiences. This kind of institutional response is often reflexive and rooted in seemingly logical assumptions, rather than a carefully considered policy. But little is known about how such responses are welcomed by the minority professionals themselves. It is not always clear whether cultural competence requires an identical cultural background between professional and patient (i.e., a Greek professional and a Greek client) or whether it can operate with similarities on some other generic status. On the one hand, as we have noted, the concept 'Greek' can include tremendous variation by many other ascribed traits, as well as by sub-community. There is no guarantee of real similarity. On the other hand, perhaps any immigrant professional might be able to understand the adaptation difficulties of any immigrant; perhaps any visible minority professional might empathize with issues of racism or difference in a way that a white worker of any background might not. One black psychologist argued that any professional ought to be able to be culturally sensitive toward any group. However, she also claimed that she can identify with all people from other cultures because she is an immigrant herself, and 'we're all learning to live here all the time.' A South Asian health care professional is a case in point. She asserts that her cultural background is useful to her. 'Some Indian clients bring in a lot of cultural conflicts with them, the Indian culture part of them and the Western part of them.' She seems to be referring here to the specifics of her South Asian background. But when she offers actual examples of cases in which her ethnic origin and cultural background have been an 'asset/ only one involves a South Asian patient. For example, one case cited was that of an Italian origin teenager who had attempted suicide. This was very problematic for the traditional culture of the family involved; since the professional came from a similar traditional and tightly knit communal background she felt she could relate well to the client. In

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 125 another case involving a Caribbean family, voodoo ritual played a role. The professional felt that growing up in India predisposed her to greater openness to issues of the supernatural or the spiritual. A similar point was made by another South Asian health care professional. She claimed that other non-Western cultures, not only her own Indian culture, placed a value on spirituality that was not found in Western cultures. It might be difficult for some Western professionals to interpret the problems of nonWestern clients and to deliver adequate treatment, but she could understand the spiritual nature of all non-Western cultures. Several professionals indicated that certain generic features of the immigrant or minority experience were sufficient for cultural sensitivity. A professional of Middle Eastern origin, indicated affinity with other minority groups. 'Like the commercial, you don't have to be Jewish ... Many of my patients, for example, they come from the Jewish population, because I can understand their culture without being part of it. I understand, you know, many of the ethnic components. And there are people who do not come to me, because I am not from their culture.' At times the slippery nature of culture could be seen. Some respondents would incorporate both a specific and generic characteristic of culture to illustrate its importance. A Greek origin social worker, for instance, said that she felt a special competence working with Greek clients. 'But I feel that Greeks, they have tremendous need, because I was a Greek member, and by associating with other Greeks, I see the problems that exist with Greek families, when they have problems with the children. Sometimes other workers are unsuccessful, not because the other workers are not good, the opposite, maybe they have more knowledge, but they don't know the culture.' But this worker felt that she could not match this level of competence with, say, black clients. 'I am sure I will not be able to help like a black worker.' However, this same worker subsequently claimed that she - and Greeks - had some affinities with blacks! The basis of the affinity might seem a bit of a stretch, but it exists in the perception of this respondent'... with blacks we have many similarities, some similarities, probably because Greeks used to travel to Africa, to Tripoli, it was Greek once upon a time ... When I was in the Bahamas, I found many similarities, in the way they think, a little bit to take their time ... it's not the Anglo-Saxon formality.' Many respondents reported episodes in which cultural competence proved helpful in specific treatment cases. A social worker of Mediterranean background described being called into an Emergency room to deal with a Mediterranean mother of a child who had got a finger caught

126 Morton Weinfeld in a door. The mother was screaming loudly and the Emergency room workers felt that she was hysterical. The worker recognized a common Mediterranean trait in which the mother (who happened to be a law student) was feeling the child's pain, feeling guilty, and simply being very emotional. The importance of cultural competence applies not only to a matched relation between professional and client. The key is dealing with cultural differences, even those that border on stereotype. A knowledge of a culture refers to culture in the anthropological sense, as everyday life, as family and interpersonal values, rather than to elements of high culture, such as the music, art, or literature, associated with ethnic groups. A counsellor of Mediterranean origin claimed, Tor example, when I work with Italians, I understand their values, I know they are noisy, speak loud, don't listen; so I have to adjust my behaviour to this, to tolerate it in order to be accepted by them.' A similar view was expressed by another social worker of Italian origin, concerning her advantages in dealing with her own group based on her knowledge of Italian 'culture.' 'In my work, for example, Italians, in terms of understanding how they raise their children, the values around everything, around child care, around understanding how children in Italian culture relate to parents, how parents discipline the children ... for an Italian, I mean, using physical discipline is very common, and so in that sense, understanding the values, where they come from, the struggles they have, the stresses of immigration ... we develop like an understanding ... whereas if there was an Englishspeaking worker who had no knowledge of the Italian culture, I think they have to work through all these things in order to start to work on whatever goal they've set. So in that sense I think, it's that understanding.' A social worker of Mediterranean origin revealed a sensitivity to cultural difference, which raises again the issue of stereotypes as opposed to actual differences. The worker felt that there was a need for some form of ethnic match to facilitate cultural understanding. I feel that with people from the Middle East, or with less known cultures, it's necessary to make the match. On the other hand let me tell you it sometimes makes work with people more difficult, because a Portuguese will tell you wasn't it the same in your home, didn't your mother beat you, don't you know in Portugal it is like this. So they start arguing, and bargaining, and so on, with you. I feel that sometimes if we don't know the cultures at all, we can do harm to the clients ... I had an experience with a Portuguese case when I first came here, I had

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 127 a feeling that this case was mishandled by the people working on it. Well, this woman was going through an extremely stressful time, with two young kids, speaking very little of the language, not understanding how to do anything, and she was pushed, and pushed and pushed, and criticized that she was not doing this and not doing that. I was told that these kids would stay in placement for the rest of their lives, they will never return home... well it took me a long time before I could build a trusting relationship with this woman, and finally we built the trusting relationship, we worked well together, and the kids returned home. I closed the case with Youth Protection, and haven't heard anything since.

As has been documented, ethno-cultural knowledge may be crucial in many areas of health care, including understanding the nature of illnesses, making correct diagnoses, illness prevention and health promotion, as well as prescribing effective treatment and obtaining compliance (Berry 1997). One psychiatrist recounted the case of a patient who was referred to him as a possible schizophrenic because he was 'hearing voices/ The psychiatrist felt that the patient was depressed, not schizophrenic, and that the 'hearing of voices' was just a way of articulating the depression. Very often his Chinese patients who were depressed would present a variety of similar symptoms. An Indian physician recounted cases of Indian women in her practice who had suffered sexual abuse, who felt that her familiarity with their cultural system helped in the therapy. Another Indian physician was convinced of the benefits of ethnic matching based on cultural knowledge and trust. When Indian patients meet an Indian doctor there is bonding built between them. Yet if the bonding is too strong, they will not learn how to adjust to the majority society. If they have a problem, I like them to come to me. [But] I don't want them to cling to me. They must be part of the mainstream. Yet the Indian physician can benefit Indian patients in various ways. For example, when an Indian woman is pregnant, we can understand them and explain to them what they should eat, what the restrictions in the hospital are, exercise of tolerance, how to address themselves in the hospital. When they are in the hospital they have to adjust themselves to the rules. For example, in India back home, when the woman is going to deliver, the whole family comes but they cannot do that in Canada ... Also in India women are used to being examined by women doctors. But I have to prepare the women ahead of time that there may be a man examining them.

What is interesting here is the sense in which the cultural knowledge is

128 Morton Weinfeld used to help guide the Indian patients towards integration into the Western model of care, rather than to help transform Western institutions to accommodate non-Western cultural specificities. This pattern was found in virtually all serious cases of possible clashes between traditional and modern/Western models of care. One East Asian dentist presents a somewhat contradictory position. He has minimal ties with the Chinese community and refuses to consider himself a Visible minority.' And he is adamant in emphasizing that 'clients from all backgrounds are all the same' and that 'culture has no relation to the delivery of services.' This would correspond to the universalistic perspective, described below. And yet he clearly recognizes that Chinese patients may prefer to come to him as they can speak Chinese in his clinic. He claims that he is aware of the different diets among his ethnic clients, but maintains that this has minimal impact on the outcome of the treatment. He recognizes that some Chinese immigrant children may be more comfortable coming to him. Moreover, since many Chinese do not brush their teeth after eating, he will pursue this with them and if they admit to not doing so he will try to get them to change their behaviour. These responses clashed with his initial position in which he downplayed the salience of his Chinese identity. Such contradictions were found in other respondents, who might espouse strong convictions about the value of ethnic match, yet elsewhere would argue that their professionalism meant that they could treat clients of any origin with equal competence. Very often a worker's ethnic/religious background becomes a direct factor in the treatment itself. Thus the congruence culturally and in origin may work in positive and negative ways in terms of the outcome for the client. The case of a Jewish social worker of Eastern European origin is illustrative. First, she cites a negative correlate of ethnic match reported by others as well: 'I know a lot of Jewish clients who don't want a psychiatrist or a social worker who is Jewish. They take it for granted that they will not go into therapy with anyone who is Jewish! The reason, heard from several professionals, was that 'if she is going to tell me something about herself, not only me is going to know it, but everybody in the community would know it/ In such cases minority clients refuse to consult professionals of their own group because of a possible sense of shame, or the fear that the news will spread to others in the community. Indeed, even where there may be a desire to obtain the services of a professional of one's own group, the fear of a lack of confidentiality - or perhaps merely of being seen in the waiting room - may be sufficient to

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 129 prevent the contact from being made. But once the actual treatment begins, it seems that the impact of ethnic match can be both positive and negative. The Jewish social worker recounts the very different experiences she had as a social worker intervening in the case of two Jewish teenagers. 'One client was seventeen, an adolescent. It was clear from the very first interview that the fact I'm Jewish is very important for her, that I can understand what she was missing from the Jewish home, what she got, what she could complete, what a dimension it takes to her life, how come that her parents did or didn't do some things Jewish ... so that was very important for her that I could follow all this.' The contrast with another case could not be more stark, or more negative. T have another adolescent who is sixteen, who told me that she is going to kill me, that she hates me, that she hates Jews ... She is Jewish, right? ... that she doesn't want to have a Jewish social worker, that she hopes I will die. She is very angry with the Jewish community because she is projecting her anger to the parents to the whole Jewish community.' The social worker in question was also apparently wrestling with elements of her own Jewish background, trying to integrate it with her professional practice. Some of the other respondents intimated a similar process of resolving their own identity conflicts through their work, but perhaps none as clearly as in this case. In an earlier placement, which had a non-Jewish clientele, the social worker's colleagues would on occasion indicate to clients that she was Jewish. She did not feel comfortable taking Jewish holidays there, and eventually she sought work in a milieu where she did not have to hide her heritage. Earlier in her career, she did not wear a visible Star of David around her neck when she went to work, but she did so now so that her many Jewish clients would recognize that she too is Jewish. This social worker's appreciation of Jewish culture was often heard in terms of making distinctions among sub-groups of Jews, which illustrates that membership in a larger group does not guarantee either complete acceptance from the various sub-groups or the absence of stereotypes. In her words: 'The Sephardic Jews, the Moroccans, the Algerians, Tunisians, they have the habit to speak loud, very loud, even when there is a quiet day they prefer screaming in such a way you can get scared. While the Ashkenazim are more restrained, more calm, more controlled in body language ...' A health care professional from the Middle East reaffirms the importance of taking culture into account. But insider knowledge and cultural

130 Morton Weinfeld sensitivity, while valuable, will not usually lead to endorsement of any cultural norms that violate those of Canadian society. In all the serious cases recounted by the various respondents, Western, liberal-democratic models and norms proved triumphant, as in general they must. The following report about marital tension and wife abuse in a Muslim family (compare with the chapter by Azmi in this volume) is an extreme example. 'I interviewed a Muslim family a couple of years ago and the mother was upset and crying and so on, and the father was travelling and had a mistress ... and he said during the interview, "I don't know why she is complaining, I have beaten her only once or twice during the past few years." In other words, he is a good man because he only beats his wife once or twice which is below the average. So, should I congratulate him? Or should I say any abuse is not acceptable and I don't care if this is culturally the norm or not! The physician in question rejected all forms of cultural relativism. T reject the position that it's your culture and if you're happy with it, that's fine.' Yet in rejecting cultural relativism there is room for a nuanced approach as well, as the same professional reveals: T remember having a Portuguese father in this office, and the Portuguese father was in tears, telling me, "If I can't hit my son, then take him." So we have to understand the variations and the differences. Of course there is a limit. I am not going to let him abuse his son because he is Portuguese. But I will have to make allowance for the fact that he's a Portuguese father, and also the studies that tell us that very often parents who are punitive to their children and beat the child are also the same parents that take the child and kiss the child.' Given the serious nature of child abuse, one wonders what is meant by the term 'make allowance.' The comments reviewed in this section illustrate the way in which familiarity with ethnic cultures can help professionals in their work. But even as minority professionals demonstrate cultural sensitivity they may not be immune from the various stereotypes - about their own group and others - that abound. Some of these stereotypes are neither inaccurate nor pernicious, but may well tap real cultural differences. Others may be as misguided or counter-productive as stereotypes that flourish in the general population. In addition, even familiarity and empathy with group traditions need not lead to an endorsement of behaviour that violates liberal-democratic Canadian norms. There is no simple way to establish a boundary between the recognition of the salience of cultural differences and the proliferation of often pejorative stereotypes.

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 131 Trust

Several of the respondents used a generic concept of 'trust' to describe the bond between ethnically matched clients and professionals. The notion of trust can be understood as distinct from linguistic or cultural competence, though it may often be related. Trust may reflect a deep, unstated primordial bond that binds members of the same 'tribe/ It suggests at root the notion that an individual is safe with a professional of his or her own group. While only 13 per cent of the professionals interviewed spoke explicitly about trust, many others implied it. One Chinese physician, when seeking to explain why Chinese patients prefer Chinese professionals, claimed ' It is an entree. You don't have to gain their trust.' Another Chinese health-care professional confirmed that view: 'They [Chinese patients] think that there is somebody who can understand them. They don't care whether I am a doctor or a psychologist, as long as I have the face and speak their language and listen to them.' While the notion of trust generally refers to feelings of confidence held by clients or patients, a reciprocal kind of primordial sentiment shared by professionals may also operate. Certain professionals may have feelings of special compassion or empathy for their group members. This concern would translate into extra effort on their behalf, or perhaps a sense of duty to go the extra distance, because of an empathetic understanding of their case. Such special treatment would not be construed as deliberate, explicit favouritism, but as tacit goodwill. One Italian origin social service worker commented: With Italians, with many ethnic backgrounds, Europeans, the Greeks, the Italians, there is that similarity. And, I mean, it may be a bias, but there is a need of overprotectiveness for me to ... protect them in a sense that they are here in a foreign country with all that are ... in their eyes very foreign, very threatening, so for me its almost I feel my responsibility to make it as smooth as possible, or to cushion the shock as much as possible. That's what I mean when I said protectiveness. With the Anglophones I don't think I, I mean ... with the dominant culture like the English or French, I would be more 'OK, this is the work we've gotta do' and there is not that... I assume they know more. When they're signing a paper, for example, they know what they're signing, at least they can read what they're signing, many of them can. With the Italian I feel like I should explain a little more, I have to put more energy.

132 Morton Weinfeld What begins with trust, with a certain bond, may of course also lead directly to improvements in the actual quality of treatment. Much depends on whether the trust that the patient places in the same-origin professional is reciprocated and welcomed by the professional. But clearly, to the extent that trust is important in the doctor-patient relation, the patient will benefit. This bonding and sense of obligation becomes even clearer in the example of the Caribbean physician described below: I certainly believe that I can provide this patient [a black] more because firstly, I'm a physician where when I'm with a patient I try to find some sort of a liaison so that I can make the relationship with that client more meaningful. If I can comment on their accent or know what island they are from, this right away sets off a different kind of relationship. Of course if I do have a young black male as a patient, an elderly white physician may have difficulty relating to him, certainly could not relate to his clothes, his music, his ideas, or his thoughts. We had one fellow who was shot several times, who was probably about eighteen years old, at a club downtown ... One of the things I keyed on for him was he had a very helpful girlfriend and he did not enjoy the food at the hospital. His girlfriend was cooking some West Indian food and bringing it in. I wanted to make sure this would be as easy as possible for her so I extended her visiting hours. Another thing that I was involved in doing was to say here is an eighteen-yearold who is suddenly shot and wakes up the next morning with these big bandages on his chest and abdomen, and once these are taken off he's got these big wounds and it will affect this young man's body image. I moved to have his girlfriend allowed to stay over in a private room. I think the fact that they're sleeping together as they were before helps him in his adjustment. The other thing is that the other [white] doctors, my peers, they didn't want to speak to him. They were afraid of him. They felt there might be some criminal element in this, that perhaps there might be some possibility of something happening to them at some point in the future ... And all conversation was directed to the wounds and when he would be going home. Whereas for me, I wanted to know more, I wanted to know what happened and what are you being involved in and what are you going to do to make sure this never happens again. So I want to make that extra step because I'm seeing this young black who can end up doing anything with his life, you know. Clearly what we have here is a visceral bond that transcends benefits of ethno-specific cultural knowledge. It is possible that this physician might also have allowed a wounded white teenager to have his girlfriend sleep

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 133 with him in the hospital. But the stereotypical baggage surrounding young black teens may have been decisive. Another black physician confirmed the importance of trust, with no direct linkage to matters of cultural knowledge or competence. 'I think in general they're just happy to see me. Because it puts them more at ease. As far as being more culturally sensitive, when culture gets in the way of medicine for instance such as Jehovah's Witnesses, that's a religious issue. I don't know that my care is any more culturally sensitive; I think that they're just more at ease because I'm black. I think its the same thing with women wanting women doctors.' Another black physician, of African origin, also emphasized the element of trust as a factor in dealing with his black patients. When asked why he thought his patients preferred going to a black doctor, he differentiated between the responses of older and younger blacks: Most of the older blacks especially feel that I should automatically show more rapport, empathy with them. Most of them feel that they are talking to a son or younger brother, so there is that immediate chemistry, that relationship. Most of the older blacks who have been around for a long time have had the feeling of being shafted by white professionals, so they have these experiences of not being given full respect as patients, being treated shabbily, in an off-handed manner, that sort of thing. Then you have the younger blacks who see you as a type of role model, see you who was like them at that age, and who managed to get through the system in the process to attaining something.

Another black physician echoed the theme of trust in similar fashion: By coincidence, the patients feel more at ease to discuss their personal problems apart from their medical problem. At least with me, maybe because I am black, they feel at ease to discuss a sexual problem, nothing to do with the cold they came to see me for. They feel more at ease. And they have the concept that a black doctor will understand them more ... And when they see me, I believe they feel I'm doing the full treatment. What they deserve and what they need. It may be naive, but they don't believe I would shaft them, to use that expression. And in terms of the significance of the patient-doctor relationship it is a big help. When they come, they believe me that what I do for them is the best that I can do. The trust is there.

As this quotation suggests, the foundation of trust that may accompany

134 Morton Weinfeld ethnic match would translate into a higher quality of care, based on greater disclosure on the part of a patient, and thus a better diagnosis. In the words of a Chinese nurse: 'If you have the same culture with the clients, they feel more comfortable to talk with you; especially if they trust you, they will tell you more. Chinese believe that you don't hang your laundry in the front yard. If they trust you that means that you respect them, they will tell you more/ Trust and reciprocal empathy cannot be taught - they are ascriptive in origin. The existence of a primordial bond that can link a professional with a patient sets a clear limit on the ability to provide culturally sensitive services through education alone. What lies behind the perceived importance of trust in the view of those professionals who cited it is unclear. The importance of being a role model for other minorities while fulfilling the professional role did not emerge in the interviews, with the exception of some black respondents. Perhaps this was due to the disadvantage of the younger generation of blacks, which may have seemed particularly acute. T am very proud to be black and have no problem being a role model for other black people if that's what they need ... I have no problem fulfilling that role. Certainly I see myself as a black physician rather than just a physician and I think that's how society at large sees me also.' Problems with Ethnic Match Some of the problems with ethnic match have already been alluded to in the preceding discussion. They are not meant to negate putative advantages as perceived by minority origin professionals, but to illustrate the complexities involved in trying to generalize the effects of ethnic match. Even where the benefits of ethnic match were cited, problematic aspects could be detected. Universalist orientations - any professional can and should treat any patient or client with comparable effectiveness - were expressed by a number of professionals; sometimes these positions co-existed with ethnic match preferences from the same respondent. Forty-two per cent of the sample were coded as inclined toward a universalist position. In its purist form a universalist position would indicate that actual treatments need not vary according to the specific culture of the patient or client: any true professional ought to be able to treat any problem, regardless of the origin of the client or patient. As one respondent put it: 'Professional is professional, though ethnic ones might be a bit more

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 135 sensitive to culture/ In other cases, it was claimed that culture may not be significant for certain types of problems, or that the elements of the human condition are similar for all people, regardless of their cultural origin. One Indian origin physician simply asserted that she 'does not want to be seen as an ethnic professional/ As suggested earlier, some professionals seem to combine universal approaches to care with cultural sensitivity. For some professionals sensitivity to cultural variation is probably subsumed within a general notion of universalistic competence. Any apparent contradictions dissolve. The position of an obstetric nurse of Caribbean origin is indicative. On the one hand, she was adamant that she treated all clients the same. 'They come for care, and I give it to them/ Yet the same professional was well aware of cultural differences that could affect the nature of care. She observed that the mainly white nursing staff at her hospital insisted on feeding the newborns every four hours, despite the fact that many of the non-white mothers preferred to feed the babies on demand. The white staff was insensitive to the wishes of these non-white mothers. Some professionals may think of universal or equal treatment as taking account of specificity to the same degree, rather than treating all patients in the same way. A black physician, for instance, initially expressed what appeared to be a universalistic approach to care, completely insensitive to ethno-cultural difference:'... a good doctor has many patients, and a bad doctor loses his patients. And I think if somebody is sick he [the patient] will not see race, he wants help, and we are here to provide help efficiently. I think that is the bottom line. As a professional, I think that is the bottom line/ Yet this physician's universalist approach was tempered: 'Any West Indian when he goes to see another West Indian, he will feel more at ease, more relaxed, and maybe some of the things we say, some of the expressions might make the patient more relaxed, be more open, be more receptive, be more talkative ... But it's there. And it's true of any group/ At times a universal position is rooted in the conviction that societal forces override cultural factors in shaping personal behaviour. Commenting on sources of domestic violence, a social worker of Middle Eastern origin rejected any cultural explanation and thus any culturally sensitive approach to treatment. The ethnic origin of her violent families is mixed: 'I've had Arabs, I've had Italians, I've had Greeks, English, Hungarians. I don't believe that it is cultural. I believe it is a societal thing. It is taught, learned from family, the media, the way males socialize differently from women. They all have something in common in that they

136 Morton Weinfeld all have the need to be in control. And that need to be in control comes from lack of self-confidence, and without exception they are all nonconfident ... and it is a question of power and control.' The same respondent actually claimed that ethnic match could in certain cases prevent effective intervention. '... But the problem comes when they will try to use this [ethnic match] as an advantage, they will try to ... well you know, the Middle Eastern mentality is a lot of negotiation, and ... that is what it is. I mean there is bargaining, they will try as hard as they can. Also, the Arab community is not very large. In this kind of job where there is [sic] a lot of threats to my life... they threatened me to put a bomb in my car.' A similar point was made by an Italian origin social service worker: 'I had an Italian man in his thirties, he and his wife were heavily addicted to cocaine, his children were placed as a result of the neglect, because they were so addicted to the drugs they couldn't provide for the children. They were placed with the grandmother, the grandmother is Italian. Now the father did not want me to be the social worker because I understood too much about the culture. He did not want me to communicate to the grandmother. He did not want the grandmother to communicate to me about what was going on. So they wanted an English social worker because there would be this barrier, this language barrier. So, that happens very frequently.' One of the most explicit and striking affirmations of a universal approach to health care came from a nurse specializing in obstetrics, who was of Caribbean origin. While she asserted that there were some 'cultural' differences among various groups of patients - Asian mothers, in her view, had a higher pain threshold than other mothers - she still felt that her treatment of patients (mothers and infants) would be strictly universal: 'The outcome is the same. They all come in and go out the same way - having a baby.' She indicated, as other respondents did, that some of the tensions associated with ethnic or traditional health practices emanate from the grandparents, since what their daughters learn in prenatal classes differs from the traditional approaches of many cultures. A black gynaecologist also offered a strong personal conviction about the universalistic nature of his professional work. In his view, cultural sensitivity was only salient for particular professions or specialties and his was not one of them. T think if a psychiatrist is speaking to a black patient, culturally blacks behave in a certain way, and if the psychiatrist is North American and is not aware of certain kinds of behavioural patterns of African women or West Indian women, he may have difficulty making a diagnosis ... However, I think in terms of gynaecologist, dermatologist,

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 137 or medical specialist, or general surgeon, I don't see the advantage of a black doctor treating a black patient as opposed to a white doctor. I don't see any difference ... in the Caribbean we have many white doctors.' Needless to say, this view directly challenges a fundamental position of the entire field of cross-cultural medicine. Yet this physician admitted that his patients may not agree with him. At times he would receive inquiries such as 'Is Dr. X black? I need a black gynaecologist.' While knowledge of a patient's or client's culture can be useful in treatment by a professional, many issues of a medical or counselling nature pose stark value choices: a traditional ethno-cultural heritage may clash with the values typical of Western, liberal-democratic societies. (See the chapters by Azmi and Levine in this volume.) The former are often typified by a strong collectivist orientation, with the individual's needs subservient to those of the family or larger group. Many proponents of cultural sensitivity imply that it may broaden overly narrow approaches to care, injecting a much-needed pluralism into the health care and social service system. Conflicts between professional norms and patterns associated with a particular ethnic tradition or community, are evident in many of the interviews already quoted, and most respondents revealed a preference for Western, individualistic approaches. The ethnic origin professional may experience conflicting pressures. Being of the same ethnic origin or familiar with a specific client's culture, or even empathizing with the client's culture, cannot by themselves dictate the nature of the professional's response. These tensions are not new. Catholic physicians and nurses have had to wrestle with their consciences concerning the performing of abortions; Jewish social workers have experienced conflicts when counselling Jewish families in crisis over a prospective inter-faith marriage. The professional's in-depth knowledge of the contending traditions does not lead to clear or painless solutions. Many different types of strains may complicate the practice of minority origin professionals. Sometimes, in dealing repeatedly with social problems affecting their particular community, they may gradually acquire a stereotypic view of their own group. A black physician recalls a bittersweet day: T had a whole series in a row of young girls who had children and I was trying to discuss other issues with them, on how they should be studying. Then I had a black lady come in who thought she was pregnant, now she was the fifth one in my day and I didn't roll my eyes but in my head I said, 'not another one.' It turned out that she wanted to be pregnant! She was an engineer and her husband was an engineer and

138 Morton Weinfeld she was trying to get pregnant. And I was so happy to hear that she wanted to be pregnant rather than all these unwanted pregnancies that I had been dealing with/ Sometimes problems may lie in the attitudes of professional colleagues, rather than in the work of the minority origin professional. A Chinese health care professional claimed that he himself found no conflict between his Chinese 'side' and his Western training. 'But my colleagues believe I have some Chinese magic touch ... I am not over-excited. I am very quiet. I don't make irresponsible comments. They think that my beautiful character is because I am Chinese. But I don't think so. I believe that all humankind is similar. I don't believe in stereotyping. I don't believe that all Chinese are clever or rich or whatever. We have stupid and poor Chinese/ Another Chinese health care professional believed that it was her duty to challenge the various myths and superstitions of her Chinese patients. For example, Chinese tradition divides food into 'hot' and 'cold' foods. Many post-partum women do not eat vegetables and fruit because they are 'cold,' and as a result they may suffer from constipation. Often it is the older mother-in-law who visits the young couple who reinforces these traditional customs. Chinese women are also told not to shower or wash their hair, as these activities are supposedly conducive to getting wind in the body. Many Chinese women believe that they do not have enough milk for the baby and give up breastfeeding too early. Moreover, Chinese tradition endorses spanking children, which is frowned upon in Canada. The respondent saw her task as trying to change the traditional and unscientific views of her Chinese origin patients. This case is perhaps the clearest example of the systematic de-valuing of an ethno-cultural tradition by a professional trained in the Western scientific tradition. One of the findings that emerged a number of times is the complexity of so-called singular ethnic categories. Even if the principle of ethnic match is endorsed, the implementation of the principle may be rendered difficult by variation within ethnic categories. Most often these categories - such as Chinese, Jewish, or black - include highly significant variation based on region, social class, subculture or religion, and even pigmentation. This within-group variation is reflected in the multiplicity of organizations often found within ethnic groups and in competing sub-identifications. A professional of Egyptian/Coptic background interviewed made it very clear that he was not to be confused with either Arabs or Moslems. It

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 139 is difficult to make assumptions about the degree of cultural congruity, given the multidimensional nature of many ethnic backgrounds and reference points. The case of this Egyptian origin medical professional is illustrative. The person labels himself a Franco-Egyptian, saying his mother is Phoenician and his father Coptic: 'I am very proud to be Egyptian. My cultural reference is not Arabic, my cultural reference is French. I am very proud to be Canadian and also very proud to be a Quebecer. Now being Egyptian must carry something of an Arab identity which my father refused but I embrace happily and proudly ... My affinity is with words, which has nothing to do with Islam and which is part of being Egyptian/ Similarly, a respondent of Greek origin born and raised in an Armenian environment emphasized the differences that this background gave her, which distinguished her from other Greeks, while a physician of Indian background admitted that people within that community were highly prejudiced, that the lighter skinned hold essentially racist views of those who are darker skinned. A Greek origin social worker pointed out how cultures differed according to the specific region of Greece. 'Each place in Greece has a different culture, slightly ... One group has a different way of thinking or handling things, the Peloponnesians the same, etc. The Athenians are completely different../ Of course the same regional pattern would be replicated in any homeland. A Chinese nurse recounted the case of another Chinese nurse in an Emergency room who spoke only Toi-shan (a dialect in south China) trying to communicate with a patient who spoke only Cantonese. A third Chinese nurse on the floor spoke only Ha-ka (another dialect). The nurse went on, 'Many overseas Chinese speak English to each other because they don't speak the same dialect/ Another Chinese nurse likewise pointed to within-group differences. 'Chinese are basically very class conscious, the rich and the poor. As far as professionals are concerned, they sometimes put up an authoritative figure. So if you want to help them, sometimes you have to come down to their level/ Similar situations can arise in any professional-client relation within so-called majority groups. Differences of region, social class, religion, sexual orientation, and gender may well impede communication. The case of ethnicity or race is merely an additional variable. Micro-managing a policy of ethnic match would be practically impossible and it would render the delivery of care a nightmare. The question becomes one of seeking to draw a line at a reasonable level of differentiation.

140 Morton Weinfeld Conclusion This exploratory study has examined one facet of the lives of minority origin professionals, specifically, the advantages and disadvantages of matching them with patients of their own origin. Discrimination faced by minority professionals was not a focus of this study, nor did it emerge as a frequently cited concern by the respondents. Perhaps a certain selfselection may have been operative. Our respondents were, after all, established and reasonably successful professionals. From the perspective of the minority origin professionals interviewed, there are strong arguments to be made in support of ethnic match. Many of the professionals assume that their ability to communicate with same origin patients/clients, and thus to diagnose, counsel, and monitor them is enhanced by shared language, cultural competence, and trust. But these common endorsements of ethnic match are often nuanced, even mitigated by ambivalence. Many minority professionals may experience role strain and are attracted to the ideal of a universalistic professionalism that can transcend differences of culture. Some professionals actively seek out a minority clientele, others seek to de-emphasize that aspect of their work. The larger policy question is whether, or in what way, societies should seek to match health care and social service professionals with patients and clients of similar ethnic origins. Additional studies of minority origin health care and social service professionals and of their majority group colleagues (see the study by Bortolussi in this volume) are clearly required. We also need detailed studies of the perceptions of minority clients and patients, as well as objective, controlled-outcome studies of their experiences, to complement this study of minority origin professionals. Replicating such studies for minority professionals in other domains, such as law or education, would also be useful. Language, cultural competence, and trust may or may not operate in comparable fashion in these different fields. There is little evidence that empathy from minority professionals would automatically translate into different treatment or intervention decisions where professional norms and ethno-specific traditions clashed. At the same time, this study suggests that some of the benefits of ethnic match cannot be replicated simply by training professionals to be culturally sensitive in general. Bonds of trust and primordial ties may operate between lawyer and client or professor and student. Such ascriptive bonds cannot be taught, and they test the limits of social cohesion. Thus

Minority Origin Professionals in Health and Social Services 141 an egalitarian ethos of professionalism clearly clashes with the impact of ascribed traits that may benefit minority recipients of service or care. It is not clear how far a liberal-democratic society can go to engender conditions of ethnic match, even with the best of intentions. REFERENCES

Bambrough, ]., W. Bowden, and F. Wien. 1992. Preliminary Results from the Survey of Graduates of the Maritime School of Social Work. Halifax: Maritime School of Social Work, Dalhousie University. Berry, John. 1997. Cultural and Ethnic Factors in Health. In Andrew Baum, Stanton Newman, John Weinman, Robert West, and Chris McManus, eds., Cambridge Handbook of Psychology, Health and Medicine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 98-102. Brabson, Howard V., Charles M. Jones, and Srinka Jaywatne. 1991. Perceptions of Emotional Support, Stress, and Strain among African American Human Service Workers. Journal of Multicultural Social Work 1(3):77-101. Calliste, Agnes. 1996. Antiracism Organizing and Resistance in Nursing: African Canadian Women. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 33(3):361-90. Doyle, Robert, and Livy A. Visano. 1987. A Time for Action: Access to Health and Social Services for Members of Diverse Cultural and Racial Groups in Metropolitan Toronto. Report Nos. 1 and 2. Toronto: Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, February and August. Head, Wilson. 1986. Black Women's Work: Racism in the Health System. Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission. Henry, Frances, Carol Tator, Winston Mattis, and Tim Rees, eds. 1995. The Colour of Democracy: Racism in Canadian Society. Toronto: Harcourt Brace. James, Carl, ed. 1996. Perspectives on Racism and the Human Services Sector. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Masi, Ralph, Lynette Mensah, and Keith McLeod, eds. 1993. Health and Cultures: Exploring the Relationships. 2 vols. Oakville: Mosaic Press. Matsuda, Atsuko, and John Sorenson. 1991. Ethnic Identity and Social Service Delivery: Some Models Examined in Relation to Immigrants and Refugees from Ethiopia. Canadian Social Work Review 8(2):255-68. Sue, Stanley. 1992. Ethnicity and Mental Health: Research and Policy Issues. Journal of Social Issues 48(2):187-205. Ronnan, John P. 1994. Teaching Cultural Competence: Practical Ideas for Social Work Educators. Journal of Multicultural Social Work 3(l):29-42. Thomas, B. 1987. Multiculturalism at Work. Toronto: YWCA. Weinfeld, Morton. 1997. Dilemmas of Ethnic Match. In W.W. Isajiw, ed., Multiculturalism in North America and Europe: Comparative Perspectives on Interethnic Relations and Social Incorporation. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 245-60.

6

The Role of Minority Educators: Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools PHILIPPE COUTON

Introduction A young French teacher in Montreal notified her principal that some of her students, recently immigrated from Haiti, are reluctant to participate in certain class activities, consistently fail to ask for help when experiencing difficulties, and generally seem ill-at-ease with classroom interaction. In another school, teachers have reported that although most Haitian students are treated as native French speakers, their knowledge of the language is often patchy and many of them prefer to use Creole with their friends and relatives. In some Montreal-area schools Haitian parents have voiced their concern about what they consider permissiveness and laxness on the part of their children's teachers. These situations are instances of what some might call cultural discontinuity (Nelson-Le Gall 1994) between mainstream education and minority students. The students' perceptions of proper classroom behaviour, language use, and authority clash with the values and practices dominant in Quebec's educational system, placing these in a precarious academic situation. In recent years arguments of this type concerning a variety of minority groups have gained currency. Many African-American educators, for example, have come to the conclusion that the desegregation efforts of the past three decades in the United States have weakened African-American culture (Dempsey and Noblit 1993), plunged minority students into a generally hostile environment, and done little to improve their academic achievement (Leake 1993). The seemingly persistent American racial divide has only reinforced the development of this line of thought (Hacker 1992; Shipler 1997). Ethnic mismatch in the origins of teachers, the curriculum, and the

Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 143 school environment is perceived as the primary cause of the negative educational experience of those students. The only way to prevent these harmful outcomes, according to some educators, is to increase the degree of 'cultural congruence' or ethnic match in the educational process, rather than systematically eradicating it, as integrationists are wont to do (Au and Kawakami 1994; King 1993, 119). This means that minority students should be taught primarily by teachers from their own group, that the curriculum should include elements of their culture of origin, and that the pedagogy should be adapted to their culture-specific needs. Use of the term 'cultural congruence' serves to emphasize the cultural component of the policy issue, even as the actors themselves are teachers of Haitian origin. In some cases entire schools have been created along such lines (see Leake 1992). Schools designed to meet culture-specific needs - such as Jewish or Catholic schools - have long existed outside the framework of public schools. Beyond providing minority students with educational services more attuned to their needs, culturally congruent education is seen by many as a way to challenge Eurocentric cultural practices. Minority groups fare poorly educationally and socially, it is suggested, because their respective cultures are excluded from the mainstream, or worse, demeaned and undermined by dominant institutions. Accordingly, minorities must fight against the disenfranchising effect of this monolithic cultural domination (Giroux 1991). In line with this argument schools should not only ensure educational equity, but 'empower' minority students, provide role models to help enhance students' sense of self-worth (King 1993), and contribute to the positive evaluation of minority cultures in general. Despite the rhetoric surrounding the issue, there are no definitive studies linking cultural congruence with effectiveness in improving students' cognitive achievements, as distinct from their self-esteem. There is suggestive work linking cognitive/cultural style, including social interactive behaviours and non-verbal communication patterns, with academic achievement (Shade 1989, 21^4). Bilingual education has been shown to have a small positive effect on achievement and learning (Casanova 1991). Other studies suggest that verbal ability stands to gain more from an ethnically homogeneous school environment than do mathematical skills (Entwistle and Alexander 1994). Further policy evolution should be based on sound evaluation studies. The intrusion of identity politics into educational debates has been the source of some concern. Many people are worried about the divisiveness of this agenda (e.g., Ravitch 1990), and it stirs memories of the 'separate

144 Philippe Couton but equal' era. Until recently these concerns were confined to the polemicprone world of U.S. educational theory and policy making (e.g., Glazer 1997), but ethno-specific education has now made inroads into Canada. Apart from the parochial schools, we have more Indian schools controlled by First Nations communities. Demonstration schools in Toronto (Daenzer 1995) and religio-ethnic schools in Quebec (Simard 1993) may be forerunners of a growing trend. Given the increasingly diverse Canadian context, it is important to understand how ethnic groups themselves, and especially the educators among them, perceive culturally congruent education and their role in that process. This brief overview highlights the dual and controversial function attributed to culturally congruent education: it is a strategy designed to improve the academic prospects of certain at-risk groups of students, but also a tool to resist assimilation and marginalization and increase the political and cultural assertiveness of ethnic communities. The exploratory study that follows investigates the significance of these issues for Haitian teachers working in Montreal schools. The vast majority of Haitians who immigrate to Canada come to Montreal. Recent estimates of the number of Haitians, foreign born and those born in Canada, are around 50,000 (Clement 1991; Hamilton 1991). The 1991 census identifies over 38,000 Montrealers who claim 'Haitian' as either a single or part of a multiple ethnic origin. Others may be included among the more than 64,000 Montrealers classified as 'black.' Earlier waves of Haitian immigrants were educated and middle class. But over the past two decades Haitian immigrants have included many refugees with lower levels of education. There is significant evidence that it is their children who are experiencing trouble in Quebec schools (Manegre and Blouin 1990; MEQ 1996; Tremblay 1991). Recent Canadian work on the education of black children includes edited volumes of Brathwaite and James (1996) and D'Oyley (1994), with the latter containing a short descriptive article on the Haitian projects described in this study. These volumes make it clear that culturally congruent education is still largely at an advocacy stage in Canada, except for a few initiatives in Montreal and Toronto. Dei has explored the cultural underpinning of these efforts in Ontario, both in the Brathwaite and James volume and in other writings (Dei 1995a, 1995b). There are no studies of samples of black teachers. Most of the literature available on Montreal projects consists of unpublished school board documents, some of which are discussed below. Studies documenting the role or attitude of minority teachers in Canada and elsewhere have been conducted (e.g., Callender 1995; Klassen and Can 1997), but there have been no published

Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 145 detailed studies of visible minority teachers in Quebec. The present study therefore makes an original contribution to the understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of ethnic matching of students and teachers, as seen from the perspective of the latter. Interviews were conducted with thirteen Haitian origin teachers in 1995. Most Haitian educators came to Quebec in the 1960s and 1970s, fleeing Haiti's oppressive regime. The thirteen interviewees were not selected to represent the full range of Haitian teachers. Contacts were established with the Montreal Haitian Teachers Association, which has around 170 members. The sample includes individuals who became known in the early stages of fieldwork and people suggested by the HTA, who would be well versed in issues and innovations relating to improving the education of Haitian students. This is clearly not a random sample of Haitian teachers, but their comments suggest issues that can be explored in further research. As a white researcher I had to confront the possibility that the racial difference between me and my respondents might affect their responses. Both insiders and outsiders bring valuable perspectives to research (Merton 1972). The outsider can bring the necessary critical distance from the object of study (McCracken 1988,22). Batunek and Louis (1996) argue that better results are obtained when insiders and outsiders work jointly to produce knowledge that combines insiders proximate information with the outsider's critical detachment. Recently, claims have been made that powerful researchers who are 'other' tend to subordinate the voice of minority respondents, assumed to be supine and unable to counteract the alleged appropriation. Yet both assumptions are essentialist and reductionist and need to be verified empirically. The respondents in this study were highly educated professionals working in a pluralistic environment. Whatever gap they may have felt with me existed also among their colleagues, superiors, and students without preventing them from functioning and advancing in their environment. Indeed, their interaction with me was no doubt far less potentially problematic than interaction with these more salient 'others.' The respondents displayed a high degree of heterogeneity. Some had a keen interest in retaining their Haitian language and culture, others were more attuned to cultural integration within Quebec's francophone environment. Moreover, while I directed the course of the interviews, at no time did I feel that I was imposing any agenda or perspective; on the contrary, the range of perspectives, life courses, and interests of the teachers working with the Haitian Project shaped my evaluation of ethnic match in the educational domain.

