Essays on Hegel's Logic [1 ed.] 0791402924, 9780791402924

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Edited by

George di Giovanni

ESSAYS ON HEGELTS LOGIC

ESSAYS ON HEGEL’S LOGIC

Edited by

George di Giovanni

State University of New York Press

Published

by

State University of New York Press, Albany ©1990

State University

of New York

All rights reserved Printed i n the United States of America No part of this book may be used o r reproduced i n any manner whatsoever without written permission except i n the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

For information, address the State University of New York Press, State University University Plaza, Albany, N Y 12246 Library

of Congress

Cataloguing-ln-Publication

Essays o n Hegel’s logic/edited

Data

by George d i Giovanni.

p. cm. “Contains the papers and the replies delivered at the Tenth Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America that was held at

Loyola University of Chicago on October 7-9, 1988”—Pref. ISBN 0-7914-0291-6. —- ISBN 0-7914—0292-4 (pbk.) 1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770—1831—Contributions in logic—Congresses.

2. Logic, Modern—20th

I. Di Giovanni, George, 1935Meeting

century—Congresses.

. ll. Hegel Society of America.

(10th : 1988 : Loyola University of Chicago)

82949.L8E77 1990 160-dc20

10987654321

89-29183 CIP

CONTENTS

Preface

(ix)

A Note about References

(x)

K a n t , Hegel a n d t h e

Possibility of a Speculative Logic by DAVID A. DUQUETTE

(l)

A Reply to David Duquette (17)

by TERRY PINKARD Beginning

by WILLIAM MAKER

(27)

T h e M e t h o d o f H e g e l ’ s Science

of Logic

by RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD

(45)

Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s Logic by PHILIP '1‘. GRIER

(59)

A Reply to Philip Grier

by ERROL E. HARRIS T h e S h a d o w o f H e g e l ’ s Science

(77) of Logic

by CYNTHIA WILLETT (85)

A Reply to Cynthia Willett

(93)

by GEORGE DI GIOVANNI

Between Being and Essence: Reflection’s Logical Disguises

by DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM

(99)

Hegel’s Criticism of Spinoza’s Concept of the Absolute by LAURA BYRNE

(113)

Ways a n d L o c i o f M o d a l i t y . T h e C h a p t e r "Actuality" i n t h e Science of the Logic

between its Absence in Jena and its Disappearance in Berlin by GABRIELLA BAPTIST

(127)

A Reply to Gabriella Baptist by DEBORAH G . CHAFFIN

Hegel’s Science

(145)

of Logic:

Ironies of the Understanding

by JOSEPH C. FLAY

(153)

W h e r e i s t h e Place o f U n d e r s t a n d i n g ? by JOHN BURBIDGE

(171)

A Reply to John Burbidge

by STEPHEN HOULGATE

(183)

Hegel and the Problem of the Differentia by EDWARD HALPER

(191)

A R e p l y t o Edward H a l p e r by MARTIN DONOUGHO

Index

(213)

(203)

Preface

This v o l u m e contains the papers and the replies delivered

at the Tenth Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America that was held at Loyola University of Chicago on October 7 - 9 , 1 9 8 8 . The first paper discusses t h e possibility o f a speculative

logic by relating Hegel’s dialectical logic to the transcendental type of Kant. The second and the third both argue that Hegel’s logic does not require a metalogic to found it; on the contrary, a n ‘absolute b e g i n n i n g ’ is essential to i t . The fourth considers a related i s s u e , v i z . w h e t h e r ‘abstract’ and ‘ c o n c r e t e ’ , w h i c h are used t h r o u g h o u t the Logic b u t d o n o t appear as categories

officially, ought to be considered as ‘metacategories’. The fifth argues that, although the Logic ought to begin with ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ indifferently, it actually privileges ‘being’ in its transition

to Dasein.

The

following

two p a p e r s

b o t h focus

attention o n the relation of ‘being’ to ‘essence’, one by describing the play of ‘show’ (Schein) enacted by ‘essence’ and the other b y calling into question Hegel’s critique of Spinoza’s idea of attribute. The seventh paper argues that Hegel’s evolving treatment o f the categories o f modalities signals a struggle o n h i s

part with a problem that very likely remains unresolved. The next two take radically different views o f the role of the ‘ understandi n g ’ i n Hegelian logic a n d , b y implication at least, a radically different v i e w o f th e n e c e s s i t y u n d e r l y i n g this l o g i c . The final p a p e r b r i n g s Hegel back to Aristotle b y a rguing t h a t Hegel dialectical l o g i c succeeds i n resolving a problem posed b y A r i s t o t l e ’ s n o t i o n o f differentia. I w i s h to express my gratitude to McGill U n i v e r s i t y , for p r o v i d i n g t h e s u p p o r t structure that made th e preparation o f the

final text of this volume possible; to M r . Bernhard Martin, for his technical advice; b u t most of all to the contributors to the v o l u m e , for their cooperation and the good h u m o r w i t h w h i c h

they accepted m y editorial injunctions. George d i G i o v a n n i

McGill University Montreal (Canada)

April 15, 1989

ix

A N o t e about References

The following abbreviations have been used in references:

the

Enz. (1817) o r (1830) = The 1817 o r 1830 edition of Hegel’s Enzyklopa'die der philosophischen Wissenschaften, followed b y paragraph n u m b e r ( s ) a n d , where relevant, A n m . ( C o m m e n t ) o r Zu. ( A d d i t i o n ) . For the L o g i c p a r t o f the

Enzyklopd'die, the page number of the English translation follows after the semicolon. The Logic of Hegel, t r . b y W. Wallace (Oxford: University press, 1975). Gesammt.

Werke = G e o r g

W. F r . H e g e l , Gesammelte

Werke,

herausgegeben i m Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgem e i n s c h a f t (Hamburg: M e i n e r , 1 9 6 8 - ) .

L o g i c , f o l l o w e d b y page n u m b e r ( s ) = Hegel’s Science of L o g i c , t r . b y A . V . M i l l e r ( L o n d o n : A l l e n & U n w i n ; N e w York: Humanities Press, 1969).

Logik

I , f o l l o w e d b y page n u m b e r ( s ) = B o o k I o f Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik, followed b y t h e page n u m b e r o f v o l . 2 1 o f Gesamm. Werke; t h i s is the 1 8 3 2 e d i t i o n o f the L o g i c . The page o f th e E n g l i s h translation b y A . V . M i l l e r follows after a s e m i c o l o n .

L o g i k I ( 1 8 1 2 ) , followed b y page n u m b e r ( s ) = B o o k I o f Hegel’s Wissenschaft d e r L o g i k , followed b y th e page n u m b e r o f v o l . 1 1 o f Gesamm. Werke; t h i s i s the 1 8 1 2 e d i t i o n o f the

Logic. The page of the English translation follows after the semicolon. Logik

I I , f o l l o w e d b y page n u m b e r ( s ) = B o o k I I o f Hegel’s Wissenschaft der L o g i k , followed b y the page n u m b e r o f

vol. 11 of Gesamm. Werke; this is the 1813 edition of the Logic. The page of the English translation b y A . V . Miller follows after the semicolon. Logik III, followed by page number(s) = Book III of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der L o g i k , f o l l o w e d b y t h e page n u m b e r o f v o l . 1 2 o f Gesamm. Werke; t h i s i s t h e 1 8 1 6 e d i t i o n o f t h e

Logic. The page of the English translation follows after the semicolon.

Phdn., followed by page number = Hegel’s Phr‘inomenologie des Geistes, followed by the page number of vol. 9 of The page number of the English Gesamm. Werke. translation b y A . V . M i l l e r follows a f t e r t h e s e m i c o l o n . P h e n . , followed b y p a g e n u m b e r = Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, t r . b y A . V . M i l l e r (Oxford, C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1977).

Brief references to Hegel’s works are entered within the text i n parentheses, immediately after the punctuation mark c o m p l e t i n g the p h r a s e o r sentence w h e r e H e g e l ’ s work is b e i n g c i t e d . W h e n a b o o k o r article is c i t e d s e v e r a l t i m e s c o n t i g u o u s l y , and i t i s c l e a r from the c o n t e x t that t h i s is the c a s e , t h e

page number of the work being cited is entered in parentheses within the body of the text.

Kant, Hegel and the Possibility

of a Speculative Logic by David A. Duquette

Immanuel Kant claimed to have accomplished two significant tasks for philosophy. One was to provide a definitive response to scepticism by demonstrating the possibility of pure natural science in establishing the transcendental conditions for knowledge in general, and the other was to set the limits to knowledge b y showing that the categories o f the understanding have only empirical application, and that pure reason, despite its

natural inclination to seek the absolutely unconditioned, has only the regulative function of directing knowledge towards the greatest unity. Accordingly, while Kant demonstrated in his "transcendental analytic" that a metaphysics of cognitive faculties is possible, in his "transcendental dialectic" he showed that any sort o f transcendent metaphysics is not possible because i t leads reason beyond the limits o f experience to things in themselves, which in principle cannot be known.

Hegel’s most extensive discussion of the Kantian "transcendental dialectic" occurs in the Science of Logic where, in the section on Quantity, he addresses Kant’s Antinomies o f Pure Reason. Instead o f focussing directly on this matter, however, I wish to proceed in a different, but complementary, direction b y attending to Kant’s and Hegel’s conceptions o f philosophical

logic. A comparison of their views on this subject will highlight the continuity in their conceptions of the nature o f transcendental thought but also show the essential way in which Hegel here departs from Kant, especially with regard to the manner in which pure speculative logic provides systematic unity for the

fundamental concepts of thought. Thus, central to my concern is to show how Kant’s logic points the way to Hegel’s and yet how Hegel’s enterprise is possible despite Kant’s critique o f pure

reason.

1. Logic, according to Kant, is the "science of the rules of the understanding

in general." ( A 5 2 / B 7 6 ) Furthermore, he contends

that a distinction can be made between "pure general logic“

DAVID A . DUQUETTE

2

which deals with absolutely necessary rules of thought—those rules the validity of which is independent of all consideration of the characteristics of objects of experience—and "transcendental logic" which involves rules of thought that do not abstract completely from the knowledge of objects. While both kinds of logic are c o m p l e t e l y d e t a c h e d from e m p i r i c a l p r i n c i p l e s a nd e x p l a n a t i o n s , transcendental l o g i c , u n l i k e p u r e general l o g i c w h i c h deals with the m e r e form o f t h o u g h t , retains a c o n t e n t i n

its treatment of "the rules of the pure thought of an object."1 By the " p u r e t h o u g h t o f an o b j e c t " K a n t appears to mean the t h i n k i n g about what i t means i n p r i n c i p l e to b e an o b j e c t . W e h a v e , i f y o u w i l l , c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a "transcendental" content w h i c h consists i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t , w h i l e n o particular

objects in space and time are made reference to, the conditions o f o b j e c t h o o d per s e ( r elativ e to th e p u r e i n t u i t i o n s o f space and

time) are the focus of analysis. These conditions are given i n rules w h i c h provide t h e c o n c e p t u a l apparatus for the having o f

objective knowledge, be it an ordinary o r simple experience of things o r a more sophisticated scientific cognition of their l a w l i k e b e h a v i o r . I t is fo r t h i s reason that K a n t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l o g i c as a " l o g i c o f t r u t h . " ( A 6 2 / B 8 7 )

Hegel’s Logic

compares

with

Kant’s

refers

conception

of

to

a

transcendental logic in that it does not make reference to e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t s o r p r i n c i p l e s a n d , u n l i k e p u r e general l o g i c , i s not devoid of content. H o w e v e r , w h i l e , l i k e the Kantian c a t e g o r i e s , the H e g e l i a n c a t e g o r i e s are p u r e t h o u g h t s , i t is i n the s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e nature o f t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e s e pure t h o u g h t s that t h e relation o f Hegel’s to Kant’s l o g i c becomes p r o b l e m a t i c . Whereas for K a n t t h e c o n t e n t o f p u r e t h o u g h t is objecthood r e l a t i v e to a consideration o f t h e t h e s e n s u o u s c o n d i t i o n s o f space a n d t i m e , for Hegel s p a c e a n d t i m e d o n o t enter i n t o any

such definition of the content of pure thought. For, although i t would b e c o r r e c t to s a y that H e g e l ’ s c a t e g o r i e s , a l o n g w i t h t h e

rules o r principles which govern their meaningfulness, indicate h o w we must reason with respect to the world and the things i n i t , the c o n c e p t o f o b j e c t h o o d r e l a t i v e to s e n s u o u s e x p e r i e n c e i s not within the domain of the speculative logic. What, then,

does constitute the central content of Hegel’s Logic?

We can turn to K a n t again in order to anchor, b y way of contrast, our characterization of the content of Hegel’s Logic.

1A55/B79.

46-47; 61-62.

For Hegel’s own explication of this distinction

see Logik I,

Kant, Hegel and the Possibility of a Speculative Logic

K a n t distinguished

between

3

a "transcendental analytic," which

examines the function of those concepts and judgments that apply to the data of experience, and a "transcendental dialectic," which provides a critique o f the use o f c o n c e p t s w h e n their application goes beyond the limits o f spatio-temporal experience. K a n t claimed that s u c h an application involves "dialectical illusion," and the p o i n t o f h i s c r i t i q u e o f this "illusion" was to

show h o w thought will lead to unresolvable antinomies or paradoxes when i t attempts to use c o n c e p t s to gain knowledge o f things which are n o t s u b j e c t to s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e , e . g . knowledge o f t h i n g s — i n - t h e m s e l v e s , noumena, the " u n c o n ditioned" o b j e c t , the s u p e r s e n s i b l e , e t c . K a n t referred to these types o f c o n c e p t s as concepts o f p u r e reason o r "transcendental

ideas." ( A 3 l l / B 3 6 8 ) Despite the fact that the faculty of reason is naturally l e d to speculate a b o u t s u c h ideas and to attempt to

derive knowledge with them, they cannot b e used to produce cognitive knowledge at all. A t best these ideas can serve a regulative or heuristic function for the systematic organization o f knowledge; and any a ttem p t to e m p l o y t h e m f u r t h e r as an organon for k n o w l e d g e , i . e . as an instrument for the p r o d u c t i o n

of objective truths, is for Kant entirely mistaken. Hegel’s Logic is a sort of "transcendental dialectic" b u t with an epistemological significance that Kant could not allow it to have, for H e g e l takes u p at least s o m e o f what Kant would call "transcendental ideas" and attempts to constitute them into an organon for k n o w l e d g e . M o r e o v e r , H eg el characterizes the "movement" o f concepts i n h i s l o g i c as a dialectic, a l t h o u g h t h i s n o w has a positive as w e l l as negative significance. I n othe r w o r d s , speculative dialectic is for H e g e l n e i t h e r a sophistical play o f i l l u s i o n b y pure reason n o r a critique o f t h i s i l l u s i o n , as i t i s for K a n t , b u t rather involves an i n t e l l i g i b l e construction o f m e a n i n g via an immanent d e v e l o p m e n t a l sequence o f p u r e t h o u g h t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . This p r es u m p tio n o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l efficacy o f the H e g e l i a n c a t e g o r i e s , i n h a v i n g a t h o u g h t content i n d e p e n d e n t o f reference to t h e

sensuous conditions of the experience of an o b j e c t , is where lies t h e divergence from Kant’s treatment of the concepts of pure r e a s o n . O n e d i s c o v e r s the significance o f the t h o u g h t c o n s t r u c -

tions employed in Hegel’s Logic i n the determination of their content through the principle of negation. According to this p r i n c i p l e , a n y t h o u g h t d e t e r m i n a t i o n c a n b e p r o p e r l y articulated o n l y i n relation to its "other" o r " o p p o s i t e , " s u c h t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f the given c o n c e p t i s e x p r e s s e d i n a c o n c e p t u a l

synthesis of the concept and its "other." Hegel refers to this synthesis as an "identity-in-difference" i n which the separateness

DAVID A . DUQUETTE

4

o f the concepts is denied o r a b o l i s h e d , b u t their distinctness nonetheless preserved (Aufhebung). The process b y which this construction takes place is called

dialectic and it exhibits two distinct rational moments for Hegel: a moment of negative reason in which thought comes u p against a "contradiction"

i n t h e pairing o f opposed

co nc e pts ,

and

a

moment of positive reason in which the "contradiction" is resolved. (Enz. (1830), § 48, Zu.; 79) The first moment is roughly analogous to the operations in Kant’s transcendental dialectic b y which reason finds itself producing antinomies in the attempt to give a discursive account of the "transcendental i d e a s . " The

moment

of

positive reason

i n H e g e l ’ s dialectic,

however, has no correlate in K a n t since for the latter it is precisely the antinomies of pure reason which signal that rational thought can proceed n o further, at l e a s t n o t for the purposes o f conceptual knowledge. H e n c e , for K a n t , there can be n o meaningful attempt to p r o v i d e a co n ten t for c o n c e p t s , the operation o f w h i c h transcends the conditions o f s e n s u o u s experience. W i t h o u t the material o f s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n , which

provides the content that fills o u t our concepts of things, concepts reference tions o f treatment however,

remain e m p t y , and s o w i t h o u t some s o r t o f c o n c e p t u a l i n the transcendental acco u n t to th e sensuous c o n d i knowledge ( e . g . th e s c h e m a o f space and time ) the o f p u r e concepts cannot r e m a i n d i s c u r s i v e . For H e g e l , there is a legitimate s p e c u l a t i v e accomplishment p r e -

cisely i n the transcending of such considerations, and this is d o n e b y changing

the focus o f t h o u g h t from

thinking

about

ob jecthood per se to thinking about pure thought itself. In other words, the c o n t e n t o r s u b j e c t matter o f H e g e l ’ s Logic i s s i m p l y t h o u g h t itself w i t h o u t restriction to a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the c o n d i t i o n s o f spatio-temporal e x p e r i e n c e .

A t t h i s p o i n t we confront a q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the metaphysical status o f Hegel’s L o g i c . How can a speculative

logic that goes beyond the Kantian transcendental logic be possible, especially given the fact that Kant presumed to have p r o v i d e d a definitive c r i t i q u e o f m e t a p h y s i c s that ruled o u t s u c h

a possibility? I will situate m y discussion of this matter by considering what I take to be Hegel’s o w n critique of metaphysics in his Logic and contrasting it with the Kantian critique. In t h i s way I b e l i e v e we can articulate t h e way i n w h i c h H e g e l ’ s s p e c u l a t i v e l o g i c goes b e y o n d traditional metaphysics and, i n s o d o i n g , e s c a p e s the K a n t i a n c r i t i q u e o f p u r e reason.

Kant, Hegel and t h e Possibility of a Speculative Logic

5

II. A s is well known, Hegel’s Logic "begins" with the category o f B e i n g and "ends" with the category o f the A b s o l u t e Idea. In

between this "beginning" and "ending" are a series of thought determinations which develop in a progressive "movement." Hegel often has been accused of dealing i n abstract metaphysics precisely for taking the concept of Being as his starting point: for the c o n c e p t o f p u r e B e i n g i s a c o n c e p t about t h a t which is per s e n o n e x p e r i e n t i a l , a n abstraction devoid o f c o n c r e t e

characteristics and typical of the sort of thing with which traditional metaphysicians concern themselves. If Being qua Being sets the theme of Hegel’s Logic then it might not seem unnatural to conclude that the whole of this work must deal with metaphysical abstractions. However, Hegel himself recognizes the philosophical deficiency of the concept of Being when he states that because o f its lack o f determinateness, its e m p t i n e s s , i t m u s t b e found

to be identical with the concept of Nothing. (Logik I , 68ff; 82ff) Hegel is well aware of the paradox involved here, for he acknowledges that i t is not the intention of thought when thinking of Being to think of Nothing, since these concepts are intitially

presumed

to have o p p o s i t e m e a n i n g s .

Nevertheless,

when we attempt to fix a determination of Being simply as B e i n g w e find that i t has n o n e , that like the c o n c e p t o f N o t h i n g its referent i s p u r e indeterminacy. M o r e o v e r , c o n c e p t u a l t h o u g h t is c a u g h t i n a d i l e m m a i n w h i c h i t m u s t , a t least a c c o r d i n g to

the rules of ordinary understanding, affirm exclusively either t h e i d e n t i t y o r t h e distinctness o f these c o n c e p t s , and y e t i t finds itself affirming b o t h . This impasse ca n b e described as the m o v e m e n t o f t h o u g h t to and fro between the concepts o f B e i n g and N o t h i n g , o r as the passing o f each concept into the o t h e r . The impasse is resolved only w h e n t h o u g h t s t e p s b a c k o r distances i t s e l f , as i t w e r e , from t h i s o s c i l l a t i o n and recognizes t h a t there i s i n d e e d a m o m e n t o f determinateness found i n T h o u g h t r e c o g n i z e s t h a t the v e r y t h i n k i n g these c o n c e p t s .

movement of thought in this conceptual connondrum constitutes t h e content of its thinking, and this movement is signified i n the concept of Becoming. Thus, Becoming, as the first form of dialectical

thought,

can

be

understood

as

the

"conceptual

synthesis" of Being and Nothing. What has just been sketched out is a rough account of what o n e m i g h t understand to b e taking place at the first s t a g e o f Hegel’s L o g i c . It would also b e a source o f d i f f i c u l t y , not to say

DAVID A . DUQUETTE

6

m y s t i f i c a t i o n , to those n o n - H e g e l i a n s w h o have p r o b l e m s i n understanding how a determinate c o n t e n t c a n b e generated from v a c u o u s n e s s . H o w e v e r , there i s a r e f i n e m e n t o f t h i s e x p l i c a t i o n

which may help us avoid the conclusion that the dialectic of Being and Nothing is simply a piece of fantasy. Surprisingly, t h i s alternative o r , b e t t e r , e n r i c h e d a c c o u n t , c o n c e d e s t h a t there can b e n o real c o n c e p t u a l d e v e l o p m e n t from c o n c e p t s which are themselves v a c u o u s , and h e n c e that t h e r e can b e n o substantial

transition from Being to Nothing, to Becoming.2 But if this is s o , t h e n p r e c i s e l y what i s t a k i n g place h e r e c o n c e p t u a l l y ?

Let us say that for Hegel the attempt to think determinately o f B e i n g is a t t h e o u t s e t to be c o n s i d e r e d as an h y p o t h e s i s , that i s , as an attempted c o n c e p t u a l p o s i t i n g w h i c h m a y , o r may n o t , b e s u c c e s s f u l . L e t u s a l s o s u p p o s e that the c i r c u m s t a n c e o f

discovering that thinking about Being converts into thinking a b o u t N o t h i n g c o n s t i t u t e s , a t t h i s i n i t i a l l e v e l o f understanding, a failure o f t h o u g h t to a c c o m p l i s h w h a t i t s e t o u t to d o . The

question is, what went wrong? What goes wrong here involves a mistake which is consistently made b y traditional metaphysics ( a n d for

all of his criticism of

metaphysics

even

by Kant

himself). The mistake, to p u t it i n Heideggerian terminology, is t o v i o l a t e t h e " o n t o l o g i c a l difference" b e t w e e n B e i n g a n d t h i n g s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e mistake lies i n t h e a t t e m p t to t h i n k o f B e i n g as i f i t w e r e a k i n d o f t h i n g o r e n t i t y , a p p r e h e n d a b l e t h r o u g h t h e l o g i c o f o r d i n a r y t h i n g s , t h e l o g i c o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstand). L e t u s , for t h e m o m e n t , j u m p ahead to the s e c o n d d i v i s i o n

of the Logic, where Hegel criticizes the ordinary way of treating the principles of identity and contradiction. According to t h e m a x i m o f e x c l u d e d m i d d l e , as H e g e l s e e s i t , a n y d e t e r m i n a t i o n

of the identity of a thing requires a n "essential difference" such t h a t "Of t w o o p p o s i t e predicates t h e o n e o n l y c a n b e a s s i g n e d t o

anything, a n d there is no third possible." (Enz. (1830), § 119, Anm.; 172) This "maxim of opposition" holds that a thing’s i d e n t i t y i s a s i m p l e s e l f - r e l a t i o n , w h i c h " c o n t r o v e r t s " the i d e a

that identity involves relation to a n opposite. Here the "abstract" understanding attempts to avoid contradiction by holding that "A m u s t b e e i t h e r +A o r —A." ( E n z . ( 1 8 3 0 ) , § 1 1 9 , A n m . ; 1 7 2 ) H o w e v e r , t h e P o s i t i v e a n d the N e g a t i v e are n o t i n d i f f e r e n t b u t

2Cf.

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic, tr. P. Christopher Smith (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) 87-91.

Kant, Hegel and the Possibility of a Speculative Logic

7

are "intrinsically conditioned b y one another," like North Pole and South Pole. (Enz. (1830), § 119, Zu.; 173) The underlying p r o b l e m , for H e g e l , i s t h a t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t a k e s t h e v e r y c a t e g o r i e s o f r e f l e c t i o n — i d e n t i t y and difference—as one—sided a b s t r a c t i o n s p u t into o p p o s i t i o n t o the n e g l e c t o f t h e i r c o m plementarity.

N o w when we take Being as the first definition of t h e Absolute, t h e n the positing of the concept of Being i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e maxim " e i t h e r / o r " o f Verstand r e q u i r e s t h a t this c o n c e p t e x c l u d e from itself t h a t w h i c h i s o t h e r to i t , o r w h i c h s t a n d s i n o p p o s i t i o n to i t . The l o g i c o f Verstand i n d e e d

presupposes that i n any positing there must b e a rigorous conceptual limitation or definition of content through dif f e r e n tiation from otherness. However, because of its indeterminateness the concept of Being appears, paradoxically, to be identical to its other, w h i c h is also ostensibly its opposite, the concept of Nothing. This identity violates the "either/or" maxim and thus produces a contradiction to thought: Being and Nothing are absolutely distinct and opposed i n their meaning, and yet t h e y are identical i n their pure indeterminacy. In the face of this contradiction t h e logic of Verstand breaks d o w n , that i s , it simply cannot make

sense of its own conceptual

positing of

Being. Hegel’s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s failure c a n b e r e a d as a c r i t i q u e o f the m e t a p h y s i c a l a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i n the p o s i t i n g o f B e i n g , w h i c h is i m p l i c i t l y t h e positing o f t h e t o t a l i t y o f w h a t i s ( t h e A b s o l u t e ) , B e i n g i s to b e t h o u g h t o f as a n e n t i t y o f s o m e sort a n d t h u s m u s t conform to the l o g i c w h i c h g o v e r n s the c o n c e p -

tualization of finite things.3 Hegel challenges this assumption by showing that no meaningful determination of Being can take place o n t h i s p r o c e d u r e ; b u t , u n l i k e K a n t , h i s s o l u t i o n i s n o t t o e l i m i n a t e a n y a r t i c u l a t i o n o f s u c h c o n c e p t s b u t r a t h e r to s u b s t i t u t e for t h e l o g i c o f Verstand t h e r u l e o f h i g h e r reason ( V e r nunft) w h i c h o p e r a t e s a c c o r d i n g t o th e p r i n c i p l e o f d i a l e c t i c a l n e g a t i o n . T h i s p r i n c i p l e a l l o w s H e g e l to s u b l a t e m e t a p h y s i c s : to annul the form of its discourse, which presents its subject matter in the form of mere objecthood, while preserving its

content w h i c h is constituted i n the thought of t h e totality of w h a t i s . T h i s c o n t e n t is p r e s e r v e d d i a l e c t i c a l l y i n t h e c o n c e p t o f

Becoming which indicates that the Absolute must b e thought o f , 3Cf.§_r_1_z.

(1830), § 28, Anm.; 48-50. Also,§ 119;171-174. See also 0. w.

W e b b , "Hegel’s Reasoning," Idealistic Studies, VIII (1978) 206-219; B . C . Birchall, "Hegel’s Notion of Auf'heben," n g u i g , XXIV (1981) 7 9 - 8 3 .

DAVID A . DUQUETTE

8

a t l e a s t i n i t i a l l y , as process a n d t r a n s i t i o n r a t h e r than as t h i n g o r e n t i t y . T h u s , H e g e l ’ s c o n c e p t o f B e c o m i n g c a n b e v i e w e d as

the first legitimate speculative moment of the Logic, the first adequate concept for thinking about the Absolute. Although the concept of Becoming is sometimes referred to as the "synthesis" of Being and Nothing, this is a bit misleading given o u r recognition that a determinate thought content cannot b e g e n e r a t e d from m e r e v a c u o u s n e s s . R a t h e r , as Gadamer

has

p u t it, "Being and Nothing are more to be treated as analytical moments in the concept of Becoming." (89) In other words, the

concepts of Being and Nothing do not refer to pre-given positional determinations but rather indicate only relative positionality w i t h r e s p e c t to the c o n c e p t o f process o r t r a n s i t i o n .

As Hegel states it, the "maxim" of Becoming is "that Being is the passage into Nought, and Nought the passage into Being." (Enz. (1830), § 88, Anm.; 131. C f . Logik I , 90-92; 105-106) This m e ans t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f B e c o m i n g e x p r e s s e s th e i n s e p a r a b l e n e s s o f t h e c o n c e p t s o f B e i n g a n d N o t h i n g s u c h that e a c h a r e

moments which "vanish" one into the other i n the form of a "coming-to-be" (passing from nothingness into a state of being) a n d a " c e a s i n g - t o - b e " ( p a s s i n g from a s t a t e o f b e i n g i n t o n o t h i n g n e s s ) . W h a t Hegel is a t t e m p t i n g to c a p t u r e here is n o t a n

analysis of temporal movement, b u t rather the pure logical structure of transition itself in which the concepts of Being and

Nothing make sense solely in terms of their function as p o l a r i t i e s that s i g n a l d i a l e c t i c a l p r o c e s s . I n the c o u r s e o f t h i s e x p l i c a t i o n t h e c o n c e p t s o f B e i n g a n d N o t h i n g lose their o r i g i n a l i n t e n d e d s i g n i f i c a n c e as a b s o l u t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s and now c o m e t o i n d i c a t e vectors w i t h i n the d y n a m i c o f B e c o m i n g . A g a i n , as G a d a m e r has s t a t e d i t , "[t]hey b a l a n c e e a c h o t h e r o u t , as i t w e r e ,

insofar as there is no other determination than the directionality implied i n ‘from-to’, which in t u r n is determined only b y the difference

i n d i r e c t i o n . " ( 9 0 ) T h u s , t h e i n i t i a l a t t e m p t to c o n -

ceive of Being as a n absolutely self-contained and determinate t o t a l i t y l e a d s , t o b o r r o w a g a i n f r o m H e i d e g g e r , to t h e c o n c e p t of Be-ing as a dynamic flowing forth, or Hegel’s concept of Be-

coming. III. I have suggested above that Hegel’s observations about the

attempt to think determinately of Being qua Being are i n a fundamental way reflections o n the whole metaphysical t r a d i -

Kant, Hegel a n d t h e Possibility of a Speculative L o g i c

9

t i o n . 4 M o r e o v e r , w e c a n v i e w Hegel’s c r i t i q u e o f m e t a p h y s i c s as a critique of its mode of discourse, a critique of its attempt to

conceive of the Absolute according to the logic of Verstand w h i c h p r o v i d e s c o n c e p t u a l standards t h a t are a d e q u a t e t o f i n i t e

objects of explanation but inadequate to the very principles of intelligibility themselves. U n l i k e K a n t , however, Hegel does not reject the intended project of metaphysics altogether, w h i c h is the attem t to conceive of and articulate the nature of the Absolute.

R a t h e r , t h i s p r o j e c t m u s t b e translated i n t o a c o h e r -

ent science through a reconsideration of the nature of t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f s p e c u l a t i v e p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s t a k e s place i n i t i a l l y

with t h e concept of Becoming as the category of Reason (Vernunft) which provides the "truth" or meaning of Being and Nothing; b u t for Hegel this is still only a point of departure. A s he puts i t , "as t h e first concrete t h o u g h t - t e r m , Becoming is t h e first a d e q u a t e v e h i c l e o f

truth....[E]ven Becoming,

however,

taken at its best o n its o w n ground, is an extremely poor term; i t n e e d s to g r o w i n d e p t h a n d w e i g h t o f m e a n i n g . " ( E n z . ( 1 8 3 0 ) , § 8 8 , Z u . ; 1 3 2 ) T h u s , i t i s o n l y i n t h e full d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e

conceptual relations that follow i n t h e Logic that an adequate specification of what is implied in the initial standpoint of Becoming can be provided. Without going into a detailed e x p o s i t i o n o f t h i s w h o l e d e v e l o p m e n t I w o u l d l i k e t o offer a n overall view of its significance with respect to Hegel’s sublation of metaphysics. We

might

notice that despite the change in

perspective

w h i c h is provided i n t h e concept of Becoming, w h e n thinking t o t a l i s t i c a l l y a b o u t w h a t i s , t h e r e i s still a d a n g e r l u r k i n g w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t t h e t o t a l i t y o f w h a t is m u s t b e t h o u g h t o f f u n -

damentally i n terms of process or transition. The danger is that process itself c a n still b e t h o u g h t o f i n t h e m e r e l y s u b s t a n t i a l m o d e , t h a t i s , as a m o v e m e n t w h i c h s u b s i s t s i n itself as a s i m p l e

unity.6 In order to move beyond this position—which, though less a b s t r a c t t h a n t h e c o n c e p t o f B e i n g , i s n o n e t h e l e s s a b s t r a c t

4Cf.

Logik I, 48-49; 63-64.

S e e also R u d i g e r

Biibner, Modern German

Philosophy (Cambridge: University Press, 1981) 164; Alain Manville, "Hegel and Metaphysics," Telos, XLII (1979-1980) 107-116. 5A3 L a s s o n p u t i t i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e 1 9 2 3 e d i t i o n of t h e W i s s e n s c h a f t d e r L o g i k : " D i e V o r a u s s e t z u n g fiir e i n w i s s e n s c h a f t l i c h e s S y s t e m , m a n m a g e s e i n S y s t e m d e r E r k e n n t n i s o d e r d e r W a h r h e i t n e n n e n , b i l d e t d e r Begriff d e r

Totalit'at." (Meiner Verlag, xxx). 601'.

Manville,115.

DAVID A . DUQUETTE

10

a n d lacking i n concreteness—the principle of dialectical negation must be enriched. This enrichment occurs f u r t h e r along i n the L o g i c w i t h t h e c a t e g o r y o f Being-for—self. H e r e t h e i d e a t h a t a posited determination must be articulated with respect to its

negation o r other (as Being is articulated with respect to Nothing) is made more explicit with the idea that a n y given qualitative determination (determinate being) must be viewed n o t o n l y i n i t s p o s i t i v e a s p e c t , a s i t i s i n i t s e l f a p a r t from a l l

other determinations (Being-in—itself), but also i n its negative a s p e c t , t h a t i s , as i t s t a n d s i n r e l a t i o n to o t h e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n s (Being-for-another). Here the principle that "determination is

negation" comes to the fore in the recognition that a thing o r quality must be determined or defined with respect to its limits o r boundaries, a n d that f u r t h e r these latter are also determined by something else, the qualitative-other of the determination.

However, since a given determination has its self-identity only i n t h e face of limitation via otherness, in order f o r this identity to be self -constituted otherness must itself be negated—a negation of the negation. This second negation does not abolish otherness but, on the contrary, incorporates it as a moment

along with the original positive side of the initial determination such that we now have a relation of self-limitation o r self—de— termination. (Logik I, 144-147; 157-159) Thus, in the category

of Being-for-self we have the logical structure of self—relation (reflection-into-self) as considered absolutely.

a

fundamental

feature

of

reality

This concept of Being-for-self not only occupies the place o f a s p e c i f i c c a t e g o r y i n Hegel’s L o g i c b u t i s a l s o a m a j o r p r i n c i p l e g o v e r n i n g t h e w h o l e o f t h e Logic’s d e v e l o p m e n t . W e might say that this principle is meta-logical, or in Terry Pinkard’s words "a concept in which the logic of the other c o n c e p t s c a n b e stated."7 I n B e i n g - f o r - s e l f t h e r e f l e x i v i t y o f a l l the logical categories is given explicit expression, along with the i d e a t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n via n e g a t i o n is u l t i m a t e l y a m a t t e r o f self-determination. With this principle Hegel is able to develop conceptual unity throughout the progression of logical categories,

n o matter what the particular relational content may be. Although the specific focus of Hegel’s discussion of Being—for-s e l f i n t h e L o g i c is t h e i d e a o f a q u a l i t a t i v e u n i t , t h e b a s i c principle applies throughout the categories of the Doctrine of

Essence, where the idea of reflection-into-self is given f u r t h e r

7Terry

Pinkard,

" T h e L o g i c of H e g e l ' s L o g i c , " J o u r n a l

Philosophy, XVII (1979) 427.

of the

H i s t o r y of

Kant, Hegel and t h e Possibility of a Speculative L o g i c

ll

refinement w i t h r e s p e c t to v a r i o u s c o n c e p t u a l d u a l i s m s , e . g . essence a n d a p p e a r a n c e , and f i n a l l y i n t h e D o c t r i n e o f the Concept where another significant shift in the level of discourse t a k e s place. T h e r e Hegel p r o v i d e s a n a c c o u n t o f the c o n c e p t (Begriff) o f t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f the A b s o l u t e , w h i c h m e a n s

that he gives a meta-logical account of conceptuality itself w h i c h is intended to ground his previous accounts i n the divisions o n Being and Essence.8 This meta-logical account continues to follow the principle of Being-for-self, except that now the idea of self-relatedness operates in the context of the

inner relation of the Concept (understood generically) to itself. I n o t h e r w o r d s , a s h i f t i n d i s c o u r s e o c c u r s from t h e " o b j e c t i v e "

to the "subjective" mode i n treating of the content of the Logic such that the Absolute is n o w characterized i n terms of i m manent self-relation, a dynamic which is isomorphic with t h e structure of t h e "I" or pure self —consciousness. (Logik III, 17-19; 583-585) H o w e v e r , t h e " s u b j e c t i f i c a t i o n " i n v o l v e d i n the s h i f t from

Essence to Concept should not be taken to i m p l y that objectivity has been annulled or eliminated, since the self -relatedness of the C o n c e p t , o r o f a n y s p e c i f i c c o n c e p t for t h a t m a t t e r , i s d e t e r -

mined through the relation to its other, to its object. ( T h u s , t h e Concept cannot b e thought of as some sort of logical demiurge from w h i c h objects are produced). Indeed, the subjectification e n g e n d e r e d i n t h e move to th e l o g i c o f t h e C o n c e p t f u n c t i o n s much like Kant’s "transcendental unity of apperception" in that

it provides a principle of organization and unity for objectivity f r o m t h e s i d e o f p u r e t h o u g h t . The i m p o r t a n t difference

here

between K a n t and Hegel o n the role of subjectivity is this: w h e r e a s for K a n t the u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n c a n a p p l y o n l y t o i n d i v i d u a t e d s u b j e c t s who o r g a n i z e i n c o m i n g phenomenal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n t o particular o b j e c t i v e u n i t i e s ( f i n i t e o b j e c t s ) , for H e g e l t h e C o n c e p t i s a g e n e r i c p r i n c i p l e o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y w h i c h a p p l i e s also to t h e A b s o l u t e . T h i s i s n o t s o m e t h i n g m e r e l y r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h o u g h t o r c o n s t r u c t e d o n t h e basis o f t h e r e c e p t i o n o f data from t h e o u t s i d e b u t i s a n a c t i v i t y o f self -ma—

king which is infinitely present to itself, and i n w h i c h the " o n t o l o g i c a l distance" t r a d i t i o n a l l y f o u n d b e t w e e n s u b j e c t a n d

object is significantly diminished. The Concept, therefore, is a p r i n c i p l e o f o r g a n i z a t i o n that is w h o l l y i m m a n e n t

in the very

objectivity i t renders intelligible, because it is t h e principle or criterion of a n y such intelligibility, and i n this way it differs

8Pinkard,

428-429.

DAVID A . DUQUETTE

12

significantly both from the principles of traditional metaphysics, which are reified into transcendent entities, and from the principles of Kant’s transcendental

philosophy which, at the

other extreme, remain purely formal and subjective. Once the Concept is made the object of Hegel’s discussion of self - r e l a t e d ness one can see that the focal content of the Logic comprises explicitly, as it had been implicitly, principles of intelligibility of the most all encompassing and far-reaching sort. I n effect, the Logic can be viewed primarily as an exercise i n generic theory of explanation. IV. There

a r e two f u r t h e r

p o i n t s I w i s h to a d d r e s s

i n the

overall characterization of Hegel’s speculative logic. T h e first point concerns the reflexivity that is built into this speculative logic as a thinking about thought. This reflexivity is exhibited i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f the p r i n c i p l e o f B e i n g - f o r - s e l f to various categorial levels in the Logic. When also applied to the Concept

itself this reflexivity consists i n the fact that what holds good for the content of speculative discourse, which a r e pure thought determinations, also holds good for t h e form of discourse itself. T h u s , speculative discourse about the Concept, about intelligibility itself, takes place at a level of pure metathought in w h i c h t h e r e is n o e s s e n t i a l i n d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e c o n t e n t a n d t h e t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e c o n t e n t , o r b e t w e e n s u b j e c t a nd o b j e c t . This is why Hegel uses the Aristotelean phrase "thought thinking i t se lf" i n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the a c t i v i t y o f s p e c u l a t i v e l o g i c a n d w h y h e u n d e r s t a n d s s u c h a l o g i c to have a d e f i n i t e a u t o n o m y i n the p r o v i d i n g for i t s e l f o f its c o n t e n t . 9 W h i l e t h i s m a y w e l l have a d i s t i n c t m e t a p h y s i c a l s o u n d t o o n e ’ s e a r s , we m u s t r e m e m b e r that what is involved here is not the postulation of supra-worldly entities or processes but rather the formulation of f undamental concepts and principles which govern all conceptual explanat i o n . T h a t i s , H e g e l ’ s L o g i c is to b e v i e w e d a s a p r o j e c t i n categorial reconstruction in which, through the systematic redescription of these concepts, an attempt is made "to provide

9A8 R . Bfibner expresses it: " T h e Science of Logic may consequently be c a l l e d t h e theory

to which there is no further metatheory,

its own metatheory." (165)

b e c a u s e i t furnishes

Kant, Hegel and t h e Possibility of a Speculative L o g i c

t h e m o s t g e n e r a l c o n c e p t u a l framework

13

for a l l t h e sciences."10

Hegel is well aware of the self-reference involved in such a p r o j e c t , where the s t a n d p o i n t from which the a c c o u n t i s g i v e n must also be included in that account, and he is clearly con-

cerned that his dialectical development of categories remains consistent with itself, which requires that the rule of dialectical n e g a t i o n b e a p p l i e d s o that n o c a t e g o r i a l o r e v e n t r a n s - c a t e g o r i a l s t a n d p o i n t c a n e s c a p e its f u n c t i o n . T h u s , a t th e h i g h e s t s t a g e of this development, attained with the Absolute Idea, the point a t w h i c h t h i s p r o c e s s o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n has r u n its c o u r s e , t h o u g h t m u s t a c h i e v e a n a l l - i n c l u s i v e n e s s w i t h r e s p e c t to i t s form a n d c o n t e n t .

The Absolute Idea can b e considered as the ultimate c o n c e p t — p r i n c i p l e o f t h e s y s t e m , t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h the m e t h o d

o r dynamic of the entire Logic is summed u p , where the reflexivity o r self-reference in the development of thought

determinations reaches a completion or closure.11 This means t h a t t h e A b s o l u t e I d e a i s t h e fin al c o n c e p t u a l s t a n d p o i n t a t which the method of the entire system becomes reflected upon,

where method becomes itself the thematic object of considera-

tion.12 However, on further reflection it turns out that the method of the system is identical with the Concept which has i t s e l f as i t s o w n s u b j e c t m a t t e r , i . e . " t h e m e t h o d i s t h e c o n -

sciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic." (Logik I, 37; 53) I n this notion of method, the s c i e n c e o f l o g i c " e x h i b i t s i t s e l f as a circle r e t u r n i n g u p o n i t s e l f , t h e e n d b e i n g w o u n d b a c k to t h e b e g i n n i n g . " ( L o g i k I , 2 5 2 ; 8 4 2 ) T h i s r e f l e x i v i t y d o e s n o t i m p l y t h a t th e p r i n c i p l e o f n e g a t i o n has been transcended but only that, having progressively

10Terry

Pinkard,

"Hegel’s Idealism

and

Hegel’s Logic," Zeitschrift

fiir

Philosophigche Forschunj. XXX (1979) 211. Cf. Klaus Hartmann, "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical

View," in

Hegel: A

Collection of Essays,

Macintyre (Notre Dame: University Press, 1976) 110. I n

ed.

Alisdair

Logik I, 17-18; 39,

H e g e l s a y s t h a t " t h e s c i e n c e of l o g i c i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e t h o u g h t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s which in general run through our mind instinctively and unconsciously—and even w h e n t h e y become part o f t h e l a n g u a g e d o n o t become o b j e c t s o f o u r a t t e n -

t i o n - w i l l also be a reconstruction [Rekonstruktionl of those which are singled o u t b y reflection a n d are fixed b y i t as s u b j e c t i v e forms e x t e r n a l t o t h e m a t t e r and import of the determinations of thought." llAs K l a u s H a r t m a n n p u t s i t : " T h e final s t a n c e , c o n c e p t , o r t h o u g h t o r i d e a , s t a n d s for c o m p l e t e i n t e g r a t i o n , for n o n - d i f f e r e n c e a n d n o n - i n d i f f e r e n c e , for c l o s u r e o r a l l - i n c l u s i o n ; i . e . a l l t h e s e are t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m i n a l category.

In i t , rationality has come full circle." (107) 12Cf.

P i n k a r d , " T h e Logic o f Hegel’s L o g i c , " 4 3 1 .

DAVID A . D U Q U E T T E

14

enriched the concept of intelligibility throughout the developmental reconstruction of philosophical categories, thought is now a b l e t o t h i n k t o t a l i s t i c a l l y , t o t h i n k t h e A b s o l u t e i n t e r m s o f the p u r e m e t h o d w h i c h g e n e r a t e s its o w n c o n t e n t — n o t a c r e a t i o n ex

nihilo b u t a creation of a content of thought from systematic thought itself. Here the Absolute is conceived as a self -identical totality, not i n the manner of Being which was a n immediate o r simple self-identity, b u t as a n inherently unstable identity, a unity o r totality permeated with "negativity," a n d thus, at the meta-level of discourse, a unity of identity (self -relatedness) a n d difference (otherness).

D u e to the reflexivity of thought-thinking-thought, i.e. thought-thinking the grounds of its o w n intelligibility, t h e Absolute Idea is the graSping of thought by itself i n its i n f i n i t u d e , i n i t s u n l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y fo r r e f l e c t i o n - i n t o - s e l f . H e r e

"infinitude" refers to the universal activity of thought as a self -determining movement and i t can be likened to a recursive function or "the representation of a sequence by a rule which s h o w s w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n i f t h e s e q u e n c e w e r e followed out."13

There is nothing inherently mysterious about such a n infinity since it is merely a way of characterizing the structural i n t e l ligibility of

a

rule

or

principle

independent

of

empirical

considerations o r finite application. Moreover, when i n t e l ligibility itself

becomes

the

object

of

discussion,

and

the

ontological distance between subject and object is thus dimi— nished, infinity characterizes the circular continuum o n which subject and object a r e correlates functioning as interweaving moments, rather than remaining i n a n absolute duality. M y second point has to d o with Hegel’s famous equation of thinking a n d reality. This identification has been a well-known issue of contention, especially with those critics who charge Hegel with holding a philosophical idealism, understood as the

view that whatever exists is mental o r is based ontologically u p o n a b s o l u t e m i n d . H e g e l i n h i s o w n t i m e was n o t u n p r e p a r e d

for such a criticism when he wrote that "the identity of being a n d t h o u g h t is n o t h o w e v e r t o b e t a k e n i n a c o n c r e t e s e n s e , as

if we could say that a stone, so far as it has being, is the same as a thinking man. A concrete thing is always very different

13Terry

Pinkard, "Hegel’s Philosophy of Mathematics," Phenomenologx

Phenomnological Rgearch. XLI (1981) 464.

and

Kant, Hegel and t h e Possibility of a Speculative L o g i c

15

from the abstract category as such."14 I n w h a t s e n s e , h o w e v e r , i s the i d e n t i t y o f t h i n k i n g a n d reality to be taken? Our discussion of the reflexivity in Hegel’s L o g i c a l r e a d y p r o v i d e s a c l u e , for t h e o p e r a t i o n o f n e g a t i v i t y i n

the positing of thought determinations has a twofold result: not o n l y d o we learn that thought destablizes all abstract determinations such that successively higher standpoints of self -relatedness are required in order to apprehend conceptual truths, but the

very nature of objective reality itself must be such that it truly contains a reflection-into-self. Thus,

the process o f o b j e c t i v e

reality and the process of thought w h i c h is aimed at conceiving this reality m u s t b e structurally correllative and isomorphic. Put a n o t h e r w a y , t h e r e can b e n o a b s o l u t e i n d i f f e r e n c e o r a n t i t h e t i c

relation of otherness between objective reality and explanatory thought since this reality is logically and conceptually determined in principles of intelligibility. Or again, the principles of e x p l a n a t i o n a r e i m m a n e n t i n the r e a l i t y t h e y e x p l a i n , t h e y

provide the logic of what is and i n this sense are ontological, as opposed to merely "transcendental" categories which govern the

structuring process i n subjective cognition without a n y implicat i o n a s t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f r e a l i t y i n a n d for i t s e l f . 1 T h u s , i f Hegel’s L o g i c p r e s u p p o s e s a n y t h i n g , i t i s n o t t h e c l a i m t h a t all

reality is mental i n its fundamental nature b u t that the intelligibility of objective reality is constituted i n principles that are also p r i n c i p l e s i n t r i n s i c t o t h o u g h t i t s e l f .

In concluding this examination, one should note that identity i n i t s s p e c u l a t i v e phi1050phical m e a n i n g i s n e v e r s i m p l e

for Hegel. The identity of thought and reality is their i d e n t i t y in-difference, which means on the one hand that they are i d e n t i c a l i n f o r m qua process o f s t r u c t u r a t i o n , a n d h e n c e t h e

14m.

(1830), § 88, Anm.; 132. Cf. § 96, Anm.; 141, where Hegel explains

t h e " i d e a l i t y " of B e i n g - f o r - s e l f . Here i t i s c l e a r t h a t for H e g e l i d e a l i s m i s a logical n o t i o n b a s e d o n t h e s t r u c t u r e of B e i n g - f o r - s e l f as an all—pervasive p r i n c i p l e , a n d n o t a d o c t r i n e d e r i v e d from a r a t i o n a l psychology o r m e t a p h y s i c a l M o r e o v e r : " P r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , i d e a l i t y i s n o t s o m e w h a t o u t s i d e of dogmatism. a n d b e s i d e r e a l i t y : t h e n o t i o n of i d e a l i t y lies i n i t s b e i n g t h e t r u t h of r e a l i t y . T h a t i s t o s a y , w h e n r e a l i t y i s e x p l i c t l y p u t as w h a t i t i m p l i c i t l y i s , i t i s a t o n c e seen to be ideality...an ideality external to it or it may be even beyond reality, w o u l d b e n o b e t t e r t h a n an e m p t y n a m e . " 15"Thought i s an expression w h i c h a t t r i b u t e s t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n c o n t a i n e d t h e r e i n p r i m a r i l y t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B u t i n a s m u c h as i t i s s a i d t h a t u n d e r s t a n d ingI r e a s o n , i s i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , t h a t m i n d a n d n a t u r e h a v e u n i v e r s a l l a w s t o w h i c h t h e i r life a n d changes conform, t h e n i t i s c o n c e d e d t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of t h o u g h t e q u a l l y h a v e o b j e c t i v e v a l u e a n d e x i s t e n c e . " ( L o g i k I , 3 5 ; 5 1 )

DAVID A . DUQUETTE

16

Hegelian dictum that "the real is rational."16 On the other hand, the distinction between thought and reality must be maintained

since reality, besides containing reason, also contains contin e n cy, accident and uncertainty. (Logik I, 380-385; 541-546)1 The Logic, however, does not deal concretely with these other matters, nor with concrete universals of any sort (which is the

task of Hegel’s Realphilosophie). It is one of the most common a n d m i s t a k e n v i e w s o f H e g e l ’ s L o g i c t h a t as a n o n t o l o g y i t m u s t provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence

of anything whatsoever, such as this pen with which I a m n o w writing. But nothing about what actually exists can be deduced from t h e L o g i c , for a s a l o g i c o f b e i n g , o r b e t t e r o f b e c o m i n g ,

o r better yet of the self-related Absolute, i t is a logic of structure and significance, not a logic of existence, actual or possible. Because the principles of speculative logic explain not

just the logic of what is b u t also the logic of thought itself, of t h e essence of Reason, the program of the Logic as thought thinking itself involves no reduction of matter to m i n d , o r of t h e p e r c e p t t o t h e c o n c e p t , b u t is r a t h e r a s y s t e m a t i c r e c o n s t r u c -

tion of concepts in order to establish their validity as categories of intelligibility, both subjective a n d objective. This is possible because in the speculative enterprise the dualisms and reductionisms of traditional metaphysical thought are transcended, and along with these the ultimately dualistic, and even sceptical, c h a r a c t e r o f K a n t ’ s o w n c r i t i c a l philOSOphy.

St. Norbert College

l6 Cf. Stanley Rosen, G.W.F.

Hegel: An Introduction

Wisdom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) 42.

to the

S c i e n c e of

”or. Logik II, 380-385; 541-546, and m. (1830) §§ mm, for Hegel’s e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e category o f A c t u a l i t y . F o r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r o l e of c o n t i n g e n c y i n H e g e l ’ s L o g i c s e e G e o r g e d i G i o v a n n i , " T h e Category o f C o n t i n g e n c y i n t h e Hegelian Logic," and John Burbidge, "The Necessity of Contingency: An Analys i s o f H e g e l ’ s C h a p t e r o n A c t u a l i t y i n t h e S c i e n c e of L o g i c , " b o t h i n A r t a n d Logic in Hegel's Philosophy, eds. Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth L. Schmitz

(New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980) 210-217 and 219-232 respectively.

A Reply t o David D u q u e t t e by Terry Pinkard

M r . D u q u e t t e ’ s p a p e r is concerned w i t h the ways i n w h i c h

Kantians have always been suspicious of Hegelians, since on their view Hegelians violate one of the basic transcendental conditions of knowledge, that a n y non-analytic claim to knowledge

m u s t b e related to p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e . His p a p e r

raises (at least) five questions about Hegel’s Logic that concern its possibility. I shall list these five questions and consider whether I think that M r . Duquette has satisfactorily answered t h e m , b o t h i n terms o f b e i n g t r u e t o H e g e l and i n terms o f

overall philosophical vindication of Hegel’s program. These q u e s t i o n s are:

1.

3.

What is the role of space a n d time i n the Science of Logic? What is the relation of the Science of Logic to ‘ordinary logic’? (This is allied with a similar question: What is the distinction of Vernunft from Verstand?) Since i t claims to be a logic, how does n e w content in the

4.

Science of Logic a r i s e ? W h a t is t h e b e g i n n i n g o f th e Science of L o g ic s u p p o s e d t o

2.

5.

do? What exactly is a ‘speculative science’ a n d w h y should anybody do it?

I shall make my remarks in two groups. The first concerns H e g e l a n d Ka n t ; t h e s e c o n d c o n c e r n s th e Science of Logic a nd

logic i n the ordinary sense. I.

I n § 16 of the B version of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant

argued

that

general

concepts

require

instantiation

in

(possible) individuals. Otherwise, they remain e m p t y predicates o f n o t h i n g . P a r t o f K a n t ’ s r e a s o n for m a k i n g s p a c e a n d t i m e forms o f i n t u i t i o n is t h a t m a k i n g t h e m forms o f t h e f a c u l t y o f c o n c e p t s s e e m s t o a l l o w t h e p o s s i b i l i t y that t h o u g h t a l o n e w o u l d c r e a t e the w o r l d o f w h i c h i t t h i n k s .

What therefore is the role of space and time in the Logic? Early i n the Logic, Hegel introduces a category of plurality (‘something and its other’). The problem of possibility is this:

17

TERRY PINKARD

l8

we h a v e a s c a t t e r e d p l u r a l i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t t h e r e i s n o

intrinsic way to distinguish one individual’s being individual from another’s being individual.1 H o w therefore is this plurality possible? Ascribing some kind of absolute being to each of them in order to explain this possibility will not work. Moreover, these individuals alter, come to be, and pass

away. Hegel apparently accepts Aristotle’s theses about a l t e r a tion, coming to be and passing away, namely, that every a l t e r a t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s a n u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t r a t e o f a l t e r a t i o n , and

the substrate must be different from the altering thing itself ( t h e s e s t h a t a r e t a k e n u p b y K a n t i n th e f i r s t A n a l o g y o f t h e

Critique of Pure Reason to show that alteration requires the postulation of substance to make it possible). On this view, the coming to be and passing away of individuals does not consist in their acquiring and then losing any so-called attribute of

existence. Rather, the underlying substrate (matter for Aristotle, s u b s t a n c e f o r K a n t ) a c q u i r e s o r loses s o m e p r o p e r t y . H e g e l h e r e asks how it might be possible to speak of individuals’ altering, coming to be, and passing away without any conception of a substance or matter that underlies the alterations.

Hegel argues that two things are necessary to understand

his conception of the being of individuals (what Hegel calls Dasein): (l) a substrate that provides the background for the scattered plurality; and (2) an individualizing factor, which is p r o v i d e d b y t h i n g s . H e g e l calls t h e u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t r a t e t h e a f f i r m a t i v e i n f i n i t e a n d the v a r i o u s ‘ s o m e t h i n g s ’ t h a t a l t e r t h e f i n i t e . T h e existence ( D a s e i n ) , t h e b e i n g o f a n i n d i v i d u a l , consists in its membership in this background (the finite, as

Hegel says, is possible only by virtue of its inclusion i n the infinite). The being of individuals is thus their presence in the

substrate of alteration (their presence in the infinite).

But why not just stick with K a n t and claim that space and time perfectly fill the role of a universal substrate in which ‘somethings’ come to be, pass away, and alter? Hegel’s argument, which I cannot go into here, is to claim, first of all, that the notion of plurality requires us to think of a substrate,

although not a particular substrate. This infinite substrate a n d plurality of individuals is a t first conceived qualitatively, as a n infinite series of changes a n d alterations in the substrate, a n d

1"Insofar

as s o m e t h i n g i s i n a n o t h e r o r i s for a n o t h e r , i t l a c k s a b e i n g of

its own." (Logik I, 108; 120)

A Reply t o D a v i d Duquette

l9

later quantitatively, as the idea of limits that can be made as arbitrarily small as one pleases. The c a t e g o r i e s o f s p a c e a n d t i m e t u r n o u t o n t h e H e g e l i a n

conception to be forms of the more general category of quantity. Kant held that space and time were p u r e intuitions. That i s , t h e y w e r e l i k e the o r d i n a r y e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n s , e x c e p t t h a t t h e y l a c k e d e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t . I n e f f e c t , for K a n t , space

and time were big (and pure) individuals a t which we could o n l y p o i n t ; t h e y w e r e n o t p r i m a r i l y o r d e r i n g r e l a t i o n s ( t h e y were n o t c o n c e p t s ) . K a n t t o o k this to b e the c o n c e p t i o n o f a b s o l u t e s p a c e and t i m e o f w h i c h N e w t o n s p o k e . H e g e l a r g u e s t h a t s p a c e a n d t i m e are n o t p r i m i t i v e s o u t o f w h i c h q u a n t i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s a r e to b e c o n s t r u c t e d , b u t are t h e m s e l v e s to b e c o n s t r u c t e d o u t o f more p r i m i t i v e q u a n t i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s . H e t h e n c o n s t r u c t e d a n a c c o u n t o f h o w i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t we c a n h a v e a n i n d e p e n d e n t

understanding of these relations without first tying them into space and time.

