Ethnicity and Class Conflict in Rural Mexico [Course Book ed.] 9781400860944

Table of contents :
Contents
Figures
Tables
Preface
Introduction
Part One. Ethnic Relations, Class Structure and the Peasant Community in Mesoamerica
Part Two. Historical Background
Part Three. Peasant Revolt in a Nahua Region
Part Four. The Forging of a New Hegemony
Conclusions
Postscrip
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Ethnicity and Class Conflict in Rural Mexico

Ethnicity and Class Conflict in Rural Mexico

Frans J. Schryer

Princeton University Press Princeton, New jersey

Copyright © 1990 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Oxford AU Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schryer, Frans I. Ethnicity and class conflict in Rural Mexico I Frans. J. Schryer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-691-07829-7 (alk. paper) ι. Land tenure—Mexico—Huejutla de Reyes Region. 2. Land use, Rural—Mexico—Huejutla de Reyes Region. 3. Peasant uprisings— Mexico—Huejutla de Reyes Region. 4. Cattle trade—Mexico— Huejutla de Reyes Region. 5. Huejutla de Reyes Region (Mexico) — Rural conditions. 6. Nahuas—Economic conditions. I. Title. HD330.H84S37 1990 3θ6.3'49'θ97246—dc20 89-37463 This book has been composed in Linotron Times Roman Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To Stephen and Emily Schryer

Contents

List of Figures

xi

List of Tables

xiii

Preface

xv

Introduction

3

Part One Ethnic Relations, Class Structure and the Peasant Community in Mesoamerica Chapter 1 Ethnicity and Class: Class Conflict in Plural Societies

17

Chapter 2 The Closed Corporate Peasant Community: Indian Identity and the Peasant Economy

27

Chapter 3 A Region of Diversity: Huejutla

50

Part Two Historical Background Chapter 4 The Colonial Heritage: From Conquest to Independence

75

Chapter 5 Indians, Rancheros and Hacienda Owners: The Changing Class Structure

88

Chapter 6 Peasant Quiescence: Ecology, Relations of Production and Factional Politics

108

Chapter 7 The Mexican Revolution: An Interlude

117

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CONTENTS

Chapter 8 Caciquismo and Agrarianism: The Cacicazgo of Juvencio Nochebuena

127

Chapter 9 The Impact of Modernization: The Expansion of Modern Cattle Production

152

Part Three Peasant Revolt in a Nahua Region Chapter 10 From Quiescence to Militancy: A Crisis in the ' 'Moral Economy''

177

Chapter 11 Agrarian Revolt in Huejutla: Peasant Leaders and Political Organizations

193

Chapter 12 Class Conflict and Factional Politics: Cliques, Violence and Kinship

214

Chapter 13 Class Conflict and the Peasant Community: The Struggle over Land Tenure and Village Administration

228

Chapter 14 Class Conflict and Ethnicity: Image and Reality

245

Part Four

The Forging of a New Hegemony Chapter 15 Reform, Co-option and Repression: A Decade of Contrived Land Invasions

259

Chapter 16 The Politics of Rural Development: New Structures of Class Mediation

282

Chapter 17 Huejutla in a Nutshell: Ethnicity and Politics in Jaltocan

303

CONTENTS

ix

Conclusions

3J7

Postscript

325

Bibliography

326

Index

343

Figures

ι 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

The Huasteca The Nahua Village of Tlalchiyahualica The Region of Huejutla Nahua Communities and Private Estates during the Colonial Period The Hacienda of Tepotzteco (circa 1890) Land Tenure in the Fictitious Ejido of Tenexco Area of Land Invasions (1979) Geneological Map of the Ramirez Family Land Tenure in the Municipio of Jaltocan

52 65 67 78 105 191 210 226 305

Tables

ι

Ownership of Means of Production and Class Structure in Tlalchiyahualica 2 Census Data on Eight Municipios in the District of Huejutla 3 Changes in Population and Cattle Production Between i960 and 1970

39 56 170

Preface

I first became interested in doing research in the district of Huejutla in the late 1970s, while I was putting thefinishingtouches on a book about Pisaflores in the nearby Sierra de Jacala region. Accounts by people who had visited Huejutla and news reports appearing in the national press indicated that the district of Huejutla was seething with insurrection and chaos: villages under seige, guerrillas in the hills and Indian peasants cutting the fences of cattle ranches and ripping out cultivated grasses to plant corn and beans. My general impression was that, unlike in Pisaflores, this bloody struggle for land was more widespread and largely successful. After an initial visit in 1980, I decided that Huejutla would be the ideal place to examine further the type of class conflicts between landless peasants and landowning cattle producers that I had already observed in Pisaflores. A study of these agrarian conflicts would also represent an intellectual challenge: how to conceptualize the relationship between class and ethnicity. Moreover, such a research project would provide me with an opportunity to learn a native language, Nahuatl. My first period offieldworkwas conducted in Atlapexco, a small municipio about the same size as Pisaflores. My immediate impression, based on direct observation and interviews conducted mainly in Spanish, was that the pattern of landholding and the economic structure of this ethnically diverse region (even after a period of invasions) were not that different from Pisaflores: the majority of agricultural estates, which were either small or medium in size, had appeared as a result of the breaking up of communal lands in the nineteenth century; the Mexican Revolution was fought by and had obviously benefited the same type of rancheros; and the recent expansion of cattle production had resulted in the erosion of subsistence cultivation and increasing migratory labor. Apart from a somewhat earlier introduction of new cattle production techniques, plus greater suspicion and political tension, the region of Huejutla seemed no different than Pisaflores. The majority of people just happened to speak a different language, and most peasants above forty years of age wore a distinctive type of dress (the white cotton calzon and manta shirt for the men and colorful embroidered blouses for the women). It looked like my research would simply be a replication of my earlier study! My first impressions changed during my first period of immersion in a pre-

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dominantly monolingual Nahuatl village. While traditional agricultural techniques and the basic diet were the same as in rural Mestizo villages, the system of internal administration (including law enforcement), interpersonal relations and religious ceremonies were completely different. As I gradually acquired a better knowledge of the Nahuatl language, a different worldview and a new set of conceptual categories were revealed. It also became apparent that the system of land tenure was very different from what I had previously thought. The tension between these two quite different initial impressions in the Huejutla region—that it was just like Pisaflores and that it could not be more different—made it necessary for me both to expand my area of research and to rethink my conceptual framework. As my research proceeded, I made additional discoveries. During my third summer of research I spent two months in the municipio of Huautla, where I lived in the type of community I had so far only read about: a village that had once belonged to a large landed estate or hacienda. It turned out that Indian villages that had been the residence of peons attached to such haciendas were quite different from those located in the formerly communal zone, even if both types of communities had the same legal status of ejido. Further information was obtained by living in other towns and villages. Fieldwork, involving participant observation and informal conversations, was complemented by two surveys and interviews with schoolteachers, government officials, businessmen and former landowners. During the last two years of my research I also gained a new perspective from talking to well-known peasant leaders and the representatives of various political organizations. By 19871 was finally satisfied that I had collected enough data in the field. Most of these data, however, contradicted the image held by journalists and other outsiders writing about the region. Many of myfindingsalso seemed to go against what anthropologists had written about other Mesoamerican Indian communities and ethnic relations in Mexico. Further discrepancies resulted from interacting with other researchers interested in Huejutla, all of whom had their own interpretations. This book is the outcome of a long period of deciphering these contradictory images and impressions of the region of Huejutla as well as going through a mass of data collected over an eight-year period. The research for this book was made possible by several grants from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Several shorter trips to Mexico were also financed by the Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean (CERLAC) of York University and the College of Social Sciences of the University of Guelph. I would like to acknowledge the insti-

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XVU

national support, in the forms of letters of introduction, that I received from the department of sociology and anthropology and, in Mexico, from the Centra de Estudios del Desarrollo Rural of the Colegio de Postgraduados of Chapingo, the Centra de Estudios Sociologicos of the Colegio de Mexico, the Centra de Investigaciones e Estudios Superiores en Antropologia Social (CIESAS), the Centra de Estudios Historicos del Agrarismo Mexicano (CEHAM) and the Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos (SARH). Moral support, encouragement and, above all, friendship, enabled me to bring my research to a successful end. I want to express my sincere gratitude to Sergio Alcantara and Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara who provided me with a home away from home when I was away from family and colleagues in Canada. Others who helped me in various ways during my numerous trips to Mexico include Marie-Odile Marion Singer, Heberto Rios Angeles, Tomas Martinez Saldana, Leticia Gandara, Jos6 Vergara Vergara, Nicanor Rebelledo, Antonio Escobar Ohmstede and Roberto Mesa. In Canada as well as in Mexico, Sally Humphries was not only a good friend and a perceptive critic but a valuable research assistant. In Huejutla the people who assisted me and offered me their hospitality are too numerous to mention. They include several now retired schoolteachers willing to become key informants, priests with whom I often discussed sensitive social and political issues, local politicians who gave me valuable contacts and, most importantly, peasants who are still struggling for a better way of life. The viewpoints and analytical insights of all of these people influenced my thinking and writing just as much as the largely academic literature I had to read to make sense out of what I observed and experienced in rural Mexico. The process of writing up the results of my research took place in various locations. All of the typing and editing of my handwritten fieldnotes and several papers or articles—in which I set out some preliminaryfindingsand analyses—were done at home, in Guelph. I wrote two first drafts of a book-length manuscript in Louisville, Kentucky, where I lived for eight months between August 1987 and April 1988. The final phase of rewriting and editing (after lots of feedback from both colleagues and external readers) took place in Amsterdam during the spring and summer of 1988, when I was a visiting scholar at the Centre for Studies and Documentation of Latin America (CEDLA). Here I received further advice and criticism from Arij Ouweneel and Frank Schenk. The very detailed written comments sent from California by Eric Van Young were particularly helpful. These and other historians, linguists and social scientists all played a part in the production of this book. I also want to mention three other people who are not Latin Americanists: Ronald Hinch and Ken Menzies of the University of Guelph, who gave me valuable theo-

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PREFACE

retical and editorial comments; and Catherine Schryer, whose own studies in the field of English composition and rhetoric inspired me to apply a more interpretive approach in my anthropological analysis. Finally, this book is dedicated to Stephen and Emily Schryer, who bore part of the emotional costs involved in its writing, since they had to endure the long absences of their father. Their combination of a sense of humor, iconoclasm and genuine compassion for other people were a source of inspiration and faith in the future of humanity.

Ethnicity and Class Conflict in Rural Mexico

Introduction

The northern part of the state of Hidalgo, called the Huasteca of Hidalgo (or Huasteca Hidalguense), is one of the most politically unstable and turmoilridden parts of rural Mexico. This geographical region is also ethnically diverse; about half of the approximately 250,000 people who live in the valleys and mountains of the sixteen municipios of the Huasteca Hidalguense and its immediate fringe speak Nahuatl1 (the same language spoken by the Aztecs) and can be distinguished as an ethnic minority, distinct from the Spanishspeaking Mestizos who also inhabit this region.2 Prior to 1970, the Huasteca Hidalguense, like the rest of the Huasteca region lying off the Gulf coast, was best known for the beauty of its terrain and its warm climate. For Mexicans, the word Huasteca also conjured up images of a unique fast-rhythm music and dance (huapangos) and of a region that exported cattle to Mexico City. By 1980, however, most Mexicans associated the Huasteca, and especially the Huasteca of Hidalgo, with rural poverty, violence and constant land invasions. On April 21,1978, the cry "the Indians are coming" went up over the city of Huejutla, the judicial administrative center for nine municipios that constitute the core of the Huasteca Hidalguense. According to press reports (Reveles 1978, 20-21), some seventeen thousand residents fled for their lives, leaving the city virtually abandoned. While the rumor proved to be unfounded, a high level of peasant militancy and political violence throughout the seventies was very real. This militancy took the form of direct-action land invasions—radical peasants cut fences, confiscated orchards and ripped out cultivated grasses in order to plant maize and beans. These actions in turn provoked assassinations and the jailing and repression of peasant leaders and 1

Following the conventions of most contemporary English-speaking scholars of Mesoamerica, the word Nahuatl is used to refer to the language (which is also known as mexicano), while the people who speak this language are referred to as Nahuas (Nahua in singular or as adjective). 2 The term Mestizo, which in Spanish refers to a person of mixed European and Indian descent who speaks Spanish (as opposed to native people who speak a non-European language and who also have a separate ethnic identity), is not usually capitalized according to English language spelling conventions. I feel that this spelling convention implies that "mestizos" are somehow "less pure" or "less noble" than Indians and for this reason I have deliberately capitalized both the words Indian and Mestizo in order to give equal status to these two distinct ethnic groups.

4

INTRODUCTION

their followers by local landowners and state authorities. By 1981, approximately one-third of all private properties in the region of Huejutla had been invaded, four hundred peasant leaders had been jailed and two hundred persons had been assassinated (Alvarez 1981, 3). This violent conflict and political turmoil culminated in the expropriation, by the Mexican government, of over twenty thousand hectares of privately owned land and the implementation of a program of land reform and rural development. Most peasant leaders, lingering in the state penitentiary, were granted a blanket amnesty and allowed to return home. A new series of land invasions ensued, however, and sporadic political demonstrations and assassinations are still continuing (1988). This book will describe and analyze the violent peasant revolt that took place in the region of Huejutla, a region which can be defined in terms of both political boundaries and socioeconomic characteristics (see chapter 3). In Mexico, the left-wing press portrayed the agrarian revolt that occurred in this region as one in which Indians were pitted against feudal-style landowners in an effort to reclaim hereditary land rights.3 According to their accounts, years of brutal exploitation, aggravated by racial discrimination on the part of the Mestizos, finally exploded in a violent struggle over land. These and other sympathetic outside supporters saw a united Nahua peasantry, proud of their heritage, who represent the communal values and egalitarianism so conspicuous by their absence in modern capitalist society. However, although many militant peasants identified with their struggle in terms of an ethnic conflict between Indians and non-Indians, conflicts over land cut across ethnic and linguistic boundaries; properties owned by Nahuatl-speaking ranchers and merchants were invaded, and landless Mestizo peasants also joined in the agrarian struggle. Usually cohesive Nahua communities also became bitterly divided by factional disputes over whether or not they should join in land invasions. In many such communities, poor peasants and rich peasants disagreed vehemently over the meaning and operation of such traditional village institutions as communal land tenure, faenas4 or the holding of religious or civil public posts. Internal disputes over these issues frequently resulted in physical expulsions. The complex series of events that took place in the region under investigation are thus not amenable to an analysis in terms of simplistic dichotomies of Indian versus Mestizo. 3 Some typical examples would be editorial articles by Gustavo Gordillo (1981b, 4) and Carlos Pereyra(i98i, 4). 4 The faena is obligatory work (usually on public projects) done by members of a Mexican rural community as a condition of their rights to access to land or other community resources.

INTRODUCTION

5

Major Themes Overt class conflict in the region of Huejutla can be attributed to increasing pressures on the land resulting from the rapid expansion of modern cattle production in an area already characterized by a very high level of population density. This causal factor, which affected Mestizo and Nahua peasants alike, especially during the two decades preceding the outbreak of a series of violent land invasions, upset an equilibrium between subsistence and commercial production dating back to the colonial period. Although they had long been economically exploited and politically dominated, the vast majority of the rural population of Huejutla (both Nahuas and Mestizos) had been able to meet at least their minimum subsistence needs prior to i960 (except during periods of natural disasters). Ambitious and hard-working peasants had also previously had opportunities for social and economic mobility, in spite of the presence of ethnic discrimination. During the century prior to the recent outbreak of a series of violent disputes over land, the Huasteca of Hidalgo had not experienced any notable peasant uprisings, not even during periods of civil war and peasant rebellions in other parts of the Huasteca or elsewhere. Peasant quiescence in Huejutla prior to 1970 does not mean, however, that peasants willingly accepted the status quo or that they believed they lived in a just society. James Scott (1985, 29) has pointed out that class struggle in agrarian societies more often takes the form of ongoing day-to-day passive resistance in the form of pilfering, sabotage or foot dragging. Like the peasants of Malaysia described by Scott, the rural poor in Huejutla were probably quite capable of penetrating or unmasking the ideological discourse that the upper classes used to justify their class position. But not until i960 did the lot of most peasants in the Huasteca become unbearable; prior to this they had at least the minimum combination of economic security, autonomy or mobility, the loss of which John Tutino (1985, chap. 1) has identified as the necessary, if not sufficient, cause of peasant uprisings. I suspect that at that time many peasants were ready to rebel. A regionally based peasant movement could not occur, however, until the right set of political circumstances became available. This happened during the regime of Luis Echeverria. Only then, around 1974, did both grievances and opportunities become available. Another major theme is the complex nature of the interrelationship between the class structure and other aspects of society such as ethnicity, religion, the law and relations of kinship. All of these aspects, which have been referred to as the superstructure, cultural values or social discourse, shaped the form taken by the class struggle in Huejutla. As E. P. Thompson (1978, 98) has

6

INTRODUCTION

pointed out, class conflict is always mediated by human experience and interpretation. For this reason, class conflict, though rooted in the mode of production, must be analyzed from a perspective that takes into consideration not only the economic system but how the legal, administrative and religious institutions of a society and their corresponding values impinge on common people and how these everyday experiences in turn affect their view of the world. By including all of these other social factors, it was possible to see how culture and various aspects of social organization not directly related to class shaped the thoughts and actions of class subjects caught within the contradictions of an economic system. For this reason a great deal of attention will be paid to local variations in the struggle for land. The struggle for land in Huejutla did not take place simultaneously in all villages, nor did class conflicts take a uniform shape. Although Huejutla can be identified as a single administrative, geographical and economic region, the form taken by conflicts over land and their outcome differed greatly among different communities, even those belonging to the same ethnic group. For example, the struggle for land involving Nahuatl-speaking peasants was not always expressed in terms of ethnic opposition; in many villages poor peasants conceptualized their agrarian struggle in terms of a fight against outsiders, or "the rich," and not as one pitting Indians versus Mestizos. In contrast, in other parts of Huejutla, poor, landless Indian peasants did conceive of their fight for access to land in terms of ethnic opposition, but at the same time they also allied themselves with poor Spanish-speaking peasants from villages that had never been "Indian." James Scott (1985, 43), in his study of class dynamics in a culturally homogeneous village in Malaysia, could afford to dismiss or ignore such ethnic differences as well as many other non-class factors. In that study, he decided to focus on class as only one of the "principles of human action," which competes with kinship, neighborhood, faction, ethnicity, language group, religion and even region. A study of the process of class conflict in an ethnically diverse region like Huejutla makes it difficult to separate class from other, nonclass factors. On the contrary, it was essential to look at how all of these other aspects of human society, especially ethnicity, became important components of class relations and class struggle. I also had to take into account the legal and administrative structures that are part of the land tenure system in Mexico, and to what extent variations in this system were associated with different patterns of ethnic relations. Such an analysis, which examines the complex interrelationships among class, ethnicity and other aspects of society, required some fine tuning through a comparison of many different case studies at the local level. It is also necessary to look at the respective world

INTRODUCTION

7

views of the two ethnic groups in question and compare land invasions involving Nahua peasants with those conducted by their Mestizo counterparts. Different forms of ethnic opposition which emerged during this period of agrarian strife must also be untangled. Throughout this study it will thus become apparent exactly how these two factors—class and ethnicity—are interrelated but at the same time vary independently. While this book will above all focus on ethnicity and class conflict in rural Mexico, one cannot avoid such issues as the relationship between peasant communities and the state, the dynamics of the political process at the macro versus the micro levels and the relationship between conflict and solidarity within peasant society. I will therefore discuss and criticize various theoretical models dealing with the Mesoamerican peasant community. The data on Huejutla indicates that, contrary to the viewpoint of many authors, communal land tenure and corporate structures are quite compatible with private enterprise. It will be demonstrated that Indian communities may be characterized not only by internal class differentiation but overt class conflicts on the village level. Moreover, internal conflicts of various kinds are not necessarily diminished or contained as a result of a common threat posed by the encroachment of neighboring communities or landowners and other power-holders. Peasant communities in Huejutla were involved in both internal and external conflicts at the same time. All of thesefindingshave implications for the broader study of peasant uprisings as well as for peasant quiescence. Despite my critique of more traditional anthropological models of the Indian peasant community, such models usually do accurately identify the cultural values shared by rich peasants and poor peasants alike, especially in predominantly indigenous rural regions. What most authors have not recognized is that these cultural rules or values are subject to constant manipulation and competing interpretations.5 Like Scott (1985, 339) I am interested in showing how such shared cultural norms and expectations "provide much of the symbolic raw material from which the most damning critique could be derived and sustained"—except that in Huejutla there was more than one set of cultural symbols, associated with two different ethnic groups who in turn shared an overarching set of symbols common to all Mexicans. All of these 5 Even written historical records are subject to such competing interpretations, as will become evident in my case study. The production of such interpretations or other forms of cultural meaning, as an integral component of social action, has become the main task of a new "interpretive" school in social anthropolology (see Marcus and Fischer 1986, 85-90). A good example of a recent application of such an approach in an ethnographic study in rural Mexico is Maria Teresa Koreck's paper (1986, i), which shows how "native representations of history (even those based on written records) do not necessarily coincide with scholarly reconstructions of what 'really' happened."

8

INTRODUCTION

symbolic systems were open to negotiation and thus reflected and at the same time distorted social reality. New cultural values have also appeared recently in the region of Huejutla as a result of an influx of professionals who represent the increasing penetration of the state into local affairs. These professionals, mainly outsiders, are today busy inculcating yet another set of symbols, or a different form of discourse that will further modify the dialogue of resistance as well as the language of class domination.6 Ethnographic and historical research on the internal dynamics of rural Mexican communities (even if done from a radical perspective) needs to examine this cultural or symbolic dimension.

General Theoretical Framework On a more abstract level, my theoretical approach is derived from an interpretation of Marxist thought that is sometimes referred to as the historicist school, associated with such writers as George Lukacs, Lucien Goldman and Antonio Gramsci.7 All of these thinkers recognized the complex, dialectical relationship between class structure and other aspects of human society (especially ideas). What distinguishes such a Marxist dialectic from other dialectical approaches, such as that of Schermerhorn (1976,48-59), is a special emphasis on the process of production and its corresponding relations of power and conflicting class interests. These neo-Marxist thinkers also put primary emphasis on the Marxist concept of praxis, which refers to the conscious, purposive actions of people. I have tried to combine their insights with those of contemporary critical scholars who have written about the peasantry, ethnicity and social movements. Another school of thought that has influenced my thinking is dialectical anthropology. The central organizing concept used by the writers associated with this school, such as Robert Murphy (1971) and Pierre Bourdieu (1977), is the dialectical interrelationship between the ideational aspects of culture and social behavior or between norms and the patterns of social interaction. Both of these scholars have argued that belief and behavior are derived from yet also contradict each other.8 6 Norman Long (1987) has examined such a process of interaction between two different discourse communities, that of peasants and agricultural bureaucrats, in another part of rural Mexico. 7 For a short discussion of the historicist school, see the entry by David McLellan in Tom Bottomore(i983, 210-11). 8 Bourdieu, who has also written on the educational system of urban industrial society (see Dawson 1983, 35), takes a more critical stance than Murphy and is more interested in the manner in which culture mediates social relationships based on class inequality.

INTRODUCTION

9

If I had to put a label on my theoretical synthesis, I would call it a dialectical, interactive approach. Such an approach rejects both crude economic determinism and the now more trendy ideological determinism of many social scientists. I recognize that patterns of culture and their corresponding social structures (especially those related to the production and distribution of wealth) shape or determine much of human behavior. I am also interested, however, in looking at how these structures are in turn constantly being modified through an ongoing process of negotiation and competition among members of different social classes. A similar theoretical approach is advocated by Eric Wolf (1986, 327) and by Carol Smith (1984, 225), both of whom have underlined the necessity of looking at the interconnections among the economy, social relations and culture. The legal aspects of land tenure in ethnically diverse parts of Mexico can serve as a particularly useful example of the dynamic interplay or interaction between structure and action or between determinism and voluntarism.9 An analysis that only looks at how the legal system (or for that matter ethnicity) functions to maintain the status quo does not provide much insight into how the law can serve as a class weapon for militant peasants in their fight for access to more land and greater control over the productive process. The history of rural Mexico can provide many examples of how peasants, especially those living in Indian villages, learned to use the legal system imposed by their conquerors to defend their communal properties against encroachment by Spanish landowners, especially during the colonial era.10 Members of peasant communities were just as capable as landowners of using and manipulating the legal system, and such communities were sometimes successful. Most of the time they at least managed to attenuate the impact of the expansion of landed estates in predominantly Indian regions. This was also true for Huejutla during the last two decades, when Nahua as well as Mestizo peasants not only invaded land but simultaneously appealed to the legal principles and worked within the legal institutions normally analyzed only from the viewpoint of how they function to maintain the Mexican socioeconomic system intact.11 This point has also been made by E. P. Thompson (1975, 258-69) in his study of agrarian conflict in England in the eighteenth century. 9

This argument has also been presented by Harnza Alavi (1975, 2-3) in connection with the role of the laboring poor in the Third World. 10 Well-known studies of the operation of the legal system in rural Mexico include those by Woodrow Borah (1983, 73), Eric Van Young (1984, 65-6) and William Taylor (1972, 197). 11 For a more detailed analysis of peasants and the legal system in rural Mexico, see Schryer (1986).

IO

INTRODUCTION

A Historical Perspective My reconstruction of the history of Huejutla prior to the outbreak of the peasant revolt has three aims. To understand better the objective (material) causes of peasant militancy in Huejutla, I had to trace the economic and political history of the region under study within the broader context of the Mexican Revolution, which gave rise to the political and economic system still in place today. Another and equally important reason for looking at local history is that the actions of people in the seventies and eighties were very much influenced by their perceptions or memories of past events. This was especially true for the history of Huejutla over the last fifty or sixty years. However, there were competing versions of history held by opposing groups or factions, especially when it came to political events. I thus had to separate factual accounts (which were or could theoretically be corroborated from other sources) from people's beliefs or opinions. Although I relied as much as possible on written documents, my own outsider's (i.e., etic) version of local history invariably involved an interpretation of competing accounts presented by members of partisan groups. No doubt, more painstaking research by future historians will throw further light on the revolutionary and postrevolutionary period in the Huasteca. My treatment of nineteenth-century and colonial history is even more incomplete, but was necessary to accomplish my third objective. I needed to show that many of the cultural patterns and institutions that shaped the course of class struggle in Huejutla in the last two decades have been around for quite some time. Indeed, some aspects of village administration and land tenure probably go back to the prehispanic era while others were introduced at the beginning of the colonial period. This is especially true for those parts of Huejutla that once formed part of the Indian republics set up by the Spanish crown. For example, conflicts over land involving competing claims by poor and rich peasants frequently became intertwined with disputes between neighboring villages over legal status. Such disputes, involving a desire by subordinate hamlets (anexos or sujetos) to become independent from their administrative centers (cabeceras), are well documented from the entire colonial era and continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see Gibson 1981, chap. 3; Lewis 1963, 117). Intraregional differences in village administrative structures, which can account for much of the local variation in agrarian disputes, must also be explained. Many of these local social and cultural differences at one time corresponded to contrasting patterns of relations of production. For example, whether or not Indian villages have some form of a civil-religious hierarchy

INTRODUCTION

II

(or its modern equivalent), and whether or not toponyms are still used, has a lot to do with the presence or absence of haciendas in the past. Indeed, prior to 1930, one could still speak of two quite different economic systems found in different parts of Huejutla: that associated with small haciendas and that associated with a mixture of ranchos and Indian communities. Although such contrasting class structures had virtually disappeared by 1940, their corresponding forms of village administration and cultural values (which have survived up until today) can explain many of the contrasts in the type of agrarian disputes that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.

Methodology Most of the supporting evidence for my analysis of the peasant revolt and its aftermath is based on oral history and direct observation. I should therefore make some comments on how I obtained my ethnographic data. Students of peasant movements rarely have the opportunity to witness the acting out of major political events or to live among people in the midst of a situation of great tensions, hostility and suspicion. This experience gave me a unique opportunity to observe the day-to-day political maneuvering, the strong differences of opinion, the village rivalries and the purely personal conflicts that were an integral part of a political struggle that may seem united and even "noble" to outsiders or future historians. Doing research in Huejutla also had its pitfalls and dangers, however. Combining periods of intensive participant observations in two or three villages with numerous short trips to other locations made it impossible to obtain the amount of detailed information or the type of inside picture of daily life so characteristic of anthropological research in a single village or municipio. I also had to spend a fair amount of time in the city of Huejutla in order to get slice-of-time snapshots of what was happening in the political headquarters of peasant organizations or in the homes of peasant leaders or local landowners who were influential on the regional or state level. I thus walked a fine line between being an oral historian, an ethnographer and a political scientist interviewing key actors, while still fitting in archival research. Frequently key informants who told me about a recent event, or about the factional struggles in a certain village, were people who no longer lived in the locality in question. In such cases it was not always possible to contact someone else who could corroborate what I had been told, and I had to use my own judgment concerning the reliability and accuracy of such information. I had to go by internal consistency, plausibility and the overall context

12

INTRODUCTION

of what I already knew. To understand better the background of well-known public events, I also needed to become acquainted with microlevel, village dynamics in different parts of the Huejutla region and to discover how events on the village level reflected state policy and decisions made on the regional level. In the end I took the decision to stop the actual data-collecting phase on the basis of a largely subjective feeling that I had collected enough data to start my final analysis, despite many lacunae and a certain feeling of frustra­ tion that there were always more things I could uncover. In writing up the results, however, I found it difficult to draw a clear line between my own, presumably objective, outsider's interpretation and the more subjective, biased perspective of "the subjects under investigation." This perspective not only came from what people had personally told me, but it was also present in various books, articles and reports written by people from the region or other parts of Mexico. Such written accounts provided not only raw data but insights that influenced my own analysis as a social scientist and a historian. I also felt this influence during some interviews and conver­ sations with key people in the region. Their views and theories in turn had a bearing on how I interpreted earlier scholarly accounts and archival material dealing with the earlier history of Huejutla.

Overview and Organization The first part begins with a theoretical discussion, including a review of literature. Chapter ι deals with the relationship between class and ethnicity in general as well as the nature of ethnic relations in Mesoamerica. Various theories concerning the nature of the peasant community in Mesoamerica, especially the model of the closed corporate community first outlined by Eric Wolf, are presented in the second chapter. Some empirical data on economic differentiation and class conflict in several Nahua villages in Huejutla are also provided. Chapter 3 introduces and defines the region of Huejutla. Part 2 provides the background information necessary to put recent con­ flicts in Huejutla into a broader historical perspective. Chapter 4 traces the origins of current variations in village-level social organization back to the colonial period. During this period Huejutla still consisted of two separate administrative units which were amalgamated soon after the War of Inde­ pendence against Spain. The subsequent emergence of a ranchero economy and the relationship among the owners of such ranchos, members of Indian communities and haciendas are presented in chapter 5. This chapter shows that at least part of the region of Huejutla, formerly characterized by ' 'Indian

INTRODUCTION

13

republics," saw the development of a new form of class differentiation on the village level, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. The ecological basis of both this ranchero economy and the haciendas of Huejutla is presented in chapter 6. Chapter 6 also explains why the majority of peasants were so quiescent prior to i960, despite a great deal of factional in-fighting among rival cliques in the local elite. Chapter 7 traces the emergence of a new political elite, made up of Mestizo rancheros, during and after the Mexican Revolution. This turbulent period is seen as an interlude in a process of economic and political transformation that started toward the end of the nineteenth century and culminated in the breakup of local haciendas in 1940. This land reform was overseen by General Juvencio Nochebuena, a regional cacique who rose to a position of prominence in the state and national arena. The political history of Huejutla, which coincided with the career of this cacique, is the subject of chapter 8. General Nochebuena was connected by ties of kinship to local cattle ranchers and fanners who were involved in cattle rustling and gun-slinging. The widespread use of violence and family vendettas, associated with internecine fighting among rival factions of landowning families between 1940 and i960, is also discussed. Chapter 9 looks more specifically at the economic history of the region, focusing on the introduction and expansion of modern cattle production after 1930. This and other economic changes were at the root of the peasant revolt that broke out in the seventies. Part 3 presents a more detailed account of a decade of direct-action land invasions. In chapter 10, the political events immediately preceding the outbreak of a peasant revolt are outlined, including the first set of land invasions in two Nahua communities that were to appear frequently in later news reports about the region. Chapter 11 describes the actual peasant revolt on a regional level in the broader context of the Mexican political economy. The facts presented consist mainly of well-known public events as they were reported in the press or recounted by peasant leaders on the regional level. These events are further interpreted in chapters 12 to 14 from the theoretical perspective presented in part 1. These more analytical chapters will also incorporate case studies of agrarian politics in specific communities in order to illustrate specific points. The fourth and final part focuses on the political life of Huejutla in the eighties. Chapter 15 describes a decade of largely contrived land invasions and increasing factional disputes among rival peasant organizations. This is the period when I personally witnessed the implementation of land reform and community development, immediately following the more violent phase of the peasant revolt in Huejutla. Again one needs to disentangle two very

14

INTRODUCTION

different, conflicting images of the Huasteca of Hidalgo: a success story of socialist reform and community development versus a picture of ongoing conflicts and the violent repression of Indian peasants. I will show that both images are true to a certain extent. Following the expropriation of most private properties in the region, the government had to restore political stability and to regain the legitimacy that the Mexican state and the official Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) had lost during the preceding years. In Gramscian terminology, a new hegemony had to be forged. Chapter 16 describes and analyzes the rural development projects that were implemented in the region. These community development projects, in conjunction with the legal recognition of lands taken over by militant groups of peasants, led to the development of new forms of class control as well as new forms of class struggle. During this postrevolt era, the ideas and actions of professionals educated in Mexico City or the state capital started to reshape local cultural values at an accelerated pace. Due to their presence, new forms of rhetoric are today emerging in rural villages. Finally, chapter 17 returns to a case study of factional politics in the municipio of Jaltocan, particularly the manner in which ethnic labels were used in a divisive electoral campaign in 1984. Several years later, this municipio saw the latest developments of class conflicts on the village level which had started in other Nahua villages more than a decade earlier. It will become apparent that local politics, rural development, education and public policy are all interrelated. AU of these aspects of Mexican society had to be included in order to arrive at a more holistic, integrated analysis of class conflict in an ethnically diverse region.

Part One Ethnic Relations, Class Structure and the Peasant Community in Mesoamerica

Chapter 1

Ethnicity and Class: Class Conflict in Plural Societies

The complex relationship between class and ethnicity presents an intellectual challenge to scholars, especially those using a Marxist framework of analysis. Some researchers simply avoid this challenge by disregarding the phenomenon of ethnicity altogether. Others only look at ethnicity as a negative factor, which hinders or retards the development of class consciousness necessary for class struggles. Still others (see Nnoli 1977) equate ethnicity and class whenever ethnic groups are overrepresented or underrepresented in different economic classes. According to this interpretation, ethnic or racial strife is an expression of class conflict whenever different ethnic groups are unequally ranked and where it is possible to identify subordinate and superordinate ethnic groups who have unequal access to power. Even in such cases of ethnic subordination, however, the correlation between class position and membership in antagonistic ethnic groups is far from perfect. This debate and the resulting confusion is also true for the literature dealing with Latin America. For example, Christian Deverre (1980, 12) considers any form of ethnic conflict in Latin America to be ' 'profoundly conservative and reactionary." In contrast, Jean-Loup Herbert, Carlos Guzman and Julio Quan (1972) argue that the class struggle can only take the form of an ethnic conflict between a class of Ladinos and a class of Indians. Herbert (1972,151) divides each of these opposing classes into various substrata, and he calls this ethnic opposition the "principle contradiction" of Guatemalan society. RicardoPozas (1971) makes a similar argument for ethnically diverse regions in Mexico. Some earlier writers (Tumin 1952; Gillin 1957) even used the notion of caste to describe Indian-Mestizo relationships in Mesoamerica because of the low level of social mobility and rigid social barriers between these two hierarchically ranked ethnic groups. The term caste has also been used to refer to similar situations of ethnic inequality resulting from the conquest of a population by people with a different culture or different somatic features. For example, Donald Horowitz

l8

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

(1985, 22) portrays Rwanda, in Africa, as having a caste-like system consisting of a small minority of pastoral Tutsi (the original invaders) exploiting the predominantly agricultural Hutu. He also analyzes the eruption of ethnic conflict in Rwanda as a purely vertical opposition of two ethnically based classes (p. 35). Such situations, where class membership was empirically synonymous with ascribed ethnic status as a result of conquest, might possibly have existed in some precapitalist state-level societies and also in some colonies in the early stages of mercantile capitalism. Such situations, however, could not have continued for any length of time given the considerable cultural assimilation and changes in the boundaries between ethnic groups that have occurred over the past several hundred years.1 In the case of Rwanda, Leo Kuper (1975, 125) has shown that the mass of Tutsi in Rwanda belonged to the same impoverished class of subsistence cultivators as the Hutu. Here a dichotomous conception of the social structure, originating from a period of conquest in the seventeenth century, no longer accurately reflected the considerable overlap between ethnic membership and position in the class structure two hundred years later. Scholars who portray contemporary, ethnically based "caste-like" societies in dichotomous terms thus give too much credence to institutional prescription or ideological categories without examining the actual economic class structure. Certainly in Mexico, legal distinctions defining the class structure of New Spain in terms of various ethnic categories no longer corresponded to reality as early as the mid-sixteenth century, as shown in a historical study of the colonial city of Oaxaca undertaken by Chance (1978). He demonstrates that these legal ethnic categories more closely corresponded to the world view of an upper class of landowners than the actual combination of economic classes and ethnic groups. This complex relationship between class and ethnicity is characteristic of all ethnically diverse societies in today's world. At the same time, one cannot deny the existence of often violent confrontations between rival ethnic groups that frequently involve factional disputes among people who occupy the same position in the class structure. Oliver Cox (1970, 319), who has examined such ethnic conflict from a Marxist perspective, states that "ethnic antagonism may so diffuse other interests that political-class differences are constantly held in abeyance." This situation often presents itself in former colonial societies, which social anthropologists refer to as plural societies. 1

The one exception might be South Africa, where the white-controlled government has legislated ethnic boundaries. Even there, however, economic and ethnic differentiation do not coincide completely, because the process of industrialization has allowed for economic, if not political, mobility for some blacks (see Kuper 1965).

Ethnicity and Class

19

Conflict in Plural Societies Complex, multiethnic societies present a challenge not only to Marxists interested in class struggle and revolution but to scholars interested in accounting for social order and stability. Ethnically diverse nation states contradict the consensus assumption used by social anthropologists who at one point studied mainly small-scale, culturally homogeneous societies. At first such anthropologists analyzed ethnic enclaves without taking into account the larger context of the nation state. However, different ethnic groups in complex societies may participate in a single economic system and be subject to the same government without sharing a common set of values or having the same form of social organization. Anthropologists who started to broaden their scope of analysis to include such complex, ethnically diverse societies referred to them as multiple or plural societies (see Furnivall 1939; Nash 1957; Smith i960; Rex 1959). These anthropologists used case studies from former European colonies to illustrate that a common culture and value consensus were not prerequisites for long-term social stability.2 They were also interested in conflict and inequality, following the examples set by Max Gluckman (1963), who did fieldwork in South Africa. Although this new brand of anthropology became associated with a school of thought known as "conflict theory," its advocates analyzed such conflict in terms of how it contributed to long-term stability and the continuity and equilibrium of basic social institutions (Gluckman 1968). The theoretical approach used by members of this pluralist school is most clearly articulated by Colby and van den Berghe, who did fieldwork in Africa and Mesoamerica. These authors define plural societies as having parallel but distinguishable sets of institutions as well as functionally similar corporate groups, whose members have different cultures or subcultures (Colby and van den Berghe 1969, 7). They argue that their framework for analyzing such plural societies (whether Switzerland or South Africa) brings together the "functionalist" and "conflict" streams of sociological thought (p. 4). According to their theory, plural societies, which are more prone to various types of conflicts, nevertheless remain stable over time because of the economic interdependence of their various ethnic groups and a common polity that articulates relations between its constituent groups (p. 10). Their case study, Ixil Country (Guatemala), is used as an example of a 2 Classic ethnographic studies using the pluralist framework have been done in Fiji (Mayer 1983), the Caribbean (Smith 1965; Depres 1967), Mauritius (Benedict 1965), South Africa (Kuper and Smith 1969) and Mesoamerica (Nash 1957).

20

T H E PEASANT COMMUNITY

plural society in which the "balance of power and wealth" between the two ethnic groups, Ladinos and Indians, was unstable and where there was neither complete equality nor complete domination. Colby and Van den Berghe primarily focus on ethnic conflict in terms of competition for both economic resources and political power between these two ethnic groups (both of which are internally stratified). The Marxist term "class conflict" is reserved for those rare situations where a subordinate ethnic group is engaged in revolutionary struggle in a classical colonial situation, as in some parts of Asia and Africa (Colby and van den Berghe 1969, 15). However, these authors do not mention the possibility of class conflicts that cut across the boundaries of ethnic groups. The emphasis on the priority of interethnic or racial conflict is also apparent in Leo Kuper's work (1975) on political conflict in plural societies. From an analysis of revolutionary movements in Rwanda and Zanzibar (based on secondary sources), he concludes that in such plural societies, "the dialectic of conflict is essentially racial" (p. 202). Kuper goes even further than Colby and van den Berghe and argues that ethnically diverse, plural societies are never subject to class conflict in the Marxist sense (pp. 224-25).3 Kuper also holds that although such ethnic conflicts usually include competition for economic resources, economic concerns and intraethnic class stratification are secondary. Unlike the authors discussed above, I believe that what they called plural societies can be analyzed from a class perspective. The case study of Huejutla shows that such societies are not immune to class conflicts (as defined from a Marxist perspective).

Marxist Approaches to Class and Ethnicity Much of the controversy about the relative importance of class and ethnicity revolves around Marx's notion of class and class struggle. These terms have also been subject to different interpretations. In this study I will use the term social class to refer to a group of people belonging to the same economic class who share a common identity and enough awareness of their common interests to be able to act in accordance with their long-term economic interests. The term economic class (or just class) will be used as an analytical category to identify only people's relationship to the means of production and 3 Kuper analyzes struggles between hierarchically related ethnic groups primarily in terms of their differential political incorporation within a colonial or quasicolonial context.

Ethnicity and Chss

21

distribution, regardless of how such relations may be perceived.4 The interrelationships among members of such economic classes compose the class structure of a society, which almost always cuts across linguistic and cultural boundaries. While researchers should be able to examine this class structure on the basis of an examination of purely objective data, the analysis of social class could not be done without taking into account subjective factors, including class consciousness. Using the terminology of social anthropologists, the study of social class and class conflict requires both an etic and an emic analysis.5 Class conflicts (or conflicts between social classes) involve people who share symbols and values based on specific cultural patterns. According to a strictly Marxist definition, members of social classes engaged in struggles vis-a-vis other classes must also occupy the same or similar positions in the class structure. Orthodox Marxist scholars deal with the development of class conflict in ethnically diverse societies in one of two ways. They predict either that class consciousness automatically involves the loss of ethnic identity or that the ethnic identity of members of a subordinated class undergoes a qualitative change to become the expression of class consciousness. In the latter case, they assume that those members of this "revolutionary" ethnic group who belong to other, opposing economic classes (i.e., those who technically form part of the exploiters from the viewpoint of an outside analyst) will reject their ethnic identity or else support the class struggle despite their own objective class position. The logical extension of such a theoretical position is that members of the subordinate class who belong to the superordinate ethnic group should also change their ethnic identity. For example, all poor, landless Mestizos in Mesoamerica could only achieve full class consciousness by identifying themselves as Indians! Jean-Loup Herbert (1972, 72), who was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, comes close to this position. In contrast, opponents of Marxism in thefieldof ethnic studies completely reject class analysis for ethnically diverse societies because of what they see as the preponderance of ethnicity in people's self-perception as well as the important role played by ethnic groups in the political arena. Such opponents argue that the primordial ties associated with ethnic groups make ethnicity a basic 4 This distinction between social class and economic class is, of course, the same as the distinction between class-for-itself and class-in-itself made by Karl Marx (1966). 5 The difference between an etic (i.e.,"objective" or "scientific") analysis and an emic ("subjective") one is that only the latter tries to portray or reflect accurately the conceptual categories of the people being studied (i.e., it tries to "get inside their heads"). Each approach requires a different procedure of validation; an emic analysis cannot be validated (at least in theory) without the affirmation, consent or approval of the subjects being investigated (Harris 1979, chap. 2).

22

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

group identity that overrides any other "secondary" ones such as those associated with class or occupation (see Isaacs 1975). For these reasons, many students of ethnicity have concluded that a class model is inapplicable or irrelevant for ethnically diverse, non-Western societies (see Horowitz 1985, 89-92). A number of social scientists have managed to overcome this false dichotomy between class and ethnicity. Orlando Patterson, inspired by Barth's work (1969) on ethnic boundaries, examines how the ethnic identity of immigrant populations of common origin who have settled in different countries changes depending on how they become incorporated into the class structure of a new society.6 According to Patterson (1975, 334), economic factors affect the size, continuity and even the definition of specific ethnic groups over time because ethnic identity may serve the economic class interests of individuals who belong to specific ethnic groups. The point is not whether people have a class identity or an ethnic identity—this is an erroneous question because people can have multiple identities—but rather how people abandon, maintain or change their ethnic identity depending on their position in the class structure. Such an analysis is quite different from a vulgar economic determinism, such as that of Deverre (1980), which predicts the gradual but inevitable disappearance of any ethnic distinctions. However, Patterson does not address the issues of how class consciousness develops (alongside or despite ethnic consciousness), nor does he examine class conflict. While Patterson focuses on the manner in which individuals manipulate their multiple identities within the broader context of a changing class structure, other Marxist scholars place greater emphasis on the function of ethnic stereotypes or symbolic systems involving ethnic stratification in maintaining a class structure (thus preventing the emergence of class conflict). For example, Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1975), who has written about southern Mexico (just like van den Berghe), analyzes Indian-Ladino relations as an expression of an ideology of ethnic superiority that reinforces the class position of upper class Ladinos. Stavenhagen also makes an analytical distinction between the class structure and a corresponding ideological system of stratification involving the use of ethnic categories. Such an ideological system, consisting of ascribed status categories, may not correspond to the actual class structure since members of subordinate or stigmatized ethnic groups may belong to the same economic classes as the dominant ethnic group. He explains this lack of fit between class and ethnicity as a type of lag effect (p. 34). Old stereotypes 6 Another writer interested in the relationship among class, polity and ethnicity from a comparative perspective is Chandra Jayarwardena (1980).

Ethnicity and Class

23

and their associated practices of discrimination do not just face away; an ideology of ethnic stratification resulting from colonization, conquest or forced migration may linger on even when the class structure has already become significantly altered. In such situations, people belonging to the dominant ethnic group continue to conceptualize class differences in primarily ethnic terms and hence, ethnic labels and certain customs and institutions associated with ethnic stratification may impede the upward mobility of members of stigmatized ethnic groups within the economic class structure. This then accounts for the strong correlation in so many countries between people's places in the class structure and certain cultural or culturally defined somatic traits. According to Stavenhagen, discrepancies between ethnic status and objective class position may result in ethnic conflicts led by better-off or upwardly mobile members of the subordinate ethnic group, which would, in turn, alter the system of ethnic statification. It could be argued, however, that this type of ethnic conflict resulting from limited economic upward mobility does not really constitute class conflict since it would result in the embourgeoisement of upper class members of a formerly subordinate ethnic group and a preservation of the original class structure, albeit with different personnel (see Colby and van den Berghe 1969, 245). Like Patterson, Stavenhagen thus does not specify how real class conflicts would actually develop in societies which continue to be ethnically diverse. Nor does he mention that prejudice against a particular ethnic group is not incompatible with members of that group in turn discriminating against still other ethnic minorities in a hierarchy of exploitation. This is the case in rural Mexico, where a system of discrimination against people labeled as "Indians" is not incompatible with class differences within predominantly Indian regions with unique institutions and values (which in turn reinforce such internal class differentiation among members of a subordinate ethnic group). So far, most of the Marxist scholars cited, including Stavenhagen, have done a much better job analyzing the class structure in ethnically diverse regions than explicating the actual process of class struggle in such societies. Like the pluralists, they have not been able to disentangle completely the complex interrelationship between the process of class conflict and ethnic conflicts that often cut across class lines. Before offering an alternative perspective on this issue, however, I should briefly discuss the Marxist term "superstructure," a term Stavenhagen (1975, 34) has used to designate ideological aspects of ethnic stratification and their corresponding patterns of discrimination. Marx's distinction between base and superstructure—a distinction that has

24

T H E PEASANT COMMUNITY

become a source of considerable debate among critical scholars7—can be used to distinguish between the class structure versus all other components of human society that do not form part of the class structure or the economic system (broadly defined to include relations of production). The term superstructure, which I see as a kind of residual category, is usually employed when examining how any aspect of either the culture or the social organization of a society serves to reinforce or reproduce the class structure.8 Ideology, including the ideology of ethnic stratification, is only one aspect or subcomponent of this residual category. The parallel institutions and the complex sets of identities associated with plural societies can likewise be seen simply as variations of the superstructure which function as alternative or simultaneous mechanisms of class control. Such parallel ideologies and institutions could coexist with a more pervasive and broader ideology of ethnic stratification. Ethnic labels and other aspects of society that have been conceptualized as superstructure are not just an epiphenomenon or unimportant for understanding human society and how it changes. I concur with E. P. Thompson (1978) that all of these aspects of human experience are integral to human society; but, unlike Thompson, I do not object to the occasional use of the term base and superstructure even though the metaphor Marx used was not the most appropriate (see Larrain 1983). There is a danger, however, in using the term superstructure—the fact that this term has become so closely identified with a school of thought known as structural Marxism, associated with such theorists as Althusser and Balibar (1970).9 Scholars using this perspective tend to examine various aspects of human society, such as ideology or the state, only in terms of how they can serve as mechanisms that maintain an underlying ("hidden") class structure. This type of structuralist analysis, which represents a systems approach within Marxism, refers to the structures of society without referring to the actions or volitions of groups or individuals.10 Struc' For an argument for the abolition of the concept of superstructure, see Jacques Chevalier (1981, chap. i). 8 The base (or infrastructure) versus superstructure distinction reflects one of the basic assumptions or tenets of Marxism; Marxist scholars are primarily interested in focusing on the economic class structure of human society, and they assign greater causal weight to economic factors in explaining the direction of social change. However, none but the most vulgar Marxist theorists would try to predict what type of art, music or political ideology will be associated with a particular class structure or mode of production. Just look at the great variety of governments (from republican to constitutional monarchy) and state ideologies (from democracy to corporatism) that have been associated with modern industrial capitalism. » For a sophisticated anthropological application of the Marxist structuralist approach, see Jonathan Friedman (1974). '" Such a structuralist Marxist approach, despite its use of radical language and dislike of capital-

Ethnicity and Class

25

rural Marxists do not look at those aspects of ethnicity or other social phenomena that may be dysfunctional for the class structure, nor do they seem to allow for the possibility of slow, gradual changes in the system as a whole as a result of the ongoing process of class conflict (see Larrain 1983, 45). The Dialectic Between Determinism and Voluntarism The analysis of the economic class structure and other aspects of human society at any particular point in time must be combined with a historical or diachronic perspective. We should examine human society as an ongoing process involving the actions of class agents within the possibilities and constraints of the broader socioeconomic structure as well as a given (inherited) set of cultural symbols. Hamza Alavi (1975, 2-3), quoting Lucien Goldman, has referred to such a perspective as a dialectical approach that transcends a purely voluntarist approach (which focuses on certain groups or classes as the subjects of history) and the equally one-sided determinist approach represented by the structural Marxists. Such a dialectical approach, already discussed in the introduction, will be used to examine the relationship between class conflict and ethnicity in the region of Huejutla. Common class actions in regions characterized by a high level of prejudice and discrimination usually involve both the affirmation and reinterpretation of ethnic identities. In the process of participation in broader class struggles, lower class members of stigmatized ethnic groups may transform an inferiority complex into a new, positive identity of ethnic pride, emphasizing certain aspects of their culture or history. In his later writings, Stavenhagen (1980, 18) argues that lower class members of a stigmatized minority could initiate their own political struggle, which, if successful, could alter class relations. Such a struggle would be simultaneously a class conflict and a struggle between opposing ethnic groups, at least for those members of the subjugated minority who equate their class struggle with a fight on behalf of their ethnic group. Stavenhagen and other authors, including Lourdes Arizpe (1978, 212), have thus underlined the importance of distinguishing between the negative aspects of ethnic identity (whether as a stereotype used by a class of exploiters or as the internalization of such a stereotype by their victims) and a positive identity by lower class members of a stigmatized ethnic minority. ism, is not really that different from "bourgeois" structural-functionalism. Like structural-functionalism, structural Marxism only looks at various components of society in terms of how these components function for the maintenance of the system as a whole (see also Barrett 1984, 89).

26

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

The manner in which class and ethnicity are interrelated and become mutually transformed, however, includes a number of scenarios other than those discussed by Stavenhagen. Upper class members of a stigmatized ethnic group could also use a more positive ethnic identity to reinforce and extend their own class position. This happened in parts of rural Mexico, with the emergence of a new Indian elite, as will be seen later. In such cases, the development of class conflicts among members of the same subordinate ethnic group could lead to a more rapid assimilation of the lower class members into the national culture in order to escape the control of a specific, ethnically based, regional elite. Alternatively, people belonging to the same ethnic group but engaged in internal class conflicts may also emphasize different aspects of their common ethnicity or disagree about how certain institutions should operate and how traditional laws should be interpreted. For example, in the Middle East, especially Lebanon, class divisions within Christian and Muslim groups are an important ingredient (and possibly even the prime cause) of an ongoing civil war (Baaklini 1983, 21). Both intra- and interclass dynamics can operate at the same time. This is what happened in the region of Huejutla. An adequate theory of class conflict in ethnically diverse regions, taking into account both inter- and intraethnic dimensions, should recognize all of these possibilities." The phenomenon of ethnicity and cultural diversity offers a unique opportunity for researchers who want to understand the complex process of social class formation and class conflict. The investigation of overt class conflict in plural societies—conflicts that may have both inter- and intraethnic dimensions—makes it necessary to go beyond the base-superstructure model as well as mechanistic models of class conflict. Ethnicity, however, is but one of several factors that influence or shape the form and outcome of class struggles. In the region of Huejutla it was also necessary to examine the role played by education, the religious beliefs shared by members of both ethnic groups, different forms of village administration (which do not always correspond to ethnic differences) and the law as it relates to land tenure in both Indian and Mestizo communities. In the process of class struggle, people on opposing sides modified previous identities, interpreted the rules of their society in different ways and developed a new language of domination or resistance. One cannot expect that the outcome of this process will always look the same. 11

Other possibilities, which have been explored by Edna Bonacich (1972; 1973; 1980), include the development of interethnic conflicts between a better-paid "labor aristocracy" and immigrant workers willing to work for lower wages, or ethnic conflicts involving competition among rival business elites.

Chapter 2

The Closed Corporate Peasant Community: Indian Identity and the Peasant Economy

The model or concept of the closed corporate peasant community was introduced by Eric Wolf twenty-five years ago. In his classic articles, cited by every anthropologist or historian writing about Indian communities in rural Mexico, Wolf (1955; 1957) described the closed corporate community as one that is egalitarian, with effective leveling mechanisms that prevent or at least attenuate the emergence of significant wealth differences or internal exploitation. This model quickly became accepted by both social scientists and historians doing research in Mesoamerica,1 although Eric Wolf (1986, 325) himself has recently stated that his original papers "now seem overly schematic and not a little naive." Wolf also objects to the manner in which many anthropologists, including recent critics, have misinterpreted his original work. These misinterpretations, however, together with the more schematic aspects of his earlier work, are similar to a set of perceptions about Indian communities held by the majority of radical politicians, government officials and the educated public in Mexico. These perceptions, which continue to influence public policy and political strategy in Mexico today, need to be critically examined in the light of both recent historical and anthropological research.

The Literature on Mesoamerican Indian Communities

When Eric Wolf proposed the term closed corporate peasant community to describe one of several types of structural relationships in rural Mesoamerica, he included in his definition many of the features already identified by previous researchers, including Sol Tax (1937), in primarily Indian communities 1

The year after Wolf developed his model, Manning Nash (1958) started using Wolf's terminology in his analysis of rural Guatemala. See also Andros Medina Hernandez's recent article (1983).

28

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

in southern Mexico and northwestern Guatemala.2 Such features were a form of internal social organization known as the civil-religious hierarchy (also known as the mayordomia system), village endogamy and community jurisdiction over the disposal of land. According to Wolf (1957, 12), these institutions or customs, together with institutionalized witchcraft and an emphasis on conformity, operate to ' 'equalize the life chances and life risks of its members." The key institution responsible for maintaining equality within the closed corporate community is the civil-religious hierarchy, whereby "the community at one and the same time levels differences in wealth which might intensify class divisions within the community" (1955, 458). Wolf also suggests that the evolution of a system of administration, separate from the wider society, may likewise have served to promote egalitarianism. Wolf's distinction between closed and more open, usually Mestizo (Spanish-speaking) peasant communities resembled earlier typologies, such as Redfield's rural-urban continuum (1941) and Camara's "centrifugal" versus "centripetal" villages (1952). However, Wolf went further than his predecessors by specifying the historical circumstances that gave rise to these different types of peasant communities. Wolf argued that the closed corporate community was a product of European colonialism and the subsequent expansion of mercantile capitalism into Latin America. Although originally created by the Spanish conquerors, many of the institutions of the closed corporate community (which were superimposed on already existing prehispanic institutions) were subsequently modified or redefined by the Indians themselves as part of a set of defensive strategies to mitigate the impact of external forces.3 The Corporate Indian Peasant Community and Acculturation

Wolf suggested that a separate Indian identity and the culture on which it is based is closely tied to the survival of the closed corporate community, although he does not clearly specify that the closed corporate community is always Indian. Neither did he discuss the possibility that the open Mestizo community, which depends to a greater degree on the production of cash crops, might be transformed into a closed corporate community with the loss of a cash market (Rhodes 1972,17). However, Wolf (1955,456) did mention 2 Part of this chapter is a revised version of an article published by the Journal of Anthropological Research (see Schryer 1987b, 99-120). 3 Wolf (1957) pointed out that peasant communities with the same internal structure, albeit with different values and institutions, also evolved in response to colonial expansion in Java.

The Closed Corporate Community

29

that the development of private forms of land tenure, cash crops and greater internal class differentiation would result in the assimilation of the members of Indian communities into the national culture, because the persistence of Indian culture depends on the maintenance of a closed corporate structure. Following this line of reasoning, closed corporate communities could only survive in the most remote areas with few opportunities for capital investment. Many scholars have since equated the corporate peasant community with remote Indian regions that are primarily geared to subsistence agriculture and local crafts. This version of the model includes the notion that cultural values and certain types of village institutions either reflect or help to reinforce and maintain an egalitarian social structure. One would not expect internal class differences to develop as long as such values and institutions persist, or, if a class structure did emerge, the closed corporate community would quickly disappear. Most Mexican as well as American scholars since Wolf have subscribed to this model of social change and acculturation. For example, in his earlier writings, Rodolfo Stavenhagen predicted the disappearance of a distinct Indian culture and a separate identity with the gradual expansion of capitalist relations into hitherto isolated, noncapitalist rural regions. This process of acculturation and linguistic assimilation is referred to as one of ladinoization or mestizaje. While at least one author, Robert Shadow (1985, 526), does allow for the possibility of the survival of a strong indigenous (tepecano) identity despite such cultural and linguistic assimilation, he too holds that the preservation of a separate Indian identity is intrinsically linked to the preservation of a traditional, noncapitalist mode of production (based on communal land tenure). Shadow also agrees with other authors that more capitalist forms of production, including commercial agriculture, will bring about a loss of an Indian identity. Most students of ethnic relations in Mesoamerica since Stavenhagen (Margolies 1975; Arizpe 1978) continue to associate Indianness with the absence of the institution of wage labor and a low level of commodity production. These scholars continue to take at face value the egalitarian ethos of Indian communities and such institutions as communal land tenure, as described by ethnographers. These researchers, who critically analyze the unjust nature of Mexico's socioeconomic system on the macro level or even in rural Mestizo villages, tend to romanticize Indian communities. While they have no trouble recognizing that a national ideology, based on revolutionary slogans, masks a system characterized by increasing polarization of wealth differences and regional disparities, such scholars continue to believe that the culture of Indian communities effectively prevents the emergence of significant class dif-

30

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

ferences (see also Pozas and Pozas 1971, 38). This position is becoming increasingly less tenable in the light of both historical research and evidence from contemporary Indian communities.

Historical Evidence for Class Differences in Corporate Indian Communities The first modifications of the closed corporate community model came from colonial historians, who challenged the notion that the prehispanic village elite, or lesser nobility among the Indians, disappeared at the beginning of the colonial era.4 These historians, including William Taylor, Woodrow Borah, Eric Van Young, James Lockhart and John Tutino, have established the importance of class differences within Indian towns, known as Indian republics {republicas de indios) throughout the colonial era. In many places, a group of Indian leaders (called principales), claiming to be descendants of the lesser Aztec nobility, monopolized the local public posts established under Spanish rule. These leaders, known as caciques,5 accumulated wealth and owned real or de facto private estates^ within the communal boundaries of the communities they controlled. The basis of both the economic and political power of these local elites was their ability to withhold some of the tribute they collected on behalf of the Crown as well as their involvement in regional commerce, often selling products that the members of Indian communities had to produce under a system known as repartimiento. Compared to the Spanish landowning elite and the merchants who lived in Mexico City, the Indian caciques who lived in small towns and villages were certainly not fantastically wealthy or powerful. However, they were certainly wealthy and powerful in comparison with the majority of Indian peasants. Apart from control over de facto private plots of land, these upper class Indians usually owned several houses and livestock and cultivated maize and other crops with the help of day laborers (i.e., poorer villagers). Also, the amount they produced was certainly more than what they needed for their own consumption. In addition, they had access to servile labor which was part of the tribute owed by the majority of Indians who did not hold public 4

The thesis of the classless Indian community was put forward by Charles Gibson (1964,192-93) who argued that the old prehispanic rulers (tlahtoani) only survived by becoming private landowners and becoming absorbed into the Spanish ruling class while the lesser nobility, the principales, who served as native functionaries in Indian towns (pueblos), also lost most of their wealth and status. 5 The term cacique was first adopted by the Spanish from the term used by the native inhabitants of the Caribbean to designate their chiefs. This term was then applied in Mexico to refer to the Indian rulers of towns and villages who usually became low-level officials in the Spanish colonial government. Such positions were often hereditary. The meaning of the term has since changed considerably.

The Closed Corporate Community

31

posts (Tutino 1976). Evidence of internal class differences in Guatemalan Indian communities has also been presented by Severo Martinez Palaez (!975* 535-57) a s part °f his argument that the image of the "conquered race," which suffered no internal exploitation under Spanish rule, is a romantic myth. The wealthy social stratum of colonial Indian communities was certainly not a homogeneous group. The origins and social characteristics of such local elites also varied from region to region. For example, in Oaxaca, the village political entrepreneurs came from the ranks of the commoners (masehuali) rather than the Indian nobility who had already moved to provincial capitals and become absentee landowners (Taylor 1972, 41-42). The literature indicates that most, but certainly not all, of these Indian local elites were bilingual, whose use of Spanish enabled them to act as brokers between the Spanish conquerors and the Indian population. The degree of class differentiation between the Indians who held public posts and the rest of the Indian peasantry fluctuated, depending on variations in the level of population density and the type of resources that could be monopolized by local elites. Various scholars have demonstrated that this is the case for both European and Latin American agrarian history (see Ouweneel 1988, chap. 2). For example, there would have been fewer class differences in thinly populated and economically less important fringe areas. Thus, in Meztitlan (not far from the Huasteca), there is no evidence of ownership of private land by Indian caciques, nor did poor Indian peasantsfromthis region seek work as hired hands (gananes) in nearby haciendas (Osborn 1973, 230). In contrast there was much greater intravillage stratification in central, highland Mexico and in Chiapas (see Lockhart 1976; Tutino 1976; Gosner 1984). Overall, it seems that the Indian village elites became stronger during the early part of the eighteenth century but started to lose their position toward the end of the eighteenth century with the abolition of the tribute system and a series of administrative reforms carried out under the Bourbon dynasty. There is also evidence of local revolts involving physical attacks by Indians on local caciques who had abused their position as alcalde, or as occupants of other local posts, to amass wealth (Taylor 1979, 131). During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, an increasing number of subordinate villages or sujetos—who were subject to various religious or civil administrative centers or cabeceras—also sought and won independent status. In the process, these previously politically subordinate settlementsfrequentlymanaged to obtain legal titles for their share of land formerly administered by larger villages.6 6

Bernardo Garcia Martinez (1987, 294-305) has argued that such separations, which resulted in

32

T H E PEASANT COMMUNITY

Some of these historians have also started to criticize or modify the concept of the closed corporate peasant community. The complexities of colonial Mexican society, with its overlapping jurisdictions (among ecclesiastical authorities, tribute-collecting agencies and district towns theoretically in charge of land administration), plus the frequency of intravillage conflicts, has led one historian, Daniele Dehouve (1984), to question exactly which administrative or political unit corresponded to the supposedly well-defined closed corporate community.7 Chance and Taylor (1985) suggest that the civilreligious hierarchy, once thought to be the key feature of the closed corporate community, did not develop until the nineteenth century as a result of the breakdown of religious brotherhoods {cofradias) which used to administer jointly that portion of community wealth destined for both religious and tribute-collecting purposes. They point out that the introduction of private property in land and individual responsibility (promoted by a series of liberalminded governments after independence) led to the development of the system of alternating civil and religious posts, in which individual heads of households rather than village associations were responsible for sponsoring religious feasts.8 Apparently only then did the sponsorship of religious fiestas have some leveling effects, although they did not eliminate inequalities in the village level altogether. However, distinct Indian communities that had been Indian republics during the colonial era survived, albeit in a modified form. Some land also continued to be communally owned, although I suspect that discrepancies between de jure and de facto corporate land probably increased. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the class structure of Indian communities throughout Mexico underwent a further transformation, with the expansion of commercial agriculture and other forms of commodity production. Population in Mexico as a whole also increased rapidly, especially after 1875 (see Brachet 1976, 119-21). During this period, large numbers of people migrated from the drier central plateau region to northern Mexico and down to the coast. Consequently, new forms of technology were introduced in previously remote and more isolated rural areas. Wolf (1956, the creation of new cabeceras, was part of a broader tendency toward fragmentation throughout the colonial period, whereby former Indian elites, who used to control much larger political and territorial units known in prehispanic days as altepeleme, gradually lost all but a very reduced section of land and minimal control, only in local (village) affairs. 7 Anthropologists who have criticized Wolf's original model include Dow (1973) and Greenberg (1981, 5). Both of these authors have argued for the need for clearer analytical distinctions between the sociostructural and the legal aspects of peasant communities. 8 Apart from the War of Independence against Spain, the first half of the nineteenth century was characterized by constant political instability, associated with a growing split between Liberal and Conservative members of the national elite.

The Closed Corporate Community

33

1056-78) suggests that this period of rural transformation witnessed the infiltration of communal Indian villages by Mestizo outsiders and the introduction of plough cultivation. Historians have not yet systematically documented when or how a new process of class differentiation took place in Indian communities, or how much continuity there was from the late eighteenth century. Again, the extent of such internal differentiation must have varied from region to region depending on type of natural resources available and the type of cash crops or other forms of commodity production carried out. During this same period, earlier liberal legislation concerning land tenure was finally implemented in most of rural Mexico, bringing about the privatization of land tenure. However, the formal abolition of communal tenure (often no more than a legal construct) is not a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of internal class differences. A good example of an Indian community that preserved its communal land and was also highly differentiated during the Porfiriato (the period when Porfirio Diaz ruled Mexico) is Tepotztlan (in Morelos). Oscar Lewis (1963, xxiv-xxv) has described how Tepotztlan had its own Nahua intelligentsia who were strong proponents of bilingual education and who even founded two local newspapers. Many of these educated Tepotztecans were professionals who also resided in nearby Mexico City. According to Lewis (1963,127), these intellectuals all came from wellto-do cacique families who monopolized the communal lands and prevented poor peasants, who were peons, from working this land.9 The development of a class of rich, "capitalist" peasants (i.e., employers of wage laborers) in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the decade preceding the Mexican Revolution has certainly been documented in considerable detail in the case of villages that were already predominantly Spanish speaking (see Gonzales 1972; Schryer 1980). My case study will provide evidence that a similar process occurred in the Nahua villages in the region of Huejutla (see chapter 4). The implication of this new process of internal class differentiation for the further evolution of corporate Indian communities will be examined later on in this chapter. It is necessary first to take a brief look at how anthropologists who have done research in contemporary rural Mexico view both Mestizo and Indian communities. 9 Lewis does not tell us what exactly were the relations of production in Tepotztlan around the turn of the century, nor for whom the local peons worked. We do not know whether these rich Tepotztecans only served as intermediaries between the local population and the railroad company, which built a line that passed through the village, or whether they set up local business or themselves employed peons in agriculture. I suspect that the local elite in Tepotztlan, like other parts of rural Mexico, must have been farmers as well as professionals. The professionals (who still identified themselves as Indians) may have also been the offspring of well-to-do Nahua farmers or merchants.

34

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

Anthropological Views of Rural Mexico in the Twentieth Century Long before Wolf started writing about Mexico, anthropologists working in rural Mexico had already developed the model of the egalitarian rural community. This anthropological model, which is quite different from the picture of rural villages painted by recent historians, reflects the economic and social circumstances of most independent (nonhacienda) villages in the period following the Mexican Revolution. When Robert Redfield (1930)—the pioneer of anthropological fieldwork in rural Mexico—did hisfieldworkin Tepotztlan in the twenties (twenty years before Lewis), the local caciques had been overthrown and there was much less class differentiation. Not only had regional elites fled to the cities, but the visible wealth differences between rich and poor peasants had been obliterated in many places as a result of widespread physical destruction of buildings and the need to supply food and provisions to various revolutionary armies during more than a decade of civil war.IO The impact of war, as well as disease, hurt all the economic strata of peasant communities alike. When the revolution was over, there were far fewer people on the land. Those who remained received additional land from nearby landed estates that had been expropriated by the government. The village poor were thus in a much stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis both local landowners and village elites when it came to wages or sharecropping arrangements." The lessening of social and economic class differences in rural villages in this part of Mexico during the postrevolutionary period, which is briefly mentioned by Lewis (1963, xxvi) in the preface of his book, can account for the romantic and idyllic notion that the peasant village (at that time usually Indian) was classless. By the time Lewis did his restudy in the forties, Tepotztlan was well on its way to becoming completely Mestizo, although many older people still spoke Nahuatl. His data on unequal landownership as well as wealth differences and factionalism were subsequently used by various scholars to debunk Redfield's (1934; 1941) concept of the idyllic "folk society," developed after his research in other remote rural communities in Yucatan. Anthropologists doing 10 For a description of the chaos and economic dislocation caused by the revolution in the neighboring state of San Luis Potosi, which includes a large part of the Huasteca, see the case study of Romana Falcon (1984, 58-127). " Peter Coy (1971) also explains the differences between Redfield and Lewis's description of Tepotztlan in terms of the increasing demographic growth and concentration of land ownership that took place between the twenties and the forties.

The Closed Corporate Community

35

research in rural Mexico after 1945, including George Foster, together with Gabriel Ospina (1948) and Lola Romanucci-Ross (1973), tended to focus on interpersonal conflicts, village factionalism, family and dynamics, with a special emphasis on the corresponding value systems or underlying beliefs that enabled people to cope with their situation. As a result, they developed a different image of peasant communities (both Mestizo and Nahua) that emphasized individualism, envy, competition and feuding.12 Such traits were still seen, however, as leveling mechanisms that attenuated even if they did not completely prevent the emergence of wealth differences within peasant society. The predominant model of' 'traditional'' peasant society became that of the "Image of Limited Good," coined by George Foster (1965). Although anthropologists became increasingly interested in competition and conflict, they showed little interest in land tenure, relations of production or the broader political economy. American social anthropologists were particularly naive when it came to examining any form of internal inequality and such phenomena as the rule of caciques or caciquismo.1* With the resurgence of more critical and Marxist perspectives, however, anthropologists such as Wolf tended to focus on the interaction between state and peasant community or the largely external forms of economic exploitation and dependency (involving absentee landowners or merchants inhabiting larger urban centers) rather than examine internal class differentiation. Other researchers using a broader political economy approach reconciled the evidence for village factionalism, envy and internal strife with the cohesiveness shown by these same peasant communities during conflicts with neighboring villages or absentee landowners. For instance, Robert Rhodes (1972, chap. 7) pointed out that village solidarity as well as a high level of cooperation in some aspects of village life are not incompatible with high levels of interpersonal animosity, envy and individualism because this solidarity is largely instrumental.14 Even critical anthropologists, however, continued to emphasize how the cultural values, social institutions and factional strife of peasant communities, espe12 A similar emphasis on individualism and competition was also being used by American anthropologists doing research in other societies. See Banfield (1958). 13 Cynthia Hewitt (1982, 46) attributes this na'iveto to the limitations of the functionalist model used by such anthropologists. 14 Rhodes's analysis is analogous to what some recent historians have written about the solidarity shown by Indian villages during conflicts with outsiders in the past. Thus Eric Van Young (1984, 77) has argued that such conflicts "served the purpose of deflecting social tensions generated within village society by a tendency towards economic differentiation." While not denying this process of internal differentiation, Van Young does suggest that this process was at least kept in check or neutralized by directing any frustration or anger against outsiders.

36

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

daily Indian ones, minimized the level of internal class differentiation and prevented the development of class conflict on the village level.

Ethnographic Evidence for Class Differences in Corporate Indian Communities

Ethnographic evidence contradicting the model of the egalitarian, classless Indian community wasfirstpresented by anthropologists in the sixties. Frank Cancian (1956), who studied the economic behavior of Tzotzil Indian farmers in southern Mexico, showed how participation in ritual posts did not level wealth differences, and how such wealth differences continued over generations. He argued that institutions that may look like leveling mechanisms were not incompatible with economic stratification, although he did not define such economic stratification in Marxist terms. Further evidence for internal class differentiation was provided by Robert Wasserstrom (1983), who applied the theory of dependency to the same region where Cancian and others had done their research. The data he presents on the accumulation of capital by wealthier Indians after 1920 and their extraction of surplus through the wage labor of poor Indians effectively destroy the picture of equally downtrodden peasants living in egalitarian villages. Pierre Durand's study (1975) of an Indian village in Puebla provides still more evidence that the civil-religious hierarchy, thought to be a leveling mechanism, in fact reinforces class differences. However, Durand and other anthropologists who have applied a more orthodox Marxist framework of analysis in their study of both Mestizo and Indian villages do not address Indian identity or ethnicity as a separate issue (Gold 1977). Other studies examining class differences in Indian villages have mainly focused on the origins of such differentiation after the revolution. Paul Friedrich's study (1970; 1986) of several Tarascan villages in Michoacan showed how a village elite reemerged after the Mexican revolution when former peasant leaders monopolized both economic and political power. The survival of the culture and institutions of such Indian communities, despite their rapid integration into a modern market economy, led Friedrich (1962) to coin the term "open corporate village." Lourdes Arizpe (1978, 145) likewise describes how Indian communities with such open economies emerged after Mazahua communities received access to fertile land through land reform in the 1930s. Not only did the majority of these Mazahua communities get involved in commercial agriculture, but Indian strongmen, or modern ca-

The Closed Corporate Community

37

ciques,15 allied to a more powerful Mestizo elite, became commercial middlemen. She points out that poorer Indians tolerated and even supported such caciques from their own communities because these strongmen (who constituted a small Indian segment of the rural bourgeoisie) protected the traditional customs and integrity of Mazahua communities. According to Arizpe, these customs provided some measure of defense against a hostile Mestizo world. However, rather than focusing on the development of a rural Indian elite, Arizpe (p. 200) spends more time examining how cultural distinctiveness enhances the subordination of Indians as a whole in a society increasingly based on urbanization and industrialization. Her primary interest is the migration of Indians to nearby Mexico City and the role of ethnicity outside of the village setting. Arizpe argues that an emphasis on conformity and distribution of wealth prevents the accumulation of capital and the development of new class differences among the Mazahuas today. She does not explain, however, why such sanctions did not prevent the emergence of wealthy Mazahua entrepreneurs on the village level. Thus, while showing clearly how one aspect of Mexican national culture (i.e., their interpretation of Indian cultural traits) affects the life chances of people of Mazahua descent, Arizpe is unclear when it comes to analyzing the relationship between culture and the peasant economy inside Mazahua villages. Before presenting such an analysis of the relationship between the economic class structure and the cultural and institutional features of the Indian peasant community, I will first provide some numerical data relating to class differentiation in a Nahua village of Huejutla. These data were collected in a survey of economically active males in a medium-sized Nahua village called Tlalchiyahualica, located in the municipio of Yahualica.l6 Apart from having a large percentage of monolingual Nahua peasants, this village still appointed mayordomos who were solely responsible forfinancingreligious fiestas, used a system of toponyms and was highly endogamous (see chapter 3). Technically at least, most of its land was also held in a corporate (i.e., communal) 15 The use of the term cacique in twentieth-century Mexico, which in most cases refers to nonIndians who combine economic and political power (including the use of armed force), has pejorative connotations. The corresponding system of caciquismo, however, has strong elements of paternalistic control, which gives it at least some degree of legitimacy among a segment of the rural population subject to the authority of such strongmen (see Friedrich 1965). 16 This survey consisted of a questionnaire containing thirty questions which was administered by the author in the Nahuatl language. The questionnaire was tested in 1981 and then applied in 1982. Interviews were first conducted through house-to-house visits (over a two-month period) and later continued during a communal work party and follow-up visits in 1983. The results were printed in a report left with village authorities and local school teachers (see Schryer 1985a).

38

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

manner. However, its village elite had also retained most of its economic and political power at the time of my stay.

The Class Structure of a Nahua Village in the 1980s My survey of Ήalchiyahualica covered well over 95 percent of the eco­ nomically active males.17 Of 283 peasants interviewed, 187 (66.1 percent) were primarily day laborers who derived most of their income from seasonal employment in the agricultural sector (both inside and outside of the village), although all of these men also cultivated small corn plots for subsistence. Another 25 men (8.8 percent) said that bricklaying or construction work was their primary occupation, while 53 informants (18.8 percent) were mainly farmers who cultivated both cash crops and maize and beans (primarily used for household consumption). Finally, there were 3 craftsmen (carpenters or barbers), 4 merchants, 7 school teachers (some of whom worked in other villages) and 4 clerical workers who worked in the state capital or in Mexico City but frequently returned to visit their families who lived in the village. In 1982 terms of monetary income, these men earned from a low of two thou­ sand pesos to over thirty thousand pesos a month (when the minimum of five kilos of corn a day needed by the average family cost fifty pesos). A breakdown of occupational specialization and monetary income, how­ ever, is not a good indicator of the economic class structure. For this it is necessary to look at the distribution of ownership or access to the means of production (see table 1). Only 8 men (2.8 percent) "owned" (i.e., actually controlled) between 20 and 40 hectares of land, not including additional prop­ erties which some of these men had bought inside the boundaries of neigh­ boring villages (and which they had all lost prior to 1975 as a result of land invasions by both Nahuatl and Spanish-speaking peasants from other com­ munities). Next, 27 peasants (9.5 percent) had between 10 and 19 hectares of land, and 75 (26.5 percent) had less than 10 hectares. This leaves 61.2 per­ cent, or 173 able-bodied men, who did not have any real control over (nor legally own) any land whatsoever. Prior to 1978, when thefirstland takeovers took place in Tlalchiyahualica, these landless peasants only had access to a small reserve of communal land consisting of mainly eroded hillsides or small patches of forest located a considerable distance from the village. Many of 17 Although I tried to cover the entire population of adult males, I missed a small percentage of names on the comprehensive list compiled with the cooperation of village authorities. These missing cases consisted of men who were either sick, working outside of the village or simply not available to answer my questions on the many occasions I made my rounds.

The Closed Corporate Community

39

TABLE 1

Ownership of Means of Production and Class Structure in Tlalchiyahualica Ownership ofproductive property Land (privately owned)

Cattle

Hogs

Coffee trees

Those without land Less than 10 hectares 10 to 19 hectares 20 to 40 hectares Total Those who have none Less than 10 head 10 to 30 head More than 30 head Total Those who have none 1 to 5 hogs More than 5 hogs Total Those who have none Less than 100 trees 100 to 299 trees 300 to 500 trees Total

Number 173 75 27 8 283 234 43 5 1 283 135 140 8 283 106 85 77 15 283

Percentage 61.2 26.5 9.5 2.8 100.0 82.7 15.2 1.8 0.3 100.0 47.7 49.5 2.8 100.0 37.5 30.0 27.2 5.3 100.0

Overall class structure Day laborers (who also practice subsistence cultivation) Intermediate stratum of peasant farmers and skilled craftsmen Rich peasant!i and professionals (e.g., teachers) who employ laborers Total

189

66.2

77

27.7

17 283

6.1 100.0

these peasants also cultivated corn plots on land owned by other people in return for rents paid in the form of either cash or labor. About half of these land-poor peasants, who subsequently received usufruct rights to about a quarter of a hectare of land as a result of their participation in three consecutive land invasions (of ranches owned by outsiders), were not counted as owners of land. In terms of other productive property, 32.5 percent of those surveyed had small sugar cane patches, 18 percent had horses or mules and only 17.3 percent owned any cattle at that time. Even among these rural property owners, who could be considered' 'real'' peasant producers as opposed to day laborers (jornaleros), there were considerable wealth differences. For instance, the wealthiest man in Tlalchiyahualica (who spoke Nahuatl and wore the tradi-

4O

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

tional home-sewn cotton shirt) owned an entire block of village houses (some of which he rented out to local schoolteachers), a cantina (Mexican bar), and about fifty head of cattle, which grazed in his privately owned pasture located within the original communal land boundaries of the village. At the other end of the socioeconomic scale were poor peasants who had to combine subsistence cultivation with seasonal wage employment, including 135 peasants (47.7 percent) who did not even own a single pig at the time of my survey, 106 (37.5 percent) who did not own any coffee trees and 86 (30 percent) who had not been able to plant a single banana tree, which thrive in the climatic conditions of this region. These very poor peasants had to work for wages for both outsiders and the wealthier peasants in their own village. Peasants who also worked as bricklayers and craftsmen or who had at some time or another worked as factory workers or miners in other regions represented a kind of "middle" peasantry who were a notch above the day laborers in terms of socioeconomic position. Members of this middle stratum occasionally hired their poorer neighbors for odd jobs or to help them in their own cornfields (milpas). Combining the criteria of monetary income, access to the means of production and employment of wage labor (versus working for others), one could divide the male population of Tlalchiyahualica into three categories: an upper class of rich peasants and several teachers (some of whom were also engaged in agricultural or who had set up stores); an intermediate stratum of small, basically self-employed cultivators, craftsmen or skilled workers and a lower class of day laborers who also cultivated small corn plots. Table 1 shows that these three categories represented 6.1, 27.7, and 66.2 percent respectively of the total number of men surveyed. However, the economic differences between the bottom two strata reflected more a process of demographic (than class) differentiation, following the life cycle of families with different worker/consumer ratios along the lines set forth by Chayanov (1966). Most of the peasants of Tlalchiyahualica work as day laborers at some time in their lives and later become more involved in small commodity production. Both the poor and middle strata also depend on subsistence cultivation to supplement the income they receive from other sources. This occupational multiplicity is a common feature of a new type of peasantry in Mexico today as portrayed by Arturo Warman (1979) and Armando Bartra (1981). Those men in Tlalchiyahualica whom I have classified as "rich peasants" do, however, represent members of a separate economic class whose interests are not only different but incompatible with those of the rest of the community. This analytical division corresponds to the actual lines of political cleavage when class conflicts emerged in Tlalchiyahualica. Not only were these rich peasants

The Closed Corporate Community

41

labeled as los ricos ("the rich") by the poor peasants; none of them agreed with or participated in local land invasions. In terms of intergenerational economic mobility, which indicates how this class structure has changed over time, most men (69.9 percent) seem to have belonged to approximately the same class as their fathers. Of the remaining who were able to provide sufficient information to place their fathers into one of the three categories mentioned above, more men had experienced intergenerational downward mobility than the other way around. Those who experienced upward economic mobility included several schoolteachers whose fathers had been either poor or middle peasants. There was also a weak correlation between age and economic class position; that is, older men were more likely to be self-employed peasant cultivators or craftsmen, again indicating the operation to some extent of Chayanovian principles. Finally, women, who were not included in my survey,18 generally seemed to fit into the same socioeconomic stratum as their husbands or grown-up children. There were few women traders or artisans as in other parts of the region. The economic class structure of Tlalchiyahualica outlined above was similar to that of villages of comparable size that had not witnessed the physical expulsion orflightof wealthy peasants. Prior to the outbreak of land takeovers in the seventies, all of the Nahua villages or towns of the same size as or bigger than Tlalchiyahualica had anywhere from five to fifteen people who could be classified as belonging to my category of "rich peasant." The class position of such rich peasants, who either owned their own small estates (ranchos) or controlled a disproportionate share of the village commons, did not differ substantially from that of the majority of Mestizo rancheros who have received so much attention in the recent literature (see Jacobs 1980; Knight 1986,2, 100). These wealthy Indians constituted a village elite who dominated both the political and the economic life of their own and surrounding, smaller Nahua communities. For example, just two or three Nahua families controlled most of the arable land in such traditional, predominantly monolingual Nahua communities as San Francisco (Huazalingo), Chililico (Huejutla) and Tecacahuaco (Atlapexco).19 There were other villages, such as Tepetitla 18 Given the local cultural norms about proper behavior with members of the opposite sex, it would have been inappropriate for me to do lengthy interviews with women in their homes or places of work in the absence of their husbands. I did ask the men, however, whether their wives had such additional sources of monetary income as running small stores, washing clothes or keeping poultry (which is considered part of the female economic domain). 19 In 1966 another researcher also did a survey to collect data on class differentiation in one of these villages (Chililico), which has since become almost a suburb of Huejutla. His results are similar to mine, although he does not mention that the wealthiest man of that village (an Indian cacique who sold most of his land to Mestizos who lived in the city of Huejutla) died about a decade prior to that

42

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

(in Yahualica) and Zitlan (Huejutla), where such wealthy Indian families not only lent money and operated retail stores but owned trucks. In contrast, in many smaller hamlets (rancherias), which were usually politically subordinate to larger Nahua communities, only poor and middle peasants were represented.20

A Theory of Indian Culture and the Peasant Economy Anthropologists conductingfieldworkin Indian communities over the past decade have started to focus much more on the relationships among the institutions, cultural values and type of economic class structure described above. It is gradually becoming apparent that the process of acculturation, ethnic identity and socioeconomic structures to a larger extent vary independently. For example, Marie-Noelle Chamoux (1981), who carried out an in-depth study of a Nahua village in the state of Puebla, shows how a village that has an "open" economy can maintain an Indian language as well as a separate ethnic identity. By including additional data on another Indian village in the same region, she also provides evidence that communities with poorer resources (where people combine subsistence corn cultivation with migratory labor) may even be less traditional in terms of dress and language than more prosperous villages whose economy revolves around the commercial production of tomatoes, using fertilizers and other expensive inputs (Chamoux 1981, 193-96). The more traditional village she studied is moreover located closer to Mestizo urban centers. This lack of correspondence between the maintenance of traditional cultural values and proximity of urban centers has been noted by other students of rural Mexico (see De Walt 1975, 101; Margolies 1975, 62). Another aspect of the older model of the corporate Indian community that has come under attack is the idea that the presence of Mestizos inevitably leads to the loss of a separate Indian identity and the breakdown of communal institutions. The earlier literature gives the impression that the arrival of nonIndian outsiders and their ability to manipulate the institutions of Indian communities meant the death sentence for the closed corporate peasant community. But the presence of such outsiders does not always lead to acculturation or the breakdown of corporate structures. Again, colonial historians, includsurvey. The class differences he describes for Chililico were thus even greater in the forties and fifties (see Vergnes 1976). 20 This was certainly the case in the small hamlet of Olma (near the town of Yahualica) where I conducted a smaller survey of only fifteen families in 1981.

The Closed Corporate Community

43

ing Tutino (1976, 185), have documented the presence of non-Indians who live inside the boundaries of Indian republics, although this was technically not allowed.21 In the case of Huejutla it will be seen that there was likewise a tremendous range of variation in terms of the presence of Mestizos in Indian communities and the type of relationships between such outsiders and different strata of the Indian population. There thus seems to be no clear correlation between the number of Mestizos who live in predominantly Indian communities and the rate of acculturation. While many aspects of Wolf's original model have been rejected, some anthropologists (Harris 1964, 25-34; Durand 1975) replaced the old orthodoxy with an equally one-sided emphasis on the class-preserving function of the civil-religious hierarchy and other aspects of Indian peasant communities. Such authors only look at how these Indian institutions and values maintain and reproduce rather than attenuate exploitation and inequality, arguing that the egalitarian ethos, the emphasis on conformity, endogamy and sanctions against conspicuous consumption, legitimize internal class differences or facilitate the extraction of surpluses from the community as a whole by outsiders. Recent writers, however, are coming to a consensus that the civil-religious hierarchy, or its subcomponents, may serve very different functions, from leveling mechanisms to a means of extracting surpluses from the peasant economy. This dual role has been analyzed in detail by James Greenberg's study (1981, 21) of a Chatino village in Oaxaca. Wolf (1986, 327) has also recently recognized the multiplicity of functions of the civil-religious hierarchy and talks about the need to study participation in this and other institutions of the corporate peasant community "as expressions of different interests and aspirations embodied in cultural forms." Theflexibilityand multidimensional nature of many aspects of the peasant community can explain the resilience of a set of uniquely Indian institutions and a separate Indian identity. Chamoux (1981, 370-72) suggests that villages will remain Indian not because of their geographical isolation or the maintenance of a subsistence economy but because the institutions and cultural values associated with Indianness simultaneously serve the interests of quite different economic strata within the village. For example, village endogamy and communal institutions can provide security and other advantages for the village poor, while the use of traditional dress and sanctions against conspicuous consumption allow the wealthy, entrepreneurial villagers to ac21

Bernardo Garcia Martinez (1988) has also discovered that in the colonial period, some legally designated Indian communities were actually towns inhabited by a majority of non-Indians (Mestizos or blacks who were members of castas) who learned how to operate within the legal structures designed for "Indian republics."