146 Philippe Couton Sensitizing the Educational System The first step in this research was to identify whether Haitians in Montreal had managed to persuade educational authorities to adapt the schooling of Haitian students to meet culture-specific needs. This section addresses whether, according to Haitian educators, some of the arguments about culturally congruent education have surfaced in the Montreal public school system and, more importantly, if they have been translated into actual measures to facilitate the schooling of young Haitians. The primary focus of the subsequent paragraphs is therefore on what has been achieved in terms of promoting ethno-specific educational practices and the explanations provided to account for their effectiveness. Haitians in Montreal have in fact achieved some degree of cultural congruence in the educational system. Although there are no 'analogous, parallel, non-complementary' (Denis 1983,113) educational institutions to serve the Haitian community (i.e., no specific Haitian schools), the two larger school boards of Montreal have created educational units to serve Haitian students in difficulty. In both cases some of the personnel involved are Haitian. One of these projects is particularly striking. What I will call Haitian Project 1 (HP1) was created following the Haitian community's request that measures be taken to remedy the problems encountered by Haitian students in Montreal schools. Here we have an example of the type of activism described by Breton (1991): organized action by the community as a coherent political unit. After a number of formal and informal reports and statements about the situation of Haitian students in Montreal's public school system, the Montreal Haitians Association (MHA) decided to intervene and to demand concrete action. In the words of the present director of the association: 'We've participated in several committees with school board officials, to help them understand the realities of the Haitian community. We dealt with two themes in particular: school violence, especially the problems with gangs, and the problem of the under-representation of Haitian teachers in the school system, as well as school personnel in general. Partly as a result of our intervention, the school board has developed a policy to increase the presence of minority personnel in the school system. We also pushed for the creation of this project that you mentioned earlier. That [the establishment of HP1 in 1984] was probably the most visible result of our intervention.' HP1 focuses on students between the ages of seventeen and twentytwo, giving those students a second chance to finish high school. It in fact supplements the regular school system by allowing some students who

Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 147 would otherwise have failed to finish secondary school. About eighty students are involved. The program is explicitly culturally congruent. It focuses on Haitian culture and heritage, the use of Creole, and Haitian educators. The project was a result of efforts by both Haitian and nonHaitian educators. The stated objective is to help students 'integrate into Quebec society/ but integration is to be achieved through the 'revaluation of Haitian culture' with the hope that this will strengthen the self-confidence and the sense of identity of students. As one of the teachers of HP1 states: 'The first step is to use their culture of origin. First of all, it's difficult to be black in a predominantly white society. Especially when you don't speak the language. Haiti is also a particularly poor country, and those children's culture is often demeaned or ignored. It's hard to be proud of that culture. So we thought that the first step was to highlight the positive aspects of that culture, and black culture in general, This first step is therefore to focus on identity and self-esteem.' What is argued here, in perfect agreement with the written goals of the school, is that identity reinforcement is the key to achieving academic progress. The project (HP2) is somewhat similar, although it has less clearly defined objectives and procedures. HP2 is an 'ecole d'accueil,' a school in which recent immigrants learn French and become familiar with their new environment before joining the regular school system. There are sixty students in the program, which constitutes more of an ad hoc response to a problem. Non-Haitian children are being admitted as Haitian immigration declines. Neither HP1 nor HP2 is the equivalent either of a Haitian public school or one of the religio-ethnic schools - Jewish, Muslim, Greek, or Armenian - receiving public funds in Quebec. Both projects would probably be suitable subjects of research on their own, and indeed five of the Haitian respondents interviewed for this study are involved in those projects. I will frequently draw on information provided by those respondents in the following pages (informants are identified as HP teachers), but because these remain relatively small-scale endeavours, I did not limit myself to these respondents and conducted interviews with teachers from the regular public sector as well. I also wanted to have a fairly diverse set of respondents; focusing on HP teachers alone may have overly biased the analysis. For a more inclusive approach, a wider range of informants was needed. My interest was not only in understanding the rationale behind institutionalized cultural congruence but also in gaining some appreciation of the perceived or actual benefits of the approach according to teachers in

148 Philippe Couton the regular sector. As an illustration, in response to a question about the argument in favour of an increased presence of minority teachers in public schools, a social science high school teacher answered: 'That is an important argument. I remember, in the school where I taught, before I came to this school, there was quite a fight with the administration about hiring more minority teachers. I do think it's important for kids to have models, to have people they can relate to. In my case, I was very active in this struggle. And I did manage to make some progress. It's the case in a number of other schools too. People are starting to understand that it is only normal, when there is a large immigrant population in the school, to have at least a few immigrant teachers.' This educator, like the association director quoted above, seems keenly aware of the need to increase the presence of Haitian teachers, particularly where a significant portion of the student population is Haitian born. Indeed, as she indicates, lobbying for more Haitian teachers is one of the most important objectives for many educators and activists. A member of the Haitian Teachers' Association responded: 'There are two schools in Montreal with large Haitian student populations. In one case the majority of teachers are Haitian, and the school director is Haitian too. The Association has put pressure on the school board for them to hire more Haitian teachers in that particular school. We think it is important that there be a fair number of Haitian teachers, especially in that type of situation.' Most respondents argue that Haitian teachers should be present in sufficient numbers when there is a significant number of Haitian students in the school. Some add that even in the regular school system, Haitian teachers are in a key position to help young Haitians. The answer of this CEGEP French language teacher is a case in point: T do have Haitian students, and of course, because we share a common culture, and because many of them have known deprivation and poor social conditions, I think I can do something for them. I do feel I have a responsibility. Especially when I realize that some of them have problems adapting to the educational system here. When I realize that, I intervene, I try to communicate with them personally, I try to help them a little bit ["de leur dormer un petit coup de pouce"].' The fact that most of these teachers agree that, because of a shared culture, they can do more to assist ethnically similar students than nonHaitian teachers are able to is not surprising. According to most of the respondents, one of the major differences between them and their nonHaitian counterparts is motivational. In the previous quotation the re-

Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 149 spondent points out that he 'feels he has a responsibility.' The original impetus to offer additional assistance to a student with a background similar to his own does not come from the knowledge that, as a teacher of Haitian origin, he possesses qualifications that enable him to improve the achievement of the student. It flows from the realization that commonality establishes an almost de facto obligation. The following statement from another teacher involved in the MHA confirms that Haitian educators are often thought to be more attuned to the needs of the students who belong to their community: 'Well, as I am sure you know, Haitian students are not in the best position in Montreal schools. Having Haitian teachers, or directors, is important to fight discrimination. For obvious reasons they are more likely to be more inclined to pay close attention to the situation of Haitian students. A Haitian director, in a school with a large Haitian student population, will probably insure that programs are put in place to help those students if the need arises. The same is probably true of Haitian teachers. Also it is important that those students know they have people they can turn to if they have difficulties/ The Haitian director of HP2 confirmed that one of the key dimensions of the role of Haitian educators is this heightened sense of responsibility toward the target student population: 'Having some Haitian teachers is important, many know what the students have been through, and also they may be more aware of what they need. In my case, for example, I do this job because I think it is important that those kids have a future. I felt it was sort of my responsibility to do something.' The results of this initial motivation vary considerably. The last respondent chose to occupy a position in which she could provide services to a small sub-group of Haitian students set apart from the regular school system. This is not an option for the majority of Haitian educators. Most, however, indicated that they can assist Haitian students when the need arises, by making themselves available for additional help, lobbying for more minority teachers, or introducing Haitian elements into the curriculum. When questioned about whether he tries to introduce aspects of Haitian culture in his teaching a French teacher answered: 'Yes, in certain classes it works out very well. When I try to explain the relations between language and society, for example. The social functions of language can foster integration or be used to exclude others. The Haitian case is always a good one. When I give my students assignments, I often try to include themes about Haiti. I always hope my Haitian students will choose those subjects, and in most cases they do/ Including the works of Haitian authors or discussing Haitian issues in

150 Philippe Couton economics, history, or social studies was mentioned by a number of other teachers. The degree to which this is practised is of course limited by curricular constraints and, quite naturally, by the presence of students of other ethnic origins in the regular school system. HP teachers, whose mandate is partially to cultivate an awareness of Haitian culture in their students, are much more likely to advocate and use ethnic-appropriate examples in their teaching. All teachers recognized the impact that introducing Haitian elements may have on the students' self-esteem. Whether these attempts are successful, whether Haitian students objectively learn more when all or part of their classes are taught by Haitian teachers - particularly in subjects like mathematics or science - is beyond the scope of this study. Research into these questions is urgently needed. Some anecdotal evidence was provided in the course of the interviews, but none of it is sufficient to formulate a conclusive response. One teacher indicated that, because she was able to establish a friendly rapport with one of her Haitian students, he improved spectacularly. Two HP teachers showed me (anonymous) student records that revealed tremendous improvement in writing and verbal skills from students who were previously failing in the regular school system. HP1 also enjoys drop-out rates considerably lower than those in regular public schools. All of this is very encouraging, but more work is needed to quantify and explain some of those outcomes. Most Haitian educators agree that, whether in an institutionalized ethnic-appropriate setting or in the less specialized context of a regular public school, Haitian teachers have a key role to play in the educational enhancement of young Haitians. Most would also agree that the hiring of Haitian teachers is at times met with overt or covert opposition. One high school social science teacher insisted that recent university graduates of Haitian origin find it difficult to find jobs in the provincial educational system. Like three other respondents she indicated that, from her experience, schools usually prefer to hire native-born whites than minority teachers. Yet roughly an equal number of respondents insisted that they have never suffered any form of discrimination, and that, to their knowledge, it is not a serious problem in public education in Quebec. Discrimination is difficult to prove or disprove. But both large Montreal school boards seem to have been fairly responsive to suggestions from Haitians and have hired a significant number of Haitian educators. This would tend to indicate that systemic discrimination is not an overwhelming impediment to hiring Haitian teachers.

Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 151 Obstacles to the further development of ethno-specific education seem to have more to do with the fact that it is perceived by some as too radical a departure from the standard objectives of public education. All HP teachers, for instance, claim that making their educational approach available to a greater number of students would have positive effects on the academic achievement of young Haitians. But they assert that mainstream educators and administrators are fearful of the 'ghettoization' of public schools that might ensue. The head teacher of HP1, for example, immediately answered that critics of the projects are opposed to it liecause they fear we're creating ghettos/ The other HP teachers confirmed that opposition to, or uncertainties about, the project usually stems from the impression that isolation from the general student population will hinder the integration of minority students. The second part of a written report about HP1 focused entirely on measuring the integration of HP students in Quebec. While little was said about the future economic prospects of the students, considerable attention was paid to their 'cultural integration,' i.e., whether they participate in the mainstream culture of the province. Recommendations were also made to ensure that students are exposed to the artistic and cultural production of Quebec. The report provides additional evidence that some mainstream educators worry as much about integration into Quebec's culture as they do about the formal academic achievements of their Haitian students. It is significant that, in drafting this report, HP teachers sought to address the issue of integration at length, perhaps partially in response to existing and potential critics. But Haitian teachers themselves see limitations in an educational experience that is excessively focused on Haitian content. Education in Quebec and the Survival of Haitian Culture Fear of excessive ethnic insularity is a recurrent concern in debates about institutionalizing distinct minority education. This fear may seem justified in view of the stated goals of some proponents of cultural congruence in education with respect to communal or cultural survival. Haitian educators in Montreal have managed to introduce, both formally and informally, ethno-specific educational practices. But what is their position on the question of cultural maintenance through education? The central pedagogical premise of HP1 is to convey a sense of 'cultural self-sufficiency' to the students through the use of teaching methods that reflect Haitian culture. Language is of course an important

152 Philippe Couton aspect, and many teachers indicate that the ability to communicate in Creole is frequently an asset when explaining difficult points or trying to establish a closer relationship with certain students. But HP teachers also insisted that Haitian culture in general needs to be validated for students to achieve better academic results: 'You know, it's important to understand that to function in society, in a culture, you have to be self-sufficient culturally. If you're not comfortable with who you are, with your identity, you cannot be integrated. That is one of the objectives of this project. To make sure those students are comfortable with who they are.' This reinforced identity is believed to emerge when the cultural production of the country of origin is discussed in the classroom and included in the curriculum. Hence there is a focus on the work of Haitian writers and on the social and historical characteristics of Haiti. A social science professor insisted that she felt it was her responsibility to help Haitian students understand that Haiti, despite its current difficulties, had nonetheless made a distinct contribution to the history of the Western hemisphere by being the first black colony to gain independence in that region. Several French teachers confirmed that they made efforts to make sure Haitian authors were represented both in the school libraries and in the curriculum: 'Personally, and as a member of this association I think it is important to make sure that Haitian culture is represented. I have, for example, insisted that books by Haitian authors be represented in my school's library. I wanted the important authors to have a place along with other writers ... Together with presenting important Haitian writers, scholars etc. it gives a positive image of Haitian culture.' Does promoting Haitian culture risk facilitating the persistence of a segregated community life for Montreal's Haitians? On this point, Haitian educators have a much more nuanced perspective. While most of them wish to highlight the contributions of their community, they prove much more reluctant to uphold the necessity of maintaining a clear cultural distinctiveness. It appears that even those most likely to practise ethnic-appropriate teaching eschew the idea of building a separate communal existence for immigrant Haitians. The following statement is illustrative of the rationale proposed by many respondents. It is also significant that this excerpt is from the same teacher who advocated, in the previous quotation, a high level of Haitian content in the classroom and in the school in general: '... There are two opposite alternatives: giving up one's culture, or adopting a sort of "negritude," and hence rejecting the dominant culture. Both are dangerous. On the one hand you lose your identity, you do not know who you are. On the other you

Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 153 become a militant. The right route is to contribute to a multi-ethnic society. To bring your original contribution, without falling into either extreme. That's what I try to do, and I think what a lot of other teachers are trying to do.' This educator, like most in the sample, seems to differentiate between two goals that are often conflated in the literature about the schooling of ethnic minorities: the need for cultural retention and the need for meaningful participation in the host society. Despite their concern for the strengthening of the Haitian community, it is interesting that the Haitian educators interviewed consider that objective to be, at best, marginal. The key objective for most remains enhancing the academic achievement of students, with a heightened concern for Haitian students in some cases. This does not mean that Haitian culture is regarded as second rate. On the contrary, many of the respondents indicated that they wish to contribute to the perpetuation of the Haitian language, culture, and artistic expression, but that this need not be a direct function of public education (private Haitian schools are unlikely to appear, primarily for economic reasons). Thus the teacher quoted above insisted that Haitian culture should be present in public schools with important Haitian student populations, but does not believe that schools should actively promote an Afro-centric perspective. Positions on this issue vary among individuals, but an interesting comment by a school director summarizes the general viewpoint: 'Don't get me wrong, I like Creole, I feel good when I speak Creole with my friends, my family and people in my neighbourhood. As a matter of fact, I made sure all my children learned the language. A lot of times I'll speak Creole to them on the phone. But does that mean I should teach it? Does that mean all young Haitians should spend time learning it in school? Is it going to get them a better job? I don't think so. Is learning Haitian geography going to help them in university? For most of them, probably not.' Put differently, a strong attachment to the Haitian language and culture does not imply a belief that they should be central to the educational experience. Some of the respondents view culturally responsive teaching in purely functional terms: sharing a common language and culture is little more than a fortuitous opportunity to be used to maximize the educational prospects of young Haitians. While this is admittedly an extreme position, it is nonetheless significant that it is this extreme that surfaced in the interviews, rather than the opposite one (i.e., a strong defence of communal solidarity). 'We don't want to create barriers; that would go against everything we're trying to achieve here. We want to try

154 Philippe Couton to make those students feel comfortable so they can go out there and do something worthwhile ("pour qu'ils puissent vraiment s'en sortir"). That's the real objective. We're not trying to build a community, at least I'm not trying, and neither are my colleagues, that's not what this school is for.' Affirmations of this kind must of course be analysed carefully. Stating that public school is no place to try to accentuate ethnic boundaries may simply be an attempt to demonstrate an acceptance of the dominant ideology (not unlike HPl's official 'integration' objective). It may be important, for educators operating in the public sector, to avoid presenting too radical an approach, especially concerning the goals of 'alternative' schools. In the absence of systematic outcome data, one could reasonably assume that being educated primarily or entirely in the Haitian idiom and culture will probably result in a greater degree of solidarity with the Haitian community, notwithstanding the motivations of teachers. One of the objectives of this study is to document the active role of teachers in both initiating and practising culturally congruent education. Some evidence was presented to support the claim that teachers do play the key role in that process, indicating that the direction and future development, if any, of ethno-specific education for Haitian students will probably be greatly influenced by the position of teachers with respect to this issue. The French teacher quoted previously and three other educators acknowledged the importance of Creole as an element of Haitian identity. But they questioned the merit of formally including it in the curriculum. Language and other culture-specific practices may, when used in the classroom, provide an extra margin of comfort to a student population otherwise plunged into a foreign environment. They may contribute to a rich communal life outside of school. But most teachers interviewed sought to keep these two concerns apart. Often drawing on their own experience and comfort in a bicultural environment (Haitian/Quebecois), most respondents made clear their wish, as one school director said, to bridge the gap between us and them, and make sure our side of the bridge is strong enough.' In other words, the teachers are not endorsing the infusion of militant 'identity polities' and communal solidarity as the core theme for Haitian education. Their lack of militancy or an Afrocentric focus does not signify opposition to the development of culturally congruent education. All HP educators were, for instance, in favour of expanding the type of services they offer to mainstream public schools. This possible expansion should however occur with a limited mandate, as the director of HP2 argued: T think that would be a great way of

Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 155 facilitating the transition of some of those students to the mainstream. There are only sixty-four students here. Enlarging our philosophy, in the sense of making the kids feel at home, respecting individual needs, ensuring that, regardless of age everyone can progress at their own pace, that would be really beneficial. I really think it would help a lot of them find their place in the regular schools. From our experience here, I think it would help reduce some of the problems a lot of Haitians are having in Montreal schools/ This essentially functional and remedial perspective is shared by most of the respondents. Almost all attempts to employ ethno-cultural similarity in teaching were in fact described as efforts to help students achieve better academic outcomes so that they may pursue other goals in mainstream settings. For some it is the only objective to be pursued, while teachers who mentioned increasing community awareness or strengthening a specific Haitian identity usually qualified those objectives. When those goals are to be pursued it is only because they are thought to have a positive effect on student performances, or on the ability of those students to adapt to life in Quebec. As the school director quoted above put it,'... it is important to avoid the identity trap ... of course it is important to know your origin, but only because it helps to relate to others/ Cultural Congruence and the Art of Teaching Regardless of their ultimate motivations, it is clear that most Haitian teachers support forms of cultural congruence. They see clear, positive impacts of ethno-specific teaching on the schooling of Haitian children. Culturally congruent education minimizes the students' experience of racism, deliberate or inadvertent, which can affect the scholastic success of Haitian students. The presence of Haitian professionals in the school system, it is thought, offers some guarantee that the interests of young Haitians will be looked after. Assertions of that type were often backed up with personal comments: 'Because I'm there I can prevent that type of occurrence. I keep an eye open for any discriminatory treatment. I just won't let it happen. I've discussed this with other Haitian directors, and they say they do the same. It's not easy, but it's part of our job/ It is difficult to measure the influence of this school director, or of any of the respondents who made similar comments, but the intention is clearly there. For example, white teachers or administrators would probably be less likely to make racist comments with Haitian teachers in the school. The respondent quoted above also contends that his vigilance helps to

156 Philippe Couton prevent both the systematic tracking of Haitian students in short/vocational streams and excessive drop-out rates. Positive effects can also flow from personal characteristics and behaviours of the teachers. These features, more specific to classroom interaction, include not only language but also non-verbal communication, shared experiences, and similar cultural references. These are lumped together here because, as one teacher put it, they form a whole often difficult to separate into discrete categories. A recurrent example concerns the visual contact between students and teachers. One respondent is often asked questions about Haitian students because of his position as liaison agent between the Haitian community and a large school board. He informed me that the most frequently asked question from non-Haitian teachers is 'why won't those students look at me?' The fact that Haitian children often look down or away when talked to, I was told, often results in poor relations with teachers, and sometimes conflict. White teachers are often unaware that avoiding eye contact is a way of deferring to authority in Haitian culture in general, and particularly in the classroom. This type of behaviour illustrates a pattern of relations to adults typical of Haiti, difficult to comprehend if not experienced firsthand, that can include not asking questions, not making individual decisions, and not expressing disagreement. Educators familiar with these traits are less likely to misinterpret them and will adapt their instructional style accordingly. Cultural familiarity also helps educators understand parent-child relations. The same liaison officer, for example, indicated that his familiarity with child-rearing practices in Haiti helps to avoid misunderstandings. The use of corporal punishment, likely to be reported to child protection agencies by other practitioners, is an issue more easily discussed by a Haitian like himself. Trust is more easily established, and bargaining may often yield better results than resorting to outside intervention. A number of teachers confirmed that their knowledge of parents' expectations regarding their children's schooling made them more effective teachers. A third set of positive factors can be categorized as cultural validation/ role model effects. Both are similar in terms of their presumed outcomes. Cultural validation, central to HPl's pedagogy, consists in conveying the message that Haitian culture is qualitatively equal to its dominant FrenchCanadian counterpart and other national cultures. Examples have already been provided of curricular inclusion of Haitian authors and history. The role model argument proposes a similar approach but focuses on

Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 157 individuals rather than culture in general. The two are of course complementary and may even overlap. A role model, according to a social science teacher, is a person who has achieved some level of professional success without forsaking his or her cultural heritage: T think they understand that I'm proud of who I am, that I am proud of my culture. Just yesterday I was talking to them about the village where I was born. In the 1950s we still did not have electricity, so it was maybe more difficult to study. But it was OK. In a way I think it showed them that despite those conditions I went to university, I was able to do something with my life.' Most teachers recognized that they serve as role models for Haitian students, providing a positive view of their culture of origin and helping to consolidate their students' aspirations. As suggested above, the Haitian teachers did express reservations about extreme forms of cultural congruence. For some, ensuring that Haitian teachers are adequately represented in mainstream educational institutions is a sufficient adaptation of public schools to the large Haitian student body. Most agreed that some Haitian content should be added to the curriculum. But there a number of respondents drew the line. As already discussed, they were afraid of fostering cultural insularity. A number were more inclined to situate their efforts within the general challenge of educating a heterogeneous group of students. Although most voiced special concern for Haitian students, many made it clear that, within the culturally diverse setting of Montreal-area public schools, those students were not, and could not be, their only focus. Being fair to all students naturally implies not devoting too much attention to any one group. Several of the teachers working in the public school system stressed the importance of their presence, and that of Haitian materials, for the non-Haitian students. The use of Haitian examples does not target Haitian students exclusively, it also introduces other students to a culture about which they know little. This is a theme that resonates in contemporary anti-racist education, as well as in 'intercultural' education in Quebec. Consider the answer of a French teacher about the use of Haitian themes in the curriculum: T then have the impression that I participate in, as they say, intercultural education. Because then they learn a lot about Haiti. They learn all kinds of new things. They have to do a little research, they have to read books about Haiti, or material I give them ... I also try to make them aware of the prejudices often attached to certain languages. Creole is a good example.' Discussing a foreign culture is a way of promoting tolerance and

158 Philippe Couton diversity, a goal that is not antithetical to a keen awareness of the special needs of Haitian students. A general promotion of tolerance, and of appreciation of diverse cultures, would inevitably have a positive effect on Haitian students as well. In the same vein, another respondent stated that his concern for impartiality and fairness made him hesitant to talk about his Haitian origin. He preferred to rely on '[t]he history of North American black people and the African homeland [which] is of more general interest. I feel I can be more objective. I don't have to worry about being too uh... involved in the topic. Although I have a great interest in it, I can be more detached, more objective.' This comment, and others, reflects a fear among Haitian educators of appearing too parochial. Most respondents in fact insisted that education should strive to reflect the universal character of human experiences rather than stressing difference. A common argument, particularly among those who relied more heavily on ethno-specific education, was the need to understand one's own culture in order to appreciate that of others. Two of the thirteen respondents expressed clear opposition to any ethnic matching between students and teachers. One warned of the danger of assuming that cultural commonality necessarily leads to better relations between students and teacher. Drawing on a personal experience, he made the following argument: 'One of my professors was Haitian, and naturally I thought I could maybe get to know him a little bit better. But it was just the opposite. He made it very clear to me that it was not because we were of the same origin that he would treat me any differently... Some teachers may not want to be pigeonholed ["categorises"] or may not want to give the impression that they favour certain students. So they may react negatively, because they don't really want to be associated with a specific function, a precise role.' The second respondent argued along the same lines that a good teacher has qualities that transcend race and culture: '... we put more emphasis on good teaching. I mean it's more important to have teachers aware of intercultural realities, teachers who care about this dimension in their classroom. It's not because a teacher is Haitian that he has those qualities. You see a Haitian teacher may very well be a lousy teacher, just like a nonHaitian can be a bad teacher.' Reflecting the multicultural orientation of his school board, this Haitian liaison agent argues that matching students and teachers is less important than making sure that the teaching staff is aware of the diversity of needs and abilities of all the students. A few educators stressed that using a public school class for community formation would probably be very difficult and, in some cases, was

Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 159 contrary to what many students and parents desired. One HP teacher mentioned that many of the students who are referred to her school do not want to be there at first. According to her, many of them come to Quebec, or are raised here, fully expecting and wishing to be in racially mixed but predominantly white schools. On the issue of language, the liaison agent even insisted that most parents see no real value in having their children learn, or improve their knowledge of, Creole:'... last year I did a quick survey of Haitian parents to ask them if they thought it was important for their children to maintain a good proficiency in the language: 60 per cent said no. The majority did not want to!' This was corroborated by other respondents who argued that, for Haitians, French is a far more prestigious language, Creole being assigned a much lower status. On a different note, a French teacher maintained that the 'identity' of his Haitian students was both elusive and largely independent of what they learned in school:'... what I see in some of my students tells me that they're creating their own identity. A few years ago, when Haiti was experiencing very serious difficulties, with the refugee problems and what have you, I saw that a lot of them would claim that they were "Caribbean," they would endorse a more general identity. Many of them would make a deliberate effort to speak English, and try to erase all traces of Haitian culture in their behaviour, language, in the music they listened to.' The external influence of media depictions and popular perceptions of Haiti were also mentioned by a social science teacher, who argued that her efforts at portraying Haiti in a positive light were often thwarted:'... it's difficult, because of what they see on television. Haiti is presented as a very poor country, with a very low rate of literacy and so on. So when you bring up Haiti in the classroom, all those negative images come to mind... it becomes very difficult to convey a positive image of Haiti.' Future Challenges What do the interviews quoted above tell us about the present state and possible future of culturally congruent education for Montreal's Haitian population, as defined by Haitian educators? First, the matching of students with same-origin teachers has made clear inroads into education in Quebec. That educators in Quebec have realized that, under certain circumstances, it is preferable to have Haitians teach Haitians comes as no major surprise. The approach is in itself no great pedagogical innovation and it is grounded in intuitive common sense. Within limits, most Haitian

160 Philippe Couton teachers would agree. But, while cultural congruence is making slow gains in Montreal, culturally congruent education remains unavailable for most Haitian school children. The vast majority are enrolled in mainstream institutions where the presence of Haitian teachers is largely a random occurrence. The objective of HP projects, and the goal of Haitian teachers who wish to help Haitian students present in their schools, is primarily to help them to achieve success in mainstream institutions. The motivation of most of these educators is to find solutions to a problem: it is doubtful that the Haitian community would have pushed for culture-specific schooling if its children were doing well. (In this the Haitians would approximate most of the other ethnic groups in Montreal.) Culturally congruent schooling is largely seen as a means to educational success, not an aid in cultural survival or communal solidarity. On this issue, two respondents articulated a viewpoint that is probably shared by many Haitian educators. The director of programs at HP2 argued, for example, that more ethnic-specific schools would only reflect reality. Rather than create community, they would reflect community, and simply make the school experience more familiar to Haitian children: T mean Haitian communities already exist throughout Montreal. We already have associations, organizations. Many of us already live in the same neighbourhoods. So why worry so much about integration? From my experience here, having schools with a more Haitian 'colour' would help with relations with the community. It would probably just give a lot of children a more familiar environment. Not a "ghetto" as some would put it.' A school director added that classifying people in ethnic groups and communities is a common feature of this and other countries. Implementing cultural congruence in schools is simply a self-defence mechanism to prevent negative and discriminatory actions; ethnic-specific education is not a way of creating or reinforcing differences, but a practical solution to a potential problem. Haitians in Montreal seem prepared to experiment with the potential benefits, but they show no great concern about its political implications. Educational debates on Afrocentric schooling in the United States have been emotional. Beyond the question of effectiveness, the 'particularistic multiculturalism' (Ravitch 1990) inherent in ethnocentric educational arrangements is seen as threatening the common civic culture. If culturally congruent education is indeed supposed to lay the foundations of a 'politics of difference,' these concerns might well be justified. The leap from John Dewey's appeal for a more socially relevant

Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 161 pedagogy (Dewey 1964) to the recent arguments in favour of transforming schools into sites of communal empowerment may be construed as a threat to the very existence of public education in its present form. This has contributed to the extreme polarization of the debates now taking place between the proponents of mainstream, but inclusive, public education and those seeking to dismantle Eurocentric hegemony by constructing discrete pedagogies and curricula for traditionally marginalized students. In Montreal culturally congruent education has been incorporated in a number of ways and in different settings, yet there is no evidence that this development is tied into a resurgence of isolationist communal pride or cultural particularism. Most of the respondents either embraced a fairly universalistic approach to the goals of education (even though the means might be culturally focused), or sought to add their own contribution to a larger, pluralistic whole. Using culturally appropriate teaching methods was not perceived as antithetical to multicultural (or intercultural) education, but as an integral, albeit specialized, part of it. The goal, in other words, is not so much to replace the common school but to modify it in order to better serve Haitian students. Pierre-Jacques (1989) confirms that the Haitian community does not question the objectives of public education in Quebec (in particular, the preservation of the French language). But the 'incomprehension of Haitian values on the part of the school system produces harmful results in the schooling of young Haitians/ preventing them from reaching those objectives (172). To return to Breton's (1964) terminology, what is sought by Haitian educators is less institutional completeness than institutional adaptation. Because the objectives of even those teachers involved only with Haitian students are largely compatible with mainstream education, there was no concern to pursue a radical 'politics of difference/ Educational innovations like HP1 and HP2 would not lead to a separate, insular Haitian community. The teachers interviewed here differed from the theoreticians and ideologues who see mainstream schooling as representing an immutable, racist barrier to minority children. Shifting the debate from the heady spheres of identity politics to the more prosaic levels of classroom interaction may yield a greater pay-off for minority students. The Haitian educators interviewed for this study walked a fine line between their sense of communal obligation and their identity as professionals. Closer investigations of the role of minority professionals would certainly be helpful in determining how at-risk students can best be helped.

162 Philippe Couton REFERENCES

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Haitian Teachers in Quebec Schools 163 James, Carl. 1996. Perspectives on Racism in the Human Services Sector: A Case for Cliange. Toronto, University of Toronto Press. King, Sabrina Hope. 1993. The Limited Presence of African-American Teachers. Review of Educational Research 63(2): 115-49. Klassen, Thomas, and Paul D. Con. 1997. Different Perceptions of Race in Education: Racial Minority and White Teachers. Canadian Journal of Education 22(1):67-81. Laferriere, Michel. 1985. I/Education de enfants des groupes minoritaires au Quebec: de la definition des problemes par les groupes eux-memes a 1'intervention de I'Etat. Canadian and International Education 14(1):29^48 Leake, Donald O. 1992. Islands of Hope: Milwaukee's African American Immersion Schools. Journal of Negro Education 61(l):24-9. -. 1993. Do We Need to Desegregate All Our Black Schools? Educational Policy 7(3):370-87. Manegre, Jean-Francois, and Louise Blouin, 1990. Le Rendement Scolaire des Communautes Culturelles: Bibliographie Cornmentee. Conseil des Communautes Culturelles et de I'lmmigration. McCracken, Grant. 1988. The Long Interview. Newbury Park, Calif. Sage Publications. Merton, Robert K. 1972. Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge. American Journal of Sociology. 78:9-47. Ministere de 1'education du Quebec (MEQ). 1996. Le point sur les services d'acceuil et de francisation de I'ecole publique quebecoise. Nelson-Le Gall, Sharon. 1994. Addressing the Continuities and Discontinuities Between Family and School for Ethnic Minority Children. In Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, ed. Reinventing Urban Education. New York: IUME Press, Teacher's College. Pierre-Jacques, Charles. 1989. The Integration of Migrant Children in the Quebec School: Similarities and Differences between State Discourse and the Views of the Haitian Community. In A. Yogev, ed., International Perspectives on Education and Society, 1:16576. Ravitch, Diane. 1990. Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures. The American Scholar 59(3):33754. Shade, Barbara J. Robinson, ed. 1989. Culture, Style, and the Educative Process. Springfield, 111.: Charles C. Thomas. Shipler, David K. 1997. A Country of Strangers: Blacks and Whites in America. New York: Knopf. Simard, Myriam. 1993. L'Enseignement Prive: 30 ans de Debats. Montreal: Themis. Sue, Stanley. 1977. Community Mental Health Service to Minority Groups: Some Optimism, Some Pessimism. American Psychologist 32(8):616-24. Tremblay, Pierre Andre. 1991. La Discrimination Envers les Minorites Visibles au Quebec. Universite du Quebec a Chicoutimi. Watkins, Williams H. 1993. Black Curriculum Orientations: A Preliminary Inquiry. Harvard Educational Review 63(3):321-38.

