Ethical Personalism 9783110329131, 9783110328707

Table of contents :
Chapter 1: Introduction
Part I: On Love
Chapter 2: Personal Individuality: Dietrich von Hildebrand in Debate with Harry Frankfurt
Chapter 3: Dietrich von Hildebrand on the “Mine” of Love and the Gift of Self in Love: Parallels toWojtyła’s Theology of the Gift
Chapter 4: On the Different Forms of Self-Love
Part II: Two Religious Perspectives on Personalism
Chapter 5: Islam and Human Dignity: Insights into Muslim Ethico-Philosophical Thinking
Chapter 6: The Confucian Ethical Vision in The Great Learning and Beyond
Part III: Personalism Revisited
Chapter 7: Community, Persons, and the Case of Faked Identity
Chapter 8: A Personalistic Religious Humanism
Chapter 9: Non-Political ‘Transpersonalism’ of Meister Eckhart
Chapter 10: In the Shadow of Virtue: Why Ethical Personalism Needs an Ethical Impersonalism
Chapter 11: Personalism and Personalisms
Part IV: Personalism and Its Demands
Chapter 12: Personalism versus Totalitarianism: Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Philosophical-Political Project
Chapter 13: Persons as Subjects of Suffering
Chapter 14: How Contextual Ethics Defies Ethical Personalism. Case Studied: Interrogational Torture
Chapter 15: Maintaining Humanity in a Technology OrientatedWorld of Today
Index

Citation preview

Cheikh Mbacke Gueye (Ed.) Ethical Personalism

Realistische Phänomenologie: Philosophische Studien der Internationalen Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum Liechtenstein und an der Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile en Santiago/

Realist Phenomenology: Philosophical Studies of the International Academy for Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile en Santiago Band VII/Volume VII EDITORS Professor Juan-Miguel Palacios With Professor John F. Crosby and Professor Czesław Porębski ASSISTANT EDITORS Dr. Cheikh Mbacké Gueye Dr. Mátyás Szalay EDITORIAL BOARD Professor Rocco Buttiglione, Rom, Italy Professor Martin Cajthaml, Olomouc, Czech Republic Professor Carlos Casanova, Santiago de Chile Professor Juan-José García Norro, Madrid, Spain Professor Balázs Mezei, Budapest, Hungary Professor Giovanni Reale, Milan, Italy Professor Rogelio Rovira, Madrid, Spain Professor Josef Seifert, Santiago de Chile Professor Tadeusz Styczeń †, Lublin, Poland Professor Luis Flores Hernandez, Santiago, Chile

Cheikh Mbacke Gueye (Ed.)

Ethical Personalism

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. North and South America by Transaction Books Rutgers University Piscataway, NJ 08854-8042 [email protected] United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, Turkey, Malta, Portugal by Gazelle Books Services Limited White Cross Mills Hightown LANCASTER, LA1 4XS [email protected]

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Contents Chapter 1 Cheikh Mbacke GUEYE Introduction..................................................................................................7

Part I: On Love Chapter 2 John H. CROSBY Personal Individuality: Dietrich von Hildebrand in Debate with Harry Frankfurt.............................19 Chapter 3 Michael HEALY Dietrich von Hildebrand on the “Mine” of Love and the Gift of Self in Love: Parallels to Wojtyła’s Theology of the Gift..................................................33 Chapter 4 Mátyás SZALAY On the Different Forms of Self-Love.............................................................45

Part II: Two Religious Perspectives on Personalism Chapter 5 Alhagi Manta DRAMMEH Islam and Human Dignity: Insights into Muslim Ethico-Philosophical Thinking....................................69 Chapter 6 Chen XUNWU The Confucian Ethical Vision in The Great Learning and Beyond...............83

Part III: Personalism Revisited Chapter 7 Michał BARDEL Community, Persons, and the Case of Faked Identity...................................99 Chapter 8 Dwayne A. TUNSTALL A Personalistic Religious Humanism..........................................................117 Chapter 9 Piotr AUGUSTYNIAK Non-Political ‘Transpersonalism’ of Meister Eckhart.................................127 Chapter 10 John R. WHITE In the Shadow of Virtue: Why Ethical Personalism Needs an Ethical Impersonalism........................137 Chapter 11 Josef SEIFERT Personalism and Personalisms...................................................................155

Part IV: Personalism and Its Demands Chapter 12 Paweł KAŹMIERCZAK Personalism versus Totalitarianism: Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Philosophical-Political Project..........................189 Chapter 13 Peter McCORMICK Persons as Subjects of Suffering.................................................................205

Chapter 14 Khalia HAYDARA How Contextual Ethics Defies Ethical Personalism Case Studied: Interrogational Torture.......................................................241 Chapter 15 Paweł BERNAT Maintaining Humanity in a Technology Orientated World of Today...........257

Index.........................................................................................................275

Chapter 1 Introduction From the purported Constitution of the Mali Empire(fourteenth century) to The American Declaration of Independence (1776), and The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)1 , the conviction of and agreement on the respect for human life, rights, and persons, individual freedom, equality and justice, are very widely shared. What is taken to represent the rights of the human person necessitates, however, a substantial, deeper, and even metaphysical account of the nature and essence of the human person. As a matter of fact, as persons, we have rights because we are beings endowed with freedom, autonomy, responsibility, and an inviolable and intrinsic value, i.e., our dignity. As Paul Ricoeur rightly summarises it: “for dignity it is enough to be human.” 2 This unequivocal statement does not just point at the nonnegotiability of the dignity of man, but also constitutes, when scrupulously respected and seriously translated in our daily acts, a guiding principle that provides solid foundations for a good life in community. However much agreement there is on these principles, the ways we get to them as well as the conceptions we have of the human person remain controversial. The present volume, by seeking to collect thoughtful ideas about the person, is an attempt to identify crucial philosophical-anthropological questions and ultimately, if not formulate some answers to them, at least indicate further points of reflection. Given the broadness and complexity of 1 While The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The American Declaration of Independence met with an almost universal consensus, The Constitution of the Mali Empire, known also as the Kurukan Fuga, and purported to be a faithful reproduction of a charter created in the fourteenth century, has sparked some controversies. Nonetheless, all three “charters” convey a common message that relates to the respect for human life and the person, individual freedom, equality and justice. At the same time, they protect against abuses to the value of the human person. 2 Paul Ricoeur, “Pour l’être humain du seul fait qu’il est humain,” in: J-F. de Raymond ed., Les enjeux des droits de l’homme (Paris: Larousse, 1988), p. 23.

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this topic, the contributors to this volume were asked to focus on the ethical aspects of personalism, though not ignoring its ontological and epistemological dimensions. Although the focus on ethical personalism may seem a biased approach, it was rather meant to be a way not just to investigate the most basic datum of the human person, namely human dignity, but also help enlarge the perspectives under which the demands of the human person could be analysed. Whereas all contributors agree on the essential value of the human person, i.e., her or his dignity, the further specific touches and spurs emphasised here and there will show not just the richness of the human person, but also the complexities of its investigation. In this volume, it is less about the disagreements on some aspects than about how these disagreements can help us elaborate on a coherent, solid, and true philosophy about the person. The complexity of such a topic requires, indeed, not just an openness to other traditions and opinions, but also a humility with regards to our own engraved convictions. Defining personalism is a very difficult undertaking, if not an impossible one. Many reasons can account for this. First, there are almost as many personalists theories and schools as there are philosophers who have insights on personalism. Secondly, whereas some philosophers emphasise one aspect of personalism—for example the ontology of the person—others dwell on the experience of the human being as person. Others, still, are rather concerned with the value—dignity—of the human person. Hence, the analysis of the human person can be done at least on three levels: ontology, epistemology, and ethics. But an effective comprehension of the richness and various complexities of the human person would require a theory that proposes a full and coherent account of what it means to be a human person. Such a theory would have to spell out, among others, that the claim of individuality and uniqueness of the human person is not incompatible with the claim of the person as a social being; such a theory would have to clearly demonstrate why persons require specific treatment; finally, such a theory would have to give an account of the role of God—or supreme Being—in our conception of persons, of the Good, and the ultimate meaning of life. Our present project aims at contributing to shedding light on some aspects of the human person by focusing mainly on the ethical dimensions. As matter of fact, ethical personalism is the view that human persons have an ontological and inalienable value, and as such they ought to be respected in all times and circumstances. It also says, following Kant,3 that the human 3

With Immanuel Kant three components play a crucial role: the autonomy and freedom

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person should never be used just as a means towards an end. Hence, it clearly departs from and strongly criticises utilitarian and relativistic views which find it hard—while remaining coherent with their principles—to protect and keep intact the dignity of the human person. This project is a work in-progress that tries to identify and ultimately answer at least four questions: what should be the tenets of a theory of ethical personalism? Which conception(s) of the person should inform ethical personalism? What is its relevance in a modern, consumerist, inegalitarian, and highly technological world? How does a true ethical personalism defend itself from all virulent—and sometimes pertinent—criticisms that often point at some naivety and even utopian bias connected with personalism as a whole? If not all questions, at least some of them will find answers in this volume. Drawing on many philosophical resources and traditions, the contributors reflect, with different prisms, on the concept of person and the theory of ethics that informs it the most suitably. Aiming at securing some of the cornerstones of ethical personalism, the present collection is divided into four parts. Part One, “On Love,” is devoted to an analysis of one of the most essential phenomena related to the person and personal existence.4 Part Two explores mainly “Two Religious Perspectives on Personalism,” namely those from Islam and Confucianism. Part Three, entitled “Personalism Revisited,” takes into account pertinent criticisms of and complementary thoughts on personalism in general, and ethical personalism in particular, in order to then spell out the tenets of a true and authentic personalism. Part Four, “Personalism and its Demands,” addresses the topicality of this project by exploring the relevance of personalistic insights for life in community in general. Exploring the essence of the human person and personhood requires a careful analysis of some key-phenomena of human existence. One of the most fundamental and expressive phenomena is love which, as Max Scheler rightly points it, is the most basic fact of human existence and makes certain demands on the human person that need to be fulfilled. As a matter of fact, writes Scheler, “before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volens, man is an ens amans.” 5 Hence, Part One starts with an investigation into the phenomenon of love. John Crosby reminds us first of all of his thesis of “personal individuality” and of the human person, as well as the value he/she represents and embodies. Kant’s personalistic project culminates with the principles enounced in different forms in the categorical imperative. 4 We specially focus here on the Christian philosophical conception of love with the examples from Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyła. 5 Max Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” in: Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. David Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 110-111.

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personhood6 which takes human persons to be more than instances of the human kind, and more than instances of some excellence such as intelligence. Personal individuality transcends the individuality that is just sufficient to instantiate some type or kind. Crosby takes love here as an example of a self-transcending value-response through which the full thematicity of the human person can be shown. The sharp and focused comparison he makes between Dietrich von Hildebrand and Harry Frankfurt on love is to show that Frankfurt’s value subjectivism and his refusal to conceive of personal unrepeatability disqualify him as a candidate for the project of ethical personalism. Such a project would indeed include as a first step showing that since every human being can be loved, every human being is a person with an unrepeatable identity and value. As a next step the project would have to ask what it takes to show respect to unsubstitutable persons, and what are the ways in which disrespect is shown to them. The analysis on love is continued by Michael Healy who proposes to examine von Hildebrand’s analysis of the different meanings of the word “mine,” especially the difference between the mine of love and the mine of possession. Applying various phenomenological distinctions to love as expressed in the complete mutual self-donation of the sexual act in marriage, Healy goes on to show that Hildebrand’s personalist approach to sexuality anticipates many of the significant themes of Karol Wojtyła’s reflections in two of his seminal works, namely Theology of the Body and Love and Responsibility. But Healy’s ultimate goal is first to dissipate some of the confusions of the modern world about love, communion, and sexuality, and then to point out some antidotes to the threat of dehumanisation and disrespect for the individual person so prevalent in our age. Love has not just an interpersonal dimension. This is shown by Mátyás Szalay who dwells on von Hildebrand’s understanding of what he calls “solidarity with myself”. Against the background of Max Scheler’s distinction between Selbstliebe (amor sui or self-love) and Eigenliebe (love of the self), Szalay argues that there are six stages of deepening love and consequently six forms of good self-love which are not inevitable but do require a high moral virtue and have to resist many temptations. The author’s attempt to rehabilitate some forms of self-love through a phenomenological analysis is a way to help understand the phenomenon of love, both in its human and divine dimension. To understand and grasp the ethical aspects of personalism both in its theoretical elaboration and practical implications requires also exploring other John Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996). 6

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traditions in which important insights could be identified. Since Christianity, as a religious-philosophical tradition, has been very productive with respect to the issue of personalism, this volume devotes a special place to it. At the same time, in Part Two, other traditions, especially Islam and Confucianism, are taken into account.7 Ethics, as Alhagi Manta Drammeh emphasises, has been intrinsic and fundamental to Islamic thought. The unfortunate oversight of much modern scholarship in not paying sufficient attention to the crucial place of ethics in Islam has led to the tendency of concentrating more on purely legalistic view about what is lawful and unlawful rather than on their principled reasons and motivations. Hence, highlighting three complex terms, insan, bashar, and nas, that are all various renderings of the concept of “person,” Drammeh goes on to emphasise the importance of personal freedom in the Islamic teachings. The person’s acts have then to be assessed against the background of his or her personal freedom and responsibility. The respect for the individuals, their freedom and dignity will thus have far-reaching consequences for developing and creating a prosperous, cohesive and strong society. On our conception of the person depends much of the kind of society we want to build. The Confucian classics, The Great Learning, constitutes an important inspirational source through which Chen Xunwu proposes to guide us. Confucian ethical personalism is profoundly grounded in a conception of the person as a concrete being of flesh and blood. In the pursuit of an ethical life, persons are bearers of moral values, possessors of thoughts, embodiments of social relations, makers of choices, and actors of actions in the socialethical life. Ethical cultivation comprises eight steps and culminates in the cultivation of the person as a whole. To live, according to the Confucian teaching, is not merely to exist. Confucian ethical personalism does not entertain the view that an individual person is, and can be, an isolated island. It emphasises personhood, not egoism, individuality not individualism, and lays a crucial accent on social value, social responsibility, and obligation, all aspects that we need to stress today. Ethical Personalism is not just an attempt to grasp the tenets of descriptive and normative aspects around the person, and in different traditions and philosophies; it aims also at addressing some critical, alternative, complementary insights and thoughts about our conception of person and ethics. It is in this respect that Part Three attempts to get at the core of a genOur efforts to get a contribution on a Jewish perspective on the person have been unfruitful. The Christian tradition is largely represented throughout this volume, especially with contributions on Karol Wojtyła and Dietrich von Hildebrand’s personalistic philosophy. 7

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uine and true personalism theory by critically assessing and analysing some existing personalistic trends and theories. Opening this section, Michał Bardel applies himself to clarifying the ancient notion of person by placing it in close relationship to the concept of community. Against certain classical and exclusive understandings of the person as individual substance (Boethius), or as fundamental primitive being (Strawson), Bardel proposes to consider the person just as one of the possible descriptions of human being. Drawing on a fictitious story about fake identity, the author emphasises his project that consists less in decreeing what the person should or must be than in describing what the person is in our universal experience of him or her. This existential category in which we analyse the nature of the person does not in any means ignore or trample on the exceptional status of the person. The point made here by Bardel is rather that the maintenance of moral demands of personalism does not require either the thesis about the substantialism of person or the belief about its primitivism or autonomy. Another alternative is to think of personalism along non-theistic lines, as Dwayne A. Tunstall proposes. Trying to situate the best ideas and insights from ethical personalism, especially from Boston personalism,8 in a nonChristian religious humanist context, Tunshall reconciles the theistic and non-theistic sympathisers of personalism by grounding ethical personalism on a non-transcendent ground, namely on the loving, ennobling, and caring interpersonal relationships we have with one another and with our environment. Boston personalism, although theistic in nature, does embody features that are conservable within a non-theistic ethical personalism. Those features include Edgar S. Brightman’s moral philosophy, as articulated in his unduly neglected book, Moral Laws. They also include Muelder’s social ethics and its conception of the person as being “born into community, nurtured by it, and influenced by it in numerous ways.” The conception of person as an embedded being that both Bardel and Tunshall emphasise provides us with a plausible alternative when it is coupled with a permanent sense of personal responsibility, care, and respect, not just for oneself, but for the others, the community and the whole environment. 8 Founded by Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910), Boston personalism emphasises the value of the person, the existence of God and the soul, and the unity and interrelatedness of reality. Taking personalism to be primarily and essentially a metaphysics, Boston personalists consider the person to be the “ultimate fact” and the “master principle”. For some bibliographical resources, see Rufus Burrow, Jr., Personalism: A Critical Introduction (St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 1999); See also Paul Deats and Carol Robb, The Boston Personalist Tradition (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1986).

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Searching beyond personalism leads us to Meister Eckhart who presents us with a radical criticism of the metaphysical concept of “person”. A crucial aspect of Eckhart’s philosophy, as Piotr Augustyniak emphasises, is Godhead whom the human person should strive to be unified with. Eckhart not only discards the category of human nature, but he also favours its replacement with a concept of “simple nature” with no attributes or specifications. Understanding this line of reasoning requires a grasp of the existential and ontological aspects of Eckhart’s thought. However, Eckhart’s deconstructionism— which persists in a dialectical thinking—of the personalist metaphysics does not make him insensible to the moral commitments of personalism. Overcoming the substantiality of the person as put forth by classical philosophy is a way to promote a certain authenticity in ethics. And if individuals are to embark on their spiritual self-improvement, a non-political and esoteric path, like that drawn by Eckhart, is, so Augustyniak argues, a viable alternative. John White proposes to explore a holistic approach to personalism so that some important impersonal dimensions of the human being can be included. As a matter of fact, ethical personalism, as a philosophical approach that highlights certain realities such as the dignity of the person—both as an object of moral activities and attitudes and as a subject of moral virtue—, tends to obscure others. Drawing on Max Scheler’s philosophical anthropology that emphasises the tripartite character (spirit-soul-body) of the human being, White points to the importance of the vital soul and its values in moral life. We live not just as persons, but also as vital animals. Both dimensions are to be understood in a certain dynamism that is proper to human life and existence. Along the lines of Max Scheler, White rejects also the idea that person “lies behind” acts. Rather acts are what express, realise and manifest the person: the person becomes itself in and through acts. Living fully as a person and complying with the ethical demands of the person and community life requires one, therefore, to “spiritualise” the vital soul and simultaneously to “vitalise” the spiritual and personal dimensions of who we are. Closing Part Three, Josef Seifert attempts to report some false theories, philosophies, and understandings of personalism and to articulate what he calls a “true” personalism. Against some ethical positions such as the situation ethics of Joseph Fletcher, or the so-called “purely teleological ethics” (a new form of consequentialism in ethics) and other positions that falsely present themselves under the umbrella of personalism, Seifert opposes an adequate personalism whose tenets could be boiled down to the following aspects: an unbridgeable essential distinction between persons (rational subjects) and impersonal beings, the rationality of knowledge and the transcendence of the person in the knowledge of truth, free will of the person, the irreducibility of rationality to intellect and free will, the person as rational substance, the

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unique value (dignity) of persons, etc. The commitment to true personalism is not just to discover the unique essence, dignity, and values of persons; it is also about choosing the path of our own philosophy. The project of Ethical Personalism is deeply informed and motivated by a commitment to investigating the existential, methodological, and systematic aspects related to the issue of the human person. As social beings, human persons constitute the cornerstone of life in community. On social and political levels, the adoption of a personalistic stance results in claims of certain rights, demands and obligations that have to do with how we take ourselves to be. Personalism should not be a vain theory; it presents us rather with an objective description of the human person and a clear project of society. What concrete consequences would personalism entail, in our lives as individuals, and in our common lives as social beings, is discussed in Part Four of this volume. Paweł Kaźmierczak proposes to reflect on the issue as to how Dietrich von Hildebrand’s philosophical convictions deeply marked his life as an individual. Indeed, confronted with the evils of National Socialism exemplified by Hitler’s regime and Stalinist system, von Hildebrand, deeply anchored in his Christian personalistic convictions, showed a relentless courage and a rare coherence, although, as Kaźmierczak notes it, his unconditional support for Dollfuss’ authoritarian regime and equally unconditional condemnation of Austrian social democracy cannot be accepted without reservation. Not siding with evils and avoiding unbearable moral compromises are direct consequences of von Hildebrand’s adherence to the irreducibility of truth and value, and to the permanent call for the respect for the person. Lack of respect for and commitment to truth, and relativism about value, contribute to the destruction of morality and disintegration of communities. Von Hildebrand’s project is also directed to the issue of authority, spirituality, and political systems. Between what philosophy offers and what philosophers take as inspirational and motivational ideas for their daily lives, there is no doubt a gap. Faced with the ineluctable problems all human beings face with suffering, Peter McCormick suggests an account of the person in terms of neither embodied entities solely nor transcendental subjects solely but as “empty selves” both acting efficiently yet ineluctably suffering. After investigating several strong conceptual tensions between physicalistic and phenomenological perspectives on the person, McCormick proposes to shift the philosophical focus to three anthropological, metaphysical, and epistemological aspects of human experience: pervasive human fragilities, elusive traces only of intrinsic values, and strongly constrained possibilities for knowledge. What follows from such a shift in focus, however, is not the establishment of any scep-

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tical attitude but two modest philosophical suggestions only. First, after examining the offers of John Rawls theory of justice as fairness and Amartya Sen’s capability approach to justice to our understandings of the sufferings of destitute street children, McCormick proposes that current debates about whether and to what extent certain institutions could help safeguard the personhood of suffering people in general, and of suffering street children in particular should be continued and refined. The second proposal is that a renewed philosophical investigation about identity, and mostly its relevance and significance with respect to suffering, needs to be freshly encouraged. From the street children in Paris our journey leads us to the dark cells of Abu Ghraib and the turbulent events of the “Arab Spring”. Khalia Haydara considers the substantial discussions opposing some forms of contextual ethics (utilitarianism and consequentialism) to ethical personalism. Against the background of the phenomenon of interrogational torture,9 she analyses the various arguments provided by these philosophical theories. The utilitarian and consequentialist approaches Haydara believes, even in their most sophisticated and elaborated conceptions of “supreme emergency” and “torture warrant,” fall short of expressing a coherent and adequate theory that would guarantee the protection of the dignity of the human person. For, besides the inevitable abuses of the human person these theories promote and somehow justify, they fail to provide arguments other than those outside the person. And yet, despite facing the tricky and thorny dilemma of “torturing one person to save the lives of many,” Haydara remains intransigent by endorsing and assuming the absolutism of a genuine ethical personalism owing much to Kant and resting on the following pillars: the agency and autonomy of the human person, the human person as being an end in him/herself and not a means for any purpose, and finally his/her ontological, inherent, and inviolable value, i.e., his/her dignity. The phenomenon of suffering has opened up new dimensions in our modern world, especially in connection with the breath-taking development of technology and communication. How to think about ourselves as persons in this context, and which place should the person hold in a world of machines, are two questions that Paweł Bernat addresses in his article “Maintaining Humanity in a Technology Oriented World of Today.” The physical, social, moral, and spiritual changes brought about by the technological development and the growing importance of technological superstructure require an awareness and a deep sense of responsibility. Bernat sees the danger of techExamples of such practices are to be found in our very recent history with the treatments of the prisoners in Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay prisons, as well as in recent turmoil and demonstrations in some Arab countries. 9

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nology to lie also in its promotion of consequentialism at the expenses of deontology, and its favouring moral relativism over moral realism. Hence, besides the personal ethical challenge of how to deal with the technology as individuals, there is an “ideological” challenge for moral realists to first realise the danger of “heartless” technology and then address it properly in order to secure values and maintain our humanity. In a world which is profoundly marked by consumerism, technology, and ultra-fast communication, the tendency to favour superficiality, relativism, and sophistication, over substance, realism, and the natural, is very high. The urgent challenge remains then as to how to work out a robust ethical theory with solid principles that would safeguard the most fundamental and most precious element of the human person: dignity. With the project Ethical Personalism, our aim was, to further develop a thorough, comprehensive, and adequate philosophy of the person and personalism. In this respect, the truth about the human person should never be left behind. The stake is too high, the urgency too near. For if we do not get the nature of the person right and understand what it practically means in our everyday life, our project of society, economic plans, political settings, and environmental policies, will inevitably and profoundly be flawed. Hence our call, “back to the person!”, far from being an empty slogan, must take roots from a deep conviction to bring into light the value of the person in each of our endeavours. One of the basic aims of philosophy is fundamental orientation. It is up to all of us, as human persons, and embedded social beings to keep a firm hold on the demands of the person.10

Cheikh Mbacke GUEYE Bendern July 2011

Warm thanks are due not only to the contributors to this volume, but also to all people who have helped for the completion of this project. Special thanks go to the Banca di Roma for its financial support of the Chair of Social and Political Philosophy at the IAP. 10

Part I On Love

Chapter 2 Personal Individuality: Dietrich von Hildebrand in Debate with Harry Frankfurt John F. Crosby Franciscan University of Steubenville Ohio, U.S. By “personal individuality” I refer to the thesis that human persons are more than instances of the human kind, and more than instances of some excellence such as intelligence, that they have an individuality more powerful than the individuality that is just sufficient to instantiate some type or kind. I want to show that Dietrich von Hildebrand, exploring the nature of love, made significant contributions to the understanding of personal individuality. These contributions are in fact superior to some recent work in analytic philosophy on love, as I will explain by setting von Hildebrand in debate with Harry Frankfurt. By “ethical personalism” I understand an ethics that is informed by a deep understanding of personal individuality and that is centrally concerned with showing persons the respect that is due to them, that is due to each as being this person. I will not develop an ethical personalism in this paper, but try to secure one of the cornerstones of it. Von Hildebrand is not the only phenomenologist to lay the foundations of an ethical personalism. Edith Stein contributes to this project with her significant concept of the individuelles Wesen of each human person, as developed in ch. 8 of her Endliches und ewiges Sein. In a future study I hope to show how she thereby captures a metaphysical dimension of the personal individuality that I will explore in the present paper. Max Scheler was another phenomenologist who should be mentioned in connection with ethical personalism; we have only to recall that his most important single work, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, bears the subtitle,

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“Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus.” But since I have discussed Scheler’s view of personal individuality and of its ethical significance in another study.1

I. Dietrich von Hildebrand We find von Hildebrand’s deepest insights into personal individuality not in his many writings in ethics but in his great treatise, The Nature of Love.2 When he explains what it is to love a person, and to love her for her own sake, he has recourse to his value philosophy. He claims in ch. 1 that love is a value-response, by which he means that when I love a person, I love that person on the basis of the value, that is, the beauty, the splendour, the worthiness that I apprehend in that person. I do not first love, and then find beauty in the beloved person, but the sight of beauty comes first, and it engenders my love. Von Hildebrand says emphatically that I do not love the other primarily under the aspect of one who can make me happy. The value-response of love is far more radically other-centered; I love the other in virtue of the worth, the dignity, the preciousness, the nobility that is proper to the other in his or her own right. Of course, I am happy in loving the other, as von Hildebrand fully acknowledges, but he cannot stress enough that my being happy is in no way the principle of the loveableness of the beloved person; it is not because this person fulfils some need of mine that he or she seems loveable to me. Love is a self-transcending value-response; I de-centre myself towards the other when I seek out the beauty of the other and love her in virtue of her beauty. It might seem that we have already found the person as individual; we just have to trace out the line of the value-responding love, and we arrive at the other as individual person. But this underestimates how much it takes to find another in all his or her personal individuality. Von Hildebrand in fact goes on to bring to light a particular perfection of value-responding love, without which love does not really reach the other as individual person. He says that the person who is loved must be fully “thematic” for the person who loves him or her. Let me explain this “full thematicity of the beloved person,” as von Hildebrand calls it,3 and let me explain it through its conspicuous absence. Sometimes an excellence in a person interests me more than the 1 John F. Crosby, Personalist Papers (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), ch. 7. I will here limit myself to Dietrich von Hildebrand. 2 Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, trans. John F. Crosby (South Bend: St. Augustine Press, 2009). 3 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

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person himself does. For example, if I am fascinated with the intelligence of a person, I am likely to be more interested in his intelligence than in himself. The proof of this is that, as soon as I meet up with an even more intelligent person, my interest will pass over to him. What had interested me in the first person is found even more abundantly in the second one, who is now the main focus of my fascination. My interest is not in the individual persons as such, but only in the intelligence that they manifest. The individual persons just serve to instantiate intelligence, and I am interested most of all in the best instantiation of it. It is not difficult to see what is meant in speaking here of a very limited thematicity of the person in whom I take an interest. It is worth noting that the thematicity of the person is perhaps even more limited in the case of a person seen in relation to an office that he holds. A judgeship has to be filled, and we look for the candidates who best fulfil the criteria of a good judge. We move with our interest from one candidate who fulfils them well to another who fulfils them better. We do not look for a judge who will be constantly expressing his personal individuality in the exercise of his office; we would rather see him disappear into his office, and to be conspicuous mainly for doing what any good judge does. But while it is understandable that persons are not very thematic as individual persons in the exercise of an office, the fact that we were just describing is somewhat surprising, namely that they may not be very thematic even in certain qualities that they possess, such as intelligence. Now it is clear that I do not love these persons who attract me by their intelligence. My interest bypasses them as persons and aims rather at their intelligence, and I do not love someone whom I bypass in this way. Note well: my interest may well be a value-responding interest in the sense of von Hildebrand, for I may be fascinated by the inner excellence of intelligence, in other words, I may be drawn to intelligence not just as something beneficial for me but as something splendid in itself. But such value-responding fascination is not the value-response of love, because the person whom I admire as intelligent is so little “thematic” in my admiration; he is obscured rather than revealed as person by the way in which his intelligence catches my interest. When I love a person I adhere to this individual person, and I am not diverted by each other person whose excellences surpass those of the person whom I love; these excellences of the others seem irrelevant to my love for this person. This is the way the “full thematicity” of a person shows itself in love: I love a person as this person and not as an instance of worthy qualities. But a difficulty arises here: where do we find the value in which a person is fully thematic, fully present as person? It is not at once obvious where we should seek this value, for all the other excellences of a person that we

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can name, such as wit, vital energy, resoluteness of will, courage also lend themselves to greater and lesser instantiations. One may at this point begin to wonder whether love really is a value-response. For it may seem that any value found in one person is such that more or less of the same value can be found in another person. This would mean that the very idea of having value interferes with the full thematicity of the person having value, and that it prevents me from adhering single-mindedly to the beloved person; it would mean that, if love presupposes this full thematicity of the beloved person, then love does not after all exist as a value-response, but has some other kind of basis, or simply lacks any basis, arising inscrutably in the heart of the one who loves.4 Von Hildebrand is quite aware of this difficulty, and he deals with it in the following way: he calls attention to what he calls the “entirely individual [and] unique value quality inhering in this individual [person].” He explains his idea like this: “The idea of [realising] some general value does not come into question here [with beloved persons]. The idea of participating in some value in general makes no sense here. The beauty of the individual person as a whole, or, as we could say, of the unique unrepeatable idea of God embodied in this person, is after all no general value type, but already as a quality it is something entirely individual and unique.” 5 Perhaps we could explain his idea like this: each person is unrepeatably himself or herself; there is no such thing as two copies or two instantiations of the same person. Now each person has, by being this person, his or her own unrepeatable beauty. In other words, growing out of the being of each unrepeatable person is a certain radiance or splendour of each, which is the unrepeatable value of each. Here, then, is the value in which I as person am fully thematic. This value cannot exist with greater fullness in another person, for then there would be something common between me and the other, the other just having 4 The difficulty that I am calling attention to has been well formulated by John Davenport: “we need some way of grounding essentially particularistic love in the beloved’s real value, but without reducing this value to a mere instantiation of some pattern or participation in some ersatz form. If objective value could consist only of repeatable properties that would require us to love equally anything exemplifying the same properties, then this subjectivist argument would succeed; the particularistic caring that exists in our life would have to be entirely ungrounded.” Will as Commitment and Resolve (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), p. 515. Davenport is like von Hildebrand in wanting to defend the value-basis of love in the light of this difficulty. But his own positive proposal for dealing with the difficulty—following Joseph Raz he suggests (pp. 515-519) that if I share a history with someone I may thereby acquire a reason to love that person with a particular love—is very different from von Hildebrand’s proposal, which I now proceed to explain in the text. 5 The Nature of Love, p. 73.

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more of the common element than I have; we would be two instances of the same value, and the value would cease to be rooted in my identity as this unrepeatable person. Whoever catches sight of this unrepeatable value in me and is moved to love by what he sees, loves me, not my qualities, not my excellences, but me myself. This is why his value-response of love for me cannot be transferred to another, however beautiful and worthy the other may be. It is also why I for my part am aware of being loved with an eminently personal love. Von Hildebrand develops this idea by showing that this individual value of the individual person is ineffable; it is so radically individual that it escapes the generality of our linguistic meanings, and so cannot be expressed through these meanings. This is why you and I stammer and stutter when asked why we love a certain person; nothing that we can say really answers the question. Our speechlessness does not come from the fact that our love lacks any value basis, but rather because the real value basis, rooted as it is in the unrepeatability of the person whom we love, is ineffable, unutterable.6 It is remarkable that in his earlier work in ethics—the work for which he is best known—von Hildebrand was not led to make a point of each human person as unrepeatable, but that he was led to it precisely in his treatise on love. As soon as he examined the kind of value-response that love is, and just how the person is taken when he or she is loved, then he was confronted with the mystery of personal individuality. In that earlier work in ethics von Hildebrand had distinguished between value and the “bearer” of value (der Werttraeger); in the treatise on love he acknowledges that the talk of “bearing” value is inappropriate to that ineffable personal value that awakens love. It is inappropriate on account of the way this value is embedded in the person, being almost one with the person, because unable to be instantiated again in any other person. It may be objected that a person seems never so loveable as when the person shows forth charm, kindness, a grateful spirit, even though these are excellences that are not found only in that person but in many others as well. Thus the principle of loveability in persons seems after all to be excellences that are not unrepeatably their own but that they share with many others. Von Hildebrand acknowledges these significant facts when he speaks of the unique personal beauty of a person being gespeist or “nourished” 7 by the worthy moral qualities of the person. I suppose he would add that this unique personal beauty is “starved” by morally unworthy qualities. But he insists that the unique personal beauty, however dependent on such moral qualities, 6 7

Ibid., pp. 22-23. Ibid., p. 73.

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is nevertheless itself a value datum over and above such qualities. We cannot indeed detach this unique personal beauty from these qualities—that is the truth in the objection—but we cannot reduce it to them either—that is the truth in von Hildebrand’s position. This irreducibility is confirmed by von Hildebrand’s idea, which he has from Scheler, about the way in which the lover stands towards the faults and disvalues of the person whom he loves.8 Von Hildebrand says that while I acknowledge these faults with all realism, I interpret them as betrayals of the true self of the beloved person. I do not put his faults on a level with his strengths, but I take the former as betrayals of who he really is, and the latter as valid expressions of who he truly is. In this way I extend what von Hildebrand calls the “credit of love” to the person whom I love. Von Hildebrand means to say that there is no partiality or arbitrary favouritism in this way of interpreting the faults of the beloved person, for the interpretation is based on a great personal reality and truth, namely that the beauty of an unrepeatable person can only be obscured by his failings, but cannot be blotted out by them. This is why the lover has something of value to hold fast to even when the beloved person has made a mess of his life. We are now in a position to clarify the “full thematicity” of the beloved person: it should not be taken simply as the full presence of the factual empirical state of the person. The one who loves commonly discounts some elements that are indeed factually present in the beloved person but are understood to be foreign to her unrepeatable personal identity; and the one who loves commonly discerns elements that are not yet real in the beloved person, and these too belong to the full thematicity of the beloved person. As I say, we can in this way explain how it is that we can love completely unlovable persons and still love them with a love that still qualifies as a value-response.

II. Harry Frankfurt I made the claim above that the work of von Hildebrand (as of other early phenomenologists) on love and personal individuality surpasses the work of some contemporary analytic philosophers on the same subjects. Let me show this with reference to Harry Frankfurt’s important little book, The Reasons of Love.9 I want to show in particular that Frankfurt fails to find a path through love to the mystery of personal unrepeatability. 8 9

Ibid., pp. 67-73. Harry Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

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In some important respects Frankfurt seems to concur with von Hildebrand and Scheler, as when he says, “Love is, most centrally, a disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and for what is good for it. The lover desires that his beloved flourish and not be harmed. . . . For the lover, the condition of his beloved is important in itself, apart from any bearing that it may have on other matters.” 10 It may at first seem as if Frankfurt is recognising something like von Hildebrand’s value-responding character of love, but in fact the concurrence with von Hildebrand concerns something we have not discussed in this paper, namely the aspect of love that von Hildebrand calls the intentio benevolentiae of love, that is, the concern of the lover for the well-being of the beloved. As a result of this concurrence Frankfurt seems to share the resolute antieudaemonism of von Hildebrand’s account of love. Frankfurt seems also to agree with von Hildebrand in a point that is central to the present paper. He says, “The significance to the lover of what he loves is not that his beloved is an instance or an exemplar. Its importance to him is not generic; it is ineluctably particular. For a person who wants simply to help the sick or the poor, it would make perfectly good sense to choose his beneficiaries randomly from among those who are sick or poor enough to qualify.. . . Since he does not really care about any of them as such, they are entirely acceptable substitutes for each other. The situation of a lover is very different. There can be no equivalent substitute for his beloved.” 11 This seems to make for quite a remarkable concurrence of the two thinkers, but we will see that their concurrence is not as great as it seems. Frankfurt sharply diverges from von Hildebrand when he denies that love is always a value-response. He says: “love is not necessarily a response grounded in awareness of the inherent value of its object. It may sometimes arise like that, but it need not do so. Love may be brought about—in ways that are poorly understood—by a disparate variety of natural causes. It is entirely possible for a person to be caused to love something without noticing its value, or without being at all impressed by its value, or despite recognising that there really is nothing especially valuable about it.” 12 We need to see exactly why Frankfurt denies that love always exists as value-response. He does not deny it because he is a eudaemonist for whom value-response involves an unreal excess of self-transcendence; we just remarked in fact that he stands with von Hildebrand in the eudaemonism debate. He denies it because he thinks that love is not really motivated by some apprehended good Ibid., p. 42. Ibid., p. 44. 12 Ibid., p. 38. 10 11

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or beauty—indeed, he thinks that it is not motivated at all, and he replaces motivation with causation in his account of love, as he intimates in speaking of the “variety of natural causes” at work in love. Love is not based on any cognition of the beloved, or on any free choice of the lover. Love arises by a kind of natural necessity that Frankfurt distinguishes from rational necessity. In another work he says, “The fact that something is important to someone is a circumstance that naturally has its causes, but it may neither originate in, nor be at all supported by, reasons. It may be simply a brute fact, which is not derived from any assessment or appreciation whatever.” 13 Frankfurt does indeed speak of the value of the beloved, but not as a motive of love. He subjectivises this value in the following way in The Reasons of Love: Of course, I do perceive them [my children] to have value; so far as I am concerned, indeed, their value is beyond measure. That, however, is not the basis of my love. It is really the other way around. The particular value that I attribute to my children is not inherent in them but depends upon my love for them. The reason they are so precious to me is simply that I love them so much.14 If we protest that we would not love our children in the first place without some prior sense of their value, and that we cannot, therefore, make this value subsequent to our parental love, Frankfurt has a plausible rebuttal that is based on his rejection of love as a value-response. We love our own children, he says, with an intensity and devotion that is missing in our love for other people’s children, and we love them with this special intensity even while acknowledging that other people’s children may surpass our own in many value respects; it follows that our parental love must be grounded in something other than our children’s value. Frankfurt thinks that it is in fact grounded in biological necessity and not in motivation by value. Thus it is, he thinks, entirely in order for him to let value appear in our children after our love for them and on the basis of our love for them. If we proceed now to respond to Frankfurt on the basis of von Hildebrand, we must before all else insist against Frankfurt that love is indeed motivated and that it is not caused. It is based on first apprehending or understanding something about the beloved person. Apprehending what exactly? As we Harry Frankfurt, “Reply to Watson,” in: Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2002), p. 161. 14 The Reasons of Love, p. 40. 13

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saw, von Hildebrand says that when I apprehend a person according to the beauty and value that he or she has as this unrepeatable person, I am in a position to respond with a particular love for that person. For this value of the other as unrepeatable person is not a value common to many, like the value of human nature, but it is a value proper to this person and found in no other. There is then no danger that my love will ever wander from this person to another who has more of the value that first drew me to this one, for there is no such thing as more of the value. If there were more of it, then this person together with the one having more, would constitute two instances of the same value—and we would no longer be dealing with unrepeatable value. Nor is there any danger that I have to limit my love arbitrarily to this particular person, as if my love, left to itself, would tend naturally to all the plausible replacements for the beloved person; on the contrary, it is entirely reasonable for me to limit my love to the beloved person as long as I love this person on the basis of his or her unrepeatable value and beauty. While it would not be intelligible for me to limit my interest in red roses to this particular one, given that I see other still more beautiful red roses around it, it is entirely intelligible for me to limit my love to this one person, given that, in the sense explained, there is no such thing as still more beautiful persons around him or her. Thus von Hildebrand is able to explain love so as to make sense of its particularity, and to make sense of its particularity in terms of motivation and not just in terms of natural causes. If I were fixated on this one rose, you might plausibly assume some natural cause working through me so as to produce the fixation, since you would be unable to explain my fixation in terms of reasonable motivation. But my cleaving to this beloved person requires no natural causes, since it makes eminent motivational sense. In order to secure this motivational sense, it will be necessary for Frankfurt to abandon his value subjectivism; he can no longer say that a person has value for me because I love her, he will have to say that I love her because of her value as unrepeatable person. He should have no difficulty repudiating his value subjectivism, since his reason for embracing it has been defeated. Frankfurt thought that love is caused and not motivated; since value presumably exercises its influence only as a motive, never as a cause in nature, he thought that value has nothing to do with the origin of love, and that he was therefore at liberty to make it posterior to love. But we have found a way to let value originate love by motivating the lover; so we have to think of the value of the beloved as prior to love and not posterior to it, even as we repudiate the idea that love is caused. But it is very difficult for Frankfurt to conceive of value in that radically individual form in which von Hildebrand discerns it in the beloved person. Very revealing for his difficulty is a false alternative that runs through The

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Reasons of Love (especially in section 5 of ch. 2): the author contrasts rational necessity, as exemplified in the laws of logic, with natural causal necessity. Since love is not a matter of rational necessity, since it is not amenable to being accounted for in universal propositions, Frankfurt thinks that it can only be a thing of natural causal necessity. But what if the necessity of love, such as it is, is neither of these two kinds of necessity? What if the necessity of love is not a causal necessity, since love is clearly motivated? And what if the necessity of love is not a rational necessity, since it turns not on a universal but on an unrepeatable individual? It is a questionable heritage of Greek philosophy to think that reason deals always in universals and that it is only the senses that register the individual. Precisely through our experience of persons and their individuality we can find what is missing in this ancient conception.15 Precisely here we can find a kind of necessity that is neither “logical” nor “causal.” The evidence of the Greek model in Frankfurt’s book is not limited to his way of contrasting rational necessity and causal necessity. Consider this: “I do not believe that the valuable qualities they [my children] happen to possess, strictly in their own rights, would really provide me with a very compelling basis for regarding them as having greater worth than many other possible objects of love that in fact I love much less. It is quite clear to me that I do not love them more than other children because I believe they are better.” The only value he can think of in his children is value of the kind that can be more or less in other children, that is, value of the kind that is instantiated in many individuals. The idea of a value that would be his child’s own in such a way as to have no possible rivals in other children, does not even occur to him. Such radical individuality he can think of only in terms of brute facts and natural causes. But there is, I suspect, an objection that Frankfurt would still raise to von Hildebrand. He is keen on doing justice to the “necessity” of love, and so he would likely say love still comes off as something arbitrary in von Hildebrand’s account. Since the individual values of different persons are incommensurable one with another, what do you say when asked why you love this person rather than that one? At least the old idea of a universal 15 Frankfurt writes: “The necessity by which a person is bound in cases [of love] like these is not a cognitive necessity, generated by the requirements of reason” (The Reasons of Love, pp. 45-46). This statement has its plausibility only as long as one thinks about the “cognition of requirements of reason” like the Greeks thought about it; as soon as we acknowledge a cognition that has an incommunicable individual as its object, the statement loses all its plausibility. On this limitation of Greek reason see the helpful comments by Linda Zagzebski, “The Uniqueness of Persons,” Journal of Religious Ethics 29.3 (2001), p. 415.

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value that is variously instantiated provided some basis for loving this one rather than that one. Frankfurt might put it like this: though von Hildebrand may contribute something to our understanding of the particularity of love, he neglects the necessity of it, and hence also the intelligibility of it, for love is not intelligible as long as it seems arbitrary. Frankfurt may therefore claim that he still has an opening for a causal account of why someone loves this person rather than that one. I would reply that we have to examine some of the ways in which my love gets focused with a kind of necessity on a particular person. Let us just stay with the kind of love that Frankfurt gives most attention to, the love of parents for their children. The fact that this child is mine has the effect of entrusting the child in a particular way to my love; I “necessarily” love my own children in a way in which I do not love other people’s children. But notice two things. 1) This special entrustment of my children to me in no way keeps me from loving them as unrepeatable persons; I do not simply love them as “mine” but rather as being this person or that person. It is an obvious deformation of parental love if I love my children simply as an extension of myself; von Hildebrand shows that in this case we have not love but égoïsme à deux.16 Let me offer a kind of proof of the personal character of parental love. Every child who was really loved by its parents will one day testify that the love of its parents was all-important in empowering it to grow into the self-respect by which it experiences and believes in its own unique worth. Truly loving parents, then, must be taking the child in all its worth as unrepeatable person, otherwise their love could not play such a role in the child coming to experience its personal worth. So we see how love can respond to the incommensurable value of this person, even while being subject to a certain necessity. For it is an intelligible factor that focuses my love on my children and keeps me from loving other children equally; and yet my love thus focused, thus invested with a certain necessity, is still a personal love, a love that takes my child as this unrepeatable person. 2) This entrustment of my children to me does not call for a natural-causal explanation, for I still apprehend the child as unrepeatable person, as was just said, and I am still motivated to love the child by what I apprehend. The focusing of my apprehension brought about by the parental relation does not deprive it of its character of understanding and its power to motivate. There are surely other ways, too, in which my love is drawn with a mysterious necessity to this person rather than that one. Let us just mention the special affinity that one person has for another. Through this affinity I can come to experience another in all her unrepeatable value; without any such 16

The Nature of Love, pp. 253-254.

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affinity I may experience in the other only excellences that she shares with others, so that I never reach the other as unrepeatable person. It is natural for me to love those whose unrepeatable value is accessible to me through my special affinity with them, and also natural for me not to love in the same way those whose unrepeatable value is not in the same way accessible to me. What is important for us in the present discussion is that this reason for loving one person and not another leaves intact the incommensurable value of the unrepeatable person as the motive of my love. Indeed, the very concept of affinity means precisely a particular sensitivity to this value, so how should it interfere with this value? Equally important in the present discussion is also this: affinity is not any kind of natural cause that disrupts the world of my motivation and causally fixes my love on this person rather than that one; my love remains clearly motivated by the value I experience in the one whom I love. It follows that by introducing the value of the unrepeatable person into the motive of love, we do not introduce any unseemly arbitrariness into love. We can still make good sense of the necessities of love that are so important to Frankfurt.

Conclusion It has not been my intention here to have von Hildebrand and Frankfurt debate the nature of love. I have aimed at a more focused encounter between them. I have only wanted to show that von Hildebrand analyses love in such a way as to reveal the beloved as unrepeatable person, whereas Frankfurt’s analysis of love was not able to accomplish this. Frankfurt is indeed aware of a certain particularity of love, but he does not trace this to the unrepeatable person who is loved and to the value proper to this person. What he calls the particularity of love is a fragment left over from a larger personalist whole, and it is only von Hildebrand who understands this whole. It is not that Frankfurt considers and rejects the idea of personal unrepeatability; he does not seem even to conceive of such a thing. From here one could proceed to the foundations of an ethical personalism, or a personalistic ethics. The first step is to show that since every human being can be loved, every human being is a person with an unrepeatable identity and value. The next step is to ask what it takes to show respect to unsubstitutable persons, and what are the ways in which disrespect is shown to them. But this is another paper and another project. We have in the present paper only tried to secure something foundational for this project, namely the fact that as person a human being does not just instantiate

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qualities and kinds, but exists with something more, with a splendour of value that is his or hers alone. ——————

Selected Bibliography —Crosby, John F., Personalist Papers (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004). —Davenport, John, Will as Commitment and Resolve (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007). —Frankfurt, Harry, “Reply to Watson,” in: Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2002). —Frankfurt, Harry, The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, The Nature of Love, trans. John F. Crosby (South Bend: St. Augustine Press, 2009). —Zagzebski, Linda, “The Uniqueness of Persons,” Journal of Religious Ethics 29.3 (2001), pp. 401-423.

Chapter 3 Dietrich von Hildebrand on the “Mine” of Love and the Gift of Self in Love: Parallels to Wojtyła’s Theology of the Gift Michael Healy Franciscan University of Steubenville Ohio, U.S.

Introduction This reflection will examine von Hildebrand’s analysis in The Nature of Love of the different meanings of the word “mine,” especially the difference between the mine of love and the mine of possession. It will go on to apply these distinctions to love as expressed in the complete mutual self-donation of the sexual act in marriage. In the process, I hope to show that von Hildebrand’s personalist approach to sexuality already in his Purity, the Mystery of Sexuality published in the 1920’s anticipates various significant themes in John Paul II’s (Karol Wojtyła) reflections on the Theology of the Body, especially his early reflections on the Original Unity of Man and Woman concerning the theology of the gift. Self-gift is also an explicit theme in von Hildebrand’s Transformation in Christ.

I. The Different Meanings of “Mine” So let us first examine, from von Hildebrand’s The Nature of Love, his different meanings of the word “mine.” I interject first my view that this chapter is a masterful example of the way in which philosophical distinctions can deeply illuminate our experience and our language, bringing to a fuller prise

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de conscience what we in a confused way already know, by exposing equivocations and false interpretations. Philosophers are sometimes made fun of for making distinctions, but this chapter illustrates the depth and greatness of such an approach. So, let me review these different meanings of “mine” and how each relates to the “mine” of love. 1. We have the “mine” referring to a constitutive part of my being (my hand, my body), distinct from the mine of love of course, even though the former may be a paradigm for the closeness and unity of the latter, e.g., when I say “You are my right arm.” Obviously this is not meant literally, which would involve a utilitarian reductionism rather than a high compliment. Thus when St. Paul says “So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies” 1 this is not meant as a literal reductionism, much less a utilitarianism, which would be insults, but as an image of praise concerning the transcendent achievement of personal unity and the depth and importance of that unity.2 2. We have the “mine” of self-reflective understanding, i.e., how I selfconsciously understand or regard my own life and self. Two main possibilities are revealed here. First, I can see my life as gift given to me, over which I am primarily the trustee and called then to make myself a gift to others. Second, in contrast, I can see myself as complete “owner,” as the centre of the world in competition for dominance and sovereignty against all others, even against God. Love calls us to the first, pride and selfishness to the second. Though this contrast is not made a specific meaning of “mine” in Chapter Eight of the book, it runs throughout von Hildebrand’s The Nature of Love 3 and is parallel to Marcel’s distinction between “availability” and “egolatry.” 4 3. We have the “mine” of belonging to a larger community. Here again we find two options. First, through the eyes of love, I can see my group as good but also have a loving affirmation of other such groups, i.e., where “mine” and “yours” are appropriate, where the group itself is not a universal. Therefore, this meaning of mine would hold with families, nations, states, etc., but not, e.g., with the human race. Second, in contrast, I can raise my group to the status of a false absolute in hostile competition with other such groups, e.g., The Holy Bible, Douay-Rheims Version (London: Baronius Press, 2007), Eph. 5: 28. Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, trans. John F. Crosby (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009), pp. 180-181. 3 Ibid., p. 493, e.g., von Hildebrand writes: “The flowing goodness—the incomparable manner in which the loving person pours himself out—amounts to a sublime self-donation that is the absolute antithesis to all egoism, to all hardness of heart, and to all indifference.” 4 Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope (New York: Harper and Row [Harper Torchbooks], 1962), pp. 13-28: “The Ego and Its Relation to Others.” 1 2

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the attitude of the Nazis. Evidently only the first meaning, qualified by love, is the valid one.5 4. We have the “mine” of formal personal relationships in three possible directions: upward toward someone in a relatively superior position (e.g., parents, a boss, an officer in the army), downward toward someone in a relatively inferior or dependent position (e.g., children, employees, a private in the army), or equal (e.g., friends, classmates, teammates). Of course, behind the relative superior-inferior relations, there is always a fundamental equality metaphysically of each human being, grounding basic human rights. Thus, children, employees, privates in the army, etc. are never merely the “possessions” of those having authority over them, to be “used” without qualification. In relation to the “mine” of love, of course, the point is that only love concretely can fulfil these formal relations and allow them to blossom into all that they are meant to be. Thus these relations continue to formally obtain even if there is no love filling them, but they remain tragically deficient and unfulfilled in such a case.6 5. We have the “mine” of one’s homeplace, the experience of “being at home” in a certain situation, accompanied by a deep loving familiarity and a being warmly received by one’s surroundings, in the place where significant events, fundamentally positive, have occurred, i.e., the place where you have been loved and nurtured—again love fulfils here. Of course, there are not only earthly but metaphysical dimensions to this concept. Is man well received by being at all or is he but a stranger in a strange land? Can man be at home or find his place in the world of the intellect, of beauty, of spirituality—e.g., finding one’s major or vocation while at college, discovering the affinity of the soul for beauty, experiencing religious conversion as a “coming home.” There is, of course, a certain tragic aspect connected with the fact that our earthly “home” is passing or already gone which points us toward the question of a transcendent home toward which we are moving. Again, it is the “mine” of love which ultimately grounds and fulfils this “mine” of a homeplace in both earthly and metaphysical terms.7 6. We have the “mine” of possession, a use of the word which is appropriate only with things, implying a one-way relationship from superior to inferior. Such a word spoken toward a human being would be a violation and thus must never be confused with the “mine” of love. Thus, for example, the “mine” of marriage must never be interpreted or reduced in this way. Also, even the “mine” of possession is illuminated or fulfilled in its true meaning Von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, pp. 182-183. Ibid., pp. 183-185. 7 Ibid., pp. 185-192. 5

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in light of the “mine” of love. Just as in the “mine” of self-understanding (2. above) wherein we can regard ourselves as stewards of our own being meant to be given as gift to others, so also we are but stewards of our possessions— which are meant to be gifts to others in love as well—rather than absolute owners in hostile competition with others for dominance or hording.8 7. Finally, we have the “mine” of love, opening up the deepest meaning of the word mine and marking the fulfilment all of the above meanings. The “mine” of love, compared especially to the “mine” of possession, is possible only with persons rather than things, implies a two-way mutual response rather than a one-way domination, and implies equality because it rests on the freedom of the gift of the other to me—the mine of love is thus the complete opposite of the mine of possession. Hence, I can only say “you are mine” [as friend, lover, fiancé, spouse] if it is equally true that “I am yours.” Thus the mine of love is humbly and reverently dependent on the free response, the openness, the receptivity, the decision of the other. This means that full self-donation to another cannot occur without full receptivity to the other and is dependent on the other’s allowance of the relationship, i.e., the other must fully receive and rejoice in me (my gift), and return the gift of herself to me. It is this full mutual gift, mutual self-donation and reception, and mutual happiness resulting, which grounds and informs the full mine of love.9 Naturally, von Hildebrand’s distinctions here are rich with parallels to Wojtyła’s contrast between love as the only adequate response to persons compared to a purely utilitarian or a pleasure-dominated using of another person in the first section of Love and Responsibility,10 as well as to his stress on the freedom of the gift in his theology of the body.11

II. Dimensions of the Gift of Love and of Self-Donation Let us investigate concisely the nature of this mutual gift and mutual selfdonation. In what does the gift of love consist? First, of course, the beloved— her existence, her nature, her personality—is a tremendous gift, the greatest earthly gift to the lover. But then also the lover’s delight in and affirmation Ibid., pp. 181-182. Ibid., pp. 192-199. Of course, as von Hildebrand develops, this “mine” of love has different instantiations depending on the kind of love involved, e.g., parental, friendship, spousal, plus the formal exchange of rights over one another in the marriage vows, etc. 10 Karol Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1982), pp. 21-44. 11 John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, trans. Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline, 2006), pp. 178-191, especially pp. 185-186. 8 9

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of the beloved is a tremendous gift in the life of both—especially if received and returned affirmatively by the beloved. So a deep natural love brings the lover to a new level of depth and understanding of his own life and self and is thus a gift in his life;12 but, the lover of course hopes that his attitude toward the beloved is a great gift in her life as well. How so? Evidently, the lover has a special and unique sensitivity to the beauty and value of the beloved and conveys this to the beloved; this is a tremendous gift of affirmation in the life of the beloved.13 This being touched by the other as well as positively responding to her illustrates specifically the way in which love goes from person to person as individually existing in all their uniqueness and irreplaceability.14 So von Hildebrand writes: But the personality of the one who loves also has a great influence on the quality of the love. The fact that there are different kinds of value that can awaken love in different persons shows the significant role of the subject in love. The personality you love is extremely characteristic for who you are.15 Wojtyła describes this unique person-to-person relation in his section on “Love as Attraction” in Love and Responsibility: The kind of good to which any given man or woman is capable of reacting to a special degree depends partly on congenital and hereditary factors, partly on characteristics acquired either under extraneous influences or as a result of conscious effort on the part of the particular person, of work by the person on himself or herself. This is what gives a person’s emotional life the specific complexion which shows itself in particular emotional-affective reactions, and is of great importance in determining what will attract that person. It largely determines to whom a given person is attracted, what in that particular person exercises a particular attraction.16 12 Von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, p. 298: “[We mean] the effect which love can have upon the entire person, . . . the way in which love irradiates the entire person, his moral standing, . . . the way in which someone is changed when a great love awakens, . . . the melting of the heart, the new level of alertness, the new capacity for seeing values, the increase in a certain humility.. . . Plato has spoken about this in a wonderful way in his Phaedrus.” 13 As will be further discussed below in connection with the “enthronement” of the beloved and the three-fold “credit” of love. 14 Ibid., pp. 72-76. 15 Ibid., p. 62. 16 Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, p. 76.

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Michael Healy Further, ‘Y”s reaction to a particular value depends however not only on the fact that it is really present in person ‘x,’ but also on the fact that ‘y’ is particularly sensitive to it, particularly quick to perceive and respond to it.17

Beyond this special sensitivity, which is not arbitrary, but a specific response to this person’s being and value,18 what the lover contributes here as a gift to the beloved is what von Hildebrand calls the “enthronement” of the beloved, i.e., the crowning of the other as an irreplaceable source of beauty and happiness in the world.19 With this enthronement comes also what von Hildebrand calls “the three-fold credit of love,” which illustrates the way in which the lover views the beloved—a type of vision which is both realistic and a great gift to the other. This vision involves first the credit of faith, i.e., the belief in the goodness and beauty of the other in realms not yet discovered—this is why the lover wants to know the beloved in ever deeper and more comprehensive ways. Secondly, the credit of hope, i.e., that the lover naturally tends to interpret the behaviour of the other in a more positive rather than negative way, as long as possible. That is, as long as the issue is still in doubt, the lover gives the beloved the benefit of the doubt. Thirdly, the credit of solidarity, i.e., when a clear fault or a negative is apparent in the beloved, the lover sees it deeply—love is not blind20 —but does not identify the fault with the other, but sees it as a betrayal of the beloved’s true self.21 To be looked at in this way of the three-fold credit, rather than neutrally or negatively is a tremendous gift—as well as the only adequate response to persons, as Wojtyła says of love.22 Further, we might ask, in this self-gift and self-surrender of love, what dimensions of self-donation are revealed here? Von Hildebrand mentions three types or levels here. The first is the stepping out of or transcending of my own subjective life and concerns (Eigenleben), as in a genuine love of neighbour wherein the focus on the other’s good is my exclusive concern compared to a concern with self.23 A second kind or dimension of selfdonation involves the very gift of my heart, of my intimate subjective life, to another person in love. Here the other “becomes the centre of my life and the source of my most personal happiness, for which I depend on the Ibid., p. 77. Von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, pp. 65-66. 19 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 20 Ibid., p. 71. 21 Ibid., pp. 67-72 on the credit of love in faith, hope, and solidarity. 22 Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, pp. 40-44. 23 Von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, p. 373. 17 18

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beloved person.” 24 This is “found in some way in every deep and intense natural love,” especially in spousal love, and is found in its highest form in love of God.25 Finally, there is unique kind of self-donation found in caritas, involving “handing myself over unconditionally to God by placing my subjectivity (Eigenleben) as it were back in His hands.” 26 Moreover, as von Hildebrand says, “This love goes hand in hand with love of neighbour, which after all lives from the spirit of caritas.” 27 And, “It is the self-donation of goodness and kindness” 28 —“the self-donation in which the heart of the one who loves is melted in holy goodness and kindness.” 29 Wojtyła, of course, in the Theology of the Body, especially his reflections on “The Original Unity of Man and Woman,” stresses many similar themes in connection with the call to self-gift and specifically the free gift of self in the sexual act. He points out that, parallel to what is expressed about the first man and woman in Genesis, my life is in fact originally a gift from God30 and I am called similarly to make my life a gift to others, according to my station and vocation, according to God’s call.31 Further, if my call is to marriage, I only give myself to you in truth sexually when I equally receive you and your gift to me in the sexual act, and vice versa—mutual gifts given in complete freedom.32 To the extent that I just use you for my purposes and pleasure (or vice versa), I violate the essence of love as well as the other’s nature as a person. I treat you as an object rather than a co-subject with Ibid., p. 373. Ibid., p. 373. 26 Ibid., p. 373. 27 Ibid., p. 373. 28 Ibid., p. 373. 29 Ibid., p. 373. 30 John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, pp. 178181: “Creation and Giving,” and “Giving and Man,” wherein John Paul II says “creation is a gift, because man appears in it, who, as an ‘image’ of God, is able to understand the very meaning of the gift in the call from nothing to existence.” 31 Ibid., p. 182: “Gift—Mystery of a Beatifying Beginning.” John Paul II says: “In fact, the gift reveals, so to speak, a particular characteristic of personal existence, or even of the very essence of the person. When God-Yahweh says, ‘It is not good for man to be alone’ (Gen 2:18), he affirms that, ‘alone,’ the man does not completely realise this essence. He realises it only by existing ‘with someone’ —and, put even more deeply and completely, by existing ‘for someone’.” 32 Ibid., pp. 185-186: “Freedom of the Gift—Foundation of the Spousal Meaning of the Body.” John Paul II says: “The human body, with its sex—its masculinity and femininity— seen in the very mystery of creation, is not only a source of fruitfulness and procreation, as in the whole natural order, but contains ‘from the beginning’ the ‘spousal’ attribute, that is, the power to express love: precisely that love in which the human person becomes a gift and—through this gift—fulfils the very meaning of his being and existence.” 24 25

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me (or allow myself so to be treated). This is a violation akin to treating you as a possession and a thing.33

III. God’s “Ownership” of our Being and Self-Donation Von Hildebrand anticipated the theology of the gift as applied to the vocation to marital love and to the sexual act in his reflections in Purity, the Mystery of Christian Sexuality, published originally in German in the 1920’s. He clearly expresses the way in which we belong to God in a special way since we are his creation, having received our very being as a gift. Thus we are not the absolute owners or arbiters of our being, but are stewards beholden to God and called by our own human nature. As he says in Purity: For only while man abides in God does he leave everything in its right place. The moment we are no longer first and foremost servants of God, and do not, at least habitually, choose Him above all things, the inner order is already destroyed, and even instinctively we shun his presence. This is true in a very special sense of the marriage act, with its strong emotional convulsion, tensest drama, and supreme self-surrender. It is now that anchorage in God must be realised effectively, if the disorder above described is not to supervene and make it impossible to remain before His face. For this new “forming,” this “reformation” of the marriage act, already in some measure effected when it is made the expression of wedded love and union, this actual adherence to God, is produced precisely by the consciousness that it is only with God’s express sanction we are entering the sexual domain, by a special glance directed to Him, and by reverent awe of sex which never permits love’s unreserved surrender to the other to become an unrestrained self-indulgence, but imparts to it for the first time the character of a union of love issuing organically from the inmost centre of the person and invested with his formal assent.34 Thus as our being so too our powers must be used in conjunction with God’s call. Therefore, I can only give myself fully to another human being within the gift I make of myself to God, i.e., with the approbation of the 33 Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, pp. 28-31 “Love as the Opposite to Using,” and pp. 40-44 “The Commandment to Love, and the Personalistic Norm.” 34 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Purity, the Mystery of Christian Sexuality (Steubenville, OH: Franciscan University, 1989), p. 72 [originally published under the title In Defence of Purity].