44

T H E PEASANT COMMUNITY

cumulate more capital while masking or legitimizing differences in class interests. Florencia Mallon (1988, 341-42) has shown how a similar coincidence of class interests can explain why both wealthy and poor peasants in Peru's central highlands had a stake in preserving community solidarity (although not one based on ethnicity): the righ peasants depended on traditional relations of reciprocity for access to labor and political power while the poor appealed to the ideology of communalism and reciprocity to protect their access to resources needed for subsistence." However, a common ideology of communalism (whether in an Indian or a Mestizo community) does not completely eliminate social tensions resulting from opposing class interests. For example, Chamoux's case study demonstrates how a system of taxation whereby all community members contribute the same amount, regardless of income, is a constant source of dissatisfaction and complaint by poorer peasants. This internal dynamic of class tension has been part of the corporate Indian community since its appearance under colonial rule. For example, in an article about Indian villages in the Guadalajara region in the late colonial period, Eric Van Young (1984, 79) points out that village elites and the mass of peasants each sought to preserve their communal landholding villages for very different purposes: the rich in order to eventually enter the non-Indian society and the poor to resist their proletarianization. But, unlike Van Young, I do not think that the eventual demise of these communal landholding villages was the result only of "changes afoot in the society as a whole." While the broader political economy certainly plays a crucial role, external forces cannot by themselves explain why some communities manage to retain their culturally distinct features and a separate ethnic identity while others (in the same locality) become transformed into completely "open," Mestizo villages. I think Chamoux's model can be applied to peasant communities in general as long as we clearly distinguish between ethnicity per se and communal or corporate institutions (regardless of their cultural connections). The crucial factor in attempting to explain social or cultural change is the nature and outcome of village class conflicts, although the level of intensity of such conflicts must in turn be related to local ecological and demographic variables, as suggested by Thomas Sheridan (1988, xviii) in his study of a Mestizo corporate community in northwestern Mexico. Local class conflicts, which usually take the form of day-to-day negotiation over cultural values and institutions— 22 Mallon (1983, 10) stresses that the communities she studied were no longer Indian or corporate in the classic sense by the beginning of the nineteenth century, although she points out in her conclusion (p. 342), that a communal ideology and "the viability of community" were maintained into the twentieth century.

The Closed Corporate Community

45

whereby each side interprets the ethnically distinct institutions and values according to his or her own interests—would most frequently take the form described by James Scott (see introduction). Day-to-day class struggles over communal ideology and corporate structures have also been described by Mallon (1983, chap. 8) for Mestizo peasant villages in the highland of Peru. There is no reason why such an internal class dynamic should be any different in Indian as opposed to Mestizo peasant communities, although its form and outcome might not be the same. The dynamics of such local-level class relations (the local balance of power, if you will) is in turn is much influenced by the broader (national or international) system. I suspect that a quiet class struggle between poor peasants and rich peasants may intensify and become more overt when the local economy undergoes rapid change as a result of the introduction of new technology, population pressure or the penetration of forces associated with modern forms of capitalism.23 The question still remains, however, what type of class dynamics would cause a transformation in ethnic status of an entire community (but not its neighbor)? According to Chamoux, a peasant community is more likely to remain an Indian village (with unique cultural features as well as a separate administrative structure) as long as its Indian status serves the interests of both the wealthier and the poorer stratum of village society, regardless of the presence of internal strife. Certainly this would be even more the case if this state of affairs also served the needs of non-Indians who require access to the labor provided by community members. Under such circumstances, poor Indians who are forced to stay at home (for whatever reason) would not likely become Mestizos, even if they wanted to do so, given the unequal distribution of power. Rapid cultural as well as structural assimilation would be more likely if external economic forces simultaneously obliterated the village elite and more thoroughly proletarianized the rest of the peasantry, as happened in El Salvador and in much of eastern Guatemala (see Smith 1984). Under such circumstances, the peasant community would more likely become Mestizo, and the poor peasants would have to adopt a new type of social discourse based on a different set of symbols as well as a different language. Would poor peasants, however, automatically lose the battle to preserve a distinct identity and to maintain a separate set of village institutions, if such a strategy of cultural survival served their class interests? And if they did win this battle, would they want to preserve exactly the same local institutions or rules that were in place in the past? These were the questions I wanted to 23

Carol Smith (1984, 213-16) has shown how, under certain circumstances, external economic forces may also decrease the level of village class differentiation.

46

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

answer with my research on a rare occurrence of overt internal class conflict in Indian communities in Huejutla. None of the anthropologists cited so far had the opportunity to observe directly and investigate the eruption of open and widespread (as opposed to covert or sporadic) class struggles in ethnically diverse regions in Mesoamerica. However, at least one scholar, Robert Wasserstrom (1975), did reinterpret ethnographic data collected by other authors in Indian villages in Guatemala toward the end of the Guatemalan Revolution (which was aborted in 1954). Many of his conclusions about intraethnic political factionalism in Indian regions—especially in regard to the differential participation of poor versus rich Indian peasants—resemble what I observed in the region of Huejutla twenty years later. Jim Handy (1988) has analyzed these same events in Guatemala on the basis of additional archival research. Although his conclusions are somewhat different from those of Wasserstrom, many of his comments on the impact of that revolution on Indian corporate peasant communities are also similar to my analysis of Huejutla. Like Handy, I tried to find out whether the unique cultural values and social institutions associated with Indian peasant communities could survive the eruption of revolutionary turmoil on a much wider scale than the village or municipio. I was also interested in what happens when poor Indian peasants get involved in broader class struggles (together with their Mestizo counterparts).

Open Class Conflict in the Corporate Peasant Community During the peasant revolt of Huejutla in the seventies, poor peasants from many Nahua communities not only took part in land invasions directed against outsiders, but they were also involved in open (and often violent) internal class conflicts. Such overt class conflicts, which took the form of a fight over land as well as control of political posts on the village level, first erupted in the village of Pepeyocatitla, in the municipio of Yahualica.24 Here radical Nahuatl-speaking peasants confronted not only absentee Mestizo businessmen who had gained possession of a section of land within the original communal boundaries, but Nahuatl-speaking Indians who were merchants and cattle producers. 14

I conducted extensive interviews with many of the peasants who had participated in this struggle during a one-month stay in the village of Pepeyocatitla in May 1984. I also spoke to some of the former Nahua landowners who now live in other locations.

The Closed Corporate Community

47

In 1971, a group of poor peasants who had access only to a badly eroded hillside invaded a pasture belonging to the richest Nahua family in Pepeyocatitla. Several of these agrarian peasants also got involved in fist fights with members of the local elite, but they managed to maintain possession of the land they had invaded by working it collectively. Two years later violence escalated when plainclothes policemen (judiciales) appeared at the scene of the first land invasion (where the peasants were already planting corn) to investigate alleged sympathies of local agrarian leaders with guerrillas operating in the region. A clash between the police, armed with rifles, and machetewielding Indian women resulted in the death of a policemen. This incident led to harsh repression of radical villagers by the army, aided by local Mestizo henchmen and the wealthier, more conservative Nahua peasants who still controlled most of the arable land belonging to Pepeyocatitla.25 Several peasants or members of their families were killed, and the rest of the radical peasants were run out of their village and subsequently found refuge in the neighboring state of Veracruz. Several years later, when massive land invasions spread across the entire region, this same group of peasants, now backed by a powerful agrarian politician, in turn expelled their wealthier Nahua neighbors and redistributed their privately owned parcels. They also took over the rest of their village lands still in the hands of merchants from the Mestizo market center of El Arenal just across the river. Similar expulsions, together with the confiscation of land owned by wealthy Nahua peasants, took place in many other villages (see parts 3 and 4). The best-known cases include San Francisco and San Pedro (Huazalingo), Cuautenahuatl (Huautla), and Tepetitla and Yahualica (Yahualica). All of these Nahua communities had elaborate religious ceremonies involving obligatory service by mayordomos and an administrative structure that included numerous topiles or helpers and messengers. Internal disputes in all of these communities were intimately bound up with conflicts between rich and poor peasants. Not only did the former generally not want to invade the properties of absentee landowners (usually local Mestizo rancheros), but they also feared that their own control over land might be eroded with a more equitable distribution of village land. Poor Nahua peasants, in turn, reinterpreted or utilized traditional Indian values to defend their class interests and to transform internal class relations. In Pepeyocatida, as elsewhere in Huejutla, an overt internal class struggle 25 A somewhat garbled account of some of these events appeared in various national newspapers several years later. See reports in La Prensa (Mexico City), May 10, 1974; Excelsior (Mexico City), May 10, 1974; and Diario (Novedades de la Tarde), June 4, 1974.

48

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

broke out when its inhabitants, who belonged to different economic classes, disagreed vehemently about how local-level institutions should operate and how traditional norms should be applied. Class conflicts were often initiated by younger, partly acculturated peasants who had worked as migratory laborers in other parts of Mexico. Such return migrants did not, however, pose a threat to the continued existence of a unique village culture or corporate institutions, as first suggested by Eric Wolf (1957, 13). Rather, militant Nahua peasants, who justified their use of direct action tactics in terms of Mexico's agrarian code (with the backing of left-wing politicians) and who challenged traditional village elites, also appealed to Nahua notions of communal land boundaries. Such peasants no longer allowed outsiders to settle or buy land in their communities. They likewise continued to insist that the prime loyalty of Nahua peasants should be to their community of origin. In Pepeyocatitla and in many other traditional Nahua communities, internal class struggle (together with the takeover of lands owned by outsiders) thus resulted in the creation or restoration of a truly egalitarian (and, in many respects, closed) type of corporate peasant community. The conflict over land and local autonomy in Nahua communities in the region of Huejutla resulted in the direct intervention of the government of Mexico and a major restructuring of both the land tenure system and the administrative structure of the region of Huejutla, as will be seen in part 4. Despite these changes, however, following a decade of overt and frequently violent class conflict, chaos, and confusion, the vast majority of corporate Nahua villages in the Huasteca (some more egalitarian, others still class-stratified as before) have survived intact. What has happened to these Nahua communities in Huejutla can be understood and explained through a careful examination of internal class dynamics. Such an approach is similar to one advocated by a colonial historian, Steve Stern (1983, 24), recently quoted in Wolf's review article (1986, 327) on the vicissitudes of the closed corporate community: the historical origins, functions, and resilience of closed corporate communities has as much to do with internal struggles among natives ("intra-native struggles linked to new class forces unleashed by colonial rule") as they did with the survival of traditions, the desires of exploiters, or the defenses of impoverished Indians against non-indigenous outsiders. Much the same could be said for the region of Huejutla over the last fifty years, with the substitution of the words "the Mexican Revolution" for "colonial rule." My case study of a peasant revolt in a Nahua region thus demonstrates that

The Closed Corporate Community

49

internally stratified corporate Indian communities embroiled in broader class struggles are susceptible to overt class conflicts between poor and rich peasants. Such local class conflicts can take the form of factional struggles within the same village or disputes between Indian town centers and their surrounding hamlets. Such local class conflicts led to the loss of some traditions typically associated with Indian communities; at the same time, other values and institutions not only survived internal class conflict but became the basis of a much more egalitarian closed corporate community as outlined by Eric Wolf.

Chapter 3 A Region of Diversity: Huejutla

The region of Huejutla, located in the northeastern part of the state of Hidalgo, forms an identifiable social, economic and political unit that sets it apart from neighboring regions in the same state. The region, whose inhabitants share a common identity and who also live within fairly well-defined geographical boundaries, gravitates around the city of Huejutla. This city (the only urban center with over ten thousand inhabitants) has the only full-service gasoline station and the only banks, hotels and movie theaters of the region. It also houses numerous government departments, including the regional offices of the Land Reform Ministry and recently built army barracks. Apart from being the administrative center, or cabecera, of the largest municipio, this small city has the only daily market place and thus serves as the major commercial center. People from other regions, such as the highlands of Hidalgo and the lowlands of Veracruz, also come to do their shopping or to visit government offices in Huejutla, but the traditional tianguis or open-air market of Huejutla serves only peasants from its own hinterland. Also, merchants who attend the various rotating, secondary markets held on specific weekdays (such as those in Santa Cruz, Jaltocan, El Arenal and Atlapexco, all towns or villages located in the region) have always obtained most of their provisions in the city of Huejutla. Moreover, all the feeder roads recently built in the region end up there. While the region of Huejutla can be defined as the physical location of a network of social interaction in both the economic and political spheres, it is quite heterogeneous in terms of cultural traits. This cultural diversity has a long history. The original native population probably included people who spoke the Huasteco and Tepehua tongues as well as Nahuatl, and even today the Nahuatl language is characterized by marked local variations (Beller and Beller 1979, vol. 2).1 The Spanish-speaking Mestizos have an even more 1 The three dialects that have been recognized (including a ItI versus a /tl/ version of Nahuatl) are mutually intelligible, and these dialect variations do not have repercussions for group loyalty (see Stiles 1982, 97-98).

A Region of Diversity: Huejutla

51

diverse background. During the three hundred years following the Spanish conquest, the area received newcomers not only of Spanish or mixed SpanishIndian descent (or Mestizos), but Europeans who spoke English, French or Italian, Arabs from Lebanon, gringos (North Americans) and native peoples from other parts of Mexico (especially Otomi merchants, locally known as xingris). This cultural diversity is also found in contiguous areas which belong to the states of Veracruz and San Luis Potosi.

The Huasteca Huejutla constitutes only a small portion of the larger semi-tropical region known as the Huasteca. This larger region, renowned for abundant vegetation, a unique style of music and cuisine and its strong regional identity, includes the northern part of the state of Veracruz, the southeastern section of the state of San Luis Potosi, the southern corner of Tamaulipas and the northeastern portion of Hidalgo.2 Purists would add a few additional slices from the states of Puebla and Queretaro (see figure 1). Culturally and geographically, Huejutla has a lot more in common with sections from these bordering states than with other parts of the state of Hidalgo to which it belongs. As a geographical region, the Huasteca can be subdivided into a low-lying plain off the Atlantic coast (the Huasteca Baja) and the piedmont and side ranges of the Sierra Madre Oriental range (Huasteca Alta). However, the transition from one zone to the other is hard to define since the latter also contains many low, rolling mountains while the former also contains numerous small intermontane valleys. Throughout the Huasteca the climate gets somewhat drier as one moves from south to north. The regional geographer Angel Bassols Batalla (1977, chap. 3) distinguishes this geographical region (defined according to purely topographical and climatic criteria) from the Huasteca as a somewhat larger prehispanic historical region (at one point dominated by Huastecan-speaking people), as a socio-cultural region and, finally, as an economic region defined in terms of interdependency. Bassols and a group of associates who did research on the Huasteca argue that, in economic terms, 2 In Spanish, La Huasteca Veracruzana, La Huasteca Potosina, La Huasteca Tamaulipefia and La Huasteca Hidalguense. Not all authors agree on exactly which parts of Hidalgo belong to the Huasteca. Herlinda Banuelos {1986, 38) defines the southern limits of the Huasteca as the highest Sierra Madre peaks located in the municipios of Zacualtipan and Molango. In an earlier study I also considered the municipios of Pisaflores, La Mision and Chapulhuacan to be part of the Huasteca of Hidalgo (see Schryer 1979). Other authors (Bassols 1977, 26) have also included the municipio of Huehuetla, which is located on the easternmost tip of the part of Hidalgo that juts out into the state of Puebla.

52

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

700 km

50 km

Tamaulipas

•J'vx

San Luis Potosi

y

\

Querotaro

|

V...

Hidalgo

FIGURE Ι . The Huasteca

A Region of Diversity: Huejutla

53

the different parts of the Huasteca as they define it have more in common with each other (and also interact more with each other) than they do with other regions of their respective states. This was even more the case prior to the expansion of a network of highways for vehicular traffic in the second half of the twentieth century. Prior to 1940, it was much easier to travel from anywhere in the Huastecas to such regional centers as the port city of Tampico in Tamaulipas or Ciudad Valles in San Luis Potosi than to any of the state capitals. Apart from oil fields in the lower parts of the Huasteca, plus fishing along the Gulf coast, the main economic activities of the Huasteca are cattle raising and agriculture. There has never been any mining of even minor significance in the region, and the manufacturing sector, mainly located in the city of Tampico, is of secondary importance. Consequently, the local elite, consisting of landowners and merchants, derive most of their income from a combination of sugar cane production, cattle raising and the cultivation or commercialization of a variety of crops, including maize, beans, chili, cotton, tobacco, chile, bananas and other tropical fruits. These agricultural activities, together with cattle production, are practiced throughout the Huasteca. The only crop that cannot be cultivated all over the Huasteca is coffee, which can only be grown in the southwestern fringe at altitudes between 300 and 600 meters above sea level. Given their common history, similar geographical and cultural characteristics and a regional economic elite engaged in much the same economic activities, it is not surprising that at various times members of local landowning families have attempted to unite the Huasteca region politically (see Meade 1949). For example, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Manuel Fernando Soto (1856), a native of the port city of Tampico, proposed the establishment of a new state. Indeed, during the short-lived empire of Maximilian of Austria, when Mexico was occupied by French forces, most of the Huasteca was actually included in a single administrative region known as the Sierra Gorda. Large parts of the Huasteca also had a de facto political unity during part of the Mexican Revolution, when General Manuel Pelaez dominated the region militarily (Falcon 1984, 100).3 Demographically, the Huasteca has a medium density of population in comparison to Mexico as a whole. Its total population in 1980 was about two million. This includes (in order of numerical importance) five ethnic groups: 3 More recently, in the twentieth century, the idea of forging a new state in the Huasteca was again resurrected by Anibal Andrade Andrade (1938; 1952), by a member of an influential family originally from Huejutla.

54

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

Spanish-speaking Mexicans (generally referred to as Mestizos), Nahuatlspeakers (also known as the Meshicas-nahuas), Huastecos, Totonacos and Otomis. In the 1970s, the Indian population, consisting of the latter four categories , represented about 21 percent of the total number of inhabitants (Bassols 1977, 125-26). This percentage is considerably higher in the southern and western portions of the Huasteca, where the vast majority of indigenous people are located. This predominantly Indian area, located in the mountainous regions along the boundaries between the states of San Luis Potosi, Hidalgo and Veracruz, is also more densely populated (if the small pockets along the coast where most of the urban population is concentrated are excluded). Although the Huasteca constitutes a single economic region, with considerable interaction across state borders, political activities have been carried out almost exclusively in the arena of state politics. The outcome of factional disputes as well as class conflicts in different parts of the Huasteca depend almost entirely on the policies and strategies of different state governments within Mexico's highly centralized political and administrative system. For example, although direct action land invasions broke out in various parts of the southern portion of the Huasteca in the 1970s, agrarian conflicts became widespread and created a political crisis only in the Huasteca of Hidalgo. And only in Hidalgo did the government carry out a massive expropriation of land. Consequently, the political boundary between Hidalgo and the states of San Luis Potosi and Veracruz is now associated with differences between contrasting sociopolitical systems, at least in the eyes of the regional elite and their supporters. The Huasteca of Hidalgo is considered to be socialist (some even say Communist territory) as opposed to the rest of the Huasteca, still characterized by free enterprise and "respect for private property." Because of such differences in political systems on the state level, my study will be restricted to the Huasteca of Hidalgo, which is practically synonymous with the district of Huejutla.

The Region of Huejutla The district of Huejutla has been a single administrative unit since approximately the beginning of the nineteenth century. Prior to the revolution, such districts had an appointed administrator called a jefepolitico, a position which was abolished with the overthrow of president and de facto dictator Porfirio Diaz. However, such regional governments survived as judicial administrative units. Today the judicial district of Huejutla consists of nine municipios

A Region of Diversity: Huejutia

55

(roughly equivalent to counties in North America): San Felipe Orizatlan, JaItocan, Huejutia, Atlapexco, Tlanchinol, Huazalingo, Yahualica, Xochiatipan and Huautla. The total population of the entire district was 158,324 people in 1970 and 191,354 in 1980 (SARH 1982). This district is served by an official called the procurador de justicia. Although the neighboring highland districts of Molango and Zacualtipan are not included in my case study of Huejutia,4 they cannot be entirely ignored in analyzing politics in the Huasteca of Hidalgo. Up until recently, merchants living in this highland region (which was also the main source of migration of Mestizos into the Huasteca prior to 1900) provided the Huasteca with many manufactured goods originating in the highland plateau, and highland politicians also wielded considerable political influence over their lowland neighbors. Not only did parts of this highland region and Huejutia once belong to the same administrative unit,5 but several prominent Mestizo families from these neighboring districts in Hidalgo continued to exercise considerable political influence over the district of Huejutia up until recently. Members of these families, who were also involved in the agrarian conflicts of the seventies, still reside in such highland towns as Xochicoatlan and Tepehuacan de Guerrero. Some of these highland municipios (Tepehuacan, Lolotla, Calnali, Molango, Xochicoatlan and Tianguistengo) were also included in the fourth electoral district, which, together with the nine municipios of the Huasteca, sent a single representative to the state legislature (Noble 1964b). Moreover, at least one state governor, Manuel Sanchez Vite, who became an influential politician and a cacique on the state level, was a native of Molango. Geographically, and in terms of economic activities, these highland districts are quite different from Huejutia. There is some overlap, however, between geographical and political or administrative boundaries. One municipio, Tlanchinol, does not really belong to the same geographical region as the rest of the district of Huejutia since it is located in the Sierra Alta region generally associated with the neighboring highland districts of Molango and Zacualtipan.6 Because of its high altitude, some agricultural and other tech4 On the basis of purely geographical criteria, parts of the municipio of Huazalingo could also be excluded, and indeed, Bassols Batalla, in his study of the Huastecas, leaves it out altogether. Much of Huazalingo, however, is practically identical to Atlapexco and Huejutia, and I have therefore not followed his example. 5 The highland district of Zacualtipan became part of the district of Huejutia in 1849 (Manzano 1922, part 1). When the state of Hidalgo was formed in 1869, the district of Huejutia also included parts of the present-day districts of Meztitlan, as well as Molango and Zacualtipan, but by 1871 Huejutia was reduced to its present size (see Garcia Uribe 1979, 32). 6 The district of Zacualtipan includes the two municipios of Tianguistengo and Zacualtipan itself

56

THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

nical agencies working in the Huasteca of Hidalgo have excluded the municipio of Tlanchinol from their area of operations. Tlanchinol also did not experience the same level of violent conflicts over land in the last two decades. For this reason I will likewise not include Tlanchinol (with its approximately twenty thousand inhabitants) in my case study focusing on agrarian struggles. On the other hand, a number of Nahua villages, such as Papatlatla and Atempa (municipio of Calnali) or Techimal, and the Mestizo town of Yatipan (both in Tianguistengo) are located in the same low-lying region as most of the district of Huejutla, even though they technically belong to the highland districts that border on Huejutla. For the purposes of this book I will therefore refer to the judicial district of Huejutla (minus Tlanchinol, plus the few low-lying Nahua communities that belong to neighboring districts of Hidalgo) as the region of Huejutla. Most of this micro region belongs to the Huasteca Alta, although sections of the municipios of Huejutla, San Felipe Orizatlan and Atlapexco also have extensions of the coastal plain considered to be part of the Huasteca Baja. The eight municipios selected for my case study vary in terms of demographic characteristics, ethnic mix and their relative economic importance (see table 2). Their respective total populations range from seven thousand to TABLE 2

Census Data on Eight Municipios in the District of Huejutla Total surface

Total

Municipio

(km1)

population

(lkm2)

Percent Indian*

Atlapexco Huautla Huazalingo Huejutla Jaltocan San Felipe Orizatlan Xochiatipan Yahualica Total

84.8 287.8 113.1 262.1 48.8

13,989 23,595 7,844 58,806 7,433

164.96 81.98 69.35 224.36 152.32

75.6 78.4 67.3 65.5 81.7

63 52 65 62 75

60.2 37.0 59.0 55.9 63.7

308.4 149.0 164.5 1,418.5

26,494 12,211 17,804 168,176

85.91 81.95 108.23 118.56

59.6 82.9 76.8 73.5

66 78 71 66.5

45.0 63.8 55.0 59.9

Population density

Percent illiterate

Percent monolingual (Nahuatl)

Source: lnstituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica, Anuario Estadistico del Estado de Hidalgo, 1987. ' Calculated as percentage of people over five years old who speak Nahuatl as their mother tongue. while the district of Molango consists of the municipios of Calnali, Lolotla, Tlahuiltepa, Xochicoatlan, Molango and Tepehuacan de Guerrero.

A Region of Diversity: Huejutla

57

almost sixty thousand (in 1980), the largest being the municipio of Huejutla. This municipio, together with that of Atlapexco and Jaltocan, is also one of the most densely populated, having between one hundred and five hundred people per square kilometer in 1970, compared to sixty to ninety-nine for the rest of the district (Bassols 1977, 88). According to the latest statistics on language use, the percentage of people who are monolingual speakers of Nahuatl, the only Indian language spoken in Huejutla today, varies from a high of 64 percent for Xochiatipan and Jaltocan to a low of 37 percent for Huautla, with Huejutla about in the middle (Marias 1986, 152). The figures on illiteracy correspond fairly closely to those on monolingualism. The municipio with the highest rate of illiteracy is the more isolated one of Xochiatipan (78 percent), followed by Jaltocan (75 percent), with Huejutla and Atlapexco about in the middle with 62 and 63 percent respectively (Matias 1986, 151). Based on my personal observations, however, people who cannot read and write include some monolingual Spanish speakers who live in a small number of predominantly Mestizo villages. Since that time the rate of illiteracy has probably declined, given the rapid expansion of the primary school system as well as several campaigns to teach literacy to adults. Each of these municipios is headed by a presidente municipal (roughly equivalent to a mayor) who is theoretically elected by the population at large. Together with an advisory council and a tax collector (who also acts as agente de ministerio publico, or representative of the judicial department), the presidente municipal administers the area under his jurisdiction with the help of one or two representatives called delegados in each of the villages or hamlets (usually referred to as rancherias) that belong to the cabecera. The term "delegado,'' however, was only introduced in 1986. Prior to that the person who held this position was called the juez, and the building (usually his own house) where he worked ajuzgado. Most people in the region have continued to use this older term. Another important position on the municipal level is that of juez menor, who is in charge of settling civil cases brought to the cabecera. In the past, this public post (called juez consiliador prior to 1986) was sometimes assigned to towns or villages other than the cabecera.7 It will later be seen that this formal system of administration, and its interaction with less formal or nonofficial methods of government and law enforcement, var7

In the recent past, larger municipios were also divided up into a number of subunits (secciones), each of which had a juez consiliador. The district office that oversees all of these minor judicial officers is called thejuzgado de primera instancia. People also come to this office to register thenlanded properties and to pay their taxes. In 1986, there was still one official who bore the title "juez consiliador" in the community of Las Piedras in a remote section of Orizatlan. However, this title now refers to the representative (or second-in-command) of the juez menor.

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ies considerably on the level of individual communities, especially in the case of predominantly Nahuatl-speaking villages.

Class and Ethnicity in the Region of Huejutla Prior to 1975, the economy of the region of Huejutla was dominated by a class of landowning farmers and ranchers who regularly employed day laborers. Apart from poor, primarily wage-earning peasants and their employers, there was also a middle stratum of better-off peasants who usually combined the cultivation of both subsistence and cash crops on a smaller scale with occasional migratory labor but who did not work as wage laborers in their home region. This middle stratum included craftsmen who were primarily self-employed and who occasionally hired day laborers to help them cultivate their own subsistence crop of maize. In addition, one could also identity a small stratum of professionals, including government functionaries, doctors, lawyers and educational workers; in the Huasteca of Hidalgo many of these professionals also owned and operated small businesses, including stores and cattle ranches. In terms of control over and access to land, capitalist farmers and ranchers owned the more fertile andflatterterrain in the region. The rest of the population (including members of both the middle strata and the poor peasants) either owned or had access to at least a tiny parcel of land in one way or another. In Huejutla, like other ethnically diverse regions of Mexico, people's position in the economic structure is strongly correlated with membership in the two major ethnic groups. There are many fewer professionals (doctors and lawyers) whose mother tongue is Nahuatl, just as there are fewer Indian landowners. Moreover, the wealthiest merchants and landowners (the upper stratum of the local bourgeoisie) are all Mestizos whose parents and grandparents were also of Mestizo or of foreign descent. This correlation between class and ethnicity, however, is much stronger in the northern part of the region of Huejutla, which borders on the flatter coastal plain of the Huasteca than in the southern, slightly more mountainous portion. Prior to the eruption of land invasions, almost all of the landowners in the northern zone were Mestizos. These Mestizo landowners generally lived in the predominantly Spanish-speaking cabeceras of Huejutla and San Felipe Orizatlan while their day laborers and tenants inhabited smaller villages and hamlets. In contrast, in the southern part of the region, there were also Nahuatl-speaking landowners, some of whom owned trucks. Likewise, the poorest, primarily wage-earning peasants were not all "Indian." People who

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neither speak Nahuatl nor identify themselves as Nahua peasants still represent approximately afifthof this subordinate class in the district of Huejutla. These poor Mestizos live both in the larger towns of Huejutla or Orizatlan and in several smaller, completely Spanish-speaking villages in both the northern and southern parts of the region. The exact boundaries between Indians and Mestizos, as ethnic groups, are difficult to delineate using purely "objective" criteria. The ethnic labels of Mestizo and Indian are dichotomous folk categories used to classify both individuals and entire communities throughout the region. Mestizos, many of whom continue to consider themselves gente de razon (people of reason), refer to Indians as indios or compadritos while the Indians, who call themselves masehuali, use the pejorative label coyomej (coyotes) for all non-Indians. These ethnic labels or stereotypes do not always correspond to observable differences in cultural traits. This is especially true for Indian men under the age of forty, many of whom also speak Spanish and who today wear the same type of clothing as Mestizos. However, although visible differences in speech or dress have diminished with the acquisition of Spanish as a second language on the part of most younger Indians, dichotomous ethnic labels continue to be used. Most people who were born and raised in the region know which of their neighbors, friends or relatives is Indian as opposed to a Mestizo, although they sometimes have a hard time making this distinction for people whom they do not know personally. Moreover, people frequently assume different and even multiple identities depending on the specific social situation in which they find themselves. It is thus becoming more and more difficult for outsiders to apply ethnic distinction in classifying individual people. The way that these ethnic labels are used and how they reflect people's images of the social system also vary according to the position of the speaker in the class structure. For example, for most professionals who come from other regions, the term "indio" is practically synonymous with campesino (peasant). Likewise, the upper stratum of the merchants who live in the city of Huejutla or in the town of San Felipe Orizatlan (and who all identity themselves as Mexicans or Mestizos) also tend to see all Indians as desperately poor as well as "uncivilized" peasants. Poor peasants who live in isolated hamlets where only Nahuatl is spoken in turn label all landowners and merchants as "coyomej." However, most people who occupy neither the lowest nor the highest position in the economic class structure are cognizant of considerable overlap in the membership of ethnic groups and economic classes. For the most part, members of this middle stratum (including smaller land-

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THE PEASANT

COMMUNITY

owners) are bilingual, having learned either Nahuatl or Spanish as a second language. Apart from ethnic distinctions based on cultural and linguistic factors, the racial distinction between "whites" (blancos) and darker-skinned people (both Mestizos and Indians) still persists in some parts of the Huasteca. Many of the lighter-skinned, wealthier families who owned local estates have long ago moved away to the state or national capitals. Those who remain are mainly descended from several Spanish families who settled two Spanishspeaking villages (Huichapa and Vinasco) during the colonial era and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, although many of their relatives later moved to Huejutla or Orizatlan. These families, who were originally small landowners and merchants, tended to intermarry among themselves as well as with immigrants (usually artisans and professionals) from England, Italy and France in order to preserve their predominantly European phenotypic fea­ tures. Other, predominantly "white" settlements in neighboring regions in­ clude the town of San Martin (San Luis Potosf) and Chalma (in Veracruz, just a few minutes by car north of Huejutla). Today many Spanish-speaking Mes­ tizos (most of whom cannot be easily distinguished from the Indian popula­ tion in terms of physical appearance) still comment on the parochial nature of such towns and make jokes about the desire of their inhabitants "to remain racially pure." Not everyone with lighter skin color, however, belongs to this small group of exclusive white families. Many are the offspring of poorer descendants of what was at one time a much more influential and wealthier elite of hacienda owners or public officials, going back to the colonial era. Such poorer descendents frequently ended up marrying upwardly mobile Mestizos who, like most Mexicans, still consider white skin, blue eyes and blond hair as a sign of prestige or greater status (de categoria), notwithstanding a nationalist ide­ ology that emphasizes the Indian roots of the Mexican nation. Other Euro­ pean-looking people, including poor farmers and small-town merchants, are probably the product of miscegenation between Mestizo women and Euro­ pean soldiers or adventurers who passed through the region at the time of the occupation of French forces in the 1860s. Moreover, families of more recent Arabic (Lebanese) origins have not maintained a separate racial or ethnic identity.

Indian versus Mestizo Communities Although it is difficult to establish ethnic origins on an individual level, and although people sometimes switch their subjective ethnic identity, all lo-

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cal communities (also known in Spanish as pueblos, comunidades, barrios or rancherias) are consistently labeled as either Indian or Mestizo. The labels "Mestizo" and "Indian" in this context are used to classify entire towns or villages as demographic and administrative units. Indeed, despite forty years of acculturative influences, only a small number of rural settlements that were Nahua villages prior to 1930 had become Mestizo by the 1970s. These include such villages as Ixtlahuac (Huazalingo), El Cojolite (Huautla), Tecolotitla (Atlapexco) and Los Parajes (Huejutla).8 Indeed, there are even a few settlements, such as Palo Gordo and Atlaltipa de Huitzotlaco in Atlapexco and Crisolco in Yahualica, that have actually gone from being Mestizo to being classified as Indian,» while the recent influx of Nahua peasants from more remote settlements to the suburbs of Mestizo towns, such as El Arenal (Yahualica), is giving a greater Indian flavor to such towns, some of which have Indian neighborhoods. The rest of the rural settlements which were considered to be Nahua villages in the past still identify themselves as Indian villages today. This does not mean that individual Mestizos do not live in Nahua communities or vice versa. For example, in some Nahua communities, such as Zitlan, Macuxtepetla and Cuamontax, Mestizos live (or used to live) dispersed among Nahuatl-speakers in both the center and the outskirts. In other cases (Ecuatitla, Coyolapa and, in the past, Tecolotitla and El Cojolite), Mestizos lived inside of the boundaries of Nahua villages but kept themselves physically separated from Indian inhabitants by means of a dividing fence, or by building their houses in a separate section (usually on the edge of a Nahua village). Even today, the Mestizo town of Tehuetlan has two separate, completely Nahua barrios. Whether rural communities are Indian or Mestizo can be identified on the basis of both objective and subjective criteria. The most striking difference between Mestizo and Indian communities is their use of language. In Indian villages, the Nahuatl language is used not only for daily social intercourse, at home or in the fields, but also for public meetings. The use of Nahuatl by both adults and a sizable number of children corresponds to a different world view that includes a unique conception of what constitutes a community (defined in terms of citizenship rights and loyalty) and an emphasis on coopera8 All place names of Mestizo towns or villages will be printed using Spanish spelling conventions, which indicate their pronunciation (e.g., Mecatlan). However, all place names of Nahuatl villages (which are always stressed on the penultimate syllable) will not bear accents even if they would be pronounced in a different manner by Spanish-speakers. This follows the conventions used by historians in both pronouncing and spelling prehispanic Nahuatl place names; for example, precolonial historians now use Acolhuacan instead of Acolhuactin. 9 In almost all of these cases, all or most of the original Mestizo inhabitants emigrated while Nahuatl peasants gradually moved in to take their place.

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tion and conformity, which is quite distinct from the more individualistic outlook and strong identity with the nation state characteristic of even the smallest and most remote Mestizo communities. In contrast, Spanish is the predominant language in Mestizo settlements. Even in the handful of former Nahua communities which are today considered as Mestizo villages, the Nahuatl language is used only on rare occasions and usually in a joking context. The vast majority of children in these villages no longer know how to speak Nahuatl. Apart from a unique language, Indian communities also have distinct folk customs, residential patterns and kinship systems. Nahua communities have a higher incidence of patrilocal residence and until recently, many still carried out a series of elaborate dances not found in Mestizo villages, especially during religious celebrations. Although traditional Nahua weddings, involving an elaborateritualisticpattern of courting, have all but disappeared, it is still customary for a suitor to present small gifts to his potential father-in-law in Nahua villages. The gerontocratic nature of Nahua society has also survived in many villages that still recognize a council of elders or pasados, made up of all those men who have served as public officials in the past. These elders are entitled to give their opinion on important political issues. Nahua and Mestizo villages also have different musical traditions; only Indian villages have brass bands that play a unique Nahua version of traditional as well as more Westernized tunes.10 These bands, which often hire themselves out for public occasions, are organized along community lines and involve obligatory service akin to the traditional system of public cargos associated with the civil-religious hierarchy of Mesoamerican villages. Finally, in terms of immediately visible characteristics, only in Nahua villages do most women still wear colorful embroidered blouses while many older men use plain white, cotton shirts and homemade trousers (calzones). Despite the continued symbolic importance of certain visible cultural traits (and a distinct social structure), in many respects Mestizo and Nahua communities resemble each other more today than they did in the past. Both types of villages today have the same type of schools, clinics and cooperative stores. Indeed, the rapid expansion of the educational system over the past ten years has meant an increasing standardization of public holidays such as "· A few older Indians still play prehispanic tunes on a drum and flute, but this type of music, primarily used for ritual occasions, has almost disappeared in Huejutla today. During just the past few years, however, music has again become more strongly differentiated along ethnic lines. Just twenty or thirty years ago many Indian villages had violin and guitar trios who used to play sones (a type of song) for huapango dances. In Huejutla today, the use of string instruments is considered to be an integral component of Mestizo ranchero music only.

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Mother's Day and patriotic feasts to celebrate various national heroes. These national holidays have replaced the uniquely indigenous version of Catholic feasts in honor of patron saints in most Nahua communities. In all Nahua villages, even ones with officially bilingual schoolteachers, Indian students today give the same speeches or recite the same nationalistic poems in Spanish only." Schoolteachers have also given Spanish names to all streets (or footpaths that are officially designated as streets or avenues) in Nahua villages. Consequently, outside visitors such as government officials and teachers who only speak Spanish might receive the wrong impression that Nahua communities in the Huasteca are exactly like rural communities in any other part of Mexico. They would also find such national institutions as parents' associations (for children of school age) and a host of committees in charge of hygiene, women's activities or agricultural credit. What is less apparent to outside observers is the continuation of a parallel system of internal administration in most Nahua villages. For example, despite the introduction of formal democracy (the nomination of competing candidates for local public office for election by all citizens), there is a much greater emphasis on unanimity in Nahua villages, and frequently only a single slate of candidates is presented to a village assembly for public approval. Such candidates are still usually chosen in the traditional manner through a process of consultation and persuasion involving all past post holders.12 Unlike Mestizo villages, Nahua communities also have a large number of helpers (called topiles or tequihues) who meet on a regular basis to discuss village affairs. Another difference for some Nahua villages is the use of a separate set of names that refer simultaneously to a person and the place where he or she resides.13 Nahua names which are simultaneously toponyms and family names are used in many parts of Huejutla for keeping an accurate list of all those who are expected to perform obligatory communal work (faenas) or of 11

Herlinda Banuelos (1986, 230-41) has analyzed such national holiday celebrations, organized in local schools, as a public ritual that serves to socialize the children of Nahuatl parents into the role behavior expected by the national society. She sees such secular rituals as one of the most important factors leading to the gradual loss of a separate ethnic identity in indigenous regions. Fnedlander (1981) presents a similar argument and goes so far as to say that school rituals in rural Mexico have become a functional equivalent of the traditional cargo system. 11 In some Nahuatl communities like Atempa (in Calnali), competing slates of candidates for all public offices are presented to the community assembly, while other Nahuatl villages use this system for civic but not religious posts. •3 The system of toponyms is also used in Nahuatl villages in the region of Zacapoaxtla in the state of Puebla. For a more detailed description of this system, see Marie-Noelle Chamoux's book (1981, 79-94)·

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those who owe money to the village cooperative store.14 The use of such toponyms also corresponds to the division of a community into a large number of sections ranging from one to over twenty houses. These Nahuatl dualpurpose names are still used instead of the two official Spanish surnames in some Nahua villages. Elsewhere, toponyms are added to individually based surnames to distinguish between people who often share not only the same Christian name but also the same surnames (e.g., as many as ten men might all be called Jose Hernandez).15 In contrast, people in Mestizo villages use individual nicknames rather than personal names followed by toponyms, and Mestizo nicknames also do not refer to entire extended families. Most monolingual Spanish-speaking teachers, community development workers or nurses, even those who have spent as much as two years living in such villages, are oblivious to the existence of such a naming system and its corresponding territorial divisions and forms of record keeping. The Nahua village of Tlalchiyahualica again serves as an example. Figure 2 shows two maps of this village comparing the official, national system of administration and its informal, unofficial counterpart (using toponyms) as they relate to the organization of physical space. Note that while the national system only recognizes residential blocks divided by streets, Nahua speakers divide up their village in quite a different manner, into groupings of extended families who share a common toponymn. The only place where this traditional system is given quasi-official recognition is the town of Jaltocan, which is also the only municipal cabecera considered to be an Indian community. Although all rural communities in the region of Huejutla can be classified as either Indian or Mestizo on the basis of language use, cultural values and some aspects of their social structure, not all villages belonging to the same ethnic category are alike. Mestizo villages that were once Indian are not exactly the same as those that were originally founded by Mestizo settlers. Likewise, there are great variations among Indian villages themselves in terms of the degree of bilingualism and the extent to which they preserve such customs as traditional healing practices or non-Christian religious practices of prehis14

I have seen written lists using such toponyms in thejuzgado of Tlalchiyahualica (I used this list as the basis of doing my census there) and in the nongovernment village cooperative store of the community of Cochotla. 15 Spanish surnames for most Nahuatl peasants were only introduced in the past two decades. Prior to that, most Indians used the first name of their father or mother as a type of last name (some of which later remained as official surnames). For this reason many archival records pertaining to Nahuatl peasants show such names as Jos£ Antonio or Antonio Pedro. The subsequent repetition of so many of the same surnames (especially Hernandez) in Nahuatl villages was the result of the forced imposition of these surnames by government functionaries with little imagination. A high rate of endogamy led to a further proliferation of these same surnames.

A Region of Diversity: Huejutla

FIGURE 2. The Nahua Village of Tlalchiyahualica

65

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THE PEASANT COMMUNITY

panic origins. Thus, Nahua villages in Xochiatipan are much more traditional than those located just on the outskirts of the city of Huejutla. Even the modern-day equivalent of the civil-religious hierarchy differs from one municipio to another. Only Jaltocan and Ixcatlan (Huejutla) have a gobernador (instead of a mayordomo) in charge of both collecting money for religious fiestas and organizing communal work parties. Both of these places also have a second rank of officials called regidores or capitanes.16 Also, in some municipios (especially in Yahualica), only a single religious official in charge of organizing religious fiestas has to pay for almost all the fiesta expenses himself, while in other places a mayordomo is only in charge of organizing a feast with the help of all of his neighbors (all of whom contribute the same amount of money).17

The Northern versus the Southern Zone The most important difference among villages in Huejutla, which cuts across ethnic boundaries, is their internal administrative structure. Indian villages that during the colonial era were located within the boundaries of local haciendas are quite different in this regard than their counterparts in the rest of the region (mainly in the south), where all larger Indian communities, together with their subordinate hamlets, once owned their own communal land (see figure 3). Two distinct areas are distinguished by older Nahua people by means of a verbal Nahuatl distinction between altepetlali (land of the towns) and asientatlali (lands of the haciendas). However, there is no official or legal recognition of the differences between these two areas, especially when it comes to the informal system of village government, nor are most government officials aware of such differences among two types of Nahua communities. Many younger inhabitants in each of these two zones do not realize that the system of administration of their village may be quite different from that of Nahua villages in the other zone. Notice that the line that divides the area once occupied by haciendas from former communal villages does not cut the district of Huejutla neatly into two 16 Short descriptions of these traditional positions of authority in different parts of the region have been written by Herlinda Banuelos (1986, 145-54) and Jaime Samperio Gutierrez (1956, 45). In different parts of the region of Huejutla, such positions are also referred to by various Nahuatl names, such as tektli or tlayakanketl. 17 It should also be pointed out that in the past, Mestizo communities such as Palo Gordo and Cuatapa (Atlapexco) also appointed mayordomos who had to spend their own money, and even in 1987 this tradition was still carried out in a few Mestizo villages such as Huitznopala (Yahualica), where a young woman took on this task.

A Region of Diversity: Huejutla

FIGURE 3 . The Region of Huejutla

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T H E PEASANT COMMUNITY

sections along an east-west axis. Not only are there a few areas within the southern zone that were once small haciendas (or colonial ranchos), but the "boundary" between the two zones meanders and sometimes runs along the north-south axis (in parts of the municipios of Huejutla and Huautla). There is also an isolated pocket of three small hamlets in a corner of the northern zone that was once part of a pueblo with its own communal land. Nevertheless, I will henceforth refer to a northern versus a southern zone of the region of Huejutla to distinguish between these two different kinds of communities in the region under study. The most noticeable difference between the northern and the southern zones is the complete absence in the northern zone of any sort of civil-religious hierarchy or its modern equivalent. For example, the only connotation that the term "mayordomo" has for Nahua peasants in this part of Huejutla is that of former hacienda supervisor and administrator. Nahua villages in the northern zone also do not have, nor do people remember ever having had, a system of classifying both people and the places where they live by the use of toponyms. The only exception is the community of Santa Cruz, which once belonged to a hacienda going back to the eighteenth century, but which has all the characteristics of corporate communities in the southern zone.18 It will be seen later how this and a number of other communities along the border between the northern and southern zone (particularly in the municipios of Orizatlan, Huejutla and Jaltocan) could also be classified as a third, transitional zone. The differences in social structure and form of village government within these two or three zones are closely linked to differences in forms of land tenure.

The Land Tenure System of the Region of Huejutla In Mexico there are today three types of land tenure: pequena propiedad (small property), ejidos and tierra comunal (communal land). The first legal category refers to privately owned, commoditized land. Ejidos, modeled after a type of communal landholding dating back to the colonial era, were established by the Mexican government after the revolution. Ejido land is officially owned by the state, which confers usufruct rights to land reform recipients 18 Since oral tradition holds that the land where this community is located once constituted part of the communal terrritory of the Nahua pueblo of Jaltocan (in the southern zone), I suspect that this Indian community was either incorporated into a nearby hacienda, or that a group of settlers from Jaltocan founded this village after their hometown bought additional land en bloque, which was still possible prior to 1856 (see chapter 5).

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(ejidatarios), who must govern themselves according to a national agrarian code. Legally recognized communal lands belong to communities that are allowed to determine the distribution and use of such lands according to local tradition. Most ejidos were created as a result of the partitioning of large private estates or haciendas, but groups of peasants may petition for any privately owned land to be handed over to them in the form of an ejido, and communal land may also be transformed into ejidos. While groups of peasants may have to wait many years before their ejidos are officially granted, and while there are often conflicts over boundaries, it is legally impossible for any piece of land to have more than one form of legal status at the same time. The way this national system actually works in Huejutla is not easy to describe. When land invasions broke out in the seventies, outsiders (including many government functionaries and agrarian politicians, normally well versed in the legal niceties of Mexico's complex agrarian system) were confronted with a situation in which the seemingly clear-cut legal distinctions among ejidos, communal lands and pequefia propiedad apparently did not apply. According to the agricultural census taken in 1970, several municipios in the southern zone consisted almost exclusively of several very large ejidos, each of which included numerous subordinate hamlets known as anexos. For example, the municipio of Atlapexco had no privately owned rural properties, and the official agricultural census likewise provided data on crops and cattle production for only eight ejidos. Records in the offices of the local Land Reform office in Huejutla in 1980 likewise indicated that there were no, or very few, privately owned rural properties in such municipios as Atlapexco, Huautla and Huazalingo. However, the registration list (padron general) of all rural enterprises (predios rusticos) between 1940 and 1982 in the archives of the municipal land tax offices of Atlapexco and Yahualica did not list any ejidos at all, while the land registry offices of Huautla, Huazalingo and Huejutla did list some comunidades, some of which were listed as ejidos only after 1984. In fact, most of the ejidos created in the southern zone prior to 1970 only existed on paper and were completely fictitious, as shown by their omission from the local land registry office in this part of Huejutla. These offices, however, did have detailed records of privately owned lands for which their individual or corporate owners paid yearly dues. In some cases (especially Huautla), villages listed as ejidos in the state capital were classified as comunidades, but members of such comunidades were allowed to buy and sell plots of land both to each other and to outsiders, and eventually to register such plots as privately owned rural enterprise. In the case of Atlapexco, at

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least some of these privately owned estates were also listed as falling outside of ejido boundaries on one map in the state branch of the Land Reform Secretariat,19 although the offices of this same department in Huejutla indicated that these properties did not even exist! Such discrepancies in the legal status of land still existed in 1986, six years after the land tenure system had supposedly been completely "normalized." For example, the Mestizo community of Ixtlahuac was at that time still listed as an ejido and also appeared as such in a map in the Office of Land Reform in Huejutla, even though the peasants of this village (most of whom own their own land) claim that they are pequenos propietarios and have never belonged to an ejido.20 To make matters even more confusing, when the agrarian movement led to internal disputes over land in many Nahua villages, both Mestizo landowners and wealthy Indian peasants fought for the preservation or the legal recognition of communal land tenure. On the other hand, in some southern municipios, other landowners or would-be landowners denied that communal land even existed. Only in some parts of the region, especially in the transitional zone or the strip of land between the southern (formerly communal) and the northern (former hacienda) zones, did the owners of pequenas propiedades have more secure legal titles to their properties. These property owners had also asked for and received government certificates that made their lands ineligible for expropriation or repartition because they were used for cattle raising. However, even these properly registered, legally more secure, rural farms and ranches were at one time or another at least mentioned in peasant petitions for land reform (even if such petitions were not granted). In contrast to the southern zone, the land tenure of the northern section of the region of Huejutla consisted of a combination of privately owned farms or ranches and genuine ejidos, set up as a result of the partitioning of haciendas in 1940. Unlike most of the southern zone, both Nahua and Mestizo ejidos located in this northern area operated much like most other ejidos in remote parts of rural Mexico. There were nevertheless many outstanding petitions for ejidos that had never been acknowledged, and requests for extensions (ampliaciones) of existing ejidos. Moreover, several large properties were also registered under the names of various people to evade possible expropriation of rural estates above the legal limits set by the law. Ironically, the northern zone also had the only villages with legally recog" Comision Agraria Mixta, whose archives will henceforth be referred to as ACAM. In this case, a petition for an ejido had been signed on behalf of this village in the 1930s, but it was only given a provisional, never the final, presidential grant. Interview with a land reform official, Huejutla, March 4, 1987. 20

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nized communal lands (Hueytlale, Mazaquilico and El Labor). Indeed, the members of one other northern communal village have never allowed the sale of land to outsiders and also did not allow the sale of parcels within communal boundaries. This village, Chiquemecatitla, which was given additional land in the form of an ejido in 1940, also does not use the system of Nahua toponyms described above.21 However, these communal lands were not originally owned by colonial village corporations going back to prehispanic times (as in the southern zone); rather, they resulted from the sale of portions of haciendas to groups of Nahua peasants who lived within the boundaries of privately owned estates. By 1970, the land tenure system of the district of Huejutla had become so convoluted and the corresponding rules and regulations so ambiguous that most local people did not fully comprehend the regional land tenure system with its local variations. Even high school graduates and rural schoolteachers did not fully understand the official legal categories of landholding that apply to Mexico as a whole, much less the intricacies of the legal aspects of the land tenure of their own region. Illiterate peasants were especially misinformed about the legal status of the land surrounding their villages. But these same peasants were quite knowledgeable about who really did or did not possess or control various pieces of land. Most people also knew that, despite two successive land reforms, the majority of peasants in 1970 continued to pay rents to landowners or had access only to much reduced commons. Despite the existence of real (as opposed tofictitious)ejidos in the northern zone and the continuation of communal land tenure and other traditional institutions in the southern zone, it cannot be said that the relations of production and the corresponding economic class structure were that different in the two subregions of Huejutla prior to the outbreak of a peasant revolt. In both regions the typical rural enterprise was very much like the small commercial rural estates or ranchos found in the completely Spanish-speaking region of Pisaflores analyzed in an earlier study (Schryer 1980). In Huejutla, the poor, primarily wage-earning peasants in both the southern zone and the northern zone worked for a class of capitalist farmers who owned such ranchos (whether rich Indians, Mestizo rancheros or the descendants of hacienda owners). These day laborers all continued to combine seasonal wage labor with subsistence cultivation or the production of at least some commodities for sale. After 1950, the majority of poor peasants from both zones had also 21 Interview with Tiburcio Salvedo, Chiquemecatitla, June 12, 1985. I also consulted the files of the Huejutla office of the cci (Confederation Campesina Independiente), whose legal adviser, Antonio Hernandez, represented this community up until several years ago.

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become increasingly dependent on migratory wage labor in urban centers or other agricultural regions in Mexico. Although it is true that the exact economic structure (including the degree of occupational specialization) of every village or municipio in Huejutla is not the same, variations in this basic economic structure cut across both administrative divisions and linguistic lines throughout the region. Such discrepancies among administrative, sociocultural and economic boundaries were the outcome of constant negotiation and conflicts between members of different economic classes going back several hundred years.

Part Two Historical Background

Chapter 4

The Colonial Heritage: From Conquest to Independence

In chapter 11 suggested that differences in administrative structures, forms of land tenure and ethnicity would shape the form of class struggles. This was very much the case in Huejutla, where land invasions were conducted in a different manner in each of the various subregions. These differences in social organization and traditions—especially the contrasts between the northern and southern zones—emerged as early as the sixteenth century, with the imposition of Spanish colonial rule. The Spanish conquest gave rise to two distinct socioeconomic systems: the Indian pueblo (or republica de indio) and the hacienda. The cultural imprints left by these two distinct agrarian structures, which became predominant in the southern and the northern zones respectively, shaped the form of agrarian conflict long after both Indian republics and haciendas had disappeared.

The Origins of Subregion Variations When Hernando Cortes arrived in the Americas, about half of present-day Huejutla belonged to the small, independent state (or senorio) of Meztitlan. This state was founded in the thirteenth century by Chichimeca warriors, after the decline of the Toltec empire. The area they controlled included most of the southern and eastern part of present-day Huejutla (Cartwright 1972, 6, 147-49; De Alva 1965, 277). The rest of the region, including those valleys that are extensions of the flat Huasteca Baja region, was incorporated into the Aztec empire (ruled from the city of Tenochtitlan) only just prior to the Spanish conquest; the small city state of Huejutla (Huexotla or Guaxutla) was conquered by Ahuizotl around 1487, later rebeled and was again subjugated by Moctezuma Xocoxotzin in 1501 (Clavijero 1971, 124; Anaya 1918, 54).' 1 This part of Huejutla, together with other parts of the Huasteca Baja, was known to the Aztecs as Huaxtecapan.

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These prehispanic administrative boundaries were only slightly altered when both regions became part of New Spain. During most of the colonial period, the two subregions just mentioned became the alcaldias mayores of Yahualica and Huejutla respectively (Gerhard 1972, 144-46, 242-45). The subsequent evolution of a distinct pattern of land tenure and administration between what I call a southern (formerly communal) and a northern zone partly corresponds to but also cuts across these earlier administrative boundaries. The development of two distinct socioeconomic subregions in Huejutla following the Spanish conquest must be seen in the light of demographic trends that involved a complete reversal of prehispanic patterns. Spaniards who traveled inland along the Panuco River (whose tributaries flow through the region of Huejutla) reported that in 1519 all of the low-lying parts of the Huasteca were densely populated (P6rez 1983, 61). The more accidental terrain of the piedmont of the Sierra Madre Oriental, which juts out into the semitropical coastal plain, was not as propitious for a high rate of demographic growth. Yet only in this more mountainous (southwestern) portion of the alcaldias of both Yahualica and Huejutla did prehispanic villages survive intact in the sixteenth century while the rest of Huejutla saw a rapid process of depopulation. This differential impact must be seen in the broader context of the political economy of this northern fringe of New Spain. A lack of mineral resources in the Huasteca meant that the victorious Spaniards were not able to set up mines. They also did not establish other types of enterprises in which to occupy the labor of the local population, extracted through encomiendas. Instead, the Spanish conquerors who controlled the Huasteca continued to buy or capture local Indians, who had a long history of rebellion even under Aztec rulers. These native inhabitants were traded for cattle originating in the Antilles, notwithstanding the fact that this was contrary to the edicts against slavery of Indians issued by the Spanish crown.2 In this manner, cattle raising wasfirstintroduced into the coastal plain and foothills of the Huasteca. In contrast, in the more mountainous parts of the Huasteca, including the many, small intermontane valleys in the foothills of the Sierra Madre Oriental, the native population escaped the worst effects of the onslaught of forced dislocation, excessive tribute demands and the introduction of slavery. In fact, this more mountainous region became a refuge for Indians fleeing from other parts of the Huasteca (Gerhard 1972, 244). Unlike other parts of the Huasteca at the time of the conquest, most of the prehispanic 2 The policy of trading Indian slaves for cattle was carried to an extreme by Nufio de Guzman, who was appointed governor of the province of Panuco after taking over part of the territory previously administered from Mexico City (see Donald Chipman 1967; Perez Zevallos 1983, 76-79).

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settlements in the southern part of Huejutla were still intact two hundred years later; the majority of sixteenth-century communities in what is today Huautla, Yahualica, Atlapexco and Xochiatipan still appeared as pueblos in the eighteenth century (Gerhard 1972, 244).

The Republicas de lndios in Huejutla The Spanish crown asserted its direct authority over the Indian population of the southern zone where Indian towns (the prehispanic altepetl) were designated as Indian republics. These native townships represented a separate administrative system, parallel to the ayuntamientos set up in towns founded by Spanish settlers, although in some cases, such as Yahualica and Huautla, the officials representing these two forms of government lived in the same locality. Indian pueblos were allowed to run their own internal affairs, but their inhabitants had to pay tribute and taxes to both civil and ecclesiastical authorities. I assume that the Spanish rulers must have given formal recognition to the land-use rights already exercised by the inhabitants of such pueblos since prehispanic days, as they did in other parts of Mesoamerica. The land boundaries of these Indian republics, also known as the comun de indigenas, remained largely intact throughout the colonial period through a legal process known as composiciones de tierras. By means of such composiciones, the Spanish crown either recognized existing communal land boundaries (since original titles were often missing or damaged) or provided additional grants in return for monetary fees.3 In some cases, Indian communities also bought sections of privately owned estates. Figure 4 shows the approximate boundaries of the communal lands belonging to several Nahua pueblos in Huejutla at the end of the colonial era. Throughout the colonial period, Spanish officials who had jurisdiction over such Indian pueblos received a percentage of the taxes paid to the crown and were also entitled to personal services. In the region of Yahualica, tributepaying Indians (tributarios) had to provide fish, chickens, corn and beans, fodder (zacate) and firewood to local officials on a daily basis. In addition, they delivered ' 'gifts'' of food, cotton and sugar loaf (pilori) to visiting church officials and local representatives of the king every four months (De Gortari 1983, 110-16). Labor contributions consisted of taking care of the horses of any Spanish officials, domestic service and acting as porters and messengers. 3 A study of this entitlement of Indian land in the alcaldia mayor of Yahualica (sometimes referred to as Xochicoatlan) between 1650 and 1800 was done by Ludka de Gortari (Mexico: CIESAS, 1983).

FIGURE 4. Nahua Communities and Private Estates during the Colonial Period

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In some cases, failure to meet such tribute obligations necessitated the selling or renting out of communal land belonging to Indian pueblos, which were subsequently bought back with gold in times of prosperity (De Gortari 1983, 65). Especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many officials accumulated additional wealth by demanding mantas (bolts of cotton cloth) and clothing woven by Indian women from the cotton grown on village lands.4 Another source of exploitation of Indian labor was the various parish priests who sometimes squabbled with the civil authorities over their share of tribute or local taxes (see Escobar 1987, 4). At least a part of the surplus derived from local tribute must have ended up in the pockets of the principales or caciques of the Nahua towns, as happened in other parts of Mexico (see chapter 2). There is no historical evidence, however, that these wealthy Indians set up small haciendas or ranchos. In the former alcaldia mayor of Yahualica, only about 10 percent of the land was privately owned as a result of the granting of individual titles (known as metcedes) to Spaniards or to members of the local Indian nobility. Moreover, unlike other parts of Mexico, this Indian elite sold its properties to Spanishspeaking outsiders who used such privately owned estates for the production of sugar loaf (Perez 1983, 67-72).5 These small estates, some of which were also listed as ranchos with trapiches during the colonial period, at various times had either slaves or permanent Indian workers called sirvientes, although most of their workers came from tributary pueblos (De Gortari 1983, 72-73). By the nineteenth century, however, most of the small, privately owned estates located in Yahualica, Xochiatipan or Huazalingo (my southern zone) no longer had settlements with resident Nahua peons. Apart from a few resident Mestizo caretakers or cowhands, all tenants or seasonal laborers were recruited from surrounding Nahua pueblos. The small size of the haciendas located in the southern part of the region of Huejutla and the fact that they were often listed as ranchos or were leased out or sold en bloque to Indian village corporations indicate the viability of the republicas de indios in this part of Huejutla. I suspect that the level of internal class stratification in these Indian pueblos was not as great as that reported for the valley of Mexico or central Oaxaca. If one accepts the ecological model developed by some agrarian historians, which posits a correlation among population density, urban growth, economic differentiation and social inequality (see chapter 2), then the Indian pueblos of Huejutla probably 4

These items fetched a high price when sold in Mexico City (see Perez Zevallos 1983, 158). This absence of Indian owners of private estates (in contrast to Oaxaca) during most of the colonial era is similar to what Wayne Osbom (1973, 229) found in the nearby valley of Meztitlan. 5

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HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

had a low level of internal class differentiation. During the colonial period, the alcaldia of Yahualica was located on the outer edge of what the agrarian historian Slicher van Bath has classified as a less developed, "supported" economic region, only partly integrated with the more dynamic economy found in three core areas in New Spain, that is, the central region of Anahuac, Guadalajara and parts of Oaxaca (Slicher van Bath 1980, 133).6 Economic class inequalities probably increased during the last part of the eighteenth century in places like Yahualica, which seemed to have experienced a greater rate of demographic growth during that century.7 During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the alcaldia mayor of Huejutla also seems to have benefited from the broader trend of population growth characteristic of Mex­ ico as a whole.8

Cabeceras and Sujetos Most Indian republics had jurisdiction over any number of subordinate vil­ lages, known in the historical literature as pueblos sujetos, barrios, tlaxicalis or rancherias (see Gibson 1964, 55-57; 1984, 389). The administrative cen­ ters of the republics or Indian pueblos were called the cabeceras indigenas. Although the same Nahua town did not always serve as the administrative center, or cabecera, for all governmental functions (ecclesiastical, agrarian and judicial), in most cases these different administrative boundaries tended to coincide fairly closely. Moreover, any Indian town or village that was ei­ ther granted or later bought its own land could become an administrative cen­ ter in its own right (Dehouve 1984). Such new cabeceras, however, in turn had their own subordinate hamlets or sent out migrants to establish daughter communities in more remote parts of their communal holdings. All of these administrative centers, which served as ceremonial centers as well, used to pay tribute to the crown on behalf of all their politically subordinate hamlets. Any politically subordinate hamlets located within the communal lands of other villages in turn had to perform communal work (faenas) under the su6 Most of the alcaldia mayor of Yahualica (or Xochicoatlan, as it was sometimes called) corre­ sponded to what I call the southern zone. 7 One indication that this part of Huejutla experienced higher rates of population increase is that Yahualica was one of a very few places in Mesoamerica that had not been afflicted by a serious epidemic in 1736, the matlazahuatl (Anaya 1918,104). By 1803, the entire alcaldia mayor (which at that time included Xochicoatlan) had 3,352 tributaries (see Gerhard 1972, 244). 8 According to sources cited by Gerhard (1972, 145), the jurisdiction of Huejutla had 852 Indian families in 1743 and 1,761 Indian tributaries in 1797, thus a doubling of the population in half a century.

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pervision of the village to which they belonged and also had to bury their dead in the cemetery of their administrative center. In the alcaldia of Huejutla, for example, the pueblos of Jaltocan and Ixcatlan, with their respective sujetos, already had their own Indian government by the end of the eighteenth century. In contrast, Pahuatlan and Macuxtepetla, each of which had its own dependent barrios, were pueblos still subject to the jurisdiction of Huejutla while at the same time in control of their own land. Another Indian pueblo, called San Pedro Tomatlan (or Tomacal), also depended on the republica de indios of Huejutla, although it was located at quite a distance from the rest of these Indian villages, far off in the northern zone. At that time, what were later to become the independent villages of Chililico, Panacaxtlan, Coxhuaco and Chicatitla were still listed as barrios of the pueblo of Huejutla.9 All of these villages (with the exception of San Pedro and the town of Huejutla itself) still had their own village commons, as well as their own Indian village authorities at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Cattle Haciendas in Northern Huejutla In contrast to the southern part of the region of Huejutla, the land tenure and administrative systems of the northern zone evolved in quite a different manner. This part of the region had lost most of its native population in the fifty years after the Spanish conquest and also witnessed the forced relocation of Indian subjects to larger population centers. For example, the surviving inhabitants of numerous dispersed hamlets were forced to move to the town of Huejutla, which was itself moved a short distance to the site of a convent established in the 1540s.10 While designed to facilitate both religious instruction and the extraction of rents and tribute, such relocations also enabled Spaniards to lay claim to both urban sites and lands abandoned by the native population. Consequently, the number of individual land grants authorized by the crown increased rapidly in the early part of the colonial period. For instance, between 1542 and 1625, twenty-four mercedes were granted to pri' "Relacion circunstanciada de las poblaciones que componen la jurisdiccion de Huejutla, 1794," in Archivo General de la Nacion, Mexico (hereafter referred to an AGN), Ramo de historia, vol. 578B. IO This convent, and an attached church (which is still a major landmark in the city of Huejutla), served as a center of missionary activity over a region much larger than contemporary Huejutla. This and other convents and monasteries in the region (in Molango, Tlanchinol and Xochiatipan) were run by the Augustinian order (Gerhard 1972, 145, 244).

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vate individuals in the northern part of Huejutla and four more in the northeastern portion of Huautla, compared to only one in Yahualica, located entirely in the southern zone (Perez 1983, 141-47). These mercedes subsequently became the basis of the haciendas in this part of Huejutla. The type of hacienda that developed in the northern part of Huejutla was not intrinsically linked to regional mining centers or the production of grain for urban centers. Rather, their owners (or tenants) sold beef, horses and pack animals to Spanish towns in the Huasteca (Panuco, Tampico and Ciudad Valles). These haciendas also exported mares to other parts of Mexico. In other parts of the Huasteca, both Spanish and Indian merchants regularly sold dried meat (cecina) to as far away as Mexico City (Perez 1983, 30). The owners of these haciendas were all Spaniards, many of whom lived in large urban centers in central Mexico, while some settled in the town of Huejutla or other small cities in neighboring states. Many local estates frequently changed hands during the colonial period, although at least one hacienda, that of San Felipe, was owned as mort main by the Catholic Church, under the control of the parish of Tlanchinol, throughout most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." Like their much smaller counterparts in the southern zone, some of the northern haciendas (those located in sections of what are today the municipios of Huautla and San Felipe Orizatlan) also produced sugar cane and corn. These haciendas probably employed seasonal wage laborers from nearby Indian pueblos for such tasks as harvesting and cutting. However, most of the northern cattle haciendas and ranchos, especially those located in the northern half of what are today the municipios of Huejutla and Orizatlan, specialized almost exclusively in cattle production. Such commercial estates, with their largely non-Indian (usually mulatto) cow hands, did not require much Indian labor (De Gortari 1983, 18; Gerhard 1972, 145).I2 From the beginning of the colonial period, the damage caused by such estate cattle entering cornfields was a source of litigation between Spanish hacienda owners and the few Indian villages that still remained in this north11 Although most colonial haciendas were managed for profitability, as business enterprises, the owners of smaller haciendas and ranchos (such as those found in Huejutla) were usually not able to diversify enough to cover losses caused by changing market conditions or the unpredictability of the weather. Such owners were also frequently in debt (see Ouweneel 1988). In Huejutla, the owners of various haciendas or ranchos at times had to obtain mortgages, frequently from local priests or from a cofradia (de animas) in Huejutla. Various documents relating to such mortgages or the sale of haciendas were found in archives of the district judicial offices of Huejutla (Archivo Historico del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Huejutla, hereafter referred to as AHJPIH). 12 According to Slicher van Bath (1981, 134), the alcaldia mayor of Huejutla (most of which belonged to my northern zone) had an underdeveloped "one-sided," peripheral economy compared to other parts of New Spain.

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ern zone.13 Such frictions between Spanish cattle producers and Indian pueblos increased toward the end of the seventeenth century, especially in the intermediate zone between the southern communal zone and the northern cattle estates. This intermediate zone was characterized by enclaves of communal Indian land and even smaller cattle estates (sometimes referred to as ranchos) owned by Spanish settlers.14 For example, when the Nahua pueblo of Jaltocan petitioned for (and received) legal recognition of its fundo legal (town's commons), as stipulated by a new royal edict, it mentioned that it no longer had sufficient space to cultivate maize because the cattle of the neighboring Spanish rancho of Vinasco were grazing on its doorsteps.15 The town of Huejutla (where many of the early Spanish landowners came to live) and its immediately surrounding territory also saw increasing tensions between Nahua peasants and Spanish settlers, who either owned their own estates or rented land from Indian communities. By the end of the eighteenth century, Spanish-speaking settlers, designated as "gente de razon," had completely displaced the original Indian population from this cabecera, while the Indian inhabitants, who were still citizens of a separate Indian republic, continued to occupy ten separate barrios on the outskirts of Huejutla (Gerhard 1972, 146). The representatives of authorities of these barrios, which still constituted a legally recognized cotnun de indigenas, were involved in litigations against Spanish owners for access to land in 1791.16

The Struggle for Independence and Civil War During the War of Independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, both Indian peasants and members of the Spanish-speaking elite born in Mexico participated in a struggle against Spain. In Huejutla, as in other parts of 13

One manuscript, written in Nahuatl, deals with a litigation in 1582 between the inhabitants of an Indian pueblo and a cattle estancia owned by Alonso Ortiz de Zufiiga. "Autos por los naturales de Apoxochilco," AGN, Ramo de Tierras, vol. 2867, exp. 41: Fs. 52. Huejutla, P°. An English translation of this manuscript is included in an appendix of a thesis by Neville Stiles (1982, 369-82). 14 Some of the very small haciendas or ranchos mentioned in documents of the eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries include Tultitlan, Zitlan, Vinasco, Canchintlan (really a part of the "hacienda" of Vinasco), Coxhuaco and Tzactipan. 15 "Los naturales del pueblo de San Juan Bautista Jaltocan, sobre deslinde de su fundo legal," in AGN, Tierras, vol. 1617, exp. 5, F. 21 (1781-82). Huejutla, P°. The native inhabitants, represented by their gobernador, gave testimony that "an old Spaniard," the father of the present owners of the rancho, had rented part of their communal lands but simply stopped paying rent after a certain amount of time. 16 "Los naturales de dicho pueblo, contra el Subdelegado del Partido, sobre posesion de tierras," AGN, Tierras, vol. 1532, exp. 2, F. 30. Huejutla, P°.

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Mexico, this struggle was led by the clergy. However, the type of uprisings against European-born Spaniards or other local elites reported for other parts of Mexico do not seem to have taken place in the region of Huejutla. There are certainly numerous references to the recruitment of Indians, including the gobernadores of Indian republics in the neighboring highland region of Molango as well as in the low-lying region of Chicontepec in the Huasteca of Veracruz.17 But the only reference to insurgents in the region of Huejutla mentions that Yahualica also took part in the War for Independence.18 This low level of militancy indicates that the economic problems and increasing social tensions that developed toward the end of the eighteenth century in Mexico as a whole were not yet as acutely felt (or possibly were kept in check by means of negotiation or concessions) in the region of Huejutla. It therefore seems that the relations between Indian pueblos and Spanish estates, between landowners and their employees (in haciendas) or between caciques and Indian peasants (in the pueblos) must have remained within the bounds of what was considered culturally acceptable. The fact that at least some Indian gobernadores in Yahualica took part in the insurrection indicates that whatever general grievances were felt by Indian peasants, including any dissatisfaction due to increasing inequality within Indian pueblos, could still be channeled against outsiders, as suggested by Eric Van Young (1984, 77).19 The creation of an independent government in 1821, run by Mexican landowners rather than the Spanish crown, did not initially alter relations of production, ethnic relations between Indians and Spanish-speaking officials or the relationship between church and state. However, the political turmoil and economic dislocation associated with the War of Independence meant a decline in economic welfare for many Indian villages in the region of Huejutla. Representatives of several Nahua communities in the southern zone complained that their towns had been ravaged in war and that they could no longer afford to pay the usual fees for marriages and masses.20 Such dislocations continued during the next several decades as a result of the subsequent civil war between Liberals and Conservatives throughout Mexico. The fact that Indian peasants were also capable of resorting to more direct forms of politi17

"Correspondencia del subdelegado de Chicontepec, Don Juan Gonzalez de Burgos, acerca de los sucesos de la insurreccion indigena." AGN, Ramo de Historia, vol. 411: Fs. 84r-ii4v (June 14, 1811). 18 See Garcia Uribe (1979, 435). •» Van Young has also suggested that the Indian village elite could thus preserve their own privileged position. 20 "Petition de ayuntamiento de Huazalingo y regidores de demas pueblos de Zoquitipan, Santa Teresa Xoxolpa y Atotomoc al parroco Manuel Galindo que no les pertubare la paga de sus derechos," in AHJPiH, 1821.

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cal protest is shown by a minor armed uprising in the municipio of Huautla in 1848. The occurrence of a minor peasant uprising in Huautla (see Manzano 1922, vol. 1)—one of the municipios where haciendas coexisted with longstanding Nahua pueblos—coincided with a much more widespread peasant uprising in the Sierra Gorda region in the neighboring state of San Luis Potosi, which had seen the rapid expansion of haciendas at their neighbors' expense (Falcon 1984, 51). The fact that Nahua peasants from Huautla joined this rebellion, or possibly took advantage of it to engage in social violence on their own, indicates that there were genuine grievances associated with this turbulent period of political in-fighting and economic dislocations, at least in this part of Huejutla. However, the brief references in historical records do not provide enough information to ascertain whether these Nahua peasants initiated these attacks on their own initiative or whether they were led and manipulated by a new class of rancheros then emerging in the southern zone, or perhaps even by wealthy Indian peasants (who thus took advantage of popular frustration for their own political ends). In any case, the violent caste war that erupted in other parts of the Huasteca around the middle of the last century did not spread into the rest of Huejutla. Sometime during the chaotic period following the War for Independence, the two separate administrative units of Yahualica and Huejutla (already called partidos since the end of the eighteenth century) were amalgamated into a single district. With the adoption of a republican form of government, another unit of local administration was introduced: the municipio. The next chapter will show how the number of such municipios increased after 1870. However, despite a change in the name of administrative units and the implementation of a liberal land reform in formerly communally owned lands, much of the system of internal administration of Nahua pueblos remained intact.

The Continuity of Administrative Boundaries Administrative boundaries and their corresponding form of labor tribute continued (but often outside of the law) throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the region of Huejutla. For example, most of the boundaries of administrative subunits of municipios, called secciones, corresponded fairly closely to boundaries of either former republicas de indios (in the southern zone) or colonial haciendas (in the northern zone). Also, some newly created, much smaller municipios, some of which only existed for a short period of time, actually corresponded exactly to former Indian republics,

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even if they were politically dominated by Mestizo newcomers or acculturated Indians. It will be seen in chapter 8 that most of the larger, mainly fictitious ejidos which were set up after 1940 also coincided with earlier colonial (and in some cases even precolonial) administrative units. Such continuities in administrative units (usually larger than individual towns or villages but smaller than present-day municipios) and their corresponding forms of internal social organization have been well documented by Robert Hill and John Monaghan (1987) in the case of Indian communities in Guatemala. Apart from defining the right to land, the various administrative categories outlined above also determined how public labor or surpluses were extracted. People who lived within the boundaries of municipios had to maintain mule trails and perform other services demanded by municipal governments (usually controlled by Mestizo politicians). In turn, the inhabitants of politically subordinate hamlets also had to help in the construction of chapels or juzgados (judicial buildings that also served as jails) in their respective Indian administrative centers. This unequal political relationship continued to be a constant source of tension among neighboring Nahua villages, especially in the southern zone, as subordinate villages tried to separate from the Nahua pueblos to which they belonged in order to gain their independence. Indeed, up until 1950, such Nahua administrative centers were the only villages in Huejutla that had a juez (today called a delegado), and the only way to become independent was to also receive the position of juez. These intervillage disputes not only involved ongoing competition among rival village elites but also could become the expression of opposing class interests between poor and wealthy peasants. Such conflicts over judicial boundaries still continue today. While there has been a large degree of continuity of administrative boundaries as well as internal organization on the local level over the past couple of hundred years, the imposition of new legal distinctions designed on the national level gave rise to a rather peculiar interpretation of Spanish legal categories in Huejutla. This is especially the case in the southern zone. For example, the terms municipio and cabecera (still used in Mexico today) acquired a meaning quite different from the way they are used in other parts of Mexico. This discrepancy between official and local usage continued up until the 1970s (and in some places persists to this day). Because these terms formed part of the mind-set of a large number of people who became involved in recent agrarian disputes, it will be useful to explain this discrepancy at this point.

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The Meaning of the Terms Cabecera and Municipio

For both Nahuatl-speaking peasants and bilingual Mestizo peasants, the term "municipio" (quotes are used to designate the local, unofficial use of this word) usually means the town that is the administrative center or head village of the lowest level of government in Mexico and not the entire geographical area (including numerous villages or hamlets) under the jurisdiction of such official administrative centers. The official term for such a municipal administrative center is cabecera municipal or simply cabecera. In the region of Huejutla, however, this same term (whose local usage will henceforth appear as "cabecera") is normally used for other types of administrative centers, whose boundaries often date back to colonial and probably prehispanic times. In Huejutla, the term "cabecera" therefore refers not to the administrative center of the unit that should really be called municipio (as used throughout this book), but rather to the various Indian villages within each municipio that had once been the centers of Indian republics with their own lands. These discrepancies between the local interpretation of certain legal terms and their official meaning within Mexico's current administrative system was to become a great source of confusion for government officials when they tried to deal with conflicts among Nahua villages during the peasant revolt in the seventies. Moreover, the forms taken by conflicts over land in the twentieth century—and the language used by both militant Indians and their local opponents—still reflect the heritage of the colonial past.

Chapter 5 Indians, Rancheros and Hacienda Owners: The Changing Class Structure

During the nineteenth century, the Huasteca became a frontier area that attracted numerous settlers from other parts of Mexico, and new mule trails were built to connect the temperate highlands with the tropical lowlands.1 This process of immigration was similar to that in the neighboring Sierra de Jacala region, which I have already described in some detail in my book on Pisaflores (Schryer 1980, 26-36). Like the Sierra de Jacala region, Huejutla was "invaded" by Mestizo settlers from the highland plateau and the Sierra Alta, the mountainous region just to the southwest of the district of Huejutla. A combination of further in-migration and the expansion of markets for local produce led the transformation of the economic class structure of the entire region of Huejutla, although different patterns of production emerged in the various subregions of Huejutla. Through this process of economic change, the different administrative structures and cultural values inherited from the colonial era came to serve new functions.

The Emergence of a Ranchero Economy Ranchos in the region of Huejutla date back to the colonial era. A rancho was usually a unit of production within the boundaries of a larger landed estate or a rural estate much smaller than a hacienda. One example of a rancho in the southern zone, dating back to the colonial era, was Texcaltipan, located in a small valley on the east side of the narrow plateau of Yahualica. This rancho was only one part of a very small rural estate (of approximately 500 hectares) called Zacatlamixtla which was sometimes referred to as a hacienda but which was itself also designated as a rancho in various documents. In • For a short summary of various studies of the economic relation between the Sierra and the lowland regions of the Huasteca, including references to the importance of mule trails, see Francois Lartigue's article (1985,15-19).

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1822 the administrator of Texcaltipan was Ignacio Nochebuena, who managed about a hundred head of cattle. By 1880 one of his descendants, Jose Maria Nochebuena, was already the owner of his own rancho when he left a small pasture and "some cattle" to his only surviving son.2 Increasingly, both former tenants or administrators and newcomers set up ranchos within the boundaries of small haciendas in the southern part of the region of Huejutla. Such ranchos replaced the hacienda as the dominant form of commercial rural enterprise in much of the southern and intermediate zones of Huejutla. Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, the few estates in the southern zone that were still listed as haciendas (such as Crisolco or Cayahual, Santa Ana and Cuachiquitla) were similar in the way they were run as the larger ranchos set up by newcomers. Some of these newly established ranchos were even run by Indians. For example, when Joso Maria Lopez (listed as a natural of Yahualica) died in 1893, he left his 180-hectare rancho of Amatzintla, including a pasture of 20 hectares, three mules, a horse and a soap factory, to his three sons. Although many ranchos in the southern zone developed as a result of the sale or division of small haciendas, others were founded within the boundaries of communal land belonging to Indian pueblos or sections of privately owned estates that had previously been bought by Indian communities. Poorer Mestizos simply moved into Nahua villages and obtained permission to graze cattle, set up trapiches and cultivate maize on village commons, in exchange for participating in communal work or making cash contributions to cover the expenses of local ceremonies.3 Some of the descendants of these Mestizo newcomers were subsequently assimilated and became Nahua peasants in terms of both dress and speech. Other outsiders who set up businesses and farms located within the boundaries of Nahua pueblos maintained their own identity and guaranteed their access to communal land in a more formal legal manner by signing rental contracts or by buying sections of land that had originally been privately owned and then purchased by village corporations. For example, the Indian commune of Yahualica at various occasions 2 AHJPiH, "Declaration de Cesario Nochebuena, de Atlapexco, que fallecio su padre Don Jesus Ma Nochebuena y dejo testamento privado . . . ," 1880. These and most of the other references in this chapter to specific ranchos were taken from the same archive. A detailed index or list of documents (with short summaries), most of them protologos, has been prepared by the historical archives of the state judicial office (tribunal), in anticipation of a future transfer of these documents to the state capital. 3 There are many historical precedents of such non-Indians becoming members of Indian communities in the historical literature. During the colonial period, such outsiders simply became tributarios, and therefore legally Indians (see Ouweneel 1988, 165 n. 30). Of course, an official change in ethnic title was no longer required in the nineteenth century.

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rented out two ranchos, Tlatlasqueco and Aguatipan (located along the fertile banks of the Atlapexco River), to outsiders.4 While outsiders gained access to increasingly larger portions of communally owned land, subordinate Nahuatl villages (sujetos) also bought their own share of the pueblo commons in order to ensure more control over the land surrounding their communities. For example, in 1852, the Nahua village of Itzocal (in present day Atlapexco) bought their own share of communal land for five thousand pesos from the ayuntamiento (town council) of Yahualica, which at that time was dominated by Mestizo outsiders.5 This land, which had previously been communally owned by the republica de Indios of Yahualica, covered half of a mountainside (approximately three thousand hectares) corresponding to what is today part of the large ejido of Cochotla. Within the boundaries of such newly consolidated village lands, Indian peasants also set up their own small ranchos. Elsewhere in Huejutla, small haciendas (or colonial ranchos) evolved into separate ranchos through a process of internal division whereby the descendants of the original owners worked separate sections of land even though the estate might remain theoretically undivided. Many of these rural estates, such as Tecoluco Calpan (Huautla), Zitlan, Teacal and Tzactipan (Huejutla), were conduenazgos as described by George McCutcheon McBride (1971, 103104). For example, the small hacienda of Tultitlan (also referred to in archival records as a rancho) was already owned by numerous owners without separate titles when it was sold as a single estate in 1853, and again in 1871. By 1882 this estate, located in the southern part of what is today the municipio of Orizatlan, wasfinallysurveyed and in 1888 officially divided among its eighteen owners. A similar process of subdivision also took place in some large haciendas, such as that of San Felipe and San Antonio, both located in the municipio of Orizatlan. In these larger haciendas, numerous tenants and newcomers had already bought shares (acciones) and set up administrative committees to see to the affairs of such estates. In some cases, sections of such conduenazgos, or rights of possession (derechos), were sold to small groups of Indian peasants who lived within the boundaries of such estates. This is 4

These same lands had earlier been rented to Mestizo outsiders as well as Spaniards living in Yahualica and were subject to a series of legal disputes over payment of rent, illegal possession and boundary disputes. See "Los autos seguidos por Don Felipe Covos de . . . Yahualica con los Naturales de la mismo, sobre arrendamiento de tierras nombradas Tlatlasqueco y Chilminaya," AGN, Tierras, vol. 1344, exp. 4. 5 AHJPiH, "Protocolo respeto de unos terrenos Uamados Atotomoc que vendio H. Ayuntamiento de Yahualica a varios vecinos en 1852," 1939. By the turn of the century, this village was renowned for its production of lime, its abundant crops and the wealth of its leading Nahua citizens.

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how villages like Huexotitla and Hueytlale in Orizatlan obtained their own land. Similarly, the comun de indigenes of Huejutla also bought sections of the former rancho (or hacienda) of Panacaxtlan and Teacal, while a group of inhabitants of Coxhuaco (former barrio of the pueblo of Huejutla) also obtained their own communal land by buying a section of a small estate by the same name.6 Most of the rights to former haciendas were bought, however, by the descendants of the original Spanish owners of colonial ranchos or haciendas. Thus, several families (the Lara, Monterrubio, Rivera and Franco) set up ranchos within the boundaries of the "haciendas" of Vinasco, Tzactipan and Zitlan, and members from these same families also bought sections of land or shares in the former hacienda of San Felipe. The Rivera family also founded the completely Mestizo village of Huichapa.7 Some of these newcomers, as well as several foreigners (French or Italians who happened to pass through the region), intermarried with each other and with members of more powerful families in Huejutla who owned haciendas. In this manner, they obtained access to portions of larger landed estates located in the northern parts of Huejutla as well. These ranchers and farmers, and their numerous offspring, later set up additional ranchos and frequently built their houses in the villages of Cececapa, Zitlan or Cuatecomet, already inhabited by Nahuatlspeaking peasants. They also invited small groups of Nahuatl peasants, willing to work in local ranchos, to establish small settlements in places like El Chote, Tzinacatitla and Matachilillo. All of these villages are located in what I have already referred to as the intermediate zone. The owners of newly established ranchos depended on tenants to clear the dense vegetation through swidden cultivation in order to create pastures. They hired additional labor for the cutting and processing of sugar cane and other cash crops. By employing poorer peasants from Indian pueblos, or inviting their Indian day laborers to set up households on the owner's property, these rancheros established the same type of symbiotic but exploitative relations with Indian peasants as the small haciendas which they replaced. Mestizo newcomers who came to set up ranchos in Huejutla all learned Nahuatl, and their children all grew upfluentlybilingual because of their constant contact with the Indian population. They also became quite familiar, and often 6 The rancho of Coxhuaco (Quexhuaco) was originally owned in the early seventeenth century by Felipe Alvarado, an Indian cacique from Huejutla. AGN, Ramo de Tierras, vol. 541, exp. 5. In 1820, the comun of Jaltocan also bought the rancho of Tamalol from the owner of the hacienda of Santa Craz (then known as the hacienda of Tuzantlan). This rancho later became the Indian community of

La Corrala. AHJPIH. 7

Interview with Godofredo Rivera, Huichapa, January 14, 1987. The Rivera family originally came from San Martin in the neighboring state of San Luis Potosi.

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had to cope, with the administrative structures and the social organization of Nahua pueblos. Unlike the owners of local haciendas, however, the new owner-operators of such ranchos resided in or close to their rural properties. They were also engaged in a variety of productive activities themselves, especially those associated with taking care of cattle; the typical ranchero rode on horseback and was a proficient cow-hand. Many owners or tenants who operated such ranchos were also small merchants or skilled craftsmen who set up small businesses such as cutting wood, making soap (from tallow) or distilling liquor (from locally processed sugar loaf). Furthermore, they became involved in a variety of agricultural activities. These rancheros, who had quite a different lifestyle than usually absentee landowners, represented a kind of rural "middle class" or village elite. In a previous study, I argued that such rancheros became an important element in the agrarian structure of rural Mexico in the nineteenth century and referred to them as a ' 'peasant bourgeoisie" (Schryer 1980, chap. 2).

