Ethics of Maimonides 9780299177638, 9780299177645, 9780299177607

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
Foreword (page ix)
Preface (page xvii)
Introduction (page xxi)
1. Socrates and Plato: Founders of Ethics (page 1)
2. Maimonides: A Radical Platonist (page 23)
3. The Good beyond Being: Ethico-Political Intricacies of a Medieval Debate (page 49)
4. Religion as Idolatry: How (Not) to Know God (page 77)
5. The "Unity of the Heart": On Love and Longing (Where Ethical Method Fails) (page 107)
6. Practice and Performance: How (Not) to Walk in Middle Ways (page 127)
7. "He Is (Not) Like You": How Suffering Commands Self or Soul (page 145)
8. On Eudaemonian Eschatology and Holy History: Zionism as Betrayal of the Ideal (page 161)
9. To Create Messianic Time: A Jewish Critique of Political Utopia (page 169)
10. The Human Face: Anticipating a Future that Is Prior to the Past (page 179)
Abbreviations (page 195)
Notes (page 197)
Bibliography (page 221)
Index (page 245)

Citation preview

Ethics of Maimonides

MODERN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION Translations and Critical Studies Barbara E. Galli and Elliot R. Wolfson, SERIES EDITORS

Ethics

of

Maimonides Hermann Cohen

Translated with commentary by ALMUT SH. BRUCKSTEIN

Foreword by ROBERT GIBBS

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN PRESS

1930 Monroe Street :

The University of Wisconsin Press Madison, Wisconsin 53711

www.wisc.edu/wisconsinpress/

3 Henrietta Street London WC2E 8LU, England Copyright © 2004 The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System All rights reserved

54321

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cohen, Hermann, 1842-1918. [Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis. English] Ethics of Maimonides / translation with commentary by Almut Sh. Bruckstein; foreword by Robert Gibbs. p. cm.—(Modern Jewish philosophy and religion) ISBN 0-299-17760-2 (Cloth: alk. paper) ISBN 0-299-17764-5 (Paper: alk. paper) 1. Cohen, Hermann, 1842-1918. Charakteristik der ethik Maimunis. 2. Maimonides, Moses, 1135-—1204—Contributions in Jewish ethics. 3.

Ethics, Jewish. 4. Philosophy, Jewish. 5. Philosophy, Medieval. | I. Bruckstein, Almut Sh. II. Title. III. Series.

BJ1287.M64 C64313 2002 296.3’6’092—dc21

2001005417

The upright blossom like a date-palm They thrive like a cedar in Lebanon

In advanced age they still produce fruit They are full of rigor and freshness Psalm 92 For Zev

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Contents Foreword ix Preface = xvii Introduction = xxi

1. Socrates and Plato: Founders of Ethics 1 2. Maimonides: A Radical Platonist 23 3. The Good beyond Being: Ethico-Political Intricacies of a

Medieval Debate 49 4. Religion as Idolatry: How (Not) to Know God = 77 5. The “Unity of the Heart”: On Love and Longing (Where Ethical Method Fails) 107 6. Practice and Performance: How (Not) to Walk in

Middle Ways 127 7. “He Is (Not) Like You”: How Suffering Commands

Self or Soul =145 8. On Eudaemonian Eschatology and Holy History:

Zionism as Betrayal of the Ideal 161 9. To Create Messianic Time: A Jewish Critique of

Political Utopia 169 10. The Human Face: Anticipating a Future that

Is Prior to the Past 179 Abbreviations 195

Notes 197 Bibliography 221

Index 245

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Foreword Without students, there are no teachers. For about ten years, interest in Franz Rosenzweig has been growing, not only in Jewish studies, but indeed, in other contexts, including philosophy, theology, and German stud-

ies. Part of that interest arose in relation to Emmanuel Levinas, who, though never Rosenzweig’s student, clearly expressed a deep debt to Rosenzweig, and especially to The Star of Redemption. Levinas, whose moment of fame in France is now being echoed in North America, represents a specifically Jewish inflection of postmodernism. Rosenzweig, on

the other hand, lived in that fecund and difficult moment of Weimar Germany—the years before the Shoah—and died in 1929. Rosenzweig, however, is not the topic of the book that lies in your hands; this work is written by Rosenzweig’s own teacher, Hermann Cohen. The book before you is a decisive refutation of Rosenzweig’s view of his own teacher—and at the same time a vindication of the teacher, and even of the student.

Thus we are drawn from student to teacher, to learn from the teacher and become students. There are many lines back to Cohen, and were we ourselves not interested in becoming students, interested not in the teach-

ing but only in the history of teachers, we would still need to study Cohen. Rosenzweig hails him as a Columbus (and I would, as a Copernicus), and claims that Cohen was the first truly Jewish philosopher who discovered a new route, a new thinking. Like a Columbus, it is Cohen who discovered the new possibility and exigency of thought, discovering a land for the voyages not only of Levinas and Rosenzweig, but also of Buber and Benjamin and, in different ways, of Scholem, Strauss, Pines, and many others. Cohen is not merely the first, he is also the teacher of those who follow. His teaching, moreover, is one that reflects a decisive need in phi-

losophy itself, a need to engage with Judaism. Judaism for Cohen is defined through its literary sources and so retains a certain kind of particularity even as it enters into conversation with, or better a correlation with, or still more clearly, even as it is translated into, philosophy. This

x FOREWORD disruption of the Greek/German philosophical tradition happens so seamlessly and so adroitly in Cohen, that even students like Rosenzweig

could overlook Judaism’s role in Cohen’s systematic philosophical works. But what seems obvious to postmoderns, that an engagement with otherness should disrupt philosophy’s authority, is developed in a complex and in its own way disturbing fashion in Cohen’s work. For Cohen will not compromise on universality and on reason (and in this remains a modern, even a modernist), but at the same time he negotiates with the specificity of Jewish sources, and not merely as warehouses for

properly philosophical ideas, but as texts and, indeed, as originary sources for a reasoning that knows ideas that are foreign to the Greek tradition. What happens when such ideas become translated into philosophy, when, for example, the messianic age becomes the idea of humanity, or when atonement becomes the way of individuating the self, is a reorientation for philosophy itself. The 1908 essay “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis” (Ethics of Maimonides) is one of Cohen’s central teachings of this new thinking. It is here translated into English for the first time, and the translator, Almut Sh. Bruckstein, has provided not only a translation and a commentary, but also an extremely valuable introduction, in which she explains why Cohen undertook to write this essay in 1908. She situates it not only in the Maimonides project of the German Jewish intellectuals, but also in Cohen’s own career. Cohen’s task is to listen again to Maimonides, but to listen in order to let him address Cohen’s contemporary philosophical and

religious scene. Cohen does make historical claims per se, that Maimonides innovated in relation to his philosophical context, or as biblical interpreter, but such claims are vastly overshadowed by Cohen’s discovery of a full range of ethical insights, insights that almost leap across the generations to address Cohen and his contemporaries. The essay is a reframing of the histories of ethics, of philosophy, and of religion—starting with Socrates, and demanding a revisiting of the tension between Aristotle and Plato. The essay makes its case with the Protestant philosophical and theological establishment of Cohen’s time—arguing for the philosophical su-

periority of a rationalist theology—or, as Cohen would prefer, of a critical idealism. The possibility for a better philosophical position starting from the origin of the Good beyond Being, from an ethics arising in reason, is made to conform with a radical but legitimate reading of the Jewish tradition—Maimonides’. For Cohen understands the task in his time to be just this reorientation of philosophy. Almut Bruckstein has produced a book that will allow us to become students of Cohen—a book that lets Cohen teach us. By finding ways to bring Cohen’s argument into our intellectual world (a mere hundred year

FOREWORD xl monides in his essay. |

jump), Bruckstein is brilliantly imitating what Cohen does for MaiSuch a text is not a simple one, nor is it an easy one to present today. Bruckstein had an immediate task of producing a translation of the essay. The problems of translation are explored in her introduction, but given the interplay between Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, Latin, and then German, the target language of English has been pushed in decisive and important ways. To hear Cohen in English, to think with him in our philosophical vocabulary, and to hear the resonances in English of what he tried to do in his own German rendering of ideas and phrases, words, and technical jargon, requires an ear or an eye that is used to reading and thinking in disparate languages at the same time, and even more to going across the languages. What Bakhtin, a follower of Cohen, called polyglossia is all the more performed in the feat of translation here. This book, moreover, is not only a translation: it is also a commentary. Cohen becomes our teacher due to the work of the commentary. Cohen struggled to find a way for Maimonides to teach Cohen, to teach his world. And Bruckstein has struggled to find a way for Cohen to become our teacher. What is this struggle? It happens on several levels all at once. First, Cohen wants to teach us the history of philosophy, but for many readers the key philosophers are not familiar. Bruckstein has to provide not only citations but also explanations and her own readings of Cohen’s readings to let us get close to the teaching about the history of philosophy. Second, Cohen also presumes a familiarity with medieval thought in the three religions—and such thought is technical. For many readers any technical thinking is off-putting, but even for those who are inclined to such rigorous thinking, the medieval version is still simply foreign. If we become bogged down or remain simply allergic to such technical discussions, we will not be able to learn from Cohen. Bruckstein manifests the sort of mastery of those texts that allows her to explain complex and technical materials clearly. But third, and most important, Cohen is a critical idealist. His philosophical convictions seem outdated to most

readers. Cohen cannot teach us unless he is allowed to address us, and to escape from the pigeon-hole that reduces him to an antiquarian curiosity. We are not, in general, prone to consider ourselves idealists, and yet Bruckstein offers in her reading of the Platonism of Cohen, as a critical idealism, a reach forward to some of the thinking that often characterizes postmodern thought. She draws deeply from the various texts of Cohen’s system, pausing to explain the reasoning and the innovation of Cohen’s logic. At the same time she does not compromise Cohen’s claims: rationality, the centrality of the Good beyond Being, the ideas,

xi FOREWORD and more, are all developed and explored in the commentary. The task is not to make Cohen say just what we want, but to make what he does say first intelligible and then even plausible. Thus what we see in Cohen’s own work is echoed in Bruckstein’s com-

mentary: an effort to let the historical background of the prior work (Maimonides in Cohen’s case, and Cohen in Bruckstein’s) fuel an inter-

pretation that brings the prior work into our contemporary conversation. The teacher is looking for a student: and the commentator takes up

this task. Bruckstein’s book works by juxtaposing a translation of Cohen’s effort and her commentary: a doubling of the reading and interpreting of Cohen. There are repetitions here, and more, there is recitation here. The problems of translation lead well beyond what I could describe, but the problems of commentary point in one deeper direction as well. The paradigmatic nature of Jewish textual tradition must be explored, and while Cohen depends on it in his essay, it is Bruckstein who best develops an analysis of it in her introduction and commentary. For the task of citation is precisely in tension with reason, in a dialectic that speeds reason on its way, and which undergirds the claims that originate in a citation by building the reason up through it. The citation of Jewish texts in a philosophical essay, even the citation of philosophical texts, seems to hide the writer from the demanding call of reason in a thicket of authority. But for the text to exercise any role it must first be cited. And what happens then? Bruckstein, in the introduction to this volume, writes: “We render account of ourselves in facing an ancient text. But the ancient text, which has been trusted in such a way, is not really the issue when it is being cited. No ancient past, but rather the commentary in the very context of which the citation has been invoked, is defended by the citation. Nothing concerning the original narrative is signified by the citation other than that which the interpretation itself

has constructed.” -

The text is introduced not to defend the past, but to take responsibility for giving an account, for providing a reason, to the reader—of the commentary. Jewish tradition discovered in its commentaries that the future readings and meanings are invoked and stand judgment over all tra-

ditional texts. What Cohen calls idealizing interpretation is framed precisely by the need to place the past under our judgment for the sake of the future. While the Jewish texts (and Cohen’s genius is to extend the practice to philosophical texts as well) are cited as sources for reason, it is reason that will reconstrue the meanings, will cultivate the highest possible reading of these texts—the readings that find the tasks of ethics.

Cohen extended this process of citation and cultivation of the tradition, not as mythic, but as de-mythicizing, to the philosophical tradition, and so he began his essay with Socrates, and with the tension of Plato

FOREWORD x1 and Aristotle. He explored how the traditions of Greek and Arabic philosophy were tributaries to Maimonides’ thought. His own rereading of the philosophical traditions refuses a reduction of their history to the victory of the dominant or surviving interpretations. Because the past is not a security for a commentary, Cohen’s commentary discerns discontinuities and unrealized rationality in previous texts. To explore the tributary is to find rich backwaters, and even little streams that run more purely than the main river.

But Bruckstein has offered us insight into the main tributary that Cohen muted: the Jewish textual tradition. While Cohen cites the medieval Jewish philosophers, it is Bruckstein who provides extensive commentary on the talmudic and biblical materials that inform the medieval discussions. She explores that other tributary, offering careful and challenging readings of the Jewish pretexts to readers who often might be unaware of those texts. This is not merely a question of historical research, although it involves extensive research, but it is still more a reconstruc-

tion of the conflictual interpretative tradition, in direct parallel to what Cohen did for the other two tributaries of philosophy. She provides what is only hinted at in Cohen’s essay, allowing this book to offer a full curriculum for Jewish philosophy. Because the process of citation opens the text to the future, and makes the commentary give reasons, Bruckstein’s exploration of the river leads

beyond Cohen, too. It leads, indeed, and this is the final element of Bruckstein’s commentary, to a discussion of the one hundred years of Jewish thought and Jewish existence that separates Cohen from her readers, his would-be students. The commentary leads on to Rosenzweig and to Levinas, even to Derrida. It finds its non-foundational ethics, its ethics of responsibility for the other, its new thinking of Judaism and philosophy, as a renewed source (spring or tributary) for the ongoing river of Jewish thought. Bruckstein examines the way that contemporary Maimonides scholarship takes a stand with or against Cohen’s Platonizing reading of Maimonides. In discrete references, she links Cohen’s messianism to contemporary debates in Israeli society about democracy and religion. She traces the river, thus, not only back, but also forward to our time, and lets Cohen’s voice register in our contemporary scene. The critical nature of these connections and river explorations is made clear in the very first citation by Bruckstein. For she cites Cohen’s student, Rosenzweig, in fulsome praise of Cohen, and yet the fact of this book, with translation and commentary of an earlier essay by Cohen, is a refutation of Rosenzweig. It seems that no single factor has prevented us from reading Cohen, from studying him in order to learn his teaching, as much as Rosenzweig’s reading of Cohen. Rosenzweig read Cohen as

having exceeded his own philosophy in his last works on Judaism,

XIV FOREWORD particularly Religion of Reason: Out of the Sources of Judaism. Rosenzweig, therefore, refused to see, even in the volumes’of Cohen’s Jewish

writings that include the essay “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis” (Ethics of Maimonides), volumes for which he (Rosenzweig) was writing the introduction, that Cohen had framed a philosophical Judaism and a Jewish philosophy as the center of his own system, and not as a belated effort at the end of his life. Almut Bruckstein cites Franz Rosenzweig, then, in an ironic gesture at the very start of her book. And to reread the context of her citation from Rosenzweig will allow us to learn not only about citation and about the development of Jewish philosophy in the twentieth century, but also, or

perhaps especially, about the task of commentary and letting a teacher teach. I cite Rosenzweig’s essay “Hermann Cohen’s Nachlafswerk” (1937, 294), with Bruckstein’s own citation of Rosenzweig in italics: In order to write about Cohen’s work and its meaning, one would perhaps have to actually write a new work from the same starting point. And someone will do that. Jewish books have not only their fate as do all books, rather they also have a special Jewish-book fate. I envision Cohen’s book printed in Hebrew folio-editions of the seventh millennia, printed in Siberian and Fuegian, in New Guinean and Cameroon editions, editions in which Cohen’s word is drowning in a flood of three, four commentaries that surround it from all sides.

First, the plain sense of this text: Rosenzweig claims that the ultimate meaning of Cohen’s Religion of Reason: Out of the Sources of Judaism lies in the future, in a new book. One can hardly overlook that this piece was written and published in 1921, the very year of Rosenzweig’s own new work: The Star of Redemption. But one might just as well consider Buber’s I and Thou, or Levinas’s Totality and Infinity—books that are new works but have the same starting point. But Jewish books have more than this relation to their successors, they have a special Jewish-book fate: to be commented upon. Thus Rosenzweig imagines an edition of Cohen in the next Jewish millennium (three hundred or so years out) surrounded by commentaries. Not rivers, now, but a sea, a flood—like a Talmud of its time. Rosenzweig, moreover, imagines translations into the most diverse and “un-Jewish” of places, in languages around the globe. Cohen’s thought will be at home both among the Jews and amongst all the world—it will have achieved the true cosmopolitan readers, will further the development of knowledge and so of humanity that Cohen so esteemed. What happens, then, in Bruckstein’s citation? Bruckstein obviously chose this passage because it is a prophecy of her own work—a transla-

FOREWORD XV tion and a commentary on Cohen. Her work here is a fulfillment of Rosenzweig’s prophecy. She is reluctant, however, to include the phrase that might link her own English translation (of a different Jewish writing

by Cohen, but the point is all too similar) with the outlandish translations for non-European humanity—because this English translation is not in the realm of the exotic, but precisely directed to communities of readers who have already been fed by the various tributaries of thought flowing in the book. This citation, moreover, also vindicates Cohen—for despite Rosenzweig’s praise, Bruckstein, along with many others, has had to defend and reread the teacher’s writings from Rosenzweig’s too-dominant reading. She shows us that even a student’s reading of a teacher’s work cannot merely be cited. The commentary must reengage both the text and its interpretation. The study of the river of Jewish philosophy extends be-

yond the tributaries, through Cohen and then on to the course of the river in our day. But such study is not simply a historical study: reason calls us to interrogate the interpretations and the currents. Commentary serves not merely to name the linkages, but also to disrupt the course, and to heighten our responsibility for following the teachings that the previous students did not learn. Such a recourse to the text, and to the recovery of unlearned teachings, is the characteristic of the Jewish textual tradition—a characteristic that Cohen developed in the philosophical tradition, and that Bruckstein here develops in relation to modern Jewish philosophy. To let the teaching teach; to produce the students who will be able to learn. This foreword itself can only allude to this subtle and rich task that is Bruckstein’s task in offering us Cohen’s vital essay and was Cohen’s task in teaching us the ethics of Maimonides. Robert Gibbs

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Preface When I first came to the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, in 1986, I participated in Shalom Rosenberg’s seminar, “Aristotle’s Ethics in Medieval Jewish Thought.” When the discussion turned to Hermann Cohen’s radically Platonic reading of Maimonides, Shalom Rosenberg told us of the

philosophical importance of Cohen’s essay. He emphasized that the “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis” holds the key to a deeper understanding of the contemporary philosophical significance of Maimonides, warning us, however, that this essay is “among the most difficult texts of twentieth-century Jewish thought,” and that it remains a riddle even for the initiated, despite the existence of a Hebrew translation.! By then I had read and studied Cohen’s essay several times. Cohen’s language, after all, seemed familiar, and I admired the courageous teaching of humanism that spoke from every page of Cohen’s work. The literary Jewish sources, however, which obviously constitute the very basis of this particular essay, were barely accessible to me at the time. Finding myself in Jerusalem for extended periods of time, I missed the scholarly

presence of my teacher, Norbert Samuelson, whose competence and whose love for the critical tradition of the medieval Jewish thinkers had guided my studies of Jewish philosophy in Philadelphia. In Jerusalem I began to owe most of what I learned in reading Jewish texts to having been introduced to an eminent Jewish scholar, Zev Gotthold, whose resources in classical Greek and rabbinic literature seem inexhaustible, and whose scholarly ethos reflects the cultural Bildungsideal so typical of the European Jewish intellectual elite before the Shoah. The privilege of having been able to learn with this master of Jewish sources for over fifteen

years—sometimes hours a day—is too great to be measured even in terms of gratefulness.

The very format of this book, the translation and commentary of Cohen’s essay on Maimonides, tangibly reflects the Sitz im Leben of this

privileged situation of learning. Often I would translate Cohen’s text

face-to-face with this teacher, and if there are traces of linguistic

XVI PREFACE resourcefulness and intellectual creativity in the English translation, these are his and not mine. As we explored the very depth of the conceptual and historical issues involved, the room would pile up with volumes upon volumes of classical Jewish literature, all opened up at places where the master—from the well of his impeccable, photographic memory—would point out and teach me the living sources of Cohen’s reading. Zettelach with numerous notes started to fill first my bags, later my desk, and finally my room, notes on subtexts and more subtexts, too nu-

merous to be all remembered, with the result that only a small part of this flood of literary references found its way into my own commentary, which surrounds the work of translation. My commentary elicits the fruits of those precious daily sessions of labor. Within that commentary I strive to situate the meaning of the classical Jewish sources within the philosophical context of a contemporary Jewish humanism that is inspired by Hermann Cohen, reaches back to Saadya Gaon, and finds forceful contemporary expression in the work of

Emmanuel Levinas. A different reading of Jewish philosophy thus emerges, a reading in which the classical issues of medieval Jewish philosophy are folded into the margins of commentary, following the grav-

ity of Cohen’s essay, which I read as a canonical text in Jewish humanism. This reading of Jewish philosophy, inasmuch as it appears in the literary form of translation and commentary, makes itself deliberately subservient to a text whose critical humanism it aspires to transmit. A project like this, which is the result of a decade of life and learning, is nourished and inspired by friends, colleagues, and teachers in ways that are difficult to retrieve. The following therefore will naturally fall short of its proper expression. I am grateful to Yechiel Greenbaum, who lent me his superb editing skills over many years, and whose patience and graciousness is beyond what can be expressed on paper. My friends, colleagues, and teachers, Dieter Adelmann, Annette Aronowicz, Hillel

Firstenberg, Robert Gibbs, Helmut Holzhey, John Reumann, Yossef Schwartz, Hartwig Wiedebach, and Michael Zank, shared their time with me during many hours of discussion, whether in Jerusalem, Zurich, or Boston. My understanding of Cohen’s texts and philosophy would be nowhere near where it is now, if it were not for those countless hours of shared learning. Moreover, they all read the manuscript, either in parts, or in its entirety, and offered informed and critical suggestions. This is true in particular for my good friend and colleague Hartwig Wiedebach, one of the leading editors of Cohen’s Werke edition, who gave the manuscript critical close reading toward the very end of the process, lending

me his vast knowledge of Cohen’s philosophy and its sources. He is presently engaged in preparing the forthcoming German critical and annotated edition of “Charakteristic der Ethik Maimums,” to be included

PREFACE XIX in the critical Werke edition, Volume 4 of Kleinere Schriften (Werke, vol.

15). I wish to express my profound gratitude to Michael Fishbane, whose critical reading of a former version of the introduction inspired me and whose personal and professional advice set in motion more than just the rewriting of the introduction. T also thank Hilary Putnam, who found time to read the introduction, - to meet, and to make valuable suggestions. My friends and fellow graduate students Jeff Israel, Christoph Noethlings, Or-Nistar Rose, and Tobias Tunkel spent time reading and commenting on the manuscript. Iam indebted to them for their efforts and their keen and critical insights. My

friend and colleague Dirk Westerkamp made valuable suggestions throughout the entire manuscript. And I express my deep gratitude to | Nils Ederberg, who devoted his time, vast learning, scholarly competence, sense of precision, and patience to a relentless reworking of my bibliography and notes. Without him the manuscript would not have seen the light of the day. The Franz Rosenzweig Research Center for German-Jewish Literature and Culture, under its former and present directors, Stephane Moses, Gabriel Motzkin, and Paul Mendes-Flohr, granted me two generous scholarships toward the completion of this book. Without the graciousness of their support, the book would not even have had

a beginning. I also wish to thank the Rothschild Foundation—Yad } haNadiv, as well as Ruth Morris and David Braun, who generously supported the editing process. To the most precious of all, Arnon, Noga, Renana, Immanuel, Sinai, and Adam-Jair, my gratitude, not only for their generosity and understanding, but also for teaching me the depths of life with which the writing of any book cannot compete.

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Introduction I envision Cohen’s book printed in Hebrew folio-editions of the seventh millennia ... editions in which Cohen’s word is drowning in a flood of commentary that surrounds it from all sides. Franz Rosenzweig

This translation and commentary path of reexamining Jewish philosof Hermann Cohen’s 1908 essay, ophy and Jewish literary sources “Charakteristik der Ethik Mai- through the eyes of a thinker whose munis,” is an introduction, of a philosophy, whose interpretation of unique sort, to medieval and mod- Jewish texts, and, in fact, whose enern Jewish philosophy. As atransla- tire life is committed both to the tion, it makes available in English critical tradition of ethical reasonfor the first time this seminal work ing and to the authority of the Jewof Hermann Cohen—rigorous critic ish oral tradition.! The physical for-

of Kant, passionate teacher of the mat of this book reflects the prophetic Jewish tradition, philoso- inspiration of that tradition, as the pher, and cultural critic. Asa com- multilayered structure of text and mentary, partaking of both Cohen’s commentary corresponds to the philosophical and Jewish writings pedagogical setting that stood at its and of the author’s own learning, inception and that tradition calls this book guides readers along the chavruta (studying and dialogue).

Moses ben Maimon: Sein Leben, seine Werke und sein Einflufs (His Life, His Work, His Influence) Cohen’s essay “Charakteristik der ence), published in 1908 by the Ethik Maimunis” appeared origi- Society for the Advancement of nally in the first of two volumes Jewish Studies on the occasion of entitled Moses ben Maimon: Sein the seven-hundredth commemoraLeben, seine Werke und sein Ein- tion of Maimonides’ death.? The esflufs- (His life, his work, his influ- says collected in these two volumes

XX ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES reflect an interdisciplinary cultural monides reflects the scope of Jewish agenda in which Maimonides fig- scholarship at the turn of the twen-

ures as an active and creative par- tieth century; the most distinticipant. He emerges here as athor- guished Jewish scholars from all oughly acculturated intellectual and over Europe and throughout all philosopher who interacts simul- fields of textual scholarship (includ-

taneously with Christian scholas- ing philosophy, Arabic literary ticism, Muslim culture, the work of studies, rabbinic studies, the study Saadya Gaon, halakhic tradition, of Midrash and Jewish liturgy) con-

the world of Scripture and Hag- tributed to these volumes. Among gada, rabbinic hermeneutics, Pla- them are Hermann Cohen, Jacob tonic Aristotelian philosophy and Guttmann, Ismar Elbogen, Adolf science, and Kabbala. The com- Schwarz, Israel Friedlaender, Edmanding breadth and depth of this uard Baneth, Wilhelm Bacher, and

multicultural portrayal of Mai- Ludwig Blau. A Long-Overdue Translation: The Importance of Cohen’s Jewish Writings

Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimuprimarily known for his ground- nis” (Ethics of Maimonides) was breaking contribution to the criti- included in this posthumous colcal idealism of the neo-Kantian lection. Although studded with school of Marburg,’ published rabbinic learning and medieval about seventy essays on matters re- Jewish literary references, this lated to Jewish studies and public essay on Maimonides speaks the Jewish life. In these essays, Cohen language of philosophy. Due to the wrote about Jewish philosophy, © strict, and unfortunate, editorial di-

Jewish history, Jewish biblical lit- vision between Cohen’s “philoerature, Talmud, Jewish education, sophical” essays and his “Jewish” and Jewish contemporary political writings, however, Cohen’s essay

affairs. Most of these essays were on Maimonides was lost to the published during Cohen’s lifetime philosophical readers that it clearly

in various Jewish journals and _ wished to address.°

newspapers; all of them were ei- In order to understand the culther reprinted (or first printed) in tural agenda that was destroyed by the three volumes of Hermann Co- this editorial division, the followhens Jtidische Schriften (Hermann ing background may prove instrucCohen’s Jewish writings), pub-_ tive. After Cohen’s death in 1918, lished posthumously in 1924, with Bruno Strauss, Albert Gorland, a famous and influential introduc- and Ernst Cassirer took the initiation by Franz Rosenzweig.* Cohen’s tive to compile collected volumes

INTRODUCTION Xx of Cohen’s essays. These scholars tween “Greek” and “Jewish” writdistinguished systematically be- ings, in fact, undermines the entire tween Cohen’s “Greek” writings gist of Cohen’s philosophy; Cohen’s and his “Jewish” writings.© Two reading of Western philosophical separate posthumous collections of sources throughout reflects the Cohen’s essays subsequently ap- promise of an ethics that draws its peared in Berlin within five years. life from Jewish sources. The new

The first collection contains Werke edition subsequently presents Cohen’s “Jewish” writings, edited Cohen’s work chronologically, fore-

by Bruno Strauss, published in going the old division between matthree volumes under the title Her- ters “Greek” and “Jewish.” mann Cobens Jiidische Schriften, What is lost in chronologically

1924, as mentioned above. The compiling Cohen’s work is the second includes Cohen’s “philo- reader’s focus on a “table of con-

sophical” writings, including his tents” in Jewish studies, whose dissertation, his early writings on scope and depth attests to the sovPlato and on German Idealism, his _ ereignty and authority of a creative,

work on mathematics (the infini- philosophically assertive, and often tesimal method), and the much- polemical, mind steeped in the Jew-

cited, influential “Introduction ish sources. Cohen’s “Jewish” eswith a Critical Note on Lange’s says demonstrate in a masterful

History of Materialism.”/ way how to make manifest what is A half-century later, scholars fi- truly humane in the Jewish literary nally corrected this editorial policy. tradition, and how to retrieve the

Inadvertently, it had created an humanity of this tradition even in abyss between European philoso- cases where the phenotype, or outphers, who until a few years ago ward appearance, of Jewish tradisaw Cohen as mainly a neo-Kantian _ tion and Jewish history has failed to

philosopher, and North American do so.® Cohen’s essay on Maiand Israeli Jewish scholars who read monides and his essay on Spinoza Cohen exclusively as a critical Jew- are the longest, most complex, and

ish thinker. In the 1960s, Helmut most influential of these “Jewish” Holzhey, the founder of the Cohen’ writings.? The full translation of Archive in Zurich, and his friend these and, indeed, of most other es-

, and colleague, Steven Schwarz- says in this collection into English schild, came to the joint decision has long been a desideratum for that the long-standing division be- Jewish scholarship.

Cohen’s “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis” Cohen’s essay on Maimonides may most challenging among Cohen’s be considered philosophically the “Jewish” writings as it provides a

XXIV ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES central nexus between Cohen’s crit- In his “Charakteristik der Ethik ical philosophy and his Jewish Maimunis,” Cohen most explicitly

thought. In “Charakteristik der correlates his principle of origin, Ethik Maimunis” we find Cohen’s which I read as a self-critical most explicit attempt to hermeneu- method of interpretative thinking, tically unravel the mysteries of with the traditional hermeneutics of Cohen’s own philosophy of origin the Jewish oral tradition. In this

and its concept of correlation: correlation, Moses Maimonides Cohen here develops the correla- (1135-1204) is assigned an inspira-

tion between Greek and Jewish tional role: it is through the philosources, between Plato’s idea of the sophical and rabbinical work of Good (which is prior to being) and Maimonides that Cohen follows his

Maimonides’s concept of “lov- own path toward the philosophical ingkindness, righteousness, and _ construction of a Jewish humanism judgment,” which is prior to that draws abundantly from Jewish Torah.!° Here, Cohen also substan- literary sources.!!

tially explicates the hermeneutical The influence on _ twentiethcorrelation between human reason- century Jewish thought of Cohen’s

ing and traditional wisdom, be- reading of Maimonides has been tween reader and text, and thus the profound. Cohen’s essay on Maiethical relationship between one monides offers a radically Platonic person and another. Also emerging reading of Maimonides, which runs for the first time is Cohen’s philoso- counter to former Aristotelian inphy of “I and Thou,” a philosophy _ terpretations. This reading has left a of alterity, predicated upon the con-___ decisive philosophical and political

cepts of infinity, purity, and holi- impact upon such modern Jewish ness—concepts that figure centrally thinkers as Leo Strauss, Franz in Jewish tradition. In this essay, Rosenzweig, Steven Schwarzschild, Cohen—through a careful textual and Emmanuel Levinas. It has also investigation of the traditional me- influenced an entire range of condieval theory of divine attributes— temporary scholarship on Maiarrives at a full-fledged formulation monides, which takes its cue from

of the correlation between the one such a Platonic reading, often God and mankind, and between without knowing the Urtext of this world and the world-to-come. that position.

1904: Plato and Maimonides—a Politicum

European scholars of the early figure in Jewish philosophy and twentieth century aligned with the Halakhah but also a means toward cultural agenda of the Wissenschaft a rational, universalist, and ethical des Judentums movement saw in rethinking of the world of rabbinic Maimonides not only a towering sources. The work of Maimonides

INTRODUCTION AXV served as a window to these tion of Maimonides’ death in 1904, sources. It opened up the spiritual European scholars involved in vista of a broad-minded, cultured, marking the occasion decided that ethical, humane Judaism—a Ju-_ the time had come to develop such daism that was meant to serve asa_ a Platonic reading of Maimonides,

“light unto the nations.” It was both on philosophical and philonone other than Hermann Cohen logical grounds. It was Hermann who in his Platonic reading of Mai- Cohen who actually delivered such monides, in his “Charakteristik der a reading in the first of the two vol-

Ethik Maimunis,” took the lead in umes that appeared in honor of the spiritual and intellectual recon- Maimonides under the title Moses struction of the entire body of Jew- ben Maimon: Sein Leben, seine

ish literary sources.” Werke und sein Einflufs in 1908.

That Cohen’s Platonic reading What was at stake for the libof Maimonides was a political issue eral Jews who turned to the in the first place can be seen in the sources of Judaism was public following. At the beginning of the proof as to the ideality of humantwentieth century, a group of Euro- ity and universal justice as Jewish pean Jewish scholars convened in values. Such proof rested upon the Breslau, Germany, in order to dis- conceptual framework of Platonic cuss its scholarly projects. One of and Kantian ethics within which the projects was a comprehensive one could construct ethical ideals, study on Maimonides, envisioning such as the idea of the Good and

a new relationship to this great ideas of justice and humanity, as a thinker—a relationship that would matter of universal knowledge allow for a more critical, more so- rather than just of general agreecialist, more ethical, more political ment or convention. To read Mai(more Platonic) Judaism. In short, monides as a Platonic thinker was

they thought Jewish intellectuals in therefore of paramount imporEurope deserved a more idealistic tance to those who hoped to prove Maimonides than the Aristotelian the ideal of universal humanity to epigone Jewish scholarship had _ be inherent in the foundations of been creating.!? At the occasion of Jewish tradition and of Jewish trathe seven-hundredth commemora- ___ ditional literature.

The Society for the Advancement of Jewish Studies and Its Scholarly Agenda

In October 1904, the scholarly 1902 with the aim of advancing

board of the Gesellschaft zur the depth and scope of Jewish Forderung der Wissenschaft des scholarship and education to the Judentums convened in Breslau. highest intellectual level. Its scholThe society had been founded in arly ambition—reflecting the pres-

XXVI ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES ence and authority of people like Jacob Guttmann, Ignaz Goldziher,

Hermann Cohen and Jacob’ Louis Ginzberg, Salomon Buber, Guttmann—was dedicated to con- and Ismar Elbogen—collaborated

structing a teaching of justice and in laying out a Grundriss der humanity out of traditional Jewish gesamten Wissenschaft des Judenliterature. From as early as 1902, tums (Basic outline of encompassHermann Cohen pushed for the ing science of Judaism).!>° The aim

advancement of a “Jewish human- of this project was to systematiism out of the sources of Judaism.” cally explore all aspects of Jewish

He promoted a systematic and in- culture and demonstrate the uniterdisciplinary approach to study- versal significance of traditional ing Jewish sources, under the con- Jewish sources. The outline reads,

necting theme of “the ethical,” indeed, like an adumbration of a over the classical agenda of mere most rigorous contemporary Jew-

historical and philological stud- ish studies program. Its detailed ies.'4 Cohen’s aim for the society scholarly agenda included Hewas to engage Jewish sources ina brew philology, biblical studies, philosophical narrative committed talmudic studies, Jewish history,

to the ideal of wahre Men- Jewish literature, poetry and folk-

schlichkeit. lore, Jewish mysticism, Jewish Cohen himself, together with theology, ethics and philosophy,

Leopold Lucas, seems to have for- Jewish liturgy, Jewish music and mulated the aims of the society. A art, Jewish education, and comflyer—entitled “An unsere Glau- parative religion.'© Cohen’s Reli-

bensgenossen” (To our brethren gion der Vernunft aus den in creed)—was sent out to Jewish Quellen des Judentums was pubinstitutions of higher learning and lished in 1919 as volume 8 of this research, and to Jewish communi- project. Parallel to this encyclopeties interested in discussing Jewish dic project, the society conceived literary sources in the wider con- of three additional scholarly proj-

text of European culture. The ects no less impressive in scope: most renowned Jewish scholars of the Corpus Tannaiticum, the Ger-

the time—Wilhelm Bacher, Ed- mania Judaica, and the so-called uard Baneth, Hermann Cohen, Maimonides-Biography.'’ The Maimonides Project It is the latter of these projects— detailed outline of the envisioned initiated by David Simonsen, Wil- project on Maimonides; its fourhelm Bacher, Markus Brann and_ teen chapters or volumes were to

Jacob Guttmann—that directly be published in honor of the upconcerns our text.!® A protocol of coming seven-hundredth Jahrzeit the October 1904 session shows a of Maimonides—commemoration

INTRODUCTION XXVII of his death—as the protocol itself critical investigation of his philospecifies.!? Leading Jewish schol- sophical thought and his hermeneuars from all over Europe had al- tics as they emerge from The Guide ready given their consent and were of the Perplexed; a discussion of working toward the publication of _ Maimonides’ influence on later Jewthis project, among them Hermann __ ish philosophy and on the Christian

Cohen, the Jewish philosopher of scholastics; an account of MaiMarburg.2? He was guiding the monides’ critics and of the polemics project in matters related to Jewish that his work evoked; and of course philosophy, and had agreed to take the long history of Maimonidean on a substantial part, namely the scholarship that had since emerged part on Maimonides’ ethics. (In (not to mention a dozen other themes the appendix of the outlined proj- that the reader might wish to look up ect we find a programmatic para- in the published protocol). With the graph entitled “Maimonides as a notable exception of the two-volume

non-Aristotelian.” )*! Moses ben Maimon: Sein Leben, The scope of this agenda touched seine Werke und sein Einflufs, con-

upon all aspects of Maimonides’ taining Cohen’s “Charakteristik der teaching—from the discussion of Ethik Maimunis” and contributions Maimonides’ commentary on the by other well-known scholars, the Mishna and his rabbinic master- full scope of the Maimonides project work, the Mishneh Torah, through a ___ was not ever published.

Medieval Jewish Culture—A Project of Enlightenment

The society’s placement of Mai- ars did not have to revert to the monides, a cosmopolitan thinker ideals of the European Enlightenof the highest order, as the authen- ment. They, rather, intentionally tic expression of Jewish tradition made reference to rationalist me-

spoke to the very Bildungsideal dieval Jewish thinkers—Saadya and cultural identity of the Euro- Gaon and Maimonides—who pean Jewish intellectual elite at the viewed a conflict between faith turn of the twentieth century. It and reason as blasphemous, and was not by chance that the mem- whose teaching of Torah is inbers of the society chose a me- debted to critical reasoning predieval figure as the protagonist for cisely in honor of God’s divine their own interdisciplinary agenda _ teaching. This “enlightened” tradiof Jewish studies. In their belief in tion of classical Jewish thought bethe universal significance of Jewish came a distinct inspiration for Eu-

sources and in their faithfulness to ropean Jewish intellectuals at the a critical tradition of scientific turn of the twentieth century. In this thinking, European Jewish schol- vein, Cohen accorded Maimonides

XXVIII ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES the status of becoming the authen- its partial and, of course, tempotic measure of the primacy and rary, fulfillment of the promise of

privilege of German culture it- enlightenment that Cohen saw self—a culture that, according to rooted deeply in the Jewish Cohen, derived its sublimity from sources.

The Present Book—A Medieval Commentary The reader will note that, typo- stands at the inception of the great graphically speaking, by means of literary traditions of medieval its translation-commentary for- translators of Greek, Hebrew, Syr-

mat, this book assumes the ap- iac, Arabic, and Latin sources. pearance of a medieval commen- The philosophical and cultural tary. It invokes the tradition of significance of this transcultural cross-cultural translation, wherein process provides a source of inspithe book comes to speak in the lin- ration for my own translation of

guistic and ideational context of Cohen’s essay on Maimonides. the reader, reminding the reader (Cohen and Levinas themselves that the very act of translation im- are groundbreaking teachers of plies teaching and commentary. such an agenda: Cohen in his The sharing of any translator’s readings of medieval Jewish philearning—itself a sort of giftto the losophy, and Levinas for his reader—situates the process of teachings of Talmud.) I shall be

learning within the context of grateful if this translation and cross-cultural exchange, a sharing commentary convey something of of literary traditions. This process _ their spirit.

Medieval Literary Features On first view, the reader will real- an introduction to classical issues

ize that this book contains ele- in medieval Jewish philosophy. ments of traditional short, mid- This book thereby takes advandle, and interlinear commentary. tage of the nonlinear, associative, This reflects the understanding eclectic kind of discussion that the that any reading implies a transla- literary form of a line-by-line com-

tion, and that any translation mentary permits—a literary form amounts to a commentary. By of- also indebted to the oral tradition fering a reading of Cohen in the of Jewish learning. These literary

medieval form of a line-by-line features, invoking the continuity commentary, the author becomes of a traditional hermeneutical the text’s advocate, endorsing a_ practice, permit me as the student definite standpoint, and providing and translator of Cohen’s text to

INTRODUCTION XXIX strictly heed the philosophical ethics as I wish to outline in the premises of Cohen’s own readings following excursus on Cohen’s of Jewish literature. These, in philosophical approach to literary turn, are bound to the primacy of sources. On Textual Reasoning

Hermann Cohen’s interpretation indeed inspiring, source for the of Maimonides in his “Charakter- contemporary hermeneutical disistik der Ethik Maimunis” repre- cussion among Jewish scholars.

sents a masterful exposition of Cohen’s philosophy of origin is Jewish textual reasoning. In the grounded in an ethical lovingkindfollowing, I wish to say something ness and justice even before it sets

about Cohen’s hermeneutical ap- out its first thought. Cohen calls proach to Jewish literary sources, this a non-foundational, anarchic

which will enable the reader to sit- thinking of origin, which he uate Cohen’s essay both within the models on the Platonic Good be-

context of his critical philosophy yond Being.** Cohen’s reading

and within the contemporary’ of Plato, as well as his developphilosophical debate on the signif- ment of a critical idealism icance of traditional religious steeped in the concept of a tran-

hermeneutics. scendent Good in which the At the conference “Textual quest for justice originates, is in-

Reasoning,” held at Drew Univer- timately bound up with Cohen’s sity in June 1997, Jewish and non-_ reading of Jewish national literJewish scholars explored the rele- ature, or classical Jewish literary vance of the traditional practice of sources.*? Levinas’s “Humanism Jewish hermeneutics and its meth- and Anarchy” of 1968 may well

ods of textual reasoning for the be studied as the contemporary contemporary debate on post- voice of a Jewish humanism that modernity. At this and earlier con- finds its most seminal modern ferences, I invoked the philosophy expression in the philosophy of of Hermann Cohen as a helpful, Hermann Cohen.?* Cohen’s Philosophy of Origin— Translating “Jewish” into “Greek”

Cohen’s work can be seen as con- temptations of fundamental onveying a neo-Kantian critical ideal- tologies and metaphysical sysism, within a philosophical narrative tems in the same way as the deeply rooted in traditional Jewish hermeneutical principles of Jewhermeneutics and oral tradition.2? ish oral tradition are meant to reCohen’s critical idealism resists the sist the temptations of religious

XXX ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES dogmatism and textual literal- entrust the guidance of my ism. Cohen’s neo-Kantian philo- Jewish consciousness to the insophical system correlates with his stinct of loyalty, loyalty to Jewish writings in the strict philo- one’s own religious denominasophical sense of this term. Cohen tion or tribe, but to philosophiconstructs an interdependence be- cal methodology, in as far as it tween philosophy and Jewish tra- is my share.*®

dition in which one set of con- .

cepts—such as Cohen’s ethical idea We may then read Cohen’s phiof humanity or his logical principle losophy In Its various stages and of origin—receives its original disciplines as a singular but multi-

meaning from another set of con- faceted attempt to translate an cepts, namely one that emerges Original Teaching (which is itself from the messianic texts of the @bsent, not at hand) into the lanprophets, or from the biblical pas- 8448¢ required by the philosophi-

sages featuring the one, unique cal discourse at hand, be it logic, God who demands the Good of ¢thics, aesthetics, or philosophy of

humankind. And vice versa: ‘eéligion. As a result, all the differCohen’s reading of central con- ©" Parts of Cohen’s philosophy cepts in Jewish tradition (such as_ tell their readers—each in its own messianism, creation, halakhic au- way—ot the justice and humanity, thority) receives its direction and Of the lovingkindness, goodness, significance from the transcenden- 204d peace, that he himselt derives tal principles of Cohen’s own criti- from the Original Teaching as a

cal philosophy. binding task for humankind, callIn an autobiographical state- ig for a Kingdom of Humanity

ment Cohen discloses to what ex- that none but ourselves can create.

tent his general philosophy is Throughout my translation of bound up with Jewish tradition Cohen, the reader will find textual

and with Jewish culture: synopses in square brackets, which

I have inserted, drawn from the en-

My enthusiasm for Judaism is tire body of Cohen’s work. Such a rooted in my conviction of the nonlinear reading of Cohen points ethical validity implied in our to the almost midrashic manner in idea of God. My understanding which Cohen cites himself. In the

of Judaism stands within the midst of an argument, he often context of my scholarly work. brings to mind a philosophical theHence I feel particularly fortu- ory carefully developed elsewhere,

nate that prior to my presenta- now being invoked while, so to

tions of more extensive works speak, standing on one foot, on the ideas of Judaism I had whereby prior reasoning takes on a the opportunity to demonstrate new direction. Moreover, Cohen’s the place of Judaism within a earlier works contain ideas that are philosophical system. I do not often thought to have evolved later,

INTRODUCTION XXX1 such as the idea of developing a “re- itself must not remain an abstract ligion of reason out of the sources dictum. Such an ideal, rather, reof Judaism,” which had been his _ ceives its paramount ethical signifown agenda for the Gesellschaft zur icance from being rooted in a livForderung der Wissenschaft des Ju- ing narrative, a narrative “as old

dentums since 1902.77 as the world, a messianic narrative Granting primacy to the her- that captures our thinking from meneutical order (determined by time immemorial, demanding that the midrashic art of citation that thought render account of its conunderlies a continuous living oral tents and actions before it even bediscourse), over formal hierarchies gins.”*° The subsequent discusof ethics established by written sion of text and commentary will philosophical treatises, means that prove this point while leaning even the highest ideal of humanity closely on Cohen’s texts.

The Original Teaching and Classical Jewish Sources

“In the beginning is the sen- and inspires the transformation of tence.” However, “the ques- this world into a Kingdom of True

tion is the lever of origin.” Humanity. In his introduction to Hence the sentence relates to the Religion of Reason, Cohen the question as commentary claims that this teaching manifests relates to the text or as reason itself particularly in classical Jew-

relates to revelation. ish sources.°? According to Cohen,

. classical Jewish sources are texts

Revelation represents the no- whose immediate meaning is as thing, that is: the question. absent as any immediate manifesTherefore, thinking must not tation of God, yet whose presence shy away from any detour via is as commanding as the voice at

nothingness.”” Sinai. Cohen’s principle of origin demands “there can be no givens

Cohen’s essay on Maimonides at the inception of thinking” [dem

demonstrates more than any of Ursprung darf nichts gegeben Cohen’s other writings how _ sein].3! The same is true for the pe-

Cohen’s reading of classical culiar hermeneutics of the Jewish texts—whether “Greek” or “Jew- oral tradition: nothing must reish”—is wedded to a relentless strict the process of interpretation critical reasoning put at the service and commentary, precisely for the

of what we could call the eternal sake of the holiness of the divine task of unveiling the significance teaching. A medieval commentaof the Original Ethical Teaching. tor, Shlomo ben Abraham Parchon

The Original Teaching (which is says the following in his book not at hand) ideally carries forth Machberet ha’Arukh:

XXX ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES When people who are uniniti- be written in scripture.” They ated in the traditional ways of say that because they think reading Jewish texts observe that their particular translahow the Jews extract all kinds tion of Scripture represents

- of midrashic explanations the literal meaning of the from the words of the Sages, original text. Thus they have they refute them, saying: “you erased the “seventy faces of

are twisting what we know to the Torah.” On Text and Commentary The meaning of the text, or, as which reads like a commentary on Cohen would say, the meaning of the very title of the book, that the source, begins to speak and Cohen sets forth the hermeneutical thus comes to life with commen- agenda for any philosophical readtary. Cohen advocates the simul- ing of Jewish sources, leading the taneity of text and commentary, reader to the conclusion that the and therewith an ahistorical, but presence of classical Jewish sources highly traditional, hermeneutical originates in future commentary in

method. He claims that classical the same way as human history Jewish sources originate in com- originates in the futuric vision of

mentary, and that commentary the prophets. In the Talmud means oral discourse, Sprach- Yerushalmi, “R.Yehoshua ben Levi denken: “Books tend to get sealed, teaches: ‘Even what a learned stuwhereas mouths and lips continue dent in the future shall expound to speak.”%? It is in his introduc- before her teacher is part of the

tion to the Religion of Reason: ‘Torah as it has been taught to Out of the Sources of Judaism, Moses on Sinai.’”*4 Commentary and Oral Tradition Due to the peculiarity of the claims _ ethical task of conveying the Orig-

of Jewish teaching (that it harbors inal Teaching and its promise of an Original Teaching demanding humanity. The commentary, not the creation of mankind), Jewish the text, therefore continues the commentary itself is bound to dis- living word of God (kol gadol velo

seminate prophetic promises. yassaf), that “great unceasing Cohen systematically develops the voice” which spoke out of the fire, political and ethical ramifications out of thick darkness.2>° Onkelos of these promises in his essay on translates velo yassaf as velo pas-

Maimonides. Jewish commentary, sak (the great voice that never then, would be charged with the ceases to command), and that de-

INTRODUCTION XXXII mands justice and the good, tradi- thus life, into the text is everytionally speaking Halakha leMoshe thing.>® Medieval Jewish thinkers miSinai, a principle that might well adamantly reiterate this hermeneu-

be rendered as “the sovereignty of tical point: the biblical scholar

the oral tradition.” Abraham ibn Ezra maintains that The hermeneutical innovation interpretation relates to the written in Cohen’s Religion of Reasoncon- word as the soul relates to the sists in identifying the originality body.°? Judah ha-Levi claims the

or autonomy of the Jewish oral “breath” of the vowels relates to tradition with the originality or the “letter” of the consonants as autonomy of human reasoning as_ the soul relates to the body.*° such. In other words, the dynamics Cohen emphasizes that “wherever

of Jewish oral tradition, in its the Talmud [the oral tradition] is claim of representing the original- taught, there the Torah is alive.”*! ity of the Jewish teaching, demon- Repeating the Torah to his people, strates the primacy of what Cohen Moses said, “the Torah is not in calls logic of origin. Cohen writes, heaven but very close to you, in “Originality—the true sign of cre- your mouth and in your heart to

ative reasoning—frees Jewish tra- do.”4* Cohen translates: “die dition from the enchantments of Thora ist nicht im Himmel, sonreligious, dogmatic consciousness, dern in deinem Herzen. .. . Sie ist

and ideally purifies its teach- in deinem Herzen und in deinem ings.”°° This kind of primacy, or Munde; so muss .. . sie zur Urspriinglichkeit, characterizes mindlichen Lehre werden” [the

Jewish learning, drawing on Torah is not in Heaven, but in sources that are privileged in that your heart... . It is in your heart they yield the messianic promise of and in your mouth; thus it must humanity. The living, oral tradi- become an oral teaching].*° tion, which, according to Cohen, The oral tradition teaches that includes all teachings inspired by even the written Torah is the result

this promise, turns out to be the of an oral teaching—“Moshe guarantor and heir of this primary kibbel Torah miSinai,” [Moses re-

source. ceives the Torah from Sinai]. He At first sight, Cohen seems to Jearns Torah before he commits

say that it is the oral and not the _ the divine teaching to writing. Jew-

written tradition that constitutes ish tradition has it that the written the living well of Jewish learning.*” Torah was originally meant as a According to Paul, the first great private, oral teaching for Moses Christian, whom Daniel Boyarin alone, that it was conceived of in a reads as a creative Jewish cultural strictly dialogical situation in critic,”the letter is nothing,” and which God spoke and Moses listhe pneuma (the breath of the tened, and that Moses’ very sharvoice) that breathes vowels, and _ ing of his Torah with the people of

XXXIV ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Israel was a voluntary act, an act oral tradition might thus be unof personal kindness and generos- derstood as one of learned disity.*4 Early on, it was forbidden to agreement. The Hebrew word capture the living word—which al- mishna itself contains a threefold ways reflects a pedagogical setting meaning, implying “to repeat, to of teacher and student—in written learn, and to teach.” It thus capscript, an injunction that was sus- tures what Cohen means by the

pended beginning at the time of originality of the Jewish source, the Mishna.*> Even the Mishna, namely that even the repetition of however, was written not for the an argument whose final implicasake of memorizing religious doc- tions have been suspended, must trine, but rather to keep alive de- generate a new teaching. In this bates among the Sages that re- way, Jewish oral tradition calls for mained unresolved (and here many engaging in a discourse that, for

sides of controversies were the sake of the holiness of the liv-

recorded as legitimate opinions).*° ing word of God, does not allow The entire history of the Jewish for human closure.

Philosophy Is Powerless: The Text Is Central Despite the predominance of oral Cohen explains to the confounded learning in Jewish tradition, Cohen reader of this essay, when it comes surprisingly suggests in his essay on to the question of how to give fur-

Maimonides that it is the text, the ther grounds to the ethical idea of text in its physical embodiment, the Good.*® Cohen invokes Plato’s which is of vital importance for the solution of the Ungrundlegung des continuity of Jewish learning. Para- Guten, the non-foundation of the doxically, it is the text, the book, Good, when facing the aporia of a

the chiffre, that conceals rather mere logical deduction of the than reveals its meaning, which is “Good that is prior to Being.”*? central to the Jewish hermeneutical But invoking Plato is only the first

tradition, a tradition that pro- step in Cohen’s philosophical soluclaims: mipi soferim velo mipi se- tion to this hermeneutical probfarim (we learn from the mouths of lem, a solution so bold it required

our teachers, and not from_ philosophies of Franz Rosenzweig books).4” One of the most impor- and Emmanuel Levinas to teach it tant points that Cohen teaches usin to the contemporary reader who

his “Charakteristik der Ethik now associates Cohen’s teaching Maimunis” is that without the text with Levinas’s fundamentally Jewas the communal core of learning, ish critique of the Western onto-

there can be no ethical teaching. logical tradition. What is Cohen’s “Philosophy is declared powerless,” point?

INTRODUCTION XXXV Philosophy’s Impotence? How to Give Further Grounds to the Good To give further ground to the idea truthfulness].°° Cohen maintains of the Good, Cohen explicitly cor- even in his “Charakteristik der relates Plato’s Ungrundlegung—the Ethik Maimunis” that the Original

concept through which Plato safe- Narrative, the text, revelation in guards the idea of the Good beyond _ short, “positive law”—specifies the

Being—with the original teaching ways of goodness.°! “Higgid lekha

of rachamim (compassion) and adamma tov...” [he has told you, chessed (lovingkindness), which re- © Man, what is good and what the

side in classical Jewish sources. “It Lord requires of you: only to do is revelation which posits these at- justice and to love goodness and to tributes,” says Cohen in this essay walk modestly with your God.°?] on Maimonides, citing the biblical Furthermore, the Sifre specifies, text “rachum vechanun, erekh “As He is gracious, so you be graapayim, verav chessed ve ’emet” cious; as he is long-suffering, so you [gracious and compassionate, long- _ be long-suffering.” suffering, full of lovingkindness and

Revelation Borders on Myth: The Rabbinic Art of Citation

At this point, of course, critical informs the content of a given reasoning must protest, since reading. For Cohen, the midrashic wherever a traditional narrative in- art of citation thereby dispels all forms a philosophical concept of notions of mythical consciousness. crucial importance, we find our- The original narrative, revelation, selves on the grounds of myth and _ borders on myth because for an inreligious dogma—and not in the _ finitesimal moment—the very mo-

domain of critical philosophy. ment in which a text is being When discussing the relationship cited—the Original Teaching between the ethical teaching of the seems to affirm its meaning, just as

Good and the prophetic word of in the case of all other mythical God, Cohen utters the elliptic sen- narratives. By being cited at the de-

tence: “It is here that revelation it- cisive moment in time at which self borders on myth.”°* But what reasoning reaches its impasse—the does it mean that a traditional nar- moment at which reasoning fails rative informs a philosophical con- to give an account for the grounds cept, and that it therefore borders of goodness—the text has become

on myth? Jewish hermeneutics the original warrant for the priorprovides a crucial answer: the very ity of ethics over ontology. The citation of a text—where words text is trusted with a gesture of are often quoted out of context— faith—which is precisely the signif-

XXXVI ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES icance of citation in rabbinic oral first meaning, “older” than the first,

tradition. We render account of lies in the future. We must pass ourselves in facing an ancient text. through interpretation to surpass inBut the ancient text, which has __ terpretation..° The meaning of the

been trusted in such a way, is not Original Teaching is deferred to really the issue when it is being commentary, as the past, the tradicited. “Oral tradition,” Cohen _ tion itself, must be anticipated. “Ansays, “extends revelation to in- _ ticipation is the fundamental activity

clude tradition, a hermeneutical of time ... the past is predicated motion that amounts inevitably to upon the future that is anticipated. It

the dissolution of revelation into is not the past that is prior to one’s cognition.”°° This is true despite thinking, but rather the future.°’

the fact that the interpretation Any idealization of the past is a owes itself entirely to the Original hindrance to the messianic task, as

Teaching that inspires it. the “past itself appears as... a The Original Teaching defies continuous ejection of anticipamythification despite the fact that it tion.”°8 Time is grounded in futuis anchored in an immemorial past. rity and only in futurity. Past and It defies mythification, since its ori- present vanish in the face of this gin lies beyond memory. Thus, the temporal mode of futurity.

The Temptations of Citing an Ancient Text Citing an ancient text carries with mentary presents a true reading

it the temptation of what Cohen of the text. But such futurity— calls “mythical consciousness”— Levinas calls it the “eschaton by invoking a revered tone inthe hope’ which the living are judged”—is

of being granted special rights or not one that is brought about by privileges. However, Jewish tradi- politics (although the task of creattion says that the Original Teach- ing such a messianic future may reing must not be confined to sucha _ sult in political action). Cohen does

mythical past. Even a doctrine as not teach Jewish hermeneutics as prone to mythical consciousness as _ the history of victorious interpretazechuth avoth, “the merits of the — tions. It is not any political future,

fathers,” is not intended to teach but rather the extent to which one loyalty to ancient monuments, but anticipates the promise of humanrather faithfulness to the ideal of ity, that provides the measure for

lovingkindness and justice, as an ultimate judgment on history. Abraham instructed his children This is the reason why Maimonides

and all of posterity “to keep the so carefully distinguishes the way of God by doing what is just world-to-come from messianic and right.”°? It is not the past but times. The world-to-come reprethe future that decides whose com- sents no utopian future, but rather

INTRODUCTION XXXVI the task of presently anticipating come to an end, but rather it must humanity, through the very act of be presently anticipated].°° The engaging ourselves in the continua- originality of classical Jewish tion of the Original Teaching: “Lo sources demands that all citaachar kakh yavo oto ha’olam—ein tions—all interpretative human ac-

hadavar ken! Ella hu matsui tivity—be subsumed under the reve’omed” [The world-to-come sponsibility of our own ethical shall not come after this world has reasoning.

The Primacy of Ethics over Ontology: Faithfulness to a Hermeneutical Tradition Cohen’s proclamation of the pri- manity must be anticipated—this

ority of ethics over ontology is the significance of the Original demonstrates his faithfulness to a Teaching, and faithfulness to this teaching whose messianic promise teaching, according to Hermann inspires the traditional interpre- Cohen, is the one and only gesture

tive methods of the Jewish oral of faith that Jewish tradition pertradition, setting forth ways of mits and demands. Levinas exthinking that pervade Cohen’s en- presses this point in a single sentire philosophy. The originality of tence: “The confidence placed in

Jewish teaching signifies to the wisdom of the Sages is, if you thought that which must not be _ like, a faith. But this form of faith given to it—namely the grounds’ which we proclaim is the only one for ever-interpretive versions of that does not have to be kept dishow to anticipate humanity. Hu- creetly to oneself.”°! Cohen’s Literary Style

Cohen’s own voice reverberates theism in monotheism” (emphasis with the ethical radicalism of the mine).

prophets. His voice is as clearly Cohen’s prose is poetic rather discernible in matters Jewish as than scientific. It knows nothing of it is in matters philosophical. the academic constructs of scholarly Cohen’s literary style is condensed, research, does not follow the almost to the point of being ellipti- methodological schemes of thesis, cal, a language that is archaic, lap- antithesis, and one’s own thesis; it idary, a powerful prose in which does without expositions and con-

conclusions are not reached but clusions, presents no theses or rather proclaimed: “Ezekiel is proofs thereof. Cohen’s language re-

the first to announce... Jewish calls music rather than geometry. monotheism, ethical messianism Rosenzweig calls it Sprachdenken,

is nothing but... This is the pan- where one must listen to the last

XXXVI ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES word before one understands what of the literary work as if we were

the beginning was all about. dealing with an ever recurring reCohen’s is a “narrating philoso- frain. It reads like a tractate on huphy,” employing a philosophical manity which unfolds into a kaleilanguage replete with metaphors, in doscope of haggadic and halakhic which one single theme—the theme teachings, the former in order to of true humanity, loving-kindness, keep alive the soul of the teaching, justice, peace—is rehearsed and re- the latter in order not to forget how peated throughout the entire body to approach one’s neighbor.

Out of the Translator’s Workshop: To the Philologists Given the density and the peculiar- stands the idiomatic character

ity of Cohen’s literary style, it both of the language from proves non-sensible to translate which he is translating and the Cohen’s texts in any interlinear language into which he is way, word by word, or even sen- translating, and that thereby he tence by sentence. In the transla- understands the author’s intention of this text, I have taken to tions in an accurate and fitting heart as methodological guideline manner, so that the translation the advice of the classical medieval will reflect accurately both the translator of Jewish philosophical author’s emotional tenor and texts, Yehuda ibn Tibbon, who in the concept he intends to conthe preface to his Hebrew transla- vey. Once the translator has dition of the Arabic Duties of the gested this basic principle, he

Heart proposes as follows: can exercise some creativity in his manner of translation and

At times a translator will need his choice of parallelism, as to transfer an idiomatic expres- long as he is faithful in captursion which presents itself in one ing the “intent” of the au-

language, into a compatible thor.

idiom which resembles or ap-

proximates it in the language Let us then draw an initial lesson into which he is translating. At from these opening remarks: other times he will need to alter

a parable or a referent that There is no innocent transladoes not fit the cultural frame tion. ... To translate is alof reference in the second lan- ready to interpret ... the one guage, into a parable or a refer- thing that would be criticizent which is similar and which able would be the naive claim performs in the same manner. of an exegesis that held itself

The most important princi- to be without a history, as ple is that the translator under- though it were possible to co-

INTRODUCTION XXXIX incide, without the mediation intonation, opinion, or heartof a tradition of reading, with beat,” any translation will inthe original signification of a deed have to keep in mind the text, even with the presumed norm of exactitude, but that

intention of its author.®? alone will not be sufficient;

. | for the one language will have

Translating means to introduce a to vie immediately with the text to an audience unfamiliar with other—there exists no crite-

the teaching by saying it anew in a bounds. .. . The two landifferent cultural context.°* Shmuel suiages engage in a boundless

Ibn Tibbon developed so many game with each other and ways of rendering into Hebrew, in against each other. In fact, it his masterful translations of Judeo- is this very game . . . that creArabic philosophical works, that he ates the translation, a translafelt the need to define is terminol- tion worthy of its name.°7 ogy in a separate glossary appended

to his Hebrew translation, the ;

Moreh Nevukhim. The tradition The translator, probing the oes depths of a of particular work, mediJewish translation—from the Septu- ates between the text and the agint, to Onkelos, to Mendelssohn, reader. In rabbinic tradition, the

and a to atria. pre uber task of the translator (ha-meturge-

Is replete with Nachatc fungen, man) is closely associated with the ccrretione of ah aeoeial™ oh oc task of defending someone before

.9

structions Of the original’; this, d€- 4 court of justice. In other words,

spite the insistence of Rosenzweig ihe translator advocates a case.

that translations ought not to Translating means to become an“move the text closer to the reader” able for what the philosopher Put rather “move the reader closer says.68 In Rosenzweig’s words:

fo Re text.” himself. h “The creative achievement of hol te chat “dhe b oe , heerlen: translating lies in the creative

° _ at jf . ‘ é ke an achievement of speaking itself... .

servient to ‘the word as rexts are Whoever has something to say

bserv: Such will say it in a new way. The trans-

subservient tO commentary. SUC lator advances to being linguistisubservience, however, byno means . ally creative.” characterizes the initial relationship Having said all this, I appeal to Petween the text and the fransiator the reader’s critical philosophical is rather the very result of the trans- and linguistic ee asking espe

o the contrary, such subservience re _

lator’ faithful he orieinal cially German-speaking readers to ator’s faithfulness to the original: weigh this version graciously wherWhen it is our concern to lis- ever they disagree with the transla-

ten to “the person, her or his tion. In order to demonstrate in

xl ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES what ways this translation trans- text in the original German and in ports the literal sense of the text, my English translation may be ilTable 1 featuring both Cohen’s luminating. TABLE 1. SYNOPSIS OF ‘TRANSLATION

ORIGINAL GERMAN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Wenn die Ethik If ethics is not to remain nicht als eine Zufaelligkeit des an accidental result

Temperaments, of temperament des Herkommens, or background,

der geschichtlichen Gesetze der nor a result of historical inertia and of Tragheit und der Veranderungslust, the urge for adjustment to fashionable changes,

nicht als das Zuckerbrot oder die nor the Carrot and Stick of autocratic

Peitsche der Machthaber, authority, nicht als der Priesterbetrug des nor the pious fraud of superstition; Aberglaubens, nicht als Balsam fiir die unheilbaren _—_ nor balm for the incurable wounds of

Wunden des Menschenloses, human fate, nicht als Tauschware des dsthetischen nor barter of the aesthetic traffic with art; Verkehrs mit der Kunst;

wenn die Sittlichkeit ernsthaft und but rather if ethics is to become and

wahrhaft ein remain seriously and genuinely a Problem des Wissens werden und problem of cognitive pursuit, bleiben soll,

so darf sie nicht von allen anderen then the cognitive pursuit of ethics may Gewissenstfragen des Wissens abgetrennt not be separated from any other

und blossgestellt werden; conscientious intellectual endeavor and may not be exposed disparately. nur im Zusammenhange der Probleme Only within the epistemological

des Wissens kann die Ethik als context can ethics flourish

Wissenschaft gedeihen und and advance as a science. aufkommen. (#3)

The translator has decided to reader whom he trusts will reclarify unspecified referents in member the intricacies of the arCohen’s text, such asinasentence gument all along. However, like, “Therefore this signifies whereas German allows for the none other than that” (see Table use of such unspecified referents, 2). I resolved these unspecified English does not. The repetition referents in concrete and unam- of these referents will clarify for biguous ways, attempting a medi-_ the reader what I as a translator ation that Cohen does not under- think the argument implies. The take, as he relies on the initiated most decisive attempt at resolving

INTRODUCTION xli unspecified referents is through As Tables 2 and 3 demonthe use of square brackets as ex-_ strate, attention has been paid to

emplified in Table 3. textual detail, especially in cases TABLE 2. SYNOPSIS OF TRANSLATION

ORIGINAL GERMAN ENGLISH TRANSLATION Wenn nun aber die Annahrung nur Now, if the concept of drawing near to diesen klaren ethischen Sinn hat und God can and may only tolerate this haben kann, darf man dann nicht clearly ethical connotation, are we then fragen, wie Maimuni der Versuchung not entitled to ask how Maimonides

widerstehen konnte, in sie die could have resisted the temptation to Gliickseligkeit zu setzen und diese in translate “nearness” as eudaemonia,

jener wiederzukennen. (#116) and to recognize such nearness to God as personal bliss? TABLE 3. SYNOPSIS OF TRANSLATION

ORIGINAL GERMAN ENGLISH TRANSLATION Alle klassischen Religionsphilosophen —_In this context [Cohen closely connects des Judentums berufen sich auf Hiob _ this paragraph to the previous one, which

(32:8): “Wahrlich Geist ist im ends with a note on the relationship Menschen, und die Seele des between “these divine characteristics” Allmaechtigen macht sie vernuenftig.” and “the purposefulness of human

Und schon Abraham ibn Daud’s ethics” |, all classical philosophers of

Erklaerung lautete: Judaism refer to Job 32:8:

“der Geist ist der menschliche Geist, “But truly, it is spirit in man, the breath und die Seele des Allmaechtigen ist der of Shaddai gives them reason.”

heilige Geist.” (# 39) Abraham ibn Daud interprets thus: Das ist der Pantheismus im “The spirit refers to the human mind, the

Monotheismus. breath of Shaddai to the spirit of holiness.” The correlation between God and man in ethical reasoning constitutes the pantheistic element within monotheism.

*The correlation between God and man in ethical reasoning constitutes the pantheistic element within monotheism.

where I opted for a translation tion”), aiming at a translation and commentary that extend the that might prove compatible with

boundaries of the text. Concern- future English translations of ing Cohen’s philosophical termi- Cohen’s philosophical works. nology, I tried to be consistent in The same consistency was also my translation of technical terms sought with respect to Cohen’s (Ungrundlegung, for example, is usage of classical rabbinic termialways rendered as “non-founda- nology.

xlii ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES For the sake of clarity and which all paragraphs, or sections, structure, numbers were added to are numbered. Cohen’s own Cohen’s unnumbered paragraphs, transliteration system of Hebrew

reminiscent of the practice in the has not been made consistent edition of the Religion of Reason: with that used in my own text. Out of the Sources of Judaism in

An Important Note to the Learner: How to Use This Book

This book is not one that the The living word of Cohen, Maireader is supposed to read silently, monides, philosophers, modern alone, from cover to cover—as is and premodern Jewish thinkers— the case with most books. This as well as that of the translator and book, rather than being a text for of the commentator—might be mere “reading,” provides the set- found here. It calls on the learner

ting for an age-old pedagogical to create her own commentary. technique in which the living The book’s multitextuality—with word is passed on from one _ its two texts facing each other— learner to the other, and in which calls for interaction in the same the act of translation provides way as the traditional talmudic only the first of many intermedi- discussions of the rabbis call for ary steps of disseminating the interpretation and commentary, teaching among students. Learn- just as two or more voices arguing

ing Jewish philosophy with this over a heartfelt issue might call book would therefore ideally hap- one who was listening all along, if

pen in chavruta—a setting of it concerns her too, to now open two—whose reading would pro- her own lips and speak. Similarly,

ceed from paragraph to para- a reader may decide to join in this graph, concentrating upon the is- study of Cohen. This book will sues at hand. The commentary provide a setting for an oral disitself, then, will serve as a sort of course, in which critical issues in second, surrogate reader, as well Jewish reasoning are voiced by the

as invite the student to explore reader herself in such a way that the classical literature that under- “every word becomes a spoken

lies Cohen’s text. word” of her own.” The Page

Where applicable, pages will con- umn of each page, in an alternate tain my translation of Cohen’s text font. Cohen’s own notes appear in and my commentary on them. The _ parentheses.

English translation of Cohen’s text Within Cohen’s text, you will generally appears in the left col- find my interpolations, which are

INTRODUCTION xiii set in brackets. These contain tex- comes an emphatic teaching, a

tual references Cohen took for repetition and enhancement— granted, as well as textual associa- such as Cohen’s teaching concern-

tions that are a result of my own ing the Platonic Good beyond reading. (However, not all para- Being; or the beautiful passages on graphs of the translation will be alterity and shepherding; or those

commented upon. Thus, some that radically challenge religious pages will contain simply my text imagination, positing the worldin two-column format and some to-come as a Kingdom of True will contain simply Cohen’s text in Humanity.

two-column format.) Finally, I commented upon pasThe commentary follows the sages because I wanted to draw atthemes of Cohen’s text in an asso-. tention to their provocative naciative manner, taking its cues from ture—such as with Cohen’s open those passages in the text that, in polemic against Christianity, surely my own first readings of the essay, a surprise to the reader counting on

called out for commentary. These the liberal, tolerant attitude of a passages, I felt, warranted commen- German Jew who shies away from tary for three kinds of reasons. In confrontation. I decided that it was some instances, the text was so dif- not the function of my commentary ficult that I did not understand it at to correct or even to apologize for

first sight—such as Cohen’s idea of Cohen’s polemic against Chris-

origin and non-foundation; his tianity. Instead, I weave it into messianic epistemology,’! which other texts of Cohen’s philosophical constructs the past from a tempo- and Jewish writings, distinguishing ral mode of futurity; or the histor- it from religious dogmatism, sharp-

ical genesis of issues in classical ening its position and deepening medieval Jewish philosophy. In its claim. The same is true conother instances I decided to com- cerning Cohen’s philosophical criment on a passage because I found _ tique of Zionism, a biting polemic it of great importance, so inspiring whose relevance for the contem-

that I wished to emphasize it. In porary debate on post-Zionism is these cases, the commentary be- hinted at without apology. Subheads within Chapters: The Hidden Agenda of the Book The subheads given within chap- commentary whose wholeness I ters of this book are not necessar- could not retain as my reading be-

ily those one would give to the came fractured in the pursuit of a paragraphs of Cohen’s essay itself. strictly interlinear reading. Thus, These subheads provide the reader only a reading all the way through

with the hidden agenda of the the commentary will illuminate the book, pointing to the book within — beginning.

the book, the book “beneath” the

BLANK PAGE

Socrates and Plato Founders of Ethics In this first chapter, Cohen provides the philosophical foundations for his Platonic, anti-Aristotelian reading of Maimonides: Plato establishes the Good as an idea, as an object of knowledge, whereas Aristotle reduces the good to the realm of economy and politics, ignoring the epistemological

question concerning the interrelation between nature and goodness, which, according to Cohen, is central to Maimonides’ thought. The idea of the Good, according to Plato, resembles a scientific hypothesis in that

it must give an account of itself. The content of the idea of the Good, however, exempts it from the relativity of all scientific hypotheses: in the idea of the Good reason itself is grounded and comes to its end. The Platonic concept of the “Good beyond Being” indicates a non-hypothesis or

non-foundational origin of human knowledge that Cohen in the later parts of this essay equates with prophetic vision.