Hegel was no d o u b t deeply influenced here as elsewhere b y Lagrange. For example, i n his discussion of the mathematical infinite, Hegel sides with criticisms by Lagrange against Newton, specifically that Newton’s calculus makes too much use of concrete ideas such as velocity, and we simply d o not have any clear idea of instantaneous velocity (required by Newton’s d o c t r i n e o f f l u x i o n s ) . H e g e l c o u l d n o t h e l p b u t be b u o y e d b y

the convictions o n the part of Lagrange that Newton’s introduct i o n o f m o t i o n ( i n d e e d , o f s p ace a n d t i m e i n g e n e r a l ) was i m p r o p e r i n m a t h e m a t i c s . T h i s w o u l d have l e n t credence t o H e g e l ’ s e x c l u s i o n o f t h e t 0 p i c s o f s p a c e a n d t i m e from h i s Science of Logic. On e c o n s t r u c t s adequate c o n c e p t i o n s o f s p a c e a n d t i m e o u t o f q u a n t i t a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n s (i.e. m a t h e m a t i c s ) , n o t t h e o t h e r way a r o u n d . T h u s , K a n t was w r o n g i n h i s under— s t a n d i n g o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f s p ace a n d t i m e t o q u a n t i t y . W e d o n o t n e e d p u r e i n t u i t i o n s to p r o v i d e a n a c c o u n t o f i n d i v i d u t i o n , a n d w e d o n o t n e e d the n o t i o n s o f space and t i m e to p r o v i d e a n account of individuation. Everything can be done categorially, conceptually.

11.

M r . Duquette argues that we must understand the b e g i n n ing of the Logic as involving a principle of dialectical thought that the ‘understanding’ with its insistence o n ‘ordinary logic’ c a n n o t g r a s p . This i s a v e r y i m p o r t a n t i s s u e , for i t i n v o l v e s o u r

whole understanding of Hegel’s project. First, I w a n t to argue

TERRY PINKARD

20

that Hegelian dialectic does not challenge ordinary logic. Second, I want to s u g g e s t a t l e a s t t h a t H e g e l ’ s L o g i c s h o u l d n o t be taken

strictly as a logic a t all but only as an understanding of philosophical explanation. What d o e s the L o g i c d o ? I t s t a r t s o u t w i t h a s h o r t d e s c r i p -

tion of something called ‘pure being’, which is abstract and indeterminate. It is followed b y another short description of ‘pure nothing’, which is given a very similar description. The two a r e t h e n said to pass o v e r i n t o e a c h o t h e r , and the r e s u l t is

said to be ‘becoming’. M r . D u q u e t t e says t h a t o r d i n a r y logic c a n n o t m a k e sense

of the beginning of the Logic, with its talk of ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ passing over into ‘becoming’. Ordinary logic, h e says, cannot

understand

this

beginning

nor

how

new

content

is

supposed to arise from it. What exactly is this ‘ordinary logic’? M r . Duquette says that it is the logic of finite things. (What of the logic of infinite things? We have a good example of such i n t h e C a n t o r i a n m a t h e m a t i c s o f t h e t r a n s f i n i t e , o r , for t h a t m a t t e r ,

i n the logic of ‘ordinary logic’ deve10ped from good measure,

infinite sets). I assume that what is meant b y is that type of deductive logic that one finds Aristotle to the late nineteenth century. Just for let us throw i n Frege and all post-Fregean

d e v e l o p m e n t s a s p a r t o f ‘ o r d i n a r y logic’. N o w , s o m e t h i n g s t h a t M r . D u q u e t t e says a b o u t o r d i n a r y

logic do not seem to me to be true. H e says that ordinary logic requires us to frame determinations of things i n terms of either/or propositions. Moreover, he tells us that a n y given thing which can be described by a certain set of properties must be s o d e s c r i b e d s u c h that i t possesses that s e t o f p r o p e r t i e s

uniquely. But logic per se does not require me to p u t things into e i t h e r / o r d i c h o t o m i e s ; j u s t n o t e t h a t th e t r u t h table2 f o r ‘ x o r y’

is different from the truth table for ‘either x o r y’

2To

be sure,

a n y d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n v o l v e s a n e g a t i o n , b u t as K a n t pointed o u t , t h a t n e g a t i o n is i n f i n i t y . The n e g a t i o n o f m y p a p e r i s , w e l l , e v e r y t h i n g . The s e a , t h e s t a r s , t h e P r e s i d e n t , e v e r y t h i n g is n o t

m y paper. S e c o n d , i t i s n o t t r u e as a matter of logic t h a t a l l d e s c r i p t i v e p r o p e r t i e s are u n i q u e to t h a t i n d i v i d u a l . I f t h a t is t r u e a t

2‘X o r Y ’ i s t r u e if X i s t r u e , and i t i s true if Y i s t r u e , a n d i t i s true if X and Y are t r u e . ‘ E i t h e r X o r Y ’ i s t r u e i s X i s t r u e and Y is n o t ; o r Y i s t r u e and X is not.

A Reply t o D a vid Duquette

21

all, i t is true as a matter of metaphysics. If one holds as Leibniz did that all predication is e s s e n t i a l a n d a l l properties are particular, t h e n a l l descriptive p r o p e r t i e s are u n i q u e to t h a t i n d i v i d u a l , b u t t h i s b e l i e f is n o t t r u e as a m a t t e r o f l o g i c . Third,

logic does not prescribe the criteria for identity; i t only prescribes the rules of inference regarding identity.

M r . Duquette takes the beginning of the Logic to display a breakdown of ‘ordinary logic’. It is true that ordinary logic cannot understand the statement that x is identical to y, and x is not identical to y. So what does that say about the beginning? In the form i n which Hegel states it, the beginning e x h i b i t s what Hegel takes to be paradigmatic for a l l p h i l o s o p h i -

cal dilemmas: we d o not see how two basic categories are both con jointly possible. In this case, two concepts that simply do not m e a n the same a r e e q u a t e d ,

y e t th e c o n t r a r y assumption—if

anything is true, then being is different from nothing—also seems to be valid (indeed it is this assumption that actually underpins Hegel’s moves here).3 The first dilemma is the contradiction between the assumption that being is different

from nothing and the statement that they are the same.4 What s e t s u p t h e contradiction as necessary is t h a t w h a t is m o s t basically true ( " b e i n g is different from n o t h i n g " ) i s n o t capable

of true assertion at this level of discourse. A t this level of discourse i t is n o t possible to e x p r e s s th e difference

of being

and nothing. Hegel goes to great pains to express this point, n o t i n g that b e i n g "does not pass o v e r b u t has passed o v e r . " (Logik I , 6 9 ; 8 3 ; m y e m p h a s i s ) . B y t h i s , h e i n t e n d s to c a l l

3"But i t i s equally true t h a t t h e y are n o t u n d i s t i n g u i s h e d from e a c h o t h e r , t h a t , o n t h e contrary, t h e y are n o t t h e s a m e , t h a t t h e y are a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t , and y e t t h e y are unseparated and inseparable a n d t h a t each i m m e d i a t e l y vani-

shes in its opposite."

(Logik I, 69; 83)

4If t h i s i s j u s t an assumption, o n e m i g h t w o n d e r all w i t h a c o n c e p t i o n of pure b e i n g . W h y n o t j u s t go c o n c e p t i o n of determinate being [ D a s e i n l and be d o n e a m o n g h i s o t h e r reasons, Hegel h e l d t h a t t h e r e was n o

w h y w e s h o u l d begin a t ahead a n d b e g i n w i t h a with it? I take it that p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem at

all with showing the difference between determinate being and nothing. Nothing has n o p r o p e r t i e s , d e t e r m i n a t e b e i n g d o e s , therefore t h e r e i s a difference. T h e d i a l e c t i c c a n begin o n l y if there i s some p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i l e m m a t o b e r e s o l v e d . T h i s d i l e m m a appears i n t h e alleged c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i d e a of ( P a r m e n i d e a n ) b e i n g and n o t h i n g . W i t h o u t t h i s a s s u m p t i o n , t h e d i a l e c t i c c o u l d n o t b e g i n . H e g e l ’ s philosophy i s t h u s n o t w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , as h e t h o u g h t . B u t t h i s need n o t b e t a k e n as a devastating o b j e c t i o n . If indeed the only presupposition i s t h a t b e i n g is different t h a n nothing, Hegel has at least begun w i t h s o m e t h i n g very m i n i m a l .

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a t t e n t i o n to the fact t h a t one c a n n o t e v e n separate the t w o c o n c e p t i o n s i n o r d e r t o s e e o n e p a s s o v e r , a s i t w e r e , into the

other. The so-called fluidity of becoming is just not present. The transition from being to nothing is more like a quantum l e a p . ( L a t e r in h i s p h i l o s o p h y o f m a t h e m a t i c s ,

H e g e l echoes

D’Alembert in his sarcastic criticism of the infinitesimal, saying that it would be like a midpoint between being and nothing. T h u s , h e e m p h a s i z e s to u s there t h a t h e d o e s n o t t h i n k o f the

transition as fluid). His point is that however m u c h Parmenideans w o u l d l i k e to i n s i s t o n the d i s t i n c t i o n , there is n o way a t

this level of discourse to make that distinction. We begin with the category of ‘being’, and we then see w h a t m u s t b e p o s i t e d i n o r d e r to avoid t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s t h a t

ensue from that initial posit. It is possible to distinguish being from n o t h i n g o n l y i f b e i n g i s e x i s t e n c e , determinate b e i n g ( D a s e i n ) . (Dasein s h o u l d p r o b a b l y b e r e n d e r e d h e r e s i m p l y a s ‘ e x i s t e n c e ’ , b u t t h e n o n e would have t r o u b l e w i t h r e n d e r i n g the l a t e r t e r m i n t h e s e c t i o n o n ‘ e s s e n c e ’ , Existenz. H e g e l ’ s t r a n s -

lators have by a n d large rendered Dasein as ‘determinate being’. This is n o t a n u n i m p o r t a n t n o t e , b u t i t is n o t o u r c o n c e r n h e r e ) .

The move from being to existence is speculative. There is n o d e d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e here; r a t h e r n e w d e t e r m i n a t e n e s s is a d d e d . T h a t i s w h y i t is c a l l e d s p e c u l a t i v e : we a d d s o m e t h i n g n e w that c a n n o t b e d e d u c e d from the g i v e n c o n t e n t . S p e c u l a t i v e inferences t h e r e f o r e do n o t c h a l l e n g e o r d i n a r y l o g i c ; b u t t h e y a r e a l s o n o t ruled o u t b y i t . T h e p a r t i c u l a r s p e c u l a t i v e inference

is justified in that only such a move—identifying being with existence—will allow one to avoid the contradiction. Moreover, this is a move from the abstract to the concrete.

The point is that none of Hegel’s dialectic in the Logic is i n o p p o s i t i o n to ‘ o r d i n a r y logic’. I t is i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h o t h e r

modes of doing philosophy. Hegel’s notion of philosophy as e x p l a i n i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c a t e g o r i e s i s n o t , for e x a m p l e , analytic or (in a Husserlian sense) phenomenological.

Hegel’s quarrel with ordinary logic was different. His concern was not with actually providing a system of formal logic as a logician would do it. It was rather with providing a speculative explanation of how ordinary logic itself could be possible (or, if one likes, h e was not concerned with actually c o n s t r u c t i n g l o g i c a l proofs as h e was w i t h h o w s u c h l o g i c a l proofs are p o s s i b l e ) . H e makes i t c l e a r that he has no q u a r r e l w i t h formal l o g i c per s e a n d t h a t h e i s n o t t r y i n g to replace

A Reply t o D a v i d Duquette

23

formal logic with something else, such as ‘dialectical’ logic.5 What bothered Hegel about the logic of his time was with what h e perceived to be its lack of rigor. To Hegel it seemed that all t h a t l o g i c i a n s u p t o h is t i m e had to offer was a k i n d o f inductive typology of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms w i t h o u t being6 a b l e t o g i v e any r i g o r o u s a n d s y s t e m a t i c d e r i v a t i o n o f t h e m . 6 H e g e l ’ s p o i n t was t h a t a n a p p r o p r i a t e goal for

logical theory is to supply that kind of derivation o r to under— s t a n d w h y s u c h a d e r i v a t i o n is u n n e c e s s a r y o r i m p o s s i b l e . ( H e g e l

was also worried about logic’s formality, since he thought it doubtful that logic could be ‘true’ if i t were purely formal. He could have avoided that worry altogether if he had been i n the position to hold the contemporary view that logic is not intended to provide truth at all b u t just to preserve it. Logic allows us to j u m p , as it were, from truth to truth; i t does not give us the truths from which a n d to which we jump. The pr0per response should be: of course it is formal!) H ege l ’ s w o r r i e s a b o u t logic’s l a c k o f r i g o r l u r e d h i m to t h e

idea that if he could link his general theory of categories with t r a d i t i o n a l formal l o g i c , h e w o u l d b e a b l e to s u p p l y t h e m i s s i n g

derivations that had escaped the logicians. H e would also be able to s h o w t h a t l o g i c is n o t a n a u t o n o m o u s d i s c i p l i n e b u t m u s t t a k e

some its basic proofs from outside of logic. He tried to supply the missing systematization of formal logic b y a systematic redescription of formal logic in the terms of his own theory of c a t e g o r i e s . O v e r a l l , I t h i n k t h a t H e g e l ’ s b as ic i n s i g h t h e r e i s s o u n d . A f t e r a l l , i t i s p o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t two—valued, three— v a l u e d , e v e n f o r t y - e i g h t - v a l u e d l o g i c s . The r e a s o n w h y a f o r t y eight valued logic seems pointless is not itself a matter of pure l o g i c b u t rests o n t h e e x t r a - l o g i c a l i n t u i t i o n t h a t o r d i n a r y

propositions only have two, maybe three, truth values. So there are s o m e n o n - l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s to b e b r o u g h t

into logic

5Hegel n o t e s t h a t " E v e n if w e are t o s e e i n l o g i c a l forms n o t h i n g more t h a n formal f u n c t i o n s of t h o u g h t , t h e y w o u l d for t h a t very reason b e w o r t h y of i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o ascertain h o w far, o n t h e i r o w n a c c o u n t , t h e y correspond t o t h e t r u t h . . . . I t i s an i n fi n i t e merit o f A r i s t o t l e , o n e t h a t m u s t fill u s w i t h t h e h i g h e s t a d m i r a t i o n for t h e powers o f t h a t g e n i u s , t h a t h e was t h e fi r s t t o u n d e r t a k e t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n . I t i s necessary h o w e v e r t o go further a n d t o a s c e r t a i n b o t h t h e s y s t e m a t i c c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e s e forms and t h e i r v a l u e . " ( L o g i k I I I , 2 8 ; 595)

6Hegel s a y s , for i n s t a n c e , t h a t a logic w h i c h s h o u l d derive i t s p r i n c i p l e s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y , and " A logic w h i c h does n o t perform t h i s t a s k c a n a t most c l a i m t h e v a l u e o f a d e s c r i p t i v e n a t u r a l history of t h e phenomena o f thinking just as

they occur." (Logik III, 28; 589)

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TERRY PINKARD

itself. Whatever d o u b t s w e have a b o u t h o w w e l l H e g e l a c t u a l l y

brought off his proposal to supply the missing derivations, we n e e d n o t raise s i m i l a r d o u b t s a b o u t the p r o p o s a l i t s e l f . Questions a b o u t h o w l o g i c i s p o s s i b l e a n d a b o u t the p o s s i b l e forms o f inference r e m a i n a s t o p i c s for phi1030phical e x p l a n a t i o n a n d therefore as p o s s i b l e t o p i c s for s p e c u l a t i v e d i a l e c t i c . O n the o t h e r h a n d , w e m i g h t r a i s e a f i n a l q u e s t i o n i n terms o f M r . D u q u e t t e ’ s t i t l e . P e r h a p s w e s h o u l d c o n c l u d e t h a t

a speculative logic i n a n y strict sense really is impossible. N o w , the word, ‘logic’, gets thrown around a lot i n philosophy, a n d i t is admittedly hard to pin it down. We have Hegel’s ‘logic’, the ‘logic’ of ordinary language, the ‘logic of social science’ and so o n . Provided that we understand we are using the term loosely, n o harm is done by this. If, however, we mean b y logic ‘those rules of inference that are truth-preserving’ (with the difference b e t w e e n d e d u c t i v e and i n d u c t i v e l o g i c b e i n g b e t w e e n r u l e s t h a t always p r e s e r v e t r u t h a n d t h o s e t h a t o n l y d o i t m o s t o f t h e time), then Hegel’s speculative logic is not, precisely speaking, a logic a t all.8 T h i s m i g h t t r o u b l e u s u n t i l w e r e a l i z e t h a t , o f c o u r s e , a n u m b e r o f o t h e r t h i n g s t h a t p a r a d e a s ‘logics’—such a s d e o n t i c l o g i c , m o d a l l o g i c a n d so f o r t h — a r e a l s o n o t a c t u a l l y l o g i c s i n th e p r o p e r s e n s e . T h e y are n o t logics b u t theories o f a

7For e x a m p l e , Hegel has n o t h i n g t o s a y a b o u t p r o b a b i l i t y theory a n d i t s r o l e i n i n d u c t i v e l o g i c . W h y t h i s i s t h e c a s e i s a m a t t e r for future r e s e a r c h . P r o b a b i l i t y theory i n H e g e l ’ s t i m e was o n l y r e l a t i v e l y n e w . B e r n o u l l i ’ s proof o f t h e fi r s t l i m i t t h e o r e m h a d been p u b l i s h e d a century e a r l i e r t h a n t h e first e d i t i o n of t h e L o g i c . P a s c a l ’ s work was ignored b y H e g e l ; H e g e l scornfully d i s m i s s e d P a s c a l ( a l o n g w i t h C i c e r o ) as merely a ‘ p o p u l a r p h i l o s o p h e r ’ . H e g e l i s a p p a r e n t l y

unaware of Arnauld's and Pascal’s contributions t o probability theory in t h e 30g; R o y a l e L o g i c . G i v e n h i s k n o w l e d g e of L e i b n i z , h e s h o u l d h a v e k n o w n b e t t e r , s i n c e L e i b n i z was a great c o n t r i b u t o r t o t h e early s t a g e s o f p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y . M o r e o v e r , s i n c e p r o b a b i l i t y theory was b e i n g used i n c a l c u l a t i o n s of a n n u i t i e s by t h e s t a t e , H e g e l , w i t h h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e modern s t a t e , s h o u l d h a v e k n o w n about i t . I n t h e Logic i t s e l f , Hegel d i s c u s s e d t h e s y l l o g i s m o f i n d u c t i o n i n a w a y t h a t

shows t h a t he was unaware of any limit theorem. (He is unaware of t h e idea t h a t a n u m b e r of t r i a l s c a n give o n e ‘ v i r t u a l c e r t a i n t y ' i n problematical c a s e s . Hegel a l s o seems t o conflate i n d u c t i o n as o n l y g o i n g from p a r t i c u l a r t o p a r t i c u l a r w i t h t h e role o f p r o b a b i l i t y i n a s s e s s i n g e v i d e n c e for g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s . H e s e e m s t o h a v e n o i d e a o f p r o b a b i l i t y i n terms o f s t a b l e l o n g - t e r m f r e q u e n c i e s ) . 81 d o n o t t h i n k t h a t t h i s very contemporary n o t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f l o g i c i s r e a l l y t h a t far off from H e g e l ’ s o w n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l o g i c . F o r e x a m p l e , i n

t h e "Preface t o t h e Second Edition" of t h e Science of Logic (finalized o n November 7 , 1831, j u s t o n e w e e k before h i s d e a t h ) , H e g e l says about t h e s y l l o g i s t i c forms, " t h a t g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g t h e y concern o n l y t h e correctness of

t h e knowledge of faCts, not truth itself." (Logik I, 17; 38)

A Reply t o David Duquette

25

c e r t a i n s u b j e c t matter. For e x a m p l e , e v e n a c u r s o r y r e a d i n g o f H e g e l ’ s e t h i c s w o u l d make us d o u b t t h a t t h e r e i s a n y s u c h t h i n g

as a logic of d u t y . A t best, such a ‘logic’ can only reconstruct the i n f e r e n c e r u l e s o f a p a r t i c u l a r form o f l i f e , o f a h i s t o r i c a l l y

embodied mode of Objective Spirit. What would we lose if wedecided that, strictly speaking, there is no speculative logic? We lose nothing really of Hegel’s theory; but w e might clear the air a bit. Georgetown University

Beginning by William

Maker

I N NO SCIENCE IS THE NEED T O BEGIN WITH THE S U B J E C T MATTER I T S E L F , WITHOUT PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS, F E L T M O R E STRONGLY THAN IN T H E SCIENCE O F LOGIC. —HEGEL

Understanding Hegel’s Logic1 is crucial to any systematic endeavor to understand this most systematic of philosophers. If we are to consider seriously Hegel’s claim to have established p h i l o s o p h y as s c i e n c e we cannot avoid a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e

Logic. It is i n the Logic that the scientific status and nature of the s y s t e m are f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e l u c i d a t e d ; i t i s t o t h i s w o r k t h a t H e g e l refers u s w h e n q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e s c i e n t i f i c

character of rest of the system arise. But if the importance of the Logic is not i n question, the same cannot be said about the work itself. Since shortly after i t s a p p e a r a n c e , t h e L o g i c h a s b e e n s u b j e c t n o t o n l y to a v a r i e t y of interpretations but also to numerous critical attacks directed

against its argumentative claims and its putatively scientific status.3 Given its central role in the system, it is not u n r e a s o n a b l e t o c o n t e n d t h a t insofar a s t h e L o g i c r e m a i n s proble— m a t i c , s o t o o d o e s t h e w h o l e o f Hegel’s m a t u r e s y s t e m a t i c philosophy.

1Throughout t h i s e s s a y , by ‘Logic’ I will b e refering t o t h e W i s s e n s c h a f t d e r L o g i k , o r G r e a t e r L o g i c , as d i s t i n c t from t h e v e r s i o n of l o g i c f o u n d i n t h e Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften.

2For e x a m p l e , H e g e l observes t h e f o l l o w i n g i n t h e Remark t o § 2 o f t h e Philosotmy o f R i g h t : " W h a t c o n s t i t u t e s s c i e n t i fi c p r o c e d u r e i n p h i l o s o p h y i s e x p o u n d e d i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l l o g i c and i s here p r e s u p p o s e d . " G . W . F . H e g e l , H e g e l ’ s

Philosophy of Right, t r . T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) 15. He w r i t e s i n t h e R e m a r k t o § 2 4 of t h e E n c y c l o p e d i a L o g i c : " I t will n o w be understood t h a t Logic i s t h e a l l - a n i m a t i n g s p i r i t of a l l t h e s c i e n c e s , and i t s

categories the spiritual hierarchy." (Eng. (1830), § 24, ELI-3 40) 3Dieter

und Methode

H e n r i c h provides a summary o f t h e c r i t i c a l o b j e c t i o n s i n " A n f a n g d e r L o g i k , " i n H e g e l i m K o n t e x t ( F r a n k f u r t am M a i n : S u h r k a m p ,

1971). F o r a recent critique see Michael Rosen, flagel’s Dialectic and I t s Criticism (Cambridge: University Press, 1982).

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WILLIAM MAKER

28

In w h a t follows I s h a l l s u g g e s t a way o f a n s w e r i n g w h a t

are certainly the most immediate, a n d arguably the most crucial interpretive and critical questions about the Logic, those concerning its beginning. But first I want to explain and defend m y claim that i t is the issue of the beginning of the Logic which deserves special attention. In so doing I shall also introduce the specific issues of Logic interpretation and critique that I p l a n to t a c k l e .

F o r students of the Logic, the issue of its beginning takes priority—we most definitely need to begin at the beginning—for a t least three r e a s o n s .

(1) According to Hegel, the salient distinguishing feature of systematic philosophy as science is its claim to rationally The autonomous self-constitution o r self—determination. hallmark of the system’s scientific character is the strict immanency of its, genesis and development, its freedom from

external determination in the constitution of its categories.4 A n d as H e g e l a c k n o w l e d g e s , a c l a i m to s u c h a u t o n o m y a n d i m m a n e n c e c a n o n l y be s u p p o r t e d insofar as th e s y s t e m h a s , i n

some sense, a beginning which is itself devoid of external determination, to wit, a presuppositionless beginning.5

B u t as

Hegel also notes, the very possibility of such a beginning is questionable:

4"The

e s s e n t i a l p o i n t of v i e w i s t h a t w h a t i s involved i s an a l t o g e t h e r n e w c o n c e p t o f s c i e n t i fi c procedure. P h i l o s o p h y , if i t would be s c i e n c e , c a n n o t , as I h a v e remarked e l s e w h e r e , borrow i t s m e t h o d from a s u b o r d i n a t e s c i e n c e l i k e

mathematics, any more t h a t i t can remain satisfied with categorial assurances of i n n e r i n t u i t i o n , o r e m p l o y arguments b a s e d o n grounds a d d u c e d by external r e fl e c t i o n . O n t h e contrary, i t c a n o n l y be t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c o n t e n t i t s e l f w h i c h s p o n t a n e o u s l y develops i t s e l f i n a s c i e n t i fi c m e t h o d of k n o w i n g , s i n c e i t i s at t h e

same time t h e reflection of t h e content itself which first posits and generates its determinate character." (Logic 27) "...[T]he character of t h e rational...is t o be unconditional, self-contained, and t h u s t o be self-determining." (m. (1830), § 8 2 , Z_u.; 1 2 0 ) " F o r reason i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l o n l y insofar as i t s c h a r a c t e r and q u a l i t y are n o t d u e t o a n e x t r a n e o u s and foreign c o n t e n t , only insofar as i t i s s e l f c h a r a c t e r i z i n g [sich s e l b s t b e s t i m m t ] a n d t h u s , i n p o i n t o f c o n t e n t , i s i t s o w n

master." (QM- (1830), § 52, 23.; 86. Cf. § 238, Q ; 294. § 9, Anm.; 13. 232; 289. § 4; 7. § 16, Anm.; 22. §17; 22-23. § 77; 110-111) "...I hold t h a t Science exists solely in t h e self-movement of t h e Concept." (Phen., 44) 5"Thus

t h e b e g i n n i n g m u s t be an a b s o l u t e , o r w h a t i s s y n o n o m o u s h e r e , an a b s t r a c t b e g i n n i n g : and s o i t m a y n o t p r e s u p p o s e a n y t h i n g , must n o t be m e d i a t e d b y a n y t h i n g n o r have a g r o u n d , r a t h e r i t i s t o be i t s e l f t h e g r o u n d of

the entire science." (Logic 70)

Beginning

29

...We can assume n o t h i n g and a s s e r t n o t h i n g d o g m a t i c a l l y ; n o r can w e a c c e p t the a s s e r t i o n s a n d a s s u m p t i o n s o f o t h e r s .

A n d yet we must make a beginning: a n d a beginning, as p r i m a r y a n d u n d e r i v e d , makes a n a s s u m p t i o n , o r r a t h e r is an a s s u m p t i o n . I t s e e m s as i f i t were i m p o s s i b l e t o m a k e

a beginning at all. (Enz. (1830), § 1; 3) Thus, Hegel’s larger claims about the distinctively scien-

tific character of the system a n d his o w n views o n the problem of making the kind of beginning the system requires focus o u r attention o n the beginning of that work which begins the system proper. Understanding the overall scientific character of the s y s t e m as s e l f - c o n s t i t u t i v e requires u s to c o n f r o n t t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s b e g i n n i n g c a n b e made w h e n a n y beginning seems to involve a presupposition.

(2) If the general question of how a presuppositionless science is to make its beginning were not enough to draw o u r a t t e n t i o n to t h e O p e n i n g o f t h e L o g i c , t h e p e r p l e x i n g c h a r a c t e r

of what Hegel has to say in the Logic about its beginning s h o u l d g i v e u s p a u s e . A t the s t a r t o f the L o g i c H e g e l tells u s that it begins without presuppositions, and that it presupposes t h e Phenomenology of Spirit. (Logic 7 0 , 4 8 , 6 0 , 6 8 ) H e tells u s

that the concept of science set forth in the Logic cannot be i n a n y way predetermined, and that the Phenomenology is the deduction of this concept.

(Logic 4 3 , 5 0 , 6 8 - 6 9 ) T h u s , u n d e r -

standing the beginning of the Logic is additionally crucial, for unless we can find a way to reconcile the seemingly contradictory

character

of

these

claims,

any

further

interpretative

conclusions about the meaning a n d the status of the Logic must remain in suspension. ( 3 ) L a s t , there is the p r o b l e m a t i c c h a r a c t e r o f t h e a c t u a l o p e n i n g s e c t i o n o f the L o g i c i t s e l f . Some o f H e g e l ’ s e a r l i e s t a n d m o s t r e c e n t c r i t i c s have c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r o f the L o g i c ’ s o p e n i n g d e v e l o p m e n t violates t h e s t r i c t u r e s c o n c e r n i n g

immanency laid down b y Hegel. Dieter Henrich has specifically argued that the movement from being through nothing to becoming can only be rendered intelligible insofar as externally reflective operations are brought to bear.6 If this is i n fact the case, then Hegel can only be judged as having failed to meet his o w n specific demands and assurances concerning the immanent character of the opening development of the Logic.

6"Anfang

und Methode der Logik," 73-94.

(Logic 4 3 )

WILLIAM MAKER

30

And if these demands are not met here, then the scientific c h a r a c t e r o f t h e L o g i c as a w h o l e a n d o f t h e s y s t e m i s c a l l e d seriously i n t o q u e s t i o n s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e c l a i m t o i m m a n e n t

self-constitution is inseparable from the system’s claim to be science. I w a n t t o s u g g e s t t h a t w e c a n r e s o l v e the f i r s t a n d t h e

third issues b y first tackling the second: by finding a way of reconciling Hegel’s seemingly conflicting claims about the Phenomenology

as t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n fo r a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s

science. I shall now turn specifically to that issue. 1. The Problem of Beginning a n d the Idea of Self -Sub1ation If we are not to dismiss Hegel immediately o n the grounds that he engages in blatant self-contradiction when he claims that the Logic has no presuppositions and that it presupposes the

Phenomenology we need to try to reconcile these claims by finding a way of distinguishing between the sense in which the P h e n o m e n o l o g y i s , a n d the s e n s e i n w h i c h i t is n o t , a p r e s u p -

position for that work.

I a m going to argue that these senses

can be sorted out if we can first make sense of Hegel’s crucial

claim that the Phenomenology is a self-sublating mediation for the logical science. How might the idea of a self-sublating mediation help us, a n d h o w m i g h t t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y b e u n d e r s t o o d as j u s t s u c h a creature? The notion of a self-sublating mediation may enable us to reconcile the seemingly contradictory claims if we u n d e r s t a n d a s e l f - s u b l a t i n g m e d i a t i o n as a m e d i a t i o n — a presup— p o s i t i o n — w h o s e o w n e l i m i n a t i o n is j u s t t h a t w h i c h i s ‘ p r e s u p p o s e d ’ for t h e b e g i n n i n g o f s c i e n c e . T h e n w h a t t h e s c i e n c e presupposes is just the elimination of a presupposition. (So the s c i e n c e is p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s i n t h a t i t i s m a d e p o s s i b l e b y t h e e l i mination o f a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , b u t b e g i n s w i t h a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i n t h e s e n s e t h a t j u s t t h i s e l i m i n a t i o n i s presupposed). B e f o r e I proceed any further let me mention three questions which

7See

above, note #

4.

8"Here t h e b e g i n n i n g i s m a d e w i t h b e i n g w h i c h i s r e p r e s e n t e d as h a v i n g come to be through mediation, a mediation which is also a sublating of itself

[durch Vermittlung...welche zugleich Aufheben ihrer selbst ist]; and there is presupposed

p u r e k n o w i n g as t h e o u t c o m e o f finite k n o w i n g , o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "

(Logik I, 54; 69-70)

Beginning

3]

o b v i o u s l y a r i s e a t t h i s j u n c t u r e and w h i c h m u s t b e c o n f r o n t e d . (1) What sort of a presupposition could be conceived as self eliminating? ( 2 ) What s o r t o f a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n m i g h t i t be whose e l i m i n a t i o n w o u l d b e r e l e v a n t to a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s , self-determing science? (3) Even supposing that such a self-

elimination could be effected, would not the science arising o u t of t h e elimination of this presupposition be only relatively p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s ? That i s , w o u l d n ’ t w e have to say that s u c h a s c i e n c e m i g h t b e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s relative to the p r e s u p p o s i tion eliminated, but not thoroughly presuppositionless? Clearly, the l a t t e r s e n s e o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s n e s s i s c r u c i a l t o H e g e l ’ s

notion of a radically self-determining science. In moving now to suggest how the Phenomenology may be understood as a self s u b l a t i n g m e d i a t i o n , I’ll b e a d d r e s s i n g t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a n d a l s o

suggesting that the answers to the first and the second provide the grounds for dealing with the difficulty raised i n the third. Following this I shall conclude with a consideration of h o w the problems

Henrich

understanding mediation.

of

raises may also b e m e t t h r o u g h

the

Phenomenology

as

a

a proper

self-sublating

2. Understanding the Phenomenology as Self -Sublating M e d i a tion

We can understand the Phenomenology as a self -sub1ating m e d i a t i o n i f w e c a n a p p r e c i a t e h o w two c o n d i t i o n s a r e m e t . First, its outcome must be radically negative in the sense that w h a t i s p r e s u p p o s e d for the w o r k ’ s a r g u m e n t i s n e g a t e d i n a n d

by its outcome.

Second, this sublation or negation must be

immanently constituted: not externally imposed but engendered by the very subject matter introduced—presupposed—at the start. P u t g e n e r a l l y , we can u n d e r s t a n d t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y as a s e l f -

sublating mediation if i t can be seen as beginning with a d e t e r m i n a t e t h e s i s and c u l m i n a t i n g i n i t s s e l f - e l i m i n a t i o n .

Now it is m y contention that these two conditions for a s e l f - s u b l a t i n g m e d i a t i o n can b e m e t , and i n s u c h a w a y t h a t t h e s u b l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n i s r e l e v a n t for t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s science j u s t i n s o f a r a s t h e t h e t o p i c o f t h e P h e n o m e -

nology is a thesis—a presupposition—about how to begin philosophical science. For, if the subject matter of the Phenomenology is a t h e s i s a b o u t h o w to b e g i n s c i e n c e , and i f its o u t c o m e i s a

self -constituted rejection of this way of beginning, then, perhaps, through this negative procedure of elimination the correct way of beginning science will have been made possible

WILLIAM MAKER

32

without being predetermined. To anticipate f u r t h e r , h o w then might looking at the Phenomenology as the self -elimination of a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a b o u t h o w s c i e n c e is to b e g i n e n a b l e u s t o r e s o l v e the a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y n o t i o n o f a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n -

less science having a presupposition by clarifying two different b u t related

senses o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ?

W h a t i s the s p e c i f i c

presupposition about beginning science which comes to b e e l i m i n a t e d b y t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y and h o w i s i t relevant to the b e g i n n i n g o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s s c i e n c e ? I want to a n s w e r these

questions provisionally b y outlining m y reading of the P h e n o menolog as a self -sublating mediation. I shall then move to fill i n the details.

The way of introducing I a m sketching might be seen as constituting a presupposition for science i n the sense that what s c i e n c e is s e e n to p r e s u p p o s e i s a n e g a t i v e g r o u n d c l e a r i n g : The P h e n o m e n o l o g y shows t h a t s c i e n c e p r e s u p p o s e s — i n t h e first s e n s e o f ‘ h a s as a p r e l i m i n a r y o r a p r e r e q u i s i t e ’ — t h e e l i m i n a t i o n

of a significant b u t erroneous notion concerning how science is to begin. A t the same time though, this would not be a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i n t h e s e c o n d s e n s e o f t h e t e r m , the s e n s e H e g e l

aims to avoid: Where a presupposition constitutes a n external o r a predetermination

o f th e s c i e n c e .

( L o g i c 6 9 , 4 3 ) More p a r t i -

cularly, just this latter sense of presupposing—as p r e d e t e r mining—could

be

avoided

if

the

Phenomenology’s

negative

function is more specifically one of eliminating just that which—somehow—prevents science from constituting o r d e t e r mining itself.

So, as regards the question previously raised about the seemingly relative character of a science which begins through the e l i m i n a t i o n o f s o m e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n : To s t a n d a s a p r e s u p -

position for a presuppositonless science, the Phenomenology m u s t n o t o n l y f u n c t i o n as the s e l f - e l i m i n a t i o n o f a p r e s u p p o s i -

tion about how science is to begin; it must also be the selfe l i m i n a t i o n o f that p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a b o u t s c i e n c e w h i c h d e n i e s o r precludes the possibility of a presuppositionless (self -determin-

ing) science. That is, the self-sublating mediation constituted b y the Phenomenology can be seen as relevant to the beginning o f a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s s c i e n c e i f the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a b o u t beginning science which the Phenomenology eliminates can be u n d e r s t o o d as t h a t v e r y n o t i o n a b o u t s c i e n c e w h i c h i t s e l f

precludes the possibility of self -constitutive, autonomous science. What I am suggesting is that the particular presupposition

Beginning

33

i n the Phenomenology concerning how science is to begin which turns o u t to be self-eliminating, and which is relevant to the beginning of presuppositionless science, is a notion about the nature of cognition i n general. In other words, it is a notion about what science must begin with that denies the possibility of autonomous science b y holding that all cognition is ineluctably other-determined

or pre-determined.

More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e

understanding of cognition which embodies this notion is just the view that regards the manner i n which consciousness cognizes objects as definitive of all cognition. For, according to this view (viz. the view that consciousness’ mode of cognition c a n b e p r e s u p p o s e d for s c i e n c e ) all c o g n i t i o n i s always pre de te r-

mined because all cognition is always cognition of that which is always already minimally determinate in virtue o f being a given object for a n awareness. Now if this notion as to w h y i t is that science cannot begin without presuppositions can b e shown to b e self -defeating—if it can be shown that consciousness cannot establish itself as exclusively definitive of cognitive possibilities—then, I submit, we can make sense of the idea that just this elimination is a ‘presupposition’ for a presuppositionless science. For this elimination will have shown that the understanding of c o g n i t i o n w h i c h p u r p o r t s to s p e c i f y w h y a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s

(self-determining) science is impossible, is arbitrary. A n d by having carried o u t this minimal a n d negative function the ‘ p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ’ i n question—the P h e n o m e n o l o g y a s a w h o l e — w i l l have made a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s s c i e n c e p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t h a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d a n y t h i n g i n i t and w i l l t h u s b e a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ( i n

the first sense) for a presuppositionless science (in the second sense). So m u c h b y wa y o f a n t i c i p a t i o n . H o w c a n t h e s e v i e w s b e f l e s h e d o u t a n d s u b s t a n t i a t e d ? Hegel p o i n t s u s i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the v i e w I a m proposing—that the s u s p e n s i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a m o d e l for scientific c o g n i t i o n is w h a t h i s s c i e n c e p r e s u p poses—at v a r i o u s p l a c e s . (Logic 4 9 , 5 1 , 6 0 ) To q u o t e o n l y o n e ,

h e writes the following i n the Logic:

...These views o n the relation of subject a n d object to each o t h e r e x p r e s s the determinations w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t h e nature of our ordinary, phenomenal consciousness; but w h e n t h e s e p r e j u d i c e s are c a r r i e d o u t i n t o the s p h e r e o f r e a s o n a s i f the s a m e r e l a t i o n o b t a i n e d t h e r e , as i f t h i s r e l a t i o n w e r e s o m e t h i n g t r u e i n its o w n r i g h t , t h e n t h e y are e r r o r s the r e f u t a t i o n o f w h i c h t h r o u g h o u t e v e r y p a r t o f the s p i r i t u a l and natural u n i v e r s e is philosophy, o r

rather, as they bar the entrance to philosophy, must be

WILLIAM MAKER

34

discarded at its portals.

(Logic 45)

What Hegel is refering to here as that whose refutation is a prerequisite for science is what he refers to i n the I n t r o d u c tion

to t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y

as t h e " n a t u r a l

assumption... in

philosophy". (Phen. 46) This is the foundational assumption, o r presupposition,

found

in

Descartes

and

throughout

modern

philosophy. It asserts that the beginning of science can be effected i n a n d through a self -investigation by consciousness of t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f its c o g n i t i o n , a s e l f - i n v e s t i g a t i o n w h i c h w i l l

allegedly culminate i n the clarification a n d legitimation b y c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f some s p e c i f i c f e a t u r e s o f i t s c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e

as definitive of scientific cognition.

I have argued a t length

e l s e w h e r e f o r t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e c l a i m t h a t t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y , as

the introduction to science, is nothing other than a thinking through of this foundational self -investigation—a thinking through of the claim that science must begin with consciousness.9 So I will now turn to the issue of just how the c u l m i n a tion of consciousness’ self -investigation comprises a mediation w h i c h s u b l a t e s i t s e l f and m a k e s s c i e n c e p o s s i b l e .

3 . S e l f - S u b l a t i o n a n d I ts C o n s e q u e n c e s

Hegel anticipates the negative outcome of the Phenomenol o g y i n the Preface a n d I n t r o d u c t i o n to t h e w o r k , a n d h e refers t o i t s p e c i f i c a l l y i n th e L o g i c , as t h e d e d u c e d c o n c e p t o f s c i e n c e , w h e n h e p o i n t s to t h e c o l l a p s e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ’ o w n

structure as resulting in the immediacy with which the Logic begins.

( P h e n . 1 5 - 1 6 , 4 9 - 5 0 ; Logic 4 9 , 5 1 , 6 8 - 6 9 )

How can

that collapse be understood as the result of the thinking through of an attempt at vindicating the presupposition that it is in and

through such a self -investigation that science must begin? M o r e i m p o r t a n t , h o w can the s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n o f j u s t t h i s p r e s u p p o s i tion specifically be connected to the possibility of a presuppositionless beginning?

The o u t c o m e o f t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y a s t h e c o l l a p s e o f consciousness’ structure and the self -induced suspension of what is p r e s u p p o s e d for u s to f o l l o w t h r o u g h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t to t h i s

culmination can be understood, although not demonstrated,

98ee

William Maker, "Hegel’s Phenomenology

As I n t r o d u c t i o n

to Science,"

Clio, X (1981) 381-397; "Does Hegel Have A ‘Dialectical Method’?", T h e Southern Journal of Philosophy, XX (1982) 75—96; "Reason and the Problem of

Modernity," The Philosophical Forum, XVII (1987) 275-303.

Beginning

35

insofar as w e c o n s i d e r w h a t w o u l d be required for c o n s c i o u s n e s s

to successfully prove that its own structure is definitive of cognition.

Minimally, what consciousness must d o to succeed i n demonstrating the legitimacy of its mode of cognition—and the n e c e s s i t y o f p r e s u p p o s i n g consciousness i n a n d for science—is t o

come to the point of being able to simultaneously identify and differentiate

knowledge

and o b j e c t .

correspondence—the notion of

O n l y a t that p o i n t can

knowledge inseparable from

consciousness—be demonstrated as attainable.11 But as Hegel s h o w s a t l e n g t h i n Chapter VIII, a n d as h e recapitulates i n the

Logic, at the very moment when consciousness attains to such self -grounding, i t is at once the self -induced dissolution of the fixed o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n s u b j e c t and o b j e c t m i n i m a l l y c o n s t i t u -

tive of consciousness as such.12 So, in grounding itself as that which must be presupposed for scientific cognition, consciousness s u s p e n d s its d e t e r m i n a t e character and t h e r e b y e l i m i n a t e s

itself as a candidate for scientific cognition. For the s i m u l taneous identification and differentiation of knowledge and object required for demonstrating correspondence, and thus for vindicating consciousness, is a state of affairs i n which the fixed o p p o s i t i o n d e f i n i t i v e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e renders i t s e l f i n t o i n d e t e r m i n a c y . Thus we s e e that t h e a t t e m p t

to vindicate the presupposition that science can begin with a preliminary investigation of cognition culminating i n a d e t e r m i n a t e p r i n c i p l e for scientific c o g n i t i o n c u l m i n a t e s rather i n the

10Such a successful demonstration w o u l d s e e m i n g l y s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e c l a i m t h a t a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n by consciousness is t h e way t o begin s c i e n c e and i t w o u l d specify t h e d e t e r m i n a t e mode of c o n s c i o u s n e s s ’ cognition d e fi n i t i v e o f scientific c o g n i t i o n . If s u c c e s s f u l , i t would result i n a s u b s t a n t i v e , d e t e r m i n a t e b e g i n n i n g p o i n t for s c i e n c e .

11The impossibility of demonstrating such correspondence i s a foregone c o n c l u s i o n for many contemporary philosophers from b o t h t h e a n a l y t i c and continental camps. F o r example, s e e D o n a l d D a v i d s o n ’ s essays " A C o h e r e n c e Theory o f T r u t h and K n o w l e d g e , ” and " E m p i r i c a l C o n t e n t , " i n T r u t h a n d I n t e r p r e t a t i o n : P e r s p e c t i v e s o n t h e P h i l o s o p h y of D o n a l d D a v i d s o n , e d . Ernest

LePore (New York: Blackwell, 1986). 12As soon as s h e e r i d e n t i t y i n difference i s a t t a i n e d , i t i s n o longer possible t o speak of knowledge i n t h e o n l y terms i n w h i c h i t c a n m a k e sense for c o n s c i o u s n e s s : for consciousness " k n o w l e d g e " always i s and must be d e t e r m i n a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t from i t s o b j e c t . T h e outcome of consciousness’ a t t e m p t t o s h o w t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l l e g i t i m a c y of i t s mode of k n o w i n g i s t h e revelation t h a t s u c h a d e m o n s t r a t i o n c a n n o t be effected except insofar as the very mode of knowing purported t o b e u n c o n d i t i o n a l i s transcended.

WILLIAM MAKER

36

s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n o f t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a b o u t h o w s c i e n c e is to b e g i n , for consciousness c a n n o t a t t a i n the p o s i t i o n o f g r o u n d i n g

its own structure without simultaneously sublating it. H ow does this v e r y c u l m i n a t i o n m a k e a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s

science possible? The self-refutation i n question is specifically relevant for the beginning of a presuppositionless science because what has shown itself in the Phenomenology to be an illicit

presupposition

is

not

just

any

presupposition

about

cognition. Rather it is that very assumption about cognition according to which all cognition must begin with a predeter— Thus the relevance of the mined (given) determination. e l i m i n a t i o n o f consciousness—the i m p o r t a n c e o f the P h e n o m e n o l o g y as p r e s u p p o s i t i o n — l i e s i n the fact that c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n s t a n t i a t e s that very c o n c e p t i o n o f c o g n i t i o n w h i c h s p e c i f i c a l l y holds that all c o g n i t i o n must b e g i n w i t h a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , and w h i c h purports to b e able to s h o w w h y this m u s t b e t h e case. Understood according to o r in terms o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , k n o w i n g

is always, minimally and irreducibly, knowledge of an object: something which is always already given in its determinate character, even if only i n the minimal sense of being present to awareness.

According

to c o n s c i o u s n e s s , d e t e r m i n a c y is always

ineluctably predetermined. Thus, i n asserting its o w n scientific c h a r a c t e r , consciousness c l a i m e d t h a t c o g n i t i o n w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s is i m p o s s i b l e , b ecau s e i t h e l d that its mode o f c o g n i tion—for w h i c h s o m e d e t e r m i n a t i o n always is p r e s u p p o s e d i n

always being given—is definitive of science. S o , g i v e n what c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n s t a n t i a t e s , w e can s e e t h a t its s u s p e n s i o n is s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n d e e d , p r e e m i n e n t l y r e l e v a n t to

the beginning of presuppositionless science. Hegel’s science can make a claim to being more than just relatively presuppositionless because the suspension of consciousness is the suspension of nothing other than the structure of presupposing itself. To e l i m i n a t e o r s u s p e n d consciousness as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n c o n c e r n i n g s c i e n c e i s to e l i m i n a t e the s t r u c t u r e o f p r e s u p p o s i n g , for

this suspension reveals as a prejudice and dismisses from scientific contention that view which holds that radical self determination

is i m p o s s i b l e .

P u t differently,

this elimination

thoroughly undermines the authority of that view which holds that

any

determination

of

determinacy

must

involve

some

predetermination. In the latest jargon: this elimination decons t r u c t s t h e fashionable p o s t - m o d e r n i s t c l a i m that a l l d i s c o u r s e i s irreducibly constrained by contextuality.

I n c l a i m i n g to b e the c o n s t i t u t i v e p r i n c i p l e for p h i l o s o p h i -

Beginning

37

cally scientific cognition, consciousness asserted the denial of the possibility o f autonomous science ( i t asserted t h e s u p r e m a c y o f h e t e r o n o m o u s contextuality) i n a twofold way. First, by

asserting its scientific primacy consciousness held that it (consciousness) m u s t be presupposed for s c i e n c e . S e c o n d , g i v e n what i t i s as a c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e , c o n s c i o u s n e s s a l s o d e n i e d t h e

possibility of autonomous science by insisting that anything science c o m e s to c o n s i d e r w i l l itself involve a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n — a p r e s u p p o s e d determinacy—because a n y t h i n g s c i e n c e c o n s i d e r s

must always already have the minimally determinate character of being a n object. Thus, by articulating the self -sublation of the s t r u c t u r e o f p r e s u p p o s i n g i t s e l f , t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y r e n d e r s

the nature of presupposing perspicuous while revealing that the purported necessity of presupposing is itself non-demonstrable. For b y s h o w i n g h o w t h e demonstration o f t h i s n e c e s s i t y is a t o n c e the s u s p e n s i o n o f th e ( p r e s u p p o s e d ) s t r u c t u r e i n q u e s t i o n , the P h e n o m e n o l o g y reveals that i n t h e last analysis t h i s p u r p o r t e d n e c e s s i t y c a n n o t b e a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a n arbitrary-

assumption about cognition. Simultaneously, i t shows how we c a n s u s p e n d that p e r s p e c t i v e a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h p r e s u p p o s i n g

is necessary and unavoidable. For we come to see in a f u n damental sense what presupposing minimally involves; a n d we come to discover that, and why, this manner of conceiving cognition need no longer be taken for granted as exclusively determinative of cognitive possibilities.

If this indicates in a general way how a presuppositionless s c i e n c e may be s a i d to have a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ( i n t h a t i t p r e s u p poses the s e l f - e 1 i m i n a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r e o f p r e s u p p o s i n g ) w h a t can b e said m o r e c o n c r e t e l y a b o u t t h i s ? H o w d o e s t h e P h e n o menology’s negative outcome nonetheless, and in its very n e g a t i v i t y , f u n c t i o n p o s i t i v e l y i n regard to t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s s c i e n c e ? For o n e t h i n g , i n s e e i n g t h a t t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n eliminates itself, we ( t h e o b s e r v e r s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) c o m e t o s e e that a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s — r a d i c a l l y s e l f It is d e t e r m i n i n g o r autonomous science—may b e p o s s i b l e . i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e that n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u c h

a science13 can be or is provided for in the Phenomenology as 13Speaking

o f o u r b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e " p u r e k n o w i n g . . . [ w h i c h has] s u b l a t e d

all reference t o an other and t o mediation... [and which thus] ceases itself t o be k n o w l e d g e , " H e g e l n o t e s : " H e r e " t h a t i s , from t h e v a n t a g e p o i n t of t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e Phenomenology, " t h e b e g i n n i n g is made w i t h b e i n g w h i c h i s represented as h a v i n g come t o b e through m e d i a t i o n , a m e d i a t i o n w h i c h i s also a s u b l a t i n g o f i t s e l f ; a n d t h e r e i s presupposed pure k n o w i n g as t h e o u t c o m e of finite

knowing, of consciousness." V_V_e can see this as the mediated outcome of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B u t , i n t h i n k i n g through

t h e self-cessation

and the sublation, we

38

WILLIAM MAKER

a s e l f —sublating p r e s u p p o s i t i o n for a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s s c i e n c e . The elimination of the structure of presupposing cannot itself c o n s t i t u t e ( i n any d e t e r m i n a t e f a s h i o n ) o r r e q u i r e the b e g i n n i n g of presuppositionless science—if it did, this would be a prede-

termination and a heteronomous beginning.

Nor can this

s u s p e n s i o n guarantee t h a t the a t t e m p t to " t a k e u p w h a t is there

before us" (Logic 69) —the indeterminacy resulting from the c o l l a p s e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s — w i l l p r o c e e d i n s u c h a fashion t h a t n o

external (pre)determinations will enter in.

For any such

g u a r a n t e e s for w h a t p u r p o r t s to b e a r a d i c a l l y p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s science could only be predeterminations themselves and, in any c a s e , n o t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t e r e m a i n s from w h a t was p r e s u p p o s e d

i n the Phenomenology to provide them.

A t this juncture we

m i g h t " r e s o l v e " " t o c o n s i d e r t h o u g h t as s u c h " ( L o g i c 7 0 ) h a v i n g b e e n d i s a b u s e d o f the p r e c o n c e p t i o n a b o u t c o g n i t i o n w h i c h

seems to preclude such a n endeavor. But as Hegel notes, (Logic 69-70) nothing necessitates this move; it can be regarded as "arbitrary."

I n a d d i t i o n to p o i n t i n g to the g e n e r a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f a presuppositionless science, the collapse of consciousness as the c o l l a p s e o f the s t r u c t u r e o f p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n h a s i n d i c a t e d w i t h what a presuppositionless science must begin: with nothing

determinate whatsoever, i.e. with sheer indeterminacy. (Logic 6 8 - 7 0 . ) T h e s e l f —induced c o l l a p s e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ( t h e s t r u c t u r e of predetermination) at the moment of grounding the view that a l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f d e t e r m i n a c y m u s t b e g i n w i t h a predeter—

mination yields indeterminacy as the sole beginning point for s c i e n c e . Since i n d e t e r m i n a c y r e s u l t s f r o m t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y i t i s p a r t o f t h e s e n s e ( t h e f i r s t ) i n w h i c h the L o g i c h a s a p r e s u p position. But the beginning with indeterminacy does not obviate

either the radically negative outcome of this self -sublating mediation o r the crucial sense (the second) in which the Logic may be said to begin without presuppositions.

For t h a t w h i c h

was presupposed i n and for the Phenomenology—consciou sness a n d its pro ject—was something determinate a n d i n its rendering

also s e e t h a t w h a t was p r e s u p p o s e d i n t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y — t h e n o t i o n t h a t a f o u n d a t i o n a l s e l f - i n v e s t i g a t i o n will lead t o s c i e n c e — h a s e l i m i n a t e d i t s e l f , a n d t h e d e t e r m i n a t e agency r e q u i r e d for t h e t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h of t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n - t h e s t r u c t u r e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s — h a s rendered i t s e l f i n d e t e r m i n a t e . O u r s e e i n g t h i s makes i t p o s s i b l e for u s t o t h e n a d o p t t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a n c e : ” B u t if n o p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i s t o be m a d e a n d t h e b e g i n n i n g itself i s t a k e n i m m e d i a t e l y , " and

t h e aforementioned mediation ( t h e Phenomenology) makes this possible, " t h e n its only determination is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought s u c h . A l l t h a t i s p r e s e n t i s s i m p l y t h e r e s o l v e , w h i c h c a n also b e regarded

arbitrary, t h a t we prOpose t o consider thought as such." (Logic 69-70)

as as

Beginning

39

itself into indeterminacy nothing has been left behind as a referable o b j e c t , that i s , as s o m e t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t e w h i c h c o u l d function predeterminatively in the science. (How then deter-

minacy arises out of indeterminacy is another matter).14 B e y o n d these ways i n w h i c h a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s s c i e n c e

is made possible, the self—sublating mediation also shows us w h a t i t i s t h a t c a n n o t b e p r e s u p p o s e d i f s u c h a presupposition—

less science is to emerge from the consideration of i n d e t e r m i n a c y . W h a t c a n n o t b e p r e s u p p o s e d i s t h e n o t i o n that a l l d e t e r m i n a c y i s , and m u s t b e , m i n i m a l l y d e t e r m i n a t e i n v i r t u e o f

being regarded as an object for consciousness. This means that we know minimally how not to proceed if we make the resolve to think the indeterminate purely, as just what i t is. We know t h a t i t c a n n o t b e d o n e i n the m a n n e r o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .

How-

ever, knowing this is not a presupposition, simply because this negative knowledge is not necessary for science. This negative outcome does not constitute a predetermined

method.

For t h e

negative knowledge is only vital for those who may happen to be i n the habit of regarding consciousness’ mode of cognition as self -evidently definitive of all cognition, and are thus i n need of being disabused of this notion. The fact that this habit is c o m m o n t h r o u g h o u t t h e h is to ry o f W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y — t h a t i n

an important sense i t constitutes this history—does not obviate m y point. I will have something more to say about this i n speaking to Henrich’s objections.

I n this way—without predetermining how t h e autonomous science will constitute itself (its ‘method’), and without predetermining what it will constitute (its determinate content)—the P h e n o m e n o l o g y f u n c t i o n s as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n for a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s s c i e n c e . The L o g i c has a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i n the s e n s e t h a t t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y c o m e s before a n d d o e s s o m e t h i n g t h a t , h i s t o r i c a l l y , n e e d s to b e d o n e : i t e l i m i n a t e s from s c i e n t i f i c purview the notion of cognition according to which cognizing m u s t i n v o l v e p r e s u p p o s i n g . The L o g i c d o e s n o t have a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i n t h e s e n s e H e g e l claims i t d o e s n o t : i t s m e t h o d , c o n t e n t , a n d scientific character are n o t p r e d e t e r m i n e d j u s t b e c a u s e w h a t has c o m e before ( t h e L o g i c ’ s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ) h a s

made possible a consideration free of such predetermining through articulating the self-elimination of t h e structure of predetermining.

l4See

p p . 8 1 - 8 7 o f my essay, " D o e s Hegel H a v e a ‘ D i a l e c t i c a l M e t h o d ’ ? " ,

The Southern Journal of Philosophy XX (1981), for a specific consideration of this issue.

WILLIAM MAKER

4O

4. Henrich’s Objections We can also see h o w u n d e r s t a n d i n g the Phenomenology as

a self -sublating mediation makes i t possible to meet the c r i t i c i s m s against the strict immanency

o f the o p e n i n g o f the

Logic which Dieter Henrich raises i n his famous essay "Anfang und Methode der Logik." For H e n r i c h , there is n o q u e s t i o n that the m o v e m e n t from

Being to Nothing to Becoming stands i n need of a reconstructive—external—"proof." (88) In fact, Henrich contends that we n e e d to differentiate

" t h e science o f l o g i c " from t h e "process o f

its logical thought-deteminacies" and that the "science" only unfolds i n a "retrospective grounding" which amounts to a "metalogic." (92-93) In respect to the beginning of the logic in particular, Henrich’s claim is that the "logic of pure Being can o n l y b e explicated

i n general b y a negative m e t h o d [ n u r v i a

negationis]." (80) More specifically, this negative method consists i n the negation [Aufhebung] of categories of reflection. When Hegel characterizes pure Being as the indeterminate immediate this shows the exclusion of reflection: "Thus i m mediacy is the negation of mediation and thus is as such mediated and determined through this concept." (85) This shows that the "source" of the thought of immediacy is "transposed" [ v e r s t e l l t ] to the l o g i c o f r e f l e c t i o n . The u p s h o t : " I f . . . t h e n a t u r e o f ‘ p u r e B e i n g ’ c a n o n l y b e b ro u g h t i n t o v i e w via negationis then the b e g i n n i n g o f the L o g i c c a n n o t be satisfactorily understood o n i t s o w n t e r m s . " A n d , H e n r i c h c o n t e n d s , H e g e l

"does not give us a n y other method [save via negationis] to explicate the t h o u g h t o f B e i n g . " ( 8 6 ) I n fact

t h e n , Henrich

p r e s e n t s a twofold

critique.

In

addition to denying that the beginning of the Logic of Being c a n b e understood

w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to e x t e r n a l reflection—in

this instance, without recourse to the logic of reflection—he c o n t e n d s g e n e r a l l y agasinst d i s t i n c t i n t h i s work; 5 t h a t

Hegel t h a t f o r m a n d c o n t e n t are t h a t w h i c h m a k e s i t possible to

explicate o r ground o r prove the argument lies outside of the development itself.