Indian Rancheros and the Emergence of Sociedades

Mestizo newcomers and a handful of foreigners were not the only ones who started raising livestock for sale, building small sugar mills (also called moliendas) or growing new cash crops with the help of day laborers. Better-off Nahua peasants also established small ranchos while others became increasingly involved in petty commerce. These wealthy Indians used surpluses of corn to fatten hogs for sale, and some owned cows that mingled with the cattle owned by Mestizos. Rich Indian peasants also employed their poorer neighbors as day laborers, manufactured soap from the tallow they made after slaughtering their pigs (just like their Mestizo counterparts) and produced sugar loaf for sale in regional market places. They transported such products on the backs of mules to more distant locations in the states of San Luis Potosi or Veracruz.8 Some of these better-off Indian peasants even became usurers who sold corn or lent money to less fortunate neighbors who experienced crop failures or sickness and early death in their families. The demand for new consumer items such as cotton cloth, petroleum and manufactured soap also made it necessary for otherwise relatively self-sufficient peasants to become more involved in occasional wage labor. This increasing purchase of goods enabled Nahua merchants to expand their operations and thus accu8 Interviews (in Nahuatl) with Michaela Tolentino Corralco and Josi Tranquilino Alaguna, in Tlalchiyahualica, April 1982; Maria Trinidad San Juan, in Olma, September 1982. Interview (in Spanish) with Amador Ramirez, Cuatapa (Atlapexco), June 1981.

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mulate capital, which was eventually used to buy ranchos or to initiate new commercial activities. The increasing commoditization of the economy at a time of increasing population accelerated this new form of internal class differentiation within Nahua pueblos. After 1856, a liberal decree on the national level (the Ley Lerdo) stipulated the dissolution of all remaining communally owned and other corporate lands. This law henceforth allowed both Indian and Mestizo rancheros in Huejutla to buy additional land or consolidate their ranchos. For example, the same year this law was passed, the town council of Yahualica auctioned off the small' 'hacienda'' of Tetectitla to one of its Spanish residents, Manuel del Rosal. Another piece of land, known as Texapa, was transferred to a French wine merchant called Vicente Violante who had moved to the village of Atlapexco.9 In 1857 Indian communities throughout Mexico also lost their special legal status as communal corporations as a result of a new constitution (see Fabila and Fabila 1978). Nevertheless, most Indian communities in Huejutla managed to retain most of their previously held commons intact. They did this through a series of legal procedures that enabled them to set up their own form of conduefiazgo, or co-ownership, usually as agricultural societies (sociedades agricolas).1° The authorities of most Indian communities, who retained considerable political as well as economic power within what were once separate Indian republics, now became the legal representatives of such agricultural societies (see also Escobar 1989, 20). In some parts of the southern region, Mestizo newcomers formed agricultural societies together with the representatives of Indian pueblos. For example, in 1875, a group of Spanish-speaking families settled in the village of Tehuetlan (Huejutla), a hamlet that belonged to the Indian pueblo of Ixcatlan. They then signed an agreement with their Indian neighbors to form a corporate partnership (sociedad) to exploit jointly the resources of this Indian commune (comiin de indigenas)." A similar agreement resulted in the formation of a corporation known as the "sociedad de la Hacienda de Huilotepec" » He acquired this rancho in the form of an adjudication (a title for land without a previous owner claimed by whoever takes possession of it). "· A sociedad is legally a private property owned by more than one person who together constitute socios or partners. In some cases, such sociedades originated in the joint purchase of an already existing privately owned estate by peasants who had already established their houses on such a property. This form of property was also commonly used by poor Mestizo peasants in other parts of northern Hidalgo (see Schryer 1980,44). 11 AHJPiH, "Escritura de convenio entre los indigenas de Yxcatlan y TehuetlSn con los Uamados de razon, constituyendose en sociedad," July 21, 1875. One of the terms of this agreement was that all partners had the same rights and obligations (including the obligation to cultivate their share of land).

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within the jurisdiction of the Nahua pueblo of San Francisco Amaxac.12 Sociedades with mainly Indian members were also established in Cuamontax (Huazalingo) and Chalingo (Huautla).13 In this way, Indian entrepreneurs were able to maintain access to a large portion of the pastures and forests that had once belonged to the Indian republics in the southern half of the region. While wealthy Indians continued to dominate village affairs, however, Mestizo newcomers started to influence public life on the regional level.

Ranchero Politics The same hacienda owners who ruled the region of Huejutla after Mexico became independent continued to dominate the social and political life of the district throughout the nineteenth century. Mestizo rancheros, however, already well entrenched in the smaller towns throughout the southern part of the region, started to play an increasingly more important role in political affairs. Most of the Mestizo rancheros who established themselves in the southern part of Huejutla, especially those rancheros who were originally from central Mexico, were liberals (i.e., anticlerical and in favor of local autonomy and the division of communal lands), just like their counterparts in the neighboring region of the Sierra de Jacala (see Schryer 1980, 70-71). These newcomers inevitably supported whatever radical movement or opposition developed on the state or national level. This was also true for a growing number of small merchants and artisans in the city of Huejutla. Small entrepreneurs (urban craftsmen and rural rancheros) not only supported the republican faction of Benito Juarez but took an active part in the armed struggle against the French army that occupied Mexico during the short-lived empire of Maximilian of Austria (1863-1867). The best-known historical figure, whose exploits are still celebrated in an annual festival in Huejutla, is Antonio Reyes (popularly known as "El Tordo"), a carpenter who lived in Barrio Arriba, one of several subdivisions of the city of Huejutla. Together with a small band of followers, he engaged in guerrilla warfare against French forces until his improvised troops won a decisive battle on May 21, 1866.14 12

AHJPiH, "Escritura de convenio celebrado por varios vecinos constituyindose en sociedad para disfrutar en propriedad los terrenos pertenecientes a los que antes se llamo comun de indigenas de San Francisco Tlamaxac," 1876. 13 AHJPiH, "Protocolos de instrumentos publicos," 1876 and 1885. 14 The military exploits of Antonio Reyes, recounted in a mimeographed essay written by a local schoolteacher (no name or date), were copied almost verbatim by Jose Garcia Uribe (1979, 129-32). These historical events are also reenacted every year in the city of Huejutla, on May 21.

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Various new municipios dominated by such Mestizo artisans and rancheros were soon established in the region. For example, Xochiatipan, a region completely dominated by rancheros, was made a municipio in 1867, and Huazalingo became a separate municipio in 1877, after it had been extinguished in 1871. The rancheros of Atlapexco seceded from Yahualica in 1871 but then disputed control over Yahualica when the two were again amalgamated in 1876. In 1870 rancheros also unsuccessfully tried to set up their own municipal government in Cuacuilco, but they did get their own juez consiliador. 1S In such municipios as Huautla and Huejutla, which also included sections of the northern zone, rancheros had to share public office with members of families who owned haciendas. At the same time that rancheros started to play a more prominent role in the political life throughout the region of Huejutla, the descendants of the old colonial bureaucracy who had once ruled Yahualica gradually lost their political influence. Here, prominent members of older (originally Spanish families), such as the Michel, Del Rosal, Rodriguez and Torres, who still ruled the southern half of this part of Huejutla after independence, gradually moved away. Many of them simply stayed in the state capital, Pachuca, where they owned houses and business ventures. These families did not own land in Yahualica during the colonial period, and only a few of them had set up their own ranchos. Their departure left room for the new class of rancheros to exercise greater political influence in this part of the southern zone, although Yahualica itself became politically less important. The poorer relatives of the former colonial elite, who stayed behind, continued to serve as the only scribes, public functionaries and teachers in a relatively isolated and still predominantly Indian region. For a while the cabecera of Yahualica continued to operate as the administrative center of a separate judicial district (without a jefe politico) within the larger administrative district of Huejutla; but this anomalous situation ended in 1870 when the position of juez de primera instancia of Yahualica was replaced with the less prestigious post of juez consiliador.l6 The city of Huejutla, which had already developed into the main regional market center, now became the sole seat of real administrative power as well. An increasing number of owners of haciendas or prosperous ranchos located in the northern zone started to live in this small city, leading to increasing disputes over land 15 Periodico Oficial del Estado de Hidalgo, no. 83 (Nov. 9), 1870. One of the men involved in this attempt to set up a new municipio, who later held the post of juez consiliador (in 1979) belonged to the same family of rancheros, the Amador family, who managed to set up their own municipio with the help of Nahuatl merchants in Jaltocan in 1936 (see chap. 8). 16 Periodico Oficial del Estado de Hidalgo no. 15 (Feb. 26, 1870).

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use with the Indian inhabitants who still lived in several outlying suburbs of Huejutla.17 These local landowners, together with Mestizos who set up their own settlements in the southern zone (or who moved into the centers of larger Nahua pueblos which had become municipal cabeceras), represented the increasing influence of the national culture in the predominantly Nahuatl-speaking southern region of Huejutla. Although important cabeceras like Huejutla and Yahualica had rustic one- or two-room schools going back to the colonial era, formal education was rapidly expanded to more remote Nahua and Mestizo communities throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century. For example, in the municipio of Yahualica (which at that time included Atlapexco), the following places had such schools: Yahualica, El Arenal, Atlapexco, La Mesa Larga, Hueyactetl, Atotomoc, Zoquitipan, Santa Teresa, Tecacahuaco and Tenexco.18 The last five were completely Indian corporate-type communities, although all of the teachers who worked there came from Mestizo towns or outside of the region. Such schools were mainly attended by the sons of wealthy Nahua peasants who were anxious that their children become bilingual.19

The Survival of the Nahua Corporate Community Despite the imposition of new legal forms, the influx of outsiders and the continuing impact of formal education and other aspects of the national society, Nahua communities, with their unique form of social organization and cultural values did not disappear as they did in other parts of rural Mexico. Mestizo rancheros, some of whom had already become members of Indian sociedades, continued to ally themselves with the Indian entrepreneurs of Nahua villages. Unlike their Mestizo counterparts, however, wealthy Nahua peasants participated actively in traditional religious ceremonies, which enabled them to become respected elders (tetatmej in Nahuatl) of Indian communities. Thus, while their economic relationships (as employers, merchants and landowners) with their economic subordinates were no different from those of the majority of Mestizo rancheros, these relationships were legitimized and expressed in culturally distinct ways. " AHJPiH, "pleito de tierras entre los de razon y los indios de Huejutla," 1882. 18 The existence of these schools and when they did or did not have preceptores are frequently mentioned in the monthly reports issued in the official state newspaper (Periodico Oficial). •» Interview with Ricardo Rodriguez, Yahualica, September 1981. This old Mestizo ranchero had taught in one of these schools prior to the revolution when he was still very young.

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In some cases such Indian rancheros or Indian members of agricultural societies helped their communities buy additional land (to which they held a proportionately larger share). These wealthy Indian families continued to expand their economic activities, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. For example, in the village of Cochiscoatitla (Atlapexco), Indian rancheros regularly sold cattle to butchers in the Mestizo town of Atlapexco. One of them, Juan Corralco, owned over a hundred head of cattle while Diego Isidro (from the same village) used to pay in advance in silver for the piloncillo (the same as pilon or sugar loaf) produced by other Indian peasants.20 These better-off Indians, who continued to dominate most former Nahua pueblos, were extremely reluctant to change the de facto communal forms of land tenure that continued under the guise of sociedades.21 For this reason, most Nahua towns opposed any further attempts to transform their commons into individually (as opposed to jointly) owned private property.22 They were able to preserve the status quo because the liberal land reform laws were not strictly applied or fully implemented in many parts of rural Mexico, until several decades after the passing of the Ley Lerdo in 1856 (see also Schenk 1986). Nevertheless, both the division of former communal land {terrenos de comun repartimiento) and its alienation to outsiders continued with renewed vigor under the regime of Porfirio Diaz, who consolidated his political power on the national level in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1888, all communal lands in the former alcaldia mayor of Yahualica were surveyed, and special land titles (called titulos de Anaya) were issued to all heads of households. Each title corresponded to sixteen hectares of land presumably already in the possession of its recipient and marked the limits of such properties in terms of metes and bounds. Most of these titles were registered in the name of individuals with Nahua surnames.23 This land reform, implemented by Loreto Anaya, jefe politico of Huejutla, legalized the de facto usurpation or purchase of formerly communal lands already in the pos20 Interview (in Nahuatl) with two older men in Cochiscoatitla, April 1982, and with Jose Francisco Pascual Tepanijtic in Tlalchiyahualica, December 1981. Interviews (in Spanish) with dona Chepita (grandmother of Jose Olivares), Atlapexco, September 1981, and with Antero Nochebuena, Atlapexco, June 1984. " This was mentioned by several older Nahuatl informants, including dona Michaela Corralco (the granddaughter of Nicolas Tolentino of Tlalchiyahualica), who was over ninety years old when I interviewed her in 1982. " See Periodico Oficial del Estado de Hidalgo, vol. 22 (March 29, 1883), which describes such resistance. 23 Many former landowners have shown me the original titulos de Anaya corresponding to the properties that were invaded in the 1970s (and which they have kept for future litigations or simply out of nostalgia); all of these titles were originally made out to people with Indian names, and they all bear the date of 1888.

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session of both Mestizo ranchers and wealthy Indian peasants. It also facili­ tated the further alienation of additional segments of former village lands. With only two exceptions (San Pedro, Huazalingo, and San Pedro Tamocal, Orizatlan), however, the inhabitants of Indian villages did not lose access to all of their community land. While the vast majority of Nahua corporate communities survived, the full implementation of the liberal land reform did result in further concentration of landownership. As soon as private tides were issued, poor Indian peasants who needed money for emergencies or ritual expenditures were able to sell the papers representing their ownership rights to wealthy Mestizo rancheros. For example, in 1888 and 1889 the inhabitants of the village of San Pedro (Huazalingo) handed over all of their titles to a priest, Jose Vicente Gonzales, who had already become increasingly involved in the economic and political affairs of the municipio of Huazalingo, while thirty-seven inhabitants of the Nahua village of Tecopia in the municipio of Xochiatipan sold their titles to Adolfο Murillo, a Spanish resident of the village of Crisolco and one of the co-owners of the hacienda of Cayahual located in the southern limits of Yahualica.24 Eight years later, sixty-one Nahua peasants from Santiago in the same municipio likewise sold their land titles to Preciliano Bustos, a name associated with a family who still owned large ranchos in 1970.25 Similar block sales are recorded for lands belonging to the inhabitants of the village of Xocotitla (to Isidro Bustos), also in Xochiatipan, and San Pedro Tamocal, whose communal lands formed a small enclave within the northern zone, dominated by haciendas.26 Most of these peasants, who sold their titles, were allowed to continue to use their land for nominal rents until such time that their owners decided to raise rents or transform the land to more profitable use. 24 AHjpiH, "escritura de venta de los terrenos de la seccion de San Pedro, Mpio. de Huazalingo, otorgado por 130 personas a favor del Sr. Cura Don Jose Vicente Gonzalez por 2208 pesos,'' October 22, 1889; "escritura de venta hecha por los sefiores Juan Hernandez, Martin de San Juan, Francisco Hdez . . . (et al.) . . . a favor del Sr. Adolfo Murillo, vecino de Crisolco . . . por 336 pesos," September 30, 1888. 25 AHJPIH, "Mpio. Xochiatipan, otorgado por igual no. de vecinos a don Preciliano Bustos . . . por 600 pesos," November 15, 1897. 26 AHJPIH, "escritura de compra venta de una portion de los terrenos de la seccion de Xocotitla del municipio de Xochiatipan de extension como de 57 fanegas de sembradura de maiz otorgado por 33 vecinos de dicha seccion cuyos nombres constan en el cuerpo de esta misma escritura a favor de Sr. Isidro Bustos por 570 pesos," November 15, 1898. Another block sale was also recorded for all of the communally owned land of the only originally Indian communal village in the northern zone. "Escritura de venta de terrenos de San Pedro Tamocal del municipio de Orizatlin por 49 personas, vecinos del mismo punto de San Pedro Tamocal, a favor del Sr. JesusS. Careta de esta vecindad . . . por 4 mil pesos," January 20, 1897.

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Over the next few decades, many individual titles also changed hands, not only from Nahua peasants to Mestizo rancheros (and in a few cases, former hacendados), but also from poor peasants to wealthy peasants within Nahua villages, and even to Nahua landowners who lived in other villages. For example, in the rancheria of Tlalchiyahualica (located across the river that flows along the western edge of the meseta of Yahualica), several prominent Indian farmers accumulated up tofiveor six titulos de Anaya prior to the revolution. Most of these prominent farmers, who became private landowners, such as Felix Tranquilino Alaguna, Nicolas Tolentino and Diego Tlajcocaltitla, owned mules and horses, made soap, processed pilon and raised some cattle.27 The De la Cruz family similarly set up ranchos within communal land originally allocated to the pueblo of Yahualica and later started buying land in the neighboring village of Mecatlan. Most of these wealthy Nahua peasants, who employed their poor neighbors and relatives as peons, continued to live in larger Nahua villages, although in a few cases, Nahua peasants who acquired titulos later built houses within the boundaries of their own properties. This was the case for Jose Julian Tzintepetzintla, who built his house in Osohuijco, overlooking the valley of Atlapexco, halfway between his native village, Paajtla, and one of its affiliated hamlets called Santo Tomas.28 Despite the complete transformation of all communal land in the former district of Yahualica into private property, sections of de facto communal land remained intact. In many Nahua villages, all or part of the new private land titles were kept in trust by a single village representative. Villages that did this, such as Santa Teresa (Yahualica) or Tecacahuaco (Atlapexco), paid their land taxes as a single unit, although there were still differences in the amount of land cultivated by the members of such villages. Wealthy members of such communities actually bought and sold some of the land titles, but only to members of their own community. In other cases, the representatives of Nahua villages bought sections of land in common and continued to register such land in the form of a corporate partnership or sociedad, as they had done in the past. For example, representatives of the village of Tlalchiyahualica bought titles from poorer peasants who needed extra cash and then registered such land in the name of the entire village to prevent the sale of additional land to outsiders. They then set aside a section of communal land that acted as a reserve for the village poor. Such land could be used by anyone for 27 Interview (in Spanish) with Francisco Martinez Cuaxocotzintla, March 1982; (in Nahuatl) with Manuel Andres Tepanijtic, June 1984; Josi Francisco Pascual Tepanijtic, June 1984; Juan Miguel Lara Tepanijtic, May 1985, all in Tlalchiyahualica. 28 Interview (in Spanish) with Erasmo Rodriguez, May 1981, and with Pascual Ruiz, May 1985, both in Yahualica.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

subsistence cultivation or gathering firewood. Land taxes for such commons were paid collectively as one lump sum payment, while wealthier Indians who had established ranchos were individually responsible for keeping their papers in order and keeping up with municipal dues charged to property owners.29 In the southern part of the municipio of Huejutla (which then included JaItocan), communal land tenure continued as a de jure as well as a de facto form of land tenure. Here the liberal land reform was introduced in a different manner. Some communal Indian village corporations, such as Panacaxtlan (which then included Chililico as an anexo) were already registered as conduefiazgos prior to 1856.30 Other Nahuatl villages continued to operate as sociedades. In any case, members of such corporate villages were allowed to sell or trade individual plots of land to each other and even to outsiders. These transactions were recorded and approved by a juez consiliador. However, only a small number of very wealthy farmers had such titles properly registered as legal deeds with a notary public in the city of Huejutla. As in the area partitioned under Loreto Anaya, only wealthier landowners (both Nahua and Mestizo) paid property taxes in an individual manner.3' Thus, wealthy Nahuatl peasants in many places managed to maintain both political and economic control. At the same time, the liberal land reform laws gave the state's blessing to an already ongoing process of internal class differentiation. With the commoditization of land and the further development of commercial agriculture, many scholars would expect the Indian closed corporate communities to disappear quickly. Chapter 2 has already demonstrated that the predicted demise of the corporate community is unwarranted; the introduction of private ownership of land, internal class inequalities and even Mestizo encroachment are compatible with the continuation of the traditions and administrative structures dating back to the republicas de Indios of colonial Mexico. This can be shown by the history of Nahua communities in Huejutla after the liberal reform. Not only did Nahua communities preserve their own identity, but even Mestizo landowners continued to recognize the boundaries of Indian pueblos which defined the spheres of influence of Nahua authorities. In part, the administrative structures (including some aspects of land ten's Interview with Reyes Baltazar, Tlalchiyahualica, March I, 1982. *> AHJPiH, "Protocolo de instrumentos publicos," 1855. A brief description in this inventory mentions the sale of the lands of Panacaxtlan. In 1950, the comun de indigenas of Huejutla also bought part of the rancho of Tepotztequito, which now belongs to the village of Chiquemecatitla. 3' Interviews with Flavio Crespo Redondo, Huejutla, June 18,1985; Apoleyo Viniegra, Tehuetlan, May 30, 1985.

The Changing Class Structure

ιοί

ure) of Nahua communities remained intact due to the passive resistance of the majority of Nahua peasants. The survival of the closed corporate com­ munity also coincided, however, with the class interests of both wealthy In­ dian families and Mestizo rancheros. These Mestizos, who had already learned to manipulate the cultural values and social institutions of Nahua so­ ciety, realized that communal boundaries had to do not only with rights of access to land but with judicial authority. Since political control in Nahua communities was organized in a highly centralized and even authoritarian fashion (despite the constant rotation of public posts), informal alliances be­ tween Mestizo landowners and the wealthy Indians who controlled their own communities could serve the economic interests of an emerging ranchero elite. For example, Nahua authorities continued to recruit communal labor for their own benefit as well as for their more powerful Mestizo counterparts, just like the caciques or principales of Indian republics had done in the colonial era. Such communal labor (the faena, usually performed on Mondays), which had originally been part of the tribute exacted by Spanish rulers, continued to be used for the upkeep or building of new mule trails, and for the construction and maintenance of the new government buildings (palacio municipal), town squares and schools buildings.32 Wealthy Nahua peasants who lived in former administrative centers of Indian republics also directly benefited from such communal labor.

Haciendas and Nahua Communities in the Northern Zone According to oral history, the wealthy owners of large haciendas in the northern zone, as well as prosperous rancheros of recent European descent who settled in places like Vinasco and Huichapa, either did not play a prom­ inent role in the fight against the French in the 1860s or actually supported the conservative faction allied to the French. Nevertheless, this economic elite did not lose its political influence after the second military district of the state of Mexico became the state of Hidalgo in 1869. Although some northern haciendas were partitioned among numerous co-owners and shareholders, others remained virtually intact. The owners of some of these haciendas also 32 Interviews (in Nahuatl) with two older men in Cochiscoatitla and with Fortunato Aguado in Tepetitla, both in April 1982; Nicolas Ortega Limantzintla, in Cuautenahuatl, May 1985. Interviews (in Spanish) with Jose Tolentino Gregorio in Tlalchiyahualica, March 1982; Clementis Ramirez, Pepeyocatitla, May 1984; Bulfrano Gonzalez Ochoa, Tlatzonco (Huazalingo), May 1985; Antonio Hernandez Mendoza, May 1986.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

bought small ranchos or sections of conduenazgos in other parts of Huejutla. Members of prominent landowning families, who consistently reasserted their political control after every major coup d'etat or rebellion, continued to hold important public posts on the regional level right up until the turn of the century. For example, Jesus Andrade, the owner of several haciendas and sometimes referred to as "the patriarch of the Huasteca," appeared as jefe politico in 1870 and was elected as diputado (member of congress) in 1873 and again in 1875.33 One of his relatives, Felipe Andrade, was municipal president of Huejutla in 1875 and then occupied various minor posts throughout the rest of the Porfiriato. The fact that this same Andrade acts as spokesperson or legal representative of various Nahua communities in the southern zone shows that the hacienda elite knew how to obtain political clients among the Indian population in both the northern and southern zones of Huejutla. I suspect that such hacendado politicians were probably willing to lend their support to any Indian pueblos who might not get along with their more radical Mestizo neighbors. Like their ranchero neighbors, the owners of northern haciendas benefited from the economic development of the larger Huasteca region. The growth of such regional urban centers as Ciudad Valles and Tampico meant an increasing demand for such local commodities as pilon, cattle and maize which could be transported from Huejutla by mule trains. The building of a railroad from Tampico to the city of San Luis Potosi and the drilling of oil wells off the Gulf coast around the turn of the century further stimulated the economic development of the entire Huasteca, even in such isolated regions as Huejutla (Stresser-Pean 1965). The owners of haciendas probably had a competitive advantage vis a vis the rancheros when it came to agricultural production because they controlled more land, often located in slightlyflatterterrain. The larger hacendados also owned assets in other parts of Mexico and in Tampico and probably had better connections with the government of Porfirio Diaz in Mexico City. This privileged position of the more prominent local hacienda owners could account for their less enthusiastic involvement in the campaign against the French (if this was indeed the case) and the renewed frictions between rancheros and hacendados that were to develop later on. Around the turn of the century, however, rancheros and hacienda owners still maintained a kind of peaceful coexistence, sometimes based on economic partnerships. The system of land tenure and economic infrastructure of the northern zone 33

Periodico Oficial del Estado de Hidalgo, nos. 10 & 18 (1870); April 30 (1871); April 10 and 24, July 17 and August 21 (1872); May 10 (1873); Aug. 3 (1875); April 26 (1880); May 29 (1879); Sept. 16 (1883).

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103

of Huejutla (and, to a lesser extent, the larger ranchos in the intermediate zone) continued to be different from the ranchero economy of the southern, formerly communal zone. Most of the northern part of Huejutla experienced the same development of agricultural and other commercial activities as other parts of the region, until commercial agriculture became just as important as the raising of cattle in the latter part of the nineteenth century. However, this process of economic diversification was reflected not in a process of internal class differentiation but rather, in an increasing number of Indian laborers living in such haciendas. Although I could not find any population figures for individual haciendas or rancherias located within the boundaries of northern haciendas, this increase in the Indian population is reflected in the overall increase of population for the region of Huejutla during the Porfiriato (from 27,000 in 1882 to 69,278 in 1895 alone)34 as well as the large number of hacienda villages at the beginning of the twentieth century compared to their almost total absence at the end of the eighteenth century. Although some of the original colonial estates were partially fragmented through a combination of sale and inheritance, the remaining portions of such northern haciendas were still large enough by the last quarter of the nineteenth century to include at least several settlements of Nahua peons and sharecroppers. These peons continued to build their houses within the boundaries of northern haciendas and were allowed to grow milpas on their employee's estates in return for labor rents. Clusters of such houses soon became small hamlets or even small villages. However, these residents were not allowed to organize their own religious celebrations or build chapels. Unlike most rancheros, the owners of these large agricultural estates maintained a distinctive (more "sophisticated") lifestyle. They also continued to use a combination of wage labor and noncapitalist forms of surplus extraction on their farms and ranches. The most important haciendas in the district of Huejutla around the turn of the century, just prior to the Mexican Revolution, were those owned by various members of the Andrade family. The most prominent member of that family, Jesus Andrade, owned the large hacienda of El Cartucho, located in the northern half of the present municipio of San Felipe Orizatlan, La Candelaria (Huejutla), as well as other haciendas in the neighboring states of San Luis Potosi and Veracruz. Some members of this family also acquired additional small properties (ranchos) in the southern zone, within the boundaries of the Indian community of Ixcatlan (Garcia Lopez 1986, 45), while others owned such northern haciendas as La Carolina (also in San Felipe) and the 34

These were the only census figures published in the Periodico Oficial.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

hacienda of Santa Cruz (in Huejutla). Another important hacienda, owned by the Careta and Zolueta families, was that of Tepotzteco, whose casco (center) was located only ten minutes on horseback from the city of Huejutla. This hacienda included the Nahua villages of Chalahuiyapan, Huitzachahual, Osoluama, El Zapote and Los Otates (see figure 5). The Careta family also owned numerous other rural estates: the hacienda of Tamocal (in the northern half of Orizatlan), portions of the haciendas of San Antonio and la Herradura (both already divided among a number of co-owners since 1882),35 Coyuco, Santa Catarina and the somewhat smaller haciendas of Cruztitla, Zohuala and La Mesa de Limantitla (also known as Ecuatitla). Several smaller haciendas, including Santa Ana and what remained of the hacienda of Nexpa, were also located in what is today the municipio of Orizatlan. Finally, further to the west, in the northeastern corner of the municipio of Huautla, were the haciendas of Tamoyon and El Aguacate. The latter, which was also well over two thousand hectares, included the rancherias of Aguacate, El Lindero, Tepeco, El Ixtle, El Pajonal and Chiliteco. This last hacienda, which originally belonged to a priest, was bought by the Castelan family, who were to dominate both the economic and political life of the municipio of Huautla for over fifty years.36 The Indians who had migrated to this section of the region throughout the second half of the colonial period and the first half of the nineteenth century formed communities of workers and tenants who maintained their own language and many customs relating to marriage feasts and healing ceremonies. However, sharecroppers who lived in such hacienda communities, regardless of ethnicity, were required to provide two or three days of labor for the landowners in return for the rights to cultivate corn plots (usually done on the weekends) and collectfirewood.37In some cases peons could also graze a few animals on the hacienda owner's land. In most northern haciendas, as well as many of the larger ranchos established in the intermediate zone, peasants also had the obligation to work an additional two days at afixedwage established 35 AHJPiH, "hipoteca general de la Hda de Herradura por conduenos de la misma," August 9, 1882. Information about other haciendas was from numerous references in this archive and through oral history. Most of these haciendas, whose value was usually measured in terms oipesos primitives, were also mentioned in various maps in documents in the State Agrarian Commission (Comision Agraria Mixta). 36 Interview with Primo Hernandez Vite, Huautla, April 30, 1983. The hacienda of Tamoyon is mentioned in colonial archives as well as more recent documents. 37 Information about such labor rents were obtained through numerous interviews in both Nahuatl and Spanish with older informants who had lived in such haciendas prior to 1920 (see also Stiles 1982, 46). I assume that the relations of production in such haciendas would not have changed that much between the end of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century.

FIGURE 5. The Hacienda of Tepotzteco (circa 1890)

Ιθ6

H I S T O R I C A L BACKGROUND

by the landowner (as a condition for access to land for subsistence cultiva­ tion). Such obligations, which were still used in some parts of the region of Huejutla well into the 1960s, contrast sharply with communal villages where neither poor nor rich Indian peasants had to pay labor rents for growing their milpas. In addition, villages located within the boundaries of such haciendas had to provide a number of men or women to work as servants or maids in the home of the owner (usually located in the city of Huejutla) on a rotational basis. Such workers, who had to serve a week at a time, were called semaneros. Traditional obligations had to be met even after local haciendas were di­ vided among several co-owners or when part or all of such haciendas were sold to new owners. For example, the obligation to work in the house of the owner continued when the wealthiest hacendado, Don Jesus Andrade, sold one of his estates, called the Hacienda of La Candelaria, to Felix Cerecedo in 1866.38 Although this new owner proceeded to set up a more sophisticated small sugar mill that produced refined sugar, a small irrigation system and new pastures, the inhabitants of the villages of La Candelaria and Homotitla (located within the boundaries of this hacienda) had to work in the same man­ ner as in other northern estates with more backward technology.39 According to older peasants still alive in 1986, the same form of labor practices, com­ bined with a paternalistic policy of occasional gift-giving and fiestas spon­ sored by the owner, were also practiced in the hacienda of Tamoyon in Huautla.

The Political Role of Nahua Indians Exactly what political role was played by the predominantly Nahuatlspeaking population during the nineteenth century, especially Indian leaders in the southern zone, is difficult to ascertain. Newspapers articles dealing with congressional debates concerning local government suggest that indige­ nous people were almost completely excluded from the running of municipal government.40 However, a larger number of documents relating to the ap­ pointment of prominent lawyers in Huejutla as legal representatives of vari'" AHJPiH, ' 'Convenio de venta de Hda de Candelaria a favor de Don Felix Cerecedo por don Jesus Andrade for 3000 pesos," October 11, 1866. » Interview with Cresencia Tobar, in Atlapexco, November 1981. She lived in this hacienda at the beginning of the twentieth century after these technical improvements had already been carried out (by Lucio Cerecedo, probably the son of the original purchaser). 40 See Documento Parlamentario del Estado de Hidalgo, April 30, 1870.

The Changing Class Structure

107

ous Indian communities indicate that Nahua authorities were quite capable of working through the legal system to defend their land claims or to ensure the implementation of the liberal land reform laws in their own favor. Such Indians certainly must have played a prominent role in the affairs of numerous larger Nahua communities. It has been seen how wealthier Indian peasants maintained political control over most Nahua communities and how they also became merchants and landowners in their own right. In some of these communities, like Chiquemecatitla, such community leaders must have played a major role in the joint purchase of former hacienda lands and in defending such land from usurpation by outsiders. The fact that the names of specific Indians do not appear in the historical records dealing with important military or political events does not mean that they were politically uninvolved in broader movements. According to oral tradition, the inhabitants of the Indian pueblo of Ixcatlan participated in the guerrilla warfare waged against the French, and it was they, not the Mestizo artisans, who defeated the occupation forces in Huejutla after the "Tordo" was mortally wounded.41 Despite such military capacity, however, there were no separate Indian rebellions (not even very minor ones) during the Porfiriato anywhere in Huejutla, although Nahua Indians undoubtedly became involved in both military and political conflicts involving rival factions led by rival rancheros or hacendados. I have not come across any archival or oral evidence of agrarian uprisings either then or during the period of civil war starting in 1910. Poor Mestizo and Nahua peasants in the region did not initiate an open class struggle against commercial landowning farmers and ranchers until the 1970s, fifty years after the end of the Mexican Revolution. *' Interview with Dr. Julio Ortega, Pachuca, Saturday, January 28, 1989. This man traveled extensively in the region of Huejutla in the 1950s and 1960s, where he interviewed the gobemador of Ixcatlan, among others.

Chapter 6 Peasant Quiescence: Ecology, Relations of Production and Factional Politics

Why were there no peasant uprisings (i.e., overt class conflicts) in the region of Huejutla during the entire one-hundred-year period from 1870 to 1970, despite the existence of inequalities in economic and political power as well as ethnic discrimination? The answer to this question requires an investigation of the ecological and demographic factors that shaped the agrarian structure of the Huasteca of Hidalgo. During most of the nineteenth and at least the first half of the twentieth centuries, the system of production in both the northern and southern halves of Huejutla was based on the stable coexistence of subsistence cultivation with commercial agriculture and cattle raising. Such ecological equilibrium is not necessarily incompatible with political turmoil or economic exploitation. Indeed, economic class relations in Huejutla were characterized by a mixture of overall paternalism and brief but sporadic outburst of outright confiscation. As in the neighboring state of San Luis Potosi, described by Romana Falcon (1984), it was not unusual for landowners to usurp land and labor from Indian communities in one region yet act as protectors and patrons for those in other regions or in their own home territory. The examples of more dramatic cases of open exploitation of some peasants by individual landowners or politicians, especially during periods of political turmoil and labor shortages, must therefore be seen in a broader context of a region that had the natural resources that allowed most peasants to make more than a basic living most of the time.

The Ecological Basis of Peasant Quiescence in Huejutla The relatively low density of population of this largely mountainous region, combined with a very lush cover of vegetation and abudant wild game, have been described by various travelers who visited the Huasteca of Hidalgo

Peasant Quiescence

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during the nineteenth century (see Soto 1856, 39-69). These ecological conditions meant that competition for access to land was not nearly as severe as it was in other parts of Mexico. Everyone, including the poorest Indian peasants, could, using the simple technology of swidden or slash-and-burn agriculture, cultivate at least enough corn to satisfy their basic subsistence needs. Moreover, the abundant wild game of the forests and teeming fish of local rivers provided additional sources of protein. Whenever harvests failed, due to lack of rain, excessive drought or locusts, poor and rich peasants suffered alike. Some landowners, of course, were able to move to their city houses in other regions, but a combination of poor communication and the humid conditions of the region also meant that they were unable to store grain for speculative sale in times of need. Profits were mainly earned during years of plenty.

Milpa Production

The peasants in the Huasteca of Hidalgo today still use the swidden or slash-and-burn technique in their milpas, even in relatively flat areas of land. It is important to note that this form of cultivation is very sensitive to population density; it is only productive as long as sufficient fallow land is available. This was certainly the case in Huejutla up until at least i960. One indication that this technology is no longer viable is the adoption of more intensive cultivation techniques, such as plough cultivation if and when these techniques become readily available. With a few exceptions, only in the last ten years are local peasants starting to turn to such alternative techniques. Although plough cultivation was introduced much earlier by Mestizo rancheros in some of the flatter parts of the region, it never became an important component of agricultural technology (unlike the more densely populated neighboring highland region).' Older informants from both former hacienda communities and villages in the southern zone consistently spoke about the abundance of timber and wild 1

Plough cultivation was used in some parts of the slightly higher-lying region of Huazalingo (in San Pedro) prior to the revolution as well as in the rancho of Antonio Tobar in Atlapexco, but here the use of the plough was abandoned after the revolution. The only region where I was told plough cultivation continued for a while after the revolution was the Vinasco area, but here ploughmen (gananes) had to be imported from the Sierra region. Ploughing was also carried out in the area of Vinasco and Huichapa in the 1940s and 1950s, but only for the preparation of tobacco fields, which became an important cash crop in this part of Huejutla. Landowners who had the capital outlay necessary to undertake plough cultivation in other parts of Huejutla also found out that this method was too risky because most of the flat land in the valley bottoms of Huejutla was too susceptible to periodic flooding or subject to poor drainage.

HO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

game as well as a high level of productivity of swidden corn cultivation dur­ ing the first quarter of this century. Apart from occasional crop failure due to excessive rainfall or drought, corn yields were normally at least three times greater than they are today. For example, depending on the quality of the soil and the nature of the terrain, ι cuartillo (5 liters or 3½ kilos) of corn sown used to yield anywhere from 10 to 35 cargas (where each carga contains 24 cuartillos or a total of 84 kilos). By the 1970s, the yield had dropped to any­ where from ι to 6 cargas per cuartillo.2 In fact, maize was so abundant in the past that, prior to 1910, many peasants only cultivated one crop per year.3 At that time corn was sill stored in special storage huts (cuescomitl) located at the actual site of cultivation. These milpas (the name given to any cultivated plot) were also rotated fairly frequently within a certain circumscribed area. Apart from maize, beans and squash (calabazas), a great variety of edible plants (quelites) and herbs were also grown in the milpas or collected in the forests. Another important milpas crop was cotton; at one point cultivated so that local women could make cloth as part of the tribute payment owed the Spanish crown, by the nineteenth century it was still sown to make the thick cotton jackets and pants used by the local population. This combination of plentiful natural resources and subsistence activities made the local popula­ tion hypothetically almost self-sufficient. The expansion of new ranchos in the southern zone did not put undue pres­ sures on the ability of poorer peasants to secure their livelihood.4 In contrast, the presence of rancheros offered a greater choice of potential patrons and intermediaries in a society that depended at least partially on external sources for manufactured items or produce from other areas. No longer did Nahua peasants have to depend only on local hacendados or a few wealthy Indians for part-time employment or assistance in times of scarcity or in case of emer­ gencies. Mestizo merchants also brought manufactured cloth (mantas), made in the factories of Puebla and other central Mexican states, which gradually replaced local home-spun cotton. It was less time consuming to raise some additional household animals or earn money to buy cloth than to produce it 2 Older informants from different parts of the region gave me surprisingly consistent estimates for corn yields when they were young. 3 This and other information about the economic history of the area is based on approximately eighty interviews (conducted in both Nahuatl and Spanish) with mainly older informants in various locations between 1981 and 1987. 4 This is not unusual for a region with a combination of low population density and the use of slash-and-burn agriculture. The association between long fallow or forest slash-and-burn agriculture and low population density has been made Esther Boserup (1965).

Peasant Quiescence

ill

oneself. This especially saved work for women, although women continued to use the manufactured cloth to hand-sew all of the white cotton shirts and pants that most Indians and Mestizos wore at that time. By the turn of the century, population must have gone up sufficiently to influence the methods of cultivation in Huejutla. By 1910 most peasants in the region were already cultivating two rather than one harvest a year. The most important corn crop was the one sown around June (this was later shifted to the end of May) just before the onset of the rainy season. The second, usually less secure crop was sown late in the fall (usually December), just prior to the onset of a period of lighter, usually intermittent rainfall. Whenever possible, the first crop, called temporal (in Spanish) ovxopamili (in Nahuatl), was cultivated on hillsides to avoid damage from too much water since the many rivers and streams that traverse the region usually overflowed their banks during the two periods of heaviest precipitation (June and September). In contrast, the second crop (called tonalmili by members of both ethnic groups) was more frequently cultivated on the flatter terrain of small river valleys in soil that was more likely to retain moisture during a normal dry spell.5 This system of subsistence production was an integral part of a complex of economic activities that formed the basis of both the hacienda and ranchero economies prior to 1930. In both zones, the slash-and-burn cultivation of maize created the pastures needed by cattle producers. The relationship between members of different economic classes in both subzones was simultaneously exploitative and symbiotic (from an outsider's perspective), although the opportunities for individual upward mobility for poor peasants were greater in the southern zone. Here, hard-working peasants could improve their economic standing by cultivating additional corn for sale in local markets or by engaging in other economic activities such as commerce, crafts or small rural industries. The subsequent dissolution of haciendas in the northern zone also provided new opportunities to former peons, some of whom bought cattle. Before the haciendas disappeared, however, even northern peasants were able to produce enough surplus corn to fatten pigs and other domestic animals. This combination of animal production and swidden maize cultivation in both zones produced a unique form of landscape that was characteristic of the Huasteca of Hidalgo. 5 Theoretically, the first corn crop should be sown on May 24, although there is some flexibility in the schedule of both harvests, and, when a particular crop is lost soon after planting due to lack of rainfall, most peasants try sowing again at a later date.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Cattle Production

Both before and after the Mexican Revolution, most of the cattle, together with horses and mules, roamed freely along the banks of rivers, through the forests and in natural pastures created in areas that had been cleared of trees. Chickens, pigs, goats and donkeys likewise grazed freely on the fringes and even inside villages and towns throughout the region. Any thoroughfares were separated from house plots and their tiny orchards with rows of low, wooden stakes. To keep animals out of milpas, provisional fences (made of stone, wood and eventually barbed fence wire) were built around the area being cultivated (rather than the other way around). Large extended families or groups of neighbors would all cultivate their crops in the same area and collaborate in the building of fences as well as in the labor of weeding and harvesting. These fences were then opened to allow cattle to graze on the dry stocks left over after the harvest, until scrubland and secondary forest again invaded this land. In some areas, long stone fences (pretiles) were also put up halfway along mountain slopes to mark off a more permanent division between land normally used for rotating swidden cultivation (usually along hillsides) and sections of land where the cattle could roam freely. Occasionally, cornfields were also planted in the dry season within lower pasture zones, but extra work had to be done to construct wooden palisades. Sugarcane fields and their corresponding moliendas were usually located in hillier and drier sections. Apart from open, communal pastures (which were also found within the boundaries of privately owned haciendas), smaller, enclosed pastures were created for milking cows and for a small percentage of yearlings chosen for fattening prior to slaughter or sale. These enclosed pastures, set up within haciendas and some privately owned ranchos, had to be carefully managed (kept free from weeds and protected from overgrazing). The most common type of grass (zacate) sown in such pastures was para. The rest of the cattle, which were branded for identification and left to wander freely in the open, usually returned to their owners' homestead or the nearest village square to lick salt bars set out for them in the evening. For example, in the rancho of Tepotzteco (part of the hacienda by the same name), nearly a thousand head of cattle used to congregate every evening after the ringing of a special bell, although an equal number strayed miles away to be rounded up periodically by horsemen. Cattle owners who lived in small towns located on mountain tops or high up on mountain slopes (such as Huazalingo and Yahualica) drove their milk cows up along narrow paths and tethered them in front of thenhouses or in the village square.

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Although the system of production described above applied to both Nahua and Mestizo communities, there was some ethnic division of labor prior to 1930. Although Nahuatl-speaking peasants raised and slaughtered pigs and used pack-animals, such specialized tasks as milking cows, castrating bulls and taming horses, as well as such associated skills as using a lasso, were generally done by Mestizos. The Indians' lack of knowledge of these skills can be explained by the fact that the more agriculturally oriented Nahua peasants tended to raise pigs and goats while hacienda owners always hired Mestizo (and in the early colonial period black) cowboys for tending cattle. Later, most cattle raising in the southern zone was still done by Mestizo rancheros who either did these tasks themselves or hired their poorer relatives. The wives and daughters of most rancheros also learned these skills and did most of the milking. In contrast, wealthier Nahua peasants who later took up cattle production generally left their cattle to graze in the open until they were ready to be sold to Mestizo dealers. Although they were not experienced cowhands, such Nahua peasants did learn how to handle teams of oxen in sugar milling operations. While Mestizos rancheros tended to specialize in cattle raising, members of both ethnic groups were involved in the rest of the principal productive activities of the region. Both Mestizos and Indians cultivated corn using either machetes (especially in the flatter areas to the north) or a short-curved, allpurpose implement called a huingaro (used on steep slopes and on rocky terrain), and both engaged in reciprocal labor-exchanges or the occasional hiring of peones (peons or day laborers), depending on their position in the class structure. At that time, as today, the proportion of Nahuatl-speaking peasants who continued to work as unskilled day laborers during their entire lives was probably greater than that of their Mestizo counterparts. However, even the children of landowning Mestizo rancheros participated in this type of manual labor, even into the 1950s, at least until they were old enough to learn other tasks. Members of both ethnic groups also cultivated and then processed sugarcane to make sugar loaf (pilon or panela), using wooden mills called trapiches.6 Wealthy Nahua peasants even set up the same type of small liquor stills (alambiques) that were run by Spanish-speaking members of the local elite. 6 Sugar cane is locally processed in small mills known as moliendas, using a contraption called a trapiche which has two revolving wheels to crush the cane stocks. Initially all these trapiches were made from wood by local artisans, until the introduction of a metal, manufactured substitute (trapiche defierro). The trapiche is set in motion by means of a long, horizontal pole hitched to a team of oxen or mules. The resulting sap is first boiled in low vats (originally copper) and then poured into molds where the sap hardens into sugar loaf (pilon or piloncillo).

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Ecology and Class Relations: The "Moral Economy" This system of production, which involved members of both ethnic groups, can explain the quasi-symbiotic, paternalistic relations between workers and their employers, between tenants and landowners or between subsistence cultivators and commercial farmers (or ranchers), even in periods of rapid commercial expansion. In the northern zone, where hacendados owned most of the land, large employers could afford to remunerate their seasonal and permanent labor force at very low monetary costs by giving them access to land for subsistence cultivation in return for labor. However, given the relatively small size of these haciendas, and the fact that they were located in what was in many ways still a frontier region, landowners were not in as strong a bargaining position with peasants as their counterparts in more densely populated regions of the highland plateau, which required irrigation or plough cultivation. The characteristics of the local productive system and its ecological basis can explain what Romana Falcon (1984, 51) calls the "complex vertical relations" between Indians and non-Indians in regions like the Huasteca. Falcon (p. 50) frequently mentions the strong paternalism on the part of the landowners in other parts of the Huasteca, yet she notes how the poor Indians were obligated to offer all kinds of free labor to "caciques, landowners and government functionaries." She states that such relations had their roots in "traditional forms of domination" going back a long way, thus suggesting that they were done almost automatically because of the internalization of an ideology of ethnic stratification. James Scott (1985, 306-308), however, has pointed out that it might well serve the economic interest of landowners to "be kind" and offer help to their peasants in times of hardship as a way of ensuring a timely and reliable mobilization of labor. Only peasants with some degree of bargaining power could systematically exert moral pressures on landowners to comply with their own paternalistic ideology. This is the other side of the "moral economy," a concept used by various students of peasant society to refer to a system of values that emphasizes the obligations of landowners to provide their economic subordinates with the means to a basic level of subsistence and to help them out in time of need (Scott 1976). Edward Thompson (1971), who first used this term, has pointed out that the same set of paternalistic norms that landowners use to legitimize thenclass position also provides the underpinnings for peasant unrest, once local patrons are no longer able or willing to provide emergency relief, or once they surpass the culturally defined limits of surplus extraction (without' 'giving anything in return"). Falcon gives the impression that Indian peasants

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often willingly provided free labor to landowners in the Huasteca. She does not specify that such "automatic" compliance probably reflected the viewpoint of landowners more than those who worked for them. More likely, such "free labor services" were considered by the hacienda peasants as an irritating but at least bearable price one had to pay for access to good land and assistance in times of drought.7 The "moral economy" is a set of symbols, and a rhetoric, used by members of various economic classes in an ongoing process of implicit redefinition and negotiation. In the southern part of Huejutla, where most peasants had access to their own land (even if it was sometimes insufficient), poor peasants would only go to work for rancheros or wealthy Nahua farmers who offered cash advances. The most successful farmers and ranchers were therefore those who could persuade the most peasants who might be interested in growing corn in marginally better land or in earning extra money, to become part-time tenants or day laborers. This competition for part-time labor gave most poor Indian peasants in the southern zone somewhat greater bargaining power than their northern counterparts. The strong correlation between economic success and access to part-time labor put a premium on cultivating patron-client ties with as many members of Indian communities as possible. The fact that members of the local elite sometimes resorted to outright confiscation or the use of brute force to extract labor in times of labor shortages indicates that most peasants were not so desperate for food and other basic necessities that they had to offer their labor freely on the open market. However, the ability to force peasants to work "for free" had its costs and its limitations, as will be seen later.

The Moral Economy and Factional Politics The need to cultivate patron-client ties and the importance of control over either land or local government to accomplish this can also provide insights into the prevalence of factional disputes among members of the regional elite. Such factional disputes took place before, during and after the Mexican Revolution. The wealth and prestige of competing landowning families were based on their control over the largely Indian peasant population who provided them with labor. Such control was in turn based on their ability to recruit their clients, the poor peasants, with the promise of protection, and access to land and other resources. These other resources included aguardiente, 7

This interpretation coincides with what many older peasants in the northern region told me.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

a rum distilled from locally produced pilon. Control over local government (not necessarily political office), the production and distribution of aguardiente and land (in that order) were the best indicators of how rich and powerful somebody was in Huejutla. Since there were only so many workers available, not too many landowners could become very wealthy, unless they had access to other sources of income outside of the area. This was even more so the case for southern rancheros than for the owners of northern haciendas or colonial administrators (in the past) who owned property or had other forms of income derived from more developed sectors of the economy of Mexico, located in urban areas or more densely populated regions of Mexico. Such competition among landowners applied to rich peasants, but on a much smaller scale, in the context of the village economy. This same dynamic is expressed in a passage quoted by Falcon (1984, 51) to illustrate the relationships between Indians and Mestizos who were conduenos or co-owners of landed estates in the Huasteca of San Luis Potosi: "El que tiene mas indios es el mas rico" (He who has more Indians is the richest).

Chapter 7

The Mexican Revolution: An Interlude

Between 1910 and 1924, the chaotic period of civil war known as the Mexican Revolution, politically active rancheros gradually displaced hacienda owners as the regional political elite, although hacendados continued to wield considerable economic power. After 1924, local rancheros further consolidated their class position through a combination of armed force and their continued manipulation of the institutions and values of Nahua communities. However, despite a high level of intra-elite factional struggles and even the occasional extraction of forced labor, the peasants still did not rebel.

The Armed Phase of the Revolution

When Francisco Madero called for the armed overthrow of the government of Porfirio Diaz in 1911, both rancheros and hacendados in Huejutla joined the rebellion against the government of Porfirio Diaz. They were led by Francisco P. Mariel, owner of the hacienda of Coyuco.1 Another prominent revolutionary was Daniel Cerecedo, whose father owned the hacienda of La Candelaria (see chapter 5). However, as the civil war progressed, the new class of small commercial farmers and ranchers who had emerged in the southern part of the district of Huejutla, especially those who were Mestizos, played the most active part. Landowners who had the most ambivalent attitude toward the revolution were extremely wealthy rancheros or the owners of small haciendas, especially if they had held public posts under the Porfirian regime. A good ex' Mariel's father was an Italian immigrant who married the daughter of a hacendado. His subsequent military career, including various charges of corruption, are outlined in the archives of the Secretaria de Defensa Nacional, exp. XI/481.5/139 (caja num.76) and carta/exp. X/1112/2/69. In a paper based on this material, Juan Briseno (1989) argues that Mariel tried to obstruct land reform in the neigboring state of Veracruz. His role in local military campaigns, as well as that of many other revolutionaries from the Huasteca, were also recorded in writing in a book of memoirs written by one of the participants in this struggle from Huejutla (see Mendoza i960).

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

ample is Fidencio Gonzalez of the small hacienda of San Pedro, in Huazalingo. His father was a priest who managed to build up a rural estate of close to a thousand hectares by buying up sections of land from Nahua peasants (see chapter 5). Fidencio Gonzalez at first tried to ignore the outbreak of a rebellion, then joined the revolution at the time of the coup of Victoriano Huerta and finally became a Huertista (or counterrevolutionary), during which time he led several expeditions that burned rebel villages.2 He later left the region and apparently became a revolutionary again. Predictably, his offspring (who later became local caciques and successful cattle producers) depict him as a heroic defender of Madero and Carranza. Others portray him as the typical Porfirista cacique who enjoyed the privileges of power (see Falcon 1984, 41)· Apart from landowning Mestizos, members of Nahua families also became involved in both the military phase of the revolution and the subsequent period of political in-fighting. In the town of Yahualica, three sons of a rich Nahua peasant called Jose Lara joined the forces of Mariel, and several slightly better-off Nahua peasants who combined farming with crafts also became active participants. The best known of these was Nicolas Portes (known as "El Indio Portes") from the small village of Ixtlahuac (Huazalingo). This peasant, who also fabricated wooden trapiches, joined the forces of Mariel and in turn recruited a large number of completely Nahuatl-speaking soldiers from the region of Huejutla.3 Both hacendados and rancheros thus used their connections with Nahua clients to build up a guerrilla army mostly made up of peasants. Many Indian peons who lived within the boundaries of northern haciendas also followed their employers into war as part of their obligation as part-time tenants. They were also attracted by the wages or promises of access to more land such hacienda owners could offer their soldiers.4 Not all Indian peasants in Huejutla, however, were interested in taking up arms. Whenever fighting broke out, most people fled to the woods with their families to avoid forced conscription or the onerous task of having to feed and humor hungry and weary soldiers. 2 Older peasants from Tlalchiyahualica and other places he burned are quite adamant about this. The rest of his career as Porfirista cacique, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary (at different times) had to be pieced together from contradictory evidence. 3 According to Briseno (1989), Mariel recruited quite a few followers in the Nahua pueblo of Ixcatlan. 4 This was probably particularly true for more prestigious, full-time workers on such haciendas, as was the case in haciendas in other parts of Mexico (see Alan Knight 1968, 1: 86). The ability of ranchero revolutionaries in the Huasteca, in particular, to recruit large numbers of Indian followers among both part-time employees and members of neighboring communities has also been noted by Romana Falcon (1984, 50).

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The fighting that took place in the region of Huejutla was not only the expression of a series of grievances against the central government and its local representatives, but also expressed long-standing enmities between rival towns or family feuds. Such internecinefightingsometimes took the form of an ethnic conflict. For example, the Laras of Yahualica were long-standing Nahua rivals of the Mestizo rancheros who dominated the predominantly Spanish-speaking town of Atlapexco (at that time politically subservient to Yahualica). It is not surprising that they joined different sides of the civil war. Such ethnically based factional conflicts had overtones of class opposition when the lower-class Indian followers of one side saw the Mestizo leaders on the other side as having gone beyond the culturally defined limits of exploi­ tation. Such Mestizo leaders in turn saw the participation of bands of militant Indians in the revolution as a dangerous signal of possible class warfare. For example, members of Mestizo families in Atlapexco considered the forays of Portes against their town as an "uprising by the Indians" (La indiada),5 even though Portes's troops closely collaborated with several Mestizo revolution­ aries who were local landowners.6 His decision to join one or another revo­ lutionary faction also caused internal wrangling within Nahua communities. For example, when a sizable group of peasants in the Nahua pueblo of Santo Tom£s (Huazalingo) decided to join Nicolas Portes, the rest of the villagers left their homes and denounced the revolutionaries to local authorities.7 In this case, the conservative faction included all of the wealthier Nahua peas­ ants in this village, an indication of a division along economic class lines that was to emerge again fifty years later. In other Nahua communities, however, rich peasants also became internally divided. The revolution created a great deal of havoc and destruction, which oblit­ erated differences in the standard of living of the people who remained in the region. Looting, burning and crop failures associated with ten years of civil war left both Mestizos and Indians equally poor, especially in such municipios as Huautla and Yahualica. In many villages families were left without 5 Interviews with Ardelia Fernandez, August 12, 1980; MaEsther Fernandez Nochebuena, August 29, 1981; Cesaria Gonzalez, August 31, 1981. 6 Portes even married the daughter of a Mestizo ranchero from the town of Santa Lucia in Calnali. This woman helped the illiterate Portes with his correspondence. He also fought side by side with peasants and rancheros from the small Mestizo village of Tlatzonco. Interviews (in Spanish) with his grandson, Domingo Portes, Ixtlahuac (Huazalingo), May 7, 1984; Melquiades Oaxaca, Santa Lucia (Calnali), October 30, 1981. Interview (in Nahuatl) with Santiago Anastacio Tepanijtic, Tlalchiyahualica, February 17, 1982. ι Interview (in Spanish) with Fortunato Mendoza, Huazalingo, May 11, 1984. A similar division took place in the village of La Mesa (Yahualica). Interview (in Nahuatl) with Chico Bautista and Jose' Lara, La Mesa de Santa Lucia, June 1, 1984.

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even such simple household items aspetates (sleeping mats) or blankets, and people had to lay down old cardboard and keep fires burning inside of their makeshift huts during the winter.8 Most of the physical infrastructure that had been built up during the Porfiriato was also lost; several telegraph and telephone lines, connecting several towns to each other and to the state capital, disappeared, and the few thatch school buildings in larger villages collapsed for lack of repair and maintenance. The district of Huejutla also experienced a dramatic decline in population as a result of an influenza epidemic that swept through the region in 1918.« For several years toward the end of the revolution, legal land boundaries had little significance since almost all of the cattle were gone and most peasants could plant corn as they pleased. This was especially true in the northern zone, which witnessed the flight of the remaining hacienda owners who had not joined the revolution. Some of the revolutionaries who passed through these estates cut the fences marking the boundaries of privately owned estates, giving local peasants free access to former pastures. In some ways the revolution was thus a blessing in disguise to the peasants who lived in villages located within the boundaries of northern haciendas since it temporarily broke down a rural class structure based on the extraction of labor rents. Former peons were not the only beneficiaries, however. During the revolution, many landowning families also sold portions of their estates to wealthy Indian peasants or rancheros. For example, five sons who inherited the small hacienda of Ecuatitla all sold their respective shares to various people, including the Austria family, who became one of the principal protagonists in land conflicts in the seventies.10 The last armed encounter in the region, in 1924, involved a skirmish between federal forces and the rebel army of Marcial Cabazos (a follower of De la Huerta), who put his general headquarters in the town of Yahualica. Only then did life gradually return to normal and a renewal of commercial activities and population facilitate the reemergence of class differences. After 1925, local schools were again set in operation, especially in municipal administrative centers. However, what little formal education had been provided for the majority of children in the area had all but disappeared duringfifteenyears of civil war. Most people who could read and write had either migrated to other regions or become public employees (scribes or secretaries) for local govern8 Interview (in Spanish) with Marcario Ontiveros, Atlapexco, March 26, 1982; taped interview (in Nahuatl) with a peasant from the barrio of Tlaica in Yahualica, March 15, 1982. * The same epidemic decimated the followers of another ranchero, Cedillo, in the neighboring state of San Luis Potosi (see Falcon 1984, 107). 10 The father of the sellers, Francisco Rodriguez, had already divided this land into five lotes.

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ments or district courts. Some, like the Laras of Yahualica, even became local caciques. For the rest of the decade, property owners started to replenish their livestock. Both Mestizo rancheros and members of wealthy Nahua families left destitute after fighting in other parts of Mexico returned home to rebuild lost family estates. A number of former revolutionaries from other parts of Mexico also bought land and settled in the region. For example, in Atlapexco, Captain Agustin Salazar married the daughter of a prosperous ranchero who belonged to a well-established Mestizo family (the Naranjos) and spent the rest of his life as a merchant and a rancher. For the most part, however, the access to land and labor required to become rich peasants or to rebuild ranchos depended on good political connections with local politicians who had fought in the revolution.

The Emergence of Revolutionary Caciques

During the rest of the twenties, the state of Hidalgo was controlled by Marias Rodriguez. This left-leaning, populist leader, elected governor in 1925," became a Callista (follower of Plutarco Calles). Calles, a revolutionary general who ruled Mexico up until 1934, either as an elected official or behind the scenes, amassed personal wealth while mouthing revolutionary slogans. During this same period the district of Huejutla was controlled by a Matias supporter and former revolutionary, Wenceslao Martinez. Martinez, who was originally from the district of Jacala,12 first served as military commander of the district of Huejutla and then became municipal president of Huejutla on four separate occasions. While he did not take advantage of his political position to amass wealth, he also did not attempt to change the local political and economic structures inherited from the Porfiriato. During his presidency, the new revolutionary government on the state level reassured hacienda owners that they could come back and reclaim their properties. When these owners returned to Huejutla, they continued to charge labor rents and expected resident Indians to perform unpaid services as semaneros. These exploitative relationships with their subordinates also continued to be couched in the lan" Matias Rodriguez was elected governor after a particularly bitter electoral dispute between his Labor and Agrarian party of Hidalgo and the Confederate party, representing the powerful Azuara clique who came from the Huejutla area. This factional dispute is discussed in Ernest Gruening (1928, 434-39)· 12 Wenceslao Martinez had been a close ally of Nicolas Flores, the chief military commander and first constitutionalist governor, in 1917 (see Schryer 1980).

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guage of paternalistic concern and mutual help (see chapter 6). The main issues of possible contention became not the amount of land the residents of hacienda communities could cultivate (there was plenty of land available after the population decline caused by the revolution) but rather how many days they had free to do so. Despite their verbal commitment to revolutionary ideals, Martinez and other revolutionary leaders in Huejutla were not averse to looking the other way when it came to noneconomic means of coercing local peasants to work for them. Municipal authorities increasingly resorted to force to obtain additional labor after 1920 precisely because most peasants were less interested in working for wages at a time of new opportunities to strengthen their subsistence economy. Such labor shortages happened at the same time that revolutionary rancheros found they had no budgets to pay for municipal services or the running of government. While Martinez was still informal power holder in Huejutla, municipal governments routinely ordered members of peasant communities to perform faenas in municipal administrative centres. Martinez also helped local landowners to rebuild the haciendas and ranchos that had been abandoned or destroyed by the revolution. For this reason many older peasants in much of the northern zone recall Wenceslao Martinez as "a friend of the hacendados." Like Plutarco Calles on the national level, Wenceslao Martinez only paid lip service to the need for land reform. In 1927, Martinez gave permission to Bernabe Sanchez, an agrarian leader from Veracruz, to organize a large political rally in downtown Huejutla for peasants from different parts of the Huasteca, but, at the end of this political rally, several peasant participants were assassinated.13 That same year, the first petitions for land (on behalf of the villages of Cuatecomet, Cececapa, Amaxal, El Chote, Palsoquico, Santa Cruz and Zitlan) were sent off to the state capital.14 AU of these were villages in the northern or intermediate zone whose inhabitants did not have titles to the land they cultivated as tenants. As in so many other parts of Mexico, however, all of these petitions fell on deaf ears. Instead, during Calles's campaign against the clergy, Martinez channeled most of his revolutionary energies into the fight against an already powerless Catholic Church. In 1926, the bishop of Huejutla, Jose Manriquez y Zarete, head of a new diocese estab13 Interview (in Spanish) with Ancelmo Torres, Huejutla, June 9, 1985. This informant suggested that these assassinations were provoked by local hacienda owners. 14 Copies of all of the original petitions for land distribution and other documents relating to subsequent land grants or denials are located in the historical archives of the Land Reform Office (Reforma Agraria, previously known as the Departamento de Reforma Agraria y Colonization). This archive will henceforth be referred to as AHRA (Archivo Historico de la Reforma Agraria).

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lished in Huejutla only three years earlier, was arrested and marched off to Pachuca for criticizing the government (Meyer 1973, 2: 255-58). The Cristero rebellion did not receive much popular support in Huejutla. Although Catholics from both Mestizo and Nahua families offered asylum to Salvador Borja, the only priest who remained in the area, they did not take up arms against the government. This lack of support for the Cristeros can be explained by the fact that most rancheros in the Huasteca, unlike their counterparts in western Mexico, were already anticlerical. At the same time the Church did not have nearly as strong a presence in the Huasteca, and there were very few priests. The very religious (but not necessary very Catholic) Nahua Indians had had little contact with the Church, nor did they feel the same kind of loyalty to formal Catholicism as did peasants in western Mexico. Moreover, the political and economic abuses that had been committed by local revolutionary leaders did not jeopardize their daily livelihood enough that they would express their dissatisfaction in this manner. Wenceslao Martinez's token agrarianism also did not pose a threat to either smallholders or rich rancheros. Although various hacienda owners in Huejutla regained much of their economic power in the later twenties under the Calles regime, they no longer had much political clout. Instead, ranchero politicians now started to convert their new political control into economic power; some revolutionaries who started off as poor rancheros even ended up owning almost as much land as former hacendados. These nouveau riche, all of whom had military experience, ushered in a new era of cacicazgos (rule by strongmen). These ranchero caciques even included some Indians. For example, Geronimo Lara, an educated Indian as well as a former revolutionary, took charge of the municipio of Yahualica. However, despite his reputation as a defender of the Nahua population, Lara soon started to use the same methods as his Mestizo predecessors. He surrounded himself with an entourage of armed supporters and required the local population to supply the same type of unpaid services (carrying the mail, feeding his horses) as during the prerevolutionary era. He also did not allow any other families (Mestizo or Nahuatl) to participate in the running of local municipal affairs and hand-picked all post-holders among his own relatives and supporters.15 In the municipios of Huazalingo, Huautla and Xochiatipan, Mestizo ran15 Interviews with Juvencio Oaxaca, Santa Lucia (Calnali), October 1981; Daniel Salazar, Mexico City, December 10, 1981. A similar cacique of Nahua origins, Eusebio Serna, established his area of influence in the region of llamatlan, just across the border in the state of Veracruz. Interviews (in Spanish) with Raul Ortiz, El Arenal (Yahualica), May 19, 1984; Ildefonso Maya, Huejutla, May 26, 1984.

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cheros set up similar cacicazgos. For example, in Huazalingo, a part-time schoolteacher and newcomer called Emilio Vargas ruled with an iron fist. Beginning as a municipal employee, he forged an alliance with the Gonzales family, who owned the small hacienda of San Pedro. Emilio Vargas then used his position as tax collector (recaudador de rentas) to acquire numerous properties in the region. He then allied himself with prominent Nahua families who in turn dominated such larger Indian villages as San Francisco and Santo Tomas. Vargas forced all peasants (regardless of ethnic affiliation) to perform their faenas in the cabecera of Huazalingo, collected personal taxes officially abolished by the revolution and then charged additional duties on any produce sold in local markets.16 Critics or political opponents were ambushed and shot by his armed retainers, known as pistoleros. Such pistoleros (as elsewhere) were officially members of rural defense committees (defensas rurales) set up by the new revolutionary government to protect the local population from bandits and possible counterrevolutionaries! The rancheros who became revolutionary caciques utilized their knowledge of the Nahuatl language and their rural experience to manipulate the inhabitants of Nahua pueblos. An examination of how these local landowners utilized their connections with both poor and wealthy Nahua peasants to recruit military and political supporters might bring us closer to solving the puzzles posed by Alan Knight (1986, 1: 108) in his recent work on the Mexican Revolution: to clarify the outcome of the complex relationships among these different groups in the Huasteca during the revolution. Apart from offering "protection" to Nahua villages (while allowing their armed retainers to "rob rich Indians" in other regions), these caciques took advantage of the authoritarian and patriarchal nature of Nahua society to maintain political control. For example, they deliberately recruited armed retainers among the more rebellious sons of strict Nahua peasants who had not yet given permission for their male offspring to get married and set up their own households. Young Indians, who were supplied with rifles, were quite willing to leave their villages for more exciting and adventurous careers as pistoleros (hired gunfighters). The most infamous of such Nahua pistoleros, known as El Mapache, was a native of the village of Mecatlan. El Mapache not only obtained a reputation as a bloodthirsty killer but frequently returned to his home village to harvest the maize of his own neighbors and relatives.17 16

Interview (in Spanish) with Bulfrano Coronel Ochoa, Tlatzonco (Huazalingo), May 31, 1985. The real name of El Mapache ("Raccoon") was Jose Manuel Flores. His excesses in the end did not serve the interests of his Mestizo bosses, and they eventually had him assassinated in 1940. Interviews (in Spanish) with Pascual Ruiz, Yahualica, September 30, 1981; Marcario Ontiveros, 17

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Such use of force, as well as paternalistic protection, must be seen in the context of the local ecology system, as outlined in the previous chapter. Not only did the use of terror reinforce the power of a small minority in political control, but it made the majority of peasants even more dependent on other, "good" landowners or rich peasants who could offer them some measure of protection or financial assistance (in return for the promise to work in local ranchos). The actions of pistoleros like El Mapache indirectly reinforced the class power of all landowners in the region who were thus assured access to labor at a time of labor shortages and a surplus of land. Moreover, the peasants tended to voice their criticism only against those who employed pistoleros, against the faction in power, not against the existing socioeconomic system with its unequal distribution of land and other resources. The nature of local social and productive relations can also explain the complete failure of idealistic, usually young schoolteachers, who tried to implement the goals of the Mexican Revolution. The overall social climate— the strong political influence of local rancheros (many uneducated), the lack of interest by most poor Indians in having their children educated (they were needed for household chores and in thefields)and the lingering trauma of war and destruction—was not propitious for experiments in social reform. Only after 1930 were schools again opened in places other than Mestizo cabeceras, but many of the teachers were the sons of local landowners educated in Yahualica or in Huejutla. Their idealism and enthusiasm usually waned as they grew older and inherited land of their own. A handful of such teachers were in no position to bring about social change, much less have much of an educational impact.18 The weak position of even more mature rural teachers can be illustrated by Jose Cabrera Licona, who will be encountered later in this book. Jose Cabrera was born in Yahualica in 1903.19 After completing his studies and getting married, Cabrera received his first teaching assignment in 1932 in the Nahua village of Cuautenahuatl (Huautla). At that time he knew very little Nahuatl, but he immersed himself in this almost completely monolingual community and gradually achieved fluency. Jose Cabrera then became aware of considerable class discrepancies in this large Nahua community and tried to perAtlapexco, March 26, 1982; Herminio Sanchez, Mecatlan (Yahualica), April 8, 1982; interview (in Nahuatl), Teodolo Gomez, Mecatlan, April 16, 1982. 18 Honorato Austria, a cacique from the neighboring highland district, threatened a twelve-yearold schoolteacher for having disciplined his son in a rural school in Cuacuilco in 1928. Interview with Bernardo Cardona (the teacher in question), Huejutla, May 15, 1981. 19 This and other details about Cabrera's life were provided by his widow, Pompeya Gomez de Cabrera, interviewed in Huautla, May 13 and 15, 1985.

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suade the wealthier Indian families, who owned more land, to share it with their less fortunate neighbors. His efforts at social reform caused considerable criticism. He was accused of being a Communist, and when rumors circulated that he would be ambushed, he was forced to return to Huautla after only two years.20 While inequalities at the village level, as well as the monopoly of power by families like the Lara, Vargas and Gonzales, did not lead to open class conflicts or political revolts, the postrevolutionary situation did create a great deal of open resentment among local landowners and rich peasants. Every municipio had its share of discontented rancheros excluded from local public office, especially the close relatives or friends of people who had been assassinated on the orders of local caciques. In Yahualica, the Nahuatl-speaking Aguado family (who had owned a lot of cattle before the revolution) unsuccessfully tried to counteract the influence of the Laras, while in the municipio of Huautla the Vites resented the political stranglehold of the Castros (both Mestizo families). The leaders of such opposing factions in turn recruited their own economic subordinates against those in power who abused their authority and made excessive demands. This phenomenon of "diagonal factionalism" was not any different from the political situation found in neighboring Spanish-speaking regions (see Schryer 1975). Members of the same family also became internally divided, as in Xochiatipan, where the Bustos, who had set up large ranchos in the nineteenth century, were split into two opposing political factions in the 1920s.21 These lingering hostilities broke out into a series of open confrontations in the 1930s with the transition of power from Calles to Lazaro Cardenas on the national level. 20 Cabrera was also accused of subversive activities in an anonymous letter sent from the town of Chicontepec (Veracruz). A copy of this letter, together with many other letters and reports, were kept by his widow. These papers will henceforth be referred to as the Cabrera Papers. 21 Interviews with Emigrio Vite, Huautla, May 11, 1983; Jesus Borja, Yahualica, June 6, 1985; Francisco Oviedo, Huejutla, June 9,1985.

Chapter 8

Caciquismo and Agrarianism: The Cacicazgo of Juvencio Nochebuena

Between 1934, the year that Lazaro Cardenas became president of Mexico, and i960, the system of land tenure and the political structure of Huejutla were radically altered. These three decades of social change coincided with the career of General Juvencio Nochebuena. A leading ranchero from the small Mestizo town of Atlapexco, Nochebuena became an important politician on both the national and state levels. His social origins, political rise and subsequent decline (including his failure to become governor of Hidalgo) epitomize the ranchero caciquismo that came out of the revolution. Although there were no overt class struggles either during or immediately following his period of informal rule, the major political events of his era are particularly relevant for understanding the land invasions that emerged several decades later. These events were still fresh in the memories of many people who became involved in conflicts over land in the seventies and eighties. The legal and administrative changes associated with a land reform carried out under Nochebuena's supervision also provided the rationale for violent acts carried out by both future peasant rebels and landowners who were to defend the status quo.

The Political Career of Juvencio Nochebuena

Juvencio Nochebuena was still a teenager when the revolution broke out in 1911. He played a minor role in the subsequent period of civil war but, after the revolution, continued his career in the army (he reached the grade of general) and then in politics. General Nochebuena was a supporter of Obregon in 1920 but left politics after he fell out of favor with Calles.1 He returned to 1

Interview with Nereo Nochebuena, Huejutla, May 21, 1981. On October 28, 1924 (while still a colonel), Juvencio Nochebuena was arrested for shooting a delivery man in Pachuca (see Manzano 1922, part 2).

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the Huasteca to manage his family estate and married the daughter of a wealthy tradesman (a carpenter and butcher) from Huejutla who had been a Porfirista. Together they moved to a new rancho he had just bought, called Teocuatitla, just across the river from Atlapexco. This rancho was the first step in building up what eventually became a sizable rural estate of close to a thousand hectares. After a couple of years of marriage, he divorced his wife and married again. According to his oldest son (of this first marriage), her lifestyle and refined tastes (for European music and food) were incompatible with Juvencio's rustic ranchero preferences (for enchiladas, corridos and charro costumes).2 In the 1930s, Juvencio Nochebuena entered politics again and became a member of the faction of congress that supported the candidacy of Lazaro Cardenas. He spent most of the rest of his life in Pachuca and Mexico City but continued to visit the Huasteca on a regular basis and to oversee his properties in Atlapexco. The many posts he held included that of municipal president of Pachuca (still under Cardenas), diputado/edera/ (member of the national congress) under Avila Camacho, AIeman and Ruiz Cortines, member of the state congress or diputado local (under AIeman) and senator for Hidalgo (also under Ruiz Cortines). During or between his various terms of office he also served as general inspector of police and head of transit in the state capital (in the late 1940s), was a candidate for the post of general secretary of the League of Agrarian Communities and Peasant Syndicates of the state of Hidalgo and helped to set up an association of urban tenants in Mexico City.3 During his long political career, General Nochebuena was the chief patron and also became the compadre4 of numerous individuals throughout the Huasteca and Sierra of Hidalgo.

The Birth of a New Cac/cazgo

In 1934, president Lazaro Cardenas initiated a sweeping land reform on the national level. Widespread popular support for his radical agenda for social 2

Interview with Nereo Nochebuena, Huejutla, August 16, 1981. Most of these and other aspects of his political career were taken from copies of letters, official documents and identification cards included in a file of personal correspondence kept by one of his sons, Miguel Nochebuena, who lives in Mexico City. This file will henceforth be referred to as Nochebuena Papers. There are also eight references (or photographs) of Juvencio Nochebuena in Gustavo Casasola's illustrated book on the Mexico Revolution (1967, 2990). 4 A compadre (literally coparent) is a Latin American role that forms part of a system of ritual kinship (compadrazgo) established through such religious ceremonies as baptism, holy communion or matrimony in the Catholic Church, involving one of the children of the coparents. It can also be established through such secular ceremonies as school graduations, involving one of the children. 3

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change, which included the nationalization of the oil industry and socialist education, made it necessary for all local politicians publicly to espouse a more leftist ideology, whether they believed in it or not. Thus, Wenceslao Martinez, then the main power holder in Huejutla, did not object when a larger number of agrarian petitions from Huejutla were sent to Pachuca (seventeen in 1935 alone). Most of these petitions were written by local schoolteachers who were acting on orders, issued from Mexico City, to promote agrarianism. In the meantime, other local politicians were busy establishing new contacts and better alliances. The chief collaborator of Cardenas in the region of Huejutla turned out to be Juvencio Nochebuena, previously out of favor on the local level. Juvencio Nochebuena started to establish his own power base in Huejutla just after completing his term of office as member of congress under Cardenas, when he decided to take part in the 1935 campaign for a new state governor. This political campaign became an open contest for power between the politicians who had originally been allied to Matias Rodriguez and their opponents . Cardenas' choice of candidate for governor of Hidalgo (representing the official government party, renamed the Party of the Mexican Revolution) was a political protege of Juvencio Nochebuena named Rojo Gomez,5 a native son who had already played a major part in the redistribution of land in other parts of Mexico. The other candidate was Ordones, who was supported by such local caciques as Emilio Vargas of Huazalingo and Wenceslao Martinez as well as by the Laras of Yahualica and the Bravos of Huautla.6 Using his political connections in the state capital, Juvencio Nochebuena hand-picked the first set of authorities for the newly created municipio of Atlapexco (where he owned his ranch). The next item on his agenda was to put an end to the political influence of the Lara family of Yahualica. Juvencio sent Palemon Nochebuena (a relative who became one of his pistoleros) to live in Yahualica, who in turn installed local Lara opponents as official post holders. Geronimo Lara and his chief collaborators fled to Veracruz where they would continue to exercise their influence over more remote parts of the municipio of Yahualica from such places as Jojocapa, Cuacoyoco or Corral 5 According to Juvencio's son, Nereo (who lives in Huejutla today), Juvencio partly financed Rojo Gomez's education, introduced him to politics and even lent him his jacket when Rojo Gomez got married. This is consistent with Rojo Gomez's social background as the son of a humble hacienda employee from Huichapan. his assuming public office while still a law student and the date of his marriage (1924) at a time when Juvencio Nochebuena was living in Pachuca (Menes Llaguno 1980, 9-14)· 6 Interviews with Emigrio Vite, Huautla, May n , 1983; Francisco Gonzalez, San Pedro (Huazalingo), May 31, 1985; Jesus Borja, Yahualica, June 6, 1985; Francisco Oviedo, Huejutla, June 9, 1985·

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de Piedra just across the state border. One of those who accompanied the Laras was Pascual Ruiz, a Nahua peasant who was to become one of the principal agrarian leaders of the region forty years later.7 Juvencio Nochebuena likewise meddled in the internal affairs of the newly created municipio of Jaltocan. This municipio (formerly part of Huejutla) was also created in 1936, largely as a result of the efforts of Luis Amador, a Mestizo ranchero originally from Cuacuilco who bought and later moved to a small rancho (Chiconcoac) just outside of the pueblo of Jaltocan. The Amadors, who wanted to set up their own sphere of political influence, had close political connections with Wenceslao Martinez. Juvencio Nochebuena, anxious to consolidate his own political control over northern Hidalgo, formed an alliance with all of the old enemies of the Amadors. These allies included Mestizo rancheros who lived in the Nahuatl villages of Cuacuilco and Macuxtepetla. The Mestizo elite of Tehuetlan was also vehemently opposed to a change in administrative boundaries in which Jaltocan was to comprise a territory including the villages of Cuacuilco, Ixcatlan, Tehuetlan, La Corrala and Zitlan (all of which still belong to Huejutla today). Apart from being opponents of Luis Amador, they abhorred the idea of becoming politically subordinate to a town that was also the home of many prosperous Nahua farmers, merchants and artisans. These rich Nahua peasants, who owned moliendas and small soap factories, had provided most of the monetary assistance needed to send numerous missions (headed by Luis Amador) to the state capital so that Jaltocan could obtain its political independence.8 Nochebuena took advantage of these factional disputes to defeat the Amador faction. He also resorted to the use of force; only a few weeks after the new municipal offices were inaugurated, the opponents of Jaltocan, personally led by Juvencio Nochebuena,9 led an armed expedition to attack the new cabecera. Rojo Gomez's term of office as governor, beginning on April 1, 1936, ushered in two decades of political influence by General Nochebuena in the district of Huejutla. After a short period of consolidation in 1937 (when Martinez returned to Jacala), Juvencio Nochebuena managed to get his own supporters nominated for the next set of municipal elections and either evicted or gained the loyalty of all informal power holders. While the Nochebuena fam7 Other Nahua peasants who were Lara supporters also went to live in the lower Huasteca of Veracruz where they were to spend the next twenty years working in sugar moliendas and as tenant farmers. Interview with Pascual Ruiz, Yahualica, November 30, 1981. 8 Interviews with Samuel Hernandez, June 11, 1985; Jos6 Hernandez Bustos (same date), all in Jaltocan; Luis Amador, June 15, 1985, Chiconcoac (Jaltocan). 5 Interviews with Maria Luisa Amador Lara, June 13, 1985, Jaltocan; Luis Amador, June 15, 1985, Chiconcoac (Jaltocan).

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ily consolidated its position throughout most of the district of Huejutla, another family of revolutionaries became the principal caciques of the neighboring highland district of Molango. This family consisted of the relatives of Honorato Austria from Tepehuacan de Guerrero, a municipio bordering on San Felipe Orizatlan. For the next forty years the Austrias and the Nochebuenas were each to rule in their respective area of political influence.

Nochebuena and Agrarian Reform in Huejutla Together with Rojo Gomez, Juvencio Nochebuena implemented Cardenas's policy of agrarianism in the Huasteca of Hidalgo. Cardenas's land reform involved the transfer of large portions of all remaining haciendas to the peons and supervisor who resided within the boundaries of such estates or to peasant villages that did not have sufficient land of their own. Ranchero politicians (led by Nochebuena) suddenly became spokesmen for the largely monolingual Indian peasant population of Huejutla and encouraged all villages of the region to submit agrarian petitions, if they had not already done so. These local political leaders became agraristas (agrarians) because they realized that only in this manner could their political patron, Rojo Gomez, maintain his image as a socialist and a true follower of Lazaro Cardenas. Not surprisingly, all of these petitions (as well as those that had been initiated when Wenceslao Martinez was still in power) received a favorable response from the state government within one or two years. In 1939, Rojo Gomez gave provisional titles to thirty-one villages for ejidos or terrenos comunales and an additional sixty-six communities submitted written requests to be included in Cardenas's land reform. Provisional grants were also issued to fortyfour of these new sixty-six petitioners only one year later.10 Over half of these petitions came from villages in the southern part of the region. However, while radically changing the agrarian structure of Mexico as a whole, this land reform did not affect the political control or economic power of the rancheros of Huejutla because Cardenas's land reform was not implemented in the same manner in the two subregions of Huejutla. In the northern zone, Juvencio Nochebuena gave his full backing to Nicolas de la Cruz, a bilingual Nahua peasant leader from the village of Chiquemecatitla, which bordered on several large northern haciendas." De la Cruz IO

These figures were obtained through an examination of all of the files (expedientes) relating to the Huasteca of Hidalgo available in AHRA. " Chiquemecatitla already had its own land (which it had obtained by buying a small hacienda), but its leaders wanted more land for its growing population in the form of an ejido.

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not only acted as representative for his home village but became a peasant leader for all of the northern hacienda communities who were interested in getting their own land. This Nahua peasant leader, who became widely respected by the mainly Indian peasant population of the northern zone, used to commute back and forth from his village to a small office (a rented room) in the city of Huejutla, where he personally typed out all agrarian petitions on an old Olivetti typewriter.12 Juvencio Nochebuena arranged to have this peasant leader (who could read and write) appointed as official legal adviser (procurador indigena) for the Indian population and then personally supervised the partition of most of the haciendas dating back to the prerevolutionary era. Cardenas's land reform met with some opposition from the hacendados in Huejutla, as is to be expected. Some of these landowners sold sections of their estates to their supervisors or to wealthy peasants against government orders.13 For the most part, however, the provisional transfer of land to peasant communities went fairly smoothly under the eyes of Juvencio Nochebuena and his armed retainers. In this manner more than half of the Nahua peasants in the northern zone received land in the form of ejidos. Such ejidos were almost all divided up into individual parcels for distribution to former peons of hacienda villages. These poor peasants were now able to practice corn cultivation without paying labor rents, although most of them continued to work as seasonal day laborers for former employers. Such employers continued to operate ranchos in Huejutla, Huautla or San Felipe Orizatlan because they were allowed to keep two hundred hectares. However, they could no longer force their peons or tenants to work as semaneros. Legally, hacienda owners were thus transformed into pequenos propietarios (small owners) like their ranchero counterparts. Former peons of local haciendas still alive today, especially in Chalahuiyapan, Otates (Huejutla) and Tamoyon (Huautla), consider General Juvencio Nochebuena to be "a friend of the peasants'' because of the role he played in the setting up of such ejidos in the northern part of Huejutla.'4 The same ranchero politicians who supervised the partition of northern haciendas also "implemented" Canienas's land reform in the southern zone where most of the arable land consisted of farms and ranches privately owned by Mestizo landowners and a minority of wealthy Nahua peasants. But, unlike the northern zone, this "land reform" did not result in any real changes 12

Interview with Francisco Oviedo, Huejutla, June 9, 1985. Interview with one of the peasants who bought such a section of land, NicolSs Hernandez, EI Zapote (Huejutla), June 2, 1985. 14 Interviews (in Nahuatl) with Antonio Felipe Angeles, Tamoyon Primero (Huautla), May 17, 1983; (in Spanish) with father of Bernabe Cruz, Los Otates (Huejutla), June 4, 1985. 13

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in the pattern of landholding. The few, very small haciendas that still remained in such municipios as Yahualica and Xochiatipan were partly dismantled to provide ejidos to several villages that already had their own "communal" lands. Local authorities then declared practically the entire southern zone to be communal (as it had once been) and persuaded the inhabitants of Nahua villages to petition for full recognition of their already existing ' 'communal lands" (for which they supposedly did not possess proper titles) in the form of ejidos.15 Most of the landowners added their names to these petitions as ' 'potential land recipients.'' Rancheros who could read and write were told that Cardenas's land reform would only be carried out "on paper," while others (who were illiterate) simply followed the orders of local caciques. To give this largely symbolic land reform in the southern zone some substance, Juvencio Nochebuena, who already owned one of the largest ranchos in the southern region, offered to turn over a portion of his own land to the peasants of Atlapexco and Tecolotitla. He also ordered a wealthy Nahua peasant, Antonio Aguacatzintla, from the village of Tenexco to sell half of his three-hundred-hectare estate to a sociedad of twelve neighbors even though this same property had already been legally incorporated into an ejido,16 pending final approval at the federal level. Nochebuena furthermore allowed a few local schoolteachers in the southern zone to have a hand in the process of land reform, as long as it did not jeopardize the economic position or political influence of his ranchero supporters and relatives. One of these teachers was Jose Cabrera, who was mentioned in the last chapter. Like many idealistic young teachers throughout rural Mexico, Jos6 Cabrera became involved in the agrarian reform movement during the Cardenas era (see Raby 1974). At that time he had taken up another teaching post in the remote Nahua village of Pepeyoca, located in the southern zone. His wife also went to live there, and several of their children were born in that village. He was to stay there for the next twenty-five years. Cabrera was particularly interested in Cardenas's policy of collectivization of agriculture (mainly implemented in areas of large-scale commercial agriculture). He only succeeded, however, in putting his ideals into practice in the village of Pepeyoca, where he persuaded four wealthy Nahuatl peasants, who were landowners, to give up their share of the "communal land" to form a collective ejido that 15 For example, most of the original petitions for these ejidos include the phrase "que se nos concede en dotacion los terrenos que en la actualidad poseemos comunalmente." The original petitions were found in the archives of the State Agrarian Commission (ACAM). 16 Interview (in Nahuatl) with one of these purchasers, Joso Geronimo Flores, Atlapexco, June 20, 1984.