Socrates, Founder of Ethics: What to Do with Socratic Irony 1. By proclaiming virtue as knowl- (See 1.) Socrates became the edge, Socrates became the founder founder of ethics as a science. of ethics; that is, concerning all Whereas pre-Socratic philosophers other questions and pursuits of were primarily interested in naknowledge, he discovered and ture, posing questions concerning

claimed the value of ethics as an the cosmos and its origins, object of cognition. Moreover, he Socrates rather focused upon the demonstrated that only as knowl- intricacies of human nature: Dioedge and through cognition will the genes Laertius, in his ancient intromeaning of virtue become conceiv- duction to the lives of the philosoable, its purpose and content appli- phers, writes,

cable. With the enthusiasm of a

discoverer—since here we are deal- Philosophy, the pursuit of wis-

ing with the discovery of terra dom, has had a twofold origin incognita, the realm of ethics—and ... [one leads] to Socrates, with the religious zeal of a prophet, who introduced ethics or Socrates made all Hellenic pursuits moral philosophy.!

2 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES of nature and natural sciences yield © Cohen elaborates:

to the benefit of the human soul. Thus Socrates considered ethics not When Socrates founded ethics only as a science, but as the science as a philosophical discipline he par exellence. He proclaimed ethics considered it to be the focus of as the core and focus of human cog- all philosophy. . . . Ever since

nition. Socrates, ethics, the doctrine of man, becomes the center of phi-

2. Socrates announced an agen- losophy.* da—the agenda of universal cul-

ture; understandably, his ethics The Socratic emphasis on the bequeathed to us no record in writ- study of man finds its renaissance in ing. The whole value of this unique — thinkers of the humanist tradition:

achievement is preparation, pioneering; a raising of the curtain, as La vraie science et la vrai étude it were, that had veiled the work- de ’homme, c’est Vhomme.? shop of ethics. However, it was left Know then thyself—presume

to subsequent scholarly endeavor not God to scan: The proper to clarify fully and to systematical- study of mankind is man.* ly present the meaning and _ purpose of the Socratic agenda. In this According to Cohen’s Socrates, process, Socrates plays the role of — ethical knowledge expresses itself as

the herald Elijah, and Plato that of the task of knowing one’s self, an

the Messiah. [Malachi 3:23.] ideal transmitted to Socrates by the Delphic oracle “Know thyself” 3. Man’s ethical stature is the lofti- (yvw8t oeavtov). Ironically, howest and most relevant achieve- ever, this task of self-knowledge conment of humanity. If our heart is to stitutes a kind of not-knowing, for it be pervaded by the powerful feel- has nothing to start with—cannot

ing attending this idea, then it touch the grounds for which it must not be kept apart from and — searches. Cohen subsequently says:

isolated from the mind and _ its own universal interests. If ethics is Socrates distinguished himself not to remain an accidental result as the originator of scientific of temperament or background, veracity. He was wont, hownor of historical inertia and of the ever, to proclaim two interurge for adjustment to fashionable secting axiomatic principles: changes, nor the carrot and stick “Know thyself” (yvw8t ceavof autocratic authority, nor the Tov) alongside “I know that I pious fraud of superstition, nor don’t know” (otSa ott ovK balm for the incurable wounds of __. otSa). We may thus term

human fate, nor barter of the aes- Socrates the master of irony.°

SOCRATES AND PLATO 3 thetic traffic with art—but rather if Socrates proclaims the maxim ethics is to become and remain “Know that you know nothing” as seriously and genuinely a prob- the highest form of human knowllem of cognitive pursuit—then edge. What had been the proclaethics may not be separated from mation of an ironic paradox in any other conscientious intellec- Plato’s Socrates, and what in poptual endeavor and may not be _ ular literature has been depreciated exposed disparately. Only within as arrogant and ostentatious, bethe epistemological context can comes an innovative epistemologiethics flourish and advance as a_ cal method in Cohen’s reading.°® In

science. This epistemological correspondence to his own philochallenge is wanting in Socrates. sophical method of origin, Cohen interprets the Socratic paradox as 4. Yet, the epistemological aspect is an “adventurous state of notnot altogether absent in Socrates; knowing,”’ a privation that lies at the discovery of virtue as knowledge the bottom of creative thinking. represents an adumbration and a_ This kind of privation produces challenge, but it never matured into knowledge through an infinite

a full systematic presentation. generative process in which nothSocrates threw down the gauntlet of ing is a given.®

conceptuality: he considered the In ethics, the Socratic privation concept to be the essence and the of knowledge refers to the concept purpose of everything, of every _ of the self, which—as Cohen says— object of nature, of human life and — exists only in terms of a task for eth-

of every action. Aristotle, in fact, ical volition. The self is not “given credited Socrates with the discovery to us” but rather has to be conof the concept. [Aristiotle 1945, NE structed anew at any moment in 1144b, 371-73; Aristotle criticizes which a person is confronted with Plato’s reading of Socrates’ concept the demand to do good.’ A leading of virtue, however, for its scientific Levinas scholar quite adequately pretentiousness and for its nonprag- sums up Cohen’s reading of Socratic

matic character. Aristotle 1981, irony: Fudemonian Ethics 1217b-1218b,

225-33; 1945, NE 1096a—1097a, Less than identical with it-

17-25; 1145b, 379-81; 1147b, self, in deficit with regard to 393~95.] Anyone who directs itself, unable to catch up enthusiasm for ethics toward scien- with itself, unable to achieve tific knowledge must comprehend presence and self-presence, the entire content and purpose of the self cannot be conceived existence within the framework of as an entity. ... It is, in Levconceptuality and as Concept; in inas’s telling expression, in

order to solve the enigma of our exile in itself.!°

4 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES world, one must acknowledge the Cohen’s philosophy of origin universal nature of ideation, and converts Socratic irony into a critithus establish the ethical charge cal method of ethical judgment—a exclusively within the realm of con- method of critical thinking that ever ceptuality. It is this conceptuality of | distances itself from reality’s status ethics that separates it as ideation quo, that eternally binds the process from the figments of myth and from — of thinking under the yoke of ethical

mere aesthetic presentation. volition. Concept and Idea: On Nominalists and Realists 5, Even conceptuality, however, is (See 5.) Indeed, a concept presents only a preliminary stage. The con- just an abstraction. Cohen reads the cept can do no more than indi- medieval debate between realists and cate—it is an indication of what is nominalists about the status of Unirelevant: the strict, exact meaning _ versals, abstractions such as ideas and

and value of ideation, of that concepts, as a continuation of the dewhich has been scientifically com- bate between Plato and Aristotle prehended (the conceptual reality). about the very concept of the Good But how do we validate this indi- as an idea. Cohen seems to say that, cation, and bring it to its conclu- in the context of science, nominalists sion, so that it does not remain a are right when claiming that concepts

mere intimation? Indeed, a con- are, indeed, just abstractions, alcept presents just an abstraction, if though of central functional value. not just a word, a name. We recall When discussing the “sublimity” of the serious medieval controversy Plato’s idea of the Good, however, regarding the objective signifi- | Cohen sides with the realists: the idea

cance of the Universals. of the Good is more than a mere ab-

straction; it is rather of constitutive significance in providing the fundamental grounds for human thought and human action.

| The Platonic Bent: A Tradition within the Tradition 6. This controversy has remained, in (See 6.) The controversy over the fact, an ongoing discussion right up meaning of the Platonic idea. The reto the present: it is the controversy newed interest in Plato among Jewish over the meaning of the Platonic neo-Kantian thinkers such as Cohen, idea. Whoever entertains even the Cassirer, and Levinas demonstrates slightest doubt that there exists a fun- the attempt to base ethical rationalism

damental difference between Platon- upon a transcendental method of

SOCRATES AND PLATO 5 ic idea and Socratic conceptuality | thought.!! Both in Cohen’s philosobears responsibility for the continua- | phy as well as in his interpretation of

tion of this undying controversy. Judaism, the Platonic idea of the Good beyond Being is of creative, piv-

7. Plato did not stop short at the fas- | otal significance.!2 Accordingly, con-

cination that seized him when | temporary Jewish thinkers—in conencountering the cognitive zeal of | scious or unconscious alliance with Socrates—nearly bordering on a | the decisively Platonic bent in Cohen’s cognitive creed. As if pledging the | “new thinking”—align themselves Sophist’s advocate, he promoted | with the Platonic tradition, emphasiz-

critical doubt concerning naive ing the “sublimity of the Good” in faith in concepts and in the Socrat- | Jewish tradition."

ic method of how to attain and

clarify a concept. Plato demanded fundamental distinction between accountability for concepts. Thus the Platonic idea and the Platonic he bestowed the validity and mean- concept is itself innovative. See ing of the concept upon this task, SPhZ 60; differently, see Shorey in which he imposed upon the con- Plato 1980, 6:104; Shorey 1980, cept: to render an accounting of x-xi; 1965, 75. Plato uses the term itself (tKoyov StSovat). [Plato 1980, «tdos less frequently, and nowhere

Republic 534b-c, 207; 531e, with reference to the idea of the 195-96.] It is this accountability Good which “lies beyond the which distinguishes the idea (Sea) accountability of the concept.” LrE from the concept (e.S0s). [Cohen’s 19, 73; Shorey 1965, 182-86.]

Vision and Idea: On Prophetic Hermeneutics

8. Two motifs converge in the (See 8.) The “Platonic Idea”: the development of the Platonic idea: etymological meaning of “vision” first, the etymological element of and the “vision” of the prophets. vision, which early Jewish philoso- Note the etymological developphers could not fail to acknowl- ment of video (Fidea), “knowing edge in spite of their addiction to or observing,” from the ancient Aristotle. The Platonic idea may form of eidos (vision > video > surely be discerned in the biblical FetSo0s).'* Veidos (compare the vision of the prophets. In this bibli- | mishnaic vadai, *x7, or “evident”)

cal context, we find the dual signifies sense-perception. Video aspect of the prophetic act proper thus points to a process of

and its attending “objective abstraction in which truth— vision,” resulting in their reintegra- © Wahrheit—means “having seen,”

tion. Hence, Fichte saw fit to trans- and in which sense-perception, late the Platonic term idea as the concretely perceived phenomena,

6 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES biblical “vision” [Gesicht]. [ErW | are generalized. Sense-perception,

208-9; SPhZ 52-57.] indicated by the term eidos, represents the initial stage of conceptual 9. The second element appears to | knowledge, or of strictly scientific be more strictly scientific. Vision is | thinking. Cohen claims that pronot confined to scientific thinking, | phetic imagination employs _preand within said thinking it does not | cisely this motif of vision-eidos in a yet bear the marks of requisite cer- | peculiar hermeneutics that is based tainty and of methodical autonomy. | upon two factors, the first being a For this certainty and methodologi- | matter of personal experience and cal autonomy Plato searched, and | intuition, the latter of constructive these he discovered in the mathe- | reasoning. Whereas prophetic expe-

matical term hypothesis. [SPhZ | rience is a gift, and as such beyond 336-66; Plato 1980, Republic 511a | the prophet’s rational control, the

b:112-15.] prophetic message is an interpretive

task entirely within the bounds of _ flashes out” to the prophet in “lightthe prophet’s own responsibility. ning flashes time and time again.” !®

Cohen explains the phenomenon Prophetic imagination is based of prophetic knowledge initially upon sense perception, upon a conwithin the context of Plato’s theory crete vision that is translated into lan-

of ideas. When asking about the guage, speech—those personal verbal subjective origins of Plato’s theory associations and articulations, which of ideas, demanding to know how constitute the prophetic message Plato was able to conceive of ideas (video-idea). In other words, the that not only assume universal sig- prophetic message results from the nificance but that constitute entire prophet’s attempt to decipher and deworlds, Cohen describes a psycho- code the personally experienced dilogical process in which “Plato is vine word, translating the tangible, being struck by a vision—by an __ sensual vision (eidos) into a norma-

idea—as by sudden flashes of light- tive idea.’ What characterizes ning.” To follow those “luminous prophetic vision is its Gesamtschau, traces” in which truth presents itself the Mosaic view of the whole: a viconstitutes the infinite task of the sion whose inclusivity and universalPlatonic thinker.!° Cohen correlates ity becomes an inspiration for the enthis process of Platonic knowledge _ tire community of humankind.!®

with prophetic vision. Maimonides’ According to Cohen, Jewish oral introduction to The Guide of the tradition invokes precisely this kind

Perplexed thus resounds with of prophetic hermeneutics. In the Cohen’s early essay on Plato. Ina fa- same way as the prophet translates

mous passage, Maimonides there a personal experience into a coherdescribes prophetic imagination as__ ent body of ideas, the community of

an experience in which “truth listeners must first hear the words

SOCRATES AND PLATO 7 of the prophets before understand- peace and of justice, and of a united

ing the impact of their teaching. humanity, originate with the tangiCohen claims—and we may read_ ble sound of speech and with the this claim as a commentary on the sensual movement of lips. “It was biblical na’asseh ve-nishmah'’—_ the prophets’ lips, after all,” says

that the loftiest ideas of the Cohen, “which announced the

prophets, their ethical vision of truth of God.”?° |

Axioms 10. In keeping with his contempo- | (See 10.) The term axiom was only

rary mathematical terminology, | later adopted. The axioms of EuPlato saw in the hypothesis not just | clidean geometry were considered

any premise at random, but the | self-evident truths, propositions for premise as a fundamental thesis, or | which no proof is required. In modeven a fundamental concept. [SPhZ | ern logic, an axiomatic theory is con358-64.] The term axiom was only | sidered one in which all the claims of later adopted for this specific pur- | the theory are presented as theorems pose. The term hypothesis is applied | derivable from a specified set or syseven to the concept of the angle. | tem of axioms. Cohen himself criti[Plato 1980, 6:110—11.] The hypoth- | cizes the Aristotelian concept of the esis then serves as the elementary | axiom in Euclidean geometry, conmethodological means of initiating | trasting it with the principles of modan investigation. [Cohen claims that | ern natural sciences. The principles the terms hypothesis, idea, nought | of modern sciences “cannot simply of knowledge, question mark, angle, | be deduced from theoretical doctrine lever, are all expressions to indicate | and axiom, as these scientific princi-

the same, namely the creative | ples are themselves predicated upon gsround—or—origin of the process | new insight, sense perception, and of critical thinking. LrE 84.] It serves | experiment.”*! as a premise establishing the prereq-

uisite for the exploration of any an initial presupposition (hypothesis) problem. The validity and fecundity in mathematics arouses no suspiof any such investigation is predicat- cions. The premise cannot be mised upon congruence with the prem- taken here for a mere presumption,

ise, which in turn constitutes its since mathematical cognition may effective, continuous foundation. not be relegated to the haziness of ingenious figment. Mathematical 17. In mathematics, this clarification procedure moves along the lines of of each and every step, experiment, | demonstration; in this case, it is only

and premise of the investigation is this procedural stringency which concomitantly necessary and indis- ensures free movement of cognition. pensable. Hence, the requirement of | The hypothesis in mathematics and

8 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES in Renaissance astronomy thus initi- “likeness” as an abstract idea, we ated a new age: the modern era. The might even mistake it for the result of hypothesis became the foundation of | a perceptual observation. The idea of

the natural sciences. [Modern sci- likeness is not inferred from actual ence and its emphasis on relativity objects such as twigs and pebbles, and kinetic processes seems to cor- but rather demonstrated by way of relate with Plato’s theory of ideas, twigs and pebbles. [Plato 1982, 257, whereas Aristotle’s view of truth as as cited in Lr— 482-83. Cohen an eternal and static substance char- emphasizes that likeness cannot be acteristically determines the entire inferred from the concept of number, medieval world of science. Frank since the concept of likeness implies 1945, 105n. 16.] Kepler himself rec- the idea of relational magnitude. ognized it as Plato’s idea and credit- Ever since Georg Cantor’s introduc-

ed him for it. [LrF 7, 430.] tion of set theory, and, in particular, his idea of the one-to-one correspon-

12. Thus the idea constitutes the nec- dence of members of two or more

essary premise, or grounding, for sets, the concept of number ceased every scientific investigation. It con- | to be fundamental for mathematical

tains the rationale, the basis and thinking.] Hence the concrete object foundation—the account that cogni- _ merely serves as the perceptual stim-

tion renders of itself. [“The idea is ulus for the cognitive idea of likehypothesis. .. . Plato’s determination ness. Cognition means grounding; of the idea as ‘concept’... does not the grounding of likeness is equivaproceed beyond Socrates. Plato’s lent to the idea of likeness. It is the original contribution lies in charac- hypothesis that safeguards the idea terizing the idea as hypothesis.” ErW against the appearance and _ suspi97 and LrE 30, 211. See also JS _cion of presenting merely an afterim-

1:308-9, and RoR 91; RdV 106; age of perception. Lembeck 1994, 89-100.] There is no

cognition without accountability, 14. How does this apply to the idea and no rendering of account without of ethics? How is it applicable to the proper grounding. Science is nothing idea of the Good, the supreme con-

but the science of grounding. cept under which Socrates had classified and unified the virtues? Only

13. This is evident, as long as we as an idea will the Good constitute deal primarily with mathematics. an object of cognition—but is the Here this restriction to hypothetical Good admissible as an idea? This is thinking serves as an advantage. the grave problem of Plato’s doctrine

Mathematics does not move beyond of ideas. [RoR 400-402; RdV ideas. Likeness, for example, is an 464-67. Cohen 1996, 36-38 (here-

idea, since it is a hypothesis. How after cited as BdR). LrE 88, and else could it be defined but as a_ Plato 1980, Republic 505c-509b, hypothesis? If we were not to accept 2:89-107.] It is this very question

SOCRATES AND PLATO 7 that serves as the testing ground for become a science, and nothing but a scientific idealism. Here we arrive at science—will it not thus become a crossroad which we feel prompted subject to the destiny of all natural

to compare to the prophetic sciences, by being submitted to scimetaphor: Heaven and Earth, nature — entific methodology? [The destiny of and science, may pass away, if only — science is its inherent relativity: sci-

God’s word, if only ethics shall entific inquiry constitutes a self-cor-

remain. [Isaiah 40:6-8.] On the rective process, in which relative other hand, if ethics itself must truths are ever-changing.] Scylla and Charybdis 15. This accountability, which (See 15.) Scylla and Charybdis. On threatens to put the axe to the tree the one hand, the idea of the Good of ethical cognition, exposes the must gain the cognitive status of all idea of the Good as an idea, in ideas—which is that of a hypothesis. contradistinction to the Good asa_ On the other hand, defined as a hymere concept. It does not suffice pothesis, the Good becomes subject to collect the various aspects of to the self-corrective process that is

ethics as a conglomeration of the fate of all scientific hypotheses. separate concepts. The idea is not Cohen seeks to avert the relativism

a concept, or rather, it is not implied in this development by inmerely a concept. Ethics is troducing the term non-hypothesis charged with accountability. This in the next paragraph. Cohen, how-

rendering of account is predicat- ever, nonetheless insists upon the ed upon proper conceptual pro- — status of the Good as an idea. If the cedure, which is grounding itself. Good were conceived of as less than

We cannot help accepting that an idea, it would revert to being even the Good may gain recogni- mere (dogmatic) opinion or doction as and only as an idea. Who- _ trine, which is precisely the position ever demands more will gain less, of Aristotle in his critique of the ide-

since one would thereby deprive ality of the Good in Plato. In folethics of its cognitive value. Thus lowing Aristotle, one deprives the Plato’s doctrine of ideas is caught Platonic Good of its epistemological

in the dilemma of Scylla and __ status, turning the Good into a so-

Charybdis. cial doctrine of cultural agreements without a critical cognitive function.

Metalogic: The Good Is Prior to Thinking 16. A solution to this dilemma (See 16.) “Hypothesis” and “nonmay only be advanced by a_ hypothesis”. According to Cohen’s change of terminology, provided Logik, the term hypothesis serves

10 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES that such a change does not lead | as a steppingstone for the concept to distortion. At this crossroad, the | non-hypothesis. A hypothesis

Platonic idea has eminently | (4ypo meaning “under”) is thus an proven itself as hypothesis. The | underlying thesis; an-hypothesis idea in itself, however, without ref- | signifies a thesis that is “beyond”

erence to hypothesis, would not | the underlying thesis, one that is have provided Plato with a solu- | prior to rational deduction.” Intion, since the idea of the Good is, | troducing this Platonic, privative qua idea, no different from the | term xon-foundation into his own idea of likeness—just as, in fact, | Logik, Cohen creates the transcen-

all mathematical ideas (ta wan- | dental grounds for a knowledge watika) belong to ideas. The idea | that is prior to rational deduction. as such does not allow for any | Accordingly, Cohen reads the Platransformational flexibility. Hypo- | tonic Good as an idea that is prior thesis, however, lends itself to the | to rational deduction—an idea that experiment of conversion in con- | Plato himself terms an-hypothesis

tent: thus Plato converts the | or non-foundation. Cohen’s interhypothesis into a matter of non- | pretation of Plato translates the

hypothesis (avuto8eTov), or non- | privative proposition “the Good is foundation. [Plato 1980, Republic | a non-hypothesis” into a proposi-

507b, 2:107, 510b, 2:110-11, in | tion of origin: “the Good is the Shorey’s translation “a principle | origin of all ethical judgment.” The

that transcends assumption.”] commitment to the Good precedes one’s own reasoning. Cohen’s en-_ dental, epistemological function in-

tire interpretation of Maimonides herent in the concept of the Plafocuses, in a way, on the concept of tonic Good. Following Plato’s the Good as the origin of ethical equation of the knowledge of the

cognition. Cohen demonstrates Good with the highest form of that Maimonides’ theory of nega- knowledge, Cohen terms Maitive attributes and his concept of monides’ ideal of Knowing God Knowing God uphold the transcen- ethical.

Dogmatists and the Concept of the Absolute 17. Out of this predicament and (See 17.) Out of this predicament its attempted disentanglement emerged the Absolute. The Platonic

emerged the Unconditioned, the term non-foundation has been Absolute, which is employed to widely interpreted by religious dogthis day as the mainstay of dogma- _matists as the static concept of the

tism in its refutation of Idealism Absolute. Cohen’s own reading and the piecemeal of its human emphasizes the critical, regulative

SOCRATES AND PLATO i wits. The Absolute, however, is | function of the Platonic Good with itself in truth nothing but the out- | regard to all aspects of human life erowth of this defamed Idealism— | (ethical, political, or scientific), and

a product of conscientious, daring | rejects conceptions of the Good cerebration, demanding accounta- | whose ontologies are steeped in bility and rendering accountable, | mysticism. Cohen’s contemporary, thus creating, grounding, and | Paul Shorey, supports this reading: advancing toward conclusions, not

without examining the validity of To call the avuto8etov [anits premises and presuppositions hypothesis, non-foundation] all along. This is Idealism’s feat. the Unconditioned or the Absolute introduces metaphysi-

18. Indeed, even the Good may not cal associations foreign to the claim to exceed its status of idea, and passage.” hence of hypothesis. However, the

content of ethics distinguishes the The concept of the Absolute or Good as idea from anything in the | Unconditioned—illegitimately borheavens above and on earth below. | rowed from Plato—continues to By virtue of this axiological distinc- | play a central role in attempts by re-

tiveness, the Good deserves as | ligious dogmatists to defeat critical, hypothesis a preferential terminology. | non-foundational thinking. How-

Thus we may term the idea of the | ever, these defenders are unaware Good a_ sufficient hypothesis | that it was philosophy that produced (uKavov). [Plato 1982, Phaedo 1: 348; | and stipulated the concept of the Un-

1980, Republic 6:114n. c; Liddell | conditioned in the first place. and Scott 1968, txkavov 825a-b.]

Whereas the idea in general merits of wisdom; not as proclaimed by the predicate “reliability” (to Plato in the dithyrambic style at the AOdAAES THS uTTOVED EWS), the idea conclusion of his Philebus, but as the

of the Good may be defined as that grounding of ethical cognition. hypothesis which constitutes the Ethics is a mode of cognition. [Philetelos or end of reason, and thus plain- bus 67b, 399]

ly terminates the report of its

accountability. 20. Whereas all other scientific hypotheses are predicated upon 19. The idea of the Good must prior hypothetical propositions, the remain an hypothesis. Ethics does hypothesis of the Good constitutes not evolve from political constitu- ts own ultimate ground, closing the tions, nor from the impulse of human cycle of reason. The non-foundation

nature, as manifested in the growth must be considered the ultimate, of trees, or the beasts’ pursuit of fock-bottom ground of all groundenjoyment. The Good is a prophecy _ ing. Ethics is to be removed from

12 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES any relativism, even from that which evidence that ethics must be an is part and parcel of the methodolo- object of thought and cognition. The

gy of all scientific investigation. idea of ethics, in and of itself, con[BdR 36-38.] Having arrived at the — stitutes its own foundation, its own

idea of the Good, | am no longer grounding, its own accountability. It

justified in inquiring why and _ does not make sense to engage in wherefore there ought to be ethics in yet more retrogressive reduction to

the world, or whether such an ethi- find a root or provenance beyond cal world might exist. If reasoning is and behind ethics. The Good consti-

to maintain meaning and validity at tutes the foundation of the world. all, we have to admit on sufficient [Plato 1942, Timaeus 29e, 55.]

“This Man Is Inhuman”: Privations, Origins, and the Principle of Anticipation 21. In the light of more exacting | (See 21.) “Infinite Judgment” and scrutiny and conceptual analysis, | “Judgment of Origin”. Cohen’s we find that “hypothesis” takes the | logic of origin is based upon the role not of an ultimate destination | logical function of the “infinite and telos, but rather of a point of | judgment.”** Aristotle defines the origin and departure. Non-founda- | infinite judgment as a proposition tion turns out to be the origin of | in which the predicate of a formally grounding. In this prominent exam- | positive statement constitutes an ple, the significance of the “infinite | indefinite term—such as in the judgment” proves itself again to be | proposition “Reuven is ‘non-seethe judgment of origin. [LrE 79-93.] | ing,’ or ‘blind.’”*> Cohen specifies

that only those judgments ought to Cohen’s infinite or privative be called privative judgments judgments are affirmative proposiwhose formally positive predi- tions—they formulate an ideal pocate—blindness—denies a property sition precisely by means of a relathat truly ought to be present inthe tional privation. If a man is blind,

subject—namely sight—creating a he ought to be seeing. Cohen in-

mental attitude of anticipation vokes the negation-particle, pn, of (namely that this person ought to Democritus in its relational syntacbe endowed with sight).2° Cohen tical function as the precedent for speaks of infinite and privative this form of privation.7® The innojudgment interchangeably, imply- vation in Cohen’s reading of the ing that in both cases the prop- _ privative judgment lies in his inter-

erty negated by the predicate is pretation of it as an affirmative anticipated to be an attribute of proposition of origin, anticipating

the subject.77 and therewith positing that prop-

SOCRATES AND PLATO 13 erty which the privative proposi- in fact, follows this logic of anticipa-

tion denies to the subject. tion.*? Note that Cohen’s relational Let us take two examples in interpretation of the privative judgorder to clarify Cohen’s point: (a) ment, based upon the pre-Socratics, “this world is unjust” and (b) “this Plato and Aristotle, breaks with the man is inhuman.” The privative interpretation of the German Idealist wording of the predicative terms un-_ tradition. Kant’s example of “the

just and inhuman implies that the soul that is non-mortal” does not respective subjects—“this world,” propose that “the soul ought to be “this man”—lack the property de- mortal,” but rather affirms the exisnied in the predicates—‘“justice,” tence of the soul by excluding mor“humanity.” On the other hand, in- tality from its properties.°° The finite judgments like “this world is Kantian example gave way to an inunjust” or “this man is inhuman” terpretative history of the infinite create a horizon of expectation: in judgment, contrary to Cohen, as Sa-

judging the world unjust, we imply lomon Maimon, Hegel, and that the world, indeed, ought to be Schelling define the infinite judgjust; in judging this man to be inhu- ment as a proposition in which there man, we anticipate his humanity. exists no reasonable relationship beCohen’s entire theory of messianism, tween subject and predicate at all.?!

Motions of the Good 22. Hence, by employing the ter- (See 22.) Retrogressive and prominology of hypothesis, Plato com- gressive. Cohen’s differentiation

bines the problem of ethics and between backward and forward ethical certainty with the problem motions in this paragraph seems of paradigmatic or mathematical somewhat confusing, since the funcognition. Two points are important damental difference with respect to

here: (a) the Good constitutes an the idea of the Good in compariidea, just as mathematics consists son to other ideas refers both to its of ideas; and (b) the methodology _ origin and its telos. The meaning of retrogressive reduction [as of the statement that “the methodapplied to the idea of the Good] ology of forward motion applies differs radically from the methodol- equally to... all ideas” lies in ogy of other ideas. This difference Cohen’s claim that, formally

obtains only in the reductive speaking, all ideas represent reguprocess backward; the methodolo- lative limits to human cognition. sy of forward motion applies equal- On the other hand, the idea of the ly to the cognitive process of all Good is hypothetically excluded ideas. There is no other methodol- from the infinite process of scienogy for problems of ethics but that tific, conceptual deduction; thus,

14 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES implied in the idea of the Good qua | “retrogressively” (with respect to idea; only with respect to its retro- | its own grounding) the idea of the

gressive motion of rendering | Good distinguishes itself from any account for its hypothesis, does the | other idea.

ethical idea differ from the

accountability of other ideas. Here- my, and if we were to expect and

in lies the difference between demand to find them there. We

ethics and mathematics: insofar as | would deprive the Middle Ages of its the latter is based upon the logic of innermost intellectual and historical

ideation, it distinguishes ethics significance, if we were to assume from logic. The idea is shared by that Aristotle, foremost among ethics and logic; the idea of the epigons, ought to have understood Good separates ethics from logic. his teacher. Crediting Aristotle with such comprehension of the idea of

23. With this dichotomy, Plato Plato would mean forestalling its launches ethics as a science. The medieval evolution. Or are we to Socratic concept of the Good gave appreciate this evolution merely as no premonition of the ambiguity the outgrowth of Aristotelian inter-

that the idea of the Good would pretation? Whereas Plato far sursubsequently expose. There is no passes his generation and makes his reason to suppose that Plato’s con- contribution for all eternity, Aristotle temporaries, for their part, under- rises after him as the harbinger of the stood that within this apparent Middle Ages. Aristotle becomes the dichotomy of the Good-as-idea was apostle of an era that sought its purenveloped the innermost integrity pose not in the giving account of its and the most powerful harmony of own reasoning and cognition, but

the human spirit for the posterity of instead in the concept of an all mankind. It would mean skip- Absolute. The recognition of the for-

ping over medieval culture, howev- mation and significance of the er, if we should endeavor to look for Absolute as having derived from the precedents during the Renaissance hypothetical idea was, for medieval

and its enduring afterglow already in times, as unattainable as it was the teaching of the Platonic Acade- undesirable and unappealing.

Theoria and Praxis: Deconstruction of an Ancient Theme 24. Aristotle misinterprets, mocks the (See 24.) Aristotle scorns the PlaPlatonic idea and holds it in con- tonic idea. The interpretation of potempt; and not the least of such treat- litical history as the “struggle of

ment does he accord to the idea of human beings in the world for the Good. [Aristotle 1945, NE individual and social perfection” is 1096a, 17—27.] We may be justified predicated upon a Platonic pursuit in speculating that if he had properly of the Good, upon the commitment

SOCRATES AND PLATO 15 appreciated the idea of the Good, he | of society’s members to act upon might have come to understand the | the idea of Goodness, which, in theory of ideas in general. For that, | turn, is determined through an inhowever, he lacks not only Platonic | terpretative process of political reacapacity, but indeed is wanting even | soning.** Aristotle, to the contrary, in the caliber of a Socrates. His heart | considers ethics and politics to repis insensitive to the profound and | resent mere practical knowledge, in sublime problems of ethics, its chal- | contrast to metaphysical speculalenges, objectives, and aspirations. It | tion which he takes to be the highdoes not drive him, like a discoverer, | est form of human knowledge.°° to set out and explore a distant terra Cohen’s critique of Aristotle turns

incognita. He is not concerned | precisely on the latter’s distinction about mankind's future emerging, as | between theory and praxis,** beit were, from the Delphic omphalos | tween contemplation as the highest of the universe. For him, every future | Good and ethical practice. This is a is but the cyclic recurrence of the | distinction foreign to the active conpast and its ever-ascending, unex- | cept of ethical ideality assumed in celled wisdom. [“And so time is | Cohen’s critical philosophy. Cohen

regarded as the rotation of the | allows neither for proclamations of sphere. . . . And this is the reason of | pure theory nor for those of mere our habitual way of speaking; for we | praxis. Rather, he constructs truth as say that human affairs... seem to be | the correlation of ideality and social in a way circular, because all these | action, committing praxis to the pur-

things . . . have their beginning and | suit of the ideal, while demanding end as it were ‘periodically.’” Aristo- | the responsibility of theory in the tle 1980, Physics 223b, 425.] Aristo- | face of social misery.*° This destructle is oblivious to ethics as a problem | tion of Aristotle’s and Kant’s distincthat demands ever-innovative reju- | tion between theoretical and practi-

venation, new questions posed | cal reason is of central significance to unceasingly, and new challenges | Cohen’s entire interpretation of Maiyielded with every new solution. | monides. Historically speaking, this This Good, to him, is not an idea, as | gave a Platonic direction to Jewish the idea as such betokens to him, at | ethics, whose legacy—even among best, a poetic metaphor. And if to | Maimonides scholars—had been Aristotle the Platonic idea itself does | strongly Aristotelian. not warrant any scientific cognition,

certainly the idea of the Good can- 25. Perhaps we are doing injustice not serve any purpose in scientific to Aristotle. In his ethics, he presdiscussion. Ethical cognition is the ents a discourse that not only trantask of the statesman. For Aristotle, scends politics, but indeed reprethe ethicist as such is the politician. sents the very climax and objective There are no further human tasks in of his ethics, namely the pure the-

| Aristotelian ethics. ory of the philosopher, the theory

16 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES of eudaemonia. [Aristotle 1945, totelian logic, which in this context

NE 1177a-b, 613-191] means his metaphysics, to bear out that methodological sobriety and 26. This, however, displays one of the lucidity which characterizes, in many contradictions in Aristotle’s profound contradistinction, Plato’s philosophy: he establishes cognition discourse on his concept of ideas. as the aim of ethics, yet he refuses to In fact, none of Aristotle’s present-

recognize ethics as a science. If day admirers would disagree that, eudaemonia serves him as the foun- even in his Metaphysics, he dation of ethics, while, on the other remains a dualist. His argumentahand, eudaemonia is excluded from tion departs not only from percepall other civic activities, constituting tual and empirical notions, but no merely the object of contemplative less emphatically from ultimate pleasure and the gratification of cog- absolute principles conceived of as

, nitive study—why then does he not immediate propositions (apeca). arrive at the conclusion that it is cog- [d\ecov: an “immediate proposinition of ethics that constitutes the tion that cannot be proven syllogisobject of his eudaemonistic theory? _ tically.” Aristotle 1983a, 515.] In

Why does Aristotle insist that ethics this way, as he is wont to do does not enjoy the status of ascience, throughout, Aristotle adopts the such as mathematics, or—before previously rejected and misunderall—even metaphysics, the cognition stood Unconditional, transformed of Being as such? By what right may into a dogmatic application. We eudaemonia, if it is then the founda- wonder: To what purpose should tion of ethics, govern the realm of these absolute first principles, and cognition—when keeping the prob- hence, the principle of eudaemolem of ethical cognition at bay as nia, apply more urgently and more

inferior? immediately than to the very purpose of ethics, especially since they

27. We would miss the heart of the converge in the dynamic cause of matter, if we were to typify Aristotle an absolute purpose? [See paraas the sober logician and Plato as_ graph 26, this chapter.] Does not the religious cogitator. [As in Zeller this purpose of ethics constitute the 1955, 185.] Had this been the case, _ very purpose of all Being and of all

we ought to have expected Aris- thinking? Misreadings: The GoJ[o]d, the Ineffable Name, and Blumenberg’s Work on Myth 28. The interrelation between nature (See 28.) The Helios parable. In his and ethics never dawned upon Aris- Helios Parable, positing the idea of

totle. He remains ignorant of Plato’s the Good as foundation of all Helios Parable establishing the idea Being, Plato compares the sun—

SOCRATES AND PLATO 17 of the Good as the foundation of all that source of light which illumiBeing, and hence of cognition. [Plato nates and exposes all objects to our

1980, Republic 100-107. “This visual faculty—to the idea of the superhuman hyperbole is the source Good, that source of knowledge of all so-called negative theologies without which our intellectual facand transcendental metaphysics from —ulty would be shaded in darkness.

Philo and Plotinus to the present Subsequently, true knowledge day”; cf. Shorey 1980, xxix.] Aristo- (from eTLoTHLN, episteme) is based

tle’s Metaphysics fails to recognize upon knowing the Good, whereas

this interrelation. As a result of this knowledge composed of mere failure to correlate the ontological opinions which remain unrelated problem of nature with the teleologi- to the foundational Good possess cal problem of ethics, Aristotle comes no clarity.

to deny cognitive validity for ethics. Cohen’s interpretation of MaiThe target of his Metaphysics is the monides is based upon Cohen’s universe. All religious questions con- construction of a correlation becerning the whys and wherefores of | tween Plato’s idea of the Good and the terrestrial and supernatural world Maimonides’ theory of Knowing vacillate between physics and astron- God. Cohen’s reading thereby adomy, on the one hand, and ontology, vances a non-foundational (anti-

the cognition of Being “as such,” on fundamentalist) interpretation the other. Aristotle's ontology, how- which radicalizes the Jewish critical

ever, relates exclusively to the being tradition of negative theology, of nature. [Aristotle 1947, Meta- maintaining the absence of the Ab-

physics 1012b, 207; 1071b, solute while claiming the idea of

139-41.] the Good to be the foundation for

the ethical idealism prominent in 29. Plato, however, is dissatisfied Jewish tradition. Among contemwith this Aristotelian universe. His porary thinkers, Hans Blumenteleology does not reflect upon a_ _berg’s Work on Myth acknowldynamic cause, a concept inher- edges the characteristic endeavor of ently attached to mechanics. Pla- neo-Kantianism to make Plato the tonic teleology is viewed from the founder of its own critical tradition perspective of the Good beyond _ (invoking the authority of Paul NaBeing, the Good beyond the being torp in this context).°° Blumenof nature (eTeKeltva THs ovotas). berg, however, remains unaware of

[Plato 1980, Republic 509b, the critical bent of Cohen’s philos6:107; LrE 88; ErW 88; BdR37.] By ophy and the Platonic reading of

maintaining the interrelation Jewish literary sources suggested between Being and that which lies therein. Subsequently, Blumenbeyond—which are two realms, berg’s concept of Jewish monothedistinct but not disparate—Plato ism is one in which violence and postulates the cognitive approach jealousy prevails: —

18 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES to ethics with no less urgency than Only the God of monotheism, he does to logic. Aristotle, on the then, would be the God of contrary, could only disclaim the Feuerbach . . . because He is cognitive character of ethics, since like man... . His relationship

the interrelation of nature and to man has the character of

ethics did not present any problem the “narcissism of small difto him; for him, Being completes ferences,” where a jealous atitself within physical nature proper. tention is paid to dotting i’s What business does the Good have and crossing t’s. This relation-

with nature? Nature pursues its ship of “being made in the good on the basis of its own inher- image of... ” is recognizably ent principles, and, accordingly, it different from the beautiful operates within relative purposes anthropomorphousness of the of Being. [Aristotle’s causa finalis Olympian gods. In them there denotes an immanent teleology, is always a remainder of the

irrespective of the question of originally foreign element... whether the final cause involves a their taking on human form is conscious purpose or intention of a mere gesture of friendliness will, or whether it simply refers to [emphasis added].°’ the end toward which something

tends naturally to develop. Aristo- Blumenberg’s reading of the tle 1947, Metaphysics 1013a-b, Jewish God as an anthropomor211-15; 1044a-b, 417.] The ques- phic God and of the Greek gods as

tion of what constitutes the pur- gods of transcendence remains pose of nature as such, and the oblivious to the fact that there is a response to this question, namely Jewish critical tradition deriving its that it is ethics that constitutes the critique of ontology precisely from

telos of nature, both lie beyond the concept of a transcendental Aristotle’s ken. Herein we grasp Other, the presence of an absence,

the difference between meta- prominently exemplified by the

physics and ethics. God with the ineffable name. Thales: On Monotheism and Pantheism and a Note to the (Postmodern) Critics of Reason

30. This difference explains why (See 30.) On pantheism. Cohen Aristotle’s philosophy brought no reads Xenophanes as the beginsatisfaction even in the decadent ning of both scientific thinking

age of classical antiquity, and and pantheism.°* He therewith hence did not succeed in bringing hints at that irreducible panthethe philosophy of that age under istic element that operates in all its exclusive control. At the incep- scientific and philosophic quests

SOCRATES AND PLATO 1D tion of systematic speculation in | for unity—whether this unity is Greece, pantheism had already | postulated with respect to nature evolved. [SPhZ 1:7; RoR, 40-41; | or with respect to God. Even

RdV 47; also “Einheit oder | monotheism contains a hint of Einzigkeit Gottes,” JS 1:87-99.] It | pantheism, simply due to its alis significant that this development | lowance that God becomes an

was preceded by the seed of | object of thought. According to monotheism. Monotheism has | Cohen, monotheism proposes the preserved this nexus with panthe- | unity of God and man in ethical

ism throughout its history. | reasoning.°” Thus transcendence, Monotheism’s contact with pan- | or what was called “divine wis-

theism is rooted in the ethical | dom” in the Middle Ages, bemotif of teleology, hence it is poles | comes immanent to thinking. To

apart from the mere mechanistic | state this in Cohen’s words: character of Aristotelian utilitari- | “Revelation is the creation of anism. Consequently, pantheism | critical reasoning.”*° According can be overcome philosophically | to Cohen’s principle of origin, only when ethics dispenses with | transcendence and immanence—

pantheism’s teleology, or with | God and human beings, God’s those of its motifs which have | word and human knowledge— functioned as substitutes for teleol- | are relational positions in a logi-

ogy. It was not only Christianity | cally immanent correlation of that emerged in terms of specula- | opposites in which God and tion out of pantheism, in particular | human beings share the lawfulout of Philonic doctrines, finding | ness of ethical reasoning. its ever-recurring impetus for reju- When asked where the word of venation in this kind of specula- | God first originated, Cohen gives tion: even Judaism could not and | us the following answer:

would not altogether resist the temptation of pantheism’s sweet It is God himself who anpoison. Philo lacks independent nounced Himself to man... stature in his speculations, having not the human mind, not scibeen nurtured by the overwhelm- entific reasoning. It is the coning power of Hellenic thinking, cept of revelation in which

and therefore has no intimate prophetic Judaism itself boreffect on Jewish apologetics. ders on myth.*!

Myth is storytelling, and so is prophetic speech.** But speech revelation. Cohen claims that the that claims to contain the truth

very idea of the one, transcen- of God must mean more than dent God is grounded in an act of what it says. The purity of God, speech—namely in the act of God’s transcendence and alterity,

20 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES demands the task of exegesis, of uous, efforts of human will tointerpreting His word which—for ward the actualization of the God’s sake—must point beyond Good. In contradistinction to

itself. Hegel, Cohen’s sense of “limit”

Transcendence in Cohen’s sense does not limit the Absolute, as is thus a “limit-concept,” postu- Hegel is wont to claim in his crilated by thinking itself in order to tique of Kant.*? Rather, it ignites

point to that which is prior to the activity of thinking, providing thinking. In other words, tran- the grounds for a logic of anticiscendence—perfection, fullness of pation, in which thought is infitime—may be anticipated infini- nitely open toward that which is tesimally in ephemeral, yet contin- other than itself.

(In)Justice Done to Philo: Logos and the Irony of History Pantheism’s sweet poison in _ of totality or immanence as idolaphilonic doctrine. When Cohen trous and unethical, owes itself to speaks of pantheism emerging out Philonic doctrine. It is therefore of Philonic doctrines, he makes ref- ironic that, of all Jewish thinkers, erence in particular to Philo’s doc- Cohen accuses Philonic doctrine of trine of Logos that proved so influ- having betrayed the spirit of ethi-

ential to Christian theology, as cal monotheism.*® evident in the interpretative history Despite its transcendental bent, of John 1:1. Philonic doctrine ob- Philonic Logos has, ironically, lent tains its pantheistic reading, accord- _ itself hermeneutically to Christian ing to Harry A. Wolfson, primarily scholastic tradition. This fact, acwithin the context of Christian inter- | cording to Cohen, must be accredpretation.** According to Harry ited squarely to Philo, who played

A.Wolfson, however, it was none no explicit role in the medieval other than Philo who firmly estab- debates where Jews defended lished the doctrine of God’s tran- (Philo’s) doctrine of uniqueness

: scendence in his interpretation of and incorporeality against the the unique God as the “incorpo- Christian doctrine of the trinity.*/ real, indivisible, and ineffable one” Philo’s contribution to the formuwhose essence is beyond the reach lation of Jewish monotheism was

of concepts.* The rejection of fi- not recognized until the dawn of nite manifestations of the divine, Jewish Enlightenment and Zunz’s which unites Jewish rationalists Wissenschaft des Judentums, when throughout history, and which lies modern Jewish scholarship beat the bottom of Cohen’s impas- came interested in the historicity of

sioned critique of all philosophies Jewish sources.

SOCRATES AND PLATO 21 The Case of Shlomo ibn Gabirol 31. However, the stature within | (See 31.) Avencebrol, the Wandermedieval philosophy of Avence- | img Jew. Avencebrol, a linguistic

brol, the Wandering Jew Shlomo | corruption of the name ibn ibn Gabirol, presents quite a dif- | Gabirol, refers to Shlomo ibn ferent case. It is noteworthy, in | Gabirol, the eleventh-century Jewfact understandable, that traces of | ish poet. He became known in the his authorship of Fons Vitae (pA | non-Jewish world primarily for om) eventually fell into oblivion | his philosophical work Fountain among Jews and Christians alike. | of Life, whereas medieval Jewish We may attribute this not only to | thinkers cherished his Hebrew poits lack of biblical references, nor | etry, of which a poetic cosmology even to his audacity in teaching | is entitled The Royal Crown.*® the universal unity of matter and | His work Fountain of Life (Mekor form throughout the entire realm | Chayyim; Fons Vitae) lent itself of Being, [Heschel 1937, 68-77; | for over nine centuries to Christ1938, 89-111] but perhaps main- | ian interpretation, with no reader ly to his agenda of a metaphysics | even aware of its Jewish authorthat assigns no exhaustive func- | ship.*

tion to ethics as a subject for spec- As in the case of Philo, the ulation. For this is characteristic of | oblivion of Fountain of Life from

a life true to monotheism: that all | Jewish tradition results from its speculation breathlessly advances | Christian hermeneutical adopin its pursuit of ethics. Any heresy | tion. Ibn Gabirol interprets the may be absolved and even over- | concept of divine will in neo-Plalooked, as long as true teleology, | tonic fashion as an emanation the ethical convergence of nature | from the first essence—from God.

and mind is being sought and| The emanation of divine will, attained. The history of philosoph- | however, had been interpreted by

ical speculation in Judaism may | Christian readers of Fountain of be developed in the light of this | Life as the divine Logos. Cohen

proposition. holds ibn Gabirol responsible for such an immanent reading of di- _ strumental in an ontological the-

vine volition, since ibn Gabirol ory of creation claiming that interprets divine will in this work worldly matter and form were as an immanent link between generated from divine non-matter God, the first essence, and the and non-form.°! For the sake of world composed of matter and _ ethical reasoning, however, divine

form.°° Thus the concept of di- volition ought to remain indevine will becomes primarily in- pendent of any ontic state of af-

22 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES fairs. Cohen so emphasizes the lawfulness and its ethical postutranscendental character of divine lates excludes itself from the will in Jewish medieval tradition Jewish project of an_ ethical that any definition which fails to hermeneutics, or what Cohen represent divine will in terms of calls prophetic monotheism.

Maimonides A Radical Platonist Ethics, not Aristotelian metaphysics, according to Cohen, constitutes the

epitome of Maimonides’ thought. Knowledge of God is inextricably linked to the cognition of the Good, which, according to the last chapters of Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, corresponds to the cognition of “lovingkindness, justice, and true judgment.” In this second

chapter, Cohen investigates the relationship between ethical (autonomous) knowledge and religious tradition, between Written and Unwritten Law, reason and revelation. He discusses the question of what kind of response to the “Pauline polemic against the Law” emerges from Maimonides’ ethics.

Cohen’s Reading of Maimonides: Urtext for a | Contemporary Debate 32. There is no greater testimony to (See 32.) Maimonides: the most Maimonides as the most vital and genuine representative of Jewish most genuine representative of phi- philosophy. Cohen’s reading of losophy within Judaism than the fact traditional Jewish literature, and that his ethics constitutes the core of Maimonides, in particular, origand effective center of his meta- inates in a commitment prior to his

physics. It would be fallacious to understanding of any particular | assume that by this homage we _ text: Cohen trusts that traditional mean to imply that his metaphysics Jewish texts will lend themselves dissolves into disquisitions of moral- to a distinctly ethical reading. The ity, lacking the strict conceptuality of _ philosophical implications of the accepted metaphysical terminology; concepts of purity and holiness dethe first two parts of his Guide of the mand that ethics be paramount in

Perplexed clearly refute any such Judaism. And by “ethics” Cohen misapprehension. Here, neither the does not mean “morality” in its

24 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES speculative structure of. principles | manifold manifestations of practinor the astronomical underpinnings | cal wisdom,' but rather the formuof a cosmic edifice of reason is | lation of a theoretical maxim aimwanting. However, it is the third part | ing at a fundamental critique of of this oeuvre that dispels any doubt | social reality.

about the meaning and purpose of Systematically exploring a correwisdom: it is ethics. Even had he not | lation between the Platonic idea of

authored the Fight Chapters, we | the Good and the messianic vision would still be in possession of his | of the prophets,* Cohen’s reading of

ethical system in his concluding | Maimonides (and his theory of dichapters of the Guide; they form the | vine attributes) commits the great-

gravitational center of the entire | est authority of Jewish rabbinic exposition. [Maimonides Fight | thought to the cognitive pursuit of Chapters 1983b contains his intro- | ethics. Maimonides’ zeal in knowduction to the Mishna tractate of | ing God’s actional attributes—repAvoth, providing a general introduc- | resented in lovingkindness, justice,

tion to the theme of ethics. Mai- | and true judgment—represents to monides’ Aristotelian terminology in | Cohen what is genuinely humane in

the Eight Chapters led to the classi- | Judaism. As such, the ethical bent

cal Aristotelian reading of Mai- | in Maimonides’ thinking becomes monides’ ethics which Cohen | imperative for any reading of Jewopposes in this essay. See Rosin | ish literature.

1876, 6-7; as well as Gorfinkle in The Characteristics of Mai-

Maimonides 1912, 5.] monides’ Ethics—Urtext of a contemporary debate. Ever since Leo _ ness, as in Hartman’s Maimonides:

Strauss’s Philosophy and Law, a Torah and Philosophic Quest; or distinct tradition in contemporary MHarvey’s “Maimonides on Human Maimonidean scholarship inadver- Perfection.”* Classical expositions

tently adopted Cohen’s Platonic of Maimonides have stressed the turn.’ This is evident ina variety of Aristotelian character of his readings: whether we take ethics to thought, evident in such interpremean a commitment to political tations as those by Harry A. Wolftheory, as in Berman’s “The Politi- son, Isaac Husik, Julius Guttmann,

cal Interpretation of the Maxim”; Shlomo Pines, Marvin Fox, Coor to indicate human perfection, as __lette Sirat, and others. The transla-

in Kellner’s Maimonides on _ tion of Cohen’s philosophical essay Human Perfection; or to refer to “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimuthe transcendental ideal interms of nis” provides the Urtext for the halakic normativity, as in Twer- contemporary Platonic reading of sky’s Introduction to the Code of Jewish philosophy in general, and Maimonides; or in terms of acom- of Maimonides’ thought in particmitment to love and lovingkind- — ular.

MAIMONIDES 25 Finis Coronat Opus 33. Even as competent an expert on | (See 33.) The signatory seal. MaiJewish philosophy as Manuel Joél | monides employs the Arabic term

missed the great historical signifi- | Rbatma, corresponding to the cance of the magnificent climactic | Greek odpayts meaning seal, chapters of the Guide. His error | mark, signet, signature. Designatof judgment is characteristically | ing the concluding chapters of the

couched in these terms: “Mai- | Guide as khatma, Maimonides monides himself indicated that they | presents them as the conclusion in are but an appendix” (Joél 1876b, | the light of which the entire Guide 1:16); ry npoIn SoD wx... pan At | is to be understood. According to a IPN) TANT TT pTa IMEX Dw ma Sy | talmudic dictum, there is “a genmann mram> xox; [Guide 3:51, 618. | eral rule in such cases: hakol Cohen quotes the ibn Tibbon trans- | holekh achar hachitum—everylation; cf. Maimonides 1987b, 577; | thing is evaluated according to its

and also Kafih in Maimonides | conclusion.”°> Cohen would say 1972, 672.] Solomon Munk trans- | that every reading of the Guide lates “Le chapitre que nous allons | ought to originate in its concluding

produire maintenant najoute | chapters—“tchilath hamachshava aucun sujet nouveau. ... Il n’est en | vesof hama’ase” [any original idea quelque sorte qu'une conclusion.” | presents itself in the conclusion of [See Guide 3:51, 618.] The Hebrew | its exposition].® term mann by no means connotes

an appendix. On the contrary, it turn, one cannot properly assess refers rather to a conclusion which, Maimonides’ relation to Aristotle

even though it does not add any without understanding the relanew problem or subject matter, tionship between Aristotle and epitomizes all that has been dealt Plato differently than it is usually with in the foregoing discussions presented.) and chapters, which chapters actu-

ally serve only as a preparatory 34. An additional question presexposition for this deductive con- ents itself here. Maimonides clusion, focusing on the problem of _ teaches his ethics not only within

love of God, or ethics. Not only the various discourses of his according to its literal translation metaphysics, but even in his dogdoes the Hebrew term mmvnn denote matic magnum opus (Apin7 7). a signatory seal. (The background of | [Maimonides himself refers to his

this error is more profound and Code in Hebrew as Mishneh more general. Nobody can gain an Torah, meaning deuteronomy, a insight into the unique character of repetition of the law, a teaching Maimonides’ ethics while being of the law by means of oral tradiblocked by the insistence upon his tion. The Mishneh Torah has been

dependence on Aristotle. And, in traditionally transmitted under

26 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES the title Yad ha-Chazakah, possi- other kind?—compatible with

bly due to the audaciousness of ethical norms that seem to be the original title. See Twersky inherently religious, as they are 1980b, 105, 527.] But is philo- an integral part of religious docsophical ethics—and is there any _ trine?

Natural Law: The Law in Our Bones 35. This problem is aggravated by the (See 35.) The Unwritten Law. In nature of Jewish tradition, which, his Ethik des reinen Willens (Ethics

much more than Christianity or of pure will), Cohen refers to the Islam, is dominated and controlled uncritical metaphysical prejudice by laws of Scripture, and even more that presents the foundations of by laws of oral transmission, regulat- ethics as natural law, as a “law in ing in detail the ethical conduct of all our bones.”” Despite Cohen’s individual and social activity. It recognition of the unwritten law as would seem that in such an authori- the foundation of any positive legtarian system, there isno room leftfor islation, including that which in the autonomous exercise of ethical Jewish tradition is called revelajudgment, for moral law followed on _ tion, he views the tradition of natthe basis of pure principle. This prin- ural law with suspicion: like all un-

ciple of ethical judgment is conven- critical metaphysics, the tradition tionally accredited to the claim of the of natural law remains attached to Unwritten Law [aypados vowos. an empirical kind of naturalism, if

Philo 1937, 101, 435; Wolfson it does not result in a juridical sys1947, 1:188-94; Heinemann 1927, tem in which the written law fig149-72, esp. 155; Husik 1925, ures centrally.’ Cohen’s argument, 381-417], an ancient paradigm in fact, invokes the association of flexibly indeterminate to fit any Maimonides’ much-cited discushuman situation, and considered not sion of the Noachite laws that so to be predetermined to comply with tantalized the modern Jewish Enany legal formulation and formality. lightenment.? Paradoxically, howThe idea of living “under the yoke of ever, Maimonides’ claim that the the Law,” on the other hand, has performance of the Seven Noachite

served since the polemics of the Commandments by a non-Jew, Apostle Paul as the dominant allega- based upon mere individual reation with which to goad, tease, and soning, is inferior to their obserheckle Judaism; intended as a stigma, vance based upon the authority of it evokes the rebuttal: does not the the written law of Moses, seems to sacramental rite of the Eucharist in find support in Cohen’s own systhis sense exceed the danger of legal tematic, critical philosophy: Cohen ritualism attributed conventionally to demands that ethics, rather than

MAIMONIDES 27 Jewish law? To be sure, our reserva- leading us back to the natural, un-

tion related to the distinction written law, ought to motivate our between ethical judgment and ritual study of the positive, written law.’

, laws of religious worship remains. Even Philo’s doctrine of the UnHowever, the former doubt weighs written Law has been recently ineven more heavily: is ethics at all terpreted in this light—its generalcompatible with an ethical system ity and vagueness being contrasted based on religious service and on the _ to the “facticity” of the Jewish law

awe and love of God? in all its minutia.!!

The Law and the Eucharist: Pauline Polemics and a Kantian Misreading 36. Let us start our discussion with this (See 35.) Living under the “Yoke

former doubt. The consensus of pres- of the Law.” This polemic as ent-day Western culture sees in the Cohen understands it is predomiautonomy of the human mind the nantly reflected in Paul’s Epistles main argument against the divine to the Romans and Galatians.!? provenance of ethical judgment. This The reception of Paul’s criticism of charge should not be taken too seri- —_ a life under the “yoke of the Law” : ously, lest it lead one to the conclusion _ finds its traditional Protestant for-

of atheism. As long as we wish to find mulation in Luther’s polemic of autonomous ethics compatible with “pharisaic self-justification versus

belief in God, it follows that God’s divine grace,” a polemic whose relation to ethics can only be viewed = anti-Jewish attitude is still re-

as a problem of philosophical flected in some recent Lutheran methodology. For the sake of the gen- | commentaries.!? Daniel Boyarin’s

eral religious and religio-ethical con- A Radical Jew: Paul and the Polisciousness, we must not alienate God tics of Identity, to the contrary,

from ethics. What kind of a God presents Paul’s critique of the Law would it be to whom merely nature, from a Jewish perspective, interand in whom merely nature, would preting Paul as a Jewish cultural become manifest? Who would not — critic who, being “motivated by a explicitly and primarily heed the dis- _ hellenistic desire for the One,” adtinctions in so-called natureg Andifwe dresses the problem of “Jewish

want to place the human above all difference”—tthe problem of disbeings known to us, it must follow that crimination in the tradition of God would relate to this peculiar Jewish law.'4 human nature in a particular way. [For The sacramental rite of the EuCohen’s citations of Goethe in thisand charist exceeds the danger of the following paragraphs, see Wiede- legal ritualism. We find Cohen’s bach’s forthcoming critical edition.] critique of the Eucharist in his

28 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Religion of Reason: Out of the from the Law, slides back into an Sources of Judaism.’ Paul’s rejec- affirmation of human sacrifice, tion of Jewish law—especially as transferred to the divine realm. The

it predicts Lutheran readings— [Eucharist seems then to suggest not only targets so-called ritualis- precisely that “man ingests God,” tic law but rather aims at the very — signifying God’s self-abandonment

principle of lawfulness itself, and for the sake of man.!® Even when therewith fore and foremost at the interpreting the Old Covenant as a

principle of the Sittengesetz or christological adumbration (Jeremoral law. “Lutheran” Paul re- miah 31:30-33), Christian tradijects both, proclaiming Jesus to be _ tion, in principle, recognizes the va-

the vicarious performer of that lidity of Hebrew Scriptures. The same law whose applicability to Divine Law therefore cannot simthe Christian believer is sus- ply be dispensed with. It is transpended. The Law is fulfilled; the ferred vicariously to God himself fulfillment, however, is being allo- who atones for the absolution of cated exclusively to the realm of the individual with the sacrifice of the divine. In other words, Chris- the only human being who could tianity imposes upon Jesus the vi- truly keep the Law.

carious observance of the Law, The difference between Judaism and thus absolves the individual and Christianity, according to believer from that very obligation. Cohen, does not lie in their respec-

Cohen concludes that the one tive teachings about “the divine who absolves the believer in this gift of Grace,”!” as Lutheran tradiway from the yoke of the Law by _ tion teaches, but in the question of keeping it himself, acts, as a sacri- who bears the responsibility for

fice for the sake of the Law, on the commitment to the ethical God’s behest. Such divinely or- commandment. Jews have tradidained human sacrifice, however, tionally maintained that they cannot be reconciled with the Law themselves are responsible for in the first place. Jewish law, inthe keeping that commitment, and the name of divine volition, abolished question of divine grace is thereby human sacrifice long ago—an abo- kept separate from the question lition acclaimed by both Christians whether or not someone actually and Jews as a forward step in the keeps the Law to its letter. Accordevolution of humanitarian values. ing to oral tradition, there can be Ironically, divine will is resorted to no account of who in his pursuit of by Christian tradition to propagate the Divine Law is deserving or human sacrifice in order to abolish nondeserving of divine grace, as

the applicability of that very Law. grace, or rather “God’s lovCohen overtly alludes to the cir- ingkindness” (chessed), is precisely cumstance that Christianity, in its defined as that gift which comes

attempt to absolve its adherents utterly unexpected and unde-

MAIMONIDES 29 served.'8 Therefore, Cohen says oblivious to the fact that his own with respect to Jewish tradition, upholding of the idea of lawfulness

“No special sacrificial arrange- in the domain of practical reason ments involving God are necessary clashes with Kant’s own uncritical

for the forgiveness of sin.” !? adoption of the Pauline-Lutheran The doctrine of vicarious fulfill- polemic against Jewish law.

~ ment of the Law through the Son of God seems to suggest precisely God commands man, and what was rejected in Jewish oral man of his own free will takes tradition—namely, that there is a upon himself the “yoke of the need for someone to be faultless in Law.” The law remains a keeping with divine will in order to yoke. Even according to

function as mediator of divine Kant’s teaching, man does not grace. According to Cohen, it is in voluntarily commit himself to the Lutheran-Pauline context that the moral law, but has to subDivine Grace is predicated upon jugate himself to duty.*° the performance of the Law—if only in form of the vicarious con- Kant’s misreading of Jewish law

summation of the Law through as an authoritarian system superChrist. Cohen’s interpretation of imposed upon a passive, hetLaw and Grace turns the tradi- eronomous individual, according tional Christian reading of Paul’s to Cohen, has been sadly influencritique of the Law radically upon _ tial, as Kant’s judgment was central

its head, invoking the argument in molding modern Western concerning the undeserved nature thought and culture. Rosenzweig in of divine grace in the name of Jew- his introduction to Cohen’s Jiidis-

ish tradition against the core of che Schriften indicates the loss of Christian worship—the Eucharist. an important essay by Cohen critiThe entire philosophy of Kant, cizing Kant’s uncritical adoption of of course, maintains the validity of Protestant prejudices against Ju-

moral Law in its legal function. daism as a heteronomous reliKant, according to Cohen, remains gion.*!

The Good God Is Impotent: Pantheism’s Complaint 37. Nevertheless we wonder: what (See 37.) Pantheism always sucplace is occupied by the autonomy ceeds in stigmatizing the transcen-

of human reason, if we admit that dent God as an alien God. Panits most precious achievement, the theism—advocating the idea that

validity of ethics, is somehow God pervades all Being—stigmapredicated upon God? This ques- tizes the transcendent God as imtion remains valid even if God _ potent, claiming that such a God

were to function only as the remains alienated from human

30 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES guarantor of ethics warranting its | beings since God’s very transcencreative potentiality and perpetual | dence allegedly does not allow for validity in the face of all doubt. It | any relationship with the world. is this crevice in our contempla- | The philosophical position of such tion that at all times provides the | pantheism is reflected in the young

entrance for pantheism: as we | Hegel’s critique of Kant. Accordponder the question of how God | ing to Hegel, Kant’s postulate of and the world should be related, | the transcendent God who guaranpantheism always succeeds in stig- | tees justice in the moral world is

matizing the transcendent God as | merely an object of subjective an alien God whose effect is only | faith; God remains alienated from extraneous—although he is actu- | history, and as such powerless and ally the innermost moving cause— | unredeemed.*?7

as pantheism then proclaims. The defenders of dualist theolHowever, if we were to accept | ogy—such as Marcion and the pantheism’s notion of an immanent | Gnostics—on the other hand, conrelationship between God and the | vert the pantheist critique into posiworld, we would have to conclude | tive doctrine. There is the truly good that there is simply no God at all; | God, who does not mix with mat-

since God would then not only | ters of the world; and then the Crepervade the world, but lose himself | ator-God, the Jewish God, who due

in it, disintegrating and vanishing | to his entanglement and concern altogether. Dispense with ethics | with the world assumes the position and God's intimate involvement | of the evil demiurgus.?? Steven with it, and the concept of God for- | Schwarzschild disqualifies both in-

feits any claim to validity and | terpretations—that of pantheism as meaning. However, we can avert | well as that of a radical dualism—as

this impasse: the autonomy of | alien to the volitional character of human reason is neither annihilat- | Jewish thinking. Both interpretaed, nor even threatened, by the | tions visualize a transcendental Infilinkage between God and ethics. | nite in spatial terms rather defining Monotheism has always absorbed | it in terms of ethical volition, and pantheism to a certain extent, in | therewith as an infinite obligation, order to save and preserve the | as prevalent in the Jewish and neo-

autonomy of human reason | Kantian traditions.** despite the divine authorship of Dispense with ethics, and the

ethics. concept of God forfeits any claim. In his Religion of Reason, Cohen religion and ethics. Only

writes: where pantheism undermines

| the modern subconsciousness, There is no distinction in the skepticism with regard to the

Jewish consciousness between so-called existence of God is

MAIMONIDES 31 entertained, and one then tries Thus, ethics is anchored in the

~ to recover at least moral concept of the one, unique God, teaching from an insolvent Ju- whereas pantheism leaves us with

daism. This recovery is not mere morality—expedient social even sufficient for the popular behavior. Although Cohen later inmind; for the latter, also, is af- troduces a fundamental distinction

fected by the pantheistic between religion and ethics, this malaise. .. . Only pantheism distinction does not affect his reis responsible for the fact that jection of pantheism, developed

religion has crept into hiding prominently in his critique of behind moral teachings.*° Spinoza.”° The Doctrine of Free Will 38. The concept of free will serves to (See 38.) On free will. Cohen

safeguard against reaching this claims that even the traditional impasse. This indeterminacy may be presuppositions of medieval Jewfelt as a contradiction, or may even _ ish philosophy preserve autonomy

be challenged altogether. [Cohen of ethical will in the midst of their has reference to the Mutakallimun, metaphysical constructions. Disome of whom in their attempt to. vine knowledge and divine will, avoid the pitfalls of pantheism and according to the medieval theory to preserve the unimpaired autono- of attributes, are to be identical so my of divine will, went so far as to as to exclude plurality from the

deny human free will altogether. essence of God. Attributes of Wolfson 1976a, 605-12; Guttmann God?’s will, however, translate into

1882, 133.] We are bound to search “attributes of action,” which, in for a yet more fundamental principle turn, become ethical paradigms warranting our assumption of free- for human emulation: “As God is dom of will, a substratum without compassionate and gracious, you which the freedom of human voli- ought to be compassionate and tion would amount to a mere shal- gracious.”*” Emulation of God’s low thesis, denuded of any pristine actional attributes—“lovingkindvigor. Freedom of will always pre- ness, righteousness, and judgsupposes freedom of reason as its ment”2°’—is to be postulated as an vital ground and premise. The phi- act of free will in order to assume

losophy of religion has always any meaning at all. A midrashic championed freedom of will in tradition insists that the Torah order to safeguard the exercise of was given neither to animals, nor reason. Hence, God can no more to angels, but rather to human become into conflict with autonomous ings who are uniquely capable, as ethics than with human rationality well as fallible, of exercising free altogether. If we call into question will and rational judgment.?? Both

32 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES the compatibility of God’s omnis- | Cohen and Maimonides emphacience with human ethical autono- | size that without this fundamental my, we may as well doubt the valid- | human constitution of free voli-

ity of cognitive reasoning, of | tion, predicated upon an auscientific thinking, and of the | tonomous way of thinking, the methodical nature and resourceful- | commandment of knowing and ness of logic. Even with regard to | loving God would be void of any these supreme achievements of | significance.°° rational activity, we could have assumed that God directly controls If God had decreed that a perour rational judgments, inferences, son should be either righteous

and demonstrations. [Descartes or wicked, or if there were 1986, 15, on Deus malignus.] If, some force inherent in his nahowever, we are to believe that ture which irresistibly drew divine omniscience and omnipo- him to a particular course... . tence do not restrict the diversity What room would there be

and uniform method of the human for the whole of the Torah??! cognitive process, why should we then assume an embarrassing con- thus: “The ‘spirit’ refers to the flict between these divine character- human mind, the breath of ‘Shadistics and the autonomous method- dai’ to the spirit of holiness” (Ibn

ology and cogent purposefulness of Daud 1919, 58; 9207 wixa xT

human ethics? wapn mo oran tw mawn wir). [See also ibn Daud 1986, 143a, 160.

39. In this context, all classical ROR 87; RdV 101; also JS philosophers of Judaism refer to Job 3:176-96, esp. 180. Classical (32:8): “But truly, it is spiritin man, readings of Job 32:8 corroborate the breath of Shaddai gives them Cohen’s reading: Midrash Tankhureason” (Iw naw wuXd xT m7 7K ma 1964, Mikkets 9; Saadya 1970, nran). Abraham ibn Daud interprets 20, on Job 32:8; 1976, 244.]