15"What w e are d e a l i n g w i t h i n l o g i c i s n o t a t h i n k i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y as a base for o u r t h i n k i n g and apart from i t , n o r forms w h i c h are s u p p o s e d t o provide mere s i g n s o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g marks of t r u t h ; o n t h e contrary, t h e necessary forms a n d s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f thought are t h e

content and the ultimate truth itself." (Logic 50)

Beginning

41

Both of these objections can be met just insofar as we have p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d t h e n a t u r e o f t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y

as

a self -sublating mediation.16 As we saw, one dimension of that w o r k ’ s c o n c l u s i o n is to effect a n e g a t i v e l e s s o n for anyone who w o u l d a t t e m p t to d o s c i e n c e . We have learned that c o n s c i o u s -

ness’ mode of thought is precisely what is to be avoided for science.

Whatever e l s e a p u r e c o n s t i t u t i o n o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f

determinacy amounts to, it can’t be conducted i n that manner.17 H o w does t h i s relate to Henrich’s c l a i m s a b o u t a " v i a nega— t i o n i s , " a reflective m e t h o d ?

The c o n n e c t i o n c o m e s i n t o focus when o n e appreciates that

it is just the structure of consciousness which c a n b e alternatively described as the structure of reflection. What we find embodied i n consciousness is a mode of conceiving determinacy in terms o f a fixed

relation o f c o n t r a s t o r o p p o s i t i o n .

With

consciousness determinacy is always minimally determinate i n virtue of not being the other: the object is always minimally determinate as a n object in virtue of not being awareness. Thus consciousness is a structure whereby determinacy emerges o u t of a reflexive relation of opposition. Stripped of all other psychological and transcendental accoutrements,

consciousness is the

structure of mediation o r of reflection. A n d if we focus o n consciousness as minimally determining the determinacy of its object i n virtue of the object’s being a n object—a Gegen—stand [that which stands over against]-—then what we have with pure c o n s c i o u s n e s s is t h e s t r u c t u r e o f c o n s t i t u t i n g d et e rmina c y via reflection: t h r o u g h a process o f r e l a t i n g w h i c h establishes determinacy b y means o f a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i n which w h a t i s , is as ‘ o t h e r than’ w h i l e yet ‘ f o r ’ . W i t h c o n s c i o u s n e s s , d e t e r m i n a c y e m e r g e s v i a m e d i a t i o n . A n d j u s t this s t r u c t u r e c o l l a p s e s i n p u r e k n o w i n g . So w h a t He n r ich sees as i l l i c i t l y i n v o l v e d i n the l o g i c

of being—the negation o r exclusion of reflection o r m e d i a t i o n — c a n be s a i d to have c o m e a b o u t l i c i t l y t h r o u g h t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y i n i t s role as the c o n s u m m a t e s u s p e n s i o n o f t h i s s t r u c t u r e . F o r the Phenomenology’s o u t c o m e i n the c o l l a p s e o f

consciousness not only establishes that whatever is to be thought p u r e l y ( w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s ) is n o t to b e t h o u g h t i n t h e m a n n e r o f r e f l e c t i o n , i t also s h o w s — i n t h e w a y t h a t H e n r i c h ’ s

16Interestingly, Henrich m e n t i o n s t h e Phenomenology as t h e ” c o n d i t i o n of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of logic as s c i e n c e " i n a footnote ( # 6 , p . 8 3 ) b u t carries o n n o further d i s c u s s i o n o f i t .

1“(What

method

t h e scientific procedure consists in more specifically, what its

unfolds i t s e l f as q u a m e t h o d , c a n only b e seen i n r e t r o s p e c t .

WILLIAM MAKER

42

ad hoc via negationis cannot—why reflection is to be excluded. W h e n s e e n from t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , H e n r i c h ’ s d i s c o v e r y o f a n e e d

for the exclusion of reflection from the logic of being n o longer amounts to a critique.

Unbeknownst

to H e n r i c h , h i s a n a l y s i s

reinforces the preparatory role Hegel assigned to the P h e n o m e nology.

How,

more

specifically,

is Henrich’s attack

deflated?

Henrich contends that the characterization of p u r e Being offered b y Hegel a n d needed to make sense of the transition to n o thing—Being’s character as indeterminate immediacy—marks a

negation of reflection and mediation and thus a n illicit appeal to a later stage of the Logic. But it is easy to see that this characterization as negation of mediation o r reflection is just t h e o u t c o m e o f the c o l l a p s e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 1

Insofar as we

take into account p u r e Being as the outcome of absolute knowing it immanently (legitimately) appears as the negation of

the structure of reflection—which is to say, n o longer as a detegrminate m e d i a t i n g s t r u c t u r e b u t a s i n d e t e r m i n a t e i m m e d i a -

cy.

18Speaking o f w h a t emerges from t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y — " p u r e knowing"-—as t h a t w h i c h i s t a k e n u p i n t h e Logic i n i t s r o l e as p u r e s c i e n c e , H e g e l c h a r a c t e r i z e s p u r e k n o w i n g as t h e c e s s a t i o n o f m e d i a t i o n a n d reflection: " P u r e k n o w i n g . . . h a s s u b l a t e d a l l reference t o a n o t h e r a n d t o m e d i a t i o n ; i t i s w i t h o u t a n y d i s t i n c t i o n a n d as t h u s d i s t i n c t i o n l e s s c e a s e s itself t o be k n o w l e d g e ; w h a t i s present i s o n l y s i m p l e i m m e d i a c y . " A n d , a g a i n s t H e n r i c h , H e g e l n o t e s t h a t t h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n is an expression o f r e fl e c t i o n a n d t h u s c a n be c o n s i d e r e d as

referring, not ahead (as Henrich would have i t ) t o t h e logic of reflection, b u t b a c k t o t h a t from w h i c h t h i s b e g i n n i n g p o i n t h a s e m e r g e d : " S i m p l e i m m e d i a c y i s i t s e l f a n expression of reflection a n d c o n t a i n s a reference t o i t s d i s t i n c t i o n from what is mediated... Here the beginning is made with being which is represented as h a v i n g c o m e t o b e t h r o u g h m e d i a t i o n L a m e d i a t i o n w h i c h i s a l s o a s u b l a t i n g

of itself." (Logic 69, last emphasis added) 9What about Henrich’s contention that the Logic requires a method of proof, t h e v i a n e g a t i o n i s ? H e n r i c h s e e m s t o c l a i m t h a t w e as t h i n k e r s are involved in applying this method of excluding reflection. I would suggest, in at l e a s t p a r t i a l agreement w i t h H e n r i c h , t h a t a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e o p e n i n g t r a n s i t i o n s w o u l d i n v o l v e reference t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of r e f l e c t i o n , b u t t h a t e v e n t h i s w o u l d n o t require illicit a p p e a l t o a n e g a t e d l o g i c o f r e f l e c t i o n : T h e

legitimacy of what Henrich claims t o fi n d present in his reconstruction is e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h t h e s e l f - s u b l a t i n g m e d i a t i o n , for, as n o t e d , i t i s j u s t t h e predilection to determine determinacy through a fixed—presupposed as g i v e n — s t r u c t u r e o f reflection w h i c h i s s u b l a t e d b y t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e P h e n o m e nology i n t h e c o l l a p s e of c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n p u r e k n o w i n g . S o , if a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n fi n d s ‘reflection present as n e g a t e d ’ , t h i s i s perfectly i n accord w i t h H e g e l ’ s c l a i m s a b o u t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e l o g i c as a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e s u b l a t i o n o f m e d i a t i o n . F o r the self-sublating mediation which the Logic presupposes is the sublation of the

s t r u c t u r e of mediation. Phenomenology

(This outcome a n d this relationship between t h e

a n d t h e Logic i s a l s o i n accord w i t h H e g e l ’ s c l a i m t h a t " W h a t

Beginning

43

Last, what about Henrich’s larger critical claim, that the

Logic is in fact only interpretable o n the basis of a metalogic, which, if correct, would mean, against Hegel, that there is a distinction here between method and content? Such a recons t r u c t i o n is o n l y n e c e s s a r y as e x t e r n a l a n d as d e s t r o y i n g

immanence insofar as we fail to see that the "via negationis" comes about through the self -sublating mediation. If we have followed t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d u n d e r s t o o d t h e c o l l a p s e o f the structure of reflection, then we would not be predisposed to i n t r o d u c e t h e r e f l e c t i v e a p p r o a c h to c o n s t i t u t i n g d e t e r m i n a c y

into o u r thinking, and hence would not be in need of a n y metalogic which, according to Henrich, must be present to inform us what to do. An external, immanency-compromising

"via negationis" as the method o r metalogic of the Logic is needed only if we have failed to follow just that path Hegel offers t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c i e n c e .

So, if the Phenomenology is properly understood as self s u b l a t i n g m e d i a t i o n , t h e n we c a n s a y that H e g e l ha s m a d e a

reasonable claim to having founded the kind of systematic philosophical science he sought: one which

m a y offe r

us a

system of autonomous reason in virtue of a beginning devoid of p r e - d e t e r m i n i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . I f this i s t h e c a s e w e c a n a l s o s u g g e s t that f u r t h e r efforts to u n d e r s t a n d H e g e l ’ s s y s t e m o n i t s

o w n terms are worthwhile, especially in a n age i n which m a n y agree with Hegel i n rejecting the primacy of consciousness b u t i n which, unlike him, few offer anything as an alternative to the philosophy of consciousness save for what he prophetically d e c r i e d i n h i s o w n t i m e as p i o u s e d i f i c a t i o n .

Clemson University

p h i l o s o p h y begins w i t h m u s t b e e i t h e r m e d i a t e d o r i m m e d i a t e , a n d i t i s easy t o s h o w t h a t i t c a n be n e i t h e r t h e o n e n o r t h e o t h e r ; t h u s e i t h e r w a y of b e g i n n i n g

is refuted." (Logic 68) However, for the reason why such a reconstruction is not n e e d e d , s e e t h e next paragraph

of the text.

T h e Method of Hegel's Science of Logi_c by Richard

Dien

Winfield

The most vexing problem facing a n y reader of Hegel’s Science of Logic is penetrating the method of its advance. A l t h o u g h Hegel continually intones the n e c e s s i t y o f the passage from o n e category to the n e x t , i t is t e m p t i n g to t h r o w u p o n e ’ s

hands and decry the arbitrariness of every move. Hegel invites much of this frustration by failing to supply in advance a unitary doctrine of method. Instead he offers fragmentary accounts at different points along the way, accounts

whose compatibility, let alone justification, is far from obvious.1

P e r h a p s the m o s t familiar o f these is the i n t r o d u c t o r y d e s c r i p -

tion of six general features of method, according to which (1) the form of logical development is i n unity with its content; (2) the s u b j e c t matter unfolds i m m a n e n t l y , as a s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t ;

(3) the science proceeds by means of determinate negation; (4) the movement of categories is circular, such that the advance from the starting point is equally a regress towards the true ground o n which the development rests; (5) the determination of categories is neither merely analytic nor synthetic, but both a t o n c e ; a n d ( 6 ) t h e d e v e l o p m e n t has its o w n m e t h o d as its final result.

Although these characterizations are first listed without m u c h a d o , He g e l does o u t l i n e a d u a l strategy for c o n f i r m i n g w h e t h e r t h e y are t h e fundamental features o f valid m e t h o d . T h i s l i e s i n t h e twin discussions t h a t in tro d u ce the s y s t e m a t i c a r g u m e n t o f t h e Science of Logic. I n th e first, e n t i t l e d , " N o t i o n

of Logic I n General," Hegel considers the nature of logic and e x a m i n e s w h a t method m u s t be a d o p t e d to p e r m i t l o g i c a l s c i e n c e to a c h i e v e its a i m s . I n the s e c o n d , e n t i t l e d , " W i t h W h a t M u s t The S c i e n c e B e g i n ? " , h e analyzes h o w p h i l o s o p h y c a n b e

1The first of these accounts, scattered i n t h e t w o introductory d i s c u s s i o n s , " G e n e r a l N o t i o n of Logic” and " W i t h W h a t M u s t S c i e n c e B e g i n ? " , l i s t s general A second a c c o u n t , features t h a t apply throughout t h e m e t h o d ’ s a p p l i c a t i o n . s u r f a c i n g i n t h e remarks preceding t h e Logics of B e i n g , Essence and C o n c e p t , d e s c r i b e s h o w e a c h s e c t i o n has i t s o w n m a n n e r of a d v a n c e , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e m e t h o d o p e r a t e s differently i n e a c h l o g i c a l s p h e r e . F i n a l l y , Hegel provides a t h i r d account a t t h e very e n d o f t h e Logic where h e first addresses t h e m e t h o d i n a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y s y s t e m a t i c fashion as a t o p i c falling w i t h i n l o g i c u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of t h e A b s o l u t e I d e a . T h i s final analysis describes a t h r e e s t a g e m e t h o d , u n r e l a t e d t o t h e division i n t o t h e Logics of B e i n g , Essence and C o n c e p t , t h a t hardly seems t o correspond t o e i t h e r of t h e t w o earlier a c c o u n t s .

45

RICHARD D I E N WINFIELD

46

undertaken without being burdened b y foundations. As Hegel s h o w s , these p r o b l e m s have one a n d the same s o l u t i o n , w h e r e b y

the discourse satisfying the demands of logic equally allows p h i l o s o p h y to o v e r c o m e f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m .

This c o n v e r g e n c e n o t

only makes intelligible why Hegel calls that with which philosop h y begins a "Science of Logic," b u t also provides the key arguments for judging the legitimacy of his descriptions of method.

L e t us consider each converging path in turn. 1. The Determination of Method O u t of The Demands of Logic Logic consists in the thinking of thinking. Although logic may b e c a l l e d a formal s c i e n c e , i n t h a t i t i s n o t a t h i n k i n g about particular objects of thought, Hegel aptly points out that

logic has a subject matter all its own: the determination of thought.

(Logik I , 2 8 ; 4 4 ) F o r j u s t t h i s r e a s o n , t h e form

of

logic has a special relation to its content, setting logical science apart from other disciplines.

Since all other sciences conceive something other than t h i n k i n g , the form i n w h i c h t h e i r c o n t e n t is p r e s e n t e d , n a m e l y

scientific thought, is different from Insofar as t h i s leaves t h e i r established within their own are c o m p e l l e d to take t h e i r t h a t m u s t already b e a t hand

their subject matter.

m e t h o d s o m e t h i n g that c a n n o t b e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , non—logical s c i e n c e s m e t h o d for g r a n t e d , as s o m e t h i n g i n o r d e r for their i n v e s t i g a t i o n s t o

proceed. However, because the method of non-logical sciences m u s t b e d e t e r m i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e i r particular subject matters, having the method in hand does not bring with it any content. Hence, the subject matter other s c i e n c e s address m u s t e q u a l l y b e g i v e n b y a n a c c e p t a n c e o f s o m e concepts or other, since otherwise, there would be no deter-

minate content for their given method to address. (Logik I , 27; 43) In logic this distinction

between

form

and

content

is

overcome to the degree that logic consists in the thinking of thinking, o r self - t h i n k i n g thought. Whereas i n other inquiries, form and content fall asunder, the form and content of logical s c i e n c e a p p e a r to be o n e and the same: t h i n k i n g t h a t t h i n k s itself.

. ' In. this r e s p e c t , l o g i c p r o c e e d s u p o n t h e o v e r c o m i n g o f the d i s t i n c t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s that H e g e l claims is t h e prerequisite

47

The Method of Hegel’s Science 0 1 L o g i c

for systematic philosophy. (Logik I , 33; 49) This distinction, whose overcoming is purportedly achieved b y the Phenomenology of Spirit’s immanent critique of consciousness’s foundational k n o w i n g , (Logik I , 3 3 ; 4 9 ) consists i n the differentiation

of

knowing from its object, where the standard of truth resides i n the independent given comprising knowing’s referent. If i n logic the object of inquiry, pure thought (that is, thought that thinks itself), is indistinguishable from the thinking cognition in which logic engages, then logical science will lack the appeal to independent givens constitutive of the representational framework of consciousness. Given how the thoughts of logic refer to nothing but themselves, there can be no question of logic seeking their truth i n some distinct criteria. For just this reason there is nothing logical at hand to refer to until logical thinking has gotten underway. Since this eliminates any possibility of drawing a distinction b e t w e e n reference a n d referent, l o g i c a l t h o u g h t is nonrepresentational, lacking the c o n s t i t u t i v e d i s t i n c -

tion defining representational cognition.

Hence, if the method of logic is the ordering of the content of logic, then the logical method will be at one with w h a t i t pre se n t s, i n expression o f th e u n i t y o f form and c o n t e n t

i n logic. Due to this underlying unity, the methodological form of the thinking of thinking is only established in the determination of what thinking is by, and within, logical science. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the method o f logic w i l l not b e conceivable apart

from the content i t orders. If anything like a doctrine of logical m e t h o d were to b e s o u g h t , i t could o n l y be obtained from the Since the c o m p l e t e d d e v e l o p m e n t o f logic’s s u b j e c t matter. logical unfolding o f t h o u g h t presents what is at one with its mode o f presentation, o n l y with completion o f l o g i c is the form i n w h i c h thinking is thought fully at h a n d . Instead o f b e i n g g i v e n a t the start, as something distinct and i n d e p e n d e n t o f its t o p i c , the method o f logic can o n l y be d e t e r m i n a b l e as a r e s u l t o f the full e x p o s i t i o n o f the content logic presents.

This allows logical science to make an absolute beginning, a v o i d i n g the dependence u p o n a g i v e n method and c o n t e n t c h a r a c t e r i z i n g other sciences. (Logik I , 2 7 ; 4 3 ) Because the

unity of form and content in logic prevents logical method from h a v i n g its proper determination

p r i o r to the completed e x p o s i -

tion of the content of logical thought, logic begins without any antecedently determined method. Similarly, since what logic is a b o u t has no independent being apart from logical t h o u g h t , logic

begins without any antecedently determined subject matter. By contrast,

o t h e r sciences

cannot

make

an absolute

beginning.

RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD

48

Because what they address is different from their theorizing, the

form of their theorizing can no more provide the content it addresses, than the subject matter examined can provide the form

o f its o w n

theoretical

presentation.

A s a result,

the

subject matter of other sciences must be independently given at the outset i n order to be available, j u s t as t h e i r method must be

independently determined apart from thinking the subject matter of their particular science. (Logik I , 27; 43) Logic, b y contrast, begins absolutely in the sense that neither its content nor method have any given character at the outset of logical investigation. Not before and outside, but only i n and through its thinking of thinking do logic’s unitary topic and procedure g e t determined.

As a consequence, logic must proceed immanently, as a self -development. Since it has no given form or content, logic must generate its o w n subject matter and ordering, unless external interventions s u p p l y i t with e i t h e r alo n g the way. The l a t t e r o p t i o n , h o w e v e r , is r u l e d o u t b y the u n i t y o f form and

content defining logic’s thinking of thinking. If any terms were externally introduced or externally ordered, the thought under examination would no longer be undertaking its own investigation. Instead, the train of logical thought would be broken and destroyed b y a thinking that determines the content and/or o r d e r o f the s c i e n c e , yet s t a n d s o u t s i d e its p u r v i e w . To escape this o u t c o m e , logic m u s t have a n immanent d e v e l o p m e n t , where

both what is thought and how i t is thought are determined b y nothing b u t the course of logical thinking itself. Insofar as logic develops a thinking that thinks itself, its deve10pment c a n n o t fail to b e i m m a n e n t , for i t is n o t h i n g b u t a s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t , where what is presented provides its o w n e x p o s i t i o n .

It follows that logic is circular in the sense that each advance represents a regress towards the ground o n which the whole d e v e l o p m e n t rests. A s a s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t uniting form and c o n t e n t , logical t h i n k i n g o n l y arrives at the completed determination o f both what is underway, d e v e l o p i n g itself, and the order of its e x p o s i t i o n , a t the conclusion o f its w o r k i n g .

Only then is the subject matter of the development determined, j u s t as o n l y t h e n is the ordering

p r i n c i p l e o r method

o f the

advance at hand. As we have seen, both are what they are only as results of the development leading to and constituting them. Since

the

preceding

development

is nothing

more

than

the

succession of stages by which logical thought both constitutes and orders itself, e a c h advance is a move towards

the g r o u n d

that determines and contains the prior stages as what they are:

The Method of Hegel’s §ci§ncg of L o g i c

49

elements in the self -constitution of logical thought. This ground is, of course, the totality of logic, which only arises as a result of the completed development. H e n c e , logic is n o t caught i n a holism o f coherence, where

the truth of each category is defined in terms of the given totality within which it resides. Nor is logical thought involved in rebuilding the ship in which it is already afloat. In either case, the content of logic would be determined b y a framework encompassing and lying beyond i t , leaving categories always determined b y something falling outside them all. This would once again disrupt the unity of form and content since the determining o f logic wo u ld n o t reside i n its o w n e x p o s i t i o n , b u t i n an external context that co u ld n ev er become s u b j e c t to logical investigation, since i t would always b e presupposed b y a ny

logical thought. Logical thought escapes the dilemmas

o f holism because

the whole to which the categories belong is not something given at the outset of the development, providing an omnipresent determining context, b u t rather a result that only contains and orders them a t the end o f its s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t .

On the one

hand, the totality that proves itself to be the ground of the preceding development can be c o m p l e t e l y transparent to logical

thought, for it is precisely what that development has consisted i n thinking through. On the other hand, this totality is not some irreducible given that thought must accept as its unquestionable foundation. Because logical thought arrives at the c o n c e p t i o n o f this totality without submitting

its labors to any

external guide, this resultant whole is not an ungrounded a s s u m p t i o n . On the contrary, i t owes every aspect o f itself to the d e v e l o p m e n t leading to i t . However, because this develop— m e n t is the self-constitution o f s e l f - t h i n k i n g t h o u g h t i n its e n t i r e t y , n e i t h e r resting o n anything else n o r following any

foreign principle, the totality of logical thought is self - g r o u n ding, mediated b y nothing b u t its own unfolding.

Hence, the pure thought of logic is just as much u n mediated as mediated.

I t is unmediated

insofar, as a w h o l e ,

nothing else determines it. On the other h a n d , it is equally mediated, since, instead of being given, in the manner of a s t a t i c form t h a t requires an independent

thinker to p o s i t i t a n d

relate it to others, self-thinking thought is what i t is only through the mediation of the categorial development of logic.

Similarly, logical thought is at once analytic and synthetic.

RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD

50

The self -thinking of thought is analytic insofar as every logical category is contained in the resultant totality comprising both the o r d e r i n g

principle and s u b j e c t o f logical s c i e n c e .

A t the

same time, self ~thinking thought is synthetic i n that each new If i t w e r e ,

category is n o t contained i n those that precede i t .

the order and content of the ensuing development would already be given i n the first category, thus rendering the method and t o p i c o f l o g i c matters that l o g i c a l science m u s t take for granted,

rather than establish. Self -thinking thought is able to avoid presupposing both, and thereby retain a synthetic dimension, precisely

because

its

pure

thinking

arrives

at

a

complete

determination of its method and subject matter only as the result of its labors. This equally allows self - t h i n k i n g thought to r e t a i n an analytic d i m e n s i o n b e c a u s e i n arriving at i t s method and c o n t e n t , i t incorporates t h e entire p r e c e d i n g d e v e l o p m e n t .

Finally, i n following an advance n o less analytic than synthetic, self -thinking thought can be said to proceed b y means o f d e t e r m i n a t e n e g a t i o n . Insofar as e a c h s u c c e s s i v e c a t e g o r y supplants its predecessor with a non-derivative content, it n e g a t e s w h a t precedes i t . Y e t , to th e d e g r e e that i t e q u a l l y i n c o r p o r a t e s its p r e d e c e s s o r s as c o n s t i t u t i v e e l e m e n t s o f its n o n - d e r i v a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n , i t s n e g a t i o n o f its predecessor is

determinate, i n that the otherness i t Opposes to the former is e q u a l l y d e t e r m i n e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o i t . S i n c e e a c h successive c a t e g o r y l e a d i n g to t h e f i n a l t o t a l i t y o f s e l f - t h i n k i n g thought u n d e r g o e s t h i s dual n e g a t i o n a n d in co rp o ratio n b y what follows

i t , logical development can thus be described as being ordered by determinate negation. This might suggest that logic is subject to a formal ordering

principle

d i s t i n c t from

its c o n t e n t ,

destroying

the

constitutive unity of the form and content of self-thinking thought. H o w e v e r , the p r i o r analysis o f h o w determinate n e g a t i o n rests o n the e q u a l l y analytic and s y n t h e t i c character o f the a d v a n c e s h o u l d indicate that this u n i t y o f form and content

is the very precondition for determinate negation playing any r o l e . I n e f f e c t , because determinate n e g a t i o n ties how categories

succeed o n e another to what they a r e , it is an ordering principle that cannot be detached from a development where form and c o n t e n t are t h o r o u g h l y i n t e r t w i n e d . 2

2

This i s largely w h a t H e g e l ’ s a n a l y s i s of t h e m e t h o d i n t h e A b s o l u t e I d e a demonstrates w h e n i t shows h o w t h e d e t e r m i n a t e negation by w h i c h logic a d v a n c e s expands i n t o t h e w h o l e s y s t e m of logical d e t e r m i n a t i o n .

The Method of Hegel’s Science (1 Logic

51

2. Pure Thought and Prescriptive Logic A l l th e se ramifications o f th e d e m a n d s o f l o g i c v e r y n e a t l y c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e s i x features c i t e d i n H e g e l ’ s first a c c o u n t o f the m e t h o d o f h i s Science of Logic. B u t d o t h e y r e a l l y f o l l o w

from the concept of logic itself? After all, many different types. of logic have been pursued. Some are merely descriptive, restricted to describing how thought i n general has factually o p e r a t e d , whereas o t h e r s are p r e s c r i p t i v e , s e e k i n g to p r e s c r i b e

how valid thought should proceed.

A n d within this broad

d i v i s i o n , l o g i c s have b e e n d e v e l o p e d t h a t are f o r m a l , t r a n s c e n -

dental or dialectical. Although in every case logic involves a thinking about thinking, if is far from true that the thinking each logic engages i n is identical to the thinking it is describing or prescribing.

I n f a c t , formal l o g i c and t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l o g i c , t o t a k e t h e m o s t w i d e l y practiced t y p e s , c a n n o t p o s s i b l y a c h i e v e a u n i t y o f

form and content. The rules of inference that formal logic provides as the canon of thought cannot b e described o r prescribed by their o w n laws of entailment. Formal logic cannot practice what it preaches both because all entailment u l t i m a t e l y proceeds from s o m e i n d e m o n s t r a b l e g i v e n p r e m i s e ,

which accordingly can only be known b y some non-demonstrative knowing, a n d because establishing rules of inference by Similarly, means of themselves would beg the question. transcendental l o g i c c a n n o t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y c o n s t i t u t e i t s o w n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t s . B e c a u s e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l o g i c s e e k s to d e t e r m i n e some p r i v i l e g e d s t r u c t u r e c o m p r i s i n g t h e p r i o r

conditions b y which objectivity is known, transcendental logic m u s t a l w a y s d e f i n e those s t r u c t u r e s d i r e c t l y , r a t h e r t h a n c o n c e i v i n g t h e m as d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e m s e l v e s l i k e a l l o t h e r o b j e c t s o f k n o w l e d g e . I f i t tried the l a t t e r route i t w o u l d e i t h e r h a v e to take what t h e y are for granted o r tran s fo rm t h e m i n t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d s t r u c t u r e s , e l i m i n a t i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n k n o w i n g a n d its o b j e c t that first a l l o w s for t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f k n o w l e d g e t o b e e x a m i n e d p r i o r to a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r objects of knowledge.3

However, if a n identity of form a n d content is not and cannot be achieved b y formal and transcendental logics, this d o e s n o t mean that i t is n o t e n t a i l e d b y the c o n c e p t o f l o g i c ,

3For

a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Richard Dien Winfield,

Reason and Justice (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), Chapter

3.

RICHARD D I E N WINFIELD

52

understood

a s a p r e s c r i p t i v e s c i e n c e o f v a l i d thought.

For i f

logic be taken to be a science concerned, not with describing how individuals think, b u t with prescribing how they should t h i n k , then logic will itself be valid only if what it establishes as the logic of valid thought is equally the logic ordering its o w n investigation. If, o n the contrary, the thinking logic employs is not one with the logic of valid thought it presents, the exposition of thought by logic will not be valid. I n other w o r d s , l o g i c a l s c i e n c e c a n n o t b e v a l i d u n l e s s i t achieves a u n i t y o f form and c o n t e n t . S i n c e s u c h a u n i t y escapes e v e r y effort o f

formal and transcendental logics, it follows that they can never successfully prescribe how we should think. A

true s c i e n c e o f l o g i c , h o w e v e r , m u s t e x h i b i t a l l the

ramifications of this unity that have so far been discussed. First, since a properly prescriptive logic aims at establishing

what valid thinking is, its o w n method cannot be taken for granted at the start. Instead, if falls within the science of logical investigation, comprising none other than its ultimate subject matter. Since the method of logic is therefore at once the form a n d content of its investigation, logical science must begin with n o antecedently given method o r subject matter. If either just its method o r just its content were given, the offered c a n d i d a t e o f v a l i d t h o u g h t w o u l d d i f f e r from i t s e x p o s i t i o n , undermining the legitimacy of each. If, on the other hand, both

its method and subject matter were antecedently determined, the science of logic would accomplish nothing i n its o w n right, leaving the putative form a n d content of valid thinking arbitrary a s s u m p t i o n s , p o s t u l a t e d o u t s i d e o f s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n . To be worthy of the name, logical science must rather arrive at b o t h i t s m e t h o d a n d s u b j e c t m a t t e r as a r e s u l t o f i t s o w n l a b o r s . Hence, the very concept of prescriptive logic does indeed entail

that it begin absolutely, without a n y preconception of its form or content, establishing its own method and subject matter at the very end of its investigation, at which point it completes

what could best be called its self -exposition of valid thinking. It might well seem paradoxical that the idea of prescriptive

logic could entail a development of thought whose theme a n d ordering is yet totally free of determination by a n y antecedent, i n d e p e n d e n t l y g i v e n p r i n c i p l e . H o w c a n a l o g i c w h o s e form a n d

content must have n o prior determination be entailed b y anything a t all? The paradox disappears once it is recognized t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f p r e s c r i p t i v e l o g i c has n o f u r t h e r p o s i t i v e f i l l i n g a p a r t from the p r e c o n c e p t i o n - f r e e c o n c e p t u a l d e v e l o p m e n t t h a t a l o n e c a n b r i n g i t to r e a l i z a t i o n , o r m o r e p r o p e r l y

The Method of Hegel’s

s p e a k i n g , to s e l f -realization.

Science o f L o g i c

53

This r e c o g n i t i o n need n o t b e a t

hand in order to legitimate the science of logic. Rather, i t is something the science itself establishes at its end b y fully determining the idea of prescriptive logic and demonstrating that i t is a n idea that determines itself. These considerations of the demands inherent i n logic thus give support to Hegel’s claims that the form of logical development is in unity with its content, that the science of logic consists i n an immanent self -development, that i t exhibits determinate negation and is equally analytic a n d synthetic, and that its movement o f categories takes the form of a circle, where every advance i s a retreat to t h e ultimate g r o u n d having

the determination of method as its final result. Let us grant that these strictures of method are all necessary fulfillments of the demands of logical science. A r e t h e y , h o w e v e r , methodological features not j u s t o f l o g i c , b u t o f

phi1050phical thought in general? As Hegel makes clear i n his other introductory discussion, "With What Must The Science Begin?", the Science of Logic is concerned not just with bringing logic to completion, but with allowing philosophy per se to achieve i t s constitutive a i m s . Do p h i l o s o p h y ’ s requirements

entail the very same methodological prescriptions inherent in logical science? 3. The Method of Philosophy As The Method of Logic I n a s k i n g , w i t h w h a t m u s t t h e science o f p h i l o s o p h y b e g i n , H e g e l ponders h o w p h i l o s o p h y c a n o v e r c o m e f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m , that i s , b e g i n w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and achieve the c o m p l e t e theoretical s e l f - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that philosophical t h o u g h t needs to rise above doxology. The challenge is twofold. Negatively s p e a k i n g , philosophy must liberate i t s e l f from reliance u p o n d o g m a t i c g i v e n s , b e they contents o r procedures that have n o t a l r e a d y b e e n established within a n d b y phi1050phical i n v e s t i g a Positively s p e a k i n g , phi1050phy m u s t g r o u n d itself, tion.

legitimating its subject matter and method by its own means alone. These demands are two sides of the same coin, for i n order to p r o c e e d without foundations, p h i l o s o p h y m u s t i n d e p e n -

dently establish all its own terms and method, just as to be self-grounding and self-justifying, philosophy must be thoroughly free of foundations. If we examine these dual requirements i n light of Hegel’s analysis o f the starting point of philosophical discqurse, we find

RICHARD D I E N WINFIELD

54

t w o c o o r d i n a t e features. On the o n e h a n d , t o proceed w i t h o u t f o u n d a t i o n s , p h i l o s o p h y m u s t s t a r t w i t h n o g i v e n s , s i n c e to s t a r t w i t h any d e t e r m i n a t e c o n t e n t o r m e t h o d involves p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s

whose legitimacy has not been established within philosophy. Hence, philosophy can only begin with indeterminacy o r being, signifying the exclusion of a n y assumptions concerning either the s u b j e c t m a t t e r o r p r o c e d u r e o f p h i l o s o p h y .

On the other hand, if philosophy is to proceed from indeterminacy

and

ground

itself, its conceptual

development

must be self -determining. Since the content philosophy presents c a n n o t d e r i v e from any s o u r c e o t h e r t h a n what philosophical

thinking sanctions and the method by which its content is ordered must equally be established b y philosophy, both what a n d h o w p h i l o s o p h y t h i n k s m u s t b e d e t e r m i n e d i n and t h r o u g h philosophical thought. H e n c e , p h i l o s o p h i c a l reason m u s t b e

genuinely autonomous, achieving not just the negative freedom of liberty from external ordering, b u t the positive freedom of self -determination. Taking these coordinate features together, whereby philosophy starts with indeterminacy and then exhibits self - d e termination,

it

follows

that

philosophy

will

commence

by

presenting nothing b u t self-determination per se, which, it s h o u l d alrea d y b e c l e a r , a m o u n t s t o th e l o g i c o f s e l f - g r o u n d i n g .

Because philosophy must begin with indeterminacy, its ensuing self-determination cannot be the self-determination of some f u r t h e r s u b s t r a t e , s u c h as a n y i n d e p e n d e n t l y g i v e n n o t i o n s o f reality or thought. If it were, philosophy would rest upon p r e - p h i l o s o p h i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s a n d fail t o a c h i e v e e i t h e r i t s n e g a t i v e freedom of presuppositionlessness or its positive freedom o f s e l f - g r o u n d i n g . H e n c e , t h e v e r y a u t o n o m y o f reason r e q u i r e s that i t proceed from i n d e t e r m i n a c y , r a t h e r than from any determinate foundation. L i t t l e e l s e c o u l d be e x p e c t e d ,

given how what is genuinely self -determined has no determinat i o n p r i o r to w h a t i t d e t e r m i n e s i t s e l f to b e .

G r a n t e d that the a n s w e r to h o w p h i l o s o p h y m u s t b e g i n is

that phi1050phical reason start with indeterminacy and present s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n per s e , i t r e m a i n s t o b e s h o w n h o w t h i s d u a l p r e s c r i p t i o n entails t h e s i x features o f H e g e l ’ s i n t r o d u c t o r y account of method.

To b e g i n w i t h , d o e s i t e n t a i l a u n i t y o f form a n d c o n t e n t ? Is f o u n d a t i o n - f ree d i s c o u r s e , p r o c e e d i n g from i n d e t e r m i n a c y a n d

presenting the logic of self -determination o r self - g r o u n d i n g , a

The Method of Hegel’s

Science of Logic

55

c o n c e p t u a l d e v e l o p m e n t whose c o n t e n t a n d o r d e r i n g c o i n c i d e ? H e g e l s u g g e s t s as m u c h i n o b s e r v i n g h o w p h i l o s o p h e r s had first c o n s i d e r e d the p r i n c i p l e o f p h i l o s o p h y as i f i t m e r e l y c o n c e r n e d w h a t c o n t e n t s h o u l d b e c o n c e i v e d , b u t had n o w recognized t h a t

the a c t of knowing was essential to t r u t h , requiring the method of philosophy to be united with its content and its form united with its principle, so that what is first for thinking also be first in the path of thinking. (Logik I, 54; 68) If philosophy begins with indeterminacy to be free of foundations and provide the only admissible commencement for a development determined b y n o t h i n g b u t i t se l f , then i n d e e d , th e i n d e t e r m i n a t e

content

with which philosophy begins is equally indeterminate in form, insofar as n o d e t e r m i n a t e method c a n already b e o p e r a t i v e . H e n c e , contra Kierkegaard} the b e g i n n i n g n o t o n l y b e g i n s w i t h

immediacy, b u t begins immediately.5 M o r e o v e r , insofar as w h a t p r o c e e d s from i n d e t e r m i n a c y is

and can only be self-determination per se, its ordering is a self -ordering, where the succession of categories is equally rooted i n w h a t t h e y p r e s e n t . H e n c e , the c o n t e n t o f t h e e n s u i n g d e v e l o p m e n t j u s t as m u c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e form o f its o w n p r e s e n t a t i o n as i t s o r d e r i n g i s i n s e p a r a b l e from its c o n t e n t . S i n c e what i s b e i n g d e t e r m i n e d is s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n p e r s e , h o w i t i s b e i n g d e t e r m i n e d i s i d e n t i c a l to w h a t i t is. I f , o n the c o n t r a r y , t h e form o f e x p o s i t i o n w e r e d i s t i n c t from i t s c o n t e n t , t h e

content would be ordered by something else, undermining its self -determined character, just as the determining principle of t h e c o n t e n t w o u l d n o t l o n g e r c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e i d e n t i t y o r "self"

of the latter, as self -determination requires. I f t h i s s u g g e s t s h o w the d e m a n d s o f p h i l o s o p h y e n t a i l the s a m e u n i t y o f form and c o n t e n t r e q u i r e d b y l o g i c , i t e q u a l l y e n t a i l s t h a t t h e m e t h o d e m e r g e as t h e fin al t e r m o f p h i l o s o p h y ’ s

initial undertaking.

The ordering principle o r method of

s e l f —determination per se consists i n n o t h i n g less t h a n t h e "self"

o r subject matter that is underway determining itself. Conseq u e n t l y , t h e o r d e r i n g o f what p h i l o s o p h y f i r s t p r e s e n t s i s n o t a t h a n d u n t i l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n has c o m p l e t e d its o w n develop—

4S¢ren

Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1974) 101-102. 5For

of t h e

a d i s c u s s i o n of w h y t h i s i m m e d i a c y i s n o t d i s r u p t e d by t h e m e d i a t i o n P h e n o m e n o l o g y o f S p i r i t , see R i c h a r d D i e n W i n f i e l d , " T h e R o u t e T o

Foundation-Free Systematic Philosophy," Philosophical F o r u m , XV (1984) 337 ff.

RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD

56

m e n t , at o n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g what i t i s and how i t is d e t e r m i n e d .

A s the unity of form and content already implies, only when the c o n t e n t o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n has c o n s t i t u t e d form o r m e t h o d e q u a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d .

i t s e l f , is its

This means that philosophical discourse, like logic, will p r o c e e d i m m a n e n t l y as a s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t whose e v e r y advance i s e q u a l l y a r e t r e a t towards i t s g r o u n d . Insofar as phiIOSOphy

must begin with indeterminacy a n d offer self -determination per s e , i t consists i n a s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t , w h e r e the s u b j e c t m a t t e r

provides for its o w n exposition, generating its o w n content and ordering. In order for this to occur, each new determination m u s t b e incorporated i n t o the s e l f - c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the s u b j e c t O t h e r w i s e , the m a t t e r whose s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n is u n d e r w a y .

connection between terms would depend upon something outside S i n c e w h a t e a c h new d e t e r m i n a t i o n is a their development. d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f is o n l y e s t a b l i s h e d a t the e n d o f the d e v e l o p ment, every advance beyond the indeterminate beginning r e p r e s e n t s a c l o s i n g i n o n the w h o l e t h a t w i l l e n d u p c o n t a i n i n g

every preceding determination as a n element i n its o w n c o n stitution. T h u s , although the resulting whole is not a given foundation, antecedently underlying the development, it turns o u t to b e t h e g r o u n d s u p p o r t i n g e a c h c a t e g o r y , p r o v i d i n g t h e

sole basis for determining of what they are part. This a l l o w s the e n s u i n g m o v e m e n t to b e a n a l y t i c a n d s y n t h e t i c a t o n c e . A s was t h e c a s e w i t h logic’s s e l f - t h i n k i n g o f t h o u g h t , h e r e e a c h a d v a n c e is s y n t h e t i c b y presenting s o m e t h i n g n o t a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d i n w h a t p r e c e d e s i t , y e t a n a l y t i c , insofar

as it provides nothing that is not contained within the whole that is i n the process of determining itself.

Similarly, the development could be said to proceed b y determinate negation. Each new term does represent a negation of what precedes i t because it has a n irreducible otherness. If i t l a c k e d t h a t e l e m e n t and were m e r e l y c o n t a i n e d i n i t s p r e d e -

cessor, the movement would not be self -determining, b u t would instead be determined by contents given prior to the ensuing development.

H o w e v e r , because e a c h t e r m e n d s u p i n t e g r a t e d

within the whole of self -determined determinacy, the otherness d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g t h e m from t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s e q u a l l y incorporates

the former terms as constitutive elements of the determination underway. Consequently they arise through a determinate negation, negating the preceding term by comprising something other to i t , yet incorporating this predecessor as an element of its own determination.

The Method of Hegel’s

Science o f Logic

57

I n s u m t h e n , the requirements o f p h i l o s o p h y i n g e n e r a l e n t a i l t h e same methodological p r e s c r i p t i o n s t h a t are required b y

logic.

As we have seen, if logic is to achieve its constitutive

g o a l s i t m u s t a c h i e v e p r e c i s e l y w h a t phi1050phy turns o u t to demand. I n fact, the s e l f - t h i n k i n g t h o u g h t that logic s h o u l d c o m p r i s e i s i d e n t i c a l t o the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d d i s c o u r s e to which phi1030phy m u s t a s p i r e . This is w h y H e g e l has g o o d reason to c a l l the d i s c o u r s e w i t h w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y m u s t b e g i n a s c i e n c e o f lo g ic an d to in tro d u ce i t w i t h parallel

discussions of the methodological problems of logic and of philosophy in general.

P erh ap s t h e i r convergence a l s o g i v e s us

good reason to endure o u r frustrations and bear down to the toils o f s p e c u l a t i v e t h o u g h t .

University of Georgia

Abstract and Concrete in Hegel's Logic Philip T. Grier

I. In recent philosophical literature having no special connection to Hegel studies, one can discover an emerging critique of the philosophical use o f the terms ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’. I t has been announced, w i t h something o f an air o f surprise, that perhaps the notions o f ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ do not have any

very clear-cut philosophical meaning, and that in many situations may in fact represent an attempt to make a distinction without a difference.

The

most

usual

philosophical

understanding

of

the

abstract/concrete distinction is surely that in which the paradigm of abstraction is taken to be a universal and the paradigm o f the concrete, the particular, where the universal is that which can be ‘shared’ b y many particulars (whatever else is true o f i t ) . One normally adds that the universal is something thought, while the particular is the existent. From this understanding o f

the distinction it is obvious that one could extrapolate to the more modern view that generating a set constitutes an act of abstracting.

The

set then becomes a n abstract entity, and the

individuals comprising its extension are concrete, (ignoring such possible complications as the null set, infinite sets, virtual sets, and so forth for present purposes).

However this common understanding o f the distinction has recently given rise to a variety o f doubts on the part o f several critics. These doubts arise out o f the alleged discovery that no single way o f formulating the distinction seems to be free o f significant difficulties, and that no one formulation o f the distinction seems to be conspicuously more fundamental than the others.These critics are impressed b y the sheer plurality o f possible distinctions between the abstract and the concrete;

indeed one has enumerated something like twelve different versions o f the distinction in

use in

current philosophical

1Recent critics of the distinction include D a v i d Lewis, O n t h e P l u r a l i t y of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) 8 1 - 8 6 ; Laverne Shelton, " T h e Abstract and the Concrete: H o w Much Difference does this This Distinction M a r k ? " (paper read at t h e 1980 Eastern Division A . P . A . meetings); and Susan C . H a l e , "Spacetime

and the Abstract/Concrete Distinction,” Philosophical Studies, L111 (1988) 85102.

59

PHILIP T . GRIER

60

literature, remarking that few p h i l o s o p h e r s s e e m t o have n o t i c e d Finally, i t i s s u g g e s t e d " w h a t a muddle t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n is."2

b y some that the distinction between the abstract and the c o n c r e t e o u g h t n o l o n g e r t o b e regarded as h a v i n g any special

philosophical significance.

Such recent criticisms as these seem to betray no awareness of the complexity of the problem i n Hegel’s treatment of it (not to mention that of other thinkers such as Whitehead, for e x a m p l e ) . I n what follows I propose to explore the problem o f the abstract and concrete i n H e g e l ’ s Wissenschaft der L o g i k , as a means o f r e - e m p h a s i z i n g the philosophical importance o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n e v e n s h o u l d i t t u r n o u t not to c o i n c i d e i n s i m p l e fashion w i t h the "usual philosophical understanding" o f i t . I n

o r d e r to do this however, one must first address a significant structural question c o n c e r n i n g th e Wissenschaft whole.

der Logik as a

11. The first point to be noticed would be that Hegel’s uses of the terms ‘abstrakt’ a n d ‘konkret’ have a s o m e w h a t special status i n t h e Wissenschaft der Logik: t h e y s e e m to b e q u i t e s i g n i f i c a n t ,

heavily-used terms in Hegel’s exposition there, and yet do not c o n s t i t u t e a n y o f t h e official categories b e l o n g i n g to the s e l f d e v e l o p m e n t o f the C o n c e p t . Rather they a p p e a r more o r less

continuously as aids to exposition throughout both the objective and the s u b j e c t i v e l o g i c s .

The p r e s u m p t i o n

m u s t therefore

be

that these terms are being used either (1) i n their ordinary s e n s e s , ( 2 ) i n their "usual" p h i l o s o p h i c a l s e n s e s , o r ( 3 ) that t h e

sense of each occurrence of these terms can somehow be made o u t from its c o n t e x t .

It is further interesting to note that in the sample of major commentators o n the Logic which I c o n s u l t e d , most d o n o t treat

the distinction between abstract and concrete there as a distinct 2Hale, 3The

87-88,100 n. 4.

critics t o whom I refer here are generally not participants in t h e effort

by some m a t h e m a t i c i a n s and logicians s u c h as Lorenzen, W e y l , Angelelli and o t h e r s t o develop a formal theory of abstraction. Nor d o they refer t o s t u d i e s

of the problem of abstraction in the tradition such as those undertaken by Gabriel Nuchelmans, Judgment amj Promlition from Descartes t o Kant (Amsterdam: North H o l l a n d , 1 9 8 3 ) and t h e two preceding volumes; or Michael Loux, "Toward an Aristotelian Theory of Abstract O b j e c t s , " M i d w e s t S t u d i e s i n

Philosophy, XI (1986) 495ff.

Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s

Logic

61

p r o b l e m ; t h e y e i t h e r use the terms w i t h o u t s p e c i a l c o m m e n t as part o f c o m m o n philosophical p a r l a n c e , o r offer a s i n g l e

definition meant to convey Hegel’s use of the terms o n all occasions. Moreover, as K l i n e has pointed o u t , not all c o m m e n -

tators are equally careful in distinguishing Hegel’s sense o f the terms from the more familiar u s a g e d e r i v i n g from the e m p i r i c i s t tradition. B a i l l i e was one o f the few c o m m e n t a t o r s who treated t h e p r o b l e m o f ‘ a b s t r a c t and “concrete as a c r u c i a l a n d c e n t r a l

issue i n the interpretation of the Wissenschaft der Logik, and I

will pay special attention to his treatment of it below.5 We might b e especially sensitive to this issue i n light of Hegel’s own admonition i n the Preface to the Second Edition that no a t t e m p t to t h i n k through o r criticize the categories o f

the logic can legitimately make use of categories which have not yet themselves emerged from the dialectical process. He declares that an exposition of the science of logic must surpass even mathematics in the degree of rigor with which i t confines itself to operating with terms strictly defined within the logic itself. " S u c h a n e x p o s i t i o n , " H e g e l says, " w o u l d d e m a n d that a t

no stage of the development should any thought-determination o r reflection o c c u r w h i c h does n o t i m m e d i a t e l y e m e r g e a t this

stage a n d that has not entered this stage from the one preceding it." (Logik I , 18; 40) This seems to suggest that the content of the Logic will be nothing other than a record of the selfd e v e l o p m e n t o f the C o n c e p t , c o n t a i n i n g n o e x t r a n e o u s c a t e g o r i es, standpoints, or presuppositions, and hence, presumably, no

distinctive expository standpoint. A n d yet i n the very next remark Hegel confesses that such "an abstract [i.e. ideal] p e r f e c t i o n o f e x p o s i t i o n " is n o t p o s s i b l e : to adhere t o i t w o u l d

mean that we get stuck at the beginning, with what is absolutely s i m p l e . H a v i n g b e e n forbidden to introduce any n o n - d e r i v e d t e r m s , we c o u l d never d i s c o v e r any g r o u n d for d i a l e c t i c a l

4See

" S o m e Recent Reinterpretations

of H e g e l ’ s P h i l o s o p h y , " by G e o r g e L .

Kline, Monist, XLVIII (1964) 34-75. In reviewing eight works on Hegel there, K l i n e raises t h e i s s u e o f t h e abstract a n d t h e concrete i n H e g e l , c r i t i c i z i n g several c o m m e n t a t o r s for carelessness i n h a n d l i n g t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , and offering h i s o w n account o f H e g e l ’ s u s e of t h e terms. 53cc

J . B . Baillie, The Origin and Significance of Hegel’s Logic (1901; repr.,

N e w Y o r k : G a r l a n d , 1 9 8 4 ) . G e o r g e K l i n e has pointed o u t t h a t t h e Russian p h i l o s o p h e r L A . Il’in also discussed H e g e l ’ s use of ‘ a b s t r a c t ’ a n d ‘ c o n c r e t e ’ a t length in Filosofiia Gegelja, kak ucheniie o konkretnosti Bo a i cheloveka [ H e g e l ’s P h i l o s o p h y as a D o c t r i n e o f t h e Concreteness of G o d a n d M a n ] , 2 v o l s .

(Moscow, 1918), also available in German (slightly abridged) as Die Philosophie

Hegels als kont_e_mplative Gotteslehre (Bern: Francke, 1946).

PHILIP T . GRIER

62

movement from within such absolute simplicity. But this entails that there must be a significant distinction between the self-development

o f the C o n c e p t , i . e . the c o n t e n t

of the science of logic strictly speaking, and the exposition of that science.

As Mure pointed out, expanding on this point, in

discussing the categories of Being we shall be unable to avoid m u c h a n t i c i p a t o r y use o f the l a t e r c a t e g o r i e s , a n d i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e C o n c e p t , the c o n v e r s e p r o b l e m a r i s e s . " A s o f B e i n g we s h a l l

have said too m u c h , so of the Concept [Mure: Notion] we shall be saying too little. As we shall have displayed mere Being too concretely, so we shall find ourselves displaying the concrete Concept

too a b s t r a c t l y . " 6

(One

good

reason

for

this

last

observation might have to d o with the difficulty of finite, t e m p o r a l l y - b o u n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s a t t e m p t i n g to grasp the c o n t e n t o f the infinite C o n c e p t , i n w h i c h t i m e has b e e n a n n u l l e d ) . Mure’s suggestion seems overly optimistic in one respect a t least: t h e e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e L o g i c m a y w e l l r e q u i r e n o t m e r e l y

anticipatory uses of categories which will themselves later emerge from the dialectic, but categories o r terms which are f i n a l l y extraneous to t h e d i a l e c t i c . The abstract a n d t h e c o n c r e t e are p r o b a b l y to b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n i n s t a n c e o f the latter sort. T h e y d o n o t , as categories o r c o n c e p t s per s e , e m e r g e from t h e d i a l e c t i c , b u t r a t h e r as e x p o s i t o r y a i d s , continuously accompany the successively emerging moments of t h e d i a l e c t i c . I f t h i s i s i n d e e d t h e c a s e , as I b e l i e v e i t i s , t h e n the question of the distinction between the standpoint of the exposition, and the standpoint of the categories or concepts themselves, in their process of self—development, grows more

serious. G i v e n the over-all aim of the Logic to articulate the entire circle of fundamental categories o r concepts necessary for a rational comprehension of what is actual, the apparently necessary retention of extraneous terms in the exposition might b e t a k e n as a tacit c o n f e s s i o n t h a t t h e p r o j e c t had failed t o a c h i e v e i t s a n n o u n c e d g o a l . O r that the p r o j e c t a p p e a r s to

succeed only with the help of some machinery hidden i n the expository standpoint.

S o , what s h o u l d we s a y a b o u t e x t r a n e o u s t e r m s u s e d i n the

exposition of the Logic which never appear among the "of f icial" categories of the dialectic, a n d yet remain i n the exposition to

6Geoffrey

26.

Mure, A S t u d y of Hegel’s Logi_q (Oxford: University Press, 1950)

Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s Logic the e n d ?

63

To anticipate o n e o f m y o w n c o n c l u s i o n s , I t h i n k the

best, most Hegelian hope we could entertain for such t e r m s , if there b e a n y , would be to s e e t h a t , a l t h o u g h they remain as t e r m s i n the e x p o s i t i o n to the e n d , i t b e c o m e s i n c r e a s i n g l y

difficult to apply them in a straightforward way, because the relatively significant differences which they once marked have n o w b e e n absorbed b y other terms emerging from the dialectic itself; i n s h o r t , t h a t t h e y have b e e n , i f n o t l i t e r a l l y aufgehoben i n the self - d e v e l o p m e n t o f the C o n c e p t ( b e c a u s e t h e y are n o t a n e x p l i c i t m o m e n t o f that d e v e 1 0 p m e n t ) , t h e y have a t least b e e n

rendered superfluous b y the unfolding of the dialectic. A n d one of the clearest indications we could find that this has i n d e e d o c c u r r e d , would b e to d i s c o v e r a series o f apparent "paradoxes": that what m u s t be d es cr ib ed as ‘abstract’ m u s t

equally b e described as ‘concrete’, and that conversely, the ‘concrete’ must also b e described as ‘abstract’ i n certain respects.

A n y attempt to examine Hegel’s use of the terms ‘abstract’ and ‘ c o n c r e t e ’ i n t h e L o g i c m u s t k e e p i n m i n d a series o f v e r y familiar c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g those t e r m s , s o m e o f w h i c h are as follows:

( 1 ) We m u s t r e m e m b e r t h a t t h e first term o f t h e L o g i c , p u r e B e i n g , is said to b e abstract, a n d t h e final t e r m , A b s o l u t e I d e a ,

is said to be concrete. The succession of terms within the Logic is said to be a progression from the most abstract to the most concrete.

(2) Every finite category i s , because finite, abstract. Concepts, o n the oth e r h a n d , i n v o l v i n g Hegel’s "true" i n f i n i t y , a r e as s u c h

concrete. (3)

The b e g i n n i n g o f the L o g i c p r e s u p p o s e s t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f

absolute knowing which was established b y the outcome of the Phenomenology. He n ce Hegel’s treatment o f e . g . B e i n g and N o t h i n g as abstractions, is from the o u t s e t i n f o r m e d w i t h t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f A b s o l u t e K n o w i n g : i . e . t h a t t r u t h a n d self—

certainty are one, that consciousness of what is objectively true will t u r n out to be identical to self -consciousness’s certainty of itself. Hence the abstractness of Being [Nothing] m u s t always b e grasped from that s t a n d p o i n t ; i t is abstract b e c a u s e , e . g . from

within pure Being it cannot be grasped how being truly is what i t declares itself to be: n a m e l y t h e a c t u a l . B u t t h e abstractness

of pure Being must not be interpreted in such a way as to a b a n d o n the s t a n d p o i n t o f a b s o l u t e knowing: t h a t i s , its a b s t r a c t n e s s m u s t n o t be explained b y the s i m p l e separation o f thought

PHILIP T . GRIER

64

from being. (4)

A t the same time we must recall many remarks b y Hegel

s u c h as that "logic is to b e understood as the s y s t e m o f p u r e reason, as the realm o f pure t h o u g h t " and t h a t i t is " t h e

exposition of God as he is i n his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind." (Logik I , 34; 50) More pointedly, he also says, "The system of logic is the realm of shadows, the world of simple essentialities freed from all s e n s u o u s c o n c r e t e n e s s . " (Logik I , 4 2 ; 5 8 ) I f the C o n c e p t is to be

held to be concrete, and not abstract, that is, as having some c o n t e n t , i t w i l l be a challenge to say i n what sense that c o n t e n t

is concrete, since it must be contrasted with "sensuous intuitions and aims, from feelings, from the merely imagined world of figurate conception" (Logik I , 42-43; 58-59) as well as from "se nsuous c o n c r e t e n e s s . "

(5) Again, i n the subjective doctrine of the Concept, i t turns o u t that the concrete a b s t r a c t universality the o t h e r . A b s t r a c t life o f t h e c o n c r e t e

universal i s c a p a b l e o f s e l f - d i r e m p t i o n i n t o o n one hand, and abstract particularity o n universality p l a y s a necessary r o l e i n the c o n c e p t ; the c o n c e p t a c h i e v e s c o n c r e t e n e s s

through its negation of abstract universality. (6)

A sixth consideration which must of course never be lost

from v i e w is that a t t h e c u l m i n a t i o n o f the Science of Logic, the o b j e c t i v e Concept ( t h e A b s o l u t e I d e a ) , which has b e e n declared to be fully concrete and s o m e t h i n g actual, is ne ve rthe less declared to b e enclosed w i t h i n p u r e thought and contrasted

with nature, the sphere of the externality of space and time, into which it "freely releases itself ." O n one hand Hegel says w e must vigorously reject "that estimate of the Idea according to which i t is not anything actual." (Logik III, 174; 756)

7Hegel

remarks t h a t ”Abstraction, therefore, is a sundering of the concrete

and an i s o l a t i n g of i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ; through i t o n l y s i n g l e properties and moments are s e i z e d ; for i t s p r o d u c t must c o n t a i n w h a t i t i s itself. B u t t h e difference b e t w e e n t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f i t s p r o d u c t s and t h e C o n c e p t ’ s [Millerz

Nation’s] individuality is t h a t in the former the individual as content and the universal as form, are d i s t i n c t from o n e another-just

because t h e former i s n o t

present as absolute form, as the Concept [Notion] itself, o r the latter is not present as t h e t o t a l i t y o f form. However, t h i s more d e t a i l e d consideration shows t h a t t h e abstract product i t s e l f is a u n i t y of t h e individual content and t h e abstract universality, and i s therefore a c o n c r e t e and t h e opposite o f w h a t i t aims t o b e . " L o g i k I I I , 5 0 ; 6 1 9 - 2 0 .

Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s

Logic

65

Rather,

...we must recognize that everything actual is only i n so far as i t possesses the Idea and expresses i t .

I t is n o t

merely that the object, the objective and subjective world in general, ought to be congruous with the Idea, b u t they themselves are the congruence of Concept [Millerz Notion] and reality; the reality that does not correspond to the Concept is mere Appearance, the subjective, contingent, capricious e l e m e n t that is not the t r u t h .