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would benefit the entire community.17 His subsequent experiment in community development and cooperative farming is an exceptional case that is not at all representative of the role played by other rural schoolteachers who actually bought land and combined their teaching careers with more lucrative activities. However, like Nochebuena's "gift" of a portion of land from one of his own estates, the presence of teachers like Cabrera had a largely symbolic function that gave an aura of legitimacy to local "agrarian" caciques. Fictitious Ejidos

Although the four relatively rich peasants in Pepeyoca (like the rich peasant of Tenexco) were forced to give up their private land titles, the majority of landowners in the southern zone, including much wealthier Mestizo rancheros, were not at all affected by Cardenas's land reform. Their rural estates were not broken up because General Nochebuena turned a blind eye when his political subordinates refused to implement the vast majority of land grants in the southern zone, an "oversight" that resulted in the creation of a large number of purelyfictitiousejidos. Nevertheless, all of the necessary bureaucratic procedures were still followed; all of the legal documents acknowledging receipt of such ejidos in the municipio of Atlapexco were signed by Nochebuena's own ranchero relatives or political henchmen. The creation of a large number of purely fictitious ejidos in the southern zone illustrates the manner in which ranchero politicians continued to manipulate the institutions of closed Nahua corporate villages with the help of their Indian counterparts. When several teams of surveyors arrived to measure the communal boundaries of Nahua villages and to take censuses in the southern zone, they were accompanied by local politicians and schoolteachers (some of whom also owned ranchos). These "peasant representatives," who acted as the guides and interpreters for these surveyors, convinced agrarian officials that no one in the southern zone owned any private properties (apart from a few very small haciendas dating back to the colonial era). They then directed representatives of Nahua "cabeceras" to show such surveyors the existing administrative or judicial boundaries which no longer had much to do with rights of access to land (see chapters 4 and 5).18 However, the majority of 17

A note about this and other events were written on the back of many photographs included in a thick album included in the Cabrera Papers. Cabrera tried to set up similar collective farms in some of the new ejidos formed in Huautla as a result of the partitioning of local haciendas but did not meet with any success. 18 A retired Mestizo schoolteacher who now lives in Huautla, told me how he accompanied several of these engineers and a group of Nahua peasants to measure such village boundaries in 1940. The

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members of both ethnic groups who were not involved in politics were at that time completely unaware of the long-term implications of this change in legal status. While willing to go along with token gestures of land reform, local caciques and most wealthy Nahua peasants thwarted any attempt at real land reform in the southern zone. This can be illustrated by what happened when recently appointed schoolteachers, who wanted to help poor peasants from small, subordinate hamlets (anexos) to gain access to more land, wrote agrarian petitions on their behalf. Such petitions were all overruled by the representatives of the Nahua administrative centers to which such hamlets belonged. For example, in 1940 the original agrarian petitions of the Nahua villages of Cochotla, Itzocal, Atotomoc and Atencuapa were all collapsed into a single file, on the recommendation of the engineer who "discovered" that they really formed a single community.19 In the case of Tenexco, a meeting was held on January 3, 1940, to designate the village of Tenexco as ejido cabecera for Atlaltipa, Huitzotlaco, Cuatapa and Coyolapa (again, leading to the collapsing of all previous "requests for land" into a single petition). This meeting was presided over by Pedro Velez, Palemon Nochebuena and Joel Nochebuena, all landowners and political henchmen of General Nochebuena.20 These petitions for the formation only of large ejidos, whose boundaries were almost identical to those of former Indian communes, show that wealthy Nahua peasants (who were village representatives) and local Mestizo strongmen alike had a stake in maintaining the existing system of land tenure and its corresponding structure of political control. This is why they insisted that all ejido petitions in the southern zone originate only from Nahua "cabeceras" on behalf of all their subordinate hamlets—another example of the historical continuity of administrative boundaries. Legally, such Nahua administrative centers acquired a new formal status as cabeceras ejidales, which represented all other villages or hamlets (called anexos) located within the boundaries of ejidos with more than one population center. This coincidence brother of this teacher, who owned a small rancho inside the former communal lands of Achiquihuixtla (Atlapexco), asked at that time what implication the formation of an ejido would have for the status of the farm his father had originally bought from an Indian of Achiquihuixtla. He was told that nothing would change, that the papers he had to sign were to protect all peasants from possible expropriation. Thirty years later, his sons were evicted by Nahua peasants from Achiquihuixtla. Interview with Narciso Naranjo, Huautla. '« ACAM, ramo ejidal, expedientes 1478, 1463, 1479 and 1477. 20 Tenexco was the only case where at least some of the holders of private land titles did present such documents as proof that there were actually pequenos propietarios inside the boundaries of this proposed ejido. ACAM, ramo ejidal, exp. 1419.

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of the informal usage of the term "cabecera" and this new legal term (as defined by the national system) further obfuscated the discrepancy between local reality and its external image, as it appeared to outsiders. In reality, much of the land included in such ejido boundaries remained in the hands of wealthy Nahua peasants and a few so-called agrarian politicians and rancheros whose rural estates sometimes surpassed the legal limits of private rural property. The fact that the poorest peasants were still able to cultivate their milpas (in much reduced village commons and sometimes on rented land), and the fact that they could still obtain cash advances for seasonal labor, explain why there was no protest or open rebellion. These same poor Nahua peasants, however, did not forget about the original communal boundaries of the corporate communities to which they belonged. The ranchero politicians from the southern zone also supervised the election of official agrarian representatives among their own relatives and Nahua clients, many of whom in fact already possessed legal titles to privately owned plots of land. Such Nahuatl-speaking representatives, who became provisional comisariado (administrative committees in charge of ejidos),21 interpreted these new positions as a formal recognition of the political status of Indian ' 'cabeceras.'' Both the holders of these new posts and the majority of peasants, who did not understand the national language, had no idea what an ejido was really about. For example, the first so-called comisariado of the Nahua village of Mesa Larga (who was still alive in 1983) was actually a small landowner. This landowning peasant told me that the position of comisariado was created to make sure that no irregularities occur in the buying or selling of land titles and that no one be deprived of his land by force (as had sometimes been done in the past). Some Nahua peasants were told that comisariados were in charge of settling disputes over village boundaries and the use of small sections of commons attached to subordinate hamlets.22 In still other villages, such as Santa Maria (Huazalingo), the same comisariado served for so many years, without having to do anything, that people eventually forgot that this post even existed.23 The only part of Huejutla not technically affected by the land reform process was the northern half of the municipio of Jaltocan. In places like Vinasco and Huichapa, rural properties owned by rancheros whose European ancestors had acquired small private estates in the colonial era for the most part did " The head or presidente of the comisariado committee is also referred to by the same term. " Interview (in Nahuatl) with Francisco Bautista, La Mesa Larga (Yahualica), June 1, 1984. 23 I was once told in a facetious matter that such agrarian post-holders "were only in charge of organizing dances." Interview with Margarita Andrade, Santa Maria (Huazalingo), December 3, 1981.

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not surpass the legal limits set by the law. Such rancheros were also not interested in using the socialist rhetoric introduced by the Cardenas regime. The Amadors of Chiconcoac (who still controlled the small municipio of Jaltocan) also refused to sign phony agrarian petitions or create fictitious ejidos to help the political careers of Juvencio Nochebuena and Rojo Gomez. In contrast, a number of other Nahua villages in the southern or intermediate zones, which belonged to the municipio of Huejutla (and within the sphere of influence of Juvencio Nochebuena) were included in a list of villages eligible to receive sections of former haciendas located in the northern zone. The largely fictitious ejidos in the southern, formerly communal zone of Huejutla stood in stark contrast to their counterparts in the north, where the formation of real ejidos (side by side with pequefias propiedades) meant the creation of village-level administrative structures as well as a land base for villages that had hitherto been completely subsumed under the authority of haciendas. This does not mean, however, that all the peasants in the northern zone obtained their own land. Some northern ejidos were not granted all of the land to which they were entitled and ended up having to wait many years for actual rights of possession. Moreover, even if comisariado committees were set up according to the guidelines of the national agrarian code, this did not mean that they were immune to manipulation by politicians still connected to landowning families. For example, not all northern ejidos were divided into parcels of equal size (as stipulated by law), and a number of communities were excluded from the original petitions altogether.24 The hopes of the inhabitants of such villages ever receiving land were dashed by the election of Avila Camacho in 1940, which meant the end of radical agrarian politics and a new emphasis on private rather than social property.

The Conservative Reaction During the 1940s, under the presidencies of Avila Camacho and Aleman, the process of land reform came to a virtual standstill in the region of Huejutla. Very few new petitions were sent to Pachuca, and only eight villages, including Pepeyoca, received the definitive, final presidential resolutions that give full legal status to provisional ejidos. The rest of these villages, also located in the municipio of Huautla, had belonged to three haciendas whose 24

Another ploy used was to grant hacienda land traditionally used by peons or tenants from other villages (even traditional enemies) at quite a distance from the petitioner's home village, and vice versa. This happened in the cases of Zitlan (which was given land near Las Chacas) and Zohuala (who were also not assigned land where they wanted).

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former owners did not have any political connections with the clique of people in power.25 Former hacienda owners (now officially pequenos propietarios) in the rest of the region still hoped to recover some of the land they had lost and started buying properties that still remained in private hands, including land located within the boundaries of fictitious ejidos in the southern zone. In this manner the concentration of landownership started anew. Apart from buying up farms in a variety of locations, some landowners also registered their properties in the names of various relatives in order to hide the total amount of land they owned. Despite the decline of agrarianism on the national level, Juvencio Nochebuena maintained his public image as an agrarian leader but at the same time continued to be a friend of local rancheros and many former hacienda owners. However, Nochebuena now started to emphasize the importance of modernization and education. Like other former revolutionary leaders who had turned into professional politicians, he used his connections in Mexico City to obtain scholarships for the graduates of rural schools, most of whom were also his poorer relatives or the children of barely literate rancheros. Some of these students, as well as the children of wealthy Nahua families, were also sent off to residential schools. Nochebuena also established a small airfield in Atlapexco and tried to improve the physical appearance of his hometown. He sent several artisans to produce roof tiles in a workshop established in his ranch. All of the rancheros, cowhands and day laborers who lived in Atlapexco were then told in a meeting to replace their thatch roofs with tiles and to put in stone courtyards. According to one of these homeowners, still alive in 1987, the general did not want his hometown of Atlapexco to "look like a hacienda village" (i.e., a cluster of thatch-roofed huts inhabited by day laborers).26 In terms of economic development, General Nochebuena persuaded the federal government to ship Swiss bulls to the Huasteca (including those donated to Mexico by foreign governments) and encouraged local cattle ranchers to continue planting new forms of zacate and fencing in all pastures. Juvencio Nochebuena also used his political influence to prevent the slaughter of cattle when the Mexican government signed an agreement with the United States to take drastic measures to stop the spread of a highly infectious cattle disease in the late 1940s. Since Huejutla was located just on the edge of the region considered to be infected, he arranged to have a quarantine line—used 25 These ejidos were Aquetzpalco, Ceresos, Chiliteco, El Aguacate, El Ixtle, La Mesa (all in 1944); Tamoyon Primero, Tamoyon Segundo (1943) and Tepeco (1947). ACAM, ramo ejidal. 26 Interview with Pedro Palacios, Atlapexco, June 15, 1985.

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to prevent the further spread of infection—to be placed just to the north of Huejutla, so that cattle producers in the district of Huejutla would be immune to the obligatory destruction of cattle.27

Patronage and Exploitation The patronage of Juvencio Nochebuena extended to Nahua villages as well. He collected money to rebuild the village of Huazalinguillo (Huautla), destroyed by fire, and helped the peasants of Tamoyon (who had already received a real ejido in the northern zone) to get proper title to an additional 150 hectares of land. Tamoyon had petitioned to be given title for these 150 hectares when the original hacienda owner, who had left during the revolution, did not return to claim his estate. Juvencio Nochebuena even sent their monolingual Nahua comisariado in a small aircraft to "interview" the secretary of state and the governor and to deliver personally to both of them a hamper full of dried beef, as a token of their appreciation.28 Nochebuena also settled numerous disputes related to boundaries, inheritance or personal animosities. For example, in 1949, a wealthy Nahua widow from Tenexco, whose husband had earlier been persuaded to sell part of their property to a group of her neighbors, complained to Nochebuena that a Mestizo ranchero from the nearby village of Cuatapa was trying illegally to take over the rest of her land. In return for protection from the general, she offered to hand over an additional portion of her estate to a group of day laborers who had also approached the general with a petition for land.29 General Nochebuena also used his political influence to provide support for Jos6 Cabrera and his ejido of Pepeyoca. The Pepeyoca experiment had by this time become a model project that was to receive considerable attention and assistance from regional politicians and especially from more educated, modern rancheros. When the cooperative of Pepeyoca bought eighteen young heifers for its communal pasture in 1957, they were given a stud bull from the wealthiest cattle producer in Huautla, Manuel Med6cigo (whose extensive pastures were later invaded by peasants from Tenexco). Cabrera was also sought out by local politicians, including Nochebuena, to show off to visitors. For example, in 1952, Cabrera gave a long and eloquent discourse in Nahuatl, during a political rally in Huejutla to support Ruiz Cortines. 27

Interview with Ezechiel Reyes, Huejutla, May 3, 1985. Taped interview (in Nahuatl) with Antonio Felipe Angeles, Tamoyon Primero, May 17, 1983. 29 Letter from Alvaro Vite to Gral. Juvencio Nochebuena, April 21, Nochebuena Papers. AU of the property under question was technically already part of a provisional (but fictitious) ejido. 18

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In return for his assistance and political intercession, all of the supporters of Nochebuena were expected to attend political rallies and demonstrations, especially those held for important politicians from Mexico City or the state capital of Pachuca. These outsiders were always impressed by the large turnout of "Nochebuena's Indians" and the hospitality provided at local banquets.30 Their impression of the Huasteca—one of colorful embroidered blouses of the Nahua women, the clean, white linen trousers and shirts of their menfolks and the numerous garlands offlowerspresented to any visiting dignitaries—belied the underlying current of conflict and political repression that was still a part of everyday life in the Huasteca of Hidalgo. Some of Nochebuena's supporters continued to extract labor and money from Nahua peasants or resorted to criminal activities in other regions. Indeed, several of the general's own nephews, who lived in Atlapexco or El Arenal, were professional thieves and cattle rustlers.31 While Juvencio Nochebuena "controlled" the Huasteca and continued to extol the virtues of the revolution, many local politicians took advantage of their connections with this influential leader to reinforce their economic power. For example, local tax collectors confiscated rural properties from political opponents or poor relatives who did not have good connections with the general.32 Apart from continuing to work in faenas from municipal administrative centers, poor peasants throughout the region were also expected to pay special taxes of the production of cash crops, and a head tax (donativo) was also administered until the early fifties.33 In fact, even Juvencio Nochebuena himself, the "agrarian politician," resorted to occasional forced labor to clear the pastures or cut the sugarcane of his own private rancho. Almost all older peasants in the southern part of the district recall having participated in such faenas for the general. In some cases, his pistoleros simply arrived and distributed wages in advance for work to be done in Teocuatitla (his ranch near Atlapexco). At other times jueces were ordered to bring day laborers to clear pastures or to carry wooden poles for fencing to his ranch without any 30 Interview with Maria Esther Fernandez Nochebuena, Mexico City, August 29, 1981, a relative of the general brought up in Mexico City, who used to accompany him on such visits to Huejutla. 31 The names of these nephews (including Felix Mas) came up time and time again in conversations with people in the region and were also mentioned in the correspondence found in the Nochebuena Papers. 32 Such abuses were frequently mentioned in conversations with local informants, and specific incidents were described in detail in interviews conducted in both Nahuatl and Spanish, between 1981 and 1985. These interviews were held with seven different people who were eyewitnesses to these events. 33 This was mentioned in nine separate interviews (including one group interview) conducted in both Mestizo and Nahua communities between 1981 and 1985.

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financial remuneration whatsoever (apart from the customary drink of brandy around mid-day).34 Most older peasants interviewed in the 1980s bitterly resented such obligatory labor, as well as the onerous duty of serving as messengers or couriers, even if they had only done so once or twice in their lifetime. Only a few peasants, who had received specific gifts or favors from the general, said that they had performed such duties voluntarily. The overall negative view of the general among peasants in the southern zone contrasts with the image presented by the sons of Juvencio Nochebuena (most of whom were educated in private schools in Mexico City). These sons claim that most of the Indians liked their father so much that they used to come and "work for him for free"! During Nochebuena's political reign, a few caciques on the local level managed to rule with a relative degree of autonomy. For example, Emilio Vargas of Huazalingo continued to dominate that municipio with little interference from Juvencio Nochebuena because his daughter had married the politically influential former revolutionary Antonio Azuara.35 Like Nochebuena (and Wenceslao Martinez before him), he also styled himself as an agrarian leader. While Emilio Vargas was assassinated in 1944 as a result of in-fighting among rival factions, his right-hand man, Ancelmo Gonzalez, took over as strongman. For the next thirty years, Ancelmo and other members of the Gonzalez family politically dominated the municipio of Huazalingo partly through the use of force and partly through political maneuvering. Several of their sisters were strategically married off: one to a Nahua pistolero and the other to an Indian farmer. In this way, members of the Gonzalez family (the descendants of Fidencio, the landowner and Porfirista mentioned in the previous chapter) became members of the ejido of San Pedro, while continuing to own their own rural estates. The ruling family of Huazalingo also became politically allied to Leodegario Vasquez, a Nahua cacique from the large Indian community of San Francisco. This Nahua strongman, who ended up owning more land and money than Emilio Vargas (the strongman of the thirties), became a major money lender and supplied raw materials to numerous Nahua women in his hometown who made embroidered blouses through a 34 Taped interviews (in Nahuatl) with several older peasants, Cochiscoatitla (Atlapexco), April 7, 1982; Francisco Lara, Pepeyocatitla (Yahualica); Jos6 Lara, La Mesa Larga, June 1, 1984; Jos£ Francisco Pascual Tepanijtic, Tlalchiyahualica (Yahualica), June 17, 1984. This information was also provided in seven interviews conducted in Spanish with both Nahua and Mestizo landowners and peasants who had belonged to different political factions. The fact that day laborers from different rancherias were "summoned" to work in Teocuatitla and an accounting of their "cost" in brandy (aguardiente) are also recorded in a written memo from E. Mtz. A. in Atlapexco to Juvencio Nochebuena, July 4, 1956. Nochebuena Papers. 35 Interview with Timoteo Vargas, Tehuetlan (Huejutla), May 30, 1985.

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kind of putting-out system. Vasquez also sold large sections of the "ejido" of San Francisco to ranchers from Huejutla, Huazalingo and Tehuetlan.36 Another example of a Nahua cacique on the local level—this one directly connected to Juvencio Nochebuena—was Andres Guillen. Guillen ruled Chililico, the administrative center of several villages of Nahua potters and corn cultivators located just to the southwest of the city of Huejutla. Guillen's grandfather was a Frenchman who lived with and then abandoned a Nahua woman in Chililico. The European-looking Andr6s Guillen grew up speaking both Nahua and Spanish, and all of his children were considered masehuali.37 This cacique acquired many plots of land in this village (the type that could be bought and sold with the signature of a juez consiliador) and then proceeded to sell most of these to businessmen who lived in the city of Huejutla or in Tehuetlan. Apart from ruling seven subordinate villages or anexos, Guillen used to order day laborers from Chililico to clear any weeds that grew in the plaza and cobblestone streets of the municipal cabecera. He also recruited poor peasants from Chililico to work as seasonal laborers in the pastures and fields of La Herradura, a former hacienda now partly owned by the wealthy Galvan family (who was also a personal friend and compadre of Juvencio Nochebuena). Some informants claim that Guill6n used to pocket part of their wages. Yet Guillen, like his political boss, was at the same time a paternalistic patron who provided protection and assistance to his subordinates.38

Violence and Vendettas The era of Nochebuenismo (the period when Juvencio Nochebuena had political control) was characterized not only by cattle rustling, factional politics and political assassinations but by a high level of family feuds involving rival landowning families. This was particularly the case for the southern zone. Such a high level of personal conflict and violent confrontations is characteristic of many rural societies. The specific form taken by such violent conflict, especially homicide, is often indicative of the "basic values and major points of tension" in a society (Taylor 1979, 77). In the case of Hue36 Interviews with Francisco Gonzalez, San Pedro (Huazalingo), May 31, 1985; Timoteo Vargas, Tehuetlan, May 30, 1985. This information was also confirmed by a group interview in Nahuatl with peasants in San Francisco itself. 37 Interviews with Teodoro Guillen, Chililico, June 1, 1985; Agustin Castillo, Huejutla, May 14, 1985; conversation with a peasant from Chililico (in Nahuatl), in a bus between Pachuca and Huejutla, April 27, 1985. 38 Interview with Noel Rodriguez, Huejutla, April 27, 1986.

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jutla, the factional in-fighting and family vendettas involving such homicides illustrate the increasing competition among rancheros for control over land. In chapter 61 mentioned how such control enabled both rancheros and hacendados to make profits from a combination of cattle raising and commercial agricultural activities (especially sugarcane) with the use of part-time labor. However, the specific form taken by factional disputes among rival landowners had changed between the Porfiriato and the postrevolutionary periods. Not only was there less private land available (due to a combination of land reform and the high rates of fertility of ranchero families), but the norms for social interaction among the local elite had also changed. Unlike the more Europeanized families from the northern zone, who had dominated the political and economic life of the region during the nineteenth century, the rancheros of the southern zone were less refined in terms of speech and deportment. They also did not hesitate to use violence to settle personal disputes. In this regard the Mestizo rancheros who came to power after the revolution, especially those of more humble backgrounds, resembled the "violent peasant entrepreneurs" in Sicily described by Anton Blok (1975). Disputes among rival members of the ranchero elite, often triggered by sexual jealousy or accusations of unfair business transactions, usually erupted when the male offspring of rival landowners reached their twenties. At this point in their lives, young men who belonged to ranchero families had to negotiate marriages that would give them access to the maximum amount of privately owned land. Unlike the previous hacienda owners, most rancheros were uneducated and did not send away their children to become educated and pursue professional careers, preferably in urban centers. This lack of access to external revenues increased the competition for access to rural estates. Since many wealthy rancheros also had more than one family through multiple marriages or mistresses, each son might only inherit a small fraction of the family estate and even end up as a landless cowboy or mule driver— unless he could marry the daughter of a landowner rich with no male heirs or disinherit his own siblings and cousins. Some young rancheros, born into prosperous families, turned to banditry or became pistoleros to avoid downward mobility into the ranks of the peasantry. Whenever such rebellious offspring robbed or killed members of other landowning families, their victims had to take the law into their own hands, which would in turn trigger family feuds. The nature and intensity of such interfamily disputes can be illustrated by numerous vendettas that occurred in the thirties and forties. Since most of the men involved in these disputes were also minor caciques or pistoleros, the examination of these vendettas can provide further insights into the role

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played by violence in ranchero society and what impact this culture of violence had on Nahua communities, which were later to become embroiled in equally violent struggles for land. The most infamous vendetta that occurred in Huejutla was that between the Flores family of Ecuatitla and the Salazar family of Coyolapa. The Flores (originally three brothers) were rancheros who had also bought properties in various parts of the region, including the northern zone, after the revolution. The Flores' family home was located in a small Mestizo cluster of houses just outside of the Nahua village of Ecuatitla (Huejutla), although they also built an extra house in Huejutla which they used for weekend visits. Some of the Flores family even set up additional households; Ignacio, for example, had a Nahua mistress in Atlapexco. In the 1930s, this family became embroiled in a bitter dispute with the Tobar brothers, who owned the rancho of La Providencia (near Coyolapa and inside the former communal boundaries of Tenexco). This dispute, ostensibly caused by a fight over a girl, led to a series of assassinations that had political overtones. Juvencio Nochebuena had provided jobs for two of the Tobar brothers in Pachuca, where he could keep his eye on them; one of them became a pistol-wielding member of the state congress, and the other was appointed chief of police. The latter, however, disobeyed Nochebuena's orders and returned home to seek revenge.39 This feud continued into the 1940s when the sons of the original Flores brothers continued to fight with the Salazars (relatives of the Tobars), including Dario Salazar. At this point General Nochebuena backed the Salazars since he suspected one Flores of plotting against him.40 Dario Salazar (who was later to become one of the protagonists in class conflicts over land) lost almost all of his brothers in this factional in-fighting; most members of the Flores family were also killed in ambushes or face-to-face gunfights. The vendetta between the Flores and Tobar-Salazar families directly affected the Nahua village of Huitzotlaco (one of the anexos of Tenexco), which was located in the sphere of influence of the Flores family. Around the mid-thirties, several Mestizos who had been soldiers during the revolution came to work with the Flores family. One of them, Eugenio Sumaya, later bought his own small rancho, Pochaica, located near Huitzotlaco. Sumaya, together with his brother and his brother-in-law, served as pistoleros and became professional cattle rustlers who regularly stole cattle from larger ranches 39 Interviews with Nereo Nochebuena, Huejutla, May 31, 1981; Cresencia Tobar, Atlapexco, November2i, 1981; Manuel Ramirez, Chalma (Veracruz), June 11,1984; Daniel Salazar, Mexico City, May 31, 1983. 40 Interview with Alfredo Fayad, Tepancahual (Huazalingo), May 7, 1984; Daniel Salazar, June 6, 1984.

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in the northern zone. These men, who were given the nickname the Pintos, not only formed a band of thieves (together with some of the younger members of the Flores family) but recruited additional help from several Nahua peasants in Huitzotlaco. These peasants were all sons of wealthier Nahua famers.41 Their lawless activities also created, however, a split in Huitzotlaco between rival families since another small Indian landowner was already a pistolero for members of the Nochebuena faction allied to the Salazars. In the end the "Pintos" had to leave the region when their boss was assassinated.42 Such personal conflicts also took the form of internal disputes among members of large extended families, such as the Ramirezes from the Mestizo village of Cuatapa. In this case, a vendetta between two cousins, which also started over a woman—one of them married the other's former mistress— involved disputes over who was going to inherit their grandfather's estate. This dispute erupted into a gun battle in downtown Huejutla in 1952, an incident that was later made into a corrido (a Mexican ballad) celebrating the virtues of bravery and dying with honor.43 Similar public shoot-outs still occurred in the sixties and early seventies among nephews of Juvencio Nochebuena.44 Such disputes, all of which contained (to a greater or lesser degree) some combination of sexual jealousy, conflicts over inheritance and personal honor, are still common themes in the popular culture of the region.

The Demise of Old-Style Caciquismo Starting in 1945, a process of economic modernization in Mexico as a whole, together with the growth of the national bureaucracy and the educational system, made family feuds and the use of force in settling political disputes both obsolete and unacceptable. Yet Juvencio Nochebuena, who had 41 Interviews with Antero Nochebuena, June 19, 1984; Daniel Flores Hernandez, Huejutla, June 20, 1984; Nicolas Hernandez, Plan de Ayala (Orizatlan), May 18, 1985; Claudio Ramirez, Audiencia Publica (Orizatlan), May 17, 1985. 42 Interviews with Cupertino Molinos Alvarado, Chichielsoquitl (Huazalingo), June 4,1985; Braulio P6rez, La Reforma (Atlapexco), April 21, 1985. The Pintos and one Nahua family subsequently moved to Jaltocan, where they initiated a similar reign of terror until the Pintos moved on to even greener pastures elsewhere. « Interviews with Claudio Ramirez, Audiencia Publica (Orizatlan), May 17, 1985; Ruperto Hernandez (together with his father), Huejutla, June 3, 1984; Ildefonso Maya, April 24, 1982; Eneo Zeron Sanchez, Huejutla, June 8, 1985. 44 Joel Nochebuena and his own pistolero, Cresencio Martinez, both died in this manner. Other nephews of the general who died violent deaths in barroom brawls were Eduardo Nochebuena and Alberto Nochebuena. Interview with Nereo Nochebuena, Huejutla, August 16, 1981. One of these incidents was also reported in a local newspaper, Innovaciones, Sept. 15, 1978.

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himself been transformed into a professional politician and an appendage of the state, still maintained his position of power on the local level through a combination of patronage, repression and piecemeal social reform. For the next decade or so, a new economic elite of modern cattle ranchers, who were more educated and had access to credit, managed to maintain good relations with Nochebuena and occasionally lent him money. However, these wealthy and more educated rancheros became increasingly resentful of the general's political influence and his connections with local outlaws. It became even more difficult for Juvencio Nochebuena to rule the Huasteca of Hidalgo after 1950, with the election of Quintin Rueda Villagran as governor of Hidalgo. This governor decided to end the political influence of Nochebuena, to reform the political administration of Hidalgo and to stop cattle rustling in the Huasteca. In 1952 Juvencio Nochebuena still ran the presidential campaign for Ruiz Cortines in northern Hidalgo and invited all of his supporters to attend a huge political rally in downtown Huejutla. Like Cardenas, Ruiz Cortines reactivated Mexico's agrarian reform as a method of consolidating popular support and to stave off peasant discontent resulting from the harmful impact of the rapid expansion of capitalism in the rural sector. In Huejutla this policy resulted in thefinalconfirmation, in 1954 and 1955, of a number of provisional ejidos that had already been created in 1939 and 1940. These ejidos were all located in the northern part of the region, with the exception of several ejidos created as a result of the partition of the already defunct hacienda of Crisolco in the southern part of Yahualica. Despite Nochebuena's background as a revolutionary and his close connections with Ruiz Cortines, however, an alliance of disgruntled local politicians and new men of wealth without connections to the old guard soon disowned the general. A few years after Rueda Villagran assumed the office of governor, Verolo Zaragosa Palacios, the member of the state congress representing the district of Huejutla, decided to challenge the political influence of Nochebuena with the backing of the state governor. Verolo Zaragosa was a relative of the Palacios family who had lost their land to the Nochebuenas and who had also supported the Laras of Yahualica in the thirties. With the help of the new governor, Zaragosa managed to get Nochebuena opponents nominated as official candidates in most of the upcoming municipal elections or persuaded former Nochebuena supporters to switch sides.45 He even persuaded Cabrera (the teacher) to leave Pepeyoca to serve as municipal president of Huautla. 45

A series of long letters (reporting on which politicians supported Villagran and which had betrayed the general) were found in the Nochebuena Papers.

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Verolo then set up a parallel structure of patronage with the help of the governor. During his term of office as municipal president, Cabrera built a new primary school for Huautla, and he also received cement for the construction of a new school in Pepeyoca and other Nahua villages throughout his municipio.46 The governor also provided patronage to other Nahua villages. For example, the village of Tecacahuaco in Atlapexco also received cement for the building of its primary school.47 The new governor, and his main local representative, Zaragosa, also played dirty politics by taking advantage of a bitter dispute between several nephews of Juvencio Nochebuena and a newcomer by the name of Crisantos Nochebuena (not a close relative of the general). Crisantos, a reformed criminal, had originally been invited to Atlapexco by the general, where he set up a liquor still and operated a store. However, he fell out of favor after he shot Felix Islas, one of Juvencio's nephews and fled to Huautla.48 The new governor and Zaragosa gave sufficient tacit support to Crisantos to enable him to start recruiting a paramilitary band to wage war on the general. Crisantos did not succeed in capturing the general's ranch in Teocuatitla, but he did make things difficult for the Nochebuena faction by setting up his own sphere of influence in a remote part of the municipio of Yahualica. Here Crisantos extorted the peasant population with the claim that he represented the government, but he also allied himself with one of the descendants of the small hacienda of Crisolco, who had also turned to banditry and cattle rustling.4^ In 1955 yet another armed confrontation took place in Yahualica, and one of Nochebuena's principal supporters, Pedro Velez (recently elected municipal president), was assassinated in Huejutla. That same year, another Nochebuena supporter, Andres Guillen (the Nahua cacique from Chililico), was also shot to death. In the process of stamping out the caciquismo of General Nochebuena, Rueda Villagran himself utilized and indirectly created the last of the oldfashioned cacicazgos based on forced loans and the recruitment of a private army. Like former caciques, Crisantos also styled himself as an agrarian leader and sent several petitions on behalf of villages in his zone of operations to the department of agrarian reform—he asked for a change of status from ejido back to communal land tenure! Such methods, however, were outdated 46

A photograph of this new school, with a written description, was also included in the Cabrera Papers. ·" Interview with Juan Torres, Huejutla, May 5, 1985. 48 This incident was reported in an official document,' 'Memorandum confidencial al C. presidente de la republica" (de J. Nochebuena), February 1, 1956. Nochebuena Papers. 49 Interview with Miguel Nochebuena, Teocuatitla, August 20, 1981.

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by the fifties. Crisantos's petitions were completely ignored in the state capital and did not get published in the official state newspaper (as required by law) until twelve years later, in 1964.50 He also lost credibility with the new governor and was eventually hunted down as a common criminal. While these events were taking place in the remotest part of Huejutla (an area on the border of Yahualica and the state of Veracruz long controlled by outlaws and bandits), the neighboring municipio of Huazalingo remained relatively calm under a new set of officials directly appointed by Villagran. In 1954, for thefirsttime, no assassinations took place in this part of the region, and cattle rustling was brought to an end in Huautla.5' Similarly, with the appointment of a military commander, called Millan, as chief of police, ' 'law and order'' was restored to the municipio of Huejutla. This outsider flushed out a nest of gunslingers and cattle thieves from the Nahua village of Santa Catarina.52 However, old-style caciquismo was even more effectively stamped out throughfiscalreforms. In 1955, municipal governments were for the first time given a small share of the revenues collected through state taxes on the sale of tobacco products. Most older informants outside of Yahualica recall this as the period when compulsory faenas in Huejutla and other cabeceras werefinallyended. The lowest point in Nochebuena's career came in 1957, when he failed to become the official candidate for the governorship of Hidalgo. Instead, Alfonso Corona del Rosal (the descendent of a Spanish family who had once ruled Yahualica) became governor in 1958, and Juvencio Nochebuena was given the less important post of senator. Juvencio Nochebuena died from illness (some Mexicans say from rage) that same year. His closest political friends attributed the political downfall of the general to his failure to get Rojo Gomez's approval of his nomination for governor.53 By the end of the fifties, however, the general had already lost a great deal of political influence over a region he once ruled almost single-handedly. 50

ACAM, ramo comunal, exp. 5-2214 (Santa Teresa), exp. 5-2238 (Tlalchiyahualica), exp. 5-2239 (Mecatlan). See also Periodica Oficial del Estado de Hidalgo, no. 20, May 24 (1965). 51 Interviews with government official (recaudador de rentas), Huazalingo, June 7, 1985; Cleto Mendoza (former presidente municipal of Huautla), May 19, 1985. 52 Interviews with Ancelmo Torres, June 9, 1985; Teodoro Guillen, Chililico, June 1, 1985; Nicolas Hernandez, El Zapote (Huejutla), June 2, 1985; Nereo Nochebuena, May 12, 1983. Another nest of bandits, with close links to one of Nochebuena's henchmen in San Felipe Orizatlan, was located in the communities of Chacuala, Nexpa and Las Piedras. Here the era of violence and cattle rustling also disappeared in the early fifties (Rebolledo 1989, 225). 53 Interview with Miguel Nochebuena, Mexico City, August 27, 1981.

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Analysis Ranchero politicians like Nochebuena constituted an important source of political support for the new revolutionary regime that emerged under Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Calles. The revolutionary caciques who consolidated their power in Huejutla in the twenties represented a form of political control associated with a traditional ranchero economy where rancheros, like oldfashioned hacendados, used a combination of paternalism and authoritarian rule to maintain or reinforce their class position. However, rancheros, unlike the more sophisticated politicians and administrators who were in control before the revolution, also resorted to the use of arms to settle intra-elite disputes. Such ranchero politicians, mainly Mestizos, were in turn allied to wealthier Indians who used somewhat different tactics to maintain their control over Nahua communities that provided most of the seasonal labor force for rancheros. Juvencio Nochebuena was the chief link or intermediary between this local power elite and the Mexican state, starting with the government of Cardenas. In some ways, the caciquismo of Nochebuena can be compared to that of Saturnino Cedillo in San Luis Potosi, described by Romana Falcon (1984), although his influence was never as widespread as that of Cedillo. Like Cedillo, Nochebuena utilized personal contacts and his intimate knowledge of an ethnically diverse region to maintain the loyalty of political supporters. Similarly, Nochebuena was a pragmatic politician and a conservative at heart, although he was not averse to utilizing land distribution and agrarian ideology for political ends, to gain the support from some segments of the peasantry. Like Cedillo, Nochebuena also organized an efficient network of fighters, most of whom were rancheros who in turn recruited their own pistoleros from among both Mestizo and Nahua peasants. Here the similarity ends. Unlike Cedillo, who spent most of his life in his own home territory (although he also took up some posts on the national level and even abroad), Nochebuena was from thefirstmuch more immersed in national political life, which involved administrative appointments in Pachuca and in Mexico City. Indeed, Nochebuena more closely resembled the younger revolutionaries of Guerrero mentioned by Ian Jacobs, "whose careers were to be of a civilian bureaucratic hue" (1982, 115). This reflects the later time period of Nochebuena's political career, which started just at the end of the military phase of the revolution. Nochebuena's career also has much in common with that of Noradino Rubio, the former governor of Queretaro, described in my earlier book on the rancheros of Pisaflores (Schryer 1980, 109-10). Both Rubio and

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Nochebuena were able to combine the new, more bureaucratic political methods with more traditional forms of social control.54 Unlike Noradino Rubio, however, Nochebuena's career spanned two quite different periods in the political history of the modern Mexico state. When Cardenas first came to power, the government still needed military support from regional leaders. That is why Nochebuena's rancheros (like the conservative Porfirio Rubio of Pisaflores) received arms to defend their country (and to kill each other). After 1940, however, electoral support in the form of bloc votes became much more important for the official revolutionary government party originally founded by Calles. At this point Nochebuena was able to mobilize large numbers of unarmed, mainly Indian peasants for political rallies in downtown Huejutla. Such supporters consisted of both land recipients and the Indian clients of local rancheros. Public demonstrations (under the watchful eyes of armed rancheros) had now become important for symbolic purposes. Juvencio Nochebuena was as much a product of a rural ranchero system as the new revolutionary bureaucracy, and so he was able to function effectively in both. Prior to 1940, it was necessary for caciques to be able to mobilize their own armed retainers and to win armed skirmishes to maintain political control in more remote parts of the Huasteca. It was also still useful to have an independent military force to bargain with the national government from a position of strength at a time when the state was still weak and its army unprofessional (Buve 1974, 273). This is why Nochebuena had to get personally involved in the armed battles of 1936. With the consolidation and expansion of state power, however, regional politicians came to depend more on good connections with the central government, which gave them access to resources they could distribute to local clients. Politicians like Nochebuena, with such connections, were at a competitive advantage. Local military leaders like the Azuaras, who had forged their power primarily during the period of military conflict prior to 1924, were unable to make the transition. This can be shown by the rapid eclipse from power of people like Cedillo and the Figueroas of Guerrero described by Ian Jacobs (1982, chap. 6). The real underlying cause of the eventual downfall of Juvencio Nochebuena was the changing nature of the Mexican economy and its corresponding political system. With the rapid expansion of modern capitalism, the Mexican state no longer needed to rely on regional caciques for its survival, nor was it to its advantage to have banditry and armed feuds impede the spread of economic development into hitherto remote regions. Ironically, Ju*· Similar to the Arenas in Tlaxcala (Buve 1974, 3-15).

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151

vencio Nochebuena himself helped to bring about this process of modernization of his home region, even though this process eventually brought about the demise of his cacicazgo. His attempts to achieve greater integration into the national system (he even sent petitions to speed up the construction of the highway from Mexico to Tampico via Huejutla) undermined the informal power of the local power holders, especially rancheros in the more remote southern zone, who had been the very basis of his regional control. These minor power-holders, who had the most to gain by the continuation of a more traditional form of caciquismo, were the main block to the further development of modern capitalism. Between 1950 and i960, Nochebuena's monopoly on regional power and the type of people with whom he was allied were no longer required by the Mexican state. The political power of the old-fashioned revolutionary rancheros of Huejutla and their traditional cultural values (with their emphasis on bravery, machismo and violence) were also no longer compatible with the economic interests of a new type of more educated, business-oriented cattle rancher and commercial farmer (i.e., modern rancheros); moreover, these new businessmen no longer found it to their advantage to follow the subsistence ethic. Both the violence and the paternalism associated with the cacicazgo of Nochebuena thus faded away. A new breed of commercial landowner, and their political representatives, had a different relationship with the Mexican state after 1958. However, their economic relationship with the predominantly Nahuatl-speaking peasant population quickly deteriorated, as will be seen in the next chapter.

Chapter 9 The Impact of Modernization: The Expansion of Modern Cattle Production

Despite a great deal of rhetoric about self-sufficiency and socialist indepen­ dence, the Mexican government has over the past few decades promoted the rapid growth of commercial agriculture run by a private sector largely de­ pendent on foreign technology (see Lanfranco 1981; Hewitt 1976; Anderson 1986). In the Huasteca, this development had mainly taken the form of mod­ ern cattle production on cultivated pastures. This strategy has become a topic of debate among developmental experts who disagree about the potential ben­ efits of this type of economic development. In a report on a ranch development program started in 1968, Vern Harnapp (1972, ι) of the University of Akron in Ohio stated that the Huasteca, espe­ cially its wetter, southern portion, was ' 'one of the outstanding ranching areas of the country," with a great deal of potential. He noted that much of the forest and scrubland had already been converted to pastures and proposed additional investment to increase the productivity of cattle raising and to solve such problems as tick infestation and a lack of machinery for clearing and mowing pastures.1 Harnapp hoped that by further technical improvements, the Huasteca would be able to increase its already impressive beef production industry to meet the needs of an expanding market in Mexico City as well as abroad. Compare the optimism of Harnapp with the more pessimistic and critical views expressed by a development economist writing on the same topic. Ernest Feder (n.d.), in a study called "Lean Cows, Fat Ranchers," argues that huge investments by the World Bank in regions like the Huasteca only benefit the rich. In a case study of the region of Tempoal, Veracruz (just to the north of Huejutla), he shows that modern cattle production does little to improve the lot of poor peasants and actually increases unemployment (see Feder 1981). 1

Between 1957 and 1972, the expansion of cattle production led to a dramatic change in the physical landscape of the entire Huasteca (see Harnapp 1978).

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In the case of Huejutla, the expansion of beef production in the long run was even more disastrous for the rural poor than Feder suggests. The negative impact of the introduction of new technology (associated with this expansion) was also the primary impulse for agrarian conflicts that resulted in a political crisis in the early seventies. Initially, the introduction of new forms of cattle production did not upset the equilibrium between the subsistence and commercial sectors of the economy of Huejutla that was described in chapter 6. Indeed, between 1930 and i960, the gradual expansion of modern cattle production even created the conditions for the continuation of traditional forms of swidden cultivation around the same time that the people-land ratios inside the boundaries of most Indian communities were reaching their limits. Subsistence cultivators originating from such communities not only created the permanent pastures but provided the seasonal labor required to keep these pastures cleared of weeds. The presence of this seasonal labor also stimulated the expansion of a profitable but labor-intensive sector of commercial agriculture that had a boom in the sixties. This is why it is necessary to distinguish between the short-term and the long-term effects of the process of modernization. In the long run, this process not only accentuated class differences but upset the delicate balance among population density, natural resources and productive activities that had formed the basis of a ranchero economy in an ethnically diverse region.

The Introduction of Modern Cattle Production

Such technological changes as cultivated grasses, rotating pastures and exotic breeds of cattle were introduced to the region of Huejutla in the early thirties. Some of these innovations had historical precedents in other parts of the Huasteca. For example, as early as the 1890s, larger landowners in other parts of the Huasteca started to experiment with guinea grass, which allowed one hectare of land to support a cow that had previously required at least ten hectares of bush-land or natural pasture (Stresser-Pean 1965). In Huejutla, a few hacienda owners also planted this new type of grass in their permanent pastures, used for milking cows. Most of the region, however, continued to use the earlier technology, and the few permanent pastures that had been created were destroyed during the ten years of civil war that followed the outbreak of the revolution in 1910. Local landowners did not start to make new pastures and repair old fences until the late twenties and early thirties. Only then were older pastures again cleared of foliage so that the hardy, self-propagating guinea grass originally planted would again grow on its own. Indeed,

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in 1930, there were still only 8,450 head of cattle in the entire region of Huejutla, of which almost a quarter were slaughtered locally according to "El Libra Azul," a businessman's directory published in 1933 (insert 2). After 1930 more enterprising landowners in the northern zone again started experimenting with new types of cattle production. Those who had earlier planted guinea now planted new, exotic grasses (first pangola, then african star and other new improved varieties) that would better nourish cows and more quickly fatten yearlings. The use of barbed wire fencing also increased. Rather than allowing most cattle to graze in the forests or feed on the stubble left by previous corn crops, modern ranchers created permanent pastures for all of their cattle. Ranchers also divided their pasture land into separate, fenced-off sections, thus allowing them to move cattle from one section or pasture to another to prevent overgrazing. Another, even more daring, innovation was the introduction of new breeds of cattle, such as the Indian Cebu which was then cross-bred with other types (especially Brown Swiss) to produce a breed of cattle that was more tick-resistant and better adapted to the heat and humidity of the Huasteca. Given the lack of access to a market for high-quality beef and the poorly developed infrastructure of roads in the region, these technological changes were initially restricted to a limited area in the northern zone while most cattle in the southern zone were still raised through traditional methods. Cattle raised in the valleys of the southern zone were usually sold to larger producers in the northern zone who specialized in finishing (fattening) cattle in permanent pastures (such as in La Herradura or Tepotzteco). Once these cattle had achieved optimum weight, they were then driven back along the banks of the Atlapexco River to El Arenal to start their long ascent through the highland districts on their way to the central Mexican plateau. To minimize both weight loss and injury to cattle transported over long distances over mountainous terrain, special pads were placed on their hooves, and frequent stops near convenient grazing spots were made along the way. Cattle bound for the highland plateau thus took from several weeks to a month to reach the railway station of the town of Apulco, for a short train ride to their final destination in the state capital of Pachuca or Mexico City. After 1935, cattle were delivered to whatever point had been reached by a number of highways slowly inching their way close to the Huasteca of Hidalgo.2 Another impediment to the spread of modern cattle production was 2

Interviews with Isidro Solis and Anastacio Guerrero, El Arenal (Yahualica), May 24,1981; Camilcar Martinez, Atlapexco, November 23, 1981; Alfredo Fayad, Huazalingo, May 7, 1984. This and other information about cattle production in the region was obtained from men who have had extensive experience building up their own ranches or working as cowhands or ranch administrators.

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the high rate of cattle rustling, especially during periods of political instability associated with factional in-fighting such as that which occurred around 1935. Even when political stability was restored, modern cattle production still continued to expand very slowly in the aftermath of the great depression. Between 1935 and 1942 many landowners were also hesitant to create more pastures because of the insecurity associated with the land reform of Lazaro Cardenas, who redistributed land previously owned by haciendas to peasant communities.

The Expansion of Modern Cattle Production Modern cattle production in Huejutla started to expand rapidly in the forties, with the advent of more conservative governments and the completion of a paved highway connecting Mexico City with Tampico. By 1942, cattle bound for central Mexico could be put on trucks in Tamazunchale, located only one day on horseback from Huejutla. Around the same time the municipal governments of Huautla and Huejutla passed laws forbidding vagrancy of animals, which put the onus on the owners of cattle to fence in their pastures.3 Most villages also started to fence in their urban zones to prevent domestic animals from wandering into surrounding milpas, although cattle were still left to wander freely (especially onriverbanks)for at least another decade in places like Atlapexco, Yahualica and Huazalingo.4 In 1946, local cattle producers also received special certificates that guaranteed that their properties would not be affected by further land reform (Bassols 1977). Once local landowners had the assurance that their private properties were safe from further expropriation, they started giving permission to local peasants to grow maize in order to clear the forests and shrubbery that still covered more than half of the land surface of the Huasteca. Peasants who did not have access to land or who wanted to achieve greater yields of maize and beans were thus able to practice subsistence cultivation on privately owned land. In return for access to land, they were expected to sow special grass crops after two or three harvests of corn before moving on to another tract of forest. In this way, cattle producers got their land cleared with no labor costs whatsoever (and sometimes received a small percentage of the corn crop as well). Indeed, the production of cattle became so profitable that even full-time mer3 Interviews with Emigrio Vite, Huautla, May 5, 1983; Tiburcio Salvedo, Chiquemecatitla, June 12, 1985. 4 Interview with Alfredo Fay ad, May 7, 1985.

I56

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

chants, who had earlier accumulated capital, started to invest in cattle. The career of Ezechiel Reyes, the man who was later to become the wealthiest ranchero of Huejutla, can be used to illustrate the opportunities for enrichment available to cattle ranchers during this period.

Case Studies of the New Economic Elite

Cheque Reyes of Huejutla

Ezechiel (Cheque) Reyes, a Horatio Alger figure, was the son of a carpenter from Huejutla.5 He and several brothers first worked as merchants, with mule trains, buying pilon and coffee in neighboring villages to sell at a profit in Tampico. Owning no land of their own, they had to keep their pack animals within a fenced-off courtyard in Huejutla during the day and pay rents to local landowners for letting their mules graze in pastures at night. By the time the highway reached Tamazunchale in 1942, Cheque Reyes had managed to accumulate sufficient capital to sell all of his mules and buy cattle. His first few head of cattle, which he bought in the state of Tamaulipas, were of the local, unimproved variety. These he put in the rancho of El Chirrin, near Atlapexco, which Cheque Reyes bought from a local ranchero. Over the next twenty years he bought or rented additional land (most of which had already been converted into pastures) and gradually built up his herds. Although Cheque Reyes became mainly a cattle producer, he also bred mares (in Cruztitla) and produced a variety of cash crops. In every one of his ranchos he had a supervisor or manager who looked after the day-to-day operations while he traveled back and forth between his ranchos and Huejutla on horseback to tend to his various business affairs. A typical day, as he recounted it, would be as follows: Cheque would get up at three in the morning, saddle his horse, andrideout to one of his ranches in Atlapexco, stopping for a cup of coffee in Tenexco, where one of his administrators lived. From there he would go to supervise his ranch of El Chirrin and spend the night in a small house located in the middle of one of his pastures and then set off the next day to visit another ranch near Platon Sanchez. One day of the week he would stay at home to pay the wages he owed the numerous Nahua peons from such villages as Zohuala and Chililico who came to see him (and who usually asked for additional cash advances) in the large patio of the much 5

This life history was obtained through various interviews with Ezechiel Reyes, starting on June 15. 1984.

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larger house he had bought near the center of Huejutla. These Nahua peons helped keep his pastures clean with machetes, worked in various moliendas he operated and did a variety of other odd jobs.6 Cheque Reyes is one example of several upwardly mobile rancheros who developed successful business careers largely through their own efforts. Another example is Emiliano Badillo, who is also considered to be one of the richest men in Huejutla. These men all speak fluent Nahuatl and when they were younger used to wear the same manta shirts as Nahua peasants (although, unlike the Indians, they used riding breeches or city trousers). One man even remarked that Emilio Badillo used to carry his own lunch in his pocket, consisting of a few simple bocoles (filled tortillas), and eat them on the road, just like his day laborers.7 Today these men own extensive urban real estate in Huejutla, including apartment buildings, stores and hotels. They also perceive all poor peasants as "those damn Indians who have taken over our land." }os£ Maria Morales of San Felipe Orizatlan

Apart from rancheros like Cheque Reyes, the descendants of hacienda owners also turned their family estates into modern business enterprises, with cattle as their most important source of income. A typical example is Jose Morales, who was already retired in 1985. This man was the grandson of Andros Ubidi, who owned a hacienda of about 800 hectares near La Labor in San Felipe Orizatlan. During the Porfiriato, this hacendado used to export cattle to the state capital, but most of his cattle and the few pastures he had planted with grass were lost during the revolution and the estate was divided among seven children.8 Jose Morales was born in 1909 but left San Felipe at the age of nine (toward the end of the revolution) to join his sister, who had run off with an army general and was then living in San Luis Potosi. They provided him with an education, and he did not return to his hometown until the Cardenas era to claim the 160 hectares that belonged to his mother (and which he, in turn, had to share with a brother). After getting married, Jose Morales started his career by operating a small store and, through constant dealings with his Nahua customers, picked up and improved upon the little Nahuatl he had learned as a child. His share of the family estate consisted of 6 His relationship with these poor, wage-earning peasants, from the various anecdotes he recounted to me, consisted of a combination of paternalistic condescension and mockery. 7 Interview with Ildefonso Maya, June 16, 1984. 8 Interview with Josd Maria Morales, San Felipe Orizatlan, May 16, 1985. This man was also asked to serve as municipal president under Quintin Rueda Villagran (in the fifties).

I58

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

two lotes, one of which was located only two kilometers from the town of San Felipe. All of this land, however, had become overgrown with small trees. It took Jos6 Morales five years of renting a 40-hectare section of land to local peasants to create a pasture divided into three separate sections, each planted with two varieties of grass. During these five years, his cows grazed in the thinner scrubland or the stubble left after each corn harvest. All newborn heifers were then transferred to another pasture in another section of land he owned at some distance from town. Only when he had finished preparing all of his pastures in 1950 did this ranchero start buying yearlings for finishing. He also trained two Nahuatl-speaking peasants to serve as his cowhands and taught them how to castrate bulls, assist at the birth of new cattle and milk the cows. Apart from building up a herd of cattle, Jose Morales also turned to farming. He initially planted 5 hectares of sugarcane and gradually expanded this to 50 hectares, which enabled him to run a molienda-style milling operation for three months of the year. Other crops, cultivated with hired hands, included tobacco and maize.

Manuel Ramirez of Cuatapa

Access to land was not the only prerequisite for developing profitable ranchos. While many landowners financed their cattle operations with money earned from commerce or farming, credit became increasingly important for setting up and continuing to operate a modern cattle ranch. Such access to credit partly depended on good connections and a certain familiarity with the banking establishment. One example of a ranchero who managed to build up a ranch in this manner is Manuel Ramirez, a member of a large Mestizo family who originally founded the village of Cuatapa (Atlapexco). His father, Luis, owned 50 hectares of land but squandered all of his income on alcohol and was actually working for wages by the time he passed away. Manuel and the rest of his siblings started off as day laborers and built their own small houses as each of them got married. They all combined occasional wage labor with subsistence cultivation on their own land and bought piglets for fattening. However, only Manuel managed to become a successful cattle rancher although he inherited only 10 hectares. Apart from the land he inherited from his father, Manuel Ramirez bought an additional 10 hectares (5 from each of his two married sisters).9 He then approached a bank, recently set up in Huejutla, and obtained a ten-thousand» Interview with Manuel Ramirez, Chalma (Veracruz), June 11, 1984.

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peso loan using his 20 hectares of land as collateral. This was when a heifer cost eight hundred pesos. After selling his first cattle, Manuel Ramirez reinvested the money he had made and gained access to additional land from two sons-in-law who had gone to work in Mexico, leaving their father-in-law to look after their wives. One had inherited 27 hectares and the other had 6. By the time his oldest son was ready to go to high school (in the seventies), Manuel could afford to buy him a small car. His financial success (by local standards) stirred up considerable envy on the part of many of his poorer relatives, including his own brothers, who subsequently invaded his land together with other militant agrarians (see section 3). Despite the introduction of many innovations, the type of cattle production done in Huejutla was still very land-extensive and relatively unsophisticated by national standards. While permanent, fenced-in pastures and Cebu cattle were almost universally adopted by all producers, the vast majority of landowners in Huejutla did not establish special feed lots, specialize in the breeding of new forms of cattle or take any but the most elementary measures to eradicate ticks. According to one expert writing about the Huasteca as a whole, most ranchers in the region of Huejutla would still fall under the category of "medium and small cattle producers operating with the traditional, extensive and semi-feudal sector of the cattle industry" (Ortiz 1977). Perhaps only a few larger landowners in Huejutla (including Cheque Reyes) might fall under his category of "the modern sector," because of their use of cement dipping tanks, professional veterinary services and new breeding techniques. Apart from the initial investment of fencing and occasionally clearing the pastures of weeds, the rest of the landowners specializing in the finishing of cattle kept their costs to a minimum. They could easily leave the care of such a ranch to one or two cowhands, get a good return on their capital and carry on some other business or occupation on the side. The social and economic effects of this strategy, however, did not become apparent for another twenty years. In the meantime, the introduction of new crops, the building of feeder roads and a period of rapid economic growth at the national level created a veritable boom for rancheros and poor peasants alike.

The Economic Boom of the Fifties The rapid growth of the Mexican economy during and after the Second World War, coupled with a primary commodity boom in the 1950s (after the Korean War), provided new opportunities to both landowners and peasant

ΐ6θ

H I S T O R I C A L BACKGROUND

producers in Mexico. This period, which also saw massive road- and dambuilding projects in other parts of Mexico, indirectly benefited more isolated regions such as Huejutla. For example, the building of the highway from Mexico to Tampico, which passed through Ciudad Valles and Tamazunchale, not only stimulated cattle production but also allowed short-distance muledriving between Huejutla and Tamazunchale, an economic activity that was taken up by better-off peasants who had managed to save sufficient money to buy one or two mules. This new group of itinerant merchants, which included both Mestizos and Indians, took over the business of supplying Huejutla and other small towns in the region with commodities, just as wealthier merchants like Cheque Reyes were getting more involved in cattle ranching. These in­ dependent mule drivers received merchandise on credit from larger merchants in Tamazunchale to bring in such consumer items as petroleum, beer and soft drinks as well as the ingredients required for local craft industries: wheat flour for bakeries, and various powders and chemicals used in the manufacturing of fireworks.10 Profits from working as independent mule drivers and travel­ ing merchants were the basis of the accumulation of further capital by Nahua merchants in such villages as Zitlan and El Pintor (a small village in the state of Veracruz that is today practically a suburb of Huejutla). Some members of the Ramirez family from the Mestizo village of Cuatapa also made money this way. The more successful merchants eventually bought land and invested in cattle production. In the 1970s, when agrarian conflicts erupted, most of these rich peasants had to leave, and most of them today live in the city of Huejutla. A combination of economic growth and the end of the most flagrant polit­ ical abuses associated with the postrevolutionary period of strongman rule gradually improved the overall quality of life in the region. This was reflected in the rapid increase in population and the expansion of the religious cargo system, or cycle of religious feasts, in Nahua communities. For example, Zoquitipan (Yahualica) celebrated three saints' feasts prior to the revolution but added three more in the 1940s and 1950s after buying new statues in Mexico City. Pepeyocatitla (Yahualica) also added its third fiesta in the 1950s, and the feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe in Atencuapa (Atlapexco) started around the same time. Cochiscoatitla (Atlapexco) also bought three 10 The only product, originally available in Tampico, that could no longer be easily obtained was the caustic soda used as a catalyst in the making of soap. Some Nahuatl peasants who used to make this soap complained that this item was taken off the market around the same time that a soap manu­ factured in Tampico (jabon huasteco) began to be imported into the region. Taped interview (in Nahuatl) with two older men, Cochiscoatitla.

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new statues for its chapel about thirty-five years ago.11 Many small rural communities also started to rebuild chapels or constructed proper (i.e., stone or brick) schools in the 1950s. Another factor that contributed to the economic improvement of poor peasants in many rural communities was the introduction of coffee trees, which could be cultivated by both rancheros and small peasant plot holders. However, this new crop was mainly restricted to parts of the southern zone. Coffee became an important cash crop in most of the municipio of Huazalingo (which lies at a higher altitude) and in the villages of Tepetitla (Yahualica) and Achiquihuixtla (Atlapexco), where all coffee was sold to intermediaries in the Mestizo town of Tehuetlan (Huejutla). Coffee also became important in Cuacuilco and parts of Ixcatlan (Huejutla) and in the southernmost parts of the municipios of Jaltocan and Orizatlan (especially in Huitzitzilingo). All of these villages also attracted traveling merchants who bought up coffee beans for further processing. Although coffee merchants in places like Tehuetlan and San Felipe reaped most of the profits, many peasants with relatively small plots of land were still able to save enough money to build better houses. For this reason, coffee-producing villages received the reputation of being "rich" in comparison with communities in the rest of the region. Starting in the middle of the sixties, the region also experienced a shortlived boom in tobacco production, although the cultivation of tobacco was restricted to a narrow strip of land between San Felipe and Atlapexco.12 At one point this economic activity became even more profitable than cattle. The tobacco boom started when an American company began to provide credit to many producers (both rancheros and small peasant producers) to grow this cash crop.13 This operation involved a chain of intermediaries, including a man who belonged to one of the families descended from former hacienda owners. Unlike cattle, this crop required a large number of seasonal wage laborers. The expansion of this and other cash crops to Nahua villages allowed the same process of class differentiation that had started in the nineteenth century to start anew on the village level; while some peasants became small entrepreneurs, the majority entered the ranks of an increasingly large 11

Interviews with Eugenio Sanchez, Zoquitipan, April 15, 1982; Camerino Pascual, Pepeyocatitla, May 21, 1984; the wife of Braulio Perez, La Reforma, May 21, 1985; taped interview (in Nahuatl) with an older peasant, Cochiscoatitla, April 7, 1982. 12 Interviews with Nereo Nochebuena, Huejutla, August 30, 1981; Daniel Salazar, Mexico City, September 30, 1983; Josi Maria Morales, Orizatlan, May 19, 1985; Carlos Manuel Lara, Vinasco, January 15, 1987. 13 An international corporation, Nestle's, also operated in Huejutla for a while; it used to buy fresh milk at the farm gate.

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rural semiproletariat. These impoverished peasants provided the seasonal labor force needed for the subsequent expansion of both cattle production and more capitalistically oriented commercial agriculture in the region as a whole. During the fifties and sixties, commercial farmers and ranchers continued to use the same methods as before for recruiting seasonal day laborers, by offering cash advances or merchandise. These loans were paid off by working on a daily basis at some future date. Other commercial crops that required many seasonal laborers were sugarcane and fruit trees (especially oranges). Rich peasants in both Nahua and Mestizo communities also used part-time laborers to cultivate such cash crops as black beans (frijol) (especially in Huautla and Xochiatipan), maize (Huejutla and Orizatlan) and the roatan variety of bananas (Remedios 1977).14 Some employers also permitted peasants who did not have access to land to cultivate milpas in exchange for labor. For example, when one ranchero, Cleto Mendoza, bought 67 hectares of land in Tlaica (near Tenexco), he turned half of this land into a permanent pasture and set aside the other half for the landless peasants who lived in the village of Tlaica to practice subsistence cultivation. These peasants also used to help him cut and process sugarcane in another property he had bought.15 However, other farmers and ranchers employed day laborers from villages whose inhabitants still had access to their own land for subsistence agriculture.

The Uneven Nature of Regional Development The effect of the continued expansion of cattle production and commercial agriculture was most apparent in the city of Huejutla, which grew rapidly and became one of the main stopovers for small commercial aircraft. Although still not connected to the rest of Mexico by highway, Huejutla attracted numerous visitors to an annual trade fair where horses and cattle were bought and sold. In i960 Huejutla not only had a complete primary school but was also setting up a secondary program of education. Another elementary school with all six grades was located in the Mestizo village of Huichapa (in Jaltocan), one of the population centers inhabited by mainly "white" rancheros of European descent. This school was attended by the children of ranchero families from many other towns and villages (see Mefiindez 1955, 294-97). 14 The municipio of Huautla also produced pineapples prior to 1961, when minor frost and disease ended this miniboom in pineapple production. 15 Interview with Anacleto Mendoza, Huejutla, May 12, 1985.

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The benefits of the economic boom of the fifties and sixties were not equally distributed, however, nor did it solve some of the basic problems associated with rural isolation. The lack of communication between the city of Huejutla and most of its hinterland meant that most rural communities in the region were extremely vulnerable to periodic food shortages due to natural calamities. Although the Huasteca might give visitors the first impression of a tropical paradise, droughts or frosts strike every ten orfifteenyears. About every three or four years there are also poor harvests due to lack of rain, high winds or too much rain. Another problem is the annual flooding of rivers, which cuts off all means of communication for weeks at a time during the rainy season from September to November. Apart from the regular seasonal overflowing of river banks, major flooding occurred in 1929 and again in 1955. There were heavy frosts that damaged most of the coffee trees in 1947, 1951 and 1963 (and, more recently, in 1984), and a bad epidemic hit the area in 1957. The majority of villages in the region also did not have even the basic one-room, three-grade schools found in other parts of rural Mexico. Like other rural communities, whether Nahua or Mestizo, they thus experienced the uneven development of Mexico and the government's neglect of marginal, isolated regions. Despite limited opportunities for the children of Indian families to attend residential schools in other parts of the country, only the sons of better-off Nahua families, who could afford to pay their travel costs and additional expenditures, received a modern education.

The Decline of Formal Education in Rural Communities

Ironically, the period of modernization starting in the fifties actually saw a decline in the level of education of the region as a whole due to a dire shortage of teachers. In the forties, the children of local rancheros with the right political connections had already started studying beyond grade school in large urban centers.16 These young people were no longer available to staff local schools, as they had done in the past. Instead, they became urban professionals or left to explore the wider world. While many eventually settled down in Mexico City, Pachuca or Tampico, an equal number returned to their family estates. Those who returned represented a new generation of more educated 16 Juvencio Nochebuena sent most of the children of his relatives in Atlapexco to Mexico City, where they stayed in the house of his aunt, Edwiges Nochebuena. This woman spent most of the rest of her life providing free room and board and acting as substitute mother for an entire generation of boys from the region of Huejutla. Interview with the daughter of Edwiges Nochebuena, Mexico City, August 29, 1981.

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farmers and ranchers, thoroughly exposed to a more urbanized (and Americanized) national culture. These educated rancheros, who took the lead in applying for credit and rationalizing the rural enterprises they bought or inherited, were certainly unlikely to take up careers as poorly paid rural schoolteachers. During this period of rapid economic growth (which came to be labeled as "the Mexican miracle") the state of Hidalgo did not have a sufficiently large budget to pay decent salaries for teachers or to build more schools. In fact, even predominantly Spanish-speaking parts of rural Hidalgo did not have sufficient schools during this period (Schryer 1980, 23). As population growth rapidly outstripped available resources, the proportion of children who received schooling in Huejutla rapidly declined. While primary schools were established in all cabeceras as well as in such Mestizo towns as El Arenal and Tehuetlan, most rancherias did not have schools. A few villages paid for their own private teachers while they awaited government support. During this period, while the children of already educated Mestizo rancheros were already attending a high school now operating in Huejutla, the rural Nahua population had less access to primary education than twenty years before. Even villages that did have unusually dedicated teachers in the forties orfiftieshad to close their schools in the sixties. As a consequence, more Nahua children ended up as illiterate, monolingual speakers of Nahuatl by the sixties than twenty years before. For example, in a lecture presented to the official government party, a researcher (Noble 1964a, 62) reported illiteracy rates of 87 percent and 76 percent for the municipios of Xochiatipan and Huautla respectively. Economic class differences were thus strongly reinforced by a new gap in formal education. The modern, educated landowners in Huejutla lamented the lack of roads and the high rate of illiteracy of the peasant population. However, the further expansion of permanent pastures as well as commercial agriculture very much depended on the existence of large numbers of illiterate subsistence cultivators who were willing to work for wages for two or three days a week. Such part-time cultivators, who could not get permanent or better-paid jobs because of their lack of education, continued to clear new land for pastures and also provided the cheap labor required in clearing pastures, running moliendas and picking oranges and avocados (another new economic activity introduced after 1945). It is therefore necessary to look at the subsistence sector of the village economy, which provided the seasonal labor force for local landowning farmers and cattle producers.

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The Subsistence Sector: Milpa Cultivation in the Sixties Prior to i960, a peasant's ability to produce his own food, as well as many objects of daily use, made it possible for family members to work for wages that were much lower than the minimum set by the government. Most of the money earned from wage labor supplemented the income the family derived from maize production and a variety of other subsistence activities. Such supplementary activities included the planting of small amounts of banana and coffee (mainly for home consumption),fishing,gathering firewood and home crafts (making brooms or fishing nets). In all villages women also keep poultry, and in some parts of Huejutla they produce pottery both for home use and for sale in the tianguis (traditional market). There are, of course, intraregional variations in the relative importance of milpa cultivation as opposed to craft activities. For example, in i960, in places like Texoloc (Xochiatipan), all households cultivated milpas twice a year and even sold surplus corn to obtain extra cash income. The yield of corn there was 1,920 kilograms per hectare. In contrast, in Ixcatepec (Huejutla), only about a quarter of the households still cultivated milpas, with much lower yield, although more coffee was produced (Bafiuelos 1986). Also, in most of the Nahua villages that are located along the highway from Huejutla to Orizatlan, most peasants combine corn production with the manufacturing of clay utensils or furniture. Where milpa production was low, these other economic activities were used to generate income to purchase maize and frijol. Additional money earned from wages was used to buy petroleum, cooking oil, clothing and medicine. Regardless of the source of additional income, the average peasant in the Huasteca must cultivate at least 2 or 3 cuartillos (10 to 15 liters) of maize to provide one of the basic staples of their family's diet. The amount of corn they can harvest is normally enough to last for at least part of the year (two corn crops a year would provide total self-sufficiency in food). To plant this amount of corn requires at least one-half a hectare. A milpa this size (also used to grow some beans, squash, chilies and a variety of greens) can be cultivated by one man with some help from other family members (and sometimes resorting to reciprocal labor exchange). Most corn plots, however, usually located on hillsides, cannot be cultivated for more than two consecutive years since these plots have to be fallowed for at least another two years. Hence the typical poor peasant (i.e., one who cultivates no commercial crops whatsoever) still requires a minimum of 2 hectares of arable land to cultivate both crops of 2 cuartillos (each crop on a separate piece of land) and still

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fallow his land. This limit had already been reached in i960 for most communities. If one assumes access to equal plots of land (which was usually not the case), most peasants would have just had sufficient land to provide for most of their own food needs. The Example of Cochotla

The Nahua community of Cochotla (Atlapexco) can be used as an example of a village inhabited mainly by day laborers who also had access to their own land. When I visited this community in 1982, class differences among the households of this village were not as pronounced as in other places because most of the terrain surrounding this village is not suitable for modern cattle production or high-yielding varieties of coffee. At the time of the revolution, most poor peasants in Cochotla worked for a handful of wealthy Nahua families who cultivated maize to sell and to raise pigs. These rich peasants also used to own the older variety of cattle that wandered through the forests. However, declining corn yields and the lack of opportunities for new entrepreneurial activities in Cochotla meant that economic class differences had practically disappeared by i960. The children of rich peasants had either moved elsewhere or turned into paupers. The village of Cochotla was part of a much larger fictitious ejido. This larger ejido (including six anexos not included in this case study) did include some flatter pasture lands near a river, but these were bought by several Mestizo rancheros a long time ago and are today in the hands of a group of peasants from another village. Even prior to the land invasions of the seventies, however, the cultivatable area in the section of land belonging to the village of Cochotla itself was pretty well equally divided among numerous small producers.17 The total amount of cattle in the community consisted of about a dozen cows (of the unimproved variety) tied up in tiny chicaderas (the name given for tiny fenced-off hillside pastures). The peasants who lived in Cochotla at that time did not have ready access to other land nearby that they could rent. Because neither Mestizo nor Nahua cattle producers monopolized part of the village commons that belonged to Cochotla (which would make people-land ratios meaningless), the approximate amount of land to which each peasant had access can be calculated. Cochotla's communal land (de facto small private plots) is approximately 17 A similar situation of such densely populated mountaintop communities exists in the Nahuatl villages of Acatepec and Zacatipa (Huautla), Xoxolpa and Aguacatitla (Yahualica) and Santo Tomas (Huazalingo).

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533.5 hectares of arable land.'8 In 1921, the village of Cochotla had a population of 275 inhabitants, which meant that there were 1.94 hectares per inhabitant (or 9.7 hectares per household taking an average of 5 people per household). Population grew rapidly, reaching 973 inhabitants by i960.19 With the same land base, there were now only 0.56 hectares of land per inhabitant (some of which was also planted with small coffee orchards, a minor supplementary activity). We can thus see that Cochotla still had the minimum amount of land per household (i.e.,0.56 X 5 = 2.7 hectares) required to support its population at a basic level of subsistence up until i960. However, all of these peasants also had to earn cash income by working in neighboring ranchos where they picked fruit, cut tobacco or sugarcane, worked in moliendas and pulled out weeds growing in the pastures of local landowners. Because there was some class differentiation in Cochotla, there were actually families with less than the average amount of land who were not able to support themselves according to the locally defined (already very low) standard of living. The further increase in population on the same land base in places like Cochotla made it increasingly difficult for all but a small minority of better-off peasants to make an adequate living by combining subsistence cultivation with part-time wage labor for local rancheros. The wages they earned were simply no longer enough to cover the basic costs because they now had to buy most of what they used to be able to produce for themselves.

Seasonal Migratory Labor The increasing pressure on the land, the result of a combination of rapid demographic growth (itself accelerated as a result of such aspects of modernization as immunization programs) and the gradual conversion of arable land into pastures, made it more and more difficult for day laborers to supplement wage income with subsistence agriculture. Thus, poor peasants from Huejutla had to seek better-paid seasonal employment in other regions in order to afford the food they could no longer grow for themselves. Starting in the 1960s, increasing numbers of peasants without access to sufficient land (especially 18 ACAM, ramo ejidal, exp. 1463 (Cochotla). The amount of land granted to the larger ejido of Cochotla was 3,247 hectares, but I have included only one quarter of the 2,134 hectares that were arable (temporal y laborable). The 533.5 hectares that constitute a quarter of this total are probably an overestimation of the amount of land actually belonging to the peasants of the village of Cochotla, who have drawn their own boundaries to mark off their share of land from those of its neighboring anexos such as Itzocal, Atotomoc and Ixcuatitla. '» I have taken the population figures for 1920 to i960 from the official national census carried out every ten years.

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in densely populated villages such as Cochotla) started to work as day laborers in other parts of the Huasteca. At first local peasants went to the municipios of Altamira and Gonzales, in the state of Tamaulipas, where they picked cotton. In the early seventies, a smaller number of day laborers also obtained seasonal work during the harvesting of vegetables, just across the border from Huejutla, in the region of Platon Sanchez. By the end of the seventies, peasants from several villages in the poorer and more mountainous parts of Huejutla (such as Tetla, Yahualica) were also finding menial jobs in the mining sector of the state capital.20 This outflow of local labor drove up wages because landowners in Huejutla now had to compete with the owners of more productive agricultural estates in the lower Huasteca who were able to pay higher wages. It was therefore no longer feasible to offer cash advances to gain access to cheap labor. Local employers were no longer interested in "helping" the poor peasants.

The Crisis in Agriculture Between 1965 and 1970, commercial agriculture in Huejutla (as in other parts of Mexico) was affected by a profound crisis. This led to a rapid decline in the production of commercial crops. For example, a sharp drop in the price of sugarcane and a scarcity of firewood (used to fire the kilns used to boil the sugarcane sap) motivated many rancheros who still cultivated sugarcane to phase out their moliendas. The few who kept on producing cane only milled it in periods of drought in order to feed their cattle. Starting around 1970, the production of pilon became an occupation only for a few poor rancheros (i.e., rich peasants), but it was no longer profitable from a purely business point of view. Next, the American company that had provided credit to local tobacco growers decided to phase out their operations in the region because of declin20 The patterns of migration for the region are complex and show a great deal of local variation. For example, by 1980, the most common type of seasonal migrant labor for monolingual, illiterate Nahuatl peasants was in the sugar fields of El Higo, Veracruz, while any peasants with a knowledge of Spanish and some primary education were seeking part-time work in construction projects in Mexico City (see Romer 1986). At the same time, the men from remote Nahua villages who had previously worked full-time in the mines in Pachuca were no longer required. In the late 1980s, many men and women who had already been working full-time in this and other places were also returning home for good, instead of returning only for the usual two visits per year. Personal communication from Dr. Irma Eugenia Gutierrez of the Centra de Estudios de Poblacion of the University of Hidalgo, 1989.

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ing soil fertility and increasing costs.21 At the same time, the mechanization of many agricultural operations in other parts of the Huasteca (especially in regions along the coast which saw a massive conversion from cotton to sorghum) meant a decrease in the number of seasonal jobs available to migratory laborers. While poor Mestizo peasants and bilingual Nahuas were seeking other types of employment (especially in construction projects) in Mexico City, employment in the industrial sector was almost impossible to get for the largely monolingual Nahua peasants of the region. Further increases in the local population, the continued erosion of subsistence agriculture (as cattle production expanded even more rapidly) and decreasing opportunities for wage labor created an economic crisis for the majority of poor peasants in the region. According to a study of regional development of the Huasteca, undertaken by a team of researchers headed by Angel Bassols Batalla (1977), the total population of seven out of the eight municipios in the region (excluding Huazalingo) rose from 93,665 inhabitants in 1950 to 132,832 in 1970, an increase of 42 percent. Yet, in this already densely populated region, cattle production rose even higher, by 56.7 percent, in the decade between i960 and 1970 (Bassols 1977, 192). This figure is an even higher 64.7 percent if one includes the municipio of Huazalingo. Table 3 shows the population density in 1970 and the percentage increase in both total population and head of cattle between i960 and 1970 for each of the eight municipios included in my study.22 Thefiguresin this table point to the uneven impact of the expansion of cattle production in different parts of the region. For example, the three municipios with the highest population densities in 1970 (over 100 inhabitants per square kilometer) were Huejutla, Atlapexco and Jaltocan. Yet Huejutla also had an increase in cattle production in the previous decade that was almost twice the average of the region (109.2 percent). The greatest rate in the expansion of cattle production was in Huautla, which showed a 132.1 percent increase, although it too is a quite densely populated municipio (seventy-four people per square kilometer).23 " Interview with Carlos Manuel Lara, Vinasco, January 14, 1987. Some tobacco continued to be grown, now under the supervision of a state-run corporation (TABAMEX), which today provides credit to a number of tobacco ejidos. " There are slight discrepancies between the figures given in the report on which this chart is based and those provided in the Batalla book. It is not possible to compare cattle production between 1950 and i960 because an agricultural census was not carried out in i960. 23 The only decline in the number of cattle counted between 1960 and 1970 occurred in Atlapexco. This does not seem right. The only explanation I can suggest (apart from errors in the original figures) is that a number of large pastures located within the boundaries of the fictitious ejido of Tenexco were already under dispute (perhaps motivating their owners temporarily to move their cattle elsewhere). Another possibility is that around this time there were also litigations over who should inherit one of

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TABLE 3

Changes in Population and Cattle Production Between 1960 and 1970

Municipios Atlapexco Huautla Huazalingo Huejutla Jaltocan Orizatlan Xochiatipan Yahualica

Population Density (1970) 151.39 74.47 64.90 122.57 114.57 66.35 47.73 93.70

Percentage No. of people 7.8 6.3 7.6 27.6 .06 19.1 18.9 17.4

increases 1960 to 1970 Head of cattle -79.5 132.1 261.5 109.2 39.3 24.8 123.2 64.7

Source: Data from various official population and agricultural censuses carried out by the Mexican government. Note: My figures diverge slightly from similar statistics provided in Bassols Batalla's book (1977, 192).

These figures partly explain why conflicts over land and the level of political violence in the mid-seventies were greater in the municipios of Atlapexco, Huejutla and Huautla. The expansion of modern cattle production, however, like the development of the struggle over land, did not follow the same trajectory in all parts of Huejutla. For example, one could compare the high rate of increase of cattle production (123.2 percent) in the largely mountainous municipio of Xochiatipan with a rate of only 24.8 percent for Orizatlan, located in the flatter northern zone. The reason for this difference is that Orizatlan, which had some of the largest haciendas of the region prior to 1930, already had a great deal of cattle production before i960 and had probably reached its peak of expansion. In contrast, the expansion of cattle production occurred later in the more mountainous portions of the southern zone (including most of Yahualica and Xochiatipan). However, the social implications of the reality underlying these dry statistics can only be properly grasped by looking at some concrete examples of specific communities affected by this rapid expansion of modern cattle production. In the northern zone, where many hillsides of former haciendas had been turned into real ejidos in 1940, it was the children of ejidatarios who had to the largest cattle ranches in this municipio. However, a government report published in 1979 lists Atlapexco, together with Huejutla, Orizatlan and Yahualica, as one of the municipios of the region that stood out for the quantity of its cattle (11,700 head compared to 52,489 for the much larger municipio of Huejutla) (Hidalgo 1979, 89).

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become tenants on land owned by pequefios propietarios in the fifties and sixties. These children no longer had access to any land other than the plots originally granted to their fathers. With growing pressure on a limited land base, such younger peasants became increasingly dependent on local rancheros for access to land but then suddenly found there was nowhere left to grow corn. In some cases (e.g., Tamoyon), the original ejidatarios set aside a small section of forest not previously cultivated for the landless peasants who could not be accommodated on the parcels of their relatives. However, these landless members of local ejidos, called comuneros,24 remained second-class citizens. The land base of most peasant villages in the southern zone shrank even faster.

The Case of Tepetitla

Tepetitla is a traditional Nahua village, located in the municipio of Yahualica (in the southern zone). Unlike other Nahua communities, which had a section of commons set aside for the village poor, all of the former communal land belonging to this village was privately owned in 1970. In 1940 the Department of Agrarian Affairs had "granted" (in theory) 519 hectares of arable land to 112 capacitados (heads of households plus their able-bodies male dependents) in the form of an ejido,25 which would have provided each peasant with almost 5 hectares of land. In reality, this Nahua community shared its so-called ejido with a Mestizo settlement called Hueyactetl, which was dominated by a group of small private landowners. Over half of the remaining land supposedly assigned to the peasants of Tepetitla was privately owned by a Nahua family by the name of De La Cruz, who ran sugar moliendas and operated a soap factory. Starting in the 1950s, this family gradually invested the capital they had accumulated from these economic pursuits into the creation of pastures both in Tepetitla and inside the boundaries of the neighboring village of Mecatlan. At least another quarter of the land of Tepetitla was sold by indebted peasants to Mestizo rancheros who lived in Hueyactetl, the rancho of El Sacrificio and the town of Yahualica. While some peasants were able to make a living from small coffee orchards they had 24

This use of the term, which in this context refers to members of an ejido who technically have what is called derecho a salvo (claims to any land if the ejido is given extensions), must not be confused with its legal definition as member of a village with legally recognized communal tenure (also, terreno comunal). " ACAM, ramo ejidal, Tepetitla, exp. 917. The total amount of land "granted" to the peasants of Tepetitla was 554 hectares (including canyon walls, roads and population center).

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planted on the remaining plots of land, others were left completely landless and destitute by 1970.26 For a while, many of the poor peasants of Tepetitla, who only owned the land where their houses were located, were able to cultivate milpas in the fertile delta to the east of the plateau of Yahualica. This delta had been divided among various private property owners since colonial times. These landowners, who lived in the town of Yahualica, had originally rented out this land to peasants from their hometown. The landowners then decided to switch to modern cattle production and started to give permission to many poor peasants from Yahualica and surrounding hamlets (including Tepetitla) to cultivate corn plots without rent in exchange for broadcasting grass seeds on the soil after completing a second harvest.27 After their pastures were completed, their former tenants no longer had anywhere else to grow corn. Again, the coyomej were no longer following the traditional norms of the subsistence ethic. This story could be repeated hundreds of times for other parts of the southern zone of Huejutla. Except for a few cases where outsiders were not able to buy land (because all land was still registered in one name), poor villagers who needed cash continued to sell their private plots (i.e., their "shares" of communal land) to both wealthy neighbors and outsiders. At first, such peasants still had access to a reserve of village commons. However, the overall loss of village land and increasing demands for the small sections of eroded (and rapidly shrinking) commons made it increasingly difficult for poor peasants to practice subsistence cultivation. Only on rare occasions was pasture land turned back into corn production, and only when poor peasants had some say in the management of their village.28 The increasing scarcity of land available for subsistence cultivation was even worse for the peasants of villages such as Lemontitla (Huejutla), a former anexo of the Nahua community of Zitlan, whose share of communal land had been sold to outsiders; its inhabitants did not own any land whatsoever. Local landowners not only stopped renting out land for making milpas, but even cut off their supply of water, thus hoping 26 I made numerous visits to interview people in Tepetitla while I was living in Tlalchiyahualica, only about three-quarters of an hour walk uphill. 27 Interviews with Adrian SanJuan Aguado, Yahualica, September 5, 1981; Luis SanJuan Aguado, Yahualica, September 30, 1981; Leonel Lara, Yahualica (barrio Tlaica), November 29, 1981; Honorio Torres, December 1, 1981. 18 For example, the majority of peasants of Chipila (Huautla) decided to disband their communal pasture when they realized that they were actually subsidizing a small minority of households who were gradually building up privately owned herds of cattle at the expense of their neighbors.

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that the peasants of this Nahua village would gradually move out for lack of employment and land (Martinez et al. 1986). In a few places, landowners went so far as to physically evict peasants from their homes. For example, around 1967, the Mestizo peons of a village located within the former hacienda of El Cartucho (in the northern zone) were driven out by their new landowner, Reyes Garcia, who sent an army detachment to evict them from their homes, which were then burned to the ground.29 This owner was a wealthy businessman who had already become one of the major cattle producers of the state of Veracruz.3° However, the vast majority of peasants in the region of Huejutla continued to have access to at least their house plots and reduced sections of commons. These poor peasants continued to eke out part of their living from badly eroded hillsides, small coffee orchards or traditional crafts and petty commerce. But they could no longer rely on either the village elite or local rancheros to provide them with access to better-quality land, pay advances or assistance in times of need. Even the most mountainous parts of the southern zone—traditionally a bastion of small-scale corn production, coffee orchards and tiny sugar trapiches still made out of wood—were affected by the expansion of cattle raising. In Huazalingo a Mestizo ranchero from San Juan managed to turn 140 hectares of quite hilly land into three large pastures between 1957 and 1964, using hired hands from San Francisco and San Juan. Where he previously harvested 20 toneladas of corn, he now produced 70 to 80 calves a year!31 Starting in the mid-sixties, wealthy Nahua peasants in even more remote places like Atlalco (Yahualica) started to do the same on a more reduced scale.32 The creation of additional pastures (in increasingly steep, more marginal land) depended on at least a part of the population of these same villages not having access to sufficient arable land. The very expansion of cattle production, however, kept reducing the overall size of the land base necessary for the reproduction of the cheap labor force required for keeping such pastures clean or for commercial agriculture in other parts of the Huasteca. Unlike the old social and ecological system, the new regional economy was becoming rid29

Such action had at least one historical precedent. In 1940, when a new owner bought all the land surrounding (and including) the small Nahua hamlet of Xancolapa near Naranjos (technically within what later became the ejido of Zoquitipan of Yahualica), he drove out the inhabitants with horse whips. Interview with Hemeresgildo Mercado, Naranjos (Yahualica), September 26, 1981. 30 Some of the evicted villagers were given permission to build their houses in La Coneja, a small barrio of the Mestizo ejido of Las Piedras, while the rest emigrated when they realized that their legal battle against this eviction was not going to succeed. Interview with Laureano, the comisariado of La Coneja, May 17, 19853" Interview with Timoteo Vargas, Tehuetlan, May 30, 1985. 32 Interview (in Nahuatl) with Juan Rodriguez Tiopancalica, Atlalco (Yahualica), May 7, 1983.

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died with internal contradictions, resulting in greater political freedom but more hunger and less work. The expansion of cattle production was continuing in the region of Huejutla when some groups of peasants decided they could no longer endure the deprivation caused by a combination of unemployment and a lack of access to land.

Part Three Peasant Revolt in a Nahua Region

Achtoui, uejkaki, moteuiyayaj sanporo koyomej Teipa peuayayaj moteuiaj maseuali ika koyomej . . . Before, in the past, the Mestizos fought only among themselves Then later, the Indians started to fight with the Mestizos . . .

Chapter 10

From Quiescence to Militancy: A Crisis in the ''Moral Economy"

Despite the increasing polarization of the economic class structure of Huejutla throughout the second half of the twentieth century, ranchero politicians, who still acted as patrons and protectors, were able to use the rhetoric of the "moral economy" to ensure general peasant quiescence. This same moral economy ethic also provided the ideological underpinnings for peasant unrest, as pointed out by Edward Thompson (1971) and George Rude (1980). Such unrest, however, was usually channeled into purely factional struggles. By the sixties, many poor peasants in Huejutla were getting desperate in the face of the economic catastrophe described in the last chapter. Their hopes were raised when the Mexican state renewed its promise of land reform. This combination of economic grievances and some measure of outside support resulted in the first land invasions, undertaken by poor peasants under the direction of genuine peasant leaders. To understand these first acts of overt class rebellion against local landowners, it is not enough to examine only the economic deprivation experienced by these peasants. One must also take into consideration the breakdown of the old system of norms and expectations that were the counterpart of the patron-client bonds between members of different economic classes. Not only did the wealthier landowners stop renting out land or helping their economic subordinates in times of need, but many peasants and landowners alike no longer spoke the same language or used the same symbols associated with the old subsistence ethic. The culture as well as the economic structure had changed.

Language and Ideology Prior to 1950 almost the entire upper class of Huejutla was bilingual while all but a handful of Nahua peasants could speak Spanish. Within one gener-

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ation, only thirty years later, the situation was completely reversed: almost all Indians under the age of thirty were now bilingual while most of the educated children of Mestizo rancheros, the new business elite, were no longer able to speak, much less understand Nahuatl. This linguistic shift, which was well under way by the time the first land invasions took place, reflected a change in the nature of class relations across ethnic lines as well as the potential balance of power; landowners no longer had a virtual monopoly over communication with the outside world. Together with the diffusion of Spanish, new ideologies and symbols emanating from the national level could penetrate local communities. Such new ideas provided the raw material for the forging of a new rhetoric of class opposition. At the same time, the continued use of ethnic categories (regardless of language use) accentuated the antagonism or mutual estrangement of modern businessmen and disillusioned peasants. Change in language use was but one component of a much broader process of cultural transformation. This transformation included a change in religious values, the expansion of education and the adoption of new values and their corresponding lifestyles. These new cultural influences had a differential impact, however, even among members of the same economic class. Huejutla became more complex, culturally speaking. To conceptualize the variations that emerged in the process of cultural transformation, I will employ the distinction of' 'traditional'' versus ' 'modern'' to portray two extremes of a cultural continuum that cut across both ethnic and class lines.1 Such variations were in part associated with differences in age, language use and level of education. Some poor peasants or day laborers, however, continued to think and act like their forefathers to a much greater extent than others. These peasants will be labeled as traditionalists or conservatives. In contrast, other (more modern) peasants adopted new perspectives in reinterpreting thenplace in the peasant community as well as in the outside world. Similarly, in presenting the other main protagonists of the social drama that took place in Huejutla, I will speak of traditional versus modern rancheros.

Modern versus Traditional Rancheros It has already been seen how political stability, as well as a higher level of personal security, returned in the fifties. Old-style cacicazgo and violent fam1 My cultural continuum is different from that of Redfield's classic folk-urban continuum (1941) insofar as it refers more to individual differences within the same region rather than interregional or intervillage variation.

