Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War: The Forgotten 1989 Expulsion of Turks from Communist Bulgaria 1138480525, 9781138480520

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of maps
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgements
The Bulgarian governments during and after the removal of Todor Zhivkov from office
The Heads of State of Bulgaria during and after the removal of Todor Zhivkov from office
List of acronyms and abbreviations, and of the names of parties and organizations mentioned
Maps
Introduction
1 On forgetfulness and its perils
2 The state of research on the 1989 expulsion
3 The 1989 ethnic cleansing through the lens of the international press
4 The ethnic cleansing's aftermath and the regime change
5 The official coming to terms with the 1989 ethnic cleansing
6 Between language and millet
7 The question of responsibility
Conclusion
Postscriptum
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

It is astonishing that scholars have ignored the ethnic cleansing of over 360,000 Bulgarian Muslims by the Communist state in 1989. Euphemistically called the ‘Great Excursion’ by Bulgarian nationalists, the expulsions were the largest in Europe since the Second World War. Now it has found its historian in Tomasz Kamusella, who has written not only an urgent historical analysis but also a moving plea for diversity and multinationalism. – Dirk Moses, Author of Empire, Colony, Genocide and Co-Editor of Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies This stimulating work of scholarship is simultaneously a probing summary and analysis of the expulsion and/or flight under pressure of many of Bulgaria’s Turks in the late 1980s and a protest against the general silence about this not only in Bulgaria and Turkey, but also in much of the West. Based on materials published in Bulgarian, Turkish, and other languages, this book is well worth reading and belongs in every university library. – Sabrina P. Ramet, Author of Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo Tomasz Kamusella has rescued out of obscurity the 1989 ethnic cleansing of Muslims (mostly ethnic Turks) from Bulgaria to Turkey. He placed it in the historical context of analogous previous expulsions. The author skillfully applies his own experience having grown up in another communist country (we can specify Poland). – Paul Mojzes, Author of Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century Tomasz Kamusella’s monograph on the expulsion of Bulgarian Turks and Muslims is indispensable for getting a full picture of ethnic cleansing in twentieth century Europe. This pioneer study is also a door opener for future archival research. The book ventures into the impact of the mass expulsion on the breakdown of the Bulgarian national communist regime under Todor Zhivkov in 1989 and the early transition years. Although more than 75 percent of the expellees returned by the mid-1990s, Kamusella rightly observes that besides a lack of knowledge about this large scale case of ethnic cleansing, there is also a lack of acknowledgement of the suffering and its ideological causes rooted in Bulgarian history. – Philipp Ther, Author of The Dark Side of Nation States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe

Thousands of books, articles and media reports have made the world aware of the gruesome ethnic cleansing that took place in the 1990s across former Yugoslavia. Yet very few people – even scholars – know much, if anything, about the “population transfers” that foreshadowed it in neighboring Romania and Bulgaria. This volume on the mass expulsion of Bulgarian Muslims – and of the Western media’s failure to acknowledge it – will help close this shameful gap in our knowledge, while providing a vital causative link between the communist and postcommunist Balkans. – Charles Ingrao, Co-Editor of Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholar’s Initiative This is a story of the story we have never been told about: how Bulgaria, in just a few months in 1989, expelled half a million of its Turkish citizens and then, in contradistinction to other ethnic cleansings, allowed a third of them to return. Kamusella deftly weaves his narrative, mainly from local and international media sources – but his is the first ever monograph on these momentous events in any language. He then leads the reader to fascinating, daring and often counterintuitive reflections on what the Bulgarian nation is, or indeed any nation at all, and ends with demanding, yet optimistic, postulates for Bulgaria as a European Union member state. This is when the reader discovers that this academic analysis is also rooted in a deeply and movingly personal story. – Konstanty Gebert, Author of Living in the Land of Ashes

Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War

In mid-1989, the Bulgarian communist regime seeking to prop up its legitimacy played the ethnonational card by expelling 360,000 Turks and Muslims across the Iron Curtain to neighboring Turkey. It was the single largest ethnic cleansing during the Cold War in Europe after the wrapping up of the postwar expulsions (‘population transfers’) of ethnic Germans from Central Europe in the latter half of the 1940s. Furthermore, this expulsion of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria was the sole unilateral act of ethnic cleansing that breached the Iron Curtain. The 1989 ethnic cleansing was followed by an unprecedented return of almost half of the expellees, after the collapse of the Bulgarian communist regime. The return, which partially reversed the effects of this ethnic cleansing, was the first-ever of its kind in history. Despite the unprecedented character of this 1989 expulsion and the subsequent return, not a single research article, let alone a monograph, has been devoted to these momentous developments yet. However, the tragic events shape today’s Bulgaria, while the persisting attempts to suppress the remembrance of the 1989 expulsion continue sharply dividing the country’s inhabitants. Without remembering about this ethnic cleansing it is impossible to explain the fall of the communist system in Bulgaria and the origins of ethnic cleansing during the Yugoslav wars. Faltering Yugoslavia’s future ethnic cleansers took a good note that neither Moscow nor Washington intervened in neighboring Bulgaria to stop the 1989 expulsion, which in light of international law was then still the legal instrument of ‘population transfer.’ The as yet unhealed wound of the 1989 ethnic cleansing negatively affects the Bulgaria’s relations with Turkey and the European Union. It seems that the only way out of this debilitating conundrum is establishing a truth and reconciliation commission that at long last would ensure transitional justice for all Bulgarians irrespective of language, religion or ethnicity. Tomasz Kamusella is Reader in Modern History at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. His monographs include Silesia and Central European Nationalisms (2007), The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe (2009), Creating Languages in Central Europe during the Last Millennium (2015) and The Un-Polish Poland, 1989 and the Illusion of Regained Historical Continuity (2017). He also co-edited several volumes, for instance, Creating Nationality in Central Europe, 1880-1950 (2016), The Palgrave Handbook of Slavic Languages, Identities and Borders (2016) and The Social and Political History of Southern Africa’s Languages (2017).

Routledge Studies in Modern European History https://www.routledge.com/history/series/SE0246 49 Stalin’s Constitution: Soviet Participatory Politics and the Discussion of the 1936 Draft Constitution Samantha Lomb 50 Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 Conflict, Colonialism and the Politics of Remembrance in Greek Cypriot Society John Burke 51 Nationalism of the Rich Discourses and Strategies of Separatist Parties in Catalonia, Flanders, Northern Italy and Scotland Emmanuel Dalle Mulle 52 Protecting Democracy from Dissent: Population Engineering in Western Europe 1918–1926 Shannon Monaghan 53 Orphans and Abandoned Children in European History Sixteenth to Twentieth Centuries Nicoleta Roman 54 1916 in Global Context An anti-Imperial moment Edited by Enrico Dal Lago, Róisín Healy and Gearóid Barry 55 Shaping the International Relations of the Netherlands, 1815–2000 A Small Country on the Global Scene Edited by Ruud van Dijk, Vincent Kuitenbrouwer, Samuël Kruizinga and Rimko van der Maar 56 Italy Before Italy Institutions, Conflicts and Political Hopes in the Italian States, 1815–1860 Marco Soresina 57 Ethnic Cleansing during the Cold War: The Forgotten 1989 Expulsion of Bulgaria’s Turks Tomasz Kamusella 58 The Peace Discourses in Europe, 1900–1945 Alberto Castelli

Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War The Forgotten 1989 Expulsion of Turks from Communist Bulgaria

Tomasz Kamusella

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Tomasz Kamusella The right of Tomasz Kamusella to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kamusella, Tomasz, author. Title: Ethnic cleansing during the Cold War : the forgotten 1989 expulsion of Turks from communist Bulgaria / Tomasz Kamusella. Description: First published 2019. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Routledge studies in modern European history ; 57 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018003024| ISBN 9781138480520 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781351062701 (e-book : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Turks—Civil rights—Bulgaria. | Muslims—Civil rights—Bulgaria. | Forced migration—Bulgaria—History—20th century. | Bulgaria—Ethnic relations—20th century. | Bulgaria—History— 1944–1990. | Bulgaria—Emigration and immigration—History—20th century. | Turkey—Emigration and immigration—History—20th century. Classification: LCC DR64.2.T87 K36 2019 | DDC 949.9/004943509048—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018003024 ISBN: 978-1-138-48052-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-06270-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Florence Production Ltd, Stoodleigh, Devon, UK

Pamiynci Fatra, Ōpy od Ani. A Ani somej a jej przyjszłej Familyje, coby juże wypyndzanie lojtōw z iych haup a hajmatōw ostało jeno geszychtom

Contents

List of maps Foreword Preface Acknowledgements The Bulgarian governments during and after the removal of Todor Zhivkov from office The Heads of State of Bulgaria during and after the removal of Todor Zhivkov from office List of acronyms and abbreviations, and of the names of parties and organizations mentioned Maps Introduction

x xi xviii xxii xxiii xxiv xxviii 1

1

On forgetfulness and its perils

11

2

The state of research on the 1989 expulsion

23

3

The 1989 ethnic cleansing through the lens of the international press

41

4

The ethnic cleansing’s aftermath and the regime change

82

5

The official coming to terms with the 1989 ethnic cleansing

110

6

Between language and millet

126

7

The question of responsibility

140

Conclusion Postscriptum Bibliography Index

166 181 184 263

Maps

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N

Turkish population in Bulgaria in 2011 Muslims in Bulgaria in 2011 Roma in Bulgaria in 2001 Pomaks in Bulgaria in 2001 MRF in the 2014 Bulgarian parliamentary elections First Bulgarian Empire Second Bulgarian Empire Bulgarian Exarchate Conflicting territorial aspirations in the Balkans, 1912 San Stefano borders of ‘Greater’ Bulgaria ‘Greater’ Bulgaria, 1913 ‘Greater’ Bulgaria during World War II Official view on the territory of the Bulgarian language in 2001: The Macedonian language does not exist Turkish dialects: the Ottoman Empire remembered

xxviii xxix xxx xxxi xxxii xxxiii xxxiv xxxv xxxvi xxxvii xxxviii xxxix xl xli

Foreword

Like 1848, 1989 enjoys an enduring reputation as a time of liberation in European history; a true springtime of the peoples. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, half of Europe awoke to a freedom that had been so conspicuously denied to them back in 1945. These were heady days indeed: fresh hope, fresh possibilities, fresh liberties pulsated as the long winter nightmare of the Cold War suddenly started to thaw. As it became clear that communist tyrannies were crumbling fast, 1989 acquired an aura of wonder: the year that saw the birth of liberty. Dr Kamusella’s courageous new book tells a different, and a darker, tale about that year of apparent miracles. To say its perspective is startling would be an understatement. Here 1989 represents not any dawn of freedom, but the abrupt climax of an ethnic nightmare. Kamusella reveals how in the summer of 1989 the Bulgarian communist regime of Todor Zhivkov expelled 360,000 of its own citizens to Turkey. Muslims and Turks in Bulgaria had recently been subject to forced assimilation tactics in 1984–5; but now intimidation was ramped up spectacularly to the point that they began to flee in their hundreds and thousands for their lives. In Bulgaria, these events have become officially known by the pathetic euphemism of the ‘Great Excursion’. We might more accurately call them by the ugly names of ethnic cleansing (or, indeed, genocide). And yet, to date in 2017, no Bulgarian state official has ever been charged for directing, or participating, in these atrocities. And no Bulgarian Turk or Muslim has ever received any financial compensation for their sufferings during that dreadful summer. Rather conveniently, the entire Bulgarian Communist Party archive went up in a mysterious fire on 27 August 1990. Rather mysteriously, the Sofia Fire Brigade on this occasion took a notably lethargic seven hours to go into action. Good scholarship teaches us things we did not know before. Here Dr Kamusella teaches us that a huge mass atrocity was committed within the last 30 years in the heart of Europe; and that it has been almost entirely forgotten internationally, even amongst subject experts. This is a huge claim: but, ultimately, also a compelling one in the light of the range of evidence he deploys. Dr Kamusella’s reconstruction of events works wonders with the most fragmentary of diverse sources scattered across several languages: effectively, this book is an act of rescue archaeology, as well as of moral witness. If nothing else, the Bulgarian expulsions of 1989 can now take their long over-due place in comparative surveys on ethnic cleansing

xii Foreword alongside much better known examples such as Bosnia. Indeed, in a highly original insight, Dr Kamusella fascinatingly suggests that the Bulgarian expulsions of 1989 may well have served as a model for Slobodan Milošević. After all, Milošević only had to look next door to Bulgaria for a shining example of how to conduct ‘successful’ ethnic cleansing, and get clean away with it. Any international backlash was conspicuous by its absence. Yet the questions posed by Dr Kamusella’s stunningly original study go much wider and deeper than this. This book suggests that Bulgaria teetered on the brink of a Bosnian-style meltdown through the 1980s, with state killings of Bulgarian Turks and Muslims frequently running in the tens and hundreds per year. This, in turn, shines an uncomfortable spotlight on the quality of democracy and inter-ethnic peace in Bulgaria ever since. Despite some occasionally encouraging gesture politics in parliament, there has been a notable absence of any sustained, official processes of reckoning with that legacy of near-civil war. This poses, in effect, the question of how far the supposedly positive ‘Bulgarian model’ of co-existence based on partial evasion and deafening silence is in fact a healthy one. And it also highlights the prevalence of enduring tension in Bulgarian–Turkish relations – even when these are partially smothered by Sofia and Ankara’s tacit agreement to overlook each other’s treatment of ethnic minorities. Above all, the pusillanimity of the European Union in not forcing a deeper reckoning with the ghosts of 1989 shines piercingly through the fog of official amnesia. After all, as Dr Kamusella demonstrates by example, it is not that hard to find out who constituted the membership of the two successive State Councils in charge of Bulgaria during the crucial years between 1981–86 and 1986–1990. It is thus a very great honour, therefore, to use this foreword to endorse Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War: The Forgotten 1989 Expulsion of Turks from Communist Bulgaria. It is a work of startling illumination. And it stands in the very best St Andrews tradition of studying political violence from unexpected angles, and with all due sensitivity to conditioning contexts. In sum, Dr Kamusella has produced a book that represents a triumph of scholarly diligence; an extended cry of outrage; and, most importantly of all, a monument to the unjustly persecuted. He deserves a wide readership. Dr Tim Wilson Director Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence University of St Andrews Scotland 18 November 2017

Preface A missing picture

In 1989 communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, precipitating the breakup of the Soviet bloc. Two years later, in 1991, the Soviet Union fragmented. The Cold War was over and the postwar division of Europe came to an end. Western and Eastern leaders tore down militarized border fences that had marked out the Iron Curtain across the continent’s valleys, plains and mountains. The 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized this process of reconciliation and reconnecting between the two formerly enemy parts of the continent. During that heady time, I completed the last years of my university studies and graduated from the University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland. Life and history unexpectedly accelerated as all of Central Europe was freed from the proverbial ‘Cold War freezer.’ In 1988, I had no hope of seeing the end of communist rule within my lifetime or any expectation of being able to obtain a passport valid for travel in the ‘capitalist states’ of Europe. However, already in 1989 I traveled to West Berlin, months before the fall of the Berlin Wall. A year later, in 1990, I went to the West German capital of Bonn, several days prior to the formal reunification of both Germanys. Afterward, in early 1991 I flew halfway across the world to read for an MA at Potchefstroom University (nowadays part of the North-West University) in South Africa. Never before had I traveled by air. In the communist period planes were readily accessible only to higher officials in the communist party or to those Polish citizens whose relatives living abroad in the West bought them air tickets at inflated prices. Technically speaking, I breached Polish law by going to Potchefstroom, because at that time Poland had no diplomatic relations with South Africa. That is why the South African Embassy at Bonn issued me with a visa on a separate sheet of paper. I kept it just inserted in my passport, so it could be easily removed when I needed to hand this document to a Polish border officer. However, in the middle of my sojourn in Potchefstroom, Warsaw and Pretoria established relations at the diplomatic level. The South Africans took a note of the fact that Poland ceased being a communist country, while, on the other hand, the Poles saw that South Africa had already begun the process of dismantling apartheid. My student friends and I, both in Poland and South Africa, obsessively read, watched and discussed news, while observing the unprecedented and unexpected transition toward democracy in freshly postcommunist Eastern Europe and in the

xiv Preface almost-post-apartheid South Africa. We thought ourselves to be well informed and knowledgeable about the momentous changes that sent political and economic ripples around the world. Not only did we read about these changes, but we also witnessed some of them. Two decades later, in 2011, I began working at the University of St Andrews in Scotland. Among my numerous tasks, I was requested to prepare a lecture on the 1989 revolutions for a large team-taught module on modern history for firstyear students. The goal of my talk was to explain, case by case, the fall of communism and the beginning of the democratic transition in all the Soviet bloc countries, alongside the communist polities of Albania and Yugoslavia that were not controlled by the Kremlin. All went fine. No surprises in this compartment, meaning the round-table negotiations in Poland and Hungary, the bloody overthrows of the communist regime in Romania and Albania, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, the reunification talks in two Germanys, or the breakups of the federal and multinational polities of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Pleased, I scrolled through my talk’s PowerPoint presentation, and at the same time I glanced at the map of the Soviet bloc in an atlas. I had forgotten about Bulgaria. No problem, I thought. I was unable to recollect how communism ended in Bulgaria. News on these events somehow evaded me, because so much took place elsewhere in the period 1989–1991. Hence, I assumed that what happened in this country was a kind of peaceful (‘velvet’) revolution, as in Czechoslovakia. This would explain why I took no note of Bulgaria in 1989. It was high time I read up on the events leading to the end of communism in Bulgaria. I downloaded a couple of articles on this topic from Jstor and borrowed a history of Bulgaria from the university library. Back home, I began reading through the material in the evening when, at long last after days full of teaching and administration, I had some free time at my hands. I learned that the standard narrative proposes communism came to an end in Bulgaria on 17 November 1989 when Petur Mladenov replaced Todor Zhivkov as General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). One communist leader replaced another. It did not make sense. How on earth could this event mark the end of communism in Bulgaria? The same communist party remained in full control, while the reshuffle at the top of the leadership simply passed the baton of totalitarian power from the older generation of Bulgarian communists to the younger one. I read on. The first free multiparty elections took place in Bulgaria in June 1990. But it was the BCP, renamed as the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), that won the majority of mandates and formed a new government. The government was rhetorically dubbed as ‘postcommunist,’ but in reality it was communist again. A slight bow to democracy was the Bulgarian Parliament’s election of a noncommunist as the country’s President in August 1990. Only the second parliamentary elections in post-1989 Bulgaria, held in October 1991, led to the formation of a non-communist government, though the BSP won the plurality of mandates. In 1994, the population displeased by the difficulties of the economic transition, voted the BSP into a majority in parliament. Finally, the pro-democratic parties

Preface  xv resoundingly defeated the postcommunist BSP for the first time only in the 1997 parliamentary elections. Apparently, the communist system lingered in Bulgaria for longer than elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc satellites. It only gradually faded into oblivion during the mid-1990s. After working my way through all the readings about the end of communism in Bulgaria I was left scratching my head. What then were the cause and nature of the end of the communist system of rule in this country? I slept on the matter and in the morning recollected a brief and strange conversation I had had with a Bulgarian scholar in 2003 when I had been on a Jean Monnet postdoctoral fellowship in the European University Institute in Florence. She told me that in 1990 many Bulgarians were sorry that ‘all the Turks and Muslims came back from Turkey’ and that ‘they should have remained there.’ I was taken aback by the forcefulness of her opinion on this subject matter. At the same time, I wondered how many returned and when they had left in the first place. By way of answer, she claimed that it was ‘a couple of hundreds of thousands.’ According to her, these returnees were ‘unpatriotic’ because in the summer of 1989 they had selfishly ‘abandoned’ Bulgaria en masse on a ‘Great Excursion’ to Turkey, while the bumper crop remained unharvested in the fields due to the lack of hands. In good faith I asked her how that had been possible because, based on my Polish experience, people had only begun to be issued with passports in late 1989. I inquired when she obtained her first passport. The Bulgarian scholar replied that she had obtained it in 1990 and then cut the discussion short. Thanks to this serendipitous recollection of the curious discussion, I decided to check whether the massive expulsion of Turks (and Muslims of some other ethnicities) from communist Bulgaria in the summer 1989 might trigger the end of communism in Bulgaria. The difficulty was, as I soon realized, that not a single learned journal article in any language (let alone a monograph) was devoted to this expulsion. I had to gather snippets of information on this expulsion, its causes and reverberations from digressions and explanatory footnotes in journal pieces and books focusing on other matters. With time, a potential train of causes and effects emerged. At the turn of 1985 Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims were finally deprived of their ‘un-Bulgarian’ names and traditions. The last communist census held in 1985 ‘confirmed’ that in the country there were no minorities and that the whole population was composed solely of ethnic Bulgarians. The strenuous suppression of any expression of unBulgarianness, including speaking in ‘foreign languages’ (that is, Turkish and Romani) brought about the formation of a vast pro-democracy Turkish (Muslim) dissident movement, led by Ahmed Dogan. Encouraged by the Soviet reform policies of glasnost and perestroika, in April 1989 this movement staged a series of demonstrations and hunger strikes involving about 60,000 people. In May, Zhivkov, angered by their ‘disloyalty,’ expelled about 1,000 perceived leaders to Austria and Yugoslavia. It was not enough, so at the turn of June he ordered the expulsion of at least half of the country’s officially non-existent Turks and Muslims, referred to in contemporary governmental documents as ‘Muslim Bulgarians.’ The sudden outflow of almost 5 percent of the Bulgarian population

xvi Preface to Turkey led to a near-collapse of the Bulgarian economy, already crippled by huge external debt owed to Western banks and governments. This situation precipitated the deposition of Zhivkov and necessitated perestroika-style promarket reforms. The gradual stream of returnees to Bulgaria in late 1989 and 1990 eased the dearth of labor, making the BCP return civil and political rights to Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims at the very turn of 1990. In no time, this act angered numerous ethnic Bulgarians, whose loyalty to the BCP was mostly ensured by this party’s nationalist program of the ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously homogenous Bulgarian nation-state for the nation of Bulgarian-speaking Orthodox Christians. Anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim demonstrations and strikes, involving over a million people, rocked the country in early January 1990, pushing Bulgaria to the brink of ethnic civil war. Such demonstrations continued throughout 1990 and 1991, and often were met by Turkish and Muslim counter-demonstrations. The ruling BCP-turned-BSP strove to prevent violence. The party’s reformist leadership reaffirmed the Bulgarian ethnonational character of the country. But at the same time, the government did not give in to nationalist demands that Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims should be stripped of their civil and political rights, as had been the case under Zhivkov during the latter half of the 1980s. The subsequent tragedy and destruction wreaked by the wars of Yugoslav succession next door to Bulgaria convinced even radical Bulgarian nationalists that the path of compromise was the only possible one. The country’s Turks and Muslims retained their civil and political rights, and established a Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). In the course of the systemic changes that took place in Bulgaria in reply to the mass protests of Turks and Muslims in April 1989, their expulsion during the year’s ominous summer, and to their return and recognition as Turks and Muslims from late 1989 through 1991, communism reluctantly came to an end in Bulgaria and was replaced by democracy. The MRF was vital to this process. It is the sole party that was not renamed, did not splinter or disappear in postcommunist Bulgaria. To this day the MRF remains the country’s third largest party, playing the permanent role of king-maker in the Parliament and making sure that democracy is preserved in Bulgaria. Democracy makes a peaceful and prosperous Bulgaria possible. It is this political system that protects the country’s Turks and Muslims against the wellremembered ravages of unmitigated Bulgarian ethnic nationalism of the 1980s. On the other hand, sticking to democracy ensures ethnic Bulgarians that their country will not descend into the hell of internecine ethnic civil war. For some reason, this afore-sketched possible explanation of the end of communism in Bulgaria is strangely missing from standard histories of the postcommunist transition in Europe. It is as much absent from the mainstream European historiography as the 1989 expulsion of Turks and Muslims from communist Bulgaria across the Iron Curtain to Turkey. This book is an attempt at reintroducing these unduly forgotten and marginalized events to the discussion on the history and politics of modern Europe.

Preface  xvii Without remembering about the expulsion and return of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims, it is impossible to understand the end of communism in Bulgaria or, for that matter, the dynamics of the postcommunist transition in the Balkans. Furthermore, a deepened reflection on these events and their ramifications may also improve the comprehension of the causes of the post-Yugoslav wars and expulsions. When Zhivkov ordered the 1989 expulsion, neither Washington nor Moscow protested, let alone intervened. The communist dictator availed himself of the political instrument of ‘population transfer’ that, according to international law, had been legal since the end of the Great War. Many even considered it an instrument for furthering and preserving human rights. In Yugoslavia future ethnic cleansers and genocidaires clearly knew of the events that unfolded in neighboring communist Bulgaria. If Zhivkov was allowed to do as he pleased with Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims, why would they not, too? Expelling Albanians, Croats, Muslims (or today’s Bosniaks), or Serbs was just another legal population transfer, was it not? Somehow, the West had a change of heart in this respect during the mid-1990s. In 1995 NATO intervened in Bosnia to prevent any further expulsions and four years later NATO struck in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (that is, Serbia-Montenegro) in order to reverse the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo. In the process, between 1993 and 1995 the previously legal instrument of population transfer was redefined as a crime against humanity under the novel name of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ Earlier ethnic cleansing was not ‘a crime without a name,’ but officially a force for good. Hence, coming to terms with the 1989 expulsion of Turks and Muslims from communist Bulgaria requires a deepened reflection on the dark side of the international law concept of population transfer. This reflection must be accompanied by a reinterpretation of the events dubbed as ‘population transfers’ during the short 20th century. They were none other but acts of ethnic cleansing. The 1989 expulsion of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims was the largest ethnic cleansing in Cold War Europe, after the wrapping up (in the early 1950s) of the expulsions of ethnic Germans from Central Europe as agreed at Potsdam.

Acknowledgements

I thank Elena Marushiakova and Veselin Popov for their inspiration, help with research, useful suggestions and reading through all the drafts of this manuscript. They made me aware of the full extent of Turkish (Muslim, Ottoman) influence on Bulgarian culture and language by relating to me the following joke. A foreigner asks a Bulgarian, ‘Do you have any Turkish words in Bulgarian?’ The Bulgarian replies curtly ‘Йок Iok!’ This word means ‘no’ in colloquial Bulgarian, and is a direct borrowing from the Turkish language, where yok also means ‘no’ or ‘nothing’ (iok 2017; yok 2017). Rumen Avramov and Richard J. Crampton kindly read and commented on the early drafts of this book. Catherine Gibson and Iemima Ploscariu meticulously brushed up the prose of and copiously commented on the final draft, alongside the two Anonymous Reviewers. Thanks to their advice, I could nuance the argument and avoid quite a few factual errors. Sofiya Zahova secured for me articles on the 1989 expulsion of Bulgarian Turks that appeared in the contemporary Bulgarian and Yugoslav state press and helped me obtain numerous Bulgarian-language books, which I needed for this project. She also corrected my transliterations of Bulgarian terms and book titles1 (especially numerous in this volume’s bibliography), and discussed some tangled issues I touch upon in this monograph, for which I am grateful. Marko Zajc, Rok Stergar and Jernej Kosi supplied me with contemporary articles on the analyzed expulsion that were published in the republican press in Yugoslavia’s socialist republics of Croatia and Slovenia. Kostas Zafeiris was always ready to discuss over lunch some ideas discussed in the work, especially if they touched upon matters Greek or Cypriot. In April 2016, on home ground, in St Katharine’s Lodge, School of History, University of St Andrews, Konrad Lawson convened a Manuscript Workshop on this work. He and our colleagues, Nikolas Papadogiannis, Kelsey Jackson Williams and Tim Wilson, joined the discussion, which immensely facilitated my task of correcting and improving the prefinal draft. Last but not least, thanks to Tim’s good offices, Tony Wilson kindly agreed to check on the wording of the fragments devoted to active politicians in order to make sure that they do not include formulations that could be seen as unsupported by evidence or unintentionally offensive. However, it is me alone who is responsible for any remaining infelicities.

Acknowledgements  xix The interlibrary loan staff in St Andrews University’s Library excelled at obtaining for my research hard to find publications. My own search for them was vastly facilitated by the metacatalog WorldCat (www.worldcat.org), alongside the online catalogs of Bulgaria’s Saints Cyril and Methodius National Library (http://www.bg.cobiss.net/cobiss_bg-en.htm) and the National Library of Turkey (http://mksun.mkutup.gov.tr/F; in May 2016 replaced by a less user-friendly service at: http://kasif.mkutup.gov.tr/), in the case of Bulgarian- and Turkishlanguage books, respectively. I must also mention the unique fully accessible free archive of the oldest Turkish daily Cumhuriyet (http://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com), which allowed me to incorporate some relevant Turkish-language material. Most probably, it would have been impossible to write this book a decade or so ago. The Internet – where I found numerous relevant documents, articles and entire books – took off in earnest across Europe’s postcommunist countries only at the turn of the 21st century, while Google Books’ vast repository of digitized texts was launched as late as 2004 (Jones 2013; http://books.google.co.uk/). Also in the late 1990s and early 2000s email became the standard way of communication and exchanging opinions among scholars across entire Europe, allowing me to double-check and correct numerous facts on which my argument hinges. Furthermore, despite my general facility with Slavic languages, a certain competence in Germanic tongues, and my friends’ help with Turkish texts (generously offered by Andrew Peacock and Michael Talbot), the statistical machine translation service, Google Translate (https://translate.google.co.uk/), launched in 2006, aided me on the go with some crucial paragraphs in Turkish and Bulgarian. The European Union’s human translators and interpreters are an unsung collective hero of statistical machine translation, having produced millions of parallel texts in multiple languages that were originally fed into the Google Translate service (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013: 38; Schulz 2013; Quigley 2010). At the last stages of writing and editing this monograph for publication, Kurt Bassuener, Konstanty Gebert, Charles Ingrao, Sabrina P. Ramet, Jan Rychlík, Philipp Ther and Erik-Jan Zürcher helped me with their kind advice and suggestions for improvement. Words of thanks also go to Robert Langham at Routledge, who immediately became interested in the monograph’s subject matter, and also to his colleagues Julie Fitzsimons, Peter Stafford and Philip Stirups who deftly oversaw the editing and production of this volume. I had the privilege of presenting the main theses of this book in November 2015 in a talk delivered during the conference ‘Transition in Retrospect: 25 Years after the Fall of Communism’ at the University of New York Tirana in Albania; in December 2015 at the research seminar in the Centre for Russian, Central and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow; in June 2016 in the Department of History at the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia (the talk was co-organized by the Institute of Contemporary History in Ljubljana); and in October 2016 in Belgrade, in the Institute for Balkan Studies (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts) and in the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (Belgrade University). The penultimate case was made possible thanks to the invitation extended to me by Rok Stergar and Jernej Kosi from the University of Ljubljana, and Marko Zajc

xx

Acknowledgements

from the Institute of Contemporary History. David Smith and Federica Prina kindly invited me to speak at Glasgow. What is more, I would not have gone to Tirana had it not been for Bardhyl Selimi’s advice and help, and for Fatos Tarifa’s invitation to the aforementioned conference. In Belgrade my talks were organized by Dragan Bakić, Vojislav Pavlović and Ana Trbović in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and by Igor Cvejić at the University of Belgrade. At this university and in Ljubljana, the organizers released my talks as video podcasts (Kamusella 2016a; Kamusella 2016b). In Glasgow Mario Bikarski corrected a factual error that occurred in my presentation, while Benjamin Thomas White made me aware of another forgotten ethnic cleansing. During the first half of the 1990s about 100,000 Nepali-speaking Bhutanese citizens were expelled from Bhutan to Nepal, roughly a fifth of the former country’s population (Chronology 2004; Population of Bhutan 2016). In the wake of overhauling Bhutan into an ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously homogenous nation-state of Buddhists who speak the Tibetan language of Dzongkha, those Buddhists who happened to speak the Indo-European language of Nepali were forced to leave for Nepal as ‘voluntary emigrants’ (Hutt 2003: 160–165, 221–227). This example shows clearly that in this modern world of ours an occurrence of ethnic cleansing may be treated as a commonplace event not worth lavishing any attention on, unless the global powers that be and the mass media put it in the spotlight. Hence, I suspect that more instances of ethnic cleansing are neglected and consigned to convenient oblivion than those which are brought to light and analyzed with an eye to preventing acts of this type in the future. Earlier, I would have been tempted to propose that more cases of ethnic cleansing suffer the indignity of such neglect if they take place outside the broadly understood ‘West,’ like the aforementioned one in Bhutan. Bulgaria, however, is located in a quite strategic corner of Europe. It lies next to Turkey, on the former Cold War fault line of the Iron Curtain, and nowadays at the southeastern frontier of the European Union. Not exactly a place where an event could easily escape the notice and attention of the international community and press. Yet few journalists, let alone the international community, took note of the 1989 expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria when this ethnic cleansing was in full swing. During the intervening quarter of a century, no scholar or reporter to my knowledge attempted even an in-depth article-length overview of the 1989 ethnic cleansing that continues to be known in Bulgaria under the unbecoming communist propaganda euphemism of ‘Big Excursion.’ Hopefully, this book may serve as a corrective, and as such help to uncover the importance of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, both to the Bulgarian and European history of late communism (including the breakup of Yugoslavia and ethnic cleansing in that country during the 1990s) and of the early postcommunist period of the transition to democracy. For better or for worse, Bulgaria as a member of the European Union, alongside the country’s relations with Turkey, was decisively shaped and to a large degree continues to be determined by the 1989 expulsion of Bulgarian Turks.

Acknowledgements  xxi

Note 1

The Bulgarian Cyrillic has been transliterated into the Latin script in numerous ways. There is still not a single standard and unambiguous way of going around this task (cf. Romanization 2015). With the privilege of hindsight, now I would have retained all the Bulgarian terms and titles in the original Cyrillic and provided transliterations alongside translations. This would have added more pages to this volume, but, on the other hand, would have limited ambiguity and provided the interested reader with the actual spellings of Bulgarian-language terms and book titles, alongside place and personal names on which she would like to learn more. The mid-back unrounded vowel /ɣ/ represented in Bulgarian by the letter [ъ] is variably transliterated as [a] or [u]. In this volume I follow the latter option. In the case of the Bulgarian letter [х] I prefer to transliterate it as [kh] rather than [h], and I use [ts] rather than [c] for transliterating the Bulgarian letter [ц]. Although in English it is popular to romanize the Bulgarian letters [ю] and [я] as [yu] and [ya], here I transliterate them as [iu] and [ia]. I do not distinguish between [и] and [й], which both I romanize as [i]. I stick to the transliteration conventions also in the case of personal and place names. Hence, Petar Mladenov’s first name is spelt in this volume as Petur, and Zhelyu Zhelev’s as Zheliu. I admit that to a degree my choices are dictated by the English-language romanization of the Russian Cyrillic as practiced in the Library of Congress (Russian 2016).

The Bulgarian governments during and after the removal of Todor Zhivkov from office

In this list of Prime Ministers, only the main parties are indicated that formed a given government: Georgi Atanasov (BCP) Andrei Lukanov (1) (BCP, later renamed BSP), Andrei Lukanov (2) (BSP) Dimitur Popov (BSP, UDF) Filip Dimitrov (UDF) Liuben Berov (MRF) Reneta Indzhova (caretaker government) Zhan Videnov (BSP, Ecoglasnost) Stefan Sofiianski (caretaker government, UDF), Ivan Kostov (UDF) Simeon II Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (Sakskoburggotski) (NDSV, MRF) Sergei Stanishev (BSP – Left Bulgaria, NDSV, MRF) Boiko Borisov (1) (GERB) Marin Raikov (caretaker government) Plamen Oresharski (BSP, MRF) Georgi Bliznashki (caretaker government) Boiko Borisov (2) (GERB) Ognian Gerdzhikov (caretaker government) Boiko Borisov (3) (GERB)

19 Jun 1986 8 Feb 1990

– –

8 Feb 1990 21 Sep 1990

22 Sep 20 Dec 1990 8 Nov 1991 30 Dec 1992 17 Oct 1994

– – – – –

20 Dec 1990 8 Nov 1991 30 Dec 1992 17 Oct 1994 25 Jan 1995

25 Jan 1995 12 Feb

– –

12 Feb 1997 21 May 1997

21 May 1997 24 Jul 2001

– –

24 Jul 2001 16 Aug 2005

16 Aug 2005

–

27 Jul 2009

27 Jul 2009 13 Mar

– –

13 Mar 2013 29 May 2013

29 May 2013 6 Aug

– –

6 Aug 2014 7 Nov 2014

7 Nov 2014 27 Jan

– –

27 Jan 2017 4 May 2017

4 May 2017

–

The Heads of State of Bulgaria during and after the removal of Todor Zhivkov from office

General Secretaries of the Bulgarian Communist Party Todor Zhivkov (BCP) Petur Mladenov (BCP)

4 Mar 1954 10 Nov 1989

– –

10 Nov 1989 2 Feb 1990

7 Jul 1971 17 Nov 1989 15 Nov 1990

– – –

17 Nov 1989 3 Apr 1990 22 Jan 1992

3 Apr 6 Jul 17 Jul 1 Aug

– – – –

6 Jul 1990 17 Jul 1990 1 Aug 1990 15 Nov 1990

15 Nov 1990 22 Jan 1992 22 Jan 1997 22 Jan 2002 22 Jan 2007 22 Jan 2012 22 Jan 2017

– – – – – – –

22 Jan 1992 22 Jan 1997 22 Jan 2002 22 Jan 2007 22 Jan 2012 22 Jan 2017

Chairmen of the State Council Todor Zhivkov (BCP) Petur Mladenov (BCP) Zheliu Zhelev (UDF) Chairmen of the Republic Petur Mladenov (BSP) Stanko Todorov (BSP) Nikolai Todorov1 (BSP) Zheliu Zhelev (UDF) Presidents of Bulgaria Zheliu Zhelev (1) (UDF) Zheliu Zhelev (2) (UDF) Petur Stoianov (UDF) Georgi Purvanov (1) (BSP) Georgi Purvanov (2) (BSP) Rosen Pleneliev (GERB) Rumen Radev (BSP)

Note 1

Nikolai Todorov (1921–2003), a high-ranking apparatchik and diplomat in communist Bulgaria, was father of the renowned Bulgarian and United States historian Maria Todorova (1949–) (Istoria 2016).

Acronyms and abbreviations, and of the names of parties and organizations mentioned

Ataka

Bulgarian for ‘attack,’ a populist and nationalist far-right party, founded in 2005, infamous for its xenophobic anti-Roma, antiMuslim and anti-Turkish rhetoric, with a close connection to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Ataka’s main target of political attacks is the MRF (Detrez 2015: 54).

BCP

Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP, Bulgarska komunisticheska partiia in Bulgarian), dissolved on 3 April 1990; existed between 1903 and 1990, transformed into the BSP.

Blue Coalition

Siniata koalitsia in Bulgarian, a coalition of five liberal-democratic parties led by the UDF, active between 2009 and 2012.

BSP

Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, Bulgarska sotsialisticheska partiia in Bulgarian), founded on 3 April 1990 on the basis of the dissolved BCP.

BSP – Left Bulgaria

BSP – liava Bulgariia in Bulgarian, an electoral alliance of the leftist parties led by the BSP. Actually in existence since 1991, under several different names. The current name was adopted in 2014, and earlier this alliance had been known as the Coalition for Bulgaria (Koalitsiia za Bulgariia).

CSCE

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (renamed OSCE in 1995), founded in 1975.

DANS

Durzhavna agentsiia ‘Natsionalna sigurnost’ in Bulgarian (State Agency for National Security), founded in 2008.

DLZPChB

Demokratichna liga za zashtita pravata choveka v Bulgariia in Bulgarian (meaning, Democratic Human Rights League in Bulgaria), founded by Turkish dissidents in November 1988 on the model of the NDZPCh (Ivanov 2004: 109).

DPV89

Druzhestvo za podkrepa ‘Viena 1989’ in Bulgarian (meaning, Association for the Support of Vienna 1989), founded on 30 January 1989 by the Turkish dissident, Avni Veliev, in order to make the plight of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims known to the

Abbreviations  xxv CSCE members during the CSCE conference on Human Rights in Paris in early June 1989 (Gorcheva 2011; Poulton 1991: 154). The confusing mention of Vienna in the DPV89’s name was not opaque in 1989, as at that time most Bulgarians saw the Austrian capital as the unofficial seat of the CSCE, because many East–West meetings took place in neutral Austria during the Cold War. DS

Durzhavna sigurnost in Bulgarian (meaning, State Security [Force]), a popular abbreviation of the force’s official name Komitet za durzhavna sigurnost (Committee for State Security). Active between 1944 and 1990, overhauled into a Natsionalna sluzhba ‘Sigurnost’ (National Force ‘Security’) that in 2008 yielded DANS.

EC

European Communities, that is, the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic Community. The construction of the three communities began in 1951. On 1 November 1993, the EC was transformed into the EU.

Ecoglasnost

Independent Association Ecoglasnost (Nezavisimo sdruzheniie Ekoglasnost in Bulgarian), a dissident organization founded on 11 April 1989, officially registered on 11 December 1989. Most of its members joined the UDF in 1989 and 1990. Apart from the Turkish/ Muslim movement, it was Bulgaria’s most influential dissident organization prior to the ousting of Todor Zhivkov on 10 November 1989 (Detrez 2015: 181). Ecoglasnost is a portmanteau word consisting of ‘eco’ that stands for ‘ecology’ and of the Russian word ‘glasnost,’ which then was the Soviet bloc’s slogan for the policy of ‘openness,’ meaning some political liberalization.

EU

European Union, founded on 1 November 1993, earlier, this organization was known as the European Communities (EC).

GERB

Grazhdani za evropeisko razvitie na Bulgariia in Bulgarian (meaning, Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria), the acronym read as a word is Bulgarian for ‘coat-of-arms,’ evoking an association with a ‘protective shield.’ GERB, founded in 2006, is a conservative and populist party, led by Boiko Borisov, who was a lieutenant in Communist Bulgaria’s Ministry of Interior (1982–1990), the personal body guard of the former communist dictator of Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov (1990–1998), the Chief Secretary of the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior (2001–2005), Mayor of Sofia (2005–2009), and Bulgarian Prime Minister in 2009–2013, 2014–2017, and for the third time since 2017 (Detrez 2015: 220–221).

ICT

International Criminal Court at The Hague, opened in 2002 when the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into force (Rome 1998).

xxvi Abbreviations KGD

Klub za glasnost i demokratsiia in Bulgarian (meaning, Club for Glasnost and Democracy), an informal discussion club founded on 3 November 1988 for supporting the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in Bulgaria. It was officially registered on 2 December 1989 and soon joined the UDF (Detrez 2015: 130).

MRF

Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS, Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi in Bulgarian and HÖK, Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi in Turkish) was founded on 4 January 1990 by members of the TNODB under Ahmed Dogan’s leadership (Detrez 2015: 329–330).

NDSV

Natsionalno dvizheniie ‘Simeon Vtori’ in Bulgarian (meaning, National Movement Simeon II), a liberal populist party, founded in 2001 as a political vehicle for the former Bulgarian Tsar (King) Simeon II (reigned 1943–1946), who as the Bulgarian Prime Minister (2001–2005) successfully prepared Bulgaria for joining the European Union in 2007. In 2007 the name of this party was changed to that of National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV, Natsionalno dvizhenie za stabilnost i vazkhod in Bulgarian), however the Bulgarian acronym remained the same (Detrez 2015: 348).

NDZPCh

Nezavisimo druzhestvo za zashtita pravata na choveka in Bulgarian (meaning, Independent Human Rights Society), founded by political prisoners and other dissidents on 16 January 1988. Initially, this society appealed for the observance of human rights of Muslims in Bulgaria, but during summer 1989 when the ethnic cleansing of the country’s Turks was in full swing, this issue was dropped from the program (Detrez 2015: 521; Dobrev 2009). In late 1989 the NDZPCh joined the UDF (Detrez 2015: 248).

OKZNI

Obshtonarodniiat komitet za zashtita na natsionalite interesi in Bulgarian (meaning, All-National Committee for the Defense of National Interests), founded on 31 December 1989. OKZNI was an important political player in Bulgaria throughout 1991 and 1992, and the acme of its activity was the proclamation of the separatist Razgrad Bulgarian Republic in November 1990. It survives to this day, but as a party of no state-wide importance, with no deputies in the Bulgarian Parliament (Angelov, Krasimir 2015; Bakalova 2006: 236; Iordanov 1995: 20; Pressluzhba 2016). Larger or smaller parts of OKZNI’s ethnonational (read: anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim) program have been adopted by all Bulgaria’s post1989 parties, with the exception of the MRF (Marushiakova and Popov 2015).

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly, CSCE), founded in 1995.

Abbreviations  xxvii Podkrepa

Nezavisima Konfederatsiia na truda ‘Podkrepa’ in Bulgarian (meaning, Independent Labor Confederation ‘Support’), an independent trade union founded by dissidents on 8 February 1989 in emulation of the Polish Independent Self-governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’ that had been founded in 1980. Immediately harassed by the DS, in late 1989 Podkrepa became the largest organization within the UDF, but left this party in December 1991 in order to pursue its own goals as a genuine trade union (Detrez 2015: 249).

PZPR

Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza in Polish, meaning Polish United Workers’ Party.

TNODB

Turskoto natsionalnoosvoboditelno dvizhenie v Bulgariia in Bulgarian (meaning, Turkish National Freedom Movement in Bulgaria) and BTMKH, Bulgaristanda Türk Milli Kurtuluş Hareketi in Turkish; a dissident organization founded on 8 December 1985 by Ahmed Dogan and other leading Bulgarian dissidents of Turkish and / or Muslim ethnic origin. The DS swiftly liquidated this organization in the following year. In early 1990 the MRF emerged from among the members of the suppressed TNODB, reactivated during the April 1989 mass demonstrations of Turks and Muslims against the Zhivkov regime (Detrez 2015: 491).

UDF

Union of Democratic Forces (SDS, Saiuz na demokratichnite sili in Bulgarian, founded on 7 December 1989).

UN

United Nations.

Map A Turkish population in Bulgaria in 2011

Map B Muslims in Bulgaria in 2011

Map C Roma in Bulgaria in 2001

Map D Pomaks in Bulgaria in 2001

Map E MRF in the 2014 Bulgarian parliamentary elections

Map F First Bulgarian Empire

Map G Second Bulgarian Empire

Map H Bulgarian Exarchate

Map I Conflicting territorial aspirations in the Balkans, 1912

Map J San Stefano borders of ‘Greater’ Bulgaria

Map K ‘Greater’ Bulgaria, 1913

Map L ‘Greater’ Bulgaria during World War II

Map M Official view on the territory of the Bulgarian language in 2001: the Macedonian language does not exist

Map N Turkish dialects: the Ottoman Empire remembered

Figure A The Kapitan Andreevo – Kapıkule, the only land border crossing between communist Bulgaria and Turkey (for pedestrian, motorized, and train traffic). The photograph of the expellees was taken on 3 July 1989 by Zhivko Angelov, a photographer of the BTA (Българска телеграфна агенция Bulgarska telegrafna agentsiia, Bulgarian News Agency). © 1989 BTA

Introduction

In 1989 the communist regimes were collapsing across the Soviet bloc. The dizzy feeling of elation spread: democracy and ‘normal’ (that is, capitalist) economy were within reach. The West was busy negotiating the new situation with the Kremlin. Meanwhile, in Bulgaria, the hardline regime with General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) Todor Zhivkov (1911–1998) at its helm, in an attempt to bolster its rapidly waning legitimacy, staked their hopes on Bulgarian nationalism. From 30 May to 22 August 1989, 310,000 to 322,000 Turks and Muslims deemed as ‘un-Bulgarianize-able’ were expelled from Bulgaria to Turkey. With some earlier expellees and members of expelled families joining them after the collapse of the regime on 10 November 1989, the tally added up to about 360,000 expellees, though some push this estimate as high as 400,000 (Angelov 2011a: Vol. 1, 35; Bulgarian MPs Officially 2012; Eminov 1997: 137– 138; Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu and Hacısalihoğlu 2012: 638; Neuberger 2004: 82; Pond 2006: 41–42). Thus, almost half of Bulgaria’s 0.9 to 1 million Turks and Muslims were forced to leave the country for Turkey (Neuberger 2004: 82, 194). (Ethnic Turks constituted about 90 percent of the expellees, while Muslim Slavophones [Pomaks],1 Roma and Tatars accounted for the remaining 10 percent [cf. Eminov 1997: 174].) After wrapping up the expulsion in late August 1989, many of their family members were abroad, mainly in Turkey, while those remaining in Bulgaria faced xenophobia and continued discrimination. As a result, more Turks and Muslims continued leaving Bulgaria for Turkey out of their own volition. Between early 1989 and late 1990, 466,000 people were expelled or migrated to Turkey. Because the state statistics from the period are sketchy for some months, Bulgarian researchers nowadays agree that in reality the total number of expellees and emigrants was about half a million. This estimate corresponds well to the 0.52 million passports that the zhivkovite regime pressed into the hands of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims by late August 1989 (Avramov 2016: 263–265). On 29 December 1989, the policy of forced assimilation of Turks and Muslims was reversed by the Bulgarian Communist Party (Lilov 1989; Verhextes 1990: 128). The BCP feared that the acknowledged 310,000 expellees would soon be joined by a further 400,000 Turks (Muslims) wishing to leave Bulgaria, which in turn would deepen the already acute economic and demographic crisis in the country (Tureckie 1990). It was estimated that despite the swift return of gradually

2

Introduction

more expellees, Bulgaria needed at least 120,000 more workers to prop up numerous understaffed enterprises, some of which due to shortage of labor had had to cease production. Meanwhile pensioners, secondary school and university students, and draftees were forced to work in their stead in the fields, factories and hospitals (Verhextes 1990: 129). As a result of ending the discriminatory policy of forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing, by late 1990, about 150,000 (or over 40 percent) of the expellees had returned to Bulgaria, meaning that in the end the number of the country’s Turks was effectively diminished by a quarter, from 0.85 million to 0.63 million (Martino 2009; Neuberger 2004: 193; Vasileva 1992: 348). Ironically, their apartments and houses having already been taken over by Bulgarians, over half of the returnees (77,000) found themselves homeless. Finally, in July 1992 a law was passed that was to ensure the return of real estate and other property to the expellees who had come back to Bulgaria (Kalinova 2014: 569; Neuberger 2004: 194; Vasileva 1992: 350–351). This ethnic cleansing of 1989 was the largest in postwar Europe after the wrapping up, at the turn of the 1950s, of the post-World War II ‘population transfers’ (that is, expulsions) of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia to post-1945 Germany (Hölle 1989: 123). (The aforementioned ‘population transfers,’ had been agreed upon by the wartime Allies at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 [Zayas 1977].) The expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria was also unprecedented due to the swift return of a sizeable percentage of the expellees. However, the event failed to register in scholarship or European public memory. Thus far, not a single overview article, let alone a monograph, has been devoted to the 1989 ethnic cleansing of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria and to the tragic event’s political and international ramifications. When ethnic cleansing is mentioned in regards to the end of the communist period, it is the Bosnian War (1992–1995) that readily springs to mind in the harrowing image of the 100,000 casualties, 1.3 million internal expellees, 0.7 million refugees who fled to the West, and 0.5 million refugees who found relative safety in other postYugoslav states (Brandes, Sundhaussen and Troebst 2010: 75, 323). Likewise, when a success story is needed, the return of as many as 90 percent of the 0.9 million 1998–1999 Kosovo expellees is used as the prime example (UN Urges Kosovo 2014; Brandes, Sundhaussen and Troebst 2010: 357; World: Europe 1999). Since the mid-1990s (when the wars of Yugoslav succession came to an end in Bosnia and Croatia), the UN Security Council began issuing resolutions calling for ‘the safe and free return of all refugees’ (Leckie 2007: 77–80). This appeal was fulfilled in a comprehensive manner only in the case of Kosovo,2 thus contributing to the coalescence of a new international norm, which obliges the international community to help refugees return home, whenever possible and feasible (cf. Boyle 2011; Leckie 2003).3 The concept of ethnic cleansing (or etničko čišćenje in Serbo-Croatian) is usually associated with and defined by the post-Yugoslav wars, while the breakup of Yugoslavia is commonly explicated with the use of this concept (cf. Calic 2013), though the earliest uses of this term date back to the early 19th century (Čubrilović

Introduction 3 1937; Saltaga 1996: 173). Now, in the popular mind, ethnic cleansing as a concept and phenomenon is somehow connected to the breakup of states after the end of communism. However, the expulsion of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria in 1989 offers a useful comparative and methodological counterpoint to this belief. In this case, the ethnic cleansing was not caused by war or a breakup of the state and did not generate any war or such a breakup. The 1989 ethnic cleansing hastened the end of the communist regime and system in Bulgaria (by triggering the collapse of the already ailing economy [Khristov 2016; Wyzan 1990]), and facilitated the ushering of democratization, which since the early 1990s, has ensured relatively pluralistic politics and the (grudging) acceptance of ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious difference in postcommunist Bulgaria. Critics disagree and propose that many of these changes were half-hearted and implemented only to a degree necessary for allowing the second-tier communists to seize political and economic power as self-reinvented ‘socialists’ or ‘social democrats’ (cf. Trojanow 2006). But, importantly, the process of democratization also spawned domestic legislation in the country that allowed for the legal, economic, and social reintegration of the returning expellees. Ironically, the United Nations and other international organizations began to press the post-Yugoslav states to implement this good practice only half a decade later. Yet, to this day, for instance, even after the 2013 accession of Croatia to the European Union, property there tends not to be returned to ethnically Serbian wartime refugees and expellees from this country (Bertoluzzi and Jovetic 2013). Furthermore, bearing in mind that the Cold War was still on in 1989, the unprecedented ethnic cleansing of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims, euphemistically referred to as the ‘Big Excursion,’ needs to be analyzed in its own right. During this expulsion, beginning in early June 1989, the communist authorities and mass media officially started referring to the expellees as ‘tourists’ (туристи turisti) and to their expulsion as at most a ‘three-month’ (тримесечна trimesechna) ‘excursion’ (екскурзия, ekskurziia) (Giurova 1989; Ranchev 1989; Stoilov 1989). As early as mid-May 1989, DS (security) officers employed the euphemism ‘excursion’ with regard to the expulsion of leaders of the April 1989 Turkish and Muslim protests and participants of the Turkish and Muslim hunger strikes (cf. R[umiana] 1989). This official duplicity immediately produced the ironic and mendacious coinage ‘Big Excursion’ (голямата екскурзия, goliamata ekskurziia) (Dimitrov 1993: 116, 184; Georgieva 1993; Marinov 2009; Mutafov 1992: 127; Pundeff 1994: 194; Zagorov 1993: 103; Zang 1989: 50), whose initials were at first not capitalized. To this day, those who wish to belittle the tragic events prefer not to capitalize the popular name of this ethnic cleansing. On 23 June 1989, the euphemistic collocation ‘big number of travelers’ (големи брой пътуващи golemi broi putuvashti) was employed in an official pronouncement reported in the press (Pangelov and Stratiev 1989: 2), perhaps strongly contributing to the adding of the adjective ‘big’ to the aforementioned ironic name of the expulsion.4 The need to treat this 1989 ethnic cleansing as a discrete event is made urgent by the widespread tendency evident in present-day Bulgarian historiography, alongside political and intellectual discourse, to merge this unique expulsion with

4

Introduction

the ‘Revival Process,’ or the forced assimilation campaign aimed at Turks (and Muslims) during the latter half of the 1980s (cf. Marinov 2009). Some authors (mostly with no ill will intended on their part) also speak of the 1989 ethnic cleansing as a ‘mere’ endpoint of the repeated bouts of expulsions and forced assimilation actions imposed on Bulgaria’s Muslims and Turks since the very founding of this nation-state in 1878 (cf. Baeva and Kalinova 2009a; Myuhtar 2003; Şimşir 1988). This long period of the protracted, usually low-level, ethnic cleansing of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims between 1878 and 1989 is ‘justified’ by the constant and ritualized recalling (by Bulgarian politicians and also in schools) of the myth of half a millennium of the ‘Turkish yoke,’5 as the period of Ottoman rule is stereotypically referred to in the Bulgarian national master narrative (cf. Pavlov 2008; Riis 2009: 31–32).6 The presumed sufferings of the Bulgarians under the Ottomans, anachronistically recast in the present-day vocabulary of nationalism, appear to put right the wrongs done to Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria after 1878. Such thinking leads to the conclusion that Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims had to be assimilated or expelled in order to reverse the (often retroactively presented as ‘illegal’) spread of Islam and the Turkish language that had taken place during the Ottoman times (cf. Petrov and Dimitrov 1987). As a result, on the one hand, the distinctiveness and unprecedented character of the 1989 ethnic cleansing is buried and nullified in the over century-long string of variegated and still poorly understood expulsions (cf. Turan 1998). Or even worse, on the other hand, the anachronistic myth of Bulgarian national martyrdom ‘suffered under Turks’ allows the Bulgarian public and commentators to dismiss the 1989 ethnic cleansing as ‘justified’ and actually of ‘no importance.’ Hence, the deafening silence on the ‘Big Excursion’ in today’s Bulgaria, let alone on the question of putting the planners and perpetrators of this ethnic cleansing in the dock. The insidious nature of this political-cum-intellectual tactic employed to skirt, and at best prevent, any meaningful discussion of the ‘Big Excursion,’ its prehistory and aftermath, and of the need for indemnifying the expellees and their descendants (in case the former might be deceased) may be immediately laid bare by applying this approach to talking about the Holocaust. Let us imagine that Holocaust deniers propose to ‘prove’ that the Third Reich’s extermination of Jews was ‘unimportant’ or a mere ‘logical conclusion’ of pogroms, expulsions and other measures taken against Jews in order to remove them from ‘Christian Europe’ since the middle ages. That these punitive measures were brought on their heads by Jews themselves, because they were usurers, unscrupulous middlemen and most shockingly they ‘killed our Lord Jesus Christ.’ In conclusion, the deniers could propose that it was Jews themselves who gave Hitler no choice but to eradicate them in order to ‘save’ Germany and Europe from a ‘Jewish invasion,’ or even from the ‘plot to dominate the world.’ Hence, quite conveniently for some, there would be no need for trials for perpetrators, indemnification for survivors, or even for the unique term ‘Holocaust,’ as ‘the event’ could be branded more euphemistically and thus ‘appropriately’ as a ‘Big Pogrom of 1943’ (cf. Wistrich 2012).7

Introduction 5 This is none other than the master narrative of anti-Semitism that entered the mainstream of European politics during the first half of the 20th century and eventually proved the unmaking of this continent in the all-consuming conflagration of World War II (Goldstein 2012). Following this indescribable inferno, after 1945 a broad consensus emerged that recognizes the sheer social and political destructiveness entailed by scapegoating and excluding ethnic, social, or religious groups from the body politic, and deems this approach as wrong and unacceptable. The consensus holds that ethnocultural, linguistic, or religious features displayed by a human group cannot be employed for justifying any discrimination against its members. The Holocaust became the symbol and moral beacon of a new Europe of human rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and the European Union. Lest Europeans and the world forget what humans and their groups are capable of, and so that no another Holocaust or genocide could take place (cf. Rudnicki 1955). It is this moral imperative to remember, recollect and research the darkest pages of the past in order to prevent their repeating what is absent in the astounding lack of any sustained discussion on the 1989 ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria, and let alone in Europe. Hopefully, the causes and ramifications of this silence may be explicated by future researchers who would delve deeper into the 1989 ethnic cleansing of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. For the time being, I may add that as much as silence on the Holocaust is in essence anti-Semitic, likewise the silence on the 1989 ethnic cleansing seems to amount to condoning the act and, by extension, all the anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim measures adopted and implemented between 1878 and 1989 in the quest for a utopian ethnolinguistically and ethnoconfessionally homogeneous Bulgarian nation-state. Having said that, I dare say, this study’s novel approach to the 1989 ethnic cleansing as an event in its own right may help rescue this tragic expulsion from nationally induced forgetting and moral relativization in Bulgaria. It is high time that the ‘black legend of the Ottoman Islamization and Turkification of Bulgarians’ (so similar in its dissimulating function to what The Protocols of the Elders of Zion are for anti-Semitism [Segel 1995]) stopped obfuscating the reality of this ethnic cleansing. The gradual forgetting about the Holocaust lasted in the West until the mid-1960s. Between 1963 and 1965 the Frankfurt trials of middle- and lower-rank officials in the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp deeply and truly shocked many in West Germany and across Western Europe, thus leading to a reawakening of (Western) European conscience over the Holocaust (Pendas 2006). This reawakening became a foregone conclusion among Western Europe’s population at large in 1968, when student and social protests, among others, made the remembrance of the Holocaust the moral core of European and Western public memory (Assmann 2014; Leggewie 2009; Marcuse 1998). This happened less than a quarter-century after the end of World War II. Waiting longer could have made the Holocaust into a forgotten element, one among many of the ‘dark 20th century’ (cf. Mazower 1999), and essentially into a non-event that was actually the case of the Soviet bloc where officially approved anti-Semitism strongly suppressed the remembrance and commemoration of the Holocaust until the collapse of

6

Introduction

communism in 1989 (Freedman 1984: 491; Horowitz 2009: x–xi; Kichko 1963; Kucia 2005: 150–155). Now a similar danger is faced by Bulgaria and Europe that the lasting importance of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, coyly dubbed as ‘Big Excursion,’ may be lost on them, resulting in damage to Bulgarian and European democracy.8 Acknowledging the importance and uniqueness of the wholesale expulsion of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria in the summer of 1989 may finally open this event to scrutiny and comparisons by international scholars. Thus far, they have lavished their attention on a variety of cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the post-Yugoslav states immediately west of Bulgaria to such an extent that they failed to notice that the Yugoslav events were shortly and importantly preceded by the ‘Big Excursion.’ The then freshly elected (8 May 1989) President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia’s Socialist Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006), came to restive Kosovo, where Albanians had appealed for observing and broadening their national rights after Serbia had unilaterally revoked the autonomy of this province on 28 March 1989 (Klip and Sluiter 2001: 13). On 28 June 1989, at the monument commemorating the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Field (Kosovo Polje in Serbo-Croatian, Fushë Kosova in Albanian), in which Christian (anachronistically seen as ‘Serbian’) forces had been defeated by the Ottomans,9 marking the six hundredth anniversary of this event, Milošević delivered a famous speech (Čolović 2014: 27–46; Milosevic’s Speech 1989). In this speech he abandoned any pretense of upholding the supra-ethnic and civic ideals of Yugoslav socialism (encapsulated in the slogan ‘brotherhood and unity’), and unequivocally embraced Serbian nationalism, alongside the renewed ideology of ante murale, presenting Serbia as a defender of ‘Christian Europe’ against the Muslim world. Obviously, in this specific case it was Kosovo’s Albanian population which was cast in the role of ‘Islamic threat’ (Čolović 2016: 385–389; Fehmel 2007; Serbs Mark 1989).10 The speech is believed to have presaged the breakup of Yugoslavia and the follow-up ethnic wars (Huszka 2014: 77). One can only wonder whether the Yugoslav-turned-Serbian, -Croatian, -Bosniak or -Kosovar (Kosovo Albanian or Serb) leaders were aware of the 1989 ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria. I would be surprised if they were not, given the front-page coverage of this expulsion of Bulgarian Turks in the Yugoslav press (cf. Mobilizacjija 1989; Nov pregon 1989; Sofija ne zatvara 1989). In addition, Yugoslav newspapers also featured in-depth essays on the forced assimilation and periodic expulsions of Bulgarian Turks and Muslims during the entire 20th century (Košir 1989a; Špeletić 1989), alongside sweeping comparisons with the situation of other suppressed minorities across Central Europe (Košir 1989b). These leaders also knew well that neither the West nor the East had intervened to stop the 1989 blitz-like expulsion of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria. And neither had Turkey intervened. On this basis the postYugoslav ethnically defined leaderships and military commanders could rationally assume that they would be able to embark with full impunity on similar campaigns of ethnic cleansing and even genocide during the wars of post-Yugoslav

Introduction 7 succession. Surprisingly, the West did intervene in this case, showing how inconsistent in its principles and actions international politics can be.11 From the methodological vantage of peace and conflict studies, by far the most important question is how the ethnic and political tension caused by the 1989 ethnic cleansing was managed in order to prevent an outbreak of Bulgarian–Turkish war that by default would have meant a (potentially global) war between the Soviet bloc (that is, the Warsaw Pact) and the West (namely, NATO). An answer to this query lies encased in the governmental archives in Sofia (София Sofiia in Bulgarian and Sofya in Turkish) and Ankara, and those of the White House and the Kremlin. Research in these archives is beyond the study’s scope. Neither do I aspire to probe into the causal links between the 1989 ethnic cleansing, on the one hand, and postcommunist Bulgaria’s systemic transition and politics, including the relations between this country and Turkey, on the other hand. I set myself a much humbler task of writing a – hopefully – solid overview of the 1989 expulsion with the intention of bringing this half-forgotten and seriously under-researched ethnic cleansing to the attention of students of communism and postcommunist transition, 20th-century Europe, conflict and peace, and ethnic studies. I hope that in this manner, I can whet some doctoral candidates’ curiosity so that further monographs might be at long last attempted on all salient aspects of the ‘Big Excursion,’ though a multifocal international interdisciplinary research project (or even projects in plural) on the 1989 ethnic cleansing would be much preferable. In this overview, which assumes the format of an exploratory study on the ‘Big Excursion,’ I first have a look at the research done on the 1989 expulsion thus far. Then, on the basis of a close perusal of the 1989 issues of the British dailies of The Times and the Guardian, with some recourse to other Anglophone international newspapers, I attempt to reconstruct a tentative timeline of the ‘Big Excursion.’ The analysis is bolstered with a further selection of articles on the subject drawn from the Bulgarian, German, Polish, Turkish and Yugoslav press, alongside relevant (though quite scant) literature that touches the subject. And last but not least, in the conclusion I scrutinize the ways in which the 1989 expulsion is remembered and commemorated (or not) in today’s Bulgaria and Turkey.

Notes 1 Apparently, Pomaks were to be excluded from the expulsion in line with the official view that they are ‘pure Bulgarians’ converted by force to Islam during the Ottoman times. (Notwithstanding this official position, in everyday politics and social life it is maintained that in order to be a ‘true’ Bulgarian a person must be an Orthodox Christian, hence in nationalist practice Muslims cannot be Bulgarians.) But given the phenomena of bilingualism and diglossia and the existence of Turkish-medium schools in Bulgaria until 1972 (despite barring Pomaks from attending them after 1962), it has never been easy to decide whether one is a Pomak or a Turk, unless a person in question declared himself or herself as one or the other. Furthermore, due to a considerable degree of religious and cultural syncretism, Pomaks could also easily function as Orthodox Christians, should they decide to convert (Lubańska 2012). However, the regions where Pomaks and Turks traditionally live in Bulgaria are non-contiguous, which lets the

8

Introduction

authorities use the place of origin to impose a preferred ethnic category on a person. Furthermore, a specific Slavic dialect of Pomaks (seen by some as ‘archaic Bulgarian’), which was produced by the socio-confessional isolation of this group, permits identifying a person as a Pomak. In a given situation a Pomak or a Bulgarian Turk can emphasize either the Turkish/Muslim or Slavohopne/Bulgarian (and sometimes also Orthodox Christian) constituent of their identity in order to gain access to or separate themselves from a given social group (cf. Okamura 1981). Hence, some estimates propose that Pomaks actually added up to as many as 111,000 persons among the 1989 expellees, or a third of the total (Bojkov 2007: 353, 361; Mariushakova and Popov 2015; Myuhtar-May 2014: 99, 108, 138). 2 Obviously, there were and still are some exceptions to this comprehensiveness of the return of expellees to Kosovo. First of all, both Serbs and Albanians persecuted Roma, and did their best to prevent the return of Roma expellees by burning their houses. Furthermore, Serbs are reluctant to return to their former houses in villages or towns where Serbs ceased to constitute at least a plurality of the inhabitants (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). 3 The all too little known fact in the Anglophone world is that the human right to homeland surfaced as an idea during the interwar period among German-speaking Jews and Germans in the territories annexed by Germany’s neighbors after the Great War. Both groups suffered expulsion, forced resettlement or were ‘coaxed’ to emigrate (cf. Laubert 1924; Rieger 1924). The idea was made into one of the core values of the political groups established by Germans expelled (‘transferred’) from across Central Europe and the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line annexed by the Soviet Union and Poland (Laun 1951; Kimminich 1978). After the 1990 absorption of East Germany by West Germany, the reunified Germany became the main promoter of the right to homeland as a human right (Zayas 2001). 4 Throughout the study I put the term ‘Big Excursion’ (Goliamata ekskurziia, Голямата екскурзия) between quotation marks in order to emphasize that it is not a neutral designation. It spontaneously developed in Bulgaria for denoting the 1989 ethnic cleansing during and immediately in the wake of this event, however, with the ideologically unsavory use of props from the zhivkovite propaganda of that time, which maintained that the expellees were nothing else but ‘tourists.’ I decided to use this coinage only reluctantly, because for the time being there is no more well-known counterpart to label the 1989 ethnic cleansing in an unambiguous manner. For the sake of style and in an effort to propose a more objective designation for the expulsions, I alternate the highly ideologized designation of ‘Big Excursion’ with the terms ‘1989 ethnic cleansing,’ ‘1989 expulsion’ and ‘forced emigration.’ Likewise, I put the phrase ‘Revival Process’ (Vuzroditelen protses Възродителен процес, which can also be rendered in English as ‘Rebirth Process’) between inverted commas, because it was the Zhivkov regime’s increasingly official term (coined in 1985 by the high-flying apartchik Georgii Atanasov, who became Bulgarian Prime Minister in 1986 [Marinov 2009]) for the policy of forced assimilation and expulsion of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims (cf. Vuzroditelen 2015a). Obviously, this ‘process’ was neither reviving nor conducive to any ‘rebirth’ of some essentialized ‘true Bulgarianness,’ supposedly ‘hidden behind the veneer’ of the Turkish language and Islam. The goal of the ‘Revival Process’ was to swiftly Bulgarianize the remaining Turks and Muslims in communist Bulgaria in order to turn the country into a fully ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously homogenous nation-state of ‘true Bulgarians’ (that is, Orthodox Slavic-speakers). Unfortunately, both communist Poland and capitalist Greece served as examples of such a through and through homogenous polity, to which Zhivkov could have looked up to as models to be emulated. In the text I alternate the ideologized term ‘Revival Process’ with the descriptive phrase ‘(forced) assimilation campaign (in the latter half of the 1980s),’ or the ‘1984–1985 assimilation campaign.’

Introduction 9 5 Had the myth of ‘Turkish yoke or slavery’ been a reality, and the Ottomans had really employed such methods of ethnic cleansing as Zhivkov did in Bulgaria in 1989, after the five centuries of Ottoman rule not a single Slavophone and Orthodox Bulgarian would have survived to build a Bulgarian polity in 1878. 6 The Bulgarian national epos (inconveniently for today’s nationalists, shared with the Serbs and the Macedonians) dating back to the period of Ottoman expansion is about valiant Prince Marko, who fought against the ‘Turks’ in the late 14th century. The story is retold in numerous books, many of them directed at children (cf. Shomov 2009). Ironically, Prince Marko (reigned 1375–1395) was a faithful vassal of the Ottomans, and fought for them (not against them) in exchange for retaining his hereditary lands. Likewise, he died when fighting for the Ottomans in the Battle of Rovine against the Walachians (Romanians) (Fine 1987: 424). As it is often the case, retaining the ownership of one’s own mansion is ‘well worth a mass,’ if I may paraphrase Henry IV’s famous remark, when he decided to abandon Protestantism for the throne of the Catholic Kingdom of France in 1594 (Dickerman 1977). 7 It is important to note that I do not compare here the 1989 expulsion of communist Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims with the Jewish Holocaust as phenomena, but only discuss and compare perceptions of these phenomena. 8 Forgetting about the most important events from the past is not that uncommon as one might think, especially if the task of acknowledging and commemorating such events is not completed within the lifetimes of those who participated in them. In 2014 the anniversary of the outbreak of World War I was celebrated across Europe. Traditionally, the attention was lavished on the bloody and immobile Western Front, between France and Germany with its notorious trench warfare, which also involved soldiers from across the British Empire and its French counterpart. However, the much longer Eastern Front, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, moved widely from today’s eastern Poland to Crimea and the Caucasus, and intermittently merged through the Armenian Genocide and the wide-ranging military operations across Anatolia with the Balkan Front. These highly mobile and extremely long frontline(s) sent millions of refugees walking in various directions and incarcerated hundreds of thousands in concentration camps across Central and Eastern Europe, and also in Anatolia and the Middle East (cf. Akçam 2006; Gatrell 1999; Prymaka-Oniszk 2016; Sukiennicki 1984). The military operations lasted for four years on the Western Front, between 1914 and 1918, while warfare alongside the Eastern-Balkan Front(s) began with the Balkan Wars in 1912 and lasted until the mid-1920s, due to all kinds of follow-up conflicts fought among the successor nationstates, and also due to numerous revolutionary wars that aimed at establishing communist (Soviet-style) regimes across the region (cf. Carr 1950–1953; Hall 2000; Roshwald 2001). The horrific sufferings and the steep loss of human life on the Eastern Front even spawned the term ‘total war’ (Ludendorff 1935), which nowadays is rather associated with World War II, not the Great War. 9 In the Serbian national master narrative the Battle of Kosovo Polje marks the end of medieval Serbia. But in reality, it is a myth. First, the belligerents were the Ottomans (including their Christian vassals) on the one hand, while on the other a coalition of Christian polities. Second, this battle was indecisive. Furthermore, the last identifiable Serbian state, or the Serbian Despotate, fell to the Ottomans in 1459, or 70 years after the Battle of Kosovo Polje. Bosnia (which had also participated on the Christian side in the Battle of Kosovo) withstood the Ottoman conquest for four years longer, until 1463. Last but not least, today’s Serbian capital of Belgrade, or the fortress of Nándorfehérvár in Hungarian, survived under Hungary’s Christian rule as long as 1521, when it was captured by Ottoman forces (Hammel 2000: 23; Mihaljčić 1989: 48). 10 I thank Rumen Avramov for bringing my attention to the coincidence of Milošević’s Kosovo Polje (Fushë Kosova) speech and the 1989 ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria. 11 I am aware only of a single author who proposes a causal connection (though in a quite throw-away and rather oblique manner) between the 1989 expulsion of Turks from

10

Introduction Bulgaria and the subsequent instances of ethnic cleansing in the course of the wars of Yugoslav succession (Ther 2014b: 74). I thank Sabrina P. Ramet for drawing my attention to the fact that the West took the decision to intervene in Bosnia only after it was established the conflict potentially endangered stability in some NATO countries. However, the 1989 expulsion of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey had directly endangered stability of this NATO member state.