(Logik I I I , 174;

756) On the other h a n d , n e v e r t h e l e s s , . . . t h i s Idea

i s s t i l l l o g i c a l , i t is enclosed

within

pure

thought, and is the science only of the divine Concept [Millerz Notion]. True the systematic exposition is itself a realization of the Idea but confined within the same sphere. Because the pure Idea of cognition is so far confined within subjectivity, it is the urge to sublate this, and pure t r u t h as the last result becomes a l s o the beginning of another sphere and science.... (Logik I I I , 2 5 3 ; 8 4 3 ) that o t h e r sphere b e i n g o f course n a t u r e .

Thus the o p p o s i t i o n

between pure thought and nature remains intact i n at least one sense at the e n d o f t h e l o g i c , and i f th e Co n cep t is said to be "fully concrete" i t m u s t b e so w i t h i n the confines o f p u r e thought

In the light of all these seemingly paradoxical considerations which must be taken into account if we are to explicate the terms ‘abstract’ a n d ‘concrete’ w i t h i n H eg el’s L o g i c , i t i s not i m m e d i a t e l y obvious whether w e s h o u l d b e s e a r c h i n g for a s i n g l e , fundamental sense for a l l th e o c c u r r e n c e s o f e a c h t e r m , o r s everal different m e a n i n g s o f th e r e s p e c t i v e te rms p e r h a p s

having some "family resemblance" to each other. I t obviously won’t do to just point to universals and particulars as p a r a d i g m s , as these terms h a v e b e e n taken u p i n t o

the Science of Logic and must themselves now be explicated i n that c o n t e x t .

Moreover, since the most usual understanding

of

the contrast between the universal and the particular tacitly invokes the metaphysical distinction between thought and being i n simple and straightforward fashion as the context in which the universal and the particular are to b e located, we have a d o u b l e b a r r i e r to e m p l o y i n g the usual understanding o f the

PHILIP T . GRIER

66

terms. The only recourse will be a careful scrutiny of Hegel’s t e x t , w i t h the added assistance o f v a r i o u s c o m m e n t a r i e s o n t h e

Logic.

(1) The simplest, most basic definition of ‘abstract’ clearly used b y Hegel would be ‘to separate’: i.e. that to abstract is to s e p a r a t e , to draw a p a r t , the e l e m e n t s o f w h a t b e l o n g s t o g e t h e r as s o m e s o r t o f u n i t y . (This i n c i d e n t a l l y seems c l o s e s t t o t h e

etymology of the word abstract: ‘to draw away’, etc.)

For

e x a m p l e H e g e l d e c l a r e s,

...But reflective understanding took possession of philosophy. We must know exactly what is meant b y this expression which moreover is often used as a slogan; i n general i t stands for the understanding as abstracting, a n d h e n c e as s e p a r a t i n g a n d r e m a i n i n g f i x e d i n its s e p a r a t i o n s .

(Logik I , 29; 45) A n o t h e r e x a m p l e o f this p a r t i c u l a r u s a g e b y H e g e l , t h i s o n e t a k e n from n e a r the e n d o f t h e L o g i c , w as c o n t a i n e d i n a q u o t a t i o n g i v e n above: " A b s t r a c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , i s a sundering o f the concrete a n d a n isolating o f i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ; t h r o u g h i t o n l y s i n g l e p r o p e r t i e s a n d m o m e n t s a r e s e i z e d . . . " (Logik I I I , 5 0 ;

619)

(2) A closely related def inition8 of ‘abstraction’ would focus on the result o f the action o f s e p a r a t i n g w h a t b e l o n g s t o g e t h e r r e f e r r e d to i n the p r e v i o u s d e f i n i t i o n and d e c l a r e t h a t a b s t r a c t i o n is " a partial o r o n e - s i d e d v i e w o f things."9 T h i s is i n fact

the definition given b y John G r i e r Hibben in his commentary on the Logic.

He i s o n e o f the few c o m m e n t a t o r s

who addres-

ses this issue explicitly and ventures to offer a single, a l l -

8Whether

t h e r e m a i n i n g " d e fi n i t i o n s " o f ‘ a b s t r a c t ’ and ‘ c o n c r e t e ’ as I have given t h e m h e r e s h o u l d be t r e a t e d as g e n u i n e l y d i s t i n c t d e f i n i t i o n s , as e x t e n s i o n s of t h e most fundamental s e n s e w h i c h o n e m i g h t s u p p o s e t o be g i v e n i n m y first " d e fi n i t i o n , " o r w h e t h e r all s i x of t h e s e e l e m e n t s o u g h t t o be conceived as aspects of a s i n g l e c o m p l e t e exposition o f t h e m e a n i n g of t h e terms for H e g e l seems t o b e o p e n for d i s c u s s i o n , b u t n o t a c r u c i a l p r o b l e m . 9John

12.

Grier Hibben, Hegel’s Logic (1902; repr., New York: Garland, 1984)

Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s

Logic

67

purpose definition for the term.10 As an illustration of this sense of the term, most of the remarks Hegel makes about abstract universality in the s u b j e c t i v e d o c t r i n e o f the C o n c e p t s e e m explicable i n t h i s w a y . (3)

A g a i n , b y extrapolation

from

the previous d e f i n i t i o n ,

a

third definition of ‘abstract’, a more distinctively Hegelian one, can be formulated: the abstract i n this sense would b e whatever is conceived as merely positive, lacking i n negativity. This definition of abstraction derives from Hegel’s account of identity (i.e. abstract o r formal identity) as opposed to identityin-difference. In the Doctrine of Essence in the Encyclopedia Logic Hegel remarks, . . . I n o p p o s i t i o n the t h i n g d i s t i n g u i s h e d has n o t m e r e l y an

other, b u t its other over against it.

The common c o n -

s c i o u s n e s s treats differents as i n d i f f e r e n t to o n e a n o t h e r . One says: I am a man and r o u n d m e are a i r , w a t e r ,

animals and other things in general. Everything there falls apart.

A g a i n s t this the aim o f p h i l o s o p h y i s to b a n i s h

indifference, and to recognize the necessity of things, so that the o t h e r appears

to stand

o v e r against

its o t h e r .

(Enz. (1830), § 119, Zu.; 173-174)

This account of the identity of a thing necessarily involving its o t h e r , w i t h r o o t s i n Plato’s Sophist a n d t h e r e s p o n s e to P a r m e n i d e s , i s o f c o u r s e c e n t r a l to t h e d i a l e c t i c . The a b s t r a c t i s w h a t fails t o e x h i b i t i t s i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h i t s o t h e r . A s H e g e l

remarks just below i n the Encyclopedia Logic, . . . E v e r y t h i n g i s o p p o s i t e . N eith er i n h e a v e n n o r i n e a r t h , n e i t h e r i n t h e world o f m i n d nor o f n a t u r e , is there a n y w h e r e s u c h a n abstract ‘ E i t h e r - o r ’ a s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a i n t a i n s . Whatever e x i s t s i s c o n c r e t e , w i t h difference a n d o p p o s i t i o n i n itself. The f i n i t u d e o f t h i n g s w i l l t h e n lie i n t h e w a n t o f correspondence b e t w e e n t h e i r i m m e d i a t e b e i n g , and what t h e y e s s e n t i a l l y a r e . ( E n z . ( 1 8 3 0 ) , § 1 1 9 , Zu. 2 ; 1 7 4 )

10Hibben i n c l u d e s t h e following entry i n t h e " G l o s s a r y " a t t h e e n d o f t h e A b s t r a k t : A o n e - s i d e d a n d p a r t i a l v i e w of a n y o b j e c t of k n o w commentary: l e d g e ; a term u s e d i n contrast t o c o n c r e t e , w h i c h s i g n i fi e s a c o m p r e h e n s i v e v i e w

of things embracing all possible considerations as t o t h e nature of t h e things t h e m s e l v e s , t h e i r origin, and

(295)

t h e manifold

relations

which

they

may

sustain.

PHILIP T . GRIER

68

(4) A fourth way to conceive of abstraction in distinctively Hegelian terms would be to identify it with what is merely immediate. For example Hegel claims that "the essential a n d real universal, when taken merely i n its immediacy, is a mere abstract universal...." (Enz. (1830), § 74, 221.; 108) Since, as H e g e l e x p l a i n s , " t h e whole o f t h e s e c o n d p a r t o f the L o g i c , the Doctrine o f E s s e n c e , is a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e intrinsic and s e l f -

affirming unity of immediacy and mediation" (Enz. (1830), § 65, Z u . ; 1 0 1 ) i t is obvious that to take s o m e t h i n g as merely i m -

mediate is to take it i n abstraction. Of course it is true that the result of mediation is once again something immediate, e.g. a c o n c r e t e notion p r e s e n t to c o n s c i o u s n e s s , n o t a n abstraction.

But

in this case mediation is not absent; i t has been sublated i n the r e s u l t w h i c h is immediate.

On the o t h e r h a n d , H e g e l criticized

immediate intuition (e.g. faith based upon feelinlg) as another instance of what is merely, abstractly immediate. (5)

Another distinctive meaning of abstraction for Hegel, it

seems to m e , would b e that w h i c h arrests the m o v e m e n t o f t h o u g h t , o r h a l t s t h e s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t o f the c o n c e p t , p r e v e n t i n g the t r a n s i t i o n , for e x a m p l e , from a t h o u g h t o b j e c t t o its o t h e r , confronting t h o u g h t w i t h w h a t is f i x e d . E x a m p l e s o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e n s e o f ‘ a b s t r a c t i o n ’ a b o u n d i n the t e x t . I n o n e o f

the quotations used above to illustrate the first sense of abstract i o n as s e p a r a t i n g , H e g e l a c t u a l l y b r o u g h t i n this l a s t s e ns e as well: . . . B u t reflective u n d ers tan d in g t o o k possession o f p h i l o s o p h y . We m u s t k n o w e x a c t l y what is meant b y this e x p r e s s i o n w h i c h moreover is often used as a s l o g a n ; i n general

i t stands for the understanding as abstracting, and hence as s e p a r a t i n g

and

remaining

fixed

in its separations."

[Emphasis mine] Also, i n his third Remark o n Being toward the beginning of the Logic, he argues that the unity comprised b y the inseparable m o m e n t s , b e i n g and n o t h i n g , m u s t be c o n c e i v e d ”as a third thing

different from both, namely becoming. He continues,

...Now wherever and i n whatever form being and nothing are i n q u e s t i o n , t h i s t h i r d m u s t b e p r e s e n t ; for the t w o terms have n o s e p a r a t e s u b s i s t e n c e o f t h e i r o w n b u t are

11For

a helpful discussion o f t h i s p o i n t , see Errol E . Harris, An I n t e r p r e t a -

tion of t h e Logic of Hegel (New York: University Press of America, 1983) 75-81.

Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s

Logic

69

only in becoming, in this third. But this third has many empirical shapes, which are set aside o r ignored b y abstraction i n order to h o l d fast, each b y itself, these its products, being and n o t h i n g , and to s h o w t h e m p r o t e c t e d

against transition. (Logik I , 80-81; 93)

This particular sense of ‘to abstract’ is intimately connected with the dialectic itself, and thus a distinctively Hegelian use of the term.

(6)

F i n a l l y , there seems to me to b e p o s s i b l y a s i x t h m e a n i n g

of abstraction involved in the exposition of the Logic which cannot quite be identified with any of the foregoing: that is the notion of the abstract as the contentless, the empty (or what is often equivalent, the merely formal). As Hegel remarks in the Introduction, ...When logic is taken as the science of thinking i n general, it is understood that this thinking constitutes the mere form of a cognition, that logic abstracts from all content.... (Logik I , 2 8 ; 4 3 ) . . . B u t i n t h e first p lace i t is q u i t e i n e p t to say t h a t logic abstracts from a l l content, t h a t i t teaches o n l y the r u l e s o f t h i n k i n g w i t h o u t an y reference to what is t h o u g h t o r

without being able to consider its nature. For as thinking and t h e r u l e s o f t h i n k i n g are s u p p o s e d to b e the s u b j e c t matter o f l o g i c , these d i r e c t l y c o n s t i t u t e i t s p e c u l i a r

content; i n them, logic has that second constituent, a m a t t e r , a b o u t the nature o f w h i c h i t i s c o n c e r n e d .

(Logik

I, 28; 44) The categories of the Logic then are not, simply qua logical c a t e g o r i e s , e m p t y o f c o n t e n t ; to find o n e s o is to treat i t as a n abstraction. This list o f various uses o f the term ‘ a b s t r a c t i o n ’ i n the L o g i c s u g g e s t s , perhaps not s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h a t H e g e l has a d o p t e d

a pre-philosophical sense of the term [to draw away, to s e p a r a t e ] , extended its m e a n i n g i n various d i r e c t i o n s c o n n e c t e d w i t h his o w n d i s t i n c t i v e m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s , and p u t these

additional meanings to work in the exposition of the Concept. The intelligibility of these specific uses of the term ‘abstraction’ is thus tied to the intelligibility of some of Hegel’s most distinctive logical and ontological claims.

PHILIP T . GRIER

7O

The s i x s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s p r e s e n t e d a b o v e as c o n d i -

tions o r constraints o n the intelligibility of Hegel’s uses of the terms ‘abstract’ a n d ‘ c o n c r e t e ’ p o i n t t o w a r d s o m e o f t h e m o s t

conspicuous difficulties i n the way of comprehending his uses o f the terms ‘abstract’ and ‘ c o n c r e t e ’ . To s u m m a r i z e s o m e o f t h e s e s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a g a i n ,

the Logic as a whole must be conceived as depicting a progress i o n from the m o s t abstract to t h e m o s t c o n c r e t e . That p r o g r e s s i o n m u s t b e c o n c e i v e d as c o m m e n c i n g from the s t a n d p o i n t o f a b s o l u t e k n o w i n g , t h a t is from the s t a n d p o i n t o f the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t s e l f - c e r t a i n t y and t r u t h a r e o n e , that the c o n t e n t o f s e l f c o n s c i o u s S p i r i t a n d Reality a r e o n e . This m u s t n o t be u n d e r s t o o d h o w e v e r as a c o m p l e t e e r a s u r e o f the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n

thought and being; the dialectic of categories within the Logic, t h e s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t o f the C o n c e p t , takes place w i t h i n t h o u g h t as o p p o s e d to n a t u r e . Therefore the p r o g r e s s i o n from the m o s t a b s t r a c t to the m o s t c o n c r e t e m u s t a l s o b e c o n c e i v e d a s t a k i n g place within thought. Finally we must cope with the claim that t h e A b s o l u t e I d e a is i n s o m e s e n s e the A c t u a l , w h i l e a c k -

nowledging that the Idea is still only logical, enclosed within p u r e t h o u g h t , a n d is the s c i e n c e o n l y o f t h e d i v i n e C o n c e p t .

III. A m o n g t h e c o m m e n t a t o r s w i t h w h o m I am f a m i l i a r , o n l y t h e venerable B a i l l i e has e x p l i c i t l y c o n n e c t e d this p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m o r ( s e t o f p r o b l e m s ) w i t h t h e issue o f ‘ a b s t r a c t i o n ’ a n d t r e a t e d t h e e n t i r e c o m p l e x as a c r u c i a l i n t e r p r e t i v e c h a l l e n g e .

H e describes this issue of the reality attributed b y Hegel to the concepts [notions] as "one of the most difficult a n d vulnerable points i n the system"12 and devotes a significant a m o u n t of s p a c e to r e s o l v i n g t h e s e p u z z l e s , i n t h e p r o c e s s a l s o d e v i s i n g a

distinctively Hegelian doctrine of abstraction. Using the term ‘reality’ in place of ‘actuality’, Baillie ackn o w l e d g e s that t h e t e r m is a m b i g u o u s , a n d u n t i l we e x p l i c a t e t h e s e n s e o f t h a t term as a p p l i e d t o c o n c e p t s [ n o t i o n s ] we c a n n o t

grasp what it means to talk about concepts [notions] being real. " C o n c e p t s , " ["Notions"] as H e g e l a c k n o w l e d g e s , " c a n n o t b e s e e n

a n d handled....[T]hey are not forces which...act; concepts [notions] are merely the devitalized shades of living individuali-

12The

Origin and Significance of Hegel’s Logic, 235.

Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s

Logic

71

t y . " ( 2 3 2 ) Baillie lists three p o s s i b l e m e a n i n g s o f ‘reality’: ( 1 ) s e n s e r e a l i t y , ( 2 ) ideal r e a l i t y , e . g . w h e n we s p e a k o f a L a w o f N a t u r e , o r the Constitution o f a S t a t e , as r e a l , ( 3 ) i n d i v i d u a l reality, e.g. a given human being. (232) Concepts [notions] o b v i o u s l y cannot b e real in the first o r third s e n s e s , b u t , B a i l l i e

argues, they must be viewed as real in the second sense. "Even if we regard them merely as "principles" in the ordinary signification of the t e r m , i.e. as ideally constructed determining forms, they would be considered real; for every principle which d e t e r m i n e s e x p e r i e n c e is tak en to b e a " real p r i n c i p l e . " ( 2 3 2 ) B y

themselves the concepts [notions] are not experience, nor a substitute for it; but since these concepts [notions] constitute the e s s e n t i a l meaning o f e x p e r i e n c e , e x p e r i e n c e in itself e x i s t s i n

and through these conceptions. Finally, Baillie acknowledges, we- may truthfully maintain that the concepts [notions] are abstracted from experience, and therefore i n another s e n s e n o t r e a l i t y .

B u t , h e s a y s , "we m u s t

distinguish abstraction which is ultimately false from abstraction which is still ultimate truth." (234) Quoting Baillie, W h e r e we have o n e e l e m e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e c u t loose from

the concrete life of experience (e.g. where subject is taken per se apart from object), there, says Hegel, we have false abstraction; we restrict the content considered to one a s p e c t , a n d c u t i t o u t o f its actual c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e w h o l e , which alone is t r u e , for the " t r u t h is t h e w h o l e . "

But where the content dealt with is considered as determining

and

determined

by

the

whole,

as

explicitly

involving the system of experience to which i t belongs, that content though abstract is a true abstract, for i t is concrete as e x p e r i e n c e i t s e l f . Thus the c o n c e p t s [ n o t i o n s ] , because n o t taken as s u b j e c t i v e n o r as o b j e c t i v e , b u t as c o n t i t u t i v e o f e x p e r i e n c e as a w h o l e , are u l t i m a t e t r u t h s o f e x p e r i e n c e , and n o t mere a b s t r a c t i o n s . ( 2 3 4 )

Admitting that the concepts are still cut off from elements of experience such as sense, he nevertheless makes three points. F i r s t , t h a t abstraction i n s o m e form is a n i n e s c a p a b l e c o n d i t i o n

of there being a n y knowledge at all, since we cannot talk about the universe i n the entirety of its contents a t once. To consider the universe as a whole is itself an abstraction because we c u t off the whole from i t s p a r t s . S e c o n d , i f we d e n y t h a t a b s t r a c -

tion i n a n y sense can be reality, then i t is clear that b y reality w e m e a n i n d i v i d u a l i t y , and t h a t i n this s e n s e there is n o t h i n g

real but experience as a whole, in its completeness. "There is

PHILIP T . GRIER

72

no doubt truth i n this view, but if this is the only reality to be spoken o f , then reality e n t i r e l y e l u d e s the grasp o f any k n o w ( 2 3 4 - 3 5 ) W e are c o n f i n e d to the c h o i c e o f ledge at all." k n o w i n g the universe step b y s t e p , part b y part, o r claiming

knowledge of its fundamental content i n some general sense; b u t none of these is knowledge of the completed individuality which alone is the A b s o l u t e . Third, reality m u s t therefore b e c o n fessed to have more than o n e m e a n i n g , and w e m u s t allow a distinction between abstraction w h i c h eliminates a l l r e a l i t y , from

the abstraction which is simply a form o r sphere of the content of reality. The latter, he claims, is the sense i n which Hegel’s concepts can be said to be abstract. (235)

The intelligibility of Baillie’s assertion that there is a kind o f ( t r u e ) abstraction " w h i c h i s s i m p l y a form o r s p h e r e o f the

content of reality" still seems to depend upon the intelligibility of some of the more difficult underlying themes of Hegel’s Logic. He is quite right in suggesting that the sense i n which r e a lity as a w h o l e c a n be g ras p ed b y t h o u g h t a t a l l , m u c h less

declared identical i n content is very difficult to see. As he implies, any momentary "grasp" of reality b y finite thought could only b e of some abstraction which is meant to stand for the whole (and of course fails miserably to include the infinite detail of actuality); such a n abstraction could not be i n a n y se ns e i d e n t i c a l i n c o n t e n t

with the actual.

The

explication

which he does give (that there is a kind of abstraction which is simply "a form or sphere of the content of reality") clearly p r e s u p p o s e s the d o c t r i n e o f t h e C o n c e p t i n which i t is t r u e to sa y that a s i n g l e abstract m o m e n t c o u l d b e taken to c o n t a i n , t h o u g h o n l y i m p l i c i t l y , the c o n t e n t o f t h e concrete whole o f

which it is a moment. But in neither of these alternatives as spelled o u t b y Baillie d o we see the ground for the implicit assurance that what is grasped i n thought is in a n y sense the content of the actual. To attain s u c h a s s u r a n c e , o r t o s e e how H e g e l t h o u g h t i t could be attained, we must return to the standpoint of absolute

knowing o r "systematic science" reached at the end of the Phenomenology.

I t i s this last s h a p e o f S p i r i t , i n which

the

content of the objective world is grasped i n the form of spirit’s consciousness o f s e l f , i n w h i c h s e l f - c o n s c i o u s s p i r i t realizes i t s

o w n Concept, that Hegel provided his account of the ground of this assurance. The assurance of the identity of content between thought (as the Concept) and reality is obtained only as a result of the teleological process, the "highway of despair" which c o n s c i o u s n e s s suffers and e n d u r e s , the confrontation

of conscious-

Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s Logic

73

ness with each successive shape of the objective world, negating and superseding them m o m e n t b y m o m e n t i n the process w h i c h

finally results in the identity of the truth of the objective world and the self -certainty o f self - c o n s c i o u s s p i r i t . What is c r u c i a l o f course is t h a t t h i s last i d e n t i t y c a n b e e x p r e s s e d o n l y i n terms o f the C o n c e p t , and t h e i n f i n i t e

capacity of thought for self -negation which is involved i n the emergence of self-conscious Spirit. The identity of content between the objective world and thought, expressible only i n t e r m s o f the C o n c e p t , is possible n o t o n l y because t h e C o n c e p t

is infinite ( i n Hegel’s sense of the ‘true’ infinite), b u t because i t is timeless.

appears i n Time

"...Spirit necessarily appears in Time,

and it

just so long as i t has not grasped its pure

C o n c e p t [Millerz N o t i o n ] , i . e . has not a n n u l l e d T i m e . "

(Phiin.,

429; 487) Spirit’s grasping of itself i n the form of the Concept is its annullment of Time. The late John Findlay has pointed out that this must not be interpreted as an Hegelian doctrine of the "unreality" of t i m e , as i n McTaggart and Bradley, b u t only that i n t h e final i n s i g h t o f p h i l o s o p h y , Time w i l l b e e x p u n g e d o r a n n u l l e d , b u t this ‘ a n n u l m e n t ’ stands for no m e t a -

physical or theological timelessness, b u t for an annulment in and for philosophy. It means t h a t , for th e p h i l o s o p h e r , c o n c e p t s are u n i v e r s a l and p r i n c i p l e s t r u e , and t h a t t h e precise m o m e n t at w h i c h a n y o n e a p p r o p r i a t e s t h e m i s

completely unimportant.13 One can agree with Findlay’s point, b u t i t remains true b o t h that t h e e m e r g e n c e o f self - c o n s c i o u s n e s s for s p i r i t i n t i m e

involves the explicit recognition of the infinite capacity of thought to "negate," to distinguish itself from, its objective c o n t e n t , and t h a t t h e C o n c e p t , i n w h i c h the u l t i m a t e i d e n t i t y o f content o f t h o u g h t and being can b e expressed p r e s u p p o s e s the

actual exercise of this infinite capacity of thought for "negation" of its objects. To

summarize,

the

intelligibility of

many

of

Hegel’s

remarks involving the abstract and the concrete, especially toward the end of the Logic presupposes an identity between

13John

N. Findlay, The

Philosophy

of H e g e l : an I n t r o d u c t i o n

Examination (New York: Macmillan, 1958) 146.

and Re-

PHILIP T . GRIER

74

the c o n t e n t o f t h o u g h t a n d t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e a c t u a l ( e x p r e s s e d

i n the Concept), a n d that identity can be explicated only by reference to the " i n f i n i t u d e " a n d t h e " t i m e l e s s n e s s " o f t h e C o n c e p t . I t seems to m e t h a t B a i l l i e i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n framed a significant question, but his answer, and the doctrine of abstraction which he formulated, fell short of an adequate

treatment of the problem, because he failed to bring the Concept,

its infinitude

and

timelessness, explicitly into that

account. To f i n a l l y a s s e r t t h e c o n c l u s i o n w h i c h I s k e t c h e d o u t somewhat earlier in the paper, it seems to me that in the end

Hegel’s use of the terms ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ is so i n t e r w o v e n w i t h h i s d o c t r i n e o f t h e C o n c e p t t h a t a n y a t t e m p t to m a k e sens e o f a l l t h e o c c u r r e n c e s o f t h o s e t w o t e r m s i n the t e x t

while ignoring the doctrine of the Concept is bound to collapse i n a h e a p o f a p p a r e n t p a r a d o x e s . F r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f the d o c t r i n e o f t h e C o n c e p t , h o w e v e r , i t s e e m s to m e that t h e t h r e a t e n i n g c o n f u si o n c a n b e h e l d a t b a y , an d the d i f f i c u l t y a t

least located where i t probably belongs: i n the challenge of comprehending all the implications of Hegel’s doctrine of the C o n c e p t . I a m therefore i n c l i n e d t o s a y t h a t t h e o t h e r p o s s i b l e

problem which I raised concerning the distinction between the content of the science of logic and the exposition of that science t u r n s o u t to b e m a n a g e a b l e a l o n g t h e s a m e lines: t h e s i g n i f i c a n t challenge appears to remain that of comprehending the content of the science of logic, and not in exploring the expository s t a n d p o i n t as a k i n d o f supra—logic w h i c h m i g h t c o n t a i n s o m e s e c r e t k e y t o the l o g i c i t s e l f ( t h o u g h t h e i n t r i g u i n g q u e s t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e two d o e s n o t s e e m t o m e e n t i r e l y dissolved).

IV.

What moral can be extracted from this tale, especially i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the c u r r e n t d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e a b s t r a c t / c o n c r e t e

distinction pointed o u t i n the beginning of this paper? O n e seemingly inescapable conclusion I would d r a w is that, if the above discussion is correct, then Hegel’s doctrine of abstraction

is not finally intelligible apart from the details of his most d i s t i n c t i v e c o n c e p t i o n , the C o n c e p t , t h e e x p l i c a t i o n o f w h i c h i s , in a sense, the whole burden of the Logic. This in turn con-

stitutes some reason for agreeing with the contemporary critics that we ought to be chary about assuming that there is a "stand a r d " phi1050phical d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n

abstract and concrete

Abstract and Concrete in Hegel’s

Logic

which will serve in most philosophical contexts.

75 The reasons

given here for agreeing with several of those critics’ conclusions a r e , h o w e v e r , q u i t e r e m o t e f r o m what m o s t o f t h e m ha d i n mind. Perhaps i t is true that we c a n r e l y u p o n s o m e v e r y elementary sense of ‘abstraction’ as ‘separating’ or ‘drawing a w a y ’ , o r ‘ e m p t y i n g ’ , b u t t h e s e a r e its p r e - p h i l o s o p h i c a l s e n s e s .

The philosophical significance of this distinction lies i n the extrapolations of these senses, a n d their applications i n specific metaphysical contexts. To suppose that the distinction can be safely made o u t in most contexts by reference either to the contrast

between

the

particular

an d

the

universal

or

that

between the set a n d the individual is merely to remind ourselves that a great deal of philosophizing is done in contexts in which t h e s e t e r m s have i m m e d iate a n d s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d a p p l i c a t i o n . B u t as o n e leaves t h e s e c o n t e x t s b e h i n d , the abstract/concrete

distinction is one which must always to some extent be forged a n e w , and as Hegel’s text instructs us, it is naive to assume that we can approach any of the major metaphysical systems already

knowing what ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ mean.

Dickinson College

A Reply to Philip Grier by Errol

Professor

Grier’s

paper

E. Harris

is

especially stimulating and

important, because i t draws attention to a significant point in Hegel’s Logic which the great majority of commentators have overlooked or neglected, and it urges us to think again about a matter commonly taken for granted, where most Hegelians fail to see any problem.

The crucial issue is the relation between

exposition and subject-matter in what Hegel calls Wissenschaft, characteristic of a level of self-consciousness capable of absolute knowing. At this level, ‘scientific’ treatment of the matter in hand requires that no presuppositions are accepted without rational support, and that the categories used have developed

themselves in the course of the dialectic native to the subject. Professor Grier asks how this demand affects the use by Hegel, and the meaning ‘concrete’, which

he gives to them, o f the terms ‘abstract’ and are repeatedly employed in the exposition o f

the Logic, and yet are not official categories in the course of its dialectical process. This is an important and intricate problem

to which little attention has been paid by commentators, an oversight of which, among the rest, I am myself guilty. Before tackling the question head-on, a word may be said

about some of the preliminary difficulties to which Professor Grier draws attention. The modern writers he cites, who fail to find consistent meaning for the distinction between abstract and concrete, and so consider i t unsatisfactory, are merely rediscovering the facts, on which Hegel perpetually insisted, that opposites are in the end identical, which is true not only o f this,

but of all similar distinctions. If one of the distincta is stressed to the exclusion o f the other i t will, o f course, tend to turn into its opposite and to contradict itself; so neither side o f the distinction, taken in isolation, appears self—consistent. This applies to all the examples and different interpretations that Professor G r i e r gives, and he is entirely right in noting that there is insufficient ground for the supposition that our ontology

can be divided exhaustively in this way between two f undamental phi1030phical kinds, the abstract and the concrete. N o good Hegelian would ever entertain such a supposition, and the modern writers who find i t unacceptable have, once again,

merely discovered that thinking on the level of the understanding always ultimately proves self-frustrating and unsatisfactory. This reflection will also throw light, at least in some measure,

on the "seemingly paradoxical considerations" listed by Professor 77

ERROL E . HARRIS

78

G r i e r , to w h i c h I s h a l l p r e s e n t l y r e t u r n . The q u e s t i o n n e x t arises a b o u t H e g e l ’ s u s e o f these t e r m s .

Is i t "in their ordinary sense?" But what is their ordinary sense? When I was a boy at school I was taught that an abstract noun was t h e name o f s o m e t h i n g you c o u l d n o t see o r t o u c h , and t h a t a concrete n o u n name s o m e p e r c e p t i b l e and solid o b j e c t . Is this the "ordinary s e n s e ? " I f s o , i t i s n o t o n e that e v e n e m p i r i c i s t philosophers w o u l d e n d o r s e . J o h n L o c k e , for i n s t a n c e , is m u c h more s u b t l e . "The m i n d , " he m a i n t a i n s , " m a k e s the particular

ideas received from particular objects to become general; which is done by considering them as they are i n the mind such appearances—separate from a l l o t h e r e x i s t e n c e s , a n d the c i r cumstances o f e x i s t e n c e , as t i m e , p l a c e , o r a n y o t h e r c o n -

comitant ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas t a k e n from particular b e i n g s b e c o m e g e n e r a l representatives o f

all of the same kind."1 So the distinction of particular from general (or universal) is introduced, and it is no "ordinary" sense of the words ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ that is now being offered, b u t rather a " p h i l o s o p h i c a l " s e n s e . I t i s , h o w e v e r , a p h i l o s o p h i -

cal sense that is by no means common to all phi1050phers, and (as Professor Grier makes evident) it is not ad0pted, nor constantly adhered to, by Hegel. I n fact, the "philosophical" sense is what is in question in this discussion. So far as context s e e m s to d e t e r m i n e t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e t e r m s are u s e d , i t still depends on how they are, or may be, defined, and that a g a i n , we are t o l d , a p p e ars to v a r y .

The s i x p r e s u m e d H e g e l i a n d e f i n i t i o n s t h a t are s e t o u t i n G r i e r ’ s p a p e r a l l l e a d back to t h e first: abstraction is p r i m a r i l y d e f i n e d a s t h e ‘ d r a w i n g o u t ’ f r o m t h e c o n c r e t e whole o f s o m e p a r t i a l e l e m e n t , w h i c h is then c o n s i d e r e d , o r a s s u m e d to b e , s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , a n d held i n is o latio n from the r e s t . T h e o t h e r s u g g e s t e d d e f i n i t i o n s are m a i n l y e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n s , o r a p p l i c a t i o n s

of the first—corollaries o r consequences, as (in some cases) D r . G r i e r himself intimates. "To think apart of things that are together," wrote R . G . Collingwood, "is to think of them as they are

not, and

t o p l e a d t h a t this i n i t i a l s e v e r a n c e

makes

no

essential difference to their inner nature is only to erect falsification into a principle."2 This might be taken as a text o n

l.

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,

20f.

R . G . Collingwood, Speculum Mentis (Oxford: University Press, 1924,

1963)160.

B k . 11, C h . x i , § 9 .

A Reply to Philip Grier

which

to base a n y

discussion of

79

Hegel’s use of

the terms

‘abstract’ a n d ‘concrete’. The restriction that Hegel lays down in the Preface to the Second Edition of Wissenschaft der Logik, which Professor Grier quotes, is that no category ought to be used o r relied u p o n i n t h e e x p o s i t i o n that has n o t e m e r g e d an d does n o t e n t e r t h e s t a g e o f d e v e l o p m e n t i n w h i c h i t is o p e r a t i v e from t h a t i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g . T h i s , h o w e v e r , refers to c a t e g o r i e s , a n d w e m u s t as k w h a t H e g e l really m e a n t b y a c a t e g o r y a nd w h e t h e r

abstraction and its opposite are, strictly speaking, categories a t a l l — o r , i f n o t , j u s t what f u n c t i o n

they serve.

Again, Hegel

admits (and advisedIY), as Professor Grier has noted, that no e x p o s i t i o n o f t h i s s c i e n c e c a n , i n f a c t , o b s e r v e t h e r e q u i r e d role

i n an unqualified manner.

The reason he gives is that the

science begins with what is absolutely simple, so that it would b e unable to p r o c e e d f u r t h e r u n l e s s i t a n t i c i p a t e d and d r e w

upon what was later to emerge.

This is no inconsistency o n

H e g e l ’ s p a r t , for the d i a l e c t i c a l p r o c e s s , as I s h a l l s h o r t l y e x p l a i n , m u s t i n v o l v e Aufhebung, the s u p e r s e s s i o n a l o n g w i t h t h e

preservation of every finite phase. Accordingly, a n y a n d every category, s h o r t o f the excludes and implies its e x t e n t w h a t is y e t to before. To b e g i n w i t h

Absolute itself, in some sense, other. Hence it must anticipate to c o m e a n d p r e s u p p o s e w h a t has the most simple is, therefore, to

both some gone have

before one what is implicitly more complex; yet i t is only b y u n f o l d i n g t h e se i m p l i c a t i o n s i n a s t r i c t a n d p r o p e r s e q u e n c e t h a t t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r c a n b e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y d e v e l o p e d . The b e g i n -

ning of the Logic (with pure Being), although i t is logically p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s , d o e s at the same t i m e n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l y a t l e a s t t h e d i a l e c t i c a l process o f t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y , w h i c h has r a i s e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s to the l e v e l o f a b s o l u t e k n o w i n g , b e l o w w h i c h n o g e n u i n e wissenschaftliche b e g i n n i n g c a n b e m a d e a t a l l . The a p p a r e n t e x e r c i s e o f h i n d s i g h t i n t h e P r e f a c e , there— fore, is dialectically vindicated.

L e t u s t h e n r e t u r n to o u r c e n t r a l c o n c e r n , the r e l a t i o n o f

exposition to subject matter. We have learned from the P h e n omenology that the truth is the whole, b u t that i t is not what it i s i n t r u t h u n t i l t h e e n d a n d o u t c o m e o f its o w n s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t (Sichselbstwerden). I t is t h u s o n l y a t t h e e n d t h a t we s h a l l b e i n a p o s i t i o n to s o r t o u t the k i n d o f i s s u e , a n d s o l v e t h e k i n d o f p r o b l e m t h a t l i e s before u s . A s Professor G r i e r c o n t e n d s , t h e d o c t r i n e o f the C o n c e p t , and e s p e c i a l l y t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e I d e a , i s i m p o r t a n t for i t s s o l u t i o n .

ERROL E . HARRIS

80

The w h o l e is g e n u i n e l y w h o l e o n l y i n i t s f u l l , s y s t e m a t i c , s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , and i t d i f f e r e n t i a t e s itself i n t o p a r t s w h i c h , to form a w h o l e , are ( a n d m u s t b e ) m u t u a l l y a d a p t e d , a n d This i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d as i t s o r d e r i n g p r i n c i p l e d i c t a t e s .

ordering principle is the concrete universal, having (as Hegel puts it) its particulars within itself. Accordingly, while the parts are i n the whole and constitute its determinate unity, the whole is also immanent i n every o n e of the parts and "informs e a c h p a r t with t h e nature o f t h e w h o l e " ( t o u s e t h e w o r d s o f F . H. Bradley). Consequently, every part is itself a provisional w h o l e , a l t h o u g h as partial a n d p r o v i s i o n a l i t has a n i s u s t o

develop what is merely implicit i n it (an sick), and to become a m o r e adequate e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n o f the u n i v e r s a l o r d e r i n g principle (the Concept). S o , i n t h e L o g i c , H e g e l defines a

category as a provisional definition of the Absolute. Each is a concept, and a provisional version of the Concept, which, h e declares, is i n truth what the others are only i n some degree.

Now, the whole is obviously concrete, and it is wholeness, o r integrity, that defines concreteness. What is ‘drawn away’, o r s e p a r a t e d o u t , from t h e w h o l e , a n d h e l d a p a r t from i t a n d from i t s c o n c o m i t a n t o t h e r , i s t h u s a b s t r a c t . B u t a s a n y s u c h

abstracted element, to be what it is, o r i n fact to be anything intelligible a t all, must somehow reflect the organizing principle o f the w h o l e to w h i c h i n p r i n c i p l e i t b e l o n g s , i t i s i m p l i c i t l y w h a t i t has i n i t to b e c o m e . Thus i t i s , as we h a v e s a i d , i n some degree whole in itself, and is a provisional expression, an

exemplification a t a certain stage of development, of the ultimate concrete universal. Everything, therefore is both c o n c r e t e a n d a b s t r a c t i n s o m e d e g r e e , s o l o n g a s i t fa lls s h o r t i n a n y r e s p e c t o f t h e A b s o l u t e . So e v e r y "of f icial" c a t e g o r y i n t h e Logic exemplifies this unity of opposites, and we most certainly

cannot affirm a n ontological dichotomy between abstract a n d concrete. This is precisely why the understanding creates c o n f u s i o n w h e n i t a t t e m p t s t o i d e n t i f y t h e a b s t r a c t w i t h , a n d to confine it to, the universal, and the concrete to the particular,

only to discover that the particular is equally (if not even more) abstract.

The dialectical relationship between successive categories is, therefore, complex. As each is only a provisional definition o f the A b s o l u t e , i t is i n s o m e d e g r e e i n a d e q u a t e t o i t s o w n c o n c e p t , a n d s o m u s t b e s u p e r s e d e d . A s far as t h i s is t h e c a s e , i t is f i n i t e , l i m i t e d b y w h a t l i e s b e y o n d i t s i m m e d i a t e b o u n d s . It is thus opposed to its other and to what supersedes it. Yet

his other defines it and determines what it is, so that they are

A Reply t o Philip Grier

81

m u t u a l l y complementary and t o g e t h e r c o n s t i t u t e a more adequate

whole, exemplifying the Concept more fully. They are thus at o n c e opposites and also complementary d i s t i n c t s , and e a c h e vinces a different degree o f adequacy to t h e C o n c e p t . They are e a c h and a l l both abstract and c o n c r e t e , e a c h i n i t s specific d e g r e e . For the same reason, each sums u p the d e v e l o p m e n t p r i o r to the s t a g e o f which i t is typical, and sublates the

previous categories, preserving them as moments within itself. No satisfactory account of any can be given which fails to do justice either to the moments which contribute to its degree of actualization, o r to the implications i t holds of further concretion. We should now be able to see the force and significance o f each of the s i x ways, that Professor G r i e r l i s t s , in w h i c h Hegel’s use o f the terms ‘ a b s t r a c t ’ a n d ‘ c o n c r e t e ’ c a n b e c o n s t r u e d : ( a ) as what is s e p a r a t e d (from th e w h o l e ) as o p p o s e d to what is h e l d i n e x p l i c i t relation to its c o n t e x t ; i t is ( b ) for this reason partial a n d o n e - s i d e d , as o p p o s e d to w h a t u n i t e s a n d d o e s j u s t i c e to opposed aspects, h o ld in g its m o m e n t s r e c o n c i l e d

in unity; (c) equally, because it seeks to exclude its other, i t pretends to exclusive positivity involving no negativity, oblivious of this very exclusion; so (d) it presents itself immediately, unmediated

b y relation to what i t n e g a t e s , as o p pos e d to the

immediacy i n which mediation has been sublated; (e) such a n a b s t r a c t u m is i m m o b i l i zed a t a n i n c o m p l e t e an d lim ite d s t a g e o f t h e d i a l e c t i c , o b s t r u c t i n g its p ro g res s , s o i t remains fixed i n its

separation from its complement; and (f) the supposedly formal and e m p t y o f c o n t e n t is a case i n p o i n t . The first o f these is the appropriate definition, the rest being consequences and corollaries. I n the q u o t e d passage from t h e preface to W issenschaft der L o gik the demand made is th at, at no s t e p i n th e d e v e l o p m e n t o f the s u b j e c t should a category (or " t h o u g h t - d e t e r m i n a t i o n " ) c o m e to the fore which has n o t i m m e d i a t e l y e m e r g e d a t t h a t s t a g e and b e e n derived from t h e one p r e c e d i n g . F r o m w h a t has been s a i d i t s h o u l d now be a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n a b s t r a c t a n d c o n c r e t e emerges a t every s t a g e , from the v e r y

beginning—where Being and Nothing contrast with the first concrete category (as Hegel calls it), Becoming—and i t necessaril y arises from w h a t e v e r has p r e c e d e d . The question a ris es , however, w h e t h e r a b s t r a c t a nd c o n c r e t e ( e a c h i n d i v i d u a l l y , o r both together) r a n k a s a c a t e g o r y

i n the proper sense. Could either, o r the dual complementarity,

ERROL E . HARRIS

82

be regarded as a provisional definition of the Absolute? A r e they not rather descriptive terms applicable to a n y and every category (in varying degrees) that is a moment of the Absolute I d e a ? C l e a r l y the t e r m s d o n o t b e l o n g a m o n g t h e d u a l c o m p l e m e n t a r i t i e s that are categories o f E s s e n c e , for t h e y are n o t the i n n e r and o u t e r a s p e c t s o f an i d e n t i c a l a c t u a l i t y , b u t a r e r a t h e r terms i n d i c a t i n g t h e d e g r e e o f c o m p l e t i o n a n d i n t e g r i t y

of t h e category under consideration (whichever i t may be). It is because they do this that they figure repeatedly in the exposition

of

the

dialectical

p r o c e s s , and

not

a s "official"

categories i n the logical series. They belong, as it were, to the meta-language of logic. If they could be subsumed under a n y category, perhaps the most appropriate would be Degree; but t h a t , as a c a t e g o r y o f p u r e q u a n t i t y , s e e m s i n s u f f i c i e n t l y v e r s a t i l e . F u r t h e r , a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a c t i v i t y o f

the understanding, which, though relevant to the type of logical thinking i n operation, is not itself a logical category, b u t is a phase in the phenomenology of mind. Whether a conception is abstract or concrete depends in large measure on the attitude of

mind with which it is entertained; a n d here Baillie’s distinction between true and false abstraction becomes relevant. The u n d e r s t a n d i n g s e e k s t o t a k e t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e concrete whole apart, and to hold them in mutual isolation (or, a t b e s t , i n e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n ) ; a n d , as has b e e n s a i d , t o t h i n k

apart of things that go together is to falsify. So this type of a b s t r a c t i o n is f a l s e . B u t s p e c u l a t i v e r e a s o n , w h i l e r e c o g n i z i n g and insisting upon the finite and partial status of the moments within the whole, sees them in their full and proper context,

maintaining a t once the necessity for both differentiation a n d unity, as conditions of concrete reality.

Thus, what

Baillie

rightly recognizes as "true" abstraction is the realization of the provisional nature a n d incompletion of the finite, without neglecting its connection, a n d contribution to the whole, within w h i c h i t s s h o r t c o m i n g s a r e aufgehoben—cancelled o u t , a l t h o u g h

its limitations a r e preserved a n d transcended. Hegel constantly criticizes the "false" abstract view of finite categories, that is held by the understanding, while he stresses their legitimacy a n d importance as necessary stages in the dialectical development ( t h e i r t r u t h , as m o m e n t s ) . T h i s d o u b l e t r e a t m e n t o f t h e m ( e s p -

ecially i n the Doctrine of Essence) is a characteristic of his exposition, the not infrequent oversight of which often results in misinterpretation. Commentators are apt to attribute to H e g e l , a s h i s o w n p o s i t i o n , t h e "false" a b s t r a c t i o n s t h a t h e i s i n

fact criticizing.

A Reply t o P h i l i p Grier

83

B u t i f the terms u n d e r s c r u t i n y b e l o n g m o r e p r o p e r l y t o

the exposition than to the dialectic, we have still to face the q u e s t i o n o f the relation b e t w e e n these two a s p e c t s o f philosoph— ical s c i e n c e . E x p o s i t i o n , i t i s c l e a r , i s t h e s a m e as m e t h o d , s o our question is concerned with the relation between method (or form) and e l e m e n t s ( o r c o n t e n t ) . This b e c o m e s e x p l i c i t a t t h e

end of the science, where Hegel deals with the idea, especially under the idea of cognition, and again under the Absolute Idea. The w h o l e w h i c h i s the t r u t h is I d e a , a n d I d e a is t h i s w h o l e a t

the level of absolute knowing—the whole fully conscious of itself and of its o w n self -differentiation. A t this level of self awareness its self-differentiation takes the form of judgement (Urtheil), and the process of judgement is that of the selfexposition of the Idea, which is the logical dialectic. Here in the Logic, the matter under investigation is the method itself, and this m e t h o d i s no m o r e nor less t h a n the s u b l a t e d p r o c e s s o f d e v e l o p m e n t , t h r o u g h i n t u i t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g u p to t h e l e v e l o f r e a s o n , and the m o d e o f o p e r a t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s at

each of these levels, which thus becomes its o w n object i n the forms o f B e i n g , E s s e n c e , a n d C o n c e p t . I n I d e a the s u b j e c t i s a t h o m e w i t h i t s e l f (bei sich selbst) i n i t s o b j e c t , a n d t h e i r i d e n t i t y

is fully explicit and obvious.

Accordingly, in Idea exposition

a n d s u b j e c t - m a t t e r , m e t h o d a n d e l e m e n t s , form a n d c o n t e n t , c o a l e s c e , a n d t h e m i n d ( o r S p i r i t ) , i n its a w a r e n e s s o f i t s o w n

procedure, is aware a t every stage of the degree of abstractness a n d concreteness of every category. I t t r a n s p i r e s , t h e n , that these terms are i n d i c a t i v e o f the i m m a n e n c e i n e v e r y p h a s e o f t h e d i a l e c t i c o f t h e I d e a . The s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e e x p o s i t i o n o f th e l o g i c a l d i a l e c t i c d i s c l o s e s a t e v e r y s t a g e th e d e g r e e o f a b s t r a c t i o n a n d / o r c o n c r e t i o n i n v o l v e d . B u t j u s t as s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t a r e h e l d a p a r t , a n d form a n d c o n t e n t a r e s e p a r a t e d , a t the l e v e l o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , s o , i n t h e e a r l i e r s t a g e s o f t h e L o g i c , e x p o s i t i o n i s ap— p a r e n t l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e d i a l e c t i c a l p r o c e s s , o n l y to b e r e u n i t e d w i t h i t a n d absorbed i n t o i t a t t h e e n d .

So t h e p r o v i s i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f a b s t r a c t a n d c o n c r e t e t h a t w e e n t e r t a i n e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g are t r a n s c e n d e d , a n d t h e apparent paradoxes they seem to present are resolved. If we h e l d t h e m t o b e e q u i v a l e n t to u n i v e r s a l a n d p a r t i c u l a r , w e n o w find ( i n t h e D o c t r i n e o f t h e C o n c e p t ) t h a t t h e s e a r e u n i t e d i n t h e c o n c r e t e , s e l f - s p e c i f y i n g , u n i v e r s a l , w h i c h has i t s p a r t i c u l a r s w i t h i n itself—that t h e c o n c e p t , as w h o l e , is a t o n c e u n i v e r s a l , p a r t i c u l a r a n d i n d i v i d u a l , a n d t h a t e a c h o f t h e s e i s the w h o l e C o n c e p t . I f we h e l d a b s t r a c t a n d c o n c r e t e to b e e q u i v a l e n t to

ERROL E . HARRIS

84

form and c o n t e n t , o r w i t h m e t h o d and e l e m e n t s , i n t h e I d e a w e find t h a t t h e y are one a n d the s a m e . I f ‘ a b s t r a c t ’ and ‘ c o n c r e t e ’

are expositional terms rather than categories, we now find that e x p o s i t i o n , i s , after a l l , n o t h i n g b u t the j u d g e m e n t a l process b y w h i c h the dialectic e x p o u n d s its o w n c o u r s e a n d m e t h o d o f

development, and that they belong together. The distinction, however, is never entirely lost, because difference is as necessary to concrete wholeness as is identity, a n d that the e x p o s i t i o n a l ter m s a p p e a r i n t h e a c c o u n t o f t h e l a t e r categories as t h e y d o i n t h e a c c o u n t o f th e e a r l i e r . Professor G r i e r is r i g h t , t h e r e f o r e , t o i n s i s t that the q u e s t i o n before u s c a n n o t b e p r o p e r l y a n s w e r e d u n l e s s we " b r i n g t h e C o n c e p t , its i n f i n i t u d e a n d t i m e l e s s n e s s " ( 7 4 ) i n t o t h e

account.

The abstract is the finite, which comes to b e and

passes away, wh i c h i s l i m i t e d b y what i t e x c l u d e s a n d a bs tra c ts

from. It is therefore inevitably subject to time. The concrete, s e l f - c o n s c i o u s , whole transcends th e l i m i t s a n d e m b r a c e s i n m u t u a l reconciliation the o p p o s i n g m o m e n t s . So i t t r a n s c e n d s , a n d i n Hegel’s a s s e r t i o n , " e x t i n g u i s h e s " t i m e (die Zeit t i l g t ) . (Phc‘z'n, 4 2 9 ; 4 8 7 ) "Time i n i t s c o n c e p t i s e t e r n a l . " (Enz. ( 1 8 3 0 ) , § 2 5 8 , Z u . ) Here the r e l a t i o n o f p ro ces s to s u b s t a n c e b e c o m e s t r a n s p a r e n t , a n d the degrees o f abstraction a n d concreteness are s u b l a t e d , and are r e v e a l e d as n o more than incidents u p o n t h e f i n i t u d e o f the passing p h a s e . A c c o r d i n g l y , ‘ a b s t r a c t ’ and ‘ c o n c r e t e ’ can be u s e d o n l y as d e s c r i p t i v e terms a p p r O p r i a t e a t

every stage of the dialectic, a n d they d o not constitute separate c a t e g o r i e s , i f o n l y because

both (each

in some

d e g r e e ) are

characteristic of every category throughout the logical dialectic. Northwestern

University

T h e Shadow of Hegel's Science of Logic by Cynthia

Willett

While Hegel chooses to b e g i n his Science of Logic w i t h the

category of being, his analysis of the transition from being to nothing, i.e. the second category of the greater Logic, suggests that the direction between being and nothing is reversible. In fact, the third remark a p p e n d e d to th e first c h a p t e r e x p l i c i t l y states that the L o g i c could have b e g u n w i t h the c a t e g o r y o f

nothing. (Logik I , 87; 99-100) Moreover, the completeness of Hegel’s system requires that the difference between the two beginnings be at once mediated and cancelled in the third category

of

becoming.

I argue,

however,

that

there

is a

difference in directionality which operates between the two b e g i n n i n g s and that this difference

cannot b e c a n c e l l e d .

The

choice to begin the logic with being and then to proceed to nothing affects the connotation and directionality of the third category. The alternative direction would give priority to nothing and accordingly change the positive connotation of becoming to the negative connotation of what I will call ‘transitoriness’. The undecidability between the move privileging being and the neglected b u t equally legitimate move favoring nothing would paralyze Hegel’s system. The dialectic advances to becoming only because Hegel implicitly chooses to p r i v i l e g e one o f t h e o p p o s e d c a t e g o r i e s , i n t h i s case b e i n g , o v e r

the other category.

Consequently, if the movement of the

d i a l e c t i c i s n o t to be paralyzed b e t w e e n b e i n g and n o t h i n g , t h e n

the dialectic must dissociate its claim to progress from any ref e rence—however tentative—to a total k n o w l e d g e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , dialectical advance o c c u r s o n l y as a n i n c o m p l e t e and a s y m m e tric—as a p a r t i a l — m o v e m e n t .

The Problem o f B e g i n n i n g s

Hegel’s Science of Logic appears to begin neither simply nor univocally. Daniel Guerriere counts three beginnings: i n d e t e r minate being and nothing, concrete becoming, and the absolute.1 J o s e p h Flay adds t h a t "With What M u s t The Science B e g i n ? " , the

section immediately preceding the analysis of the first three

1 D a n i e l G u e r r i e r e , ” W i t h W h a t D o e s Hegelian S c i e n c e B e g i n ? " T h e R e v i e w

of Metaphysics, XX (1977) 285-97.

85

CYNTHIA WILLETT

86

categories, should be read as a beginning.2 And Hegel supplem e n t s the p r e l i m i n a r y d i s c u s s i o n w i t h a n i n t r o d u c t i o n a n d t w o p r e f a c e s . The s e c o n d p r e f a c e d e m o n s t r a t e s a c o n c e r n for t h e

proliferation of beginnings by discounting as external reflections the r e m a r k s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n a n d p r e f a c e s , as w e l l

as a n y use made of derived categories that include becoming and p r o c e e d i n a n e g a t i v e a n d c o n t i n g e n t f a s h i o n .

The e f f o r t

is to eliminate complex o r mediated beginnings, a n d thus to lay bare the simple notions of being and nothing. (Logik I , 65; 78) The preliminary section, "With What Must The Science B e g i n ? , " ("Womit muj3 der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht werden?") c o n s i d e r s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e o f o p e n i n g t h e L o g i c w i t h

the category of beginning. Hegel notes that this category would s e e m to b e m o r e s i m p l e a n d p u r e a n d t h u s t o p r e s u p p o s e less than the category o f b e i n g . ( L o g i k 1 , 5 9 - 6 0 ; 7 3 ) H e g e l p o i n t s

o u t , however, that the notion of beginning already contains the mediated unity of being a n d nothing. (Logik I, 59-60; 73) What begins is not yet anything but is o n its way to becoming something. The notion of beginning, then, is a result of the bringing together of being a n d nothing. If the logic were to o r i g i n a t e w i t h what i s a l r e a d y m e d i a t e d a n d c o m p l e x , w e w o u l d

i n fact a d m i t contingency a n d external reflection into the system. This is because a n analysis of a general, o r already s y n t h e s i z e d , i d e a " d e p e n d s u p o n w h a t e a c h p e r s o n j u s t finds i n h i s o w n i m m e d i a t e , c o n t i n g e n t i d e a . " ( L o gO i k 1 , 6 1 ; 7 4 - 7 5 )

W h i l e analyses i n g e n e r a l t e n d to p r o d u c e v a r y i n g o r e q u i v o c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f c o m p l e x i d e a s , H e g e l ’ s o w n analysis o f t h e c a t e g o r y o f b e g i n n i n g t u r n s u p t h e same m e d i a t i o n o f

being a n d nothing as contained in the category of becoming. Hegel mentions, however, one interesting difference between the

t w o categories: "Beginning is itself a case of Becoming; only the former term is employed with a n e y e to the further advance." (Enz. (1830), § 88, A r m . 3; 130-131) Becoming a n d beginning name, o r denote, the same mediated unity b u t the categories differ i n connotation. This variance i n connotation reflects a difference

w i t h r e s p e c t to p o s i t i o n i n t h e s e q u e n c e

of

the

categories of the Logic.

It is doubly ironic that while the Phenomenology of Spirit transforms the negations of skeptical understanding into the 2Jose

ph F l a y offered t h i s remark i n a s e m i n a r o n H e g e l ’ s L o g i c given i n t h e fall of 1 9 8 2 at t h e P e n n s y l v a n i a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y . T h i s p a p e r , i n i t i a l l y w r i t t e n for t h e s e m i n a r , owes m u c h t o Professor F l a y ’ s c o m m e n t s .

The Shadow of Hegel’s

Science o f Logic

87

m e d i a t i o n required b y s p e c u l a t i v e p h i l o s o p h y , the s u p p l e m e n t a r y

beginnings of the Logic protect the sphere of p u r e knowing from the arbitrary mediations of the understanding. The first irony is that the text of the Logic begins by external reflections a ga inst the p r o c e ss o f external reflection itself.

B u t secondly

the first category of the system of the logic collapses the mediation w h i c h c o m p r i s e s the s p e c u l a t i v e c o n c e p t , the dis— c o v e r y o f the P h e n o m e n o l o g y , into t h e a b s t r a c t form o f immediacy. From the absolute s t a n d p o i n t achieved i n the

Phenomenology, "all that is needed to insure that the beginning remains immanent in its scientific development is to consider, o r rather, r i d d i n g o n e s e l f o f all o t h e r reflections a nd O p i n i o n s whatever, s i m p l y to take u p , what is there before us." (Logik I , 5 5 ; 6 9 ) A b s t r a c t i n g from all that is m e d i a t e d , "what i s p r e s e n t

is only simple immediacy...and this simple immediacy...in its true expression is pure being." (Logik I , 55; 69) "That which constitutes the beginning, the beginning itself, is to b e taken as s o m e t h i n g unanalysable, taken i n its s i m p l e , u n f i l l e d i m m e d i a c y , and there as being, the c o m p l e t e l y e m p t y b e i n g . " (Logik I , 6 2 ;

75) Thus, the mere utility of drawing o n prefatory remarks as well as o n the prior education of consciousness in the Phenomenology casts some suspicion o n the possibility of a simple beginning. How could the system profit so much from what is sheerly accidental o r extrinsic to that system? For purposes of t h i s p a p e r , h o w e v e r , we respect H e g e l ’ s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e external, o r s u b j e c t i v e , b e g i n n i n g and the s i m p l e , o r o b j e c t i v e ,

beginning.

Thus, the system of the Logic begins with pure,

simple being—and nothing else. If the n o t i o n o f being is s i m p l e , h o w e v e r , b e i n g is n o t d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from n o t h i n g , w h i c h is also p u r e , i n d e t e r m i n a t e , and e m p t y . Inasmuch as a c a t e g o r y is i m m e d i a t e , n o t h i n g c a n d i s t i n g u i s h i t from a n y o t h e r c a t e g o r y w h i c h i s e q u a l l y i m m e d i a t e . We can distinguish b e i n g and n o t h i n g o n l y b y g i v i n g these categories a determinate c o n t e n t a n d t h e r e b y d e s t r o y i n g

their simplicity.

It is the interchangeability of being and

n o t h i n g w h i c h assures that they are the m o s t s i m p l e a n d abstract I f we could not exchange o n e c a t e g o r y for the categories.

other, being and nothing would no longer function as the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s o r i g i n o f the L o g i c .

A s Gadamer

points out,

the category of nothing immediately3 "bursts forth" from that of Both being and nothing being without dialectical negation.

3Hans-Georg

Gadamer,

H e g e l ’ s D i a l e c t i c , t r . P . Christopher

Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) 89.