7

Wife Abuse and Ideological Competition in the Muslim Community of Toronto SHAHEEN AZMI Introduction Social work in North America is rooted in Judeo-Christian and liberaldemocratic values, which emphasize justice, freedom, equality, and the worth and dignity of the individual. The recent wave of non-European immigrants has consequently posed problems for social work professionals, whose clients may now include immigrants with more collective orientations and different value systems and traditions (Green 1995; Lum 1996). For example, Southeast Asian refugees have often had often traumatic experiences, such as torture, and have required help from mental health professionals. But many Asians associate psychotherapy with mental illness, which in turn is seen as a disgrace. Thus culturally sensitive psychotherapy, which takes into account community feelings about professional intervention, is required to meet refugee needs (Kelly 1992). Many similar cases can be identified in Toronto, Canada's major multicultural city. A report on Toronto's Chinese community has identified gambling as a problem, but the report also suggests that popular models of intervention would not work. Some forms of gambling, such as Mah Jong and horse racing, are an accepted part of Chinese social life and seen to be healthy leisure activity, if the amounts of money involved are reasonable. Moreover, when problem gamblers seek help, they would first be inclined to turn to their extended family. Thus it is not enough merely to recognize a problem, that problem must be placed in its specific cultural context (Chinese Family Life Services of Metro Toronto 1996). The conflict between traditional communities and Canadian norms and laws is at the heart of debates on multiculturalism in Canada. Such tensions have been part of the Canadian experience since the turn of the

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 165 century brought waves of 'different' immigrants to Canada's shores. Generations earlier, Catholics and Protestants had developed distinctive hospitals and social service agencies. Jews followed suit, seeking both to perpetuate their religious traditions and to avoid discrimination. Years ago professionals working in those agencies, and from those groups, were wrestling with questions of the appropriate religious response to various social problems. (For examples, consult back issues of the Journal of Jewish Communal Service and the Catholic Charities Review.) As we shall see, those debates remain as timely as ever. This study explores in detail the case of wife abuse in Toronto's Muslim community. The city's Muslim community has developed a range of welfare services in response to wife abuse. Some are part of the larger, mainstream institutional responses, others function entirely within the Muslim community. Both offer two main services, counselling and shelter, but there is striking variation in the ideologies that underlie their delivery. The story of wife abuse and the welfare response to it is in many ways also the story of ideological competition, not only between the Muslim community and mainstream society, but also within both of these communities. The present study focuses on ideological competition within the Muslim community on the issue of wife abuse and the appropriate welfare response to it. While the Muslim community in Toronto is defined by a shared religion, it is a very diverse community in which significant ideological differences continue to affect the way in which it relates to the mainstream society. Wife abuse is an issue that cuts across virtually all barriers of race, religion, and culture; at the same time, it is one of the few social problems that bring members of insular minority communities, like some sections of the Muslim community, into direct contact with mainstream institutions. In 1994 eighteen individuals active in efforts to address wife abuse in the Muslim community of Toronto, thirteen Muslim and five nonMuslim, were interviewed for this research. The format was that of a focused interview (Merton, Fiske, and Kendal 1990); the interviews were qualitative in nature but followed an interview schedule. Questions were structured to gather perceptions about wife abuse and the welfare response to it (Azmi 1996), both in general and with specific reference to the Muslim community in Toronto. The primary emphasis of the study is on the perceptions of the thirteen respondents who had Muslim backgrounds and on the issue of providing culturally sensitive social service care by 'matching' Muslim clients

166 Shaheen Azmi with combinations of Muslim practitioners, Muslim organizations, and Muslim practice. Specifically, it will examine ethnic match of clients and social service professionals. The variety within the sample of Muslim interviewees illustrates the problems inherent in the assumption that a simple categorical matching of professionals and clients will lead to a homogeneous treatment approach. Background on the Muslim Community in Toronto The Muslim community is a rapidly expanding part of Toronto's urban mosaic. The 1981 Canadian Census indicated that about a third of all Muslims in Canada resided in Metropolitan Toronto. In 1981 there were more than 98,000 Muslims in Canada, 30,000 of whom lived in Toronto (Rashid 1985). Virtually all were immigrants or children of immigrants who had migrated to Canada sometime after 1960. About two thirds had migrated to Canada during the seventies. Natural increase, religious conversion, and most significantly, continued immigration and refugee movements have since added to the population. The 1991 census reported 253,000 Muslims in Canada and about 106,000 in Toronto. In 1996 the Canadian Office of the Muslim World League estimated that there were upwards of 200,000 Muslims in the Greater Toronto Area. Muslims have come to Canada from all parts of the Muslim world and no single race, language, ethnicity, or national origin group dominates. According to the 1991 census the two largest Islamic racial-ethnic groupings in Canada were South Asian (91,000) and Arab and West Asian (96,000). But these two groupings are diverse in themselves. For example, South Asian Muslims came not just from the Indian subcontinent, but also from Africa, Europe, and the Caribbean. They speak several distinct languages and dialects and represent different cultural traditions. More recently, two new and sizeable national communities have been added to the Muslim demographic mix: tens of thousands of refugees from Somalia and Iran. Thus, by any standard, the Muslim community in Toronto is home to as broad a range of religious practices and doctrinal expressions of Islam as might be found in any part of the Muslim world. In several areas of Toronto distinctive Islamic attire and religious architecture are increasingly common. The Muslim community in Toronto also shares common features with Muslim communities in other, larger North American centres. Many of these communities also tend to be highly diverse, largely immigrant communities that have emerged only in the last few decades. The one

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 167 notable difference between the Toronto community and Muslim minority communities in many American cities is that it is almost entirely an immigrant-based community, without a significant presence of AfricanAmerican converts to Islam. It is also noteworthy that the Muslim community in Toronto is influential among immigrant-based, North American-wide Islamic institutions and organizations. Virtually all North American-wide Islamic organizations are active in Toronto. Many of these organizations and many prominent individuals within them have significant roots in Toronto. Several religious schools and seminaries in Toronto and vicinity serve a North American constituency and are models for other North American centres. Despite its significance in the North American Muslim community, scholarly study of Toronto's Muslim community remains in its infancy (Azmi 1989a; 1989b; 1990; 1996a; 1996b). Most of the literature on Islam in North America approaches the Muslim community from a continentwide perspective and identifies religious and social adjustment issues at the 'macro-level' see Haddad 1991; Haddad and Smith 1994; Waugh, AbuLaban, and Qureshi 1983 and 1991). This study focuses on Toronto and consequently approaches issues facing Muslim minority communities from the micro-level. The primary value of such an approach is that it demonstrates how complicated issues internal to the Muslim community make the idea of ethno-specific or religiously specific services a simplistic solution to challenges of cultural sensitivity. The study of the Muslim minority community from the micro-level also vividly fleshes out the pluralism within the group. In discussing perceptions of wife abuse, this article illustrates both the diverse and complicated nature of Muslim minority community life in Toronto and the entrenched conflicts that often confront traditional, confessional communities in modern settings. Identity Groupings among Muslim Respondents All communities face issues of identity. In what sense and to what degree is a particular community distinct from the general society and other communities? In Canada, the normal conceptualization of multiculturalism emphasizes secular identity as the primary source of cultural distinction. Consequently, the Muslim religious community is rarely identified as a cultural group. Indeed, the Muslim faithful are usually identified with more commonly recognized ethnic groups, such as the South Asian community, the black community, or the Arab community. However, for many Muslims, their identification with the Muslim religious commu-

168 Shaheen Azmi nity is the significant and often paramount identification, superseding any national or racial identification. Studies conducted in the United Kingdom showed that the primary source of identity for Muslim South Asian adolescents was their religion, before any racial, ethnic, or other shared trait (Hutnik 1988). During the course of my interviews the respondents were asked how they perceived the Muslim community and their place within it. The interview data clearly suggests that religious community identity among Muslims in Toronto was significant, but not equally or exclusively so for everyone. From self-declarations made by respondents I enumerated several distinct sources of respondent identity, including religious community, religious ideology, race, culture of origin, ethnic community, gender, occupation, nationality, Canadian identity, and liberal ideology. Typically, individuals demonstrated several intertwined sources of identity, but in the context of the interview one or two proved to be more significant in structuring individual responses. In the end, I categorized the Muslim respondents into two groupings based on the basic framework they employed to identify themselves. These were a Muslim religious grouping and an ethnic-cultural grouping. Of the thirteen Muslims interviewed for the research, nine demonstrated a clear preference for identification with their religion and religious ideologies over identification with any other source of identity. This means that these nine interviewees addressed the issue of wife abuse from within a Muslim religious community frame of reference. Not surprisingly, all nine identified themselves as practising Muslims. Six were women and three were men. But they also represent a varied mix of cultural, racial, linguistic, and religious sectarian affiliations. Their work with reference to wife abuse was conducted in different contexts: three were functionaries or activists working in Muslim religious and welfare institutions, four were employed in mainstream welfare institutions, and one was an employee of an ethno-specific social service agency. Those interviewees who demonstrated greater identity with Islamic ideology tended to employ the term 'Muslim community' to refer to what ought to be rather than what was. They tended to differentiate between the Muslim community as a social reality and as a religious ideal. For example, one respondent noted, T would phrase it, instead of saying the "Muslim community," I would say the "so-called Muslim community/" While these respondents identified themselves as Muslims first, there was no unanimity on Muslim ideology. Indeed, while virtually all nine

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 169 indicated that they valued Islam, the type of individual religious ideology varied significantly. As a result, despite each giving primacy to a Muslim religious framework, the nine interviewees held distinctly separate views on key categories for understanding and responding to wife abuse. The four remaining respondents demonstrated a primary preference for identification with their ethnic communities and cultures of origin. What is intended by 'ethnic community' is the community recognized in Canadian public culture, the immigrant community categorized and defined, often arbitrarily, with reference to a single aspect of identity like race, religion, culture, or nationality. Ethnicity is some experience of being associated with the ethnic community, the defining quality of which is centred in the host society, not in the country of origin. In contrast, the culture of origin as a source of identity is independent of host country identification and centred in the country of origin. For the four individuals who identified ethnically or with culture of origin, their ethnicity and native cultures were the primary reference points employed to conceptualize wife abuse and the welfare response to it as distinct from their religious community. Three of these four respondents also identified themselves as practising Muslims; the fourth identified herself as being of Muslim background, but indicated that she was no longer a believing or practising Muslim. Three of the four were women. Three were employed in mainstream welfare institutions and one was employed in an ethno-specific organization. The ethnic identities specified were Somali, Arab, Iranian, and South Asian. These four individuals were generally uncomfortable in employing the term 'Muslim community' to give context to their work or their views; all preferred to refer to their ethnic communities. At the same time, only one of the four was hostile to the idea that her ethnic community could be conceived as being part of a larger Muslim community. This respondent, of Iranian background, insisted forcefully, 'When you say "Muslim community," I don't exactly understand what you mean by that, because the Iranian community, although they are all Muslims, it is just different from the other communities. I would rather say the "Iranian community."' The four respondents who gave primacy to their ethnic-cultural community identity also indicated stronger affiliation with secondary sources of identity than did those in the Muslim religious group. Two of these four individuals made significant reference to gender as an important factor shaping their conception of themselves and their understanding of

170 Shaheen Azmi wife abuse. The other two individuals indicated that their occupations were an important factor shaping their identity. It might be postulated that the distinctions identified by the two categories of Muslim respondents, religious and ethnic-cultural, would be clearly reflected in the way each group viewed wife abuse and the appropriate welfare response to it. However, while I began my analysis of the data with this assumption, I quickly discovered that perceptions of wife abuse are not so easily categorized. In some cases the views of respondents from the Muslim religious group differed significantly from respondents from the ethnic-cultural group, but in many others the range of views was as marked within the two groups as it was between them. Perceptions on the Nature of Wife Abuse In public campaigns addressing wife abuse it is commonly assumed that the meaning of the term is self-evident. However, part of what is in contention in situations of cultural diversity is precisely the meaning of key notions such as wife abuse and part of what makes a community distinct is how it defines such terms. I will review the perceptions expressed by respondents with respect to two significant aspects of wife abuse - its definition and its cause. The differences between respondents was most clearly displayed in the variety of their attempts to define the term. When asked to define wife abuse, all respondents, Muslim and ethnic-cultural, agreed that wife abuse was something to be condemned and that it might include many types of behaviours, both physical and psychological. Here unanimity ended. What emerged instead were substantial differences in opinion, not only between members of the Muslim religious group and the ethniccultural group, but also within the Muslim religious group. Respondents from the Muslim religious group and the ethnic-cultural group employed two very different standards to determine the reality of 'abuse.' One emphasized the purely subjective feeling of abuse by the victim; the other required the use of some objective external indicator to determine whether abuse had occurred. Three of the four members of the ethnic-cultural group advocated a subjective type of definition, as did all the non-Muslim respondents interviewed. A typical expression of this type of definition was put forth by one worker in a women's shelter who declared: Tf you feel that you're being abused ... chances are it's abusive.' In contrast, almost all members of the Muslim religious group, eight of the nine respondents, empha-

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 171 sized the ultimate authority of either Islamic scripture or the Shariah (the Islamic divine law) to confirm abuse. The distinction between Islamic scripture and the Shariah is important to bear in mind. The Qur'an (the Muslim holy book) and the Sunnah (the 'Prophetic tradition') represent the two levels of Islamic scripture out of which traditional interpretation and application have been encoded in the legal-juridical texts that represent the Shariah. The Imam of one of Toronto's major mosques, known for its conservatism, framed probably the most concise statement of this type of definition. He defined wife abuse as 'any violation of the Shariah by the husband in relationship to the wife/ a definition that directly tied the determination of abuse to the objective standards of the Shariah. It is significant, however, that the shared emphasis by members of the Muslim religious group on Islamic scripture or the Shariah as the proper objective standard to employ in defining wife abuse does not resolve all problems. There is considerable variation in interpretations of Islamic scripture. This meant that, in effect, some in the Muslim group shared certain positions regarding definition with respondents from the ethniccultural group. Nothing so clearly illustrates this range of views as the Muslim religious group's divisions over the issue of the physical beating of a wife. From the perspective of those who maintained a subjective type of definition of wife abuse, any hitting of a wife by her spouse, however minor, which is accompanied by the feeling of pain, physical or emotional, is considered wife abuse. However, from the viewpoint of those who maintained an objective type of definition confirmation of an objective authority is necessary for the feeling of pain to be considered 'abuse.' Virtually all of the respondents of the Muslim religious group agreed that the objective authority was either the Islamic scripture directly or the Shariah, its traditional commentary and application. However, in responding to the meaning of a key Qu'ranic scriptural reference to wife beating, they differed widely in their interpretation. The main Qu'ranic reference to wife beating reads as follows: '... for those women from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and banish them to beds apart, and beat them. Then if they obey you, seek not a way against them. Lo! Allah is ever High Exalted, Great' (Pickthall 1979, 80). This and other significant scriptural references appear to indicate that under some circumstances it is permitted for a man to beat his wife. This has clearly been the interpretation of all of the traditional schools of Shariah, and all but one of the respondents from the Muslim religious group acknowledged this interpretation. As one religious leader who was instrumental

172 Shaheen Azmi in establishing a Muslim religious social service agency indicated, 'There are cases when it is allowed by the Shariah for a man to strike a woman, that is when a woman is being unfaithful, meaning ... that she is doing non-Islamic things, or doing extreme, extremely bad, non-Islamic things/ Several respondents defined the extent of the beating allowed by referring to a Prophetic tradition that the beating of a wife should not exceed the strength of a light tap from a pencil-sized tooth stick called a Misivaak. Those respondents who interpreted the scriptural references to allow for a 'light' physical beating divided on the possibility of acting on it in the Canadian context. Some simply affirmed the allowance in principle and were content to determine the permissibility of any specific wife beating on the basis of the particular context. The Imam, for example, was most adamant in affirming the right of a Muslim to act upon the Shariah in any context. In contrast, other respondents indicated that the Islamic allowance of wife beating was invalid in the Canadian context. As the religious leader who had helped to found a Muslim religious social service agency explained, T honestly feel that there is no need for a law within this context, because it was only an alternative allowed in extreme cases, and the way the law in this society is set up ... my counselling to Muslim men openly and secretly is that they should avoid it altogether/ Another and contrasting view was offered by a counsellor working in a mainstream welfare institution. This counsellor was either unaware of or disagreed with the Shariah-based interpretations of the Qu'ranic reference, and offered an interpretation of her own that prohibited wife beating altogether. She claimed that the verse in question emerged within a specific historical context, where excessive wife beating was normal. According to this respondent, by suggesting a limited beating, the Qu'ranic verse was intended to prevent wife-beating, rather than to affirm the practice. As this counsellor indicated, 'Yeah, it's a prohibition. It's a prohibitive element there, not something to be used. It's prohibiting you from anger, hitting her, and hurting her/ This counsellor's interpretation of the Qu'ranic reference results in a position on the issue of abuse that differs little from the outlook of those who advocated a subjective definition of wife abuse. Beating was always 'abuse,' irrespective of its degree or the circumstances in which it occurred. In contrast, from the viewpoint of those who acknowledged in principle the right of a man to lightly beat his wife under extreme circumstances, wife beating is not necessarily 'wife abuse/ The determination

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 173 depended on the degree of the beating and/or the legitimacy of the circumstances that precipitated it, not the fact of a beating per se. Causes of Wife Abuse The respondents were also queried about what they believed to be the causes of wife abuse. The varying ways in which they had defined abuse were echoed in their explanations of its causes. Respondents from the Muslim religious group differed most overtly from the ethnic-cultural group in the language chosen to frame a response: all respondents from the Muslim religious group placed the cause of wife abuse within the symbolic context of religious morality and ethics, more specifically, with reference to Islam as a body of moral and ethical teachings. In varying ways all of these respondents argued that the lack of comprehension and application of the moral and ethical teachings of Islam was a fundamental cause of wife abuse. A typical example of this position is contained in one counsellor's formulation of the 'number one cause' of wife abuse, which he declared was '...a wrong perception of Islam, a lack of understanding of what the religion is, and then the role of men and women with the religion, because people here tend to look at Islam based on their culture not based on the actual principles of the religion.' In contrast, respondents from the ethnic-cultural group, along with all of the nonMuslims interviewed, addressed the issue of causation directly, without reference to religion, morality, or Islam. Although some of these respondents did have strong views on how religion related to wife abuse, they related their responses about causation to specific social phenomena, which were not necessarily related to religion. All respondents agreed that causation is a very complex issue and, generally speaking, respondents were little interested in discussing the philosophical issues associated with the idea of causation. They were more focused on identifying the primary factors associated with the cause of wife abuse. Each of these associated factors I have termed a locus of causation. Two main loci of causation of wife abuse were a general religious and spiritual decay in society and the state of gender relations. Three respondents from the Muslim religious group directly identified spiritual and religious decay as the primary cause of wife abuse. Other members of the group undoubtedly shared the general sentiment that Islam was a positive force working to counteract wife abuse, but they did not regard this as the ultimate and only cause of the problem. Among the three from the Muslim religious group who did explicitly attribute wife

174 Shaheen Azmi abuse to spiritual and moral decay, only the Imam saw it as the sole cause. The Imam insisted that the cause of wife abuse was 'the love of the material world and the hatred of death/ which is a portion of a Prophetic saying that attributes all sin to this ultimate cause. The other two respondents who emphasized spiritual and religious decay also attributed causation to the state of gender relations. One respondent from the ethnic-cultural group specifically mentioned the decline of religion in society as a factor in causing wife abuse, but he did not emphasize it to the exclusion of other, less abstract causes. The remaining three respondents from this group either felt that religion was a neutral force in explaining wife abuse or that it was a major source of the problem. Two respondents indicated that religion and Islam were neutral factors, neither significantly promoting nor preventing wife abuse. The remaining respondent felt strongly that religion in general and Islam in particular was a major cause of wife abuse. This interviewee was harsh in denouncing Islam for 'oppressing women/ As she indicated, 'Islam does not provide any rights for women.' Rather, Islam created an environment of oppression of women, which promoted wife abuse. The most commonly mentioned cause of wife abuse among both groups was the state of gender relations in society and family. Ten respondents, six from the Muslim religious group and all four from the ethnic-cultural group, cited some form of male domination as being a cause of wife abuse. However, further inquiry reveals that there was considerable variation among these ten respondents regarding the exact nature of male domination and the linkages between male domination and wife abuse. The vast majority of respondents who identified male domination as a source of wife abuse argued that inequality between genders per se was not the source of the problem. Rather, wife abuse was identified with an excessive and unbalanced inequality and an unqualified type of male domination. As the religious leader working in a Muslim social service agency that he had helped to establish explained,'... there is an abusive type of dominance, but then there is a positive type of dominance, where the man is the leader of the home, more like the leader. When the balance is there you don't have a problem.' Two respondents from the Muslim religious group and another from the ethnic-cultural group refused to accept the idea that Islam actually supported the notion of male domination in marriage at all. In their view, Islamic scripture established separate and distinct spheres or roles for males and females without indicating any inequality or dominance, Men and women were thus 'separate but equal.' Wife abuse was related to

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 175 situations in which male domination was superimposed on the differentiation of roles established by Islam. According to these respondents, any form of male domination that Islamic scripture does not sanction is a cause of wife abuse. As one respondent observed, 'The Western world looks upon Islam as being a very patriarchal religion, but I don't think so ... Islam is the only religion that has given rights to women, not like other religions. So if it is a religion that has given equality, where is patriarchy?' The last perspective on male domination as a cause of wife abuse was provided by the respondent from the ethnic-cultural group who regarded Islam and religion as being a major cause of wife abuse. From her perspective any form of male domination was not only a cause of wife abuse but was itself wife abuse, and Islam was identified as one religion among others that clearly promoted male domination. The notion that wife abuse is related to male domination of any type was common to all non-Muslim interviewees, who shared the view that wife abuse was caused by 'patriarchy/ Where they parted company was on whether religion was independent of patriarchy or the source of it. Perceptions on the Response to Wife Abuse What one believes to be the appropriate response to wife abuse is obviously very much dependent on how wife abuse is defined. Thus, perceptions about the response to wife abuse follow closely and are a practical manifestation of different perceptions about the nature of wife abuse. Two separate and distinct categories of response emerged from the interviews and they again highlight the range of views present in the Muslim community. These two categories are 'perception of goals for the welfare response to wife abuse' and 'perception of counselling in response to wife abuse.' Goals for the Welfare Response Underlying different perceptions of the appropriate welfare response to wife abuse were different understandings of what the primary goal of the response should be. While many overlapping goals were identified, it was only by identifying a primary goal that most respondents, Muslim and ethnic-cultural, could simplify the complex phenomenon of welfare response to wife abuse and offer any evaluation at all. Seven of the thirteen respondents, five from the Muslim religious group and two from the ethnic-cultural group, provided a sufficiently clear indication of what

176 Shaheen Azmi they believed to be the primary goal guiding the welfare response to wife abuse. The three primary goals identified were the salvation of souls, the preservation of families, and the safety of abused women. Two respondents from the Muslim religious group identified the primary goal of the welfare response to wife abuse as saving souls from perdition in the next world. These two were both religious functionaries - the Imam and the religious leader who had helped to establish a Muslim religious social service agency. The Imam's approach essentially defines welfare as synonymous with religion, and renders any attempt to separate them as doomed to failure. Seeing no separation between the religious and secular worlds - all is religious - according to the Imam, the principal and overriding aim of any activity must be religious salvation. Accordingly, Islam, as a religious practice, is the ultimate welfare activity. It is only through the broader aim of religious salvation that any 'welfare' activity can result in any real benefit. The other religious leader grounded this notion in a practical context, referring to the aims of the Muslim religious social service agency that he had helped to establish. Religious salvation was its primary goal. This goal was to be achieved through the development of all activity according to the 'limits set by the Islamic Shariah, the establishment of 'the fear of Allah as one of the major points of cure'; and by endeavouring to 'bring a family together not to break it up.' Welfare is thus inseparable from the goal of salvation, and the activities of this particular welfare agency were only valid so long as it acted to extend Islam's reach. Four respondents, three from the Muslim religious group and one from the ethnic-cultural group, indicated that preservation of families should be the primary goal of the welfare response to wife abuse. Most of these respondents believed this view to be in sharp contrast with what they understood to be the underlying aim of many mainstream welfare services for abused women - removing the wife, mother, or daughter from the family unit. For example, as one respondent indicated with some antagonism: 'One of the problems here is some women's agencies in particular ... hearing of wife abuse cases would go there and help, and the solution they provide a lot of times is separation ... and they exploit the situation to their advantage, and so they think that they are helping women, but no! To me they are ruining families/ Since the family is a key unit in Islamic life and ritual, the goal of preserving families was also identified as crucial by the two religious leaders who accepted that the primary goal of welfare was religious salvation. For these two, the preservation of families was an essential

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 177 complement to the goal of salvation. These respondents who identified preserving families as the primary goal of welfare were less emphatic in explaining why the preservation of families was so important. The underlying supposition seems to be that the family is of pivotal social value as much as it is of religious value, and that marriages should be preserved. Also, as one respondent remarked, the preservation of families was a goal shared by most abused Muslim women. 'Most of the women I've seen don't want the marriage to be broken up. They want the man to change, and they want it to get better, and they want to go back home.' One respondent from the ethnic-cultural group indicated that the safety of women in abusive situations must be the overriding goal of all welfare services to abused women. She was the only one of thirteen respondents of Muslim background to do so. Although all other Muslim respondents shared the view that it was very important to protect women from further abuse, only this respondent stated that it was the single overriding concern. In contrast, all non-Muslim respondents advanced women's safety as the primary goal and this is clearly the dominant mandate of current mainstream welfare responses to wife abuse. It is also notable that all of the respondents who gave priority to the goal of women's safety, including the respondent of Muslim background, recognized that this position was resisted in the Muslim community, and were hostile to the idea that family unity superseded the immediate safety concerns of an abused women. As one of these respondents indicated, the goal that should be encouraged is: 'First and foremost getting the women out. Typically, the opposite occurs, you want to keep the family together, and in so doing you put the woman and the children at risk, so the initial crisis intervention that needs to take place is to get her out, all of the other stuff you can deal with later.' Perceptions of Counselling Responses to Wife Abuse Virtually all respondents had some experience counselling families suffering from marital discord and family violence. At the time of the interviews five respondents from the Muslim religious group and two from the ethnic-cultural group were actively engaged in counselling in exactly these kinds of situations. In addition, counselling was identified by almost all of the respondents as the most pervasive welfare activity currently employed in addressing situations of wife abuse. Evaluations of counselling activities were offered by most respondents, and in greater detail than those offered of any other form of response to wife abuse.

178 Shaheen Azmi Understandably, the views on counselling and counselling methods, pro and con, in many ways mirrored the range of views expressed about goals for the welfare response to wife abuse. Hostility to Mainstream Counselling Seven of the nine respondents from the Muslim religious group and all four members of the ethnic-cultural group made a judgment regarding counselling services provided by mainstream agencies for wife abuse victims. Most of these comments were directed toward counselling provided by women's shelters, but they were occasionally extended to include general counselling provided by what was termed as 'the mainstream.' Despite the fact that several of these individuals worked in institutions that might also be considered mainstream, virtually all of these respondents were, to varying degrees, negative in their assessments of mainstream counselling services. The most severe criticism of mainstream counselling came from active counsellors from the Muslim religious group. These five were emphatic in charging that mainstream counsellors and welfare organizations were hostile to Islam and prejudiced against Muslims. One respondent summed up the general perception of these five: 'The mainstream organizations are prejudiced against the Muslims. They preach that in Islam violence is condoned, that we are all inherently violent, that men especially are all oppressors.' These five Muslim respondents also share the belief that mainstream counsellors maliciously encourage family breakup. As one of these five indicated, '...in many cases they do more harm than good ... because they are not sensitive to the real needs of the community, and they have a pre-judgment in their minds, and in many cases they have this intention of separating the family.' All of these respondents were particularly hostile and suspicious of counselling services provided by women's shelters. Accusations were made that many counsellors in shelters were using their position to promote feminist ideological propaganda. One female respondent who worked with a mainstream agency remarked: 'There are cases where some kind of brainwashing takes place by the counsellors, something opposed to their religion and culture, and by other women who have a different philosophy of womanhood ... we have cases where women have been brainwashed and changed their beliefs.' Two of these five Muslim respondents also accused women's shelters of being centres of lesbian activities, and portrayed many counsellors in shelters as attempt-

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 179 ing to exploit their positions to seduce vulnerable and abused Muslim women into a lesbian life style. Women of Muslim background who worked in shelters were also criticized. These five respondents described Muslim women who worked as counsellors in shelters or mainstream agencies as rebellious Muslims who were hostile to the faith. One respondent described the situation in mainstream agencies as follows: '... most of the secular-minded service people that I have met, well they have a prejudgment. They are prejudiced against Islam ... or there is somebody from the community, who is ashamed of the community... they are generally the ones who take up this role.' Another respondent declared, '... there is Muslim staff in agencies but their knowledge of Islam is very little and misinformed or misdirected, they have this rebellious attitude among themselves against Islam. That goes for many mainstream agencies/ The remaining two respondents from the Muslim religious group who commented on counselling services provided by mainstream agencies were somewhat less severe in their criticism. They did not attribute to mainstream counsellors and institutions any malicious intention toward Islam and the Muslim community. Instead, they believed that the bias in mainstream counselling against Islam and Muslims was the result of illfounded stereotypes and an information gap about the true nature of Islam and the Muslim community. One of these respondents commented, 'They are reluctant to intervene and even try to help because they do not really understand our culture or our religion and ... they [have] admitted this. They think by "helping," they are not really helping.' All four respondents from the ethnic-cultural group identified the 'fit' between the mainstream counselling services and their particular ethniccultural communities as a problem. Asked why the fit was not right, opinion varied. Two accused mainstream counsellors and workers of being 'racist' and 'sexist/ and making only superficial moves toward accommodating the needs of minority communities. The other two respondents were less severe. They saw not racism or sexism but rather differences in cultural understanding, an inability or unwillingness to read one another's cultural codes. With time, people of good will could sort these misunderstandings out. Respondents in the ethnic-cultural group focused primarily on their own particular ethnic-cultural group within the larger Muslim community. But, while they came from different ethnic or national backgrounds and differed as to whether the issue was racism and sexism or a bridgeable gulf in understanding, the common thread running throughout their

180 Shaheen Azmi views was that the mainstream counselling organizations and the Muslim community did not speak the same language when it came to wife abuse. One respondent described the problem as one of a 'cultural gap/ Unlike the Muslim group, none of the ethnic-cultural respondents made even passing reference to mainstream hostility to Muslim religion or religious ideology as a factor in determining the relationship between their sections of the Muslim community and mainstream counselling. The problem was not religion; it was perception. Viewpoints on Counselling All five respondents from the Muslim religious group personally active in counselling stated that their counselling work was informed by Islamic values and scriptural guidelines. This included the Imam and other religious leaders who were exclusively involved in counselling Muslims. But it also included two counsellors who worked in mainstream settings and who regularly counselled both Muslim and non-Muslim clients. One of these respondents observed, 'I do a lot of counselling, and sometimes I just go into the Islamic perspective [about] what a woman is, what a woman's rights should be ... A lot of my counselling will involve that/ Three respondents who regularly counselled non-Muslim clients indicated that they often fall back on Islamic religious values. One of these respondents observed: 'I use the Islamic guidelines to even counsel my non-Muslim patients/ Another respondent explained why she relies on Islamic values and guidelines to counsel her non-Muslim clients: 'If we look at the values of Islam and practise them, they are all valuable to all families, not just to Muslim families ... anything which is good doesn't necessarily have to be identified because it is Islamic. If it is good, it can be useful to you and to me and to those who don't even profess to be Muslims/ The three respondents who worked with non-Muslim clients also indicated that in their work they sometimes deliver what they regard as specifically religious messages, often in defiance of secular organizational regulations: 'Unofficially, I am not supposed to be doing this but when I am counselling Muslim women, even Hindu women, and what ever religion ... I am telling them that their only hope of finding peace in their lives, and coming to terms with what has happened [to them], and starting a new beginning, is for them to turn to God/ These overt uses of Islamic perspectives to help counsel both Islamic and non-Islamic clients probably go beyond what is usually meant by culturally sensitive social service. In contrast, the three respondents from the ethnic-cultural group who

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 181 worked as counsellors shared the general outlook of most of the nonMuslim counsellors interviewed. All focused on the specifics of the abuse and on the problem of abuse from the vantage point of legal codes and the allocation of responsibility to the man. One of the non-Muslim counsellors spoke for all those who shared her view of wife abuse. 'I think we all make judgments in our work with people ... Ours is a very clear mandate. Our judgment is that we follow the laws of Canada. We also expand abuse to include emotional and other things past the legal mandate, and we judge that the man is responsible/ As far as she was concerned, neither religion nor religious values played a role in her or her colleagues' counselling about issues of family violence. If victims came from deeply religious backgrounds, that was at best irrelevant; at worst it was part of the problem. Solutions were conceived entirely in secular terms, and secular values were the only ones needed to guide counselling. Bringing couples in abusive situations together for counselling is frowned upon if not against the established protocol of mainstream social agencies. No ethnic-cultural group respondent nor any nonMuslim respondent identified this protocol to be an issue of concern in their counselling. However, all of the five respondents from the Muslim religious group were vocal in rejecting separation. The Imam indicated that he only counsels cases where both husband and wife are involved, and would not see one partner without the other. Another Muslim respondent who worked in a mainstream agency declared that seeing partners separately is 'standard procedure, but I am the only one in my organization who sees these couples and families together.' She explained that joint counselling was the only way of helping some of her clients. 'If a woman calls in and she still would like to have her family kept together, but the abuse doesn't stop, and if she is given the kind of service... where the husband is not included, she just won't call. She will come in one time and that's it.' The abused wife in this example was not the only one who made the survival of the family a goal. The Muslims interviewed saw preservation for the family unit as a primary goal of counselling and regarded counselling couples together as necessary to ensure that the family was kept together. Muslims preferred, if not insisted upon, joint counselling. Divisions within the Muslim Religious Group Although all five respondents from the Muslim religious group who were active in counselling shared the goal of maintaining the family unit, there were significant differences among their approaches, which were

182 Shaheen Azmi clearly reflected in their perceptions of one another's work. The five religious counsellors worked in three different institutional structures. The Imam counselled as part of his religious calling and only from within the mosque. Two other religious leaders counselled in specific social service settings outside of mosque facilities. For one of these, the Muslim religious social service agency he had helped to found served as home base for his counselling work. The remaining two respondents were trained social workers employed in mainstream or ethno-specific social service agencies. Although some Muslim religious group respondents expressed admiration for the Imam's counselling efforts, four of the respondents who were active in counselling also expressed reservations about the counselling work of the Imam and others in the Muslim community who were seen as operating in a similar fashion. The two religious leaders specifically involved in social service activity politely but firmly disagreed with the Imam's approach and indicated that he was only one of several local Imams whose work was counter-productive and, they argued, not religiously correct. According to one of these respondents, the Imams in question do not have the perspective necessary to counsel those in need. 'Some Imams are not recognizing the abusers, they are encouraging the abusers... Their own perception of Islam is not correct. I am not saying all of them, but some Imams, who are just viewing things from one perspective only, are giving this kind of advice, so that wives that seek some solutions through the mosques are not getting the right advice.' The two Muslim trained social workers, as well as two other Muslim respondents with social work training, were openly negative, not only about the counselling work of the Imam but also about that of other Muslim religious leaders. The Muslim respondent who worked in an ethnospecific agency argued that most Imams tended to be biased towards the husband's side. 'The feedback I get from the religious leader,' she explained, 'is forgive him if he has done that and the man is very lightly reprimanded. And the responsibility, the onus, the guilt, is put on the wife.' This same respondent indicated many of her Muslim clients came to her only after they had had a bad experience with an Imam or a religious leader: 'Muslim women when they come to me they have already been to their mosque and they say, "well we went to Mr so and so, and all he told us was to be a good wife, be obedient, the Qu'ran teaches us to forgive; "I think for the sake of the children you should go back." And, she does go back, endangering her life more so, and receiving more beatings until finally she comes to an organization like ours,

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 183 and says, "I did go to the mosque/" Another respondent with social work experience was of the opinion that religious leaders need training if they are to continue counselling in abusive situations. As things stood, these leaders were simply unaware of the dynamics of an abusive situation. As this respondent indicated: 'Basically they look at the man as, maybe he just lost control this time, it's just a one-time thing. They don't understand the psychology of an abusive man. They think that if he is religious, and he is practising, that he wouldn't be doing that.' Several respondents were quite familiar with the welfare activities of the religious leader who had helped to establish a Muslim religious social service agency. He and his agency maintain a high profile within the Muslim community and, since he was so closely identified with the agency, comments about his counselling work were inseparable from those about the work of his agency. This agency, established in 1990, was the first of its kind in the Toronto area. It emerged out of the efforts by the religious leader to deal with marital problems brought to him as Imam of one Toronto's major mosques. He found that women were generally intimidated by the mosque, which he referred to as a 'very masculine setting.' Consequently, he decided to establish a social agency that he felt was more conducive to counselling families experiencing marital problems who remain bound by Islamic religious aims and norms. Most of the respondents from the Muslim religious group who commented on this Muslim religious social service agency praised its work in relation to wife abuse and lauded the efforts of the religious leader who was its main counsellor. However, one of the Muslim respondents with social work training questioned the lack of technical or professional training of its main counsellor and other staff. Perhaps because of the absence of training, this respondent lumped the work of this religious leader and his agency into the same category as that of Imams and religious leaders working in mosque settings. It is notable that the Imam made no reference to this Muslim social service agency, although he was surely aware of its work. His silence should not be mistaken for approval. While he made no direct reference to the agency, the Imam's views were very clear and they precluded acceptance of any non-mosque-based social work. The notion that social work or counselling as an activity distinct from that offered by the Imam was rejected as invalid or religiously unsound, even if it were offered by a Muslim social agency. From the Imam's perspective an 'Islamic' social agency was a contradiction in terms. The Imam was very concerned that all social issues be addressed within a traditional, religious framework.

184 Shaheen Azmi Indeed, he rejected the very idea that the social and religious realms could be separated. Everything is religious and ruled by religious strictures, including wife abuse. In his view, wife abuse, like other so-called social problems, could only be dealt with in the context of the mosque, and under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shariah. To deal with issues such as wife abuse outside a mosque, in the context of a social agency, even a Muslim social agency, not only violated his understanding of religious norms but it also opened the possibility that other 'social' problems could be removed from the mosque to the jurisdiction of secular legal codes. This was unacceptable to the Imam. The Imam was no more positive about the counselling work of Muslim social workers employed with mainstream agencies. He felt that these Muslims were generally weak in their religious practice and their social work training only served to further undermine their religious integrity and understanding of religious principles. Their counselling, he feared, too often misdirected families away from the only real solution to their problems, the unswerving adherence to Islam. The Imam's position on Muslim social workers working in mainstream agencies was part of his broader views on the work of trained professionals. He routinely refused any contact with trained professionals, Muslim or non-Muslim, and had many times refused to participate in interviews and meetings requested by such individuals. The Imam only agreed to meet and talk with me, a social work researcher, after he was approached by an intermediary, and in the full knowledge that I am a practising Muslim. And our discussion was hardly that of researcher and interviewee. The Imam agreed to see me only on the condition that our discussion be a free exchange according to the rules of a religious dialogue in the mosque. Social science conventions were dismissed. He refused to sign any consent forms, to follow an interview schedule, or to allow the recording of our dialogue. The other two religious leaders interviewed were not nearly so dismissive of this researcher or hostile toward trained Muslim social workers working in mainstream agencies. But they cautioned that some people working for mainstream agencies who were identified as Muslims were, as far as the two religious leaders were concerned, non-practising and perhaps actively in rebellion against Islam. At the same time, both recognized the positive contributions made by those few practising Muslim social workers counselling in mainstream agencies. As a measure of observance both religious leaders gave utmost weight to the observance of the Sunnah, 'the Prophetic tradition,' which included the Hijab or head cover for women. The observance of Hijab is the norm for women

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 185 working within the Muslim religious social service agency established by one of these leaders. The two active female counsellors from the Muslim religious group who worked with mainstream agencies did not customarily observe the Hijab, and would therefore undoubtedly be considered religiously questionable by the two religious leaders. From Wife Abuse to Social Integration: Competing Ideological Views To review, there was substantial variation among Muslim respondents with respect to the nature of wife abuse. Their views can be grouped into four ideological camps. On one end of the spectrum was the Imam. His perceptions were unique and reflected a profoundly traditional religious view of welfare. Wife abuse was understood within an exclusively religious framework. It was a religious problem and had a religious answer. Wife abuse was exclusively the result of religious deviation and weakness, and the appropriate welfare response was grounded in a sincere and proper adherence to the Shariah, under the guidance of religious functionaries in the context of the family and the mosque. As far as the Imam was concerned, the social reality, including the social reality of the Muslim community, must remain unbending in its adherence to the norms of the Shariah. On the other end of the spectrum were the perceptions of respondents in the ethnic-cultural group, who tended to separate the realms of secular welfare and religion. The viewpoints of this group conform, in general, to the viewpoint of the non-Muslim respondents interviewed for the study. In defining wife abuse and responding to it, the ethnic-cultural group accepted the same modern, secular norms for welfare as non-Muslim respondents did. They all shared a belief that wife abuse needed to be responded to in conformity with secular law and the liberal social norms prevailing in larger civic society, by trained professionals in the context of public agencies. Where there was any deviation from a strict adherence to this secular, liberal outlook, it can be seen as a measure of the degree to which members of the ethnic-cultural group maintained some identification with the religious stream within their particular ethnic-cultural communities. For example, they expressed frustration with mainstream institutions for what was regarded as a lack of cultural sensitivity. They were divided on whether this lack of cultural sensitivity was the product of systemic racism or a more benign absence of cross-cultural training and experience. In the middle of the spectrum lie the various members of the Muslim

186 Shaheen Azmi religious group. They accepted some division between welfare and religious realms, but disagreed with the completely secular perspective of the ethnic-cultural group. But even this middle-of-the-road group was divided into two sub-groupings. The first was best typified by the religious leader who was actively involved in social service work. For him the Shariah, the traditional interpretation of the scripture, was an important starting point in dealing with wife abuse. But it was also imperative to acknowledge the nature of the larger social reality, the position of a minority Muslim community in the larger Toronto and Canadian context. For example, this religious leader, like the Imam, recognized the Shariah's allowance of light wife beating under extreme circumstances. But he declared its practise in Canada was invalid given the larger nonMuslim legal and social context. In contrast, the Imam was firm in declaring the principle, and remained silent on its application in Canada. This is a major distinction. Unlike the Imam, the religious leader never lost sight of the social context of the Muslim community even as he tapped the wisdom, ideals, and codes of the Shariah. The second sub-group was typified by the Muslim welfare professionals who worked within mainstream institutions. For them, the Shariah was not a starting point at all. This sub-group was attentive to scripture but offered interpretations, sometimes unique, that were much more in keeping with modern social norms. Recall the female counsellor's less-than-traditional interpretation of the verse of the Qu'ran on wife beating. Her interpretation amounted to a contextual nullification of the outward and most apparent meaning of the verse - the right of a husband to physically discipline his wife - an interpretation that conflicted with modern norms. Thus, while members of this sub-group drew upon religion in their approach to wife abuse and social work generally, in effect their religious perceptions were only slightly more amenable to traditional Islamic religious norms and values than those of the more secular ethnic-cultural group. They also tended to articulate a vision of an evolving Muslim community, which had both social and religious dimensions. The spectrum of views expressed about wife abuse and its requisite response reflects a general variation on issues affecting the Muslim community's adaptation to the non-Islamic Canadian secular environment. The perspective of the Imam represents an entirely segregationist approach to the development of the Muslim community, one that attempts at all costs to preserve a traditional, religious form of the Muslim community in the midst of Canadian society. His perspective calls for as little

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 187 interaction as possible with mainstream society, and he advocates the building of parochial religious institutions to serve the community, with the mosque at its centre. The perspective of the other members of the Muslim religious group represents, to varying degrees, a more malleable and less segregationist approach than that advanced by the Imam. This perspective clearly favours the development of parochial, parallel Muslim institutions to serve the needs of the Muslim community. These would include social service institutions. No one expressed any reservation about patterning these institutions to one degree or another on those of the mainstream. The call for Muslim institutional development in parallel to that of mainstream Canadian society also assumes the need for continuing interaction with that society. The Muslim religious group understood that these Muslim social service institutions will need to be recognized, sanctioned, or accredited, and perhaps funded in whole or in part by the mainstream society, and, accordingly, might best be developed in partnership with it. This approach to institutional growth is predicated on the larger civic culture's continuing commitment to multiculturalism, but with a difference. It demands an allowance of religious group definition as opposed to the largely secular cultural orientation of official multiculturalism in Canada. The separation of church and state is not as clear as it is in the United States. In any event, Muslim agencies would follow the models developed by Christian and Jewish agencies in an earlier period. The perspective of the ethnic-cultural group represents acceptance of official multiculturalism. It also constitutes the most integrationist view advanced within the Muslim community, one which sees the development of that community along ethnic-cultural rather than religious lines and participating freely in the mainstream society. While it may retain support for some separate, ethnic-based institutions, it is far more amenable to encouraging mainstream institutions to provide culturally sensitive services to members of the ethnic community. Conclusion This study of perceptions of wife abuse and welfare responses demonstrates considerable diversity within the Muslim community. The variety of 'Muslim' approaches suggests that recognizing the importance of cultural sensitivity is only a first step. While Canadian law seems clear on the issue of wife abuse, the optimal approach for social work practice sensitive to Islamic sensibilities is not.