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God to whom I belong. Therefore, I can only give myself truly to another in marriage, in sexual expression of the bond and in confirmation of the lifelong commitment, when I do so in the conviction that this is also my call and vocation from God, the giver of all good gifts calling me to imitate Him in laying down my life for another in this way. This is expressed by Wojtyła as follows in Love and Responsibility: We are now on the verge of understanding the ‘sacramental’ character of marriage. According to the teaching of the Church, it has been a sacrament from the beginning, that is to say ever since the creation of the first human couple. The ‘sacrament of nature’ was subsequently reinforced, in the Gospels, by the institution or rather the revelation of the ‘Sacrament of Grace,’ which is connected with it. The Latin word sacramentum means ‘mystery’— which, in the most general sense, is something not fully known, because it is not fully visible, it does not lie within the field of direct sensory experience. Now, both the proprietary right which each of the persons has in relation to himself or herself and still more the dominum altum, which the Creator enjoys in relation to each of them, lie outside the field of immediate experience and are accessible only to reason. But if the couple accept, as every religious human being must, this supreme proprietorial right they must seek justification above all in His eyes, must obtain his approval. It is not enough for a woman and a man to give themselves in marriage. If each of these persons is simultaneously the property of the Creator, He also must give the man to the woman, and the woman to the man, or at any rate approve of the reciprocal gift of self implicit in the institution of marriage.35 Similarly, again, von Hildebrand expresses this thought in his book on Purity forty years earlier: [The pure man] possesses a deep reverence for the mystery of which he is here in presence. Sex as such in no aspect seems to him contemptible or base. Bearing no repugnance to the fact of sex, free from all prudish and hysterical disgust, whether of sex as such or of the act of marriage, he remains at a respectful distance from it so long as he is not called by the disposition of God to enter its domain. Reverence is a fundamental component of purity. The pure man always lives in an attitude of reverence 35

Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, pp. 223-224.

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Michael Healy for God and His creation, and therefore reveres sex, its profundity and its sublime and divinely ordained meaning. Indeed, and we have now reached the factor which is decisive both for purity and for the character of sex, the pure man understands that sex belongs in a special manner to God, and that he may only make such use of it as is explicitly sanctioned by Him.36

This topic of the unfolding of the gift and the call to self-gift is also a great theme at the climax of Von Hildebrand’s Transformation in Christ, published in German in the 1940’s, in the final Chapter, “True Surrender of Self.” He points out that “true surrender is a properly and eminently personal act, and the only one by which a person can rise above his inherent limitations.” 37 Though in response to the beloved, in this case God, we are swept up into a higher realm of beauty, goodness, and values, compared to our everyday level of existence; nonetheless, this is not at all akin to being carried away falsely by a powerful urge, desire, or passion, but rather works in conjunction with our freedom.38 Like the Platonic Eros it involves an ecstatic stepping out of the everyday realm and being lifted up,39 an upward rising of the heart in conjunction with the reason and the will, which clarifies our place in being, our relations to others, and our understanding of self.40 Our value response to other beings, both to goods of a high order and especially to other persons in love, prepares the heart for this ultimate response to the God of Love Himself, a response which itself is also His gift, flowing from His grace to which we must be receptive.41 As von Hildebrand says, “Every act of giving ourselves to what, even though it has no supernatural connotation, approaches us from above, will help to thaw our heart. It will, ultimately, further our progress towards that state of blissful freedom which is the privilege of those living by Christ.” 42 Though it is not so much a part of the public record that Wojtyła was inspired by von Hildebrand in various of these themes, this would seem to be Von Hildebrand, Purity, the Mystery of Human Sexuality, p. 40. Dietrich von Hildebrand, Transformation in Christ (Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press, 1990), p. 485. 38 Ibid., pp. 488-489: “In true self-surrender, we experience ourselves being possessed by God”; pp. 489-491: “Possession by God is the opposite of abandonment to passion or to mass psychosis”; pp. 491-494: “We can freely sanction the loss of our habitual sovereignty over self and circumstance.” 39 Ibid., p. 488. 40 Ibid., p. 494: “True self-surrender is the antithesis of depersonalisation”; and pp. 494495: “True self-surrender clarifies and deepens our vision of things.” 41 Ibid., p. 495: “We should prepare ourselves for possession by God”; and pp. 495-500: “Possession by high natural goods will prepare us for possession by Christ.” 42 Ibid., p. 496. 36

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the case at least to some extent.43 Regardless of the path of influence here, which is a secondary question, I wish at least to point out the parallels and anticipatory themes in von Hildebrand, which each thinker may also have arrived at independently in trying to sort out the confusions of the modern world about love, communion, and sexuality. Similarly, other great 20th century thinkers uncover parallel ground— e.g., Marcel on “availability” vs. “egolatry,” 44 Buber on “I-Thou” vs. “I-It” relations.45 Thus, similar antidotes are stressed by these great personalists of the 20th century to the threat of dehumanisation and disrespect for the individual person so prevalent in our age. ——————

Selected Bibliography —Buber, Martin, I and Thou (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958). —Marcel, Gabriel, Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope (New York: Harper and Row [Harper Torchbooks], 1962). —The Holy Bible, Douay-Rheims Version (London: Baronius Press, 2007). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Purity, the Mystery of Christian Sexuality (Steubenville, OH: Franciscan University, 1989). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, The Nature of Love, trans. John F. Crosby (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Transformation in Christ (Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press, 1990). —Wojtyła, Karol, Love and Responsibility (New York: Farrar, etc., 1982). —Wojtyła, Karol, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, trans. Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline, 2006).

43 Thomas Howard, “A Portrait of Dietrich von Hildebrand,” insidecatholic.com/crisis magazine, 7/21/09, available at . Howard states: “In an audience granted to von Hildebrand’s widow in January 1980, John Paul II forthrightly acknowledged his own intellectual debt to von Hildebrand, especially in the matter of marriage.” 44 Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope, pp. 13-28 “The Ego and Its Relation to Others.” 45 Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), especially Part I, pp. 1-35.

Chapter 4 On the Different Forms of Self-Love Mátyás Szalay Edith Stein Institute of Philosophy Granada, Spain

Introduction Clarifying the different forms of self-love is one of the key issues to understanding the phenomenon of love, both in its human and divine dimension. Thus, in the first part of my essay, I present von Hildebrand’s understanding of what he calls ‘solidarity with myself’. I evaluate his account in the light of the distinction offered by Scheler in his Ordo amoris between Selbstliebe (amor sui or self-love) and Eigenliebe (or love of the self). In the second part of my paper I explore the nature of the difference between one’s relationship with oneself and with others. I affirm von Hildebrand’s fundamental claim according to which the love to others is in no way derived from the love to oneself. On the other hand, I claim that a certain type of attitude towards oneself manifested in true love of one’s own person goes along with a fundamental openness towards others, meanwhile a very distinct type of egocentric attitude, called “self-love” (amour propre), makes it harder or even impossible to have an authentic relationship (let it be spousal love or friendship) with another person, for it does not entail, but rather excludes, the “gift of the self.” The ‘self’ that appears in both terms (‘self-love’ and ‘love of the self’) is an equivocal term as the German expressions rightly suggest (Selbstliebe and Eigenliebe). I argue that the fundamental difference of understanding the ‘self,’ i.e., the extension of the term stems from whether or not one has a loving fundamental attitude. Following the spirit of Hildebrand’s phenomenological analysis, drawing on his philosophy of love and especially on

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his analysis of false forms of pseudo-humility, I argue that there are six stages of deepening love and consequently six forms of ‘self-love’.

I. Two Faces of Philosophy and Their Unity Looking at the very term ‘φιλοσοφια’ (love of wisdom) we can distinguish two types of basic interpretations of the expression depending on whether they highlight and accentuate the first or the second part of it. Hence, we have two ways of proceeding and two centres of main interest: one is more concerned with wisdom, with what wisdom is in relation to knowledge, while the other focuses rather on love, on how wisdom is related to love both in terms of its subsistence and of the process of donation and reception. These two approaches to philosophy and their essence never exist separately and in no way exclude each other; it is this deep and often forgotten intuition that is expressed in the complex term ‘love of wisdom’. Disentangling the interrelationships within the term, we should note two aspects: (a) perfect love is perfect wisdom, for there is no knowledge accessible without some kind of ‘loving’ attention and personal devotion to the object of knowledge, therefore (per analogiam) real wisdom is only given through and by deep love, i.e., personal devotion that goes far beyond the tribute that one pays for mere knowledge even if it is of the highest (metaphysical) order. (b) On the other hand, no true love is possible without some kind of knowledge of the beloved, and consequently (per analogiam), perfect love is only given if there is unity with the divine person who alone is worthy of such absolute devotion: This unity of the loving human person and the beloved God, however, presupposes the highest humanly possible knowledge of the Beloved, for blind and unjustified love (based on a mere opinion) cannot be perfect. The careful elaboration and deep reflection on these two essential aspects of philosophy (love and wisdom) are indispensable to any systematic philosophy that goes beyond occasional clarifications of problematic philosophical issues and aspires to give a comprehensive answer to what is love, and ultimately speaking, to Who is love. This philosophical response to the whole body of truth necessarily implies a most heroic fight against what we might call the ‘obfuscation of truth’ (some fundamental true-claims) in a certain historical epoch. Philosophy is not mere contemplation but also a way of life that includes existential fights—most of the time—for the mere possibility of rational thinking. Against the vain hope (based on the pride of human intellect) of Hegelian and positivist spirit, it seems that till the end of historical times (which means the manifestation of Truth in all Glory) human thinking toddles from one crisis to another. Therefore it is the philosopher’s

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responsibility to restate, reformulate, and put forward over and over again the unity of love and wisdom, overcoming the criticism and scepticism voiced by his own epoch.

II. Saint Augustine’s Basic Distinction and the Problem of Self-Love For a theocentric phenomenologist the phenomenon of ‘love’ manifests itself from and through itself as a dynamic reality. I call it ‘dynamic’ for it is not represented only as the subsisting essence of perfect love, but rather the focus of his investigation necessarily oscillates between, on the one hand, human and imperfect, and on the other hand, divine and perfect expressions and manifestations of love. One of the main tasks of philosophy is in this sense to describe the strong interrelationship between these two phenomena by giving a philosophical prise de conscience of (a) how divine love differs from human love, (b) how it can be at the same time its foundation and source, and (c) how therefore human love, once its own gift-nature1 is recognised, directs itself towards divine perfection and fulfilment. The distinction made here between human and divine love is based on who is the lover him/herself : a finite or the infinite person. That gives rise to differences on the level of what is love, between autonomous love (self sustaining and perfect) and contingent expressions of love (originated and imperfect)—despite their common nature (Wesenheit). Once we shift our attention to human love, another existentially important distinction has to be made by clarifying the nature of the intentional object of love: who or what is worth loving? There is a quick answer to this question: it could be either identical or different (of) (for) the lover him/herself. In the case of transcendent expression of love, it could be either another human or Divine person. It is worth, however, to put this far too quick response under a magnifying glass, for it entails some less obvious relationships between me and the other and presents it as if these alternatives would necessarily and on all levels exclude each other. The interrelationship between love towards the other human or divine person and some kind of appreciation of the self is worth philosophical ex1 See especially, Marcell Maus: “Sur le don,” in: Marcell Maus, Sociologie et anthropologie (Paris: PUF, 1999); Jean-Luc Marion, Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Hegel, Heidegger et la phénoménologie (Paris: PUF, 1989); Jean-Luc Marion, Étant donné: essai d’une phénoménologie de la donation (Paris: PUF, 1998); Antonio López, The Spirit’s Gift. The Metaphysical Insight of Claude Bruaire (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006).

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ploration. I am going to take as a starting point one of the probably most influential, for most powerful and all-embracing analysis of love in the history of philosophy, offered by Saint Augustine in the De Civitas Dei (XIV, 28). Let me quote only the well-known key phrase: “Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duos; terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui”. It is important to observe that even if Saint Augustine opposes love of the self (amor sui) to love of God (amor Dei), he does not reject by the same token all forms of positive relationship to the self (seipsum). He discovers namely that the love of God dwells precisely in his interiority, in his restless heart2 and this renders human nature especially dignified. In the background we find a fundamental difference between at least two essentially distinct forms of relationship to ourselves that following the traditional expressions of self-love and love of the self. Even if Saint Thomas Aquinas’ reputation as a philosopher of love is overshadowed by the fame of the Franciscan philosopher, like Doctor Mellifluus, Bernard of Clairvaux3 or others, like William of St-Thierry4 or Aelred of Rieval5 , the patron of friendship, it is—among others—his special merit to shed some light on this question. One could summarise the classical argument as follows: if we declare that not just the egocentric love of the self (amor sui) but also ‘natural self-love’ is opposed to the love of God (amor Dei) we run the risk of devaluating (created) human nature. Even if certain love towards the self effectively makes impossible the love towards God, while philosophy testifies this, it should not forget about the intrinsic value of human nature that precisely entails the fundamental capacity of transcending itself. A certain appreciation of the self is a completely legitimate and adequate value-response given the high dignity of the person as ‘imago Dei’. Such a love motivated by the ontological dignity of the human person (and thus my own self) does not in any way contradict the transcendent form of love; on the contrary, it enables me to perceive, affirm and receive the gift that the other person is as such. At the same time this particular form of self-love originated within what Plato calls the ‘care of the soul’ allows for and even makes possible the donation of the self.6 2 Saint Agustine, Confessions, 1. Book: “Nos fecisti ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.” 3 Bernard de Clairvaux, De amore Dei. 4 William of St-Thierry, De natura et dignitate amoris. 5 Aelred of Rieval, Sobre amistad espiritual. Oración pastoral, Introduced by PierreAndré Burton; Trans. Mariano Ballano (Burgos: Editorial Monte Carmelo, 2002); Aelredi Rievalensis, Opera omnia, 1. Opera ascética et mystica. Ed. Anselm Hoste, OSB, et C.H.Talbot, (CCCM 1) (Brepols: Turnhout, 1971). 6 It clarifies this issue how Hildebrand insits in chapter IX of his Das Wesen der Liebe

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The important expression ‘usque’ in the afore-mentioned quote describes an objective limitation of the opposition between self-love and love towards God. These limits cannot be transgressed even by the most arduous love, without it losing its own character as authentic expression of love: the inner vital sphere of the self is not dissolved nor annihilated in the love of another person, human or divine; it comes rather to its utmost perfection and fulfilment.7 It is enough to refer here to the fact that the highest expression of love towards God is complete self-gift (donatio suipsius); such a gift would be utterly impossible without a certain appreciation of this particular human nature that is both the agent of donation and the gift. What is true here concerning the self-value of the person’s dignity is also true by extension of the ‘datum’ of the nature, i.e., the whole (created) reality: love towards God, as radically distinct from any other being (ontological difference) cannot mean rejection of being; on the contrary, it means real appreciation (sanctification) of it, for in the light of summum bonum the intrinsic value of everything that is becomes prevalent. The true love towards God entails necessarily an act of thanks giving for, among other things, our own life and our particular nature (such-being). This, however, does not deny the fact that some form of egocentric self-love (as opposed to Theocentric love of the self) certainly reduces and even excludes the possibility of self-giving. These introductory reflections show sufficiently that achieving clarity on the different forms of self-love is one of the key issues in order to understand the phenomenon of love, both in its human and divine dimension. Thus, in the first part of my essay I present the distinction offered by Scheler in his Ordo amoris between Selbstliebe (amor sui or self-love) and Eigenliebe (love of the self). that: “Das Eigenleben gehört zum Sinn und Wesen des Menschen, und seine Fülle ist eine notwendige Unterlage für die Glut der Wertantwort und der glutvollen Hingabe an den Willen Gottes. Das Eigenleben gipfelt in der persönlichen Liebe zu Christus und in der Sehnsucht nach ewiger Vereinigung mit ihm. So sehr auch die Ewigkeit den Inhalt des Eigenlebens modifiziert, sie ist doch auch die höchste Erfüllung des Eigenlebens,” in: Dietrich von Hildebrand, Das Wesen der Liebe (Regensburg: Verlag Josef Habbel, 1971), p. 286. 7 This point is masterfully treated by Hildebrand who distinguishes transgression from the ‘Eigenleben’ as opposed to giving up the ‘Eigenleben’ in the sense of living my life according to a foreign, or not yet appropriated principle. He writes: “Es gilt nun zu verstehen, dass ein solches Überschreiten des Eigenlenbens, ebenso wie das heraustreten aus ihm, nicht ein Aufgeben des Eigenlebens darstellt, ein Hinwegsterben des Eigenlebens. Das Eigenleben und das Hinausgreifen durchdringen sich organisch.” In: Ibid., p. 280. One could make the point even stronger by adding that the care of the soul, the cultivation of the inner spiritual life is an existential presupposition for the act of transgression towards the transcendence manifested in the other human or divine person.

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III. Scheler’s Account on Radically Distinct Kinds of Love Towards the Self I would like now to restate the main difficulty of two radically different forms of how one loves by recalling Scheler’s distinction between ‘Selbstliebe’ and ‘Eigenliebe’. In his posthumous published essay, Ordo amoris, Scheler considers ‘Eigenliebe’ (love of the self) as a deteriorated love in which one perceives everything through and by the intention that is exclusively related to oneself. All that is given to the consciousness is filtered through emotional states and self-referential attitudes and thus its real and objective nature never comes to real transparency. Among the phenomena of this general deception we find even the highest intellectual and spiritual potencies that are enslaved in order to serve the very self.8 Real self-love is in clear opposition to this deficient and exclusively selfreferential bond to our own self. The main difference consists in the following essential feature: the spiritual centre of intentionality in the case of real selflove is beyond the world (überweltlich). The subject of self-love perceives his/her own person from the divine perspective. This is tantamount to say that everything that appears to this ego in its consciousness in reference to his/her own person acquires its ultimate meaning in reference to the absolute good. It is important to stress that, according to Scheler, it is real love that binds the ego to its own self, even though this love does not include but what is appreciated by God, i.e., what appears as valuable sub specie aeternitatis. The love to my own self in this way is nothing else than the conscious awareness of what contributes to my salvation. This perspective serves as objective criteria according to which the whole person is transformed in and through love. Certain series of acts, like self-education in virtue and revision of consciousness, intend to get rid of whatever represents an impediment to 8 “Es ist selbst wieder eine gewisse Art von Liebe, welche der Erkenntnnis der individuellen Bestimmung vorherzugehen hat: Es ist die von aller sog. Eigenliebe grundsätzlich verschiedene, echte Selbstliebe oder die Liebe zum eigenen Heile. In der Eigenliebe sehen wir alles, auch uns selbst nur in der Intention durch das ‘eigene’ Auge und beziehen zugleich alles Gegebene, auch uns selbst also auf unsere sinnlichen Gefühlszustände, so daß uns dieser Bezug nicht zu gesondertem, klarem Bewußtsein kommt. Also können wir darin hängend auch unsere eigenen höchsten geistigen Potenzen, Begabungen, Kräfte, ja sogar das oberste Subjekt unserer Bestimmung selbst zum Sklaven unseres Leibes und seiner Zustände machen. Wir ‘wuchern nicht mit unserem Pfunde’—wir vergeuden es. Von einem Gewebe bunter Täuschungsphantome bedeckt und eingestickt, gewoben aus Dumpfheit, Eitelkeit, Ehrgeiz, Stolz, gewahren wir in der Eigenliebe alles—und darum auch uns selber.” Max Scheler, “Ordo amoris,” in: Schriften aus dem Nachlass, Band I, Zur Ethik der Erkenntnislehre, ed. by Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1957), pp. 345-377.

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come closer to the self-image that appears as an internal requirement, once the person succeeds in looking at his or her own self from the perspective of radical value-transcendence.9 I would like to highlight the new aspect Scheler’s argument introduces in our discussion on the difference between authentic and inauthentic bond to our own self: the decisive role of the reference of the Divine as highest and most relevant value for the salvation of the person that we are (and have to become). Scheler suggests that one has to transfer the spiritual centre out of him/herself in order to love him/herself in a correct way, for, in this way, i.e., viewed from the objective perspective, our own life appears in real light and we only love in our own self what is really worth loving. On the other hand, Scheler’s argument could be complemented by calling attention to the difference between a self-love within the context of cosmic love as opposed to personal love. Real self-love is not achieved by a mere intellectual and even spiritual transference of my own spiritual centre via abstraction from my real life and the situation that surrounds me in order to view it from a cosmic perspective. The perspective from which I perceive myself in order to establish authentic love to my own self is also not a postulate of an ideal perfect person imagined on the basis of what one knows about oneself minus the weaknesses. This would be a Manichaeistic view as it is described by Hans Jonas,10 according to which every human person has a heavenly and an earthly self and this latter should intend in his/her earthly life to come closer (mostly by way of knowledge and an ascetic life) to the heavenly form in order to be completely united with it after death. The decisive step by which one acquires the real perspective of one’s own self depends exclusively on one’s own will; for, it is the perspective that is only given through the already existing love to our own selves. One does not have to imagine and so to speak create or consciously constitute the ‘perfect self’ in order to love what is loveable about his/her own self. It is rather the established unity between the lover and the beloved that reveals the necessity 9 “Ganz anders ist es in der echten Selbstliebe. Hier ist unser geistiges Auge und sein Intentionsstrahl eingestellt in ein überweltliches Geisteszentrum. Wir sehen uns ‘wie’ durch Gottes Auge selbst—und das heißt erstens: ganz gegenständlich, zweitens: ganz als Glied des ganzen Universums. Wohl lieben wir uns noch, aber immer nur als solche, die wir wären vor einem allsichtigen Auge, und nur so weit und sofern, als wir vor diesem Auge bestehen könnten. Alles andere an uns hassen wir—um so stärker, als unser Geist in dies göttliche Bild von uns eindringt, j.e., herrlicher es vor uns aufwächst, und je stärker es andererseits von dem Bilde abweicht, das wir außerhalb des Gottesbeständigen an uns in uns finden. Die selbstgestaltenden, bildnerischen Hämmer der Selbstkorrektur, der Selbsterziehung, der Reue, der Abtötung treffen alle Teile von uns, die über jene Gestalt hinausragen, die uns dieses Bild unser vor und in Gott vermittelt.” Max Scheler, ibid. 10 Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion (Boston: Baecon, 1963).

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of transformation of the self: the need to love that most lovable with a more and more perfect love. The image of the self that is truly worth loving is thus given by the desire to give oneself in love to the beloved. The definition of the self that is the real reference of authentic self-love could be formulated as follows: ‘the gift that we can be and want to be for the love to the other person’. Clarifying on this ‘self’ is not so much a mere step, as it is a process that goes through various stages. Each of these clearly distinct existential stages of discovering and affirming who one really is could be characterised by a certain (more or less perfect) realisation of self-love. Self-love in this sense, however, depends on the subjectively clarified self-image of the ‘self’ that actually serves as the respective intentional object of self-love. It is a real phenomenological task to specify the content of this self-image and to demonstrate how the different stages of acquiring the truth concerning one’s real self are related with each other. In the following reflections I would like to contribute to this endeavour.

IV. A Phenomenological Account of ‘Self-Love’ By reflecting on the Schelerian insight presented above it became transparent that there is an essential relationship between the existential development of authentic self-love and the process of deepening love towards God. This relationship alters in time with relation to one’s devotion and self-donation to God. According to the measure of how the person understands oneself through and by this sublime love one becomes self-transparent and thus, the love towards his/her own self is transformed according to the ‘measureless measure’ personally experimented in the love of God. This development is not a mere continuous process; it has several significantly distinct stages. Passing from one stage to another requires always a certain spiritual, intellectual and emotional change that projects itself, among other things, also on the ‘selfimage’. However different the love towards God might be, its nature depends still on whether there is a fundamental attitude towards God. Such a basic disposition of the person to follow and to realise whatever one has good reason to interpret as the will of God, or morally good, and consequently to consider some aspects of one’s own self as good or bad, marks the irreconcilable difference between ‘love of the self’ (in which the measure is the person himself) and self-love. Without a solemn decision that affirms the goodness manifested and expressed through God’s love as (an) independent and valid measure for men, and the resolute will to faithfully carry out this insight in

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preferably all spheres of life and thus, first and foremost with respect to one’s own self, it is not possible to acquire true self-love. I am going to present here a phenomenological typology of self-love according to its existential relation to the love towards God on the basis of the four steps of love described by Saint Bernhard in De amore Dei.11 Following von Hildebrand’s path at the same time I am going to focus on the phenomenon of fundamental attitude that is constitutive for both relations: love towards the self and love towards God. 1. The Natural Self-Love: amor sui naturalis12 Notwithstanding its different manifestations, the natural self-love is present in all other types of self-love, given the fact that it informs all faculties of the soul. Natural self-love manifests itself primarily in how the soul aspires to sustain its existence and its unity with oneself. Even if the natural self-love pervades the whole soul with its faculties, its immediate intentional object13 dwells in the ‘vital sphere’. Hildebrand is right by observing that this specific form of self-love does not require a volitional act of taking a certain ‘stand point’ (Stellungnahme), for there is a natural (positive) attitude (Einstellung) towards myself. The notion of ‘my self’ refers here to a ‘vital self,’ to the very subject of the ‘Tua res agitur’. This elemental love refers to God inasmuch as it is effectively impossible and therefore unthinkable for this ‘vital subject’ to sustain himself and to reach its perfection without God, for every contingent (created) being aspires by its nature to absolute perfection. It is of crucial importance to stress that natural love is not only present in all types of love-expressions, i.e., in sensual, intellectual and spiritual love, but it also includes the requirement to reach its plenitude in perfect realisation. The fourth, fifth and sixth forms of self-love analysed here are steps that follow from one another in natural order representing the self love in relation to the more and more perfect realisation of the love towards God. 11 I follow in great part the exploration of the four steps of love towards God marvellously elaborated by Bernhard of Clairvaux in his afore-mentioned opus, De amore Dei. 12 I limit myself to presenting here a short summary of the ideas elsewhere elaborated in detail: “Bevezetés Rafael Tomás Caldera A szeretet természetéről című munkájához,” in: Rafael Tomás Caldera, A szeretet természetéről (Budapest: Kairosz Kiadó, in print). 13 The ultimate, i.e., real final intentional object of natural self-love is the origin of my own life and existence: God, the creature of my self (myself). The connection between immediate object and final object is, however, not thematically present in the elemental, i.e., insufficiently reflected form of self-love. It becomes explicit inasmuch as one acquires a fundamental attitude of openness towards ultimate reality by existentially experiencing the (unconditional) love of God towards others (mostly and primordially, though not exclusively, through parental love).

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2. Love of the Self as the Deformation of the Natural Love: The Love Towards My Own Self Lost in the World, Oblivion of the Divine (‘Gott-vergessenheit’) In the description of Saint Augustine quoted above, the two forms of love towards oneself and love towards God are opposed to each other as two radically distinct poles of fundamental attitudes between which there is a whole scale of potential grades. One of these possible forms of self-relation deserves special interest for it is very common. It consists not so much in the conscious rejection of God as in becoming insensitive towards the divine presence, and thus leaving it on the margin of one’s vital sphere, which is determined primarily by the self. This specific love of the self is characteristic of a person who suffers (without even noticing it sometimes) from what Hildebrand calls value-blindness (Wertblindheit). Even though this person broke through the absolute immanence, his or her value-horizon, i.e., the values that are subjectively relevant for him/her have not (yet) reached the summum bonum: his view is captured and detained by values that are immanent of his and other human person’s reality. This moral state or ‘stadium’ is rightly called immature for such a person does not yet have a fundamental attitude, and thus cannot have solid moral principles either. He or she is lacking the moral spine and is rootless, experiments a constant falling and restless changing in time that overwrites all experiences and impressions by presenting always new opportunities to satisfy his/her appetite. Lacking any absolute measure, an absolute point of orientation such a person wanders around by following the most intense impression and biggest actual impetus or call. The best examples for such form of life, and therefore of love, is perhaps the figure of Casanova. He does not conquer women with the intention of doing harm, but rather because of his weakness that cannot resist the beauty he has actually in front of him. To a certain extent he believes what he says until a new and perhaps even more intense desire calls his attention. His deeds and choices of values are always motivated by the actual (sensual) desire precisely because he is lacking any fundamental attitude that would enable him to perceive a reality beyond the beauty of passing moments. As it is well known, according to Kierkegaard’s classification of the person’s development, this form of life and love is called aesthetic stadium.14 As far as God as summum bonum, and therefore the values in themselves, are blocked outside the horizon on which the value appears that motivates the act in question, it leads to a reduction of both, the reality of my own In: Kierkegaard’s Writings, III, Part I-II: Either/Or. Trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). 14

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self and the reality of another human or divine person involved in the act. According to this, the other person becomes necessarily a friend or an enemy, but can ever be brother or sister; for his/her relevance consists in supporting or preventing me from carrying out some good for myself; he/she can even be neutral, i.e., someone whose existence is irrelevant. He/she can, however, not appear in a perspective beyond my own interest, without significantly changing my fundamental attitude. Therefore, the value of my own self is subjectively perceived in relation to whether the most profound and noblest desire that one is able to express and that constitutes my subjective valuehorizon is satisfied or not. Because of the lack of fundamental attitude, there are only attitudes that refer to a mere temporal, i.e., actual reality: there is no openness and no disposition to any other reality beyond this temporal dynamic of more or less immediate satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Consequently, my own self and its value appear within the same reductive perspective and according to the same deficient categories provided by a merely temporary desire. It goes without saying that such a relation to my own self is far from being authentic: it is a narcissistic love that is imprisoned in the passing moment. 3. Love of the Self as the Radical Deterioration of Love Towards One’s Own Self: The Love of Myself that Stems from the Conscious Rejection and Denial of God. The third type of love towards the self is a more radical deterioration of natural self-love. The difference stems from the fact that here God as summum bonum not only remains outside of one’s subjective value-horizon but it is also consciously denied. While in the first case the decisive factor is the lack of fundamental attitude and thus a certain disposition and directedness of one’s moral life according to the principle beyond temporality that is given in the experience of the divine, in this case there is a fundamental attitude— it is, however, negative. This difference is reflected in the original meaning of the expressions ‘agnosticism’ as opposed to ‘atheism,’ for what has been before the mere lack of consciousness of the divine becomes here the resolute denial of his existence as summum bonum. If there is no absolute value, then any value can be absolutised according to an arbitrary choice that is only limited, if at all, by the freedom of the other person: not so much because it is an absolute value, but rather in order to avoid chaos that would do harm to one’s own self. This has radical consequences in how to perceive values in general. The value-relativism described under the second point, according to which the given disordered and spontaneous attitudes permitted a certain awareness

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of some self-referential values acquires here a nihilistic feature. I would like to call this fundamental attitude ontological pride. It goes along with a narcissistic self-love that conquers metaphysical heights; it is a love of my own self above everything that there is, for it is the radically autonomous me who is the centre of the realm of value. It is obvious that such a negative attitude cannot leave intact the way the meaning of the other human person is ‘constituted’ for one’s self. I mean here by ‘constitution’ the way in which the subject extracts the meaning of the other’s self-given reality by forming it to a meaning for him/her. In the case of this fundamental attitude, the other person appears to me merely relatively to my own self and therefore his/her own dignity remains hidden from me. The conscious data that I become thematically aware of is reduced exclusively to my person as the only ‘absolute’ reference point, from which all meanings stem, and thus the other person becomes a mere extension of my own self—as von Hildebrand observes. Independently of what such a fundamental attitude is capable to perceive from reality, the other person is a reality on his/her own; thus it comes inevitably to experiences that are irreducible to one’s own ego. From the point of view of a person with this specific fundamental attitude these autonomous elements are immediately opposed to his/her own identity and question it; they become impediments and limits of his supposedly limitless freedom. The strong relationship between the denial of God and the ontologically, and therefore ethically reductive conception of the other, come to the fore in an exemplary way in the philosophy of Sartre. Thus, it is worth evoking here some of his key ideas. The French thinker thematises the other person as the ‘objectifying view’ that reduces my person to mere appearance. On the other hand, it is precisely in opposition to this objectifying force how one can assume the personhood, i.e., the realm of freedom beyond the objectified self. How the other objectifies me through his view does not allow me to go beyond my phenomenal self and to reach the plenitude as a person with its ontological dignity, since it throws me back on my factual life that is considered by him as an inhibition of his freedom. Very much opposed to von Hildebrand’s realistic view, the other person is present for Sartre not (only) within but radically beyond the world (l’être extra-mondain) as somebody whose gaze I passively undergo. There is no talk about the possibility of actively revealing the other person, penetrating in his/her existence and personhood. The way of recognition of the other person is the negation of his/her interiority (négation d’intériorité); the other person appears therefore as a ‘non-ego’ radically opposed to my own being. For Sartre, who rejects the real existence of the highest and absolute value, the other person’s dignity does not stem merely from his/her choices

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or his/her existence but rather from his/her particular nature. Thus, the other person cannot be my brother and there is no charity possible towards him/her. My attitude towards him/her is determined by my facticity: by who I am (man, woman, child, worker, or teacher) and who I want to become. All acts of genuine self-giving, all acts of love marked by self-donation, are ultimately expressing nothing but fatal surrender in front of the other, the non-ego. For such an ego, who preliminary aspires to self-realisation humility is a meaningless term, while the values determined by the free existence thrown into the world (être-au-milieu-du-monde) through the ‘project’ (a concept that Sartre inherited from Heidegger) are certainly meaningful. Thus, existence has no other obligation and responsibility in the strong sense than in front of oneself; his rights should be brought to recognition and validation even against the others: if somebody does not do so, his/her existence becomes the inauthentic life of others. Curiously enough such a fatal love of the self—in its desperate way— aspires also to a certain false infinity by extending its own limits over and against Being. 4. The Self-Love of the Person Who is Able to Love the Human and the Divine Person for his/her Own Sake It is of great importance to clarify the nature of such self-love for it is a common error to think that the claim according to which self-love is existentially fundamental for the love towards the other human and divine person is equal to saying that love is indeed reducible to self-love. The falsity of this latter thesis has been demonstrated, among others, by von Hildebrand. The main charge against this thesis is that it completely misunderstands the essence of love by leaving aside the possibility of genuine self-donation. Now, concerning the essence of love, this is certainly true; yet there are certain imperfect manifestations of love that gave rise to this false claim precisely because they are reducible to self-love. It is certainly the authentic expression of love that should guide us in describing the essence of love, but the description of the concrete existential forms of love should also take into account the inauthentic expressions. It is hardly deniable that most of our everyday experiences of love are unfortunately rather subtle and sophisticated extensions of self-love to another human or divine person more than genuine attempts to do justice to real transcendence. The person of our fourth category of love recognises and acknowledges that there is something like the summum bonum, as he/she also admits the Highest Person’s extraordinary status in the cosmic order; this motivates the person from time to time to manifest a positive disposition. Thanks to

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this availability and openness, a certain form of value-experience can indeed take place. Since the disposition characteristic of this person is far from being unconditional, the respective recognition of the values cannot be fully achieved: there is no awareness of the values on their own, i.e., they are recognised and thus affirmed only in their relevance to the self. The main feature of this type of love can be summarised as follows: these persons cannot recognise and affirm the other human or divine person on its own and for its own sake but only inasmuch as it is good for the given self, i.e., inasmuch as the other person meets one’s needs and expectations, is the other real and true for this person. The very perception of the other person and not only the response motivated by it is deficient. When reaching its perfection this form of life could lead over to the next stage of ‘deepening love’. This attitude is most characteristic of the sophisticated humanist, who might give through his/her life and deeds an inspiring testimony of noble and high values even though the recognition of these values is not based on and might be even disconnected from the sphere of the Divine. That is why for such an attitude and form of life the greatest danger consists in replacing the Divine with some other values (freedom, tolerance, peace) that are noble but have infinitely less dignity than the Divine itself. If this person is utterly consequent in his/her affirmation of this deformed value-hierarchy, even when he/she has the best intentions, his/her thinking and acting can lead to the greatest absurdities and inhumanities, like ‘the fight for peace’ during communism, the ostracism from public life and discussion of everyone who is deemed to be intolerant. This type of love is a strange mixture of the second and the third form mentioned above. It resembles the second inasmuch as it lacks fundamental attitude, and it is similar to the third for it does recognise the existence of God and that of another human person. The difference here consists in not rejecting these values in their autonomous existence but simply not perceiving them as such. Evaluating this specific form of love, we find that it is, due to its mixed nature somewhere between real perfection and complete imperfection of love; it determines a mediocre moral state, for the person who lived his/her life according to this specific form of love in his/her valueresponses truly aspires to goodness, and yet the series of acts performed by him do not result in a firm and fully transparent moral character united through the highest virtue of unconditional self-donation.

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5. The Self-Love of the Person Who Loves the Human and Divine Person for Their Own Sake and in Themselves The new feature of the fifth form of love consists of the clear recognition and full awareness of the transcendent nature of the intentional objects of love: the human and the divine person. As opposed to the third form, described above, it is not characterised by a negative, but rather by a positive fundamental attitude, thus it is not ontological pride but on the contrary, ontological humility. The ontological humility is nothing else than the recognition of my own self on its own in the light of the sublime being. It is thus the humility as fundamental attitude first and foremost towards God; this disposition stems from assuming one’s own contingent nature and arriving at full awareness when confronted with God as the Absolute: the humility of the creature towards the Creator, to Whom she/he belongs. While the metaphysical revolt characteristic of the third type leads to a negation of the human nature, ultimately denying the ‘imago Dei,’ here we find a volitional collaboration with God as what is really and truly adequate for human nature. This type of love could be characterised by the following essential features: aspiration to virtue, piety, the veneration of the law as requirements of love and not just regulations, and an effective testifying for values which is not discouraged even when confronted with the necessity of sacrifice. The power leading to perfection required here stems not only from the conviction, but also from the evidence that at a certain situation the relevant values appear beyond all transmission and mediation through subjective realities and perceptions, i.e., as values in themselves within the ordo amoris; that is why their call cannot be overheard, only denied. Whoever is sensitive enough to hear this call because of the specific openness is faced with the existential question: can she/he bear the consequences of the due response? Whenever one is involved in a situation where the value-response refers to the value on its own, or even to the value manifested in the human and divine person, one thing is sure: the past experiences, however rich they might be, are always insufficient for they only reveal a certain aspect of the given reality in question. To put it differently: the transition from the fourth to the fifth type of love necessarily entails a transformation of the self: a reference to the person whom I have to become rather than a reference to the person I have been before this given situation. The educational character of love becomes prevalent whenever the intentional object of love is not any more ‘the beloved as it is for me,’ but rather ‘the beloved as he is on its own.’ Whenever the person manifests a certain readiness to overcome him/herself, the relationship towards the summum bonum becomes personal in the

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deepest sense of the word: for this moment and this act is the real birth of the person—of the person one really and truly is and not just the one that subsists. This relationship is not only personal because, in effect, it is a relationship among persons, for the Highest Value cannot but be person, but also because it is characterised by the mutual knowing of one another from within (certain intimacy), and by the dynamic of approach and distance,’ of ‘seeking and encountering,’ typical of personal relations. (It is thanks to this personal feature of the relationship that the universal history of salvation becomes a vivid life of faith.) The fact that the other person is considered as a reality and value on its own means that he/she is not only recognised as a constituted being within the world; he/she does not appear to me in the refraction produced by the categories and concepts of my interest and expectations, etc. towards the other as perceived from a certain point of view as friend, enemy or neutrally irrelevant being. The other person manifests a value above and beyond any role that is displayed within the intentionality of the consciousness, where it is interpreted as a reality the meaning of which stems from the world-life; this value, if fully recognised as human dignity—on the basis of the similarity of our common ontological nature—motivates and urges us to respond adequately by fully acknowledging in the other the imago Dei that is precisely not given as constituted by the world. The decisive moment in natural love when reaching its plenitude is precisely this ‘going above and beyond’ the intentional object towards the real being in itself. Within the value-horizon, we find our self as a solid starting point; by fully capturing one’s own value, one discovers that the other person also has her/his own autonomous value, i.e., there is an inalienable ontological dignity that he/she expresses for simply being human. It is, among other things, this very insight and deep comprehension that the other person has an inalienable ontological dignity by his/her very nature that enables us to love the other person as ourselves. Since existentially this ontological similarity is most easily accessible when manifested and expressed in similarities of ‘second order,’ it is, according to Saint Aelred, the experience and the praxis of spiritual friendship (friendship in Christ) that provides us with the concrete meaning of caritas. Friendship as devoted and exclusive love towards another person, is not only the source of the theoretical insight on which charity is based, but at the same time it is also the reality within which the virtues of self-donation can be exercised. Friendship as a form of love-relationship based on a benevolent attitude makes real encounters possible, encounters in which our own value-horizon, i.e., the densely knit veil woven as product of the category ‘good-for-myself’ is—from time to time—torn by the face of another human or divine person; the starlights of

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the other’s moral perfections, i.e., virtues that shine through this rupture sheds light also on the true nature of our selves, and demonstrates not only who we really are, but also who we should become. 6. The Self-Love of the Person Who Loves his/her Own Nature through and in God The afore-mentioned five different types of love—despite their significantly distinct natures—had one feature in common: they were all directed from the ego towards the other human or divine person. As such, they were all manifestations and expressions of what we called at the beginning of this analysis natural self-love—even though two forms were clearly against the natural tendency, and should be considered therefore as deteriorations of natural self-love. I mean here by directedness that the loving person orients himself/herself from within the immanence of the self towards the transcendence of the beloved person. This love, both as attitude and as act succumbs to this centrifugal force. What von Hildebrand defined in his work Das Wesen der Liebe 15 as ‘Eigenleben’ 16 serves as the starting point for the inner perception of the self-given transcendence of the beloved; in the process of ‘deepening love’ up to this point we have described how this transcendence becomes absorbed and integrated within the realm of ‘Eigenleben’ by transforming the self. This process can be considered as natural inasmuch as it takes place by the volitional cooperation of the lover and according to his/her capacities; his/her potencies as lover become actualities when responding. The type of love analysed under this last point, however, does not follow in the same In: Dietrich von Hildebrand, Das Wesen der Liebe (Regensburg: Verlag Josef Habbel, 1971), pp. 267-295. 16 I should rather use the term ‘Eigenleben’ for the English translation does not express exactly what the German term implies. The translator himself admits this: “No German word in this work presented a greater challenge to me as translator than the word Eigenleben. We can approach its meaning by considering that in this chapter title, Eigenleben forms a certain antithesis to transcendence, or perhaps better, Eigenleben and transcendence are set in a relation of polarity, a polarity akin to the polarity that a philosopher might express in speaking about ‘self and other’.” In: Zenit, “A Certain Interior Dimension of the Person Comes to Light,” John Crosby’s speech at an October 12th conference on Christian philosophy held at the Franciscan University of Steubenville, 11.05.2010: http://www.zenit.org/article-20852?l=english. Possible versions are: self-life, life of my own, personal vital sphere, real life of my own vital self, personal life of a human person as a self. “The defining trait of Eigenleben is the realm of all those things that are of concern to me as this unrepeatable individual, that stand in some relation to my happiness, that address me—this in contrast to all that belongs to the Eigenleben of another person whom I do not know.” In: The Nature of Love, trans. John Crosby (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009). 15

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way from natural love as in the cases we observed before. The distinct nature of the sixth type of self-love is certainly in no way opposed to natural self-love; the self-love in the sense of a love towards our own self in God is rather infinitely beyond the dignity of any other form of self-love, for it is supernatural, and thus includes all the other positive forms of self-love by taking them to their plenitude. What does it mean then that natural love is transformed to supernatural love after it has reached its culmination, i.e., after it considers God and the other human person as values and realities on themselves? First of all, it means that the direction of love becomes radically different: it does not depart anymore from the immanence towards transcendence; on the contrary, it proceeds from the divine transcendence towards human immanence. This radical change and turning around—that basically comes down to the fact that the lover does not consider himself/herself from within the immanency but rather from the point of view of the reality of transcendence—cannot be carried out by the lover on his/her own. The process of the complete transformation of the self by which it empties itself in order to be filled by the divine,17 and to be newly born, I would like to call with the expression of John of the Cross “the dark night of the soul”.18 It is far from being impossible to give a strict phenomenological account of this process; it is in no way opposed or contradictory to the real nature of philosophy, nor is it a task that goes beyond what is proper to philosophy19 —this has been more than sufficiently demonstrated by Edith Stein’s work, entitled Kreuzwissenschaft.20 She analyses each step of the transformation in detail and comes up in this way with a systematic phenomenology of the soul, concerning its distinct faculties and their proper function explored from the most This process is beautifully described in Santa Teresa de Avila’s work, El Castillo interior, see especially the seventh chamber. 18 Let us evoke the last verse of the poem: “Quedeme y olvideme, el rostro recline sobre el Amado, ceso todo y dejeme, dejando mi cuidado entre las azucenas olvidado.” 19 I do not think that the phenomenological description of the experience (Erlebnis) goes beyond the task of philosophy if such an experience is given to somebody either because he lived it or/and because it has been transmitted to him through authentic testimony in form of genuine experience and thus acquired true insights. Edith Stein analyses the text of John of the Cross; the point of departure for her is the testimony transmitted through the text. Even if the theological relevance of her text is indubitable, this is in no way a sufficient reason to criticise her endeavour as unintelligible philosophy. 20 Edith Stein, Kreuzeswissenschaft. Studie über Johannes a Cruce (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1950); NA in Edith-Stein-Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 18, Freiburg, 2. Aufl. 2004. 17

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adequate perspective: their plenitude reached through the passive and active transformation in love. The analysis of the soul is doubtlessly one of the most important problems of philosophy, for the soul—as Aristotle says—has the capacity (in some sense) to entail and to become everything. Since the faculties of the soul come to their plenitude thanks to the graceful love, and since this process can be interpreted as a process of acquiring the soul’s perfections in this (earthly) life, it is a precondition for any comprehensive and strict philosophical prise de conscience to depart precisely from this transformation and plenitude of the soul by which (by the love of God) it becomes truly and fully what it is. Therefore, the central issue of real phenomenology, and thus, true philosophy is the conversion through love by which everything becomes visible and intellectually accessible as ‘full phenomena’. I restrict myself here only to shed some light on the issue of fundamental attitude. The gracefully fundamental attitude similar to any attitude has four basic dimensions in connection with four ‘objects’ towards which it is more or less explicitly directed. By object I mean here four layers within the attitudinal fundament in front of which any intentional object of act appears as meaningful, for there is no intentional object that appears to an abstract ego, but rather to a real person already involved in relations that serve as a complex meaning-horizon for any intentional act towards the object in question. These, which I would like to call ‘basic relations’ are the following: towards my own person, towards the other person, towards the world, and towards God. It is easy to see how God is at the same time the first and the last object of my fundamental attitude for already my natural love towards myself is pervaded by gratitude for everything that serves to satisfy my appetite and natural desires; and on the other hand, God is at the same time the ultimate object of the most noble spiritual desire. Now, the distinguishing feature of the gracefully fundamental attitude is the following: one relates to the values in a way that they are not perceived in relation to him, not even in themselves, in order to come up with an adequate response, rather in a radically reversed order, one measures oneself as deficient nature and reality by and through these values. It is true for all the afore-mentioned forms of love—even the forms of ‘love of the self’ (Eigenliebe)—that they maintain, and in some way testify for the natural relation between the love towards another person and the love towards God. It is obvious, however, that this relation is most clearly and fully present in case of the sixth type of self-love, for here the love towards another person stems from the love of God towards me. Thus, the person who experiences that his/her existence and nature is a divine gift, and tries to transform himself/herself according to this evidence, can truly donate himself/herself in love towards another person: once acknowledged that our life

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is a gift, we truly want to be gifts for others. Such a donative love goes even beyond what one strictly owes to the other who is recognised as an intentional object of love according to his/her nature. To put it differently, one loves the other not inasmuch as one knows him/her, but rather manifesting a disposition towards the other as somebody not yet fully realised.21 One loves the other not for his/her past, nor for his/her present but endowing him/her with his/her own future, as a gift. This love is fully generous for it assures to the other person a special freedom thanks to which he/she can realise—being transformed by goodness—what he/she is not yet. That is why accepting the other person is never passive, it is not a mere tolerance but an active providing him/her with a future from which his/her freedom stems. Through the experience of this sixth and highest love it becomes also existentially evident that the love towards God is absolutely not a transformed self-love, nor is it a mere extension of one’s love towards another person in the direction of the perfect person, like a mere prolongation of self-love. This noblest form of all also renders false the claim according to which self-love should guide me from my immediate and evident presence through the mediate presence of the other to the incomprehensible presence of God. The explanation is quite different. The essence of love is presented in an ascending order according to the elevation of the soul. Whoever went this way, however, and experienced how the spiritual life and the soul is transformed by the truth encountered through and in love, can perceive behind the epistemological order its ontological foundation, i.e., the primacy of descendence. The more one is elevated the more it becomes clear: it is the primary love of God that makes any love towards me and towards another possible for this is what provides the growth of everything to that what it really is: makes me to myself as it makes the other to him/herself.

21 That is what explains the act of forgiveness in which it is recognised that the culprit is not on a metaphysical level merely the guilty person. His imperfection is present to me in the background of the absolute perfection. That does not only make love more critical, but also more accepting, for it determines that he is not a full realisation of what is loved— precisely because love goes beyond the mere phenomenological data to its source. If the person is considered as a gift, as something that is freely donated to me, his imperfection can never erase or override the fact of his self-donation. That is why he can be forgiven for purely metaphysical and not merely emotional or moral reasons. (I owe this and many other important comments to Prof. Guillermo Peris.)

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It is the philosopher as lover of wisdom who should give a testimony for the reality as it is revealed in both, in the elevation of the soul and what makes this possible as prior to this: the descending Love. These two perspectives are, however, only accessible for somebody who can love one’s own self from and through the perfect love of God towards him/her. ——————

Selected Bibliography —Jonas, Hans, The Gnostic Religion (Boston: Baecon, 1963). —Kierkegaard, Søren,Kierkegaard’s Writings, III, Part I-II: Either/Or, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). —López, Antonio, The Spirit’s Gift. The Metaphysical Insight of Claude Bruaire (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006). —Marcell Maus, “Sur le don,” in: Marcell Maus, Sociologie et anthropologie (Paris: PUF, 1999). —Marion, Jean-Luc, Étant donné: essai d’une phénoménologie de la donation (Paris: PUF, 1998). —Marion, Jean-Luc, Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Hegel, Heidegger et la phénoménologie (Paris: PUF, 1989). —Scheler, Max, “Ordo amoris,” in: Schriften aus dem Nachlass, Band I, Zur Ethik der Erkenntnislehre, ed. by Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1957). —Stein, Edith, Kreuzeswissenschaft. Studie über Johannes a Cruce (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1950). —Von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Das Wesen der Liebe (Regensburg: Verlag Josef Habbel, 1971). —Von Hildebrand, Dietrich, The Nature of Love, trans. John Crosby (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009).

Part II Two Religious Perspectives on Personalism

Chapter 5 Islam and Human Dignity: Insights into Muslim Ethico-Philosophical Thinking Alhagi Manta Drammeh Al-Maktoum College of Higher Education Dundee, Scotland

Introduction The Quranic methodology is based on striking a balance between material and spiritual, reason and revelation, physical and metaphysical. It does not negate the existence and relevance of material things, but wants humanity to go beyond the material world in order to give new dimensions and meanings to the human life and the quality of that life. Indeed, it strikes a balance between the tangible and the intangible, the seen (shahadah) and the unseen (ghayb). As Muslims believe in the idea that human is not absolute and unlimited and cannot comprehend the totality and the entirety of the truth, it is therefore important that there is a link between reason and revelation. This becomes even more important with regards to the secrets of the universe and the metaphysical world in particular. Indeed, the idea that there can be common moral values for all humans is present in all Abrahamic faiths and other world’s major religions. Humans share certain values, such as that murder is evil, justice as a good thing and certain basic institutions like family. The Quran points out clearly in the following: “O people! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most

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righteous of you. And God has full knowledge and is well-acquainted (with all things)” (Quran, Al-Hujurat 49: 13.) The ethical principles constitutive of the Islamic humanism are for all human beings, whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim. The two ethical terms of Islam that frequently occur in the Quran are (maruf ) good, virtue and (munkar) bad in moral-ethical terms. Maruf is an action that is generally recognised and known to people as acceptable, good and hence virtuous. Munkar is an action that is generally unacceptable to people and hence bad and evil. Thus, it is not surprising to notice that Islam in all its injunctions is aimed at achieving and protecting the following:1 • Religion (al-Din) • Life (al-Nafs) • Mind/intellect (al-’Aql) • Property and wealth (al-Mal) • Progeny/family (al-Nasl) The above are referred to as the five universal principles (al-Kulliyy¯ at alKhams) that cannot and should not be tempered with. Indeed, the Quranic narratives and accounts of past events attest to its moral-ethical underpinnings. This paper will dwell on the concept of ethics in Islam, ethics in Muslim thought and the centrality of the person in the Quranic discourses.

I. Conception of Ethics and Ethical ‘Personalism’: An Islamic Perspective The word ethics comes from the Latin word “ethos” meaning habit or custom and the word morality from Latin “moralis” meaning mores or customs.2 Al-Qurtubi, according to Zaroug, interprets the phrase khuluq al-Awalin to mean their ancient customs and to mean religion or doctrine. Al-Ghazzali 1 Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi has dealt with the above issue in his Fi Fiqh al-Awlawiyyat [On the Jurisprudence of Priorities] (Damascus, Amman, Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islami, 1999). In this book, he has outlined three very important concepts, namely, necessities (daruriyyat), needs (hajiyaat) and finally complementary elements (kamaliyyat). 2 Abdullah Hassan Zaroug, “Ethics from an Islamic Perspectives. Basic Issues,” in: The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, vol. 16, Fall 1999, N° 3, p. 45.

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suggests that morality is not an invention of Greek philosophers but they rather borrowed it from revealed religions.3 Morality is generally considered to be more important than customs and moral principles are supposed to override customs. Defining ethics means distinguishing between moral and non-moral behaviour. Another criterion is that whether a statement is intended to be prescriptive and that moral judgment is overriding. Another important characteristic of moral judgement is universality; that is, moral judgments must apply to all people, at all times and all circumstances and that it should be public and not private.4 Another criterion is that morality should be practical.5 Islam does consider the need for universal morality that it should not be left to the whims and fancies of individuals. Rationalists claim that science should not deal with values; it should deal with facts, for values are subjective and rest on feelings and personal liking or disliking. However, some maintain that values are inseparable from facts and scientific activity.6 Zaroug points out that those values can be rationally and objectively investigated and that the distinction between facts and values is questionable. He maintains that propositions about values can be supported by argument and evidence, facts about human nature, about what constitutes the well-being of man, about God and the truth of religion. The importance of morality also has to do with ethical concepts such as equality, justice, freedom, and rights that are central to legal discourse. Issues of the enforcement of law, justification of punishment, legal obligation are all moral issues. In fact, the question of how we should live relates to ethics in all its aspects, science and technology, medicine, journalism, education.7 Ethics can be then defined as emanation of actions from the self without any pre-thought, constraint or unnatural manner.8

Ibid., p. 45. Ibid., p. 47. 5 Ibid., p. 48. 6 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 7 Ibid., p. 50. 8 Abullatif Muhammad al-Eid, al-Akhlaq al-Islamiyyah (Cairo: dar al-‘Ulum, 1983), p. 5. The word (khuluq) in the singular form has appeared in the Quran two times both in the Makkan period of the revelation: “verily! You are of a tremendous nature.” (Quran, Al-Qalam 68:4). Similarly, “This is but a fable of the men of old.” It is giving an account of the call of Prophet Hud to good deeds but they were obstinately bent on following what they inherited from the past even though it was detrimental to the very core values of any society. In essence, ethics is part of normative science that looks into not what is but what ought to be. See also, Mustapha Hilmi, al-Akhlaq bayna al-Falasifah wa hukma’ al-Islam (Cairo, dar al-Thaqafah al-Arabiyyah, 1987), p. 506. 3 4

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On a conceptual level, there are fundamental differences between law (alQanun) and ethics (al-Akhlaq) from a Muslim point of view. While the law judges the external, extrinsic and visible actions of people, it also punishes crimes of murder and theft for example. Ethics on the other hand, has a wider scope. The most important element of ethics is related to the internal and intrinsic behaviour of people in terms of conscience, feelings, emotions, and intentions. Intention seems to be more valuable than the mere action.9 Similarly, every action has a specific reward (jaza’) or a penalty (‘uqubah). Penalty goes hand in hand with specific texts of the law. On the contrary, ethics from an Islamic perspective has a wider dimension and can be looked at from the following lenses: 1. A person expects a reward from his Creator in this world and the hereafter. This means that it is self-driven and not because of a certain law that may put checks or restraints on the person. The Quran explains: “Whosoever does right, whether male or female, and is a believer, him verily we shall quicken with good life, and We shall pay them a recompense in proportion to the best of what they used to do.”) (al-Nahal 16:97). Also, the Quran observes that “Verily! Those who love that slander should be spread concerning those who believe, theirs will be a painful punishment in the world and the Hereafter. Allah knows. You know not.”) (al-Nur 24:19) 2. An ethical act is something that a person feels in his/her consciousness. They feel about it in their being and inner emotions. They are either content and happy or irritant and uneasy.10 Sadness bothers an individual the most. It is caused by: • Jealousy and creates a continual feeling of sadness and regret; • It may be without a visible and manifest reason; • It may be due to a loss of good health, a dear friend, or an opportunity.11 3. Another difference between ethics and law is that from an ethical point of view, one would be disturbed by the fact that the society shuns them and does not approve of their acts and behaviour. That could be an important social.12 9 Al-maliji Ya’qub, al-Akhlaq fi al-Islam (Alexandria: mu’assasat al-Thaqafah al-Jami ‘iyyah, 1985), pp. 14-15. 10 Ya’qub, al-akhlaq fi al-Islam, pp.16-19. 11 Id. ibid., p. 20. 12 Id. ibid., p. 21.

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Thus, ethics is concerned with developing high values and the Quran therefore perfects those values in people and society in order to achieve internal peace and security (al-Amn al-dakhili). In essence, there are different understandings of ethical personalism, such as the American and the French, the Catholic and non-Catholic, the Islamic and non-Islamic.13 Although the focus of this paper is on the Islamic perspectives, it is recognised that personalism could have different layers of meaning. However, what may be affirmed, according to Jan Olof Bengtsson, is the recognition that human persons have “an intrinsic worth” and are not “equated by non-persons”.14 He also notes that personalism ‘develops a worldview that begins with immediate, selfconscious experience and interprets not only the life of the individual but the world at large in personalistic terms.” 15 One may assert that the complex nature of personalism lies in the claim that it goes beyond personalistic assertions about the person to the meta-narratives about the world. Here lies, one may claim, the relevance of the linkages between reason and revelation. Muslims believe that tawh¯ıd provides the normative framework for human behaviour and life. It is the conviction that there is no deity worthy of worship except Allah; and it affirms that the universe is not the result of chance. The universe is a cosmos, a systemic entity, not a chaos. It can be said that the Sufis were the ones to have developed the assertion that the knowledge of the religion cannot be separated from its spiritual-ethical practice. Their methodology is characterised by practical application (ist’m¯ al) of the verses of the Quran and the Sunnah.16 Although other Muslim scholars in other disciplines have touched upon this matter, it was the Sufis who developed a deeper understanding of the various practical ethical and spiritual dimensions of attributes such as repentance (tawbah), piety (wara’), trust (tawakkul) and contentment (rida’).17 As such it may not accept any segregation between the material and the spiritual, but it commands people to exert efforts and burn energies in order to construct a healthy and sound life. Therefore, material powers and resources should be welded together and utilised for the achievement of spiritual elevation and in the service of just ends, and not to shy away from the challenges of life. 13 Jan Olof Bengtsson, The Worldview of Personalism Origins and Early Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 1. 14 Ibid., p. 31. 15 Ibid. 16 Krsitin Zahra, Sufi Commentaries on the Qur’an in Classical Islam (London: Routledge Curzon, 2006), p. 29. 17 Id. ibid.

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It is believed that in this epistemology, the two readings are united and complementary in such a way that people are able to embark upon their role as caliphs. One cannot be independent of the other.18 The two readings refer to both of the reading of the scripture and of the universe. Tawh¯ıd is derived from the word wah,h,ada, which literally means, “one”. Indeed, the unity of God is the basis for the Islamic religion and is most expressive of the simple formula “la ilaha illa Allah” meaning “there is no God, but Allah.” It also implies the declaration of the Oneness of Allah and the realisation of His Unity in all of man’s actions. Another important principle as a corollary of tawh¯ıd is the concept of the unity of humanity. Repeatedly, the Quran has reminded us of the fact that mankind is of a single parentage. No doubt, mankind can be seen in many colours, ethnic groups, nations and tribes. But the underlying reason for this diversity is for people to know and understand each other. Indeed, the bottom line is piety and righteousness, taqwa. Islam rejects inherent social immobility. This is what is referred to as Creator-creation relationship to all humans.19 This concept of unity of humanity is clearly illustrated in the Quran.20 The verse explicitly amplifies that the only criterion of differentiation among humanity, in the sight of God, is the degree of their righteousness. In addition, an illustrious tawhidic principle is that humanity is of a single parentage.21 The above-mentioned two verses are addressed to the entirety of humanity. The following section will focus on how the person has been presented in the Quran. Thus, I will highlight the terms used to expound the concept of the person (insan) and other derivatives as (bashar) and (nas).