Smith

(New

CYNTHIA WILLETT

88

originally a p p e a r as immediate c a t e g o r i e s .

Because initially no mediation can occur between these categories, there is no justification for a hierarchy o r priority o f one notion over the o t h e r .

T h u s , we are n o t s u r p r i s e d t o

learn that nothing, with equal immediacy, returns to being. (Logik I , 69; 8 2 ) H e g e l explains t h a t t h i s r e t u r n t o b e i n g o c c u r s i m mediatel y u p o n s e e i n g that n o t h i n g is a n o t i o n . B e i n g a n d

nothing both have being as notions, and i n both cases their notions contain nothing. Daniel Guerriere concludes that the "indeterminate may indifferently b e called Being o r Nothing. Hence the beginning of science is—in a n awkward but accurate term—Being/Nothing o r , even, Being=Nothing." (466) Of pure being Hegel writes, "it is equal only to itself," and of pure nothing he writes, "it is simply equality with itself ." (Logik I , 69; 82) Once w e c a n state the e q u a l i t y b e t w e e n the tw o n o t i o n s ,

we can comprehend the infinite a n d purely circular movement to a n d fro as b e c o m i n g . The c a t e g o r y o f b e c o m i n g requires that

being and nothing not simply be collapsed b u t also b e retained and distinguished as ideal points o r abstractions of becoming. Hegel writes that Becoming

is

the

unseparatedness

of

being

and

nothing, not the unity which abstracts from being and nothing; b u t as the unity of being and nothing it is this determinate unity in which there is both being and nothing....They are...sublated moments. I, 92; 105)

(Logik

Becoming, like the concept of beginning, contains both being

a n d nothing as moments. N o n e t h e l e s s , as immediate c a t e g o r i e s , b e i n g a n d n o t h i n g r e m a i n i n d i s c e r n i b l e and i m m e d i a t e l y r e v e r s i b l e . S i n c e t h e r e i s n o basis for p r i v i l e g i n g o n e n o t i o n o v e r the o t h e r , t h e L o g i c c a n

begin either with being or nothing, though not with their equality. Hegel himself recognizes the double origin of the logic. He writes that if we abstract all that is external from the beginning of p u r e science, then "that nothing would be the result[,]...and that n o w the beginning should be made with n o t h i n g (as i n C h i n e s e p h i l o s o p h y ) n e e d n o t c a u s e u s to l i f t a f i n g e r , for before we c o u l d d o s o t h i s n o t h i n g w o u l d n o less

have converted itself into being." (Logik I, 87; 99-100) Without the lifting of a n Au/hebung, nothing turns back into being.

The Shadow of Hegel’s Exactly

two categories satisfy

Science of Logic

89

Hegel’s criterion o f a s i m p l e ,

indeterminate beginning. The logic may begin with either being o r n o t h i n g . For, as Heraclitus already u n d e r s t o o d , the path u a n d the path down are o n e and t h e s a m e ; t h e y trace a c i r c l e .

Or so Hegel insists, as he points o u t that while the Eleatics’ asserted p u r e b e i n g as the a b s o l u t e , oriental t h o u g h t was

equally justified in beginning with nothing—which is not a n o n positing, b u t the positing of the notion of nothing. (Logik I , 7 0 ; 8 3 ) Hegel p r o c e e d s b y d e n y i n g the doctrine t h a t n o t h i n g comes from n o t h i n g . I t is true that from the p o i n t o f v i e w o f

abstract understanding the category of nothing resists thought. But the notion of being, Hegel argues, is equally vacuous. Neither notion has any content in its abstract self -identity. To start the logic with nothing is not to begin with no thing, and to think such is to misconceive the Speculative notion of nothing i n terms of a determinate and finite thought of the understanding. (Logik I , 72-73; 86) Nor is nothing negation, if the latter is interpreted as a relation.6

R e l a t i o n is a more c o m p l e x an d determinate

notion

than simple nothing. Hegel does claim that we may understand nothing as "the abstract, immediate negation: nothing, purely o n its own account, negation devoid of any relations—what could also be expressed if o n e so wished merely b y ‘not’ [Nicht]." (Logik I, 87; 99-100) Logic begins with what is simple. Being and Nothing are equally simple and nothing else can be said of them.

Therefore,

nothing can distinguish them.

H e g e l c i t e s Heraclitus as th e first to c o m p r e h e n d t h a t n e i t h e r b e i n g n o r n o t h i n g can be t h o u g h t a p a r t from t h e i r u n i t y

i n becoming: "Against the one-sided abstraction the d e e p t h i n k i n g Heraclitus b r o u g h t forward the h i g h e r , total c o n c e p t o f b e c o m i n g and s a i d : being as little i s , as n o t h i n g i s , o r , a l l flows, w h i c h m e a n s a l l is becoming." (Logik I , 7 0 ; 8 3 ) . H e g e l t r a n s -

lates the polemos of Heraclitus into the German word FIie/3en. Hegel then interprets F Iie/3en in terms of the category of Werden, o r b e c o m i n g .

Werden, polemos, o r F lie/3611 may d e n o t e

the same idea of change, b u t their connotations differ s i g Heraclitus’ polemos emphasizes the destructive nificantly.

4G.S. Kirk and J D . Raven, T h e Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 189, fr. 60. 5This c o m m e n t i s added t o t h e original paper i n response t o a n objection raised from t h e floor by Theodore G e r a e t s .

CYNTHIA WILLETT

90

character of a transition. Thus, it is common to translate polemos which Heraclitus uses to name the father of all things, as war. ( K i r k and Raven, 195, fr. 53) H e g e l ’ s explication o f Werden i n terms o f the v e r b flie/3en,

however, may more directly allude to the river-image used b y Heraclitus

to d e p i c t the ceaselessness o f c h a n g e .

(Kirk

and

Raven, 196, frs. 12, 91) F1iej3en suggests the notion named b y Fliichtigkeit, o r transitoriness, both German words stemming from the G r e e k root, pleu, w h i c h s i g n i f i e s to flow, t o r a i n , o r

to swim. Werden, however, means not only becoming b u t also g r o w i n g , a r i s i n g , and

progressing.

Werden, t h e n , s u g g e s t s a

closer allegiance to Aristotle’s phusis than to Heraclitus’ river o r wa r i m a g e r y . The positive connotations o f th e word Werden, i n o r polemos, c o n t r a s t to the negative c o n n o t a t i o n s o f Flie/3en

would grant a priority to the category of being over that of nothing.

Interestingly, the first remark, which begins by a c k n o w ledging equally both the Eleatic being and the oriental nothing ends by forgetting this equality: "What is first i n the science had o f neces sit y to s h o w i t s e l f historically as the first. A n d we must regard t h e E l e a t i c o n e o r b e i n g as th e first s t e p i n the

knowledge of thought." (Logik I , 76; 88) Hegel is not unaware o f t h e p r o b l e m o f p r i v i l e g i n g o n e o f two o p p o s e d c a t e g o r i e s . The second r e m a r k d e s c r i b e s " a u n i o n w h i c h can o n l y b e stated as a n u n r e s t o f incompatibles" and warns t h a t " t h e c o m m o n e s t

injustice d o n e to a speculative content is to make it one-sided, t h a t i s , t o g i v e p r o m i n e n c e o n l y to o n e o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s i n t o

which i t can be resolved." (Logik I , 78; 91) If not in name, then, at least in function,

Werden w i l l

attempt to comprehend equally both being a n d nothing. Becoming is in this way a double determination. I n o n e o f t h e m , nothing i s i m m e d i a t e , that i s , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s t a r t s from n o t h i n g w h i c h relates i t s e l f

to being, o r in other words, changes into it; i n the o t h e r , being i s i m m e d i a t e , that i s , the d e t e r m i n a t i o n

starts from being which changes into nothing; the former is c o m i n g - t o - b e and the latter is ceasing-tobe.

(Logik I , 9 3 ; 1 0 5 - 6 )

B e c a u s e e a c h m o m e n t is d e t e r m i n e d

i n r e l a t i o n to the o t h e r ,

there are two unities within becoming.

The Shadow of Hegel’s

Science 0 : L o g i c

91

That i s , i n a s m u c h as Werden c o n t a i n s both c o m i n g - t o - b e ,

o r Entestehen, and ceasing-to-be, o r Vergehen, the category serves as a neutral, o r i m p a r t i a l , totality. C o m i n g - t o - b e a n d c e a s i n g - t o — b e each trace a c i r c l e o f m o v e m e n t b e t w e e n b e i n g a n d n o t h i n g . The t wo circles reflect, o r m i r r o r , o n e a n o t h e r ,

differing only in direction of movement: B o t h are the s a m e , becoming, and a l t h o u g h t h e y differ s o i n direction they interpenetrate and paralyse each o t h e r . The o n e is ceasing-to-be: b e i n g passes o v e r into n 0 t h i n g , b u t n o th in g is e q u a l l y th e o p p o s i t e

of itself, transition into being, c o m i n g - t o - b e . This c o m i n g - t o - b e is the other direction. (Logik I , 93; 106) Werden, as the e q u i l i b r i u m w h i c h r e s u l t s from c o m i n g - t o - b e a n d c e a s i n g - t o - b e , l i k e w i s e c o m p l e t e s a c i r c l e w h i c h is the u n i t y b e t w e e n its two moments. The c i r c l e o f b e c o m i n g , h o w e v e r , a l s o takes o n a d i r e c -

tionality.

A neutral circle orients itself i n both of its two

possible directions

at once.

I f the c i r c l e , h o w e v e r ,

is t h e

concrete beginning of a dialectical spiral, then the category of becoming must give emphasis to exactly one of its two d i r e c tions. For, as Aristotle justly claims, an ambiguous starting p o i n t renders motion i m p o s s i b l e (Metaphysics, I V , 3 : l O O 6 a 1 5 - 2 0 )

and

yields o n l y

paralysis.

Thus H e g e l m u s t make a choice b e t w e e n the A r i s t o t e l i a n

notion of becoming, o r Werden as genesis a n d development, and t h e Heraclitian n o t i o n o f transitoriness. W h ile h i s p r e f e r e n c e for Ar i stotle o v e r Heraclitus—f o r b e i n g o v e r nothing—f ails t o re c e ive

a n y justification o r elaboration, it is clear that in the German language

Werden m a y function

as a s y n o n y m

for Entstehen.

This partiality effects the vanishing of Vergehen i n the stabilizing of becoming as Dasein, i.e. existence or determinate being, and the further determination of Dasein, i.e. existence o r determinate

b e i n g , a n d the further determination

o f Dasein as

presence. Gadamer’s reading of the Logic repeats the Hegelian bias towards being over nothing and likewise refuses to recognize this privileging as anything other than natural. Gadamer writes,

i t is v e r y e a s y to s e e . . . t h a t o n e m u s t progress from

the thought of becoming to the thought of Existence. All becoming is a becoming of something which

CYNTHIA WILLETT

92

exists as a result of having become. That is an ancient truth, one already formulated b y Plato in the Philebus as the gegennemene ousia or genesis eis ousian, respectively. (87) That is, Hegel resolves Werden, signifying also growing, into Dasein, which signifies existence b u t also life. Aristotle’s study of phusis defines substance in terms of what moves itself towards the actualization of its form; as a consequence of this definition, Aristotelian metaphysics cannot account for natural death,

or

destruction,

except

by

rendering

i t an

accident.

Similarly, Hegel’s dialectic, by initially giving priority to being over nothing, orients itself towards a return to being._ This s p i r a l upwards m u s t forget its d o u b l e pointed downwards.

And

because the spiralling dialectic cannot claim the neutrality of the circle, the second spiral is lost i n the shadow of the Logic.

Le Moyne College

A Reply t o Cynthia Willett by George di Giovanni

Before I address the main i s s u e o f P r o f e s s o r Willett’s p a p e r d ir ectly, I want to make two p r e f atory c o m m e n t s . The firs t has to do w i t h A r i s t o t l e ’ s c o n c e p t o f ‘ n a t u r e ’ . I t is a c o m p l e x

concept—more a cluster of related meanings than a single one. Taken in the sense of ‘form’ and with reference to a n y material i n d i v i d u a l , i t signifies what a n y s u c h i n d i v i d u a l i s intended t o

be, o r what it is born to be.1 Even if restricted to this one sense however,

alone

one must s e e i t a t work

i n the c o n t e x t o f

Aristotelian cosmology before the metaphysical assumptions that condition its use are manifested. This cosmology has provided indeed

the c o n t e x t o f a l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l s p ecu lation u p t o the

modern scientific revolution, including Christian theology. What we have is a system of immortal entities on the o n e hand, i.e. the h e a v e n l y s p h e r e s whose movements a r e r e c u r r e n t and fully

determined b y the umoved movers; a n d , on the other, within these s p h e r e s , i n o u r e a r t h l y r e g i o n , a n u n l i m i t e d l i n e a r procession o f material i nd iv id u als t h a t c o n s t a n t l y c o m e to b e a n d p e r i s h . 2 I t is a m o n g t h e s e individuals that ‘flux’ r e i g n s , e v e n

though for Aristotle such ‘flux’ is never quite unmitigated, for it is contained a n d controlled by the informing agency of the outer spheres.

Now, it is a sign of how m u c h Aristotle is committed to a m e t a p h y s i c s o f ‘ b e i n g ’ , as c o n t r a s t e d to ‘ b e c o m i n g ’ , ( o n t h i s

score I agree with Prof esor Willett’s paper entirely) that for him the only individuals of which there can b e a science are p r e c i s e l y t h e h e a v e n l y s p h e r e s , whose n u m b e r is l i m i t e d a n d wh ose m o v e m e n t i s s t r i c t l y d e t e r m i n e d . A s fo r t h e m a t e r i a l i n d i v i d u a l s o f o u r i m m e d i a t e w o r l d , a l t h o u g h t h e r e c a n be a s c i e n c e o f t h e i r a b s t r a c t forms, t h e r e c a n n o t b e s c i e n c e o f t h e m

1See t h e senses distinguished in Physics, 1,1, and note especially Physics, I,1:193b,8-10; 7:198a,23-33. 28cc especially O n t h e H e a v e n s , I , c h s . 2 , 3 , 1 0 , 11, 1 2 , where t h e ‘ c i r c u l a r ’ motion o f t h e heavens is d i s c u s s e d . S u c h m o t i o n , s u p p o s e d l y , d o e s n o t e n t a i l any c o n t r a r i e t y , and h e n c e n o t ‘ a l t e r a t i o n ’ i n any s t r i c t s e n s e .

93

94

GEORGE DI GIOVANNI

(in a strict sense) precisely as individuals.3 But it is of these individuals a l o n e , w h e t h e r t a k e n s i n g l y o r as g r o u p s b u t always o n l y for limited p e r i o d s o f t i m e , t h a t , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , w e c a n say that t h e y ‘ p r o g r e s s ’ o r , c o n v e r s e l y , t h a t t h e y ‘regress’. T h e i r f o r m s , i . e . t h e i r n a t u r e s , d o n o t c h a n g e . The i n d i v i d u a l s alone

undergo alterations b y acquiring one form a n d , by the same token, losing its contrary. As for the heavenly entities whose movements are fully determined and recurrent, their local a l t e r a t i o n s are m e r e a c c i d e n t s w h i c h i n n o way affect t h e permanence of their essential being. In either case, whether w i t h r e s p e c t t o change i n the h e a v e n s o r here b e l o w , s i n c e

Aristotle never quite anaylized what the ‘acquiring’ o r ‘losing’ o f a form m e a n s , i t i s fair to say t h a t i n fact h e n e v e r q u i t e conceptualized the process o f ‘ b e c o m i n g ’ a t a l l . A g a i n , t h i s

shows how much Aristotle’s metaphysics is committed to ‘being’. I t d o e s n o t f o l l o w , h o w e v e r , ( a n d t h i s is t h e p o i n t t h a t I have

been driving at) that ‘becoming’ is for him therefore slanted i n favor o f ‘progression’. On the contrary, in Aristotle’s scheme of t h i n g s , s u c h c o n c e p t s as ‘ p o s i t i v e ’ o r ‘ n e g a t i v e ’ , ‘ p r o g r e s i o n ’ o r ‘ r e g r e s s i o n ’ , o n l y have l i m i t e d a p p l i c a t i o n . T h e y o n l y a p p l y to

the limited existence of material individuals. The only have physical, not metaphysical, meaning. In the Aristotelian universe t h e d y n a m i s m o f n a t u r e i s d i r e c t e d to t h e preservation

of the given order, the status quo. To inject into it the image o f a forward m o v e m e n t (as Professor Willett s e e m s to d o i n h e r paper) is misleading. I c o m e to m y s e c o n d c o m m e n t .

To a p p r o a c h H e g e l b y

way of Aristotle a n d his tradition of metaphysics is always i n s t r u c t i v e , p r o v i d e d h o w e v e r t h a t o n e r e m e m b e r s that b e t w e e n t h e t w o there s t a n d K a n t and Fichte ( n o t to mention D e s c a r t e s ) . T h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n marks a radical b r e a k o n t h e p a r t o f m o d e r n

thought from the Greek tradition—how much of a break can be gathered precisely from Hegel’s Science of Logic. This Logic is a n ontology, in the sense that it implies a theory of being. Y e t , e v e n as s c i e n c e o f b e i n g , i t i s a n d remains logic first a n d f o r e m o s t — i . e . the s c i e n c e o f t h e c o n c e p t qua c o n c e p t f i r s t , and

30f. Posterior Analytics, I,8:75b,21-26. Also Metaphysics, VII,11:1037a,231037b,8. I d o n o t m e a n t o say t h a t for A r i s t o t l e t h e r e i s n o k n o w l e d g e of m a t e r i a l i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t o n l y t h a t any s u c h k n o w l e d g e w o u l d h a v e t o b e science o n l y s e c u n d u m g u i d . O n t h i s s c o r e , H e g e l a n d A r i s t o t l e are o n common g r o u n d . F o r H e g e l t o o t h e t h i n g s of n a t u r e are u l t i m a t e l y impervious t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m p r e h e n s i o n , n o t because t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g l a c k i n g t o t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t b u t because t h e t h i n g s themselves fail t o m e e t m i n i m u m c r i t e r i a of d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d h e n c e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . They fall b e l o w t h e threshold o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . I n

this sense Hegel speaks of an Ohnmacht d e r N a t u r . (§n_z_. (1830), § 250, Anm.)

A Reply to Cynthia Willett

95

science of being only inasmuch as it is the science of the concept. Hegel is now claiming to have achieved comprehension o f the logos that governs the u n i v e r s e — b u t n o t because (as h e w o u l d have had to claim within the parameters o f ancient m e t a p h y s i c s ) he has managed to transpose h i m s e l f outside the c o s m o s , s o to s p e a k , o r to gain a c c e s s t o G o d ’ s m i n d before the

creation of the world.4 He can make his claim, rather, because for H e g e l n o w the s o u r c e o f all i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ( t h e logos itself)

is the activity of thought itself as exercised in science. Here is where the contribution of Kant and Fichte are most clearly visible. Meaning is no longer the product of forms inherent i n nature but the function of goal-directed activity. The heavenly s p h e r e s o f A r i s t o t l e ’ s c o s m o s are b e i n g r e p l a c e d b y the c i r c l e o f

a thought reflecting upon itself. It is this circle that now contains and gives stability to the flux of daily experiences. Reflection is a movement, moreover, which i n going forward simply returns to its starting point; what comes to be is what was there from the beginning, precisely the sort of movement

(or non-movement) that Aristotle attributed to the heanvens.5 The difference is t h a t H eg el i s n o t n o w a s s u m i n g the s t a n d p o i n t o f a n e x t e r n a l observer w i t h res p ect to t h e m o v e m e n t b u t

(again, because of Kant and Fichte) displays it as is being acted o u t i n science. The movement can therefore b e conceptualized p r e c i s e l y as the total unrest that i t is.6 The L o g i c is a p r o t r a c ted a t t e m p t a t conceptualizing the m o v e m e n t o f t h o u g h t b y means o f a series o f c a t e g o r i e s . Inasmuch as e a c h c a t e g o r y , o r

more precisely each set of categories, introduces absolute

4Hegel does indeed say t h a t t h e Logic i s G o d ’ s k n o w l e d g e before t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e w o r l d . ( L o g i k I , 3 4 ; 5 0 ) B u t my p o i n t i s t h a t for H e g e l t h e " c r e a t i o n of t h e w o r l d , " as a supposed event p r e - d a t i n g real n a t u r e , can o n l y b e Hegel demythologizes Christian metaphysics precisely by recognizing a myth. " p i c t u r e representations" for w h a t they are, a n d by u s i n g t h e m as s u c h .

5See n o t e 2 above. For Hegel of course, j u s t as for A r i s t o t l e , t h e e v e n t o f becoming is s i m p l y presupposed. B u t for A r i s t o t l e i t i s presupposed as s o m e t h i n g which, i s n o t p e r s e intelligible ( t h o u g h e x i s t e n t i a l l y u n d e n i a b l e ) , whereas for

Hegel t h e event establishes t h e possibility of all intelligibility (just as t h e presence of ‘form’ o r ‘ousia' does for Aristotle). Aristotle’s form transcends t h e b e c o m i n g of w h i c h i t i s t h e first p r i n c i p l e . H e g e l ’ s form, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i s always o n l y o n e possible configuration t h a t t h e c o m p o n e n t e l e m e n t s of becoming ( I am t a k i n g ‘becoming’ here i n a broad s e n s e , n o t j u s t as t h e first assume.

category of Hegel's Logic). Hegel’s Logic (which is his version of scientia prima) is the methodical

display

of all s u c h

possible configurations—a

display

that

reveals t h e limitation ( t h e abstract character) of each. 6Among

36, 292, 295.

other texts, see especially E n s . (1830), §§ 17, 24, 237, 241; 22-23,

GEORGE DI GIOVANNI

96

determinations i n the intended object where in fact there are none, the attempt must constantly end in failure. Yet, thought’s o w n reflection reveals the failure i n each c a s e , and sets a new attempt i n motion with a new s e t o f categories. The progression is not an arbitrary o n e , for the new categories m u s t b e able to express the previous ones as abstract determinations o f a reality

that i n fact transcends them. Nor is it endless—not because thought could ever be ob jectif ied qua act (as such it can only be performed) but because the Logic finally turns upon itself, as i t does i n B o o k Three, and defines the course i t has covered s o

far precisely as the methodic display of all the conditions that make for the possibility of ever renewed reflection. The progression of the Logic is actually a process of recollection.7 It is the return of thought, through a meander of physical and metaphysical doctrines, to what originally makes for truth—not necessarily this o r that doctrine, b u t the fluidity of thought itself that constantly undermines the prejudices of the common mind and opens it to new e x p e r i e n c e s .

Finally (and this third comment is the most important o n e , because i t differentiates Hegel’s Logic from both Aristotelian metaphysics and Kantian critique) it is part of thought’s recollection that it should know itself as an activity rooted i n social practice, and hence ultimately continuous with nature. I n defining th e conditions o f its p o s s ib ility reflection also mirrors the nature wh i c h that possibility constantly p r e s u p p o s e s . A s the c o n c e p t o f the c o n c e p t , the L o g i c thus turns out to be the c o n c e p t o f b e i n g . I n t h i s sense H e g e l i a n l o g i c is also metaphy— s i c s . N o t i c e h o w e v e r the ro u te that i t has followed i n its r e t u r n

to the classical tradition. The Logic is first and foremost metalanguage; this i t owes to Kant and Fichte. But language is a social

and

ultimately

natural

product;

contribution to the Kantian inheritance.

this

is Hegel’s o w n

As meta-language,

therefore, the L o g i c is also meta-physics. T h e crucial difference still r e m a i n s , h o w e v e r , that whereas Aristotelian m e t a p h y s i c s ,

and the theology that was its aftermath, are essentially oriented towards cosmology, Hegelian Logic points from the beginning i n the direction of social theory. Moreover, whereas in the classical tradition

dependent

on the Greeks

there always has

been a difficulty i n establishing the possibility of historical

7The

theme of ‘recollection’ runs through t h e Logic. I t is strikingly present,

h o w e v e r , i n t h e analysis of W e s e n as R e fl e x i o n .

Understood

in this sense, Wesen

is ‘being as recollected’. (Logik II, 241; 389) "...[D]ieses reine Sein [i.e. Wesenl, d i e N e g a t i o n alles E n d l i c h e n , eine E r i n n e r u n g u n d Bewegung voraussetzt,

das unmittelbare Dasein sum reinen Sein gereinigt hat.”

welche

A Reply t o Cynthia Willett

97

k n o w l e d g e i n a s t r i c t s e n s e , s i n c e t h e logos d i s p l a y e d b y the

Hegelian Logic is the meaning of

historical discourse, the

p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s c i e n c e o f the h i s t o r i c a l s u b j e c t i s t h e r e b y a l s o

established. For i t is only in history that the logos exists. It is r e a l i z e d t h e r e o n its o w n (far sich) w h e n e v e r s o m e o n e performs

the kind of pure reflection which is the Logic. W h a t can i t p o s s i b l y m e a n , t h e n , t o s a y t h a t a t t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g o f the L o g i c H e g e l favored ‘ b e i n g ’ o v e r ‘ n o t h i n g ’ , t h u s g i v i n g a p o s i t i v e b i a s to t h e s u b s e q u e n t p r o c e s s i o n o f c a t e g o r i e s that b e l i e s the i n t e n t i o n o f ‘ b e c o m i n g ’ as s u c h , i . e . as

‘flux’? If it means that in the Logic there is progression i n the reflection o f t h o u g h t u p o n i t s e l f , t h e n o f c o u r s e t h e c h a r g e i s

valid. But what would be the sense of doing logic if the exercise d i d not constitute a learning experience—if in the process one never reached anything definitive? Progression is attained in the Logic, moreover, only through a series of reflections that reduce to mere ‘moment’ thought’s previous attempts at self - o b jectif ication. Progression marks the recollec— tion of the fluidity of thought. The Logic practices negativity, in other words, from beginning to e n d , and it is this negativity that i t finally makes the explicit object of its reflection. For this reason its thinking is dialectical and not metaphysical in the c l a s s i c a l s e n s e . I t is p o s s i b l e to e n t e r i n t o t h e p r o c e s s o f t h e

Hegelian logic anywhere, (Enz. (1830), § 17; 23) a n d were one to begin with what is historically Book T w o , one would discover t h a t Reflexion o f w h i c h Schein ( w h i c h is t h e O p e n i n g c a t e g o r y t h e r e ) i s a p r o d u c t is " t h e m o v e m e n t o f n o t h i n g t o n o t h i n g , a n d is n e g a t i o n t h a t c o i n c i d e s w i t h itself." (Logik I I , 2 5 0 ; 4 0 0 ) H e r e

is where Hegel thematizes for the first time the utter fluidity of t h e o r i g i n a l ‘ b e c o m i n g ’ , b y e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t t h i s f l u i d i t y is o n l y r e a l i z e d i n f u l l i n the m o v e m e n t o f ‘ r e f l e c t i o n ’ i t s e l f . Schein ( w h i c h i s ‘ b e i n g ’ r e f l e c t i v e l y e x p r e s s e d ) is t h e i m m e d i a c y g e n e r a t e d b y Reflexion. H e g e l , i n o t h e r w o r d s , i s b e g i n n i n g t h e

Logic again here with ‘nothingness’ alone—just as Sartre will b e g i n h i s t h e o r y o f freedom w i t h j u s t ‘ n o t h i n g n e s s ’ , e x c e p t t h a t H e g e l , u n l i k e S a r t r e , is i n t e n t o n s h o w i n g t h a t t h e r e f l e c t i o n o f

‘essence’ leads us straight back to the immediacy of ‘being’. I f the p o i n t b e i n g made is t h a t t h e p r o g r e s s i o n o f t h e

Logic implies a definite goal and that therefore it forecloses discourse, then the charge is invalid. As I have been trying to say, the closure of absract logical reflection is the attainment of t h e r e f l e c t i v e freedom from a b s t r a c t i o n ( h e n c e from d o g m a ) t h a t m a k e s for o p e n n e s s o f d i s c o u r s e . ( I t is n o t b y c h a n c e t h a t a t

the e n d of the Logic we return to the object of m e r e sensation,

GEORGE DI GIOVANNI

98

t o i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e o n c e m o r e . We are n o w i n a p o s i t i o n t o take a n u n e n c u m b e r e d l o o k a t the w o r l d a r r o u n d u s ) .

A n d finally, I fail to see w h y the introduction of Dasein s h o u l d b e s i n g l e d o u t as t h e p l a c e w h e r e H e g e l , s u p p o s e d l y , falls

short of the intention of ‘becoming’. Dasein (which should not b e t r e a t e d as e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x c o n c e p t o f

‘existence’) is the utterly contingent, still indeterminate material individual of Aristotle. There is nothing particularly positive a b o u t it, unless by ‘positive’ one means ‘immediate’. But then all the early categories of the Logic are immediate; the reflection hiding behind them is still to be made explicit. T h e world of Dasein i s as fuzzy a n d s h i f t y a s n a t u r e w o u l d have t o a p p e a r to a n y o n e w h o l o o k s a t i t o n the a s s u m p t i o n o f ‘ b e c o m i n g ’ , as b o t h

Aristotle and Hegel do.

What we learn from Hegel, b u t not

from A r i s t o t l e , i s t h a t the i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f n a t u r e i s b o t h t h e

product and the presupposition of the negativity of thought. If I may e n d o n a n epigrammatic note, Hegel’s Logic is a metaphysics of becoming because it is exactly what both Kant a n d Fichte wanted their philosophy to be, a logic of freedom.

(1830), § 23; 35-36) McGill University (Canada)

(Enz.

Between Being and Essence: Reflection's Logical Disguise by Daniel

0. Dahlstrom

In the first part o f his Wesenslogik, Hegel gives an account o f reflection left to itself, the determinacy o f which is operative but disguised in the entire first book o f the Wissenschaft der Logik,

v i z . the l o g i c o f being.

The

aim

o f the following

remarks is to suggest how this account o f reflection in its immediacy provides the essential Vorstruktur to the very project o f a science o f logic. Departing from tradition and in order to make e x p l i c i t its double entendre, I refer to this i m m e d i a c y —what H e g e l designates as Schein—as the guise, o r t h e disguise

of reflection.1 Albeit in broad strokes, the discussion will

follow the movement o f Hegel’s text from the general to the specific.

I t w i l l proceed from an elaboration o f the character

and role o f reflection’s disguise between the doctrines o f being and those o f essence (Section 1) to an interpretation o f the p r i n c i p l e s o f formal l o g i c , especially c o n t r a d i c t i o n , (Section 2 ) and will conclude w i t h a b r i e f suggestion regarding the success

and the failure o f Hegel’s account.

1. Reflection’s Guise and Disguise H e g e l unpacks two senses o f the opening d o c t r i n e o f essence: "Die Wahrheit des Seyns

sentence o f his i s t das Wesen."

1While generally recognizing i t s t w o f o l d , i f n o t manifold significance, F r e n c h c o m m e n t a t o r s seem t o favor t h e t r a n s l a t i o n "apparence," while English writers propose " s h o w " o r "seeming" for Schein. See Georges N o é l , L a lggique d e Hggel,

2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1967) 54- 55; Eugene Fleischmann, L a scie_nce universelle ou l a logigue de Hegel (Paris: Plon, 1968) 135: deux sens que revét le mot a l l e m a n d Schein, c ’ - e s t a - dire

v a i n e apparence e t réflexion ( d a n s u n m i r o i r ) . . . .

Andre Léonard, Commentaire littéral de l a Logigue de Hegel (Paris: Vrin,1974) 135: "I1 faut n o t e r e n effet q u ’ e n allemand, Scheinen signifie aussi b i e n ‘ l u i r e ’ e t ‘ b r i l l e r ’ q u e ‘ p a r a i t r e ’ e t ”sembler e t que S___chein p e u t e t r e t r a d u i t p a r ‘apparence’

mais aussi par ‘lueur’." In A Study of Hegel’s Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950) 92-93 and An Interpretation of the Lomc of Hege_l (Lanham, Md.: University

Press of

America,

1983)

respectively opt for "show," while

158f, G . R . G . M u r e

Burbidge

and

(On Hggel’s njg

BE.

Harris

(Atlantic

Press, 1 9 8 1 ) 6 3 - 6 7 and 248, notes 4 and 7 ) N e w Jersey: Humanities Highlands, translation "seeming" in contrast t o M i l l e r ’ s more argues for Wallace’s original

recent rendering of Schein as "Illusory

Being.” (Logic 394).

99

DANIEL O . DAHLSTROM

100

( L o g i k I I , 2 4 1 ; 3 8 9 ) O n the o n e h a n d , essence makes e x p l i c i t

that being, the indeterminate immediate at the beginning of the Wissenschaft der L o g i k , is the product o f a n external reflection,

an abstraction in which everything determinate is denied. Essence is b e i n g ’ s truth i n that essence encompasses w h a t On the o t h e r h a n d , essence makes underlies that a b s t r a c t i o n .

explicit a movement of reflection that, while negating and explaining immediate being, nevertheless itself still is. Essence is thus itself a truth which belongs to being’s own determinaThe s t a n d p o i n t o f e s s e n c e makes a p p a r e n t that t h e tions. transitions o f b e i n g are a f u n c t i o n o f a past that r e m a i n s , t h a t

is, of a being that overcomes its otherness and is for- itself. This being---for itself is essence. Precisely because essence is a reflection of thought’s movement of abstracting pure being from the manifold of experience,

i t contains a l l the determinations

of being.

For

example, taken immediately, this reflection is as indeterminate as pure being. The completeness of thought existing for itself, which implicitly grounded the demonstration of the categories

of being, must present itself in the movement of reflection.3 Yet herein lies also the distinction between categories of being and those of essence. In the latter, all relativity to other is o v e r c o m e , i . e . is p o s i t e d b y and c o n t a i n e d i n th e c ha ra c te r o f w h a t is essential. Pure i m m e d i a c y and r e l a t i v i t y to o t h e r ( o r w h a t is e x t e r n a l ) are o v e r r i d i n g features o f the categories o f b e i n g . From t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f e s s e n t i a l c a t e g o r i e s , h o w e v e r , t h e y are s e e n to b e a m e r e s h o w , a seeming or a (dis)guise.

Essence as the reflection o n being represents the overcoming of b e i n g as m e r e i m m e d i a c y .

From t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f i m m e d i a t e l y

distinctive beings (Dasein), essence is other than being. from

the

perspective

immediacy is a guise.

of

what

is e s s e n t i a l ,

But

being’s simple

Moreover, insofar as the guise is

c o n s i d e r e d a g u i s e o f b e i n g ( i . e . as b e l o n g i n g t o , a n d o f t h e

2Lo

vergangene 3Logik

k I I , 2 4 1 ; 389: Seyn."

" . . . d e n n das

Wesen

I I , 2 4 3 ; 3 9 1 : " D i e Negativittit

i s t das vergangene,

aber

zeitlos

des W e s e n s i s t d i e R e fl e x i o n , u n d d i e

Bestimrnungen reflectirte, durch das Wesen selbst gesetzte und ihm als aufgehoben bleibende....Das Wesen ist das An-und-Fursichsexn, aber dasselbe in d e r B e s t i m m u n g d e s Ansichseyns; d e n n s e i n e allgemeine B e s t i m m u n g i s t , a u s d e m S e y n h e r z u k o m m e n oder d i e e r s t e N e g a t i o n d e s S e z n s z u s e i n . " 4Put

in another

w a y , when a d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between w h a t i s e s s e n t i a l

and unessential in an immediately distinctive being (Dasein), t h e distinction is

external and arbitrary. (Cf. Lo ik II, 245; 394-~5)

Between Being and Essence

101

character o f , S e i n ) , the g u i s e is a disguise. For the g u i s e is a reflected i m m e d i a c y , o n l y e x i s t i n g b y means o f i t s n e g a t i o n . 5

("Her behavior was a mere guise, disguising her real feelings") Opposite

its negation,

the guise i s " n o t h i n g

but

the e m p t

determination of the immediacy of the nondistinctive being." I n other words, the guise is simply the immediacy of being, preserved w i t h i n t h e essence o f reflection, and as s u c h i s really

the essence—disguised. ("No, you are quite mistaken; her very (dis)guise unmasks her real feelings") The indifference to b o u n d a r y , o r the reflection within itself w h i c h is the hallmark o f t h e e s s e n t i a l , m i g h t j u s t as w e l l be described as the e s s e n c e ’ s

disguising of itself. "Phenomenon"

for the sceptic and "appearance"

for

the

idealist, Hegel notes, represent historical analogues to this immediacy which is only in relation and yet immediately determined i n a multitude of ways.8 The variety of immediately d e terminate features o f b e i n g are s i m p l y transferred i n these p h i l o s o p h i c traditions to what for each tradition disguises ( a n d for the s c e p t i c s h o p e l e s s l y d i s g u i s e s ) what is real.

Underlying this paper is the suggestion that Hegel’s use of Schein exploits the familiar double—meanings attaching to terms s u c h as " s e e m i n g " a n d " a p p e a r i n g . " 9

Consider the two re a dily

distinguishable uses of these terms i n the following exchange: "She s e e m s / a p p e a r s q u i t e h ap p y w i t h h e r d e c i s i o n , d o n ’ t you t h i n k ? " " N o , I t h i n k s h e o n l y seems/appears h a p p y . ” I n the first

5Logik I I , 2 4 7 ; 397: " D e r S c h e i n also e n t h a l t e i n e u n m i t t e l b a r e V o r a u s s e t s u n g , e i n e u n a b h a n g i g e S e i t e gegen das W e s e n . Es i s t aber v o n i h m , insofern e r vom W e s e n unterschieden i s t , nicht z u z e i g e n , d a B e r s i c h aufhebt u n d i n dasselbe zuriickgeht...."

6Logik I I , 2 4 6 ; 3 9 6 : ” E s ist als d i e reflectirte U n m i t t e l b a r k e i t , d . i . , welche n u r v e r m i t t e l s t ihrer Negation i s t , u n d d i e ihrer V e r m i t t l u n g gegenilber n i c h t s i s t als d i e leere B e s t i m m u n g d e r Unmittelbarkeit des N i c h t d a s e y n s . ”

7These descriptions of S c h e i n i n reflection are designed t o r e c a p i t u l a t e t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s of S e i n . H o w e v e r , S c h e i n begins t o make explicit w h a t was h i d d e n i n S e i n . A d i s g u i s e i s n o t a secret t o everyone and i n every perspective.

8While

the sceptic is not identified,

Hegel m e n t i o n s

Leibniz, Kant,

and

Fichte, among t h e idealists. (See Logik II, 246-7; 396-7) 9See

Roderick M . Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd e d . (Englewood

Cliffs, N e w Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1 9 7 7 ) 2 6 - 3 0 , and Arthur

C. Danto, Trans-

figuration of t h e Commonplace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981) 19-20.

102

case h e r appearance

DANIEL O . DAHLSTROM

( h o w she s e e m s ) faithfully

displays h e r

feelings, while i n the latter case the seeming is a mere show, an illusion of happiness. This sort of ambiguity attaches to both "guise" and "disguise," i n such a way that in many contexts the two function synonimously. However, in order to sort out Hegel’s exploitation of the ambiguity of Schein, i n the remaind e r of this paper "guise" principally stands for a more o r less faithful showing, while "disguise" signifies a deceptive display that one might even presume to be able to detach from what is d i s g u i s e d , as i f i t were a m a s k .

Nevertheless,

note that the

difference is not one of kind, b u t of degree. A disguise remains an attenuated guise, awaiting decipherment. A disguise is always an uninterpreted guise, and the very notion that a disguise can b e detached from what is disguised confuses a disguise with a mask. Hegel affirms the presence of a guise in reflection. A t the same time, through the location of the guise i n reflection, sceptical and idealist disguises are unmasked. The terms "guise" and " d i s g u i s e , " l i k e Schein, s i g n i f y w h a t presents itself i m m e d i a t e l y and as i m m e d i a t e l y d i s t i n c t i v e . T h u s , K a n t ’ s p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d , o r t h e appearances o f th e idealists, s u p p o s e d l y

contain a myriad of determinations i n their very determinations. Yet, this Schein is in fact the immediacy of a reflection which is e s s e n t i a l ; Schein is th e g u i s e o f e s s e n c e . The s c e p t i c a l a n d idealist e r r o r is to take Schein as b e i n g ’ s m a s k , as though Schein i n its very i m m e d i a c y m e d i a t e d w h a t i s ( b e i n g ) . Schein i s , to b e s u r e , the i m m e d i a c y o f b e i n g b u t w i t h i n a reflection that i s essential. H e g e l ’ s c o m p l a i n t seems to b e that sceptics a n d i d e a l i s t s d i d n o t g e t r i g h t t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f what p r e s e n t s a

manifold of determinations in its very immediacy. While they w e r e r i g h t t o s e i z e u p o n the importance

of this kind of im-

mediacy, they grasped i t only as a mask of being, that is to say, e x t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d t o b e i n g and t h u s u l t i m a t e l y j u s t i f y i n g the sceptic’s despair. J u s t as n o n - m e d i a t e d b e i n g ( t h e g u i s e o f

nothing) cannot be pointed out, neither can essence without its guise, o r even its disguise. The guise is the immediacy o r the being of the essence as the initial moment of what is essential—a d i s g u i s e , i f y o u w i l l , s o l o n g as the m e d i a t i o n is masked.

The

essence thus has its o w n disguise o r , as Hegel puts i t , "the essence is the disguising of itself in its very self ." Through the Science of Logic the real identity of essence’s disguise comes to

Between Being a n d Essence

103

be known and reflected.10 The paradox o f the g u i s e / d i s g u i s e can b e pressed f u r t h e r . I n relation t o the c o m p l e t e m o v e m e n t o f r e f l e c t i o n , w h i c h is

essential, the guise is relatively unessential and disguised. The guise is the essence or the reflection viewed as simply being. The simple being expressed b y the guise is "its o w n likeness with itself ." However, this likeness with itself is precisely what characterizes the absolute reflection of what is essential. 1 O r , to put the matter i n another way, as a guise and not a mere disguise, the guise is precisely not t h e medium of another, i.e. not the m i e n or show of something else, b u t is rather the essence or reflection itself. Hegel is struggling to point out that the guise is the same as the r e f l e c t i o n , e x c e p t t h a t t h e g u i s e is t h e es s e nc e o r t h e

reflection taken immediately.12 The paradoxes associated with this notion of guise insure that reflection or essence is a becoming, b u t a becoming i n which the negative or the "other" with respect to becoming is precisely only a guise—a guise of

10Logik I I , 2 4 9 ; 3 9 9 : " D a s Aufheben dieser B e s t i m m t h e i t d e s W e s e n s b e s t e h t daher i n n i c h t s w e i t e r als i n d e m Aufzeigen, d a B das U n w e s e n t l i c h e n u r S c h e i n [ist], u n d d a B das W e s e n v i e l m e h r d e n S c h e i n i n s i c h s e l b s t e n t h a l t als d i e u n e n d l i c h e B e w e g u n g i n s i c h , w e l c h e s e i n e U n m i t t e l b a r k e i t als d i e N e g a t i v i t a t , u n d s e i n e N e g a t i v i t a t als d i e U n m i t t e l b a r k e i t b e s t i m m t u n d s o das S c h e i n e n s e i n e r i n s i c h selbst i s t . Das W e s e n i n d i e s e r s e i n e r S e l b s t b e w e g u n g i s t d i e R e fl e x i o n . " S c h e i n i s u s e d b y Hegel b o t h as a " g u i s e " a n d as a " d i s g u i s e . " T h e difference i s w h e t h e r t h e immediacy i s v i e w e d as t h e s h o w , s e e m i n g , o r a n t i c i p a t i n g , of essence—the reflection t a k e n immediately-or whether is viewed r a t h e r as t h e show of b e i n g . I n t h e l a t t e r case S c h e i n becomes a k i n d of C a r t e s i a n d i s g u i s e o r mask w h i c h , upon r e fl e c t i o n , y i e l d s an endless series of d i s g u i s e s a n d l e a d s t o H u m e ’ s s c e p t i c i s m . F o r b e i n g s i m p l y cannot be s h o w n as p u r e immediacy a n d as t h e d i s g u i s e d o b j e c t , s i n c e b e i n g ( e n c o m p a s s i n g t h e c a t e g o r i e s of b e i n g ) i s a d i s g u i s e , a disguised reflection o r t h e disguise e s s e n c e .

11Logik I I , 2 5 0 ; 4 0 0 : " D e r S c h e i n i s t das N i c h t i g e o d e r W e s e n l o s e ; aber d a s Nichtige oder Wesenlose hat sein Seyn nicht in einem Andern in dem es scheint, sondern sein Seyn ist seine eigne Gleichheit mit sich; dieser Wechsel des des Wesens N e g a t i v e n m i t s i c h s e l b s t h a t s i c h als d i e a b s o l u t e Reflexion bestimmt."

12Hegel’s difficulties are t h e t r a d i t i o n a l ones of n e g a t i v e predication. How can s o m e t h i n g w h i c h i s n o t be l e g i t i m a t e l y p r e d i c a t e d ? W i t h i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f t h e D i n g - a n - s i c h , t h e disguise expresses t h a t t h e d i s g u i s e o r b e i n g i s , b u t o n l y as a s n a p s h o t of history. These s n a p s h o t s are necessary a n d i n e v i t a b l e b u t o n l y as moments of history ( i n l o g i c , of r e f l e c t i o n ) . F o r o t h e r accounts of Hegel’s v i e w s o n reflection, see D i e t e r H e n r i c h , " H e g e l s Logik d e r R e fl e x i o n , " i n Hegel i m

Kontext (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967) 95-156, and Peter Riesinger,

"Reflexion und Ichbegriff,” Hegel-Studien VII (1971) 231—265.

DANIEL O . DAHLSTROM

104

essence o r reflection itself.13 I n this manner the stage of essence subsumes and yet maintains a clear difference, even a radical d e p a r t u r e ,

from

the logic of

being.

I n contrast

to

external otherness characteristic of the categories of being, the other of reflection is only the ref lection’s self - r e f erring negation o r , more simply, the other is a disguise. Most important, this disguise (viz. Schein) is not the immediacy of what simply is, o r from w h i c h o n e b e g i n s . R a t h e r , this d i s g u i s e is the i m m e d i a c y

of the movement of reflection itself. A science of logic cannot be simply an analysis of the categories of thought without a n analysis of thought itself. The categories of being are those categories, immediately given to thought, in which thought is disguised. In the Wesenslogik this disguise is accounted f o r , and the c e n t r a l role o f reflection i n t h e d i s g u i s e is made e x p l i c i t . The i m p o r t o f H e g e l ’ s a c c o u n t o f

Schein is that being is not die Sache selbst veiled by some sort of disguise, a mental picture or representation, some appearance R a t h e r , the d i s g u i s e is die Sache s e l b s t , or perception. The p h i l o s o p h i c " e s s e n t i a l reflection" i m m e d i a t e l y t a k e n . foundation that w o u l d b e b o t h i m m e d i a t e , a n d y e t i n r e l a t i o n to a n o t h e r , is a d i s g u i s e d r e f l e c t i o n o r a g u i s e for w h a t is

In other words, the beginning of reflection is essential. immediate—but not as an image of being, not as a medium for something

t h a t stands forth i n s h e e r i m m e d i a c y

even though

never to be found behind the image. Rather, the beginning of reflection is being—all that there is to being, as ref lection’s o w n (dis)guise.

The s u m of this first part of m y reconstruction of Hegel’s account

of

Schein

is p e r h a p s

captured

by

th e

notion

that

reflection is always a distortion o r diversion of sorts. The etymology of the word confirms that deception, i n a sense, is an inevitable element of reflection. H o w e v e r , r e f l e c t i o n is also u n i v e r s a l . E v e r y b e i n g , v i e w e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f r e f l e c t i o n , is

13Logik I I , 2 4 9 ; 399: " D e r S c h e i n i s t d a s s e l b e , was d i e R e fl e x i o n i s t ; a b e r e r i s t d i e Reflexion a l s u n m i t t e l b a r e ; filr d e n i n s i c h g e g a n g e n e n , h i e m i t s e i n e r

Unmittelbarkeit entfremdeten Schein haben wir das Wort der fremden Sprache, die Reflexion." One reason for Hegel’s use of t h e term Reflexion may be its foreignness t o t h e German e a r t h a t suggests t h e r e v e r t i n g t o a root m e a n i n g , i . e . i t s e l f a departure from i m m e d i a c y . I t i s also possible t h a t Hegel prefers t h e foreign word Reflexion over t h e G e r m a n o n e h e sometimes uses as i t s s u b s t i t u t e , v i z . " N a c h d e n k e n , " b e c a u s e t h e l a t t e r s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t s t h e temporal past w h i c h precedes t h i n k i n g , and t h i s i m p l i e s a psychological perspective w h i c h i s o u t of p l a c e i n a s c i e n c e of l o g i c . I t may b e w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g t h a t Reflexion i s n o t t o be found i n t h e 1 8 9 3 volume of t h e G r i m m D i c t i o n a r y .

Between Being and Essence

105

i n fact a disguised reflection. The deception of the disguise occurs where the immediacy of what is present to reflection is construed as fixed and final, s o that its d e n i a l i s e q u i v a l e n t to its disappearance. This d e c e p t i v e n e s s , i n o t h e r w o r d s , is

characteristic of a disguise viewed as being, o r as a show of being. W h a t is essential i s the m o v e m e n t o f r e f l e c t i o n , a n d t h i s is w h a t a d i s g u i s e i s , the immediacy o f a r e f l e c t i o n . This n o t i o n

of disguise, to be distinguished from a mere mask, serves the critical function of destroying the illusion that there is a fixed sort of being apart from the immediacy of reflection. The speculative

counterpart

to this function

does

not deny

the

disguise, b u t sees through it by identifying the essence of the disguise as the movement of reflection taken immediately. Moreover,

the

very

fact

that

reflection

begins

with

disguise insures its completeness. Relation to a n other a c counted for the transience of the categories of being; within r e f l e c t i o n , h o w e v e r , this o t h e r is the reflection i t s e l f as d i s guised. R e l a t i o n to an o t h e r i s preserved p r e c i s e l y i n the

nature of a reflection which begins with its disguise. The categories of being, which abstractly denote relation to s o m e thing other, are indeed preserved, but as the immediacies of reflection. The discussion of Schein is thus meant to introduce e x p l i c i t l y what before was i m p l i c i t i n the Science of Logic, v i z .

the absolute reflection that constitutes the logical categories. A n d t h e r e b y i t also becomes e v i d e n t that this reflection c a n n o t b e associated w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r c o n s c i o u s n e s s . L i n k i n g w h a t is

essential to a n arbitrarily conceived subject subverts the very logical character, the universality and objectivity of the c a t e g o r i e s d e n o t e d b y "essence." H e g e l ’ s i n t h e c h a p t e r o n Schein is a c c o r d i n g l y a t i o n w i t h o u t the t r a p p i n g s o f a private made f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f an impartial

account of reflection d e s c r i p t i o n o f reflecego, o r a d e s c r i p t i o n observer, purged (by

the despair-filled path of the Phaenomenologie des Geistes) of a n y i n c l i n a t i o n to absolutize a particular form o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . So too i t b e c o m e s e v i d e n t i n w h a t way th e a c c o u n t o f Schein i s

central to the argument of the Science of Logic as a whole. By demonstrating how the immediacy of being is retained within e s s e n c e i n t h e form o f reflection l e f t to i t s e l f ( w h i l e o r , r a t h e r , p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e , essence u n m a s k s the disguised reflection o f

being) Hegel is in effect establishing that the concept of self reflection o r subjectivity, logically conceived, is the foundation a n d unity of being and essence.

DANIEL O . DAHLSTROM

106

2. Reflection’s Logical Disguises That r e f l e c t i o n i s i n s o m e s e n s e p r i o r to the identification

of a self, o r at least that the self only is i n the movement of reflection, suggests t h e s o r t o f p r i o r i t y H e g e l also attaches to reflection i n his account o f the t r a d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s o f formal

logic. A s "determinations of reflection o r essentialities," in effect, fixings of the movement of reflection left to itself, identity, difference, and contradiction constitute essential disguises. Each determination characterizes the movement of reflection as a w h o l e and y e t i s d i s g u i s e d a s a m o m e n t pos ite d b y reflecti o n . I n t h e m e d i u m o f p u r e s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n these

determinations are established and endlessly fixed, just as every transition i n t o , and r e f l e c t i o n o n , a n o t h e r is s u b s u m e d i n s e l f r e f l e c t i o n . The p e c u l i a r d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s o f the determinations o f reflection is t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n o f r e f l e c t i o n i n i t s e l f , i . e . w i t h i n

reflection’s disguising.14 A t least three purposes are served by this account. First, Hegel seems intent o n demonstrating how the validity attached to formal l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f i d e n t i t y a n d c o n t r a d i c t i o n d e r i v e s

from the absoluteness of reflection, a n d not vice versa. These determinations are disguises by which reflection relates to its otherness within itself. Second, b y demonstrating how identity, difference,

and contradiction

a r e p o s i t e d b y the e n t i r e m o v e -

ment of reflection i n itself, Hegel aims a t distinguishing essential identity from abstract o r purely formal identity. T h i r d , while d e m o n s t r a t i n g h o w i t is t h a t a s p e c i a l , fixed s t a t u s is a t t r i b u t e d to t h e s e l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s , t h e real s t a t u s o f t h e

essentialities as disguised reflections allows Hegel to demonstrate the relations and movement among them. Ultimately, the separate and fixed character of these disguises of reflection i n i t s e l f proves c o n t r a d i c t o r y . I n o r d e r to k e e p this p a p e r w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s , I pass o v e r H e g e l ’ s d e t a i l e d d i a l e c t i c o f i d e n t i t y ,

14Logik

I I , 258; 4 0 9 : " D i e R e fl e x i o n s b e s t i m m u n g e n

pflegten

sonst

in die

Form von Séitzen aufgenommen zu werden, worin von ihnen ausgesagt wurde, daB sie von allem gelten. Diese Stitze galten als die allgemeinen Denkgesetze, die a l l e m D e n k e n z u m G r u n d e l i e g e n , an i h n e n s e l b s t a b s o l u t u n d u n b e w e i s b a r s e i e n . . . . " F o r a s t u d y of t h e passages n o w b e i n g considered s e e George d i

Giovanni, ”Reflection and Contradiction. A commentary o n Some Passages of Hegel’s Science of Logic," Hegel-Studien, VIII (1973) 131-161. Among t h e more i n t e r e s t i n g themes d i G i o v a n n i pursues i s t h e w a y i n w h i c h H e g e l ’ s t r e a t m e n t of c o n t r a d i c t i o n provides t h e logical basis for t h e c o n t i n g e n c y t h a t i n t u r n serves

as an element in t h e demonstration of t h e freedom of subjectivity (recalling t h e earlier work of Annelise Redlich u n d U t e Guzzoni). Di Giovanni reverses the order i n t h e L o g i c , p l a c i n g t h e r e f l e c t i o n - d e t e r m i n a t i o n s reflection.

before t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f

Between Being and Essence

107

difference, variety, and o p p o s i t i o n ( j u s t as I o m i t t e d t h e a c c o u n t

of positing, external, and determining reflection directly preceding it). In abbreviated fashion, the import of that a c c o u n t is the speculative c o n c l u s i o n that e s s e n t i a l i d e n t i t y , as O p p o s e d to abstract i d e n t i t y , contains as a r e f l e c t i o n the

determination of difference and vice versa. As characteristic of the entire reflection, identity is the negation of any difference from that reflection. This negation extends to identity itself as a disguise o f reflection.

W h a t , i n effect, is absolute

identity’s difference from all difference distinguishes it from itself, i.e. constitutes a self -distinguishing. Absolute identity, as reflections’s disguise in itself, is thus e q u i v a l e n t to absolute difference—and is perfectly vacuous. I d e n t i t y , as a d e t e r m i n a -

tion of reflection, collapses into indeterminacy, for it is a difference in which nothing is differentiated. Similar arguments are made in regard to absolute difference (as a reflection and self-relating, difference is different, not from an other, b u t from itself, and this is to say that difference is also identity) as w e l l as to p r i n c i p l e s o f variety a n d o f o p p o s i t i o n . 1 Upon Reflection l e f t to itself p r o v e s c o n t r a d i c t o r y . reflection, each determination of reflection (identity, difference, v a r i e t y , o p p o s i t i o n ) is unmasked as i n d e t e r m i n a t e . The neces—

sary union of absolute identity and absolute difference is indeterminate as i s the p u r p o r t e d d etermin ate difference, the o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e n e g a t i v e and the p o s i t i v e . This i n d e t e r m i n a c y

of the determinations of reflection is a contradiction within reflection left to itself .16 What is contradictory is the image of a n indifferent,

independent

determination of reflection.

H e g e l ’ s a c c o u n t o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n , as th e c o n c l u s i o n t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f reflection left to itself, t h u s s e e m s to c o n f i r m the e m p t i n e s s o f reflection. H o w e v e r , th e n u l l i t y o f r e f l e c t i o n ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s left to t h e m s e l v e s ” r e p r e s e n t s o n l y the c r i t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n to this instance o f H e g e l ’ s d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d . There

15Logik

II, 273; 425.

II, 262; 413. Log'k 11, 266; 417. Logic 11, 269-270; 421-422. Logik

16Logik d e r an d e r E n t g e g e n s e t z u n g I I , 286; 4 3 9 : " D e r Widerspruch, hervortritt, i s t n u r das e n t w i c k l e t e N i c h t s , das i n d e r I d e n t i t fi t e n t h a l t e n i s t u n d Diese i n d e m Ausdrucke v o r k a m , d a B der S a t z d e r I d e n t i t fi t N i c h t s s a g e . Negation bestimmt s i c h w e i t e r z u r Verschiedenheit u n d z u r E n t g e g e n s e t z u n g , w e l c h e n u n d e r gesetzte Wider-spruch int."

17Cf.

the preceding note.

DANIEL O . DAHLSTROM

108

is a speculative s i d e as w e l l .

W h a t falls a p a r t i n this dialectic

of the positive and the negative is what Hegel calls "the "Das Gesetztseyn d e r positedness o f the i n d e p e n d e n c e . " 1 8 Selbstandigkeit" signifies a b e i n g that has b e e n posited b y

another o r , in effect, a relation to something other than the movement of reflection itself. The speculative side to the excluding reflection of the positive o r the negative yields precisely this conclusion. For example, the positive excludes the negative and thereby makes itself into something that has been posited. However, the negative signifies what has been posited as independent. In the excluding reflection, then, the notion that something has been posited by an other-as-independent is overcome. For this sort o f positedness proves contradictory. Moreover, the contradiction is itself a disguise o f reflection i n i t s e l f , insofar as the othe r

that posited the negative side is the very reflection that produces the positive. I n other words, what is posited is not so much the negation of an other as a return to the unity of reflection at the beginning. This return signals "the unity of the essence," a unity that is at once self —suff icient yet posited. This unity has been posited b y overcoming the disguise of being posited b y another, overcoming it within reflection i n itself, e.g. as the independence o f opposites: th e positive and the ne ga tive . (Logik 11, 2 8 1 - 2 8 2 ; 4 3 4 - 4 3 5 ) T h i s essential u n i t y is posited b y

reflection and thus comes to be. Yet i t overcomes any notion o f having

been

posited

by another.

Therein

lies the s e l f -

sufficiency of reflection, the foundation of the validity attributed to the principles o f i d e n t i t y a n d contradiction i n formal

logic. 3. Success and failure of reflection’s disguise

The success of Hegel’s account of reflection in terms of its disguises is at least fourfold. (1) With respect to the status of the Logic, b y demonstrating the interconnectedness and movement of logical categories, Hegel has effectively

treatment of them.

18Logjltr

criticized the standard,

s t r i c t l y formal,

A t the same time, by demonstrating that

I I , 2 8 1 ; 4 3 3 : " D e s P o s i t i v e u n d Negative machen das G e s e t z t s e y n d e r Selbstfindigkeit a u s ; d i e N e g a t i o n i h r e r d u r c h sie aelbst hebt das G e s e t z t s e y n d e r Selbstfindigkeit auf. D i B i s t e s , was i n W a h r h e i t i m Widerspruche n u G r u n d geht."