1

On forgetfulness and its perils

During the 1990s, the post-Yugoslav wars and their aftermath became the poignant staple of daily news in the press and on television. Following World War II, the widespread hope was that military conflicts should never again take place in Europe. All in vain. The end of the Cold War, brought about by the fall of communism and the breakups of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union, opened a space for playing out substate rivalries, led by ethnonational entrepreneurs who readily seized the opportunity (cf. Bieber 2011: 170). Meanwhile, the sole remaining superpower of the United States and the rapidly imploding former superpower of the Soviet Union diminished to a Russian Federation stayed away and looked on until the situation became too bad to turn a blind eye. But then it was too late. Federal Yugoslavia was the sole European leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and, when successful, this state thrived as a genuine bridge between East and West (cf. Mates 1989; Savić 1979). But the country internally destabilized and postcommunist Europe in flux, no powers had any interest in helping to keep Yugoslavia together (especially, given the fact that resurgent Serbia under Slobodan Milošević’s leadership wanted to transform this multiethnic country into a homogenous greater Serbian nation-state). This federal polity split along the republican borders that were ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously defined in a broad manner, with the exception of Bosnia that suffered the most devastating war of all the wars of post-Yugoslav succession, a simultaneous war of partition and of ethnic cleansing (cf. Trbovich 2008; Waldenberg 2005). The sought-for elusive ideal of ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogeneity (cf. Altermatt 1996) triggered mass deportations and genocidal massacres that in 1991–1992 (Burns 1992; Safire 1993) introduced the English-language term ‘ethnic cleansing’ to the regular lexicon of news, international relations, and law (cf. Carmichael 2002; Mojzes 2011: 131–238). General works soon followed on the nature and mechanisms of the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing, mostly defined as the forced expulsion of an ethnically defined group of people from one state (or region) to another (Bell-Fialkoff 1996; Naimark 2001; Pégorier 2013; Ther 2014a). In this context, when reading – in the early 1990s – for an MA in European Studies and International Relations at the Central European University in the Czech capital of Prague (in the very year when Czechoslovakia disappeared from the political map of Europe, that is, 1993), in my thesis I used this then-novel term

12 On forgetfulness and its perils ‘ethnic cleansing’ for denoting the post-1945 deportations of Germans and the policies of ethnolinguistic homogenization in communist Poland’s new region of Silesia, gained from Germany after 1945 (Kamuzela 1994). I summarized the findings in two articles devoted, respectively, to the situation at the end of the war and in its immediate aftermath, and during the latter half of the 20th century (Kamusella 1999 and 2003). The former piece I delivered at the large conference on ‘Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe’ that took place in 2000 at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. One of the keynote speeches during this event was delivered by Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, the then Head of the National Security Agency (1999–2005). He spoke of the Bosnian War, though he mentioned witnessing ethnic cleansing in the Balkans during the 1980s and 1990s (Hayden 2003: 31). Hayden’s mention of the 1980s made me pause and ponder. The post-Yugoslav wars commenced in 1991 with the war in Slovenia (cf. Bauman and Vidic 1991). During a coffee break, I approached the speaker and asked what he meant by ‘ethnic cleansing in the 1980s.’ He replied that he referred to Bulgaria. Specifically, to the so-called ‘Revival Process’ (1984–1989), when about 0.85 to 1.1 million Turks and Roma1 – accounting for over a tenth of the country’s population – were forced to adopt ‘purely Bulgarian’ (that is, Slavic) names and surnames (the goals of the name-changing campaign were mostly completed between late 1984 and early 1985)2 (Laber 1987; Şimşir 1988: 278; Vasilev 2011). Hayden witnessed and monitored these events, first as the air attaché in the United States Embassy at Sofia (1984–1986), and afterward as the Chief of Intelligence for United States Forces in Europe (Politico-Military Affairs Officer) in the Pentagon, Washington DC (1986 – September 1989) (Biography 2015; Hayden 2003: 31). He closely observed and followed the rapid unfolding of the ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria during the three summer months of June, July and August in 1989, when 360,000 Turks/Muslims (including ethnic Roma and Pomaks) – that is, almost five percent of the citizenry – were expelled from Bulgaria to Turkey (Bulgaria Condemns 2012; Martino 2009). I asked Hayden why he had not spoken of the huge and rapid expulsion of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria in 1989. He replied that the audience would not have known the facts and context necessary to follow his talk, while the time for his speech was limited, hence he had chosen to focus on well-known instances of ethnic cleansing from the wake of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Fair enough. But his approach is illustrative of how much the ‘Big Excursion’ is forgotten among politicians, scholars and the general public. The limelight of international attention was ‘stolen’ by even more notorious instances of ethnic cleansing and genocide that occurred in Europe in postcommunist, post-Yugoslav, and post-Soviet states after the fall of communism in 1989. The only exception to this rule is the mutual ethnic cleansing between Azeris and Armenians that ensued during the NagornoKarabakh War (1988–1994) (Cox and Eibner 1993). It is still remembered and commented on, perhaps, because this ethnic cleansing continued well into the postcommunist period and the war has not been concluded by a peace treaty yet (cf. Adamczewski 2012).

On forgetfulness and its perils 13 The apparent mechanism of marginalizing and forgetting the ‘Big Excursion’ at the international level is as follows. First of all, the 1989 expulsion from Bulgaria to Turkey continues to be little known, so it is not evoked as a comparative example in research, or by politicians and commentators. Second, in thinking about forced population movements, the semantic shift from legal ‘population transfers’3 to criminal ‘ethnic cleansing’ took place some three years after the 1989 expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria, that is, during the early 1990s in the context of atrocities perpetrated in the course of the wars of Yugoslav succession (cf. Adelman and Barkan 2011: xii–xiii, 54–57, 68–69; Lieberman 2010: 45; Preece 2009: 165; Ther 2014a: 236, 242, 273). Prior to this recent semantic shift population transfers were seen as a legal instrument of international relations, perhaps painful, but when ‘surgically applied’ such transfers purportedly would secure peace and stability, and even further human rights (cf. Bierzanek 1963: 25; Henckaerts 1995: 8–9; Kirk 1930: 175; Schechtman 1946: 467–468; The Search 1951: 208). Hence, the 1989 expulsion from Bulgaria occurred when population transfers were still seen as legal, not yet a case of ethnic cleansing that would constitute a crime against humanity. Third, on the temporal plane the ‘Big Excursion’ was fully contained to the communist period, so this ethnic cleansing is overlooked due to the popular and persisting belief among scholars who maintain that communism ‘froze’ all ethnic tensions and conflicts (cf. Lukic and Lynch 1996: 12). The ‘Big Excursion’ flies in the face of this simplistic conviction. And perhaps most importantly, the 1989 expulsion did not lead to a war, border changes, an annexation of some territory, or a breakup of Bulgaria, which in turn made this ethnic cleansing ‘unremarkable’ and ‘unmemorable,’ despite its intensity and – at that time – its unprecedentedly huge scale. It is as though sufferings and indignities visited on the expellees were of no import, nor worth dwelling upon. I can only wonder whether this indifference might be an indication of the West’s oft-denied but in reality continuing prejudice against Muslims. When in 1876 the Ottoman administration suppressed the Orthodox Christian uprising (known as the April Uprising in Bulgarian national historiography) that had briefly erupted across the Bulgarian Exarchate,4 the seasoned British politician William Ewart Gladstone (1809–1898) seized this opportunity for mobilizing ‘moral outrage’ in Britain and across Christian Europe (Shannon 1963). Two years earlier, in 1874, he had lost the post of Prime Minister to Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881). Gladstone accused Disraeli of indifference to the fate of ‘fellow Christians,’ because the latter politician cultivated an alliance with the Muslim Ottoman Empire against Christian Russia (Bulgarian Horrors 2016). Disraeli argued that reports of the massacres were intentionally exaggerated, to which his opponents, commenting on the Jewish origin of the Prime Minister, replied with anti-Semitic arguments ad hominem (Glassman 2003: 85; Turan 1998: 50–51). Gladstone wrote the eponymous brochure on the ‘Bulgarian Horrors’ (Gladstone 1876), which was immediately translated into Russian (Gladston 1876). The brochure was published in over 20 editions with the cumulative run of almost 80,000 copies. On its basis Gladstone spoke in Parliament and delivered numerous lectures to the public from London to Scotland.

14

On forgetfulness and its perils

In 1876–1878 at least 46 publications appeared on the topic of these ‘horrors,’ the vast majority in Britain, Ireland, Canada, and the United States, but also six in Russia, four in Germany, and three in France (su:Bulgaria 2016). Gladstone successfully exaggerated the scale of ‘Turkish5 crimes,’ and tirelessly led a hugely successful campaign across Britain to gather aid for the suffering (Orthodox) Christians. Finally, the United Kingdom and other European powers had no choice but to lean on the Ottomans and side with Russia in the Kremlin’s subsequent war against the Ottoman Empire (1877–1878), in this way indirectly contributing to the founding of an autonomous Bulgaria in 1878 (Matthew 1997: 269, 277–278). Two years later, in 1880, Gladstone became Prime Minister again. Streets and buildings continue to be named after him in Bulgaria to this day (A View 2013; Melitev 2009).6 In the Bulgarian national master narrative, the Gladstonian ‘horrors’ of 1876 were made into the founding myth of contemporary Bulgaria. In Bulgarian school textbooks the number of casualties was ‘accordingly’ inflated to 30,000, or even to 100,000 (Prokopov 2012; Zafirov and Aleksandrov 2007: 321).7 The Ottomans acknowledged 3,000 Orthodox Christian and 500 Muslim dead,8 while British and American sources reported 12,000 to 15,000 victims (Turan 1998: 51). Significantly, the numbers mostly do not distinguish between Orthodox Christian and Muslim casualties, the suspicion being that irrespective of their religion all were subsumed in the higher (inflated) numbers. Furthermore, it is forgotten that most Muslim irregulars (bashibazouks, from Osmanlıca başıbozuk for ‘irregulars’) who committed these atrocities were recruited from among Circassian expellees (cf Fortna 2016). Following the completion of the Russian conquest of the Northern Caucasus in 1864, which cost the lives of almost half a million Circassians (Goble 2005), within three years over half a million Circassians had been expelled from their homeland on the Black Sea northeastern littoral mostly to the Ottomans’ Balkans, but also to Anatolia and Syria (Richmond 2013: 89; Taboroši 2011: 80). (The British Ambassador at Constantinople had made London aware of their tragic fate, but in this case no Western politician had taken any interest in the ‘Circassian horrors’ [Richmond 2013: 107]). These Circassian survivors in the Balkans rightly feared that if the Bulgarian Exarchate would be made into a Christian polity in its own right they would face another expulsion, which came to pass already two years later, in 1878. In 1876 the Circassian irregulars were fighting for their expellee communities’ livelihood and, in the end, for their very lives (Jelavich 1983: 347–348; Richmond 2013: 8, 82, 96; Taboroši 2011: 81–82). Presumably the largest of all the 1876 massacres that followed in the course of the Ottoman suppression of the April Uprising took place in the village of Batak (Батак) (nowadays in Pazardzhik [Пазарджик in Bulgarian, Pazarcık in Turkish] Province). The event and locality were made into the eponymous Bulgarian lieu de mémoire par excellence, and the number of 50,000 casualties into an unchallengeable national orthodoxy (cf. Batashko 2016; Boicho 1991 [1892]; Pavlov 2008: 69). When in 2007 the Austro-Bulgarian team of scholars attempted to do research on the Batak massacre and discuss its tabooed aspects (Baleva and Brunnbauer 2007), they were immediately dubbed ‘grandiose falsificators’ in

On forgetfulness and its perils 15 Bulgaria and their project a ‘provocation against the Bulgarian national history’ (Batak 2016; Yoncheva 2007). Four years later, in 2011, during the celebration of another anniversary of this massacre, the victims were canonized as saints of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Martyrs 2011; Polyakov 2012), placing them and the massacre in the realm of the sacred, thus safely off-limits to any further scholarly scrutiny (Myuhtar-May 2014: 79). More than a century after the Bulgarian Horrors, despite much improved access to information, in 1989 no British, Western, or Eastern politician spoke of any ‘Turkish Horrors,’ or ‘Turkish Outrages’ perpetrated by Orthodox Christians against Muslims in communist Bulgaria. It appears that the silent principle is that expulsions and massacres perpetrated by (European) Christians at the expense of (‘non-European’) non-Christians are often overlooked (cf. McCarthy 1995; Toumarkine 1995). As a result of this attitude and the above-discussed perceived ‘un-newsworthiness’ of the 1989 expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria, the ‘Big Excursion’ is not mentioned, let alone analyzed even in comprehensive monographs on ethnic cleansing in the Balkans or Europe (cf. Mojzes, 2011; Tesser 2013; Ther 2014a; Várdy and Tooley 2003). The ‘Big Excursion’ is briefly and rather incongruously referred to as ‘emigration’ (Emigrationsakt) and ‘mass flight’ (Massenflucht) in the most thorough reference work on ethnic cleansing in Europe published so far (Brandes, Sundhaussen and Troebst 2010: 95–96, 666–667). The book’s authors refuse to recognize the ‘Big Excursion’ as ethnic cleansing (ethnische Säuberung) or expulsion (Vertreibung), though they acknowledge that ‘some elements of expulsion’ (Elemente der Vertreibung) could be detected in it (Brandes, Sundhaussen and Troebst 2010: 95). The 1989 ethnic cleansing of Bulgaria’s Turks (and Muslims) makes just a fleeting appearance in some works on ethnic relations and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans (Carmichael 2002: 26; Mulaj 2008: 48; Popova and Hajdinjak 2006: 119) or in general histories of Bulgaria (Crampton 2010a: 210–211; Rychlík 2000: 362), but fails to impress the authors, who do not accord to it much importance, either comparative, theoretical or normative. Quite uniquely, a Minority Rights Group analyst, Hugh Poulton, devoted a separate two-page section to the ‘Big Excursion’ in his 1991 overview of the minorities and ethnic conflicts in the Balkan states in the wake of the end of communism (Poulton 1991: 157–158). On 26 June 2015, the search I ran with the use of the term ‘Yugoslav war’ in www.wordcatalog.org yielded 8,384 hits, including 6,430 books. On the contrary, the phrase ‘Big Excursion’ scored a mere nine hits, all irrelevant. Although the search engine www.google.co.uk yielded as many as 32,400 hits for this term, very few of them were of any remote relevance, unlike in the case of 154,000 hits for the collocation ‘Yugoslav wars’. Only the use of the Bulgarian-language term for the ‘Big Excursion’ – ‘Голямата екскурзия’ – brought back 16,800 returns. The Turkish term for the same event, the somewhat bland ‘1989 Göçü’ (‘1989 Migration’) yielded 2,900 hits. (In the early 1990s, the ethnic cleansing was also known in Turkey, rather more appropriately, as the Büyük Göç or ‘Big Migration’ [cf. Konukman 1990], and as 1989 Bulgaristan Zorunlu Göç or ‘1989 Forced Migration from Bulgaria’ [1989 Bulgaristan 2012; Sofya’dan 1989]. Seldom are

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On forgetfulness and its perils

these events referred to in Turkey as etnik temzilik or ‘ethnic cleansing’ [cf. Dokuzuncu 2005: 242–243], and kov(ul)ma or ‘expulsion’ [cf. Tarihte 2004: 144].)9 Additionally, only the Bulgarian and Russian Wikipedias offer separate entries on the ‘Big Excursion,’ the latter published for the first time in 2008, and the former in 2013 (Bol’shaia 2015; Goliamata 2015). Both Wikipedias suggest there is also an entry on this event in the English Wikipedia, but the link actually leads to the article on the ‘Revival Process’ (Revival 2015). Strangely, there is nothing on the ‘Big Excursion’ in the Turkish Wikipedia, and the link from the entries on the ‘Revival Process’ in other Wikipedias leads to the article on ‘Bulgarianization’ (Bulgarlaştırma) in the Turkish Wikipedia (Bulgarlaştırma 2015). Another surprise is that, unlike in any regular Wikipedia entry on a historical event of wide social and political importance, not a single photograph or image is supplied to illustrate some practices and realities of the 1989 expulsion and of the forced assimilation campaign during the latter half of the 1980s. Clearly no established term for the ‘Big Excursion’ exists in international or Anglophone discourse, which consigns this singular event to continued irrelevance. It is so, because the ‘Big Excursion’ remains a non-event in international law, politics, and scholarship. Any serious and sustained attention (though mainly outside academia, with some rare exceptions [cf Ramet 1991: 262–263]) is accorded (in a rather ad hoc and intermittent manner) to this expulsion almost exclusively in Bulgaria and Turkey, the states directly involved in this ethnic cleansing. Actually, the lengthy and unwieldy English-language phrase ‘exodus of Turks from Bulgaria’ brings back 2,800 quite relevant Google returns, because it must have entered the Anglophone discourse of international politics by the back door, following the publication of the eponymous brochure by the Turkish government (Exodus of Turks 1989) when the expulsion in question was in full swing. Exceptionally, in her overview of the policies of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, the British researcher Klejda Mulaj (1969–) of Albanian origin devoted a full page to the ‘Big Excursion.’ And even more significantly, she concluded the analysis with a strong normative claim stating that ‘[t]his was the first instance in the Balkan region when ethnic cleansing was reversed’ (Mulaj 2008: 48). Unfortunately, other scholars and political analysts failed to take a note of this important statement, let alone follow it with a deepened reflection on the 1989 expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria. The ‘Big Excursion’ remains a subject of some research and much discussion only for scholars, journalists, and politicians in Bulgaria and Turkey. But even there, it had remained largely a taboo subject by 2009 (Hershman 2009). In a class of his own is the Bulgarian émigré journalist and political scientist at the University of Ottawa (Ivaylo 2016), Ivaylo Grouev’s (1955–), in a cross between a monograph and a popular non-fiction book, promisingly entitled Why Bulgaria Did Not Explode (2004). Although the 2004 volume is annotated as a second edition of the 1996 original (Grouev 2004: 2), a quick bibliographical search reveals that the latter was none other but the author’s unpublished master’s thesis on The Ethnic Situation in Post-Communist Bulgaria (1989–1994) (Grouev 1996). The 2004 work, although legally published in Canada, was in reality printed in Bulgaria. The print run must have been miniscule, since the book is extremely

On forgetfulness and its perils 17 hard to obtain even in the largest research libraries. The issue of Bulgarian nationalism and the arguably positive and inclusive treatment of the country’s Turks after 1989 continues to be the subject of Grouev’s later research, as evidenced by his Canadian and Bulgarian doctoral dissertations (Grouev 2005; Gruev 2003). In his 2004 study Grouev identified the ‘name-changing campaign’ of 1984– 1985 and the 1989 ‘mass exodus’ as the two singularly significant events in late communist Bulgaria that somehow led to the 10 November 1989 ‘velvet coup d’état,’ thus relieving Zhivkov of power, and opening the way to the end of communism and systemic change in Bulgaria. With his book the author aspires to answer the question of why Bulgaria ‘did not experience civil war, nor [sic] violent ethnic clashes, or violent break-up’ (Grouev 2004: 8). In an insight which so far has been rare among authors writing about the end of communism in Bulgaria, Grouev intimates that the post-Yugoslav-style ethnic cleansing, warfare and breakup of the country was a clear possibility that luckily was prevented in Bulgaria (2004: 163). Unfortunately, rather than focusing on replying to the research question at hand, the volume morphs into a politico-cum-ethnological overview of the history of selected ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic minorities in Bulgaria. It is typical of the approach at the beginning of the 1990s that was used to research Bulgaria’s multiethnic character (cf. Eminov 1997; Marushiakova and Popov 2004; Karakhasan-Churnar 2004; Rusanov and Aleksandrova 1994; Zheliazkova 1994). In the opening chapters of his work, Grouev discusses the postwar (post-1945) international and European instruments of minority rights protection (2004: 18–48), before sketching a history of the Bulgarian minorities legislation between 1878 and 1989 (2004: 49–63). Subsequently, he focuses on the history and situation of Bulgaria’s minorities of Pomaks, Macedonians and Roma (Grouev 2004: 64–129). Analytically, the narrative picks up only in the final – seventh – chapter devoted to the Bulgarian Turks (Grouev 2004: 130–166), before in the conclusion (Grouev 2004: 167–176) the author attempts briefly to answer the question posed in the volume’s title. Quite unbelievably, Grouev proposes that Bulgaria avoided the violent fate of Yugoslavia first of all thanks to the persistence in the country of the elements of the tolerant Ottoman tradition of the millet system of non-territorial autonomies for monotheistic ethnoreligious groups (cf. Jaber 1967), despite the steady vilification of all things Ottoman in the Bulgarian national master narrative, as taught at school and espoused in public discourse. Grouev claims that this was possible – without really explaining how – because Bulgaria is the sole Christian nation-state in the Balkans whose inhabitants did not win independence by their own military effort. It was the Russian troops who carved out this country from the Ottoman lands (Grouev 2004: 172). But the available historical evidence clearly shows that both the Russian occupation administration and afterward the Bulgarian authorities did their best to remove any traces of the Ottoman rule from the Bulgarian nation-state, among others, striving for the homogenization of the Bulgarian population that ideally should consist solely from Slavophone

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On forgetfulness and its perils

(Bulgarian-speaking) Orthodox Christians (cf. Crampton 2010a: 111–112). The wholesale destruction of mosques, minarets, school buildings, cemeteries, tekkes (Sufi ‘monasteries’), Muslim-style houses (konaks) and vakıfs (charitable endowments) was rapid, relentless, and lasted under a variety of pretenses, despite various treaty obligations that required Bulgaria to desist and actually protect its Muslim minority and its heritage (Turan 1998: 194–195, 200, 208, 213). It goes without saying that the surviving practices of day-to-day toleration as instituted under the Ottoman system of ethnoreligious millets must have had something to do with the gradual defusing of the heightened ethnic tension in late communist Bulgaria on the cusp of the systemic change. But it was Turks and Muslims who preserved the millet practices in Bulgaria rather than ethnic Bulgarians. The former fell back on these millet practices of tolerant coexistence in order to ensure a modicum of dignity for themselves and their families in the ideologically anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish state that aspired to ethnoreligiously and ethnolinguistically homogenize the entire population. Most ethnic Bulgarians passively or actively agreed to this assimilatory program, which stood at stark variance with the values of the millet system. It was so because in one way or another the majority of ethnic Bulgarians ended up as beneficiaries of this program. The concept of the unitary (or homogeneous) Bulgarian socialist nation (единната българска социалистическа нация edinata bulgarska sotsialisticheska natsiia) made an appearance in Bulgarian theoretical literature during the mid1970s (cf. Todorov 1976: 149–150; Košir 1989a; Špeletić 1989). Probably, the inspiration for this formulation stemmed from the 1971 East German decision to conceptually separate the then newly proclaimed ‘East German socialist nation’ (sozialistische Nation der DDR or sozialistische deutsche Nation) from the ‘West German bourgeois (capitalist) nation’ (kapitalistischen Nation der BRD)10 (Eichhorn 1976: 410; Kosing 1975; Maier 1997: 27). But this East German formulation was not predicated on religion or language, but rather sought to carve out the socialist segment of German-speakers from the ethnolinguistic commonality of the pre-1945 German nation. Hence, the ethnolinguistic and unifying (homogenizing) character of the Bulgarian idea of the unitary (homogeneous) socialist nation was probably adapted from the Soviet postwar discussion on the coming together (сближение sblizheniie) and the eventual merger (слияние sliianie) of the Soviet nationalities (национальности, natsional’nostii) into a unitary Soviet socialist nation (нация natsiia) or people (народ narod) (Kholmogorov 1970a: 98; Kholmogorov 1970b), which at the turn of the 1970s yielded the popular collocation ‘Soviet unitary people’ (eдиный советский народ edinyi sovietskii narod) (Tarasenko 1975). The Bulgarian counterpart of this Soviet policy of ‘coming together’ was the priobshtavane (приобщаване ‘inclusion’) of the country’s Turks, Pomaks, and Roma, as having nothing to do with the Turks and other Muslims living in Turkey. The denial and suppression of their ethnic and confessional identities allowed for the ideologically construed incorporation of these groups into the united and homogeneous Bulgarian socialist nation because officially this postulated nation was to be more socialist than ethnically Bulgarian (that is, Slavic and Orthodox) in its character (Höpken 1997: 67–68;

On forgetfulness and its perils 19 Zagorov 1989: 16–17). Perhaps such a socialist (or non-ethnic) understanding of nationhood made it possible for Zhivkov to apply, in 1962 and 1973, for some form of integration of Bulgaria with the Soviet Union, even to the point of a state union (Khristov 2012; Petkova 2010; Tsanev 2010). This concept of the unitary (or homogeneous) Bulgarian socialist nation became the ideological foundation of the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign, and eventually of the 1989 ethnic cleansing as well (Baeva and Kalinova 2009b: 376). In 1986, at its 13th congress, the BCP officially espoused this idea as the foundation of the state ideology in Bulgaria (XIII Kongres 1986: 282). This official drive at the full ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogenization of communist Bulgaria is clearly visible in the results of the Bulgarian censuses during that period which took place in 1946, 1956, 1965, 1975, and 1985. First of all, in line with the ideologically atheist character communism, information on religious affiliation was not collected in censuses after World War II. As a result, no reliable information on the number of Muslims was available until after the fall of communism, that is, till the first postcommunist census in 1992 (Eminov 1997: 70). Because Bulgaria had been an ally of Hitler’s Germany, the Soviet Union ‘punished’ Sofia by leaning on the Bulgarian government to include numerous ethnic minorities in the 1946 census, among others, Macedonians, who nowadays are officially seen in Bulgaria as a mere regional group of the Bulgarian nation, much to the Republic of Macedonia’s chagrin. In the subsequent censuses, the number of ethnic minorities recognized and recorded gradually dwindled. Because of the ideological rift between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc in 1948, Sofia was allowed to drop the category of Macedonians from the 1965 census. Now it was a ‘punishment’ for federal Yugoslavia, where the Republic of Macedonia was located on the very border with Bulgaria. The category of ‘Gypsies’ (Roma) disappeared from the 1975 census. The results of this census were published only in part, while the information collected on ethnic identity was declared a state secret. A decade later, in the wake of the 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation, officially no information was collected on ethnic identity, because ‘there was not any further need for it,’ as now everyone in Bulgaria was already an ethnic (that is, Slavophone and Orthodox) Bulgarian (Eminov 1997: 70; Hutchings 1988: 205; Košir 1989a; Špeletić 1989). In other words, the ideal of the Bulgarian homogeneous socialist nation had been achieved. It lasted for a mere four years before the utopia of ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogeneity of the Bulgarian nation dissolved like thawing snow in the spring of 1989. The Turkish (Muslim) mass protests in April and May enraged Zhivkov, who decided to expel 360,000 ‘troublesome’ but officially ‘non-existent’ Turks and Muslims. Returning to the main theses of Grouev’s book, the author writes that between 1878 and 1988, there were no ethnically motivated clashes between ethnic Bulgarians and Turks (Muslims). Somehow forced emigration and repeated expulsions of the latter escape his attention (cf. Karpat 1989a; Kirişci 1006; Şimşir 1988). In addition, he seeks to validate his unsubstantiated normative claim (Grouev 2004: 172–173) by referring to the Bulgarian simplistic feel-good myth that the country had ‘saved its Jews’ during the Second World War (cf. Avramov

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On forgetfulness and its perils

2012; Danova and Avramov 2013). Furthermore, Grouev quite incredibly credits the (ethnic) Bulgarian intelligentsia with protecting the Turks and returning to them civic and human rights, on the one hand, while on the other, with stemming the widespread anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim feeling in the population at large, arguably generated by the partial reversal of the 1989 ethnic cleansing (Grouev 2004: 173–174). Perhaps the author – without saying it openly – subsumes in the category ‘Bulgarian intelligentsia’ the leadership of the Turkish (Muslim) mass opposition and dissident movement. But it is only my guess. Grouev’s further points are less unbelievable, such as when he says (2004: 174–175) that the MRF (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, or Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi in Bulgarian and Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi in Turkish), since its founding in early 1990, has strenuously taken care to steer away from any statements or activities that could let Bulgarian nationalists accuse the party and its leadership of a soft spot for autonomy, federalism, or let alone any feared ‘secessionism’ (Höpken 1997: 74). This principled and careful stance made it possible for the MRF to become the most stable and the most long-lasting party in postcommunist Bulgaria’s political system. Actually, the MRF is the sole Bulgarian party that has not splintered or disappeared from the political scene since 1990. Part and parcel of the postcommunist settlement in Bulgaria, or even its very foundation, was the return of civic and human rights to Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims at the very turn of 1990, facilitated – as Grouev argues (2004: 174–175) – by the presumably diminished importance of religion in everyday life. This achievement of the preservation of ethnic peace and stability in postcommunist Bulgaria, according to Grouev, produced something known as the ‘Bulgarian model’ of ethnic coexistence (Grouev 1997; Grouev 2004: 176; Palchev and Pencheva 2002). As I show below, this model is just a feel-good slogan with precious little substance to it in Bulgarian politics or everyday life. Hence, eventually Grouev’s ambitious and well-timed volume on the singularly important question signaled in the title fails to explain why Bulgaria did not descend into internecine civil war at the beginning of 1990 or why it did not break up, like neighboring Yugoslavia. It seems that the author is equally frustrated by this analytical failure, as elsewhere in the book, quite desperately, he seriously proposes that Bulgaria’s ‘Turks instinctively followed [Mahatma] Gandhi’s [1869–1948] principle of passive non-violent reaction11 [sic]’ (Grouev 2004: 164). However, it does not seem probable that all Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims should be ‘naturally born Gandhians.’ Even for Gandhi himself it took time and effort to live up to this high-minded principle.

Notes 1 A haunting children’s book on this forced name-changing campaign, tellingly entitled My Name was Hussein, was published in the United States by the Roma Muslim author, Hristo Kyuchukov (2004). On the other hand, it was the phenomenal Bulgarian weight lifter Naim Suleimanov (Наим Сюлейманов) (1967–) whose story made this campaign known to all the world. As an ethnic Turk, he was forced to Slavicize his name to Naum Shalamanov. After competing in the World Cup Final in Melbourne, he defected and

On forgetfulness and its perils 21

2 3

4

5

6 7

8

9

settled in Turkey, where he immediately returned to the original form of his name. In addition, he dropped the Slavo-Bulgarian male surname ending –ov from his family name, replaced by the Turkish surname ending -oğlu, which resulted in the form Naim Süleymanoğlu, as written in the Turkish Latin alphabet. In pronunciation, the Bulgarian form ‘Suleiman’ (Сюлейман) and the Turkish ‘Süleyman’ are exactly the same, the spelling difference being a result of the transliteration of the former from Cyrillic (Neuberger 2004: 164; Türenç 1988). The ‘Arabo-Islamic’ names of Pomaks, or Slavophone Muslims had been Slavicized a decade earlier in 1970–1974 (Myuhtar-May 2014: 100, 133, 135). The concept of ‘population transfer’ as a legal instrument of international law commenced with the signature of the Treaty of Constantinople in September 1913 between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire upon the conclusion of the Second Balkan War (Korb 2016: 377; Tsarigradski 1913: Art 7). In 1876 the Bulgarian Exarchate largely overlapped with the Ottoman Vilayets (provinces) of Manastır (Bitola), Edirne, Prizren (Prizreni/Prizren), Selanik (Salonica) and Tuna (Danube). The activities of the April Uprising unfolded in the area where all the villayets’ borders met, with the exception of Manastır Vilayet (April 2005). In Bulgarian school atlases of history, the territory of this uprising is teleologically (and with no much respect for the facts on the ground) beefed up into a veritable premonition of a Bulgarian nation-state, extending in a continuous manner from the Black Sea to Sofia and from the Danube to the point where today’s frontiers of Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia meet (Boseva 2008: 20; Matanov 2009: 51; Tsvetkov 1996: 21). As the practice of that time was and continued until the mid-20th century, in the West the label ‘Turkish’ was variably applied to mean ‘Muslims’ or ‘Ottomans,’ while only rarely ‘Turkish- or Turkic-speaking populations.’ A slow change in this usage came about in the wake of the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. However, to this day, the slightly obsolete synonym of ‘Turk’ for denoting a ‘Muslim’ crops up in European languages, from English and Czech to Bulgarian and Greek. I thank Tim Wilson for alerting me to this salient link between Britain and matters Bulgarian and Ottoman (Turkish). Ironically, this unrealistically high estimate of 100,000 casualties is the actual number of Muslims who soon did die as a result of Russian and Bulgarian military actions and repressions during the Russo-Ottoman War in 1877–1878 (Turan 1998: 145) that officially aimed at ‘exterminating’ Muslims and Turks (Turan 1998: 120, 125, 163). By comparison, this level of victims left in the wake of suppressing a seditious event was nothing abnormal then in Christian Europe, either. Vienna used local serfs to squash an attempted noble uprising of 1846 in western Galicia, which resulted in 1,000 to 2,000 noble victims (Hahn 2000: 173–172). I suspect that the Turkish preference for the rather neutral and non-committal term göç (‘migration’) for referring to the 1989 ethnic cleansing may have something to do with modern Turkey’s day-to-day politics. Ankara makes sure to steer away from any official use of such highly charged labels as ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘genocide,’ first because of the ongoing ethnic cleansing of Kurds in eastern Anatolia, and second due to Turkey’s persistent refusal to recognize the Armenian Genocide as anything else but the 1915 Olayları (‘Events of 1915’) (1915 yılı 2017). As a result, the fate and sufferings of Turkish and Muslim expellees from Bulgaria in 1989 are marginalized and consigned to oblivion in Turkey itself, where the remembrance of this ethnic cleansing should be cultivated lest it might be repeated. In a way, Zhivkov’s communist propaganda machine won, even Turkey tacitly accepted his official line on ‘irresponsible touristsmigrants’ who during the crucial harvest season ‘spontaneously’ left Bulgaria en masse for their unplanned ‘holidays’ in Turkey. Interestingly, I found a Turkish book in which the term soykırım (‘genocide’) is employed to talk about the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign in Bulgaria (Çavuş 1984).

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On forgetfulness and its perils

10 In turn, thanks to the Austrian example, East German party theoreticians and politicians knew that it was possible to excise a chunk of the population from an ethnolinguistic nation and mold it into a nation in its own right on a different foundation than ethnolinguistic commonality. In interwar Austria the majority of the inhabitants felt themselves to be Germans and longed for a union with Germany, an option that was explicitly prohibited by the Allies (Solsten and McClave 1994: 79; Wistrich 1990: 66). In 1938 most Austrians (that is, self-declared Germans living in this country) welcomed enthusiastically the incorporation (annexation) of Austria into Germany. When the tide of World War II turned in the disfavor of Germany (unofficially known as the Third Reich), the Allies decided to woo Austrian Germans to their cause by stating in the Moscow Declaration of 1943 that Austria had been the first free country (victim) unlawfully seized by Hitler’s Germany. In 1945 Austria was excluded from defeated Germany and split into four Allied occupation zones. The occupation lasted for the entire decade. In 1955 Austria was recreated (reunified) as a country, rather than split into West (capitalist) and East (communist) Austrias, on the understanding that the state would remain neutral in the Cold War and would not seek any union with West or East Germany. Vienna’s guarantee of this deal was the official strict and unwavering espousal and propagation of the idea of an Austrian nation as separate from the Germans. This effort paid off. Austria is a successful nation-state, and its population in their vast majority see themselves as members of the Austrian nation that is different from and must remain separate from the German nation that was recently reunified. Only a minority of Austrians (Austrian Germans) harbor the desire of any reunification with Germany (cf. Böhm 1955; Thaler 2001). 11 Obviously, the author means ‘nonviolent resistance.’

2

The state of research on the 1989 expulsion

The 1989 ethnic cleansing of Bulgaria’s Turks surprised Turkish and Western scholars researching the forced assimilation of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria. The two documentary volumes published in 1989 on the ‘Bulgarian atrocities’ committed against the country’s Turks and Muslims covered the period 1877–1986, without any mention of the 1989 ethnic cleansing (Memişoğlu 1989a; Memişoğlu 1989b). In the same year, the Center for Turkish Studies (established in 1979 at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and financially supported by Ankara) published a special issue of semi-annual International Journal of Turkish Studies (Vol. 4, No 2) devoted to the situation of Bulgaria’s Turks between 1878 and 1989 (Karpat 1989b). The center’s head and the distinguished Turkish historian, Kemal H. Karpat (1924–), included the 1989 expulsion in his introduction to this journal’s special issue, in which he gave an overview of the assimilationist policies pursued in the Bulgarian nation-state since its inception in 1878 (Karpat 1989a: 21). Subsequently, in 1990, this issue was republished as a stand-alone volume (Karpat 1990). In late 1989, an unusual 100-page psychological analysis of the 1989 ‘migration,’ contextualized against the history of repeated expulsions of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria after 1878, was provided immediately in the wake of the ‘Big Excursion’ by the renowned female doyen of Turkish psychology, Beğlan Birand Toğrol (1927–2016), from Istanbul University (Toğrol 1989). It was followed by a 130-page collection of documents and photographs on the 1989 Büyük Göç (Big Migration) compiled by a Turkish MP and a leading Turkish journalist (Konukman and Doğan 1990). The official discussion on the 1989 expulsion was wrapped up in Turkey a year later with a 60-page condemnation of the ‘Bulgarian atrocities of 1989’ (Uluslararası 1990). At the same time, in Bulgaria, during the 1989 ethnic cleansing, the Zhivkov regime stepped up official propaganda in order to deny any accusations of ‘mass deportations of ethnic Turks’ laid at Bulgaria’s door (Gerassimov 1989: 3; Sofija 1989). What is more, Sofia pressed the ball squarely into Ankara’s court by blaming Turkey for its dismal inability to accommodate the wave of ‘tourists’ flowing from Bulgaria. Sofia maintained that the sudden surge in the number of ‘tourists’ had been caused by the liberalization of the passport policy in Bulgaria. In other words, it was none other than a reply to Ankara’s long repeated wish that

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State of research on the 1989 expulsion

Sofia allow Bulgaria’s Turks to leave for Turkey1 (cf. Bulgaria: Imprisonment 1986). Though the Bulgarian authorities, in a face-saving spin, claimed that they had simply followed the Helsinki process or the imperative of respecting human rights as agreed between the East and the West in the 1975 Helsinki Accords and afterward regularly monitored by the CSCE2 (Gerassimov 1989: 3–4; Mikhailov 1989). The Bulgarian propaganda offensive in 1989 was directed mainly at foreign journalists from the West, alongside Turkey and the Arab countries, as indicated by a stream of official publications in Turkish, English, Spanish, and Arabic (Gerasimov 1989, Gerassimov 1989, Guerasimov 1989; Khristov and Iankov 1989b). The Zhivkov regime fell back on numerous books and brochures, produced in the late 1980s, on the Ottoman Empire’s presumably planned and executed ‘Islamization’ and ‘Turkification’ of Bulgarians,3 or in other words, (Orthodox) Christian Slavic-speakers (cf. Gandev 1989; Grozdanova 1989; Gocheva 1987; Iankov 1988; Mizov 1989; Petrov 1988; Petrov and Dimitrov 1989). (Unfortunately, this genre persists in postcommunist Bulgaria to this day, with the oftrepetaed thesis that accuses the Ottomans of a planned ‘genocide’ of Bulgarians [cf. Bozkov 2013].) The ideological idea of the ethnically Bulgarian (that is, Slavic and Christian) origin of all present-day Bulgaria’s Turks was first proposed in the 1960s by a group of scholars led by the historian Petur Khristov Petrov (1924–), then based at Sofia University (Petrov 1962, 1964a, 1964b), and by the student of ‘scientific atheism,’ Nikolai Mikhailov Mizov (1961). In the 1970s this view became a foundational dogma of the ideological concept of unitary (or homogeneous) Bulgarian socialist nation (cf. Çavuş 1984: 50–55; Şimşir 1986: 272; Takhirov 1981). Petrov, together with his university colleague, Khristo Gandev (1907–1987) and Atanas Primovski (1911–1999) from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, were tasked with working out the ‘scientific details’ of the dogma (Gandev 1972; Petrov 1972; Primovski 1973). This view, posed as ‘the scientific truth,’ was speedily imposed as official on school teachers of history across Bulgaria (Petrov 1974), and was lent additional credence by the fact that scholars and activists of Turkish ethnic origin, such as the specialist in Ottoman history Vera Petrova Mutafchieva (Mutafçi, 1929–2009) and the BCP apparatchik Shukri Takhirov (Şükrü Tahir, 1936–) (whose name was changed to Orlin Zagorov in 1985), actively supported the dogma (Mutafchieva 1977; Takhirov 1981). Sofia also produced wide-ranging propaganda on this topic in multiple languages that was directed at international observers (Christow 1989; T’ahia epiveveonun 1989; The Archives 1986–1989; The Truth 1986; Who Worries 1985; Yankov 1989). The authorities appeared to be forgetful of the fact that prior to the Zhivkov regime, prewar and communist Bulgarian governments had time and again acknowledged the existence of the Turkish minority in the country, alongside this minority’s non-Slavic origin. Bulgaria’s Turks arrived from Anatolia following the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the medieval Balkans (cf. Kerekoff 1925; Koev 1951). The Zhivkov regime used the unsubstantiated claim of the ‘planned’ character of the presumed ‘mass Ottoman assimilation action’ of Bulgarians in order to justify the radical methods and the widespread employment of intimidation

State of research on the 1989 expulsion 25 and violence in the course of the ‘Revival Process.’ The myth of the Ottoman forced assimilation of Bulgarians became the ideological cornerstone of the communist-cum-national policy of the ‘Revival Process,’ as for instance, indicated by an edited volume on the subject, which was published in the huge run of 102,000 copies, or one per 1,000 Bulgarian citizens (Khristov and Iankov 1989; Stranitsi 2015). In the latter half of the 1980s, all Bulgaria’s researchers in the social sciences and humanities were dragooned to produce publications that ‘proved’ the ‘truly Bulgarian’ (that is, Orthodox and Slavophone) character of the country’s Turks and ‘Muslim Bulgarians’ (or Slavic-speaking Pomaks) and that the Ottomans had ‘really’ pursued a modern-style policy of the forced assimilation of Slavophone Bulgarian Christians. Some of these scholars just went through the moves in order to retain their jobs, while others were attracted by various benefits (for instance, a passport to attend a conference in the West, a higher salary, a better post, a higher academic degree, membership in informal networks that ensured improved access to positions in the academia and the state central administration) received for each ideological commission of this kind, while yet others were genuinely convinced of the ‘truth’ of the propaganda message they were requested to support with ‘scientific evidence,’ even when there was no evidence to this end. They made sure to ‘find’ (that is, fabricate) necessary evidence (Konstantinov 1997: 36–36; Marushiakova and Popov 2015). It appears that all these Bulgarian scholars became guilty of the ‘treason of intellectuals’ (trahison des clercs), a condition first identified by the French philosopher and novelist Julien Benda (1867–1956) in his eponymous 1927 book on the subject (Benda 1969). Instead of describing and analyzing political and social phenomena in an objective and dispassionate manner, the Bulgarian scholars uncritically and – in most cases – quite willingly underwrote with their ‘research’ whatever was demanded by the powers that be, in this case Zhivkov’s program of ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogenization of the country’s Muslim (Turkish) population and – quite ambitiously – of its past. Benda, being of Jewish background, could observe first-hand the rise of modern anti-Semitism across Europe and its adoptions as an increasingly ‘respectful’ element in mainstream political parties’ programs at the turn of the 20th century. One of the momentous events that motivated Benda to write his ground-breaking study was the shocking unveiling of the blatant miscarriage of justice in the Dreyfus Affair (1894–1906), when the young French officer Alfred Dreyfus (1859–1935) was accused of treason and convicted, basically because he just happened to be of Jewish extraction (Benda 1969: 50–51, 104–105; Wilson 1982). The philosopher also saw this condition, when displayed by intellectuals pandering to politicians and nationalists, as one of the main causes of the outbreak and the unprecedented ravages of the Great War (Benda 1969: 53, 174, 216–217). Subsequently, according to Benda, the ‘treason of clerks’ contributed to starting World War II, the Holocaust, and the Cold War (cf. Benda 1949), in this way producing the ‘dark 20th century’ in Europe’s history (Mazower 1999). Thus far, Bulgarian intellectuals and scholars, by and large, have failed to acknowledge their role in the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the assimilatory campaign

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of the 1980s. On the other hand, many of their counterparts elsewhere in Europe – with some rare exceptions (cf Ramet 1991: 263-264) – have failed to notice and assess the role of their Bulgarian colleagues in these tragic events. Hence, by association, European (Western) scholarship may be seens as guilty of the ‘treason of the intellectuals’ in this case, too. Especially so, because the support some western intellectuals lent to Bulgaria helped the country join the European Union in 2007. To my knowledge, the tragedies of the ‘Big Excursion’ and ‘Revival Process’ were not openly discussed during the membership negotiations. Hence, Bulgaria acceded to the European Union, bringing along the still unexorcised specter of the 1989 ethnic cleansing. The specter will keep haunting the entire EU in the future, complicating and marring the Union’s relations with Turkey, unless this ethnic cleansing is widely acknowledged and fully researched, together with its far-reaching ramifications that continue across Europe and Turkey to this day. The question of the recognition of the Kurds in Turkey is not directly connected to the ‘Revival Process’ and the ‘Big Excursion’ in Bulgaria. Yet, whenever Ankara wanted to criticize the Zhivkov regime too vociferously, Sofia never failed to communicate to Turkey its intention to reciprocate by bringing to the international attention the ongoing non-recognition, oppression and expulsions of Kurds in Turkey (Bulgaria: Kurds Stand 1985; Laber 1987: 6; Suleiman 1999: 12). Furthermore, communist Bulgaria acted as a Soviet proxy by providing safe haven to Kurdish activists and facilitating the smuggling of arms to Kurdish dissident groups inside Turkey (Golan 1990: 246; Gunter 1988: 394, fn 20; Historical Antecedents 1982: 79). This was a precious leverage that helped the Bulgarian government appease Turkey, whenever necessary. Following the end of communism, Sofia continued to support Kurdish groups in Turkey during the 1990s (Uzgel 2001: 58). Publications on the Kurds and their tragic situation in Turkey proliferated in postcommunist Bulgaria. A Committee for Solidarity with Kurdistan and a Culture and Information Center on Kurdistan were founded in Sofia in the early 1990s (cf. Azizi 1992; Bedreddin 1992; Petrov 1995). Some books on the topic were also published in English and Turkish translations, perhaps, with an eye to shaming Ankara in the international arena (cf. Balabanov 1998a; Balabanov 1998b). Interestingly, the first book on the Kurdish question was published in Bulgaria in 1992, while the first one on the ‘Revival Process’ only in 2004, that is, 12 years later. Between the end of communism and the time of writing (2015) 22 books have been published on the latter issue, while as many as 19 on the former (Kiurdski 2015; Vuzroditelen 2015b). As if in its significance, in Bulgaria the question of Turkey’s Kurds was almost on par with the forced assimilation and expulsion of Bulgarian Turks and Muslims. Perhaps lavishing attention on its southern neighbor’s wrongdoings lets Bulgaria forget and hide the skeleton of the ‘Big Excursion’ and the ‘Revival Process’ in its own wardrobe all the better. The plight of Kurds is well-known and widely discussed across the world (cf. Gunes and Zeydanlıoğlu 2014; Yildiz and Müller 2008). Unfortunately, the same is not true of Bulgaria’s 1989 ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation of Turks and Muslims during the latter half of the 1980s.

State of research on the 1989 expulsion 27 In Bulgaria, the rare (and perhaps lonely) voice of righteousness and humanity during the May 1989 Turkish protests, the 1989 ethnic cleaning, and in the immediate aftermath was Rumiana Uzunova (1936–1995). In 1980 she defected to Paris, and two years later moved to Munich in Western Germany where, until her untimely death, Uzunova worked as a journalist in the Bulgarian Section of Radio Free Europe. She became head of this section in 1991. In May–September 1989, in Turkey and Western Europe, she conducted at least 35 aired in-depth interviews with Turkish and Muslim expellees from Bulgaria. Immediately after the downfall of Zhivkov on 10 November 1989 she began interviewing people directly in Bulgaria (Rumiana 2016a). In 1988–1989 alone she conducted over 400 interviews also broadcast by the Deutsche Welle and the Voice of America (Angelov 2015: 30; Rumiana 2016b). Although not present in her country during the 1989 ethnic cleansing, her voice entered Bulgarians’ apartments and houses when they clandestinely listened to Radio Free Europe. On a daily basis, Uzunova made them fully aware of the unprecedented scale and intensity of the human tragedy during the 1989 forced mass expulsion. But in the wake of the anti-Turkish nationalist reaction of 1990 and 1991 her voice and message of humanism were muted by hatred, and then forgotten. The publication of a huge (over 700-page-long) volume with her interviews and reportages in 2007 (Uzunova 2007) failed to reintroduce Uzunova’s unique voice to the new generation of Bulgarians. Only nowadays, a quarter-century later, the youngest generation of Bulgarian journalists are rediscovering her work (cf. Ivanova 2014), as amply proved by the following assessment: What most impressed me from the [Radio Free Europe] archives are interviews from 1989. They were made mainly by Rumiana Uzunova but also by her colleagues who helped her to make them. She was not alone but she was part of a huge team. There are shockingly strong interviews with displaced Bulgarian Turks (during the so-called Revival Period) and with people who were then scattered throughout the country and no other media was [sic] interested in them. I was very impressed by the conduct of Rumiana Uzunova herself – very humane and empathic with the way she listened to people: ‘I hear you, I sympathize with your feelings.’ She does not ask questions. And this is what I’d like to be heard in the film. That’s why the title Listen comes from the power of those words that she says. How much power there is in these words, ‘Listen’ and ‘I am listening to you’ when it is said with absolute humanity. (Diana Ivanova in Pavlova 2014) Uzunova shares the method of patiently listening to, empathizing with, and telling stories only through the words of her interviewees with the 2015 Belarusian Nobel laureate in literature, Svetlana Alexeivich (1948–). Famously, the latter told such stories through the voices of Soviet children, women, and men who suffered unthinkable privations during World War II, in the postwar Soviet Union, and during the post-Soviet period. Unfortunately, untimely death did not allow

28 State of research on the 1989 expulsion Uzunova to rework her interviews into an equally compelling and accessible people’s story of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and of the atypical end of communism in Bulgaria. At present, as far as I know, Veselin Angelov (1953–) is the sole Bulgarian historian who probes into the 1989 ethnic cleansing as an event in its own right in any sustained manner (Vreme za 2015). However, his focus is on gathering and publishing documents rather than on the analysis of the events. At his own expense, he published a two-volume selection of Bulgarian governmental documents on the very expulsion (Angelov 2011a). His 30-page-long introduction to this selection amounts to the first-ever in-depth overview of the ‘Big Excursion,’ including a reflection on its causes and aftermath (Angelov 2011a: Vol. 1, 5–36). It should be read in conjunction with his 110-page-long introduction to the selection of documents on the January–May 1989 protests of Turks against forced assimilation in Bulgaria and on the subsequent suppression of these protests in the first half of 1989 (Angelov 2010: 5–119). More recently, Angelov (2015) supplemented it with another overview of the crucial ten days of Turkish protests in late May 1989 that constituted the immediate trigger of the ‘Big Excursion,’ and as such should be seen as the very beginning of the end of the communist system in Bulgaria. With another collection of documents, Angelov also illustrates the forced Bulgarianization of Turks and Muslims during the so-called ‘Revival Process’ (Angelov 2008). This volume should be consulted together with the recently published official extensive collection of documents on the same subject (Durzhavna sigurnost 2013) and two earlier Bulgarian-language ones (Azizoglu and Karaman 2005; Levi 2003), of which the former, quite tellingly, had to be printed in Turkey. Obviously, the story would not be complete without getting to know the activities of the Bulgarian Wałęsa or Havel, namely Ahmed Dogan (1954–).4 As President of TNODB (Turkish National Freedom Movement in Bulgaria, Turskoto natsionalnoosvoboditelno dvizhenie v Bulgariia in Bulgarian and Bulgaristanda Türk Milli Kurtuluş Hareketi in Turkish), he headed the Turkish (Muslim) dissident opposition movement between 1984 and 1990. In communist Bulgaria, it was the sole mass opposition movement that actually brought about the subsequent systemic change (cf. Angelov 2011b). As yet the salient fact has not been acknowledged and appropriately recognized either in Bulgaria or by European historians of the fall of communism. Some even dismiss this mass opposition movement, portraying it rather as a case of ‘nationalist mobilization’ (Daskalov 2011: 253), tacitly trying to separate it from the Bulgarians by closing this movement in the zhivkovite stereotype of ‘anti-Bulgarian Turkish diaspora nationalism’ – as though such mass mobilization persisting for six years, despite harsh repressions, could be somehow non-political and in essence non-oppositional, or taking place in utter isolation from the rest of Bulgarian society. Iskra Baeva (1951–) and Evgeniia Kalinova (1959–), historians from St. Kliment Okhridski University of Sofia, offered a selection of documents that trace some international repercussions of the ‘Revival Process’ (2009). On the other hand, Angelov (2009, 2011b and 2012a) and the Bulgarian-Turkish intellectual-

State of research on the 1989 expulsion 29 cum-publisher Aziz Dzhelil Azizoglu (2004) collected documents and information on how the ‘Revival Process’ mobilized the persecuted Turks and Muslims to organize, in 1985, their own dissident organization, TNODB, that strictly subscribed to non-violence. This organization was led by, among others, the young philosopher Ahmed Dogan who, as a result, was incarcerated between 1986 and 1989, (perhaps) put for some time on death row in 1987,5 and in 1989, behind the closed doors, the Varna (Варна in Bulgarian, Varna in Turkish) court of law sentenced him to ten years in prison. Following the fall of communism in the wake of the ‘Big Excursion,’ Dogan was released from prison on 22 December 1989. Half a month later, on 4 January 1990, Dogan founded a Turkish and Muslim party, Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), which he chaired until 2013. From 2001 to 2009, this party was a junior partner of all the Bulgarian governments during that period (Angelov 2009: 9; Gerchev 2007). Angelov (2012b) also compiled an important collection of documents that gives an insight into the crucial period at the turn of year 1990, when expelled Turks began returning to Bulgaria and were re-granted their civil rights, including the right to use and cultivate their Turkish language, names and culture, alongside Islam. This reversed the indignities of the ‘Revival Process,’ facilitated interethnic reconciliation, and became a (if not the) legitimizing basis of the postcommunist Bulgarian statehood. Perhaps without making some amends for the wrongdoings so swiftly in the early 1990s Bulgaria would not have been able to join NATO in 2004 and, three years later, the European Union in 2007. The reversal of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the subsequent reintegration of Turks and Muslims into the mainstream of Bulgaria’s political, social and economic life moved some Bulgarian scholars and commentators to dub the process a ‘Bulgarian ethnic model’ (cf. Palchev and Pencheva 2002). Unjustly, this claim has been hardly noticed outside Bulgaria, let alone really tested by researchers. The only exception is Bernd Rechel, who proposes that this model, rather than an instrument of embracing Bulgaria’s all minorities, merely legitimizes the participation of the de facto Turkish party, MRF, in Bulgarian politics (2007: 1212). Beyond press articles (cf. Tokin 2009) and the aforementioned archival materials, which are of little interest to the general readership in Bulgaria I spotted an oblique mention of the ‘Big Excursion’ in a school atlas of history for secondary schools (Matanov 2012: 68). But this stark message, available to a large pool of students in today’s Bulgaria, is ‘softened’ on the relevant map by supplying the arrow depicting the movement of expelled Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey with the information: ‘Revival Process, 1985–1989.’ Contrary to the actual rapidity of the expulsion in 1989, the atlas wrongly suggests that it was a gradual process lasting for half a decade. Furthermore, similar arrows of Turkish expellees – although without any dates next to them, feature on the territory of Bulgaria’s neighbors, namely, in Yugoslavia and Romania, suggesting that it was a ‘norm’ at that time to expel Turks. But the expulsions and forced emigration of Turks and Muslims from these two states took place much earlier, that is, in the 1950s. The ‘Big Excursion’ was not contemporaneous with them.

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I completed the manuscript of this monograph in late 2016. Due to a variety of technical and organizational reasons the book’s publication was delayed. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian economist Rumen Avramov (with whom I discussed various questions regarding the 1989 expulsion)6 published his magisterial work on the economics of the ‘Revival Process’ (Avramov 2016).7 Although his monograph is not devoted solely to the 1989 ethnic cleansing, significantly, quite a few separate chapters and sections of a significant length and scope are devoted to this tragic event (Avramov 2016: 119–146, 261–313, 314–403, 505–550, 682–688). At long last, the 1989 expulsion is acknowledged in Bulgaria as a significant event and an important subject of research, whose in-depth comprehension is a necessary basis for an improved understanding of modern Bulgarian history. In Turkey, the state of research on what is known there, in a rather subdued manner, as the ‘1989 Migration’ is similarly limited. As in Bulgaria, it is the press that devotes much attention to the expulsion (Turkish Exodus in 1989 2011), but no monographs have been published on the ethnic cleansing yet. Often, the tendency is to lump together the forced assimilation of the latter half of the 1980s together with the 1989 expulsion, without distinguishing between these two (Kemaloğlu 2012). But unlike in Bulgaria, the 1989 ethnic cleansing was somewhat incorporated into the overarching (and increasingly, Pan-Turkic) discourse, for instance, in the monumental multivolume bilingual (Turkish and English) reference, Türk Dünyası Kültür Atlası / A Cultural Atlas of The Turkish World (Taşağıl 2003: 298–299). Furthermore, the wife-and-husband team of historians, Neriman Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu (1970–) and Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu (1971–), from the University of Istanbul and Yıldız Technical University, respectively, edited the first-ever collection of scholarly articles on the ‘Big Excursion’ and its aftermath (2012). But this extensive – 700-page – volume focuses mostly on the integration of the expellees in Turkey and their personal experience of the expulsion. The book is wrapped up with numerous photographs and the chronology of the 1989 ethnic cleansing. The character of the volume does not come as a surprise, given that it is dedicated to Neriman Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu’s parents, expelled together with her from Bulgaria in 1989 (Neriman Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu and Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu 2012: 5). From 2012 to 2014, under the auspices of the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1954–), the project ‘Recording the “Unknown” History: The Forced Migration of Turks from Bulgaria in 1989’ was carried out under the joint supervision of Hüseyin Mevsim (1964–) and Muzaffer Kutlay (1984–). The former, who left Bulgaria in 1991, is a scholar of Bulgarian language and culture in the Comparative Civilization and Peace Research Center (KAMMER) at the University of Ankara, while Kutlay was then an MA student of international relations at Middle East Technical University in Ankara (Mevsim 2015; Kırcaalili 2013; Kutlay 2015: 4). The project was undertaken in preparation for the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the ethnic cleansing in 2014 (1989 Göçü 2014). Its tangible results are six volumes of memoirs and interviews with people who were expelled from Bulgaria during this ethnic cleansing, each of about

State of research on the 1989 expulsion 31 150 pages, illustrated with numerous photographs (Muzaffer 2017). The books focus in a structured manner on the Rhodope Mountains homeland of the expellees (Berraksu 2013), their recollections of the tragedy of the expulsion (Con 2013), on the wrongdoings, which the expellees suffered at the hands of Bulgarians (Gökay 2013), on how they found it difficult to integrate with Turkish society, when no one wanted to talk about their fate and about this ethnic cleansing (Türkoğlu 2013), and finally on the life stories of the expellees before and after 1989 (Yılmaz 2013). Also, at the grassroots level expellees and their children made an effort to celebrate this sad 25th anniversary, sometimes followed by a volume of reminiscences and photographs (cf. Boykoy 2015). While in Bulgaria researchers concentrate on publishing collections of archival documents devoted to the 1989 expulsion, their Turkish counterparts lavish most attention on the life stories of the expellees. No genuinely overarching reflection has been developed yet on this ethnic cleansing, a reflection that would take into account both domestic (Bulgarian and Turkish) and international developments and context. What is more, as a rule of thumb, all the publications are produced in minuscule numbers of copies, often with obscure publishers, meaning that the books rarely reach interested readers in Bulgaria or Turkey, let alone outside these two states. In Bulgaria, more attention is given to the ‘Revival Process,’ which contributes to the continued obscuring of the uniqueness of the ‘Big Excursion.’ And quite worryingly, the zhivkovite regime’s propaganda term of ‘Revival Process’ is increasingly accepted as a supposedly neutral designation for communist Bulgaria’s anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim policies in the latter half of the 1980s, as indicated by the gradual abandoning of quotation marks between which this term used to be placed (cf. Aliev 2001; Baeva and Kalinova 2009b; Bozhkov 2012; Gruchev and Kal’onski 2008; Zagorov 1993). It is as if the Hitlerite coinage of ‘Final Solution’ (Endlösung) could fully describe the experience of the Holocaust, so that there would be no need for the latter term. This ongoing normalization of the collocation ‘Revival Process’ without quotation marks leads to the now frequent employment of it for referring to anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim policies in Bulgaria from the 1930s through the early 1990s (cf. Baeva and Kalinova 2009a). The only joint Bulgarian-Turkish project ever devoted to the ‘Big Excursion’ of which I am aware is the 2003 feature film on this ethnic cleansing, Stolen Eyes (Spasov 2003). It was broadcast and released on DVD, both in Bulgaria and in Turkey. However, at present this film is unavailable in retail in any of these two countries or abroad. Sadly, as in the case of the aforementioned books on the 1989 ethnic cleansing printed in low runs, the film, unavailable as it is– rather than enlightening the public at large on the expulsion – continues to consign this tragedy to oblivion. Likewise, the two early English-language documentaries on the ethnic cleansing (Candan 1991 and Stankov 1994), alongside two recent ones (1989: Bulgaria’s Exodus 2009; Nedeva and Getov 2010) are now available only on the Internet. However, the early Bulgarian-language documentaries (Peeva 1990; Traianova 1990; Trifonova 1992) and even a television miniseries (Petkova 1994) on the ‘Revival Process’ and the ‘Big Excursion’ are not accessible either on the

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Internet or as DVDs. Unfortunately, the same is true of the first genuinely investigative documentary, by the then Radio Free Europe reporter Tatiana Vaksberg’s Tekhnologiia na zloto (Technology of Evil).8 With a clear focus on the ethnic cleansing, the film boldly ventures beyond mere interviews and analyzes in depth the events, unequivocally calling the wrongdoings perpetrated in the course of the ethnic cleansing as ‘evil’ (Vaksberg and Ilieva 2001). This controversial documentary triggered an intensive, though all too brief, discussion on the ‘Big Excursion’ in Bulgaria and the country’s Parliament in 2001 (Kalinova 2014: 578; Peeva 2001). Despite the film’s moral call for bringing planners and perpetrators of the 1989 ethnic cleansing to justice, the documentary was criticized for identifying only those ethnic cleansers who had already passed away. Furthermore, the film also hit strongly against MRF leaders accusing them of acting as informers and operatives for the Bulgarian secret police during the 1980s. In this way, it implied that they were also responsible for planning and carrying out the 1989 expulsion. This accusation came in the very year of 2001 when the MRF joined the Bulgarian coalition government for the first time ever (cf. Chervenkova 2001; Filmat 2001; Marushiakova and Popov 2015). Recently, two short Bulgarianlanguage documentaries were devoted to the ‘Revival Process’ and the ‘Big Excursion,’ but regrettably with a clear focus on the former, rather than on the latter (Chopakova 2015; Racheva 2008). Alongside the aforementioned films, I recommend the spot-on four-hour-long private video footage (posted on the web) of the expulsion of a single family shot on 24 June 1989 en route from Bulgaria to Turkey (Vertreibung 1989). Furthermore, perhaps the most evocative photographs of the 1989 expellees ever taken are those by the renowned Turkish photographer Behiç Günalan (1952–) (Behiç 2010; Behiç 2016). The ‘Big Excursion’ has also been tackled – albeit modestly – in Bulgarianlanguage poetry, fiction and memoirs (cf. Apostolova 2008; Kalinova 2014: 586; Kolev 2011), but mostly the ethnic cleansing is subsumed within literary works that talk on the human-level experience of the ‘Revival Process,’ as exemplified by a recent extensive anthology (Zafer and Chernokozhev 2015). It appears that scholars from Bulgaria or Turkey, who touch upon issues connected to the 1989 ethnic cleansing, when writing in Bulgarian or Turkish, or in English for the international community, never zoom in directly on the ‘Big Excursion’ in their articles. They tend to skirt this singular event. Some focus on life stories of expellees from the vantage of ethnography or oral history (Elchinova 2012; Georgieva 1993; Zhelyazkova 1998). But most Bulgarian researchers (Bobeva 1994; Markova 2010; Petkova 2002; Vasileva 1992) and their Turkish counterparts (Baklacioglu 2010; Çetin 2008; Kirişci 1996; Turan 2006) see the expulsion as a ‘mere’ blip in the history of the over-a-century-long ‘migrations’ between Bulgaria and Turkey. Scholars from outside Bulgaria and Turkey, perhaps influenced by this example, follow similar trajectories (Neuberger 2004; Parla 2003; Parla 2009; Parla 2015). Some veered from the path to focus more on the aspect of human rights (cf. Çetin 2008; Lütem 2000; Vassilev 2002), often in the context of Bulgaria’s then approaching accession into the European Union (cf. Maeva 2005). In all these articles and working papers, the ‘Big Excursion’ gets just a brief

State of research on the 1989 expulsion 33 mention, rarely longer than a single page (cf. Markova 2010: 5; Vasileva 1992: 347; Vassilev 2002: 105–106). The only exception to the aforementioned trend of sidelining the 1989 expulsion is an article by the Bulgarian political scientist Victor Bojkov (2004), who recently left academia in Italy for more gainful employment in the EU institutions (EU Whoiswho 2015; Sito Web Docente 2015). Hence there is not much hope remaining that he will write a monograph on the ‘Big Excursion.’ Many refer to the expulsion as ‘forced migration’ (cf. Myuhtar 2003: 81; Zang 1989: 1, 28), some as ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Bulgarian MPs Officially 2012; Mulaj 2008: 48). But Bojkov does not mince words and goes one step further dubbing it a ‘quasi genocidal induced exodus’ (2004: 344), that is a ‘near genocide,’ if I may simplify his formulation. To my knowledge, he is the first and thus far the only scholar to employ the term ‘genocide’ – though somewhat indirectly – to characterize the nature of the ‘Big Excursion.’ Perhaps, in his diagnosis he follows the Turkish journalist Mehmet Çavuş’s strong opinion that the scale of human loss during the ‘Revival Process’ could be seen as ‘genocidal’ (Çavuş 1984). Another feature that distinguishes Bojkov’s article from the typical run-of-themill texts on the 1989 expulsion is his sustained endeavor to explicate the causes of this ethnic cleansing in broader terms than those of ethnic nationalism and the Zhivkov regime’s need for bolstering its waning legitimacy. Bojkov’s geopolitical hypothesis hinges on the propaganda message drummed since the beginning of Zhivkov’s rule in the mid-1950s that any clearly visible ethnolinguistic heterogeneity in Bulgaria might incite Ankara to annex these parts of southeastern and eastern Bulgaria with a Turkish (Muslim) majority or plurality of inhabitants that border directly on Turkey.9 The Zhivkov regime interpreted a certain decline in centralized rule in the Soviet Union following the 1982 death of the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982) and a modest liberalization introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev (1931–) after 1985, as a sign that the time of the Brezhnev Doctrine was over. The Kremlin would not come to Sofia’s succor if Bulgaria’s Turks rose in an uprising or Ankara seized a region from the country (Bojkov 2004: 353, 355, 357). This theory seemed to have been ‘proved’ by the 1983 declaration of the independence of Northern Cyprus under Turkish auspices (Crampton 2014 [2002]: 178). Until that time, since the signing of the 1968 Bulgarian–Turkish emigration agreement for allowing Bulgaria’s Turks to leave for Turkey, Sofia had refrained from taking a position or let alone criticizing Ankara’s politics, including Turkey’s policy on Cyprus after the division of this island in 1974. Ankara had reciprocated in kind, and 22 high-level friendly visits had been recorded between the two countries’ officials in the period 1968–1984 (Petkova 2002: 46), including Todor Zhivkov’s state visit to Ankara in 1968 (Şimşir 1988: 273). After 1983 this existential fear of the Bulgarian communist elite that their country may be split alongside the ethnic cleavage like Cyprus simultaneously caused, radicalized, and legitimized the campaign of forced assimilation of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. For instance, the gigantic name-changing campaign of late 1984 and early 1985 coincided with the last months of Konstantin

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Chernenko’s (1911–1985) brief rule as the Soviet leader, when the power vacuum in the Kremlin was at its acutest (Avramov 2015). The assimilation campaign became drastic in the latter half of the 1980s, when Zhivkov planned to expel 100–150,000 Turks and Muslims in 1985. He was stopped in his tracks by the succession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the top post in the Soviet Union, when the Kremlin managed to regain a modicum of effective control over the Soviet bloc countries. But already in early 1989, when the Soviet rule waned rapidly, Zhivkov ‘improved’ on his earlier plan with a new one, in whose framework as many as 200–300,000 people were to be pushed across the border to Turkey (Bojkov 2004: 364, 366; Paraskevov 2012: 32). To this geopolitical fear the populist argument of nationally construed demography was added, namely that Turks and Muslims, mostly residing in rural areas, tended to have more children than ethnic Bulgarians predominantly living in towns and cities. As a result, the proportion of the former in Bulgaria’s population was bound to grow ‘at the expense’ of the latter (Bojkov 2004: 355). Continuing on the international causes and ramifications of Zhivkov’s assimilating campaign, the proposition is oft repeated that Gorbachev, when he met Zhivkov on 23 June 1989 in Moscow, apparently expressed an interest in the forced change of the names of Bulgaria’s Muslims and Turks. According to this view, it was so because supposedly Bulgaria was a testing ground for a policy that, if successful, later was to be applied in the case of the Soviet Union’s numerous Muslims (cf. Balkan Exodus 1989; Alexandre Benningsen in Karpat 1989a: 10f.n22; Marushiakova and Popov 2015; Petkova 2002: 48–49). However, this claim seems to be improbable, given Gorbachev’s consistently low opinion of Zhivkov’s governance and policies. Other scholars suggest that the Soviet leader was frustrated that he was unable to prevent Zhivkov from proceeding with the heavy-handed policy of expelling Bulgarian Turks to Turkey, which added more worries to the Kremlin’s already stretched international agenda (cf. Crampton 2010b; Paraskevov 2012: 28–31; Walker 1989g). Because Gorbachev’s presumed approval or disproval of Zhivkov’s anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim polices weighs so heavily on the proposed explanations of the causes and the dynamics of the ‘Revival Process’ and the ‘Big Excursion,’ the matter should be further investigated by future scholars who would focus squarely on the 1989 ethnic cleansing. Another important issue that Bojkov tackles is the number of deaths caused by the use of the military in order to force through the renaming campaign during the three and a half months of its duration from November 1984 to early February the following year. Turkish sources speak of 800 to 2,500 victims, while international observers concede that there were more than 1,000 casualties. Bojkov sides with the higher threshold, proposing that death certificates of numerous Turks imprisoned in the Belene (Белене) concentration camp on the eponymous island in the Danube were customarily falsified, stating that inmates died of illness or suicide, not of beatings or summary executions (Azizoglu 2005; Bojkov 2004: 359, 366; Martino 2009; Mudeva 2009; Şimşir 1988: 266). It is estimated that during the 1981–1983 martial law in communist Poland (which is much better known in Europe and across the world than Bulgaria’s ‘Big Excursion’) 122 dissidents and

State of research on the 1989 expulsion 35 innocent bystanders were killed by the military and security forces (Rokita 2005: 33). And during the three decades of the civil war (‘The Troubles’) in Britain’s Northern Ireland, between 1968 and 1998, 3,500 people lost their lives (Northern Ireland Violence 2010). Hence, bearing in mind the aforementioned numbers, during the periods of military-style violence, around 117 persons died in Northern Ireland per annum, and 100 in Poland 100, while 2,000 in Bulgaria. Furthermore, all the deaths in Bulgaria occurred mostly in a single quarter, that is, during a mere three months. The numbers can be adjusted by the countries’ population, thus yielding 65 deaths per annum per 1 million inhabitants in Northern Ireland, three casualties per annum per 1 million inhabitants in Poland, and as many as 227 victims per annum per 1 million inhabitants in Bulgaria. It shows that the level of militaryinduced violence in the Bulgaria of the renaming campaign, on the average, was four times as high as that in the North Irish civil war. Accordingly, the resultant polarization of society and growing acceptance for the use of weapons to settle scores must have been comparatively wider at this point in Bulgaria than in Poland or even in Northern Ireland.10 Surprisingly, no armed resistance groups emerged from among Bulgarian Turks’ ranks. The British doyen of Bulgarian history, Richard Crampton, explains this phenomenon by proposing that ‘most Turks and Pomaks conscripted into the [Bulgarian] army served in the basic units, digging latrines or mending roads. They would have had little training in the use of sophisticated weapons, or indeed any weapons at all, and absolutely no training in leadership’ (2010c). The Bulgarian economist (who was Advisor on Economics to the first noncommunist Bulgarian President, Zheliu Zhelev (1935–2015), between 1990–1991 [Roumen 2016]), Rumen Avramov (2015), claims that it was the shockingly unprecedented level of militarized state repression, which prevented any concentrated opposition on the part of the targeted population during the renaming campaign in the winter of 1984/1985. Furthermore, the Bulgarian scholars, Elena Marushiakova and Veselin Popov (2015), nuance Crampton’s opinion by proposing that in communist Bulgaria all males – irrespective of their ethnic or religious background – had to undergo the foundational training in the use of simple arms, including those in basic units (строителни войски stroitelni voiski, also translated into English as the ‘construction corps’). Furthermore, not only Roma, Turks, and Pomaks served in these basic units, but ethnic Bulgarians, as well. However, the fact is that Roma, Turks, and Pomaks were hugely overrepresented in the basic units. This overrepresentation could have something to do with the state’s relative distrust of the ethnically non-Bulgarian ethnic groups, but it appears that what counted most was the level of education. Those with elementary or vocational education were posted to the basic units. Because Roma continued to be socioeconomically underprivileged under communism, while the majority of Turks and Pomaks resided in the countryside, as a result a disproportionate share of ethnic Bulgarians graduated from secondary schools and universities.11 Hence, in the army Roma, Turks, and Pomaks tended to be put to menial tasks and to be excluded from accessing more developed weaponry. There were some Roma,

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Turks, and Pomaks who managed to rise to the middle-rank military posts, but never to the highest ones that de facto were earmarked for ethnic Bulgarians (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). However, during the latter half of the 1980s, when the Zhivkov administration engaged in the forced assimilation and expulsion of Turks (Muslims), the vast majority of drafted Turks (Muslims), Roma, and Pomaks were dumped in the basic units (Konstantinov 1997: 45–46). After its founding in 1990, the MRF acknowledged that the main developmental problem faced by the party’s electorate was not ethnically based discrimination, but rather the low level of education among Turks and Muslims (including Roma and Pomaks). Hence, one of the main goals of the MRF’s program was to improve the average level of education among Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. The observed low level of education among this section of Bulgaria’s population was caused by their concentration in the countryside and the prolonged discrimination they had suffered at the hands of the state authorities since 1878, including the wholesale destruction of Ottoman schools in 1877–1885 (Turan 1998: 213). It was this discrimination – ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic in its character – that effectively had contained the Turkish and Muslim population to the rural areas in Bulgaria (Troebst 1994: 34). It is estimated that during the 1980s, especially in the latter half of the decade (between 1984 and 1987) at the height of the ‘Revival Process,’ over 600 acts of terror were recorded in Bulgaria. Responsibility for them is ascribed, in a wholesale manner, to Turks and Muslims and their underground organizations, especially TNODB, led by Ahmed Dogan. Although the supposition appears convincing, given the state-organized oppression suffered by Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims, it is not conclusive, because the vast majority of these terrorist acts remain not fully explained (Baeva and Kalinova 2009b: 356–357; Chopakova 2015; Mantov 1995: 115–116; Teroristichni 2016). It seems that the only attack in which people actually lost lives (six persons in total) took place at the railway station in the small village of Bunovo (Буново in Bulgarian, Bunovo in Turkish) in 1985 (30 godini 2015) on 9 March 1985.12 What remains to be accounted for is the question why there were no more casualties caused by these numerous terrorist attacks and why the staggeringly high number of acts of terror did not translate into the coalescence of a Turkish (Muslim) guerilla movement. Assuming conservatively that about three perpetrators organized each terrorist attack, this estimate yields the number of 1,800 potential guerillas ready to kill and die. Each would have to be supported or harbored by several (let us assume, five) members of his (or her) family or community, hence around 9,000 people. Together with the hypothetical fighters, they would add up to almost 12,000 people. At this level, the group would constitute a force and logistic network capable of defying a regular army in a mountainous terrain, such as the Rhodopes. Strangely, there is no shred of information on a guerilla movement of this kind. Why not? Maybe the number of actual terrorist attacks was hiked up for propaganda effect in order to coax ethnic Bulgarians to side with the Zhivkov regime and its program of forced assimilation. Or it was actually the state security service who staged many (most?) of the attacks, taking care not to kill anyone

State of research on the 1989 expulsion 37 (or very few), as many authorities strongly suspect (Crampton 2015a).13 Some propose that the DS kept close tabs on all non-ethnic Bulgarians (that is, Jews, Macedonians, Pomaks, Roma, Tatars, Turks, and so on) with secondary and university education. If they wanted to find employment fitting their qualifications and build a career in communist Bulgaria, they invariably had to cooperate with the security forces to a certain degree. It is worth remembering that the communist security services infiltrated opposition and democratic organizations and parties in Bulgaria through mid-1991, which was nominally two years after the fall of communism (Dermendzieva and Metodiev 2013). As a result, this brutal past may give present-day Bulgaria’s security service (DANS) undue leverage on leaders and activists of various political parties, but mainly those of the MRF (Zahova 2016). However, only going to the archives and carrying out a wide research project (including interviews with DS officers and with those who the security forces pressed into the DS’s service as informers) on this subject could provide definitive answers to these distressing questions.14 The current state of research on the 1989 expulsion as presented above is highly unsatisfactory. Apart from just knowing that this ethnic cleansing did happen, we have only mere assumptions on the prehistory, causes, and later ramifications of this singular event. It is most unfortunate, because on the other hand, it seems that the ‘Big Excursion’ was the proverbial blown fuse that initiated the rapid dismantling of the communist system in Bulgaria and launched the country onto the path of the subsequent postcommunist transition. Furthermore, it appears that this expulsion determined the character of Bulgaria’s systemic transition at least until 2009, when the MFR had been part of the two subsequent governments between 2001 and 2009. The ethnic cleansing still does determine Bulgaria’s relations with Turkey. And until both countries come to terms with the ‘Big Excursion’ and how it should be remembered, this crucial event in the recent Turkish-Bulgarian history will continue to divide. The Polish dissident and intellectual Jan Józef Lipski (1929–1991), a precursor and one of the foremost figures of the German-Polish reconciliation, once remarked, ‘We must tell all to each other . . .]. Without this the burden of the past will not let us enter a common future’ [my translation] (Lipski 1996 [1985]: 89–90). The opinion is also true of the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey. All those who lost their lives at the hands of the Bulgarian army and security forces must be accounted for. There is no chance of genuine and lasting reconciliation between these two states until the 1989 ethnic cleansing has been properly researched, analyzed, documented, and commemorated by scholars, politicians and all interested parties from both countries. To sum up, at present, for better or worse, the only book-length publications (in reality, all of them booklets) that attempt to give an overview of the 1989 ethnic cleansing are those which were written during and in the immediate wake of the expulsion. They were published by the Turkish administration (Exodus of Turks 1989; Konukman 1990; The Tragedy 1989; The Tragedy 1990; World Press 1989), private scholars (Memişoğlu 1989b; Memişoğlu 1992),15 and international organizations (Bulgaria: Imprisonment 1989; Poulton 1989; Zang 1989).16 These reports

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should be read in conjunction with some earlier ones (Bulgaria: Imprisonment 1986; Bulgaria: Continuing 1987; Laber 1987;17 Proceedings 1988; Şimşir 1985; Şimşir 1986; Şimşir 1990;18 The Repression 1987), which describe the rapidly worsening situation of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims in the run up to the ‘Big Excursion.’