II. Person in Islamic Core Sources Regarding the person, the Quran has used three distinct terms, namely, (insan), (bashar) and (nas).22 Insan has been used in the Quran about sixty times illustrating different elements of the individual persons from their creation, their life in this mundane world and final destination after death. The Ibid., p. 96. Ismail Al Faruqi, Cultural Atlas of Islam (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 46-47. 20 Allah says “O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you into nations and tribes that ye may know each other. Lo! The noblest among you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Lo! Allah is Knower, Aware”. 21 Allah says: “O mankind! Be careful of your duty towards Allah in Whom ye claim (your right) of one another, and toward the wombs (that bore you). Lo! Allah hath been Watcher over you.” Quran, Al Nisa 4:1. 22 (Insan) maybe translated as person, (bashar) as human beings and (nas) as people. 18 19

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chapters and verses about the person discuss issues regarding the spiritual, emotional and psychological conditions and indeed the embryonic stage.23 Essentially, they elaborate personal relations, relations with oneself and relation with God. Similarly, the Quran has used the term bashar in order to highlight the nature of human beings from the perspectives of their genesis and their relations with different Prophets in different historical contexts. It is noted that the word (bashar) has been used in the Quran about forty times.24 As for the word (nas), it has been used about a hundred and eighty times in different connotations. Strikingly, one can recognise that the Quran has different levels of discourse with regards to the usages of (nas). Seemingly, they allow people to be reflective of their own genesis and parentage.25

III. Parentage of Humanity Islam strongly affirms that humanity is of a single parentage, namely Adam and Eve. This is the philosophy of Islam from whose prism it looks at humanity. Considering the humanity as a single family of Adam and Eve has two factors that they are all servants of Allah and that they are all from Adam. The fact that humanity is of a single parentage dictates knowing one another. The Quran refers to it as mutual cooperation (ta’aruf ). In fact, it is mandatory for different peoples, nations and races to know one another and not to despise one another. Islam also makes it a matter of principle for its adherents to conduct dialogue and even disagreement in an amicable and polite manner (h,usn¯a). Toshiko believes, on the one hand, that Islam represents one of the most “radical religious reforms” to have appeared in the East. Thus, Islam rejected many idolatrous beliefs of Arabia as incompatible with the divine revelation and adopted others. He suggests that there are three layers of moral discourse in the Quran: • Those that describe the ethical nature of God. • Those that describe the various aspects of human’s attitude towards God. See Quran, Al-Nisa: 28; Ibrahim: 34; Al-Hijir : 26 Maryam: 66-67 etc. See Quran, Al-Maidah: 18, 60; Ibrahim: 10,11; Al-Zumar : 17; Fussilat: 30. 25 See Quran, Al-Baqarah: 21, 24, 44, 94, 142, 143; Al-Furqan: 50m; Al-Hajj : 27, 40, 49, 65, 73. 23

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Alhagi Manta Drammeh • Ethical principles and rules that regulate the ethical relations among individuals living within the religious community of Islam.26

On the other hand, Hussein Abdul-Raof thinks that the Quran is “a code of conduct that can regulate the social system and cure social ills”.27 In the main, there are three main issues within the Quran, namely, belief system (aqidah), ethics (akhlaq) and law (fiqh) that ranges from the ritual of prayer (salah) to marriage and business transactions. 1. The creed or belief system (aqidah) informs us about the Creator of the creation (al-Kh¯ aliq), His Divine Attributes, articles of faith, life after death and accountability. This has led to the development of theology in Muslim thought referred to as ‘Ilm al-Kalam.’ 2. Ethics (akhlaq) is concerned with purifying the human soul and perfecting their behaviour. The aspect of Islamic thought deals with issues such as truthfulness, trustworthiness and fulfilling covenants and agreements. 3. Fiqh (translated as Islamic law/jurisprudence) is a set of practical rules that govern the life of a Muslim from birth to death.28 It is based on the efforts of a jurist (faqih) to extrapolate laws from the primary sources (Quran and Sunnah). This activity has led to the development of schools of jurisprudence (al-Madhahib al-Fiqhiyyah). It is reflective of the dynamism Muslim scholars have had over the centuries to date in terms of dealing with the scriptures and in order to respond to the daily challenges and new circumstances and problems. Ethics is indeed important to organise relations between the individuals of any particular society, protecting their interests and rights, as well as guaranteeing order and stability.29 Thus, the Islamic ethics emphasises the importance of personal freedom.

26 Izutsu Toshhik, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’an (London and Montreal: McGill Queen’s Press, 2002), p.16. 27 Hussein Abdul-Raof, Exploring the Qur’an (Dundee: Al-Maktoum Institute Academic Press, 2003), p. 85. 28 Ya’qub, al-Akhlaq fi al-Islam, p. 5. 29 Id., ibid., p. 14.

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IV. Personalism and Freedom:30 The Context of Islam Freedom is the absence of human coercive forces which would arbitrarily limit and curb decision. Seemingly, it is an essential part of Islam and the laws that follow are meant to regulate that freedom between the individuals and the groups. Individual liberty has been the concern of political thinkers, sociologists and theologians alike. Where does individual freedom begin and where does that of the group begin? Where do they converge and diverge? The distinction between public and individual spheres of freedom is worth looking. It is about the paradigms about individual act within the context of the entire society. This dichotomy between the individual and the group seeks to entrench values and ideals for both individuals and groups in such a way that all have to abide by for the prosperity of all. Without rules and regulations to govern those relationships, that freedom all aspire to espouse may be meaningless. This individual and collective relationship can therefore be managed through the mechanism of a powerful spiritual concept of the realisation of both the immanence and transcendence of God as embedded in piety (taqwa). The call for the abolition of all forms of deity except the One, is integral to the notion of freedom in Islam, which has resonance with the political notions of freedom. In fact, this notion transcends the duality of the mundane and ecclesiastical, the private and public, and the material and the spiritual. Freedom as an integral part of Islam aims at establishing a just society based on the rule of law (shar’iyyah qanuniyyah), respect of human dignity (karamat al-Insan) which is established by Islam and all other divine religions. The Quran states in no equivocal terms: “We have honoured the Children of Adam. . . .” (Al-Isra, 17:70) and “And he has subjected to you, as from Him, all that is in the heavens and on earth. . . ” (Quran, al-Jathiya, 45:13). Freedom has many dimensions and is closely associated with human reason, which is deemed as a blessing for mankind to explore and unravel the secrets not only of the universe but also of social, natural and even complex psychological laws and relations. This concept emphasises the importance of freedom through which individuals obtain their due recognition and are able to speak of their ideas without fear or retribution. It also proposes the 30 Muhammad Hashim Kamali in his Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1991) has presented a detailed outline about the concept of freedom (hurriyyah/ikhtiyar) within the Muslim thought. He has made interesting comparisons of the concept between the Muslim and non-Muslim traditions from linguistic, juristic and theological perspectives.

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precedence of the development of the personality of the citizens, allowing them to have more options and choices. Here comes the importance of interdependence between those individuals in order to make a prosperous society. This perhaps underscores that individuality can assert itself as long as it does not encroach upon others. Understandably, human happiness and social progress are contingent on the customs and traditions of the people. Freedom is an inherent and inalienable right of the individual in society. Freedom, it must be noted, is instrumental and relational in order to provide a conducive environment and good conditions for a good life in society. Giovanni Sartori makes an interesting point with regard to political freedom and liberty. He believes that the former will be meaningless without the latter. While political freedom is the idea, liberty or liberal freedom is its incarnation.31 Al-Attas defines freedom (ikhtiyar) as the choice between good and bad; and indeed to act according to one’s true nature (fitrah). Accordingly, the choice of good or better, or best is an act of justice (adl).32 Arguably, it can be asserted that this choice has to be based on knowledge and be a rational act detached from domination. Equally, it is a powerful spiritual and inward act that links the self with the sublime. The human freedom is closely associated with human dignity and the respect of the person.

V. Human Dignity Repeatedly, the Quran has reminded us of the fact that mankind is of a single parentage. No doubt, mankind can be seen in many colours, ethnic groups, nations and tribes. But the underlying reason for this diversity is for people to know and understand each other. Indeed, the bottom line is piety and righteousness taqwa. Islam rejects inherent social immobility. This is what is referred to as Creator-creation relationship to all humans.33 This concept of unity of humanity34 is clearly 31 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), pp. 305-306. 32 Syed Naquib Al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995), p. 33. 33 Al Faruqi, Cultural Atlas of Islam, pp. 46-47. 34 See Leaman, Oliver, “Islamic Humanity in 4/10 century,” in: Nasr Syyed Hossein and Leaman, Oliver (eds.) History of Islamic Philosophy, vols. 1, 2 (London and New York, Routledge, 1996). Oliver observes that Muslim scholars have paid a good deal of attention to “humanism” going back to Muslim philosophers such as Al-Farabi, Ibn Miskawayhi and Abu Sulayman al-Sijistani.

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illustrated in the Quran.35 The verse explicitly amplifies that the only criterion of differentiation among humanity, in the sight of God, is the degree of their righteousness. Furthermore, the Quran places the greatest value on the human life and the pre-eminent position of human beings. In fact, the Quran seems to equate the killing of one life as killing the entire humanity.36 Apparently, the two citations suggest that human life is sacred and inviolable. The two conditions laid down are that the human life must be protected against any violation and that avenues leading to corruption and mischief must be stopped. As such man has been made a vicegerent of God (kahlifat Allah) on earth in order to govern the world with justice and impartiality.

VI. Human Person as Vicegerent (Khalifah) The Quran has always given a positive picture and the role man should assume in this world as both vicegerent and servant. Tawh¯ıd makes it clear that God being both Beneficent and Purposive did not create humanity in vain. Rather, He has endowed them with senses, reason and understanding. He has also made them complete in the best form and breathed into them a spirit from Him in order to prepare them to be khalifah. Expounding on the notion of how the human being is honoured in Islam, Ismail Raji al-Faruqi claims that humanism in Islam springs from the conversation/dialogue God had with the angels in which God asked them to prostrate for Adam, the first person believed to be created by God.37 He adds Allah says “O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you into nations and tribes that ye may know each other. Lo! The noblest among you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Lo! Allah is Knower, Aware.” 36 See the Quran as in the following verses “If anyone killed a person unless it is for murder or for spreading mischief in the land it would be as if he killed all mankind, and if anyone saved a life it would be as if he saved the life of all mankind.” (Al-Maidah 5:32) and also “Nor take life—which Allah has made sacred—except for just cause. And if anyone is slain wrongfully, we have given his heir authority (to demand qisas or to forgive): but let him nor exceed bounds in the matter of taking life; for he is helped (by the Law.)” (Al-Isra 17:33). See also R. S. Downier and Elizabeth Telfer, Respect for Persons (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969). They highlight that respect for human dignity and person is an integral part of social morality, p. 38. 37 See the Quran (Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: “I will create a vicegerent on earth.” They said: “Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood?—whilst we do celebrate your praises and glorify your holy (name)?” He said: “I know what you know not.” And He taught Adam the nature of all things; then He placed them before the angels, and said: “Tell me the nature of these if you are right.” They said: “Glory to You, of knowledge We have none, save what you have taught us: In truth it is You Who art perfect in knowledge and wisdom.” (Al-Baqarah 2:30-33) He said: “O Adam! Tell them their natures.” When he had told them, Allah said: “Did I not tell you that I 35

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that the angels in their nature cannot deviate or deviate from the course of actions created for them by God. On the contrary, the humans are capable of obedience or disobedience because they make rational choices. The concept of caliphate (khilafah) according to Al-Faruqi is therefore transformation of human creation into the patterns of God including all good values and ethical imperatives. In addition, they are given lordship (taskhir) over nature in order to ably fulfil the task of khilafah.

Conclusion The paper has looked at the ethics of the person in the context of Muslim thought. It has argued that the dichotomy between the individual person and the collective body is superfluous as the collective is made by the individuals. Therefore, it is believed that both complement each other in a way that there should not necessarily be a clash or contradiction. Arguably, however, the Quranic discourses have emphasised significantly the role of the person and how individual actions can have a bearing on the collective in different aspects. Respect for the individual, their freedom and dignity will thus have far-reaching consequences for developing and creating a prosperous, cohesive and strong society. On the contrary, disrespecting the above values may lead to the destruction of the society. In this light, Capps asserts that it is important that the law is “practically reasonable” in that it provides necessary and conducive environment in order to allow individuals to have dignity.38 Also, the paper has looked at the ethical principles within Islamic core sources. I have made specific references to issues related to the person (insan), freedom and dignity. The paper has observed that the human life is inviolable and therefore sacred according to the scriptural interpretations of Islamic core sources. Indeed, it has been emphasised that respect for the person is the locus of human value and dignity. Thus, promotion of such values is largely related to the growth of society. Furthermore, ethical foundations regarding personalism can be found in the two primary sources of Islam, Quranic exegesis (tafsir), Sufi mystical writings and commentaries on philosophical treatises. I have also looked at the usages of (insan) and similar terms in the Quran and have shown how the Quran uses different discourses regarding the person.

know the secrets of heaven and earth, and I know what ye reveal and what ye conceal?” 38 Capps, P. M., Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart Publishing LTD., 2009), p. 103.

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Selected Bibliography —Abdul-Raof, Hussein, Exploring the Qur’an (Dundee: Al-Maktoum Institute Academic Press, 2003). —Al-Attas, Syed Naquib, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995). —Al Faruqi, Ismail, Cultural Atlas of Islam (London: Macmillan, 1995). —Al-Qaradawi, Sheikh Yusuf, Fi Fiqh al-Awlawiyyat [On the Jurisprudence of Priorities] (Damascus, Amman, Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islami, 1999). —Bengtsson, Jan Olof, The Worldview of Personalism Origins and Early Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). —Capps, Patrick, M., Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law (Hart Publishing LTD., 2009). —Downier, Robert S., and Telfer, Elizabeth, Respect for Persons (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969). —Kamali, Muhammad Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1991). —Leaman, Oliver and Syyed Hossein, Nasr, (eds.) History of Islamic Philosophy, vols. 1, 2 (London and New York, Routledge, 1996). —Sartori, Giovanni, The Theory of Democracy (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1987). —Toshhik, Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’an (London and Montreal: McGill Queen’s Press, 2002). —Zahra, Krsitin, Sufi Commentaries on the Qur’an in Classical Islam (London: Routledge Curzon, 2006). —Zaroug, Abdullah Hassan, “Ethics from an Islamic Perspectives. Basic Issues,” in: The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, vol. 16, Fall 1999, N° 3, pp. 45-63.

Chapter 6 The Confucian Ethical Vision in The Great Learning and Beyond Chen Xunwu University of Texas at San Antonio Texas, U.S.

Introduction We shall start with this simple but often forgotten fact: It is in reality that we exist; it is as persons that we live. This fact gives us a clue of the strength of ethical personalism. From the point of view of ethical personalism, as Max Scheler puts it, “the final meaning and value of the whole universe is ultimately to be measured exclusively against the pure being (and not the effectiveness) and the possible perfect being-good, the richest fullness and the most perfect development, and the purest beauty and inner harmony of persons, in whom at times all forces of the world concentrate themselves and soar upward.” 1 Ethical personalism “allocates to the becoming and being of the spiritual individuality of the person as the bearer of moral values.” 2 It “locates the highest and ultimate moral meaning of the world in the possible being of (individual and collective) persons of the highest positive value.” 3 As a result, in ethical personalism, the becoming of persons of spiritual in1 Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S.Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), xxiv. I am greatly indebted to John Crosby in understanding Scheler’s ethics. In particular, I benefit greatly from our many discussions of Scheler’s ethics many years ago, and his fine article, “The individuality of human persons: A study in the ethical personalism of Max Scheler,” The Review of Metaphysics, 52 (September 1998), pp. 21-50. 2 Ibid., p. 508. 3 Ibid., p. 572.

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dividuality is the foundational rock of the ethical-moral life. According to ethical personalism, it is in persons that “at times all forces of the world concentrate themselves and soar upward.” 4 Correspondingly, in ethical personalism, cultivation of the person as a whole is the focus of ethical-moral cultivation.

I This leads us to Confucian ethics. It is part and parcel of Confucian ethics to call for a return to the person as the bearer of ethical-moral values, the possessor of thoughts, the embodiment of social relations, the maker of choices, and the actor of actions in the social-ethical life. It is part and parcel of Confucian ethics to insist that persons constitute the rock foundation of the social-ethical life and cultivation of the person as a whole is the central focus of ethical-moral cultivation. As Tu Weiming indicates, in Confucian ethics, “the person in ordinary daily existence is the basis for the full realisation of humanity.” 5 In Confucian ethics, concrete persons in ordinary daily existence, not particular virtues that persons possess or particular faculties and social relations that persons have, constitute the rock foundation of the social-ethical life. In turn, cultivation of persons as concrete, flesh-blood individuals becomes the head-rope of ethical cultivation in Confucianism. Noteworthy, in Confucian ethics, personalised sages such as the sage-king Yao, the sage-king Shun and various others remain as paradigms of human existence and one of the most enduring sources of ethical values and meanings of human existence. Accordingly, cultivation of inner sage-hood in persons after the images of those sages is emphasised utmost in Confucian ethics. Dao Xue, the Confucian classic that is translated as The Great Learning in English, provides a paradigmatic illustration of Confucian ethics. The Great Learning outlines eight steps of Confucian ethical cultivation as the following: Since the ancient time, those who want to manifest their clear characters to the world (the globe) would first want to bring order to their nation-states; those who want to bring order to their nation-states would first want to regulate their families. Those who want to regulate their families would first want to cultivate their persons. Those who want to cultivate their persons would first want to rectify their minds. Those who want to recIbid., p. xxiv. Tu Weiming,Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University Press, 1993), p. 52. 4 5

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tify their minds would first want to make their intentionalities sincere. Those who want to make their intentionalities sincere would first want to extend their knowledge. Those who want to extend their knowledge would first want to investigate things. Only after things are investigated can knowledge be extended. Only after knowledge is extended can intentionality become sincere. Only after intentionality becomes sincere can the mind be rectified. Only after the mind is rectified can the person be cultivated. Only after persons are cultivated can a family be regulated. Only after families are regulated can a nation-state be put into order. Only after nation-states are put into order can there be peace throughout the world (the globe). Therefore, from the Son of Heaven down to the mass, all regard cultivation of the person as building the substance and the foundation (italic—mine).6 The Confucian program of ethical cultivation above has two distinctive features. One is its emphasis that cultivation of the person [as a whole] builds the substance and the foundation of the social-political, ethical-moral life. Among the eight-steps of ethical cultivation, cultivation of the person as a whole is the highest-goal of self-cultivation and the starting and foundational point of the ethical-political life in a family, a nation-state, and the world (the globe). Cultivation of the person builds the home or abode. Thus, The Great Learning quotes Confucius asking, “Even a yellow bird knows its home, how can a person be not as good as a bird?” 7 Another feature is the concept that the person is irreducible to his or her valuable traits, faculties, or activities. The concept exhibits itself in the fact that cultivation of the person as a whole is not identical to, or reducible to, the activities of rectifying the mind, making intentionality sincere, extending knowledge, and investigating things, though it presupposes these activities. In the concept of the irreducibility of the person as described above, the person as the embodiment of social relations is also not reducible to any of the social relations which the person embodies. He or she is not simply an aggregation or a web of these social relations. His or her personhood is a distinctive substance while those social relations which he or she embodies are attributes. Noteworthy, the concept that the person as a whole is not reducible to his or her traits, activities, faculties, or social relations is emphasised not only The Great Learning, in: The Four Books and Five Classics, Zhang Zheng De (ed.) (Chengdu, China: Ba Chu Publishing House, 1996), p. 4; Cf: Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 86-87. 7 The Great Learning, p. 10; Chan, A Source Book, p. 88. 6

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in The Great Learning, but also in The Analects. The Analects is a book of cultivation of “ren”. On this point, the Chinese word “ren” (“humanity”) homophones with another Chinese word “ren” (“the person”) and, therefore, means “ren” (“the person”) from time to time in The Analects. Indeed, in The Analects, the search for “ren” is in effect a search for universal humanity in some contexts and a search for personhood in other contexts and at times, the question of what is ‘ren” is in effect a question of what is personhood.8 On this point, Tu Weiming rightly reads “ren” in The Analects as a metaphor, not a particular value or characteristic trait of a person. “Ren” is a metaphor for personhood and for the person as a whole. In this sense, Confucius said: “Humanity stabilises the person. Knowledge does good to “ren” (“the person”).9 The concept of the irreducibility of the person to his or her activities, traits, faculties or social relations in The Great Learning is also at home with Mencius’ characterisation of cultivation of the person as “the method of establishing one’s fate.” 10 For Mencius, while fate is a web of “the causal and normative constraints on human activities,” a person himself or herself is the creator of his or her fate.11 The concept of the irreducibility of the person to his or her activities, traits, faculties or social relations corresponds further to Mencius’ emphasis that in his or her ethical existence, a person should arrive at the horizon of truth, beauty, and good.12 What Mencius emphasised was not merely that a person should embody some particular virtues or honour some particular social relations. Instead, it was that by bearing those human values and virtues and embodying those particular social relations, one as a whole should be elevated to become a person existing in a possibly perfect horizon of truth, beauty, and good. Further noteworthy, in The Great Learning, the person that is spoken of is a concrete, individual person, not an anonymous, universal human being in general. Admittedly, the person that is spoken of in The Great Learning is a member of a collective—for example, a family, a community, and a country (nation-state)—and an embodiment of social relations. That being said, he or she is an individual him or her in the full sense. In The Great Learning, each 8 Confucius, The Essence and Substance of the Analects (Lun Yu Zheng Yi), ed. Liu Bao Nan, in: Completed Works of Teachers (Zhu Zi Ji Cheng), vol. 1 (Beijing: Unity Publishing House, 1996), 1:2, 4:2, 13:27, 17:6, 19:6. 9 Ibid., 4:2. 10 Mencius, The Essence and Substance of Mencius (Mengzi Zheng Yi), ed. Jiao Shun, in Completed Works of Teachers, vol. 1, 7A1. 11 Kwong-Loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 78. 12 Mencius, The Essence and Substance of Mencius, 7B25.

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person is concrete and self-conscious of his or her concreteness. Each person is an individualised bearer of individualised vital energies, individualised social relations, individualised ethical fate, and the like. Each person differs from others in being and fate. Admittedly, all persons’ ethical paths—that is, ways of ethical cultivation—share some common points. And all persons share common humanity. All the same, the substantial content of each person’s ethical being differs from others’. The substantial content of each person’s task of ethical cultivation differs from others’. The collective does not cancel the individual. The universal does not replace the particular. On this point, a distinction exists between having a unique concept of the person of distinctive individuality and having no concept of the person as a distinctive individual. Confucian ethics as illustrated in The Great Learning has its own unique concept of individuality. In short, The Great Learning presents a distinctive Confucian version of ethical personalism that emphasises cultivation of the person as a whole, as a concrete, individual person of concrete social relations, and as an authentic individual person of particular destiny and fate. This version of ethical personalism calls for “the conscious intention of the person toward his own highest value.” 13 It prizes a person’s conscious endeavour to cultivate a personhood of great substance and spiritual individuality. It values utmost the value of the person in the ethical life. To appreciate this version of ethical personalism more, we shall analyse further the four steps of ethical cultivation leading to the step of cultivating the person and the step of cultivating the person itself in The Great Learning.

II Virtues are valuable, but the person as a whole values most. This Confucian maxim exhibits conspicuously in the four steps of ethical cultivation leading to the step of cultivating the person as a whole and the step of cultivating the person as a whole itself. The four preceding steps and the step of cultivating the person as a whole itself differ in task, content, focus, activity and objective. Here, were the step of cultivating the person as a whole itself reducible to any of the four preceding steps, we would be correct to hold that Confucian ethics as illustrated in The Great Learning is a form of virtue ethics, instead of a form of ethical personalism. As indicated above, the four steps of ethical cultivation leading to the step of cultivating the person as a whole are: investigating things, extending knowledge, making intentionality sincere, and rectifying the mind. In 13

Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, p. 501.

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content, these four steps divide between two categories: the first two steps are about making the person knowledgeable. The third and the fourth steps are about being back to the person as the bearer of values, the possessor of thoughts and traits, the maker of choices, the actor of actions and the embodiment of social relations. For example, the third step—making intentionality sincere—cultivates the virtue that “there is no self-deception in the person; a person’s intentionality must come from the person (himself or herself), akin to loving beauty and hating bad smell.” 14 The fourth step calls for a phenomenological return to the authentic mind of a person. Each of these four steps will contribute to pave the way for the step of cultivating the person as a whole, but is not a direct part of the step of cultivating the person as a whole itself. In terms of activity, the first two steps move the person outward, while the third and the fourth steps move the person inward. In the first two steps, the person as a whole believes, chooses and acts as a subject seeking knowledge. In the third and fourth steps, the person as a whole is the subject cultivating its intentionality and rectifying its mind. Noteworthy, in each of the four steps, the person as a whole is always the acting subject, not the object of action. Things, knowledge, intentionality, and the mind that are the objects of action are clearly distinguished from the person (as a whole) as the acting subject. In terms of focus, the first two steps concentrate on intellectually enlarging and extending the person, while the third step focuses on ethically-morally getting deeply and firmly in touch with the self of the person and the fourth step focuses on internal self-regulation. The first two steps indicate the inseparability of ethical cultivation and development of cognitive understanding and knowledge. The third and the fourth steps emphasise that ethical cultivation must focus on the person as the subject (of intentionality, reflection, appropriation, and judgment). Noteworthy also, in each of the four steps, the person as a whole is always the focusing subject, not an object of focus. Things, knowledge, intentionality, and the mind that are the objects of focus are clearly distinguished from the person (as a whole) as the focusing subject. Here, we find affinity between The Great Learning and The Analects. In The Analects, Confucius also emphasised that in ethical cultivation, a person should “set his or her will at the Dao, should abide by moral norms, should house himself or herself in becoming the person of humanity, and should equip himself or herself with technical arts”; he or she should “be inspired by poetry, establish himself or herself by following rites, and refine himself 14

The Great Learning, pp. 15-16.

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or herself through music”.15 In The Analects, cultivation of the person as a whole was not reducible to cultivation of virtues that he or she desires to possess. Instead, cultivation of the person as a whole was not only a distinctive step in its own, but also the purpose and an intrinsic value, while cultivating those desirable traits, virtues or capacities into a person was an instrumental value to cultivation of the person as a whole. Confucius thus said: “If it is not for cultivation of the person as a whole into full humanity, what is the point in emphasising ritual propriety?”; “If it is not for cultivation of the person as a whole into full humanity, what is the point in talking about refinement by music?” 16 This leads us to the step of cultivating the person as a whole itself. The first thing to note is that this step is an independent one, separable and not reducible to any of the four preceding steps, while the four preceding steps set the stage and create the necessary conditions for this step. If we take each of the four preceding steps as a step to cultivate one faculty of the person, the step of cultivating the person is a step of comprehensively cultivating the person as a whole. The person is the substance. What are cultivated in the four preceding steps are attributes. The step of cultivating the person is a step of building the substance. Second, the step of cultivating the person as a whole focuses on cultivating a comprehensive individual personhood, not on this or that particular virtue or trait—for example, courage—of a person. It is to build the possibly perfect being-good, the richest fullness and the most perfect development, and the purest beauty and inner harmony of an individual person, e.g., in Menciusan idiom, it is to build a person of truth, beauty, and good. This is where the difference lies between ethical personalism and virtue ethics. This is a reason that it is more correct for us to read Confucian ethics as a form of ethical personalism rather than as a form of virtue ethics. Third, in the Chinese phrase “xiu shen” (“cultivation of the person,”) the Chinese word for the person is “shen,” literally meaning “the body.” As Kwong-Loi Shun notes in the context of discussing the concept of self in Chinese philosophy, the word “shen” “is used to refer sometimes to the body and sometimes to the person as a whole.” 17 In The Great Learning, the word“shen” (“the person”) refers to the person as a whole—the person who is Confucius, The Essence and Substance of the Analects, 7:6, 8:8. Ibid., 3:3, 8:10. 17 Kwong-Loi Shun, “Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought,” in: KwongLoi Shun and David Wong (eds.), Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy and Community (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 183-199, at p. 187. 15 16

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a bearer of values, a possessor of thoughts and faculties, an actor of actions, and an embodiment of social relations. Fourth, The Great Learning recommends “junzi” (“authentic person”) as an ideal model of the person that one ought to be. For the purpose of our present enquiry, we should not be strict on the issue of the desirability and ideality of this model of the person here. Instead, we should focus on the fact that cultivation of the person as a whole has its content, focus, task, and objective; it has a task to build a personhood, e.g., a junzi -personhood in a person as a whole. Fifth, cultivation of the person as a whole includes the task to lift the person up to a possibly perfect horizon of existence. The Great Learning thus reads: “The essence of great learning [for a person] is to exemplify those bright virtues, to become creative and renovating, and to arrive at the possibly perfect horizon of existence.” 18 It further reads: “Only when one knows what kind of horizon one’s existence would arrive at can one be firm [in one’s endeavour]”.19 In other words, there are three objectives of ethical cultivation: an individual person exemplifies those bright virtues, an individual person becomes creative and constantly renovates himself or herself, and an individual person arrives at a possibly perfect horizon of existence. By “a possibly perfect horizon of existence,” The Great Learning refers to the Confucian horizon in which a person arrives at a total harmony with the universe at large, or in the Confucian idiom, the harmony of heaven, earth, and the person is achieved. Here, Confucian ethical personalism calls for not only a return to persons, but also elevation of persons to a possibly perfect horizon of existence. As Charles Taylor notes, “Things take on importance against a background of intelligibility. . . . One of the things we can’t do, if we are to define ourselves significantly, is to suppress or deny the horizons against which things take on significance for us”; “The agent seeking significance in life, trying to define him- or herself meaningfully, has to exist in a horizon of important question.” 20 In Confucian ethics, an authentic person is self-conscious of himself or herself against a background of intelligibility or under a horizon. By this token, a person also exists in a given horizon.

The Great Learning, p. 4. Ibid. 20 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 37, p. 40. 18 19

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Sixth, in The Great Learning, as it is in The Analects, the most important distinction is the distinction between a junzi (authentic person) and a xiao ren (a petty person).21 As indicated above, junzi is what one ought to be. Xiao ren is what one must not be. Cultivation of the person as a whole liberates one from conditions and possibility of becoming a xiao ren. This distinction again underscores the point that what matters here is not so much whether or not a given virtue should be cultivated in a person, or a person is excellent in a specific domain. Instead, what matters most is the kind of being which each person as a whole will be. What matters most is the kind of horizon of existence which he or she will arrive at. What matters most is the becoming and being of the destined person of distinctive individuality and right fate. What matters most is that a person lives as an authentic person, not merely exists in alienation and in loss of the self. In short, in The Great Learning, the value of the person as a whole is emphasised utmost. The value of cultivation of the person as a whole is also emphasised utmost. Thus, cultivation of the person as a whole is what the other four preceding steps of ethical cultivation should lead to, and the necessary foundation for the steps of regulating a family, bringing order to a state-nation, and bringing about peace in the world. The step of cultivating the person as a whole is thus the head-rope of ethical cultivation and builds the rock foundation of the ethical life of a community, as well as that of a state-nation and that of the globe. To live is not merely to exist. To live is to live as a person in an authentic whole.

III Who is the first to be awakened from the dream? The “I” must be the first to know the “I”. Confucian ethical personalism as illustrated in The Great Learning epitomises the substance of Confucian ethics in general. At the core of Confucian ethics is the call for a return to persons as the rock foundation of the ethical, social, and political life. While Confucian ethics emphasises that a good and happy life is possible only if persons operate with the norms of humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trust in the ethical life, it teaches building persons as the rock foundation of the ethical life. The Confucian ethical vision can be seen best in the light of Scheler’s following words: Each person must comfort himself as ethically different and different in value from every other person under otherwise similar organisational, psychic, and exterior circumstances—and he must 21

The Great Learning, p. 10, pp. 15-16.

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A few qualifications are in order here. Ethical personalism and virtue ethics share common points. Both of them emphasise the value of human excellence. That being said, ethical personalism differs from virtue ethics in focus and content. Virtue ethics focuses on virtues that are cultivated in a person, while ethical personalism focuses on the person as a whole or the personhood of a person. In ethical personalism, cultivation of virtues is not the purpose itself, but serves to cultivation of the personhood of a person. In virtue ethics, what matters is that a person possesses those desired virtues. In ethical personalism, what matters is that those virtues which are possessed by a person are in harmony with one another on the one hand and such a harmony cultivates a personhood in a manner of 1 + 1 >2 on the other hand—that is, in a manner in which the personhood of a person is not merely a simple aggregation of virtues, but a whole developed out of virtues. Correspondingly, the success or failure of ethical cultivation in virtue ethics is measured by whether or not the intended virtue is possessed by a person in the end. In comparison, the success or failure of ethical cultivation in ethical personalism is measured by whether or not a person as a whole is elevated to the intended level of being. In virtue ethics, a particular virtue is an intrinsic value in itself. In ethical personalism, a particular virtue is merely an instrumental value to the making of the person as a whole. The distinction between ethical personalism and virtue ethics can also be appreciated through a view of the relation which each has with the concept of shame. The concept of shame is a rise of personhood in ethical personalism. Thus, in The Analects, Confucius emphasised rites and morality for the ethical-political life because rites and morality cultivated a sense of shame in a person, which would guide the person to transform himself or herself in the ethical-moral life.23 When he was asked what was the most crucial criterion for being a person, Confucius answered: “Being able to regulate oneself by the feeling of shame.” 24 In Mencius, Mencius also emphasised that “a person must not be without a sense of shame.” 25 In Confucian ethics, one feels ashamed of oneself not so much because one has no this or that particular virtue as it is because as a whole one fails to be the kind of person which one aspires to be. One feels ashamed of oneself because one is below the expectation of one’s aspired personhood. Kwong-loi Shun tells us, “Hisu,. . . is Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, p. 509. Confucius, The Essence and Substance of the Analects, 2:3. 24 Ibid., pp. 13-20. 25 Mencius, The Essence and Substance of Mencius, 7A3. 22

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focused on the badness or the low standing of oneself as reflected in, or as likely to ensue from, the thing that occasions hsiu . . . To wu something is to dislike it.” 26 In comparison, in virtue ethics, when the feeling of shame is emphasised, the feeling is a rise of having no a particular virtue (or particular virtues), not so much of the failure to be an individual kind of person as the whole. The distinction between ethical personalism and virtue ethics can also be appreciated further through a view of the relation which each has with the concept of zhi xiang (aspiration for becoming a particular kind of person, the ideal of the self). The concept of zhi xiang is a rise of the sense of personhood and thus central in ethical personalism. In The Great Learning, it is emphasised that one must first establish one’s zhi xiang and horizon; only if one has known what horizon of existence one would aspire to arrive at can one be steadfast in one’s endeavour. The Analects also reads, “The commander of the three armies can be given away, but not a person’s zhi.” 27 Confucius would associate yielding one’s zhi xiang with insulting the person as a whole—that is, if one were not steadfast to one’s zhi xiang, one would insult one’s personhood.28 I Jing (The Book of Change) also reads: “An authentic person. . . preserves his integrity even in adverse circumstances. To realise his zhi xiang, he will transcend the opinions of others”; “Poverty cannot dissuade an authentic person from being steadfast to his ideal [even in poverty]. An authentic person is willing to devote his life to realise his zhi xiang.” 29 Now, while establishing one’s zhi xiang and horizon is central in the Confucian ethical life, a person’s zhi xiang is always personal. X’s zhi xiang is not Y’s, even if the two persons’ zhi xiangs share some common points. In virtue ethics, the concept of zhi xiang is not central or personal. Confucian ethical personalism is not individualism. As Tu Weiming indicates, from the point of view of Confucian ethics, “one can endorse an insight into the self as a basis for equality and liberty without accepting Locke’s idea of private property, Adam Smith’s and Hobbes’ idea of private interest, John Stuart Mill’s idea of privacy, Kierkegaard’s idea of loneliness, or the early Sartre’s idea of freedom.” 30 Confucian ethical personalism as illustrated in The Great Learning emphasises cultivation of persons as the rock foundation of the social, ethical, and political life. That being said, Confucian ethical 26 Kwong-Loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 59-60. 27 Confucius, The Essence and Substance of the Analects, 9:26. 28 Ibid., 18:8. 29 I Jing, notes by Fang Fei (Xinjiang, China: Xinjiang Youth Publishing House, 1999), p. 190, p. 311. 30 Tu, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, p. 78.

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personalism does not entertain the view that an individual person is, and can be, an isolated island. It emphasises personhood, not egoism. Essential to the concept of the person in Confucian ethical outlook are the concepts of social value, social responsibility and obligation, self as an embodiment of social relations, and the like. In individualism, these concepts are totally marginalised, if they exist at all. Confucian ethical personalism shares common points with humanism. Indeed, Confucian ethics is often labelled as humanism today with good reasons. In Confucian ethics, the norm of humanity is one of the five core norms (other four are righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trust). The quality of humanity is part of the universal property of the personhood of each individual person. Also, Confucianism shares the Kantian view that “Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing can ever be made.” 31 That being said, Confucian ethics is a form of ethical personalism rather than a form of humanism. The rock foundation of Confucian ethics is not humanity in abstract and universal, but human persons in concrete and particular—that is, in individuality. The quality of humanity is at the core of each person’s personhood. However, each person’s personhood consists not only of universal humanity. The person in Confucian ethics is not merely a human being, but also an individual person having his or her social relations—including familial, communal, and national relations—and fate. The rock foundation of humanism is always the concept of universal humanity in abstract. In connection with the above, in Confucian ethics, those norms such as loyalty, piety, trust, friendship, generosity, and the like are also human ethical norms of conducts and practices. In comparison, norms such as loyalty, piety, trust, friendship, generosity, and the like are not necessary norms of humanism. These norms are applicable to individual persons, not to humanity in abstract. While the person in Confucian ethics should embody and realise general humanity, humanity is substantialised concretely and individually in persons. Thus, for example, filial piety and brotherly love are root sentiments that internalize humanity as the value, property, and standard within the person.32 While piety and brotherly love might be universal human feelings, their contents for each person differ from those for others. A person internalizes humanity within himself or herself by his or her concrete, individual, substantialised senses of filial piety and familial love. No wonder, in The Analects, as well as 31 “Aus so krummem Holze, als woraus der Mensch gemacht ist, kann nichts ganz gera des gezimmert warden.” Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1923), vol. 8, p. 23; cited by Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. v, xi. 32 Confucius, The Essence and Substance of the Analects, 1:5.

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in The Great Learning, the method of humanity is to reflect what is near at hand and “one’s own existence, body and mind, provides the primary context wherein the Way is pursued concretely.” 33 Correspondingly, even though Confucian philosophers often talk about human nature, Confucian ethics is not based on an assumption of some kind of universal human nature, while the ethics of humanism is grounded in an assumption of the universal human nature. Admittedly, in Confucian ethics, cultivation of the person and nurturing the human nature of this person go hand in hand. The Doctrine of Mean even reads: “What is endowed in the person is called the nature, and following the nature is called the Dao.” 34 The Confucian master Mencius talked about extending one’s mind and knowing one’s nature. That being said, Confucian ethics is not grounded in the concept of some kind of a priori human nature, e.g., the Kantian concept of human nature. In addition, when the Confucian concept of human nature that connotes what is endowed in each individual person individually is evoked by Confucian thinkers, what is conceived to be endowed in the human nature of a person is not purely universal, but both universal and particular. For example, what is endowed in the nature of a person is also the seed of his or her fate. However, fates of different persons differ from one another. Thus, Confucius would say, “he or she who does not know his or her fate cannot be a junzi (authentic person).” 35 Confucianism is often criticised for its alleged de-emphasis on persons as individual persons and alleged over-emphasis on persons as members of a community or collective. This criticism is unjustified. First, even if one can make a case that Confucianism does not emphasise individual rights as Western ethics does—a main “reason” which the criticism mentioned above evokes, it does not follow that Confucianism does not emphasise the individuality of a person. The key is the fact that the concept of the individuality of a person is not co-extent with the concept of a person’s individual rights. A person’s individuality indicates that the person is a flesh-blood, concrete one, not merely an instance of the collective or the universal. Second, even if Confucianism emphasises that a person is an embodiment of social relations and belongs in a particular community, it does not follow that Confucianism does not emphasise persons as individual persons. The key is the fact that a person’s embodiment of social relations is concrete, particular, and personal. For example, X has two brothers and one sister while Y has only one sister. X belongs in one family group and has various relatives, while Y belongs in Tu, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, p. 67. The Doctrine of Mean, in: The Four Books and Five Classics, Zhang Zheng De (ed.) (Chengdu, China: Ba Chu Publishing House, 1996), ch.1. 35 Confucius, The Essence and Substance of the Analects, 20:3. 33 34

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another family group and has different relatives. All these differences will make X and Y two different individual embodiments of social relations. In conclusion, as we learn fromThe Great Learning, Confucian ethics is one of ethical personalism. At the core of Confucian ethical personalism is its phenomenological call for a return to concrete, flesh-blood persons in the ethical life. According to Confucian ethical personalism, while humankind lives and non-human animals only exist, only when persons first live, then humanity lives. It is in reality that we exist and it is as persons that we live. That much we know, and that much we ought to know. ——————

Selected Bibliography —Berlin, Isaiah, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). —Chan, Wing-Tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). —Confucius, The Essence and Substance of the Analects (Lun Yu Zheng Yi), ed. Liu Bao Nan, in: Completed Works of Teachers (Zhu Zi Ji Cheng), vol. 1 (Beijing: Unity Publishing House, 1996). —Kant, Immanuel, Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1923). —Scheler, Max, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S.Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). —Shun, Kwong-Loi, “Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought,” in: Kwong-Loi Shun and David Wong (eds.), Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy and Community (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). —Shun, Kwong-Loi, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). —Taylor, Charles, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991). —The Great Learning, in: The Four Books and Five Classics, Zhang Zheng De (ed) (Chengdu, China: Ba Chu Publishing House, 1996). —Weiming, Tu, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University Press, 1993).

Part III Personalism Revisited

Chapter 7 Community, Persons, and the Case of Faked Identity Michał Bardel Collegium Civitas Warsaw, Poland In the recent cinema production by Ridley Scott based on the tale of brave Robin Hood, we come across a philosophically interesting circumstance: Robin Longstride returns from a military campaign, where he served King Richard the Lionheart, in order to keep the promise given to the dying Sir Robert Loxley—to give back the sword that belongs to his father, Sir Walter Loxley. Robin fulfils the promise, whereas Sir Walter, thus notified about the death of his son and the only heir, decides to save the family wealth by means of a small mystification: Robin will pretend to be the deceased Sir Robert, the husband of Lady Marion. Robert had left Nottingham ten years earlier so there is a chance that nobody in the small town will spot the change. It quickly turns out that Robin in disguise of Sir Robert does not raise anyone’s suspicion. He makes use of privileges of his new personality and deals well with the role. Although this situation is transitional, we can freely imagine it with a long-term status. What is more, we can also imagine that old grey-haired Robin alias Robert dies, and the estate is passed to his and Marion’s children. He is buried in the local graveyard with an inscription saying ‘Sir Robert Loxley, requiescat in pace’. Nobody in Nottingham, even nobody in the entire England, including his children and the most outstanding experts of medieval English history, will ever be aware of the true identity of the deceased. As far as I can tell, this type of story—let us call it the ‘Case of the Faked Personality’ or more briefly: ‘The Case of Robin Loxley’—has not been seriously considered until now. And it certainly raises questions. Are we here

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dealing with a mere hoax? Will it be sufficient to refer to it in categories of lie, swap or mystification in order to invalidate the identity issue included in this story? I am afraid it will not. Sub specie aeternitatis, that is, in our case, from the point of view of a spectator in the cinema, we possess the knowledge about the ‘real’ identity of the character. However, one needs to assume that in true reality this knowledge could only be available to Robin himself. So if we were to discuss the real identity here, its character is in fact subjective. It is—in other words—the ‘I’ identity of Robin alias Robert, the self-identity understood in categories of self-reflection. Robin is Robin only for himself. For others, he is Robert Loxley husband of Marion, son and heir of Sir Walter. This ‘for others,’ the discourse of the non-subjective identities, cannot be easily ignored. We can point out that what occurs here is a mere mistake. However, this mistake has far-reaching and quite real effects. Robin alias Robert can go down in history with the entire range of acts and words which will be Robert’s acts, although only one Robin will be aware that they are in fact Robin’s. Or perhaps they will be in fact Robert’s acts? And so there exists—one cannot possibly deny it—an inarguable and subsisting, non-subjective identity of Robert Loxley. Whether we like it or not, it is the same kind of personal identity that we usually assign to every man, every person that we deal with.

I. Person as a Description of Human Being Let us—for a moment—leave the Case of Robin Loxley aside in order to distinguish a few terminological matters. Since the questions of substantiality, primordiality and generally of ontological status of person have for centuries consistently resisted all attempts to prove and justify, in this paper I make an arbitrary decision based on a belief that this particular choice will shed more light on these dark issues. I propose to comprehend person neither as the fundamental primitive being, how e.g., Strawson would like it to be, nor as individual substance, just like Boethian tradition preaches, nor as the general term or universal allowing for straight identification and assigning the appropriate name to particular being.1 I propose to consider it as one of the possible descriptions of human being (or simply: man). By the ‘description,’ for the sake of accuracy, I understand certain modus of reference dependent on the relation between the describens and the descriptum. Above all it is dependent on ‘location’ of Robert Spaemann’s critical account on that matter can be found in his Personen. Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen >etwas< und >jemand< (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996), p. 11. 1

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the describing. It is not about the axiologically engaged description, neither about the axiological status of the described (Spaemann’s nomen dignitatis).2 It is not about the description of a being existing in a particular (e.g., rational) way, as Richard of St. Victor seems to introduce the person in his dispute with Boethian individuae substantiae rationis naturae. When I call ‘person’ as one of the descriptions of human being, dependent on the location of the describing, I understand it in the simplest way: one and the same thing (here: a man, a human being) can be described from various locations: once as ‘I’ or ‘Self’ in the act of self-reflection, another time as ‘Thou’ in the exclusive relation described in the Twentieth century tradition of philosophy of dialogue; on other occasions simply as ‘person’. Appealing to this straight, nominalistic and common-sense tradition of thinking about person in categories of description, I am driven by desire to avoid exhausting aporiae and barren disputes into which the issues associated with the identity of person were entangled in Twentieth century. I also have some hopes of avoiding notorious tendency to apply restrictions and conditions of the possibility not that much of being person (it is still a deeply philosophical matter), but the possibility of being recognised as person, most often leading to expressed or unexpressed conclusions that being a person is an almost unattainable objective, not very far from being a saint. Or—that we are persons only from time to time, spending most of our life in impersonal dimensions (e.g., when we are sleeping,3 not to mention the period of childhood or states of insanity, dementia or mental illness). I am also driven by desire—perhaps rooted in my phenomenological background—to concentrate on what person is in our universal experience, that is how we experience someone else’s or our own being a person. I am much less drawn to answering questions such as what a person should or must be. Being a witness of many disputes on comprehending the notion of person, particularly the ones in the analytical tradition, I tend to build a solid opinion that it is a philosophically perilous category. The threat that I notice here grows out of the common preoccupation with the so-called Personalistic Norm, which permanently connects the idea of person with the requirement of treating it as a subject of special dignity. It is easy to observe this takeover already on the level of colloquial language when the notion is put beside other descriptions of human being. They usually carry an attempt of axiological reinforcement. And so, even though we still carry on fundamental disputes about the very meaning of the word ‘person,’ about the designatum of this See. op. cit. p. 10. Cf. John Locke’s remarks in his XXVIIth chapter of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding or Derek Parfit’s, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). 2 3

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notion, we in fact agree without words that whatever it would mean and whatever it would stand for, it raises its designatum to higher axiological dimensions. An entire sequence of traps lies waiting for researchers of person. It has much to do with the simple yet deceptive distinction between person and thing (Locke, Spaemann, Strawson and others). It is quite obvious that this type of duality disregards the differences occurring between the notion of person and self-reflexive ‘I’ or even the simple concept of man. In the outstanding analysis by Crosby, for example, the category ‘I’ is left hidden below the surface of subjective dimension of human person.4 Similarly, Sokolowski carries out a penetrating analysis of various ways of speaking ‘I’ in his superb phenomenology of the human person.5 In fact, in many recognised works on the subject of person it would be enough to change the word ‘person’ for ‘human being’ or ‘rational being’ (by reverence for Locke’s talking parrot) and we would receive the right dichotomy: man—thing or the rational being— thing. We would even move straight back to Cartesian res cogitans and res extensae. If so, what new and important account on the person are we learning here?6

II. Person versus Other Descriptions of Human Being We refer to a man differently than to a thing—we use various descriptions dependent on the location of the describing subject. A chair can be an object Cf. John F. Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996). 5 Cf. Robert Sokolowski, Phenomenology of the Human Person (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 6 I have myself fallen to temptation of this simple yet misleading dichotomy of person and thing (see Michał Bardel, and Tadeusz Gadacz, “Osoba,” in: Bogdan Szlachta (ed.), Słownik społeczny (Krakow: WAM, 2004), pp. 783-799. Yet, another temptation arises here, namely the temptation of introducing a type of super-notion that could have been opposed to things/objects and that would embody all these descriptions as ‘I,’ ‘person’ or ‘man’. This would be all the more worthy also because this super-notion would easily comprise God Himself (who certainly deserves to be differentiated from things), Locke’s thinking parrot, artificial intelligence etc. If we were to find a good name for the super-notion we could turn back to an old concept of ‘rational being,’ ‘self-essence,’ ‘selfconsciousness,’ Dennett’s Intentional System or Sartre’s ‘being-for-itself’. Nonetheless, I believe we should resist this temptation and satisfy ourselves with the notion of ‘man,’ which is sufficient enough to be discerned from things/objects. Then, if we decide to apply personal description towards God, thinking machine or some clever parrot, it will be understandable enough in terms of analogy, not without an effort of anthropomorphisation. Yet, at the end of the day, this is man, who is the only rational being that we can intermediately experience. 4

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of man’s description, but it cannot hope that it alone will describe itself, or that it will become the subject of the description of another chair. The man can be, and is, described also from these additional perspectives. We can refer to a man with descriptions that can be either subjective (when I am interested in myself as ‘I’) or objective, where we have at least two possibilities: we can describe another man as an individual (human being, man) or as a person.7 There is also the somewhat mysterious description ‘Thou’, which has neither the objective, nor the subjective character. Therefore it is not obvious—at least if we remain on traditional epistemological ground—whether it is still possible to call it a description. Let us then examine the basic typology of the description exploiting the straight gradations: subjective, intersubjective and objective. 1. Subjective Definition (‘I’) Description ‘I,’ as it has been said before, has a strictly subjective character8 and is the only one of that kind. It is formed by reference to oneself (selfreflection). In thinking about man, its strong position has been developed with Descartes’ meditations. It seems that, treating this matter in a Cartesian manner, when speaking of identity, this description is the strongest and most certain (the confidence originates from the indisputable cogito). Independently of unpredictable changes and complication in the dimension of personal identities, ‘I’ remains a long-lasting and unchanging point of reference. However, regardless of all its undoubted virtues, this description is strictly subjective: I can experience and describe but one human being in the universe—myself. 2. Objective Description (‘Man’) It may seem that this description does not require any explanation. Its objectivity comes from the fact that we do not have any cognitive access to man qua man. The cognitive access is possible with the aforementioned subjective description (where we reach the ‘ego’), and with the intersubjective description discussed below (where we reach the man through his or her ‘person’). It can be said in a Kantian manner that objective description ‘man’ is noumenal (contrary to phenomenal descriptions of ‘I’ and ‘person’). Describing the See e.g., Robert Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 8. In terms of phenomenological reflection, yet not without Michael Novak’s limitation: “The subject that is now an object of my reflection is the subject of previous acts, not the subject who is now reflecting”—see his Belief and Unbelief. A Philosophy of Self-Knowledge (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966), p. 76. 7

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man qua man we refer to the pre-assumed unity of the universal, but we do so only on account of the observations taken from the self-reflection (subjective description) or reflection on others (intersubjective description). In the process, the objective description proves correct in the function of the ‘supernotion,’ in which, as in a lens, both subjective and intersubjective experience converge. Owing to this, the description works very well also as initial and basic one in sciences, such as biology, theology or economics. These sciences emphasise referring of the category of man to the world surrounding him.

3. Intersubjective Description (‘Person’) As it has been stated before, the personal description is the second (besides the self-reflection) possible means of cognitive reference to a man. I claim that this description is available exclusively through relation to community, or—even more precisely—through referring the community (of other persons) to the particular man. The person is the dimension of myself owing to which I participate in community, I communicate with others and am identified by them as such. Person constitutes a certain type of external expression of myself. Obviously, because it is an external expression, my own person is given to me equally indirectly as it is given to others. I can of course reflect on myself as person. However, this type of reflection will be distant from the pure clarity of ‘I’. I will reflect on myself as a person more or less with the same dose of indirectness and objectivity with which I refer cognitively to every other person. I cannot, however, rule out the possibility that from time to time, or perhaps even usually, my experience of myself as person will be poorer than the experience of others referring to it. The fact that I often happen not to pay back the money I borrowed can escape my notice and I shall not perceive it as something constitutive of my person. More than certainly, it will not escape the attention of my creditors as easily. Similar situations may include the possible slovenliness of clothes, abuse of certain words or a long list of traits which are more easily noticed in other persons than in myself. Is this inability to spot certain faults (or virtues, maybe) in myself the reason to regard my own perceiving of my person as more reliable, more real than others’ perceiving of my person? It would seem it is the opposite way. Although it is hard to treat it as a universal rule, I claim that for my person qua person the knowledge that others have on me is more relevant than my own self-knowledge. After all, each of us experiences this unpleasant duality of personal narrations, when our own self-assessment differs from the one that others managed to develop. And for this reason it is also possible that the identity of Robert Loxley is

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not solely fiction, but the true identity of a person with this very name, even if it was the shrewd Robin Hood hiding behind it. 4. Dialogical ‘Description’ (‘Thou’) The Twentieth century philosophy of dialogue (Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas et al.) has broadened the list of possible interpersonal references with the one expressed by the second person. That dialogical relationship (I–Thou), as can be seen clearly in Buber’s account,9 exceeds the cognitive dimension so far that it is rather impossible to include it within the simple categories of objective–subjective. This relationship, which defies linguistic expression, does not present an interesting case for us at the moment, as it extends beyond the cognitive discourse, does not experience the other but enters into an intimate relationship with him. Its existence outside the area of description does not seem to contribute much to the concepts of person and community, at least in this context. The word ‘description’ is put in quotes here precisely for this reason.

III. Person and Community For the sake of illustration let us summon here again the tale of Robin alias Robert Loxley. What right do we have to claim that after the death of real sir Robert and thanks to clever Robin Hood the personal identity of the former has been supported and retained? What makes the person survive in spite of the death of a man? I believe that the substrate of the existence of a person is the community to which he or she belongs. The personal identity is possible only on the social base. This very direct and indissoluble connection of person and community constitutes the fundamental thesis of this essay. The thought alone is not new. Voices noticing the importance of this report appear in discussion on issues of the person from time to time. Smith10 says directly that one should understand persons as strictly social beings, created, constituted and appearing exclusively in society. Also Strawson11 seems to comprehend the person exclusively in relation to the community of other persons, although he does not draw essential conclusions from it. And the consequences of such a thesis seem significant. 9 See Michał Bardel, “Miejsce świata rzeczy w XX-wiecznej filozofii dialogu,” in: Małgorzata Kitowska-Łysiak, Marcin Lachowski (red.), Rzecz i rzeczowość w kulturze XX i XXI wieku (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2007). 10 See. W. C. Smith, “Thinking About Persons,” Humanitas (1979, 15), pp. 147-152. 11 See Peter F. Strawson, “Reply to Mackie and Hide Ishiguro,” in: Zak Van Straaten (ed.) Philosophical Subjects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

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Firstly, it indicates a fundamental revolution in the popular thinking about community, namely that persons create the community. I believe it is the other way around. Community is created by human individuals, whereas persons appear only as a result of such community constitution. Let us imagine, that the local dairy is deciding to play a football match with the local brewery. Until the forming of the teams, dairymen will be dairymen (but also fathers, neighbours, Catholics, etc.) and brewers will be brewers. But when the first whistle is blown, each of them becomes a player at the same time. To the current list of descriptions one more is added—the only one essential for the community gathered on the field. It is possible to say that team requires players but it does not indicate that players are primary in relation to the team. Community is first in relation to person, and so person is not—because it cannot be—an independent, autonomous substance. Such an observation seems to shake the foundations of Stern’s personalism (although not in its principle moral demand). It also challenges Strawson’s thesis of the primitiveness of the person and the thing.12 The view about the priority of community to person is taken also into consideration by Spaemann, although at the end of the day he abandons it. According to him, the person is nomen dignitatis and as such it would each time require a special act of acknowledgement by the community, which is of course difficult to imagine.13 Since John Locke formulated the criterion of personal identity appealing to the sameness in different moments of time (it is often discussed as the identity of memory), this thesis has not been criticised too often. As if for philosophers it did not matter whether they were talking about the identity of a person or the self-identity of ‘I’. Undoubtedly the constitution of a person must assume the identity in time as the necessary condition. However it is not—according to what was said before—self-identity reflected on by the subject itself, but the identity reflected on by other persons. Somebody can say about me: ‘He is not the same person anymore’—and although in most cases these words will be metaphorical, it is easy to imagine that for some reasons I became unrecognisable for my neighbour (for example as a result of a mental illness). Obviously, at the same time I will retain my self-identity in a completely intact state. It is not by chance that psychology uses the related term of personality to describe the concept that surrenders to certain changes, alterations, development and decline with the passing time (while our ‘I’ stays unchanged). Which similarly does not change much in his division of predicates (it is quite enough to assume, that P-predicates do not demand persons but can be equally applied to men). 13 See Robert Spaemann, op. cit., pp. 252-264. 12

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In this sense one needs to be reconciled with the fact that a psychologist can have more to say about my personality than I know about it. At the same time however one should remain sceptical about to what extent a psychologist can say anything about one’s ego. Because ego is given to us exclusively in an introjective self-reflection—personality, however, constitutes the sum of what we are able to communicate to others. All attempts to limit the applicability of the notion of person towards human individuals seem to confirm the thesis propagating the close relationship between person and community. Traditional concepts of person—e.g., Scheler’s (and later Ingarden’s) phenomenological project—seem to narrow this category to the individuals capable of making conscious intentional acts (the so called requirement of sanity), thus denying small children and mentally handicapped the name of person. It is worthwhile pointing out that sanity is not a condition to be judged subjectively. It requires a tribunal of other persons and it takes place in the dimension of interpersonal communication,14 resp. in the area of a certain community. Similarly in the case of all conceptions that define persons in the wide context of rights and obligations (Kant)—with neither allowing the possibility to free oneself of the community context. It is worthwhile here to appreciate the exceptional shrewdness with which the authors of the contemporary conception of human rights—having grown out of Kant’s Personalistic Norm—have decided not to talk about rights of person, but appealed instead to the wider, objective category. (Owing to that, perhaps, we are not discussing today whether one should regard small children forced into military service or babies sold for illegal adoption as subjects of human rights, or whether one should delay with their protection until they grow up and achieve personal status). This example shows quite clearly that resignation from the exceptional status of person (nomen dignitatis) does not ignore the most important moral demand of personalism, stating that the person should always be treated as the sole purpose and never as a means. For this demand, in harmony with the fundamental Kantian expression, entails the purposive treatment of humanity within one’s person or within that of the other’s (Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person als in der Person eines jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloss als Mittel brauchst).15 What is more, there is no difference between these two versions. The man qua man, as the specimen of his own kind, has a peculiar dignity which one should respect. In situations This is probably why we assent the possibility of at least partial (per analogiam) impersonification of animals (the case of Locke’s parrot). We guess that they participate in some type of community relationship; that they communicate with us. 15 Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, par. 429. 14

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in which I can respect or trample this dignity, that man (it can be me as well) is perceived by me as person (and only this way). Thus I am allowed to say that a person deserves this respect. In this particular case it is possible to apply both descriptions interchangeably. Therefore, to maintain moral demands of personalism requires neither the thesis about the substantialism of person nor the belief about its primitivism or autonomy. It would be certainly worthwhile to examine how we perceive this special value that is being conferred onto another person. It appears that even here we would also easily discern significant reference to community as the primordial substrate. The other man that I am looking at, although belonging to the world of my experience populated by various objects, he or she clearly differs from these objects. He is not me. He is neither a chair nor a stone; he is not an ordinary thing. He is something between me and things/objects; he possesses features that make him resemble both me and thing/object properties. I am not able to experience him like myself (by introspection), but for some reason I also feel that I should not experience him like a chair or a stone. What are the reasons? Perhaps I notice his uniqueness. It already constitutes an essential trait distinguishing him from objects (he has a face, name, a surname and a history—I will not mistake him for another man, what often happens in case of chairs and stones). I experience this uniqueness of another man (of his person, because this is what I perceive) undoubtedly by means of empathy (Einfühlung). I am guessing that this person, like myself, has the internal, individual structure of ‘I,’ that is capable of self-reflection, that constitutes a being-for-itself. And so its dignity is a consequence of my own dignity, the place singled out in the hierarchy of beings it owes largely to my belief about my own distinguished place in the universe.

IV. Person as a Role This way of understanding person in categories of one of possible descriptions of human being (which itself grows out of its location within a community) not only seems to satisfy our common sense, but also has a rich ancient tradition. It is actually possible to say without exaggeration that the history of the notion of person is consolidated exactly in such an understanding and starts from it. Latin persona points directly to the Greek prosopon meaning ‘(drama) mask,’ worn by Greek actors to express the ‘personality’ of the character portrayed toward the audience. In Hellenist era this word became independent and its meaning broadened to: ‘face,’ ‘look,’ ‘facial expression’. The tradition in which comprehending person constitutes a straight linguistic intuition gradually gave way to a more philosophical definition toward

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the end of the ancient era. It owed to the famous formulation by Boethius (5th/6th c.) included in Liber contra Eutychem et Nestorium, where person is called individual substance of rational nature. With Boethian definition a brand new substantial period started in the career of the Latin category of persona. It is not of my interest right here though. It leads to a vast amount of difficulties, collisions and controversy (starting with Trinitarian disputes) which I would like to omit as far as possible. Staying in the field of early Christian tradition I would like to stop for a while on one of Biblical quotations. It surely calls for an enlightening interpretation and has an additional virtue—it directly mentions the category of ‘person’. So it appears to me, although I have no professional competence here, that the presented concept allows us to cast some light on it. The quotation comes from the letter of St. Paul to the Galatians: ‘God does not look at a person’ (Gal 2, 6). Spaemann16 aptly mentions this passage as an example of the traditional understanding of the person as a role being played in the world (as a dramatis personae on a theatre poster). However, answering his own question—‘What, in that case, is God looking at?’—he appeals to the newer understanding of person and states: ‘God looks at. . . persons. He looks precisely at what we would today call persons’. It looks like the term ‘person’ has changed its meaning so radically that even God himself can no longer discern it. It is my deep desire to reveal such understanding of the person that will assure us that the sentence ‘God does not look at persons’ means exactly this and nothing less or opposite. I read this statement in the context of the Apostle’s full sentence: ‘As for the men of great authority, what they were before, for it I am not caring; God does not look at a person’. The man can judge another man only ‘looking at a person,’ that is on the basis of acts and their effects. He has no full knowledge about motives and intentions, and so he does not reach back to the ‘I’ of another man. God on the contrary—He does not have to judge according to the ‘mask’. He does not look at the outside expression. God looks into us, into our ‘I’. And He does so at least as precisely as we do. Should we really avoid understanding person as a description of a role that human being plays on the stage of life? For there is nothing humiliating or offensive for us in playing a role. There is no need to return to questions of nature of human freedom either. What I have in mind here is playing the role in terms of Jozef Tischner’s philosophy of drama,17 where the world is a stage, and our life is a drama in which we participate as actors (dramatis personae). See Robert Spaemann, op. cit., pp. 13-14. See Joseph Tischner, Das menschliche Drama: phänomenologische Studien zur Philosophie des Dramas (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1989). 16 17

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It is not about you pretending to be someone else. It is about your authentic pretending to be yourself, rooted in the inevitable difference between your subjective self-description and the personal description of yourself. We live, we communicate, we work, and all these activities build—both in our eyes and in the eyes of community—images of our persons. We may identify with it more or less closely. An actor who modulates his voice while asking his wife whether she fed the dog or a soldier placing children in a row to check the effects of evening bath are only extreme and very obvious examples of the first possibility. People who are more self-confident and self-satisfied seem to demonstrate a poorer identification with their persons, like a man ignoring, or reacting late, to someone calling out to him ‘Professor!’, even though he has all the required titles. This sort of persons feel far better in their subjective selfidentification; only secondarily and not without a difficulty or even amazement they discover their personal, external, identity.