Between Being and Essence

109

these categories are determinate o r operative o n l y i n r e l a t i o n , h e

joins hands with a quite contemporary school of thought i n finding them to be vacuous if treated as qualitative categories ( w h i c h would e n t a i l a category m i s t a k e ) . ( 2 ) A s regards the a u t o n o m y o f t h o u g h t , b y imbedding the account o f the logical categories i n a theory o f r e f l e c t i o n , this

autonomy of thought, far from being denied b y the critical stance towards the p r i n c i p l e s o f formal l o g i c , i s u n d e r s c o r e d . For what p r o v e s contradictory i s the n o t i o n t h a t the d e t e r m i n a tions o f reflection, e . g . t h e poles o f o p p o s i t i o n , have a s e l f -

sufficiency of their o w n or have been posited b y something other than the movement of reflection itself. In effect, Hegel’s account

of

reflection

provides a kind

o f impartial

observer

theory by means of which the necessity attaching to the logical categories is established i n n o n - p s y c h o l o g i s t i c

fashion.

What

constitutes their necessity is the movement of reflection which they disguise, each in its particular fashion.

( 3 ) A s to the extent that contradiction pervades logical reflection, Hegel must obviously abide b y the general principle of communication, e.g. the law of non-contradiction. Neverthe— l e s s , the presentation o f the m o v e m e n t o f reflection is p r e c i s e l y

the existing contradiction. Contradiction is decisively operative in reflection and i n reflection’s disguises (which subsume the categories of being). The linguistic presentation of reflection can indeed disguise reflection, insofar as the movement of the l a t t e r i s localized o r temporalized i n a n isolated e x p r e s s i o n . This reflection, h o w e v e r , i s a deceptive d i s g u i s e ( m a s k ) , i f taken as

a sign of something that is not expressed. In fact, the presentat i o n a t issue i s significant o n l y i n th e c o m p l e t e f l o w o f l a n guage.19 A c c o r d i n g to H e g e l , "all things a r e i n themselves

contradicting."20 Contradiction is inevitable i n reflection i n itself, i.e. something is determinate or significant only i n the m o v e m e n t o f reflection. This u n i t y c o m p r i s e s the essential determinate difference o f that s o m e t h i n g . Yet the u n i t y and the

19See

Riesinger, "Reflexion

u n d Ichbegriff," 2 4 4 .

”Log“: II, 286; 439:"Alle Dinge sind an sich selbst widersprechend, und

z w a r i n d e m S i n n e , d a B dieser S a t : gegen d i e fibrigen vielmehr d i e Wahrheit W e s e n der Dinge ausdrflcke.”

und

11 0

DANIEL O . DAHLSTROM

difference are contradictory.21 (4) As for explaining the ground of error, Hegel’s account of contradiction can perhaps best be viewed as a reflection o n a Platonic problem. Plato offered a way of mediating identity and difference in being while establishing the possibility of error in the context of sophistic reasoning. Hegel now articulates the u n i t y o f i d e n t i t y and difference i n a n o t i o n o f reflection that disguises i t s e l f as b e i n g . I n the manner o f Plato’s

relative non-being, the possibility of error is accounted for b y Error reflection’s o w n disguises which are contradictory. consists in mistaking a determination of reflection for something that simply was—more specifically, for something that was posited by something other than reflection. Error is not avoided b y holding fast to the notion that nothing is contradictoryRather, the error is to fail to grasp the contradiction. "Das spekulative D e n k e n b e s t e h t n u r d a r i n , d a B das D e n k e n den W i d e r sp r u c h u n d i n i h m s i c h s e l b s t festhalt, n i c h t a b e r daB es s i c h , wie es d e m V o r s t e l l e n g e h t , v o n i h m beherr-

schen und durch ihn sich seine Bestimmungen nur i n andere o d e r i n Nichts auflosen lasst." (Logik II, 287-288; 440-441) The determinate character of essence emerges clearly i n this text. Essence as ref lection-in-itself begins from its own disguises and thus i s c o m p l e t e i n itself, w i t h o u t r e l a t i o n to s o m e t h i n g e l s e . There i s n o t h i n g e l s e , s i n c e t h i s r e f l e c t i o n is th e m o v e m e n t from

nothing to nothing. Yet this feature establishes that the disguises are contradictions and errors essential to the reflection. What is essential resolves the c o n t r a d i c t i o n , o r explains the e r r o r t h a t besets b e i n g and its r e f l e c t i o n , the immediate i n d e t e r m i n a c y

of things and their essence. Despite these successes o f H e g e l ’ s account o f r e f l e c t i o n ’ s d i s g u i s e s , there remains a l e g i t i m a t e d o u b t a b o u t t h e radicalness

of Hegel’s conclusion. While the notion of Schein makes i t possible to construe disparate, even opposed, notions within the

21Logik 11, 2 8 7 - 2 9 0 ; 4 4 0 - 4 4 3 . T h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s i n h e r e n t i n reflection left t o itself might seem t o i m p l y t h a t contradiction i s t o b e shoved off i n t o a corner, a problem for c o n s c i o u s n e s s o r l a n g u a g e alone, as if c o n s c i o u s ness o r language d o n o t themselves c o n s t i t u t e a w o r l d . However, contradiction i s i n e v i t a b l e i n reflection i n i t s e l f and t h u s in- a l l i t s d i s g u i s e s . The c o n t r a d i c t i o n was already present throughout t h e sphere of t h e categories of b e i n g , b u t was n o t reflected t h e r e . I n i t s disguises o r formal p r e s e n t a t i o n s , t h e c h a r a c t e r o f w h a t simply i s , i s retained i n t h e essence o f reflection. I n effect, c o n t r a d i c t i o n

is not to be denied or dismissed as some inexplicable human error. (See below, h o w e v e r , my criticism‘ of Hegel's i n s i s t e n c e o n c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) .

Between Being and Essence

one framework

111

o f r e f l ectio n , to take reflection itself as c o n -

tradictory seems neither necessary nor possible. Identity is not different

from difference

i n th e same r e s p e c t as difference

is

different from identity. Similar arguments apply regarding the identities of identity and difference, as well as the oppositions o f negative a n d p o s i t i v e . In s u m , th e account o f r e f l e c t i o n ’ s d i s g u i s e s provides a s p e c u l a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n o f the relations a nd an movements ideally obtaining among logical principles, e n d e a v o r regrettably n o t s o m u c h d i s c o u n t e d as l a r g e l y i g n o r e d i n c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h i z i n g . H o w e v e r , this e x p l a n a t i o n need n o t pos tula t e t h e u n t h i n k a b l e , viz. t h a t s o m e t h i n g be a n d n o t b e in t h e same respect.

C a t h o l i c University o f A m e r i c a

Hegel's Criticism

of Spinoza's Concept of the Attribute by Laura Byrne

The way in which the attributes express the essence of substance w i t h i n Spinoza’s metaphysics has perplexed commen-

tators since Spinoza’s own time.1 Hegel makes a contribution to this debate in a remark at the end of his discussion of the absolute in the Science of Logic. (Logik 11, 376-379; 536-540) He turns to this question at this point in the Logic because, in his view, the central concept o f Spinoza’s philosophy, substance, corresponds within his o w n system to the concept o f the absolute and the relation o f reflection to i t . (Logik II, 3 7 6 ; 5 3 6 )

I t is this assertion and its implications for Hegel’s understanding o f the attributes o f substance within Spinoza's metaphysics that are the concern o f this paper.

I f we are to understand Hegel’s remark, i t is necessary to understand the category o f the absolute and the concept o f

reflection.

Most fundamentally, the absolute is a category of

essence. Consequently, i t is with a b r i e f consideration o f this broader category and the absolute’s place in i t that our discussion must begin.

Being, the subject o f Book One o f the Logic, is the sphere o f finite, externally related entities. Essence, as the negation o f being, that is, as the negation o f being’s characteristic separation

into something and other, is the negation of everything finite and determinate. This does not mean that all determination is excluded from essence: such a simple unity would be one more f initude limited or bordered b y the determinateness i t excludes.

1The perplexity of Leibniz ("Ad Ethicam Benedict de Spinoza," 2;; philosophischen Schriften von G.W.F. Leibniz. ed. C.J. Gerhart (Berlin, 18751890; rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1960) I , 141, prop. 2) and de Vries (Benedict

Spinoza, Spinoza Opera, ed. C a r l Gebhardt (Heidelberg: Carl W i n t e r , 1925; r p t . 1972), E p . 8 ) , for example, expressed itself as scepticism about t h e possibility of a single substance having more t h a t one attribute. This, of course, raises the larger question o f the nature of the attribute and its relation t o substance. Hereafter Spinoza's Ethics will be referred to as follows: E 1 = E t h i c s , P a r t I ; P1=Proposition 1; D e f = D e fi n i t i o n ; Exp=Explanatiom S c h : Scholium; LemzLem-

ma; Ep.1=Letter 1.

113

LAURA B Y R N E

l 14

A s s u c h , d e t e r m i n a t i o n m u s t s o m e h o w b e p r e s e r v e d 'in e s s e n c e . As we shall see, this demand culminates in the problem of the absolute.

In the sphere of being, the unity of being and nothing, which is the heart of determination, is articulated by the something’s taking its character from the other which i t sets outside of itself. If the other is constitutive of the something, h o w e v e r , t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n c a n n o t b e t h e i r u l t i m a t e t r u t h . A s the c u l m i n a t i o n and t r u t h o f b e i n g , e s s e n c e recognises t h i s b y

incorporating otherness within itself. This has a profound effect u p o n e s s e n c e . I t i s a tense u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s . These o p p o s i t e s are SOphisticated o r d e v e l o p e d forms o f t h e e q u i v a l e n t o p p o s i t e s o f b e i n g a n d n o t h i n g . J u s t as b e i n g a n d n o t h i n g are e q u i v a l e n t as w e l l as o p p o s i t e , s o t o o are t h e m o m e n t s o f e s s e n c e . A s a

result, essence is self -repelling and self -reuniting. Because of the difference within it, i t sets itself against itself only to find itself i n the difference that it has created. This is the logic of i t s categorial d e v e l o p m e n t . S h o w ( S c h e i n ) 2 i s what h a s b e c o m e o f the d e t e r m i n a t e n e s s o f b e i n g . I t is the o t h e r as n o n - s u b s i s -

tent.

It is the moment of distinction which is n o longer

p r o d u c t i v e o f a s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t o t h e r b u t is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n essence. Consequently, rather than being simply identical with

itself, essence is also different from itself. As a result, essence i s self— r e f l e c t i n g . Reflection i s the i n t r a n s i t i v e b e c o m i n g o f e s s e n c e . B e c o m i n g was t h e word for t h e i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n t h e e q u i v a l e n t o p p o s i t e s o f b e i n g a n d n o t h 1 n g a n d t h e various n a m e s t h e y

2Although

M i l l e r has d e c i d e d t o t r a n s l a t e

Begriff as

”Concept,"

he still

favours "illusory being" for Schein (A.V. Miller, ”On Translating Hegel," T h e Owl of Minerva, XIV (1983) 6): A word t h a t p r e s e n t s some d i f fi c u l t y i s S c h e i n . T h i s w o r d h a s u s u a l l y b e e n t r a n s l a t e d by " s h o w " ; b u t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f E s s e n c e I do not think ”show" adequately conveys Hegel’s meaning. "Schein" says Hegel, "consists solely in the sublatedness of Being, i n i t s n o t h i n g n e s s ; t h i s n o t h i n g n e s s i t h a s i n Essence a n d apart from E s s e n c e S c h e i n i s n o t . " A n d i n t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y h e s a y s t h a t S c h e i n i s t h e n a m e w e g i v e t o B e i n g t h a t i s i n i t s o w n self a n o n - b e i n g . " I n t h e l i g h t of t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s , " s h o w " s e e m s t o m e t o be t o o i m p r e c i s e a t r a n s l a t i o n . S c h e i n h a s o n l y an i l l u s o r y b e i n g and t h a t i s h o w I h a v e t r a n s l a t e d i t .

I t i s , h o w e v e r , p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e s h o w i s n o t merely illusory t h a t I h a v e c h o s e n

t o deviate from Miller’s usage. I t is otherness within essence’s unity. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e n e g a t i v i t y of w h i c h M i l l e r s p e a k s i s c a p t u r e d u s a g e : mere s h o w , s h o w - o f f , a n d s o o n .

by s h o w ’ s full r a n g e o f

Hegel’s Criticism of Spinoza’s Concept of t h e Attribute 115

themselves t o o k o n as t h e y d e v e l o p e d t h r o u g h the process o f t h i s

interplay. This development resulted i n the necessity of rethinking their relationship. Essence’s task is to think a unity which contains otherness or negation within i t . Reflection is t h e new word for the old interplay o f o p p o s i t e s as i t is w o r k e d o u t i n e s s e n c e . H e g e l discusses t h r e e forms o f reflection: p o s i t i n g ,

external, and determining. The first two figure prominently i n Hegel’s discussion of Spinoza. Both of these are inadequate to e s s e n c e ’ s c o m p l e x i t y because t h e y e m p h a s i s e o n e m o m e n t at the ex pense o f the o t h e r . Positing reflection goes too far i n

expressing the non-subsistence of the other or of the m o m e n t of difference. Upon discovering the non-subsistence of s h o w , i t declares it to b e one w i t h e s s e n c e .

I t fails, h o w e v e r , to g i v e

due emphasis to the distinction between the two. External reflection is charged with this task, b u t it carries i t out at the expense of unity.

It posits t h e two s i d e s , the self - e q u a l i t y o f

essence and the difference of show, as wholly distinct. What is required instead i s the r e c o g n i t i o n that i d e n t i t y and difference

are two moments of a self-differentiating u n i t y . These m o ments of self-equality and self-difference make for the am— biguity which will drive the process forward. Essence is simple relation to s e l f , a n d i t i s s h o w , the o t h e r i n e s s e n c e . T h i s i s t h e

complexity which animates the categorial development of essence. The essential categories represent attempts to come to grips with the reflective nature of essence. The discussion of ground, through to actuality and the a b s o l u t e , s t r u g g l e s w i t h v a r i o u s forms o f the bifurcation o f the

elements of determinate reflection. The absolute integrates the m o m e n t s i m p e r f e c t l y r e l a t e d i n th e categories w h i c h p r e c e d e i t . E x i s t e n c e , for e x a m p l e , immediately u n i t e s t h e m o m e n t s o f

u n i t y and difference which were expressed as the separate sides o f the g r o u n d r e l a t i o n , b u t the naive c o n s t r u c t o f the p u r e and s i m p l e e x i s t e n t soon shows itself to b e a m u c h m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d s t r u c t u r e a n d e n g e n d e r s the category o f a p p e a r a n c e . The s i m p l e self - p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the existent is n o l o n g e r taken a t face v a l u e a n d w e l o o k for the truth g r o u n d i n g i t . T h i s e n g e n d e r s the c a t e g o r y o f appearance w h i c h has its b e i n g and t r u t h i n a n o t h e r . b e t w e e n the s i d e s o f a p p e a r a n c e i s W h e n the difference r e c o g n i s e d , we a r r i v e a t t h e s t u b b o r n o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n the

world of appearance and the world i n itself. Y e t , again, each implies the other. The result is one totality w h i c h maintains the difference of the sides within itself. It i s , therefore, s e l f repelling and produces two totalities. W i t h this we approach a s t r u c t u r e a d e q u a t e to the e s s e n c e - s h o w c o m p l e x .

E a c h o f these

two totalities contains the other and is essentially related to the

LAURA BYRNE

1 l6

other. Each has its self -subsistence i n the unity of both. The membership

o f the sides i n o n e u n i t y becomes apparent i n the

whole-part relation as a form of correlativity. A t first, each side insists o n its distinction from the other to which it is related. Its relation to the other is soon seen to be essential to its own being. The sides are not merely correlative, b u t constitutive of one another. A new structure which recognises this fact and does away with the untenable dichotomy of the whole-part relation is required. Force and its expression are different sides of one dynamic reality. I n expressing itself, force does n o t pass o v e r into a n o t h e r .

A stubborn element of

disjunction remains, however, until i t is recognised that force’s externality is its s e l f ~ e x p r e s s i o n .

I n b e i n g e x t e r n a l to itself, i t

is itself. Its relation to another is a self -relation. Consequently, force is an infinite movement of self - d i f f erentiation and return to self. A self -determining unity is achieved. This marks the transition to actuality and the absolute. The earlier categories of essence failed to integrate self -relation and diversity. Actuality overcomes this shortcoming. Its development consists, first, in the removal of the false barrier between the sides of reflection which characterised the earlier c a t e g o r i e s , a n d , s e c o n d , i n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f a more adequate

expression of their relationship. Distinction and identity are no longer distributed over two sides of a barrier b u t are installed in a higher unity.

To r e l a t e t h e s u b s t a n c e o f the Ethics to t h e a b s o l u t e as a

category of actuality, then, is to assert that this substance attempts the unification of self -relation and difference. This is a fair assertion because S p i n o z a intends t h e a t t r i b u t e s a n d m o d e s to c o n s t i t u t e the d e t e r m i n a t e c o n t e n t o f s u b s t a n c e . Substance

consists of infinite attributes.3 The modes are asserted to follow from the nature of substance as a self -caused infinite totality.4 I n other words, all determination and difference is the d e t e r mination and difference of one substance. Nevertheless, Hegel’s c o r r e l a t i n g S p i n o z a ’ s s u b s t a n c e w i t h the a b s o l u t e , a n e a r l y a n d immediate category o f a c t u a l i t y , is m e a n t t o s i g n a l t h a t Hegel

does not think that it effects this unification of unity a n d

3"Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constant e m i n fi n i t i s a t t r i b u t i s , q u o r u m u n u m q u o d q u e a e t e r n a m , 8L i n fi n i t a m e s s e n t i a m

exprimit." (ElDef6)

4r"Ex necessitate divinae n a t u r a e , infinite infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent." (E1P16)

Hegel’s Criticism of Spinoza’s Concept of t h e Attribute l l 7

difference satisfactorily.

A s th e first stage o f a c t u a l i t y , t h e first

priority of the absolute is the resolution of the separation between otherness and u n i t y . I n i t i a l l y , this transition s e e m s t o involve a c o l l a p s e o f determination i n t o the a b s o l u t e . It is

necessary, then, to discover how determination will re-emerge. The absolute seems to be the most formal contradiction. (Logik II, 370; 530) A s the unity of the sides of reflection, i t m u s t contain all determinations, b u t i n c o n t a i n i n g t h e m , i t s e e m s

to annihilate them. This is the result of its immediacy or its being the first stage of the reformulation of the n e w unitary relationship between unity and determinateness. A s an im— mediate

expression

of

this new

unity,

it is an instance

of

positing reflection. Hegel’s own discussion of the attributes and modes

details

the

re-emergence

of

d eter m in a ti on

and

the

resultant ripening of this immediacy into reflective maturity. B u t , i n H e g e l ’ s estimation, Spinoza’s a c c o u n t o f the a t t r i b u t e s and modes fails to d o t h i s . A s s u c h , the H e g e l i a n d o c t r i n e o f

modes and attributes constitutes a n effort to achieve what Spinoza could n o t . Because the e m p h a s i s in t h e a b s o l u t e is o n unification, i t appears as a void i n w h i c h all d eterm ination has

vanished. (Logik II, 370; 530) In Hegel’s own discussion of the a ttr ibute a n d the m o d e s , d e t e r m i n a t i o n is recovered from t h i s " b l a c k w h o l e . " If He g e l is c o r r e c t , Spinoza’s understanding o f the attributes and modes fails to d o t h i s . I n s h o r t , t h e n , i n identifying

Spinoza’s substance with t h e

absolute, Hegel asserts that Spinoza has the merit of offering a theory of reality as a unified totality, free of the dichotomy e x e m p l i f i e d b y the world o f appearance and t h e w o r l d - i n - i t s e l f o r t h e r e l a t i o n o f i n n e r and o u t e r . B u t because Spinoz a’s s u b s t a n c e d o e s n o t g o beyond the category o f the a b s o l u t e , b e c a u s e h i s a c c o u n t o f the attributes and m o d e s does n o t p e r m i t a h i g h e r and m o r e adequate u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f d e t e r m i n a t e u n i t y , i t c a n n o t e x p r e s s the determinate concreteness to w h i c h i t a s p i r e s . R e s t i n g at the level o f the a b s o l u t e , s u b s t a n c e is o n e ,

a n indivisible totality in which all determination is contained and dissolved. Like the absolute, it integrates everything into itself at the expense of distinction. Hegel retrieves distinction

5"Die Eine Substanz, Eine untrennbare S u b s t a n z dieses S y s t e m s i s t T o t a l i t fi t ; e s g i b t k e i n e B e s t i m m t h e i t , d i e n i c h t i n diesem A b s o l u t e n e n t h a l t e n u n d aufgelost w a r e ; u n d e s int w i c h t i g g e n u g , d a B allea, was d e m n a t fl r l i c h e n V e r s t a n d e ale s e l b s t fi n d i g e s erscheint u n d Vorstellen o d e r d e m bestimmenden vorschwebt, i n j e n e m n o t w e n i d g e n Begriffe gfinzlich zu einem bloBen G e s e t u e y n

herabgesetzt int."

(Logik II, 376; 536)

LAURA BYRNE

l 18

from the unity of the absolute through a dialectical development o f the attribute a n d m o d e .

He c l a i m s t h i s e m e r g e n c e o f c o n t e n t

is absent i n Spinoza. L e t us examine this charge with regard to the attribute. Hegel’s general criticism of Spinoza’s substance is that i t is determined i n a m e r e l y external w a y . I n o t h e r words, j u s t as e x t e r n a l reflection is t h e first and inadequate r e c o g n i t i o n o f

the moment of difference which positing reflection devalues, so too, Spinoza’s articulation of the determination lent to substance by the attributes and modes does not allow substance to call the attributes and modes its own. External reflection posits the two sides, the self -equality of essence and the difference of show, as wholly distinct. Instead, identity and difference must be recognised as two moments of a self - d i f ferentiating unity. This alone permits t h e d e t e r m in ate difference o f s h o w to b e e s s e n c e ’ s

own difference o r difference developed from within it. Because external reflection holds these sides apart, there can be no such internal development. If they are related, they are related as distinct sides without a n y internal relation. If Hegel is correct, then, and Spinozism’s determining is an external thinking, the attributes a n d modes are n o t s e e n as the s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t o f substance, b u t as principles d i s t i n c t from i t related to i t from

the outside.

This claim of Hegel’s seems distinctly unfair because, as w e have s e e n , Spinoza claims that the absolute infinity o f substance requires that i t have infinite a t t r i b u t e s and m o d e s . ( E l D e f 6 E x p & E l P l 6 ) Hegel a p p l i e s t h i s c r i t i c i s m t h a t the

determination of substance is an external thinking specifically to Spinoza’s attribute, and it is in relation to the attribute that we will evaluate this charge of externality. H e g e l asserts that E l D e f 4 ’ s d e f i n i t i o n o f the a t t r i b u t e as the m a n n e r i n w h i c h the intellect c o m p r e h e n d s the e s s e n c e o f s u b s t a n c e 7 i s c o n t r a r y to the nature o f the a t t r i b u t e a s the

essence of substance because it reverses the order of being. That t h e a t t r i b u t e is perceived b y t h e i n t e l l e c t as s u b s t a n c e ’ s e s s e n c e means that the d e t e r m i n a t e n e s s o f the a t t r i b u t e d o e s n o t

6”Der

S p i n o z i s m u s i s t d a r i n e i n e mangelhafte

P h i l o s o p h i e , d a B d i e Reflexion

und deren mannichfaltiges Bestimmen ein fiusserliches Denken ist." 376; 536) 7"Per

attributum

intelligo

id, quod

intellectus

tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.” (E1Def4)

de

substantia

(Logik II,

percipit,

Hegel’s Criticism of Spinoza’s Concept of t h e Attribute 119

follow from substance b u t is a n external a c c r e t i o n , t h e w o r k o f the i n t e l l e c t . This i s problematic because the i n t e l l e c t , as a mo de, is i n substance and dependent u p o n i t and its essential a t t r i b u t e s , 8 b u t the understanding o f the attribute as a p e r c e p t i o n o f the intellect makes the attribute d e p e n d e n t u p o n the

mode.9 Gueroult rightly takes strong exception to this criticism, a l t h o u g h he does n o t mention H eg el b y n a m e .

He asserts that

to understand ElDef4’s definition to claim that the attribute is t h e p r o d u c t o f the i n t e l l e c t is to substitute a K a n t i a n i n t e l l e c t

for the Spinozistic one.10 Rather than claiming that the intellect s u p p l i e s its o w n s u b j e c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to its a p p r e h e n s i o n o f

substance, Spinoza asserts that it perceives substance adequate1y.11 Consequently, given the adequacy of the intellect’s p e r c e p t i o n , t h e assertion that th e attribute i s t he p e r c e i v e d e s s e n c e o f substance does n o t mean that th e i n t e l l e c t is a p r i n c i p l e o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n exterior t o s u b s t a n c e , b u t t h a t the i n t e l l e c t a p p r e h e n d s a determination i n t r i n s i c t o s u b s t a n c e . Hegel’s c r i t i c i s m s clearly i m p l y that he reads E l D e f 4 as

supporting his general claim that the determination of substance is an external thinking. But a proper understanding of the nature o f the i n t e l l e c t ’ s p e r c e p t i o n o f substance d o e s n o t s u p p o r t this.

H e g e l also addresses Spinoza’s claim that substance has an infinity of attributes. He maintains that because Spinoza’s

discussion only deals w i t h thought and extension and does not show why out of the infinite plurality only these two are given,

8"Per

modurn i n t e l l i g o substantiae affectiones,

sive i d , q u o d i n a l i o e s t , p e r

quod etiam concipitur." (ElDefS) 9"Nach bey S p i n o z a ferner d i e D e fi n i t i o n d e r D e fi n i t i o n des Absoluten m d e s A t t r i b u t e a_uf; u n d wird ale dasjenige b e s t i m m t , w i e d e r V e r s t a n d d e s s e n Wesen begreift. Ausserdem d a B der V e r s t a n d s e i n e r N a t u r n a c h ale s p a t e r angenommen w i r d , ale daa A t t r i b u t , — d e n n S p i n o z a bestimmt i h n ale M o d u s , — s o w i r d das A t t r i b u t , d i e Bestirnrnung ale Bestimmung des A b s o l u t e n , v o n e i n e m A n d e r n , d e m V e r s t a n d e , a b h a n g i g gemacht, welches d e r S u b s t a n z gegeniiber

ausserlich und unmittelbar auftritt." (Logik II, 377; 537) 10"La r a c i n e d u contresena consiste a s u b a t i t u e r l ’ e n t e n d e r n e n t k a n t i e n a l ’ e n t e n d e m e n t d e s r a t i o n a l i s t s classiques, l e q u e l e s t , n o n u n e forme, e t encore m o i n s u n e for-me déformante, maie le pouvoir d e c o n n a i t r e les choses v r a i m e n t , c’est—a-dire t e l l e s q u ’ e l l e s s o n t e n aoi...." (Martial G u e r o u l t , S p i n o z a ( P a r i s :

Aubier Montaigne, 1974) I, 440) 11"Cognitio

aeternae,

&

infinitae

involvit, est adaequata, 8: perfecta."

essentiae

(E2P46)

D e i , quam

unaquaeque

idea

LAURA BYRNE

120

they must be adopted e m p i r i c a l l y . 1 2 Since these a t t r i b u t e s are the two realms into which the e x p e r i e n c e d world can b e divided and there is n o e x p l i c i t d e r i v a t i o n o f t h e m from s u b s t a n c e , one may c o n c l u d e that t h e y are derived from e x p e r i e n c e . The heart o f this charge is a g a i n the claim that t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t is

external to substance. To be given empirically is to b e given

from the outside.13 Is there anything to this?

E l D e f 6 does i n fact attempt to ground the attribute i n substance b y asserting that an absolutely infinite substance must have infinite attributes o r its nature will involve negation and

12"Die A t t r i b u t e bestimmt S p i n o z a ferner als u n e n d l i c h ; u n d z w a r u n e n d l i c h auch i m S i n n e e i n e r u n e n d l i c h e n V i e l h e i t . E s kommen z w a r w e i t h e r h i n n u r d i e z w e x v o r , D e n k e n u n d A u s d e h n u n g , u n d es i s t n i c h t g e z e i g t , w i e d i e u n e n d l i c h e V i e l h e i t s i c h n o t h w e n d i g n u r auf d e n G e g e n s a t z u n d zwar diesen b e s t i m m t e n , des D e n k e n s u n d d e r A u s d e h n u n g , reducirt.-Diese beyden A t t r i b u t e s i n d

deBwegen empirisch aufgenommen." (Logik II, 377; 537) 13Hegel clearly infers t h a t t h e assertion t h a t t h e r e are i n fi n i t e a t t r i b u t e s m e a n s t h a t there are i n fi n i t e l y m a n y . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o n t e s t e d by G e o r g e K l i n e . ( ” O n t h e I n fi n i t y of S p i n o z a ’ s A t t r i b u t e s , " i n S p e c u l u m S p i n o z a n u m :

1677-1977, e d . Siegfried Hessing (London: Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1977), 333-352). Kline identifies two senses in which t h e term "infinite" is used i n a systematic

way.

T h e first s e n s e i s "perfect

w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n " and t h e second

is "all without exception." (342) He conjectures t h a t Spinoza uses "infinite" in t h e second s e n s e r a t h e r t h a t " a l l " because h e regards i t as a more e m p h a t i c form

"since it means all t h a t is and all without exception." (343) Furthermore, Kline b u t t r e s s e s h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by p o i n t i n g o u t t h e advantage o f g i v i n g t w o senses to a term. B y u s i n g " i n fi n i t y " equivocally t o mean b o t h "perfect w i t h o u t

limitation" and "all without exception,” Spinoza can assert a systematic connection between these concepts.

B y refusing t o assume that there must be indefinitely many attributes, Kline avoids t h e k n o t t y problem of w h y o n l y t w o , t h o u g h t and e x t e n s i o n , are k n o w n t o u s . B u t if S p i n o z a really uses " i n fi n i t e " i n t h e way K l i n e asserts h e d o e s , h e

would answer those who confront him with this problem by pointing o u t t h a t they have misinterpreted t h e term. This h e does not d o . For example, when Tschirnhaus p u t s this question t o him, h e answers t h a t t h e infinity of o t h e r attributes are known, b u t not by our minds. ( E p . 66) See A.E. Taylor, "Some Incoherencies in Spinozism: I," in Studies in Spinoza: Critical and Interpretive

Essays, e d . S. P a u l Kashap (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), 204. E v e n if K l i n e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n were correct, however, e m p i r i c i s m w o u l d a p p l y b e c a u s e t h e fact t h a t s u b s t a n c e ’ s

t h e charge of two attributes

correspond t o t h e two realms i n t o which t h e empirical world is divided would n o less s u g g e s t , i n t h e absence o f a d e m o n s t r a t i o n s u b s t a n c e , t h a t t h e y are t a k e n from experience.

of

their

derivation

from

Hegel’s Criticism of Spinoza’s Concept of t h e Attribute 121

limitation.14 This seems to vitiate the charge that lies at the heart of both of Hegel’s criticisms. Yet Hegel is obviously not satisfied with i t and goes o n , in the face of what he takes to be Spinoza’s

f a i l u r e , to s h o w b y means

o f a very

complicated

argument that the attributes and the modes follow from the nature of the absolute. Because Hegel’s criticism of Spinoza cannot be fully grasped apart from the corrective this argument offers, we must examine it briefly. Hegel’s own account of the attributes and modes is one in which their determinate nature is shown to be the absolute’s own self -contained otherness. Because the absolute is an immediate unity, it is in the determination of identity. But this realization introduces determination into the absolute. This is the a t t r i b u t e , the absolute as d e t e r m i n e d . 1 5 This d e t e r m i n a t i o n

is not something affixed from the outside as a property to a neutral substrate. It i s , instead, rooted i n the very nature of the absolute. It is the consequence of its nature as a self —identical totality. But this absolute determination is purely negative. It signals that all determinations are sublated into this u n i t y . The absolute contains the elements of unity and difference which we have seen that the earlier essential structures bifurcate into independent

sides.

But

the

attribute

as substance

in

the

determination of identity recognises only the moment of unity. It is an e m p t y

or negative

totality.

negativity, the negation of difference.

Thus,

th e attr ibute

is

It is an instance of

positing r e f l e c t i o n . Spinoza meant i t to be a positive expression o f the e s s e n t i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e a b s o l u t e , b u t H e g e l r e v e als

i t to be nothing more than a recognition of the moment of identity. Thus, the attribute collapses back into the identity of t h e a b s o l u t e . I n a s s e r t i n g its i d e n t i t y , i t e x c l u d e s all d e t e r m i n a -

14"Dico absolute i n fi n i t u m , non autem i n suo genere; q u i c q u i d e n i m i n suo genere t a n t u m i n fi n i t u m e s t , i n fi n i t a d e eo a t t r i b u t e negare possumua [dat i s , m e n k a n o n e i n d i g e toeeigeningen bevatten, d i e t o t d e s zelfe n a t u u r n i e t b e h o r e n ] ;

quod autem absolute infinitum e s t , ad ejus eesentiam pertinet, quicquid essentiam exprimit, & negationem nullam involvit." (ElDefGExp) 15"Das

Absolute iet darum Attribut,

i n der Bestimmung der Identitat ist...."

w e i l e s ale einfache absolute I d e n t i t a t

(Logik II, 373; 534)

122

LAURA BYRNE

tion.16 A re-examination of this identity, however, soon provides Hegel with what he needs. As the negation of difference, the attribute is the negation of negation, and accordingly, is self repelling. It must posit itself as other, the mode. The mode presents itself as the externality which the absolute must negate to maintain its i d e n t i t y . B u t i f t h i s is t h e case, i f t h i s e x t e r n a l i t y m u s t b e negated i f the a b s o l u t e is to b e , t h e n the absolute c a n n o t d o without the m o d e . The m o d e , t h e n , is a function o f the absolute’s e x c l u s i v e n a t u r e . 1 7 T h i s means that the mode is

not an extrinsic determination. It is not something picked u p This reflective from t h e o u t s i d e , b u t is the a b s o l u t e ’ s o w n . movement w h i c h m o v e s o u t to the mode from the collapse o f the attribute b a c k i n t o substance and t h e n claims the mode as

substance’s own determination allows the determination latent in the unity of the absolute to become explicit. It seemed at first t h a t the a b s o l u t e was u n m o v e d i d e n t i t y and determination

stood

outside of it. But, in truth, determination grows o u t of the absolute as a function of its self-related identity and the

16"Aber i n d e m d i e Reflexion von ihrem Unterscheiden s o n u r z u r I d e n t i t fi t d e s A b s o l u t e n zuriickkehrt, i s t sie z u g l e i c h n i c h t aus ihrer Aeusserlichkeit heraus

u n d z u m wahrhaften Absoluten gekommen.

Sie hat n u r die unbestimmte,

abstrakte I d e n t i t fi t e r r e i c h t ; das h e i B t , d i e j e n i g e , welche i n d e r B e s t i m m t h e i t d e r Identittit i s t . - 0 d e r d i e Reflexion, indem s i e als i n n r e Form das Absolute z u m A t t r i b u t b e s t i m m t , s o i s t dieses B e s t i m m e n e i n noch von d e r Aeusserlichkeit verschiedenes; d i e innre B e s t i m m u n g d u r c h d r i n g t das Absolute n i c h t ; s e i n e

Aeusserung ist, als ein bloB gesetztes am Absoluten zu verschwinden." II, 374; 534)

(Logik

17"Diets A t t r i b u t i s e r s t l i c h das A b s o l u t e a l s i n d e r einfachen I d e n t i t fi t m i t s i c h . Z w e x t e n s i s t e s N e g a t i o n , u n d diese als N e g a t i o n i s t d i e formelle Reflexioni n - s i c h . D i e s e beyden S e i t e n machen z u n a c h s t d i e z w e y Extreme des A t t r i b u t e

aus, deren Mitte es selbst ist, indem es sowohl das Absolute als die Bestimmtheit ist.-Das z w e y t e dieser Extreme i s t das N e g a t i v e als N e g a t i v e s , d i e d e m A b s o l u t e n a u s s e r l i c h e R e fl e x i o n . — O d e r insofern e s als das I n n r e d e s Absoluten

genommen wird und seine eigene Bestimmung es ist, sich als Modus su setzen, s o i s t e r das Aussersichseyn d e s A b s o l u t e n , d e r Verlust seiner i n d i e Vet-finderl i c h k e i t and Zuffilligkeit d e s S e y n s , s e i n Uebergegangenseyn ins Entgegengesetzte o h n e R u c k k e h r i n s i c h . . . . I n d e r T h a t i s t also erst i m Modus das Absolute als absolute I d e n t i t fi t g e s e t z t ; es i s t n u r , was e s i s t , nemlich I d e n t i t fi t m i t s i c h , als

sich auf sich beziehende Negativitat...." (Logik II, 374-375; 534-535)

Hegel’s Criticism of Spinoza’s Concept of t h e Attribute 1 2 3

negativity it entails.18 Thus, the movement from absolute, to attribute, to mode is the self -sundering movement which returns to self of difference in identity.19 This movement animates a fully determined actuality, named

u n i t y and e n g e n d e r s a n e w category w i t h i n actuality after i t , w h i c h expresses the fully

integrated determination which the movement of the absolute created. Externality grows out of the absolute’s self -re1ation. The absolute becomes actuality because i t can manifest

itself.

With this, Hegel thinks he has demonstrated i n a way that Spinoza d o e s n o t that a determinate c o n t e n t is e n g e n d e r e d substance or the absolute.

by

A s we have seen, E l D e f 6 grounds the attributes i n substance’s absolute infinity, and Hegel’s assertions about the e m p i r i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l o r i g i n o f the attribute are a p p a r e n t l y u n f o u n d e d . This d o e s n o t m e a n , h o w e v e r , that H e g e l ’ s c r i t i c i s m

of Spinoza’s conception of the attributes of substance should b e dismissed as being simply a misreading of Spinoza. A s the essence of infinite substance, the attribute, like substance, should be conceived

from i t s e l f a l o n e . ( E l P l O ) B u t

if one accepts Hegel’s analysis of the category of determinate b e i n g , this seems incompatible with the notion of determination w i t h which Spinoza is working. The attribute is infinite, not absolutely, b u t only i n its o w n k i n d . That i s , unlike absolutely infinite

substance w h i c h involves no n e g a t i o n , o t h e r a t t r i b u t e s

can be denied of i t .

( E l D e f 6 E x p ) Thought is not extension.

E a c h a t t r i b u t e i s l i m i t e d b y the o th er a t t r i b u t e s wh ic h i t is n o t . H e g e l mentions Spinoza’s understanding o f the a t t r i b u t e s specifically i n h i s discussion o f the role o f negation and l i m i t a t i o n i n d e t e r m i n a t e b e i n g , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t as d e t e r m i n a t e ,

18"Insofern von s e i n e r a b s o l u t e n d a h e r d i e A u s l e g u n g d e s Absoluten I d e n t i t fi t a n f fi n g t , u n d z u d e m Attribute u n d von d a s u m Modus u b e r g e h t , s o Aber erstlich i s sie d a r i n h a t d i e darin vollstéindig ihre Momente durchloffen. n i c h t e i n b l o B negatives V e r h a l t e n gegen diese B e s t i m m u n g e n , sondern d i B i h r T h u n i s t d i e reflectirende B e w e g u n g s e l b s t , als welche das A b s o l u t e n u r wahrhaft

die absolute Identitfit ist." (Logik II, 375; 535) 19"Die wahrhafte B e d e u t u n g des Modus ist daher, d a B e r d i e reflectirende eigene B e w e g u n g d e s Absoluten i s t ; e i n B e s t i m m e n , aber n i c h t , wordurch es e i n a n d e r e s w u r d e , sondern n u r dessen, was es schon is_t; d i e d u r c h s i c h t i g e A e u s s e r l i c h k e i t , w e l c h e das Z e i g e n s e i n e r selbst i s t , eine B e w e g u n g aus s i c h h e r a u s , aber s o d a B d i B S e y n - n a c h - A u s s e n , e b e n s o sehr d i e I n n e r l i c h k e i t s e l b s t

ist; und damit eben so sehr ein Setzen, das nicht bloB Gesetztseyn, sondern

absolutes Seyn ist." (Logik II, 375; 535-536)

LAURA BYRNE

124

the attributes are negations.20 But Hegel argues in his discuss i o n o f this category that this l i m i t i n g other is constitutive

of

that which i t limits for that which i t limits cannot be understood apart from

it.

Consequently,

that which is limited b y

another cannot be understood through itself alone. Spinoza argues that because the attributes must be conceived through themselves a l o n e , they are conceived as really distinct o r one

without the assistance of the other. (ElPlOSch) The Hegelian o f determinate

analysis

being, however,

entails

that

the a t -

tributes cannot be conceived through themselves because they cannot be conceived without the assistance of the other. They are not conceptually d i s t i n c t . In o t h e r words, from a Hegelian p e r s p e c t i v e , Spinoza’s understanding o f the determinate nature

of the attribute is far too primitive to be the essential d e t e r mination of an absolutely infinite substance. This reading is supported b y assertions Hegel makes about Spinoza i n the context of his discussion of determinate being, (Logik I , 101; 113) and later in an examination of Spinoza’s understanding of the infinite as absolute affirmation to which the first discusion refers. (Logik I , 247; 249-250) The first discussion argues that because infinite substance is absolute affirmation, the determination o f th e attributes which entails negation must have its source outside substance, i n the i n t e l lect.21 I n o t h e r words, the determination o f the attributes is

incompatible with the absolute nature of substance and so cannot be derived from i t . This is why Hegel ascribes its o r i g i n to the intellect. This ascription does not rest o n a m i s u n d e r standing o f Spinoza’s doctrine o f th e i n t e l l e c t , b u t rather is a

recognition of the fact that the determination of the attribute cannot be substance’s own determination because i t is incompatible with its absolutely affirmative nature. The

second

discussion

o f Spinoza

develops

this

point

20"Denlten

nemlich

u n d S e x n o d e r Auadehnung, d i e zwey B e e t i m m u n g e n , d i e S p i n o z a vor eich h a t , m u B t e e r i n dieser E i n h e i t i n e i n a s e t z e n , d e n n ale

beetimmte Realitfiten, sind sie Negationen, deren Unendlichkeit ihre Einheit

iet...." (Logik I, 101; 113) 21"....[Nlach

Spinoza: Definition, wovon weiter unten, ist die Unendlichkeit von Etwas seine Affirmation. E r begriff sie daher ale Attribute, d . h . ale solche, d i e nicht e i n besonderea B e s t e h e n , e i n A n - u n d - f t l r - s i c h - S e y n

h a b e n , sondern

nur

als aufgehobene, ale Momente sind; oder vielmehr aind eie ihm nicht einmal M o m e n t e , d e n n d i e S u b s t a n z i s t das i n i h r selbst ganz beatimmungaloee, u n d die A t t r i b u t e s i n d , w i e auch d i e M o d i , Unterscheidungen, d i e e i n auseerer Vemtand

macht.” (Logik I, 101; 113)

Hegel’s Criticism of Spinoza’s Concept of the Attribute 125 further b y linking negation to relation to another. Here again, Hegel asserts that for Spinoza the infinite i s absolute affirmation

while the finite is determinateness and negation.22 This means that

the

infinite

is a relation

to

self,

while

the

finite, as

negation, is a relation to another.23 Although Hegel does not mention the attributes h e r e , this analysis applies to their being limited b y the other attributes they e x c l u d e . The inadequacy o f

Spinoza’s substance is that i t is only immediate and inert affirmation and self -relation. It excludes negativity and relation to another rather than including i t as the developed affirmation

of negation of negation.24

This charge is repeated in the

remark at the end of the discussion of the absolute. The distinction between the attributes cannot be maintained. I n the wholly affirmative unity of the absolute, their determination m u s t vanish.

These discussions give us a much better understanding of Hegel’s claim that the determination of the attribute must be external to s u b s t a n c e .

From the p er s p ective o f his categorial

system, the determination of the attribute is the primitive, other related determination of determinate being. Substance, o n the other hand, is a primitive or immediate unity which excludes this negativity. This is the justification for the charge of externality and the motivation for Hegel’s own dialectical account of the attributes. Determination vanishes in Spinoza’s

22"Er

Existena

definirt auna'chst das U n e n d l i c h e als d i e A b s o l u t e Affirmation d e r irgend e i n e r N a t u r , das Endliche i m G e g e n t h e i l als B e s t i m m t h e i t , als

Verneinung." 23"Die

(Logik I , 247; 249-250)

absolute Affirmation einer Existenz ist nemlich als ihre Beziehung a_uf

s i c h s e l b s t au n e h m e n , n i c h t dadurch z u s e y n , daB e i n Anderes i s t ; das Endliche h i n g e g e n i s t d i e Verneinung, e i n Aufhbren als B e a i e h u n g auf e i n A n d e r e s , das

fiusser i h m anffingt."

(Logik I , 247; 260)

24"'Die

absolute Affirmation einer Existenz erschopft nun zwar den Begriff der Unendlichkeit n i c h t , dieser enthfilt. daB die Unendlichkeit Affirmation i s t , nicht als u n m i t t e l b a r e , sondern nur als wiederhergestellte dutch die Reflexion des Aber bey S p i n o z a h a t Andern i n sich s e l b s t , oder als Negation des Negativen.

die Substanz und deren absolute Einheit die Form von unbeweg'ter d.i. nicht sich mit sich selbt vermittelnder Einheit, von einer S t a r r h e i t . worin der Begriff der negativen E i n h e i t des S e l b s t , d i e S u b j e c t i v i t fi t , sich noch n i c h t findet." ( L o g i k

I , 247; 250) 25"Spinoza macht d i e erhabene Foderung an das D e n k e n , alles U n t e r d e r n u b e t r a c h t e n , das h e i B t , w i e es i m G e s t a l t d e r E w i g k e i t , sub specie aeterni, Absoluten i s t . Aber i n jenern Absoluten, das nur d i e unbewegte Identitfit i s t , ist

das Attribut, wie der Modus, nut als verschwindend, nicht als werdend...." (Logik I , 377; 638)

126

LAURA BYRNE

substance because i t i s incompatible

with it.

The affirmative

unity of substance cannot be reconciled with the primitive negative determination of the attribute. Hegel’s discussion, o n the other hand, provides an account of determination which allows it to emerge from the absolute rather than being excluded i t from it. Obviously, this criticism which operates within the framework of the Hegelian categories need be immediately c o n v i n c i n g n e i t h e r to Spinoza n o r anyone e l s e . I t does n o t b y i t s e l f c o n v i n c e , b u t instead i n v i t e s further s p e c u l a t i o n a bout

determination a n d absolute unity. G i v e n Hegel’s understanding of determinate being, the charge that the determination o f the attributes is n o t p r o p e r l y d e v e l o p e d from substance can b e seen

to b e grounded i n something more than a misunderstanding of Spinoza’s concept of the intellect. That is, if Spinoza’s concept of the way i n which the attributes are determined is inadequate to their being the essence of substance, then his effort to demonstrate that they are the determinate expressions of s u b s t a n c e ’ s n a t u r e i s flawed.

Determination is not grounded i n

substance’s own nature because no account of determination compatible with it has been offered. Furthermore, in the light of this failure, Hegel’s o w n dialectical account of the attribute gains plausibility as a remedy because it develops a form of de terminaten e ss which does n o t suffer l i m i t a t i o n a nd relation to another.

I n c o n c l u s i o n , t h e first p r i n c i p l e o f external d e t e r m i n a t i o n w h i c h Hegel a t t r i b u t e s to Spinoza, t h e i n t e l l e c t , is n o t confirmed

b y the text of the Ethics.

Spinoza does not assert that the

i n t e l l e c t is t h e s u b j e c t i v e and e x t e r n a l source o f the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the a t t r i b u t e s . Furthermore, Spinoza does i n t e n d to

ground the attributes i n the absolute infinity of substance. Nevertheless, if we consider this remark in conjunction with the d i S c u s s i o n o f t h e c a t e g o r y o f d e t e r m i n a t e b e i n g , we can u n c o v e r , n o t s i m p l i s t i c m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t controversy a b o u t the nature o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n , l i m i t a t i o n a n d n eg ation.

University of King’s College (Canada)

Ways and Loci of Modality. The Chapter “Actuality” in the Science of Logic between its Absence

in Jena and its

Disappearance in Berlin‘ by Gabriella Baptist

The great merit o f contemporary Hegel-research is that i t

has taught us to recognize in Hegel’s thought the tireless theoretical search o f a work in progress. Hegel’s philosophy is not a monolithic whole whose compactness is to be defended at

all costs, even through modifications, as his school did. There is a problematic side to i t which calls for further questioning on our part. In this paper I shall try to give one example o f what

I might call the ‘turbulence’ of Hegel’s thinking. I shall identify an area of the Logic which was subjected to changes and revisions to the end. These changes are evidence, not just o f a concern to patch up cracks in the whole for the sake o f formal

coherence, but of a tenacious re-thinking of a fundamental problem. What appears in the Science of Logic as the chapter "Actuality" must be analysed, which means precisely that one will need to ask in what way and where the so-called modal categories are subjected to an explicit categorial analysis. I a m

not referring to the more general section "Actuality," which is to be found as an autonomous part from 1 8 0 8 and remains on

the scene until the last version of the Encyclopaedia. In this section i t is a question o f an initial division, in which the specific chapter does not yet appear. Through a detour the chapter "Actuality" then assumes a position o f central importance

(Science of Logic) until a new ordering, in which only traces of it seem to remain—a strange return, at first glance, to the Nfirnberg or even Jena standpoint. In this way the chapter "Actuality" o f the Science of Logic

stands between a preceding

1I wish t o t h a n k here Valerio Verra, O t t o Poggeler, W a l t e r Jaeschke and Hans-Christian Lucas for their advice and encouragement as well as Leslie B r o w n and Anthony Steinbock for their help in the English translation of this t e x t , H o w a r d P . K a i n z and George d i Giovanni for their stylistic improvements.

127

GABRIELLA BAPTIST

128

This

e v i d e n t absence and a s u b s e q u e n t apparent disappearance.

is exactly the point which shall be problematized here. manifold

connections

of

this chapter

to o t h e r

parts

The the

of

Science of Logic will have to remain unconsidered. Also left merely in the background are the various relations which connect the logico-ontological elaboration of the categories of modality with the corresponding o r related parts of Hegel’s Realphilosophie.

l . ‘Actuality’, a Notion Still in Process of Becoming The problem of modality is set from the beginning b y the philosophical constellation of the time. Post-Kantian thinking is played o u t precisely in the attempt to overcome the difficulties of the critical position through revisions which are constantly begun anew. Where the table of categories is concerned, the principal problem is their deduction and completeness; in this context the quest for a categorical o r apodictical foundation o f reason translates itself into a demand to w i n back from the Kantian canon the organon. Thus the weak point of the Kantian t a b l e , which is represented b y the modal categories w i t h t h e i r exceptional p o s i t i o n and t h e i r seal o f the transcen-

dental-hypothetical standpoint, must be rethought.3 Here i t is impossible to show how, for instance, Fichte or the young S c h e l l i n g , and also intermediary f i g u r e s such as R e inhold, M a i m o n , S c h u l z e , Bardili, had taken u p j u s t this task again and

2So for i n s t a n c e t h e reciprocal actions and reactions w h i c h bind elaboration o n t h e theme of c o n t i n g e n c y and necessity i n t h e philosophy

an of

nature or in t h e philosophy of history t o a theoretical clarification of its abstract and s y s t e m a t i c a l

structure.

301‘. Immanuel K a n t , K r i t i k d e r r e i n e n V e r n u n f t , A 5 0 ff/B 74 ff. O n t h e deduction of t h e pure c o n c e p t s of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , cf. A 9 6 ff/B 1 2 9 ff. O n K a n t ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ” c a n o n of pure reason" and " o r g a n o n , " cf. A 7 9 6 / 8

823. On the particular position of the categories of modality, cf. A 2 1 9 / 3 266. On the particular

function of t h e modality

of judgements,

cf. A 74 ff/B

99 ff.

The problem of the completeness and deducibility of Kant’s table has also occupied our century, cf. Klaus Reich, Die Vollstandigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel ( B e r l i n : S c h o e t z 1 9 4 8 , 2 n d e d . ) , w h o tried t o found K a n t ’ s order i n reverse, i . e . from m o d a l i t y . C r i t i c a l of i t , see L . Kruger, ' W o l l t e Kant d i e

Vollstandigkeit seiner Urteilstafel beweisen?" Kant-Studien, LIX (1968) 333-56.

Ways and L o c i of Modality

again.4

129

I n a n y c a s e , Hegel’s reflections o n K a n t ’ s table o f

categories, and especially o n its dynamic part, can take their place i n t h i s restlessness o f the t i m e . This i s , h o w e v e r , a p e r s i s t e n t trait w h i c h can be s e e n as a permanent reference-

point i n Hegel’s thought, from the first steps taken in Tfibingen to the d e v e l o p i n g system i n B e r l i n . The s o - c a l l e d Materials for

a Philosophy of Subjective Spirit of 1794 are the first evidence o f h i s i n t e r e s t i n K a n t ’ s table o f c a t e g o r i e s . as t h e b e s t e v i d e n c e for the c u s t o m a r y

This t e x t can serve perception of the

problem at that time because, whenever the table of categories is mentioned, the categories of relation are always used as examples.

E v e n the b r i e f presentation o f t h e 5 dynamic

nomies shows a mixing of relation and modality. the

young

Hegel

considerations

of

anti-

Of course for

contingency,

necessity,

possibility and actuality play a considerable role i n the so—called Early Theological Writings; b u t one can hardly classify them i n the context of an explicit dispute with Kant’s table of categor i e s . The reference to this table remains for H e g e l h i m s e l f n o t

4The

understood

different v e r s i o n s of F i c h t e ' s D o c t r i n e of S c i m c a n b e properly as a t t e m p t s t o d e d u c e c a t e g o r i e s . Cf. W i l h e l m R i p k e , U b e r d i e

Beziehung d e r Fichteschen Kategorienlehre z u r Kantischen, Diss. (Heidelberg: Pfeffer, 1 9 1 3 ) . O n t h e m o d a l problem as p o i n t o f crisis i n t h e F i c h t i a n program, cf. Wolfgang J a n k e , F i c h t e , S e i n u n d Reflexion, G r u n d l a g e n d e r k r i t i s c h e n Vernunft ( B e r l i n : d e G r u y t e r , 1 9 7 0 ) 1 3 2 , 1 4 2 ff. F o r Reinhard L a u t h , Rig transzendentale Naturlehre Fichtes nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre ( H a m b u r g : M e i n e r , 1 9 8 4 ) , F i c h t e ’ s modal problematic i s t o be s e t rather i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y of n a t u r e . O n t h e elaboration of t h e modal p r o b l e m a t i c i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h K a n t and F i c h t e from t h e s i d e of t h e y o u n g S c h e l l i n g , cf. F r i e d r i c h W . J . S c h e l l i n g , U b e r d i e M o g l i c h k e i t e i n e r Form dgLPhilosophie fiberhaupt, eds.

Wilhelm G . Jacobs, Jorg J a n t z e n , Walter Schieche, Gerhard Kuebart, Reinhold Mokrosch and Annemarie P i e p e r , W e r k e , v o l . 1 ( S t u t t g a r t : F r o m m a n n - H o l z b o o g , 1 9 7 6 ) 2 6 3 - 3 0 0 , e s p . 2 9 4 ff. Friedrich W . J . S c h e l l i n g , V o m I c h a l s P r i n c i p d g P h i l o s o h i e o d e r fi b e r d a s Unbedin t e i m m e n s c h l i c h e n W i s s e n , e d s . H a r t m u t B u c h n e r , J o r g J a n t z e n , Adolf Schurr and A n n a - M a r i a S c h u r r - L o r u s s o , W e r k e , v o l . 2 ( S t u t t g a r t : Frommann-Holzboog, 1 9 8 0 ) 6 7 - 1 7 5 , e s p . 1 5 1 ff a n d 1 5 6 f

("Tafel aller Formen d e r Modalitat"). Friedrich W . J . Schelling, Bruno oder fiber o t t l i c h e u n d n a t t l r l i c h e Princi das S c h r o t e r , S c h e l l i n g g W e r k e , Milnchner

d e r D i n e , E i n G e s p r a c h , e d . Manfred Jubilaumsdruck, vol. 3 (Manchen: Beck,

1927) 109-228. Cf. O t t o Kein, Schellingg Kategorienlehre (Berlin: Junker und D u n n h a u p t , 1939). 6G.W.F. Hegel, M a t e r i a l i e n n u e i n e r P h i l o s o p h i e d e s s u b j e k t i v e n G e i s t e s 1 7 9 3 - 1 7 9 4 , i n D o k u m e n t e z u Hegels E n t w i c k l u n g , e d . J o h a n n e s Hoffmeister S t u t t g a r t : F r o m m a n n , 1 9 3 6 ) 1 9 5 - 2 1 7 , e s p . 2 1 0 ff. I t i s probably a transcript from earlier Tilbingen notes and materials composed as a systematical draft. A critical e d i t i o n i s being prepared by Friedhelm Nicolin and G i s e l a von E i n e m -

Schtiler for t h e first volume of t h e Gesamm. Werke. K a n t , cf. r e c e n t l y Andre

Stanguennec,

O n Hegel’s dispute with

Hegel critigue de Kant

( P a r i s : Presses

Universitaires d e France, 1985), Hegel’s Critique of K a n t . ed. Stephen Priest

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

GABRIELLA BAPTIST

130

much more than a task still to be executed, as the following remark shows: " h e r e ( i . e . apropos o b j e c t i v e w o n d e r ) belongs a n

inquiry o n the concept of possibility and actuality, see the categories."6 Even the later fragment The Death of Achilles, which subjects the possible and the actual to an explicit analysis, testifies to the "thinking-together" with HOIderlin’s Judgement and Being, rather than to a logico-ontological and explicit analysis of Kant’s table of categories. The latter should be p l a c e d i n the Jena p e r i o d . 7 The slow d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e problematic from the first years o f the c e n t u r y c a n be e x p l a i n e d h e r e o n l y i n s u m m a r y form as e x a m p l e .

I n the preface to the Difference

e s s a y , where a n i n d e p e n -

dent philosophical confrontation with Kant’s categories takes place for the first time, we read: "The identity of subject and object is limited to twelve acts of pure thought—or rather to nine only, for modality really determines nothing objectively the n o n i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t e s s e n t i a l l y pertains to it.’"3

Such a remark, which i n the first instance seems to be only the observation of a weakness i n Kant, sounds at the same time like the first definition of a task: if the rejected identity of subject and object, which i n Kant had pushed the modalities to the m a r g i n o f t h e table o f c a t e g o r i e s , has to b e t h o u g h t o v e r a g a i n ,

then the modalities become a sort of test for the n e w beginning.

6Hegels theologisfche Jugendschriften, ed. Herman Nohl (Tubingen: Mohr, 1907) 364. This study (Unkunde der Geschichte....) originated in 1795 near the

s o - c a l l e d Life o f J e s u s a n d was suggested b y t h e r e a d i n g of t h e N e u e s t h e o l o g i -

sches Journal, I and 11 (1793/4). A critical edition is being prepared for t h e first volume of the Gesamm. Werke. 7Karl Rosenkranz, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben (Berlin: Duncker u . Humblot, 1844) 60-1. O n i t Helmut Schneider, "Mythos und Logik: D e r Tod

des A c h i l l , " i n P h i l o s o p h i e u n d P o e s i e , Festschrift O t t o Pbggeler s u m 6 0 . G e b u r t s t a g , e d . Annemarie G e t h m a n n - S i e f e r t , v o l . 1 ( S t u t t g a r t : F r o m m a n n Holzboog, 1 9 8 8 ) 2 8 5 - 3 0 2 . Cf. also F r i e d r i c h H o l d e r l i n , U r t h e i l u n d S e y n , e d . Friedrich Beissner, Stimtliche Werke, GroBe Stuttgarter Ausgabe, v o l . 4 , 1

(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1961) 216-7. 8G.W.F.