188 Shaheen Azmi My personal experience suggests that the competing ideological perspectives identified - defining different approaches to piety and to contact with the non-Muslim world - are vital forces shaping the internal dynamics and development of the Muslim community. The Muslim community is replete with internal antagonisms and competition, based as much on ideological perspectives as upon the often more visible sources of diversity, including race, national origin, culture, religious sect, and language. This differentiation has illustrated the limits of assuming that a simple ethnic or religious matching of clients and professionals will predetermine treatment procedures or outcomes. These kind of differences are certainly not unique to the Muslim community; they are found in all significant minority communities. Issues like wife abuse pose the greatest challenge to the multicultural vision, to the extent that some interpretations of traditional cultures clearly violate both Canadian law and norms. Studying the various ways in which the Muslim community reacts to this tension can help us to understand how minority communities in general establish their place within the Canadian mosaic. REFERENCES

Azmi, S.H. 1989a. An Analysis of Religious Divisions in the Muslim Community in Metropolitan Toronto. Al-Basirah: Bulletin of Islam and Islamic Social Sciences l(l):2-9. - 1989b. Social Service Provision and the Muslim Community in Metropolitan Toronto. Unpublished, Faculty of Social Work, University of Toronto. - 1990. The Tabligh Movement in Canada: Its Development and Future Prospects. Paper delivered to International Workshop on the Tablighi Jama'at, Committee on the Comparative Study of Muslim Societies, American Social Sciences Research Council, 7-9 June 1990, London, England. - 1996a. Perceptions of the Welfare Response to Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Metropolitan Toronto. Doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto. - 1996b. Muslim Educational Institutions in the Greater Toronto Region. Unpublished paper. Chinese Family Life Services of Metro Toronto. 1996. Working with Gambling Problems in the Chinese. Family Life Services of Metro Toronto mimeo. Green, James W. 1995. Cultural Awareness in the Human Services: A Multi-Ethnic Service. 2nd ed. Toronto: Allyn and Bacon. Haddad, Y.Y., ed. 1991. The Muslims of America. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Haddad, Y.Y., and J.I. Smith, eds. 1994. Muslim Communities in North America. Albany: State University of New York Press. Hutnik, N. 1988. Aspects of Identity in a Multi-Ethnic Society. Neiv Community 12(2):298309. Kelly, Patricia. 1992. The Application of Family Systems Theory to Mental Health Services for Southeast Asian Refugees. Journal of Multicultural Social Work 2: 1-13.

Wife Abuse in the Muslim Community of Toronto 189 Lum, Doman. 1996. Social Work Practice and People of Color: A Process-Stage Approach. 3rd ed. Toronto: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co. Merton, R., M. Fiske, and P. Kendal, 1990. The Focused Interview. 2nd ed. New York: The Free Press. Muslim World League, Canadian Office. 1996. Muslim Guide to Canada. Toronto: Muslim World League, Canadian Office. Pickthall, M.M., trans. 1979. The Meaning of the Glorious Quran. Karachi, Pakistan: Idaratul Quran wal Uloomil Islamia. Rashid, A. 1985. The Muslim Canadians: A Profile. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Waugh, E.H., B. Abu-Laban, and R.B. Qureshi. 1983. The Muslim Community in North America. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press. - 1991. Muslim Families in North America. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press.

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PART III: ETHNICITY, RACE, AND POLITICS

Ethnicity in Canada, as in many other national societies, has become politicized. Like that of most liberal democracies, Canada's political system is rooted in conceptions of the individual citizen exercising individual rights. But group rights must also be considered. Reserving electoral seats for designated groups, designating a religious group as eligible for public funding of its schools, or the exercise of individual rights by a collection of same-origin citizens, such as the right of Sikhs to wear turbans in the RCMP, can contest pride of place with individual rights. The political mobilization of minority groups and the greater salience of minority political issues undoubtedly influence the course of Canadian political life. Ethnic politicization takes two basic forms. Like all organized bodies, ethnic communities have their own internal political structures. At times these become torn by conflict, sometimes as the result of old-world conflicts transplanted to the new world. In other cases basic differences of region, subculture, or ideology within either a newly arrived immigrant group or a well-established ethnic group may cause difficulty. But these political disputes, important as they might be to the ethnic group, are usually hidden from outsiders: little is known of how minority groups actually govern themselves and how decisions are made. We know more about the second dimension of ethnic political life, its external dimension. Organizational structures of the ethnic polity increasingly serve as lobbies representing or defending group interests to government. The issues of special concern to minority groups are often associated with international affairs - a homeland dispute - or involve discrimination affecting minorities in Canada. Minorities or their leadership may try to mobilize their respective communities around such issues. When this happens, minority interests are defended both by the

192 Part III official organizations of the polity itself, and also by minority origin elected politicians or, more delicately, by senior public servants or political appointees of minority origin. Such insiders often have to walk a personal and professional tightrope, balancing obligations to the wider electorate, their party, or their government with the interests of their particular community or heritage. Both the internal and external dimensions of ethnic politics are shaped by the larger political environment, particularly as that environment accepts the legitimacy of defending minority issues. In the past, defending minority interests, or even being a member of a minority group and a public official, left one open to charges of 'dual loyalty.' Traditional political elites, and indeed many Canadians, assumed that defence of a minority interest automatically clashed with the defence of a Canadian or national interest. These suspicions were usually heightened in times of war or international crisis. Minority politicians and representatives avoid establishing a case on a purely particularistic or material basis, preferring instead to take the high road and make a case based on the defence of principles such as human rights or equal opportunity. Political parties and the media can shape the social environment in which ethnic polities and ethnic politicians defend - or choose not to defend - the interests of ethnic constituents. Media treatment of minority political issues, for example, poses dilemmas with no easy solutions. To what degree should racist or allegedly racist political expression receive media coverage? Does that coverage serve to expose and undermine those expressions, or does it add legitimacy to racism, thereby contributing to its spread and possible acceptance? The trends in ethnic politics, part of the larger world of 'identity polities' that is taking hold in Canada, challenge traditional Canadian political assumptions. Canadians have been schooled to think rationally and objectively about political decisions, to vote for and support political positions or candidates based on their merits. In a political process in which image increasingly dominates over substance, we know how often these ideals have been breached in practice. The intersection of ethnic politics and polities adds an important element to that mix.

8

Black Insiders, the Black Polity, and the Ontario NDP Government, 1990-1995 ADAM LEWINBERG

Introduction In dealing with government, minority activists defend their group's interests in two ways. As leaders of communal organizations, they may put pressure on government from the outside. They may also work from within government, as elected politicians or, more commonly, as senior public servants or government political appointees. Both of these approaches to government have played a role in the evolution of the black polity in Ontario. To date, however, little work has been published on the political involvement and mobilization of blacks in Ontario. This study focuses on the challenges that faced black insiders in the Ontario NDP government in the early 1990s. Ontario is Canada's most urbanized province and Toronto is its largest urban centre. Ontario, and the Toronto area in particular, has been a magnet for immigrants over the past four decades. Since the early 1970s the majority of all immigrants to Canada have come from what used to be called 'non-traditional' sources of immigration - the non-European developing world. Many have settled in Toronto, which, in the mid-1990s, is home to more than a million non-whites. Indeed, it is estimated that by the turn of the century the majority of those living in Toronto will be people of colour (T.J. Samuel 1992). The largest component of the approximately 250,000 blacks in Toronto are of Caribbean background, although a separate and distinct infusion of Somalis, Ethiopians, and other Africans is also present. With ethnic and racial diversity have come issues of racism. While racism is part of the historical legacy of Canadian society, it is also true that racism is today regarded as socially and legally unacceptable. But

194 Adam Lewinberg this does not mean that racism has been eradicated or that it is not corrosively pernicious in nature. Daily encountering discrimination and racism, blacks in Ontario have repeatedly pressed government, particularly the provincial government, for action (Etorama 1995, 160). And there has been some response. For example, in 1982 the Ontario Human Rights Commission responded to discrimination against blacks by establishing a Race Relations Branch. Protests by blacks have helped to shape the direction of police reform in Ontario, and black demands for educational reform have resulted in curricular, personnel, and administrative reform since the 1970s. But while the increased black presence in Ontario and in Toronto in particular has reshaped government policy and programming in some areas, there has been little effort to chronicle or understand the role of blacks in this process. This study examines the ways in which blacks negotiated with the government in Ontario on racial issues between 1990 and 1995, while the New Democratic Party was in power. In particular, it explores the role of black insiders, caught at the interface between the emerging black polity in Ontario and the mainstream political process. Canadian multiculturalism has legitimized governmental negotiation with ethnic and racial groups on issues which these groups, as citizens, feel are important to them and to their legitimate place in the larger society (Fleras and Elliott 1992). But negotiation between ethnic and racial groups and government is a complex process. Governments are most comfortable negotiating with leaders who can genuinely claim to represent the group. They also prefer to deal with groups that have a bounded identity; that is, they like to be sure just who it is that spokespersons represent. In Ontario, the NDP government publicly committed itself to redress the victimization of blacks caused by racism. In order to do this they needed to find representative leaders who could speak for the entire, diverse group of blacks that live in the province. But who could speak for so diverse a community? Anti-black racism may affect each and every black in Ontario, but the notion of a single black community and polity is misleading. The black presence in Ontario defies efforts to depict it as a single, unified community and it is certainly not a community with a single, recognized leadership (Walker 1990, 41). Blacks in Ontario reflect a host of different backgrounds and experiences. The largest group, Caribbeans, come from more than ten different countries and they arrived during the 1960s and 1970s. Other blacks have been in Canada for generations: some of them have roots that extend back to the Loyalists. More recently, blacks have

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 195 arrived from the United States, and a large number of African blacks have emigrated to Canada, most of them from East Africa. Many of the Africans retain ethnic and religious ties that are very different from those of other blacks. In addition to these variations in national and ethnic identity, there is also a significant class divide among blacks in Ontario. Of course, these kinds of divisions can also be found within other immigrant groups to Canada and they play an important role in shaping the social and political life of those groups (Burnet and Palmer 1989). But while blacks are given to all the insecurities associated with immigrant status, they are appreciably worse off as a result of widespread economic inequality and racism. Therefore caution must be applied in comparing blacks with other immigrant groups, especially those of European origin. Recognizing the burden of racism carried by Blacks and accepting the principle that community participation is essential in defining and resolving community difficulties, the NDP government sought to identify agents who could speak for the entire black community and suggest positive initiatives that would work for the community as a whole. This search was predicated on the assumption that blacks in Ontario constituted a united, corporate entity rather than a diverse group of peoples with both common and distinctive experiences (Walker 1990; Dehli 1990). How could the government have viewed blacks in Ontario as a single community and have assumed that there existed one community leadership cohort in the midst of such diversity? It was the most politically expedient way to address the entire universe of blacks in the province. The government was able to legitimize this view with the help of black insiders who promoted, and often believed, in an Ontario black community. Both bureaucratic insiders and insiders in the political arm of government consistently put forward this view, even when at odds over who would control the course of programming aimed at blacks in Ontario. Black insiders, those blacks holding posts in either the political or bureaucratic arms of the NDP government, were at the cutting edge of efforts to promote policy and programming that would benefit black people in Ontario. Working with a government committed to combating racism, black insiders helped to ensure that black issues remained on the public agenda. More importantly, they were able to direct the openness of the NDP to equity initiatives and, in the aftermath of what was widely regarded as a race riot in Toronto in May 1992, to focus the government's post-riot initiatives. The riot was a watershed. On 5 May 1992 a demonstration was organized by the Black Action Defence Committee (BADC) to protest the

196 Adam Lewinberg shooting of two black men by Toronto police. The Toronto incident was exacerbated by an information spillover from Los Angeles riots, which had ended the previous day. In Toronto, the protesters spent the afternoon in front of City Hall. Nerves were on edge. The mood was tense. BADC leaders, who might have kept a lid on the demonstrators, were then attending a conference in the United States. Perhaps out of frustration that their protest seemed to be unheard, attacks on property and looting erupted among some of the younger demonstrators. But eye witness reports and media footage of the disturbance do not indicate that this was a race riot of the kind witnessed in American cities in recent years. Blacks were soon outnumbered by white youths. One-on-one racial conflict was minimal, and there were images of inter-racial cooperation as looters helped one another carry heavy items out of stores (Toronto Star, 6 May 1992). Nevertheless, this event was widely described as a race riot and it helped set in motion the governmental initiatives that are analysed below. Though black government insiders were previously important in organizing various government equity initiatives of benefit to blacks, in the wake of the riot, black insiders found the government even more responsive to equity initiatives. But the government was committed to dealing with communities. Accordingly, black insiders projected the image of a unified black community. Images, however, do not always reflect reality. In the end, the success of black insiders in promoting initiatives that would benefit blacks was hampered by the absence of a unified black community. No matter how open the NDP establishment might have been to equity and other initiatives, when broad community support was necessary for implementation or to overcome opposition to the initiatives, problems ensued. Black insiders worked with a small and select group of primarily middle-class blacks who claimed to speak for the black polity. There was little grassroots support for their efforts, even when these efforts might benefit a larger black constituency. The lack of significant grassroots support left initiatives in peril and also made it relatively easy for detractors to attack equity initiatives. This left the government on the defensive with little or no support, even from within the black community. Blacks in Canada and the Toronto Setting There has been a black presence in Canada for more than two hundred years. But until a colour-blind immigration policy was fully implemented

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government

197

in 1967 and large numbers of persons from the Caribbean began arriving in Ontario, Canada's black population was relatively small. Today, Toronto contains the largest black population in Canada. Indeed, fully 63 per cent of all blacks in Canada live predominantly in Ontario, the majority in the greater Toronto area, with smaller numbers in several other urban areas (Etoroma 1995, 87-90). Scholarly interest in the experience and role of blacks in Canadian society has tended to focus on racism and the experience of victimization. Racial bars to black mobility (Weinfeld 1990) in finding employment (Henry and Ginsberg 1985; Billingsley and Muczynski 1985; Reitz 1981), and discrimination in the police forces and educational system (Ontario Ministry of Education 1992; Lewis 1992; Lewis 1989; Larter and Wright 1988) are part of a sociological literature and widely reported in the black-focused press: these experiences are also recounted in anecdotal form in biographies and interviews (Hill 1981: Thorualdson 1979). Social science works focusing on blacks as active players in the shaping of Canadian society are few. Etoroma (1995), Mannette (1988), Brathwaite (1986), and Brown (1981) examine black contributions to their local communities or to specific policy arenas. Brathwaite, for example, explores the role of blacks in Quebec education. None of these works, however, focuses on the role of blacks in shaping governmental policy. Henry (1994) has written the only comprehensive ethnographic treatise on blacks in Canada, outlining the diverse experiences and life patterns of Caribbean immigrants in Toronto. Henry describes the social context that Caribbeans have created but she does not explore the political dimensions of black relations with the larger society. Despite their common experiences of racism and immigration, Henry recognizes the heterogeneity of Caribbeans in Toronto (269). She highlights the absence of a unified Caribbean community structure and of a middle-class commitment to helping the lower class (211). Caribbean immigrants were unlikely to cite 1?lack' (see also Etoroma 1995) or 'Caribbean' as a primary identity, nor was there any widely acknowledged leadership group amongst them (244-5, 260). Many social functions tend to be based on island of origin (227-8). This lack of unity played a role in impeding effective political mobilization. Henry's study, like other investigations of the black experience in Canada, does not focus primarily on processes of inclusion and political participation. Given a degree of similarity in immigration patterns between Canada and the UK, British literature offers Canadian readers some insight into the role of blacks in the political system. British litera-

198 Adam Lewinberg ture examines black incorporation (in Britain the term 'black' is used generically to describe what we in Canada have termed 'visible minorities') into established political parties, focusing particularly on the role of insiders (Anwar 1986; Studlar 1986; Fitzgerald 1990). There are studies of the impact of blacks working outside of the political system on policy debates and the national agenda (Hemermen 1972; Jacobs 1986; Goulbourne 1990); the place of blacks within both mainstream political discourse and counter-hegemonic discourses for the purposes of policy formation (Solomos 1988; Keith 1990); and the extent of bloc voting and the role of black identity in political decision making (Eade 1991). Several British studies point to a high rate of black participation in party politics (Goulbourne 1991; Anwar 1986) and growing efforts on the part of the various political parties to attract the black vote (Sidney 1991, 63; Solomos 1993,203). (It should be noted that Caribbean blacks arrived in Britain about ten years before they came in large numbers to Canada.) In Canada and Ontario attempts have also been made to attract ethnic involvement in party politics, but because of their small number blacks have not received significant attention (Henry 1994, 245; Driedger 1987, 144-8). While the participation rate does not match that in Great Britain, some blacks have edged into party politics in order to further an antiracist agenda (Sewell 1993, 29-30). The particular importance of equity issues to black political participation is seen in the party choice of blacks in Ontario. The likelihood of a political party gaining power coupled with the level of support that the party has shown for initiatives important to blacks appear to determine the party's popularity among blacks. Election night results suggest black support is split between all three major parties, but anecdotal evidence indicates that the black vote tends to favour the Liberals, especially at the federal level. Compared to the Conservative or Reform parties, the Liberals have a demonstrated ability to win elections and a generally positive record of support for equity and social service issues important to blacks. The NDP has attracted only modest black voter support, in spite of the party's enviable record on equity issues. At the provincial level this might be because, until 1990, the NDP was regarded as unlikely to win an election in Ontario. Blacks have been active in organizational activities, but no one organization speaks for all or even a majority of them. In Ontario, for example, there are more than seventy volunteer organizations run by and for African immigrants who, in the main, only arrived in Canada during the

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 199 last decade or so (Opotu-Dapah 1993, 1). There has been some political organization: in the recent past blacks mobilized against police racism; lobbied school boards on curriculum, teaching staff, and equity reform; and entered public debate over multiculturalism, anti-racism, race relations, and immigration. But except for black mobilization around the accountability of police, one would be hard pressed to point to areas in which black intervention was widely representative or singularly successful in reshaping government policy. In Britain, riots signalled the rage of a large, British-born black population frustrated by racism and discrimination (Anwar 1991, 2). As a Canadian-born generation of black youth has emerged in Canada, new social problems have been noted by commentators and in government reports (Henry 1994; Toronto Board of Education 1989). Mobilization among black youth in Ontario and the reaction of society to it has been heavily influenced by American race relations. The fears generated by the May 1992 riot beg comparison with the United States, particularly the spillover from the Los Angeles riot that erupted just in advance of the Toronto disturbance. But Canada is not the United States. There is nothing in Canada comparable to the American Black Power movements, youth gangs, and inner-city crime and the fear that they inspire in white America. Also, there is no Canadian parallel to the far more homogenous, nativeborn black population in the United States. Response to the May 1992 riot in Toronto, by both the government and the media, was radically different from either the American or British experience. Blacks were not shunned by the government as a result of the riot. This was probably due to a number of factors: the relatively small scale of the Toronto event, fear that the situation might escalate if problems were not addressed, the presence of a small but active group of black insiders in the provincial government, and the NDP's more open attitude toward working with marginalized groups. The broken glass on Yonge Street was still being swept up when the provincial government began seeking consultations on possible governmental initiatives to combat racism and reached out to blacks. Methodology The research for this study was conducted in 1995, immediately prior to and following the NDP defeat at the polls. It involved in-depth interviews with key informants and a review of government documents and

200 Adam Lewinberg black periodicals. The twenty individuals interviewed included twelve black insiders - senior government political or bureaucratic staff and persons appointed to government commissions and boards - and eight individuals who were active in black community organizations. Some of the respondents held several positions or had experience in a number of areas relevant to the study. These interviews proved a very rich source of information. Most respondents agreed to speak on the record, although a few preferred to speak in confidence. The wishes of these respondents have been respected and no attribution is assigned to their quoted comments. Only two individuals declined to be interviewed. I felt some initial apprehension in undertaking these interviews, given my status as a white researcher. While one or two respondents were visibly cautious, the rest welcomed my questions and spoke openly and often warmly. Perhaps this was due to the fact that this study was simply an academic effort to understand the link between Ontario blacks and the political system. It did not pretend to be the kind of action-oriented study that had disappointed blacks in the past. The review of a key black periodical, Share, a free weekly distributed in Toronto, provided some insight into black community reaction to NDP government initiatives. Share, with a claimed circulation of 69,000, is a particularly revealing source for black concerns in Toronto. While it is dominated by Caribbean blacks, the paper tries to be inclusive of Canadian-born and African black concerns. Share also spotlighted many of the same issues raised in interviews. Government reports and documents afforded insight into policy implementation. In the case of some specific meetings and negotiations between blacks and the NDP, they also provided a paper trail for unravelling the decision-making process. Overview: Equity Initiatives before and after the Riot In 1990 the Ontario NDP was elected to power for the first time, forming a majority government with only 38 per cent of the vote. The NDP, widely regarded as the most progressive of the mainstream parties in Ontario, took power with a strong equity agenda. The one black NDP member of the legislature, Zanana Akande, was appointed to the cabinet. And between coming to power in 1990 and the Yonge Street disturbance on 4 May 1992 the NDP initiated a number of policies that blacks and, to a lesser extent, other visible minority groups had advocated. In 1991 an 'Anti-Racism Strategy for Ontario' was announced, which upgraded the Race Relations Directorate in the Ministry of Citizenship to an Anti-

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 201 Racism Secretariat and committed the government to pursue anti-racism policies within the Ontario public service and private sector and to consult with visible minority communities on anti-racism issues (Ministry of Citizenship 1991). In addition, a new Police Services Act was passed, legislation long advocated by black lobbyists and initiated under the previous provincial Liberal government. A former president of the Jamaican Canadian Association recalled, 'The NDP went to great lengths in ensuring that [black community] members were elected to boards and tribunals, that they were included in government. They had a greater sense and practice of inclusiveness than other governments' (Karl Fuller, 30 August 1995). The racial disturbance in downtown Toronto added momentum to the government's equity and race relations agenda. Despite the ambiguity of the event, federal, provincial, and municipal governments regarded the event as a race riot and acted to defuse any further racial explosion of this kind. Premier Bob Rae quickly announced that Stephen Lewis, formerly both NDP leader in Ontario and Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, would conduct an inquiry and make recommendations to the government. Lewis's report was ready after one month. The federal government undertook to coordinate a similar inquiry (Share, 9 July 1992), but the federal initiative took more than six months to issue its report, Towards a New Beginning. Towards a New Beginning was rather anticlimactic. Not one representative of any of the four levels of government appeared at the unveiling of the report in November 1992 and none endorsed it. The report proposed thirteen 'Action Steps.' Each had its own time line for implementation. None was acted upon. Why? Six months after the riot the heat was off and with the provincial government moving ahead with several initiatives, federal and municipal governments could afford to stay clear. One municipal official allowed that '[njothing was really done at the municipal level as a result of the Yonge street disturbance or the Towards a New Beginning, Four Levels government report.' Extensive reviews of the black press and questioning of government workers and community members uncovered only one new federal initiative directly targeting the black community: the funding of a business apprenticeship program in 1995, run by the Black Business and Professional Association. But there was also a change of government at the federal level in 1993, so this project may have been part of the new government's funding initiatives, independent of the 1992 riot or report. The Lewis Report, in contrast, was an action document. It was published

202 Adam Lewinberg in the form of a letter from Stephen Lewis to Premier Rae only a month after the riot. Indeed, the short time span between the disturbance and the Report meant that issues were fresh in mind when the Report was issued. And instead of ignoring the Report's twenty-four recommendations, the premier promised aggressive implementation, although not always within the time lines or at the level suggested (Ministry of the Attorney General 1994). One key official recalled, 'Everything was channelled through Lewis. There was a sense that the money came from the Lewis Report so no issues that didn't include Lewis were brought up' (Pamela Grant, 31 August 1995). The involvement of two high-level black NDP political staff, Pamela Grant and Grace-Edward Galabuzi, and a number of black public servants in the implementation process was also crucial. These black insiders ensured that the Report was taken seriously at the political level. They had access to the cabinet office, which would ultimately decide how recommendations were to be handled. In addition, they were well placed to influence the choice of individuals who would represent the 'black community' to the government. These black insiders were not new to the Lewis Report. Some worked with Lewis on the research and writing of the report. Because of their pivotal role, they also exercised power in structuring recommendations. One well-positioned black insider noted that 'After Stephen, me and Grace [-Ed ward Galabuzi] were the only people who knew the process leading to the Report, who had contacts across the government, to ministers, and who knew the intended implementation' (Pamela Grant, 31 August 1995). Implementation of the recommendations depended on the notion that there was a unified black community suffering racism and that the team working on the report already knew 'the community' and what was best for it. One researcher commented that 'there were no new ideas invented over our time in office. There had been a need for the programs we put in place for a long time. The [black] community had been asking for them or wanting them.' The black insiders thus served as gatekeepers, channelling ideas into and out of the Lewis Report team and government. They also attempted to dictate who should speak for the black Ontarians or rather, what voices Lewis or the government should hear. Describing an initial orientation meeting one researcher recalled, "[w]e invited every person and organization that it would be important for him [Stephen Lewis] to hear from... there were thirty or forty people there." Given the diversity of black organizations in Toronto alone, it was

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 203 difficult for any small group of people to reflect the range of opinions and issues that engaged blacks in Ontario. This same researcher described those who Lewis heard as 'involved in ongoing issues with the government/ While consultations ranged wider than these comments would imply, this description still suggests a self-selecting group of black people already familiar to the government. For their part political and bureaucratic insiders felt that they understood the 'community/ that they knew the key players and were in a position to shape government's relationship to blacks in Ontario. They also helped shape policies and programs to aid them. To be fair, the Lewis Report correctly identified most issues of importance to blacks in Ontario. Indeed, given the widespread experience of anti-black racism in Ontario, it was not difficult to pinpoint the key issues. Fighting discrimination in the workplace, schools, and the police were priorities that received a large degree of support from black Ontarians, along with other minorities and members of the mainstream. However, the Report assumed that because many blacks shared common experiences they constituted a unified community, and black insiders admit that Lewis was not encouraged to consult beyond the select group that they assembled for him. This closed-door approach gave the government confidence to move forward with a number of initiatives in the name of a unified black community, even while many blacks played a marginal role in the shaping of these initiatives. But there was a price to pay. Because the government seemed oblivious to the complex diversity of the black experience in Ontario, it generated some hostility among those who felt excluded or did not identify with the operational definition of the black community projected by government insiders. Many blacks consequently refused to support government initiatives ostensibly undertaken in their name. Nevertheless, the machinery set up to ensure that the Report's recommendations were implemented demonstrated a strong commitment on the part of the NDP, and the legislature more generally, to anti-racism and equal opportunity for disadvantaged minorities. Zanana Akande and, to a lesser extent, Alvin Curling, a black Liberal MPP, were involved in monitoring progress; two of the premier's top staff were put in charge of directing implementation, and Grace-Edward Galabuzi was transferred to the cabinet office to oversee the process from that end. In addition, the NDP's top bureaucrat, Deputy Secretary of the Cabinet Michael Mendelssohn, was teamed with the director of the Anti-Racism Secretariat in the Ministry of Citizenship, Ann Marie Stewart, to co-chair a

204 Adam Lewinberg coordinating committee of cabinet ministers and top bureaucrats from all of the ministries involved. Black insiders were included in this cabinet committee as well. The committee met monthly from 1992 to early 1994, until all ministries were judged well on their way towards reaching their implementation goals. Representing the Community The 1992 riot and resulting Lewis Report undoubtedly signalled a major watershed in relations between blacks and the government, focusing government attention on black issues and the need for wider black participation in government. But in some ways the Report changed government gears rather than direction. Some of what Lewis recommended was underway before the Report was published: the NDP had already made the hiring of visible minorities a priority. In addition, visible minorities, including blacks, were included among most appointments to provincial boards, agencies, and commissions (Share, 10 June 1993). Elaine Ziemba, then Minister of Citizenship, established the Ontario Anti-Racism Working Group (OARWG) with representatives from various Ontario visible minority groups. While this group had little authority, it did confirm the government's commitment to seeking input from visible minorities. The Working Group, including its five black members, was charged with advising the government on issues of importance to visible minorities in the province. After the Lewis Report, the process of government appointments became increasingly politicized, as different groups of black insiders sought to ensure that those sympathetic to their views of the black community were brought forward. Outwardly, there was relative harmony among blacks within government as to how blacks should be represented to government. But in private, there were differences among black insiders, particularly between political and bureaucratic officers, about policy and program priorities and implementation. Differences erupted, for example, over the political orientation of people chosen to represent the black community. Political insiders within the NDP were generally outspoken in their advocacy of change in government and black control of program initiatives - these were the 'radical' blacks. Bureaucratic insiders, in contrast, wanted to enlist the cooperation of those the bureaucracy termed 'compatible blacks/ blacks who had a track record of working within traditional bureaucratic processes. This would leave the bureaucracy in control and able to proceed as it had

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government

205

traditionally done, without challenge to its operating procedures and programming. This difference in approach and philosophy did not arise as the result of different visions of the black community; what was at issue were types of initiatives the government would pursue and, perhaps more importantly, who would manage them. This conflict, with very few exceptions, pitted educated, middle-class, Caribbean origin blacks in government, and their respective white bureaucratic or political staff allies, against one another. But they agreed on one point - the black community must be represented to government as unified. Given the insiders' frames of reference, this meant thinking of blacks in Ontario as though they were all of Caribbean descent. A Diverse Community If blacks in Ontario represent a diverse group or series of groups, so too do those of Caribbean heritage. As the former director of the Jamaican Canadian Association explained, 'We are not a monolithic community. Just as the Jewish community has conflict so do we. The public thinks that all black people should be the same and share the same perspective but there are differences in our politics, our working styles, cultures, and backgrounds' (Karl Fuller, 30 August 1995). But no insiders were prepared to challenge the notion that overarching Caribbean issues defined the universe of black community issues. Consequently, those called in as spokespersons for the black community, whether by the political or bureaucratic arm of the government, were mostly Caribbean blacks who made no attempt to challenge the insiders' portrayal of the black community. The Caribbeans - and other blacks - who might have done so remained outside the networks used by the political or bureaucratic arms of the government. As a result, a significant number of blacks who might have benefited from many of the initiatives undertaken to help them, remained marginalized. Formal and Informal Access: Cases Cabinet Round Table on Anti-Racism Projecting the image of a unified black community was important in the formation of the Cabinet Round Table on Anti-Racism. The Round Table was a high-profile government response to the Lewis Report designed to

206 Adam Lewinberg give visible minorities a forum in which they could meet and address policy makers. As Grace-Edward Galabuzi, Assistant to Premier Rae, noted, 'One of the long-standing complaints that visible minority communities have is that they do not have access to decision makers' (GraceEdward Galabuzi, 3 August 1995). Along with employment equity, this Round Table was the major initiative undertaken by the government to give visible minorities a voice in planning. The Round Table also served to highlight government responsiveness to the needs of visible minority members at a low cost. Because it placed high-profile politicians across the table from visible minority representatives every three months, each time in a different part of the province, visible minorities tended to view the Round Table as a substantive initiative to address their concerns. The twelve hand-picked representatives included three blacks from more than a thousand applicants. However, insiders suggest that the government attempted to ensure that the Round Table would not cause significant controversy, notably between the political and bureaucratic arms of government. In one case, insiders within the bureaucracy tried to prevent the appointment of a radical black activist with strong links to the NDP. Political insiders fought hard and eventually succeeded in having him appointed. The bureaucrats had their own agenda. Viewing the Round Table as an effort by political insiders to control the process of discussion with the black and other visible minority communities, the bureaucrats pushed open the door to still wider contacts with visible minorities that the Round Table could not control nor dare to stop. Bureaucrats successfully pressed to have each Round Table meeting scheduled in a different provincial location. Then, at their own initiative, but in conjunction with Round Table meetings, they organized very open and high-profile events at which ranking civil servants and visible minorities from the surrounding area might meet and network. The Round Table also invited briefs and discussion from local visible minorities but, despite the efforts of some of its members, compared to the openness and shoulder-rubbing type of gatherings organized by the bureaucrats, the Round Table seemed closed (Marie T. Osborn, 21 July 1995). At the bureaucrats' informal meetings, visible minority community members, particularly social service professionals working in non-profit organizations, and provincial bureaucrats from the surrounding area had an unprecedented occasion to meet, exchange information, and talk, opening the door to further discussion. In addition to stealing some of the Round Table's thunder, these meetings, while not a publicly an-

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 207 nounced governmental initiative, may have achieved more than the Round Table meetings. As one bureaucrat recalled confidentially: 'The political staff handpicked the representatives [on the Round Table] so that they became gatekeepers. What we [the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat] did was to build a complimentary process that would give anyone access. Our consultants were sent into the region where the meeting was to take place to activate community groups there and build consciousness of the potential for the meeting. These people were able to build relationships with important bureaucrats from six or seven ministries.' Did political insiders resent being bested? Some already regarded the bureaucrats with suspicion, convinced that they were more interested in consultation as a form of control than as a step toward action; it presented a means to enhance the black insider's gatekeeper role while limiting the impact of those with contrary views: 'There was lots of political will on our part, but not as much willingness on the part of our bureaucratic colleagues. They were only interested in moving the stuff ahead quickly ... Informally a black focus was maintained ... but when the deputies had meetings without us and senior staff had meetings without us, when they left the table with us to write policies and make program decisions they would not write policies with reference to anti-black racism ... We had no real ability to push the bureaucrats forward. They would not have been able to cope ... When it comes to racism people get their backs up, and feel very defensive. There is systemic and individual racism in the bureaucracy. I experienced both' (Pamela Grant, 31 August 1995). A black activist member of the Round Table agreed. 'The people who fought the equity agenda were the bureaucrats. It was the deputy ministers who were really in charge' (Lennox Farrell, 21 August 1995). Sri Gugen Sri Scanda Rajah, a member of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Justice System saw it similarly. 'The bureaucrats were given the responsibility for implementing many of these things [anti-racist initiatives]. If they were not actively on side, the programs tend to be scuttled' (28 July 1995). There is perhaps some truth in these accusations. But, whatever their reason for doing so, the bureaucracy opened itself to be more responsive to blacks and other visible minority communities. Even some members of the Round Table allowed that they had few, if any, other concrete successes to show for their effort. One black delegate to the Round Table could recall little or no benefit from his participation. 'The Round Table was if not a total failure at least a failure ... At the end of the day no one knows what was accomplished, no one knows what was done' (Lennox Farrell, 23 August 1995).

208 Adam Lewinberg Jobs Ontario Jobs Ontario (later jobsOntario) put the issue of black access to government to the test. The Jobs Ontario program was the NDP's multimillion dollar initiative designed to encourage economic development in the province. It brought six provincial ministries together to organize a program of job training, infrastructure development, day care, and community economic development. It was to be an inclusive program: Tor the first time all six of the JOCA [Jobs Ontario] ministries started to realize that they had to include visible minorities and marginalized people/ To meet this objective, black staff from all ministries responsible for the Jobs Ontario program built an informal organization of black bureaucratic workers dedicated to helping black-focused organizations access funding for community development projects. As a result black groups that might otherwise not have applied to Jobs Ontario for funding were successful in doing so. One insider in the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade noted, 'When the [Jobs Ontario] program was announced mainstream communities could access funding immediately. Marginalized, ethnic communities were left out. The government made pro-active approaches to get people from the marginalized communities to go out and help their communities with applications. If not the mainstream organizations would get all the money' (Keith Anatol, 2 August 1995). A staff member of the Jamaican Canadian Association observed, 'Realistically, often community members working in government make a suggestion to apply for funding or a project and that is how a lot of grants and projects get funding' (Karl Fuller, 30 August 1995). There is no denying that blacks were targeted. This was particularly true of job training, community economic development programs, and, most importantly, job training for youth, Jobs Ontario Youth (JOY). JOY offered summer work experience to young people who often have trouble finding summer employment. While traditional mainstream social service organizations were quick off the mark in applying for JOY funds, black insiders were able to ensure that black youth, who suffered particularly high unemployment levels, were informally targeted. Insiders also encouraged Jobs Ontario administration contracts for black-focused organizations such as the Jamaican Canadian Association and Barbados House of Canada. These organizations became delivery agents for the Jobs Ontario Training program, which offered job-training bursaries to companies hiring new employees and acted as employment centres helping to find candidates to fill these jobs.