Notes 1 In the wake of the forced name-changing campaign at the turn of 1985, on 9 March 1985 the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal announced that Turkey was prepared to accept all Bulgaria’s Turks (Şimşir 1986: 280). 2 CSCE stands for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, that is, the forerunner of today’s OSCE, or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 3 In Bulgarian the dual process of adopting Islam and the Turkish language is referred to by the single term pomakhomedanchvane (помохамеданчване), literally ‘Muhammadization,’ though its basic meaning denotes just the conversion to Islam (cf. Mutafchiev 1993: 3–5-313; Pomakhomedanchvane 2003). 4 Obviously, in Turkish orthography Ahmed Dogan’s surname should be spelled as ‘Doğan’ (Ahmed 2016). But the transliteration into English of the Cyrillic-based Bulgarian form Доган yielded ‘Dogan,’ which in English-language literature has become popularly – though incorrectly – accepted as the standard spelling of the politician’s family name. Interestingly, his first name, rendered as Ахмед in Bulgarian, is given as Ahmed in English, rather than ‘Akhmed,’ which would be required by faithful transliteration from the Bulgarian Cyrillic. Furthermore, the typical Turkish version of the Arabic name Ahmad (‘highly praised’) is ‘Ahmet’ (Ahmad 2016; Ahmet 2016; Tekin 1993: 39, 71), but again, in this case the imperfect transliteration from Bulgarian, seems to have tipped the scale in international English usage in favor of ‘Ahmed.’ As in the case of other Bulgarian Turks, in 1984–1985, Dogan was compelled to accept a Bulgarian (Slavic) first name and surname, namely, Medi Doganov. In the case of his family name, it was deemed sufficient to add the male Slavic surname ending –ov to Dogan. In Bulgaria, the patronymic is part and parcel of one’s legal name. The name of Dogan’s father, Ismail, was changed to that of ‘Dogan,’ yielding the patronymic ‘Doganov’ for his son. So, in the 1985–1989 Bulgarian documents Ahmed Dogan is officially known as ‘Medi Doganov Doganov.’ However, for the case of operational clarity in the documentation the DS always supplied Dogan’s new name with the annotation saying that ‘his former name was Ahmed Dogan’ (Angelov 2011b: 143). 5 The story of putting Ahmed Dogan on death row resurfaces in some articles, but on the whole there is precious little information on the time of his incarceration in available publications (cf. Detrez 2015: 165). Avramov (2015) and Marushiakova and Popov (2015) state that Dogan was never condemned to death. This disagreement on basic facts shows how much spade work remains to be done in order to come up with a well-documented history on the most crucial events in modern Bulgarian history. 6 In his new book Rumen Avramov kindly acknowledges his perusal of the early manuscript of this monograph (Avramov 2016: 262). 7 With this new book, Avramov completed his trilogy on the forced assimilation and expulsions of Bulgaria’s Greeks, Jews, and Turks during the 20th century in quest for an ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously homogeneous Bulgarian nation-state (cf. Avramov 2011; Avramov 2012; Danova and Avramov 2013). 8 Avramov (2015) and Marushiakova and Popov (2015) propose that the importance of Tatiana Vaksberg’s documentary is overstated in foreign publications, because it was produced by a Radio Free Europe journalist, which ensured a relatively wide press

State of research on the 1989 expulsion 39

9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16

coverage of this film outside Bulgaria. Apparently, from the Bulgarian perspective, this documentary was not such a clear breakthrough. However, none of the other documentaries touching on the 1989 ethnic cleansing seems to have eclipsed Vaksberg’s film yet. The 1974 ethnonationally and ethnoreligiously defined partition of Cyprus seemed to corroborate this Bulgarian fear. The division of the island state resulted in 2,500 casualties and displaced 210,000 people, namely 48,000 Turks (Muslims) and 162,000 Greeks (Orthodox Christians). Although in absolute numbers the mutual ethnic cleansing in Cyprus was a third smaller than the 1989 expulsion of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria, the relative scale of ethnic cleansing was larger in Cyprus, where 37 percent of the population were deported or compelled to leave, as compared to less than 5 percent in Bulgaria (Borowiec 2010: 2, 101, 128; Prospects Remain 2009). Avramov (2015) questions Bojkov’s (2004) numbers, proposing that the communist administration’s official numbers were closer to the mark. This would either disqualify or even nullify my comparison of the situation in the late 1980s Bulgaria with that in Northern Ireland or communist Poland. The problem is that as to my knowledge, no one has yet conducted a thorough and well-documented research on the actual number of people who lost their lives in the course of the persecution. It is another problem into which scholars must probe before a more authoritative interpretation of the events is possible. Between 1878 and 1990 it has been Bulgaria’s undeclared policy to keep Turks and Muslims at a lower level of education in order to prevent the emergence of a numerous Turkish (Muslim) intelligentsia that could effectively challenge the (Orthodox Christian) Bulgarian authorities (cf. Turan 1998: 213–214). Bulgarian communist press and propaganda sources usually quote the number of eight casualties and 50 to 80 wounded (Paraskevov 2013: 138; Teroristichni 2016). Likewise, today’s Bulgarian nationalist sources propose that these acts of terror caused the Zhivkov administration to embark on the 1984–1985 forced action of the forced assimilation of Turks and Muslims. However, only two of these acts, namely bomb explosions in the Varna Airport and at the Plvodiv railway station, took place before this forced assimilation action, both on 30 August 1984 (Teroristichni 2016). Interestingly, unlike in Bulgaria itself, the communist country’s security services excelled at assassinating Bulgarian dissidents and others abroad and at supporting terrorist organizations outside the Soviet bloc, especially in Turkey and the Middle East (Garthoff 2001: 312; International 1985: 11; Khristov 2013; Kostadinov 2010; Kostov 1988; Sanktuarium 1990). Since 2009 the official Committee (for the Disclosure of Documents of the [Communist] State Security Services and Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Army and for the Disclosure of the Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to These Services) has published 31 volumes (by July 2016) of such documents which survive in the state archives. However, as yet, no synthesis on the communist past of Bulgaria has been written on the basis of these documents (Sbornitsi 2016). Quite typically for numerous members of the small circle of Bulgaria’s academics and intellectuals of Turkish origin Hüseyin Memişoğlu (1937–) was expelled from Bulgaria in 1989 and resumed his academic career in Turkey (Hüseyin 2016). The career lawyer, Theodore (Ted) Zang jr (1963–) (Danielle 2007), who did research in Bulgaria for the Human Rights Watch at the turn of the 1990s, also probed into the then under-researched situation of Bulgaria’s Roma and into how the forced assimilation campaign affected them (Zang 1991). To this day, the subject of Roma expelled from Bulgaria to Turkey during the 1989 ethnic cleansing has not been appropriately covered. Apparently, during the 1989 ethnic cleansing the Turkish activist Erdal Kesebir intervened with the Turkish authorities that they should not push the expelled Roma back to Bulgaria. After he became a deputy to the Turkish Parliament (1991),

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two years later, in 1993, Kesabir proposed annulling the legal measures used to deport non-domiciled Roma from Turkey, but to no avail (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). 17 Jeri Laber (1931–), one of the founders of the Human Rights Watch (Laber 2002: 1), also probed into the destruction of the ethnic and linguistic identity of Kurds in Turkey (Laber and Whitman 1988). I mention this because the fate of Kurds in Turkey became one of the ideological arguments which the Zhivkov regime employed to convince Ankara that Turkey should accept Turks and Muslims expelled from Bulgaria in 1989. 18 Bilal N. Şimşir (1933–), a Turkish diplomat and historian was born in Bulgaria, but left the country with his family during the 1950–1951 ‘population transfer’ (Bilâl 2016).

3

The 1989 ethnic cleansing through the lens of the international press

Not to leave the reader at sea, and in fulfillment of the promise given in the introduction, in this section I attempt to provide an overview of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, as reflected in the international press. To this end, I mainly use reports and articles from the summer of 1989 on the subject from two British newspapers, namely, The Times and the Guardian, with some further contemporaneous reports drawn from other Anglophone newspapers, and from the German weekly Der Spiegel (Mirror). In order to deepen the archival base of this analysis, I also included relevant articles from Yugoslavia’s two state-wide official dailies Borba (Struggle) and Politika (Politics). In addition, I had a look at the Yugoslav republican press, namely the dailies Delo (Labor) and Večer (Evening), and the weekly Danas (Today), the last periodical published in Yugoslavia’s Socialist Republic of Croatia, while the former two in the country’s Socialist Republic of Slovenia. I complement the choice with some official Bulgarian propaganda on the events as published in the BCP’s press organ Rabotnichesko delo (Worker’s Cause), alongside a handful of articles from the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet (Republic) and from the first legal non-communist Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza (Elections Newspaper) that serendipitously for this book began publishing already in May 1989. The origin of the ‘Big Excursion’ rests with the three months and a half (November–January) of the unprecedentedly brutal and intensive renaming campaign at the turn of 1985.1 Well over half a million (or even 800,000) Muslims – mostly ethnic Turks, but also some Slavophones (Pomaks),2 Roma, and Tatars – were made to give up their Islamic names and surnames, which were replaced by the authorities wholesale with Bulgarian, or broadly Slavic, counterparts (Myuhtar 2003: 73; Şimşir 1988: 266).3 As it is now known from the recently published documents, Zhivkov predicted that the campaign would not be fully effective, and a considerable section of the targeted population would certainly resist forced assimilation. He assessed the group at 100–150,000 and proposed expelling them when an opportune moment would arise (Bojkov 2004: 364). For the time being, the most active opponents of the renaming campaign and the concomitant suppression of the Turkish language,4 Islam, and (Balkan) Muslim traditions5 were incarcerated in the notorious concentration camp on the Belene Island in the Danube. Originally, it had operated in the stalinist period between

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1949 and 1959 (Todorov 2000: 40), but was reopened in 1985–1989 for Turkish and Muslim opponents of the ‘Revival Process.’ In the good stalinist manner, with snow and rain falling on their heads, the first contingents of inmates actually had to rebuild the camp for themselves (Howard 1989b; Özkan 2011). The camp was also the site of the first mass protest of Turks that was a harbinger of the Turkish mass demonstrations during May 1989. In 1987 many inmates went on a hunger strike, after which they were dispersed to other prisons and penal colonies across Bulgaria (Poulton 1991: 142). In 1988, the Bulgarian government admitted that 40 people had died in clashes with troops and militiamen (that is, communist-style police) in the course of the renaming campaign, though Amnesty International’s estimate of the casualties was more than twice that number, namely around 100 casualties (Kalinova 2014: 573; Sofia Admits 1988). (However, as I discuss above, the actual number of deaths may have been much larger, even around 2,500.) In late 1987 the Turkish public television broadcast a dramatized documentary on the ongoing persecution of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims with a focus on Turkish and Muslim families split between Bulgaria and Turkey by Sofia’s policy of not allowing all family members to leave together for Turkey (Seden 1987). To add insult to injury, the series’ title The Revival Process was a direct and highly negative comment on Bulgaria’s 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation. The broadcast of the subsequent parts of this film series irked Sofia and the displeasure was made known to Ankara in unambiguous terms. In order not to close the few remaining channels of communication with Bulgaria and lose some leverage on the Zhivkov regime, the Turkish government discontinued the broadcasting of this documentary (strangely, a public debate on this film in Bulgaria itself opened only in May 2015, perhaps, due to a rise of anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish feeling connected to the European migrant crisis in 2015) (Foreman 1988a; Turskata 2015). In the following year, Bulgaria retaliated in kind with the almost five-hourlong cinema super-production Time of Violence (Staikov 1988) based on Anton Donchev’s (1930–) historical novel Time of Parting (Donchev 1964; Donchev 1967). This feature film, set in the late 17th-century Ottoman Empire, narrates the story of a brutal conversion to Islam in an ethnically Bulgarian village, as enforced by a regular Ottoman army regiment. In line with the official line of Zhivkov’s ‘Revival Process,’ this movie ‘proves’ (without any historical evidence to corroborate the events) that communist Bulgaria’s Muslims and Turkish-speakers were none other than Orthodox Slavophone Bulgarians who had been Islamicized and Turkified by force. Ironically, but quite typically in Bulgaria, in 2003 the film’s cameraman, Radoslav Spasov, directed the revealing Bulgarian and Turkish coproduction Stolen Eyes on the human tragedies of the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign (Spasov 2003). Unlike Spasov, Donchev never distanced himself from the anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim message of his novel that has enjoyed a cumulative run of well over 1 million copies. Hence, in a country of 8 million inhabitants, each Bulgarian adult either read or leafed through this book. This novel, which is regularly republished to this day, continues to reinforce the

1989’s events & the international press 43 anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim prejudice in today’s Bulgaria (Anton 2016), while the writer is lauded for his contribution to Bulgarian literature and culture (Akademik 2010; Anton 2014). Likewise, nowadays – a quarter-century after the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the fall of national communism in Bulgaria – the public at large considers Time of Violence to be the best Bulgarian film ever (cf. Vreme razdelno 2015).6 When Time of Violence was released in 1988, the shooting of the nine-part television series Under the Yoke (Iankov 1990) was already under way, based on the eponymous 1894 novel by Ivan Vazov (1850–1921). It tells the story of a Bulgarian (Slavophone and Orthodox) village whose inhabitants spontaneously get ready to rise in a rebellion (ostensibly, the 1876 April Uprising) against the Ottomans, invariably referred to as ‘Turks.’ In 1952 the novel was made into the first full-scale feature film in communist Bulgaria and 24 years later was shot in full color as another film (Dakovski 1952; Donev 1976). The story has remained an ideological evergreen before, during, and after communism. Vazov’s book continues to be seen as the best Bulgarian novel ever (Pod igoto 2009), and the films based on it were assessed likewise, though they nowadays share the coveted position of the best Bulgarian film ever with its ideological twin, The Time of Violence (Ganev 2015). It seems that with this television series the Zhivkov administration wanted to improve on the previous films based on Under the Yoke in order to provide a fittingly flashy and cinematographically modernized conclusion to Time of Violence. Ironically, the Bulgarian national television began to broadcast the series in March 1990, at the time of the most intensive ethnic tension in tentatively postcommunist Bulgaria. Nationalists were vindicated by popular culture. In 1988, despite Zhivkov’s best efforts to hold out against Gorbachev’s reforms (Daskalov 2011: 251–252) encapsulated by the slogans of perestroika (economic restructuring, meaning a pro-market reform) and glasnost (openness, that is, less censorship) (Elliot 1988; Gorbachev 1987; Gorbachov 1987), some small opposition groups (with members drawn predominantly from the inner circle of the Bulgarian Communist Party [Marushiakova and Popov 2015]) did make a timid appearance in Bulgaria. These groups aspired to emulate the opposition movements already operating on a large scale and even negotiating future political changes with the communist governments in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (Bulgaria 1989; Crampton 2010: 210). In Bulgaria, however, it was Turkish and Muslim activists (for instance, Zeynep/b Ibrahim(ova) [1958–], Sabri Iskander(ov) [1947–], Mustafa Iumer(ov)/ Ömer(ov) [1944–], or Ali Ormanla (Ormanliev) [1940–], together with Ahmed Dogan among them, despite his incarceration at this time in Pazardzhik)7 who, inspired by the then ongoing democratization in Poland and Hungary, really galvanized the opposition movement across Bulgaria (Gorcheva 2009a; Gorcheva 2009b; Interviu 2011). The first ever non-communist and independent organization after the 1947 communist takeover in Bulgaria was the Independent Human Rights Society (NDZPCh) founded on 16 January 1988 by ethnically Bulgarian BCP members. On the one hand, they were inspired by Gorbachev’s reforms, while

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on the other hand, they strongly disagreed with Zhivkov’s anti-Turkish and antiMuslim campaign of forced assimilation (Bulgaria 1991; Detrez 2015: 521; Dobrev 2015). Not surprisingly, the NDZPCh immediately attracted some prominent Turkish dissidents, such as the aforementioned Zeynep Ibrahim. When for her dissident activities she was expelled to Turkey on 3 February 1989, already 50 ethnic Turks were members of the society, constituting a seventh of the total membership of 350. Eventually, in the course of the May 1989 anti-government mass demonstrations, so many Turks joined the NDZPCh that they became more numerous than the ethnically Bulgarian members (Poulton 1991: 153–154). In emulation of the NDZPCh, on 13 November 1988, the Turkish dissidents Sabri Iskander, Mustafa Ömer and Ali Ormanla met in Vratsa (Враца in Bulgarian, Vraça in Turkish) in northwestern Bulgaria and founded a Democratic Human Rights League in Bulgaria (DLZPChB). Soon, with 900 members, this league became bigger than the NDZPCh itself. In April 1989, in Kazanluk (Казанлък in Bulgarian, Kazanlık in Turkish) in the Province of Stara Zagora (Стара Загора in Bulgarian, Eski Zağra in Turkish) brothers Ibriam (Ibrahim) Rutnov and Ferhat Rutnov established a Muslim Strike Committee (Мюсюлмански стачен комитет Miusiulmanski stachen komitet) in emulation of Poland’s Solidarity which throughout the 1980s had successfully employed strikes for the regime change in this country. The platform for a mass dissident action was set against Zhivkov’s oppressive regime. The DLZPChB is often credited with the organization of the mass Turkish demonstrations against the Zhivkov administration in May 1989. It should, however, be borne in mind that many of the Turkish dissidents were also members of TNODB. But in the new circumstances, they chose to keep this organization in the shadows, as the authorities – rightly or not – had accused TNODB of organizing terrorist acts during the mid-1980s (Gorcheva 2009b; Ivanov 2004: 109; Ivanov 2009; Poulton 1991: 154). Last but not least, Avni Veliev (1949–) (whose original Turkish surname Velioğlunu was changed in 1984) was one of the very first Bulgarian and Turkish dissidents in Bulgaria. In 1980 he founded a Leninist Communist Party of Turks in Bulgaria (TLKPB, Bulgaristan Türk Lenin Komünist Partisi in Turkish; Ленинска комунистическа партия на турците Leninska komunisticheska partiia na turtsite v Bulgariia in Bulgarian) that shrewdly challenged the BCP’s political monopoly on the plane of the very same ideology of communism. Four years later, in 1984, prior to the commencement of the campaign of forced name-changing, Veliev was sentenced to 7.5 years in prison for ‘anti-state activities.’ After serving half of the term, he was released early on 29 December 1988, but with the stipulation that the rest of the sentence he had to spend in internal exile in his home town of Dzhebel (Джебел in Bulgarian, Cebel in Turkish) in Kardzhali Province. However, on the wave of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet bloc, already a month after his release, on 30 January 1989, Veliev founded an Association for the Support of Vienna 1989 (DPV89). The idea was to construct an organization that would gather materials on the persecution of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria, and then make sure to deliver this sensitive information to the delegates of the CSCE members at their Conference

1989’s events & the international press 45 on Human Rights that was to be held in Paris in June 1989. They succeeded and on 2 May got through by telephone to Radio Free Europe, which they informed of the atrocities committed against Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims (Gorcheva 2011; Osman 2014; Poulton 1991: 154–155). The aforementioned CSCE Conference lasted from 30 May through 23 June 1989 and coincided with the first half of the 1989 ethnic cleansing (Bloed 1993: 92) (‘rounded up’ by Zhivkov’s meeting with Gorbachev on the very same day of 23 June), which naturally opened quite an elevated platform from which to voice international criticism of the Bulgarian government (cf. Poulton 1991: 161). The aforementioned organizations (NDZPCh, DLZPChB, DPV89, TLKPB and TNODB) – mostly led by Turks (Muslims) and with predominantly Turkish (Muslim) membership – constituted the foundation of the early dissident movement in Bulgaria. What is nowadays too often forgotten is that initially this Bulgarian dissident movement was overwhelmingly Turkish (Muslim) in its character. It was Turks and Muslims who were second-class citizens in communist Bulgaria, not ethnic Bulgarians (Bikov 2009: 384). The latter were often pleased with the country’s relative prosperity, which lent much legitimacy to the Zhivkov regime, underwriting his assimilatory policies in the 1980s and the 1989 ethnic cleansing. Very few ethnic Bulgarians openly sympathized with the plight suffered by their Turkish and Muslim co-citizens, and did so only when the Turkish (Muslim) opposition movement was transformed into a mass force that could not be disregarded. On 20–30 May 1989, Turks and Muslims organized numerous hunger strikes and demonstrations against forced assimilation (Anil 1989a; Angelov 2011b: 71–89; Angelov 2015). Exhausted by a hard and hopeless existence (Khristov 2014), tens of thousands of people (at least 30,000 to 53,000 [Angelov 2015: 125; Špeletić 1989; Svađa 1989]) protested against this policy (Bulgaria 1989), demanding the right to their own names, freedom of religion, and equal pay for the same work for Turks and Muslims (Howard 1989b). From behind tanks and armored carriers, militiamen and soldiers were shooting at the protesters with live ammunition. They wounded 200 protesters and killed at least 30 to 60, or even as many as 102.8 Two thousand protesters were summarily imprisoned. The measures had no visible effect on the demonstrations and hunger strikes that continued unabated (Košir 1989a; Poulton 1991: 159; Špeletić 1989; Svađa 1989). The number of hunger strikes skyrocketed from 30 in April to 200 in mid-May to over 1,000 a month later (Poulton 1991: 155). In this situation, finally around 100 ethnic Bulgarians joined their Turkish and Muslim co-citizens in the anti-government demonstration in Targovishte9 (Търговище in Bulgarian, Eski Cuma in Turkish) on 27 May. Also on 22–24 June (when the CSCE Conference was coming to an end in Paris) the leadership of the NDZPCh appealed to the authorities to stop the anti-Turkish campaign. But then the NDZPCh was already a predominantly Turkish organization; the vast majority of ethnic Bulgarians neither helped nor attacked Turks (Muslims), but approvingly looked at the Zhivkov administration’s swift moves to expel them to Turkey (Angelov 2015: 43; Poulton 1991: 160). No full catalog of repressive measures employed against Turks and Muslims in the latter half of the 1980s and during the 1989 ethnic cleansing has yet been

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compiled, let alone sifted through, systematized and connected to the specific decisions of the Bulgarian government, the administration, and individual officials, and the subsequent implementation of such decisions. The sheer invasiveness and poignancy of forced assimilation measures may be illustrated by the following two examples observed during the ‘Big Excursion.’ The implementation of the ban on the use of the Turkish language and on any mention of the language’s name was such that in Turkish areas in public spaces (such as bus stops or railway stations) the authorities posted notices saying ‘It is forbidden to speak in French’ (or ‘in a foreign language’). The name ‘French’ was employed in order not to say ‘Turkish.’10 Although until the end of communism French had been seen as the language of intellectual refinement in Bulgaria, obviously there were not any French-speaking communities in the country. Militiamen, Komsomol (the youth branch of the Bulgarian Communist Party) activists, and for that matter any ‘concerned citizen’ listened closely for anyone who dared to speak in Turkish (or in the equally unwanted Romani language) (Marushiakova and Popov 2015; Tugdar 2015: 205–206). ‘Linguistic offenders’ were summarily fined. These stringently observed onerous restrictions on the use of ‘their French’ language by the officially ‘non-existent’ Bulgarian Turks’ led to the erection of tombstones for recently deceased Turks and Muslims without any inscriptions or religious symbols on them. Even the name of the dead person was omitted because the family did not want to use the imposed Bulgarian name, while the authorities would not allow the Turkish (Arabo-Islamic) name. Hence, the photograph11 mounted on the granite or sandstone block had to suffice as the sole means of identification of the dead person (Montalbano 1989). Following the repeated destruction of Muslim cemeteries and gravestones in Bulgaria between 1877 and 1989, after the end of communism the country’s oldest recognizably Muslim and Turkish graves date back only to 1990 (Turan 1998: 301). The Bulgarian authorities replied swiftly with the brunt of the state’s full force in order to quell the aforementioned protests staged by Turks and Muslims. Troops and tanks were sent to the regions with a substantial presence of Turks and Muslims. Between 30 and 50 people were killed and at least 2,000 arrested (Anil 1989a; Anil 1989b; Howard 1989d; Howard 1989f.; Khronologiia 2016; Muslims Clash 1989; Protest 1990; Traynor 1989b), though the Bulgarian government admitted to a mere seven casualties (Haberman 1989a; Pangelov and Stratiev 1989: 2; Sofia Agrees 1989; Traynor 1989a). Some vociferous Turkish and Muslim dissidents who would not keep quiet were incarcerated indefinitely in psychiatric hospitals (Walker 1989e) in line with the Soviet model of dealing with educated ‘troublemakers’ (cf. Guzman 1989). But these drastic measures proved insufficient to bring the situation under control. As a result, the regime decided to expel the most ‘problematic’ activists to Turkey. Shortly after 20 May 1989 (Bulgarıstan’da 1989; Sofya’dan 1989), the first group of 170 Turkish (Muslim) leading dissidents was sent abroad (Anil 1989a), then all the other identified 4,000 to 10,000 Turkish (Muslim) leaders and activists of note were expelled in late May (Holland 1989; Howard 1989g). The initial 1,000 dissidents were sent to the West usually by way of Vienna (though

1989’s events & the international press 47 some were sent to Yugoslavia and Sweden12 [Poulton 1991: 158]), but most of them eventually came to Turkey (Avramov 2015; Grouev 2004: 141–143; Velike 1989). This unprecedented wave of repression and expulsion led to the rapid coalescence of a Bulgaria-wide and supraethnic opposition movement, initially composed of small and disparate organizations of diverse character. Typically, their members were pensioners or common people with no direct stake in the state politics, solely conducted and controlled by the communists, that is, higherranking BCP card-holders. As a rule of thumb, almost none of the first-wave members of the grassroots opposition were members of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). The independent trade union, Podkrepa (Support, led by Konstantin Trenchev [1955–]), modeled on Poland’s independent trade union Solidarity, criticized the violent suppression of Muslims’ and Turks’ peaceful demonstrations. The government quickly retaliated and threw the union’s head into prison (Traynor 1989b). The aforementioned expulsion of thousands of Turkish and Muslim activists in late May and early June 1989 from Bulgaria to Turkey (cf. Vertreibung 1989) was necessarily conducted across the Iron Curtain, from the Soviet bloc to a NATO member. Hence, prior to this expulsion, some negotiations evidently must have taken place between Sofia and Ankara on this subject, certainly in close consultation with Moscow and Washington. But such talks are absent from the press reports. Hopefully in the future some researchers will probe into this issue. The passport was a restricted document in all the Soviet bloc countries. Under normal circumstances, it was issued on application to the trusted few and had to be surrendered to the authorities immediately after one’s return from abroad. Importantly, as a rule, an entire family was never issued with passports to travel to a capitalist state in order to limit the incidence of ‘defection’ (cf. Stola 1992; Stola 2012: 141–176). Ostensibly, not to fall foul of the Kremlin’s pressure that Bulgaria follow the reformist course of Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost, on 10 May 1989 Sofia adopted a law that would provide for the issuance of passports to all Bulgarian citizens, who would even be allowed to keep this valuable document at home. (It was a modification of the earlier 1969 passport law.) This new law was published on 19 May (Petov and Fotev 1990: 15, 70; Zakon za zadgranichnite 1989). It was combined with the amnesty of 16 May 1989 for all who had left Bulgaria earlier without the authorities’ consent, or ‘defected’ in the communist officialese (Zakon za amnestiia 1989). Perhaps the authorities saw it also as preparatory step for the expulsion of ‘troublesome Muslims.’ However, this law was to enter into force only on 1 September 1989, hence it could not have been used as a legal basis for giving passports to Bulgarian Turks (Avramov 2015; Grouev 2004: 144). Not that the communist regime would be unduly deterred in its decisions by such legalistic niceties. It seems that at that time Zhivkov still kept all his options open, because in early May 1989 Bulgarian diplomats met repeatedly with their Turkish counterparts in Sofia, Ankara and Belgrade. They discussed the best ways to quickly improve the strained political and economic relations between both countries. Sofia promised Ankara a ‘constructive’ dialog (Bolgari 1989). On 1 June

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1989 at a press conference in Brussels, Turkey’s Prime Minister appealed to Sofia that in light of the tense situation both countries should sign an agreement on the immigration of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey (Svađa 1989). It was too late: three days earlier, on 29 May, Zhivkov had already decided on the expulsion of ‘Muslim Bulgarians’ (Zhivkov 1989). During May 1989 Zhivkov and the BCP were incensed by the mass demonstrations of the Turkish and Muslim opposition masterminded by imprisoned Ahmed Dogan and his circle. Even the formidable DS was unable to effectively suppress these demonstrations. Reports of the events in the foreign press began to undermine the image of Bulgaria on the international scene, tipping the balance of international opinion in favor of Bulgaria’s dissident Turks and Ankara. The Zhivkov regime urgently sought a way to prevent any further damage to Sofia’s international reputation. Another goal was to dismantle the full-blown Turkish (Muslim) mass dissident movement. At that time, it was the country’s only mass dissident movement, and as the demonstrations amply showed it was capable of unsettling the regime. The imminent danger was that the idea of directly opposing the regime would spread to the ethnic (Slavophone and Orthodox) Bulgarians, thus precipitating a fall of the Zhivkov government (Karpat 1995: 725). Faced with this existential emergency, with no help or guidance forthcoming from the Kremlin, Zhivkov and the Politburo decided on an unprecedented solution.13 On 29 May 1989 the Bulgarian dictator delivered a famous speech that was broadcast over television and the radio, and a day later was reprinted in full on the front page of the BCP’s press organ, the daily Rabotnichesko delo (Turcy 1989; Zhivkov 1989). The dictator opened and concluded his speech by stating that Bulgaria was the fatherland of all those who were born in the country, and that all of them constituted a ‘homogeneous socialist Bulgarian nation,’ which is ‘the responsibility and fate’ of each single citizen. In line with the principles of the newspeak of communist propaganda he reiterated all the slogans that the BCP officially upheld at that time. Among others, Zhivkov maintained that Sofia fully observed human rights in Bulgaria to the high standard required by the CSCE, thus acting ‘in the spirit of Helsinki and Vienna.’ Subsequently, he accused Turkey of instigating and conducting a planned ‘anti-Bulgarian campaign.’ As a quip, the communist strongman added that he disagreed with Ankara’s claim that all Muslims in Bulgaria were Turks, and shot back asking Ankara to state truthfully how many Bulgarians live in Turkey. Finally, Zhivkov appealed to the Turkish government to open the border and let in all these ‘Bulgarian Muslims’ who might want to come for a visit or emigrate permanently to Turkey (Zhivkov 1989). Obviously, Zhivkov refrained from using the ethnonym ‘Turk’ that appeared in his speech only once. Wherever needed he replaced this ‘unseemly’ ethnonym with the ideologically correct term ‘Bulgarian Muslim,’ because officially since 1985 there had been no ethnolinguistic minorities left in Bulgaria, let alone Turks. Bulgaria was declared to be a homogeneous nation-state inhabited by the socialist nation of Slavophone (and culturally Orthodox) Bulgarians. Zhivkov’s speech was immediately followed by the generalized ideological drivel on the front pages of the Rabotnichesko delo. It circled around the same tried and approved themes and

1989’s events & the international press 49 ossified figures of speech featured, as officially ‘uttered’ – according to press reports – by Bulgarians of all walks of life, from the ‘common worker’ to intellectuals and party officials (Dumata 1989; Mladenov 1989a; Otechestvo 1989; V dukha 1989). The Orthodox Church and the Supreme Spiritual Council of the Muslim Faith14 were compelled to lend their support to Zhivkov, as well (Rodinata 1989). They declared: ‘all in support of the [29 May] theses of our country’s leader,’ ‘Bulgaria is the fatherland of all who were born in this land,’ ‘Bulgarian Muslims have only one motherland, namely, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria,’ ‘the united and cohesive [Bulgarian] nation – the builder of the new society,’ ‘the Bulgarian nation is ethnoculturally homogeneous,’ ‘we stand for good neighborly, civilized and humanitarian relations [with Turkey],’ or ‘the Bulgarian nation will not fall on their knees [in front of Turkey]’ (Dumata 1989; Edinen 1989; Edinni 1989; Liutskanov 1989; Rodinata 1989). On 31 May 1989, in Sofia, 60,000 citizens ‘spontaneously’ organized a mass demonstration in ‘unwavering support’ of Zhivkov’s ‘only correct line of action’ to ‘resist [Turkey’s] anti-Bulgarian campaign.’ Their main slogan read ‘Our [Bulgarian] borders are open, [now] open yours [that is, Turkey’s borders]’ (Niama 1989; Svađa 1989). Simultaneously, a short popular volume devoted to the ‘forced Islamization of Bulgarians’ was published. Zhivkov coauthored it, alongside the most renowned Bulgarian historians and social scientists15 (Khristov 1989a). The Rabotnichesko delo urged its readers to buy the publication in order to learn ‘the truth’ about ‘the tragic past of the Muslim population in our country,’ who were none other but ‘Islamized Christians’ (Khadzhinikolov 1989). Speedily, for the sake of propaganda directed abroad, the volume was also published in Russian (Khristov 1989b), German (Christow 1989), Arabic (Khristov 1989c), Turkish (Hristov 1989a), French (Hristov 1989b), English (Hristov 1989c), and Spanish (Jristov 1989). However, no one commented on the curious employment of religion for identifying ‘true’ Bulgarians in the officially atheist state, as required by the orthodoxy of Sovietstyle communism (cf. Pospielovsky 1987). Already throughout May 1989, even prior to Zhivkov’s speech, the authorities began issuing passports to all those tacitly considered to be Turks, that is, Turkicspeaking Muslims (Angelov 2015: 35; Baeva and Kalinova 2011: 66; Todor 2015b). This coveted document was initially pressed into the laps of Turkish and Muslim activists, participants of hunger strikes and leaders of the May protests (R[umiana] 1989). Recipients of this document, which previously had hardly ever been seen, had two weeks to leave for Turkey. The DS (security force) harassed laggards with unannounced visits, anonymous letters and phone calls (relatively few people had phones at home in the Soviet bloc countries [Turnock 2003: 218; Verstraete 1992: 68]) in order to ‘convince’ the now passport-holders to leave as soon as possible (Böcker 2009; Marushiakova and Popov 2015; Uzunova 2007). The anonymous phone calls became more threatening, beginning in August 1989 when those who were reluctant to leave were told in no uncertain terms that unless they went to Turkey they would be slaughtered like ‘lambs for Kurban Bayrami.’16 In some cases DS plainclothes appeared announced and gave families under the order of expulsion no longer than two hours to gather some belongings (Khristov

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2017). This concentrated harassment deepened the already generalized fear among the Turks (Muslims) still remaining in Bulgaria causing them to leave this country as quickly as possible (Kyuchukov 2015). Simultaneously, official propaganda printed in the Bulgarian daily press described expellees as ‘tourists’ on a ‘three month excursion’ in Turkey (Giurova 1989), bizarrely emphasizing the logistical difficulties awaiting travelers at the border crossing, alongside the lack of employment perspectives and the low living standard in Turkey (Atanasov 1989; Konstantinov, Todorov, Stonlov and Kidikov 1989; Konstantinov, Todorov, Kidikov and Stonlov 1989; Todorov 1989). Even more curiously, Ankara was accused of ‘anti-Bulgarian propaganda’ that ‘caused’ expellees to stream to Turkey. At the same time, to stop in its tracks any Turkish high-level verbal retaliation, the topic of the Turkish ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus was brought to the fore, alongside the suppression of Kurds and their ethnolinguistic identity in Turkey’s eastern Anatolia. It was suggested that the Turkish authorities planned to send expellees from Bulgaria to Northern Cyprus and eastern Anatolia (Otkrita 1989; Teokharidis 1989). On 19 June 1989, Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov (1933–) rejected Ankara’s appeal for talks on the status of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria (Bugarsko-turski 1989). Soon afterward, at the press conference on 23 June 1989, Sofia upped the ante by accusing Ankara of using ‘Bulgarian Muslims’ as a pretext in preparation for annexing part of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian officials lamented the supposed suppression of a Bulgarian minority of a mere 700 to as many as 701,000 people in Turkey, which had never been mentioned earlier (Mandžuka 1989). In addition, the 1980s terrorist attacks in Bulgaria were blamed on Turkey and directly connected to the May 1989 mass demonstrations of Turks and Muslims. (Ironically, the West was well aware of Bulgaria’s role as the Kremlin’s proxy in supporting international terrorism across the Middle East [Kostadinov 2010; Garthoff 2001: 312].) In conclusion, Sofia declared that Turkish and international journalists were completely wrong to label the ‘tourists’ streaming from Bulgaria to Turkey ‘expellees’ (гони goni)17 or ‘deportees’ (депортирани deportirani). What was going on was none other but the freedom to travel in action, as prescribed by the CSCE (Pangelov and Stratiev 1989). (Perhaps these early protestations are the source of today’s belief that the 1989 ethnic cleansing was not an instance of mass expulsion but of ‘emigration.’) Whatever bad happened in Bulgaria, it was Turkey that was responsible, accused by Sofia of being ‘the hub of global terrorism’ and a ‘militaristic power’ intent on the reconquest of the former Ottoman territories (Nedev 1989). This expulsion of activists convinced many other Bulgarian Turks and Muslims to follow, if possible, in the expelled activists’ footsteps, as they saw no future for themselves in such an ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously homogeneous Bulgaria (Haberman 1989a). Ankara tentatively welcomed Sofia’s willingness to let the harassed (but unacknowledged) minority go, if they wished to, given that previously the Bulgarian authorities had usually done their best to keep to an absolute minimum the number of Bulgarian citizens traveling to Turkey, let alone leaving permanently for this country (Howard 1989g). The Turkish consular

1989’s events & the international press 51 services in Bulgaria played ball and issued all Bulgarian passport-holders who requested it with a three-month (that is, 90-day) tourist visa (Howard 1989b). But the number of applicants grew so steeply that already on 2 June 1989 Bulgarian Turks and Muslims were permitted to cross the Bulgarian–Turkish border without a Turkish visa (Grouev 2004: 146; Howard 1989i; Kirişci 1996: 393). On 31 May 1989, in reply to Zhivkov’s speech of two days earlier (29 May) in which the Bulgarian dictator had appealed to Ankara to open the Turkish border to ‘Bulgarian Muslims’ wishing to go on an ‘excursion’ to Turkey, the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal (1927–1993) announced that all Turks coming from Bulgaria would be accepted (Özal’dan 1989). From the Turkish point of view, it was a principled reiteration of Özal’s promise to this end, which he had given on 9 March 1985 in the wake of the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign. But back then Sofia had flatly denied the existence of any Turks in Bulgaria and none had been allowed to leave the communist country (Şimşir 1988: 280). On 13 June 1989, the Turkish government boastfully pledged that the Republic of Turkey would accept all of the estimated 1.5 million Bulgarian Turks18 if need be (Gürdilek 1989a), and the Turkish Prime Minister reconfirmed this pledge on 14 June (Haberman 1989a; Tzvetkov 1993: 419). Özal grandiosely proposed that Turkey, with its population of 56 million, would not have any problems with the absorption of either half a million or even 2 million Turks from Bulgaria. And he concluded that they should leave ‘this shitty country of fear and trembling’ and come to Turkey (Göç çığ 1989; Hölle 1989: 123). While welcoming Bulgaria’s willingness to let out those Turks who wished to leave, Ankara nevertheless criticized Sofia’s unprecedented oppression of Turks and Muslims. Washington supported Turkey in this criticism of Bulgaria, as shown on 13 June 1989, when the State Department of the United States refused to meet the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade who happened to be on a state visit in Washington DC (Poulton 1991: 161). On 18 June, Özal proposed that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should be invited to iron out the details of the ongoing expulsion from Bulgaria to Turkey (Gürdilek 1989b; Howard 1989d). However, Sofia continued in its denial of any persecution of Turks in Bulgaria, repeating that there were no such people in the country, only Muslim Bulgarians (Haberman 1989a; Haberman 1989d; Power 1990b; Traynor 1989b). To the Turkish accusation of deportation or forced emigration in line with Article 1 of the United Nation’s 1951 Refugee Convention, the Bulgarian government invariably replied that this wave of migrants could not be labeled in this manner, because all those who were then traveling to Turkey from Bulgaria did so initially on tourist visas, before Ankara waived this requirement on 2 June 1989 (Kirişci 1996: 393). Hence, in Sofia’s view, they were simply ‘tourists.’ Ankara did not agree to any talks without a clearly defined agenda. Sofia, on the other hand, did not want any UN representative in charge of refugees to attend such talks, because the presence of an international official of this kind would confirm Ankara’s claim that the so-called ‘tourists’ were in reality refugees or expellees (Haberman 1989b; Howard 1989f.; Kirişci 1996: 392–393).

52 1989’s events & the international press This as yet inconclusive – among scholars and politicians – discussion about whether the sudden massive outflow of ‘Bulgarian tourists’ to Turkey in summer 1989 (followed by the return of a third of them in late 1989 and 1990) was ‘tourism,’ ‘emigration,’ ‘expulsion,’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’ hinders the recognition of the tragic reality of this event as an act of ethnic cleansing. As a result, almost no research has been done on the subject, because the 1989 ethnic cleansing has not yet coalesced as a ‘tangible’ and thus ‘researchable’ fact, and as such remains elusive both in the minds of the Bulgarian population at large and those of decision-makers in grant-making institutions across Europe. Obviously, after the end of communism, no one in Bulgaria seriously claims – as zhivkovite propaganda once did – that the 1989 expellees were ‘tourists.’ But, as Richard Crampton emphasizes, many Bulgarians question the label of ‘expulsion’ for this event: ‘[T]o what extent is it correct to say the Turks were ‘expelled’? Were they forcibly kicked out, or was it more a matter of intense cultural and psychological pressure which created a critical mass of apprehension which in turn led to mass flight rather than physical expulsion?’ (Crampton 2015a). Roger Brubaker in his classic work Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe also proposes that it was a ‘flight’ (1996: 155). But was it really a ‘refugee crisis,’ brought about by the communist regime with the use of psychological methods? Or maybe the term ‘mass exodus’ (Avramov 2015) is more appropriate for describing what happened, though such a formulation appears to already put some vague blame on the Zhivkov administration. At present, only Turkish scholars consistently see the 1989 expulsion as at least ‘coerced (e)migration’ (zorunlu göç). The problem is that without much differentiation they apply this label to all the instances of inflows of Turks and Muslims to the Ottoman Empire and Turkey from Bulgaria from moment the latter nation-state was established in 1878 (cf. Kirişci 1996: 387, 392). This approach makes Turkish researchers oblivious to the unprecedented exceptionality of the 1989 expulsion, though on the other hand, they hardly ever forget to add that it was ‘the largest mass migration since World War II’ (Kirişci 1996: 393).19 A similar discussion unfolded in Poland concerning the nature of the 1968 expulsion of Jews from that country. Officially, no one was expelling them from Poland. They were not even referred to as ‘Jews,’ because according to the country’s Constitution and legislation all Polish citizens were Poles, irrespective of their ethnicity, language or religion. Officially the authorities’ political wrath was not directed at (Polish) Jews (or Jewish Poles), but at ‘zionists’ (syjoniści in Polish), or ‘clandestine supporters of imperialist Israel,’ who were admonished to leave for Zion (Syjon in Polish), that is, Israel, unless they corrected their ‘wrong political views.’ However, as a rule of thumb many were demoted or fired from high positions in the Communist Party (that is, the Polish United Workers’ Party, or Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR, in Polish), academia and enterprises. Indubitably ethnic (and at least culturally Catholic) Poles replaced them in quick succession. Children of the fired or demoted Jews ceased overnight to be treated as Poles and were singled out in school, and often removed from universities

1989’s events & the international press 53 which from now on were to educate ‘true’ Poles alone (Berendt 2009). Meanwhile, though travel to the West was tightly rationed (on principle never made simultaneously available to all family members), contrary to this well-established policy of preventing ‘defection,’ entire families of ‘zionists’ were issued with travel documents (Stola 2012). Most left for Israel or the West (Wiszniewicz 2008). After the fall of communism in 1989, this ‘emigration’ was recognized as ‘forced emigration,’ which in turn was gradually equated with expulsion and ethnic cleansing (Stola 1992). Nowadays the last term is the standard label for the wave of Jewish ‘emigrants’ that the 1968 events sent away from Poland (Stola 2000: 17). But the 1981 expulsion of Roma from the Polish town of Oświęcim (that is, quite poignantly, wartime Auschwitz) was similar in its dynamics, complete with the wholesale dishing out of passports to all the Roma there with the unsubtle suggestion that they must immediately leave for Sweden. This expulsion of Roma remains unresearched and unrecognized as an act of ethnic cleansing (Isztok 2004; Kapralski 2008). At present, any expression of anti-Semitism is deemed unacceptable in public life across Europe, but unfortunately anti-Romism (also known as anti-Tsiganism or anti-Gyps(y)ism [cf. Agarin 2014; Kyuchukov 2013; Selling 2015]) remains a sad standard of public discourse, which brushes off on the delayed and rather scant recognition of the wartime Holocaust (Porajmos, Kali Traš, or Samudaripen in Romani [Marushiakova and Popov 2015]) of Roma (Kapralski 2012). As evidenced in many places throughout this book, the Bulgarian communist authorities used the militia (as the police was usually known in the Soviet bloc countries), the army, and the security forces (DS) for intimidating and expelling Turks (Muslims) from Bulgaria, and also for organizing this unprecedentedly vast and fast ethnic cleansing in 1989. In 2012, despite vociferous opposition, the Bulgarian Parliament recognized the 1989 expulsion of Turks and Muslims as an act of ethnic cleansing (Deklaratsiia 2012). But many – or even most – Bulgarians disagree, preferring the euphemisms of ‘forced emigration’ or ‘mass exodus’ (Avramov 2015; Marushiakova and Popov 2015) (unless they even fall back on zhivkovite propaganda flatly denying that there was any expulsion, but only an unprecedented surge in ‘irresponsible tourism’ on the part of ‘deluded’ Turks and Muslims [Krasni 2014]). Unfortunately, the latter term – ‘mass exodus’ – tacitly removes from the semantic field the Bulgarian government and administration as the unquestionable perpetrators of this ethnic cleansing, allowing the reader to come to a potential – though wholly unwarranted – conclusion that this exodus might have been triggered by a natural disaster or generalized displeasure with the economic inefficiency of the communist system (Grouev 2004: 143–144). Some propose that the majority of ethnic Bulgarians were disgusted with and on principle opposed to the 1989 ethnic cleansing and objected to the long campaign of forced assimilation that had preceded it. But this silent majority said or did nothing to show their disagreement with the communist government’s actions, because supposedly they were thoroughly intimidated by the DS (Grouev 2004: 149–150, 155–157). This explanation seems unlikely, however, given the large

54 1989’s events & the international press and numerous popular anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim demonstrations that raged across Bulgaria in 1990 and 1991 after a modicum of civic and minority rights had been returned to Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims at the fateful turn of 1990. On the other hand, with the exception of the MRF, ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious Bulgarian nationalism remains to this day – albeit to a varying degree – part and parcel of each Bulgarian party’s program, be it officially inscribed onto a given party’s documents, or silently adopted, without any paper trail, but clearly visible in party officials’ and members’ day-to-day actions and pronouncements (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). In the late 1980s, Zhivkov’s government had a useful means of political leverage on Turkey, courtesy of the Kurdish question (cf. Turkish Prime 1989). The denial of any Turkish minority in Bulgaria was almost an exact reflection of the Turkish denial of the existence of 8 million Kurds in Turkey, officially dubbed as ‘mountain Turks’ (Foreman 1988b). Like Turks in Bulgaria, Turkey’s Kurds were not allowed to speak or publish in their language, or use their own specific Kurdish names and surnames (Haberman 1989a). (Unlike in Bulgaria, Ankara’s persecution of Kurds did not have a religious dimension, as both Turks and Kurds are Muslims.) Even worse, it was forbidden to employ the very ethnonym ‘Kurd’ in the Turkish press (Walker 1989a). Thus, if Turkey could assimilate Kurds by force, why should Ankara complain about Bulgaria doing the same to Bulgarian Turks? (Sofia Agrees 1989). What is more, since 1984 the Turkish army had been engaged in an undeclared civil war against Kurdish partisans. By 1989 Ankara had destroyed the villages of about 100,000 Kurds in eastern Anatolia and forced them to resettle in western Turkey (Siegelberg 1991: 263). The war continued unabated until 1998. By then 3,000 Kurdish villages had been destroyed and 3 million more Kurds had been forced to move westward to central and western Turkey (Yildiz and Müller 2008: 153). In the midst of the 1989 expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria, with almost religious fervor, Turkish officials kept reiterating the dogma that only Turks lived in Turkey (Foreman 1989b), and angrily rejected any comparisons of Ankara’s policy toward Kurds with that of Bulgaria’s toward its Turks. It was a mere face-saving measure and, for that matter, a childishly easy charade to see through (Walker 1989a). Thousands of expellees from Bulgaria in late May 1989 turned into tens of thousands in June and hundreds of thousands in July, before Turkey closed the border to this virtual tide of expellees on 22 August (Grouev 2004: 143–144; Howard 1989i; Zaparli 1989). The daily rate of expellees crossing the state frontier grew steadily from 2,000 in mid-June (Howard 1989b) to 3,500 in July (Holland 1989), prior to peaking at 4,000 in mid-August (Haberman 1989b). After Ankara sealed the border crossing and reintroduced the visa requirement for Bulgarian citizens on 21 August (Grouev 2004: 146; Howard 1989i; Kirişci 1993: 393), the number of Bulgarian Turks entering Turkey dropped radically to 35–100 persons per day in September and continued at the low daily rate of a mere 10 people in October (Haberman 1989f.; Howard 1989k), despite the fact that the Turkish authorities had reopened the border with Bulgaria already on 3 September (Semafor 1989). In mid-June 1989, the reporters covering this exodus predicted

1989’s events & the international press 55 that at least 100,000 people would eventually be expelled (Walker 1989b), before settling on a threefold higher prediction of the total of 300,000 refugees later that month (Balkan Exodus 1989; Walker 1989g). In mid-August, even this prediction was stepped up to 400,000 (Haberman 1989d). The later predictions closely correspond to the final number of expellees and accurately reflected Zhivkov’s wish to expel at least 200,000–300,000 Turks, which he revealed in a ‘secret speech’ to the Bulgarian government on 7 June 1989. His argument for the plan was that unless the aforementioned number of Turks were expelled, Bulgaria would turn into ‘another [divided] Cyprus’ and would cease to exist in a decade and a half (Bulgarian Archives 2012). Sofia’s motive and intent to expel Bulgarian Turks and Muslims was laid bare in this speech, which was only recently released from the Bulgarian Archives. Obviously, in summer 1989 the speech’s stark message was well known among BCP members and was diligently repeated amongst the population at large by word of mouth (Avramov 2015). Furthermore, at the meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow on 23 June 1989, Zhivkov named even a higher number of half a million Muslims (that is, Turks and Pomaks) to be expelled (‘expatriated’) from Bulgaria. As a caveat he added, in line with the ideology of ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously homogeneous Bulgaria, that these Muslims should by no means be identified as of ‘Turkish nationality [that is, ethnicity].’ Officially, following the thorough suppression of visible ‘traces of Turkishness’ during the ‘Revival Process,’ there had been no Turks in Bulgaria since the 1985 census. Gorbachev cautioned the Bulgarian leader by bringing to Zhivkov’s attention the fact that two days earlier, he had received a special message from the Turkish President Turgut Özal with the request to lean on Sofia so that no more than 30,000 Turks would be sent from Bulgaria to Turkey. Zhivkov disregarded this cue, while Gorbachev let Zhivkov act as the latter saw fit, washing his hand of the situation by saying that ‘the responsibility for the situation in each [Soviet bloc] country is its own problem.’ Finally, at the conclusion of this meeting, both leaders agreed not to mention in the announcement on their meeting that they discussed ‘the Turkish problem [in Bulgaria]’ (Memorandum 2000 [1989]). In 1877–1878 the Muslim population in Bulgaria was halved from 1.6 million to 800,000 (Turan 1998: 145). From 1880 to 1908, half a million left Bulgaria for the Ottoman Empire (Turan 1998: 154–155). During the two Balkan Wars (1912–1914), about 150,000 Turks (Muslims) were either expelled from or killed in the territories annexed by Bulgaria (McCarthy 1995: 164; Şimşir 1988: 161).20 Between 1925 and 1988, 380,000 Turks and Muslims were either expelled from or left Bulgaria for Turkey, or on average 6,000 per annum (Anil 1989b). (However, Turkish sources for the period estimate that the number of expellees and emigrants amounted to at least half a million [Kirişci 1996: 408; Myuhtar 2003: 8–9; Şimşir 1988: 166, 179, 301].) Almost the same number of Turks and Muslims were expelled from Bulgaria between June and August 1989. The cumulative demographic dynamics of this ethnic cleansing, as reported in the international press (interspersed with the declassified Bulgarian statistics) was as follows:

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31 May 1989: 238 (mostly Turkish dissident leaders, including 160 to Vienna and 78 to Belgrade) (Svađa 1989) 6 May – 3 June: 1,000 (including 340 on 3 June alone) (Nov pregon 1989) 25 May – 4 June: 1,556 (Avramov 2016: 711) 5 May – 6 June: 1,340 (Košir 1989a) 6 June: 2,202 (Avramov 2016: 711) [NB: 6 June: by that date 12,230 Bulgarian Turks had applied for passports and the authorities had prepared 7,721 passports (Avramov 2016: 712)] 11 June: 7,859 (Avramov 2016: 711) [NB: 11 June: by that date 53,876 Bulgarian Turks had applied for passports and the authorities had prepared 37,548 passports (Avramov 2016: 712)] Early June: 10,000 (Gürdilek 1989a) 26 May – 12 June [1]: more than 10,000 (Masovno 1989; Proterivanje 1989) 26 May – 13 June [2]: 16,300 (Anil 1989b) 14 June [1]: 17,597 (Avramov 2016: 711) 14 June [2]: 18,000–20,000 (Bulgaria Accused 1989; Howard 1989b) [NB: 14 June: by that date 126,931 Bulgarian Turks had applied for passports and the authorities had prepared 92,676 passports (Avramov 2016: 712)] 18 June: 34,000 (Hillmore 1989) 19 June [1]: 35,000 (Bugarsko-turski 1989) 19 June [2]: 40,000 (Gürdilek 1989b) 20 June: 50,000 (Turkey Asks 1989) 21 June: 46,087 (Avramov 2016: 711) 22 June: 52,000 (Haberman 1989a; Walker 1989b) (meanwhile, 60,000 people were waiting on the Bulgarian side of the border to cross to Turkey [Balkan Exodus 1989; Walker 1989b]) 22 June: 53,000 (Sofia Agrees 1989) (23 June: the Turkish press’s prediction that at least 250,000 ‘migrants’ would arrive to Turkey from Bulgaria [250 bin 1989]) 24 June: 60,000 (Antibugarski 1989) 26 June: 70,037 (Avramov 2016: 711) 27 June: 65,000 (Holland 1989; Walker 1989e) 28 June: 70,000 (Walker 1989f.) [NB: 28 June: by that date more than 150,000 Bulgarian Turks had been issued with passports (Karte 1989), while almost 372,000 had applied for passports and the authorities had prepared 224,000 passports (Avramov 2016: 712)] 29 June: 80,000 (Walker 1989g) 30 June: 86,747 (Avramov 2016: 711) 1 July: 90,000 (90 bin 1989) 5 July [1]: about 100,000 (Bugarska 1989) 5 July [2]: 105,352 (Avramov 2016: 711) 7 July [1]: more than 100,000 (Howard 1989g) 7 July [2]: 102,000 (Sofija 1989) 12 July: 134,683 (Avramov 2016: 711) 20 July: 170,045 (Avramov 2016: 711)

1989’s events & the international press 57 21 July: 177,000 (Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu and Hacısalihoğlu 2012: 640) 23 July: 185,000 (Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu and Hacısalihoğlu 2012: 640) 24 July: 190,080 (Avramov 2016: 711) 26 July [1]: 200,057 (Avramov 2016: 711) 26 July [2]: 200,000 (Howard 1989h) (100,000 alone during the fortnight since 11 July [Son 1989]) 27 July: 203,000 (furthermore, since late May 1989 1,000 Bulgarian Turks had been expelled from Bulgaria to Western Europe, mainly, to Vienna and Belgrade) (Velike 1989) 31 July: 220,183 (Avramov 2016: 711) [NB: 1 August: by that date 238,282 Bulgarian Turks had been issued with passports, while 514,161 had applied for passports, and the authorities had prepared 355,480 passports (Avramov 206: 712)] 3 August: 230,860 (Avramov 2016: 711) 7 August [1]: 246,130 (Avramov 2016: 711) 7 August [2]: c 250,000 (Cichy 1989) 10 August: 260,328 (Avramov 2016: 711) 12 August: 274,000 (Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu and Hacısalihoğlu 2012: 640) 14 August [1]: 272,136 (Avramov 2016: 711) 14 August [2]: 279,000 (Haberman 1989b) 16 August: 290,000 (Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu and Hacısalihoğlu 2012: 641) 18 August: 292,511 (Avramov 2016: 711) 20 August [1]: 303,000 (Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu and Hacısalihoğlu 2012: 641; Haberman 1989c) 20 August [2]: 308,929 (Avramov 2016: 711) 21/22 August: 310,000 (300 bin 1989; Haberman 1989d; Howard 1989i; Montalbano 1989; Searle and Power 1989a) 23 August: 309,592 (Avramov 2016: 711) c 25 August: 320,000 (Hölle 1989: 123) August/September: 350,000 (Searle and Power 1990a) 26 September [1]: 312,513 (Avramov 2016: 711) 26 September [2]: 337,944 = 312,513 expellees (including 36,500 cars) + 25,431 returnees (including 2,130 cars), according to the DS. What is more, by 26 September, 438 potential returnees had been barred from entering Bulgaria, because they did not possess appropriate documents (Katsunov 2011: 108). A strong suspicion is that most of those who were refused entry were ethnic Roma (Marushiakova and Popov 2015) [NB: 1 October: by that date 549,757 Bulgarian Turks had applied for passports (Avramov 2016: 712)]. The vast majority of expellees (that is, 292,000) came from the three provinces of Razgrad (123,000), Varna (89,000), and Haskovo (80,000) (Katsunov 2011: 108). By the way of comparison, according to the 2011 census, today’s populations in these three Bulgarian provinces amount, respectively, to 125,000 (Razgrad 2016), 475,000 (Varna 2016), and 246,000 (Haskovo 2016). Tellingly, the number

58 1989’s events & the international press of 1989 expellees from Razgrad Province equates to the province’s entire presentday population. The expellees amount to 19 percent and 32.5 percent, respectively, of the current numbers of inhabitants in the provinces of Varna and Haskovo. The trauma of the 1989 ethnic cleansing must be the deepest and most widespread in these three provinces. Hence, it is the most promising area where future researchers, with the use of the methods of oral history, could count on completing the missing picture of this forgotten ethnic cleansing with individual stories of expellees and returnees, alongside their families and communities. As illustrated by the numbers quoted above, the intensity of the 1989 expulsion was horrific, and additionally heightened by the fact that all the expellees had to cross to Turkey through a single border crossing between these two countries. On average, between 25 May and 22 August 1989, 22,814 Turks were expelled per week, with the highest weekly rate reaching 31,182 expellees in July 1989 (Avramov 2016: 714). It was almost six times as much as the highest weekly rate of 5,600 expellees during the postwar expulsion of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey in 1950–1951, which was reached in December 1950, and then in January and February 1951 (Avramov 2016: 713). The daily averages of expellees in July 1989 stood in Bulgaria at 4,454. In the summer of 1989 Bulgaria expelled 3.5 percent of its population, while the plan was to expel 5.8 percent, or 0.52 million. In comparison, the 1950–1951 expulsion removed to Turkey 2.1 percent of Bulgaria’s inhabitants (Avramov 2016: 262–263). Despite the repeated promises to accept all Turks and Muslims expelled from Bulgaria and those that wished to leave the country, as early as mid-June Turkey began to experience troubles with absorbing the massive influx of expellees (Cichy and Orlikowski 1989).21 Quite presciently, in early August the Turkish government described this exodus-in-progress as ‘the biggest expulsion in Europe since the “population transfers” at the end of World War II’ (Traynor 1989b), that is, the expulsions of ethnic Germans from Central Europe in 1945–1950 (Hölle 1989: 123). Beyond the border crossing (Kapitan Andreevo [Капитан Андреево in Bulgarian] in Bulgaria and Kapıkule in Turkey), summarily dubbed ‘Checkpoint Ali’22 (Wiedemann 1989: 110), during the first week of June 1989 tent cities (commonly referred to in Turkish as kampı or ‘camps’) were hastily erected in Turkey to accommodate the expellees in the vicinity of the frontier with Bulgaria (Bulgar sınırına 1989). Many were also sheltered in schools left empty during the summer holidays (Haberman 1989e; Howard 1989b; Traynor 1989a), but in view of the imminent return of children to schools, increasingly more expellees had to move to living containers (Hölle 1989: 124). The influx caused a steep hike (up to 100 percent [Hölle 1989: 124]) in rents across the European part of Turkey, which made accommodation even scarcer and less affordable to those expellees who had managed to find low-paid manual jobs (Howard 1989j). On top of that, to their dismay, female expellees, whatever their qualifications, could not find any suitable jobs in conservative and strongly patriarchal Turkey (Hölle 1989: 124). The majority of Bulgarian Turks remained in European Turkey or at most in westernmost Anatolia, in the vicinity of Istanbul. For instance, 80,000 expellees arrived in the city of Bursa23 alone. All flatly refused Ankara’s encouragement to

1989’s events & the international press 59 settle in eastern Anatolia, then the theater of the undeclared civil war against Turkey’s Kurds (Hölle 1989: 123). The concentration of the expellees in westernmost Turkey exacerbated the already high rate of unemployment which stood at 20 percent for all of Turkey in 1989. Financial outlays for immediate aid to expellees created an additional strain on the Turkish budget and economy, then saddled with an annual inflation of 70 to 80 percent, alongside the steep cost of the undeclared war against the Kurds in the east (Hillmore, 1989; Hölle 1989: 124; Walker 1989c). The influx of Bulgarian Turks came after a decade of the slow and difficult integration of the early 1980s wave of 600,000 Iranian refugees who had left their country in the wake of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Anil 1989b). Furthermore, the international press negatively compared Ankara’s attention lavished on Bulgarian Turks to the cold shoulder which Turkey extended to Kurdish refugees from Iraq. In March 1988, when 5,000 Kurds died in the governmental chemical attack against them in northern Iraq, 50,000 to 100,000 fled to southeastern Turkey. 35,000 Iraqi Kurds remained in the makeshift camps in 1989 (Anil 1989b; Howard 1989a; Howard 1989b). While Bulgarian Turks were offered Turkish passports, shelter, aid, and jobs, the forgotten Kurdish refugees from Iraq were left to languish and fend for themselves in the camps. They were forbidden to speak Kurdish, and at most were offered some free classes in the Turkish language for beginners in lieu of proper aid, integration, or gainful employment (Gürdilek 1990; Karte 1989; Walker 1989a; Walker 1989f.). The economic and social difficulties convinced Ankara to reintroduce the visa requirement for Bulgarians on 21 August 1989, and a day later to close the border to the unceasing exodus on 22 August 1989, in spite of Sofia’s and widespread domestic criticism of the Turkish government for rescinding on their bold June promise to accept all Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria (Howard 1989i; Markova 2010: 5; Özal’a 1989). The frustrated would-be expellees stranded in the no man’s land pleaded with the unbudging Turkish border guards: ‘rather throw us into the sea than send back [to Bulgaria]’ (Hölle 1989: 123). Tensions between Bulgaria and Turkey were on the rise, because between July and September Ankara was playing with the idea of resettling some of the expellees in Northern Cyprus. (In late June 1989, the first President of Northern Cyprus, Rauf Denktaş [1924–2012], invited 30,000 expellees to the island, intent on gaining more recognition for his state, recognized only by Turkey [Karte 1989].) But this would have validated Zhivkov’s persistent propaganda on Turkey’s clandestine efforts to seize, in the neighboring countries, ethnically Turkish (Muslim) territories adjacent to Turkey. Such a move would also have alienated Greece. Perhaps these considerations and Washington’s displeasure with potentially more instability in the crucial eastern flank of NATO caused Ankara to drop this plan (cf. Briski 1989; Wiedemann 1989: 111) and reopen, on 3 September, the border with Bulgaria for Turks and Muslims from that country, provided they possessed valid Turkish visas in their passports (Semafor 1989). At the human level the sudden closure of the border added to the grief of the 25,000 would-be expellees stopped in their tracks on the Bulgarian side of the frontier. Vilified in Bulgaria with the use of the dehumanizing pejorative ‘worms’ (глисти glisti) in rife anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim graffiti on trains24 (Wiedemann

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1989: 110), they had nowhere to return to in Bulgaria, having sold cheaply (under the authorities’ relentless pressure [Poulton 1991: 156]), or mostly given up for free their apartments, houses and movable property25 (Simmons 1989) to be auctioned by the BCP or passed to a deserving BCP member (Vehextes 1990: 129). It seems that this forced expropriation was not an official measure, but rather depended on the whim of local civil servants and DS (security forces) officers intent on lining their pockets (Avramov 2015). In addition, expellees had to leave their bank accounts to the state, while at the border crossing they faced more ad hoc harassment. In an unregulated manner, but with the full approval of their superiors, border guards excelled at relieving Bulgarian Turks of any cash and valuables deemed as ‘excessive’ (Haberman 1989a; Walker 1989e). Adult expellees were allowed to take the pittance of 300 levs (Bulgarian currency) per person (Verhextes 1990: 129). No official note was made of these arbitrary confiscations, hence expellees were never indemnified for their financial losses after the fall of communism (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). Ankara’s retraction on the promise to accept all expellees from Bulgaria was a rare propaganda victory for communist Bulgaria. Already in late June 1989 the Bulgarian press was full of stories portraying real or supposed plight of expellees in Turkey (Atanasov 1989; Giurova 1989). In early September 1989, the April law which allowed all Bulgarian citizens to be issued with passports finally entered into force. From now on they could travel abroad whenever they wished and were accepted (Searle and Power 1989a). It was done with an eye to add to the political and economic pressure already mounting on Turkey. A day before closing the border on 22 August 1989, that is, on 21 August, Ankara resumed the requirement of a Turkish visa for Bulgarian citizens wishing to travel to Turkey (Kirişci 1996: 393; Markova 2010: 5; Parla 2015: 108), and also introduced a rudimentary language test that stemmed the inflow to Turkey of Slavophone Pomaks and Roma who could not hold a basic conversation in Turkish26 (Grouev 2004: 73). And even worse, some expellees disillusioned with ‘the West,’ which they had experienced in Turkey decided to return to Bulgaria, seemingly in corroboration of Sofia’s insistence that they were not any expellees, but mere ‘tourists.’ The main factors contributing to their decision to go back were hard living conditions in the refugee camps and difficulties experienced in adjusting to a radically different type of society and economy in Turkey (Göç turu 1989; Pope 1989). In addition, after the initial enthusiasm, the Turkish authorities increasingly abandoned the expellees to their own devices, deepening the former’s growing frustration. To add insult to injury, claiming ‘measureless exhaustion’ to the press, in the wake of the closing of the Turkish-Bulgarian border, Prime Minister Özal retreated to the Aegean Sea resort of Bodrum for a brief respite on the beach (Hölle 1989: 124; Özal sezon 1989). Unsurprisingly, the elderly constituted most of the returnees,27 preferring a pittance of a pension in anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim Bulgaria to no pension at all in Turkey (Mackenzie 1989). In mid-August 1989, the returnees added up to a couple of hundreds, before their number shot to thousands in September and then to tens of thousands in October. The daily rate

1989’s events & the international press 61 of returnees crossing the border to Bulgaria topped 1,000 in mid-September (Mackenzie 1989), and subsequently fell to 500 in October (Howard 1989k). In mid-September Sofia officially greeted these returnees as ‘patriots’ in order to further shame Ankara for its unilateral closure of the border (Mackenzie 1989). However, in reality, as secret documentation reveals, the authorities assessed these returnees quite negatively, and even in a prejudiced manner, stating that the vast majority of them were ‘uneducated,’ ‘of low intelligence’; those with secondary and incomplete university education amounting only to 9 percent. The DS could not say whether with the rapidly changing political and economic situation in Bulgaria returnees might not decide to go to Turkey again (Katsunov 2011: 109). The largest ethnic cleansing in postwar Europe turned into a ‘big return.’ It was the biggest return of expellees in Europe ever, prior to the 1999–2000 return of more than 90 percent of the 0.9 million Albanian refugees from Kosovo. They were expelled during the 1998–1999 war between the Yugoslav (Serbian) army and Kosovo’s Albanians and Muslims. In addition, 0.6 million Kosovo Albanians were displaced within Kosovo in the course of this conflict (Girgle 2006: 108; Parliamentary Assembly 2001: 488). The cumulative dynamics of the unprecedented 1989–1990 return of expelled Turks to Bulgaria captured in newspaper reports (interspersed with the declassified Bulgarian statistics) was as follows: 15 July 1989: ‘52 families’ (Wiedemann 1989: 112) 24 July: 314 (Avramov 2016: 712) 26 July: 385 (Avramov 2016: 712) 31 July: 450 (Avramov 2016: 712) 3 August: 595 (Avramov 2016: 712) 7 August: 752 (Avramov 2016: 712) 10 August: 909 (Avramov 2016: 712) 12 August: ‘hundreds’ (Pope 1989) 14 August [1]: 300 (Haberman 1989b) 14 August [2]: 1,179 (Avramov 2016: 712) 18 August: 1,457 (Avramov 2016: 712) 23 August: 2,209 (Avramov 2016: 712) 25 August: 1500 (Hölle 1989: 124; Howard 1989j) 28 August: 3,332 (Avramov 2016: 712) 11 September: 12,265 (Avramov 2016: 712) 17 September: 15,000 (Mackenzie 1989) 19 September [1]: 10,000 (Haberman 1989f.) 19 September [2]: 19,436 (Avramov 2016: 712) 26 September: 25,431 (Avramov 2016: 712; Katsunov 2011: 108) 3 October: 31,018 (Avramov 2016: 712) 10 October: 35,211 (Avramov 2016: 712) 11 October: 30,000 (Howard 1989k) 17 October: 40,922 (Avramov 2016: 712) 24 October: 45,017 (Avramov 2016: 712)

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1989’s events & the international press 31 October: 47,615 (Avramov 2016: 712) 10 November: 40,000 (Briski 1989) 21 November: 59,950 (Avramov 2016: 712) 28 November: 65,000 (Angelov 2012b: 5) 19 February 1990: 80,000 (Searle and Power 1990a) 23 August: 130,000 (Searle and Power 1990b) Late 1991: 175,000 to 235,000 (Joly, Nettleton and Poulton 1992: 78)

Sadly, on their way back home many returnees’ money earned or received as aid in Turkey was arbitrarily confiscated by Bulgarian customs officers (Searle and Power 1990a). Beyond Sofia’s patriotic propaganda, it soon turned out that often returnees had nowhere to return to. In mid-September 1989 militiamen and troops barred many of them from going back to their home regions, because their houses and apartments were now in the possession of ethnic Bulgarians (Simmons 1989). Upon their return to Haskovo (Хасково in Bulgarian, Hasköy in Turkish)28 numerous expellees from this city found out that the municipality, following ‘Mayor’ (that is, BCP Chairman of the Municipal Council) Dimitur Velev Dimitrov’s order,29 had had bulldozed over 1,000 of their houses30 based on the prediction that some expelled Turks might have a change of heart and come back to the city31 (Poulton 1991: 159; Searle and Power 1990a). By April 1991 it had been officially established that at least 2,080 houses of Bulgarian Turks had been destroyed all over Bulgaria during the summer of 1989 in order to prevent expellees from returning (Joly, Nettleton and Poulton 1992: 78). Until 10 November 1989, many returnees were forcibly dispatched to other parts of the country in a poorly disguised attempt to disperse Turks across entire Bulgaria. On top of that Turkish professionals who dared to come back were compelled to do manual work (Poulton 1991: 159). And poignantly, in mid-October 1989, about 50 returnees were kept in no man’s land, barred from entering Bulgaria on the slim pretense that their documents were invalid or not in good order (Howard 1989k). (Perhaps, they were Muslim Roma, equally unwanted by Bulgaria and Turkey, hence as a matter of course, Turkish border guards kept turning back to Bulgaria these potential expellees who due to their swarthy complexion appeared to be ‘Gypsies’ in their eyes [Kyuchukov 2015]. This question of dual discrimination of Muslim Roma by Bulgaria and Turkey in the broader context of the 1989 ethnic cleansing should be probed into. In many ways, this phenomenon is similar to what happened when Albanian expellees returned to Kosovo after the 1998–1999 war. Subsequently, the ethnically Albanian returnees did not allow in around 50,000 Kosovo Roma, who to this day languish in refugee camps in the neighboring states [Marushiakova and Popov 2015; Prospects 2012].) On the basis of incomplete data (yet another issue still to be researched in depth), it is estimated that the Zhivkov administration expelled well over 300,000 Bulgarian Turks and other Muslims (Pomaks, Roma, Tatars). The proposed totals vary between 310,000 and 360,000. The high number of 370,000 (Brubaker 1996: 155) is also quoted, but rather more rarely. Out of the more than 300,000 expellees, by mid-1990 about 230,000 had returned to Bulgaria, while 70,000 chose to remain

1989’s events & the international press 63 in Turkey. In 1990 human and political rights were restored to Bulgaria’s Muslims and Turks, alongside a limited catalog of minority rights. But the acute economic and social problems of the postcommunist transition in this country continued sending subsequent waves of migrants abroad. The overwhelming majority of these migrants were Turks (Muslims) who went to Turkey. First of all, most of the 1989 expellees received Turkish citizenship without having to renounce their Bulgarian citizenship. This practice continued to be applied through 1992 in the case of all expellees wishing to acquire Turkish citizenship (Avramov 1989: 265; Kirişci 1996: 393). Secondly, the Central European states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia waived visas for Bulgarian citizens only in 1997–199832 (Markova 2010: 8), while the Schengen Area followed suit as late as March 2001 (Triandafyllidou and Nikolova 2014: 130). Meanwhile (especially so because Bulgaria was placed on the EU’s ‘black visa list’ in 1993 [Markova 2010: 8]), it was easier for Bulgarian citizens of Turkish (Muslim) origin to obtain Turkish visas, on account of their ethnicity (religion), and networks of their relatives and friends already resident in Turkey. Eager at that time to open accession negotiations with the EU, Ankara waived the visa requirement for Bulgarian citizens in June 2001 (Kasli and Parla 2009: 2008). Since that time Bulgarians – irrespective of their ethnicity, and as citizens of the sole EU member state – have enjoyed easy visa-free access to Turkey (Visa 2016). It seems that every Bulgarian Turk (Muslim) was followed at least by two ethnic Bulgarians to Turkey as tourists or in search of work, because the number of Bulgarian citizens entering this country tripled between 1996 and 2004, from 0.38 million in 2000 to 1.3 million in 2004 (Kasli and Parla 2009: 207). Not surprisingly, in early 1990 the Turkish Embassy in Sofia was issuing over 6,000 visas every month to Bulgarian Turks and Muslims (Poulton 1991: 159–160). In 1992, 170,000 Bulgarian Turks (Muslims) emigrated to Turkey, followed by 80,000 in 1993, and 50,000 in 1994 (Kirişci 1996: 389; Turan 1998: 302). The Bulgarian statistics for the same outflow is 88,000 in 1990, 40,000 in 1991, 65,000 in 1992, 70,000 in 1993, and 64,000 in 1994 (Markova 2010: 7) (and subsequently 30,000 to 40,000 annually in 1995–1997 [Avramov 2016: 265]). The totals of both the Turkish and Bulgarian figures are almost the same in 1990–1994, namely, 300,000 and 307,000, respectively. Thus, I suspect that the Turkish high number of immigrants from Bulgaria in 1992 is actually an aggregate number of immigrants from the three years 1990–1992. Finally, by mid-1995 the situation had stabilized. Almost 245,000 Bulgarians Turks (Muslims) settled for good in Turkey and acquired Turkish citizenship, while effectively 125,000 returned to Bulgaria (Kirişci 1996: 393). It means that the total number of Bulgarian Turks (Muslims) who were expelled in 1989, and thus qualified for fast-track naturalization in Turkey, amounted to 370,000. In 1998 Sofia allowed them to regain Bulgarian citizenship without the necessity of giving up their recently acquired Turkish citizenship, thus creating a group of around 380,000 people with dual citizenship (Smilov and Jileva 2009: 228, 247). But apart from them, a similar group of Bulgarian Turks (Muslims), who left Bulgaria in 1990 and later, reside and work today in Turkey with no easy access to Turkish citizenship. In 2009 they amounted