The Concept of Correlation: God Is Other to the World 40. The correlation between God (See 40.) The correlation between and man in ethical reason consti- God and man. I am introducing tutes the pantheistic element with- the concept of correlation at this in monotheism. This ethical motif point as a referent for the indeter-

of pantheism did not escape the minate “das ist der Pantheismus

attention of Maimonides; he im Monotheismus” in Cohen’s adopted it in spite of his basic text, interpreting and specifying

aversion to intuitionism and mysti- “das ist” as the correlation of God

cism. He has no objection to and man in ethical cognition, in accepting the unity of reason, — the cognition of the Good, of lov-

MAIMONIDES 33 divine and human. [Guide 1:1, | ingkindness, and of justice. In Re23.) On the contrary, this unity lays | ligion of Reason Cohen says, “We the foundation for his theory of | establish the correlation of man

prophecy. [Guide 2: 7-14 32-48, | and God upon the theoretical 360-412: Maimonides 1992a, | grounds of reason. . . . Job ex143, 206-8.] Hence, the assertion | presses this relation even more of the autonomy of the human | specifically: ‘But truly, it is spirit in mind could not lead him astray in | man.’” Cohen holds that the tranhis proclamation of ethics as a way | scendence of God “precludes the

of serving God, or rather, as the | immanence of man and God. one and only way of serving God. | God’s transcendence, however, in-

cludes the immanence implied in Ethical reasoning constitutes the relationship between God and the pantheistic element within man.”22 Ethical cognition, there- monotheism. Cohen admits that fore, “does not signify identity, but there is a pantheistic element in the rather correlation; the concept of idea of correlation. We may under-

correlation indicates ‘identity’ stand this claim with reference to inasmuch as ‘correlation’ signifies Cohen’s logic of origin which pro-

‘cognition’: the serpent calls it vides us with a theory of relativity ‘identity’; our philosophical lan- for Maimonides’ ethics. In this the-

guage coined the term ‘correla- ory of relativity, God and human

tion.’”%? beings constitute relational posiCohen employs the term corre- tions in a logically immanent corlation consistently throughout his relation, a correlation constituted philosophical writings. It is in this by the accessibility of the divine

essay about Maimonides’ ethics, commandment to human underhowever, where Cohen specifically standing: introduces and develops the idea

of the ethical correlation between Thus reason lies at the root of God and man, claiming that Mai- the content of revelation. And monides’ interpretation of divine no objection should be raised attributes provides the theoretical against this proposition, since

grounds for such a concept.** the correlation of God and Cohen works his idea of correla- man, this correlation of the tion carefully through the various divine vis-a-vis the human stages of Maimonides’ theory of spirit, necessarily entails a knowing and emulating God, all kind of identity of logical rea-

the while drawing upon his own soning.?° logic of origin, and thus maintain-

ing an essential linkage between However, God’s transcendence his reading of Jewish sources and is posited as a limit-concept exer-

his philosophical method.°° cising a critical function on any

34 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES given socio-political context: duct.*! For the intellectually uniniCohen’s concept of Deus necnon tiated, so Maimonides maintains,

natura (God is other to the knowing God is therefore rightworld) demands tikkun olam (a_ fully termed mekkubaloth (tradimending of the world).2” God’s tional knowledge).4* Moses him-

postulated otherness invokes an self, the epitome of human ever-critical attitude with respect perfection, knows God in a sover-

to human reality. In order to eign way, independent of the dicmaintain this critical perspective, tates from worldly, sensory im-

Cohen contrasts his concept of ages.42 In this way Moses’ God to all forms of pantheism: sovereignty constitutes a paradigm Judaism proclaims the correla- for individual emulation, appealtion of God and man, whereas ing to the initiated, whose rational pantheism proclaims their iden- capacity provides the grounds for tity.°° (This correlation is “imma- such autonomous pursuit of divine

nent” only in the sense that its wisdom.** own imperative nature must be Ethics as the only and ultimate advocated by means of ethical purpose of divine serivce. | find it reasoning.) The concept of the important to remind the reader— transcendent God, according to even at the expense of repetitiousCohen, is not “given” to human ness—that Cohen’s definition of consciousness (gegeben), but _ ethics does not refer to any kind of rather postulated by reason itself practical morality but rather to the

as a task (aufgegeben).°? cognitive, normative interrelation The unity lays the foundation _ of ideality and reality, an interrela-

for his theory of prophecy. Ac- tion which is theologically termed cording to Maimonides, such Walking in God’s Ways, or, more unity of reason divine and human generally, Imitatio Dei. Ethics conis realized de facto only by Moses stitutes an epistemological func-

who represents the highest form tion rather than a practical guide

of knowing God, and whose for moral action. According to prophetic knowledge therefore Cohen, Maimonides defines the constitutes the authoritative teach- Torah and Jewish law through ing, the Torah.*? Cohen’s associa- their ethical function insofar as tion of Maimonides’ concept of they are instrumental in the ultiMosaic prophecy with lawfulness, mate human pursuit of Knowing ethics, and the Good provides the God, a knowledge that translates

srounds for Maimonides’ (other- into Walking in His Ways. For wise triumphalist) halakhic claim Maimonides, this knowing is that all humans are bound to ac- bound up with a theoretical underknowledge Mosaic tradition as the standing of divine negative and acauthoritative source of ethical con- _ tional attributes.*°

MAIMONIDES 35 Saadya on Sikhlioth and Shim‘ioth: A Dichotomy in Legal Thinking 41. Early on, Saadya had made a fun- | (See 41.) Radical commandments

damental distinction between the | and those of obedience. Sikhlioth laws of the Torah: Some are based on | (rational commandments) and rational truths (nvo>w) while others | shim‘ioth (traditional command-

require one to listen and obey | ments) are central to medieval (nrymw). A tendency toward such a | Jewish thought and its systematic

differentiation between the com- | critique of Jewish tradition. Both _mandments can be detected already | terms are derived from the Kalam,

in the Talmud [Sifra on Leviticus | and were introduced into Hebrew 18:4; TB Yoma 67b; Numbers 19:2 | by the Tibbon family in their and midrashic parallels; Heine- | translations of Jewish philosophimann 1993, 1:22-35]; and even | cal works written in Judeo-Arabic. though such a classification is not | The term sikhlioth refers to ra-

systematically developed there, the | tional laws whereas the term Sages made no attempt to homoge- | shim‘ioth is derived from the Henize these differences. Had they so | brew root *shm’, which in turn,

attempted, they would not have | has a threefold meaning—to persingled out the tractate of Avoth as | ceive sound acoustically; to underthe compendium for ethical guid- | stand the meaning of a sound; and

ance. to accept an utterance as binding, to commit oneself to what is being mandments that are spontasignified.4© The medieval term neously amenable to reason (such shim‘ioth can accordingly have as the injunctions against murder two connotations—to be in- and theft) and those whose rationformed by a voice, and to comply ale is hidden from human cogni-

out of discipline.4’ The different tion (such as the injunction readings and interpretations of the against wearing linen and wool term shim‘ioth are manifest in the woven together, or of consuming

variant translations into English, any combinations of meat and revealing the hermeneutical atti- milk).4? Maimonides insists, howtude of the respective translator.*® ever, upon the umity of the entire

Cohen constructs an affinity halakhic corpus: “All the Laws between Saadya’s distinction of havea rationale, though we ignore sikhlioth and shim‘ioth, on the _ the rationale of some of them.°°

one hand, and Maimonides’ ra- Thus Maimonides himself does tionalization of the divine teach- not employ the terminological dis-

ing (ta’ame ha-mitsvoth) on the tinction between sikhlioth and other. Maimonides does express a_ shim ‘ioth. He actually rejects this

distinction between those com-_ distinction, implicitly referring to

36 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Saadya, when claiming that “some All things considered, let us note of our later sages, who were infected that Cohen’s favorable exposition of

with the unsound principles of Saadya’s_ distinction between the Mutakallimun, called these sikhlioth and shim ‘ioth in this para[commandments amenable to rea- graph does not provide us with his

son| rational commandments ultimate word on the matter, espe[stkhlioth].”°! Instead, he adheres to cially since Saadya’s distinction in-

the biblical distinction between deed defeats the strategy of Cohen’s chukkim and mishpatim (Deuteron- own reading. The distinction beomy 4:8) or between chukkim and tween rational and traditional laws mitsvoth—a distinction Cohen ex- does a disservice to Cohen’s Platonic plicitly adopts and endorses: “Those reading of Maimonides. The unity of commandments whose purpose is_ the entire body of law must be as-

clear to the multitude are called sumed in order to argue for the ethimishpatim, and those whose pur-_ cal function of the Jewish law. The pose is not clear to the multitude are sages made no attempt to homogecalled chukkim.”*? In this sense, nize these differences. Cohen induces Maimonides classifies the entire an argumentum ex silentium which group of ethical laws (mishpatim) as cannot be conclusively validated. “social agreements by convention,” The Talmud, in fact, cites the disor “those commandments whose tinctions and divisions with regard utility is clear to the multitude” (me- to various groups of commandments

fursamoth).> Maimonides holds under the names of different authors that only few commandments are among the tannaim and amoraim. It truly muskaloth, “rational truths is true that the Sages did not deal derived from reason.” The most ob- systematically with these distincvious case of those is the first direc- tions, nor did they attempt to hotive commandment of Maimonides’ mogenize these differences. Cohen Book of Commandments (Sefer ha- concludes that the Talmud, by Mitzvot), demanding that all Jews means of silent consent, endorses

| “actively acknowledge that there is a fundamental value-distinction

God.”>* among the commandments.

Christian Liberation

Ritual Law and Its Abolishment: The Pitfalls of

42. Jewish tradition for the most (See 42.) “Ritual Law” and its part tends to ignore in practice any abolishment. Cohen suggests that discrimination between ethical and religious communities define themritual laws. This tendency may well selves either by common (pedahave been motivated by the need to gogical) practice or by common re-

MAIMONIDES 37 develop a defense mechanism _ ligious dogma. Thus, Jewish tradi-

against other religions which tion establishes specific directives exempted themselves from the and strictures concerning communal

bonds of Law, a law which extends practice, but the range of its its regimentation to every detail of hermeneutic activitiy remain unindividual and communal modes of bound by canonic dogma. Accordliving. Yet, by this very act of liber- ing to Cohen, Christian freedom

ation, they imposed upon them- from the “yoke of the Law” is atselves a stress of fiducial commit- tained at the price of a bondage no ments which reaches far more less heavy than the original one—a deeply, imposing an even more new bondage which imposes itself burdensome charge. Despite this on the individual by the very canonquandary of fiducial crisis, Chris- ization of religious truth. Rabbinic

tianity took advantage of its thinking, on the other hand, allows increasing political power to perse- for multiple ways of interpreting the

cute Judaism. As a means of self- tradition, as long as such interpredefense, Judaism saw its vindica- tive action relates itself to the litertion in the indiscriminate validation ary sources.° Cohen claims that of all laws, ritual and ethical, as the Jewish tradition is privileged in that

integral whole of Judaism. Chris- it constitutes a hermeneutical tianity had abrogated the laws of process of infinite creativity, whose the Old Covenant [Jeremiah — very designation as oral tradition in31:30-33] by establishing its own dicates the continuous enactment of ritual in a polemical transformation — the “living words of God”: and reinterpretation of Jewish tradi-

tion. Any denigration of the ritual The “oral teaching” is not a laws on the part of the Jews would finished product, but rather have meant recognition of Christian open-ended, one that always authority, exposing Judaism to its continues to be produced. The missionary influence. The historical book gets sealed; mouth and judgment regarding the validity of lips continue to speak.°° ritual laws, and regarding Jewish

persistence in validating them, Cohen’s reading draws from the seems ill-considered and self-right- traditional sources:

eous. The power of Christian dogma has proved effective not These words God spoke unto only with respect to the develop- all your assembly at the ment of prominent political move- mountain out of the midst of ments in world history but also by the fire, of the cloud, and of intermingling with cultural devel- the thick cloud, with a great opments, not the least of which is voice—kol gadol ve lo

philosophical speculation. yassaf.>’

38 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Onkelos translates: kol rav velo. chazak vekayam le’olam (for His passak (a great voice that did not voice continues to speak forever). cease), and Rashi comments: kolo

The Equal Validity of All Laws: Communal Ramifications

The emphasis put upon the valid- Maimonides himself illustrates ity of the entire corpus of rabbinic — the practical and communal rami-

legislation is to be understood in fications of this debate in a respon-

the context of pressure exerted sum addressing the question of upon the Jewish diaspora by mis- whether to listen to the public sionary activities of Christians en- reading of the Decalogue while dowed with political power. Mai- standing or sitting. In this responmonides’ “validation of all laws” sum he strictly advises against any is by no means indiscriminate; he special homage to be paid to the does distinguish between com- Decalogue, opposing the opinions mandments pertaining to a per- of Saadya and Nachmanides who

son’s traditional commitment, treat the Decalogue as a central such as tsitsith, tefillin, Shabbat, text, following the early Philonic and those relating to a person’s so- attempt to structure the entire cial commitments, such as injunc- body of commandments as ramifi-

tions against stealing, adultery, cations of the Decalogue.®? Maigroundless hatred, or bearing a monides recalls that the Sages had grudge.’®> Maimonides, however, abrogated an early custom during nonetheless stresses the equal va- the times of the Second Temple to

lidity of the entire body of rab- recite the Decalogue as part of the binic legislation. Maimonides in- daily public services precisely in terestingly relates the discussion protest against the Christian prefconcerning the “equal validity of erential treatment of the Deca-

the entire law” directly to the logue, as this “preferential treathermeneutical question of the ment” epitomized the Pauline “equal validity and indiscriminate abrogation of Jewish law in all its status of all scriptural passages.”°? detail.¢! It is in this context that Both claims, according to Cohen, Cohen evaluates the Jewish affirare directed against Christian can- mation of “the indiscriminate va-

onization of Scripture and its pref- lidity of all laws as an integral erential treatment of the most whole of Judaism”: prominent directives of Jewish leg-

islation—such as the Decalogue— The [equal validation of the]

at the expense of the validity of Jewish Law serves us as a lethe Law—that is, the text—as a gitimate means towards the

whole. isolation of Judaism... . Such

MAIMONIDES 39 isolation is undoubtedly nec- theism over against the two essary in order to preserve the other forms of monotheism

undiminished [messianic] [Christianity and Islam].° function of Jewish mono-

God Is Dying: The Bequeathing of a Testament Christianity had abrogated the and in Jewish identity, the etymolaws of the “old covenant”. In Je- logical superimposition of the remiah we read, “Behold, a time Greek term 6ta8ynkn upon the Heis coming—declares the Lord— _ brew term berith plays a central when I will make a new covenant role in the hermeneutical strategy

[berith| with the House of Israel of revoking the authority of the and the House of Judah.”®? The Old Covenant by reference to a Septuagint translation of this greater authority, namely that of passage applies the Greek term the 6ta8nkn (testament) of God Sta8nkn (testament, disposition himself. It takes the death of God of property by will) to the He- to bequeath mankind a new forbrew term berith, which, in turn, mulation of God’s will: invoking signifies a contract between living the d:a8nKn of the dying God espartners.°* Given the central sig- tablishes the christological claim

nificance that the concept of that in Christ the Law is no berith assumes in Jewish tradition longer binding.©

Signs and Holy Objects: The Polemic against the Eucharist Continues

After having abrogated the Law, in favor of an ethical reading Christianity established its own predicated upon the concept of ritual in a polemical transforma- purity—God’s_ purity demands

tion of Jewish tradition. Cohen that there be no sacralization of turns the Pauline polemic against immanence, of worldly things or Christianity itself, to the effect sacred objects. Cohen’s reading of that Paul’s critique of Jewish Maimonides thus emphasizes the statutory observance becomes a symbolic and educational characJewish polemic against Christian ter of the Halakhah, claiming that dogma and the Eucharist.°° At the there are no holy objects in Ju-

same time, Cohen takes the daism, and that not even a comPauline critique seriously even in mandment can be legitimately his own reading of Jewish sources. called holy: each rather serves as a

He deconstructs any dogmatic, sign (oth) attesting to a person’s statutory claim in Jewish tradition relationship to the divine. Thus,

40 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES tefillin or mezuzah are not holy tradition, according to Cohen and objects, but rather reminders of a Heschel, does not recognize the in-

prior commitment. herent holiness of religious objects. As such, the Jewish Pessach meal,

The entire ritual . . . presents the eating of the Pascal lamb toitself explicitly as a system of gether with bitter herbs and unsymbols, designated by the leavened bread, and the drinking technical term “sign” [oth] or of four cups of wine,°’ signify per“reminder” [zikkaron], im- sonal freedom from bondage—ex-

printing the ritual with the odus from Egypt—but not holy rit-

seal of spirituality.°” ual. Cohen’s polemic against the Eucharist charges the christologi-

Abraham Heschel echoes the cal interpretation with turning tenor of Cohen’s reading when these objects—wine, bread, and

maintaining that lamb—into “sacramental, ritual objects.” Jesus is the Pascal lamb.

Things may be instruments, Christ becomes the sacramental never objects of worship. object represented in the transubMatza [unleavened bread, stantiated host as hoc est corpus eaten on Passover], the shofar meum, and hoc est sanguine meo.

..., the lulav ... are not Cohen’s critique fails to take

things to be... paid homage into consideration the widely dito, but things to be used. vergent opinions among Catholics, Being instruments they have Lutherans, and Calvinists concern-

symbolic meaning, but they ing the question whether the Euare not primarily regarded as charist ought to be understood on[holy] symbols in themselves tologically or, in fact, rather

[emphasis added].°° symbolically.” (And we may observe that Cohen’s polemical typol-

Heschel, allying himself with ogy of Judaism and Christianity, Cohen’s polemic, contrasts the indeed, amounts to a triumphalist

functional character of religious inversion of the iconographic objects in the Jewish tradition with image of Church and Synagogue—

the ontological character of reli- one holding the light of truth, the gious objects in Christian theology, other blindfolded; one representin which the symbol itself—the ing a revolutionary mode of thinkCross, or the Grave—turns into a_ ing predicated upon openness for holy object of adoration and rever- alterity, the other characterized by

ence. (Heschel’s critique aims at the incarnation of what is holy, Christianity, but the adoration of and by proclamations of salvaholy objects—holy stones and holy _ tional history, leading toward qui-

graves—is, of course, abundant etism and the political justification among Jews.) In contrast, Jewish of the status quo.) But let us sug-

MAIMONIDES Al gest that Cohen’s anti-Christian works with fundamental ontolopolemic is primarily concerned gies. It is such an enchantment with the dangers of totalitarian with being—whether in Christian, thought patterns. Totalitarian Jewish, or Greek terms—against thinking invokes the holiness of which Cohen’s critique is forethings, proclaims holy history, mostly directed. Axiological Distinctions in the Torah 43. In the light of this strenuous situ- | (See 43.) Classical Jewish philoso-

ation it is a sign of audacity and | phy tends to make axiological disintegrity of religious conviction that | tinctions within the Torah. There throughout the entire Middle Ages | are multiple ways—terminologiclassical Jewish philosophy unchal- | cally and conceptually—in which lenged and unabatedly advocated to | medieval Jewish thinkers distinmake axiological distinctions within | guish between socially motivated the content of Torah. [RoR 351-52; | or rational commandments on the RdV 408-9; Kaufmann 1877, 105, | one hand, and divinely revealed or

109; Saadya 1976, 1-3, 138-47; | traditional ones on the other. Judah ha-Levi 1997, 7, 11; ibn Daud | Throughout, Cohen interprets 1986, 214a, 263; Bahya 1973, | sikblioth and shim‘ioth as rational 85-108.] No one stated this with | commandments, not versus tradisuch lucidity, firmness, and cogency | tional or disciplinary ones. He stu-

as the man who in his profound | diously avoids the attribute reinsight detected the grave danger | vealed (offenbart) with reference latent within the philosophical spec- | to shim'‘ioth in order not to suggest ulations of ibn Gabirol despite all the | an antithesis between ethical rea-

goodwill and admiration he felt | soning and revelation, the unity of. toward him personally. [Ibn Daud | which provides the conceptual 1967, 100, 102.] Abraham ibn Daud | basis for his entire reading of Jewdid not become intoxicated by the | ish literature. pantheistic concept of prime matter nor by any of the other seductive parts of the Torah are not all of equal

charms of neo-Platonic fantasy. Pro- value” (aw OD ox... ANT pon ceeding carefully and thoroughly as 7722 Ibn Daud 1919, 102.); [1986,

he is wont to pursue his studies in 214b, 263-64; also RoR 351-52; logic and metaphysics, he proves RdV 409; RoR 470.] The Torah is himself as lucid a rationalist in ethics, | rooted in faith. [Ibn Daud 1986,

and consequently also in dogmatics. 214a, 257 (see translator’s note He crowns his Exalted Faith with the here), 263.] Next in importance to proposition—not just as an aside, but the commandments regarding faith in its full significance cited, demon- are customs of universal conven-

strated, and reiterated: “The various tion, adopted by all people or

42 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES approximated by them. “However, praises: “The dogmas of universal

the commandments that are not concurrence unite the hearts dividrationally grounded, are of a very — ed, they constitute the conventional

inferior grade in comparison to agreement among the various those rooted in faith” (n77 ja ona ~~ nations. They unite people who oth-

axa mwon mma Ibn Daud 1909, erwise differ in their professions of 102.); [1986, 214b, 263-64; RoR faith, and who contradict each other 351-52; RdV 409.] Prior to this in their religious traditions, accusing statement, he bases his evaluation one another of lying, and holding of rational commandments on the — each other in contempt; the dogmas

historical conventional agreement of universal concurrence, in turn, [consensus gentium] among all peo- unite their reasoning as if incorpo-

ples concerning these command- rated within one state, within one ments. [Ibn Daud 1986, 214a, 263; body.” [Ibn Daud 1986, 172b—73a, 1919, 102.] Hence he contends that 204—5.] Therefore these universally

the rational commandments are accepted, and hence rational dogequivalent to the conventional ones mas are not subject to any change (MONA = nroow). Their distinction or moderation, or to any doubt. is merely a terminological variation [lbn Daud 1986, 173b, 205. Rem-

between logic and metaphysics. iniscent of Maimonides 1987a, [According to ibn Daud 1986, 172 chap. 8.] This then is the difference

a-b, 204: “The logicians call the between the rational precepts and

rational commandments ‘mefur- those that demand compliance samoth,’ the Mutakallimun call them and obedience (moaipaA = miprnw). ‘sikhlioth.’”| Those commandments _ [Ibn Daud 1919, 75. See Guttmann

that are universally accepted he 1879, 234.] ~ Ibn Daud: A Purist Critique of Neo-Platonism “Ibn Daud did not become intox- of emanation.’! Neo-Platonic cosicated by the pantheistic concept mology invokes hule as that stuff

of prime matter, nor by any of the of prime matter out of which other seductive charms of neo-Pla- everything automatically evolves

tonic fantasy.” Whereas ibn or emanates. The rabbinic Sages Gabirol at times identifies the con- object to such a thesis: “Those are cept of vAn (bule or prime matter) the heretics who say that the uni-

with divine will, jeopardizing the verse is an automaton.” The thetranscendental character of God’s ory of “cosmos as automaton” is will as conceived by most me-_ itself an Epicurean teaching ac-

dieval Jewish thinkers, Mai- cording to which the world moves monides’ older contemporary, automatically, uncared for by the Abraham ibn Daud, explicitly re- gods. Maimonides himself explicfutes any such neo-Platonic theory _ itly criticizes all cosmogenic theo-

MAIMONIDES 43 ries which involve the existence of mains—divine and worldly—indi-

prima materia (vAn).’”° cated by the hylic flow of the diAccording to Cohen, critical vine. Therefore Cohen must reject medieval Jewish thinkers reject neo-Platonic theories of immaneo-Platonic cosmology based nence on both theological and ethupon their radical objection to di- ical grounds, even though Maivine immanence. As such, their cri- monides at times invokes that tique reaches far beyond the ques- terminology: “Know that the true

tion of cosmology. Neo-Platonic reality and quiddity of prophecy cosmology in its theory of divine consists in its being an overflow overflow reiterates the “auto- overflowing from God.””

matic” transition between do-

Shim‘ioth and Consensus Gentium: Ibn Daud on Local and Universal Ways of Reasoning

The Torah is rooted in faith. Ac- ents ibn Daud as “the most imcording to ibn Daud, the Torah in- portant and most intimately recludes various kinds of command- lated predecessor of Maimonides’ ments—commandments that are ethical rationalism.”

not of equal value. Ibn Daud “The commandments that are stresses that “the basic principle not rationally grounded are of a and pillar of the Torah is faith.””° very inferior grade.” Cohen’s read-

Accordingly, the most important ing of those commandments that parts of the Torah are those expli- are “not rationally grounded” is cating Israel’s faith, followed by guided by Weil’s translation, conthose that teach ethical virtues.”° trasting shim‘ioth with those comIbn Daud’s classification of com- mandments which are “rooted in mandments formally adopts the faith.” Weil’s translation creates an classical Aristotelian exposition of antithesis between the nonrational, ethics, translating its definitions merely traditional, positivistic com-

of supreme happiness, ethical mandments, on the one hand, and virtues, economics, and politics the laws relating to the foundations into a traditional Jewish context.’’ —_ of Jewish faith, on the other.”® Such

By reference to ibn Daud’s saying an antithesis, however, might not be that “the parts of the Torah are not _ the best reading of ibn Daud’s text.

all of equal value,” Cohen con- According to one contemporary instructs an affinity between ibn terpretation, ibn Daud seems to be Daud and Maimonides’ ethical ra-_ interested in the integrity of the tionalism, dislocating ibn Daud Torah as a whole when suggesting from his Aristotelian context, and that even those laws referred to as positioning him within a Platonic shim‘ioth actually strengthen the tradition. In this way Cohen pres- Jewish faith:

44 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES That the reasons for them sequent equation of the consensus [for the commandments of gentium or mefursamoth with rasacrifices, for example] are tional laws (sikhblioth) results from

feeble does not mean that a conflation of two passages in they are unreasonable—on The Exalted Faith.** In one place, the contrary, Ibn Daud lists ibn Daud reports that some reli-

four reasons for them. gious rules are, in the language of [Rather, a feeble reason the logicians, “generally acknowlmeans] that the reasons [for edged” (mefursamoth). On the these commandments] are other hand, the Mutakallimun (lit-

psychologically less com- erally, masters of science) call pelling and less self-evident to those rules rational laws people outside of the faith (stkhlioth), such as community of Israel.” righteousness is good, injus-

The reasons for shim‘ioth may tice is evil, it is good to praise seem feeble because their rationale him who is good, and it is imis self-evident merely to the legacy proper to liken oneself to of Israel. Cohen, however, is hard one’s protector.®° put to accept such a claim, as Is-

rael represents to him the avant- From here we learn that “that garde of universal ethical reason- which is accepted by all” is “raing. Cohen obviously sees no tional.” In contrast, there are those danger or temptation in a totality directives that exercised by the demands of ethi-

cal reasoning. He can therefore in the language of the logisympathize with ibn Daud’s link- cians, are called “traditions” ing ethics to those commandments [mekubaloth], or, in the lanwhose rationale is obvious to all, guage of the Mutakallimun, even though such a reading pres- “revealed” [shim‘toth]. Examents ethics in a non-Platonic fash- ples include the observance of

ion—namely as consensus gen- Shabbat and the prohibition

tium. against eating pork.** Rational commandments are

equivalent to the conventional Since ibn Daud attributes a ones. The medieval Jewish term “feeble rationale” to these laws,®>

for consensus gentium is mefur- Cohen contrasts them with rasamoth.®° Ibn Daud, in particular, tional laws, those laws concerning defines the consensus gentium as which there is universal agreement.

those norms of conduct or com- An agreement by convention mandments concerning which “all that is postulated in terms of unithe nations agree.”8! Cohen’s sub- versal ethics is, of course, a com-

MAIMONIDES 45 pletely non-Platonic argument. eral consent, as Aristotle is wont to Consensus gentium means an opin- Claim. Ethics, rather, is knowledge ion generally held, a view express- of the highest kind. In his Ethik des ing public opinion.86 The Aris- reinen Willens, Cohen subsequently

totelian term for an opinion Criticizes any ethics based upon generally held is endoxa (evSoEa), general consensus; such an ethics is hence dogma.®’ Aristotle himself as arbitrary as the caprice of nature contrasts opinionated knowledge _ itself. Natural law is unreliable and with scientific or true knowledge. opportunistic; ethical knowledge is The latter represents the pursuit of not found in our bones.®’ Cohen’s

human perfection, which both reading of ibn Daud’s terminologiPlato and Aristotle refer to as epi- cal equation—“ethical, rational steme (emtoTHn), hence episte- laws” are those of “universal agreemology.*® Cohen’s entire critique of _ment”—accounts, however, for

the Aristotelian readings of Mai- Maimonides’ explicit adoption of monides, of course, turns precisely Aristotelian terminology when repon the point that ethical knowledge resenting the majority of the Ten

is not just an opinion generally Commandments as conventional held, a prudence based upon gen- laws, or mefursamoth.”°

44. In his distinction among the His quest for ethics.] In sacrifice, various commandments of the ibn Daud recognizes and assesses Torah, ibn Daud finally discusses _ the historical and intrinsic cause of

the archetype of ritual laws, the all ritualism. [RoR 173; RdV precepts of sacrifice. [Ibn Daud 200-201; Heinemann 1993, 74. 1986, 214b-15a, 263-64.] His Maimonides points to the educa-

evaluation of sacrifices invokes the tional value of the sacrifices as authority of Jeremiah, who incom-_ deterrents against idolatry. Guide bating sacrificial rites alleges God 3:32, 530, 3:46, 581-82.] to proclaim (7:22): “When | deliv-

ered your ancestors from Egypt, | 45. In ibn Daud we ought to rec-

did not speak with them or com- ognize the most important and mand them concerning holocausts most intimately related predecesor sacrifice.” [See the commentary sor of Maimonides. Their mutual of Kimchi 1878 on Jeremiah 7:22. aversion to neo-Platonic mysticism

Other biblical references have demonstrates their congeniality. been cited to this effect, such as | [Twersky 1980b, 384n. 73, 388n.

Samuel 15:22: Psalms 50:8, 80, points to the congeniality of 51:17-18; Isaiah 1:11-14; and these two thinkers’ unbending Micah 6:6-8, all expressly relating rationalism.] | Maimonides _ is God’s distaste for sacrifices with moved, first and foremost, with the

46 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES intellectual honesty and boldness regarding the various parts of the with which ibn Daud proceeds Torah. Yet it stands to reason that against the prejudice of equiva- his bearing this principle in mind lence accorded to all parts of the helped him to facilitate the enorTorah. It is perhaps for this reason mous organizational effort of sur-

that Maimonides does not quote veying perspicaciously the vast him. To be sure, Maimonides never volume of traditional material for

becomes articulate on this point. his magnum opus.

Yet undeniably it serves Maimonides as a propelling principle 46. Most of all, this principle of in all his life’s work that one must rational evaluation concurs with his discriminate axiologically among dogmatics. The rationale of the laws

the various contents of Torah. [fnyan ‘apy] is his supreme objec[Twersky 1980b, 276.] He never tive. [Heinemann 1993, 79-97; enunciates this principle explicitly Twersky 1980b, 374—-80.] The laws

lest he jeopardize the acceptance of disciplinary obedience, which of the nonphilosophical part of his are also termed traditional [M?apal, extensive systematic contribution were slated now to be validated on to Judaism. [Ha-Am 1905; Leo _ rational grounds as well. Inasmuch Strauss 1988.] It is not, as it were, as he posits a rationale for the comthat he lacks the sincerity or lucid- mandments, he summons them ity to assert this principle, but he before the tribunal of reason. Maifinds a formula that allows him to monides proves to be most intrepid take productive advantage of it, in issuing these summonses. Thus

and yet to avoid the pitfalls of he classifies the dogma of creation provocative exposition. It was his not among the rational, but among ambition to present in one uniform the traditional dogmas. [Guide corpus the entire scope of the Jew- 2:24, 326-27; 2:16, 293-94.] Maiish religion, its political, civil legis- _monides attempts to provide every

lation, its institutional and commu- one of the 613 commandments

nal regulations, as well as its with a rationale. [Guide 3:35-49, doctrines on creed and duty. 535-613.] In the few cases in which Beginning with the uniqueness and his method fails he expressly unity of God as his premise, [Mai- assumes personal, subjective short-

monides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth comings for it. It is obvious that Yesodei haTorah 1] he sets out to Maimonides’ evaluation of Jewish present the multiplicity of laws law is based entirely upon teleologcomprehensibly and plausibly ina ical grounds; the purpose of Jewish rationally structured system. [Twer- law derives from reason.

sky 1980b, 254-76.] In light of

such a project it would have 47. Critical reasoning reigns proven untenable to enunciate the supreme in Maimonides’ entire severe principle of nonparity discussion of both individual com-

MAIMONIDES 47 mandments and their classes; he ic problems. Therefore he was scrutinizes his sources with method- exceedingly cautious in attributing to

ical exactitude. Reason to Mai- reason any claim to truth for which monides means not merely the reason lacks the terminological and opposite of tradition and revelation. | methodological apparatus. His pene-

The two or more souls within this trating mind as a logician and his gigantic personality unfold before us: _ pure interest in the strictly scientific he was not just a philosopher of reli- pursuit of logic defy such attempts.

gious enlightenment and of the By virtue of the internal coherence of rationality of ethics, nor only a_ all disciplines within any given sysdialectician and systematizer of tal- tem of philosophy, the ethical conmudic discussions. He was at the tent of the religious problem reaps same time a pure logician of scientif- the benefit of logical precision.

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The Good beyond Being Ethico-Political Intricacies of a Medieval Debate In this third chapter, Cohen addresses the problem of the Aristotelian terminology in which mainstream medieval Jewish philosophy admittedly couches its ethics. Cohen demonstrates how the mechanical assumptions of Aristotelian cosmology and metaphysics and Aristotle’s

utilitarian understanding of the good are irreconcilable with Maimonides’ theory of knowing God. He thereby provides an “esoteric” reading of Maimonides, in which Aristotelian language is used to disguise the Platonic foundations of Maimonides’ theological position. Toward the end of this section, Cohen arrives at the heart of his argument,

providing the philosophical grounds for a new formulation of Maimonides’ theory concerning God’s actional attributes.

Cohen’s Founding of a Platonic Jewish Family 48. We had to preface our discus- (See 49.) “The generally assumed sion with these elaborate remarks, in doctrine.” Maimonides refers to order to establish the grounds for a Aristotle extensively throughout the critical investigation of the thesis Guide. He clearly adopts Aristotle’s which seems to be a guiding princi- metaphysical and scientific termiple of Maimonidean ethics: the laws nology and has thus been widely

of ethics are not rational laws and authoritatively interpreted as [nrSw], nor traditional laws, but are an Aristotelian thinker. There is an to be classified as those of conven- oblique but authoritative allusion tion, of general agreement (nma07DA). to Aristotle in the introduction to the Eight Chapters, and we find a

49. The generally assumed doc- most distinguishing remark on trine—that Maimonides has proven’ Aristotle in one of Maimonides’ himself in this central point to be an —_ letters—“Aristotle’s philosophy is epigone of Aristotle—fails to provide the supreme achievement of human

us with viable historical understand- thinking.”! All these factors taken ing. This assumption seems to have together account for the fact that

50 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES ignored how much it deprecates the Aristotelian readings of Maireligious idea and its inherent value monides’ ethics do prevail in for Maimonidean ethics. With due contemporary scholarship. Mairespect to the God of Aristotle, he is | monides’ ethics emerges therein as a

truly not the God of Israel. [Cohen masterful but philosophically rather

alludes here to Judah ha-Levi’s clas- uncreative attempt to integrate sical distinction between the God of Aristotelian philosophy with the the philosophers and the God of Jewish sources.’

Abraham; see Kuzari 1964, 4:16, Cohen’s innovative interpreta223. In Pascal and Kierkegaard this tion of Maimonides’ ethics, on the distinction attains a radically differ- other hand, situates Maimonides’

ent meaning; see Kodalle 1988, attitude toward history, Jewish 309-10.] It is well known, and we _ law, the doctrine of creation, and will have to investigate this painstak- eschatology, as well as social and ingly, how intimately ethics is relat- political theory within a _philoed in Maimonides to the doctrine of sophical context committed to

the unique God, who demands weaving the Platonic idea of the goodness. And ought this not to be Good into the fabric of Jewish trasufficiently decisive for the basic dition. Cohen is the first of a famquestion about the cognitive value ily of modern Jewish thinkers who of ethics? Should the mere mention makes the Platonic concept of the of the name God, or gods, in Aristo- Good beyond Being interact and tle have been sufficient for Mai- correspond with the concept of the monides to have been driven blind- Jewish God who demands justice

ly into the arms of this pagan and the Good. Cohen’s Platonic philosopher? We would discredit reading of Maimonides constitutes

the peculiar distinctiveness of the the beginning of a prominently concept of God in Jewish mono- ethical bent among modern and theism if we were to attribute to it contemporary Jewish thinkers who such insignificant influence regard- continue to read Jew-ish tradition

ing the fundamental problem of in the light of the Platonic Good

ethics as a science. and in opposition to any fundamental ontology. Such divergent 50. Let us clarify the respective ratio- thinkers as Franz Rosenzweig, Leo

nales of both Aristotle and Mai- Strauss, Steven Schwarzschild, and

monides for rejecting the strict Emmanuel Levinas develop their rationality of ethics. We are already own interpretations of Jewish trafamiliar with Aristotle’s animosity dition along the very lines of a Platoward the Platonic idea, toward the tonic reading. The ethical implica-

idea of the Good. [Aristotle 1945, tions of these interpretations, NE 1096a-1097a, 17-25; 1981, however, have nowhere been as Fudemian Ethics 1217b, 223-33.] To forcefully explicated as in this be sure, Aristotle really oughtto have original text, Cohen’s interpretaarrived at a different conclusion. We tion of Maimonides.

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 51 might say that it was precisely his logical sense, is derived trom rationantagonistic argumentation against al principles, why then is it not pos-

the Platonic idea that gave him sible to validate a metaphysics of away. If ideas as such possess no — ethics—just in order to shun the idea validity, then the idea of the Good of the Good? Does this rejection not must also be invalid. If, however, in imply the admission that without the spite of the invalidity of the idea, a idea of the Good there cannot be cognition, a metaphysics in the onto- any metaphysics of ethics?

Aristotle’s Ethics — Mere Practical Wisdom

51. The idea of the Good war- (See 51.) Aristotle turns into an rants the teleological interrelation opponent of ethics as science. Aris-

between nature and ethics. Due to totle divides human knowledge his principal opposition to the fun- into theoretical and practical wisdamental doctrine of the Good as dom, episteme and phronesis, a idea, Aristotle turns into an oppo-_ distinction he inherited from Plato. nent of ethics as science. Therefore Metaphysics, according to Aristohe champions the inferior status of tle, is the highest theoretical sciethics—ethics can only instruct us ence whereas ethics is mere practi-

about what is true “in rough out- cal wisdom.? It is this traditional line” (TayvAws Kat TUT). (Aristotle opposition between theory and [1945], NE 1094b, [1:3, 7].) He practice that is rejected in Cohen’s denies the cognitive value of ethics, anti-Aristotelian advancement of since he rejects the paradigmatic “ethics as first philosophy,” giving nature of the unique concept of the way to an ethical epistemology Good. Moreover, he refuses to rec- grounded in the original vision of ognize the Good as both the uni- the Good. Levinas picks up this form purpose of the entire human “epistemology of a vision” when situation and as an unalterable he proclaims that “ethics is an opguiding precept. Furthermore, as a__ tics.”* Cohen renews and upholds historical empiricist, he admits to the Platonic claim that ethics itself only a relative rating of the Good, constitutes a sublime and original

with respect to the various social form of theoretical wisdom, or classes and professions. We shall episteme.°

come to realize how an apparent Aristotle admits only a relative exception, which may be assumed rating of the Good. He denies that for his eudaemonia, only confirms there is any transcendental funchis principal opinion. Aristotle pro- tion of the concept of the Good.°®

claims that ethics does not come to The Good is used as a predicate teach “what virtue is, but rather defining skills that are relative to how we may become virtuous.” the utility of an object, or to a per(ETEL OUV TN TapOVOa TpayuaTELa son’s social class and profession—

ov Sewptas EveKa eoTW wotep at a good knife, a good business deal,

52 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES adAat (ov yap tv etSwpev TL eoTW | a good musician.’ In the context of NY apeTn oKeTTOVEPa, adAA wv | Aristotle’s ethics, which is an ethics ayasot yevope—a [étet ovdSev av | of practical wisdom concerned exEv ob€A0S avTns]) avayKatov eoTt | clusively with the performance of

Ta Tept Tas Tpatets TwS tpak- | practical virtues the significance of Teov avutas. [Aristotle] (1945), NE | the Good consequently refers to 1103b, 2:2 [75.]) It would be super- | questions of prudence and experifluous to emphasize that this edu- | ence only, without leading to any cational consideration should | cognition of a higher good.® hopefully not come into conflict with Socrates and Plato. Our main description and historical developconcern here, however, is this Aris- | ment, a sort of knowledge, in which totelian proclamation: the cognition assumption and probability prevail,

of the Good does not figure as an rather than certainty and demonobjective in ethics, nor does the — stration. [Aristotle 1945, NE 1141a

Good even constitute a cognitive and NE 1094b, 343, 7: “But these problem. Therefore, when he conceptions (the virtues of political defines ethical truth as being evi- science) involve much difference of dential, which he does not even do opinion and uncertainty, so that consistently, he distinguishes this they are sometimes believed to be kind of evidential truth from cogni- | mere conventions (SoKetv vow) to tion as such. Hence, he turns ethics have no real existence in the nature

into a matter of psychological — of things.”]

Against an Ethics of Mere Intentions: Aristotle vs. Kant Aristotle’s ethics teaches how we _ by rabbinic tradition, medieval Jewmay become virtuous. “For we are _ ish thinkers have adopted this princinot investigating the nature of virtue ple by coining the expression “7for the sake of knowing what it is, chok ha tov lehativ” (goodness ought but in order that we may become _ to be defined as doing good).”

good.”? Character disposition, ac- Cohen, in this case, adopts Ariscording to Aristotle, is predicated totle’s position. The principle that upon one’s actions, which, in turn, goodness demands actualization

are a result of habitual character figures prominently in Cohen’s training. Against Plato, Aristotle own critique of any ethics of pure claims that “the nature of goodness intentions. In a critical turn against demands actualization.”!° Aristotle’s Kant and his claim that “a good definition of goodness in terms of its will is not good because of what it concrete actualization was adopted effects . . . but only because of its

by Philo, the neo-Platonists, and volition,” and thus against an most mystical traditions, as well as__ ethics that values the purity of in-

by Patristic and Scholastic litera- tentions above all, Cohen defines ture.'' Transmitted in similar form ethical will as the “translation of

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 53 will into action.”!% Cohen explic- the ideational grounds for human itly credits Aristotle with having — social action.'!? Cohen thus incoremphasized the need for actualiz- _ porates Aristotle’s principle of ac-

ing the Good.!* But he invokes tualizing the Good into his PlaAristotle’s own concept of good- tonic reading of Maimonides’ ness for the sake of an even more epistemology and its emphasis on radical Platonic reading in which the emulation of actional, divine the Good beyond Being signifies attributes.

Aristotle’s Cosmogony and the Propagation of Evil 52. Would it behoove Maimonides (See 52.) Would it behoove Maito accept unreservedly the formula- monides? Whereas Maimonides

tions of Aristotle? Were this the seems to follow Aristotle unrecase, the significance of Mai- servedly in all matters of the nat| monides’ rationalism, which mani- ural sciences, his understanding of

fests itself in his pursuit of a divine wisdom employs a tranrationale for the respective com- scendental Platonic method. This mandments, would then be only of is true not only with respect to the historical and anthropological inter- doctrine of creation but in parest. To be sure, Maimonides at times ticular concerning Maimonides’ employs such an approach, but this ethical and educational rationali-

does not represent his main focus. zation of Jewish law. “EveryRather, his basic aspiration, thatthe- thing that Aristotle has said ology should culminate in ethics, about all that exists in the subluattests to his rationalism; likewise nar, physical world is indubitably

every stage of Maimonides’ dog- correct,” Maimonides writes. matics tends toward ethics. [RoR However, “what [Aristotle] says 310-11; RdV 361.] Maimonides’ about... some of the opinions acceptance of the Aristotelian regarding the divine. . . contain[s| approach toward ethics would thus grave incongruities and perversi-

undermine his rationalism. Such an ties that... propagate evil, and ethics would then mainly consist that he cannot demonstrate.”!®

of historical or anthropological Although the context of the clarifications, such as inthe case of quoted passage refers specifically

Maimonides’ exposition of the to the question of creation, MaiSabians. [Guide 3:29, 514-22, monides formulates his reservaesp. 518.] The difference between tions toward Aristotle’s costhe Aristotelian and Maimonidean mogony on ethical grounds. He approach lies consistently, and in claims that any theoretical specuevery respect, in the significance of lation about the origin of the Maimonides’ concept of God for his |» world, which ignores the question

theology and also, as must be of the world’s purpose, amounts

assumed, for his ethics. to “propagating evil.” !”

54 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES On Historical Method: Pagan Practices and the Pedagogy of Torah

Maimonides, as in the case of pedagogical rationale of his own the Sabians, sometimes employs a_ reading of Torah, which is in direct historico-anthropological approach opposition to pagan practices.

toward Jewish law. Maimonides takes the Sabian practices of idolatry The Torah may be viewed as his historical point of departure historically as a pedagogicfor mapping out a universal rational- therapeutic instrument which ization of all of the commandments: uses a shaded spectrum of devices to uproot all vested or

The meaning of many of the vestigial pagan beliefs and

laws became clear to me... practices. The Torah conthrough my study of the doc- sciously and energetically

trines, ... practices, and cult confronted Sabianism and

of the Sabians. .. . The with wisdom and cunning

knowledge of these opinions eradicated it.*° and practices is a very impor-

tant chapter in the exposition For Cohen, pagan practice signiof the reasons for the com- fies the very epitome of evil, exem-

mandments.!® plified by the sacrifice of children to Moloch, the local Ammonite god Maimonides claims to have _ (Leviticus 18:21). The eradication studied every literary work avail- of idolatrous practices, to Cohen, able on astrology and other pagan amounts to the eradication of evil: worship, and that these historical studies have in fact helped him to Idol-worship must be eradigain a clearer understanding of the cated by all means... . there commandments and their causes.!” ought to be no pity and no According to Cohen, Maimonides consideration when it comes to

adopts this historical method pagan practices. True worship merely in order to demonstrate the of God uproots all quietism.7!

An Unbridgeable Gap: Maimonides and Aristotle on Knowing God The difference between the Aris- lite of the intellect, demands active

totelian and Maimodean ap- human emulation of God’s actional proaches. Maimonides’ doctrine of attributes. Cohen stresses that such Imitatio Dei, or Walking in God’s a concept clashes with Aristotelian Ways, figures centrally in Cohen’s metaphysics, according to which reading. Maimonides’ concept of knowledge of God aspires to an emKnowing God, while idealizing a ulation of the self-sufficiency of the

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 53 Active Intellect, predicated upon conflict with Maimonides’ demand God’s mere self-contemplation.** that such a contemplative life ought

According to Cohen, Aristotle’s to result in “ways of lovingkindideal of Knowing God stands in ness, justice, and true judgment.”25

Ma’asseh Bereshith and Ma’asseh Merkavabh: A Paradigm Shift

in Matters of Creation

53. To be sure, it may be argued | (See 53.) In Maimonides’ termithat Aristotle too teaches a concept | zology, metaphysics is called the of God in his Metaphysics—a con- | “science of the divine.” Cohen at-

cept of God that could then dis- | tests to the fact that the terminolpense with an ethics that is based | ogy of Maimonides’ metaphysics on assumption and probability. | is clearly borrowed from Aristotle. Thus Maimonides terms meta- | In his definition of metaphysics, physics the “science of the divine” | Maimonides adopts a distinctly (Mr-MoOX mn), meaning that God is | Aristotelian formulation. Aristotle the object of science. This analogy, | claims that there are three speculahowever, is purely extraneous; yet | tive sciences—mathematics, physics, it allows us to note the following | and theology. Theology, the divine

true distinction: Maimonides’ con- | science, is the most perfect and

cept of God would have been | most “honorable,” since it deals identical with the God of Aristotle, | with the most honorable Being—

had His inclusion in metaphysics | namely with “that which exists been predicated on His exclusion | separately and is immovable.”7*

from ethics. Maimonides uses this definition almost verbatim in Milloth ha-Hig- and talmudic distinction of gayon: theology or metaphysics ma’asseh bereshith and ma’asseh (hachokhma ha-elohit) is that merkavah.*®© Ma’asseh bereshith

speculative science which con-_ refers to the natural sciences, cerns itself with the study of all whereas ma’asseh merkavah rethat transcends matter—such as lates to matters concerned with di-

the deity, pure intellects, or the vine science. When dealing with question of intelligences, as wellas divine matters in a strictly rabwith questions concerning the ulti- binic context, Maimonides, how-

mate causes of Being.*° ever, avoids Aristotelian terminolMaimonides goes further and ogy*’—a fact that may indicate a applies the Aristotelian distinction rejection of then-popular Aris-

between physics or natural sci- totelian metaphysics. As such, ences, on the one hand, and divine Maimonides reiterates and empha-

sclence or metaphysics, on the sizes the talmudic admonition that other, to the traditional mishnaic ma’asseh merkavah ought not to

56 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES be taught publicly, “not even Cohen claims that precisely when to a single student.” Further, a Maimonides’ terminology seems to teacher may relate “hints and merge with Aristotle’s to the greatest hidden allusions” concerning di- degree—namely at the point where vine knowledge only to students Maimonides defines the essence of who are already initiated and _ divine wisdom—Maimonides’ own who understand by themselves.7® thinking shifts toward the ethical Maimonides mentions fewer re- and, hence, farthest from Aristotle.

strictions when discussing the This shift of paradigm is most evipublic teaching of matters per- dent in Maimonides’ much-cited

taining to ma’asseh bereshith.*? Aristotelian definition of the Note, however, that Maimonides “fourth wisdom,” consisting “in the nowhere mentions the doctrine acquisition of the rational virtues .. .

of creation in the context of of true opinions concerning the dima’asseh bereshith—a fact that vine things.”°° This teaching assupports Cohen’s transcendental sumes a Platonic bent when examreading of creation, elevating the ined in the context of Maimonides’

doctrine of creation from the doctrine of Knowing God’s Goodrealm of natural sciences to that ness, and of emulating this goodness

of ethics. by Walking in God’s Ways.

Messianic Projections of the Good: Futurity as Origin 54. In fact, the very opposite is true. (See 54.) Without the concept of

Since for Maimonides no ethics is God, no ethics is possible. The possible without the concept of conceptual relationship between God—we shall see how he formu- God and ethics figures centrally in lates this interrelation as the foun- Cohen’s Ethik der reinen Willens dation of his ethics—he can afford (Ethics of pure will). Ethical pro-

to employ the term universally jections of the Good—in Maiaccepted, or conventional not in the monides’ terms Knowing God or strict and exacting sense. He knows the ideal of human perfection, in

that as long as the interrelation Cohen’s terms the messianic ideal between God and ethics is warrant- of humanity—become incentives

ed, the interrelationship between for human action. Inasmuch as ethics and reason is safeguarded as__ these concepts are conceived of in well. Besides, ibn Daud had already futuric terms, human acts of goodpromoted the proximity of the two _ ness are anchored in the futurity of

concepts to the mode of identity. redemption. In other words, [lbn Daud 1986, 204.] When Mai- Knowing God—knowing what a monides first introduces the term redeemed world would look like conventional [prove] in his Guide, and how the ways of lovingkind-

he conceives of Good and Evil ness and justice translate into

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 57 (Good and Bad) as equivalent to | human action—constitutes the oriBeautiful and Ugly [Guide 1:2, 25. | gin of ethical will. In traditional By use of the terms na’eh and | terms, ethics originates with the di-

meguneh, Maimonides initially | vine promise of redemption, eninvokes an aesthetic judgment con- | trusting human beings with the cerning all modes of social action in | task of paving the way for the mes-

terms of their being “approved” or | sianic future. “disapproved.”]: this usage demonstrates how little attention he pays monides 1987b, chap. 8, self-evident

in this instance to the specifically propositions that are based upon ethical significance of the Good. conventional agreement are distinct The same applies even to his dis- from those propositions representing cussion of this term in his Terminol- — sikhlioth, or rational truths.] Therefore ogy of Logic (ram mon), wherein it — the term conventional does not stand

is explained as one of the four in polar opposition to rational truths, classes of propositions that are self- since like them it signifies a proposievident. [Note that in terms of Mai- _ tion that is self-evident.

Saadya’s Dogmatism: More on Sikblioth and Shim‘ioth 55. However, we may better eluci- (See 55.) The dogmatism that date this issue by analyzing the “seemed to have been sanctioned .. . author’s general disposition rather in such a seemingly harmless fash-

than through such terminological ion.” Cohen claims that Saadya’s considerations. Maimonides, in differentiation between sikhlioth any case, did not borrow the term — and shim ‘ioth sanctions dogmatism.

conventional directly from Aristo- Characterizing some laws as ra- | tle, but had rather found it in the tional and subjecting others to

frisky polemics of ibn Daud. the authority of mere tradition [1986, 214.] It was this parameter amounts to a dogmatic fixation. If

of consensus gentium that made not for this dogmatic distinction, possible the sharpest distinction the traditional laws (shim ‘ioth) between the two kinds of com- would lend themselves to the same mandments in the Torah. More- process of innovative, “rational” in-

over, Saadya on his part had terpretation and commentary that already divided the Torah into laws characterizes all other parts of Jew-

of reason and laws of tradition. ish tradition. Furthermore, those (1976, 137-47] This differentiation commandments called _ rational was well meant; even ibn Daud (sikhlioth) are, of course, themselves maintained this good intention, as part of tradition.°! Maimonides, did Maimonides himself and all therefore, cautions against Saadya’s others before him and after him. distinction, proposing an integrated Yet this good intention must have rationale for all commandments

58 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES irritated Maimonides on account | (¢@’ame ha-mitsvoth) thereby adof his scientific, methodological | vancing a unified purpose for the exactitude and conscientiousness; | entire Halakhah.** Cohen’s intuitive

and this dogmatism, which | suggestion that Maimonides could

seemed to have been sanctioned | not have endorsed a two-tiered raand nurtured in such a seemingly | tionale for the commandments (“it

harmless fashion, must have | must have irritated, . . . must have

scared his rationalism. scared” Maimonides) corresponds with Cohen’s own interpretation of lam” [the entire Torah was given for the Law as that way of reasoning one purpose only: to create peace in

which ethically integrates reality the world], says Maimonides in the and ideality, the world with its end of Hilkhoth Channukka. “Reli-

human purpose: “kol hatorah gion,” Cohen says, “is the logic of [kula] nitna la’asoth shalom ba’o- purpose.”*°

Infinity and Totality 56. To be sure, the danger of dog- (See 56.) To adore the present realmatism looms also for ethical laws ity as reasonable. This immanen-

in the civic domain. In jurispru- tism of reason was audaciously dence and statecraft, people are proposed by Hegel in his Elements only too ready to grant sovereign- of the Philosophy of Right. ty to reason, to worship the prevalent reality as reasonable. But Mai- Everything real is reasonable,

monides, in turn, does not even and everything reasonable is

recognize the dogma of Creation real. as a fundamental precept of faith. [Alles was wirklich ist, ist Would it have served him in good verniinftig, und alles was stead to ratify creation as a ration- verniinftig ist, ist wirklich. ]°4

al truth? On this topic he could

conveniently invoke the authority We may say that Cohen’s exposiof Aristotle which went unchal- tion of Judaism as ethical monothelenged in his time, in the same ism advances a philosophical, social, way as he did, in fact, make use of and political protest against the alSaadya’s rationale for laws con- leged equivalence of reason and real-

cerning incestuous relations ity. He charges that this linking of which proved expedient in settling reason and reality leads to a reacthe question of whether these laws _ tionary sanctioning of the status quo

should be included among those and thus to political quietism. Based

universally accepted. upon the idea that God is other to

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 59 the world, Cohen appeals to Jewish idolatry when translated into the traditionalists to remain “absolutely socio-political context constitutes a critical” of the social and political hermeneutical extension of Cohen’s status quo. According to Steven epistemological method of origin, Schwarzschild, most passionate Co- invoking a meaning of infinity that henian among the American neo-_ deviates sharply from that of Hegel. Kantians, Jewish critical reasoning is While Hegel conceives of infinity as

called upon to oppose itself to any that totality which includes all di-

teaching of immanence that pro- alectical movement within itself claims what is real to be ideal.*° while being at rest as a whole, With Schwarzschild, we may Cohen’s conception of infinity conread Cohen’s reference to “the dan-__ceives of the infinite as “alterity,” as ger of dogmatism... inthe civic do- a limit-concept generating a radical main” within the wider context of a_ critique of the totality of Being.*’

fundamental critique of idolatry: a From Cohen’s perspective, the philosophy of identity which en- Hegelian idea of the infinite as an dows reality with the status of ab- all-inclusive totality which is itself at solute being inevitably results in the rest represents the prime philosophworship of power.*© The critique of ical example of idolatry.°°

Ontology and Ethics: On Creatio ex Nibilo, an Esoteric Reading Maimonides does not recognize upon the idea of redemption as rethe dogma of Creation as a funda-_ vealed by prophetic tradition. mental precept of faith. Cohen Scripture’s proclamation of Crereads Creation in the light of the ation amounts to the establish-

prophetic promise of humanity; ment of the purpose of Being. Creation means to bring about Cohen inverts the temporal order that promise. As in Rosenzweig’s of Creation for the sake of an eth-

Star of Redemption, Creation is ical order: it is messianism, the thus understood in the light of ideal of redemption—defined in prophetic speech, and in the light terms of “lovingkindness, justice, of a future kingdom. The doctrine and true judgment”—which conof Creation is thereby committed _ stitutes the original grounds of to an ethical reading, separating Creation. Ethics, in Cohen’s readthe idea of Creation from its onto- ing of traditional Jewish doctrine logical roots in cosmogony. The _ of Creation, is prior to ontology in dogma of Creation—its claim that that any knowledge of the world, God created the world for a pur- or of Being, is predicated upon the pose—constitutes human responsi- knowledge of the Good (true bility toward the world, a respon- Being), reminiscent of the much-

sibility that is itself predicated cited commentary of Rashi on

60 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Genesis 1:1: “The creation narra- dealing with the scientific validity tive does not come to teach us the of any ontological or temporal acchronological order of creation,” count of the world’s actual beginbut rather its [ethical] purpose.>? ning. The traditional claim of Cre-

When emphasizing that Mai- ation expresses itself in ethical monides initially did not count the terms, hinging upon the belief that Creation dogma among the thirteen the world lends itself to a process

principles of faith,4? Cohen in- of tikkun or repair, independent of evitably refers to a mere cosmogeni-_ the various claims of science, as-

cal, ontological concept of Creation. tronomy, cosmogony, or astroIt is enlightening to note that when _ physics in the context of which the

Maimonides finally did add the question of Creation is traditiondogma of Creation to his Thirteen ally discussed. In this respect, Principles of Faith, he did so in the Maimonides could “conveniently context of the fourth principle, that invoke the authority of Aristotle,”

“the Creator is the first and the since he agrees that, ontologically last.” Maimonides claims that God’s__ or scientifically speaking, Creatio Being is absolutely prior to all ontic ex Nihilo is disputable.*> Cohen’s

being (“God’s existence is prior to “esoteric” reading of Creatio ex everything that exists”) including the Nihilo, maintaining the priority of becoming of the world.*! For Mai- the ethical order of Creation over

monides, as for any medieval reli- the ontological order of the cosgious thinker, this proposition mos, would remain viable even if counts among those truth-claims we were to make room for Maithat are self-evident (muskaloth).44. | monides’ unabashed endorsement

Maimonides seems to question of Aristotle’s argument concerning this self-evidence, however, when the eternity of the world.

Consensus Gentium? Saadya’s Sexual Psychology

Saadya’s rationale for laws con- upon. Saadya claims that laws cerning incestuous relations. Mai- concerning sexual relations ought monides draws on Saadya’s psy- therefore to be defined in terms of chology when designating halakic rational consensus. They are to as-

injunctions against promiscuous sume the same status as injuncsexual relations as consensus gen- tions against idolatry, bloodshed,

tium (matters universally ac- and robbery—injunctions that the cepted).** Both Saadya and Mai- Sages call mishpatim, or laws that

monides agree that some “if they would not have been legpsychological barriers in social in- islated in the Torah we would tercourse, such as not to entertain have legislated them ourselves.”*° sexual relations with close blood Maimonides agrees with Saadya

relatives, are universally agreed that laws concerning forbidden

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 61 sexual relations are matters of uni- Nonetheless, Maimonides often versal agreement (mefursamoth),*® gives psychological reasons for the but he does not count these laws laws of Torah (ta’ame ha-mitzvoth), among the mishpatim—among the _ such as in the case of Sukkoth, the

laws that are self-evident. He _ celebration of the ingathering of the rather stresses that laws concern- harvest. And the Feast of Taberna-

ing sexual relations are to be _ cles, Maimonides says, is done all treated as chukkim—laws whose for the sake of “rejoicing, gladness, very purpose is hidden from us.*’ and leisure.” Here Maimonides ex-

He thus seems to say that matters pressly invokes the authority of of sexual relations do reflect a cer- Aristotle’s Ethics: “Offerings are tain consensus gentium, although — given because of the need for leisure

they are by no means matters that after a laborious task. This is liter-

are self-evident or rational. ally what Aristotle says.”*° 57. By now it has become obvious devoted to the ultimate ideal of that there are general trends domi- Knowing God. See Guide 3:54, nating Maimonides’ way of think- 638; 3:53, 630-32.] not even as a ing as a whole, which makes it homily; and even in his theological plausible that Maimonides accept- system, it would strike us as an ed Aristotelian terminology without —unorganic and extraneous element. much reservation, a kind of termi-

nology that had been routinely 58. We may relinquish once and adopted within Arabic philosophy. for all this entire terminological This routine adoption of Aristotelian confusion, which arises from the terminology, however, does not — clichéd method of scrutinizing the

even remotely indicate Mai- similarities between or congrumonides’ inner methodological ence of Maimonides’ terminologidependence on Aristotle nor his cal usage and Aristotle’s, thereby agreement with Aristotelianism. If | gauging Maimonides’ comparative

we had to assume such depend- progress or stagnation. Aristotle ence and agreement, Maimonides’ himself assists in acquitting Maiethics would not rate as philosoph- = monides of any extraneous agree-

ical ethics based upon its own ment and dependence, in that autonomous and unifying princi- | Maimonides remains beholden to ple. Such an ethics would be self- his teacher for one essential les-

contradictory even in its religious son: despite all that profoundly aspect; it would not fit the cli- separates them, Aristotle serves mactic conclusion of the Guide, him as master and model in his [Maimonides’ proposition of enthusiasm for pure theory, scienchessed, tsedakah, umishpat (lov- _ tific cognition for its own sake, ingkindness, justice, and true judg- — which is the ultimate and absolute

ment) as the parameters for a life purpose of human _ existence.

62 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES [Aristotle 1945, NE 1177a, 1178a, is cognition, represents an act of 613-19.] This deification of cogni- homage to the divine forces. Their

tion raised the Stagirite to become mythology would not have a true Hellene. It is the compelling matured into their philosophy had vigor of ancient Greek culture that they not sensed that “all is divine cognition, and science insofar as it and human is all.”

Betselem Elohim: On Logos, Love, and Eudaemonia 59. The tenth book of the Nico- (See 59.) Enthusiasm for pure themachean Ethics constitutes a torso ory. The activity of the Aristotelian

by itself, the torso of a head, God consists of pure intellectual which is incompatible with the contemplation.*? Subsequently, trunk of the preceding nine books. Aristotle defines the human intelThis concluding book bears close lect as that which is “divine in a affinity to Book 12 of Aristotle’s human being,”*? positing the enMetaphysics, insofar as the eudae- gagement in pure contemplation as monian theory is truly applicable — the ultimate human task of human only to God, who may be emulat- —_ existence.

ed therein, however, by human That which is divine in a human beings. The significance and effect being, human intellect, is termed of this Aristotelian theory of God _ by traditional Jewish sources tse-

shall not be our concern at pres- lem, or betselem Elohim (that ent. We only wish to note that which is in God’s image).°! Philo striving for cognitive truth, and the interprets tselem as Logos, signifydeification of this objective and _ ing the intellectual and incorporeal purpose of human existence, lends part of a person, “the copy of the plausibility to the fact that Mai- original seal.”°* Philo’s reading remonides and other medieval Jew- __ verberates more or less literally in ish philosophers found themselves the commentaries of Rashi, David

able to follow Aristotle. The Jewish Kimchi, Obadiah Sforno, and philosophers had no reason to sus- other medieval Jewish commentapect Aristotle’s striving for cogni- tors on Genesis 1:27: “God cre-

tive truth, which he had raised toa ated the human being in His dogma of the Absolute. Not that image, in the image of God He crethey actually looked up to him as_ ated him.” Prima facie, it is Mai-

the patron of this dogma. To be monides who renders the most sure, he represented to them a strikingly Aristotelian reading of Saintly One among the Gentile this passage: “It is . . . because of nations, [| found no explicit refer- the divine intellect conjoined with ence to Aristotle as chassid umoth man, that it is said of the latter that

ha’olam. See, however, Mai- he is in the image of God and in monides (1987; 1988, 553) in a His likeness.”?

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 63 letter to Shmuel Tibbon; this is In opposition to this tradition of cited by Falaquera (1837, 107) in a purely intellectual, metaphysical

his commentary on Guide 2:22.] reading of “likeness,” Cohen ofand more than this, a patron saint fers his own interpretation, transof strict, conscientious cognition, ferring the discussion from the

| critically investigating the truth. realm of mere intellect to that of Cognitive pursuit was indeed love: betselem Elohim signifies a inscribed on the banner of this “correlation of God and human philosophical era. Since Jews are beings” that hinges upon the always wont to remain vindicators human ideal of lovingkindness and

of their faith, concern with their justice. Cohen invokes a classical religion drove them to champion discussion among the Sages: cognitive approaches. Religion found itself in a state of deteriora- “You shall love your fellowtion. People often lament the disin- person as you love yourself”: tegration of religion, and it is then Rabbi Akiba says: “this is a that they summon philosophy in great principle in the Torah.”

order to buttress their creeds. Ben Azzai says: “This is the Against the suspicions of the story of mankind—this is a obscurants and the scoffing of the greater principle in the Torah: skeptics, the defenders of religion the day that God created

claim that vindication is on the man, He created him in the agenda and that only philosophy image of God—betselem Elo-

would be effective. him.>*

60. In his assessment of the valid- Cohen sides with the universal ity of cognition, Maimonides sees reading as expressed by Ben Azzai, himself as a disciple and follower tracing the demand of love beyond of Aristotle. He emphasizes and __ the limits of the self which are im-

develops chiefly the intellectual plied in an adverbial reading of aspect of Aristotle’s methodologi- Rabbi Akiba’s “love your fellow-

cal dualism. [The dualism Aristo- person as you love yourself.”°° tle has in mind is between empir- Cohen introduces a transcendental

ical method as applied to both (Platonic) twist into the discussion , natural and social sciences of what it means to emulate “that (including ethics as a psychologi- which is divine in a human being,”

cal discipline) and metaphysical transcending the ontological, speculation (as engaged in purely Philonic—or neo-Platonic—“flow intellectual methods of contempla- of divine intellect” by emphasizing tion and theoretical knowledge for _ the ethical claim implied in the exits own sake).] Aristotle’s sensual- pression betselem Elohim.

ism, on the other hand, which Aristotle terms the intellecforms, as it were, the psychological tual activity of “emulating God”

64 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES introduction to Aristotle’s meta- eudaemonia; eudaemonia signifies physical system, had indeed been “highest happiness,” or “state of adopted and developed since _ bliss.”°° A life engaged in the pur-

Saadya by all predecessors of suit of pure intellectual activity is Maimonides. [Saadya 1976, “a life of truest pleasure” (ndovn, 243-44.] Altogether, Arabic phi- /edone, pleasure).°’ According to

losophy adopted this approach Aristotle, true intellectual hedofrom Alexander of Aphrodisias. nism, unlike all other sensual [Pines in Guide 1:lxiv-Ixxv.] Thus pleasures, is not driven by some even Maimonides does not fail to psycho-sociological motivation but

provide his ethics with an anthro- rather constitutes an end in itpological introduction. [Mai- self—which is why Cohen terms monides 1912, 37-46.] Yet this Book 10 of the Ethics a “torso” expresses merely the Zeitgeist, standing on its own.> However, which does not indicate, howev- the very concept of hbedone itself, er, any substantial linkage to Aris- Cohen claims, represents the epittotle. According to Maimonides, ome of sensualism, as it is predi-

the true Aristotle teaches that cated upon the idea of pleasure in there are absolute principles of precise opposition to his own concognition, engendering cognitive cept of the free ethical Self, or the

science. task of facing the needs and suffering of others.>?

61. Maimonides therefore underes- The significance and effect of timated the danger implied in Aris- Imitatio Dei. The Aristotelian con-

totle’s denigration of ethics. From cept of Imitatio Dei points to a his vantage point, it was easy to person’s embracing a life of pure overlook this danger, since he intellectual contemplation. In the

knew the validity of ethics had Maimonidean context this conbeen warranted by Jewish religion. cept takes on quite a different Jewish religion only had to adjust meaning—despite the fact that to the basic claims of cognition, Maimonides, of course, endorses and then there would be no ill Aristotle’s ideal of intellectual pereffect in Aristotle’s exaggerated fection: zeal for pure theory, which brings

him to deny the cognitive validity a person’s ultimate perfecof ethics. If only cognition as the tion is to become rational in

spiritual ideal can be maintained actu, ... which would conas the raison d’étre even for reli- sist in knowing everything... gion, then ethics per cognition is that is within the capacity safeguarded within religion. Only of man to know in accorwhen religion is in jeopardy would dance with his ultimate

ethics also be on shaky ground. perfection.°°

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 65 Consequently, Maimonides did not However, Maimonides, unlike jeopardi ze his ethics by integrating Aristotle, interprets the concept of it with religion, since he had estab- Imitatio Dei in terms of God’s ac-

lished religion itself on cognitive tional attributes and their ideal principles. From this central van- function as paradigms for hu-man tage point, it seems evident that the emulation.®! The educational char-

question of the conventional as the acter of Imitatio Dei is the key, main characteristic and principle then, to Cohen’s philosophical criof ethics, loses significance over tique of any eudaemonian, Arisagainst the cognitive significance totelian reading of Maimonides’ of ethics, and therewith of religion. concept of Knowing God.

Wisdom and Volition 62. In his zeal for truth, pursuing | (See 62.) The ancient Greek nous is

cognition, Maimonides grounds | equivalent to volition. In his arguhis intellectualism. [In his com- | ment against the Mutakallimun, mentary on the Mishna Chagigah | Maimonides identifies divine wis2:1, Maimonides (1992b, 1:240-43) |dom (Hebrew chokhmah, Greek states that whoever does not care | nous) with divine volition, claiming

for his intellectual and spiritual |that both are inseparable from endowment (betselem) actually | God’s essence.® The identity of diforfeits his human integrity and | vine wisdom with divine will corredignity.] Hence he cherishes the | lates with the demand for human

intellect, the ancient Greek nous | knowledge to become identical above all, and makes it equivalent | with ethical volition: Maimonides to volition. The autonomy of voli- | defines the “highest human perfection emerges as a problem only | tion” in terms of chokhbmah.® The later with Crescas’s doctrine of the | highest ideal of human knowledge affect. [Harvey 1988, 113-23; the | (Knowing God’s actional attribLatin terms affectus, affectio, and | utes), however, is itself formulated

| passio all denote “accident” in the |in terms of wisdom and volition. general sense, and can be traced | God’s actional attributes—precisely

to the Aristotelian term ta8os. |in their being subject to human Wolfson 1958, 2:193-94.] In the | knowledge—become vectors for a absence of this doctrine, however, | person’s ethical will.

the autonomy of volition is not called into question, but rather “Don Chasdai Crescas’ religionsremains safeguarded in its union philosphische Lehren in ihrem with the intellect. (This may be — geschichtlichen Einflusse,” 1876,

taken as an addendum to Joél, 2:71.)

66 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Wisdom and Torah

63. Hence, according to Mai-| (See 63.) According to Maimonides, cognition is the task and | monides, cognition is the task and telos of religion, and consequently | telos of religion. He emphasizes of ethics. Now the question arises: | that all practical virtues, all practi-

what is the object, the center! cal aspects of the Jewish law, are toward which all this cognition| merely preparatory means to converges? It is God. Maimonides, | achieve “the conception of .. . true however, teaches us in the first part | opinions concerning the divine

of the Guide, dedicated mainly to | things.”°* In this vein, Maithe problem of Knowing God, that | monides makes a distinction becognition of divine attributes is | tween chokhmah and Torah, subimpossible. How can we engage in | ordinating the latter to the former: substantive cognition of God with- | “all the actions as prescribed by

out having access to the knowl- | the Law... [are] not to be com-

edge of His attributes? pared with this ultimate end, .. . being but preparations made for directed toward a higher plane of

the sake of this end.”® In the human wisdom. According to Parable of the Palace, practical Cohen, a merely pragmatic unobservance of Torah is depicted as_ derstanding of Jewish law—what

a preparatory step toward the to do and what not to do—jeopknowledge of God, which alone ardizes the Torah’s embrace of constitutes “coming close to His the ideal of humanity, resulting

presence. ”°° in sectarian forms of religious The prophetic claim toward the hypocrisy. Cohen’s violent reestablishment of a panhuman — sponse to Lazarus’s Ethik des Jucommunity—a community in- dentums is to be understood prespired by the idea of humanity— cisely on the grounds of such a can only be upheld when interpre- critique of merely moral or ha-

tation of the Torah is itself lakhic pragmatism.®” The Absence of the Absolute: Holiness and the Desacralization of the World

Cognition of divine attributes is “unique, incorporeal and incomimpossible. It is of central concern parable God” does not allow for to Maimonides’ philosophical and an “essential” definition of God, religious agenda to demonstrate since any predicative description the inadmissibility of divine essen- of God would imply composition,

tial attributes: the concept of the multiplicity, corporeality and

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 67 therefore assume “likeness” be- work amounts to an advancement tween God and nature.®® Through- of the concept of purity; even his

out his own philosophical work, logic of origin works against the

Cohen translates Maimonides’ reduction of the inexhaustible

negative theology into an ethical, grounds of thinking and interpre-

political, and hermeneutical tation to known first axioms of agenda that objects to any ultimate reason.®°? According to Cohen,

manifestations of finitude and Maimonides established within power in that it postulates the ab- Jewish tradition a human commit-

sence of the Absolute. This ab- ment to a nonmanipulable God. sence, this demand for a desacral- Maimonides thus rejects as idolaized world, is a direct consequence _ try claims of a sacred entity, ideol-

of negating worldly manifestations ogy, or theology fabricated in of holiness for the sake of divine order to judge, force, dominate, or purity. Cohen’s own philosophical kill others in the name of God.”

Divine Attributes: The Intricacies of a Medieval Debate 64. This question challenges the (See 64.) The whole medieval disterminology and the entire method- cussion of devine attributes. Me-

ological apparatus of Maimonides, dieval Jewish, Christian, and as well as that of his predecessors Muslim theology strove to reduce and successors. It even calls into divine attributes to those “essenquestion, at present as acutely as_ tial” attributes that resist further then, any idealist exposition of the reduction—classically, life (or ex-

God-concept. How do you intend istence), omnipotence (or will), to know God, and how can you. and omniscience (providence).’! comprehend God as the object of Saadya emphasizes that this mulcognitive endeavor, if you denude _ tiplicity of attributes does not in-

this object of all attributes, by virtue dicate a multiplicity in God’s of which alone we can attain the essence, but that such theological

knowledge of any object? This formulation is rather due to the whole medieval discussion of inadequacy of our human landivine attributes, indeed, points, so guage—‘“the Torah speaks in the it seems, to the question of the real- language of men” [dibbera Torah ity of the object, its essence and _ bilshon benei adam].’* Saadya, as

substantiality—or, in Christian well as his successors in this meterms, to the personality of God, dieval discussion, including Maisince, without attributes, the trini- monides, follow the tradition of ty of the Godhead presents itself the Mutakallimun who solved the as a problem. How could Mai- problem of anthropomorphic immonides deny the cognition of ages in the Koran by means of a

68 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES divine attributes on the one hand, | theory of negative attributes from

and on the other hand proclaim | which they exempted only such knowledge of God as the main essential and irreducible attribprinciple of his theology and his | utes: life, omnipotence, and om-

ethics? niscience.