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 209 It should not be supposed, however, that Jobs Ontario was designed for or dominated by blacks. Rather, measures were taken to encourage black participation. In this Jobs Ontario was a success, although blackfocused organizations never matched mainstream organizations in either the level of grant funding or the reach of their programs. The majority of Jobs Ontario money was spent on community infrastructure projects: community centres, assisted housing, and similar projects. The grants given to black projects were small, with the exception of a $341,000 grant to the Caribbean Cultural Committee (CCC), which organized Caribana, an annual festival subsidized by blacks in Toronto that brings millions of dollars in revenue into Ontario. Even the CCC grant was small in comparison with community infrastructure grants, which often exceeded a million dollars. In the words of one respondent, 'Relatively speaking, what the NDP did was revolutionary; but when you look at it relative to what others take for granted it's inconsequential.' Despite the low sums of money involved, the black focus within Jobs Ontario was still resented as preferential treatment. Some minorities had no insiders actively advocating their cause inside the Jobs Ontario administration. The government's own 1995 Report of the Equity and Access Committee noted, 'Local projects ... rely heavily on sympathetic insiders to advance their concerns with local politicians and bureaucrats.' Were other visible minority groups, lacking insiders, being disadvantaged or left out? According to one observer, some members of the South Asian community thought so. They were said to feel ignored by government staff; their funding applications went unprocessed for long periods of time, causing them to be late and therefore invalid. Discontent was also expressed within the black community. Black insiders, as we have seen, generally equated 'black' with Caribbean heritage or some notion of a singular black community in Ontario. This proved a problem for those who held another vision, including a significant portion of the black 'community' in Ontario: Africans. The general inability of African blacks to identify with the pan-black definition of 'community' articulated by black government insiders proved problematic for a number of black community development projects and for the efforts of recent immigrants from Africa to assert their own identities and demands within the provincial policy and programming arena. African Outsiders The national and other historical divisions among blacks in Ontario are

210 Adam Lewinberg clearly reflected in the efforts of the Council of African Organizations in Ontario (CAOO) to meet with the Ontario government. The CAOO, an umbrella group including thirty-eight organizations servicing recent immigrants from various parts of Africa, represent a quickly growing population in the greater Toronto area. Most members of the CAOO define themselves not in racial but in ethnic, or national terms, such as the Ibo State Cultural Organization and the National Council of Ghanaian Canadians. But they found themselves grouped by the government, the media, and in the popular mind as part of unified black community. And they resented this situation. The refusal of these African groups to define themselves racially threatened the dominant construction of a black community and shaped their interactions with black bureaucrats and political staff. The CAOO did not feel that the Round Table or any of the other black initiatives represented their interests. The executive director of CAOO explained: 'We are not segregationist. We are continental Africans. Afro-Canadians who have been here from slave days see themselves one way. The Caribbean community see themselves another way. Some people in each of the three groups can be better because they understand the system. But we are Africans, and we do not choose to be black' (Dr Kwazi Agegeaman, 26 July 1995). In early 1993, the CAOO requested a meeting with NDP cabinet members to discuss their needs. Bureaucrats overseeing the government's anti-racist efforts were asked to organize a meeting. Conflict soon erupted over the level of access that the African umbrella organization would be given. Black bureaucrats and political insiders, protecting the notion of a single black community, were less than enthusiastic about any meeting between the CAOO and significant players in the NDP. One of the insiders assigned to arrange the meeting, the manager of leadership resources at the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat, Paul Kwasi Kafele, had written on the need for unity in the black community. In an unpublished paper entitled, 'Struggle and Strength: The Crisis of African - Canadian Leadership' (1990), he described a disparate but self-conscious black community. He included recent African immigrants within this community, but noted that their inclination to define themselves as national groups created a problem for those, presumably like himself, intent on projecting a unified black community. The CAOO, resisting black 'community' and asserting the national and ethnic origins of African immigrants, clearly challenged black insiders who spoke for a unified black community. Yet another NDP political staff member, Grace-Edward Galabuzi, also

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 211 played an important role in determining the level and scope of any meeting that the CAOO would have with the NDP government. As an architect of the Lewis Report, key to the implementation of the Round Table and other recommendations of the Report, he too was confounded by a 'black' group raising concerns that the work he and his colleagues had done to represent the community was fundamentally flawed. The CAOO waited, but the promised meeting was not scheduled. The CAAO chairman recalled his difficulty in getting past black insiders. 'We have problems accessing cabinet itself. We want to be part of our government.' After he protested directly to the premier's office that his organization's request for a meeting was being ignored, the CAOO finally met with the premier and three of his cabinet ministers in February 1994. The chairman was content that in the wake of the meeting there was a 'progressive and cordial relationship in the works/ but he was less pleased with the black political insiders. When, a year after the meeting, no movement was forthcoming on several items agreed to, he blamed political insiders. 'The bureaucrats felt that our community was not important... it is not easy at all to work with the politically appointed bureaucrats. The professional bureaucrats were more helpful, but have limits as to what they can do' (Hasan Idris, 26 July 1995). Community Development Black insiders, convinced of the necessity of portraying a unified black community, did all they could to stream community development funding toward organizations that did not challenge the unitary model. As a result, opportunities for specifically nationally or ethnically based organizations, African or even Caribbean, to access community development funding were diminished. Of nineteen grants made to black-focused projects under Jobs Ontario, only one such organization, the Jamaican Canadian Association, arguably the strongest black community social service organization in Ontario, received funding - despite applications from at least three nationally based organizations for funding to build a community centre. The image of black unity may have been important to black insiders, but it was not always a priority for those blacks who wanted Jobs Ontario money to generate employment. The two largest grants given to black groups, for a Black Business Resource Centre and a Caribbean African Canadian Credit Union, were dependent on a unified black identity for their success. Both projects were aimed at building a singular black

212 Adam Lewinberg community infrastructure and received funding outside of Jobs Ontario as a special government measure to address issues raised by the riot. The Caribbean African Canadian Credit Union was initiated with the cooperation of black political insiders convinced that the black community lacked a financial infrastructure that would encourage its members to pool their resources and generate investment capital. In the words of one black insider, 'the initiative was ostensibly undertaken to do something in the short term and establish trust within the black community' after the riot. It was argued that the idea for the credit union came from the community itself. A political insider recalled the concern for black economic structure. 'Coming out of Lewis there was a need to address some of the concerns which had arisen around economic development. There were demands for community business and access to capital particularly. Some of this was done internally. After our study had identified areas where action could be taken a group of people were brought in from the [black] community to work on the projects.' Insiders argued that the one of the greatest obstacles facing the black community was accessing capital, either through equity or loans, and that the creation of a black credit union would solve this problem. If approved, this project would necessitate more than just coordination of resources; it would require the black community to unite behind the credit union. The project was approved on the assumption, 'if you build it they will come,' that a committed and unified black community existed and was willing to bypass mainstream banks in favour of the community's enterprise. The reality was different. There was no groundswell of community support behind the initiative, and the credit union soon floundered. The black press reported institutional infighting; there were accusations that Jamaicans continued to dominate the leadership, that some groups of blacks were not included. And of course, African immigrants felt outside the project (Share, 12 and 26 January, 9 February 1995). One black professional lamented, 'People didn't do the community work to make the Credit Union work. There was no wider vision of a credit union, without the government funding' (Francis Jeffers, 22 July 1995). And in the end there were just too few blacks in business who believed that their 'black' or even 'Caribbean' identity was relevant to economic matters. It was simply not sensible to assume that black people would structure their economic or business lives around economic initiatives intended to strengthen a black community, in the absence of any short-term economic benefit.

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 213 Like the credit union, the black Business Resource Centre presumed the existence of a black client group, in this case, black entrepreneurs. As one staff person explained to prospective clients, 'We can help you [black entrepreneurs] and at the same time you can help someone else too, for the strength of our community.' But again the same problem existed. The absence of any overarching black identity translated into little significant demand for services organized around it. While individuals might appreciate the Centre's assistance in starting a new business, expanding an existing business, or improving entrepreneurial skills, the notion that service had to be delivered in a race-specific organization drew little support. The Centre remained heavily dependent on government subsidies and began to service anyone who was willing to pay, irrespective of race. As one official said, 'The Credit Union and black Business Resource Centre were projects ... developed to bring the community together' (Keith Anatol, 2 August 1995). But to bring a community together there must be a community of interest to begin with. To the disappointment of community advocates, this community of interest was weak. Community Centre Yet another community development initiative dependent on a unified base of communal support involved a plan, or rather a series of plans, to establish a black community centre. While Jobs Ontario approved money to consultants for feasibility studies, the project never got off the ground. Government insiders insisted that funding for the project would only be available for a single, all-inclusive black community centre, and black groups were unable to submerge their particularist national and ethnic sub-identities under a single black identity long enough to get a centre going. To be sure, there was interest in a black community centre. At one time twelve different requests for funding a community centre were submitted to the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat, many from nationally focused groups, including four from organizations representing recent African immigrants. It is likely that additional funding requests were made to other branches of the government involved in the Jobs Ontario program. One of these submissions, the African Village proposal, proposed to build a single, multimillion-dollar community centre for the entire black community, which would become the hub of black organizational life in Ontario. Endorsed by a number of prominent blacks, the proposal had little or no institutional backing. As the black press argued, this may have

214 Adam Lewinberg been because no organization or coalition of organizations was really capable of speaking for all black Ontarians (Share, 5 May 1994). Other proposals were submitted to Jobs Ontario by various organizations - the Jamaican Canadian Association, for instance, had necessary matching funds in hand -but insiders favoured the African Village project. They had little choice, for how could they justify funding one national or ethnic-based initiative while denying others? Furthermore, approval of any particularist application would have meant conceding that there was no unified community. As a result, insiders attempted to coax all interested groups into joining in the African Village proposal. For almost two years they tried to get the various black-focused groups that wanted to found a community centre to sit down together and work as a collective on a joint proposal under the African Village umbrella. Meanwhile, those who submitted the African Village proposal attempted, with little success, to drum up support, including private financial support, for their proposal. Little progress was made. Recently arrived African immigrant groups resented being grouped with other black groups. They felt that their history, identities, and needs were distinct from those of the Caribbean heritage or Canadian-born black's and they did not wish to be subsumed within a larger 'black' project. A spokesman for one group confidentially explained the problem. 'The public thinks that all black people should be the same, have the same perspective, but we are different politically, in our working styles, culture ... I hesitated for a long time about putting in a submission [for community centre funding]... the other groups just did not have the track record ... They [Jobs Ontario staff] did have the goal of having us work together. They had the administrators from all the different organizations meet. I don't want to say anything about the other organizations, but our feasibility study was a good one.' Division persisted, much to the chagrin of government insiders committed to the vision of a single black community. Not even the Africans were united. According to one observer, 'The African immigrant groups were divided into four groups themselves. We [government officials] tried to suggest they get together but they rebuffed us.' Hard as it was for the insiders to accept, the various African groups had distinct ethnicities and histories and could find little ground on which to group together for the purposes of a 'community' centre. Race was not their major issue. Close to the end of the NDP's term in office, it was clear to black insiders that the government would not be re-elected and that Jobs Ontario funding would probably be discontinued. Insiders hoping to see

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 215 some kind of black community centre built in spite of differences recommended that both the JCA proposal, which met the major funding requirements, and the African Village proposal, which did not, receive funding. But it was too late (Keith Anatol, 2 August 1995). According to a political insider, 'The black community has pursued a multi-service community centre for the past twenty years. Under JOCA [Jobs Ontario] the African Village centre was the most prominent initiative. It did not materialize because the work done was not adequate for the minister to decide to proceed, and then time ran out. There were other initiatives more viable than this one, but time ran out as well/ The NDP was defeated in a provincial general election and the landscape changed drastically. Black Insiders as Victors and Vanquished If black insiders had a mixed record of success in shaping the government's internal agenda on race relations and equity, what happened when they encountered not division in the black community but resistance to their efforts from powerful elements of the larger community? Piven and Cloward (1978) argue that the power generated by grassroots political tactics, such as demonstrations, may provide the only way for marginalized groups to win significant concessions from government. In the case of blacks in Ontario, this was not true. Black insiders, working within the system, made gains. Where Piven and Cloward may be correct, however, is in assessing the possibilities for a marginalized group forcing serious concessions from a government confronted by equally serious and opposing political pressure from other quarters. This was telling in areas of police and justice. In the wake of the May 1992 Yonge Street riot, the NDP tabled legislation to establish new 'use of force regulations' for police, including a demand that police officers file a written report each time they draw a gun. Black insiders may have been delighted, but the police were not. Police associations across Ontario, supported by the press and much of the public, condemned the legislation, particularly the section requiring a written report every time a gun was drawn. Police mounted a pressure campaign culminating in a mass march on the provincial legislature on 28 October 1992. Despite police and public protest, the NDP passed the legislation. The government had less success, however, in moving forward with a larger police reform agenda. According to a prominent black activist, once immediate pressure from blacks subsided, the NDP started to backslide, caving in to police and media pressure. The executive director of

216 Adam Lewinberg the black Action Defence Committee noted, 'The NDP moved to implement some ... initiatives but later on we found that pressures were brought by pro-police forces, organizations and individuals to stop the NDP government from implementing some of the programs recommended by Lewis' (Dudly Laws, 1 August 1995). According to a public servant with a long history in police-community relations, the NDP may have won the legislative battle but it lost the reform war. 'In 1992 it all broke. The [police] march on Queen's Park precipitated by the requirement to file a report when the police draw a weapon was too much. The NDP had done a lot but they were terrified when the police marched ... No government wants the police against them.' An influential black member of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Services Board agreed. 'AntiRacism moved off the NDP's agenda and keeping the peace with police became, I think, an objective that they pursued. Given the choice between having police strike or work to rule and irritate the black community the NDP chose to work with the police' (Arnold Minors, 27 July 1995). Following the police march, the NDP and the police began a review of police monitoring procedures. There was no black representation on the review board. The Special Investigations Unit (SIU), a semi-autonomous unit under provincial jurisdiction responsible for investigating possible cases of police misconduct, which had been strengthened on the recommendation of the Lewis Report, was itself put under review. The head of the SIU, highly regarded by black activists, was replaced with a new head reportedly more agreeable to the police. What is unusual in this case is not that the NDP reacted to police pressure, overriding the concerns of black insiders, but rather, given the weight of public support for the police, that the NDP resisted at all. The Justice System The NDP attempted to ensure that the justice system was responsive to the new racial reality in the province and to the particular problems of blacks in the justice process. The government framed five separate antiracist initiatives, most of which were intended to make the justice system more culturally sensitive. Four of the five assumed a lack of impartiality in the existing justice system with regard to race. This assumption, as might be expected, provoked significant resistance. 'The word racism invokes a lot of hurt at a very gut level. When you use the word people in the system react as if you have plunged a knife into them' (Sri Gugen Sri Scanda Rajah, 28 July 1995).

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 217 Two of the initiatives were pilot programs, one designed to encourage diversion of black first-time young offenders, and the other providing court worker assistance to ensure that blacks going through the judicial system understood their rights (Ministry of the Attorney General 1994, 3-4). According to press reports, both came under fire for singling out black people for preferential treatment within the justice system, and both were cancelled after their initial funding ran out (Toronto Star, 6, 8, 10, and 14 November 1994; Globe and Mail, 8 and 12 November 1994). A third program provided anti-racist educational training to lawyers in the Ministry of the Attorney General. When a number of lawyers made complaints against the organizer of the training, the training was cancelled. Ironically, an inquiry into the accusations against the organizer vindicated him (Share, 10 November and 22 December 1994; Toronto Star, 25 October 1994). The other two initiatives had an even higher profile. A comparison of the two is helpful to illustrate the source of resistance to anti-racist initiatives within the judicial system. The first involved a petition taken to the Attorney General by black law students with the backing of the City of Toronto. They requested help in establishing a legal aid centre dedicated to servicing black people in Toronto. A black insider, Pamela Grant, who had been instrumental in the preparation and implementation of the Lewis Report and was then Chief of Staff to Attorney General Marian Boyd, took a personal interest in the proposal, and she secured Boyd's support. Although the Law Society initially rejected the proposal, Grant and Boyd persuaded it to approve funding for a legal clinic that would take only civil rights test cases with a focus on the black community (Ministry of the Attorney General 1994, 4). The initiative, while it would not provide significant services to blacks per se, was a victory for black insiders. The clinic did not attack the legal system as flawed; rather, it cast the system as the defender of the rights of blacks and other threatened minorities. Perhaps because of its non-threatening nature, resistance was minimal. The fifth and highest-profile initiative undertaken by the NDP in the area of justice was a direct product of the Lewis Report. Lewis, who described the relationship between the justice system and minorities in the province as 'two solitudes in life' recommended setting up a Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Justice System. The Commission was to document the extent of disparities in the justice system, including jury selection, sentencing, and the role of racial minorities in policy making. Unlike the Legal Clinic, and very much like the other

218 Adam Lewinberg three NDP initiatives, the Commission was grounded in the argument that there was a problem within the justice system with regard to racial impartiality. As a consequence the Commission was a lightning rod for resistance even before its inception. The NDP committed itself to the Commission but government officials working for the Attorney General were reportedly sympathetic to complaints about it from within the justice system. Only when it was made clear that the Commission would focus on structural barriers in the justice system, rather than challenging the impartiality of those working within it, did resistance to the Commission ease. But it did not entirely disappear. According to Share, bureaucrats stung by criticism of the proposed Commission stalled the initiative in consultations, effectively delaying any start-up until late in 1993 (Share, 2 September 1993). When the Commission was given the go-ahead, it was only funded to a level allowing for the hiring of two members of staff, ensuring that the first Commission report would be completed later than originally planned. Weakened if not rendered ineffective, the Commission had not reported by the end of the NDP's mandate. Despite this, according to Rajah, one of the Commission's members, the general climate encountered by the Commission was one of hostility. The black press's assessment of the NDP initiative was harsh. The NDP did nothing to make the Justice System more equitable for Blacks' (Share, 8 December 1994). Why was the NDP not more effective in reforming the police and the justice system? Why were insiders who supported these reform measures ineffectual? Again, the problem was in part the expectation that a unified black community would support the government initiatives. The black community, diverse in origin, largely comprised of recent immigrants, and facing inequalities of all kinds, was not there to be mobilized. As a result, with its back against the political wall on issues of justice and police, the NDP found itself on its own, with little or no organized, grassroots black support when challenged by powerful interests from within the bureaucracy, the police, and the justice system. As the political costs mounted, the government felt that it dared not push the initiatives further without a strong base of community support. They were either dropped or watered down. Conclusion It may be unavoidable that the relationship between minority insiders, government, and a larger ethnic or racial group will be complex and

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 219 often conflictual. Insiders with links to the community and to government are crucial elements in the formation of an effective minority polity. They are people with the potential for dual allegiances, allegiances to their group and to their employer or institution. Black insiders advocating on behalf of the 'black community' from within the Ontario NDP government wrestled with these challenges. Differences between political insiders and those working as career public servants would often complicate matters, as did the differences between what the government understood by community and the reality of black pluralism in Ontario. Insiders, focusing government attention on the needs of black Ontarians, portrayed a strong and unified black community with clear needs and demands. The reality of the black community was different. There was no single, unified black community, and certainly no community that could line up effectively behind the efforts of the insiders or the government. Internal rivalry has been common in the history of ethnic polities in Canada, and it has usually been more pronounced in the earlier stage of the mass migration of a group. In this case, in spite of the best efforts of insiders, blacks from Africa generally chose not to identify as a racial group. According to some informants this situation may be changing, particularly among the youth, who are developing a strong black consciousness that transcends origin differences among Caribbean and African countries. But most of those interviewed for this study conceded that the communal cohesion and development necessary to improve the black position in Canadian society and fight racism are still lacking. Accordingly, community development initiatives that required the support of a unified black community tended to falter. In the end, insiders delivered several equity initiatives that benefited blacks in Ontario. Importantly, relationships were also built between blacks working in a variety of non-profit organizations and the Ontario bureaucracy. Black-focused organizations now have someone to call and access to information and advice on government grants and programs. But these developments owe as much to the openness of the NDP to addressing broad equity issues as they do to any strong and united grassroots black pressure. When particular initiatives, such as reform in the justice system, came under heavy attack, there was little or no counterbalancing support from the black community. As a result, black insiders often lost the initiative, undone by insufficient support. The challenges facing the black polity in Ontario would become even more acute following the defeat of the NDP government by Mike Harris's Progressive Conservatives, who opposed the equity agenda supported by blacks.

220 Adam Lewinberg REFERENCES

Anwar, Muhammad. 1991. Introduction I: The Context of Leadership: Migration, Settlement and Racial Discrimination. In Pnina Werbner and Muhammad Anwar, eds., Black and Ethnic Leadership in Britain: The Cultural Dimensions of Political Action. New York: Routledge. - 1986. Race and Politics: Ethnic Minorities and the British Political System. New York: Tavistock Publications. Ben-Tovim, Gideon et al. 1986. The Local Politics of Race. London: Macmillan Education. Billingsley, Brenda, and Leon Muczynski. 1985. No Discrimination Here?: Toronto Employers and the Multi-Racial Workforce. Toronto: Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto. Braithwaite, Gilbert. 1986. An Analysis of the Organizational Practices and Educational Effects of the Quebec Board of Black Educators. Unpublished PhD thesis, McGill University. Brown, Joan A. 1981. A Comparative Study of Socio-Economic Patterns in Black Nova Scotian Communities. Ottawa: National Library of Canada. Bryson, Lois, and Martin Mowbray. 1981. Community: The Spray-on Solution. Australian Journal of Social Issues 16(4):255-67. Byng, Michelle Denise. 1992. A New Face in the Structure of Community Power: The Black Political Elite of Richmond Virginia. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Virginia. Burnet, Jean, and Howard Palmer. 1988. Coming Canadians: An Introduction to the History of Canada's People. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Daje, Sharon J. 1994. Middle Class Blacks in Britain: A Racial Reaction of a Class Group or a Class Fraction of a Racial Group. New York: St. Martin's Press. Dehli, Kari. 1990. Women in the Community: Reform of Schooling and Motherhood in Toronto. In Roxana Ng et al., eds. Community Organization and the Canadian State. Toronto: Garamond. Driedger, Leo, ed. 1987. Ethnic Canada: Identities and Inequalities. Toronto: Copp-Clark Pitman Ltd. Eade, John. 1991. The Political Construction of Class and Community: Bangladeshi Political Leadership in Town Hamlets, East London. In Pnina Werbner and Muhammad Anwar, eds., Black and Ethnic Leadership: The Cultural Dimensions of Political Action. New York: Routledge. Etoroma, Efajemue Enenajor. 1995. Blacks in Hamilton: An Analysis of Factors in Community Building. Unpublished thesis, McMaster University. Fitzgerald, Marian. 1990. The Emergence of Black Counsellors and MPs in Britain: Some Underlying Questions. In Harry Goulbourne, ed., Black Politics in Britain. Brookfield: Avebury. Fleras, Augie, and Jean Leonard Elliott. 1992. The Challenges of Diversity: Multiculturalisrn in Canada. Scarborough, Ont: Nelson Canada. Goulbourne, Harry. 1991. The Offence of the West Indian: Political Leadership and the Communal Option. In Pnina Werbner and Muhammad Anwar, eds., Black and Ethnic Leadership: The Cultural Dimensions of Political Action. New York: Routledge. - 1990. The Contribution of West Indian Groups to British Politics. In Harry Goulbourne, ed., Black Politics in Britain. Brookfield: Avebury.

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Hemermen, Benjamin W. 1972. The Politics of the Powerless: A Study of the Campaign against Racial Discrimination. London: Oxford University Press. Henry, Francis. 1994. The Caribbean Diaspora in Toronto: Learning to Live With Racism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Henry, Francis, and Effie Ginsberg. 1985. Who Gets the Work?: A Test of Racial Discrimination in Employment. Toronto: Urban Alliance on Race Relations and the Social Planning Council. Hill, Donna, ed. 1981. A Black Man's Toronto, 1914-1980. The Reminiscences of Harry Gairey. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario. Kafele, Paul Kwasi. 1990. Struggle and Strength: The Crisis of African-Canadian Leadership. Unpublished paper. Keith, Michael. 1990. Misunderstandings?: Policing, Reform and Control, Co-optation and Consultation. In Harry Goulbourne, ed., Black Politics in Britain. Brookfield: Avebury. Killingrey, David. 1994. Africans in the United Kingdom: An Introduction. In David Killingrey, ed. Africans in Britain. London: F. Cass. Jacobs, Brian D. 1968. Black Politics and Urban Crisis in Britain. New York: Cambridge University Press. Larter, Sylvia, and Ouida Wright. 1988. Final Report of the Consultative Committee on the Education of Black Students in Toronto Schools. Toronto: Toronto Board of Education. Lewis, Clare. 1992. The Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force. Toronto: The Task Force. - 1989. The Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force. Toronto: The Task Force. Lewis, Stephen. 1992. Report on Race Relations in Ontario. Toronto. Mannett, Joy. 1988. Making Something Happen: Nova Scotia's Black Renaissance, 19681986. Unpublished PhD thesis, Carleton University. Minister of the Attorney General. Letter to Stephen Lewis, 3 May 1994. Ontario Ministry of Citizenship. 1991. Ziemba Announces Comprehensive Anti-Racism Strategy For Ontario. New Release. 3 April 1991. Ontario Ministry of Education. 1992. Changing Perspectives: A Resource Guide for Antiracist and Ethnocultural Equity Education: All Division and OAC. Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Education. Opotu Dapah, Edward. 1993. Report on the Workshop for African Community Groups in Toronto. Toronto: York Lanes Press. Piven, Francis, and M. Cloward. 1978. Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Pantheon Books. Reitz, Jeffrey, et al. 1981. Ethnic Inequality and Segregation in Jobs. Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto. Report of the Equity and Access Committee. 1995. Pursuing Equity - Phase One. Toronto: The Premiers Council on Health and Well Being. Samuel, T.J. 1992. Visible Minorities in Canada: A Projection. Toronto: Race Relations Advisory Council on Advertising, Canadian Advertising Foundation. Sewell, Terri. 1993. Black Tribunes: Black Political Participation in Britain. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Sidney, Jeffers. 1991. Black Section in the Labour Party: The End of Ethnicity and 'Godfather' Politics? In Pnina Werbner and Muhammad Anwar, eds., Black and Ethnic Leadership: The Cultural Dimensions of Political Action. New York: Routledge.

222 Adam Lewinberg Solomos, John. 1993. Race and Racism in Britain. 2nd ed. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. - 1988. Black Youth, Racism and the State: The Politics of Ideology and Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Studlar, Donley T. 1986. Non-White Policy Preferences, Political Participation and the Political Agenda in Britain. In Zig Layton-Henry and Paul B. Rich, eds., Race, Government & Politics in Britain. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. The Four Level Working Group on Metropolitan Toronto Black Canadian Concerns. 1992. Towards a New beginning: The Report and Action Plan of the Four-Level Government / African Canadian Community Working Group. Toronto: Office of Minister of Multiculturalism and Citizenship. Thorualdson, Patricia, ed. 1979. Identity: The Black Experience in Canada. Toronto: Ontario Educational Communications Authority. Toronto Board of Education. 1987. Consultative Committee on the Education of Black Students in Toronto Schools. Toronto: Board of Education for the City of Toronto. Walker, Gillian. 1990. Reproducing Community: The Historical Development of Local and Extra-Local Relations. In Roxana Ng et al., eds., Community Organization and the Canadian State. Toronto: Garamond. Weinfeld, Morton. 1990. Trends in Ethnic and Racial Inequality. In James Curtis and Lome Tepperman, eds., Images of Canada: The Sociological Tradition. Scarborough: PrenticeHall. Youth Employment Services Branch. Ministry of Community and Social Services. New Release. 5 Jan. 1993. Newspaper References Globe and Mail, 12 November 1994, D 7. An affront to Blacks (Ontario's program on black young offenders) - 8 November 1994, A 23. Don't carve up justice along racial lines (Ontario program for black offenders) Share, 22 December 1994,1. Minors cleared by Commission - 8 December 1994. Justice System unchanged by NDP - 1 November 1994,1. Anti-racism training cancelled - 5 May 1994,1. 62 000 for African Village feasibility study - 10 June 1993, 2. 5 Black women appointed to Government commissions by Blacks - 9 July 1993, 3. Four levels of government cooperate: committee studies Black issues Toronto Star, 14 November 1994, A 21. Black Justice Plan merits our attention - 10 November 1994, A 32. Adults part of Black legal proposal, official says - 10 November 1994, A 31. Justice diverted in any program based on race - Walkom - 8 November 1994, A 21. Bluntly Black Legal Program is racist - Walkom - 6 November 1994, A 3. Alternative justice plan for blacks stirs storm - 25 October 1994, A1. Province axes Minors' course - 6 May 1994, A1, 5. Blaming hooliganism seems a little too easy Interviews Dr Kwazi Agegeaman, 26 July 1995 Keith Anatol, 1 August 1995

The Black Polity and the Ontario NDP Government 223 Lennox Farrell, 21 August 1995 Karl Fuller, 30 August 1995 Grace-Edward Galabuzi, 3 August 1995 Pamela Grant, 31 August 1995 Hanas Idris, 26 July 1995 Francis Jeffers, 22 July 1995 Dudly Laws, 1 August 1995 Arnold Minors, 27 July 1995 Marie T. Osborn, 21 July 1995 Sri Gugen Sri Scanda Rajah, 28 July 1995

9 The Canadian Jewish Polity and the Limits of Political Action: The Campaigns on Behalf of Soviet and Syrian Jews HAROLD TROPER The Ethnic Polity in Canada In the early 1970s the Canadian Jewish community was awakened to the plight of Jews suffering under the burden of state-supported discrimination and persecution in both the Soviet Union and Syria. A major campaign was quickly initiated on behalf of Soviet Jewry, a campaign designed to mobilize Canadian and world Jewry into action, engage the sympathy of the larger Canadian community, lobby Canada and other Western governments to intervene and, in the end, to force the Soviet Union either to grant its Jews equal protection of Soviet law or allow them to leave. Under a banner of 'Let My People Go/ the campaign lasted for almost twenty years, ending only when a disintegrating Soviet Union finally permitted the free departure of Jews. No similar campaign was mounted on behalf of Syrian Jews. Why? How did the two causes differ? And what can these two cases tell us about the limits of lobbying, protest, and political mobilization by Canadian ethnic polities? This study explores the limits of an ethnic polity's ability to mount an ethnically based campaign of protest in the Canadian context. While the events discussed took place over twenty years ago, their example continues to illustrate the possibilities of ethnic mobilization and lobbying today. In his perceptive analysis of ethnic polities in Canada, sociologist Raymond Breton observes that ethnic polities, especially those of the more established and institutionally better organized ethnic communities, tend to mirror governments in the organization and management of

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 225 ethnic community affairs. Like government they are characterized by a process of collective decision making, active internal debate, formal and informal mechanisms for choosing and rewarding leaders, political mechanisms for setting a community agenda and, increasingly, a professional bureaucracy that oversees the community's organizational structure and directs its agenda.1 Of course, ethnic polities, like government, may pretend to internal harmony, but below the surface they are often racked by divisiveness and rancorous debate. This is only to be expected. After all, ethnic polities are political and given to tensions endemic to political structures, including those which arise from a clash of ideology, personal styles, or egos. But whatever their internal divisions, ethnic polities, are expected to assume responsibility for defending community interests, promoting organizational life, and ensuring institutional stability. In many cases ethnic polities raise funds and administer services, including social services, regarded as essential to the community. This may give moneyed community members greater influence in community affairs than others. But in addition to ministering to the community's institutional life, the ethnic polity is also often called upon to be guardian of the community's historical legacy and cultural continuity - community intangibles related to the ethnic community's identity, which make inter-generational continuity possible. Government can be said to have a similar mandate. But there is a fundamental difference between the governance of even the most unified and institutionally complete ethnic community and the governance of a state. While shared cultural symbols, heritage, history, religion, and, increasingly, race mark the boundaries between ethnic entities in Canadian society, all ethnic polities share a common dilemma. The polity offers the ethnic community a form of intra-ethnic governance but, unlike government, the ethnic polity cannot enforce its will, at least not in legally sanctioned ways. Ethnic polities do not have the power to compel members to anything. Consider fund raising, for example. It is often necessary for an ethnic group to raise funds to support the community's activities, including the delivery of programs and services, and the cost of operating its governing structure. This fund-raising effort may involved any number of techniques. Money may be raised by tapping into a few generous community stalwarts with deep pockets, or a general, community-wide fundraising campaign modelled on the United Way; through a series of smaller fund-raising efforts by individual community organizations; or

226 Harold Troper even by some kind of voluntary tithing among community members. Often a combination of fund-raising techniques, including arm-twisting, is called for. An observer might be tempted to think of ethnic fund raising as a form of self-taxation. But it is not taxation. An ethnic group member might have any one of a number of reasons for reaching into his or her pocket to contribute - he or she may support the cause for which money is spent, or find the influence, prestige, and honour accorded to a donor, or the tax-deductible receipt attractive - but that individual is not legally compelled to give. In the final analysis, giving remains voluntary. Each individual decides whether, why, and how much to give. If an ethnic polity cannot compel its members to contribute funds in support of the community, neither can it compel them to toe any particular ethnic party line, let alone demand their active participation in ethnic affairs. The ethnic polity dares not even expect those who share in the group's heritage or culture to make that identity a part of their public or private lives, nor can they be forced to accept the authority of any ethnic group polity to speak on their behalf. Increasingly, ethnic self-identification in Canada's liberal-democratic society is being seen as a voluntary expression, especially among the growing numbers of Canadian-born individuals of European descent. For them, belonging to an ethnic group, however that might translate into individual commitment, is in no way equivalent to citizenship. The powers of the ethnic polity are in no way comparable to those of the state. This is not to say that ethnic communities in Canada are unimportant or a fiction; they are a very real and very important part of the Canadian social fabric. But while the ethnic polity in Canada may offer governance, it is not government. On issues important to the ethnic polity for which government assistance or approval is required, the ethnic polity may well have to compete for attention and, in the late twentieth century, the ethnic polity would be well advised to acquire expertise in lobbying. Historically, Canadian policy makers have not been receptive to the special pleading of minority groups, particularly in areas that relate to the international arena. Senior government officials were almost exclusively of British and French origin and unlikely to see the concerns of these 'other' Canadians as reflecting the national interest. In addition, minority origin Canadians may have lacked the confidence and the know-how to mount effective lobbying campaigns.2 The situation changed slowly in the post-war period, as the public service gradually opened up its senior ranks to talented Canadians of varying origins and politicians became more sensitive to ethnic voting

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 227 blocs. The human rights revolution that swept the international agenda meant that all Canadian citizens had an equal right to make demands of government, in any policy domain. The dawn of multiculturalism added impetus to this movement, and in some cases minority origin Canadians came to be valued as assets in enhancing trade and economic growth in an increasingly interdependent and competitive world. In this new environment, ethnic leaders could seek to mobilize not only their own community members, but the Canadian government and the Canadian public as well. If it is one thing to win support on an ethnic issue, it is quite another to decide what issues are important to the ethnic polity. How are ethnic community interests determined? Since a priority of the ethnic polity is likely to be the survival of the ethnic group, what issues draw the community together, increasing the number and commitment of ethnic stakeholders to it? What is it about some issues that enables them to transcend intra-ethnic differences or indifference and command wide community support, even among those who might otherwise not identify with the ethnic community? And, in cases where ethnic interests dictate lobbying of government or courting support beyond the borders of the ethnic community, how is that interest presented or promoted in the larger civic culture? The Jewish Polity in Canada The answers to the questions posed above may differ from issue to issue and among ethnic communities. Certainly, different ethnic groups have different traditions of community organization and governing structures. Some, such as the Canadian Jewish community, have a well-defined sense of governance and a high-profile ethnic polity. One can point to the peculiar nature of Jewish history in the diasporas as giving Jews a head start in the development of communal organizations. Most often forced to rely on themselves, Jews developed organizational mechanisms for self-help and to ensure as much as possible a base level of welfare. Often denied access to the civil courts or expecting no justice from them, Jews also relied heavily on an internal legal structure legitimized by custom and religious sanction. Overseeing these functions at the local and, after the formation of the nation state, in some measure at the national level, was a complex communal Jewish organizational structure, the ethnic polity. The Jewish polity took responsibility for defending Jewish interests, both inside and outside the community.3

228 Harold Troper This legacy of organization was brought to Canada by Jewish immigrants and given new expression in the Canadian context. Even today, no other ethnic group in Canada is as institutionally complete, nor does any other group have a comparable degree of communal self-awareness, as measured by knowledge of organizations and leaders, voluntarism and reading of the ethnic press, community fund raising, and individual self-identification.4 Compared to most other groups, and certainly compared to other ethno-European groups, Jews are a highly identified, unassimilated group - at once confessional and secular - while being well educated and well versed in politics. Indeed, some might claim that Canadian Jewish life today suffers from organizational duplication and turf wars, which consume too much of the leadership's time and energy. Yet the Jewish communal polity remains a model for aspiring ethnic groups.5 One should not suppose, however, that the Jewish polity is any more united than that of any other community. The centripetal force of ethnic communal politics, competition between leadership elites, and differences in world view, status, and ideology often make ethnic politics divisive and bitter. The Jewish polity is no different. In Canada, as in the United States, there are divisions between the observant and the secular, and religious divisions that follow ill-defined fault lines between the Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox Jews. There are also differences between those Jews who tend to be accomodating in their approach to issues, especially issues dealing with the non-Jewish world, and those who hold a more parochial and insular view. This difference is often manifest in arguments over the desirability of embracing opportunities to fully participate in the Canadian social, cultural, and political mainstream. Those at home in Canadian society have different views from those who hold themselves somewhat to the margins of Canadian society, concerned that the price of participation may well be assimilation and an end to Jewish continuity. And, like the rest of society, the Canadian Jewish community is torn by class, economic, and political cleavages. Indeed, divisions within the Canadian Jewish community, as elsewhere, are so much a part of Jewish life that they are almost taken for granted. Few Jews will deny that there is more than a grain of truth in the classic Jewish joke that every Jewish community must have at least two synagogues - 'the one I pray in and the one I would not be caught dead in/ Given these internal divisions, the degree to which the Canadian Jewish community presents a unified face to the larger civic community is somewhat astonishing.6

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 229 In part, the image of a unified Canadian Jewish community is the historical product of an overarching and unifying organizational structure. Unlike the United States, the Canadian Jewish polity, in spite of its internal differences, affords a remarkably unified public presence and single voice in defence of community interests because, at least in the past, the large number of Jewish organizational structures were able to coalesce under an umbrella organization, the Canadian Jewish Congress, a self-styled Canadian Jewish parliament. The Congress first emerged in the 1920s and was revitalized in the late 1930s in response to widely shared community concerns: fear of antiSemitism at home and abroad, the need to lobby government on issues of immigration and human rights, and the desire to capitalize on the appearance if not the reality of a single, strong, united Jewish voice in dealing with government and the larger civic culture. To this day Congress, both as a national body and through its regional and local arms, is not a mass membership organization. Rather, it is made up of constituent organizations that reflect an incredible range of social, political, and religious leanings within Jewish life.7 Congress is still widely recognized in the Jewish community and in Canadian society as a whole as the single most important and representative voice of Canadian Jewry. However, several major Canadian Jewish organizations remain outside the Congress umbrella and within Congress deep divisions and rancorous debate periodically characterize the internal decision-making process. However, rather than decry these divisions, one might see them as the strength of the Jewish polity in the past. Congress has survived because it remained a forum for open debate, for airing the differences of opinion and approach that were characteristic of the wider Canadian Jewish thinking on many issues. In the process of this debate community leaders either compromise or sidestep issues on which compromise is impossible in favour of agenda items on which united action is easier. Today Congress, both at the national and regional levels, is not without competitors. There have always been groups, often at the margins of the organized Jewish community, that cannot or will not find a place for themselves under the mainstream umbrella. Militant groups, like the Jewish Defence League, for instance, regard Congress as too mainstream, too comfortable with the status quo and too weak in defence of Jewish interests they define as important. These dissident voices present themselves as an alternative avenue of Jewish political expression. While their numbers are often small and they know they cannot supplant Congress,

230 Harold Troper such groups attempt to prod the community into action, pushing one part or other of the Jewish communal agenda faster or in a different direction than the Congress and the Jewish establishment might want. Congress is not only pressed by those outside the establishment tent, it is also challenged from within. One division is with the membershipdriven organization B'nai Brith, which sees itself as a more populist voice of the Jewish communal concerns; another exists between Congress and those organizations directly involved in fund raising in support of Jewish community organizations and services. Congress does not raise its own funds. It is a line item on the list of community organizations and services funded in full or in part out of annual fund-raising drives within local Jewish communities. In an environment where community, social, and welfare needs increasingly outstrip available funds, Congress is forced to justify its value as the political voice of the community. What is more, in many areas, the fund raisers are not only asking Congress to prove its worth, they are beginning to suggest that they themselves could perform Congress's job as the political voice of the Canadian Jewish community better, and at a lesser cost. Thus, while Congress retains the confidence of many in the Jewish community and is regarded in the non-Jewish world as the legitimate voice of the Canadian Jewish community, there are those nipping at the Congress heel.8 In the end, the voice of Congress remains something of a lowest common denominator in Canadian Jewish political life; Congress speaks with the moderate voice of the Jewish mainstream, some might say the Jewish establishment. Its constituent member organizations exist because they can count on the support of loyalists freely volunteering their time, expertise, and often money to the community. More recently, lay leadership has shared the decision-making process with a highly trained, organizationally skilled and paid bureaucratic machine that has become the mainstay of organizational administration and program delivery. Among the priorities of the Canadian Jewish polity is defining and promoting the relationship between Jews in Canada, Jews in Israel, and Jews in other parts of the diaspora. The Jewish polity shares this diaspora/ mother country and diaspora/diaspora concern with many other ethnic communities. Indeed, many ethnic communities resonate with the political, territorial, cultural, or religious shifts of the homeland or ethnic confreres elsewhere. This does not mean that the ethnic polity or the ethnic community for which it speaks are necessarily of one mind about

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 231 issues of the homeland. There are many cases in which the politics of the old country sharply divide the ethnic polity and community in Canada. But there is no denying that many events external to Canada are central in shaping the community agenda and the organization of the ethnic polity in Canada.9 Examples abound. In the years following the end of the Second World War, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians resettled in Canada. Many harboured strong nationalist sentiments and feared that their homelands, absorbed into a greater Soviet Union, were being slowly 'Russified.' Many forged a community solidarity grounded in steadfast anti-communism and passion for preserving intact in Canada traditional cultural symbols - religion, language, historical narrative - which they feared were being repressed in their homeland. With little success, they lobbied the Canadian government to pressure the Soviet Union for the cultural autonomy if not independence of their homelands. They enjoyed equally limited success in passing on their passion to the next generation. Often detached from their parents' world, cultural slippage into the Canadian mainstream was high among the Canadian born.10 Further examples of Canadian ethnic engagement with issues of the homeland and fears for the human rights of kith and kin are easy to find. Palestinians and other Arabs in Canada have protested Israeli occupation of the West Bank, while this same issue divides Canadian Jewish opinion. Many in the Greek community trumpeted their displeasure at the military junta that ruled Greece through the early 1970s, or Turkish moves in Cyprus. Some Canadian Sikhs are very much involved in the struggle for Sikh self-determination and statehood in the Punjab. The small Tibetan community in Canada has been outspoken in advocating the independence of Tibet from China and protesting the drowning of Tibetan culture in a sea of new Chinese migration. Many in the growing Canadian Chinese community remain preoccupied with events in a variety of homelands, including mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Close to half a million Chinese Canadians have come to Canada in recent years. Because of their immediate familial or financial ties to Hong Kong and unease over Hong Kong's reabsorption into the larger China, leaders of the Hong Kong Chinese community in Canada impressed upon Canadian officials the importance of monitoring the situation. They also pressed for assurances of Canadian assistance to families in the event that reunification in Hong Kong did not go as hoped.