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ily vendettas almost completely disappeared between 1955 and 1965. During this period of landowner quiescence, the expansion of the system of education (at least for the children of the local elite) and the modernization of the local economy gave rise to two quite distinct types of ranchero families: those who aspired to purchase modern consumer items and send their children to school (so that they could become veterinarians, doctors or lawyers) versus those who continued to set up multiple households and had to prove their valor in drunken brawls. This difference in lifestyle and cultural values between two segments of the landowning class can explain a lot about the dynamics of the ensuing agrarian revolt and the complex alliances that were forged by both sides. Modern rancheros for the most part acted as local authorities during the peasant revolt. This modern elite included the most prominent cattle producers, farmers or merchants: the Fayad family in Huejutla, the Medecigos in Huautla and the Olivares and Arteagas in Atlapexco.2 Members of these same families had also served as municipal authorities between 1950 and 1979 (under governors Quintin Rueda Villagran and Corona Del Rosal). An example of someone in this category who did not hold an important public post but who was certainly well known and influential is Ignacio Galvan. This man can serve as a useful illustration of what I call a modern ranchero. Ignacio Galvan received his degree in medicine and then became one of the most important cattle producers of the region after buying up large sections of the former hacienda of La Herradura in the northern part of Huejutla.3 These men displaced the traditional rancheros who had fought in the revolution or who participated in the armed encounters of the thirties and forties (like the Nochebuenas) as formal and informal leaders. Even more isolated municipios came under the political influence of more sophisticated and educated representatives of landowning families.4 Although most of the modern, educated rancheros probably had a "more enlightened" attitude toward the Indian populations, their urban education made it difficult for them to comprehend fully the more subtle aspects of life in Indian villages. A generation of even younger, more educated businessmen 2

I am here referring to the majority of their members; in most of these and other large, extended landowning families, one could usually find examples of individuals at both ends of the spectrum. 3 His name, as well as those of other notables in the region, is mentioned in a book about the Huasteca, written in the fifties (Menindez 1985). * For example, in Huazalingo, Francisco Gonzalez, who had left home when he was very young to get an education and who had then returned as a sophisticated gentleman farmer, managed to persuade his surviving relatives to end the feuding of the past. Interview with Francisco Gonzalez, San Pedro (Huazalingo), May 31, 1985.

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PEASANT REVOLT

could not even understand Nahuatl. When they were old enough to take over their family estates, they were not aware to what extent secure access to land had depended on the alliances forged between their forefathers and the Nahua village elite. They did not even recognize or even understand the significance of the judicial boundaries that had formed the basis of so many fictitious ejidos created in 1940. They were also no longer interested in acting as pater­ nalistic patrons to peasants, although not averse to helping ambitious Nahua students to better their education. In contrast, old-fashioned (and usually bigoted) Mestizo rancheros still shared the same lifestyle and much of the value system as Nahua peasants. Most were still able to speak Nahuatl. Good examples of such traditional rancheros would be the most of the Salazars of Atlapexco, the Zunigas and Badillos of Huejutla and the Bustos of Xochiatipan. These traditional ranche­ ros were not only able to communicate more effectively with their economic subordinates but realized that they had to continue to "do favors" for at least the most prominent representatives of Nahua communities. At the same time, they would not hesitate to use guns and "show who is the boss" if necessary. Such traditional rancheros, together with former pistoleros and Nahua ca­ ciques, were to become most directly involved in a series of armed confron­ tations associated with the agrarian uprising. These people had the most to lose in the struggle for land and power since they had few alternative ways of making a living outside of the region. The modern, sophisticated (educated) ranchero businessmen, however, who constituted the real regional elite, did most of the back-room plotting and eventual negotiation with higher-level government officials. For this reason, at the height of the conflict, names of both modern and traditional rancheros were to appear in public statements of condemnation by peasant leaders.

Modern versus Traditional Peasants Like the elite, the mainly Nahuatl-speaking peasantry of Huejutla under­ went profound cultural changes in the decade prior to the peasant revolt. Many younger peasants became more cosmopolitan and sophisticated as a result of their exposure to modern Mexico through migrant labor, service in the army (another viable option for earning money) and a limited exposure to school. Such peasants came back to their villages with a better understanding of such modem institutions as ejidos and peasant organizations. While they were often criticized for becoming "coyomej" when they first came home, these younger, partly acculturated peasants gradually started to exercise more

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influence in Nahua villages throughout the region. This new generation was rapidly making the transition to bilingualism in the sixties, although most had picked up only rudimentary Spanish. Although they continued to use Nahuatl in their villages, many now refused to speak Nahuatl to more old-fashioned, bilingual rancheros. The younger Nahua peasants, especially those who had earned money outside of the region through migratory labor, were no longer economically dependent on old-fashioned rancheros or wealthy Indian families. These young migrants increasingly resented the half-hearted paternalism of older Mestizo landowners. The older rancheros, in turn, became increasingly ambivalent about these young Indian migrants who were the offspring of former peons or tenants. Not only did these young Indians no longer "show the proper respect' ' toward either Mestizo rancheros or the tetatmej (older, more successful elders in Nahua communities), but return migrants often started putting up the same tile or tin roofs on their houses that only wealthy peasants or rancheros could afford in the past. By the end of the seventies, many poorer rancheros even complained that "the Indians today dress better than we do and even buy good radios." However, the lack of access to land and increasing unemployment throughout Mexico meant that these "modern" Indians, with their tile roofs and radios, still ended up hungry like their more humble cousins who never left the region. Other young peasants, who had not yet left their villages, became aware that they would not be able to emulate the example of earlier migrant workers because of increasing unemployment in Mexico as whole. Both groups of peasants could also no longer improve their economic position through a combination of subsistence agriculture and small commodity production. The more modern, partly acculturated peasants, whose ambitions could no longer be channeled in another direction, were to become the grass-roots leaders who established personal contact with political agitators and peasant organizations. Such peasants, who internalized aspects of new ways of thinking (ranging from orthodox Marxism to Liberation theology) in turn radicalized other poor peasants in their home villages. Some peasants, however, continued to maintain traditional patron-client ties with local caciques, even in cases where such caciques no longer lent them land or provided their political clients with regular seasonal employment. The relative strength of such economic ties and the growing gap in incompatible world views (especially when it came to political ideology) often varied independently. In general terms, however, there was growing cultural estrangement between members of different classes as well as different ethnic groups. This estrangement took many different forms.

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Changing Religious Values Profound changes in world view and cultural values often manifest themselves in new interpretations of religious beliefs and the appearance of new cults or sects. Such changing religious values started occurring in Huejutla several decades prior to i960. The first manifestation was the sudden appearance and equally sudden decline of a religious cult of prehispanic origins with millenarian overtones. The second was the introduction of protestantism. Although diametrically opposed to one another in terms of content and source, each made life more meaningful in an increasing chaotic and turbulent period of rapid social change. Both forms of religion allowed people with strong personalities and thwarted ambitions to assume leadership roles in an increasingly beleaguered rural society. The Chicomexochitl Cult Nahua villages have always had a syncretic religion that combines elements of Christianity with prehispanic belief and rituals. Apart from the more public civil-religious hierarchy (found only in the southern zone), there are many private or family rituals involving part-time religious specialists who are shamans, diviners or traditional healers. In Nahua these specialists are known as tlamatini (wise ones), who, among other things, performed special fertility rites to ensure good harvests or successful childbirth (see Hernandez 1982; Sandstrom 1986, chap. 2). Up until 1940, well-known tlamatini, who gained a reputation on the regional level, could become quite wealthy peasants, although there was considerable competition among rival specialists. After 1940, with the introduction of modern medicine and rural schools, traditional religious practices went into decline even though some old-fashioned Mestizo rancheros and Indians alike still consulted native healers (called curanderos in Spanish). Then, in 1944, the same year that saw a drought followed by sudden disastrous floods, a new phenomenon occurred in many parts of the southern zone of Huejutla: a revivalist cult involving worship of the Aztec corn goddess "Seven Flowers" (or Chicomexochitl). Although the ceremonies and beliefs associated with this cult linger on only in the remotest mountain hamlets today, its initial popularity and the hostility with which it was regarded by local authorities can serve to mark the beginning of what was to become an ever increasing gap in the world views of rural peasants and members of a more urbanized, Western-oriented local upper class. This native cult originated in the now dried lake called La Laguna, in the northernmost tip of the state of Puebla, and then quickly spread to northern

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Veracruz and throughout the rest of the Huasteca.5 Its practitioners and followers witnessed the miraculous appearance of maize kernels and other agricultural produce in the forest. After being "found" (usually by young children), the maize kernels were led in processions to local temples (usually private homes) for a night of dancing and singing involving the impersonation of the corn goddess by young girls.6 Both men and women were involved and, in many villages in Huejutla (e.g., Paajtla and Tlalchiyahualica), traditional ritual specialists were often thefirstpromoters of chicomexochitl. That it posed a psychological threat to the status quo is proved by the fact that the cult was strictly forbidden and harshly repressed by most civil as well as ecclesiastical authorities. My interpretation of the Chicomexochitl cult is that it represented a cultural response to the ambiguities involved in the impact of the process of economic change on still isolated and remote Nahua villages. This new religious phenomenon happened just around the time that more remote parts of the Huasteca were characterized by a combination of strong external acculturative pressures, relative overall prosperity and occasional, unpredictable natural disasters. The worst effects of the revolution and postrevolutionary caciquismo were over, some additional land had just become available with Cardenas's land reform (though not that much in the southern zone) and an economic boom was just beginning. Many highways had just been built to within a day or two's walk from most villages in Huejutla, and schoolteachers and priests were again appearing in larger numbers in areas that had not seen any strangers for many years. At the same time, outlaws and ousted caciques were still using more remote parts of the Huasteca as places to hide out (and occasionally impose illegal taxes or forced loans). I see the acceptance of the Chicomexochitl cult as a way for people to cope with new economic and political realities by means of symbolic systems rooted in an almost quasi-tribal type of peasant society still largely dependent on a semitropical rain forest environment for its survival. The harsh reaction to and dislike of this cult by most members of the local elite also indicate the 5 Most former participants used the name Chicomexochitl when referring to the cult, although this word has many other connotations. Little systematic research has been done on the cult, but various anthropologists working in the neighboring state of Veracruz have come across references to the cult while doing research on other topics. Personal communication from Francpis Lartigue, director of the Huasteca research project of CIESAS in Tlalpan, Mexico City. 6 Interviews (in Spanish) with Honorio Torres, Yahualica, December 1, 1981; Jose Pascual, Tlalchiyahualica, December 2, 1981; Zeferino Hernandez, Yahualica, May 2, 1983; and tape-recorded accounts (in Nahuatl) with Juan Bautista, Tlalchiyahualica, February 23, 1982; Jose Cruz Corralco, Tlalchiyahualica, March 7, 1982; Agustin Huexotzintla, Atlalco, May 6, 1983; Antonio Nazario, Paajtla, May 28, 1983.

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beginning of the breakdown of a system of shared cultural symbols and a common discourse among upper and lower class members of this ethnically diverse society. Some of the cult leaders also took a leadership role in more secular political affairs. For example, a man by the name of Pancho Pilas (in the community of Acatepec, Huautla), who became involved in this cult, led a struggle to defend his village against attempts by a Mestizo cacique from Xochiatipan to take control over a section of their land at that time.7 This cult and the cultural tensions it engendered merely foreshadowed what was to become a deep-seated, regionally based cultural divide between rulers and ruled.

Protestantism

At the same time that the Chicomexochitl cult was being practiced in more remote parts of southern Huejutla, protestant sects provided another source of new symbolism and ritual to peasants in other peasant villages. In the forties, a group of Protestant missionaries affiliated with the Mexican Presbyterian Church visited the small Mestizo town of Santa Lucia in Calnali. Here they converted several families who in turn introduced this new religion to the "pagans" of the hitherto nominally Catholic region of Huejutla. One of their converts was Clementis Ramirez, a Nahua peasant in the village of Pepeyocatitla (Yahualica). Clementis's father, Juan Camotero, had been a famous shaman and folk-healer (as well as a traveling merchant) whose base of operations was Santa Teresa in Yahualica. Clementis was one of many children of this wealthy Nahua peasant, and his mother, who later moved to the town Yahualica, was his father's mistress. The young Clementis, however, did not see much of a future in healing and divination. Instead, he had the opportunity to work for several years as sacristan and guide for the priest stationed in Yahualica prior to the revolution. After the revolution, Clementis started farming, and he was invited to take up residence in the Nahua village of Pepeyocatitla, just across from Santa Teresa, where he got married and thus gained rights to work a section of communal land. When he became a Protestant, Clementis already spoke Spanish (the priest taught him), and he even knew how to write. He also attended school in Yahualica for a couple of years. Although his economic class position was that of a poor peasant, his ability to read the Bible gave him a sense of equality vis-a-vis the ranchero coyomej, and he attracted a small following in his home village. Soon after 7

Interview with Narciso Naranjo, Huautla, May 13, 1985.

From Quiescence to Militancy

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his conversion, Clementis also started preaching in the Nahua pueblo of Santa Teresa. Over the next twenty years, many other denominations (Seventh-Day Adventists, the United Mexican Churches and Baptists) also arrived in the region. In Huazalingo, a Pentecostal sect was first introduced to the Mestizo village of Tlatzonco and, from there, peasant missionaries (all of them poor peasants) won a number of converts in the traditional Nahua community of San Francisco in the sixties.8 AU of these Protestant sects, locally referred to as evangelistas (evangelists), were persecuted by local authorities allied to Mestizo caciques. For example, when Clementis Ramirez was preaching and raising funds to build a small chapel in Pepeyocatitla, Pedro Velez, one of Juvencio Nochebuena's henchmen who lived in the nearby Mestizo village of Huitznopala, threatened the Protestants and would not allow them to build their chapel. After numerous complaints to federal politicians, Clementis finally received a building permit, nearly twenty years later! However, while the evangelists of Pepeyocatitla were finally allowed to build their chapel, their counterparts in San Francisco were thrown in jail. When the agrarian revolt broke out in the early seventies, many of these Protestant peasants became involved in class struggles. In Pepeyocatitla, Clementis (now quite elderly) was a strong supporter, though not an active participant, in thefightfor land in his village. Younger peasants who had become converted to Protestant sects led land invasions in places like the barrios of Tierra Playa in Tecolotitla (Atlapexco), Tepetitla (Yahualica) and San Francisco (Huazalingo).9 Likewise, in Huextetitla (Huejutla), the peasant leader Modesto Hernandez had worked as a Protestant missionary before becoming a radical agrarian. This man later became quite prominent on the regional level, and to this day he does not smoke or drink.10 The peasant militants who had been exposed to protestantism represented only a minority of the radical agrarian peasants. Other militant peasants were exposed to new forms of Catholicism (as will be seen later), and a few even became advocates for the resurrection of traditional religious practices. What they all had in common was a heightened awareness of the discrepancies between the established beliefs, norms and values espoused by the local elite and the reality of increasing class inequalities. Such radical peasants, who were first exposed to an alternative set of symbols and beliefs, were the first 8

Interview (in Nahuatl) with Anastacio Vargas Mendoza Ueyitipa, San Francisco, June 7, 1985. Interviews with Juan Velasquez Lara, Huejutla, May 19, 1985; Antonio Velasquez, Tepetitla, May 27, 1985. 10 Interview with Agustin Avila, Mexico City, April 22, 1986. See also OIPUH Boletin Informativo, no. 7, p. 10 (September 1984). 9

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to discover the blatant contradiction between the legal status of many Nahua ejidos and their actual control by local cattle ranchers. They were also more receptive to the radical political discourse used by political agitators and some government officials from outside of the area. Many of them were to take the first steps in challenging the economic as well as the political power of the local elite.

The Revival of Agrarianism By the early 1960s, the decade that saw the continuing expansion of cattle production, most inhabitants of Huejutla had all but forgotten about land reform. Then suddenly, in 1966, President Diaz Ordaz (another president interested in improving his image as a popular leader) provided the final stamp of approval for forty-nine ejidos originally set up by Rojo Gomez in the southern part of the district of Huejutla. When officials from the Land Reform Office came to visit a few of the now definite, new "ejidos," they tried to explain this legal status to village representatives. As a result, comisariados in the southern zone started to understand the implications of the public posts they held and the legal status of the village they were supposed to represent. For the first time since the legal disputes in the colonial era, peasant leaders from southern villages made the long trip to the state capital or to Mexico City on their own initiative. There they asked the government to implement the land reform initiated under Rojo Gomez. However, their petitions did not succeed in getting any concrete action. The predominant form of actual landholding continued to be that of privately owned ranchos whose owners paid land taxes to municipal offices. Despite the publication of the presidential decree recognizing local ejidos, the new political elite and the landowners whose properties were located within the boundaries of these ejidos could not believe that their properly registered private properties were suddenly turned into ejidos "because of some decision made by bureaucrats who did not even know the region."11 Their refusal to recognize thefinalpresidential resolution meant that, in practice, the status quo did not change one iota; this second paper reform did not result in more access to arable land for the majority of peasants. There was now an even greater gap than before between the de facto and de jure status of landholdings in many parts of Huejutla. Peasants and landowners, how" Various landowners used a phrase something along these lines.

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ever, no longer shared the same set of assumptions about the meaning of legal and administrative terms. The new legal status of their communities, and the fact that this was printed on paper, created a deep-rooted conviction among young radical peasants that the communal boundaries that their grandparents used to talk about were real after all. In their attempts to gain access to land belonging to their villages in the form of ejidos, these peasants started to create their own interpretation of history, according to which a few rich Nahua families and the coyomej had "stolen" the land thatrightfullybelonged to all the masehuali.12 In contrast, most of the landowners in Huejutla, especially the younger rancheros who had been educated outside of the area, had quite a different view of the development of land tenure in Huejutla. They firmly believed that all privately owned ranchos were the product of proper legal procedures initiated under Benito Juarez. These modern landowners and businessmen were therefore flabbergasted to hear that much of the land in their hometowns was ejido land. They were even more surprised to discover the geographical location and shape of such ejidos. In theory (i.e., according to national agrarian legislation), the urban centers of several municipal cabeceras suddenly fell under the jurisdiction of neighboring peasant communities that had once been Nahua pueblos. For example, the town center of Atlapexco legally became part of the now definitive ejido of Tecolotitla. The case of the town of Huautla was particularly bizarre; here four separate barrios or neighborhoods of this ethnically mixed cabecera each received final confirmation for ejidos whose boundaries actually divided up the Mestizo town center into four separate sections. On paper, these four new ejidos13 between them shared the central plaza; technically, the local hospital was located in one ejido, the Catholic Church in another and the new kindergarten in yet another! Each ejido was now supposed to elect a new comisariado (as opposed to the provisional agrarian committees which had preceded them). The arrival in the Huasteca of official representatives of the Land Reform Office, who came to hand over the necessary documents for local ejidos, set 12

In light of the original conquest or even the liberal land reform (if one interprets "stealing" ina broader sense), such an interpretation is probably accurate. These peasants believed, however, that local landowners had actually confiscated sections of their original communal lands (equated with ejidos) during the Mexican Revolution or just after the Cardenas land reform. The efficacy attributed to the written word in the genesis of native versions of history, in which natives become "subjects," has been underlined in an article by Maria Koreck (1989) dealing with "the fetishism of the written word." 13 Barrio Hondo, Barrio Bajo, Barrio Alto and Barrio del Salto (these barrios also had unofficial Nahuatl names).

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off aflurryof new petitions to have this land handed over to the peasants who were entitled to them. At the same time, a number of villages in the municipio of Jaltocan that had never petitioned for land (e.g. Tzinacatitla, Chiconcoac), and which were located inside the boundaries of privately owned ranchos, asked that they too be considered for land reform. The landless peasants of these and other communities of Jaltocan, whose earlier petitions had never been answered (Amaxac, El Chote, La Capilla, Matachilillo, Octatitla) were all told that the properties that would have to be expropriated were not large enough to be subject to land reform. These requests were officially rejected by the state governor in 1968 and 1969. The peasant leaders from these and other villages made more trips to the state capital and to Mexico City but still did not achieve any concrete results. On the contrary, some of them (including duly elected comisariados) were even jailed for rabble-rousing by local authorities. At this point some peasants decided to take more drastic actions.

The First Land Invasions The first direct-action land invasions in Huejutla, involving militant peasants from the villages of La Corrala and Tenexco, took place in 1968.14 These two land invasions, one in the municipio of Huejutla and the other in AtIapexco, set a precedent for the peasant unrest that was to spread through the entire region several years later. In both cases, a national peasant organization, the Central Campesina Independiente (cci) initially gave legal advice and moral support to agrarian peasants, and local peasant leaders (especially in La Corrala) later played a prominent role in the peasant movement on the regional level. Both had once had communal land, and both were turned into fictitious ejidos, whose status was confirmed in 1966. In the case of both La Corrala and Tenexco, a relatively small number of peasants were at first involved in direct-action tactics. The core group of agrarians in La Corrala, the Hernandez brothers, were both Nahua peasants who spoke broken Spanish and still wore the traditional shirts made from mantas. However, they had both had extensive contact with Mestizo labor contractors and local politicians. They had also represented their village in earlier peaceful land litigations. The Hernandez brothers had also experienced generational downward mobility since they came from a family of slightly more prosperous Nahua peasants who had in the past played a leading role in 14

Interviews with Anacleto Mendoza, Huejutla, May 12,1985, and the comisariado of La Corrala, June 16, 1985.

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village affairs. The property they took over was one of many pieces of land in possession of the powerful Rivera family originally from Huichapa, many of whom now lived in Huejutla. These absentee landowners were lighterskinned, educated Mestizos closely related to the group of rancheros who still considered themselves to be "racially pure." The Riveras and several other families had in the past bought many ranchos in the intermediate zone, including some of the formerly communally owned land that was to become part of the partly fictitious ejido of La Corrala.15 The invasion of part of their land, involving a confrontation between Indian peasants and Spanish landowners, thus comes fairly close to the classic image of agrarian conflict in rural Mexico. The agrarian structure of Tenexco (a name that will reoccur), and the conflicts it generated, were more complex but probably more representative of most of the corporate-type peasant communities in Huejutla. Like La Corrala, the poor peasants of the village of Tenexco and its surrounding hamlets had access to only a small portion of communal lands even though they theoretically belonged to a much larger ejido. There were more landowners in Tenexco, however, and these belonged to both ethnic groups. Some, like Cheque Reyes, were wealthy ranchers who lived in Huejutla while others were small, more old-fashioned rancheros or wealthy peasants with pastures. Many of these landowners also lived within the former communal boundaries of this former Nahua pueblo, either in the village of Tenexco itself (which had already been divided into two separate administrative subunits), in one of the many anexos or in isolated homesteads.

The Fictitious Ejido of Tenexco

While La Corrala had only one small subordinate hamlet, the fictitious ejido of Tenexco contained almost a dozen separate villages, hamlets or isolated homesteads scattered over an area of approximately 3,000 hectares. These included both Nahua and Mestizo settlements. When this ejido was given full legal recognition in 1966, most of the land belonging to Tenexco and its anexos continued to be privately owned in the form of individual ranchos. The largest rural estates included within the boundaries of this so-called 15

The lands of La Corrala were actually part of the hacienda of Tuzantlan (later called Santa Cruz) during the colonial period. This land, at that time called the rancho of Tamalol, was sold to the comun de indigenas of Jaltocan in 1820 (AHJPIH). According to oral history, a village called Tamalol, which was subsequently established on this land, was later abandoned due to an epidemic, and the remaining inhabitants (as well as some outsiders) then founded what is today known as La Corrala. The name La Corrala Tamalol appears on the written request for an ejido in 1940.

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ejido were a rancho called La Providencia, owned by Dario Salazar, two ran­ chos belonging to Cheque Reyes (whose land was also registered in the name of a relative), and several farms and ranches owned by the Medecigo family of Huautla and by Anacleto Mendoza (who used to live in El Frijolillo). While most of these ranchos had been converted to pasture land, some of their owners still rented out part of their land to poor peasants. Some landowners charged two days' labor per week as rent, while others allowed local peasants to grow corn in exchange for cash payments. Figure 6 shows the location of these and other ranchos, located within the boundaries of Tenexco.l6 Note that at least six landowners had more than one section of land in different parts of this so-called ejido. Most of the smaller and medium-sized properties (from ι ο to 50 hectares) were owned by mem­ bers of a few traditional Mestizo ranchero families: the Ramirezes, the SaIazars, the Ordazes and the Hernandezes (of Coyolapa). Nahua peasants also owned small ranchos within Tenexco's boundaries, although the only three indicated on this map are those belonging to Juan Bautista (of San Miguel), Jos£ Miguel Lopez (who lived in a place called Tepemecatitla) and Fidel SanJuan (from the village of Tenexco).17 Other sections of land indicated on this map (those that do not have numbers attached to them) constituted the "communal" lands of Tenexco, although even within this so-called com­ munal land, there were many privately owned ranchos whose owners had titulos de Anaya (including two or three wealthy Nahua families in Huitzotlaco). Only two properties in Tenexco (one of the ranchos of Anacleto Mendoza and a small corner of Dario Salazar's estate) were invaded in 1968. The agrar­ ian leader who led these land invasions was not a Nahua peasant, but a Mes­ tizo (Felipe Naranjo) who was born in Tecolotitla. Felipe came to Tenexco when he was very young with his father, who moved there to open up a small 18 store. Felipe Naranjo was the only Mestizo who grew up in the village of Tenexco and left home in the early sixties to work as a cane-cutter in the Huasteca of Veracruz, where he was exposed to the ideas of left-wing agrar­ ian politicians and saw real ejidos. When he returned to Tenexco, he joined the legal battle to have the ejido of Tenexco handed over to the majority of 16 This map was included in a report written by a team of investigators from the Land Reform Office in Pachuca. ACAM, ramo ejidal, exp. no. 1419 (Tenexco). 17 My description of the area surrounding Tenexco is based on visits to about half of the ranchos or hamlets that belong to this ejido and numerous interviews with agrarian peasants, former landown­ ers and government officials. I used this oral history to complement the already large file of newspaper clippings on Tenexco and a case study included in a thesis by Marcos Matias Alonso (1986,94-121). 18 Interview with Ruperto Hernandez (originally from Tenexco), Huejutla, June 3, 1984.

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•

Villages

•

Hamlets or ranchos Rivers and streams

Names

Numbers on Map

Ezechiel Reyes 2 other members of Reyes family 6 members of Medecigo family Pablo Ramirez 11 other members of Ramirez family Anacleto Mendoza Oario Salazar 8 other members of Salazar family

1 1-1,1-2,1-3,33 2,3,4,5,6,7 34 8,35 to 43 9,9-1 11 14,14-1,15,17,21,22,23, 30,31 10 16,20 18,19 25 13 12,24,26 to 29,32

Juan Bautista 2 members of Ordaz family 2 members of Hernandez family Jose Miguel Lopez (Tepemecatitla) Fidel SanJuan 8 other owners Communal land (much of it also pnvately owned) TOTAL

no numbers

Source, adapted from map in office of Comision Agraria Mixta, Nov. 31,1971.

FIGURE 6. Land Tenure in the Fictitious Ejido of Tenexco

No. of Hectares 17 384 523 225 298 150 162 38 112 23 36 14 330 1503 3815

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peasants. At that time a small group of peasants had already become aware of their legal status as a result of their contacts with both the Land Reform Office and a new schoolteacher who wanted the villagers to set aside part of their ejido for the upkeep of the local school. A small group of destitute peasants in Tenexco (who were also exposed to the ideas of a radical Catholic priest) not only gave Naranjo their political support but collected money to finance his frequent trips to the state capital to plead their case.19 Their first act was to replace the Mestizo rancheros, who had hitherto acted as a phony comisariado, with Nahua peasant representatives. These representatives, like their counterparts in La Corrala, undertook direct-action land invasions after they had exhausted all other channels to gain access to their ejidos. The state government reluctantly allowed small groups of militant peasants from both La Corrala and Tenexco to work the lands they had invaded in 1968. However, the struggle for access to the rest of their ejidos was curtailed when thefirstNahua representative of the ejido of Tenexco, Eleuterio Flores, was assassinated on November 28, 1969.2° With the threat of a renewed, militant agrarianism, local landowners thus resorted to violence, while state officials stood idly by. The difficulties faced by this incipient peasant movement can be summed up in the words of Ann Craig (1983, 234), who studied a similar initial attempt at agrarian struggle in another part of Mexico in the twenties: ' 'their struggle . . . was conducted in the face of strong local opposition, and, at least at the outset, with vacillating support from non-local officials." The peasant leaders from both of these two villages had to await a more propitious time for continuing their struggle for land, when they would have more external support and a government more favorably disposed to land reform. Such a situation presented itself when Luis Echeverria was elected national president in 1969 (his six-year term of office started in 1970). Only then did the right set of political circumstances allow for the development of a more widespread, regionally based peasant movement. 19 Several older Nahua-speaking peasants from Tenexco who belong to the more radical faction, which subsequently founded the new village of Emiliano Zapata, have a slightly different interpretation. According to them, Felipe Naranjo was at first extremely reluctant to get involved in the agrarian struggle, and he had to be persuaded to become the official representative of the ejido of Tenexco. Group interview (in Nahuatl), Emiliano Zapata, February 1, 1989. 20 Report in El Sol de Hidalgo, February 7, 1970, p. 1.

Chapter 11

Agrarian Revolt in Huejutla: Peasant Leaders and Political Organizations

By the time Echeverria became president of Mexico, peasant leaders in Huejutla were struggling for access to more land, the right to have their own jueces and build their own schools and, in some cases, to practice their own religion. The overwhelming issue, however, was land. The way in which these separate issues congealed in a peasant movement (transcending the village level) can only be understood by examining the interaction among peasant leaders, urban-based politicians and the Mexican state. Such an analysis, which requires a broad, overall sweep of the major political events that occurred in the region, will inevitably involve a "top-down" perspective, focusing on key actors. Starting in 1972, peasant leaders in many villages initiated land invasions with the help of different peasant organizations. Most of these organizations were in some way linked to the state, although at least one independent peasant union refused to negotiate or bargain with the government. The external politicians who initially supported direct-action tactics wanted to "stir things up" as a way of bypassing local power holders and initiating certain government programs of rural development. However, the peasant movement in Huejutla quickly went far beyond the guidelines and controls imposed by the state. Attempts to coopt or repress peasant leaders who were too radical only made things worse, to the point where the state itself lost legitimacy in the eyes of most of the population of Huejutla. Only outright suppression finally put a stop to the agrarian revolt. Nevertheless, by 1979, a larger number of militant peasants were firmly in control over the land once in the hands of local farmers and cattle producers.

The Revival of Radical Agrarianism Since the Revolution of 1910, both regional caudillos and government officials on the national level have used land reform as a means of extending

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and consolidating their control over the countryside (Hellman 1983; Martinez 1980). However, state policies to redistribute land, for whatever reason, are usually not put into effect unless the state (or regional politicians) can also mobilize local supporters to counteract the opposition of strong vested interest groups. In the thirties, the government of Lazaro Cardenas was able to implement its policy of breaking up haciendas in regions like Huejutla with the support of ranchero politicians under the leadership of Juvencio Nochebuena. These rancheros (who were themselves not adversely affected by this land reform) established patron-client bonds with Nahua peasants in the northern zone while continuing to exercise their more traditional forms of domination over poor peasants in the south. In 1971, President Luis Echeverria reactivated agrarianism on a national level, using much the same rhetoric as Cardenas in the thirties. This time, however, it was the rancheros whose properties were under attack, and they therefore opposed any attempts by the central or state government to carry out a policy of land reform and rural development. To overcome this opposition, the state had to mobilize new groups of militant peasants in a region that was ripe for an open rebellion. Only then did local aspirations for land reform "coincide with government efforts to encourage the formation of local reform organizations, as a means of implementing state and federal policies" (Craig 1983, 235). As soon as Echeverria took office, politicians on the national level set out to recruit supporters for his policy of renewed land reform. This policy was part of a broader program aimed at offsetting the lopsided development of Mexico which had exacerbated existing regional disparities. Echeverria also set up a program for integrated rural development that included credit for peasant producers (to eliminate middlemen) and an extensive, labor-intensive road-building project to provide employment and raise wages in marginal areas. This program involved a complete reorganization of Mexico's staple commodities marketing agency, the National Company for Popular Subsistence (CONASUPO), which recruited many idealistic young professionals (Grindle 1977). By paying more attention to the rural sector, Echeverria hoped to restore some of the legitimacy the Mexican government had lost in the countryside. Under Echeverria, there were many pay-offs for agrarian politicians who had their eyes set on further career advancement. Agrarian politics in Mexico, however, can also be a competitive and risky undertaking in which one may have to strike out on one's own. For example, in the early seventies an official of the government-linked cci set up his own peasant organization called the Consejo Agrario Mexicano (Mexican Agrarian Council) or CAM. The cci itself was a radical peasant organization that had been partly repressed and then

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coopted by the government, but Humberto Serrano left the cci after a disagreement with its leader. Serrano's ability to recruit peasant followers, using an even more radical rhetoric than his predecessors, enabled him to win the post of diputado several years later (Avila and Cervantes 1986, 26). Serrano visited the Huasteca on numerous occasions and encouraged peasant groups to petition for land and, in instances where these groups had strong legal claims arising out of boundary disputes or unfulfilled land reforms, actually to take direct possession of the land. Simultaneously, bilingual schoolteachers (many of them educated in the town of Chicontepec in the predominantly Nahua region of the Huasteca of Veracruz)1 and the leaders of left-wing opposition parties, such as the Popular Socialist Party (or PPS), began encouraging similar tactics. During the first two years of Echeverria's regime, political agitation in the Huasteca took place in the face of adamant opposition by the local elite. Moreover, it was difficult to maintain ongoing contacts with peasant communities because of poor means of communication. Both the gravel road connecting Huejutla to the highland district and a set of tracks to Tamazunchale (which included two river fords) were frequently impassible. The completion of a paved highway connecting Tampico to Pachuca (via Huejutla) in 1974 removed the last barrier to this state of isolation, resulting in an influx of technical experts, political agitators and government officials. In the meantime, the region had already achieved a reputation as one characterized by social tensions and unresolved conflicts due to various incidents that received press coverage on the national level.

Agrarian Politics in the Early Seventies In 1972, peasants organized by CAM leaders started invading sections of land owned by wealthy cattle producers in the municipio of San Felipe while CCI officials (who had already helped both La Corrala and Tenexco recover some of their land in 1968) continued to support militant peasants in such southern communities as Ecuatitla and La Mesa de Limontitla (Huejutla).2 Increasing social unrest and dissatisfaction with local governments were also 1 These teachers, called bilingual because they were recruited from Indian villages, were specially trained by a separate educational institution designed for native minorities. Because they were allowed to start teaching without full certification, they were often looked down upon by other (federal) schoolteachers. 2 Interview with Antonio Hernandez Mendoza (regional secretary of the cci), Huejutla, April 29, 1986.

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reflected in a series of turbulent municipal elections. In the more remote municipio of Yahualica, a Marxist opposition party (the PPS) managed to get sufficient support to nominate its own pro-agrarian candidate for municipal president (a radical schoolteacher called Candido Arenas San Juan). The PPS was not allowed to win, and Arenas himself was later taken away for questioning by security officers. His subsequent disappearance (Granados 1974) led to a flurry of protest by local supporters and an upsurge of peasant militancy throughout the municipio.3 In the village of Pepeyocatitla, a group of sixty peasants, originally organized by Arenas, decided to initiate theirfightto gain access to land. Their use of direct-action tactics resulted in an armed confrontation between agrarian peasants and the state police, allied to local caciques. The confrontation between police and peasants in Pepeyocatitla (described in chapter 2) resulted in the death of several policemen and the subsequent massacre of Nahua peasants. The surviving agrarians and their families fled to the city of Tampico where they denounced these atrocities to a local radio station. This incident created a political scandal in the state of Hidalgo, whose governor, Sanchez Vite, was accused of illegally using state traffic police to crush local opposition and of planning to give the land under dispute in Pepeyocatitla to several of his cronies (Hernandez 1974). One of the peasant leaders of Pepeyocatitla, Nabor Herrera, who had already traveled outside of the region and spoke Spanish, subsequently met Primitivo Garcia Zapata, a CAM official who arranged for a delegation from Pepeyocatitla to meet with Luis Echeverria.4 What he heard about Pepeyocatitla was only one of several excuses needed by Echeverria to force the resignation of the governor of Hidalgo three years later. Sanchez Vite, a former teacher from the highland town of Molango, had built his own political empire in the state of Hidalgo. This modern cacicazgo on the state level stood in the way of the effective implementation of national policy; under his regime, landowning ranchers still ruled such municipios as Yahualica and continued to obstruct any attempt to transfer additional land to the peasants. Although the radical peasants from Pepeyocatitla were allowed to return to their homes, they did not gain access to their ejido. The discrepancy between a radical national policy and the reality of still intact local power structures put agrarian politicians in a difficult position. For, although Echeverria supported agrarianism in principle, regional au3 Details concerning the disappearance of this teacher also appear in "Memorandum de Pascual Ruiz al Ing. Jorge Cruickshank Garcia, Secretario Nacional de la Direction Nacional del PPS," VII, 16, 1974. A copy of this memorandum and other documents or letters were obtained in the personal archives of Jos6 Baron Larios of Atlapexco (hereafter referred to as Larios Papers). 1 Interview with various peasants (including Nabor Herrera), Pepeyocatitla, May 18, 1984.

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thorities still treated agrarian protest as insurrectionary attempts. Moreover, unauthorized violence by local landowners was also on the increase. Even educated, more "refined" members of the local elite who had opposed the old-style caciquismo of Nochebuena now found that they had to resort to force to maintain their class control. Those who could not (or would not) use armed force themselves had to rely on more old-fashioned rancheros to do their dirty work for them, while publicly lamenting the use of violence. Agrarian politicians, in turn, had to find ways of redistributing at least some land in the Huasteca (to satisfy the demands of their local clients) without unduly antagonizing the local power elite. In this situation of rising tensions, not all peasant organizations applied the same stragegies. The CAM continued to promote land invasions to show the government that they had a strong base of support (which needed placation). In contrast, more established (and respectable) cci officials took advantage of their connections with a recently appointed senator, Alfonso Garzon Santibanez (one of the founders of the official cci and Serrano's rival).5 These cci politicians recommended that the government expropriate several larger farms located in northern Huejutla (part of the former hacienda of La Herradura) for distribution to landless peasants. They argued that in this way further bloodshed and conflict could be avoided. Local cci leaders then persuaded peasants who belonged to their organization to petition formally for land in La Herradura, which they received in 1974. The landowner affected by this expropriation, a member of the prosperous Gal van family, was in any case eligible for a partial expropriation of his vast holdings. He also did not have the political clout to oppose the government. Most of the cci peasants who received access to this land came from the villages of La Capilla, Amaxac and Chiconcoac located in the northern part of the municipio of Jaltocan. These were the same peasants whose petitions for land were turned down in the late sixties. Peasants affiliated with the CAM (from Los Jobos and Buenos Aires, Orizatlan) were also given a share of this estate. AU of these radical peasants moved to a new population center called Congreso Permanente Agrario, while their more conservative neighbors continued to live in their home villages and to work as day laborers in local ranchos. A similar type of resettlement (on a much smaller scale) also took place in 1974 when a group of landless peasants from the overpopulated community of Acatepec asked for a cattle ranch (Cuachiquitla) located in a small valley 5 Interview with Antonio Hernandez Mendoza (regional secretary of the cci), Huejutla, April 4, 1986. For a summary of the history of the cci (including its various internal divisions), see Armando Bartra's book (1985, 91-93).

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on the border between the municipios of Xochiatipan and Huautla. All of the members of this group of agrarians, including their leader, Vicente Martinez, were poor Nahua peasants who had worked as agricultural laborers in Veracruz. When they returned home, they recruited additional supporters among their relatives in Acatepec (most of whom had not worked outside of the region) and also invited poor peasants from the village of El Coyolar to join them.6 Together they invaded Cuachiquitla. Unlike the land takeover of Pepeyocatitla, however, these agrarians simply moved in with the blessing of high-ranking agrarian officials and the tacit approval of the absentee owner of this ranch. The agrarian leader from Acatepec not only was supported by the CAM but also received legal assistance from the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (National Indigenous Institute or INI), which had just started operating in the area and had appointed a legal adviser (a procurador indigena) in Huautla.7 By allowing this "land invasion," however, the government sowed the seeds of future intervillage disputes since the actions of the radical peasants from Acatepec would later incur the wrath of a long-established Nahua village in Xochiatipan (Iztacsoquico), which had prior legal claims to this land. Government officials also did not succeed in staving off a more broadly based peasant rebellion.

The Outbreak of a Peasant Revolt Despite limited land redistribution and attempts to appease the more militant peasant leaders, the majority of peasants in the region of Huejutla did not get the land that they needed. In most of the southern zone, requests for land (even land that had already been turned into ejidos) still fell on deaf ears, while numerous petitions for the enlargement of northern ejidos were entangled in bureaucratic red tape. The expectations of radical peasants were again raised when they heard that the next state governor would be Jorge Rojo Lugo, the son of a previous governor who had originally set in motion the process of land reform during the Cardenas era (with the help of Nochebuena). Rojo Lugo styled himself as an agrarian politician, while maintaining 6

Interview with Vicente Martinez, Nuevo Acatepec, May 22, 1985. INI, one of the institutions that came out of the policy of indigenismo fomented under Cardenas, administered both educational programs and rural development activities in indigenous areas. Such activities also included the extension of social services through a series of regional centers (Centros Coordinadores Indigenistas). The first regional INI center, staffed by applied anthropologists, was set up in the highlands of Chiapas in 1949, but such services were not extended to other parts of rural Mexico until many years later (see INI 1978, introduction). 7

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good relations with loyal ranchero families in the region of Huejutla. However, the governor-to-be was unable to prevent local landowners from taking the law into their own hands. On July 28, 1975 (a month before the new governor was due to take office officially), a truck full of masked gunmen pulled up in front of the CAM office in Huejutla and killed six peasants who were conducting some business inside.8 This massacre triggered off a volley of land invasions that led to further political polarization. Rojo Lugo responded by issuing a series of decrees forbidding further land invasions. He announced that the agrarian problems would soon be solved and made a symbolic gesture to that effect by handing over land titles to new land recipients in Congreso Permanente Agrario (the new population center set up under the auspices of the cci). However, Rojo Lugo was also willing to tolerate minor protests as long as those who engaged in such political actions did not challenge his government. For example, the governor gave in when a group of militant peasants affiliated with the CAM organized a political demonstration in Yahualica and threatened to take over the municipal buildings unless their municipal president resigned. This municipal authority was a modern ranchero who also held office when the peasant leader of Yahualica disappeared and when the massacre of Pepeyocatitla occurred. He was replaced by a schoolteacher (who also happened to be one of his relatives).9 The governor also allowed groups of peasants to take possession of some hitherto fictitious ejidos. The pequenos propietarios of the district then formed their own political organization to demand an end to the illegal occupation of privately owned ranchos. Their next tactic was to recruit as many peasants as possible who owned their own tiny ranchos, saying that the government wanted to turn them all into agraristas. Land invasions escalated in 1976 when Rojo Lugo handed over the reins of power to an interim governor, Jose Luis Suarez Molina. That same year, peasants affiliated with the CAM continued to invade land "illegally" in other parts of Huejutla. Land takeovers took place in fourteen different places in Huejutla, four in Huautla, one in Atlapexco (Tenexco again), seven in Jaltocan and nine in Orizatlan. The size of the properties invaded ranged from 3 to 225 hectares of land.10 By the end of that year, the total number of farm units (predios) officially listed as invaded (since 1972) reached ninety-one 8

The names of the victims appear in a report written by Jos6 Baron Larios on August 10, 1975. Larios Papers. 9 Interview with Leobardo Hernandez, Mecatlan, May 24, 1984. 10 A list of all of these properties was included in an unsigned report written on January 9, 1977. Larios Papers.

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(representing over 5,000 hectares)." These invasions were part of a strategy on the part of CAM leaders to overwhelm their opposition by simultaneously taking over as many properties as possible throughout the entire district. This was also the last year of Echeverria's term of office, and local CAM leaders feared that the advent of a more conservative government on the national level (under Lopez Portillo) would slow down the process of land reform. By fomenting land invasions, the CAM unleashed a violent class struggle that took on broader aspects than those anticipated by its national leaders. When local elections were held, groups of radical peasants occupied local government buildings to prevent unpopular or antiagrarian municipal authorities from taking office. For example, in Atlapexco, CAM demonstrators did not allow Desiderio Ordaz (a high school teacher from a local landowning family) to take office for several weeks.12 Militant peasant leaders belonging to the CAM also organized a huge caravan of agrarian peasants who marched from Huejutla to San Felipe, stopping in many villages along the way to show their strength and verbally to attack local opponents of land reform. On several occasions, landowners or government employees were also detained or kidnapped for anywhere from several hours to a few days.'3 This increasing radicalism alarmed government officials and led to even more violent responses by local landowners. Tensions increased in March 1977 when a peasant leader, Pedro Amador Hernandez (from Huextetitla, Orizatlan) was kidnapped, brought to Pachuca and tortured. He died three days later.I4 This militant peasant leader had been recently elected (at a meeting of all Nahua village representatives) as the representative of the Consejo Supremo Nahuatl, a new organization for indigenous people created by Luis Echeverria on the national level.15 His assailants were never caught. At the same time, the government approved the release of four landowners who had been apprehended and jailed the previous year for the murder of the six peasants in the offices of the CAM (Estrada 1978). Nei" The number of hectares invaded in each year were as follows: ioo (1972), 96 (1973), 72 (1974), 1,220 (1975), 5,837 (1976). These figures were included in a government report quoted in Marcos Matias (1986, 160, fig. 8). 12 Interview with Desiderio Ordaz, Atlapexco, August 17, 1981. 13 Interviews with Ildefonso Maya, Huejutla, May 5, 1983; Mariano Azuara, Macuxtepetla, January 15, 1987. 14 Interviews with Agustin Castillo, Huejutla, May 14,1985; Crisostomos Arenas, Huautla, April 4, 1986. 15 This organization, with its assembly of representatives from all the major indigenous groups in Mexico, was set up partly in response to the demands of an increasing number of radical, ethnically conscious professionals (mainly teachers) who were critical of the Mestizo-dominated and paternalistic policies associated with the philosophy of indigenismo (see Bontil Batalla 1981, 29, 371).

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ther the CAM nor the cci was capable of stopping this escalating violence and attacks on peasants by local pistoleros. These national peasant organizations also failed to bail local peasant leaders out of jail (despite their links with the government) or to obtain proper documentation for the land they had recovered. Consequently, many peasants turned to alternative sources of external support, including rural extension workers who were affiliated with an independent Marxist political party, the PMT (Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores). The PMT was introduced to the Huasteca by Gustavo Gordillo and Santiago Sanchez, who at that time worked under a program called CONASUPO, an institution set up by Echeverria for achieving self-sufficiency in food production.16 These extension workers, who formed part of an elaborate rural development bureaucracy, had been instructed to foment community-level participation. Part of their official task was to set up cooperative stores, a job that enabled them to meet local peasant leaders. Such community workers were also interested in "breaking the power of the caciques or the sons and grandsons of caciques" (Grindle 1977, 160), and thus they decided to provide local peasant leaders with political backing. One of their contacts was Pedro Beltran, a young, idealistic technician (and an outsider). A recent graduate from a rural extension school in southern Hidalgo, Pedro Beltran had come to live in Huejutla only a few years earlier but had already become a peasant leader in his own right. He was put in jail for his work as a political agitator in 1976 while affiliated with the cci but was released a year later with the help of PMT lawyers. Beltran became a symbol for the peasant cause and the main representative and spokesman for radical peasants. As agrarian conflicts accelerated, the Catholic Church was also drawn into regional politics. During the early seventies, Antonio Lona Reyes, who was later appointed as bishop of Tehuantepec, was a popular and well-known priest in the area. During the ten years he spent in Huejutla, his ideas on social justice and the need for liberation influenced a generation of priests who were to play a significant role in the political and social life of the region during the height of the agrarian conflicts.17 Local clergy, inspired by a new theology of liberation, made public statements about the injustice of low salaries paid to day laborers and condemned such ongoing abuses as obliging peasants to carry messages to Huejutla and other cabeceras without remuneration. A number of priests, who decided to "side with the poor," organized study 16

Interview with Agustfn Avila, April 22, 1986. At the same time, this priest was able to maintain good relations with members of the upper class of Huejutla, many of whom took part in an elaborate farewell party when he left Huejutla. 17

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groups to teach peasants their rights under the Mexican constitution and denounced human rights violations.18 They also invited members of an interdenominational organization called the National Center of Social Communication (or CENCOS) to investigate and report on such incidents. These CENCOS representatives, who were also members of the PMT, made frequent visits to Tenexco, together with several priests from Atlapexco.19 Local priests became personally involved in agrarian conflict itself as a result of the aftermath of the second major armed confrontation in the region. On May 14, 1977, a shoot-out between landowners and peasants occurred on the outskirts of Huitzotlaco, an anexo of the ejido of Tenexco. During this violent encounter, two young sons of Fermin P6rez (a politically influential landowner from the municipio of Xochicoatlan) and several Nahua peasants were killed or mortally wounded.20 Other members of landowning families involved in this clash were several young men from the Austria family, who owned a nearby ranch where the Perez boys spent the night. This tragic event created panic among local inhabitants, and the agrarian peasants, fearful of retaliation, refused to have anything to do with the police or ambulance attendants sent to handle this emergency. They would only allow the parish priests to enter Huitzotlaco. Two priests from Atlapexco delivered the dead and wounded to the local curato (parish residence) where the victims were attended by visiting nuns. Despite their moral influence over the peasant population, however, these priests could not dissuade the more militant agrarians from Tenexco from going on a rampage against a group of somewhat more prosperous peasants in the hamlet of Tlaica who had previously sided with local landowners in land tenure disputes. This pattern of group violence against conservative peasants who did not want to join the cause (or the other way around) was to become a frequent occurrence throughout the southern zone. The radical peasants held eleven of these peasants in temporary custody, beat them up and then burned down their houses. These peasants and their families in turn fled to Huejutla and had to be put up in a town hall, until they could be relocated to a new village.21 18 Carta-circular no. 6 de los sacerdotes del diocesis de Huejutla, September 5,1977. This circular, included in the Larios Papers, denounced twenty-six cases of assassinations, stabbing and torture in the region. •» CENCOS put out frequent news bulletins (also found in Larios Papers). However, this organization ceased to operate several years later when its offices in Mexico City were ransacked by the secret police. 20 Informe de Josd Baron Larios sobre la matanza en Huitzotlaco, May 13 to May 16,1977. Larios Papers. 21 The government then expropriated a small private property within the boundaries of the ejido of

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The attack on conservative peasants in Tlaica was the first of a rash of expulsions of peasants from Nahua villages in the southern zone. Most of these peasants would never again return to their villages of origin. At the same time, many landowners started moving from small rural villages to the city of Huejutla. Just after the death of the P6rez brothers, the Austria family left their homes in the small hamlet of Chichielsoquitl (near Ecuatitla) to join other landowners who had already abandoned their houses and ranchos. These landowners included the Flores family (already mentioned in connection with family vendettas in the fifties) as well as Efrain Zuniga, the person most often accused in the press of being a cacique. These landowners had all bought properties located within the boundaries of the communities of Cuamontax (Huazalingo) and Ecuatitla (Huejutla), both of which border on Tenexco." These landowners who lost their farms and ranches located within the boundaries offictitiousejidos came to be known as enclavados. Only a few months after these events in Huitzotlaco and Tenexco, another political assassination occurred. This time a CAM leader from Atlapexco, Humberta Hernandez, was assassinated. Humberta Hernandez was a young woman from a family of Mestizo rancheros and related (through her sister's marriage) to some of the most notorious minor caciques of Atlapexco (including a nephew of Juvencio Nochebuena). Despite these family connections, she became a leading opponent of the political faction in power in Atlapexco and sided with militant Nahua peasants throughout the municipios of Atlapexco and Yahualica. Despite her use of radical agrarian rhetoric, her actual political behavior was quite moderate. She was a member of the official government party and even negotiated between militant agrarians and modern rancheros. Nevertheless, a masked assailant shot her through the head in a bus, while she was returning from Pachuca to pick up her paycheck from the government (as part of her "job" as an official in one of the many programs set up by the government). Her assailants were never caught, and many political commentators from the region suggest that she ' 'did not play the political game'' according to the rules of the system. Another theory is that her death was in revenge for the killing of the two Perez brothers near Huitzotlaco, for which she was held responsible. Whatever the motive of her execution, this event triggered another series of land invasions in the region of Atlapexco, this time under the direction of more radical leaders. The events in Atlapexco coincided with the beginning of a new political Tenexco and built them a new settlement located halfway between Tenexco and Huitzotlaco, called Plan Huasteca. 22 Interviews with Daniel Flores Hernandez, Huejutla, June 20, 1984; Cupertino Molinos Alvarado, Chichielsoquitl (Huazalingo), June 4, 1985.

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current that was to become increasingly important in the Huasteca: an independent peasant organization led by Alejandro Hernandez Dolores. The son of a Nahua peasant, Hernandez Dolores had become an army corporal. This man came back to the Huasteca to became the most militant of all peasant leaders. The peasants he recruited in Tenexco and other Nahua villages were expected to sacrifice their lives if necessary for the cause of recovering land without the backing or tacit approval of influential politicians. Like the leaders of other peasant organizations (such as the CAM), the people who organized this paramilitary peasant grouping expected their members to pay monthly quotas to finance their military operations. Dolores and his associates spent a large percentage of their funds to purchase illegal weapons (such as automatic rifles) and severely punished anyone who strayed from the fold. The political ideology of Alejandro Dolores and his group, like that of other peasant syndicates or political parties, was clearly Marxist in orientation. However, they emphasized communal forms of cultivation and refused to have anything to do with the government's rural development programs. This organization, which became subject to harsh repression, was relatively decentralized, and Alejandro Hernandez eventually remained in the background. In fact, he seemed to have started or coordinated a variety of different peasant groupings (some of which even had different names) which became involved in the struggle over land. For example, one such group was called the 14th of May movement (Catorze de Mayo) after the day that the armed encounter took place in Huitzotlaco. Such independent groups rapidly gained support in villages that had so far not yet won their fight for land, especially in the municipio of Huautla and in the northern part of the municipio of Huejutla. Dolores also recruited many peasants in Nahua villages in the neighboring state of Veracruz. Not until 1978 did these peasants and their external advisers adopt an official name: Organizacion Independiente de los Pueblos Unidos de las Huastecas de Veracruz, Hidalgo y San Luis Potosi (Independent Organization of United Peoples of the Huastecas), or OIPUH.23 The use of increasingly more radical tactics was not restricted to peasants affiliated with the OIPUH. In the municipio of Jaltocan, peasants who belonged to the CAM not only invaded land but confiscated cattle in Huichapa and Vinasco.24 Land invasions also continued in the northern half of San Fe23

Their manifesto was published in a major national newspaper, Excelsior, December 12, 1978. Copies of this manifesto later also appeared in various books dealing with the political struggles of native peoples in the Americas (see Bonfil Batalla 1981, 403-10). This organization subsequently joined a larger umbrella organization of independent peasant organizations, the Coordination Nacional de Plan de Ayala, or CNPA. 14 Many of these incidents were reported in a small newspaper printed in Huejutla, called Inovaciones.

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lipe Orizatlan where peasants from various former hacienda communities, such as Nexpa, Los Coyoles and El Brasilar, invaded part of a large rural property owned by a landowner who lived in Mexico City. These peasants took over his farmhouse and founded the new village of Tamocaltitla. In 1977 various newspapers also reported abuses by CAM officials, who were accused of inciting peasants to acts of violence against other peasants and taking hos­ tages,25 while an increasing number of peasants joined the PMT party. The leaders of all of these peasant organizations and left-wing parties publicly denounced the coyomej and the gente de razon during political rallies in downtown Huejutla. Continued land invasions as well as increasing petitions for land reform by members of both the PMT and CAM culminated in a political crisis in 1978. The Apex of a Peasant Revolt In the beginning of April 1978, Pedro Beltran Trejo, by now the most pop­ ular agrarian politician (and member of the PMT), was assassinated in Hueju­ tla (Castillo 1978). Rumors circulated that his followers were going to hold a large political demonstration and then occupy the town of Huejutla. The po­ litical tension created by these rumors and increasing fear by the inhabitants of downtown Huejutla (some analysts have even classified their reaction as a kind of mass psychosis) resulted in the closing of the market in Huejutla. For the next few days, many inhabitants of downtown Huejutla evacuated the city in a long line of cars, and armed landowners took up positions on rooftops (Reveles 1978). No one returned until a battalion of soldiers arrived in Hue­ jutla. Although their fears of an attack by armed peasants proved unfounded, the landowners and merchants who lived in the district administrative center continued to complain bitterly about the "lack of guarantees for property owners" and increasingly criticized the government for not doing enough to keep political agitators under control. They even accused the interim gover­ nor, Suarez Molino, of being personally responsible for continuing agrarian unrest in numerous hamlets and villages throughout the area (Diaz 1978). When Rojo Lugo resumed his post as governor on June 1, 1978, he again promised to resolve the land tenure problems of Huejutla and to halt all forms of violence and lawlessness once and for all. However, only two months after returning to office, the bullet-riddled bodies of four peasants from the ejido of Huitzachahual (Huejutla) were found in a ditch along the highway from 25

See various articles in Voceador (August ι and 2, 1977) andInnovaciones (November 22, 1976, and March 13, 1977).

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Tlanchinol to Huejutla (Herrera 1978). Rojo Lugo was not only faced with the usual flurry of protests following such a political assassination but also had to contend with an even more rapidly expanding OIPUH. At this point another actor entered the political stage: the Socialist Worker's Party of Mexico (PST), another left-wing opposition party founded in the early seventies. The PST was formed around the same time as the PMT (their respective founders were even planning to form a party together), but, unlike the PMT, which continued to criticize the government from an independent position, the PST formed close links with the Mexican government and was officially registered as an opposition party in 1977 (Needier 1982, 64). From here on it continued to support the "progressive left within the PRI" on the national level while assuming a radical oppositional stance against "caciques" and "corrupt PRI officials" in municipal elections.26 Starting in 1978, the PST (together with its affiliated syndicate, the National Union of Agricultural Workers, or UNTA) expanded its sphere of influence in the region of Huejutla at the expense of both the PMT party and the CAM organization. The PST, like other left-wing parties, was Marxist in terms of its rhetoric, and it even created local committees to study the principles of socialism. However, unlike the PMT or the independent peasant organization of Alejandro Dolores, the PST usually supported the official candidates for governor or president on the national level. In Hidalgo, the PST also established a working relationship with Rojo Lugo, and it was careful to consult with him before undertaking any land invasions. This left-wing party, although technically opposed to the PRI (the official government party), became the primary counterweight to more radical and independent political forces. The leaders of the PST in Huejutla were a father and his two sons. This family was originally from the district of Molango. The father, Pedro Martinez, had once owned his own rancho but worked for the rest of his life sawing wood (to make planks). Pedro Martinez originally came to Huejutla after fleeing from his hometown of Atesca because he had become a political enemy of the Austria family (rival of the Nochebuenas) who dominated the highland districts. He later worked as a caretaker and woodcutter for Ezechiel Reyes, the millionaire of Huejutla. Pedro Martinez, a downwardly mobile traditional ranchero, had had lots of experience interacting with Nahua peasants. In contrast, his oldest son, Teodolo Martinez, never learned Nahuatl and attended high school before entering a political career. To build up a local constituency and basis of popular support, these political leaders had to obtain land for local peasants, through land invasions if necessary. Thefirstgroup of peas* Interview with PST leader in Huejutla, Teodolo Martinez, May 20, 1985.

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ants who won their struggle for land with their help lived in the Nahua village of San Francisco (Huazalingo), another fictitious ejido. With PST backing, these peasants, led by a group of militant young men, not only regained all of the land previously in the possession of outsiders, but also took over the properties owned by a wealthy Nahua cacique (Leodegario Vasquez, mentioned in chapter 9). After successfully defending agrarian peasants in San Francisco, PST leaders started to expand their area of political influence. Their next major political triumph was the takeover of a small property owned by the absentee widow of an American businessman, with the tacit approval of the governor. Pedro Martinez told me that when he approached Rojo Lugo and told him that they were planning to invade the property, the governor's reply was, "don't tell me that you are planning to invade this property. Come and tell me when you have already taken it."27 On this property, located on the outskirts of the city of Huejutla, the PST founded a new colony for poor, homeless peasants from Huejutla. This new colony, called Primero de Mayo (First of May), became the first of several constituencies who would henceforth vote for the PST, which in turn enabled the Martinez' to negotiate with the government. By offering their support to government-linked politicians on both the state and federal levels, the PST leaders received official recognition and a certain number of seats in the legislature. In this situation of increasing competition from opposition groups (albeit "loyal" ones), Rojo Lugo also took political initiatives of his own. In 1979, his government announced a special plan for regional development (Plan Huasteca). This project, largelyfinancedthrough federal funds, involved the coordination of activities by a variety of agencies, some of them originally set up under Echeverria. Next, he sent his niece, Gabriela Rojo, to Huejutla. She was given three important administrative posts: head of the regional Land Reform Office, director of the coordinating center of INI, and finally, director of another agency called Patrimonio Indigena, also newly established in Huejutla. Gabriela Rojo in turn appointed a local Nahua artist and teacher, Ildefonso Maya, as subdirector of INI. Apart from becoming the main source of political patronage for local politicians, she also used the radical language of local agrarian leaders to gain their support. She thus formed a series of political alliances which included a radical peasant leader from Chililico. As head of the Land Reform Office, Gabriela then started to hand over land that Ie27 Ibid. In a published interview with a reporter, Teodolo's brother, Gabriel Martinez (at that time head of the UNTA) stated that Rojo Lugo was "neither for not against" the peasant movement and that the governor backed the PST. Mario Garcia Sordo, Uno Mas Uno, July 29, 1980, p. 3.

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gaily belonged to Nahua communities (i.e., fictitious ejidos). However, this was generally only done for peasants who belonged to or who were willing to join the official National Peasant Federation (CNC), affiliated with the govern­ ment party. At the same time, she tried to placate local landowners, afraid of further invasions, by telling them that she and her collaborators only wanted to help the peasants better organize their ejidos in order to become more self sufficient.28 Gabriela Rojo built up her own base of peasant support in Huautla, where the principal peasant leader, Crisostomos Arenas, who even spent some time in jail in 1976, had already joined the CNC. Crisostomos Arenas, a somewhat older than average peasant leader, spoke fluent Nahuatl although his barrio in Huautla had become almost completely Mestizo by the late seventies. He was also a proficient cowhand who had frequently worked in local ranchos. His modern outlook, and his ability to portray himself as "an Indian" in the larger political arena, made Crisostomos an ideal political broker, worthy of state backing. Together with Jose Guadarrama, a state official from Pachuca, Gabriela Rojo traveled to Huautla together with a convoy of government trucks to hand over all of the land that belonged to the four previously ficti­ tious ejidos, representing the four barrios of Huautla and the nearby village of Hernandeztla. They presented the proper documentation for these ejidos29 and then notified all private landowners who owned land inside the bound­ aries of these ejidos that they had to remove their cattle within forty-eight hours. Gabriela Rojo also persuaded the peasants from Santa Maria (Huazalingo), who had already recovered their ejido on their own, to join the PRI (and the CNC) to become eligible for credit and access to other services pro­ vided by the government. She likewise won the support of Nahua peasants in Toltitlan, one of the barrios of Jaltocan that had already won control over its share of communal land. Here she used her position as coordinator of Patrimonio Indigena to set up a cooperative sandal-making workshop.30 Not all peasant leaders were so easily coopted, however. In Yahualica, Pascual Ruiz, a principal peasant leader affiliated with the CAM until 1979, joined the PST and started to organize land invasions in more remote sections of that municipio. Another former CAM leader, Modesto Hernandez (one of the Protestants), continued unauthorized land takeovers in Orizatlan and the northern half of Jaltocan. Upon the advice of former PMT officials, Modesto, together with Benito and Margarito Hernandez from La Corrala, also estab28

A man who had worked as her chauffeur told this to me in 1981. Interview with Crisostomos Arenas, May 15, 1985. This event was also reported in the press: El Sol de Hidalgo, January 26, 1979. 30 Interview with Meliton Hernandez, Barrio Toltitlan (Jaltocan), June 15, 1985. 29

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lished their own independent (i.e., nongovernment-affiliated) peasant union. They managed to sign up thirty-six communities in an inaugural meeting held in Lemontitla, the Nahua village (close to La Corrala) whose inhabitants no longer had anywhere to grow corn.31 Around the same time Alejandro Dolores (of the OIPUH) armed villagers in the northern zone halves of Huejutla and Huautla to invade sections of land that they had petitioned as extensions of their ejidos (originally set up in 1940). By 1979, the number of hectares listed as invaded reached 23,171. Figure 7, taken from an official report, shows the approximate locations of all invaded properties in Huejutla. Note that most of the land taken over by peasants was flatter land located in river valleys. The failure on the part of Rojo Lugo to stop further unauthorized land invasions after implementing the Huasteca plan led to a more systematic suppression of the peasant revolt.

The Suppression of a Peasant Revolt Ironically, while Rojo Lugo (the son of the famous agrarian politician Rojo Gomez) was still governor, more peasant leaders were assassinated or put in jail than during any other period of office. In the last year of his term of office, Rojo Lugo ordered the incarceration of 250 militant peasants, including such leaders as Pascual Ruiz and Modesto Hernandez. All of these peasants were picked up by the state police for illegal land invasions and offered amnesty only if they would join the CNC.32 Most of these radical peasant leaders, who belonged to a variety of peasant organizations and political parties, were to spend the next two years behind bars in the state penitentiary in Pachuca. Finally, Rojo Lugo sent in the army toflushout members of the OIPUH, which was the only peasant organization that continued to undertake land invasions, especially in the municipio of Huautla, where prominent landowners (such as Emiliano Badillo of Huejutla) owned large ranchos. At first, the military crackdown was confined to the municipio of Huautla where the OIPUH exercised its greatest influence. Peasants who sympathized with the OIPUH then became even more militant, and a group of peasants from 31 Interview with Modesto Hernandez, Huejutla, June 3, 1985. See also a mimeographed report that summarizes the peasant struggle from the viewpoint of a group of peasants from that village (Martinez 1986, 11-12). This was one of the peasant communities that had developed inside of the boundaries of a privately owned rural estate in the intermediate zone. 32 Interview with Leodegario Martinez, San Pedro Huazalingo, May 11, 1984; Modesto Hernandez, Huejutla, June 3, 1985; Rutilio Lara, Tlalchiyahualica, June 10, 1984; Jose Tolentino Gregorio, Tlalchiyahualica, March 17, 1982 (all of these peasant leaders were incarcerated in 1979).

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Cabeceras Paved Highway Dirt Roads Rivers Municipio Boundaries State Boundaries

Breakdown of Properties Invaded Municipio Huejutla Atlapexco Huautla Jaltocan Orizatlan Yahualica Huazalingo Xochiatipan

Surface Area Invaded (has)

Number of Properties Invaded

% of Total Hectares Invaded

7499 1238 2854 915 8354 1572 357 382

176 41 41 38 149 58 18 9

19 8 14.6 9.9 18.7 27.0 95 36 2.5

Source: Adapted from government report (n d.)

FIGURE η. Area of Land Invasions (1979)

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one village went so far as to forcefully detain Gabriela Rojo herself until she promised to solve their land problems.33 At this point the army extended its operations to other municipios as well. One of its first targets was Tenexco, where an army detachment was posted for two months. In May, government agrarian officials forced their radical comisariado to resign under the allegation that he and his followers had been involved in criminal activities. The more radical peasants leaders of Tenexco were then replaced by new authorities hand-picked by a more conservative peasant from Huitzotlaco, Feliciano Sanchez (nicknamed El Chino). Although nominally an agrarian and a member of the CNC, this Nahua cacique still had close links with former as well as current landowners. The army returned again two months later, this time to arrest the former members of the radical comisariado for misappropriation of public funds while they were in office.34 This repression of radical peasant leaders of Tenexco, all of whom had been involved in thefirstset of invasions ten years before, marked a partial return to the status quo. In 1980, some of the most fertile land belonging to the ejido of Tenexco was still in the hands of local landowners, including El Chino himself. However, many other peasants in this and other Nahua villages were now growing their milpas in land that had been pasture in 1970.

A Typology of Peasant Organizations in the Seventies Several Mexican social scientists have analyzed the events described above in terms of the type of relationships between peasant organizations and the state. These analysts, some of whom were (or still are) involved in the peasant movement on the state or national level, have developed typologies that are useful for understanding the origins and possible future developments of local class conflicts as part of a broader struggle to transform Mexican society. In a paper written by a team of researchers from a center for research in social anthropology, political action by the peasantry of the Huasteca is classified according to four categories: independent class action (represented by the OIPUH), peasant action guided by the state (e.g., the CAM), spontaneous political action (e.g., the short-lived 14 de Mayo movement which preceded the formation of the OIPUH) and apolitical or passive action (Briseno et al. 1984, 31-37). The last two are seen as stages leading up to the development » Interview with Ildefonso Maya, Huejutla, June 21, 1986. 34 See various reports in Uno Mas Uno, June 29, 1980, and July 14, 1980. These and other incidents were condemned in various mimeographed bulletins (boletin informative) put out by this organization.

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of a more cohesive peasant movement which usually has elements of both independent and guided political class action. These writers also see a growing polarization between the more militant OIPUH, which refuses to have anything to do with the government and organizations that are willing to negotiate with the state. A similar typology is also presented by a team of researchers from the National Autonomous University who worked in Huejutla (Guerrero et al. 1984), and by Agustin Avila from the National School of Anthropology (Avila and Cervantes 1986, 25). Avila classifies the peasant movement of Huejutla into three consecutive stages, from a series of dispersed, spontaneous and isolated rebellions in different communities (1966 to 1977)» to a peasant war (1978 to 1980) andfinally(up to 1984 when he wrote his article), a pact between a peasant movement and the government of Rossell de la Lama. This last phase will be covered in part 4. The macro-level political analysis offered by these writers needs to be complemented by an examination of the interface between formal peasant organizations and the peasant communities that formed the basis of their political support. Peasant organizations are made up of different kinds of leaders who have complex relationships with their followers. No matter how radical or independent, all of the political organizations that operated in the Huasteca provided opportunities for local leaders to increase their personal prestige and standing in the community. Their political involvement also represented a temptation to obtain personal economic benefits. This was especially true for those organizations that formed an integral part of the national political system. As intermediaries between national organizations and peasant communities, peasant leaders were able to help their constituents obtain access to land, protection from pistoleros and even legal aid in time of repression. While such a role was often risky, it offered potentially large economic rewards for leaders who could successfully mobilize and then control the peasants whom they represented. Once a leader can show that he or she can muster an important constituency, the government is always willing to coopt the leader through bribery and corruption (Hellman 1983). Successful peasant leaders, who carved out a niche in the highly centralized political system of Mexico, could become political patrons in their own right.

Leaders and Followers Peasant leaders, especially those who belong to independent, nongovernment organizations (which have fewer external resources), are in an ambivalent position. Such leaders often have to obtain money and food from their

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constituents in order to keep their organization alive. Theoretically, militant peasants should provide suchfinancialsupport out of purely ideological motives, but in practice the leaders often have to use more than moral suasion to obtain the required contributions. The role of collector (as well as organizer) is open to ambiguities and possible abuse. Leaders can exploit their followers, but leaders who are too blatantly opportunistic may also be rejected or actively opposed by their followers. The strains and tensions associated with being a peasant leader are expressed by peasant leaders themselves, who point out that it is difficult to be a good leader; a leader has to know how to handle people, and his followers can be fickle. For every story of a peasant leader in Huejutla who went on to fame (and sometimes fortune), there is another story of one who went bankrupt or returned to live in poverty and oblivion. Many others, of course, got shot. Although the peasant leader is a new phenomenon in Huejutla, his role is also characterized by elements of continuity from the past. For example, although the main role of peasant leaders is to "fight against the caciques," their opponents often accused them of acting like caciques themselves. There is some truth to this remark, as long as one accepts that old-fashioned caciques had a certain degree of legitimacy, that is, if they acted as patrons and did not step beyond the limits of what was considered acceptable. Take, for example, the relationship between Felipe Naranjo, the peasant leader of Tenexco, and his followers (see chapter 10). While he fought on behalf of the peasants, and made many trips to Mexico City, he was also given more than thanks or honor. The peasants of Tenexco supported his family with gifts of food, firewood and personal assistance. His detractors interpreted such gifts as an example of how a typical "opportunistic peasant leader exploits the Indians," and they also accused him of "getting free women" in the process (he did run off with the wife of a local ranchero). In contrast, the agrarian peasants saw him as a heroic figure and a martyr; they also pointed out that he was assassinated for his role in the struggle for land. Other peasant leaders who lasted much longer and who established a much wider network of supporters did end up profiting from their political involvement, as will be seen later. But first the focus must be shifted to view the peasant revolt from a more microscopic perspective. It is necessary to get more of the "inside story'' of what was happening on the village level and examine local events in the context of a broader historical perspective.

Chapter 12

Class Conflict and Factional Politics: Cliques, Violence and Kinship

The people who became involved in the peasant movement in the seventies had a variety of backgrounds and motives. Political leaders, together with their followers, also became involved with other types of conflicts which were still lingering from the past. In this way class conflicts became intertwined with other types of social cleavages. To understand fully what happened on the local level, it is necessary to look at some specific case studies and examine the conflict over land in the context of a violent history of factional disputes and family vendettas going back to the twenties and thirties. Recent political conflict showed much continuity from the past; however, such conflicts also involved new forms of village factionalism, changing patterns of homocide and new types of family disputes.

Factional Disputes Militant agraristas fought not only against individual landowners but against cliques who controlled local governments. In the thirties and forties a handful of ranchero families in each municipio exploited not only their own tenants and day laborers but the entire peasant population—through forced extractions of communal labor and illegal taxes. Although the worst abuses had disappeared by the late 1950s, some local authorities still humiliated humble peasants who came to the presidencia to register births or deaths or to seek permission to hold dances. For example, in the early seventies, one president of Yahualica still used to summon andfinepeasants from the Nahua villages of Santa Teresa and Xoxolpa just for sending petitions to various government departments without prior authorization from the municipal cabecera.1 Local power cliques thereby tried to prevent peasants from using 1

Interview with Beto Hernandez Dolores (a teacher who worked in both of these villages at that time), Ceresos, May n , 1983.

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proper legal channels to gain access to land. When agrarian peasants confronted these authorities during the more militant phase of their struggle, they usually joined forces with disgruntled landowners who had their own grievances or who had been deprived of power. These politically dissatisfied rancheros, whose own land was not in danger of being invaded (or who derived most of their income from commerce in any case), supported radical peasants in local political disputes. Landowning members of out-factions even recruited their own peasant supporters with the promise of land as a way of gaining back power. Indeed, some of the political in-fighting on the municipal level in the seventies at the same time as the land invasions was not that different from the factional politics described in my book on the nearby region of Pisaflores (see Schryer 1976). Thus the struggle for land became intertwined with long-standing factional disputes among rival landowning families. For example, in 1976, a member of the Ordaz family, a family of small landowners from the village of Coyolapa (a Mestizo anexo of Tenexco) became municipal president of Atlapexco. This family, together with the Flores family from the rancho of La Reforma, had controlled the municipal government for the previous decade. The mob who stormed the local government building in 1976 to prevent Ordaz from taking office were led by Humberta Hernandez, herself the daughter of a ranchero family. Moreover, the people calling for the resignation of Ordaz included not only radical CAM agrarian peasants from various villages but all of the Palacios of Atlapexco. The Palacios (some of whom still owned small ranchos) were fighting for political reforms and a change of government rather than for land. The Palacios had also been political opponents of general Juvencio Nochebuena in the past and had supported Yahualica in its fight with Atlapexco in the thirties. In other municipal cabeceras, pro-agrarian families involved in electoral campaigns had likewise been political enemies of Nochebuena. Thus, in Huautla, Daniel Hernandez (originally from the Nahua village of Zacatipa) and Narciso Naranjo (a Mestizo who owned a small rancho in Atlapexco) had both belonged to a political faction of Nochebuena opponents (the Bravos and Vites) several decades before.2 Both of these men (both retired schoolteachers) supported the agrarian leader, Crisostomos Arenas, in hisfightfor land in the seventies. Although old factional divisions among rival members of the upper classes continued, the outbreak of open class warfare in Huejutla also gave rise to new patterns of factional politics, especially at the village level. In earlier 2 Interviews with Emigrio Vite, Huautla, May 11, 1983; Daniel Hernandez, Huautla, May 19, 1983; Daniel Salazar, Mexico City, May 31, 1983.

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works (Schryer 1975), I analyzed village factionalism in peasant communities in terms of the competition of rival upper class leaders who maintained patron-client bonds with their respective lower-class supporters. The main characteristic of such factionalism—in areas not subject to widespread, open class conflict (whether in Pisaflores or Huejutla prior to i960)—was the absence of consistent ideological positions and the failure of local politics to alter the economic class structure, even when elements of class conflict were occasionally incorporated in factional patterns of politics. In contrast, internal divisions at the village level during the peasant uprising were characterized by vehement disputes over ideological differences that had a direct impact on and often transformed the local class structure. The social setting in which factionalism occurred was also different; faction disputes in the seventies and eighties became more severe at the level of small hamlets and villages than in the municipal centers. Moreover, ongoing factional divisions among local landowners and merchants were now subject to the dynamics of factional divisions among rival groups of peasants rather than the other way around. The task of political anthropologists is to ascertain how the political system at the national level and local class dynamics jointly determine the form of village factionalism (see Schryer 1977,197). Since the Mexican political system had not changed that much since the thirties, the new forms of factionalism I encountered in Huejutla could be explained primarily in terms of changing class dynamics on the local level. Technically, factions are noncorporate conflict groups whose leaders recruit their followers on the basis of diverse principles (Nicholas 1965, 2729). The main characteristic of any form of factionalism is the fluidity of boundaries between opposing conflict groups. For example, ranchero factionalism involved shifting ties of kinship, ethnicity and personal loyalties in an ongoing competition over power, including the spoils of political office. Such factional disputes (which sometimes became intertwined with family feuds) were usually an expression of an underlying economic competition among rival landowners and smallholders. Factional boundaries among rival groups of peasants in the seventies were just as fluid, with constant realignments and people switching from one side to another. However, the main basis for such internal conflicts was the relationship of opposing sides to an ongoing class struggle; members of opposing factions mainly disagreed over whether or not to engage in a struggle for land at all, if so, whether such land invasions should be done through legal channels or through direct action tactics, and what peasant organizations they should join (see Rebolledo 1989, 9). The underlying motive forces were strong class conflicts at both the village and regional levels as well as deep divisions among equally poor peasants about

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what should be the form and outcome of such class struggles. Such factional divisions frequently took an extremely violent form.

Violence and Coercion The official spokesmen of every peasant organization and political party involved in the struggle for land in Huejutla claimed that they advocated peaceful solutions to local political problems. They all said they would use direct-action tactics or firearms only when all legal channels had been thoroughly exhausted. Each organization also accused the others of causing divisions within the peasantry and using such strong-arm tactics as beating up peasants who did not want to join up. Likewise, peasant leaders publicly condemned the use of excessive force against the owners of small ranchos and other opponents in the class struggle. In fact, violent tactics were used by both Mestizo and Nahua peasants of every political persuasion. Such violence and the frequent assassination of political opponents on both sides must be understood in its broader cultural and historical context. The use of machetes andfirearmsand the hiring of pistoleros to settle disputes in both the private and public domain also have a long history, especially among local Mestizo rancheros (see chapter 8). The knowledge of how to use guns and the associated norms of male valor had also become diffused among a significant minority in the Nahuatl-speaking population (just as a certain percentage of Nahua peasants learned to be cowhands or ranchers). Although the profession of hired gunslinger had become practically obsolete by 1970, there were still many old-fashioned ranchero caciques quite willing to kill peasant leaders on behalf of more "civilized" and refined political leaders or modern, educated ranchero when land invasions began. The wealthier landowners themselves mainly wore guns for self-protection, although some were labeled as caciques presumably hiring professional assassins. The landowner most often mentioned as a cacique who employed pistoleros was Efrain Zuniga Gonzales of Huejutla. This rancher and businessman also had a permit as a member of the police force of the neighboring state of Veracruz (Velasquez 1986, 75). Agrarian peasants who initiated the struggle for land knew that local caciques had assassinated political opponents in the past. Thus, even peaceloving but militant peasants had to resort to arms (or cruder weapons) to defend themselves. Armed conflicts escalated in the seventies because each side, in their own minds, felt they had every right to defend what rightfully belonged to them. While some notorious ranchero caciques had deliberately

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cheated or used force to acquire land illegally in the past, most of the landowners in 1970 had inherited land going back three or four generations or had bought their farms and ranches within the "rule of law." These landowners, businessmen with modern ideas or peaceful peasant fanners, simply did not want to believe or could not accept that the land they owned had officially been turned into ejidos. Some of these landowners resorted to the use of arms because they were just as convinced that they were right in defending their property as their agrarian opponents were adamant in their belief that they had been unjustly deprived of access to their ancestral lands. When the government could no longer prevent land invasions from spreading to areas that had not been affected by previous land reforms (i.e., those that were "authentic" pequenas propiedades), more landowners became armed combatants. For example, some of the landowning families who lived in Vinasco and Huichapa, who had previously kept out of the factional in-fighting of the Nochebuena era, were the first to resort to guns to defend their properties. Several members of these families (usually more traditional-type rancheros) were even charged with the possession of illegal (high caliber) weapons and subsequently spent some time in jail.3 A few former pistoleros, who had earlier fought for local caciques, also became involved in agrarian disputes on the side of the peasant movement. Their action can be partly explained in terms of earlier political cleavages and long-standing family feuds. In Yahualica, the main agrarian leader, Pascual Ruiz, was a former pistolero of the Laras, the family who had held power under Plutarco Calles (see chapter 7). Although he and some of his former companions had already advanced well beyond middle age by 1970, their knowledge of fighting with guns must have been valuable. They certainly knew how to protect themselves, unlike one of the sons of Geronimo Lara (a student in the seventies) who was assassinated soon after joining the struggle for land. In some cases, former pistoleros who had been allied to the Nochebuena faction also ended up as agrarians. For example, at least one gunslinger (the illegitimate son of Andres Guillen, the infamous cacique of Chililico) joined the pro-ejido agrarian faction in the seventies. Similarly, Nicolas Hernandez, a radical agrarian leader in Huitzotlaco, was the son of a Nahua peasant who had fought as a mercenary (or "soldier") on the side of the Nochebuena faction against El Pinto in the forties (see chapter 8).4 Both Nicolas 3 They were later acquitted. Their names appeared in various newspaper articles (see Estrada 1978). 4 Interviews with Nicolas Hernandez, Plan de Ayala, May 18, 1985; Dario Salazar. Atlapexco, May 31, 1985. An incorrect version of this feud also appeared in a newspaper article (Loaiza Ortega 1983)·

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and his brother (called the Nilos) had learned how to use guns. Indeed, Nicol&s Hernandez often joked or bragged about his ability to use guns.5 While some of these pistoleros were poor peasants in need of land, they also joined the agrarian movement to seek revenge against old political enemies or as a means of gaining back some of the privileges they had enjoyed as professional fighters in the past. For example, in the case of Pascual Ruiz (the former Lara supporter from Yahualica who became a major peasant leader in the seventies), various peasants told me that this former pistolero had previously abused his position to take money from them. Pascual did the same thing again in the 1970s when he forced a peasant in Tepetitla to give money to him for the second time in his life to prevent the confiscation of a small coffee orchard. A peasant from Yahualica also told me that one of Pascual's sons (who became involved with the PST) sometimes donned a policeman's uniform to "push people around." This picture, held by many peasants of his hometown, stands in stark contrast to the impressions many people in other places have of Pascual Ruiz. Those who were his companions in the CAM movement, the leaders of the PST and the owner of a small newspaper in Huejutla all portray him as a heroic and noble leader, and they all mention that it was such a shame that he fell so quickly from power. To keep things in perspective, we should keep in mind that Pascual Ruiz was in turn submitted to much more violent treatment by security forces than he probably ever inflicted on anyone else; on several occasions he was beaten up (possibly even tortured) before being thrown in jail. The mystique and glamor associated with the use of firearms among the majority of male peasants and traditional rancheros had both positive and negative consequences for the class struggles of the seventies. While the use of firearms by radical peasants was perhaps the only way to protect themselves from the political violence perpetrated by local landowners and security forces, these same guns could also be used to settle purely personal disputes among poor peasants themselves. Likewise, the fact that some agrarian leaders had previously served as pistoleros repelled many potential followers among the peasant population. One agrarian leader of a faction in Mecatlan (a small village that had become Mestizo) used to organize punitive expeditions against other peasants and also encouraged his followers to engage in petty theft.6 These agrarian peasants from Mecatlan were also accused of staging attacks against members of the OIPUH and recently tried to evict a 5

Some peasants from Tenexco blamed Nicolas and his brother for instigating the armed encounter that took place in Huitzotlaco in which several peasants lost their lives (see chapter 11). 6 His group subsequently joined the PST as well. Interview with Leobardo Hernandez, Mecatlan, April 15, 1982.

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group of peasants from La Mesa Larga because this anexo of Mecatlan wanted to set up its own ejido. More recently, two rival groups from Mecatlan were also wounded in a machete fight. Such incidents, involving intravillage or intervillage conflicts, became a commonplace occurrence in the eighties, as will be seen later. The eruption of armed clashes on the village level sometimes has tragic consequences. In January 1980, the assassination of several peasant leaders, presumably carried out on the orders of local caciques, sparked further violent confrontations between two rival peasant factions in the village of Tzacuala (Huautla). A shoot-out, involving militant members of the OIPUH, resulted in the death of women and children caught in the line of fire. Again, there are different versions of what lay behind this event. Most people, both OIPUH sympathizers and their opponents, agree that the OIPUH peasants from Metlatepec were the first to attack after the leaders of Tzacuala (who had formerly supported the group led by Alejandro Dolores)' 'betrayed their leader." Such use of violence against political opponents, even if they are fellow peasants, was condoned or excused in the writings of local intellectuals. The events in Tzacuala were made into a play by Ildefonso Maya (the former Nahua subdirector of INi mentioned earlier) and are also discussed in a book by a journalist from Veracruz (Velasquez 1986, 73-75). Both of these authors justify the use of violence by radical peasants on this occasion, arguing that the armed attack was a just revenge and the resulting bloodbath the necessary consequence of a revolutionary struggle. The fear of this type of political violence, as well as the memories of the atrocities associated with factional in-fighting among armed bands in the past, can explain why so many peasants in the region were afraid of (although they also admired) more radical agrarian groups. The sometimes brutal attacks against other peasants (simply for refusing to join up) or constant harassment by members of militant peasant organizations resulted in the emigration of many peasants to other parts of Huejutla.

Changing Patterns in the Use of Violence

Despite the continuation of a culture of violence based on firearms, dating back to the Mexican Revolution, the patterns of violence and homicides have changed dramatically between the era of caciquismo of the first half of the twentieth century and the outbreak of a peasant revolt in the seventies. The analytical approach used by William Taylor (1979) in connection with colonial Mexican villages can be applied to Huejutla in the twentieth century. In

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comparing the two time periods, one can examine how political violence re­ flects changes in social relations, and in this case in particular, class relations. Between 191 ο and 1950, most homicides in Huejutla involved the murder of political opponents of the same class (the rancheros) in factional disputes or vendettas. Such homicides generally took place in bars, under the influence of alcohol. According to local folk theory, anyone who was not "brave" enough to avenge his opponents laid an ambush to kill their enemies along some deserted road. In contrast, although a variety of intimidation tactics were used against the population as a whole, poor peasants were generally not assassinated. Poor peasants and other "ordinary" people were much more likely to get wounded or killed in actual gun battles between private armies whose members were recruited from a variety of class backgrounds. Such political shoot-outs usually took place in village plazas or out in the open fields. In the seventies, the number of assassinations of peasants went up dramat­ ically while old-fashioned face-to-face shoot-outs between traditional ranche­ ros occurred very rarely. Moreover, agrarian peasants were usually killed in small groups while traveling together or while attending meetings in Hueju­ tla. This change in the pattern of homicides reflects the changing function of violence: from a means of settling intra-elite disputes to a direct method of conducting class war in the face of open opposition from economic subordi­ nates. Assassinations of peasants became prevalent at a time when more sub­ tle methods of class control (including intimidation) no longer worked. Also, the assailants responsible for such political assassinations were rarely identi­ fied or caught, which gave rise to a great deal of ambiguity. In the past, most people either knew who were murderers (there were usually lots of witnesses) or, in the case of ambushes, everyone could guess who was probably respon­ sible. During the height of the agrarian revolt of the seventies, members of different classes often had different interpretations of who was responsible for political assassinations. Militant peasants usually blamed well-known "caciques" or rich landowners while modern, educated rancheros often as­ sumed that the government itself had ordered assassinations of peasant lead­ ers if they "had gone too far" or become too independent.7 Another difference in the pattern of political violence between the thirties and the seventies is the complete absence of paramilitary forces in the latter 7

Apart from the fact that the Mexican government does not have the resources to conduct thorough investigations into all of these assassinations, it could be argued that the failure to establish clearly who is responsible contributes to some level of political stability by keeping everyone guessing and allowing opposing sides of the political spectrum each to keep believing their own version of what really happened.

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period. Between 1974 and 1988, few military confrontations occurred either during electoral disputes or in the process of invading land. Both invading peasants and landowners (or their retainers) usually showed up with arms, but landowners could do little against the numerically more powerful agrarians. Instead, they chose to eliminate the leaders or small groups of representatives rather than risk open gun battles. Landowners also used their connections with the police and state officials to have peasant leaders arrested and jailed. Given the presence of a much stronger and more centralized Mexican state after 1950, it is unlikely that the government would have permitted open battles between the opposing sides, since the use of private armies would imply the usurpation of the right of the state to use force in such a public manner. Instead, the landowners would ask the army to dislodge agrarian peasants, who usually retreated only to return a few days later. On other occasions, the army or police even oversaw "land invasions" if such invasions had prior authorization through the mediation of peasant organizations (such as the CNC or PST). Despite the symbolic show of military power, most of the struggles for land involved a lot of backroom maneuvering and political negotiations. Given the lack of "real battles" (for the most part), one older peasant from Yahualica who had fought in the Mexican Revolution even told me glibly: "Before we old guys were real revolutionaries; nowadays, these young guys are little, make-believe revolutionaries."8 Another noticeable change in the pattern of violence is the eruption of machete fights and even shoot-outs within rural (especially Nahua) villages, something that had rarely occurred before. In the thirties or forties, the predominant pattern of factional in-fighting was among Mestizo rancheros who lived in Mestizo cabeceras or small ranchos, as has been seen. Such factionalism usually took quite violent forms. At that time there was not nearly as much overt violence within Nahua communities or villages inhabited mainly by poorer Mestizo peasants. Whenever fights did break out (often in bars), it usually involved disagreements between individuals over personal matters. In contrast, in the seventies and eighties, huge fights (with machetes and fists) frequently broke out in larger Nahuatl communities between whole groups of people belonging to opposing factions, especially in the southern zone. Such group confrontation, usually between radical and conservative peasants, reflected completely opposing and irreconcilable interpretations about the status of land tenure and whether or not to join in the agrarian movement. In villages with such internal divisions, it became increasingly more difficult to hold the communal feasts that used to last for two or three days. Municipal as well as village authorities could no longer afford to allow such feasts, with their com8

Conversation with Porfirio Ontiveros, Yahualica, May 12, 1981.