V. Public Identity These remarks let me now return to the initial Case of the Faked Identity. Equipped with the proper tools I believe to be able to shed some light on this issue. Obviously, the essential problem here includes the identity that guarantees the existence of person, being not its subjective self-identity. What is the dominating factor here? What is it based on? The first answer directs our attention to corporeality. Not by accident, in Husserl’s search for the intersubjective, the body of the other man constituted a point of departure. At first it seems quite natural that corporeality is somehow inherent in my personhood: it constitutes a point of identification. “When one is asked to distinguish someone’s personality from the body, we are not sure what to distinguish from what”—claims Williams in Personal Identity and Individuation.18 Admittedly, we exist in the public sphere as persons owing to our names, but they still demand a bodily verification in various situations. Fingerprints and even a simple photograph in the identity document, still and invariably constitute the basic reference where social relations are possible. Should the access to the Loxley castle have been granted on the basis of scanning of one’s iris pattern, the entire Robin Hood mystification would have fallen through. Will it be sufficient, though, to reduce personal identity down to permanent, uninterrupted possession of the body with the same easily verifiable physical properties? See Cathrine McCall, Concepts of Persons. An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self and Human Being (Avebury: Gover Publishing Company 1990), p. 135. 18

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In order to dispel the belief about this sufficiency, it is enough to reach to the obvious examples of the indirect communication. I need no bodily confirmation on the part of my Greek friend in order to have a strong concept of the identity of his person. Although I have seen him only once, the letters we have exchanged for years are more than sufficient. Modern technology supplies us with many examples of such identity. The sole invention of writing (letters, books and their authors) is enough to grasp the matter. Therefore, what we are dealing here with is a certain kind of public identity. The source of its existence can be found in an intersubjective belief of individuals and human groups, that thanks to various systems of signs (and bodily properties, names, etc.) used in the process of communication, they are able to more or less accurately identify particular persons. Such identification is not free from mistakes—but why would we require it to be so? It is not precisely explicit either: it is even possible to say that the detailed content is different for every subject of the identification. Perhaps I tend to fill up Charlize Theron’s person with a slightly different content than my wife would do, but there certainly exists a common ground determining the very identification. And thus Charlize Theron exists as person owing to a spontaneous effort of million thinking subjects (including her own). Another interesting circumstance demands explanation here. If this intersubjective public identity, guaranteed by the community of individual observers, is the foundation of the existence of real person, then in what does it differ from the unreal (in the objective and subjective meaning), fictional, novel character? Would the difference consist only of lack of that personal self-reference? (We, as readers, refer to the person of Hans Castorp from Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain, but it would be hard to expect the unreal Hans Castorp to refer to himself as to the person). Can we then apply the category of person to the fictional literary character equally as we do so to the real human individual? Or should we use the term ‘person’ here by the way of analogy, just as we are applying it to God? If the person is only a description and if its ontological status assumes its heteronomy (towards the community), it would seem that nothing stands in the way. All the more so because there is a certain group of literary characters, whose fictionality may not be clear to some readers (e.g., Sherlock Holmes). In order to make the notion of the public identity a bit clearer, I will appeal to the interesting analyses of Robert N. Fisher included in The Inhistorisation of Persons. The notion of inhistorisation called for by Fisher as the fundamental process in the shaping of person seems to agree with my intuition of person’s dependence on community. The very concept of inhistorisation was found by Fisher in the work of an English theologian H.H. Farmer who used it as a kind of complementation to the theological category

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of incarnation.19 The latter expresses exclusively the meaning of ‘discontinuous’ God’s action into history of creation, while inhistorisation assumes both the moment of discontinuity and becoming a part of the history—that is ‘continuous’ action into and through the history. According to Fisher, the notion of inhistorisation transferred to human metaphysics describes the process of our becoming persons in the best possible way: Elements of continuity and discontinuity lie at heart of what is to be a person. Persons are physically, biologically continuous with and integrated in the course and flow of events of history. They are born, grow up, mature, and die—they are continuous with the process of nature. Yet persons are discontinuous in the sense that within these processes, something radically new emerges; persons have the ability to act ‘into’ that history, in a dynamic and interactive manner, so as to fashion and create a distinctively personal kind of life. Persons emerge in-and-through history, and have the capacity to act into that history.20 As far as I understand this dialectics of historical continuity and discontinuity, according to Fisher a person is a human being written down into history, but at the same time co-writing this history. History in which we become involved as persons is possible to be understood exactly in categories of public identity: as the person I owe my public identity being held in history, in the collective memory of members of my community: whether it will be a family, a nation or the mankind. In the view of history I am a person, history will remember me as a person, with all inaccuracies resulting from cognitive mistakes, dislike or low self-assessment. For how one can measure these oblique statements, inaccuracies and unfair evaluations? What should be their criterion, since I alone reflect on myself indirectly, not free from pre-assumptions? I can protest against the opinion that I am mean, but what will be a real point of reference for me? The self-reflection of ‘I’ ? Can I, in my heart of hearts, say that I am not mean but there are people who perceive me this way? This ‘in my heart of hearts’ would have to denote my subjective description ‘I,’ but can my ‘I’ be mean or wasteful? The meanness, the wastefulness and the entire number of other attributes and moral defects seem to be closely associated with me as a person, and not with a transcendental subject of my acts. And so the evaluation does not lie in See Herbert H. Farmer, Revelation and Religion: Studies In the Theological Interpretations of Religious Types (London: James Nisbet and Co. Ltd, 1954). 20 Robert N. Fisher, “The Inhistorization of Persons,” in: Robert N. Fisher (ed.) Becoming Persons, vol. I (Oxford: Applied Theology Press, 1995), p. 207. 19

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the dimension of the subjective description. The assessment of my person can come exclusively from the intersubjective inspection of the members of my community (again, not excluding my own, external and objective look at myself as person). So it is necessary to come to terms with the fact that my person is what it is, meaning that it is namely how it exists in my intersubjective public memory, how it is becoming part of the history of my community. Therefore it is not homogeneous, as there probably are as many detailed contents behind the personal description of ‘Michał Bardel’ as many observers for whom this description is legible. Here we are not dealing even with the clear intersubjectivity—rather with the certain synthesis of what is intersubjective and subjective. When I look at another man as at the person, I combine the identity given to me through the intersubjective knowledge shared also by other observers, with the identity I formed subjectively and independently. Even more interesting processual model of person had been proposed by Alistair McFadyen.21 According to his idea of ‘sedimentation,’ personal identity is being shaped in time through the accumulation of contents resulting from communicating with other persons (questions and responses). The history of the person’s interaction with the community is slowly accumulating in the individual identity. My person is a continuous building effect of participating in a community through communication. According to Fisher the conception of sedimentation gives way to the conception of inhistorisation, because it puts emphasis on a certain kind of passive accumulation of contents, while entering history is understood definitely more actively: as a person I have more to say on me, I have a larger impact on my personal identity. Not entering the detailed dispute about the superiority of one conception above another, I lean rather towards McFadyen’s proposal. I am not convinced that in shaping my personal identity I have significantly more to say than other members of my community. Both these theories of the public human identity of person constitute an important tool for a second reading of the Case of Robert Loxley. If the criterion of personal identity would be the historical identity as the effect of process of inhistorisation or sedimentation, the death of a man understanding himself as Robert Loxley, in this particular case does not mean the death of Robert Loxley’s person. A competent swap of roles in the dimension of community communication, in the historical dimension, guarantees an effective continuation of historical personal identity of the knight. Robin Hood conscripted into not his own person through his interaction with a See Alistair I. McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 21

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community, through the system of questions and answers, adds next layers to the personal identity of Robert Loxley. Carrying the very name, living with Miriam and managing the assets he becomes a passive participant of the history of the Loxley family (he inhistorises himself in ‘constant’ dimension), whereas through his words, acts and decisions, indeed he modifies this history (inhistorises himself in the ‘discontinuous’ dimension). Therefore I would not dare to call a paradox the ascertainment of the existence of person X after the death of physical X. If it were possible to identify persons easily and explicitly with physical individuals standing behind them, if they were inseparable from them, cases of faked identity would not take place at all. ——————

Selected Bibliography —Bardel, Michał, “Miejsce świata rzeczy w XX-wiecznej filozofii dialogu,” in: Małgorzata Kitowska-Łysiak, Marcin Lachowski (red.), Rzecz i rzeczowość w kulturze XX i XXI wieku (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2007). —Bardel, Michał, and Tadeusz Gadacz, “Osoba,” in: Bogdan Szlachta (ed.), Słownik społeczny (Krakow: WAM, 2004). —Crosby, John F., The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996). —Farmer, Herbert H., Revelation and Religion: Studies In the Theological Interpretations of Religious Types (London: James Nisbet and Co. Ltd, 1954). —Fisher, Robert N., “The Inhistorization of Persons,” in: Robert N. Fisher (ed.) Becoming Persons, vol. I (Oxford: Applied Theology Press, 1995). —Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Chicago: Open Court, 1949). —McCall, Cathrine, Concepts of Persons. An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self and Human Being (Avebury: Gover Publishing Company 1990). —McFadyen, Alistair I., The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). —Novak, Michael, Belief and Unbelief. A Philosophy of Self-Knowledge (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966). —Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). —Smith, W. C., “Thinking About Persons,” Humanitas (1979, 15), pp. 147152.

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—Sokolowski, Robert, Phenomenology of the Human Person (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). —Spaemann, Robert, Personen. Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen >etwas< und >jemand< (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996). —Strawson, Peter F., “Reply to Mackie and Hide Ishiguro,” in: Zak Van Straaten (ed.) Philosophical Subjects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). —Tischner, Joseph, Das menschliche Drama: phänomenologische Studien zur Philosophie des Dramas (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1989).

Chapter 8 A Personalistic Religious Humanism Dwayne A. Tunstall Grand Valley State University Michigan, U.S.

Introduction My first attempt to situate these two Christian personalist ethical ideas in a non-theistic context began with a presentation on W. E. B. Du Bois’s ethical personalism given at the International Conference on Persons in 2003.1 There I claimed that Du Bois’s social and political thought gave us a model for thinking about personalism in a non-theistic manner. Of course, this attempt is complicated by the fact that some Boston personalists, such as Rufus Burrow, Jr., claim that ethical personalism must be theistic in nature. Indeed, Burrow defines ethical personalism as an ethics in which “persons possess inherent dignity not merely because they are persons, but because they are summoned into existence, loved, and sustained by God. Persons possess inviolable worth because they belong to God, who imbues in each of them the image and fragrance of God.” 2 Burrow’s position follows from his conception of Boston personalism as being primarily “a metaphysics, a way of thinking about reality and how all things hang together.” 3 Moreover, an ethical personalist should view human life as one where we live “together in a world in which all life forms depend for their existence and destiny on a God whose nature is love, and whose acts of creation are acts of love.” 4 1 Dwayne A. Tunstall, “W.E.B. Du Bois’s Personalism” (presentation, 7th International Conference on Persons, Memphis, TN, August 9, 2003.) 2 Rufus Burrow, Jr., Personalism: A Critical Introduction (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 1999), p. 184. 3 Ibid., p. 228. 4 Ibid.

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Where does that leave those sympathetic to ethical personalism who cannot accept Boston personalism’s dependence on a transcendent divine to ground our moral worth? I am convinced that someone could ground ethical personalism on a non-transcendent ground, namely on the loving and ennobling interpersonal relationships we have with one another and the caring relation we can have with our environing world. Unfortunately, this is not the occasion to develop this non-transcendent ground for ethical personalism. For now let us take this opportunity to identify those features of Boston ethical personalism that could be conserved within a non-theistic ethical personalism.

———— The first feature of Boston ethical personalism that can be conserved in a non-theistic personalist context is Edgar S. Brightman’s moral philosophy, as articulated in his unduly neglected book, Moral Laws.5 I take Brightman’s Moral Laws to be representative of the core ethical principles accepted by those theologians, philosophers, and pastors who identify themselves as Boston ethical personalists. This view is further supported by the fact that later generations of Boston personalists (e.g., Peter Bertocci and Rufus Burrow, Jr.) take Moral Laws as one of the major ethical writings of the Boston personalist tradition.6 Just what is the moral philosophy advanced in Brightman’s Moral Laws? We can interpret Brightman’s moral philosophy as being partly a Kantian investigation into the conditions for the possibility of moral experiences. It also functions as a method that can “guide our choices or help us make responsible moral choices.” 7 As such, Brightman’s moral philosophy ‘is essentially a method for making moral judgments.” 8 Given that Brightman thinks of moral philosophy as a method of moral discernment, he seeks to develop a moral philosophy fluid enough to account for our individuality while simultaneously recognising the uniqueness of each moral dilemma we encounter. He also seeks to make his method systematic enough to account for the general structure of human moral experience. In other words, Brightman’s moral philosophy is tasked with giving an account of the invariant features of human moral experience while simultaneously recognising that our moral Edgar S. Brightman, Moral Laws (New York: Abingdon Press, 1933). See Burrow, ibid., pp. 208-222. 7 Ibid., p. 204. 8 Ibid. 5 6

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experiences involve us dealing with specific moral dilemmas, occurring in various concrete situations. In Moral Laws Brightman explains how eleven interrelated moral principles, which he often misleadingly called “laws,” constitute a viable moral philosophy. These principles move from the most abstract condition for the possibility of moral experience to the most concrete advice about how to develop one’s moral character. The first two moral principles are called the Formal Laws. As such, they are the principles “which sustain and unify the whole moral enterprise.” 9 The first formal principle, the Logical Law, states: “All persons ought to will logically; i.e., each person ought to will to be free from self-contradiction and to be consistent in his intentions. A moral person does not both will and not will the same ends; this property of a moral person is called his formal rightness.” 10 In other words, this formal moral principle reminds us that we have a duty to choose ends in a consistent manner. The second formal principle, the Law of Autonomy, states: “All persons ought to recognise themselves as obligated to choose in accordance with the ideals which they acknowledge. Or: Self-imposed ideals are imperative.” 11 According to this second formal moral principle, we are obligated to pursue those values and projects we have chosen to pursue. Indeed, we become morally responsible agents to the extent that we can live out this principle. As Brightman writes: [M]an is responsible to himself. The ideals which he recognises and imposes on himself are ideals which he has no excuse for not obeying. If, however, he does disobey them, reason requires that he give an account to himself of what he has done, judge his conduct by his ideals, hold himself responsible. Such responsibility is moral maturity; until it has been achieved one may be said to be morally still an infant.12 However, Brightman informs us that these principles only govern how we ought to choose values. These principles do not tell us which specific values we ought to choose and act on in concrete situations in order to live morally. This is why he had to formulate the Axiological Laws. The Axiological Laws are those moral principles that enable us to select values that are sensitive to the various circumstances we must deal with as we decide which course of action is the most moral one to take in a given morally problematic situation. The first axiological principle, which Brightman, ibid., p. 124. Ibid., p. 98. 11 Ibid., p. 106. 12 Ibid., p. 118. 9

10

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has been appropriately named the Axiological Law, states: “All persons ought to choose values which are self-consistent, harmonious, and coherent, not values which are contradictory or incoherent with one another.” 13 The second axiological principle is the Law of Consequences. This moral principle states: “All persons ought to consider and, on the whole, approve the foreseeable consequences of each of their choices. Stated otherwise: Choose with a view to the long run, not merely to the present act. (In the fuller statement, the phrase “on the whole” is necessary, for some bad consequences may follow good choices, although the predominant tendency of the consequences may be good.”) 14 The third axiological principle is the Law of the Best Possible: “All persons ought to will the best possible values in every situation; hence, if possible, to improve every situation.” 15 The fourth axiological principle is the Law of Specification: “All persons ought, in any given situation, to develop the value or values specifically relevant to that situation.” 16 This principle reminds us to concentrate on the specific situation we face and seek to act in such a manner that we are able to actualise the best possible outcome imaginable by us. The fifth axiological principle is the Law of the Most Inclusive End: “All persons ought to choose a coherent life in which the widest possible range of value is realised.” 17 Brightman explains this principle further when he writes: “The Law of the Most Inclusive End goes much further and specifies both that a coherent life—a plan for growth and development—is the aim of the good man and also that such a life should include the greatest variety compatible with that plan. It is thus a Law of complexity and of synthesis.” 18 Of course, how this principle is acted upon depends on the specific life plan chosen by an individual. Given our individuality, we need to exercise moral imagination and practical wisdom, all the while following our moral duties when needed, for us to apply this principle in our daily lives. The sixth, and last, axiological principle is the Law of Ideal Control: “All persons ought to control their empirical values by ideal values.” 19 This is the axiological principle that combines the other five axiological principles and commands us to live by our chosen ideals. This principle reminds us that we ought to evaluate our lives not from the standpoint of our actual selves, but from the standpoint of the ideal values we have chosen to actualise in our lives. These 13

Ibid., Ibid., 15 Ibid., 16 Ibid., 17 Ibid., 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., 14

p. p. p. p. p.

125. 142. 156. 171. 183.

p. 194.

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ideal values we have chosen ought, in turn, to be the most ennobling values we can actualise. The last three moral principles in Brightman’s moral philosophy are the Personalistic Laws. They are meant to give us practical guidance in our moral dealings with others. The first personalistic principle, the Law of Individualism, states: “Each person ought to realise in his own experience the maximum value of which he is capable in harmony with moral law.” 20 Here Brightman reminds us that only individual persons can have moral obligations, not “society.” 21 “Society” is an abstraction referring to all the individual persons who related to one another and to their environing world. We as individuals are obligated to uphold the formal and axiological laws if we are to live moral lives. The second personalistic principle, the Law of Altruism, states: “Each person ought to respect all other persons as ends in themselves, and, as far as possible, to co-operate with others in the production and enjoyment of shared values.” 22 Of course, this principle is difficult to follow and can only be actualised, imperfectly. The third, and last, personalist principle is the Law of the Ideal of Personality: “All persons ought to judge and guide all of their acts by their ideal conception (in harmony with the other Laws) of what the whole personality ought to become both individually and socially.” 23 This last moral principle in Brightman’s moral philosophy is the culmination of all the other moral principles in that it is the one that is meant to assist us in developing our moral discernment. Moreover, it is the one meant to function as an ever-present reminder that we could always act more morally than we do. It is meant for us to not be complacent with who we are, morally speaking. Brightman expresses this point toward the end of Moral Laws when he writes: “An ideal of personality has a twofold function: On the one hand, it guides the conduct of the person who holds it as his plan of action and goal; on the other hand, it is an instrument of criticism, used to point out both the meaning of and also the defects in the present situation.” 24 Brightman ends his Moral Laws by writing that the method of moral discernment he outlines there does not necessarily require us to accept an idealist metaphysics in which our moral experiences point toward an objective moral order, one created by “a supreme mind that generates the whole cosmic process and controls its ongoing.” 25 All that is required to accept Brightman’s 20

Ibid., Ibid., 22 Ibid., 23 Ibid., 24 Ibid., 25 Ibid., 21

p. p. p. p. p. p.

204. 206. 223. 242. 253. 86; see also ibid., pp. 275-276.

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moral philosophy is to agree with Brightman that our moral experiences have the following phenomenological structure: Whenever we engage in moral deliberation and act on whichever course of action we decided upon, we consider ourselves to be the author of whichever action resulted from that deliberation. We also feel as though we could have chosen otherwise than we actually chose under the same exact circumstances.26 Many of Brightman’s contemporaries and later Boston personalists did not consider Brightman’s metaphysics to be an optional feature of his moral philosophy, however. They thought that his moral philosophy required us to accept a specific brand of metaphysics, namely one compatible with Boston personalism. Accordingly, Harold DeWolf and Walter Muelder added a Metaphysical Law to Brightman’s moral philosophy. As formulated by DeWolf, this principle states: “Every person ought to form all his ideals and choices in relation to his conception of the ultimate reality which is the ground of ethical obligation.” 27 Of course, the ultimate reality being referenced is the one created and sustained by a divine person. DeWolf, Muelder, and some other Boston personalists sincerely thought that Brightman’s moral philosophy had to point beyond the ethical realm; otherwise, there wouldn’t be any foundation of the objective moral order that is the source of all moral value. For a Boston personalist, such an omission would be unforgivable since our moral worth as persons is dependent on our spiritual likeness to the divine person who created us. Thankfully for non-theists, later Boston personalists are wrong to think that accepting Brightman’s moral philosophy requires us to accept their conception of the divine. These personalists are mistaken for two reasons. First, Brigthman’s moral principles were derived from his phenomenological investigation of human moral experience. As a result, these principles are not wed to any particular metaphysics. Again, this is something Brightman himself acknowledges in his Moral Laws. Second, Brightman admits that moral philosophy is unable to account for anything transcendent qua moral philosophy. He restricted moral philosophy to the systematic study of human moral experience along with those principles that allow us to live moral lives. Once we begin speculating about the ontological origin of human moral experience, we have left moral philosophy proper. And for Brightman’s idealist metaphysics to be a necessary component of his moral philosophy, he would have to be able to explain exactly how our everyday moral experiences are dependent on the existence of an actual divine person for their existence. The history of modern western philosophy provides a series of object lessons about the 26 27

See ibid., pp. 281-284. Burrow, Personalism, p. 224.

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difficulty of proving the necessary existence of a deity, much less proving the existence of an actual divine person. A non-theist personalist can avoid this particular difficulty by just accepting Brightman’s moral philosophy while rejecting his idealistic theism. Perhaps this is a good time to discuss the second feature of Boston ethical personalism I would like to conserve in a non-theistic ethical personalism. I think a non-theistic ethical personalism sympathetic to Boston ethical personalism should emphasise social ethics and its conception of the person. It should especially emphasise Muelder’s conception of persons as being “born into community, nurtured by it, and influenced by it in numerous ways. But persons also influence the community in many ways. Both persons and their groups affect the community.” 28 Moreover, it should embrace Muelder’s ethical personalism, especially its highest communitarian principle, the Law of the Ideal of Community: “All persons ought to form and choose all of their ideals and values in loyalty to their ideals (in harmony with the other Laws) of what the whole community ought to become; and to participate responsibly in groups to help them similarly choose and form all their ideals and choices.” 29 This communitarian moral principle is another way of expressing the idea that our moral ideals should, ideally, obligate persons to act in ways that enlarge their moral spheres to include once-excluded persons as respected members of the moral community. Thus, a person should regard his fellow persons’ well-being as something worthy of respect and act to promote it, not only because they are fellow autonomous, rational beings, as Kant would contend. A person should respect his fellow persons’ well-being because they possess worth as human beings with capacities we ought to respect and with talents we should help cultivate. For a morally mature person, his or her conduct should not only be the result of choosing projects that better himself or herself, but also the result of choosing projects that assist others in attaining their most ennobling ideals. Some readers might wonder why non-theists should care about the Boston ethical personalist’s emphasis on social ethics. Unlike most non-theistic moral philosophies, Boston ethical personalism has had an admirable record of inspiring people to respect people’s dignity, regardless of their socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, ethnic identity, racial identity, gender, sexual orientation, and so forth. Furthermore, Boston personalists have historically been known to act on this call in concrete situations like the Civil Rights Movement, as evidenced by the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ibid., p. 211. Walter G. Muelder, Moral Law in Christian Social Ethics (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1966), p. 119. 28 29

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and Muelder. Present-day religious humanists who desire to battle the dehumanisation of people living in oppressive societies and situations can be inspired by the example of mid-twentieth century Boston personalists who lived out Brightman’s moral philosophy in a socially uplifting manner. We should end this essay by briefly mentioning what an ethical personalism, inspired by Boston ethical personalism and placed in a religious humanist context, would entail. This personalism—a personalistic religious humanism—would probably affirm the functional ultimacy of persons, more specifically human persons. This is not a claim that human persons are ontologically superior to any other living organism. Rather it reminds us that we are the only ones who can improve ourselves and our environing world such that it is more hospitable to the striving and flourishing of not only human persons, but also the larger environment. As I have written elsewhere: This means that practicing meliorism is the best means we have available to improve our condition, and even then there is no guarantee that any of our efforts will succeed in the end. In fact, our meliorative efforts can be undone within a generation or two.. . . Accordingly, if one seeks to engage in intergenerational improvement of one’s society, then each generation will have to work to improve society while also maintaining the beneficial practices and institutions created by previous generations. [William R.] Jones recognises the precariousness of this situation in the following excerpt [from his article, “Theism and Religious Humanism: The Chasm Narrows”]: “This is the meaning of the tragic sense of history in humanism—not that human efforts are doomed to defeat, but that the best-laid plans of one generation may be sabotaged by the actions of the next.” 30 The religious humanism briefly introduced in the passage above is a humanism that is compatible with the general ethical orientation to Boston ethical personalism. It even allows one to take up ethical personalism as a religious orientation in a Boston personalist-like manner. We must remember, though, that the religious orientations of religious humanism and Boston ethical personalism differ in fundamental respects, the most important being that the religious humanism featured here is a non-theistic religious orientation whereas Boston personalism is a Christian (more specifically, Methodist) religious orientation. Of course, I realise that Dwayne A. Tunstall, “Cornel West, John Dewey, and the Tragicomic Undercurrents of Deweyan Creative Democracy,” in: Contemporary Pragmatism, 5.2 (December 2008), p. 121. 30

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many humanists, especially humanists living in North America and Europe, are reluctant to grant that a religious variety of humanism is still a genuine form of humanism. These humanists desire to divorce humanism from religion altogether. I, on the other hand, agree with religious humanists such as Jones and Anthony Pinn that humanism can be a legitimate religious orientation. As a religious orientation, religious humanism is primarily a humanistic response “to moral evil and its ramifications by an appeal to the essential worth and responsibilities of humanity for the quality of life [we have].” 31 This religious orientation is primarily ethical. Religious humanists think that by using our critical intelligence, scientific inquiry, moral imagination, and good old fashion meliorism, we can learn to act in a fallibilistic, humble, and compassionate spirit. By acting on this spirit, we can create the social conditions in which people can live well without seeking salvation in some other-worldly realm.32

Conclusion By practicing a personalistic religious humanism inspired by Boston ethical personalism, we would have reason to respect the fragility of human existence and appreciate the precious nature of life-sustaining, loving, and ennobling interpersonal relationships. We would also acknowledge the difficulty of living lives where we genuinely honour these things. Moreover, we would be ever vigilant against neglecting or ignoring the personhood of those who differ from us in terms of nationality, ethnicity, racial identity, religious affiliation, political affiliation, gender, sexual orientation, socioeconomic class, age, and so forth. Yet, we can do all these things without depending on any objective moral order created by some divine person. We just would have to work with others to create a personal world where persons are able to safely cultivate their natural talents and pursue their projects as long as those talents and projects do not denigrate the personhood of others or of oneself and unnecessarily harm our environment. This would be a worthwhile personalism for non-theists, indeed!

Anthony B. Pinn, African American Humanist Principles: Living and Thinking Like the Children of Nimrod (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 2. 32 See ibid., pp. 59-60 and p. 104. 31

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Selected Bibliography —Brightman, Edgar S., Moral Laws (New York: Abingdon Press, 1933). —Burrow, Jr., Rufus, Personalism: A Critical Introduction (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 1999). —Muelder, Walter G., Moral Law in Christian Social Ethics (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1966). —Pinn, Anthony B., African American Humanist Principles: Living and Thinking Like the Children of Nimrod (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). —Tunstall, Dwayne A., “Cornel West, John Dewey, and the Tragicomic Undercurrents of Deweyan Creative Democracy,” in: Contemporary Pragmatism, 5.2 (December 2008). —Tunstall, Dwayne A., “W.E.B. Du Bois’s Personalism” (presentation, 7th International Conference on Persons, Memphis, TN, August 9, 2003).

Chapter 9 Non-Political ‘Transpersonalism’ of Meister Eckhart Piotr Augustyniak Cracow University of Economics Cracow, Poland In his Sermons, Eckhart strongly distances himself from the interpretation of man as a person who, in accordance with the metaphysical tradition originating from Boethius, is understood as individua substantia. . . . Through mystical unification, as Eckhart understands it, one must transcend everything that is individual in oneself: “D´v solt alzemal entzinken diner dinisheit vnd solt zer fliesen in sine sinesheit vnd sol din din vnd sin sin éin min werden als genzlich, daz d´v mit ime verstandest ewiklich sin vngewordene istikeit vnd sin vngenanten nitheit.” 1 What this means is that in terms of man’s unification with Godhead (gotheit), substantial individuality (separateness) is the fundamental problem. Since such unification is possible according to Eckhart, and substantial individuality is an essential part of defining a ‘person,’ ‘personal’ existence cannot be the essence of human existence reaching towards Godhead. In other words, man analysed in terms of unification with Godhead cannot be analysed as a ‘person’. Like Godhead itself, man can only be termed so in an incorrect and therefore misleading way. The concept of ‘person’ is completely unsuitable for describing Godhuman relations and interdependencies. Wæren joch hundert persônen in der gotheit, der underscheit künde genemen âne zal und âne menige, der enDW III, p. 443 (all quotations from the Sermons are from the original work in Old German. Source: Meister Eckhart, Die deutschen Werke. Predigten, ed. J. Quint, t. I, II, III, Stuttgart [respectively] 1958, 1971, 1976. I abbreviate all references to this publication with DW, followed by volume and page number). 1

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bekente doch niht dan ein got. [. . . ] joch etlîche pfaffen wizzen dâ von als wênic als ein stein: die nement drîe als drîe küeje oder drîe steine.2 The criticism of the metaphysical concept of ‘person’ is as radical as possible in Eckhart’s thought. For Eckhart, the problem on the path to Godhead is not so much individuality itself, as its substantial character, which lays the foundations for man’s metaphysical separateness. This character comes up when the philosophical interpretation of man enters the area of metaphysics of person. From this perspective, human individuality is the ‘owner’ of ‘human nature’, which is the guarantor and the foundation of the presumed substantial character (metaphysical autonomy and separateness) of a human individual. Therefore, Eckhart, problematising man’s individuality, first of all consistently attempts to negate the category of ‘human nature’ vel ‘humanity’ (Menscheit), which is part of the concept of ‘person’. Eckhart reaches this, it seems, radically ‘anti-personalist’ conclusion by using his characteristic dialectical thought process. Let us follow its main stages. First, it seems that the path towards Godhead, tantamount to rejecting the viewpoint which depicts man as an individual, i.e., autonomous, substance, leads to the identification of the meanings of the terms ‘man’ and ‘human nature’; as if man placed in Godhead ceased to be a specimen of the human species and became the species of ‘man’ itself. Ich spriche ein anderz und spriche ein swærerz: swer in der blôzheit dirre natûre âne mitel sol bestân, der muoz aller persônen ûzgegangen sîn, alsô daz er dem menschen, der jensît mers ist, den er mit ougen nie gesach, daz er dem alsô wol guotes günne als dem menschen, der bî im ist und sîn heimlich vriunt ist.3 This would mean that man is transformed into ‘humanity’ which, in Eckhart’s opinion, is something infinitely nobler than individuality, since it is placed ‘close’ to Godhead—that is to say, it seems to be ‘similar’ to Godhead. Ich spriche: menscheit und mensche ist unglîch. Menscheit in ir selber ist als edel: daz oberste an der menscheit hât glîcheit mit den engeln und sippeschaft mit der gotheit. Diu groeste einunge, die Kristus besezzen hât mit dem vater, diu ist mir mügelich ze gewinnenne, ob ich künde abegelegen, daz dâ ist von disem oder von dem, und künde mich genemen menscheit.4 However, the process of overcoming the perspective of substantial individuality of man, through the unification with Godhead, does not end at the moment of overcoming the individuality for ‘humanity’. ‘Humanity,’ as human nature, is also subject to questioning since it is also, according to Eckhart, still a metaphysical construct, based on the assumption of the subDW II, p. 234. DW I, pp. 87-88. 4 DW II, pp. 13-14. 2 3

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stantial separateness of its individual exemplifications. In other words, the meaning of the term ‘human nature’ encompasses the fact that its ‘owner’ (man) is an individual substance. Yet in the process of unification with Godhead not only and not so much ‘accidental’ features of an individual must be overcome, but first and foremost the very essence of substantiality of an individual man, which is an inherent part of human nature. Therefore, man cannot be analysed as such a general entity which implies any individual (either accidental or necessary) features that would suggest that we are dealing with a substance, i.e., a being of ontological separateness. Alsô sol diu sêle gevestiget und gestætiget sîn, diu got bekennen sol, daz sich niht in sie gedrücken enmüge noch hoffenunge noch vorhte noch vröude noch jâmer noch liebe noch leit noch niht, daz sie entsetzen müge.5 Thus, the dialectical process of thinking forces Eckhart to discard the category of ‘human nature’. He replaces it with the concept of ‘simple nature’ with no attributes or specifications. This ‘nature’ is both Godhead itself and also the deepest characterisation of man (it is the ground or spark of the soul). It is the simple divine One, in whom a ‘different’ self appears; a self which is the oneness of Him and me. Ez sprechent die meister gemeinlich, daz alle menschen sint glîch edele in der natûre. Aber ich spriche wærlîche: allez daz guot, daz alle heiligen besezzen hânt und Marîâ, gotes muoter, und Kristus nâch sîner menscheit, daz ist mîn eigen in dirre natûre. [. . . ] Dâ der vater sînen sun gebirt in dem innersten grunde, dâ hât ein însweben disiu natûre. Disiu natûre ist ein und einvaltic. Hie mac wol etwaz ûzluogen und iht zuohangen, daz ist diz eine niht.6 In this way, the depiction of man as an individual being endowed with a specific (such and no other) nature (which sets him apart from other beings (stones or mosquitoes) but at the same time makes him one of them: one of the many individual substances inhabiting the world) disappears. In Eckhart’s interpretation of Godhead it appears that there is one and one only divine being (wesen), which is free of all determinants, definitions and attributes and as such it is ‘nothing’ rather than ‘something’ with differentia specifica. . . . swanne ich dar zuo kome, daz ich mich gebilde in niht und niht engebilde in mich und ûztrage und ûzwirfe, waz in mir ist, sô mac ich gesast werden in daz blôze wesen gotes.7 In order to better understand why Eckhart carries out this dialectical destruction of the category of ‘human nature’, completely rejecting the interpretation of man as a person on the path to Godhead, it is essential to DW III, p. 146. DW I, pp. 86-87. 7 DW III, p. 322. 5 6

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outline the existential and ontological aspect of his thought.8 In his Sermons, Eckhart does not project a particular ‘spirituality,’ the observance of which would lead man to unification with God. He does not refer to a special, moral or religious effort which would enable establishing a communion with God, who himself ‘objectively’ would remain separate from man. That is, Eckhart does not refer to the way in which two persons (two separate, individual, substantial beings) may become unified, building bridges over their original separateness, which in the case of God and man would be even greater, since God is the Creator and man is the creation. Eckhart’s reflections are aimed not at describing (establishing) a moral unification of two persons (i.e., a certain ethical effort) but at showing (getting through to—durchbrechen) such a perspective in which it would be revealed that the ontological, trans-substantial oneness of God and man as originaland has existed ‘since infinity’. Got und ich wir sint ein 9 —this is one of the most important statements of the medieval Meister. Eckhart is convinced that the assumption that God and man are separate (two persons facing each other) is a derivative of a certain inevitable illusion, which leads to a commonsense interpretation of man, culminating in the metaphysical concept of ‘person’. This inevitable illusion consists in the way in which man experiences himself in his everyday manner of being in the human community. Eckhart calls this everyday self Eigenschaft. This manner of existence is connected with the inevitable experience of unnecessity of one’s own existence. This experience, in turn, results from the threat of destruction (which man inevitably feels) posed by the surrounding human world, in which everyone is forced to fight for their existence. In this way man, who sees in himself a member of the human community that is forced to fight for (his) living, is forced to define his existence as permanently looking for himself 10 and acting for his own benefit.11 This is the essence of Eigenschaft: acting in a way which is always supposed to be beneficial in the most fundamental sense of the word, i.e., to preserve, solidify and strengthen man’s threatened existence in the world. It is from this completely inevitable, primal experience of one’s existence in the (human) world that, in Eckhart’s opinion, the illusory interpretation of one’s metaphysical status results. The ‘inevitable illusion’ consists in individual substantiality and closely related nature (understood in a metaphysical 8 I made a detailed outline elsewhere. All readers who feel this summary too brief can find it in my monograph Inna Boskość. Mistrz Eckhart, Zaratustra i przezwyciężenie metafizyki, Kraków 2009. 9 DW I, p. 113. 10 DW II, p. 59. 11 DW II, p. 7.

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way). The threat of immediate destruction, which can only be avoided by taking appropriate actions, where one must rely mostly on oneself, is the source of metaphysical interpretation of one’s existence as an individual substantiality. The latter implies separateness and finiteness, which are conditions for the possibility of the ever-present threat of destruction. Moreover, the substantiality indicates the possibility of independent actions, in particular those that counteract destruction, i.e., serve to strengthen the permanently threatened individuality (separateness). This primal (inevitable) experience of oneself as Eigenschaft is just as inevitably transferred to the other inhabitants of the world (both the human community and the natural world), who are perceived as participants in the same game of survival. In this way, everything we encounter in the space of our experience becomes an individual substance to us. Eckhart says in this context that everything that exists is ‘this’ [diez] or ‘that’ [daz], i.e., a substantial, space and time specific ‘something’ [iht].12 If every being encountered in the world is an individual substance, then everything has the ‘nature of substance’ within which we can distinguish ‘human nature’, or ‘canine nature,’ or ‘mosquito’s nature,’ and also ‘God’s nature’. In this basic, inevitable perspective God is also interpreted as a being analogous to us, even though transcendent. To Eckhart, such an interpretation of God’s substance, which is Thomas Aquinas’s fundamental assumption, is a metaphysical variation on the inevitable, vernacular interpretation of God as a cow, i.e., a being-to-be-used which is external to me. Aber etlîche liute wellent Got mit den ougen anesehen, als sie eine kuo anesehent, und wellent got alsô minnen, als sie eine kuo minnent. Die minnest dû umbe die milch und umbe die kæse und umbe dînen eigenen nutz. Alsô tuont alle die liute, die got minnent umbe ûzwendigen rîchtuom oder umbe inwendigen trôst; und die minnent got niht rehte, sunder sie minnent irn eigenen nutz.13 It should be very strongly emphasised that the classical concept of person is not a theory that is supposed to metaphysically interpret and conclusively sanction this reflexive (primarily inevitable) manner of acting in the world, consisting in ‘egoistic’ (in the deepest, existential and ontological meaning of the word) way of caring for oneself, for reinforcing one’s existence. On the contrary, the metaphysical category of ‘person,’ as the basis for personalist ethics, is aimed at validating the thesis that the measure of man (who unlike other creatures is an intelligent being, and thus a free one) is acting in a way which respects the intelligence and freedom of others. As a result of the personalist perspective, the primal, existential egotism is to be overcome 12 13

DW III, p. 336 and DW III, p. 223. DW I, p. 274.

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in favour of respecting another man’s dignity, respecting values, acting for the common good, i.e., for solidary cooperation, or for one’s own spiritual development, in which love and responsibility, acting and thinking creatively, combined with the ability to sacrifice oneself and with concern for other people and living creatures, will all play an important role. All the objectives that personalist ethics is committed to were undoubtedly close to Eckhart’s heart, but the classical interpretation of a person, which is supposed to justify such ethics, must have remained extremely problematic and unsatisfactory for him. The reason, I believe, was the fact that the concept of a ‘person’ as a metaphysical concept par excellence is the kind of attempted response to man’s inevitable existential and ontological egotism that happens inside, rather than outside, of the metaphysical interpretation of the world which is based on it. Consequently, personalist ethics must remain a hostage of Eigenschaft, to the extent that, paradoxically, the more radical and authentic the effort of living in the spirit of personalism is, the more defenceless man is against his own primal self-interest. This is because he hides it under the guise of ethical declarations in such a veiled way that he becomes a victim of a dangerous self-illusion, since he is ‘completely convinced’ that every man, as soon as he decides to be ‘good,’ really overcomes his existential egotism; thus the egotism stops being perceived as a primal and inevitable manner of human existence. This self-illusion is the most radical when man takes a stance on God in the spirit of this metaphysical depiction of person. According to Eckhart, every spur of a man who understands himself in this way, who honestly aims to give himself to God, no matter how extreme his devotion and ascesis, hides the same egotistic fight for his own survival, looking after his own interests etc. Sehet, diz sint allez koufliute, die [. . . ] tuont ir guoten werk gote ze êren, als vasten, wachen, beten und swaz des ist, aller hande guotiu werk, und tuont sie doch dar umbe, daz in unser herre etwaz dar umbe gebe, oder daz in got iht dar umbe tuo, daz in liep sî: diz sint alle koufliute. Daz ist grop ze verstânne, wan sie wellent daz eine umbe daz ander geben und wellent alsô koufen mit unserm herren.14 It is difficult to imagine social order without everything that the personalist vision of man assumes. If one gave in without restrains to the primal, inevitable manner of being a human which Eckhart talks about, our world would be in a state of permanent war, i.e., ruthless rivalry, competition, mutual exploitation and destruction. I believe Eckhart’s opinion in this regard is very close to Hobbes’s diagnosis: the human world is in fact a bellum omnium contra omnes. However, according to Eckhart, although this state of affairs is a result of the inevitable manner of an individual’s existence in 14

DW I, p. 7.

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society, it should not be described in terms of some objective human nature. The genius of the medieval Meister consists in the fact that he considers the term ‘human nature’ to be a derivative of such a manner of existence and understanding oneself. This is why he persists in dialectical thinking, which helps him to shake the foundations (relativize and deconstruct) not only of the term ‘human nature’ but also the terms ‘nature,’ ‘substance,’ ‘identity’ and all metaphysical concepts, including ‘person’. Eckhart’s objective in this destructive work is to reduce all metaphysics to a theoretical ‘superstructure’ based on Eigenschaft. In this way, he goes back to existential sources of thinking in order to make an essential turn. He is convinced that Eigenschaft, although a primarily inevitable manner of being, is also illusory. ‘Illusory’ not in the sense unreal (its realness can be felt in our lives every step of the way) but in the sense inappropriate, i.e., it is only a substitute and a curtain, which hides a different way of being oneself (man’s different self), one which consists in an ecstatic loss of oneself in Godhead, being one with God, which has been mentioned above. In order to disclose this correct, original perspective of man, Eckhart acts completely ‘non-politically’. He is, as Leo Strauss would say, a true philosopher, who—contrary to a political philosopher—looks for basic and final interpretations of reality without any regard whatsoever for how much his work could be dangerous to the polis. He is not, as I have already mentioned, an enemy of the objectives adopted by ethics par excellence (which I believe metaphysically based personalism to be), which are to build a harmonious, friendly and fair human community. However, in his radical attempt at thinking of man from the perspective of Godhead, he does not attach any importance to justifying and propagating this ethics. On the contrary, in a manner somewhat similar to Nietzsche or Socrates, he provokes, exposing quite ‘mundane’ human (political) grounds for practising the ethics. In other words, he looks not for a manner of being a man that is first and foremost ethical but one that would be authentic, i.e., divine, belonging to divine, super-substantial Totality, which—like the Greek zoe—encompasses everything there is. In his description of such a manner of being, freedom plays the most important role, along with a lack of impediment, ecstatic joy, titanic inner strength and ‘will of power’. . . . Wan in dem selben wesene gotes, dâ got ist obe wesen und ob underscheide, dâ was ich selbe, dâ wolte ich mich selben und bekante mich selben ze machenne disen menschen. Her umbe sô bin ich mîn selbes sache nâch mînem wesene, daz êwic ist, und niht nâch mînem gewerdenne, daz zîtlich ist. Und her umbe sô bin ich ungeborn, und nâch mîner ungebornen wîse sô enmac ich niemer ersterben. [. . . ] In mîner geburt, dâ wurden alliu dinc geborn, und ich was sache mîn selbes und aller dinge; und hæte ich gewolt, ich enwære niht, noch alliu dinc enwæren niht;

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und enwære ich niht, sô enwære ouch ‘got’ niht. Daz got ‘got’ ist, des bin ich ein sache.15 I believe it hardly needs reminding what price Eckhart paid for his nonpolitical philosophy. Medieval authorities sentenced him in a sham process, like the Athenian polis had done to Socrates. He was sentenced unfairly, but justifiably. His theses, forcing their way through to the terrifying, divine bottom of the human soul, were easily interpreted in a subversive manner: as dangerous for a social order founded on the metaphysical thinking of man as a person whose calling is an ethical life in a community shaped by the order symbolised by the Ten Commandments. The non-political (mystical) thought of Meister Eckhart, trying to reveal the usually hidden, but original perspective of thinking about the world, leads to the disappearance of ‘human nature’ as a category which excessively narrows and distorts the sense of being a man, and to the disappearance of the traditional theology founded on the concept of person, which distorts the correct depiction of God dormant in Christianity. In its place comes the abysmal thought of Godhead as the oneness of God and man; God as an uncreated ‘Nothing’ hidden in myself. Ez ist etwaz, daz über daz geschaffen wesen der sêle ist, daz kein geschaffenheit enrüeret, daz niht ist.16 This ‘Nothing’ is expressed in my creative activity. However, it also always transcends me as a certain ‘irreversibility’ of freedom, which I cannot divest myself of, which is assigned to me, independent of me. This is why it can be said that ‘me’ (my ‘person,’ my specific life) is nothing but a flourishing of this divine ‘Nothing,’ its way to reveal its secret, i.e., its persona (in the Greek meaning of the word), its mask—the face which it puts on to show itself in the human world. If this is how things are with man in Eckhart’s non-political philosophy, is it also not, paradoxically, the deepest possible justification for ethicalness, which emphasises man’s dignity, i.e., calls to treat every man not solely as a means, but also always as an end of one’s actions?17 Is Eckhart’s justification not a hundred times more profound than the traditional philosophy of person based on metaphysical grounds? Admittedly, such a basis for ethics constituting society as a community of persons is too ‘esoteric’ and ‘elitist,’ i.e., its intellectualness and subtlety are too demanding for the average inhabitant of the human world. Painted on the banners of the masses’ common thinking, it can easily become fuel for the self-satisfaction of the ‘last man,’ which only DW II, pp. 502-504. DW II, p. 66. 17 I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten [in:] I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, herausgegeben von W. Weischedel, Frakfurt am Main 1974, p. 61. 15 16

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increases social demobilisation.18 The statement Got und ich wir sint ein is grist to the mill of modern self-satisfaction (caricatural self-deification) of man.. . . On the other hand, however, if there is any future for embarking on the spiritual self-improvement of man (so important for ethical thinking), i.e., shaping and cultivating the Spirit in oneself, should it not reach for such ‘esoteric,’ that is non-political, inspirations as Eckhart’s? Is reaching for them today, in the face of modern crisis, not the duty of political (feeling responsible for the polis, i.e., human community) philosophy? I believe so—arguably, this is the only way at present. ——————

Selected Bibliography —Augustyniak, Piotr, Inna Boskość. Mistrz Eckhart, Zaratustra i przezwyciężenie metafizyki (Kraków 2009). —Kant, Immanuel, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten [in:] I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, herausgegeben von W. Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main 1974). —Meister Eckhart, Die deutschen Werke. Predigten, ed. J. Quint, t. I, II, III, Stuttgart [respectively] 1958, 1971, 1976. —Nietzsche, Friedrich, Also sprach Zarathustra. Kritische Studienausgabe, herausgegeben von G. Coli und M. Montinari (München, 1999).

F. Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra. Kritische Studienausgabe, herausgegeben von G. Coli und M. Montinari (München, 1999), pp. 18-21. 18

Chapter 10 In the Shadow of Virtue: Why Ethical Personalism Needs an Ethical Impersonalism John R. White Franciscan University of Steubenville Ohio, U.S.

Introduction Ethical personalism is, amongst other things, a philosophical approach to moral life which emphasises the dignity of the human person both as an object of moral activities and attitudes and as a subject of moral virtue. However, though any theory or philosophical approach tends to highlight certain realities, it typically—and thereby—tends to obscure others, just as there is always a shadowy periphery surrounding any area on which we shine a light. So with ethical personalism: as a theoretical approach which illumines the dignity of the person, in its shadows can stand important philosophical realities, including the moral significance of impersonal dimensions of our human being. In this paper, I underline the importance of some impersonal dimensions of the human being, in particular the importance of our being animals, for living a moral life. I will begin by outlining some of the historical factors that have entered in the rise of “personalism” as a philosophical and broader intellectual movement and why these factors illumine certain insights but obscure others. Second, I will offer a brief exposition of some of the philosophical anthropology developed by Max Scheler, emphasising the tripartite character (spirit-soul-body) of the human being. Third, in part based on Scheler, I will argue the importance of the vital soul and its values in moral life, suggesting that it is a part of the moral destiny of the human being to learn how to live both as person and as vital animal, not one at the expense of the other, as

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one might infer from some personalistic ethical theories. In the final analysis, I will argue, a substantial goal of our moral life is to “spiritualise” the vital soul and simultaneously to “vitalise” the spiritual and personal dimensions of who we are.

I. Ethical Personalism The notion of an “ethical personalism” is not to be identified with a specific school philosophy, but is rather a kind of ideal which runs through the work of philosophers of many different stripes. Quite diverse philosophical traditions, in fact, can include thinkers who adhere to ethical personalism and find distinct ways of integrating its ideals into their thinking. Differences amongst thinkers like Martin Buber, Max Scheler, Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Maritain, Karol Wojtyła and Emil Brunner (not to mention American personalists such as Borden Parker Bowne are manifold, even if there can be a good deal of similarity and even some mutual influence among them. One way of elucidating the common ideal which informs ethical personalism is to understand the historical context out of which it grew. Personalism in most of its forms became an attractive philosophical ideal in part because of the social, political and economic conditions which arose in Europe and the United States in the late 19th century. Many of these problems can be associated with industrialisation and the rise of political liberalism. Allow me to sketch some of these issues sufficiently to highlight what made ethical personalism attractive. Perhaps the earliest problem which engendered personalism was industrialisation and the more general social and economic organisation of society termed “industrial capitalism”. Industrialisation of its nature is an attempt to harness the labour power of individuals into the larger project of industrial production, but we should not assume that industrialisation consists only in this project. On the contrary, social relations quite generally come to be impacted and organised around industrialisation, at least in practice. While there are differing ways of treating of this issue, we might summarise sociological analyses of industrial social relations into four points: (1) the widespread advent of wage labour; (2) the separation of work time and domestic time; (3) the separation of work space and domestic space; (4) the ownership of capital as the mark of social status.1 Though I cannot treat of these issues in detail, it should be clear that these features of industrial social relations can be detrimental to the dignity This is derived from several essays in Granovetter, M., and Swedberg, R. (eds.) The Sociology of Economic Life (Cambridge MA: Westview Press/Perseus Book Group, 2001). 1

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of the human person. For example, widespread wage labour carries with it an equally widespread sense of dependency, since one’s economic life becomes dependent on other people’s activities and their willingness or unwillingness to respect one as a worker. Similarly, as Karl Marx emphasised in many texts, one’s labour, which is meant to be an expression of one’s inner life and creativity, tends to be treated as just one more commodity within this social structure, i.e., something the value of which is measured only by whether someone else wants to purchase it. Or again, if capital is the mark of social status, then of course one’s dignity runs the risk of being subsumed into the issue of whether one owns capital: an emphasis on having rather than being. Associated though distinct from the issue of industrialisation is the correlating problem of what is sometimes termed “the administrated life”.2 The goals of efficiency within industrialised society require greater centralisation and greater “rationalisation” of social relationships. This term “rationalisation” is Max Weber’s and it is meant to express the fact that social relationships become more and more defined through reflection and rational control over those actions, e.g., through policy and legal definitions. With this rationalisation comes also a reduction of spontaneous activities: social activities become more and more institutionalised and with institutionalisation social activities become more and more a function of legal and policy-based control as well as correlating measurements. If we take as one of our assumptions from personalism that the sense of dignity arises at least in some measure through the uniqueness of personality and that that uniqueness also expresses itself in spontaneous actions and creative freedom, it should be clear that the problem of the “administrated life” can easily lead to the loss of the sense of personal dignity. A third area of criticism also became essential to personalism, even if it was not exclusive to it, something sometimes called the “critique of mass society”. We find this sort of criticism frequently in the first decades of the 20th century as the personalist movement takes off in the German-speaking world and begins also to have an impact on French thought. Thinkers from diverse disciplines, such as Max Scheler and Gabriel Marcel in philosophy, Emil Brunner in theology, and Carl Jung in psychology all focused on the problems arising from a new consumer-oriented society, where even modes of human life become subject to industrialised and consumption-based pictures of how life should look. The concept of “mass society” concerns how all aspects of human life, including so-called private life, become rationalised in an extended sense from Weber’s: for it is “rationalised” not primarily by law Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism, trans. Philip Mairet (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), especially chapter 4. 2

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and policy (though by those too) but by idealised pictures of life born of the goals of consumer capitalism. Here too a type of “universalisation” of life is superimposed on the human person, in such a way that the choices one has in how one’s life is to look are set by the parameters of what industrialisation permits and, later, what the advertising industry imposes. In this respect there are strong parallels between personalism and the critical theory of the early Frankfurt School. What is important to note from each of these points is that ethical personalism in many ways arises out of a concern for “depersonalisation,” where this term denotes essentially two things: (1) the loss of experience of and respect for human dignity, through one being treated merely as one more labourer, one more institutional cog, or one more consumer; (2) the uniqueness implicit in personal freedom and life choices becomes overwhelmed by a “mass” or one might even say “standardised” personality. Thus personalism at its core seems to be, more than anything else, an attempt to articulate personal dignity and the correlating respect for the uniqueness of each person as expressed through spontaneous and creative freedom, in the face of massive social forces tending toward uniformity, standardisation, and loss of the sense of personal uniqueness. The social forces and correlating experiences which engendered original personalism more than a hundred years ago have, if anything, intensified since that time. Each of the three areas of social life outlined above have increased in power; hence the ability of individual persons to resist that power is simultaneously weakened, in part from the fact that new generations have no sense of what life might look like without these factors. For this reason too one might argue that contemporary Western society not only needs personalism more than ever but may also lack the basic experiences which are likely to result in the development of a robust personalism. If philosophy “begins in experience,” what general social experiences of personal dignity are robust enough to counteract such social forces?

II. Compensatory Movements in History Without posing the following as a full-fledged principle of the philosophy of history, I want to highlight a pattern one often finds in history, including in the history of philosophy. When some claimed insight is strongly emphasised by a thinker or philosophical movement (or a political leader, community, etc.) and done so in a way persuasive enough that it is likely to have significant impact on a community (including the community of philosophers), there is often a kind of counter-reaction. The counter-reaction may be born

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of many things: it may be rooted in the belief that the claimed insight is incorrect; it may be that the claimed insight is not as new as the individual proclaiming it thinks; it may be that the claimed insight, though true in some measure tends to obscure something else; and there are other possibilities as well. On these and similar occasions, the counter-reaction will often take the form of positing a position understood to be an opposite of the original claim. To take an example from the history of philosophy: when thinkers in the Rationalist tradition emphasised the mind as the criterion for its own ideas, as in René Descartes, it was experienced by some philosophers as an extreme. Thinkers in the Empiricist tradition who experienced Rationalistic thinking this way, for example, reacted by emphasising the importance of sense experience for validating the claims of ideas. While this emphasis on the part of Empiricist thinkers may well have been necessary in the face of Rationalism and may contain an insight not sufficiently appreciated by some Rationalist thinkers, the counter-reaction may also be extreme. We might argue, for example, as in the case of David Hume’s rejection of ideas as anything but less vivid sensations, that the reaction, though having a point to make, turns out to be another kind of extreme, one which also loses the original insight that Rationalism was trying to defend, namely, the dignity of intellectual knowledge in the face of growing scepticism. I refer to reactions like the above as “compensatory reactions,” i.e., reactions which, though having potentially important points to make in the manner of compensating for problematic elements in the theories, ideas, and practices to which they are reacting, often carry with them other problems at least as serious as those which they are attempting to correct. This arises in part because such reactions often are not sufficiently self-critical, since they define themselves more or less exclusively through attempting to correct a perceived problem without also taking into account the positive (even if partial) insights contained in the position to which they are reacting. Such compensatory reactions exist not only at the level of society but also in the course of individual life, as Carl Jung’s notion of compensatory functions in the soul demonstrate.3 The relevance of this point for our discussion of personalism is as follows. Though personalism rightly decries the problems associated with modern industrialised and liberal societies, in particular the various ways in which such societies can become “impersonal,” in the sense that the unique individuality and creative freedom of persons are neither honoured nor nurtured, personalism runs the risk of missing the value of dimensions of the human Carl G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), especially pp. 173-187. 3

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being which are not personal in the narrow sense, and therefore in some sense “impersonal,” but are not for that reason “impersonal” in a negative sense. By way of example, it is not unusual to find personalistic thinkers who attempt to highlight the value of the person by comparing and contrasting the being, value, and functions of personal being to those of (“mere”) animal being. On such accounts, personal being is typically treated as unqualifiedly superior to purely animal being and thus the source of human dignity becomes articulated in terms of what is “not-animal” in the human being. Though many excellent personalistic thinkers do not fall into this trap, such arguments are nonetheless common enough amongst personalistic thinkers to merit attention. One way to highlight the problem of such argumentation is recognise that the human being is not only personal but also animal and that this is not just a combination of two principles externally related to each other. In other words, it is not the case that human beings are part animal and part person; it is rather that human beings are simultaneously fully animal and fully personal: human beings are both, all the way through. Hence the being, functioning and life of the human being also requires honouring both person and animal, both spirit and life. Indeed, one might argue that the fuller integration of person and animal within us is one of the chief goals of our ethical lives. Thus, if what I am saying is on the right page, when one puts forth an ethics which purports to be personalistic yet which simultaneously degrades our animal being in favour of our personal being, such an ethics leads to a derailment of the full moral life required of being human. One suffers then from what Maritain describes as “angelism,” whereby one so emphasises spiritual, personal being that our vital animal being is lost in the process. Speaking now as not only a philosopher and professor but also as a practicing psychotherapist, my experience in the consulting room is quite similar to my experience in the classroom: so often, people are in one of two situations. Either, they are trying to understand and live out their personal dignity but think that to do so requires the repression or even rejection of their animal being, drives, etc. or they dwell in a compensatory opposite position, living a crude hedonism that cynically denies personal dignity altogether. In the latter case, the person in question typically tried to live out personal dignity by rejecting their animality but their animality would not permit them to reject it and so “struck back” by bringing on problems that could only be worked out in psychotherapy, the soul or psyche being the principle of animal life in the person and also the proper subject matter of psychotherapy. It may well be, in fact, that the widespread presence of addictions to sex, alcohol, drugs and the like in the United States, where I am writing from, is in part because of a derailed personalism, a personalism which, in spite of containing

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many insights, is too imbued with a puritanical rejection of the body or a cynical counter-reaction to it: i.e., because human dignity is conceived of as arising too exclusively from the spiritual side of our being, our animal being is experienced as irrelevant or as something like a necessary evil we have to accept in spite of our dignity arising from the exclusively spiritual dimension of being a person.

III. Max Scheler’s Tripartite Anthropology Max Scheler is, in my opinion, a major exception to this problem. More than perhaps any other personalistic thinker, Scheler is aware that valorising the distinctly personal runs a correlating risk of devaluing whatever is not personal. In general, in fact, Scheler recognises that the realisation of moral values in a person is a function not only of one’s attitude toward some specific value or values but of how one experiences and lives the axiological relationships amongst values. Hence, it is not simply having a specific relationship to a value but a general attitude of understanding, loving and living according to the right order amongst values that makes moral life and being possible. For this reason, Scheler is less inclined to valorise some sphere of value or being to the exclusion of the other, since his focus is precisely on the right relationship amongst differing spheres of value and being. A similar habit of mind displays itself in Scheler’s anthropology, where he differentiates three distinct, phenomenologically-given centres of activity in the human being: lived body, psyche or soul, and person. Each of these is an eidetically distinct locus of acting, though in lived experience the activities of each tend to interweave—to the point that we call the complex unity of them all “consciousness”. Consciousness for Scheler—at least in the looser sense of the term–can be attributed to all three strata of experiencing, in that each is a distinct mode of awareness.4 The lived body is a notion developed perhaps most comprehensively by Maurice Merleau-Ponty5 but which nonetheless was an area of substantive development in much of phenomenology before Merleau-Ponty, especially in the work of Scheler. The notion of the lived body is meant to express the nature of the body in terms of bodily based “inner” experiences, rather than “exter4 Throughout Scheler’s work but see especially Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and the Non-formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 370-476. See also John White, “Max Scheler’s Tripartite Anthropology,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2001, pp. 255-266. 5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 2005).

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nally” in terms of being an object of outer perception (as e.g., Descartes’ res extensa). There are in fact specific conscious experiences based in the lived body, such as sensations in the rigorous sense of the term, experiences associated with what traditionally were termed “vegetative” experiences, pleasure and pain, and unifying experiences amongst the senses, to name a few. It should be noted that Scheler’s emphasis is on these bodily realities insofar as they are experienced or, in other words, insofar as they are lived. Distinct from the lived body is the psyche or soul, the locus of vital consciousness. The psyche is characterised by spontaneous experiences of vital drives toward eating, drinking, sexuality, etc. Scheler further associates psyche with sensing, in that the latter are connected to an animal’s vital needs and with the experienced movements toward what is advantageous to life and away from what is disadvantageous to life. The psyche, therefore, is both the principle and the experienced stratum of animality within us. The psyche is also the primary location of what Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung and other depth psychologists would call “the unconscious,” i.e., that dimension of vital consciousness that remains below the threshold of full awareness yet is powerful enough to be a force on thought, feeling and action. The activities of the psyche, in Scheler’s terminology, are called “functions”. Still different from psyche and lived body is the person, the aspect of the human being which is properly spiritual. “Person” denotes a distinct and specific mode of being, that aspect of human beings generally which differentiates human beings from animals and all other purely vital beings. Personal acts are “intentional” in the narrowest sense of the term: they are “filled with meaning” and therefore intelligible only in terms of their reference to that which is at least functionally transcendent to them (Husserl’s “consciousness of”). The person does not, for Scheler, denote a substance: the traditional category “substance” would suggest a relatively stable substrate underlying acts, something Scheler rejects as inadequate to phenomenological experience. Rather, “person” is a being whose being consists in its realisation in acting, a phenomenologically given, unique centre of acts and act-being, which does not underlie in the manner of a substance, but is realised and manifest in and through acting. The contrast here is worth highlighting. Scheler’s rejection of the person as substance is based more on modern (Cartesian and post-Cartesian) notions of substance than on ancient or medieval notions; hence the extent of the applicability of Scheler’s critique of substance to ancient and modern philosophy is still an open question. What constitutes the heart of the criticism, however, is that Scheler rejects the idea that person “lies behind” acts. Rather acts are what express, realise and manifest person: the person becomes itself in and through acts. Any suggestion that acts have the character of conscious occurrences which merely

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happen “on” the person or have the character of being an accident which does not significantly affect its underlying substrate would be an inadequate ontology, for Scheler. Scheler’s anthropology highlights our problem in that significant sides of our being human are not essentially personal and yet form spiritual, personal experience in decisive ways. Not only the spiritual person but also the vital soul and lived body form together the totality of our conscious life, including our consciousness of values. Hence the conscious world of our ethical experience is not restricted to us as persons, but includes elements which are “impersonal” in the sense of not comprising our spiritual being, yet nonetheless essential for living a full ethical and personal life.

IV. The Integration of Spirit and Life Scheler’s differentiation of diverse centres of experiencing and consciousness illuminate important aspects of human acting and also delineate something of a goal of human life. In particular, for Scheler, many of the basic moral stances we take toward the world require the cooperative activity of spirit and life together. That is to say, only through an integration of spirit and life, of person and psyche, can the individual human being realise his or her dignity and, simultaneously, act on the grounds of a sense of human solidarity, love and communion. Consequently, insofar as this latter—human solidarity, love and interpersonal communion—are at the heart of personalism, at least to that extent do we need to have an ethics of the psyche and of vital consciousness; hence ethical personalism requires an ethical impersonalism. Though Scheler develops ideas relevant to this point in many of his works, perhaps the most straightforward text is part 1 (of 3) of his work The Nature of Sympathy.6 Though this first part of the text purports to be a criticism of the “ethics of sympathy” worked out by various British moralists, in practice it is also a positive statement of how spirit and life co-function in the morally flourishing human being. Indeed, the issue of sympathy appears to be an occasion for Scheler developing an entire philosophy of the integration of spirit and life. As with all of Scheler’s work, the text is rich in ideas and yet such that it perhaps raises more questions than it develops and answers. Still, the text is developed enough for us to see how the person and some of the impersonal sides of being human, would interact ideally within the Schelerian ethical framework. Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath (Hamden CT: Archon Books, 1970). 6

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The essential point for Scheler appears to be that a fully flourishing moral being includes an essential dialectic between vital identification and spiritual difference. In practice, this means that most of the important moral activities we human beings do require both a rich and dynamic vital or psychic life and a similarly rich spiritual life. Yet these two strata of the human being relate to the world in diverse ways. For Scheler, “spirit” is a term designating the activity of persons—human, angelic, divine. It is also the locus of individuality and therefore of personality: it is the primary source of the uniqueness in any human being. On the other hand, psyche and vital consciousness are notions associated with human beings insofar as we have an animal nature and insofar as that nature is also communicable with others of the same species, genus, and so forth. These two strata are not connected in a unity of substance but rather through a distinctive dynamic causality—not an external, efficient causality, but a type of causality nonetheless.7 For Scheler, the spiritual and vital elements of our being also experience others in distinctive ways. Since, for Scheler, the spiritual part of one’s being is experienced as one’s own uniqueness, it is therefore the locus of our experience of difference from others. In contrast, the experience of our vital being is born of a sense of identification with other beings. One can envision this last point perhaps as an image of concentric circles: our first sense of identification in the smallest circle is with other humans, a larger surrounding circle represents identification with other mammals, a still larger circle represents identification with other animals, and the largest represents identification with other living beings. The smaller the circle, the richer the possibility of identification, whereas the larger the circle, the fewer the grounds for identification. This experience of felt identity is crucial for all acts of solidarity, according to Scheler, though it is never solidarity simply by itself. This highlights the ideal of what a fully moral human being looks like to Scheler. For Scheler, the expansion of both vital and spiritual powers is essential to living a fully moral life because the expansion of each extends the range of possible values. However, the expansion of each occurs in different ways. In the case of spiritual, personal being, the expansion occurs primarily through enriching our sense of value feeling and preference. In the case of vital being, it occurs through richer vital identification. And further, as a rule the expansion of spiritual understanding of values is conditioned by the expansion of vital identification. Thus expanding the full range of vital consciousness is key for expanding the full range of spiritual understanding 7

Scheler, ibid., p. 76.