232 Harold Troper The Holocaust Legacy and the Six-Day War The Jewish polity has been outspoken in its concern for issues of homeland, in this case Israel, and the well-being of Jewish communities throughout the world. Indeed, when it comes to assisting Jewish communities in distress, Canadian Jews have a demonstrated record of setting aside their differences in a united concern for those in need. This has been and remains a major focus of lobbying by the Jewish polity.11 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the force binding Jews together. Suffice to say, in spite of enormous differences in outlook and world view, they are able to draw from a sense of shared religious tradition, singular historical legacy, collective memory, and entwined destiny. Many Jews in Canada demonstrate a deeply held feeling of mutual interdependence and transnational identification with Jews elsewhere that defies easy explanation. In part, it was these bonds that impelled early Jews in Canada, as elsewhere, to make the organization of mutual aid organizations a priority even over the construction of a synagogues.12 And it is the same force that today impels Canadian Jews to commit their communal organization not just to serve the local needs of Jews in Canada but also to act as a buffer for Jews everywhere. Concern for distant Jews was evident in the Jewish communal response to European Jewish suffering during turn-ofthe-century pogroms and the consequent mass exodus of Jews from Eastern Europe, and it found institutional expression in the activities of such organizations as the Baron de Hirsch Fund, the Joint Distribution Committee, the American Jewish Committee and, for that matter, the Canadian Jewish Congress. The same commitment to intervene on behalf of threatened Jews was paramount in the Canadian Jewish response to the Holocaust and the outpouring of diaspora Jewish support for the fledgling state of Israel founded in the aftermath of the Second World War.13 The sense of obligation that Canadian Jews felt toward Jews in distress, an obligation that drew heavily on the linkage between Holocaust memory and attachment to the State of Israel, became even stronger during the 1960s. A number of events were critical in reinforcing that link during the post-war decades. One was the Eichmann trial of the early 1960s. Previous to the trial something of a fog of ignorance hung over the Holocaust and obscured Jewish understanding of the genocidal Nazi effort. Not that there was any doubt in the Jewish world that the Holocaust was a catastrophic event. But there was a lack of understanding about how it happened, how it could happen and how the outside world let it happen.

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 233 And, to be honest, there was also unease about how so many could have been murdered without unleashing major armed Jewish resistance. This question was especially pronounced among Israeli-born youth, armed in defence of their land and people.14 The Eichmann trial in Jerusalem answered questions that many had previously been too frightened even to ask. But it was more than just a singular, judicial historical lesson; the Eichmann trial precipitated an explosion of Holocaust research that continues today. And while historians lay bare more and more of the Holocaust narrative, Jews would appear to have already internalized one key lesson from the Eichmann trial and the swelling body of research that has since appeared: the Jews of Europe were not so much trapped by the Nazis as they were abandoned to them by the rest of the world. Yes, the Nazis planned and executed the genocide. They bore primary responsibility. But others were implicated in their efforts - those who willingly lent their minds and bodies to assist in the Nazi crusade, those who stood by and did nothing when something might have been done, and those, Jewish and non-Jewish, who turned their backs and preferred not to know. Out of this realization came a renewed sense of obligation. As if proclaiming that all Jews are survivors, the Jewish polity, like that of Canada, accepted ensuring that persecution of Jews would never again go unanswered as something of a sacred obligation. Indeed, if there was one lesson world Jewry took from the Holocaust it was that. The Jewish polity vowed that no Jews anywhere would again be left powerless, sacrificed to the blood lust of the anti-Semites, and never again would an appeal for help go unanswered. What made this pledge more immediately meaningful was the existence of a Jewish state with doors open to oppressed Jews all over the world. In the wake of the Holocaust revelations, the image of Israel among many Jews gradually shifted from a state forged, in part, out of the agony of Holocaust, a state dependent on charity from Western Jews to build an infrastructure and resettle those Jews who survived the genocide, to a self-assured and self-reliant state dedicated to ensuring that no Jew would ever again face Holocaust. Nor was this task Israel's alone. Implicit in this vision was a partnership between Israel and the diaspora, including the Canadian diaspora, a sense of partnership cemented by bonds linking the past and the present, Holocaust, the Jewish state, Jewish self-defence, and Jewish survival. These bonds were put to the test by the two weeks leading up to the 1967 Six-Day War. Hard on the heels of a newly revitalized Arab military

234 Harold Troper alliance forged against Israel, UN peacekeeping troops withdrew from the Sinai on Egyptian orders. The Egyptians, well stocked with Soviet arms, closed the Straights of Tiran to Israeli-bound shipping, a move Israel denounced as an act of war. While Israeli military planners were secretly confident that their forces could handle any military threat, the prevailing wisdom was that Israel stood perilously close to a war which, even if it won, would be catastrophic in human terms.15 The next few weeks were critical for Canadian Jewish self definition. Amid media discussion about how long Israel could survive a protracted war and how heavy civilian casualties might be, Canadian Jews, like Jews everywhere, were gripped by the sudden fear that Israel's days could be numbered. All of a sudden, Canadian Jews understood that the Holocaust could happen again with bystanders ready to eulogize Israel but not to offer it aid. An observer of the American Jewish scene on the eve of the Six-Day War could also have been writing of Canada: '...in those two traumatic weeks most American Jews experienced a passion of solidarity with the Jews of Israel that was new and shocking and powerful, that went far deeper and much further than their commitment, such as it was, to Zionism or to Jewish survivalism in the sense of a belief in the special value and worth of Jewishness or of identification, a literal embodiment of the ideal that kol yisrael arevim zeh ba-zeh, every Jew is part of every other.'16 In retrospect it is hard to imagine the sense of isolation, if not abandonment, felt by world Jewry, including Canadian Jews, as war loomed. Feeling thrown back on themselves, Canadian Jews, through their organizational structure, did what they do well. The Jewish polity organized - rallies, fund raising, lobbying of government. And they prepared for the worst. The lightning Israeli victory in the Six-Day War was as much a relief as it was exhilarating to a Canadian Jewish community and polity so recently convinced that Jewish survival hung in the balance. The immediate impact of the war was to electrify a Jewish community which, hearing echos of the Holocaust, had felt threatened to its very core. And out of the war, the trauma of isolation, and the fear of annihilation came a deeply felt sense that this generation of Jews in Israel and in the diaspora must be responsible for one another and for the continuity of the Jewish people. For Canadian Jews, the experience of the Six-Day War, aided by memories of Holocaust and a renewed sense of pride in Jewish identity, not only forged strong bonds of community between Jews in the diaspora with one another and in Israel, it also breathed life into the notion that the

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 235 oppression of any Jew is the concern of all Jews. 'Never Again' meant preventing the annihilation of Israel and the oppression of Jews anywhere. Never again would Jews simply be abandoned to their fate.17 We turn now to an examination of two campaigns waged by the Canadian Jewish polity for Jews in distress: one for Soviet Jews, the other for Syrian Jews. The former effort has been more widely documented and analysed and I rely here on published accounts. The campaign for Syrian Jewry has not received similar analytical attention. This study is thus based on primary sources, documents, and interviews with key informants. The objective, as I indicated earlier, is twofold. First, these cases reveal the types of mobilization strategies for homeland or diasporic issues available to minority communities in Canada. Second, we seek to understand why one effort was far more successful than the other. The Successful Struggle for Soviet Jewry Perhaps nowhere was the sense of Jewish interdependence more deeply felt nor so completely transformed into a community-wide crusade as in the cause of Soviet Jewry. With the possible exception of the Canadian Jewish polity's concern for Israel's security, no other issue so dominated its lobbying efforts for two decades. Two years before the Six-Day War, Elie Wiesel, Holocaust survivor, novelist, and journalist, visited the Soviet Union. His journal of that visit and, most particularly, his encounter with the beleaguered Jews of the Soviet Union was published in a slim but impassioned volume entitled Jews of Silence (1966). He painted a picture of Jewish life in the Soviet Union somehow seeping though the cracks in the Soviet wall of hostility, of Jews oppressed, barely able to maintain a spark of Jewish life and dignity in a society where state-tolerated, if not state-supported, antiSemitism was rife. Many sought protection in the invisibility of assimilation, hoping that by divesting themselves of Jewish identity they would be safe. But in the Soviet Union one's historic 'nationality' or ethnicity had legally defined ramifications: escape into anonymity was not easy. And those Jews who openly identified as Jews, who demanded rights as citizens or looked to immigration westward or to Israel for relief were denied permission to leave and punished for their pains.18 Admittedly, Wiesel was not the first who sought to warn the world, including the Jewish world, of state oppression of Soviet Jews. But his timing was fortuitous. Wiesel's book, already widely read, took on new

236 Harold Troper meaning in the aftermath of the Six-Day War. Canadian Jews, like Jews throughout the West, so caught up with the fragility of Jewish survival and the self-imposed injunction to stand by Israel and one another, were soon swept up in the cause of Soviet Jewry. Of course in the pluralist and often fractious Canadian Jewish community not everyone responded to the issue of Soviet Jewry in the same way. From the right, the Jewish Defence League (JDL) entered the drama claiming, as they often did, that the North American Jewish establishment was too soft on the enemies of the Jewish people. They pointed an accusing finger at the North American Jewish establishment, arguing that it had done less than it could during the Second World War to save Jews who would die at the hands of the Nazis and that now, in the case of Soviet Jews, it was dragging its feet again. The JDL demanded militant and immediate action and pledged to lead the way. But the issue was never whether the Jewish polity was committed to the cause of Soviet Jewry. It was. The question was how to turn commitment into priority and priority into a full-blown campaign.19 The Canadian Jewish polity had been united in concern for Israel in the years before the Six-Day War, but it had taken the turbulent crisis of the few weeks prior to its commencements to make Israel an overarching priority. What would make Soviet Jews a Canadian Jewish priority? It was not the JDL's call to arms. In the wake of the Six-Day War it could be argued that the Canadian Jewish polity was primed for a campaign on behalf of oppressed Jews. Only a spark was needed to ignite the campaign. That spark was provided by the 1970 Leningrad Trials, at which nine defendants, seven of whom were Jews, were convicted of attempting to hijack a Soviet airliner. The hijacking was interpreted by some as an act of desperation by Soviet Jews who endured renewed anti-Semitism in the wake of the Six-Day War - the Soviet Union being the major supporter and supplier of arms to both Egypt and Syria. On Christmas Day 1970 the press headlines announced that two Jews found guilty in the hijacking were to be executed. Convinced that their crime was not the botched hijacking but the fact that they were Jews, the organized Jewish community in North America screamed anti-Semitism and galvanized protest against the Soviet verdict. In Toronto a hurriedly called protest rally brought an estimated 10,000 people out into the sub-zero cold of the city hall square in protest. Rally organizers were overwhelmed by the response. They had expected only a fraction of the crowd that actually showed up. Out of that rally and a series of other community events that followed emerged an organized campaign on behalf of Soviet Jewry,

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 237 which ran unabated from 1970 to the opening of the Soviet Union to Jewish emigration in the period leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. Canadian Jews were not alone; Jewish communities across the Western world became involved in the campaign. But none could have been more engaged or more successful in rallying community support than the Canadian Jewish polity. In concert with Jewish communities elsewhere in the West, the Canadian Jewish polity committed itself to a multi-level campaign in support of Soviet Jewry's struggle for human rights, ethnic and religious self-realization within the Soviet Union, or the right to emigrate. In the Canadian context, the Jewish polity organized a multifaceted campaign against business-as-usual with the Soviet Union while Soviet Jews remain oppressed. It rallied Canadian Jews and all those of good will to support their cause, lobbied the Canadian government to lead the international community in support of the human rights of Soviet Jews, and pressed Canada to offer a haven to any Jews who managed to depart the Soviet Union. Beyond the justice of the Soviet Jewish cause, one must ask why the plight of Soviet Jews so completely captured the Canadian Jewish imagination and became an overriding concern of the community, a concern perhaps second only to eliminating anti-Semitism at home and the community's ongoing commitment to Israel's security. Of course, the time was right to take up the cause of Soviet Jewry, following as it did so closely on the heels of the Six-Day War. But how did that translate into a full-blown campaign and why was the campaign so enduring? In retrospect, one can see in the origins of the campaign on behalf of Soviet Jews the successful and fortuitous convergence of a series of elements - timing, logistics, strategies, politics, and simple luck - which came together to make the Jewish polity's efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews remarkably effective in mobilizing Jewish community support and engaging the sympathy of many in the larger civic society. One of the key factors shaping the success of the campaign was the international political context of the day - the relationship of the Soviet Union to the Western alliance of which Canada was a partner. No factor is more important than the Cold War. Simply stated, the Soviet Union was the enemy not just of Soviet Jews but of the West in general. As victims of Soviet persecution, denied both the protection of citizens under Soviet law and the right to emigrate, Soviet Jews found wide sympathy in the West. With religious and cultural expression of Jewish identity in the Soviet Union frowned upon if not repressed by Soviet authorities, and any suggestion of emi-

238 Harold Troper gration, let alone filing an application to leave the Soviet Union, likely to be rewarded with loss of jobs, expulsion from university, and harassment, Canadian attitudes with respect to the Soviet Union were validated. Jews of the Soviet Union were not just prisoners of conscience, they became symbols of all that was wrong with the Soviet Union and the Soviet system. There was little or no conflict between the goals of the Canadian Jewish campaign on behalf of Soviet Jews and the larger context of Western policy with respect to the Soviet Union. Indeed, most of the time the Soviet Jewry campaign and Western policy neatly dovetailed with one another. It was not long before Soviet treatment of Jews came to be regarded by many in the West as something of a litmus test of Soviet openness and willingness to engage in constructive dialogue. During the twenty-year roller-coaster ride of Soviet-Western relations that ended in the demise of the Soviet Union, Soviet treatment of its Jews was a constant issue. When relations were strained, the cause of Soviet Jews stood out as an example of the kind of repression that the 'Evil Empire' was prepared to inflict on its own citizens. When relations warmed up, as during the era of Detente, the Soviet Union was repeatedly pressured to demonstrate its sincerity by addressing the 'Jewish question/ In addition, as one of the two world major powers, the Soviet Union was continually under the microscope, studied by academics, the media, and policy analysts. The national capital, Moscow, contained both a large Jewish population and the bulk of the foreign diplomatic and press corps. Information on Soviet Jews, names of those who were punished for applying to leave, and reports on underground religious services or schools were forever leaking into the West. What is more, during the twenty years of the Soviet Jewry campaign, the Soviet Union was further vulnerable to criticism as it slowly sought to balance its deteriorating relations with China in the east by opening itself to the West, or at least to trade in much needed goods, services, limited capital investment, technology, and information. With trade came foreign contact and still more pressure over Soviet Jews. In the end, the increasing need of the Soviet Union to get beyond the Cold War left it vulnerable to accusations of mistreatment of its Jews. And any token Soviet effort to placate the West or the Western Jewish lobby served only to increase demands for more concessions/70 The Cold War explains why the Soviet Jewry campaign played well to the larger Western audience and proved so problematic to the Soviet Union's efforts to engage the West in trade and dialogue. But it does not

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 239 explain why the cause of Soviet Jews become so much a part of the fabric of Jewish life, a gut issue that united Jews in an otherwise fractious community. Other issues divided the Canadian Jewish community, but there was little disagreement on the priority of working for the cause of Soviet Jewry. Could this unity, in and of itself, be a reason the campaign was embraced by the Jewish community? It poured oil on troubled community waters. There are any number of competing social, political, and religious camps in the Canadian Jewish community; indeed, to the informed observer, the wonder is not that a working Jewish polity is so successful, but that it exists at all. But, if the Jewish polity could join together on little else, it could unite in common cause for Soviet Jews. As a result, it was natural that this issue should be so much profiled. It united the polity as one. One question still remains. Why did individual Canadian Jews become so personally drawn into the cause of Soviet Jewry? The answers are in some measure personal and individual. It might be argued that Canadian Jews had a sense of special linkage with Soviet Jews or Jews of Eastern Europe more generally. Most obviously, Eastern Europe was the address of the Holocaust. Once again Jews in Eastern Europe were being persecuted. Among Canadian Jews, a community alive with Holocaust memory, there could be no denying Soviet Jews or Canadian Jewish responsibility to those in need. The Canadian Jewish community of the 1970s and 1980s was also still very much influenced by an immigrant and first Canadian-born generation that had personal roots in Eastern Europe, if not the Soviet Union per se. Many were Holocaust survivors or the children of survivors. Some still had family in the Soviet Union. Thus, in the Canadian context, a campaign on behalf of Jews in the Soviet Union did not speak of distant and unknown Jews; for many Canadian Jews it invoked family and personal history. And in a Jewish community where so many parents or grandparents were immigrants to Canada from Eastern Europe, spoke English with an Eastern European accent, perhaps, just perhaps, when confronted with the plight of Soviet Jews, even the Canadian born had a nagging sense that 'there but by the grace of immigration go I/ What also gave the campaign on behalf of Soviet Jews drawing power was that the tools necessary to organize such a campaign were at hand. Few would deny that the Jewish polity, no matter how internally divided, had demonstrated expertise in organizing meetings, protest rallies, and fund-raising events, distributing petitions, and lobbying government. And the tactics of political organization, many adapted from the great labour

240 Harold Troper union battles of the 1930s and 1940s, the American civil rights struggle, and anti-Vietnam War protests, were easily recycled to the cause of Soviet Jewry and given a particular Jewish spin. Of course, every campaign needs targets and there were no shortage of targets for anti-Soviet protest. It was relatively easy to organize high-profile rallies, petitions, or protests in front of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, or to find individuals ready to chain themselves to the Soviet embassy gate. Beyond that, Canadian Jews lobbied sympathetic members of Parliament and organized boycotts of Soviet goods and disruption of cultural and sporting events involving Soviet participants. Every occasion for Canadian-Soviet interaction - a cultural event, an academic exchange, a Canada-Russia hockey game, a visit by a trade delegation - whether in Canada or the Soviet Union, was regarded as an opportunity to further embarrass the Soviet Union, to press the Soviet Jewish cause with government and the media and, if possible, to make contact with individual Soviet Jews. Jews and non-Jews who went to Moscow for the now legendary 1972 Soviet-Canadian hockey tournament, including hockey players, volunteered to take Jewish religious articles to give to Soviet Jews. Some met with Jewish Refuseniks - Soviet Jews who had applied for exit visas and were now unemployed and in official limbo. A few Canadians were so moved by these meetings that they reportedly also left personal effects, money, and clothing behind with the Refuseniks. They brought back photographs, letters, and personal reports.21 When a large Soviet freighter docked in Toronto harbour, Jewish protesters, with the media again in tow, were there. Protesters set up a movie projector and, much to the dismay of Soviet authorities, invited the general public to view a film about the oppression of Soviet Jews projected onto the white hull of the ship.22 Person-to-person telephone calls were made from Canada to Soviet dissidents, and individual dissidents jailed or otherwise punished by Soviet authorities became the focus of special interest in a much more high-profile version of the Amnesty International model. Efforts were made to publicize the plight of individual Soviet Jewish dissidents whose names, like that of Anatoly Sharansky, gradually became synonymous with the Soviet Jewish cause.23 The Canadian families of Jews in the Soviet Union were encouraged to apply to bring their family members from the Soviet Union to Canada. The Jewish calendar and life-cycle events also lent themselves to keeping the Soviet Jewish campaign in the forefront in Canadian Jewish consciousness. If Jewish children in the Soviet Union were being denied religious schooling and even bar or bat mitzvahs were being discour-

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 241 aged, why not encourage twinning of bar mitzvahs between Canadian and Soviet youth? Before long many Canadian Jewish families signed on to twin the celebration of a child's bar mitzvah in Canada with a child denied a bar mitzvah in the Soviet Union. With the public announcement of the name of the twinned Soviet child during the bar mitzvah service, it was as if the Soviet child were having a bar mitzvah in absentia. Canadian families were also encouraged to write to the Soviet child and even to send a bar mitzvah gift. Links, family to family, and child to child, were initiated. Jewish holiday celebrations were also reconfigured to express concern for the difficult plight of Soviet Jews. As Canadian Jews observed Passover, with its story of Israelites emerging from slavery into freedom, they were asked to remember that Soviet Jews were still in bondage. The final line of the Passover Seder, 'Next Year in Jerusalem' took on new meaning. Chanukah, a festival celebrating resistance to tyranny, held similar lessons. And then there was Simchat Torah, the holiday marking the completion of the annual cycle of Torah reading and the beginning of the next. In Moscow dissident Jews, many with no religious background, began to gathering outside the main Moscow synagogue on this unlikely holiday in a public demonstration of their determination to survive as Jews. Soviet authorities, at first taken aback by the spontaneity of the Simchat Torah gatherings, dispersed them. But the demonstrations persisted and grew year after year and, as a measure of solidarity with the Jewish community, Western diplomats began joining Jews at the synagogue for the annual event. Synagogue and in many cases communitywide celebrations of Simchat Torah grew in solidarity with events in the Soviet Union and became yet another link in the chain connecting Canadian and Soviet Jews. If one particular protest demonstration stands out as typifying the organizational thrust of the Canadian Jewish polity, it was a protest demonstration early in the Soviet Jewry campaign. On the evening of 25 October 1971, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was in Toronto at the end of a nine-day state visit to Canada. The Soviet Union was hoping the visit would open the door to greater trade, travel, and scientific cooperation with the West. The Kosygin visit was seized upon by several eastern European ethnic communities to protest against communism in their homelands and what they regarded as the forced feeding of Russian culture and language. The Canadian Jewish Congress, in contrast, used the Kosygin visit to publicize the issue of Soviet Jewry, which it saw as separate and distinct from the anti-communist thrust of other groups.

242 Harold Troper The issue for the Jewish polity was the human rights of Jews in the Soviet Union, not the particular ideology of the state. It was the right to free emigration, not a battle for the dismantling of the Soviet federation. As a result, the Canadian Jewish Congress rejected overtures from other Eastern European community organizations to join in one mass anti-Soviet protest and instead organized its own demonstration. With the cooperation of the police and the international press invited to be on hand, an estimated 12,000 members of the Jewish community, many more than planners had expected, gathered in a suburban park. In a light drizzle and as thousands carried signs reading 'Let My People Go' the crowd began a half-mile protest march to a large vacant field across the street from the hotel where Kosygin was staying. There, amid a sea of signs and glowing candles held aloft by the crowd, Elie Wiesel spoke about the miracle of renewed Jewish self-expression in the Soviet Union and the need for diaspora Jewry to redouble efforts of behalf of Soviet Jewish emigration. After Wiesel finished speaking several thousand people, largely young adults, announced an all-night vigil. The rest of the crowd, feeling that it had made its point, quietly dispersed. This and other demonstrations during the Kosygin visit received wide coverage in the press. While there is debate as to exactly how much impact the protest had in reshaping Soviet policy with regard to its Jews and, by extension, liberalizing conditions for other religious and cultural minorities within the Soviet Union, there is little doubt that it had an impact - and not just on the Soviet Union. In the West, the Soviet Jewish issue became one of the defining features of Soviet-Western relations. It just would not go away. The key to the campaign was not simply the Tightness of the cause. The Soviet Jewry campaign built on a foundation of negative Western attitudes toward the Soviet Union, at a time when the Soviet Union wanted to establish better relations with the West. And there was no shortage of targets for the Jewish protest: there was enough of a Soviet presence in Canada - economic, political, and cultural - to afford ready venues for protest, and the contours of Jewish life allowed that protest to be integrated into the ritual life of the community. The Canadian Jewish campaign on behalf of Soviet Jewry only ended when the Soviet Union opened its borders to the free exit of those Jews who wished to leave. The Campaign for Syrian Jewry: Anatomy of Failure By any measure, the Soviet Jewry campaign can be judged a singular model of success. It united the Jewish community, engaged the sympathy

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 243 of government and the media, and ensured that the cause of Soviet Jewry remained a key issue in Soviet-Western relations for two decades. The plight of Syrian Jews did not attract the same attention. Admittedly, the four or five thousand Jews of Syria were hardly the millions understood to be in the Soviet Union. But numbers alone do not tell the whole story. The history of Jews in what is today Syria date back to Biblical times. But the vast majority of Syrian Jews left Syria before or just after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948; those who remained became hostage to the toe-to-toe stand-off in the Israel-Arab conflict. They became subject to state-sanctioned discrimination, restrictions on movement, and arbitrary arrest. Syria is a tightly controlled police state and Syrian citizenry as a whole are denied the kind of protection of the law and freedom of expression that are the norm in Western liberal democracies. But the situation of the Jews who lived in Syria, then the backbone of Arab resistance to any accommodation with Israel, went from to bad to worse and from worse to almost unbearable in the aftermath of Israel's victory in the Six-Day War. For a time, Jews were under virtual house arrest. Then, allowed out of their homes, they were forced to stay within a three-kilometre radius of their homes. Domestic inter-city travel, even for business or medical treatment, required a special travel permit and travel abroad became virtually impossible. Jewish institutions, such as schools, were either closed or effective administration was assumed by the state and its internal security arm, the Machaburat. There were quotas on Jewish admissions to universities. All postal and telephone communication into and out of the Jewish community was monitored. While all Syrians carried identification papers, those issued to Jews were marked with a special red stamp in Arabic reading Mousawi, or follower of Moses. Beatings of Jews and theft of Jewish property were common and little police protection could be expected. And, in a society where baksheesh, bribery, remains a way of life, Jews were being squeezed not just to pay for basic service, but for personal protection or to prevent the few civil amenities still afforded to them from being cut off. For some the only solution was escape. In some cases individuals and families spent their life savings on hiring a smuggler to help them cross the Syrian border into Turkey or Lebanon, from where it might be possible to reach the West or Israel. The lucky ones made it. Others did not. Some smugglers sold out their charges to the Syrian secret police. Even those Jews fortunate enough to find a trustworthy smuggler who was ready to honour his word, perhaps in the hope of attracting more Jewish clients, were not home free. Syria's frontiers was closely patrolled by

244 Harold Troper border police. Those apprehended during an escape attempt could expect no mercy. Would-be escapees - including women and children were stripped of property and subjected to prison and torture. Those Jews who escaped knew that family left behind could pay a heavy price. Any remaining property was confiscated and family members - a father, mother, brother - could be imprisoned without trial for allegedly abetting the escapee or not reporting that an illegal departure was planned. As a warning to others who might be contemplating escape, these family members were often tortured.24 One failed escape attempt stands out. The deaths of three sisters, Mazal, Laura, and Farah Zeybalk, and their cousin Eva Saad came as close as the Syrian Jewish movement could to having a Sharansky or Ida Nudel, individuals who symbolized the resistance of an entire people. In mid-March 1974, reports filtering out of Syria and published in the French press informed the world that several weeks earlier the bodies of the four young Jewish women had been found raped, robbed, and murdered in a cave near the town of Asfura on the Syrian side of the SyrianLebanese border. The bodies were mutilated. According to a subsequent New York Times story, one of the young women had a finger cut off in order to remove a ring she was wearing. On the Sabbath before the Jewish Festival of Purim, celebrating diaspora Jewry's victory over their enemy's genocidal plans, the women's bodies, in sacks, were returned to their parents for burial.25 Perhaps to prevent the dead women from becoming martyrs and to deflect any accusation that the Syrian authorities were directly implicated in the murders, the Syrian government moved quickly to shift blame onto others. Syria disclaimed any and all responsibility for the murders. The story officially released was that smugglers had been hired to illegally take the four across the border into Lebanon. The women were driven out of Damascus by car but, instead of going to Lebanon, they were murdered. As far as the government was concerned, the motive for the murder was robbery. The four were said to be carrying jewels and other valuables with them. Of course, there was no mention of why these women were ready to risk so much in trying to escape Syria, or of the fact that there was virtually no legal way for Jews to leave that country. As word of the murders leaked into the Western press, the Syrian minister of the interior announced that four men had been arrested for the crime - two smugglers and two Jewish men, both prominent and respected members of the Jewish community. The four were alleged to be a gang that specialized in organizing the flight of rich Jews from Syria.

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 245 They were said to have approached the women with the escape scheme; en route to the border, the women were robbed and murdered. The first response from the world Jewish community was predictable. To Jews the very idea that the two Jewish men, who were said by Syrian authorities to have confessed, 'would go to a cave in the mountains to participate in the robbery and murder of 4 girls from their own community, is an insult to the intelligence of the enlightened world and a slap in the face of justice and human decency.' It was charged that any confessions could only have been extracted by torture and were designed to conceal the 'facts.' And what were the facts? As far as Jewish observers was concerned, the Syrian authorities were culpable. After all, by denying Syrian Jews even the most basic of human rights, devaluing their lives, and keeping them virtual prisoners in Syria, the Syrian government invited desperate Jews to make risky escape attempts. It was their only option. As far as Jewish observers were concerned, the Syrian authorities might just as well have been in the cave with the smugglers raping and murdering the women.26 Interviewed in Toronto in 1994, several years after finally leaving Syria, Rabbi Ibriham Hamra, former Chief Rabbi of Syria, dismissed any notion that the two Jewish men were in league with a gang of smugglers. He allowed, however, that the two may well have assisted the women in making contact with the smugglers. The two Jews were arrested after a note that the women had left behind was turned over to the police. The note advised the parents that the four were escaping and that the two Jewish men would know where they were. But, the Rabbi noted, the women were desperate to leave Syria and if these two men had not assisted them in contacting smugglers, they would have turned to others or set out on their own. By dealing with the smugglers for them, the two men may erroneously have thought they were protecting the women.27 The murder of the four women highlighted what was already known to Jewish leaders: the situation of Syrian Jews was desperate. Israeli authorities certainly monitored the situation of Syrian Jews but, given the adversarial state of Israeli-Syrian relations, any public Israeli intervention would likely have aggravated their situation. Accordingly, Israel actively worked behind the scenes, feeding information to friendly governments and Jewish organizations in the hope that they could act where Israel could not. In 1971, the year of Kosygin's visit to Canada, the World Jewish Congress, headquartered in Paris, acknowledged that, 'Apart from the Jewish problem in Soviet Russia, the Syrian Plight has become our problem No. 2.'28 At that time, two non-denominational committees of concern - one in France and the other in the United States - were

246 Harold Troper already protesting the plight of Syrian Jewry and alerting Western governments, the media, and the conscience of the world to the violation of human rights of Jews in Syria. While these two committees were independent of direct official Israeli involvement, and the American committee was sponsored by the non-Zionist American Jewish Committee, there is no doubt that the Israelis welcomed their establishment and encouraged similar committees of concern to organize elsewhere, including Canada. But, in spite of quiet Israeli efforts to energize bipartisan and outwardly interdenominational committees, the wind gradually blew out of their protest sails and even the French and American committees gradually petered away. What of the Canadian Jewish polity? In the early 1970s a small group, some previously allied to the Jewish Defence League, unaware of the efforts of the Israeli government or of the activities of the French or American committees of concern, was also drawn to the plight of Syrian Jews. Already active in the Soviet Jewry campaign, they accused North American Jewish leaders of wilfully ignoring the plight of Syrian Jews. If the mainstream Jewish leaders did not take up the Syrian challenge, they declared that they would lead the way. Once the Jewish rank and file where aroused, they believed, the Jewish polity would inevitably follow. At first blush it all seemed simple. Accepting that their cause was just and that there was a deep reservoir of Canadian Jewish concern for oppressed Jews, the activists' first step was to try to raise Jewish community consciousness of the Syrian cause. Once that was done, the Jewish establishment, the larger Jewish polity, would have no choice but to fall in line behind awakened Jewish consciousness. Tactically, they foresaw no problems. There was a proven action model - the Soviet Jewry campaign. All they had to do was duplicate that campaign step by step, a focus attention on the plight of Syrian Jewry and employ the same protest techniques used successfully in the case of Soviet Jews. But it was not quite that easy. A cause, they would soon discover, must not only be just, it must also possess the hooks on which to hang a campaign. Those hooks were there for the Soviet campaign, but they were not present in the case of Syrian Jews. The Soviet campaign worked so well both inside the Jewish community and beyond because there was already a basis for wide non-Jewish support: the Cold War. The Canadian Jewish campaign on behalf of Soviet Jewry had little trouble in striking a responsible public cord; moreover, it could not have come at a worse time for the Soviet Union, which was starting to court better relations with the West. But Syria was off the diplomatic and economic beaten track, almost

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 247 unknown to most Canadians and at best tangential to Cold War politics. Canada had little direct or active interest in Syria - little trade, and few cultural exchanges or shared interests. To the degree that Syria had a public face, it was regarded as something of a Soviet client state, an Arab police state, and front-line stalwart in the Israeli-Arab conflict. It was not a state in which many Canadians would argue Canada had a vital and immediate interest and, if they thought about it at all, which was not likely, they might conclude it was best that way. Few might doubt that the Jews of Syria were persecuted or disagree that this was bad. But the solution was not going to come through Canadian actions or as part of Cold War diplomacy; it would come as part of a reasoned solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict. This is hardly the kind of conclusion that lends itself to building wide public support of the kind that Soviet Jews enjoyed as victims of the Cold War in which Canada was a partisan player. In the protracted Israeli-Arab dispute Canada was merely a well-intentioned neutral party. What is more, Canadian Jews had little more experience of Syria and Syrian Jewry than other Canadians. Of course, they knew that Syria was an Arab state, hostile to Israel, but little beyond that. There were few if any direct connections between the Jews in Canada and the Jews of Syria. Jews in Canada were mostly Ashkenazi Jews, originating in central and Eastern Europe, including what was then the Soviet Union; Syrian Jews are Sephardic Jews, whose origins lie in the Mediterranean basin and the Arab world. While there was a growing and vibrant community of Sephardic Jews in Montreal, most came to Canada from North Africa or Israel, not Syria. And what of Syria itself? Syria was not the Soviet Union. In the early 1970s, Syria was not nearly as eager as the Soviet Union to mend its diplomatic fences with the West. A repressive police state, Syria was racked by tensions between the ruling Alawite elite and Muslim fundamentalists on the one hand and possessed by its conflict with Israel on the other. It was not nearly as interested as the Soviet Union in opening to the West; in fact, it mistrusted the West, especially the United States, as antiArab and supportive of its enemy, Israel. In this context some might fear that any campaign on behalf of Syrian Jewry along the lines of the campaign on behalf of Soviet Jews would be counter-productive. Any foreign intervention on behalf of Syrian Jews would be regarded by Syria as more than interference in Syrian internal affairs; it would be seen as proof positive that Syria's Jewish population was suspect and potentially disloyal. Some were concerned that protest might make things worse still

248 Harold Troper for Syria's Jews. Some members of the Canadian Jewish polity hoped that states like Canada would monitor the situation of Jews in Syria, but Canadian diplomatic sources advised the Canadian Jewish leaders that public protest could be counter-productive, compromising Canada's appearance of Mid-East neutrality.29 But questions of whether or not to organize a Canadian campaign on behalf of Syrian Jews did not stop there. If diplomatic advice was ignored and a campaign initiated, what would be the targets of opportunity for such a campaign? In the case of Soviet Jews, there were ample targets in Canada - diplomatic, economic, cultural, and political - around which to organize. Not so for Syria. Protest needs an address, and Syria had none in Canada. In the early 1970s there was no Syrian diplomatic mission in Ottawa which could provide the site of demonstrations or where petitions might be delivered. There were few, if any, Syrian businesses or manufactured goods entering Canada that could provide the focus of a boycott. There was no Syrian airline office, shipping line, or cultural exchanges, nor were there any Syrian-Canadian hockey tournaments, and there were few if any high-profile visits by Syrian academics, diplomats, or trade missions or anyone else from Syria. The absence of any immediate targets around which to build a campaign posed significant problem. Without an ongoing Syrian profile of one sort or another in Canada, opportunities for protest and the all-important spin-off media publicity would soon dry up. Organizing a protest campaign on behalf of Syrian Jews would be like the sound of one hand clapping. But, pressed by the Israelis and genuinely concerned for the plight of Syrian Jews, the Canadian Jewish Congress had to do something. In June of 1972 the Congress attempted to kick-start a campaign in Montreal on behalf of Syrian Jewry, using a public rally much like the rally in Toronto during the Kosygin visit the previous year. Six weeks before the announced rally Congress released a 'manifesto' on behalf of Syrian Jewry to the press. The manifesto, entitled 'A Cry from the Night/ was also placed in several Ottawa and French-language Montreal newspapers as a paid advertisement. It called on Canadians to 'add their voice to the wave of world-wide protest. Even a cynical world seemingly immune to suffering cannot deny this cry from the night. Syrian Jewry is a claim on the conscience of all mankind.' The ad closed with a quote from Isaiah, Ts this not the fast that I have chosen? To loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke?'30 On 27 June 1972 the community rally on behalf of Syrian Jews drew

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 249 several thousand people to the ballroom of Montreal's Bonaventure Hotel. The packed hall listened as the guest speaker, American black civil rights activist Bayard Rustin, demanded that Syrian Jews be granted the right to migrate. 'We're merely asking for the human equation/ said Rustin. 'Let our people go where they want to go, in the name of human democracy and human freedom.' The rally shouted its approval of a resolution urging Syria to 'release those Jewish prisoners, whose only "crime" is their desire to leave the country.'31 Satisfied that the cause of Syrian Jews, like that of Soviet Jews, was now a Congress priority, the meeting ended on a confident note. But rather than initiating a continuing campaign on behalf of Syrian Jews to rival that on behalf of Soviet Jews, the 1972 Montreal rally proved a one-shot affair. There were little in the way of follow-up activities. Yes, some activity sputtered on here and there for a time. Several Jewish organizations under the Congress umbrella - the Canadian Zionist Federation, the National Council of Jewish Women, and Hadassah-Wizo chimed in with their own resolutions, statements of concern, or telegrams to Canadian, United Nations, and Syrian officials. Several rabbis delivered sermons and the Jewish press carried articles about the situation of Syrian Jews. Many synagogues set aside the Sabbath before Purim to remember the four women killed in 1974 and, by extension, to keep congregants informed of events in Syria. A Canadian Jewish Congress Committee on Jews in Arab Lands also continued to make information on Syrian Jewry available, and at Congress triennial plenaries the delegates regularly passed resolutions protesting Syria's treatment of its Jews.32 But this was a pale imitation of the ongoing campaign on behalf of Soviet Jewry. Without wider public support in Canada on which to build, cautioned that Syria would be impervious to protest, or that protest might make things worse for its Jews, and without ready targets of protest, it proved impossible to establish a robust Canadian campaign on behalf of Syrian Jews. The Canadian Jewish polity cared about the plight of Jews in Syria, but organizing a campaign comparable to that on behalf of Soviet Jews was impossible. If the Canadian Jewish polity, if Canadian Jews, were going to make a difference in the lives of Syrian Jews, it was not going to be through well-worn techniques of community mobilization, lobbying of government, and high-profile public protest. The Canadian response to the suffering of Soviet and Syrian Jews does much to illuminate the larger issue of limits to political action by an ethnic polity. As the different fates of the Soviet and Syrian campaigns

250 Harold Troper suggest, these limits are not shaped by the justness of a particular cause. Many just causes fail to engage the public. Rather, the outcomes are shaped in some measure by whether and to what degree a particular cause is marketable both within the ethnic community and to government and the larger civic society. As we have seen, even a well-organized ethnic polity, the leaders of which are effective professionals with close ties to government, does not guarantee success of campaigns oriented toward diasporic relief. If one may judge from the Soviet and Syrian cases, it would appear that the cause that has the most impact is that which successfully bridges the divide between the ethnic polity and the larger political or public interest. The winner is the cause that complements or mirrors the values, attitudes, and political agenda not just of the ethnic polity, but of Canadians more generally. It would appear that the ethnic polity that mounts a successful campaign, mounts a Canadian campaign. NOTES

1 Raymond Breton, The Governance of Ethnic Communities: Political Structures and Processes in Canada (New York: Greenwood Press 1991), 2-5 2 Dennis Olsen, The State Elite (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1980); Dennis Stairs, 'Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of Canadian Foreign Policy/ International journal 32 (1977): 128-49 3 For a discussion of the American and Canadian Jewish polities see Daniel J. Elazar and Harold M. Waller, Maintaining Consensus: The Canadian Jeivish Polity in the Postwar World (Laham, Md.: University of America Press 1990). 4 For a discussion of the Jewish and several other ethnic communities in Toronto see Raymond Breton et al., Ethnic Identity and Equality: Varieties of Experience in a Canadian City (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1990). 5 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld, 'Canadian Jews and Canadian Multiculturalism/ in Howard Adelman and John H. Simpson, eds., Multiculturalism, ]ews, and Identities in Canada (Jerusalem: Magnes Press 1996), 15-17, 30-1 6 An interesting but somewhat superficial discussion of the Canadian Jewish community and polity as compared to its American, British, and Israeli counterparts is found in Norman F. Cantor, The Sacred Chain; The History of the Jews (New York: HarperCollins 1994), 355-60; for a more detailed study of the Canadian Jewish polity see Elazar and Waller, Maintaining Consensus, and for the American Jewish polity see Howard M. Sachar, A History of Jeivs in America (New York: Knopf 1993) and Daniel J. Elazar, Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry (Philadelphia: JPS, 1995). An insight into the workings of the American Jewish establishment elite is offered in J.J. Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment (Reading, Pa.: Addison-Wesley 1996). 7 For a discussion of the early years of the Canadian Jewish Congress see Gerald Tulchinsky, Taking Root: The Origins of the Canadian Jeivish Community (Toronto: Lester 1992), 265-75.