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to around 320,000 persons, 50,000 of them on permanent residence permits. The rest were either their dependents or illegal workers, the latter amounting to around 150,000 (Kasli and Parla 2009: 206, 215, 225). Hence, the total number of Bulgarian Turks (Muslims) who were expelled in 1989 and emigrated mainly during the 1990s adds up to around 0.7 million people in present-day Turkey (Gheorghieva 1998: 1; Kasli and Parla 2009: 215). According to the 2012 statistical data 1.3 percent of Turkey’s population (or almost a million people) were born abroad, 423,000 of them in Bulgaria (İçduygu and Sert 2015: 100–101). The high rate of shuttling between Bulgaria and Turkey is also caused by the fact that Bulgarian Turkish parents are appalled by the prospect that their sons, when they come of age, will be drafted into the Turkish army and perhaps sent to fight Kurdish guerillas and suppress Kurdish villages and towns in eastern Turkey (Konstantinov 1997: 51). And last but not least, following Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union in 2007, a growing number of Turks of Bulgarian origin are applying for Bulgarian citizenship, as the Bulgarian passport gives them the right to move freely and settle in other EU member states (İçduygu and Sert 2015: 100). They mostly go to Germany and the Netherlands, where there are large Turkish immigrant communities of long standing (Guentcheva, Kabakchieva and Kolarski 2003: 44; Mancheva 2008). During the intervening quarter of a century following the 1989 ethnic cleansing, censuses and scholars estimated the number of ethnic Turks remaining in postcommunist Bulgaria at 600,000 to 800,000 (Angelov 2012b: 7; Prebroiavanie 2012: 4). Although the official Bulgarian censuses calculate the number of the country’s Pomaks or ‘Muslim Bulgarians’ (that is, Slavophone Muslims) at shy of 70,000, both Bulgarian and international experts in minority issues agree that in reality their number is much higher, anything between 220,000 and 250,000 (Babali 2005: 974; Prebroiavanie 2012: 29; Zhelyazkova 2014: 577). Nowadays, at least 42,000 (or slightly over 18 percent) Bulgarian Roma are self-confessed Muslims,32 though the number might again be higher (perhaps even skirting 100,000 [cf. Zang 1991: 4]), given the widespread phenomenon of underreporting the Roma ethnic identity, due to the generalized marginalization and prejudice (or anti-Romism) suffered by Roma across Europe33 (Prebroiavanie 2012: 29; Zhelyazkova 2014: 580). Hence, the community of Turks and Muslims close to Turkish culture seems to number over 1 million in today’s Bulgaria. Together with 0.7 million Bulgarian Turks (Muslims) residing in Turkey they amount to over 1.7 million people, which is rather high, given the estimates of 1.1 to 1.3 million Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria during the late 1980s (Eminov 1989: 33–34). Perhaps, the difference may be explained by continuing positive demographic growth in this group and by the case of double accounting, when a significant part of 380,000 holders of dual Bulgarian and Turkish citizenship are included in both Bulgarian and Turkish statistics (Gheorghieva 1998: 7–8). The 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation, followed by the 1989 ethnic cleansing dramatically impinged on the lives of 1.1 to 1.3 million Turks and persons of Muslim background in communist Bulgaria. These official actions made them into enemies of the state. The irony is that throughout the communist period

1989’s events & the international press 65 attachment to Islam as a religion and a culture of everyday life had been steadily on the wane. Turkish and other Muslim parents had increasingly acquired and chosen to speak to their children exclusively in Bulgarian. They also had often decided to give their offspring Bulgarian, Slavic, or international (that is Western, of French, Italian, English, or German origin) names. They thought it would have been good for their children to blend seamlessly into majoritarian society in the successfully modernized communist Bulgaria of a near future. It was a clear possibility, because in the 1970s and until the mid-1980s the Bulgarian economy was robust and excelled at producing consumer goods for the population at large, ensuring considerable legitimacy for the regime (cf. Iankova 2002: 52). Hence, had the Zhivkov government not embarked during the 1980s on its disastrous campaign of forced assimilation and on the ethnic cleansing, there would have been a good chance that by now the majority of Bulgaria’s Muslims – out of their own volition – would have adopted Bulgarian language and culture as their own, while in the sphere of religion, they would have mostly chosen indifference, while a minority might have even become Orthodox Christians (Eminov 1999: 50; Marushiakova and Popov 2015). This view is shared by the incumbent Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borisov. In 2008, while still Mayor of Sofia, he publicly emphasized that the error of the Revival Process was not its goal, but rather the methods employed for achieving this goal (Boiko 2008). With its actions of forced assimilation, the communist state condemned over a tenth of Bulgaria’s population to dissidence. Most kept silent, afraid of losing jobs or that their children might be barred from entering a preferred school or gaining access to university. A minority, who later became leaders of TNODB and the MRF, actively opposed the state, demanding equal rights – as guaranteed by the Constitution and the CSCE’s Helsinki Accords – for all Bulgarian citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity or religion. The silent majority of the persecuted passively supported the activists, and at the height of the reformist wave in the Soviet bloc (from the influence of which Zhivkov hoped to insulate Bulgaria) many actively showed their displeasure by organizing and participating in widespread protests in late May 1989. Around five percent of the persecuted (that is, close to 60,000 [Angelov 2015: 125]) took part in these demonstrations. The subsequent snap expulsion of the activists and a third of the silent majority of the persecuted (even those who had not joined the protests) left no leeway for remaining silent or inactive. People were forced to make a tragic binary choice between loyalty to zhivkovite totalitarianism or departure for Turkey. The persecuted (ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously singled out by the DS as Turks and Muslims) accounted for over ten percent of the Bulgarian population and constituted the as yet not widely acknowledged Bulgarian mass opposition movement that forced the BCP to open the way for a systemic change in the country during the winter of 1989–1990. By comparison, the same role of a not so silent opposition to the communist regime in Poland was played by the Independent Selfgoverning Trade Union Solidarity, whose membership topped 10 million (or almost a third of the country’s population) in November 1981, prior to the clamping down of Martial Law in Poland on 13 December the same year. Meanwhile, the number

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of members of the Polish Communist Party (PZPR) had sunk by over 1 million to a mere 3 million, while numerous party members had also joined Solidarity (Lisicka 2001: 116; Wasiutyński 2000: 74). Eight years later, when the Round Table negotiations prepared the ground for the first ever (partially) free elections in the Soviet bloc that took place in Poland on 4 June 1989, this silent opposition previously grouped in the ranks of the pre-Martial Law Solidarity gave the indisputable electoral victory to the anti-communist opposition. In Bulgaria, the ratio between the silently opposed and the BCP’s membership was a much closer match than in Poland, since the party’s members numbered around 1 million in 1989 (Ivanov 2008: 290), while the persecuted Turks and Muslims amounted, at most, to 1.3 million.35 What tipped the scale was the nearcollapse of the Bulgarian economy caused by the sudden expulsion of 360,000 Turks and Muslims in the summer of 1989 (Khristov 2016). The free fall of the country’s economy can be illustrated by the rapid change in the unofficial (‘black market’) exchange rate between the US Dollar and the Bulgarian Lev, from 7 levs per $1 in early 1989 to 30 levs per $1 in late July 1989. This rate began bouncing back only with the return of expellees in August, reaching the level of 10 to 14 levs per $1 in October 1989 (Avramov 2016: 747).36 The image of Bulgaria as a state was also dramatically tarnished on the international stage, while Zhivkov’s hardline regime became gradually isolated even within the Soviet bloc itself, on par with the oppressive and odiously violent communist regimes in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, or Romania. The indignity of de facto forced labor in fields for urbanites (predominantly, ethnic Bulgarians), coupled with the humiliating pariah status earned for Bulgaria in the international arena by the Zhivkov government’s actions, effectively breached the ethnic wall of separation between the persecuted Turks and Muslims on the one hand, and the ethnic (that is, Slavophone and Orthodox) Bulgarians on the other. The latter were intended to be at the same time beneficiaries and staunch supporters of Zhivkov’s policies of ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogenization. However, in an unexpected turn of events, they found themselves at the receiving end of these policies’ negative consequences. In this situation, they could start seeing themselves as victims of the communist system, not unlike the persecuted Turks and Muslims. Faced with this insurmountable internal pressure and the ongoing dismantling of the Soviet bloc, the BCP had no choice but to agree to systemic change or face popular revolt. But no managed change of the political and economic system would have been possible in Bulgaria without accommodating the persecuted Turks and Muslims. It was the very prerequisite to this peaceful change, also known as the fall of communism. Without such accommodation, Bulgaria could – or even would – have faced civil war fought out along ethnic lines, a breakup of the country, or quite possibly an international conflict with the involvement of Turkey. Ankara would have had no choice but to intervene if the anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim feeling, so palpably felt across Bulgaria in 1990, had not been moderated and had been allowed to spill into bloody reprisals against Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. At the turn of June 1989, the attention of Europe and the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States was turned to the Round Table Talks and the first

1989’s events & the international press 67 free elections in Poland, to the democratizing changes in Hungary (including the Kremlin’s April 1989 decision to withdraw Soviet troops from this country), and to the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre in China. In the summer of 1989, European and world politicians nervously deliberated the fate of over 20,000 East Germans seeking asylum in the West German embassies in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. In September the refugees were permitted to leave for West Germany via Hungary and Austria. In October the global mass media focused on the huge demonstrations in East Germany, which led to the democratization of the country, commenced by the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. The changes necessitated that in 1989–1990 the wartime Allies should urgently negotiate the terms of German reunification. Meanwhile, in November and December 1989, mass protests shook Czechoslovakia and brought about democratizing changes also in this country. In late December 1989, violent and bloody civil unrest broke out in Romania and culminated in the summary execution of the country’s communist leader and his wife. The following year, in 1990, the two superpowers, alongside France and Britain, in the wake of the end of communism and the breakup of the Soviet bloc, were busy working out principles of a new postcommunist world order in Europe and farther afield (Ther 2014b: 58–85). The aforementioned events in ‘big politics’ decisively overshadowed the largest ethnic cleansing in postwar Europe underway in communist Bulgaria. Reports on the ‘Big Excursion’ were buried in the middle or at the end of a typical international newspaper. The news on hundreds of thousands of expellees from Bulgaria to Turkey in the summer of 1989 never made it to the front page, except in Turkish and Yugoslav newspapers (cf. 250 bin 1989; Bulgarıstan’da 1989; Nov pregon 1989; Sofija 1989). Obviously, in Turkey the topic was of such immediate political and social importance that it featured on newspapers’ front pages throughout the summer of 1989 (cf. Sofya’dan 1989; Zorunlu 1989). In Bulgaria communist censors expunged and manipulated the news almost until the end of 1989, when Bulgaria’s own democratization commenced in a timid and gradual manner following the ousting of Zhivkov on 10 November. The ‘Big Excursion’ failed to register as an event of any international import in the course of the fall of communism across the Soviet bloc. As a result, this ethnic cleansing, Europe’s largest between 1948 and 1991, remains largely forgotten outside Bulgaria and Turkey. Additionally, it was overshadowed by the immense expulsions during the multidirectional wars of post-Yugoslav succession. For instance, between 1991 and July 1992 the wars in Croatia and Bosnia sent 374,000 refugees outside the former Yugoslavia, 532,000 to other post-Yugoslav states, while 0.68 million and 0.85 million people, respectively, were displaced internally in Croatia and Bosnia (War Crimes 1992: 95). However, for better or for worse, the 1989 ethnic cleansing, known under the euphemistic sobriquet ‘Big Excursion,’ did shape the Bulgarian democratic opposition and conditioned the systemic transition in Bulgaria. To this day the ethnic cleansing and its sudden reversal constitute the historical, ideological, and political foundation on which postcommunist Bulgaria has been built as a

68 1989’s events & the international press democratic state, thus allowing Bulgaria to join NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007. Before 1989, and since the founding of Bulgaria in 1878, the country’s Turks and Muslims were assimilated by force, periodically expelled, and almost constantly harassed to make them ‘voluntarily’ emigrate. The postcommunist period is the first ever in the history of modern Bulgaria when the state and its administration have not formulated or pursued any policy of forced assimilation of Turks and Muslims. Interestingly, and perhaps quite significantly, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 which created modern Bulgaria frightened 150,000 of the territory’s Muslims (‘Turks’) into leaving for the safety of regions still under Ottoman rule. Over half of the refugees (80,000) had returned by late 1878 (Crampton 1983: 179; Toumarkine 1995: 33). The Bulgarian end of communism was marked by a similar phenomenon of expulsion and rapid return by almost half of the expellees. This parallel strengthens the proposal to treat 1878 and 1989 as distinctive cesuras of modern Bulgarian history, which would also appropriately incorporate the fate of the country’s Turks and Muslims into the mainstream narrative on the country’s past and present. The ‘Big Excursion’ and its fallout also conditioned the international environment in which the systemic transformation of Bulgaria had to be negotiated and carried out. Hence, it is necessary to look at the international response to the 1989 ethnic cleansing. In mid-June 1989, Washington and London expressed their concern over Bulgaria’s violent treatment of its Turks (Hillmore 1989; Howard 1989c). On 15 June, the Senate of the United States adopted a resolution (tabled by the Arizona Senator Dennis DeConcini [1937–]) condemning communist Bulgaria’s discrimination of the country’s Turkish minority and referred this document for further reflection in the Committee on Foreign Relations; however, no further action was taken (Condemning 1989). Apparently, the West failed to anticipate this expulsion and initially was at a loss how to respond (Polansky 1992: 29). Ankara followed suit and likewise expressed only its concern (Gürdilek 1989b). On 19 June, in the wake of this statement, an official fact-finding tour was organized for the diplomatic corps in Turkey to the border areas affected by the expulsion. Thirty ambassadors joined the tour, but tellingly not a single one from a Soviet bloc country, though all had been invited (Howard 1989e). The following day, on 20 June, the Turkish government asked the United Nations for help with the refugees (Turkey Asks 1989). On 23 June, at the conclusion of the three-week CSCE Conference in Paris, the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas (1922–), lambasted the governments of Bulgaria, Romania, and China for ‘grave violations of the rights of human beings’ (Rights Challenge 1989). As a result, the ball passed to Moscow’s court. The Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, Albert Chernishev (1936–2012), was evidently very upset by the situation, but emphasized that the Kremlin would not mediate between Bulgaria and Turkey (Howard 1989f.; Walker 1989f.). He also added that all the differences between Sofia and Ankara must be resolved through diplomacy, and that the Kremlin looked forward to better relations between the Soviet Union and ‘friendly Turkey’ (Mandžuka 1989). Neither did Zhivkov’s difficult meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow on 23 June 1989 sway the Bulgarian

1989’s events & the international press 69 leader’s resolve to press on with the ethnic cleansing (Balkan Exodus 1989). The deafening silence of the Soviet Ambassador to Bulgaria, Viktor Sharapov (1931–), on the ongoing expulsion seems to suggest that some segments in the Soviet diplomatic corps rather sympathized with Zhivkov and his actions. Others propose that Sharapov let Chernishev do the talking in order not to antagonize Zhivkov even more, because the Bulgarian leader apparently deemed Gorbachev’s appointment of Sharapov to Sofia in 1988 as a personal rebuff against his unyielding hardline style of rule. Zhivkov saw Sharapov as a stalwart of Gorbachev’s ‘liberal camp,’ alien and inimical to the previous generations of Soviet bloc leadership from which the Bulgarian strongman stemmed (Lévesque 1997: 168). Soviet overtures remaining ineffective, on 26 June the White House reiterated its criticism of Bulgaria for the harsh treatment of the country’s Turks (Bulgaria 1989). Washington wanted Bulgaria just to let Turks leave the country in a ‘decent way,’ but to no avail (Polansky 1992: 29–30). The following day, the Turkish President Kenan Evren (1917–2015) visited the refugee tent cities on the border (Evren 1989), and on 29 June the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mesut Yılmaz (1947–), accused Bulgaria of ‘new crimes against humanity’ (Walker 1989g). (By using the adjective ‘new’ Yılmaz made sure that Bulgaria’s earlier crimes of the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign were brought back to scrutiny, as well.) The subsequent isolation and shaming of the Bulgarian government by the West and – to a degree – also within the Soviet bloc failed to change Zhivkov’s decision to continue, as planned, with the expulsion of as many of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims as possible. It appears that for two months the world’s leaders accepted this state of affairs, because Turkey appeared to cope reasonably well with the influx of expellees and Ankara was happy to accept them, propped up by the promise of United States and international assistance (Abramowitz 2007: 116). On 25 July 1989 (one day after her nomination to the post), Minister of State for Overseas Development and Africa, Lynda Chalker (1942–), from the British Foreign Office, toured the border area on the Turkish side of the frontier. She expressed the British government’s concern with the situation (Howard 1989h). Then, quite surprisingly, the international press seems not to have taken note of any further international reactions for an entire month. Maybe there were not any, apart from Washington’s largely symbolic gesture of welcoming over 800 expellees to the United States in mid-August, as noted in the Turkish press (ABD’den 1989). But August 1989 was the crucial month when a third of all the expellees were pushed across the border to Turkey. It looks as if the Western and Eastern ambassadors in Bulgaria and Turkey, alongside their colleagues in their respective countries’ foreign ministries, went on summer holidays, or decided that the tense situation on the Bulgarian–Turkish frontier had been satisfactorily resolved or brought under control. In this way, the international community gave Zhivkov carte blanche to do as he willed. Only at the end of the summer holidays was the situation on the Bulgarian–Turkish border paid some attention to at the international level. On 20 August 1989 the French President’s wife, Danielle Mitterrand (1924–2011), offered to take some Kurdish and Bulgarian Turkish refugees from Turkey to

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France. But it appears that Ankara saw this proposal to be an affront, due to the mention of ‘non-existent’ Kurds (Haberman 1989c). As a result, this low-key French offer of help was not accepted. A week after the closure of the border, when the immensity of the expulsion briefly dawned on the world, on 29 August the United States Ambassador to Bulgaria, Sol Polansky (1926–2016), was recalled to Washington for consultation over the ‘continuing human rights abuses’ by the Bulgarians (Bulgaria 1989; Montalbano 1989; Searle and Power 1989a). The following day, on 30 August, United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar (1920–) offered to mediate between Sofia and Ankara on the issue of the expellees, but to no avail. Sofia rejected this proposal (Pomak Leader 1989). In the fall of 1989 the United States Embassy in Sofia developed more intensive contacts with the fledgling (or in other words, led by ethnic Bulgarians) democratic opposition, and leaned on the Zhivkov regime to observe a modicum of human rights in line with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (Bange and Niedhart 2008; Bulgaria 1989; Polansky 1992: 30–31). The CSCE responsible for monitoring the observance of the Helsinki Final Act principles, organized an international environment conference in Sofia (Report 1989). Zhivkov recklessly gambled that by hosting this event he would have been able to bolster his regime’s legitimacy abroad. The conference lasted between 16 October and 3 November 1989 and was attended by both Western and Soviet bloc countries’ representatives. Ostensibly, the conference was not political in its nature. But in reality, many delegates added to the pressure already mounting on the Zhivkov government to soften its hardline policies (including those on Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims) in accordance with glasnost and the democratizing changes, as already implemented in many countries across the Soviet bloc (Searle 1989). The protests and their suppression during the conference, but especially on 26 October, in full view of foreign diplomats and journalists, dramatically contributed to the rapid delegitimation of Zhivkov’s rule (Crampton 2010a: 211). Since May 1989 the Bulgarian and Turkish foreign ministers had repeatedly planned to meet in Kuwait37 for talks on the refugee crisis caused by the expulsion of Bulgaria’s Turks (and Muslims). But they failed to do so due to constant bickering between Ankara and Sofia on the scope, format, and agenda of such a meeting (Turkish Prime 1989). The Turkish government wanted Bulgaria to sign a formal bilateral agreement on the immigration of Bulgarian Turks in emulation of the 1950 and 1968 agreements of this kind (Irwin 1989: 399). Zhivkov declined because on the one hand he would have had to admit the existence of a huge Turkish minority in the officially ethnolinguistically homogeneous Bulgaria, while on the other wished to add pressure on Turkey, perhaps, in order to achieve a better bargaining position, or to divert the world’s attention from his country’s mounting internal problems (Hölle 1989: 123). In mid-October 1989 the plan of such an agreement was again reiterated and a five-hour bilateral Bulgarian–Turkish meeting took place on 30 October in Kuwait. It was inconclusive and further bilateral talks were planned in November (More 1989; Pregovori 1989). But the removal of Zhivkov from power and the sudden changes in Bulgaria’s government and political system that followed considerably delayed the follow-up meeting.

1989’s events & the international press 71 It eventually took place in Kuwait only on 9 January 1990, when the ethnic cleansing had been over for more than four months, and Turkey had largely dealt, on its own, with the aftermath (Hornsby 1990a; Power and Searle 1989). The 1989 expulsion, in spite of its swiftness and unprecedented enormity after the Second World War, did not trigger an insurgency, civil, or – most surprisingly – international war. The potential for such a widespread conflict was clearly on the horizon. However, the configuration of internal and external forces and conditions – which still need to be properly researched and accounted for – luckily prevented such a devastating outcome. Rallying domestic support for his embattled regime, Zhivkov had readily brandished the propaganda specter of ‘another Cyprus’ and ‘Turkish invasion and annexation’ since the mid-1980s. At the international level, Greece was sympathetic to such arguments, often employed by Athens itself for the sake of propaganda. Ankara regularly repudiated Bulgarian (and Greek) fears of this kind, and when the expulsion of Bulgarian Turks was in full swing, on 18 June 1989 the Turkish Prime Minister Özal repeated that his country had no ‘desire to harm Bulgaria’ (Hillmore 1989). Yet, a week later Özal’s words were contradicted by dramatic events in Istanbul, additionally fueled by the untrue rumor that Sofia had invited Soviet troops to pacify the Turkish and Muslim regions in Bulgaria38 (Bugarski 1989). On 24 and 25 June 1989 (Saturday and Sunday) the largest demonstration in Turkey since the 1980 military coup d’état shook the city. Over 100,000 protesters gathered in Istanbul’s famous Taksim Square, chanting anti-Bulgarian slogans (for instance, ‘Zhivkov = Hitler,’ ‘Invade Sofia!,’ ‘Turkia [sic] Will Stop Bulgarian Cruelty!’) and burning Bulgarian flags (Antibugarski 1989; Taksim’de 1989; Turks Urge 1989; Walker 1989d). International commentators remarked that without the support of the Warsaw Pact countries, Bulgaria with its population of 10 million would stand no chance against the 56-million-strong Turkey (Walker 1989c). This warmongering demonstration must have spooked Sofia, given that in April 1989 Soviet troops had begun withdrawing from Hungary. Zhivkov’s anti-glasnost and anti-perestroika government could not be sure at all that, if needed, Gorbachev would come to Bulgaria’s succor militarily. Hence, this anti-Bulgarian demonstration in Istanbul seemed to corroborate Zhivkov’s propaganda claims alleging that Turkey was busy planning a military invasion of Bulgaria that would lead to an annexation of the country’s Turkish and Muslim regions directly bordering on Turkey. Off the record, Turkish officials remarked that the demonstration was permitted in order to ‘let off the steam’ of the mounting anti-Bulgarian sentiment, and that in reality Turkey had no intention of attacking Bulgaria (Walker 1989d). The Turkish government’s quietly peaceful stance was openly and in a loud manner rejected by the powerful and politically influential nationalist and republican movement, the Grey Wolves. Although banned since 1980, this organization as part of the so-called ‘deep state’38 had continued training paramilitary forces and pressed on with its campaign of assassinations of real and perceived opponents (dubbed as ‘traitors’) of the Turkish state and nation. Not surprisingly, on 29 June 1989 the Grey Wolves called for a military intervention against Bulgaria (Walker

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1989g). In one way or another the issue of a military intervention to stop persecution of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria remained tacitly unresolved, as a useful means of leverage on Bulgaria until the turn of 1990, when systemic change had already been under way in that country. In order to dampen the hysterically anti-Turkish feeling rife in Bulgaria, on 5 January 1990 the reformist Bulgarian government officially announced that there was no danger of Turkish intervention (Anti-Muslim Strike 1990). Four days later, on 9 January, Ankara reaffirmed Sofia’s statement by declaring that Turkey would not do anything that might threaten Bulgaria’s territorial integrity (Hornsby 1990a). Perhaps not incidentally, Ankara’s message coincided with the Bulgarian–Turkish talks in Kuwait on the refugee question, generated by the 1989 ethnic cleansing of Bulgarian Turks (ICO Satisfied 1990; Tainted 1990). Internally, Bulgaria was seriously destabilized by the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the subsequent return of more than a third of the expellees during the second half of this year and in 1990. Because the expulsion took place shortly before and during the harvest, the agricultural sector of Bulgaria’s economy took a hit, given that the country had already been heavily indebted to the west, the external debt accounting to more than a quarter of the Bulgarian GDP (Khristov 2016). The Soviet bloc’s countries strove for self-sufficiency in the field of food production, because in this sphere they did not generate significant or appropriate surpluses to exchange with one another, and had no spare hard currency for purchasing essential foodstuffs from outside the bloc. The rapid collectivization of the Bulgarian countryside had been completed in 1958. It had turned peasants into (agricultural) workers and pushed millions into towns and cities. In the late 1980s only a third of the population lived in villages (Duijzings 2013: 7). Hence, during harvest insufficiently mechanized collective and state farms suffered an acute dearth of labor. The state ‘solved’ this problem by commandeering students, teachers and office workers to work in the farms for a month in summer. Turks and Muslims were disproportionately overrepresented in Bulgaria’s agricultural workforce. Hence, with so many of them gone in the ‘Big Excursion,’ the quota of free labor imposed on city dwellers would have had to be increased considerably from the usual norm of about one month to two or even more. In turn, this could have caused economic problems in other sectors of the economy (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). The situation endangered the food security of Bulgaria, whereas the tangible prospect of not harvesting tobacco, which was a significant cash crop, would further diminish Sofia’s already meager hard currency reserves. As a result of muddling through this insoluble dilemma, Bulgaria’s economy was left in tatters (Khristov 2016). For a time, the Zhivkov regime could deflect any criticism, blaming the ensuing economic problems on the ‘unpatriotic’ Bulgarian Turks who unexpectedly decided to embark en masse on a ‘tourist trip’ to Turkey. But with no friends either in the West or the East, let alone in Turkey, Sofia was left alone to face the economic damage. Because nationalism is not enough to live on, while basic staples were becoming scarcer in Bulgarian shops by the day and the state budget was starved of indispensable hard currency, the reformist-minded communists toppled Zhivkov on 10 November 1989.

1989’s events & the international press 73 This palace coup took place a week after the disastrously mismanaged CSCE Conference on environment. Another week elapsed and on 18 November the main opposition groups, most only tentatively pro-democratic (on the account of the fact that the vast majority of their leaders and members stemmed from the Bulgarian Communist Party, many still holding its membership cards), organized a meeting. Tellingly, this meeting lacked participation from Turkish or Muslim opposition groups, which at that time were the only mass dissident organizations in communist Bulgaria. In the meeting’s wake, on 7 December 1989, the delegates founded Bulgaria’s main non-communist party, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The philosopher Zheliu Zhelev was elected its leader (Tzvetkov 1993: 429). Today he is presented as a (or even ‘the’) leading dissident who had opposed the Bulgarian Communist Party since 1965. But in reality Zhelev was one of the reformists tolerated and sometimes even encouraged within the BCP itself.40 His main claim to being a dissident was expulsion from the BCP and ‘internment,’ between 1966 and 1972, in Grozden (Грозден), the home village of his wife, in Burgas Province (Kekhaiova 2015). But unlike in English, Polish, or many other Central and Eastern European languages the term ‘internment’ in Bulgarian does not denote ‘arbitrary incarceration in a prison-like facility.’ The Bulgarian term интерниране internirane means ‘internal exile’ (Interniram 2016), which in the case of Zhelev prevented him only from legally visiting and residing in Sofia (Slavov 1991: 71; Zhelyu 2006). On 1 August 1990 Zhelev became Bulgaria’s President, and thus the first noncommunist head of state in Bulgaria since the communist takeover that had swiftly followed in the wake of the 8 September 1946 abolition of monarchy in Bulgaria. On 20 December 1990 the President was joined by the first non-communist Prime Minister (also since 1946), Dimitur Popov (1927–2015). The communist political system was definitively over as a political system in Bulgaria, but not its wellestablished practices of doing politics. The old networks of exercising power, be it economic or political, largely remained in place, though decision-makers constituting and operating through these networks rebranded (and in some cases genuinely reinvented) themselves as socialists, social democrats, democrats, liberals, conservatives, nationalists, entrepreneurs, capitalists, and so on. Likewise, the aforementioned networks become part and parcel of Bulgaria’s new system of electoral democracy, which to a certain extent follows the usual political freedoms required by the European Union’s acquis communautaire (body of legislation) (cf. Tugdar 2015). The main ideological constant of the de facto values which underlies this apparent continuity in the power structures (often including their staff) between communist and postcommunist Bulgaria is ethnolinguisticcum-ethnoreligious nationalism. This ideology is steeped in the Bulgarian language and Orthodox Christianity, and underpins the national master narrative as imparted in Bulgarian schools. In this way Zhivkov’s national communism does continue to this day, of course, less communism itself and less the communist state’s official policy of atheism. But it must be added that communist Bulgaria’s ‘struggle against religion’ was more lenient on the ‘national’ faith of Orthodox Christianity than

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on the ‘enemy’ religion of Islam (Crampton 2010a: 210–216; Kavalski 2010; Marushiakova and Popov 2015). The end of communism and the postcommunist transition in Bulgaria were as much a result of the collapse of the Soviet bloc as of the domestic economic, political and social instability decisively engendered by the ‘Big Excursion’ in the summer of 1989. The domestic problems were to a large extent caused and exacerbated by continuing repressions against Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria during this expulsion, and by the subsequent rapidly worsening labor shortage. The Bulgarian authorities unsuccessfully attempted to manage the deepening lack of essential work force with increasingly authoritarian measures. With the Soviet bloc crumbling all around, the Zhivkov regime would collapse anyway. But the ‘Big Excursion’ and its aftermath conditioned the actual pathway and the overall character of this collapse, also decisively brushing off onto the shape of postcommunist Bulgaria’s political life and social relations (Avramov 2013). To a large extent the 1989 ethnic cleansing made Bulgaria the state which it is nowadays, though the formative role of this expulsion remains unacknowledged, consigned to oblivion by deepening public amnesia. During the initial stage of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, in the first half of June, Turks and Muslims continued demonstrating against Sofia’s assimilationist policies. In addition, at least 300 people went on hunger strikes campaigning for the release of imprisoned Turkish and Muslim activists (Hillmore 1989). When the expulsion was in full swing, in late July 1989, Pomaks (or Slavophone Muslims) began protesting against the authorities’ refusal to issue them with passports. Many wanted badly to join Turks in this forced exodus, which also offered a glimmer of hope and ethnocultural freedom in the ‘Turkish West.’ In the course of the suppression of the Pomak demonstrations with the employment of troops, armored vehicles, and tanks, Pomak leaders claim that 160 people lost their lives. Western diplomats estimated that the number of confirmed deaths amounted to at least 15 (Angelov 2015: 15; Bulgaristan’da Pomak 1989; Grouev 2004: 73; Pomak Leader 1989). This is another event in Bulgaria’s latest history that should be researched properly so that each casualty can be accounted for. Due to the outflow of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria, labor shortage became acute by late June 1989 (Bulgaria Accused 1989; Exodus Creates 1989). In order to tackle this problem, the Bulgarian authorities introduced longer working hours in the afflicted areas, often with no overtime pay. This measure was disproportionately aimed at the remaining Turks and Muslims. Also, office workers and students were sent from cities and towns to the fields earlier and for longer periods than the usual single month of ‘voluntary labor’ each summer. The seriousness of the economic situation was emphasized by the deployment of troops to replace missing farm hands (Howard 1989f.; Howard 1989g). Zhivkov toyed with inviting even more workers from ‘fraternal Vietnam’ than the 20,000 who had already arrived by 198941 (Joly, Nettleton and Poulton 1992: 78). He even requested Moscow to send over some 0.26 million ethnic Bulgarians from Soviet Moldavia (that is, today’s Moldova), but to no avail (Karpat 1995: 727). By the turn of July many companies and state farms, with their staff halved (or even reduced by

1989’s events & the international press 75 80 percent) overnight in the course of the 1989 expulsion, had to stop production altogether (Wiedemann 1989: 110). The new slogan ‘Discipline, Order, Personal Responsibility’ did not help (Karekinian 1989; Marcheva 1989). The situation failed to improve even after the issuing, on 4 July,42 of the draconian decree on peacetime mobilization (гражданска мобилизация в мирно време grazhdanska mobilizatsiia v mirno vreme);43 the number of vacant job positions grew from none in May 1989 to 35,000 in mid-July and as many as 59,000 in late August (Avramov 2016: 755). This ad hoc law required all men aged 18 to 60 and all women aged 18 to 55 residing in the afflicted areas to work for free in the fields as long as necessary. Those with their ‘own means of transportation’ (meaning private cars) were compelled to use them for facilitating work and the commuting of workers from towns to the countryside. The working day was extended from 8 to 12 hours. Whoever tried to evade this de facto forced labor could face unrealistically steep fines (Avramov 2016: 600; Bugarska 1989; Khronologiia 2016; Mobilizacija 1989; Poulton 1991: 158). Obviously, all these punitive measures were disproportionately aimed at remaining Turks and Muslims who lived in the towns adjacent to the rural areas in dire need of labor. This arbitrary imposition constituted another form of harassment that compelled more Turks and Muslims to leave for Turkey, whenever they could. However, ethnic Bulgarian workers were also forced to move to the regions denuded of their Turkish population in the ethnic cleansing. The peacetime mobilization caused much resentment against Turks and Muslims among ethnic Bulgarians, especially so because this decree was repealed only after half a year, on 15 December 1989 (Poulton 1991: 158). Meanwhile, Turkey accused Sofia of withholding passports from young Turks aged 17–25, so that both young men and women could be drafted, respectively, into the army and state adjunct labor formations for the sake of helping with the harvest that otherwise was posed to go to waste in the fields (Walker 1989c). In the Black Sea ports and in the centers of tobacco production (which were worst affected by labor shortage) the authorities introduced local curfews for Turks and Muslims. As an additional disciplining measure, troops and tanks were summarily dislocated in the streets of their villages and towns. Generalized intimidation and the thinly veiled threat of violence goaded many harassed Turks and Muslims, who were essential agricultural workers, into staying in Bulgaria or at least delaying their desired departure for Tukey until the fall (Holland 1989; Walker 1989c). At the turn of September 1989, already a week after Ankara’s unilateral closure of the border, more soldiers were sent into the countryside in order to force Turks and Muslims to work in the fields and to break strikes staged by those who wished to leave for Turkey before the end of the tobacco harvest. At the same time, Sofia shot itself in the foot by eventually letting the passport law of 10 May 1989 come into force on 1 September. This provision allowed all citizens to obtain passports for unrestricted foreign travel (Ramcharan 2006: 142–143). On the one hand, the Bulgarian government wanted to keep Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria for the harvest, while on the other, continued pushing them out to Turkey. The conflicting messages made the standoff between the troops and Turks all the more acute

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(Searle and Power 1989a). By mid-September many collective farms and factories had ground to a standstill with not enough workers left to operate them in any meaningful manner (Haberman 1989f.). In reply, later that month, Sofia stepped up its military presence across the Turkish areas. The curfew hours were increased and numerous roadblocks sprang up in central and southeastern Bulgaria, which began to look like a war zone (Simmons 1989). In addition, the worsening tension was heightened by the swelling wave of returnees from Turkey and those who did not manage to cross the border after Ankara had closed it in late August. Conflicts about repossessed houses and apartments became rife, fueling the generalized ethnic tension across the entire country. At that moment the tension could have easily erupted into widespread violence, and even insurgency and civil war. The crucial question which remains to be researched and answered is why the tension did not blow up in this way. As it is well known, in neighboring Yugoslavia similar ethnic tensions even on a smaller scale ended up sparking long years of multidirectional warfare that sent waves of hundreds of thousands of refugees and expellees in various directions during the entire 1990s.

Notes 1 Between 1981 and 1983 the names of over 100,000 people (mainly Muslim Roma) were changed by force, perhaps, in preparation for the large-scale operation in 1984–1985. The same measure was applied to Tatars and Alevis in the summer of 1984 (Şimşir 1988: 275). 2 The Islamic names of the majority of Bulgaria’s Pomaks had been already changed by force a decade earlier, between 1972 and 1974. Such changes were imposed on about 150,000 Pomaks and also on 200,000 Turks at that time (Eminov 2007: 7; MyuhtarMay 2014: 100, 133–136; Şimşir 1988: 274). 3 It would be interesting to check whether the Bulgarian planners and implementers of the recurring name-changing campaigns during the 1970s and 1980s in Bulgaria drew at the example of communist Poland, where in the latter half of the 1940s, the German(ic)-sounding or looking names and surnames of over 1 million ‘Autochthons’ were changed, that is, Polonized. The label of ‘Autochthons,’ imposed from above by the Polish administration is very similar in this function to that of ‘Bulgarian Mohammedans’ for referring to Pomaks in order to distance them from Turkishdom and Islam. Warsaw used the former category of ‘Autochthons’ to speak about the bilingual (Slavic-Germanic) ethnic groups of Kashubs, Mazurs, Silesians and Varmiaks, holders of German citizenship, whose regions, after 1945, found themselves within Poland’s new postwar borders, extended westward at the expense of Germany. Similarly, as in the Bulgarian case, where speaking of ‘Bulgarian Mohammedans’ facilitated the Bulgarization of Pomaks, this novel Polish bureaucratic category allowed for distancing the target populations from Germany and legitimize their Polonization (Linek 1997a; Linek 1997b: 51; Strauchold 1995: 128). Many of the persons concerned and their descendants began recovering their original names after 1990, when the German minority was recognized in Poland. Nowadays, more identify themselves as Germans than before 1945 (Lis 1991: 192; Wracają 2008). 4 In Bulgaria Turkish-language periodicals were progressively Bulgarianized by making them first bilingual, and subsequently most of their contents was printed in Bulgarian. The last Turkish-language newspaper closed down in January 1985 (Şimşir 1988: 245). A similar procedure was applied earlier to the Turkish-language educational system. In 1958–1960 Turkish and Bulgarian elementary schools across the Turkish areas were

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merged, that is, made into bilingual or fully Bulgarian-medium ones. In 1960–1961 all Turkish-medium secondary schools were closed down. The remnants of the Turkishlanguage minority educational system had been liquidated by 1974–1975 (Höpken 1997: 68; Nuberger 2004: 72). Circumcision was banned, alongside circumcision celebrations, which were even of more import to families and local communities than the act itself. Women were prohibited from wearing comfortable traditional salwar trousers, which hampered their freedom of unrestricted movement in fields. Mosques were closed, and sanctioned religious worship was limited to once a day. This was of a significance only to the oldest generation, as students and the working-age population were made not to participate in any religious worship. Muslim-style weddings and funerals (like their Orthodox Christian counterparts, though to a lesser extent) were also banned. The state authorities issued special instructions for socialist celebrations of such social events, with no religious content involved (Höpken 1997: 68–69; Howard 1989b; Marushiakova and Popov 2015; Natsova 2016; Özkan 2011; Takhirov 1979: 70, 117; Takhirov 1984). But very few Turks embraced such ‘socialist’ but ethnolinguistically purely Bulgarian rituals (Höpken 1997: 70). I thank Sofiya Zahova for bringing the film and novel to my attention. With no archival research on this subject, it remains anyone’s guess whether Ahmed Dogan was really able to commence and head the demonstrations from his prison cell (cf. Koen 2015). However, it was a wise tactical move on the part of the Turkish (Muslim) dissident movement to make him into the undisputed leader, because this might effectively prevent the DS from splintering the movement. Otherwise DS agents would not have had much trouble to play hypothetical multiple leaders against one another. The BCP and other Bulgarian official sources tended to downplay the number of casualties, usually settling for a number well below 20 (Paraskevov 2013: 138). In line with the adopted transliteration system the city’s name should read Turgovishte, but I decided to adopt the form Targovishte, which is widely used in English-language publications. Similarly, until 2004 the ethnonym ‘Kurd’ could not be mentioned in Turkey and Kurds had had to be referred to by the official coinage ‘mountain Turks’ that had been developed in the late 1930s (cf. Aktürk 2012: 4). As a matter of course, the dead person had to be presented in such a photograph in ‘normal Bulgarian and European’ attire. Elements of clothing seen as of a ‘backward Muslim and Turkish character’ were actively banished both in interwar and communist Bulgaria (cf. Neuberger 2004: 90–91, 104–105). Some sources claim that at least 2,500 Bulgarian Turks ended up in Sweden in 1989. Ironically, many were deported back to Bulgaria, when Stockholm decided to recognize Bulgaria as a ‘safe and democratic’ country in 1990 (Joly, Nettleton and Poulton 1992: 78). The BCP might model their response on Beijing’s increasingly heavy-handed manner of suppressing the growing pro-democracy movement in communist China, eventually leading to the Tiananmen Massacre on 3 June 1989 (Tzvetkov 1993: 420). Another source of inspiration could be neighboring Yugoslavia. On 20 February 1989 the authorities of the Socialist Republic of Serbia proposed to abolish the autonomous status of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. Albanian strikes against this possibility engulfed Kosovo, but a month later, on 23 March, surrounded by Serbian tanks (which only in name were ‘Yugoslav’), the Kosovan Assembly was forced to concede to the loss of autonomy. The province’s name reverted to its pre-autonomous (pre-1974) version, namely, the Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Janssens 2015: 56; Šaćirović 2010; Tzvetkov 1993: 420). Nowadays Muslims in Bulgaria are led by the National Conference of Muslims (Struktura 2016).

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15 The mentioned edited volume’s contributors included, Khristo Angelov Khristov (1915–1992), Dimitur S. Angelov (1917–1996), Strashimir At. Dimitrov (1930–2001), Petur Khristov Petrov (1924-), Nikolai M. Mizov, Orlin Tikhomirov Zagorov (1936– ), Todor Ivanov Zhivkov 91911–1998, Georgi G. Stoianov (1934–1995), Elena Aleksandrova Grozdanova 91941–), Georgi N. Iankov, Emil Peichev Boev (1932– 2013), Tsvetana Borisova Georgieva (1937–), Georgi Khristov Khristov, Margarita T. Deianova-Vaklinova, and Evgeni R. Radu 16 Kurban Bayram(i) is the Turkish name of the holiday known as Eid al-Adha in Arabic, meaning ‘Festival of the Sacrifice.’ It is one of the most important Muslim holidays, which commemorates the willingness of Ibrahim (that is, Abraham) to sacrifice his young first-born and only son in obedience to God’s command. Furthermore, this holiday marks the end of the annual Hajj to Mecca (Kurban Bairam 2016; Rashed 1998). As in the case of other Muslim religious or cultural celebrations, Kurban Bayrami could not be legally observed in communist Bulgaria after 1984 (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). Security and state officials harassing Turks to leave Bulgaria in 1989, chose to use this simile, because on the one hand, it evokes the image of numerous blood-stained animal carcasses, while on the other the chilling threat is immediately comprehensible to each Muslim. In addition, at the time of the expulsion, this threat was the more emphatic, given that the observance of any Muslim holidays and customs was strictly forbidden in late communist Bulgaria. After such a threatening phone call the targeted Turk or Muslim knew that if he wanted to live and to enjoy again his ‘barbaric holiday,’ he had better move to Turkey soon. (I thank Kelsey Jackson Williams for making me aware that this point should be explicated at length, as it was not immediately clear to a non-Muslim Anglophone reader.). 17 It is a rather slangy abbreviated version of the term изгонени izgoneni. 18 The discrepancy between Bulgarian estimates of the members of the country’s Turkish minority at 0.8–0.9 million and the Turkish estimate of 1.5 million stems from the fact that the latter seems to include all Bulgaria’s Muslims, including Pomaks, Roma, and Tatars. This shows that Ankara continues to equate the Ottoman millet of Islam in Anatolia and the Balkans with the Turkish nation, irrespective of any ethnolinguistic differences. 19 In the opening of his article, Kemal Kirişci (1954–) quotes the definition of ‘refugee’ as given in the United Nations’ 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1996: 387), but ultimately fails to use it for characterizing the nature of the 1989 expulsion, let alone for tying it up with the then, in the early 1990s, freshly coined notion of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ Article 1 of this Convention defines the plight of a refugee as follows: ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ (Convention 2000 [1951]: 14). In a way, it is also one of the best definitions of what the end-result of ‘forced emigration’ is. 20 The numbers of Turkish (Muslim) emigrants and refugees for the period of 1877–1923 are rough estimates. Bulgarian authors tend to give lower numbers, while their international and Turkish colleagues higher ones. Warfare, rudimentary administration in rapidly changing multiple official languages and scripts, the existence of two ‘Bulgarian states’ (Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia) between 1878 and 1885, alongside vast territorial and population changes caused by the two Balkan Wars and the Great War, do not allow for a better exactness. 21 Interestingly, the reporting on the 1989 expulsion in the fledgling non-communist press in the ‘fraternal people’s democracy’ of Poland was criticized by ‘concerned Bulgarian citizens’ who wrote to Gazeta Wyborcza, which spearheaded the free mass media in this country (cf. Czekając 1989). 22 The sobriquet ‘Checkpoint Ali’ was coined by international journalists in emulation of the most famous border crossing between West and East Berlin, officially known as

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‘Checkpoint C,’ but popularly nicknamed ‘Checkpoint Charlie,’ in line with the US Joint Army and Navy Phonetic Alphabet. With time, in popular usage, the name ‘Charlie’ became symbolic of US soldiers controlling this crossing on the side of West Berlin (Checkpoint 2016). Likewise, the name ‘Ali’ in ‘Checkpoint Ali’ stood for Muslim or Turkish expellees from Bulgaria, as well as for border guards in Turkey. The expellees amounted to over 13 percent of the city’s then 600,000 inhabitants, adding much strain on the rudimentary refugee aid and welfare provisions. Interestingly, so many expellees chose this city as their preferred place of settlement in Turkey, because as many as a third of its inhabitants (200,000) stemmed from the Balkans, that is, mainly from Bulgaria. Family links and cultural closeness cushioned the shock of expulsion and adaptation to the socio-economic realities in ‘capitalist Turkey’ (Hölle 1989: 123). Expelled Turks and Muslims loaded onto these trains ‘as pigs’ dubbed them ‘trains of [Bulgaria’s] shame’ (Pociąg 1989). Whenever possible, Turks forced into exile sold their houses and apartments at reduced prices especially to Pomaks and other Muslims. As a result, many formerly Turkish villages in Veliko Turnovo Province became Pomak settlements (Konstantinov 1997: 42). Faced with this dilemma and the anti-Muslim attitudes in the freshly postcommunist Bulgaria, in early 1991 around 200 Pomaks attempted to claim asylum in Greece, but to no avail. Athens did not want to add more to the country’s ‘Slavophone Greeks’ (Joly, Nettleton and Poulton 1992: 78). According to the DS, on 26 September 1989, pensioners amounted to 15 percent among the returnees, children and teenagers accounted for 30 percent, while people of working age for 55 percent (Katsunov 2011: 109). The transliteration system I am employing in this book for Cyrillic-based Bulgarian names and terms would require that Haskovo be spelt as ‘Khaskovo.’ However, in English-language literature the form ‘Haskovo’ predominates, so I have decided to adopt it. In 1992 Dimitur Velev Dimitrov was accused that in breach of the law he ordered the hasty demolition of around 1,000 Turkish and Muslim houses in Haskovo in 1989. He could not be tried immediately, because as an MP he was protected by parliamentarian immunity of which the Bulgarian Parliament refused to strip him (Strakhovete 2005). When he failed to win another mandate, in 1997 the Haskovo court of law acquitted Dimitur Velev Dimitrov of the accusation, arguing that this demolition was not an illegal act, but a mere ‘removal of illegal constructions’ in accordance with the administrative regulations (Khaskovskiiat 1997). It would be crucial to find out whether this 1997 ruling paved the way for a similarly nonchalant approach, which local authorities seem to adopt when ordering and carrying out frequent and widespread demolishing of Roma houses across present-day Bulgaria (cf. Bulgaria 2014; Bulgaria 2015). Curiously, numerous houses were and continue to be constructed in the country in blatant breach of any planning regulations. But courts of law express no interest in such cases, let alone resort to demolishing, as long as offending buildings belong to ethnic Bulgarians (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). Marushiakova and Popov (2015) and Bulgarian sources (cf. Khaskovskiiat 1997) suggest that the number of Turkish (Muslim) houses destroyed in 1989 was half the quoted number, that is, ‘over 500.’ Again this discrepancy of opinion between publications and first-hand observers shows how much more spade work remains to be done by researchers in order to arrive at a fully fledged and properly documented description and analysis of the 1989 ethnic cleansing. The situation is eerily reminiscent of how Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were treated in postwar Poland. When they dared to return to their home towns and villages, the local, ethnically Polish, inhabitants were afraid that the survivors would claim their houses, apartments and businesses already taken by Poles. In order to prevent such

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1989’s events & the international press justified restitution, Jews were intimidated to leave and many were even murdered to this end (cf. Gross 2006; Lisek 2016). Most communist-time provisions for Bulgarian citizens to enjoy visa-free travel to other former Soviet bloc countries remained in place, but typically were not observed. After the fall of communism, a Bulgarian wishing to visit Hungary or the Czech Republic was required to produce an invitation issued by an organization or citizen from the target country, alongside an accommodation and board voucher for the planned stay. (I thank the Anonymous Reviewer for this reminder on the travel practicalities among the freshly postcommunist states in Central Europe.). In the 2011 Bulgarian census, of the self-declared 230,000 Roma, 85,000 were Orthodox Christians, 50,000 refused to declare their religion, 30,000 were ‘of no religion’ (that is, atheists), while 23,000 professed various strains of Protestantism (Prebroiavanie 2012: 29). In 1995 as many as 71 percent of ethnic Bulgarians would not want to live next door with a Roma family (Gradev 1995: 66). It seems not much has changed in this regard since the mid-1990s: 63 percent ethnic Bulgarians still want to live separately from Roma (Police 2006: 18), and members of this ethnic group continue to be marginalized and persecuted in a myriad of ways as a matter of course (cf. Left Behind 2015; Luffman 2012; Thorpe 2015). Due to the assimilatory persecution of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria since 1878 and to the fact that most were strongly religious and lived in rural areas, Turks accounted for a mere 5 percent of all the BCP members. This hardly reflected their demographic share in the Bulgarian population that during the communist period stood at 10 to 15 percent (Höpken 1997: 66). In 1985 as many as 55 percent of Bulgarian Turks declared themselves to be religious, which at that time was true only of 23 percent ethnic (Slavophone) Bulgarians (Höpken 1997: 69). In the Soviet bloc countries the exchange rate between the currencies of the people’s democracies and the West’s ‘hard currencies’ was established by the communist party’s fiat, with no respect for the economic realities. Hence, the official exchange rate for the US Dollar was 2 levs in Bulgaria in 1989, before in recognition of the severe economic difficulties it was raised slightly to 2.50 levs on 1 September 1989 (Avramov 2016: 747). Kuwait was seen as a neutral ground, neither part of the Soviet bloc nor of the West. On the other hand, already in the 1980s it was a prosperous and modern oil-rich state where, apart from engaging in difficult negotiations, visiting officials could enjoy some rest and relaxation in resorts at the warm seaside of the Persian Gulf. What is more, after the fifth summit of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO, since 2011 known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), held in Kuwait City in January 1987, Kuwait was responsible for the organization of the ICO’s activities until the subsequent summit in the Senegalese capital of Dakar (1991). Since the mid-1980s the ICO had expressed a strong interest in the fate of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims who were Bulgarianized by force and finally expelled to Turkey (cf. ICO Satisfied 1990; Organisation 2017). Despite Sofia’s official denial of the arrival of such Soviet troops to Bulgaria, it remains an open question that needs to be checked whether Zhivkov or another high official of the BCP might have requested that the Kremlin send Soviet soldiers to Bulgaria. The ‘deep state’ (derin devlet in Turkish) is believed to be a group of secret authoritarian organizations composed of or led by high-level officials from the military and civil service, alongside businessmen and mafia members. They are alleged to decisively influence the democratic institutions of Turkey, finance their activities through organized crime and corruption, and are responsible for mass human rights violations and for instigating armed conflicts (Söyler 2015). Memorably, the reformist-minded and simultaneously high-flying party members coalesced as a group in 1968 when they protested against the Soviet-led invasion in

1989’s events & the international press 81 Czechoslovakia. Unlike elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, instead of expelling and incarcerating them, the Bulgarian Communist Party tolerated and contained these ‘unruly’ members within its fold with the never fulfilled promise of a reformed communism (Marushiakova and Popov 2015; Protests 1968). 41 The idea of attracting workers to communist Bulgaria from abroad appeared for the first time in the early 1970s. Initially, Zhivkov hoped for arrival of such workers from Egypt. But problems with salaries in hard currency meant that Sofia looked to Vietnam. For the time being the Vietnam War (1954–1975) stalled any bilateral projects. But at the turn of the 1980s, some Soviet bloc countries, including Bulgaria, began inviting Vietnamese workers and students from the freshly victorious and reunited communist Vietnam which struggled with the demographic bulge of the postwar ‘boom generation.’ On the basis of a bilateral agreement signed in 1980, Bulgaria promised that during the forthcoming decade it would accept 25,000 workers and 5,000 students from fraternal Vietnam. The project stalled again in 1984, due to the growing political and social instability across the Soviet bloc. In the turmoil of the postcommunist transition in Bulgaria, and in the context of growing ethnic nationalism, all Vietnamese (with the partial exception of students allowed to finish their degrees) were de facto forced to leave Bulgaria for Vietnam. Emiliia Maslarova (1949–), who served as Minister of Labor and Social Politics in the Bulgarian governments of 1990–1991 and 2005–2009, saw to the departure of Vietnemse from the country during her first term in office. On the other hand, in 2008, she signed a new bilateral agreement on immigration of Vietnamese workers. A year after Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, it became clear that the country’s economy would soon face a dearth of cheap manual labor (Apostolova 2016; Borisova 2012; Terziev 2008). But due to strong xenophobia persisting in Bulgaria, by 2016 not more than 2,000 workers had arrived from Vietnam (Apostolova 2016). 42 This new law was to be implemented beginning on 12 July 1989 (Avramov 2016: 600). 43 It would be interesting to check whether the standoff between Gorbachev and Zhivkov during their meeting in Moscow on 23 June 1989 might finally convince the latter of the necessity of introducing this desperate measure. The production of communist Bulgaria’s economy was heavily oriented toward the Soviet Union and strongly dependent on Soviet raw materials (Daskalov 2011: 295). But Gorbachev’s economic reforms meant that this lifeline was effectively withdrawn from Bulgaria, unless Sofia could pay for necessary supplies in hard currency (Mincheva and Gurr 2014: 123).

4

The ethnic cleansing’s aftermath and the regime change

The increasingly confused and contradictory measures taken by the Zhivkov regime turned out to be insufficient to reverse the worrying trends, and actually worsened the domestic situation. On 23 October 1989 the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petur Mladenov (1936–2000), met with the US Ambassador Sol Polansky to protest against Washington’s meddling in Bulgarian domestic affairs. However, the following day, Mladenov resigned from the post and his membership in the Politburo of the BCP’s Central Committee, apparently in preparation for ousting Zhivkov (Tzvetkov 1993: 422). On 25 October 1989 during the two-week (16 October – 3 November) international environment conference organized by the CSCE in Sofia, representatives from Western and Eastern countries witnessed the dissident Ecoglasnost group’s demonstration for a clean environment and for softening the regime’s hardline policies against both pro-democratic forces, and Turks and Muslims (Searle 1989). The demonstration was brutally broken up and its participants manhandled and beaten up by militiamen in full view of foreign journalists and delegates (Searle and Power 1989a; Tzvetkov 1993: 422). Swift repressions failed to turn the tide and since that moment power was gradually taken by the camp of reformist communists, who subscribed to Gorbachev’s program of glasnost and perestroika. On 3 November, when about a thousand demonstrators gathered in front of Parliament, chanting ‘Democracy!’ the authorities, quite tellingly, refrained from using violence, letting this demonstration go its course unhindered (Tzvetkov 1993: 424). Then, after 35 years in power, Zhivkov was finally removed from his post on 10 November1 (Jivkov 1989). In his stead, one of the reformists, Petur Mladenov, was made General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Crampton 2010a: 211). Four days later, on 14 November, in one of his very first public statements, Mladenov stressed the necessity to terminate the assimilationist policy directed at Bulgarian Turks and Muslims (Poulton 1991: 163). However, from the global perspective, all the changes in Bulgaria fell under the proverbial radar, overshadowed by the news of the fall of the Berlin War on 9 November 1989, and the international repercussions (Tzvetkov 1993: 427). Subsequently, the new reformist communist leader of Bulgaria and the reformist (or just ‘second-tier’) communist government had to face the country’s near economic collapse and international ostracism, alongside the radicalized and

The aftermath and the regime change 83 polarized population at large, some wanting democracy, others Turks and Muslims out, while in turn Turks and Muslims expected full respect for their human, civic and cultural rights. Gorbachev pressed on Bulgaria’s reformists to truly espouse his program of glasnost and perestroika, while the United States made free and fair elections the precondition of any American and Western aid for Bulgaria (Polansky 1992: 31). Mladenov replied with the promise of a ‘mixed economy’ that would combine elements of capitalism and socialist planned economy (Power and Searle 1989). A week after the deposition of Zhivkov, on 18 November 1989, 50,000 people demonstrated in Sofia for democracy. On this occasion, the NDZPCh appealed for the return of names to Turks and Muslims. It became clear that the demonstrators would not tolerate the communists’ single party-style rule any longer; the unequivocal demand was for a multi-party system (Karamihova 2007: 32; Poulton 1991: 165; Power and Searle 1989). In partial response to the demonstrators’ wishes, on 27 November Mladenov dissolved the Interior Ministry’s hated Department Six (Отдел VI Otdel VI), responsible for the brutal persecution of dissidents and the Turkish and Muslim minority. In addition, 2,000 officers apparently remaining loyal to Zhivkov were purged from the security forces (Searle and Power 1989b), but not from the BCP. However, the aforementioned demonstrators, in reply to NDZPCh speakers’ appeals for a change in the zhivkovite policy of the forced assimilation and expulsions of Turks and Muslims called the speakers ‘traitors’ (Tainted 1990). This was a clear early sign that it would be next to impossible for Bulgaria’s weak and divided democratic opposition to avoid being denounced as ‘enemies of the Bulgarian nation’ if they dared to reverse the zhivkovite policy of the forced assimilation and expulsion of Turks, Muslims, Pomaks or Roma (Ludzhev 2008: 128–130). In late 1989 an open discussion on the Turkish and Muslim minority commenced, despite strong opposition on the part of the proponents of Zhivkov’s ‘Revival Process’ assimilatory campaign and of the ‘Big Excursion’ expulsion, whose stance was shared and genuinely supported by a plurality or even majority of ethnic Bulgarians (Power and Searle 1989). Mladenov’s BCP government did not act on its November pledge to stop the campaign of forced assimilation, so in turn incensed Turks and Pomaks demonstrated in Sofia on 11 December (Poulton 1991: 163). The following day, on 12 December, Mladenov officially admitted that Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims were unjustly and cruelly persecuted, but again no measures rectifying their status followed the statement (Karpat 1995: 745). In his eight-point program Mladenov solely focused on the technicalities of the process of democratization, without acknowledging any political role for Bulgarian Turks as a minority in a postcommunist Bulgaria (Osem 1989). Hence, on 16 December more demonstrations began erupting across Bulgaria’s Muslim and Turkish areas. The demonstrators demanded the return of their names, together with the return of full human and political rights to the country’s Muslims and Turks (Karamihova 2007: 32). Meanwhile, on 14 December 1989 the promised abolition of the BCP’s leading role in Bulgaria as guaranteed by the Constitution was delayed by one month. This led to an outburst of public anger and demonstrations, further stoked by General

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Secretary Petur Mladenov’s careless remark that it was a high time to send tanks to the streets of Sofia (Tzvetkov 1993: 430–431). On 15 December, the government decided to buy some precious time and calm by annulling the decree on peacetime mobilization. This decree had been universally hated by the country’s entire population (irrespective of ethnicity) since its introduction on 4 July 1989 (Poulton 1991: 158). Meanwhile the Soviet bloc was collapsing all around Bulgaria. On 21 December the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușescu’s (1918–1989) televised speech failed to prevent the spread of demonstrations across the country, while most Romanian troops refused to shoot at the protesters. The population at large wanted democratization in line with Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost. But Ceaușescu would not budge, leading to violence in streets across the country, and to the leader’s swift downfall and summary execution on 25 December (Kunze 2016: 400). Sofia took good note of these events in neighboring Romania (Tzvetkov 1993: 432), on 22 December 1989 the Turkish and Muslim democratic opposition leader, Ahmed Dogan, was freed from prison to lessen an anti-government tension among Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims (Angelov 2011b: 362). A week later, on 28 December, the capital’s public opinion was shaken by the silent protest of Turks and Muslims in front of the Bulgarian Parliament, whose participants – memorably – held placards with the heart-felt plea: ‘We want back the names our mothers gave us’ (Искаме си майчините имена Iskame si maichinite imena) (Ivanov 2014; Karamihova 2007: 32–33; Nie si 2016). It was a unique moment of all-Bulgarian civic unity. Sofia’s inhabitants, irrespective of their ethnicity, were moved by the sight to bring food and hot drinks for the protesters who had to endure subzero temperatures (Karamihova 2007: 33; Marushiakova and Popov 2015). On 29 December 1989, the reformist government (that is, the BCP’s Central Committee) promised a reversal of the anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim measures, as introduced since the mid-1980s renaming campaign. The policy of the ‘Revival Process’ was officially recognized as ‘wrong’ and was declared to be an unjustified ‘mistreatment of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims.’ The government promised that the ‘misdeeds’ of the campaign of forced assimilation would be swiftly addressed and overcome (Hornsby 1990a; Karamihova 2007: 33; Katsunov 2011: 254–275; Lilov 1989; Protest 1990). One of the first results of this change in the official attitude toward Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims was the founding, on 4 January 1990, of a de facto Turkish and Muslim party, MRF (Movement for Rights and Freedoms), under Dogan’s leadership (Power 1990a). By February 1990 over 100,000 people had joined this party, mostly Turks and Muslims, but also ethnic Bulgarians, Jews and Armenians (Dogan in Stefanova 2012: 767; Poulton 1991: 167). In light of total membership, the MRF became the second largest part after the BCP-turned-BSP (Höpken 1997: 72–73). A sizeable number of ethnic Bulgarians, maybe even the majority, while opting for democracy, also wanted a new Bulgaria that would be an ethnolinguistically homogeneous nation-state, that is, without any Turks or Muslims, as Zhivkov had proclaimed it – ‘free of ethnic aliens’ – in 1985. Ethnic Bulgarians were incensed that ‘Arabo-Turkic’ names might be returned to Turks and Muslims who, prior

The aftermath and the regime change 85 to 29 December 1989, officially had not existed and had been (ethnic) Bulgarians ‘like everyone else.’ The nationalist movement coalesced at a frightening speed in direct reaction against the BCP government’s 29 December promise to observe human and political rights of the country’s Turks and Muslims. On 31 December low-rank BCP officials in the predominantly Turkish Region of Kardzhali2 (Кърджали in Bulgarian and Kırcaali in Turkish) founded OKZNI (Общонародният комитет за защита на националите интереси Obshtonarodniiat komitet za zashtita na natsionalnite interesi in Bulgarian, meaning, AllNational Committee for the Defense of National Interests) (Bakalova 2006: 236). They might disagree with many of Zhivkov’s decisions, but saw his policy of forced assimilation and the subsequent expulsion of Turks and Muslims as a move that ‘saved’ Bulgaria from ‘Cyprus-ization’ (that is, ethnically defined partition), or demographic ‘vanishing’ by succumbing to ‘Turkification,’ due to the higher birth rate among – usually rural – Turks and Muslims. Mladenov’s sudden reversal of the assimilatory course immediately brought out, on 2 January 1990, 10,000 to 12,000 OKZNI-led protesters to the streets in the town of Kardzhali. The Turkish and Roma inhabitants who amounted to almost half of the town’s population, intimidated by the years of repressions, preferred to hide at home in order to survive this outburst of nationalist fervor unscathed (Angelov 2015: 12; Protest 1990; Tylko 1990; Nacjonalistyczne 1990). However, contrary to the facts, the protesters alleged that their Muslim neighbors wanted to expel them, that some Turks shouted ‘Christians, go away!’ and that Bulgaria’s Muslims were planning a civil war in order to facilitate Turkey’s annexation of their region (Verhextes 1990: 128–129). Ten thousand more ethnic Bulgarian protesters, braving the freezing winter temperatures, joined their Kardzhali counterparts in another demonstration on 4 January, this time in Sofia. Soon afterward, in an unprecedented form of statewide grassroots mobilization, literally streams of cars and trucks brought over half a million protesters to the Bulgarian capital (Bakalova 2006: 237; Tajna 1990; Verhextes 1990: 128). They chanted ‘Bulgaria is not Cyprus,’ ‘We, Bulgarians will never be Turkey’s slaves,’ ‘No to Autonomy,’ ‘Bulgaria for Bulgarians,’ ‘Turks in Turkey,’ ‘Long Live Bulgaria,’ or ‘Unity.’3 The protesters concluded and emphasized their stance by yelling that ‘One error cannot be corrected by another,’ meaning that the 1989 expulsion of Bulgarian Turks should not be rectified by a return of human and minority rights to them in Bulgaria, which then officially was still an ethnically homogeneous nation-state, where all minorities (including Turks and Muslims) had ‘ceased to exist’ in 1985. Simultaneously, a much smaller group of members of the independent trade union Podkrepa demonstrated in Sofia on the very same day in support of the government’s decision to right the wrongs of the ‘Revival Process’ and the ‘Big Excursion.’ The Podkrepa members’ calls for national reconciliation with Turks and Muslims were met with derisive jeers on the part of the large anti-Turkish demonstration. Only the cordon of militia-men separating the two demonstrations prevented a potentially lethal assault on the Podkrepa demonstrators (Bakalova 2006: 237; Bulgarians Attack 1990; Karamihova 2007: 33; Sofia Faces 1990; Tzvetkov 1993: 433–434;

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Verhextes 1990: 128). It was as close as it came to bloodshed and possible civil war in Bulgaria (which then might have involved Turkey) at the cusp of the postcommunist transition. In the span of one night and day, twice as many people descended on Sofia as Turks (Muslims) had been expelled half a year earlier in all the summer of 1989. Well over half a million anti-Turkish Bulgarian nationalists were bussed and came by car from all over the country. Indeed, it was quite a frightening sight to Turkish and Muslim returnees (Bakalova 2006: 237). Anti-Turkish (anti-Muslim) demonstrations continued almost non-stop until mid-January in the Bulgarian capital and in the bigger towns and cities where ethnic Bulgarians constituted a plurality or majority of the inhabitants in the predominantly Turkish and Muslim regions (Howard 1990). An opinion poll conducted by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology showed that barely more than 1 percent of Bulgarians wanted a quick solution to the ethnic conflict with Turks, while the improvement of living conditions was of much more importance to at least 43 percent of them (Verhextes 1990: 129). The protesters did not heed the government’s warning that Bulgaria risked international isolation unless full civic and human rights were guaranteed for the country’s Turks and Muslims. On the other hand, the demonstrators were assured that neither the army nor militiamen would be deployed to contain or disperse them. On 5 January 1990 the protesters pressed on with their demands and threatened a country-wide general strike (Anti-Muslim Strike 1990; Howard 1990). They shouted down Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov (although he had served under Zhivkov since 1986; Atanasov retained his post until early February 1990) when he tried to reason with a crowd of 6,000 protesters in Sofia. (It was quite a sudden change of heart on his part, given that in 1985 it was he who had coined the very term ‘Revival Process’ for the state policy of forced assimilation of Bulgarian Turks and Muslims [Marinov 2009].) The protesters replied with the shouts of ‘Bulgaria for Bulgarians’ and ‘No equal rights for Turks.’ In a quick succession of events, a general strike engulfed Bulgaria, further endangering the economy already in free fall (Bulgarians at Anti-Muslim 1990; Traynor 1990; Turk and Bulgar 1990). The government even considered introducing a state of emergency, and moving army units to Sofia and other restive areas in order to prevent armed confrontations (Verhextes 1990: 129). From October 1989 to January 1990 the Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz kept reiterating his wish to meet with the Bulgarian counterpart to discuss the management of the fallout of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the seriously strained relations between both states. However, the actual meeting was postponed until 9 January, due to the anti-Turkish demonstrations that obviously were not conducive to holding any official talks between Sofia and Ankara (Power and Searle 1989; Traynor 1990). Ankara chose to see the protests as a result of the continuing influence of diehard zhivkovite hardliners in Bulgaria (Bulgaria Calls 1990), which for a moment deflected the blame from the reformists’ government and actually allowed for holding the meeting before the end of these protests (Hornsby 1990a). With Bulgaria’s external relations, especially with Turkey, now

The aftermath and the regime change 87 under tentative control, the new Bulgarian government could turn its attention to the inflammatory domestic situation. All this was happening against the background of the Round Table (Кръгла маса Krugla masa) negotiations between the Bulgarian Communist Party and the freshly founded opposition UDF opposition party. The talks (modeled on the Polish Round Table Talks of the previous year [Magdalenka 1990]) lasted between 3 January4 and 14 May 1990. Tellingly, no representatives of the MFR, or any other Turkish / Muslim party or organization were invited to participate in the Round Table, due to the then ongoing anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim nationalist backlash across Bulgaria (Bikov 2009: 413–414; Trojanow 2006: 84–85). Perhaps this was the ‘original sin’ of postcommunist Bulgaria. On the way toward democracy and the full reintegration of Turks and Muslims in all the spheres of the country, no place was reserved for Turkish and Muslim leaders at the negotiating table. That is why the position of Turks and Muslims in today’s Bulgaria may be described as a kind of reluctant ‘semi-inclusion’ (Frizon-Rosh 2012). (Interestingly, a renowned Roma activist, Manush Romanov [originally, Mustafa Aliev, 1928– 2004], participated in the Round Table talks, but this did not translate into any improved integration, let alone political representation, for Roma in postcommunist Bulgaria [Dokumentalni 2011; Marushiakova and Popov 2015].) The democratization of 1989–1990 is not known as a ‘revolution’ in Bulgaria,5 though this term is readily used for referring to the systemic transition in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and even in Romania. In Bulgaria the term (Goliamata) Promiana ([Голямата] промяна, or ‘[Big] Change’) is employed in this sense (cf. Simenov 1996), thus emphasizing the fact that it was communists and reformist communists who negotiated with one another the systemic change.6 No revolution was intended. The situation was volatile enough. The genuine dissidents, or mainly the MRF, were not permitted to participate in the talks because they were not seen as ‘ethnic Bulgarians’; or even more strongly, they were commonly denied the distinction of being ‘true Bulgarians’ (cf. 25. Goliamata 2015; Marushiakova and Popov 2015; Simenov 1996; Trojanow 2006: 24, 87). Ironically, the term ‘Big Change’ seems to be the reverse of a single coin whose obverse was the ‘Big Excursion.’ Even in name, the two Goliamatas, or ‘Big Ones,’ of Bulgaria’s postcommunist history are inseparable. Without the ‘Big Excursion’ there would have been no Big Change. It was the 1989 ethnic cleansing that brought about the palace coup when Zhivkov was removed from office on 10 November 1989. Then even more significantly, the ominous domestic and international reverberations caused by the ‘Big Excursion’ necessitated the parallel processes of returning civic and human rights to Turks and Muslims, and of negotiating the actual process of dismantling the communist system. In conjunction, these two processes yielded the Big Change, or the systemic transition in postcommunist Bulgaria (Crampton 2015a). On 9 January 1990, when the Bulgarian and Turkish Foreign Ministers Boiko Dimitrov and Mesut Yılmaz were talking in Kuwait, Prime Minister Atanasov again faced the protesters in Sofia. They yelled the invective ‘traitors’ at human rights activists who kept appealing for full rights for Turks and Muslims.