The reduction of these attrib- multiplicity of His essential atutes to three seems to have its ori- tributes, on the other. Christian gin in Christian tradition and its dogmatic tradition resolved this attempt to correlate God’s essen- tension by declaring multiplictial attributes with the elements ity to be inherent in the God-

of the trinity. It was Jacob head (the one trinitarian God), Baradaeus, in particular, the whereas most medieval Muslim sixth-century founder of the Syr- and Jewish philosophers sought ian church, who suggested the to avoid any multiplicity of essencorrespondence of the essential tial attributes, attempting to esattributes (Intellect, Word, Life) tablish “holiness” and “uniquewith the Godhead in its trinity ness” in radical opposition to the

(Father, Son, Holy Spirit).’* ambiguities of the world. MaiThus, the medieval Christian- monides went farthest in this deJewish disputations revolved velopment, claiming that even around the question of howtore- “life, omnipotence, and omnissolve the tension between God’s cience” are inadmissible as divine

unity, on the one hand, and the _ essential attributes.” 65. The solution to this problem _ trine of divine attributes that will will elucidate the Maimonidean disclose the solution. concept of cognition. It is his doc-

Philosophy’s Impotence: The Text That Is Prior to Reason 66. What are, indeed, the argu- (See 66.) There are no divine attribments marshaled for the negation of utes other than those specified in divine attributes? To be sure, such revelation. It is philosophy’s impo-

attributes cannot be denied in toto, tence that is exposed here, and since the revelation narrative itself Cohen sounds like an existentialist

posits such attributes. [Exodus theologian. But his language is de34:6-7.] It is precisely this point, ceptive. In Cohen’s reading of Maihowever, that holds the solution to monides, it seems that the referthe puzzle that faces us here: there ence to “revelation” does not refer are no other divine attributes than to any irrational theological dicthose posited by revelation. Itis phi- tum, but rather to the translogical losophy’s impotence that is exposed origin of ethical thinking as such. here. We shall see that Maimonides When asked to provide further

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 69 advanced forceful arguments that | proof for the validity of the Good,

both took advantage of Aristotle | reason itself is powerless. Phiand yet rejected him. Of what sort | losophy cannot provide further are the attributes articulated by rev- | grounds for the Good. The origielation? The attributes revealed do | nal teaching itself, embodied in a

not portray God according to the | narrative, the literary source, incategories of space and time, or of | forms philosophy of its ultimate substance and power, of number, | commitment to the Good. The bibmagnitude, and infinity. [Aristotle | lical passage that Cohen specifies 1983, Categories 17-19; Mai- | as his literary source and which, as monides rejects all but one of the | he says, “holds the solution to the ten Aristotelian categories as unfitto | puzzle that faces us here,” is the represent divine attributes. The sin- | following:

gle exception is the category of “actional attributes,” Guide 1:52, God, compassionate and gra114-19. “actional attributes,” in cious, slow to anger, aboundturn, are expounded in terms of the ing in kindness and faithfulthirteen attributes (Exodus 34:6-—7): ness, . . . forgiving iniquity, “compassionate and gracious” etc. transgression, and sin; yet He Guide 1:54, 124.] Instead, revela- does not remit all punish-

tion posits those attributes that ment, but visits the iniquity of reveal God solely and exclusively the fathers upon the sons. as an ethical being, as a being of ethics, according to the words of [El rachum vechanun erekh Scripture: compassionate and gra- apayim verav chessed vecious, abounding in kindness and emeth, . . . notser chessed faithfulness (Exodus 34:6-7). This is la’alafim, nosei avon valfesha

the focus of Maimonides’ doctrine vechata’a venakeh lo of attributes: he pinpoints and limits yenakeh.] (Exodus 34:6—7) the concept of a divine attribute to

an ethical attribute, thus identifying Compassion and graciousness the concept of God with the ethical | become constitutive points of ref-

concept of God. erence for an ethical pursuit of Knowing God, in that they repre- that which transcends mere logi-

sent the goodness of God’s cal deduction—analogous to

ways—“I will pass all my good- Plato’s idea of the Good that is

ness before thee” [ani a-avir kol prior to logical hypothesis. tuvi al panekha].’© We thus find “When asked to provide further

that the ethical bent, which ac- grounds for the validity of the cording to Cohen is mandatory Good, reason itself is declared for any Jewish interpretation of powerless,” Cohen claims. He Imitatio Dei, is predicated upon correlates the transcendence of

70 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES the Platonic idea of the Good with erary source of Exodus 34:6-7— the originality of the Jewish liter- precisely in terms of God’s goodary source. The literary source is ness, proclaiming these scriptural prior to textual reasoning just as attributes to be ethical attributes

the Good is prior to thinking. for emulation. Those attributes Making this argument, Cohen §are significant only in the context closely follows Maimonides’ inter- of human interaction, just as the

pretation in the Guide, where entire text of Scripture assumes Maimonides defines the Thirteen — significance only in the context of Attributes—emerging from the lit- oral tradition.

Compassionate and Gracious: A Talmudic Dispute— the Opinion That Dwells Alone

Compassionate and gracious, Exodus 34:6-7.’” Cohen’s reading abounding in kindness and faith- of Maimonides reflects an implicit fulness (Exodus 34:6-7). The thir- agreement with Rav Yehuda who teen attributes were originally rec- claims that the Thirteen Attributes

ommended in Jewish tradition for allude to the covenant (berith recital in public penitential prayer kerutah) between God and man, services, as they seemed apt to ef- rather than to the order of the fect atonement for the community. Rosh HaShana liturgy.78 MaiAfter all, the prayer of Moses—im- monides, indeed, sees in the commediately following the revelation munal recitation of God’s attribof these attributes to him—effected utes merely a religious custom, atonement for the community after stressing that the main, halakhic Israel had worshiped the golden _ significance of the Thirteen Attribcalf (Exodus 34). In the talmudic utes lies in their active application tractate Rosh HaShana, we find a_ in performing the commandment

dispute between Rabbi Yochanan, “You shall walk in His ways” on the one hand, and Rav Yehuda, (Deuteronomy 11:22).”? In this in-

on the other, concerning the ques- novative reading, Maimonides tion of what precisely was the stands, in fact, alone over against function of the public recital of all earlier rabbinic authorities.°° Aristotle’s God: No “Naught of Knowledge” 67. According to Aristotle, divine (See 67.) According to Aristotle, di-

substance is identical with divine vine substance is identical with essence not only terminologically divine essence. Aristotle defines but due to his entire Aristotelian God as the First Cause of the unicognitive approach. This divine verse, subsequently specified as the

substance, however, is not the prime, Unmoved Mover who is

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 71 object of Knowing God according | identical with eternal substance.*! to Maimonides. Substance can | Cohen contrasts this static, self-ref-

only be recognized by its attrib- | erential definition of God (a God utes, and divine attributes are | whose object of thought is God’s inaccessible to man. The critique | own thinking, and whose essence is

of positive attributes constitutes | identical with divine substance) the most pivotal, fundamental, | with Maimonides’ claim that God’s

and prominent focus of Mai- | essence—a “naught of knowlmonides’ teaching. Nonetheless, edge”>*—is present in divine voliMaimonides asserts and demands | tion, in other words, in Creation. the cognition of God—insofar as | Creation, however, is a secret to be he can make this demand in light | disclosed exclusively by reference to

of this fundamental doctrine; | God’s actional attributes, which in indeed, he turns this cognitive | turn are paradigms for human emudemand into the cardinal principle | lation.

and cornerstone of his theology and ethics. For him, the cognition regarding this paradigm, we may of God means the cognition of the justifiably claim that it represents basic premise, as a paradigm, and _ the idea of ethics.

God’s Goodness: A Theory of Intersubjectivity 68. God's attributes are His ways (See 68.) Gods attributes are His [Exodus 33:13]; and His ways are ways. Maimonides identifies the vectors of His actions. His God’s thirteen attributes with atattributes are therefore “attributes tributes of action, claiming that of action” ("wpm =axn). [Cohen uses these attributes contain the anthe Hebrew term te-are hama’aseh_ —swer to Moses’ request (Exodus in this context. However, ibn Tib- 33:13), “Show me now Thy ways,

bon and al-Charizi use te-are that I may know Thee.” Moses’ hape’ulah, which is closer to the other request (Exodus 33:18), original Arabic. Efros 1924, 121.] “Show me, I pray Thee, Thy They are not essential attributes; glory,” was denied to Moses (Exo-

they do not pertain to substance. dus 33:20). Maimonides interDivine actions are only attributes prets this to mean that God’s insofar as they serve as paradigms essence remains inaccessible to for human conduct. [There are human knowledge—“No mortal four main references in halakhic can know [God] in essence,”®% midrashim that discuss the idea of | since (Exodus 33:20) “no person Imitatio Dei: (a) the Mekhilta on can see my face and live.” God’s Exodus 15:2 (for Abba Shaul’s eth- answer to Moses’ first request is ical reading of 1m38\/ve’anvehu in contained in Exodus 33:19, “I will contradistinction to the aesthetical make all My goodness pass before

72 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES interpretation, see Mekhilta 1960, | Thee.” Maimonides subsequently 127, and 1955, 78); (b) the Sifra on | relates God’s goodness to the ways Leviticus 19:2 (Sifra 1959, 86); (c) | God governs the universe (nature)

the Sifre on Deuteronomy 11:22 | in general and in detail.** Mai(Sifre 1993, 114); and (d) TB Sotah | monides specifies those ways, 14a; also Soloveitchik 1983-1985, | however, instantly in terms of 2:170-73.] Hence, the cognition | compassion and graciousness, of God actually means the cogni- | therewith establishing the priority tion of these paradigms, translated | of an ethical reading of Creation

into rules, into legislation for | over an ontological one, defining human action, by virtue of which | God’s goodness as the adumbrathe action obtains the character of | tion of “ethical human qualities”

ethical conduct. (middoth ha-adam).*°

Maimonides’ innovative con- God’s goodness thus becomes junction of the mishnaic middoth meaningful exclusively within the

ha-adam with the Thirteen At- interpersonal context: “God is tributes becomes the key for good” translates into “I [you] shall Cohen’s reading of Maimonides’ become good.”*” In opposition to theory of Imitatio Dei. The good- the world of myth, Cohen argues, in ness of God—embodied in the his Ethik, that Judaism is not inter-

Thirteen Attributes of action—is ested in whether God is good or not meant as genetivus subjec- just, but rather exclusively whether tivus—“the meaning here is not human beings act toward one anthat He [God] possesses moral other in ways of goodness and jusqualities,” but the goodness of _ tice.®? This ethical bent defines the God rather assumes the form of | meaning of Cohen’s concept of the

an ideal whose significance lies “correlation between God and exclusively in human emulation: man.” It is in Cohen’s reading of “He [God] performs actions re- Maimonides where this concept of sembling the actions that in us _ correlation emerges in the context

proceed from moral qualities of the classical Jewish literary

(emphasis added).”*° sources.

“You Shall Become Holy”: An Introduction to the Literary Sources The divine actions are only attrib- shall walk in God’s ways) in his utes insofar as they serve as para- discussion of the Thirteen Attribdigms for human conduct. Mai- utes. Rather, he invokes the Sifra monides does not formally cite the on Leviticus 19:2, as well as the term vehalakhta biderakhav (you Sifre on Deuteronomy 11:22—an

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 73 innovative combination of the lit- His ways—these are the ways of erary sources which, as we shall God: compassionate and gracious, see, provides cogent support for longsuffering.””!

Cohen’s reading.°? Maimonides’ association of

Maimonides relies on two bibli- Abba Sha’ul’s concept of Imitatio cal passages and their attending Dei with the concept of Walking in halakhic midrashim in his interpre- His Ways—defined in the Sifre on tation of the Thirteen Actional At- Deuteoronomy 11:22 in terms of

tributes in Exodus 34:6-7. First, the Thirteen Attributes—is unique he cites Leviticus 19:2, “You shall among rabbinic interpretations. become holy” (kedoshim tibyu) to- Maimonides therein establishes the gether with the attendant Sifra in very point of Cohen’s own reading

which Abba Sha’ ul is reported to of Leviticus 19:2, “You shall behave introduced the idea of Imita- come holy”: tio Dei or mechake lamelekh (to imitate the King).”? Second, Mai- For the utmost virtue of man is monides associates the demand of to become like unto Him... emulating the Thirteen Attributes as far as he is able; which with Deuteronomy 11:22: “If you means that we should make then faithfully keep all this instruc- our actions like unto His, as tion that I command you, loving the Sages make clear when inthe Lord your God, walking in all terpreting the verse “Ye shall His ways, and keeping close to become holy.” They said: “He Him.” Maimonides also follows is gracious, so be you also grathe interpretation of the attending cious; He is merciful, so be also Sifre of this passage: “Walking in you merciful.”?

Knowledge of God: On Autonomy and Revolution 69. The objection may be raised (See 69.) Imitatio Dei: the genthat an action obtains its ethical uine, free, autonomous act of reacharacter merely by emulating a som and rational volition. Cohen paradigm and by acting in accor- stresses the autonomous character dance with rules. Conceived of as of Maimonides’ concepts of such, ethics would represent only Knowing God and of Walking in copy and imitation, and not the God’s Ways, claiming that holigenuine, free, autonomous act of ness is a task incumbent upon a reasoning and of rational volition. person’s ethical will, and thereSuch an objection, however, is with predicated upon the autonmerely polemic, not arising from omy of human volition.?*? Cohen

any substantive criticism. In defines autonomy as “independresponse, Maimonides himself— ence from any extrinsic, worldly

74 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES as we shall demonstrate further stimulus.”?4 Cohen’s concept of on—asserts the freedom of will. autonomy does not signify the self-

Against this position of Mai- sufficiency of reason, nor any monides, one may not contend other idealist solipsism, but rather

that it contradicts the aspect of an “activity desired for its own emulation; for this contention will sake,” an activity not dictated by be refuted by Maimonides’ own _ external rewards. Likewise, Jewish

concept of cognition. tradition speaks of the desire to study Torah for its own sake, in70. | cannot simply act asa mimet- voking a midrashic report about ic follower of the divine paradigm: God who desires to play with imitation is not cognition. The pos- Torah.?> Most contemporary intertulate of Knowing God is the con- _ pretations of Maimonides’ concept

ditio sine qua non for His ethical of prophecy are hard put to accept

| subsistence. Hence it can only be — such a reading, claiming, in turn, cognition in which and by which _ that there must be a radical differ-

man, emulating God’s actions, ence between “autonomous” and builds himself through his own “prophetic” knowledge.?® Maiconduct into an ethical person. monides, indeed, makes a basic Without cognition there is no distinction between the intellect of

ethics and no God. Moses, the supreme prophet, and

that of all other people, including 71. Maimonides elucidated and other prophets.?” However, the difascertained through the doctrine of ference concerning the degree of attributes that cognition constitutes prophecy leaves the autonomy of the ethical foundation of theology. Moses’ cognition unimpaired. Accordingly, he could apply the Thus, when Moses went to Mount term conventional to some ethical Sinai, “his imaginative faculty was laws, and, if you wish, even to all annulled, together with all extrinof them, [Guide 2:33, 364] having _ sic sense perception.”?°

made certain that the cognitive When discussing the intellectual validity of ethics is established and moral qualifications required beyond doubt. For Maimonides, for the attainment of prophetic Knowing God warrants the cogni- knowledge, Maimonides empha-

tive validity of ethics. sizes that the “detachment from any [egocentric interest in] sensual

72. For this theoretical insight, and physical reality” is a conditio Maimonides was certainly histori- sine qua non.*? He thus stresses the

cally and personally indebted to autonomous nature of the moment the fundamental approach of of yichud (seclusion) between God Greek culture, as represented by and Moses. In contrast to the tradiAristotle. This debt holds true for tion made prominent by Judah

THE GOOD BEYOND BEING 79 the entire ancient world beyond | ha-Levi, Maimonides seems to Hellas, as it remains for us and any | maintain that the relationship besubsequent culture. Wherever con- | tween God and Moses on Mount scientious pursuit of truth is |} Sinai becomes constitutive for Israel evoked and focused through the | precisely by dint of its autonomy:

lens of an enthusiastic apprecia- | Autonomy signifies receptivity with tion of science, there the lasting | respect to an imperative that is “as afterglow of Hellenism becomes | old as the world.”!°° The constitumanifest. The breadth and univer- | tion of the Self, according to sal scope of Maimonides’ scholarly | Cohen, is a task that originates with life and work eminently attest to | God’s demanding the Good, just as

the epoch-making dimension of | freedom is constituted by an imperHellas’s contribution to the pursuit | ative that binds human volition of science. Yet it seems adventi- | from time immemorial. One rabtious and extraneous to argue that | binic interpreter says, “Read not

Maimonides’ intellectualism in | charuth—chiseled in stone—but theology and ethics is simply | rather cheruth—freedom” when re-

derived from Aristotle. If this were | ferring to Moses’ writing on the so, we would have to recognize in | tablets.!°! In heeding this original Maimonides’ concept of God the | demand, human volition must not God of Aristotle. Since, however, | be dictated by the utilities of exterGod, the God of the prophets, rep- | nal reality—lest the Self become enresents for Maimonides an object | slaved to “things as they are”—but

of cognition, just like mathematics, | rather the self is called upon to logic, and metaphysics—and real- | transform reality. This task of izing that God is no longer identi- | transformation, as any revolutioncal with the Aristotelian divinity— | ary task, cannot begin with “what

it follows that the concept of | is” but rather must start out with a ‘Knowing God must be different | knowledge of what “will be.” The from the metaphysical concept of | scream of the pained creature de-

Knowing God in Aristotle. mands that all things must become otherwise. This sort of eschatologi- The deepest significance of

cal knowledge pushes humanity the concept of purity lies in beyond any quietist consent to the its [social, ethical, political]

social and political status quo. applicability. !°*

BLANK PAGE :

Religion as Idolatry How (Not) to Know God In this fourth chapter Cohen discusses the specificities of Maimonides’

negative theology. Emphasizing the correspondence between Maimonides’ theory of negative attributes and the docta ignorantia of Nicolas of Cusa, and in a critical turn against Spinoza’s philosophy of imma-

nence, Cohen offers a detailed analysis of Maimonides’ theory of attributes in relation to the Platonic Good as the non-foundational origin of human knowledge. Drawing upon the difference between negative and privative propositions as well as upon the proposition of infinite judgment, Cohen proposes a reading that corresponds with his own Logik der reinen Erkenntnis: The negation of privation inherent in Maimonides’ theory of knowing God necessitates a reading of divine actional attributes as imperative grounds for human action.

“Negative Attributes”: (No Mere) Technicality 73. In the context of our discus- (See 73.) The doctrine of negative sion, the doctrine of so-called neg- attributes. The medieval discussion

ative attributes demands a more of negative divine attributes elaborate analysis, in order to clar- throughout Muslim, Jewish, and ity the significance of Maimonides’ Christian literature often took on God-concept for ethics, to the ben- an extremely technical character.! efit of which it exclusively applies. The original motive for this doc-

It is only from the perspective of trine lay in the embarrassment this doctrine that the entire Mai- caused by the many anthropomormonidean philosophy emerges as a__ phic images in the Koran, as well as

unified system; even the structure in the Hebrew and Christian Scrip-

of the Guide appears coherent tures. The purity and transcendence only as a result of such an analysis. of God, to be sure, is itself not anHis entire philosophy distinguishes chored in Scripture—to the con-

itself from scholasticism whose trary, Scripture abounds with antechnical argumentation is execut- thropomorphic imagery.2 Only in ed artificially for its own sake. the wake of the Philonic doctrine of

78 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Maimonides, on the contrary, | divine unity, incorporeality, and always focuses his attention on the | simplicity—as given in the biblical

actual, vital meaning of the con- | injunction “You shall not make cepts, despite his scholarly compe- | for yourself a molten/sculptured tence in dialectics. The actuality of | image”—did anthropomorphic imhis concepts lies in ethics, and this | agery become a problem for meintrinsic vitality lies at the root of | dieval religious thinkers.’ Muslim the inexhaustible originality of his | theologians of the rationalist school

mind and of his work. of the Kalam were the first to ad-

dress the issues partly by way of al- Joseph ibn Tsaddik, Judah ha-Levi, legorical and metaphorical interpre- Bahya ibn Pakuda, and ibn Daud.’ tation, partly by developing a the- Maimonides, however, proves the

ory of “negative attributes.” The most radical in his denial of essenattempt to avoid multiplicity in tial attributes.° Maimonides explicGod’s essence while holding on to itly denies that life or existence the three essential attributes of om- should be counted among the posiniscience, omnipotence, and life re- tive divine attributes. But Cohen’s sulted in the negation of divine at- point is rather that Maimonides extributes: “God is omniscient but _ plicitly subordinates the entire docnot through knowledge as his at- trine of divine attributes to the epistribute; God is omnipotent but not temological task of Knowing God in through power as his attribute, and terms of divine actional attributes.

so on.”4 And in this, Maimonides distin-

The majority of pre-Maimonidean guishes himself as the ideal propoJewish medieval thinkers followed nent for Cohen’s ethical reading of this technique—such as Saadya, the Jewish tradition.’

The Specter of the Late Cohen: Rosenzweig’s Seminal Misreading 74. Since the discussion of the so- (See 74.) Religion and Ethics. called negative attributes is con- Cohen later speaks of the “distinccerned with the concept of God, _ tive nature of religion,” proposing

we broach the entire problem of a definition of religion in which how religion relates to ethics. The the correlation of God and man is doctrine of negative attributes asa understood in radically subjective locus classicus of Jewish philoso- terms.® Guilt and atonement are phy is apt to clarify and resolve the central terms in Cohen’s existenproblem of this relationship, if we — tialist grounding of the correlation

were to succeed in demonstrating between God and man in terms of more incisively and plausibly the subjectivity.? Nonetheless, Cohen

following: that Maimonides in leaves unimpaired the ethical,

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 79 combating positive divine attrib- | “messianic” purpose of that correutes was motivated not merely by | lation. Even the distinctive nature scholastic subtlety, nor even theo- | of religion remains predicated logical concern for maintaining | upon the autonomy of a person’s

the conceptual purity of divine | ethical resolutions."

unity, but primarily by the pure It is Cohen’s definition of the rationalism of his ethics. Mai- | distinctive nature of religion that monides does not have a double | prompted Rosenzweig’s existenstandard of truth: whatever proves | tialist interpretation of the late true for religion, must eo ipso | Cohen in his celebrated introducapply to ethics. [LrE 605; ErW | tion to Cohen’s Jiidische Schriften 439-66; BdR 50. Cohen provides | of 1924." Rosenzweig’s reading—

a fundamental critique of the | a seminal misreading—created the scholastic “double truth theory” in | specter of Cohen as the seventywhich “reason” and “revelation” | year-old baal teshuvah, who dis-

constitute two independent | covers Judaism toward the end of sources of truth. Wolfson 1976b, | his academic, philosophical career.

112-40.] The narrative of the “late Cohen”

and his ascending path from the European Cohen scholarship in sterility of neo-Kantian abstraction the last thirty years—notably the to the fertile grounds of Jewish ex- work of Dieter Adelmann, Helmut

istence haunts the majority of Holzhey, Rivka Horwitz, PierCohen’s post-Rosenzweig readers, francesco Fiorato, Andrea Poma,

for whom critical philosophy and and Hartwig Wiedebach!’—has

Jewish existentialism represent advanced a radically different two diametrically opposed ways of reading, carefully demonstrating thinking.'* Cohen’s ethical mono- the continuity of Cohen’s philo-

theism, his prophetic idea of hu- sophical development. In my manity, his concept of correlation, own commentary on Cohen’s of the priority of the Other, and reading of Maimonides, I wish to his idea of messianism are thus demonstrate how Cohen’s lifebeing taken hostage by a polarized long commitment to Jewish clasdebate between idealists and exis- sical texts, Jewish hermeneutics, tentialists—philosophers and Jew- and ethical messianism expresses

ish religionists—whereby Cohen’s itself as critical thinking, and genuine engagement of Jewish how intimately Cohen’s reading sources in a sustained line of ethi- of Jewish literature correlates

cal reasoning throughout his with his main _ philosophical philosophical writings is over- work, most notably his Logic

looked. and his Ethics.

80 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Walls and Fences: Two Traditions of Legal Thinking

75. To be sure, as a dogmatist of (See 75.) “The wall around the rabbinic tradition, Maimonides law.” The metaphor of the “wall

had to erect an enormous around the law” corresponds to hermeneutic wall [Mishna Avoth the rabbinic dictum to “make a

1:1; Stein 1979, 301-29], in hedge for the Torah” (Mishna order to safeguard against the Avoth 1:1)—“to impose additional flood of exceptions, which devel- restrictions so as to keep at a safe

op within the confines of the law distance from forbidden itself. Even in our own assess- ground”—according to one opinment of his unique epoch-mak- ion.'4 Travers Herford offers a ing achievement, [Maimonides’ more sympathetic reading: “The magnum opus, his halakic code precautions taken to keep the di(Mishneh Torah), is revolutionary — vine revelation from harm, so that

in its novel systematization and the sacred enclosure, so to speak, classification of halakhoth. See might always be. . . open for the

Twersky 1980b, 273] we must human to contemplate the dinot be led astray by his involve- vine.” !° The innundation of excepment with the exceptions, insofar tions that develop within the wall as we consider them relevant: itself. Cohen’s view of halakic rea-

rather, in this central point, we soning is influenced by the legal must gauge our historical under- tradition of Western Europe— standing not so much by Mai- _ based upon the Justinian Code and monides’ relationship to rabbinic the Napoleonic Code—in which

tradition but rather by his rela- legal decisions are derived from tionship to the prophetic teach- statutory, apodictic rules in appliing. The monotheism of Israel cation to individual cases. Only in originates with the God-concept such a deductive system does it of the prophets and not with that make sense to speak of exceptions

of the Talmud, although Mai- to the rule. monides felicitously aspires even Jewish law, on the other hand,

with respect to this innermost based upon talmudic thinking, core to invoke the authority of constitutes a casuistic system, not the haggadic part of the Talmud. unlike the Anglo-Saxon common In the Haggadah of the Talmud, it law, which is situational: if such

is ethics that features as the and such happens, then it should prominent problem of the law, be handled in such and such a and hence of the Torah. [“The manner. Casus refers to a unique interpreters of Haggadah say: if situation that has occurred and you want to know the One who | demands legal judgment. A legal ‘spoke-and-the-world-came-into- case is by definition “an unexbeing,’ go and pursue the study pected disaster,” and the process

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 81 of Haggadah, by dint of which | of legal decision making is thus a you will come to know the holy | creative act that is by nature inone, blessed be He, and cleave | ductive. Even the “fence around unto His ways.” Sifre 1993, | the Torah” is part of this inductive

114-15.] process:

[Maimonides realizes] that law individuality. A code is a ra-

has immanent uncertainties, tional construction which capand that the legist regularly tures and freezes as much as

and unavoidably faces possible of a fluid, unpreunimagined contingencies and dictable, sometimes recalci-

new hesitations. .. . Like the trant reality, but there is alhistorical process or personal ways a fluctuating residuum experience, law can never be which must be confronted purified of its mutations and openly and freshly.!¢ Esoteric and Exoteric Reasoning: Haggadah and Halakah Maimonides’ relationship to rab- of the prophets and not with that binic tradition vs. his relationship to of the Talmud.” This statement,

the prophetic message. Cohen di- from the present paragraph, is verts our attention from the ha- wont to tempt the reader into the lakhic aspect of Jewish tradition— impression that Cohen’s Jewish

to an appreciation of the _ philosophy finds its groundings meta-legal rationale in Mai- mainly in prophetic teachings and monides’ exposition of the Torah less so in the rabbinic tradition. claiming that Maimonides subor- ‘Talmudic teachings—in as far as

dinates legal reasoning to the they are halakhic—are often exoprophetic ideal of Knowing God. _ teric in that they are orientated to-

According to the last chapter of ward the practicability of everythe Guide, Maimonides proposes’ day life. Both prophetic visions a relationship between Halakah and haggadic narratives, on the (rabbinic tradition) and chokhmah other hand, are esoteric, enigmatic (the ultimate wisdom) in which messages, especially since prophetic

the legal thought takes on a sub- visions express an experience of

ordinate role with respect to God. Cohen claims that these esothe achievement of a higher wis- _ teric prophetic and haggadic tradi-

dom. Maimonides terms this tions serve Maimonides as stepping prophetic knowledge, knowl- stones toward the development of

edge of God.!” his own doctrine concerning the “The monotheism of Israel ultimate human perfection.'® Maioriginates with the God-concept monides mentions that he, indeed,

82 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES intended to write an exposition of emphasizes Haggadah, whereas a

all the haggadic material in the neo-Kantian thinker like J. B. Talmud and in the prophets, focus- Soloveitchik stresses the priority of ing specifically on the question of _ Halakhah.)

how they relate to the ideal of When looking more closely at

Knowing God.!? the etymology of the term hagIn the Haggadah of the Talmud, gadah, we realize that this term is

ethics features as the prominent not merely restricted to denote problem of the law. (Those who _ those parts of the oral tradition that study Levinas’s talmudic lectures are of non-halakhic character. The

on the haggadic parts of the Tal- contradistinction of Haggada and mud will see in this sentence an al- Halakhah itself constitutes a rather

most programmatic agenda for arbitrary distinction.** The etymoLevinas’s hermeneutical approach logical root of aggada expresses, in to talmudic literature.)*° It says in fact, precisely what is implied in the Sifre on “You shall walk in His Cohen’s concepts of “living speech”

ways”: and “correlation.” The noun haggadabh or aggada is derived from the

if you want to know the One causative of the three radical letters

who “spoke-and-the-world- *ngd. This denotes a positioning came-into-being,” go and pur- “over-against” in the sense of the sue the study of Haggadah, by Latin objectus; haggadah thus repdint of which you will come resents an object-lesson, a teaching

to know the Holy One, conveyed by means of a living parblessed be He, and cleave adigm, including nonverbal, allu-

unto His ways.*! sive means of communication, or , otherwise demonstrative behavior. This midrashic passage demon- __ It is precisely in this sense in which

strates the ethical focus of Cohen’s this root is used in Micah 6:8, the reading. The one who “spoke-and- prophetic passage which is fundathe-world-came-into-being” signi- mental to Cohen’s entire interpretafies the archetypal personification tion of Judaism as ethical messian-

of the ethical that is grounded in ism: speech. As such the study of Hag- ©

gadah is endorsed as a foremost It has been demonstrated to

means to “walk in His ways.” you, o you human being, (Note that Cohen commits both what is good [higgid lekha Haggadah and Halakhah with adam ma tov], and what the equal rigor to his ethical interpre- Lord requires of you: only to tation, whereas some of Cohen’s do justice, and to love kindsuccessors seem to have narrowed ness, and to walk unostentathe scope of their reading: Levinas tiously with your God.3

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 83 Cohen could have invoked dogmatism in that it turns out to be David Kimchi’s commentary to this a consequence of Haggadah: higgid passage in Micah that expressly re- /lekha adam ma tov. This interpreta-

lates “walking humbly with your tion is offered by Maimonides’ son God” with the demand of Walking Abraham who defines Haggadah— in His Ways.** Walking in His Ways like Cohen—with direct reference

thus advances beyond theological to Micah 6:8.*°

Religion Is Idolatry: Maimonides’ Critique of Theology, and the Anti-Maimonidean Polemos 76. We cannot deny, however, that | (See 76.) The opposition of the from the perspective of a person’s | unphilosophical community of be-

absolute faith in God, the zeal for | lievers. The pulmus or polemos the doctrine of negative attributes | against Maimonides’ rabbinic and spells something rather suspicious | philosophical writings—which and oppressive. We are bidden to | eventually brought about the reput our trust in the content of reve- | jection of Maimonides’ books— lation, relying but upon its rational | started in Maimonides’ own lifemoorings, and yet we deprive | time. This polemos touches upon rational cognition of its positive | central political and theological conceptuality: what foundation | questions concerning human perremains at our disposal for know- | fection and the conditions of saling God if we are left to operate | vation, questions whose ramifica-

merely with negative attributes? | tions can be felt well into the Would it not appear that a latent | present.*® Philosophically speak-

trait of aversion and of distrust | ing, the spiritual struggle of the against the very foundation of the | pious against the philosophers is God-concept, against its cognitive | directed against the concept of puvalidity, prevailed throughout this | rity—the Naught of knowledge entire Maimonidean argument? | that is God—which Maimonides Maimonides was not bound to give | advances as a fundamental con-

himself a clear accounting of this, | cept of the Jewish faith. Maibut this question makes the oppo- | monides (and the legacy he besition of the unphilosophical com- | queathed) excludes from the body munity of believers more plausible | of authentic Jewish tradition any

and more palpable. kind of religious fundamentalism that insists on the “positivity” of ways in which one humbly apits theological images and makes proaches God. use of the sacred for the sake of its Maimonides, indeed, accuses the political interests, forgetful of the “pious enemies of philosophy”—

84 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES simpletons, politicians, those Maimonides’ rejection of any who confuse their image of the physical representation of the disacred with God—of violating vine in terms of the sacred—even if the injunction against idolatry. only by pure imagination—repreNo positive definition of God is sents the most radical position permissible, lest such people wor- concerning the injunction against ship themselves when taking the idolatry in Jewish tradition. His products of their own imagina- judgment, however, has talmudic tion to be God. The consequences support in a discussion of idola-

of such intellectual idol-worship trous worship in Talmud Bavli are severe. All idolaters, accord- (Chagigah 16a), in which the ing to Maimonides, are heretics Palestinian Sages object to the who must be excluded from the Babylonian practice of prostrating community of Israel, forfeiting oneself at the sight of a rainbow. their “share” in the world-to- This practice developed in reminis-

come.’ cence of a passage in Ezekiel: Abraham ben David of Posquieres

opposed the harshness of Mai- Like the appearance of the monides’ rulings. In a trenchant cri- bow which shines in the tique of Maimonides, he exonerates clouds on a day of rain, such

such unphilosophical believers: was the appearance of the surrounding radiance |hanoga

Why has he called such a person saviv|. That was the appearan heretic? There are many peo- ance of the semblance of the ple greater than and superior to Presence of the Lord [demuth him who adhere to such a belief kevod adonai|. When I beheld on the basis of what they have it, I flung myself down on my

seen in verses of Scripture.”° face. (Ezekiel 1:28)

Maimonides, however, differs The Palestinian Sages oppose

from their view: such prostration before natural phenomena: If, however, it should occur to

you that one who believes in Against the Babylonian Sages

the corporeality of God we say that it is forbidden to should be excused because of prostrate oneself before the his having been brought up in appearance of a rainbow— this doctrine or because of his since this practice is suspected

ignorance and the shortcom- to be idolatrous.°° ings of his apprehension, you

ought to hold a similar belief Many talmudic versions deleted with regard to an idolater.*? this opposition to the practice of

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 85 prostration before the rainbow from Sages had caused an agitation among

their editions,*! and with this dele- the guardians of popular folklore tion they disposed of the entire ques- similar to the agitation that ensued tion of the permissibility or imper- upon Maimonides’ rejection of popmissibility of worshiping divine ular theology.** Politically speaking, manifestations in nature. They didso Maimonides’ strictures against any possibly in order not to offend idola- kind of religious imagination involvtrous astrological practices deeply ing divine corporeality were, in fact,

rooted in Babylonian culture. It directed against the widespread phestands to reason that the rejection of nomena of fundamentalism in the such a worship by the Palestinian thirteenth century.

Maimonides, Cusanus, and Modern Epistemology: The Construction of a Philosophical Tradition 77. On the other hand, we are now | (See 77.) Nicholas of Cusa, father in a better position to appreciate | of modern philosophy. The philo-

the influence exerted by Mai- | sophical significance of “negative monides not only upon scholasti- | theology” is so foundational to cism but even upon the period | Cohen’s own critical idealism that extending into the early Renais- | he, in fact, proclaims Nicholas of sance, and in particular upon the | Cusa, rather than Descartes, to be great Nicholas of Cusa. [1986, | the father of modern philosophy.*? 60-61 and throughout. On the | Cohen was followed herein by Casinfluence of Maimonides upon the | sirer, whose history of modern episChristian scholastic tradition, see | temology begins with a discussion

the groundbreaking essay of Jacob | of Cusanus.** We thereby meet Guttmann, which appeared in the | with the construction of a philosame volume as Cohen’s own |} sophical tradition rooted in alterity essay on Maimonides (Guttmann | and difference, one that spans from 1971, 135-230). For a contempo- | Maimonides and Nicholas of Cusa rary assessment of the relationship | to Cohen and Cassirer. This tradi-

between Jewish and Christian | tion is challenged first by Spinoza scholasticism, see the study of | and later prominently by Hegel and Yossef Schwartz 2002.] However, | Heidegger.

the danger of rationalism proves itself here also to be a challenge to _ of the trinity. [ErW/ 447; but see LrE | Judaism. Nicholas of Cusa could 31-32 where Cohen _ introduces afford to play with the ambiguities | Nicholas as the discoverer of the

of pantheism in a daring and epistemological significance of meaningful fashion since he could _ infinity.] In contrast, Maimonides

use them to expound the mystery guards himself against the serpent

86 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES of pantheism, although he is not ment of neo-Platonism. [Kreisel disinclined toward the enchant- 1994, 169-211, esp. 183-211.] Spinoza’s Annihilation of Alterity: The End of a Hermeneutical Tradition 78. Finally, this provides us witha (See 78.) Spinoza’s concept of di-

keener and more substantive vine immanence. Cohen refers to

understanding of Maimonides’ Spinoza’s concept of divine imma-

relationship to Spinoza. [JS nence as the “serpent of panthe3:290-372; L. Strauss 1997, ism.” In contrast, Maimonides’ 147-92.] The more zealously epistemology is constituted as the Spinoza safeguards his concept of _ task of ethical cognition rooted in

divine substance against all deter- the teaching of “the unique minative restrictions, the more God.”*°> According to Cohen, ethiproblematic the possibility of any cal cognition is the one and only positive, absolute knowledge of way in which the relationship be-

God becomes, and hence the tween God and human beings can more Maimonides’ pan rises on _ be, or, in fact, ought to become, the scale and seems to be out- immanent. Spinoza, on the conweighed. For Spinoza’s concept of _ trary, defines the concept of divine

divine substance means neither substance as an ontological immaexclusively nor even primarily the nence. In medieval terms, Spinoza God of ethics, but merely the God _ negates all divine attributes, inof nature: deus sive natura. [“That cluding attributes of action, as lim-

eternal and infinite being we call itations of the divine substance, God, or nature.” Spinoza 1985, positing “infinite substance” in544, 548, also 66. Cohen (ErW 45, — stead.°® Spinoza’s “divine sub-

16) to the contrary, proclaims stance” cannot, according to Natura necnon Deus: “If God and Cohen, inspire human action, nor nature are identical ... the differ- the kind of infinite hermeneutical ence between Being and Ought is creativity that so characterizes the suspended.” Even in LrE (356-57), Jewish oral tradition.?”

he contrasts religion as the logic of Spinoza, on the other hand, purpose to Spinoza’s religion of criticizes the openness and assoimmanence which “gives up on ciative nature of rabbinic hermeteleology and thus abandons the neutics in general and of Mai-

problem of ethics.”] monides’ philosophical writings

in particular. Divorcing the ques79. Let us recall, however, how — tion of truth from the reading of even Plato formulates his idea of Scripture, Spinoza ends two thou-

the Good in seemingly negative sand years of interpretive history.

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 87 terms as non-foundation. [Plato’s | Over this time, Jews have enconception of the Good as a| trusted their texts with the task of non-foundation (an-hypotheton) | rendering ever new significance in expresses the notion that the idea | their continuous search for truth.

of the Good is hypothetically | Spinoza, to the contrary, denies excluded from the infinite process | any transcendental grounds for of scientific, conceptual deduc- | the words of Scripture. He subtion—see commentary for transla- | sequently radically historicizes the

tion paragraphs 16 and 21 in chap- | text, rejecting any innovative ter 1. The concept of the Good as | reading that stipulates a “hidden”

non-hypothesis (an-hypotheton) | meaning as a dogmatic “textual

thus constitutes the self-pro- | distortion.” claimed ethical limit or end of rea- Cohen, for whom the search of son. LrE 88. It is in this paragraph | meaning beyond the letter is diCohen begins to explicitly corre- | rectly associated with a Jewish delate Plato’s concept of non-founda- | sire for transcendence, accuses tion with Maimonides’ theory of | Spinoza of willfully constructing a

negative attributes.] The common | narrow-minded and _ primitive

translation renders this Platonic | image of Judaism. He thereby term [to avutofeTtov] incorrectly | lends support to the critique of Juand inexactly as the Uncondi- | daism as a religion that is centered tioned Absolute. [See Cohen para- | around the letter of the law—an graphs 16 and 17.] | would venture | image which, according to Cohen, to propose that in similar fashion, | is but the reflection of Spinoza’s

Maimonides by no means con- | own philosophy of immanence. ceives of the negative attributes in | Cohen sees it as a tragic irony of a purely negative vein, but rather | history that Spinoza’s distortion of

relates them to infinite judgment, | Judaism, his rejection of Maiwhich only apparently takes on the | monides and of his philosophical form of negation in that its formu- | reading of the Jewish tradition, inlation employs a negating particle. | fluenced and determined the views

[Guide 1:58, 136.] of many Enlightenment scholars. Spinoza’s annihilation of Mai- ing to Cohen, it is Spinoza who

monides’ critical thinking thus di- _ precipitated the paradoxical view

rectly influenced the anti-Jewish of classical Judaism that permeprejudices of Kant, Lessing, and ates post-Enlightenment Western Herder, which in turn influenced philosophy and culture—whether Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem. Accord- Christian or Jewish.°?

88 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Nichts and Ichts: Cohen’s Judgment of Origin and the “New Thinking” 80. In this context, Aristotle has ren- (See 80.) Two different kinds of dered a disservice to the students of | ~egation. In Democritus and Plato logic in his time, as well as to those we find a distinction between the

of the Middle Ages and modern two negating particles, un (me) times, by failing to maintain the dis- and ov (ou). The first refers to a

tinction between the two negating privation or relational negation particles ou and yn. [Cohen claims whose logical and grammatical (LrE 86) that Aristotle neglects the use function is to lead the “non-existof the relational negative particle yn. ing to the truly existing, the NothHowever, Aristotle preserves the dis- ing to the Something.”*° Cohen tinction between privation and nega- translates Democritus’s Greek de-

tion. Aristotle 1947, Metaphysics scription of this transition from 1022b, 273-74; 1983a, Categories nothing to something into an ex12a-b, 85-89; also Wolfson — pression truly characteristic of the 1973-1977, 2:215.] We find this dis- innovative idiosyncrasy of Cohen’s

tinction sharply outlined, and pro- language, playing with the terms ductively elucidated and developed Nichts and Ichts—with the terms by Plato. Although Maimonides of naught and ought, predicating

had not read the Sophists and the latter upon the former: Nicht Parmenides, he probably knew mebr ist das Ichts als das Nichts.*' Timaeus. [Pines’s introduction to the One may say that the hermeneutiMoreh Nevukhim, Guide |xxv-Ixxvi, cal, or rather logical, structure of 283-84.] Even the latter presents the Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption meaning of infinite judgment for that is predicated upon what Cohen kind of negation which only appears himself calls the “new thinking,” a to be a negation, in a forceful and way of reasoning which originates

lucid manner. Hence, Maimonides in a nought—a nought which was able to find in Plato as well asin Cohen defines as the absence of a

, neo-Platonism the point of departure _ predetermined first body of knowland support for developing his own edge, a “naught of knowledge.”**

fundamental doctrine of Knowing Cohen claims that absolute God: it is not through negation, but negations—expressed in Greek by rather through a negation that is only the negating particle ov—are unapparent, that we attain a true and creative and uninstructive. On the

fast affirmation of God. other hand, privative predicative expressions—expressed by the par-

81. What may be argued against the ticle un—are interesting and crepreference for positive attributes in ative. To refer to an example menthe first place is their formal connec- tioned earlier, a proposition like tion with their negative counterparts. “this man is inhuman” posits and

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 89 Wherever provision is made for pos- anticipates the nonexistent attribitive attributes, there must logically ute, “humanity,” in a way in which be room also for negative attributes the absence of that attribute is felt in every sense. Wherever references as a privation. Cohen explains that

to perfection are predicated, even the attribute “humanity” thereimperfections may not methodologi- with enters into an infinitesimal cally be excluded. The God-concept equation with “this man” in such a ought to be exempt from this gener- way that the privation is felt as a

al logical destiny of judgments. judgment: “This man” is now [Guide 1:52, 114-16; 1:55, 128-29; judged by the attribute of “humanWolfson 1973-1977, 2:195-97; also ity” which he is specifically lack-

Altmann 1966.] ing.4> Such an infinitesimal equation is termed by Cohen judgment 82. Maimonides opposes essential of origin.

divine attributes because they The privative judgment, resultimply the ambiguous duality of ing in an “opposition to inhumandefinition, which as such must be _ ity,” according to Cohen, is by no

formulated in terms of genus and means the same as a positive differentia specifica. [Guide 1:52, proposition that could advance 115; also Wolfson 1973-1977, humanity. The former task can be — 2:161-94; Samuelson 1969.] Such performed zealously without ever differentiation predicated as it is developing it into a dogmatic ideupon the relation between genus ology. The latter demands a kind and species is inadmissible in that of knowledge that is not far from

it would establish a comparison what religion calls “absolute between God and all nondivine knowledge,” and which is looked beings. “Those who allow for at by Cohen with suspicion. It is essential attributes (a7msy onxn) Plato who fully develops Democrithink that this position is compati- _tus’s thesis that being originates in

ble with the assumption that just nonbeing (wndev eivat), or, in as God’s essence is not compara- other words, that true Being ble to the essence of other (dvTws ov) is not identical with exbeings, so His essential attributes istence.** Cohen’s reading of Maiare not comparable to those of monides’ theory of negative attrib-

other beings; they agree that one utes systematically employs this definition cannot at once contain Platonic distinction between true divine and nondivine attributes Being (essence) and being (exis(anx 77) DIxp xn). However, they — tence), by proposing the subsequent

have failed to follow through their aboriginal negation “true Being

assumption rigorously: while does not exist” as the ethical maintaining the incomparability of grounds of Jewish tradition. True divine and nondivine attributes, being passes judgment on reality; it

their very allowing for positive does not become identical with it.

90 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES attributes, indeed, amounts to the | Although Maimonides had not inclusion of divine and nondivine | read the Timaeus, he probably attributes within one definition.” | knew of it. Maimonides, in fact, (Guide 1:55 [sic], Maimonides | rejects the cosmogenic theory de1856-1861, 1:225.) [The passage | veloped in Plato’s Timaeus, based is found in Guide 1:56, 131.] Since | upon his critique of the Platonic this incomparability precludes any | concept of prime matter (vAn).*° definition as well as any essential | From Cohen’s perspective, howattribute, the concept of divine | ever, this critique is outweighed by being is incomparable to that of | Maimonides’ indebtedness to the

any natural being; this incompara- ethical groundings of Platonic bility applies not only to essence, methodology and of Plato’s theory but equally to existence. [Guide | of creation. 1:57, 132; Altmann 1988, 314-15;

and Wolfson 1958, 1:121-25.] existence from those attributes “God's existence is necessary. upon which divine perfection is Accordingly, His existence is iden- predicated. Plantinga 1965, tical with His essence and His true 57-64.] It is in this context that the reality, thus His essence is His exis- | controversy about Maimonides’ tence” (Guide 1:57; Maimonides own opinion as to existence arose,

1856-1861, 1:232. ry ‘ipxX namely in the context of the quesISA TAN Osa ama NW 72pm tion whether existence may be SRA wasy) inmvaxi ws) [Pines in considered a_ divine essential Guide 1:132.] Since existence may attribute, while constituting an be transferred from man to God, accident when applied to natural and from God to man only as a_ beings (Maimonides 1856-1861, homonym, [the attribute of exis- 1:232; and also Kaufmann 1877, tence when applied to God desig- 422ff). nates only a way of speaking: dib-

bera Torah ki leshon bene adam 83. Maimonides thus steadfastly “the Torah speaks in the language _ insists upon attributes that are rad-

of man.” Guide 1:59, 140. God ically dissociated from essence. “exists, but not through ‘existence’ Even oneness is incompatible with

other than His essence. . . . He essence. “Now to ascribe to Him lives, but not through life, etc.” the accident of oneness is just as Guide 1:57, 132] this term cancels absurd as to ascribe to Him the itself out as an attribute of divine accident of multiplicity. | mean to

existence. [Maimonides antici- say that oneness is not a notion pates Kant’s critique of the ontolog- that is added to His essence, but

ical proof of God, denying that that He is one not through oneexistence can be “superadded” to ness.” [Guide 1:57, 132.] (Guide God's essence, therewith removing 1:57, Munk, 234. roy 7pwn 79 xT ID

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 91 FO Py MINNA PRD Dammam mapa void of any meaning, since the STN XP INN WIT Vax wayy 9p, Mai- meaning of the positive proposition

monides 1856-1861, 1:234) [Ibn as such has been invalidated. Ezra’s Sefer HaEchad defines the number one as that which contains 84. Now, if Maimonides establishes all multiplicity and division within Knowing God as the principle of itself. Ibn Ezra 1985, 399; according and basis for his entire system, then to medieval mathematics, one signi- its restriction to negative attributes fies immanence, constituting genus — signifies indubitably nothing but par excellence, since all other num- the following: that we may estab-

bers turn out to be its species.] lish and maintain true knowledge Hence positive attributes, even the of God preferably or even exclumost meaningful ones, become _ sively through negative attributes.

Getting Something from Nothing: Infinitesimal Equations — “The Wall That Does Not See”

85. Aristotelian logic, at least, (See 85.) Maimonides’ distinction offered Maimonides guidance in between negation and privation. its differentiation between nega- Aristotelian logic offered Maition and privation (atodaots and monides its differentiation beotepnotis). There are two ways of tween negation (atodacts) and

positing absence. Accordingly, privation (otepnots). Aristotle one may say, “The wall does not maintains that the privative judgsee,” or more exactly, “The wall is ment constitutes a proposition in non-seeing.” Aristotle designates which the predicate denotes a prithis non-being, that is, the wall’s vation, for example, “This man is lack of sight, in terms of the nega- blind,” whereas a negative judg-

tion particle ovk ov, and not in’ ment is a proposition in which terms of the privative particle tn the predicate constitutes a habit ov. Or, he classifies it as indefi- (e&ts), such as, “That man is not nite (aoptotov ovopa). [Aristotle seeing.” 1983a, 141; Boethius translates Cohen derives his terminology nomen infinitum, and therewith from ibn Tibbon’s translation of introduces the term infinite judg- the two Maimonidean Arabic ment into philosophical terminol- terms yrsn>x otpox and oqwv>KX ogy. Boethius’s Commentary on = powna>x as he’eder meyuchad (rela-

De Interpretatione, ad loc.; see tive privation)*® and _ he’eder Wolfson 1973-1977, 542-544.) gamur (absolute privation). AlHence, positing absence in a radi- Charizi translates the former as cal way is restricted to those rela- ha-efes ha-mugbal (infinitesimal

tions that present the lack not as zero), and the latter as ha-efes

92 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES deprivation, but that present the a-gamur or ha-efes ha-muchlat absence of the respective predicate (absolute zero).*’ The concept of as one that is expected. [Asin case _ the “infinitesimal,” a limit-concept of the proposition “The wall is not by means of which eighteenth-censeeing.”] Thus the proposition con- tury mathematicians and physicists veys that something is lacking, but began to measure movement and

not wanting, rejecting the entire velocity,** figures centrally in premise of the proposition, thereby Cohen’s Logik der reinen Erkennt-

confirming the absence of the is. There it signifies an epistemopredicate. [That is, the wall is not logical method in which knowledge expected to see in the first place— (something) is predicated upon a

how could one have possibly naught of knowledge (nothing). expected the wall to see?] Even the That naught, in which knowledge

possibility of such a rejection, is generated, amounts to an infinihowever, exposes the concept of tesimal origin, which Cohen also God to the peril of relation. The refers to as the Question:

more “relation” advances, the more questionable and ambiguous And thus we recognize the the profit of resorting to “absence” logical significance of the

becomes. question, as the fulcrum of

origin. .. . The question is the

86. But must we not attribute to beginning of cognition [emGod knowledge, hence reason, and phasis added]. therefore a soul—hence also life?-—

in order that He become compati- And further: ble with living creatures, or at least

with human beings, who possess a The question, however, is of rational soul? By the same token, such fundamental value only He may even exercise volition, and insofar as it leads towards an

hence be subject to passion, or at answer ... but the way toleast to affects. We notice how prof- wards the answer must not be itably “privation” recommends itself a straight one—since the ori-

as an expedient to the naive: God gin of “something” cannot be

must not be envious, irascible, sought in some other thing. spiteful, and vindictive; with refer- The judgment therefore must

ence to God, they hold that all not shy away from an advenaffects must logically be considered turous detour. . . . It is Nothprivations. [Thus, the naive believ- ingness which constitutes this ers invest their God with positive detour of thinking. It is by attributes—they know that God is means of this detour nothing-

loving, caring, good, and merci- ness that the judgment constiful—and it is on the basis of this tutes the origin of something knowledge that they deny God [emphasis added].*”

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 93 envy, spitefulness, and vindictive- This text leads us into the midst ness as privations that are not befit- | of the contemporary hermeneutiting the nature of God.] They reject | cal debate on deconstruction. Derthem, but not as a combination of | rida writes: incomparables, as in the proposi-

tion of the unseeing wall. [This is The impossible . . . has ocwhat they should have done, since curred: there is a history of

affects relate to God as seeing the question, a pure memory relates to the wall.] Logically speak- of the pure question which in

ing the rejection of divine affects its possibility perhaps authormust therefore not be one of priva- izes all inheritance and all tion but rather one of genuine nega- pure memory in general. ... tion; the positing of divine affects as [T]he question must be main-

such constitutes a contradiction. By tained. As a question... if contrast, polytheism, and no less this commandment has an

pantheism, relates God to the ethical meaning, it is not in whole gamut of modifications in that it belongs to the domain human consciousness, no matter if of the ethical, but in that it ulin conflict or in concord. [The gods timately authorizes every ethi-

of the pantheon display human cal law in general... . Thus emotions, and are all too human in the question is always entheir dealings with one another and closed; it never appears immewith the human world—love and diately as such, but only

hatred, anger, pride, jealousy. through the hermetism of a Rosenzweig 1990, 33-35; 1971, proposition in which the an-

36-38.] swer has already begun to determine the question. The pu- totle’s Metaphysics. It serves Mairity of the question can only monides as the paradigmatic propo-

be indicated or recalled sition when demonstrating the nonthrough the difference of a relativity of all divine attributes in hermeneutical effort.°° their application to God.>! Alexander comments upon ArisCohen’s hermeneutical effort in totle’s definition of privation in this

this essay consists in working his way: whereas I can claim of both a

method of origin through Mai- man and a wall that they are “not monides’ theory of actional attrib- seeing,” it is only the proposition

, utes, trying to develop knowledge “this man is blind” that should be of God as an ethical position (some- properly called a privation, and not thing) predicated upon transcen- the proposition “this wall is blind.”°* dence (nothing). “The wall does not Commentators of the Guide elabosee” is taken from Alexander of rated much upon Alexander’s examAphrodisias’s commentary on Aris- ple of the wall, making a distinction

94 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES between total negations (shelilab which subject and predicate are not koleleth) and specific negations related in any logical continuity— (shelilah meyuchedeth) of divine at- _ since no predicate would be expected

tributes, the latter being reminiscent naturally to pertain to God.’ Cohen, and logically analogous to Plato’s however, reads the medieval discus-

negation particle wn ov.>? sion of privation from the hermeneuCiting Aristotle, Maimonides _ tical perspective of his logic of origin.

maintains, as we have seen, that In this way—as the reader will real“nothing can be described in priva- ize—the most technical aspects of tive terms unless the characteristic Maimonides’ metaphysical terminoldenied by the predicate constitutes a ogy lend themselves to Cohen’s innonatural disposition of the subject.”°* vative epistemology of “getting When God assumes the role of the something from nothing”—an epissubject, it would seem, prima facie, temology that figures centrally in

that Maimonides’ negation of all Cohen’s advancement of the ethical positive attributes would have to _ significance of Maimonides’ theory amount to an absolute negation in of divine attributes.

Totalitarian Thinking: Aristotle, Hegel, and the Status Quo— A Note on Humankind 87. Thus Maimonides extends his (See 87.) Divine self-sufficiency. avoidance of privation even to the Such self-sufficiency, which expoint of rejecting life as a divine cludes humanity, characterizes the

attribute. For Maimonides, God’s God of Aristotle. The God of life is identical with divine knowl- Aristotle relates to the world onedge; (Guide 1:53; Maimonides tologically, as its first cause, not 1856-1861, 1:213-14, ovmm nan ethically, as Aristotle’s God is not

“nx rv) divine knowledge, howev- postulated to represent the er, means God's knowing Himself, world’s purpose.°° The self-com-

divine Self-awareness. (Guide 1:42; placency of Aristotle’s God, Maimonides 1856-1861, 1:150-51; whose thinking represents an onsee Kaufmann 1877, 400, with ref- tological totality, corresponds to erence to the critique of Abravanel, and culminates in Hegel’s notion InN pia om cn wasp ron >>) Mai- of the “absolute spirit” and its dimonides was able to avail himself alectic manifestations in history, here, formally speaking, of Aristo- which, according to Cohen, repre-

tle’s God-concept: God is the sents an unabashed apology of the object of His own thought. [Aristo- political and social status quo. In

tle 1977, 1072b, 149-51; Guide his Ethik des reinen Waillens, 1:68, 165-66; and Maimonides Cohen criticizes Hegel’s state1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei ment, “That which is rational ts haTorah 2:10.] Yet in thinking of real,” from Elements of the PhiHimself, the God of Maimonides losophy of Right:

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY | D5 must not be the exclusive content of Here the error of heteronomy His thought. Such self-sufficiency, is obvious. In no way does which excludes humanity, charac- moral reason coincide with

terizes the God of Aristotle. This reality, and in no way does makes no sense, however, for the moral law coincide with the Jewish God. According to Judaism, positive laws of historical re-

when thinking of Himself, God ality or of any particular must relate to mankind. The idea of State. Here lies the enormous man, however, must be the initiative difference between Hegel and

of God, and must not be derived Kant. Kant would say: that

from human existence. which is rational is not real, but rather ought to become The Aristotelian triumvirate real [emphasis added].°’ of cause, form, and end is situated, within Maimonides, as an

Confusingly enough, Mai- explication of the concept of Immonides’ ethical bent and implicit itatio Dei, “a seeking to be like

critique of the Aristotelian doc- unto His perfection.” This, in trine of divine self-contemplation turn, is interpreted by Cohen is itself framed throughout in clas- Platonically as the actualization

sical Aristotelian terminology: of love and justice, predicated

upon the knowledge of the

His will and His wisdom . . . are Good, upon the messianic per-

not something other than His fection of humanity. Cohen essence. Consequently He .. . is refers to the term mankind not the ultimate end of everything in its empirical, historical sense,

and the end of the universe is but rather in its futuric, messimilarly a seeking to be like Sianic sense: mankind does not unto His perfection as far as it is yet exist; its actualization is inwithin its capacity. ... Thus I cumbent upon the human will. have made it clear to you... True mankind has yet to be crethat He is an efficient cause, a ated—socially as well as politiform, and an end. For this rea- cally.°? “Messianism,” as Cohen son the philosophers designated Says, constitutes the “simple Him as a cause and not only as consequence of Jewish monothea maker [emphasis added].°® ism.” 69

More on Wisdom and Volition: More Critique of Ontology 88. From this perspective, itbecomes (See 88.) The inconsistencies of plausible for Maimonides to equate the medieval attempt to unify didivine volition with divine cognition. | vine essence and divine will (vol[Guide 2:13, 452; 3:25, 505-6; wuntas) in an ontological equation Diesendruck 1928, 508-10.] What led Spinoza to a denial of divine

96 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES does volition mean insofar as it is volition.©! Cohen’s reading of distinct from cognition? Obviously, Maimonides, on the other hand, that it initially generates its content transcends the entire medieval disand objective out of itself. This, how- cussion, claiming that will is not ever, creates a dichotomy of the an ontological attribute of God— mind’s content. [Guide 2:18, 301; in the sense that God “has will”— 2:21, 314-17; 3:20, 480-84.] Knowl- but rather that divine will is an exedge would then necessarily relate to pression of ethical lawfulness things that did not yet become actu- (God’s goodness and justice) in

al, whereas they should be already which human, ethical free will contained in God's self-awareness, originates. Divine voluntas is poswhich is unlimited in its actuality. tulated as a radical demand for the

Thus we would obtain not only a human pursuit of the messianic dichotomy in the content of divine task.®* Ethical will is therewith decognition, but even in the concept of fined not in terms of potentiality,

cognition itself, in terms of divine but precisely as the instantaneous

self-knowledge. actualization of the ideal Good.

Rashi on Genesis 1:1: A Non-ontological Concept of Creation 89. Hence, we also understand (See 89.) The very concept of crethat the very concept of Creation ation must have been objectionmust have been objectionable to able to Maimonides. Cohen’s cri-

Maimonides. The concept of Cre- tique of medieval religious ation points to a relation of tran- ontology results in a non-ontolog-

scendence between God and _ ical, atemporal reading of creman, whereas this relation has to ation, reminiscent of Rashi’s combe immanent. This immanence, mentary on Genesis 1:1: grounded in cognition, is threat-

ened by the concept of volition; The biblical text of bereshith the concept of Creation seems to bara does not intend to teach

carry out this threat. “Neither us anything about the tempopower nor will exists in, or ral order of creation—velo ba belongs to, the Creator with hamikra lehoroth seder respect to His own essence; for He habria—but rather the cre-

does not exercise power over ation narrative instructs and Himself, nor does He exercise ascertains that the world has volition over Himself. This would a divine purpose: bereshith

be unimaginable. Rather, these does not mean “in the beginattributes can only be posited with ning” but rather for the sake reference to the mutual relation- of: for the sake of Torah [for ships between God, the Exalted, the sake of the perfection of and His creatures.” (Guide 1:53. the world] God has created it

snx 5D pr psa odin pro 92 751 [emphasis added].

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 97 SOY XD NITW WaSY onan xa xy According to Cohen, it is not due Xow TA mn sy imyna awn xd sy | to ontological considerations that naw oyax oaxnn x Dax ox wes" | Maimonides defends the doctrine

myn oon pa oabnna oom nrnaa | of Creatio ex Nihilo against the x12 p31 Maimonides 1856-1861, | various Greek cosmogenic tradi-

1:214, [Guide 1:53, 122.]) tions,°* since any cosmogenic meaning of Creation will have to Creation, as Cohen says above, presume the immanence of divine “must have been objectionable” to essence. The ontological concept of | Maimonides.®>

God’s Immanence: How to Anticipate the Kingdom , 90. The concept of Creation as well (See 89.) Whereas the relationship as that of volition in general implies between God and man has tobe im-

a distinction between potentiality manent. Insofar as the very idea of and actuality. [Aristotle uses the Walking in God’s Ways is predicated terms potential and actual intellect upon human cognition, the relationin order to describe two states of the ship between God and man is imintellect: one before the act of think- manent—immanent for thought.°* ing, when the intellect is in the state Such an immanence of God for of a mere capacity; one contempo- thought (Cohen would say for ethi-

raneous with the act of thinking, cal reasoning) constitutes what when the intellect is an actuality. Cohen calls the correlation between Aristotle 1975, 165; and Wolfson God’s Being and the world’s Becom1958, 1:404-5. Maimonides—like ing.°’ The world will ever remain

Aristotle—denies this form of unfinished with its messianic task, potentiality when applied to divine because the ethical task transcends

cognition. Maimonides — the ways of the world. Each individ1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei ha- ual person holds the key to the realTorah 2:9-10; Guide 3:20, 483-84. ization of this task. The individual, Similarly, Maimonides rejects the in fact, anticipates redemption when association of a temporal sequence —actualizing the Good in the face of of events when referring to divine another human being. Cohen calls

volition, emphasizing the fact that such anticipation of redemption time itself is created. Guide 2:13, “ethical will.” Ethical will—a tran281-83.] Potentiality, however, scendental moment in which redoes not merely indicate contradic- demption is immanent—points to tion-free thinkability; such thinka- the immanence of God’s relationbility is already implied in essence, — ship with man. According to Cohen,

in cognition. For potentiality, in the idea of transcendence excludes contradistinction to thinkability, the the immanence of man and God. concept of time comes into play: But it includes the immanence of the we understand potential to be that relationship between God and man.

98 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES which is not yet actual. Thus priva- Relating to something potential tion and potentiality conjoin. This must be excluded from God— places a new burden on privation. hence even volition.

Docta Ignorantia 971. As a result of all these reflec- (See 91.) The term docta ignorantions, we may conclude that the tia coined by Nicholas of Cusa denegative attributes, of which Mai- notes a negation of any rational monides could avail himself, must knowledge of God. To Cohen, the inevitably take as their premise and mere negation of the knowledge of prerequisite the privative attributes, God does not yet provide us with in so far as we relate them to God. a helpful hermeneutical position,

[“No doubt it is a primary notion since such a negation functions that... with regard to Him all defi- logically like any other plainly afciencies must be denied.” Guide firmative dogma. (Cohen does not

3:19, 477.] Instead of saying that explore the possibility that the Maimonides advocates the doctrine classical doctrine of docta igno-

of negative attributes, we ought to rantia itself implies a negatio say that he admits only those nega- negationis, a critique of such simtive attributes that imply the nega- ple negation of knowledge.) The

tion of a privative attribute. Mai- negation of a privative proposimonides proposes by no means tion, on the other hand, such as merely a docta ignorantia. [See “God is not unjust,” constitutes a paragraph 77, above.] He is not medieval technique of delimitaeven ultimately concerned only tion; this amounts to an affirmawith the unknowability of God’s tion of infinite ways in which the essence. Rather, by multiplying attribute whose privation is exnegations, Maimonides promotes cluded—“justice”—ought to be the true, seminal, (ethical) cogni- established. Cohen points to the tion of God. [Guide 1:59, 138-39. ethical bent of this medieval techCohen associates this chapter with nique, claiming that its obsession Maimonides’ discourse on actional with “exclusions of privations,” in attributes in Guide 1:52, 118-19, fact, reveals a deep concern for the

and with the ethical reading of establishment of those attributes these attributes in Guide 1:54, that must remain beyond doubt— 124.] The ordinary use of privation, lovingkindness, justice, and true

as well as of affirmative superla- judgment. These actional attribtives, impedes and inhibits the true utes must remain, as they serve as knowledge of God. This applies not arch-images (Urbilder) for human only to those terms that are explic- emulation.®*

itly articulated as _ pantheistic expressions, but even to those

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 99 terms whose external appearance thus to proclaim deus sive natura. gives no indication of their latent In contradistinction, Maimonides negation: the concept of divine relates God exclusively to ethics. volition in itself creates such priva- Hence the only admissible divine tive meaning. The analogy to con- attributes are attributes of action.

sciousness, which is hardly These attributes, or characteristics inevitable, indicates the apparently [middoth], are the ways of God. (“It

almost insurmountable pitfall of is clear that the ways the cognition privation. At this point, Mai- of which Moses demanded of God, monides sets out to revise the issue. — and which God proclaimed to him,

| are the actions proceeding from 92. We are now in a position to God. The Sages call them middoth appreciate how Maimonides’ criti- and speak of thirteen middoth. This

cism of positive attributes distin- term, as they use it, is applied to gsuishes itself from that of his prede- | moral qualities of man, such as nine cessors. Jewish philosophy prior to — [sic] middoth of those who visit the

Maimonides had followed the path house of study, four middoth of

indicated by the neo-Platonists those who give alms. This usage who had advocated the doctrine of | occurs frequently. The meaning here

negative attributes. (See Kaufmann is not that God possesses moral 1877, 481.) Maimonides’ criticism, qualities, but that He performs however, expresses itself more actions resembling the actions that pointedly and more radically. He in us proceed from moral qualities— puts forward his critique even at the | mean from the aptitude of the risk of exposing himself to the sus- soul. . . . It is therefore clear that the

picion of dispensing with the ways and the characteristics are knowledge of God and of depriving — identical.” mipq77 "> aKNanT 72> 7

it of all content. Why does he com- oF oF omx ipstm ony? wpa AWK mit himself to this course and why = own? GeADNT Ayr aA mExan mawan did he feel impelled to do so? We = 251) O07 AN Dita TIwWY ww max m7,

know the focus of his thinking: it °D72 ma YANN .OINT mt Fp owiw. lies in ethics. Consequently he has an 7Pay cima mma yaaN wot m2? to negate, concerning the content 22x m7) 292 NW IPR Tn pum wat

of Knowing God, anything based ounxn mxanq mond nynt nia Fine upon privation—implicit or formal- > 92 AKNANT TAD AIA MSM 779 ny

ly explicit—in that it creates a link 3wmw XD PWR) INR MAM oan between God and something else .o7 nrwal mnon Oya AYym Guide

by analogy or through any other 1:54; Maimonides 1856-1861,

relationship. 1:218-19.) [The Hebrew word middah has been adopted from

93. Let us recall that pantheism con- the Latin modus, which in turn is siders it to be the summit of cogni- derived from the Greek pedovat

tion to impute nature to God, and (measure, or limit), or in the

100 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES transfigurative sense (a way of philosophy in particular, Efros acting). See Bacher 1923, 69-70; 1924, 67-68; Baneth 1985, 23; for the usage in Jewish medieval 1968, 2:146.] Midrash and Ethical Judgment 94. If, however, this meaning of the | (See 94.) Divine Emotions. middoth attributes that Mai- | Midrashic tradition, too, predicates monides articulates points to their | the admissibility of divine attributes

character as a model for human | as paradigms for human emulation emulation, then we must negate | upon ethical judgment. Divine atthose privations that would create | tributes such as vengeance, wrath, in human volition and conduct, a | and anger are ruled out as paraconflict with ethics, or even only a | digms for human conduct because collision with them, as for instance | they conflict with the pedagogy of in the case of emotions. It would be | Walking in His Ways.°? Cohen wrong to say that because emotion | points out that midrashic tradition belongs to volition, God must be | passes ethical judgment on the bibsubject to emotion as well—indeed | lical text when favoring some dithe opposite is true: since emotion | vine attributes over others, declardepends on volition, we had better | ing some to be educationally more negate volition as applied to God, | suitable for emulation than others. or sublate divine volition into cog- | Cohen has no problem with such nition. Negation of privations—that | exercise of ethical judgment, since is the true achievement of divine | he sees in the oral tradition an exunity: the exclusion of all relativity | pression of the very activity of criti-

from His essence. [Maimonides’ | cal, ethical reasoning itself. Even rejection of God's relativity with | the midrashic concept of God, acreference to anything other than | cording to Cohen, does not escape His essence extends even to a cri- | the scrutiny of this critique when it tique of God’s syntactical involve- | fails to answer the human plea for

ment in grammatical constructive | providing an ultimate ground of chains. For instance, one should | goodness.”? say, “the living God,” and not “the

life of God”; see Maimonides term negative attributes? This ques1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei _ tion involves another weighty issue. haTorah 2:10; also 1912, 100-101;

and Guide 1:68, 161.] 96. We have noted the ramifications of the ideas to which Maimonides 95, We have at this point attained a _ had to resort in order to implement more exact definition of negative his thesis: he had to sublate divine attributes. Yet, are they now entire- _ volition into divine cognition. Hence

ly free of the negative connotation one might be led into assuming a that seemingly attaches itself to the perspective from which the whole

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 101 battle against privations seems a life- © mankind cannot in principle lie out-

and-death struggle not only for reli- side of the God concept. Thus nega-

gionists, but even for those who _ tion of privations stands in need of would identify religion with ethics. If modification, in the process of which

we do identify God exclusively as its autonomous logical meaning the God of ethics, then the relation to shall be more clearly exposed.

Cohen’s Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (Logic of Pure Cognition): An Eminently Jewish Book? 97. Here we have reached a point | (See 97.) Here we have reached a

at which | pursue a basic idea of | point at which I pursue a basic my own systematic logic. This pur- | idea of my own logic. Cohen’s suit means that the impartiality of | hermeneutical approach in his discussion and the objectivity of | reading of Maimonides is derived

historical elucidation is put to a | from Cohen’s Logik der reinen difficult test. However, the reader | Erkenntnis, in which he develops as well as the author may rest their | a logic of origin that is predicated minds considering that the entire | upon the philosophical concept of history of philosophy exposes | purity. The concept of purity itself itself to the risk of the autonomous | closely interrelates with Cohen’s interest of speculation and hence | Jewish thinking: Cohen’s advance-

inescapably must be charged with | ment of the concept of pure the preference of certain prob- | thought and its plea for the infi| lems; or rather, if one may say so, | nite creativity of the human mind this ought to be the case. There | to interpret, change, and construct exists only one means of safe- | cultural facts owes itself to a culguarding against such subjectivity: | tural tradition whose hermeneutiresort to painstaking research of | cal creativity is predicated upon a the literary source material and the | God whose command to interpret, separation of hypothesis from fact. | change, and construct human real-

ity is rooted in His purity or Holi- haustible grounds of creativity and ness. In other words, the concept of goodness (traditionally speakof purity, which lies at the heart of ing, of holiness). The concept of Cohen’s logic, is a concept that is purity thus generates a tradition rooted in the sensibilities of Jewish within the tradition of which Mai-

tradition. monides is the most outspoken

On the other hand, Cohen’s rabbinic representative. Cohen and philosophical interpretation of pu- Levinas are the most prominent rity becomes the yardstick for modern heirs of this tradition. what is truly Jewish in Jewish tra- Cohen’s Logic correlates with dition. Through it, the nonmanip- the emphasis both on the oral and

ulable God safeguards the inex- on the ethical character of the

102 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Jewish tradition in that its very Maimonides’ theory of Knowing concept of origin establishes the God represents such kind of thinkpriority of what is unknown over ing in that its ethical position is

what is known, of the Other over predicated upon a nought of the Self.”! Rosenzweig’s Sprach- knowledge in which goodness denken and Levinas’s “ethics as_ functions as a transcendental limit.

first philosophy” are ramifications Cohen’s rejection of Jewish of Cohen’s Logic and his Ethics. mysticism as expressed in the traWe may therefore say that Cohen’s_ dition of Cabala and Chassiduth is

philosophical work—and not his grounded in prejudice: Cohen Religion of Reason—ultimately reads mysticism as an unveiling of delineates the method of his Jewish divine knowledge.”* Any unveiling

thinking. Whereas tradition pro- or positing of divine knowledge, vides content and parameters for for Cohen, however, signifies a Cohen’s Logic, especially the con- mythification—and myth, accordcepts of purity, origin, and infinity. ing to Cohen, Rosenzweig, and Accordingly, Cohen terms Jewish a Levinas, sacralizes the world.’”? In way of thinking infinitely occupied order for the world to relate to the with the integration of limits asin- idea of humanity, however, it must spired by the concept of purity. first be radically desacralized.”*

Philosophy and Oral Tradition: A Book May Be Closed, Lips and Mouths Continue to Speak The risk of the autonomous in- with the traditional hermeneutics terest of speculation. Cohen re- of Jewish oral tradition, and thus

assures himself and his tradi- retrieves a premodern mode of tional reader—both concerned discourse for his own critical phi-

, with the limits of subjective in- losophy. In the same way as ethiterpretation—by recalling the cal judgment is predicated upon fact that the interpretation of the futurity of the messianic ideal,

traditional Jewish texts at all the significance of any text is times has been determined by _ predicated upon future interpreta“autonomous interests of specu- tions. In this process, “the conlation.” Any hermeneutical ac- cept reigns supreme” (in the sense tivity continuously lends new _ that there is no limit to this intermeaning to the otherwise “silent pretative process), even though letters” of tradition, and must be the fate of any interpretive taninvested with such autonomous gent remains determined by the

interests.’ political structure of the commuIt seems that Cohen con- nity, and by its interaction with

sciously brings his own philo- the specificity of the texts themsophical method in correlation selves.”