The Canadian Jewish Polity and Political Action 251 8 Canadian Jewish News, 2 January 1997, 3 9 David Taras and Morton Weinfeld, 'Continuity and Criticism: North American Jews and Israel/ in Robert J. Brym, William Shaffir, and Morton Weinfeld, The Jews in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press 1993), 293-310 10 Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld, Old Wounds: Jeivs, Ukrainians, and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada (Toronto: Viking 1988), 54-8 11 Lobbying of the Canadian government on Israel and the Middle East by the Canadian Jewish polity is at issue in many of the articles in David H. Goldberg and Davis Taras, eds., The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab Israel Conflict (Montreal: McGillQueen's University Press 1989). 12 This history of mutual interdependence reaches back to the earliest period of Jewish settlement in Canada. See Sheldon J. Godfrey and Judith C. Godfrey, Search Out the Land: The Jews and the Growth of Equity in British Colonial America, 1740-1867 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995). 13 Simon I. Belkin, Through Narrow Gates: A Review of Jewish Immigration, Colonization and Immigrant Aid Work In Canada (1840-1940) (Montreal: CJC 1939); Joseph Kage, With Faith and Thanksgiving: The Story of Two Hundred Years of Jewish Immigrant Aid Work in Canada (Montreal: Eagle 1962); Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys 1982) 14 Michael R. Marrus, The Holocaust in History (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys 1987), 4-6 15 For an useful outline of events in and around the Six-Day War see Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), 88-104. 16 Norman Podhoretz, 'A Certain Anxiety,' Commentary 52(2) (August 1971), 4-5 17 Milton Himmelfarb, 'Never Again!' Commentary 52(2) (August 1971), 73 18 Elie Wiesel, The Jeivs of Silence: A Personal Report on Soviet Jewry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1966) 19 The best study of the Canadian effort on behalf of Soviet Jews is Mindy B. AverichSkapinker, 'Canadian Jewish Involvement with Soviet Jewry, 1970-1990: The Toronto Case Study' (PhD thesis, University of Toronto 1993); see also Wendy Eisen, Count on Us: The Struggle to Free Soviet Jews: A Canadian Perspective (Toronto: Burgher 1995). 20 For a discussion of the Soviet Jewry movement in the United States during 1960s and 1970s see William W. Orbach, The American Movement to Aid Soviet Jews (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 1979). 21 Averich-Skapinker, 'Canadian Jewish Involvement with Soviet Jewry/ 74 22 Interview with Judy Feld Carr, 24 August 1993, Toronto 23 Martin Gilbert, Shcharansky: Hero of Our Time (New York: Viking 1986) 24 For an analysis of the position of Jews in Syria during the 1970s see, for example, Judy Feld Carr Papers, File 22. George E. Gruen, 'The Present Status of Syrian Jewry/ American Jewish Committee, 3 May 1976. 25 New York Times, 14 April 1974 26 Judy Feld Carr Papers, File 1. Rabbi Joseph Harari to the New York Times, 18 March 1974; Department of External Affairs Archives (Ottawa), External Affairs Papers. 45ME-13-3, Vol. 6. Telegram to EA, Ottawa, from Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv, 21 March 1974; Judy Feld Carr Papers, File 1. Committee of Concern, Statement on the Murder of Four Jewish Women in Syria, 25 March 1974; Canadian Jewish Congress Archives (Montreal), DA 12, Box 13, File 6. Memorandum to All the Affiliated Communities and Organizations of the World Jewish Congress from A. Kaplan, Re: Syria, 27 March 1974.

252 Harold Troper 27 Interview with Rabbi Ibraham Hamra, October 1,1994, Toronto 28 Canadian Jewish Congress Archives (Montreal). DA12, Box 13, File 8. Memorandum to All Affiliates of the World Jewish Congress from Armand Kaplan re: Tragic situation of the Jews in Syria and request for immediate action by all our affiliates 29 Interview with David Satok, 20 December 1994, Toronto; Interview with Alan Rose, 31 May 1995, Montreal 30 1OI no. 655, 28 April 1972; Canadian Jewish Congress Archives (Montreal) DA 12, Box 14, File 1. Task Force on Syrian Jewry,' nd; DA 12, Box 15, File 16. Press Release, Syrian Jewry Suffers Discrimination, Torture: Manifesto Issued to Canada, 11 May 1972; Ottawa Journal, 15 May 1972; Ottawa Citizen, 15 May 1972; La Press, 16 May 1972; La Droit, 15 May 1972; Canadian Jewish Congress Archives (Montreal) DA 12, Box 14, File 3. Sol Kanee to Jean Gascon, 14 March 1972 31 Suburban, 21 June 1972; Gazette, 28 June 1972; Montreal Star, 28 June 1972; le Devoir, 28 June 1972; IOI no. 588, 30 June 1972; Canadian Jewish Congress Archives (Montreal) DAS, Box 36, File 3 32 Rubin Feld Papers, File 16. All Jewish Affairs Representatives from Estelle Eisenberg (NCJW Foreign Jewry Coordinator), January 1973; Rubin Feld Papers, File 5. 'Resolution of Support and for Action Concerning Syrian Jewry' (ZOA) nd; Canadian Jewish Congress Archives (Montreal) DA 12, Box 13, File 5. Memorandum to Syrian Jewry Committee from Mrs Chas. Balinsky (Hadassah-Wizo), 17 May 1972

10

Immigration and the Canadian Federal Election of 1993: The Press as a Political Educator LIANE SOBERMAN Introduction The early 1990s witnessed a surge of right-wing populism in Canada. Observers have yet to fully explain why this occurred but almost certainly the new right's success owed much to its ability to tap into growing economic anxiety and widespread resentment at what was often described as 'big government' pandering to 'special interest groups' at the expense of 'ordinary Canadians.' The populist agenda for change included demands for less government, lower taxes, less regulation, getting 'tough' on criminals, a return to 'core family values/ and a l^ack to basics' approach in schools. This agenda stressed individual responsibility and a vigorous work ethic. To clip the wings of special interest groups and protect 'real Canadians' there was a call for an end to multiculturalism and legislated equity, rejection of special claims by Quebec, and a reduction in immigration, particularly of immigrants who did not share traditional Canadian values. One suspects this latter phrase to be code for non-European immigrants.1 If some hoped that the right-of-centre Progressive Conservative Party could be infused with zeal for necessary change, others argued that only a new party, free of obligations to special interest groups, a populist party, could promise the kind of action they sought. The Reform Party soon became the voice of right-wing discontent. This study seeks to examine how issues of immigration and multiculturalism fit into the Reform Party's call for a cohesive civic society built on time-tested Canadian values and, most particularly, the role of the print media in spreading the Reform message on these issues during the federal election of 1993. American scholars such as Rita Simon have

254 Liane Soberman recognized the role of the press in shaping public policy and political attitudes to immigration.2 Canadian research on this subject, in contrast, has been relatively neglected. There has been little published research on the Reform Party and the immigration issue during the 1993 federal election, or the role of the press in shaping the immigration issue during the campaign This study hopes to create a Canadian understanding of the link between politics and the press.3 Background: The Emergence of the Immigration Debate Canada and Canadians have long been ambivalent about the place of immigration and immigrants in the process of nation building. At times immigration was rigorously promoted by government, at other times it was tightly restricted. Freda Hawkins has labelled this the 'tap on and tap off phenomenon.4 Regardless of how open the tap, before 1967 there were restrictions, based on categories such as nationality, ethnic group, geographic area of origin, customs, habits, methods of holding property, and unsuitability to climate. Only in 1967 were the last restrictions allowing for discrimination in admissions expunged from Canadian immigration regulations.5 The introduction of a non-racially based immigration points system in 1967 has had dramatic results. When the point system was introduced the majority of immigrants coming into Canada were Europeans. Four years later, most of the immigrants entering Canada were nonEuropeans. Prior to 1961 over 90 per cent of immigrants were of American or European descent. According to Statistics Canada, between 1977 and 1990, 71 per cent of immigrants came from regions other than Europe; 42 per cent came from Asia alone. If the impact was felt unevenly across Canada, the increasingly diverse racial and ethnic make-up of Canada is now reflected in schools, restaurants, universities, inner cities, and suburbs across the country. Even as the racial face of Canada changed, the Canadian economy entered a new era. Free trade, shifting export markets, new trading blocks and technology combined to dislodge many from the workplace. Thousands of blue-collar jobs disappeared or flowed off shore or into the United States. Many Canadians suffered economic decline and status dislocation. They felt left out or abandoned by an economic system beyond their control and seemingly beyond the ability of government to control. Some believed that their political institutions were failing them, and villains were also found in Canada's changing demographic profile.

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 255 Immigrants were accused of stealing what jobs there were or abusing the unemployment and social welfare system. 'Immigration/ 'race/ and 'ethnicity' were equated with crime, welfare fraud, and an attack on Canadian identity and values. Nor were these views relegated to the fringes of Canadian society. They gradually crept into the mainstream. By the time of the federal election of 1993, the merits of immigration were quietly debated at the dinner table, in the car, and among friends. It was also a topic of media interest. However, until the federal election of 1993, while private discussion of immigration was growing, mainstream political parties remained mute on the subject. Immigration was, according to one academic observer, the issue that 'everyone is talking about, but no one is talking about/6 Certainly negative discussion of immigration was seen by some as risky. Those who publicly criticized Canada's immigration policy, the Western Report (a staunchly conservative weekly magazine) warned, were in danger of being dismissed as politically incorrect, or worse. In 1988 the Western Report claimed that 'all critics of immigration policy... labour under a cloud of racism.'7 Discussion of immigration may have remained in the shadows, but the government was aware of it. Public opinion polls tracked shifting attitudes on immigration prior to and during the 1993 election. There was also increasing discussion of immigration in the print media during the two years prior to the election and William Gairdner's negative appraisal of public policy and immigration in particular, The Trouble with Canada, enjoyed several months on the Globe and Mail's best-seller list in 1991. For this reason alone it is worth considering the message the book presented. The Trouble with Canada was 'not... aimed at academics or specialists but at the everyday reader searching for answers to our troubles.'8 Perhaps the most pointed chapter is 'The Silent Destruction of English Canada - Multiculturalism, Bilingualism, and Immigration/ in which Gairdner argues that a key source of Canada's troubles is to be found in its 'foolhardy immigration policy/9 Eulogizing a supposed earlier golden era when Canada was all white, English speaking and law abiding, Gairdner laments the changing nature of Canadian society and in particular the decline in what he saw as an English Canadian way of life in the face of immigration. According to Gairdner, 'The greatest problem for English Canada - and I mean not only for its language, but also for its every tradition - is that this extremely unnatural policy of multiculturalism, which will have - has already had - the effect of reducing the country's core culture to parity with a hundred alien ones, is that it has been imposed from the top down, by politicians/10

256 Liane Soberman The point system, family reunification, and refugee admissions meant the arrival of non-European immigrants. With this new immigration, Gairdner argues, '... we surrender our ability to determine the future composition of our nation. Instead, its composition gets decided by the demographic forces of the outside world; by the desires of people quite different from us, who have no intention of changing, whom we pay to remain the same and who may even cherish the day when we become more like them in a kind of demographic capture of Canada/ Gairdner also quotes an unnamed source from Employment and Immigration Canada as saying that '70% of refugees coming to Canada are bogus.'11 The September 1992 publication of Daniel Stoffman's research critical of Canadian immigration policy sparked wider debate. After Stoffman's series of articles, originally funded by an Atkinson Fellowship in Public Policy, appeared in the press, the C.D. Howe Institute invited him to make policy recommendations for improving Canada's immigration system. His recommendations were published by C.D. Howe's 'Backgrounder ' in June of 1993. It, too, received wide coverage in the print media and the Reform Party of Canada is widely assumed to have relied in part on Stoffman's work in forming its immigration platform for the 1993 federal election. Articles by Stoffman also appeared in Canadian Business and Saturday Night.12 The main thrust of Stoffman's argument was economic. He suggested that immigration in the early 1990s was not working to the economic benefit of Canada; in fact, it had the opposite effect. Stoffman proposed altering the Canadian immigration admissions system to reward applicants who possessed language, work skills, and investment possibilities that would directly benefit Canada. But he also acknowledged the possibility of racial tensions as a result of the changing racial balance forced by immigration. While Stoffman himself did not advocate a return to the racially selective, whites-only immigration policy of the past, some of his readers might use his economic arguments as cover for just such a conclusion. Perhaps stimulated by Gairdner and Stoffman's work, in the two-year period leading up to the federal election of 1993 the media carried an increasing number of stories about immigrants as a drain on the taxpayer, bogus refugees, immigrants and crime, and numerous other negative issues associated with immigrants.13 One study of media content noted that of more than twenty major stories appearing in major Englishlanguage newspapers across Canada, only one emphasized the benefits of immigration.14 Discussion of the positive economic and social benefits

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 257 of immigration was largely relegated to the pages of scholarly journals or government reports.15 The Reform Party and the Immigration Issue As discussion of immigration smoldered just under the surface of public discourse, the fledgling Reform Party of Canada, with its ideology of selfreliance and rugged individualism, took root. Immigration reform was not one of the party's key platform areas, but Reform did advocate substantial cuts in immigration and rejection of multiculturalism. As a result, the Reform Party was soon identified with immigration restriction. The most obvious statements of Reform's immigration and ethnocultural policies were contained in The Blue Book, a window on Reform Party policy, and Preston Manning's The New Canada, articulating the party leader's personal and political vision. But perhaps most telling were changes made to The Blue Book (actually The Blue Sheet] during 1991. The mid-1991 version stated that Reformers 'oppose any immigration policy based on race or creed or designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic makeup of Canada/16 William Gairdner advocated precisely the same policy in The Trouble with Canada.17 Perhaps sensing that the phrase 'or designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic make-up of Canada' was too explicit a statement of the party's intent, the offending phrase was removed from a revised edition of the Blue Book issued in late 1991. Prior to the 1993 election Reform leaders may not have imagined that the party's immigration and multiculturalism policies would prove so important. But as the party's position on these issues became a focus of media attention, Reform became cemented in the public mind with reduced immigration and an end to state-supported multiculturalism. This proved a mixed blessing. Although some party organizers may have worried that these policies generated widespread criticism from proimmigration and more moderate groups, they must also have recognized that they were something of a selling point, attracting both members and much-desired media attention. Of course, not all the media attention was flattering. Hints that Preston Manning and his Reformers harboured racists were splashed across the pages of many of the country's largest newspapers. There were articles about Reform's tolerance of intolerance, its embrace of anti-immigration or racist policies and questions about some of those who attached themselves to the party. For example, in 1988 controversial Vancouver col-

258 Liane Soberman umnist Doug Collins sought the Reform Party nomination in a Vancouver riding. Collins, according the Western Report, 'often slam[med] Canadian immigration policy ... calling for Ottawa to get tough with refugees and insisting] that western Europeans be favoured over immigrants from the Third World.' Collins was asked to signed a declaration rejecting racial discrimination; when he refused, he was denied permission to run.18 Later, Reform disassociated itself from several Heritage Front members found in the party's ranks, but rumours persisted that many more remained within the party.19 Less extreme than the Heritage Front, but no less tied to Reform, was author 'Bill' Gairdner, who often spoke at Reform rallies where his book, The Trouble with Canada, was offered for sale.20 Fully aware of the problems that extremists had caused his father's Social Credit Party, Preston Manning and his Reform Party publicly sought to distance themselves from accusations that the party was either racist or extremist. Immigration, Manning declared, while important, was hardly a key party issue. Reform's core agenda involved an equal federation of provinces, Senate reform, and economic conservatism. But the media and the public's attention seemed fixed on Reform's immigration and multicultural policy. And some, like Gairdner, must have known that they could count on an enthusiastic response from Reform supporters when they pushed the anti-immigration button.21 Concerned that the racist or extremist labels would scare off voters, but not wanting to lose the edge that the party's immigration platform gave to Reform in some quarters, Manning did not so much address the offending policy as opt for damage control. It was a delicate balancing act. A political warhorse like Manning probably understood that beyond the editorial pages of the national media and the pointing fingers of liberal, pro-immigration advocacy groups lay a constituency of voters that appreciated Reform's right-wing populism. Despite the controversy that surrounded many of its social policies, or perhaps because of it, support for the Reform Party mushroomed. During the three-year period leading up to 1991 the party more than doubled its membership annually. Membership increased from 300 in 1987 to over 100,000 by the end of 1991. When the 1993 federal election was called, Reform had a mortgage on the immigration issue. At first, all other parties steered clear of the immigration debate, leaving Reform to tap public concern and set the immigration agenda. Canada's major newspapers and magazines picked up on public rumblings of discontent - rumblings they had helped to

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 259 generate. This discontent seemed to intensify throughout the course of the campaign, and eventually entered political discourse from the right. The Reform Party provided its sharpest voice. The 1993 Election and Media Coverage of Immigration Issues The federal election was officially called on 8 September 1993. After a slow beginning, polls tracked growing Reform support. This drew even more media attention to the party's platform and its immigration and multiculturalism planks. Indeed, as the press reported, only Reform seemed to be ready to openly address these questions. A little more than two weeks into the campaign, on 25 September, an article entitled 'Immigration: Too hot to handle' appeared in the Toronto Star, and another, 'Immigration goes undiscussed' was published in the Globe and Mail. Pointing to immigration as the 'phantom issue' in the election, these two articles opened a floodgate of media attention. In just forty-five days, more than two hundred news stories linking Reform and immigration appeared in six major English-language newspapers across Canada. The media cranked up the heat on mainstream politicians who had hitherto been loath to address issues of immigration, race, and multiculturalism. But why did the original two articles suddenly appear? Were these articles truly reflective of public interest in the Reform Party's immigration agenda or did they incite discussion of immigration as an election issue? In order to uncover the links between immigration-related issues, the Reform Party, and the media, a sample of English-language newspapers from across Canada was studied. Major Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Montreal, and Halifax newspapers were analysed, as was Canada's selfdeclared national newspaper, the Globe and Mail. Articles were classified as 'minor' - signifying that the article did not focus on immigration specifically, but had one or two lines devoted to the subject; 'medium' signifying that the article was about a number of things, including immigration, which received more than a brief mention; and 'major' - signifying that the article was about immigration as it related to the election. These classifications were applied to editorials, opinions, and letters to the editor, as well as to political cartoons. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 offer a breakdown of all of the stories having to do with immigration that appeared during the election period. These stories will be looked at in four different time frames. The election was called on 7 September 1993 and coverage began the following day. The first time

260 Liane Soberman TABLE 10.1 Stories Classified by Newspaper Newspaper

Period

Minor story

Medium story

Major story

Calgary Herald

A B C D

5 0 1 6

3 1

0 3 0 9

24

Total

42

Halifax Chronicle-Herald

Montreal Gazette

Globe and Mail

Toronto Star

Vancouver Sun

A B C D

A B C D

A B C D

A B C D

A B C D

1 0 1 0

2 0 1 2

7 2 3 2

2 0 1 2

2 2 3 3

5 9

3 2 0 5

6 1 1 8

3 2 2 1

1 1 2 2

2 1 0 2

Total

8 4 6

0 0 0 4

4 2 1 9

Total

16

1 0 2 9

9 1 4 19

Total

33

0 1 3 10

10 5 8 13

Total

36

0 3 5 15

3 4 8 19

Total

34

0 1 1 17

4 4 4 22

Total

34

period (Period A) runs from the date the election was called (7 September) to just before the telling Toronto Star and Globe and Mail articles appeared (24 September). The second period (Period B) runs from 25 September until the day of the televised English-language leaders'

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 261 TABLE 10.2 All Stories Classified by Period and Importance

All Newspapers

Period

Days

Minor story

Medium story

Major story

Total

A B C D

17 10 8 11

19 4 10 15

18 8 10 27

1 8 11 64

38 20 31 106

Total

195

debate (4 October). The third period (Period C) runs from 5 October until the day before Reform candidate John Beck was dismissed by the party for making anti-Semitic remarks about immigrants and Jews to Excalibur, the York University newspaper (13 October). The final period (Period D) runs from 14 October until election day (25 October).22 Table 10.1 indicates the number and classification of articles appearing in each of the four periods, by newspaper. Table 10.2 presents the same information for all of the newspapers combined. Most letters to the editor were counted as 'major' because they were exclusively about immigration. Comments from the 'Vox Populi' section of the Globe and Mail were counted as 'minor' because each person's comment was but one of four comments and therefore constituted only a fraction of the article. The average number of stories on immigration carried by each daily during the election period was 32.5. Four of the six dailies were within four articles of the average. The Calgary Herald carried more stories than the average (forty-two), while the Halifax Chronicle-Herald carried far fewer stories about immigration than the others (16). This may be a product of variation in immigrant settlement patterns across Canada. In twenty-five Canadian cities immigrants, on average, represent 16.1 per cent of the population. Immigrants made up almost 40 per cent of Toronto's population in 1991. With the exception of Halifax, all of the other cities whose daily newspapers were examined fell within the Canadian average. Only 7 per cent of Halifax's population is made up of immigrants.23 In every newspaper examined, the highest number of stories on immigration appeared in Period D, the eleven-day period immediately prior to the election; the most 'major' stories on immigration were also found in this period. Finally, with the exception of the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, each daily contained more 'major' stories in Period D than they did stories of 'minor' or 'medium' importance. In other words, as the campaign progressed the Reform Party and its immigration policies became a focus of press attention across Canada.

262 Liane Soberman Table 10.2 presents an aggregate of all of the findings, to show that 106 out of 195 stories (approximately 54 per cent) appeared in the final period of the election campaign. And of the 106 stories appearing in, Period D, 60 per cent were of 'major' importance. Compared to the first period of the campaign, Period A, with the exception of one 'major' story, all of the other stories were either of 'minor' of 'medium' importance. During the middle two periods there is a decline in the total number of 'minor' and 'medium' stories and an increase in the number of 'major' stories focusing more attention on the Reform Party and its policy on immigration issues. The Views of the Press With the exception of the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, which had markedly less coverage of Reform and immigration than any of the other dailies examined, each newspaper had one or two editorials exclusively devoted to Reform and immigration.24 Moving west, the Montreal Gazette ran an editorial on the separate English- and French-language leaders' debates. It was less than flattering of Preston Manning, '... he of the irritating whine and condescending manner.' On the question of immigration the Gazette lamented 'that all five parties are apparently scared stiff of white, mainstream backlash; in English they danced around the question of immigration (with Mr. Manning making the most obvious pitch for keeping immigrants out).'25 The Gazette failed to offer any detailed editorial analysis of the Reform Party's platform. It must be remembered that Reform was not a big player in Montreal or Quebec, where the party did not run candidates. The Toronto Star, long identified as a pro-immigration paper, published two editorials, back to back, on immigration. Both challenged Reform's assertions that 250,000 immigrants a year was too high even in a weak job market; that Canada accepts too many 'bogus' refugees; and that newcomers strain Canada's already overburdened social safety net, defraud welfare and the employment insurance system, and commit disproportionate numbers of crimes. The first Star editorial asserted that a careful examination of Canada's immigration record suggests the opposite: 'No studies have reached any such conclusion.'26 In the second editorial, the Star argued that 'Reform party leader Preston Manning may talk of a "colour-blind" policy, but many of his supporters reserve their lustiest cheers for his call to reduce immigration.'27 Perhaps what best represents the Star's view of Reform and its immigration policy is the first editorial's

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 263 conclusion: 'Anti-immigration feelings always rise during economic downturns and recede once the economy bounces back. A sound longterm policy would not be based solely on one passing phase of public sentiment. But that's precisely what Manning is proposing - and without any credible economic basis.'28 The Calgary Herald, a Southam-owned daily like the Montreal Gazette, was very open in its view on Reform's immigration policy. Its news coverage was not particularly friendly and a key editorial on Reform and immigration, 'Below the party line/ spared no punches. 'Like so much of the Reform Party programs, it's not the official line on immigration policy that many find alarming, but the questions it begs. The proposal to cut immigration from 250,000 to 150,000 annually seems innocuous enough. However, the number of immigrants is not the issue; it's the process of selecting them that rings alarm bells ... To be blunt, there is a fear that immigration would be for sale to the highest bidder with the right skin colour... Reform's opposition to government-supported multiculturalism also invites questions. Is it simply a cost issue, or something more fundamental? ... Reform's philosophy suggests that it's not only the cost of the programs that is under attack, but the very philosophy behind it. And that is why Reform has not convinced many voters that its immigration program is as benign as it seems at first glance.'29 The Western Report protested that the Calgary Herald was far too negative when it came to Reform. A week before the Calgary Herald editorial, the Western Report ran a story, '"Balanced" coverage, Southam-style,' which accused the Herald of anti-Reform bias both at the editorial and news levels.30 Their criticism followed on the heels of a front-page story in the Herald on 30 September 1993, suggesting a Klu Klux Klan endorsement by a Reform candidate, and an opinion piece by Catherine Ford, the Herald's associate editor.31 In her column, Ford wrote, 'His [Preston Manning's] party is the smooth and practised voice of the frightened right, who mask their agenda of revenge and retaliation in the bland exterior of change, accountability and freedom.' Ford concluded: 'To use the words and concepts that the core of the Reform party will understand - because you cannot see the Devil does not mean he doesn't exist. Because Reform has the language of change down pat doesn't mean that you, too, aren't a target. Just as long as you stay happy, healthy, white, Anglophone, employed and Canadian, Reform will speak your language.'32 The Calgary Herald was not the only Western daily to take a strong stand against Reform's ethno-cultural policies. The Vancouver Sun ran an editorial entitled, 'On immigration, parties are clear.' The editorial sup-

264 Liane Soberman ported the notion that immigration was the unspoken issue in this election: 'Immigration has been the great simmering issue of this election. It is, to some extent, one of the few policy areas on which the parties hold clearly different positions/ The Sun went on to review the different party policies but was careful not to criticize Reform. It did, however, state that Reform's suggestion to cut immigration to 150,000 has 'given rise to allegations of an underlying racist agenda/ The Sun also carefully outlined the Tories' rewriting of the nanny program that would 'make it almost impossible for poor Third World women to qualify/ Pointing out that in the English-language debate Jean Chretien painted a picture of Canada as a country made richer by its openness to immigration, the editorial gently endorsed the Liberals: 'So, whether you would stay the course with the Tories, open your arms with the Liberals, or close the door with Reform, on immigration the choice is clear/33 Overall, however, the Sun's editorial tone was somewhat muted, perhaps in response to the negative criticism the paper received for an antiReform editorial cartoon published two days earlier. The cartoon, which caused a demonstration outside the newspaper's office, depicted a large screen in which a hole had been cut in the shape of a Klansman and a sign saying 'STEP THIS WAY/ The caption read 'Reform Candidate Screening Process/ The senior editor stood behind the cartoonist, who claimed that the cartoon was a response to the expulsion of Toronto Reform candidate John Beck for his racist and anti-Semitic remarks. The position of the Globe and Mail toward Reform was somewhat more positive than that of other dailies. In an editorial that appeared immediately after the English-language debates, the Globe asserted that Reform had been unjustly tarred as racist. In particular, it ripped into a critic of Manning's debate performance who suggested that Manning's final plea for voters to vote with their conscience was coded message in support of racial quotas and assaulting the poor. The Globe said that such a message 'is nowhere stated, implied, or decipherable in the Reform program, even if they used invisible ink/34 and the editorial went on to assert that Reform and its leader had earned their place on the political stage. 'Mr. Manning did not have a good debate. But merely by appearing on the stage with the other leaders, he will have confirmed Reform's arrival as a legitimate choice for those fed up with the traditional parties ../35 Perhaps a better window on the Globe's views is gained from an 'Opinion' by its editor-in-chief, William Thorsell. Thorsell correctly argued that 'The new parties (particularly Reform) are posing new questions - questions that have languished in the wings despite considerable

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 265 public interest in their content.'36 He went on to suggest some of these 'new questions.' On immigration, Thorsell noted that Canada accepts immigrants and refugees at more than twice the rate of other industrialized countries, which translates into roughly 1 per cent of our population annually, over-represented in major cities. Most come from very different cultures and are visible minorities. This, he argues, leads to obvious questions: 'What effect might this have on Canadian society as we have known it7. Are the problems with assimilating new, non-European immigrants different from those of old? Are recent immigrants and refugee claimants over-represented in crime statistics? If so, which ones and what can be done? What are the implications of this immigration for our education and political systems? What are the economics?'37 Thorsell concluded that 'A repressive consensus has enveloped the main-line parties on many issues... New answers to chronic problems receive almost no airing, and new questions about old wisdom rarely make the agenda. That's what is changing through the arrival of new parties. It's inevitable and fundamentally healthy.' While he did not endorse Reform, the questions Thorsell raised implied a certain sympathy with the negative vision of an immigration policy out of control that Reform preached. Maclean's magazine was not nearly as ready to grant Reform's place in the Canadian political sun. Instead, Maclean's urged voters to think carefully before giving their vote to the Reform Party. In an 18 October note from the editor, readers were cautioned to look beyond the specifics of Reform's ethno-cultural policies and to remember that 'in the emptiness of the rhetoric of campaign '93, it is difficult to be assured that the consequences of so many simple solutions have been fully explored.'38 Thus, with the exception of the Globe and Mail, none of the dailies offered much editorial sympathy for the Reform Party or its position on immigration. However, there did appear to be consensus on the muted nature of previous political debate on immigration. William Thorsell of the Globe argued that '[a] repressive consensus has enveloped the mainline parties on many issues,'39 and the other papers seem to have agreed. The Toronto Star noted that '[a]nxiety over immigration is on the rise, yet most Canadians remain reluctant to discuss it publicly for fear of fanning intolerance. Reflecting this sentiment, most political leaders have shied away from the issue/40 Similarly, the Vancouver Sun acknowledged that 'Immigration has been the great simmering issue of this election ... And yet the major party leaders have worked so hard to evade the issue that it has never become central to the campaign.'41 And the Toronto Star reminded its readers, '... such self-imposed silence robs us of a needed

266 Liane Soberman debate and cedes ground to polemicists. It also erodes public support, and democratic legitimacy, for a policy so vital to our past and future development/42 The Unfolding of the Campaign It was not only the editorial boards that acknowledged an apparent lack of discussion about immigration - an issue important to many. The absence of political debate on immigration became a news story in its own right. On 25 September, two weeks into the campaign, both the Toronto Star and the Globe and Mail ran feature articles on immigration as the phantom issue of the election. These articles signalled a dramatic turn in the immigration debate. The press exploded with articles on immigration and the election. On average, two stories per day appeared in the print media during this first, seventeen-day period of the election campaign. Most were of minor or medium importance (thirty-seven), making only a passing reference to Reform's ethno-cultural policies, to comments made by Manning or his supporters at campaign rallies, such as those regarding either immigration numbers or the wearing of turbans by RCMP officers.43 In the second period of analysis, after 25 September, an average of two press stories on immigration-related issues per day continued. However, the extent to which these articles focused on immigration and diversity issues was far greater than in the first period of analysis. If most politicians still sought to avoid discussion of immigration, the 'phantom' issue that was '[t]oo hot to handle' and therefore 'undiscussed/ according to the press, the public was forcing the issue on the doorstep. In his Globe and Mail article of 25 September, Kirk Makin noted that whether politicians liked it or not, they were being hammered at the door by voters concerned about immigration. 'Glancing theatrically around him as if he were John Wayne scanning the hills for wild savages, Philip Marshall lowered his voice and addressed the question of immigration. "Just ask a lot of WASPs - or white people -1 was born and raised here. It's a great country. But our immigration laws stink. You just have to read the newspaper to see the crime. Where do these people come from?"'44 From 25 September until the televised leaders' debates, and just prior to John Beck's dismissal from the Reform Party for racist and anti-Semitic remarks, attention paid to Reform and in particular to its immigration and ethno-cultural policies, increased sharply. But attention paid to Reform's immigration policies should not be mistaken for discussion of

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993

267

Figure 10.1 Levels of Intolerance by Political Party Affiliation

Ekos Research Associates, Rethinking Government

immigration in its own right. Rather, much of the press and many nonReform politicians attacked Reform for stirring up a racial hornet's nest. But as more and more critics of Reform spoke out against the party and its immigration policies, freelance journalist Andrew Cardozo warned that by attacking the Reform Party rather than honestly addressing the immigration issue, Liberals and Conservatives allowed Reform to set the electoral agenda on immigration. Even as the Conservatives, playing right-wing catch-up-ball with Reform, belatedly hinted at changes to their own federal immigration policy if they were returned to power, Cardozo was right on the mark when he suggested that the one-sided immigration debate inflated people's fears. Cardozo warned, 'Reform and the Tories are practising the politics of backlash, where reality has little currency.'45 Perhaps sensing the danger, politicians, including Reform politicians, tried to put a lid on the immigration debate or at least to avoid immigration discussion turning on the issue of race. But the press would not let them. Sensing that the public wanted more, not less, discussion of immigration, the press zeroed in on the issue and a rush of letters to the editor followed. But who took which side? In February 1994, just four months after the

268 Liane Soberman election, Ekos research examined patterns of intolerance by political party affiliation (see Figure 10.1). Their findings revealed that a considerably higher percentage of Reform Party affiliates felt that there were 'too many immigrants/ The average across all of the major parties was 53 per cent. Sixty-seven per cent of Reform Party supporters polled felt there were 'too many immigrants' - 14 per cent higher than the national average.46 How much of Reform's support came from those whose first concern was immigration cannot be determined, but press attention to Reform was increased as its numbers in the polls increased. And with increased attention came a revisiting of what might be described as Reform's darker side. Past statements on immigration-related issues were dredged up and Reform was attacked as a party that 'doesn't want ethnics.'47 Manning was said to appeal to 'anti-French, anti-immigrant sentiment.'48 Critics of Reform labelled its 'colour-blind' immigration policy as 'veiled racism.' A letter in the Halifax Chronicle-Herald said that Reform's immigration policy was discriminatory and bordered on racism,49 while a former premier of British Columbia dismissed Reformers as 'a bunch of Right-Wing wackos.'50 And on 9 October the Calgary Herald printed an article entitled 'Reformers prepare for mass attacks,' suggesting that central Canada regarded the Reform Party as 'a Right-Wing rump party for rednecks.'51 As if to validate this charge, on 14 October, 1993 the major newspapers across Canada carried the story of York-Centre Reform candidate John Beck's attack on immigration. In a public discussion of immigration, Beck was quoted as saying 'You have a $150,000 guy there coming to buy a citizenship into Canada to create a job, fine, he's bringing something to Canada. But what is he bringing? Death and destruction to the people.' Claiming that immigrants were 'overpowering' English-speaking Canadians, that when an immigrant gets a job, 'he is taking jobs away from us, the gentile people, white people,' Beck argued that he felt like a minority member in his own country.52 He was quoted as describing 'immigrants as criminals' and suggesting that 'Anglo-Saxons need to reassert themselves.'53 Finally, Beck told the Toronto Star. 'I feel we have lost control of our country here ... It seems to be predominantly Jewish people who are running this country.'54 When his remarks became public, Reform disassociated itself from Beck and his candidacy. According to a Reform spokesperson, Beck's riding of York-Centre was in some disarray during the nomination process and Beck's racial views seemed to have evaded Reform's 'stringent' screening process as a result. But some argued that this was not an oversight but a sign of deep rot within the party. According

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 269 to broadcaster and political commentator Dalton Camp: 'The important truth about Beck and his oddball, abhorrent racist-tainted views is not that he escaped the notice, until now, of his party superiors, but that there are many more just like him out there, babbling on about foreigners, people of colour, queers, those who need hanging and the sublime consolations of remaining forever unilingual. Preston Manning is the leader of the party, but John Beck is the party.'55 The Globe and Mail, on the other hand, argued that the Beck incident, while deplorable, should not be used to tar Reform with racism. But, according to the Globe and Mail, the incident encouraged the Conservatives to do so, 'in a desperate bid to turn back the Reform tide, [to] launch an all-out hunt for more of the party's candidates they can saddle with a racist or sexist epithet.'56 If the Progressive Conservatives may have had the most to gain from discrediting Reform, they were not alone in doing so. For several days following the ousting of John Beck, the country's newspapers scoured lists of Reform candidates for those who held arguably questionable views about immigrants, ethnic minorities, and women. In a front-page story, even the Globe and Mail stated that 'The Reform Party of Canada has one face it is selling the voters - that of Leader Preston Manning. But behind that image is a team of outspoken candidates whose personal views stretch well beyond the official party policy he articulates on the campaign trail.'57 Who were these 1sad apples/ as Manning himself described them? The press put forward several names. The Globe and Mail identified Doug Christie, defence lawyer for Holocaust denier Ernst Zundel and founder of the separatist Western Canada Concept, as a Reformer.58 A Vancouverarea Reform candidate was reportedly a member of the same separatist group.59 A Reform Candidate in Burlington, Ontario was quoted as 'jokingly' telling a fellow Reformer to hit a female candidate. His nomination a year earlier was said by the press to have led to the resignation of several members of the riding executive because, in addition to the candidate's alleged sexist comments, he reportedly made racist comments at an earlier nomination meeting.60 What was Preston Manning's response to this storm of criticism? At first the press claimed that he downplayed problems in his ranks and blamed others - the press and his political opponents - for bringing them on. On 15 October Manning was quoted as saying that the 'fear mongering' Liberals and the other political parties were '... making unstable people opposed to immigration come to us by unfairly labelling us as racists ...'61 Manning tried to explain that every party has its l^ad apples.'