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Representatives of the protesters also repeated the old chestnut of zhivkovite propaganda that allegedly the new government was considering a proposal of autonomy for the Turkish areas in Bulgaria, which – as nationalists maintained – would be the first step toward a future annexation of these regions by Turkey (Angelov 2015: 12; Bulgaria Calls 1990; Tainted 1990). Atanasov replied that, in light of the rapidly changing times, the Bulgarians and their leadership must respond accordingly to the realities of a new reintegrated Europe-in-the-making (Turk and Bulgar 1990). He concluded by emphasizing that ‘Turks [are] an important pillar of national reconciliation’ in Bulgaria (Hornsby 1990a). (Perhaps, in his proposition Atanasov emulated the already available model of the successful German–Polish reconciliation, whose foundations had been laid in 1989 [Dragan and Woronowicz 2008].) Clearly, for the sake of a democratic future of Bulgaria, the government of reformist communists turned out to be courageous enough to act against the wishes of the majority of populace, who would rather prefer an ‘ethnocracy,’ or democracy for ethnic Bulgarians only. On the other hand, bearing in mind that Atanasov had been one of the main architects of the ‘Revival Process,’ it is equally plausible to propose that in the quickly changing Bulgaria, with this pro-democratic rhetoric he might aim at saving as much influence and decisionmaking power for the old zhivkovite guard as possible (Avramov 2015). Yet, quite shrewdly, the government met some of the protesters’ concerns. First, in an attempt to defuse the incendiary situation, Atanasov agreed to the proposal of a non-partisan Public Council on the National Issue, which was held between 9 and 11 January 1990 (Spasov 2001: 108). The meetings of this council – attended by around 30 experts, nationalists and their opponents – were the platform through which Ahmed Dogan officially joined Bulgarian politics (Karamihova 2007: 33). The council produced a Declaration on the National Question in which, on the one hand, the restoration of religious freedoms and names to Turks and Muslims was pledged, while on the other, secessionist groups were outlawed and territorial autonomy for the Turkish minority was rejected (Vassilev 2002: 107). Furthermore, on 11 January Atanasov promised to OKZNI a non-aggression pact with Turkey.7 This move divided the nationalists opening a space for negotiating a compromise (Power 1990a). Two days later, the MRF signaled to the government that Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims were deeply disturbed by the anti-Turkish character and program of the demonstrations and of the general strike (Power 1990b). The Parliament, which was to officially adopt the Declaration, as yet not legally binding, was urged to uphold such principles of renewed politics and statehood that would satisfy both nationalists, and Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims (Searle 1990). The government added, as a caveat, that reconciliation was badly needed in order to prevent a Northern Ireland-style ethnoreligious conflict and violence in postcommunist Bulgaria (Hillmore 1990). On 13 January the final draft of the Declaration (that had been already been agreed upon two days earlier) was ready for passing to the Parliament. The nationalists (whose leaders invariably were communist party members [Marushiakova and Popov 2015]) finally agreed to drop anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish demands, and signed this list of principles. The Declaration provided that all Bulgarian citizens

The aftermath and the regime change 89 should be free to practice their religion, select their own names, and speak the language of their choice in everyday life (Hornsby 1990b; Vrushtaneto 2010). On 15 January, the Parliament approved this Declaration and, importantly, passed an amnesty for all Turks and Muslims sentenced since 19848 in connection with the forced assimilation campaign and the 1989 ethnic cleansing (Vassilev 2002: 107–108). Three days later, on 18 January 1990, the BCP government ordered the arrest of Todor Zhivkov. The investigation of the crime of ‘incit[ing] ethnic hostility and hatred,’ among other wrongdoings was slow. The parliamentary commission tasked with the investigation of the crimes committed during the communist period prior to 10 November 1989, announced, on 14 May 1990, that it was Zhivkov’s governing circle9 which was guilty of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and of the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign. But no successful accusation was brought against any person on this account. The prosecutors did not find any documents with the dictator’s or other BCP functionaries’ signature that would prove it was one or the other who ordered and oversaw the ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation campaign (Marinova 2008). In March and April 1990, popular culture gave a significant boost to the pro-communist, pro-zhivkovite, and antiTurkish Bulgarian national feeling among the population at large when the antiTurkish television series Under the Yoke was broadcast. Ironically, it was Zhivkov’s regime that had commissioned this series, which had been also fully shot before the deposition of Zhivkov (Pod igoto 2016). Luckily for the accused Zhivkov and his inner circle, the fire in the House of the Party on 27 August 1990 destroyed many documents that could help to build a successful case against them (Marinova 2008; Ot arkhiva 2015; Rezhisiorut 2015). What is more, during the ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation campaign they apparently had tended to issue orders over the phone, without leaving any paper trail of their decisions. This brings to memory Adolf Hitler and the origin of the Endlösung (Final Solution). It is well established that on 20 January 1942, in a villa in Berlin’s leafy suburb of Wannsee the National Socialist government of the Third Reich (Germany) took the decision to exterminate Jews. Not a single document with Hitler’s signature to this end has been found yet (Gray 2012: 162), but this predicament did not prevent politicians or scholars from recognizing that it was the Führer who ordered and masterminded the wartime Holocaust of Jews and Roma (Wistrich 2001). Why was not a similar test of the very results of Zhivkov’s policies of ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation employed as a proof of his guilt? Zhivkov ruled over Bulgaria three times longer than Hitler over Germany. Bulgaria is a much smaller country than Germany, and its population was at least seven times smaller than that of the Third Reich. Hence, Zhivkov must have been much better informed on what was happening on the ground than Hitler. In July 1990 Zhivkov was released from prison and put under extremely lenient house arrest in his comfortable Sofia villa, which increasingly looked like the BCPrenamed-BSP leadership’s attempt at protecting their former overlord and making his life as comfortable and safe as possible. Although, after the 18-month trial he was finally sentenced to seven years for the embezzlement of US$24 million

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in state funds (Binder 1998), Zhivkov stayed in his opulent house and was not prevented from making a triumphant visit to his native village of Pravets (Правец in Bulgarian, Pravec in Turkish) in May 1995 (Georgieff 2016; Poulton 1991: 165–166). Eventually, the blame for the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the 1984–1985 assimilation campaign was heaped on a single person only, namely Milko Balev (1920–2002), Secretary of the BCP Central Committee between 1979 and 1989. He was the only BCP official sentenced for these crimes. But even Balev was let off lightly. In 1992 he was sentenced to two years in prison, though this sentence was immediately commuted to conditional imprisonment. As a result, Balev never served a single day in prison. Any outstanding criminal cases against Zhivkov were dropped briefly after his death in 1998 as unresolved on account of insufficient documentation (Hristov 2009; Poulton 1991: 166). Neither the UDF nor MRF, despite initial hopes to this end (Poulton 1991: 166), turned out to be able to force through a program of identifying, trying and sentencing those guilty of perpetrating crimes against humanity in Bulgaria during the 1980s. One can only wonder why. Perhaps, many members of both parties were too closely related to the Zhivkov oppressive regime. Maybe the fear was that pressing on with such a mega trial would disrupt a semblance of stability in postcommunist Bulgaria leading to political and ethnic strife, which could easily turn into ethnically defined civil war. Most, if not all, Bulgarians – irrespective of their ethnicity – took care not to allow the eruption of Yugoslav-style ethnic violence and ethnic cleansing in their country. Clearly the 1989 expulsion and the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign were deemed a more than enough warning. Another possibility, in line with the so-called Stockholm syndrome, is that due to long-term cooperation in government and at various levels of administration, with time, victims began to sympathize and paradoxically even internalize some of the anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim attitudes displayed by the perpetrators of the 1980s crimes against humanity in communist Bulgaria (cf. Bejerot 1974; McKenzie 2004). A case of the Stockholm syndrome-style mentality is exemplified by the circumstances surrounding Zhivkov’s official visit to the mountain Pomak village of Iundola (Юндола) in southwestern Bulgaria on 17 August 1997. Ironically, this village is located in the county with the capital in the town of Pazardzhik, where Dogan had been incarcerated between 1986 and 1989. The village’s Pomak inhabitants (who to this day profess the ‘un-Bulgarian’ faith of Islam) welcomed the former communist dictator and unrepentant ethnic cleanser in the traditional manner with bread and salt. They hailed him as Bashtitsata (Бащицата, literally ‘the Daddy,’ meaning ‘Our Daddy,’ ‘Great Daddy,’ or even ‘Great Daddy of the Bulgarian Nation’),10 which is a flattering form of address when talking reverently to or about a respected man of power, especially if seeking his patronage. While recalling the ‘good old times’ under Zhivkov’s rule, the villagers even referred to the former dictator as edin istinski bashtitsa (един истински бащица, ‘the only true Daddy’). In the Pomaks’ eyes, despite expulsions and forced assimilation, Zhivkov was a good leader because in communist Bulgaria there was no unemployment, which began plaguing most of the country’s rural areas

The aftermath and the regime change 91 immediately after the end of communism (Ivailova 2007 [2004]; Kevork 2010). After his release from prison in June 1990, Zhivkov was accompanied by a former DS lieutenant in charge of a fire fighting unit, Boiko Borisov (1959–), who remained the erstwhile communist leader’s main bodyguard until Zhivkov’s death in 1998 (Bakalov 2011). Not unsurprisingly, Borisov’s security company Ippon-111 (established in 1991) remains one of the largest in today’s Bulgaria (Boiko Borisov 2016). Subsequently, Borisov became the leading bodyguard of the former Bulgarian Tsar (King), Simeon Sakskoburggotski (1937–), who served as Bulgaria’s Prime Minister between 2001 and 2005 (Boiko 2011). Prime Minister Sakskoburggotski nominated Borisov as Chief Secretary of the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, simultaneously promoting him to the ministry’s rank of colonel. In 2002 Borisov was made a major general and two years later, in 2004, a lieutenant general (Boiko Borisov 2016). The network of connections then established with the country’s most prominent politicians and businessmen helped Borisov enter Bulgarian politics at the central level. After Simeon Sakskoburggotski lost the parliamentary elections in 2005, Borisov left the Ministry of Interior in the rank of retired major general and was swiftly elected as Mayor of Sofia (2005–2009), before becoming Prime Minister of Bulgaria (2009–2013, 2014–2017, 2017–). To this day Borisov continues to refer approvingly to Zhivkov as Tato (Тато ‘Dad’) (Borisov 2011; Karaabova 2010). In this, Borisov is the sole EU leader who unhesitatingly speaks favorably of an unrepentant ethnic cleanser. Elsewhere in Europe, only the Russian President, Vladimir Putin (1952–), praises Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) (Akopov 2016; Lun 2016), who was a genocidaire (Naimark 2010), besides being an ethnic cleanser and mass murderer (Polian 2004). Hence, Borisov’s attitude toward Bulgaria’s difficult past appears to be more similar to that of the Turkish leadership who persist in their denial of the Ottoman genocide of Armenians (Suny, Müge Göçek and Naimark 2011), or to Chinese leaders who extol Chairman Mao Zedong (1893–1976), despite genocide and mass murders committed repeatedly under his rule (Xi 2013). Dimitur Stoianov (1928–1999), Minister of Internal Affairs (1973–1988) and Secretary of the BCP Central Committee (13 December 1988–1916 November 1989), quite disarmingly commented on these crimes against humanity that ‘the USSR kept silent and we took it as consent’ (Poulton 1991: 166). He could not be too far off the mark on that. The Kremlin never protested, never followed a single request from Ankara to lean on its Bulgarian satellite so that Zhivkov would have stopped persecuting and expelling Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. The post-1989 Bulgarian elite and the average Bulgarian citizen – irrespective of ethnicity – seem to have accepted this view and gave up the idea of pursuing and trying those guilty of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and of the 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation (Khristov 2004; Khristov 2011; Poulton 1991: 165–166). What remains of the initial indignation-soon-turned-into-indifference is the famous British writer Julian Barnes’s (1946–) forceful novel The Porcupine (1992), which is a searing study of an unrepentant dictator, closely modeled on Zhivkov.12 Notably, the Bulgarian translation appeared in Sofia earlier than the English

92 The aftermath and the regime change original. The Bulgarian title Bodlivo svinche is quite allusive, as it might be literally translated as ‘Prickly Pig’ (Barnes 1992; Barns 1992). The BCP reformist government, in order to act on its promise of 29 December 1989 to return human and political rights to Turks and Muslims, passed an act on the restoration of names on 5 March 1990. (By that time, a person born in 1911 had had his name ‘Arabo-Turkish’ name Bulgarianized, returned to the original form, or otherwise altered around ten times, leaving any personal documents in total disarray [cf. Turan 1998: 299–300].) But this act, as a concession to nationalists, included numerous nefarious legal formalities which de facto prevented any quick or mass restoration of original names. Even worse, this law kept the ethnically Bulgarian male and female name endings –ov/a and -ev/a as obligatory for the patronymic. To the wronged Turks and Muslims, it looked as if only half of their names would be returned, the patronymic necessarily in the Bulgarianized form (Bakalova 2006: 238). As a result, on 4–5 March and again in mid-March 1990, 3,000 Turks and Muslims demonstrated against this act in Sofia (Poulton 1991: 168; Vassilev 2002: 108). With such a wave of support the MRF managed to have this law amended early the following year, so that the return to the original name became a simple administrative procedure with no Bulgarianizing undertones. By March 1991, the majority of Turks and Muslims targeted during the ‘Revival Process’ (around 0.6 million) had had their names restored (Bakalova 2006: 239; Höpken 1997: 72; Vassilev 2010: 300). Interestingly, since October 1989, the DS had developed new collocations for referring to Bulgarian Turks, so as not to mention the still ideologically unacceptable ethnonym ‘Turks.’ These euphemisms, included, among others, ‘persons with restored names’ (лицата с възстановени имена litsata s vuzstanoveni imena) and ‘a Bulgarian population with traditional names’ (българско население с традиционни имена bulgarsko naselenie s traditsionni imena)13 (Katsunov 2011: 112; Khristov 2016: p. 1 of the enclosed DS document, dated 4 September 1989), because many returnees had regained their original (Turkish, Muslim) names while in Turkey and had come back with new Turkish IDs and passports featuring these names (Göçmenler 1989). During the economically difficult 1990s of the systemic transition after the fall of communism, some re-adopted their rejected Bulgarian names in order to facilitate their planned travel in search of employment in Western Europe (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). As part of their reassertion of Turkish identity – though at present all Bulgaria’s Turks are to a degree fluent in Bulgarian (with the pronounced exception of the oldest generation) – not more than a third choose to speak Bulgarian at home (Höpken 1997: 72). Hence, to this day, in Bulgaria there are Turkish villages where it is impossible to communicate in any other language but Turkish. The inhabitants either do not know Bulgarian, are ashamed to speak it in a rudimentary fashion, or simply choose not to speak in this language (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). Demonstrations and strikes continued across Bulgaria throughout 1990 and 1991 when the foundations of a new democratic Bulgaria with a fledgling freemarket economy were being negotiated and laid out. But for a couple of quite significant and poignant exceptions, the ‘Turkish and Muslim question’ ceased to

The aftermath and the regime change 93 be the dominant one. The tentative pushing of this subject to the back burner showed that after the ravages of the ‘Revival Process’ and the rupture of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, Turks and Muslims were again – at least nominally – accepted as full and equal members of the Bulgarian body politic (cf. Zang 1990). On 10 and 17 June 1990, the first free postcommunist elections to the Bulgarian Parliament took place (a full year after the Polish elections of the same kind on 3 June 1989), and were won by the BSP, or the former communist nomenklatura (Bułgaria nadal 1990; Zwycięstwo 1990).14 Meanwhile, the MRF gained 23 mandates and became the third largest party in this assembly, after the UDF (Crampton 201a: 215; Genov and Krasteva 2001: 329). Immediately, in the capital, OKZNI-led demonstrations turned against the deputies accusing them of being ‘Turkey’s fifth column in Bulgaria’ (which was a slogan of the zhivkovite propaganda for decades [Tzvetkov 1993: 419]). Various attempts were undertaken to prevent the MPs from physically reaching and taking their seats in the Parliament, which at that time, in a ceremonial manner – on this occasion known as Grand National Assembly – assembled in Bulgaria’s old medieval capital at Veliko Turnovo.15 Nationalists considered it an anathema that even a single Turkish or Muslim MP would attend the Grand National Assembly. For them it meant ‘polluting the heart of Bulgarianness,’ symbolized by this solemn event (Vassilev 2010: 301). MRF candidates gained all but one mandate in Kardzhali Province, that is 11 in total. Ethnically it is the most Turkish of all the Bulgarian provinces. Nowadays, Turks numbering almost 90,000 there constitute 66 percent of the province’s population (Prebroiavanie 2012: 26). Upon the 11 MRF deputies’ return from Veliko Turnovo, they were met with jeers and anti-Turkish slogans in the town of Kardzhali, which from the ethnic vantage had then just a slight plurality of ethnically Bulgarian inhabitants (nowadays Turks account for 62 percent of the population [Obshtina 2016]), though the immediate countryside was (and still is) overwhelmingly Turkish. The ethnic Bulgarian protesters shouted that ‘there are no Turks in Bulgaria, but only Muslim Bulgarians,’ in line with the post-1985 zhivkovite dogma that the ideal of the edinata bulgarska sotsialisticheska natsiia, or the homogeneous (unitary) Bulgarian socialist nation had already been achieved. These protesters warned of a Turkish invasion and appealed for the dissolution of the ‘illegal’ MRF, thus repeating all stalwart claims of Zhivkov’s propaganda (Judah 1990). These anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim demonstrations and protests clearly showed how deeply the communist propaganda had become entrenched among the population at large. Had it not been for the economic collapse and the breakup of the Soviet bloc, this fervent national feeling shared by most ethnic Bulgarians would have easily buoyed the Zhivkov regime well into the 1990s. Meanwhile, in the course of the numerous political changes in summer 1990, when all kinds of protest actions in favor of democracy and against ethnic pluralism were widespread, a strange occurrence took place. On 26 August 1990 the crowd protesting against the remnants of communism in Bulgaria stormed the House of the [Bulgarian Communist] Party (Партиен дом Partien dom). BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) officials, who had been communist functionaries until

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3 April 1990, when the BCP was renamed as BSP, were reluctant to remove communist symbols from the building, which was one of the protesters’ demands. This reluctance was what seemingly incited the demonstrators’ anger. What followed is still anyone’s guess. Apparently some protesters forced their way into the building, which subsequently was gutted and quickly went up in flames at around 9 p.m. Curiously, despite repeated calls to the fire service, no attempts had been undertaken to extinguish the burning House of the Party until 4 a.m. the following morning on 27 August. The strong suspicion is that it was the communists-recently-turned-socialists themselves who incited the protesting crowd to attack the building with their calculated reluctance to talk to the protesters or to meet their demands. This – nomen omen – incendiary situation might create a convenient cover for the communists to torch the building, while blaming the fire on the protesters. At that time the ‘reformed communist’ BSP government was in power, as led by Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov (1938–1996). Hence, it had to be BSP officials in high positions who stopped firefighters from extinguishing the fire for as long as seven to eight hours. What most probably was lost in the blaze were the vital documents that proved who had taken decisions to commence the 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation and the 1989 ethnic cleansing.16 As a result, to this day no one has been formally accused of, let alone tried for, these indubitable crimes against humanity17 (Kostadinov 2016; Marinova 2008; Ot arkhiva 2015; Rezhisiorut 2015; Tzvetkov 1993: 455–456). Apparently, the sidelined hardline BCP forces, with full support from the DS, began regaining some political momentum in fall 1990. They rode on the wave of the growing anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim feeling, rapidly deepened by the steep political rise of the MRF and the return of a third of the expellees from Turkey, who now could demand back their real estate and moveable property. To the average ethnic Bulgarian it looked as if the internalized zhivkovite ideal of edinstvo (единство, or the homogeneous Bulgarian nation), achieved in the mid1980s, was now being dismantled in front of their eyes by this ‘anti-Bulgarian’ democracy (Iordanov 1995: 44). The ‘Bulgarian tourists’ who had gone ‘on a visit’ to Turkey in summer 1989 were coming back, but somehow inexplicably transformed into Turks. This development was especially painful to ethnic Bulgarians in villages, towns and regions with Turkish (Muslim) majorities or pluralities of the inhabitants. A potential ethnic conflict was brewing. At long last, on 14 and 20 September 1990 the BSP government’s Minister of the Interior met with the MRF’s leader, Ahmed Dogan, to discuss the Turkish and Muslim community’s concerns and measures to prevent any further deepening of the ethnic conflict (Katsunov 2011: 467–487). On 25 October 1990 the MRF branch in Shumen (Шумен in Bulgarian, Şumnu or Şumen in Turkish) was destroyed by a secretly planted bomb (Poulton 1991: 170). Then anti-Turkish acts unfolded 50 kilometers north in Razgrad (Разград in Bulgarian, Razgrad in Turkish). Perhaps an attempt at stoking up more antiTurkish feeling was to buy the BSP government some badly needed legitimacy and popularity. These events took place briefly before the whole country was rocked by students who went on strike on 5 November in the wake of the

The aftermath and the regime change 95 introduction of food rationing in late October (Tzvetkov 1993: 432, 456, 460). They demanded the resignation of the BSP government (Łukanow 1990), and on 18 November the students were joined by 120,000 nationalist protesters in Sofia (Pochody 1990). But the non-confidence vote held on 23 November was won by the BSP government. In reply, a general strike commenced three days later, on 26 November. The following day the strikers blocked traffic in central Sofia and in other Bulgarian cities. Subsequenty, on 29 November the strikers from all over the country flooded the capital to mount pressure on the BSP government (Tzvetkov 1993: 461–462). Out of all Bulgaria’s provinces, Razgrad Province has the second largest population of Turks (72,000), who account for slightly more than half of all the inhabitants (Prebroiavanie 2012: 26). The town’s ethnic Bulgarians, quite vocal in their displeasure at what they saw as the unjustifiable ‘re-Turkicization’ and ‘re-Islamization’ of their town and Bulgaria itself, threw their support behind a largely symbolic Razgrad (National Bulgarian) Republic (Разградска българска / народна република Razgradska bulgarska / narodna republika), proclaimed on 22 November 1990. Two days later, on 24 November, the first non-communist President Zheliu Zhelev declared this republic unconstitutional and called for its public disavowal (Bakalova 2006: 239; Vassilev 2002: 109). But surprisingly, on 26 November, when a governmental declaration was broadcast on the need of dismantling this republic, the leadership of the self-proclaimed republic was made known to the country on national television, as if in a tacit effort to lend theses nationalist separatists an air of legitimacy. Perhaps it was a useful diversion to keep the public opinion’s attention away from the general strike that on this very day began engulfing Bulgaria. It appears that it was Vice President of Bulgaria, General Atanas Semerdzhiev (1924–2015), who allowed the use of the state television to this end. Between 1966 and 1990 Semerdzhiev, as a full member of the Central Committee of the BCP, had participated in all the most important decisions of Zhivkov’s government, including the 1984–1985 forced assimilation and the 1989 ethnic cleansing. On 27 December 1989 he became Minister of Interior (with full control over the DS), and held the position until 1 August 1990, when the Bulgarian Parliament elected him to the newly established post of Vice President of Bulgaria. It was part of the Round Table compromise, which secured for the democratic opposition the post of President to which the UDF Chairman, Zheliu Zhelev, was elected on the same day (Pressluzhba 2016). On 27 November 1990, nationalist parties and groupings criticized Semerdzhiev’s decision as ‘internecine’ and ‘unpatriotic,’ thus making the Razgrad Republic and its leaders even better known and popular across the country. The criticism was rationalized by proposing that Sofia unnecessarily ‘pandered’ to the pro-Turkish lobby that ‘plotted against the unity (homogeneity) of the nation.’ Nationalist critics saw it as the first step to the ‘integration’ of Bulgaria with Turkey within a Black Sea Economic (Cooperation) Zone, the idea of which had been voiced in September 1990 by Turkish President Özal (Aral 2003). Obviously, the ironic use of the term ‘integration’ signaled that the nationalists shared the zhivkovite propaganda’s fears of Bulgaria losing sovereignty or part of its territory

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to Turkey. The following day, on 28 November, the UDF replied with its own declaration on the political situation in the country. Apart from unequivocally blaming the economic collapse on the subsequent BCP and BSP cabinets, the declaration also condemned the Razgrad Republic (Fotev 1994: 142; Iordanov 1995: 42–44; Ivanov 2012; Pressluzhba 2016; Sakhatchiev 1996: 130). The situation became quite volatile, when a day later, on 29 November, the BSP – or in other words, ‘last communist’ – government was compelled to step down by the strikes and protests of, both, nationalists and proponents of democracy. The following day Parliament accepted Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov’s resignation (Bułgaria: Czwartkowa 1990; Tzvetkov 1993: 463). The UDF declaration, alongside the end of the unpopular government, appeared to have sealed the end of the Razgrad Republic and of the blatant employment of anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim propaganda for power struggle in Bulgaria. Even in Razgrad the town’s ethnic Bulgarians accepted the visible political, social and cultural presence of Turks and Muslims18 (Power 1992). But throughout the 1990s this Razgrad Republic kept popping up as a rhetorical figure in verbal sparring matches between nationalist and liberal parliamentarians and intellectuals (cf. Dvesta 1993). OKZNI members who, in late 1990 and in 1991, staged numerous sit-in and hunger strikes against the reintroduction of Turkish as a school subject, kept the memory of the Razgrad Republic alive and politically potent. In addition they contested President Zhelev on the issue of minority rights for Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslism, calling him a ‘traitor’ and an ‘American lackey’ (Vassilev 2010: 302). On 3 January 1991 a modicum of non-partisan consensus on the future of Bulgaria was finally reached when the BSP signed with the other political parties an Agreement Guaranteeing the Peaceful Transition to a Democratic Society (Detrez 2015: xxxix; Tzvetkov 1993: 467). This document was concluded at an auspicious moment, just before the Soviet army’s intervention in Vilnius on 13 January 1991 and prior to the 17 January US attack against the Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait. The former event was used by democrats to criticize nationalists’ and the BSP’s desire to keep Bulgaria closely allied with the Soviet Union in order to forestall the supposed ‘Turkish threat.’ On the other hand, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (2 August 1990 – 25 February 1991) was a reminder that a relatively small state like Bulgaria would not be able to face up an invasion from a bigger state (be it the Soviet Union or Turkey), unless a member of a broader defense alliance. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait resonated with the Bulgarian public opinion more strongly than elsewhere in the postcommunist world, due to the fact that in 1989–1990 Bulgarian and Turkish delegations met in Kuwait City to negotiate the fallout of the 1989 ethnic cleansing of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. A time of hard choices commenced, especially when the Warsaw Pact disbanded its military structures on 31 March. Four months later, on 1 July, the members dissolved this Pact. The existential angst in Bulgaria reached its acme. The visit of the US Vice President Dan Quayle (1947–) to Sofia on 7 June partly calmed the fears and encouraged Bulgaria toward the Euro-Atlantic structures, that is, NATO and the European Communities. On 12 July the postcommunist

The aftermath and the regime change 97 Constitution was promulgated and a group of 39 democrats finished their hunger strike when President Zhelev announced that the parliamentary elections would take place in the fall. The UDF won the parliamentary elections held on 13 October. After the 57 years of communist rule, the new Parliament declared itself a direct continuation of non-communist Bulgaria. Formally, communism and the rule of the BSP second tier communists came to an end (Tzvetkov 1993: 468–470, 473, 486, 494). However, symbols and slogans of communism persist to this day, remodeled in line with the nationalist propaganda that casts Bulgarian Turks and Muslims as a ‘threat’ to the Bulgarian nation and state (cf. Milenkovičová 2016). Since the relative calming of the political situation in Bulgaria at the turn of 1991, the MRF has been tolerated. But to this day nationalists still have wanted to have the party banned, due to the MRF’s de facto Turkish character (Searle and Power 1990b; Troebst 1994: 38). Ethnically Bulgarian MRF members participated in Prime Minister Liuben Berov’s (1925–2006) technocratic and non-partisan government of 1992–1994, which was also formally nominated by the MRF (Troebst 1994: 34; Vassilev 2002: 121). Both supporters and critics of this government dubbed it ‘Turkish.’ The former meant it positively, as a sign of Bulgaria becoming an inclusive democratic state open toward the multiethnic character of its population. For the critics, however, it was a clear sign that Zhivkov was right, and now the country, according to them, fell back under a new ‘Turkish yoke’ (Vassilev 2002: 121). The MRF denied its visible ethnic character pointing out that the word ‘Turkish’ or ‘Muslim’ is not mentioned either in the party’s name or program. The Bulgarian Constitutional Court accepted this reasoning in 1992 with the use of tortuous procedural means, when half of the court’s 12 judges presented dissenting opinions on this verdict (Bakalova 2006: 240; Ganev 2004; Troebst 1994: 34). On the other hand, in the postcommunist Bulgarian Constitution promulgated on 13 June 1991, the nationalists received Article 11.4, which says that ‘There shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines, nor parties which seek the violent seizure of state power’ (Constitution 1991). The pragmatic compromise was reconfirmed in practice between 2001 and 2009, when the MRF participated as a coalition partner in all the Bulgarian governments of this period (Crampton 2010a: 217; Eminov 2001: 10–13; Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu and Hacısalihoğlu 2012: 649; Ghodsee 2010; Warhola and Boteva 2003: 264–271). This unsung compromise became the cornerstone of democracy, politics and statehood in postcommunist Bulgaria. Turkish-medium education at all levels from kindergarten to university existed in communist Bulgaria from 1946 to 1961, though it was made bilingual (Turkish and Bulgarian) in 1959, and then swiftly liquidated. However, some elements of Turkish minority education (mainly the Turkish language as a school subject) survived until the school year 1974/1975. In the late 1950s, 150,000 students attended more than 1,000 Turkish minority schools (Höpken 1997: 68; Nuberger 2004: 72; Şimşir 1988: 1989, 143, 155, 192, 195, 202–203, 206). The planned reintroduction of Turkish to education in the fall of 1991 was thwarted by the parliamentary BSP majority led by zhivkovite nationalist hardliners. On 1 October 1991 they even managed to force through Parliament an act explicitly forbidding

98 The aftermath and the regime change any teaching of, or in, minority languages in Bulgaria’s schools. This move triggered Turkish demonstrations and a school boycott in which 35,000 Turkish (Muslim) schoolchildren participated (Höpken 1997: 78; Vassilev 2010: 302). In the subsequent snap elections that followed on 13 October 1991, the UDF won and formed a new government with the unofficial support lent by the MRF and its 24 deputies. In the course of the simultaneous regional and local elections, MRF members gained over 1,000 mandates and became mayors in 20 towns and elected leaders of over 650 villages (Poulton 1997: 209). As a result, the long-standing Zhivkovite ban on the teaching of Turkish and in Turkish as a minority language was swiftly lifted, justin time for term two, which commenced in February 1992. Unlike before 1961, when various subjects were taught through the medium of Turkish, nowadays only Turkish as a subject (that is ‘mother tongue’) is taught. In the communes with the Turkish majority, it is a ‘required subject,’ while in areas with a substantial (20 percent or more) Turkish minority it is construed as an ‘optional subject.’ There is no automatism in either of these two cases. In both cases parents need to ask the school authorities for a Turkish class for their children, but in the case of the ‘optional subject,’ the authorities have a bigger legal leeway to refuse such a request. Unfortunately, this possibility is used time and again to the detriment of teaching in Turkish when the local or regional government happens to be under control of Bulgarian nationalist forces. This negative attitude means that increasingly fewer ethnically Turkish schoolchildren learn Turkish as a minority language in school (Eminov 1999: 44–45, 48–49).19 For instance, in 1993 parents requested minority Turkish education for 92,166 children, but the authorities claimed to be unable to provide requested schooling in Turkish for over 17,000 (18.5 percent) children (Höpken 1997: 79). After the end of communism not a single Turkish-medium minority school was established in Bulgaria. The Turkish language is taught for four hours per week as a subject to ethnically Turkish children at regular Bulgarian schools. In official documents this subject is dubbed as ‘mother tongue’ (майчин език maichin ezik). The number of Turkish students to whom the possibility is offered plummeted rapidly from 13,800 in 2005 to 6,381 in 2014 (Strategiia 2015: 21; Za turskiia 2013). Furthermore, many a Bulgarian nationalist is still horrified that among the 150 or so private schools in Bulgaria that receive some state aid, there is still a single school that offers, among other languages, Turkish (Tasheva 2012). In early 2016 nationalists were also scandalized that Turkey partly financed four religious schools in Bulgaria, which are attended in total by 200 children (Tsvetanova 2016). Radio programs in Turkish produced in Bulgaria were available between 1959 and 1984. In 1992 a reintroduction of some limited radio broadcasting in Turkish was intended in the country, but this plan came to a naught due to strong nationalist opposition. Finally, after the hiatus of entire decade, the daily four-hour Bulgarian radio service in Turkish resumed in 1994 (Bulgaristan 2016; Radio 2016; Tugdar 2015: 2006). In August 2015 a heated discussion ensued and staunch nationalist opposition erupted against the Bulgarian National Radio’s plan to establish a local Turkish-language radio station in Kardzhali (BNR 2015). But a month later a license was successfully extended to this radio station. The plan is that it will start

The aftermath and the regime change 99 broadcasting for three hours in 2016 and its Turkish-language programs will have extended to 19 hours daily by 2019 (SEM 2015). In October 2000 the Turkish community in Bulgaria received brief daily afternoon news of 15 minutes in their language on television (Bulgarska 2016; Petkova 2002: 52). However, the disconcerting practice remains that when a religious or political leader of the Turkish (Muslim) community speaks in Turkish on the Bulgarian television, the sound is turned off, and either the Bulgarian translation is read or provided in the form of subtitles (Eminov 1999: 49–50). After scaling many obstacles and the staunch (or even hostile) political opposition, between 1991 and 1998 the MRF published its weekly in the parallel Turkish- and Bulgarian-language versions, namely, Hak ve Özgürlük (Rights and Freedoms) and Права и свободи (Prava i svobodi, Rights and Freedoms). Initially, the former version had a run of 100,000 copies and the latter of 50,000 (Poulton 1991: 169–170). To a degree the now defunct state-wide periodical’s function was taken over by the Bulgarian weekly offshoot of the Zaman daily from Turkey, also known by the same name as the Turkish daily, namely Zaman (Time, 1992–). Some low-run local, specialized, religious, educational, and childrens’ periodicals appeared in the 1990s, most either bilingual with two separate language versions, or with some Bulgarian-language content. For instance, Müslümanlar (Muslims, 1990–2000) (with the parallel Bulgarian-language version Мюсюлмани (Miusiulmani) [1990–2003]) that became the bilingual monthly MüslümanlarМюсюлмани (Miusiulmani) in 2005, Işık- Светлина (Svetlina, Light, 1991– 1992),20 Cırcır– Щурче (Shturche, Sound Made by a Cricket, 1991–1996), İslam Kültürü (Islamic Culture, 1992–1994) (with the parallel Bulgarian-language version Ислямска култура (Isliamska kultura), 1992–1994), Güven- Доверие (Doverie, Confidence, 1992–1996), Filiz (Sprout, 1992–), Balon (Balloon, 1994–2002), or Ümit- Юмит (Iumit, Hope, 1995–). Many quickly went defunct. In the first decade of the 21st century, Kırcaali Haber (Kardzhali News, 2007–) became a popular newspaper readily available across Bulgaria, thanks to its website, like its aforementioned competitor, the weekly Zaman. A handful of new low-run periodicals also followed, namely, Kaynak (Font, 2000–), Hoşgörü (Tolerance, 2003–), Mozaik (Mosaic, 2007–), or Alev (Flame, 2008–) (Turan 1998: 302; Yenisoy 2012). In 2011 an all-country bilingual, Turkish-Bulgarian, weekly was planned, but due to a nationalist backlash this project came to a naught. One would look in vain for Turkish-language periodicals in Sofia or at a regular newspaper kiosk in Bulgaria. They are mostly distributed via informal channels, hidden out of ethnic Bulgarians’ view, like Turkish-language ad hoc booklets or school textbooks (Apostolova 2011; Marushiakova and Popov 2015). In 2010 around nine fully or partly Turkish-language periodicals circulated among Bulgaria’s Turks. But it seems that many of them were actually published and printed in Turkey (Vassilev 2010: 303–304). Apart from textbooks for minority Turkish schools, the publishing of Turkishlanguage poetry and fiction in communist Bulgaria was a highly politicized affair. It took off in 1959 when the last solely Turkish-medium schools were closed down or replaced with bilingual Bulgarian-Turkish counterparts. In 1959 two volumes

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were published and as many as 18 in 1966. Afterward the production plummeted rapidly to a mere three titles in 1969, which was the end of Turkish-language book publishing in People’s Bulgaria (Şimşir 1988: 223–224, 236–239). Ostensibly, there was no need for continuing with such a fig leaf-style observance of minority rights, given that in 1968 Sofia and Ankara signed an agreement that allowed for state-approved emigration of 130,000 Turks (Muslims) from Bulgaria to Turkey between 1969 and 1978 (Şimşir 1988: 301). After the end of communism, Turkishlanguage textbooks are published in Bulgaria again, alongside a modest number of Turkish-language books for general consumption among Bulgarian Turks. For instance, in 2015 there were 19 Turkish-language book titles published in Bulgaria with the total run of 5,000 copies. Out of this number, 13 were volumes of poetry and fiction. By comparison, in the same year 304 volumes were published in English with a total run of 112,000 copies, 52 in Russian with the total run of 14,000, 23 in German with the total run of 13,000, and 18 in French with the total run of 7,000 copies. In 2015 the number of Bulgarian-language titles amounted to 8,857 that were printed in 4.73 million copies (Izdadeni 2015). Given that in today’s Bulgaria Turks roughly amount to a tenth of the country’s population, this should translate into at least 880 Turkish-language book titles per annum with the total run of 473,000 copies. Obviously, under the current circumstances, Bulgaria’s Turks may purchase Turkish-language books and periodicals directly from Turkey or access Turkishlanguage mass media on the Internet or via satellite and cable television. Furthermore, while researching for this book I came across the vibrant Turkishlanguage Internet news platform T Haber (T News), established in 2013. It provides a wealth of articles, alongside some television and radio programs, including a little in Bulgarian, too. The platform is hosted in Bulgaria and specifically targets the country’s Turks and Muslims, as evidenced by its mission: Bulgaristan’ı Türkçe okuyun (‘Bulgaria Reads in Turkish’) (T Haber 2013; T Haber 2016). Similar online media platforms in Turkish were also developed by the aforementioned weekly Zaman published in Bulgaria, and for the Pomak audience, namely, the Pomak Ajans (Pomak Agency) (Pomak Ajans 2016). Quite significantly, in 1998 Sofia reached out to Bulgarian Turks and Muslims in Turkey, promulgating a law that allows the 1989 expellees to keep (or regain) Bulgarian citizenship, even if they have acquired another (mainly, Turkish) (Kalinova 2014: 574). However, the acceptance of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims has been at best half-hearted (cf. Rechel 2007). For instance, the first postcommunist census in Bulgaria, held in December 1992, in accordance with the official acceptance of the multiethnic and polyconfessional character of this country, reintroduced the formerly banned statistical categories of Turks or Muslims. Following the democratic principle of the freedom of self-identification, people were free to declare whatever ethnic (national) identity and religious affiliation they wanted. It appeared that any impositions from above in this regard on the part of the state administrations were over. But soon the Iakoruda (Якоруда, Yakoruda in Turkish) cause célèbre showed how fragile the fledgling Bulgarian democracy was.

The aftermath and the regime change 101 In the counties of Iakoruda and Gotse Delchev (Гоце Делчев, Nevrokop or Gotse Delçev in Turkish), located in the southwestern Province of Blagoevgrad (Благоевград, Cuma-ı Bala21 in Turkish), 36,000 people declared that they were Turks. Nationalists pounced on this ‘unacceptable result,’ claiming that the ‘too big’ number of Turkish declarations was due to the MRF’s undue pressure and canvassing for the Turkish cause, which amounted to ‘forced Turkification’ (Höpken 1997: 76). ‘In reality,’ the nationalists emphasized that these people were ‘really Bulgarian Muslims,’ that is, Slavophone Pomaks. Indeed, most of those concerned did not speak Turkish. The Parliament accepted the nationalist line of thinking on this issue and tacitly adopted a purely linguistic definition of ‘nationality,’ or the fact of belonging to an ethnolinguistically construed nation (Pomatsite 2005). No one listened to scholars who sanely remarked that where Pomaks live in proximity to Turks, the Muslim commonality, reinforced by recent persecution and expulsions of Turks and Muslims, encourages Pomaks to adopt Turkish identity and language (Höpken 1997: 76). After a series of stormy deliberations, on 17 September 1993, both BSP and UDF deputies joined forces to nullify the offending census result as ‘irrelevant.’ In the pre-1989 zhivkovite fashion, from above, in blatant breach of the 29 December 1989 promise of full respect for the human and political rights of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims, and without seeking an opinion of those concerned, the Parliament redefined the 36,000 self-declared Turks as Bulgarians (that is, Bulgarian-speakers) of the ‘Mohammedan religion’ (that is, Islam) (Dvesta 1993; Karamihova 2007: 38; Konstantinov 1997: 36; Marushiakova and Popov 2004: 36–38; Mincheva 2005; Sakhatchiev 1996). By comparison, after 1989 the previously officially ‘non-existent’ German minority was recognized in Poland, numbering then over 300,000 persons. Neither in 1989 nor now has there been any German-speaking locality remaining in postwar Poland. In everyday life the overwhelming majority of Poland’s Germans communicate either in Silesian (a Slavic language) or Polish. However, in the subsequent postcommunist censuses they have been invariably declaring German nationality and language. Polish nationalists disliked this development, but the Polish government and administration did not even dare to propose that these ‘unobjective’ results be nullified. This would have been a blatant breach of individual freedom and the principles of democracy. Potentially, such a move would have endangered the freshly postcommunist Poland’s warming relations with the just reunified Germany. Polish politicians were keenly aware that Poland’s way to the European Union led through Berlin (Kamusella 2014). Ankara had no such leverage over Bulgaria, while the European Union and the OSCE were somehow not really interested in exerting pressure on Sofia on account of the socalled ‘Iakoruda case.’ It was in spite of the so-called Copenhagen criteria adopted in the Danish capital on 22 June 1993. Each EU candidate state must conform to these principles as the prerequisite for opening membership negotiations. One of the criteria provides for ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ (Accession 2016). And even more curiously, no Bulgarian politician is perturbed by the continued under-reporting of Roma in Bulgarian censuses, who officially amount to 325,000,

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though their actual number is over twice as big and assessed at 0.8 million (Pogány 2006: 341; Thompson 2013: 558). It is so because, in line with the nationalist line of thinking unlike in the Iakoruda case, fewer Roma means more ‘true’ Bulgarians, despite rife anti-Romism (anti-Gypsyism) that almost emulates apartheid in the case of Bulgaria’s Roma (cf. Tsoneva 2015). Other examples of anti-Turkish (anti-Muslim) moves by the political elite in early postcommunist Bulgaria include when in 1994 the BSP attempted to force through the Parliament a bill banning the use of Turkish in the Bulgarian military forces. As a result, Bulgarian Turks drafted for military service would have been punished for speaking in this language to their ethnically Turkish colleagues (Vassilev 2010: 303). In 1995 the BSP government changed the electoral law in such a way that it allowed the governing party to contest the results of local elections, which were held in October and November this year. On this basis, the election of an ethnic Turk as mayor of the city of Kardzhali, in Bulgaria’s most Turkish Province of Kardzhali, was petitioned as invalid. In February 1996, the Kardzhali City Court retracted the mayor’s mandate. As a result a by-election was held, which conveniently was won by an ethnic Bulgarian (Eminov 1999: 38–39). After 1989 Bulgaria did not recognize its Turkish population as a minority in any single piece of legislation. In 1999 such a recognition arrived, but from outside when Sofia signed the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Only in this international treaty, at long last, postcommunist Bulgaria formally recognized Bulgarian Turks as a national minority (Vassilev 2010: 303). Similar anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim abuses of legislation and nationally induced miscarriages of justice continue across Bulgaria to this day. For example, in 2013 and 2014 MRF deputies and members were repeatedly fined for canvassing in Turkish, the argument being that Article 3 of the Bulgarian Constitution designates Bulgarian as the country’s sole official language. Ergo, neither Turkish nor any other ‘foreign’ language can be employed in Bulgarian public – and especially, political – life (Bulgarian Party 2013; Constitution 1991; Leviev-Sawyer 2014a; Leviev-Sawyer 2015). On the same basis, in 2014 it was proposed that the Bulgarian National Television should stop broadcasting brief daily news bulletins in Turkish (Leviev-Sawyer 2014b). This situation begins to look similar to what occurred during the ‘Revival Process’ and the ‘Big Excursion’ when Turks, Roma, and Muslims speaking ‘foreign languages’ (that is, Turkish or Romani) were fined and harassed. Obviously, ethnic Bulgarians conducting business and liaising with the European Union institutions with the use of English, French, or German do not suffer such indignities. Last but not least, the half-hearted semi-inclusion of Turks and Muslims in present-day Bulgaria is illustrated by the failed assassination attempt on Ahmed Dogan in 2013. The incident remains unexplained, despite numerous sites on the Internet with footage of this event (Elder 2013; Failed 2013). But the attempted assassination compelled Dogan to leave politics and retire from his post as President of the MRF (Avramov 2015; Dogan se 2013). However, he remains the party’s Honorary Chairman (Mustafa 2016).

The aftermath and the regime change 103 Part of the problem may be the fact that the actual character and immensity of the 1989 ethnic cleansing has not been fully acknowledged yet, let alone researched in depth or appropriately commemorated as a lieu de mémoire or even the most important breaking point of the recent Bulgarian history (before it becomes, as it should, part and parcel of European history). The same is true of the 1989 ethnic cleansing’s aftermath and various ramifications that continue to shape Bulgaria to this day, alongside the country’s relations with Turkey and the European Union. When talking to Bulgarians about the apparent dearth of research articles and monographs devoted to the euphemistically dubbed ‘Big Excursion,’ one is often met with the reply that ‘everyone knows about it,’ suggesting that there is no need to do any research or write on the subject. I beg to differ. Strangely, the botched 1999 blowing up of the Mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov (1882–1849) (or the first leader of communist Bulgaria) in Sofia (Destroying 2007) is obliquely pushed to the forefront of postcommunist Bulgaria’s history (cf. Todorova 2006). I am not saying that it should not be remembered. The destruction of the mausoleum may usefully serve as a symbolic closure of the communist period. But it would be plainly wrong if the razing of this edifice and burying its embalmed tenant (already in 1990) were to help keep the 1989 ethnic cleansing in the shadow. A curtain of forgetfulness is tightly drawn over the 1989 expulsion. The memory of this tragic event is inexplicably abandoned. Its specter is left unexorcised to haunt future generations of Bulgarians, Turks and Europeans. That a quarter of a century after the ethnic cleansing Bulgarian historians and social scientists still prefer not to deal with the subject is surprising, to say the least. In present-day Bulgaria the shrouding of the 1989 expulsion of Turks in silence seems to be more preferable to discussing it openly, let alone in the appropriate depth that this event requires. Why? Some, who prefer a clean break with the unsavory past and thus are intent on shifting all responsibility on those in power prior to the first free elections in June 1990, simply blame the Bulgarian Communist Party for committing this crime of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, alongside any other wrongdoings perpetrated during the communist period. They add, that after having realized this error, the party quickly changed gears at the turn of 1989, reversing the policies of forced assimilation and expulsion of Turks and Muslims. Hence, now there is nothing left to be done with regard to this matter for today’s Bulgarians (cf. Lilov 1989). It sounds like the proverbial washing of hands with regards to the ‘Big Excursion.’ Others propose to explain this phenomenon of generalized amnesia by pointing out the fact that during the last stages of the Zhivkov regime the vast majority of Bulgaria’s historians and social scientists were dragooned into ad hoc committees and research teams that were tasked with producing ‘scientific evidence’ that would ‘prove beyond any doubt’ the inherent Bulgarianness of Bulgaria’s all Turks and Muslims22 (Daskalov 2011: 334; Konstantinov 1997: 35–36; Grochowska 2003). Hence, in order to embark on research devoted to the ‘Revival Process’ and especially to the ‘Big Excursion,’ in most cases, these scholars would have to critically analyze their own or their colleagues’ highly ideologized papers on the

104 The aftermath and the regime change subject, or to propose that their doctoral students would do it. Potentially this exercise could cost many a scholar a loss of face, hence research on the 1989 ethnic cleansing is still best avoided in today’s Bulgaria (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). The most opportune moment to come to terms with this ‘scholarship’ was on 10 January 1990, when 60 scholars (mainly historians) of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the University of Sofia, and the National Library approved the restoration of human and political rights to Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. As a caveat, they emphasized it was the BCP that had forced them to provide ‘scientific justification’ of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the preceding assimilation campaign (Poulton 1991: 164). However, they failed to act upon their declaration, and no research was done on their ‘scientific work’ written in support of such criminal actions by the authorities. As a result, the subject of the 1989 ethnic cleansing is not broached in school history textbooks (Kalinova 2014: 589), and new generations of Bulgarians born and raised after the end of communism have no knowledge of the ‘Big Excursion.’ The generalized amnesia deepens even without the totalitarian state’s apparatus that had enforced silence on taboo subjects before 1989 (Daskalov 2011: 334). This attitude to the recent past veers away from the European norm of open and free discussion, and is eerily similar to China’s official erasure of the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989 from books and any discourse permitted in the country’s public space (Lim 2014). A similar silence on the 1989 ‘Great Migration’ continues in Turkey, despite some books published on the subject; all of them in very small runs. Perhaps there is nothing to be gained on part of the Turkish state. As a result, besides collecting stories of expellees, the authorities desist from supporting research projects that would delve into the origins, mechanisms, dynamics and outcomes of the 1989 ethnic cleansing. Reversing this prevalent trend, among others, would also necessitate an honest probe into Turkey’s program of forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing (resettlement) of the country’s Kurds. Talking openly about the ‘Kurdish question’ is as much a taboo in Turkey, as the ‘Big Excursion’ in Bulgaria. On this basis, I assume that the quid pro quo between Ankara and Sofia is that as long as Bulgaria does not raise the issue of Turkey’s Kurds, the Turks will refrain from looking too deeply into the 1989 ethnic cleansing. Luckily for this amnesiac trend that makes the 1989 ethnic cleansing a virtual taboo in, both, Bulgaria and Turkey, international scholars’ and experts’ gaze has remained fully turned away to the wars of post-Yugoslav succession and the horrific acts of ethnic cleansings and genocide connected to these wars. As a result, to this day, they have failed to investigate the 1989 of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria. Tim Judah (1962–) is one of the reporters-cum-scholars who made their careers on covering the tragic events in the postcommunist Balkans. He wrote numerous articles and hugely popular monographs on these events. In 1990 Judah briefly reported for the Guardian on the systemic change in Bulgaria and the aftermath of the ‘Big Excursion’ (Judah 1990). But the commercial logic of the mass media is to be on the lookout for sensational news that would boost sales. The uninteresting lack of an outbreak of some war, ethnic strife or insurgency in

The aftermath and the regime change 105 freshly postcommunist Bulgaria was not news. Hence, Judah decided to move on to Belgrade where the action was: ‘In 1991, as post-revolutionary Romania faded from the news, rumblings of war could be heard from neighboring Yugoslavia. Tim and his family moved [from Bucharest] to Belgrade, which was a base for covering the Croatian and Bosnian wars’ (Tim Judah 2006). As though the news of preventing a possible Turkish–Bulgarian war or civil war in Bulgaria could not be made into a rapturous story that would grab the attention of millions of readers.

Notes 1 Perhaps the accidental coincidence of the environmental conference, the clash of prodemocracy demonstrators with the DS forces, and the subsequent swift deposition of Zhivkov gave rise to the popularly accepted but rather simplistic conclusion that the regime change in Bulgaria was effected by environmental activists. This claim proposes that the delegitimation of communist power in Bulgaria began, first, with the disastrous explosion in the nuclear plant in Chernobyl (today’s Chornobyl) in Soviet Ukraine, and became complete when in 1988–1989 people started speaking out and protesting against the life-threatening air pollution in Ruse (Русе in Bulgarian, Rusçuk in Turkish) on the Danubian border with Romania, where across the river the Romanian inhabitants of Giurgiu (Yergöğü in Turkish) suffered the same fate (Cellarius 2004: 29–30; Crampton 2015b; Ruse 2016; Tzvetkov 1993: 415). 2 In light of the transliteration system of the Bulgarian Cyrillic accepted here, the city’s name should read Kurdzhali. However, I settled for the spelling Kardzhali, because it is most common in Anglophone literature. 3 This slogan calling for ‘Unity’ referred to Zhivkov’s policy of building a unitary (or in other words, ethnically homogeneous) Bulgarian socialist nation (edinata bulgarska sotsialisticheska natsiia) (cf. Todorov 1976: 149–150). 4 But only a month later, on 9 February 1990, the DS was ordered to cease any operations against the democratic opposition in Bulgaria (Katsunov 2011: 306). 5 I am aware only of a single Bulgarian-language title that refers to the end of communism in Bulgaria as ‘revolution’ (Ludzhev 2008–2012). 6 In reunified Germany the term die Wende (‘the Change’ or ‘Turning Point’) is employed interchangeably with the term Revolution (cf. Bahrmann and Links 1994–1995; Neubert 2008). Perhaps, the former is a reflection of the fact that much of the systemic change in East Germany was not driven internally, but rather was imposed from outside by West Germany that effectively absorbed the former country. Ostensibly, the mass demonstrations against the East German communist regime in fall 1989 are referred to as the ‘Peaceful Revolution’ (Friedliche Revolution), which is seen as the beginning of die Wende. The latter term embraces all the momentous events of 1989 and 1990, including the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany (Wende 2016). It is probable that the German term die Wende influenced the coining of the Bulgarian term Goliamata Promiana. 7 The promise of such a ‘pact’ was realized two years later, when on 6 May 1992, Bulgaria and Turkey signed a Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness, Cooperation and Security (Petkova 2002: 55). The treaty was modelled on the German–Polish Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation contracted on 17 June 1991 (cf. Snyder 1993: 259). Between 1993 and 1995, over a hundred similar bilateral treaties (many with minority protection clauses) were contracted among postcommunist and post-Soviet states (including some Western neighbors, such as Germany or Austria) as the basis of the Pact on Stability in Europe. The French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur (1929–) proposed this pact in 1993 (hence, it is also known as the Balladur Plan). The CSCE adopted it in the following year and the CSCE-turned-OSCE took it under its

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wing in 1995. The general aim was to defuse potential ethnic tensions within and between these states (Teasdale and Bainbridge 2016). This cut-off date left out Muslim Roma, Tatar and Alevi protesters thrown into prison, as these groups’ names were Bulgarianized mostly between 1981 and mid-1984 (Şimşir 1988: 275). Arguably, the inner core of this ‘governing circle’ was composed of Zhivkov himself, Chudomir Aleksandrov, Georgi Atanasov, Iordan Iotov, Pencho Kubadinski, Stoian Mikhailov, Petur Mladenov, and Dimitur Stoianov (Poulton 1991: 166). Chudomir Aleksandrov (1936–1998) was Secretary of the BCP Central Committee in 1981–1984 and 1986–1988, and served as Deputy Prime Minister in Andrei Lukanov’s BCP/BSP cabinet of 8 February – 21 September 1990. Georgi Atanasov (1933–) served as Prime Minister under Zhivkov and in the immediate aftermath of the latter’s deposition, from 24 March 1986 to 8 February 1990. Iordan Iotov (1920–2012) was Secretary of the BCP Central Committee in 1986–1988, and importantly, between 1979 and 1989 served as Editor-in-Chief of the BCP’s daily press organ Rabotnichesko delo (Worker’s Cause). Pencho Kubadinski (1918–1995) was briefly First Secretary of the BCP Central Committee (1968–1971) and served as a full member of the State Council from 11 July 1957 to 10 November 1989. Stoian Mikhailov (1930–) was Secretary of the BCP Central Committee (1978–1988) and briefly served as Deputy Prime Minister in 1989. Petur Mladenov (1936–2000) served as Foreign Minister (13 December 1971 – 20 October 1989), succeeded Zhivkov as General Secretary of the BCP Central Committee (10 November 1989 – 2 January 1990), became Chairman of the State Council (17 November 1989 – 3 April 1990), and subsequently Chairman of the Republic (‘President,’ 3 April – 6 July 1990). Dimitur Stoianov (1928–1999) was Minister of Internal Affairs (responsible for the DS) between 1973 and 1988, and also served as Secretary of the BCP Central Committee (13 December 1988 – 16 November 1989). This Bulgarian form of address has its direct counterpart in Russian, namely the title Batiushka (Батюшка, literally ‘Daddy’), employed as a simultaneously reverent and intimate way of talking to or about a priest or a man of power, for instance, ‘Batiushka Stalin’ (Batiushka 2016a). In Belarusian the title is Bats’ka (Бацька). Phonetically and semantically (though not etymologically, as the Bulgarian, Belarusian and Russian titles derive from Church Slavonic [Batiushka 2016b]) it is similar to the Turkic title Baş(-ı) (literally ‘head, leader’), employed to address men of power (Baş 2016). Hence, the late Turkmenistan leader, Saparmurat Niyazov’s (1940–2006), official bombastic title Türkmenbaşy, that is, ‘Leader or Head of all the Turkmens’ (Türkmenbaşy 2016). The Anglicized title ‘Pasha’ for high officials in Persia and the Ottoman Empire stems either from Turkic Baş(-ı) (as in present-day Turkish words başkan for ‘president’ or başkent for ‘capital city’) or from the Persian royal title Padishah (that is, pād for ‘master’ and shāh for ‘king’) (Padishah 2016; Pasha 2016). Obviously, all the cases to a degree must have been influenced by the example of the Turkish leader, Kamal Mustafa, who in 1934 proclaimed himself as Atatürk, or ‘Father of the Turks’ (Gesetz 1934). The company’s name is the Japanese martial arts’ term ippon (一本, ‘one full point’) for the highest score possible in judo or kendo (Ippon 2017). It is widely known that Boiko Borisov is a keen judoist (Boiko 2011). In his novel that spins around the trial of Zhivkov, Barnes rightly predicted that Zhivkov would be let off the hook rather lightly and easily. Although other Soviet bloc leaders are mentioned in The Porcupine by their real-life names (Barnes 1992: 79–80), Zhivkov is disguised under the pseudonym ‘Stoyo Petkanov.’ Likewise, when Barnes writes about ‘genocide’ perpetrated by Zhivkov (Barnes 1992: 16, 32), instead of mentioning Bulgarian Turks and Muslims who were the victims of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, the novelist refers to them as a ‘Hungarian minority’ (Barnes 1992: 131). There was not and is not any Hungarian minority in Bulgaria, unlike in neighboring Romania. I guess

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the publisher advised Barnes to change Zhivkov’s name and to replace the actual Turkish minority with a Hungarian one in order to deflect any libel lawsuits. Furthermore, in the novel (perhaps conceived and written in the heady year 1990 or 1991) Barnes presciently foresaw that Zhivkov would be rehabilitated (Barnes 1992: 78, 103) and any accusations and lawsuits against the dictator would come to naught (Barnes 1992: 136). The writer was right on both counts, though such charges were actually dropped as late as 1995. Meanwhile the personality cult of Zhivkov that took off in the mid-1990s developed into a full-blown affair (which unfortunately continues to this day) after the former dictator’s death in 1997. In addition, Barnes predicted the 1993 breakup of Czechoslovakia (Barnes 1992: 80) and that Bulgarians and scholars would quickly forget what really brought about the end of communism in Bulgaria (Barnes 1992: 42), namely the 1989 expulsion of 360,000 Turks and Muslims. Other euphemisms used by the DS in order not to utter the abhorred ethnonym ‘Turks,’ included, ‘Islamized Bulgarians’ (ислямизирани българи isliamizirani bulgari), ‘Bulgarians-Muslims’ (българи-мюсюлмани Bulgari-miusiulmani), ‘Bulgarian citizens [who are] Muslims’ (български граждани мюсюлмани bulgarski grazhdani miusiulmani), or in the case of Turkish activists, the authorities branded them as ‘fanatics’ (фанатици fanatitsi) (Angelov 2015: 26, 35, 44, 47). Interestingly, in the DS’s internal vocabulary, the unit responsible for monitoring and assimilating Turks was known as the ‘Turkish Unit’ (Tурски отдел Turski otdel) (Angelov 2015: 25). The BSP was as much pleased as frightened by its own electoral success. In a way the communists continued governing Bulgaria, but they lacked necessary legitimacy at the international stage and among a considerable section of the country’s population. Hence, they engaged in a multilateral dialog with the UDF, first to prevent any huge conflict that would further destabilize the state, and second in expectation that sooner or later the UDF would take over the government (Katsunov 2011: 376–377). On 10 July 1990 the first postcommunist Bulgarian parliament assembled in a celebratory manner at the medieval Bulgarian capital in Veliko Turnovo. It became a tradition for the Bulgarian parliament to assemble there on occasions deemed as of historical importance for modern Bulgaria. The tradition commenced in 1879, when Parliament adopted the first-ever Bulgarian constitution in this city. Yet, another occasion of this type occurred, for instance, in 1949, when Parliament promulgated the first communist constitution (cf. Gesheva 2001). Some propose that these vital documents were not burnt, while the fire was used as a cover in order to remove them from the House of the Party. If that is true, those who are now in possession of these documents may employ them to blackmail these politicians, civil servants and entrepreneurs in present-day Bulgaria who previously might have participated in deciding about the ‘Revival Process’ and the ‘Big Excursion’ (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). Ironically, one could propose that Bulgarian communism began with a fire and came to an end in a fire. The final fire was the 1990 burning of the House of the Party in Sofia, while the inaugural fire was the arson attack on the Reichstag (German Parliament) in Berlin on 27 February 1933. The burning of the Reichstag solidified Adolf Hitler’s (1889–1945) hold on power and rapidly paved the way to totalitarianstyle dictatorship in Germany (Manvel and Fraenkel 1974; Tobias 1964; Verordnung 1933). Conveniently, foreigners were blamed for starting the Reichstag fire, among them, the Bulgarian communist, Georgi Dimitrov (1882–1949). He calmly and successfully undertook his own defense. After his release, Dimitrov went to the Soviet Union, where in 1944 he was tasked with taking over the government in Bulgaria. He successfully laid the foundations of the communist regime in this country, which he ruled until his death in 1949. His brother-in-law, Valko Chervenkov (1900–1980), succeeded him. But the death of Joseph Stalin ushered national communism into the Soviet bloc, hence the ‘local communist,’ with no record of a prolonged stay in the

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Soviet Union, Todor Zhivkov, replaced Chervenkov as First Secretary of the BCP in 1954 (Dimitrov 1960 [1933–1934]; Interview 1934; Stankova 2010). 18 In 1995 only a third of ethnic Bulgarians would not accept Turks (Muslims) as neighbors (Gradev 1995: 66). However, fewer than a fifth of ethnic Bulgarians would let their children marry a Turk (Muslim), which translates into strong endogamy between both groups that continues to this day. In 1994 a quarter of ethnic Bulgarians did not accept the existence of any ethnic Turkish party (that is, the MRF), as many as half disagreed that Turks should be permitted to serve as deputies in the Bulgarian Parliament, two-thirds would forbid Turkish minority education, 72 percent considered all Turks to be ‘religious fanatics,’ while a mere 12 percent would approve of a Turkish minister in government (Höpken 1997: 77). Obviously, none (or just a couple of individuals) would consent that an ethnic Turk (Muslim) could become a Bulgarian President or Prime Minister. Unfortunately, this multifaceted (cultural, marital, social and political) separation of Bulgaria’s Turks (Muslims) and ethnic Bulgarians (Orthodox Christians) is a tangible divide that one day might be easily transformed into a clear-cut line of conflict, if a political party or influential movement decides to use it to this end. 19 Interestingly, one of the main reasons that convinced many 1989 expellees to return to Bulgaria was the fact that they had hard time comprehending the Turkish language as spoken and written in Turkey. The language barrier arose so sharply, because their own (Bulgarian, Balkan) Turkish language (Koloğlu 2015: 43–55) did not undergo the rapid engineering (‘reform’) that during the interwar period ‘purified’ Turkey’s Turkish of Arabicisms and Persianisms. Furthermore, the Latin alphabet superseded the Arabic script for writing this new (Anatolian) Turkish in 1928 (Gheorghieva 1998: 15; Koloğlu 2015: 223–293; Lewis 1999). In this way a radically different (modern, Anatolian) Turkish language was created in the Republic of Turkey. The distance between Turkey’s (Anatolian) Turkish and the Bulgarian (Balkan) Turkish was deepened by the fact that between 1934 and 1944, Arabic letters had to be employed for writing and publishing in the latter (Şimşir 1988: 243–244). A fledgling Kemalist secularist organization Turan in Bulgaria that, among others, successfully promoted the Latin alphabet and the new Turkish language was dissolved in the wake of the Bulgarian military coup d’état of 1934 (Höpken 1997: 62). At the same time the Latin alphabet was banned in Bulgaria for Turkish-language publications, and the authorities fully imposed the Arabic script in this function, also as a measure of isolating the country’s Turks from any unwanted intellectual influences which might radiate from Kemalist Turkey (Poulton 1997: 207–208). When Turkish-medium education was revived in postwar Bulgaria in 1946, the imposition of communism on this country was usefully reflected by the parallel imposition of Latin letters on the Bulgarian Turkish, despite the Muslim religious elite’s opposition to this move. Their influence and the teaching of the Arabic script in any widespread manner ended in 1952 when Quran-based religious instructions and scholarship were banned. Among the staff of communist Bulgaria’s postwar Turkish-medium university departments and three teachers colleges, instructors and academics from Soviet Azerbaijan (and some other Turkic-speaking Soviet republics) predominated (Baeva and Kalinova 2009a: 20; Höpken 1997: 65; Marushiakova and Popov 2004: 10; Şimşir 1988: 234, 245). The advantage was that they were loyal communists and in addition fully literate in the Latin alphabet-based Turkish. Azeri is as close as or even closer to Turkish than Bulgarian (Balkan) Turkish. Like Turkish, Azeri was ‘purified’ and engineered into a language in its own right in the interwar Soviet Union, and was written in Latin characters through 1939, when Cyrillic was imposed on it (Grenoble 2003: 51). Last but not least, because illiteracy was three times more prevalent among Bulgaria’s Turks (30 percent) than ethnic Bulgarians (10 percent) (Şimşir 1988: 195–196), the liquidation of this phenomenon by the 1950s meant that the vast majority of the country’s Turks became literate in the

The aftermath and the regime change 109 Latin alphabet-based Turkish (Höpken 1997: 64). The subsequent infusion of the Bulgarian Turkish with Azeri linguistic loans and Soviet calques from Russian was perceived by some Turkish intellectuals in Bulgaria and Turkey as an unwanted ‘distortion’ (Şimşir 1988: 245). 20 Işık-Svetlina was just a short-lived postcommunist reincarnation of communist Bulgaria’s most important and longest-lasting Turkish newspaper. The communist version was published from April 1945 to January 1985. In 1948 Işık was renamed as Yeni Işık (New Light) in a preparation to become the authorities’ main propaganda outlet directed at Bulgaria’s Turkish minority. Apart from Sovietization, this newspaper also spearheaded the differentiation of Bulgaria’s Turkish from standard Turkish by infusing the former with numerous Azeri linguistic loans. In the 1971 Yeni Işık became a bilingual, Turkish-Bulgarian, Yeni Işık-Нова светлина (Nova svetlina), in which the Turkish content was progressively limited to a mere 10 percent in 1984 and 1985 before the newspaper became a Bulgarian-language only Nova svetlina. In turn, in 1991 Nova svetlina returned to the bilingual formula, renamed as Işık-Svetlina. But the bad mamories of Yeni Işık-Nova svetlina that was one of the BCP’s instruments of forced assimilation made the postcommunist Işık-Svetlina ideologically suspect in the eyes of potential readers, which eventually condemned this initiative. Hence, in 1992 the bilingual newspaper was boldly renamed Güven-Doverie (Confidence), but it went defunct four years later, in 1996 (Cambazov 2011; Şimşir 1988: 244–245). 21 Before 1950 the Bulgarian name of this city was derived from the Turkish one and read Gorna Dzhumaia (Горна джумая). Subsequently, it was renamed in honor of Dimitur Blagoev (Nikolov) (1856–1924), the founder of the first socialist party in the Balkans, namely the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party in 1891. 22 It is proposed, but without providing necessary evidence, that during the communist period some scholars – especially historians – ‘warned against compromising scholarship by bending to political pressure or working on commission’ (Daskalov 2011: 353).

5

The official coming to terms with the 1989 ethnic cleansing

The initial program of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) consisted of the following three main goals: development, participation and rehabilitation. The first goal assumed an improvement in the general level of education and of the standard of living among Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims so that this level would become equal to that enjoyed by all Bulgarians. Another aim called for the full participation of Turks and Muslims in politics and all other walks of public life in Bulgaria. Last but not least, rehabilitation meant a liquidation of the consequences of the forced assimilation campaign from the latter half of the 1980s and of the 1989 expulsion (Troebst 1994: 34). To this end, on 5 March 1990 the still communist Bulgarian Parliament passed a law returning Turkish and Muslim names and surnames to all whose documents had been ‘Bulgarianized’ and who requested such a reversal. On 1 August 1990, the first officially non-communist government of Bulgaria (de facto still run by an old BCP/BSP apparatchik, Andrei Lukanov) decided that repossessed real estate and property should be returned to the expellees who had come back to Bulgaria. Two years later, this decision was made into a law in August 1992 (Kalinova 2014: 569, 572). In 1992 the poet and Ecoglasnost dissident turned MP, Edvin Sugarev (1953–), declared that the 1989 ethnic cleansing was a ‘genocide against part of the Bulgarian people’ (Kalinova 2014: 573). Five years later, on 29 July 1997, freshly sworn in as Bulgarian President, Petur Stoianov (1952–), while delivering a speech in the Turkish Parliament in Ankara, admitted that the changing of Turkish and Muslim names was ‘one of the most shameful pages’ in Bulgarian history (Lütem 2000: 64). He also referred to the ‘Big Excursion,’ albeit in quite a roundabout manner by saying that ‘[t]his disgrace [of the persecution of Turks] in Bulgarian history is not the fault of [the] Bulgarian people at all, it is the shame of that time’s communist party and, in recent years, there are no such cruelties or persecutions [carried out] against the Turks living in Bulgaria’ (Bulgarian President 1997). This throw-away remark ingeniously deflected any blame from ethnic Bulgarians for the anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish atrocities and attitudes of this kind that continue to hold sway in today’s Bulgaria; it was as if the anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim mass demonstrations had not taken place at the turn of 1990 after the reformist communists’ government had taken the decisions to observe human and civil rights also in the case of Bulgarian Turks and Muslims.

The official coming to terms with 1989 111 But do the official gestures and democratizing changes in the Bulgarian law mean that a national reconciliation has been accomplished between the perpetrators and the victims of the ‘Revival Process’ and of the ‘Big Excursion,’ or more generally, between Bulgaria and the country’s Turkish and Muslim citizens? That the ethnic tension and prejudice suffered by Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims is safely a thing of the past? And that the proposed national reconciliation has already become a sturdy pillar of the new postcommunist Bulgaria, as presciently proposed by Prime Minister Atanasov on the fateful day of 9 January 1990? I would say no; none of the lofty goals has been fully, unequivocally and irrevocably achieved yet. Somehow the process of national reconciliation has almost ground to a halt. In December 1994, a monument of the Victims of Communism was unveiled in Sofia in the form of a wall with 7,500 names of victims inscribed on it (Gruichev 2015). Many Turks and Muslims are commemorated in this manner, but I am not sure whether the names of all the victims of the anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim repressions during the second half of the 1980s feature on the wall, as they would have to account for at least a third of all the victims featured on this monument. Even if they do, the placing alongside of this group of victims among all others from the period between 1944 and 1989, contributes rather to forgetting than to the remembrance of the murdered Turks and Muslims. During the unveiling of this monument, religious rites were conducted by an Orthodox priest. Tellingly, no Muslim clergyman or rabbi was present, emphasizing the still striven-for (however, tacitly) homogeneously Orthodox character of the Bulgarian nation (Gruichev 2015). Perhaps, that is why Article 13 of the Bulgarian Constitution, apart from securing religious freedom in the country, nevertheless announces that ‘Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria’ (Constitution 1991). As though Islam or Judaism have been somehow less traditional in the Balkans and Bulgaria than Orthodox Christianity. The constitutional provision, without saying this openly, tacitly anoints Orthodox Christianity as Bulgaria’s state and national religion. In 1993 the MRF leader Ahmed Dogan inaugurated a small drinking fountain monument (cheshma) in memory of the three executed local victims of the ‘Revival Process’ in the overwhelmingly Turkish village of Trunak (Трънак in Bulgarian, Tranak in Turkish) (Tranak 2015) in Burgas (Бургас in Bulgarian, Burgaz in Turkish) Province (Kalinova 2014: 574). In 2007 a group of Bulgarian nationalists from the radical far-right populist party Ataka (Attack) defaced this fountain in Trunak and two years later they completely destroyed it, claiming that the commemorated victims had been terrorists. The cheshma has not been rebuilt to this day (Tasev 2014). Also, in 2007 Bulgarian nationalists, led by Ataka, erected a huge, 7-meter tall monument in the hamlet of Bunovo in Sofia Province (Bunovo 2015), where on 9 March 1985, seven people died in a terrorist attack allegedly carried out by Turks / Muslims. The rife but apparently undocumented suggestion is that those commemorated by the Trunak drinking fountain might be the perpetrators of the Bunovo attack (30 godin 2015; Atentat 2015; Kalinova 2014: 588; Kasabova 2009; Patriotite 2015). Not surprisingly, critics of the Trunak

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memorial fountain choose to overlook the fact that at that time terrorist attacks were the sole ‘offensive instrument of defense’ remaining available to Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims against whom the totalitarian state waged an undeclared war. (Furthermore, a strong suspicion is that the majority of the so-called ‘terrorist attacks’ in communist Bulgaria during the 1980s were organized by the state’s security forces themselves in order to stoke up the flagging popularity of the Zhivkov regime [Crampton 2015a].) Terrorism is often the weapon of the weak, oppressed, dispossessed, and powerless1 (cf. Azzam 2003; Fanon 1968: 91, 272). In the Soviet bloc’s historiography such terrorism of subaltern and other economically or nationally oppressed groups was interpreted as legitimate ‘class struggle’ or ‘national liberation struggle,’ as long it took place outside this bloc (cf. Ignatenko 1988: 42; Prášil 1969). But in reality it was the totalitarian communist state that was the most terrorist in its character and impositions on the population within its boundaries (cf. Sanktuarium 1990). The brute force of state violence bred limited reaction expressed in a similar, but hugely diminished, form. Domestic terrorists-vel-freedom fighters (depending on the vantage of observation) stood no chance against the totalitarian state’s security (that is, oppression) apparatus. The Soviet bloc spread terrorism under the guise of ‘class struggle’ and ‘national liberation struggle’ worldwide, but would not tolerate any other but its own state terrorist-style actions against the population at home (Kauffer 1999; Oechmichen 2010: 128). The desperation of Turks and Muslims suffering the unprecedented ravages of forced assimilation during the ‘Revival Process’ was deepened by the state authorities’ reluctance to permit them to leave Bulgaria for Turkey until the very moment of the ‘Big Excursion’ in 1989. Between 1984 and 1989 the state was waging against them (or the tenth of the entire population) a de facto civil war (Avramov 2016: 670). Interestingly, the year 2007 seems to constitute a turning point in the Bulgarian politics of history (Geschichtspolitik). Another low-key broadcast of the 2003 feature film Stolen Eyes (Spasov 2003), this time by the State Bulgarian Television, took place in 2007. It triggered angry protests by Ataka against ‘outrageous lies’ and ‘yet another impudent anti-Bulgarian provocation’ (Kalinova 2014: 589). No politician or intellectual of note dared to criticize Ataka and their intolerant reaction. This was because the vast majority of ethnic Bulgarians actually sympathized (and still do) with Ataka’s anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim attitude. At the grassroots level, many different groups and individual Bulgarians had condemned the film since the very time when it had been produced. There was even an action of collecting signatures to stop the production, and subsequently the release of this film. Like in the Zhivkov times, anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim feeling remains a potent instrument of political mobilization in Bulgaria because most ethnic Bulgarians appear to share this attitude, despite all the democratizing changes since 1989 (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). However, in this ongoing struggle over the remembrance of the recent past (cf. Traverso 2010), Bulgaria’s Muslims and Turks, alongside the MRF, managed to secure a quiet low-key success. In one of the most harrowing scenes in Stolen Eyes a toddler is crushed by a tank. It really happened. On 26 December 1984, in

The official coming to terms with 1989 113 the village of Mogiliane (Могиляне) in the Province of Kardzhali, during a silent protest against the forced name-changing campaign, a tank drove over a 17-monthold baby girl, Türkan (Molla) Hasan (1983–1984), killing her instantly (Tracks 2010). In the village, she has been officially commemorated since the early 1990s, first with a small memorial plaque, and subsequently with a modest cheshma. Each year, on the anniversary of her death celebrations take place at the fountain, gathering thousands of participants (Mekhmedali 2010; Nai-nevrustnata 2016). Frequently high-ranking officials from Turkey attend, too (Mestan 2015). This monument has developed into the most important lieu de mémoire of contemporary Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. The MRF takes care to cultivate this commemorative place because it generates positive social and political cohesion among the party’s electorate, and can hardly be seen as ‘anti-Bulgarian’ by ethnic Bulgarian nationalists (Shiukri 2013). The memory of this innocent victim even crossed the state frontier in 2013, when a monument of baby Türkan and her mother, Fatma, was unveiled in the Turkish city of Edirne in a park, also named after the toddler. In Turkey Türkan has grown into a symbol of the tragic past suffered by all Turkish and Muslim expellees from the Balkans (Park 2013). Another Turkish city, Bursa, followed suit and a year later, in 2014, a cheshma was unveiled there in Türkan’s memory (Turkan 2014). Thus far, Bulgarian nationalists have not attempted to destroy the Türkan cheshma in Mogiliane. Perhaps, they see violence against a memory of a toddler as unbecoming and unmanly. On the other hand, prospective vandals may also be stopped in their tracks by this image of a baby victim that is uncomfortably too close to that of baby Jesus. Due to this latter aspect, the commemorative monument to baby Türkan has the potential of becoming a badly needed all-Bulgarian – and conveniently syncretic – lieu de mémoire. Another victim of the forced name-changing campaign was the young and promising Bulgarian-language poet of Turkish origin, Mekhmed Karakhiuseinov (Mehmed Karahüseyinov, 1945–1990). On 2 February 1985, on the eve of his own renaming, the poet committed a desperate act of protest through self-immolation. He was saved but fell into a coma, which was not sufficient to prevent the authorities from imposing on the unconscious man the Bulgarianized name ‘Metodi Asenov Karakhanov.’ The poet never regained consciousness and died before his original name could be returned to him. During the harrowing time, DS security guards did not allow Karakhiuseinov’s family to take care of him in hospital where he stayed until his death. In quiet defiance of the authorities, his friends published two samizdat2 collections of his poems in 1989 and 1990 (Na 8 oktomvri 2013). Regrettably, only recently were Karakhiuseinov’s tragic protest and poetry brought back into the public discourse on recent Bulgarian history (31 godini 2016). In 2014, the Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Broisov condemned the ‘Revival Process’ and paid a modest homage to the poet and aforementioned baby Türkan (Boiko Borisov osudi 2014). A year later, a foundation named after the poet published a volume with his selected poems (Karakhiuseinov 2015). But no monument has been erected to his memory yet.

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The recent past still divides Bulgaria and neither politicians nor historians have managed to forge a common historical narrative that would bring about unity. Unfortunately, the ongoing transformation of this past into the newest history of Bulgaria has spawned yet another ideological battlefield. Different groups of Bulgaria’s population propose various and oftentimes conflicting, and even mutually exclusive histories of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the forced assimilation campaign from the latter half of the 1980s (cf. Nora 1989: 8; Traverso 2010). Not that this phenomenon is unprecedented or typical only of postcommunist Bulgaria. Such multiple conflicted narratives especially on the past proliferate in deeply divided postcommunist societies. Societies divided alongside ethnic (national), linguistic or ethnoreligious lines (cf. Cultures 2017; Sindbæk Andersen and Törnquist Plewa 2016). For instance, Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs fundamentally differ in the interpretation of the ‘proper’ national ownership of this country (cf. Čolović 2016; Dačić 2016). Whereas the interpretation of the Soviet past and symbols is starkly opposed in the opinions of Russophones on the one hand, and those of Estonian- and Latvian-speakers, in post-Soviet Estonia and Latvia, respectively (cf. Bronze 2017; Cheskin 2016; Kattago 2016: 77–96; Wezel 2016). Furthermore, differences in the remembrance of the same past may also emerge within a supposedly homogeneous ethnolinguistic national community, for instance, between the majority of Latvians and Latvians in Latvia’s region of Latgale, some of who see themselves more as ‘Latgalians’ than Latvians (cf. Gibson 2016). To this day, no monument has been erected to commemorate the tragic 1989 ethnic cleansing of the 360,000 Turks and Muslims (or, for that matter, the victims of the forced assimilation campaign of the 1980s). On the 20th anniversary of this forced expulsion, in 2009, only a modest stream of thoughtful press pieces on the subject appeared (mostly online) and passed without evoking any broader discussion on the subject among the Bulgarian public (cf. Genova 2009; Hershman 2009; Martino 2009). Yet, the neglect of the expellees and of the memory of their fate must have lain heavily on the conscience of the politicians who brought about the systemic change in postcommunist Bulgaria and governed the country for a decade in partnership with the MRF. In October 2009 the former Prime Minister and MP, Ivan Kostov (1949–), backed by liberally minded deputies grouped in the Blue Coalition led by the UDF, proposed that a declaration on the forced assimilation campaign and the 1989 ethnic cleansing should be discussed by the Bulgarian Parliament. The proposal was declined then and again in 2010 (Bulgaria MPs 2010). Finally, the initiative made it to the Parliament’s agenda early the following year, that is, in 2011, when the ruling party GERB decided to lend its support to this initiative. The outcome of the heated discussion gradually turned in favor of the proposed declaration. The central question is why the deputies voting to adopt this document had such a change of heart on this matter, even though they knew well that endorsing this declaration would make many of them unpopular in their respective constituencies, and that voting yes on this matter would possibly cost them their mandates in the subsequent elections. By the way of explanation, foreign observers point to the lasting influence of Tatiana Vaksberg’s 2001 documentary Technology of Evil.