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 103 On Divine Attributes: A Theory of Relativity

98. lf God is the God of ethics, the | (See 98.) The relationship to relationship to human beings must | uman beings must be inherent in

be inherent in Him. This is the | God. Cohen’s rigorous applicameaning of essence, hence also of | tion of his principle of origin in divine essence, that it constitutes | this paragraph introduces a theory the basis for relations. Therefore, | of relativity into Maimonides’ thewhile privations, which presume | ory of negative attributes. This comparability between man and | prepares for an epistemological God, shall be negated, it in no way | position in which divine actional

follows that the relationship | attributes are interpreted as vecbetween God and man is voided | tors for human action. As stated altogether through this negation of | earlier, Cohen thereby converts privative attributes; rather, on the | the conventional reading of Maicontrary, in this way we create the | monides’ theory of attributes as prerequisite foundation for gen- | negative theology into a philo-

uine (necessary) relatedness. | sophical formulation of MaiTherein lies the preference for | monides’ ethical position. these attributes over against the

positive ones. If | say, “God is that activity must remain.” Also wise,” | can only intend to define Diesendruck 1935, 147; and Spero His essence. The target of Knowing 1972, 73.] God, however, must not be cogni-

tion of His essence, but rather of 99. Hence, these attributes are His significance as the ethical more positive, more germane, than paragon. On the other hand, if | positive attributes. If | say, “God is say “God is not ignorant,” or more not powerless,” this signifies that accurately, “not not wise,” the “His existence suffices for the bringproposition aims at its grounding, ing into existence of things other at the origin of this attribute, and than He.” [Guide 1:58, 136.] Thus thus | attribute to God self-aware- _ the attribute “not powerless” consti-

ness and governance. Therewith, | tutes the origin of other beings relate to divine knowledge the besides God, whereas the attribute world with all that it contains. of “omnipotence” is entirely inca[Cohen seems to suggest that pable of attaining such a meaning. the double privation “not not-x” (say, “God is not not-active’”) 100. Moreover, if | say “God is not hermeneutically excels over both inattentive or negligent,” | mean the simple position “x” and the “that all beings follow a certain simple negation “not-x,” since it order and governance; that they are amounts to an affirmative proposi- not neglected and not given over to

tion excluding “all forms of inac- chance.” (t'rip7 PX 7A 12 InN tivity from God's essence in a way 9 OUND PRI AMDT ART) ODM FD NTw

104 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Oxy? “TTA we oimaesaw ... 4x 2 pxrw there is but One ethical grounding 920 NO) WoAK pty) andar ony oa7 and origin for the ethical world. Py TT yw FD CD yn TaD TWA NIT Mx 5D °D jany xd) Sma) x? anax = 703. By differentiating between emamaw) xO mam ato Sy moo mxygaim nation and irradiation, the concept of

7p 7wx> mm Guide 1:58; Mai- existence obtains the moment of monides 1856-1861, 1:244) [Guide action, and thus the attribute of 1:58, 136.] The apparently negative divine existence becomes an attribattribute, that only seems to forfenda ute of action. Maimonides himself

frivolity, implies governance and combines the two terms negation providence, whereas “will” does not — and privation. He calls our attention

imply such a transitive relationship. | to the usage of attributes in the books of the prophets, “that they are 101. Therefore, Maimonides defines attributes of action or that they indithe identity of essence and existence cate the negation of their privations in such a way that “it by no means in God.” (BOA Naw 7M ANW OAK

suffices for Him to exist solely for 12 wax Dax yop Tava xq oan

Himself, but myriad existences 1X Twa “RN ow WN. aw An emanate from Him. And this emana- .a7tyn now Oy mon Guide 1:59; tion is unlike that of heat from fire Maimonides 1856-1861, 1:258.) and unlike the proceeding of light Here, both pertinent moments are from the sun. Rather, this emanation explicitly stated: the designation of constitutes the grounds of existence, the negative as negation of its privaits duration and order by means of _ tive has the sense of an infinite judgwisely contrived governance.” (71% ment as the proposition of origin; MpmOA WY NIT WX ImNEsA PR xyam [As in the case of the infinite propo-

Na myaw Jax aaa xya mow 1» sition “God is not-ignorant,” in on> per pawn Sax... manomyrya which the negation of privation Opn mA. ArT orp) ATaY Tan indicates an infinite affirmation of Guide 1:58; Maimonides God's knowledge: “God is the ori1856-1861, 1:243) [Guide 1:58, gin of cognition.” The advancement 136.] The essence of God conse- of this epistemological position is quently signifies not merely His own — predicated upon Cohen’s concept

being [Wesen]|—and insofar as _ of origin, which assumes an infiniGod's essence is equated with exis- _tesimal integrative function in intertence, it relates not merely to divine — preting cultural facts, as it is critical

existence—but extends even to the of all fundamental, dogmatic emanation of other beings, and to assumptions that are supposed to lie

the governance of them. beyond the reach of the activity and creativity of interpretation/thinking

102. Hence this is also the meaning _ itself.] at the same time, Maiof God's uniqueness: that He has no ~=monides equates the attributes thus

peer, which ultimately means that defined with actional attributes.

RELIGION AS IDOLATRY 105 The Priority of Ethics over Religion 104. Now we are in a position to | (See 104.) To ground the entire reliappreciate Maimonides’ innova- | gion of Israel in ethics. A clarificative contribution to the doctrine of | tion in terms of Cohen’s notion of attributes in its historical perspec- | “religion” is useful here. Cohen’s tive vis-a-vis his predecessors. In | later modification of “religion” in fact, he shares with all of them the | terms of its peculiarity or specificity, tendency to fend off all corporeal- | in which he emphasizes the individ-

ity and all anthropomorphism on | ual’s existential relationship to behalf of pure Jewish monotheism. | God,’’ leaves the paramount imporThis relates to his basic tendency | tance of the ethical ideal in Judaism

to ground the entire religion of | unimpaired. Throughout his later

Israel in ethics, and, insofar as it | writings, Cohen continues to can be carried out, to dissolve reli- | maintain the universality of the

gion into ethics. messianic objective in Judaism. He does so by emphasizing its re105. Even the methodological | demptive promise for all people,

force of his philosophical specula- | thus continuously establishing the tion exceeds that of all his prede- | priority of ethics over religion.” cessors. Maimonides’ combat is directed against materialism in all formalism. Only with Maimonides

its consequences and rudiments. does the doctrine of negative His victory is therefore the triumph attributes assume the vital serious-

of idealism. [Note that Cohen ness that commands our attention: speaks here of critical idealism in _ the far-reaching ramifications of his sharp contradistinction to the ide- | doctrine reveal themselves. There-

alism of Hegel which became the fore only Maimonides provokes target of the existentialist critique.] _ vehement polemics against this Hence, his methodology alone doctrine on the part of immature does not permit us to conceive of believers. Maimonides’ oeuvre

him as an Aristotelian. emerges from this situation as a true classic characterized by shun-

106. Moreover, in his capacity as ning eclecticism, enlivening the an author Maimonides demon- mere technicalities of argument, strates his originality. His prede- and lending vitality to their real cessors turn out to be more or less | consequences. Thus, he brings the eclectics; hence in their discus- problem of divine attributes toward sions, even the thesis of negative a solution and its treatment to full attributes remains on the level of | maturity.

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The “Unity of the Heart” On Love and Longing (Where Ethical Method Fails) Contemplating main topics of Maimonidean theology, such as the relationship of cognition and love, love and fear of God, and questions of eschatology, Cohen in this fifth chapter explores the consequences of his Platonic reading of Maimonides’ theory of divine attributes for a Jewish theology that is grounded in but not exhausted by its rational founda-

tions. In discussing the aesthetic dimension of love, Cohen here as well as , elsewhere in his Jewish writings focuses upon the medieval thinker Bahya ibn Pakuda. The critique of the Aristotelian eudaemonian ethics continues to be the issue against which Cohen turns his critical argument.

Divine Omniscience and Human Volition

} 107. In keeping with his doctrine of | (See 107.) No contradiction beattributes, Maimonides rejects the tween the freedom of the human distinction between intellect and being and divine omnipotence. Acvolition. Volition constitutes that cording to Maimonides, the omnisforce (no1>°) in which impulse cience of God expresses itself as the merges with reason. Impulse has not rational order of the universe, and yet reached the stage of affect and therefore divine omniscience does

does not yet claim the status of an not contradict but rather endorses autonomous potency vis-a-vis rea- the faculty of human reasoning. son. Hence Maimonides is able to Human reasoning, in turn, is predteach freedom of will, but not mere- icated upon the freedom of will ly in the psychological or anthropo- without which there would be no logical sense, according to which accountability for one’s actions. Aristotle admits that even children Maimonides’ concepts of divine

and animals possess freedom— and human will, Cohen claims, which freedom, however, lacks all converge, or correlate in the ethical ethical implication. [Aristotle 1945, task of human perfection—KnowNE 1111b, 129.] Maimonides insists ing God and Walking in His Ways.!

108 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES that intentionality is intrinsic to lishment of a basic ethical relationfreedom, a demand that Aristotle ship between God and the human dismisses. Maimonides does not being. There can be but one reason brook any contradiction between upon which knowing God is necesthe freedom of the human being — sarily predicated. Maimonides and the omnipotence or omnis- adopts the interpretation of ibn Ezra cience of God. Otherwise we_ that we may read as a corollary to

would have to admit a conflict Hear O Israel: “The mediator between reason human and divine; between God and the human it is precisely this conflict, however, beings is reason.” 772) CUNT Pa N77

that is resolved through the very Ww win rnox (See Guide 3:52 7Wwx definition of reason. Perhaps we piaw7 NXT... 2207 ~wT pr wr) [also

may then say that ultimately the ibn Ezra 1985, 142; and ibn Ezra’s concept of reason in Maimonides commentary on Mishlei 22:21 in means none other than the estab- ibn Ezra 1884, 31].

Mediation and Kingship: Reading ibn Ezra

“The Mediator between God Cohen reads the Shema as the and the human beings is reason” classical Jewish expression of the [hamal’akh ben ha-adam uven_ correlation between God’s oneness

elohav hu sikhlo], says ibn Ezra and the messianic unity of in his preface to his commentary mankind.’ This reading renders in-

on the Torah, emphasizing that congruent any mythical imagery the hermeneutical principles of concerning the intellect mediating

biblical commentary and of the between God and the human oral tradition reflect a rational being. Maimonides’ use of the neopractice of interpreting Torah. It Platonic image of divine overflow, is not by chance that Cohen dis- “likening God to an overflowing cusses this statement in the con- spring of water,”* represents to

text of Shema Yisrael, as he Cohen a mere conventional way thereby alludes to a playful allit- of speaking, as the implications of erative association of malakh_ divine overflow seem to suggest a

and melekh, of “mediator” and mediation of God and world in “king,” positing God’s oneness ontological ways. On the other as the mediating ground for the — hand, the concepts of holiness and

obligation traditionally ex- purity, upon which Cohen’s readpressed as “kabbalath ‘ol ing of Maimonides is predicated, malkhuth shamayim” [taking demand that any such mediation the yoke of God’s kingship upon between God and humankind be

oneself].2 volitional.

THE “UNITY OF THE HEART” 109 Knowledge and Love 108. The unity of knowledge and | (See 108.) The fundamental identity will leads Maimonides to establish | of knowledge and love. Against a the fundamental identity of knowl- | purely rationalist reading of Maiedge and love. [Maimonides 1971, | monides’ theory of Knowing God,

59, directive 3; Maimonides | Cohen argues that “if God were 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah | only an object of knowledge, then 10:6; Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah | God would not be ‘Unique,’ for 2:2, 4:12; Guide 1:39, 89; 3:28, | knowledge has other objects and 512-13; 3:51, 621.] He is not the | other problems.”> Striving to know first to propose this idea, nor even | God implies a commitment of love. the first to develop it. We find this | Love of God results in an act of eth-

idea among all Jewish philoso- | ical volition: “If ethics had not disphers; [Haberman 1973, 190-92; | covered the principle of volition, it the identity of knowledge and love | would have had to evolve from the originates with the biblical text. | [monotheistic] religion.”® Love of Genesis 4:1 and the Hebrew root | God is, then, inextricably linked to

*vd“; also Rashi on Genesis | a cognitive process—it is episteme 18:19.] Bahya, in particular, is of | in the truest sense of the word, since

lasting significance due to his | it refers to a process in which deeply significant correlation of | thought gives an account of itself.

this idea with his tenet of unity Consequently, Cohen, when (“unifying the heart” in the] asked the question what it means Hebrew of ibn Tibbon: yichud ha- | to love God, emphatically declares:

ley|. The whole of rabbinic litera- | “How is it possible to love any-

ture is suffused with this idea of | thing but an idea? ... Only the love. Even in Scripture, this idea of | ideal can I love. . . . The ideal is the love represents the distinctive mark | archetype of ethics.”’ Scorned by

of the monotheistic concept of | the existentialist critics of rationGod. [JS 3:48-52. Uncharacteristi- | alism as the “philosopher’s love of cally, Cohen makes use of a classi- | God,”® Cohen’s assertion that love cal gematria—substituting numeri- | of God is a cognitive commitment cal values for the Hebrew letters—to |. corresponds, in fact, with the traemphasize the equation of love and | ditional commentaries on Shema oneness, both of which Hebrew | Yisrael and the pertaining Sifre: terms—ahavah and echad—amount to the numerical value of thirteen. JS And what is called true love

3:49.] of God? The answer is “and these words shall be upon heart you will come to know your heart”—by keeping God and will thus be able to “these words” close to your cleave to His ways. ”

110 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Bahya ibn Pakuda and the “Unity of the Heart”: Beyond Philology

Unifying the Heart. Cohen cites tion as the “unity of heart,” or

Bahya as follows: yichud ha-lev, in Bahya’s original Arabic text.!* The philologists say

The unification of the heart that Cohen’s entire commentary has two aspects: firstly, the on Bahya’s “unity of the heart” is unity of the heart that is the result of a philosophically gergrounded in the unity of God; mane mistranslation, namely that and secondly, the unity of the of Yehuda ibn Tibbon in his rendi-

heart when it is directed to- tion of the Hebrew term yichud wards God, when one per- ha-lev for the Arabic original. forms an act directed towards Cohen’s answer to Bacher is the world-to-come, obligatory poignant: adherence to philology is,

or voluntary.!° indeed, necessary for any significant | commentary, but adherence to mere Throughout his reading of philology may prove deficient when

Bahya, Cohen argues that the addressing a philosophical quesunity of the heart and the unity of tion.’ First, we may say that even one’s actions are both predicated the literal translation of the Arabic upon the Jewish concept of the achlaz, as tohar ha-matspun, does

unity of God.'! In other words, strengthen Cohen’s reading, as there is a correlation between the tohar ha-matspun should itself be individual’s innermost being (lev) rendered as the purity of one’s inwith the one God which results innermost being (Innerlichkeit).'® the unity of one’s action (yichud Secondly, and more important, the ha-ma’aseh), an expression that we Judeo-Arabic tradition itself coined find in the Arabic original.'* The the term yichud ha-lev in its classi-

unity or purity of the heart thus cal rendition of the Arabic term represents to Cohen the very cul- achlaz, as Saadya himself associates mination of the spirit of Judaism.'> that Arabic term with the biblical Philologically there has been yached levavi (Psalms 86:11) in his disagreement with Cohen’s Tib- _ translation of Psalms into Arabic.!” bonite reading of Bahya’s notion of Thirdly, the very connotation of the “unity of the heart.” Both Cohen’s Hebrew term lev is one of a spiricontemporary, the Arabist Wil- tual, cognitive, and volitional funchelm Bacher, as well as a contem- tion, since the opposition of heart porary Arabist, Yosef Kafih, point and mind does not exist for the Heto the fact that there is no such no- _ brew term l/ev.!®

THE “UNITY OF THE HEART” 111 Where Ethical Method Fails: The Innermost Part of the Soul (Innerlichkeit) 109. The question of how the con- (See 108.) Cohen’s focus on Inner-

cept of love is to be combined lichkeit, or on the “unity of the with the God-concept is very diffi- heart,” implies a critique of the cult. The Greek gods are venerat- ethical method and its universaled, yet love is not a technical term ism—a critique that hinges upon of Greek worship; as we know, in the person’s uniqueness and parfact, the elimination of all erotic — ticularity. Cohen develops this crielements from worship must have _ tique fully in his Religion of Rea-

been the primary concern of the som: Out of the Sources of prophets. [Levinas shares Cohen’s Judaism. Cohen’s reading of position: “Such Love [of God is] Bahya’s concept of the soul or without Eros.” See Levinas 1996, heart as the “innermost part of 140. For a critic of Levinas on one’s being”—proposed first in this issue, see Bruckstein 2001, this essay on Maimonides and 128-35. Eroticism in Jewish wor- later in his essay on Bahya— ship has become a major issue brings into focus a uniquely peramong contemporary Kabbala sonal relationship with God. This scholars who dispute Scholem’s — relationship, by dint of its very claim that there is no unio mystica specificity, must escape the strucin Jewish tradition. See Scholem ture of ethics: the one God does

1995, 123, and his critics: Idel correlate with one mankind, but 1988a, 24, 52: E. Wolfson 1995.] the correlation between the For them, from a merely linguistic | unique God and the single human perspective, the word love implies soul escapes the universal method

knowledge. [Genesis 4:1, 4:17, of ethics: 4:25, 24:16; 1 Samuel 1:19.] Even

if knowledge takes on sensual sig- Ethics, so to speak, is no re-

nificance, sensuality cannot be specter of persons... . Each considered its dominant meaning, one represents to ethics but rather the sensual connotation merely the self-same symbol

has a concomitant metaphorical of mankind.'” ring to it. [ROR 269; RdV 314,

invoking Hosea 2:21; see also Cohen’s concept of radical subJeremiah 2:2 and the gamut of jectivity is borne out by the relametaphorical interpretations of tionship between the unique God Song of Songs.] On the other and the single soul. Traditional hand, love attains through this Jewish concepts such as devekuth association a more spiritual and (cleaving to God), ahavath hashem ethical character. Thus the love of | (love of God), and ahavath hahuman beings is generated by the _ reah (love of one’s neighbor) point

112 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES love of God: love of one’s fellow, | to relationships whose roots lie be-

the stranger, hence of mankind. | yond the grasp of ethical method. The love of mankind reflects the | In other words, the soul’s passion-

love of God, since God is the | ate love of God, manifest in her paragon for man. To love God | compassionate response toward means to cultivate ethics which, in | the suffering of her neighbor, testi-

turn, constitute the essence of | fies to an aesthesis, an emotional God. [RoR 144-64; RdV 167-91; | commitment. Such a commitment

ErW 403.] “penetrates body and soul,”?° es-

caping all universal definitions of des reinen Geftihls (Aesthetics of ethics and humanity, while remain- pure feeling)—a book that has not ing faithful to fulfilling precisely been studied enough and whose

what ethics would demand. content is yet of profound influCohen’s reading of Bahya_ ence for twentieth-century Jewish points to the longing of the human thought**—defines aesthesis as

soul. This longing is directed to- “feeling, taste, sensory knowlward the fulfillment of that which edge.” This emotional quality of is ethical, notwithstanding the fact aesthesis lies at the roots of one’s that the ethical, due to its universal commitments to others, and as

structure, cannot relate to the such ethical commitments, in paruniqueness of the soul, her particu- ticular, are anchored in the very lar existence. Ethical demands turn _ singularity of the individual, in the out to be precisely that—duties of very singularity of the other person

the heart—and as such these de- whose suffering touches one’s own mands of ethics themselves know _ soul.*°

no legal measure. They are predi- Cohen’s discussion of Bahya’s cated upon the passions of the concept of the “unity of the heart” soul (“love of one’s fellow, love in this essay is of much significance

and fear of God, Walking in His as it provides a new insight into Ways”), says a thirteenth-century the distinction between ethics and compendium of Jewish law, and _ religion in his later work. Cohen’s have no shi’urim—no quantified reading of Bahya’s yichud ha-lev as

legal measure.7! the “innermost part of one’s Cohen’s distinction between being” both transcends and under-

God’s oneness and God’s unique-_ girds the demands of ethics. Bahya ness, between ethical will and the himself says in his Book of Direchuman soul, teaches a knowledge tion to the Duties of the Heart: of ethics that is itself anchored in the “innermost part of the soul.”* [The obligations of the law]

The soul “tastes” God in a way are of no avail to us unless that escapes both the ethicist and our hearts choose to do them the theologian.?? Cohen’s Asthetik and our souls desire their per-

THE “UNITY OF THE HEART” 113 formance. .. . These obliga- the human heart—das Menschentions are upon us constantly, herz—are Cohen’s terms for a pereverywhere and at all times, son’s innermost self in her relationaccompanying every hour, ship to the unique God. The soul is every minute, every situation, longing: “My soul longs for You,

as long as our minds and O God; my soul thirsts for the liv-

souls are yet with us.*° ing God.”?°

Cohen quotes this Psalm often

Which obligations? Bahya ex- in order to express an emotional emplifies the “duties of the heart” longing that transcends the con-

by citing from Leviticus: fines of all theoretical structure while strictly heeding the ethical

Thou shalt not take demands of the God who charges vengeance, not bear any “to do justice and walk humbly grudge. ... Thou shalt love before your God.”?? The concludthy neighbor as thyself .. . de- ing paragraph of Bahya’s Book of

part from evil and do good; Direction to the Duties of the seek peace, and pursue it.7” Heart stresses the ethical ramifications that ensue from yichud haCohen’s emphasis upon Bahya’s_ /ev, from the relationship between

concept of yichud ha-lev in this a person’s innermost being and essay—alternately to be rendered God. We are exhorted

as “the unity of the heart” and “the uniqueness of the human to control your tongue, to rule soul”—reaches far deeper than the over your senses, to master philologist’s critique: While ethics your desires, to restrain your

may not know the human soul, members, to scrutinize your Bahya’s “unity of the heart” does. thoughts, to make your deeds The human soul—die Seele—and the equal of your knowledge.” “All My Goodness”: A Critique of Cosmic Love 110. This conclusion, this equiva- (See 110.) Ethics is the recognizable

lence, Maimonides achieves with attribute of God. God’s answer to great precision, with intense devo- Moses’ request to know the ways tion, with classical perspicuity, and of God is, “I will make all My he applies it creatively to his entire goodness pass before Thee.”°! Actheology and ethics. Knowing God cording to Maimonides, the knowlis loving God, and love of God is edge of the goodness of God is not

knowledge of God; these are the only predicated upon an_ under-

two vectors of one and the same standing of the natural order fundamental idea which promoted (Cohen comments that goodness Maimonides to the status of Israel’s can never be demonstrated by

114 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES teacher par excellence for all time. | reference to natural order), but the Both love of God and knowledge | goodness of God rather signifies an

of God, however, are equivalent to | ethical order whose content has love and knowledge of ethics; for | been revealed to Moses in terms of ethics is the recognizable attribute | human ethical characteristics, the of God. There is no love of God | Thirteen Attributes.** Acting upon that is not by definition knowledge | the knowledge of these attributes of God, or knowledge of ethics. By | represents the love for God about knowledge of God, Maimonides | which Cohen speaks. Aristotle’s does not mean some adjunct to | concept of the Prime Mover offers metaphysics, such as knowing the | its own teleological explanation of Prime Mover of the spheres, [Aris- | “cosmic love”: “the Good . . . is the totle 1977, Metaphysics 1072a—b, | end of some action which causes

147-49.] nor any ontological | motion as being an object of knowledge of the divine metaphys- | love.”°°? This explanation is reical substance, but rather he refers | flected verbatim in Maimonides’ exclusively to the cognition of the | cosmological claim that the motion divine ethical character, hence to | of the stars is the result of “a desire knowledge as love. Thus it seems | for that which ... is the beloved obobvious that Maimonides reveals a | ject: namely, the deity, may His more profound kinship with Plato | name be exalted.”**

than with Aristotle, although he Cohen, of course, reads this may have only been familiar with | Aristotelian teleology of cosmic Timaeus. [Pines’s introduction to | love within the context of mythiMoreh ha-Nebukhim, Guide Ixxv. | cal ontology. Whereas myth is in-

It was Diesendruck who first | terested in the ontological origins explored Cohen’s Platonic reading | of things (such as the origin of of Maimonides. Diesendruck | motion, the origin of matter), Jew1928, 415-535, esp. 416; also | ish monotheism focuses instead Cohen paragraph 32 in chapter 2 | upon the origins of this world’s

of this book.] purpose—arriving at God’s word as the grounds of goodness, of neighbor.’ According to both justice, and of love of one an- Cohen and Maimonides, cosmolother. Jewish thinking—or better, ogy and physics are subordinate

Cohen’s own critical philoso- to theology and ethics. This is phy—takes up the task of oppos- why Maimonides’ own physics, ing any ontology of origins. Aris- which is decidedly Aristotelian,

totelian cosmology is associated does not stand in the way of with the panpsychic love of heav- Cohen’s distinctly ethical and Pla-

enly bodies while Cohen’s reading tonic reading of Maimonides’ of messianism correlates with the metaphysical theory of Knowing

concreteness of love of one’s God.*°

THE “UNITY OF THE HEART” 115 Jeremiah’s Wisdom: Saadya on Textual Reasoning 111. The Guide concludes charac- (See 111.) The authority of Jereteristically with an urgent appeal to muah. It is useful to quote Jeremiah

commit oneself to the pursuit of (9:22—23) in full: knowledge. Maimonides grounds himself in the authority of Jeremiah Let not the wise man glory in

(9:22-23), that knowing God his wisdom [nnn]; let not the should motivate man’s sole aspired strong man glory in his dignity; and this knowing is charac- strength; let not the rich man terized as wisdom (ma dm). Even glory in his riches. But only in adherence to the Law is reduced to this should one glory: in his “preciousness,” and does not attain earnest devotion to Me. For I the rank of Knowing God. (Rosin the Lord act with kindness, 1876, 103, emphasizes the differ- justice, and equity in the ence between knowledge of God world. For in these I delight—

| and faith in God.) [Also Kafih’s declares the Lord.°’ commentary on Sefer ha-Mitsvoth

in Maimonides 1971, 58n. 1. See The context in which MaiMaimonides’ reading of Midrash monides discusses Jeremiah 9:22-—23

Bereshit Rabba (1996, 333) in inthe Guide enhances Cohen’s readGuide 3:54, 636-37. The term ing. Chokhmah (wisdom), as indichefets (desire) is used there in three cated by Jeremiah, refers to that different contexts: (a) Chafatsekha kind of knowledge which estab(Proverbs 3:15), “things you canst lishes our existence in the world-to-

desire,” which refers to worldly come, and constitutes the highest - precious goods; (b) chafatsim human perfection.°® Knowledge of (Proverbs 8:11), “things desirable,” God, however, is no intellectual which refers to the commandments achievement alone (“let not the wise

and good deeds that are precious man glory in his wisdom”) but it and desirable to God; and, the most rather hinges upon the actualization

inspiring meaning, (c) chafatsti of “kindness, justice, and equity.” (Jeremiah 9:22), “that which God Scripture goes on to say, “For I, desires,” which refers to lov- God, act with kindness, justice, and ingkindness, justice, and true judg- equity in the world. For in these I ment, “that you understandeth — delight.”

and knoweth Me.” Guide 3:54, Maimonides follows the ratio636-37.] Maimonides makes the nalist tradition of Saadya’s hermefundamental distinction between neutics. Accordingly, oral tradition Torah and Wisdom (aman). [Guide (any authoritative interpretation of 3:54, 634, 636: “the term wisdom Hebrew Scripture) must be atten(chokhmah), used in an unrestricted tive to the principles of correct

sense and regarded as the end, speculation. Saadya advises that

116 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES means in every place the appre- | “if Scripture does contradict reahension of Him; that all the actions | son [a convincing way of reasonprescribed by the Law [are] not to | ing], the text in question should be be compared with this ultimate | interpreted accordingly.”°? Cohen

end . . . being but preparations | proposes that it is just this correcmade for the sake of this end.” Mai- | tive and creative attitude toward

monides advances a functional | traditional texts which constitutes concept of Torah in that “actions | the distinct hermeneutical rationale prescribed by the Law” lead to the | of Jewish oral tradition. Creative higher end of Knowing God—a | interpretation, which Cohen refers

knowledge culminating in the | to as the activity of “the concept,” active recognition of “lovingkind- | provides the grounds for a “conness, justice, and true judgment.”] | struction” of the sources of JuIn this distinction he might well | daism.*° Tradition itself teaches base himself upon a significant | that the written text, the literal auHaggadic passage: “When a person | thority of Scripture, in fact, hinges appears before the heavenly court | upon and results from oral tradithey first ask: ‘During your lifetime, | tion. In other words, oral tradition

have you fixed a schedule for | does not provide the community studying Torah; have you devoted | with interpretation—where the yourself to the pursuit of wisdom; | written text serves as the passive have you drawn inferences from | basis for such interpretation—but that which you were taught?” [in | rather the text itself is already a TB Shabbat 31b; RoR 91; RdV106.] | poesis, a poetic rendition of meanMaimonides concludes: “It thus has | ing, the result of a prior hermeneu-

become clear to you that, accord- | tical effort to make sense of the ing to the Sages, knowledge of | teaching.*! Torah is of one kind, and wisdom is Moses taught the Torah for of another kind, and that it is wis- | forty years before it was committed dom which must verify the teachings | to writing, and once there was a of the Torah through true speculation” | lapidary written text, it could not

Cmax oyyyn monn mya maxd xm)| be studied without commen-

(Guide 3:54). [Guide 634.] taries.4* Interpretative activity is

prior to the text: oral tradition in- ity of Saadya and Maimonides in

seminates and thus generates what their rational bent of this teaching, . only literalists (fundamentalists) claiming that the rational investigawill consider to be “prior” to inter- tion of the Writ—the hermeneutipretation—namely the written text cal quest for meaning—constructs itself.4? Cohen follows the author- the authority of the Jewish source.

THE “UNITY OF THE HEART” 117 Love, Awe, Fear

112. This identity of knowledge and (See 112.) Love and awe. The love led to the important distinction term awe (Ehrfurcht) connotes an

between love and fear [Furcht.| emotion of mingled reverence, [Bamberger 1929; Urbach 1987, dread, and wonder, inspired by 400-419. Sifre on Deuteronomy something majestic or sublime. 6:5 (Sifre 1993, 54); Isaac ben Fear (Furcht or Angst) on the Joseph of Corbeil 1937, 3-5, other hand, refers to an “appretogether with the gloss of Rabbenu hension caused by the expecta-

Perets therein; Bahya 1973, tion of danger, pain, disaster, or 435-36; Judah ha-Levi 1964, the like.”*4 Cohen associates 113-15, 143-50; Maimonides serving God out of fear with an 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah extrinsic (heteronomous) rela10.] Just as love is, so also is feara tionship whose motivation is basic term in worshiping God. The dominated by material factors,

concept of fear clearly links reminiscent of the very nature of monotheism with polytheism. idol-worship. “The concept of However, even the latter does not fear clearly links monotheism resign itself to fear, but rather devel- with polytheism,” he writes. Mai-

ops it into shy reverence (atéws). monides, too, claims, [ErW 490, *atdws.] The biblical concept of awe does not connote Let not a man say, “I will

terror-stricken dread, but rather observe the precepts of the grateful devotion, as demonstrated Torah and occupy myself in the context of the verse: “You with its wisdom, in order shall revere the Eternal, your God, to that I may obtain all the

Him attach yourself.” Ga [...] 30 blessings written in the patn) [Deuteronomy 10:20.] To Torah, or to attain life in revere God means to attach one- the world to come; I will self—whereas the natural effect of abstain from transgressions fear should be daunting, recoil and against which the Torah restraint. Thus we find that the Jew- warns, so that I may be ish philosophers, drawing on Tal- saved from the curses writ-

mudical sources, have linked awe ten in the Torah, or that I and love as “awe-filled love” (Ax may be cut off from life in Manx ow). Here again Bahya pre- the world to come.”*° cedes Maimonides with his deep

sensitivity; yet the Maimonidean whereas awe or reverence corpresentation of this linkage surpass- relates with “knowledge and es him. [Maimonides 1984-1996, _ love.”*®

118 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 2:1-2: the commandments, he does “God commands us to love Him devise a differentiation of trenchant and to be in awe of Him.... When character and thus surpasses him: a person contemplates God’s works performance of the command-

... she will immediately love, and ments educates man toward the praise, and... will be seized by a awe of God, whereas knowing God keen longing passion to know the and his oneness leads man to the Great Name. ... When this person love of God. [Guide 3:52, 629-30; now deliberates upon all these also Nachmanides on Exodus 20:8, things ...she willbe... conscious _ relating “directive” commandments that she is but an insignificant, low to love of God, and “injunctive” and obscure creature, standing commandments to fear—or hold in light-minded and ignorant before awe—God: “And the former are the Perfect Mind. ...In accordance greater than the latter, as love is

with these matters, | shall explain higher than fear.” Nachmanides

great principles of the work 1971-1976, 2:309-10; also Rashi wrought by the Master of the cos- (1982, 529) on Deuteronomy 6:5 mos, so that they may serve as a_ (Sifre 1993, 54).] Hence the cere-

gateway for the cogitator to love monial laws are relegated to a

God.” (translation by author) preparatory stage of worship, which expresses itself as fear. This 113. We have highlighted Abraham _ stage is preliminary to and distinct

ibn Daud’s achievement of distin- from genuine worship, which is suishing categories among the laws serving God through knowledge of the Torah. [Paragraph numbers and love. Worshiping God by perA1 through 45 in chapter 2 of this forming the commandments is book.] Although Maimonides does equivalent to entering the antenot introduce such qualitative dis- chambers of the sanctuary dedicattinctions into the classifications of ed to the one God.

Becoming Like God— Righteous, Holy, and Wise: Plato’s Theaetetus

114. The identity of knowledge and (See 114.) “Attaining likeness love led Maimonides to adopt and) unto God.” Plato writes that atarticulate an idea which is inherent taining likeness unto God is to theoretically and practically in all “become like God, so far as this is religions, namely “drawing close” possible; and to become like God to God (manpnn). Greek culture is to become righteous, holy and employs the terminology “attaining wise.”48 The Greek opotwots Seu likeness unto God” (opLotwots G€w); (to become like God) in this pas-

[Plato 1952, Theaetetus 176b, sage is meant as a nomen actionis,

THE “UNITY OF THE HEART” 119 128-29; see ErW 111] and “deifi- | which indicates the process of cation” (QeoToLnots) represents an | “coming close to God” rather than

important concept not only for | the state of “being close to God.” Christian folk belief, but also for the | This is the reason why Theaetetus speculative beginnings of Christian- | 176b became a central reference

ity. [Cohen refers here to the church | for those interpreters of Maifather Irenius.*’] This belief consti- | monides who—explicitly or imtutes the point of departure for | plicitly—follow Cohen’s Platonic asceticism, as well as for all mysti- | reading.*?

cism. Nothing is more offensive The passage of Theaetetus, and repulsive to Judaism than this | however, is often elliptically allusion to the suspension of the | quoted. The full passage reads difference between God and man.

At its origin, this contraposition But it is impossible that evils may vanish; since man is the prod- should be done away with, uct of divine creation, and reason Theodorus, for there must alcorrelates creator and creature. For ways be something opposed the development of mankind, how- to the good; and they [evils] ever, considering its end and pur- cannot have their place pose, any obliteration of this dis- among the gods but must intinction must be considered crass evitably hover about mortal

blasphemy. nature and this earth. Therefore we ought to try to escape must persist as a contrast to the from earth to the dwelling of Good.”*°9 Neither does Cohen

the gods as quickly as we can; share Plato’s escapist conclusion; : and to escape is to become “Therefore we ought to try to eslike God, so far as this is pos- cape from earth . . . as quickly as sible; and to become like God we can.”

is to become righteous and Suffering in history, to the con-

holy, and wise. trary, obliges humankind to labor at the repair (tikkun) of our social Cohen sympathizes with Plato’s world. This is the contribution of conclusion “to become like God is Jewish messianism to human culto become righteous and holy, and _ ture: wise.” He finds himself in funda-

mental disagreement, however, Messianism, however, means with Plato’s fatalist assumptions the dominion of the good on concerning evil: “Even the most earth .. . that injustice will

penetrating of all profound cease. This view—which even thinkers, Plato, exposes the objec- Plato did not have—is the

tionable shallowness, that evil new teaching that the Unique

120 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES God brings to messianic hu- sianic future that pertains to all, manity ... [that] ethics will introduced the concept of world become established in the history into human consciousness, human world . . . and the dis- breaking the lock of history’s continction between ideal and ac- finement to an eternal human suf-

tuality will be buried by the fering. The prophetic promise of

Messiah.>! messianic futurity in a history full of suffering, according to Cohen, Cohen claims that the prophets, constitutes the “miracle of mono-

through their projection of a mes- theism.” Sufist Trends: Love and Longing 175. Maimonides’ principal aver- (See 115). Maimonides’ aversion to sion not only to asceticism but to mysticism. Sufist tendencies were mysticism altogether is characteris- strongly present in Maimonides’ tic of his ethics. His rationalism family, and greatly influenced Mai-

animates his intellectualism, so monides’ own ascetic and ecstatic that it never ossifies into pietist doctrines.’ Cohen’s argument— spiritualism, nor is it seized by the _ often said to be characterized by the wings of pantheism. Several promi- Kabbala-Angst of nineteenth-cen-

nent passages in his writings reveal tury German liberalism°*—is dihis appreciation of the poetic vein rected mainly against the irrationalin the mystical love of God, a fact ity of pietism and pantheism, which

that, due to the profundity of his both conflict with Maimonides’ universal mind, we would never supreme effort to ground the Jewish have called into question; howev- tradition in a rational concept of er, his intellectualism safeguards God’s transcendence. Such _philohim against the looming danger of —sophical grounding, however, by no

pantheism. Hence he _ deals means stands in conflict with Maiexhaustively with the concept of monides’ ecstatic and impassioned approximation, of “drawing nigh” plea for a way of life that is govunto God. [See Guide 1:18, 44, in erned by the love of God and by a which Maimonides interprets longing for “keeping close to God”: Psalms 73:28—“the nearness of

God is my good’—as “union in to love the Eternal with a knowledge and drawing near great and exceeding love, so through apprehension, [and] not in strong that one’s soul shall be space.” Guide 1:18, 44; also RoR knit up with the love of God,

163-64; RdV 189-91.] Had he and one should be continually drawn on Aristotle in the more pro- enraptured by it, like a

found sense, it would have to lovesick individual whose become evident at this point; it mind is at no time free from

THE “UNITY OF THE HEART” 121 would then have been the most his passion for a particular felicitous and most sympathetic woman. ... Even more inidealizing exposition of “eudaemo- tense should be the love of nia,” if he would have replaced this God in the hearts of those term with “drawing close to God.” who love Him.>° Even his predecessors did not con-

ceive of the concept of “drawing Maimonides’ poetic Hebrew close to God” as referring to a sub- | motto concluding the very last stantive union with God. Bahya | chapter of the Guide expresses the contends that the ideas of “immor- | accessibility of such spiritual purtality” and “resurrection” are suffi- | suit for all searchers: ciently explained by the expression “proximity to God,” or approxima- God is very near to everyone tion. [Bahya 1973. Bahya does not who calls—He is found by

cite Psalms 73:28 in this context. every seeker who searches for But see Cohen, /S 1:297, and read Him, if he draws towards Him this passage in light of RoR 313-15 and goes not astray.°° and RdV 363-65, where Cohen interprets the world-to-come not as The climax of this universal exa mythological, spiritual future | pression we find in the much-cited state but rather as the ever present | passage of Hilkhoth Shmittah vetask of “drawing closer” by pursu- | Yovel where Maimonides discusses ing the archetypal attributes of lov- | the privileged status of the tribe of ingkindness and justice.] Like oth- | Levy:

ers before him, he refers to the word of the Psalmist [73:28]: “As Not only the tribe of Levy but

for me, nearness to God is good.” every single individual from , In the same spirit, Maimonides among the world’s inhabitants, combats all sensuality and corpore- whose spirit moved him and

ality within God Himself, hence whose intelligence gave him also in the relationship of man to the understanding to withdraw God. To him, “drawing close to from the world in order to God” can only mean ethical emu- stand before God to serve and lation, ethical training according minister to Him, and to know to the model, which model repre- God, and who walked upright sents the elementary law of ethics. in the manner in which God Thus emulation restricts the prox- made him, shaking off from imity to God to that which the love his neck the yoke of the maniof God may aspire. This motion of fold contrivances which men

drawing closer to God makes seek—behold, this person has manifest the soaring of the loving been totally consecrated, and soul as well as the blossoming of God will be his portion and in-

cognition. heritance forever and ever.>’

122 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Drawing near to God constitutes conclusion of Maimonides’ theory both substantially and formally the of Knowing God.>*®

“As for Me, Nearness Is Good”

Cohen himself reads the passage The Psalmist’s words “the from Psalms as “Die Nabe Gottes nearness of God is my good” are ist mein Gut.” His translation is cited by Cohen as the highest exclose to that of Mendelssohn who pression of the ethical and aestakes tov to be a noun: “Au Gott thetic nature of Judaism. It serves

mich halten, ist mir hoechstes as a central motif for Cohen’s Gut.” Buber translates Ji tov in the reading of Jewish philosophy,°* verbal sense, “Ich aber, Gott nahn whereby Cohen consistently emist mir das Gute.” The Septuagint phasizes the aesthetic aspect of translation is similar: eyo. 5€ To the longing of the human heart. It TpookoAAaobat (passive infinitive) is Cohen’s emphasis upon this Tw Sew ayasov eotiw.>? Pines ren- longing for the nearness of God

ders li tov in the Guide ina similar that distinguishes his passion manner to Cohen: “The nearness from unio mystica: of God is my good.”°? Maimonides

interprets this expression as “draw- Only nearness to God, not

ing near through knowledge and union with God, can be the love of God”—which is, of course, object of my longing.®° precisely Cohen’s point.°!

Nearness and Material Reward: On Zionism and Eudaemonia

“Immortality of the soul” and and great pleasures.” To the “resurrection” as espressions of contrary it is said: “You shall “Proximity to God.” Cohen em- be my chosen people, and I phasizes that many literary sources will be a God unto you, who in Jewish philosophy explain “im- will guide you. Whoever of mortality” in the sense of “coming you comes close to me, and close to God,” thereby rejecting re- ascends to heaven, is as those ligious notions that project an af- who, themselves, dwell

terlife of spiritual and material among the angels... . You well-being. Significant is Cohen’s shall remain in the country

reference to Judah ha-Levi: which forms a stepping-stone to this degree, namely the

Therefore we do not find in Holy Land of Israel [erets the Bible: “If you keep this hakedosha]. Its fertility or law, I will bring you after barrenness, its happiness or death into beautiful gardens misfortune, depend upon the

THE “UNITY OF THE HEART” 123 divine influence which your impure by imputing an external,

conduct will merit... . All materialistic reward for it. At-

these promises have one basis, tachment to the land or to any

that is the anticipation of otherworldly thing forfeits the being near to God." pursuit of the highest good. Zionism, even in Judah ha- Levi’s con-

Cohen agrees with Judah ha- ception, is eudaemonia: “Die Levi’s concept of “anticipating the Kerle wollen glicklich sein”

nearness to God.” Characteristic [Those chaps want to. be cally, however, Cohen skips ha- happy].° Judah ha-Levi’s concept

Levi’s references to erets hake- of eudaemonian Zionism as didosha, the Holy Land. Cohen vine reward for Israel’s righteous rejects ha-Levi’s promise of Is- conduct clashes with Cohen’s rael’s dwelling in the Holy Land reading of Maimonides’ world-toas a “reward for the righteous” as come as an ethical concept, whose being a mythological interpola- transcendental status proves to be

tion which renders the entire a corrective of materialist expecprocess of drawing close to God tations. Eudaemonia: On Intellectual Hedonism 116. Now, if the concept of draw- (See 116.) Eudaemonia, the bliss ing near to God allows and justi- of pure contemplation, constitutes fies only this clearly ethical con- the height of Aristotelian thinking.

notation, are we then not entitled Cohen claims that this “highest to ask how Maimonides could bliss of human intellectual activ-

have resisted the temptation to ity” links Aristotelian ethics— translate “nearness” as “eudaemo- otherwise of a pure pragmatic nia,” and to recognize such near- _ character—with Aristotelian meta-

ness to God as personal bliss. physics, which is otherwise conEudaemonia is the telos of Aris- sidered pure theory.°®° Cohen totelian ethics. [Aristotle 1945, NF launches an assault on the very 1177a-78a, 613-19.] One may principle of eudaemonia, claiming argue that without eudaemonia that it remains enslaved to the Aristotle’s ethics would never have _ principle of material well-being,

gained its outstanding prestige. It even if couched in intellectual or

contains the only speculative contemplative terms.°” “I do not method featured in the entire oppose the feeling of happiness book. Without this speculative ele- but rather the idea of its absolutement the book would merely be of ness,” says Cohen. And further, interest and value to anthropolo- “where idealism ends, the dualism

gists, psychologists, behavioral between materialism and spirituscientists, and political scientists; | alism is unavoidable.”®

124 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES however, this loquacious book Aristotelian metaphysics conwould not offer any philosophical | ceives of God as the ontological insight even into the Aristotelian | first cause, and not as the messensystem proper. Eudaemonia is the | ger of a teaching, or as the comfaint wisp of a connection between | mander of justice. Accordingly,

ethics and the core of his meta-| Aristotelian ethics does not prophysics. Although Plato contended | claim the human pursuit of the , with this type of eudaemonia, it| Good as its highest aspiration. was Socrates who initiated it. Thus, | Whereas for Socrates the discovery , even if Aristotle’s ethics is struc- | of virtue was a revolutionary step tured and developed in a sensory | that led toward the Platonic idea and empirical vein, it is eudaemo- | of the Good as the highest aspira-

nia that lends to it the renown of | tion for human cognition, the

philosophical speculation. Aris- | post-Platonic bifurcation of practi-

totelian ethics is nothing but his | cal virtue and intellectual virtue

eudaemonia. backslides into hedonistic sophism and materialism of which Aristo117. This eudaemonia consists of | tle’s principle of eudaemonia is the pure theory, but actually only the | epitomal expression.° Deity is perfectly capable of such cognitive purity. It is incumbent NE 1177a, 613; also 1947, Meta-

upon man, however, to emulate physics 982b-83a, 15.] divine cogitation in order to partake, within the limits of the human 118. But does not the principle of condition, of divine bliss. This bliss drawing close correspond to the

consists of pure thinking—for Aristotelian bliss of Deity and human beings as for God; not of man? To all outward appearances, material fortune, of the boons of this correspondence suggests an birth, of status, of power, and gov- essential similitude. All the more ernance, but solely of the euphoria urgently, we face the question: of engaging in theory, in vision, in how could Maimonides miss this cognition. As ever so often, so also. opportunity to draw an analogy, in this case, Aristotle seems to have and therewith fail to take advantaken advantage of the contested tage of the pretext, which he must Plato: he has rejected the Platonic have been looking for, to transfer vision of the idea, yet in a different into his system the esteemed and _ etymological radix (@ewpta), he celebrated fundamental concept of

retained the self-same concept of eudaemonia. Or, let us put the vision as the end and purpose of question differently: how could he ethics for God and man. [Aristotle dare to oppose openly the doctrine retains the Platonic idea of emulat- of eudaemonia, while it is in paring God in his ideal of pure theory ticular this point of contest with and contemplation. Aristotle 1945, Aristotle that could have aroused

THE “UNITY OF THE HEART” 125 the suspicion that Maimonides of intellectualism, but also out of restricts himself to a mere religious literary considerations in order to rationale for advancing his ethics. keep all sorts of critics and oppo-

In other words, how could he nents at bay. [L. Strauss 1988.] In begrudge and deprive ethics of its the eyes of the greatest intellects of speculative principle, which prin- those days, any criticism of Aristo-

ciple was acknowledged to be’ tle was tantamount to an attack none other than eudaemonia, and upon or even a betrayal of philoso-

therewith remove ethics from any phy itself. Regarding the entire

philosophical rationale? question of the relationship

between Maimonides and Aristo119. With regard to this issue it tle, it is therefore of utmost imporseems important to pay attention to tance to note: Maimonides opposMaimonides’ attitude toward Aris- es, contends with, and replaces the totle from the literary point of view. doctrine of eudaemonia. He does Maimonides attacks and criticizes not replace it with the concept of him much more often and much = approximation, “drawing near to more deeply than is obvious upon God,” as he could have done, but a superficial reading; his polemic, substitutes a different concept, one however, is unmistakable. He even _ that contains within itself the force

employs irony in his argumenta- of a principle and which as a tion against him, a sign of his inde- replacement for eudaemonia pendence and self-assurance vis-a- proves itself a far more effective vis the great master. In general, he principle. Before we advance to rather prefers to give and maintain the discussion of this most prothe impression of tacit agreement found principle, however, we shall with him. Not only because he felt _ first have to engage in a discussion truly indebted to the rational guid- of Virtue [apetn (goodness, virtue, ance of Aristotle and his basic idea _excellence)] and the virtues.

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Practice and Performance How (Not) to Walk in Middle Ways In this sixth chapter Cohen discusses the concept of human perfection in critical relation to the Aristotelian theory of virtues, according to which

virtues are mere practical human skills rather than ideal vectors for human action. Cohen therefore rejects the traditional understanding of the “golden mean” or the “middle way” as a “medium between two vices,” trying to recontextualize the ideality of this teaching halakically and philosophically within the framework of Maimonides’ great rabbinic code, Mishneh Torah.

Socrates and Plato: On Virtues and “The Good”

120. The concept of virtue origi- (See 121.) Socrates defines the nates in folk morality or mores; Good as a virtue. The Socratic through the concept of virtue, folk ideal of moral perfection is thus morality expresses its standards of prescribed within the relativist ethics. The distinction between framework of a moral theory in ethics on the one hand, and good’ which a hierarchy of virtues deter-

fortune and chance, force and mines which of the many virtues power, nature and heredity, on the embodies the highest virtue of all.

other, is articulated by the term This virtue therefore will play a virtue. [apetn, Latin virtus> *vir privileged role in the practitioner’s

suggests “manliness, manhood, pursuit of the highest happiness. strength, vigor, bravery, courage,” “Thus it becomes understandable

and also “worth, excellence, that the Socratic doctrine of the virtue.” See also RoR 402; RdV ‘good’ was unable to liberate itself 466.] Even the distinction between from the ambiguities of utilitariethics and piety, in which piety is anism and eudaemonia,”' Cohen

128 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES the conventional expression of | says in his Religion of Reason: civic religion, is thus defined. | Out of the Sources of Judaism. Nonetheless, there remains a natu- Plato, however, raises the Good

ralistic residue in the meaning of | above the realm of practical virtue, which is not surprising, con- | virtues in that he proclaims the sidering the folkloristic origin of the | Good to be foundational for term. Hellenic opinion distinguish- | human cognition as such. Plato es between virtue and cleverness | thus subordinates the many virtues (SetvoTns); [Aristotle 1945, NE| to the one idea of the Good in light

1144b, 371; 1144a, 367-69,| of which ethics as theoretical 1152a, 427.] however, even in this | knowledge first arises. From this Hellenic opinion virtue has not yet | perspective, from the perspective lost its ambiguous connotation of | of an ethics predicated upon the prowess. After all, virtue originally | cognition of the Good, the concept

denoted manliness (apeTn). of virtue takes on a negative connotation, denoting mere practical 121. Socrates already conceives of | skill. Aristotle, when removing the virtue in all of its ethical precision | Platonic idea of the Good from the and stringency; yet the concept of | agenda of theoretical knowledge, the Good remains at the side of | holds precisely this against Plato: any virtue, and thus connotes the | ethics has no share in the theoretisuperior term. In Plato the virtues | cal sciences, and virtue is therefore recede to a preparatory stage of the | to be considered precisely that— idea of the Good. The idea of the | mere skill or €€s.?

Good sublimates the virtues, and must assume a multiplicity of they shed all of their naturalist virtues. [ErW 488.] Aristotle’s accreditation, idealized as irradia- ethics is not derived from princitions of the Good. Aristotle, how- ples, but represents a typology and

ever, rejecting the idea of the classification based upon empiriGood, must again equate the Good cal, psychological, and _ historical

_ with virtue. [Aristotle 1945, NE data; thus his concept of virtue 1106a, 89-91.] Since he does not must also correspond to this psyacknowledge the one Good, he chologicoethical method. Virtue —Skills and Goodness

122. The primary concern aroused (See 122.) Aristotle’s concept of by Aristotle’s definition of virtue skill. Aristotle defines virtue as any

relates to the concept of skill kind of practical skill. The me(eEvs). [Aristotle 1945, NE 1098b, dieval and modern Hebrew term 39; Aristotle 1970, 169-73.] Aris- toviut corresponding to the Greek totle must emphasize this concept, apetn (virtue), in contrast, is pred-

PRACTICE AND PERFORMANCE 129 since his ethics does not deal with | icated etymologically upon the He-

cognition, but rather with control | brew root *tov (good).° Cohen of conduct. Hence it is skill that | himself could have availed himself constitutes the objective of this eth- | of this etymological development ical method. From the perspective | as a linguistic indication of the Plaof the idea of the Good, however, a | tonic bent of Hebrew culture. person never achieves the skill of | Most of the medieval references perfection [Ethics is conceived of | use the term toviut when referring by Cohen as an infinite approxima- | to God’s goodness as a paradigm

tion with which we are never | for human emulation.* , done. In contrast, Cohen renders the Aristotelian concept of €&ts in value. Yet it is undeniable that the a German pun as Fertigkeit, sug- ideal of moral tact and of correct gesting precisely that: “to be done — and balanced behavior is certainly

with it.”] and may never dispense within its limits desirable and with the ever-new effort of cogni- indispensable, so that even social tion, when examining action to be © skills are not altogether suspect or

taken with regard to its ethical objectionable.

Gradus ad Parnassum , 123. Jewish philosophy uses two (See 123.) “Excellence” and the terms for virtue: excellence (75pm) process of “perfection.” Cohen reand perfection (mm%w). [Note the marks that, strictly speaking, the

literal combination of shlemuth word ma’ala denotes a nomen with toviut in Albalada 1583, acti—such as “rung, step, grade.” 35a—-36b, especially 35b.] Judging A nomen acti is a noun that deby its root, excellence may also be _ scribes the result of an action, and

rendered as “rung, step, grade.” not a nomen actionis, a noun [*m5y is “to ascend.”] It would be a_ which describes the process of an desideratum to investigate whether action. In support of his progresand to what extent this term may © sive, actional reading of the term denote not only the state of excel- ma’ala or excellence, Cohen there-

lence, but also a step in the fore cites the Baraitha of Pinchas ascending process of attaining it Ben Ya’ir, which deals with a per(ny). [ROR 406-9; RdV 471-74.] son’s spiritual ascent toward perfection on a rising ladder of suc-

124. Similarly, we may interpret cessive “grades” (ma’aloth) of

the second term, perfection. This — spiritual achievement: , term as well seems in conflict

with the fundamental demand of Zeal leads towards cleanliethics: perfection is merely an end ness, and cleanliness leads toto be pursued, and hence virtue, wards purity, and purity leads

130 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES as perfection, can only present an towards separation, and sepaend for pursuit, but does not denote ration leads towards holiness, a skill that one is able to acquire. and holiness leads towards [See ErW 424.] We shall see that humility, and humility leads these considerations do not remain towards the avoidance of sin, alien to Maimonides, and that by and the avoidance of sin leads rejecting the concept of eudaemo- towards lovingkindness, and nia, he vouchsafes to his alternative lovingkindness leads towards idea even the concept of virtue vis- the spirit of holiness, and the

a-vis these reservations. spirit of holiness leads towards resurrection.°

125. Skill and perfection define the

Aristotelian concept of virtue from We find a similar understanding the aspect of the soul’s disposition | of ma’alabh in the agenda of variand functions; [Aristotle 1945, | ous medieval and modern Jewish 1098a, 33.] Aristotle even defines | ethical works, whose chapter the substance and value of virtue: it | headings indicate “ascending is the mean (ecov) between two | steps” in the individual’s pursuit of moments or extremes. [Aristotle | spiritual perfection.° 1945, NE 1104a, 77; also 2:vi-vil, ff.| Maimonides himself adopts this [Aristotle 1945, NE 1107a, 97.] In

definition, [Maimonides 1912, 58; any case, Maimonides had every Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth reason not to categorically dismiss Deoth 1:2-4, 1:7, 2:2: Fox 1988, the “Middle Way,” since the term

93-96.] lending support to the mean (ysax 777) is also talmudic impression that in his philosophical usage. [Tosefta 1955-1988, Tosetta thinking, formulation, and system- Chagigah 2:5, Tosefta Baba Kama atization he is entirely and intimate- 2:12. See Maimonides 1984-1996, ly dependent upon Aristotle. Yet to Hilkhoth Deoth 1:4, 1:5, 1:7, 2:2;

the contrary, it bespeaks Mai- also in Falaquera 1970; Malter monides’ philosophical originality 1911, 160n. 15. It is Falaquera who that he displays no ostentation about explicitly associates the doctrine of his profound deviation from Aristo- the Middle Way with a talmudic tle on this point. Rather he leaves source, Mo’ed Katan 5a; see Falathe impression that he has no objec- quera 1970, 5. In the Mishna, the tion to adopting this trite teaching, term benonit is used in the sense of or that he would even acknowledge a modified position between two it as a decisive factor. We shall see extremes, Mishna Avoth 5:13. See

that Maimonides, in a focal point of Herford 1974, 134, and Mishna his discussion, actually throws this | Terumoth 4:3—4 on the distinction

Middle Way doctrine overboard; between emtsai and benonit in taljust as even Aristotle himself had to mudic usage; Kohut 1955, 1:125b,

admit exceptions to this panacea. 2:56a, 125b.]

PRACTICE AND PERFORMANCE 131 126. The principle of mediocrity fallacy: that two vices should profollows from = Aristotle’s basic duce virtue. To him, virtue means stance against all ideal views and the avoidance of two deficiencies visions of mankind. Aristotle wants or vices; it is the lesser evil or the

to keep ethics within the narrow median one. Basically Aristotle boundaries of anthropological and thinks that a human being is historical empiricism; whatever unavoidably exposed to the malice passes beyond these confines he — of his nature and to the risks of his-

considers to be a phantasma over- torical seduction; thus he at least

shooting the limits of the human seeks to accommodate himself condition and to be overbearing— along the road of the golden mean.

hence to be false and evil. [Horace 1947, 130—31.] It is merely a prescribed path to virtue, as it 127. On the other hand we should were, arranged as the moral career not deny that this thought of limit- for humanity. ing ethics to what is humanly pos-

sible bears within it a profound, 129. Now Aristotle himself cannot good, and true element. Indeed, all help making an exception for the human virtue contains a moment virtue of justice—little realizing of selfishness. The most sublime that this exception invalidates his

achievements of the mind are whole doctrine. [Aristotle 1945, encumbered with earthliness. The NE1107a, 2:vi, 97.] Justice for him

light of the spirit and of virtue is not an avoidance of two remains immured in matter. Thus extremes; consider the avoidance even the highest level of virtue is of both rashness and cowardice, still, under scrutiny, merely a medi- resulting in a prudent rationale for an stage. In brief, one may argue weakness—should the glory and

that what has been granted and power of courage then really be acknowledged of this principle is nothing but a maneuver of avoidnot merely a triviality. Yet it bears ance? The concept of the mean can

the marks of the basic fallacy in only originate with an outlook in

Aristotelian ethics. which nature and history reign supreme. In contradistinction, the 128. The mean is not merely posit- idea of the Good prevails over all ed between two extremes, each of expedient considerations. Wherev-

which partakes of this particular era more profound demand of the

virtue to an equal or differing interrelation between nature and extent in such fashion that perfec- ethics enters into ethical delibera-

tion would lie at the center; but tions, a demand which defies all rather it represents a mean state prudence, the principle of median between two vices (uegotns dvo_ ethics can no longer remain in Kaktov). Aristotle 1945, NE 1107a, control. A genuine principle will (2:vi), [95.] Herein lies the basic have to replace it.

132 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Laws Concerning Character Dispositions: Know Who You Are 130. Turning now to Maimonidean | (See 130.) Halakhic implications ethics, we should expect that the | of knowing oneself. Maimonides,

concept of God, of knowing and} in his halakhic treatise “Laws loving God, would replace the | concerning Character DisposiAristotelian doctrine of the mean. | tions and Ethical Conduct” As has been demonstrated, how- | (Hilkhoth Deoth), seems to sugever, the concept of Knowing God | gest that the ultimate human task in Maimonides represents in sub- | of Knowing God and Walking in stance exclusively the cognition of | His Ways is inextricably linked ethics. This is the reason why he | to a critical assessment of one’s could not conceive of the princi- | own character disposition, claim-

ple and problem of God apart | ing that any pursuit of self-perfrom the principle and problem of | fection is predicated upon a man; for ethics constitutes the | process of rigorous self-critique.’ relationship between oneself and | Hilkhoth Deoth is unique among God, and as such the relationship | Maimonides’ writings in that it

between oneself and others as | does not start out with norma-

well as one’s relationship to one- | tive legislative directives as do al-

self. [Guide 3:35, 538.] It is} most all other sections of his remarkable how the doctrine of | Mishnehb Torah but rather with

the mean demonstrates the funda- | an assessment of one’s own self, mental difference between Aristo- | with an empirical survey con-

tle and Maimonides—and we | cerning concrete character dispomean this not only with respect to | sitions and temperaments of sin-

the roster of exceptions. gle individuals.

Human beings are exceed- does not even desire the few ingly different from one an- things that our bodies need. . other, every single person has . . Furthermore, there are the her own character disposi- sanguine and the melantions, and as such no person choly, the stingy and the genequals another. One person erous, the cruel and the meris choleric, always irascible; ciful, the timid and those another sedate, never getting who like adventure, and so

angry ... one man is forth [translation modified

haughty to excess, the other by author].® humble to the extreme. One

is a sensualist whose lusts The halakhic implementations are never gratified, another of this entire ethical treatise are is sO pure in soul that he predicated upon a critical assess-

PRACTICE AND PERFORMANCE 133 ment of the question “Who am In Maimonides’ treatise of I?” and upon subsequent peda- Hilkhoth Deoth, ethical obligagogical labor upon one’s own eth- tions ben adam le’atsmo (beical self. This is true whether we tween a person and herself) for think of obligations that deal with the first time gain halakhic status,

the relationship between oneself as their primary objective is the and one’s fellow (ben adam _ empirical self-awareness of every lechavero\—such as “You shall individual:

love your fellow person”—or whether we speak of those that to imitate His ways, to cling address the relationship between to those who know Him, to oneself and God (ben adam love others, to love converts, lamakom)\)—such as “You shall not to hate one’s fellow in walk in His ways.” In a different your heart, to admonish context, Maimonides reiterates someone who acts wrongly, this point, claiming that all obli- not to put others to shame, gations between oneself and God not to oppress others, not to are, in fact, only educational tools bear tales, not to take re-

serving the task of improving venge, not to bear a

one’s self: erudge.!°

Among the classes we have All of these commandments redifferentiated . . . [these] be- quire introspection and analysis

long to the group devoted to with respect to one’s self in the relationship between a relationship to others. Self-awareman and his fellow man, ness thus constitutes the methodwhile all the other classes deal ological starting point for selfwith the relationship between perfection even though, logically man and God. For every com- speaking, Cohen would say that mandment, whether it be a self-awareness is the very result of prescription or a prohibition, one’s obligation toward another, whose purpose it is to bring in which thinking about one’s self about the achievement of a first originates.'' Cohen, accordcertain moral quality or... ingly, reads Maimonides’ adopthe rightness of actions which tion of the Aristotelian doctrine ... concern the individual of the Middle Way as an empirical himself and his becoming device, a psychological technique, more perfect is called by the that is quite distinct from the Sages a commandment deal- transcendental foundations of ing with the relationship be- Maimonides’ ethics, which lie in tween man and God [empha- his epistemological theory of

sis added].? Knowing God.

134 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES The Middle Way: Normativity or Mediocrity? The roster of exceptions. Mai- Middle Way as a generally useful, monides formulates an explicit ha- empirical psychological device for lakhic injunction against acting ac- dealing with all sorts of character cording to the Middle Way when it _ traits.!> When concerned with the

comes to anger and pride. In the pursuit of saintliness, however, cases of anger and pride one ought Maimonides formulates an explicit

to incline toward the opposite ex- halakhic injunction against the

: treme of completely subduing Middle Way, such as in cases of one’s anger and of utmost humil- anger and pride—character traits ity.!* The Law (Halakhah) in these that are detrimental to the pursuit cases is not according to the Mid- of the Good, and in which cases dle Way, but rather demands that any measure of “mediocrity” must middath chassiduth (the standard be avoided.!®

of the Saintly One) becomes The fundamental difference be-

mandatory for all.!3 tween Maimonides and Aristotle Maimonides’ reference to the in their employment of the Middle Aristotelian doctrine of the Middle Way, according to Cohen, lies in Way is ambiguous. At times he em- their differing positions on the ploys it in the Aristotelian psycho- question of ethics as theoretical logical, technical sense, and at knowledge. Wherever virtue is detimes he does so in a strictly nor- fined in merely practical terms, a mative and non-Aristotelian sense, mere technical device is sufficient for example when associating the to improve a person’s “skills” of Middle Way with God’s ways, with virtue. Wherever ethics is defined the perfection of God’s creation, or as a highest form of cognition, even with the Law as a whole.'* however, the ideal of mediocrity

Maimonides follows Aristotle proves inadequate to the ethical when advocating the method of the _ task.

Chassid and Chakham: Acting beyond Mediocrity 131. Maimonides, in introducing (See 131.) The saintly men of yore.

the doctrine of the mean into his In Cohen’s reading, Maimonides theological magnum opus, [Mai- favors the chassid, the saintly one monides, halakhic code, Mishneh_ who is “particularly scrupulous Torah] immediately stipulates a and deviates somewhat from the fundamental reservation: the saint- exact mean,” over the chakham, ly men of yore departed from the the prudent one, who follows the Middle Road in their attitude and Middle Way, and whose “charac-

character (my7) and adopted the ter traits are intermediate and

PRACTICE AND PERFORMANCE 135 principle of “voluntarily narrowing | equally balanced.”!” It is the for-

the boundaries of the law” (am> | mer, the chassid, who represents pom omawa)(Hilkhot Deoth 1:1] pure, radical ethics which—ac-

[correctly 1:5]). [Maimonides | cording to Cohen—is the only 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei ha- | ethics there is. The distinction beTorah 5:11; Maimonides 1912, 4.] | tween “prudence” and “saintliThis principle is derived from the | ness” is reiterated forcefully by Talmud. [This halakic principle | Steven Schwarzschild, identifying might best be rendered as “going | “saintliness” with ethics, and denbeyond the boundaries of the law.” | igrating “median” ethics to ArisHerzog 1980, 1:384-85; also TB | totelian mediocrity, mere “practiBaba Metsia 83a; TY Baba Metsia | cal prudence.”!®

6:6; Bialik 1992, 741-42; Lichten- Maimonides, however, does not stein 1978, 102-23; Silberg 1984, | always keep the concepts chassid 110; S. H. Cohen 1970.] This prin- | and chakham clearly distinct. He ciple is equity, and may be consid- | actually uses the term chakham ered a corrective that tempers the | also with reference to someone

principle of justice. [Aristotle | who goes “beyond the strict 1945, NE 1137a-38a, 313-17; | boundaries of the law.”!’ Keeping

FrW 618-21.] Cohen’s claim that there can be no mediocrity in ethics, but that ethics certain situations: public figures,

must rather be radically good such as teachers or community (rooted in goodness), we may ven- leaders, for example, should alture to say that both the chakham ways act beyond the strict bound-

and the chassid represent ideal aries of the law.*! And the types of ethical conduct.*® The chakham, just the same, should go chassid, for his part, does not so beyond the strict boundaries of the much represent any superogatory law, whenever he finds himself in a category of ethics, as rather a_ public situation where his personal

mandatory example of action conduct is wont to serve in setting demonstrated by certain people in an example for others.?”

The Idea of Equity: Going beyond the Letter of the Law 132. Equity, pervading the entire (See 132.) Equity. In his Ethik des legal system of the Talmud, chal- — reinen Willens, Cohen argues that it lenges the subjectivity inherent _ is, in fact, the very ideal of humanity

in all human virtue by becoming _ that constitutes the normative conitself the ultimate principle, the tent of the principle of equity (Bilcorrective and counterbalance of _ ligkeit). Equity, representing the justice. Equity therewith attains ideal of humanity, sets out to correct

136 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES the status of an autonomous legal | the legal claims of justice, balancing

principle, not subordinated to | the letter of the law, complementing justice. [As in the case of Aristo- | the very generality of its formulatle, for whom equity applies in | tions: the body of the law, the stricthose subjective instances in | ture of its letter, is called upon to adwhich the legal systems fail. Aris- | just itself when facing the specificity

totle 1945, NE 1137a—38a, | of a singular case to which no law 313-17.] In this principle the | readily applies. The talmudic princiTalmud acknowledges the Stoic | ple lifnim mishurath ha-din (going principle of natural law [lex natu- | beyond the boundaries of the law) ralis) which has always main- | allows the facticity of a particular tained the linkage between law | case to become a corrective of a speand morals, jurisprudence and | cific Halakhah in that this talmudic ethics. [ErW 618; also Wolfson | principle demands action “beyond

1947, 2:165-200; and Husik | the letter of the law.” 1925.] The Talmudic appreciation This principle does so, however, of this principle of equity may be | without undermining the authority demonstrated by the homiletic | of the rabbinic legal system, since lesson that attributes the destruc- | lifnim mishurath ha-din itself is a tion of the Second Temple to the | principle of halakic law. In this way violation of equity. [TB Baba Met- | the principle “to go beyond the

sia 30b.] What benefit can be | strict letter of the law” asserts the derived from scouting out the limit | universality of the ethical norm of the median line if true ethics | whenever it is in danger of being be-

rather demands conduct beyond | trayed “in the name of the Law.” this line? In any case, median | Equity counterbalances lawfulness. ethics itself can no longer serve to | But Cohen insists that the very prin-

delimit lawful conduct. ciple of equity itself must be made

part of positive law, lest it will be grates the idea of lawfulness with left to the whims of natural law: the ideal of humanity, or, in traditional terms, rabbinic legal stricture

It is a calamitous illusion to with the messianic ideal of goodthink that equity belongs to ness and justice. Natural Law, whereas it is, in Cohen’s reading has been em-

fact, an integral part of the phatically reiterated by Aharon

positive Law.7° Lichtenstein’s much-cited article “Does Jewish Tradition Recognize Equity—or correspondingly the an Ethic Independent of Halakha?”

talmudic principle of “going be- In this article, the author claims that yond the strict letter of the law”’— _ specific formulations of various hatherefore constitutes Sollen (Ought) lakhic obligations apply to an indiin a strictly normative sense. It inte- vidual inasmuch as his or her case

PRACTICE AND PERFORMANCE 137 may be subordinated to a particular individual at all times and in all sithalakhic ruling. General, exhorta- uations.** This article shows Lichttive formulations of halakhic direc- enstein’s neo-Kantian lineage, retives, on the other hand, like “going maining true to the features of the beyond the strict letter of the law,” work of his teacher, J. B. Soloveitchik, or “doing the right and the good in who wrote a dissertation on Cohen’s

the eyes of God” (Deuteronomy epistemology, and whose readings 6:18) are expressions of equity that of classical rabbinic texts preserve were integrated into halakhic rea- a commitment to Cohen’s ethical soning and that are binding for the hermeneutics.*>

The Select Few 133. Maimonides places this talmu- | (See 133.) The elite to whom the dic principle of equity in its proper | ideal of the good applies. The ethical systematic perspective. By placing | gist of Cohen’s reading demands that equity in juxtaposition to the princi- | the ideal of the radical Good—the ple of the mean, he actually invali- | ideal of the so-called elite—must in

dates the latter as a norm. [Mai- | principle relate to all humankind, monides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth | since this radical Good constitutes Deoth 1:5; and Maimonides 1992b, | the grounds for all human ethical ac-

1:286-87.] Maimonides seems to | tion. Maimonides does not seem to retain the doctrine of the mean | fundamentally disagree with such a merely as an educational, technical | reading. He suggests, however, that | means, while dismissing it as a fun- | most people will get distracted from damental principle. Thus he under- | the ultimate cognitive pursuit of God mines theentire basis of Aristotelian | for various practical reasons—such

ethics, which is only concerned | as “lengthy preliminary studies,” with human mediocrity, but not | “limitations of their intellectual cawith the chosen who are sum- | pacity,” or “sickness and death”— moned by the idea of the Good. | which is why “only very few would Maimonides, however, advances | arrive at that knowledge in their the guideline of the “sage and the | own lifetime” if there were no relisaintly.” [See paragraph 131 in this | able and authoritative tradition of chapter.] Thus, he drives the vector | the “true teaching.” It is the task of

of his religion toward ethics. the “select few” to keep this tradition alive.*° For mere empirical and Maimonides associates the practical reasons, “these matters of | chassid with the ideal of holiness divine knowledge are only fora few (kedusha), which in turn is idensolitary individuals of a very special _ tified with the idea of human per-

sort, not for the multitude.”77 fection, of Walking in His Ways

138 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES and of Imitatio Dei.*® All these passages as a rejection of eudae-

ideals are expressions of what monian materialism rather than Cohen calls “radical, cognitive as political quietism; he distinethics.” Maimonides’ concept of guishes between social affairs kedusha suggests, at times, an as- sought for the sake of pleasure, cetic bent, advising self-restraint and social or political engageand seclusion from society, prima ments resulting from one’s comfacie implying political and social mitment to doing good and purquietism.”” But Cohen reads these suing justice.