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of value as well as key to the expansion of morally significant acts, especially the realisation of both vital and spiritual love, eros and agape. It is love which is the supreme moral act and thus the expansion of the experiences of both love and value define the moral constitution of any human being (more than anything else.) We might pose these issues schematically in four different areas: (1) vital identification; (2) vital sympathy; (3) the possibility of meaningful social realities; (4) ethics of love. Let’s look at each separately. Vital identification. The development of the entire human being, as we have seen, requires the expansion of vital powers and their link to value. We could put the point, perhaps, as saying that the expansion of vitality is itself an expansion of the field of value with which the spiritual person engages. Such a formulation would not be far from Heidegger’s notion of “being-inthe-world,” 8 except that it would pose the notion in terms of value and not limit “world” to a system of references interpreted as being; it would rather put the burden of worldliness in terms of value and vital consciousness. On this account, then, our worldliness and its range of meaning and value is bound up with the expansion of vitality and its powers, since it is that development which also expands the possible range of value perception; and it is therefore only on condition of that expansion that the full spiritual powers of the human being can also expand, since the latter is conditioned first and foremost by the range of possible value experience. This is so, on Scheler’s account, because the bulk of our relationships with the world around us, both personal and non-personal world, is bound up with vital identification. This latter term is a way of describing the sense we have of identification with others—both human and non-human—on the grounds of our shared vitality. Thus our sense of solidarity with others and a sense of their correlating values is contingent upon a robust sense of the shared value of organic life, without which our union with others in any other way, including on personal grounds, becomes impossible. Indeed, as we shall see, genuine appreciation of an “other” is always on the grounds of a two-fold pattern: vital identification and spiritual difference.9 To elucidate this a bit, we need to introduce Scheler’s distinction between “feeling function” and “feeling state”. The latter is an affective experience which is basically passive and static, a mere consequence of external forces on the human being. In contrast, feeling functions are those affective experiences which are associated with the cognitive experience of value. Whereas feeling states have the character of being mere experienced effects of external factors, Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), especially pp. 37-58. 9 Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, p. 39. 8

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and therefore associated with the lived body, feeling functions are intentional in the strict phenomenological sense: they are meaningful experiences such that they yield genuine experiences of value. For Scheler, values are not cognised in the manner of a material object but are felt as specific qualitative factors in some entity.10 For Scheler, therefore, our entire sense of value is bound up with the expansion of our vital consciousness, the development and cultivation of our drives, desires, and vital powers. Indeed, Scheler thinks this is an enormous problem for modern industrialised societies where our experiences of vitality and bodiliness are reduced to an almost mechanistic experience of being a mere tool for production and labour. For Scheler the expansion of our basic experience of the world around us is conditioned by the expansion of our vital being: our basic experience, one might say, is not a “being-in-the-world,” as Heidegger puts it, but a “being-toward-value,” rooted in vital expansiveness. Vital sympathy. If vital feeling functions ground our sense for others, our sense of solidarity with others is also founded on vital feeling functions.11 In other words, it is in one’s ability to identify with living others that also renders possible socially formed spiritual experiences. For example, vital identification underlies all sense of spiritual difference from other beings, in that our experience of others occurs by virtue of a dialectic of identity and difference.12 When I sense the “living power of trees” 13 or experience the exhaustion, say, of a horse, there is a complex experience at stake: I both identify with the living entity, understanding and experiencing something of the “power” of life associated with the trees or the exhaustion of a horse, something we in some measure share, but I also recognise that these experienced traits are not mine, but the other’s. Both the experience of vital identification, insofar as vital experience is shared, and the experience of spiritual difference, such that the experience is attributed to another, are part and parcel of this experience. This is equally the case with human solidarity, though with modifications. Here too the sense of shared vitality as well as spiritual difference makes possible all higher forms of community.14 The spontaneity of these vital movements is important for Scheler, in that living into these movements is a key to expanding our experience beyond our self-enclosed individual identity. That is to say, the spontaneous movement Id., ibid., p. 41. Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, p. 49. 12 Id., ibid., p. 96. 13 Scheler, Formalism in Ethics, p. 340. 14 For the development of other sides of this issue, see my “Exemplary Persons and Ethics. The Place of St. Francis in the Philosophy of Max Scheler,” in: American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 79/1, Winter 2005, special issue on Max Scheler, pp. 57-90. 10 11

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of the human psyche toward value expands the possible range of experience of values, even for the spiritual person: it is what sets the broad field of possible value experience. This is not to say that this expansion is the exclusive way of experiencing value, but that it sets the experiential framework from which we have a range of value experience and thus grounds all solidarity with humans and non-humans. Meaningful social relationships. If meaningful social relationships always assume some level of identification between or amongst persons, then vital consciousness associated with psyche is essential to all properly social life. All types of human identification with others occur at the vital level of our being, whereas the experience of difference occurs at the spiritual level. This thesis of Scheler apparently causes some confusion in his commentators, in part I believe because of the insufficiently phenomenological approach such commentators take. Scheler is of course not suggesting that there cannot be types of spiritual community, that spiritual being and difference imply, for example, some kind of liberal individualism. Rather Scheler’s point is that such spiritual community is not experienced as identity but as another kind of unity distinct from identity. The point, I think, can be well taken, especially as witnessed through the eyes of the therapist. Countless problems and even pathologies arise from confusing spiritual communion with vital identity, as when married couples or families become consciously enmeshed to the point of a psychological fusion, thereby conflating vital identity with spiritual forms of unity and community. On the other hand, experiencing spiritual difference without a sense of vital identity is precisely what carries with it the social derailment of liberal individualism, what Mounier calls “personalism’s dearest enemy,” where human beings experience themselves without a sense of solidarity with other beings and so organise society around principles of mutual isolation and defence, usually expressed in competitive economic systems and social ethical theories based solely on rights, i.e., solely on the claims we potentially have against each other. Liberal individualism is an odd consequence of too much emphasis on the spiritual (“rational”) part of our being and on too much of a materialist metaphysics when it comes to material reality—that is, material reality is conceived of without a life principle. In particular, material reality, on the view of liberal individualism, becomes governed solely through principles of utility, whereas, on Scheler’s account, utility has no claim on vital values because vital values are of a higher rank than utility values: only religious and spiritual/cultural values have claims over vital values.15 15

Scheler, Formalism in Ethics, pp. 86-104.

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Thus the integration of the experience of spirit and life within conditions the possibility of counteracting the excesses of liberal individualism. Eros and Agape. In the final analysis, that which breaks through the basic problems with our society that personalism seeks to overcome is love. Love, for Scheler, is not one act amongst others or merely a higher or nobler act than others: love is an act of another order entirely. For Scheler it is the realisation of maximal love which also realises the maximal range of value experience, thus conditioning all other kinds of value experiences, responses, reactions, etc. For Scheler, however, this maximal love is not an exclusively spiritual or personal love, but rather the unity of spirit and life, of agape and eros. Eros is that love which seeks vital identification and agape which seeks personal union, i.e., a union born of the experience of difference. These two need to co-function, on Scheler’s account, so that the full and expansive range of possibilities can be actualised in amongst human beings. The archetypal case of this is found in St. Francis of Assisi, whom Scheler thinks stands alone in the history of Western humanity, insofar as we speak of this unity of spiritual and vital love. Francis expands the notion of the Fatherhood of God beyond the realm of spiritual persons to the entire cosmos, such that a sense of solidarity is extended to non-personal beings (“brother Sun, sister Moon”). At the same time, no one more than Francis understood uniqueness and difference in all beings. It is not just the flowers of the field but this flower which Francis loves and in its uniqueness from that flower, a sense for uniqueness that becomes intensified in Francis deep love for others. This sense of unity and love extends beyond traditional Western and Christian models, Scheler tells us, because the priority of the spiritual does not dim the sense of vital solidarity with other living beings.16 St. Francis, more than anyone else, was able to embody the unity of eros and agape, a new model of integrated human being that has not been actualised since his time, though his ideal has certainly impacted Western civilisation. Francis represents, for Scheler, the development of all emotional aspects of the human being, spiritual and vital, personal and impersonal, so that spiritual difference and vital identity join in an original, comprehensive solidarity with all of being.17 For Scheler, this means that the development of vital powers to some extent conditions the possible range of spiritual powers: the more one develops those vital powers, to that extent is expansion at the spiritual level possible, because the more primitive, identity function associated with psyche gives the range of what spiritual understanding can truly grasp. Furthermore, 16 17

Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, p. 87, p. 90. Id., ibid., p. 103 ff.; White, “Exemplary Persons and Ethics”.

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one (or one’s society) can lose the foundation of spiritual powers after their cultural development, such that the spiritual powers continue to exist but have lost some of their sense and meaning because the expansion of spiritual powers becomes accompanied by a repression and reduction of vital powers. Hence an entire civilisation can in principle lose the vital ground which originally made sense of its developed spiritual powers, rendering those spiritual powers less and less effective and valuable and making them run the risk of being lost altogether. This is the condition in which Scheler sees modern Western humanity of his time—though had he seen our current civilisation, he probably would have thought our time worse than his own. Much of the inheritance of Western civilisation and its building up of spiritual culture is no longer founded on vital expansion and, without that vital expansion, the grounds for meaningful expansion of value experience and realisation becomes impossible. Indeed, spiritual life itself must rather contract over time in this case, on Scheler’s account, because the foundation of spiritual fullness is in vital expansion, even if the former does not consist in the latter.

Conclusion If Scheler’s analysis of personal acts in Sympathy is correct, there is no expansion or living out of personal moral life without simultaneously living intensely our vital being: psychic or vital life and its power to expand conditions in significant ways the range and possibilities of spiritual connectedness to values, because vital identification conditions the possibility of spiritual difference as well as forms of spiritual communion. On Scheler’s account, therefore, it is impossible to consider ethical personalism as a philosophical ideal without simultaneously opting for a certain kind of ethical impersonalism, i.e., an attitude toward vital being that respects the connection between person and animal, spirituality and vitality. Furthermore, if we consider again the social structures against which personalism was acting historically (developed above), in each case Scheler would see a denigration of the vital as part and parcel of the problem: in each case (industrialisation, rationalisation of life, mass society) mechanises and commodifies the experience of the body and animality, such that the expansion of vitality on its own terms is repressed in favour of a model of control and commodified sensuality. We can infer from this that rather than focusing on personal uniqueness alone, genuine personalistic thinking, for Scheler, not only exalts personal uniqueness but also the original way in which persons relate to their animality. A personalism which does not do this falls prey,

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on Scheler’s account, precisely to the spiritual derailments of our time that personalism meant to counteract. Indeed, Scheler’s account raises even broader issues for personalism than simply the question of solidarity with our own animality and vitality. For if Scheler is correct, the expansion of our vital powers must extend well beyond our relationship to human animal being to the expansion of a sense for vital value throughout the cosmos. In principle, therefore, Scheler’s personalism can simultaneously, if somewhat surprisingly, act as the basis of an environmental ethic, precisely because Scheler recognises the significance of the expansion of the human sense of value to the range of all vital values, not only those immediately associated with the human.18 It may well be, in fact, that one cannot attain a deep sense of personal dignity without simultaneously attaining a sense for the vast range of value which permeates the entire natural world, because only in that way can begin to understand “the place of man in the cosmos,” as Scheler titled his final published book. ——————

Selected Bibliography —Granovetter, Mark, and Swedberg, Richard (eds.) The Sociology of Economic Life (Cambridge MA: Westview Press/Perseus Book Group, 2001). —Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996). —Jung, Carl G., Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). —Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 2005). —Mounier, Emmanuel, Personalism, trans. Philip Mairet (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970). —Scheler, Max, Formalism in Ethics and the Non-formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973). —Scheler, Max, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath (Hamden CT: Archon Books, 1970). 18 I have developed some of the relevance of Scheler’s thought for environmental ethics in “Lived Body and Ecological Value Cognition,” in: Suzanne Cataldi and William S. Hamrick (eds.), Merleau-Ponty and Environmental Philosophy: Dwelling on the Landscapes of Thought (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), pp. 177-189 and in: “Ecological Value Cognition and the American Capitalist Ethos,” Environmental Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 44-51.

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—White, John, “Max Scheler’s Tripartite Anthropology,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2001, pp. 255-266. —White, John, “Exemplary Persons and Ethics. The Place of St. Francis in the Philosophy of Max Scheler,” in: American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 79/1, Winter 2005, special issue on Max Scheler, pp. 57-90. —White, John, “Lived Body and Ecological Value Cognition,” in: Suzanne Cataldi and William S. Hamrick (eds.), Merleau-Ponty and Environmental Philosophy: Dwelling on the Landscapes of Thought (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), pp. 177-189. —White, John, “Ecological Value Cognition and the American Capitalist Ethos,” Environmental Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 44-51.

Chapter 11 Personalism and Personalisms

Josef Seifert International Academy of Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Santiago, Chile

Introduction Is personalism something positive? The answer to this question cannot be given without making some important distinctions. For while we could indeed call a true personalism one of the chief contributions to both metaphysics and ethics achieved in the last century, a great number of “false personalisms” obscure the philosophy of being, philosophical anthropology and ethics in a way rarely seen before in the history of philosophy. While what I would like to call true or authentic personalism has possibly provided a deeper understanding of the moral sphere and of the distinctive nature of human beings, many ethical positions such as the situation ethics of Joseph Fletcher, or the so-called “purely teleological ethics” (a new form of consequentialism in ethics) and other positions, in the name of personalism, negate the true nature of the person. Moreover, many important and fine philosophers who call themselves “personalists” or are called so by others, such as Mounier, are in certain respects less deserving of this name than some classical authors such as Augustine or Thomas Aquinas, whom one frequently pits against personalists, as we shall see. Finally, there are many authentic personalists who are nevertheless “personalist philosophers” only in a very imperfect way.

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I. Different ‘Personalisms’ (1) Adequate (ideal) personalism: By this term we mean a philosophy (or theology) which does full justice to the reality, nature, and dignity of persons. While no human philosophy can realise personalism in this sense absolutely, we can encounter in certain schools of contemporary philosophy, for example in the Polish personalist ethics of Karol Wojtyła,1 Tadeusz Styczeń,2 Andrzej Szostek3 and others, or in the philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand,4 a personalism which is adequate in a large measure to the reality and dignity of persons. Nevertheless, it remains a perpetual task of philosophy to develop an always increasingly adequate philosophy of the person and personalism. (2) Imperfect personalism: In many philosophies (and theologies) we find a basic personalism but nevertheless a greater or lesser absence of some elements which constitute an adequate personalism. (3) False personalisms (pseudo-personalisms), non-personalist or antipersonalist systems and ideas: Though the line which separates false personalisms, pseudo-personalisms, and anti-personalisms from ‘imperfect personI am speaking here of the philosopher Karol Wojtyła, but his philosophical-theological work since he has become Pope John Paul II, especially his documents on human suffering, the theology of the body, the Holy Spirit, and others contain an immense amount of philosophy and develop, as a whole, a personalist vision of the universe which is possibly even more grandiosely personalist than the “pure” philosophy of Karol Wojtyła expressed in his Love and Responsibility, trans. by H.T. Willetts (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993) or in The Acting Person (Boston: Reidel, 1979); cf. also the corrected text, authorised by the author (unpublished), Library of the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality Liechtenstein, Bendern. See also John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them. A Theology of the Body, trans., introduction, and index by Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2006). 2 I have in mind here many works of Tadeusz Styczeń, especially his “Zur Frage einer unabhängigen Ethik,” in: Tadeusz Styczeń, Andrzej Szostek, Karol Wojtyła, Der Streit um den Menschen: personaler Anspruch des Sittlichen (Kevelaer: Butzon and Bercker, 1979). 3 See Tadeusz Styczeń, Andrzej Szostek, Karol Wojtyła, Der Streit um den Menschen, cit. 4 See for example Ethics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978); Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft. Untersuchungen über Wesen und Wert der Gemsinschaft, 3., vom Verf. durchgesehene Aufl., Dietrich von Hildebrand, Gesammelte Werke IV (Regensburg: J. Habbel, 1975); Das Wesen der Liebe; Dietrich von Hildebrand, Gesammelte Werke III (Regensburg, 1971)/The Nature of Love, Preface by Kenneth Smith, Trans. and introd. by John Crosby with John Henry Crosby, (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine Press, 2009); Die Umgestaltung in Christus. Über christliche Grundhaltung Einsiedeln Köln: Benziger and Co. 1940 (Nachdruck der 5. Auflage St. Ottilien: Eos Verlag, 1988)/ Transformation in Christ. Our Path to Holiness. Reprint of 1948 (New Hampshire: Sophia Institute Press, 1989). 1

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alisms’ cannot be clearly drawn in all cases, we must distinguish in principle sharply philosophies which are clearly, albeit in many degrees of radicality, opposed to personalist philosophy, from the discussed imperfect personalisms. For these contain a basic bent towards personalism which is wholly absent in the anti-personalist philosophies. In this paper, we will contrast the necessary elements of an adequate personalism with those of pseudo- and anti-personalism and then discuss briefly a few examples of an imperfect personalism.

II. The Essential Tenets of Adequate Personalism and Some Opinions of Its Anti-Personalist Foes Adequate personalism, in its great vision of the central metaphysical and moral position of the person in the cosmos, combines many truths which were discovered by philosophers of different ages and different periods in the history of philosophy. True personalism in this sense is not a philosophical school of the last decades, restricted to a narrow group of adherents, but truly just another name for the philosophia perennis (eternal philosophy), understood in the best and widest sense of the term, which includes all genuine contributions to philosophy, but only inasmuch as they are true. The philosophical recognition (prise de conscience) of the eternally valid elements of personalism cuts across history and unites philosophers of different ages who hold in common many truths about the person. Authentic personalism is characterised chiefly by the following elements: 1. An unbridgeable Essential Distinction Between Persons (Rational Subjects) and Impersonal Beings True personalism is characterized by the discovery of the radical and unbridgeable essential distinction, which can never be explained by evolution or even by biological processes of generation, between persons and non-personal entities. This distinction is founded, to begin with, on the rationality and spiritual substantiality of the person to which we shall return.5 5 To understand the philosophical foundations of these assertions see Ludger Hölscher, The Reality of the Mind. St. Augustine’s Arguments for the Human Soul as Spiritual Substance (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986); and Josef Seifert, Das Leib-Seele Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion. Eine kritisch-systematische Analyse (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2nd ed., 1989); the same author, What is Life? On the Originality, Irreducibility and Value of Life. Value Inquiry Book Series (VIBS), ed. by Robert Ginsberg, vol 51/Central European Value Studies (CEVS), ed. by H.G. Callaway (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997).

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The person is capable of perceiving and understanding concrete individual objects in such a rational way that she is able to name them, as well as to form general concepts of their natures, to make judgments about states of affairs regarding them, to use language which expresses conceptual meanings, to perform free actions which involve moral responsibility, to perform religious acts, etc. All these and many other faculties and abilities of persons involve an entirely new level of consciousness and conscious (intentional) relations to objects, which express themselves also in countless other qualities: in science, method, philosophy, in the reflected use of means to reach ends, etc.; they entail the rationality of the person, and thus the abyss which separates persons from animals. An evolutionism which believes that the person is just a higher developed animal and that there is no essential distinction between persons and animals, as Ernst Haeckel or Peter Singer hold, Leninism and Bolshevist Communism6 and the totalitarian communist Regimes in Russia, or the biologistic and racist Nazi-philosophy and practice, but also an ideologically slanted “ecological ethics” which does not take into account the essential newness of persons compared to animals or other living organisms, are anti-personalist ideologies or political systems diametrically opposed to personalism.7

2. The Rationality of Knowledge and the Transcendence of the Person in the Knowledge of Truth The most foundational intellectual faculty of the person is the intuitive grasp of essences, most of all of necessary essences.8 This knowledge of essences is also inseparable from the phenomenon the scholastics have called “the second operation of the mind” (judgment) and which we here identify first as the receptive grasp of states of affairs: that such and such a nature possesses or does not possess such and such traits. The insight into positive or negative 6 See Alexander Solschenizyn, Macht und Moral zu Ende des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, ed. by Rocco Buttiglione und Josef Seifert (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1994). 7 See Dietrich von Hildebrand, Memoiren und Aufsätze gegen den Nationalsozialismus 1933-1938. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte, mit Alice von Hildebrand und Rudolf Ebneth hrsg. v. Ernst Wenisch (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1994), and Josef Seifert, (Hg.), Dietrich von Hildebrands Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Carl Winter, 1998). 8 See Dietrich von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy?, 3rd ed., with a New Introductory Essay by Josef Seifert (London: Routledge, 1991), ch. 4. See also Josef Seifert, Discours des Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology (Frankfurt, Paris, Ebikon, Lancaster, New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag, 2009).

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states of affairs (Sachverhalte) is a crucially significant part of the rational knowledge of essences.9 Where the non-necessity and limited intelligibility of a nature does not allow insight and rational intuition of its essence and of its essential traits, such as in the case of the characteristics of a cow or of the human heart, only empirical inductive knowledge of the universal nature of things is possible and is another significant aspect of human rationality.10 Both rational intuition and inductive knowledge give rise to other types of intellectual acts: to some kind of responding to the intellectual grasp of universals. Such an intellectual response occurs first of all through the act of formation of what Augustine calls the verbum mentis, i.e., abstract concepts.11 See Adolf Reinach, “Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils,” in: Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe in zwei Bänden, Bd. I: Die Werke, Teil I: Kritische Neuausgabe (19051914), Teil II: Nachgelassene Texte (1906-1917), pp. 95-140. 10 In such an inductive knowledge we arrive only gradually at the grasp of the universal natures of things by repeated observation and methods of experimentation, accompanied by forms of intuitive understanding of gestalt- and form-principles. Also this complex and differentiated process of a genuine grasp of universal natures is characteristic of human knowledge and partakes in the traits of rationality. It also requires insight into the nature of empirical-inductive knowledge and the development and application of scientific experimental sciences that are capable of gaining knowledge of general natures. See Josef Seifert: “Objektivismus in der Wissenschaft und Grundlagen philosophischer Rationalität. Kritische Überlegungen zu Karl Poppers Wissenschafts-, Erkenntnis- und Wahrheitstheorie,” in: N. Leser, J. Seifert, K. Plitzner (Hrsg.), Die Gedankenwelt Sir Karl Poppers: Kritischer Rationalismus im Dialog (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1991), pp. 31-74; The Philosophical Diseases of Medicine and Their Cure. Philosophy and Ethics of Medicine. Vol. 1: Foundations. Philosophy and Medicine, vol. 82 (New York: Springer, 2004), Prolegomena and ch. 1. This sort of empirical and incomplete induction constitutes only one specifically human form of the knowledge of non-necessary universals among others. Higher persons than human ones can know also the non-necessary morphic universal natures of things in far more perfect ways than by induction. 11 Most concepts (with the exception of purely functioning concepts such as the ‘copula’ and others) correspond to the essences which we know. In the corresponding concepts, the natures or essences of things are meant under certain points of view and are considered on distinct levels of generality (such as genus, species, sub-species, etc.). The world of meaning-units and concepts, as bearers of truth, cannot be restricted to those conceptual meaning-units that are formed by the human mind and linked by us, as their meanings, to words. Specifically the bearer of truth in its totality requires also a sphere of “ideal meaning-units.” An adequate theory of truth has thus to develop certain intuitions of Husserl in Logical Investigations. See Josef Seifert, “Is the Existence of Truth dependent upon Man?”, in: Review of Metaphysics, 35, 1982, pp. 461-481; and Wahrheit und Person. Vom Wesen der Seinswahrheit, Erkenntniswahrheit und Urteilswahrheit. De veritate–Über die Wahrheit Bd. I (Frankfurt, Paris, Ebikon, Lancaster, New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag, 2009), chs. 4 and 5. 9

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The “intellectual response” of the mind to the knowledge of universal natures also occurs on a second level that is related not to things and essences as such but to the states of affairs connected with them, to the fact that something is or is not, is such and such, or not such and such. Correspondingly, we find the sphere of convictions, and—based on them—the acts of judgment in which we affirm, internally or externally in language, the states of affairs which we have recognised. The “intellectual response” of the mind to the knowledge of universal natures also occurs on a second level that is related not to things and essences as such but to the states of affairs connected with them, to the fact that something is or is not, is such and such, or not such and such.12 Correspondingly, we find the sphere of convictions, and—based on them—the acts of judgment in which we affirm, internally or externally in language, the states of affairs which we have recognised.13 Neither personal, rational, and intellectual knowledge nor judgments are restricted to universal essences, however. The person has also an entirely different intellectual ability: namely, to grasp the individual in his or her haecceitas. And also this faculty, which plays a crucial role in love and in human relations, in historiography and geography, and in many other fields of science and life, in particular of moral life, is only possible for a rational subject. In fact, the grasp of the individual in its haecceitas is not less properly an act of the intellect than the grasp of the universals. This rational grasp of the individual qua individual gives rise to the capacity of naming individuals, of doing biographies, historical research, etc. Above all, in love and in moral action, the intellectual faculty of grasping the individual as such is of utmost and indispensable significance. And this faculty is not less On the notion of states of affairs, see also Adolf Reinach, “Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils,” in: Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe in zwei Bänden, Bd. I: Die Werke, Teil I: Kritische Neuausgabe (1905-1914), Teil II: Nachgelassene Texte (1906-1917), S. 95-140; see likewise Mariano Crespo, “En torno a los estados de cosas. Una investigación ontológico-formal,” Anuario Filosófico, XXVIII/1 (1995), 143-156; Josef Seifert, Wahrheit und Person, ch. 3. 13 In the judgment, however, we are faced with more than the psychic acts of individual subjects. We find in them objective contents of these acts and in a sense their products: propositions. A proposition (judgment in the objective sense) is an entity of its own. It consists of concepts, unlike the act of judging; it can contain abstract concepts, unlike the wholly individual acts of judging; it can be judged by many different individuals whereas the acts of judging can in no way be thus shared, etc. The proposition is a complex meaning-unit composed of different concepts which have meanings and, at any rate, exert different functions in the proposition. The propositions or judgments—as objective entities of their own which differ both from the acts of judging and from the judged states of affairs—‘assert’ (not in the sense in which persons through their acts of asserting assert, but quite ‘objectively’) states of affairs. 12

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astonishing than the knowledge of universals; it, too, involves the entirely new type of specifically personal and rational consciousness. The abilities to judge and to make the distinction between true and false propositions about universal natures and individuals are cornerstones of the intellectual rationality of the person. A third fundamental intellectual faculty of reasoning equally constitutes a significant part of the rationality of a person’s intellect. In the process of inferring (reasoning) the person is capable of applying intuitively grasped laws of logic to the deduction of the truth of conclusions from the truth of certain premises of logical arguments.14 In all of these acts truth can be discovered. True personalism does not see the person locked into his or her mere subjectivity of experiences and inborn ideas, nor does it regard the person as a subject that creates or constitutes all objects of her consciousness, as German idealists and many forms of contemporary constructivists thought and keep thinking. On the contrary, pure subjectivism denies the deepest essence of the person. Contrary to a widespread belief: subjectivism and also German idealism (in spite of its clear personalist aspirations) is, on this score of the transcendence of man in the knowledge of truth about things in themselves,15 the antithesis to authentic personalism. For it belongs to the essence of the person that all personal acts are intrinsically related to what really is the truth or at least to what is intended as the truth. Personhood truly rests on the foundation of the capacity of the person for the transcendence in the knowledge of objective truth.16 Truth is, as Karol Wojtyła and the school of ethical personalism have shown in detail, “the inner principle of the human action” Also here we should distinguish the acts of inferring from the objective inferences and syllogisms investigated by logic. The latter can be ‘formal’ (resting only on the form of propositions) or ‘material,’ i.e., making reference to the specific contents of the natures at stake, such as when we infer from ‘it has rained’: ‘the streets must be wet’. In such syllogisms, the conclusion drawn cannot be derived from the pure form of propositions (for example from the form of the proposition ‘it has rained’) but only from the known natures of the things in question. (In our case, one must know the nature of rain and raining in order to draw the mentioned inference.) Such material-logical inferences constitute a large part of our reasoning and inferring. 15 See Josef Seifert, Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism (London: Routledge, 1987). 16 I tried to show this in my book Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit. Die Transzendenz des Menschen in der Erkenntnis (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 2nd ed., 1976); and in the paper “Ideologie und Philosophie. Kritische Reflexionen über Marx-Engels ‘Deutsche Ideologie’– Vom allgemeinen Ideologieverdacht zu unbezweifelbarer Wahrheitserkenntnis,” in: Prima Philosophia, Bd. 3, H 1, 1990. 14

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and no rational act can be carried out which does not presuppose truth as its foundation.17 Any conception of the person as not related to a truth transcendent to herself, and as inventing right and wrong or as creating arbitrarily her own nature, any value relativism and subjectivism, while they pass themselves frequently as personalism, are antipersonalist because they deprive the person of her highest destiny to do the truth and to live in the truth and they cancel also those specific values and truths which are the foundation of any personalism, even the relativistic personalism which cannot escape from presupposing truth for its underlying assumptions. We can reply to any form of anti-personalist subjectivism in the following way: Truth is clearly given as not constituted by subjectivity and as resting, in the last analysis, on some being and reality which is not created by the human subject. In fact, any attempt to deny this transcendence of man in knowledge in subjectivism, psychologism, and idealisms of all sorts, contradicts itself and presupposes that at least these alleged facts of the relativity of all knowledge can be known as they are independently from our subjective consciousness and thus reintroduces the recognition that the human intellect is capable of knowing an objective truth about things themselves that are independent of our minds. Apart from its internal contradiction, any subjectivism profoundly undermines personalism. Only in virtue of partaking cognitively in objective being is the person truly person. For in the first place, solely in this light any other attribute of personhood can truly be ascribed to the person, and secondly, only in their reference to truth can human actions be rational. 3. Free Will of the Person The rationality of the human person is not less found in her free will than in her intellectual life as such. The rational nature of the person lies also in the ability of engendering acts and actions which are not the effect of internal or external natural causes or of a transcendent divine cause but which truly spring from the centre of the person as from their ultimate source. Aristotle puts it magnificently well by saying in the Eudemian Ethics that man is “the lord over the being (einai) or the non-being (ouk einai) of his actions.” 18 The 17 See Karol Wojtyła, The Acting Person, cit.; see also my “Wahrheit als Orientierungspunkt für menschliche Entscheidungen,” Prima Philosophia Bd. 7 (1994) H 3, pp. 289-305. 18 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, II.vi.8-9; 1223 a 3 ff.: “hoon ge kurios esti tou einai kai tou mee einai” (and the master as he is lord of their being and of their non-being.) See also Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, III; and Magna Moralia, 87 b 31 ff., especially 89 b

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capacity of performing free acts, whose rationality, while being based on the rationality of knowledge, still constitutes an entirely new sphere of rational life of the person, is of crucial significance for understanding the true nature of the rationality of persons. For the pure rationality of the intellect alone is incapable of bringing into existence the highest sphere of the person’s rational life: moral life and moral values. The pure cognitive life of the intellect as such does not embody the higher rationality which consists in the free will conforming itself to the good. 4. The Human Heart as Seat of Affection: Adequate Personalism Impossible if Rationality is Reduced to Intellect and Free Will Besides free will, the heart as seat of spiritual affective experiences is equally part of the rational nature of the person; so are the affective responses which relate adequately to their objects: for example, a joy which is due to high goods. These affections, when they are sanctioned and formed from within by freedom, have also great significance for ethics. Think, for example, of compassion with suffering persons, of Saint Peter’s tearful repentance of his sins, of the spiritual suffering a noble person experiences when faced with great evils such as war crimes. The objects of these affections deserve the corresponding affective responses. Not to rejoice with those who rejoice and not to suffer with those who cry for good reasons constitutes a defect of humanity and of that rationality and appropriateness which only the affective value responses can realise. While an infinitely perfect person might only experience positive affections and no pain and suffering, except per eminentiam, the spiritual forms of affectivity do not just belong to the human person but to any person. The heart as seat of the affective life of the person is also clearly distinct from the free will. For in the first place, feeling constitutes quite another datum than willing; secondly, the movements of the heart, unlike free will, are not within our immediate power, and thirdly, they are characterised by a far greater differentiation than willing. For these three reasons, the affective life of the person, which stands in many relations to freedom, cannot be replaced by willing or knowing. Feeling constitutes an important centre of specifically personal and spiritual experiences.19 True personalism is thus also characterised by the insight that, while the conscious and rational life of the person in cognition and free acts is of crucial significance, also the spiritual affective life is an irreducible and central part 6 ff. Aristotle could hardly be more explicit on freedom as he is in these texts, calling the free agent first principle, cause, lord, master of the action. 19 See on this Dietrich von Hildebrand, Das Wesen der Liebe, cit.; see also Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Heart (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1977).

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of the person’s rational being. The discovery of the existence of spiritual forms of the affective life of the human person constitutes one of the great contributions of contemporary philosophy to the philosophy of the person, following the leads given to us by Plato’s philosophy of holy madness, by Augustine’s critique of Stoic philosophy in the City of God, and by Blaise Pascal’s philosophy of the heart. The affective and emotional life must also be freed from the suspicion that it is, in its entirety, common to animals and humans, and, moreover, not found at all in higher than human persons. No, besides instincts and irrational affections and passions, which are clearly not part of the properly rational human life and are also possessed by animals, although, inserted in the life of person, they receive an entirely new character, meaning, and value, we find in the human person also affective experiences and responses which are intentionally and adequately related to their objects and to other persons including God. Thus they possess the full dignity of the rationality of the person and can just as well exist in higher forms of personal beings. Think of the joy over the liberation of a friend from prison, or of the emotion of love or beatitude that would be unthinkable if the spiritual centre of the person consisted solely of intellect and will! While these affective experiences are not within the reach of man’s direct free power, they have not only many relationships to indirect and to cooperative freedom which can facilitate or sanction them but they constitute a sphere of personal life which can in no way be substituted by the will.20 Feeling is a fundamental and irreducible datum and the affective life of the person contains a wealth and richness of qualities which can never be replaced by the more “linear” experience of the will. Any philosophy of man and ethics that restricts the rational life to intellect and will only fails to do justice to the fullness of the person’s being and is an imperfect personalism. 5. The Person’s Relation to the ‘World’ as the Totality of Finite Beings A further central mark of the person is that he or she has not only Umwelt (some form of environment) but Welt. This world-openness of the person entails that she is related to the totality of the spatio-temporal cosmos that goes infinitely beyond what we can experience of it, but also includes a relaOn the cooperative and indirect freedom, see Dietrich von Hildebrand, Ethics, cit., ch. 24-26. See also Andreas Laun, “Die mitwirkende Freiheit bei Dietrich von Hildebrand und die geistliche Lehre des hl. Franz von Sales,” in: Truth and Value. The Philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand. Aletheia Vol. V. (Bern: Peter Lang Verlag, 1991), pp. 258 264. 20

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tion to the totality of all immaterial finite beings. Aristotle in his insistence on the capacity of the intellect to grasp being qua being and Max Scheler, in his philosophy of world-openness (Weltoffenheit) have seen this clearly.21 Not to be limited to the objects in space which we experience but to extend our thought beyond all objects of our experience to the physical and temporal cosmos as a whole, to the infinitely small (divisible) and the infinitely large, and to the totality of all finite beings, is no doubt of the essence of the human person and constitutes a chief difference between persons and animals.22 6. The Person’s Being Essentially Related to the Absolute Being, to God Countless philosophers from antiquity on, and most pointedly Soeren Kierkegaard, have insisted on a related and yet very different feature of rationality, that the Self has a relation to the Absolute, and in a certain way is only in this relation. The metaphysical relationship to God is constitutive for the very being of the finite person. This could be understood purely objectively (in the order of creation) but also with respect to the order of a conscious and free relationship to God, as well as with regard to strictly moral and religious relationships.23 Only in his relationship to the divine and infinitely perfect Being the human person can reach his ultimate reality and selfhood. Thus the ability of performing religious acts of thanksgiving or of adoring God is essential to the rational structure and essence of the person, who, if she is not God, is in manifold ways related to God.24 See Aristotele, Metafisica Saggio introduttivo, testo Greco con traduzione a fronte e commentario, a cura di Giovanni Reale, in 3 vols., (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1993), Books 1 and 4. See also Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (1928), in: Max Scheler, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. IX, hrsg. v. Manfred Frings (Bern: A. Francke Verlag, 1976), pp. 7-72. See also Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman K. Smith (Toronto, New York: Macmillan and St Martin’s Press, 1929, 1965). The grasp of the world as the “totality” of all spatio-temporal things, of all causes and of the world as a whole plays also a decisive role in Kant’s philosophy of the Weltbegriffe and in his teachings on the antinomy of pure reason in the Critique of Pure Reason on which Kant has many insights that are quite independent of his subjectivist interpretation of the transcendental idea of “world.” See Josef Seifert, Überwindung des Skandals der reinen Vernunft. Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der Wirklichkeit–trotz Kant (Freiburg, München: Karl Alber, 2001). 22 See also Giovanni Reale, Per una nuova interpretazione die Platone, 20th ed. (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1997). 23 See also my treatment of various personalist arguments for the existence of God based on this fact in Josef Seifert, Erkenntnis des Vollkommenen. Wege der Vernunft zu Gott (Bonn: Lepanto Verlag, 2010). 24 See Max Scheler, “Probleme der Religion,” in: Max Scheler, Vom Ewigen im Menschen, 5. Aufl. (Bern und München: Francke Verlag, 1968), pp. 101-354; “Reue und 21

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7. The Person as a Rational Substance: “Persona est individua Substantia Rationabilis Naturae” In all of the marks of persons, especially in knowledge and freedom, we find that the person can never be a function, an aspect of the brain, of society, of anything, even not of God. The person, more than any other thing and substance, stands on his or her own feet in being, is a being in him/or herself. Hence a personalist philosophy requires the insight that all attributes of the person presuppose this great truth, for the sake of the formulation of which Boethius and Thomas Aquinas should have an immortal name in philosophy: “the person is an individual substance of rational nature.” 25 An imperfect personalism that reduces persons to an act-centre, as Max Scheler did,26 or to “social selves,” relations, etc., does in no way do justice to the substantiality of persons and undermines an ethics that recognises unconditional respect for human life. The foundations of a personalist ethics are even more threatened by the many extremely anti-personalist philosophies which reduce persons to brain-functions, social products, play-balls of drives, instincts, and other impersonal forces of nature. The new world of personal rational being requires necessarily a subject which is wholly different from matter and from the rest of nature. In the human “bodily or embodied person,” personhood requires a human soul which is strictly indivisible in a sense in which matter can never be so, and a soul as a spiritual and rational substance. The spiritual substantiality of the person is found in all persons, not only in the person-in-a-body, which is man. The essence of the person in terms of his substantiality is expressed in the classical definition of Boethius which Saint Thomas Aquinas adopted, as we have seen: “The person is an individual substance of rational nature,” “persona est rationabilis naturae individua substantia.” 27 No other being stands in himself, is substance, in a more perfect sense than the person.28 This is true most of all of God.

Wiedergeburt,” ibid., pp. 27-59: “Scheler on Repentance,” in: John F. Crosby, (Ed.), Max Scheler, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 79, 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 183-202. 25 See Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, cap. 3; in PL 64, 1343. Thomas takes over this definition and uses it repeatedly, for example in Summa Theologica, I, q. 34, a. 3, RA 1. 26 See Winfried Weier, “Aktualistische und phänomenologische Anthropologie,” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 29 (1967), pp. 123-140. 27 Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, cap. 3. 28 See Josef Seifert, Essere e persona. Verso una fondazione fenomenologica di una metafisica classica e personalista (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1989), ch. 8-9.

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8. The Unique Value (Dignity) of Persons and Its Four Sources (Levels) Authentic personalism, and here we move to a simultaneously metaphysical and ethical sense of this term, requires also the discovery of the unique value and dignity of each person. This dignity flows intelligibly from the essence of the person as it was described—not as if a neutral ‘is’ could found an ‘ought’ or a value: but the being of the person is precisely not neutral and reveals itself as such. The dignity which springs intelligibly from the essence of the person and her rational nature constitutes an intrinsic and absolute value that is not just relative to our inclinations, appetites, or satisfactions. It flows from the essence and existence of the person.29 It is clearly an intrinsic value of which it would make no sense to say that it exists only for me or for you, even if a person of course can be in a special way a gift for another person of a friend, spouse, or child, in which she is not a gift for any other person. ‘Dignity’ is not only an intrinsic and objective value which also animals possess but it is a sublime and exalted value whose excellence and awesome greatness we call dignity and intellectually see rooted in the nature of the person. ‘Dignity’ also signifies a value which must not be ‘negotiated’ for any other good, which must not be attacked or destroyed for the sake of reaching other ends, which must absolutely and always be respected. Kant has seen this strikingly in the personalist formulation of the categorical imperative, in his insistence on the ‘sanctity’ of life, and in a famous and classical text on the absoluteness of dignity (Würde) over against the relativity and negotiability of Preis (price), even though he has undermined the understanding of human dignity in many other ways.30 This “moral absoluteness” and inviolability of the person’s dignity also forbids as intrinsically wrong countless inner attitudes which are inappropriate to persons, such as hatred and envy, and many external deeds such as killing the innocent, which are likewise intrinsically wrong. The inviolable dignity (which gave rise to the definition of personhood which St. Albert favoured) is of the essence of the dignity of the person. More than Boethius’ famous definition of personhood31 and even more than the two alternative definitions of the person given by Richard of 29 On the role of essence and existence see my Sein und Wesen (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), especially chapters 1-2. 30 See Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals), 2. Abs., III 60 f. See also Josef Seifert, “Grandezas y insuficiencias de la filosofía kantiana de la dignidad humana. Un análisis crítico,” in: Ignacio García de Leániz (ed.), De nobis ipsis silemos. Homenaje a Juan Miguel Palacios (Madrid: Encuentro, 2010), pp. 173-204. 31 See above, note 27.

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St. Viktor32 —it is the “definition of the masters” cited by Alexander von Hales, which emphasises those marks of personhood which render possible the recognition of the essential links between personhood and morality as well as basic rights. According to this axiological definition the person is “a substance (hypostasis), distinguished from others through a quality that pertains to dignity.” 33 Albert the Great thinks that this definition is the most significant one because it gets at the most proper quality of persons, their dignity. In this respect, the admirably personalist statement of Aquinas, according to whom the person is the most perfect thing there is, the perfectissimum in tota natura, reveals him as a student of Albert. Aquinas ingeniously links the Boethian with the Master’s definition of the person and both to the ancient origin of mask in an admirable text.34 Any ethics which regards the dignity of the person not grounded primarily in the spirit and as essentially superior to the value of animals, as the Naziideology, and as many forms of a new ethics, for example Peter Singer’s, is a clear anti-personalism. We could at this point distinguish four, partly independent, sources of personal dignity which I have analysed elsewhere.35 The first one is the ontological and inalienable dignity which a person possesses simply in virtue of being a person, whether she lives consciously or is a just conceived embryo, lives in the ‘vegetative state’, is good or evil. The second source of the dignity of the person requires the conscious life of the person. The person acquires a new dignity depending on the actualisation of consciousness and on the fullness and maturity of personal consciousness. Many fundamental human rights (to education, free expression of opinion, participation in the political process, etc.) are founded on this level of ‘actualised consciousness’. Of these first two senses or dimensions of personal dignity there is no (contrary or hostile) opposite other than their total or partial absence. 32 His first definition is: “persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existential”; the second “existens per se solum juxta singularem quendam rationalis existentiae modum.” Richard von St. Viktor, Trin. 4, 22; ebd. 4, 25. Richard thought to avoid thereby several errors, philosophical and theological ones, of the Boethian definition. Even of one disagrees with his criticisms, Richard’s addition of the incommunicability of the personhood is an important addition to the attempts of defining personhood. 33 Alexander Hal., Glossa 1, 23, 9. 34 Thomas von Aquin, In Sent., pag. 133, 136, 137, 228-229. 35 Josef Seifert, “Dimensionen und Quellen der Menschenwürde,” in: Walter Schweidler, Herbert A. Neumann, Eugen Brysch (eds.), Menschenleben—Menschenwürde (Hamburg, München, London: LIT Verlag, 2003), pp. 51-92; the same author, The Philosophical Diseases of Medicine and Their Cure, ch. 2.

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Thirdly, there is a dignity which is a very different, and in an important sense a far higher qualitative, value and is bestowed upon a person in virtue of her quest for truth or moral virtue. This dignity is not reducible to, but chiefly, a moral dignity and it has an opposite in form of the moral unworthiness and undignified quality of, for example a devil, who also possesses the first, purely ontological dignity of a person and the dignity of an intelligent and fully awakened being but the opposite of this third kind of dignity. The ring and meaning of dignity here is another and higher one; there are infinitely many degrees of this dignity which, as Kant rightly says, culminates in holiness36 and renders the being of the person worthy of an affirmation sui generis, of a special moral esteem or veneration. For while in all of nature there is nothing higher than persons who call for a loving affirmation for their own sakes, and special kind of respect and love only due to persons, this ontological dignity is so essentially directed to moral dignity that moral evil can in some sense overshadow or absorb the ontological dignity of persons such that a purely and perennially evil person would in some sense of the term lose his lovability and even become worthy of some kind of “rejection”. We will here omit a discussion of a fourth, “bestowed,” dignity, which can have its root in human persons, political and legal communities, being loved by a person, or in some natural or divine gift. 9. Ethics and Philosophy of Love: “Persona est affirmanda propter seipsam” Based on these metaphysical and axiological insights, we can now proceed to formulate the core of personalist ethics in the words of the Polish ethical personalism: persona est affirmanda (amanda) propter seipsam, which is differentiated in accordance with the respective dimension of value and dignity of persons. This principle that persons ought to be affirmed for their own sakes constitutes the very backbone of personalist ethics and provides a final ethical breakthrough, overcoming the many reductionist conceptions of morality, which conceive of the moral life in terms of non-personal categories such as appetites, or mere universal strivings for self-perfection, etc. Any hedonism, eudemonism and other ethical systems which fail to express clearly the possibility of a response to a person in virtue of her inner preciousness and for her own sake fail to do justice to the person. Perhaps this is the deepest reason why even the ethics of Aristotle and of his medieval followers (putting 36

Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, A 14 ff.

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happiness in the supreme position as moral motive) are not properly and fully personalist. In the last century, we find a unique and historically unmatched prise de conscience of this moral transcendence of the person. In a certain way, Kant saw this very clearly in his critique of eudemonism and other elements of his ethics. But his formalism and subjectivist philosophy prevented him from drawing out and recognising clearly this inner soul of the moral act and the objectivity of the value of human dignity and of its foundation in being-aperson. True personalism requires the insight into the moral transcendence which lies in the ability of the person to give things, and especially the sublime being of persons, a due response, and a response for their own sakes. The central notion of a personalist value-ethics is the following: moral acts and love are in their deepest essence characterised by the transcendence of giving oneself to the good, to finite persons and to God, for their own sakes. This response for their own sakes culminates in the gift of oneself to other finite persons and most of all to the infinite personal being of God in love. True and adequate personalism requires the full recognition of the ethical transcendence in the fulfilment of the due-relation to the good (persona est affirmanda et amanda propter seipsam).37 The ethical transcendence in the fulfilment of the due-relation to persons in loving them for their own sakes marks both in the subject-person and in the object-person the radical newness of personal beings in contrast to animals; this radical newness of personal beings lies in their ability to an adaequatio, to a conforming their will to the intrinsic value of goods, in giving a proper value response and in persons’ deserving such a response. Pure hedonism (as Aristipp’s ethics) or any utilitarian and egocentric hedonist ethics which—as Joseph Fletcher’s situation ethics—often passes as personalism, is profoundly anti-personalist because it negates the crucial moral transcendence of the person and the call to affirm persons for their own sakes. 10. The Absolute Primacy of Moral (and Religious) Values38 True personalism has to understand also that the person is not first of all characterised by the intellectual life and that, however crucial the cognitive life is, the deepest values of the person are not realised by the intellect alone. Certainly, the highest perfection of persons is indeed linked to rational con37 The respective insights are developed by Karol Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility; The Acting Person, cit.; and by Dietrich von Hildebrand, Das Wesen der Liebe, cit., especially chs. 1, 4, 6-9. 38 “For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul” (Mark 8:36). See also Mark 8:37; Math. 16:26.

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scious life. But this personal conscious life is not only or primarily intellectual but culminates in moral and religious values, in the last analysis in holiness, as the great medieval tradition, especially Saint Anselm, and the great Franciscan masters, saw so clearly. The highest personal values are grounded not primarily in the intellect as such (in which they have only their necessary condition) but in freedom and virtue. And the highest perfection of morality, love and holiness, constitutes what absolutely speaking is the highest vocation and mission of the person, which stands in the centre of the Christian message: “haec est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra.” (‘For this is the will of God, your sanctification,” 1 Thess 4:3). A one-sided placing the vocation of the person into intellectual values (as Aristotle) and heavenly bliss into a mere vision of God by the intellect does not do justice to the centrality of moral values in the hierarchy of personal values and fails to do justice to the fulfilment of the person in the free submission to the good and in love as the core of the person’s essence. Thus one-sidedly “intellectualistic” philosophies constitute an imperfect personalism. 11. The Person is Ordained Essentially to Community (and Relation) Adequate personalism can also be characterised by the understanding that the person is essentially ordained to a communio personarum and is therefore not sufficiently characterised as a res cogitans. Only in the community with others, mostly in those communities which have love as the foundation of the union among persons, can the person be actualised fully. But persons can never be reduced to relations and all relations between the embryo and his mother, between spouses, etc. rest on the substantial character of the person. This is true of any conceivable person. While we must reject any philosophy which reduces the being of the person to a relation (which already presupposes a substance, a hypostasis), the person stands in fact by her very essence in a relation to other persons and specifically not only to a “him” or “her” but to a thou. Without this essential ordination of each person to love and to be a member of a communio personarum, neither the deeper meaning of the distinction between man and woman, nor the community-character of the family, of humanity and of religious communities, etc., can ever be understood. Any purely Cartesian conception of the person as a rational substance of the ego cogitans, which would fail to take into account the person’s ordination to community, is an insufficient personalism.

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And yet, a personalist philosophy requires the insight that the intrinsically relational vocation of the person to the consciousness of the world, to love and to community, is not incompatible with the substantial character of the person but presupposes it. On the other hand, any reduction of personhood to a relation—in God and in man—fails to do justice to the person’s standing in herself and is likewise in opposition to true personalism, leading as it does to a denial the personhood of human beings if these are not lovingly affirmed and integrated in the community of the family or of the state such that non-socially integrated or unloved persons would lose their inviolable dignity. 12. The True Moral Drama of the Fundamental Choice Between Good and Evil Authentic personalism understands the full extent of the moral drama of man: that the person is able to make fundamental choices, to opt truly between good and evil, and that these radical moral choices cannot be explained by some type of mere intellectual error, i.e., by a choosing the wrong means for a necessary and pre-given end of human acts. Understanding this, which involves a grasp also of real evilness of moral evil, is crucial for the personalist renewal of ethics and moral theology.39 In their denial of the true moral drama (which is a necessary element of authentic personalism) any form of determinism, including religious determinisms which subject human decisions to a predetermination “regardless of freedom,” as well as all theories which subject the moral choices of humans to biological or mere psychological “motivational necessities,” are clearly antipersonalist. Moreover, all philosophies which reduce the moral drama of man to a choice between means, claiming with Socrates that “nobody commits moral evil knowingly” or with Aristotle that the final end (happiness) is intended necessarily by man, are imperfect forms of personalism and even to some extent anti-personalist, by not recognising the fundamental personal choice between the incommensurable ultimate goals and motives of good versus evil human actions and fundamental attitudes.

See also Josef Seifert, “Natural Law: Persons Are United through Ends: Seven Different Relations between Persons and Ends and Their Relation to Natural Law and Community of Persons,” Revista Española de Teología Vol. 67, cuad. 2-3, Facultad de Teología “San Damaso,” 67 (2007), pp. 149-163. 39

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13. Absolute Moral Imperatives Which Can Never Be Suspended The dignity of the person is inseparable from absolute moral imperatives which can never be overridden by circumstantial situations. To have defended such absolute imperatives and absolutely binding goods, whose offence leads to intrinsically evil acts, is an element of any authentic ethics and personalist philosophy. This thesis is central in Socrates’s ethics and in countless other works.40 These absolute moral obligations do not only relate to inner fundamental options but to concrete actions carried out in the body, because the human body is essentially united with the human personhood and is never a mere res extensa. Any utilitarian and teleological ethics which rejects an intrinsece malum negates the true backbone of personalism even if it thinks that it thereby overcomes legalism and introduces true personalism. For the recognition of absolute moral obligations which cannot be suspended by the circumstances (as many others can) is not an impersonalist “legalism” but throws into relief the dignity of the person and of God and the fact that there are inviolable goods against which we must never, under no circumstances, act. Without this dimension of morality, which is the condition and reason for all martyrdom, the person’s moral life would collapse into mere utility and would lose that quality which Kierkegaard ascribes to it when he calls it the “breath of the eternal.” 14. To Be a Person as Pure Perfection and as Divine Attribute To be a person is a pure and absolute perfection. Personhood being a pure perfection,41 it is absolutely better to be a person than not to be one, and personhood also allows for infinite perfection. For this reason, personhood must not be restricted to human beings and the finite world but also God must be the personal being kat’ exochén, the most central personalist insight that I cannot develop within the limits of this paper.42 Thus personhood and It is also the central thesis of Pope John Paul II’s Encyclical Veritatis Splendor. On this absolutely foundational metaphysical notion, which has been elaborated by Saint Anselm of Canterbury in his Monologion, 15, and further developed by Duns Scotus, see my Essere e persona, cit., ch. 5. 42 See Josef Seifert, Gott als Gottesbeweis. Eine phänomenologische Neubegründung des ontologischen Arguments (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), 2. Aufl. 2000; and Erkenntnis des Vollkommenen. Wege der Vernunft zu Gott. See also my “Essere Persona Come Perfezione Pura. Il Beato Duns Scoto e una nuova metafisica personalista,” De Homine, Dialogo di Filosofia 11 (Rom: Herder, Università Lateranense, 1994), pp. 57-75. 40 41

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personal perfections must be clearly and unambiguously attributed to God, and to him alone perfectly. Therefore, any conception which regards God as a non-personal being or the category of personhood as a mere finite category applicable exclusively to human beings is not a true personalism, because it fails to recognise the absolute metaphysical rank and perfection of personhood. To negate this highest level of personalism ultimately must lead to atheism, negating or regarding as an illusion also the deepest dialogical structure of human personhood in the ethical drama and in the dialogue with God. Such an agnostic and non-personalist metaphysics undermines the ultimate significance of being a person as well as the foundation and ideal embodiment of moral values in real being, and thus likewise inevitably destroys ethics and moral theology even if it is to be traced back allegedly to a new personalist and anti-legalistic thinking. In reality, atheistic positions cannot be truly personalist because they strike out the highest part of personalist metaphysics; but also agnostic or impersonal conceptions of the absolute being do not leave intact those divine attributes which would be mere myths and absolutely incomprehensible without true divine personhood.43 They thereby not only deny the deepest metaphysical reality of personal being open to purely philosophical knowledge, but also the foundations of any theistic religion, of the Islam and more particularly of Jewish and Christian religion. How could a non-personal entity “create us”? How could God be the eternal just judge, as Jews, Moslems and Christians believe, if He would not perfectly know and understand us, which only persons do? How could He love us so much that He sent His only-begotten Son into the World to die for us and to redeem us, as Christians confess, if He were an impersonal id ? How could the absolute being have exclusive rights over life and death which no human person possesses, as Socrates argues—if He were no person?

43 See on this also the positions of Fuchs which show the inseparable links between an ethics of an intrinsece malum and a proper metaphysics of morality. Fuchs seeks to dissolve—as mere anthropomorphism—God as judge, as creator of the soul, as source of absolute commandments, and he links his utilitarianist pragmatism which denies moral absolutes to his agnostic metaphysics of God. See Josef Fuchs SJ., “Das Gottesbild und die Moral innerweltlichen Handelns,” Stimmen der Zeit Bd. 202 Jg. 109 H 6 (Juni 1984), 363382; see my response to this article: Josef Seifert, “Gott und die Sittlichkeit innerweltlichen Handelns. Kritische philosophische Reflexionen über den Einfluss anthropomorpher und agnostischer Gottesvorstellungen auf Ethik und Moraltheologie,” in: Forum Katholische Theologie I, 1 (1985).

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III. Some Remarks on the Imperfect Personalism of Some Great Philosophers of the Past In the following, I wish to say a few words on some imperfectly personalist philosophies of the past. In a certain sense, we can no doubt call the philosophies of Plato or Aristotle “personalist,” although they do not use the term “person.” Especially Plato insists on many elements of authentic personalism: the existence of a spiritual soul, knowledge, freedom, the primacy of moral values, the freedom and knowledge of the creator of the world (the demiurge).44 Aristotle, too, gives a description of freedom45 which captures a profound element of personalism. Moreover, although he does not (as Plato) attribute free creative action to the “divine unmoved mover,” he nevertheless insists on the perfect knowledge of the divine Nous, on his rational life, contemplation, and beatitude all of which are elements of the personhood of the absolute being recognised by Aristotle. The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle are imperfect personalisms, however, for the reason that they ignore some of the crucial elements of integral personalism regarding both certain anthropological and certain ethical positions. In discussing the reasons why we cannot accept even St. Thomas’s philosophy as a full personalism, it will become clearer which necessary elements of adequate personalism we miss also in Aristotle, for none of those elements of full personalism which we will point out as missing in Thomas Aquinas are found in Aristotle. What are the elements of personalism that are absent or present only in a very limited form in Thomism? 1. There is first a general metaphysical and axiological requirement for an authentic philosophy of the person, namely the nature of the good itself. Authentic personalism rests on the general metaphysical-axiological foundation that the character of bonum (and therefore also the value and dignity of persons) characterises beings intrinsically. Only through the distinction of different types (categories) of positive importance (of goodness in the wider sense) can this be properly shown. The objective value (positive importance in itself), the good in the sense of objective goods for persons, and the merely subjectively satisfying must be distinguished clearly.46 Now, in Thomas’s theory that the good (the bonum) is a transcendental property of being only ad aliud, in relation to appetitus, and not in se (as essence and 44 Acccording to Plato’s semi-creationism, the Demiurg does not create the world from nothing but puts order where there was chaos. See Giovanni Reale, Verso una nuova interpretazione die Platone, 16th ed. (Milano: Jaca Book, 1996). 45 In his Eudemian Ethics cited above. 46 See on this Dietrich von Hildebrand, Ethics, cit., chs. 1-3, 17-18.

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esse: res and the character of ens are according to Thomas’s De Veritate), Thomas must also explain our relationship to the goodness of God and of other persons in terms of their relationship to the appetitus, to their fulfilling our inclinations and appetitus. This idea also gives rise to eudemonism; it fails to provide the general axiological and metaphysical background for understanding the love of other persons for their own sake which we have recognised as the very backbone of personalist ethics.47 Duns Scotus has seen clearly the intrinsic goodness (the bonum as a transcendental in se) and he has also connected his personalism with the general assertion that the bonum, just as the character of ens and of res, belongs to being in se, insisting on the fact that only in this way love can be explained as a response for the sake of the person himself whom one loves. 2. Based on this relational conception of the good, some essential capacities of persons are likewise not recognised sufficiently by Aquinas, which, as Scotus has seen rightly, constitute the rationality and perfection of persons and of their wills: A first one of these perfections is the ability of the person to have an entirely different relationship to goods than animals by not just desiring them as source of their pleasure or even of their happiness and as font of the fulfilment of their appetites, but for their own sakes. The capacity to give things a ‘value response’ because such a response as love, adoration, respect, joy, etc., is due to them for their own sakes, distinguishes the person profoundly from the animal. And this cannot be seen if one adopts a relational notion of goodness as appetibile. 3. This due-relationship also allows the person to respond to all goods (including their perfections inasmuch as these surpass all our own fulfilment through them). Only because the primary sense of the good is intrinsic goodness (before the good which is an objective good for us), all intrinsic goods can be the object of our value response, even God inasmuch as we never will exhaust his infinite perfection and as it is not related to our beatitude but transcends it. Our relation to the good, as Scotus points out, is not limited by the finite set and finite measure of appetitus which we have or by the relationships of the good to our person. Only therefore the will, just as the intellect, is a fully rational faculty and extends to all being and to all goods and hence is a pure perfection.48 47 See Crosby, John F., “The Idea of Value and the Reform of the Traditional Metaphysics of Bonum,” in: Aletheia, 1 (1977), pp. 231-339. 48 See Walter Hoeres, Der Wille als reine Vollkommenheit nach Duns Scotus (München: 1962). See also my “A volontade como perfeição pura e a nova concepção não-eudemonística do amor segundo Duns Scotus,” traduzido do inglés por Roberto Hofmeister Pich, Veritas (Philosophische Fakultät, PUCRS, Porto Alegre, Brasilien: September 2005), pp. 51-84.