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munal drinking bouts, because "too many people will attack each other under the influence of alcohol."9 This eruption of internal violence is an indication that the level of internal differentiation, combined with an extremely ambiguous and contradictory land tenure situation, had reached a breaking point in such Nahua villages. The recent internal conflicts that occurred in so many Nahua villages can be used to show how difficult it is to generalize or develop a single theoretical model about general patterns of conflict and solidarity in peasant communities. For example, many authors, including James Greenberg (1981) and Lola Romanucci-Ross (1974, 54), have commented on the ability of the closed corporate Indian community, in particular, to contain or avoid open internal conflict (despite a high level of interpersonal tensions) as long as such communities can displace internal conflicts outward against a common enemy. Huasteca Nahua communities in the seventies, however, were characterized by both internal and external conflict at the same time. I also question Greenberg's suggestions that a high level of internal conflict, caused by the individualization of peasant holdings, is a sure sign of the imminent downfall or disintegration of the corporate community. It is true that the expansion of modern cattle production in the long run had much the same effect on Indian communities in Huejutla as the introduction of coffee in the Oaxaca village studied by Greenberg. I also agree that internal conflicts reflected the breakdown of the delicate balance between "local ecological conditions" and "the demands of the larger political-economic system" (Greenberg 1981, 21-22). In the case of Huejutla, however, such internal conflict sometimes led to the restoration of this balance and a restoration of the closed corporate community, as will be seen in the next chapter. Another form of group violence that developed in Huejutla in the seventies was demonstration marches led by peasant leaders. Such marches usually involved a high level of not only verbal but occasional physical attacks by groups of agrarian peasants against local authorities or representatives of opposing political factions. Such groups of radical peasants often traveled from one village to another on foot, picking up supporters on the way. In each village they passed, local peasants would point out the houses of minor caciques or "the rich" for ridicule or vandalism. In some cases local militants even rounded up unpopular teachers, students or government technicians whom they perceived to be too sympathetic to local landowners and then forced them to work in the fields to "teach them what it is like to be peas9 I often heard this type of statement from both village and municipal authorities and also saw the aftermaths of some of these fights as the wounded were carried to the nearest available clinic or hospital.

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ants." Such behavior was not that different from the mob scenes described by Edward Thompson (1971, 76-136) for rural England in the eighteenth century. In Huejutla, members from such mobs also painted slogans (e.g., "death to so-and-so") on public buildings or fences. These marches also involved minor looting from stores belonging to rich peasants or landowners considered to be "enemies of the peasants," although stores owned by politically neutral or sympathetic landowners or merchants were not touched. Such group violence became an opportunity to express past grievances against people who were perceived as having unfairly exploited the peasants in the past, although no doubt some people also took advantage of such situations to carry out acts of hooliganism. Once agrarian peasants managed to win control over a particular village, coercion continued to be used against local opponents, especially in Nahua communities in the southern zone. Nahua villages that used to be Indian republics have a long tradition of authoritarian rule and internal law enforcement (through the use of ropes to tie up offenders if their villages did not have special buildings used as jails).10 In such communities, with their emphasis on the need to achieve unanimity, there was no precedent for a formal, institutionalized, political opposition. Rather, decisions were always reached on the basis of a long process of informal discussion, debate and consultation rather than open voting." External political leaders and even government officials took advantage of this traditional system of consensus for their own political ends. For example, while very much in favor of more open elections and competing candidates in Mexico in general, the PST (just like the PRI) received bloc votes from Nahua villages like San Francisco where the majority of peasants were affiliated with their party. Indeed, a group of peasants there told me that they would not allow anyone to vote for or join any other party because "democracy is for the cities but not for the countryside."12

Class Conflict and Kinship Both land invasions and the types of violent demonstration described above were frequently initiated by younger and partly acculturated peasants who had 10 This authoritarian tradition is consistent with the norms of conformity and loyalty that probably go back to colonial or even prehispanic times. 11 In the context of a small community, such a discussion and consensus system is probably more democratic than one based on competing slates of candidates. 13 Interview (in Nahuatl) with village authorities, San Francisco, June 7, 1985. This village also evicted a group of peasants who joined an even more radical peasant organization.

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worked as migratory laborers in other regions. These young radicals chal­ lenged the authority of traditional village elites who were usually older and wealthier peasants (see also Avila and Cervantes 1986, 19). In many cases, this brought about a generational conflict. In most Nahua villages, older, more conservative peasants (who also had more secure access to land) com­ plained that land invasions and other radical actions were undertaken ' 'only by boys" (i.e., men less than twenty-five years old). While this generaliza­ tion is not completely true (many older peasants also became agrarians), class conflicts in both Nahua and Mestizo communities frequently coincided with a conflict between two generations. This generational conflict even created divisions between older and younger members within the same family. For example, when the radical peasants affiliated with the OIPUH took over the rancho of San Miguel, owned by a wealthy (and elderly) Nahua peasant, this old man fled to Tenexco. But some of his own sons and his many grandsons joined the radical agrarians who came from Tenexco and Cuatapa to set up their new homes in Emiliano Zapata.13 Such intrafamily splits, involving richer versus poorer relatives, also oc­ curred in Mestizo families. I have already mentioned the factional conflicts between members of the Ramirez family of Cuatapa (see chapter 8). Conflicts within this family continued in the 1970s when several brothers joined the agrarians of Tenexco and then expelled a cousin, an older brother and even their own grandfather (who had been a rural schoolteacher)! The Ramirezes who became agrarians had all worked as migratory laborers or had joined the army before returning home. Their more prosperous relatives (who did not want to join in the land invasions) were teachers or modern ranchers (some­ 14 times both at the same time). Such intrafamily splits continued in the 1980s, when members of the Ramirez family who remained in Cuatapa (i.e., the agrarians) joined forces with El Chino of Huitzotlaco to attack even poorer and more radical (mainly Nahua) peasants who wanted a more equitable dis­ tribution of land within their ejido. At this point, however, at least one Ra­ mirez, instead of supporting El Chino (the new conservative leader), sided with radical peasants who later moved to Emiliano Zapata (see figure 8). 15 Such class-based factional divisions among members of large, extended fam­ ilies (especially conflicts between people related as second or third cousins) were also found in other villages. For example, in the Mestizo village of El Cojolite, many of the agrarian peasants (whose last name was Hidalgo) could 13

Interview with Anacleto Mendoza, Huejutla, May 12, 1985. Interview with Manuel Ramirez, Chalma (Veracruz), June n , 1984. 15 Interviews with Claudio Ramirez, Audiencia Publica, May 17, 1985; wife of Braulio Ρέκζ, rancho la Reforma, May 21, 1985. 14

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FIGURE 8. Geneological Map of the Ramirez Family

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trace their kinship connections to the small landowners whom they invaded in 1979.l6 However, unlike intrafamily disputes among Mestizo rancheros in the past, which more often took the form of a competition between people of the same generation (first cousins or even brothers), those that took place in the seventies were more likely to involve conflicts between members of different generations. Such family splits often coincided with the traditional (uneducated) versus modern (educated) distinctions presented earlier. While class conflict took the form of both intrafamily and interfamily disputes, family connections between poor and rich peasants (or between landowners and day laborers) also inhibited class conflict because of strong patron-client bonds often established through kinship. This was especially true in the case of families where the majority of members continued to share the traditional culture of peasant communities. In such families, poor peasants did not want to attack members of their own extended family precisely because of the powerful norm of kinship solidarity. Another cultural norm that influenced political behavior was that of harmony among people connected to each other through the institution of compadrazgo (Active kinship), an institution that plays such an important role in Latin American society. The very fact that people lamented that compadres sometimes became bitter enemies during the peak of the agrarian struggle indicates that the norm of solidarity among Active kin basically remained intact. In most (but not all) cases, ties of compadrazgo between people who belonged to different social classes (what the literature calls vertical compadrazgo) continued to reinforce the class structure (Mintz and Wolf 1950). At the same time horizontal compadrazgo (Active kin ties among equally poor peasants) created greater loyalty and solidarity in a common struggle for land. Ongoing patterns of social relationships, inherited from the past, thus shaped the form of class conflicts that developed in the seventies and eighties. 16

Interviews with Odilon Hidalgo, El Cojolite, June 13, 1984.

Chapter 13

Class Conflict and the Peasant Community: The Struggle over Land Tenure and Village Administration

A combination of bitter factional disputes and class conflict erupted in most, although not all, communities in Huejutla.1 However, internal strife did not take the same form in all villages, nor did it always lead to the same outcome. What can this variation in internal conflict tell one about such issues as the differences between "open" and "closed" peasant communities? And was the process of internal class opposition different in Mestizo as opposed to Indian villages? To answer these questions requires an examination of the complex and dynamic interactions among the larger economy, the peasant community, ethnic differences and the process of social class formation. But first a definition of peasant community must be supplied.

The Peasant Community I use the term peasant community to refer to any number of rural people who live in a particular geographical location and who also interact socially on a regular basis. People who belong to the same peasant community usually share a common outlook, lifestyle and set of cultural values. This definition isflexibleenough to include most of the rural settlements in Huejutla, regardless of ethnic and other variations. Peasant communities, like other types of communities, often overlap to a certain extent; people who live in small ham1 For example, no internal class conflict or factionalism occurred in the Cuapaxtitla (an anexo of Cuacuilco, located in the southern zone) between 1970 and 1988. Personal communication from Daniele Greco (an anthropologist working in this village). Likewise, very little overt conflict has taken place in Santa Cruz (Huejutla), partly as a result of the presence of a group of Italian mission priests who have acted as mediators and peace-makers. This former hacienda community, which was granted a real ejido in 1940, is also one of the most thriving commercial centers of the region (next to Jaltocan).

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lets (or even smaller clusters of houses) may constitute communities in their own right even though they form part of more comprehensive communities that include people from other villages with whom they share common administrative or judicial boundaries. Although Mestizos and Indians often form their own, separate communities, members of different ethnic groups in Huejutla can also belong to the same peasant community as long as they share at least one common language and a common set of cultural symbols. Not everyone in the region of Huejutla belongs to a rural community.21 do not consider most of the "modern rancheros" or professionals who are absentee landowners to be members of peasant communities because they do not reside in the same locality as the peasantry, nor do they share the same lifestyle or cultural values. These outsiders may have economic (and in some cases other, purely professional) relations with the local peasantry, but they no longer consider themselves nor are they accepted as members of a common rural community. Such outsiders are members of quite distinct communities or form part of a network of social interaction that for the most part excludes the peasantry, even though such outsiders might have (and occasionally visit) relatives who are still members of peasant communities. A clear correlation between residence in distinct rural communities and membership in different economic classes is not a new phenomenon in Huejutla. Before and during the Porfiriato, most hacienda owners were certainly not members of peasant communities. Their occasional appearance in local villages or their social interaction with servants was highly ritualistic and specified by a set of unwritten rules about proper social interaction across culturally defined class lines. Social and economic relationships with their economic subordinates were usually mediated by the supervisors and managers of local estates, although such supervisors did belong to peasant communities. Membership in a common peasant community does not mean the absence of economic class differences (etically defined) or even emic status distinction. For example, many Mestizo rancheros, in contrast to the hacendados, were or became fully participating members of peasant communities (they even intermarried with members of such communities), although their interactions with Indian workers involved culturally defined ethnic status distinctions. Most anthropologists or historians would have no difficulty recognizing class differences between such Mestizo rancheros and poor Indian peasants 2 Many people who live in Huejutla today do not interact with either the peasants or landowners of the region, except as strangers who see each other in the street or who might happen to shop in the same store.

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even though members of the two groups belonged to the same community and shared a similar lifestyle. However, they might not so readily accept class differences in ethnically homogeneous peasant communities, especially Indian ones. A failure to recognize such internal class differences is the major weakness of much of the earlier anthropological literature which tried to develop a general model of the "typical" peasant community to explain a wide range of attitudes, behaviors and institutions found in most peasant communities. The best known of these attempts are George Foster's "Image of Limited Good" (1965) and Edward Banfield's "Amoral Familism" (1958). While both of these writers have correctly identified many of the social and cultural characteristics of rural communities—whose populations depend largely on the land, usually without the benefit of modern technology—their analysis of the relations of production from an etic perspective has been weak or nonexistent. Most peasant communities, regardless of ethnic affiliation, have an economic class structure, although the extent of economic class polarization has fluctuated over time. Whether or not (or how) such class differences are culturally recognized differs from community to community. This may be one of the main differences between what has been labeled as the open (Mestizo) versus the closed (usually Indian) peasant community. In chapter 2 it was seen how many social historians believe that the open peasant community, whose inhabitants recognize class differences and value individual upward mobility, are more integrated into wider markets. In contrast, the closed peasant communities, with their emphasis on egalitarianism and their leveling mechanisms, are supposed to have more of a subsistence economy. I have argued that such a simple correlation between cultural characteristics and degree of commercialization does not always hold. Similar economic class structures at the level of the peasant community may be associated with quite different normative systems, contrasting legal and administrative structures and different patterns of ethnic relations. How such differences come about is often a matter of historical accident. These differences, however, can explain variation in the process of social class formation and internal conflict. The Peasant Community and Class Conflict

It is not difficult to recognize and understand that the breakdown of patronclient ties between rural elites or upper classes (who do not belong to peasant communities) and their economic subordinates can lead to social violence. This has been the subject of much scholarly research on peasant rebellions

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(Moore 1964; Migdal 1974; Paige 1975; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1978). For a long time in Huejutla there was peasant quiescence because, in the words of William Taylor (1979, 132), "the inherently unstable accommodative structures between rulers and subjects" did not lose their "viability." Poor peasants from both Nahua and Mestizo communities initiated class struggles when absentee landowners, most of whom lived in Huejutla or even outside of the region, no longer subscribed to or complied with the ethic of the moral economy. It is much more difficult to accept and to comprehend why class conflicts between poor peasants and rancheros or rich peasants, who continued to belong to rural communities, were so bitter. Members of village elites were often much more savagely attacked than large absentee landowners, even though the village elite did not profit from the broader system of economic surplus extraction to nearly the same extent. I would argue that this antagonism against village elites was that much stronger precisely because the upper stratum of the peasant community (who are still "peasants" in the eyes of most city people) were no longer considered "good members" of their community. The discrepancy between norm and act, or between the ethos of equality (or patronage and protection) and the reality of economic exploitation (or abandonment) was that much more obvious. The targets of dissatisfaction were too familiar and too close. Militant agrarian peasants also took out their wrath against former neighbors who had already moved away and had thus stopped being members of peasant communities. However, the peasants took over their land and vilified them not only because they had ceased to be members of their communities, but because these landowners refused to act as patrons and employers. If the farmers and ranchers who were once members of peasant communities had become more like the paternalistic hacienda owners or wealthier, absentee rancheros of the past, widespread, open rebellion would probably not have taken place. When a peasant movement developed in the region of Huejutla in the seventies, class conflicts, and their associated factional divisions, involved peasants from both "open" and "closed" peasant communities, from ethnically homogenous as well as a few ethnically mixed rural communities and in peasant communities that had once belonged to haciendas as well as in former communal towns or villages. Internal conflicts, however, including internal class conflicts, did not always take a violent form, nor did they lead to the same results. To explain such variation in the class struggle at the village level, it is necessary to consider the cultural symbols and administrative structures of different types of peasant communities.

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Class Conflict and the Corporate Indian Peasant Community The fierce conflicts within and among Nahua villages (which developed at the same time as massive land invasions) usually related to internal class opposition between rich and poor peasants. Nahua peasants who owned land and cattle were generally opposed to land invasions or only reluctantly joined in the struggle for land as a way of preventing their own land from being confiscated by more radical neighbors. In other cases, they, too, lost their land or had to agree to a more equitable distribution of parcels. Chapter 2 explained how a minority of such wealthier, landowning peasants in places like Pepeyocatitla, Tenexco and other Nahua villages in the municipios of Yahualica, Huazalingo and Atlapexco controlled most of the land. Yet these same wealthy Nahua families, many of whom were politically allied to Mestizo rancheros, still followed most of the traditions and customs associated with the "typical" Mesoamerican closed corporate community. In many of these former Indian republics fierce internal class conflicts took the form of a fight about whether or not these communities should become real ejidos, where every member of the community had access to the same amount of land. Initially, many of the rich peasants no longer wanted to belong to an ejido if this meant losing their de facto privately owned land. The village elite in these Nahua communities sometimes started to identify themselves as pequefios propietarios, just like the Mestizo rancheros. While willing to set aside a portion of their existing "ejidos" as a sort of commons for poorer villagers, these landowning peasants did not believe that all members of the "ejido" should have the same amount of land. Rich peasants also did not object to the fact that some of the land officially under the jurisdiction of such fictitious ejidos had been bought by outsiders, as long as such outsiders recognized the authority of wealthy Nahua peasants who were the authorities in Nahua communities. Internal class conflicts took a somewhat different form in the corporate type of Nahua communities in the municipio of Huejutla. Here, many communities, such as Cuacuilco and Chililico, had at one time or another petitioned for legal status as either ejidos or comunidades on the basis of colonial titles. The inhabitants of these villages became divided between peasants who wanted to become full-fledged ejidatarios and those who wanted to be legally registered as comuneros. Since the status of communal land tenure in Mexico is much moreflexiblein terms of how such land is actually allocated to community members, it was the wealthy peasants with fenced-in pastures who wanted to be comuneros while the poorer, wage-earning peasants fought for

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a change in legal status from communal to ejido. In Chililico, the numerically smaller but more prosperous comuneros were closely allied to a group of businessmen from the city of Huejutla who had bought land within their village boundaries.3 These comuneros were represented by four men who had all been close associates of Andres Guillen, a former Nahua cacique (see chapter 8). These comuneros won a court battle in 1976 confirming Chililico as a comunidad rather than an ejido. The court also ordered agrarian peasants to return any land taken from such comuneros. Notwithstanding this legal victory, the agrarians, with the backing of the Land Reform Office, again physically evicted their enemies and were again given legal recognition as an ejido by state politicians.4 Similar divisions between comuneros and ejidatarios also occurred in the Nahua community of Panacaxtlan, where the peasants from a subordinate hamlet called Teacal wanted an ejido. During the 1980s, wealthy Nahua peasants who still controlled their own land in the municipios of Atlapexco and Yahualica changed their political strategy. In villages such as Tepetitla and Tlalchiyahualica, rich Nahua Indians now realized that they could no longer deny the reality of prior land reforms. They then started to fight for a change of legal status from ejido to comunidad, just as their counterparts in Huejutla had done in the seventies. When this strategy failed, these same wealthy landowning peasants, who had already lost the properties they owned within the boundaries of other ejidos, finally renounced their status as de facto small property owners and became ejidatarios (at least in name). Unlike what happened in Chililico in the seventies, however, the rich Nahua peasants of Tepetitla and Tlalchiyahualica did not lose control over the comisariado committee and managed to keep most of the land they owned inside the boundaries of these so-called ejidos. In some cases, conflicts between poor and rich Nahua peasants also took the form of afightbetween politically subordinate hamlets (anexos)—whose members did not possess private land titles or had access to much smaller portions of the original commons—and other Nahua villages that were the administrative centers of former Indian republics (i.e., so-called cabeceras). In the case of Ixcatlan and Macuxtepetla, both located in the municipio of Huejutla, the majority of radical agrarians came from such subordinate hamlets while more conservative and more prosperous peasants allied to Mestizo powerholders lived in the "cabeceras." Peasants from such subordinate hamlets as Cuaxocotitla (Ixcatlan) or Oxpantla (Macuxtepetla) not only partici3

Interviews with Agustin Castillo (former member of the Consejo Supremo Nahuatl), Huejutla, May 14, 1985; Juventino Huexotl, Chililico, May 3, 1985. 4 Interviews with Marcelo Hernandez (the lawyer representing the comuneros), Huejutla, May 3, 1985, and Nicolas Hernandez (one of the comuneros), May 5, 1985.

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pated in land invasions of ranchos owned by outsiders but questioned the uneven distribution of land among neighboring communities. This is why subordinate hamlets wanted ejidos instead of communal land tenure (with its de facto private property), real ejidos instead of phony, fictitious ejidos and, in some cases, their own separate ejidos. In other cases, agrarian peasants who lived in ejido cabeceras, and who were unable to defeat or expel Nahua landowners, set up new hamlets. This happened in Tenexco (Atlapexco), where a group of more radical peasants founded the village of Emiliano Zapata in 1983, and in Tenemaxtepetl (Yahualica), where such peasants moved to the previously abandoned Mestizo village of Crisolco. In the case of Cuautenahuatl (Huautla), radical agrarians, who lived in one of the poorer barrios in this village, did not found a new village but rather started their own independent village government with the backing of the OIPUH. Radical agrarian peasants in San Pedro, Huazalingo, did the same thing. In both of these cases, not only did members of a radical faction elect a separate juez or at least their own alternate juez (juez segundo), but they built separate chapels for religious worship.5

Class Conflict and the Open Mestizo Peasant Community Agrarian militancy in the seventies was not confined to radical Nahua peasants; Mestizo peasants, most of whom belonged to separate peasant communities, played an active role in direct-action land invasions. In the predominantly Spanish-speaking village of Mecatlan (Yahualica), such peasants took over the farms and pastures of both Mestizo and Nahua landowners in the mid-seventies. Other land invasions initiated by poor, Spanish-speaking peasants occurred in the Mestizo communities of Cuatapa (an anexo of Tenexco), El Cojolite (Huautla) and several of the barrios of the town of Huautla. In all of these cases, the Mestizo agrarians took over land belonging to businessmen who lived in Huejutla or Mexico City as well as attacking rich peasants or rancheros who were their own neighbors (i.e., who lived in the same or nearby peasant communities). Like their Nahua counterparts, Spanish-speaking peasants, including the poorer descendants of Mestizo rancheros and the members of several formerly Nahua villages that had become completely acculturated, were in5 In San Pedro, the priest from Huazalingo used to come first to say mass for the "agrarians" and then come back the next day to do the same for the conservative faction.

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volved in vehement internal disputes with their wealthier neighbors. Poor and rich peasants in these more open Mestizo peasant communities also disagreed about whether or not to take part in land invasions of properties owned by both absentee and resident commercial landowning farmers and ranchers. However, the internal class conflicts that took place in Mestizo peasant communities (including Mestizo municipal cabeceras) usually took a somewhat different form than in their Nahua counterparts. I will therefore present a case study of class conflict and factionalism in two villages that most anthropologists would consider as more open, Mestizo peasant communities. The political involvement of poor peasants from these Mestizo communities will be described to illustrate the mentality and tactics used by Mestizo peasants in the southern zone.

Class Conflict and Factionalism in Atlapexco-Tecolotitla

Atlapexco and Tecolotitla, which will be dealt with together, are neighboring, yet quite different, Mestizo peasant communities. However, their respective agrarian and political histories are intimately interconnected: in the past these two peasant communities shared the same communal boundaries, and today they are legally part of a single ejido. There has also been considerable intermarriage among families from these two villages at both ends of the socioeconomic scale (in contrast to the high degree of endogamy usually in Nahua communities). The only way they are not representative of other Mestizo peasant communities in Huejutla is that, unlike Mestizo villages like Huautla or El Cojolite, poor peasants and day laborers in both Atlapexco and Tecolotitla did not engage in direct-action land invasions until after 1980. Atlapexco is a town founded by Mestizo newcomers over one hundred years ago. At the turn of the century it was inhabited by Mestizo merchants and rancheros. In Atlapexco, the term ranchero meant anyone who either administered or rented his own cattle ranch.6 However, this term glossed over some significant class differences among such "rancheros" since the term included both landowners and small-scale cattle producers who did not own their own land. The latter consisted mainly of men who rented pastures from larger landowners, such as the Nochebuenas, or who worked as cowhands (vaqueros) or ranch administrators. AU of these cattle tenants, as well as Mes6

Interviews with Juana Baltazar, Atlapexco, May 9,1983; Eustorgio Solares, Atlapexco, June 15, 1985·

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tizo rancheros with small rural properties, also grew maize (contrary to the stereotype that "only Indians grow corn"). Tecolotitla, only twenty minutes on foot from Atlapexco, is an example of another type of Mestizo community: one that was once a Nahua pueblo. Tecolotitla was (and still is) much larger than Atlapexco in terms of population, and it also has two anexos (Tierra Playa and Atlaltipa). Prior to 1930, the Mestizo inhabitants of Tecolotitla lived in a separate cluster of houses just outside of the village itself while the Indian population lived in Tecolotitla proper, a settlement that was spread out along the side of a hill. By 1945 perhaps half of the inhabitants of Tecolotitla were still Indians, but the distinction between Tecolotitla proper and its Mestizo adjunct had become almost completely obliterated as a result of a combination of intermarriage and acculturation. In 1970 all three villages (except Atlaltipa) could be classified as Mestizo because only a handful of older people still spoke Nahuatl. Although a few of these older people still consider themselves to be masehuali, the vast majority of people in Tecolotitla today think of themselves as Mestizos, and the inhabitants of neighboring Nahua hamlets also consider Tecolotitla to be a village of san poro koyomej (pure Mestizos). Like so many other peasant communities, Atlapexco and Tecolotitla jointly "petitioned for land" in 1939 without realizing the full legal implications of such a procedure. The first "comisariado" was comprised of a group of men from Atlapexco, including Miguel Arteaga (a cowhand related to a family of prosperous landowners) and Vicente Ortega (a carpenter and violin player also without land).7 However, this largely fictitious ejido, comprising two separate villages, was soon forgotten. When one of the members of the comisariado tried to turn Atlapexco into a real ejido, he was promptly assassinated, and small property owners in both Atlapexco and Tecolotitla continued to raise cattle and to charge rent for maize cultivation as they had always done. Even the large block of land officially relinquished to the peasants by Juvencio Nochebuena was still administered as an integral part of his ranch of Teocuatitla. Various Mestizo peasants told me in 1980 that the majority of people in Atlapexco did not want to become members of an ejido ' 'because ejidos are for Indians.'' Over time, fewer and fewer poor people in Atlapexco bothered to cultivate milpas and instead worked as migratory laborers on local road construction projects or set up small stands in the busy marketplace. In 7 This history of the ejido of Atlapexco-Tecolotitla is based on interviews with Octavio Arteaga, Atlapexco, May 17, 1981; Nereo Nochebuena, Huejutla, August 16, 1981; Victoriano Palacios, Atlapexco, August 31, 1981; Francisco Naranjo, Tecolotitla, September 1, 1981; Camilcar Martinez, May 31, 1981; Jesus Palacios, May 9, 1985; Eustorgio Solares, Atlapexco, June 15, 1985. Additional information is also included in Rebolledo (1989, 45-84).

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Tecolotitla most poor peasants still practiced subsistence cultivation but on a rapidly reducing land base. In the early seventies, the legal status of Atlapexco-Tecolotitla (as ejido) was discovered by a group of peasants from Tecolotitla. They immediately elected a new comisariado to replace the now defunct committee set up in the 1940s and then persuaded the Department of Agrarian Reform that Tecolotitla should be the cabecera of the ejido, arguing that their community was much older than Atlapexco. During the height of the agrarian conflict in the late seventies, however, peasants from Tecolotitla who had already initiated a legal battle did not undertake any land invasions. In the town of Atlapexco, a group of landless peasants who sympathized with the agrarian cause likewise did not attempt to take over any land, although they did actively support land invasions undertaken by peasants in other communities. Not until 1981 did a group of poor peasants from both Atlapexco and Tecolotitla undertake their own land invasion. The main leaders of this invasion were several peasants who lived in Tierra Playa (one of the anexos of Tecolotitla), who initiated a takeover of a pasture of over a hundred hectares owned by Cheque Reyes of Huejutla. These agrarian peasants, who joined the PST, recruited other poor peasants from Tecolotitla and also invited a group of poor Mestizos peasants from Atlapexco to join them. These agraristas (agrarian peasants) converted this cattle pasture into a patchwork of tiny milpas. The first milpa was communally planted and then divided up into individual strips of land. Although most of the radical agrarian peasants involved in this invasion were poor peasants from Tecolotitla, the comisariado of their fictitious ejido was a small landowner. This landowner was allowed to keep most of the approximately 60 hectares he owned. He also went along with a decision to claim additional sections of land owned by people who lived in Atlapexco. In particular, the agrarian peasants of Tecolotitla wanted to take over a field just on the outskirts of Atlapexco, which had been subdivided and sold as urban lots to a group of former emigrants who now lived in Mexico City. After a series of verbal altercations, the peasants of Tecolotitla tore down part of the fence surrounding this property, but a committee of citizens in Atlapexco (led by several rancheros) put it up again and prepared to defend this land with arms. This act was denounced on a local radio station as an "invasion" of Tecolotitla by Atlapexco, and the matter was then submitted for arbitration to the Land Reform Office. This conflict (which had still not been completely resolved by 1988) was then fought out in the courts. Around 1984, peasants from Atlapexco who belonged to the radical faction led by Humberta Hernandez in the seventies organized themselves as an

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agrarian group separate from Tecolotitla. The leader of this group, Jesus Palacios, was a return migrant who had worked as a policeman and a sailor for many years. Hefirstrecruited many poor Mestizo peasants who did not want to get involved in earlier land conflicts and also incorporated the day laborers of Atlapexco, who had already joined the earlier land invasions led by Tecolotitla. The most active supporters of Palacios were his own relatives (some of whom still owned land, while others had become wage laborers). This man persuaded the PST leader, Teodolo Martinez of Huejutla, to recognize Atlapexco as a section (or an independent work group) within the ejido of Tecolotitla.8 After getting elected as the ejido representative for Atlapexco, he then negotiated for 200 hectares of land, including several cattle ranches recently expropriated by the government (see part 4). The Mestizo peasants from Atlapexco who received access to this land included several artisans and skilled workers who were interested in cultivating their own milpas in the part of the fertile delta that represented their share of the ejido. However, to meet the minimum requirements of the number of ejidatarios required to justify the amount of land they had been allocated, the agrarian peasants of Atlapexco invited about twenty Indian peasants from Atlaltipa (the only Nahua anexo of Tecolotitla) also to cultivate milpa plots in the section of land claimed by the agrarians of Atlapexco. These Nahua peasants had just lost access to their own land as a result of an internal dispute involving the comisariado of Tecolotitla.9 Nevertheless, the agrarian leaders of Tecolotitla and Atlapexco, although still at loggerheads about details concerning a possible division of their joint ejido, cooperated to invade additional land in 1986.

A Comparison of Nahua and Mestizo Land Invasions Events in Atlapexco and Tecolotitla, together with the earlier class conflicts that took place in other Mestizo peasant communities, can be used to illustrate the differences between the political behavior of peasants who live in Mestizo as opposed to Nahua communities, at least in the southern, formerly communal part of Huejutla. Unlike their Nahua counterparts, poor peasants in Mestizo villages were more willing to divorce rights to land from the rights 8 One of the people involved in these negotations was an anthropologist working with an institution called Patrimonio (see chapter 16). » These Nahua peasants, whose slightly better-off opponents at home had converted to Protestantism, were willing to commute back and forth from their homes (located about an hour on foot from Atlapexco) to their fields.

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(or eligibility) to live in a particular settlement. Thus, once they had won their ejidos, Mestizo peasants did not insist, like their Nahua counterparts, that former landowners or people who had not joined in the land invasions (and who did not want to join such ejidos) leave the community. Rather, they preferred to set up their own administrative structures, separate from the village government per se (which continued to be responsible for education, the enforcement of rules concerning proper conduct and the reception of visitors). Consequently, internal disputes in Mestizo peasant communities usually did not result in the physical expulsion of former landowners and peasants who refused to join in land invasions. Mestizo agrarian peasants were also more willing to invite peasants from other communities to join their ejidos if they needed to have greater numerical strength. For example, the largely Spanishspeaking peasants of Barrio del Salto in Huautla invited a prosperous Nahua peasant who had been expelled from his own community to join their ejido. Likewise, poor peasants from the Mestizo hamlets of Huitznopala and Naranjos in the municipio of Yahualica were willing to join forces with radical Indian peasants from their Nahua "cabecera," Zoquitipan, in their fight against landowners from these same Mestizo hamlets. These differences in values and tactics gave a unique character to the class struggle of Nahua as opposed to Mestizo peasants in the southern part of the region of Huejutla, even if such Mestizo peasants belonged to communities that had once ,been Indian villages. Such ethnically based differences also explain the different outcomes of internal class conflicts in places like Tecolotitla, Atlapexco, El Cojolite or the much more acculturated barrios of the town of Huautla, as opposed to the Indian communities of Pepeyocatitla, San Francisco or Ecuatitla; only in the latter cases did the struggle for land result in the revival of many of the characteristics of the colonial closed corporate peasant communities as described in the literature. Although many of the more visible traits of Nahua communities (traditional dances, dress and music) have either declined or are rapidly disappearing throughout the region of Huejutla, their internal social organization has remained or again become very traditional. For example, poor Nahuatl-speaking peasants in the southern zone who were involved in fights with village elites or with local rancheros have reinstituted the rule that no outsiders can become permanent residents and thereby obtain full membership rights. Where such militant Nahua peasants have succeeded in winning control over the village government as well as access to land, they have also forced wealthier Nahua peasants to give up parts of their previously de facto private rural estates to their less fortunate neighbors. In many Nahua communities, agrarian peasants (including converts to protestantism) continued to participate in a modified form of Nahua

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self-government based on the appointment of "cargo holders," rather than open elections with competing candidates.10 Thus, only in Nahua communities did internal class conflict, together with land invasions, result in the restoration of the truly egalitarian type of closed corporate peasant community first described by Eric Wolf. Many Nahua communities that have recovered former village communal land and gained full control over their ejidos now require all men who want to leave for more than just a day or two (or all those who want to work as migratory laborers or to visit distant relatives) to seek permission from village authorities. In some cases, if the community needs tofinishsome urgent task involving communal labor, such permission is denied. Most Nahua communities have also set up much more stringent rules about community membership and applied stronger sanctions against the further accumulation of wealth." This does not mean that there are no wealth differences nor that all Nahua communities have obliterated internal class differences. Those Nahua communities that most closely resembled the more egalitarian type of closed corporate community at the time of writing include Pepeyocatitla and Santa Teresa (Yahualica), Santo Tomas, Santa Maria and San Francisco (Huazalingo), Ecuatitla and Cuaxocotitla (Huejutla), Paajtla, Achiquihuixtla and Emiliano Zapata (Atlapexco) and Cuautenahuatl (Huautla). AU of these Nahua communities are located in the southern, formerly communal zone of Huejutla. However, they are not necessarily the most remote communities, nor do they lack the natural resources (water, level land and timber) that would enable the process of class differentiation, based on commercial production, to start anew (as it did in the past). But so far the peasants of all of these communities have made a conscious decision to not allow individual peasants to become richer than their neighbors. They have also rejected government attempts to reintroduce cattle production on a collective basis (see next section). The difference in the form and outcome of the struggle for land in Nahua as opposed to Mestizo peasant communities shows that social behavior (in this case the struggle for control over both land and power) cannot be divorced from what Eric Wolf (1986, 325) has called "culturally encoded sym10 In some cases, former land invaders also continue to serve as mayordomos, responsible for organizing religious feasts, after the wealthier peasants who used to be individual sponsors declined to continue this practice (Schryer, Humphries and Fox, 1989). " Various political observers have commented on this process of increasing village autonomy in terms of an "end to a period of confinement or captivity" (Avila and Cervantes 1986, 18) or a "substitution" of traditional forms of vertical control whereby Indian communities take charge of their own affairs (Rebolledo 1989, 9).

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bolic forms." The values and institutions that had functioned to legitimize or mask inequalities and internal exploitation prior to the outbreak of agrarian conflicts were also used by peasants in their struggle for access to land in the seventies and eighties. Certain norms and values associated with former Indian republics, however, were more clearly preserved in Nahua as opposed to Mestizo communities. However, the marked contrasts just described should not give the wrong impression that such differences in political behavior can be explained only by the respective world view of two different ethnic groups, as expressed in their language and patterns of day-to-day social interaction. The Nahua communities listed above were not only culturally distinct but had once controlled their own communal land. They had also inherited a complex internal administrative structure, which was still largely intact in 1970, despite the manner in which it was manipulated and controlled by rich peasants and Mestizo rancheros. This is why it is also necessary to examine internal class conflicts in Nahua communities located in the northern zone—peasant communities with their own, distinct history and very different forms of internal administration when the peasant revolt broke out in the seventies.

Internal Conflicts in the Northern Zone Unlike most of the southern zone, both Mestizo and Nahua peasants involved in land invasions in the northern zone fought for extensions of already existing, real ejidos, created in the 1940s and 1950s. By 1970 the majority of peasants in these northern ejidos rented additional farmland from local landowners. These peasants wanted the government to expropriate the privately owned rural properties that had remained after the partition of former haciendas. As in the southern region, the poorer, primarily wage-earning peasants in the northern zone also initiated the struggle for land while peasants who owned some private land and wealthier ejidatarios (who were either self-employed or who had a steady source of employment) generally opposed the invasion of privately owned farms and ranches. These wealthier peasants (including members of Nahua villages) often consisted of previous caretakers or overseers who had monopolized larger sections of the land partitioned among local peasants after the land reform of Cardenas or who had bought small parcels of land from neighboring landowners. As in the southern villages, internal divisions in this northern zone also took the form of an opposition between members of rival political parties or peasant organizations (with the radical peasants usually joining the CAM, the OIPUH or the cci). Unlike the

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southern zone, however, internal divisions in Nahua villages did not coincide with mutually exclusive positions over what form of land tenure should prevail. They also did not lead to the expulsions or bloodshed that characterized internal struggles in so many villages of the southern, "communal" zone. Class Conflict and Factionalism in Chalahuiyapan

The type of internal divisions that occurred in the northern zone can be illustrated through the case study of the ejido of Chalahuiyapan. This ejido was created in 1940 when this village (and its anexo, San Antonio) received its share of the large hacienda of Tepotzteco. In Chalahuiyapan, 109 land recipients received approximately 900 hectares of mostly arable, good quality land (Molina 1981), and everyone received the same amount of land.12 In terms of its internal administrative structure and many other aspects of social organization, Chalahuiyapan was no different from most other Mestizo ejidos in other parts of Mexico. It had a real, functioning comisariado committee and, like most former hacienda villages, Chalahuiyapan has never had a civilreligious hierarchy or any of the other institutions found in the formerly communal zone. According to these traits, Chalahuiyapan would certainly not be seen as a typical Mesoamerican peasant community. Economically, Chalahuiyapan is also probably one of the most "open," that is, commercially oriented ejidos of the area. In the 1950s, this ejido was selected for a special project in large-scale collective cattle ranching whereby part of the ejido land previously not used for corn was made into a communal pasture with the assistance of the government. The peasants also got very involved in cash-cropping. Over the next two decades, Chalahuiyapan became a model ejido that gained the reputation of being well organized and cohesive. By the 1970s, this ejido had also bought itsfirsttruck, and in 1980 it bought an even bigger one, which is used to transport both goods and people. Despite its overall prosperity, however, Chalahuiyapan also became internally stratified along the lines of economic class. Not only were there differences in income and wealth, but one or two of these wealthier ejidatarios (who employed wage laborers) had bought additional land outside of ejido boundaries from private landowners. The economically developed ejido of Chalahuiyapan is at the same time one of the most "traditional" Indian communities in the area in terms of its 12 Most of these land recipients were former peons who also cultivated plots of com for subsistence, although a few better-off peasants had been estate administrators who owned a few head of cattle.

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cultural characteristics and a strong ethnic identity. For example, its inhabitants have preserved the Nahuatl language to a much greater extent than many more remote (and poorer) Nahua villages. Although Chalahuiyapan was one of the first Nahua villages to get a complete primary school—many of its students subsequently went on to high school in other places—all children were still completely bilingual in 1985 and the Nahuatl language continued to be used in the fields, at home and at most public meetings. This combination of a completely open, commercially oriented economic structure and a separate culture and ethnic identity defies the classical anthropological typologies of Mesoamerican peasant communities. With the eruption of agrarian unrest in the region, the older, relatively prosperous leaders of this community (especially those whose children had become successful professionals or skilled laborers) were politically conservative (i.e., opposed to any left-wing peasant organization) and did not want to have anything to do with the land invasions taking place in poorer, neighboring ejidos. In contrast, the younger peasants of Chalahuiyapan who did not have their own ejido parcels (as well as a number of older but poorer ejidatarios) wanted their village to petition for an extension of their ejido. Some of these radical peasants participated in land invasions organized by other communities. The resulting split between poorer, younger peasants and wealthier, more established peasants took the form of a factional division between two sections of this village (Barrio Bajo versus Barrio Arriba). Not only were the peasants from Barrio Bajo militant agrarians, but they were much more favorably disposed to hosting an adult education program and a government-sponsored community center.13 This factional split became more apparent when the radicals joined a new independent peasant organization, the URECHH, in 1980. In contrast, the conservative peasants of Barrio Arriba continued to be card-carrying members of the official government-sponsored peasant federation, the CNC. Soon afterward, with the assistance of peasants from other URECHH communities, the more radical peasants of Chalahuiyapan invaded a privately owned property (owned by a coyotl)14 bordering on their ejido. After harvesting their first crop of maize, they also built their own chapel and started celebrating their own fiestas (but without mayordomos) independently from Barrio Arriba. While still resentful of the conservative faction, however, their struggle for land did not involve a direct confrontation with the more prosperous villagers after the poorer peasants of Barrio Bajo obtained access to 13

Interview with Ildefonso Maya, May 27, 1983. ^ Singular form for coyome (coyotes), the derogatory term applied to Mestizos.

1

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their own parcels of land. They also continued to participate in a collective cattle pasture owned by the village as a whole. Internal divisions similar to that in Chalahuiyapan, often involving membership in opposing peasant organizations, occurred in many other Nahua communities located in the northern zone. Most of these communities had access to exceptionally fertile soil (e.g., Tamoyon, in Huautla) or had excelled in commercial activities (Santa Cruz in the municipio of Huejutla). They were all also characterized by different degrees of internal class differentiation. Both land invasions and internal conflicts associated with those northern Nahua communities that were real (as opposed to fictitious) ejidos did not differ greatly from agrarian conflicts associated with completely Spanish-speaking northern communities (see chapters 15 and 16). The fact that land invasions involving peasants from different ethnic groups were almost identical in the northern part of Huejutla might lead one to conclude that legal status (regarding land tenure) and administrative structures had a greater influence on the form taken by class conflicts than ethnic differences based solely on language and customs. Indeed, differences in the structure of village administration and social organization closely coincided with cultural differences and ethnic status in the southern part of Huejutla, thus accounting for the contrasting patterns of land invasions and internal conflicts between Mestizo and Nahua peasant communities in this part of Huejutla. However, the very fact that all peasant communities in the southern zone (both Nahua and Mestizo) have such a different form of land tenure and administrative apparatus from their northern counterparts is also the outcome of colonial policy based on the original ethnic distinction between separate Spanish and Indian republics. Such ethnic distinctions are still important today in both the northern and the southern zones (as well as in the intermediate zone). To appreciate and understand ethnicity per se, it is necessary again to compare different villages in the southern versus the northern zones in terms of how ethnic labels were used not just in the process of agrarian conflicts, but in the context of the region as a whole.

Chapter 14

Class Conflict and Ethnicity: Image and Reality

Most scholars who have written about the peasant movement in Huejutla on the regional level have commented on the role played by the ethnic factor. For example, Agustin Avila (1986, 34-35) argues that, in the seventies, formerly captive Nahua communities took charge of their own cultural values and forms of government necessary to maintain a unique way of life. Avila also equates the class struggle in the Huasteca with an ethnic strife involving the revival of ethnic pride on the part of the Indian peasants. This dichotomous view is also apparent in newspaper articles written by left-wing journalists who either ignore or gloss over any facts that contradict the equation of class and ethnicity. For example, in dealing with the conflicts in the ejido of Tenexco, nowhere does anyone mention that the infamous cacique and pistolero, El Chino, is a native Nahuatl-speaker of Huitzotlaco, a village which has preserved the Nahuatl language and many of its traditions better than most other (and sometimes more radical) Indian communities. Nor is there any mention that the radical peasants who formed the new Nahua village of Emiliano Zapata also took over a rancho that belonged to a wealthy Nahua peasant. Similarly, when journalists want to quote an "Indian" opinion, they often cite Crisostomos Arenas of Huautla, who was appointed president of the Consejo Supremo Nahuatl in 1984. The fact that he is a Nahua Indian (as well as an official representative of the Nahua nation), however, is conveniently omitted when other writers accuse him of being one of the caciques affiliated to the CNC. This equation of class and ethnicity is part of a broader set of assumptions that includes the image of a classless Indian society (see Schryer 1987, 99). Most writers, especially popular writers and journalists (see Ortega 1978; 1979), portray the Nahua community as the survival of a prehispanic commune (albeit impoverished and exploited). This simplified and idyllic image of the Indian community is widely shared by the Mexican public, including most politicians. Both academics and journalists also tend to use the terms

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"Indian" and "peasant" interchangeably. In many accounts, after a general introductory statement about the importance of ethnicity, any further references to the ethnic factor are omitted—the readers presumably already know that all the militant peasants are Indians, and that their opponents (the landowners and caciques) are Mestizos. This dichotomy between Indians (who are always good and poor) and Mestizos (mainly rich, even if not always bad) also appears in the book written by Ildefonso Maya, the subdirector of the INI center in Huejutla. In this book, in referring to two important peasant leaders who were Mestizos (Pedro Beltran and Humberta Hernandez), Maya (1986, 41) says that they were "Indians in their hearts." This educated Indian author, the press and most social scientists who have written about the region also give the impression that all Indian villages throughout the region have the same cultural norms and share a common social organization (albeit in different stages of "purity"). My description of the peasant movement in Huejutla and the various case studies already presented gives a very different picture. Class struggles in Huejutla not only saw Indian villages pitted against absentee, Spanish-speaking landlords, but also involved class conflicts within Nahua communities. During such internal class conflicts, ethnic labels were not widely used although members of opposite sides did use other types of dichotomous terms. For example, most conservative peasants portrayed militant agrarian peasants as being rebellious, disrespectful "troublemakers" (the Spanish term revoltosos was also used by Nahuatl speakers). Radical peasants, in turn, called the more conservative, wealthier peasants "the rich" (los ricos) or used the Nahuatl expression, tlakuajkejya (they have already eaten). In some cases, militant peasants also used the pejorative label coyomej for somewhat more acculturated, wealthier villagers who were also better educated (including Nahua schoolteachers who owned land), although the latter still portrayed themselves as "authentic Indians" to outsiders. Even when ethnic labels were used, the characteristics of Nahua communities or individual Nahua peasants involved in class struggles often bore little resemblance to what anthropologists would consider typical Indian versus Mestizo cultural traits. For example, poor Nahua peasants who became militant agrarians were more likely to wear Western dress and speak a mixture of Spanish and Nahuatl, while many conservative and wealthy peasants continued to use the traditional manta and spoke a ' 'purer'' form of Nahuatl. A few of these more prosperous Nahua peasants were even ceremonial specialists or traditional healers; yet, in at least one case, in Paajtla, poor Indian peasants invaded land owned by such a healer. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of their notions about community membership and equal access to land,

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younger, more acculturated day laborers were more "typically Indian" than their wealthier neighbors. This lack of fit between ethnic labels and the distribution of cultural traits does not mean, however, that ethnic differences can be ignored. We have already seen how the struggle for access to land and political power was conducted in a different manner in Nahua as opposed to Mestizo communities located in the southern zone. Ethnic labels and ethnic identities were also employed in quite different ways by peasants involved in land invasions in the different subregions of Huejutla, especially in the north versus the south.

The Use of Ethnic Labels in Agrarian Conflicts It has been seen how the struggle for access to land in Nahua communities in the southern zone was associated with legal disputes over whether or not such communities should become real (as opposed to fictitious) ejidos or whether or not such communities should retain their status as comunidades. However, although Nahuatl-speaking communities in the southern zone would be considered by ethnographers as "more typically Indian" (because of their unique communal institutions, including special toponyms), most of the land invasions involving the Indian peasants of such southern villages were not couched in ethnic terms. Rather, the fight for access to more land was generally couched in terms of a struggle against "all outsiders" (both Nahua and Mestizo). This absence of ethnic labels during agrarian disputes in most of the southern zone can be explained by the lower level of association between class and ethnicity. Here the struggle for land was generally conducted against both wealthy Nahua peasants and bilingual Mestizo rancheros who frequently shared a similar lifestyle with their Indian neighbors. The only exceptions were a few cases where conflicts over land in the southern zone did take the form of disputes between neighboring Nahua and Mestizo villages. These conflicts, which were simultaneously class struggles and conflicts between neighboring villages of different ethnic status, involved afightof poor Nahua peasants against Spanish-speaking landowners and merchants who lived in small commercial centers. The Spanish-speaking inhabitants of such centers had treated the Indian peasants of surrounding hamlets particularly harshly in the past. For example, throughout the seventies and eighties, the Mestizo village of El Arenal was involved in vehement disputes with the Nahua village of Santa Teresa in the municipio of Yahualica. After invading most of the pastures belonging to the inhabitants of this Mestizo anexo in 1978, radical Indian leaders from Santa Teresa wanted to take over

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the town itself and expel all of its inhabitants, whom they called coyomej. Such attempts resulted in an armed clash in 1985 that required the intervention of the army. Similar conflicts between neighboring Nahua and Mestizo villages also took place in Huejutla (Tehuetlan versus Ixcatlan). In both cases, ethnic opposition coincided with an ideological battle about whether or not Mestizo landowners should be allowed to own and operate ranchos within the communal boundaries of Nahua villages. Unlike their counterparts in most of the southern zone, Nahua peasants in the northern zone more clearly expressed their disputes with local landowners in ethnic terms because of a closer correspondence between class and ethnicity on the local level. Not only were the vast majority of landowners Mestizos, but these landowners usually lived in the predominantly Spanish-speaking towns of Huejutla or San Felipe Orizatlan (see chapter 3). Such Mestizos included the descendants of the original hacienda owners (mostly of direct European extraction) as well as rancheros from the southern zone who had moved to Huejutla after buying ranchos in the northern zone. Many of these larger landowners were no longer bilingual at the time of the eruption of a peasant revolt. Militant agrarian peasants in the north not only saw their class struggle in terms of ethnic opposition, but they also emphasized the exploitative nature of the hacienda system (especially the institution of serving as semaneros) to which their parents or grandparents had been subjected prior to 1940.1 Yet, from the perspective of many anthropologists, such ethnically conscious northern Indian villages were less "typically Indian" insofar as they did not have communal administrative boundaries or such institutions as the civil-religious hierarchy. The equation of class conflict with ethnic opposition between Nahua day laborers and Spanish-speaking landowners could also be observed in the intermediate zone of Huejutla, which had been dominated by landowners from the Mestizo villages of Vinasco and Huichapa. This area, which was also characterized by a continuation of marked ethnic discrimination by Mestizo (or "white") rancheros, resembles the northern zone in terms of a strong correlation between class and ethnicity, although the landowners who lived in Vinasco and Huichapa continued to speak Nahuatl as a second language and tried to maintain paternalistic relations with their workers and tenants to a greater extent. Although agrarian struggles in the northern zone and intermediate zones were generally expressed in terms of ethnic opposition, there were actually 1

For example, when the radical peasants from Chalahuiyapan established their own chapel after invading a private property in 1985, they emphasized the fact that they would have been unable to do so in the past "when our fathers were still slaves of the hacienda owners." Interview (in Nahuatl), with a group of peasants during a fiesta, June 10, 1985.

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very few confrontations between Nahua and Mestizo peasants from neighboring villages. For example, in Los Humos (Orizatlan), Mestizo cowhands and Nahua field laborers undertook joint land invasions.2 Indeed, throughout the seventies, militant peasants from both Mestizo and Nahua peasant communities invaded lands together. Likewise, agrarian peasants from the completely Mestizo ejidos of La Coneja and Las Piedras joined forces with their Nahua neighbors, and these two Spanish-speaking ejidos subsequently became part of the rural development and resettlement project that brought together several Mestizo and Nahua ejidos (to be examined in part 4). Even in Vincaso, poor Mestizo peasants and recent Nahua newcomers to this Mestizo village joined forces. As in the southern zone, ethnic labels also did not always "fit" reality (as defined by anthropologists) because such labels were often used in an extremely ambiguous manner. For example, when various ejidos joined together to form a common association (a producers' union) in the eighties, their Mestizo leader from the Spanish-speaking town of Las Piedras insisted that this political association be designated as a union of Indian communities.3 However, the Nahua community of Los Coyoles referred to the "coyomej of Las Piedras" when a Mestizo gunman from that village was suspected of killing their more radical Mestizo comisariado, who was the leader of the "Indian" peasant union. The wealthier and more conservative Mestizo peasants from places like Las Piedras and La Coneja in turn more frequently used the pejorative label of indios to refer to militant agrarian Indians. The great variation found in the use of ethnic labels, and the lack of fit between class and ethnicity in the region as a whole, does not mean that ethnic distinctions (which are part of a system of ethnic stratification in Mexico as a whole) can be ignored in the analysis of local class conflicts. A strong correlation between class membership and ethnic affiliation probably facilitated the earlier development of class consciousness (and hence class conflict) in places like La Corrala. Such communities, characterized by greater polarization of class as well as a strong correlation between class and ethnicity, were also less likely to be disrupted by internal divisions and internecine fighting (as happened in Tenexco). However, the influence of ethnicity on class conflict can be examined even when the correlation between class and ethnicity was not very strong. A distinctive lifestyle and common membership in a stigmatized minority provided poor Nahua peasants throughout the region with a * Several years later, however, a dispute between these two ethnic groups did arise when the Nahua peasants received a larger share of land. Interview with Nicanor Rebolledo and Carlos Robles, Mexico City, January 6, 1987. 3 Interview with Nicanor Rebolledo, Mexico City, January 4, 1987.

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stronger sense of identity and cohesion than their Mestizo counterparts. This distinctiveness gave Nahua peasants a competitive edge when they had to organize themselves to undertake conflicts with non-Indian landowners (once their ties of dependency on local patrons had weakened due to greater contact with the outside world and increasing access to the national language). Moreover, the fact that they could speak Nahuatl among themselves was of great tactical value when they did not want outside politicians, police spies from the state capital or even members of the increasingly monolingual Spanishspeaking local elite to understand what they were saying to one another. We should also take into account the use of ethnic symbols by people who operate in the national arena and the impact of their actions on the local level.

An Interactive Analysis of Ethnicity and Politics The historian Serge Gruzinski (1986) has shown how an Indian self-identity emerged during the colonial period, especially among former native rulers and noblemen, despite the ongoing process of Westernization. This Indian identity developed as the only way of coping with and manipulating the political world created by the Spanish conquerors. Because land rights were vested in the name of Indian pueblos, the representatives of such pueblos came to be Indians, rather than members of specific ethnic enclaves. Historians have shown that toward the end of the eighteenth century, which saw increasing demographic pressure and a rash of legal battles over land in rural Mexico, many wealthy, partly acculturated Indian caciques again started to stress their Indian identity and even sent petitions in Nahuatl, although they could easily converse in Spanish (see Ouweneel 1988, 179). Such revivals of an ethnic identity among members of Indian elites are not only a response to continued ethnic discrimination, but also a useful political strategy whenever the central government of Mexico gives special legal recognition to Indians as members of rural ethnic minorities. This recognition became more explicit in the twentieth century, especially after the Mexican Revolution. The politics of ethnicity on the local level must therefore be seen in this broader context of national policy. The use of ethnic symbols by national-level politicians affects the ethnic identity and the use of ethnic labels by people on the local level, which in turn affects government policy. The renewed emphasis on nativerightsby the government of Mexico under Cardenas can explain why it was necessary for Mestizo politicians in Huejutla, including Nochebuena, to present themselves as pro-indigenista. To gain

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political merit and to show that they were good defenders of Mexico's native population, these Mestizo politicians had to provide land to the Indians. This was easily done in the case of the northern zone where most peasants who had previously worked for hacendados spoke Nahuatl. It has been seen how these same politicians managed to give the impression that they had helped even more Indians by reviving the original communal boundaries in the southern zone. These Mestizo politicians thus fulfilled the expectations of the central government by utilizing the appropriate ethnic symbols. Such an emphasis on ethnic labels by Mestizo ranchero politicians happened to coincide with their own economic class interests since a land reform ostensibly designed for Indian peasants did not affect their own class interests. Thirty years later, President Luis Echeverria resurrected a policy of radical indigenismo in an era of renewed social tensions in the countryside caused by great regional disparities and a crisis in agricultural production because of two decades of rapid but lopsided economic development (see Hellman 1983; Schryer 1983, 41-42). The rural districts hardest hit by this economic recession included many of the predominantly indigenous regions like Huejutla. Echeverria's program included support for the setting up of a Supreme Council representing different indigenous regions of Mexico, including Nahuas. Now, however, it was radical peasant leaders, engaged in a struggle for land, who had to take into account (and, if possible, take advantage of) new ethnic images and ethnically defined institutions on the national level. For this reason, peasant leaders from both the southern and northern zones couched the general agrarian struggle on the regional level in terms of an opposition between masehualmej and coyomej. The first president of the Supreme Nahua Council (Consejo Supremo Nahuatl), Pedro Amador Hernandez, was a radical Indian peasant from the village of Huextetitla (Orizatlan). After his death, he was succeeded by Agustin Castillo, one of the agrarian leaders from Chililico. This man had not only taken part in land invasions but also wanted his village to be an ejido instead of a comunidad. When Castillo was officially elected president, forty-six Nahua comisariados still showed up at a meeting held in the local offices of the official government party, the PRI.4 However, Castillo's term of office was less controversial than that of his predecessor. Although he was subject to at least one possible attempt on his life, he maintained close contact with state officials and became one of the principal collaborators of Gabriela Rojo, the niece of Rojo Lugo, who supported but also tried to control local peasants. 4

Interview with Agustin Castillo, Huejutla, May 14, 1985.

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After Castillo stepped down, the Consejo Nahuatl became even more subject to control by Mestizo politicians who realized the need to keep tight control over this potentially powerful organization because of its symbolic importance. For example, state officials used all of their influence to ensure that members of the regional committee were not too radical; they included, among others, people like Feliciano Sanchez (El Chino, the conservative CNC representative and the owner of a de facto private property) and a young man from Yahualica who worked as a government employee. With such blatant manipulation by the government, and the presence of conservative Nahua politicians, it is not surprising that many radical Nahua peasants became less interested in this organization. According to Agustin Castillo, only ten community representatives showed up at the 1980 elections, and the committee became less and less involved in agrarian politics. Although the Consejo Nahuatl became almost totally divorced from the struggle for land, its presence is one indication of a new trend: the tendency of better-off, more educated Nahua men to stress their Indian identity vis-avis the central government and its representatives. For example, the new president of the Consejo for the period 1980-1985 was Ramon Sagahun, a Nahua merchant from Jaltocan. This man had actually been opposed to land invasions in his home region, although he later became quite willing to collaborate with agrarian leaders to further his own political career (see chapter 17). Throughout the eighties, wealthy Nahua peasants and even some Mestizos were to develop an Indian identity not to achieve a more equitable distribution of land, but as a way to consolidate their position as small landowners and members of the village elite. Identification with the label "indio" was now used more and more with officials in the Office of Land Reform, state politicians and technicians in charge of a new program of rural development. Peasants who continued to struggle for land also learned the necessity of stressing their Indianness with political agitators and more politicians on the state level who might be able to provide them with assistance. This is why it is important also to take into consideration the perception of ethnicity and ethnic relations of Mestizo outsiders who worked in the government bureaucracy. The manner in which ethnic relations in the Huasteca were perceived by people from other parts of Mexico not only influenced the way agrarian conflicts were presented to outsiders, but often determined their outcome as well. Government officials and political agitators from other regions (including professionals who considered themselves to be Indians) saw all Nahua communities as classless, but they also were oblivious to the differences in agrarian politics between north and south. They were also unaware that some of

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the formerly Nahua communities had become completely acculturated (to the extent that their inhabitants had lost both their Nahuatl language and their identity) and that there were very poor peasants who lived in communities that have always been Mestizo. These outsiders perceived the struggle for land throughout the whole region as one pitting Indian peasants against the direct descendants of European landlords. This image was reinforced through their initial contact with places like La Corrala and Lemontitla. However, the combination of communal structures and ethnic/class polarization characteristic of places like La Corrala and Lemontitla is not representative of most of Huejutla. Land conflicts that received a great deal of publicity in the seventies, such as those in Tenexco and Pepeyocatitla, were directed against wealthy Indian peasants or bilingual rancheros. However, these subsequent events were filtered through a set of perceptual glasses that did not allow outside observers to see the intra-ethnic dimensions of such conflicts. The cultural perceptions of outsiders explain why the struggle of peasants in ethnically diverse regions received more press coverage (and government attention) than more homogeneous Mestizo areas. Nahua villages in the Huasteca initially received more visits from sympathetic outsiders than their non-Indian counterparts, until members of Mestizo villages, especially those that had once been Indian pueblos, learned to portray themselves as "Indians" to outsiders. This happened in the case of Tecolotitla. This strategy was used by both poor and wealthy Nahua peasants, and even by people who technically are not peasants. Thus, in Macuxtepetla, a schoolteacher and parttime rancher, who was the son of a Mestizo ranchero, recovered several plots of his previously privately owned land by defending his rights as a fullfledged member of an Indian ejido. Although this man had been attacked as a coyotl by fellow villagers, he still presented himself to outsiders as an Indian (he was, from his mother's side) and a member of a Nahua community with a long history of heroic struggle to maintain its own land and its own identity! Nahua professionals who did not own rural property or engage in commercial activities occupied an even more ambiguous and often contradictory position in the social structure of Huejutla in the seventies. A good example is Ildefonso Maya, the founder and current director of a Nahua cultural center in the city of Huejutla who was quoted at the beginning of this chapter. His life history and subsequent career can be used to illustrate the role of educated, urbanized Indians as mediators or brokers between a predominantly Nahua-speaking peasantry and the national state committed to the ideals of indigenismo.

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The Case of lldefonso Maya: A Nahua Intellectual

Ildefonso Maya was born in 1936 in the municipio of Ilamatlan (Veracruz), which borders on the region of Huejutla. His father, a Nahua merchant, sent him to primary school where he learned Spanish. The young Ildefonso continued his studies in Mexico City where he took classical Nahuatl and art.5 He was also exposed to the intellectual and artistic world of Mexico City, including some of the famous muralists whom he got to know working parttime as a servant in their houses.6 In 1954 he returned to Huejutla to accept a position as art instructor in a recently established private high school, and he also gave private lessons. He married a Mestiza woman who is a member of a prominent Mestizo ranchero family from Atlapexco. Maya was thus incorporated into the social network of upper- and middle-class families in Huejutla to whom he served as an example of the talented, educated Indian. While not socially accepted by the more bigoted Mestizos, Maya was consulted as an expert on Nahua culture by modern, more educated people in the city of Huejutla. He also made many trips to Nahua villages to collect samples of folklore and local history from which he drew inspiration for his paintings. One of these paintings, depicting traditional prehispanic themes and the struggle of native peoples against the evil and corruption of Western civilization, can be seen in the lobby of the main hotel of downtown Huejutla, the Hotel Fayad— a hotel owned by one of the most successful capitalists of Huejutla. During the agrarian turmoil of the seventies, Ildefonso Maya sympathized with the peasants' struggle for land and often acted as a spokesman for the Nahua peasantry. For example, he chided more racist Mestizos for their opposition to the inevitable implementation of a long overdue land reform and their use of violent tactics. However, his role in class conflicts within Nahua communities was more ambiguous. For example, he helped the peasants of Toltitlan (Jaltocan) in their attempts to set up a sandle-making workshop and to become more independent vis-a-vis their cabecera. He also defended these peasants when they were unjustly accused of leading land invasions. In other cases, however, Maya's interest in promoting local crafts put him at odds with more radical agrarian peasants. In Chililico he organized a display of ceramics in collaboration with a group of peasants who belonged to a faction of wealthier, more conservative peasants. As a result, he was perceived as an 5 Part of this life history is recounted on the inside cover and in a preface (written by Roberto Garrido Gutierrez) of a book by Maya (1986, 11-14). The book's title, in translation, is Why: What Have They Done to My People! 6 These aspects of this life history were based on various interviews or conversations with Ildefonso May in Huejutla between 1983 and 1986.1 was not able to verify through other sources all of what he told me.

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enemy by the more militant peasants who were engaged in a class struggle. For this reason members of this conservative faction, who sided with local landowners and who were later expelled from Chililico, were referred to by their opponents as mayamej (a pun on Maya's surname, which in Nahuatl can also be made to sound like the plural of the word mayatl, a type of string bag).? While often criticizing the cultural imperialism of the Western world (in­ cluding the Mexican state), Ildefonso Maya nevertheless collaborated with various state governments whose leaders tried to contain peasant unrest or channel it into an officially approved direction. It has already been seen how Maya became a close collaborator of Gabriela Rojo (the niece of Governor Rojo Lugo), who was appointed to several local administrative posts, includ­ ing that of director of INI (the National Indigenous Institute). Gabriela Rojo appointed Maya as her subdirector in INI, which made him the chief admin­ istrator in charge of the regional coordinating office located in Huejutla. In this capacity, he was in charge of setting up small community projects as well as acting as a consultant for the program of indigenous education. Maya, the first and only Nahua subdirector of this center, tried to introduce some changes, such as making its Mestizo employees learn at least some Nahuatl. However, not only did he fail to make local INI personnel more sensitive to cultural issues, but he soon realized that the coordinating center of INI in Huejutla actually had little autonomy and a very small budget.8 After stepping down from his position in INI, Maya opened up a small museum of Nahua art and pursued his career in painting and teaching. He also continued to act as a consultant and expert on Nahua culture to the Mestizo intelligentsia of Hue­ jutla, some of whom had gone to live in Mexico City. In chapter 16 it will be seen how Ildefonso Maya, a kind of unofficial spokesperson for the Nahua population of the Huasteca, again entered politics in the eighties. Ildefonso Maya is an example of what often happens in Mexico when an Indian intellectual becomes involved in regional politics or takes up a post in the government bureaucracy. Maya is both a beneficiary and a critic of the indigenismo establishment; a member of a still stigmatized minority, yet one who also belongs to a privileged stratum of professionals; a believer in the noble, egalitarian Indian community, yet the son of a prosperous Indian small town merchant; a radical and a critic vis-a-vis the Mestizo elite of Huejutla, ι Conversation (in Nahuatl) with a peasant from Chililico on a bus, April 27, 1985. 8 Apart from running a small clinic, the local INI center could do little more than distribute basket­ balls to Nahuatl communities and act in a kind of consultative capacity to a variety of other programs.

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but at the same time criticized and rejected by at least one group of poor, Nahuatl-speaking peasants engaged in internal class conflicts.

Conclusion The politics of ethnicity has many facets. Ethnic stereotypes and their opposite—the acclamation of a positive ethnic identity—form part of a set of cultural symbols used by a wide variety of actors belonging to different classes. For example, the preservation of Nahua culture has become part of a set of political demands of the intellectual spokesmen of the OIPUH. This radical independent peasant organization usually includes at least a couple of lines of Nahuatl in its public bulletins to give them a special Indian flavor. Its members or supporters have also organized Nahua cultural events (song and dance) in conjunction with solidarity meetings for Nicaragua and the rebels of El Salvador. However, this same emphasis on the value of maintaining a separate ethnic identity is also characteristic of various government departments that are portrayed as the enemy by the OIPUH. Appeals to Indianness or demands for ethnic survival in such ethnically diverse regions as Huejutla are neither inherently reactionary nor inevitably revolutionary, as rival scholars would like to argue. In each case, it is necessary to examine the relationship between belief and behavior, between the official ideology and the actions of state representatives, between the rhetoric used by agrarian politicians and their personal interests and real intentions.

Part Four The Forging of a New Hegemony

. . uan nama san poro maseualtsitsi moteuiaj . . and now only Indians fight among themselves

Chapter 15

Reform, Co-option and Repression: A Decade of Contrived Land Invasions

Rojo Lugo, who is remembered by most peasants in Huejutla as a "bad" governor for his suppression of militant peasants, became governor of Hidalgo while Luis Echeverria (self-styled left-wing champion of the third world) was still in office. Six years later, the more moderate, "business-like" Lopez Portillo was in charge on the national level. No one was surprised when Lopez Portillo picked the state minister of tourism, architect Guillermo Rossell de la Lama, as official candidate for the governor of Hidalgo in 1980. Radical intellectuals in Mexico City predicted that Rossell, a multimillionaire from Pachuca and "a friend of the caciques," would help the landowning cattle producers of Huejutla get back the land they had lost. Unexpectedly, this governor would carry out a real land reform in the Huasteca. However, to implement such a drastic change, Rossell had to create his own network of patronage in the region and establish a new peasant movement under his own control. Only in this way could the state win back the legitimacy it had lost during a decade of peasant revolt and set the groundwork for a new period of relative peasant quiescence. The election of Rossell de la Lama in 1980 marks a turning point in the peasant movement of Huejutla. Although a member of the economic elite on the national level, Rossell did not have any family ties with the political elite that had ruled the state of Hidalgo over the previous few decades. He was thus able to break the political alliance between the state government and caciques on the local level. He also played up to ethnic loyalty to a much greater extent than his predeccesors. For example, the new governor arranged for Ildefonso Maya, the locally well-known Indian artist and educator, to officially receive and welcome him on several official visits to the region. For one of these public occasions, Maya recruited a group of young girls, wearing traditional Nahua dresses, to bedeck the governor with flowers. Maya delivered the opening address, saying that the Nahua people received the governor with open arms and hoped that he would not betray them like so many others

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had done in the past. This symbolic act helped to create an image of Rossell as "a friend of the Indians." Over his next six years of office, Rossell oversaw the most radical restructuring of the land tenure system in Huejutla since the liberal land reforms of the nineteenth century. This land reform, however, also laid the groundwork for a new type of capitalist development. In fact, while Rossell has been accused by local businessmen of ' 'being a Communist," his government created the conditions that enabled former landowners (transformed into merchants and bureaucrats) again to dominate and control the peasants who live in both older and newly established ejidos. The Co-optation of a Peasant Movement While still campaigning for a position that he was almost sure to win (in Mexico's de facto one-party system), Rossell de la Lama formed an alliance with the major left-wing political leaders of the region. Hisfirstally was the PST, which was already disposed to cooperate with any "progressive" government. In return, Pedro Martinez, the Mestizo PST leader from Huejutla, was given one of the seats in the state legislature reserved for candidates from opposition parties with a certain percentage of the popular vote. The second, more important alliance formed by Rossell was with a recently formed, new independent peasant organization—the Union Regional de Ejidos y Comunidades de la Huasteca Hidalguense (Regional Union of Ejidos and Communities of the Huasteca of Hidalgo) or URECHH. The leaders of this new peasant organization were the same two Hernandez brothers from La Corrala who had participated in thefirstland invasions of 1968. The URECHH was established in 1979 under the name of Union de Pueblos Unidos de Mexico. A declaration of principles and a political program, published in July of that year, included a demand for the release of all peasant leaders held in jail, the legalization of all peasant landholdings and public investment in public projects (URECHH, 1980). These peasants also announced their willingness to negotiate with the government if their organization could be officially recognized. This invitation was immediately taken up by Rossell, who met with URECHH leaders while he was still governor-elect. Another political group that approached the governor-to-be was the enclavados, whose properties were located inside the boundaries of fictitious ejidos. Their leaders were Genaro Murillo (the son of a former landowner from El Arenal) and Ignacio Ramirez (a schoolteacher originally from Cuatapa).1 1

Ignacio Ramirez is a member of the family mentioned earlier in connection with family feuds (chapters 8 and 12).

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The organization these two men founded was an offshoot of the association of pequenos propietarios that had been formed several years earlier by local landowners. The enclavados felt that they would be more likely to get some form of compensation if they formed their own pressure group since, unlike larger landowners, their land titles (e.g., those of Anaya) had never been properly registered with a notary public. These small landowners (rich peasants or professionals who had bought small parcels of land) also wanted to set themselves apart from the powerful cattle ranchers who had dominated previous associations for landowners. Rossell promised these two men his future assistance. After lengthy negotiations with this and other political groups, Rossell announced that he would do three things as governor: provide compensation for the owners of ranchos that had been invaded, provide legal titles for all peasants who had access to land, and finally, free the political prisoners. When Rossell formally took office on April 1, 1981, he moved the headquarters of his government (including his entire cabinet) to Huejutla so that he would be able personally to oversee the resolution of any outstanding problems in the region. The governor had a large prefabricated dome built on the outskirts of Huejutla to house his various ministries.2 One of the first pieces of legislation passed by the state congress was a law forbidding any future illegal land invasions. The new governor ordered the 20,000 hectares of land invaded so far (and already sown) to be cordoned off by the army, pending further judicial procedures (Alvarez 1981). Other steps taken in thefirstthree months of Rossell's government included the freeing of one hundred political prisoners and the appointment of a new INI coordinator (to replace Gabriela Rojo). He then moved the central offices of the state government back to Pachuca. However, the governor returned frequently to settle disputes over land among rival ejidos. His wife, who handed out toys to thousands of children of the Huasteca, also became a figure frequently seen in the region.3 A combination of such public gestures of generosity, paternalism and occasional harsh "law-and-order" measures were to characterize the rest of his term of office. Rossell's first year of office coincided with a short-lived oil boom. This boom enabled the Mexican government to spend money to improve living conditions in the countryside, especially in such politically volatile regions as Huejutla. On August 25, the state and federal governments jointly announced an integrated program for the rehabilitation of the Huasteca, including the 2 3

See report in Uno Mas Uno, April 2, 1981. See front page coverage in Clarin, May 5, 1981.

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expropriation of 18,000 hectares of land (Loaiza, 1981). The official reason given for the expropriation was that the government needed this land for an irrigation project in the Huasteca of Hidalgo. This program, with a budget of 2,818 million pesos, was called the Integrated Program of Rehabilitation of the Huasteca of Hidalgo. With one stroke of the pen, most of the region of Huejutla was thus transformed into public property. As the chief executive officer in charge of overlooking this operation, Rossell had the opportunity to develop a powerful patronage network through the agrarian affairs bureaucracy. Whatever peasant organization had the best contacts with his government would henceforth be able to "invade" land for its clients with little risk of reprisal. It would take a few years, however, before the majority of local peasants and rancheros were to realize fully the implications of this piece of legislation. To consolidate his political influence in the region, Rossell de la Lama allowed both the PST and the URECHH to invade an additional 3,000-4,000 hectares of land despite his injunction against such direct-action tactics. The PST immediately undertook a series of land invasions in the municipios of Atlapexco, Yahualica and Xochiatipan. Other land invasions also took place in the municipio of Huejutla (in Chalahuiyapan, Coxhuaco and Atlalco) under the auspices of the URECHH. Landowners in other parts of the region, who had not yet been invaded (and who continued to operate their privately owned ranchos) were sent notices by the government to present their documents to the Land Reform Office in preparation for an eventual takeover of their land. In 1982, the URECHH, hitherto involved in a series of negotiations with Rossell's government, was formally recognized as a regional peasant federation. The inauguration, attended by a host of dignitaries and Nahua peasants, was held in the old cinema of Huejutla. Apart from Benito and Margarito Hernandez from La Corrala, Modesto Hernandez from Huextetitla and Bernabe Cruz from Los Otates (the only leader from the northern zone), a prominent peasant leader on the national level also appeared on the speaker's platform. This national leader was Anacleto Ramos, an outsider originally from the state of Guerrero and supposedly a former companion of the guerrilla leader Lucio Cabanas.4 Despite the use of radical slogans, however, this public event marked the beginning of a new form of political patronage. Anacleto Ramos, a charismatic figure, helped the URECHH to become a stronger peasant organization that was to play a leading role in both rural development projects and political mobilization. Not only did this organiza4

Anacleto Ramos, who was supposed to have betrayed Cabanas, spent some time in a federal penitentiary until he was released.

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tion (nominally still independent) continue to invade land with the state's blessing, but its leaders established their own network of rural extension. Local URECHH leaders (many of them peasants) were suddenly in charge of a major operation financed by the state itself. They also generated additional income of their own by collecting membership dues—at one point ten thousand peasants were paying fifty pesos each. These funds were used for legal aid and to set up an office for their organization in the city of Huejutla. With such resources and state backing, the URECHH spread rapidly throughout the region. The actual expropriation of privately owned lands in Huejutla (many of which had already been taken over by radical peasants) took place one or two years later. Partial compensation was first paid to wealthy cattle producers with legally registered properties. These large landowners used the money they received to buy new ranchos in such "safe" places for investment as Veracruz and San Luis Potosi or bought local businesses (garages, urban real estate, buses or commerce). Others retired and lived off the interest of their accounts (SARH 1986,70). The former owners of small ranchos located within the boundaries offictitiousejidos (the enclavados), however, did not receive any compensation. These small landowners, including many wealthy Nahua peasants who had been evicted from their communities, started to put direct political pressure on Rossell. On May 5, 1982, five thousand enclavados, led by Genaro Murillo and Ignacio Ramirez, held a demonstration in downtown Huejutla to demand that they be paid or given land.5 Rossell responded by promising to give each enclavado 5 hectares of land in one of the region's most fertile valleys, located in the northeastern corner of the municipio of San Felipe Orizatlan. Most of this fertile land, originally part of a hacienda owned by the Andrade family of Huejutla, was still in the hands of such wealthy businessmen as Reyes Garcia (mentioned in chapter 9), Lopez Loriga, a well-known television personality and a high-ranking executive of the state-owned oil company, PEMEX.6 Some of these landowners had already lost sections of their estates in the land invasions of 1979, but no peasant organization had yet dared to invade this fertile valley because of the political connections of these powerful landowners on the national level. After paying nominal compensation to its owners, government troops escorted a convoy of trucks carrying the families that were allowed to settle this valley. A number of political 5 Interviews with Ignacio Ramirez Ramirez, April 30, 1984; Genaro Murillo, May 28, 1985, both in Huejutla. 6 Another landowner, a member of the Lastro family, had his own airstrip in this valley.

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commentators even commented (off the record) that ' 'the government itself had to invade this land."7 The governor put Ignacio Ramirez and his brother (both high school teachers) in charge of this project and expected them to recruit additional enclavados for this new settlement. Most of the settlers became disillusioned, however. First of all, they discovered that they would have to share part of this fertile valley with a group of radical peasants who had been evicted from a Nahua community (to be discussed later). Many of the enclavados, who had other occupations and still owned their own houses in municipal cabeceras, even if they had lost their ranchos, could not get used to this rough, pioneering way of life.8 The vast majority of enclavados lost interest and returned home, while others only showed up for occasional visits. These former small landowners, ideologically committed to the idea of owning their own land, were even less interested in staying here when the government decided to turn all of this land into several large, modern, collective ejidos. At this point, Genaro Murillo, one of the original representatives of the enclavados, initiated a new political battle to obtain individual plots of land for former small landowners in other parts of the region. While Rossell tried to appease former landowners and allowed government-linked peasant organizations to continue invading land, he had a much more ambiguous relationship with the OIPUH, an organization that refused to collaborate or negotiate with his government. Atfirstthe governor completely ignored its existence,9 but then he tried to weaken this independent organization. For example, his government did not intervene when a group of eighty-seven peasants from Tenexco and some of its anexos, who had joined the OIPUH, were deprived of their parcels in 1982.IO He then turned a blind eye when members of a new comisariado, who had close connections with local rancheros from Atlapexco and Coyolapa, further harassed the radical faction by polluting their wells. These radical peasants, still affiliated with the OIPUH, finally decided to take the offensive. They invaded a rancho still owned by Anacleto Mendoza, a cattle producer and farmer who lived in Hue7 This "symbolic" invasion of land by the government is another example of how the government tried to gain legitimacy by creating an image of agrarian radicalism. See also Rebolledo (1989, 150). 8 One of the difficulties in living in this new settlement was that this location is very humid and infested with tiny mosquitos during summer nights. Interviews with Ruperto Hernandez, June 3, 1984; Manuel Ramirez, Chalma (Veracruz), June 11, 1984; Ramon Jimenez Hernandez, Audiencia Publica, May 19, 1985. » On May 6, 1981, the regional military commander reported to El Sol de Hidalgo that Alejandro Dolores and his presumed guerrilla band was a figment of people's imagination, and that peace had returned to the region. IO UnoMas Uno, December 18, 1982.

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jutla, and then left the village of Tenexco to establish their own population center (Alvarez 1983a). The place where they chose to relocate was a small hamlet called San Miguel (actually a rancho owned by a wealthy Indian), which they renamed Emiliano Zapata. The same day they were putting up their houses, an army helicopterflewover the new settlement andfiredshots. The next day the state prosecutor arrived with a military escort and handed these peasants an order of evacuation. However, this representative of the state government was met by a team of reporters from a well-known left-wing newspaper who had come to visit the new settlement, and the prosecutor and the soldiers returned to Huejutla (Alvarez 1983b). At this point Rossell decided to attempt co-option. When the radical peasants who founded Emiliano Zapata refused to evacuate their new settlement and the land they had invaded, Rossell made a personal visit and handed over to them the documentation officially declaring Emiliano Zapata a new settlement. Despite this gesture of reconciliation, however, Rossell was unable to persuade the inhabitants of this village to leave the OIPUH, nor to move their settlement, located on a hillside, to the riverbank below (close to a new road and a health clinic). This strategy of alternatively (sometimes simultaneously) repressing and wooing groups of peasants who belonged to truly independent peasant organizations continued throughout the rest of his governorship. Apart from building up his own base of support among a significant proportion of former land invaders, Rossell de la Lama skillfully managed the nomination of new municipal authorities, by nominating, as official PRI candidates, people who had not previously been involved in agrarian disputes. In this way his government managed to prevent the reoccurrence of the type of attacks against unpopular municipal administrations that took place throughout the seventies. For example, in Huazalingo, the government refused to allow any of the Gonzalez' (the family from San Pedro who had dominated that municipio for over a hundred years) to hold office. Instead, the person chosen to be municipal president was Alfredo Fayad, a prosperous ranchero of Arab origins, who had not previously been involved in local politics." Fayad developed a working relationship with the PST and former peasants leaders, and he even helped villages affiliated with the OIPUH to obtain schools and clinics. The president who succeeded him was a ranchero and merchant who belonged to a family who had been opponents of Emilio Var" Alfredo Fayad had previously not been involved in politics in Huazalingo, his land had not been invaded and he was not even a member of the PM prior to his nomination.

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gas, the infamous cacique, in the thirties. Such candidates were at least acceptable to agrarian peasants.

The Renewal of Factional Politics Rossell de la Lama also knew how to manipulate tensions between more militant peasants and their conservative opponents. This strategy became apparent in his handling of an incident of violent in-fighting in Huitzotlaco, the anexo of Tenexco that had earlier witnessed an armed clash between CAM peasants and members of two landowning families (see chapter 11). In 1983, Huitzotlaco was still ruled by El Chino (Eugenio Sanchez) and his son (a schoolteacher as well as a part-time Nahua rancher). These two men were also the caciques of the entire ejido of Tenexco, and any decisions made by members of the comisariado who lived in the village of Tenexco were taken in consultation with El Chino (the nickname was also applied to his son). The younger Chino was also the representative of the official peasant federation, the CNC, which had previously included local landowners. The people they controlled consisted of all of the conservative peasants (those who previously owned small ranchos), as well as many peasants who had previously been CAM supporters. Like Tenexco, Huitzotlaco also had a radical faction led by a peasant called Nicolas Hernandez. Apart from taking part in the invasion of various properties owned by large landowners from Huautla and Atlapexco in the seventies, Nicolas Hernandez and his followers had taken over a small rancho near Huitzotlaco, part of which was converted into milpas. The rest of this rancho was preserved as a communal pasture for collective cattle raising, with credit and technical assistance provided by the government. However, a dispute between Hernandez (also named NiIo) and El Chino over the management of this pasture erupted into open violence. In the process of dividing up the cattle of this cooperative venture, El Chino tried to take the best of the herd for himself. The radical peasants protested, took out their arms, and occupied the pasture to prevent Chino's supporters from entering. After the shooting ended, one of Chino's men lay dead.12 El Chino and his supporters lashed out in anger; the day after the dispute 12

Interview (in Nahuatl) with Nicolas Hernandez, Plan de Ayala, May 18, 1985; interviews (in Spanish) with Teodolo Martinez, Huejutla, June 16, 1984; a woman resident, Huitzotlaco, May 27, 1985; Ildefonso May, Huejutla, April 30, 1983.

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over cattle, they ransacked and dismantled the houses of about twenty families who belonged to the Hernandez faction.13 He then put up a roadblock to prevent anyone from entering this village. A special commission, headed by Ildefonso Maya (the Nahua artist and former subdirector of INI), was sent in to negotiate with El Chino.14 NiIo and his followers, who were forced to take refuge in the public auditorium of Huejutla, wanted to take revenge, but they too were placated. The PST leader, Teodolo Martinez, whom NiIo had met on a previous occasion, persuaded NiIo and his faction not only to join the PST but to accept Rossell's offer of much better land in the fertile valley just expropriated in the municipio of San Felipe Orizatlan. After spending about a month in Huejutla, most of the families evicted from Huitzotlaco joined the group of enclavados in their joint expedition to settle land left vacant after the expropriation of several large estates (mentioned above). The resettlement project in the municipio of San Felipe Orizatlan became the pet project of Rossell de la Lama. Although this project was originally designed for small farmers and ranchers who had been evicted from their home communities, the governor decided to use it as a way of reducing social and political tensions in the region by including all sorts of political refugees (such as those who had left their communities due to religious as well as political divisions). This project was then expanded into a much more ambitious rural development scheme. Rossell sent a team of architects to plan a small town (to be called the Micropolis), which would provide housing for both newcomers and the inhabitants of six other peasant communities, two of them Mestizo and the rest Nahua. The idea was to relocate all of these peasants to this model new town, where they would have access to new schools, a clinic, running water and latrines.15 This resettlement project was to become an arena for fierce in-fighting between radical peasants and conservative elements allied to a faction of businessmen who lived in the city of San Felipe.16 13

This attack was partly in revenge for a previous incident, in which several Nilos murdered the village "witch doctor," who was also a member of the Chino faction. They had killed this "witch doctor" (a healer cum artisan) after their father died of a snakebite. They held the healer personally responsible because he had threatened their entire family after Pedro Hernandez started competing with him after learning the same lucrative craft of weaving. •< Interview with Ildefonso Maya, Huejutla, April 30, 1983. See also his book (Maya 1986, 4 3 48). •5 UnoMas Uno, February 11, 1983. 16 Nicanor Rebolledo (1989,10) has argued that village factionalism increases when various channels of communication and resources are made available by competing formal organizations or parties. Only when one party or external power holder holds a monopoly on power will factionalism diminish or disappear.

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The Impact of the Recession

Despite land reform and resettlement projects, the livelihood of a significant segment of the local population had not improved by 1983. Much of the land recovered through land invasions was turned into collective cattle pastures or left idle due to ongoing legal disputes over boundaries. Consequently, only about half of the peasants who took part in land invasions obtained access to a sufficient amount of land to be at least partly self-sufficient in food. Moreover, the return of high levels of unemployment made access to land even more urgent for part-time laborers (especially younger peasants) who could no longer get seasonal jobs in construction projects or road building. The disappearance of the majority of ranchos in Huejutla also meant that there was less seasonal employment in the region itself for monolingual Nahua day laborers (Romer 1986, 12). A combination of continued demographic pressure, continuing wealth differences and the unfulfilled desire for land of many peasants gave rise to renewed conflicts over land. Starting in 1984, conflicts over boundaries between neighboring Nahua communities increased dramatically. Some boundary disputes involved competing boundary claims dating back for hundreds of years. Other disputes were caused by inaccurate or contradictory tracing of boundaries by team of surveyors from the Office of Land Reform. New forms of class tensions also emerged. Peasants who had hitherto not joined in land invasions (and who had therefore not gotten their share of prime land) resented the fact that some of their more radical neighbors were now "becoming rich." Land invasions also broke out for the first time in some of the more isolated, mountainous sections of the southern zone that had not experienced agrarian conflicts prior to 1980. This part of Huejutla still had a number of comunidades or fictitious ejidos characterized by unequal access to land (notwithstanding the state expropriation). However, these internal class conflicts became rapidly incorporated into a process of factional politics, involving fierce competition among rival peasant organizations (the URECHH, the PST and the CNC), as each tried to expand into new territories. The URECHH first expanded its sphere of operations in the more remote Nahua communities in the municipios of Yahualica and Atlapexco around 1983. In San Pedro Huazalingo (whose ejido was still controlled by the Gonzalez family), URECHH organizers helped a group of radical peasants set up their own separate village government and, on several occasions, helped to bail local supporters out of jail. These organizers also recruited several peasant leaders who undertook new land invasions in Tlalchiyahualica and Zoquitipan. However, this put the URECHH into direct competition with the PST

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(and in some cases the surviving pockets of CAM supporters). Zoquitipan became internally divided into rival PST and URECHH supporters, though both of these political organizations were equally "radical" (with the backing of the same state governor). In other cases, neighboring Nahua communities that had traditionally been rivals supported different peasant organizations. This competition between rival organizations became even more complex when politicians formerly opposed to Rossell de la Lama tried to regain political influence through the CNC. The main CNC organizer for Huejutla in 1982 was Juan Torres, a retired schoolteacher and old-time politician related to a family of Mestizo landowners in Yahualica. When he became the regional representative of the CNC, Juan Torres not only inherited long-standing CNC strongholds in Huautla and Atlapexco but started to recruit groups of former landowners and conservative peasants in Yahualica and Huejutla. In the village of Tlalchiyahualica (Yahualica), he won the support of a conservative faction and promised to help them turn their community into a comunidad (instead of an ejido). At the same time, he also instigated his own land invasions to broaden his base of support among peasants who had hitherto not taken part in land takeovers. Such invasions were also designed to embarrass or discredit local left-wing leaders not affiliated with the official Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI).