Masquerades of Pride: “You Shall Have No Foreign Gods” 134. It is noteworthy that among (See 134.) National Pride. Humilothers the main exception to which _ ity, according to Cohen, is the ulti-

the method of the mean does not mate expression of messianism, as apply is the virtue of humility (7), it describes a relationship with otha fact that Maimonides points out — ers that is not self-centered. True with great emphasis. [Maimonides humility demands one’s orientation 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 2:3; and attention not only toward the

also Maimonides 1992b, Avoth other but also toward the others, 4:4. and Rawidowicz 1969-1971, transcending and invalidating all 1:436-39, especially nn. 132 and national borders. National pride, 135 in which Rawidowicz refers to _ to be sure, tends to masquerade as

Cohen’s present essay on Mai- humility. We see such rhetoric as, monides.] He is not the first to “The individual is nothing, security accord humility a central position of the nation is everything.” Yet among the virtues. [Demut < deo- even national pride, according to

mut; that is, “the lowliness of a Cohen, is nothing but hatred of knight.”] Abraham ibn Daud pre- _ others in disguise: cedes him in this, although he links

it with equity. [Ibn Daud 1986, Hatred and gruesomeness 262; Bahya 1973, 304-27; also may adorn itself with the Kafih 1989; and Soloveitchik highest motives: after all, in 1978.] Maimonides is perhaps the name of religion people nowhere as moving as when char- were burnt at the stake, and acterizing this virtue. (See especial- it is nationalism which dely [Maimonides 1992b]; Mishna clares hatred of others a Avoth 4; and 1984-1996, Hilkhoth duty.*! Deoth 2:3. For example, “There-

fore it is said of Moses: he was And further: exceedingly humble.”) This man, a

scholar of world renown and man We know the difference beof the world pursuing his medical tween state and ethnicity. The

PRACTICE AND PERFORMANCE 139 profession: how great must have natural element of ethnicity been his inner joy when focusing may result in staining patriotwith such intense energy on this ism with the poison of nationvirtue, as if humility might stand alist vanity deteriorating into for all—illustrating this through hostility and hatred. This natmoving examples. Certainly the ural facticity that today is Jewish religion would not prove termed nationalism actually itself as the religion of martyrdom represents the greatest enemy attesting to its truth in the face of of all social and spiritual all sorts of worldly pressure, were forces upon which the sincerit not the religion of humility. A ity and dynamics of political Jew says thrice daily after his main advancement depends.** prayer: “Be my soul silent unto those who reproach me, be my_ Religion of humility, religion of soul lowly unto all as the dust.” martyrdom. Jewish messianism [See also ROR 427-28; RdV 496. compromises its very essence when

Cohen alludes to the Shemoneh it encourages hatred of others in Esreh—the Eighteen Benedictions. the guise of nationalism—espeThe passage cited belongs to the cially when such nationalism is adprivate devotion of the individual vocated in the name of Judaism it-

that is recited immediately after self.°°> Whether Cohen would the Shemoneh Esreh. TB Berakhot have maintained this position 17a. “Be my soul silent to those were he to have seen the Shoah who reproach me” was a personal and the foundation of the State of prayer of Mar, the son of Ravina. Israel is a moot question. Steven

Elbogen 1993, 53-54.] Hence, Schwarzschild sharply reiterated , Maimonides would not admit any Cohen’s critique of Jewish na-

calculations and search for the tionalism even after the Shoah mean in this case; he demands and after the foundation of the self-effacement (m7 5Bw) [Proverbs _ state of Israel. Guided by Cohen’s

16:19; 29:23; Isaiah 57:15; see critique of eudaemonia, Schwarzalso Abraham bar Chiya 1971 on — schild claims that Jewish nationIsaiah 57:15.] unconditionally and alism is Heilsgeschichte (holy hiswithout exception. Pride is consid- tory), and that Heilsgeschichte is ered “equivalent to idolatry.” It lies idolatrous.°* Humility, Cohen in-

at the root of all vices and of all sists, demands the renunciation corruption in any social and_ of individual as well as national national life. Genuine national pride, and precisely in this capacpride might even appeal to humil- ity, Cohen emphasizes that humil-

ity as its living fountain, or, in ity figures prominently among more human terms, to modesty. Jewish virtues.°° Whoever does not categorically Aristotle, on his part, treats modprotect himself from the appeal of esty as an exaggerated parameter.*©

140 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES such pride is lost to the cause of The virtuous path, according to pure ethics. You will always find a Aristotle, leads one to walk between well-reasoned argument to varnish _ bashfulness and humility, neither of

any vice as a virtue. Hatred may which is, in fact, a virtue. Maithus masquerade as love. [ErW monides, to the contrary, presents 628.] The same applies to one’s humility as a radical demand—there personal life. By not making any exists no Middle Way when walking allowance for average conduct in humbly before one’s God. Jewish the case of humility, Maimonides virtues are modeled upon God’s ac-

surpasses the philosopher par tional attributes—“as He is gracious excellence in human understand- so you shall become gracious.” So,

ing and in worldly knowledge. too, is the virtue of humility. Both [Aristotle does not grant humility God and Moses, God’s prophet, are the status of virtue, but rather sees depicted in rabbinic sources as “exin it a bashful feeling that is befit- ceedingly humble.”%” Jewish traditing for the young, but not for the tion demands “blood testimony.” “srown-up man.” Aristotle 1945, Profaning God’s name—violating

NE 1128b, 249-50; 1108a—b, justice—has to be resisted even at

105.] the cost of one’s life.?°

In Religion of Reason, Cohen as-

135. One could argue, however, sociates the virtue of humility with that this appreciation of humility, the idea of “Israel’s vicarious sufferwhich is shared by both Christian ing for mankind,” testifying to the and Jewish consciousness, express- “ethical truth of monotheism.”°” es a typically medieval virtue pre- Cohen does see Israel in the role of

scribed by the church or by reli- Isaiah’s “suffering servant,”*° and gion as the guiding principle for his Christian interpreters have taken

human conduct. In medieval ample note of this. But Cohen’s times, one surrendered one’s indi- reading of the suffering servant does viduality to the religious commu- not advocate any masochism,*! nor

nity, and—in consonance or in does it imply the justification of hisconflict with this surrender—one tory. To the contrary, by having Isrelinquished control to the state rael assume the role of Isaiah’s sufcommunity. What sort of dignity is fering servant, Cohen expresses a accorded to the individual, if the most radical opposition to human church or the state to which he suffering: in defiance of all the pain

belongs obtains and affirms its in history, Jewish tradition proown dignity at the individual’s claims the knowledge of a better expense? Hence, one could view world. According to Cohen, Israel’s humility in an ambiguous light, willingness to suffer for this defiance and could interpret its exceptional is her humility. It is only on account

status with reference to the doc- of her messianic knowledge that

PRACTICE AND PERFORMANCE 141 trine of the mean as a threat to the | Israel can be made accountable for

ethical individual. These misgiv- | the suffering of others. (Cohen ings would then undermine Mai- | claims that Israel forfeits this particmonides’ entire ethics as he might | ular accountability once its national not have restricted himself to this | pride causes it to “become like all one point. Since we come to real- | the nations.”) This then is the sig-

ize that what is called into ques- | nificance—hypocrisy—of Jewish tion here is nothing less than the | particularity according to Cohen,

concept of the individual, the | that it seems to imply “all are rebearer of ethical self-awareness, | sponsible, but I am more responsi-

[ErW 203-6, 356-57; Schmid | ble than all.” 1995, 62.] it behooves us to scru- | Pride is considered idolatry. Maitinize the connotation of humility | monides contrasts both anger and

in this respect. pride with humility, but only of anger does he say “whoever gets alent to idolatry” [kol hako’es ke-ilu angry is considered as if he worships oved avodah zara] is not found exidols.” This links the mishnaic in- _ plicitly in talmudic literature.*? Yet junction “not to be quick to anger” © Maimonides is consistent in his cita-

to the passage in Psalms (81:10), tion of this statement.*4 Inasmuch “You shall have no foreign God.”** _ as pride is considered “equal to idol-

The precise wording of Mai- _atry,” “humility” is associated with monides’ statement: “anger isequiv- true knowledge of God.

Exceedingly Humble

136. In prescribing the practice of (See 136.) Humility and greatprayer, the Talmud cites the exege- mess. There is a plethora of sis of a haggadic gnome, which midrashic and other traditional points to the linkage between material emphasizing humility— God’s humility and His greatness, both in the social as well as in grounding God's greatness in His the spiritual sense. Classical exhumility. [RoR 266, 425-26; RdV amples are the commentaries on 311, 494; and TB Megillah 31a: Isaiah 57:15 (“I dwell on high, in “wherever you find God’s mighti- holiness; yet with the contrite ness (gevurato; gedulato) men- and the lowly in spirit.”*°) or the tioned in Scriptures, there you find midrashim on Psalms 68:5-11 His humility.” Most of the talmudic (“Exult in His presence—the faversions of this dictum have gevu- ther of orphans, the champion of rato (mightiness), and not gedulato widows, God in His holy habita-

(greatness). Rabinovicz 1976 on tion.”) In fact, much that came Megillah 31a. Cohen obviously to be of prominence in Jewish

142 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES cites his text from the siddur—see | tradition is described by the the passage concluding the catenae | Midrash in terms of its humility: of auspicious biblical verses initiat- | God humbly consulted with His

ing the workday week: “Rabbi| angels before creating the Yochanan said: In every passage | world.*® Mount Sinai was the where you find the greatness [gedu- | most humble among the moun-

lato) of God mentioned, there you | tains; and the burning bush, find also his humility’; also Judah | which was not devoured when ha-Levi 1977, 41; and the dispute | God revealed Himself there to between Yechezkel Segal Landau | Moses, was physically a most and Samuel Edels in Landau 1960, | humble site.*7 Moses, God’s 2:1; also Moshe ben Jacob 1993, | prophet, was the “most humble 1:102, injunctive 64.] It is in itself | among men.” *°

conspicuous that this virtue is According to one midrashic traattributed to God despite the tradi- | dition, it is only due to Moses’ hutional reluctance to innovate divine | mility that God can speak face to attributes. [TB Berakhot 33b; also | face with him. Humility is a passivMaimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth | ity that, according to tradition, exTefillah 9:7, and Guide 1:59, 140 | presses itself as receptivity vis-a-vis

object to the recitation of a great | the presence of the divine. “What many divine attributes—in order | brought him [Moses] this distincnot to “exhaust” God’s greatness. | tion? His meekness . . . since whoAlso Nachman of Bratislava 1991, | ever is meek will cause the shekhi-

101-8.] And how strange is this | za to dwell with [him] on earth, new attribute! The salvational pur- | as it is said. . . ‘I dwell in the high

pose of humility divine, as it is | and holy place, with him that is of known in Christology, has no place | a contrite and humble spirit.’”* in Judaism. Like all other attributes, | Cohen calls this passivity “humil“humility” can only signify an ethi- | ity.” And Levinas, who terms it

cal ideal. In concord with the | election, holds that it “is not a simabove-mentioned haggadic gnome, | ple effect of the Good .. . it is in Maimonides places humility at the | this passivity [in this humility] that

center of his entire system of | the Good is.”°° virtues: it follows not only that Maimonides confirms this divine attrib- | humility to God? Only because it is

ute as the grounds of God's great- incumbent upon man to reflect ness, as the foundation of the idea upon humility and to realize it, is of God, but rather that in so doing God “humbled,” as it were, by this

he affirms the even more important attribute. The case of humility

idea that the divine attribute as proves beyond doubt that the such can only be understood as an divine attribute as such does not ethical paradigm. For what literal refer to divine substance, but rather

meaning could lie in ascribing to acorrelational concept of ethics.

PRACTICE AND PERFORMANCE 143 Agnus Dei: Carrying Something on One’s Neck The salvational multipurpose of _ sianic imperative to abolish suffer-

humility divine. The Christian ing make sense. Humanity is enimage of the Agnus Dei—of Christ _ trusted with the task of this abolas the sacrificial lamb of God—is ishment. While humanity at large modeled upon the virtue of humil- is so entrusted, the task falls par-

ity and readiness for sacrifice. ticularly to those who carry the “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for burden of a law that promises justheirs is the kingdom of heaven,” tice, those who take upon themsays Jesus in Matthew 5:3, and _ selves the “yoke of the kingdom of

further (11:29), “Take My yoke Heaven.” upon you, and learn from Me, for According to Christian dogma, I am gentle and humble in heart; Jesus “takes upon himself the and you shall find rest for your yoke of the kingdom,” thereby

souls.” The “poor in spirit” setting the example for all of hu(TTwYOL) is a translation from the mankind. So it is said in Matthew

Hebrew -w (ani or “poor”), a 11:29, “Take My yoke upon word that is close to the Hebrew you.” Christian dogma traditionterm wy (anaw or “humble”).! ally associates the yoke with the Cohen himself comments upon cross borne by Jesus, which ever this etymological connection, re- since symbolizes Christian humilpeatedly emphasizing the identity ity. Imitatio Dei in Christian tradiof the poor with the humble, asso- __ tion is thus intrinsically related to

ciating both with those who are the directive, “take up the cross without blame, the innocent, the and follow me.”>* pious ones.°* The poor are pious Cohen claims that it is the salvabecause their suffering is unde- tional aspect of divine humility—

served. Cohen writes, the fact that, dogmatically speak-

, ing, Christ’s suffering and death |

It is not true that poverty is vicariously atones for the transcaused by sin. Those inflicted gressions of all—which is foreign by suffering are innocent and to Jewish teaching. The image of

righteous. The God of the the yoke, however, is deeply righteous must be the God of rooted in Jewish tradition. One

the poor.°° takes upon oneself ol malkhuth shamayim (the yoke of the king-

Cohen’s adamant insistence dom of heaven), or ol hamitsvoth

that poverty is undeserved op- (the yoke of commandments), poses the mythical contention that both traditionally associated with suffering is meted out as a punish- Shema Israel.°° Similarly, o] Torah

ment of the gods. Only when suf- (the yoke of Torah) is called ol fering is undeserved does the mes- chokhma (the yoke of wisdom).°°®

144 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES The literal meaning of o/ refers to One”—becomes a concrete act of a bar that one carries on one’s neck. submission to God’s will. Christian Jewish tradition employs this expres- tradition, prima facie, translates ol sion metaphorically when relating it back into physical terms when porspecifically to a person’s commit- traying the Son of God, Christ, in the ment to the one God, whereby recit- bodily image as one who “takes up ing Shema Israel—“Hear, o Israel, the yoke of the cross” in submitting

the Lord our God, the Lord is to the will of God. Transubstantiation: A Polemic against Institutionalized Salvation 137. The ethical wholesomeness of | (See 137.) The Jewish God cannot

the more open-minded constitu- | transubstantiate in his church for tion of the Jewish religion proves | the sake of institutionalized salva-

itself in that its God cannot tran- | tion. Cohen’s polemic against substantiate in his church for the | Christianity culminates in the sake of institutionalized salvation. | claim that the Christian concept Just as we have no cognitive access | of Imitatio Dei impairs the autonto His essence, so God cannot be | omy or radicality of human freesubstantiated or vicariously repre- | dom upon which Jewish teaching

sented in “divine” institutions. | of the sole human responsibility Only by relating to God directly | for the pursuit of messianism is can we and may we establish | predicated.°’ Christ’s death and ethics. However, someone unable | atonement signifies to Cohen a reto enter this relationship—what is | gression to mythical religiosity in she then, what will become of her? | that Christianity institutionalizes

Can we achieve building a Self | salvation, sanctifying the Church

without relating to God? as holy space in which salvation takes place. In his Religion of Yom Kippur were to effect atoneReason, Cohen polemically con- ment for transgressions between a trasts this conception with the person and God, such “vicarious

“institution” of Yom Kippur, performances” never included where sacred time allows for the any transgressions toward one’s atonement of sins. Even inthe an- fellows, for violations of the ethicient Jewish tradition according cal pursuit of lovingkindness and to which the high priest’s vicari- justice. According to Cohen, there

ous performance of penitential can be no vicarious fulfillment of acts in the Jerusalem temple on the messianic task.

“He Is (Not) Like You” How Suffering Commands Self or Soul Having discussed the ideal of human perfection first halakhically and morally, Cohen in this seventh chapter sets out to ground the human pursuit of the ideal in the individual’s responsibility. The concept of individual responsibility, which Cohen models after the teaching of the prophet

Ezekiel, is of central importance to Cohen’s theory of the Self as an infi- . nite task rather than a given entity. The Self emerges in the relationship to another—a thou—rather than in the lonely pursuit of the philosopher trying to achieve the bliss of theoretical knowledge as promised by Aristotelian eudaemonian ethics. Self-perfection, according to Cohen, means the pursuit of justice, a pursuit in which ethical self-awareness makes itself felt as an autonomous power of the human will.

Self or Soul

138. In the language of religion we (See 138.) The Self. There is no would search in vain for a term con- Hebrew term for Self in the Cartenoting the Self. The Self originates in sian sense of cogito ergo sum. Maiself-awareness, and hence belongs monides employs the term nefesh to philosophical terminology. It is to (soul) for what one could read as the credit of prophetic religion that it an indication of the thinking Self.! discovered the concept of the person However, the Hebrew term nefesh,

in the concept of the soul. The per- although taken by medieval son as an individual emerges in rela- thinkers at times in the Aristion to ancestors, kinfolk, and nation; totelian sense of intellect or raand these social bonds cannot be _ tional soul, usually carries the imsevered. Thus we can speak of the plications of the Greek psyche and individual only in the generic sense the Latin anima. Whereas the conas son of man, as one of the children cept of Self in the modern philoof man. [The term ben adam (son of | sophical sense always points to man) applies in biblical sources in — self-awareness (Selbstbewusstsein),

146 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES particular to the prophet Ezekiel | medieval usage of the Hebrew nehimself who represents to Cohen the | fesh often refers to pure physical very responsibility of the single indi- | vitality in explicit opposition to vidual. RoR 211; RdV 246. In other | the intellect. Also the postbiblical instances, the term ben adamsimply | Hebrew term sekhel for mind

indicates the generic term descen- | does not denote the Self but dant of Adam (a human being). The | rather the rational faculty (vous, application of the term son of man | intellectus; Vernunft; reason) with to the founder of Christianity origi- | no indication of any subjective nates in Jewish apocalyptical, apoc- | self-awareness. ryphal writings close to the Essene movement. Flusser 1997, 124-33.] sal and generic domains of ethics Even the individual cannot be con- (BdR 61-62; ROR 167-68; RdV ceived of in his or her own right 195-96), is strictly bound to the ethexcept within this generic relation- ical pursuit of the ideal of humanity.

ship. [Cohen's concept of the indi- BdR 58-59; RoR 167-68; RdV vidual, pointing beyond the univer- 195—96.]

Ezekiel’s Concept of the Individual and Individual Responsibility: The Meta-Ethical Self—Teshuvah The prophets who discovered the cording to Cohen, constitutes a concept of individual soul. Cohen main feature of mythical thought: refers to his favorite passage in “We must eradicate the archevil Ezekiel (18:4, 20), “hanefesh ha- of myth, namely its claim that huchoteth hi tamuth” [the soul that man nature is tainted with heredsinneth, it shall die]. Cohen cred- itary sin.”?

its his namesake, the prophet The idea of free will and of indiEzekiel, with the discovery of the vidual responsibility results in the original human commitment to- personal accountability of human

ward the Good and, subse- action, giving rise to the concept of quently, with the discovery of the individual Self. According to ethical responsibility, by pro- Cohen, the prophet Ezekiel discovclaiming that it is the individual ers the concept of the “single indialone who can be made account-_ vidual” (das Individuum als Ich) able for her own transgressions: and contributes it to the conscious“The soul that sinneth, it shall ness of human culture.* Das Indi-

die; the son shall not bear the in- viduum als Ich points to the iquity of the father with him, nei- unique Self, the meta-ethical Self

ther shall the father bear the iniq- that lies beyond the range of uity of the son with him.” It is ethics: Ezekiel who abrogates the concept of hereditary sin and of col- The problem of the single inlective responsibility, which, ac- dividual [Ich] can neither be

“HE IS (NOT) LIKE YOU” 147 exhausted through [ethical] what happens to a prophet when propositions of universality, being addressed by God: “And nor through any reference when God’s spirit addresses the to social context, i.e., social prophet ... he will be changed

plurality.° into another person, and will realize that he is not the same as he

Nonetheless, Cohen burdens his had been.”®

meta-ethical Self with an eminently The process of return, in fact, ethical task that originates with truly reflects the hermeneutics of the original obligation of the Self prophecy in that it denotes selftoward others. Cohen calls this transformation in the face of God task teshuvah (return or repen- who summons the individual Self tance). Teshuvah indicates a return toward its messianic task. This task

to the original commitment, a_ is an eminently ethical one, Cohen

mending of its betrayal. claims, that is reiterated in any enCohen claims that the Self is counter with a suffering person originally constituted in the process whose face summons one to be-

of teshuvah. There is no Self, come another (better) person to beCohen says, that exists outside come more humane than one has ethics, outside this process of re- been. The ritual expression of this turn. Following Maimonides’ ex- process is the day of atonement, position of the Laws of Repentance Yom Kippur.” The existential sig-

(Hilkhoth Teshuvah), Cohen nificance of Yom Kippur, according claims that the ethical Self, in this to Cohen, lies in the enactment of process of return, mends its past by Ezekiel’s idea of individual responappealing to the futurity of its bet- sibility.° Cohen invokes the Tal-

terment. This process constitutes mud in order to corroborate his no less than the very creation of the reading of Ezekiel on individual re-

Self: “The one engaged in the sponsibility as a privileged text: process of repentance . . . might want to change his name [to indi- Rabbi Jose bar Chanina says: cate that his identity has changed] “Moses, our teacher, promulas if to say: ‘I am changed into an- gated four decrees for Israel. other person, and have nothing in Along came four prophets and

common with the one who has abrogated them. . . . Moses committed those deeds.’”® Cohen said: ‘He visits the iniquity of further says, “This possibility of parents upon children’ (Exo-

self-transformation [teshuvah] dus 34:7); along came Ezekiel turns the individual into a free I.”” and superseded him by statMaimonides’ reading of teshu- ing: ‘The soul that sinneth, it vah as the very creation of the Self shall die’” (Ezekiel 16:4)."!

recalls another passage of his Code, a passage that deals with There is a Midrash that supprophecy, with the question of ports Cohen’s reading as well, pre-

148 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES senting a gradational line of tion between the single individual interpretations on the subject of and the ideal of humanity (ben repentance. The Midrash rates adam). Individual repentance, the lowest the scriptural idea of the demand to “cast away from you all

unforgivable nature of an evil your transgressions, wherein you deed: “Evil shall always pursue have transgressed, and make yourthe sinners” (Proverbs 13:21). It self a new heart and a new spirit,” ? then progresses, unlike Cohen, to finds response by a God who is fora mythical reading of the above- giving and long-suffering, el rachum quoted passage from Ezekiel that vechanun (Exodus 34:6-7). Accordthe Midrash interprets as the expi- ing to Cohen, the correlation beation of sin through death: “The tween the ethical responsibility of soul that sinneth, it shall die.” The _ the individual and the forgiving God

Midrash then touches upon the undergoes a fundamental change halakhic idea of compensating an when Christian dogma adopts the evil deed through action: “Let him term son of God to denote the son’s

bring a guilt offering” (Leviticus vicarious suffering for the atone5:6) and finally culminates in the ment of hereditary sins: idea of individual repentance and

atonement before God: “And the It is a tragedy of monotheism Holy One Himself replied: in pen- that precisely the attribute of itence let him mend his ways and God’s goodness, the forgivehis sin shall be forgiven him.” !4 ness of sin, has endangered

Menschensohn—ben adam. pure monotheism through the Cohen uses the biblical term ben [Christian] concept of the Son adam in order to point to a correla- of Man.'* 139. The Self therefore is not justan — which, in turn, is postulated by the

expression of the empirical individ- idea of the one God. RoR 420-21; ual but rather represents an ideal RdV 488; BdR 51-53; ErW 404-5.]

concept in ethics, defining a task This ethical labor, however, is assigned to man—a task to which _ linked to the idea of God, as it is man has to commit himself inas- directed toward God; thus the formuch as he strives for self-perfec- | mation of the ethical Self is incontion in his effort to become an eth- _ceivable without relating to God. ical person. [“Incessantly the Self The concept of humility is central must remain the task which con- _ to that relation, and thus it follows tains in itself the task of the moral that humility relates to the human law.” BdR 59; also ErW 259. Thus — Self. The virtue of humility is meant the Self is for Cohen no empirical — to teach and educate a person who

concept, but rather an ideal task, in trying to find herself, should not whose realization finds expression look for empirical or historical indiin the messianic ideal of humanity, — viduality, but solely for the pursuit

“HE IS (NOT) LIKE YOU” 149 of ethical self-perfection; namely, ensure that it may ever remain a for self-perfection toward God. human virtue; humility is the rod [Humility, according to Cohen, is and the staff [Psalms 23:4] with the epitome of messianism. RoR which a person works toward the

266-88; RdV 310-23; also see ethical ideal. The Self finds its paragraph number 134 in chapter 6 model in God. Knowledge of God,

of this book.| A person can and as well as love of God, are mean-

ought to recognize ethical self- ingful exclusively in terms of perfection merely as an infinite human ethics, in terms of interpertask. She must never yield to the sonal relations, and of a person’s proud-hearted feeling of power relationship to herself. and achievement, of greatness, [Deuteronomy 8:17.] of her integri- 740. Do we also find this meaning

ty or her complacency. She should in the god of Aristotle? In a brief advance the concept of Self only as_ discussion of this question, we

an ever-challenging task. Humility shall return to the problem of is a divine attribute in order to eudaemonia. Knowledge, Knower, Known: A Critical Note on J. B. Soloveitchik

1471. In Aristotle, thought and (See 141.) Knowledge, knower, action are opposites. [Aristotle and known. Maimonides adopts 1977, Metaphysics 12:9; 1945, NE this metaphysical terminus techni1177b, 337-53. The Aristotelian cus from Aristotle, and most com-

distinction between intellectual mentators suggest a plain Arisvirtue (apetat n@tkat) and practi- totelian reading of this doctrine. cal virtues (apetat Stavondtkat) Cohen, of course, maintains that testifies to the dissolution of ethics the ethical and political implicaas science and therewith to the loss tions of Maimonides’ doctrine of of the idea of the Good as a regu- Walking in His Ways suggest a lative ideal for human action. RoR radical critique of the Aristotelian 403 and RdV 467 on Aristotle principle of mere divine contem1945 NE 1103a, 67; NE 1178b, plation.'® We find a perceptive in623.] The life committed to the terpretation of Maimonides’ theeudaemonia of thinking is there- ory of actional attributes in J. B. fore a life of leisure. [The Greek Soloveitchik’s essay “And Thence word oxodn (scholei), from which They Request,” whose ethical gist the English terms scholar, scholar- and anti-Aristotelian bent are ship, and school derive, literally clearly indebted to Cohen’s readmeans “inactivity” or “leisure.”] ing.'’ Soloveitchik’s interpretation, This leisure is identical with con- however, reverts to a plain reading templation for which it provides of Aristotelian metaphysics when

150 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES the conditio sine qua non. A life of | it comes to Maimonides’ citation

contemplative leisure is thus, in | of the classical doctrine of God fact, a life of reason. Hence, this | contemplating himself." eudaemonia of thinking and of rea-

son constitute divine excellence, 142. Does this God, who finds His or, if you wish, the characteristic of _ self-sufficiency in thinking of Him-

God. God as the Prime Mover _ self, bear any resemblance to or kinmeans nothing but that; the auto- ship with the God of Maimonides? If motive faculty is tantamount to a $0, one would have to assume that thinking whose object of thought for Maimonides the essence ot God consists exclusively of itself. For is primarily defined in terms of CreAristotle, the automotive faculty is ation; it is precisely this definition,

the principle of motion; hence a however, which Maimonides, in mind that thinks of itself (self- fact, rejects. What effect does this reflective thinking) is the principle “thinking of thought” exert on of thinking. Therefore the thinking ethics? Should ethics perhaps be of the Aristotelian God means grounded in the notion of God’s cel“thinking of thinking” (vonots ebrating His eternal bliss by thinking vonoews). [Aristotle 1977, Meta- Himself? To which of the actional physics 1074b, 165.] What else attributes, however, should we refer can He, what else needs He, think? _ this divine bliss? Of God, we only

He thinks thinking (that is, He know attributes of action. But in thinks Himself); for He is thinking, Aristotle, thinking and action are the very principle of thinking. And diametrically opposed. The panjust as all motion emerges from the theon is far removed from any principle of motion, so all thinking action. Should the gods perhaps be emerges out of the principle of executing deeds of virtue, or of justhinking. In thinking the thinking, tice? “Will it not seem ridiculous?” or in thinking Himself, the uni- (Aristotle 10:8, NE1178b, 11.) [“The

| verse, anything in motion becomes gods, as we conceive them, enjoy the object of this thinking; for the supreme felicity and happiness. But cosmos finds its origin and princi- | what sort of actions can we attribute ple in this divine thinking. This to them? ... Will it not seem ridicu-

then produces the equation of lous (yeAo.os) to think of them as “knowledge, knower, and known” making contracts, restoring deposits, (Sou ‘Dw >%2w). [Maimonides and the like? ...If we go through the 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei _ list we shall find that all forms of vir-

haTorah 2:10; Guide 1:68, 163-66; tuous conduct seem trifling and 3:21, 484-85: Maimonides 1912, unworthy of the gods. Yet, neverthe-

chap. 8.] This equation proves less, they have always been con- | meaningful not only with reference ceived as . . . living actively. .. . But

to God: pantheism applies it to for a living being, if we eliminate

human reasoning. action, and a forteriori creative action,

“HE IS (NOT) LIKE YOU” 151 what remains save contemplation? It like that of God. Human reason is follows that the activity of God...is not only receptive, but active (vous

the activity of contemplation; and totntiKos). [Guide 1:68, 164-65.] therefore among human activities, To be sure, the satisfaction of one that which is most akin to the divine who has achieved wisdom _ is activity of contemplation, willbe the greater than that of one who is

greatest source of happiness searching for it. And yet, one does (emphasis added).” [(Aristotle 1945, not necessarily have to renounce NE 1178, 623.)] Here, Aristotle — this bliss. If man only cultivates the

thinks merely in terms of trading thinking of wisdom, thereby disamongst the gods themselves, placing practical conduct, as Arisignoring, however, any relationship totle’s ethics requires, he can of the gods to mortals. Gods are advance himself by means of the exempt from acting and producing, intellectual engagement of the hence they cannot serve as para- philosopher toward pure thinking, digms for human action, nor can and in so doing arrive at God's their eudaemonia express itself as essence consisting of eudaemonia. one of action. Thus we find eudae- [RoR 403 and RdV 467 on Aristotle

monia of leisure diametrically 1977, Metaphysics 1072b, 149; opposed to eudaemonia of action. Aristotle 1945, NE 1175a, 597.] How can we imagine ethics with- Eudaemonia is produced by virtuout action? The gods are removed _ ous thinking only, which exclusive-

from virtuous conduct, hence they ly applies to the “dianoetic are divorced from virtue as such. It virtues.” Virtuous conduct may be follows that they are excluded from impeded by many factors, being

any relationship to ethics. Since, subject to financial circumstance, according to Aristotle, however, the physical strength, and freedom of essence of God is characterized in choice. Scientific activity, however, terms of eudaemonia, Maimonides _ is not at all or is hardly affected by must needs reject the most funda- _ these.

mental principle of Aristotelian ethics (that is, eudaemonia) ashe is 144. Thus, according to Aristotle, bound to reject the God of aeudae- the purpose of ethics consists in

monia deprived of ethics. refraining from ethics; ethics aims at abstention from all virtuous human

143. What, then, is the meaning of conduct. This characterizes the eudaemonia as it relates to human eudaemonia of Aristotelian ethics, ethics? Only vaguely can man_ which ensures that mortals become aspire to an ethics expressed in equal or similar to the gods. In praceudaemonistic terms. The human __ ticing eudaemonia, not to say, in mind shares in divine reason; celebrating it, man gratifies the strivhence one learns to master think- ing to assimilate to God. Both for ing. Human thinking is creative, man and for God, this eudaemonia

152 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES actually raises a wall of separation elsewhere, see S. Scheyer in his

blocking the way to ethics. commentary to his translation of part 3 of the Guide, esp. 447.) Mai-

145. Such eudaemonia Mai- monides not only decisively and monides was bound to reject, and emphatically rejects the doctrine of with it any kind of eudaemonia—if eudaemonia, with broad and prosystematic coherence of thought is found conclusions deriving from to serve as a Criterion at all. Joél this opposition, as we shall further did not recognize even this deci- elaborate, but at the same time, he

sive difference between Mai- undertakes to introduce a substitute

monides and Aristotle, consisting of for this basic eudaemonian conthe basic question of eudaemonia, cept, as we have pointed out previ-

due to his failure to recognize the ously. The substitution must be ethical value of thinking defined by found along the same path from the cognition of God. See his essay which eudaemonia went astray. on Maimonides 1876b, 1:49. For That is the path upon which selfthe correct insight, here as well as improvement will move.

I and Thou: Asymmetrical Relationships and the Priority of the Other

146. It is an irresistible delusion (See 146.) I and thou. Cohen forthat the lone thinker in his eudae- mulates the dialogical principle monian bliss will mature most safe- that the Self is engendered by the

ly into Selfhood. On the other Other, that “I originate with You,” hand, we know that this solitary or, in typically Cohenian terms, Self of thinking cannot be identical “that the I correlates with the with the ethical Self, because the Thou.”!? In contributing the theme latter Self demands action. For the of I and Thou to twentieth-century

ethical Self cannot exist as an | Jewish philosophy of intersubjecwithout a You. The Other is termed tivity, Cohen inspires dialogical Re’a in Hebrew—he is like You; thinking and the political and theo[Leviticus 19:18; and JS 1:145-95; logical traditions of dialogue that

as well as 3:43-97, esp. 52-65.] ensued.?? Cohen, in contrast to Re’a is the You who correlates with Buber, conceives of the relationship

the |. The Self results from the eter- between I and Thou as an asym-

nal relationship between | and metrical one, as he predicates the Thou; that is, it is the infinite ideal very concept of Self upon the priorof this ever-continuing relationship. ity of the Other whose suffering The ideal always remains ideal; the commands love and justice. The task remains a task. Yet the ideal is Thou imposes a claim on the Self, a

defined by its demand for zealous commandment “to do good” that emulation, hence it opens up the _ is prior even to ethical reasoning:

“HE IS (NOT) LIKE YOU” 153 possibility of coming closer; just as Ethical method fails when the task is a task only insofar as it is facing this new problem of incumbent upon me, insofar as it is attaining the concept of

my personal concern. Working at Thou. ... There arises the this task, | am working on myself, question whether it is not on my Self; this Self integrates the | precisely in paying heed to and the Thou. In striving toward this the suffering of another in aim, in which the Self is manifest, | which this other appears no

am practicing that virtue which longer as him or her but might best be termed the virtue of rather as Thou.*' the Self. We have already met this

virtue: it is humility. Maimonides, It is the suffering of the Mitmenopposing the Aristotelian principle | sch, the fellowperson, and her call of eudaemonia, replaces this princi- | for compassion that establishes, in

ple, and reformulates it in such a | Cohen’s language, the priority of way that the Self is prominently | you over myself. The other person exposed; he substitutes self-perfec- | demands goodness of me in pretion for eudaemonia. [RoR 313, | cisely the same way as God does, 315; RdV 364, 366-67; and Guide | and as is stated in Micah 6:8:

3:35, 538.] “He has told you, adam, what is good: ... only to do justice, and to of God.”?* The suffering of anlove goodness, and to walk humbly — other reminds the Self of its origiwith God.” The imperious cry of — nal responsibility, a responsibility

the creature demands the fulfill- that is prior to reason. The other ment of the commandment to do person provides the grounds for “the right and the good in the eyes _ the messianic ideality of the Self.?°

Re’a Fellow: Shepherding Others

The Other is termed re’a in He- This attitude of care, this Befindbrew. Cohen gives the term re’a lichkeit der Sorge, unlike that of (fellow) a universalist bent, relat- Heidegger, is not one that is coning the term to the “fellow-Jew” cerned primarily with its own as well as to the “foreigner.”*4 Dasein.*® It rather constitutes, ac-

The Hebrew text reads “ve- cording to Cohen, a response to a ahavta_ le-reakha kamokha” commandment that is prior to (Leviticus 19:18). The term re’a one’s own Being. Maimonides (pn) is etymologically related to himself restricts the meaning of the root *ny7 or “shepherding,” re’akha in Leviticus 19:18 to suggesting that the word re’a im- “your brother who is committed plies a personal attitude of care to the Torah and to the pursuit of

or shepherding toward others.2? the Commandments.”*’ Here

154 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Cohen disagrees, and we could brother” seems sensible only if we argue that Maimonides’ very re- grant the fundamental validity of striction of re’akha to “your Cohen’s universalist interpretation.

Creation of the Ethical Self

He is like you. Cohen’s transla- cal commentaries on Leviticus tion of kamokha as “He is like 19:18.°° you” stands in opposition to the Cohen proposes the concept of adverbial interpretation which is Self as the integral limit for the usually given to the sentence, ethical will in its pursuit of the namely “Love your fellow as you — ideal of humanity. He thus models

love yourself.” Cohen advances his concept of intersubjectivity an adnominal reading instead: upon his principle of origin, in “Love your fellow, since he is which the concept of limit (you

one like you are.”*% Rosen- are [not] like me) assumes an zweig’s translation leaves the originative, creative function with meaning open, thus fully preserv- respect to the very process of ing the ambiguity of the text: human cognition.°*! The ideal Self “Halte lieb deinen Genossen, dir which constitutes itself as an gleich.”*? Buber on his part em- “ought of self-awareness” [das phasizes the peculiar dative con- Sollen des Selbstbewusstseins|°? struction of the passage, featur- when facing the needs of another, ing the indirect object, ve-ahavta_ is not simply “given” within us, le-re’akha. We do not read “Love but rather has to be created. The

your fellow” in the accusative very grounds of the creation of sense, in the sense of a direct ob-_ the Self, however, lie in the con-

ject, but rather “Act lovingly to- crete needs and in the tangible wards your fellow,” suggesting a_ sufferings of the other person. relational, existential commit- The facing of such need, Cohen ment toward the other, which is says, brings about the creation of grounded in the classical bibli- the ethical Self. The Principle of Grace and the Principle of Justice 147. Maimonides defines the con- (See 147.) Justice and love. Maicept of self-perfection by subsum- _monides discusses the term justice

ing it under the most important (tsedaka) in conjunction with two

concept in Judaism, originally other concepts, namely lovdenoting justice, subsequently as ingkindness (chesed), and true well love, hence piety and ethics judgment (mishpath).°> The conin general—tsedaka (npty). Yet cepts lovingkindness, justice, and since Maimonides offers this ulti- true judgment assume a pivotal

“HE IS (NOT) LIKE YOU” 155 mate religious and ethical value as position for Maimonides as he adthe substitute for eudaemonia, it is vances them as ideal expressions of now equivalent to self-perfection. a life lived in emulation of divine

Tsedaka means self-perfection actional attributes. According to (mabnwn), for perfecting the Self is Cohen’s reading, Maimonides’ not merely a task for man in his concept of tsedaka indicates justice relationship to himself but at the in the fullest sense, including the same time implies a relationship concept of equity. Thus the term

with God. On the other hand, tsedaka, indicating more than

human aspiration to perfection “mere legality,” assumes a central does not aim at the isolated self-suf- role in Cohen’s definition of the

ficiency of the divine essence, but content of humanity as ethical rather refers to the advancement _ ideal.°*

toward the ideal Self, which repre- Maimonides defines the term sents the highest good. There is no chesed, on the other hand, as other good, since only through this “beneficence toward one who has

advancement does the ultimate no right at all to claim this from purpose of man (nx man) mani- you.”*? In other words chesed is fest itself, crowning human ethics analogous to what in Christian and man’s relationship to God. tradition is referred to as grace [Guide 3:54, 635. For the Hebrew (xapts). In his essay “Liebe und translation see Maimonides 1987b, Gerechtigkeit in den Begriffen 597. Ibn Tibbon refers to the fourth Gott und Mensch,”°® Cohen emhighest perfection in Maimonides’ phasizes that lovingkindness, “asconcluding chapter of the Guide suming a gracious attitude towards also as shelemuth acheron[a], indi- others,” is the first among all Jewcating an ultimate perfection which — ish virtues. As such, it is the first of

is beyond natural disposition. Cf. the divine actional attributes to ibn Tibbon’s appendix of philo- emulate. Grace, inasmuch as it is

sophical terminology in Mai- defined as an undeserved gift of monides 1987b, appendix 85. For beneficence, however, cannot serve the translation of Kafih, see Mai- as a principle for ethical self-permonides 1972, 692.] There is no fection. Such a principle, according

purpose in human existence that to Cohen, would constitute an inremains unlinked to the purpose of —fringement upon the sovereignty of

ethics. Hence, the purpose of man ethical will, and, as such, an incannot relate to a divine essence fringement upon the very principle

unconcerned with man. On the of individual responsibility.°” contrary, it is in directing itself Cohen therefore claims that “Mai-

toward human action that the monides defines tsedaka as the divine being posits the ultimate virtue of [ethical] self-perfecpurpose of human existence. There- _ tion.”°* Maimonides’ formulation

fore self-perfection presents a of tsedaka quite literally endorses |

156 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES perfect substitute for eudaemonia. | Cohen’s claim that tsedaka “apEudemonia provides an aim, a fin- | plies to every good action perish, a real end. A human being | formed by you because of a moral

ought not to settle for such an end | virtue [ethical attribute] with and terminal objective; the ultimate | which you perfect your soul.”°? end is but continuous work; it is no

idle work, however, but rather of the soul, as the soul itself is not advancement in goodness, by dint defined in terms of the perfection

of striving toward the Good. of entelechy. Whereas the process of se/f-perfection (tTEX«t-

148. The term sel/f-perfection [liter- wots) has never obtained any ally, process of perfecting] is signif- particular significance in Aris-

icant, since it distinguishes itself totelian ethics, [Aristotle 1947, from the state of perfection (mnm>w). Metaphysics 1021b, 266, where

Previously (See paragraph 123 in perfection (from tedetwots) indichapter 6.) we have tried to clarify cates an immanent teleology with the different terminological usages no particular reference to any ethiin Hebrew of virtue, and we point- cal telos.] this very term plays a ed to the term 72yn in its connota- significant role in Jewish ethics, tion “grade,” a process of develop- most prominently in Maimonides. ment [gradus ad parnassum] than Thus we may be led to assume that

just the state of excellence. [See the term perfection (ma>w) may paragraph numbers 122 and 123 in have given rise to the later seman-

chapter 6.] Perfection is suspect in tic development of the Hebrew its kinship with that sort of skill term self-perfection (mn>nwn). (eEts) which we had to reject. As a_ = [Hishtalmuth is a modern term.

matter of fact, we should assume Ben-Yehuda 1980, 1214a.] The that the Hebrew term for perfec- perfection of the soul is projected tion originated with Aristotle’s term into the process of perfecting the entelechy, by which he defines the Self. Now we may dispense with

soul. [Aristotle 1975a, On the Soul, the concept of eudaemonia, 412a, 69. Aristotle’s concept of which, in any case, itself bodes ill. entelechy indicates an immanent

teleology, as it denotes a natural 149. It is to the credit of Maiprocess that contains its telos or monides, having achieved a great perfection within itself.] Entelechy breakthrough in Jewish ethics, that means substance as reality brought he did away with the ambiguous to perfection; reality’s telos (Tehkos) concept of eudaemonia, replacing is inherent. In designating virtue as it with that concept through which perfection, perfection is defined as _ rational ethics has always discussed

the virtue of the soul, and there- the problem of free will, namely with declared to be the substance autonomous ethical self-awareness.

“HE IS (NOT) LIKE YOU” 157 [ErW 258-84, 285-323.] It is this ic concept of virtue: the process of doctrine of the autonomous ethical perfecting (mm°nwn) instead of perSelf which now mediates the gener- fection (ma>w).

To Inherit the Good—Studying Torah for Its Own Sake 150. This breakthrough is all the (See 150.) To imberit the good. In more meritorious as it is obtained most versions of the traditional text in the face of that most intricate of Redusha desidra especially among issue admittedly most amenable to the Ashkenazi traditions, the expresseduction; that is, the eudaemonia_ sion “to inherit the good” (lirosh of thinking. Even the luxury of con- /atov) refers to the messianic days,

templation is renounced, once the counted among the promised redanger of the false principle has wards for performance of the com-

been recognized. Indeed, when mandments (“ve-nirash tova .. . facing the issue of eudaemonia, no leshnei yemoth hamashiach”).*° less than the very grounds of ethics Cohen, of course, rejects such exis at stake. No ethicist was ever so trinsic reward for “doing the right

cruel as to deny the ethical person and the good.” We may point her claim to true happiness. [“I do out, however, that Maimonides’ not oppose the feeling of happi- Sephardi version of this text, in ness, but only the idea of its fact, did not make any mention of absoluteness.” ErW xii, 293-96.] messianic days as a historically She attains this happiness in the immanent, this-worldly reward pursuit of self-perfection, whereas for serving God, pointing instead she must fail to achieve it under the to the world-to-come as the ulti-

false slogan of eudaemonia. The mate good.*' In this way, the false principle will lead to false Sephardi tradition lends support conclusions. How much Mai- to Maimonides’ own explicit remonides himself attributes his over- jection of any ulterior, extrinsic, coming Aristotle to Jewish tradition heteronomous motive for serving he himself attests by stating his God. Maimonides, as we shall see,

, aversion to eudaemonia more _ strictly distinguishes between the explicitly in his halakic code (Yad messianic days and the world-toha-Chazakah [Mishneh Torah]) than come. He labels the former “thisin the Guide. “The one who serves. worldly” and “historically imma-

God out of love is engaged in the nent,” in contrast to the latter pursuit of Torah and its laws, and whose function is “transcendenfollows the paths of wisdom, not for tal” and whose reward, although

the sake of some mundane or contingent upon a person’s pursuit earthly interest, nor for the sake of of justice, lies “beyond human cal-

avoiding pain or suffering, and in culations.”

158 EHITCS OF MAIMONIDES order to gain any hedonistic good The ideal of studying the Torah

(7a wa x>) [Siddur 1943-1945, | for its own sake, which Mai1:204; TB Niddah 52a.] but rather | monides associates with the ideal

one is engaged in the pursuit of | of serving God out of love, is tratruth for truth’s sake . . . and this | ditionally related to the rejection level is a very high one, and not | of any extrinsic, eudaemonian moevery wise person attains it > px | tive for studying Torah.*? Historim mp oonm).” And he continues: | cally speaking, the idea of “study“This is the level of our forefather | ing Torah for its own sake” (Torah Abraham... the level that God has | lismah) found its most prominent

required of us through Moses.” [See | expression in the Lithuanian Maimonides 1984-1996 (Hilkhoth | movement of Talmud study initiTeshuvah 10:2), also 10:4—-5.] It} ated by R. Chayim of Volozhin in

seems beyond doubt that the | the early nineteenth century and phrase “not every sage” alludes to | by other disciples of the Vilna Aristotle and is derived from Mai- | Gaon who related the idea of monides’ devotion to his own tradi- | Torah lismah exclusively to the tion rather than from the irony of | pursuit of studying and learning any criticism in point; Maimonides | talmudic texts.44_ Maimonides, refers here not only to Moses but | however, does not develop the idea also to Abraham vis-a-vis Aristotle, | of pursuing Torah for its own sake

as if to say: my deviation from Aris- | within the context of Hilkhoth totle is not to my credit, but is root- | Talmud Torah (as one would exed in the basic attitude of Judaism. | pect). Rather, he does so within the

existentially and ethically broader love.”45 As such, it is itself di-

context of Hilkhoth Teshuvah. rected toward an emulation of Torah lismah becomes an expres- God’s ways, ways of lovingkind-

sion for “serving God out of ness and ways of justice. The God of Abraham, Not the God of the Philosophers: Abraham and Moses Maimonides portrays both Moses which Maimonides denotes with

and Abraham as epitomes of the verb nyw (shotet), indicating a human perfection, both distin- meandering of one’s thoughts.*® guished in their knowledge and Maimonides ascribes to Abraham love of God. Abraham discovers not only the speculative discovery God, the creator of the heavens of God’s uniqueness, but also the

and the earth, through “au- discovery of those ethical attribtonomous speculation,” in a_ utes that developed into the tradiprocess of independent thinking tional characteristics of Abraham’s

“HE IS (NOT) LIKE YOU” 159 faith: Walking in His Ways and level that God has required of us love of God predicated upon “the through Moses.”°° This is the forway of lovingkindness,” and the mulation of a traditional Halakah practice of “justice and righteous- in which it is Abraham, in particu-

ness.”47 lar; who represents the ways of

Maimonides emphasizes, how- God (lovingkindness and justice), ever, that Abraham, in his inde- with Moses serving merely as the

pendent, rational discovery of mediator of that ideal. The conGod, could never claim that “God _ trast between the God of Abraham

has sent me to you” (thus Abra- and the God of Aristotle, or the ham was perpetually tempted by God of the philosophers, a charac-

doubt), whereas Moses was tu- teristic trope in Jewish medieval tored face-to-face by God.*® Moses _ literature,°! found its classical for-

thus prima facie represents the mulation in Judah _ ha-Levi’s higher stage of prophetic knowl- Kuzari: edge, personifying and embodying

the ultimate knowledge of God in Now I understand the differits intellectual, ethical, and politi- ence between Elohim and cal dimensions. But even this kind Adonai, and I see how far the of perfection does not originate ex- God of Abraham is different trinsically: Maimonides stresses from that of Aristotle. Man the nonsensual, pure character of yearns for Adonai as a matter Moses’ knowledge of God when of love, taste, and conviction; emphasizing the unbound, unlim- whereas attachment to Eloited origin of Moses’ closeness and him is the result of speculaintimacy with God.*? Cohen reads tion. A feeling of the former this intimacy with a revolutionary kind prepares the adherents of bent, claiming that it frees Moses the Jewish faith to sacrifice from the dictates of any given real- their life for His sake, and to

ity and its status quo. prefer death to His absence. Maimonides portrays both Speculation, however, makes Abraham and Moses in contrast to veneration plausible only as a purely intellectual, contemplative long as it entails no harm to

pursuit idealized by the Aris- the believers, but nobody totelian tradition. “This is the level would bear pain for the sake of our forefather Abraham... the of such rational faith.°7

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On Eudaemonian Eschatology and Holy History Zionism as Betrayal of the Ideal In his final three chapters Cohen discusses the ideal of human self-perfection

within the context of prophetic messianism. The relationship between eschatology and ideal society, the immortality of the soul, repentance and resurrection in classical Jewish theology, and a socialist concept of messianism are the subjects of discussion in this short eighth chapter.

“Eudaemonian Eschatology” and Ideal Society 151. Indeed, one may ask, what (See 152.) Arabic Philosophers. In are the circumstances and subordi- some Islamic sources we find a nate motifs to which the principle prominent exposition of this kind of eudaemonia owes its universal of eudaemonian eschatology.' But reception and_ indestructible not only in Islamic sources: Abraappeal; for both its naturalistic ham ben David of Posquiéres deethics and its ambiguity must at all fends what Cohen would call the times have called its value and mythical elements of Jewish eschavalidity into question. For Plato, tology, exonerating such ideas as concupiscence is the very epitome the physical resurrection of the of wickedness; [Plato 1982, Phae- dead and the material well-being do 68c-69c, 237-41; also Plato of the Jews in an other-worldly fu1952a, Philebus 66-67, 393-99; ture.”* The traditional depiction of ErW 145-46; RoR 403; RdV 467.] messianic times does not focus it demanded quite some audacity only upon the eudaemonian ason the part of Aristotle to revive his pects of spiritual happiness and

162 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES eudaemonia in the face of such an material well-being, but often emassemblage and such an ambi-__phasizes instead the “birthpangs of

ence. What mockery and what the Messiahs,” and the catasatire of the wretched lot of strophic, apocalyptic events anhumanity, in which but the theo- nouncing messianic times.°

retician, and only a philosopher, Maimonides himself portrays may relish such bliss! Could such messianic times in terms of im-

eudaemonia provide comfort to proved material and social con-

humankind? ditions. His portrayal of the mes-

sianic, ideal society does imply a 152. Eudaemonia gained other political utopia,*+ but, according to powerful allies. The universal ten- Cohen, it should not be mistaken dency to promote the general wel- for being merely eudaemonia. Mesfare thwarts the exclusivity of an — sianic socialist materialism is rather

aristocratic pursuit of science. Even tied to the pursuit of justice and Plato could not resist the charms of peace for its own sake, embodied in a literary genre concerned with the _ Israel’s occupation with Torah and

social good. [See Plato 1942, universal pursuit of knowledge of Timaeus 25a—d, 41-43; Plato 1942, God:

Critias 113b-121c, 279-306; and and then the entire world Cohen 1924, 1, 326.] Arabic . be occupied solely with .the

. . . knowledge of God, and

philosophers have also developed

this borderline domain of ethics the people of Israel will

and poetry. (S. Munk 1988, 438) peop’. typ aes be exceedingly [See also critique in of wise, ;matters . . they . vsMaimonides’ will be initiated

the Islamic eschatological tradition. that are now hidden. and

Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth a , they will achieve knowledge Teshuvah 8:6.]aeStoicism, in an era of their Creator according of but actuallycapacity precipitating . i slavery, . to everyone’s as it. its disintegration, promoted the says in Isaiah [11:9]: “For popularity of theland ideas shall and ideals y m1 Lye , the beoffilled

socialism in their development ofwith . knowledge of God natural law and of the law of as water covers the nations. [ErW 68-70. Inasmuch as 595

. . ode SCda.

the idea of social progress is linked

throughout history to the ideal of a The messianic future actualizes shared material common good, the _ the ultimate Good, and the futurity pursuit of justice and of human _ of this Good transcends all political rights remains attached to eudae- interests. “Therefore Israel . . . longs

yadq 8

monian principles. Even modern for the days of the messiah, so that socialism, according to Cohen, is they will be released from all poliessentially a question of material tics,” according to Maimonides.°®

ON EUDAEMONIAN ESCHATOLOGY AND HOLY HISTORY 163

sustenance “heeding the demands In opposition to a long history of of the stomach.” ErW 295-96; RoR | traditional Jewish messianism, 240; RdV 281; also Schwarzschild | Cohen claims that messianism pre1956.] Indeed, the revolutionary | cludes all Jewish nationalism. The

ethical impetus of the earliest | weakness of Zionism, according to Christian communities found its | Cohen, lies in its attempt to create a reverberation here, inasmuch as | political reality in which the mesthat revolutionary impetus itself | sianic ideal merges with national exemanated from this socialist force. | istence. The political materialization In Judaism, the original humanistic | of the messianic ideal, inasmuch as meaning of prophetic messianism | it is bound up with manifestations

| had never become effete, even | of national power, sacrifices the puthough the Jewish people drew | rity of the messianic ideal, which, in their inspiration for this ethical | turn, provides the grounds for a rad| vision from the hope for ultimate | ical critique of political reality. relief from temporal straits. Cosmopolitanism vis-a-vis the vandal- tence—lies at the bottom of all clasism of migration, and socialism vis- sical myths of the immortality of the

a-vis the misery of the masses, soul, which extend the bliss of indiprovided the ferment which always vidual existence into an eternal revitalized the pursuit of eudaemo- future. RoR 247; RdV 288-89; also

nia. [The messianic ideal of the Rosenzweig 1971, 3; 1990, 3.] Out

prophets, although providing the of apprehension concerning the ferment for the socialist pursuit of a human fate after death, the concept greater social and material good, of the soul originally emerged, with preserves the idea of transcendence all the attendant ambiguity, howev-

even in the midst of its most ambi- er, inherent in this origin. To the

tious demands concerning the extent that such an image of the actual political implementations of _ departed soul as haunting spook this ideal in any societal context. and specter loses its grip, and to the An “irreconcilable contrast to what extent that this image becomes subis called ‘world politics’ in histori- _limated psychologically in focusing

cal terms lies within the ideal of on consciousness and its unity, to prophetic messianism.” ErW 407.] that extent this image dematerializes and ceases to be relevant for 153. Perhaps no less important for solving the riddle of ethics. Leaving

the survival of eudaemonia has the provenance of mythology and been the eschatological element in _ religion, the concept of the immor-

the mythology of all cultures. tality of the soul has become the [According to Cohen, fear of subject of philosophical ethics. death—the human dread of facing [Cohen reads Maimonides’ concept the ephemerality of our own exis- of immortality—the world-to-come

164 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES (olam ha-ba)—as a concept of uni- ish tradition have at all times met versal ethical significance, repre- with mental reservation; and prejusenting the fruit of one’s knowledge dice prevailed among the generally of God irrespective of the question well-educated that the inferior status of one’s national or religious identi- of the Jewish religion is attested by ty. RoR 329-30; RdV 383; and __ its lack of any tenet of immortality.

Wiedebach 2000, 431-—57.] [Liebeschuetz 1967, 32.] Whoever is acquainted with the Hebrew 154. Consequently, in this point also Scriptures will have difficulties in

Aristotle parted ways with Plato. comprehending the distortion preOnly the one who engages his soul sented by this opinion. Such prejuin theoretical speculation, only the dice becomes plausible, however, if

Nous, the creative faculty of think- we understand the demands that ing, is immortal according to Aristo- those educated in religion unceas-

tle, and not the human soul as such. ingly make upon the doctrine of [Also Aristotle 1975b, On the Soul, immortality—overtly or covertly. 430a, 171; Maimonides 1912, 1:43; [Da Costa 1993, 47, might serve as | Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth an example in point, as after a long, Teshuvah 8:3; and Guide 1:68, existential search he outright negat163-66; 3:27, 510-12.] Yet there ed that there can be any certainty in , exists something in a human being matters of immortality and salvation that shares in the life of the immor- in Jewish (and Christian) tradition.]

tals. This admission, then, that Aris- The same applies perhaps even | totle—from his point of view—pres- more to the irreligious who are no | ents to the general philosophical less superstitious in matters of life creed lends support to his eudae- after death. Scripture maintains

monian theory. immortality strictly within the ethical context, as circumscribed by the

155. Approaches toward the idea of correlation between God and immortality in the literature of Jew- human beings.

Cohen vs. Scholem: On the Historicity of Jewish Tradition

156. It is the proximity of God (See 156.) The Hereafter rarely (nox nap) that in Psalms 73:28 is presents a distinct theme of rellitermed a person’s “goodly por- gious imagination in Judaism. The | tion.” [Cohen invokes the German critical tradition within Judaism noun Gut not in the adjectival rejects all mythical perceptions of sense of “good” but rather in the the Hereafter as inauthentic, adnominal sense of “a portion of claiming that they represent a begoods,” alluding to Maimonides’ trayal of the integrity of the indireading of Sanhedrin 10:1: a _ vidual and of individual responsi-

ON EUDAEMONIAN ESCHATOLOGY AND HOLY HISTORY 165

“share/portion in the world to _ bility. About messianic times, Mai-

come.” See also Cohen 1924, monides says: 1:297, and his reference to Judah

ha-Levi there.] This is an idea all these details about what almost unanimously limited by will happen in messianic times Jewish philosophers to the mean- is beyond the capacity of ing and valence of immortality. human cognition . . . those [RoR 313-15; RdV 364-67.] The Sages who nonetheless talk sufferings as well as bliss in the about those matters, do this Hereafter were rarely allowed to without the authority of our

present a distinct theme of reli- Torah. . . . Nobody shall gious imagination in Judaism. Res- therefore waste his time study-

urrection is already portrayed in ing any of those apocalyptic

Ezekiel as a parable, [Ezekiel legends about the coming of 37:1-14; and TB Sanhedrin 92b.] the Messiah .. . they have no signifying none other than immor- deeper religious meaning, tality, which, in the end, is merely since they neither bring about an expression for ethical recom- the fear of God, nor do they pense. At times, even this recom- teach the love of God.’ pense finds itself described and

determined according to the pre- The predominant part of Jewvailing Zeitgeist; yet even such ish tradition, of course, runs deviations from the main stream of counter to both Maimonides’ ra-

Jewish thinking are balanced tionalism and Cohen’s reading of through the irrepressible correction it, portraying a colorful picture of

induced by the basic concept of both apocalyptic and blissful imrepentance (mawn)—a concept ages in Jewish traditions dealing within which religious imagination with the imagined life in the and ethics become reconciled in Hereafter. Gershom Scholem critJudaism. All fanaticism of retribu- icizes the “great Jewish scholar-

tion is deprived by one single ship of the nineteenth and early moment of repentance of its infer- twentieth centuries, who to a nal claim; repentance cheats Satan great extent determined the out of his blacklisting. [R. Abahu image of Judaism. In view of their

says: “The position that ba’alei concept of a purified and rational teshuvah attain, the perfectly right- Judaism, they could only applaud

eous cannot attain.” Mishnah_ the attempt to eliminate or liquiAvoth 4:17; TB Berakhoth 34b; TB date apocalypticism from the Avodah Zara 17b; and Mai- realm of Judaism.”® However, monides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Cohen’s hermeneutical agenda is Teshuvah 7:4; also Maimonides different from that of Scholem

1912, vi.] and other scholars of history. For

166 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Scholem, the ideal of historical ical and cultural implications of and philological accuracy serves one’s hermeneutical activity. It as a measuring stick for scholar- seems ironic that—while Scholem ship. Cohen’s entire hermeneuti- criticizes Cohen for his old-fashcal approach to Jewish literary ioned, nineteenth-century rationalsources is critical in that all tex- ism—Cohen’s critical hermeneutics, tual and historical phenomena in in fact, provides conceptual tools Jewish tradition are themselves for the contemporary, postmodern subjected to a critique grounded agenda of reappropriating Jewish in a hermeneutical agenda in sources, proceeding from decidedly which the ethical reigns supreme. _ ethical grounds.

Cohen knows that critically read- Cohen’s definition of Judaism ing a specific tradition means not proceeds methodologically in the only to analyze its texts in philolog- form of a critical construction of ical objectivity but also to subjugate “facts.” Judaism as a “cultural a given body of literature to a cul- fact” is itself not given, but is subtural agenda for which the inter- ject to the task of conceptual conpreter bears responsibility. Reading struction, as are all other facts of a tradition critically implies that one culture. According to Cohen, hisbecomes answerable for one’s own tory is itself constructed, and as

approach to the text, opening one- such history—rather than being self to the self-critical process of accurate or inaccurate—stands “siving an account” of one’s own trial before the critique extended readings. One reflects upon the eth- by those who question it.

Ezekiel the Thirty-sixth

In the dispute on how to interpret the Guide, where Maimonides Ezekiel’s prophetic vision concern- claims that all visions of prophecy ing the “quickening of dry bones,” ought to be interpreted metaphoriMaimonides and Rashi side with cally: “[I am reading] the prophetic the opinion of the tannaitic master, books and the dicta of the Sages in Rabbi Yehuda, who reads this vi- a way as if I translated words from sion as a metaphor rather than a_ one language into another, or as if I literal description of future events.? appropriated the meaning of the In joining this dispute, Cohen cre- external sense of the speech.” !! Acates his own exegetical chain—the cording to Cohen, Ezekiel’s narra-

prophet Ezekiel, Rabbi Yehuda, tive of resurrection is the external, Rashi, Maimonides, and himself, literal sense by means of which the “Ezekiel, the thirty-sixth.”!° prophet speaks of closeness to God Cohen finds support for this read- and of the longing for spiritual and ing in Maimonides’ introduction to — ethical perfection.

ON EUDAEMONIAN ESCHATOLOGY AND HOLY HISTORY 167 Drastic elaborations of the soul’s _ tion even report about the soul’s fu-

sufferings in hellfire (gebinnom) ture fate in the grave. This particubecame popular especially within lar kind of apocalyptic imagination

the kabbalistic pietist traditions became so widely accepted that it during the early middle ages. Tra- eventually gained impact upon haditions about the soul’s mortifica- lakhic considerations as well.!?

Fanaticism of Retribution vs. One Moment of Teshuvah

According to one opinion in the Maimonides’ treatment of reTalmud, the spiritual position at- pentance in such cases seems raditained by ba’ale teshuvah (masters cally different. He defines teshuof repentance) cannot be attained vah as an autonomous resolution

even by the perfectly righteous.!* of will through which a person What Cohen calls “fanaticism of overcomes her passion for a forretribution,” however, pervades bidden pleasure without being in even the concept of repentance it- need of any physical retribution. self. There are traditions that pre- For Maimonides, it is, indeed, scribe repentance and penance ac- “one single moment of teshuvah,” cording to precise measure, opening in which all need for retribution is up a balance sheet of one’s personal abolished. This is the moment in

account of transgressions and re- which a person anticipates her wards.!> Some halakhic thinkers, better Self—a moment in which for example, took sexual promiscu- integrity creates a break with the

ity to represent the epitome of past, so that a new Self emerges.!” human transgressions, weighing the Cohen himself, as we have seen, punishment in these cases in strict terms such anticipation of the fumeasure against the seriousness of ture a process in which redemp-

the deed.!¢ tion is anticipated.!®

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To Create Messianic Time A Jewish Critique of Political Utopia on Prophecy In this chapter Cohen provides a politically important distinction between messianic times and the world-to-come, two often conflated eschatological concepts in Maimonides’ thought. In contradistinction to the historicity of messianic times, the futurity of the world-to-come represents a metahistorical dimension. Cohen correlates the metabhistorical futurity of the world-to-come with the purity of the ethical ideal. His rejection of all totalitarian political movements is anchored in this separa-

tion of messianism as a political utopia from the messianism of the prophets, grounded in the futurity of the ideal as represented by Maimonides’ concept of the world-to-come. Maimonides’ introduction to the tenth chapter of the Mishna tractate Sanhedrin provides the textual basis for Cohen’s discussion in this section.

Psychology of Prophecy: “Face to Face” 157. Maimonides’ universal intel- (See 157.) Maimonides’ dialogical

lectual independence, with which interpretation of the prophet. he counters all dogmas through his Maimonides suggests reading emphasis on ethics, is perhaps prophetic messages as metaphorinowhere as distinctly and cogently cal images that demand interpredemonstrated as by the inferences tation and translation.' Especially drawn from his denial of eudaemo- in instances where prophetic vi-

nia. He replaces eudaemonia with sions invoke bodily images of self-perfection; and self-perfection God, these images are to be trans-

he equates with “drawing close to lated into an epistemology of God” (manpnm). Thus he presents us Knowing God, and into social

with the most sublime reading of and political engagement. The immortality. Now it only remains prophets, according to Cohen, for him to expose the sham argu- become the founders of Jewish ment of social advantages prom- messianism, in proclaiming the re-

ised by eudaemonia. Here Mai- lationship between God and monides was able to take human beings to be foundational

170 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES advantage of his conception of | for God’s very own Being. This prophecy, and in particular of his | stands in contrast to the ontologipsychological interpretation of the | cal tradition inspired by Aristotle prophet. [Guide, introduction and | in which the self-sufficiency of the 2:46, 581-82.] Thus he arrives at a | divine is proposed.

fundamental distinction invalidat- From the perspective of this ing the two main motives of | reading, a theory of intersubjectiveudaemonia. [Namely the bliss of | ity that is distinctly dialogical pure contemplation, on the one | emerges. God’s speaking face-tohand, and of the pursuit of materi- | face with Moses provides Jewish al well-being, on the other.] He | tradition with the pedagogical and distinguishes between Life Eternal | ethical mode of human discourse

(xan obi) [hereafter referred to as | in which openness, receptivity, olam ha-ba] and the messianic era | and listening creates a way of Qead> nv). [RoR 310-11; RdV 361; | thinking different from mere self-

and Maimonides 1984-1996, | sufficient rationality. Thus writes

Hilkhoth Teshuvah 9:2.] Alphonso Lingis:

The locus where this impera- Cohen’s messianic epistemology

tive is articulated is the and through Rosenzweig’s concept other who faces—the face of of Sprachdenken—a way of think-

the other. Facing... is the ing in which time figures centrally move by which alterity in taking “its cues from others”— breaks into the sphere of that the pedagogy of Torah transphenomena .. . responsibil- lates into the philosophical lanity is the response to the im- guage of the West. In keeping alive

perative addressed in the the economy of an absolute pasconcrete act of facing.* sivity of thought with respect to that which precedes thought in the

Jewish oral tradition embodies free gift of speech, contemporary

the reenactment of an original philosophy and hermeneutics, in pedagogical moment. It is through fact, do reenact an ancient gesture.

A Radical Critique of Political Utopia

Maimonides uses the terms the tory.* It seems that neither the future to come (atid lavo) and Talmud nor Midrash, nor Maimessianic days (yemoth ha- monides himself, are consistent in mashiach) interchangeably when their terminological usage of the referring to the messianic era to expression atid lavo.* Yet, Maibe expected in the course of his- monides clearly distinguishes be-

TO CREATE MESSIANIC TIME 171 tween atid lavo and yemoth ha- of messianic times, of a radical fu-

mashiach. turity, provides Cohen with the The messianic era has been in- conceptual grounds for a funda-

terpreted by Steven Schwarzschild mental critique of all social reality.

as a future that is always in the Realpolitik cannot divorce itself coming, always to come—a future from war and from the perpetrathat is never to be fully realized.° tion of hatred and aggression: poSchwarzschild thereby intends to _ litical prudence will always remain

| preserve the transcendental func- “the art of foreseeing war and of tion of messianism in its radical winning it by every means.” !?

opposition to and critique of the It is the inherent historicity of world’s suffering and injustice. Maimonides’ concept of messianBoth Maimonides and Cohen—to _ ism that lends itself to the tempta-

be sure—have expressed their ex- tion of utopian politics, run by pectation of messianic times in the the “tyrants of heaven.”!*’ Cohen near future.’ Cohen reportedly ex- emphasizes, however, that Mai-

claimed, “Please, let it be fifty monides’ concept of the world-toyears!”® However, when reading come balances that danger. The Maimonides’ description of mes- world-to-come refers to a spirisianic futurity—a description that, tual reality that coexists with this according to Cohen’s reading, is world in that it reflects one’s own adamantly socialist?—the transcen- pursuit of the Good, representing, dental character of Maimonides’ in fact, the very fruit of one’s eth-

concept of messianic futurity is ical labor. The world-to-come ex-

evident: tends beyond the powers of human imagination—“No eye has

There will be no poverty in seen it, o God, but you alone” /4— messianic times . . . all fight- transcending any worldly form. ing and wars will cease... . The world-to-come does not lend

[We] do not hope for mes- itself to messianic politics, but sianic days for the sake of rather provides the grounds for a worldly riches . . . but rather transcendental critique of politi-

because there will be a domin- cal reality. ,

ion of goodness and of wis- From this perspective, Mai-

dom.!° monides’ discussion of messianic days and the world-to-come in the

Messianism, according to _ context of Hilkhoth Teshuvah (The Cohen, is not identical with any Laws of Repentance)!> provides us political utopia. To the contrary, with a more critical reading of meshe writes that in messianic days, sianism than the restorative descrip“Israel will be released from all tion of political utopia in Hilkhoth matters of politics.”'! The concept Melakhim (The Laws of Kings):

172 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES The Messiah will appear as Cohen, of course, advises to the king of Israel who rein- study this political utopia in light states the former kingdom of of Maimonides’ own more radical David and reinvests it with its messianic demand for the estaboriginal sovereignty. He will lishment of a humanity fully initireestablish the Holy of Hollies ated in the ways of lovingkindness

in Jerusalem and bring about and justice and peace. What the ingathering of the Jews sounds like a nationalist restorascattered amongst the peoples. tion of the past, in fact, translates All the laws which governed into a revolutionary social theory: the former kingdom of David, “In messianic times there will be including those concerning the neither famine nor war, neither Temple in Jerusalem, will be jealousy nor competitiveness, but

valid once again.!¢ rather goodness itself will rule.”!7 To Create Messianic Time: A Jewish Task (A Polemic That Overshoots Its Mark) 158. The genealogy of these ideas (See 158.) On the Christian mesis obvious. Life Eternal belongs to siah. Cohen’s polemics against mythical belief; [RoR 299-304; Christian eschatology focuses on RdV 348-53.] the messianic era is the idea of Jesus the redeemer as

the historiosophical idea of guarantor of the world-to-come, as prophetic ethics. As these two _ stated in John 14:6: “I am the way,

ideas touch human fate in an the truth, and the life: no one innermost way, they conceptually cometh to the Father but through intertwine. Early on, they original- | me.” Cohen repeats his conviction

ly tended to interrelate and inter- that Christian dogma provides a sect with each other in Jewish tra- purely extrinsic concept of salvadition and consciousness. Yet, in tion that is attained at the expense talmudic literature, we may trace of Israel’s personal and collective

the tendency to distinguish responsibility for the creation of between these two concepts, and messianic times in this world. In separate these two modes of time. _ the Religion of Reason: Out of the [Throughout the Talmud, especial- Sources of Judaism, Cohen claims

ly in the Talmud Yerushalmi, the that the Christian doctrine of salterm atid lavo signifies both mes- vation replaces the sociopolitical, sianic times and an eschatological ethical imperative implied in the world-to-come; we find a clear concept of messianism. This occurs

distinction between messianic through a passive, eschatological times and the world-to-come, expectation of the advent of God’s however, in TB Berakhoth 34b; kingdom, which, according to John

TO CREATE MESSIANIC TIME 173 and, of course, in Maimonides 18:36, is “not of this world.”!® 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah Cohen defends the Jewish imma9:2.] This distinction had to be artic- nence of this imperative in con-

ulated most pointedly vis-a-vis trast to the Christian exteriority of Christianity. Christianity announced — the future kingdom:

itself as messianism; its messiah, however, was predicated upon the In my personal worship of

creed of Life Eternal; he, and he God, the kingdom of God exclusively, wanted to be its guaran- ought not be relegated to the

tor. Thus Christianity presented a future, but it rather must be challenge to Jewish thinking, pro- ever present. This idea is ex-

voking clarification and_ self- pressed by the Jewish tradiexamination with regard to the tional concept of “taking radically different meaning inher- upon oneself the yoke of the ent in the messianic idea from its kingdom of God.” . . . Thereinception. The messiah does not fore I must not simply wait represent the redeemer of human and pray for the kingdom of beings in the other world, but the God to appear, but rather redeemer of human beings in this through my own firm inten-

world. tion, my own volition, I precipitate its realization.”