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4. Only on this basis of the discovery of the intrinsic value also the fundamental due-relationship which reaches its peak in the vere dignum et iustum est of all value responses culminating in the pure praise of God of the Sanctus, can be discovered. And this relationship constitutes an entirely new type of cause of personal acts, a type of causality not possible in the extra-personal world which is incapable of intentional relationships to objects. Starting from this discovery, we can see that authentic personalism requires the discovery that on the level of the person completely new kinds of causes exist.49 Therefore any philosophy which seeks to interpret the life of persons only in terms of the four (or five) traditional causes fails to be properly personalist. 5. Likewise, while means-ends-relationships (into which classical Aristotelianism and Thomism want to “enclose” the relationship between morality and happiness) dominate the impersonal world, in the person we find the relationship of superabundance and superabundant finality which alone can provide the clue for understanding the essence of the person and of the relationship between moral goodness and happiness. This is not a meansend-relationship, as Aristotle and Thomas believe. Happiness is neither the fundamental motive nor the final end of morality but moral goodness gives rise to it as to a fruit. Happiness is the necessary consequence of moral goodness in a world dominated by God, it is meaningfully related, as reward, to moral goodness, but it is not the end for the sake of which we are good. 6. Only a philosophy of the bonum in se allows for understanding the transcendence of love and of the moral act for the sake of the person loved and an understanding of the truth persona est affirmanda propter seipsam. Thus a crucial feature of love and of the moral life, its specific transcendence and self-donation without which “being a person” cannot properly be properly grasped only on the basis of the discovery of objective and intrinsic value. 7. Furthermore, only on this basis, as again Duns Scotus saw, it is possible to explain why we can love God beyond all things including more than ourselves.50 For if there were no intrinsic good but if goodness were constituted by a relationship to appetitus, how could we love God more than ourselves, since then self-love would be the clue to the love of other persons as Thomas says in some texts? And how could we explain then any love that See Josef Seifert, Essere e persona, ch. 9. See my further explanation of this in Josef Seifert, Essere e persona, ch. 9, and Josef Seifert, “Von der Gottesliebe,” in: FILOJEOS-Philotheos. International Journal of Philosophy and Theology” 7 (2007), pp. 3-37; and Josef Seifert, “A volontade como perfeição pura e a nova concepção não-eudemonística do amor segundo Duns Scotus,” traduzido do inglés por Roberto Hofmeister Pich, Veritas (Philosophische Fakultät, PUCRS, Porto Alegre, Brasilien: September 2005), pp. 51-84. 49 50

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exceeds the love for ourselves? Or that the love for a thou has primacy over self-love?51 8. Another element of a lack of the fullness of personalism in Saint Thomas is not clearly connected with his notion of bonum as appetibile: it is Saint Thomas’s lack of full recognition that the intellectualism of Aristotle must be overcome and that Socrates, Plato, and Augustine do much more justice to reality than Aristotle when they do not put intellectual values (contemplative knowledge, cognition, omniscience, vision, etc.) on the highest place within the rational life of the person but when they consider moral goodness, justice, and love as higher. In this respect, the Franciscan school is far more personalist than Thomism by putting clearly love and holiness higher than visio or intellect. Moral values are not just means to reach the perfection of the intellect but, springing from freedom, they constitute in themselves what alone is “good without restriction” (as Kant puts it beautifully in the first words of his Foundations of a Metaphysics of Morals) and what is most perfect within the rational life of persons.52 This insight is also completely akin to the Christian view of St. John of the Cross that “one single act of love (caritas)” is of higher value than all sciences and cognitions in the world. 9. Following from all this, also the concept of the eternal beatitude in St. Thomas in terms only (or primarily) of beatific vision is seen to be incompletely personalist. For it is the eternal love-communion with God that constitutes the primary source of heavenly bliss. Likewise, the love-communion with all other blessed spirits increases our own heavenly blessedness. In fact, Anselm states beautifully that, in virtue of the perfect love that will reign in heaven, our own beatitude will augment by each other person who is blessed in the same measure in which we rejoice in our own blessedness; in other words, we will not be less happy over the blessedness of other persons then over our own.53 10. Also the idea that in heaven freedom exists in utmost perfection and that the kind of “impossibility” of deviating from God’s will that exists in heaven must not be conceived as being “bought at the price of a necessity that 51 See on this the ground-breaking philosophy of love of Dietrich von Hildebrand in his Das Wesen der Liebe, cit., “Prolegomena,” chs. 1-7; 9. 52 See Josef Seifert, “Moral Goodness Alone Is ‘Good Without Qualifications’: A Phenomenological Interpretation and Critical Development of some Kantian and Platonic Ethical Insights into Moral Facts which Contribute to the Moral Education of Humanity,” in The Paideia Project (20th World Congress of Philosophy in Boston, August 10-15, 1998); http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TEth/TEthSeif.htm. 53 See my paper on “Personalist Philosophy at the Basis of Saint Anselm’s Conception of eternal Beatitude.”

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would be opposed to freedom,” stands in the centre of Saint Anselm’s and Scotus’s personalism. Also this lack of full comprehension of the perfection of freedom in heaven is one reason why Saint Thomas gives too small a role to the will in heavenly bliss. 11. Moreover, the drama between good and evil and the possibility of an evil will which chooses another final end (object) than happiness or than the good will can only be explained on the basis of a theory of motivation which does not make our objective good or the intrinsic good the only object of the will, or an object willed by necessity. Only a philosophy which admits of the possibility of choosing an utterly different final end can be fully “personalist.” Also this element is hardly present in ordinary Thomism, though it is present in Fabro’s interpretation and deep texts of Thomas.54 12. Finally, also the role of freedom for the intellectual knowledge and a certain foundational role it has for ethical knowledge and value knowledge in general are not sufficiently recognised by Saint Thomas, except in some passages.55 Thus another dimension of the primacy of willing over knowing (in spite of the fact that any voluntarist and irrationalist interpretation of this element must be clearly avoided) constitutes full personalism and this element is only partly present in Thomas’s philosophy of the relationship between intellect and free will. Although I attribute certain limits to the angelic doctor’s personalism, I am well aware of the fact that on almost all of the mentioned indispensable elements of personalism one can find texts in Thomas in which none of these weaknesses are to be found and in which he even contradicts the thoughts I just attributed to him. This does not refute the fact, however, that the main lines of his philosophical anthropology and metaphysics are insufficiently personalist; it only shows that such gigantic minds as Saint Thomas’s liberate themselves often through their deeper insights from the strictures and limits of their “general system of thought,” and recognise occasionally many things themselves which have hardly a place within the general lines of their philosophy. This is also true of many other great thinkers. Another observation on the limits of Saint Thomas’s personalism is necessary. Some interpreters of Thomas and original thinkers, notably Cornelio Fabro, have quoted texts and given interpretations to Thomas, which let Aquinas’s philosophy appear almost perfectly “personalist” and which show that its deepest insights are truly and profoundly personalist. However, also Fabro, the most “personalist interpreter of Thomas” known to me, insists See Cornelio Fabro, Riflessioni sulla libertà, cit., who shows that Thomas recognises the possibility that the damned in hell choose another and a perverse final end. 55 See Fabro, ibid., pp. 22 ff., 33 ff., 39 ff. 54

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on the fact that the mainstream interpretations of Thomas, and even many of Thomas’s own thoughts, are not at all personalist but even include an intellectualism and eudemonism which destroys freedom and authentic personalism.56 The deeply personalist philosophy of freedom which Fabro defends in various works and his extremely learned and differentiated interpretation of Saint Thomas was also inspired by the great personalist thinker Søren Kierkegaard, however, whose works Fabro translated into Italian. And Fabro himself distinguishes an Aristotelian and “non-personalist” or “insufficiently personalist” Thomas from another one (with whom he identifies), whose positions are very different from usual Thomism, partly even opposed to it.57 The sense in which the common forms of Thomism are insufficiently personalist, however, is not only a fault of Thomists but has its roots in some of the Angelic Doctor’s own teachings. In justice, one has to add: St. Thomas is in a great number of respects not only a personalist thinker, but even a true model of a personalist metaphysician. Let us therefore first point out the positive elements of his personalism: He insists on the superiority of persons over all non-personal beings (saying, “the person is the most perfect thing in the entire nature”)58 and on the unbridgeable essential distinction between personal beings (God, angels, and the human soul) and animals; on the unique dignity of persons; and on the immortal destiny of each person. Thomas emphasises especially the character of the person as a spiritual individual substance, which we have identified as one of the most significant elements of true personalism. Without it, a real philosophy of freedom and of personal dignity is impossible. Thomas likewise developed a profoundly personalist ethics, for example by the ingenious distinction between finis operis and finis operantis, as well as by his innumerable contributions to a philosophy of virtues and vices, of free and responsible acts, of moral conscience, etc. In his De Regimine Principis, and in many other works, he presented also an extraordinarily rich and personalist vision of the relationship between the individual and the state, which contrasts sharply with the impersonalist vision of the same relation defended 56 Cf. Cornelio Fabro, Riflessioni sulla Libertà (Rimini: Magggioli, 1983), pp. i-xi, pp. 13- 132, especially ibid., pp. 22 ff. 57 Thus Fabro (op. cit., pp. 23 ff.) quotes texts in which it appears that Thomas teaches a strict necessity with which the intellect dominates the will and does not leave a proper free will and choice with respect to the means, let alone the final end. But Fabro also shows how there are other texts in which even an almost complete dependence of the intellect on the moral attitudes of the person is implied (Fabro, ibid., pp. 33; pp. 39-42). 58 “Persona est id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura scilicet subsistens in rationali natura”. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I q. 29, a. 3.

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by Averroes.59 Thomas, by insisting on the role of secundum naturam and on the foundational role of divine reason as well as on the eternity of the moral law, much more than Scotus, and partly against the latter’s voluntaristic and anti-platonic opposition to Henry of Ghent and other Augustinians, recognises an intrinsece malum also with reference to “the second tablet” of the divine commandments (4-10). Such a recognition we saw to be a necessary prerequisite of true personalism. And in this respect, Thomas is much more personalist than Duns Scotus who appears to restrict the eternal and inviolable moral law to the first tablet of the divine commandments, the acts which are directed immediately against God. Also Thomas’s clearer recognition of divine ideas (an Augustinian element in Thomas), and his insistence on truth being the basis of all rational action, makes Aquinas deeply personalist and avoids some voluntaristic errors of Duns Scotus. Many other elements of true personalism not even developed in our paper, for example the insight into the incommunicability of the person, are found in Thomas. Thomas’s true personalism culminates in the conviction that to be a person is a pure perfection, and that it is therefore absolutely better to be a person than not to be one—and on this point he agrees with the position of Anselm and Duns Scotus, though using another terminology (perfectiones absque defectu) and approaches the topic of the pure perfections mainly from the aspect of the names which can be attributed to God,60 and develops the doctrine of pure perfections further than Anselm, though possibly with less precision than Scotus. Therefore Thomas insists that God must be a personal being and possess all the perfectiones ipsas which we can attribute to God not only metaphorically (such as lion or rock) but literally.61 Our fourth example of an imperfect personalism is the philosophy of Max Scheler.62 The philosophy of Max Scheler is in different ways than Thomas’s and in a very explicit way (personalism being one of Scheler’s chief goals) very personalist, for example in recognising the unique dignity and incom59 Rocco Buttiglione has shown very well that this difference had its roots in the radically different metaphysics of knowledge of the two thinkers. See Rocco Buttiglione, Metafisica della conoscenza e politica in S. Tommaso d’Aquino (Bologna: CSEO, 1985). 60 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (L. I, c. 30, 2). 61 Thus Thomas insists that we attribute pure perfections to God (quaecumque nomina absolute perfectionem absque defectum designant, de deo praedicantur et de aliis rebus: sicut est bonitas, sapientia, esse, et alia huiusmodi). He makes an important contribution to the metaphysics of pure perfections by distinguishing more clearly than Scotus between the pure perfections in themselves and as known by us. See on this also Josef Seifert, Essere e persona, cit., chs. 5 and 9. 62 See Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

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municability of the person, the untenability of eudemonism, etc. But also Scheler’s philosophy of man belongs in the category of imperfect personalism, and in some sense much more so than Aquinas’s, because Scheler denies various important metaphysical aspects of personalist philosophy, including central elements of metaphysical personalism which were clearly recognised by Saint Thomas. Scheler rejects, for example, the substantial being of the person which is one of the most absolute conditions of authentic personalism, and—in his late philosophy of the Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos—also the character of personal being as a “pure perfection” attributable to the absolute being.63

Conclusion We have seen the many elements which constitute true personalism, a personalist philosophy which is not just one among other modern schools of philosophy but which coincides with the deepest sense of philosophia perennis, of the authentic discoveries of truth by philosophers of all times. In this sense, full personalism requires a manifold discovery of the unique essence, dignity, and value of persons. Such a true personalism recognises also the fundamental principle of ethics that persons ought to be loved for their own sakes. True personalism culminates in the understanding that the infinite and divine being must be person. All true metaphysics and ethics stands on this firm foundation and climax of personalism: that the absolutely perfect Being is also person: Being [in the most proper sense] is person! Being in the supreme and infinitely holy sense is a personal Being, a Deus vivens et videns, a God who is not some impersonal “it” but a living and knowing God and most of all a God who IS LOVE! 64

63 Josef Seifert, “Essere Persona Come Perfezione Pura. Il Beato Duns Scoto e una nuova metafisica personalista,” De Homine, Dialogo di Filosofia 11 (Rom: Herder/Università Lateranense, 1994), pp. 57-75. 64 This attribute is also found among the names of God in Islam and Judaism. Needless to say: any Christian philosophy, according to which God is trinitarian love and loved the world so much as to send His only Son into the world to redeem us, must be personalist.

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Selected Bibliography —Buttiglione, Rocco, Metafisica della conoscenza e politica in S. Tommaso d’Aquino (Bologna: CSEO, 1985). —Crosby, John F., “The Idea of Value and the Reform of the Traditional Metaphysics of Bonum,” in: Aletheia, 1 (1977), pp. 231-339. —Hoeres, Walter, Der Wille als reine Vollkommenheit nach Duns Scotus (München: 1962). —Hölscher, Ludger, The Reality of the Mind. St. Augustine’s Arguments for the Human Soul as Spiritual Substance (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986). —John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them. A Theology of the Body, trans., introduction, and index by Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2006). —Reale, Giovanni, Per una nuova interpretazione die Platone, 20th ed. (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1997). —Scheler, Max, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (1928), in: Max Scheler, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. IX, hrsg. v. Manfred Frings (Bern: A. Francke Verlag, 1976). —Scheler, Max, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). —Scheler, Max, “Probleme der Religion,” in: Max Scheler, Vom Ewigen im Menschen, 5. Aufl. (Bern und München: Francke Verlag, 1968). —Seifert, Josef, Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism (London: Routledge, 1987). —Seifert, Josef, Das Leib-Seele Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion. Eine kritisch-systematische Analyse (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2nd ed., 1989). —Seifert, Josef, “Dimensionen und Quellen der Menschenwürde,” in: Walter Schweidler, Herbert A. Neumann, Eugen Brysch (eds.), Menschenleben— Menschenwürde (Hamburg, München, London: LIT Verlag, 2003). —Seifert, Josef, (Hg.), Dietrich von Hildebrands Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Carl Winter, 1998). —Seifert, Josef, Discours des Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology (Frankfurt, Paris, Ebikon, Lancaster, New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2009). —Seifert, Josef, Erkenntnis des Vollkommenen. Wege der Vernunft zu Gott (Bonn: Lepanto Verlag, 2010). —Seiefert, Josef, Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit. Die Transzendenz des Menschen in der Erkenntnis (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 2nd ed., 1976).

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—Seifert, Josef, Essere e persona. Verso una fondazione fenomenologica di una metafisica classica e personalista (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1989). —Seifert, Josef, Gott als Gottesbeweis. Eine phänomenologische Neubegründung des ontologischen Arguments (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), 2. Aufl. 2000. —Seifert, Josef, “Objektivismus in der Wissenschaft und Grundlagen philosophischer Rationalität. Kritische Überlegungen zu Karl Poppers Wissenschafts-, Erkenntnis- und Wahrheitstheorie,” in: N. Leser, J. Seifert, K. Plitzner (Hrsg.), Die Gedankenwelt Sir Karl Poppers: Kritischer Rationalismus im Dialog (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1991). —Seifert, Josef, Sein und Wesen (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996). —Seifert, Josef, The Philosophical Diseases of Medicine and Their Cure. Philosophy and Ethics of Medicine. Vol. 1: Foundations. Philosophy and Medicine, vol. 82 (New York: Springer, 2004). —Seifert, Josef, Überwindung des Skandals der reinen Vernunft. Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der Wirklichkeit–trotz Kant (Freiburg, München: Karl Alber, 2001). —Seifert, Josef, Wahrheit und Person. Vom Wesen der Seinswahrheit, Erkenntniswahrheit und Urteilswahrheit. De veritate–Über die Wahrheit Bd. I (Frankfurt, Paris, Ebikon, Lancaster, New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2009). —Seifert, Josef, What is Life? On the Originality, Irreducibility and Value of Life (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997). —Solschenizyn, Alexander, Macht und Moral zu Ende des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, ed. by Rocco Buttiglione und Josef Seifert (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1994). —Styczeń, Tadeusz, “Zur Frage einer unabhängigen Ethik,” in: Tadeusz Styczeń, Andrzej Szostek, Karol Wojtyła, Der Streit um den Menschen: personaler Anspruch des Sittlichen (Kevelaer: Butzon and Bercker, 1979). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Die Umgestaltung in Christus. Über christliche Grundhaltung Einsiedeln Köln: Benziger and Co. 1940 (Nachdruck der 5. Auflage St. Ottilien: Eos Verlag, 1988). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Gesammelte Werke III (Regensburg, 1971). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Gesammelte Werke IV (Regensburg: J. Habbel, 1975). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, The Heart (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1977).

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—von Hildebrand, Dietrich, The Nature of Love, Preface by Kenneth Smith, Trans. and introd. By John Crosby with John Henry Crosby, (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine Press, 2009). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Transformation in Christ. Our Path to Holiness. Reprint of 1948 (New Hampshire: Sophia Institute Press, 1989). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, What is Philosophy?, 3rd ed., with a New Introductory Essay by Josef Seifert (London: Routledge, 1991). —Wojtyła, Karol, Love and Responsibility, trans. by H.T. Willetts (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993). —Wojtyła, Karol, The Acting Person (Boston: Reidel, 1979).

Part IV Personalism and Its Demands

Chapter 12 Personalism versus Totalitarianism: Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Philosophical-Political Project Paweł Kaźmierczak Jesuit University of Philosophy and Education “Ignatianum” Cracow, Poland

Introduction The following article is an attempt at the reconstruction of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s political project rooted in Christian personalism, intended as an antidote to the evils of totalitarianism. A brilliant philosophical analysis of this subject was given by Josef Seifert in his seminal article “Personalistische Philosophie und der Widerstand gegen Hitler. Zum Kampf Dietrich von Hildebrands gegen den Nationalsozialismus, seine Ideologie und seinen rassistischen Antisemitismus” 1 , to which I am greatly indebted. Since Hildebrand’s project was highly conditioned by the particular historical circumstances shaping the political situation in Europe in 1930’s, my modest contribution is meant to put his philosophical and religious crusade against National Socialism (and Bolshevism) in the context of his attitude towards the German nation, towards democracy, authoritarianism, monarchism and socialism in Austria, as well as towards Fascism in Italy. I will also aspire to identify the philosophical elements of Hildebrand’s vision which preserve the lasting value. J. Seifert, “Personalistische Philosophie und der Widerstand gegen Hitler. Zum Kampf Dietrich von Hildebrands gegen den Nationalsozialismus, seine Ideologie und seinen rassistischen Antisemitismus,” in: Josef Seifert (ed.), Dietrich von Hildebrands Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus (Heidelberg: Universtätsverlag C. Winter, 1998), pp. 107-163. 1

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I. Historical and Biographical Background of Hildebrand’s Project The German phenomenologist Dietrich von Hildebrand criticised German National Socialists from the very beginning of their movement in the early 1920’s.2 Therefore, soon after Hitler rose to power in the beginning of 1933, Hildebrand had to leave Germany. Staying there would have meant for him either unbearable moral compromises (such as staying silent in the face of barbarity) or being sent to a concentration camp.3 While staying in his temporary refuge in Italy, Dietrich von Hildebrand drew up, together with a young German journalist Klaus Dohrn, a project for the publication of an anti-Nazi magazine, based in Vienna. Both Hildebrand and Dohrn were impressed by the new course of Austrian politics under the rule of Engelbert Dollfuss.4 Originally, in autumn 1933, when the Social Democratic party in Austria still existed, Hildebrand and Dohrn took into consideration the collaboration with the socialists in the anti-Nazi coalition.5 However, the subsequent course of events made any cooperation between the Catholics and the socialists impossible. The project for the magazine gained support of the Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss6 and it was published under the title Der christliche Ständestaat in Vienna from 3 December 1933 until the Anschluss of Austria to the Third Reich in March 1938. Its original mission was the propagation of the “Austrian awakening” against the National Socialist revolution in Germany, which Hildebrand diagnosed from the start as intrinsically evil.7 Hildebrand wholeheartedly supported the authoritarian reforms of Engelbert Dollfuss, who dissolved the Parliament, banned the Austrian Nazi party, suppressed the socialist insurrection and banned the Social Democratic Party. As a result a one-party system was created with the Patriotic Front being the only legal political body. In a posthumous biography of Dollfuss, murdered by the Nazi rebels on 25 July 1934, Hildebrand wrote, “He was just totally 2 D. von Hildebrand, Memoiren und Aufsätze gegen den Nationalsozialismus 1933-1938, Mit Alice von Hildebrand und Rudolf Ebneth herausgegeben von Ernst Wenisch (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1994), pp. 4-9. 3 Id., ibid., p. 24. 4 Id., ibid., pp. 50-51. 5 R. Ebneth, Die österreichische Wochenschrift ‘Der christliche Ständestaat’. Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1976), p. 10. 6 D. von Hildebrand, Memoiren und Aufsätze, pp. 58-60. 7 Id., “Was wir wollen,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1933, 1, 3 December, p. 3. D. von Hildebrand, “Österreichs grosse deutsche Stunde,” in: Reichspost, 1933, 231, 20 August.

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the instrument of Providence”.8 Later, under the rule of Kurt Schuschnigg, Hildebrand had to refrain from the explicit criticism of the Third Reich and National Socialism due to the growing pressure of Pan-Germanism and Nazi infiltration in Austria. In 1937 he was even forced to resign from the post of magazine publisher and was no longer able to disseminate his views publicly.9 He remained, however, a highly regarded speaker within the monarchist movement, whose aim was to restore the Habsburgs to the Austrian throne.10 The legitimists were fervent Austrian patriots, most emphatically opposed to the idea of the Anschluss.11 The Anschluss of Austria to Hitler’s Germany in March 1938 put a definitive end to Hildebrand’s political activity in Austria and forced him to leave this country immediately. The further course of events—the atrocities of World War II—became a tragic confirmation of his prophetic insights as to the inherent evil of National Socialism.

II. Objectivism and the Hierarchy of Values Hildebrand political endeavours were a direct consequence of his philosophical position. As an adherent of realist phenomenology, he perceived notions such as being, truth and value as ultimate data, which cannot be defined or reduced to something other than themselves.12 He held the question of truth to be of primary importance. He condemned National Socialists for their overt contempt for the truth, for replacing the question of truth with the question of the conformity to the spirit of national revolution and the feelings of the Nordic race: “To make the question of whether one should accept or reject a religion depend upon the conformity to the feeling of the Nordic race—that is, upon a completely contingent and subjective standard—is a species of relativism unheard of in all human history”.13 D. von Hildebrand, “Engelbert Dollfuss. Ein Katholischer Staatsman,” in: Civitas, Sonderheft 3, 2009, p. 40. 9 R. Ebneth, Die Österreichische Wochenschrift, pp. 249-250. 10 Id., ibid., p. 171. 11 A. Wandruszka, “Österreichs politische Struktur. Die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen Bewegungen,” in: H. Benedikt (ed.), Geschichte der Republik Österreich (Wien, München: Verl. für Geschichte und Politik, 1954), p. 349ff. 12 D. von Hildebrand, Ethics (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1972), pp. 48, 95. 13 D. von Hildebrand, “Der ‘Sklavenaufstand’ gegen den Geist. Ein Beitrag zur Rehabilitierung des Geistes,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 7, 21 January, 4; D. von Hildebrand, “The Dethronement of Truth,” in: D. von Hildebrand, The New Tower of Babel (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1977), p. 58. 8

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However, attempts at subjecting religion to political or ideological motives, though deplorable, have not been so rare in history. One might e.g., refer to the principle of Cuius regio, eius religio, introduced by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, establishing religious conformity within a state, as an earlier example of the similar position. Hildebrand warned that the lack of respect for the truth leads to the destruction of morality, when right is supplanted by brutal force, conviction is replaced by manipulation, man is subject to depersonalisation.14 His own devotion to the truth even at high personal cost was exemplary, as he decided to give up all his material possessions and leave his country in order to remain faithful to his conscience. Another ultimate datum is value. “Value embodies the true, the valid, the objectively important”.15 The authentic value calls for an adequate response, and appeals to our free spiritual centre in a non-obtrusive way. By responding to this call we transcend the boundaries of our self-centredness.16 Values are ordered within an objective hierarchy, which reflects the hierarchy of beings. The lowest is the sphere of matter. Higher than matter is the realm of life, still higher is the realm of the spiritual person. The highest realm of being is the supernatural, the absolute, the infinite.17 Disregarding this hierarchy, e.g., putting the vital sphere above the spiritual one or deifying life, brings about chaos, both on the personal and on the social level.18

III. The Rehabilitation of the Spiritual Person Hildebrand identified anti-personalism as the major threat to the western culture. He traced the roots of anti-personalism back to the age of the Enlightenment, which denied the concept of the spirit and of the spiritual person. Consequently, one of his main aims was to rehabilitate the spiritual person. He also claimed that there is no antithesis between the person and the realm of the objective. The person is “a much more potent and higher being. Above all, he is a being that possesses an incomparably greater fullness of meaningful activity.” 19 Id., “The Dethronement of Truth,” p. 61. Id., Ethics, p. 48. 16 Id., ibid., pp. 38-39. 17 Id., “Das Chaos der Zeit und die Rangordnung der Werte,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 5, 7 January, pp. 4-5. 18 Id., ibid., pp. 5-6. D. von Hildebrand, “Idol und Ideal,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 24, 20 May, pp. 3-6. 19 Id., “Der Kampf um die Person,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 6, 14 January, p. 3. 14 15

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The human being discovers his own existence as given by God. Thereby, Hildebrand concluded, the person is an objective being, irreducible to a mere product of imagination. The spiritual person is an image of God, much more perfect than other created beings, capable of knowing the truth and affirming objective values.20 The opposition to the mechanisation of life discredited the person, who alone is capable of producing the artificial. This led to the cult of the vital sphere, whereas the real antithesis to the artificial is to be found in the spiritual person.21 The personalistic criterion enabled Dietrich von Hildebrand to assess the danger of totalitarian systems. He pointed out that the personalistic approach excludes racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, since every human being has equal personal dignity.22 In particular, Hildebrand rejected antiSemitism, both racial, propagated by the Nazis and religious, which was widespread among Austrian Catholics.23 He protested, for example, against using the tragic death of his colleague at Vienna University, logical empiricist philosopher Moritz Schlick,24 for anti-Semitic propaganda, and he refuted the unsubstantiated claim that the Jewish spirit was fundamentally anti-metaphysical.25

IV. The Hierarchy of Communities In contradistinction to the individualistic liberalism, Hildebrand advocated the concept of the human person as essentially assigned to the community. He considered the yearning for organic communities to be the positive feature of his epoch.26 The community possesses its own essence and value, and cannot be reduced to ‘a mere sum of individual persons juxtaposed atomistically” or to a “means”.27 The existence of community is only possible among persons, therefore there is no real antithesis between person and community. On the Id., ibid., p. 4. Id., ibid., p. 5. 22 Id., “Das neue Österreich und das Dritte Reich,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 19, 15 April, pp. 3-4. 23 D. von Hildebrand, “Die Juden und das christliche Abendland,” in: D. von Hildebrand, Memoiren und Aufsätze, pp. 349-354. 24 Moritz Schlick was killed by a mentally unbalanced student on personal grounds, unrelated to racial or ideological issues. 25 D. von Hildebrand, “Gegen gemeine Verleumdung eines Toten,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1936, 29, 19 July, p. 696. 26 Id., ibid., p. 3. 27 Id., ibid. 20

21

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contrary, lack of appreciation for the spiritual person undermines the genuine community, transforming it into a mass or a pan-psychic totality.28 Hildebrand hinted at the beneficial role of the communities and the danger of being immersed in a mass. The community helps the individual person grow spiritually, whereas the mass brings about the person’s degradation: yielding to the sub-rational, irresponsibility, succumbing to manipulation, to “illegitimate forms of influence”. In order to create a genuine community it is necessary to rehabilitate the human being as a spiritual person, which alone can prevent us from being dissolved in a mass.29 In Hildebrand’s philosophy the hierarchy of communities is determined by the sphere of values in which they are rooted. The highest position in this hierarchy is held by a religious community, referring to supernatural values. The second in order is mankind, rooted in the metaphysical sphere. The third sphere comprises communities of love, such as a pair of friends, marriage and family. The fourth level, referring to the sphere of culture, is occupied by the nation and the Kulturkreis (the culture circle). The communities of the fifth sphere, such as clan, tribe and ethnic community are rooted in the vital values. And finally, the sixth sphere, is the sphere of law and public life, including state, municipality and other administrative divisions.30 Therefore, marriage and family, as communities of love, stand higher than the state, belonging to the sphere of law.31 Consequently, Hildebrand considered any interference of the state in the free choice of a spouse or in the right to procreate absolutely unacceptable. The example of such interference was the enactment of the Nazi Nuremberg Laws of 1935. They included the Law for the Defence of German Blood and Honour, which prohibited marriages between Jews and citizens of German blood. Even extramarital relationships were subject to penalties.32 This law sanctioned racist ideology and was an element of state totalitarianism.33

Id., ibid., p. 5. Id., “Masse und Gemeinschaft,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1936, 2, 12 January, pp. 31-38. 30 D. von Hildebrand, Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft. Untersuchungen über Wesen und Wert der Gemeinschaft (Regensburg: Verlag Josef Habbel, 1975), pp. 278-280. 31 Id., ibid., pp. 279-286. 32 D. Nicholls, Adolf Hitler: A Biographical Companion (California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., Santa Barbara, 2000), p. 186. 33 D. von Hildebrand, Die Juden und das christliche Abendland, pp. 352-354. 28 29

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V. Authoritarianism and Monarchy versus Democracy Hildebrand also held the traditional Catholic conviction that every authority is a representation of God. It did not mean that he excluded democratic procedures of electing a person to a position of authority. He was only wary of “democratic ideology” which claimed that authority came from the people.34 His reserve towards democracy could be explained by the fact that the establishment of a parliamentary republic in Austria was seen as favouring socialists and disadvantageous for the Catholics, “above all, to take the sharpest ideological contrast, think of Austria in 1918, the Austria of Renner and Otto Bauer—and the Austria of Dollfuss and of the Christian corporative state.” 35 Hildebrand claimed that the introduction of the authoritarian form of government by Dollfuss was a great and decisive patriotic deed, which saved the German culture from the destructive influence of National Socialism.36 According to Hildebrand, Dollfuss knew that a people—just like an individual— can become unfaithful to its own identity and task, especially under the influence of the powerful modern propaganda.37 This was the reference to Ignaz Seipel’s idea of “true democracy”, implementing “objectively correct policy”. Seipel asserted that Christians owed obedience to the leader, because he was a leader and only the leader could express the will of the entire people, not just a part of it. Seipel was critical towards the masses and contrasted “true democracy” with parliamentarism and party struggle.38 In other words, in Hildebrand’s eyes, Dollfuss was the leader, who could take responsibility for the government and, since he was better aware of the task of Austria than the majority of the people, his authoritarian policy was justified. The saddest episode in the conflict between the authoritarian Catholic government and the socialists in Austria was the Civil War in February 1934. The socialist insurrection was promptly crushed, but it left very deep wounds in the Austrian society. A balanced historical evaluation of the event is hard, even from the distance of almost 80 years.39 34

7-8.

Id., “Autorität und Führertum,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1933, 1, 3 December, pp.

35 D. von Hildebrand, “Wahres Deutschtum,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1935, 48, 1 December, p. 1143. 36 Id., Engelbert Dollfuss, Ein Katholischer Staatsman, p. 24. 37 Id., ibid., pp. 23-24. 38 R. Stöger, “Der christliche Führer und die ‘wahre Demokratie’. Zu Demokratiekonzeptionen von Ignaz Seipel,” in: Archiv, 1986, 2, p. 61. 39 G. Walterskirchen, Engelbert Dollfuss. Arbeitermörder oder Heldenkanzler (Wien: Molden Verlag, 2004).

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Hildebrand’s admiration for Mussolini is somehow striking when compared with his unequivocal condemnation of Hitler. According to Hildebrand, Mussolini was a born leader and a great friend and supporter of Dollfuss.40 From the point of view of Realpolitik Dollfuss had no one else apart from Mussolini to rely on for the support of Austria’s independence against Hitler’s expansionism.41 Austrian reliance on Italy contributed to the power of the Heimwehr and intensified the tension between the Fascist Heimwehr and the socialist Schutzbund, which practically made an anti-Hitler coalition comprising conservative Catholics and socialists in Austria impossible.42 Mussolini was Austria’s protector against the Third Reich until the war in Abyssinia brought him into conflict with the Western powers. We must take into consideration that Fascist Italy was a respected member of the League of Nations until 1937.43 It must also be remembered that even liberal democracies, such as England, did not renounce their imperial claims at that time. Nonetheless, Hildebrand emphasised the difference between Dollfuss and Mussolini, indicating that Fascism referred to the tradition of pre-Christian Rome, whereas Dollfuss’ idea was to revive the Christian Middle Ages.44 Hildebrand had monarchist sympathies and was closely related to the Austrian monarchist movement. It was more than just a certain form of government—it was an ideological, cultural and political option. For Hildebrand the Habsburgs were the “embodiment of the Austrian idea and the mission of Austria,” 45 since the history of Austria coincided to a large extent with the history of the Habsburgs. Therefore he pinned his hopes on the restoration of the Habsburg monarchy, the symbol of the universalist, supranational occidental culture. The Habsburgs symbolised the repudiation of militaristic spirit.

VI. Patriotism versus Nationalism Hildebrand was radically opposed to triumphant and militant nationalism. At a peace congress organised by Marc Sagnier in 1921 in Paris he admitted he would have had no problems with admitting German responsibility Ibidem, p. 21. Ibidem, p. 22. 42 G. Botz, Faschismus und Lohnabhängige in der Ersten Republik, “Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur,” 1977, Heft 1, p. 108. 43 D. von Hildebrand, “Italien und die gegenwärtige öffentliche Meinung der Welt,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 8, 23 February, p. 178. 44 Id., Engelbert Dollfuss. Ein Katholischer Staatsman, p. 34. 45 Id., Habsburg und die österreichische Sendung, CS 1936, 47, 22 November, pp. 11141115. 40 41

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for the outbreak of World War I if it had been confirmed by the archival documents. This statement brought about his first serious clash with the National Socialists, who accused him of being a traitor.46 Patriotism—as opposed to nationalism—grants other nations the right to develop freely, it acknowledges the particular values embodied in other nations. Austrian patriotism, as Hildebrand saw it, entailed commitment to the supranational culture of the Christian Occident, to the European common good.47 It is true that Hildebrand himself was enthusiastic in acknowledging the positive features peculiar to other nations,48 he was also attached to the idea of the supranational cultural community of the Christian Occident.49 Nonetheless, the concept of true German culture or the “genius” of the German nation as opposed to National Socialism constituted a crucial dimension of Hildebrand’s vision. True German culture, was, in his view, marked by universalism, intellectual seriousness and commitment to the truth. The universal character of German culture was epitomised in the works of Goethe.50 National Socialism embodied features exactly opposite to the above-mentioned: contempt for the truth, rejection of all foreign culture.51 Hildebrand sought to save the positive values of German culture. It was in Austria that he saw a chance of saving the German spirit. In an essay Österreich und der Nationalismus he wrote, “since the very beginning of its existence, Austria has embodied an antithesis to nationalism” and “Austria embodies the noblest and most authentic development of the German spirit”.52 The interesting point is the close connection between the concepts of the “genius of the nation,” “the mission of the nation” and the preference for the authoritarian form of government. The authentic leader is the one who perceives and seeks to realise the mission of the nation. When the nation is no longer faithful to its divinely ordained task, it is the role of the leader to lead the nation in the right direction. The authentic leader can guarantee D. von Hildebrand, Memoiren und Aufsätze, pp. 4-5. Id., ibid. 48 E.g., Italian in D. von Hildebrand, Italien und die gegenwärtige öffentliche Meinung der Welt; Swiss in: D. von Hildebrand, “Der Genius Österreichs und der Provinzialismus,” Christliche Ständestaat, 1935, 31, 4 August, pp. 731-733 and others. 49 D. von Hildebrand, “Die geistige Einheit des Abendlandes,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1933, 3, 17 December, pp. 7-12. 50 Id., “Wahres Deutschtum,” p. 1144. 51 Id., ibid., p. 1145. 52 D. von Hildebrand, “Österreich und der Nationalismus,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 54, 16 December, pp. 24-26. 46

47

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the unity of the nation, and can express the aspirations of the entire nation, not just a part of it.

VII. Religious Dimensions of Hildebrand’s Project For Dietrich von Hildebrand anti-personalism inevitably led to atheism.53 He viewed totalitarian ideologies as directly anti-Christian, since they were antihuman. Therefore politics became for him a matter of Weltanschauung— he considered it a Christian duty to actively withstand National Socialism. His political project was imbued with his Catholic faith. As a proponent of political Catholicism he warned against “the danger of quietism” meaning by this the attitude of turning away from politics or withdrawing from the political “into the purely religious sphere”. The desire to remain “outside” or “above” the political fray led in his opinion to the passive collaboration with the National Socialists.54

VIII. Contemporary Relevance of Hildebrand’s Philosophical and Political Concepts Are Hildebrand’s ideas valid for contemporary society? The concept of “the dethronement of truth” is definitely valid nowadays. Hildebrand himself applies the term to some contemporary intellectual trends, such as subjectivism, progressivism, pragmatism, historicism and psychologism.55 He demonstrated in a convincing manner that relativism is no defence against totalitarianism, because both National Socialism and Bolshevism were utterly utilitarian in treating the truth—they accepted it so far as it served the purpose of their revolution. The weapons of propaganda, disinformation and manipulation did not belong only to the arsenal of the 20th-century totalitarian regimes—they remain in frequent use in contemporary politics. Establishing the proper hierarchy of values is a perpetual, enormous challenge for every generation of mankind, as we are constantly tempted by materialism, which veils the spiritual sphere, not to mention the supernatural. The transcendent dignity of the human person must be defended against unjustified claims of the state. One of the fundamental aspects of the personalistic social order is the precedence of marriage and family over state 53 54

228. 55

Id., Der Kampf um die Person, p. 5. Id., “Quietistische Gefahr,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1935, 10, 10 March, pp. 227D. von Hildebrand, “The Dethronement of Truth,” p. 86.

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regulations, which entails the right of the free choice of a spouse and the right to procreate, as well as the decisive role of parents in their children’s education. There is also a vast array of bioethical problems connected with the emergence and development of biotechnologies, the contemporary version of eugenics.56 The importance of communities in fostering spiritual growth of individuals remains a valid observation, as well as the danger of immersion in a depersonalised mass. Depersonalisation reduces a person to the sub-rational sphere and makes people susceptible to demagogy, advertising and other forms of manipulation. The role of community is undermined nowadays by the growing alienation and individualism, connected with the breakdown of traditional social ties, including marriage and family. Hildebrand’s idea of cultural continuity, the genius of the nation “which finds its expression in the history, tradition and culture” 57 raises some problems because of the existence of the conflicting currents within the nation’s history and culture. Worded differently, the difficulty with the concept of the genius of the nation is the diversity among the members of a nation, such as the unquestionable existence of the three Lager (Catholic, socialist and national) in the interwar Austrian society. Another problem is change and discontinuity in the course of various historical processes. Therefore, there seems to be some arbitrariness in determining what the “genius of the nation” is. In Hildebrand’s theory this dilemma is solved by using the conservative yardstick of history and tradition of the nation, by reference to its “golden age”. The “genius of the nation” is its most positive potential, per analogiam to the individual person, whose real nature is best reflected in their “better self”.58 In this sense it might be argued that the concept of the “genius of the nation” retains its validity when understood as the noblest heritage of the nation’s culture. Preserving national identity, drawing on the cultural richness of one’s own tradition in times of increasing globalisation can become an important contribution to the international community, ultimately to mankind conceived as a whole. Without it, we would face a total homogenisation of culture. Hildebrand was right when he called for active opposition to evil and denounced the quietistic attitude as “an outright desertion of duty”.59 When good people do not react to evil they are also responsible for their inaction— 56 E.g. F. Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future. Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2002). 57 D. von Hildebrand, “Wahres Deutschtum,” p. 1144. 58 Id., ibid., p. 1147. 59 D. von Hildebrand, “Quietistische Gefahr,” p. 227.

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the active participation in the social life is called for, even at the cost of personal inconvenience. Some of Hildebrand’s ideas were strongly influenced by the spirit of his times and could hardly be considered feasible nowadays. For example, he advocated the idea of the corporative state, proposed by Pius XI and partly implemented by the Austrian government. Although the principle of the Ständestaat was incorporated in the Austrian Constitution from 1 May 1934 it was hardly put into effect in real life—only two professional estates had been introduced by the time of the Anschluss.60 Corporativism became finally compromised by its Fascist version and was discarded by the Church after World War II. The question arises whether Hildebrand’s authoritarian sympathies can be considered compatible with personalism. He claimed that the authoritarian state, in contrast with the totalitarian state, does not overstep the sphere of its competence. It restricts its activity to the realm of politics and does not interfere in the personal life of the citizens, particularly marriage and procreation, which the totalitarian state does.61 He pointed out that the authoritarian system functions well if there is the right person in the position of authority, such as Dollfuss in Austria and Mussolini in Italy. However, the wrong person, for instance Hitler in Germany, leads the country to destruction.62 It might be argued that Dollfuss was in a state of emergency, having, as Paul Stöcklein put it aptly, “Hitler ante portas,” which justified his course of action.63 But, on the other hand, it seems hard to overemphasise the danger of accumulating too much power in the hands of an individual without any external institutional control. There are only too many examples of authoritarian regimes that have demonstrated the risk of power abuse where the system of checks and balances is missing. There is always the tendency to enlarge the scope of control of the state organs and to interfere in the private sphere of the citizens’ life. And the question may be posed: how to H. Wohnout, “A Chancellorial Dictatorship with a ‘Corporative’ Pretext: the Austrian Constitution Between 1934 and 1938,” in: G. Bischof, A. Pelinka, A. Lassner, (eds.), The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria. A Reassessment (New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p. 153. 61 D. von Hildebrand, “Österreichs Sendung,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1933, Nr 1, 3 December, pp. 3-5; D. von Hildebrand, “Autorität und Führertum,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1933, Nr 1, pp. 6-8. 62 Id., “Zum Jahrestag des autoritären Regimes in Österreich,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 14, 11 March, p. 18. 63 P. Stöcklein, “Wirksame Gegner Hitlers,” in: Schweizer Monatshefte, 1989, 5, May, p. 398. 60

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avoid arbitrariness on the part of the leader in defining the mission and the genius of the nation? Hildebrand’s reverence for Mussolini proved ill-placed in the long run, although in this case we must take into consideration a decisive difference between Mussolini’s position in 1934 and his affiliations in 1937 and later. In the case of monarchy, especially based on the somewhat idealised model of historical Austro-Hungarian Empire, it could be argued that it was in conformity with the personalistic principle. For Dietrich von Hildebrand monarchy meant the conservation of Catholicism, the spirit of supranational universalism and preserving the rich cultural heritage, even if the restored Habsburgs’ monarchy were to encompass only the territory of the Austrian republic.64 However, the political constellation of post-war Austria ruled out the possibility of the restoration of monarchy. Only after Otto von Habsburg, an heir to the Austrian throne, had renounced all claims to the Austrian crown in 1961, was he able to visit his homeland in 1966. Summing up, Hildebrand’s personalistic proposition is still valid and relevant in its philosophical kern. The task of rehabilitating the spiritual person is as urgent as ever. His condemnation of National Socialism and Bolshevism was timely, accurate and penetrating and remains a valuable witness of moral integrity in the face of overwhelming evil. The rejection of relativism, the desire to reinstate the right hierarchy of values, and the corresponding hierarchy of communities have not lost their topicality. The need for the nation to draw on its history and culture in their most sublime forms is also a valuable postulate. Although probably one should add the demand for the acknowledgement of the nation’s historical faults as the condition for the authentic reconciliation with other nations. However, some of Hildebrand’s political sympathies, such as authoritarianism, corporatism and Austrian monarchism, not to mention Fascism, seem to belong to the stormy 1930’s and are not likely to be revived now or in the foreseeable future. It would also be unacceptable to classify today’s Austrians as the members of the German nation—their separate national identity is now taken for granted.

64

D. von Hildebrand, Habsburg und die österreichische Sendung, p. 1114.

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Selected Bibliography —Ebneth, Rudolf, Die österreichische Wochenschrift ‘Der christliche Ständestaat’. Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938 (Mainz: MatthiasGrünewald-Verlag, 1976). —Fukuyama, Francis, Our Posthuman Future. Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2002). —Nicholls, David, Adolf Hitler: A Biographical Companion (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2000). —Seifert, Josef, (ed.), Dietrich von Hildebrands Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus (Heidelberg: Universtätsverlag C. Winter, 1998). —Stöger, R., ‘Der christliche Führer und die ‘wahre Demokratie’. Zu Demokratiekonzeptionen von Ignaz Seipel,” in: Archiv, 1986, 2. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Autorität und Führertum,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1933, Nr 1. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Das Chaos der Zeit und die Rangordnung der Werte,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 5, 7 January. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Das neue Österreich und das Dritte Reich,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 19, 15 April. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Der Kampf um die Person,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 6, 14 January. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Der ‘Sklavenaufstand’ gegen den Geist. Ein Beitrag zur Rehabilitierung des Geistes,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 7, 21 January, 4. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Engelbert Dollfuss. Ein Katholischer Staatsman,” in: Civitas, Sonderheft 3, 2009. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Ethics (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1972) —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Gegen gemeine Verleumdung eines Toten,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1936, 29, 19 July. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Idol und Ideal,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 24, 20 May. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Masse und Gemeinschaft,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1936, 2, 12 January. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft. Untersuchungen über Wesen und Wert der Gemeinschaft (Regensburg: Verlag Josef Habbel, 1975). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Memoiren und Aufsätze gegen den Nationalsozialismus 1933-1938, Mit Alice von Hildebrand und Rudolf Ebneth herausgegeben von Ernst Wenisch (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1994). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Österreichs grosse deutsche Stunde,” in: Reichspost, 1933, 231, 20 August.

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—von Hildebrand, Dietrich, The New Tower of Babel (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1977). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Wahres Deutschtum,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1935, 48, 1 December. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Was wir wollen,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1933, 1, 3 December. —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Zum Jahrestag des autoritären Regimes in Österreich,” in: Christliche Ständestaat, 1934, 14, 11 March. —Walterskirchen, Gudula, Engelbert Dollfuss. Arbeitermörder oder Heldenkanzler (Wien: Molden Verlag, 2004). —Wandruszka, Adam, “Österreichs politische Struktur. Die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen Bewegungen,” in: H. Benedikt (ed.), Geschichte der Republik Österreich (Wien, München: Verl. für Geschichte und Politik, 1954). —Wohnout, Helmut, “A Chancellorial Dictatorship with a ‘Corporative’ Pretext: the Austrian Constitution Between 1934 and 1938,” in: G. Bischof, A. Pelinka, A. Lassner, (eds.), The Dollfuss/Schuschnigg Era in Austria. A Reassessment (New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 2003).

Chapter 13 Persons as Subjects of Suffering Peter McCormick The Royal Society of Canada (Ottawa) L’Institut international de philosophie (Paris) “An adequate understanding of what makes human persons intrinsically valuable ought to be broad enough to enable us to comprehend why it is that violations of human personhood of all kinds are in some sense transgressions against what makes human persons intrinsically valuable. Judged by this standard, rationality which I take to be the leading candidate for what makes human persons intrinsically valuable in the history of Western philosophy, is too narrow to enable us to understand the full range of violations that transgress against the intrinsic value of human persons. There are violations that transgress against the intrinsic value of human persons that do not violate their rationality.” —P. Quinn.1 “. . . denken entlang den Fakten!” —E. Husserl.2

Introduction Today, large world cities like Paris exhibit many increasingly urgent human problems.3 Some of these problems require renewed ethical and not just 1 “On the Intrinsic Value of Human Persons,” in: P. Van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons Human and Divine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), p. 238. 2 This expression has often been attributed to Edmund Husserl but I have been unable to find an exact reference in his published work. I thank Hubertus Dessloch for reminding me regularly of its continuing pertinence to some philosophical reflection. 3 See, for example, Manière de voir: L’urbanisation du monde (Paris: Le Monde Diplomatique, 2010), “L’urbanisation du monde,” in: M.-F. Durand et al. (eds.), Atlas de la mondialisation (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2009), especially pp. 24-26; and Th. SaintJulien and R. Le Goix, La métropole parisienne: centralités, inégalités, proximités (Paris: Belin, 2007), especially pp. 113-137.

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economic, political, and sociological reflection.4 And one such very serious problem is the persistence of extreme child poverty in the midst of unprecedented affluence and its many pernicious effects on the identities and nature of children as persons.5 Exactly what does a society’s lack of sufficient political will to eliminate extreme child poverty in such exceedingly wealthy countries and cities as France and Paris tell us, if anything, about the nature and identities of persons? In Paris, utter child destitution persists amidst extraordinary wealth. An early morning walk around the Gare du Nord, for example, confronts one directly with many ragged children sleeping under cars between bouts of sniffing glue to appease their hunger before shuffling off for another day of petty theft and prostitution. Evidently, eminently resourceful Parisian elites lack the political will to institutionalise sufficient resources regularly to feed, clothe, medicate, house, and educate such extremely poor foreign children, however few, not to mention the so many other French children surviving precariously in the faces of plenty. Most of at least the destitute foreign children will die prematurely. This continuing juxtaposition of immense resources and abject child misery has persisted for at least forty years ever since the appearance in France in the 1970s, after the end of “les trentes glorieuses,” of both systematic unemployment and exponential growth in personal and institutional wealth.6 Yet, after the financial crisis that began in the United States on September I write here “renewed” because already for some years thoughtful people in France in particular have been investigating general issues of poverty. See for example the work of P. Bourdieu and his collaborators in their benchmark publication, La misère du monde (Paris: Seuil, 1993), especially pp. 1339-1447. 5 In this paper we may generally follow what might be called a “standard” contemporary English language philosophical usage of the word “person” as recorded in recent philosophical reference works in English. At least initially then we may understand the English word “person” in David Wiggins’s well-argued sense (see his Sameness and Identity Renewed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chapter 7) as “any animal that is such by its kind as to have the biological capacity to enjoy fully an open-ended list of psychological attributes. The list of attributes is to be filled in by reference to the class of actual persons [see for example below, note 6]” (Q. Cassam, “Persons,” The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. T. Honderich, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 692-693. In his entry Cassam helpfully discusses some of the pros and cons of this animal attribute theory of the person.) A brief representative selection of other contemporary but non-English language understandings of the person may be found in, for example, M. Brasser (ed.), Person: Philosophische Texte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Reklam, 1999), especially pp. 104-199. 6 Cf. X. Emmanuelli and C. Frémontier, La fracture sociale (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2002), especially pp. 38-47. 4

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15, 2008,7 within no more than weeks immense resources were found to sustain enormously wealthy Parisian bankers, financiers, captains of industry, and “la caste des riches.” 8 Many would argue that, in the face of persisting child destitution, such priorities on the part of a generally very affluent society are socially unjust and ethically unacceptable.9 But what resources might still be on hand for helping generate sufficient political will to aid those destitute children in Paris who, if unaided, will continue to die prematurely? Could, surprisingly, some of these resources include philosophical ones? Sadly, I am not able to offer here anything more than two quite modest philosophical suggestions for further inquiry. Moreover, these two suggestions are restricted to the domain of the metaphysical. Still, these otherwise “idealistic” notions do not arise from exclusively a priori considerations. They arise rather a posteriori. They arise that is from sustained reflection on the strictly empirical ways in which the many kinds of sufferings of extremely poor children, in France generally and in Paris in particular, would seem to affect the nature and identities of such children precisely as persons. The motivation here is simple10 but the intentions are twofold. First, I would hope to contribute in some small way to continuing debates about whether and how to institutionalise new, less ineffective social policies in France and elsewhere that might better safeguard the personhood11 of such suffering children.12 And, second, I would also hope to understand better and September 15, 2008 is the date of the financial collapse of Lehman Brothers in New York City, the date on which most analysts now believe the banking crisis began. This banking crisis then led to a generalised financial crisis throughout the world. 8 M. Pinçon and M. Pinçon-Charlot (Paris: La Découverte, 2009). 9 See the two quite recent and very well informed works, J. Damon, Eliminer la pauvreté (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2010), pp. 143-200, and, more generally, A. Touraine, Après la crise (Paris: Seuil, 2010), pp. 111-142. 10 Cf. N. Sarthou-Lajus, “Toute vie est exposée à la précarité et crée des obligations de solidarité à l’égard de personnes que l’on connait peu or pas du tout” (Études, 154 [juillet-août, 2010], p. 6). 11 In what follows “personhood” may initially be understood in a sense now standard in English language philosophy as “the condition or property of being a person, especially when this is considered to entail moral and/or metaphysical importance. Personhood has been thought to involve various traits, including (moral) agency; reason or rationality; language, or the cognitive skills language may support (such as intentionality and selfconsciousness); and ability to enter into suitable relations with other persons (viewed as members of a self-defining group” (E. Johnson, “Personhood,” in: R. Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 662, emphases omitted. 12 Cf. N. Baverez, “Ce n’est pas la protection sociale qui est remise en cause . . . mais bien les principes, les institutions et les règles qui la gouvernent en Europe. . . . Sous la pression du surendettement public, tous les pays européens sont contraints de restructurer 7

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thereby perhaps make more probable the actual alleviation of the suffering of such persons one distinguished French historian has notably characterised as “les exclus hors du système; ceux qui ne sont pas visibles sur les radars de detection sociale; ce qui échappent à nos analyses et statistiques.” 13 In what follows I come to my suggestions by sketching the backgrounds of the identities of persons generally, and then by respectfully questioning two quite distinguished and critically elaborated accounts of poverty with respect to the nature of persons. I do so in the harsh light of some only of the apparently endless empirical details of extreme child poverty in Paris today14 that, I believe, often renders these otherwise quite cogent general accounts ineffectual. In each case I try to show that further philosophical reflection may still open up innovative paths in the future for helping both to understand and to remedy such persisting child destitution less ineffectually. Before coming to those accounts and specifically their respective understandings of persons, however, it proves useful to begin with some basic reminders not about the nature of persons but about their identities.

I. Persons and Their Multiple Identities “. . . we cannot discuss persons without making some assumptions about personal identity.” —D. Parfit.15

Many thoughtful people today are raising difficult questions once again about the identities of persons. And these questions concern not just philosophical but cultural and religious identities as well. But why such questions now, and why are they “difficult”? Just what are at least some of the basic questions today about persons, and how might they be, if not answered, at least rearticulated in more explicit and more actionable terms? And how are we today to re-articulate fundamental issues leurs Etats-providence, la France en tête dont la dépense sociale représente 35% du PIB. Le pacte social de l’après-seconde guerre mondiale est mort. Il doit être réinventé. . . il n’est pas de sortie de crise pour la France et l’Europe sans une innovation intense, y compris dans le domaine social” (Le Monde, August 10, 2010). 13 J.-R. Armogathe. Personal communication, September 2010. 14 See A. Bhalla and P. McCormick, Poverty Among Immigrant Children in Europe (London: Palgrave / Macmillan, 2009). 15 D. Parfit, “Persons, Bodies, and Human Beings,” in: T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 177. Note that this paper although first published here was “written in around 1990” (note 27). “I have not revised this paper,” Parfit writes, “to take into account any later publications (though I have added a few references)” (loc. cit.).

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about the identities and nature of persons in the light not just of general philosophical theories of personal identity16 but specifically of the very great sufferings so many extremely poor persons continue to undergo? 1. Why questions about cultural and religious identities now? Such renewed interrogations today are not surprising. For just after the bloodiest of all previous centuries ended, the new century began spectacularly on September 11, 2001, with the gratuitous murders on real-time television of roughly three thousand persons in the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Centre. The perpetrators thought of themselves as bound by, among other things, both their cultural and religious identity as persons to murder thousands of other persons who did not share that identity. Something all too vaguely like an “identity politics” seemed also to be at issue. Not long afterwards, the war in Afghanistan, the second Intifada in the Middle East, and the second invasion of Iraq, ethnic warfare and its terrible consequences in Darfur provided still more terrible instances of appeals to cultural and religious identities of persons as supposed justifications for the murders of many other people. Confronted almost continuously with such horrendous matters, some thoughtful individuals began asking just what sense and significance could considered talk about “identity” properly have? But why is talk of identity today “difficult”? Several good reasons could be adduced. But at least one quite important reason for such difficulty today is the recurring failure of otherwise knowledgeable persons to disambiguate different ways of talking about identity. For we know but sometimes forget that reflective persons may use the word “identity” to refer to a number of quite distinct matters. Thus, for brevity’s sake restricting ourselves here to English parlance, one may properly use the word “identity” mainly to refer either to a fact or to a close similarity. That is, “identity” may refer to “a fact of being who or what a person or thing is” (“She knows the identity of the bomber”), or to “a close similarity or affinity” between things or persons 16 Parfit discusses the identities of persons mainly in terms of what he calls “the possible criteria for personal identity” (Parfit, “Persons, Bodies, and Human Beings,” p. 177). In the same place Parfit summarises his earlier and important investigations in his book, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) as follows. “On the Wide Psychological Criterion, for some future person to be me, we must be psychologically continuous. On the Physical Criterion, which I shall here rename the Brain Criterion, we must have the same brain; on the Narrow Psychological Criterion, we must both be psychologically continuous and have the same brain.” Despite other substantial work in this area of metaphysics, Parfit’s work remains the most influential. His two-volume major work, What Really Matters, includes further sustained reflections on personal identity and is scheduled for publication by Oxford University Press in February 2011.

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(“Although not the same, there is an identity between Hebrew and Arabic”).17 Focussing on the first main sense here, the fact of identity, proves helpful. For we may then distinguish a nominal sub-sense, that is, what determines the fact of identity, from an adjectival sub-sense, that is, from what modifies the fact of identity. Thus, we may distinguish nominally “the characteristics determining [“to determine” here means “to identify”] who or what a person or thing is” (“She wanted to understand his distinctive Israeli identity”), from what determines who someone or what something is “by bearing their name and often other details. . . ” (“She examined his identity card”). This, the modifying sub-sense of “identity” as a hard fact and not just as a close similarity, helps us understand better what many people mean when they speak, for example, of “identity politics” as “the tendency for people of a particular religion, race, social background, etc., to form exclusive political alliances, moving away from traditional broad-based party politics.” 18 Thus, many questions today about such matters as identity politics and, we may add, cultural identity and religious identity also, are often difficult at least because of unresolved and recurring verbal ambiguities. 2. When talk of “identity” is suitably disambiguated, what then are at least some of the main questions about such matters as cultural identity and religious identity? Once again, a number of candidate questions come to mind. They arise when we reflect not just on everyday informed discussion of such matters or even on sophisticated contemporary philosophical reflections. Often they arise from reflection on more particular issues connected with the many practical uses of different senses of the phrases “cultural identity” and “religious identity.” After considering some of the usual senses of historical, sociological, and anthropological studies of “cultural identity” that refer mainly to those general aspects of the modifying facts of identity that are “characteristics of a particular form of life,” 19 we may take this expression here more narrowly.20 Let us say then that “cultural identity” here refers in particular to those hierarchies of values that contribute to give sense and significance to characteristic forms of life. Cultural identity on this narrower account is a causal agency that “permits the self-conscious evaluation of human possibilities in 17 See the Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 18 Ibid. 19 Cf. D. Cuche, La notion de culture dans les sciences sociales, 4th ed. (Paris: La Découverte, 2010), especially pp. 98-114. 20 See for example A. Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (London: Allen Lane, 2006), especially pp. 18-39.

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the light of a system of [cultural] values that reflect prevailing ideas about what human life ought to be.” 21 Similarly, when reflecting on “religious identity” here, we may take this second expression more narrowly than in the usual broad senses of the religious identity of a person or a community deriving from central beliefs based upon both religious faith in revealed truths and human reason. Let us say then that “religious identity” here refers in particular to the fact of a person’s or a community’s identity deriving from central beliefs based upon natural reason alone.22 Again, “religious identity” understood in this narrower sense is also a causal agency permitting “the self-conscious evaluation of human possibilities in the light of a system of [religious] values that reflect prevailing ideas about what human life ought to be.” 23 3. With these reminders on hand, we now recognise that several of the main questions concerning cultural and religious identities today arise not just from recurring ambiguities in our uses of these expressions. Important questions also arise from the conceptual tensions between such identities when these identities are made explicit. Now among these several issues, two questions deserve particular attention here. The first question might initially go: do individual persons have one or many not just identities tout court, but what we might call vaguely for now “basic identities,” whether cultural or religious? And the second might go: must persons sometimes establish the priority of one or several basic identities, whether cultural or religious? But how are we, if not to answer such questions, at least to reformulate them in such a way that they might more easily find their appropriate responses? Several further distinctions prove useful. For to rearticulate even these two questions we need to distinguish between not just cultural and religious identities; we must also distinguish between singular and plural identities, personal and communal identities, and between first-person and third-person identities. If we think mainly of cultural identities in the regimented senses specified so far, then we can easily recognise that, at least culturally, persons belong mainly to more than one group. Thus, you may be of English origins, a British citizen, an Anglican practitioner, a member of the Labour Party, a maritime lawyer, a regular weekend hockey team player, married to a French 21 J. Kim, “Culture,” in: T. Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 185. 22 Cf. W. J. Wainwright, “Natural Religion,” The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. R. Audi, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 23 J. Kim, ibid.

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woman, the father of two sons, and so on. You are not just “English.” You have more than one cultural identity. Your cultural identity is plural. Correlatively, it is false for anyone to hold that you are just “English” and thereby reduce your plural identities to something strictly singular.24 A second distinction now comes into view. For if our cultural identities are ever more than just singular, then we still need to distinguish between our identities as individual persons belonging to multiple groups and our identities as individual persons per se. That is, some of our cultural identities are clearly less central to us strictly as individuals than they are to us more largely as also members of our respective societies. We have then sometimes to rank our cultural identities in terms of our various allegiances both to ourselves and to others. Someone might want to claim, for example, that as a citizen of Great Britain a particular person in question is legally subject to military conscription. But, as someone who rejects Ulster Unionism on strictly political grounds, and as a life-long resident of the Isle of Man, this person no longer can recognise that legal claim for these and other reasons as binding on him. Here we find the claim that a person’s individual cultural identity may take precedence over his social identity, his being subject to English laws.25 That cultural identity may even in fact come to constitute the person’s basic identity. And, for now, a last distinction comes into view just here. For especially with regard to religious identity we often realise that, in trying to explain our value choices rationally to others and to ourselves, we tell different stories about our own strictly individual religious identities. Thus, we may sometimes talk about ourselves to others as being the kind of person (as having the identity of someone) who repeatedly chooses not to act in certain kinds of religiously unsatisfactory but strictly legal ways. (“That’s just not me,” we may sometimes overhear ourselves saying.) And yet, at other times, we discover some of our inner monologues to be very much taking place in first-person terms only. (“Continuing to act up in that way is just not continuing to be you any more.”) Call the first kind of stories about personal identity “third-person stories” and the second kind “first-person stories.” 26 Now, however plural one’s cultural identities remain, 24 On “the illusions of a unique identity” see especially A. Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, notably pp. 32-36, 132-148. 25 See, among others, M. Miegel, Epochenwende: Gewinnt der Westen die Zukunft (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2005), especially pp. 229-237. I thank Hubertus Dessloch for this reference. 26 Some of the scientific and philosophical complexities here come clear in the multidisciplinary contributions to the joint meeting of the French “Académie des Sciences” and the “Académie des Sciences morales et politiques,” June 23-24, 2005, published as

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unlike third-person stories about religious identity, first-person stories here may sometimes require establishing a unique religious identity. Here, a person’s religious identity may come to constitute the person’s basic identity.27 Return now to our initial formulations of two main questions about cultural and religious identities: “Do individual persons have one or many basic identities?” and “Must persons sometimes establish the priority of one or several identities?” In view of the previous distinctions perhaps we may now reformulate our first question along some such lines as these. “Among the plural identities that persons exhibit when considered both as members of different cultures within society and as strict individuals, in what senses, if any, may any one of these plural cultural identities be properly called ‘basic’ ?” Could poverty ever constitute an essential element in the basic cultural identity of unaccompanied, immigrant, extremely poor children? And perhaps we may also reformulate our second question similarly. In order reasonably to make certain basic life choices, must religious persons establish a unique personal religious identity so as rationally to articulate a properly ordered hierarchy of values that makes possible a suitably selfcritical assessment of what an authentic human life ought to be? Could habitual attitudes towards the poverty of destitute children ever constitute an essential element in the religious identity of certain resourceful elites? 4. By way of transition: on the bases of even such brief, elementary reflections as these, I believe that many fresh questions today about the nature of persons and their identities both cultural and religious often yield promising reformulations when due critical attention is paid to basic ambiguities and distinctions. But many of these reformulations themselves soon come under unusual conceptual pressure when attention is focussed on what we will discover to be the perplexing nature and identities of suffering persons in particular. Consider then the quite specific empirical situations and numbers of persons suffering from extreme poverty especially in the midst not of generally poor countries but of very affluent ones. Consider, that is, the situation of the many poor children in France today. L’identité? Soi et non-soi, individu et personne, ed. E. D. Carosella et al. (Paris: PUF, 2006), especially pp. 69-91 and 101-110. Cf. E. D. Carosella and T. Pradeu, L’identité, la part de l’autre: immunologie et philosophie (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2010), especially pp. 185-213. 27 I leave aside here important considerations about personal identity that derive especially form ethical considerations not about the distinction between first and third person accounts but those about second person accounts. See for example S. Darwell, The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), especially pp. 3-38.