The official coming to terms with 1989 115 Whatever criticisms may be leveled against it, the film shows how the Bulgarian judiciary system has failed the victims and de facto protects perpetrators of the 1989 ethnic cleansing rather than brings them to justice. Not a single perpetrator of the ‘Big Excursion’ or the ‘Revival Process’ has been brought to the dock yet, which does shame the political class in Bulgaria (Turkish Media 2012). Despite some half-hearted attempts, no effective system of transitional justice was put in place for healing the gaping cleavage between the oppressed and the oppressors (Kritz 1995: 706–709; Momchil 2009: 165). Posed with the dilemma of this oftdenigrated as ‘un-Bulgarian’ or – even more strongly – ‘anti-Bulgarian’ declaration, in the context of the continuing lack of research on the 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation and on the 1989 ethnic cleansing, many Bulgarians tend to fall back on conspiracy theories. It is not uncommon to hear that it was the United States and the European Union that twisted the hand of the Bulgarian Parliament to adopt the aforementioned declaration, perhaps, for the sake of placating Turkey almost permanently stalled in its decades-long efforts to join the EU, since it had become an EU (then EEC, or the European Economic Community) associated member in 1963 (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). On 11 January 2012, after three years in the parliamentary works, thanks to the principled efforts of the UDF-led liberal parties grouped in the minority Blue Coalition, the Bulgarian deputies adopted ‘The Declaration Condemning the Attempted Forced Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims’ (Bulgarian MPs 2012). Regrettably, it went largely unnoticed in Europe and the West, but the Turkish mass media praised this Declaration highly, pointing out the unprecedented character of this document. Although the Declaration falls short of a straightforward apology, it decisively breaks with the cozy amnesia surrounding the tragedy of the ‘Revival Process’ and of the 1989 ethnic cleansing.3 The deputies condemned the former and, importantly, recognized the latter as an act of ethnic cleansing. They also appealed that the statute of limitations not be applied to the crimes committed against Bulgarian Turks and Muslims between 1984 and 1989. That these wrongdoings should be considered crimes against humanity, thus permitting for bringing to justice the perpetrators as long as they are alive. Tellingly, during the several years that have elapsed since, not a single one of such perpetrators has been tried (Bulgaria Condemns 2015; Kutlay 2012; Popov 2012; ‘Vuzroditelniat’ 2012). Given the historical importance of this Declaration, below I quote verbatim the document’s latter section, which contains the crucial resolutions. (Sadly, there exists no official translation of the document into English or any other Western language. As if it were hoped that the discussion on the 1989 ethnic cleansing could remain concealed from Europe’s and the world’s gaze, and as such would be limited to Bulgaria’s and Turkey’s attention only.) We, the Deputies of the 41st [Bulgarian] National Assembly declare [. . .] that 1.

We condemn vociferously the assimilation policy of the [Bulgarian] totalitarian communist regime against the Muslim minority in the Republic of Bulgaria, including the so called ‘Revival Process.’

116 The official coming to terms with 1989 2.

3.

We declare the expulsion of more than 360.000 Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin [from Bulgaria to Turkey] in 1989 as an act of ethnic cleansing4 committed by the [Bulgarian] totalitarian regime. We call upon the Bulgarian Justice and the Attorney General of the Republic of Bulgaria that they ensure completion of the case against the perpetrators of the so-called ‘Revival Process.’ Efforts to terminate this case with the use of the statute of limitations means shifting the blame [for this atrocity] onto the Bulgarian people, away from the actual perpetrators.5 (Deklaratsiia 2012 and in Kutlay 201 2; NB: my translation)

It is important to note that officially the Declaration was not adopted under any diplomatic pressure from Turkey or the European Union. Neither did the MRF nor any other Turkish or Muslim minority organizations canvas for it. Hence, this Declaration is a powerful moral statement on the part of the liberal spectrum of Bulgarian politics, desiring to reactivate the long overdue task of completing national reconciliation (Popov 2012). Such reconciliation was promised in January 1990 by Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov, and two years later, in 1992, MP Edvin Sugarev showed the way by proposing that the 1989 expulsion might be even seen and recognized as an act of genocide. However, between 1992 and 2012 an acute case of collective amnesia seems to have struck Bulgaria in accordance with the guiding principle of national historiography, namely, that ‘[m]emory remembers what “they” did to “us” and forgets what “we” did to “them”’ (Pavlowitch 2004: 66). President Stoianov’s veiled 1997 apology in Ankara for the 1984–1989 atrocities was rather subdued and completely noncommittal on the part of the Bulgarian government and Parliament, who interpreted it as his own personal act with no binding power on the Bulgarian state and its institutions (Popov 2012). For over two decades the exigencies of the postcommunist transition were quoted as the reason for claiming that ‘now it is not the time [for talking] about this’ (in Popov 2012). Simultaneously, the oft-lauded ‘Bulgarian ethnic model’ of dealing with ethnic relations was deftly employed for de facto abandoning the idea of national reconciliation altogether and for not coming to terms with the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the forced assimilation campaign in the latter half of the 1980s. The rhetorical repetition of the empty phrase ‘Bulgarian ethnic model’ in governmental documents and in talks with international partners speciously reassured the latter that reconciliation had already been achieved in Bulgaria, opening the way for this country to join NATO and the European Union. On the other hand, in Bulgaria this beautiful figure of speech increasingly legitimized and deepened the growing collective amnesia of what had been done to Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims during the latter half of the 1980s and in the tragic summer of 1989 (Palchev and Pencheva 2002; Rechel 2007). Nowadays, in the context of the rise of the extreme right across Bulgaria and many other parts of Europe, and while the increasing anti-Roma prejudice (anti-Gypsyism) has led to the officially sanctioned destruction of Roma houses in 2014 and 2015 in Bulgaria (Bulgaria: Roma 2014; Bulgaria: Romani 2015; Thorpe 2015), the very concept of a

The official coming to terms with 1989 117 ‘Bulgarian ethnic model’ has disappeared from the political discourse in the country and in the European Union. The reality on the ground has shamed the rhetorical flourishes too much. For instance, in May 2017 the aggressive nationalist Valeri Simeonov (1955–) was nominated Deputy Prime Minister and also Head of the governmental Bulgarian Council on Ethnic Minority Integration. He uses violent anti-Roma and anti-Turkish rhetoric in his speeches, which is at variance with his duties. In 2016 Simeonov proposed creating ‘modern concentration camps’ for Roma, whom he likens to ‘parasites,’ ‘wild animals,’ and ‘humanoid apes’ (brf 2017; Rorke 2017; Rorke 2016). A year later, he maintained that Turks and Turkey constitute a threat to Bulgaria’s national security (Bulgarian Prosecutors 2017; Leviev-Sawyer 2017). It is still to be seen whether the aforementioned Declaration will successfully lift the notorious veil of amnesia, which at present still conceals the ‘Revival Process’ and the ‘Big Excursion’ from full public view, both in Bulgaria and at the international level. This bold document might have just come too late, and what is more, it does not contain a straightforward apology to Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims for the indignities which they suffered under the Zhivkov regime. Nowadays, over a quarter of a century after these events, in numerous cases such an apology would have to be offered beforehand to victims’ descendants in Bulgaria and Turkey. On the contrary, the last apartheid President of South Africa, Frederik Willem de Klerk (1936–), apologized for this racist system of governance and its crimes in 1992, when he was overseeing the systemic transition, which led to the first universal elections in this country two years later, in 1994 (Kraft 1992). Then, immediately after the systemic change, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was convened in 1994 for uncovering the truth about the crimes of the apartheid decades. The hope was that when the truth about the painful past had been revealed and explicated, it would in turn foster the reconciliation so badly needed for legitimizing and facilitating the democratization of post-apartheid South Africa. The commission had completed most of its tasks by 1999, a mere five years after the official end of apartheid (Truth and Reconciliation 1999; Wilson 2001), and as such became one of the models of how the ideal of transitional justice should be pursued after democratization in highly divided societies (cf. Lollini 2011). This South African achievement stands in stark contrast to now more than 25 years of Bulgarian (and also international) near-silence on the 1989 ethnic cleansing. Bulgaria’s reconciliation with Turks and Muslims has not really begun to this day. All the aforementioned official statements given in 1990, 1992, 1997, and 2012 appeal for national reconciliation, while the two last ones also propose that this process is well overdue and must start immediately. But nothing has been done in this respect yet, and the current prevailing political climate in Bulgaria and in Europe does not bode well for such reconciliation. On 17 January 2012, not even a week after the adoption of the Declaration, Bulgarian nationalists led by Ataka officially contested this document in the Bulgarian Parliament by proposing that the deputies should declare it null and void. Ataka argued in a submitted bill that the Declaration was passed in violation of Bulgaria’s raison d’état and of international law. In the former accusation, Ataka’s bill, following in the footsteps

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of the main thesis of the zhivkovite propaganda, obliquely suggested – as openly confirmed by Ataka leaders in follow-up press reports – that, according to them, the Declaration would give a boost to some undefined ‘separatists’ in Bulgaria – presumably a boost to the country’s Turks and Muslims, whom nationalists, without any proof, tend to cast in the role of perennially anti-Bulgarian separatists. With regard to the other accusation, the bill proposed its own enumerative definition of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ not actually attested in any international legislation. The bill’s authors claimed that some unnamed international institutions allegedly recognized, by the way of a definition, as examples of ethnic cleansing the Turkish (that is, Ottoman) genocide of the Armenians in 1915, the 1913 deportation of Bulgarians from Western Thracia recaptured from Bulgaria by the Ottomans in the course of the Second Balkan War, and the deportations and massacres during the post-Yugoslav wars of 1992–1995. The mentions of the Armenian Genocide and the 1913 Thracian deportation of Bulgarians were calculated to turn the ensuing discussion against Turkish government, which should first apologize for the Ottoman crimes. Furthermore, quite rightly, the bill remarked that not a single international institution had taken any lasting note of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, let alone accused Bulgaria of the crime of ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity on this basis. The unbecoming silence on the subject continues to this day. Subsequently, the bill’s drafters hoped to deliver a swift coup de grâce by pointing to the fact that the official recognition of the 1989 expulsion and the 1980s assimilation campaign as ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the Declaration might result in demands for huge pecuniary compensations that victims and their descendants would seek against Bulgaria, for instance, in the International Criminal Court in the Hague or in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The assumption on the part of the bill’s drafters was that Bulgaria would not be able to afford to pay compensations of this kind. Nevertheless, the Parliament withstood the nationalist temptation, and stuck to the high moral ground by rejecting Ataka’s bill that sought to annul the potentially historic Declaration (Bulgarian MPs Enforce 2012; Ivanov 2012). However, it is to be seen whether Bulgaria may ever act on this Declaration, rather than allowing it to gather dust in the state archives. On 9 March 2015, the incumbent Bulgarian Prime Minister, Boiko Borisov, attended the Bunovo celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the terrorist attack at the railway station in this hamlet. The celebrations took place at the feet of the aforementioned monument erected in 2007. The place and the event have already become a significant lieu de mémoire now indelibly etched on the Bulgarian collective memory. In his speech Borisov admonished Bulgarians that ‘[a]ll of us, Christians and Muslims, in Bulgaria, should find a way of living in the best way for us. Confrontation is harmful and you see it does not lead to any good things’ (Deeds 2015). Nevertheless the Prime Minister did not mention the 2012 Declaration or the urgent need for uncovering the truth about the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the forced assimilation campaign as the very prerequisite to genuine national reconciliation. Unlike the 2012 Declaration’s future-oriented theses, the Prime Minister’s lofty words sound static and show no way forward. At best they tacitly

The official coming to terms with 1989 119 call for a return to the ‘normal good practice’ of the ‘Bulgarian ethnic model,’ which allegedly ensures continued collective amnesia and passively prevents any reconciliation from taking place. Perhaps, Borisov’s noncommittal stance has something to do with the fact that between 1982 and 1990 he worked in a firefighting unit under the control of the Ministry of Interior. During the ‘Revival Process’ at the turn of 1985, as a lieutenant commanding a unit (of several hundred to a thousand firefighters [Batal’on 2016]), he was tasked with ‘keeping order’ in villages and towns, where Turks (Muslims) and Roma were forced to change their ‘Islamo-Arabic’ names. Likewise, he served in a similar role during the 1989 ethnic cleansing (29 mai 2012; Boiko 2009; Boiko 2008; LevievSawyer 2009). Neither did I hear of the Prime Minister or of any other Bulgarian statesmen participating and delivering speeches in 2014 at commemorative meetings on the 25th anniversary of the 1989 ethnic cleansing. This anniversary came and passed almost unnoticed. To my knowledge, no one visited the site of the demolished modest drinking fountain in Trunak, which is increasingly written out from the Bulgarian public memory. What replaces it is the seemingly ‘nationally correct’ symbol of the towering monument in Bunovo. It divides Bulgaria’s population by subliminally proposing that ‘in truth’ it is ethnic Bulgarians who were and still are victims of Turks and Muslims. At the beginning of the 2010s the political climate in the European Union’s postcommunist Eastern half rapidly turned toward ethnolinguistic nationalism and populism (Havlík 2016). This change is usefully symbolized by the nationalist and populist Viktor Orbán’s (1963–) return to power in Hungary as the country’s President in 2010 (Trencsényi 2013). Two years later, in 2012, the far-right and self-avowedly neo-fascist party, Golden Dawn, entered the Greek Parliament (Henley and Davies 2012). The 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath tended to turn people away from democracy and liberalism. In their stead, a longing for a strong and all-knowing leader that would show the right path to follow has reappeared in many postcommunist European Union member states, alongside Greece (cf. Backes and Moreau 2012; Meijers 2011; Sen 2012; Žižek 2013). Recently, the common platform, thanks to which such movements and political parties gain influence and votes across the European Union, is the rife and spreading anti-immigrant rhetoric and feeling, as in the case of Germany’s Pegida or France’s Front National (cf. Beauzamy 2013; Bremmer 2015; Nachtwey 2015). The unprecedented inflow of migrants to Europe in 2015 from war-torn Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan deepened the generalized xenophobic attitude, especially in the eastern flank of the European Union (Migrant Crisis 2016). Poland’s new populist government and President, overseen by the actual leader Jarosław Kaczyński (1949–) from behind the scenes, joined the worrying trend (Europe’s New 2015; Pawlicka 2015), alongside Turkey where unprecedented purges of civil servants and the muzzling of the mass media by Turkish President Recep Erdoğan’s administration followed in the wake of the failed coup of 15 July 2016 (2016 Turkish 2016). Some claim it became a new political norm with the election of the far-right populist Donald Trump (1946–) as President of the United States in 2016 (Freedland 2016).

120 The official coming to terms with 1989 Bulgaria is no different (cf. Dawson 2014; Gizdavokov 2013). The nationalist and populist forces’ program in this country is closer to most incumbent politicians’ convictions and interests than to the needs of Bulgarian–Turkish reconciliation. For instance, the right to use the Turkish language by MRF members merely in contacts with their electorates continues to be questioned. The nationalists want to criminalize any instance of the use of Turkish (alongside Romani)6 in public, as was the case in Zhivkov’s Bulgaria during the late 1980s. They threaten that if their wish in this regard is not observed, ‘the events of the Western Balkans [that is, Yugoslavia] will come [to haunt Bulgaria].’ According to the nationalists, speaking in English, German, Romanian, or Greek is fine, but Turkish (or Romani) words in the public sphere somehow would turn the country into ‘another Yugoslavia,’ meaning that civil war would tear Bulgaria apart. The MRF leader in 2013–2015, Liutvi Mestan (Lütfi Mestan in Turkish, 1960–), was appalled that such a renewed ban on the Turkish language could be considered at all and that in some cases it is even enforced with the questionable full brunt of the law in democratic Bulgaria, which had been an EU member for eight years. As though some elements of Zhivkov’s discredited ‘Revival Process’ had been already welcomed back through the back door of legal tricks, making it again ‘a crime to speak in your mother tongue,’ as Mestan poignantly remarked (Leviev-Sawyer 2015). Liberal politicians and intellectuals in Bulgaria fear that this increasingly anti-Turkish trend may precipitate another ethnic conflict in the country (Kadiev 2015). Ironically, on 24 December 2015 Mestan was relieved from his duties as MRF leader in a political punishment for the unequivocal support he had given to Turkey’s downing of the Russian warplane a month earlier, on 24 November, when it had breached the NATO airspace over this country (Krasimirov 2015). Bulgaria is a NATO member, but the growing pro-Russian feeling in the state tipped the scale of public opinion in the other direction. Sofia may be in a military alliance with the West and a member of the EU, but at present it is politically unacceptable there to stress the point (Morris 2014). In a tension or conflict between Turkey and Russia, the Orthodox cultural and historical commonality, keenly felt by ethnic Bulgarians, trumps Bulgaria’s formal agreements and alliances, especially if they could be seen as pro-Turkish. The anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim edge of Bulgarian populism and nationalism must still be reckoned with. Even by the MRF, which since its founding in 1990 has grown into the sole solid pillar of political stability in Bulgaria, only thanks to its unwavering emphasis on the formally non-ethnic character of this party and its loyalty to the political opinions and views held dear by the ethnic Bulgarian majority. I suspect the MRF’s bottom line is this majority’s (however grudging) acceptance for Turks (Muslims) in Bulgaria and their culture (if not for the Turkish language). As long as this tacit agreement holds, the MRF will continue to toe the line of the Bulgarian political correctness, which posits Russia as a friend of Bulgaria, while Turkey as a rival, or at times, an enemy. It would be interesting to research what this rather schizophrenic dynamics of Bulgarian politics does to the average Bulgarian Turk’s political views and ethnic

The official coming to terms with 1989 121 identity, especially if he or she regularly shuttles for employment or family business between Bulgaria and Turkey, as so many tens of thousands do (Parla 2015). In May 2012, a low-key enquiry about the possibility of establishing a Turkishlanguage university in Bulgaria brought about an immediate angry reaction on the part of the watchful nationalist forces (Petrova 2012). No such university has been founded in Bulgaria to this day. However, it is somehow politically and socially acceptable and desirable that Bulgaria’s town of Blagoevgrad is home to the English-language American University founded there already in 1991 (Quick Facts 2015). What is more, no national or any other Bulgarian party has a problem with the fact that in 2004 Bulgaria co-founded and now co-finances the bilingual, Bulgarian and Moldovan (Romanian), Taraclia State University in Moldova’s Taraclia District, where the two-thirds of the country’s 66,000-strong Bulgarian minority concentrate (Ganczew 2014; Petrova 2012; Socor 2015). And even more, Sofia sees nothing inappropriate in supporting this minority’s increasing pressure on the Moldovan government in Chișinău in the quest to gain a Bulgarian territorial autonomy in the country (Bulgarians in Moldova 2013). To this end, in late 2016 it was announced that a Bulgarian consulate would be opened in Taraclia (Bulgaria to Open 2016). In the two unapproved referenda of 1999 and 2011 the majority of the district’s Bulgarians voted in favor of such an autonomy (Goble 2013; Vote 1999). In 2015 the idea of a bill was introduced under deliberation in the Moldovan Parliament which, if accepted, would allow for granting Taraclia District and other ethnically non-Moldovan districts and towns in Moldova a ‘special national-cultural status.’ The fear is that a development of this kind would lead to the administrative and, subsequently, territorial fragmentation of the country, while the ensuing instability would push Moldova (or its fragments, including Taraclia) firmly into the Russian sphere of influence (Po nastoiavane 2015; Socor 2015). For instance, 38 percent of Taraclia’s ethnic Bulgarians feel a strong attachment to the former Soviet Union, 17 percent to the Russian Federation, and only 6.5 percent to Bulgaria; while 78 percent see Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea as legal (Gancev 2016). The aforementioned bill was formally proposed in November 2015 by the pro-Russian Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) (Proiectul 2015) in the wake of the mass protests against corruption symbolized by the ‘disappearance’ of $1 billion from the country’s banks in 2014 (Moldovans 2015). Taraclia Bulgarians side with the PCRM because they fear that the current government, which steers Moldova toward the European Union and away from Russia, may also opt for a union with Romania. In such a case they would seek a union of their region with Moldova’s autonomous Gagauzia. The Orthodox Turkic-speaking Gagauzes, like Taraclia Bulgarians, are pro-Russian in their attitudes, hence a hypothetical independent Gagauzia-Taraclia would quickly become a client state of Russia (Filipov 2016; Surdu 2016). The European Union appears to support the idea of a special status for Taraclia, though with the caveat that it would not mean independence for the region, as long as Moldova remains a sovereign polity.

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As of June 20167 there has been no vote on the aforesaid bill; however, in February 2016 an opinion was issued by the Moldovan government that the ideas included in this bill are in breach of the Moldovan Constitution (Delegația 2016; Guvernul 2016; Primarul 2016). On the other hand, this opinion may not hold, given the victory of the pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon (1975–) in Moldova’s presidential election in November 2016.8 He promised to seek for Moldova accession into Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (Pro-Moscow 2016; Tanas and Prentice 2016). The situation in Moldova, apparently worsened in Taraclia by Sofia’s direct involvement, should be observed in the context of the much spoken of but never realized Bulgarian fears that the country’s Turkish minority might seek and gain a cultural and territorial autonomy in Bulgaria. It was proposed that in the future such a hypothetical development would inescapably lead to Turkey’s annexation of an autonomous region of this type. No such autonomy for Bulgarian Turks is on the cards, but a similar program is now gradually implemented for the Bulgarian minority in Moldova, also due to Sofia’s short-sighted support for this project. Ironically, what was and remains out of bounds for Bulgarian Turks and Muslims is seen as an inviolable right of Bulgarians in Moldova. It is a clear example of double standards and hypocrisy in politics and international relations. At present the West does not pay any serious attention to Sofia’s dangerous maneuvers in Moldova. But if the situation becomes acute, Bulgarian politicians will not be able to keep it out of limelight for long. The European Union and NATO would demand a clarification on this issue, especially should Russia or Turkey get involved, too. And since the early 1990s, Ankara has developed a strong interest in and cooperation links with the Gagauzes on a Pan-Turkic platform (Hardy 2016; Karlsson 2006). Children of the 1989 expellees now come of age and make their careers in Turkey, Bulgaria, and on the international plane. They will do the necessary reporting, when a need arises. Some already dig into the dark past of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the mid-1980s campaign of forced assimilation in an effort to understand the convoluted lines of their parents’ lives and professional choices. They are appalled to see how the powers that be, with no respect for their parents’ wishes or well-being, shunted them from one country to another. Given the much lauded success of postcommunist Bulgaria’s democratization during the last quarter of a century, many of these young people are surprised to find out that the sphere of Turkish-language culture remains rather pitifully limited in today’s Bulgaria. This seems to be at variance with the fact that the country is now an EU member state, which should oblige Sofia to uphold a higher level of minority rights observance. The young people’s peers born in Turkey also take an interest in this issue. Recently, in 2015 the young female filmmaker Yelda Yanat (1980–) (Yelda 2016) produced a revealing documentary film Bulgaria, My Land on the tragic history and the current – in many ways, dire – situation of the country’s Turkish and Muslim minority. Courtesy of Al Jazeera, this film brought their situation to the attention of international public opinion (Yanat 2015).

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Notes 1 With much trepidation I include this explanation that some Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria saw and still see the aforementioned mid-1980s bomb attacks as justified acts of desperation, the then sole available to them way of active opposition to the totalitarian state, which decided to destroy their culture, language and identity. Not that I personally in any way approve of such acts. I do not. I repeat: I do not. However, as a scholar I am obliged to try to understand actors of specific events, and their actions and motivations in a given socio-political context in a specific place in a given period of time. Nowadays, in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the current narrative of global-wide ‘war on terrorism’ condemns all acts of terrorism in a blanket manner with no much attention paid to the context of such acts. It is a new dogma of politics and international relations. As a result, any dictator or autocrat seeking to silence political opposition or suppress an ethnic, social or religious group may brand their armed opposition as terrorism and thus justify deploying military forces against such groups. But the understanding and assessment of what today is defined as terrorism was quite different before 2001 and especially during the Cold War. It should be borne in mind that opinions about, alongside preferred definitions and uses of a phenomenon change through time and differ from place to place. I thank Catherine Gibson and Iemima Ploscariu for cautioning me to the possibility that if some sentences are taken out of context from the above analysis of the supposed terrorist attacks in communist Bulgaria, they may be used for accusing me of espousing terrorism. Hence, I provide so many references and this lengthy endnote in order to emphasize that I do not approve of or in any way identify with the aforementioned acts of terror in communist Bulgaria, and that I do not approve of terrorism, or for that matter, of state violence, either. I hope that these precautions will not prevent taking any sentence of mine out of context. On the other hand, it is sad that nowadays a historian working in a free country in order to analyze some contentious events from the past must go to such lengths to forestall unjustified criticism that eventually could amount to character assassination. It appears that the topic of terrorism has now become a taboo that delineates a new boundary of freedom of speech, which one crosses at their own responsibility. The existence of this informal taboo to be observed by all does not bode well for the freedom of research in the social sciences, history included. Personally, I experienced similar informally tabooized subjects in communist Poland, where the love of and loyalty to the Soviet Union had to be unwavering (cf. Bazylow et al. 1982: 122; Chołaj and Dudinski 1976; Kraszewski 1974: 50; Układ 1955), and in postcommunist Poland where certain pivotal elements of the national master narrative are considered hallowed and as such must not be critically analyzed (cf. Glosariusz 2012; Minutes 2001; Minutes 2004; Senft and Drobek 2004). Any curbing of the freedom of speech invariably heralds the beginning of tyranny. 2 ‘Samizdat’ is a loan word adopted from Russian самиздат (samizdat) for ‘selfpublished [material].’ The term denotes all publications in the Soviet bloc that were produced privately outside the control of the state’s censorship (that is, illegally from the point of view of the bloc’s legislation). In their vast majority samizdat material was published by dissidents, that is, the pro-democratic and anti-communist opposition. 3 Rumen Avramov (2015) saliently notices that a similar phenomenon can be observed in the case of Sofia’s frustrating reluctance to accept responsibility and officially apologize for the 1943 deportations of Jews to the death camp in Treblinka, which the Bulgarian occupation administration conducted in southern Yugoslavia (or today’s Macedonia) and northern Greece. As a German ally, Bulgaria had been allowed to annex these territories in 1941 (cf. Danova and Avramov 2013). Likewise, Sofia has a problem with acknowledging the 1906 expulsion of Greeks from the Black Sea town

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of Pomorie (Поморие in Bulgarian, Ahyolu in Turkish, Αγχίαλος Anchíalos in Greek) (Avramov 2011), or the systemic repression of Bulgaria’s Jews. The latter, within Bulgaria’s prewar boundaries, were summarily stripped of their economic assets during World War II, though not deported to concentration camps, despite Berlin’s pressure on this issue. As a result, nowadays the Bulgarian political and intellectual elites prefer to fall back on the easy feel-good story of Bulgaria as fascist Europe’s ‘only state’ (apart from typically overlooked Denmark and Albania) that did not give up ‘its Jews’ to Germany for annihilation (cf. Bar-Zohar 1998). The Jewish deportees from the ‘new territories’ are conveniently forgotten, and rarely does anyone look into the question of why so many of the ‘saved’ Jews almost immediately left Bulgaria after 1945 (Avramov 2012; Immigrants 2016; Todorov 2003). However, one of the causes of their emigration was also the widespread desire among convinced communists to ‘build socialism’ in Israel. Finally, due to the near-collapse of the Bulgarian economy after the fall of communism, during the difficult 1990s most of the remaining Jews left Bulgaria either for Israel or the West (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). 4 The Bulgarian form of the pivotal term ‘ethnic cleansing’ employed in this Declaration is етническо прочистване etnichesko prochistvane. 5 The full Bulgarian-language original of this Declarationsn is given below. Декларация осъждаща опита за насилствена асимилация на българските мюсюлмани Ние, народните представители от 41-ото Народно събрание, – като се позоваваме на най-високите достижения на европейската и световната мисъл, на международното право в областта на правата на човека и малцинствата; – като се позоваваме на Европейската харта за правата на човека и Конвенцията за защита правата на човека и основните свободи; – като изразяваме огромното си съжаление за това, че от началото на демократичните промени, в продължение на 20 години, българската правосъдна система не съумя да накаже виновниците за опита за насилствена асимилация на българските мюсюлмани, в това число и за така наречения „Възродителен процес“; – като изразяваме категоричното си убеждение, че за подобни престъпления не може да има давност, Заявяваме: 1. Осъждаме категорично асимилационната политика на тоталитарния комунистически режим спрямо мюсюлманското малцинство в Република България, включително и така наречения „Възродителен процес“. 2. Обявяваме прогонването на над 360 000 български граждани от турски произход през 1989 г. за форма на етническо прочистване, извършено от тоталитарния режим. 3. Призоваваме българското правосъдие и главния прокурор на Република България да направят необходимото за приключване на делото срещу виновниците за така наречения „Възродителен процес“. Опитът той да се покрие с давност прехвърля вината от конкретните виновници върху целия български народ. Декларацията е приета от 41-ото Народно събрание на 11 януари 2012 г. и е подпечатана с официалния печат на Народното събрание.

The official coming to terms with 1989 125 6 In Bulgaria, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, the common belief is that Roma do not have any language of their own. Hence, no legislation was passed to ban Romani either during the ‘Revival Process’ or is attempted nowadays in Bulgaria. But in reality, Roma were intimidated not to speak Romani in public during the latter half of the 1980s, and at present the situation is again such that they feel compelled to talk exclusively in Bulgarian outside the privacy of their families (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). 7 The manuscript of this book was largely completed in July 2016. 8 Ironically, at the very same time, the political scene in Bulgaria was unsettled by the election of a pro-Rusian BSP candidate as President (Oliphant 2016).

6

Between language and millet

In this chapter, I survey some persistent myths and stereotypes which have guided thinking about politics and national master narratives (as usually imparted at school, and otherwise ubiquitous in public discourse) in Bulgaria and other postOttoman nation-states. At times, they are so commonplace that these myths and stereotypes have become ‘transparent categories’ to these countries’ inhabitants, which in turn these populations tend to see as ‘the truth.’ Having gained this status of ‘the truth’ par excellence, such stereotypes and myths are to be accepted, not analyzed, let alone questioned. On the other hand, non-specialists may not know about the origin and history of these myths and stereotypes, because a Western reader can come across them rarely, only when in conversation with a person coming from the Balkans, or when perusing a monograph on the region. Disentangling the past and the present from ‘the national norm’ as imposed by the myths and stereotypes may put conflicts and their causes in sharper analytical relief, thus initiating an open-ended space of communication necessary for imaginative political thinking on how to better comprehend these conflicts and on the ways of how best to defuse them (cf. Kusek, Purchala and Sanetra-Szeliga 2015). The main obstacles preventing a breakthrough on the outstanding issue of national reconciliation in Bulgaria are not solely political. One blockage has to do with succumbing to the allure of oft repeated national myths and stereotypes. Another is the model originating in France of the unitary (homogeneous) nationstate grafted on the Ottoman concept of the religiously defined non-territorial autonomy, known as ‘millet.’ The main stereotype widespread in popular and intellectual discourse in Bulgaria, the Balkans, and even across Europe, is that of ‘Turkish yoke.’ It proposes that until two centuries ago, most of Southeastern Europe, from Slovakia to Crete and from Croatia to Crimea, was ‘occupied’ by ‘Turkey,’ which is a popular but incorrect shorthand for the Ottoman Empire.1 This topos of many a Balkan national master narrative claims that this or that modern-day nation ‘suffered for five centuries’ under the ‘Turkish yoke.’ Alternatively, the Ottoman rule is also referred to as ‘Turkish slavery’ (Jezernik 2010; Kołodziejczyk 2006; Konstadinov 2016: 28; Riis 2002: 31–32). Despite the fact that Bulgaria has existed as a de facto independent nationstate since 1878, and de jure since 1908 (Manifest 1908), the standard narrative of Bulgarian modern history and culture continues to be couched in the terms of

Between language and millet 127 constant struggle against the ‘Turkish yoke,’ which at present is posed as a ‘Turkish danger or menace’ (турска опасност turska opasnost, турска заплаха turska zaplakha) (cf. Lalov 2013; Ruski 2016). Tellingly, to this day, Ivan Vazov’s novel Under the Yoke (1894) remains the acme and the very reference point of Bulgarian national literature and culture (Daskalov 2004: 206–208; Vazoff 1912; Vazov 1894). During the communist times the novel served as a basis of two eponymous films (Dakovski 1952; Donev 1976) and one television series (Iankov 1990). The aforementioned series based on the novel remains especially popular to this day, as evidenced by its wide availability on Youtube (cf. Pod igoto 2013). Interestingly, what is nowadays not remembered in modern-day Bulgaria is that until the interwar period Bulgarian historians had proposed that the ‘yoke’ or ‘slavery’ suffered by Bulgarians was of dual character standing both for ‘Turkish’ political oppression and for Greek linguistic and religious oppression. Obviously, the vast majority of both Greeks and Bulgarians were and are Orthodox Christians. But until the founding of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1872,2 higher posts in the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox Church (doubling as the Rum [Roman], or Orthodox millet) were entrusted exclusively to ethnic Greeks (that is, Greek-speakers)3 (Roudometof 1998; Stanev 1920; Vanchev 1977). The founding of the Bulgarian Exarchate created a new Bulgar millet separate from the Rum millet, now often seen rather incorrectly as the ‘millet of the Greeks’ (Daskalov 2014: 188–189). Earlier, because the millets controlled education, the predominant language and script of the Rum millet was Greek, to the marginalization of Cyrillic and Church Slavonic, which early Bulgarian activists increasingly protested against (Nikolova 2006). The Greek part of this ‘yoke’ suffered by Bulgarians was largely forgotten after the population exchange between Bulgaria and Greece executed between two world wars.4 This ‘exchange’ ‘unmixed’ both populations, doing away with areas where Bulgarians and Greeks lived as neighbors, sharing towns and villages (Dragostinova 2009; Pentzopoulos 1962: 60–61). Likewise, prior to the Balkan Wars the actual territorial extent of the Bulgarian millet was limited to the Bulgarian nation-state, despite the nominally much larger territory of the Bulgarian Exarchate. In 1913 the seat of the Bulgarian Exarchate was moved from Constantinople (Istanbul) to Sofia, 40 years later leading to the establishment of an autocephalous Bulgarian Patriarchate de facto and de jure coterminous with Bulgaria (Detrez 2015: 99; Kalkandzhieva 1997). By the mid-19th century the millet system (at present frequently idealized in the West as a vehicle of ‘progressive multiculturalism’) had become the basis of the administrative and political organization of Ottoman society. In the scope of this system each subject of the sultan was included in this or that religiously defined group (that is, millet). Such millets were essentially non-territorial and not associated with any vernacular, bar the ‘holy tongue and script’ of this or that ‘sacred scripture.’ From the turn of the 19th century through the early 1920s (mainly) Christians won their polities in the Balkans (cf. Kitromilides 1989). Subsequently, the Ottoman Empire collapsed, giving rise to Turkey as a nationstate for the millet of Islam in Anatolia (Carleton 1937; Jaber 1967). All the new nation-states found themselves strung between the already established Ottoman

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political and administrative praxis of millets and the Western – that is, French – model of ethnolinguistically homogeneous national polity (cf. Ther 2014a: 29; Weber 1976). As a result, the Balkan nation-state was designed for a single millet only, with no (or just tactical) acceptance for ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious minorities. And in accordance with the French model (Certeau, Dominique and Revel 1975), the national polity’s dominant group imposed its language on coreligionists speaking different vernaculars, yet seen as ‘true members’ of a given nation-in-making. These minorities ‘erred’ in their linguistic customs and traditions, but the state authorities would make sure that the former see the ‘light of [the] national message’ (Braude 1982; Hupchick 1994; Lewis 1988: 38–42; Talbot 2015). For instance, Turkey’s nation was constructed from the members of the Islamic millet living within the state’s territory. Non-Muslims were either compelled to leave, convert to Islam or face the danger of repression, summary expulsion or even a genocidal-scale massacre. A similar fate of forced ethnolinguistic assimilation was meted out to Muslims who happened to speak vernaculars other than Turkish, be it Armenian, Greek (cf. Mackridge 2009: 65), Georgian (Laz) or Kurdish. Tellingly, the modern Turkish word for ‘nation’ is millet, emphasizing the ideological mixture of the Turkish language and Islam as the actual basis of the Turkish nation (cf. Akçam 2006; Bruinessen 1994; Donef and Bet-Şawoce 2014; Hirschon 2003). On the other hand, the Christian nation-states created in the Balkans were composed from the members of the Orthodox millet. These polities’ borders tended to follow the boundaries of extant or extinguished administrative units of the Orthodox Church, often in one way or another connected to this or that preOttoman medieval polity and its defunct Orthodox patriarchate. In this manner, different parts of the Orthodox millet were increasingly territorialized and apportioned to nation-states-in-making as these polities’ postulated nations. This process of ecclesiastically driven territorialization became the main source of later conflicts among the Christian Balkan nation-states (cf. Jugoslavia 1944: 120; Matanov 2012: 55). First of all, some early Greek nationalists claimed for a future Greek nation all the members of the Orthodox millet from the Prut River5 in the north to the Nile in the south; obviously, irrespective of any vernacular linguistic differences (Mackridge 2009: 46, 74–76). Furthermore, nationalists proposed that the boundaries of their specific states under construction had to coincide with the largest extent of this or that former or existing ecclesiastical unit (cf. Chupovski 1913; Jugoslavia 1944: 94; Kalemaj 2014: 144; Matanov 2012: 55). This was a ‘modernized’ political vocabulary of the millet system readily comprehensible to all who lived in or stemmed from the Ottoman lands. Those who talked this vocabulary could negotiate concessions with the Ottoman government and other Balkan national states. But for the sake of gaining legitimacy for their claims in the West, where the millet political lexicon was utterly unknown, the Balkan nationalists presented the demanded boundaries of their postulated national polities as ‘correctly’ reflecting the territory of some medieval polity (cf. Jugoslavia 1944: 87). It was then the standard way of building and legitimizing the nation-state in Western or Central Europe (Rosdolsky 1986). Obviously,

Between language and millet 129 within a given Christian Balkan nation-state established in this manner the dominant group’s specific vernacular was made into the polity’s sole national language. Speakers of other languages had to conform or leave. Likewise, nonChristians had the choice of conversion, but the authorities would rather have them expelled or even exterminated (Mojzes 2011). Interestingly, Albania is an atypical Balkan nation-state that was built on the purely ethnolinguistic basis, without any use of the millet model. It is so, because Albanian-speakers belonged to as many as three different millets, as traditionally they professed Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholicism (Rocca 2012). Due to the conflation of the ethnoreligious (millet) and ethnolinguistic (‘European’) models of nation-building, the Balkan concept of national ‘purity’ (that is, homogeneity) is extremely onerous. All the inhabitants of a typical Balkan national polity have to speak a ‘correct’ language and profess a ‘correct’ religion. Additionally, the national language cannot be shared with any other nation or nation-state. As a result, only Turks can live in Turkey, and simultaneously they must be Muslims, too. That is why, as discussed above, until recently, in order not to fall foul of the official national ideology, Kurds living in Turkey were officially labeled as ‘mountain Turks,’ their language was banned, and it was forbidden to use the very ethnonym ‘Kurd’ in public or print. Apart from the ethnolinguistic homogenization, the drive for ethnoreligious homogeneity led to the expulsion of the majority of Turkey’s few remaining Orthodox Christians (Greeks) and some Judaists (Jews) in the mid-1950s, even if they spoke Turkish (Güven 2012). In the case of the Bulgarian national master narrative, what indelibly got etched onto it is the never really implemented provisions of the San Stefano6 Treaty (3 March 1878) and the short-lived (1872–1913) initial territorial extent of the Bulgarian Exarchate (cf. Crampton 2010: 82; Matanov 2012: 40–41, 52). The Treaty of San Stefano, imposed by Russia on the Ottomans, established a Bulgaria that largely overlapped with the ecclesiastical area of this exarchate, and which corresponds to the territory of today’s Bulgaria and parts of present-day Romania, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Greece and Turkey. Seeking legitimacy for this new state in the West, national-minded Bulgarian politicians and historians eagerly pointed out that the boundaries of ‘San Stefano Bulgaria’ also roughly corresponded to the territory of the late medieval Bulgarian Empire of the mid-13th century (cf. Crampton 2010: 23; Matanov 2012: 18–21). However, only a quarter (three months) after signing the San Stefano Treaty, on 13 July 1878 in Berlin the European powers not eager to allow such a large pro-Russian polity in the midst of the Balkans decided to halve the territory granted to Bulgaria. Since then until 1945 the successive Bulgarian governments, at however huge a human cost, had strongly contributed to the outbreaks of the two Balkan wars and participated in both world wars with an eye to ‘regaining’ these ‘lost territories’ (cf. Crampton 2010: 136; Matanov 2012: 60–61, 64–66). Simultaneously, since the very moment of the founding of Bulgaria, Turks and Muslims were spasmodically assimilated by force and expelled from this country until 1989. Despite suffering anti-Semitic persecution and requisition of assets (that

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is, capital, houses, farms, apartments, shops, factories, furniture, machinery and the like), almost all Bulgarian Jews survived World War II within the country’s interwar frontiers (cf. Avramov 2012). But Sofia agreed to the deportation of Jews to Germany’s Treblinka extermination camp from the territories gained during the war from Yugoslavia and Greece (Mojzes 2009: 155; Poulton 2000: 113). Nevertheless, most of Bulgaria’s Jews left communist Bulgaria shortly after the end of World War II7 (Chary 1972: 182; Karady 1997: 133–134). The same was true of the few remaining Greeks and Armenians, who left Bulgaria for their ‘home’ nation-states or the West (cf. Dragostinova 2009). Roma (Gypsies), irrespective of religion, were persecuted like Bulgaria’s Muslims, be they Turks or Slavophone Pomaks. In the Ottoman Empire, Roma had been organized as a separate non-territorial taxation category, though loosely and variably connected to their own territorially defined Roma sanjak (administrative district) with its center in the town of Kırk Kilise (Σαράντα Εκκλησιές Saranta Ekklisiès in Greek, Lozengrad in Bulgarian; today, Kırklareli in Turkey). Obviously, Muslim Roma had fallen under the jurisdiction of the millet of Islam, while Christian ones under the jurisdiction of the Christian (mainly, Orthodox) millets. They had constituted a group apart from the rest of society in the Ottoman Balkans (although similar Roma-like groups in their way of living and customs had existed and still exist in Turkey’s Anatolia [Böhmer 2004]) that had not neatly fitted the categories of the millet system. What had set them apart, and continues to set Roma apart, is their traditional way of living (or a memory of it), the Romani language, and some specific in-group customs (Marushiakova and Popov 2001: 34–35). In communist Bulgaria there was no question that a Rom could become a ‘true Bulgarian,’ and this political approach toward Roma in many ways continues in today’s Bulgaria. The state’s main ideological and national task with regard to them was to prevent any Rom from becoming a Turk. Certainly, anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish measures also applied to Muslim Roma. Due to the different function of their culture and the tradition of accommodating to the powers that be these measures were not so painfully felt among Roma as among Turks or Pomaks. Basically, changing one language for another for the sake of communicating with the outside world, in the context of widespread illiteracy among Roma, was not a big issue. When it came to changing names, Roma tended to use their own (be them Muslim, Christian, Turkish, Slavic or Romani) names at home, so official impositions were not of much import for their in-group life. Whatever the authorities forced on them, Roma paid lip service to what was required in public, while sticking to their own in-group choices and preferences at home. Because there was no Roma nation-state where Roma could be possible expelled from Bulgaria, they had to be kept in the country. But Roma were usually not recognized as a nation or national minority in the Soviet bloc, and neither were they in Bulgaria. Their Romani language and ethnic difference, though clearly noticeable, were studiously disregarded. Hence, no Roma minority organizations were permitted in communist Bulgaria until 1989. The official suppression of Roma identity in Bulgaria also meant a ban on speaking Romani in public and on the

Between language and millet 131 use of the very ethnonym Циган Tsigan (Roma, or literally Gypsy) in the press or books. The utter character of this official denial of the existence of Roma as a distinctive ethnic group in communist Bulgaria was quite similar to Ankara’s denial of the existence of Kurds in Turkey (Marushiakova and Popov 2007; Zang 1991). In the Soviet bloc Roma were usually compelled to conform to the basic socioeconomic patterns of the communist nation-states. They were sedentized (‘settled’) by force and ‘productivized’ as unskilled or low-skilled workers in stateowned factories. However, this was not an issue of importance in Bulgaria, because very few Roma there (or for that matter anywhere else in the Balkans) led an itinerant (‘nomadic’) way of life (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). In Bulgaria, Roma children attended regular schools. No official segregation was introduced. But the traditional Roma city quarters (mahallas8 [cf. Goziev 2015]) and villages dating back to the Ottoman times were not dispersed or desegregated. As a result, better (predominantly ethnic Bulgarian) teachers were gradually leaving schools in Roma areas, while the (predominantly ethnic Bulgarian) authorities, unofficially perceiving the schools located there as ‘for Roma,’ were not interested in the proper maintenance of the school buildings, let alone in the level of education imparted. Finally, these neglected schools were overhauled into schools for ‘children with the low standard of living and the low level of culture,’ eventually giving way to vocational schools for low-skilled workers. Obviously, the term Tsigan (Gypsy) was not mentioned in the names of these schools. Likewise, the Romani language was not offered there as a subject, let alone was used as a medium of education (Marushiakova and Popov 2014; Marushiakova and Popov 2015). The situation was similar in Greece, while a certain exception in this regard was offered by the example communist Yugoslavia. In this country Roma were recognized as a non-territorial national or ethnic minority in 1981, as if they constituted a neo-millet (Crowe 1996: 227–228). But after the breakup of Yugoslavia and the end of communism, the situation of Roma became desperate across the entire Balkans. Due to their ethnic difference and the traditionally low social status ascribed to it, Roma were the first to lose jobs and the majoritarian population at large often seek to be spatially separated from Roma in cities and villages through the means of summarily erected walls, fences, and the establishment of increasingly segregated Roma quarters (that quickly are degraded to the level of slums). In the Balkans this tendency may be interpreted as a ‘return’ to the tradition of Ottoman millets that could live together in cities, but nevertheless in separate quarters. Elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe this ongoing segregation reminds one of Jewish ghettoes and of the Jewish Pale of Settlement in the Russian Empire (Europe’s Walls 1999; Roma Wall 2015). Ironically, the eastward enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 provided an opportunity for voluntary and often mass migration of numerous Roma from Bulgaria and other postcommunist countries to Western Europe, where anti-Roma stereotypes and feelings are less prevalent or entrenched. Roma escape the hopeless situation, segregation, and discrimination in their home countries and often become well respected ‘regular’ employees and citizens, be it in Britain or the Netherlands

132 Between language and millet (Bauerdick 2015; Crowe 1996; Zoon and Templeton 2001). In these countries no one enquires about their ethnic origin, while on the other hand, when it comes to an informal discussion on this question Bulgarian Roma prefer to conceal their identity, identifying themselves either as Bulgarian Turks or ethnic Bulgarians (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). Returning to the conflation of the millet and ethnolinguistic nationalism for the purpose of nation-state-building in the Balkans, let us turn our gaze to Greece. All Muslims and Turks were either expelled or exterminated across the Greek national polity with the lone exception of Western Thrace that Athens gained as late as 1920 (McCarthy 1995; Pentzopoulos 1962: 12). Outside this easternmost area of today’s Greece, there is not a single operational mosque. A scandal struck in 2004, when the promised mosque was not opened in Athens for Muslim sportswomen and sportsmen attending the Olympic Games due to the Greek Orthodox hierarchy’s vociferous opposition. In 2003, after many strong rebukes from Brussels, one’s religion is no longer indicated on Greek identity cards and passports. But one’s confession still must be declared when dealing with the state bureaucracy or running for an elected position. Hence, people of religious persuasions other than Orthodox Christianity have little chance of entering Greek politics, let alone the country’s government or elites (Dragonas 2013). On the other hand, the French-style (or ethnolinguistic) principle of Greek nationalism requires utter disregard for speakers of other languages than Greek. Slavic-speaking Orthodox Christians (Macedonians, Bulgarians) in northern Greece and Slavic-speaking Muslims (Pomaks, Bulgarians, ‘Turks’) in Western Thrace are seen as ‘Slavophone Greeks’ (Kofos 1995: 279; Perry 1992), because apart from the recognized and tolerated Turkish (Muslim) minority (including Pomaks) in Western Thrace, all others profess Orthodox Christianity, hence by default they must be Greeks. It is as in Turkey, where all Muslims must be Turks. The equation of Ottoman millets with today’s ethnolinguistically defined nations continues unabated across the Balkans. In the Greek political discourse, the ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic principles combined and grafted onto the national master narrative resulted in the ongoing Greek claim to all historic Macedonia as an inalienable part of the Greek nationstate. This unbudging stance caused Athens to refuse any recognition to the postYugoslav nation-state of Macedonia under its ‘illegal Greek’ name. Thus, the polity is known in Greece with the employment of the name of the Macedonian capital of Skopje as the ‘Republic of Skopje’ (Δημοκρατία των Σκοπ ίων Dimokratía ton Skopíon) and, on Greek insistence, most NATO and European Union member states agreed to refer to it as FYROM (‘Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia’ in English) (Trukhachev 2011). One of the exceptions to this principle is Turkey that recognizes Macedonia under its own preferred name of ‘Macedonia’ (Daskalov 2014). Similarly, in Greece, Orthodox Albanian-speakers (Arvanites, Arbëreshë, Albanians) and Romance-speakers (Vlachs, Aromanians) must be Greeks who speak, respectively, the rustic patois of Arvanitika and Vlachika slated for extinction in the wake of Greek-style modernization. At best they are referred to as ‘Slavophone,’ ‘Vlachika-speaking,’ and ‘Arvanitika-speaking’ Greeks

Between language and millet 133 (cf. Rossos 2008: 5). Ironically, and contrary to the facts, it is claimed that these two dialects or languages have nothing to do either with Albanian or Romanian. In Greece it is also ‘incorrect’ to refer to the country’s dialects/languages of Arvanitika (Αρβανίτικα) and Vlachika (Βλαχικα) with the linguonyms ‘Albanian’ (Αλβανικα Alvanika) and ‘Romanian,’ (Ρουμανικα Roumanika) because from Athens’s point of view such an equation would ‘illegally’ suggest that Arvanitikaand Vlachika-speakers might constitute Albanian and Romanian national minorities in Greece. An admission of such a fact would fly into the face of the myth of the full ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogeneity of today’s Greece (Mackridge 2010: 14; Trudgill 2002: 122–124). How strongly in a normative fashion the Greek belief in the sole possession of the monopoly on the historical and geographic name ‘Macedonia’ is entrenched can be exemplified by an unusual event. In 2008 the first-ever Greek–Macedonian dictionary was published in Greece, in the city of Thessaloniki (Kratza 2008). The following year, in 2009, activists of the far-right Golden Dawn party violently interrupted the international promotion of this dictionary in Athens, with full impunity, while police were standing by and watching idly. According to Greek far-right activists the ‘Macedonian’ language does not exist, because Macedonia is a Greek name and region, so it cannot denote a Slavic tongue, which they believe should be known as a mere ‘Skopjan language’ (Σκοπιανή γλώσσα Skopianí glóssa) (Denying 1994: 42; Promotion 2009). Not surprisingly, this issue is also played out in the continuing Greek–Turkish ideological conflict. The Turkish government and Turkish scholars recognize the Macedonian language under its preferred name of ‘Macedonian’ (cf. Hatipoğlu 1999). Bulgaria follows the Greek model but with a different twist toward Macedonia and its national language. Sofia recognizes Macedonia as a state, but neither the Macedonian language nor the Macedonian nation (cf. Majewski 2013: 74). The Macedonian language is seen in Bulgaria as another literary standard of the Bulgarian language (Shea 1997: 352), hence my Bulgarian acquaintances find it difficult to believe that bilingual, Bulgarian–Macedonian dictionaries may really exist, but they do (Khristova-Simonovska 2005; Mladenov, Tsrvenkoski and Blagoeski 1968). Likewise, the Macedonians are considered to be a mere regional or ethnographic group of the Bulgarian nation9 (cf. Diletanti 2012). In order to emphasize this point, shortly prior to Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union, Sofia began offering the now highly coveted Bulgarian citizenship (soon due to grant its holders EU citizenship, as well) to Macedonians. The latter’s state faring economically worse than Bulgaria, and Macedonian citizens needing then to apply for visas in order to travel to Western Europe, it was no surprise that over 50,000 Macedonians (or 4 percent of Macedonia’s ethnic – that is, Slavophone – Macedonians) applied for and received Bulgarian citizenship. It came complete with the Bulgarian passport. On this Bulgarian and EU passport, Macedonians can enjoy borderless travel and employment across the European Union (Peshkopia 2014: 186). As one of the results of the Bulgarian approach toward Macedonia, the San Stefano borders of ‘Greater’ Bulgaria are still present in official research on the ‘Bulgarian’ dialects. Maps of such dialects include all of Bulgaria, alongside

134 Between language and millet Macedonia, the southern third of Serbia, northernmost Greece and slivers of Turkish and Albanian territory (BAN suzdade 2014; Bulgarski 2001: 469). In the eyes of present-day Bulgarians such maps continue ‘proving’ the ‘true’ territorial extent of the Bulgarian language and nation. A still unburied political project of ‘Greater’ Bulgaria is often subliminally hidden under the cover of ‘objective’ linguistic research (cf. Karta 2015).10 The insidious coupling of the millet principle of ideologized religion with the Western and Central European ideal of ethnolinguistic homogeneity for the sake of building, legitimizing, and maintaining national statehood in the Balkans is visible in Article 13 of the Bulgarian Constitution. It makes Orthodox Christianity and the Orthodox Church into the ideological pillar of the Bulgarian national statehood, to the tacit exclusion of people professing other faiths, despite the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. The European Union could not berate Bulgaria too strongly on this breach of laïcité, or the principle of the separation of state and church (religion), because in this respect Sofia just copied the spirit of Article 13 of the Greek Constitution. Among others, this Article says ‘The practice of rites of worship is not allowed to offend public order or the good usages. Proselytism is prohibited,’ basically meaning that the worship of, especially Islam, alongside religions other than Orthodox Christianity may be limited as the state (and the church) sees fit (Mavrias and Spiliotopoulos 2008: 28). This message is forcefully driven home in Article 3, which without any secularist qualms makes Orthodox Christianity Greece’s state religion by stating that ‘[t]he prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ’ (Mavrias and Spiliotopoulos 2008: 20). Like in Bulgaria, the undeclared aim is to reserve ethnolinguistically homogeneous Greece for one confessionally defined millet-like nation only. Strangely, without any constitutional provisions, the same normative idea of the tight spatial and ideological overlapping of religious and linguistic homogeneities is present in Croatia. Although the Croatians do not perceive their country as constituting part of the Balkans (MacDonald 2002: 118; Winland 2007: 119), they seem to be subscribing to the Balkan (or more correctly, post-Ottoman) normative idea of one millet for one nation-state only. Parts of historical Croatia were included in the Ottoman Empire, but most of today’s territory of this national polity used to belong to the Venetian Empire and to the Habsburgs (cf. Klaić, Dugački and Mardešić 1954: maps 24–26). Hence, it is an instructive example of the spread of this Balkan (post-Ottoman) political institution of millet westward and northward, without explicitly mentioning its name. One of the best contemporary Croatian writers, Miljenko Jergović (1966–), was born and resided in Yugoslavia’s Bosnia. When Bosnia declared independence and the country descended into internecine warfare, he applied for Croatian citizenship. In order to secure this document, this self-declared atheist author had no choice but (which was most humiliating to him) to undergo the ceremony of Catholic baptism (Jergović 2012: 137–144, 152–155). To this day Catholic baptism is the undeclared but stringently observed sine qua non condition of granting

Between language and millet 135 Croatian citizenship to Croatians from Bosnia (cf. Jergović 2007). The situation changes immediately north of Croatia. For some historical and traditional reasons, this or that religion may be preferred in Slovenia or Hungary, but what counts is the national language. As long as a person speaks Slovenian or Hungarian, she has a good chance to pass as or become a ‘proper’ Slovenian or Hungarian, respectively. There is no religious requirement for obtaining either Slovenian or Hungarian citizenship. A partial explanation of this phenomenon may be the fact that purely on the linguistic plane, after the cultural commonality was solidified for seven decades in Yugoslavia, it is next to impossible to distinguish between speakers of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, or Serbian who before the breakup of this country received their education entirely through the medium of the common Serbo-Croatian language (cf. Bugarski 2002; Greenberg 2004). Returning to Bulgarian-Turkish relations, it is worthwhile probing into another myth that weighs heavily on them. The Bulgarian national master narrative in search for added pride for today’s ‘small’ Bulgaria goes as deep into the past11 as the mid-seventh century. At that time bands of Bulgar warriors founded the first Bulgarian Empire, alongside several other Bulgarias in Central Asia, on the Volga, between the Black and Caspian seas, in the Danube delta, on the territory of present-day Hungary, or even in what today is northern Italy (Matanov 2009: 8–9). Ironically, these Bulgars were Turkic-speaking (Pritsak 1955), hence a Turk would be able to strike a conversation with them, but not an ethnic Bulgarian, who is a Slavic-speaker, typically with no smattering of Turkish to his soul. This paradox of Turkicphone Bulgars in the role of the presumed direct ancestors of today’s Slavophone Bulgarians is conveniently glided over in numerous Bulgarian textbooks and album-format children’s books devoted to this increasingly popular subject, which is squarely and dogmatically placed within the confines of the ethnolinguistically defined Bulgarian national history (cf. Petkov 2012; Vladimirov 2009). In the Bulgarian language there is no distinction between the Slavophone Bulgarians and the Turkic-speaking Bulgars of the Middle Ages, both are Българи Bulgari in this Slavic tongue. However, the distinction between these two different peoples is drawn in Bulgarian by referring to the Bulgars as Protobulgari (Протобългари ‘Proto-Bulgarians’) (cf. Kamenov 2000). Other, less preferred terms include the more objective designation of Prabulgari (Прабългари ‘PreBulgarians’) (cf. Karapetrov 1931), the more ideologically involved ones in favor of the continuous Bulgarian national master narrative, namely, Purvobulgari (Първобългар ‘First Bulgarians’) and Drevni Bulgari (Древни Българи ‘Early Bulgarians’) (cf. Aleksiev-Khofart 2009; Beshevliev 1984). Yet still another name does emphasize the ethnolinguistic difference of the Bulgars vis-à-vis today’s Bulgarians, namely, Khuno-Bulgari (Хуно-Българи ‘Huno-Bulgarians’) (cf. Tanev 2007). The discourse becomes even more curious, when the equation of the Bulgars with the Bulgarians (both referred to in Bulgarian, rather confusingly, with the very same ethnonym Bulgari Българи), leads the interested reader to a richly illustrated book on the subject in English. The volume bluntly proposes that it was the Bulgarians (meaning, Bulgars) who originally ‘civilized’ the ‘barbaric’ Slavs

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(presumably, including the Slavophone Bulgarians, too) (Dimitrov 2001). This thesis almost sounds as a beautifying spin on self-hatred. Another publication of that type, for instance, maintains that the Bulgarians invented Cyrillic and endowed with this script over a hundred nations across the globe with the populations, which cumulatively add up to 300 million (Konstadinov 2016: back cover). Beginning in the mid-1980s Ankara also embarked on its own form of geopolitically ambitious politics of memory (or history). But Turkey has been anxious not to tread on Sofia’s ideological toes. In 1985 a new shape of the Turkish presidential seal with 16 stars surrounding the sun of Turkey was promulgated (Soysal 2010: 227). These stars are interpreted as 16 great Turkic empires, from the Great Hunnic Empire of the third century BCE to the Ottoman Empire in the 20th century; extending from the northern reaches of Korea to present-day eastern China, central Asia, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. Turkey is proposed to be these empires’ rightful and becoming inheritor (16 Türk 2015). This myth was a rather obscure part of the Turkish state lore, before the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan started actively and amply using symbols of these 16 empires for official purposes beginning in 2014 (Cumhurbaşkanı 2015). Overview books and articles popularizing the idea of Turkey’s 16 glorious predecessors followed swiftly (Hangi 2015; Yağmur 2015). Importantly, although it is a clear and for that matter tantalizing possibility, Turkey chooses not to claim any of these polities and empires of Turkic Bulgars, which Sofia had already espoused as part of the Bulgarian national master narrative. It is an oblique, but definitely conciliatory, move on the part of Ankara. Clearly, Bulgaria and Turkey prefer to divide the turf of mythical past so the two nation-states’ ‘own’ chunks of it do not overlap. It looks like a tactical move, because on the other hand, both states have too many axes to grind on this very front with other neighbors. Worryingly, many commentators on matters Balkan and in today’s Balkans subscribe to the theory of the inevitability of a ‘clash of civilizations,’ couched in geopolitical-cum-religious terms (Huntington 1996), as initially developed by British and American experts in area studies during the Cold War decades (cf. Betts 1985: 221; McAllister 2001: 266). The idea has been also expressed with the use of the stereotype of ‘Islamic or Muslim arc’12 that purportedly extends across the Eastern Hemisphere from Indonesia to Morocco (The Quarterly 1957: 197). Initially, this belt of Islam was perceived as an ‘arc of backwardness and passivity’ (Laffin 1979: 168). During the last decade of the Cold War, with the Kremlin’s failing intervention in Afghanistan, it was construed as an ‘arc of instability’ that could be employed for weakening or even destroying the Soviet Union (Saroyan 1993: 23). In the wake of the fall of communism, this Muslim arc was presented in more neutral and positive light as a ‘Green Transversal’ (green being the color that commonly symbolizes Islam). However, at the same time this transversal was put in opposition to the ‘Christian (Orthodox) arc’ that is said to extend from St. Petersburg and Moscow through Ukraine and Romania to the Balkan nation-states of Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and Serbia (which at the time of formulating this concept, still included Montenegro). Because of the postYugoslav wars waged by Belgrade or its proxies in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia,

Between language and millet 137 and due to the atrocities committed there by (mainly) Orthodox Serbs during the 1990s, the West saw the Green Transversal as friendly, while the Orthodox arc as inimical (Brown 2001: 155). The attitudes changed decisively after al-Qaida’s terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. This appeared to be an early proof that Huntington’s prophecy was correct on the coming clash of civilizations that would supposedly follow the end of the Cold War as a new (supposedly ‘natural’) method of doing politics on a global scale. Subsequently, the Muslim arc was cast in the role of a global villain that endangers both the ‘Christian West and East’ (Rabasa 2004: 50). This new narrative picked many ready-made ideas from the political discourse in Croatia under Serbian attack in the early 1990s. The freshly independent post-Yugoslav country’s leaders saw Albanian and Bosnian Muslims as a danger on a par with Orthodox Christian Serbs (RFE/RL 1992: 37). Presenting themselves as stalwarts of the West and its values, Catholic Croatia and Orthodox Christian Greece (quickly joined by post-Milošević Serbia) chose to construe the Green Transversal as a potentially continuous band of Muslim populations from Turkey, through Bulgaria and Macedonia to Albania and Kosovo. In this view, some faceless ‘Islamic world’ supposedly intends to use a Green Transversal defined in these geopolitical-cum-demographic terms for bisecting the ‘Christian Balkans’ in an effort to rebuild the Ottoman Empire (Aydintasbas 2013; Bogdanovic 2016; Clogg 2002: 208). In Greek political discourse it is the feared Turkey that plays the role of the mastermind of such an ‘Islamic plot,’ heightening the long-time simmering conflict between these two NATO allies. As a result, the term ‘Muslim arc’ (μουσουλμανικό τόξο mousoulmanikó tóxo) has entered everyday language in Greece (Photopoulos 1999: 26). A similar development can be observed in Serbia, mainly on account of Belgrade’s decision not to recognize the 2008 independence of – in Belgrade’s view, ‘actively Islamicized’ – Kosovo that in the Serbian political discourse continues to be an ‘inalienable part’ of Serbia (Čolović 2016: 436–463), as stressed by Articles 114 and 182 of the Serbian Constitution (Constitution 2006) and Serbian politicians’ ritualized announcements to this end (Dačić 2016; Čije 2016). In the Serbian language the term is also ‘Muslim arc’ (муслимански лук muslimanski luk) (Milivojević 2014), but often used synonymously with the collocations ‘Green Transversal’ (зелена трансверзала zelena transverzala) (Srpske 2010; Trifković 2016) and ‘Islamic arc’ (исламски лук islamski luk) (Khiladakis 2014). Not surprisingly, Bulgaria’s Slavophone Orthodox Christian elites share both, these fears and plot theories, with the stamp of ‘rationality’ usefully lent to them by the West’s (however tentative) acceptance of the doctrine of the clash of civilizations. Many Bulgarian commentators chime in on the supposed danger of the worldwide Muslim arc (мюсюлманска дъга miusiulmanska duga) (Stoianov 2003: 141) said to be destined to overhaul Southeastern Europe into the ‘Green (that is, homogeneously Islamic) Balkans’ (Зелени Балкани Zeleni Balkani) (Koi 2013). In the case of Bulgaria, this reading of the political role of Islam falls back on the earlier fear that the country’s Turks, with Ankara’s support, may split

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Bulgaria as their coethnics and coreligionists divided in Cyprus in 1974. Whatever differences exist between Sofia and Greece, Athens readily concurs on this subject (Larrabee and Lesser 2003: 95; Linardis 2015; The Turkish-Albanian 2015; Turkish Review 2000). In both countries’ shared view the only solution to this perceived debacle-in-the-making is the creation of a suprastate ‘Orthodox arc’ (ορθόδοξο τόξο orthódoxo tóxo in Greek, and православна дъга pravoslavna duga in Bulgarian),13 though some criticize that this project as an instrument for bringing the Balkans into resurgent Russia’s sphere of influence (Nedelchev 1998: 169; Photopoulos 1999: 26). Last but not least, the continuation of this stereotype of ‘Muslim danger’ associated with Turkey as the ‘leader of a global Islamic plot’ merges well with communist Bulgaria’s propaganda on this subject. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Zhivkov and the BCP stoked up the fear of an imminent Cyprus-ization (or Turkeyled breakup) of Bulgaria and another of the demographic engulfing of ethnic Bulgarians by Turks, Muslims, and Roma. The latter supposedly tend to have more children than the former, a fact which is correlated less with ethnicity but with a relatively higher percentage of Turks and Muslims residing in the countryside, and of Roma living in slums. Regardless, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, Bulgarian nationalists deny that the country’s Turks, Muslims, and Roma will ever be accepted as, or able to become ‘true Bulgarians’ (Angelov 2015: 12; International 1985: 11; Tylko 1990). In this mythologized perspective, Zhivkov appears to have been a prescient national leader who ‘instinctively’ arrived at Samuel Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations two decades earlier than this American political scientist himself. Such thinking and the discussed fears unfortunately add to the dictator’s posthumous aura and continue to fortify his cult in today’s Bulgaria.

Notes 1 A similar erroneous conflation of modern-day states and nations with historical empires can also be found in the Russian case, where Muscovy, the Russian Empire, and Soviet Union are all too simplistically perceived as ‘Russia’ (cf. Sharipzhan 2016). (I thank Catherine Gibson for this example.). 2 The sultan’s trilingual firman (in Bulgarian, Osmanlıca [Ottoman Turkish] and Greek) establishing this exarchate was issued in 1870, but promulgated only two years later. Thus, in literature the reader may come across two different dates of the founding of this ecclesiastical structure (Sultan’s Ferman 1870). 3 Greek-speaking members of the Rum millet in the Ottoman Empire referred to themselves in Greek as Romaioi (Ῥωμαῖοι), or ‘Romans.’ On the contrary, in the independent Greek nation-state, in order to differentiate themselves from their coethnics remaining in the Ottoman Empire and loyal to the sultan, Greek-speakers began referring to themselves with the revived ancient ethnonym ‘Hellenes’ ( Έλληνες) (Mackridge 2009: 50, 55, 58). 4 Recently, this trope of Greek or Byzantine ‘yoke’ is actively revived in Bulgarian school textbooks (cf. Konstadinov 2016: 23). 5 Nowadays, the Prut River doubles as the border between Romania and Moldova, while its sources are located in Ukraine. 6 At present the former locality of San Stefano (Άγιος Στέφανος Aios Stefanos in Greek, and Ayastefanos in Turkish) is the Yeşilköy neighborhood in the European part of Istanbul.

Between language and millet 139 7 The majority of the Holocaust survivors left for the British Mandate of Palestine, which in 1948 was made, in part, into the Jewish state of Israel. From the perspective of the Ottoman system of millets, it looked as if all the members of the former Jewish (Judaist) millet of the defunct Ottoman Empire were gathered in this former Ottoman territory to the exclusion of the members of other erstwhile millets, be it Muslims or Christians of various creeds. In present-day Israel the millet systems survives in its full traditional form only in the Old City of Jerusalem, where the separate traditional quarters for Judaists (Jews), Muslims, (Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant) Christians and Armenian Christians brush sides. 8 Mahalla (mahalle in Turkish, махала makhala in Bulgarian, from Arabic maḥallä for ‘settlement’) is a city or town quarter, a village neighbourhood, or a stand-alone settlement inhabited exclusively by members of a single Ottoman millet (ethnoreligious group). 9 Nationalisms being the ‘narcissism of small differences’ (Freud 1930: 85) writ large, Sofia does not have any problem with recognizing the Germans and the Austrians, or the British and the Australians as separate nations in their own right, despite the fact that they happen to share languages, namely, German and English, respectively. Neither are the Bulgarian authorities interested in opining on the recent split of the SerboCroatian language into Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian for the eponymous post-Yugoslav nations and their nation-states. 10 The lure of clandestine ‘true’ borders of one’s polity filed away in obscure publications to be accessed only by those ‘in the know’ is not a Bulgarian or Balkan specialty alone. After World War II the European powers’ colonial empires were dismantled. In return, Britain obtained a British Commonwealth of Nations. The centralist model of the French national statehood did not allow for such a decentralized and confederal-like solution to the post-imperial dilemma in this country. Instead, in 1970 Paris came up with a solution true to the ethnolinguistic nature of French nationalism. In this year an Organisation internationale de la Francophonie was founded, known in short as ‘La Francophonie.’ This neologism ‘Francophonie’ stands for all the countries where French is the (or a) state / national language, or where it plays some undefined ‘important role.’ Five years ago I bought an atlas of the Francophonie and was surprised to learn that Poland is part of this secretive linguistic empire of France. Next to no one knows about this ‘fact’ in Poland itself (Map 2008; Poissonier and Sournia 2006: 19, 25; Serwański and Napierała 2014). 11 Nowadays, drawing at Huntington’s (1996) theory that the world’s history is played out through conflict among ‘civilizations’ (an approach very close in its logic to social Darwinism [Krejčí 2014: 239]), Bulgarian school textbooks propose, without any hint of irony, that the world’s first-ever civilization emerged on the territory of today’s Bulgaria. Furthermore, Bulgaria is posed as Europe’s oldest surviving state and at the same time one of the modern world’s extant 12 civilizations. In addition, Bulgarian is proposed to be one of the globe’s oldest languages endowed with a writing system (cf. Konstadinov 2016: 9; back cover). 12 I thank Kostas Zafeiris for bringing my attention to this stereotype of the Islamic arc. 13 Sometimes the idea is referred to in Bulgarian as the ‘Orthodox axis’ (православна ос pravoslavna os) (Andreeva 1998: 127; Kalinova 2006: 303).

7

The question of responsibility

The discussion on an act of ethnic cleansing cannot skirt the burning question of who bears responsibility for the 1989 expulsion. Odiously, so far no one has been really accused, let alone tried, for the crimes against humanity which the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation indubitably were. The 1992 suspended sentence for Milko Balev, Secretary of the BCP Central Committee (1979–1989) hardly counts as justice for the hundreds of thousands who suffered forced assimilation and expulsion (Poulton 1991: 166). In this way, the political program of Todor Zhivkov’s ideological turboacceleration for the swift completion of the over a century-long Bulgarian national revolution of ethnolinguistic and ethnoconfessional homogenization of the Bulgarian nation-state remains tacitly unchallenged. Mainstream parties and politicians in Bulgaria do not (usually) act upon this program’s illiberal ideals, but the program itself remains in the sociocultural offing, ready to be reactivated, whenever an opportune moment comes. No Bulgarian party dares to criticize the national revolution’s program directly, and most political groupings accept some of its tenets, including the MRF, which for instance has never really pressed for the re-establishment of a fully fledged Turkish-medium minority educational system in postcommunist Bulgaria (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). This tacit acceptance of the unacceptable is the real danger to ethnic peace and stability in today’s Bulgaria, a (relatively) successful European state in the European Union, and a (somewhat reluctant) NATO member. The sole internationally agreed point of reference and instrument for checking on whether an event was ‘something like ethnic cleansing’ is the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that entered into force in 1951 (Convention 1951 [1948]). Bulgaria became a party to this Convention on 21 July 1951 (Participants 2016). It would be interesting to know whether Zhivkov, before embarking on the unprecedented expulsion of Bulgarian Turks in 1989, consulted his lawyers and advisers about whether Bulgaria would be in breach of the Genocide Convention, and what their contingency planning might be if an international organization evoked this convention to confront Sofia on the issue.1

The question of responsibility 141 In Article 2, the Convention defines genocide in the following fashion: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Undoubtedly, Bulgaria’s Turks (Muslims) fall under the definition of ‘a national, ethnic or religious group.’ It is also undeniable that the Zhivkov administration sought to destroy this group, as they disappeared as an acknowledged category from the official statistics in the 1985 census, following the 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation. However, none of the methods enumerated from (a) through (e) were employed for achieving this ‘disappearance.’ Hence, in light of the Convention no genocide was committed against Turks (Muslims) in communist Bulgaria. But in the wake of the United Nations Security Council’s 1992 resolution on the atrocities in Bosnia (Resolution 780 1992), the first internationally adopted definition of ethnic cleansing was attempted: The expression ‘ethnic cleansing’ is relatively new. Considered in the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, ‘ethnic cleansing’ means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ is contrary to international law. (Letter 1994: 33) It is hardly disputable that in the course of the 1989 ethnic cleansing ‘force or intimidation [were employed] to remove persons of given groups from the area,’ in this case Turks (Muslims) from Bulgaria, in an effort to ‘render [the country] ethnically homogeneous’ (Letter 1994: 33). The document unequivocally states that ‘‘[e]thnic cleansing’ is contrary to international law,’ which makes it a potentially punishable crime against humanity. Obviously, the ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria took place three years before the Security Council began discussing the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing in 1992, and half a decade prior to the formulation of the aforementioned definition of ethnic cleansing in 1994. Hence, a Bulgarian court of law is at liberty to rule that this legal understanding of ethnic cleansing may not retroactively apply to the 1989 expulsion of Turks (and Muslims) from Bulgaria.

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The 1994 opinion on ethnic cleansing specifies that: [b]ased on the many reports describing the policy and practices conducted in the former Yugoslavia, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. Those practices constitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention. (Letter 1994: 33) In a nutshell, it is a list of means with the use of which an act of ethnic cleansing may be executed. In all probability the methods of ‘forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population’ were employed during the 1989 ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria. In a less generalized manner, ‘murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention [and] extra-judicial executions’ were applied to some individuals as well. Furthermore, the Bulgarian decree of 5 July 1989 on peacetime mobilization that intended to force mainly the remaining Turks and Muslims to stay put in the country and to make them work for free (Bugarska 1989) may be credibly interpreted as ‘confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas.’ The irregular use of militia (police), the DS (security force), and the military for compelling Turks (Muslims) either to leave for Turkey or, at times, to remain in Bulgaria against their will falls under the rubric of the opinion’s ‘deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas.’ Furthermore, the leveling of around 1,000 houses belonging to expellees in Haskovo (or over 2,000 across Bulgaria [Joly, Nettleton and Poulton 1992: 78]) in order to prevent their potential return from Turkey to this city (Poulton 1991: 159; Searle and Power 1990a) was none other than ‘wanton destruction of property.’ Besides labeling ethnic cleansing as a crime against humanity, the 1994 opinion connects this phenomenon to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Thus, this opinion potentially extends backward the temporal remit of recognizing ethnic cleansing as a crime against humanity. It means that under the Genocide Convention all acts of ethnic cleansing committed after 1948 may be treated as punishable crimes against humanity, with no statute of limitations applicable. On this legal basis, Bulgarian ethnic cleansers could be subpoenaed to the International Criminal Court (ICT) at The Hague. This court began operating in 2002 when the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into force (Rome 1998). Bulgaria signed the Statute in 1999, and ratified it two years later in 2002 (Bulgaria 2003). The Rome Statute does not employ the concept of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ but the Court’s jurisdiction covers ‘crimes against humanity’ (Article 5.1.a). Article 7 provides the list of specific crimes against humanity.