159. In his commentary on the Mishna, Maimonides establishes The polemic, of course, is itself this fundamental ethical significance one that is constructed. Jewish

of the distinction between the sources, too, stress the extrinsic world-to-come and messianic days character of the “coming of the vis-a-vis all the inaccuracies, lack of kingdom,”*° and Christian tradidefinition, obscurities, and confu- tion, certainly teaches ethical re-

sions concerning the eschatological sponsibility in the context of terms in Jewish tradition. [Mai- God’s second coming. Cohen’s monides provides a comparative polemic against Christian docanalysis of the concepts “garden of trines of hereditary sin and what Eden” (gan eden), hell (gehinnom), he calls institutionalized salvation resurrection of the dead (techiath ha- tries, principally, to advance a critmethim), messianic days (vemoth ha- ical reading, in which redemption mashiach), and the world-to-come _ signifies the universal task of an-

(olam ha-ba) in his introduction to ticipating the Good and assisting Sanhedrin, 1992b, 137—40.] To what in the creation of the messianic extent this conceptual separation is kingdom. What Cohen calls the

due to Maimonides’ rejection of ethical task of Judaism is the eudaemonia, we find demonstrated prophetic demand to create mesby his definition and distinction of sianic time, to bring futurity into

174 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES the two ideas, the Hereafter and the the present, to anticipate redemp-

this-worldliness of the messianic tion. It is this task, according to age, predicated upon the ethical Cohen, that is incumbent upon principle of self-perfection. [RoR every human being, and it is in this

312-15; RdV 362-67.] task that Israel represents humanity. The World-to-Come: Ephemeral Moments of Redemption 160. Myth conceives of Life Eternal (See 160.) The world-to-come in a worldly style, as in the Isles of (olam ha-ba). The meaning of the the Blessed. [ErW 401; RoR 247; Hebrew term ha-ba is actually amRdV 289. The utopian idea of the biguous, as it may refer in Hebrew Isles of the Blessed originates with either to the perfect or to the presGreek myth as an imaginary island ent tense. In the perfect tense, the at the Western edge of the world on expression olam ha-ba reads as

which the souls of the blessed enjoy “the world that has already a blissful existence after death. Hes- come.” In the present (future) iod 1920, 98-99.] Even if we leave tense it means “the world that is the realm of myth, however, there is about to come.” Cohen claims that no dearth of images in which Life most interpreters have mistakenly Eternal is presented as the realm of understood olam ha-ba in the fu-

the future, as it is believed that it turic sense, confusing olam ha-ba will occur at the Parousia of Jesus, at with a utopia of materialist reward

his eschatological return. [Matthew to be enjoyed by the righteous in 24:1—31; Mark 13; Luke 21.] InJew- the future.

ish eschatology, the Hereafter and Maimonides, to the contrary, the messianic future become con- reads olam ha-ba as a spiritual fusingly entangled; even with existence whose very presence reregard to the surviving souls, belief sides in our effort to know and

has it that their domain will come serve God.*! The world-to-come into existence only in the future represents an effort of ethical and within or outside of the context of spiritual self-perfection, which in the messianic era. [Nachmanides the light of Maimonides’ discus-

1983. Nachmanides’ gives a_ sion of divine actional attributes detailed account of the rewards and) and God’s ways of lovingkindpunishments of the individual souls ness and justice, gains social and

in the Hereafter. Note, however, political dimensions. For Maithat Nachmanides also quotes Mai- monides then, the world-to-come

monides’ interpretation of the does not depict a utopian future, world-to-come as “one that has but rather embodies the fruits of already come, or that is presently our very labor at an ethical exiscoming,” drawing upon midrashic tence in this world. “The worldand kabbalistic traditions, as in to-come presently exists and is

TO CREATE MESSIANIC TIME 175 Scholem 1980, 114, and references | firmly established,”?? says Mai-

there; Bahir 1912, 30. Nach-| monides in his Mishneh Torah. manides equates the world-to-come | The human pursuit of God’s ways with the original light of creation, | constitutes the anticipation of the

which according to Rashi was hid- | world-to-come within a single den as a reward for the souls of the | moment. All acts of goodness are righteous in the world-to-come, and | but ephemeral moments of re-

which Nachmanides—much in the | demption—moments in which spirit of Maimonides—identifies | history is judged by what Cohen with chokhmah. Nachmanides | calls prophetic messianism: 1983, 117-20.] It might have been

of primary concern to disrupt the It is incredible that messianism materialism implied in the images defies all political pragmatism, of Life Eternal as a future world; the denigrates reality, treats it with Hebrew idiom olam ha-ba (the com- contempt, and annihilates it ing world) favors such a materialis- without mercy, substituting

tic interpretation. Maimonides this sensible presence with a obliterates this materialistic image. new kind of [presence] . . .

[ROR 310-11; RdV 361.] which is futurity. .. . The great contribution of messianism is

161. Maimonides succeeds _ in its creation of the future, repaccomplishing this annihilation by resenting, in effect, the true dint of his principle of self-perfec- political reality.”° tion. “When the Sages refer to the

world-to-come, they do not mean Levinas terms Cohen’s mesthat the world-to-come does not | sianism “the presence of the espresently exist—that this world | chaton.” He reaffirms the signifi-

would have to perish before that | cance of Cohen’s theory of world could be established. That is | infinity (and the infinitesimal) for

not the case. Rather the world-to- | a contemporary theory of mescome is already present .. . for the | sianism. Levinas writes that “it is individual, however, life in the | not the last judgment that is deciworld-to-come becomes accessi- | sive, but the judgment of all the ble only after his life in this world | instants in time, when the living has expired.” (Hilkhoth Teshuvah | are judged.”*4 Maimonides’ defi-

8:8.) Life Eternal constitutes an | nition of olam ha-ba as the presorganic accrual of the human indi- | ence of the future kingdom has vidual for the sake of and in the | rootings in midrashic and kabbalcause of her maturing toward an | istic sources.*°? As such—in conethical personality. The term Life | junction with the pertinent pasEternal does not imply that any- | sages in Sefer ha-Bahir—it was

thing is to be expected in the | reiterated throughout medieval future, nor is it predicated upon | Jewish literature.*®

176 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES any future event; Life Eternal exists | Maimonides wrote it under external

in its own right. It exists insofar as pressure exerted by rabbinical it is due; since Life Eternal is the authorities disturbed by his radical

acquisition of individual ethical rationalism. Kellner 1986, 55.]

pursuit, it must come. About Gehenna, he remarks that the Talmud does not elaborate on this

162. According to the innermost punishment. [Maimonides 1992a, train of thought, Life Eternal consti- 137-38 maintains that the talmudic tutes an ethical mode of Being; itis references leave the matter unreconceived of as an ethical idea. It solved; see TB Avodah Zara 3b and is the idea of ethical individuality, TB Sanhedrin 108a.] Even eternal predicated upon its eternity, which _ bliss is interpreted in a purely spiriis termed the world-to-come. The — tualized mode. He also spiritualizes

prospective world of spiritual exis- resurrection; it is a fundamental

tence has turned into the ethical rational principle (70) but not a world of the eternal individual. fiducial tenet (97), nor related to

[ROR 329-30; RdV 383-84. ] such a tenet. [See Wiedebach

| 2000, 440-41; RoR 82, 91-92:

163. In the same context, Mai- RdV 96, 107; but see also Kellner monides also refers to the problem 1986, 20-21; and Maimonides of resurrection. [Maimonides 1992b, 138.] Such terminological

1992b, 138; also Maimonides distinctions that permeate the 1997-1998, 1:339-74. Scholars are _ entire literature are eloquent sympdivided about the authenticity of this toms of the tendency to restrict the letter; for an argument against its power of dogma. However, the effi-

authenticity, see Goldfeld 1986. cacy and lucidity of Maimonides’ Even those who take the letter to be rational principles make this tenauthentic, however, point out that dency most prominent. Internalizations

164. Describing the bliss in the (See 164) On reward and punish-

world-to-come, [Maimonides ment. Cohen alludes here again 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah to Maimonides’ introduction to 8:2.] Maimonides is led by the tal- Perek Chelek: “And if you heed all mudic dictum that “in that life the | these commandments, I shall assist righteous shall enjoy the splendor you in their performing . . . even if of the shekhinah” [TB Berakhoth — you fulfill only parts of the com17a; and Maimonides 1984-1996, | mandments motivated by love and

Hilkhoth Teshuvah 8:2. Midrash true endeavor, I shall help you to Exodus Rabba 1887, 3a; ascribes succeed with all of them.”*” The

this spiritual state of “enjoying the ethical significance of Mai-

TO CREATE MESSIANIC TIME 177 splendor of the shekhinah” to | monides’ definition of reward, acMoses at the “forty days of revela- | cording to Cohen, lies in Maition,” during which time he was in | monides’ emphasis on its internal-

no need of any material suste- | ization. The reward of keeping a nance. Deuteronomy 9:9; and | commandment is that it leads to Maimonides 1992a, 142-43.] to | keeping another commandment, further spiritualize this blissful | and the punishment for committing delight by claiming it to consist of | a transgression is that it leads to cogitation, cogitation meaning | another transgression.2® “And in continuous knowledge of God. | the Talmud it says: ‘whoever asOne might thus gain the not- | pires to purity shall find support,’? groundless impression, consider- | [and] ‘for the path which a person

ing certain passages in Mai- | chooses to pursue, [s]he will find monides’ writings, that Life Eternal | support.’”?° even for him is vouchsafed purely

for the theoretician. However, his perfected, that nature should not principle of self-perfection is of obstruct the existence of the soul such central importance that it and its cognitive pursuit: this is the must have systematically trans- meaning of Life Eternal. “When a formed Aristotelianism even in this | person pursues the Good and avoids

controversial issue. Thus Mai- evil, she improves her humanity monides attains to the ethical inter- (wuxn py 12 ob) and distinguishes pretation claiming that even retri- herself from the beast, and a person

bution, reward, and punishment shall perfect herself, as human are only expressions for the divine nature is to be perfected, that no “promotion” of human ethical obstruction will disturb the rational

endeavor (77 YO). sustenance of the soul, and this is ‘life eternal.’” (Mishna, Commentary

165. Interpreting the idea of perfec- on Perek Cheklek, 128a) [Maition in the Hereafter as the paradigm monides.1992b, 139.] Thus it is the for the amelioration of human __ idea of perfecting nature that is pos-

nature, Maimonides presents us tulated by the principle of self-perwith the crowning achievement of fection. This idea is bound up with spiritualization, of ethical advance- Life Eternal, precisely in the sense of ment—that a person aspires to per- the “rational sustenance of the soul” fect herself, that human nature be = [—which is Knowing God.]

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The Human Face Anticipating a Future That Is Prior to the Past Cohen’s essay on Maimonides’ ethics culminates in the exaltation of Jewish messianism and its sublimity, stressing the social and humane dimensions of Maimonides’ concept of messianic times. Toward the end of this work, Cohen grounds his Platonic reading once again in the traditional sources of Maimonides’ rabbinic code and his commentary on the Mishna. Cohen thereby evokes the universality of human cognition

and the eternal validity of the equality and unity of mankind. Jewish messianism—by holding on to the purity of these ideals in the midst of a history full of corruption, violence, and human pain—burdens its adherents with the task of bearing witness to the unending struggle for the reign of human justice in the world.

This World and the World to Come: The Powers of Messianism 166. The removal of sensualism (See 166.) The temporal world—

from the World Beyond corre- and the world to come. Maisponds to the idealization of the monides’ distinction between this temporal world in the messianic world and the world-to-come is era. The distinction between these crucial to Jewish critical thinking, two corresponding states, the denial since any identification of the status of their being identical, establishes quo with some ideality, according

the ethical correlation between the to Cohen, must lead to political two. The yearning for the messianic quietism, violating the revolutionredeemer has not lost its universal ary character of prophetic messian-

human significance, despite all ism. However, the very concept of political terrorization and persecu- messianic times lends itself to the tions of Israel; however, skepticism temptations of proclaiming the or mysticism has turned the idea of messianic reality before it has been

the messianic future into utopi- attained. A strictly transcendental anism. [ROR 247-48, 310-11; RdV concept is needed. Cohen proposes 289, 361.] Maimonides discerns the _ the ethical concept of the world-to-

same old eudaemonia in the utopi- come as a counterbalance to the anism of Arabic political theories; temptations of messianism.

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[Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Maimonides’ description of Teshuvah 8:6; and note paragraph messianic times, however, stresses number 151 in chapter 8 of this the perfection of the human condibook.] actually, Sir Thomas More tion, attainment of universal jus-

was also a stoic eudaemonist. [EFrW tice, and the ceasing of war, 584; ArG 1:301; 2:114. “Utopia”— poverty, and of all political strugliterally, ov-totia, “no-place’—is gle. Maimonides’ idea of the mesthe name given by Sir Thomas More _ sianic future—although to be realto the imaginary island in his politi- ized in this world—thus transcends cal fiction of the same name (1516), the various states of empirical real-

whose perfect laws and politics are ity of past and present:

contrasted with the evils of the social and political status quo.| The sages and prophets did Maimonides could take advantage not long for the days of the of an ethicized Beyond, defined in Messiah that Israel might exterms of the ideal state of self-per- ercise domination over the fection, as a model for the messian- world, or rule over the heaic era, by presenting the messianic thens, or be exalted by the naera as the preparatory stage for that tions, or that it might eat and Beyond. To aspire to one’s qualifi- drink and rejoice .. . but cation for and ascertainment of self- rather they longed for the perfection is tantamount to recog- days of the Messiah so that

nizing the messianic idea. Israel be worthy of life in the world to come.

167. We would like to pursue yet In that time there will be another direction concerning the neither famine nor war, neither principle of self-perfection, stressing jealousy nor strife. Blessings

the messianic era and its own sub- will be abundant, comforts stantive significance vis-a-vis the within the reach of all. The one ‘World Beyond. Although — the preoccupation of the whole Beyond, too, is ultimately geared world will be to know the toward the sublimation of human Lord. “For the earth will be nature, self-perfection relates to full of the knowledge of God humanity, as the human condition as the waters cover the sea.”! presents it. This historical dimension

of the human condition is particu- Messianism implies that the past larly represented in the messianic and the present must be measured idea; the human individual can only _ by, and, in fact, be predicated upon

mature by being involved in the eth- the future. Predicating the past ical development of every part of upon the future means to actively mankind. State and legislation anticipate that future. In his Logik

should provide guidance for the des reinen Erkenntnis (Logic of

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human endeavor of self-perfection; | pure cognition), Cohen develops however, in their respective histori- | his concept of futurity in a way cal actualizations they can only sig- | that expressly captures the critical nify approximations toward this | perspective of messianism: objective. Just as messianism must

be purged of all eudaemonistic ele- Anticipation is the fundamenments, it must also beware of indif- tal activity of time... the ference toward the injustices of his- past is predicated upon the futory, an indifference for which the ture that is anticipated. It is

problem of theodicy is merely of not the past that is prior to aesthetic interest. Eudaemonia one’s [critical] thinking, but favors egotism and the opportunistic rather the future.* stance of nations and _ potentates.

Historical realism proves to be The ethical and religious implimaterialism as evidenced by its | cations of this logical principle of attendant social injustice. Social | anticipation are apparent from utopianism, however, places itself in | the following passage, in which jeopardy from the opposite direction | Cohen distinguishes mythical and | by employing a fallacious principle, | prophetic visions of redemption: inasmuch as its alternative valuation

of life seems to be primarily con- Myth knows no vision of the

cerned with material welfare. future; it relegates its images about a peaceful time among The concept of futurity conman and nature to the past, to stitutes the grounds for a a “Golden Age.” The prophet, new ethics... . The “end of however, projects his ethics days” is conceived of as that onto the future. The concept point in the future toward of futurity distinguishes the which all politics must strive, Jewish religion from all myth. and toward which all reality ... It is the concept of futurity must direct itself. Neither the which has torn the one God present, nor the past shall difrom the limitations of a mere rect us—however glorious it national divinity, and which may be and however many proclaims Him as the unique sacred narratives it may

God, the God of all peoples, hold. the one God of mankind.? Time is grounded in futurity and only in futurity. Past

And in his Religion of Reason: and present vanish in the Out of the Sources of Judaism, face of this temporal mode

Cohen elaborates: of futurity.*

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Jews, Christians, and Moslems: Pave the Way for King Messiah! 168. The incisiveness and lucidity (See 168.) Cognition constitutes of Maimonides’ ethical thinking the premise for messianic conver-

cannot be admired enough pre- sion. It is cognition, and not cisely at the point of demarcation merely religious or political behavbetween theory and practice, par- iorism, upon which the messianic

ticularly since so many have failed conversion of the social world in this distinction. [ErW 27.] “And order is fundamentally predicated. therefore all Israel, their prophets Acting upon the messianic vision

and their sages, long for the days of of lovingkindness, justice, and the Messiah, that they will be peace, means to anticipate redempreleased from the burden of poli- tion, and as such, the concept of tics, in order to become worthy of redemption is prior to the action eternal life; for in those days of the that it arouses. Cohen finds supMessiah there will be an increase port for his decidedly universalist in cognition and wisdom and_ reading of the messianic vision of truth.” [Maimonides 1984-1996, peace in Maimonides’ concluding Hilkhoth Teshuvah 9:2.] Cognition Halakah on the laws of the Jubilee

constitutes the fundamental prem- year: ise for the messianic conversion of

the social world order; cognition Not only the tribe of Levi, but as knowledge, not merely as reli- every single person from gious behaviorism, establishes the among the world’s inhabitants truth. [Maimonides 1984-1996, whose thinking motivated her Hilkhoth Melakhim 12:4-5 and and whose intelligence gave Hilkhoth Teshuvah 9:1-2; Guide her the understanding . . . and 3:54, 636.] The intention envi- who walked upright in the sioned for the messianic age is not manner in which God made merely the intensive and extensive her . . . behold every such per-

augmentation of the body of son [will be] completely conknowledge, but rather everyone's secrated [to God’s ways of ho-

personal share in this cognitive liness].° pursuit. [Maimonides 1984-1996,

Hilkhoth Shmittah veYovel 13:13.] In Mishna Avoth we find an expression of messianism that 169. The converting of the historical found its way into traditional nature of human beings is predicated prayer: “That the temple should

upon the universal spreading of be speedily rebuilt in our days, — knowledge—upon the broadening and grant us our share in the purof the shared human faculty of cog- suit of your Torah [emphasis nitive pursuit. “But in those days it added].”” Cohen’s reading, unlike will be very easy for the children of that of other classical commenta-

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man to earn their livelihood; with | tors on this Mishna,® predicates all minimal effort one will achieve max- | Messianic aspirations of building

, imal results . . . and wisdom will | the temple speedily in our days increase .. . and war and strife will | upon our (everyone’s) share in the

cease .. . and great perfection will | prophetic vision of peace: ten come about among humankind .. . | chelkenu betoratekha (“and afford

one ought not to consider it far- | us our share in thy Torah”). All fetched that the thousand-year reign | study of Torah must be directed towill sustain itself. However, we long | ward this messianic cognition, as and hope for the days of the Messiah | “the entire Torah was given for

not because of abundant bounty and | one purpose only—namely to riches . . . but rather because there | make peace in the world.”? will be a predominance of the pious, According to Maimonides, Jews and Good and wisdom will rule | and Christians and Muslims share (AADnT maw many” [Maimonides | this prophetic task, all pursuing it 1992b, 138-39]—the Good of wis- | in their own ways. Indebted to the

dom, or ethical wisdom. Wisdom, | teachings of Jesus and Muhamcognition alone, is the Good to be | mad, Christians and Muslims pave pursued; all social and cosmopolitan | the way toward redemption preramifications of messianism are | cisely through their commitment

predicated upon such wisdom. to Christianity or Islam:

All these matters relating to one accord, as it is written: Jesus of Nazareth, and to the For then will I return the peoIshmaelite [Muhammad] who ples to a pure language, that came after him, only served to they may all call upon the pave the way for King Mes- name of the Lord, to serve

siah, to prepare the whole Him with one consent. [emworld to worship God with phasis added]! Isaiah’s Vision Versus al-Razi’s Pessimism: Capturing a Messianic Gesture

170. \In contradistinction to al- (See 170.) The vision of Isaiah. Razi’s pessimism, [Abu Bakr Maimonides cites Isaiah’s vision Muhammad ibn Zakariyya al-Razi of peace as a metaphor for mes(850-932) was a Muslim physi- — sianic social conditions: cian and philosopher who Maimonides reads as a pessimist, cf. Let no one think that in the Guide 3:12, 441-42; see Pines’s days of the Messiah any of

introduction in Guide the laws of nature will be set

CXXXI—XXXil.] Maimonides aside, or any innovation be

184

adduces the parable in the vision introduced into the order of of Isaiah portraying the peaceful creation. The world will folcoexistence of the wolf and the low its normal course. The lamb, [Isaiah 11:6; Maimonides words of Isaiah: “And the 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Melakhim wolf shall dwell with the 12:1; and Guide 3:12, 441.] and lamb, and the leopard shall lie thereby claims the cosmos, and down with the kid” (Isaiah not the empirical individual, as the 11:9) are to be understood criterion for the universal Good. figuratively, meaning that IsHe argues in favor of an anthropo- rael will live securely among

logical theory proclaiming the the evil nations." equality of humankind. This origi-

nal human equality has to be Inthe Guide, Isaiah’s metaphor bedeveloped, formulated, and acted comes a crucial reference in the upon. There can be no doubt that context of which the very question

this equality manifests itself in of good and evil is discussed. reason, and that this egalitarian Much in support of Cohen’s readassumption is predicated upon the ing, Maimonides draws from the equality of human reason despite vision of Isaiah the very criterion —

all empirical differences. for truth:

171. This argument reinforces the For through cognition of the central function of cognition. “Wis- truth, enmity and hatred are dom will increase”—that is cogni- removed and the inflicting of tion in which the unity of reason is harm by people on one anattested. Maimonides expressly dif- other is abolished. It holds

ferentiates between wisdom and out this promise, saying: And Torah. [Guide 3:54, 634, 636.] the wolf shall dwell with the Only wisdom (knowledge) pro- lamb, and the leopard shall lie vides us with rational demonstra- down with the kid, and so on tion, even with respect to the inter- [emphasis added].!? pretation of Torah, which is verified

_ through such demonstration, cor- In characteristically Platonic rect reasoning (nvaxn yry; see para- fashion, Maimonides maintains graph 111 in chapter 5). [“Accord- that absence of knowledge is the ing to them (the Sages), the science root of evil, whereas the cognition of the Torah is one species and wis- of truth is identical to the presence

dom is a different species, being the of the universal Good. Cohen verification of the opinions of the comments: Torah through correct speculation.”

Guide 3:54, 634.] True perfection, The concept of the messianic the fourth perfection in which gen- God developed in distinct op-

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uine human perfection is attained, position to the dualistic prinand in which the ultimate telos is ciple of Parsism. Evil in itself realized, this is the perfection of does not exist. Evil is a conintellectual virtues (MYoDw mibya). cept which is deduced from

[Guide 3:54, 635; Maimonides the concept of freedom. The 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 9:2 power of evil exists in myth

and Hilkhoth Melakhim 12:5; Alt- only.!? mann 1987, 60-129. Altmann’s article presents a critique of Pines’s Religion diverts its interest

more agnostic stand on the prob- from the question of the orilem of speculative knowledge in gin of evil, and rather directs Maimonides. Pines 1988, 91-122; it towards the origin of the

also Fox 1990, 26—46.] good.!4

Cohen rejects the idea that the [true] that man is an end,” says a individual’s grade of happiness Maimonides scholar of Platonic may ever turn into a criterion for bent, “but that man is given an measuring the universal Good. To — end.”!” Subsequently, Maimonides measure the universal Good by the defends a cosmocentric teleology in

greatest amount of individual hap- which it is the particular task of piness—as utilitarian ethics, in human beings to actualize the ultifact, suggests—is to agree with al- mate Good:

Razi’s pessimistic dictum that “there is [always] more evil than the true way of considering

good in what exists.” !° this is that all the existent individuals... are... ofno The reason for this whole value at all in comparison mistake [of al-Razi’s pes- with the whole that exists and simism] lies in the fact that endures. .. . Man is merely this ignoramus . . . considers the most noble among the only that which exists with things that are subject to genreference to a human individ- eration. !° ual. Every ignoramus imagines

that all that exists exists with In other words, “The Lord hath

a view to his individual made everything le-ma’anehu”—

sake,!6 both “for His own sake” and “for its own sake.”!? God’s goodness Maimonides takes issue here _ signifies the creation of goodness with Saadya’s anthropocentric tele- in the world. ology, which proclaims that hu- Maimonides’ anti-utilitarian tele-

mankind represents the “crown” ology provides an answer to the or “end” of creation: “It is not question of theodicy. The concept

186

of messianism demands an active such, Cohen claims, pessimism opposition to human suffering. Suf- indicates a betrayal of the other.7!

fering commands goodness. The But lovingkindness, according to only significance that suffering can Cohen’s reading of Maimonides, have is that it ought to be abol- captures a messianic gesture. “And ished. Thus, Cohen writes, “The God will wipe away the tears from very concept of the God who de- _ every single face” (Isaiah 25:8). It is mands the Good beyond Being con- _ precisely when this gesture becomes

tains in itself the answer to theod- human that we speak of the anticiicy.”2° The task of opposing human pation of the Kingdom. Levinas un-

suffering, according to Cohen, is derscores this point: “God is perthe foremost task in human exis- haps none other but this permanent tence; al-Razi’s pessimism betrays oppositzion to a history which the prophetic commitment to “only would come to terms with our prido justice and love goodness.” As _ vate tears.”

The World Will Follow Its Normal Course: Messianism as the Fulfillment of Prophecy 172. In his evaluation of these (See 172.) The world will follow its

intellectual virtues (apetat usual course. Maimonides rejects the Stavontikat), Maimonides admit- traditional materialist, eschatological tedly has reference to Aristotle; images pervading medieval thinking [ROR 403; RdV 467] this is no acci- on messianic days and the worlddental reference, but rather derives to-come. Maimonides adopts the from historical context. The sover- phrase “olam ke-minhago noheg” eignty of reason, a Hellenistic prin- [this world will follow its normal

ciple, expresses itself in the dia- course] from the talmudic Sages

noetic virtues, with all the who use it in order to designate the ambiguities of intellectualism strict adherence of “this world” to inherent in them. Maimonides, — the laws of nature.*? He trusts that however, absolves himself of these the supreme validity of natural laws ambiguities; indeed, he remains and their normative function within

independent even in this point. the cosmos is unbreakable, even Thinking for him is not leisurely when facing the question of miracontemplation, and hence it is not cles. Miracles, according to Maithe philosophical engagement of monides, are the fulfillment of a the elect few in their typical social prophesied event. Miracles thus milieu. Maimonides’ proclama- were inscribed into the order of cretion “The world will follow its ation, and as such, they do not signormal course” (371 wT3aD Ow) is nify any disruption or suspension of

not intended to assert any reac- the natural order.*4

187

tionary complacency in the face of By anchoring the concept of the desirable progress of political | miracle in the very concept of credevelopment, but is meant rather to | ation, Maimonides opposes the

oppose any expectation of miracu- | theories of the Islamic Mulous transformation. Maimonides | takallimun who claim an instanta-

does not grant legitimacy to the | neous creation of the world at preservation of any routine, not even | every moment.*> According to to a routine concerning the logical | both Cohen and Rosenzweig, such questions of natural science (Mai- | a concept of creation, presuppos-

monides 1856-1861, 1:403; S.| ing a capricious God, makes Munk 1988, 321, 378.) [Guide 1:73, | knowledge of God, or, in fact, any 206-9. Cohen reads this proposition | act of faith, entirely impossible.*®

as a critique of the assumption that | Inasmuch as the concept of meshabit plays a significant role in the | sianism is meant to guarantee the

phenomena of nature. | knowledge of God, Maimonides safeguards the concept of mes- God demands that nature’s laws sianic times from the capricious- be consistently valid—in order ness of the Kalam’s atomistic the- that we can be assured of the eter-

ories of creation: “The idea of nal validity of ethics.”7’ None Is Exempt from the Messianic Task: On the Strict Measure of Judgment 173. Maimonides argues against (See 173.) The educational task the Mutakallimun, whose orthodox of guiding the masses. It is theology defends the skeptical prin- © commonly understood that Mai-

ciple that natural phenomena are monides uses the expression only perceived as proceeding in an hamon (the multitude) in a derogaorderly fashion on account of our tory way, opposing them to the in-

habituated impressions; they _ tellectual elite initiated into the sedefend this skeptical principle crets of the divine science.*® The

against the energetic principle of multitude, according to Maicausality. Within ethics, however, monides or, as he also says, the even Maimonides does not recog- “vulgar among the people,” live in

nize any so-called natural law, ignorance and darkness, and “the which would hamper the ideal of truth is entirely hidden from continuous human progress. [“The them.”*? As such, Maimonides exphilosophical bias, allegedly meta- __ plicitly bars common people from

physical, that we should conceive studying metaphysics, following

of the foundation of ethics asalaw the opinion of the talmudic © of nature—as ‘bred in our bones’— _ Sages.°?

188

implies the danger of scientific dog- Cognition of God, however, to matism.” ErW 98-99. In other Maimonides, is a universal prereqwords, the pursuit of justice cannot uisite for human perfection. Such be generated by any empirical, nat- cognition, however, cannot be ural, even habituated, process, but compromised because the multirather depends upon the transcen- tude may be physically or mentally dence of the ethical ideal in pro- unsuited for abstract speculation, claimed opposition to both natural or because the average mind easily and historical forces—which are falls back upon configurations of both to be considered as reactionary anthropomorphic images. Due to when proclaimed as philosophical its imperative nature, the highest

principle.] All people are called wisdom imposes itself as a task upon to attain knowledge of God; upon humankind, notwithstanding this knowledge, however, is predi- the insufficiencies of human nature

cated upon cognition as such. and its difficulties in adequately Hence all people without exception grasping the divine science. Due to

must gain unhampered access to this imperative nature, true knowlcognitive advancement. This consti- edge of God is demanded of all, tutes the compelling vigor of the even of the multitude, whose imagmessianic idea: no optimal social inations about a god of flesh and conditions without the universalism blood, according to Maimonides, of cognition. Truly, the messianic halakhically speaking, never conidea implies the universal cognition stitutes anything but a form of of God. [Maimonides 1984-1996, _ idolatry. In other words, the multi-

Hilkhoth Melakhim -12:5; Mai- tude is held accountable for its monides 1992a, 138-39; and RoR opinions in matters of divine sci242-43; RdV 283~85.] There ought ence in just the same way as the into be no worship of God without _ tellectual elite:

he endeavor to know God. This

endeavor of Knowing God, howev- If, however, it should occur to er, implies the difficult educational you that one who believes in task for every person, even the mass- the corporeality of God

, es (77a) to gain insights into what is should be excused because of implied within the idea of God— his having been brought up in that God is incorporeal and _ that this doctrine or because of his there is nothing physical about Him; ignorance and the shortcomand that His knowable attributes are ings of his apprehension . . .

but those that relate to ethical [you should know that] there action. [Guide 2:54, 124.] Would is no excuse for one who does this not suggest to those capable of not accept the authority of the

appreciating it that the popular people who inquire into the understanding of God (that of the truth and are engaged in spec-

189

entire people and of all of ulation if he himself is incahumankind) ought solely to be pable of engaging in such based upon ethics? This alone ele- speculation.°! vates the philosophy of knowledge

to a general requirement for human- regarding the messianic idea. istic education. This kind of intellec- Hence, Maimonides arrives at his tualism is not Aristotelian, but is conclusion, supported by the Sifra:

genuinely, truly, and perennially “You shall sanctify yourself, and Platonic. [It should be noted that you will become holy” (Leviticus

Cohen revised his socialist reading 11:44), which by no means of Plato in a critical turn in favor of | applies to external sanctification at the prophets in his later writings (see all (993 777M ANA PY orx). In the JS 1:317-22; and Wiedebach 2002, same vein, Maimonides recognizes 314-23).] Averroés translated Plato’s only the one “who pursues truth for Republic. (See Munk 1988, 314.) it own sake” (MAXT OSL MAND pax) Did Maimonides read it? We might as the one who “serves God out of at least assume that their concord _ love.” ([Perek] Chelek f. 127b) [Mai-

is based on their congeniality monides 1992a, 131.] Sanctify Yourself: The Friendliness of the Face Sanctify yourself and become holy. yourselves therefore, and be ye

Maimonides maintains that holy, for I am holy.” *? Cohen’s point, of course, 1s

“Sanctify yourselves there- that the concept of “holiness” fore, and be ye holy, for I am (kedusha) is the very opposite of

holy” ... does not apply at the concept of the sacred,°** in all to uncleanness and clean- that holiness is not predicated ness. [The] Siphra states liter- upon any inherent, mythical qualally: This concerns sanctifica- ity, as it is the case with any sation by the commandments; cred object, or taboo. Holiness, to

they [the Sages] also say of Cohen, is rather a correlative His dictum Ye shall be holy term, associated with a person’s that this concerns sanctifica- self-sanctification in her fulfilltion by the commandments.** ment of the command “do the good and the right in the eyes of Maimonides’ exclusive associa- | God” when facing the need of antion of holiness with the “sanctifi- other.°°

cation by the commandments” What is then the true exprestoys with the literal affinity of the sion of a person’s self-sanctificatwo biblical passages, “Ye shall be tion and humanity? Cohen says holy, for lam holy” and “Sanctify that it is friendliness that radiates

190

toward a person’s face (sever Maimonides claims that among

panim yafoth): the foremost ways of defiling holiness are the cardinal transgressions

Friendliness is not just good- of idolatry, adultery, and the shed-

ness, since it is free of any ding of blood.” Whereas one who hypocrisy. Neither is friendli- goes beyond the letter of the law ness the same as love, as it (ve-ya’asseh lifnim mishurath remains free of the ambiguity hadin) and who turns toward othof love. Friendliness is not ers with friendliness (ummekabbelam

even the same as friendship, be’sever panim yafoth) indeed since friendship is generated sanctifies God’s name (harei ze kidby preference and sympathy, desh et haShem).>® Cohen’s associeven though it is grounded in ation of friendliness with the “infaithfulness. Friendliness does nermost light of a person” (dem

not know any of those fear- Urlicht des Menschen) reverberful choices between one per- ates with the priestly blessing: son and another. Respect and

love converge in friendliness. Bless us, . . . with the light of And it is the face of the per- Thy countenance; for by the

son [das Menschenanlitz] light of Thy countenance thou which radiates friendliness. It hast granted us the Teaching is the face in which friendli- of life, and lovingkindness ness can be spied even when and justice, blessing, compasthe face is clouded by an at- sion, life and peace. May it be tempt of its denial. And it is good in Thy eyes to always

the friendliness of human bestow blessing upon your

feelings which radiates from people Israel, and to promote the innermost light of a per- peace in the world.°” son; the feeling of friendli-

ness can be darkened and Walking in God’s Ways, sanctiscared, but it nonetheless fying God’s name, means to turn to constitutes the original light and reflect “the light of Thy counof a person—a light that only tenance.” “Die Freundlichkeit ist expires with a person’s last die Leuchte der Menschlichkeit” breath. Friendliness is the [Friendliness is the light of all that

light of humanity.°*° is humane].*°

174, Without such knowledge of | duct, nor upon conventions and God we cannot attain true love of _ traditions, but rather solely upon God, and hence cannot attain eth- one’s critical awareness: cognition ical cognition. Ultimate perfection lays and ensures the grounds for

is not founded upon rules of con- conventions and for moral con-

191

duct. Hence, Maimonides carries of “rational virtues . . . a perfection

through his intellectualism in his belonging to him alone.” It is presentation of messianism. It through this perfection that the seems undeniable that ethical voli- humanity of a person is estabtion is maintained within the intel- lished: “through it a human being

lect. is a human being.” All quotes from Guide 3:54, 635.] The messianic

175. Just at that point where Mai- ideal can only be the ideal of monides seems most closely allied mankind by virtue of developing terminologically with Aristotle, he and crystallizing the principle of actually distances himself farthest self-perfection. The Self requires from him. According to Aristotle, humanity, and humanity claims the only the elect may engage in intel- Self. The ideal of humanity reprelectual virtues, since the economic sents the perfected individual; it and political system affords leisure leads each person toward the telos only to them. In the world of antig- _ of self-perfection.

uity, the individual is subject to absorption by the State; for Mai- 176. The world-to-come of the

monides, however, the principle of individual and this world of self-perfection is decisive. It human civilization are two aspects expresses itself in autonomous _ of the single unfolding principle of

activity of the individual Self self-perfection. Even the doctrine devoted to the development of her of immortality does not consider own ethical Self; at the same time, the mere external, so-called perself-perfection means the aspira- sonal traits of the individual, but tion to an ever higher level of Self rather a person’s ethical character. which is the task and telos of ethi- Hence, Maimonides could afford cal perfection. It is not without a to follow Aristotle with respect to polemic tenor against this ancient the idea of pure cognition, without and Aristotelian notion that Mai- risking entanglement in Aristotle’s

monides cites against the aban- one-sided intellectualism. Mai-

donment of the Self: “Do not aban- monides defines the individual don your own dignity to others,” (the Self) as human spirit which is and “it was my own vineyard _ not identical with any native facul-

which | did not guard.” [Proverbs ty of the soul. [“Know that it 5:9 and Song of Songs 1:6 are both behooved us to compare the relaquoted by Maimonides in the con- tion obtaining between God .. .

text of his definition of the “true, and the world to that... between ultimate human perfection.” This the acquired intellect and man; perfection gives the individual _ this intellect is not a faculty in the “permanent endurance,” and con- body but is truly separate from the

sists in the autonomous acquisition organic body and_ overflows

192

toward it.” Guide 1:72, 193. A. max. At the same time, the mesneo-Platonic reading of Mai- sianic idea serves as the fulcrum for monides’ theory of Knowing God the idea of God. The messianic and of Imitatio Dei—triggered by idea is the energizing spirit of Maimonides’ use of the term over- Judaism and of its historical flow—is suggested by Kreisel endurance. It is of profound signifi1994 in contradiction to the tran- cance for the integral nature of scendental ethos of Cohen’s read- Maimonides’ thinking that he sucing.] This spirit, however, actual- ceeds in integrating all tributaries of

izes itself exclusively upon the Greek and Arabic knowledge and exertion of thinking (73727 5). thought into the One life-stream of the Jewish spirit, namely into his 177. Since such spirit guarantees messianic ethics; that his prophetic

the unity of knowledge, Mai- cognition of God, to wit: love of monides may legitimately infer the God and love of one’s fellow, uniimpending unification of all think- fies all multiplicity and diversity of ing individuals. To recognize this thought; that the prophetic cogniinner connection we need not to — tion of God signifies love of God—

resort to mysticism, neither in this as reflected through the love of world nor in the Beyond, but rather — one’s fellow.

need focus upon messianism, which postulates and proclaims 179. It is the ultimate and most the unity of all thinking individu- articulate meaning of Maials in the united messianic com- monides’ theory of attributes that munity. [Maimonides 1984-1996, God is not the God of metaHilkhoth Melakhim 12:5. Also physics, nor the God of cosmic Sifre 1993 and Rashi 1982 on substance, but the God of ethics, Deuteronomy 6:4 and their cita- that is the God of humankind. tion of Zephaniah 3:9, supporting God as the paradigm and ideal the idea of a messianic community for human emulation and for the

unified through the messianic human Self: solely as this human lucidity of language. Cited in Mai- ethical ideal does God relate to monides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth the world and to humanity. Melakhim 11:4.] Maimonides raises

the ethical vigor, wholesomeness, 180. Even the doctrine of creation and sublimity of messianic cogni- recedes as a metaphysical problem tion above any dogmatic or mysti- in Maimonides’ ethics. It is truly cal pursuits. Messianic cognition amazing how he violates the dog-

purges and permeates his ethical matic medieval agenda on this

cognition. issue, with which agenda he is generally in agreement. This boldness, 178. In advancing the messianic however, is only the result of the ethidea, prophecy reaches its very cli- ical principle guiding his theology.

193

Maimonides’ ethics signifies mes- tion, ethicizing knowledge of God sianic cognition of God, repelling as loving God, reinforcing the ethiall one-dimensional intellectualism cal character of human love by lovby dint of universal love of human- ing God, and establishing the oneity, integrating cognition and voli- ness of humanity through the love of the ideal messianic Self.

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Abbreviations

ArG Asthetik des reinen Gefiihls by Hermann Cohen BdR Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie by Hermann Cohen

CEM “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis,” in Moses ben Maimon, by Hermann Cohen

ErW Ethik des reinen Willens by Hermann Cohen Guide The Guide of the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides IS Hermann Cohens Jiidische Schriften by Hermann Cohen LrE Logik der reinen Erkenntnis by Hermann Cohen MGW] = Monatsschrift fiir die Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums

NE Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle RdV Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums by Hermann Cohen

RoR Religion of Reason: Out of the Sources of Judaism by Hermann Cohen

SPhZ Hermann Cobhens Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte by Hermann Cohen

TB Talmud Bavli TY Talmud Yerushalmi

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Notes

Preface 1. Cohen 1977, “Ofiah shel torath-hamiddoth leha-rambam,” 17-59. The Hebrew translation of the “Charakteristik” due to the difficulty of the text and the lack of commentary left little impact upon contemporary debate. See, however, Navon 1991, 29-43; and Steinberg 1985, 148-201.

Introduction 1. For a comprehensive introduction to Cohen’s intellectual biography in English, see Zank 2000. 2. Cohen [1908] 1971, 63-134, reprinted in Cohen 1924, 3:221-89 (hereafter cited as JS). Maimonides 1971, 63-134. 3. See Holzhey 1986. 4, Even in contemporary literature, Cohen’s Jewish Writings are sometimes referred to as “edited by Franz Rosenzweig,” an imprecision that is symptomatic not only of the impact of Rosenzweig’s introduction, but also of the extent to which Cohen’s Jewish writings and Rosenzweig’s own thought appear to be interwoven into one dynamic strand of tradition, especially for Jewish scholars of the European philosophical tradition. See Schweid 1999, 21n. 2. 5. Bruno Strauss, on the other hand, tells of the late Cohen’s wish to “collect his small, Jewish writings”; Strauss 1924, v.

6. Albert Gorland and Ernst Cassirer were students of Cohen at Marburg, and were among the most prominent representatives of the Marburg school after Cohen died.

7. See Cohen 1928 (hereafter cited as SPhZ). This collection was edited by Cohen’s students and colleagues Albert G6rland and Ernst Cassirer. 8. Cf. Niew6hner 1991. 9. JS 3:290-372.

198 NOTES TO PAGES xxiv-xxxii 10. Maimonides 1963, 3:54, 636-38 (hereafter cited as Guide). Maimonides 1975, Hilkhoth Melakhim 12:5. 11. See also Schweid 1991, 51-52. 12. In Jerusalem, shortly before his death, I asked the Jewish philosopher Eliezer Berkovitz, himself an observant Jew, about his own experiences as a visiting

student at the Hochschule fiir die Wissenschaft des Judentums in Berlin,

about the students’ relationship to Hermann Cohen as a teacher, and whether they were ever critical of him. Berkovitz’s response was emphatic: “God forbid, we would not question his authority. Hermann Cohen’s word was to us like the word of God!” 13. According to Brenner 1996, 5 (emphasis added): German Jewry “was char-

acterized neither by a radical break with the past nor by a return to it. Indeed, it used distinct forms of Jewish traditions, marking them as authentic, and presented them according to the demands of contemporary taste and modern cultural forms of expression.” 14. See Adelmann 2000, 29-31. 15. Society for the Advancement of Jewish Studies, MGW] 48(1904), 52-64. 16. Society for the Advancement of Jewish Studies, MGW] 48(1904), 60-63. 17. Philippson and Lucas 1904, 752. 18. Bacher et al. 1908-1914, viii. 19. Philippson and Lucas 1904, 752-54.

20. The protocol mentions Israel Abrahams (Cambridge), Wilhelm Bacher (Budapest), Eduard Baneth (Berlin), Chaim Brody (Nachod), Ismar Elbogen

(Berlin), Simon Eppenstein (Briesen), Jakob Guttmann (Breslau), Saul Horovitz (Breslau), Israel Levy (Paris), Adolf Posnansky (Warsaw), Arthur Zacharias Schwarz (Vienna), and David Simonsen (Copenhagen). Philippson and Lucas 1904, 754. 21. Philippson and Lucas 1904, 754. 22. Bruckstein 1997c, 1998. 23. Cohen 1972, 24 (hereafter cited as RoR); Cohen 1995, 28 (hereafter cited

as RdV). 24. Levinas 1987. 25. See Cohen 1997, 1981, 1982, 1996 and RoR/RdV. Holzhey 1988, 202, speaks of Cohen’s “narrating philosophy of origin.”

26. Cohen in a December 1904 letter to the Frankfurtloge, as cited in Rosenzweig 1924, JS 1:323, my translation. 27. Adelmann 2000. 28. Wissenschaft itself, according to Cohen, means nothing else but to “render an account.” 29. Based on Cohen. 1997, 84 (hereafter cited as LrE) 30. RoR 24-34; RdV 27-40. 31. LrE 36.

32. Parchon 1844, Chelek ha-Diqdug 11b. I quote the uncensored version, based upon an early manuscript at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, the text of which I saw in the annotated copy of Machberet ha’Arukh belonging to my teacher, Z. Gotthold.

NOTES TO PAGES xxxiii-xlii 199 33. The term Sprachdenken was coined by Rosenzweig 1937, 387; see also Glatzer 1972, 199-200; RoR 28; RdV 32-33. 34. Talmud Yerushalmi (hereafter cited as TY) Peah 2:6. 35. Deuteronomy 5:18 with Targum Onkelos. For English Bible citations I am

using the translation of the Jewish Publication Society 1985 throughout. : 36. RoR 34 (paraphrase); RdV 39-40 (paraphrase). 37. Exodus 34:27. 38. Boyarin 1994b; 2 Corinthians 3:5; 5:12. 39. Bacher 1881, 173-75; Ibn Ezra 1985, 316, 319. 40. Ha-Levi 1964, 202. This point is made even clearer in the translation of this work by Kafih; see Ha-Levi 1997, 150. 41. RoR 28; RdV 33. 42. Deuteronomy 31:12-14. 43. RoR 28; RdV 33. 44. Talmud Bavli (hereafter cited as TB) Nedarim 38a. 45. TB Gittin 60b; also Guide 175-76. 46. Mishna Eduyot 1:5. 47. Culbertson 1995, 50-51, n. 5S. 48. JS 3:245-56. 49, JS 3:226, 229. 50. JS 1:246. Citation refers to Exodus 34:6-7. 51. Cohen 1981, 54, 333-38 (hereafter cited as ErW). 52. Micah 6:8; ErW 54. 53. Bruckstein 1997b, 271-72. 54. ErW SA. 55. RoR 258; RdV 301. 56. Levinas 1997, 67. 57. LrE 154. 58. Wiedebach 1998. 59. Genesis 18:19; RoR 316-18; RdV 368-69. 60. Maimonides Hilkhoth Teshuvah 1984-1996, 8:8. 61. Levinas 1997, 68-69. 62. Culbertson 1995, 189, slightly modified. 63. Ricoeur 1998, 332. 64. See also Kepnes 1996, 2-4. 65. In oral communication with Professor Moshe Idel, Hebrew University. For a critical discussion of whether these two principles of translation, first suggested by Schleiermacher, can be kept distinct in Rosenzweig’s theory of translation, see Askani 1997, 117-24. 66. Rosenzweig 1994, 40. 67. See Rosenzweig’s epilogue to his translation of Judah ha-Levi’s poems in Rosenzweig 1926, 154. See also Askani 1997, 121 on this. Author’s translation. 68. Felstiner 1995, xvi. 69. Rosenzweig 1937, 202; cf. Askani 1997, 123. 70. Rosenzweig 1937, 134.

200 NOTES TO PAGES xliii-13 71. Here I borrow Robert Gibbs’s term coined in his talk on Hermann Cohen’s

concept of messianism at the International Conference on Hermann Cohen’s Religion of Reason in Zurich, September 1998. The main contri-

bution to an understanding of Cohen’s messianic epistemology in the German language was made by Fiorato 1993; 1994, 366-78.

1. Socrates and Plato 1. Diogenes Laertes 1942, 1:15, 19. 2. ErW 1. 3. Charron 1986.

4. Pope 1950. | 5. ErW 530. 6. Plato 1982, 81-89; Stone 1988, 81-83, 253n. 14. 7. LrE 84; Fiorato 1993, 10-11; Wiedebach 1997a, 68-77. 8. LrE 84. 9. ErW 338-40, 350.

10. Lingis 1998, xxxvii. See also Schmid 1995, 261-63. 11. See SPhZ. See also Gibbs 1992, 17-23; and Lembeck 1994. 12. Holzhey 1997, 226-41; Poma 1997, 21-36, 177-84. 13. Gibbs 1992; R. Cohen 1994; Bruckstein 1997a, 16-21. 14. Lewis and Short 1980.

15. SPhZ 54-SS.

16. Guide 7. 17. Jeremiah 1:11-12; Abravanel 1956, 306; Guide: 43, 392; Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah.7:2—4; Carlebach 1982. 18. Deuteronomy 34 with commentaries; SPhZ 54; see also Adelmann 1997, 2. 19. Exodus 24:7. 20. ErW 190-94; Cohen 1982, 359-63 (paraphrase; hereafter cited as ArG). 21. LrE 257. 22. LrE 87-88. 23. Plato 1980, 6:110; see also Shorey 1980, xxxili-xxxvi. 24. LrE 86-89. 25. Aristotle 1983, On Interpretation 19b, 141; Categories 12a—b, 85. 26. For a differentiation within Aristotle’s privative judgments, see Wolfson 1973-1977, 2:544. 27. Cohen’s combined reading of Aristotle’s categories finds precedent in the commentary by Averroés on Aristotle’s On Interpretation claiming that the infinite judgment, “A is not-seeing,” and the privative judgment, “A is blind,” are propositions which make sense only if the property denied by the predicate is expected to be by its nature present in the subject. Averroés, as quoted in Wolfson 1977 2:548n. 32; also Maimonides 1987 a, 56.

28. LrE 85. 29, LrE 154; RoR 290-91; RdV 338-39. 30. Kant 1950, 113. 31. Bergman 1967, 124-27, 267-69; Bruckstein 1992, 36-37.

NOTES TO PAGES 15-24 201 32. Rawls 1972 also exhibits a Platonic bent in that justice assumes the status of a foundational Good. 33. Aristotle 1945, NE 1177a—79b, 613-29. 34. Aristotle 1947, Metaphysics 993b, 87. 35. ErW 89; Wiedebach 1997a, 106-13. 36. See Blumenberg 1985, 49. 37. See Blumenberg 1985, 28-29. 38. Diogenes Laertius 1942, 1:27; SPhZ 1:7; RoR 40; RdV 47. 39. See paragraph number 66 in chapter 3 of this book. 40. RoR 72; RdV 84. 41. ErW S4.

42. ErW 190-94; ArG 359-64. 43. Hegel 1977, 84-88; Priest 1987, 2-17. 44. Wolfson 1947, 1:327-32. 45. Wolfson 1947, 2:94-138. 46. RoR 107; RdV 124. 47. References to Philo play no major role in a book like Lasker 1977. 48. Ibn Gabirol 1959, 257-85. 49. “Gabirol’s Fountain of Life suffered a rather curious fate. Written in Arabic,

the total work has been preserved only in a Latin translation . . . of the twelfth century. This translation was well known to Christian scholastics who variously called its author Avicebrol, Avicebron, or Avencebrol. Because of the total absence of all biblical and rabbinic quotations from the work, some scholastics considered its author a Muslim, while others . . . considered him a Christian Arab. Not until the middle of the nineteenth century, when Salomon Munk discovered and published a Hebrew florilegium by

ShemTob Falakera (1225-1290), was it established that ibn Gabirol and Avicebrol are one and the same author.” Hyman and Walsh 1991, 358. See also Guttmann 1973, 101-3; and, differently, Kaufmann 1899, 111. 50. RoR 107; RdV 124. 51. Bieler 1933, 57-58. Even if ibn Gabirol’s doctrine of divine will could be interpreted to constitute the final cause of creation (Bieler 1933, 64-68), the doctrine still implies an ontological relationship between God and world.

2. Maimonides: A Radical Platonist 1. It is precisely this supposed practical Jewish concern with ethics that Cohen (JS 3:1-35) refutes in his biting critique of Lazarus. 2. JS 1:306-30. In this exploration, Cohen becomes increasingly critical of the Platonic tradition, finding ethics and true socialism later, primarily in the prophets. See “Das Soziale Ideal bei Plato und den Propheten.”

3. Strauss 1995; Green 1993, 56, 168n. 3. Green pays little attention to the vital contribution of Cohen’s essay “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis” on Strauss 1995, 151n. 11; but cf. also Green 1997, 72.

4. Berman 1961, 53-61; Kellner 1990; Twersky 1980b; Hartman 1976; Harvey 1990, 11-12.

202 NOTES TO PAGES 25-34 5. TB Berakhoth 12a; also TY Berakhoth 1:4. 6. Saba 1879, 16b, on Exodus 11:9-10, reminiscent of Shelomoh al-Kabez’s famous formulation in the hymn “Lekha Dodi.” 7. ErW 99.

8. RdV 96-97; RoR 82-84; ErW 99.

9. Schwarzschild 1990, 29-59; see also Niew6hner 1988, 84-87.

10. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Melakhim 8:11; ErW 70, 599-600, 618-20. 11. N. Cohen 1995, 281-84; Urbach 1987, 290-92. 12. Romans 6; Galatians 3. Paul uses the term “yoke of the Law” (Cuvyov) in Acts 15:10 and Galatians 5:1.

13. On “pharisaic self-justification versus divine grace,” see Luther 1932,

6:447-62. For Lutheran commentaries, see Burton 1988, 142-77; Longenecker 1990, 110-25; and more radically, Martyn 1998, 324-28. On the other hand, see the critical discussion of Sanders 1991, esp. 1-12, against

nineteenth-century German Lutheran, but also English Anglican scholarship, as being anti-Semitic. See also Betz 1979; Dunn 1988, ILxiii-lxxii. I am

grateful to John Reumann for his helpful suggestions in finding my way through the literature on the subject. 14. Boyarin 1994b, 2-12. 15. RoR 343-44; RdV 399-400. 16. RoR 343-44; RdV 399-400. 17. RoR 213; RdV 249. 18. Mishna Avoth 1:3; Guide 3:53, 631. 19. RoR 213; RdV 249. 20. RoR 345; RdV 401; also JS 1:284-305. 21. According to Rosenzweig 1924, 1:334. 22. Hegel 1977. 23. Jonas 1972, 141-43. 24. Schwarzschild 1990, 63. 25. RoR 33, 40-41; RdV 38, 47-48.

26. BdR 27, 32-84, esp. 45; RoR 11-23; RdV 12-27; JS 3:290-372; and L. Strauss 1924, 5-314. 27. Sifre 1993, 114. 28. Guide 3:54, 630-38. 29. TB Berakhoth 25b; TB Yoma 30a; TB Kiddushin 54a. 30. RoR 408; RdV 473-74. 31. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 5:4, my translation. 32. JS 3:40. On Job, see RoR 87, RdV 101. 33. See also on “correlation,” Adelmann 1968, 209; RoR 86; RdV 100-101. 34. Cohen develops his concept of the “correlation between God and man in ethical reasoning” in RoR precisely in the same context as in this essay, namely in relationship to Job 32:8; RoR 87; RdV 101. 35. The phrase “Korrelation zwischen Gott und Mensch” was formally introduced by Cohen in BdR 45. 36. RoR 82-83; RdV 96. 37. RoR 86; RdV 100-101.

NOTES TO PAGES 34-37 203 38. RoR 86; RdV 100-101; ErW 462-65. 39. RoR 98, 103-6; RdV 114, 119-20; Altmann 1987, 301-17. 40. Guide 2:45, 576; and Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah, chaps. 7 and 8. Maimonides intended to write a separate essay on prophecy; see Guide 9.

41. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Melakhim 8:11; and Schwarzschild 1990, 29-59. 42. Maimonides 1987a, 46; and Guide 2:33, 364; where Maimonides refers to the third to tenth commandments as mekkubaloth; that is, as heteronomous acceptance of tradition. 43. Cohen terms the task of ethical self-awareness autonomous: a thinking that is not driven by, or simply the result of, external stimuli of natural necessities. ErW 324-26. 44. Maimonides seems to endorse this view in Guide 1:34, 72-79; and also Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 4:11. 45. RoR 109-12; RdV 127-30. 46. Klatzkin 1968, 106-8, 133-34; Ben Yehuda 1980, 7275b—76a, 7569a—71a. 47. Abraham bar Chiyya 1971, 146. 48. Rosenblatt (in Saadya 1976, 145) translates shim’ioth (Arabic *sm’y) as “revealed precepts.” Altmann (in Saadya 1965, 102) renders the term “revelational laws.” Samuelson, too (in ibn Daud 1986, 214a, 263), translates the term as “revealed commandments.” Husik (1966, 39) avoids the dichotomy between revelation and reason and felicitously speaks of traditional laws. Guttmann (1973, 79) uses “commandments of obedience.” Similarly Kafih (in Saadya 1970, 122, and in Maimonides 1972, 553); Jakob Guttmann (1882, 135n. 2) refers to Saadya’s commentary to Sefer Yetzirah 1:1 and Saadya’s usage of sikhlioth and shim’ioth there—though the authorship of

Saadya for this commentary is only attributed. Cohen himself, like Guttmann, stresses the character of obedience to tradition when discussing the term shim’ioth, applying the term “revelational” for the revelational character of human reasoning itself. RoR 351; RdV 409. 49, Guide 3:26, 507. 50. Guide 3:56, 507; also see Kafih in Maimonides 1972, 3:26, 552; I follow Kafih in rendering the Arabic (7x1) as rationale, or purpose; also Guide 3:33.

51. Maimonides 1912, 77, also notes on 41-42; see also Maimonides 1992a, 302n. 5 and the additional note in the appendix.

52. RoR 25; RdV 29; Guide 3:26, 507, modified translation; see also Maimonides 1912, 77—78n. 3, in which Gorfinkle explicitly refers to Cohen’s “Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis.” 53. Maimonides 1987a, chap. 8; Guide 1:2, 25; 2:33, 364. 54. Cf. the controversy between Maimonides and Nachmanides about the issue of whether or not Knowing God is to be considered part of Positive Law or whether it rather constitutes the very grounds for the law, as Nachmanides maintains; Nachmanides 1981, 141-42. 55. Introduction to RoR. Here Cohen seems to prefigure a thesis currently developed by Daniel Boyarin (2002) concerning the interdependence of canon-

204 NOTES TO PAGES 37-44 ical homonoia in Christian tradition and increasing polysemic polynoia among the rabbinic authorities. 56. TB Eruvin 13b; RoR 28; RdV 32-33; also ErW 33-34. 57. Deuteronomy 5:19; TB Sanhedrin 17a; Guide 2:33. 58. Maimonides on Mishna Peah 1:1 in Maimondes 1992b, 1:54-55. 59. Maimonides 1992a, 144; also Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 9:1.

60. Maimonides 1957-1961, 2:495-98; Maimonides 1997-1998, 2:610-11; Maimonides 1995a, 22n d; and Philo 1937, 1-95. Saadya, too, develops his

traditional list of commandments on the basis of the Decalogue: Saadya 1941, 185-216; Nachmanides 1963-1964, 2:521; see note by Chavel there. 61. TY Berakhoth 1:5; Ginzberg 1971, 1:166.

62. RoR 359; RdV 418.

63. Jeremiah 31:30-33; RoR 81-82; RdV 94-95. 64. Liddell and Scott 1968, 394b; Sperber 1984, 84-86.

65. Bammel 1960, 313-19; also Roetzel 1970, 377-90; and Behm 1964, 133-34: “The task of Jesus... is to execute the new decree which God has published to settle the relation between Himself and man. . . . His bloody death, represented by the eucharistic cup, gives life to the new divine order.” For a typical Jewish and Muslim medieval critique of the Christian abrogation of the Law, see ibn Daud 1986, 201-4.

66. RoR 342-44; RdV 399-400. 67. RoR 342; RdV 398; cf. Mishna Rosh haShana 3:4—5; also Charles 1964, 561; Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 3:4; also Maimonides 1971, 128, directive 137, where Maimonides distinguishes between the concepts signal and symbol. 68. Heschel 1954, 122; also Kochan 1997, 53-75. 69. Mishna Pessachim 10.

70. Gerrish 1996. 71. Guttmann 1973, 165-66; ibn Daud 1919, 67; Saadya 1976, 55-56; also Sefer Yetzirah 1972, 105; and Saadya 1984, 219. 72. Midrash Tehillim 1947, 22; and Lieberman 1974, 223. 73. Guide 1:75, 223-24. 74. Guide 2:36, 369. 75. Ibn Daud 1986, 263. 76. Ibn Daud 1986, 257. 77. Aristotle 1945, NE 1179b-1181b, 629-43; ibn Daud 1986, 256-57. 78. Ibn Daud 1919, 131. 79. Ibn Daud 1986, 263-64. 80. Maimonides 1987a, chap. 8; and Samuelson in ibn Daud 1986, 212n. 2. 81. Ibn Daud 1986, 263. 82. Cohen reads ibn Daud 1986, 263 (section 214) in light of 204 (section 172a).

83. Ibn Daud 1986, 204; Maimonides 1987a, chap. 8, cites partly the same examples in his definition of mefursamoth. 84. Ibn Daud 1986, 204; Maimonides 1987a, chap. 8. 85. Ibn Daud 1986, 264.

NOTES TO PAGES 45-55 205 86. Maimonides 1987a, chap. 8. 87. Aristotle 1945, NE 1145b, 377. 88. Aristotle 1945, NE 1139b, 333. 89, ErW 99, 90. Efros 1924, 77; Guide 1:2; 2:33, 364; and Kasher 1985.

3. The Good beyond Being 1. Maimonides 1912, 35-36; Maimonides 1997-1998, 2:553. 2. Sirat 1985, 4.

3. Aristotle 1945, NE 1140a—-b, 337, 1179b, 629-43; Aristotle 1947, Metaphysics 983a, 15. 4. Levinas 1992, 23. 5. Plato 1980, Republic 508-9c, 6:100-107. 6. Aristotle 1945, NE 1096b, 23-24. 7. Aristotle 1945, NE 1097a, 25-26. 8. Aristotle 1945, NE 1040a, 337. 9. Aristotle 1945, NE 1103b, 75. 10. Aristotle 1945, NE 1098b-99a, 39. 11. Wolfson 1947, 1:202. For an example of the neo-Platonist viewpoint, see Luzzatto 1987, 22-26. In Patristic (Augustine, Dionysus Areopagita) and also in Scholastic literature (Thomas Aquinas), this principle—that the concept of the good implies actualization—is rendered as bonum est diffusivium sui. Thomas Aquinas 1952, 25-26. 12. Sefer ha-Chinukh 1977, 545; Nachmanides 1989, 125-26; Sforno 1980; see also Nachmanides and Sforno on Gen. 22:1. 13. Kant 1997, 50; and Cohen 1910, 216; ErW 182-89. 14. ErW 169. 15. Plato 1952b, Theaetetus 176b, 129. 16. Guide 2:22, 319-20. 17. Even Shmuel associates Maimonides’ critique of Aristotle’s cosmogony and metaphysics with Maimonides’ rejection of mythology; see in Maimonides 1935-1960, 3:109-13. 18. Guide 3:29, 518, 521; also Twersky 1980b, 391. 19. Maimonides’ epistle on astrology, Maimonides 1997-1998, 2:481; also

Gotthold 1972, 75-85. Cohen’s source on the Sabians was most likely Chwolson 1856, 1:689-97. 20. Twersky 1980b, 389-91; also Funkenstein 1970. 21. RoR 52; RdV 60. 22. Aristotle 1977, Metaphysics 1072b, 149. 23. Guide 3:54, 638. 24. Aristotle 1977, 87-89; Metaphysics 1064b; and 1947, 1026a, 297. 25. Maimonides 1987a, 107-8; Efros 1924, 49-50; also Wolfson 1973-1977, 1:493-545. 26. Guide Introduction, 6; 1:33, 72. 27. Such as Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 4:10-11, and his commentary on Mishna Chagigah 2:1 in Maimonides 1992b, 2:250.

206 NOTES TO PAGES 56-64 28. Mishna Chagigah 2:1. 29. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 4:10-11. 30. Guide 3:54, 635. 31. Maimonides 1992b; “completions and corrections” refers to p. 302n. 5S. Situating this Maimonidean critique of Saadya’s distinction between “rea-

son” and “tradition” within the work of the contemporary philosopher Gadamer and his critique of a reason that imagines itself to be without the prejudice of tradition, will make a most interesting reading. See Gadamer 1975, 281-90. 32. Maimonides 1912, 77; Guide 3:33, 532-34. 33. LrE 43; also ErW 320-22. 34. Hegel 1996, 20. 35. Schwarzschild 1990, 61-81, esp. 65-67. 36. Schwarzschild n.d. 37. LrE 180. 38. Schwarzschild 1987. 39. Rashi 1982 on Genesis 1:1. 40. Kellner 1986, 53, see also 174n. 348; also Abravanel 1982, 70, 76. 41. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 1:1—-3. See Cohen’s discussion of Being and Becoming in the context of Creation. RoR 59-70; RdV 68-81. 42. Maimonides 1987b, chap. 8. 43. Guide 1:2, 25. 44. Maimonides 1987a, 45; Saadya 1970, 119, 121-22; 1976, 141, 144; also

Sefer ha-Chinukh 1977, 92. 7

45. Sifra on Leviticus 18:4 (1959, 850); Rashi 1982 on TB Yoma 67b; Guttmann 1882, 136, 139; Maimonides 1912, 77; 1972, 553n. 5. See also marginal note in TB Yoma 67b; for a different solution to the problem of Maimonides’ deviation from the text in Yoma, see Maimonides 1992a, 303. 46. Maimonides 1987a, chap. 8. 47. Maimonides 1992b, 2:258-59; Maimonides 1912, 77; and marginal note in TB Yoma 67b by Pick-Berlin. For a different solution to the problem of Maimonides’ deviation from the text in Yoma, see Maimonides 1992a, 303; and Kafih in Maimonides 1972, 553n. 5. 48. Guide 3:43, 572; also Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Sukkah veLulav 8. 49. Aristotle 1977, Metaphysics 1072b, 149-51. 50. Aristotle 1945, NE 1177b, 617. 51. Genesis 1:27; 5:1-3. 52. Philo 1929, 3. 53. Guide 1:1, 23; also Saadya 1976, 114, on betselem Elohim. Emphasis in original.

54. RoR 85-93; RdV 99-108; Sifra on Leviticus 19:18 (Sifra 1959, 89); TY Nedarim 9:4, 26a; and Midrash Bereshit Rabba 1996, 236-37 and n. 12. 55. RoR 119; RdV 137-38. 56. Aristotle 1945, NE 1177a, 613. 57. Ibid.

NOTES TO PAGES 64-73 207 58. Aristotle 1945, NE 1178a, 619; and Armstrong in Aristotle 1977, 429. On the relation of Aristotle’s concept of eudaemonia to ethical virtues, see Wolfson 1947, 175-76. 59. RoR 17-19; RdV 19-22; Bruckstein 2000, 129-55. 60. Guide 3:27, 511; also Guide 3:54, 635; and Altmann 1981, 71.

| 61. Guide 1:54, 124.

62. Guide 1:69, 170; Rosenzweig (1971, 126-29; 1990, 114-16) emphatically

| reiterates this point.

63. Guide 2:54, 632-36. 64. Guide 3:54, 635. 65. Guide 3:54, 635. 66. Guide 3:51, 619; Kellner 1990, chap. 3. 67. See JS 3:1-35, for a critique of Lazarus. 68. Guide 1:52, 114-19; and Wolfson 1977, 2:195-—230.

69. LrE 36-38. 70. ErW 628; Cassirer 1974, 277-96. 71. Saadya 1976, 101-2. 72. TB Berakhoth 31b; TB Yebamoth 71a; TB Baba Metsia 31b, 4; also Twersky 1979, 239. 73. Husik 1966, xxiii, xliv.

74. Husik 1966, 34. 75. Guide 1:53, 121-22. 76. Exodus 33:19. 77. TB Rosh HaShana 17b. 78. Exodus 34:10 and Rashi 1982 on this; JS 3:46-47.

79. Maimonides 1957-1961, 505-9; Maimonides 1997-1998, 2:604-6; Maimonides 1971, commandment 8, 62-63. 80. Hildesheimer 1987, 98-99n. 433. 81. Aristotle 1977, Metaphysics 1072a—73a, 149-53. 82. LrE 83-85; reiterated by Rosenzweig 1990, 22-26; 1971, 20-24. 83. Guide 1:54, 124. 84. Guide 1:54, 124. 85. See Maimonides’ reference to Avoth 5:13 in Guide 1:54, 124.

86. Guide 1:54, 124. ]

87. JS 3:176-96; ErW 56; RoR 160; RdV 185-86. On Cohen’s translation of Leviticus 19:2, “You shall become holy,” see RoR 96, 426; RdV 111, 494-95. 88. ErW 55, 403. 89. Guide 1:54, 128. 90. Schechter 1969, 199-218. 91. The imperative “You shall walk in His ways” appears only once in the Pentateuch—in Deuteronomy 28:9. Maimonides, however, explains that the commandment in the infinitive verbal expression (Deuteronomy 8:6, 10:12, 11:22, 19:19, 26:17, 30:16) has the same binding force as the imperative. See Maimonides 1971, directive commandment 8, 62-63. 92. Guide 1:54, 128.

208 NOTES TO PAGES 73-81 93. JS 3:183-96; also RoR 110-12; RdV 127-30. 94. ErW 326. 95. Psalms 119:77, 92, 143, 174; cf. also Proverbs 8:30-31 with attending midrashim. 96. Such as Shapiro 1957, 692.

97. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 7:6; Guide 2:35, 367-69. 98. Maimonides 1992b, 142-43. 99. Guide 2:36, 369-73. 100. I borrow this term from Levinas’s talmudic lecture “As Old as the World,” 1994b, 70-88. 101. According to R. Yehoshua ben Levi; cf. Mishna Avoth 6:2. 102. ErW 391.

4. Religion as Idolatry 1. The classical exposition that served Cohen himself as a source is Kaufmann 1877.

2. Halbertal and Margalit 1992, 9-36. 3. Wolfson 1947, 2:94-101. 4. Wolfson 1947, 2:126-38; Husik 1966, xxii—xxiil. 5, Saadya 1976, 101-2; Josef ibn Tsaddik 1903, 56-59; Judah ha-Levi 1964, 84-85; Bahya 1973, 132-49; Ibn Daud 1986, 147, 153.

6. Guide 1:57, 132; Altmann 1988, 148-65, esp. 161-62; and Wolfson 1973-1977, 2:31. 7. RoR 161-62; RdV 187-88. 8. BdR 10, 61-64; RoR 15-16, 178-235; RdV 18, 208-75. 9. Zank 2000. 10. BdR 65. 11. Rosenzweig 1924, xii—Ixiv, esp. xlvii-l.

12. Buber 1988, esp. 52-62; Bergman 1991, 150-55; Fackenheim 1996, 21; more moderately, Mosés 1992, 45-49; Klein 1976, 132-48, esp. 135-43; with the notable exceptions of Guttmann 1973, 415-16; Altmann 1987, 301; and Schwarzschild 1970. 13. Adelmann 1968 stresses the “unity of consciousness” in Cohen’s philosophy; Holzhey 1986, 1:67-—79, carefully distinguishes the agenda of Cohen’s

philosophy from that of his colleague Paul Natorp and (1:343) invokes Cohen’s statement that “our philosophy of culture is in complete harmony with our [Jewish] religion.” We find an explicit critique of Rosenzweig’s “late Cohen” in Poma 1997, 157-69. 14. Mishna Avoth 1877, 25.