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II. Poor Young Persons In his November 15, 2010 Annual Report France’s official “Defenseur des enfants” claimed that, of the 8 million persons estimated to be living below the poverty threshold in France today, 2 million are children living in families with total incomes below 950 euros per month.28 These numbers however are questionable. For quantifying the numbers of poor children in France today is difficult. To see why, one need to consider merely the many different definitions of poverty, or the many different kinds of poverty such as relative and absolute poverty, subjective and objective poverty, transitory and chronic poverty, or the even more numerous different measures of poverty such as the incidence of poverty (that is, the number of poor persons and the rate of poverty), the intensity of poverty (that is, the sum of the disparities with respect to the threshold of poverty), the inequalities among the poor themselves, and so on. This difficulty can be seen particularly in the variations in official government accounts of numbers of poor children in France during the period from February 2004 to March 2010. 1. In February 2004, the French Conseil Emploi Revenus et Cohesion Sociale (CERC) estimated that roughly 1 million children29 in France were living below the then official French poverty level of 50% of net national income.30 This number of poor children represented an estimated 6% of the Rapport annuel du Défenseur des enfants (Paris: La Documentation française, 2010). See Le Monde, November 16, 2010. 29 Note that The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted on November 20, 1989 in the General Assembly Resolution 44/25 and officially in force as of September, 1990, defines children as, generally, all persons from their ages of birth up to their 18th birthday but not above. Some current French discussions about juvenile delinquency include proposals to re-define current French legal definitions of those children who are currently understood to be “mineurs.” In speaking of “children” here I will be following throughout the understanding of “children” in the United Nations sense above and not in the newly controversial French legal understanding of “mineur.” 30 ONPES, Rapport 2009-2010 (Paris: ONPES / La Documentation française, 2010), p. 65. Philosophers and others may sometimes need to remind themselves of several elementary questions concerning the nature of statistical information in the social sciences particularly. Thus about any set of statistics one needs to answer such questions as: “What kinds of statistics are these?” “What is the exact meaning of the terms in which they are labeled?” “What can these terms actually tell us, and what can they not tell us?” “Who gathers these statistics, who publishes them, when and how often are they gathered and published?” “Are they regularly revised and, if so, by whom, how, and how often?” “How should they, normally, be interpreted?” “What are the time periods covered?” “Where relevant, do the statistics take into account seasonal adjustments and inflation?” In short, just how epistemically reliable are the particular statistics at issue? Cf. Stutely 2006, pp. 1-27. 28

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then French population as a whole.31 At that time, the expression “living below the poverty level” meant living below the official French norm of 50% of the median household revenue.32 The poverty at issue here was a so-called “relative poverty,” fixed not with respect to any consumption norm but as a function of a level of socially tolerable minimum well-being.33 In February 2008 also, the French national statistics office, INSEE, reported its estimates on the numbers of poor persons in France.34 On the basis now of the 60% measure of equivalent median household revenue in each of the then member states of the European Union (EU), INSEE also reported that in 2005 12.1% of the population or 7.13 million persons were estimated as living below the poverty level in 2005.35 INSEE specified the numbers of poor children as roughly 2 million persons.36 In 2008, however, the French government finally correlated its previous official French measure of the poverty level with the official European Union (EU) measure of 60% of net national income. Accordingly, in April 2008 (ONPES) reported that an estimated 12.1% of the then French population, including children, was now living below the poverty level. But the 2008 report did not specify exactly how many children, excluding other poor persons, were estimated to be living below that poverty level. 32 The “poverty level” of most European Union (EU) countries is mainly calculated according to the median household revenue, a measure according to which one half of the population measured gains more whereas the other half gains less. The “net national income” is “GDP (gross domestic product) plus net property income from abroad (rent; interest; profits and dividends) = GNI (gross national income) minus capital consumption (depreciation) = NNI (net national income.. . . NNI is the most comprehensive measure of economic activity, but it is of little practical value due to the problems of accounting for depreciation” (R. Stutely, The Economist Guide to Economic Indicators, 6th edition [London: The Economist / Polity, 2006], p. 29). For definitions, discussions, and criticisms of many general economic indicators see Stutely, passim. For understanding economic and social statistics especially in France see S. Dupays, Déchiffrer les statistiques économiques et sociales (Paris: Dunot, 2008), pp. 69-86. See also the article, “De nouveaux outils pour la mesure du bien-être,” in: “Dossier: Le bonheur peut-il être un indicateur économique?” in: Le Monde économie, January 29, 2008. 33 See the interview of E. Lasida and K. Minkieba Lompo with the distinguished French economist, J.-L. Dubois, “La pauvreté : une approche socio-économique,” Transversalités n° 111 (juillet-septembre, 2009), 35-47, especially p. 38. 34 Cf. INSEE’s presentations of its “Indicateurs des inégalités sociales” and Fiche thématique 16: Niveau de Vie et Pauvreté for 2008 in its November 2008 authoritative annual publication, France: Portrait Social (Paris: INSEE, 2008), pp.117-122 and pp. 226-227 respectively, with its discussion of its “Indicateurs des inégalités sociales” and Fiche thématique 16 : Niveau de Vie et Pauvreté for 2009 in the November, 2009 edition (Paris: INSEE, 2009), pp. 143-148 and pp. 268-269. 35 Cf. ONPES 2008, pp. 26-31. 36 Between 2002 and 2005 the numbers of the poorest among the already poor, that is, those persons who are presently described in France as living with less than 40 per cent of the median national revenue, increased by 14%. While individuals living alone are clearly affected by such elements, households and especially the non-working children in 31

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Are we then to understand that between 2004 and 2005 the official numbers of poor children in France changed from 1 to 2 million persons by reason solely of a change in the official measure for determining the poverty level? Or did these numbers also change because of an actual rise in the numbers of poor people including poor children? Finding the correct answer remains difficult. 2. In March 2010 France’s official Observatoire national de la pauvreté et de l’exclusion sociale (ONPES) corrected its earlier April 2008 estimates with the help of its unusually valuable ten-year longitudinal study, Bilan de 10 ans d’observation de la pauvreté et de l’exclusion sociale à l’heure de la crise.37 ONPES now reported that already in 2007 poverty in France measured at the rate of 60% of net national income and according to ONPES’s 11 central indicators applied to data from 1998 to 2008 affected 13.4% of the then population. Moreover, ONPES specified the different kinds of poverty at issue.38 But official government statistics specifically for the actual numbers of poor French children were not provided. ONPES reported, with all due deference: “Les indicateurs de mesure de la pauvreté, élaborés avec une méthodologie robuste par les administrations publiques de la statistique, ne permettent pas, à ce stade, de mettre en évidence un impact de la crise économique sur la pauvreté.” 39 3. Today, in November 2010 as I write, in the continuing aftermath of the September 2008 onset of a global housing, banking, financial, and economic crisis, French government estimates—corrected, reliable, and official—of the numbers specifically of children in France living below the adjusted poverty level at very different degrees are still not available.40 But the situations such households are even more affected. 37 ONPES 2010. 38 ONPES 2010, p. 65. 39 ONPES 2010, p. 32. 40 “Numbers”, INSEE’s next official census originally planned for 2010, will probably be delayed. Note that some relatively exact numbers of poor children may be known but not authorised for public knowledge. In the recent past, for example, at least one official French institution, the Agence nationale d’accueil des étrangers et migrations (ANAEM), has refused without explanation standard requests from A. Bhalla and me for authorisation to publish some of their statistical information about the ethnic identities of some poor children in France. This statistical information had enabled us to construct a number of useful tables for our recently published book, Bhalla and McCormick 2009. Lacking official authorisation we were obliged to delete these tables from our final book ms. Note that in this paper wherever possible I use more recent and corrected figures for those first presented in the 2009 book. A convenient overview of both of the many relevant Internet addresses in France and in the EU and of the most recent statistical information can be found in “Les Chiffres de l’économie 2011,” Alternatives économiques, Hors Série n° 86 (4e

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of poor people generally and in particular of poor children in France have certainly worsened.41 In fact, the exact numbers of even the relatively small numbers of very poor children in Paris today will most probably never be known officially. For these extremely poor children are administratively invisible. INSEE has yet to develop either specific enough categories for their numbers to be properly registered, or sufficient and reliable enough essential data.42 Consequently, institutionalising government programmes for addressing efficiently the desperate, indeed mortal, problems of such destitute children, adequately budgeting, and regularly evaluating such programmes remains virtually impossible. Some still proclaim that, although some persons including extremely poor children are lacking in “well-being,” 43 a certain stabilisation of the numbers trimestre 2010). 41 Although the numbers of poor persons in France have remained relatively stable over the last seven years, both the material and the immaterial situations of these persons have worsened substantially, especially those of children (ONPES 2010, p. 65). For among the many factors affecting the numbers of poor persons is the unemployment level. And between 2003 and 2005 alone the numbers of those employed at least seven months out of the twelve in the year at issue but not earning enough to keep them above the official poverty level for that year, the numbers of the so-called “working poor,” increased by 21%. This description is of those persons officially satisfying the European definition of travailleurs pauvres. 42 Despite recent progress in both the kinds of official statistics gathered and their reliability (see for example an interview with the economist and Director of INSEE, J.-P. Cotis, in: Le Monde, November 18, 2009, INSEE unlike its UK and USA counterparts does not yet enjoy full political independence (see for example the article of the Assistant Director of Le Figaro’s economics section in Le Figaro, May 21, 2008). In the past this fact has sometimes negatively influenced both the types of statistics collected as well as the timing of their publication, obstructing the proper understanding of, for example, French unemployment rates. See L. Data, Le grand truquage: Comment le gouvernement manipule les statistiques (Paris: La Découverte, 2009), especially “Réduire la pauvreté . . . en changeant d’indicateur,” pp. 97-113. Despite its sensationalist title, this book includes serious work. The book’s back cover states that the author’s name, “L. Data,” is “le pseudonyme d’un collectif de fonctionnaires issus de la statistique et de la recherché publiques, dont les plupart sont tenus à l’obligation de réserve.” Still, on the publication of a French government commissioned two volume report by the Nobel prize laureats, A. Sen and J. Stiglitz, together with J.P. Fitoussi, the president of the influential Observatoire français des conjunctures (OFCE), Le Monde titled a headline inside its September 15, 2009 edition: “Nicolas Sarkozy s’appuie sur le rapport Stiglitz pour appeler à une revolution statistique mondiale” (President Sarkozy signed the Preface of the Report). Since then, however, nothing further seems to have happened with respect not just to a revolution in world statistics but especially with respect to ensuring greater political independence (and job security for some of its anonymous employees) for INSEE. 43 “Well-being” has become something of a technical word in much contemporary economic, political, legal, sociological, and philosophical writing. See two recent extended dis-

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of poor people in France over the last years has occurred. They can do so correctly, however, only by restricting their understandings of poverty to mainly monetary terms. But although politically quite expedient, such a restriction is demonstrably unsatisfactory. That is why some statisticians at CERC, ONPES, INSEE, and elsewhere in the EU44 continue to work on developing less unsatisfactory indicators for measuring poverty.45 4. The March 2010 ONPES authoritative ten-year longitudinal study of poverty in France concluded: “En France comme en Europe, la pauvreté et l’exclusion restent à un niveau inacceptable.” Such a conclusion from such a source based on such evidence covering the previous ten years is rightly upsetting. For how can such utter poverty persist among so many children in such an affluent country as France and in such an extraordinarily rich city as Paris? How can such an affluent society remain incapable of generating sufficient political will to put the remedying of such persistent children’s suffering among its highest priorities?46 Perhaps several reminders from some contemporary work in English language social and political philosophy may prove suggestive. Consider first cussions in N. Baylis, F. Huppert, and B. Keverne, The Science of Well-Being (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) and D. Bok, The Politics of Well-Being: Government Can Learn from the New Research on Well-Being (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). For our purposes here see especially A. Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane, 2009), especially “Happiness, Well-Being and Capabilities,” pp. 269-290. 44 For example, at the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Institute at Oxford University. See also the detailed report in The Economist, July 31, 2010, on the newest metric developed at this Institute. This metric, the “Multidimensional Poverty Index” (MPI), an aggregation of ten separate indicators was adopted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its annual report published in October 2010. 45 For example, in its April 2008 Annual Report for 2007-2008, ONPES elaborated a new set of eleven “central” indicators for describing objectively poor persons, socially excluded persons, and persons receiving minimum social benefits. ONPES also provided a ten year longitudinal study (1996-2005) of the evolution of these eleven indicators. And in its March 2010 Annual Report for 2009-2010 ONPES used these indicators in its articulation of the ONPES ten-year Bilan. 46 Some may ask more angrily: How can reasonable persons even imagine that “enlightened” Paris, after Marie Antoinette, can find no bread for its destitute children? Must these children break their teeth on stones? Note that in 2008, however, the French government finally correlated its previous official French measure of the poverty level with the official European Union (EU) measure of 60% of net national income. Accordingly, in April 2008 the Observatoire national de la pauvreté et de l’exclusion sociale (ONPES) reported that an estimated 12.1% of the then French population, including children, was now living below the poverty level. But the 2008 report did not specify exactly how many children, excluding other poor persons, were estimated to be living below that poverty level.

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several reflections of John Rawls.47 These considerations will lead to an initial suggestion as to how to characterise more basically just what it is that destitute Paris children clearly lack precisely as persons. In turn, this will help to understand better how to address that lack more efficaciously than at present. For affluent Paris elites clearly lack something basic as persons too.

III. Justice as Fairness and Poor Children in France “Since Greek times, in both philosophy and law, the concept of the person has been understood as the concept of someone who can take part in, or who can play a role in, social life, and hence exercise and respect its various rights and duties. Thus, we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a fully cooperating member of society over a complete life.. . . Since persons can be full participants in a fair system of social cooperation, we ascribe to them the two moral power connected with the elements in the idea of social cooperation. . . a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good. A sense of justice is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterises the fair terms of social cooperation. The capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational advantage, or good.” —J. Rawls.48 “Our options are physicalism or dualism. Which are we to endorse? The Incarnation points us toward physicalism. For the physicalist, unlike the dualist, can insist that becoming embodied is necessary for becoming human; she can insist that the Incarnation requires the Son to become incarnate. Moreover, and more importantly, the physicalist—but not the dualist—can easily and straightforwardly account for God the Son’s having the body of Jesus and no other.” —T. Merricks.49

In trying to articulate his reflections on the nature of justice in a just society, John Rawls (1921-2002) starts with a thought experiment. He asks us to imagine a situation of thoroughgoing impartiality in which persons are called upon to judge fundamental issues with a maximum of fairness. The situation he proposes we imagine is one in which free and rational persons who, while knowledgeable about the general facts of the natural and social sciences, are nonetheless completely ignorant of every particularity that concerns their interests as individuals. That is, the persons in such an 47 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, revised edition 1999). Poverty and its remedies is not a central theme but nonetheless an important one in Rawls’s very influential work. 48 J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” in: S. Freeman (ed.), Collected Papers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 397-398. 49 JT. Merricks, “Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation,” in: P. Van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons Human and Divine, p. 299.

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imaginary situation are incapable of knowing what might specifically be in their own individual interests. When called upon to settle fundamental but controversial matters, they cannot judge but impartially in the sense that they cannot take into account their own individual interests. Their specific task is to reach agreement about what might be the minimal fundamental principles of justice on the basis of which just institutions and a just society might evolve.50 In such a situation Rawls believes that the fundamental principles of justice come out to be two. After reworking their formulations several times, Rawls’s final formulation of these two principles is the following. a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties; are to be guaranteed their fair value. b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.51 Note that Rawls assigns the priority of the first principle, a principle of the strict equality of rights and liberties, over that of the second, a principle of fair only equality of opportunity and hence of permissible inequality. And note further that the first [simple] principle “applies roughly to the constitutional structures and guarantees of the political and legal systems, and the second [twofold principle] to the operation of the social and economic systems.. . . ” 52 It is the latter condition of the second condition, the much discussed ‘difference principle,” that concerns especially the poor.53 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 102-160. Throughout, I cite the 1999 edition. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 5-6. 52 See T. Nagel, “Rawls and Liberalism,” in: S. Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 62-85. The citation here is from p. 66. 53 In fact, there is more than one difference principle. See P. van Parijs, “Difference Principles,” in Freeman 2003, pp. 200-240, especially pp. 202-208 where van Parijs distinguishes no less than different formulations. Still, “the core of the principle is a simple and appealing idea: that social and economic inequalities should be evaluated in terms of how well off they leave the worst off. The idea is simple; it amounts to asking that the 50 51

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Rawls’s understanding of poverty and its remedies involve two main elements. The first element is a certain version of utilitarianism, which he later repudiated.54 And the second is a central distinction between different kinds of human goods, which he later retained but only with important modifications.55 1. The version of utilitarianism Rawls initially held in his justly renowned 1971 major work, A Theory of Justice, had two components. The first was that the sole central element in human happiness, or “well-being” understood as “a person’s good,” is utility. Rawls took the technical word “utility” here mainly as the satisfaction of an individual’s rational preferences, or, more carefully, as the satisfaction of a hierarchy of the rational preferences of an individual. The second element was that the moral rightness of actions is a function solely of their producing as consequences for happiness and well-being at least as much utility for all persons affected as any feasible alternative would.56 “The main idea [in this version of utilitarianism],” Rawls wrote in 1971, “is that a person’s good is determined by what is for him the most rational long-term plan of life given reasonably favourable circumstances. A man is happy when he is more or less successful in the way of carrying out this plan. In a word, the good is the satisfaction of rational desire.” 57 In the light of many constructive criticisms, however, Rawls reconsidered his earlier views in a new Preface he provided for the much-revised 1999 edition of his book. “I do not believe,” he now wrote, “that utilitarianism can minimum of some index of advantage should be maximised. To many; it is also appealing; for the demand that the advantages enjoyed by the least advantaged should be as generous as (sustainably) possible provides a transparent and elegant way of articulating an egalitarian impulse and a concern for efficiency. For it avoids, at the same time, the absurdity of equality at any price and the outrageousness of maximising the aggregate no matter how distributed,” p. 200. 54 Utilitarianism is more than one doctrine. For, besides the classical (rather different) views of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick on maximising pleasure or happiness or utility, utilitarianism comprises also many contemporary versions, including sophisticated versions of contractualism. 55 Cf. Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. J. C. C. Smart and B. Williams, 1982, and T. Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 56 For a thoroughgoing account of this central topic see S. Scheffler, “Rawls and Utilitarianism,” in Freeman 2003, pp. 426-459, especially pp. 448 ff. 57 Rawls, A Theory of Justice.

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provide a satisfactory account of the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons.. . . ” 58 2. Besides a certain version of utilitarianism, Rawls’s earlier views on poverty also included a major distinction between primary goods and natural goods. Primary goods are directly controlled by the basic structure of society that distributes such goods. By contrast, natural goods are not directly controlled in this way, although they are subject to the influences of such basic structures. Initially, Rawls took primary goods as “things that rational persons want whatever else they want, and what these were and why they were to be explained by the account of goodness.. . . ” 59 Thus, primary goods are those that need to be distributed fairly and justly, the goods we might initially consider extremely poor Paris children to be lacking and the goods that, faute de mieux, French political elites and their successive governments are obligated to provide. Again, however, thanks to widespread critical discussion, Rawls recognised that this initial account of what primary goods are conceals a serious ambiguity. What is ambiguous is whether a primary good depends for its proper understanding on “the natural facts of human psychology,” or whether a primary good depends on “a moral conception of the person that embodies a certain ideal.” 60 In 1999 Rawls believed that his revised version of what he meant by “primary goods” resolved this ambiguity. It did so by more clearly articulating the second of the two interpretations possible and by elaborating the second interpretation further. 3. Thus, “persons are to be viewed as having two moral powers,” he wrote, ‘. . . and as having higher-order interests in developing and exercising those powers.” 61 The first moral power persons have is “the capacity for a sense of justice, [that is] . . . the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation.” The second moral power persons have is “a capacity for a conception of the good, [that is] . . . the capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good.” 62 Significantly, as Id., ibid., Preface. Cf. Pogge, John Rawls. His Life and Theory of Justice, pp. 73-79. 60 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. xiii. 61 Loc. cit. 62 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. E. Kelley, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 19. 58 59

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we will see in a moment, Rawls formulated each of these basic moral powers in terms of what he called “capacities.” More generally, Rawls also spelled out what he called “the chief primary goods.” These are: “rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth.” He specified the central primary social good as self-respect. In particular, he detailed the primary goods at length as: “(a) basic rights and liberties; freedom of thought and liberty of conscience. . . ; (b) freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities.. . . ; (c) powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility [in the political and economic institutions of the basic structure]; (d) Income and wealth understood as all-purpose means. . . generally needed to achieve a wide range of ends whatever they may be; [and] (e) the social basis of self-respect, understood as those aspects of basic institutions normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends with self-confidence.” 63 Among those enjoying such primary goods in abundance today of course are, among many others in France and elsewhere, Paris elites. 4. Now, when we return to our present concern with specifying just what extremely poor children lack as persons when some say all too generally that they lack “well-being,” Rawls’s account may seem immediately helpful. For we might be inclined to believe that what these children basically lack are certain primary goods as wants. Thus, remedying such lacks would mainly involve satisfying those wants. But closer attention to the empirical particulars of their situations show that what in fact extremely poor children basically lack are not some of the primary goods they may want. Rather these children basically lack certain other primary goods they need although they may be incapable of wanting them. To see this point, we need to recall briefly the situations of such Paris children.

IV. Very Poor Children in Paris A vast majority of extremely poor unaccompanied children are concentrated in the Paris region although many are dispersed throughout France.64 They constitute a heterogeneous group of persons from different regions and countries. And their separation from their families is motivated by different reasons. 63 64

Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 58-59. See ONPES 2010, pp. 76-77.

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1. French government administrations currently recognise the following five categories of these children:65 a. Asylum-seeking Children, that is, poor children who have fled to France from civil wars or ethnic strife in their countries of origin. b. “Mandated” (“mandates”) Children, that is, poor children belonging to families who have assigned them a financial mission to accomplish in France. Often parents force such children from their homes to travel abroad alone, to find money there, and to send back remittances. c. Exploited Children, that is, poor children who fall prey to drug-traffickers, pimps, and paedophiles. Most such exploited children are forced to act as conduits for transporting drugs and to indulge in other illegal activities in France. d. Runaway Children, that is, poor children who leave home and go to France because they are abused or maltreated or for other reasons. e. Roaming Delinquent Children (“errants”), that is, poor children who may have indulged in begging and stealing in their home countries before coming to France where they often continue to do the same. 2. The unaccompanied extremely poor children we are specifically concerned with may fit into all of the above administrative categories, into some, or into none of them. We do well then to refer to these utterly poor children separately. Let us call them here not improperly “destitute children.” 66 One major reason for calling these children “destitute” is that the empirical situations of these extremely poor children fully satisfy the two-volume Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’s informative description of how the word “destitution” is currently used.67 Thus, we may not improperly refer to those extremely poor Paris as “destitute” for this word is commonly used to refer to persons continuing to live in a state of “extreme poverty,” in “great need of food, shelter, etc.”, “without resources,” “left friendless or hopeless.” Further, such persons’ persisting lack of many fundamental needs for survival such as food, clothing, shelter, medical assistance, and so on results in 65 These categories are taken from A. Bhalla and P. McCormick, Poverty Among Immigrant Children in Europe, p. 118. 66 See the Table 1.1 in Bhalla and McCormick, Poverty Among Immigrant Children in Europe, p. 5. The table gives a typology of some distinguishing features of the interrelated but distinct notions of poverty, deprivation and destitution. 67 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

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chronic undernourishment, ill health, progressive physical and mental deterioration, and finally premature death. And finally these Paris children are also destitute in the original Latin sense of the word. That is, these Paris children are destitutus in a sense that still resonates profoundly for many persons today. For most of these destitute Paris children would seem to be “forsaken.” 3. These particulars of the concrete situations of destitute children in Paris appear to show up important gaps in Rawls’s otherwise cogent account. They call attention to at least two basic yet problematic assumptions. One basic assumption here is that almost all persons are eminently rational. Yet as experience demonstrates, most persons who are in a position today to remedy the persistence of destitution among destitute Paris children, for example many educated, experienced, resourceful, powerful, and even well-intentioned members of different Paris elites, often continue to live as if they lack the mature rationality that Rawls’s approach presupposes. Moreover, a second basic assumption here is that almost all rational persons enjoy the two central moral capacities of a sense of justice and a comprehensive conception of the good. Yet as experience also demonstrates, not just the fact of child destitution but the persistence of this fact over such a long time in such an affluent country and in such a very wealthy city strongly suggests that other circumstances, situations, proclivities, priorities, and choices have obstructed the development of rational powers in many such persons and in their respective circles. So, however cogent Rawls’s carefully considered views may at first seem, whether a justice-as-fairness approach can prove satisfactory enough for elucidating both what destitute Paris children basically lack and why their destitution persists is doubtful. The undue abstraction of the justice as fairness approach as a whole and the assignment of too central an importance to the moral powers of citizens are finally not helpful enough. Nonetheless, several important points arise from these reminders. And these points focus fresh attention on the nature and identity of persons. One is the idea we noted in §III.2 that a primary good depends on “a moral conception of the person that embodies a certain ideal.” 68 And another important point is the connected idea we noted in §III.3 that persons have a moral power, “a capacity for a conception of the good, [that is] . . . the capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good. . . .” 69 The first idea raises the question of just what Rawls thinks the ideal might be that he says a person embodies. In 1999 he writes that “. . . in both 68 69

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. xiii. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 19.

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philosophy and law, the concept of the person has been understood as the concept of someone who can take part in, or who can play a role in, social life, and hence exercise and respect its various rights and duties.” 70 Although other candidates might be advanced for playing the role of the ideal that Rawls believes persons embody, I believe that the contexts of his remarks here clearly favour taking this ideal as the potential to be a citizen. For, as Rawls continues immediately to write in the same place, “Thus, we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a fully cooperating member of society over a complete life.. . . ” 71 A person then may arguably be said to embody pre-eminently neither a cultural nor a religious ideal but a political one. One central consequence is that the moral moves from the private into the public space where it can become subject to ongoing debate and argument. The second idea focuses attention on just what is to be taken as underwriting the striking claim that persons are endowed with a double moral power. This claim turns out to derive its main justification from the antecedent claim that persons embody the potential to be citizens. As Rawls proceeds to argue, “Since persons can be full participants in a fair system of social cooperation [that is by virtue of their already embodying the potential to be citizens], we ascribe to them the two moral power connected with the elements in the idea of social cooperation. . . a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good.” 72 The sense of justice at issue here, the person’s first moral power, is what Rawls in the same 1985 paper calls “the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterises the fair terms of social cooperation.” And the person’s second moral power, Rawls’s capacity for a conception of the good, is “the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational advantage, or good.” 73 Similarly then, a person may also be said to embody two basic moral capacities. But part of the central justification for this claim follows from the argument for the antecedent claim. Since that antecedent claim has among its consequences the shift of a basic ideal of the person from the most often inaccessible domains of private discourse to the much more open domains of public discourse, so too here one consequence is that further inquiry into the nature of the person’s two basic moral capacities also shifts from the private to the public domain. J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” p. 397. Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid., p. 398. 70 71

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In short, reviewing Rawls confronts us with a conception of the person as always embodying a certain public good. This good may perhaps not unfairly be understood in terms of what one philosopher has expressed figuratively and memorably as “the sovereignty of the good,” 74 what I will refer to hereafter as “a sovereign good.” 75 4. Now this particular notion of the nature of the person as embodying a public and not just private sovereign good we may take as generating a first suggestion for further critical inquiry about persons. If some Paris street children are understood however destitute as nonetheless persons necessarily embodying a certain public sovereign good, then the most basic primary social good they may be said clearly to lack is the individual and communal recognition of the public sovereign good they incarnate. Consequently, if they are to be finally efficacious with respect to social justice,76 any attempts to remedy such a basic lack must start not just from an inventory of the primary social goods these persons also lack but from the realisation of what these persons basically lack, namely the effective recognition of the public sovereign good they embody, the public sovereign good they may be said more resonantly to incarnate. Perhaps we may put this first suggestion informally as a proposition. Doing so might make such a rough suggestion more amenable to constructive This is the title of Iris Murdoch’s philosophical book of many years ago. This expression is to be understood here as not excluding Rawls’s much earlier theological concerns in his Princeton undergraduate senior thesis submitted to the Department of Religion in December 1942 and now published as A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith, ed. T. Nagel (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). See Rawls’s discussion of eight features of personal relations on pp. 115-118, J. Cohen’s and T. Nagel’s discussion of these points on pp. 8-9 of their “Introduction,” and R. M. Adams’s related comments in his accompanying essay, “The Theological Ethics of the Young Rawls,” pp. 24-101, especially p. 52. Rawls had originally considered studying to become an Episcopalian (Anglican) priest. However, he entered military service in 1942 just after submitting his senior thesis at the age of 20. And when he returned to Princeton in 1946 to pursue doctoral studies, he decided to study philosophy and not religion. Very much later in his life he speculated that his war experiences probably brought about the loss of his Christian faith, a change he discussed in a short paper he drafted in 1997 and entitled, “On My Religion,” five years before his death in 2002. Not published during his lifetime, his draft paper “On My Religion” is now included in with his posthumously published senior thesis on pp. 261-269. 76 Note that talk of “social justice” is always ambiguous and sometimes equivocal. See the helpful reflections of F. Gonthier in the “Avant Propos” to the dossier, ‘Justice sociale et action publique: des principles à leur mise en oeuvre,” Problèmes politiques et sociaux, n°s 949-950 (juin-juillet 2008), pp. 5-13. This dossier includes a very great number of extracts from some of the most important contemporary work on different conceptions of social justice, including that of both John Rawls and Amartya Sen. 74 75

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revision and perhaps even reformulation for an eventual consideration as a recommendation. Thus, (P1) What destitute Paris children basically lack as persons is not so much primary social goods but efficacious recognition of their necessarily incarnating as persons a public sovereign good.

V. Justice as Capabilities and Destitute Paris Children “In arguing that the pursuit of a theory of justice has something to do with the kind of creatures we human beings are, it is not at all my contention that debates between theories of justice can be plausibly settled by going back to features of human nature, rather to note the fact that a number of different theories of justice share some common presumptions about what it is like to be a human being. We could have been creatures incapable of sympathy, unmoved by the pain and humiliation of others, uncaring of freedom, and—no less significant—unable to reason, argue, disagree and concur. The strong presence of these features in human lives does not tell us a great deal about which particular theory of justice should be chosen; But it does indicate that the general pursuit of justice might be hard to eradicate in human society, even though we can go about that pursuit in different ways.” —A. Sen.77 “. . . [persons] are animals in the sense that we are wholly constituted by animals, and yet we are ontologically unique in virtue of having first-person perspectives. A being with a first-person perspective constituted by a human body—a human person—is ontologically distinct from any animal, human or nonhuman. [This view,] the Constitution View is compatible with a robust theism, without entailing it.” —L. R. Baker.78

Consider briefly now a related approach to understanding better and eventually helping to remedy persisting child destitution in Paris. This approach will help us come to a second and final suggestion for further critical inquiry into the nature of persons. The Nobel Prize economist Amartya Sen’s capability approach to poverty defines poverty as a failure of some members of society to enjoy a certain minimum not so much of either natural or of primary goods but of capabilities.79 Like John Rawls’s justice as fairness approach to poverty, Sen’s capability A. Sen, The Idea of Justice, pp. 414-415. “Persons and the Natural Order,” in: P. Van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman, ibid., p. 275. 79 See A. Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999), pp. 20 and 87-110. Among these capabilities are such matters as, for example, being free from starvation, being adequately sheltered, being free to visit friends and so on. “The role of income and wealth—important as it is along with other influences—has to be integrated” Sen writes, “into a broader and fuller picture of success and deprivation.” (p. 20) 77 78

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approach develops from a critique of certain versions of utilitarianism. And it includes a criticism of the notion of primary social goods.80 1. Sen challenges several of the central behavioural assumptions behind the classic utilitarian methodologies that turn on the maximisation of utilities.81 His criticisms focus on utilitarianism’s neglect to address seriously enough factors that constrain a person’s “freedom of choice.” Freedom of choice Sen takes as comprising two elements. The first has to do with a person’s freedom to take decisions autonomously, that is, the freedom to take decisions by oneself independently of interference by others or by institutions. Sen calls this element “the process aspect of freedom.” The second element has to do with whether or not a person enjoys sufficient occasions for taking such autonomous decisions, given the nature of those occasions and their relations to the person’s goals and objectives. Sen calls this element “the opportunity aspect of freedom.” 82 For each of the two aspects of freedom of choice, there is a typical kind of constraint on that freedom. In the case of process freedom, the constraint is what Sen calls “chooser dependence,” that is, the constraint on the exercises of one’s freedom deriving from the kinds of institutions to which one is subject. And in the case of opportunity freedom the constraint is what he calls “menu dependence,” that is, the constraint on the exercises of one’s freedom deriving from the limited kinds of occasions actually available.83 I rely here mainly on A. Sen, Inequality Reexamined (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1992); Sen, Development as Freedom; Sen, The Argumentative Indian (London: Allen Lane, 2006), and Sen 2009 also noted above. For recent interpretative essays see Amartya Sen, ed. C. Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). See also S. Freeman’s excellent discussion in his review of Sen 2009, “A New Theory of Justice,” The New York Review of Books, October 14, 2010. 81 His basic objections are well-summarised as follows. “First, the behavioural assumptions relating to the choice of a maximal element in a given set of alternatives may be inappropriate. An individual may not seek to maximise personal well-being [,] and individual choice may be motivated by broader objectives (e.g., other people’s well-being) and other objectives (including obligations and commitments to others). Second, personal well-being may not be independent of freedom of the range and adequacy of choices available. If autonomy and freedom of choice affect personal well-being, then the possibility of choice and the number of alternatives in a set (intrinsic valuation of the freedom to choose) as well as, perhaps, the range (or diversity) and the quality (or adequacy) of these alternatives also affect personal well-being” (P. Vizard, Poverty and Human Rights [London: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], p. 110). In short, there are two different kinds of basic constraints on freedom of choice for persons. 82 P. Vizard, ibid., pp. 67-68. 83 “Whereas the process aspect of freedom,” Vizard (ibid.) summarises, “reflects the intrinsic value of a person’s procedural or formal freedom to choose and attributes value to direct personal control over mechanisms of decision-making and to the ability of a person to choose for themselves (the act of choice), the opportunity aspect reflects the 80

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When we take freedom, then, as an essential part of a person’s well-being, it follows that persons may lack well-being as a function of the constraints on their process freedom as chooser dependence and as a function of the constraints on their opportunity freedom as menu dependence.84 2. Besides his critiques of utilitarian behaviourist methodologies, Sen also wants to rearticulate the basic concept of primary social goods.85 Sen’s main problem with the Rawlsian idea is not its insensitivity to certain inequalities. The problem is its situation of equality in “the wrong space.” 86 The proper domain is not resources, as Rawls had maintained, but “capabilities.” 87 For Sen, inequality arises mainly not from an unfair and unjust distribution of resources, opportunities, and so on. Rather, inequality arises mainly from the capabilities persons possess or do not possess to use resources, opportunities, and so on once they are distributed to them fairly and justly.88 What then intrinsic value of the substantive or real opportunities to achieve valuable combinations of human functionings, rather than the numbers of options; or the mechanisms of control.” (pp. 70-71) 84 With respect to further senses of freedom, Sen also distinguishes “freedom from want” that entitles individuals to enjoy income and material goods from “freedom to act” or an individual’s choice set that enhances his or her capability. The entitlement to income and commodities is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to enlarge one’s choice set. Individual abilities to convert goods into capabilities will differ a great deal depending on one’s natural and social environment, gender, age, health, and access to health care, education, housing, employment, and other resources. 85 Unlike Rawls, however, Sen’s understanding of the basic concept of primary goods incorporates a constructive criticism of the Nobel prize economist Kenneth Arrow’s earlier claim that his own welfare-based index could better satisfy citizens’ needs than Rawls’s index of primary social goods. Arrow had argued that his welfare approach was more sensitive to certain inequalities that continue to affect citizens’ capacities not just occasionally but across their entire lives. Rawls accepted the need to articulate his index of primary goods across the entire lives of citizens. Nonetheless, he rejected Arrow’s welfare approach. And so did Sen. Later on, however, Sen himself followed Arrow’s initiative in criticising Rawls’s understanding of his own index of primary goods. 86 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, pp. 138-41. 87 Before his death in 2002, however, Rawls replied to these criticisms and offered ‘restatements’ of his mature views. Among the restatements—the modifications and elaborations—he made in 1999 were several key ideas. Rawls now claimed that, besides other elements, basic human needs must be articulated in such a way as to entrench minimum human subsistence rights. Moreover, basic human rights themselves should explicitly comprise minimum economic benefits. Still more, a less inadequate primary goods index must incorporate specific information about inequalities, such as individual outcomes from health inequalities (Vizard, ibid., p. 54). These were definite improvements on the earlier positions that had generated criticisms from Sen and others. 88 Besides his reservations about Rawls’s idea of the index for primary social goods to be constructed on an understanding of this basic concept in terms of resources instead of capacities and capabilities, Sen also indicated another critical point. Rawls’s idea of primary goods left unaddressed certain kinds of care that some people provide for others.

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does Sen mean by “capabilities?” ’89 Sen uses the expression “capability” mainly to refer to a person’s opportunity to achieve valuable combinations of human “functionings.” 90 And he calls a person’s “capability set” the alternative combinations of functionings that are within a person’s reach (and which are therefore feasible) and over which a person has freedom of effective choice (regardless of what he or she actually decides to choose).91 3. To elucidate, Sen distinguishes between “capabilities” and “capacities.” The capacities of an agent, that is, as one philosopher comments, “their abilities. . . which they can deploy in actual circumstances. . . are not to be identified with their individual capacities or with their aggregate power.. . . Capabilities are to capacities. . . as effective demand is to demand: it is the specific capabilities of agents and agencies in specific situations, rather than their abstract capacities or their aggregate power, that are relevant to determining which obligations of justice they can hold and discharge—and which they will be unable to discharge.” 92 In other words, the capabilities of persons are their potential capacities plus their effective capacities. To elucidate further his particular uses of the cardinal expression, “capabilities,” Sen distinguishes also between persons’ capacities, say their ability to realise “valuable functionings,” and persons’ entitlements, say their “comFor example, Rawls’s idea of primary social goods had much to say about citizens such as professional politicians and high civil servants but virtually nothing about poor people many of whom are not citizens of the country in which they are living precariously. It was, in short, insensitive to the dependence of many needy persons including children. Thus, Rawls’s “account of the primary goods, introduced. . . as an account of the needs of citizens who are characterised by the two moral powers and by the capacity to be ‘fully cooperating,’ has no place for the need of many real people for the kind of care we give to people who are not independent” (M. Nussbaum, “Rawls and Feminisim,” in: Freeman 2003, p. 512). Furthermore, his idea was also insensitive to the variations of dependency in the course of a life. A final difficulty that Sen noted in Rawls’s idea of primary social goods was its abstractness (Cf. Walzer, Spheres of Justice [New York: Basic Books, 1983]). As several philosophers summarised the issue, “Rawls’s theory of justice was designed to apply universally and thus failed to attend to the ways in which different cultures embody different values and practices.. . . [His] conception of the social resources of which justice demands a principled distribution is conceptually incoherent.” 89 Sen’s most recent summary exposition of his views on capabilities and capacities is to be found in his “Capabilities and Resources,” Sen, The Idea of Justice, pp. 253-268. 90 The term “ ‘functioning” ’, Vizard writes, “refers to aspects of the states of being and doing that a person achieves ranging from elementary personal states (such as achieving adequate nutrition or being literate) to complex personal states and activities (such as participation in the community and appearing without shame)” (Vizard, ibid., p. 68). 91 Sen, Development as Freedom, p. 18. 92 O. O’Neill, “Agents of Justice,” in: T. Pogge, Global Justice (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 188-203; her emphases.

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mand over commodities.” 93 Thus, the relation between someone’s control over certain resources and his or her capacity to convert those resources into things of value depends on certain general constraints. Among these constraints are such matters as environment, gender, body-type, age, health, and so on. Thus, “people who differ with respect to disease, disability, nutritional needs, or gender, will convert the same package of primary social goods into different sets of capabilities; they will remain unequal in ways that matter to justice.” 94 4. But we now need to recognise that the possibility of simply extending the capability approach developed on the basis of adult poverty to child poverty generally and specifically to the poverty of destitute children is not evident. For such salient features of destitute children’s poverty as we have noted constitute qualitatively different kinds of poverty than the poverty of adults. Is the case then of destitute children different enough from that of poor adults to make the capability approach less applicable? Without trying to argue the case here, perhaps we may reply: “Probably.” Moreover, most children including destitute ones are not mature enough to judge for themselves what is good or bad for them. Nor can most children say what sort of life they value most; that is, they lack certain crucial capabilities. Still, a child’s capability potential will remain latent unless it is deliberately actualised through physical and mental development in a healthy environment. Could Sen’s approach, then, unlike Rawls’s, be applied if not generally then with some modifications to the situations of destitute children? “Probably not.”

VI. Destitute Children and Resourceful Elites in Paris We need to see why Sen’s approach can probably not be applied to the situations of destitute children. 1. When we then ask just how the quite basic lack that destitute children suffer from non-recognition of the sovereign good they incarnate as persons might be remedied, perhaps we may at first believe that such a remedying Vizard, ibid., pp. 108-109. Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p. 256. “For example, a person may have the capacity to work as an agricultural labourer or an ability to organise family resources to last from harvest to harvest; a development agency may have the capacity to distribute resources to the needy in a given area. However, when a social and economic structure provides no work for agricultural labourers or no resources for a given family to subsist on or for an agency to distribute, these capacities lie barren.” That is, although lying ‘barren,’ the abstract capacities for action and for being remain, but the concrete capabilities are not there. (O’Neill, ibid., pp. 188-203; her emphasis). 93

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would require institutionalising specific social programmes to enhance what Sen might take to be the basic capabilities of such children.95 Yet the most general operating assumption in the capability approach is seriously questionable. For the major difficulty in applying the capability approach to understanding and remedying the situation of destitute children is Sen’s assumption of a very high level of rationality in the exercises of personal freedom. This is the rationality of a personal freedom as both rational freedom from the constraints of “chooser dependence,” and rational freedom from the constraints of “menu dependence.” But assuming this level of rationality as both a capacity and a capability to be presupposed in sufficient numbers of even dedicated high civil servants, socially aware politicians, and other elites and then eventually to be fostered in effective programmes for durably assisting destitute children is just wildly idealistic. However, in his comprehensive collection, Rationality and Freedom, Sen carefully formulates his crucial notion of rationality in broader terms than the narrow ones usually underlying traditional economic discussions.96 Thus, instead of taking rationality as either nothing more than consistency in choice or as “the capacity to choose efficient means to what are presumed to be selfish ends,” 97 Sen construes rationality as “the discipline of subjecting one’s choices—of actions as well as of objectives, values and priorities—to reasoned scrutiny.” 98 This broader construal puts Sen in a strong position to criticise both traditional utilitarian approaches that still overly influence most government social planning and much of the continuing vogue in economic analysis for rational choice theory.99 In turn, this critical stance is central to realising his own broader aims. For, as one of Sen’s most astute readers has remarked, “Sen’s guiding principle is that we have to think about human beings in ways that do justice to the complexity of their values and beliefs. If they in 95 An able-bodied individual in his or her mid-thirties is likely to command greater resources, freedom to act and abilities than a juvenile of say, 15, who is dependent on his parents for financial means, moral support and guidance, and a choice set. Capabilities and choice sets depend only partly on individual characteristics; they also depend on age, resources and opportunities offered by families and households, social organisations, the government and society at large. And, as we say, within households, the well-being of children depends on the income of others—parents, uncles, and other income-earning family members. 96 A. Sen, Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002). 97 A. Ryan, “The Way to Reason,” The New York Review of Books, December 4, 2003. 98 Sen, Rationality and Freedom, p. 4. 99 See for example M. Allingham, Choice Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

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fact guide their conduct by high principle, a passion for justice or freedom, simple compassion for the badly off, or whatever else, there is nothing to be said for theories that represent ‘rationality’ as the single-minded pursuit of self-interest defined in the narrowest possible terms.” 100 But, granted that Sen’s larger view of rationality is a substantial improvement on many overly constricted, traditional construals of rationality in economic analyses, that admittedly broad view still remains far too idealistic for our concerns with better understanding what destitute children basically lack and how such a basic lack is to be remedied. For how could destitute children regularly subject the quite minimal choices they actually have to “reasoned scrutiny?” (Sniffing glue under parked cars?)101 And how could even experienced politicians regularly subject their quite extraordinary choices to “reasoned scrutiny?” (12,000 euros for imported cigars?)102 2. Much more pertinent for our specific concerns here than “process freedom” and “opportunity freedom” and “rationality” is trying to understand better two basic issues. The first is understanding how individuals and societies in affluent countries are to assume their social, political, and moral responsibilities in better assisting destitute children to incorporate fully their rights and dignity as children and persons. And the second is understanding just how such individuals and societies are to respond to the specific moral as well as ethical demands of social justice in properly integrating such children into their societies. Thus, elucidating the persisting ill-being of destitute children and the eventual remedies for such an unacceptable situation is better fostered by analysing not what these destitute children lack in terms of personal freedoms to choose but in what resourceful elites may offer them as persons in terms of dignity, justice, and the common good. 3. And just here we may come to a second and final suggestion today for further critical inquiry into the nature of persons. This second suggestion arises from a consideration of Sen’s work specifically on rationality. The Ryan, ibid., p. 44. The peculiar and especially debilitating species of poverty (given their age) has mired destitute children all too often in situations where few if any are able to learn to reason about anything whatsoever (P. Krugman, “Poverty is Poison,” The New York Times, February 23, 2008). In fact, many of those children enjoy virtually no freedom of choice at all. Whatever freedom they may properly be considered to have is much more a freedom to receive something from others than a freedom from constraints on doing something for themselves. And an essential part of the specific kinds of poverty such destitute children suffer from is an impoverished rationality. 102 A Minister in President Sarkozy’s government was pilloried in the French press for having charged his ministry for 12,000 euros worth of imported cigars, apparently for official functions only. 100 101

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second suggestion pertains, however, not to understanding better the peculiar nature of the basic lack destitute children continue to suffer, but to arriving more readily at marshalling sufficient political will for taking appropriate and sustained institutional measures for remedying the these children’s persisting situation. Sen underlines as we saw that . . . the specific capabilities of agents and agencies in specific situations. . . [are what] are relevant to determining which obligations of justice they can hold and discharge—and which they will be unable to discharge.” At least one important question arises here with respect to our society’s elites. What exactly are those specific capabilities that determine what obligations of justice these elites can hold and discharge? Such specific capabilities cannot reduce to what Sen calls “the discipline of subjecting one’s choices—of actions as well as of objectives, values and priorities—to reasoned scrutiny.” 103 For almost all government social policy choices including explicit objectives, values, and priorities are regularly subjected to such reasoned scrutiny. And that is the case even when reason and rationality are taken more broadly in Sen’s enlightened senses. And yet what official government agencies themselves have called “unacceptable” is still continuing, namely the unremedied persistent suffering of destitute Paris children. In short, reviewing Sen reminds us of a still widely prevailing conception of persons in terms mainly of reason and rationality that is largely restricted to the rational arbitration of means only rather than being essentially open to the reasonable re-construction of ends as well. This idea leads to a realisation of a strong distinction holding between exclusively instrumental conceptions of reason and more than exclusively instrumental ones. In short, reviewing Sen reminds us of a still widely prevailing conception of persons in terms mainly of reason and rationality that is largely restricted to the rational arbitration of means only rather than being essentially open to the reasonable re-construction of ends as well. This idea leads to a realisation of a strong distinction holding between exclusively instrumental conceptions of reason and more than exclusively instrumental ones. 4. We may take this distinction as generating a second suggestion for further critical inquiry into the nature of persons. If remedying the most basic lack of destitute Paris children, the lack of society’s effectively recognising such persons as incarnating the sovereignty of the good, is taken as entailing mere rational arbitration among suggested policy means to provide primary social goods, then such remedies must fall short. For they cannot include the more fundamental need to reconstrue the actual purposes, aims, 103

Sen, Rationality and Freedom, p. 4.

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and objective of current French social policy as a whole. “Ce n’est pas la protection sociale qui est remise en cause,” as one French economist has recently observed, “. . . mais bien les principes, les institutions et les règles qui la gouvernent. . . .” 104 And among these principles must certainly figure the intrinsic value of persons.105 But on Sen’s own accounting, it is not evident that grasping the intrinsic value of the sovereign good of such persons as the destitute children we are mainly considering here is exclusively a matter of rational apprehension alone. For, as Sen writes, “[w]e could have been creatures incapable of sympathy, unmoved by the pain and humiliation of others, uncaring of freedom, and—no less significant—unable to reason, argue, disagree and concur.” 106 This reminder of the human capacity for “sympathy” has as its background Sen’s abiding interest in Adam Smith and the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment’s repeated appeals to a so-called “moral sense.” 107 For, despite his pronounced advocating of what appears to be an unmitigated intellectual rationalism, Sen leaves room for the various species and roles of “sympathy” in understanding human affairs. This is part of his motivation in promoting a looser conceptualisation of rationality in economic reasoning generally. As Sen continues in the same place, “[t]he strong presence of these features in human lives does not tell us a great deal about which particular theory of justice should be chosen; but it does indicate that the general pursuit of justice might be hard to eradicate in human society, even though we can go about that pursuit in different ways.” 108 With these remarks as required contexts, then, perhaps once again to facilitate further critical discussion we may put our final suggestion here informally as another proposition. Thus, N. Baverez, Le Monde, August 10, 2010. “Intrinsic value” is a complex concept which I cannot discuss in detail here. Very generally however when I speak of the intrinsic value of a person here I am referring to the value a person has in and of himself or herself. See M. J. Zimmerman, The Nature of Intrinsic Value (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), especially pp. 75130. My own view draws more substantially not on these largely analytic reflections only but especially on elements of the phenomenological traditions to be seen at work in, for example, R. M. Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 47-67, R. M. Chisholm, Ethics and Intrinsic Values (Heidelberg: Universitaetsverlag Carl Winter, 2001), pp. 25-35, and C. Porębski, Polish Value Theory (Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press, 1996), pp. 61-73, 129-134. 106 Sen, The Idea of Justice, p. 414. 107 For example in Sen, The Idea of Justice, pp. 188-190. See also E. Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 52-71, and, more generally, M. Biziou, Shaftesbury: Le sens moral (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2005), pp. 76-110. 108 Sen, The Idea of Justice, pp. 414-415. 104

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(P2) What may help remedy the basic situations of destitute Paris children as persons is not so much further reflection on the rationalisation of actual French social policy, but reasonable and not just rational re-articulation of the most basic objectives of the French social model overall including the promotion of the nature of persons as intrinsically valuable.

Envoi “Is there anyone among you who, if your child asks for bread, will give a stone?” —The Gospel of Matthew 7.9.

To conclude: some reflective persons need to ask whether it is morally acceptable for successive French governments to allow such immense, persistent, yet avoidable suffering of destitute Paris children to persist in the midst of such enormous affluence. And they may also need to ask whether it is ethically permissible for so many resourceful, knowledgeable, powerful, and immensely privileged French elites to continue to leave such a vastness of child suffering substantially unalleviated. I recognise that the suggestions here are not practical. I have been able to suggest for further critical discussion no more than two informal propositions. The first is that what destitute Paris children basically lack is not so much primary social goods but efficacious recognition of their necessarily incarnating as persons a sovereign good. And the second suggestion is that what may help remedy the basic situations of destitute Paris children is not so much more social reflection on the rationalisation of French social policy, but reasonable and not just rational re-articulation of the most basic objectives of the French social model overall including the promotion of the nature of persons as intrinsically valuable. In short, some fundamental philosophical reminders require on the part of individual persons and groups of persons a reconsideration of just why the destitution of poor children in such affluent countries as France persists. It seems eminently appropriate to try to renew some moral, epistemological, and especially metaphysical approaches to such a phenomenon. For the emergence of such approaches implies the emergence also of certain transformations of personal attitudes. And as such they involve as well the responsibility of the philosophical community itself.

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Yet even after further critical reflection perhaps these suggestions today will turn out to be finally no more than stones. For, as some have sadly learned long ago, philosophy bakes no bread.109 110 ——————

Selected Bibliography —Allingham, Michael, Choice Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). —Baylis, Nick, Huppert, Felicia, and Keverne, Barry, The Science of WellBeing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). —Bhalla, Ajit and McCormick, Peter, Poverty Among Immigrant Children in Europe (London: Palgrave / Macmillan, 2009). —Bok, Derek, The Politics of Well-Being: Government Can Learn from the New Research on Well-Being (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). —Bourdieu, Pierre, (ed.) La misère du monde (Paris: Seuil, 1993). —Brasser, Martin, (ed.), Person: Philosophische Texte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Reklam, 1999). —Carosella, Edgardo. D. et al. (ed) L’identité? Soi et non-soi, individu et personne (Paris: PUF, 2006). —Carosella, Edgardo. D., and Pradeu, Thomas, L’identité, la part de l’autre: immunologie et philosophie (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2010). —Cassam, Quassim, “Persons,” The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Honderich, Ted, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). —Chisholm, Roderick, M., Brentano and Intrinsic Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). In saying that “philosophy bakes no bread” I do not mean to suggest either that philosophy consists of no substantial knowledge or that philosophical inquiry makes no progress. Rather, my suggestion is that in the matter of alleviating severe and increasing problems of malnutrition and hunger among the destitute not just in Paris but in the world at large, philosophy apparently can contribute little of substance. See G. Gutting, What Philosophers Know (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), especially pp. 224-242, and P. McCormick, When Famine Returns: Ethics, Identity, and the Deep Pathos of Things (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 2003), especially pp. 145-152. 110 Earlier and shorter versions of this here further revised and expanded paper were presented at the Ecole nationale supérieure in Paris on November 12, 2010, at the annual conference of the Académie catholique de France in Paris on October 16, 2010, and in an initial version at the XXVII International Symposium on Eco-Ethics held in Copenhagen from October 22-26, 2008. I thank the participants on those occasions for their many helpful comments and constructive criticisms. And I thank C. M. Gueye for his acceptance of this much revised paper for inclusion in the present collection. 109

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—Chisholm, Roderick, M., Ethics and Intrinsic Values (Heidelberg: Universitaetsverlag Carl Winter, 2001). —Cuche, Denys, La notion de culture dans les sciences sociales, 4th ed. (Paris: La Découverte, 2010). —Damon, Julien, Eliminer la pauvreté (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2010). —Darwell, Stephen, The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). —Durand, Marie-François et al. (eds.), Atlas de la mondialisation (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2009). —Gutting, Gary, What Philosophers Know (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). —Johnson, Edward, “Personhood,” in: R. Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). —McCormick, Peter, When Famine Returns: Ethics, Identity, and the Deep Pathos of Things (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 2003). —Miegel, Meinhard, Epochenwende: Gewinnt der Westen die Zukunft (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2005). —Nagel, Thomas, (ed.)A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith (Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). —Parfit, Derek, “Persons, Bodies, and Human Beings,” in: T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), pp. 177-208. —Parfit, Derek , Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). —Pogge, Thomas, Global Justice (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001). —Pogge, Thomas, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). —Porębski, CzesławPolish Value Theory (Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press, 1996). —Quinn, Philip, “On the Intrinsic Value of Human Persons,” in: P. Van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons Human and Divine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007). —Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, revised edition 1999). —Rawls, John, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Kelley, Erin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). —Rawls, John, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” in: Freeman, Samuel (ed.), Collected Papers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

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—Rawls, John, Political Liberalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). —Saint-Julien, Thèrèse, and Le Goix, Renaud, La métropole parisienne: centralités, inégalités, proximités (Paris: Belin, 2007). —Sen, Amartya, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999). —Sen, Amartya, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (London: Allen Lane, 2006). —Sen, Amartya, Inequality Reexamined (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1992). —Sen, Amartya, Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002). —Sen, Amartya, The Argumentative Indian (London: Allen Lane, 2006). —Sen, Amartya, The Idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane, 2009). —Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983). —Wiggins, David, Sameness and Identity Renewed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). —Zimmerman, Michael, J., The Nature of Intrinsic Value (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).

Chapter 14 How Contextual Ethics Defies Ethical Personalism Case Studied: Interrogational Torture Khalia Haydara University Cheikh Anta Diop Dakar, Senegal

I. Preliminaries Personalism could be considered as a reaction against contextual or circumstantial ethics theories such as utilitarianism in particular and consequentialism in general. Contextual ethics rejects the absolute and archetypal nature of abstract moral principles. It is concerned with investigating concrete and depersonalised states of affairs, and it regards this as the basis for all philosophical and/or moral investigation. Each state of affair is qualified as unique and complex and should be apprehended in accordance with that specificity. Contextual ethics requires that our moral actions be based on experience and empirical facts. This was the thought Hume was expressing through the following assertion: “It is full time they [men] should attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation.” 1 As for orthodox consequentialism, the value of an action is determined according to the resulting benefits. “Supranaturalis” moral principles are thus dismissed. The utilitarian focuses on the principle of Utility. According to Mill, Utility includes both the pursuit of happiness, as an end, and the David Hume, “Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals,” in: Stephen Darwall (ed.), Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), p. 66. 1

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minimisation of suffering. The guiding thought behind that idea is that the virtue of a person consists in pursuing the happiness of the greatest number of persons. Mill’s controversial Greatest Happiness Principle focuses on the collective good or collective happiness. It is in itself such as to support the prioritisation of the collective worth which seems to surpass the worth of the individual. Utilitarianism is an influential approach in our today societies. Unfortunately, in the hand of politics and social planners the utilitarian approach can be the most dangerous weapon. Thus, in the name of collective interest individuals are killed, tortured, abused. In the worst case, they are oppressed because they belong to a different culture, religion or race. It appears that the utilitarian approach has some serious defects that make it yield very imperfect results when one applies it to the world arena. In exceptional circumstances it allows the violation of one’s integrity, freedom, autonomy, and sometimes right to life. We gain better insights on the utilitarian approach deficiencies when it is applied to interrogational torture. Torture is identified as “the most profound violation possible of the dignity of a human being” 2 , for the victim is used as a mere means. All forms of torture are an infringement on human dignity. Interrogational torture consists in inflecting harm against a person in order to gain some important information. That type of torture is widely practiced in today’s world. The most recent case took place during the Egyptian “Arab Spring”. The Arabic Network For Human Rights organisation claimed that more than a hundred protesters were victims of torture from the army. However, contrary to the general belief, torture is not only practised by poorer nations and developing countries. During the Iraqi war the American army was guilty of torturing the detainees of Abu Ghraib. It’s quite probable the American soldiers’ purpose were to gain enough information to avoid any potential new terrorist act.3 Their approach is unquestionably utilitarian. Consequently, there is a need to reaffirm the significance and the worthiness of the person regarded as a dignified human being. Now if there is a way to oppose contextual ethics theories such as utilitarianism it should be ethical personalism. Ethical personalism is a philosophy that considers every human being as equally bestowed with an inviolable and 2 David Sussman, “What’s wrong with Torture?”, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), Vol. 33, N° 1, p. 2. 3 The White House counsel, general Alberto Sanchez wrote in a Memo: “The nature of the new war (on terrorism) places a high premium on. . . the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities” in: Karen J. Greenberg et alii. (eds.) The Tortures Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. XV.

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irreducible value-dignity. In other words, ethical personalism affirms the intrinsic worth of every rational and moral being. It also asserts that dignity is something all persons share and that such dignity should not be violated under any circumstances. That view is based on the understanding that every individual is a moral and rational being. Therefore, ethical personalism is hostile to any circumstantial arguments that give more importance to the happiness of the community than to that of the individual. Ethical personalism opposes contextual ethics of every sort. It values human beings for their own worth while still acknowledging the importance and the necessity of a healthy relation between one another. My arguments in this paper shall be directed against the utilitarian approach to interrogational torture. Subsequently, I shall argue that ethical personalism provides us with a more promising way of achieving human development than utilitarianism. First, I shall show that torture is the most obvious infringement on human value. Torture combines intentional physical harm and moral cruelty. The victim is subjected to indescribable sufferings and has no means to stop his transgressor. The torturer deprives his victim of his right to be an end in himself. In order to grasp the cruelty of the act of torture I shall consider the testimonies of some of the Abu Ghraib victims. Second, I shall examine some utilitarian arguments on torture. To gain better insights on the two approaches (ethical personalism and utilitarianism) I shall consider torture in the context of the well-known fictive story, the “ticking bomb.” 4 I shall ultimately bring forth the ethical personalism approach to torture.

II. Investigating into (Interrogational) Torture Notwithstanding the complexity of the notion, all forms of torture share two essential points: the intention of the torturer to inflict severe harm on his victim and the impossibility of the latter to act accordingly to his will, that is, to protect or defend himself from the assault of his attacker. Thus, the victim of torture is subjected to physical pain and psychological suffering without his consent. Let’s add that in the case of interrogational torture the purpose of the torturer is to obtain from his victim information or confession. The United Nations Convention Against Torture defines the notion as follows: 4 A terrorist has placed a bomb in an unknown place, if it explodes thousands of civilians will be killed, the now prisoner-terrorist is the only one who knows where the bomb is planted. So the only one way to save all those innocent people is to get the prisoner to say where the bomb is hidden. As a consequence, the question is whether the terrorist should be tortured in order to get the needed information.

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Khalia Haydara Torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind (. . . ).5

In the same vein David Sussman defines the phenomenon as involving “[. . . ] the deliberate infliction of great pain or some other intensely distressing affective state (fear, shame, disgust, and so forth) on an unwilling person for purposes that person does not and could not reasonably be expected to share.” 6 At first sight, we notice that most definitions of torture emphasise the physical pain inflected on the person. But we know that psychological torture is also widely used today. The emphasis on physical harm could be explained by the severity of the pain the victim of torture is subjected to. When we read the stories of the detainees of Abu Ghraib, gathered in the Torture Papers, we notice that they were all victims of severe and inhuman physical assaults. Detainee n° 152307: “[. . . ] they threw pepper on my face and the beating started. This went on for a half hour. And then he started beating me with the chair until the chair was broken. After that they started choking me. At that time I thought I was going to die, but it’s a miracle I lived. And then they started beating me again. They concentrate on beating me in my heart until they got tired from beating me. They took a little break and then they started kicking me very hard with their feet until I passed out”.7 It’s paradoxical though that most definitions of torture do not stress enough the psychological suffering of the victim while psychological distress has the most harmful effect on the person. It also bears an intimate relationship with physical pain. Indeed, when it comes to torture, physical pain involves ineluctably mental suffering even though it’s not always the case that mental distress leads necessarily to physical pain. However, the mental suffering does not result from the very physical assault. Rather it results 5

UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html. Last access: 25/05/2011. 6 David Sussman, ibid., p. 2. 7 Karen J. Greenberg et alii. (eds.), ibid., p. 505.