Hegel, Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems d e r

P h i l o s o p h i e i n B e z i e h u n g auf R e i n h o l d ’ s B e l t r a g e z u r l e i c h t e r n Q b e r s i c h t d e s Z u s t a n d s d e r P h i l o s o p h i e z u Anfang d e s n e u n z e h n t e n J a h r h u n d e r t s , J e n a e r k r i t i s c h e S c h r i f t e n , G________esamm. W e r k e , v o l . 4 , 6 ; English t r . , T h e Difference B e t w e e n F i c h t e ’ s and—_——— S c h e l l i n g ' s S y s t e m o f P h i l o s o p h y , e d s , trs. , H e n r y S . Harris and W a l t e r Cerf ( A l b a n y , N . Y . : S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y of N e w York P r e s s , 1 9 7 7 ) 8 0 . Cf. o n t h i s point O t t o P6ggeler, " H e g e l s J e n a e r Systemkonzeption," i n H e g e l s

Idee einer Phanomenologie des Geistes (Freiburg/Milnchen: Alber, 1973) 125 ff.

Ways and L o c i of Modality

131

Following o n the heels of the Difference essay is Hegel’s first logic lecture, now documented from the recently emerged notes o f a s t u d e n t . I t presents i n its first part a theory o f categories which is influenced b y H e g e l ’ s nearness to S c h e l l i n g , and i n

which modality is in fact absent.9 Even so, ‘the actual’ and ‘the p o s s i b l e ’ serve to explain the notions o f substantiality a n d accidentality. Some d e t a i l s , which a t first s e e m insignificant,

nevertheless reveal a peculiar uncertainty in the elaboration of the dynamic part of the table of categories. For instance, if the categories of quality and quantity are recorded correctly in the margins b y the note—taker, the treatment of relation is accom— panied b y no key-word. In Faith and Knowledge, where "the shallowness of the deduction of the categories" i n K a n t is once more criticized, a new starting point is sought i n the notion of transcendental i m a g i n a t i o n . For i n s t a n c e , p a r a g r a p h 7 6 o f t h e Critique of Judgement s e r v e s as a p o s s i b l e c o r r e c t i o n , particular-

ly the "Idea of an intuitive intellect, for which possibility and actuality are one."10 In this way the project of a metaphysics of substance and that of a continuation of K a n t i n the task of a metaphysics of reason come together. Particularly, the task o f t h i n k i n g t h e possible and th e a c t u a l t o g e t h e r , whic h accord—

ing to the transcendental position were to join only i n the postulated region of an ‘as if’, leads to a new consideration of necessity, for which the a b s o l u t e s u b s t a n c e as w e l l as t h e i n t u i t i v e i n t e l l e c t r e p r e s e n t a p a r a d i g m . So the p r o b l e m , w h i c h is s t i l l v a g u e l y d e l i n e a t e d , is r a i s e d , from the b e g i n n i n g , o n

several levels. For example the problem of a theory of j u d g e m e n t , w h i c h i s t o b e r e v i s e d , o r a t e l e o l o g y w h i c h i s to be t h o u g h t a n e w , i s a d d e d t o the o n t o l o g i c a l and c a t e g o r i a l a s p e c t

91 w i s h h e r e t o t h a n k K l a u s Diising, w h o has k i n d l y enabled me t o c o n s u l t t h e corresponding p a r t of Troxler’s l e c t u r e n o t e s . T h e l a t t e r i s n o w accessible. Cf. S c h e l l i n g s u n d H e g e l s erste a b s o l u t e M e t a p h y s i k ( 1 8 0 1 - 1 8 0 2 ] . Zusammenfas-

sende Vorlesungsnachschriften von I.P.V. Troxler, ed. Klaus Dflsing (K‘oln: D i n t e r , 1 9 8 8 ) . I n these n o t e s " m o d a l i t y " proper i s first m e n t i o n e d ( t o g e t h e r w i t h

q u a n t i t y , quality and relation) but then crossed o u t . (68 ff). 10G.W.F.

Hegel, Glauben und Wissen, oder die Reflexionsghilosoghie

der

Subjectivitat in deLVollstandigkeit ihrer Formen, als KantischeI JacobischeI u n d Fichtesche Philosophie, Jenaer kritische SchriftenI Gesarnm. Werke, vol. 4, 327, 3 4 0 ; E n g l i s h t r . , F a i t h & K n o w l e d g e , e d s . , t r s . , W a l t e r Cerf and Henry S . Harris

(Albany, N.Y.: S t a t e University of New York Press, 1977) 69, 8 8 . O n this point K l a u s D i l s i n g , D a s P r o b l e m d e r Subjgktivitat i n H e g e l s L o g i k , Systematische u n d e n t w i c k l u n g s g e s c h i c h t l i c h e Untersuchungen s u m Prinzip des Idealismus und sur

Dialektik (Bonn: Bodvier 1976, Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 15) 8 6 ff.

GABRIELLA BAPTIST

132

of the elaboration in the confrontation with Spinoza and Kant.11 The

so-called

Jena

Logic

and

Metaphysics

of

1804/5

presents in its first parts an elaborate doctrine of categories. As in the lectures on logic of 1801/2, there is no chapter which is explicitly dedicated to the modal categories. Under the title "Relationship o f Substantiality" the division in a ) , b), c), which has

not

been

further

explained,

reveals

nevertheless

that

possibility-actuality-necessity have in fact become the guides for

the elaboration of substance.12 The shift in the notion of substance occurs primarily through its "modalization;" that is, the "life" of substance is activated from precisely those categories which carried the seal of the subjective standpoint in Kant.13 I n this way the two opposite positions of ob jectivistic dogmatism and of transcendental criticism are synthesized in a n e w beginning. A s is w e l l k n o w n ,

the

new

project

of

a speculative

philosophy, which appears i n 1805/6 as a list of key-words at the e n d o f the Philosophy o f S p i r i t , has n ev er b e e n worked o u t

as such. I n any case, the structure of "absolute being which becomes other to itself (relation) life and cognition—and knowing

knowledge, s p i r i t , s p i r i t k n o w in g itself," though o n l y

embryonic, already constitutes the speculative logico-metaphysi-

11In fact o n e c a n read t h e variations i n t h e categorial elaboration m o d a l problem parallel w i t h t h e changes i n t h e d o c t r i n e of j u d g e m e n t

of t h e (where

also t h e judgements of modality are first absent) and with the definition of t h e notion of end. ,12G.W.F. Hegel, J e n a e r Systementwflrfe, LogikI Gesamm. Werke, vol. 7, 3 9 42, on the structure-problems cf. t h e editorial report, 356 ff, esp. 359-60; English tr., The Jena stem, 1804-05: Logic and Metaphysics, eds. John W . Burbidge and George d i Giovanni (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 1986) 41-5. 130a

t h i s point cf. Franco

Chiereghin,

L’influenza dello spinozismo

nella

formatione della filosofia hegeliana (Padova: Cedam, 1961) 1 2 1 ff, 135 ff. Heinz Kimmerle, D a s P r o b l e m d e r A b g e s c h l o s s e n h e i t d e s D e n k e n s , Hegels "System d e r

Philosophie" in den Jahren 1800-1804 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1970, Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 8 ) 5 7 ff, 81 ff.

Franco Biasutti and Maria Giacin, " L a relazione

d e l l ’ e s s e r e , " i n G . W . F . Hegel, L o g i c a e m e t a fi s i c a d i J e n a ( 1 8 0 4 ( 0 5 ) , e d . Franco

Chiereghin (Trento: Verifiche, 1982) 307-39.

Ways and Loci of Modality

133

cal structure of the later Phenomenology of Spirit.“ Through this origin and this systematic intention, the Phenomenology can be interpreted as the introduction to speculative determinations a n d single groups o f categories from the s i d e o f a natural

counsciousness striving for science. Therefore, one should also be able to find here in a new elaboration the dynamic part of Kant’s doctrine o f categories. I n d e e d , principally the third c h a p t e r , "Force and the Understanding: Appearance and the S u p e r s e n s i b l e W o r l d , " offers sufficient evidence to assume that

the part "relation" of the systematic basis of 1805/6, already worked o u t i n t h e preceding chapter ("Perception: o r the Thing

and Deception"), is being here laid down as a foundation even more explicitly. Therefore, an elaboration of the categories of relation and modality is to be sought here. (Pha'n., 82-102; 7 9 103)15 It becomes e v i d e n t then that the n o t i o n o f force which

already emerged in 1804/5 in a logical context really represents the phenomenological example for the still tightly fused dynamic categories.

I f o n e m e r e l y follows the emphasises i n the text, i t

becomes immediately apparent that force as

substance of

distinctions and duplications is necessary i n its expression, that

i t becomes actual as soliciting and solicited, and finally, that in the interplay of forces, the twofold actuality turns o u t to be an e m p t y possibility o n the one hand (the thing in itself), and a mere contingency o n the other hand (the world of events). (Phiin., 85, 87, 98, o n ‘contingency’ 92; 83, 85, 9 8 , 92) The situation

has

clearly

changed

in

comparison

with

1804/5,

because modal determinations are not only ordered differently, b u t are also symmetrically subordinated to the categories o f r e l a t i o n . The possible and the actual are n o l o n g e r attributed to s u b s t a n c e , i n s t e a d , substance is what is necessary. (Phc‘in., 1 8 ;

10) The actual as activity is still imputed to the categories of c a u s e - e f f e c t . The contingent comes to the fore i n the i n t e r a c t i v e play b e t w e e n appearance and the transcendental w o r l d ,

14G.W.F.

H e g e l , J e n a e r Systementwurfe

III, Gesamm. Werke, vol. 8, 286;

English tr., Hegel and t h e Human Spirit, ed. Leo Rauch (Detroit, MI: Wayne S t a t e University Press, 1983) 181. O n this point, cf. O t t o Pdggeler, "Die Komposition der Phfinomenologie des Geistes," in Hegel-Tage Royaumont 1964. Beitrage z u r D e u t u n g d e r Phanomenologie

des G e i s t e s , e d . H a n s - G e o r g

Gadamer

(Bonn: Bouvier, 1966, Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 3 ) 27—74. O t t o Poggeler, "Hegels Phfinomenologie

d e s S e l b s t b e w u B t s e i n s , " i n H e g e l s Idee e i n e r P h a n o m e n o l o g i e

des

Geistes (cf. note 8), 266 ff (cf. also the chapters: 'Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeption" and " Z u r D e u t u n g der Phfinomenologie des Geistes"). 1501'. O t t o Pdggeler, 'Hegels Kritik der sinnlichen G e w i B h e i t , ' i n S i n n l i c h k e i t u n d Verstand i n d e r d e u t s c h e n u n d franzbsischen Philosophie von Descartes bis

Hegel, e d . Hans Wagner (Bonn: Bouvier 1976) 167-85.

GABRIELLA BAPTIST

134

w h e r e the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f is a n e m p t y p o s s i b i l i t y . Only in the Preface, which was w r i t t e n l a t e r , does i t become clear that the

elaboration of the actuality problem is shaped b y reference to Aristotle, and that the actual as becoming, which is at work, is properly interpreted as becoming-to-itself. So energeia reveals itself as entelecheia, ‘purposive activity’. Phi1030phy itself then becomes a n actual k n o w i n g , p r e c i s e l y because i t can t h i n k the

Absolute in its teleological becoming-to-itself as a living actuality.

(Pha'n., l l , 2 0 , 3 4 ; 3 , 1 2 , 2 7 )

2. Actuality as Becoming-To-Itself As is well known, research has had to neglect the i m mediately subsequent phase—the Niirnberg teaching period—because there is not even a single useful edition of the existing materials a t o n e ’ s d i s p o s a l . B u t these are indispensable p r e c i s e l y

for the approach to the Science of Logic, if only because of temporal proximity. Here it will be possible to give only a summary of that which concerns o u r more limited problem. The philosophical E n c y c l o p a ed ia for t h e u p p e r class ( 1 8 0 8 ff) takes

u p for the first time the categories of relation within the

objective logic under the general title "Actualrty"16

The

i n v e r s i o n o f the a r g u m e n t is e v i d e n t i n s p i t e o f the didactic sim plificati o n . H e g e l n o l o n g e r argues that substance is the p o s s i b l e o r the actual o r th e n e c e s s a r y , r a t h e r , h is thesis is: " t h e

actual is substance!“

Actuality itself, no longer a mere

p r e d i c a t e , b u t i n t e r p r e t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h Aristotle’s m e t a -

physics as the activity itself, is now to be ontologized and taken as a basis for the elaboration of the so-called categories of relation.

With regard to o u r more limited problem, the logic for the middle class of 1808/9 represents a dead-end, so to speak, in H e g e l ’ s drafts, s i n c e there o b j e c t i v e logic i s s u b d i v i d e d a c c o r d -

16G. W . F . H e g e l , P h i l o s o p h i s c h e P r o p fi d e u t i k , e d . Karl Rosenkranz, W e r k e , v o l . 18 ( B e r l i n : D u n c k e r u n d H u m b l o t , 1 8 4 0 ) 1 5 7 - 8 . " A c t u a l i t y " i s here an i n d e p e n d e n t part o f t h e o b j e c t i v e logic and follows t h e s e c t i o n s "1. B e i n g " and "II. Essence.”

1I’Propéideut

ik, 1 5 7 . O n e h a s t o n o t i c e , t h a t t h e n o t i o n of force, w h i c h first emerged i n t h e elaboration of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f c a u s a l i t y , i s n o w p u t back i n

t h e preceding logic of essence. I n this way essence becomes actuality through force. I t i s t h r o u g h a d y n a m i s w h i c h has t o prove itself t o be e n t e l e c h i c a l , s o t o s p e a k , t h a t t h e o u s i a becomes e n e r g e i a .

Ways and L o c i of Modality

135

ing to the faculties and confuses the previous ordering.18 The categories of relation are analysed under the heading "A. Understanding" where one finds no allusion to the categories of modality.19 The doctrine of categories is repeated i n part "C. Reason" w h e r e " the dialectic o f the categories is also presented

on the basis of Kant’s antinomies.20 There the elaboration of possibility-actuality (and necessity) takes place before the p r e s e n t a t i o n o f s u b s t a n c e , c a u s a l i t y , i n t e r a c t i o n , w h i c h already

provides evidence of a more than merely inchoate rearrangement o f Kant’s o r d e r i n g . 2 1

The Logic of 1810/11 shows that the problem was still in flux. Despite its many deletions, corrections and additions, Hegel’s preserved manuscript of the section o n "Actuality" already demonstrates o n first glance just how arduous its

composition had to be.22 The final version, published in the socalled Nz‘irnberg Writings presents i n its first three paragraphs the now more detailed notion of absolute substance with reference to Spinoza and Leibniz. The emphasized categories of modality appear i n the following paragraphs, and are further taken as g u i d e s for t h e presentation o f e m p h a t i c a c t u a l i t y o f t h e

notion of substance. Substance itself (not merely as category of r e l a t i o n , b u t as t h e u n c o n d i t i o n e d m o n a d i c s u b s t a n c e as a b s o l u t e s e l f - r e f l e c t i n g a c t u a l i t y o f causa s u i ) proves itself to b e n o t

simply possible but as the possibility itself which is actual i n its c o m p l e t e n e s s , a n d i n i t s o w n u n i t y , i s itself i n p o s s e s s i o n o f its

18Probably

a consequence

of t h e failed project

t o offer t o h i s s t u d e n t s

a

pneumatology (as phenomenology and psychology with introductory function) a n d a logic i n t h e same y e a r , according t o t h e ministerial i n s t r u c t i o n s . On N i e t h h a m m e r ’ s " N o r m a t i v , " cf. K a r l Rosenkranz, G e o r g W i l h e l m F r i e d r i c h H e g e l ’ s

Leben (cf. note 7) 254-6. 19G.W.F.

Gutachten

sum

S c h r i f t e n , Texte, R e d e n , Hegel, Nfirnberger 1808-1816, Gymnasialunterricht Nfirnberger

und Berichte ed. Johannes

Hoffmeister (Leipzig: Meiner, 1938) 30. 20Possibly

again

a

decision

which

was

conditioned

by

the

ministerial

instruction. 21Niirnberger

Schriften, 40-4.

22Nfirnbergg Schrifte_n., 81-6. I wish t o t h a n k here Helmut Schneider, who has kindly enabled me t o consult t h e manuscript materials which h e will critically edit for t h e Gesamm. Werke. Note that now "Actuality" is n o longer an independent part of objective logic (as in 1808) but is subordinated instead

t o t h e l o g i c of essence as i t s third s e c t i o n .

GABRIELLA BAPTIST

136

necessity.23 The following paragraphs on cause and interaction s h o w n o further analyses e x p l i c i t l y d e d i c a t e d to the modalities; i n any c a s e , actuality remains a unifying g u i d e i n the stabilized This is to s a y , the s o - c a l l e d sense o f acting (as Wirkende). categories o f modality have gradually become independent from

those of relation. They are placed after absolute substance and structurally shift more and more into the middle of the argument. They are n o w indeed between absolute substance and relation. After the toilsome development since the Jena period, this rearrangement finds i n the Science of Logic its coup de théatre. Here the more specific chapter " A c t u a l i t y " m e r e l y dedicated

to

the categories of modality, appears as such on the scene for the f i r s t . t i m e i n the s e c t i o n " A c t u a l i t y " b e t w e e n "The Absolute" and

"The Absolute Relation." (Logik 11, 369-409; 529-71) W e can assume h e r e that the c h a p t e r "Actuality" i n the

Science of Logic, often the object of commentaries and disputes, is g e n e r a l l y k n o w n . 2 4

23Nllrnberger

H o w e v e r , b y v i r t u e o f the d e v e l o p m e n t

Schriften, 82-3.

24Among t h e many c o n t r i b u t i o n s o n t h i s theme are t o be m e n t i o n e d : William T . Harris, H e g e l ’ s L o g i c , A B o o k o n t h e G e n e s i s of t h e Categories of t h e M i n d , A Critical Exposition ( C h i c a g o : G r i g g s & C o . , 1 8 9 0 ) 3 2 9 - 4 8 . G e o r g e N o é l ,

L a logigue d e Hegel (Paris: Alcan, 1897) 75-83. J o h n M c T . Ellis McTaggart, A Commentagx o n H e g e l ’ s L o g i c (Cambridge: University P r e s s , 1910) 1 5 5 - 8 6 . Herbert Marcuse, H e g e l s Ontologie u n d d i e G r u n d l e g u n g e i n e r Theorie d e r

Geschichtlichkeit (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1932) 99 ff; English t r . , Hegel’s Ontolggx and t h e Theory of flitoricity, e d . Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge, MA/London:

M . I . T . P r e s s , 1 9 8 7 ) 89 ff.

Geoffrey R . G . M u r e , A S t u d y of H e g e l ’ s

Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950) 126-50. Dieter Henrich, "Hegels Theorie

fiber den Zufall,” Kant-Studien, L (1958/59) 131-48.

Eugene J . Fleischmann,

"Die Wirklichkeit in Hegels Logik; Ideengeschichtliche Beziehungen su Spinoza,"

Zeitschrift filr philosophische Forschung, XVIII (1964) 3 - 2 9 . Eugene Fleischm a n n , L a science universelle ou l a logigue d e Hegel (Paris: Plon, 1968) 199—231. Y v o n B e l a v a l , " L a doctrine d e l’essence c h e z Hegel e t c h e z L e i b n i z , ” Archives d e

Philosophie, XXXIII (1970) 547-78. Georg Lukacs, Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen

S e i n s , Hegels falsche

und

echte

Ontologie

(Neuwied

11. B e r l i n :

Luchterhand, 1971) 107 ff. Yvon Belaval, " L a doctrine d e l’essence chez Hegel

et chez Leibniz (Suite et fin)," Studi internazionali di Filosofia, VI (1974) 11538.

Hans-Christian Lucas, Wirklichkeit und Methode in der Philosophie Hegels,

Untersuchungen

160 ff.

s u r Logik, D e r EinfluB S p i n o z a s , D i s s . ( K b l n : Heidemann,

1974)

John W . Burbidge, ”The Necessity of Contingency; An Analysis of

H e g e l ' s C h a p t e r o n ‘ A c t u a l i t y ’ i n t h e S c i e n c e of Logic,” and George d i G i o v a n n i , ” T h e Category of Contingency i n t h e H e g e l i a n Logic," b o t h i n Art a n d L o g i c i n H e g e l ’ s P h i l o s o p h y , e d s . Warren E . S t e i n k r a u s & K e n n e t h I . Schmits ( N e w

Jersey/Sussex: Humanities Press/Harvester Press, 1980) respectively.

Beatrice

Longuenesse,

201-17 and 179-200

Hegel et la critigue de la métaphxsigue,

Etude sur l a doctrine d e l’essence (Paris: Vrin, 1981)

138-204.

Beatrice

Ways and Loci of Modality

137

of the problem sketched h e r e , s o m e o f its characteristics c a n b e better understood. Especially interesting are the impasses and

hesitations which condition the further development of the problem.

The multiplicity o f perspectives can still b e r e c o g -

nized in the different actualities that emerge: the first, absolute ‘actuality’ (of the section title), names that unity o f essence and existence

which

was conceived

b y modern

philosophy

as the

absolute (whether it refers for instance to the Cartesian G o d , the Spinozian

Substance,

the Leibnizian

monad,

Kant’s

idea o f

reason o r even Schelling’s notion of identity); the second, ‘actuality proper’ (of the chapter), takes as its clue the Kantian table of categories and develops its modal determinations along these lines; finally, a third formal ‘actuality’ is to be found under these modal determinations. ( F o r the distinction between absolute actuality, actuality p r o p e r and a c t u a l i t y as formal m o m e n t , cf. Logik I I , 369; 5 2 9 ) These modal d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , moreover, are constantly submitted to a duplication such that the clue o f actuality to be categorially elaborated unfolds i n

levels of a mere formal (i.e. possible) actuality, a real (i.e. properly actual) actuality and finally an absolute (i.e. necessary)

actuality. 5

If one follows this complicated network it is

possible to ascertain that actuality according to its mere possible determinations is first an immediate existence, whose formal (i.e. possible) possibility is an identical essentiality in itself and whose mere formal (and that is to say again possible) necessity is the bare contingency of chance. ("A. Contingency, o r Formal Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity", Logik 11, 381-5; 542-6) The following real ( i . e . factual) actuality shows i t s e l f to b e the facticity o f the t h i n g , its a c t i v i t y , whose real ( i . e . factual) possibility is its c o n d i t i o n o r determination and whose real ( i . e . factual) necessity is its p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . ("B. Relative N e c e s s i t y , o r Real A c t u a l i t y , Possibility, and Necessity", Logik 11, 3 8 5 - 9 ;

546-50) The whole logic of essence is once more in play here. I n the next paragraph o n ‘ A b s o l u t e Necessity’ o n e w o u l d p r o p e r l y expect to read i n the title " A b s o l u t e Actuality, P o s s i b i l i t y and Necessity", analogously to the o t h e r two pa ra gra phs .

Longuenesse, "L’effectivité dans l a Logique d e Hegel," Revue

de Métaghgsigue

et de Morale, LXXXVII (1982) 495-603. 1061 Biard, D. Buvat, J.-F. Kevergan, J . - F . K l i n g , Alain Lacroix, Andre Lecrivain and M . S l u b i c k i , I n t r o d u c t i o n 3 l a l e c t u r e d e l a S c i e n c e d e l a l o i u e d e H e e1, v o l . 2 , L a d o c t r i n e d e l ’ e s s e n c e i P a r i s : Aubier M o n t a i g n e , 1 9 8 3 ; 3 1 3 - 3 9 . Tomoyuki Yamane, W i r k l i c h k e i t ,

Interpretation eines Kapitels aus Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’ (Frankfurt a.M./Bern/New York: Lang, 1983). André Don, L a logigue d e Hegel e t les

problemes traditionnels de l’ontologie (Paris: Vrin, 1987) 141-58. 251

wish t o thank here Thomas S . Hoffmann for his suggestions.

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138

And thus, with the already familiar delineation into 1. 2. 3. one would expect an elaboration of absolute necessity (as promised i n the title) from the point of view of its necessary actuality, its necessary possibility and its necessary necessity. (Logik II, 3 8 9 92; 550-3) In the text itself, which is not articulated like the other p a r t s , o n e can find

r i g h t a t the b e g i n n i n g a n absolute

actuality which is emphasized, and which i n the course of the reveals itself as a necessary actuality as w e l l as a n

argument

absolute possibility. (Logik II, 389; 550 551) It remains obscure, however, w h y such a self-referential necessary actuality o r a b s o l u t e necessity i s t h e n characterized

as b l i n d , as ‘absolute

negativity’ and as ‘contingency’ which was i n fact already elaborated as a phase of the merely possible actuality. (Logik II, 391; 552-3)

In contrast both to the previous a n d to the following elaborations, the chapter "Actuality" offers i n fact a unique attempt

to assume

logically a n d o n t o l o g i c a l l y the p r o b l e m o f

contingency i n the dialectical treatment of the necessary. The existence (Dasein) o f a merely p o s s i b l e a c t u a l i t y t h a t is i n i t i a l l y inconceivable shows i t s e l f as t h e t h i n g a n d th e m a t t e r o f a

factual and active actuality which, i n its self -reference, ransoms its o w n contingency and so gathers u p in its necessity not only contingency itself b u t , more radically, even the contingent. C o m p l e t e clarification o f a c t u a l i t y , i n c l u d i n g its self - g r o u n d i n g , seems to b e o u t o f place h e r e , because s u c h clarification a p p e a r s to p r e s u p p o s e the c o n c e p t u a l i t y o f s u b j e c t i v e l o g i c . Therefore, t h i s n e c e s s i t y o f the logic o f e s s e n c e reveals itself n o t as a transparency b u t s t i l l as a b l i n d n e s s ( j u s t as the infinity o f the understanding i n t h e l o g i c o f b e i n g has remained a b a r e e m p t i n e s s ) . To be s u r e , i n the a s s u m p t i o n o f the s p e c u l a t i v e material o f the entire l o g i c o f e s s e n c e , n e c e s s i t y effects the

transition to the subjective logic, although the latter is only anticipated o r hinted at. Thus, this absolute necessity remains i n fact absolute only in an abstract sense, the necessity of the actual still inadequate, not a teleological b e i n g - a t - w o r k , b u t an indifferent

being-such.26

3. What Has Become of ‘Actuality’? The b e s t e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d i f f i c u l t y lies i n t h e elaboration

of absolute necessity o r of necessary actuality as blind c o n t i n 26Although

t h e further part o n t h e categories of r e l a t i o n fi n d s i t s s t a r t i n absolute necessity and elaborates t h e "necessary a c t u a l , " t h e modal categories are i n t h e further c o u r s e ' o f t h e analysis n o l o n g e r expressly t h e m a t i z e d .

Ways and Loci of Modality

139

g e n c y i s offered b y the notes o f a s t u d e n t from the N fi r n b e r g period o n the Philosophical Encyclopaedia ( 1 8 1 2 { l 3 ) w h i c h are

in immediate proximity to the Science of Logic.2

All the more

noteworthy are therefore the variations w h i c h cannot s i m p l y b e attributed to simplifications required for pedagogical r e a s o n s . The note to paragraph 1 0 , w h i c h presents the whole o b j e c t i v e

logic as if in a long digression, is especially detailed just o n the third section of the logic of essence. The first part o n absolute substance

s i m p l y disappears

at this point, while the part on

actuality is simplified into possibility and into necessity, with the eloquent omission of contingency. The greatest weight is s t i l l g i v e n to the categories o f relation i n w h i c h , h o w e v e r , the

determinations of modality play a greater part in comparison with the Science of Logic. This intervention i n the text of the Science of Logic then becomes more radical i n th e version o f th e corresponding parts o f the Encyclopaedia o f 1 8 1 7 . There the c h a p t e r o n "Actuality" disappears definitively from the i n d e x as does t h e p a r t o n "The A b s o l u t e " already l o s t i n th e notes o f th e s t u d e n t from Niirn-

berg. (Enz. (1817) §§ 91-108)?8 The fact that these paragraphs are divided by subtitles only in the index and not i n the text i t s e l f is a n example

of

th e m a n y

peculiarities in the part,

indicating that the situation remains problematic.29

The

treatment of modality is not only shortened, b u t also simplified in its content. The new version now offers a development and concretization of possibility u p to necessity. Here a first possibility as a g e n u i n e modal d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n the Kantian s e ns e o f a m e r e subjective an d h en ce e m p t y reflection becomes the real p o s s i b i l i t y o f a condition o r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h r o u g h t h e real c o n t e n t o f a c t u a l i t y . A n d f i n a l l y , i t b e c o m e s the f u l l g r o u n d o f a n identity with itself which i s necessary. I n this

way, the guiding function of actuality is diminished; contingenc y is n o t c o m p l e t e l y eliminated from necessity; i n any case, the latter is no l o n g e r a b s o l u t e . I t is rather referential as the g o i n g -

271

wish to thank

here Helmut

S c h n e i d e r , w h o has k i n d l y enabled

me t o

consult t h e unpublished materials and who will critically edit these notes. 28See

also t h e unedited notes of Franz A . Good of Hegel’s lectures o n logic

a n d metaphysics, which were h e l d on t h e basis of t h e Encyclopaedia i n t h e S u m m e r - t e r m o f 1 8 1 7 . Cf. especially t h e emphasis o n ” a c t i v i t y . ” I w i s h t o t h a n k here O t t o P d g g e l e r , w h o has k i n d l y enabled me t o consult t h e unpublished manuscript. 29The

only other case is t h e part on "Sittlichkeit' in the philosophy of

objective s p i r i t , w h i c h i s also divided only i n t h e i n d e x .

GABRIELLA BAPTIST

140

into-one-another

o f its ground that has b e e n raised from

the

merely immediate actuality. The following categories of relation are presented according to the guide of the notion of necessity (in spite of the index) and develop its referentiality. The difficulties are however acknowledged by the author himself: "The notion of necessity is one of the most difficult ones in Philosophy, because i t is even the notion itself b u t still in its externality." (Enz. (1817), § 101) even

The version o f 1 8 2 7 c o n t i n u e s the problems and varies further t h i s part that was a l r e a d y s o often varied.30

Contingency, like i n 1817, is assigned to mere possibility and to actuality (in the sense of what is merely externally existing) in s u c h a way that contingency is further separated from the n o t i o n o f necessity and the latter is merely posited, something

external. The categorial and ontological treatment of modality is now definitively placed into a longer introduction without the following categories of relation remaining subordinated to the modalities as in the edition of 1817. The version of the Encyclopaedia of 1830 brings n o relevant variations, though it includes significant additions which need not be discussed

further here. (Enz. (1830), §§ 142-159; 200-222)31 W h a t is the significance o f this withdrawal o f modalities from the versions o f the E n c y c l o p a e d i a which runs parallel to the revision o f t h e notion o f c o n t i n g e n c y and o f the absolute? The fact that the Encyclopaedia places the p ro b lem o f c o n t i n g e n c y o n o t h e r levels as w e l l s u r e l y plays a n important r o l e .

For instance, the conceptual pair necessity-contingency is assigned rather to the philosophy of nature which, i n its organic stages as living actuality and process of life, is in fact already b e y o n d this o p p o s i t i o n .

A n d s o rational actuality finds its place

fundamentally i n the philosophy of spirit. There is, so to speak, a s p l i t t i n g o f the modal p r o b l e m i n t h e corresponding o r related

3°C..

w. F. Hegel, Encylopfidie der der philosophischen Wissenschaften im

Grundrisse,

sum

Gebrauch

seiner

Vorlesungen,

OBwald,1827) §§ 142-159;141-53.

z w e i t e Ausgabe

(Heidelberg:

31The reference t o the writer of history in t h e treatment of possibility (cf. § 143 note; 203-204) is for instance surely connected with the systematic changes

w i t h i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y of history. Among t h e commentaries t o be m e n t i o n e d : Andre Leonard, CommJentaire littéral de la Logigue de Hegel (Paris: Vrin, 1974) 240-314. Bernhard Lakebrink, Kommentar z u H e g e l s 'Logik" i n seiner ' E n z y k l o g fi d i e " von 1 8 3 0 , v o l . 1 , S e i n u n d W e s e n (Freiburg/Milnchen: Alber,

1979) 329-430. Errol E. Harris, An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel (Lanham/New York/London: University Press of America, 1983) 189-212.

Ways and L o c i 0f Modality

parts o f the realphilosophy.

141

B u t th e s p l i t t i n g also takes place o n

the mere logical level where, for instance, ‘the self -grounding actuality proper’, as well as ‘ t h e absolute’, are to b e placed rather i n the Logic o f N o t i o n , for e x a m p l e , i n the chapter o n

teleology, o n the idea of life o r o n the absolute idea. One could even maintain that to the withdrawal of the logical elaboration of modalities in the section "Actuality," there would correspond their becoming a type of metacategorial unity. Already in the Science of Logic modality had at least three logical places: in the section o n ‘measure’ of the Logic of Being, in the chapter o n ‘actuality’ o f the Logic o f Essence and i n the paragraph "The

Judgement of the Notion" in the Subjective Logic. (Logik I (1812), 189 ff. Logik I , 323 ff; 327 ff. Logik II, 380 ff; 541 ff. Logik III, 8 4 ff; 657 ff) Although the Encyclopaedia of 1830 represents Hegel’s last variation on this topic, the eventful story of the categories of modality

at this p o i n t o f the logical d ev elo p men t

has not yet

come to an end. There is sufficient reason to assume that Hegel would surely have made some modifications in the revision of the logic of essence, had it not been for his sudden death. Carl Hegel’s notes o f the lectures on logic i n 1831, not yet edited, show in any case that i n the section "Actuality" the categories of modality are left more and m o r e i n th e b a c k g r o u n d , w h i l e the problem o f history a n d o f the p r e s e n t , for e x a m p l e , c o m e i n t o

relief .32 In any case Hegel’s grappling with ‘actuality’ is also to b e s o u g h t o n o t h e r levels, for e x a m p l e , i n the B e r l i n d o c u -

mented modifications i n the system, which are not only restricted to ‘logical’ i m p l i c a t i o n s . E v e n the Hegelian school realized that this p o i n t was a task to be s o l v e d and therefore tried to bring this fermentation to a s y s t e m a t i c standstill. I t w i l l c o m e as no s u r p r i s e that, for instance, Johann E . Erdmann o r K a r l Rosenkranz restructured this part o f the l o g i c o n ‘actu— a l i t y ’ , both e m p h a s i z i n g the function o f modalities r a t h e r than that o f relations. They confirm i n this regard that the a p p a r e n t disappearance can a t the same t i m e also b e i n t e r p r e t e d as a sort

of transfiguration.33

321 w i s h here t o t h a n k O t t o Poggeler w h o has k i n d l y enabled me t o consult t h e original manuscript as w e l l as H a n s - C h r i s t i a n Lucas for having shown me t h e

transcription which h e and Udo Rameil made. An edition of the notes of Carl Hegel has b e e n announced. 33Johann Fflnf Grundriss der Logik und Metaphysik, E. Erdmann, Vorlesungen ( H a l l e : L i p p e r t , 1 8 4 1 ) 8 7 - 9 8 . Karl Rosenkranz, Wissenschaft der logischen I d e e , v o l . 1 , M e t a p h y s i k (Konigsberg: Borntrfiger, 1 8 5 8 ) 4 2 6 ff.

GABRIELLA BAPTIST

142

B u t how

is t h i s to b e u n d e r s t o o d ,

this restlessness o f

thinking which has been briefly described here and which remains in constant fermentation even posthumously? The

i n i t i a l c o n c e r n fo r reciprocal c o r r e c t i o n

o f Spinoza

and Kant had taken shape as a new thinking of actuality whereby both Spinoza’s thematization of an abstract substance a n d Kant’s

thesis—actuality is no real predicate—were

to be

revised. The quest to actualize substance and to ontologize actuality also led to a general revision of Kant‘s dynamic categories, which were thought anew in their relation to one another as well as in their order within a doctrine of categories. Following an initial modalization of the notion of substance came a progressive symmetrical distribution of modalities under the categories of relation to t h e p o i n t o f t h e i r position o f prominence w i t h i n the Science of Logic. H e r e , as a m a n n e r o f being o f absolute s u b s t a n c e , t h e y became modes o f e x p o s i t i o n

o f self -grounding, freeing themselves from marginalization which also e x p l a i n s , p e r h a p s , t h e modification

i n the o r d e r i n g .

In one of the most difficult parts of the logic, where the transition from Objective to Subjective Logic is concerned, modalities become guides to the transition itself, even if they do become more abstract than the relations through the i n v e r s i o n . The n e w s t a r t i n g p o i n t finds i n A r i s t o t l e ’ s energeia, as e n t e l e chical force o f l i f e , t h e g u i d i n g i n s t a n c e , a n d i s therefore d e e p l y connected w i t h the s y s t e m a t i c transformation that t o o k place i n

Jena in 1805/6 where he worked o u t the notion of end (Zweck). But precisely with the central position of actuality as the core o f the a r g u m e n t ,

the n e w s t a r t had u n l e a s h e d the p r o b l e m o f

necessary contingency as actual and absolute possibility; actuality was to be read now as a necessity capable of carrying contingency in a n e w conception of the absolute. This also explains the variations of the versions of the Encyclopaedia, where i t appears even more clearly that the necessity of the logic of e s s e n c e c a n n o t be a n a b s o l u t e o n e .

The untiring elaboration of the categories of modality is nevertheless the best expression of a n unrest i n thinking that presents itself as a n element of continuous restructuring and self-correction in Hegel’s system. In fact, the courageous program of an apodictic foundation of absolute reason through a m e t a p h y s i c a l ontology as a " S y s t e m o f P u r e Reason" c a n d o

nothing else than continuously revise itself o n the touchstone of modalities, in the face of the problem of contingency and of the

Ways and L o c i of Modality

143

b e i n g - a t - w o r k of totality. I n any case, Hegel’s questioning of the modal categories, w i t h their p l a c e - c h a n g e s

and even t h e i r

apparent disappearance o r transformation i n h y p o - or hypercategories, shows that the modal p r o b l e m , which has c a u s e d productive shipwrecks i n th e philosophy o f this century as w e ll,

was, by becoming placeless, a creative impasse for Hegel himself. Hegel’s ‘actuality’ also remains a further touchstone for contemporary philosophical s e n s i b i l i t y which takes u p the then underestimated p o s s i b l e , o r even the i m p o s s i b l e , and s e e k s , for instance, i n the u t o p i c traits o f art o r e t h i c s , i n difference and

alterity, the constitution of reality. The question of the actual still holds "philosophizing i n suspense."34

Hegel-Archiv, Bochum

34Martin Heidegger, Aristoteles, Metaphysik T H 1 - 3 , Von W e s e n u n d a.M.: Wirklichkeit der Kraft, G e s a m t a u s g a b e , I I . Abteilung, v o l . 33 (Frankfurt

Klostermann, 1981) 178.

A Reply t o Gabriella Baptist by Deborah G. Chaffin

In recent years it has become almost commonplace to claim that every writer has a certain unthought element in her work which, when properly thematized, can be seen to issue i n ‘aporias’. Indeed, s u c h aporias are often viewed as the results o f a failure to q u e s t i o n the discrepancies and inconsistencies o f philosophy’s m i s e en scene. T h u s , D r . Baptist’s inquiry into the process o f H e g e l ’ s conceptualization o f ‘ a c t u a l i t y ’ , as w e l l as i n t o his actual practice o f exposition and the s t r u c t u r e s o f his

argumentation, brings to light a certain aporia which, instead of simply belying his phi1050phical enterprise, is rather constitutive o f its successful c o m p l e t i o n .

The aporia D r . Baptist identifies

is the "...way the chapter ‘Actuality’ of the Science of Logic stands between a preceding e v i d e n t absence and a s u b s e q u e n t

apparent disappearance." H e r understanding of Hegel’s philosophical enterprise is that it is an attempt to show that "PhiIOSOphy itself ...[is] actual k n o w i n g , precisely because i t can

think the Absolute in its teleological becoming-to-itself as a living actuality." ( 1 3 4 )

Now i t might seem that the intricately detailed account of ‘actuality’ given in the second book of the Science of Logic and the formulation of his project as a whole given in The Phenomenology of Spirit, make use of two different and at most only barely related senses o f ‘ a c t u a l i t y ’ . B u t i t is one o f the u n d e r l y -

ing themes of Baptist’s work to show that this is not the case. A s h e r reconstruction o f the history o f Hegel’s conceptualization

of ‘actuality’ would show:‘ "In contrast both to the previous and to the following elaborations, the chapter ‘Actuality’ offers i n fact a unique a t t e m p t to assume logically and o n t o l o g i c a l l y the p r o b l e m o f c o n t i n g e n c y in the d i a l e c t i a l treatment o f the necessary." (138) I n o t h e r w o r d s , and as G e o r g e d i G i o v a n n i argued i n the

Hegel Society meetings of 1974 at Georgetown University, "Hegel...assigned to phi1050phy...the function of reconciling

1Gabriella B a p t i s t , " W a y s and Loci of M o d a l i t y . The C h a p t e r ‘ A c t u a l i t y ’ i n in t h e S c i e n c e of Logic b e t w e e n i t s Absence i n J e n a and i t s Disappearance Berlin,” in this volume, 127-43.

145

DEBORAH G . CHAFFIN

146

thought with nature, reflection with immediacy."2

Thus, the

"impasses and hesitations" o f the Science of Logic’s treatment o f the modalities, as w e l l as the "absence" o f s u c h treatment i n the J e n a writings and its "disappearance" i n the B e r l i n p e r i o d , m i g h t

be viewed as evidence of structural and categorial problems attendant upon the a t t e m p t to i n t r o d u c e realphilosophisch material i n t o a general ‘ m e t a p h y s i c s ’ , understood as categorial

ontology. Understood, that is, as a ‘reconstruction’ i n terms of thought, o f what is p r e g i v e n i n e x p e r i e n c e and s c i e n c e . 3

In what follows, I will focus on what appears to be the philosophical crux of Baptist’s reconstruction of Hegel’s modal theory. Taking her clue from the gradual appearance of an explicit treatment of the modal categories i n the Nfirnberg teaching period, and the full blown theory of the Science of Logic, Baptist gives great weight to the "impasses and hesitations," as she puts i t , of the Logic’s treatment. The central issue which emerges from this section of Baptist’s text centers around the details of Hegel’s treatment of ‘absolute actuality.’ For Baptist takes his characterization of this category as ‘blind’, as ‘absolute negativity’, and as ‘contingency’ to b e evidence o f an i m p a s s e , a h e s i t a t i o n p e r h a p s o n h i s part.

According to her analysis, Hegel fails somehow to recognize explicitly that this absolute actuality o r absolute necessity "...remains in fact absolute only i n an abstract sense, the necessity o f the actual still inadequate, not a teleological b e i n g a t - w o r k , b u t an indifferent being-such."4 I would like now to examine briefly whether this view offers a successful reconstruction of the Hegelian text. W h a t , t h e n , is the case H e g e l i s m a k i n g i n the logic o f

essence, and more particularly, in the chapter "Actuality"?

I

t h i n k we m i g h t a g r e e t h a t , m o s t g e n e r a l l y p u t , H e g e l ’ s t a s k , as

Baptist several times points o u t , is a "...new project of a s p e c u l a t i v e p h i l o s o p h y . " ( 1 3 2 ) I n d e e d , the L o g i c o f Essence has

2George

d i Giovanni, ”The Category of Contingency in t h e Hegelian Logic,”

i n Art a n d L o g i c i n H e g e l ’ s P h i l o s o p h y , e d s . W . E . S t e i n k r a u s and K . I . Schrnitz

(New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980) 179. 3Klaus

Hartmann,

” T h e ‘ A n a l o g i e s ’ and After," i n P r o c e e d i n g s of t h e T h i r d

International K a n t Congress, e d . L.W. Beck (Dordrecht-Holland: D . Reidel, 1972) 47-62. 4Baptist,

138.

A Reply t o Gabriella Baptist

147

been viewed as that area of the Logic where many of the problems o f He g e l ’ s p r o j e c t are manifest.

The L o g i c o f B e i n g

gave an account of the interrelated concepts necessarily involved i n the a t t e m p t to think ‘ b e i n g ’ as i t is i n itself, i m m e d i a t e l y .

Yet the determination given at this stage, Hegel argued, required more than the specification of directly apprehended qualities which one object had, and another did not. Such a procedure would have to distinguish literally everything from an object in order to pick o u t just that o b ject—an impossible task. Thus, we need to know the ground, the generalized basis, according to which we can claim that having s u c h p r o p e r t i e s d i s t i n g u i s h e s this thing as su c h , and f u r t h e r , w h ich allows u s to contrast a

‘qualitative thing’ with its contraries. Such a basis involves what Hegel calls an act of reflection. Hegel now argues, i n the Logic of Essence, that i t is due to thought’s reflective activity that a thing can be k n o w n ' t o have an identity through its possible appearances.

T h u s , the modalities are s o m e o f the terms o f this

identity-specifying activity which need to be analyzed i n the Logic of Essence. This s i t u a t i o n is c o m p l i c a t e d , h o w e v e r , n o t o n l y b y the fact that the claims for reflection are s o b r o a d , b u t a l s o b y t h e

fact that this analysis falls between the ‘entity’ Logic of the first b o o k , and the L o g i c o f the Concept o f the t h i r d b o o k . I n o t h e r w o r d s , the analysis o f the Logic o f E s s e n c e is s u p p o s e d to

contribute to Hegel’s general claim that the self -examination of spontaneous t h o u g h t gradually c o m e s "...to u n d e r s t a n d

t h a t the

origin of the notions fundamentally necessary for i t to think a world

reflectively

can

o n l y b e . . . i n t e r n a l to the

autonomous

development of thought itself...."6 However, this claim is only implicit in the determinations or categories of reflection since i t is s t i l l governed b y a relation o f d e p e n d e n c e . The L o g i c o f E s s e n c e has a n orientation towards its o b j e c t s that separates a n d

categorizes the dual moments of ‘being itself’.

For example,

necessity and c o n t i n g e n c y are not understood as qualities o f separate b e i n g s , b u t as ‘ m o m e n t s ’ o f a n y b e i n g t h a t r e f l e c t i o n

can identify and understand. Yet because reflection is still governed by its relation of

5The

general overview presented here has benefited greatly from the

d i s c u s s i o n presented by Robert B . P i p p i n , Hegel’s Ideali_srn. T h e S a t i s f a c t i o n s of S e l fi C o n s c i o u s n e s s ( N e w Y o r k , N e w Y o r k : Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 9 ) 201-207. 6Pippin,

201.

DEBORAH G . CHAFFIN

148

dependence

upon

its o b j e c t s ,

t h e a c t i v i t y o f reflection,

the

determinations it evinces are only relative. A s Hegel puts this point: "Essence is the Notion as posited (gesetzter) Notion, the determinations

i n essence are o n l y r e l a t i v e , not y e t as s i m p l y

reflected in itself; accordingly the Notion is not yet the Notion for itself." (Enz. (1830), § 112; my translation) And we see that reflection often misunderstands its own ground and even the status of its results, and this is what leads it into dilemmas o r , perhaps, ‘aporias,’ that force it to revise its own selfunderstanding, until a s p e c u l a t i v e , non—reflective account can b e g i n to be g i v e n . A s Hegel s a y s , "The s p h e r e o f essence thus

turns out to be a still imperfect combination of immediacy and mediation....And so it is also the sphere of the posited c o n tradiction, which was only implicit i n the sphere of Being." (Enz. (1830), § 114; m y translation) The posited c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f the s p h e r e o f essence is that

essence’s determinate reflection into itself is as well reflection into the determinate other. And the regions of essence, appearance and a c t u a l i t y , may be v i e w e d as demarcated

b y the

relation these two reflections bear to one another. That is, if the relation between them is one of immediate difference, then we have

the s p h e r e o f a p p e a r a n c e ; i f th e relation is o n e o f

mediated identity, then we have the sphere of actuality. In this w a y , b y following

K a n t ’ s lead and d e l i n e a t i n g

substance

as

relational, Hegel will be able to show that the categories of actuality are the primary categories of objective being. I n the Science of Logic’s treatment o f modality a n d o t h e r categories o f a c t u a l i t y , w e v i e w H e g e l ’ s m o s t s u s t a i n e d thorough treatement o f th e e x p i c i t u n i t y o f e s s e n c e existence. A s t h e posited u n i t y o f reflection i n t o s e l f

the and and and

reflection into other, actuality is the posited identification of reflection and its other. In the narrow sense of the chapter " A c t u a l i t y , " we v i e w the a b s o l u t e w h i c h p o s i t s itself i n i m m e d i a c y . T h u s , the m o d a l i t i e s are the various ways i n which the absolute manifests i t s e l f i n e x t e r n a l i t y , o r t h e y are the stages

i n reflection’s real unity with immediacy. The essential u n i t y o f b e i n g i n appearance does n o t l i e i n

the immediate being of reflection n o r i n its immediate other, b u t rather i n t h e transition between t h e m .

A n d actuality posits

this unity i n immediacy: because it is a unity of being, actuality must manifest itself i n immediacy, and because this unity is n o t posited i n a p p e a r a n c e , b u t is n e v e r t h e l e s s p r e s e n t , appearance can be v i e w e d as l o g i c a l l y d e f i c i e n t t o the category o f actuality.

A Reply to Gabriella Baptist

149

T h u s , since actuality posits this unity o f essence and e x i s t e n c e ,

i t is, first, a regional category in which being (Seiendes) exhibits an intrinsic unity with ground. In other words, the ground of actuality is posited in it, its ground is explicitly i n and of being. Actuality is thus externally unconditioned, i t is n o l o n g e r opposed

b y c o n t e n t which is s u p p o s e d to ground i t

b u t remains indifferent to it. Because actuality deals with being to which ground is intrinsic, i t is the posited unity of the logical structure (the determinations of relation) with reality. As real, Hegel calls such a ground the absolute. Yet the absolute is determined because it is relative to form. As so determined, the absolute is the predicate of the absolute, or the absolute attribute. (Logik II, 373; 533) The attribute is the absolute considered as a determination of form. But form is self -relating negativity, and as Hegel has already shown i n the determination o f absolute ground as form and matter, (Logik I I , 2 9 7 ; 4 5 1 ) form as self -related negates i t s e l f i n its o t h e r . B u t i n the case o f the absolute attribute, form is

real; thus it cannot totally sublate itself into the other. Therefore, as s e l f - r e l a t e d ,

the attribute i s the determinate

absolute.

But the attribute is also reflection which is external to the absolute—indeed, i t i s o n l y as reflection external to the a b s o l u t e that i t is the determinateness o f the a b s o l u t e . Therefore, the

absolute can only be understood as determinate if it posits the negative and remains identical with itself i n the negative. To be determinate, the absolute must be self -relating negativity, the reflective movement of and out of itself in virtue of which it manifests itself. (Logik I I , 374; 5 3 5 ) This manifestation o f its determinate content is its m o d e . A n d in its mode c o n t e n t can

best explicate itself b y means of its identity through formal A s s u c h self-explication o f the a b s o l u t e , c o n t e n t difference. i t s e l f is a b s o l u t e . A s absolute form and absolute m a t t e r , the absolute is posited as being which is self ~ g r o u n d i n g , as i n d e p e n d e n t actuality.

This actuality, i n the narrow sense o f t h e chapter " A c t u a l -

ity," is the absolute which posits itself in immediacy. As Hegel says, actuality is "reflected absoluteness"—(Logik II, 380; 541) that is, it is ground which determines itself as real reflection which posits itself in its external manifestation. Nevertheless, there can be various modes i n which the actual manifests itself

71

am indebted t o Thomas J . Bole for this understanding of the movement

of ‘ a c t u a l i t y ’ .

DEBORAH G . CHAFFIN

150

i n externality, and Hegel treats these, the stages in reflection’s real unity with immediacy, as modalities. In other words, Hegel presents the modalities as the internal differentiations of the absolute; indeed it is in virtue of such diff erentiations that the absolute manifests itself in actuality. We may view the modaliti e s , t h e n , as structures

o f determinate

ground

which govern

external being; they map the grounding relations into being’s determinations.

B u t a c t u a l i t y is more than g r o u n d , and because

it is ground which is the inner to the outer of determined being, i t is being in itself (Ansichsein). And each configuration, each modality of actuality reflects this being’s ambiguities. Thus, each modality of actuality can be construed as the immediate and c o n t i n g e n t , for w h i c h i t is b u t which is i n i t s e l f

and opposed to i t as well (being-for-other); and it can be construed as t h e n e c e s s a r y , o r b e i n g i n itself posited as reflected

immediacy, with ground necessarily determing being. Thus, the modalities in addition to the major modal determinations of actual b e i n g and intrinsic g r o u n d , are in tra-mo d al differentiations o f the relationship b e t w e e n immediacy a n d reflection.

As this brief reconstruction of the place and meaning of the

modalities

i n t h e Science

of

Logic

indicates,

I believe

Hegel’s treatment of them shows that there is a dialectical continuity between the form and the content of modalities. I n the case o f the final m o d a l i t y , a b s o l u t e a c t u a l i t y , H e g e l shows

that its being in itself is real necessity, a n d real necessity has its determinateness always c o n t i n g e n t u p o n e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s . (Logik 11, 3 8 9 - 3 9 0 ; 5 5 1 ) B u t this does n o t m e a n that c o n t i n g e n -

c y is extrinsic to real necessity as determinate; as he argues, contingency constitutes the content which is real necessity’s b e i n g i n it se l f . T h u s , H e g e l resolves categorially the c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n the e x t r i n s i c , e x i s t e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p o f the two

contents, and the intrinsic, conceptual unity of the categories of real necessity and contingent condition. He calls this unity ‘absolute necessity’.

Absolute necessity is thus the identity of being with regard to content with its negation o r essence. It is absolute necessity because it is ‘because it is’. But this means that i t remains uncomprehended as ‘reflection o r form of the absolute’. (Logik II, 391; 552) As thus simply self -identical, the positing o t its o w n contingency cannot b e integrated into it, it remains ‘blind’. Thus, in distinction to the "obscurity" Baptist sees i n this characterization

o f a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y , t h e v i e w I have o u t l i n e d

is able to explain the contradictory character of absolute necessity o r necessary actuality o n the basis of the intercategor-

A Reply to Gabriella Baptist

ial relations o f the modalities as a w h o l e .

151

I n d e e d , the d i f f eren—

tia necessary for identity are ‘free actualities’, externally related to each other in such a way that what is reflected b y one actuality into another i s s i m p l y p o s s i b l e , extrinsic to the o t h e r

actuality which is its ground—it is a contingency. (Logik 11, 391-392; 553) Absolute necessity is actuality which is absolute in content but contingent i n form. It is contradictory since it is reflection and form o f the absolute, yet contingent u p o n another actuality. I t i s supposed to b e necessary, b u t is

contingent. Just as in the situation with regard to its content, the contradiction here is resolved in a categorial unity which abstracts from the real differentia b y determining them as a conceptual

whole.

S in ce

th e

contingent

relationships

are

necessary for actuality to be absolute form, they are the manifestation

o f actuality’s absolute

necessity.

Substance

is

actuality as the complete, o r absolutely necessary, ground of its contingency.

The upshot of this limited treatment is that Hegel allows us to understand why actuality is genetically presupposed b y possibility and yet, ontologically, is more determinate; and his analysis likewise allows us to understand why necessity envelops contingency without undercutting o r eliminating it. Thus, I disagree with Baptist’s suggestion that the chapter o n ‘actuality’"...gathers up i n its necessity not only contingency itself b u t , more radically, even the contingent."8 If this were the case, i t would mean

that H e g e l ’ s Science of

Logic has an irreducible

real, a reminder of what there is, at the very heart of the interplay

between

e sse n ce a n d c o n c e p t .

This

w ould

imply,

further, that Hegel’s Logic could only be a piecemeal dialectic, o n e in constant and perpetual need of being reminded of what e x i s t s . B u t , as we have s e e n , Hegel’s procedure i n the L o g i c d o e s n o t ignore the irreducibility o f o t h e r n e s s , o f a l t e r i t y , o r o f

what is; yet neither does he confuse such otherness with ne gation. The Science of Logic reconstructs otherness i n te rms o f negation and double negation s o that we c a n take n o n c o n t i n -

gent otherness as understandable. Based as i t is o n the total domain of categorial content, and presenting as i t does a total reconstruction

in terms o f t h o u g h t , H e g e l ’ s procedure

replaces

irreducible otherness with ‘reducibles’, o r rational resolvables. I n the e n d , t h e n , I disagree with Baptist’s final s u g g e s t i o n that Hegel’s ‘actuality’ can be taken as a "touchstone" ( i n h e r

8Baptist,

138, my emphasis.

DEBORAH G . CHAFFIN

152

word)

for

contemporary

p h i l o s o p h i c a l sensibility—one

which

s e e k s " ..in difference and alterity, the constitution of reality."9 Hegel’s. analysis of ‘actuality, far from introducing a place for such irreducible difference rather shows the conceptual def i c i e n c y o f absolute necessity o r necessary a c t u a l i t y .

The "suspense"

of Hegel’s procedure here is a temporary one, o n e appearing i n the process of the dialectic itself. Thus, i t is not "philosophizing" which is unresolved, b u t only this stage of the categorial explanation of the comprehensive categorial dialectic.

San Diego State University

9Baptist,

1 4 3 ; m y emphasis.

Hegel's Science of Logi : lronies of t h e Understanding by Joseph C. Flay

It is generally agreed that the understanding and its rigid distinctions are crucial to Hegel’s whole procedure in the Science of Logic: the force and power o f the negativity generated in the kind of thinking which Hegel designates "the thinking of the understanding" is not something to be disdained and discarded but is, rather, to be worked through and preserv-

ed.1 But this sort of thinking is radically opposed to, and in t u r n is opposed b y , the speculative thought rooted in what Hegel understands as "reason." In this paper I want to explore the

relation between these two kinds o f thinking as i t appears in his Logic.2 This relationship involves the movement which Hegel calls an Aufhebung, and so I will that very troublesome concept.

also be e x p l o r i n g the nature o f

Traditionally, the attempt to understand this relation has been undertaken b y means o f a logical analysis. For some i t is to b e made in formal-logical terms, for others in a less formal,

but still logical manner.

For reasons I will give below, I do not

think that these attempts, o r a n y attempts like them, have even the possibility of success. I will argue that i t is rhetoric that actually governs the logic o f the L o g i c . If I am r i g h t about

this, and since for Hegel method is not something external to content b u t i s , rather, the order implicit

in the content itself,

what emerges is the view that rhetoric has a metaphysical

status

as well as a place in discourse.

1There are different sorts o f a t t a c k on t h e understanding w h i c h at t h e same t i m e praise i t s p o w e r , b u t what concerns u s most d i r e c t l y here is t h e way in Hegel makes which d i a l e c t i c a l reason depends upon t h e abstract understanding. i t clear t h a t in order t o practice t h e dialectic in both i t s negative and positive hold fast concepts in t h e i r stages, one ” m u s t first practise abstract thinking, ( L o g i k I , 27; 5 6 - 5 7 ) determinateness and learn t o cognise by means of them.” P h a n . , 27—28; 18-19. See also, for example,

21 in Hegel’s I find i s definitive t h a t t h e relationship will n o t b e claiming system in general o r even in other parts of his system. However, I think t h a t in t h e latter. one would find t h e same sort of relationship

153

JOSEPH C . FLAY

154

Finally, I will suggest that acceptance of this interpretation s h e d s l i g h t o n H e g e l ’ s c l a i m t h a t h i s p h i l o s o p h y marks n o t o n l y

the culmination of the tradition that began with the pre-Socratics, but also the beginning of a new age. This will indicate a continuity where most who today think about the question of the culmination hold that there is simply a rupture. l. Rhetoric, Logic, Force, and Necessity

If we are to understand Hegel’s analyses and discussions in the Logic, i t is necessary to begin b y asking what it is that g i v e s t h e m t h e i r force; for i n th e e n d , i t i s the force o f the a r g u m e n t and n o t m e r e v a l i d i t y , w h i c h matters p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . 3

That is to say, i t is one thing to have validity, another to be accepted

as " s o m e t h i n g t h a t matters"; for t h e r e are countless

valid arguments that are irrelevant o r for other reasons lack force i n a given situation. A n d if something does not matter, then it also has no necessity in any relevant way. Let us begin with the general nature of the content of the Logic. The discussions contained in this work offer a rational-speculative critique of the ways in which the traditional logic and metaphysics—the logic and metaphysics of the understand-

ing—deal with their respective problems.4 Two things are to be noted about this critique.