The question of responsibility 143 The following ones seem to apply to the events of the 1989 ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria, namely: ‘Deportation or forcible transfer of population,’ mean[ing] forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law. ‘Persecution,’ against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law . . . mean[ing] the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity. (Rome 1998) Despite the official communist propaganda to the contrary, when the 1989 ethnic cleansing was in full swing, it amounted to an expulsion, or in the Statute’s terms to ‘forced displacement,’ unequivocally termed in 2012 as such by the Bulgarian Parliament itself. Furthermore, the Bulgarian deputies also recognized this tragic event as an act of ethnic cleansing (Deklaratsiia 2012). The 1989 expulsion and the earlier forced assimilation measures of the ‘Revival Process’ were indubitably aimed against Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims, identifiable as a ‘group or collectivity’ on ‘national, ethnic [and] religious . . . grounds.’ Hence, in the Rome Statute’s understanding the aforementioned measures amounted to the ‘persecution’ of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims, who in the travesty of Bulgaria’s assimilatory statistics and ‘scientific ethnography’ had been announced as officially ‘non-existent’ since 1985 when the last communist census had taken place (Eminov 1997: 70; Hutchings 1988: 205). Another ground to consider Bulgaria’s treatment of its Turks (Muslims) as a clear case of ‘persecution’ was the blanket ban on speaking Turkish (and Romani), and on practicing Islam, Islamic cultural celebrations (circumcision of boys, weddings and funerals), and on wearing Islamic or Turkish traditional dress (Howard 1989b; Marushiakova and Popov 2015; Özkan 2011; Poulton 1991: 129–130). These measures fulfill the Statute’s definition of ‘the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.’ The following two further types of crimes against humanity seem to apply to some cases during the 1989 ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria, namely: ‘The crime of apartheid,’ mean[ing] inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law. (Rome 1998)

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Undoubtedly, both the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign and the 1989 ethnic cleansing were carried out by ethnic (that is, overwhelmingly Slavophone and Orthodox) Bulgarians, while Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims were exclusively at the receiving end of these two processes. Likewise, the blocking of some Turkish areas in 1984–1989 (Poulton 1991: 130), and the peacetime mobilization of 5 July 1989 impinged much more harshly on the rights and freedoms of the remaining Turks and Muslims than on the rights and freedoms of ethnic Bulgarians (Bugarska 1989). Furthermore, Pomaks living in the vicinity of the frontier with Greece and Turkey were targeted more by the securitization of this border than ethnic Bulgarians. By the mid-1950s specially designated militarized border zones had been established and continued until the early 1990s. However, already at the turn of the 1960s the depth of such zones was limited from 30 to 50 kilometers, usually to two kilometers along the frontier (Marushiakova and Popov 2015).2 Those living inside these zones had to possess special IDs, and could not leave their zone without a permit. Likewise, residents from elsewhere in Bulgaria needed permission to enter the zones for longer periods. Among others, the isolation allowed for a swifter and more effective imposition of the policy of Bulgarianization on Pomaks who often live alongside the Bulgarian border with Greece (Konstantinov 1997: 48–49). The officially formulated and acted upon ethnic cleavage sharply divided the social and public space in Bulgaria, reserving the (relatively) privileged and elevated position for ethnic Bulgarians, while dumping Turks and Muslims on the other side of the fence as de facto second-class citizens. This often translated into a progressing (and enforced in times of crisis) social and spatial isolation of Turks and Muslims in their villages (Orlikowski 1989). In addition, many of them, when expelled to Turkey in 1989, were automatically stripped of their Bulgarian citizenship if they ‘overstayed’ the prescribed limit of three months for sojourning abroad as ‘tourists’3 (Smilov and Jileva 2009: 228, 247). The situation of official ethnolinguistic and ethnoconfessional stratification and division, as developed and rigidly maintained in Bulgaria during the latter half of the 1980s, may be credibly defined as a kind of apartheid. Since the beginning of the forced assimilation campaign in 1984, Turks and Muslims opposing it were intimidated, killed, and arrested without recourse to the due procedure of law (Azizoglu 2005; Bojkov 2004: 359, 366; Martino 2009; Şimşir 1988: 266). The policy of extrajudicial imprisonment continued through May 1989 (Gorcheva 2009a; Gorcheva 2009b; Interviu 2011), when the Zhivkov government decided to expel the ‘unassimilable Turks’ to Turkey. Officially the policy of extrajudicial incarceration came to an end only on 15 January 1990, when the Bulgarian Parliament announced amnesty for Turks and Muslims imprisoned in connection with the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign and the 1989 ethnic cleansing (Vassilev 2002: 107–108). It seems certain that imprisonment of this type amounted to what the Statute refers to as ‘severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law.’ Ahmed Dogan is the sole postcommunist Bulgarian politician active to this day at the state level in Bulgaria who experienced such extrajudicial incarceration from 9 December 1986 to 22 December 1989 (Angelov 2009: 9; Angelov 2011b: 219–220, 363; Gerchev 2007).

The question of responsibility 145 Obviously, the aforementioned arguments are just food for thought, not a case for the indictment of any Bulgarian ethnic cleansers. Only lawyers can build an effective case against an ethnic cleanser that would be accepted for trial in a court of law. But constructing any indictment against Bulgarian officials guilty of perpetrating, participating in, or facilitating various crimes against humanity in Bulgaria during the latter half of the 1980s, and especially within the scope of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, would be contingent on Sofia’s and the International Criminal Court’s actual willingness to bring them to justice. This seems unlikely, given the fact that as an EU and NATO member, Bulgaria belongs to the very core of the West. Since 2013, the ICT has been regularly criticized for the fact that the majority of cases accepted and defendants put in the dock are from Africa, that is, from the world’s least empowered continent. As such, African leaders and politicians are an (all too) easy target for international justice, while states elsewhere, and especially in the West, excel at giving safe haven to and protecting their own perpetrators of crimes against humanity4 (cf. African 2016; ANC 2015; Bowcott 2016; Brinbaum 2013). There is also a technical problem. It seems that all publicly available documents that would link Bulgarian ethnic cleansers with specific crimes against humanity committed during the latter half of the 1980s conveniently perished on 26 August 1990 in the as yet unexplained fire of the House of the Communist Party. The BCP-turned-BSP, then in power in Bulgaria and Sofia, seems to have made sure to leave the fire unextinguished for up to seven hours in the very center of the Bulgarian capital (Marinova 2008; Rezhisiorut 2015). When the question of responsibility for the 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation and the 1989 ethnic cleansing is touched on, however lightly, in Bulgarian press articles, nowadays all the odium is heaped on the late Todor Zhivkov, as though he were a stand-alone dictator with no one to advise him or with powers of co-decision in the politics of communist Bulgaria, as if everyone around Zhivkov, in fear for their lives, carried out his orders, even if they thought the communist leader’s decisions were illegal and harmful to Bulgaria. But communist Bulgaria was a modern state with a full-blown state bureaucracy which doubled as (or tightly overlapped with) the organizational structures of the BCP. Tens of thousands of civil servants (with families accounting at least for hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians) dutifully carried out the communist leadership’s decisions that were lent legitimacy by the BCP’s 1 million members, who together with their families amounted almost to half of Bulgaria’s inhabitants (Ivanov 2008: 290). Drawing on an insight currently developed in the field of the Holocaust studies (cf. Godlhagen 1996), ultimately, these 5 million people could be seen as indirectly or directly5 responsible for what happened. If they saw the assimilation campaign and the ethnic cleansing as wrong but did nothing, by default they abetted this radical program of ethnolinguistic and ethnoconfessional homogenization. They were Zhivkov’s ‘willing executioners’ to borrow Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s (1959–) famous 1996 indictment of ordinary Germans (and Austrians) who passively looked on and went around their own daily business, as if nothing had

146 The question of responsibility happened,6 when the national-socialist state implemented the meticulously planned genocide of Jews and Roma across occupied Europe (Goldhagen 1996). The vast majority of these ordinary Germans (and Austrians) remained silent until a generational change took place around the year of 1968, that is, 23 years after the end of World War II (Marcuse 1998; Pendas 2006). Only then did the new postwar generation of Western Germans take their parents and grandparents to account. In East Germany the process was not mirrored until after the reunification of Germany in 1990. On the other hand, to this day a discussion on the complicity of Austrians and other ethnically non-German Europeans in the Holocaust remains hard-going to say the least (cf. Gross 200; Muskała 2016; Vanagaitė and Zuroff 2016; Weiss-Wendt 2009). A similar coming to terms with the difficult past of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation is unlikely to happen in Bulgaria though anytime soon. In 2016, when I was completing this monograph, 27 years had already elapsed from the 1989 ethnic cleansing. The silence on this event is deafening both in Bulgaria and elsewhere in Europe. The young generation of Bulgarians born around the year 1990 have no memories of the 1989 expulsion. This ethnic cleansing was effectively erased from the Bulgarian public memory. The most the youth recollect (or rather are aware of), when inquired, is the assimilation campaign of 1984–1985. The vast majority of the young people who came of age during the 2010s struggle to earn a living or even plan to leave Bulgaria for richer member states of the European Union. Hence, they hardly have time or strength to reflect more deeply on the mendaciously named ‘Revival Process.’ Even the best educated and most politically conscious of them fail to notice that in many ways today’s Bulgaria is a product of this very forced assimilation campaign (cf. AP 2015). The generation born a decade earlier, during the 1980s, vaguely recollects the trauma of the 1989 ethnic cleansing. They saw with their own eyes families torn apart and streams of refugees in trains or cars, incongruously reported on Bulgarian television as ‘tourists’ participating in an unprecedented ‘Big Excursion.’ Some of their childhood friends ‘vanished’ with no trace in the course of this ‘Big Excursion,’ until a postcard arrived from Turkey, making the situation clear. The 1980s generation of Bulgarians remembers the 1989 expulsion but as yet does not see it as a distinctive event in its own right. At most they perceive it as a culmination of the forced assimilation campaign that had begun five years earlier (IP 2015). Ahmed Dogan and the MRF did not press the point of recognizing and making amends for all the wrongdoings done to Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims between 1984 and 1989. The party and the country’s Turks and Muslims had no time and space for such ‘niceties,’ faced with the swelling wave of aggressive Bulgarian nationalism in the early 1990s. They wanted to win political and social acceptance for their party and for an increasingly limited repertoire of minority rights for the country’s Turks and Muslims. In line with the pragmatic formula ‘live and let live,’ they decided to let bygones be bygones for the sake of achieving a democratic and

The question of responsibility 147 prosperous Bulgaria in the near future. Thus no one could accuse the MRF of being disloyal to the state, and disparage Bulgarian citizens of Turkish and Muslim origin as ‘un-Bulgarian.’ Engaged in the brutal civil war against its Kurdish population during the 1990s and busy with the forced resettlement of 3 million Kurds from eastern to central and western Anatolia, Turkey kept an unusually low profile. Ankara stayed clear of Bulgarian politics, even when anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim scandals periodically erupted in the neighboring country after the end of communism (Gunes and Zeydanlıoğlu 2014; Gunter 1988; Yildiz and Müller 2008). Tellingly, if nowadays (that is, in 2015 or 2016) one buys a newspaper in Turkey, the front page tends to give information on temperatures in Istanbul, alongside Tirana and Sarajevo. This occurs despite the fact that no significant Turkish population lives either in Albania or Bosnia. On the other hand, Sofia never features in this standardized listing, even though around 1 million Turks live in Bulgaria.7 They constitute the largest Turkish community in any post-Ottoman state with the exception of Turkey itself. Germany is a home to 2.7 million Turkish citizens and their descendants (Personen 2011), but at least 0.8 million of them are ethnic Kurds, not Turks (Heine 2015). However, the Turkish diaspora in Germany does not share with Turkey the common Ottoman past, as Bulgaria and its Turkish population do. As proposed above, Zhivkov’s ‘willing executioners,’ or ordinary (overwhelmingly, ethnic – that is – Slavophone and Orthodox) Bulgarians, who implemented, passively approved of, or remained silent (as if nothing had happened) in the face of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign may add up to 5 million. But who were the designers and managers of this ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation? In the absence of relevant documents, we simply do not know. Yet with strong suspicion bordering on certainty, it is reasonable to equate them with the top ruling stratum of communist Bulgaria during the latter half of the 1980s. This stratum can be construed as the members of the State Council of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (Държавен съвет на Народна република България Durzhaven savet na Narodna republika Bulgariia) and the Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Централен комитет на Българската комунистическа партия Tsentralen komitet na Bulgarskata komunisticheska partiia), the latter usually doubling as the Politburo of the BCP’s Central Committee (Политбюро на ЦК на БКП Politbiuro na TsK na BKP). Effectively, it is these bodies and their highest-ranking members that shaped and governed communist Bulgaria. The two successive State Councils of 1981–1986 and 1986–1990 overlap with the period covered in this monograph. Many functionaries served during both terms. In total they amounted to 40 people (Durzhaven 2016). Likewise, it is worthwhile checking which functionaries served as Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party 1981–1986 and 1986–1990. Such secretaries, some of whom also served both terms, numbered 19 (Tsentralen 2016). Ergo, it would seem that the core group of officials who decided about the 1989

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ethnic cleansing and the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign was composed of 59 individuals. This core group operated within the BCP’s inner group composed of the Central Committee’s secretaries, full members and candidate members. Between 1981 and 1986, the three groups of party-cum-state functionaries amounted, respectively, to 11, 198, and 139 individuals, totaling 348. In the period 1986–1990, the Central Committee included 11 secretaries, 196 full members and 145 candidate members, adding up to 352 (Tsentralen 2016). Obviously, numerous served both terms, too. Hence, the BCP’s inner group amounted to about half a thousand individuals. Some of the aforementioned persons entered postcommunist Bulgaria’s politics and administration, especially during the 1990s. Zhivkov died a peaceful death of an unrepentant dictator and ethnic cleanser in 1998. Numerous others are still alive. It appears that the network of social, economic, and political influences and patronage, which they managed to carry over to or reestablish in postcommunist Bulgaria, has ensured their impunity. Investigating the 1989 ethnic cleansing would entail investigating their own past and responsibility for this crime against humanity. In this situation only an international effort could bring the still living ethnic cleansers to justice, but there is not much taste for it. Bulgaria is a fully fledged member of the EU and NATO, which gives another layer of invulnerability to the state’s political elite past and present. The incumbent (in 2016) Bulgarian Prime Minister, Boiko Borisov, seems to be an important guarantor of this continuing impunity as a bridge between the 1980s communist and the postcommunist political elite in Bulgaria. During the forced name-changing campaign of 1984–1985 Borisov was a DS lieutenant in command of a unit of firefighters who ‘kept order’ in the targeted areas (Boiko 2009; Boiko 2008; Leviev-Sawyer 2009). His current high-flying political career seems to be a direct result of help and patronage that the DS-turnedDANS top brass and BCP apparatchiks-turned-BSP democrats conferred on Borisov. Crucial to this end was the ‘anointing’ that Borisov directly received from Zhivkov as his bodyguard between putting the former dictator under house arrest in 1990 and his death in 1998 (Bakalov 2011; Boiko 2011). Hence, nowadays Borisov is the sole leader of an EU member state who has continued to assess positively the memory of an ethnic cleanser (Borisov 2011; Karaabova 2010). At present neither the Serbian President, nor the Prime Minister, nor any minister for that matter in the Serbian government would dare, at least in any official capacity, to speak fondly of the ethnic cleanser (and potentially genocidaire) Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006). But Serbia is not (yet) a member of the EU or NATO, while in addition, the former Serbian leader was officially indicted of crimes against humanity and brought to justice. On 25 May 1993, when the Bosnia War was in full swing (it ended only in 1995), the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 827, thus founding an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. The court’s name is usually abbreviated, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (United 2016). On 16 November 1995 the ICTY issued the first indictment. The first trial

The question of responsibility 149 commenced on 7 May 1996. The Court issued its first judgment on 29 November 1996 and on 27 June 1997 the first arrest operation was carried out on behalf of the ICTY (ICTY 2016). In 1998, the year of Zhivkov’s death, 27 indicted persons were already held in the ICTY’s Detention Unit (Fifth 1998: 3). The Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević, who held office between 1989 and 2000, was indicted for crimes against humanity (as the first sitting head of state) in 1999 and brought to the ICTY two years later, in 2001. His trial commenced in 2002 and was never concluded due to the defendant’s death in 2006 (Milošević 2016). Zhivkov was still alive when the ICTY was established. The indictment of Milošević mainly concerned his involvement as a decision-maker during the 1998–1999 War in Kosovo, which among other atrocities entailed a mass expulsion (that is, ethnic cleansing) of the region’s Albanian and Muslim population. The indictment’s latter half is strikingly similar to what Zhivkov and his core group did to Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims in the course of the 1989 expulsion. But neither Zhivkov nor anyone from the BCP’s decision-making core group in communist Bulgaria found themselves under international censure, let alone facing an indictment for crimes against humanity. Numerous members of this core group remained in or entered the government, parliament, judiciary, administration, and economy of postcommunist Bulgaria apparently ensuring lasting immunity for themselves and for professionally inactive members of this former core group. The most notorious case of such seeming protection and insulation from any responsibility for crimes committed was that of Zhivkov himself. This stalinistcum-national communist dictator of three and a half decades lived out the last nine years of his life in calm, secure and plush opulence more becoming a respected retired head of state than an ethnic cleanser. Despite being responsible for extrajudicial murders of opponents and dissidents in Bulgaria and abroad, international terrorism (Garthoff 2001: 312; Khristov 2013; Kostadinov 2010; Kostov 1988; Sanktuarium 1990), the forced assimilation of over a million people, the expulsion of 360,000 persons, and the collapse of the Bulgarian economy that dashed the well-being of millions for decades to come, Zhikov was fully insulated from being afflicted by the effects of his actions. The only ‘punishment’ that was meted out to Zhivkov by his fellow apparatchiks was his removal from office on 10 November 1989, when the elderly dictator had lost touch with the political and economic reality on the ground. In an effort to make good for this ‘wrongdoing’ of a palace coup, the core group ensured security and prosperity to Zhivkov and his family (Bakalov 2014; Familiia 2010; Milionite 2007; Otkus 2011). The suspicion is that the quid pro quo was to ensure the former first secretary’s silence on the unsavory past of his colleagues from the BCP-turned-BSP, who after 1989 stayed in politics or made fortunes in the freshly capitalist economy, thanks to their insiders’ knowledge and cozy relations with the state administration, especially when the privatization of stateowned enterprises and other state assets was in full swing during the 1990s (Bulgarian Organized 2005; Guineva 2012; Imidzhut 1995). Neither were his colleagues blind to the persisting popularity and charisma of the former dictator, which grew in leaps and bounds when the Bulgarian economy in the systemic

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transition was badly faltering and brought increasing hardships on the vast majority of Bulgarians. All of a sudden, popular nostalgia for the communist times was born in Bulgaria and encapsulated in the widely held opinion that life was much better under Zhivkov. (A similar process of reactive nostalgia – in the context of the difficulties of the postcommunist transition – for the communist past developed in other postcommunist countries, but never took such an unabashedly apologetic view of the last communist ruler like in Bulgaria [cf. Ahbe 2016; Ostalgie 2017].) There was no unemployment, shops were well stocked, and people had money to buy what they needed. Life was good and easy in this over-simplistic view. No capitalist owners were exploiting workers and collective farm laborers. Arguably, income disparity in communist Bulgaria was one of the lowest in the developed world after World War II (Gini 2009). Hence, the perception of the communist times in Bulgaria is not far off the mark, but only in complete isolation from the outside world. If such a comparison is introduced in the equation, obviously, prior to 1989, life was much better in Italy or West Germany, but also more unequal. Of course, the price for the equitable prosperity in communist Bulgaria that is not factored into the economic indicators was the lack of personal freedom and the sheer arbitrariness of governance, so typical of all totalitarian states. In the case of Bulgaria, there were also sufferings inflicted on well over a million people through forced assimilation and expulsion. But these indignities were quickly forgotten, for the rosy spectacles of the communist past better fit the noses of those who lost most in the heady period of ‘turbo capitalism’ in postcommunist Bulgaria. They tend to confuse causes with effects and, conveniently for the powers-thatbe, many seem to accuse Bulgarian Turks and Muslims for the country’s economic woes and other ills. They do not see Zhivkov’s acceleration of the national revolution of ethnolinguistic and ethnoconfessional homogenization during the 1980s as a crime against humanity or as the main cause of the economic, political, or social problems that continue to plague postcommunist Bulgaria to this day. These latterday zhivkovites are sorry this revolution was stopped in its tracks on 10 November 1989, and began to be reversed on 29 December 1989. To them, the sudden return of a third (or even half) of the Turks and Muslims expelled during the 1989 ethnic cleansing was an anathema amounting to putting Bulgaria back ‘under the Turkish yoke.’ Many still dream of completing the national revolution, jealous of Greece where a similar national revolution of ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogenization had been pursued since the ‘Greek Revolution of 1821’ (Ελληνική Επ ανάσταση του 1821 Ellinikí Epanástasi tou 1821) to its successful completion in 1923, when the ‘population exchange’ was conducted between Greece and Turkey under international supervision (cf. Bruce 2006; Dakin 1972; McCarthy 1995; Mackridge 2009: 16–18). The persisting and undisguised anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim feeling frustrated the full re-incorporation of Turks and Muslims as Bulgarians, all united by the same citizenship and civic values shared with ethnic Bulgarians. This failure is the springboard from which numerous anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim demonstrations and protests were launched in the 1990s, and the explanation why the very existence of the MRF was questioned. The generalized xenophobia felt toward

The question of responsibility 151 fellow Bulgarian citizens of Turkish or Muslim origin spawned the rabidly nationalist far-right Ataka party in 2005 and convinced many mainstream parties to adopt elements of Ataka’s successful program. A certain protection afforded to Bulgarian Turks and Muslims by the Constitution, law, and the MRF appears to channel the nationalist frustration into acts of violence against Roma. Many such acts are post factum rubber-stamped as ‘legal’ by condoning local administration and law courts, as exemplified by the repeated destruction of Roma houses in 2014 and 2015 (Bulgaria 2014; Bulgaria 2015). The rife anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim feeling, mixed with the displeasure of ‘what has become of’ Bulgaria nowadays – despite the country’s membership in the EU and NATO (or maybe because of it) – resulted in the receptive atmosphere for making Zhivkov into a de facto Bulgarian national saint. While apparently the dictator did not enjoy any genuine cult of personality during the communist period, mainly due to the lack of personal charisma and looks, paradoxically such a cult of his person rapidly unfolded after the end of communism (Bakalov 2009; Tsvetia 2006). Until 1989, Zhivkov enjoyed ruling Bulgaria as he wished, while afterward adoration and reverence were accorded to him by a multitude of ordinary Bulgarians. Unlike his role model Stalin (cf. Otfinoski 2004: 22; Özkan 2011; Sanchez 2011; Todorov 2000), who combined both, power and adoration by common people, Zhivkov enjoyed these two privileges in succession, one after another. Present-day worshippers of Zhivkov are the same Bulgarians who during the communist times did not shy away from repeating anti-communist political jokes. They mostly agree with the incumbent Prime Minister, Boiko Borisov, that Zhivkov was a ‘good Daddy’ to his nation (obviously, not to the Bulgarian Turks who were ethnically cleansed) (Borisov 2011; Karaabova 2010). However, they prefer not to heed Borisov’s own admonishment that ‘[a]ll of us, Christians and Muslims, in Bulgaria, should find a way of living in the best way for us. Confrontation is harmful and you see it does not lead to any good things’ (Deeds 2015). In 1974 Zhivkov’s family home in the village of Pravets, 60 kilometers east of Sofia, was renovated and overhauled into a local museum (Etnografiskiiat 2015). In 1981, on the occasion of the official celebrations of the 1300th anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian state8 (by the Turkic-speaking Bulgar Khan Asparukh in 681), the village was elevated to the status of town (10 izgleda 2014). A year later, the production of Bulgarian microcomputers commenced in this town. The brand shared its name Pravets with the town (Pravets 82 2016), making Zhivkov’s place of birth known to the entire Soviet bloc, within which Sofia was given the task of developing IT technologies (Germuska 2015: 174). In 1987 a bronze monument of Zhivkov was unveiled in Pravets, suggesting an attempt at the development of a personality cult for the Bulgarian leader. But already a year later, in 1988, the imposing statue was quietly removed, apparently in fear that a Turkish (Muslim) protester could deface it (Bakalov 2009; Georgieff 2016). Not all was well in late Zhivkov’s Bulgaria, and the DS must have been well aware of the partly successful blowing up of the Lenin monument in Cracow, in ‘fraternal People’s Poland,’ in 1979 (Zapomniana 2016). Hence, the public worship of

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Zhivkov was scaled down to an exhibition of official gifts received during his state visits, which to this day is housed in the Historical Museum in Pravets (Kolektsiia 2016). (The idea of such a museum probably was borrowed from the Yugoslav example of another museum of this kind established in 1962 for collecting the gifts presented to Tito during his numerous state visits abroad [Museum 2016].) This Zhivkov museum and the Pravets municipality building are located in Zhivkov Town Square, whose name remains unchanged (Obshtina Pravets 2016). Despite his house arrest, Zhivkov was allowed to travel across Bulgaria. In May 1995 he made a triumphant return to Pravets, where thousands of the town’s tearful inhabitants warmly welcomed their ‘true leader’ and ‘benefactor’ (Georgieff 2016), tired of the rampant ‘corrupted [systemic] transition’ in the country (Trojanow 2006). On this occasion the former dictator and ethnic cleanser bragged to the journalists: ‘The whole country loves me’ (Binder 1998). In February 1996, Zhivkov was acquitted of embezzlement. He remained under indictment for the abuse of human rights, but it was not acted upon, owing to the lack of evidence (Binder 1998). Zhivkov’s 39-volume Izbrani suchineniia (Collected Works) (Zhivkov 1975–1989) gather dust on library shelves, but finally in 1997 he pulled off a staggering commercial success as a writer, when his Memoari (Memoirs) became an off-the-charts bestseller. The huge volume’s final sentence, namely, ‘I, Todor Zhivkov, used all the power I had for the well-being of my people’9 (Zhivkov 1997: 710) became the oft-repeated motto of his burgeoning personality cult in postcommunist Bulgaria. The term народ narod (generously translated here as ‘people’) may be also rendered as ‘nation.’ Such an interpretation of this quote would clearly entail, at the very least, the exclusion of Turks and any Muslim nonSlavic speakers from the ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously homogeneous Bulgarian national community for which Zhivkov strove during his heyday. Not only did he stand as the self-appointed guard of his nation’s prosperity, but simultaneously – with the use of forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing – Zhivkov endeavored to rid it of any ‘ethnic impurities’ that would mar its desired Slavo-Orthodox homogeneity. When Zhivkov died in 1998, the UDF government refused the BSP’s request of a state funeral for the dictator and ethnic cleanser. But thousands joined the cortege (Thousands 1998), giving him, on 5 August, under the BSP’s supervision, a de facto state funeral, complete with all the typical trappings employed on such occasions for ‘dear departed leaders’ of a Soviet bloc country (5 avgust 2016; Todor 2015a). By a strange twist of fate, a year later, in 1999, and also in August, following a week of botched pyrotechnical attempts, the mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov – the official founder and first ruler of communist Bulgaria – was finally razed (Communist 1999). This act, quite inadvertently, did away with his competitor, leaving Zhivkov as Bulgaria’s sole communist-cum-national saint and hero united in a single person. Thus, quite accidentally, the latter-day cult of Zhivkov was made into the country’s most important symbolic ‘lieu de mémoire,’ which spatially is anchored in Pravets. On 7 September 2001, the 1987 monument of Zhivkov was returned from storage to Pravets. It was unveiled by the late dictator’s bodyguard, Boiko Borisov,

The question of responsibility 153 in the presence of the BSP candidate for Bulgarian President, Georgi Parvanov (1957–). The latter won the presidential election in November 2001 and took office in January the following year (Boiko otkriva 2016). Paying homage to the late BCP strongman seemed advantageous. Voices critical of this rapidly developing personality cult are few and far between, and do not deter anyone from paying respect to Zhivkov (Leviev-Sawyer 2010). A tradition developed that each year Pravet’s inhabitants, Zhivkov family members (now led by his grandchildren), BSP leaders, and guests from all over Bulgaria lavishly and with much pomp celebrate successive ‘birthdays’ of Zhivkov (Pravets 2012). The celebrations take place at his statue, while the stand-alone grand plaque (erected in 2000) with his portrait and the increasingly famous quote (namely, ‘I, Todor Zhivkov, used all the power I had for the well-being of my people’) near his family house features prominently in the news (100 godin 2001; Pravets 2015). In 2011 an exhibition on Zhivkov’s life and career opened in his former family house-turned-museum (Rodnata 2016). In this way, Pravets was successfully turned into a rosy-colored zhivkovite disneyland of Bulgaria’s communist paradise lost. (In this respect, the development is similar to the continuing unreflective commemoration of Stalin in his birthplace, the Georgian town of Gori, thoroughly sanitized of any mention of the dictator’s crimes against humanity [cf. Joseph Stalin 2017; North 2015; Stalin State 2016].) Another remarkable twist in the growing cult of Zhivkov took place in 2013. On the 102nd anniversary of the dictator’s birth, a new bust of Zhivkov was unveiled in the village of Odurne (Одърне in Bulgarian, Odırne in Turkish) in Province of Pleven (Плевен in Bulgarian, Pilevne in Turkish), thanks to the efforts of the village’s headman who, counterintuitively, is also a local MRF leader. It seems Zhivkov had nothing to do with Odurne, but it was the headman’s own initiative to honor the communist leader for his unique ‘contribution to the development of the Bulgarian countryside’ (Kmet 2013). Apparently, despite his Turkish and Muslim background, this village headman decided that the communist leader’s achievements outweighed his crimes, including the 1984–1985 campaign of forced assimilation and the 1989 expulsion of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. Zhivkov’s granddaughter Evgeniia Zhivkova10 (1965–) (daughter of Ludmila Zhivkova) attended the celebrations. In her public speech she opined that in the recent times no other Bulgarian leader or politician had done so much for the country as her grandfather (Zheni 2013). Indeed, she repeated Boiko Borisov’s 2008 statement to the same effect (Boiko 2008). It appears that Bulgaria’s political elite has already stamped a seal of approval on this burgeoning personality cult of Bulgaria’s last communist dictator (cf. 1/3 ot bulgarite 2010; Barekov 2014; Gotev 2011; Todor 2016b). Even more remarkably, thanks to her readily recognizable surname, Evgeniia Zhivkova was elected to the Bulgarian Parliament for the 2005–2009 term. During this time, she served as Deputy Head of the delegation of Bulgarian deputies to the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly. In this capacity Zhivkova was a co-rapporteur of the Monitoring Committee of the Council of Europe on Azerbaijan (Evgeniia 2016; New 2009). She monitored the country’s respect for human rights, but does not seem to have referred anywhere to her grandfather’s

154 The question of responsibility crimes against humanity. In 2009 she left politics (Zheni 2013) to pursue her career as a successful fashion designer. Although, given Bulgaria’s close ties between business and politicians (cf. Bivshite 2007; Corruption 2012; WikiLeaks 2011), it is a clear possibility that under favorable circumstances Zhivkova may yet return to the political arena in the future. As an early indication of such a possibility, in 2015 the BSP proposed Zhivkova to stand as the party’s candidate for the post of the mayor of the Bulgarian capital (Zheni 2015). She refused the nomination, given that at that moment the party was internally divided, but remarked that if the left would become stronger, she would seriously consider returning to politics in a couple of years (Gigova 2015). Perhaps not coincidentally, her grandfather (in 1949) and the incumbent Prime Minister Boiko Borisov (in 2005–2009) had used this very mayoral post to launch their respective political careers (cf. Kmetove 2016). The continuing cult of Bulgaria’s last communist leader is a unique development in a European postcommunist country that did not split following the collapse of communism in 1989. Otherwise, not a single communist leader who then wielded power in a Soviet satellite state is commemorated in the same celebratory manner as is Zhivkov. They have no museums dedicated to them or streets and squares named after them. There is no museum or monument of Enver Hoxha in Albania, Gustáv Husák (1913–1991) in the Czech Republic or Slovakia, Erich Honecker (1912–1994) in Germany, János Kádár (1912–1989) in Hungary, Wojciech Jaruzelski (1923–2014) in Poland, or Nicolae Ceaușescu (1918–1989) in Romania. A lone plaque commemorating Husák in his native village of Dúbravka (now part of Bratislava) does not count for much yet (Tkáčiková 2008). Actually, there are neither museums nor monuments of any communist leaders of any Soviet satellite country, including Albania. The only exceptions I am aware of are those of the first two Soviet leaders, Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) and Joseph Stalin, who are still commemorated in some post-Soviet states (Lenin’s Mausoleum 2016; Muzei 2016; Stalin 2016). Closer to Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) continues to be remembered fondly in some post-Yugoslav states because he is not directly associated with the bloody and destructive wars of Yugoslav succession (Velikonja 2008). Hence, some busts and pictures of this communist strongman remain undisturbed in public spaces, and a few streets and squares are still named after him, while his family house in Kumrovec (nowadays in Croatia, on the border with Slovenia, 60 kilometers west of Zagreb) is frequented by tourists and enthusiasts of Yugo-nostalgia (Andric 2012; Titova 2016). However, unlike in the case of Zhivkov, there is no nationally inflected personality cult attached to this persistent, but a rather low-key interest in Tito, since Yugoslav nationalism as a political idea seems to have already disappeared together with Tito’s death in 1980 (Prodger 2004). On the contrary, the personality cult of Zhivkov is part and parcel of present-day Bulgaria’s politics, social life, and intellectual discourse. A misstep when commenting on Zhivkov and his life may cost politicians their career, whereas a strategically placed wreath at a Zhivkov monument may secure a candidate running for an elected post precious votes of the BSP electorate.

The question of responsibility 155 The only dictator in Europe to be similarly (mis)remembered and commemorated is Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) in today’s Italy. Officially reviled and condemned after World War II, his proponents and people for whom life had been better under the fascist regime incrementally re-created a limited cult of personality for Il Duce in postwar Italy. In 1957 Mussolini’s corpse was reinterred in the purpose-built mausoleum in his home town of Predappio near Bologna. Since then pilgrimages of fascists and tourists to his tomb and family house have never ceased, while Mussolini-themed memorabilia continue to be in demand and readily available across all of Italy (Povoledo 2011). Under the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s (1936–) rule many aspects of fascism and Mussolini’s politics were positively revaluated (Mattioili 2010). Ambivalence has become rife, gradually replacing the postwar principled condemnation of fascism (cf. Aquarone 1995 [1978]). In 2013 Berlusconi’s unequivocal praise for this fascist dictator further stoked confusion on how Il Duce should be remembered (Nadeau 2015). Another parallel with the personality cult of Zhivkov is offered by Mussolini’s granddaughter, Alessandra Mussolini (1962–), who switched from acting to politics in 2004 when she was elected to the European Parliament (Alessandra 2016). The political and artistic career of Evgeniia Zhivkova, achieved to a degree thanks to the popularity of her grandfather, mirrors Alessandra Mussolini’s achievements. Evgeniia Zhivkova and Alexandra Mussolini are almost of the same age, both artistically inclined, and they entered politics at roughly the same time. Both cultivate and benefit from the positive image of the former totalitarian regimes led by their grandfathers.11 The question arises why other Soviet satellite countries’ leaders are either forgotten or reviled, while Zhivkov is commemorated like a national hero in today’s Bulgaria. What may Zhivkov have in common with Lenin, Mussolini, Stalin, or Tito that has guaranteed him a high degree of what appears state-level commemoration and inclusion in the current Bulgarian national master narrative as the (however contested) modern hero of this postcommunist nation-state? It may well be the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the 1984–1985 forced assimilation campaign. In the eyes of his proponents by committing these crimes against humanity Zhivkov ‘saved Bulgaria from Turkish annexation or partition.’ During the 1970s and 1980s the Zhivkov administration’s propaganda had never tired of warning that Bulgaria could soon become ‘another Cyprus,’ unless the ‘Turkish (Muslim) danger’ was tackled firmly (cf. International 1985: 11). Why the Zhivkov personality cult may be of a strange – almost perverse – attraction to some of Bulgaria’s Turks and Pomaks is another matter. Perhaps an answer is provided by the official state-led personality cult of Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938) in neighboring Turkey. In 1934 the Turkish leader gave himself the new family name of Atatürk, or ‘Father of the Turks,’ which by law cannot be adopted by any other person (Gesetz 1934; Lewis 1999: 55). The untouchable icon of Atatürk superimposed on the Turkish flag has been the foundation of Turkish nationalism and statehood to this day. Countless images, portraits, and busts of him dot Turkey’s landscape, hillsides, cities, offices, and people’s houses and

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apartments (Atatürk’s Monumental 2009; Ataturk Rock 2016; Zürcher 2012). Curiously, many monuments and posters of Atatürk suggest that he was born but will never die, by giving his dates of birth and death in the following fashion, ‘1881–∞’ with the sign of infinity as the year of the leader’s death that will never come (Mustafa 2016; Ulu 2016). Because Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims look up to Turkey as a non-communist model of politics and economy, such a deification of a strongman might appear ‘natural’ to them, and for that matter, good for the stability of the state and the cohesion of society. Like Zhivkov, other communist leaders in the Soviet bloc countries were also guilty of crimes against humanity, but never on such a huge scale, never with the intent to make an entire ethnic group ‘disappear,’ which would account for as many as a tenth of the country’s population. Radical decimation in the name of the ethnolinguistically (and sometimes ethnoconfessionally) defined nation is what Zhivkov shares with Tito and Stalin, and to a degree with Lenin, Mussolini, and Atatürk. All of them were ethnic cleansers par excellence, while the two Soviet leaders went a ‘notch higher’ in their criminal activity, earning them the ‘distinction’ of being recognized as genocidaires. Tito wanted to build a communist Yugoslavia as a homogeneous nation-state for South Slavs, hence Italians and Germans were expelled and sometimes killed in a genocide-like manner (Schindler 2003; Petacco 2005). Also Turks (Muslims, including numerous Albanians) were expelled from Tito’s Yugoslavia (Karadžoski 2010: 125–126), while Albanians were suppressed and at times forcibly Slavicized (Persecution 1987). Lenin ordered the extermination and expulsion of socially and politically defined populaces that, nevertheless, oftentimes turned out to be ethnic or ethnoreligious groups (Gellately 2007: 21–79; Witkowicz 2008). Stalin followed in Lenin’s steps and ‘improved’ on the scale of ethnic cleansing that time and again became genocides (Rummel 1990). Populations slated for liquidation (‘purging’) were increasingly defined in ethnolinguistic terms after 1938, when the Soviet Union was de facto remodeled as a Russophone communist empire or even as a Russian nation-state (Dzyuba 1968; Naimark 2010). Apart from dutifully following Germany in Berlin’s plan of the extermination of Europe’s Jews (Sarfatti 2006), Mussolini also conquered Ethiopia (1935–1936) in a genocidal manner with the widespread use of poisonous gases (Kali-Nyah 2000). Famously, General Rudolfo Graziani (1882–1955) commented on the ongoing war by saying that ‘[t]he Duce shall have Ethiopia, with or without the Ethiopians’ (Graziani in Markusen and Kopf 1995: 105). Atatürk never attempted to stop or condemn the 1915 genocides of Armenians and Assyrians in the Ottoman Empire. Afterward he presided over the creation of an ethnolinguistically homogeneous Turkish nation-state. In 1923 ethnoreligiously defined ‘populations’ were ‘exchanged’ between Turkey and Greece, and in the former country the Kurdish identity and language were to be summarily stamped out (cf. Akçam 2004; Ataturk 2016; Heper 2007; Hirschon 2003).12 The European Union turns a blind eye to the unsavory personality cults of Zhivkov in Bulgaria or of Mussolini in Italy, as during World War II and the Cold War the West did in the case of Lenin, Stalin, Tito or Atatürk. Neither Brussels

The question of responsibility 157 nor Washington considers criticizing the continuing personality cult of Atatürk or the revival of the personality cult of Stalin in today’s Russia. The West lost the higher moral ground by entering a close relationship with communist China, where the cult of the genocidaire Mao (Rummel 1991) continues to be the very ideological foundation of this totalitarian state. An ethnic cleanser or genocidaire can be accepted in the European public discourse as a respected statesman to be appropriately commemorated, as long as he (invariably, a male) was not indicted and officially sentenced for crimes against humanity. Lenin, Stalin and Mao were both genocidaires and ethnic cleansers. Mussolini, Tito, and Zhivkov ‘at least excelled’ as ethnic cleansers. None of them has ever been indicted for crimes against humanity. Hence these dictators are commemorated as great leaders and politicians, who – yes, maybe committed ‘grave errors’ and had ‘complicated personalities’ – but nevertheless were ‘great patriots,’ too. After 1945 such recognition is not accorded to Hitler, because after his death by suicide the Führer was unanimously condemned as a genocidaire. That is why neither Milošević nor Radovan Karadžić (1954–) can be officially commemorated and feted in Serbia and Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, where many see them as ‘heroes.’ The ICTY indicted both of genocide. On the contrary, the first President of Croatia (1990–1999), Franjo Tuđman (1922–1999); the first President of Bosnia (1991–1996), Alija Izetbegović (1925–2003); or the first Kosovan President (1992–2006), Ibrahim Rugova (1944–2006) are cherished as great statesmen in their respective post-Yugoslav nation-states. In one way or another all were deeply engaged in the internecine wars of Yugoslav succession, during which as a matter of course ethnic cleansing and genocidal-like massacres were employed to render territories ‘homogeneous’ (Mojzes 2011: 131–220). As a result, they could be also involved in such crimes against humanity, but the murky past is left alone, and studiously not probed into. Croatia is now a member state of the European Union and NATO, while Bosnia and Kosovo were founded as Western (US–EU) protectorates. The recent ethnonational past of these polities, however dark, is sanitized and accepted without much analysis for the sake of peace and stability. Some say that hypocrisy is a small price to pay for that, but is it? The seemingly arbitrary division of ethnic cleansers (genocidaires) into two classes may cause much damage in the long run. The fate of the condemned ones constitutes a certain deterrent, but the approved ones whose crimes are tacitly absolved and actively forgotten may encourage a new generation of ethnic cleansers and genocidaires in the future. Furthermore, what adds to the attractiveness and ‘legitimacy’ of the Zhivkov personality cult in present-day Bulgaria is the fact that this cult developed in earnest after his deposition, and was not marred by any successful indictment (until his death Zhivkov enjoyed full impunity for his criminal actions). Bulgarians worship the former dictator freely, not under duress, which was typical of the stateled and controlled personality cults of Lenin, Mussolini, Stalin, or Tito. Uniquely, Zhivkov is the sole totalitarian leader of whom I know that was deposed and could enjoy such a personality cult at leisure, in his retirement, and for that matter,

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under democratic circumstances. A certain similarity, less democracy, can be detected here in the case of the personality cult of Fidel Castro (1926–2016) in communist Cuba, especially after Castro’s retirement from politics in 2008 (McKinley 2008). But does a body politic (or in other words, ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983]) need a myth or cult to bind it together? Is there any alternative to Zhivkov? Some cast Bulgaria’s first non-communist President, Zheliu Zhelev, in this role, but to no avail. Too many Bulgarians saw him as personally responsible for the daily difficulties caused by the economic transition that they had to suffer through. Under Zhivkov, especially during the 1980s, life was (relatively) good. Furthermore, Zhelev’s record as a dissident and a political leader of masses is not that convincing. Many suggest that actually there is no Bulgarian Lech Wałęsa (1943-) or Václav Havel (1936–2011), and strangely it was communists who oversaw the democratic transition in Bulgaria, which does not seem right (Bikov 2009: 424; Feffer 1991: 119; Khristova 2005: 144, 166; Nikolov 2006; Pawlus 2013; Stefan 2014). The aforementioned Polish and Czechoslovak dissident leaders, turned Polish and Czech Presidents, respectively, are, at the international level, readily recognizable symbolic icons of the democratizing changes in postcommunist Europe. When it is proposed to Bulgarian colleagues that in the case of Bulgaria Ahmed Dogan could be successfully cast in this elevated role, their immediate reaction is to deny such a possibility on the account of the politician’s ethnicity. According to many Dogan, as a Turk, is not and cannot be a Bulgarian (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). When Bulgarians speak in this way, it is clear that at the level of ideology Zhivkov won, the country’s population internalized the tacit but extremely strong normative conviction that only Slavophone Orthodox Christians can be ‘true Bulgarians.’ Sadly, as in many other postcommunist states in Central Europe, the definition of nationality through citizenship as enshrined in the constitutions (cf. Preambuła 1997) is immediately forgotten in day-to-day politics at the grassroots level. Is it not that Dogan has time and again repeated that the MRF is not a Turkish but an all-Bulgarian party? (Dogan in Stefanova 2012). What is more, this party and its leadership have never strayed from the mainstream of Bulgarian politics and many of their decisions could be seen as overly proBulgarian, or at times even somewhat anti-Turkish (cf. Krasimirov 2015). The only explicit exception to this normative compulsion of associating political greatness with appropriate ethnicity and language among Central Europe’s postcommunist nation-states is offered nowadays by Romania, though in the mid-1990s the nationalist Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare) had its heyday. Subsequently, its ideological appeal faded, though a limited attraction to the wartime Romanian fascist regime and its politics persists in the country to this day (Greater 2017; Hausleitner 2011). In 2014 the ethnic German, but above all a Romanian citizen, Klaus Iohannis (Johannis in German spelling) (1959–) was elected as President of Romania. Remarkably, in this electoral contest it was the ‘good Romanian’ who prevailed over ‘true [or ethnic] Romanian’ candidates. It appears that it was the Romanian diaspora whose votes tipped the scale in favor

The question of responsibility 159 of Iohannis (Mappes-Niediek 2014). Furthermore, after the 1990s blighted by communists-turned-democratic leaders and the beginning of the 21st century marred by run-away corruption, in 2015 the first-ever non-partisan government of experts was entrusted with power in Romania for the sake of ‘putting the house in order’ (Cioloș 2016). In this way, the stability was preserved in Romania, and the country so far (March 2016) has been spared the gradual turn of the political spectrum in Central Europe’s postcommunist states (including Austria) toward right, far-right and openly xenophobic nationalist parties. These recent developments in Romania that go against the grain of the central European norm of nationally defined ethnolinguistic homogeneity build on a significant precedent from a quarter of a century ago. It is widely acknowledged that the democratizing change which ended communism in Romania, alongside the maverick Nicolae Ceaușescu’s erratic regime, was triggered by the ethnically Hungarian dissident Pastor László Tőkés (1952–) of the Romanian Reformed Church. In 1988 and 1989, he suffered stigmatization and persecution at the hands of the Romanian security police, Securitate, for daring to speak out his mind in sermons to support independent grassroots initiatives, and to limit state intrusion in his congregation, even against his bishop’s orders. In July 1989, when Hungary had already entered the path to democracy, Reverend László Tőkés gave an interview to the Hungarian state television, and overnight became known all over Europe and Romania. The bishop, supported by the state, secured an order to evict the pastor from a church apartment in Timișoara, which was to be enforced on 15 December 1989. But Tőkés’s parishioners and the city’s other inhabitants created a human chain around the block of apartments in question, defying the militia and Securitate agents. Subsequently, rioting and anti-Ceaușescu demonstrations rocked Timișoara. In brutal response, on 17 December the militia shot at and killed tens of demonstrators. But the protests grew only larger and more defiant. By 20 December, the communist authorities had lost control over the city. The news about these events traveled fast, and anti-communist demonstrations engulfed other Romanian cities, including the capital of Bucharest. On 22 December Ceaușescu lost power, was tried together with his wife three days later on 25 December, and both were summarily executed the same day, opening the way for the so-called second-tier communists to seize power in postcommunist Romania (Galloway and Wylie 1991; Kunze 2016: 393–421; Mioc 2002b; Siani-Davies 2005). The role of Reverend László Tőkés in igniting the Romanian Revolution of 1989 has been widely acknowledged since the end of communism in Romania, equally in Romanian-language (Mioc 2002a) and Hungarian-language (Molnár 2013) books on this dissident pastor. After the revolution, Tőkés’s story was also retold for the international audience in English (Corley and Eibner 1990; Porter 1990) and German (Porter 1991). Likewise, as in the case of the current Romanian President, Klaus Iohannis, the ethnicity of Tőkés is widely known and never denied. The pastor himself has always called for solidarity among the country’s Romanians, Hungarians, and citizens of other ethnicities (Deletant 1999: 158). Likewise, his brave deeds brought down the communist regime not only for ethnic Hungarians in Romania, but for all the country’s inhabitants

160 The question of responsibility irrespective of ethnicity or religion. The pastor is hailed as a national hero of all Romanians. Tőkés continues working for Romania to this day, at present as an independent member of the European Parliament since 2007, when Romania joined the European Union. In recognition of his lifetime achievements, Tőkés served as Vice President of the European Parliament between 2011 and 2012 (László 2016). However, some nationalist voices misinterpret Tőkés’s support for minority rights as ‘anti-Romanian.’ Obviously, the pastor’s closeness to the Hungarian government does not help, or the fact that in 2011 he and his family accepted Hungarian passports (cf. Dragomir 2013; Peter 2011). Since the 1980s Ahmed Dogan has espoused a stance similar to Tőkés’s, in that he works for the good of Bulgaria and all its inhabitants, irrespective of ethnicity or religion. As a dissident, Dogan operated under much more exacting circumstances than Tőkés. The pastor struggled against censorship and eviction from a church apartment, while on Dogan a new name was imposed by fiat (as on all Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims), and he was imprisoned for four years. Dogan must have been aware that he potentially faced death, because communist Bulgaria’s authorities did not hesitate to ‘liquidate’ those who directly and unwaveringly criticized the regime (Daskalov 2011: 252). Despite these adversities, Dogan managed to build communist Bulgaria’s sole mass dissident movement (unfortunately, its opposition character and momentous historical role are still dismissed by Bulgarian scholars [cf. Daskalov 2011: 253]) that successfully brought about the fall of Zhivkov, despite the as yet not widely acknowledged ethnic cleansing of 360,000 Bulgarian Turks in the summer of 1989. Subsequently, Dogan and the party he founded, MRF, cooperated in managing the extremely difficult systemic transition from communism to democracy, while a third of the expellees were returning home in 1989–1990, which stoked up combative Bulgarian nationalism specifically aimed at the country’s Turks and Muslims. Demonstrations of Turks (Muslims) and Bulgarian nationalists’ anti-Turkish protests brought into the streets from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of demonstrators. At this juncture Bulgaria could have easily descended into a bloody inferno of civil or even international war, unless Dogan and communiststurned-socialists had held their nerve. Dogan’s crucial role in bringing down communism in Bulgaria, peacefully reversing in part the 1989 ethnic cleansing, calming down and keeping under control ethnic tensions that then were running riot, alongside ensuring peace and stability in the delicate moment of transition to democracy remains unacknowledged in Bulgaria and completely unknown outside this country. Seen from such a perspective, Dogan’s achievements appear much more momentous than those of Tőkés’s, or for that matter, of Havel’s and Wałęsa’s. Furthermore, Dogan officially remained at the helm of the MRF until 2013, though to this day he remains active in Bulgarian politics as this party’s Honorary President. The MRF is the single significant party that has not splintered or been dramatically overhauled in postcommunist Bulgaria. Furthermore, unlike other Bulgarian parties of import, the MRF has been practically involved in the formation of each

The question of responsibility 161 postcommunist Bulgarian government, either as a powerbroker or a coalition partner. As such, it has functioned as a solid pillar of stability on which Bulgarian politics could safely rest in the periods of commotion and serious flux, when during recurrent deep economic or political crises other parties appeared, vanished or underwent substantial change. Under Dogan’s oversight the MRF has become the unacknowledged linchpin of peace, stability and prosperity in postcommunist Bulgaria. What underwrites this party’s crucial function is the tacit agreement, shared by all the country’s political forces, including the nationalist and xenophobic parties, that the national revolution of forced ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogenization, which began in 1878 and finally came to ‘the’ sad end in 1989, should never be reignited. Despite these towering achievements, Dogan remains largely forgotten in Bulgaria, and utterly unknown at the international level, though the incumbent Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borisov, in low-key press interviews, openly recognizes Dogan as his ‘greatest political rival,’ ‘the greatest and best Bulgarian politician,’ and ‘the most far-sighted visionary of postcommunist Bulgaria’s transition period’13 (Boiko Borisov: Akhmed 2008; Borisov 2009; Boiko 2014; Krachunov 2015). This is a rare potential for good will and mutual understanding between one of the former (middle-ranking) DS officers participating (in a not fully explicated role) in the campaign of persecution against Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims (Boiko Borisov 2016; Boiko Borisov e 2008; Boiko Borisov i 2009; Boiko Borisov se 2001; Grigor Lilov 2016; Lilov 2009: 81–86; Sezgni 2013; Who 2009) and one of the persecuted that could be made into a foundation of a new, truly inclusive Bulgaria. The moment appears to be opportune, because after the Council of Europe’s 2012 appeal to the Bulgarian authorities for reconciliation with and justice for the victims of the forced assimilation actions in 1985–1989 (Hammarberg 2012), in late 2014 Prime Minister Borisov finally condemned the ‘Revival Process’ in unequivocal terms and also demanded justice for victims (Boiko Borisov osudi 2014). (But it might be just a rhetorical flourish, as to this day not a single person guilty of the crimes of the ‘Revival Process’ and the 1989 ethnic cleansing has been brought to the dock. Furthermore, in October 2016 Bulgaria’s Constitutional Court declared as unconstitutional a change to the Penal Code that in September 2015 had abolished a statute of limitations on crimes against humanity committed during the communist period.14 As a result, by late 2016 no person found guilty of such crimes could be legally brought to justice [Leviev-Sawyer 2016; Mestan 2016].) As a prerequisite of such a reconciliation Dogan’s unique role in ending communism in Bulgaria must be properly recognized. What is more, it was also Dogan’s principled stance that ensured the successful democratization of political life in this country. The only two Englishlanguage books that make the person of Dogan and his achievements available to the international reader were published in minuscule runs in Bulgaria, so it is next to impossible to purchase them. Besides, these volumes’ politically involved format makes them opaque to anyone who does not have an intimate knowledge of modern Bulgaria’s history and politics. One such book proposes that with Dogan’s help

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Bulgaria worked out a new model of managing ethnic relations in a multiethnic polity (Palchev and Pencheva 2002), while the other is a bilingual (Bulgarian and English) collection of Dogan’s speeches and articles (Dogan 2009). Strangely, there seem to be no books on Ahmed Dogan available in Turkish. But even in the Bulgarian language there is no proper biography of Ahmed Dogan. Readers in Bulgaria can choose either between a brief sketch of the politician’s career (Palchev 2001), a book-size interview with Dogan (Benovska 1992), his ‘biography’ composed of archival documents (Angelov 2011b), or two volumes which are an attempt at character assassination (Bikov 2010; Iapov 2009). The authors of the two last volumes that intend to denigrate Dogan propose that he was a DS agent, and as such always under the control of and steered by the Bulgarian security forces.15 Other works that focus on Ahmed Dogan are rather devoted to the analysis of Bulgarian politics and Dogan’s role in it (Levi 2010; Mizov 2010), or his role in the 1989 revolution (known as the ‘Big Change’ in Bulgarian) (Angelov 2015; Iapov 2009; Lazarova 2010). This limited range of publications on Ahmed Dogan stands in such stark contrast to the plethora of volumes devoted to the ethnic cleanser Todor Zhivkov. A simple catalog search, in Bulgaria’s Saints Cyril and Methodius National Library, for books on or by the late dictator yielded 1,170 volumes (Todor 2016a). Between 2005 and 2015, 12 new books were published on or by Zhivkov in Bulgaria. They include two massive biographies of the dictator (Kastelov and Baeva 2005; Khristov 2009); a lengthy selection of Zhivkov’s writings on Bulgaria’s ‘really existing socialism’ (Zhivkov 2006b), alongside the second edition of his extensive memoirs (Zhivkov 2006a); a laudatory volume on the ethnic cleanser as a ‘great statesman’ (Sapundzhiev 2012), a volume of proceedings from the conference organized on the occasion of the centenary of Zhivkov’s birth (Minchev 2012), a book condemning the ‘putsch’ of 10 November 1989 that removed Zhivkov from power (Bakalov 2008); together with some sensational publications on the ‘great leader’s secrets’ (Blagov 2009; Nikolev 2010; Spasov 2011), and another which absolves Zhivkov of embezzling millions of dollars in public funds (Blagov 2015). The production reads like an attempt at whitewashing Zhivkov’s crimes, a conscious or not boost to the burgeoning personality cult of the late communist leader. The unchecked growth of this personality cult devoted to the ethnic cleanser, alongside the simultaneous downgrading and active forgetting of Dogan and other (mainly ethnically Turkish and Muslim) dissidents whose actions brought about the fall of communism and the introduction of democracy in Bulgaria, do not augur well for the future of this country. Should the new generations forget that part and parcel of the current consensus that underpins the country’s stability and prosperity is the full acceptance and inclusion of all Bulgarians, irrespective of their ethnicity, language or religion, the national revolution of 1878–1989 may be reignited, inadvertently, or on purpose. That would be a disaster, for Bulgaria and the Bulgarians, the country’s neighbors (especially, Turkey) and for the European Union.

The question of responsibility 163

Notes 1 Notoriously, on the Kremlin’s insistence, social and political groups were excluded from the protection of the Genocide Convention, because on this basis the Soviet Union might be accused of genocide, for instance, when aristocrats, middle class (bourgeoisie) or kulaks (relatively well-to-do peasants) had been liquidated as groups (cf. Fournet 2007: 51–55; Semystyaha and Tatarinov 2015: 56; Simon 2007: 118). If the Zhivkov administration believed their own propaganda, they could claim that those who were expelled were not any Turks and Muslims (who anyway, since 1985, officially had not existed in the officially ethnolinguistically and ethnoconfessionally homogeneous Bulgaria), but ‘counterrevolutionaries,’ ‘anti-communists,’ or simply an ‘unpatriotic element.’ Had such a claim been accepted, it would have automatically freed communist Bulgaria from any accusations of genocide as defined in the Convention. 2 It appears that communist Bulgaria borrowed the idea of such a militarized border zone from Greece where the so-called ‘surveillance zone’ had been established on the frontier with Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey already in 1936 and remained in use as late as 1997. Like Bulgaria, Athens utilized its zone to isolate Pomaks living there (officially known in Greece as ‘Slavophone Greeks’) from their kin in Bulgaria. Hence, under these circumstances, it was easier for the Greek authorities to Hellenize the border area’s Pomaks, mainly through the imposed spread of the Greek language at the expense of the Slavic Pomakian language, and of Orthodox Christianity at the expense of Islam (Bulut 2011; Denying 1994; Labrianidis 1999; Perry 1992). Obviously, as suggested by the Anonymous Reviewer, other sources of inspiration for communist Bulgaria’s militarized zone could include France’s Maginot line (constructed at the turn of the 1930s), interwar Yugoslavia’s militarized frontier with Bulgaria, or the fencing and militarization of the Soviet Union’s entire land border in the 1930s (cf. Allcorn 2003; Fedorova 2012: 113; Phillips 2004: 31; Raffass 2012: 153). 3 Perhaps, Sofia borrowed this ‘solution’ to the ‘ethnic problem’ at hand from Greece. From 1959 to 1998 Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law provided that ‘A person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality.’ As a result of this provision dutifully (ab)used by the Greek administration, 47,000 to 60,000 Greek Turks (Muslims) were deprived of Greek citizenship (Deprivation 2016). What is more, Greece refuses the use of the ethnonym ‘Turk’ or the adjective ‘Turkish’ in relation to any Greek citizens or organizations active in Greece. Instead of these ‘subversive’ terms that are seen to mean exclusively citizens of Turkey and their organizations, Athens encourages the ‘compromise’ expression ‘Greek Muslims’ (Έλληνες Μουσουλμάνοι Éllines Mousoulmánoi) ‘Greek Muslim’ (Continuing 1999). The situation is similar to the official denial of the ethnonym ‘Kurd’ until recently in Turkey, and to the denial of the existence of Turks in Bulgaria between 1985 and 1989, who were then dubbed as ‘Bulgarian Muslims.’ And to this day, Sofia officially employs the collocation ‘Bulgarian Mohammedans’ for referring to Pomaks, irrespective of the concerned persons’ wishes in this regard. 4 In recognition of the fact that international criminal justice pursues disproportionately more Africans than criminals from other parts of the world; in 2016 South Africa, Burundi and Gambia decided to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (Burundi 2016; Gambia 2016; South Africa 2016). 5 Responsibility for carrying out the forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims at the grassroots level should be placed in the lap of the country’s security forces. The DS’s staff numbered 13,000 at the end of communism, and by the time they had handled around 60,000 informers. So in total 73,000 people were more or less directly enforcing the BCP leadership’s decisions with the use of legal and extralegal measures (Daskalov 2011: 299). Together with their families they accounted

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for 5 percent of the country’s population. This percentage oddly equates the number of Turks and Muslims who were expelled in summer 1989. Tellingly, this very same rhetorical figure – ‘as if nothing had happened’ (сякаш никога нищо не е било siakash nikoga nishto ne e bilo) was employed in 2014 by Prime Minister Boiko Borisov when he condemned the crimes of the forced assimilation and expulsion of Turks and Muslims in 1985–1989, and despaired the fact that not a single perpetrator had been brought to justice yet (Boiko Borisov: Nikoi 2014). As the Anonymous Reviewer rightly points out, the number of 1 million Turks in Bulgaria is a moderate estimate popularly accepted in Turkey. In accordance with the 2011 Bulgarian census, officially only 0.6 million ethnic Turks live in the country (2011 Population 2012: 3). However, given the suppression of the Turkish, Muslim, Pomak and Roma identities during the communist period and even in the postcommunist 1990s (Mincheva 2005), the number of Turks in today’s Bulgaria appears to be seriously unreported both by those concerned and by the state authorities (cf. Biuksenshiutts 2000: 129). Furthermore, a Pomak (Slavophone Muslim) or Muslim Rom may be counted or declare himself either as a Bulgarian or a Turk (cf. Okamura 1981). The celebrations of the 1300th anniversary of the founding of the so-called First Bulgarian Empire was a curious, and very un-socialist matter. It appears that an inspiration for this anniversary came directly from the 1971 celebrations of the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire held in Iran (Adams 1972). Zhivkov was invited but refused to attend. His daughter, Ludmila Zhivkova (1942–1981) interested in all matters esoteric, pleaded with her father that in his stead she should be allowed to represent Bulgaria during these celebrations in Iran, but to no avail. Despite the fact that Zhivkov gave a cold shoulder to the Shah, the Bulgarian Ambassador was entrusted with a 2500 Years of the Persian Empire gold commemorative medal that was duly passed on to the Bulgarian leader (Vasilev 2016). As Chairwoman (in the rank of minister) of the Committee of Culture (as the ministry of culture was then known in Bulgaria), Ludmila Zhivkova led the organization of and presided over the celebrations in 1981 for the 1300th anniversary of the establishment of Bulgaria (cf. Zhivkova 1981). In Iran the Islamic population celebrated the pointedly un-Islamic (and even ‘heathen’) beginning of the Persian Empire, while in Bulgaria the Slavophone Orthodox population celebrated the strangely un-Orthodox (again, ‘heathen’) and non-Slavic (that is, Turkic) beginning of the First Bulgarian Empire. This occasion could have been employed for including Bulgarian Turks in the ideological and cultural commonality of the Bulgarian national master narrative. But it appears that no one seriously entertained this idea. On the other hand, those who believe in numerology may see such celebrations of grandeur past as a clear sign of hubris. Eight years after the 1971 celebrations in Iran, it led to the nemesis of the Islamic Revolution in 1989. And also exactly eight years after the celebrations in Bulgaria, this hubris brought about the nemesis of the 1989 Revolution in this country. Both, the Shah and Zhivkov were swiftly deposed. A coincidence perhaps, but how very pregnant with symbolic meaning. In a similarly megalomaniac fashion, a year earlier than in Bulgaria, that is in 1980, in neighboring communist Romania, the maverick dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu presided over the celebrations of the 2050th anniversary of the creation of the first independent and centralized ‘Romanian’ state by the Dacian ruler Burebista (cf. Condurachi 1980). My translation. The original sentence in Bulgarian reads as follows, Az, Todor Zhivkov, izpolzvakh tsyalata vlast, koyato imakh, za dobruvaneto na svoya narod Аз, Тодор Живков, използвах цялата власт, която имах, за добруването на своя народ. The spelling of Todor Zhivkov’s surname is slightly different from that of his granddaughter’s (Zhivkova), because in Bulgarian (as in many Slavic languages) the feminine form of the same surname is formed from the masculine one by the addition of the suffix -(ov)a.

The question of responsibility 165 11 As Konstanty Gebert rightly points out, the personality cult of Zhivkov can be also usefully compared with such cults of Ion Antonescu in wartime Romania, Francisco Franco in Spain, Miklós Horthy in interwar and wartime Hungary, or António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal. 12 Konstanty Gebert rightly cautions that some may argue that the aforementioned cases are not similar enough to be fully comparable. But doing justice to this subject (let alone to Mao Zedong’s genocides or to the 1947 mutual ethnic cleansing and genocide between India and Pakistan as presided then by Jawaharlal Nehru and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, respectively) would require a stand-alone chapter, which would be too much of a digression. 13 Whether this is genuine admiration on the part of Prime Minister Boiko Borisov or a deliberate move to further and maintain his popularity among Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims in order to secure a comfortable majority in the Parliament is of course debatable (cf. Andreev 2015). For instance, since 2014 when Borisov condemned the forced assimilation campaign of the latter 1980s and the 1989 expulsion as crimes and demanded that perpetrators be brought to justice (Boiko Borisov osudi 2014), nothing of this kind has taken place until now, in late 2016. 14 The 2015 law change that would have opened the way for trying persons guilty of crimes against humanity committed during the communist period was proposed by Prime Minister Boiko Borisov’s GERB party (Leviev-Sawyer 2016). 15 Nowadays, in postcommunist states it is a popular pastime to uncover any contacts, however tiny, short-lived and inconsequential, which future dissident leaders might have had with the communist security forces – usually under duress – as young and vulnerable persons facing the totalitarian state’s overwhelming apparatus of enforcement. On this basis, authors of such publications and their proponents, usually born after the fall of communism and enjoying the fruits of democracy, propose that this or that dissident leader ‘in reality’ was a ‘sell-out’ or even ‘traitor’ (cf. Cenckiewicz and Gontarczyk 2008; Mladí 2011; Sabŭ 2016). As though it were the communists themselves who criticized, opposed and eventually dismantled communism.

Conclusion

The necessarily small sample of national myths and delusions from Bulgaria and across the Balkans presented in the penultimate chapter illustrates the unexpectedly simplistic method in which internal and external conflicts are generated with the use of such legends and pet hypotheses. It invariably involves claiming a larger piece of the by nature limited and thus ‘unstretchable’ territory1 (or land mass) with the employment of ‘objective’ arguments, be they ‘historic,’ ‘ethnic,’ ‘religious’ or ‘linguistic.’ A way out of this quagmire of contradictory myths and delusions is to accept that nations, states and languages are all imagined into being by humans alone, and that traditions underpinning them are invented, too: that nations, states, and languages are nothing else but artifacts of culture, designed, built, and maintained by people and their groups, that these artifacts of human imagination are not products of nature, or sent by gods down to earth from the heavens (cf. Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Kamusella 2015). A small step in this direction was the recent eastward enlargement of the European Union and Bulgaria’s concentrated effort to join it. Suddenly, within the European Union, statehood politics ceases to be a zero-sum game, when the principle of absolute sovereignty is de-absolutized. Then jurisdictions, peoplehoods and statehoods may overlap in a non-conflictual but complementary manner, as exemplified by the dual institution of European Union and national citizenship. One is not compelled to choose between these two, both can be enjoyed simultaneously (cf. Kamusella 2004). When it comes to imagining into being artifacts of culture, it depends solely on people and their groups as to how they choose to construe them. The principle of absolute sovereignty, implemented in Central Europe since the mid-17th century yields polities that are competing (read: warring) for limited territory and resources. The competition has been time and again played out with the legitimizing use of religion, nationhood or history, among others (cf. Krasner 1999; Pierson 1996). Resigning from absolute sovereignty for a more flexible and negotiable version of it makes territory ‘stretchable’ and ‘shareable.’ Nowadays a Bulgarian, or more exactly a Bulgarian citizen, may travel, study, live and work unhindered across the entire European Union, irrespective of their ethnicity, language, religion or even irrespective of their lack of ethnicity or religion. Ethnic Bulgarians, Turks, Muslims, Roma, Macedonians or Tatars who

Conclusion 167 are holders of the dual Bulgarian and European Union passport can all freely partake of these opportunities. Perhaps that is the realistic actualization of nowadays the somehow neglected ideal of fraternité (‘solidarity,’ ’fraternity,’ ‘brotherhood,’ ‘common humanity’), which stems from the French revolutionary slogan of liberté, égalité, fraternité. This tripartite slogan became the basis on which modern (or at least, Western) politics and statehood have been built. In the age of nationalism, fraternité was exclusively construed and extended to the members of one’s own nation only. The nation and its national polity tend to be construed in ethnolinguistic terms across most of Europe, and additionally in ethnoreligious (millet) terms in the Balkans. The in-built exclusivism of such definitions of national statehood creates minorities from people who speak ‘incorrect’ languages and profess ‘incorrect’ religions,’ thus excluding them from the camaraderie of ‘national fraternité,’ more appropriately known as ‘national egoism’ (cf. Porter 2000: 189–231). What is more, the process casts minorities in the unwanted role of national bêtes noires, a ‘menacing Other,’ a ‘danger’ to the ‘purity’ of ‘our’ nation and its language, and to the ‘territorial integrity’ of ‘our’ national ‘fatherland.’ The ‘logical conclusion’ is a preemptive strike against a threatening minority, before they turn into a ‘fifth column.’ Namely, the solution is the ‘logically’ increasing violence of forced assimilation, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide. Raison d’état, über alles. But this ‘logic’ of unceasing conflict that compels all to be on the watch against ‘internal and external enemies’ of ‘our’ nation is conditioned in masses through pet – that is, exclusivist – definitions of sovereignty, the nation and of national statehood. Such definitions have been – rather unthinkingly – espoused for the task of building nations and their states in Bulgaria, Turkey, the Balkans, and elsewhere across continental Europe. But, apart from the limits of human imagination alone, there is nothing really to prevent construing a body politic in different terms than those commonly employed by now. Examples exist, which show that the past and its ‘normal’ practices can be transcended. There are countries with no official or national language designated, where religion is truly a private matter, as for instance, in the United States or Britain.2 All languages can be employed there when necessary for effective communication and carrying out administrative and other tasks of import. On the other hand, as the cases of exceptionally homogeneous Somalia and ethnolinguistically homogeneous Rwanda amply show, homogeneity in language, religion and ethnicity does not guarantee anything, let alone peace and stability (Kiernan 2007: 555; Strangio 2012: 29). However, despite such examples to the contrary, in Central Europe the myth of the normative equation of ethnolinguistic homogeneity with peace and stability persists (cf. Babeți, Adriana and Ungureanu 1997: 268; Haliżak and Kuźniar 2000: 293; Kornaś 1995: 93; Manchev, Grigorova and Bobev 1992: 269; Nedelcheva-Paskaleva and Todorova 1991: 252). Tens of thousands of Bulgarians (meaning, Bulgarian citizens) make full use of the depoliticization of language and religion in the United Kingdom. They request interpretation in hospitals and courts of law, and written information in their language(s) from the municipalities in the towns and cities where they live.

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When they are handicapped, such information is readily offered to them in the form of an audio recording, in larger font, or in Braille. Should they wish so they may establish newspapers and radio or television stations, respectively, publishing and broadcasting in their language(s), alongside (usually weekend) schools that provide education in such a language(s). No one would even dream about branding provisions of this kind as a danger to the homogeneity of the British nation or to the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom. As the reader sees, I have marred my prose a little with the ungainly indication of such Bulgarians’ language(s) both in singular and plural. The former is a nod to the prevailing normative monolingualism of today’s Bulgarian nation-state, while the other an acknowledgement of the deeply entrenched multilingualism of the country’s postOttoman population, who speak Bulgarian, Turkish, Romani or Tatar, among other languages. These ethnic (Slavophone) Bulgarians, Bulgarian Turks, Bulgarian Muslims, Bulgarian Roma or Bulgarian Tatars meet one another in Britain, and all of a sudden, thanks to their shared Bulgarian origin and experience, they drop the qualifying adjectives and perceive one another as ‘Bulgarians.’ A feat and a leap of political and social imagination still unparalleled ‘back home,’ in Bulgaria itself. They also quite seamlessly integrate with British society, alongside its nationalcum-regional-cum-ethnic (sub)groups such as the English, Scots or Welsh. Some apply for British citizenship. Having become a United Kingdom passport holder an adjective-less post-national Bulgarian may begin to feel a Bulgaro-ScottishEuropean, too. No one would be surprised in Britain or dare to decry a DIY identity of this kind, the possibility of it safely guaranteed by Britain’s liberal respect for individual choices, provided the individual in question remains a law-abiding citizen who pays taxes. Alas, in today’s Bulgaria (alongside many other EU member states in continental Europe) such an identity would be still lambasted as an ‘unseemly monstrosity,’ a new European ‘danger’ to ‘our’ nation. These new Euro-Brito-adjective-full Bulgarians are the same people who at their previous ‘home’ were conditioned by prejudice and education to live apart from one another. They employed their languages and religions to draw invisible lines that visibly divided the quarters where they had to live and social spaces in which they were permitted to move about. However, in Britain a once downtrodden Bulgarian Rom may work as a respected policeman, while a previously despised Bulgarian Turk could become an ethnic Bulgarian’s daughter-in-law. The children of such a union most likely would speak Turkish, Bulgarian and English, and it will not be an insurmountable problem for them to celebrate, side by side, Bayram (Eid al-Fitr, or the holiday that marks the end of Ramadan, or the Islamic holy month of fasting) and Christmas. As it sometimes was the case in the Balkans before the coming of the nation-state3 (cf. Lubańska 2012). Hopefully, politicians at Sofia may take note of this possibility of an inclusive change in the imaginarium of the Bulgarian body politic, in agreement with the ideal of fraternité, as already practiced in the United Kingdom.4 The original drafters of the 2012 ‘Declaration Condemning the Attempted Forced Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims’ in the Bulgarian Parliament must have borne this possibility

Conclusion 169 clearly and presciently in mind when working on this document and pondering about a better future for their country in united Europe and in the globalizing world. But this Declaration alone is not enough, it will not carry out by itself the goals sketched out in the text. Political will is needed to implement the Declaration’s program that for sure will be met with staunch opposition of those who benefit from the present-day divisively exclusivist ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic nationalism that underpins the Bulgarian national statehood. Otherwise, the Declaration will remain a dead letter. Noble but impotent, and eventually of no other import than antiquarian. Another lost chance for overcoming the ways of doing politics ‘as usual,’ so that Bulgaria remains like Greece and Turkey – the ‘best enemy allies’ fighting an undeclared war (for the time being, mostly) of nerves within NATO’s bosom.5 A way forward from the current stalemate in Bulgaria (at present guaranteed by amnesia, the effective erasure of the recent past from public memory) leads through the full acknowledgement of the crimes of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, alongside those of the forced assimilation program in the latter half of the 1980s. An acknowledgment of this kind, in line with the best examples and ideals of transitional justice (for instance, in the form of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission), must be followed by a wide-ranging uncovering of the truth about the 1989 expulsion and the ‘Revival Process,’ thus opening a way for genuine national reconciliation through remembering and forgiving. Each single victim must be accounted for, an appropriate apology offered to their families or the survivors, together with indemnification for the loss of lives and opportunities, and for sufferings caused. The separate character of the two events, the ‘Big Excursion’ and the ‘Revival Process,’ must be also recognized, and both need to be visibly and unequivocally commemorated. So that the 1989 ethnic cleansing and the assimilatory campaign of the latter 1980s would become significant and indelible lieux de mémoire of the modern Bulgarian history (alongside numerous previous expulsions of Muslims [Turks] that began in Bulgaria already in 1878, and assimilatory actions to change [Bulgarianize] ‘Islamo-Arabic’ names of Muslims [Turks] that commenced in 19126 [Marsuhiakova and Popov 2004: 4]). Only in this manner could the two tragic events become history and cease to linger as the divisive memory that haunts and tears asunder society in present-day Bulgaria. Of course, commemoration of the 1989 expulsion and the ‘Revival Process’ calls for monuments and museums in prominent public spaces, both in the capital and the country’s main cities. Not a single one has been built yet. But before a possibility opens for exorcising the recent past in this manner, the unique place of the 1989 ethnic cleansing in the modern Bulgarian history must be first clearly comprehended. This 1989 expulsion (alongside the unprecedented return of a third of the expellees) constitutes the end of communism in Bulgaria and is the singular event that made the unwilling Bulgarian Communist Party embark on the process of reforms, which brought about a systemic change, also known in Bulgarian as the ‘Big Change.’ As a result, Bulgaria was overhauled into a democratic country with a market economy, and could join NATO and the European Union. Too few Bulgarians recognize this significant causal link, which

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should be appropriately appreciated and ought to feature prominently in school textbooks, with a clear emphasis on the prominent role which Bulgarian Turks and Muslims played in this process (cf. Ivanov 2009). Furthermore, I hope that the 1989 ethnic cleansing closed the period of the prolonged ethnodemographically defined national revolution. In the ‘long century’ between 1878 and 1989, it was the norm in Bulgaria to assimilate by force and expel Turks, Muslims, Roma, and other ‘non-Bulgarians’ in search of a utopia of a ‘truly homogeneous’ nation-state. Within this national revolution carried out mostly by and in (economic, social and political) favor of ethnic Bulgarians, the modernization of Bulgaria took place, too, or the shift from agricultural and rural to urban and (post–)industrial society. This modernizing revolution is closely connected to the communist regime in Bulgaria, which was imposed by the victorious Soviet Union in the wake of World War II. Bulgaria, as a wartime ally of the Third Reich had little military possibility or moral political will to oppose this imposition. Actually, most Bulgarians quite readily espoused the Soviet-style modernization, making Bulgaria into the most faithfully pro-Soviet satellite state in the Soviet bloc. Unlike in the cases of other Soviet bloc countries, the aforementioned Soviet imposition could be easily written into the Bulgarian national master narrative, commonly understood as ‘welcome help’ extended by the amical Slavic and Orthodox ‘elder brother.’ In 1878 this ‘elder brother’ (then officially known as the Russian Empire) ‘freed’ Bulgaria from ‘Ottoman slavery,’ while at the end of World War II it delivered the Bulgarians from the ‘Nazi yoke.’ To this day the traditional Orthodox connection yields a kind of special relation between Russia and Bulgaria. Likewise, in the Balkans similar special relations with Russia are also enjoyed by the ideologically Orthodox – and at the same time, somewhat anti-Western – polities of Serbia and Greece (Tomova and Richevski 2004). The strength of the Bulgarian–Soviet alliance is clearly indicated by Sofia’s overtures in 1963 and again, ten years later, in 1973 to join the Soviet Union as its 16th republic.7 The idea was, first, to strengthen cooperation between both fraternal people’s democracies, in turn, leading to a confederation, and subsequently to the full political union. Had the Kremlin not gently rejected this membership application, Bulgaria would have become another Soviet republic (Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996: 179; Petkova 2010). Whatever was disliked in the process of Soviet-style modernization in Bulgaria, it was made palatable to most Bulgarians by the adoption of national communism when Zhivkov became the leader of the country in 1954. This move tightly reconnected the Soviet-led revolution of modernization with the Bulgarian national revolution of a much longer standing, as it had commenced already in 1878. Under Zhivkov’s rule both revolutions8 became an indistinguishable whole, arguably the national element gaining the upper hand over the modernizing one since the mid-1980s. After embarking on the policy of ‘Revival Process,’ the national quest for ethnolinguistic and ethnonational purity of the Bulgarian nation trumped any economic considerations, as exemplified by the folly of the 1989 expulsion, which left the Bulgarian economy in tatters.