The main land invasion organized by Juan Torres involved the Nahua community of Chiquemecatitla. Although Chiquemecatitla was still a fairly prosperous Nahua community, with its own ejido as well as communal land, its inhabitants claimed that they had lost a narrow strip of land near the hamlet of Tecorral (one of three anexos of Chiquemecatitla), which is located along the paved highway, several kilometers from the city of Huejutla.17 The peasants of Chiquemecatitla, affiliated with the CNC, proceeded to take this land, which included yet another pasture owned by Cheque Reyes, the "millionaire" ranchero from Huejutla alluded to earlier. This incident almost brought about an armed confrontation between the CNC and the PST because this pasture included a house occupied by Teodolo Martinez, the leader of the PST. Teodolo's father, Pedro, had first moved into this house when he worked as a caretaker for Cheque Reyes. Cheque Reyes allowed his former employee to use this house with the understanding that the PST would not invade his pastureland. This is why the PST had earlier decided to take over only a neighboring property owned by the American widow in order to set up their new 17

Chiquemecatitla also had legalrightsto land located right on the outskirts of the city of Huejutla, which included the city's airport and government hospital.

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workers' colony in the early eighties. When Pedro moved into the new colony just across a stream from this pasture, his son, Teodolo, set up his household in the old caretaker's house, conveniently located on the edge of the highway into Huejutla. When the peasants from Chiquemecatitla threatened to take over this house, Pedro Martinez in turn warned them that he would recruit all of the peasants from the very large Nahua village of Panacaxtlan (then a PST village) to attack Tecorral, the anexo of Chiquemecatitla.l8 While renewed agrarian conflicts involving Chiquemecatitla caused considerable friction between the PST and the CNC, factional disputes involving rival peasant organizations took an even nastier turn when the URECHH and the CNC both penetrated Nahua communities that had so far not been involved in land invasions. The worst violence occurred in thefictitiousejido of Ixcatlan. This former Indian pueblo has a very large number of subordinate anexos (including the Mestizo town of Tehuetlan). In 1982 the majority of peasants living in its forty-odd hamlets still owned tiny plots of land (some more than others); however, Mestizo rancheros who lived in Tehuetlan, as well as businessmen from Huejutla, were in possession of several cattle ranches within the judicial boundaries of Ixcatlan. Several wealthy Indians from the municipio of Jaltocan, which also borders on Ixcatlan, also owned land that legally corresponded to these forty hamlets, whose "cabecera" was in the pueblo of Ixcatlan. At a meeting in 1982, the representative of this fictitious ejido agreed to join the URECHH, and a year later peasants from all of the anexos together invaded several privately owned ranches. Several of Ixcatlan's anexos also invaded small properties (mainly coffee orchards) owned by Nahua merchants and farmers in the town of Jaltocan. The URECHH then proposed that Ixcatlan be made into a real ejido, with an equal division of parcels of land and precise boundaries between all of its anexos. This proposal caused strong internal divisions. Not only was the distribution of ownership of land within Ixcatlan uneven (Garcia Lopez 1987, 40-50),19 but many Nahua peasants owned small plots of land, planted with coffee trees, in anexos other than where they lived. A group of merchants and former landowners in Tehuetlan who had connections with the CNC persuaded both the wealthier, landowning peasants of Ixcatlan and most of the conservative peasants with small plots of land to renounce the URECHH. They convinced the authorities of Ixcatlan to petition for legal recognition as a comunidad rather than an ejido.20 This con18

Interview with Pedro Martinez, Colonia Primero de Mayo, April 27, 1986. " For example, one Nahua peasant still owned 60 hectares. 20 Interviews with Modesto Hernandez (president of the URECHH), Huejutla, June 5, 1985; Arternio Ramirez (the son of a rich peasant from Ixcatlan), Huejutla (in the jailhouse), June 16, 1984;

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servative faction, led by rich peasants, also persuaded the majority of the inhabitants of the "cabecera" and many of the anexos to switch their membership to the CNC, resulting in increasing tensions. The leaders of the URECHH, who felt increasingly self-confident and powerful, became more aggressive and openly hostile to political opponents. Their tactics, however, also caused the government some embarrassment. A group of peasants from Xiquila (affiliated with the URECHH), who had earlier fled for protection to la Corrala, returned to seek revenge on a local CNCaffiliated cacique who had taken control over their comisariado committee. This cacique fled to the second story of his house and was then burned alive as his former enemies set fire to the building. Like so many other political crises, Rossell personally intervened in this dispute. He came to Huejutla to admonish the URECHH peasants who had thus taken the law into their own hands but then forgave the culprits. In a short speech, the governor told a group of URECHH supporters to dedicate themselves to working the land and not cause any more trouble.21 URECHH supporters, however, feeling that they were now immune from the law, took even more drastic action. In the summer of 1983, they broke into the offices of the official government party (the PRi), which also housed the CNC, and beat up Juan Torres.22 Not surprisingly, several months later, on October 11, 1983, the president of the URECHH, Benito Hernandez, was assassinated in Huejutla, an event that received extensive press coverage.23 The person elected to replace Benito Hernandez as president of the URECHH was Modesto Hernandez from Huextetitla (Orizatlan). He was a more efficient administrator and anxious to eliminate the corruption associated with the earlier stages of the organization. Apparently, various peasant leaders affiliated with the URECHH had extracted money from landowners so that their properties (officially expropriated but not yet taken over) would not be invaded. There were also allegations concerning diversion of funds and the confiscation of lumber cut by peasants, which was then sold for the personal Juventino Huexotl (a teacher who works in Ixcatlan), Chililico, June I, 1985; Trineo Andris Reyes (from Tlaltzintla, an anexo of Ixcatlan), El Pintor, Veracruz, June 15, 1984. 21 Interview with Ildefonso Maya, Huejutla, May 26, 1983. This incident is one more example of the high level of violence used by both sides in local political conflicts and the extent to which such violence was often condoned (if not approved) by higher political leaders. " Interviews with Trineo Andr6s Reyes, Huejutla, June 15,1984; Ignacio Ramirez, Huejutla, May 16, 1985; Miguel Hernandez, May 13, 1985. 13 See Uno Mas Uno, Oct. 12, 13, 25, 26, and 31, Nov. 1, 1983. As with previous political murders, the press blamed former landowners, the government decried yet another act of violence, and most civilians (from all classes) speculated whether or not Rossell might have ordered this assassination because Benito had "gone too far."

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benefit of the URECHH leaders. Despite his efforts at internal reform, however, the leader of the URECHH, just like those of other government-linked peasant organizations, increasingly had to compromise his political ideals in other ways. During the early eighties, the PST and the URECHH had consistently sided with groups of landless peasants (albeit with government approval). However, to increase their membership, both of these organizations also started to support more conservative and prosperous groups of peasants engaged in internal class conflicts with new agrarians affiliated with rival peasant organizations. A good example to illustrate this purely opportunistic form of politicking, and the role that both of these organizations played in contributing to an increase in purely factional disputes, is the bizarre conflict between the peasant communities of La Mesa Larga and Mecatlan (in Yahualica). The Case of La Mesa Larga and Mecatlan

Prior to the seventies, both La Mesa Larga and Mecatlan shared the same fictitious ejido, going back to 1940. Mecatlan, which had already become completely Mestizo, first became involved in the agrarian movement when a group of militant peasants invaded all of the privately owned ranches located within former communal boundaries, but owned by outsiders. Several small landowners who lived in Mecatlan also had to give up part of their land to their militant neighbors. However, the slightly more prosperous (landowning) but much less acculturated (i.e., more Indian) peasants of La Mesa Larga wanted to maintain their status of pequefios propietarios and refused to join the ejido of Mecatlan. They also had a great deal more contact with conservative Mestizo landowners of the nearby village of Santa Lucia, located in the municipio of Calnali. Throughout the 1980s, the peasant leaders of Mecatlan put increasing pressure on its anexo, La Mesa Larga, to recognize the authority of the comisariado in Mecatlan and to transform its share of the former communal land into an ejido. This intervillage dispute (with its competing interpretations of the law) became increasingly more violent. The ejido of Mecatlan was itself divided into rival agrarian factions. The peasant leader of one of these factions, affiliated with the CAM, wasfirmlyin control in 1984. He was especially vehement in his opposition to the violent tactics that had been used by members of the other agrarian faction.24 By the end of 1985, however, this rival faction, which was affiliated with the more influential PST, started taking over all small properties owned by the peasants 24

Interview with Leobardo Hernandez, Mecatlan, May 27, 1985.

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of La Mesa. They were led by Albino Sanchez, a man who had served in the army and had managed to obtain his own supply of guns. The excuse used for this action was that the peasants of Mecatlan had prior legal rights to ejido land since only their names appeared in the original list of land petitioners. He also refused to hand over a section of land previously in the hands of a group of very poor peasants in a nearby hamlet (Acalamatitla, also located within the ejido boundaries) even though these peasants had actively participated in the struggle for land in the seventies, side by side with Mecatlan.25 Ironically, just prior to this confiscation of land by Albino Sanchez's group, the PST had managed to persuade the more conservative peasants of La Mesa Larga to join their party with the promise that they would help them defend their land. The leaders of the PST were even willing to recognize that their land was communal rather than an ejido, and they also suggested that the ejido be divided into two separate sections. When they were unable to persuade the peasants of Mecatlan or the Land Reform Office to arrive at some sort of a compromise, the PST advisers suggested that the peasants from La Mesa accept an offer by the government to leave their village and to accept land in the Micropolis project. When they realized that the PST could not help them, and that some of their enemies in Mecatlan already belonged to this same political party, the peasants of La Mesa disowned the PST. This left them even more vulnerable to the further attack by the more militant peasants from Mecatlan, who damaged fences, confiscated some cattle and hurt several people in La Mesa Larga. To make matters worse, the municipal president of Yahualica, closely linked to the URECHH, refused to have anything to do with this matter and told the peasants of La Mesa Larga to obey government orders to abandon their land. After Albino Sanchez's forays, most of the male population of La Mesa Larga, now landless, had to abandon their homes to seek work in other parts of Mexico. They also continued their legal battle and got some support from a sympathetic army lieutenant who offered them protection and assistance.26 The people who ended up solving their problem were a group of extension workers from the Agricultural University of Chapingo, who were also members of a small left-wing splinter party, the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP). They first visited La Mesa Larga at the invitation of a student from the village who was studying in Chapingo (and who was at that time unaware of the political affiliation of the extension workers). One of these 25

The situation was more complicated because, as in all intervillage disputes, some individuals from each village also allied themselves to the faction representing the "enemy" of their own home community. 26 Interview with Eleodoro Cortes (from La Mesa Larga), Huejutla, May 11, 1985.

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workers, Ricardo Ferrer, started investigating and working in La Mesa Larga and helped to organize the peasants to defend themselves against the PST militants of Mecatlan. They took back some of the land invaded by the peasants from Mecatlan and proceeded to work it collectively (including their women) in order to discourage reprisals. Peasants from Acalamatitla were also invited to participate. To help resolve their ambiguous land tenure situation, and to seek redress for damages caused by Mecatlan, the MRP decided to bring these matters to the attention of authorities at the highest possible level of government. They did this by transporting the entire village (including women, children and village band) to Mexico City where they joined in a large peace march, which was being covered by the international press. They then initiated a hunger strike in front of the national palace, demanding to see the president of Mexico. The resulting publicity, and their willingness to negotiate with government officials, brought quick results. When the village representatives were invited to enter the plush inner rooms of the presidential palace, they were received not by the president of Mexico but by Rossell de la Lama, who had come up from Hidalgo and who promised to meet them in La Mesa Larga the following day. In less than two months, Rossell negotiated that La Mesa Larga be given its own ejido, and the government finished putting a roof on its school (something local authorities had neglected to do) and provided them with credit and technical assistance. He also spoke to the national secretary of the PST, who expelled Albino Sanchez from that political organization. Rossell personally told Albino to leave town.2^ When the peasants of La Mesa Larga had won their battle, an internal conflict based on existing class differences emerged. Most of the previously conservative peasants of La Mesa Larga, who had owned their own small plots of land, were radicalized in the process of the conflict against the established agrarian faction of Mecatlan. They now not only accepted the concept of the ejido but were willing to continue working at least part of their land in cooperative fashion. However, two brothers of La Mesa Larga who had previously owned the largest amount of land (about 80 hectares) were adamantly opposed. They refused to cooperate with any of these community projects and wanted their original land returned to them. These wealthy peasants, and a small entourage of conservative supporters, then asked for and received political support from the URECHH! In the meantime the peasants of Mecatlan 27 Personal communication from Jorge Morrett, department of rural sociology of the University of Chapingo. This professor, who is also a member of the MRP (now incorporated into the newly formed Partido Revolucionario Democratico), gave me copies of all the written transcripts of sixteen hours of videotape that were taken in La Mesa Larga during this conflict.

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also started fighting among themselves. The government soon found additional ways to further divide the peasant population.

The Emergence of New Leaders Starting in 1986, the URECHH started to lose its political influence. Initially, the state government still supported this organization as it acquired new members by expanding into other areas. In the long run, however, local URECHH leaders could no longer compete with more experienced politicians and a new type of educated peasant leader who was more familiar with the Mexican legal system. The main handicap of the URECHH was its inability to work through the complicated bureaucracy of a government whose vision of the now "pacified" Huasteca included a new, efficient technocracy to replace mass organizations run by semiliterate peasant leaders. Consequently, the government started to encourage a different type of politician or "peasant leader." A good example of this new type of intermediary between the government and peasant communities is Antonio Hernandez Mendoza, who is today the head of the cci in Huejutla (and their regional secretary). Originally from the Nahua village of Huitzitzilingo in San Felipe Orizatlan, where both he and his father still own coffee trees, he became a part-time student while working in Mexico City and managed to obtain a degree in law. He came to Huejutla in 1981 after working for the cci in other parts of Mexico. His knowledge of the complexities of the legal process, combined with his ability to relate to the local Nahua population, enabled him to get full documentation for numerous peasant communities that had already recovered their village lands at the height of the agrarian revolt.28 Unlike the local peasant leaders of the URECHH, not only is Antonio Hernandez better educated, but he also has more experience in national politics and better contacts with influential politicians. Unlike Modesto Hernandez of the URECHH, the cci leader also speaks fluent Nahuatl and portrays himself as a masehuali. Another modern, more bureaucratic leader (also trained as a lawyer) is Marcelo Hernandez, originally from the Nahua village of Acatepec, in Huautla. His father, a better-off peasant, had sent the young Marcelo off to school, first in Huautla and later outside of the region. He too came to Huejutla once it had turned into a small booming city in the 1980s, although he had to brush 28

Interview with Antonio Hernandez, April 29,1986. In 1986 he was handling 159 cases on behalf of cci-affiliated peasant communities villages.

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up on his Nahuatl, which he had almost forgotten.29 Marcelo Hernandez was appointed by the federal government to provide free legal advice to all peasants affiliated with any of the PRi-linked organizations (such as the CNC, CAM, and Vieja Guardia Agrarista). He also helped a number of peasant groups get legal access to land and then started his own peasant organization, the Union de Pueblos de Hidalgo, for peasants who had no other affiliation. Using his legal expertise as well as his connections in the federal bureaucracy, he managed to obtain full documentation or to resolve boundary disputes for many local ejidos. An example of how this legal adviser was able to win adherents comes from the small Nahua hamlet of Olma, situated close to the town of Yahualica. Most of the peasants of Olma were peons who rented land from several rancheros or wealthy Nahua peasants. One of these rancheros was also the owner of the actual site where their houses are located. During the Cardenas era, the peasants from Olma were unsuccessful in an attempt to get title to the land where they lived and worked, but they were given part of the former hacienda of Crisolco (one of the small southern haciendas) in 1954. Initially the peasants of Olma did not want to accept this land because it was located at least four hours away on foot and they did not want to move the location of their village, but eventually they started commuting back and forth to their ejido to grow corn. At the same time they continued to work for wages for landowners from Yahualica and to rent land closer to home to cultivate beans and at least one corn crop a year.30 During the political turmoil of the seventies, the village of Olma ended up inside the boundaries of the ejido of Yahualica, while part of their own ejido in Crisolco was invaded by peasants from the village of Xuchitl. When the peasants of Yahualica threatened to evict the inhabitants of Olma in the eighties, the peasants of Olma (who were poorer than many of their counterparts in Yahualica) decided to invade several small properties where they had always made their local milpas.31 Several peasants from Olma (who were not affiliated with any organization) were subsequently incarcerated. They had gotten into trouble with the law again and were issued court orders to evacuate the land they had invaded, when they were introduced to Marcelo Hernandez. He managed to get them their own ejido, close to their home village, within a year. Marcelo was able to help the peasants of Olma by taking advantage of a 19

Interview with Marcelo Hernandez, Huejutla, June 23, 1984 (and other occasions). A more detailed history of this hamlet appeared in a bilingual, mimeographed report done for this community (see Schryer 1985b). 31 One of these properties was owned by a rich peasant who was also a member of the ejido of Yahualica. 30

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change in the legal status of most of the privately owned land in the region as a result of the 1981 expropriation. Since such land technically belonged to the nation, it was possible to petition for the setting up of new ejidos. Thus, when he accompanied the villagers to the offices of the procurador dejusticia in Huejutla (who had earlier issued a warrant for their arrest), Marcelo submitted a petition for land on their behalf. He also threatened to foment more land invasions, unless the district authorities left the peasants of Olma in peace. Since obtaining this new ejido, these peasants have had no more legal problems, and they recently obtained credit for starting a collective cattle pasture. However, groups of needy peasants were not the only ones who benefited from this legal procedure. Despite his use of populist rhetoric, Marcelo was quite willing to help rich peasants who had once been small landowners or clients of former caciques. Not only did he give legal advice to the CNC faction in Ixcatlan, but he even started legal proceedings, on behalf of a group of wealthier peasants who had been evicted from Chililico, to turn this Nahua ejido back into a village with communal land tenure!

Yet Another Land Reform Between 1984 and 1985, over twenty new ejidos suddenly cropped up in the region as a result of the legal actions of Marcelo Hernandez and other legal advisers. These new ejidos were all created out of the properties expropriated by the government in 1981 or other rural estates (outside of the area affected by the expropriation) that the state government decided to buy outright. For example, in the land surrounding the narrow plateau of Yahualica, four new ejidos were created: Olma Segundo, for the peasants of the hamlet of Olma; Luis Cabrera, for a group of peasants from Yahualica itself without land (who did notfitinto the old ejido); Cayetano Perez y Gomez, for a group of peasants who already owned small properties (but without proper titles) and finally, the ejido of Pedro Maria Anaya, for a group of former enclavados from the village of Pepeyocatitla who had refused to join the CAM in 1976. Several of these new ejidos, some of them tiny, consisted of separate slices of land not connected to each other. The seemingly miraculous, sudden granting of land to numerous groups of peasants enabled other peasant leaders with the right connections to recruit new members. For example, two of the new ejidos for peasants in Yahualica were arranged through the intercession of a native son who is a former government employee and a part-time photographer appointed to the Consejo Supremo Nahuatl, who later joined the URECHH. Needless to say, members of these two new ejidos (each of which

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also received its own full administrative apparatus) became his loyal political clients. Of the other two ejidos, Olma Segundo joined Marcelo's new organization, while the other belonged to the organization of former enclavados set up by Genaro Murillo. In terms of their economic class background, these new land recipients (and clients of the state) were quite a heterogeneous group. Originally all remaining privately owned land expropriated by the government was supposed to be given to former enclavados, but it soon became apparent that some of the new ejidos were created by members of the local elite to accommodate loyal peasants "who would not cause any problems." For example, Marcelo Hernandez, together with a member of the wealthy Gonzalez family of San Pedro (who was also a lawyer), used their connections with the agrarian bureaucracy to have a slice of land belonging to the Gonzalez (and then sold to the government) turned into an ejido for two groups of peasants: several former PRI supporters who had been evicted from Santo Tomas by their more radical PST counterparts, and a group of young men from Xochiatipan (affiliated with Marcelo's peasant "union") who could no longer be accommodated in other ejidos.32 In other cases, former landowners became ejidatarios themselves, as in the case of the ejido Antonio Reyes in Huejutla, where a former landowner evicted from Ecuatitla was operating a small farm in 1984 on the same land originally owned (and then sold to the government) by his own relatives.

A Renewal of Direct-Action Land Invasions Although Rossell de la Lama proclaimed that the Huasteca had returned to the' 'rule of law,'' radical peasants in need of land again ignored the law when they realized that newly created ejidos were to be given to "rich peasants," to poor peasants allied to local "caciques" and even to former landowners. Peasants belonging to a variety of organizations now started invading such land, arguing that they did not want such new ejidos to "go to outsiders." Consequently, few enclavados obtained the land they were promised by Rossell. For example, half of a small property near Chiconcoac (near Jaltocan) destined for enclavados was taken over by peasants from the barrio of Toltitlan, while the peasants from the village of La Capilla took the other half.33 The new ejido of Ley Agraria Seis de Enero (promised to enclavados from 32 33

Interview with Marcelo Hernandez, Huejutla, June 5, 1985. Interview with Meliton Hernandez, Barrio Toltitlan (Jaltocan), June 15, 1985.

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the municipio of Huautla) was invaded by the peasants of Tecolotitla. These same peasants, together with those of Atlapexco, also took over another slice of land originally destined as an extension for the more conservative ejido of Tamoyon (which already has its own land).34 Since most of these land invaders belonged to government-linked peasant organizations—whose leaders had constituted Rossell's basis of local support—there was little either the government or the enclavados could do. These were some of the "minor problems still unresolved'' according to a government report (Hidalgo 1986). This report does not mention that a number of villages controlled by the OIPUH (Amaxac and Tosquicac in Huazalingo) have also set up their own ejidos completely outside of the legal system.35 During the last year of Rossell's term of office (1986), political tensions rose asrivalpolitical organizations jostled to establish better connections with potential candidates for the next governor. This same year, Anacleto Ramos, the external adviser for the URECHH, was assassinated.36 During this period of political in-fighting, the government clamped down on any actions that could be interpreted as political protest or dangerous radicalism. Land conflicts in Ixcatlan still escalated, however, and resulted in a number of deaths. This time the CNC itself took the offensive, and its members attacked the two most radical villages, whose inhabitants had not only joined the URECHH but also flirted with the OIPUH. The CNC faction destroyed their houses, and one of these villages was left deserted.37

A Return to Repression The image of prosperity and social harmony in the Huasteca, portrayed in a glossy government brochure printed in March 1986, stands in stark contrast to the endless series of reports in the left-wing press about continued repression, especially against peasants who refuse to leave the OIPUH. After failing to coopt this independent organization, the government had again sent out the army to search for arms and harass peasants belonging to this organization in 1984 and 1985. Local authorities, who joined in the search for peasant radicals, even borrowed the trucks and used the expertise of former landowners. These landowners, whom even conservative peasants refer to as caciques, knew the terrain and instructed soldiers which peasants were the "trouble34

Interviews with Eustorgio Solares, Atlapexco, June 15, 1985; Jesus Palacios, May 9, 1985. On paper, they appear as anexos of other ejidos. 36 Notice in Diario de Yucatan, December 10, 1986. « Interview with Agustin Avila, Mexico City, January 16, 1987. 35

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makers." 38 Several peasants affiliated with the OIPUH were also kidnapped and tortured in the neighboring region of Chicontepec and then brought to Jalapa, Veracruz. These acts prompted a noisy demonstration in Huautla on November 2,1984. In 1985 pistoleros from Huejutla and other places accom­ panied the president of Atlapexco and Feliciano Sanchez (El Chino) from Huitzotlaco on various punitive expeditions to the villages of Emiliano Zapata and Cuatapa. OIPUH bulletins also reported that the Austria brothers returned to Ecuatitla with a band of armed retainers to threaten its inhabitants and then cut down cedar trees on ejido land.39 Investigations by members of Amnesty International and other human rights organizations substantiate this image of repression. Assaults by security forces on members as well as leaders of OIPUH villages increased in 1985 after peasants from this organization temporarily took con­ trol of such villages as Pahuatlan and Xiquila in Huejutla to protest govern­ ment policy.40 In retaliation, policemen entered the homes of various peasants in a small village near Tehuetlan to arrest peasants who belonged to the OIPUH and broke all of their household belongings. The wives of these peasants then staged a sit-in in downtown Huejutla. Even the leaders of the PST and people who have no sympathy for the OIPUH voiced their protests against this blatant oppression. Early in 1986, the plight of these victims was brought to the at­ tention of the Mexican public by members of the OIPUH and other independent organizations, who staged demonstrations in the main plaza of Mexico and set up placards from December 1985 to February 1986.41 In the meantime, a paramilitary band, which included Albino Sanchez (the former PST leader in Mecatlan), attacked members of another independent organization called 42 cuso, operating in Yahualica. After the election of Verduzgo Lugo toward the end of 1986, all political factions stopped their protests and legal actions. Between the formal an­ nouncement of Lugo's victory and his assumption of power on April 1, 1987, the leaders of left-wing organizations that had supported Rossell entered into a series of negotiations with the new incumbent. In the meantime, the cci, the URECHH and the PST had to keep a low profile since they could no longer 38

OIPUH, Boletin Informative no. 7, 11-20. 3» OIPUH, Boletin Informafivo, no. 8, 16. *> Article in UnoMas Uno, February 24, 1986. «• See Uno Mas Uno, December 3, 1985, 7. 42 Article in Uno Mas Uno, December 13, 1985. The OIPUH, CUSO and another organization in Veracruz joined together that year in a larger umbrella organization called the Frente Democratica Oriental Emiliano Zapata (FDOMEZ), which is represented by a solidarity committee consisting of students and young professionals in Mexico City.

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rely on the protection of Rossell de la Lama. However, former landowners and other members of the local elite were more optimistic and talked about getting permission to rent pastures from local ejidos once law and order were restored. These men knew that a new breed of bureaucrats and businessmen were gradually taking control of the region in more subtle ways. This local elite (consisting primarily of former landowners) had still maintained thenpersonal contacts with any remaining peasant clients (including former pistoleros) and used these clients to infiltrate local ejidos and peasant organizations formed in the previous few years. By 1987, the offspring of rancheros who came to power at the end of Mexican Revolution were thus once again partly in control.

Chapter 16

The Politics of Rural Development: New Structures of Class Mediation

Rossell de la Lama's approach to the economic development of Huejutla was quite different from that of previous governors who had always seen privately owned cattle ranches as the essence of the Huasteca. Rossell's vision of the Huasteca of Hidalgo was that of a region of highly productive, collective ejidos, closely tied into the state sector. During his period in office, rural development programs gradually helped to mold a new class structure in which members of peasant communities became economically as well as politically dependent on government bureaucrats. Relations with this new economic class, composed of outsiders or the offspring of "modern" rancheros, involved a radical shift in the use of language and its corresponding set of cultural symbols, symbols which became the basis of new forms of domination and new forms of class struggle. Many of the rural development programs set up in the eighties were closely linked to institutions specially designed for Indian communities. Rossell de la Lama also appointed Ildefonso Maya as one of his informal consultants. However, most of the technicians, extension workers and rural development experts were outsiders, who brought with them a set of preconceptions that were to have a bearing on the patterns of social interaction that emerged. Not only did they have to learn to cope with Nahua peasants whose behavior and attitudes were quite different from Mestizo peasants in other parts of Mexico, but they were confronted with "Indian peasants" who were actually wealthy Nahua caciques or educated professionals. This Nahua elite, as well as bilingual Mestizo businessmen, played up to the dichotomous image of such outsiders. Local entrepreneurs thus took advantage of a situation of ethnic ambiguity to reinforce their position as intermediaries between the majority of peasants and the state.

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Rural Development During the Decade of Land Invasions Rural development programs in Huejutla began around the same time that the peasant revolt broke out. These programs, which were part of the policy of Luis Echeverria to win rural support, were at that time run by a federal agency known as PIDER (Integrated Program of Rural Economic Development), PIDER coordinated the activities of a variety of institutions in charge of agriculture, health and rural electrification. Starting in 1977, a number of large rural communities were selected for a house improvement project (which provided cement, roofing material and the salaries of masons) and the building of prefabricated rural schools. However, the same government that was trying to improve the living conditions of peasants simultaneously promoted the further expansion of modern cattle production which was having such an adverse effect on the local population (see chapter 10). One of the best-funded development projects consisted of the building of special cement tanks for the bathing of cattle as part of a campaign against cattle tick infestation. These cement tanks were constructed by wealthy ranchers (with the government partially subsidizing the cost of construction as well as the necessary chemicals and water delivery service). Not surprisingly, some of these installations were destroyed by peasants during the height of the agrarian crisis, almost as soon as they were completed. In the midst of the political crisis of the Huasteca, a presidential decree authorized another rural development agency specializing in indigenous regions to extend its operations in the Huasteca with an increased budget: the Patrimonio Indigena del Valle del Mesquital y de la Huasteca Hidalguense (Patrimonio, or PIVMHH).1 This institution started introducing mechanized forms of agriculture to the Huasteca. The first set of projects initiated by Patrimonio can be used to illustrate the link between rural development and ethnicity and class dynamics at the village level. These projects are also an example of how institutions designed for native peoples were largely run by Mestizo professionals unfamiliar with Nahua culture or local political realities. One of the first sites chosen by Patrimonio was the politically contentious ejido of Tenexco. Patrimonio helped to build a dirt road to Tenexco and provided materials for the construction of new houses in Plan Huasteco, to the peasants who had been expelled in 1977. Its directors then persuaded the 1

The Patrimonio Indigena was originally established for indigenous (mainly Otomi-speaking) regions of Hidalgo in the fifties.

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comisariado to set up a cooperative farm in one of the invaded properties. A Patrimonio tractor, operated by Mestizo operators from Huejutla, plowed a large field which was then planted with maize. The rest of the work (weeding, harvesting) was done collectively by peasants from all of the villages belonging to this huge ejido, although a small radical faction belonging to the independent organization did not participate. Most people agree that the Tenexco project was an unmitigated disaster. Patrimonio did not provide any training or orientation, some of the tractor drivers andfieldinspector insulted the' 'Indians' ' (told them they did not know anything about agriculture) and, to make matters worse, then pocketed most of the profits (according to the peasants). The failure of this project caused further dissension in Tenexco, and Patrimonio subsequently decided to withdraw from this ejido altogether.2 In contrast, similar projects, undertaken in ejidos that did not include enclavados (and which were not racked with internal dissension), had much better results. This was the case in Tamoyon Primero (Huautla) and Congreso Permanente Agrario (the ejido set up in 1974 with radical peasants belonging to the cci). Here rural extension gained more experience about how to work with Nahua peasants. Several years of rural development work resulted in the introduction of such new agricultural techniques as the use of tractors to plow the land, and the hoe (instead of machetes or huingaros) for weeding operations. In such ejidos, plowing was also done on a collective basis. The tractor is either leased or sold to the ejido, which sets up a special tractor committee, but then each individual is responsible for taking care of his own milpa. These techniques were later adopted by many ejidos in the northern zone. Such new forms of production, however, implied access to flat, fertile land. This was not the case in most of the other already overcrowded ejidos and comunidades.

A Plan for the Rehabilitation of the Huasteca After the announcement that the government would expropriate most privately owned rural estates in Huejutla, another, much bigger, plan for rural development was initiated. This plan involved the two agencies already established for native development: the Patrimonio Indigena (under the direct control of the state governor) and INI (the federal National Indigenous Institute). Most of the agricultural extension was done by the Secretary of Agri2 An attempt to establish a model farm in Tenexco several years later met with the same disastrous results.

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culture and Water Resources (SARH), while agricultural credit was extended by the Bank of Rural Development. In areas controlled by the URECHH (the organization first courted and then captured by Rossell), most rural development projects were done in close collaboration with this peasant organization. Indeed, the URECHH even declared that it was "a party of work," or a producers' organization, primarily dedicated to increasing productivity and raising the standard of living of as many people as possible. This rhetoric reflects its close ties with Gustavo Gordillo, the former PMT organizer who was also involved in the setting up of the Coalition of Colective Ejidos of the Yaqui and Mayo Valleys and the subsequent founding of the National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organizations, an organization willing to work with the government on its own terms (Gordillo 1988). Starting in 1981, all rural communities, including those located in less accessible, more mountainous parts of Huejutla, saw an influx of government employees working for a variety of institutions or agencies. Agricultural extension was initially restricted, as it had been in the seventies, to combating plant diseases (especially in the case of coffee) or suggesting new varieties of maize (which were rarely adopted). Soon new projects were added, however, including the building of special fish tanks for aquaculture, beekeeping (this had been introduced earlier as well) and more feeder roads. Extension workers associated with the SARH also offered easy-term credit to groups of peasants for the production of basic staples (maize, beans) on land dependent on rainfall. This program of credit to traditional corn producers was part of a national policy emphasizing self-sufficiency in grains (a program called the Sistema Alimenticia Mexicano, or SAM) initiated under Lopez Portillo in 1980. The local peasant population was suddenly exposed to a bewildering proliferation of acronyms: SAHOP, IMECAFE, TABAMEX, FRUTIMEX, SARH, CONASUPO, INi. Most of these institutions or programs, which provided social and extension services, were initiated without detailed studies, and few rural extension workers understood Nahuatl. This made it necessary for community representatives and Nahua peasants to use their often imperfect Spanish to communicate with these new coyomej. In fact, Spanish rather than Nahuatl now became the language of dependency (Stiles 1982, 12-13). m the past, bilingual landowners had carried out all transactions with Indian peasants in Nahuatl, thus controlling all communication between peasant communities and the government. After 1980, it became necessary for agrarian peasants to use Spanish to deal with the new state bureaucracy, which was rapidly becoming the new source of all external resources. Development agencies also became one of the main employers of part-time day laborers (as construction

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and road workers) and the principal source of credit for members of ejidos. This new economic and political dependency influenced the vocabulary of Huasteca Nahuatl, which soon included a long list of Spanish words about credit, insurance and various government agencies (Stiles 1982, 127). Initially, many peasants who had gained access to land through land invasions were not interested in working with the government. When agricultural experts started to arrive in large numbers, most people were extremely suspicious of official institutions and skeptical of any promises of help (given the number of times they had been deceived in the past). Extension workers thus had to find key contacts in local communities (such as bilingual teachers or educated peasants) to help them win the cooperation of village assemblies and political organizations. They soon learned that they had to arrive very early in each village (around 6 o'clock) to find the men at home and talk to the village authorities. Even then, they usually had to return for lengthy meetings, which sometimes resulted in the rejection of their proposals. After two or three years of exposure to sometimes bungling but well-intentioned extension workers, the peasant population of Huejutla got used to and accepted most of these rural development programs, just as they had earlier accepted the value of schools. In fact, the number of petitions for projects began to flow in faster than the various agencies could respond. To help these technicians with their work, Ildefonso Maya wrote a handbook for the use of agronomists and technical experts. This handbook gave a detailed account of the unofficial calendar followed by Nahua peasants in their major agricultural activities as well as their festivals. It even included a short explanation of some aspects of classical, prehispanic mythology to give it a more exotic flavor.3 The idea was to help integrate modem scientific knowledge with the traditional know-how and wisdom of the Nahua peasants. In practice, most rural development projects became a new source of patronage and a system for rewarding political loyalty. These projects also became a source of competition between rival political organizations who started to exercise increasing control over the peasant population.4 Apart from providing work or credit for corn production to poor peasants, the rural extension officers provided new opportunities for peasant leaders to strengthen their position as new intermediaries between the state and the 3

Many agronomists thought that this handbook (Maya 1986) was too schematic to be of much practical use. They did not realize, of course, that this book describes the ideal (normative) rather than the actual schedule of economic activities, which varies from year to year. 4 However, many peasants, who had become radicalized in the struggle for land, remained critical of the performance of government technicians and sometimes evicted them or detained them if they were not satisfied.

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largely Nahuatl-speaking peasant population. For example, URECHH leaders like the Hernandez brothers of La Corrala used their access to such resources as a few trucks (donated by the governor) and their contacts with various development workers to persuade additional peasants to join their organization or to withhold services from those who quit or refused to join. For instance, an extremely impoverished hamlet near La Corrala (its only anexo) still had not received most of the basic services provided to most other villages by 1986 because it did not join the URECHH. Peasant leaders affiliated with the URECHH or other peasant organizations also controlled most of the government consumer cooperatives (still under the CONASUPO program) that continued to operate in the region.

The Setting Up of Cattle Ejidos While credit for corn production (including insurance schemes) spread throughout most of the Huasteca, it was much more difficult for rural extension workers to persuade peasants to adopt collective cattle production. While such cattle cooperatives represented possible cash revenue for the community as a whole, they did not provide many jobs. Many poorer Nahua peasants were also unfamiliar with the techniques of caring for cattle or dealing with the bank or cattle buyers. Such peasants knew that the creation of pastures would again reduce the amount of land available for milpa production. However, peasants who had already worked as cowhands or who had owned some cattle in the past were willing to try this new form of cooperative production, which included the possibility of acquiring individual cattle with the profits from communal cattle grazing. One of the few successful cattle ejidos organized by land invaders was Barrio del Salto. Politically this barrio was controlled by an influential peasant leader, Crisostomos Arenas, who was already the epitome of the successful Indian cowboy. Although the barrio of the town of Huautla where he lived had become increasingly more acculturated (most people no longer spoke Nahuatl nor thought of themselves as Indians), Crisostomos Arenas became one of the main Nahua representatives for the region when he was selected to be one of the members of the Consejo Supremo Nahuatl (together with other peasant leaders who joined the CNC). He later became its local president and official representative in Mexico City as well. The ejido of Barrio del Salto, which was created and run by Crisostomos Arenas, was the only one of the four barrios of Huautla whose land was properly divided into equal shares and where all of its members received their own parcels of land for corn

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cultivation. Its thirty-two members also set aside 161 hectares for collective pastures.5 Most of these peasants were poor day laborers, many of whom had already gained some experience working as cowhands. After receiving credit from the government to create a cultivated pasture and buy their first herd, they all worked together to clear their communal pastures. Much of this work, plus the task of taking care of the cattle, was done with faenas (not remunerated through wages), and the profits were distributed at the end of each twoyear period. Apart from cash payments, members of the ejido were also given the offspring of dairy cattle, which then became their individual property. Apart from combining a political career with the administration of this cattle ejido, Crisostomos Arenas also managed to develop a small herd of cattle of his own. Crisostomos Arenas gave me a tour of his cattle ejido in 1986. He proudly showed me how they were managing their pasture better than the former owners (who were evicted from this fictitious ejido). He also pointed out that they had used part of the money they earned from their first sale of cattle, to a private dealer in Mexico City, to build new houses for all of their members and claimed that when some of the ejidatarios received theirfirstchecks (their shares of the profit), their hands shook because they had never seen so much money. One of their members even used his share of the profits to put a down payment on a truck. Because they were not able to save up enough money to reinvest, they decided to obtain more credit from the government-run rural credit bank, but they hoped eventually to attain complete self-sufficiency. In comparing his own ejido to that of Huemaco, which borders on Barrio Del Sal to, Crisostomos explained that this neighboring village had too many people and too little land to be able to run a successful collective ranch. Other ejidos in Huautla that have cattle production (beef and dairy) include El Cojolite and Barrio Bajo. Agrarians from both of these Mestizo communities left most of the pastureland they had won intact. Examples of completely Nahua ejidos that have set up successful cattle operations include Chalahuiyapan (see chapter 13) and Tamoyon, where Patrimonio built a stable for milking operations. The leaders of most such ejidos (and many others as well) are former ranch hands. In contrast, in the Nahua community of Huazalinguillo (also in Huautla), the less experienced peasants, who agreed to take part in a cooperative cattle project, were left heavily in debt. Even more traditional Nahua villages, especially those located in the southern zone (e.g., Pepeyocatitla), have abandoned any attempt to raise cattle or only rent out their pastures to outsiders as a source of extra cash for their community. 5

Interview with Crisostomos Arenas, Barrio del Salto (Huautla), May 15, 1985.

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Other Nahua communities (for example, Santa Maria in Huazalingo) that have continued with collective cattle have not gone into the potentially more lucrative dairy industry. They prefer tofinish(fatten) beef cattle because it is less risky and requires less care. The success of a small number of Nahua cattle ejidos is a reflection not only of access to sufficient land and prior experience in cattle production, but also of their ability to deal with the new rural development bureaucracy, with its specialized language. For this reason, local peasant organizations became more and more involved in helping local peasants deal with these state institutions, as a way of gaining more supporters (and possibly a share of revenues). Municipal authorities and government officials also became more directly involved in rural development projects even though such duties were not strictly speaking in their own domain of experience or responsibility. For example, officials of the Land Reform Office sometimes arranged credit for local ejidos, while people from the rural credit bank became involved in issues related to land tenure problems. These inverted roles, perhaps "irrational' ' or' 'inefficient'' from the point of view of a smooth-running technocracy, illustrate the close intertwining of agrarian politics and rural development in a region that had just witnessed a period of radical peasant revolt. The primary function of both the one-party system and the rural development bureaucracy in such a region was to forge a new political and ideological hegemony necessary for continued state control. Involvement in rural development projects could also be profitable. The same could be said for the more "social" aspects of rural development, such as popular education and the promotion of local culture.

The Rural Theater Project of lldefonso Maya Apart from becoming Rossell's unofficial stage manager and consultant on rural development, the state governor authorized a budget to expand Maya's small museum of Nahua crafts6 and to hire several bilingual teachers to collaborate in a number of cultural projects. Such projects included bringing groups of dancers and musicians from the region to perform in the state capital for one of the television stations. The most ambitious project was a program of Nahua theater. This theater program, called teatro masivo Nahuatl, 6

The museum (where Maya's office was located) displayed all the traditional agricultural tools and other objects of daily use of the typical Nahuatl peasant as well as some of Maya's own art work. This museum (which was later officially renamed the Casa de Cultura Nahuatl) became an informal drop-in center for local politicians, peasants and teachers.

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consisted of open-air group performances put on by the peasants themselves. Maya used his local connections and prior experience to persuade the inhabitants of Nahua villages to collaborate in the preparation of such plays. In return, the villagers were provided with food rations or other forms of assistance. The plays, presented in Nahuatl (with Maya himself acting as director and interpreter), reenacted traditional ceremonies such as Indian weddings and healing ceremonies (which are fast disappearing in the region). Although ostensibly designed to reinforce or revive local Nahua culture, this open-air theater was also directed toward a wider public. For example, one of the larger performances put on in the village of Ceresos (Huautla)—it was even attended by the wife of the governor—was filmed by a crew from a national television station.7 This particular performance in Ceresos can serve as a good example of the dual nature of Maya's theater program and the ambiguous message it presented. Most of the outsiders who attended this play paid more attention to the ritual of a real live shaman whom Maya had persuaded to participate than to the unfurling of flags at the end of the show, which was supposed to represent unity among rival different political parties (symbolized by a marriage alliance between two families portrayed in the play). The broader viewing public (who saw sections of the play on television) were likewise unaware that such open-air performances had a specific political function, namely, to regain people's confidence in the Mexican state, following a period of political crisis. Maya's performances were frequently staged in areas known to be ' 'trouble spots." For example, the theater project in Ceresos was deliberately designed to woo back supporters from the particularly militant and independent 01PUH.8 Maya was partly successful in achieving this goal by getting his theater program accepted in Ceresos despite stiff opposition from the informal peasant leader who represented the OIPUH in this village. However, government officials from the state capital failed to convince this village to participate in other projects. These officials (including an engineer who was the governor's right-hand man) briefly met with the authorities of the village of Ceresos in a closed-door meeting after the play had ended. But, despite a great deal of persuasion, these village authorities did not accept the government's offer of credit and assistance for a rural development project. In the end, the theater program was discontinued and replaced by a mobile library unit (containing 7 I attended this performance and discovered that, apart from the authentic Nahuatl men and women from Ceresos who participated in this event, some of the musicians and dancers were Mestizos from completely Spanish-speaking villages in the region. 8 According to Ildefonso Maya, these theater programs were supposed to convince the population that "they had nothing to fear from the government."

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Spanish books only). The fact that the governor subsequently provided more spacious quarters for the Nahua cultural center in Huejutla and then commissioned Maya to paint a set of murals in the state capital indicates that Maya's loyalty and efforts were nevertheless rewarded.

The Ecological Micropolis Maya's theater project is not the only example of how the multifaceted process of rural development can become the object of new forms of class conflict and the battleground for politicians with opposing ideological views. The intricate relationship between class politics and rural development can be further illustrated by looking at one of the favorite projects of the governor, the Ecological Micropolis, which was mentioned in the previous chapter. From its conception, the Ecological Micropolis, set up in the northwestern portion of the municipio of Orizatlan, was plagued with a host of minor political squabbles. More serious political conflicts erupted when this project, which received a larger influx of funds than any other part of the region, became the arena for conflicts between agrarian peasants and the members of the former rural elite who were put in charge of economic development projects. This project also illustrates the involvement of Mexican social scientists in local politics. One of the institutions most closely involved in setting up the Micropolis was Patrimonio. This development agency built the houses for this resettlement scheme, sent in the heavy equipment needed to clear the scrubland (where earlier pastures were left abandoned as a result of the expropriation) and also lent its tractors for most of the plowing and weeding in cornfields (usually just before the governor was about to pay another visit). When the Micropolis project began, the director of Patrimonio on the state level was Jonathan Vega, who had earlier helped the Nahua peasants of Toltitlan (one of the barrios of Jaltocan) to obtain a cooperative sandal-making workshop. In 1984, Vega sent two social anthropologists to Huejutla, ostensibly to undertake studies of the process of cultural adaptation and to design social programs that would help to facilitate the process of adjustment involved in having people of such diverse backgrounds all come together in one place. However, their primary objective was to raise the political consciousness of the local population and to organize them politically.9 9

One of these anthropologists (Rebolledo 1989) subsequently wrote a thesis, which includes a detailed case study of this project.

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It has already been seen how the Micropolis was first put under the management of two Mestizo schoolteachers, the Ramirez brothers from Cuatapa, one of whom was also appointed to the Consejo Supremo Nahuatl. They both had to commute back and forth to a high school in Veracruz and also owned a house in Huejutla. These teachers brought in their father, a retired teacher and former ranchero who was bilingual and who still had extensive contacts (as former patron and employer) with both Nahua and Mestizo peasants in different parts of the region of Huejutla. When the initial membership of the Micropolis (almost all enclavados) declined to only a half a dozen families, they were able to activate these prior contacts (usually with more conservative peasants) to bring in "real peasants" to take the place of those who had left. However, the government also sent them other groups of more radical peasants, some of whom had previously belonged to the OIPUH. The anthropologists who came to work in the project turned these more radical peasants against the two Ramirez brothers, whom they accused of embezzling funds and absenteeism. This accentuated a factional split between two of the new ejidos in the Micropolis and the subsequent resignation of one of the Ramirez brothers as comisariado. However, the anthropologists underestimated the bonds between the Ramirezes and many of their Nahua clients. They were unable to dislodge the two brothers, and they also failed in their attempts to integrate a group of Nahua peasants from yet another community to the project. Moreover, the governor, Rossell de la Lama, also backed the Ramirezes.10 The anthropologists also organized a union of ejidos to prevent local merchants and politicians from San Felipe from sabotaging the efforts of peasant groups to organize their own commercial operations. The activities of the two anthropologists working with Patrimonio created a furor among many local politicians and administrators, and they were ordered to leave the area for being political agitators. Their sudden departure coincided with a growing split between Jonathan Vega (the head of Patrimonio) and gobernacion (interior affairs) within the state government itself.11 The political mobilization started by the two anthropologists was continued by the PST. Teodolo Martinez, the chief PST leader, had already helped the peasants from Huitzotlaco to join the Micropolis project after they were kicked out by El Chino. The leader of this group of dissident peasants, Nicolas Hernandez, had also supported the anthropologists, and he subsequently persuaded the members of a number of other ejidos belonging to the Micro10 Interview with Ignacio Ramirez, Huejutla, April 28, 1985. " The head of gobernacion, Jose Guadarrama, had closer ties to the local power elite of Huejutla than Vega. Later that year, Jonathan Vega died in an automobile accident. Another, more left-leaning government official, Gabriela Rojo, also lost her life in this manner in the early eighties.

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polis project to joint the union of ejidos. The PST thus reaped the fruits of work done by the anthropologists. Like the Ramirez brothers, this PST leader had a great deal more political experience, as has been seen already. The PST organizers started organizing political rallies in the Micropolis and told the peasants that, unlike the anthropologists who "had acted on their own," the PST was officially recognized by the government.12 The PST leaders pointed out that their party had already managed to win one of the seats in the municipal assembly of San Felipe, PST representatives (like those of other organizations and parties) also accompanied delegations from peasant communities whenever they went to see the rural credit bank or the Office of Land Reform. They argued that they would be able to get problems solved more quickly and projects accomplished more efficiently because of the PST'S connections with progressive agronomists, land surveyors and lawyers working for the government. In this way they managed to win the support of a sizable number of radical peasants in about a dozen ejidos in the northern half of San Felipe, including all of the ejidos of the Micropolis project except Audiencia Publica, which still had a number of more conservative peasants who were enclavados.13 Although the PST leaders exercised a certain amount of influence in the communities involved in the Micropolis project, the new union of ejidos, under the direction of radical peasant leaders, did not join any particular political party. Nevertheless, they faced stiff opposition from local government officials, especially from the former president of San Felipe (Refugio Rivera), who had been appointed as the director for the entire Micropolis project. He perceived the leaders of the union of ejidos, as well as the PST, as dangerous rabble-rousers. Many of these PRI politicians (who held posts in the local branches of the Land Reform Office and other government agencies) belonged to the same families accused of being caciques and exploitative middlemen. Some of these politicians also had good connections with (or were themselves) landowning cattle producers. Such cattle producers had ranches across the state border, but they also rented pastureland from local ejidos (especially after the agrarian revolt). The political and economic elite of San Fepile Orizatlan was firmly opposed to a strong, independent ejido sector. However, the only way they could prevent this from happening was by forging alliances with an emerging stratum of better-off, more conservative peas12 Actually the anthrologists, through Patrimonio, had already managed to get a legal charter for the union. 'J However, the ejido of Audiencia, controlled by Ignacio Ramirez, could also be considered as belonging to the PST'S sphere of influence since Ignacio is the brother-in-law of Teodolo Martinez (who married Ignacio's sister).

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ants. At the same time they at least had to pay lip-service to the agrarian cause and provide some minimum level of services to agrarian peasants to stave off more discontent. However, they first had to wrest away the leadership of the union. Just at the time that the ejidos who had formed their own union were taking control over their own affairs, a group of peasants from the URECHH (who had previously had little contact in this part of Huejutla) attacked the urban center of the Micropolis and looted several houses. This was a clear case of splinter groups within the URECHH being used as a type of shock troop to attack organizations that are becoming too independent.I4 Apart from thus demoralizing the members of the union, local politicians used their connections with government functionaries and their knowledge of the region to overthrow the union executive and to cut off its ties with the PST. They accomplished this by calling a meeting of the union on short notice and then making sure that only the comisariados who had been hand-picked by the president of Orizatlan were represented. The more radical former president of the union, an older peasant from Las Piedras who had been an agrarista during the Cardenas era, was replaced by a former caretaker and ranch-hand who used to be one of the ' 'men of confidence'' of the same landowners. This former caretaker, who also served the comisariado of the ejido of Las Piedras, was purported to be a pistolero. That same year, the former radical peasant leader was assassinated. When I spoke to an official of the secretary of agriculture (SARH) in Mexico City later that year, this official mentioned that the new president of the peasant union of San Felipe was a good choice ' 'because he knows how to control people."15 The higher-level technocrats in charge of all of these rural development operations were for the most part unaware of such behind-the-scenes maneuvering and politicking. Their indirect role in local politics can be illustrated by one of the directors of SARH at the national level in 1987 who was in charge of the SARH office in the city of Huejutla for two years. This man, who spent most of these two years planning budgets, gathering statistics and coordinating the activities of local agrarian technicians, never had the time to become personally acquainted with local peasants, regional customs or the history of the region. However, he was regularly wined and dined by members of the local elite, who presented him with the impression of being efficient, modern 14 This incident happened during a period of increasing internal tension between the URECHH president, Modesto Hernandez, who has much closer ties to the UNORCA, and the more charismatic (but also more corrupt) Margarita Hernandez from La Corrala. The URECHH also received direct funding from gobernacion, according to one informant. 15 Interview with a former SARH official in Mexico City.

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administrators. For example, he established close ties with the head of the SARH office for Orizatlan, who just happens to be the brother of the director of the Micropolis project. Such high-level bureaucrats very much depended on this new class of professionals and businessmen on the local level to implement their programs, even if such programs were originally designed by urban intellectuals who wanted "to liberate the Indian masses."

The Changing Class Structure of Huejutla During the six years following the expropriation of most privately owned land, at least some of the peasants of Huejutla had been firmly incorporated into the state sector of the economy. This state sector managed a significant proportion of the commercial agricultural and cattle sectors through a class of professional administrators, who often belonged to the same families who had earlier been (and in some cases continued to be) modern rancheros. However, not all former rancheros became bureaucrats and career politicians. A segment of the regional elite was transformed into a commercial bourgeoisie. Former landowners (and merchants) invested in the expanding service sector and the urban real estate market of the city of Huejutla. This new commercial bourgeoisie also acted as the middlemen in the commercialization of pilon, coffee and any surpluses of corn. Some of these larger businessmen established direct links with the authorities of more prosperous ejidos while others worked through members of the petit bourgeoisie in the city of Huejutla. One such lower-level intermediary is Noel Rodriguez, a small businessman who owns a hotel in downtown Huejutla as well as a rancho. This man, who was present at the inauguration of the URECHH in 1981, already had good connections in local peasant organizations, and most peasant leaders used his hotel whenever they came to stay overnight in Huejutla. This man became a broker between radical agrarian peasants and members of the former landowning elite who supplied trucks or tractors to local ejidos. Other businessmen who developed close contacts with peasant organizations supplied the peasant population with many new consumer items (such as patent medicines and school supplies). With a changing set of class relations, class conflicts took on new forms; rather than fighting for access to land, peasants in new ejidos now wanted better terms of credit, higher prices for their produce and their own associations of producers. Class opposition also took the more subtle form of simply not having anything to do with government-run development agencies or only pretending to do so. Poor peasants also fought against new forms of internal

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inequalities. It has already been seen that class differences within many peasant communities either were reduced or disappeared altogether in the process of agrarian struggle. However, in some peasant communities that had won their land, the process of internal class differentiation continued or started anew during the boom of the early eighties. New forms of economic inequality also developed on the regional level, in the form of a growing gap in the standard of living between more productive ejidos with access to more fertile, flatter land and ejidos located entirely within more mountainous terrain (parts of the southern zone). Such intraregional disparities also gave rise to new forms of class differentiation among the peasantry when poor peasants from less developed villages started to work as seasonal day laborers in more prosperous ejidos. Instead of working for local rancheros or rich peasants in their own communities, day laborers from poorer communities were now hired by more prosperous collective ejidos, which also sold them part of their corn harvest. For example, not only did poor peasants from the mountainous zone of Huautla (e.g., Acatepec) "help" in the corn harvest in Tamoyon Primero, but the impoverished peasants of Nahua communities near Tehuetlan (such as Chiquila), who had joined the URECHH, even became seasonal day laborers in the tobacco fields and pastures of their own union leaders in La Corrala. Such class relations were now couched in the language of revolutionary rhetoric used by local peasant organizations as well as a new ethos of pan-Indian solidarity. However, these new employees had to live up to their own rhetoric at least in part by continuing to pay the somewhat higher wage rate that came about as a result of the economic and political changes of the seventies and early eighties. Employers were also expected to provide their workers with the customary drink of aguardiente and at least some food around noontime. Day laborers also did not have to work as many hours per day as before 1970. Nevertheless, a new type of patron-client relationship with its corresponding code of ethnics was thus created as part of a new class structure. The few remaining private ranchers and farmers now had to follow this new set of norms as well.

The Politics of Education No discussion of rural development would be complete without at least a brief discussion of the system of formal education. I have already made references to bilingual Indian teachers, who constituted a minor appendage to the education system prior to 1970. By 1980, however, there were two par-

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allel and distinct school systems: the federal system and a parallel system of indigenous education. A special system of education for Indian communities and the training of more and more bilingual teachers had broader political implications because such Nahua teachers were more likely to reside in and become members of Nahua peasant communities.'6 Many bilingual teachers were also exposed to the ideas associated with more radical Indian intellectuals who persuaded the government to adopt a new policy of pluriculturalism. This policy recognized the need for genuinely bilingual education at all levels (Scanlon and Lezama 1982). In Huejutla, a vocal minority of bilingual teachers also supported the demands for educational reform proposed by a left-wing caucus within the teacher's union.17 Nahua teachers who supported this caucus were involved in some bitter fights with the government about who should be appointed local school inspectors. In 1984 they organized a mass demonstration of Nahua peasants to force the resignation of a school inspector imposed by the government. A year later, his reinstatement led to more protest actions, in which radical teachers and peasants put up roadblocks halting all traffic entering Huejutla. The protest organized by radical teachers illustrates the ability of bilingual teachers, who wield considerable influence in Nahua communities, to recruit large numbers of peasants for political demonstrations. Such teachers had to persuade these peasants that their political presence would contribute to the better education and well-being of their children. They also reminded them of the extra services they provided for village authorities, such as typing out agrarian petitions or other forms. In the end, however, more radical demands for the introduction of the Nahuatl language as an integral part of the school curriculum (although officially on the books) came to naught because of both internal divisions among Nahua teachers and the vehement opposition to the idea of Nahuatl language instruction by almost all Mestizos in Huejutla (both old and young). Ironically, many older Mestizo rancheros, who used to denigrate the Nahuatl language by referring to it by the pejorative title of dialecto, today lament the decline of Nahuatl (and their monopoly over communication with 16

Most federal teachers who work in rural villages commute back and forth from larger towns where they reside, while teachers in the indigenous system are expected to stay in the villages where they both teach and provide a variety of services to the population at large. •' The CCL (Consejo Central de Lucha del Magisterio Hidalguense). Its opponents refer to its members as "the dissidents" (disidentes). This independent caucus, whose headquarters were located in Pachuca, also published its own newspaper, which critically examined such issues as the agrarian crisis in the Huasteca, politics in Central America and the role of education in modern society. See Cero, no. 2, 1984.

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the outside world). Some of these Mestizo rancheros (particularly those who taught at some point in their lives in Nahua communities) have even become "experts" on the Nahua culture and language. These former Mestizo landowners, however, also justify the exclusive use of Spanish in local schools by saying that the peasants no longer speak Nahuatl but a "diluted mixture" of Spanish and Nahuatl. They argue that the Indian peasants will become "more reasonable and less radical" if they become fully acculturated, while privately resenting the fact that their former clients, employees and tenants today speak Spanish and "go off to work in the city.'' Their arguments reveal the underlying reason why the policy of pluriculturalism has not been put into practice: they are afraid that the teaching of Nahuatl, especially beyond the primary level, will hinder the inculcation of the values and ideology of the national political system. The internalization of the jargon and the norms of the modern state are essential not only to ensure social control but for the further expansion of the type of rural economic development that will serve the long-term class interests of former landowners and their offspring (most of whom have become professionals and modern business people). Radical teachers not only are opposed to minor caciques on the local level but object to the partnership on the national level of capitalist enterprises and higher levels of the bureaucracy whose control over Mexico is masked by a rhetoric of socialist reform. This is why militant Nahua teachers of Huejutla are considered much more dangerous and subversive than peasant leaders (who can be more easily manipulated).18 This intertwining of education and politics was not confined to the primary system. The last six or seven years have also seen the establishment of institutions of higher education (beyond primary school) in the region of Huejutla. These consist of a limited number of technical high schools (which have a different teacher for each subject), less prestigious television high schools (where one teacher per grade assigns work based on programs piped in on a public education channel) and, more recently, postsecondary technical schools for agricultural subjects plus a two-year program (escuela normal), required before entering teacher's college. These schools are the same as the rest of Mexico (except for a greater emphasis on technical training and agricultural subjects). Although the lower quality of teaching of rural high schools (especially television high schools) puts their students at a great disadvantage in competing with the graduates of Huejutla and other urban centers, most parents have great hopes that additional education will enable their children to be highly successful. In this way, the hopes for upward mobility " Interview with Roberto Mesa, Pachuca, June i, 1985.

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through the education system help to prop up the system. However, the majority of teachers and almost all of the principals of these high schools are the sons (occasionally daughters) of the same families who used to own cattle ranches.19 The people who are today teaching an increasing number of Nahua students of peasant background have close links with the local elite. For example, the principal of the technical high school in Atlapexco in 1982 (who was also municipal president at the height of the peasant revolt) was the son of a ranchero from Coyolapa who had at one time served as ' 'comisariado'' of the fictitious ejido of Tenexco. A former principal of the television high school of Atlapexco also comes from a family of rancheros (in fact, his grandmother was married to one of the Flores of Ecuatitla), and the principal of the television high school in Tamoyon in 1983 was the son of a former landowner of Huautla. The principal of the technical high school of Tlalchiyahualica was the son of Palemon Nochebuena (one of the right-hand men of Juvencio Nochebuena). Similarly, the son of Anacleto Mendoza (one of the landowners of Tenexco) taught at the a new teacher's training school (a normal) just outside of the city of Huejutla. The list could continue. All of these teachers are inculcating the values and attitudes of modern Mexican society to Nahua pupils whose parents recently invaded the landed estates where these teachers were born and raised. Given the class background of most of the people who work in the high schools of Huejutla, it is not surprising that some aspects of the system of secondary education became entangled in the politics of factional disputes, class conflict and ethnic strife. This can be illustrated by a fight over the location of a technical high school in the municipio of Yahualica. Three villages were originally chosen as possible sites: the town of Yahualica, Mecatlan and Tlalchiyahualica (a larger Nahua village). Yahualica wanted a technical high school because it is the municipal cabecera. Both former rancheros and two factions of agrarian peasants were in agreement on this issue. In Mecatlan, the peasants who had initiated land invasions (and who now controlled the village government) also wanted a technical high school. In Tlalchiyahualica, the conservative, anti-agrarian faction (affiliated with the CNC) wanted this school, but the militant faction was opposed to a technical high school in their village because they saw it as yet another way former landowners would maintain their control over their village. Apart from the corn's With the expansion of the education system, better means of communication and the introduction of such facilities as running water and electricity in most of the larger towns, many young professionals who would earlier have left home to pursue careers elsewhere were now able to work in their home regions.

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petition for the prestige and economic advantages of having this technical school, its location became a political issue of some symbolic importance not only in these three villages, but in many other parts of the municipio as well. Radical peasants throughout the region perceived a technical high school in Tlalchiyahualica as a victory of the caciques. Indeed, even the agrarian faction of Tlalchiyahualica was in favor of the Mecatlan site. The issue of the location of this school came to a head during a visit from Rossell de la Lama to Yahualica on February n , 1982. After his helicopter touched down, he was greeted with a large crowd of people from many Nahua villages, including hamlets located at quite a distance (across yet another river and mountain range). A smaller number of people from Yahualica also carried banners for their own town. To avoid a direct confrontation, the governor did not make any commitment, although he made a blunder when he said that the technical school would definitely be built in the municipio (i.e., in some location the government and educated Mexicans defined as a municipio, without specifying any particular village). The governor's statement was misinterpreted to mean the cabecera or town of Yahualica, and a loud cheer went up from the Yahualica contingent. A local politician whispered in the governor's ear, who then quickly clarified what he had said. He also summoned members of the respective education committees of the contending places to a meeting in Huejutla the next day to sort out this issue. But the decision had already been made in favor of Tlalchiyahualica.20

The Effects of the Debt Crisis on Rural Development An economic recession, starting in the mid-eighties, put a damper on any further construction of schools, clinics or roads. Rampant inflation and rising unemployment had a negative impact on all economic classes, especially poor peasants who still did not have access to sufficient land for subsistence agriculture. Such peasants (both Indian and Mestizo) suffered a sharp decline in standards of living, given the lack of social programs in rural Mexico. The drop in oil prices and the subsequent financial crisis also meant that agricultural development projects started in 1981 had to be sharply curtailed. Many extension workers were laid off, while the graduates of new technical schools in the area (many of whom were sons of peasants) could notfindjobs. Before the debt crisis, a fleet of jeeps and pick-up trucks crisscrossed (and crashed) 20 Tlalchiyahualica was probably in a slightly better location than Mecatlan because of abundant fresh water and more space, but the teachers there (one of whom was also the principal of their federal primary school) also had better contacts with officials in the Ministry of Education.

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in every corner of the region that had some sort of a road or track. After the cut-backs, a smaller number of field officers had to share a dwindling supply of vehicles. Many government employees also had to wait for as much as several months for back wages each time the government ran out of money. Such extension workers faced an even greater challenge in helping to keep the new alliance between state and agrarian peasants alive. In terms of real income, day laborers in 1986 earned the same amount of corn (from 2 to 5 cuartillos) per day (or its monetary equivalent) asfiftyyears ago, although his workday was shorter. However, this money had to go much farther because of new needs (school supplies and uniforms for their children, manufactured goods) while the yields of their subsistence plots (in all but the most fertile land) had declined. Even peasants with access to better land and jobs complained about how difficult it was to make ends meet. The impact of the debt crisis was even more disastrous for the majority of peasants who lived in the more mountainous and overpopulated southern half of the municipio of Yahualica, which did not have any roads at all.21 Apart from a sharp decline in income, this part of Huejutla even experienced temporary food shortage, just like those of a few decades ago. The resulting class tension in this part of Huejutla, which had hitherto not experienced overt class conflict, enabled rival peasant organizations to recruit new supporters and organize more land invasions, as has been seen. These peasant organizations, however, were not able to turn such communities into functioning ejidos based on the introduction of new technology and viable forms of alternative employment. Even in the more prosperous Huasteca Baja part of Huejutla, most poor peasants who used to be able to find part-time work felt the negative impact of the economic crisis. These peasants had to rely even more on the subsistence sector to survive. However, at the same time that an increasing number of rural inhabitants wanted to become more involved in small-scale cash crops and subsistence cultivation, the government decided to phase out credit for corn cultivation on land dependent on rainfall, and to put a renewed emphasis on cattle production.

Conclusion A brief period of relative prosperity, which saw the influx of funds from various government agencies, enabled the Rossell government to reestablish 21 The misery in this region has been vividly documented by a team of researchers from University of Hidalgo, who did fleldwork in Nahua village of Tetla (UAH 1986). Many people who have migrated from this village now live in one of the slums surrounding several mining centers in the state capital, where they have found the dirtiest and most menial types of jobs that are available.

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a new hegemony in the region of Huejutla. This hegemony consisted of a new set of rules and expectations, which were still open to a certain amount of negotiation and reinterpretation by peasants, state functionaries and a new middle stratum of merchants and professionals. However, the stronger bargaining position of peasants who had just won back control over land was quickly eroded by worsening economic conditions in many parts of Huejutla. The end of the oil boom and the beginning of a new period of economic decline on both the regional and national levels put great strains on a new system of class control largely based on state patronage. Rural development administrators, extension workers and a new brand of professional political leaders became increasingly caught up in an escalating series of disputes that expressed new forms of factional divisions as well as new forms of class conflict. Despite deteriorating economic conditions and political in-fighting among the elite, however, the time was not ripe for another full-scale peasant revolt.

Chapter 17

Huejutla in a Nutshell: Ethnicity and Politics in Jaltocan

Jaltocan, the smallest municipio of the district of Huejutla, is in many ways the most typical of the region of Huejutla, with all of its diversity and variations. Political trends in Jaltocan can also serve as a barometer of the political temperature of the Huasteca Hidalguense as a whole. The municipio of Jaltocan saw both the first and the most recent land invasions of the Huasteca of Hidalgo. Jaltocan has also seen every other possible type of political conflict. The agrarian conflicts that took place within the boundaries of this municipio in the seventies took the form of an ethnic opposition that came closest to the external image of poor, completely landless Indian peasants pitted against European, Spanish-speaking landowners. At the same time, this municipio is also a good example of class conflicts between rich and poor peasants within Nahua communities, the convergence of economic and political interests between an Indian elite and Mestizo caciques and purely factional disputes (i.e., disputes cutting across class lines) that took the form of both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic opposition. More recent events there also give a fairly good picture of what is currently happening in the region of Huejutla.

The Town and the Municipio of Jaltocan The tiny municipio of Jaltocan is a microcosm of Huejutla as a whole. Although only a small section of Jaltocan ever belonged to any haciendas, many of the Nahua villages located in the northeastern half of this municipio are similar to those found in the northern zone of the district. At the time of the land invasions in the seventies, villages located in this part of Jaltocan were inhabited by day laborers who worked for landowners whose ancestors had established ranchos or small haciendas during the colonial era, long before the liberal reform of the nineteenth century. This is why this part of Huejutla was classified as a zone "intermediate" between north and south.

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Since no ejidos (real or fictitious) were created in this part of Huejutla at the time of Cardenas, labor relations between these Nahua inhabitants and Mestizo landowners were probably not that different from those in northern haciendas just prior to their partition in 1940. Most of these rancheros charged labor rents, and Nahua peasants did not have access to land of their own. Nahua communities in northeastern Jaltocan also resembled their counterparts in the northern zone in other ways. Although some of the older villages in this part of Jaltocan still used toponyms, they did not have an elaborate administrative structure, unlike Indian communities in the southern zone. Also, like the northern zone, once these villages were finally given ejidos in the late seventies, they were all real ejidos. In contrast, the southeastern part of the municipio of Jaltocan, where the municipal cabecera (also called Jaltocan) is located, still preserves its communal land, just like Ixcatlan, Cuacuilco and other former Nahua republicas de indios (see figure 9). Unlike other municipal cabeceras that were once Indian pueblos, the town of Jaltocan has maintained not only its Nahua identity but all of the social and cultural characteristics associated with the typical corporate Nahua community. Indeed, only municipal cabecera in the state of Hidalgo is still organized in this manner. The town of Jaltocan has an elaborate set of Nahua officials presided over by a gobernador. This functionary is in charge of both organizing communal work parties and collecting money for fiestas. Each of its five barrios has a juez and two regidores, who in turn collect money for fiestas and also appoint topiles to do manual labor (cleaning up the plaza). Funds required for putting on religious celebrations are also collected from the inhabitants of a subordinate hamlet (Cuatecomaco) located within the communal boundaries of the town of Jaltocan. In addition, there arefiscaleswho help the gobernador take care of the church. Jaltocan's official or formal administrative system also has a distinct Nahua flavor. For example, unlike all the other municipal cabeceras of Huejutla, which have long ago replaced the names of their administrative subunits with their Spanish equivalents or the names of national heroes, the town of Jaltocan has preserved the Nahua names of its barrios (e.g., Tlalnepantla, Toltitlan, Chalahuitzintla). Even the names of streets (a recent innovation) are mainly in Nahuatl. This preservation of a strong Indian identity can be attributed to Jaltocan's importance as a regional center of commerce and crafts controlled by a Nahuatl-speaking village elite. In many ways Jaltocan resembles such Indian towns in Guatemala as San Pedro and Quetzaltenango described by Waldemar Smith (1977, 178-79). Many of its inhabitants are Nahua traders and artisans who specialize in the making offireworks,and a large number of women operate bakeries or make embroidered blouses. Jaltocan

Huejutla in a Nutshell

FIGURE 9. Land Tenure in the Municipio of Jaltocan

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also has an annual carnival celebration that attracts a large number of visitors precisely because of its Indian crafts. Apart from their commercial activities, Nahua business people own orange trees and coffee orchards or produce pilon (and have recently started to expand cattle production). Moreover, not only are these more prosperous Nahua inhabitants proud to be Nahua Indians, but even some of Jaltocan's Mestizo families identify with the Nahua character of the town. It has already been seen how the municipio of Jaltocan was set up in 1936. Prior to this date Jaltocan was politically controlled by Julio Hernandez, a Nahua peasant who was appointed as juez by Wenceslao Martinez (the former military commander who ruled Huejutla). Julio Hernandez, a minor Nahua cacique, built a large, two-story juzgado (administrative building) that later served as the presidencia (municipal offices) of Jaltocan. This building, which is still used today, was constructed with communal labor (faenas) in the hopes that Jaltocan would one day become its own administrative center.1 This goal was achieved largely as result of the efforts of a small group of Mestizo families, led by Luis Amador (see chapter 8), who owned a rancho called Chiconcoac, bordering on the communal lands of Jaltocan. He was supported in his endeavors to create an independent municipio by a Nahua elite of better-off artisans, merchants and farmers who owned their own small private properties within the town's communal boundaries. These wealthier Nahua families, however, were not interested in actually running for office after Julio Hernandez was assassinated. Rather, until recently, they dedicated themselves to business and left political intrigues to the coyomej. Ethnic relations in the municipio of Jaltocan are similar to, yet more complex than, those in other parts of the district. These ethnic relations must be seen in a historical perspective. The Amadors segregated themselves socially from their Nahua neighbors, although the cluster of houses where they lived was actually located inside of the communal boundaries of Jaltocan. In contrast, Mestizo merchants who lived in the town of Jaltocan itself more readily intermarried with wealthy Nahua families. Although their relations with the small Indian elite of Jaltocan were cordial, however, they treated their Nahua day laborers with the same combination of condescension and racism characteristic of other parts of the region. The Mestizos of both Chiconcoac and the town of Jaltocan, in turn, looked up to and tried to emulate the lifestyle of the descendants of the European families who bought ranchos in the northern part of the municipio. These landowners (referred to as blancos), who 1 Interviews with Juana Flores (who lives in Jaltocan), Atlapexco, June 12, 1985; Francisco Garcia, Jaltocan, June 13, 1985; Meliton Hernandez (grandson of Julio), Jaltocan, June 15, 1985.

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lived in the villages of Vinasco and Huichapa, for the most part intermarried among themselves in order to maintain their "racial purity," although some members of these families nevertheless did mix their genes with Mestizo rancheros from Chiconcoac, and at least one wealthy Indian family from Jaltocan. Thus, while ethnic/racial distinctions remained in force, a network of personal links based on kinship developed among the various strata of property owners belonging to all three ethnic groups. The "white" rancheros of Vinasco and Huichapa also established compadrazgo ties with lower-class Indians and Mestizos. Some of these wealthy blancos (who distinguish themselves from the rest of the Spanish-speaking Mestizos as well as the Indians) also ended up holding the administrative post of municipal president in JaItocan, but, like the smaller Nahua entrepreneurs in the cabecera, they did not get involved in the factional politics between 1930 and i960.2

Ethnicity and Agrarian Politics in Jaltocan When land invasions broke out in the seventies, groups of militant peasants in most of the Nahua villages located in the northern half of the municipio invaded sections of ranchos owned by the landowners from Vinasco and Huichapa (first with the CAM, later with the URECHH). Some of these landowners already lived in Huejutla, but they maintained close contacts with their relatives, who still lived "in the ranchos." Other radical peasants (for example, in Amaxac and Chiconcoac) had already been given land in Congreso Permanente Agrario with the help of the CCI (see chapter 11). Like their counterparts in La Corrala, these peasants saw their struggle for land in terms of an ethnic opposition, since all of the landowners in this part of the region were "coyomej" (as well as blancos). These "white" ranchers and farmers owned numerous ranchos not only in Jaltocan but throughout the intermediate zone corresponding to the municipio of Huejutla (near places such as Cececapa, Zitlan and Lemontitla), as well as in the southern portions of San Felipe Orizatlan. In contrast, the peasants who lived in the town of Jaltocan were not involved in this struggle for land. They did not participate in land invasions 2

The wife of a ranchero from Vinasco who was president of Jaltocan in 1938 told me that she and her husband were Nochebuena supporters, but only to follow the wishes of a friend who was a politician from Tampico. Interview with Helena Monterrubios, Vinasco, January 31, 1989. Other rancheros from Vinasco did not want to criticize or interfere with the actions of the Amadors (to whom they were related) in order to avoid reprisals or blood feuds. Interview with Norma Lara Saenz, Pachuca, February 7, 1989.

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owned by Mestizo landowners, nor did they protest the unequal distribution of land within the communal section (despite the beginning of some cattle production). They were also probably not aware that the Mestizo rancheros who lived in Chiconcoac had already petitioned for an ejido on their behalf in i960, only to be officially turned down in 1972 on the basis that there were no properties eligible for expropriation within the legally defined radius of Jaltocan.3 Only the barrio of Toltitlan petitioned for its own separate portion of communal land.4 These peasants also started their own cooperative craft industries, industries that had hitherto only been run by "rich peasants in the center." The peasants of Toltitlan also refused to serve faenas in downtown Jaltocan or to pay taxes on the urban house plots located on communal land.5 This opposition between poor Nahua peasants against wealthier propertyholding Nahua families who also controlled the informal administrative system of the cabecera was the first indication of internal class tensions in the town of Jaltocan. While there was no overt internal class conflict in the southern part of Jaltocan itself, the Nahua farmers and merchants who lived in the cabecera did become involved in class confrontations with poor Indian peasants from various anexos belonging to Ixcatlan, whose ' 'communal'' lands border on those of Jaltocan. For example, in 1979, a radical group of peasants from Cuaxocotitla not only invaded pieces of land owned by wealthy peasants from Jaltocan within the boundaries of Ixcatlan but took over coffee orchards inside the communal boundaries of Jaltocan. In retaliation, the authorities of Jaltocan and conservative and wealthier peasants in the ' 'cabecera'' of Ixcatlan closed off all the footpaths and mule trails leading from Cuaxocotitla to Jaltocan or Huejutla, thus imposing an economic blockade. After running out of supplies, and without contact with the outside world, the peasants of Cuaxocotitlafinallymanaged to send someone to Huejutla to ask the municipal president (a teacher who also belongs to the Nochebuena family) to intercede on their behalf. The jueces of the four barrios in Jaltocan as well as representatives of Ixcatlan and Cuaxocotitla then held a meeting and signed an agreement that the agrarian peasants would evacuate the land they had occupied. 3 ACAM, ramo ejidal, exp. 1782 (Jaltocan). It seems that this petition was deliberately submitted with the expectation of a negative reply (which came in 1972), so that small property owners bordering on Jaltocan could apply for agricultural credit (as shown by copies of several requests for certificates of inaffectability included in this file). * AHRA, ramo comunal, exp. 107 (Toltitlan). The section of communal land first asked for in 1966 was not close to the barrio but bordered several small properties of Vinasco and La Capilla. A letter from Cuatecomaco (included in the Jaltocan file), written in 1979, also complained about the loss of their section of communal land to landowners from these same two Mestizo villages. 5 Interview with Meliton Hernandez, Jaltocan (Barrio Toltitlan), June 11, 1985.

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In return, the owners of the land in question promised not to seek retaliation.6 This conflict had no ethnic overtones because both landowners and invaders belonged to the same ethnic group. Moreover, the municipal president of JaItocan at the time of this incident, Ramon Sagahun, was thefirstNahua Indian to occupy this post. The fact that he had also sided with the Mestizo landowners of Jaltocan in their dispute with agrarian peasants in the northern part of the municipio shows that ethnic differences do not automatically prevent class solidarity (in this case among members of the upper class). Ramon Sagahun's subsequent involvement in politics on the regional level also aggravated internal divisions among Nahua peasants. Although he was opposed to any form of agrarianism in the early seventies, Sagahun was not averse to manipulating disputes among rival groups of peasants to advance his own political career. For example, he supported a group of peasants from the community of El Potrero (in the northern part of Jaltocan) in a dispute with La Corrala (Gordillo 1981a). Such intra-ethnic factional disputes continued when Ramon Sagahun became president of the Consejo Supremo Nahuatl, the official legal representative of all Nahua Indians. The leaders of the URECHH protested this appointment and accused him of being responsible for persuading the peasants of El Potrero (affiliated with a rival peasant organization) to invade part of the land in dispute with La Corrala only a month earlier (the same day Governor Rossell was scheduled to make his first visit there). Such factional disputes were directly linked to political conflicts at the state level since Sagahun was closely associated with a member of congress, Jose Alva Calderon, who belonged to the faction in Pachuca opposed to Rossell de la Lama. In 1982, when Sagahun finished his term of office as municipal president, he moved to Mexico City to join the permanent committee of the Consejo Supremo. Calderon, the political patron of Sagahun, was at that time interested in being elected a member of the federal congress for Huejutla. However, to obtain official backing, Calderon first had to expand his influence in the local political arena and to ensure the victory of municipal authorities who would support his nomination. When he tried to orchestrate the election of the next president municipal of Jaltocan (with the help of Sagahun), Calderon inadvertently generated afiercepolitical struggle with ethnic overtones, which eventually raised the class consciousness of the town's poor peasants who had hitherto only been passive observers in the political arena. Before looking at the final outcome of this chain of events, it is necessary to 6 Interview with Juan Flores, Jaltocan (Barrio Mirador), June 15, 1985. This person also showed me the written agreement signed by the leaders of all the disputing parties involved.

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examine the municipal electoral campaign of 1984 in the light of ethnic labels and competing interpretations of past historical events. This electoral campaign and the controversies that arose with the defeat of a Nahuatl-speaking candidate can provide further insights into the way in which ethnic labels are used not only by radical agrarian peasants but also by conservative, smalltown merchants and rich peasants who constitute the Nahua segment of the rural petit bourgeoisie. It also illustrates the complex intertwining of political links among local, regional and state-level politicians.

The Municipal Elections of 1985 Most outside observers believed that the 1984 elections for the municipal authorities of Jaltocan, which ended with a three-month occupation of the presidencia at the beginning of 1985, represented a new phase in a "heroic struggle" of the Nahua peasantry. Radical left-wing politicians, in particular, applauded this occupation by Nahua peasants (who defied the government's decision to impose its own candidate against their will) as a ' 'victory of the people." In fact, this electoral conflict was another case of patronage politics—manipulated by higher-level politicians—that led to divisions among the same class of semiproletarian peasants. It was also an example of an ethnic conflict that had more to do with factional divisions involving small town elites than with a struggle for a change in the relations of production. The candidate originally chosen by both Calderon and Sagahun was Luis Amador, the grandson of the original founder of the municipio. Luis Amador, like other members of his family, still lived in the rancho of Chiconcoac, although most of his family's land had already been expropriated for a new ejido for enclavados. Luis did not derive a large part of his income from his rural property since he had studied to be a teacher and subsequently developed a successful career. For example, by the time he entered politics, he had already been the principal of several high schools in the region. Nevertheless, when he started campaigning in Nahua hamlets in the northern part of the municipio, he was almost overwhelmingly rejected by the peasants, who had already won their struggle for land. These radical peasants knew that he was a member of the same family of Mestizo rancheros who had achieved notoriety for their harsh treatment of Nahua subordinates. In their eyes, Luis Amador represented a long line of caciques (all of them members of the same Amador family) who had dominated their villages since 1936. Given the lack of popularity of Luis Amador, Ramon Sagahun decided to encourage another, more popular, person to enter the race for official PRI can-

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didate. Calderon and Sagahun then nominated Valeriano Garcia, the son of a wealthy Nahua peasant and merchant who lived in the center of Jaltocan. Although not an agrarian, Garcia was an acceptable "neutral" choice for the majority of peasants in the northern part of the municipio. These peasants and their leaders (most of whom still belonged to the CAM) decided to back Garcia to prevent Luis Amador from winning. The peasants of El Potrero and a few other villages affiliated with the CNC through the Consejo Supremo Nahuatl were also opposed to Luis Amador. The local (municipal) PRI committee declared Garcia to be their first choice for municipal president. The only people who supported the nomination of Luis Amador were his relatives and compadres in Vinasco and Huichapa and a group of peasants in the rancheria of La Capilla (close to Vinasco). Upon the recommendation of Ildefonso Maya, Luis Amador also recruited the peasant leaders of the barrio of Toltitlan by promising to help them get access to that portion of his land which the government was originally planning to give to outsiders. These peasant leaders (the Hernandez brothers) were the same peasant leaders who had set up thenown huarache (sandal) workshop and disliked the people who lived in the central plaza of Jaltocan. The Garcia faction then took advantage of a factional split within Toltitlan by forming an alliance with a group of peasants who did not get along with the Hernandez. Regional peasant organizations were also drawn into this electoral conflict by virtue of the fact that the Hernandez brothers had recently joined the URECHH. Since the URECHH had become a rival of the CAM and the CNC in other parts of Huejutla, the leaders of the URECHH (who also remembered Sagahun's role in the 1980 conflict between La Corrala and El Potrero) were also favorably disposed to Amador's nomination. Initially, however, the URECHH did not take an active role in the campaign. Everyone else in Jaltocan (including the majority of the population of the cabecera) was in favor of Valeriano Garcia and expected that he would soon head the next municipal government. Then, unexpectedly at the last minute, the state electoral commission decided to give its official approval to Luis Amador.7 Although Valeriano had more popular support, Luis was thus automatically "elected" since he was the official candidate. Such imposition of candidates is not uncommon in Mexico and had happened many times before in the history of the region. However, the state electoral committee rarely misjudges the political mood of the region so badly. One political commentator in the state capital ' A slightly different version of this nomination meeting is presented in a paper by Pablo Vargas (1989, 10), who writes that the Amador family imposed their own candidate in a convention attended by only three out of nineteen communities.

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even suggested that Calderon deliberately provoked the ensuing conflict so that he could "solve the problem" and thus make the merit points he required to become a member of congress (which he succeeded in doing two years later).8 Whatever may be the dynamics of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering preceding this electoral campaign, the victory of Luis Amador caused an uproar in Jaltocan and resulted in three months of political turmoil. As soon as the results of the election were announced, the faction who had backed the nomination of Valeriano Garcia occupied the presidencia and would not let Luis Amador take office. They declared Valeriano as the real presidente municipal and installed him in the presidencia. Every day a new contingent of peasants from different rancherias, including women and children, came into town to take their turn in "defending their government" by keeping a twenty-four-hour watch on their town. Luis Amador (who was provided with the official seals and a budget), located his office in the huarache workshop of Toltitlan. State police also put a roadblock near the entrance to Jaltocan to prevent trucks from Jaltocan from leaving. In turn, the people who occupied the central plaza would not allow outsiders whom they did not recognize to enter the plaza. Tensions rose when several violent incidents occurred. For example, at one point a group of judiciales arrived in a car without license plates and managed to enter the house of Valeriano without being detected, and wanted to take him away.9 As soon as someone realized what was going on, the church bells were rung and the entire town came running to the rescue, forcing the judiciales to retreat. The political stalemate was still not broken when the URECHH sent its members (from various villages in Huejutla) to surround the town of Jaltocan and cause damage to the crops sown by pro-Garcia supporters. The use of URECHH agrarians to harass fellow peasants further illustrates how dirty politics had become by 1985. After three months the governor intervened, dismissed both sets of authorities and appointed a former president of San Felipe Orizatlan (the same person who was also officially in charge of the Micropolis project).

The Influence of Historical Memory and Ethnic Labels The 1985 electoral dispute in Jaltocan illustrates how ethnic labels were used in local politics, and how past events were interpreted in quite contra8 Such accusations, which are often made in the Mexican political scene, are an indication of the Machiavellian nature of Mexican politics. The same commentator also told me that the PST was ordered not to get involved in this dispute, although it had already won the support of many former CAM followers who now backed the Garcia faction. « Interview with Josi Hernandez Bustos, Jaltocan, June 11, 1985.

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dictory ways by opposing sides. The supporters of Valeriano Garcia all told me that the grandfather of Luis Amador and all of his relatives had exploited and humiliated the Nahua population of Jaltocan. They also said they wanted an authentic Nahua candidate rather than the descendant of a cacique and suggested that Luis Amador's grandfather (with the same name) had had Julio Hernandez (the Nahua juez who built the presidencia) assassinated in 1936 because "he didn't want to have an Indian bossing him around." Ironically, the grandchildren of Julio Hernandez were the leaders of the barrio of Toltitlan who supported Luis Amador (and even escorted me to his rancho so that I could hear his side of the story). They, too, remember that Julio was a great hero, but Luis Amador (during my interview) reminded them that Julio had been a revolutionary companion of his grandfather, and that they had also fought together to create the municipio of Jaltocan. While the young Luis Amador represents the sophisticated generation of professionals who are the offspring of Mestizo rancheros, his political image was not helped by the fact that some of his more old-fashioned relatives used derogatory remarks concerning even better-off Nahua families. For example, one of Luis's aunts (the daughter of the original Luis), who lives in the town of Jaltocan, considered Valeriano Garcia and his supporters a "bunch of stupid Indians." She even told me she regretted that her father had helped to found the municipio of Jaltocan since Jaltocan was so ungrateful to the nephew of its principal founder. In contrast, another elderly woman (but a monolingual Nahua-speaker) completely identified with the other side, even though her father had been a Mestizo merchant and an ally of Luis Amador (and one of the original "defenders of Jaltocan" in the days of Nochebuena). Such ethnic rivalries played a prominent role in the factional divisions of Jaltocan. Several people who did not support either side commented that Luis Amador probably would have made a good president, but that he ended up paying for the sins of his ancestors. Both rich and poor Nahua peasants and even some of the Mestizo merchants of Jaltocan were united in their opposition to Luis Amador because he represented the cacique family who had not only exploited the peasant population in the past, but had held a monopoly on political power and discriminated against Indians. However, the fact that the majority of peasants who supported this pro-Indian faction were radical peasants from the northern part of the municipio (who had earlier engaged in land invasions) does not make the ethnic opposition associated with the electoral dispute into a class conflict, as some Marxist analysts might insist. The Nahua "peasants" from Jaltocan with whom the former land invaders allied themselves were the same people who had earlier starved out the agrarian peasants of Cuaxocotitla.