15. Herford 1974, 21. ,

16. Twersky 1980b, 139; also Halbertal 1997. 17. Guide 3:54, 636-37. “The term wisdom [chokhmah]... means... the apprehension of Him... and that similarly all the actions prescribed by the Law... [are] not to be compared with this ultimate end and [do] not equal it, being but preparations made for the sake of this end.” Guide 636. Note

NOTES TO PAGES 81-92 209 the significant fact that the entire halakhic code, the Mishneh Torah, ends with the prophetic vision of Isaiah 11:9 in which the universal knowledge of God is made manifest. Prophecy—the knowledge of God—precedes faith in the Law. Guide 576. 18. Guide 5-14; Strauss 1988. 19. Maimonides 1992a, 140, 143, 184 (editor’s comments); and Guide 9. 20. Levinas 1990. 21. Sifre 1993, 114-15. 22. RoR 28; RdV 32; also Bialik 1944, 9-28. 23. ErW 54, 403; RoR 33; RdV 39; also 2 Samuel 19:7 with Hirsch’s commentary on Deuteronomy 26:3, Pentateuch 1989, 5:478. 24. Kimchi 1878, 114b. 25. Abraham ben Moses ben Maimon 1953, 81. 26. Halkin 1979. 27. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 3:6—7; Guide 1:36, 82-85. 28. Twersky 1980a, 282. Twersky cites Scholem and other scholars who associate the Rabad’s critical attitude toward Maimonides with his kabbalistic, mystical leanings. See Abraham ben David of Posquiéres 1985, 56-57, on Hilkhoth Teshuvah 3:7. Naor cites the various editorial versions of that

gloss, demonstrating the attempt to blunt the biting barb of Rabad’s ad hominem critique.

29. Guide 84-85; also Abraham ben David of Posquiéres 1964, 127; and Rawidowicz 1969-1971, 1:171-233. 30. TB Chagigah 16b; also TB Berakhoth 59a; TB Kiddushin 40a; and in the uncensored version, ibn Chabib 1961, 3:74. 31. According to Rabinovicz 1976 this critical opinion has been deleted from most editions of Ein Ya’akov. 32. Rabinovicz 1976. 33. LrE 31-32, 215. 34. Cassirer 1994. 35. JS 3:371 (paraphrase). 36. Spinoza 1985, 1-8, 85-86; also Wolfson 1958, 71-78. 37. RoR 331; RdV 385-86. 38. Spinoza 1951, chap. 15; and Yovel 1989, 3-26. 39. JS 3:371; RoR 331; RdV 385-86; also L. Strauss 1924. 40. LrE 85; and RoR 62-63; RdV 71-72; also Hartmann 1965, 147. 41. LrE 85. 42. LrE 34; Rosenzweig 1999; Rosenzweig 1990, 26-27; 1971, 20-22; Wichl 1988. For an entirely different reading, see Samuelson 1988. 43. LrE 90. 44. LrE 86. 45. Samuelson 1994, 100-101. 46. Guide 1:17, 42-43; Efros 1924, 37-38; note that Efros reads Maimonides’ theory of privation in a purely Aristotelian, rather than Platonic, context. See also Maimonides 1856-1861, 1:245. 47. See the translation of al-Charizi in Maimonides 1904, 2:18 [sic], 164; and Wolfson 1973-1977, 2:195—230.

210 NOTES TO PAGES 92-109 48. LrE 83-84. 49. LrE 83-84; Cohen’s logic radicalizes the Platonic theory about wonder and

astonishment (Savpacetv) as origin of all philosophical thinking. Plato 1952, Theaetetus 155d, 54-55. 50. Derrida 1995, 80. 51. Guide 1:58, 136. 52. Hayduck (ed.) Alexander in Metaphysica, according to Wolfson 1973-1977, 2:209,

53. Narboni 1852, 10; and Falaquera 1837, 87a; Wolfson 1973-1977, 2:210. 54. Maimonides 1987b, 78 (paraphrase). 55. Guide 1:58, 136-37. 56. Rosenzweig 1990, 53-54; 1971, S8. 57. ErW 331; Poma 1997, 78. 58. Guide 1:69, 170. 59. Schwarzschild 1956. 60. RoR 255; RdV 297. 61. Wolfson 1958, 1:406-7. 62. Also JS 3:38-42 and throughout ErW; also Schwarzschild 1990, 63-64. 63. Rashi 1982 on Genesis 1:1. Rashi takes his point of departure in deliberating upon the meaning of the first letter of the Torah—bet—which he reads as an instrumental rather than a temporal proposition. Also Zornberg 1996, 3-4. 64. Guide 2:13-24, 39-54. 65. Kellner 1986, 53-61. 66. RoR 59-70; RdV 68-81. 67. RoR 41-46; RdV 47-53. 68. RoR 110-11; RdV 128; also ErW 88. 69. Marmorstein 1950. 70. ErW 88-89; RoR 324; RdV 377. 71. ErW 212-13. 72. RoR 414; RdV 480. 73. See Bruckstein 2000, 29-55. 74. Levinas 1994a, 141.

75. RoR 28; RdV 32-33. |

76. RoR 8-11; RdV 9-12; Boyarin 1994a, esp. 117-29; Halbertal 1997, 45-89. 77. BdR 10; RoR 15-16; RdV 18. See above paragraph number 74 in this chapter. 78. RoR 186-87; RdV 218-19.

5. The “Unity of the Heart” 1. RoR 99-115; RdV 85-99. 2. Mishna Berakhoth 2:2.

3. RoR 31-33; RdV 36-39; and Rosenzweig’s comment, 1937, 297; also Rashi’s commentary on Deuteronomy 6:4, based upon Sifre 1993, 54. 4. Guide 2:12, 279; 3:37, 374-75. 5. RoR 50; RdV 58. 6. RoR 50; RdV S58.

NOTES TO PAGES 109-115 211 7. RoR 160-61; RdV 185-87; cf. the controversy between Buber and Cohen on this issue, Buber 1988. 8. Buber 1988, 104. 9. Sifre on Deuteronomy 6:6 (Sifre 1993, 59 ) as interpreted by Rashi (1982, emphasis added); also Mizrachi’s supercommentary (1973, 5:9b) on Rashi discussing Deuteronomy 6:6; and Maimonides 1971, 59, directive 3. 10. Cohen cites Stern’s edition: 1aw> nwyam tm) cwm yan tina aon oo ona Inx Saba wna way’; cf. also JS 3:218. 11. JS 3:218, 1:291. The Sifre on Deuteronomy 6:5 defines the division of the heart (chilluk ha-lev) as the opposite of yichud ha-lev, associating the division of the heart with the disturbing presence of the evil impulse. See Cohen’s discussion of this Sifre in JS 3:215; and Sifre 1993, SS. 12. Bacher 1910a. 13. JS 3:220. 14. Cf. Bacher 1910a and 1910b. Kafih translates tohar ha-matspun instead of ibn Tibbon’s yichud ha-lev (Bahya 1984, 244) just as Bacher translates Lauterung der Gesinnung, oder des Inneren instead of Cohen’s Einheit des Herzens. Bacher 1910a, 349, and 1910b, 733-34. 15. JS 3:218-19. 16. Bahya 1984, 244; oral communication by Rav Josef Kafih. 17. Cf. Saadya’s translation and commentary (1966, 200) on Tehillim. 18. Cf. Guide 1:39; and the commentary attributed to Saadya on Sefer Yetzirah 1:4, Sefer Yetzirah 1972, 6Sn. 83. 19. RoR 15-16; RdV 18; BdR 55-56. 20. RoR 162; RdV 190. 21. Sefer ha-Chinukh 1977, 41. 22. JS 3:214-17. 23. Judah ha-Levi 1964, 223, is reminiscent of Psalms 34:9. 24. Cf. Wiedebach 1997a, 162-94. 25. RoR 18-19; RdV 21-22. 26. Bahya 1973, 89, 91. 27. Leviticus 19:18; Bahya 1973, 105. 28. Psalms 42:2-3. 29. Micah 6:8. 30. Bahya 1973, 446. 31. Guide 1:54, 124. 32. Exodus 34:6-7. 33. Aristotle 1977, Metaphysics 1072b, 147. 34. Guide 2:4, 256. 35. RoR 120-21; RdV 139-40. 36. In his introduction to the Guide, when discussing the influences of Aristotle and Plato, Pines himself refers exclusively to questions of cosmogony, theories of creation, and physics. Guide |xi-Ixiii, lxxv—Ixxvi.

37. Haskel veyadoa oti. Kafih in his commentary on Sefer haMitsvoth 1:1 (Maimonides 1971) emphasizes the distinction between Knowing God and belief in God, claiming the latter to be a dogmatic and un-Maimonidean ren-

212 NOTES TO PAGES 115-122 dition of the classical Arabic sahada. This same dogmatic reading of the

Arabic sahada is reflected in the traditional rendition of the Thirteen Principles as ani ma-amin (I believe in the one God). The Thirteen Principles subsequently have come to assume a catholic function of catechism in Jewish

tradition. See also Kellner 1986, 5-6. The prayer that begins, “For I the Lord,” can be found in Jeremiah 9:23; RoR 256; RdV 299; also Mishna Avoth 4:1.

38. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 9:2; Maimonides 1992, 139; and Rawidowicz 1969-1971, 1:333-45; for an abridged English version,

1974, 317-23; see also the discussion of “the thing that survives” in Altmann 1987, 60-129. Altmann’s article is a critique of Pines’s more agnostic stand on the problem of speculative knowledge in Maimonides; see Pines 1988; also Fox 1990. See also Guide 3:54, 635; Altmann 1981, 71-74. 39. Saadya 1965, 157-58; also Maimonides’ correspondence with the rabbis of southern France, 1997-1998, 2:478-79. 40. RoR 1-34; RdV 1-40. 41. Paraphrase from N. Z. Y. Berlin’s introduction to his commentary on the Torah (1937, vols. 2 and 3); also Melammed 1975, 1:1-128; and Simon 1988; Fishbane 1986; Boyarin 1994a, 11-9; Handelman 1982, 40. 42. Meiri 1964, 17. 43. Culbertson 1995, 99n. 26 on the etymological root connection between “Torah” and the root *yrh, “to shoot” or “to inseminate.” 44. Cf. Otto 1943, 12-15. 45. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 10:1.

46. RoR 406-8; RdV 472-74; Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah. 2:1; Bahya 1973, 436. 47. Cohen 2001, 464; also Cohen 1997, 133; ErW 306. 48. Plato 1952, Theaetetus 176a b, 126-29. 49, Shapiro 1975, 29; and Diesendruck 1928, 416, 523. 50. ErW 298.

51. RoR 21 and RdV 24-25, corresponding to Maimonides’ reading of Jeremiah 9:23 in Guide 3:54, 637. 52. RoR 70;-RdV 81. 53. Twersky 1980b, 463; also Maimonides’ son, Abraham ben Moses 1973; and Margaliot 1953-1954. Maimonides shares Aristotle’s aversion to the sense of touch and to sexual pleasure. Guide 3:8, 432-33 and throughout. 54. Scholem 1995, 1-3. 55. Maimonides Hilkhoth Teshuvah 10:3 in the translation of Twersky 1980b, 478. 56. Guide 3:54, 638.

57. Maimonides Hilkhoth Shmittah ve-Yovel 13:13 in the translation of

Twersky 1980b, 441-42. , 58. Literally speaking, Bahya, and not Maimonides, uses the Hebrew form hitkarvuth the way Cohen reads it (Bahya 1984, 156); also Menachem ben Zerach 1880, 40a and 42b, uses the term hitkarvuth precisely in Cohen’s sense, pointing to the love of God. 59, Also Targum Onkelos: a» ) ~2 39pn NIN.

NOTES TO PAGES 122-135 213 60. Guide 1:18, 44. 61. RoR 162-64; RdV 188-91. The translator of RoR unfelicitously renders the term Selbstannaehrung, “approaching God” (literally, “bringing one’s Self near”), as “self-nearing.” 62. JS 1:251-52 and 1:21.

63. RoR 212; RdV 248; also JS 1:251-52; and Rosenzweig 1924, i, Ivii. According to Nahum Glatzer, Nehemiah Nobel chose this verse from Psalms 73:28 for the inscription on Cohen’s tombstone. Glatzer 1972, 256.

64. Judah ha-Levi 1964, 75-76. 65. JS 1:cx; see also RoR 360-63; RdV 419-22; Wiedebach 1998, 9. 66. Cohen rejects Aristotle’s antithesis of “pragmatic” versus “intellectual” virtues, and therewith the very concept of an “isolated” intellectual perfection. Aristotle 1945, NE 1177a—78a, 613-19. 67. RoR 400-403; RdV 464-67. 68. ErW xii; and Poma 1997, 108; RoR 403; RdV 467. 69. RoR 403; RdV 467.

6. Practice and Performance 1. RoR 402; RdV 466. 2. Also Schmid 1995, 237-38. 3. Klatzkin 1968, 1:17; also Simon’s Hebrew translation in Xenophanes 1960, 12n. 3. In talmudic literature we find “virtue” also rendered in Hebrew as tivut.

4. Consider the Christian sources on unus est bonus—Deus. Matthew 19:17, Mark 10:18, Luke 18:19. Also The “New Zohar,” cited in Blankstein 1964, 382.

5. RoR 406; RdV 471; cf. TB Sotah in Liss 1979, 2:368; whereas Cohen cites only one version of Pinchas Ben Yair’s Gradus ad Parnassum, there are, in fact, many more. Liss 1979, 2:369. 6. Cf. “gates” of content in Bahya 1973; similarly Abraham ben Moses ben Maimon 1973, 189; and Luzzatto 1995, ix—x. 7. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 1:1. 8. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 1:1. 9. Guide 3:35, 538; also Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Issure Mizbe ach 7:11; Maimonides 1992b, Menachoth 8:5. 10. See also Wolfson 1947, 2:312; Maimonides 1992b, Avoth 1:2; Peah 1:1; Maimonides 1984—1996, Hilkhoth Deoth table of contents. 11. ErW 339. 12. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 2:3. 13. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 1:5.

14. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 1:7; Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 1:7; Guide 2:39, 380; Maimonides 1912, 64; also Guide 2:28, 335-36; Fox 1988, 109. 15. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 1:2-4. 16. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 2:3. 17. Twersky 1980b, 462; Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 1:4.

214 NOTES TO PAGES 135-143 18. Schwarzschild 1990, 137-60. 19. Rawidowicz 1969-1971, 1:430n. 118 and 431n. 119; also Rabinovitch, on Hilkhoth Deoth, in Maimonides 1990, 1:23-25. 20. For a Jewish adoption of Max Weber’s concept of the “ideal type” as represented in Spranger’s Types of Men, cf. Soloveitchik 1991, 1 and 139n. 1. 21. Herzog 1980, 1:385.

22. Maimonides 1984, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 5:11; also Maimonides 1997-1998, 1:37. 23. ErW 618.

24. Lichtenstein 1978, 114-17. ,

25. Soloveitchik 1933; cf. R. Munk 1996. 26. Guide 2:39, 75. 27. Guide 1:34, 79. 28. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Tum’ath Okhalim 16:12; Guide 1:54, 128.

29. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Tum’ath Okhalim 16:12.

30. RoR 266-67, 426-27; RdV 310-11, 493-95; ErW 549; Schmid 1995, 261-63. 31. ErW 628. 32. ErW 629. 33. See the correspondence on Zionism between Cohen and Buber in 1916. JS 2:319-27; also Wiedebach 1997, 23-36, as well as Buber 1920. 34. Schwarzschild n.d. 35. RoR 426-28; RdV 494-96. 36. Aristotle 1945, NE 1128b, 249-50; 1108a—b, 10S. 37. RoR 266; RdV 311; paragraph number 136 in this chapter. 38. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 5; and H. Soloveitchik 1976, 281-319. 39. RoR 267-68; RdV 312-13. 40. Isaiah 53; also ibn Ezra (1964, 91) on Isaiah 53:2. 41. Schulte 1997, 219; also Bruckstein 2000, 129-55. 42. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Deoth 2:3; Maimonides 1992b, Avoth 2:13; Maimonides 1946, 67n. 5. 43. Cf. TB Shabbat 105b; and TB Nedarim 22a. 44, Maimonides 1957-1961, 2:728. 45. See the commentary by Abraham bar Chiya 1971, 62. 46. Ginzberg 1968, 2:51-52. 47. Ginzberg 1968, 3:83-84; Ginzberg 1968, 2:304; Bialik and Ravnitzky 1992, 707-12. 48. Numbers 12:3. 49. Mekhilta 1960, 238 on Exodus 20:18; Mekhilta 1949, 273. 50. Levinas 1987. 51. Matthew 5:3. The Greek allows for the same ambiguous reading as the Hebrew ani/anaw, Hatch and Redpath 1954, 2:1239b; cf. also Cohen 2002, 365-66, Wiedebach’s commentary, note 4. $2. RoR 265; RdV 310; also Wiedebach 1997b, 243—44n. 4.

NOTES TO PAGES 143-154 215 53. JS 1:242. 54. Matthew 16:24 and synoptic parallels: “If anyone wishes to come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross.” 55. Mishna Berakhoth 2:2. 56. This meaning is preserved in Ben Sira, Ecclesiastes 51:26. 57. Cf. Levinas 1997, 89-90, on TB Sanhedrin 98b.

7. “He Is (Not) Like You” 1. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei ha-Torah 4:8. 2. Ezekiel 18:20; also Jeremiah 31:28-29; Deuteronomy 24:16 and the classical commentaries thereon. 3. JS 1:245. 4. RoR 183; RdV 216. 5. RoR 187; RdV 218. 6. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 2:4. 7. RoR 193; RdV 225. 8. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 7:1. 9. RoR 216-35; RdV 252-75. 10. Zank 2000. 11. TB Makkoth 24a; also JS 1:157-58. 12. Pesikta 1975, 369; also TY Makkoth 2:1. 13. Ezekiel 18:31; RoR 194; RdV 226. 14. RoR 211; RdV 246. 15. Aristotle 1977, Metaphysics 1075a, 167. 16. Also Schwarzschild 1990, 143-44. 17. Soloveitchik 1979, 115-235. 18. Soloveitchik 1979, 180-97, esp. 195-97. 19. ErW 208-12; RoR 14-15, 165; RdV 17, 192. 20. See R. Munk 2000, 275-86. 21. RoR 16-17; RdV 18-19, italics in the original. 22. Levinas 1994, 50; also Levinas 1992, 200. 23. RoR 16-19; RdV 19-21. 24, JS 1:186-91. 25. Naphtali Herz Tur-Sinai in his note to Ben-Yehuda’s entry on 77 (shepherding). Ben- Yehuda 1980, 6642b. 26. Heidegger 1962, 235-44, esp. 237. 27. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Evvel 14:1.

28. Cohen sides with Hartwig Wessely (Naphtali Herz Wessely) against Mendelssohn in their controversy over the reading of Leviticus 19:18; cf. Mendelssohn 1972 on the Torah, Leviticus 19:18. 29. According to the Buber-Rosenzweig translation, Bible 1987-1994, Leviticus 19:18. 30. See Buber’s preface to Cohen 1935. See Nachmanides’ commentary of the Torah on Leviticus 19:18, 19:33—34, Nachmanides 1971-1976, 2:292-94.

31. ErW 208-12.

216 NOTES TO PAGES 154-165 32. ErW 283. 33. Pines translates mishpath as “judgment,” and tsedaka as “righteousness,” Guide 630. My translation is guided by Cohen’s own reading of chessed vetsedaka as Liebe und Gerechtigkeit or “lovingkindness and justice.” 34. ErW 617-21. 35. Guide 3:53, 631. 36. JS 3:43-97. 37. JS 3:76. 38. JS 3:81. 39. Guide 3:53, 631; JS 3:81. 40. TB Niddah 64a. 41. Goldschmidt 1978, 205; see also the various traditional Sephardi prayer books.

42. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 8:7; and paragraph number 160 and following beginning in chapter 9 in this book. 43. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 10:5. Sifre 1993, 87; and the Mishna Avoth 1:3 on Antigonos of Socho. 44, Lamm 1989; Solomon 1993.

45. Guide 3:51, 620-21. ] 46. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Avoda Zara 1:3, 2:1; also Ginzberg

1968, 5:210n. 16. Bacher 1923, 336, points to Maimonides’ terminological innovation of the term shotet. In the sense of “speculative reasoning,” this was used, however, already by Judah ibn Tibbon (Bahya 1949, 17) in his translation of Chovot ha-Levavot. 47. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Evel 14:2. Genesis 18:19; Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Matnot Aniyim 10:1. 48. Guide 2:39, 379; Bruckstein 1997a, 283-84.

49. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 7:6; Guide 2:35, 367-69. See Maimonides 1992b, 142-43; Altmann 1987, 82-83. 50. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 10:2; also Tosefta 1955-1988, 167.

51. Judah ha-Levi 1964, 223; also Bahya 1973, 432-33. 52. Judah ha-Levi 1964, 223; modified translation.

8. On Eudaemonian Eschatology and Holy History 1. Niewohner 1999. 2. TB Sanhedrin 92b. 3. Scholem 1995b, 8-9. 4. Idel 1998b, 53. 5. Maimonides 1992a, 138; Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 8:2 and Hilkhoth Melakhim 11:4; TB Berakhoth 34b; cf. also Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Shmittah ve-Yovel 13:13. 6. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 9:2. 7. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Melakhim 12:2.

8. Scholem 1995b, 8-9; also Idel 1998, 20; and for a demonstration of midrashic sources on Jewish eschatology and apocalypses, see Patai 1988.

NOTES TO PAGES 166-173 217 9. TB Sanhedrin 92b with Rashi; see also Maimonides’ letter to Josef ibn Aknin in Maimonides 1997-1998, 1:354. 10. Rosenzweig 1924, 1:lii. 11. Guide 3: Introduction, 416, slightly modified translation.

12. See the anonymous medieval treatises Tractate of Gehenna (Masekhet Gehennom) and The Book on the Scourge in the Tomb (Sefer Chibbut haKever) in Jellinek 1982, 1:147—52; and Higger 1970, 253-61, and the bibliographical list there, 93-94. Saadya (1970, 213n. 90) is the first medieval

Jewish philosopher to refer to these apocalyptic traditions under the term Chibbut ha-Kever. For a kabbalistic adoption of this theme, cf. Hillel ben Semuel of Verona 1981, 199-200. 13. Caro 1993, 384; also the fourteenth-century halakhic code Orchot Chayim in Aharon ha-Cohen of Lunel 1959, 2:596. 14. TB Berakhoth 34b. 15. For example, Ele’azar ben Judah of Worms 1967, 25-26, on Hilkhoth Teshuvah and Teshuvat ha-Mishkal. 16. Cf. the glosses of Tzvi Hirsch Chayoth on TB Sotah 3a in the standard Vilnius-Form editions. 17. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 2:4.

18. Reminiscent of Rosenzweig’s analysis of prayer in Rosenzweig 1971, 272-73, and 1990, 303-4.

9. To Create Messianic Time 1. Guide 2:46, 404. 2. Lingis 1998, xix.

3. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Bet ha-Bechirah 6:14, 16-17; and Hilkhoth Melakhim 12. 4. According to Maimonides’ son, Abraham ben Moses ben Maimon 1953, 61, 66.

5. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 8:7. 6. Bruckstein forthcoming. 7. See Maimonides’ letter to the Jew of Yemen in Maimonides 1997-1998, 1:152.

8. Rosenzweig 1926, 239. 9. RoR 311; RdV 361. 10. Maimonides 1992a, 138-39. 11. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 9:2. 12. Levinas 1992, 21, modified translation of Isaiah. 13. Rosenzweig 1971, 271-72; 1990, 302. 14. TB Berakhoth 34b; TB Sanhedrin 99a; Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 8:7; and RoR 313; RdV 363. 15. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 9. 16. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Melakhim 12:1-S. 17. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Melakhim 12:1-S. 18. RoR 309; RdV 360. 19. RoR 310; RdV 360-61.

218 NOTES TO PAGES 173-185 _ 20. See TB Sanhedrin 98a on the coming of the Messiah at a time of moral and ethical corruption. Most of the texts which portray the future kingdom in a utopian sense, however, use the ambivalent term atid lavo which is often explicitly related to the world-to-come; for example, TB Ketuboth 111b. 21. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 8:8. 22. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 8:8. 23. RoR 291; RdV 338-39; also Bruckstein 2000, 129-55. 24. Levinas 1992, 23. 25. Scholem 1970, 114-15.

26. Nachmanides 1983, 117-18; Falaquera 1970, 24; Albo 1929-1930, 4:306-16; also Scholem 1970, 114. 27. Maimonides 1992a, 137. 28. Mishna Avoth 4b and Maimonides’ commentary on this in Maimonides 1992b. 29. TB Shabbat 104b. 30. TB Makkoth 10b.

to. The Human Face 1. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Melakhim 12:4—5. 2. LrE 154; Fiorato 1993, 152-55; also Wiedebach 1997a, 68-73, although I do find myself in disagreement with Wiedebach’s ontological reading of Cohen’s concept of the national spirit of the Jewish people.

3. ErW 405-6. 4. ErW 405-6; RoR 249-50; RdV 291. 5. ErW 406. 6. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Shmittah veYovel 13:13, based on the translation by Twersky 1980b, 441-42. 7. Mishna Avoth 5:23. My translation is based upon Herford 1974, 143; see also the conclusion of the Amidah, the Eighteen Benedictions. 8. Mishna Avoth 5:18; Maimonides 1992b, 119. A reading that comes close to the one advanced by Cohen is that of Maimonides’ grandson on Mishna Avoth 5:28, David ben Abraham Maimuni 1944, 119. 9. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Channuka 4:14.

10. See the uncensored version of Maimonides’ Hilkhoth Melakhim 11:4 as

quoted in Twersky 1980b, 452; the uncensored version of Hilkhoth Melakhim is found in Maimonides 1975, 693. Cf. also the edition of Kafih,

Maimonides 1984-1996, 23:353nn. 8-10, based upon Yemenite manuscripts and cf. the textual versions listed by Frankel in Maimonides 1998, 626. On the quote of Zephamia 3:9 in this passage, see also Rashi 1982, 529; on Deuteronomy 6:4; and TB Avodah Zava 24a. 11. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Melakhim 12:1. 12. Guide 3:12, 441.

13. ErW 452.

14. ErW 362. 15. al-Razi as quoted by Maimonides in 3:12, 441.

NOTES TO PAGES 185-190 219 16. Guide 3:12, 442. 17. Saadya 1976, 4:180-81; Diesendruck 1928, 456. 18. Diesendruck 1928, 456. 19. See Maimonides’ reading of Proverbs 16:4 in 3:13, 452; also Diesendruck 1928, 448n. 76, 510. 20. ErW 451. 21. ErW 449-50; and JS 1:253-54. 22. Levinas 1994a, 20.

23. TB Avodah Zarah 54b, 4:7; and commentary on Avodah Zarah 6:7 in Tosefta 1937, 469-70. 24. See Guide 2:29, 345; also Maimonides’ commentary on the Mishna Avoth 5:5 in Maimonides 1994, 101. It is Rosenzweig (1971 and 1990) who picks up this Maimonidean reading of miracles after Cohen. 25. See Maimonides’ discussion of the Mutakallimun on the freedom of divine will in Guide 1:73, 199-200; also Pines’s introduction in the Guide, Ixxxiv, Cxxiv—cxxxi; and Pines 1997, 32-40.

26. Rosenzweig 1971, 117-18, 130-31; and 1990, 122-24, 136-37. 27. ErW 446. 28. Guide 1:34, 79; and Maimonides’ introduction in Guide 6-7, based on the discussion in TB Chagigah 13a.

29. Guide 8. 30. TB Chagigah 13a; Guide 1:17, 42-43; also Guide 1:34, 79. 31. Guide 1:36, 84-85; and Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Teshuvah 3:6-7. 32. Sifra on 19:2 (Sifra 1959, 86); and Sifre on Numbers 15:41 (Sifre 1992, 127). For Maimonides’ own elaboration of the midrashic sources there, see Maimonides 1971. 33. See Bruckstein 1997b, 271. 34. Levinas 1994a, 141. 5. RoR 16-20, 103; RdV 19-23, 120; also JS 3:177. 36. ErW 627. 37. Guide 3:47, 595, based upon the Sifra on Leviticus 16:16; also Schechter 1969, 205. 38. Maimonides 1984-1996, Hilkhoth Yesodei haTorah 5:11. 39. Recited in response to the priestly blessing of the cohanim. My translation includes Saadya’s universalist clause “to promote peace in the world,” cf. Saadya 1941, 19.

40. ErW 627.

BLANK PAGE

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242 BIBLIOGRAPHY Thomas Aquinas. 1952. The Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province and revised by Daniel J. Sullivan. Volume 1. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. Tosefta. 1937. Tosephta. Based on the Erfurt and Vienna Codices. Jerusalem: Bamberger & Wahrmann. Tosefta. 1955-1988. The Tosefta. Edited by Saul Lieberman. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

Twersky, Isadore. 1979. Joseph ibn Kaspi: Portrait of a Medieval Jewish Intellectual. In Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, edited by Isadore Twersky. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. . 1980a. Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah). New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

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BLANK PAGE

Index

Abba Sha’ul, 73 actualization, 115, 192; of the Good

Abraham, xxxvi, 158-59 and ethical will, 96; goodness Abraham ben David of Posquiéres, and, 52-53

84, 161 Adelmann, Dieter, 79

Abraham ben Moses ben Maimon, 83 aesthesis, 112

Abraham ibn Daud. See ibn Daud, affect, doctrine of, 65

Abraham Agnus Dei, 143-44

Abraham ibn Ezra, xxxiii, 108 Al-Charizi (Rabbi Yahuda Al-

absence. See negation Charizi), 91-92

the Absolute, 10-12, 14; absence of, Alexander of Aphrodisia, 93-94 66-67; cognitive truth as, 62; al-Razi (Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn

limits and, 20; Unconditioned Zakariyya al-Razi), 183-86

Absolute, 87 alterity, 85, 86-87

absolute knowledge, 89 anger, 140-41 absolute spirit, 94 anthropomorphism, 18, 77-78, 105,

absolute zero, 91-92 169, 185, 188

Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya _—_ anticipation, 173, 175, 181; imma-

al-Razi, 183-86 nence and, 97-98; logic of,

accountability, 141, 166; cognition 12-13; repentance (teshuvah) and, 8; the Good as idea vs. con- and, 167. See also futurity cept, 9; individual responsibility apocalypticism, 165, 167

and, 146; of the multitude, Aristotle and Aristotelian tradition: 188-89; Plato and accountability the Absolute, 14; Aristotelian ter-

for concepts, 5 minology, used by Maimonides,

actional attributes, 98-100, 104, 55, 61-62, 191; cause, form, and 149-52; Divine Will and, 31-32; end, 95; consensus gentium and

Knowing God and, 65, 69, endoxa, 45; criticism of, 125; di70-72; moral behavior and, 72; vergence from, 191; episteme and origin and, 93-94; Soloveitchik phronesis, 51; eudaemonia and,

on, 149-52 124; First Cause, 70-71; “fourth actuality, 97-98 wisdom,” 56; the Good and, 9,

246 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES 14-16, 128-29; goodness defined tonomous, xxxiii; hypothesis in terms of concrete actualiza- and, 6; Moses’s sovereignty, 34; tion, 52-53; humility and, 140; prophetic knowledge vs. au-

infinite judgment, 12; tonomous knowledge, 74-75

Maimonides and, xxvii, 24, 25, Avencebrol (Shlomo ibn Gabirol),

61-62, 74-75, 124-25, 130, 21-22

132, 134, 149, 158; Maimonides awe, 117 on, 49-50, 53; Plato and, xxiv, 8, axioms and, 7-9 25; Platonic idea and, 14-16; theory and praxis, 14-16; theory — Bacher, Wilhelm, xxvi

of God, 62-65, 70-71, 94-95. Bahya ibn Pakuda, 78, 121; unity of

See also eudaemonia the heart, 109-10

asceticism, 119, 120-21, 138 Baneth, Eduard, xxvi

Asthetik des reinen Gefiihls Being (essence) vs. being (existence),

(Aesthetics of pure feeling), 112 89-90

astronomy, 7—8 Ben Azzai, 63

atid lavo, 170-71, 172-74 berith, 39

atonement, 70, 78, 167; institutional- | Berman, Lawrence V., 24 ized salvation, 144; Jesus and vi- _—betselem Elohim, 62-65 carious atonement, 143-44; Law __ bliss (shekhinah), 176-77 of Repentance, 147; Yom Kippur, Blumenberg, Hans, 17-18

144, 147 Book of Commandments (Sefer ha-

attributes, divine attributes: actional Mitzvot), 36

attributes, 31-32, 69, 70-72, 93, Boyarin, Daniel, 27 98-100, 104, 149-52; cognition Brann, Markus, xxvi of divine attributes as impossible, | Buber, Martin, 152-53, 154 66-67; Divine will and, 31-32; Buber, Salomon, xxvi docta ignorantia and, 98-100;

doctrine of divine attributes, 68, canonization of Scripture, 37

192; emotion and, 100-101; Cantor, Georg, 8 ethics as, 113-14; humility as, Cassierer, Ernst, xxii, 85 141-43; life (existence), 66-67, casuistic legal systems, 80-81 92, 94; as limits of divine sub- cause, form, and end, 95 stance (per Spinoza), 86; Medieval ceremonial law, 118 debates on, 67—68; moral behav- chakham, 134-36 ior and actional attributes, 72; Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis,

negation of, 68—70; negative at- xxili-xxiv, xxxv; as Urtext, 24 tributes, 77-78, 88-91, 100-101, chassid, 134-35, 137-38 103; omnipotence, 66-67, 78, chavruta, as model for format of 103, 107-8; omniscience, 66—67, book, xxi, xlii 78, 107; revelation and, 68-70; chokhmah (ultimate wisdom), 81; vs.

Thirteen attributes (middoth), Torah, 66; world-to-come and

70-73, 99-100, 114 original light of creation, 175

automaton, universe as, 42-43 Christianity and Christian theology, 39; autonomy: free will and, 31-32; of Agnus Det, 143-44; applicability human reason, 30; human rea- of the Law, 27-29; the Decalogue, soning and oral tradition as au- 38-39; deification and, 119; dis-

INDEX 247 tinguished from Judaism, 28; consensus gentium (mefursamoth),

Eucharist, 26, 27-29, 39-41; for- 43-45, 60-62 giveness, 148; humility divine and — conventional, use of term, 56-57

salvation, 142; ibn Gabriol and, conventional law, 74 21-22; Jesus and prophetic task, corporeality, 85, 105, 121, 188-89 183; Jesus as messiah, 172-74; correlation: atonement and, 78; Logos and pantheism, 20; persecu- Cohen’s use of term, 33-34; of

tion of Judaism, 37; prejudices God and human, xxiv, 32-34,

against Judaism inherent in, 58-59, 63-64, 72, 78, 169-70; 28-29; ritual law abolished, 36; as immanent between God and symbols and holy objects in, humankind, 97—98; between in39-41; the trinity, 20; trinity of dividual and ideal of humanity, the Godhead, 67-68; world-to- 148; infinite judgment and rela-

come, exteriority of, 173 tionship between subject and

chukkim, 36, 61 predicate, 13; “living speech”

citation, xxxv-xxxvi and the oral tradition, 92; of opcognition: divine cognition, 96, 150; posites, 19; of pantheist God and ethics as, 11; the Good as foun- the world, 30; relational position dational for human cognition, and, 33-34; between the Self and 128; as grounding, 8; human in- God, 148-49; singularity of rela-

tellectual contemplation as di- tionship, 111 vine, 62-63; Jewish thinking, cosmology, 53 114; Logik der reinen Erkenntnis creation, 192; commentaries on

(logic of Pure Cognition), 101-2; Genesis (1:27), 62; divine voli-

love as cognitive commitment, tion and, 71; dogma of creation, 109-10; messianic cognition, 58; as ethical rather than scien182-83, 192~—93; messianic con- tific issue, 55—56; of the ethical

version and, 182-83; the Self, 154; ex nihilo, 59-60, 97; Question and origin of, 92; self- and fourth principle of faith, 60; perfection and, 184-85; as serv- Mutakallimun, 187; nonice to God, 66; of truth, 184-85; ontological understandings of, universalism of, 188; validity of, 96-97; original light of creation,

63-64. See also scientific 175; potentiality vs. actuality and,

cognition 97; Rashi on Genesis (1:1), 59-60 Cohen, Hermann: biographical and critical idealism, xxix—xxx, 105 scholarly information, xxii-—xxiii; cultural tradition, Jewish, xxvi Jewish literature and tradition in (Cusanus) Nicolas of Cusa, 85-86 works of, 79; Jewish thinking and,

102; on Original Teaching, xxxi death, 163-64; of God, 39; of the

commentaries: as living Word, soul, 146

xXxXXU-XXXi11; oral tradition and, the Decalogue, 38

XXXU-XXXIV Decartes, René, 32 compassion, 69-70, 72, 73, 153; aes- | deconstruction, 93

thesis, 112 deification, 119

compassion (rachamim), xxxv Democritus, 88, 89 conceptuality, 3; nominalism and real- Derrida, Jacques, 93

ism, 4; vs. Platonic idea, 4—5 desire, 114, 115

248 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Deuteronomy: (6:5), 118; (6:18), 137; divine essence, 95-96; existence

(8:17), 149; (11:22), 70, 72-73 and, 89-90, 104; negative attri-

Diogenes Laertius, 1 butes and, 78; relations between docta ignorantia, 98-100 God and humankind and, 103

dogma and dogmatism: the Absolute, | Essene movement, 145 10-12; canonization of Scripture, ethical cognition, 33-34 37; Christian dogma, 37, 39-41, ethics: Aristotle’s denigration of,

143; consensus gentium and en- 64-65; Cohen’s use of term, doxa, 45; of creation, 46; critical 23-24; as duty of the heart, 112; philosophy and, xxxv; distinction eudaemonia and, 151-52; as between sikhlioth and shim’ioth human purpose, 155; as human and, 57-58; as idolatry, 59; non- responsibility, 2; individual and, foundation and, 10-11; rational 111; ontology and, xxxvii; as dogma, 41-42, 46; totalitarian practical wisdom, 51-52; rejection

thought, 41; traditional vs. ra- of strict rationality and, 50-51; tional, 46; universal concurrence religion and, 30-31; as service to

and, 41-42 God, 33, 34; Socrates and, 104

dualism, 123, 185; of Aristotle, 16; Ethik des reinen Willens, 26, 45, 56,

dualist theology, 30-31 94-~95; equity as ideal, 135 Duties of the Heart, xxxviii Eucharist, 26, 27-29, 39-41 eudaemonia, 16, 51, 62—65, 121, 138;

ecstatic doctrines, 120 of action vs. leisure, 151; as coneditorial policy, xxiii templative leisure, 149-50; disElbogen, Ismar, xxvi tinct from nearness to God, 123; emanation and existence, 104 ethics and, 151-52; the Good

emotions: Asthetik des reinen Gefiibls and, 127; intellectual hedonism, (Aesthetics of pure feeling), 112; 123-25; materialism and, 123; re-

fear and awe, 117-18; love and jected by Maimonides, 173-74; commitment, 112; volition and, self-awareness as replacement for,

100-101 156-57; self-perfection as re-

emulation, 72-73, 98, 192; Aristotle placement for, 169-70; vs. study and emulation of God, 64-65; of Torah for its own sake, 158; as distinct from theory of Knowing universal in appeal, 161-62; God, 74; of God’s goodness, virtue as replacing principle, 125;

128-29; of the Ideal, 124 virtuous thinking and, 151;

the Enlightenment and “enlightened” Zionism as, 122-23 tradition as context, xxvii-xxviii —_ evil, 53, 54, 119, 148, 184-85

entelechy, 156 excellence: as actional, 129-31; vs.

Epicureanism, 42-43 perfection, 129-31 episteme, 51 Exhalted Faith (Ibn Daud), 41-42

epistomology, 45 existence: Being (essence) vs. being

equality, 184 (existence), 89-90; as divine at-

equity, 135-37, 155 tribute, life, 66-67; emanation

Eros, 111 and, 104

essence, essential definitions of God, existentialism, 68, 78-79 66-68; Being (essence) vs. being Exodus: (20:8), 118; (33:19-20), 71;

(existence), 89-90; divine will and (34:6-7), 69-70, 73, 147, 148

INDEX 249 Ezekiel: (1:28), 84; (16:4), 147; (18:4, 30; as unique and singular, 20,

20), 146; (36), 166-67; 68, 104, 109, 112, 158-59. See (37:1-14), 165; individual re- also attributes, divine attributes sponsibility and, 146-49 Golden Mean. See the Middle Way Goldziher, Ignaz, xxv1

faith: Original Teaching and, xxxvii the Good, xxix, 69; actualization and

fear, 117-18 ethical will, 96; Aristotle and, 10,

Fichte, Johann Gottleib, 5—6 14-16, 128-29; divine attributes

Fiorato, Pierfrancesco, 79 and, 69-70; eudaemonia and,

forgiveness, 148 127; as foundational for human

format, xxi; of book, xlii-xliii; com- cognition, 128; goodness defined mentary and, xxviii; Medieval in terms of concrete actualiza-

hermeneutical traditions, tion, 52-53; as hypothesis,

XXVILI-XXI1X 11-12; hypothetically excluded

Fountain of Life (ibn Gabirol), 21 from scientific inquiry, 13-14; as free will, omnipotence and, 107-8 idea vs. concept, 9; Jewish tradi-

friendliness, 189-90 tion and, 50; messianic vision of fundamentalism, 83-85 the prophets and, 24; motions of,

futurity, xxxvi-xxxvil, 119-20, 162, 13-14; Nominalism vs. Realism 171, 173-74, 180-81; Aristotle and, 4; non-foundation of, xxxiv, and, 15; Cohen on, 181; mes- 86-87; Original Teaching corre-

sianic ideal, 102; as origin, lated with, xxxv; philosophy of 56-57; volition and, 75. See also origin and, xxiv; as relative rat-

anticipation ing, 51-52; retrogressive reduction, 13-14; scientific cognition gematria, 109 and, 14-16; scientific or matheGenesis: (1:1), 59-60, 96-97; (1:27), matical inquiry and, 8-9; theory 62; (4:1), 109 of Knowing God and, 17; as

geometry, Euclidean, 7 virtue, 127-28; Wisdom as, 183 Ginzberg, Louis, xxvi goodness, 128-29, 185; natural order

Gnosticism, 30 and, 113-14

God: Abraham as discovery of, Gorland, Albert, xxii 158-59; Aristotelian theory or grace, Divine Grace, 28-29, 69-70, concept of, 62-65, 70-71, 94-95; 72, 73, 154-57; lovingkindness

death of God, 39; as first Cause and, 155 or prime mover, 70-71; the good “Greek” vs. “Jewish,” writings of

God, 29-31; humility of, 140, Cohen, xxiii 141-42; as impotent, 29-31; in- The Guide of the Perplexed, xxvii, 6, corporeality of, 20; of nature, 86, 23-24; eight concluding chapters

99; ontological proof of God, as khatma (signatory seal), 25 90-91; as the Other, 18, 32-34; Guttmann, Jacob, xxvi pantheist God relation to world,

30; of Philosophers vs. God of Haggadah, 80-83; study of

Abraham and Moses, 158-59; Torah, 116

as Prime Mover, 150; as self- Halakhah, xxiv, 35, 39, 58, 80, 81, referential, 70-71; the Soul and, 82, 136-37, 159; ethical obliga112; transcendent God postulate, tions and, 133; vs. Haggadah,

250 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES 82; Imitatio Dei and, 71-72; the “I and Thou,” xxiv, 152-53 Middle Way and, 134; sexual in- ibn Daud, Abraham, 32, 41-42,

junctions as consensus gentium, 45-46, 56, 78; axiological dis-

60-61 tinctions within law, 43-44, 118

happiness. See eudaemonia ibn Ezra, Abraham, 108

Hartman, David, 24 ibn Gabirol, Shlomo (Avencebrol),

hatred, 138 21-22

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 13, ibn Gabriol, Solomon, 21-22, 41-42

20, 30, 58, 59, 85, 94-95 Ibn Tibbon, 155. See also Shmuel Ibn

Heidegger, Martin, 85 Tibbon; Yehuda ibn Tibbon Helios Parable, 16-18 Idealism, 13, 74, 79, 105; God-

hell, 167, 173 concept and, 67; negative theol-

Herder, anti-Jewish prejudices of, 87 ogy and, 85

Hereafter: confused with messianic ideas, 124; Aristotle and, 14-16; vs.

future, 174; hell or punishment, conceptuality, 405; hypotheses as 167, 173; in Jewish tradition, more flexible than, 10; Plato and,

164-66, 167, 172-74 4—5, 8; validation of, 50-51

hereditary sin, 146, 173 identity, Jewish identity, xxvi

Hermann Cohens Jiidische Schriften, idolatry: anthropomorphism and,

XXU11 188; dogmatism and, 59; fabri-

Heschel, Abraham, 40 cated theologies and, 67; fear Hilkhoth Deoth, 132-33 and, 117; holiness defiled by,

Hilkoth Teshuvah (Laws of 190; Maimonides’ rejection of Repentance), 171-72 physical representation of the dihistory: as construct, 166; political vine, 83-85; nationalism and,

history, 14-15 139; natural phenomena and,

holiness: vs. the sacred, 39-40, 189; 84-85; pride as, 139, 141; relispirit of holiness, 32; transgres- gion as, 83-85; sacrifice and, 34 sions and defilement of, 190 Imitatio Dei, 71, 95; Aristotle and

Holzhey, Helmut, xxiii, 79 emulation of God, 64-65;

Horwitz, Rivka, 79 Deuteronomy (11:22), 72-73;

hule (prime matter), 41, 42-43 free will and, 144; Leviticus humanism, Jewish humanism, (19:2), 72-73. See also Knowing

XXU-XXVI, XXIX God, theory of

humility: Agnus Dei, 143-44; in immanence, divine immanence,

Christian tradition, 142, 42-43, 86-87, 156, 173; correla-

143-44; greatness and, 141-42; tion between God and humartyrdom and, 139-40; na- mankind as immanent, 97-98;

tional pride and, 138-41; volition and, 21

poverty and, 143-44; as recep- immortality, 121, 122, 163-65; as

tivity or passivity, 142; salva- self-perfection or drawing close

tion and, 142, 143-44; the Self to God, 169 and, 148-49; as virtue of the the individual, 14-146; atonement as

Self, 153 individual responsibility, 147-48;

hypotheses, 6, 7-9; and non- correlation as singular personal

hypotheses, 9-10 relationship, 111; Ezekiel and

INDEX 251 individual responsibility, 146-49; judgment: true (mishpath), xxiv,

the Hereafter as betrayal of, xxix, 24, 28-29, 56-57, 61, 63, 164-65; Life Eternal as individ- 98, 116, 130, 144, 154-55, 174, ual project, 175; perfection and of origin, 88-89 the ideal of humanity, 191; as Jiidische Schriften, 29, 79 Self, 191; self-awareness and, justice: as actional attribute, xxiv,

141; self-knowledge and, xxix, 24, 28-29, 56-57, 61, 63, 132-33; world-to-come and, 191 98, 116, 130, 144, 154-55, 174;

ineffability, 17-18, 20 Middle Way and, 131; tsedaka,

infinite judgment, 12-13 154-57 the infinitisimal, 91-92, 175

infinity and the Infinite, 30, 58-59; kabbalah, 167 infinite judgment, 12-13; infini- Kant, Immanuel, xxv, 95; anti-Jewish

tisimal equations, 91-92, 175; prejudices of, 87; critical idealism Spinoza and divine substance, 86 in Cohen’s work, xxix-xxx; intention: ethical will and intentions, moral Law and, 29; ontological

52-53; free will and, 107-8 proof of God, 90-91; Plato and, irony, ethical judgment and, 3—4 4-5, 17; privative judgments and, Isaiah: (57:15), 141; messianic social 13; transcendent God pos-

conditions and, 183-84 tulate, 30

Islam, 39, 77-78, 187; Muhammad kedusha, 138

and prophetic task, 183; Kellner, Menachem Marc, 24

Mutakallimun, 187 Kepler, Johannes, 8

Israel, 75, 139, 140; messianic task khatma (signatory seal), 25 : and, 174; politics and, 171 Kimchi, David, 45, 62, 83 Knowing God, theory of, 17, 24, 34,

Jacob Baradaeus, 68 61; actional attributes and, 65; Jeremiah: (7:22), 45; (9:22-23), 115; Aristotle and, 54—55; cognition (31:30-33), 28, 37 as service to God, 66; compas-

Jesus: as Agnus Dei, 143-44; messianic sion and graciousness as consticognition and prophetic task, 183; tutive, 69-70; “drawing near to mythification and institutionalized God,” 118-22; vs. imitation or

salvation, 144; as sacred object, emulation, 74; love and, 113-14; 40; as son of God, 148; vicarious messianism and, 192-93; negaperformance of commitments, 28, tion and, 88; negative attributes

29, 143-44, 148 and, 78, 91; as prophetic ideal,

Jewish cultural identity, xxvii-xxviii 81; self-awareness and, 133-34.

Jewish cultural tradition, Cohen See also knowledge of God

on, xxx knowledge: absolute knowledge, 89;

Jewish particularity, 141 autonomous knowledge, 74-75; Joel, Manuel, 25-26, 152 love and, 109; naught of knowlJohn: (1:1), 20; (14:6), 172; (18:36), edge, 71, 83, 88, 92; prophetic

172-73 knowledge, 74-75, 159; self-

Joseph ibn Tsaddik, 78 knowledge, 2-3, 132-33; will Judah ha-Levi, xxxiii, 50, 74-75, 78, and, 109. See also knowledge

122-23, 159 of God

252 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES knowledge, knower, and known, 57-58; traditional law, 46;

! 149-52 Unwritten Law, 26-27; valida-

knowledge of God: docta ignorantia tion of, 38-39; “wall around the and, 98-100; privation and, 98; law” metaphor, 80-81; Western as shekhinah (bliss), 176-77. See European legal tradition, 80 also Knowing God, theory of Lazarus, Ethik des Judentums, 66 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, anti-

law: adherence to law vs. Knowing Jewish prejudices of, 87 God, 115; applicability to Levinas, Emmanuel, xxiv, xxviii, Christians, 28; axiological dis- xxix, xxxiv, 50, 51, 82, 102,

tinctions with the Torah, 41-42; 142, 175 as berith, a living contract, 39; Leviticus: (5:6), 148; (11:44), 189;

beyond, 190; casuistic systems, (18:21), 54; (19:2), 72-73;

80-81; ceremonial law, 118; (19:18), 153-54; duties of the chassid vs. chakham, 135-36; heart and, 113 Christian abrogation of law, 39; Lichtenstein, Aharon, 136-37 chukkim, 36, 61; chukkim vs. life, 66-67; as divine attribute, 92, mishpatim distinction, 36; con- 94; essence and, 104; negative at-

sensus and ethical laws, 49; con- tributes and, 78 sensus gentium (mefursamoth), Life Eternal: as ethical mode of Being,

43-45, 60-62; conventional 176; self-perfection and, 174-76 laws, 74; deductive systems, 80; likeness: “drawing close to God,”

dogmatism and distinction be- 118-22; as idea, 8 tween sikhlioth and shimvioth, limit-concept, 20; the infinitisimal as,

57-58; equity and, 135-37; 91-92; transcendence as, 33-34 “going beyond the boundaries of — Lingis, Alphonso, 170

law,” 134-38; Halakhah, xxiv, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (Logic of

35, 39; Hilkoth Teshuvah (Laws Pure Cognition), 101-2, 180-81 of Repentance), 171-72; integra- Logos, 62 tion of reality and ideality, 58; longing of the soul, 112-13 Kant and, 29; Laws of Repen- love, 63; as cognitive commitment,

tance, 147; mishpatim, 36, 109-10; cosmic love, critique of, 60-61; Mosaic prophecy and, 113-14; fear and, 117-18; God34; natural law, 136; Noachite concept and, 111; knowledge laws, 26-27; psychological rea- and, 109; monotheism and, 109; sons for, 60-61; qualitative dis- and service to God, 189. See also

tinctions and, 118; rational Lovingkindness (chesed) commandments, 41-42, 43-44; Lovingkindness (chesed), xxiv, xxix,

rationalization of, 46-47; respon- xxxv, xxxv1, 24, 28-29, 31, sibility for commitment to ethical 56-57, 61, 63, 98, 116, 130,

commandment, 28; ritual law, 144, 154-55, 174; defined, 155; 36-38, 45-47; scriptural law vs. Imitatio Dei, 73

natural law, 26-27; self- Lucas, Leopold, xxvi knowledge and, 132-33; Lutheran tradition, 27; prejudices sikhlioth vs. shim’ioth di- against Judaism inherent in,

chotomy, 35-36, 41, 43-44, 28-29

INDEX 253 messianic social conditions,

ma’asseh bereshith, 55-56 183-84; logic of anticipation ma’asseh merkavah, 55—56 _and, 13; love and, 114; Mai-

Maimon, Salomon, 13 monides on, 165; messianic Maimonides: on Aristotle, 49-50, 53; cognition, 182, 192-93; mes-

Aristotle and, xxvii, 24, 25, sianic days (yemoth hamashiach),

61-62, 74-75, 124-25, 125, 157, 165, 170-71, 173; mes130, 132, 134, 149, 158; as in- sianic task as ever unfinished, spirational, xxiv; on messianism, 97-98; Micah (6:8), 82-83; na165; the Middle Way and, 130; tionalism and, 139; oral tradition

polemos and rejections of, as messianic narrative, xxxi; 83-85. See also specific works the other as ground for mes-

and concepts sianic identity of the Self, 153; Maimonides, Moses, Aristotelian ter- prophetic messianism, 24, 163,

minology used by, 55, 61-62, 175, 179, 186-87, 192-93; the

191 Self as ideal task of messianic

Maimonides-Biography, xxvi-xxvit project, 148; temporal issues,

Marcion, 30 179-81; unification and, 192;

martyrdom, 139-40 universality of messianic project Materialism, xxiii, 123, 138, 186; in Judaism, 105, 108; vision of Life Eternal and, 175; world-to- the prophets, 24; world-to-come come and, 174; Zionism and, distinct from messianic days, 157

122-23 Metaphysics, 16-17

mathematics, xxiii, 7-8, 91-92 methodology of book, xxi; book’s forMedieval Jewish culture, xxvii-xxviii; mat as reflection of, xxi, xlit—xliii;

literary features, xxvili-xxix chavruta as model, xxi; commen-

mediocrity, 131, 134 tary and, xxviii; Medieval heur-

mefursamoth, 43-47 maneutical traditions and, mekkubaloth, 34 xxvili-xxix; multitextuality and

Mendelssohn, Moses, 87 format, x/ii; nonlinear reading,

Messianism, 79, 119-20; abolishment xxx—-xxxi; subheadings in book, of suffering and, 143; apocalypse xliii; translations, xxxviti—xli

and messianic times, 161-62; Micah (6:8), 82-83, 153 Christianity and, 172-74; cogni- — the Middle Way: benonit vs. emtsai,

tion and messianic conversion, 130; ethical conduct and, 182; as consequence of monothe- 134-35; exceptions and rejecism, 95; correlation between God tions, 130-31, 134; Maimonides and humankind, 78-79; creation and, 130; mediocrity and, 131 and, 59; divine will and human middoth (Thirteen attributes), 70-73, messianic task, 96; futurity and, 99-100, 114; knowledge and, 114 162-63; Hereafter confused with midrash, citation and, xxxv-xxxvi messianic future, 174; humility miracles, 186-87

and, 138, 149; idealism of the Mishna, xxxiv temporal world and, 179; as in- Mishneh Torah (Code of Maidividual responsibility, 147; infin- monides), xxvii, 25-26,

itesimal and, 175; Isaiah and 132-33, 147

254 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES mishpatim, 36, 60-61 nationalism, national pride, 138-41, monotheism, 110; Blumenberg on, 172; messianism and, 162-63 17-18; divine attributes and mul- _ natural law, 26-27, 45, 187 tiplicity of God’s essence, 67-68; nature: cosmology and, 114; desacral-

ethical grounding and, 105; for- ization of the world, 66-67;

giveness and, 148; Jewish ethics and, 16-18; God of nature, monotheism, 17-18; love and 86, 99; goodness and natural orawe as worship, 117; messianism der, 113-14; idolatry and natural and, 95, 120-22; negative attri- phenomena, 84-85; miracles and butes and, 68, 78; origin in god- consistency of nature’s laws, 187; concept of the prophets, 80-82; Mutakallimun and perception of

pantheism and, 18-20, 29-31, natural phenomena, 187; Spinoza

32-33; prophetic mono- and God of nature, 86

theism, 22 naught of knowledge, 71, 83, 88, 92 morality, 129, 190~91; divine attri- negation: as affirmation of God, 88;

butes and, 72, 99; natural law, nothingness, 93; privation and,

136; virtue and, 127 88-91, 91-94, 104; the wall that

More, Sir Thomas, 180 does not see, 93-94

Mosaic prophecy, 34 negative attributes, 77-78; docta ig-

Moses, xxxiii, 34, 71, 113, 116, norantia and, 98-100; monothe158-59; autonomy of, 74-75; ism and, 68; non-foundation

humility of, 140, 142-43 correlated with, 87

Muhammad, messianic cognition and _ negative theology, 85

prophetic task, 183 “new thinking,” 88-91

Munk, Solomon, 25 Nicholas of Cusa, 85-86; docta igno-

muskaloth (rational truth), 36, 60 rantia and, 98-100 Mutakallimun, 31, 44, 187 Nicomachean Ethics, 62 mysticism, 45, 119, 120-22; messian- | Noachite laws, 26-27

ism and, 179; rejection of, 102; nominalism, 4

unio mystica and love, 111 non-foundation, 10; the Good and,

myth and mythification, 19-20; xxxiv, 86-87; negative attributes ethics as opposition, 72; eudae- correlated with, 87; as origin of

monian eschatology and, 161; grounding, 12-13 eudaemonia’s survival and, non-hypotheses, 9-10, 86-87 163-64; futurity and, 181; non-linearity: Cohen’s literary style hereditary sin as, 146, 173; Life and, xxxviii; nonlinear reading as Eternal, 172, 174; mythical con- methodology, xxx-xxxi sciousness as temptation, xxxv1; nothingness, 93

ontology and, 114; original nought and ought, 88-91. See also teaching as resistant to mythifi- naught of knowledge cation, xxxvi; prophetic revela-

tion and, xxxv—xxxvi; sacrali- olam ha-ba (world-to-come), 174-76 zation of the world and, 102; the _o/ (yoke) in Jewish tradition, 143-44 sacred and, 189; salvation as in- | omnipotence, 66-67, 103; free will

stitutionalized, 144 and, 107-8; negative attributes Nachmanides, Moses, 38, 118, 174-75 and, 78

INDEX 255 omniscience, 66-67; negative attri- oral tradition and commentary, butes and, 78; rationality, human xxxii-xxxili; temporal issues,

reasoning, and, 107 XXXVI-XXXVI; text and, xxxv

Onkelos, xxxii, 38 the Other, 58-59, 79, 101-2; God as,

Ontology, ethics and, xxxvii 18, 32-34; humility and, 138; I oral tradition, 170; authority of and Thou correlation, 152-53;

Scripture and, 116; autonomous Re’a, 152-54; suffering and, 186.

interests of speculation and, See also alterity 102-3; vs. canonization of

Scripture, 37-48; commentaries pagan practices, 54 and, xxxii-xxxiv; correlation and pantheism, 18-20; correlation and, “living speech,” 82; critical, ethi- 32-34; divine immanence and,

cal reasoning and, 100; format of 86-87; God of nature and, 99; book and, xxi; on grace, 28-29; impotence of God and, 29-31; Haggadah and, 82-83; interpre- Logos and, 20; monotheism and,

tation and, 116; as messianic 18-20, 19-31, 32-33; transcennarrative, xxxi; nonlinear reading dence and, 29-30; the trinity

and, xxxi; Original Teaching and, 85

and, xxix—xxxi, 170; prophetic Parable of the Palace, 66 hermeneutics and, 6-7; Rabbinic __ Patristic tradition, 52 citation and, xxxv-xxxvi; sover- Paul and Pauline tradition, xxxiii, 26; eignty of, xxxii-—xxxiii; Spinoza as cultural critic, 27; the Decalogue

and, 86-87; Torah as living text, in Christian tradition, 38

XXXII peace, 58

origin, philosophy of, xxiv, xxix; Perek Chalek, 176-77 actional attributes and, 93-94; perfection, 64-65; awe and Perfect

divine will and first essence, Mind, 118; elite and the ideal of 21-22; Jewish sources and the good, 137-38; vs. excellence, Original Teaching, xxxi-xxxit; 129-31; Knowing God and, 107; logic of, xxxili, 12-13, 33, 67; self-awareness and, 133; self-

ontology and, 114; original perfection and tsedaka, 154-57; light of creation and chokhmah, spiritual achievement as progres175; privative judgments and, sive, 129. See also self-perfection 12-13; relationship between Philo and Philonic doctrines, 20,

God and humankind and, 26-27, 52, 62

103-4; relativity of God and phronesis, 51 human beings, 19; Socratic pietism and piety, 120-21, 143, 167;

irony and, 4; translation and as distinct from ethics, 127-28 the oral tradition, xxix—xxxi; of | Pinchas Ben Ya’ir, 129-30

word of God, 19 Plato and neo-Platonic tradition: acoriginality. See origin, philosophy of countability, 5, 8, 9; vs. Aristotle,

origin xxiv, 8, 16-17; Aristotle and, 25;

Original Teaching, xxix—xxxi, 170; Aristotle and neo-Platonism, 52; Jewish faith and, xxxvii; Jewish axioms and, 7-9; Cohens works sources and, xxxi-xxxii; mythifi- on, xxiii; emulation of the Ideal, cation defied by, xxxv—xxxvi; 124; eudaemonia and, 161-62;

256 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Helios Parable, 16-18; hule and, 5-6; unity as foundation of (prime matter), 42-43; hypothe- theory of prophecy, 34 ses, 6, 7—9; idea as Biblical or Psalms: (23:4), 149; (68:5-11), 141;

prophetic vision, 5; ideation, (73:28), 120, 121, 164; (86:11),

4—5; Jewish tradition and, 5, 110

50-51; Maimonides and, xxiv- punishment, 167, 176-77 xxv, 24, 90; messianic vision and _ purity, 101-2, 177; eudaemonia and,

prophets, correlation to, 24; 124; perfection and, 129-30 modern Jewish philosphers and,

xxiv; Theaetetus, 118-20. See the Question, 92 also the Good

politics: political contexts, xxv; as radical subjectivity, 111-12 practical knowledge, 14-15; self- | Rashi (Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki), 38,

perfection and, 180. See also 118, 166; on Genesis (1:1),

utopia 59-60, 96-97 Poma, Andrea, 79 rationalism (science and logic),

potentiality, 97-98 xxvii; scientific thought and vipoverty, 143, 171 sion, 6; Socrates and scientific pragmatism, 6; ethics as practical wis- veracity, 2

dom, 51-52 realism, 4 praxis, theory and, 13-16, 51-52, reality: integration of reality and ideal182 ity, 58; the real and the rational, pride, national pride, 138-41 94-95; transformation of, 75

prime matter, 41, 42-43, 90 reason, as mediator between God and

Prime Mover, 70-71, 114, 150 human beings, 108

privation: of knowledge, 3; knowl- Re’a (the other), 152-54 edge of God and, 98; negation redemption: as anticipation of the

and, 88-91, 104; negation con- Good and as messianic task, 173; trasted with, 91-94; negation of prophetic vs. mythified, 181 privation, 100-101; privative relativity, theories of, divine attributes

judgments, 12-13, 88-89 and, 103-4. See also correlation prophecy: Christians and Muslims religion: definitions of, 78-79, 105; share prophetic task, 183; creation ethics and, 100-101; fundamenand, 59; as dialogical, 169-70; im- talism, 83-85; grounding in manence and, 43; interpretation or ethics, 105; as idolatry, 83-85 translation of, 169; messianic ideal Religion der Vernunft aus den

and, 163; messianic vision and the Quellen des Jedentums (Religion

Good, 24; messianism and, 192; of Reason, Cohen), xxvi, xxxii,

origin of word of God, 19-20; 28, 30-31, 140, 144, 172, 181 prophetic hermeneutics, 5-7; repentance, 165, 167; Hilkoth Teprophetic knowledge, 74-75, 159; shuvah (Laws of Repentance),

prophetic messianism, 24, 163, 171-72 175, 179, 186-87, 192-93; resurrection, 121, 122, 165, 176; as

prophetic monotheism, 22; closeness to God, 166-67; perfecprophetic vision, 4-5, 24; psychol- tion and, 130 ogy of prophecy, 169-70; self- retribution, 154, 167, 177 transformation and, 147; truth retrogressive reduction, 13-14

INDEX 257 revelation: critical reasoning and, 19; responsibilities of, 152-53; self-

divine attributes and, 68-70; awareness as origin of, 145-46; prophetic revelation and mythifi- vs. soul, 191; soul and, 145-46;

cation, XXXU-xXXXUI1 term or concept of, 145; teshu-

ritual law, 45-47 vah as responsibility of, 147

Rosenzweig, Franz, xxli, xxiv, xxxiv, self-awareness: eudaemonia replaced XXXVU-KXXXVINL, xxxix, 29, SO, by, 156-57; of God, 94—96; indi-

59, 88, 154; on Cohen, xxi; exis- viduality and, 141; Knowing God tential interpretation of Cohen, and, 133-34; as origin of the Self,

78-79; Sprachdenken, 102 145-46; perfection and, 133 self-knowledge, 132-33; Socrates and,

Saadya Gaon, xxvii, 35-36, 38, 64, 2-3 78, 185; divine attributes, 67; self-perfection, 174, 177; cognition dogmatism, 57-58; laws, univer- and, 184-85; knowledge of God sal acceptance of, 58; textual rea- and, 190-91; knowledge of God

soning and, 115-16; translation prerequisite for, 188; Life Eternal

of the Psalms, 110 and, 174-76; prophecy and, 170

sacrifice, 45-47; Agnus Dei, 143-44; in _ self-sufficiency: divine, 94-95, 150 Jewish and Christian traditions, 28 sensualism, 63-64, 111, 112

saintliness, 134-37 set theory, 8

salvation: Christian salvation, 172; Sforno, Obadiah, 62 humility and, 143-44; institu- shekhinah (bliss), 176-77 tionalized salvation, 173; tran- shim’ioth, 35-36, 41, 43-44, 57-58

substantiation, 144 Shlomo ben Abraham Parchon,

sanctification, 189-90 XXXI-XXX11

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 13. Shlomo ibn Gabirol (Avencebrol),

Scholastic tradition, 52 21-22

Scholem, Gershom, 165-66 Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki. See Rashi Schwarzschild, Steven, xxiii, xxiv, 50, (Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki)

59, 139, 171 Shmuel Ibn Tibbon, xxxix, 91

scientific cognition, 8—9, 32, 151; sikhlioth, 35-36, 41, 57-58 Aristotle and speculative science, Simonsen, David, xxvi 55; ethics and, 15-16; the Good sin: evil and, 148; hereditary, 146, 173

and, 13-14, 15; grounding and, skill, virtue as, 128-29 8; ideas as premise for, 8; panthe- socialism, 162, 171, 172, 189

ism and, 18; vision and, 6 Socrates, 124; Aristotle on, 3; concepScripture: anthropomorphic imagery tuality, 3; irony and, 1-4; selfand, 77—78; authority of, 116; knowledge and, 2-3 canonization of, 37; oral tradi- Solomon ibn Gabriol, 21-22, 41-42 tion and, 37-48, 116; vs. original Soloveitchik, J. B., 137, 149-52 text, xxxii; scriptural law vs. nat- the Soul, 145-46, 167; God and, 112;

ural law, 26-27; transcendence immortality of, 163-64; mythifiand, 77—78; truth and, 86—87 cation of, 163; unity of the heart the Self: constitution of, 75; creation and, 111-13 of the ethical Self, 154; humility Spinoza, Benedict de, xxiii, 31, 85,

as virtue of the Self, 153; individ- 86-87; divine volition and,

ual responsibility and, 146-47; 95-96

: 258 ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES Sprachdenken, xxxvii, 170 Torah: axiological distinctions within, Star of Redemption (Rosenzweig), 41-42, 46; free will and, 32;

59, 88 “hedge around” the law, 80; in-

Stoicism, 136, 162 terpretation and, 108, 116; as liv-

Strauss, Bruno, xx1i—xxili ing text in oral tradition, xxxviii; Strauss, Leo, xxiv, 24, 50 Moses as recipient of, xxxiii-—

style, Cohen’s literary, xxxvii-xxxviii xxxiv; pedagogy of, 54; as prepasuffering, 140-41, 186; aesthesis and, ration for knowing God, 66; psy-

112; messianic imperative to chological reasons for law, abolish, 143; of the Other, the 60-61; study of, 115-16, 157-58 fellowperson, 152-53; as punish- _ totalitarian thought, 40-41

ment, 143; theory and praxis transcendence, 19-20; as limit-concept,

and, 15 33-34; pantheism and, 29-30; as

symbols, 39-41 postulate, 33-34; Scripture and, 77-78

teaching, xxviii; guidance of the transcultural exchange, xxviii masses, 187-89; prohibitions re- —_ transformation of reality, 75

garding, 55-56. See also Original transgressions, 58, 60-61

Teaching translation, xxviii; Cohen’s literary Terminology of Logic, 57 style and, xxxviii; conventions teshuvah, 147, 167 used in text, xxx; as interpretatext: authority of Jewish source, tion, xxxviii—xlii; Jewish traditions 116; as central to philosophy of, xxxiv; Original Teaching and and ethical teaching, xxxiv; nature of, xxxix; of prophecy, conventions used, x/ii; ethical 169; transcultural exchange and, reading and purity of, 23-24; as xxxix; of “unity of the heart,” 110 Original narrative, xxxv; prohi- transliteration systems, xlii bition against written and pri- transubstantiation, 144 macy of oral tradition, xxxiv; as trinity of the Christian Godhead,

subservient to commentary, 67-68, 85

xxxix; textual reasoning, truth, 184, 189; axioms as self115-16. See also methodology evident truths, 7; cognitive truth,

of book 62; muskaloth (rational truth),

textual reasoning, xxix, 115-16 36, 60; prophecy and, 5S, 7;

Theaetetus (Plato), 118-20 Scripture and, 86-87

theodicy, 185-86 tsedaka, 154—57

theory and praxis, 13-16, 51-52, 182 Twersky, Isadore, 24, 45 Thirteen attributes (middoth), 70-73,

99-100, 114; knowledge and, unio mystica: “drawing near to God”

114 as distinct from, 122; love and,

tikkun, 60, 119 111

Timaeus, 90 unity of God. See monotheism time and temporal issues, 170; mes- universalism: of cognition, 188;

sianism and, 179-81; olam ha-ba Jewish cultural tradition and (world-to-come), 174-76. See identity, xxvi; Judaism and,

also futurity xxvil; of messianic conversion,

INDEX - 259 182; of prophetic vision, 6; uni- 107-8; Imitatio Dei and free

versalist interpretations, 154 will, 73-75, 144; individual re-

utopia, 170-72, 179-80 sponsibility and free will, 14647; knowledge and, 109; love

validation of laws, 38-39 and, 109; mediation between

virtue: ethics and, 52; excellence vs. God and human beings as voliperfection, 129-31; hierarchy of tional, 108; negative attributes virtues, 127; intellectual vs. prac- and, 78; nous as, 65; omnipotical virtue, 124, 149; meaning tence, 66-67, 78, 107-8; potenof, 127-28; the Middle Way and, tiality vs. actuality and, 97; 130-31; as skill, 128-29; as tri- repentance (teshuvah) and, 167;

fling, 150. See also humility Spinoza and divine volition, vision, 51; messianic vision and the 95~—96 Good, 24; prophetic vision, 4-5, | wisdom: chokhmah, 66, 81, 115,

6, 24 183; ethics as practical wisdom,

51-52; “fourth wisdom,” 56 Walking in God’s Way, 73, 189-90. Wissenschaft des Judentums (Society

See also Imitatio Dei for the Advancement of Jewish

the wall that does not see, 93-94 Studies), Maimonides and, xxiv, Western tradition: legal influences on XXV-XXUI Cohen’s thinking, 80; perspective Wolfson, Harry A., 20

on classical Judaism in, 87 Work on Myth, 17-18

Wiedebach, Hartwig, 79 world, desacralization of, 66-67, 102 will: “attributes of action” and Divine world-to-come, 157, 171; distinct

will, 31-32; chokhmabh as, 65; from messianic days, 173; the death of God and reformulation individual and, 191; olam ha-ba of divine will, 39; divine will and (world-to-come), 174-76 ethical lawfulness, 96; divine will

and first essence, 21-22; divine Rabbi Yahuda Al-Charizi, 91-92

will and human messianic task, R. Yehoshua ben Levi, xxxii 96; emotions and, 100-101; ethi- Rabbi Yehuda, 166 cal volition and the Infinite, 30; Rav Yehuda, 70 Ethik des reinen Willens, 26,45, | Yehuda ibn Tibbon, xxxviii, 109, 110

| 56, 94-95, 135; freedom vs. free | Rabbi Yochanan, 70, 142 will, 107-8; free will or auton- yoke of law: Christian freedom from,

omy of volition, 31-32, 65, 37; as image in Jewish tradition,

73-75; futurity and, 75; the 143-44

Good, actualization and ethical Yom Kippur, 144, 147 will, 96; human reasoning and

free will, 107; human volition, Zionism, 122-23

| MODERN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION |

Translations and Critical Studies |

Barbara E. Galli and Elliot R. Wolfson, SERIES EDITORS

Hermann Cohen Ethics of Maimonides Translated with commentary by Almut Sh. Bruckstein Emil Fackenheim An Epitaph for German Judaism: From Halle to Jerusalem Franz Rosenzweig On Jewish Learning