Conclusion 171 The national revolution strove to rid Bulgaria of ‘non-Bulgarian elements’ on the way to building a ‘truly’ homogeneous nation-state, where only Slavophone Orthodox Christians would be allowed to reside, despite various limitations in this regard initially imposed in the 19th century on Bulgaria by the Western powers in the treaties regarding this new state and its international status (Njagulov 2011: 75). This program of a homogeneously Orthodox and Slavophone Bulgaria merged well with Orthodox Russia’s broader imperial-cum-religious project of (re-)capturing Orthodox Christianity’s Constantinople (‘Second Rome’), or the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarch.9 From the mid-18th century until World War I, Russian armies gradually seized and annexed Ottoman and other Muslim territories around the Black Sea,10 subsequently denuded of the Muslim populations by extermination and expelling millions to the shrinking Ottoman Empire. muhājir Understandably these muhacirs11 (that is, muhajirs, from Arabic for ‘migrants’) had no love lost for their new Christian neighbors in the still Ottoman Balkans (McCarthy 1995; Richmond 2013; Toumarkine 1995). During the Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878), the Russian Prince Vladimir Cherkasski (1824–1878), soon made Head of the Provisional Russian Administration in Bulgaria, did not mince his words. He referred to the conflict as a ‘racial [ethnic] war of extermination’ (une guerre des races et d’extérmination), a view widely shared by other Russian officials, alongside Bulgarian leaders (Turan 1998: 120, 125, 163). This French expression could be read as a 19th-century name for what later became known as ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing.’ Ironically, this prince’s surname means ‘Circassian,’ as his princely family originally was of this very ethnic origin (Cherkasski 2003). The Circassian refugees, 15 years earlier expelled, in 1864, to the Balkans from the Black Sea north-eastern littoral and hinterland seized by Russia, suffered most from among all the Muslims during the 1877–1878 conflict. It was so because Circassians were most effective in opposing the Russian advance, having an intimate knowledge of the Russians’ military tactics and methods, as experienced first-hand during the prolonged Russo-Circassian War (1763–1864) in the northern Caucasus (Fonvill’ 1991 [1831]; Lapinskii 1991). In the subsequent peace treaties Russian and Bulgarian representatives successfully strove to exclude Circassians from any relief provisions and to ban them from Bulgaria to the Ottoman Empire (Hertslet 1891: 2473, 2528, 2686, 2776, 2860). All of these Circassians (about 100,000 in total) either fled or were expelled from Bulgaria. None were allowed to return to their homes after the end of this war (Taboroši 2011: 81–82). The Russian atrocities committed against Muslims during the 1877–1878 war cost the latter at least 100,000 casualties, as meticulously reported in the Western press. A year earlier, in 1876, when the suppression of the anti-Ottoman April Uprising had resulted in the deaths of 3,000 Bulgarians the Western public opinion had been outraged at these ‘Bulgarian horrors.’ On the contrary, in 1877 and 1878 the very same public opinion, when informed on the much larger scale of the loss of life among Muslims, they did not bat an eyelid. No one cared to be outraged at these ‘Muslim (Ottoman, Turkish) horrors’ (Donaldson 1877; McCarthy 2001: 48; Turan 1998: 134, 164). Bulgaria’s Muslim population accounting for at least

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half of the territory’s inhabitants before the war was more than halved from 1.8 million to 800,000. During the war 100,000 Muslims were killed, another 100,000 died while fleeing, while over 600,000 managed to reach the safety of the territorially diminished Ottoman Empire (Turan 1998: 145). After the cessation of the hostilities, the Russians did their best not to allow the refugees to return to their homes, and only reluctantly made an exception for those who were Jews and Orthodox Greek-speakers. The Western powers made the Russian provisional administration accept Muslim returnees, but no Circassians were allowed to come back (Turan 1998: 146, 148). The system of protection for Muslims imposed on Bulgaria by the great powers was observed mostly in the breach. The eight-year long Pomak rebellion (1878–1886) against the Russians and the Bulgarian authorities (Turan 1998: 163) did not dispose the Bulgarian government well to the country’s Muslims (Turan 1998: 173). Between 1880 and 1910, mistreatment and discrimination convinced around half a million of the country’s Muslims to leave for the Ottoman Empire (Turan 1998: 154–155). (Bulgarian estimates of Muslim refugees and expellees to Turkey are lower, at 350,000 in 1878–1912 [Avramov 2016: 692], because typically the refugees and expellees from Eastern Rumelia [annexed by Bulgaria in 1885] are not included.) As a result, the share of Muslims in Bulgaria’s population plummeted from 27 percent in 1880 to 13 percent in 1910, and of Turks (that is, Turkish-speakers) from 15 percent to 11 percent during the same period (Turan 1998: 106–109, 113–115). In the course of the Balkan Wars (1912–1914), between 150,000 and 200,000 Turks (Muslims) died or were expelled from the territories conquered by the Bulgarian troops. Between the two World Wars (1923–1939), 199,000 Turks (Muslims) left Bulgaria for Turkey, and they were followed by 21,000 more during World War II and its immediate aftermath (1940–1949) (Şimşir 1988: 166, 179). The corresponding Bulgarian statistics of 222,400 expellees and refugees between 1924 and 1939 agrees well with the Turkish estimate, while that of 6,400 for 1941–1943 is substantially lower, because it does not cover 1944–1945 and the latter half of the 1940s when the communist regime was installed in Bulgaria (Avramov 2016: 692). Between 1950 and 1978, at least 284,000 Bulgaria’s Turks (Mulsims) went or were expelled to Turkey (Şimşir 1988: 166, 179, 301). This Turkish estimate corresponds closely to the Bulgarian statistics of 271,099 Turkish and Muslim expellees and refugees in this period (Avramov 2016: 709–710). Between 1877, 1881, and 2011, during which time Bulgaria’s population almost quadrupled, the share of ethnic (that is, Slavophone and Orthodox) Bulgarians in the country’s population grew rapidly from 51 (or rather 48) percent12 to 68 percent, and to 85 percent (2011 Population 2012: 3; Bibina 2002: 154; Crampton 1983: 176; Turan 1998: 82–84). The result is very close to the situation observed in today’s France. Less foreigners, immigrants and naturalized French citizens, the ‘ethnic French’13 added up to the 82 percent of France’s inhabitants in 2012 (Évolution 2012). In today’s globalized world, Bulgaria being part of the European Union where people can move at will, this result cannot be improved without sealing Bulgaria’s borders and resorting to expulsions and genocide. It would mean the reintroduction of an autarkic totalitarian regime, which

Conclusion 173 fortunately does not seem to be on the cards. Hence, I propose the national revolution, whatever one may think of it, has been completed in Bulgaria. What is more, the ethnic, linguistic and confessional diversity is bound only to increase within Bulgaria which remains open to the world as a member state of the European Union. Despite the enormous technological, social and economic changes in Bulgaria after the end of communism, the modernization revolution, like its national counterpart, had been completed by 1989. At the height of the national revolution, between 1878 and 1945, the share of the urban population among Bulgaria’s inhabitants grew at a glacial pace from barely a fifth to nearly a quarter of the inhabitants: hardly a sign of any significant modernization at all. The general patterns of economy remained largely as they had been during the Ottoman times. But during the four and a half decades of the communist period the share of people living in the country’s towns and cities skyrocketed, growing almost threefold to only slightly below the mark of 70 percent in the late 1980s (Bulgaria Among 2006; Population 1992). During the communist times Bulgaria was decisively transformed from a rural to industrial country. In Bulgarian statistics the national revolution is clearly detectable in spatial terms within the modernization revolution, when the place of residence of Bulgarian Turks, Muslims and Roma is taken into consideration. Barely a third of the country’s Turks and a bit more than half of the Roma did live in urban areas in 1989. A quarter-century later, the ratios remain largely unchanged (cf. 2011 Population 2012: 3). In line with the promise of national communism, the modernizing revolution was mainly reserved for ethnic Bulgarians. To a large extent, Turks, Muslims and Roma were excluded from this ethnonationally construed revolution, and in this sense they remain ‘unmodern’ or ‘traditional’ to this day, that is, excluded from the mainstream of Bulgaria’s social, political and economic life. It is an ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously induced structural wrong, hardly yet noticed or atoned for in Bulgaria. Ethnic Bulgarians need to take responsibility for what was good and bad in the national revolution and the revolution of modernization. They also must accept responsibility for the sufferings visited on all those defined from above as ethnically ‘non-Bulgarian,’ for Turks, Muslims, Roma, Tatars or Pomaks who until 1989 were progressively alienated and excluded from the Bulgarian nation and body politic, and also prevented from reaping the fruits of communist modernization. The dual revolution benefited ethnic Bulgarians disproportionately more than ethnically ‘non-Bulgarian’ Bulgarians. The resultant dual exclusion of the latter tentatively came to an end in 1989 when the ‘Big Excursion’ became the ‘Big Change’ that finally concluded these two revolutions. The revolutions are over, but politically, economically and socially Bulgaria is not a level playground. Bulgaria’s Turks, Roma, Muslims or Tatars remain short-changed, they ‘have it harder’ than ethnic Bulgarians. In order to ameliorate the gaping inequality, one could simplistically propose an affirmative action of the type that is practiced in Britain or the United States. But the nationalist forces spearheaded until recently by Ataka and nowadays

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by GERB would not allow it, just as they continue preventing any meaningful implementation of the provisions appealed for in the Parliament’s 2012 ‘Declaration Condemning the Attempted Forced Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims.’ The popular sentiment in today’s Bulgaria – basically shared by all the parties with the exception of the MRF – is still characterized by badly concealed anti-Turkish, anti-Roma and anti-Muslim feelings (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). Should the political elite or its considerable part decide to act on these ethnic animosities, many – if not most – ethnic Bulgarians would follow, facilitating and readily espousing renewed bouts of state-approved forced assimilation and expulsions. This intolerant and inherently anti-democratic attitude prevails, because during the last quarter of a century after the end of communism Bulgaria has failed to come to terms with its own history, preferring or even refusing to see it for what it is. Education, popular history books and the nationalist rhetoric maintain the dangerous delusion that the national revolution continues or needs to be restarted. Undefined further modernization also remains a vague goal, but without giving a thought to Bulgaria’s Turks, Roma and Muslims who were (to a degree) excluded from the communist modernization,14 and nowadays have been turned into Bulgaria’s underclass of the forgotten, pushed to the margins, compelled to leave for elsewhere in the European Union, or for Turkey.15 Recognizing this dual revolution which took place in Bulgaria, alongside its positive and pernicious effects, would pave the way for acknowledging the 1989 ethnic cleansing of Bulgarian Turks and Muslism as the pivotal ‘Great Turning Point.’ The GTP that simultaneously ended the two revolutions and turned out to be the cause of and the primum movens driving the ‘Big Change,’ which delivered postcommunist Bulgaria. The Bulgaria of the present era. Bulgaria’s success as a country hinges on this acknowledgement. The choice is between it and the delusion of the never-ending national revolution. Persisting in this delusion means living in a national dream detached from the economic, social, and political reality of Bulgaria within the European Union and in the globalized world. The Bulgaria of this kind would continue losing its inhabitants (irrespectively of their actual ethnicity) to more accepting and multicultural areas in the EU, but without attracting migrants from within the EU or immigrants from outside the Union who could replace those who have decided to leave. The countryside denuded of population and the demographically shrinking towns and cities would translate into a steadily lowering standard of living. Then the only remaining place of growth would be the Black Sea coast, some sentimental Bulgarians and other EU citizens affording themselves of summer houses there for their comfortable retirement. Quite a bleak and strangely ‘postmodern’ scenario. It can be even bleaker, given the fact that increasingly more Bulgarians with some means to their soul prefer buying holiday and retirement houses in Greece or Croatia that appear – at this moment – more stable and less corrupted than Bulgaria (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). The other possible approach that would rather make Bulgaria an attractive place to live requires the aforesaid acknowledgement of the difficult past, of the two

Conclusion 175 revolutions, and of the crucial role that the ‘Big Excursion’ played in ending both of them and in kick-starting the subsequent ‘Big Change.’ In order to be seen as genuine and thus become effective, this acknowledgement must come complete with the full acceptance for all Bulgarians, irrespective of language, religion, ethnicity, or any other difference. The test of an acceptance of this kind would be such percentual shares of ethnic Bulgarians and Bulgaria’s Turks, Roma and Muslims in the urban population, among attractive professions, at all levels of the state and self-governmental administration, in the judiciary system, alongside the Parliament and the government, which would correspond to the actual percentages that these groups amount to in Bulgaria’s overall population. Further elements of this acceptance test would be a swift erection of monuments and museums devoted to the ‘Big Excursion’ and the ‘Revival Process’ seen as an inalienable part of Bulgaria’s national history, alongside apology and indemnification to the victims of the 1989 ethnic cleansing and of the forced assimilation, or to their descendants. The depoliticization of religion and language necessary in order to achieve these ends would allow for the unfettered use of various languages in school, broadcasting and publishing. In this way, Turkish and Romani would be embraced as Bulgarian languages, alongside Bulgarian itself. Not only would Turks and Roma speak Bulgarian, as the case is now, but also ethnic Bulgarians would master Turkish and Romani as a matter of course. The country would be the first one to successfully marry the two post-Ottoman millets (of Orthodox Christians and Muslims) that also differ in language16 into a cohesive body politic. To such an attractive Bulgaria of the future immigrants would flock and they would add their own ‘New Bulgarian’ languages to this rewardingly multiethnic mix. ‘An utter impossibility,’ a Bulgarian realist might say, whereas a Bulgarian nationalist could decry this scenario as a ‘nightmare.’ For this vision of a Bulgarian future, I have employed none other than elements and solutions already present in today’s Britain and Ireland, or in other words the European Union countries where many Bulgarian citizens choose to migrate, attracted by this liberal model of statehood, society and economy. Following and acting upon the spirit of the 2012 ‘Declaration Condemning the Attempted Forced Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims’ could deliver an attractive Bulgaria of this kind.17 And in turn, the country could become a leader in transcending the divisiveness of domestic and international politics in the Balkans, as still generated by sticking inflexibly to the ideological model of national statehood normatively steeped in the crossover of millet and language. The acceptance of the inviolability of international borders, in line with the Helsinki Accords, would be a must for this process, alongside lowering normative expectations regarding the character and level of homogeneity in a polity. Bulgarian citizenship alone should suffice for defining the Bulgarian, while European Union citizens of other national citizenships should be treated the same as Bulgarians, when they decide to settle down permanently in Bulgaria. Last but not least, further research on the causes, the implementation and the broader ramifications of the 1989 ethnic cleansing is bound to deliver insights of relevance for European and international politics. Above all, an answer to the question of why the ‘Big Excursion’ did not trigger a war between Turkey and

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Bulgaria (and by extension, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact), or a civil war within the Bulgarian borders that could precipitate a breakup of the country. Secondly, it would be of import to check whether the international acquiescence toward the 1989 expulsion of Bulgarian Turks might actually encourage republican-turned-national leaders in late Yugoslavia to think that they could engage in ethnic cleansing and genocide with similar impunity. Thirdly, it would be necessary to study in parallel the 1989 ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria and the post-Yugoslav instances of ethnic cleansing and genocide with an eye to teasing out decisive (if any) differences and similarities between these two processes. Finally, a conclusion could be drawn on the necessity of a better – that is, constant – monitoring of potential and possible instances of ethnic cleansing and genocide, so that one act of this type carried out with impunity and no notice on the part of the international community might not encourage similar acts elsewhere. Ethnic cleansers and genocidaires are as good mimics as any humans.

Notes 1 For the sake of brevity, I use the concept of territory in quite a simplistic manner here. I should rather say ‘land,’ ‘space’ or ‘territorium’ untouched by the human technologies of state making. It is these technologies of measurement and control that produce a finite territory of a state, surrounded by frontiers that limit free access from outside into this territory and vice versa. As a result, continuous territorium (that also includes seas and oceans) is split among the discrete territories of the world’s states. State frontiers are invisible from outer space, which amply proves that territories are as much imagined as states, languages or nations are. That territories are an artifact of culture, a product of human ingenuity. A territory is a projection of human wishes and intentions onto a fragment of territorium. Territorium is visible to both, those who are aware of this territory-making projection and to those who are not (including animals), but the territory is perceivable exclusively to the former, those ‘in the know.’ Only then people may see it as ‘normal’ that in order to cross from territory A to Territory B they need to secure a visa and show their passport to a border guard (cf. Elden 2013: 323–330). 2 The British case is complicated by the fact that the Monarch of the United Kingdom doubles as the Supreme Governor of the Church of England. However, this arrangement is of negligible influence on the everyday life of Britain’s population. 3 Marushiakova and Popov (2015) consider this vision to be overoptimistic. Maybe they are right: the future will show. 4 Not that I am blind to Britain’s own set of grief and specific problems, though these are of a radically different kind than those faced by Bulgaria. Hence, I refrain from analyzing them in the study. 5 Rumen Avramov proposes that ‘this is wishful thinking [because Bulgaria’s] neighbors’ nationalisms are vivid and [in turn] feed [Bulgarian nationalism]’ (Avramov 2015). That may be true, but someone might try to break the vicious circle; and why not Bulgaria? All my youth in communist Poland I was fed official anti-German feeling by school and the mass media. It can be summarized by the then popular Polish nationalist saying that ‘as long as the world exists, a German will never be a brother to a Pole.’ However, after 1989 the German–Polish reconciliation became a fact, and as such paved the way for the successful democratization of Poland, and for the eastward enlargement of the European Union (cf. Feldman 2012; Sułek 2009). 6 Muslims (Turks, but also Pomaks, Roma, Tatars, Circassians, etc.) suffered repeated expulsions and bouts of forced emigration from Bulgaria in 1878, 1885, 1912, 1927, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1950–1951, 1968–1978 and 1989 (Ersoy-Hacisalihoğlu 2013:

Conclusion 177 368–369; Marushiakova and Popov 2004: 4, 6–7, 9, 12). Between 1880 and 1911, as many as 350,000 left for the Ottoman Empire. In the interwar period, over 200,000 Turks (Muslims) were forced to leave for Turkey, at least 150,000 of them on the basis of the 1925 Bulgarian–Turkish agreement. After World War II, the waves of emigrants and expellees from Bulgaria to Turkey amounted to 155,000 in 1950–1951 and to 130,000 in 1968–1978 (Höpken 1997: 55). Between 1878 and 1900, hundreds of mosques were destroyed (or turned into Orthodox churches); the same fate was meted out to Muslim cemeteries and tekkes (Sufi lodges), while all the geographical and place names were Slavicized (Bulgarianized) in an effort to erase any traces of the Ottoman (Turkish, Muslim) past from public space (Lory 1985; Turan 1998: 192–194). For instance, after 1878, the number of the mosques in Sofia was reduced from 44 to 3, and to a lonely one in 1897, which was unsuccessfully proposed for demolition in 1906. To this day it remains Sofia’s sole mosque (Turan 1998: 194). In the wake of the 1934 coup d’état in Bulgaria, Turkish MPs and mayors were removed from their posts on the slim pretext of their ‘insufficient command of the Bulgarian language.’ (Some propose that it was the beginning of the ‘Revival Process’ – or the forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing of the country’s Turks and Muslims that lasted largely unabated until 1989 [Avramov 2016: 667].) The number of Turkish-language periodicals, remaining at the level of 50–60 from the 1880s to 1920, plummeted to seven in 1934, to four the following year, while in 1944 all were closed, but a single title owned by Protestant missionaries (Höpken 1997: 63; Şimşir 1988: 243–244). The number of Turkish-medium schools that stood at 2,500 in 1875 was halved in Bulgaria to 1,284 in 1894, and remained at this level until the Balkan Wars and the Great War. Afterward the number of Turkish minority schools reached the then all-time low of 852 by 1920, before rebounding to 1,712 a year later. By the late 1920s the number of schools had dropped again to 949, before the 1934 coup’s nationalist program reduced the number drastically to 605 in 1936 and to 545 a year later. Subsequently, the number of Turkish schools had been further reduced to 424 by 1943, before rebounding, under the early communist regime, to 1,199 in 1947 (Höpken 1997: 63; Şimşir 1988: 32, 35, 112, 155; Turan 1998: 212, 222, 266). Significant assimilatory actions (including pogroms, forced change of names, compulsory conversion to Orthodox Christianity, drastic reduction or outright ban on Muslim and / or Turkish-language press book publishing or education, bans on clothing seen as ‘Muslim,’ and on Muslim religious and cultural celebrations) occurred in Bulgaria in 1912–1913, 1934, 1942, 1944, 1949, 1952, 1958–1959, 1962, 1970–1974, 1981 and 1984–1989 (Marushiakova and Popov 2004: 4, 6–7, 9, 11–14; Myuhtar-May 2013). The fully documented story and analysis of the over a century-long ‘national (that is, Bulgarianizing) revolution’ in Bulgaria, between 1878 and 1989, still needs to be written. Despite its brutality and persistence, this revolution neither delivered an ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously homogeneous Orthodox Bulgarian nation-state, nor made Bulgaria into a successful and welldeveloped European polity on a par with Germany. On the contrary, Poland achieved this holy grail of ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogeneity, but only due to the accident of the unintended consequences brought about by the involvement of external powers (that is, Nazi Germany and the wartime Allies). These powers imposed on Poland a dramatic change in its borders, while on the country’s population the Holocaust of Jews and Roma, the ‘population transfers’ (that is, internationally approved expulsions) of ethnic non-Poles (Germans, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Jews, etc.) to ‘their own countries,’ alongside the ‘repatriation’ (read: expulsion) of ethnic Poles who happened to find themselves outside the borders of the post-1945 Poland, to this country (Sienkiewicz and Hryciuk 2008). That nowadays (2016) Poland in the level of its technological development and the standard of living of its inhabitants approaches Germany is only thanks to the unprecedented period of stability and prosperity during the quarter of a century following the fall of communism in 1989. It was the process of European integration and the 2004 enlargement of the European

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Union that made this unprecedented stability and prosperity possible (cf. Program Operacyjny 2016; Program Polska 2016). But on the other hand, such changes required the opening of Poland to ethnically non-Polish immigrants, and allowing at least 3 million (and counting) ethnic Poles to leave the country and settle elsewhere across the European Union (Emigracja 2015; Ponad 2006). The very same challenges were faced by Bulgaria which joined the European Union in 2007. The utopia of ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogeneity is at variance with the European-style modernity based on democracy, tolerance and plurality. Such homogeneity in order to be achieved and subsequently maintained requires totalitarianism, a near-total isolation of the closed and closely watched state borders, alongside economic autarchy that invariably translates into abject poverty for the population at large. Interestingly, until 1956 the Soviet Union was composed of 16 union republics. In 1956 the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic was downgraded and transformed into a Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, contained within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Basically, Moscow resigned from its wartime plan of seizing Finland and adding it to the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic (Schuman 1957: 449). But when the number of states in the United States grew, it might not look well that the number of the SU’s union republics went down a notch. Bulgaria’s accession to the SU would have improved on this statistic. I was inspired to reinterpret the history of modern Bulgaria in the terms of such rather longue durée revolutions by the Polish philosopher, Andrzej Leder, who focuses on explicating the mechanisms of the processes of modernization in Poland during the last two centuries (Leder 2013). In Russia’s imperial ideology of the Third Rome (identified with Moscow), since the 16th century the goal had been to recover for Orthodox Christianity the Second Rome (Constantinople), known in Slavic as Tsar’grad, or the capital of the emperor of the Orthodox world (царь tsar). Russia as the largest Orthodox polity in the modern period (its ruler, known as Tsar) looked (and actually often saw himself) as if ‘destined’ to defeat the Ottomans and ‘reconquer’ Constantinople (Romanowski 2013). The Russian Empire (known as the Grand Duchy of Muscovy before 1721) initially embarked on the program of gathering all the lands of medieval Rus.’ After largely accomplishing this feat, this program morphed into an officially unacknowledged gathering of the lands of the Golden Horde that had destroyed Rus’ and subjugated its constituent principalities in the 13th century. The Russian expansion around the Black Sea littoral was part and parcel of this imperial project (Kappeler 2001: 19, 21). After World War II, the Arabic in its origin term muhacir was gradually replaced with the Turkish neologism göçmen (Podręczny 2016: 11), in line with wholesale linguistic engineering, which was to rid the Turkish language of Arabic and Persian linguistic loans and influences (Lewis 1999). In all probability, the percentage of Bulgarians (Slavophone Orthodox Christians) was several points below the 50 percent threshold, given the fact that Ottoman statistics merely registered Muslims and non-Muslims. The latter added to the aforementioned 51 percent of the territory’s inhabitants prior to the Russo-Turkish War in 1877–1878. However, apart from Slavophone Orthodox Christians, the category of non-Muslims also included Greek-, Romani- (‘Gypsy’) and Romance-speaking (Vlach, Aromanian) Orthodox Christians, alongside Armenians (or members of the Armenian Apostolic Church), Catholics and Jews. According to the Ottoman census reinterpreted in this manner, in 1877 ethnic Bulgarians (or Slavophone Orthodox Christians) did not amount to more than 48 percent of the 3.72 million inhabitants in the territory that later became Bulgaria (Turan 1998: 94–96). I put the term ‘ethnic French’ in inverted commas, as officially Frenchness is defined in France solely in the terms of French citizenship. That is why no official statistics are gathered in France on the population’s religions and languages (cf. Żelazny 2000). During the communist period, modernization – understood as access to school,

Conclusion 179 healthcare, decent housing and employment that provides a living wage – did take place in the case of Bulgaria’s Turks, Roma and Muslims, too. Their situation improved, as compared with what they had been able to enjoy before the Second World War. However, the problem was that this modernization for ethnic non-Bulgarians lagged behind what ethnic Bulgarians were gaining at the same time. Hence, to the former it looked as if communist Bulgaria unduly favored the latter. The gaps in modernization experienced by different ethnic groups in communist Bulgaria can be explained by pointing to the stark differences in the initial starting points. In 1945, because of habituated discrimination and due to the discriminatory edge of the national (Bulgarianizing) revolution, the socioeconomic position of Roma was the lowest, followed by the slightly better positions of Pomaks and Turks, with ethnic Bulgarians at the top of the pile. The paradox was that prior to the founding of the Bulgarian nationstate in 1878, the socioeconomic position of Muslims (Turks, Pomaks) was better than that of Orthodox Christians (ethnic Bulgarians), due to lower taxes for the former group and its privileged access to employment in the state administration. The national revolution rapidly reverted this pecking order resulting, among others, in the ruralization of Bulgaria’s remaining Muslim population, and in the simultaneous Bulgarianization (or in other words, de-Muslimanization) of the country’s towns and cities. When communist-style modernization commenced in Bulgaria during the latter half of the 1940s, Muslims were largely contained to the countryside, while ethnic Bulgarians were over-represented in the urban areas. By the very nature of the presence of a larger number of facilities and specialists in urban areas, this modernization took off faster and was more thorough in towns and cities than in the countryside (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). 15 The end of communism, which ushered both capitalism and democracy to Bulgaria, also did away with the idea of positive discrimination. Hence, the relatively narrow gaps in the level of socioeconomic development among communist Bulgaria’s different ethnic groups began diverging rapidly following the end of communism. After 1989 Roma were the first to be fired from failing state-owned enterprises, the last to be employed in private companies, while the habituated discrimination against them is not moderated by the state and its ideology any longer. A lot of developmental aid and modernizing programs financed by the European Union are devolved to local governments. Roma, Turks and Pomaks are under-represented in the local governments, hence such governments tend (even unintentionally) to work for the sake of improving the socioeconomic situation of ethnic Bulgarians. On the other hand, in entirely Roma or Turkish local governments, the generally lower level of education of the members and their worse access to the higher echelons of the state administration (dominated by ethnic Bulgarians) translate into poorer developmental results for such local communities (Marushiakova and Popov 2015). 16 The Albanian nation is composed of three former Ottoman millets of Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Catholics. But unlike in Bulgaria, these millets’ members are united in a single language, as all are Albanian-speakers. Furthermore, two millets (Judaists-Jews and Muslims-Palestinians) brush sides in Israel and as many as three millets (Muslims-Bosniaks, Orthodox Christians-Serbs and Catholics-Croats) in Bosnia. However, members of these millets are rigidly separated from one another spatially, and also with the employment of separate bodies of legislation, separate administrations and separate systems of social services. In Israel this separation is deepened by the language difference between Hebrew-speaking Jews and Arabic-speaking Muslims, while in the case of Bosnia such a language difference was rapidly constructed when in the wake of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Serbo-Croatian language was split as well, yielding Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian in the case of Bosnia. 17 Some Bulgarians may see this possibility as complete naïveté. Let me propose an example of such a development which until a decade ago appeared utterly unthinkable to ‘realists.’ After the Second World War the Allies moved Poland 300 kilometers

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westward, meaning that one-third of the postwar country’s territory had belonged to Germany before 1945. As a result, the German–Polish border became one of the most tense and intractable fault lines between East and West during the Cold War. In light of international law this border became fully recognized only with the ratification of the Polish–German Border Treaty in 1992. Since then it has been one of the foundations of the new ‘EUropean’ order (Kamusella 2010). After Poland joined the Schengen Area of borderless travel in 2008, this German–Polish frontier was relegated from the landscape to maps as a mere notional line separating Germany and Poland. In the wake of this event, Poles from the city of Szczecin (or Stetting in German) began buying less dear and better finished houses and apartments across the border in German villages and towns denuded of population, while Germans from these depressed area often go to Szczecin in search of gainful employment. The area – bisected by this increasingly imaginary border – is becoming rapidly multiethnic, multilingual, tolerant and futureoriented (cf. Lowe and Szymanowski 2013; Życie 2011).

Postscriptum

My late Father was a power engineer, all his working life employed in the Elektrownia Blachownia (Blachownia Power Plant) in Kędzierzyn-Koźle, Upper Silesia, Poland. He graduated from Wrocław Polytechnics, Poland, where he made friends with the Bulgarian student, Aglaida (Аглаида). They kept in touch until the fall of communism by the way of exchanging Christmas or New Year cards each year. Perhaps this personal connection convinced Father to apply for the temporary post of power engineer at the construction site of a new power plant, Марица Maritsa 3, in the Bulgarian town of Dimitrovgrad (Димитровград in Bulgarian, Dimitrovgrad in Turkish). Father was responsible for the installation and the starting of the turbines there in 1971. He did two tours of duty to Dimitrovgrad, each lasting for half a year. The first one in 1971 and the other in 1972 in order to keep an eye on the turbines during their initial period of work. Everything was fine. Father enjoyed his time in Bulgaria immensely, including the brand-new planned town of Dimitrovgrad, built at the turn of the 1950s. Following one’s profession in line with the state-approved goals of international cooperation with other ‘people’s democracies’ was the only way open to Father to travel. The Polish communist authorities would not let him then have a passport valid for capitalist countries so that he could visit his relatives in West Germany, expelled from Poland as ethnic Germans at the turn of the 1950s. Visiting foreign lands was always his dream. Prior to going to Bulgaria he realized this heart-felt wish as a student during the period of the 1956 Thaw when politics was briefly liberalized in communist Poland. Father went on a student exchange to a power plant in the Dutch city of Rotterdam, where he gathered material for his thesis. In the Netherlands he spoke German, his first language on account of which in postwar Poland he had had to stay for the second time in the fourth grade of his elementary school, until he had acquired a working command of Polish. As with every Polish student, after the communist takeover in 1948, Father had to learn Russian at school. He never became good at this language, just as he failed to excel at Polish. The sudden termination of his education in German school in 1945, when Moscow passed the German region of Upper Silesia to Poland, meant Father never had a chance to master German, either. In the end he lived in between languages, always at the ready to strike an interesting and friendly conversation over beer with anyone. No language was permitted to be an obstacle

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to it, though he felt most at home in Silesian, Upper Silesia’s local tongue composed from Slavic and Germanic elements. As a kid I always wondered how come Father agreed to go to work for a year in Bulgaria, with no knowledge of Bulgarian. Now, four decades later, having worked on the history and practice of language politics in Central Europe, I see that he deftly employed the pre-national skill of transcending languages. Basically, while Father talked to people, he endeavored to make himself understood, and expected the same from his interlocutor. The properly national way would be first to negotiate a language in which a conversation could be attempted. He would have none of that. Father abhorred changing borders and national regimes that expelled people from his own heimat of Schlonzsko (that is, Upper Silesia) either westward to postwar Germany, eastward to the Soviet Union, southward to Czechoslovakia, or northward to Poland ‘proper.’ He narrowly escaped this fate himself: many members of his family did not. Father’s later dream was to revisit Bulgaria with all his family. He had his way in the summer of 1978. In our Fiat 125p (bought with his Bulgarian earnings in 1972) we proceeded across Soviet Ukraine and Romania to Varna on Bulgaria’s Black Sea coast. After ten days in a resort in Golden Sands (Златни пясъци Zlatni pias'tsi), we drove inland to his friends whom he had made when in Dimitrovgrad. All of them were Bulgarian Turks, good at fun, talking, drinking, and showing us around. A mosque was included in the itinerary, alongside the park dedicated to the memory of the tragic poet Pen’o Penev (1930–1959). Penev had come to Dimitrovgrad after the war to participate in the construction of this new socialist town. He had published his first poem there in 1947 and ten years later, in 1957, had committed suicide. During this short period Penev had become the communist town’s famous bard. The rivulets, ponds and charming alleys strewn with white gravel in the park named after him convinced me that I would become a poet, too. (Well, I did not.) We had a great time in Dimitrovgrad. After a couple of days, we continued from Dimitrovgrad to Sofia. We met Aglaida and her family. Then it was time to return home, which we did driving across Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to our Schlonzsko. Back in Poland we never stopped reminiscing about this oncein-a-lifetime trip. Father would not have it and decided to revisit Bulgaria. The time was not auspicious. The decade-long crisis of the socialist planned economy began for real in Poland in 1979, when the Soviet attack on Afghanistan terminated the all-feel-good festival of détente between East and West. Workers rose in strikes across Poland in 1980, and 10 million people joined the independent trades union Solidarity dwarfing the then ‘four-million-weak’ membership of the Polish Communist Party. In December the following year (1981) the communist authorities clamped down with martial law on Poland, ostensibly in order to prevent a Soviet-led invasion of ‘fraternal people’s democracies,’ like that one in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. The martial law lasted through July 1983. In 1986 I finished secondary school and in the fall would begin my studies at university. Father decided that we had to go back to Bulgaria that summer. He made his best to make the plan happen. It was not easy, though by then some more

Postscriptum 183 onerous administrative obstacles previously thrown in the way of potential holidaymakers wishing to go abroad to a ‘fraternal people’s democracy’ had been dropped. Hurrah! Father had it his way again. In the Soviet Union we would buy gold rings for next to nothing. In Romania we would sell Biseptol antibiotic tablets used there under Nicolae Ceaușescu’s increasingly crazed pronatalist regime as an impromptu intravaginal contraceptive. In turn, with Romanian leis in hand we’d buy cotton T-shirts and enjoy grapes galore, never to be had in communist Poland. Back home in Poland the socialist economy of scarcity, rationing cards, empty shop shelves, and never-ending queues was in full swing – not really that different from communist Romania, though a choice of few varying goods was in constant supply in both countries, for instance, vinegar in Poland or French-language books in Romania. In comparison, Bulgaria was a socialist paradise of golden beaches, sunshine, wine and ripe peaches. As eight years earlier, following the ten carefree days in sunshine on the Black Sea coast, we set off to Dimitrovgrad. When we reached the town we had to stay under a tent in a campsite. The house of Father’s Turkish friends appeared abandoned. No one knew what happened to them. Even worse, no one recognized their surname. Time and again it was pointed out to us that it sounds Turkish, and Turks do not live in Bulgaria but in Turkey. That Bulgaria is a Slavic country. Father just nodded and smiled. He explained nothing to us, but must have immediately understood. It was like in his Schlonzsko, where after 1945 no Germans had been left, his own name and surname summarily Polonized, while he had been required to unlearn rapidly the German language of his childhood. Another damned expulsion already completed or still in the making. Bulgaria was not priding itself in Sofia’s policy of forced assimilation. Sofia kept silent on it. On the other hand, there was no Internet to glean any news about the events, while censorship would not allow any articles on this subject in communist Poland’s newspapers. Father sensed the immensity of the tragedy from the silences and sheer evasiveness. My brother and I were just disappointed we would not have a repeat of a great time with our ‘Bulgarian aunt and uncle.’ We didn’t get it. Now I know. It was the forced assimilation campaign of 1984–1985, a violent prelude to the 1989 ethnic cleansing. Father enquired about the whereabouts of his Turkish friends, asking Aglaida and some other Bulgarian acquaintances. No one knew what happened. Maybe they preferred not to know. Father never heard from his Turkish friends again. April and June–August 2015 and January–March, May–July and October–November 2016 and June–September 2017 Saunt Aundraes / Cill Rìmhinn Scotland / Alba

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Notes 1

2

3

4

5

Literally the Bulgarian collocation means ‘little excursion,’ which is a direct reference to the ‘Big Excursion,’ or the ethnic cleansing of Bulgarian Turks and Muslims in 1989. The article’s author does not harbor any doubts that Vietnamese were expelled from Bulgaria in 1990 and 1991. Gazeta Wyborcza was Poland’s first non-communist and non-state-owned daily, which began publishing on 8 May 1989, that is, nearly a month before the first free elections in the still communist state that were held on 4 June. It explains the newspaper’s title of ‘Electoral Gazette,’ or ‘Elections Newspaper’ (Dudek 2013: 36). The first noncommunist Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki (1927–2013), assumed office on 27 August 1989, but censorship, though in a gradually more lenient form, survived until April 1990. Cichy’s article, with some sentences removed by a censor, is an example of this late censorship in the almost-postcommunist Poland (Krótki 2010). The volume de facto was never published. Joachim Blaschke is a scholar and an NGO activist, who was active especially in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. He specialized in conferences and team research on migrations in the then freshly postcommunist, post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav states, while the findings were published by his non-profit publishing house, Edition Parabolis. Vagaries of grant financing meant that some completed and advertised volumes were never actually printed, and only exist in a virtual fashion as pdf files available online. This is the sad case of this 2004 important collection, Migration and Political Intervention: Diasporas in Transition Countries (Blaschke 2016; Jochen 2016; Marushiakova and Popov 2015). Essentially, it is the second edition of Petrov (1972), which was to be appended with a second volume that never was published, due to the fall of communism in Bulgaria and to the return of civic and human rights to this country’s Turks and Muslims. The entire title is in Turkish with the exception of this mid-section which is in Bulgarian but spelled in Turkish orthography.

Index

Page numbers in bold refer to maps A Cultural Atlas of The Turkish World 30 affirmative action 173–4 Afghanistan 136 Agreement Guaranteeing the Peaceful Transition to a Democratic Society 96 aid 14, 59, 62, 72n22, 83, 98, 176n15 Albania 129, 154, 179n16 Albanians xvii, 61, 62 Aleksandrov, Chudomir 106n9 Alexeivich, Svetlana 27–8 al-Qaida 137 Amnesty International 42 Anatolia 50, 58, 130 Angelov, Veselin 28 Ankara 42, 47, 47–8, 50, 59, 68, 71–2 anti-Muslim prejudice 42–3 anti-Roma prejudice 116 Anti-Romism 53 anti-Semitism 5–6, 13, 25, 129–30 anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim demonstrations 54, 85–6, 94–5 anti-Turkish prejudice 42–3 Antonescu, Ion 165n11 apology for the 1989 ethnic cleansing, lack of 117 April Protests of Turks and Muslims, 1989 xv–xvi, 3, 19, 45, 71 April Uprising, 1876 13–15, 21n4, 171 Armenian Genocide 9n7, 21n9, 91, 118 Armenians 12 Association for the Support of Vienna 44, 45 Ataka 117–18, 151

Atanasov, Georgi 8n4, 50, 86, 87–8, 106n9, 116 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 155–6, 156–7 Austria xv, xxv, 22n10, 67, 105n7, 159 Autochthons 76n3 Avramov, Rumen 30, 35, 38–9n8, 38n7, 39n10, 123–4n3, 176n5 Azeris 12 Azizoglu, Aziz Dzhelil 29 Baeva, Iskra 28–9 Balev, Milko 90, 140 Balkans, territorial aspirations, 1912 xxxvi Balkan Wars, 1912–1913 9n7, 127, 172 Balladur, Édouard 105n7 Barnes, Julian, The Porcupine 91–2, 106–7n12 Batak massacre, 1876 14–15 Batiushka 106n10 Belene concentration camp 34, 41–2 Benda, Julien 25 Berlin Wall, fall of xiii, 82 Berlusconi, Silvio 155 Berov, Liuben 97 Big Change, the 87, 161, 169–70, 173, 174–5 ‘Big Excursion,’ the 3, 4, 6, 8n4, 83, 146; 20th anniversary 114; 25th anniversary 119; acknowledgement of role 174–5; blame 90, 103; economic impact 72–3, 74; fallout 67–9; forgetting 12–13; generalized amnesia 103–5; internet

264

Index

search 15–16; literature review 15–18, 19–20; origin 41–2; scientific justification 104; Stoianov on 110; temporal plane 13; trigger 28 bilingualism 7n1 Black Sea Economic (Cooperation) Zone 95–6 Blue Coalition 114, 115 Bojkov, Victor 33–5, 39n10 Borba 41 border crossing 50, 51, 54; Checkpoint Ali 78n21; closure 59–60, 70, 75 borders 128–9, 180n17; securitization 144, 163n2 Borisov, Boiko 65, 91, 118–19, 148, 151, 152–3, 154, 161, 164n6, 165n13 Bosnia xii, xvii, 2, 6, 9n9, 10, 11, 67, 105, 141, 157, 179n16 Bosnian War 2, 10n11, 12, 67, 148–9 Brezhnev, Leonid 33 Broisov, Boiko xxii, xxv, 65, 91, 106n11, 113, 118–19, 148, 151, 153–4, 161, 164n6, 165n13 Brubaker, Roger 52 Bulgaria, My Land (film) 122 Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Sociology 86 Bulgarian citizenship 64, 100, 133, 144, 175 Bulgarian Communist Party 47, 48, 73, 77n8, 80n39, 169; Central Committee 147–8; change 66; forced assimilation policy 1–2, 19; leadership reshuffle xiv; leading role abolition delayed 83–4; legitimacy 1; loyalty to xvi; membership 66, 145; nationalist program xvi; purge 83; renamed BSP 94; responsibility 103, 147–8; restoration of names act 92; Round Table negotiations 87; Turk membership 80n34 Bulgarian Constitutional Court 97 Bulgarian Empire: First xxxiii, 164n8; Second xxxiv Bulgarian ethnic model 29, 116–17, 119 Bulgarian Exarchate xxxv, 21n4, 127, 129, 138n2 Bulgarian Horrors, 1876 13–15, 171–2: see also Turkish Horrors

Bulgarian intelligentsia, the, Grouev on 20 Bulgarian language xl, 102, 134 Bulgarian model, the 20; see also Bulgarian ethnic model Bulgarian Muslims 48–9, 50; see also Pomaks Bulgarian National Radio 98–9 Bulgarian Parliament xiv-xvi, 32, 53, 79n28, 82, 84, 88–9, 93, 95–7, 101–2, 107n15, 108n18, 110, 114–18, 143–4, 153, 165n13, 168, 173, 175 Bulgarian Socialist Party xiv–xv, 92, 93, 93–4, 102, 107n14, 154 Bulgarian–Soviet alliance 170 Bulgarian–Turkish agreement, 1925 177n6 Bulgarian–Turkish war, prevention of 7 Bulgarianization 28, 144, 179n14 Bulgars 135–6 Bunovo 36, 118 Bursa 58, 113 Castro, Fidel 158 Cavuş, Mehmet 33 Ceaușescu, Nicolae 84, 159 cemeteries, desecration 46 censorship 43, 67, 123n2, 160, 183 census 19; 1985 xv, 55; 1992 100–1; 2011 57, 80n32 Center for Turkish Studies, University of Wisconsin–Madison 23 Chalker, Lynda 69 Checkpoint Ali 78n21 Cherkasski, Prince Vladimir 171; see also Circassians Chernenko, Konstantin 34 Chernishev, Albert 68–9 Chernobyl 105n1 Chervenkov, Valko 107–8n17 China 68; Tiananmen Square protests and massacre 67, 77n13, 104 cinema 42–3 Circassians 14, 171, 172 circumcision 77n5 citizenship 100, 150, 158, 166, 175; British 166; Bulgarian 63–4, 100, 133, 144, 175; Croatian 134–5; dual 63–4; French 78n; German 76n3; Greek 163n3; Hungarian 135; Turkish 63–4

Index  265 civil rights xvi, 20, 92 civil war: de facto 112; threat 66, 76, 85, 90, 105 clash of civilizations 136–8, 139n11 Cold War, the 3, 11, 25, 136 collective amnesia 103–5, 115–16, 116, 117 commemoration of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, lack of 103, 119 Committee for Solidarity with Kurdistan 26 communism: Bulgarian 107–8n17, 170; collapse of xiii, 1, 37, 53, 67, 79–80n31, 84, 136; end of in Bulgaria xiv–xvi, 17, 68, 107n17, 160, 161, 179n15; national 73, 107–8n17; nostalgia for 150; standard narrative xiv condemnation, lack of 118 confiscations at the border, 1989 60, 62 conflict, logic of 167 Constantinople, Treaty of, 1913 21n3 Constitution 96–7; Article 3 102; Article 11.4 97; Article 13 111; and religion 134 Constitutional Court 161 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 140–2, 163n1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 78n18 Copenhagen criteria, 1993 101–2 Council of Europe 153, 161; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 102 Crampton, Richard 35, 52 crimes against humanity 69, 90, 91, 142, 142–4, 155, 156 Croatia 3, 67, 134–5, 137, 157 CSCE 38n2, 65, 105–6n7; Conference on Human Rights, Paris, 1989 44–5, 68; Sofia conference, 1989 70 Culture and Information Center on Kurdistan 26 Cumhuriyet 41 curfew 76 Cyprus 39n9, 50, 59, 138 Cyrillic, transliterations xxi Czechoslovakia 2, 67, 80n39 Czech Republic 154

Danas 41 DANS 37 deaths 34–5, 39n10, 42, 46, 74 Declaration Condemning the Attempted Forced Assimilation of Bulgarian Muslims, The 114–16, 117, 117–19, 124n4, 168–9, 174, 175 Declaration on the National Question 88–9 decolonization 139n10 DeConcini, Dennis 68 de Klerk, Frederik Willem 117 Delo 41 democracy and democratization xiv, xvi, 3, 43, 83, 87, 93–4, 96–7, 117, 122, 158 Democratic Human Rights League in Bulgaria (DLZPChB) 44, 45 demographic crisis 1–2 demographic dynamics 55–8 demonstrations: anti-Bulgarian demonstration, Istanbul 71; anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim 54, 85–6, 94–5; restoration of human rights 92 denial 4 Department Six, Sofia demonstration, November 1989 83 Der Spiegel 41 Deutsche Welle 27 development 110 Dimitrov, Boiko 87 Dimitrov, Dimitur Velev 79n28 Dimitrov, Georgi 107n17 Dimitrovgrad 181, 182, 183 diplomatic dialog 47–8 Disraeli, Benjamin 13 dissident movement 43–5, 65, 160; aim to dismantle 48; expulsion 44, 46–7; harassment 49–50; imprisonments 46; repression 45–6; transformed into a mass force 45; Turkish character 45 Dodon, Igor 122 Dogan, Ahmed xv, 28, 29, 38n4, 38n5, 48, 77n7, 84, 90, 94, 102, 111, 144, 146, 158, 160–2 Donaldson, James, Atrocites Russes en Asie et en Roumelie pendant les mois de Juin, Juillet et Aout 1877 171, see also Turkish Horrors Donchev, Anton, Time of Parting 42–3 Dreyfus Affair 25

266

Index

Dreyfus, Alfred 25 DS 3, 37, 38n4, 48, 49, 53, 57, 60, 61, 65, 77n7, 79n26, 91, 92, 105n1, 105n4, 107n13, 113, 148, 163–4n5 dual discrimination of Muslim Roma 62 Dumas, Roland 68 East Germany 18, 22n10, 67, 146 economic collapse xvi, 66, 72, 82–3, 96 edinstvo 18-19, 94, see also unitary Bulgarian socialist nation education: levels 36, 39n11; Roma 131; Turkish 108n19; Turkish language 76–7n4, 96, 97–8, 177n6 elections 83; 1990 xiv, 93; 1991 xiv–xv, 97; 2001 153; 2005 91; 2014 xxxii environmental activists 105n1 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 30, 48, 119, 136 Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu, Neriman 30 Estonia 113 ethnic Bulgarians 45, 84–5, 87, 94, 95, 108n18, 121, 144, 173 ethnic cleansing: causes 3; criminal 13; definition 2–3, 118, 141–2; expulsion recognized as 53; generalized amnesia 103–5; impact 67–9; introduction of term 11–12; recognition of 52; responsibility 90; scientific justification 104; Yugoslavia xvii, 11; see also population transfer ethnic identity 19 ethnic minorities 19 ethnic relations 116 ethnolinguistic nationalism 119, 140 ethnonational character xvi ethnoreligious millets 18 euphemisms 3, 53, 92, 107n13 European Court of Human Rights 5, 118 European integration 177n6 European Parliament 155, 160 European Union 3, 5, 32–3, 96, 102, 121, 148, 175; black visa list 63; Bulgarian accession 26, 29, 64, 81n40, 115, 116, 133, 166; Copenhagen criteria 101–2; developmental aid 179n15; eastward enlargement 166; preoccupation 66–7; responsibility 156–7 Evren, Kenan 69 exchange rates 80n35

expellees: anonymous phone calls to 49–50; Bosnian War 2; Bulgarian citizenship 100; children of 122; dehumanization 59–60; demographic dynamics 55–8; dissident movement 44, 46–7; by ethnic group 1; intimidation 53–4; Muslims 1; numbers 1, 12, 41, 54–5, 58, 62–4; outflow, summer, 1989 50–2; persecution 65–6; returnees 2, 52, 60–2, 62–3, 63, 72, 79n26, 108–9n19, 169; Roma 1, 39–40n16; Tatars 1; as tourists 3, 8n4, 21n9, 50, 51; in Turkey 58–9, 60–1; Turkish citizenship 63–4; Turks 1; see also ethnic cleansing, population transfer expulsion decision 19, 48 expulsion negotiations 47 expulsion rates 54–5, 58 expulsions, rapidity 29 extra-judicial incarceration policy 144 fact-finding tour, 1989 68 far-right, rise of the 119 financial crisis, 2008 119 food rationing 95 food security 72 forced assimilation policy 4, 6, 8n4, 19, 38n7, 42, 44, 45, 51, 64–5, 68, 74, 83, 86, 90, 91, 114, 183; Ottoman Empire 24–5; recognized as wrong 84; responsibility 144, 146; reversed 1–2 forced name-changing campaign 12, 20–1(n1), 33–4, 38n1, 38n4, 42, 76n1, 76n2, 76n3, 84, 130 forced Turkification 100–1 foreign languages, suppression xv forgetting 9n7, 12–13, 103–5 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Council of Europe 102 France 69–70, 126, 139n10, 172, 178n13 Franco, Francisco 165n11 Frankfurt trials 5 fraternité 167–8 free-market economy 92 French language 46 Freud, Sigmund 139n9 Front National 119

Index  267 Gandev, Khristo 24 Gazeta Wyborcza 41 GDP 72–3 Gebert, Konstanty 165n11, 165n12 generational change 146 genocidaires, Soviet bloc countries 156–7 genocide, definition 141 Georgi Dimitrov, Mausoleum of 103, 152 GERB 114, 173–4 German–Polish Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation 105n7 Germany 8n3, 154; reunification 67, 105n6 Gladstone, William Ewart 13–14 Golden Dawn 119, 133 Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah 145–6 Goliamatas 87 Gorbachev, Mikhail 33, 34, 43, 55, 68–9, 81n42, 83 Gotse Delchev 101 graves, desecration 46 Graziani, General Rudolfo 156 Greater Bulgaria xxxviii; San Stefano borders xxxvii, 129, 133–4; World War II xxxix Greater Romania Party 158–9 Great Turning Point, the 174 Greece 59, 71, 79n25, 119, 127, 128, 131, 132–3, 134, 137, 150, 163n2, 163n3, 169 Green Transversal, the 136–7 Grey Wolves 71–2 Grouev, Ivaylo 16–17, 19–20 Guardian 7, 41, 104 guerilla movement 36–7 Hacısalihoğlu, Mehmet 30 Hasan, Türkan, monument to 113 Haskovo 57–8, 62, 79n28, 142 Havel, Václav 158 Hayden, Lieutenant General Michael V. 12 Heads of State of Bulgaria xxiii Helsinki Accords 65, 175 Helsinki Final Act, 1975 70 historiography 3–4 history: conflicted narrative 113; politics of 112; standard narrative 126–9, 135

Hitler, Adolf 89, 157 Holocaust, the 4–6, 9n7, 25, 79n30, 89, 123n3, 130, 139n7, 145–6 homeland, human right to 8n3 homogenization 17–19, 25, 38n7, 84–5, 129, 134, 140, 150, 167, 170 Horthy, Miklós 165n11 houses 79n24; destructions 62, 79n28, 79n29, 142 human rights 8n3, 20, 24, 48, 68, 70, 92 Human Rights Watch 39–40n16, 40n17 Hungary 2, 43, 66–7, 119, 154 hunger strikes xv, 3, 42, 45, 49, 74, 96–7 Iakoruda 101 Iakoruda case, the 101–2 Ibrahim, Zeynep 44 identity 18, 19 importance 6 imprisonments 46 income disparity 150 Independent Human Rights Society (NDZPCh) 43–4, 45 India 165n12 indictment 145 indifference 13 inequality 173–4 intellectuals, treason of 25, 26 international community, silence 69 International Criminal Court 118, 142–3, 145, 163n4 International Journal of Turkish Studies 23 international law 16, 21n3, 140–2 international ostracism 82–3 international repercussions 28–9 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 148–9 Internet, the 100 interwar period 127 Iohannis, Klaus 158–9 Iotov, Iordan 106n9 Ippon-1 91, 106n11 Iran 59, 164n8

268

Index

Iraq 59; occupation of Kuwait 96 Iskander, Sabri 44 Islam 65, 134; forced conversions 7–8n1; the Green Transversal 136–7; spread of 4; suppression of 41, 143; threat of 6, 136–8 Islamic Conference Organization 80n36 Islamization 5, 24, 49 Istanbul, anti-Bulgarian demonstration 71 Italy 155, 156 Iundola 90–1 Ivanova, Diana 27 Izetbegović, Alija 157 Jergović, Miljenko 134–5 Jews 123n3, 124n3, 129–30, 156 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 165n12 Judah, Tim 105 judiciary system, failure of 115 justice: lack of 114–15; miscarriages of 102 Kaczyński, Jarosław 119 Kalinova, Evgeniia 28–9 Kamusella, Tomasz, father 181–3 Kapitan Andreevo, the xlii Karadžić, Radovan 157 Karakhiuseinov, Mekhmed, selfimmolation 113 Kardzhali 85, 93, 98–9, 102 Karpat, Kemal H. 23 Kesebir, Erdal 39–40n16 Kirişci, Kemal 78n18 Kosovo xvii, 2, 6, 8n2, 61, 62, 77n13, 113, 137, 149, 157 Kosovo Field, Battle of 6, 9n9 Kostov, Ivan 114 Kubadinski, Pencho 106n9 Kurds and the Kurdish question 26, 40n17, 50, 54, 59, 77n10, 104, 129, 147 Kutlay, Muzaffer 30–1 Kuwait, Iraqi occupation of 96 Kuwait talks 70–1, 72, 80n36 Laber, Jeri 40n17 labor shortage 2, 72, 74–6, 80–1n40, 142 language: Bulgarian 102, 134; depoliticization of 167–8, 175; French 46; homogeneity 167; incorrect 167;

Macedonian xl, 133; national 129, 135; Romani xv, 46, 53, 102, 120, 125n6, 130, 131, 175; suppression xv, 41, 46; transcending 182; Turkish 4, 76–7n4, 92, 96, 96–100, 108–9n19, 109n20, 120, 121, 143, 175; Turkish dialects xli Leder, Andrzej 178n8 legislation, abuses of 102 Leninist Communist Party of Turks in Bulgaria (TLKPB) 44–5, 45 Lenin, Vladimir 154, 156, 157 linguistic offenders 46 Lipski, Jan Józef 37 literature reviews: Bojkov 32–5; Bulgarian 23–30, 32, 39n14; current state 37–8; documentaries 31–2, 38–9n8; Dogan 161–2; European (Western) scholarsship 26; joint Bulgarian-Turkish 31–2; literary works 32; number of deaths 34–5; opposition 28–9, 35–7; terrorism 36–7; Turkish 30–1, 32; Zhivkov 162 living conditions 60, 86 logistics 50 long century of ethnic cleansing in Bulgaria, the 170 ‘lost territories’ of ‘Greater Bulgaria’ 129 Lukanov, Andrei 94, 96 Macedonia 132–3 Macedonian language xl, 133 Macedonians 19 Mao Zedong 91, 157, 165n12 Marko, Prince 9n6 Marushiakova, Elena 35 mass protests, April and May, 1989 19, 28, 42, 44, 45, 48, 65 Memişoğlu, Hüseyin 39n15 memorials 111–13, 114 Mestan, Liutvi 120 methodological approach 7 Mevsim, Hüseyin 30–1 migrant crisis, 2015 42, 119 migration 174 Mikhailov, Stoian 106n9 military intervention, call for 71–2 military service 35–6, 102 militia 53, 142 millet system 18, 126–9, 130, 134, 138n3,

Index  269 139n7, 175, 179n16 Milošević, Slobodan 6, 11, 149, 157 minorities legislation 17 minority rights 63, 96, 127 Mitterrand, Danielle 69–70 Mizov, Nikolai Mikhailov 24 Mladenov, Petur xiv, 82–4, 106n9 modernization, communist period 178–9n14 modernization revolution 173 Mogiliane 113 Moldavia 74 Moldova 121–2 moral imperative 5 Moscow 34, 47, 68–9, 178n9 Moscow Declaration, the 22n10 MRF (Movement for Rights and Freedoms) xvi, xxxii, 20, 29, 32, 36, 37, 54, 65, 84, 88, 93, 97, 98, 99, 110, 113, 116, 120, 140, 146–7, 151, 158, 160–1, 174 Muhammadization 38n3 Mulaj, Klejda 16 Muscovy 138n1, 178n10 Muslims: change in the official attitude toward 84; education levels 36, 39n11; exclusion from Round Table negotiations 87; expellees 1; expulsion of 1; forced assimilation 4; the Green Transversal 136–7; holidays 78n15; millet practices 18; participation 110; place of residence 173; population 55, 64, 171–2; postcommunist settlement 20; re-incorporation of 150; repeated expulsions 176–7n6; restoration of human rights 92; return to Bulgaria xv; socioeconomic position 179n14; stripped of civil and political rights xvi; suppression xv, 77n5; threat of 136–8 Muslim Strike Committee 44, 45 Mussolini, Alessandra 155 Mussolini, Benito 155, 156 Mutafchieva, Vera Petrova 24 myths 126 Nagorno-Karabakh War 12 name-changing campaign 12, 20–1(n1), 33–4, 38n1, 38n4, 42, 76n1, 76n2, 76n3, 84, 130

national communism 73, 107–8n17 national egoism 167 nationalism 1, 4, 33, 120, 139n9, 167, 169, 176n5; ethnolinguistic 119, 140 nationalist movement and program xvi 84–5 nationality, linguistic definition 101 national language 129, 135 national martyrdom, myth of 4, 9n5, 9n6 national purity 129 national reconciliation 88, 111, 126 national revolution 169–74, 177n6 nation-building, ethnolinguistic models 128–9, 132–5 nationhood 18–19 NATO xvii, 10n11, 96, 120, 148, 169; Bulgaria joins 29, 68, 116 Nehru, Jawaharlal 165n12 newspapers 7 Niyazov, Saparmurat 106n10 Non-Aligned Movement 11 non-violence 29 Northern Cyprus 33, 39n9, 50, 59 Northern Ireland 35, 39n10 Odurne 153 official duplicity 3 OKZNI 85, 88, 93, 96 Ömer, Mustafa 44 opposition 28–9, 35–7, 42; supraethnic 47 Orbán, Viktor 119 Organisation internationale de la Francophonie 139n10 original sin, postcommunist Bulgaria 87 Ormanla, Ali 44 Orthodox axis 139n13 Orthodox Church 49, 65, 127, 128–9, 134 OSCE 101–2 Other, the 167 Ottoman Empire 4, 9n5, 9n6, 9n9, 118, 171–2; forced assimilation policy 24–5; Islamization 5; millet system 126–9, 138n3, 139n7; Orthodox Christian uprising, 1876 13–15, 21n4; progressive multiculturalism 127–8; toleration 18 Özal, Turgut 38n1, 51, 55, 60, 71, 95–6

270

Index

Paris, Conference on Human Rights, 1989 45, 68 parliament, first postcommunist 107n15 participation 110 Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova 121 Parvanov, Georgi 153 passport law, 1989 47–8, 50, 75 passports, issued to Turks 49–50 peace and conflict studies 7 peacetime mobilization, 1989 72, 74–6, 80–1n40, 142, 144 Pegida 119 Penev, Pen’o 182 Perez de Cuellar, Javier 70 Petrov, Petur Khristov 24 phone calls, anonymous 49–50 Plvodiv railway station bombing 39n12 Podkrepa 47, 85–6 pogroms 4 Poland xiii, 12, 39n10, 43, 44, 79n30, 119, 154, 176n5, 177–8n6, 181, 182, 183; elections 66–7; expulsion of Jews, 1968 52–3; expulsion of Roma, 1981 53; German minority 101; German–Polish frontier 179–80n17; martial law 34–5, 65–6; namechanging campaign 76n3; population transfers 2; reporting on the 1989 expulsion 78n20 Polansky, Sol 70, 82 Polish–German Border Treaty, 1992 180n17 political rights, Turks stripped of xvi politics, religious 3 Politika 41 Pomak rebellion 172 Pomaks xxix, xxxi, 7–8n1, 74, 76n2, 79n25, 101, 144, 163n2, 179n14 Pomorie 124n3 Popov, Dimitur 73 Popov, Veselin 35 population changes, 1877–1923 78n19 population growth 173 population transfers xvii, 58; legal 13, 21n3; post-World War II 2; see also ethnic cleansing populism 119 positive discrimination 179n15

postcommunist settlement and transition xvii, 20, 67–8, 73–4, 82–97, 116, 149–50, 158 Potchefstroom University xiii Poulton, Hugh 15 Pravets 151–2, 153 press conference, 23 June 1989 50 press coverage 41–76, 104–5; sources 41; television and cinema 42–3; Turkish public television 42 Prime Ministers of Bulgaria xxii progressive multiculturalism, Ottoman Empire 127–8 propaganda 8n4, 21n9, 23–5, 49, 52, 96, 143; Turkey 50, 60 Provisional Russian Administration 171 Public Council on the National Issue 88 public opinion 86 Putin, Vladimir 91 Quayle, Dan 96 Rabotnichesko delo 41, 48–9, 49 Radio Free Europe 27, 32, 38–9n8, 45 rationing 95 Razgrad 57–8, 95 Razgrad (National Bulgarian) Republic 95, 96 Rechel, Bernd 29 Recognition of the 1989 ethnic cleansing, need for 169 reconciliation 29, 115–23, 126, 161 Recording the “Unknown History project 30–1 Refugee Convention, 1951 51 ‘refugee crisis,’ 1989 52 rehabilitation 110 religion 19, 134–5, 167; depoliticization of 175; freedom of 111 remembrance, struggle over 111–17 responsibility 90, 103, 140–62; Bulgarian Communist Party 147–8; Dogan 160; ethnic Bulgarians 173; European Union 156–7; forced assimilation policy 144, 146; grassroots level 163–4n5; impunity 148; indictment 145; legal basis 140–5, 148–9; MRF 146–7, 151; State Councils 147–8; Turkey 147; willing executioners 145–7; xenophobia

Index  271 150–1; Zhivkov 140, 141, 144, 145, 149–58 restoration of names act 92 re-Turkicization 95 returnees 2, 52, 60–2, 62–3, 63, 72, 79n26, 108–9n19, 169 Revival Process 4, 8n4, 12, 25, 55, 83, 86, 146; acceptance of term 31; amnesia broken 115–16; error of admitted 65; international repercussions 28–9; opposition 42; recognized as wrong 84 Revival Process, The (TV series) 42 Roma 19, 35, 80n33, 87; under communism 130–1; dual discrimination 62; education 36, 131; expellees 1, 39–40n16; expulsion from Poland, 1981 53; forced assimilation policy 39–40n16; migration 131–2; namechanging campaign 130; numbers 80n32, 101–2; persecution 130; place of residence 173; population xxx; postcommunist Bulgarian population 64; socioeconomic position 179n14 Romania 2, 68, 84, 105, 154, 158–60, 183 Romani language xv, 46, 53, 102, 120, 125n6, 130, 131, 175 Rome Statute, 1999 142–4 Round Table negotiations 87, 95 Rovine, Battle of 9n6 Rugova, Ibrahim 157 Russia 171–2, 178n9 Russian Empire 178n10 Russian Federation 11 Russian occupation 17 Russo-Ottoman War 21n7, 68, 171–2, 178n12 Rutnov, Ferhat 44 Rutnov, Ibriam 44 Rwanda 167 Sakskoburggotski, Simeon 91 Salazar, António de Oliveira 165n11 Samizdat 113, 123n2, see also censorship San Stefano, Treaty of (1878) 129, 133–4; borders xxxvii, 129, 133–4 Schlonzsko 181, 182, 183 school boycott, 1991 97–8 secessionism 20 Second Balkan War (1913) 118

secret police 32 securitization 144, 163n2 security services 37, 39n13, 48, 49, 53, 65–6, 163–4n5 self-identification, freedom of 100–1 Semerdzhiev, Atanas 95 separatists 118 September 11 2001 terrorist attacks 137 Serbia 6, 9n9, 11, 77n13, 137, 148–9, 157 Sharapov, Viktor 69 Shumen, MRF branch bombing 94 silent majority, the 65–6 Simeonov, Valeri 117 Şimşir, Bilal N. 38, 40n18 Slavophone Greeks 163n2 Slovakia 154 social democrats 3 socialist paradise 183 Sofia 12, 26, 42, 47, 47–8, 50, 51, 84; Anti-Turkish (anti-Muslim) demonstrations 85–6; CSCE conference, 1989 70; democracy demonstration, November 1989 83; demonstration, 31 May 1989 49; Mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov 103, 152; Victims of Communism monument 111 Solidarity 44, 47, 65–6 Somalia 167 South Africa xiii–xiv, 117 sovereignty: absolute 166–7; fears of loss of 95–6 Soviet bloc: breakup of xiii; genocidaires 156–7 Soviet Union 33, 34, 68–9, 96, 156, 183; attachment to 121; economic reforms 81n42; fragmentation xiii, 11; and the Genocide Convention 163n1; Gorbachev’s reforms 43; intervention rumor 71, 80n37; population transfers 2; preoccupation 66–7; relations with Bulgaria 170; republics 178n7 Soviet unitary people 18 Spasov, Radoslav 42 Stalin, Joseph 91, 107–8n17, 154, 156, 157 State Council of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria 147–8

272

Index

statehood 166–7, 169 state ideology 19 state of emergency 86 state terrorism 112 stereotypes 126 Stockholm syndrome 90–1 Stoianov, Dimitur 91–2, 106n9 Stoianov, Petur 110 Stolen Eyes (film) 31, 42, 112–13 students strike, 1990 94–5 Sugarev, Edvin 110, 116 Suleimanov, Naim 20–1(n1) Supreme Spiritual Council of the Muslim Faith 49 Sweden 47, 77n12 Takhirov, Shukri 24 Taksim Square protest 71 Taraclia State University, Moldova 121 Tatars 1 Technology of Evil (film) 114–15 Tekhnologiia na zloto (Technology of Evil) (documentary) 32 terminology 8n4, 21n9 territorial aspirations, Balkans, 1912 xxxvi territorium 176n1 terrorism 112, 123n1; blamed on Turkey 50; casualties 39n12; literature review 36–7; September 11 2001 attacks 137; state 112 Thracian deportation,1 913 118 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre 67, 77n13; China 67, 104 Time of Parting (Donchev) 42–3 Time of Violence (film) 42–3 The Times 7, 41 Tito, Josip Broz 154, 156, 157 TNODB 29 Todorova, Maria xxiiin1 Todorov, Nikolai xxiiin1 Toğrol, Beğlan Birand 23 Tőkés, Pastor László 159–60 toleration 18 tombstones 46 ‘tourists,’ expellees as 3, 8n4, 21n9, 50, 51 trade unions 47 transliterations 38n4, 77n9, 79n27

transparent categories 126 Traynor, Ian 58 Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness, Cooperation and Security 105n7 Trenchev, Konstantin 47 true Bulgarians 8n4, 158 Trump, Donald 119 Trunak memorial fountain 111–12 truth 126 Truth and Reconciliation Commission 169 Tuðman, Franjo 157 Turan 108n19 Türkan 113 Turkey: anti-Bulgarian demonstration 71; anti-Bulgarian propaganda 50; Atatürk cult 155–6; border closure 59–60, 70, 75; Bulgarian population 64; call for military intervention 71–2; Cyprus policy 33, 50, 59; deep state 71–2, 80n38; exclusion from Round Table negotiations 87; expellees in 58–9, 60–1; fact-finding tour 68; financial outlays 59; genocide terminology 21n9; Great Excursion to xv; Kurds and the Kurdish question 26, 40n17, 50, 54, 59, 77n10, 104, 129, 147; land border crossing xlii; language test 60; living standard 50; naturalization 63–4; non-aggression pact with 88; pledge to accept expellees 51; political leverage on 54; presidential seal 136; propaganda 50, 60; public television coverage 42; relations with Bulgaria 7, 37, 59, 135–6; response to Anti-Turkish (anti-Muslim) demonstrations 86–7; responsibility 147; silence 104; suppression of Bulgarian minority 50; threat of 137–8; Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness, Cooperation and Security 105n7; visa requirement 59, 60, 63 Turkicphone Bulgars 135–6 Turkification 5, 24 Turkish citizenship 63–4 Turkish consular services 50–1 Turkish Horrors 15, 171; see also Bulgarian Horrors

Index  273 Turkish language 76–7n4, 92, 96, 108–9n19, 120; acceptance of 175; dialects xli; education 97–8, 177n6; and military service 102; periodicals 99, 109n20, 177n6; publishing 99–100; radio programs 98–9; spread of 4; suppression of 41, 46, 143 Turkish-language university 121 Turkishness, suppression of 55 Turkish threat 96 Turkish yoke 4, 126–9, 150 Turks: Bulgarian Communist Party membership 80n34; change in the official attitude toward 84; decline in numbers 2; disappearance 141; education 97–8, 108–9n19; education levels 36, 39n11; emigration 1; euphemisms 92, 107n13; expellees 1; expulsion of xv–xvi, xvii, 1; forced assimilation 4; intimidation 75; lack of acceptance of 108n18; mass protests, April and May, 1989 19, 28, 42, 44, 48; military service 102; millet practices 18; numbers 78n17, 164n7; oppression 51; participation 110; passports issued to 49–50; persecution 143; place of residence 173; population xxviii; postcommunist Bulgarian population 64; postcommunist settlement 20; Razgrad Province population 95; recognition as a national minority 102; re-incorporation of 150; repeated expulsions 176–7n6; restoration of human rights 92; return to Bulgaria xv; self-identification 100–1; socioeconomic position 179n14; stripped of civil and political rights xvi; suppression xv; useage 21n5 Under the Yoke (TV series) 43, 89, 126–9 Union of Democratic Forces 73, 87, 93, 96, 97, 98, 107n14, 114, 115 unitary Bulgarian socialist nation 18–19, 24, 48, 105n3, 126; see also edinstvo United Kingdom 69, 139n10, 167–7, 176n2, 176n4 United Nations 3, 68, 70

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 51 United Nations Security Council 2, 141, 148 United States of America 11, 68, 69, 70, 82, 83, 167; preoccupation 66–7; September 11 2001 terrorist attacks 137; Trump elected president 119 University of Wisconsin–Madison, Center for Turkish Studies 23 Uzunova, Rumiana 27 Vaksberg, Tatiana 32, 38–9n8, 114–15 Varna 57–8 Varna Airport bombing, 1984 39n12 Vazov, Ivan 43, 126–9 Večer 41 Veliev, Avni 44–5 Veliko Turnovo 107n15 Victims of Communism monument 111 Vienna 21n8, 22n10, 46–7 Vietnam 74, 80–1n40 Vilnius 96 Voice of America 27 Wałęsa, Lech 158 Warsaw Pact 71, 96 Washington 47, 59 weapons training 35–6 West Germany 181 Wikipedia 16 willing executioners 145–7 World War I 9n7 World War II xxxix, 5, 19–20, 25, 123n3, 130, 145–6, 177n6 xenophobia 150–1 Yanat, Yelda 122 Yugoslavia xvi, 19, 47, 77n13, 131; breakup of 2, 6, 10n11, 11, 13, 20, 105, 136–7, 142, 154, 157, 179n16; ethnic cleansing xvii, 11; population transfers 2 Yılmaz, Mesut 69, 86, 87 Zang, Theodore, Jr. 39–40n16 Zhelev, Zheliu 73, 95, 96, 97, 158 Zhivkova, Evgeniia 153–4, 155

274

Index

Zhivkova, Ludmila 164n8 Zhivkov, Todor xiv, 1, 8n4, 17, 108n17; arrest 89; campaign prediction 41; CSCE conference, Sofia 1989 70; death 148, 152; delegitimation 70; expulsion decision 19, 48; expulsion of Turks xv–xvi, xvii; expulsion plan 34; forced assimilation policy 44; funeral 152; governing circle 106n9; house arrest 89–90, 152; indictment 152; isolation 66, 69; and labor shortage 74, 80–1n40; legitimacy 45, 65; literature review 162; meeting with

Gorbachev 34, 55, 68–9, 81n42; national communism 73; personality cult 138, 151–8, 162, 165n11; political leverage on Turkey 54; popularity 149–50; Pravets statue 151; propaganda 23–5; punishment 149; removal from power xvi, 24, 48, 70–1, 72–3, 82, 105n1, 149, 160; responsibility 52, 140, 141, 144, 145, 149–58; secret speech, 7 June 1989 55; speech, 29 May 1989 48–9; support for expulsion policy 49; trial 89–90; visit to Iundola 90–1