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A Nahua identity and an emphasis on the maintenance of the Nahua language and culture is not necessarily synonymous with being a socialist (as it is in the minds of many of the upper-class Mestizos of Huejutla). Nor do people who support pro-Indian candidates necessarily have to be ' 'progressive." For example, one of the older relatives and supporters of Valeriano was a wealthy Nahua peasant. This man pointed out to me that they needed a Nahua candidate since previous presidents who were outsiders had always embezzled public funds (he cited a former Mestizo president who had come from another municipio). However, during a conversation at the end of the formal interview this political supporter and relative of Valeriano also mentioned lending his best rifle to one of his Mestizo nephews who accompanied a group of landowners from Vinasco to Huejutla "to kill those agraristas"! This incident provides further evidence that wealthy Indians of Jaltocan were politically allied to Mestizo landowners in the seventies. Ironically, although himself an Indian, the person who bragged about his involvement in the persecution of agrarians was also a cousin of his political enemy, Luis Amador, because he had a Nahua aunt who had married one of the Laras from Vinasco. Such apparent anomalies illustrate the ambiguous nature of ethnicity as part of a system of cultural symbols and the complexity of the relationship between ethnic labels and the class structure.

The Development of Class Conflict in the Cabecera of Jaltocan When I visited Jaltocan shortly after the occupation of the presidencia had ended, many of the poorer peasants who live in the town's barrios complained that they no longer had anywhere to grow their corn, and that they could not build any more houses in the land corresponding to the urban section of Jaltocan. These same peasants had taken part in the occupation of the municipal offices in 1985. These disgruntled peasants, however, who were radicalized through their involvement in the political crisis of Jaltocan, soon started to perceive that the very people from the center whom they had supported were their class enemies. Only eight months after the government had appointed a new president to "restore order," these peasants decided to undertake their own class struggles. As a result, a series of invasions occurred within the communal land boundaries of Jaltocan itself. These poor peasants, who complained that they could not use their own communal lands, took over many of the pastures and orchards owned by Nahua farmers and merchants who lived in downtown

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Jaltocan. These internal class conflicts (similar to those that had earlier taken place in Pepeyocatitla, Tlalchiyahualica, Chililico and other Nahua communities) took place during a period of increasing economic pressures, reflecting the impact of Mexico's debt crisis and other forces at the national level that caused decreased standards of living in a local region already faced by severe ecological constraints. These local class conflicts also created internal divisions between radicals and conservatives in most of the barrios of Jaltocan. Thus history repeats itself! In December 1986, these radical peasants also supported a group of bilingual schoolteachers who still belonged to the independent (socialist) caucus. Together, the teachers and the peasants occupied one of the primary schools of Jaltocan when educational authorities threatened to dismiss such teachers in one of these barrios. The radical peasants as well as the dissident schoolteachers were supported by the PST. Both sides in this class conflict (the radical peasants who invaded land in 1986 versus the landowning merchants and artisans) identified with their Indian heritage, but they interpreted that heritage in very different ways.

Conclusions

In a previous study (Schryer 1980, 3-9), I criticized the simplistic view of prerevolutionary Mexico as a country where a handful of absentee landowners (hacendados) ruled over a mass of equally downtrodden sharecroppers, smallholders and peons. My central thesis was that rural Mexico had a much more complex class structure, in which rancheros (previously thought to be "family farmers" of little economic or political importance) constituted a significant segment of the rural elite. My case study of Huejutla, which is an ethnically diverse region, has led me to debunk another dichotomous bi-polar model, that of Mestizo rancheros exploiting poor Indian peasants. In Huejutla, not all Indians were poor peasants. Although there has always been a strong correlation between class and ethnicity, Nahua communities were also internally divided into economic classes. The nature and extent of such internal class stratification havefluctuatedover time, depending on the degree of demographic pressure, the mode of production and the relationship of local villages with external power holders. Class differences go back to prehispanic time, probably continued to some extent during the colonial period and reappeared in new forms in the nineteenth century, when many Indians occupied the same position in the class structure as Mestizo rancheros. This finding raised the question of whether some Indians were really rancheros. To provide a satisfactory answer, it is necessaryfirstto clarify whether such terms as ranchero or Indian are folk labels or analytical categories. From the viewpoint of an objective (i.e., etic) analysis, many Indians in Huejutla were rancheros (as defined in my earlier study). From a subjective (emic) perspective, however, one cannot really say that Mestizos and Indians who occupy the same position in the class structure of rural Mexico are alike. As a folk category, the word indio (Indian) has a pejorative, negative connotation for most Spanish-speaking Mexicans. Even when the term is used in a more positive sense (or when native people learned to use Spanish legal categories to defend their rights), being' 'Indian'' is still synonymous with being a member of an exploited minority. In contrast, the term ranchero, which generally implies Mestizo (as opposed to Indian), has either a neutral or a positive meaning. The word ranchero implies someone who is independent, that is, the owner of a small private estate, or simply one who specializes in cattle raising.

3i8

CONCLUSIONS

In rural Mexico, both the use of the term ranchero (as opposed to hacendado) and the designation of someone as member of an Indian (versus Mestizo) community can obfuscate the class interests of rich peasants or small landowners and their unequal relationships with poor peasants. In Mestizo communities, peasants look up to and admire the village elite and frequently believe that they too can become rancheros. In Indian communities, class relations are legitimized or masked by means of a different kind of ideology that emphasizes communalism and shared poverty. An upper-class Indian is also a member of a common "ethnic class." The fact that the same process of class differentiation is legitimized or masked by means of contrasting cultural values and the way the term indio at the same time holds a pejorative meaning (as part of a broader ideological system of ethnic stratification) illustrates the complex and often contradictory relationship between the economic structure and cultural categories. This complex relationship between relations of production and other aspects of society is also evident when one examines the process of class conflict. The negative impact of the expansion of modern cattle production, undertaken by landowners in Huejutla, resulted in land invasions in both Nahua and Mestizo communities. However, class conflicts by poor peasants who were part-time laborers involved more than just afightfor access to land. The men and women who undertook direct-action land invasions also fought over legal definitions, cultural values and control over village governments. Moreover, the struggle to change their society was expressed in different ways, depending on the nature of local level administration, land tenure systems and ethnic relations in each part of this diverse region. Such variation in what some scholars would call the superstructure could only be explained historically, by tracing its origins back to the colonial period. The examination of the history of the region of Huejutla provided insights into both the economic and noneconomic causes of class conflict. To understand fully why both Nahua and Mestizo peasants took part in a violent peasant revolt in the seventies it was useful to investigate why peasants in the same region did not do so in the previous century. Past peasant quiescence could largely be explained in terms of the regional system of production, which was rooted in an ecology characterized by the interdependence of cattle raising and subsistence cultivation in a geographical region with abundant vegetation and relatively low population density. These conditions were compatible with a "moral economy" or a "subsistence ethic." A "moral economy' ' does not imply the absence of an economic class structure in the Marxist sense, nor does the presence of paternalistic forms of class control mean that peasants were never subject to abuse by local authorities. Naked exploi-

CONCLUSIONS

319

tation or outright robbery happened often enough, especially during and after the Mexican Revolution. However, peasants were not ready to rebel en masse until there was a more general breakdown of both the norms that regulated interclass relations and the ecological equilibrium upon which such relations were based. Even then, more "class-conscious" poor peasants had to wait for the right set of political circumstances. Apart from doing a historical analysis—which tries to reconstruct "what really happened" as accurately as possible—it was necessary to examine people's historical memories of past events. In some parts of Huejutla, agrarian peasants were absolutely convinced that local landowners had invaded the ejidos that the government had given to them in the thirties or forties, while many of these landowners were equally adamant that their properties had been legally constituted as the result of the liberal land reform of Benito Juarez, and that these properties had never been turned into ejidos. These historical memories (filtered through the perspectives of different class interests) shaped the discourse used to justify people's political actions. Radical peasants emphasized the exploitative nature of the hacienda system or the use of coercive forms of labor by municipal governments. In contrast, commercial farmers and ranchers pointed out that the blatant abuses of the system of caciquismo had already disappeared long before the outbreak of land invasions. They also emphasized the increase in standards of living and the opportunities available to hard-working peasants. Some people changed their evaluation of the past once a peasant revolt erupted. For example, prior to 1970, more educated and progressive landowners criticized Juvencio Nochebuena for his abuses of power, but after 1975, these same landowners lamented that the former cacique was no longer alive to prevent chaos and anarchy. These competing images and interpretations were part of an ideological battle that became intertwined with an armed conflict over land. The overt class conflicts that took place in Huejutla transformed both the class structure and many of the cultural values and legal definitions found in the region. Such transformations (especially those relating to land tenure) suggest that the peasants won their battle against landowning cattle producers—certainly many more peasants today are again able to cultivate the soil for both food and a small cash income. The majority of peasants, however, still depend on some other source of income and have become dependent on (and indebted to) the government-controlled bank. At the same time, members of the local elite have not lost their economic power, notwithstanding their complaints that' 'the Indians have taken over." Not only did large landowners receive compensation, but many have become commercial middlemen, and some have even bought new farms and ranches in neighboring

320

CONCLUSIONS

states. Former landowners also continue to exercise political influence by manipulating and even joining peasant organizations. Others have become government functionaries or professionals who now run an expanded system of education, rural development programs, and even the Land Reform Office. Despite the fact that open class confrontations have come to an end as a result of a combination of repression, cooption and reform, the class struggle still continues (in a less dramatic fashion) under new forms. The issues today are not so much access to land, though this is still important for many peasants, but more favorable terms of credit, the elimination of middlemen and the creation of new sources of employment. This struggle is also waged within the education system, where a minority of radical teachers are leading a new kind of battle against the ideological hegemony of the state. These teachers want to introduce a more meaningful set of values and symbols needed to bring about further changes in society, including a greater sense of self-worth and ethnic pride among impoverished Nahua peasants. However, not all Nahua teachers or other types of professionals of Indian background are necessarily helping to bring about a more egalitarian society. It has been seen how various Nahuatl-speaking lawyers and teachers, who were also agrarian leaders or politicians, have become intermediaries in a new system of economic exploitation and political control. These intermediaries, who form part of a new educated elite, also portray themselves to outsiders as Indians. The emergence of an educated native elite in small provincial cities, who act as intermediaries between the state and Indian peasant communities (and in the process improve their socioeconomic position) is not something that developed only in the twentieth century. Recent colonial historians, especially those specializing in the eighteenth century, have noticed a similar pattern of upward mobility by better-off and more educated Indians who also portrayed themselves as "true Indians" and "defenders of the race." Like some of today's professionals in Huejutla who were born in Nahua villages, colonial small-town elites used native languages and maintained patron-client relations with poor Indians while simultaneously living in a larger Spanishspeaking Mestizo world. An examination of the history and politics of Huejutla led me to reject a set of widely held assumptions about ethnically diverse rural regions in Mexico: the equation of class and ethnicity, the notion of the classless Indian community and the belief that all Indian communities located in the same geographical region (and where people speak the same language) are basically alike. Scholars specializing in Mesoamerica, especially anthropologists, have added greater weight to these assumptions by focusing on the cultural values

CONCLUSIONS

321

and rituals that give the impression of egalitarianism and effective leveling mechanisms in Indian communities. This image of the egalitarian corporate community—engaged in an ethnic struggle against Spanish-speaking landowners—is often reinforced by popular historical accounts that portray the Mexican Revolution as a struggle between Indian peasants and Mestizos landowners. Such romantic and simplistic interpretations have been effectively debunked by professional historians (particularly members of the' 'revisionist school") and social anthropologists. However, many other anthropologists, sociologists, development historians, geographers and political scientists (especially those who are not Mexicanists) are familiar only with the earlier interpretations of the revolution and subscribe to the old model of the closed corporate peasant community. Such scholars still tend to interpret contemporary indigenous regions in Mesoamerica too much in terms of a continuity of a caste-like colonial system resulting from the Spanish conquest. Most scholars have also ignored the tremendous diversity found not only between but within rural regions. For this reason my study of the Huasteca of Hidalgo draws special attention to the tremendous variation among communities whose inhabitants belong to the same ethnic group. Nahua villages located in areas that were once republicas de indios are quite distinct from those located within the boundaries of former haciendas. Apart from differences between the northern zone (dominated by haciendas until 1940) and a southern zone (which saw the emergence of a ranchero economy), there are also communities that had once been Nahua but are today considered to be Mestizo villages. Likewise, Mestizo villages founded by European immigrants differ from those resulting from the influx of Spanish-speaking Mestizos from other parts of Mexico. Like their academic counterparts, government officials and technicians who worked in the Huasteca of Hidalgo did not appreciate the degree of variation in land tenure, the use of ethnic labels and the informal systems of administration in different parts of Huejutla. Their mental picture of the agrarian structure of Huejutla combined the image of European hacienda owners exploiting Indian day laborers (true to a certain extent for the northern zone) and the image of corporate communities with elaborate ceremonies (true only for the southern zone). These outsiders thought that the owners of large haciendas (or Mestizos who became rich during the revolution) had recently confiscated almost all communal lands belonging to egalitarian Indian villages throughout the region of Huejuda. This model of Huejutla as a region with the same agrarian structure and the same type of Nahua communities led the Mexican government to apply a single policy or the same political tactics to the entire region. People working in institutions like Patrimonio or INI did

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not modify their programs in accordance with such internal social and cultural diversity. Apart from debunking a series of misconceptions and stereotypes, my study has tried to transcend both sides of the debate about the role of ethnicity in the development of class conflict. The argument that ethnic identity in rural Mexico reinforces class conflict, and the opposite position that ethnicity is a block or hindrance to the development of class consciousness, are both inadequate. Religion, formal education and the complex legal system of Mexico have been examined in a similar fashion. Many scholars either argue that these institutions are functional for the continuation of the class structure or try to show that these same institutions or values can be incorporated into a revolutionary transformation of society. Both sides of the debate are right, yet they are also both wrong for not taking a more holistic, dialectical approach to the study of class conflict. In the region under investigation, various aspects of its social organization and culture (including ethnicity) reinforced the class exploitation of poor peasants by capitalistic landowners. Yet all of these aspects of society also became integral components of a class struggle that reached the level of a full-scale peasant revolt. Likewise, existing social and cultural elements were incorporated into the hegemonic project of a local upper class of merchants and government functionaries, yet these same elements also became ingredients of an ongoing class struggle. One-sided analyses, which only look at ethnicity or the law in terms of how they function either to maintain the class structure or to facilitate the development of class consciousness, must be substituted with a more interactive methodology that combines the study of structure and process. Such an approach must pay as much attention to the creative actions of class agents as to the determination of infrastructure and/or superstructure. Finally, the reciprocal influence of the different theories and images held by people both in Mexico City (or Pachuca) and in Huejutla cannot be dismissed. Such images not only reflect the class interests of their respective subjects but also have their own internal dynamic. For example, the top stratum of landowners (or former landowners) saw all peasants as Indians. Similarly, the poorest, most destitute monolingual Nahua peasants saw all landowners as coyomej. These perceptions coincided with those held by outsiders, who also tended to conceptualize the social structure of Huejutla in such dichotomous terms. Consequently, when poor Mestizo peasants were struggling for land, they learned to portray themselves as members of Indian communities (but only to outsiders and government officials) if the villages where they lived had once been Nahua communities. Similarly, the equation—in the minds of the local elite—of socialism and the preservation of the

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323

Nahua culture can explain why experiments in native education (already approved by the Mexican government) have not been introduced in the region of Huejutla. It is not sufficient, however, to provide empirical evidence that certain theories or models do not "fit the facts." One must also show how these "misconceptions" (from the viewpoint of an outside observer) are an integral part of the reality being analyzed. One should also recognize that Mexican researchers who are politically involved in rural Mexico often have a different view of the relationship between class and ethnicity from "more objective" (less politically involved) foreign scholars. Yet it is also much easier for foreign scholars to forget about the interaction between theory and practice. Theories, including those of academics, directly or indirectly influence the purposive actions of people even in remote rural areas. In the case of Mexico, academic theories about ethnic relations and the peasantry have been particularly important in the formulation of public policies concerning rural development and education. These same theories have also guided people engaged in political struggles directed against the government as well as against local elites. Even if the theories are incorrect (from the perspective of other researchers), they do affect the actions of social change agents (whether outsiders or local leaders), whose behavior and ideas in turn shape the type of analysis done by social scientists. This reciprocal influence of theory and practice needs to be incorporated into an analysis of the complex and often contradictory relationship between the class structure and such aspects of society as cultural values and ethnic relations.

Postscript

No dramatic new developments have taken place since the time this book was written. During the 1988 presidential campaign, the PST in Huejutla jumped on the Cardenista bandwagon and changed its name to the Partido Frente Cardenista para la Reconstruccion Nacional. Some former caciques also supported Cuauhtemoc Cardenas on the national level, and according to the official count, they received about 20 percent of the popular vote in Huejutla. The internal split within the URECHH between Modesto Hernandez and Margarita Hernandez continues, but they both gave their support to the Salinas de Gortari, the official PRI candidate who ended up winning the national election. Their informal adviser, Gustavo Gordillo, who is now a high-ranking government official in the SARH, is channeling many of its resources into URECHH-affiliated peasant groups through the UNORCA umbrella organization. The FDOMEz (including the OIPUH) boycotted the elections and organized their own demonstrations and sit-ins in Mexico City at the same time that the Cardenistas protested the fraudulent outcome of the elections. On the local level, the former pistolero who took over the union of ejidos of San Felipe is now presidente municipal after a hotly contested set of elections in which Refugio Rivera (the former director of the Micropolis project) was pitted against his own brother (the local SAHR official). Apart from the factory in Atlapexco (which still does not have washrooms) and a small maquiladora operation in the Micropolis (associated with the Liverpool department store chain), no employment is yet available for most women in Huejutla. Many peasants are still hungry and unemployed. Plus $a change, plus 9a reste la meme chose.

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Index

Acalamatitla, 273-74 Acatepec, 166, 184, 197-98, 275, 296 acciones, 90 acculturation, 28, 4 2 , 4 3 , 48, 60, 86, 180, 1 8 1 , 183, 224, 234, 236, 253, 298 Achiquihuixtla, I35n, 1 6 1 , 240 administration. See government administrative centers. See cabeceras Africa, 18-20. See also Hutu; Rwanda; South Africa; Tutsi agente de ministerio publico, 57 agrarian code, national, 48, 69, 137 agrarian conflict, 4-6, 54-56, 75, 153, 160, 201, 205, 2 1 8 , 237, 247, 254, 303; classic image of, 189; in England, 9; how perceived by outsiders, 252-53; outbreak of, 243; outcome of, 252, 296; variations in, 10. See also class conflict; land invasions; peasant militancy; peasant revolts agrarian leaders, 47, 122, 130, 1 4 1 , 147, 190, 2 1 5 , 2 1 8 - 1 9 , 238. See also peasant leaders agrarian movement, 70 agrarian peasants, 47, 159, 196, 202, 2 1 3 , 2 1 5 , 2 1 7 , 234, 239, 272, 291, 310, 319. See also agraristas; peasant militancy agrarian petitions, 129, 1 3 1 - 3 2 , 297; phony, 137. See also land petitions agrarian politics, 1 3 , 47, 69, 136, 190, 194, 196-98, 205, 252, 256, 289, 3°7- end of,

tion; coffee; commercial agriculture; subsistence cultivation; sugarcane agronomists. See technicians aguardiente, 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 , 296 Ahuizotl, 75 air transportation, 138, 162, 263, 269n Alavi, Hamza, 9, 25 alcaldia mayor, 76, 77n, 79, 80, 8on, 81, 82n alcohol abuse, 1 4 1 , 158, 2 2 1 , 223 Aleman, Miguel, 128, 137 altepetl (altepeteme), 32n, 77 Althusser and Balibar, 24 Alva Calderon, Jose. See Calderon Amador: family in Jaltocan, 95n, 130, 137; Luis Sr., 130; Luis Jr., 310, 3 1 2 , 3 1 3 , 3 1 4 Amaxac, 188, 197, 307 America: companies of, 1 6 1 , 168; people of, 5 1 , 207, 269. See also foreigners Amnesty International, 280 "amoral familism," 230 amplicacidn, 70 Anahuac, 80 Anaya, Loreto, 97, 100. See also titulos de Anaya Andrade: Anibal, 53; family in Huejutla, 103, 263; Jesus, 102, 103, 106 anexos, 10, 69, 100, 135, 142, 144, 172, 189, 202, 220, 228n, 233, 236, 237, 264, 266, 269, 308; boundaries between, 270; of ejido,

137 agrarian reform. See agrarianism, land reform agrarian structure, 92, 1 3 1 , 189, 321; variations on local level, 75, 252 agrarian uprisings. See peasant revolts agrarianism, 127, 129, 1 3 1 , 194, 196, 264n, 309; decline on national level, 138; renewal, 186, 192-93; token, 123. See also agrarian politics agraristas, 1 3 1 , 199, 214, 237, 294, 314. See also agrarian peasants; peasant militancy Agricultural University of Chapingo, 273 agriculture: crisis in, 168, 251; mechanization of, 169, 283, 284. See also banana produc-

135, 166; Mestizo (of Nahua cabecera), 215; Nahua (of Mestizo cabecera), 238. See also subordinate hamlet anthropologists, 1 1 , 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 1 > 27, 34-36, 43, 45, 183, 2 1 1 - 1 2 , 216, 229, 235, 246, 248; political involvement of, 238n, 291-93, 32021 Arabia: origin of, 60; people of, 5 1 . See also Lebanon Arenas, Crisostomos, 208, 2 1 5 , 245, 287, 288 Arizpe, Lourdes, 25, 36-37 armed confrontations, 144, 145, 147, 150, 179, 180, 196, 202, 207, 217, 219, 220-22, 248, 266. See also guns

INDEX

344

armed retainers, 47, 124, 132, 134-35, 148, 150, 199, 2 1 7 , 218, 249, 280. See also guns; pistoleros army, 60, 150, 173, 180, 204, 205, 209, 2 1 1 , 2 1 8 , 222, 225, 229, 248, 261, 264, 265, 273, 306; barracks, 50; private, 147, 221,

Barrio Del Salto, 239, 287-88 Barth, Frederick, 22 Bartra, Armando, 40 base-superstructure, distinction, 23, 24, 322 Bassols Batalla, Angel, 5 1 , 55n, 169 belief [vs. social reality], 10, 35, 185, 218,

222

Arteaga: family in Atlapexco, 179; Miguel, 230 artisans, 94, 107, 238; European, 60; Mestizo, 95, 138; Nahua, 207, 304. See also craft production 2g

assassinations, 4, 122, 124, 126, 1 4 1 - 4 2 , 144, 145, 147, 148, 192, 199, 200, 202n, 20 3 n, 205, 206, 209, 2 1 3 , 2 1 7 , 218, 220, 2 2 1 , 236, 2 7 1 , 279, 294, 306, 3 1 3 ; different interpretations of, 221 assimilation, 18, 26, 29, 45, 89 Atempa, 56, 63n Atencuapa, 135, 160 Atlaltipa de Huitzotlaco, 6 1 , 135 Atlaltipa de Tecolotitla, 236, 238 Atlapexco: municipio, 55, 56, 57, 90, I20n, 129, l63n, 170, 180, 199, 203, 2 1 5 , 232, 233, 239, 262, 264, 266, 268; town, 50, 77, 95, 96, 97, 1 1 9 , I 2 5 n > 128, 133, 137- 138, 140, 144, 156. 179, 200, 2 1 5 , 235-38, 264, 279, 281, 299; village, 93 Atlapexco-Tecolotitla, as ejido, 237 Atotomoc: hamlet, 135, l67n; as name of land, ,, ' , 90n; pueblo, 84,96 . . . „ Augustinians, 8in Austria, family from Ecuatitla, 120, 203, 281 . . ^ ... , * , Austna: family in Tepehuacan, 1 3 1 , 202, 206; Honorato, I2 5 n, , 3 1 Avila, Agustm, 2 1 2 , 245 Avila Camacho, Manuel, 128, 137 ayuntamiento, 77, 9on Aztecs 3 30 75 76 182 Azuara: Antonio, 141; politicians originally from Huejutla, 1 2 1 , 150 Badillo: Emiliano, 157, 209; family in Huejujjj0 tja banana production, 40, 53, 162, 165 banditry, 124, 140, 143, 145-47, I48n, 150, 183, 319. See also outlaws Ban field, Edward, 230 banks, 152, 158, 285, 288, 289, 293, 319 Banuelos, Herlinda, 5 1 , 6 3 n , 66n barrio, 61, 80, 81, 83, 187, 208, 234, 239, 287, 291, 304, 308

256, 320, 322. See also ideology; worldview Be|tnin

Pedr0

m

2QI> 2 0 5 6o,

sm

,

„

m 6

^ „

8?y

g6>

I3I>

I42 I95 ' ^ ' I77' 17 "'243' 247' 248, 253, 282, 292. See also language bish

°p:

Huejutla> I 2 2 ; TehuantepCC

also Catholic

'

201

'

See

Church

blacks, i8n, 43n, 1 1 3 blancos (ethnic category). See whites Blok, Anton, 143 Bonacich, Edna, 26 Borah, Woodrom, 9n, 30 Boserup, Esther, n o Bourbon dynasty, reforms under, 31 Bourdieu, Pierre, 8 bourgeoisie, 23, 36, 58, 295; Nahua segment of, 310; "peasant," 92; petit, 295, 3 1 3 Bravo, family in Huautla, 129, 2 1 5 Briseno, Juan, 1 1 7 , u 8 n bureaucracy, 145, 150, 186, 198, 252, 262, 275, 276, 281, 285, 289, 294-95; agriculw r a l 8n> 2 g . c o l o n i a l 9 5 ; former landowners . , ... ,, m, 260; revolutionary, 150; specialized lan, „ „ , guage of, 289. See also government; tecnni. ClanS

businessmen, 46, 178, 179, 187, 207, 2 1 7 , 2l8

' 2 3 3 , 26°' 2 6 3 ' 2fi7' 27°' 2 S l ' 282; landowners as, 142, 234; Nahua, 306; new

claSS

'

295; offspring of former landowners

'

Bustos: family in Xochiatipan, 126, 180; Isidro, 9 8 ; Preciliano, 98 Cabanas, Lucio, 262 Cabazos, Marcial, 120 cabeceras, 10, 3 1 , 32n; ceremonial centers, 80; colonial, 80; different meanings of, 87, 300; of e idos j , ' 3 5 , 234, 237; Indian, 64, 86; informal use of term, 136, 233, 239, 270, 271; Mestizo, 50, 57, 58, 235 Cabrera Licona, Jose, 125, I26n, 133-34, 138, 146-47 cacicazgo, 123, 124, 127, 128, 147, 1 5 1 , 178, 196. See also cacique; caciquismo

INDEX

345

cacique, 1 3 , 35-36, 3711, 55, 1 1 4 , 1 1 8 , 123, 125, 129, 1 3 1 , 135, 1 4 1 , 143, 147, 1 5 0 - 5 1 , 160, 1 8 1 , 183, 184, 185, 196, 201, 203, 206, 2 1 3 , 2 1 7 , 218, 220, 2 2 1 , 245, 246, 259, 266, 2 7 1 , 277, 278, 279, 293, 298, 300, 303, 306, 3 1 3 ; "agrarian," 134; colonial, 30, 3 1 , 79, 101, 250; defined, 37n; Indian, 33, 34, 35, 9m, 149; Nahua, 84, 1 2 1 , i23n, 1 4 1 - 4 2 , 147. 180, 207, 2 1 1 , 233, 282, 306; ranchero, 123, 217; revolutionary, 1 2 1 26, 149. also armed retainers; caudillos caciquismo, 35, 37n, 127, 145-49. ' 5 ' , 183. 197, 220, 319. See also cacicazgo Calderon, 309-12 Calles, Plutarco, 1 2 1 , 122, 123, 126, 127, 149.

147, 148, 155; tick infestation, 152, 159, 283; vagrancy, 155, 166. See also dairy production; ranch cattle raising, 3, 70, 82, 1 1 1 - 1 3 , 143, 152, 153-55, 159, 172, 179, 282, 295, 301, 308, 3 1 7 , 318; collective, 240, 242, 266, 287-88; expansion of modem, 5, 1 3 , 152-56, 1 5 8 6 0 , 162, 169, 1 7 0 - 7 1 , 173, 174, 186, 223, 2 8 3 > 3 o 6 i 3 i 8 ; i ntr oduced at time of conquest, 76. See also ranch; rancher caudillos 193 Cayahual, hacienda, 89, 98 Cececapa, 9 1 , 122, 307 Cedillo, Saturnino, i2on, 149-50 Central America, 2 9 7 n

'5° Calnali, 55, 56, 1 1 9 , 184 Camera, Fernando, 28 campesino, label, 59 Campesinos Unidos de la Sierra Oriental (cuso), 280 Cancian, Frank, 36 capacitados, 1 7 1 capital, 44; accumulation of, 3 0 - 3 1 , 36, 37, 92,

Central Campesina Independiente (cci), 7 m , ^ I9?> i g 9 2 0 0 24I? 2 ? 5 ; 2g0j 30^ Central de Lucha del Magisterio (CCL), 297n C e n t r o C o o r d i n a d o r a l nd igenista. See Institute Nacional lndigenista C e n t r o N a c i o n a l d e Comunicacion Social (CENCOS), 202 Cerecedo (family in La Candelaria): Daniel,

93, 156, 166, 171 capitalism, 18, 2 4 n, 28, 29, 45, 146, 254, 260 Cardenas, Lazaro, 126-29, 1 3 1 , 132-34, 137, 146, 149, 150, 155, 157, 183, 194, 198, 241, 250, 276, 294 Careta: family in Huejutla, 104; Jesus, 9 8n cargos. See civil-religious hierarchy Caribbean, i 9 n , 3 on casco

- 104 cash advances, on wages, 156, 162, 168 cash crops, 28, 29, 33, 38, 58, 9 1 , 92, io 9 n, 140, 156, 1 6 1 , 162, 242. See also commer7 . cial agriculture ^ case, 17, 1 , 5 , 3 2 1 Castillo, Agustin, I42n, 2 5 1 - 5 2 „ „ Catholic Church, 32, 77, 8in, 82, 122, 123, i28n, 183, 185; involvement in local politics, .' . . . . o. . c 201-2; liberation theology in, 1 8 1 , 201. See also priests Catorze de Mayo (Fourteenth of May), peasant movement, 204 cattle, 3, 38, 40, 69, 82, 83, 89, 92, 102, 103, i n , 1 1 3 , 1 1 8 , 1 2 0 - 2 1 , 126, 138, 1 5 3 - 5 7 , 1 6 1 , 168, i69n, 208, 230, 287, 288; Cebu, 158; confiscated, 204; in ejidos, 287-89; exchanged for Indian slaves, 76; finishing of, 154, 159, 289; haciendas, 81-83; quarantine, 138—39; rustling, 1 3 , 140, 142, 144, 146,

1 1 7 ; Felix, 106; Lucio, io6n ^ 2gQ chalahuiyapan, 104, 132, 242-43, 248, 262,

Ceresos>

2g8

Chalma (in Veracruz), I44n, 160 chamoux, Marie-Noele, 42-45, 6 3 n Chance chatmos

John

lg

32

e(hnic grQup

43

Chayanov, A., 40, 41 chiapaSi 3I > ,98n chicaderas
1 2 1 > l 3 2 < 137. I42n, 144, 148, Hernandez Mendoza, Antonio, 7 m , loin, 275 ' 5 7 , 162, 169, 170, 179, 180, 199, 200, 231 232 234 237 262 269 278 Hewitt de Alcantara, Cynthia, 35 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 3°7"8' Hildago, state of, 3, 5 0 - 5 1 , 54, 55n, 1 0 1 , 1 2 1 , 3 " , 322; city, 3, n , 4 m , 50, 53, 58-60, 6 6 82 128, 130, 164, 196, 206, 259 ' > 94-96, 100, 104, 107, 122, i26n, I32, I42 I46, I47 I5 high schools, 159, 164, 200, 206; private, 254; ' ' °' 151' ls6' l6°' l 6 2 l 6 4 I 9 5 , 2 0 3 social background of principals, 299; techni' ' ' 2 0 5 - 7 ' 233> 248, 261, 269 cal, 298-99, 300; television (telesecunda• 2 1 ^ 2%0' 2™< 3 ° 8 ' 3145P"rtido, 57, 8 j ; PrehlsPanlC s t a t e ' ™ " ^ P o n s , 66-71, rias), 298-99. See also education 76 l highland districts, 55, 84, 1 3 1 . 154, 206, 310. ' « > I 3 1 ' 3 2 I ; * a d e fair' l 6 2 ' „ , ... also northern zone; southern zone; lntermediSee also Sierra Alta „ . , . . . . . . „ ate zone Huejutla highway (paved), 1 5 1 , 154, 155, 160, 162, „ . * o i I , . Huerta, Victonano, 1 1 8 165, 183, 195, 269-70. See also roads ... j, j, yj, y Huextetitla, 185, 200, 262, 271 Hill, Robert, 86 „ ' , Hueyactetl, 96, 171 historians, 8, 1 1 - 1 2 , 27, 30, 32-34, 42, 6 m , ueytlale, 7 1 , 91 H 79, 229-30, 250, 320-21 Huichapa, 60, 9 1 , 1 0 1 , iogn, 136, 162, 189, historicist school, 8 204> 248> 3 „ history: different interpretations, 10, 12, 192, Huichapan (in southern Hidalgo), i2 9 n 3 1 2 - 1 3 , 3 1 6 , 319; native interpretations, 7n, huingaro, 1 1 3 25, i87n; oral, 1 1 . See also memories Huitzachahual, 104, 205 Huitzitzilingo, 1 6 1 , 275 homicides, 142-43, 200, 214, 220-21. See also assassinations Huitznopala, 66n, 185, 239 Horowitz, Donald, 17 Huitzotlaco, 135, 144-45, 190, 202, 203n, huapango, 3, 62n 2 1 1 , 219, 225, 280, 292 Huasteca: Alta (higher), 5 1 , 56; Baja (lower), human rights violations, 202 56, 75, 168, 301; of Hidalgo, 3, 5, 14, 5 m , hunger strike, 274 54, 56, 58, H I , 1 3 1 , 140, 146, 262, 303, Hutu (in Africa), 18 321; image of prosperity, 279; proposed new state; 53; as region, 3, 5, 30, 34n, 45, 5 1 , identity, 29, 45, 5 1 , 62, 89, 250, 306; com54, 55n, 58, 76, 82, 85, 88, 102, 117n, 122, 128, 1 5 2 , 154, 163, 169, I79n, 183, 195, 201, 204, 209, 255, 259, 261, 275, 278, 289, 297n; of San Luis Potosi, 5 1 , 116; of Veracruz, 84, I30n, 190, 195

plexity of, 22, 24, 26; multiple, 59. See also ethnic identity, Indian identity; Nahua identity ideology, 5, 18, 24n, 29, 129, 149, 177, 178, 1 8 1 , 2 1 3 , 216, 248, 256, 291, 298, 3 1 8 ,

352

INDEX

ideology (cont.) 319; of communalism, 44-45, 204, 318; of ethnic stratification, 22-24, 114- See also belief; worldview Ilamatlan (in Veracruz), i23n, 254 illiteracy, 57, 7 1 , 164 Image of Limited Good, 35, 230 IMECAFE, 285 immigrants, 22, 26, 60, 88 incarceration. Sec jailing income, monetary, 38, 40, 301 Indian, as pejorative label. See indio Indian, term synonymous with exploited minority, 58-59, 208, 3 1 7 Indian commune. See comun de indigenas Indian community, 6, 10, 12, 26-29, 3 1 - 3 3 . 36, 42-46, 49, 60-62, 66, 68n, 79, 89n, 93, 96, 223, 232, 3 2 1 ; administrative and legal structure, 43n, 45, 241, 304; authorities of, 93; encroachment on, 7, 9, 33; fight for autonomy, 10, 86; internal strife, 45; perceived as classless, 27, 29-30, 34, 36, 245, 252, 320; presence of non-Indians, 43; values and institutions of, 4, 28, 29, 36, 37, 42-43, 45, 47, 49, 179; wealth (class) differences in, 29, 4 1 , 43-46, 49, 7 1 , 79, 84, 100, 3 1 7 . See also corporate peasant community; Nahua community; village administration Indian identity, 14, 27-28, 29, 33n, 36, 42, 43, 206, 250, 252, 304, 320 Indian heritage, 60, 3 1 5 ; competing interpretations, 3 1 5 Indian nobility, 3 0 - 3 1 , 79, 250. See alsoprincipales Indian pueblo, 75, 77, 79, 86, 89, 9 1 , 93, 250, 253. See also republicas de indios Indian republics. See republicas de indios Indians: as ethnic group, 3, 20, 3 0 - 3 1 , 37, 43, 60, 91; legally recognized, 89n, 250 Indianness, 29, 43, 252, 256 indigenismo, I98n, 200, 250-51, 253, 255 indigenous, 7, 29, 54 indio, as pejorative label, 23, 59, 249, 284, 317-18 industrial: process, l8n, 37; sector, 169 inflation, 300 institutions, parallel sets of, 19 Institute Nacional lndigenista (INI), 198, 207, 220, 246, 255, 261, 267, 284, 321; coordinating centers, I98n, 207, 255

Integrated Program of Rural Economic Development (PIDER), 283 intellectuals (intelligentsia), 33, 256, 259, 297; Mestizo, 255; Nahua, 33, 254-55 interactive analysis, 250-53, 323 intermarriage, 60, 91, 229; across ethnic lines, 235-36, 306 intermediaries: economic, 33n, 37, 1 6 1 , 293, 295. 319-20; political, 149, 275, 282, 286, 320 intermediate (transitional) zone, of region of Huejutla, 68, 70, 83, 89, 9 1 , 103, 122, 137, i8 9 . 209n, 248, 303, 307 internecine fighting. See factionalism interpretive school, in anthropology, 7n irrigation, 106, 262 Italians: as mission priests, 228; as newcomers, 9 1 . 1 '7n Itzocal, 90, 135, i67n Ixcatlan, 66, 103, 107, Ii8n, 130, 1 6 1 , 233, 248, 277, 279, 304, 308; as Nahua pueblo, 81 Ixtlahuac, 61, 70, 1 1 8 , ii9n Ixil Country, as case study, 19 Jacala, 121 Jacobs, Ian, 149-50 jailing of landowners, 200, 218; of peasants, 4, 86, 201, 208-9, 222, 260-61, 276 Jalapa (in Veracruz), 280 Jaltocan: Nahua pueblo, 81, 83; municipio, 14, 55, 57, 68, 100, 130, I45n, 1 6 1 , 162, 188, 197. 199, 204, 270, 303-14; town, 50, 66, 68n, 95n, I30n, 208, 252, 270, 291, 303-4, 307-8, 3 f O - ' 5 Java, 28 Jayarwadena, Chandra, 22 jefe politico, 54, 95, 97, 102 jornaleros. See day laborers journalists, 220, 245 Juarez, Benito, 94, 187, 319 judicial boundaries. See village administration judiciales, 47, 312. See also police juez, 57, 86, 234, 304, 306, 308; consiliador, 57. 95. 100, 142; menor, 57; deprimera instancia, 5 7 n, 95 juzgado, 57, 64, 86, 306 kidnapping: political, 200, 280 kinship (and family), 5, 6, 1 3 , 35, 62, 143,

INDEX

353

145, 179, 216, 225, 227; mistresses, 143-44, 184. See also marriage Knight, Alan, 124 Korean War, 159 Koreck, Maria Teresa, 7n, i87n Kuper, Leo, 18, 20

237, 314. See also communal land; ejido\ land reform; land titles; privately-owned land; renting of land; sharecroppers; sociedad; tenants land titles, 97-100, 190, 199, 261; colonial, 232 landlessness, 4, 6, 143, 145, 172

La La La La

landowners, 4, 7, 9, 1 1 , 18, 34, 53, 58-60, 70, 83-84, 96, 1 1 4 - 1 5 , 178-79, 200, 205, 2 1 5 , 216, 222, 242, 250, 293, 322; absentee, 3 1 , 35, 47, 92, 189, 198, 229, 2 3 1 , 235, 246, 317; association, 261; compensation to, 263, 319; as members of ejidos, 136, 278; modem > educated, 164, 319; Nahua, 58, 1 7 1 , 234; other sources of income, 1 1 6 ; support agrarians, 215 language (linguistic factors), 4, 6, 18, 2 1 , 42, 45, 50, 72, 136, 177-78, 229, 244, 246,

Candelaria, 106; hacienda, 103, io6n, 1 1 7 Capilla, 188, 197, 278, 3 1 1 , 318 Coneja, i73n, 249 Corrala, 9 m , 130, 188-89, 192, 195, 2089, 249, 253, 262, 2 7 1 , 287, 294, 296, 307, j La Herradura, 154, 179, 197; as hacienda, 104, I42

"laindiada," 1 1 9 La Mesa de Lemontitla, i 3 8 n , 195; hacienda, I04

la Mesa Larga (de Santa Lucia), 96, n 9 n , i j 6 n , 1 4 m , 220, 272-74 laborrents, 104, 106, 1 2 0 - 2 1 , 132, 162, 190, labor shortages, 1 2 2 , 1 2 5 ladinos, 20, 22; ladinoization, 29 land invasion, 3 - 5 , 7, 9, 13, 22n, 38-39, 4 1 . 46-48, 54, 58, 69, 75, 127, 177-78, 185, 188, 190, 192, 195, 197-200, 203-4, 206-9, 211,215-18,222,224-25,227,232,23435, 2 3 7 - 4 1 , 243-45, 246-49, 2 5 1 - 5 2 , 254, 259-64, 266, 268-70, 274, 276-79, 283, 286-87, 299, 301, 303, 307-9, 3 1 4 - 1 5 , 318 land petitions, 70, 135, 138, 147, 188, 195, 197, 214, 232, 236; ignored, 148 land reform, 68, 70, 122, 1 3 1 , 137, 143, 146, 150, 155, 177, 183, 186, 188, 193, 194-95, 197-98, 200, 2 1 1 , 218, 233, 251; in eighties, 1 3 , 259-60, 277-78; liberal, 1 3 , 85, 97-98, 100, 107, l87n, 259-60, 277-78, 319; in thirties, 4, 36, 128-29, 1 3 1 - 3 3 . 135-37, i87n, 194, 241 Land Reform Office, 50, 70, i22n, 186, 187, 190, 192, 207, 233, 237, 252, 262, 268, 273, 289, 293, 320 land tenure, 5, 6, 9 - 1 0 , 26, 28-29, 32-33, 3435, 48, 6 8 - 7 1 , 75, 77, 81, 90, 96, I20n, 125, 134-36, 138, 143, 158-59, 174, 18687, 205, 207, 218, 232, 234, 239, 260, 289, 293, 3 1 4 , 318; different interpretations, 7 1 , 222, 227, 242; legal aspects, 9, 14, 3 1 , 32n, 33, 69-71, 86, 120, 136, 137, 189, 192, 195, 230, 233, 244, 260-61, 277; urban,

2

5 ° - 2 8 2 ; o f dependency, 285; of domina- 8> 2 6 ; a s e t h n i c m a r k e r ' 6 1 • 6 4- 89; monolingualism, 37, 4 1 , 57, 125, 164, 169, 250, 268; statistics on, 57; radical, 24; of re-

tion

sistance l6

'

'

207

'

See also bilin

Sualism;

Na

"

huatl; S p a n i s h l a n g u a g e f a m U y in Y a h u a l i c a

' " 9 ' I 2 1 - I26> I29, > 2 l 8 " I 9 ; G ewnimo, 1 2 3 , 129; J S6 1 1 8 14111 ° ' ' 1 Lara fami 'yin Vinasco' 9I' 3 1 4 Lartigue, 88n Las Pledras ' 57", I48n, I73n, 249 Latin America, 17, 28, 3 1 , 227 law ' 5- 9, 26, 205, 218, 2 7 1 , 276, 278; different interpretations, 87, 272; "and order," I 4 8 2 6 l ; taking in o w n hands ' - I 4 3 ' ! 99> 2 See also 7>'egal disputes; legal system; lawyers I30

'

I46

lawyers, 58, 106, 179, 293, 320; in politics, 2 75> 278 Lebanon, 26, 5 1 , 60. See also Arabia legal disputes, 82, 83, 83n, 90, i6gn, 186, 188, '90, 247, 250, 268, 3 1 8 , 319 'egal system, 107, 136, 187, 275, 322; assistance provided by, 132, 2 1 2 , 263, 276; manipulation of, 9. See also government; land tenure legitimacy: of caciques, 3 7n, 213; of state, 14, 193-94, 259, 264n Lemontitla, 172, 209, 253, 307 leveling mechanisms, 27, 32, 35-36, 43, 230, 321. See also civil-religious hierarchy Lewis, Oscar, 33, 34

354

INDEX

LeyLerdo, 97 Liberals, 32-33, 84, 93, 98, 107, 303; ranchero, 94 liberation theology. See Catholic Church litigation. See legal disputes livestock, other than cattle, 30, 40, 92, 166 Lockhart, James, 30 Lolotla (in highland district), 55, s6n Lona Reyes, Antonio, 201 Long, Norman, 8n looting, 224 Lopez Portillo, Jose, 200, 259 Los Coyoles, 205, 249 LosOtates, 104, i32n, 262 Lukacs, George, 8

Maximilian of Austria, 53, 94 Maya, Ildefonso, I23n, 207, 220, 246, 253-56, 259, 282, 286, 2 8 9 - 9 1 , 3 1 1 mayordomo: as estate supervisor, 68; as sponsor of fiestas, 28, 37, 47, 66, 24on, 243. See also civil-religious hierarchy Mazahuas, 36-37 McCutcheon McBride, George, 90 Mecatlan, 6in, 99, 124, i25n, 1 7 1 , 219-20, 234, 272-74, 300 Med€cigo: family in Huautla, 179, 196; Manue[j medical doctors, 58, 179, 182 memories, of historical events, 10, 127, 220, 3 I 9 S e e a f s o history

Malaysia, 5, 6 machismo, 1 5 1 Macuxtepetla, 6 1 , 130, 233, 253; pueblo sujeto, 81 Madero, Francisco, 1 1 7 maize, 3, 30, 38, 47, 53, 58, 82-83, 8 9, 92, 100, 102, 104, 1 0 9 - 1 1 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 5 , 120, 124, 142, 153, 155, 158, 162, 165-66, 172-73, 183, 236, 242-43, 276, 285-87, 291, 295, 301, 314; commercialization of, 296; goddessof, 183; yields, 1 1 0 , 165-66. See also subsistence cultivation Mallon, Florencia, 44 Manriquez y Zarate, Jose, 122-23 Mariel, Francisco P., 1 1 7 - 1 8 market places, 47, 50, 205, 236. See also tianguis marriage: controlled, 124; of convenience, 60, 1 4 1 ; multiple, 143. See also kinship Martinez (family of peasant leaders): Pedro, 206-7, 269-70; Teodolo, 206, 238, 267, 269-70, 292, 293n Martinez, Wenceslao, 1 2 1 , 123, 1 2 9 - 3 1 , 1 4 1 , 306 Martinez Palaez, Severo, 31 Marx, Karl, 2 in, 24 Marxism, 1 8 1 , 196, 204 Marxist analysis, 8, 1 7 - 2 3 , 36, 3 1 3 , 318; structural, 24-25, 34 masehuali (or masehualmej): as ethnic term, 5 1 , 59, 142, 187, 236, 2 5 1 , 275; pre-hispanic usage, 31 massacres. See repression Matachilillo, 9 1 , 188 Mauritius, I9n

Mendoza, Anacleto, 162, 196, 264, 299 mercedes, 79, 81-82 merchants, 30, 35, 38, 47, 50, 53, 55, 58-60, 82, 94, 260, 292, 310, 322; Indian, 46, 255; itinerant, 160-61; as landowners, 47, 260; Nahua, 4, 33n, 95n, 160, 252, 254, 270, 3 1 1 , 314; Otomi, 51; rancheros as, 92 Mesoamerica, 3n, 7, 12, 17, 19, 2 1 , 27, 29, 45, 62, 77, 232, 242-43 mestizaje, 29 Mestizo, as ethnic group, 3-5, 42-43, 5 0 - 5 1 , 54-55, 58-59, 6in, 88, 3 1 7 - 1 8 Mestizo community, 26, 29, 34, 36, 44-45, 57, 61-64, 70, 91, 229, 235-36, 3 2 1 ; administrative and legal system, 239; class conflict in, 234, 238-39, 274-75; class differences, 225-27, 235-37; cultural values, 62, 145, 238-39; factionalism in, 235, 239. See also open peasant communty; ranchero Metztitlan, 3 1 , 79n; district, 55n; senoria, 75 Mexican Revolution, 10, 13, 33, 34, 36, 48, 53-54, 68, 103, 107, i n , 1 1 5 , 1 1 7 - 2 6 , 1 3 1 , 149, 153, 157, 160, 166, 183-84, i87n, 193, 220, 222, 250, 281, 3 1 3 , 319; romantic interpretation, 321 mexicano, 3n. See Nahuatl Mexico: central region (highland plateau and valley), 3 1 - 3 2 , 55, 79, 82, 88, n o ; northera, 32, 44; southern region, 22, 28, 36. See also Huasteca; rural Mexico Mexico City, 3, 14, 30, 33, 37-38, 76, 79n, 82, 102, I23n, 128-29, 138, 140-41, I44n, 149-50, 154-55, 160, 163, 169, 186, 188, 205, 2 1 3 , 234, 237, 254-55, 2 59, 275, 280, 288, 294, 309, 322 Michoacan, 36

INDEX

355

Micropolis project, 267, 273, 291-94, 312 Middle East, 26 middle peasantry, 40, 58 middlemen. See intermediaries migration, 55; forced, 23; internal, 32, 37, 80,

315; survival of, 96-100; values and institutions, 42, 61-64, 1 0 1 • 124, 224, 230, 241, 249-50; visible traits, 239; wealth (class) differences, 38, 42n, 48, 93, 96, 99, 107, 1 2 5 , 166-67, 240. See also corporate peasant

i°4 migratory wage labor, 42, 48, 58, 72, 167-69, 1 8 0 - 8 1 , 225, 236, 238, 240. See also wage labor military. See army milpa, 40, 103, 106, 1 0 9 - 1 2 , 136, 155, 162, 165-66, 172, 2 1 1 , 236-38, 266, 276, 287. See also maize; subsistence cultivation mining, 40, 53, 76, 82, 168 miscegenation, 60, 307

community Natma cultural center, 253, 291. See Maya; Nahua folk culture Nahua folk culture, 62, 290; communal feasts, 2 2 2 ; ; n i o c a \ museum, 255, 289; loss of, 49, 6 2 2 3 9 ; p reS ervation of, 256, 323; theater, 2 g 9 _ 9 0 . W eddings, 62 N a h u a l d e n t l l y > 5 9 > IOO> ^ 304> 3o6> 3 , 4 N a h u a n a m j n g s y s t e n l ) for p e o p l £ i , j , 3 7 , 6 3 65, 68, 7 1 , 247, 304. See also surnames

m o b T T S * socldmobili mobility. See socia mobility Moctezuma Xocoxotzin, 75

Nahuas: in Cardenas era, 130; in nineteenth century, 106-7; political role; as stigmatized „ , „ . minonty, 249. See also Consejo ... , Nahuatl language, 3,4,6,34,37n, 39,50,54, e 6 . . „ „ 0 58-62, 83n, 91, 124-25, 138, 157, 178, 180-81,206,208,236,243,245,248,251, ' ' ' . .. 255 ' 285-86 297-98, 314; decline

modernization, 138, 145, 1 5 1 - 5 3 , 163 ... , „ / . • ^ Molango, 5 m , 55-56, 8in, 206; district, 56n, 84131 , j , , ,„ 0 molienda, 92, I30n, 158, 164, 167-68, 1 7 1 . also sugar loaf Monaghan, John, 86 , ,. „ money lending. See usury . o c , moral economy, 1 1 4 - 1 5 , 177, 318. See also subsistence ethic Morales, Jos6 Maria, 156-57 . . . Morelos, state of, 33 Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), 2 ? 3

_

7 4

mule: driving, 143, 160; trails, 88, 1 0 1 - 2 municipal presidents, 57, 157, 273, 280, 3079, 3 1 2 municipio: amalgamation, 95; creation of, 95; different meanings of term, 86-87, 300 murder. See homicide Murillo, Genaro, 260, 263-64, 278 Murphy, Robert, 8 music, as ethnic marker, 24n, 62, 62n, 239, 2g9 Nahua community, 37-42, 48, 61-66, 96-100, 242-43, 304-6; administrative and legal system, 47, 62-64, 66n, 85, 92, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 107, 224, 224n, 2 3 9 - 4 1 , 304, 3 2 1 ; as "captive" (manipulated), 1 0 1 , 1 1 7 , 134, 24on, 245; factional disputes, 70, 244; gerontocratic tradition, 62, 96; inside former hacienda, 28, 66, 104, 106, 242; internal class conflict, 232-34, 239-44, 246, 254, 256, 303, 308,

,n

' 2 5 3 ; as l a n g u a g e o f d e p e n d e n c y ' 2 8 5 1 tac" tical advantage, 250 ., Naranjo: family from Tecolotitla, 1 2 1 , 192, J . Fell e ^ P - '9°213; Narc.so, I 3 5 n , 215 Nash, Manning, 27n B ' Natlonal Com an P y f o r P o P u l a r Subsistence (CONASUPO), 1 9 4 , 2 0 1 , 2 8 5 , 2 8 7

natural, 89 natUral disasters

ics

' 5'

l63

'

l83

'

also e

Pidem"

Nestlfi s, i6in P ° P u l a t i o n c e n t e r s . '99, 202, 20 3 n, 207, 234 ' 264-65 N e w S ain P > l8> 7 6 ' S e e a l s o c o l o n i a l e r a newspapers. See press coverage Nex a r P ' 48n, 205; hacienda, 104 Nicaragua, 256 "Nilos," 219, 266-67. See also Hernandez of new

Huitzotlaco nineteenth century, 10, 1 3 , 32-33, 44n, 53-54, 6o 8 i 8 « " 5 - 8 8 - 8 9 , 96-97, 103, 106, 143, 200 > 303, 3 l 7 Nochebuena, Crisantos, 147-48 Nochebuena: era, 218; faction, 218 Nochebuena: Alberto, I45n; ancestors of Juvencio, 89; Eduardo, i45n; Edwiges, i63n; family from Atlapexco, 1 3 1 , 206, 308; Joel, 135,

356

INDEX

Nochebuena (cont) 14511; Miguel, I28n; Nereo, 127, I28n, I29n, I44n; Palemon, 129, 135, 299 Nochebuena, Juvencio: general, 1 3 , 1 2 7 - 5 1 , i63n, 179, 185, 194, 197-98, 203, 2 1 5 , 235-36, 250, 299, 307n, 3 1 9 Nochebuenismo, 142 northern zone of Huejutla: under Cardenas, 1 3 1 - 3 2 ; under colonial rule, 81-83; internal conflicts in, 241-44; in nineteenth century, 1 0 1 - 6 ; as socio-economic subregion, 66-67 Nufio de Guzman, Beltran, 76n

Pahuatlan, 280; pueblo sujeto, 81 Palacios: family in Atlapexco, 146, 215; Jesus, 238; Pedro, I38n Palaez, Manuel, 53 Palo Gordo, 61, 66n Panacaxtlan, 81, 9 1 , 100, 233, 270 panela. See pildn Pan-Indian solidarity, 296 Panuco, 82; province, 76n; river, 76 paramilitary forces, 147, 221, 280. See also armed retainers; army; pistoleros Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (PMT),

Oaxaca, 3 1 , 43, 79-80, 223; city, 18 Obregon, Alvaro, 149 occupation, of government offices, 200, 2 1 5 , 310, 312, 314 occupation: multiplicity in, 40; specialization of, 38, 72 oil, 53, 102, 129, 263, 300; boom, 261, 302 Olma, 42n, 92n, 276-77 Olma Segundo, ejido, 277-78 open peasant community, 28, 36, 42, 44, 230,

201-2, 205-6, 208, 285 Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), 195-96 Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), 14, 206, 208, 224, 2 5 1 , 265, 269, 2 7 1 , 278, 293, 310—11; PMR as predecessor, 129. See also government Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), 206-8, 219, 222, 224, 237-38, 260, 262, 265, 267-70, 272-74, 278, 280, 292-94, 3i2n, 3 1 5 pasados, 62. See civil-religious hierarchy

234-35, 242. See also Mestizo community opposition political parties, 195, 206, 260. See also Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (PMT); Partido Popular Socialita (pps); Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) oppression. See repression Ordaz: Desiderio, 200; family from Coyolapa, 19°, 215 Ordones, 129 Organization Independiente de los Pueblos Unidos de las Huastecas (OIPUH), 204, 206, 209, 2 1 1 - 1 2 , 219-20, 225, 234, 241, 256, 26465, 279-80, 290, 292 Orizatlan; municipio, 55, 56, 57n, 68, 82, 909 1 , 103, 104, 1 3 1 , 132, I48n, 1 6 1 , 170, 195, 200, 204-5, 208, 26?, 267, 275, 291, 294, 307, 3 1 2 ; town, 58-59, 60, 157-58, l 6 l , 248, 267, 293-94 Osborn, Wayne, 79a Ospina, Gabriel, 35 Otomf: ethnic group, 5 1 , 54; language, 283 outlaws. See banditry

pastures, 47, 89, 94, 106, 1 1 2 , 140, 153-58, 164, 166-67, 169-73, 189-90, 2 1 1 , 234-35, 237, 269, 287-88, 291, 314; communal (or collective), 1 1 2 , 138, 172, 242, 244, 266, 268, 277, 287-88; cultivated with grasses, 3, m - 1 2 , 138, 152-55, 158, 172; permanent (fenced), 138, 1 5 3 - 5 5 , 158-59, 162, 232; renting of, 281, 288, 293 paternalism, 37n, 106, 1 1 4 , 122, 125, 142, 149, 15711, 180-81, 200n, 261, 318 Patterson, Orlando, 22, 23 Patrimonio (Indi'gena del Valle de Mesquital y d e l a Huasteca Hidalguense), 207-8, 283-84, 288,291 321 patronage (patron-client bonds), 1 1 5 , 128, 139, I 4 I _ 4 2 i I 4 6 _ 4 ? j I 5 0 i ? 7 ) j 8 i , 2 1 3 , 216, 2 2 ? > 2 3 1 , 250, 259, 262, 280, 286, 292, 2 g 6 2 9 g 3 I 0 > 3 2 0 . b r e a k _ d o w n o f > 2 3 0 ; po _ lkical, 207, 212, 262, 278, 302, 309 peasant community, 7, 33-36, 43-46, 6 1 , 2283 I ; a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and judicial system, 60, 238-39, 290; anthropological 66 2 2 % 2 J I

Paajtla, 99, 183, 240, 246 Pachuca, 128, 129, 144, 149, 163, 190, 195, 200, 208, 259, 261, 309, 322; mentioned as state capital, 14, 69, 95, 122, 140, 148, 154, 157, 168, 186, 188, 192, 250

models, 12, 27, 30, 35, 42, 230; change in ethnic status (from Indian to Mestizo), 34, 45, 61-62, 64, 67, 89, 208, 219, 234, 236, 239, 253, 272; class conflict in, 26, 32, 44, 46-49, 228, 230-32, 235, 268, 272, 339; class differences, 7, 19, 3 1 , 34-36, 43, 45n,

INDEX 126, 172, 230, 244, 296, 3 1 7 ; culture of, 48, 2 3 0 - 3 1 ; defined, 228-29; different types of, 28, 34, 60, 189, 228-29, 2 3 0 - 3 1 , 241; economy of, 42, 164; envy in, 35; external relations, 223, 282, 317; internal divisions (factional), 2 1 6 , 223; lifestyle in, 228; membership criteria, 239-40, 246; seen as egalitarian, 36, 48; solidarity (cohesion), 4, 7, 35. 44, 223, 227, 242; values and institutions, 26, 28, 35, 43, 45, 227, 228, 230, 231 .See also Indian community; Mestizo community; Nahua community; village administration peasant leaders, 3, 4, h , 36, 1 3 1 - 3 2 , i ? 7 , 179-81 186 188, 1 9 2 ^ 3 , 196, 1 9 ^ 2 0 1 , 204, 206, 208-9, 2 1 1 - 1 3 , 2 1 7 , 219-22, 225, 246, 260, 268, 272, 275, 286-87, 289, 29395, 3 1 1 ; amnesty for, 4, 209; co-optation, . ., ... „ 208; corruption, 2 1 2 , 29411; with military ex,, , , perience, 204; on national level, 262; repres„ , , . sion, 2 1 1 . See also agrarian leaders peasant militancy, 3, 4, 84, HI, 196, 204, 209, 2 1 5 ; causes, 10. See also agrarian peas-

357

283, 289, 299, 3 1 8 - 1 9 , 322; apex (in Huejutla), 205, 237, 275; causes, 5, 26; suppression of, 193, 209. See also agrarian conflict peon. See day laborers PEMEX, 263. See oil penitentiary. See jailing Pepeyoca de Cabrera, 133-34, 146 Pepeyocatitla, 46-48, ioin, 1 4 m , 160, 18485, 198-99, 232, 239-40, 253, 277, 288, S e e p r i v a t e i y . 0 w n e d land propietarios, 70, 132, 1 7 1 , 199, 218,

pequefja propiedad pequeiios

232, 272. See also enclavados; landowners; privately-owned land p.rez:

Jn X o c h l c o a t W n >

Ferm[n>

2Q2 peru>

' ... pesosprimitivos, I04N „ T PIDER. See Integrated Program of Rural E x 6 „ nomic Development pU

° n ( c M o ) ' 77, 97, 102, 1 1 3 , 1 1 6 , 156, 306; commercialization, 295. See also molienda'

ants -.agraristas peasant movements, 5, i r , 188, 1 9 2 ^ 3 , 20 7 n, 2 1 1 - 1 2 , 218, 2 3 1 , 245, 259; classified, 2 1 1 12; co-opted, 260. See also peasant organizati o n s

sugar loaf Pisaflores (inJacalaregion), 5 m , 7 1 , 88, 150, 215-16 ptooleros, 124-25, 129, 140, 143-45, 149, 180, 201, 212, 2 1 7 - 1 9 , 245, 280-81, 294; as

peasant organizations, 1 1 , 180-81, 193-96, 201, 205, 209, 2 1 1 - 1 2 , 216, 222, 262-63, 281, 285-86, 289, 295-96, 301, 3 1 1 , 320; co-option, 259, 279, 320; corruption, 271; government-linked, 264, 272, 279; independent, 193, 204, 206, 208, 243, 256, 262-65, 279-80, 284; organized as unions, 193, 204, 208, 249, 294, 296; rival, 1 3 , 212, 241, 244, 268-70, 279, 286. See also Consejo Agraria Mexicano (CAM); Confederation Nacional Campesina (CNC); Campesinos Unidos de la Sierra Oriental (cuso); Frente Democratico del Oriente de Mexico Emiliano Zapata (FDOMEZ); Organization Independiente de los Pueblos Unidos de las Huastecas (OIPUH); Union Nacional de Trabajadores del Campo (UNTA); Union Regional de Ejidos y Comunidades de la Huasteca Hidalguense (URECHH) peasant quiescence, 5, 7, 1 3 , 1 0 7 - 1 6 , 177,

agrarians, 2 1 8 - 1 9 ; Nahua, 124, 1 4 1 . See also armed retainers; caciques Plan Huasteca. See rural development P l a t 6 n S n c h e z (in * Veracruz), 156, 168 ploughs, use of, 33, 109. See also agriculture P Ural S 0 d e t y I 7 2 0 , 2 4 ' ' " ' 26 pluralists, as theoretical school, 19, 23 pluriculturalism, 397-98. See also education P ° l i c e ' 47, 128, 144, 148, 2 1 7 , 219, 222, 238, 2 5°> 2 8 o ; state, 196, 209. See also judiciales political agitators, 186, 195, 201, 205, 292 political alliances, 6, 179-80, 207, 232, 233, 259, 293, 301, 314; across ethnic lines, 101 political brokers, 3 1 , 208, 253. See also intermediaries political demonstrations, 4, 150, 199, 205, 224, 263, 280, 297; as marches, 200, 224, 274; in mobs, 2 1 5 , 224; as rallies, 146, 150 political repression. See repression

2 3 1 , 259, 302, 318 peasant revolts, 4-5, 7, 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 3 , 3 1 , 46, 48, 7 1 , 76, 85, 1 1 9 , 127, 179-80, 185, 193, 197-98, 2 1 2 - 1 3 , 216, 220, 2 3 0 - 3 1 , 241,

politicians: death in automobile accidents, 292n; professional, 48, 193, 194, 207, 233, 252, 260, 271, 302, 3 1 0 population. See demographic factors

358

INDEX

Porfiriato, 97, 1 0 2 - 3 , 107, 1 1 7 , 1 2 0 - 2 1 , 143, 157 Porfirista, 128, 1 4 1 . See also Diaz: Porfirio Portes, Nicolis, 1 1 8 - 1 9 . See also " E l Indio Portes" pottery. See craft industries Pozas, Ricardo, 17 praxis, 8 preceptores, 96n. See schoolteachers prehispanic; era, 10, 28, 3 on, 3 2n, 5 1 , 7 1 , 76, 11, 224n, 317; mythology, 286; survival of cultural traits, 6 m , 6 2 n, 64, 245 prejudice. See discrimination presidencias (also known as palacio municipal), 1 0 1 ; occupied, 306, 3 1 2 presidente municipal, 57. See municipal presidents

pueblo, 3211, 6 1 , 90; Indian, 68, 77, 79; Nahua, 68n, 77, 79-80, 85, 89, 92-94, 96-97, 189, 236. See also cabecera; repUblica de indios pueblo sujeto, 80 Quan, Julio, 17 Queretaro, 5 1 , 149 Quetzaltenango (in Guatemala), 304 racial ldentity, 6o, i89> 3 0 7 . S e e aiso blancos.

whites racism, 254, 306 radio station

lg6

23?

Ramirez: Amador, 9 2n; family from Cuatapa, I 4 5 l6o> I 9 0 ; 2 2 5 2 9 2 _ 9 3 ; Ignacl0) 26o> 263-64; Manuel, I44n, 158-59

press coverage, 4, 1 3 , 47n, i45n, 148, 195. 204n, 205, 208n, 252-53, 2 7 m , 274, 279 pretiles, 1 1 2 priests, 79. 82n, 84, 98, 122, 123, 183-84, 192, 201-2, 228, 23411; as landowners, 104, 1 1 8 ; radical, 201. See also Catholic Church principales, 30, 79, lot. See also Indian nobil-

Ramirez, dementis, loin, 184-85 Ramos, Anacleto, 262, 279 ranch, 158-61, n o n ; administrator, 154, 156. gee a[so cattle; cattle raising rancher, 13, 46, 58, 9 1 , 146, 156, 158-59, l 8 g 2 I ? i 2 3 5 j 28i; control over ejidos, 186; Nahua, 4, 1 1 3 . See also cattle; cattle raising rancherla, 42, 57, 60, 80, 164. See also subor-

'ty privately-owned land, 4, 9, 30-32, 34, 41, 47, 5 4 , 6 0 , 68-70, 7 1 , 77. 79. 82-84, 88-90, 136-37, 186, 216, 236, 270, 317; administrators (managers, caretakers or supervisors), 68, 79, 89, 156, 229, 235, 241, 242, 294; confiscated by caciques, 140; inside communal lands, 100, 166, 172, 306; inside ejidos, 142, 1 7 1 , 232; expropriated by government, 4, 14, 54, 70, 188, 197, 202n, 238, 262-63, 267-68, 2 7 1 , 277-78, 291, 295, 308; de facto, 166, 233-34, 239, 252. See also hacienda; pequena propiedad; rancho procurador dejusticia, 55, 277. See also law; legal system procurador indigena, 132, 198 professionals, 8, 14, 58-60, 143, 163, 194. 200n, 229, 253, 261, 280, 283, 298-99, 320; Nahua, 33, 252-53, 282, 320; as new class, 295. See also lawyers; medical doctors; schoolteachers; technicians proletarianization, 44, 45, 162, 3 1 0 Protestantism, 182, 184-86, 238n; specific denominations, 184-85 Protestants, 208; as agrarian peasants, 239 public posts, 3 0 - 3 1 . 57, 186 Puebla, 3 6 , 4 2 , 5 1 , 63n, 182; city, 1 1 0

dinate hamlet ranchero economy, 12, 103, i n , 149, 153; c i a s s relations of, 114; emergence of, 88. See a i s o ranchero; rancho rancheros, 1 3 , 84, 88-96, 99, 1 1 0 , 1 1 3 , 126, I 5 I , I 5 6 , 159, 161-62, 166-67, 1 7 1 . 217. 2 3 9 i 2 9 2 > 296-97, 299, 304, 308, 3 1 3 ; abSentee, 2 3 I ; anticlericalism, 123; caciques, 123, 127; competition among, 143; contrasting lifestyles, 179; different meanings of, 235, 317; Indian (Nahua), 93, 97, 123, 217, 265-66, 317; involved in Revolution, 1 1 7 I 9 1 5 1 ; as members of peasant communities, 2 2 9 ; Mestizo, 4 1 , 47, 7 1 , 9 5 , 227; modern (educated), 139, 146, 1 5 1 , 158, 164, 1 7 8 7 9 , i 9 9 , 203, 2 1 7 , 221, 229, 282, 295; as politicians, 94-95, 125, 1 3 1 - 3 2 , 136, 149, 251; as teachers, 298; traditional (old-fashioned), 143, 1 5 1 , 1 8 1 , 189, 197, 206, 218, 2 2 1 , 227; white (European), 162, 248, 307. See also landowners; privately-owned land; rancho rancho, 1 1 , 1 2 , 4 1 , 7 1 , 82-83, 89, 90-95, 98, 189, 307; colonial, 68, 79, 303; inside communal boundaries, 99-100, 103, 190, 199, 272; as unit of production, 88 rebellion. See peasant revolts

INDEX

359

recaudador de rentas, 124 Redfield, Robert, 28, 34, 178 regidores, 66, 304 religion, 5, 6, 8 1 , 123, 178, 182-85, 234, 322; conflict over, 185, 234, 267; reinterpretation of, 182. See also Catholic Church; chicomexochitl; Protestantism renting of land, 39, 81, 83, 89, 90n, 98, 172, 177, 196, 236, 2 4 1 , 276, 2 8 1 , 288, 293. See also tenants repartimiento, 30 repression, 140, 219, 280; of militant peasants, 3, 14, 47, 146, 193, 196, 204, 209, 2 1 1 - 1 2 , 259, 265, 280, 320 republicas de Indios, 10, 12, 30, 32, 43, 75, 7 7 - 8 1 , 83, 85, 90, 93-94, 100, 232-33, 241, 304, 3 2 1 ; fragmentation of, 32n. See also pueblos resettlement (relocation), of peasants, 81, 197, 202, 203n, 249, 267-68. See also expulsion; Micropolis revenge, 219-20, 267, 271. See also family feuds revisionist school, in history, 321 revolutions, 19, 20. See also Mexican Revolution Reyes, Antonio, 94. See " E l Tordo" Reyes, Cheque, I39n, 159-60, 189, 196, 206, 237, 269 rhetoric, 14, 1 1 5 , 137, 177-78, 194, 195, 203, 206, 256, 277, 285, 296. See also discourse Rhodes, Robert, 34, 35n " r i c h " ("Jos ricos"), as class label, 6, 4 1 , 246 Rivera, family from Huichapa, 9 1 , 189 roads, 159-60, 194-95, 283, 285, 300-301; blocked, 267, 297, 312; lack of, 164. See also highway Rodriguez, Mati'as, 1 2 1 , 129 Rojo, Gabriela, 207-8, 2 1 1 , 2 5 1 , 255, 261, 292n Rojo Gomez, Javier, i29n, 130, 1 3 1 , 137, 148, 186, 198, 209 Rojo Lugo, Jorge, 198-99, 205-7, 209, 2 5 1 ,

Rueda Villagran, Quintin, 146-48, 157, 179 Ruiz, Pascual, 99n, 12411, 130, 208-9, 2 1 8 - 1 9 Ruiz Cortines, Adolfo, 128, 139, 146 rural development (extension), 4, 14, 193-94, i98n, 204, 249, 252, 262-63, 267, 282-302, 320, 323; agencies, 55-56; as arenas for class conflict, 201, 291; school, 202; workers (agents), 201, 273, 282, 285-87, 3 0 1 - 2 . See also government, technicians rural estates. See privately-owned land rural Mexico, 7, 23, 26-27, 32-35, 42, 70, 3 1 7 - 1 8 , 322-23; assumptions about, 320. See also Mexico rural-urban continuum, 28 Rwanda (Africa), 18, 20 Sagahun, Ram6n, 252, 3 0 9 - 1 1 SAHOP, 285 Salazar: Agustin, 1 2 1 ; Dario, 144, 190; family i n Atlapexco, 144-45, 180, 190 San Antonio, as hacienda, 90, 104 San Felipe, as hacienda, 82, 90, 91 San Felipe Orizatlan. See Orizatlan San Francisco, 4 1 , 47, 94, 124, 1 4 1 - 4 2 , 173, 185, 207, 224, 239-40 San Luis Potosi, 34n, 5 1 , 53-54, 85, 9m, 92, 103, 108, I20n, 149, 157, 263; city, 102 San Martin (in San Luis Potosi), 60, 9 m San Miguel, 190, 225, 265. See also Emiliano Zapata San Pedro (in Guatemala), 304 San Pedro de Huazalingo, 47, 109, I29n, I42n, 234, 265, 268, 278; ejido, 141; hacienda, 118; Nahua pueblo, 98 San Pedro Tamocal: hacienda, 104, 1 1 8 ; Nahua pueblo, 81, 98 Sanchez, Albino, 274, 280 Sanchez (family in Huitzotlaco): Eugenio, 265; Feliciano, 2 1 1 , 252, 280. See also " E l Chino'' Sanchez Vite, Manuel, 55, 196 Santa Ana, hacienda, 89, 104 Santa Catarina, 148; hacienda, 104

255, 259 Romanucci-Ross, Lola, 34, 223 Rossell de la Lama, Guillermo, 2 1 2 , 259-67, 269, 2 7 1 , 274, 278-82, 285, 289, 292, 301, 309 Rubio, Noradino, 149-50 Rubio, Porfirio, 150 Rude, George, 177

Santa Cruz, 50, 68, 9m, 104, 122, i89n, 228n, 244 Santa Lucia, 1 1 9 , i23n, 184 Santa Maria, 136, 208, 240, 289 Santa Teresa, 96, 99, 184-85, 214, 240, 247; Nahua pueblo, 84n Santo Tomas, 1 1 9 , 124, 166, 240, 278 Schermerhom, R., 8

360

INDEX

schools (primary), 57, 96, 9611, 120, 147, 162, 163-64, 180, 182, 192, 243, 254, 274, 283, 286; inspectors, 297; occupation, 3 1 5 ; private, 141; residential, 138, 163. See also education; high schools schoolteachers, 37, 38, 40, 4 1 , 58, 7 1 , 95-96, 125, 163-64, 183, 192, I95n, 200, 207, 246, 253, 286; attacked by peasants, 223; bilingual (Nahua), 63, 195, 286, 289, 296-98, 3 1 5 , 320; as caciques, 124; in Cardenas land reform, 129, 1 3 3 - 3 5 ; dissident, 315; federal, l 9 5 n , 2 9 7 n ; involvement in politics, 196, 199-200, 207, 2 1 5 , 260, 264, 266, 269, 292, 297; as landowners, 164; as municipal president, 299, 308; as offspring of landowners, 125, 299 Scott, James, 5 , 6 , 7 , 4 5 , 1 1 4 . seasonal (part-time) wage labor. See wage labor „ seccion, 57n, »5 Second World War, 159 Secretaria de Agriculture y Recursos Hidraulic o s (SARH), 2 8 4 - 8 5 , 2 9 4

sects. See cults semaneros. See labor rents Serrano, Humbeito, 195 seventeenth century, 18, 79, 83 Shadow, Robert, 29 shaman. See divination; healers sharecroppers, 34, 1 0 1 , 104, 317 Sheridan, Thomas, 44 shoot-outs. See armed confrontations Sicily, 143 Sierra Alta, region, 55, 88, I09n, 128. See also highland districts Sierra de Jacala, region, 88, 94 Sierra Gorda, 53, 85; uprising, 85 Sierra Madre Oriental, 5 1 , 76 Sierra of Hidalgo. See Sierra Alta sirvientes, 79 Sistema Alimentario Mexicano (SAM), 285 sixteenth century, 18, 75-76, 79 slash-and-burn cultivation. See subsistence cultivation slavery, of Indians, 76, 79, 284n Slicher van Bath, B. H., 80, 82 Smith, Carol, 9, 45n Smith, Waldemar, 304 social class, 9, 2 0 - 2 1 , 26; formation, 230. See also class; class consciousness; day laborers; hacendados\ landowners; peasants; rancheros

social mobility, 5, 1 7 - 1 8 , 41; downward, 4 1 , 143, 188, 206; upward, 23, 4 1 , 60, H I , 123, 157, 230, 298, 320 social scientists, I I , 12, 22, 27, 2 1 1 , 246, 321. See also anthropologists; historians socialist, 14, 54, 200, 314; caucus in teachers unjon> 3 j 5 sociedades, 92-94, 96-97, 99-100, 132 society non-class aspects of, 6, 8, 24-25, 318, 3 2 3 ; relationship to class structure, 5 - 7 , 9, I4

soldiers. See army •

South Aftica> Ign

s o u t h e m Z Q n e o f H u e j u t l a . C a r d e n a s , r e f o r m in> I 3 2 _ 3 ? . u n d e r c o l o n i a , role> 7 ?

_8i;

a s soclo_

economic region, 66-67 „ . , ,„ . , „ . , Spain (and Spanish Crown), 10, 1 2 , 3 0 - 3 1 , 76„ 0 77,83-84 Spaniards, 9, 28, 3 0 - 3 1 , 5 1 , 60, 61, 76-77, 79> 8[_8/(j 9 0 0 i g 3 . 95> ,48> 2 5 0 S p a n i s h l a n g u a g e { c a s t e U a n o ) , 28, 3 1 , 33, 57, 59> 6 q

fi2

6 3

9 3

I ? 8

l 8 l

I g 4

I 9 6

2 5 Q

254,285,291,298 S t a t e A g r a r i a n Commission, I0 4 n, 133 See ah() Land Ref()rm office

,46 the _ 4 ? _ g U _ I 2 l 8 I 9 24n> 3 5 , 9 g 259; arena, 13, 38; expansion of power, I 5 0 ; Mexican, 14, 68, 84, 1 0 1 , 1 4 9 - 5 1 , 177, 193-94, 212, 253, 255; patronage of, 302. See also government state capital. See Pachuca Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, 22-23, 26, 29 stereotypes, 22, 322; ethnic, 25 Stern, Steve, 48 Stiles, Neville, 83n strongmen. See cacique Suarez Molina, Jose Luis, 199, 205 subordinate hamlet, 10, 3 1 , 42, 66, 69, 86, 90, 135, 136, 142, 189, 233-34, 304. See also anexo, village administration subsistence cultivation, 5, 18, 29, 38, 40, 4 2 43, 58, 7 1 , 9 1 , 100, 106, 1 0 8 - 1 2 , 153, 155, 158, 162, 164-67, 169, 172, 1 8 1 , 230, 237, 300, 318. See also maize subsistence ethic, 1 5 1 , 172, 177, 318. See also moral economy sugarcane, 39, 53, 82, 91-92, 106, 140, 143, 158, 162, 168, 190 sugar loaf, 77, 79, 92, 97, 1 1 3 . See also molienda; pilon (cillo); trapiche state

INDEX

361

sujeto [vs. cabecera], 10, 3 1 , 81, 90. See also anexo; subordinate hamlet superstructure, 5, 24, 3 1 8 , 322; as residual category. See also base-superstructure suppression, of peasant unrest, 193-94, 259 surnames, Spanish, 64 surplus extraction, 36, 43, 86, 103, 231 swidden cultivation. See subsistence cultivation Switzerland, 19 systems approach, 24

tepecano, 29 Tepeco, 104, I38n Tepehua, as language, 50 Tepehuacan de Guerrero (in highland districts), 55. 5611, 131 Tepetitla, 41, 47, ioin, 1 6 1 , I72n, 1 7 1 - 7 2 , 185, 219, 233 Tepotzteco: hacienda, 104, 154, 242; rancho, 112 Tepotztlan (in Morelos), 33-34 tequihues, 63

TABAMEX, l69n, 285. See also tobacco Tamalol, 9 m , l89n. See also La Corrala Tamaulipas, state of, 5 1 , 53, 156, 168 Tamazunchale, 155-56, 160, 195 Tamoyon, 132, I38n, 139, 1 7 1 , 244, 279, 284, 288; hacienda, 104, 106 Tampico, 53, 82, 102, 1 5 1 , 155, 160, 163, 195, 196, 307 Tarascan (villages), 36 Tax, Sol, 27 taxes, 44, 57n, 77, 79, 140, 148; collector, 57, 124, 140; illegal, 124, 140, 183, 241 Taylor, William, 9, 30, 32, 220, 231 Teacal, 233; colonial rancho, 90, 91 teachers. See schoolteachers Tecacahuaco, 4 1 , 96, 99, 147 technicians, 195, 201, 223, 252, 282, 286, 293-94, 3 2 1 ; detained, 286; their perceptions, 282; political role, 201, 273. See also rural development (extension) technocrats. See bureaucracy technology, new forms of, 32, 45, 153-54, 301 Tecolotitla, 6 1 , 1 3 3 , 185, 187, 190, 235-39, 253, 279 Tecorral, 269-70 Tehuetlan, 6 1 , 93, ioon, 130, 1 4 m , 142, 1 6 1 , 164, 248, 280, 296 television: high schools, 298; news coverage, 289-90 Tempoal (in Veracruz), 152 temporal, 111 tenants, 58, 79, 82, 89-92, 104, 1 1 5 , 1 1 8 , 122, 1 3 m , I37n, 1 7 1 - 7 2 , 1 8 1 , 214, 298. See also renting of land Tenexco, 96, 1 3 3 , 135, 139, 144, 156, 162, 188-92, 195, 199, 202, 203-4, 2 1 1 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 5 , 2i9n, 225, 232, 234, 245, 253, 264-66, 283-84 Tenochtitlan (of ancient Aztecs), 75 Teocuatitla, 128, 140, 1 4 1 , 147, 236

terreno comunal. See communal land terrenes de comun repartimiento. See communal land

tetatmej (elders), 96, 1 8 1 . See also village administration Texcaltipan, as colonial rancho, 88-89 theater project, 289-91. See also Maya, Ildefonso See

banditry; cattle rustling ' 9n> 259 Thompson, EdwardP., 5, 9, 24, 1 1 4 , 177, 224 tianguis (traditional market), 50, 165 Tianguistengo (in highland districts), 55 Tierra Playa, 185, 236-37 titulos de Anaya. See land titles Tlaica, i2on, 162, 202-3 tlahtoani, 30n Tlalchiyahualica, 3 7 - 4 1 , 64, 92n, 97n, 99, ioon, Ii8n, Ii9n, 1 4 m , I72n, 1 8 3 , 2 3 3 , 268-69, 299-300, 3 1 5 Tlanchinol: as municipio, 55-56; as town, 8in, 206; as colonial parish, 82 Tlatzonco, ioin, 1 1 9 , i24n, 185 tobacco, production, 53, I09n, 158, 1 6 1 , 167, 168-69 Tobar: Antonio, i09n; Cresencia, io6n, i44n; family in Atlapexco, 144 Toltec empire, decline, 75 Toltitlan, 254, 291, 304, 308, 3 1 1 - 1 3 tonalmili, I I I topiles, 47, 63, 304 toponymns. See Nahua naming system Torres, Juan, 269, 271 torture, 200, 202n, 280 Totonacos, as ethnic group, 54 trapiche, 79, 89, 1 1 3 , 1 1 8 , 173. See also sugar loaf tribute, 30-32, 76-77, 79-81, 89n, n o ; predecessor oifaena, 101; servile labor as, 30 Tultitlan: hacienda, 90; colonial rancho, 83n Third World

362

INDEX

Tutino, John, 30, 43 Tutsi (in Africa), 18 Tuzantlan, 9 m , i89n. See also Santa Cruz Tzactipan, as colonial rancho, 83n, 90-91 Tzinacatitla, 9 1 , 188 Tzotzil (in Chiapas), 36

Vinasco, 60, 1 0 1 , iogn, 136, 204, 248-49, 307-8, 3 1 1 , 314; colonial rancho, 83n, 91 violence, 3-5, 1 3 , 18, 47, 48, 85, 142-45, I48n, 1 5 1 , 170, 197, 201, 205, 216-24, 254, 266, 271-73; changing patterns, 220-24; culture of, 144, 220; effect on Nahua community, 144; group, 202, 222-24, 230; justifica-

unemployment, 152, 174, 1 8 1 , 268, 300 Union Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales d e C a m p e s i n o s A u t o n o m o s (UNORCA), 294N

Union Nacional de Trabajadores del Campo (UNTA) 206 Union de Pueblos de Hidalgo, 276-77 Union de Pueblos Unidos de Mexico, 260 United States, 138. See also America upper class. See class uprising. See peasant revolts upward mobility. See mobility urban centers, 37, 42, 50, 54, 72, 79, 82, 102, 1 1 6 , 143, 163 Union Regional de Ejidos y Comunidades de la Huasteca Hidalguense (URECHH), 242, 260, 262-63, 268-75, 277. 279-80, 285-86, 294J1, 296, 307, 309, 3 1 1 ; used as shock troops, 294, 3 1 2 usury, 42, 92, 141 Van den Berghe, Pien*. Colby Van Young, Eric, 9 n, 30, 3 5 " , 44. 84 vaquero. See cowhand ,, c ic ^ ^ Vargas, Emilio, 124, 126, 129, 1 4 1 , 264-65 Vasquez, Leodegano, 1 4 1 , 207 6 ,, , ' Vega, Jonathan, 291-92 _ . „ V61ez, Pedro, 135, 147, 185 j j , t/. j vendettas. See family feuds ' Veracruz, 47, 50, 5 1 , 54, 92, 103, i i 7 n , 122, I23n, 129, 148, 152, 160, l68n, 173, 183, 198, 204, 2 1 7 , 263, 28on Verduzgo Lugo, 280 Vieja Guardia Agrarista, 276 village administration, 1 0 - 1 1 , 26, 28, 3 7n, 38n, 68, 228, 238-40, 268, 286; boundaries, 30, 40, 46, 48, 7 1 - 7 2 , 77, 80, 85-86, 1 0 1 , 134-36, 180, 187, 189, 235, 248, 2 5 1 , 304, 308; centers, 50, 80, 81; differences in, 10, 244; straggle for control over, 318; variation in, 12 village commons. See communal land villages. See Mestizo communities; Nahua communities; peasant communities

^

^

200

2I9

'

'44.

' ^ J 2 0 - landowner, 192, 197, ' P e a s a n t ' 2 2 0 • 2 2 3> police,

2 1 9

' n ^ u a u " a ' I2< *' voluntansm [vs determinism], 9, 25, 322 wage labor, 29, 36, 40, 92, 103, 158, 165; seasonal, 40, 7 1 , 79, 82, 136, 143, 153, 1 6 1 62 < i 6 4 , 168, 169, 1 8 1 . See also day laborers ; migratory labor wa es g > level of, 34, 168, 194, 296 War of Independence, 12, 32n, 83-85 Warman, Arturo, 40 Wasserstrom, 36, 45 Westernization, 246, 250, 254 whites: as ethnic category, i8n, 60, 306-7; rancheros, 1 0 1 , 162, 248, 307; settlements of, 60 witchcraft, institutionalized, 28; "witchdoctor," 267 Wolf

> 9 ' I 2 ' 2 ? ~ 2 9 ' 3 2 ' 35. 43. 48-49 ' ' 2 ° 2 ' 220; ec0n0mic role' 4 1 ' 1 1 1 ' 1 1 3 . 1 4 1 . 165, 304; political role, 47, 203, 261,274,280,290,312,313 , , , workers colony, 270 ,»,,,„, World Bank, 152 . . , worldviews, 6, 7, 18, 61; incompatible, 181, . . , , , ' r 182, 241. See also beliefs .„ . , ,. , _ written word, fetishism of, i87n '

Eric

WOmen

41

xingris. See Otomi 1 u l l a . 2 7 1 , 280 Xochiatipan: municipio, 55, 57, 66, 77, 79, 95, I 2 3 , I 2 6 l 6 2 I ? 0 l8o ' ' ' > I98' 262' 2?8; town 8ln ' ' 184 Xochicoatlan: alcaldia, 7 7 n , 8on; municipio, 55. 56n, 202; town, 55 xopamili, 111 Xoxolpa, 166, 214; Nahua pueblo, 84n

Xl

Yahualica; alcaldia mayor, 76, 77n, 79, 80-81; Indian pueblo, 89, gon, 99; judicial district, 95; municipio, 37, 46, 55, 77, 79, 84, 95-

INDEX 96, 98, 99n, 1 1 2 , 1 1 9 , 123, 125, 146-48, 1 7 0 - 7 1 , 214, 219, 222, 233, 247, 262, 269, 280, 299; partido, 85; town, 42n, 47, 56, 88, 90, 1 1 9 - 2 0 , 124, 126, I29n, 147, 184, 199, 208, 2 1 8 - 1 9 , 252, 276-77 Yucatan, 34 Zacapoaxtla (in Puebla), 63n zacate. See pastures Zacatipa, l66n, 215

363

Zacualtipan (in highland districts), 5 m , 55; as district, 55n Zanzibar, 20 Zaragosa Palacios, Verolo, 146-47 Zitlan, 42, 6 1 , 9 1 , 122, 130, I37n, 160, 172, 307; as colonial rancho, 83n, 90 Zohuala, I37n, 156; as hacienda, 104 Zoquitipan, 96, 160, 268-69; a s ejido, I73n; as Nahua pueblo, 84n Zuniga Efrain, 217; family in Huejutla, 180