270 Liane Soberman A Montreal Gazette article quoted Manning as saying that'... these are the growing pains of a populist movement, not an indication of the character of the movement/62 As charges of racism in Reform continued, Manning changed course and joined the chorus attacking racism. At a Reform rally in Pickering, Ontario attended by four thousand people, Manning 'denounced racism and said extremists would be removed form [sic] his party/ He went on to say that Reform 'invites all Canadians who deplore racism and extremism to help keep Reform free of such abuses/63 Some felt that Manning and Reform were getting a raw deal. In the Globe and Mail, Kenneth Whyte, the western editor of Saturday Night, argued that the attention given to Reform and John Beck during the previous two weeks was unfair and he too blamed the Conservatives and their '"all-out hunt" for extremists and bigotry in the Reform Party/ Whyte went on to compare the presence of John Beck to the excesses of the Mulroney Conservatives and the 'anti-Christian bigotry' of Sheila Copps and Dorothy Dobbie, who called Preston Manning racist. Claiming that the Liberals had their own run-in with racists, Whyte noted that Ernst Zundel once challenged Pierre Trudeau for the Liberal leadership.64 The to-do in the press did not seem to have lessened support for Reform. Indeed, in the last ten days of the election campaign, as polls projected a large Reform vote, press attention was lavished on the Reform Party in general and in particular on its policies on immigration and multiculturalism. Of course, immigration was not the only Reform policy the media discussed, but others had an immigration-related spin. When Reform advocated tightening up on welfare fraud it also hinted that immigrants were high on the list of offenders. The link between immigrants and welfare fraud seemed validated four days before the election when it was reported that Somalian strongman Mohammed Farah Aidid's wife was collecting welfare. Then, on 20 October, many papers carried front-page allegations about Somali refugees making multiple welfare claims and sending the money home to buy arms for warlords in Somalia. A front-page story in the Vancouver Sun carried news that 80-90 per cent of the Somalian community are on welfare, with the average person making two claims and some individuals making as many as five or more claims. On 23 October the Halifax Chronicle-Herald repeated this allegation. The welfare fraud stories hit a raw Canadian nerve. In an article about why a highly respected soldier, Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, was attracted to Reform, the soldier was quoted as saying, '[Reform] has hit the refugee button and we know in Ontario we have

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 271 General Aidid's wife, and second wife, and six brothers and sisters and a whole bunch of kids on welfare. So that strikes a chord.'65 Was Reform quietly exploiting race as an issue? In letters to the editor academics debated this and the place of Reform in the Canadian political tradition. A letter to the Globe and Mail from historian Tony Hall of the University of Lethbridge took issue with fellow historian David Bercuson's characterization of Reform as an extension of Diefenbaker's 'One Canada' vision. Hall argued that 'The truth is the Reform Party's deepest roots lie not in Canada but in the Right-Wing politics in the United States. Mr. Manning and his Reform Party colleagues are simply giving a Canadian voice to a worldwide current of ideological extremism that draws sustenance from the scapegoating of immigrants, native people and linguistic minorities. Let us not forget where these politics of intolerance once took the world, plagued as we are by bad economic times.'66 According to Hall, Reform emerged out of a conservative backlash epitomized by Richard Nixon's 'silent majority.' York University political scientist James Laxer agreed, arguing that 'The Reform party gives a voice to a societal reaction against the complexities of the modern world. Over the past century, in Europe and North America, there have been recurrent waves of reactionary politics, of a more or less virulent character.'67 Laxer went on to explain that these movements traditionally appeal to white, middle-aged males '... trying sincerely to address concerns they have with a system which no longer serves their interests ...'68 In a Vancouver Sun article Simon Fraser University political scientist Bruce Foster argued that Reform policies 'stem from a visceral unease' at the pace and direction of social changes since the 1950s: 'You have to look at Reform as the revenge of the previous generation. They represent people for whom Canada meant white, middle-class Christian values and self-reliance.'69 And if the polls were correct, many of them were going to vote Reform. But one-on-one, Reform's constituency was not that easy to pin down, as a letter to the Vancouver Sun, indicated: 'Thought I'd just pitch this to the 'pigeon-holers' out in left field. I just happen to be young (ooooooooh!). I also happen to be an immigrant (aaaaaaaah!) and very female (eeeeeeeek!). But now the clincher. I'm voting Reform! Anyone got the smelling salts?'70 Other letter writers attacked Reform. One suggested that before Canadians vote they should take a careful look at the damage Reform would do to the 'emerging struggle against racism. We should cherish the present and future Canadian mosaic of "hyphenated Canadians," as Reform terms them, and celebrate diversity, not attempt to destroy it.'71 On the whole, the majority of published letters opposed Reform, but so did the

272 Liane Soberman newspapers that published them. Even some of those letters supportive of Reform expressed doubts about the party's leader and some of his policies. In the dying days of the campaign, the question persisted: Did Manning create an anti-immigrant backlash or was he just piggybacking on one that was already out there? According to James Laxer, Manning was 'the cat among the pigeons' with 'a perfect ear for picking up animosities, magnifying them and transmitting them back to the populace.'72 Less boldly, Toronto Star columnist Michele Landsberg stated that 'Manning has appealed to Canadians' worst instincts: to blame and fear "others" in a time of crisis.'73 As the election campaign drew to a close, three dailies published the same article under different headlines. An opinion piece by Ken MacQueen of Southam News titled 'Canada's changing face,' in the Vancouver Sun, 'New Complexion: Immigration has changed Canada's face for the better,' in the Montreal Gazette, and 'Immigration a "doorstep issue" in B.C.' in the Calgary Herald, again made the case that immigration had become a volatile 'doorstep issue.' This was particularly true of British Columbia where, according to the author, there was growing discomfort with increasing ethnic diversity in ridings traditionally held by people with names like Turner and Campbell, now 'contested by a newer wave of immigrants named Tao, Wan or Dhaliwal.' Arguing that these challenges to the old way are occurring more dramatically on the Pacific coast than elsewhere, MacQueen concluded 'Immigration is a doorstep election issue here and a prime reason that Reform, with its policy of cutting immigration levels, may carry two thirds of the province.'74 MacQueen may have been right about immigration as the key to the Reform Party's popularity in the province. He certainly anticipated how popular Reform would prove to be: three days after the MacQueen piece appeared, Reform won twenty-four of British Columbia's thirty-two seats in the House of Commons. The Special Case of the Western Report No examination of the press, immigration, and the Reform Party in the 1993 election campaign would be complete without special consideration of the Western Report. With the exception of the Globe and Mail, daily newspapers and Maclean's magazine, as we have seen, demonstrated a profoundly anti-Reform bias. Except for the Globe and Mail, all of the press examined published consistently critical coverage of the Reform

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 273 Party's policies and lashed out against Reform in editorials. The Western Report's coverage of the election, in contrast, was fiercely pro-Reform. The Western Report prided itself on being staunchly, proudly, and irreverently right wing. Articles with titles like 'Just plain homos' and 'Another blow to taxpayers and family responsibility: Edmonton expands from subsidized baby-sitting to free food' were not unusual. The roughly ten election campaign issues of the Western Report reveal repeated attacks on the homosexual lifestyle, praise for 'moral majority'-type political activism in Canada, and determined support for the Reform Party of Canada. The Western Report was also highly critical of immigration policy and multiculturalism. Even before the election was called, the Western Report printed 'Article # 1' in the series 'Party Policy '93.' The article, entitled 'Toughen immigration, demands the RPC,' was accompanied by a photograph of people at the airport under a sign that read 'Immigration du Canada.' The caption read, 'New Arrivals, 250,000 a year: Equal, in fact, to the number of new Canadian jobs.' A letter to the editor that appeared in a later issue took exception to the caption as misleading, since it suggested that all immigrants that come to Canada are of working age the majority are not - and ignored the argument that immigrants do not only take jobs, they also create them.75 But the caption was not the only problem. The article also contained two telling errors of 'fact.' The second paragraph claimed that 'In Canada ... most attempts to raise the issue of immigration are quickly rebuffed and any criticism of the country's current policy branded racist. Meanwhile, Canada continues to admit more than 250,000 immigrants a year, better than half that number in refugees ,./76 It might be true that immigration was a volatile topic, but the Western Report's misreading of the figures did not help. In the several preceding years Canada did not reach its 250,000 target and less than 20 per cent of arrivals were refugees. In a 1993 article published in Policy Options, McGill sociologist Morton Weinfeld noted that 'Immigrants fall into three broad groups: independents, such as skilled workers, business immigrants and assisted relatives; family class; and refugees. In 1991 the immigrant intake broke down to 37 per cent, 37 per cent and 26 per cent respectively, with projections through 1995 aimed at keeping a roughly similar mix.'77 Weinfeld broke the refugee numbers down even further and showed that of all the refugees who came to Canada in 1991,10,348 were asylum refugees, 17,333 were privately sponsored refugees, and 7,665 were government-sponsored refugees. This is a total of 35,346 refugees, nowhere near the number that the Western Report suggested. Another questionable 'fact' contained in this two-page article con-

274 Liane Soberman cerned the amount of money spent on federal multiculturalism. The article asserted that Ottawa spends nearly $250 million 'on multicultural groups and programs/ This is wildly out of line with official figures and those used by other journalists in discussions of the policy. According to Maclean's, for example, 'multicultural programs' account for only $53 million - a figure said to be inflated by salary costs, among other things.78 The Western Report did not report the source of its figure but its antimulticulturalismbias and concerns about immigration were clear enough. An article in the 13 September issue argued that an increase in school violence was the inevitable result of 'non-assimilation policies.'79 The article mentioned conflicts between Asian and Lebanese students in Calgary and suggested that because the government would not break down criminal statistics by race, Canadians cannot be sure if other such incidents are on the rise. The article concluded by warning that, 'with current annual immigration levels running at about 250,000 individuals, many from lands with very different conceptions of law and order, the potential for ethnic clashes is clearly rising.'80 On 4 October 1993, the Western Report ran an article describing how the Lethbridge RCMP Veterans Court Challenge Committee, bolstered by $150,000 raised during the summer, was preparing for a court challenge of a March 1990 decision allowing RCMP officers to wear turbans. The article did not pretend to be balanced and offered no view except that of those who felt the law should be overturned on appeal.81 Maclean's, examining the same issue, took the exact opposite position, linking the legal challenge to the spirit of Reform. 'No matter how much Manning denies it, his party represents the kind of racist rednecks who are currently raising $350,000 around Lethbridge, Alberta to finance a court battle against the RCMP allowing its members to wear turbans.'82 When John Beck was ejected from Reform, the Western Report did not see this as a cause for worry. In an article entitled 'Swift action against racists/ John Beck is explained away as a loose cannon, unrepresentative of the Reform constituency. Reform had acted quickly to be rid of him, and anyway, other parties also had their loose cannons: Ernst Zundel was once a Liberal, and in 1977 a Quebec Tory candidate was said to have Klu Klux Klan ties.83 On 18 October the Western Report tied a ringing endorsement of Reform in the election to the party's declared intention of ending official multiculturalism, which the magazine saw as corrosive of Canadian identity. According to the Western Report, 'Government has so widened

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 275 our "tolerance" for other cultures that we have lost all concept of our own, so now the consensus of values that must underlie any society no longer exists.'84 Reform, readers were reminded, was opposed to both large-scale immigration and multiculturalism. The Press in Perspective Whether pro-Reform (Western Report), moderately pro-Reform (Globe and Mail), or generally hostile to Reform during the 1993 election campaign, all of the press was party to a public 'debate' on immigration which occasionally had racist overtones. Discussion in the press seemed more an unconstructive, angry altercation than any kind of reasoned debate. Throughout the debate Reform was accused of making political hay out of race hatred. Respected, conservative, and usually temperate political commentator Dalton Camp, for instance, described Reform as 'a party populated by bigots, racists and haters and led by a charismatic authoritarian.'85 Peter C. Newman from Maclean's was no less severe when he summed up Reform as 'the kind of racist rednecks' who would challenge turbans in the RCMP.86 A less colourful but no less pointed description of Reform concluded that the party drew its strength from 'frustrated middle-class conservatives and others who feel threatened by rising crime, immigration and the forces of economic and social change.'87 And the Globe and Mail described Reform as 'Main Street, middle-class, silent majority conservatives who feel exploited and bullied by a Montreal-Toronto-Ottawa elite that for the past thirty years has controlled the political levers of power and has, over the heads of ordinary Canadians, defined the nation's political orthodoxy.'88 Whether the press described the Reform Party as filled with 'a bunch of Right-Wing wackos' or white, middle-class rural or suburban Canadians who felt dispossessed by the national elite, what is important is that Preston Manning and Reform set the agenda on immigration in this federal election. Afraid of antagonizing urban ethnic voters and 'scared stiff of white, mainstream backlash,'89 mainstream politicians would rather not deal with immigration or related issues in an election campaign. But, as Maclean's suggested, Manning had no such fears and his electoral success was due, in part, to his willingness to openly discuss issues like immigration that 'other leaders [were] loath to address.'90 In so doing, he knowingly or unknowingly played on voter fear and exacerbated the divisive discourse on immigration and related issues in the election.

276 Liane Soberman But the media helped. The media not only gave wide coverage to the racially loaded fringe, it tended to legitimize their position. Discussion, once limited to the margins of acceptable discourse, shifted to centre stage and was too often uncritical. If discontent found a public voice, a truly informed public debate on immigration failed to take place. In The Social Responsibility of the Press,]. Edward Gerald discusses the media in a pluralist society. He argues that '[i]n systems that try to reconcile diverse groups and their different concepts of social function, the press is the agency by which the constituent groups in society become aware of their differences and are brought to accept intercourse based on the principle of toleration/91 In the months preceding the federal election of 1993, the print media fell short of meeting this measure of social responsibility. Once it was accepted as a national political entity with a loud populist voice, Reform told those Canadians experiencing anxiety over immigration and diversity that they were not alone, that their anxieties were acceptable and legitimate. Reform brought fear of the stranger into the open and promised a return to a golden era of social cohesion that had long since disappeared, if it ever really existed. Could the Reform Party have delivered its message without the media? Certainly the media paid much attention to Reform's ethno-cultural policies and the incidents of racism that dogged the party during the campaign. But it also portrayed the party as a populiar alternative to the fallen Progressive Conservatives. In so doing the media helped make Reform a gathering place for those who shared anti-immigrant and anti-multicultural views. The media said: if you are racist, intolerant, or even fearful of multiculturalism, if you blame immigrants or refugees for crime and welfare fraud, you are not alone and Reform is your party. Toward the end of the campaign, McGill Chancellor Gretta Chambers described Reform as having gained 'legitimacy well beyond its protestmovement roots.' Reform and the media had unwittingly worked hand-in-hand to help the party earn this legitimacy. By the third stage of the election, Reform was held up as the party reflecting issues others would not touch. And it did not really matter whether the media coverage of Reform was positive or negative, the important thing was that it was there. Reform was setting the immigration agenda and the media reported it. And even though the media's coverage of Reform tended to be negative, the media had previously published its own series of antiimmigration articles and the effect of this media attention was to validate

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 277 the Reform Party for many Canadians. In the end, the collision between immigration, Reform, and the media in the federal election of 1993 served to legitimize both Reform and its anti-immigrant platform. Oddly enough, for all the attention immigration and Reform's policies received during the election, immigration as a public priority faded quickly afterwards. An Ekos Research study entitled 'Setting the Domestic and International Context for Immigration Policy: Changing Societal Perspectives,' conducted shortly after the election, is particularly revealing. Exploring changes in voter priorities between September 1993 (midcampaign) and February 1994 (just five months later), Ekos reported that in both periods between 41 and 89 per cent of people identified national unity, unemployment, crime and justice, and deficit and debt as priorities. With the exception of unemployment, all of these issues were given higher priority in February 1994 than they were at mid-campaign. In contrast, during the campaign, 36 per cent of people identified immigration as a priority; however, just five months later immigration was not identified as a priority by anyone.92 How is this to be explained? Perhaps the election acted as a release valve, allowing voters to let off steam on the issue of immigration. Once the election was over, public and media attention quickly shifted elsewhere, particularly to issues of national unity, the Quebec referendum, and bread-and-butter economic problems. Perhaps, once a large Reform caucus took their seats in the House of Commons, their supporters felt that an immigration watchdog had been set in place so there was less cause for concern. Or perhaps, chastened by the way Reform ran away with the immigration issue, other political parties and provincial governments began signalling their understanding that a shake-up of immigration and related policies - social, economic, and political - was in order. What is clear is that during the election of 1993 the press, on the whole unsympathetic to the Reform Party, was forced to acknowledge what voters were about to do - make Reform a major and legitimate political voice in Canada. And while the press generally opposed Reform it highlighted that agenda for a public that already regarded immigration as a problem, if not a threat. While publicly denouncing racism and claiming to be opposed only to the 'wrong kind' of immigration, the Reform Party offered hope to those looking for a bulwark against a feared immigrant and non-white tide. Reform played the race card and the press was the reluctant dealer.

278 Liane Soberman NOTES

1 Alan C. Cairns, 'Election 1993,' Canadian Public Policy 20 (September 1994), 230 2 Rita J. Simon, Public Opinion and the Immigrant: Print Media Coverage, 1880-1980 (Lexington: DC and Heath 1985) 3 Thomas Flanagan, Waiting for the Wave: The Reform Party and Preston Manning (Toronto: Stoddart 1995); Trevor Harrison, Of Passionate Intensity: Right-Wing Populism and the Reform Party of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1995) 4 Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration (Montreal 1988) 5 Harold Troper, 'Canada's Immigration Policy since 1945,' International Journal 68 (1993): 255-81 6 'Immigration: Too hot to handle,' Toronto Star, 25 September 1993, Bl; Sydney Sharp and Don Braid, Storming Babylon: Preston Manning and the Rise of the Reform Party (Toronto: Key Porter 1992), 125-6 7 'A debate at the gates/ Western Report, 2 May 1988,14 8 William Gairdner, The Trouble with Canada (Toronto 1991), vii 9 Ibid., 404 10 Ibid., 394 (emphasis added) 11 Ibid., 413 12 Daniel Stoffman, 'Canadians Wanted: No Skills Necessary/ Canadian Business (August 1993), 26-31 and Saturday Night reference 13 'The Oriental Mafia,' Western Report, 13 July 1987,24; 'Triad Menace an iceberg, reports warn/ Globe and Mail, 10 March 1993, Al; 'Computers help to keep tabs on rising tide of Asian gangs/ Vancouver Sun, 27 August 1993; 'Crackdown stops 1,405 illegals short of the border/ Calgary Herald, 7 March 1993, A1-A2; 'Public Security ministry draws fire/ Calgary Herald, 2 July 1993, A8; Transfer of services to new superministry assailed/ Vancouver Sun, 3 July 1993, H20; 'Xenophobia: Campbell groups foreigners with smugglers and criminals/ Montreal Gazette, 5 July 1993, B3; 'Immigration move will breed intolerance: critics/ Montreal Gazette, 3 July 1993, E6; 'Close eye being kept on docked freighter/ Calgary Herald, 13 July 1993, A2; 'Refugee-law changes forcing people to welfare/ Montreal Gazette, 17 February 1993, Bl; 'Metro official criticizes immigrants' welfare costs/ Globe and Mail, 17 April 1993, A13; 'Ignoring the concerns about high immigration/ Globe and Mail, 16 September 1993, A2; and 'Fake refugees ruining system, ex-official says/ Vancouver Sun, 27 July 1993, A3 14 Kathleen Morrison, 'Immigration Part I: The Human Interest Story/ On Balance, 6(3) (1993), 6 15 T.J. Samuel and R. Faustino-Santos, 'Canadian Immigrants and Criminality/ International Migration, 29 March 1991,55-6; Derrick Thomas, 'The Foreign Born in the Federal Prison Population/ paper presented at The Canadian Law and Society Association Conference (8 June 1993), Carleton University, Ottawa, 1; Julian Simon, 'The Economic Effects of Immigration: Theory and Evidence/ and Michael B. Percy, 'Macroeconomic Impacts of Immigration/ in Steven Globerman, ed., The Immigration Dilemma (Vancouver 1992); Morton Weinfeld, Immigration and Canada's Population Future: A Nation-Building Vision/ A working paper on social behaviour published by the Department of Sociology of McGill University (Montreal 1988), 3 16 'Reform party tries to shrug racist label/ Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 24 June 1991, A1-A2 17 Gairdner, The Trouble With Canada, 405 18 'Manning hangs tough/ Western Report, 7 November 1988,10

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 279 19 'Manning fears plot behind racist infiltration of Reform Party/ Globe and Mail, 27 February 1992, A7; 'No room for racists, Reform chief says,' Toronto Star, 29 February 1992, A9; 'Heritage Front supports candidate,' Canadian Jewish News, 8 April 1993, 3; Harrison, Passionate Intensity 198-9; Murray Dobbin, Preston Manning and the Reform Party (Toronto: James Lorimer 1991), 108-9 20 Dobbin, Preston Manning, 111-2 21 Ibid., 168-170 22 Precise numbers in each article classification are not the focus of this paper and the classifications of 'minor,' 'medium,' and 'major' are being used only to illustrate the visibility of immigration issues in the print media during the campaign. It is enough to know that while a 'minor' article would have to be carefully read to see its comments about immigration, a 'Major' article would likely stand out by its headline. I am more concerned with overall trends than exact numbers. For these reasons, no inter-rater reliability was used in the classification of these articles. 23 Morton Weinfeld, 'Immigration and Diversity/ Policy Options (July-August 1993), 70 24 Telephone interview with Lou Clancy, 24 April 1995. Information supplied by Lou Clancy, managing editor of the Toronto Star and substantiated by Warren Clements, editor of the commentary page for the Globe and Mail. Telephone interview with Warren Clements, 25 April 1995 25 'Not much light was shed/ Montreal Gazette, 6 October 1993, B2 26 'Honest debate on immigration/ Toronto Star, 16 October 1993, C2 27 'Whisper campaign against immigrants/ Toronto Star, 17 October 1993, H2 28 'Honest debate on immigration/ C2 29 'Below the party line/ Calgary Herald, 17 October 1993, A6 30 '"Balanced" coverage Southam-style/ Western Report, 11 October 1993,11 31 'KKK reference fails to faze Reformer/ Calgary Herald, 30 September 1993, Al 32 'Reformers hiding behind a mask/ Calgary Herald, 30 September 1993, A4 33 'On immigration, parties are clear/ Vancouver Sun, 22 October 1993, A18 34 'Reform in their sights/ Globe and Mail, 6 October 1993, A20 35 Ibid, (emphasis added) 36 'New parties bring overdue scrutiny to controversial questions/ Globe and Mail, 9 October 1993, D6 37 Ibid, (emphasis added) 38 'Note from the editor/ Maclean's, 18 October 1993, 2 39 Ibid. 40 'Honest debate on immigration/ C2 41 'On immigration, parties are clear/ A18 42 'Honest debate on immigration/ C2 43 'Manning upset at media coverage of racism charges/ Montreal Gazette, 15 September 1993, A12 and 'You'll pay our debts, Manning warns students/ Montreal Gazette, 16 September 1993, A8 44 'Immigration goes undiscussed/ Globe and Mail, 25 September 1993, Al 45 'Reform quietly setting agenda on immigration/ Toronto Star, 5 October 1993, A23 46 Ekos Research Associates Inc., 'Setting the Domestic and International Context for Immigration Policy: Changing Societal Perspectives' 47 'Combative campaigners engage in verbal slugfest/ Montreal Gazette, 14 September 1993, A6 48 'Reform and Bloc drain Tory votes from Right/ Toronto Star, 23 September 1993, A25

280 Liane Soberman 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83

'Voice of the People/ Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 8 September 1993, C2 'On the campaign trail/ Calgary Herald, 7 October 1993, A8 'Reformers prepare for mass attacks/ Calgary Herald, 9 October 1993, Al 'Reform candidate resigns amid allegations of racism/ Montreal Gazette, 14 October 1993, A6 'Tories hunting flawed Reformers/ Globe and Mail, 15 October 1993, Al 'Reform candidate who resigned slipped by screening, officials say/ Toronto Star, 15 October 1993, A16 'Conduct unbecoming/ Toronto Star, 17 October 1993, H3 Tories hunting flawed Reformers/ Al 'Reform Party's many faces/ Globe and Mail, 14 October 1993, Al 'Tories hunting flawed Reformers/ A4 'Manning fights to restore lustre to Reform's tarnished image/ Halifax ChronicleHerald, 15 October 1993, D13 'Reform dogged by controversy over candidates/ Montreal Gazette, 15 October 1993, Al, A12; see also Flanagan, Waiting for the Wave, 152-3 'Liberals driving racists to Reform, Manning says/ Toronto Star, 15 October 1993, A16 'Racists in Reform Party? That's just "growing pains/" Montreal Gazette, 17 October 1993, A4 'Reform victim of extremists of political correctness, Manning says/ Vancouver Sun, 20 October 1993, A4 'The bells of bigotry ring true in more parties than Reform/ Globe and Mail, 23 October 1993, D2 'Ex general "warm" on Reform invite/ Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 23 October 1993, A2 The roots of Reform/ Globe and Mail, 22 October 1993, A30 'Manning: Reactionary cat among conservative pigeons/ Toronto Star, 17 October 1993), H3 Ibid. 'Old-line parties put spin on losses to Reform by portraying upstart party as far-rightwing/ Vancouver Sun, 14 October 1993, A4 Letter to the Editor, Vancouver Sun, 23 October 1993, A17 'Celebrate Diversity/ Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 20 October 1993, C2 'Ex general "warm" on Reform invite/ A2 "Thank students for exposing Reform racists/ Toronto Star, 19 October 1993, C5 'Canada's changing face/ Vancouver Sun, 22 October 1993, A19; 'New Complexion: Immigration has changed Canada's face for the better/ Montreal Gazette, 22 October 1993, B3; 'Immigration a "doorstep issue" in BC/ Calgary Herald, 25 October 1993, A3 'The immigration numbers game/ Western Report, 27 September 1993, 5 Toughen immigration, demands the RFC/ Western Report, 6 September 1993, 6 'Immigration and Diversity/ Policy Options (July-August 1993), 67 Ibid. 'Reaping the multicultural harvest: School violence may be an inevitable result of nonassimilation policies/ Western Report, 13 September 1993, 38 Ibid. 'Headed to court over headgear/ Western Report, 4 October 1993,36 'This election needs a touch of magic/ Maclean's, 18 October 1993, 58 'Swift action against racists/ Western Report, 25 October 1993, 7

Immigration and the Federal Election of 1993 281 84 'Dave Barrett put the case for the Reform party in a nutshell/ Western Report, 18 October 1993, 52 85 'Conduct unbecoming/ Toronto Star, 17 October 1993, H3 86 'This election needs a touch of magic/ 58 87 'Where the major players stand/ Maclean's, 18 October 1993, 28 88 'Main Street, middle-class, silent majority conservatives on the march/ Globe and Mail, 22 October 1993, A30 89 'Not much light shed/ Montreal Gazette, 6 October 1993, B2 90 Ibid. 91 J. Edward Gerald, The Social Responsibility of the Press (Minneapolis 1963), 8 92 Ekos Research Associates Inc., 'Setting the Domestic and International Context for Immigration Policy: Changing Societal Perspectives'

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Epilogue: Expanding the Research Agenda

The studies presented in this volume have focused on that aspect of Canadian diversity which Will Kymlicka (1995) calls 'polyethnic/ as distinguished from 'national' or 'multinational.' In the Canadian context polyethnic refers to diversity that has arisen primarily through immigration. National or multinational diversity, in contrast, operates within formal political and constitutional contexts and involves groups with a long-standing link to a specific territory, such as First Nations or Quebecois. Of course, there are some parallels between the polyethnic cases studied here and challenges facing national minorities in Canada. It is ironic that even as French nationalism in Quebec has grown, so too has the polyethnic dimension within Quebec society, particularly in Montreal. Parts of Montreal are as ethnically and racially diverse as any in Toronto, Vancouver, Hamilton, or Calgary. Many of the dilemmas concerning immigrant integration, the nature of pluralism, and the range of policy responses in a variety of domains are as common in Montreal as they are in other major Canadian cities. Moreover, in many ways the daily lives of off-reserve, and especially urban First Nations members resemble those of immigrant groups in Canadian cities. Both French Quebec and the collectivity of First Nations in Canada also wrestle with internal pluralism and the need for policy responses. These groups are far from homogeneous entities. The issues of culture, service delivery, and internal and external group politics resonate for them. Any agenda for future research should include policy-related studies along the lines of those presented in this volume, set within Quebec and First Nations polities. Another common theme linking the polyethnic and national paradigms is the increased salience of 'identity politics/ if not among the rank

284 Epilogue and file then among the cultural and political elites of various minority groups (Littleton 1996). While integration in various forms remains the preferred option for immigrant/minority groups, here too one finds increasing demands for a politics of recognition and an essentialist focus on ascribed identities (Taylor 1992). Self-government or special representation rights are correctly defined by Kymlicka as distinct from polyethnic rights (1995, ch. 2). But the gains made by national or some ethnic minorities in these rights areas can become the standard for the claims of other polyethnic minorities, with or without a territorial basis. For example, the emergence of multiculturalism policy followed hard on the heels of federal policies promoting the stature of the French language in Canada. Those demanding policies that defend polyethnic rights - equal treatment, fair representation, respect for cultural and religious difference speak with the same passion as representatives of nationally defined groups. Let us turn to the question of scholarly research into Canadian pluralism. The studies in this volume are part of an emerging 'second generation' social scientific research agenda for the study of Canadian diversity. The term 'second generation' refers to a new wave of research with somewhat different sets of assumptions, research questions, and methods than those of the first generation. The first generation of research focused primarily on clear patterns of socio-economic inequality and issues of immigrant integration and cultural retention or loss: Prejudice and discrimination were linked directly to lower educational, occupational, and income attainment for minorities, and to under-representation in most elite sectors of Canadian society. This research argues that Canadian culture, both at the elite and popular level, afforded little room for cultures labelled as inferior because they were not those of the two European charter groups. The first generation of research in the modern period includes John Porter's pioneering The Vertical Mosaic (1965) and the comprehensive study by Raymond Breton and his colleagues of the incorporation of ethnic and racial immigrant groups in Toronto (1990). Analyses of quantitative data from the census, from national sample surveys measuring prejudice or discrimination, from field experiments, and from attitudes and culturally linked behaviours of minorities themselves have provided valuable insights into Canadian pluralism. It is essential that this first generation research tradition continue both in its own right and for the role it plays as a catalytic precursor to the second generation research at the core of this volume. But the first generation research tradition did not emphasize linking

Epilogue 285 diversity to issues of public policy. When public policy was studied it was often as a dark area of government-sponsored or sanctioned discrimination against minorities. Social scientific and historical studies have explored topics as wide ranging as the ambiguous role of the Department of Indian Affairs in determining conditions facing First Nations, the formulation and application of Canadian anti-immigration policies, the assimilationist campaigns waged by the schools and other agents of conformity, and racially stamped national security policies, such as the forced relocation of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War (Abella and Troper 1982; Adachi 1976; Avery 1979; Jaenen 1973; Ponting and Gibbins 1980; Sunahara 1981). The emergence of a second generation of research reflects a changing social and political reality. The range of and consciousness about Canadian diversity are greater now than at any time since the turn of the last century. The impact of the federal Charter of Rights and Freedoms and provincial human rights legislation and the acceptance of the discourse of multiculturalism and doctrines of cultural relativism have generated grey policy-linked questions where issues were formerly black or white. Prejudice and discrimination are now far more subtle than in the past, though old-fashioned bigotry still exists (Barrett 1987). There is very little open opposition in the public sphere to the notions that minorities deserve equal and fair treatment and that their cultures are worthy of respect and consideration. The issues now revolve around systemic discrimination, or how best to accommodate these principles within our inherited liberal-democratic values and framework, and the intersection of public and private domains. In the past the courts also played a role in setting the boundries of outright discrimination (Walker 1997). Although policy issues are now framed as clashes between equally compelling rights or claims, the courts will continue to play a decisive role. The collection of detailed, focused, mainly qualitative studies presented in this volume can help us to begin to think through these dilemmas. Future second generation research would ideally be both interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary, involving not only the social sciences and history but also law, medicine, literature, and the arts. The issues explored can be local or national in scope, they should ideally have a public policy dimension, and they can be either 'top down' or 'bottom up/ We need more information about how Canadians, whether from minority or majority groups, both leaders and ordinary community members, perceive and act upon issues of pluralism in their daily lives or as they relate to specific high-profile events and policy debates.

286 Epilogue Three areas of policy research have been isolated in this volume. The first is that of culture, whether in the artistic sense or as a blueprint for everyday life. In our view, the boundaries separating elite and minority cultures in Canada are becoming ever more porous. Gone are the days when Canadian literary stars and literary themes were all of AngloSaxon, French, or European origin. Yet we need more detailed studies of minority artistic cultures, minority artists and their publics and the institutional gatekeepers. Persisting forms of cultural elitism in some areas of artistic endeavour leave the playing fields far from level. Rebecca Raines's study of rap and Hip-Hop has shown how youth cultures provide an arena in which interpersonal and intercultural contact blend, and in which a distinctive Canadian cultural product can emerge. But complete acceptance is not yet at hand. Further studies may enable us to better understand the full processes of cultural cross-fertilization and remaining barriers and biases. Equally, there is a need for more empirically based studies of highly charged, family-linked issues in which minority cultural traditions lock horns with Canadian custom and law. Alissa Levine's study of the controversial issue of female genital operations suggests that education, rather than legal sanction, may be a more efficacious policy approach for modifying unacceptable practices. One of Levine's other conclusions that in evaluating the seemingly aberrant practices of minority cultures we might also begin to question those of the Canadian mainstream - may have relevance to many other family-centred customs. A systematic comparison of arranged marriages with the outcomes of the Canadian dating and singles scene comes to mind as just one example. The second area of policy research discusses 'culturally sensitive' public services in education, policing, health care, and social services. In the past, much of the literature in these areas has been more noteworthy for its advocacy than for its detailed research, but it has also documented underutilisation of services, dissatisfaction, and under-representation of minority professionals. Given that these problems have generally been identified as requiring policy responses, a second generation of research must address several gaps in knowledge. For example, there is a need for outcome or evaluation studies that measure the long-term impacts of alternate modalities of service delivery along the 'ethnic match' paradigm described in this volume. It is unlikely that a 'one size fits all' approach will work, whether in various policy domains, or for various groups. If we know little about long-term outcomes for clients or service recipients, we know even less about the key role of minority origin

Epilogue 287 professionals. The studies by Azmi, Bortolussi, Couton, and Weinfeld only begin to address this issue, but they share a similar finding: While ethnic match may offer potential benefits to clients, it is unwise to assume that minority professionals share common opinions with respect to work with their own group, relations with colleagues, and views on professionalism and group ties. Similarly, it is clear that more research is needed on the process and experienced meanings of culturally sensitive services, for both the recipients and givers of care. Finally, researchers must ask whether the 'ethnic match' paradigm can be expanded to include other policy domains or sectors like business and the media. Once sufficient studies of these questions have been completed, it may be possible to address larger questions combining several policy domains, in order to measure more general societal impacts. For instance, how does ethnic match relate to social cohesion or social justice? The third policy area is the domain of ethnic politics and ethnic polities. Here we refer not just to studies of voting patterns, political attitudes, or minority representation in parties or elected assemblies, important as these all are. The evolution in the work of Raymond Breton from notions of 'institutional completeness' to the recognition of the salience of governance issues in ethnic polities marks a transition from first to second generation research concerns (1964; 1991). Second generation studies need to examine in detail the varied processes of minority political life. These include the inner working of the minority polity itself, how it sets its agenda, relations between leaders, the community members, factions within the group, and the relevant factors in the external environment. In his comparison of the Soviet and Syrian Jewry issues, Troper shows that these factors can ultimately determine the political outcome of various campaigns. It is also essential to determine the ways in which ethnic issues are defined and shaped in the Canadian political arena, with particular emphasis on the role of the media and political parties. Soberman's study of the immigration issue in the 1993 federal election illustrates how the media inadvertently raised the profile of racial and racist concerns and, in so doing, gave them a level of respectability during the campaign. Lastly, the interplay between leaders of minority communal organizations, minority origin elected politicians and public servants, and mainstream political institutions calls for further research. In an earlier study we sought to address such questions by looking at the mobilization of the Canadian Ukrainian and Jewish communities over the issue of Nazi war criminals in Canada (Troper and Weinfeld 1988). In his study of black

288 Epilogue insiders and the Ontario NDP government, Lewinberg reveals how intracommunal division, along with conflicting demands on community activists working for government, helped to derail anti-racist initiatives. His discussion of the role of insiders obviously parallels the analyses of the roles of minority origin professionals in the earlier section. The Troper, Soberman, and Lewinberg studies demonstrate that unity and consensus are often as elusive within minority polities as they are within the general Canadian body politic. Agenda-setting by minority groups also illustrates changing self-perceptions and cultural understandings, as well as the power wielded by effective ethnic entrepreneurs. Pressure-group activity by minority lobbies is not identical to that of economic pressure groups in Canada, since minorities generally frame their claims within a rubric of human rights. It is thus harder to compromise or to accept a policy reversal - which is the stuff of interest to group politics. These findings have clear implications for policy making aimed at assuaging minority concerns or securing the ethnic vote. Together, the studies in this volume also sharpen our focus on another theme that underlies second generation research on Canadian diversity. It may no longer be heuristically useful to analyse ethnic and racial minorities only, or even primarily, as victims. We know that some would object to this characterization. But we feel that in the domains of culture, services, and politics, minority origin Canadians have in recent years demonstrated a new assertiveness, indeed a sophistication - if not yet decisive power - in demanding justice. No longer are minorities or their leaders prepared to accept second-class treatment or citizenship. Nor should they be. It may also be time to moderate the conception of majority group Canadians - whites or Europeans, British and/or French origin - as wilful oppressors of minorities. In some cases the term is apt and demands immediate remedial action. But in other instances, as demonstrated in this volume, there are many nuances and shadings operating. A fuller understanding of the persisting inequalities in Canada, what some have called 'democratic racism/ can be enhanced by the second generation of studies described above (Henry et al. 1995). As additional evidence from this more policy-focused, second generation research comes in, and if it resembles the findings of the studies in this volume, it will be harder to identify clearly heroes and villains in the drama of Canadian diversity. In diversity, as in so many other areas, we muddle on, and the Canadian experiment - on the whole still successful - continues.

Epilogue

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REFERENCES

Abella, Irving, and Harold Troper. 1982. None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys. Adachi, Ken. 1976. The Enemy That Never Was. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Avery, Donald 1979 'Dangerous foreigners,' European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1986-1932. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Barrett, Stanley. 1987. Is God a Racist? The Right Wing in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Breton, Raymond, Wsevolod W. Isaiw, Warren E. Kalbach, and Jeffrey G. Reitz. 1990. Ethnic Identity and Equality: Varieties of Experience in a Canadian City. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Breton, Raymond. 1964. Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants. American Journal of Sociology 70:193-205. - 1991. The Governance of Ethnic Communities: Political Structures and Processes in Canada. New York: Greenwood Press. Henry, Frances, Carol Tator, Winston Mattis, and Tim Rees. 1995. The Colour of Democracy: Racism in Canadian Society. Toronto: Harcourt Brace. Jaenen, Cornelius. 1973. Minority Group Schooling and Canadian National Unity. Journal of Educational Thought 7: 81-93. Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Littleton, James, ed. 1996. Clash of Identities: Essays on Media, Manipulations and Politics of the Self. Toronto: Prentice-Hall. Ponting, J.R., and R. Gibbins. 1980. Out of Irrelevance: A Socio-political Introduction to Indian Affairs of Canada. Toronto: Butterworths. Porter, John. 1965. The Vertical Mosaic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Sunahara, Ann A. 1981. The Politics of Racism. Toronto: James Lorimer. Taylor, Charles. 1992. The Politics of Recognition. In Amy Gutmann, ed. Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 25-73. Troper, Harold, and Morton Weinfeld. 1988. Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada. Toronto: Viking. Walker, James. 1997. Race, Rights, and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: Historical Case Studies. Toronto/Waterloo: Osgoode Society and WLU Press.

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Contributors

SHAHEEN AZMI has a PhD in social work from the University of Toronto and is currently working as an independent researcher and consultant on Islamic affairs. DIVA BORTOLUSSI holds an MA in political science from McGill University. She is currently working as a social research consultant in Ottawa. PHILIPPE COUTON earned his MA in sociology at McGill University, where he is completing his doctoral studies in sociology. REBECCA j. HAINES has a joint honours BA from McGill University and an MA in sociology from York University. She is now a community health researcher with the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto. ALISSA LEVINE earned her MA in etudes litteraires from the Universite du Quebec a Montreal. She is completing her doctoral studies in sociology at McGill University. ADAM LEWINBERG holds an honours BA in sociology from McGill University. He is now in New York doing computer programming for the telecommunication and finance industries. LIANE SOBERMAN holds an MA in the history of education from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education and is currently completing her PhD in the Department of Health Administration at the University of Toronto. HAROLD TROPER is a professor in the Department of Theory and Policy Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto. MORTON WEINFELD is a professor of sociology and is Chair of Canadian Ethnic Studies at McGill University.