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from the victim’s inability to stop the violation of his own body or merely to fight back. This inability to respond or to retreat sets torture apart from a “fair fight.” 8 This drives the victim to undervalue his person and to feel culpability and humiliation. Second, let’s consider the other essential part of torture: the “intentional infliction” of severe harm. Indeed, whatever the motive and the form of the torture, it requires that the torturer be moved by the actual intention to harm his victim. For “while one might accidentally kill or inadvertently maim, one cannot accidentally or inadvertently torture.” 9 We can better grasp the torturer’s intention to hurt in modern torture or what is now called “intelligent torture”. Nowadays, special tools are created and psychological techniques of torture are elaborated with meticulous care. In his famous book, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, the American historian Alfred McCoy reveals how the CIA sought after the expertise of many American experts with the aim to perfect methods of psychological torture.10 The Torture Papers provide us with stories of prisoners that prove the cruel intention of their tormentors. The second night, Graner came hand hung me to the cell door. I told him, “I have a broken shoulder, I am afraid it will break again, cause the doctor told me ‘don’t put your arms behind your back’.” He said: “I don’t care”, then he hung me to the door for more than eight hours. I was screaming from pain the whole night. Graner and others use to come and ask me, “Does it hurt?” I said yes: They said “Good.” 11 In addition we should insist that torture does not require the victim’s consent. The latter is assaulted and against his will. He can but suffer the effects of the violence he is subjected to. On the one hand, there is a free agent, willing to hurt and to whom the means and the power to hurt are given; on the other hand is a person stripped from all capacity to react or to exercise the most basic liberty such as to just walk away or to defend himself from his tormentor. As a result, the victim is humiliated and his dignity as a human being is degraded. Humiliation plays an important part in torture. In fact, most of the time victims of torture are first subjected to techniques of humiliation, such as nakedness,12 before the physical violence. The Abu 8 Henry Shue, “Torture,” in: S. Levinson (ed.), Torture: A collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 23-60, p. 51. 9 David Sussman, ibid., p. 5. 10 See Alfred W. McCoy, A question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). 11 Karen J. Greenberg et alii. (eds.), ibid., p. 524. 12 “They come in the morning shift with two prisoners and they were father and son. They were both naked, they put them in front of each other and they counted 1, 2, 3,

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Ghraib detainees said they were continually humiliated sexually. Pictures and videos taken by the American soldiers show naked Iraqi prisoners piled in a pyramid. They were forced to masturbate in the open but also to perform oral sex on their fellow prisoners.13 In the light of their aim at harming and humiliating their victims it is no wonder torturers have often recourse to such techniques of treatments. For indeed, nakedness and sexuality belong to the most intimate part of human life. To this regard, Nagel has made a noteworthy remark, viz., “we don’t want to expose ourselves completely to strangers even if we don’t fear their disapproval, hostility, or disgust. Naked exposure itself, whether or not it arouses disapproval, is disqualifying.” 14 We should note before closing this chapter that people do not escape unscathed after such an indescribable treatment. What follows naturally are long lasting untoward consequences. The victim is condemned to experience, for the rest of his life, the eternal return of his torments. Thus we ask how torture could be justified or even permissible. It seems as if torture expresses but the bankruptcy of reason inasmuch as reason is supposed to be the ground of moral requirements and it is morally required that the person be treated in regard to her dignity. As he tortures his victim the torturer does not treat him as an end but rather as a means. That makes torture a moral cruelty. For a Kantian, the crux lies in the fact that it is the autonomy of the person tortured which is directly violated. Torture is certainly the most violent invasion in the Ego. When we speak about human value and dignity, we cannot help having in mind his autonomy. It’s not too much a claim to say with Kant that autonomy is the foundation of the dignity of the human person. As a result, torture infringes upon the person’s ontological value-dignity. Now the question that emerges is whether torture should be sanctioned on the ground that some higher purpose might be attained. In other words, is there any kind of “supreme emergency” that could justify the torture of a human person?

III. Utilitarianism and Consequentialism Approach to Torture Is torture morally justified? It’s striking that sometimes this question receives positive responses. In fact, it is largely acknowledged that torture in itself and then removed the bags from their heads. When the son saw his father naked he was crying.” In: The Torture Papers, p. 505. 13 Ibid., p. 501. 14 Thomas Nagel, “Concealment and Exposure,” in: Philosophy and Public Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), Vol. 27, N° 1, pp. 2-30, p. 4.

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is an evil. The harm and the untold sufferings inflected on the victim are condemnable in themselves. And yet, in some special situations a form of torture is permissible. This exception consists in the so-called interrogational torture or coercive interrogation. It should actually happen as a supreme emergency. As an illustration of such situation political philosophers use the fictive story of the “ticking bomb”. Let’s consider this: 1. The individuals X1. . . Xn are about to be killed by the explosion of a bomb; 2. X1. . . Xn are innocent civilians who do not deserve such harm; 3. The now prisoner- terrorist is the only one who knows where the bomb is planted and he is not willing to collaborate; 4. As a consequence, the question is to know if the terrorist should be tortured in order to get the needed information. In this respect, it seems that interrogational torture gives rise to a moral conflict15 viz., an obligation to chose between two currents of actions (A and A’), A having at its foundation a moral and unconditional principle, A’ being motivated by the avoidance of disastrous consequences. In some regards, whatever the choice of the individual his action will be blameable. For, if one decides to perform action A’, that is to torture P, one might save thousands of innocent people. If, on the contrary, one decides not to torture P, in choosing action A, thousands of innocent civilians might die. According to contextual ethics theories such as utilitarianism in particular and consequentialism in general the prisoner should be tortured. For the context is such that if he is not tortured a greater harm will follow. Thus, it is a supreme emergency that does not appeal to any abstract universal moral principle. The fact is that thousands of people are going to die and if we can save them by torturing one person, that person should be tortured. Hence only the resulting benefits matter. However, as David Sussman has stressed, the utilitarian approach is not just concerned about the consequences; it also “focuses on the actual harm involved in torture.” 16 Thus, the pain the terrorist is actually undergoing and the pain he will undergo perhaps during the rest of his life are taken into account. That is to say, as long as the resulting benefits are worth it the As for Alan Gewirth we face a conflict of rights and loss: one right opposes a collective rights and one loss opposes an “aggregate loss,” “Are there Any Absolute Rights?”, in: Philosophical Quarterly (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1981), Vol. 31- N° 22, p. 6. 16 David Sussman, ibid., p. 13. 15

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torture is permissible. Otherwise the person should not be tortured. In any case, the person tortured should not suffer more pain than needed. Thus, even though the utilitarian sanctions torture during “supreme emergency,” he tries to stay faithful to his principle of minimising pain. It is yet legitimate to wonder whether the harm prevented by torturing a person, that is, by infringing the dignity of a human being, could ever outweigh the cruelty of torture. In this respect, the utilitarian concern about the pain inflected on the victim is often criticised as being an attempt to rescue a lame argument. Whatever the truth, circumstantial ethic is an influential approach among political philosophers today.17 In his famous article, “Torture,” Henry Shue provides us with a pertinent refutation of the arguments pro torture, making use of a comparison between torture and “Just War Killing”. Surprisingly, in the same article Shue justifies18 the torture of the ticking bomb terrorist.19 Nevertheless, he puts some limits to his argument: 1) the torture will be performed under the vigilance of legal authorities, 2) certain type of violent treatment such as rape, or any other treatment that put in danger the life of the victim is prohibited, 3) a doctor and a priest must be present, 4) later the torturer will have to justify his act in front of a judge.20 However, Shue insists on the necessity of a “legal prohibition” of torture. On that point of view, Shue opposes Alan Dershowitz who strives to defend the need of a “torture warrant.” 21 According to the latter, a torture warrant is an adequate answer to the continuous and illegal practice of torture. Torture seems therefore to be a necessary evil that should be under the control of the law. The main aim is, according to the author, to reduce the practice of See Bernard Gert, “Justifying violence,” in: Journal of Philosophy 66, 19, 1969, p. 623; Kenneth Himma, “Assessing the Prohibition Against Torture,” in: Steven P. Lee (ed.), Intervention, Terrorism, and Torture: Contemporary challenges to Just War Theory (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2007), pp. 235-248; Uwe Steinhoff, “Torture–The Case for Dirty Harry and Against Alan Dershowitz,” in: David Rodin (ed.), War, Torture and Terrorism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 98-113; R. Posner, “Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation,” in: S. Levinson (ed.), Torture: A Collection. 18 Henry Shue, “Torture,” in: S. Levinson (ed.), ibid., pp. 23-60, p. 56: “Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that there are imaginable cases in which the harm that could be prevented by a rare instance of pure interrogational torture would be so enormous as to outweigh the cruelty of the torture itself (. . . )”. 19 However, we should notice that Shue will later change his mind. See the “Response to Sanford Levinson,” in: Dissent 50, 3, 2003. 20 Henry Shue, ibid., p. 58. 21 Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2002); see also his “Tortured Reasoning,” in: S. Levinson, ibid., pp. 257-280. 17

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torture or to completely annihilate it.22 Needless to say that with such warrant, torture could not only become nothing out of the ordinary, but a “torture warrant” would put the phenomenon on a slippery slope as well. In other words, other atrocities and cruelties will also pretend to a legal warrant. In fact, William Schulz, points out a serious issue namely that if torture is sanctioned by the law, why not deliver to the torturer a “rape warrant,” “a brutality warrant”? etc.23 In the same vein, David Luban wonders if in legalising torture we will not end up creating a “culture of torture,” 24 with all the elements it requires viz., forming torturers experts, manufacturing torturing tools, etc. One may also add the possibility to torture an innocent person. Maybe the prisoner is not actually a terrorist, maybe he does not know where the bomb is planted. Many Abu Ghraib’s victims who are free today have confessed their innocence. The different arguments against the approach of contextual ethics to torture are of prime importance. They are pertinent as well. However, those arguments are also based on circumstantial elements, outside the person, just as any principles of contextual ethics. Schulz worries about the slippery slope that would allow not only the sanction of torture but also many other moral and physical cruelties will also be permitted by the law. As for Luban, we should strive to avoid the emergence of a “culture of torture” in our world. Yet, as we understood it so far, torture is “the most profound violation possible of the dignity of a human being.” 25 Therefore, the human being as person should be the starting-point for any argument against torture. In other words, a personalism approach to torture is necessary for an absolute and effective condemnation of torture. As we will see it in the following chapter ethical personalism rejects all forms of torture. In doing so it does not focus on circumstantial arguments. Ethical personalism condemns torture on the unique ground that it degrades the value and the dignity of the human person. Thus, neither the circumstances, nor the future consequences can break or even weaken the absolute nature of the moral principles that guide our actions towards the person. The best illustration of ethical personalism approach to torture is found in the deontological or Kantian tradition.

Alan Dershowitz, “Tortured Reasoning,” p. 257. William F. Schulz, “The torturer’s Apprentice: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age,” in: Nation, May 13, 2002 quoted by A. Dershowitz (2004), pp. 266-267. 24 David Luban, “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb,” in: Steven P. Lee, ibid., pp. 249-271, p. 256. 25 David Sussman, ibid. 22 23

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IV. The Argument It is morally wrong that a human being inflicts intentional harm on a vulnerable human being. Even in a fair fight or in what is commonly called “a just war” it is morally shocking to see two persons harming and killing each other. It seems that torture is even more wrong than a just war killing. Torture is especially wrong because it humiliates the person and profoundly degrades his dignity. Thus whatever the prisoners of Abu Ghraib might have done and whatever the utility of the information they might provide, they don’t deserve the treatment they were subjected to. For even negative reciprocity, which means to respond to hostile actions with actions of the same nature, does not justify torture. It’s therefore no wonder that ethical personalism condemnation of torture is absolute. It is also applied to all forms of torture, interrogational torture included. Furthermore, ethical personalism provides us with three dimensions of the person that prohibit categorically the torture of a human being. As we shall see in the following paragraphs the first two dimensions are concerned with the nature of the person, respectively, they ascribe to the human person an intrinsic value-dignity and state that all human beings share equally that dignity. Relying on the first two dimensions the third affirms the unconditional respect due to mankind and hence the prohibition of torture. In fact, at the core of ethical personalism is a threefold intuition about the “Persona”. The first intuition emphasises the intrinsic worth of the human being; an intrinsic worth that is generally called dignity. This value is incorruptible and unchanged, thus unsubordinated to the will and purposes of other beings. As persons, human beings are equally bestowed with such inherent dignity which is deeply rooted in the personhood of mankind. Indeed, at the heart of personalism is the concept of “Persona”. “Person” is the special name given among all other substances to individual human beings having a rational nature.26 That assertion is closely linked to Boethius widely acknowledged definition of the person namely that “persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia.” 27 The Boethian definition stresses two essential qualities of the human being as “persona,” that is his effective existence and his intellective capability. Henceforth, on the one hand, the person is a concrete and a unique individual that has an effective physical presence in the world. On the other hand, he is qualified as an essentially rational 26 Thomas Aquinas, I, q. 29, a. 1, c, quoted by Jove Jim S. Aguas, “The Notion of the Human Person and Human Dignity in Aquinas and Wojtyła,” in: Kritike, vol. 3, N° 1, 40-60, p. 45. 27 De duabus naturis et una persona Christi chap. III, “differentia naturae et personae,” Migne, Patrol, Lat., tome LXIV. See also Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, cap. 3.

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agent. Thus, he is able to think, deliberate, imagine, feel, create, assent, deny, define his own purposes and will, and choose consciously. He is also a free and responsible being capable of morally relevant actions. As such, the person is worthy of esteem and honour. That is to say, he is a dignified being. In his book What is life? Josef Seifert provides us with a significant definition of human dignity: When we speak of the dignity of the person or the justice of a judge, we do not mean only a positive importance which depends on our pleasure. We mean an importance which characterises the human being or justice in themselves and endows them with an inherent, intrinsic preciousness which makes them “good in themselves”. . . .28 This amounts to saying that human dignity is not relational. That is to say, it does not depend on us, on our “general inclinations and wants”. As for Kant everything that has reference to our inclinations is relational inasmuch as through our judgments and appreciations we alter the nature of that thing. Kant regards human dignity as being an unconditional and incomparable worth. In other words, it does not admit “equivalent” and it must be raised above all “market value.” 29 The second intuition states that just by being human, individuals are of equal worth and dignity. Earlier, we stressed two essential qualities of the human being as “persona”: his bodily existence and his intellective capability. We should note now that both qualities are affected with differences from one person to another. Persons are shaped differently. That is to say, they have different customs, different cultures, different religions, and different physical features. Intelligence and opportunities are also unequally shared. Thus, those two qualities are subjected to changes following differing biological and social circumstances. Adopting an Aristotelian attitude ethical personalism characterises those differences as being merely accidents and not essences. Thus, if human dignity is rooted into personhood, that is to say the essence that makes a person what he is, therefore the value of the person is independent from the accidents we just enumerate. In other words, the notion of the person and his dignity is “gender-independent,” “rank-independent,” “location-independent,” “culture-independent,” “religion-independent,” “colour-independent,” and “intelligence-independent”. In sum, “the notion of the 28 Josef Seifert, What is Life? The Originality, Irreducibility, and Value of Life (Amsterdam/ Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997), p. 96. 29 Immanuel Kant, “Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals,” in: Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. by Thomas K. Abbott, (London, New York and Bombay: Longmans Green and co.,1909), p. 53.

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human person and his inherent dignity transcends all limits and boundaries pertaining to the differences in beliefs, convictions, world-views, cultures and ideologies.” 30 That dimension of the human being resists the prioritisation of the collective worth over the individual worth. To put it differently, there is not an “aggregate dignity” that surpasses, in value, the dignity of the individual person. The community is not endowed with more worthiness than the single person. Hence, in the name of the interest or the security of the community a person ought not to be tortured. As we notice the second intuition collides with the utilitarianism’s Greatest Happiness Principle as long as the principle involves the “sacrifice” of one single human being. As a result, the third and last intuition gives to the person a fair claim to unconditional respect on the ground of the special dignity he is endowed with. In fact, the nature of the dignified human being requires a special type of treatment. Kant writes that the idea of the dignity of a being endowed with reason should be the motif of any action we perform in regard to ourselves and in regard to others. Kant expresses his thought in a very telling passage of the Foundation. Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end.31 Human dignity is in fact a morally relevant value and as such it directs our actions towards a moral sphere. In other words, it imposes moral imperatives on us. Henceforth, it is a moral obligation to respect and treat oneself as an end but also to equally respectt the other and treat him as being whose existence in itself has absolute worth. Kant did draw the attention of his readers on the duty of the person to treat oneself as an end. In fact, when I act in regard to myself I ought to treat myself with unconditional respect. In this respect, Kant claims that the person who commits suicide fails to respect and treat oneself according to his dignity. Let’s add the example of the prostitute who is using/ selling her body in order to gain money. She is also acting towards her person as if she was a mere means. I can also fail to respect myself in the way I treat others. In torturing his victim the torturer degrades himself as well. As a rational being, the 30 31

Jove Jim S. Aguas, ibid., p. 42. Kant, ibid., p. 46.

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person has the responsibility to “develop a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for it.” 32 The torturer is therefore responsible of a double crime: the violation of his own dignity and of the dignity of his victim. In different words, in treating his victim as a means he is simultaneously treating himself a means. To treat a person as a mere means amounts to reifying him, to denying him his autonomy and his nature as a rational and self-purposed being. In this respect Kant contends that a person “is not a thing,” for “a thing is what is incapable of being the subject of imputation. Every object of the free activity of the will, which is itself void of freedom, is therefore called a thing (res corporealis).” 33 Autonomy is according to Kant the foundation of human dignity. It essentially characterises a free self-purposed and responsible being. That is why for a Kantian what makes torture morally wrong is that it coerces and alienates the agency of the person. The torturer disposes of his victim according to his own subjective volition, thus forcing him to act and even think against his will and reason. In other words, all the mental activities which ought to come within the will of the person fall under the external and tyrannical will of his torturer. The victim experiences a lack of control over his own being. He acts against his own will and purposes for, obviously, the latter cannot share the decision of his torturer to inflict deliberate harm against him. According to Sussman that explains the terrible inner conflict the victim is forced to experience during torture. In other words, the victim experiences his own person ‘colluding against himself”. Whatever its ultimate goal, torture aims to make its victim make himself into something that moral philosophy tells us should be impossible: a natural slave, a truly heteronomous will. The victim retains enough freedom and rationality to think of himself as accountable, while he nevertheless finds himself, despite all he can do, to be expressing the will of another, the will of a hated and feared enemy leading thus the victim to act against his reason and will. Therefore there is a conflict in the victim.34 One might even add that this psychological conflict gives rise to different feelings such as self-betrayal, culpability, humiliation, loss of identity, etc. For, in feeling what his torturer wants him to feel; in behaving the way he Kant, ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 10. 34 David Sussman, ibid., p. 29. 32 33

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wants him to behave, the victim ends up believing that he is participating in his own maltreatment. All in all, torture is an infringement of the fundamental property of the human being. As Locke remarks, the first and essential foundation of property consists in the perception of oneself as belonging to one’s own person.35 This assertion is so true to Locke that he regards all other future belongings as dependent on that fundamental and natural right. As a dignified being the human person has an exclusive right on his body and on his entire being. We must admit with Kant that “I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him.” 36

Conclusion Torture is a physical and a moral cruelty. It displays the most obscure part of a human being. Consciously and intentionally the torturer inflicts physical and psychological harm on his victim. The latter is assaulted against his will. His absolute vulnerability and incapacity to protect himself from his tormentor forces him in a position where he can but suffer the pain without any hope to escape or to fight back. Torture is all the more an inhuman treatment as it depersonalises its victims. The torturer treats his victim as if he were a mere means. He reifies him in denying him his autonomous agency. Ethical personalism approach to torture has revealed the impossibility to elaborate a convincing moral justification of torture. It condemns categorically all form of torture on the ground that torture is the most profound infringement of the dignity of a human person. I have shown so far that such violation goes against the threefold intuition about the persona viz., the intrinsic value-dignity of the person, the fact that all persons share equally that dignity, and finally the due unconditional respect to the persona. In contrast, contextual theories such as utilitarianism and pure consequentialism sanction interrogational torture. In the case of the “ticking bomb” many consequentialists have maintained that the prisoner ought to be tortured if to torture him could save innocents lives. They focus then on the resulting benefits, presupposing that the general interest or the happiness of the greatest number is more important than the fate of a single person. Such attitude reveals a fundamental oversight of the Persona. Thus, my main contention is that ethical personalism provides us with a more promising and effective way of achieving human development. In taking John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government, section 27. 36 Kant, ibid., p. 47. 35

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the persona as a starting-point for all kind of investigation it acknowledges the dignity of the person and the respect it commands. ——————

Selected Bibliography —Aguas, Jove Jim S., “The Notion of the Human Person and Human Dignity in Aquinas and Wojtyła,” in: Kritike, vol. 3, N° 1, 40-60. —Dershowitz, Alan, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2002). —Gert, Bernard, “Justifying violence,” in: Journal of Philosophy 66, 19, 1969, pp. 616-628. —Gewirth, Alan, “Are there Any Absolute Rights?”, in: Philosophical Quarterly (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1981), Vol. 31- N° 22, pp. 1-16. —Greenberg, Karen J., et alii. (eds.) The Tortures Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). —Himma, Kenneth, “Assessing the Prohibition Against Torture,” in: Steven P. Lee (ed.), Intervention, Terrorism, and Torture: Contemporary challenges to Just War Theory (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2007), pp. 235248. —Hume, David, “Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals,” in: Stephen Darwall (ed.), Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). —Kant, Immanuel, “Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals,” in: Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. by Thomas K. Abbott, (London, New York and Bombay: Longmans Green and co.,1909). —McCoy, Alfred W., A question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). —Nagel, Thomas, “Concealment and Exposure,” in: Philosophy and Public Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), Vol. 27, N° 1, pp. 2-30. —Seifert, Josef, What is Life? The Originality, Irreducibility, and Value of Life (Amsterdam/ Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997). Shue, Henry, “Torture,” in: Levinson, Sanford (ed.), Torture: A collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 23-60. —Steinhoff, Uwe, “Torture—The Case for Dirty Harry and Against Alan Dershowitz,” in: David Rodin (ed.), War, Torture and Terrorism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 98-113.

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—Sussman, David, “What’s wrong with Torture?”, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), Vol. 33, N° 1, pp- 133.

Chapter 15 Maintaining Humanity in a Technology Orientated World of Today Paweł Bernat1 Collegium Varsoviense Warsaw, Poland

Introduction Day by day the importance of technology increases in every aspect of human life, including the moral one. It is extremely important, then, to precisely elucidate the phenomenon of technology. Even more so because the progressing evolution, enlargement of the intension of the term ‘technology’ rightly mirrors both, the technological development and its impact on humans. The goal of the paper is to establish a diagnosis of the actual situation of how technologies influence our morality and ethics. The preconceptions of the greatest philosophers of technology are, in this respect, rather pessimistic. Technology is a growing power with growing autonomy from humans. As it will be demonstrated it does change what we believe is good and right, and the change does not seem to be a good one. Nobody questions the danger technological development may bring about. Deep philosophical analyses carried out by Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul help us understand those processes and give us knowledge for appropriate counteract if needed. Both of them believe that the new, ‘technological’ ethics promotes its own values and diminishes the importance of the old ones. In this context, if nothing should be done, the future generations might have entirely different moral The project has been realised with the support of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway through funds allocation from the EEA Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism within the Scholarship and Training Fund. 1

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point of view than we do. I think that it is our moral duty to preserve our moral ideals. For if we are truly convinced about the rightness of our ethical mind-set we are obliged to promote it and conserve it. Technology favours consequentialism over deontology, moral relativism over moral realism. The only way to secure our values for the future is by addressing this technology determined ethical change in the context of moral realism. Personalism seems to be the most suitable candidate here. This paper however will not provide arguments for that. Its intention is to serve as an expression of the today’s challenges for personalism. The article begins with a thorough explanation of the phenomenon of technology and its development. The next section is dedicated to the examination of autonomy of Technology.2 Thereafter, I discuss the utopian and dystopian approaches toward the technological development, as well as describe possible dangers stemming from it. The following section focuses on Heidegger’s notion of the essence of technology and his ideas how Technology reduces everything, including human beings, into standing-reserve. Subsequently I try to explain why technologies may be so confusing from the axiological point of view. I end the paper with a formulation of the challenge and a request directed to personalistic moral philosophers to take into account the changes that Technology has introduced. For ethics to be widely accepted must be firmly grounded in reality.

I. Technology. Development. Definition The world ‘technology’ has a Greek origin and simply means “systematic treatment.” The common definition given by The New Oxford Dictionary of English describes technology as an application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes, especially in industry; machinery and equipment are developed with the help of such scientific knowledge; it is the branch of knowledge dealing with engineering or applied science.3 This definition surely reflects out common intuitions on technology but in its generality and simplicity is far from being entirely adequate. For the notion is a fuzzy one, the best strategy to capture its essence is to thoroughly examine the usages of the word and build up towards greater understanding of the phenomenon. 2 I introduce here ‘Technology’ spelled with ‘T’ to denote generally conceived technological superstructure that has become an environment for actions, behaviours and thoughts of the people of the West; Technology here is distinguished from technology understand particularly (in one of the four meanings discussed above). 3 Judy Pearsall (ed.), “Technology,” in : The New Oxford Dictionary of English (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 1903).

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I share the opinion of Arnold Gehlen who claims that in order to reach the fruitful analysis of technology one needs to work with its general definition. Gehlen writes: It is evident, then, that just as one cannot precisely define “art,” it is difficult to determine exactly what ‘technology’ is, especially when one includes organic surgical interventions of a medicaltherapeutic sort—not to mention the fairly predictable effects of attempts at mental manipulation, in which one cannot always clearly distinguish between advertisement, propaganda, and education. It is therefore necessary to stick with a rather general definition, and above all to keep in mind that this concept includes still others.4 Martin Heidegger, the founding father of the discipline of philosophy of technology in 1954 published his famous essay The Question Concerning Technology 5 where he defined technology, generally speaking, as a means to an end. This definition, however broad, does not cover all phenomena that we believe today should be accounted as technology. What is interesting is the fact that today the most common usage of the word denotes artefacts.6 Clearly the definition needed an upgrade. It actually requires one constantly for technological development does not stop. On the contrary, it accelerates in the pace closer rather to geometric progression than arithmetic one. What makes things even more complicated is the fact that the traditional idea of technology reduces technology to singular applications of natural science. Such approach does not take into account the interaction between the various components of the general phenomenon that Gehlen calls the superstructure. This superstructure consists of four factors the coexistence of which constitutes, according to Gehlen, the primary difference between our culture and all previous cultures.7 These components may be characterised by the fact that (1) every particular technology is related to the natural sciences, but also (2) to industrial machine production; then, (3) that these first two spheres are bound together by a complicated relationship of mutual 4 Arnold Gehlen, “A Philosophical-Anthropological Perspective on Technology,” in: Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek (eds.), Philosophy of Technology. The Technological Condition. An Anthology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 213-220. 5 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in: William Lovitt (ed.), The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 3-35. 6 Stephen J. Kline, “What is Technology,” in: Philosophy of Technology, pp. 210-212. 7 Arnold Gehlen, “A Philosophical-Anthropological Perspective on Technology,” p. 214.

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influences. These three realms, closely linked with (4) the entire sphere of information can be seen as forming the ‘superstructure.’8 Before further analysis of technology conceived as superstructure and thinking of its consequences for humans I suggest taking a closer look at a slightly different strategy of explaining technology. Stephen J. Kline proposes a reportive definition that recognises four meanings of the word: (1) sociotechnical system of manufacture, (2) methodology (technique), (3) artefacts, and a (4) socio-technical system of use.9 The first most common usage of ‘technology’ is the process of manufacturing hardware. It generally refers to producing equipment and the people who operate it. Moreover, besides the machines and people handling them we also find behind that term what Kline calls a socio-technical system of manufacture, namely, the ‘complete system for manufacturing,’ planes, motorbikes, telescopes, etc. This usage covers all the elements required to produce a particular piece of hardware; it refers to the complete working system: its inputs (i.e., people, machinery, resources, processes), but also its legal, economic, political and physical environment. A second usage of ‘technology’ is the range denoted by words like ‘technique,’ ‘methodology,’ or ‘know-how.’ In other words, this usage is employed to designate knowledge within a socio-technical system of manufacture. This meaning may be a source of much significant confusion when one tries to make a clear distinction between technology and technique.10 However, there is a strong tendency in common parlance to practice this usage. Very often ‘technology’ is used to denote methodology for accomplishing any given task, as in, ‘we have the technology to do the job.’ In other words, ‘technology’ in this case refers to the information, skills, processes, and procedures for accomplishing tasks, which are applied to support the system of manufacture. The third usage, as mentioned before, is perhaps the most common one. It denotes artefacts (or hardware)—manufactured articles, i.e., things made Id., ibid., p. 214. Stephen J. Kline, “What is Technology,” pp. 210-212. 10 Such confusion may occur especially in case of translation. For example, Heidegger’s “Technik” just like Ellul’s “La Technique” is translated into English as “technology.” This seems to be the reason why some of the usages of the word in English appear to sound inappropriate for not native speakers. The range of English “technology” is much broader than German relatively new word “Technologie.” The former actually contains the ranges of both “Technik” and “Technologie.” This interesting fact demonstrates how important it is here to elucidate clearly the key terms. On the other hand, it proves that philosophy of technology as independent domain of knowledge has still long road ahead. For comparison, let me call again the example of art as similarly indefinable, but as it appears rather obvious, none of the problems of aesthetics come from lack of inter-linguistic communication. 8 9

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by humans that do not occur naturally on earth. For instance bows, heavy suits of armour, quills, typewriters, computers, airplanes, mines, roads, soap, bicycles, and many more. In sum, ‘technology’ in this sense refers to all kinds of non-natural objects. Engineers usually call these objects ‘hardware,’ while philosophers and anthropologists recognise them as ‘artefacts.’ The last connotation of ‘technology’ pertains to what we do with the hardware after producing it; let us call it the ‘socio-technical system of use.’ For example, due to cars we construct a system of roads, gas stations; we define laws of ownership and operation, etc., and we use this resulting combined system (i.e., the cars plus all the rest) to extend our human capacity to move around and transport ourselves and our possessions. The synthesis of the above reported meanings of ‘technology’ provides us with a description of the general phenomenon of technology that corresponds to Gehlen’s technological superstructure. For almost every newly designed artefact has a specific purpose within the existing socio-technical system. Every time we introduce new hardware, we change the system a little, making it faster, more efficient, safer, etc. However, this system is a system that uses combinations of artefacts and people to accomplish tasks that humans cannot perform unaided by such systems. In other words, we extend our capacities and go beyond our natural boundaries by using the hardware. Nowadays, these systems make up, at least for the Western man, the status of our environment. Gehlen believes: that the apparatus which we once handled freely have now started to become part of our biological make-up to such an extent that it looks as if mankind no longer belongs to a species of mammals, but has instead turned into some kind of shellfish. If we conjoin this thought with the (. . . ) view that an instinct-like, unconscious process has propelled the various epochs of technology, this would lead to an acknowledgement of Heisenberg’s idea (. . . ) to the effect “technology in fact no longer appears as the product of a conscious effort to enlarge material power, but rather like biological development of mankind in which the innate structures of the human organism are transformed in an ever-increasing measure to the environment of man” in biological process which is no longer subject to human control.11 The socio-technical systems are used as well by other beings, e.g., ants, bees, beavers, etc., but only humans are capable of purposefully making innovations in the socio-technical systems in order to improve their functioning. Arnold Gehlen, “A Philosophical-Anthropological Perspective on Technology,” pp. 219-220. 11

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However, humans are themselves part of these systems and are being affected and changed by them. The latter will be discussed in detail few paragraphs below.

II. Technology. Autonomy Having accepted the thesis that Technology does indeed alter who we are, one immediately raises the question regarding the amount of control we possess over that system. Do we have the power to change it, shape it as we wish, or rather is it an independent paradigm we have no access to? The straightforward answer is that that question has divided the philosophers of technology. At this point nobody questions the value-laden characteristic of technology. What is disputed about nowadays is whether means and ends are linked in systems (substantivism) or whether there is a choice of alternative means-ends systems (critical theory).12 At the level of technology (with small ‘t’) the question can be reduced to the notion of choice and predetermination. If we decide to opt for full determination of means by ends, then, I believe, we will struggle to sustain the view while confronted with reality. There are, for example, different technologies (techniques) of in vitro inception, or to be more precise the ways of acquiring the eggs, methods of selection of fertilised eggs (or the choice not to select them at all) and decisions how many embryos should be transferred to patient’s uterus; whether to freeze and store embryos or not. Such a choice then, in accordance with the claims of the critical theory proponents, does exist. On the other hand however we cannot deny a certain truth behind substantivism. It seems actually that it explains reality more adequately than its opposition. The only condition we have to accept here is getting rid of universal quantification. Yes, we may have a choice but we usually prefer and decide on more efficient solutions, unless of course there are other values that overpower the value of efficiency, which might be the case of in vitro inception discussed above. Such cases occur relatively seldom. In everyday life we choose cars over horses as transportation means, electric kettles over bonfires to boil water, computer keyboard over quill to write an article. However, if we try to analyse Technology in this respect, things, in my opinion, start look drastically different. Some arguments put forward by Jacques Ellul are pretty convincing. In his paper “Autonomy” he argues that [T]echnology13 is autonomous from entities like politics, economics, or even Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1-17. Ellul in original French writes here about ‘technique,’ which is, following the above introduced distinction, much closer to Technology than technology. Obviously, there is 12

13

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the society itself. And what is perhaps more relevant for our examination here is the fact that Technology, according to Ellul, is also entirely independent from values and ethics. If it was the case, it would mean that we live in a changing environment, where we, being a part of that environment, undergo changes as well. Moreover, we would have no control or power to steer that change. It is a disturbing vision. For very quickly we could lose parts of what we today believe to constitute humanity. What guarantee would we have that what today we hold as good or right will be recognised as such in the future? Although I do not share that pessimism with Ellul, he makes few excellent points worthy taking closer look. He claims, for example, that technology does not endure any moral judgment. He writes: It seems obvious that the researcher must absolutely not pose the problem of good and bad for himself, of what is permitted or prohibited in his research, his research simply is. And the same is true for its application. Whatever has been found is applied, quite simply. The technician applies his technology with the same independence as the researcher.14 In the above passage Ellul describes reality. It belongs more to the domain of descriptive ethics rather than to a normative one. Naturally, one may question the adequacy of that description, and I would say that Ellul is not entirely right in it. Again, I believe that universal quantification is not justified here because certain technologies (e.g., human cloning) are indeed banned by some agents, and those bans are rightly respected by other agents. Here we get closer to understanding what in my opinion constitutes autonomy of Technology. There will always be agents who do not, for whatever reasons, share our ethics and reservation towards certain actions. If we decide to refrain from a research, somebody will pursue it. Technology moves forward. It might encounter a few obstacles on its way, be put on hold for a while but it never stops developing.15 no such a differentiation in the English translations of Ellul’s works (“The ‘Autonomy’ of the Technological Phenomenon” and “The Technological Society”) that have been the source of the summary of his thought in this paper. I still want to emphasise the distinction between particular technology and Technology as an environment and this is why I decided for ‘[T]echnology’ that indicates that. 14 Jacques Ellul, “The ‘Autonomy’ of the Technological Phenomenon,” in: Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek. Malden, ibid., p. 394. 15 Stem cell research may serve as a good example of how research blocked due to moral concerns in a short time overcomes such blockades. Embryonic stem cells were isolated in humans for the first time in 1998. After a short period of banning this kind of research more and more countries now allow it. And in Sweden and UK one is even allowed to produce embryos just for the research purposes.

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If we accept that researchers, as Ellul describes them, “must absolutely not” ask themselves whether their inquiries constitute moral burdens, then our humanity is lost. He predicts: Maintaining that morality should not judge invention or technological operation leads to saying, unwittingly, that any human action is now beyond ethics. The autonomy of technology thus renders us amoral. Henceforth, morality will no longer be part of our domain, it will be shouted off into the void. In the eyes of scientists and technicians, morality—along with all values of what can be called humanism—is a purely private matter, having nothing to do with concrete activity (which can be only technological) and with no great interest in the seriousness of life.16 Not only Technology is going to cram into only private sphere but it also has become the creative force of new values and of new ethics. Technology, quoting Ellul again, has destroyed all previous scales of value; it impugns the judgment coming outside. After all, it wrecks all their foundations. But being thus self-justified, it quite normally becomes justifying. What was done in the name of science was just; and now the same holds true for what is done in the name of [T]echnology. It attributes justice to human action, and man is thus spontaneously led to construct an ethics on the basis of, and in terms of, technology.17 Ellul believes that Technology has turned out to be a real power of general legitimating. On this account any question addressed earlier by ethics is nowadays a subject of technological or para-technological research. The Technological ethics, as he calls it, is constructed bit by bit. It demands a certain number of virtues from a human being, such as precision, exactness, a realistic attitude, and, above all, the virtue of work. Moreover, it brings about a certain outlook on life that is based on modesty, devotion, and, naturally, cooperation. Technology due to its nature permits very clear value judgments by answering questions like: what is serious, what is effective, efficient, useful, etc. This ethics is built up on these particular givens because, Ellul explains further, it applauds such behaviour that is required for the technological system to function well. It thereby has the substantial 16 17

Jacques Ellul, “The ‘Autonomy’ of the Technological Phenomenon,” p. 394. Id., ibid., p. 396.

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priority over the other moralities of being truly experienced. Furthermore, it involves obvious and inevitable sanctions that allow the technological system to endure. In The Technological Society Ellul is even more fatalistic regarding the impact of Technology on human being. He claims that The purpose of our human techniques is ostensibly to reintegrate and restore the lost unity of the human being. But the unity produced is the abstract unity of the ideal Man; in reality, the concrete application of techniques dissociates man into fragments.18 In Ihde’s interpretation, Ellul’s Technological society is utterly materialistic. This, in consequence, brings about another change, i.e., the change of ‘human being’. Humans of new Technological society are nothing more but mere ‘material objects.’ In this respect, Ellul’s conclusions are quite similar to those of Heidegger. The difference is that Ellul stays dystopian to the end. He believes that there is no escape from Technology. It has become all encompassing and overarching, and hence, like the religious civilisations of the past, it has grown to be the very way in which everything else is considered.19 Let us think about the consequences of Ellul’s observations. If he is right, there is a high probability that our grandchildren shall not share our moral beliefs, our ethical ideals. It is possible then that we would not be proud of their moral choices. Maybe having a chance we would condemn their values. They might even look in our eyes as stripped of humanity. Is there a way to prevent it? This article is an attempt to suggest a solution. Before that however we should take a moment and shed some light on the eventual dangers of Technological development. So far we have established the existence of general phenomenon of (superstructure) Technology, as well as, its certain autonomy in regard to humans. In length I have discussed the latter providing the arguments of Ellul. He is not lonely in his opinions. That view, to a various extent, is also shared by the representatives of currently predominant substantive theory of technology like Heidegger, Marcuse, Jonas, Habermas, Ihde, Latour. There is a hope however. One can rightly admit that although the further expansion of Technology is inexorable, it is still possible to soundly argue for a feasibility of human control over it. Dietrich von Hildebrand, for example, sees reality in similar terms. He writes: 18

399.

Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 398-

Don Ihde, The Consequences of Phenomenology (New York: New York State University Press, 1986), pp. 102-103. 19

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Paweł Bernat The development of technology, as such, cannot be stopped, even if we considered it to be desirable. But this does not mean that we must accept in a mood of fatalistic pessimism, an extension of the spirit of technology to all fields of human existence. That is what is meant by spiritual technocracy.20

There are spheres of life that should be protected, if possible, against the roller of Technology. Is it possible? I think it is. The idea of sustainable development, not only the environment protection but nature protection policies stem from certain change in human mind-set. These changes escape the paradigm of Technology. For quite often they mean less efficiency, less profit and more work. The change happens slowly but our environment that is Technology is so large and complex that it simply cannot progress differently. At this point we can risk a statement that we humans have certain control over Technology, the power to at least partially form the system as it is from within. Such knowledge should result in taking responsibility for the morality of future generations. In order to do it, we need to clearly define the dangers Technology brings about.

III. Technology. Development vs. Progress. Dangers The first step is to distinguish development from progress. In Baconian terms such a distinction cannot exist because for him technological development is a necessary symptom of progress. However, the term ‘progress’ is ambiguous. Von Hildebrand rightly observes that it may refer either to the immanent development taking place in a specific domain, or to an improvement.21 This distinction is very helpful in elucidating two main attitudes humans share toward technology. The first group believes that the development of technology is indeed an improvement, while the second one claims that the fact that although there is a progress in technology there is no reason to further claim that technology itself is also progress. For example, technological development is very often perceived as a danger for individual human beings and humankind as a whole. The progressive utopian direction of the ideas of technology begins with the Renaissance, the birth age of modern science and technology. It is in the development of a new concept of science-technology that the utopian direction arises. That concept is that scientific knowledge constitutes and Dietrich von Hildebrand, “Technology and its Dangers,” in: Robert Paul Mohan (ed.), Technology and Christian Culture (The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1960), p. 72. 21 Dietrich von Hildebrand, “Technology and its Dangers,” p. 74. 20

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contains power, namely the power to change the very world.22 Perhaps the most dramatic and utopian visions of this concept come from Francis Bacon who specifically accounts for knowledge as power: as the means of overcoming human limits, of changing society, of even challenging nature. Knowledge equals power; power equals the means by which we are able to change the world; to change the world is to exceed the bounds in which we find ourselves. Utopia is a world, which is new, changed, and good. What is also interesting is the fact that the utopian-dystopian thought is governed by the laws of theory of combinations. It simply avails itself of all the possible arrangements as the combinations, which were created by different cultures. Indeed, the perfection achieved in the past vanished because it was fate, or because it was destroyed by man; this wonderful state will never return, or it will but in one thousand of years (holistic vision), or it shall return when the Messiah appears.23 Most utopian permutations embrace the one main belief that science and technology are capable of delivering an ever more perfect environment for humankind. This powerful utopian scheme has a clear structure that may be represented by an ascending line. It shall be better and better. It constitutes the major tendency for the last three centuries, despite the fact that technological growth has also brought about some qualitative new fears which have been reflected by the scientific dystopias. The classic statement of technological dystopianism occurs in Mary Shelley’s story of the Frankenstein’s monster. Here the mad scientist—mad because he seeks a kind of arcane knowledge, which will allow him to give life to the dead and hence have power over life itself—sews together the parts of corpses. These are endowed with life through mysterious technological machines, creating the horrible monster whose initially benign actions turn out to be misdirected and overpowering with respect to his creator. The implicit moral of the story is that things are better left alone and that humans should live within the bounds that are theirs. The contemporary field of debate over the fate of technological civilisation continues to be marked by both such utopian and dystopian directions. Though it seems possible to, at least in the larger picture, detect a certain shift. Whereas the nineteenth century was predominantly utopian—progress was inevitable—the twentieth century has become filled with doubts.24 It 22 In contrast, Greek classical science was contemplative; its aims were not to change a world, but to unite the knower with the order of things, the human logos with the divine Logos, and any changes were at most changes in the soul. 23 Stanislaw Lem, Fantastyka i futurologia (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2003), Vol. 2, pp. 353-354. 24 Don Ihde, Consequences of Phenomenology, p. 100.

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has even become possible to say that there could be a scientific-technological disaster, a destruction of the world with a bang (nuclear war) or with a whimper (global pollution leading to the greenhouse effect). But, there is also another anxiety that differs in character. It is based on the presupposition that technologies affect us, form us and change us without our control and consciousness.

IV. Technology. Essence. Dangers Heidegger analyses Technology in very abstract terms. Following his metaphysics he describes modern technology as a revealing of being. The kind of revealing that rules in modern technology is a “challenging which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.” 25 This revealing has the character of setting-upon in the sense of a challenging-forth. Hence, the earth now reveals itself as a coal-mining district, and the soil as a mineral deposit, etc. In the opposition to a peasant cultivating his field modern agriculture challenges the soil of the field. For instance, contemporary cultivation falls under a different kind of setting-in-order—one that challenges forth the energies of nature as expeditious. This expediting occurs in two ways, namely, it unlocks and exposes the energy. And yet, it is always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, in other words, how to reach the maximum yield at the minimum expense. There is a significant difference between a windmill and the hydroelectric plant that is set into the current of the Rhine. The river is dammed up into the power plant; it turns into a waterpower supplier. The challenge is manifesting itself by unlocking the energy concealed in nature, and then, in the fact that what is “unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew”.26 All those processes are ways of revealing. This revealing process, however, never simply comes to an end. And that is why regulating and securing have become the chief characteristics of the challenging revealing. On this account everything within modern technology is ordered to stand by. Everything becomes standingreserve (Bestand), and in this sense it no longer stands over against us as object, and, consequently, it is completely unautonomous. Science, by its nature moves beings into the position of mathematically theorised objects, and then, technology enters and places these objects in such a way that they 25 26

Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” p. 14. Id, ibid., p. 16.

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merely become resources qualified by a humanly predetermined end. This is how the objectivity of objects vanishes. Of course, a machine is surely an object, although, in this sense, it conceals itself as to what and how it is; that what is revealed is merely the fact that it is a certain kind of standing-reserve waiting to be used by man. Human beings, however, have no control over unconcealment itself. But they themselves belong even more originally than nature within the realm of standing-reserve. On the other hand, in opposition to nature, humans are not merely a standing-reserve—they take active part in ordering as a way of revealing. Modern technology as an ordering revealing is, then, no merely human doing. Therefore we must take that challenging that sets upon man to order the real as standing-reserve in accordance with the way in which it shows itself. That challenging gathers man into ordering. That gathering concentrates man upon ordering the real as standing-reserve.27 For this challenging claim that strengthens human determination to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve Heidegger introduces the word ‘Enframing’ (Ge-stell). Enframing designates the essence of modern technology. However, Enframing does not mean merely challenging but also the producing and presenting that lets what presences come forth into unconcealment. In Enframing, “that unconcealment comes to pass in conformity with which the work of modern technology reveals the real as standing-reserve.” 28 Thus, this work is neither merely human activity nor just a means within such activity. On this account, the instrumental definition of technology is indefensible. In modern technology, causality is reduced to causa formalis. It seems to be shrinking into reporting of standing-reserve that must be guaranteed. The danger for man lies in that that everything may ultimately sink only under this cause. When predetermining reigns in the mode of Enframing, a supreme danger arises that demonstrates itself in two ways: (1) what is unconcealed no longer concerns humans as object but merely as standingreserve, and humans are nothing more but the orderers of those. Human beings can reach a point when they turn in such reserve themselves; or (2) by the fact that as the consequence of the achievements of modern technology human beings can get to see themselves as lord of the earth. In this way an impression may come that every thing that human being encounters exists insofar as it is his construct. In other words, if everything is identified with 27 28

Id., ibid., p. 19. Id., ibid., p. 21.

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nothing more but the passive stance that awaits to be used, then Being is identified with that what is technological. I have decided to incorporate the above summary of Heidegger’s theory of technology because whatever abstract and detached from reality it may seem, it actually is a brilliant insight into Technology. The anticipating point when humans would become standing-reserve is already upon us. There are countless examples but let me evoke just one—the reproductive tourism in India. Let me quote an article describing the procedure from New York Times: You can outsource just about any work to India these days, including making babies. Reproductive tourism in India is now a half-a-billion-dollar-a-year industry, with surrogacy services offered in 350 clinics across the country since it was legalised in 2002. The primary appeal of India is that it is cheap, hardly regulated, and relatively safe. Surrogacy can cost up to $100,000 in the United States, while many Indian clinics charge $22,000 or less. Very few questions are asked. (. . . ) The surrogates, many of whom are cooped up in surrogacy homes away from their families for the duration of the pregnancy, are often in dire financial straits. One woman told a journalist that with a $4,000 debt and an alcoholic husband, she had first considered selling a kidney to get herself out of debt, but decided that the $ 7,000 surrogacy fee was the better option.29 I think there are not many things in this world that would more clearly confirm Heidegger’s theory. Human beings have indeed turned themselves into standing-reserve. Those with money have the power to reduce others to reproductive machines.30 It is happening on a large scale and increasing in numbers. Now the question is how do we judge it morally. Obviously it is permitted and working, so there must be a large part of our human population believing it is right thing to do, that there is some good in it. “Some describe this as a win-win situation. The doctors get clients, the childless get children and the surrogates get much-needed money.” 31 Some see in it the brake of one of 29 Amana Fontanella-Khan, “India, the Rent-a-Womb Capital of the World The country’s booming market for surrogacy”. New York Times, 23.08.2010. 30 What belongs to the constitutive features of Technology is its financial aspect. Technology is an economical issue just as it is ethical. The two are inseparable. However due to the size of this paper I had to leave it out of the discussion. 31 Amana Fontanella-Khan, “India, the Rent-a-Womb Capital of the World The country’s booming market for surrogacy.”

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the most basic principles of humanity. The golden rule, Kant’s categorical imperative, or whatever formulation of the main personalistic deontological constraint that “you shall not treat another person as a mere means to an end” is being violated. And it is not individual occurrences we are talking about but a change of human morality on a global scale. In the next section I will try to shed some light why does it happen.

V. Development is Quick. Technology is Axiologically Confusing The mechanism behind the occurrence of cases like the one described above is actually quite simple. Technological development, as it was addressed already, progresses in constantly accelerating pace. More and more we are faced with situation we lack language to describe and ethical or aesthetical categories to assess. Moreover, the speed of introducing new such confusing cases does not allow to work out a proper conceptual framework. There is no time for it. And such occurrences of employing modern technologies into spheres is truly disorienting. Let me give you an example from aesthetics first. Hatsune Miku is Japan’s newest pop star. This is how Daily Mail describes her: She is cute, stylish and has had a number one chart-topping single. But Japan’s newest and biggest pop star differs from most of her peers in one crucial aspect: she is a hologram. Hatsune Miku has taken the music scene by storm in her native Japan where her concerts are always sold out and are full of screaming, adoring fans. Now, like something out of a science fiction film, videos have emerged which show Miku on tour in Japan, singing a selection of hits.32 Yes, she is a touring hologram, a star selling thousands of records. We respect and love artists, actors and singers for their natural talents, their skills, stage presence, personality. We praise them for that. Hatsune Miku is different. If I liked her show whom should I congratulate, whom to give flowers? The designers of her looks, the engineers who programmed her voice and dancing on the stage, the musicians responsible for her songs, or maybe the ones who came up with technology enabling the show? Can we say that Hatsune is a good singer or performer? Such questions valid and Nial Firth, “Japanese 3D singing hologram Hatsune Miku becomes nation’s strangest pop star.” Mailonline, 12.11.2010. 32

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helpful for evaluation of human artists here are empty. Of course, she is not a good singer because she does not exist in the material world. Her voice is digitally generated and thus may span through the whole sound spectrum, even beyond the frequencies accessible for humans. The questions that remain valid in such cases cannot refer to the object of art33 but only to the impressions of the subject. I still can enjoy the show, or not, and on that account I put value to it. Another example showing that ethics is simply unable to keep up with the new phenomena is so called i-dosing or digital drugs. They are sound tracks with binaural beats, which basically means that if the right ear hears a tone at 400 hertz and the left ear hears a tone at 410 hertz, the beat that they hear in their head is at 10 hertz. If a person is listening to binaural beats at 10 hertz, they are supposed to have an increase in brain wave activity at 10 hertz and enter some sort of altered state of mind, commonly known as ‘being high.’34 The small amount of research that has been done until now denies such effects. On the other hand there are more and more situations like the one described below. Three students at Mustang High School just outside Oklahoma City were hauled into the principal’s office recently after appearing to be intoxicated at school. The students confessed that they had been “i-dosing”—that is, they claimed to be high after listening through headphones to sounds they had downloaded from the Internet. Local authorities were so concerned by this behaviour that they sent a letter to parents cautioning them about this bizarre new practice.35 How should we behave now? Is it morally justified to ban this kind of products (tunes) and practices and put the whole machine of prohibition in motion? As for today we simply have no enough data to make a reasonable decision. And what about surrogate Indian mother? Should we condemn such practices, or rather support the procedure? We can imagine a situation where a mother of let us say three children offers her womb to the couple 33 Undoubtedly, Hatsune is a work of art but does not create art. One can see her perform live on youtube: . 34 See “Researcher Dispels Notion Music Can Get Kids High,” NPR Music, 14.07.2010. 11.01.2011. 35 Katie Connolly, “Can ‘digital drugs’ get you high?”, BBC News, 21.07.2010. 11.01.2011.

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who cannot get pregnant; not for money but out of compassion and will to help. It seems that majority of us would have nothing against. On the other hand, the surrogacy business in India provokes many negative judgements. Is it money involved, or maybe the scale of the phenomenon? Probably both, because the women in India are financially forced to do it. They rent their bodies for nine months. The scale is also relevant for it makes it a common thing to rent a surrogate and not be pregnant by ourselves. These practices endanger the traditional order of conception, pregnancy, motherhood and childhood. Again, how should we react on that new way of reproduction? All the agents are of age and freely decided to participate in it. Ellul has rightly described what happens in such situations. If traditional ethical solutions give us no answers, we rely on the values stemming from the Technology paradigm, namely, efficiency, gain, happiness. In fact Technology probably shifts human morality, and in consequence ethics, towards consequentialism and farther away from deontology.

VI. Personalism. The Saving Power? At the end of Heidegger’s famous article “The Questions Concerning Technology” there is a surprising quotation. Throughout the whole paper he convinces us that Technology is a true danger for our humanity but then he recites after a poet: But where danger is, grows The saving power also.36 There are no doubts that Technology changes us. Not only socially, economically and psychologically, but also morally. It has become our environment, the paradigm of our actions. We can hardly see its influence but it is there. It is dangerous because we do not know who we or our children may become. It is possible that they would not share our beliefs on what is good and right. They might lose what we understand today as humanity. The counteraction is needed. An active and strong voice arguing for maintaining the humanity, our values. It is a challenge, especially for moral realists first to realise the danger, and secondly properly address it.

36

Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” p. 34.

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Selected Bibliography —Ellul, Jacques, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964). —Feenberg, Andrew, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999). —Gehlen, Arnold, “A Philosophical-Anthropological Perspective on Technology,” in: Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek (eds.), Philosophy of Technology. The Technological Condition. An Anthology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 213-220. —Heidegger, Martin, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in: William Lovitt (ed.), The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 3-35. —Ihde, Don, The Consequences of Phenomenology (New York: New York State University Press, 1986). —Lem, Stanislaw, Fantastyka i futurologia (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2003). —von Hildebrand, Dietrich, “Technology and its Dangers,” in: Robert Paul Mohan (ed.), Technology and Christian Culture (The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1960), pp. 72-98.

Index Al-Ghazzali, Ibn, 71 altruism, 121 Anselm, Saint, 171, 173, 178, 179, 181 anthropology, 13, 137, 143, 145, 155, 179 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 48, 131, 155, 166, 168, 175, 176, 179–182 Aristotle, 63, 162, 165, 169, 171, 172, 175, 177, 178 Augustine, Saint, 47, 48, 54, 155, 159, 164, 178 autonomy, 7, 8, 12, 15, 108, 119, 128, 229, 242, 246, 253, 257, 258, 262–265 Bible, 34 body, 13, 33, 34, 39, 89, 95, 110, 137, 143–145, 148, 151, 166, 173, 219, 228, 245, 252, 254 Boethius, 12, 109, 127, 166, 167 Boethian, 100, 101, 109, 168, 250 Bowne, Borden P., 12, 138 Bowne, Borden, P. Boston personalism, 12, 117, 118, 122, 124 Brightman, Edgar, 12, 118–124 Buber, Martin, 43, 105, 138 Burrow, Rufus, Jr., 117, 118 care, 12, 48, 230, 231 categorical imperative, 9, 167, 271 Christianity, 11, 134

Christian, 9, 14, 40, 109, 117, 124, 150, 171, 174, 178, 182, 189, 195, 198, 227 community, 7, 9, 12–14, 34, 76, 86, 91, 95, 104–108, 110–113, 123, 130, 131, 133–135, 140, 148, 149, 171, 172, 193, 194, 199, 211, 231, 243, 252 concern, 25, 38, 61, 132, 248, 263 Confucius, 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93, 95 Confucian, 11, 84, 85, 87, 89–96 conscience, 34, 47, 63, 72, 157, 170, 180, 192, 223 consciousness, 40, 50, 55, 60, 72, 102, 143–149, 158, 161, 162, 168, 172, 207, 268 Crosby, John, 9, 10, 83, 102 dehumanisation, 10, 43, 124 deontology, 16, 258, 273 depersonalisation, 42, 140, 192, 199 Descartes, René, 103, 141, 144 Du Bois, W.E.B., 117 Eckhart, Meister, 13, 127–135 egoism, 11, 29, 34, 94 Ellul, Jacques, 257, 262–265, 273 equality, 7, 35, 36, 71, 93, 220, 221, 230 essence, 7, 9, 14, 46, 47, 64, 102, 127, 129, 158–161, 165–167, 170, 171, 177, 182, 193, 251, 258, 268

276

Index

existence, 9, 13, 36, 53, 55–58, 63, 84, human rights, 7, 35, 107, 168, 229, 86, 90, 95, 105, 110, 111, 117, 230, 242 123, 125, 127, 130–132, 163, humanism, 70, 79, 94, 95, 117, 124, 167, 251, 252, 266 125, 264 humanity, 15, 16, 69, 74, 75, 78, 79, family, 69, 75, 85, 86, 91, 95, 112, 171, 84, 86–89, 91, 94, 96, 107, 125, 172, 194, 198, 199, 232, 233 128, 150, 151, 163, 171, 257, Frankfurt, Harry, 10, 19, 24–30 263, 265, 271, 273 freedom, 7, 8, 11, 36, 42, 55, 56, 58, Hume, David, 141, 241 64, 71, 76–78, 80, 109, 131, Husserl, Edmund, 110, 144, 159, 205 133, 139–141, 163, 164, 166, 171, 175, 178–180, 223, 228– identity, 10, 12, 15, 23, 24, 30, 56, 99– 231, 233, 234, 242, 253 101, 103–106, 110–114, 123, fulfilment, 36, 47, 49, 170, 171, 176 125, 133, 146, 148–150, 195, fullness, 22, 83, 89, 151, 164, 168, 178, 199, 201, 208–213, 225, 253 192 impersonalism, 137, 145, 151 Gehlen, Arnold, 259, 261 inalienable, 8, 60, 78, 168 God, 8, 12, 22, 34, 39–42, 46, 48– individualism, 11, 93, 94, 121, 149, 50, 52–56, 58, 59, 61–64, 69, 150, 199 71, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 102, individuality, 8, 9, 11, 19–21, 23, 24, 109, 111, 117, 130–132, 134, 28, 78, 83, 87, 91, 94, 95, 118, 150, 164–166, 170–174, 176– 120, 127, 128, 131, 141, 146 178, 181, 182, 193, 195, 219 inequality, 220, 230 divine, 10, 45–47, 49, 51, 54, 55, infringement, 242, 243, 254 57–63, 75, 77, 118, 122, 125, intentional, 47, 52, 53, 59, 60, 63, 64, 129, 133, 134, 146, 162, 169, 107, 144, 148, 158, 177, 243, 173–175, 181, 182, 267 245, 250 Godhead, 13, 127–129, 133, 134 intentionality, 50, 60, 85, 87, 88, 207 Heidegger, Martin, 57, 147, 148, 257– interpersonal, 10, 12, 105, 107, 118, 125, 145 259, 265, 268–270, 273 intrinsic, 7, 11, 14, 48, 49, 72, 73, 89, Hobbes, Thomas, 93, 132 92, 167, 170, 176, 177, 205, human dignity, 8, 60, 69, 77–79, 140, 229, 236, 243, 250, 251, 254 142, 143, 167, 170, 242, 251– inviolable, 7, 15, 79, 80, 117, 167, 172, 253 173, 181, 242 human life, 7, 13, 69, 79, 80, 117, 139, 145, 164, 166, 211, 213, 246, Islam, 9, 11, 69–71, 74, 75, 77–80, 174, 182 257 Islamic, 11, 70, 72–74, 76, 80 human nature, 13, 27, 40, 48, 49, 59, 71, 95, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 228 Jonas, Hans, 51, 265

Index

277

Kant, 8, 15, 107, 123, 165, 167, 169, religion, 69–71, 73, 125, 174, 191, 210, 170, 178, 246, 251–254, 271 227, 242, 251 Kantian, 94, 95, 103, 107, 118, respect, 7, 10–12, 14, 19, 30, 77–80, 246, 249, 253 108, 121, 123, 140, 166, 169, Kierkegaard, Søren, 54, 93, 173, 180 176, 219, 250, 252, 254 King, Jr. Martin, L., 123 responsibility, 7, 11, 12, 15, 47, 57, 94, 119, 132, 158, 195, 196, Locke, John, 93, 102, 106, 107, 254 223, 237, 253, 266 love, 9, 10, 19–30, 33–35, 37, 38, 43, 45–49, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 60– Scheler, Max, 9, 10, 13, 19, 24, 25, 64, 94, 117, 145, 147, 150, 164, 45, 49–51, 83, 91, 107, 137– 169, 171, 176–178 139, 143–151, 165, 166, 181, 182 Marcel, Gabriel, 34, 43, 139 Sen, Amartya, 15, 228–236 Maritain, Jacques, 138, 142 Singer, Peter, 158, 168 Marx, Karl, 139 Socrates, 133, 134, 172–174, 178 Mounier, Emmanuel, 138, 149, 155 Sokolowski, Robert, 102, 103 Muelder, Walter, 12, 122–124 soul, 13, 35, 48, 53, 62–64, 76, 129, 134, 137, 141–145, 166, 170, Nietzsche, 133 174, 175, 180, 267 obligation, 11, 14, 57, 71, 94, 107, Spaemann, Robert, 100, 102, 106, 109 121, 122, 173, 229, 231, 235, Stein, Edith, 19, 62 247, 252 Strawson, Peter, 12, 100, 102, 105, 106 peace, 58, 73, 85, 91, 192, 196 Styczeń, Tadeusz, 156 personality, 36, 37, 78, 99, 106–108, subject, 13, 14, 39, 88, 102, 106, 107, 110, 121, 139, 140, 146, 271 111, 112, 157, 160–162, 166, personhood, 9, 11, 15, 56, 85–87, 89, 170, 205 90, 92–94, 113, 125, 161, 162, subjective, 38, 55, 59, 71, 100, 102, 166–168, 172–175, 205, 207, 103, 110, 113, 162, 214, 253 250, 251 substance, 12, 13, 16, 87, 89, 100, 106, phenomenology, 62, 63, 102, 143, 191 109, 128, 129, 131, 133, 144, Plato, 37, 48, 164, 175, 178 166, 168, 171, 180 poverty, 206, 208, 213–216, 218, 221, suffering, 14, 15, 156, 163, 205, 207, 222, 224, 228, 232 208, 213, 218, 237, 242–244, 247 Quran, 69–80 Rawls, John, 15, 219–223, 225–227, technology, 15, 16, 71, 111, 257–266, 268, 269, 271, 273 230–232 reason, 11, 28, 41, 42, 69, 72, 73, 77, theism, 123, 228 79, 119, 125, 211, 235, 253 theistic, 12, 117, 174

278

Index

thematicity, 10, 20–22, 24 torture, 15, 241–250, 253, 254 transcendent, 34, 35, 47, 48, 59, 118, 122, 131, 144, 162, 198 truth, 13, 14, 16, 24, 46, 52, 64, 69, 71, 79, 86, 89, 157–159, 161, 162, 166, 169, 177, 181, 182, 191–193, 197, 198, 211, 262 uniqueness, 8, 37, 108, 118, 139, 140, 146, 150, 151 unrepeatable, 10, 22–24, 27–30, 61 unsubstitutable, 10, 30 value-response, 10, 20–26, 48, 58, 59 virtue, 10, 13, 50, 58–60, 70, 84, 86, 87, 89–92, 103, 104, 109, 137, 148, 162, 169, 171, 180, 242, 264 von Hildebrand, Dietrich, 10, 11, 14, 19, 20, 22–30, 33, 36–38, 40– 42, 45, 53, 56, 57, 61, 189, 190, 193, 198, 266 Wojtyła, Karol, 9–11, 33, 36–39, 41, 42, 161