First, it is not offered simply as a

negative c r i t i q u e , b u t i s meant to b e p o s i t i v e as w e l l , i . e . to lead us o u t o f the negative c r i t i q u e into a p o s i t i v e construction. (Logik I , 2 6 - 2 7 ; 5 5 - 5 7 ) The c r i t i q u e is to s h o w a dialectic i n

the categories themselves, a dialectic that will demonstrate both what has been wrong in the tradition and what should be said in place of the traditional accounts. Second, the critique is not m e r e l y e x t e r n a l c r i t i q u e , i . e . c r i t i c i s m t h a t s i m p l y takes a p o i n t

of view other than the point of view governing the position being examined.

This form o f c r i t i q u e is t o b e avoided because

3 T h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

are n o t i m p o r t a n t .

I am

only arguing t h a t necessity and force cannot be determined o n logical grounds alone. Validity gives u s a necessary b u t not a sufficient condition for necessity and force.

4 Hegel makes this clear by making t h e central issue of the Introduction t o t h e Science of Logic t h e explanation of t h e need- for such a critique.

Hegel’s

Science a t L o g i c : Ironies 0f the Understanding

155

i t involves b e g g i n g the q u e s t i o n w i t h w h a t is being c r i t i c i z e d . 5 The dialectical critique o f the L o g i c has its f o r c e , rather, i n the

fact that it shows that a given comprehension of reality—or some aspect o f s u c h a comprehension—turns o n i t s e l f o r is s e l f - r e f u t -

ing. In dialectical critique the critique "counts" i n the eyes of those criticized because it shows that what they hold to be true is self-refuting in terms of their o w n standards and the standards o f reality to which t h e y a p p e a l . This is the o n e characteristic that a l l d i a l e c t i c s h a r e s , from Plato u n t i l t o d a y . 6

The first point, then, is that the general content of the Logic involves (a) traditional positions of the understanding concerning various categories held to be definitive of the nature of thought and of being, and (b) a dialectical analysis of these positions which shows that they are self-refuting because of their o w n dialectical nature. Finding the locus of the force and necessity of the dialectic, then, involves seeking an answer to the question of how this self -refutation is brought about. No formal-logical answer to this q u e s t i o n w i l l s e r v e o u r p u r p o s e ; for a n y form a l - l o g i c a l response is b o u n d to a s i m p l e t h e o r y o f i m p l i c a t i o n and to a sense o f analytical d i s t i n c t i o n that t h e d i a l e c t i c s h a t t e r s .

If one argues that there may be some as yet unknown formal logic that will give us the answer, or that the logic of Hegel’s Logic is to be treated in a more intuitive way, the response to t h i s is t h a t , i n n o case does l o g i c d e t e r m i n e

5For

a thorough

th e force o f a n

discussion of this see Henry W . J o h n s t o n e , J r . , P h i l o s o p h y

a n d Argument (University P a r k : The Pennsylvania S t a t e University Press, 1959). M o s t of t h e criticisms of Hegel s i n c e h i s d e a t h have involved a b e g g i n g o f t h e either on a simple rejection of Hegel’s q u e s t i o n since most have been based presuppositions o r on a c r i t i q u e w h i c h involves s i m p l y p u t t i n g forth a n o t h e r s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem at h a n d . Recent work of " p o s t - m o d e r n i s t s , ” h o w e v e r ,

whatever else may be defective about their approach t o Hegel (e.g. basing their c r i t i q u e o n u n t e n a b l e v i e w s of w h a t Hegel s a i d ) , are n o t s u b j e c t t o t h i s c r i t i c i s m . I n s o far as they ” d e c o n s t r u c t " Hegel’s basic presuppositions, t h e y have some version o f a d i a l e c t i c a l approach t o Hegel. am

looking

at

the

differences

between

various

forms

of d i a l e c t i c , t h i s

important identity is often overlooked. In Plato’s Socratic dialogues, t h e original theses are always prepared by t h e interlocutors of S o c r a t e s . S i m i l a r l y , i n Marx t h e t h e s e s , b o t h i n h i s independent critiques ( e . g . T h e G e r m a n I d e o l o g y ) and i n C a p i t a l , are t a k e n u p by Marx from capitalist theoreticians and practitioners. The positions t a k e n u p , i n b o t h Marx and P l a t o , ”refute“ themselves. W i t h o u t t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , n o p o s i t i o n c a n be called " d i a l e c t i c a l . "

JOSEPH C . FLAY

156

argument.7 One can mount all the valid arguments one wishes, i n whatever

logical form

one w i s h e s , b u t none o f them

will

necessarily count for any purely logical reasons as having any force in a given situation o r under given conditions. In respect to Hegel’s system in particular, it has been made clear many times that if one seeks logical necessity in the formal-logical sense, sometimes one succeeds and sometimes one fails; but most often it is the latter, since b u t slight reflection can show alternative

moves that w o u l d have b e e n p o s s i b l e .

This logical

possibility of other paths not only diminishes the force of Hegel’s

argument,

but

as

well

removes

the

all-important

necessity which he seeks and claims to have found. One must therefore look elsewhere than i n the logical structure itself for the necessity and force of the dialectic: necessity cannot be pure logical necessity. If one looks beyond the purely logical for the source of the necessity and force, one finds first of all that what gives force, what makes an argument relevant, is a matter of specific content.

The a r g u m e n t m u s t address a n issue t h a t is a n is s ue

for those involved.

If ‘being’ o r ‘essence’ o r ‘difference’ are

i s s u e s , then they m u s t be addressed.

O n th e o t h e r h a n d , i f

‘history’ o r ‘gravity’ are not issues, then it is irrelevant to discuss them and any discussion, no matter how valid the arguments, will have neither force nor necessity i n the context. But this source of relevance is b y itself not enough; i t only g i v e s us the possibility o f force and necessity. W h a t is n e e d e d as well is so m e t h i n g that w i l l make avoidance o f the relevant

issue o r issues impossible.

It is here that the matter of a

rhetorical framework comes into play; for i t i s , b y d e f i n i t i o n , the rhetorical framework that determines w h e t h e r o r not the

argument and its issues are persuasively addressed, i.e. i t is here that it is determined whether o r not the discussion really counts for something. There a r e , c l e a r l y , degrees o f persuasiveness. B u t here we are s e e k i n g a persuasiveness which is i n e s c a p a b l e , w h i c h has

irresistable force and necessity; for the dialectic of Hegel’s Logic c l a i m s j u s t s u c h a n e c e s s i t y . W e are also i n t e r e s t e d , o f c o u r s e , i n w h a t Plato referred t o as "good rhetoric," i . e . i n a r h e t o r i c a l framework w h i c h is n o t merely p e r s u a s i v e , b u t w h i c h involves

7For

argument

a good example o f a more i n t u i t i v e approach a n d a very forceful for purely logical n e c e s s i t y , see for example J o h n B u r b i d g e , O n H e g e l ' s

Logic (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981).

Hegel’s

Science 0 : Logic: Ironies of the Understanding 157

truth and validity as w e l l . I want to argue now that o n l y a rhetoric governed b y the trope o f irony w i l l g i v e the required

necessity i n o u r case, and that therefore the rhetorical framework o f H e g e l ’ s dialectic is i n general governed b y i r o n y . 8

2. Irony and the The Science of Logic I will b e using the term ‘irony’ i n o n e of its generally accepted meanings: a situation that contains o r shows the incongruity of an outcome contrary to what was or might have been expected, recognizing this not i n the form of sarcasm, b u t as the nondeliberate emergence of a meaning different from and often the direct opposite o f the meaning i n t e n d e d . 9

Irony is

unique among the tropes and other forms that can govern a discussion. I n other frameworks, there is always a problem of truth and a question of the degree of force and necessity to be attached to the discussion. There is a question of the a p propriateness of the framework o r of the use to which the framework is put. For example, if metaphor is employed, there is always the question o f the justification o f the m e t a p h o r used

8The relation between dialectic and irony has l o n g been n o t e d , beginning w i t h P l a t o . I t was important for H e g e l ' s contemporaries as w e l l , especially i n F i c h t e , Schleiermacher, S c h l e g e l , and Solger. See Rene W e l l e k , " T h e German Philosophers: Solger, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, H e g e l , " i n A Histogy of

Modern Criticism:

1750-1950, e d . R. Wellek (New Haven:

Yale University

P r e s s , 1 9 5 5 ) ; and G u s t a v E . M u e l l e r , " S o l g e r ’s A e s t h e t i c s , A Key t o Hegel (Irony

and Dialectic)," in Corona: Studies in Celebration of t h e Eightieth Birthday of

Samuel Singer (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1941), 212- 27. F o r H e g e l ’ s o w n discussion s e e , for example, Philosophy of R i g h t , § 1 4 0 , where h e writes t h a t Solger " h a d philosophical insight and so seized u p o n , emphasized, and retained only that part of Schlegel's view [of irony] which was dialectic i n t h e s t r i c t sense, i . e . d i a l e c t i c as the pulsating drive of speculative i n q u i r y . " F o r o t h e r c i t a t i o n s , see t h e "Hegel Lexicon," i n S fi m t l i c h e W e r k e , v o l s . 2 5 - 2 6 ( S t u t t g a r t :

F r . Frommanns Verlag, 1977) under "Ironie," and ”Solger.”

For more recent

discussions of irony and d i a l e c t i c , see Kenneth B u r k e , A Grammar of M o t i v e s New Y o r k : George Braziller, 1 9 5 5 ) , 4 0 2 - 4 3 , 5 0 3 - 1 7 ; Haydn W h i t e , M e t a h i s t o g

Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1973) and Tropics of Discourse

Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1978). A l l of t h e s e works are insightful, as are Hegel’s own reflections. B u t w h a t they all m i s s , and w h a t t h e present essay will hope t o s h o w , is t h a t there is a

constructive, as well as a destructive form of irony. I t is the former t h a t will take us beyond what Hegel himself understood about his own dialectic in its speculative form. 9In t h e case of absolute idealism rhetoric i s of t h e same general domain as Consequently, spiritualised rhetoric, l i k e i s logic, i . e . t h e domain of s p i r i t . to metaphysics and ontology rather spiritualised l o g i c , i s something t h a t belongs t h a n t o an i n s u l a r subjectivity. I t was t h e purported subjectivity of irony t o w h i c h Hegel o b j e c t e d .

JOSEPH C . PLAY

158

and of the degree to which the metaphor applies i n the parThis question o f appropriateness o r fittingness ticular case. essentially weakens, to o n e degree o r a n o t h e r , the persuasiveness

o f any discussion, and thus weakens its force and makes problematic a claim to necessity. But in the case of irony this question o f appropriateness

does n o t and c a n n o t a p p e a r .

With irony (in the nonsarcastic sense) relevance as well as truth is dealt with in a unique way. Irony presents us with a framework within which the truth with which we are concerned is not a truth related to something "objective" o r beyond the discussion itself. Rather, the locus of truth is the very truth claimed b y the position under examination.

This does n o t m e a n

that we assume to be true what is claimed to be true i n the sense that the claim refers to something

which is actual and

which we have verified. With irony we begin b y accepting as true and justified what is claimed to be true and justified, and only for the reasons that are given in the justification. Thus, what goes on i n a framework of irony is the relating of claims to their justifications, n o t claims to the "things" to which those

claims refer us. In the case of the latter sort of relation, there are always difficulties in establishing truth; in the case o f the former—of relating claims and their justifications accepted as true—we have no such difficulties; for truth is to begin with accepted as established.

I f i t is n o t , then w e do n ot have i r o n y .

But because this is the locus of truth, the kind of relevance and appropriateness belonging to a discussion framed i n irony is also radically different from discussions rhetorically framed i n other ways. What is discussed is discussed in terms of the position originally claimed to be true. Assuming that the claimant is serious about the claims, and thus that the claims matter, this makes the discussion of the claims and their justifications

relevant i n t h e strongest p o s s i b l e w a y .

To l o o k

again at metaphor for a contrast, a critique in these terms is one which takes the original position away from its original form b y s u g g e s t i n g and a r g u i n g

that the o r i g i n a l form

was

deficient

because there were aspects of the state of affairs being referred to which had been s i m p l y overlooked. The metaphor carries us away from the o r i g i n a l . W i t h i r o n y , however, this is n o t t h e

case. With irony one offers a critique which shows that the original form of the original position itself has consequences and outcomes w h i c h are d i r e c t l y i n o p p o s i t i o n to the c o n s e q u e n -

ces and outcomes intended. Instead of being drawn away from the original position—a move which can defuse necessity and force just because the person i n the original position does not

Hegel’s Science 0 1 L o g i c : Ironies of th e Understanding

159

want to be drawn away—one is more deeply implanted i n the original p o s i t i o n . A s one is more d e e p l y implanted i n the original p o s i t i o n , there is necessity and force to the c r i t i q u e because there i s at stake a claim that m a t t e r s . W i t h i r o n y , t h e n , b o t h the truth claims and the appr0priateness claims are s i m p l y

inherited from the original position. This makes the acceptance o f the critique inescapable so l o n g as and to t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h the u n e x p e c t e d a n d perverse o u t c o m e s are d e m o n s t r a t e d o n n o

grounds other than those of the original position. It is this sense of irony that I want to suggest is contained in the Logic and bestows necessity upon the advances made there.

If o n e l o o k s to i r o n y , o n e w i l l find a n e c e s s i t y governed

not b y logical possibility or formal rules of validity, but b y a rhetorical structure that captures the original thesis and forces it into a reconsideration of itself i n light of its o w n content. To say this i n another w a y , w h a t g i v e s o n e n o t o n l y the n e g a t i o n ,

b u t as well the negation of the negation, is the particular content contained in the original thesis, i n so far as this particular content presents its o w n irony.

There are two levels of irony present i n Hegel’s dialectic, o n e d e s t r u c t i v e , the o t h e r c o n s t r u c t i v e : the first o c c u r s i n t h e

primary negation of the original positive term, the second i n To b e g i n w i t h , the first o r the n e g a t i o n o f this n e g a t i o n . p o s i t i v e m o m e n t o f the d i a l e c t i c i n the L o g i c is o n e i n w h i c h a

category is taken u p for consideration. The category is to b e considered just because i t has b e e n h e l d b y the tradition e i t h e r to define the a b s o l u t e o r to b e an i n t e g r a l part o f s o m e one category that d e f i n e s the a b s o l u t e . ( H e r e , o f c o u r s e , the a b s o l u t e means the u l t i m a t e u n i t y o f w h a t - i s s u c h t h a t there is n o n e e d to g o beyond i t o r to look for a more fundamental

category.) This first moment of positivity is important, not only because i t p r e s e n t s a c a t e g o r y , b u t also because t h e c a t e g o r y p r e s e n t e d is a c a t e g o r y o f the t r a d i t i o n , i . e . o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . A s a c a t e g o r y o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g i t i s , i n terms o f c o n t e n t , a c a t e g o r y that m a t t e r s . This g i v e s us the o r i g i n a l s o u r c e o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f force and n e c e s s i t y . What further d e e p e n s the relevance is that the e x a m i n a t i o n o f the c a t e g o r y i n q u e s t i o n proceeds o n the basis o f the d e s c r i p t i o n o f i t and t h e c l a i m s made for i t , n o t b y H e g e l , b u t

b y those i n the tradition who held it to be absolute or to b e a crucial moment of the absolute. This examination leads to and i n part constitutes the second or dialectical moment proper, and evidences a self-destructive contradiction in the category as

JOSEPH C . FLAY

160

defined and described. I t i s here that, as i n the dialectic practiced b y Socrates, the claim either "stands the test o f an elenchos" o r "refutes itself ." I f the latter occurs i n the frame— work governed b y irony, this means that i t has been s h o w n , by means of criteria intrinsic to the original position itself, that the

claim of absoluteness made for the category in question involves us in a self -destructive contradiction in some specific, determinate way. W e do not here have refutation

o n l y i n a logical s e n s e .

What gives force and necessity to this refutation is the fact that the emergence of negation in the form of self-destructive contradiction occurs within the framework of irony. It is at this point in the examination that the first kind of irony occurs. The rhetorical framework of irony gives us a necessarily negation

self-destructive

which

has

absolute

force

because

within it we find a determinate negation such that something explicitly denied i n the original position is in fact entailed by the original position. The irony is that precisely what was to be avoided, denied, o r excluded, m u s t , for totally unforeseen reasons, be accepted, affirmed, o r i n c l u d e d . Thus, s i n c e the original position had its source i n a philosophy o f the u n d e r -

standing, we have a logical refutation of the understanding that "matters" to the understanding itself, n o t because o f the l o g i c alone, b u t primarily because o f the irony which frames the

logical contradiction. The result is that either the original must be modified

i n such

a way

i t w i l l avoid

that

the ironical

self -destructiveness that was implicit in it, or the project of the understanding must fail. If Hegel’s dialectic stopped here, it would be very much like, if not identical to, the Socratic dialectic. But it doesn’t. Hegel notes that a refutation is always determinate, i.e. that it is always

a destructive

critique

in

respect

to one

o r more

specific, limited points or aspects of the original position. The original position is n o w , so to s p e a k , d a m a g e d ,

b u t remains

nevertheless. Since one is confronted with a self-destructive ironical turn originating in the understanding’s own position, and since one is, i n the case of Hegel, in agreement with the understanding’s

desire to find the a b s o l u t e , one m u s t therefore

not simply surrender after the dialectical critique, b u t must

Hegel’s

figignce 91 Logic: Ironies of the Understanding 161

search for a remedy to the situation.10 This move involves taking the understanding and its power seriously. The s i g nificance of the move beyond this first negative moment lies in Hegel’s commitment

to the preservation

o f the power o f the

understanding. That is to say, the speculative moment and its ironical turn will involve the preservation

o f the power of the

understanding in the sense that ironically, b y the speculative turn against the understanding, the project of the understanding will be saved from its own self -destruction. But in the search for a remedy, a second form of irony appears. What we find is that what will allow us to avoid the determinate, self -destructive negation just encountered is either acceptance

o f something

else repugnant

to the understanding,

i.e. acceptance of some other element of description and definition that the understanding seeks to avoid, o r acceptance of what was originally to be rejected. Here we try to avoid the first sort of contradiction that goes with the first instance of irony, b y accepting a second sort of contradiction inherent in a second instance o f irony.

This second sort o f contradiction

is

not negative and does not lead to the self-destruction of the original

position

but, rather,

is positive, i . e . i t leads to the

acceptance of something that will "save" the original project, that will accomplish

the original purpose.

I t is therefore

a

constructive move, and it is so because framed i n irony: one finds that if one accepts what was to be rejected o r something else which had been j u d g e d unacceptable

to the understanding,

one will be able to carry on in the search for the absolute idea. The i r o n y , t h e n , is that the "correction" o f the failure resulting from the first contradiction is to be found, n o t i n the s i m p l e

removal o f contradiction, but in a second contradiction. This i s , t h e n , a rich form o f irony; for not only are we now led to unexpected outcomes i n specific instances o f the categories, b u t

as well to the general irony that contradiction—something repugnant to all philosophies of the understanding—is to be necessarily accepted if the original, self -destructive contradiction is to be avoided. Constructive contradiction is the only cure for destructive contradiction, and the acceptance of destructive irony as something leading to the acceptance of constructive irony is the only way to achieve the goals of the understanding itself. Finally, in the stage following the speculative moment

10This

i s an important

presupposition

that Hegel shares w i t h t h e tradition

he is criticising, but one that I do not share. See my criticism of the presupposition in the final chapter of my Hegel’s Quest for Certainty (Albany: State

University of New York Press, 1984).

162

JOSEPH C . FLAY

characterized b y this second form o f i r o n y , one finds and takes u p a category from the tradition that w i l l embrace the c o n s t r u c -

tive contradition and formulate a n e w claim to absoluteness o r a new claim to something that is in part constitutive of a b soluteness.

All this has been rather abstract. I now turn to an example from Hegel’s Logic that will exhibit this dialectical method, and then indicate briefly how the process continues.

3. Being and Irony I I shall choose the category ‘ b e i n g ’ for m y e x a m p l e . c o u l d have c h o s e n any o f the c a t e g o r i e s , b u t I have several

reasons for choosing this one.11 The first is that a certain negativity is introduced with the discussion of the category ‘being’ that is crucial for an understanding of what follows. Secondly, there has been as much, if not more controversy over this category and just what the movement to ‘nothing’ and ‘becoming’ mean, than there has over any of the other categories. This makes it a bit easier to judge whether o r not what I am g o i n g to s u g g e s t is v i a b l e . Finally, i n the case o f the three categories—‘being’, ‘ n o t h i n g ’ , and ‘ b e c o m i n g ’ — H e g e l is rather less verbose than i n his discussion, s a y , o f identity o r o f a ny one o f the forms o f the i d e a , and t h i s lends itself to greater clarity i n the sense that we c a n b e t t e r s ee j u s t where the dialectical m o v e m e n t is o c c u r r i n g . I w i l l a l s o indicate the way that i r o n y is involved i n the r e l a t i o n between the category ‘ b e i n g ’ and the

very first discussion of the "Doctrine of Being," the discussion o f what constitutes a p r o p e r b e g i n n i n g .

The category ‘being’ is the first, and seemingly most natural candidate for the absolute. As the goddess told Parmenides when d i s c u s s i n g the three ways o r h o d o i , to p h i l o s o p h i z e i n this way is the o n l y way to p h i l o s o p h i z e p r o p e r l y . " I t

is" [esti] can and must be said of absolutely everything, without exception. On this ground, both nonbeing and becoming must be denied any reality; for the first is a self-contradictory category (either i n the Parmenidean form "it is not" [ouk em] o r , i n later philosophers, in the form nonbeing), and becoming again involves the acceptance of the self -contradictory category ‘nonbeing’, b u t this time compounding the error b y relating it 111 a m presently w o r k i n g o n A Companion t o H e g e l ’ s Logic, w h i c h I will work through t h e Logic i n a s y s t e m a t i c w a y a l o n g t h e l i n e s suggested i n t h e present e s s a y .

Hegel’s

Science of Logig: Ironies of the Understanding 163

to the t r u e , absolute category ‘ b e i n g ’ . Three t h i n g s are to b e accomplished here, according to the understanding: ( 1 ) we are

to be given the absolute method (Parmenides) o r the absolute category (most o f the rest of the tradition); (2) we are to be able to distinguish what-is from what-is-not o r pure being from pure nonbeing; and (3) we are to be shown that i t is necessary either to reject becoming o r to relegate it to a status of illusion, mere appearance, o r s o m e t h i n g derivative and secondary.

This

is the full thesis about being, and the three points are integral to the articulation of the category ‘being’. However, an examination of ‘pure being’ as i t has been described and defined here reveals that it turns out in fact to be indistinguishable from ‘pure nonbeing’ o r ‘pure nothing’. Irony informs o u r first contradiction, the negation of the original position: if we accept the definition and description of the absolute

as

being’, then

‘pure

we

have

also

accepted

the

definition and description of the absolute as ‘pure nonbeing’; for their respective definitions and descriptions are identical.

The

attempt completely to exclude nonbeing from being leads not only to including it in being, but to making i t identical with being. According to the tenets of the understanding itself, this is a self-destructive contradiction; for ‘A’ is to be absolutely nonidentical to ‘ - A ’ , b u t turns o u t to be identical to i t .

Thus,

b y the definition and description originating in the philosophy of the understanding itself, its conception of the absolute as pure

b e i n g is ironically unacceptable

understanding.

to a phi1050phy o f the

The philosopher of the understanding has

refuted himself o r herself i n the very process o f attempting to refute j u s t the position one now has to accept: ‘ b e i n g ’ and

‘nonbeing’ are identical.12 This is the irony which makes it necessary for the understanding to accept the dialectic: the d i a l e c t i c matters, the necessity is relevant and therefore has f o r c e , because i t involves the self - r e f utation and s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n o f the thesis a b o u t b e i n g given b y the understanding itself. The necessity remains i n spite o f the fact that o t h e r paths o f

reasoning could have been taken; for the revelation of c o n t r a d i c t i o n at the heart o f what really matters to the understand-

ing makes these other possibilities irrelevant.

12Thus,

one cannot

h o l d , at t h i s stage of t h e argument,

that

” t h e same"

means "belong together.” It means ”are identical" in a strict sense. However, when we move t o t h e next irony and its constructive contradiction, " t h e same" will mean " b e l o n g t o g e t h e r . " O n e can s a y , t h e n , t h a t i n order t o avoid i d e n t i t y o f w h a t i s different one m u s t , for Hegel, embrace the belonging together of what is different.

JOSEPH C . FLAY

164

But this does not make the proffered category ‘being’ simply a matter of nonsense, to be rejected as a category. The into

must n o w , again o f necessity, come

moment

speculative

play. One must look—and this is the meaning of the term ‘speculation’ here—one must look at or inspect the particular way that the refutation of the original position concerning pure and

being occurred,

t h e n determine

the

how one can avoid

contradiction that has emerged from it. Again, because of the irony b u t n o t directly involving an ironical turn, there is necessity to this move. Because the self -refutation matters due to the destructive nature of the irony which leads one to equate being with nonbeing, and because the project of establishing the nature of the absolute in terms of being is central to the understanding, that same original, destructive irony leads the understanding necessarily to seek a determination of being which will satisfy the need to distinguish being from nonbeing. The destructive irony structures not only the kind of relevance the dialectical argument has for the understanding, b u t as well structures the connection between the dialectical, destructive moment

of

the

dialectic

and

the

constructive

speculative,

moment of the dialectic. There is no arbitrary movement here, b u t rather movement in a necessary direction. A s before, i t is clear that, abstractly considered out of context, other moves could be imagined. But because what alone matters here is the removal of the self-destructive contradiction, as what mattered i n the first ironical t u r n was acceptance o f the force and

necessity of imaginable

the

self-destructive

moves

are

simply

contradiction,

irrelevant

and

the

thus

other

lack

all

necessity and force. The original position sought to determine the absolute as being. ‘Being’ was to give us all that which is and to completely exclude that which is not (in a total and not merely relative sense o f "is n o t " ) . I t was to allow us fundamentally

to differen-

tiate what-is from what-is-not. The goal of allowing us fundamentally to differentiate what-is from what-is-not was to b e accomplished

other.

b y c o m p l e t e l y ex clu d in g

the two from

each

We can see at this point, t h e n , that the self-refutation

occurred

because

to dissociate

completely

what-is-not

from

what-is forces us to identify what-is with w h a t - i s - n o t , and this dissociation is the source of the ironical turn. That is to say, to understand

‘ b e i n g ’ as designating

that

which is w i t h o u t

any

further determination—for any determination would involve us with negation and thus with what-is-not—is to make it c o m pletely indeterminate and thus indistinguishable from what-is-not or nonbeing.

That

is the determinate

character

o f the

Hegel’s

Science 9 1 L o g i c : Ironies of the Understanding

165

negation that emerged i n the first movement of the dialectic here.

Accordingly, what must therefore be avoided is the absolute separation—the absolute nonrelation—of being to its opposite, nonbeing; for i t is that nonrelation which is the source

of the ironical self -destruction. In this way, then, the speculative moment is given its direction and we discover the resolution of our problem, governed again b y irony: to not separate the

two i n order to avoid self -destructive contradiction is to relate them, and the category that relates them is ‘becoming’. I t is to ‘becoming’ that we and the understanding must turn if we are to avoid the self -destruction. Second irony: ‘becoming’ was first held to designate e i t h e r something to be totally r e j e c t e d , o r to

be relegated to the status of the illusory, or to be made dependent

upon ‘ b e i n g ’ . However, we n o w see that o n l y i f we

take being as becoming, only if we define and describe the category ‘being’ in terms of what has been traditionally held to be the definition and description of the category ‘becoming’, will we avoid the specific and determinate

cause o f the f i r s t ,

self -destructive contradiction that emerged from the category ‘being’. If being is becoming, then there are two ways that being is clearly distinguished from nothing. The first is in the element of becoming that involves the generation and sustenance of what-is,

the second is the moment o f the deterioration

and

destruction of what-is. The first is the movement from nonbeing to being; the second is the movement from being to nonbeing. ‘Being’ thus includes, but is differentiated from ‘ n o n b e i n g ’ i n two distinct ways.

Inherent i n this c o n s t r u c t i v e

irony involving the acceptance of becoming as the truth of b e i n g , there is also a corollary i r o n y . When b eing is accepted as becoming, nonbeing turns o u t to "logically" precede b e i n g ; for

becoming is a movement from nothing to nothing. later b e underscored

This will

in the p h i l o s o p h y o f nature, when H e g e l

identifies time as becoming in terms of externality, (Enz. (1830), § 2 5 9 ) and then argues that the o r i g i n o f time is the future while its goal is the past. (Enz. ( 1 8 3 0 ) , § 2 6 1 ) To

be sure,

the category

something pure, without relation a defect in determining being as with pure being we came into tradiction. What we have now framed

within

a constructive

‘ b e i n g ’ no l o n g e r

designates

to anything else, b u t that is not becoming; for when we began ironical self-destructive conis a constructive contradiction

irony,

an

intelligible

unity

of

opposites, a unity which preserves the opposites as opposites. Thus, a l t h o u g h nothing and becoming were not to be considered

JOSEPH C . FLAY

166

real o r fundamental

i n the first d e f i n i t i o n

and d e s c r i p t i o n o f

being, they now ironically turn o u t to be what is real and fundamental about being. The understanding can and must accept this contradiction as constructive rather than destructive because the contradiction

i n fact preserves as a possibility the

whole intention and project of a metaphysics of the understanding: to get to what is absolutely fundamental concerning what-is through the establishment of the difference between being and n o n b e i n g . B e c o m i n g as a category g i v e s us a stable whole that We are is the framework for internal, qualitative difference. not left with the unregulated chaos predicted and feared b y those who would i n s i s t o n p r e s e r v i n g the purity o f b e i n g i n

some form o r other; o n the contrary we have a conception of what-is

that reflects both its u n i t y a n d its internal difference

and that gives us o u r only chance of comprehending being. We are left with b u t one t a s k , t h e n , i n r e s p e c t to this stage

of the Science of Logic". the positing of what has resulted as a new definition of the absolute. What we have when w e consider being as becoming is Dasein, determinate being, being-there, existence.

W e have l e f t b e h i n d as a n illusion pure

being, Sein als solches, and now understand the absolute to be a being-there that involves difference. The task at this point, then, is to come to a comprehension of this new category, Dasein;

for as a r e s u l t o f th e d e t e r m i n a t e

negation a nd

the

negation of that negation, we have come to a more powerful and more c o m p l e x c o m p r e h e n s i o n

o f th e nature o f w h a t - i s .

Before leaving this d i s c u s s i o n , i t must be noted that t h e ironical turns i n v o l v e d i n the category o f ‘ p u r e b e i n g ’ generate

an irony i n the relationship between the discussion of being a n d the discussion o f ‘ b e g i n n i n g ’ that preceded i t . I n what is actually the o p e n i n g section o f the "Doctrine o f B e i n g , " we are given a n involved argument that the category ‘ b e i n g ’ m u s t b e

the first category to be considered. Not only nonbeing and becoming, but numerous other categories are rejected. Upon a c c e p t a n c e o f these arguments and t h e adoption o f the p r o c e d u r e that accepts ‘ b e i n g ’ as the first c a t e g o r y , and b y means o f

the subsequent examination of the claims of ‘pure being’ which we have just discussed, we come to see that it is a "false start," that ‘becoming’ is the true meaning of this category and thus the real beginning. Thus, after all of the argument about the necessity of beginning with pure being, the result is to find that i t i s , as a r t i c u l a t e d , at b e s t an abstract b e g i n n i n g , that b e i n g as

such, together with nonbeing, is only a n element of the real beginning. But this irony leads to a second. The meaning and

Hegel’s

Science a t L o g i c : Ironies of t h e Understanding

167

force of determinacy, which we gain by adopting the description and definition of ‘becoming’ as the true or actual definition and description of ‘being’, is lost when ‘determinate being’ is taken as a simple, immediate beginning; for the need for and meaning of determinacy derives only from the lack found i n indeterminacy. The truth, then, is that the category ‘becoming’ gives us a mediated beginning, and that the way that it is mediated must be retained as part of its force and meaning. Thus the final irony here is that, i n order to arrive at the significance of the immediacy of ‘being’—its status as being "logically first"—one must understand its mediated nature. This dialectic structured by irony continues as the general category ‘being’ is discussed in its more determinate forms of ‘quality’, ‘ q u a n t i t y ’ , and ‘measure’. On the broadest view o f this discussion, the various arguments o f the understanding concerning the importance o f the distinction between quality and quantity, and the consequent ways that they had b e e n held a p a r t , are s h o w n to lead to the general ironic situation that one loses the d i s t i n c t i o n , i . e . one finds o n e s e l f i n the situation that

quality becomes quantity and then quantity becomes quality. Their unification in measure is the only way that one can preserve the distinctions and y e t n o t cancel t h e m o u t t h r o u g h mutual destructive contradiction. A g a i n , the contradiction we

reach in measure is a constructive o n e , one which preserves what the understanding would in fact lose if i t did not accept contradiction in its constructive form. A discussion of the sections o n essence and the c o n c e p t would reveal the same presense o f b o t h a destructive and a constructive i r o n y until we come to the final discussion o f dialectic i n the category o f the absolute idea. The conclusion to which we are ultimately driven is this. To posit a l i n e a r

structure to thought and being is self-destructive.

Only the

dialectic i n the unity o f thought, in the u n i t y o f b e i n g , and i n

the unity of thought and being can give us what the original nondialectical understanding wanted, but has now been shown to he never capable of achieving. To adapt a line from Plato’s Gorgias, the philosophers o f the understanding

had done almost

nothing they wanted to d o , b u t had done what seemed best to them.

13Plato,

Gorgjaa 466d.

JOSEPH C . FLAY

168

4 . The Ultimate Irony: From C l o s u r e to Openness

Hegel understood himself as standing both at the end of one epoch and at the b e g i n n i n g o f another.

A s a c h i l d , o r more

precisely an infant of the new age, he neither understood nor could foresee where his reconstructive retrieval of the tradition would take us i n its o p e n i n g o f n e w questions and new metho-

doi. The final irony is that Hegel’s system carries within itself its own destructive ironies, and demands the acceptance of constructive

irony i f this intention to escape the prison o f the

narrow understanding is ultimately to find success. Hegel’s philosophy, it is true, involves us with a certain kind o f closure. However, it is a closure which is dialectical i n nature, which constantly

opens

up

new

categories

and

developments

by

working o n and out of itself. The ultimate irony is that closure can be truly achieved only by recognizing the openness installed by dialectic and the irony which makes the dialectic itself matter.

A s standing at the end of one epoch and the beginning of another, Hegel was first of all considered—and still continues to be b y most—as simply the one who culminated the tradition of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . A n d , i t i s t r u e , h e does c u l m i n a t e that tradition. B u t because h i s t h o u g h t i s governed b y b o t h d e s t r u c t i v e and constructive irony a n d has shown the culmination o f the tradition to l i e o n l y i n the transformative transcendence o f

that tradition, he also stands in that new age, an age which is to r e j e c t the understanding, its l i n e a r l o g i c , and its insistence o n

hard and fast analytic distinctions.

If one, o n the one hand,

r e m a i n s with the understanding, t h e n this n e w age which Hegel ushers i n is an a g e o f relativism, o f mad transformations, o f nonsense, o f n i h i l i s m . None o f these is acceptable to the

understanding, and thus none of these "forms o f thought" are considered to be authentic forms of thought. If, o n the other h a n d , one takes up the movement of thought initiated i n Hegel, p r e c i s e l y wh e r e is i t that o n e ends u p ?

I will not pretend a definitive answer to this question in the present e s s a y , b u t will suggest where I t h i n k we have b e e n

led. In a word, we have been led to where we are. On the one hand, philosophies of the understanding are i n abundance and take as the task o f p h i l o s o p h y the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the traditional

tasks o f philosophy, albeit with new logical and analytical tools. These

p h i l o s o p h i e s remain

w i t h classical m o d e r n i t y ,

t h e y are

pre-Hegelian, a remnant of the movement of modernity i n the classical age, a remnant of the thinking that Hegel showed to be

Hegel’s Science

Q:

L o g i c : Ironies of the Understanding

169

self - d e s t r u c t i v e . O n the other h a n d , there exists a s e t o f thinkers who take u p the theme and power o f i r o n y and o th er rhetorical frame-

works, and who begin to articulate the ascendency of rhetoric, not in the traditional way in which it is made either a handmaiden o r enemy

o f p h ilo s o p h y, b u t as a n important

s tr uc tur e

to be analysed and employed for itself. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard and their twentieth-century progeny continue the work begun by Hegel in his engagement w i t h philosophies of the understanding. Hegel, i n turn, himself becomes the explicit or implicit thinker to be interrogated and retrieved. However, contrary to what most interrogators t h i n k , Hegel is not an unwilling prisoner. The slow and difficult working out of the ironies i n Hegel is what we have experienced since Hegel, and is the m o v e m e n t

o f s p i r i t o f w h i c h w e are n o w a part.

The Pennsylvania State University

Where is the Place of Understanding? by John Burbidge Understanding has a bad press amongst Hegelians. "However much Understanding may be the foundation of the sciences and of practical life, and must serve as a beginning to philosophy," writes Findlay, "it will none the less lead to thwarted and arrested development i f i t is allowed to dominate philosophical thinking."1

Errol Harris comments: "The understanding restricts itself to the finite, and its thinking is always finite thinking... That is why its objects are always abstract and separated from the matrix in which they are, in truth, actually embedded as moments of an infinite process through which an infinite whole

develops itself."2 A third example comes from Merold Westphal: "The task, which Understanding finds impossible, is so to remain in control

of onesself in giving oneself up to the mediating activity of the other that the whole operation can be called a self -mediating

activity.“ Findlay and Harris admit that there is a role for understanding to play. Faced with §§ 79 to 82 of the Encyclopaedia, they allow that the understanding has a subordinate function in intellectual discourse and action. Hegel, after all, when lecturing on the paragraph on understanding comments that

"Understanding is as indispensable in practice as it is in theory." (Enz. (1830), § 8 0 , Zu.; 1 1 4 ) But its fixity and accuracy are soon

to be overwhelmed by the effects of dialectical and speculative reason. I t is not simply in the introduction to the Encyclopaedia, is discussed positively. There is

however, where understanding

1J.N.

Findlay, Hegell A Re-examination (London: Allen and Unwin; New

York: Humanities, 1958) 62. 2E.E.

Harris, An Intemretation of the Logic of Hegel (Lanham, Md.:

University Press of America, 1983) 40. 3M. Westphal, "Hegel’s Theory of the Concept,” in Art and Logic in Hegel’s N.J.: Philosoghz, eds. W . E . Steinkraus 81 X L . Schmitz ( A t l a n t i c Highlands,

Humanities, 1980) 108.

171

JOHN BURBIDGE

172

also a bit of praise i n the Preface to the Phenomenology. "Analysis," writes Hegel, "only arrives at thoughts which are themselves familiar, fixed, and inert determinations.

B u t what

is thus separated and non-actual is an essential moment; for i t is only because the concrete does divide itself, and makes itself

into something non-actual, that it is self -moving. The activity of dissolution is the power and work of the Understanding, the most astonishing and mightiest o f powers, o r rather the absolute

power." (Phdn., 27; 18) From this passage one draws the conclusion that Hegel’s judgement o n understanding is at least ambivalent. It is not an operation that is simply forgotten once we enjoy the vision of the whole, o r the sense o f the compatibility o f opposites. I t i s , in fact, the motive power o f philosophical thinking—it generates

a process of destruction that dissolves wholes into parts. A n d it is only because Spirit neither shrinks from death nor keeps itself untouched

b y devastation, b u t instead endures death and

maintains itself therein, that genuine phiIOSOphical wisdom becomes possible.

(Pha'n., 2 7 ; 1 9 )

This strong claim about the essential role of understanding i n philosophy, expressed so eloquently in the Preface to the Phenomenology, is reproduced, as we have s e e n , in the small section of the Encyclopaedia that introduces the logic as such: the section entitled " L o g i c further defined and divided." ( E n z . ( 1 8 3 0 ) , § 7 9 ; 1 1 3 ) This was not an addition to the 1 8 2 7 e d i t i o n , although its location immediately preceding the doctrine

of being is new. In 1817, Hegel places the four paragraphs o n the three "sides" of the logic at the very beginning of the "Preliminary Notion"—right after the antecedent of what later became § 19. Between 1 8 0 7 and 1 8 1 7 Hegel had produced the Science of

Logic. We might well presume that the passage introduced into the Encyclopaedia was designed to summarize the "method" of that logical system.

We a r e , t h e n , faced w i t h a question: Where

i n the larger logic does Hegel discuss the role of understanding? From the order of the Encyclopaedia’s list: understanding, dialectical reason and s p e c u l a t i v e reason, w e m i g h t well presume

that understanding has its place at the beginning of the logic. B u t i t does not take very l o n g before we become uncomfortable w i t h that conclusion. The first c o n c e p t , being, is almost t h e

exact opposite of understanding. It is indeterminate, lacking a n y distinctions and divisions, whereas understanding involves

Where is the Place of Understanding?

173

”fixity of determinations and their distinctness from one another." (Enz. (1830), § 80; 113) The concept being cannot be the expression of understanding as such. Perhaps, then, i t is not i n the concept, but what happens

to the concept. In thinking pure being, thought finds itself thinking nothing. By reflecting o n that transition it identifies the most primitive feature of thought, which it calls becoming. Becoming names the process in which the thought of being passes over into its o p p o s ite, nothing. B u t this process is described in the Encyclopaedia passage under a different

paragraph. It is not understanding but "in the dialectical stage [where] finite characterizations

or formulae supersede themselves

and pass into their opposites." (Enz. (1830), § 81; 115) Beco m i n g ,

and its more developed

forms

o f alteration,

repulsion and attraction, continuity and relation do not develop the explanation and description o f understanding,

but rather the

various charateristics of dialectical reason. If understanding is not described in the beginning, is i t picked up in the intermediate discussion of essence? After all, the power o f the negative that Hegel describes in the P h e n o m e -

nology is not a starting point, but a mediation that breaks up the circle from which it began on the way toward a more comprehensive

perspective.

Here again o u r quest is unsuccessful.

F o r , in the early

stages of essence, thought shifts back and forth from essential to inessential, from show to essence.

What happens h e r e is n o t

simply the immediate transitions o r passings over that characterize b e i n g . Rather, the process of becoming is n o w taken together with its starting point and its result, so that the whole complex becomes the focus o f attention. We became aware o f becoming only because we found ourselves at a different place

from where we thought we were. In thinking essence, we are aware of a larger picture because the focus is constantly shifting, like a holograph. This perpetual flickering from one notion to its contrary and back again is now being considered as a whole. To this sense of the whole Hegel gives the name reflection. Reflection first synthesizes the complex, recognizes that it stands outside the complex, and then establishes the determinate structures that define the essence both of the I n other words, reflection complex and o f its recognition. considers the reciprocal flickering as a u n i t y which has p e r manent determinations that help to constitute the opposition

JOHN BURBIDGE

174

between two transition.

sides.

It

comprehends

both

dissolution

and

The process of positing and determining sounds as if i t might reflect the act of understanding. But once again we are deceived. For my description of reflection is captured b y Hegel, not in the paragraph o n understanding, b u t in the paragraph on speculative reason: "The Speculative stage, o r stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of the determinations in their opposition—the affirmative, which is involved i n their disintegration and in their transition." (Enz. (1830), § 82; 119). of

This sense o f the u n i t y i n opposition is n o t o n l y a feature reflection, but is picked u p throughout the doctrine o f

essence: as contradiction and ground; as the essential relations of whole and part, force and expression, o u t e r and inner; a n d as the absolute relations o f s u b s t a n c e , cause and reciprocity.4 We a r e , t h e n , left w i t h o n l y o n e o p t i o n . The theory o f understanding is developed i n the doctrine o f the c o n c e p t . B u t

this flies against all conventional wisdom. Errol Harris, for example, says that Hegel protests against the abstraction o f traditional logic that says that "the concept is that of understanding, the abstract universal." (227) A n d Findlay introduces his discussion of concept o r notion b y referring to the way i n which "the melting of the walls between interacting substances c a n , if i t occurs a t a l l , o n l y be a conscious melting." "The Notion is accordingly one w i t h a man’s t h i n k i n g b e i n g , the same

universal thinking nature i n all...." (222, 223) A melting of walls, even though it be conscious, cannot be correlated with "fixity of determinations and their distinctness from o n e another."

Nonetheless we should pause.

Many commentators

have

wondered why Hegel, when he arrives at the freedom of the c o n c e p t , proceeds to talk about the abstractions o f formal l o g i c ,

with its syllogisms and inferences. These seem to be the products of understanding; and they are not simply criticized b u t , as always in Hegel’s philosophy, given a positive and significant position within the total picture. Once the limitations of any thought, concept, o r term, is recognized, it is left free to function without challenge.

4Compare

here Daniel Dahlstrom’s contribution t o this volume.

Where is the Place of Understanding?

175

The phrase "freedom of the concept" is itself intriguing. For it suggests the sphere of practice, and i t reminds us that Hegel said in his lectures: "A man of character is an u n d e r standing m a n , wh o i n that c a p a c i t y has definite e n d s i n v i e w and u n d e v i a t i n g l y pursues t h e m . " A n d " U n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . c o r r e s ponds to what w e call the g o o d n e s s o f G o d . . . . U n d e r this shape

Understanding is visible in every department of the objective world; and no object i n that world can ever be wholly perfect which does not give full satisfaction to the canons of understanding." (Enz. (1830), § 80, Zu.; 114-115)

When we turn to examine the text of the larger logic more closely, we find some surprising claims. Within the section o n the particular concept, Hegel writes: "This is the impotence of nature, that i t cannot adhere to and exhibit the strictness of the concept, and runs wild i n this blind unconceptual multiplicity." (Logik III, 39; 607) This claim that it is not the melting of the w a l l s , b u t the strictness o f fixed forms t h a t defines the c o n c e p t runs directly c o u n t e r to Findlay’s c l a i m . A n d so i t is perhaps

not surprising that Johnston and Struthers, formed in a n earlier Hegelianism, turned this sentence completely around: "This is the i m p o t e n c e o f Nature, to h o l d fast and t o r e p r e s e n t the austerity

of the Notion, so that i t wastes away into this notionless and

blind multiplicity."5 On looking further, we find precisely in the section o n the particular c o n c e p t a n e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n o f understanding.

Particularizing a concept involves abstracting a determination. The faculty of such abstraction is called understanding.6 Such a process involves fixity and unalterability. But, says H e g e l , " w e m u s t recognize the infinite force o f the understand-

ing i n splitting the concrete into abstract determinations and plumbing the depth of the difference, the force that at the same time is alone the power that effects their transition." (Logik, III, 41; 610) Far from adopting the l i g h t estimation a n d inferior r a n k i n g w h i c h had been a p p l i e d to understanding b y h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , H e g e l here identifies i t w i t h t h e p r o c e s s o f p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g o r

5Hegel’s Science of Logic, t r . W.H. Johnston 8.: J G . Struthers (London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1929) 11, 241i.

6It is interesting t h a t Miller does not italicize understanding when it first appears in Hegel’s text (Logik III, 40; 609), although Hegel uses Sperrdruck.

JOHN BURBIDGE

176

determining a concept.

And he attributes the fault of bare b u t to reason: "Since, therefore,

analysis not to understanding

understanding exhibits the infinite force which determines the universal, or conversely, imparts through the form of universality a fixity and subsistence to the determinateness that is i n and for itself transitory, then it is not the fault of the understanding if n o progress is made beyond this point. It is a subjective impotence of reason which adopts these determinatenesses in their fixity, and which is unable to bring them back to their unity through the dialectical force opposed to t h e i r abstract universality, i n o t h e r words through their o w n peculiar

nature, o r through their Notion." (Logik III, 42; 611) The end of that citation suggests that the notion o r concept is the remedy brought in to rectify the half -truth of understanding. But that is misleading, for the phrase "through their notion" is parallel to " t h r o u g h t h e i r own peculiar nature."

How can we know the peculiar (eigentiimliche) nature o f the determinatenesses if we do not particularize that nature b y means o f t h e understanding?

The suggestion here is that the

way out of the fixity of understanding is not to be found b y bringing i n an antidote, but by following it through consistently to its limits. Hegel goes o n to make t h i s e x p l i c i t : "The h i g h e s t m a t u r i t y ,

the highest stage, which anything can attain is that in which its downfall begins. The fixity of the determinateness into which the understanding seems to r u n , the f o r m o f t h e i m p e r i s h a b l e , i s that o f s e l f - r e l a t i n g u n i v e r s a l i t y . B u t this belongs p r o p e r l y

to the Notion..."

As a result, "the determinate and abstract

Notion i s the condition, o r rather an essential moment of reason."

"Therefore the usual practice of separating understanding and reason is, from every point of view, to be rejected." (Logik, III, 42f.; 6 l l f ) There

is a n amazing

s u g g e s t i o n h e r e , i f o n e has b e e n

reared o n the traditional interpretation. The highest achievement of thought is understanding, which actually brings about the destruction of what has been achieved. This, indeed, is what t h e n occurs i n t h e L o g i c .

For the n e x t s t e p is t h e process

of particularizing the process of conceiving itself. By isolating a n d fixing t h e process o f conceptual t h o u g h t ( o r n o t i o n as the older s c h o o l has i t ) o n e d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t from that w h i c h cannot

Where is the Place of Understanding?

177

be c o n c e i v e d , o r the s i m p l e singular.7 In the section o n the particular c o n c e p t , t h e n , we find what we have b e e n looking for, an e x p l i c i t discussion o f the

role of understanding. And although it begins from the contemporary dismissal of understanding as contrary to reason, it ends b y making understanding a condition and essential moment of reason. The process of particularizing and fixing determinations continues throughout the third book of the Logic: in the analysis of formal logic; in the discussion of systematic analyses, whether mechanical, chemical or teleological; and i n the discussion of the process b y which thought is applied to its opposite i n life, cognition and finally pure method. What is happening here is a process of particularizing and singularizing—of identifying not only the constituent terms but also the relations between the terms. It is that process of full articulation—of bringing all the features to consciousness—which ends b y admitting that t h o u g h t is itself finite, and needs to surrender to externality—an admission that opens u p the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a

transition from logic to its antithesis, nature. In other words we are driven to take seriously the opening sentence o f the c h a p t e r o n the concept: "Understanding is the term usually e m p l o y e d to exp r es s the faculty o f c o n c e i v i n g . "

(Logik III, 32; 600) L e t us st0p

for a moment

and consider where

we are.

Although in the Encyclopaedia Hegel outlines the three sides of the logic i n the order o f understanding, dialectic a n d s pe c ulativ e reason, i n the L o g i c h e places understanding at the e n d , and calls i t the h i g h e s t maturity which anything c a n attain.

There is a phrase i n § 7 9 that should perhaps have b e e n

7It i s i n t h e s e c t i o n o n " T h e Singular" t h a t Hegel i d e n t i fi e s t h e abstract universal. As t h e antithesis of the s i n g u l a r , i t must y e t be combined w i t h i t . T h i s finds expression i n the positive j u d g e m e n t : ” T h e singular is t h e (abstract) universal." Compare here P h i l i p G r i e r ’ s contribution t o t h i s volume, and B E .

Harris’s comment that "Abstraction is the characteristic activity of the understanding" (82). Together, these comments provide further evidence t h a t understanding finds its place in the chapter on " T h e Concept." 8This

sentence

Houlgate’s comments.

received

some

elaboration

in

my

response

to

Stephen

An earlier statement of the point may be found i n _O_n

H e g e l ’ s L o g i c ( N e w Jersey: Humanities,

1 9 8 2 ) 220ff.

W h i l e I had already been

forced t o notice that Hegel placed his discussion of understanding in the third book of t h e Logic, a t t h e time I had n o t y e t fully worked o u t i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s .

JOHN BURBIDGE

178

taken m o r e seriously: " L o g i c a l doctrine has three sides." The word "sides" suggests a plane fig u re, and three sides refers to a

triangle. Perhaps we have been wrong all along in looking for a first among the three. Perhaps, like a triangle o n a plane, i t can rotate, s o that a t various moments different sides are at the b o t t o m , and different s i d e s are a t the t o p . The dissolution o f

understanding initiates the dialectic. The transitions of dialectic trigger the reflections of speculative reason, and the wholes of speculation are fixed and determined by understanding. The triangle becomes a rather lumping wheel, bumping its way through thought, nature and the world of man. I now draw three implications from m y conclusion. First, if conceiving involves particularizing and not generalizing, then i t is better to translate th e German Begri ff

with "concept" than

with "notion." In the preceding text I have cited Findlay and Miller, using their terminology. I trust you understood that when I sometimes used "notion" and at other times used "concept" I was talking about the same thing. But my Oxford English Dictionary defines "notion" with the term "concept," and notes that i t is regularly used with "under": "Under the notion of ...." This means that particulars are not the ways the notion determines itself, b u t are rather items to be subsumed into the general. Concept, however, retains the sense of determinacy and particularizing, p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n i t is expressed n o t b y the s i m p l e n o u n , b u t b y the g e r u n d " c o n c e i v i n g . " There is quite a

difference between "the labour of the notion (or alternatively " t h e labour o f the c o n c e p t " ) and " t h e labour of c o n c e i v i n g . "

If

the concept involves moving from the universal to the particular u s i n g a process c o m m o n l y called u n d e r s t a n d i n g , then the gerund

is a useful way of glossing Hegel’s text.

Once we do this, however, we are confronted with o u r second implication.

Neither the r i g h t - w i n g , n o r the left-wing

interpretation of Hegel is right. For the left-wing Hegelians have made dialectic the foundation, and the right-wing Hegel— ians have made speculation ultimate. But if anything is right, i t is that understanding clearly d e t e r m i n e s and fixes each o f these moments within a t r i a n g l e that i n c l u d e s all three. I t alone

is fully self - r e f lexive. I n this way it establishes the triangle as ultimate, and not any o n e of its sides or points. The r i g h t - w i n g

interpretation

takes H e g e l ’ s d i c t u m : "The

true is the whole" as normative. Therefore only when all determinations are speculatively reconciled in a comprehensive totality is some level of phi1030phical wisdom achieved. This

Where is the Place of Understanding?

179

interpretation rides uncomfortably with history, particularly the history after Hegel. Either you claim, with Kojeve and Stanley R o s e n , that history stopped o n c e H e g e l published his P h e n o m e -

nology, o r you take the position of Findlay and others that the ultimate achievement o f knowledge is to e m e r g e from the cave and contemplate atemporal t r u t h s .

The left-wing interpretation sees no final reconciliation b u t only a dialectical process, one that is always dissolving what is present and p a ssi n g b e y o n d i t . because i t is radically o p e n . There to the opposite o f what we n o w become frustrated b y trying to s t o p and promote i t .

History is take n s e r i o u s l y , w i l l always b e a movement have, and o n e can e i t h e r i t , o r g e t o n the bandwagon

But if we take seriously Hegel’s statement that "the highest maturity, the highest stage which anything can attain, is that i n which its downfall begins," then we have to rethink o u r understanding of what is absolute and what is true i n Hegel. For the implication of placing understanding’s ability to fix and determine at the culmination of the logic, where logical theory is conscious of its own operations, is that there will be i m mediate dialectical transitions into o p p o s i t e s , b u t there w i l l also be speculative reconciliations i n t o w h o l e s . B u t those reconcilia— The t i o n s , once achieved, will b e c o n c e i v e d , o r understood. c o n s t i t u e n t moments and the relations between them w i l l become

fully articulate.

A n d that achievement will inevitably trigger

another dialectical t r a n s i t i o n . Therefore any c l a i m to a b s o l u t e n e s s , any claim to t r u t h , w i l l discover that the very effort to fix the claim c o n c e p t u a l l y w i l l r e s u l t i n its d i s s o l u t i o n and downfall.

This must apply to Hegel’s theory itself. That b e i n g s o , w h y does H e g e l conclude his works w i t h chapters called " A b s o l u t e K n o w l e d g e , " " A b s o l u t e I d e a , " and The answer to that q u e s t i o n can o n l y b e "Absolute S p i r i t " ?

provided b y a detailed understanding of what is i n fact d e s c r i b e d i n those c h a p t e r s . 9 B u t I w i l l a n s w e r b r i e f l y b y referring

to an interesting statement i n the Introduction to the Science of Logic: "1 c o u l d n o t pretend that the method w h i c h I follow i n

this system of logic—or rather which this system i n its o w n self follows—is n o t capable o f greater c o m p l e t e n e s s , o f m u c h elaboration i n detail; b u t at the same time I k n o w that i t is the

only true method." (Logik I, 38; 54)

98cc

Burbidge, O n H e g e l ’ s Logic, Chapters

13 and 1 4 .

JOHN BURBIDGE

180

wheel,

Since the method is the l u m p y , b u m p y triangular

it will involve both dialectic and speculation. essential, and comprehensive

Transitions are

wholes are essential.

B u t this can

be acknowledged only because understanding can isolate and fix each of them, and hold them together in a disjunction. Either becoming or reflection; which also means that both transition and reflection are essential constituents. And that disjunctive judgement is the culminating stage of the effort to couple the contradictory terms of conceptual thought-universal and

singular—in a single perspective. 0 In

other

words,

dialectical

transitions

will

introduce

contingencies; reflection will integrate this new subject matter into a comprehensive perspective; understanding will fix its terms and relations. Each such move will involve elaboration in detail, and will move toward greater completeness, particularly as the results o f all three are adequately understood. Such a development toward a n o p e n future is described i n the c u l -

minating chapters of each of Hegel’s three works: Phenomenology, Logic, and Encyclopaedia. The only thing which does not become relativized is the method itself. The inherent dynamic of proper knowing, of proper thinking, and of pr0per selfconscious life will embody its pattern and s e q u e n c e . B u t , as we noted with respect to the c h a p t e r o n Absolute Idea, where Hegel e x p l i c i t l y conceives the m e t h o d , the achievement o f understand-

ing, or conceiving, results i n the method acknowledging its o w n particularity;

and

its

claim

to

be

a

complete

discovers its own partiality.11 I n other

words,

b y recognizing

perspective

that speculative

reason,

dialectic, and understanding, are all to be placed at the pinnacle o f the method,

we recognize that no immediate

transition, n o

comprehensive vision, and no philosophical wisdom will ever be the last word.

The o n l y true m e t h o d will see to i t that another

word will emerge. And that will happen because the understanding of the concept self -referentially understands that and

101

refer

the reader,

if I m a y ,

t o my "Transition

Internationale de Philosophie, XXXVI (1982) 111-124. 11W

or Reflection,"

Revue

hen one considers t h e significant changes that the chapter on Dasein went through between the first edition of t h e Logic in 1812 and the second edition in 1831 (as well as the three intermediate versions, varying in concepts and order, summarized in the three editions of the EncycIOpaedia), i t seems that Hegel sees the categorial framework of the Logic itself as detail that will continue t o be elaborated.

Where is t h e Place of Understanding?

181

how the three sides of the one true method are related. This moment of self -ref erence i t alone commands with full authority. And it produces the recognition that none of the three, including itself, is final. My third and final comment concerns a more complex question. It is the thesis of Walter Zimmerli among others that what Hegel actually does i n the Logic is not ade uately d e s -

cribed and explained in the theory of the concept.l There are inferences and arguments that are not captured in the formalism of judgement and syllogism. The picture I have proposed suggests that Zimmerli has been looking for the wrong thing, and in the wrong place. Careful analysis of a number of logical transitions has shown that, inevitably, they start with the effort to isolate, conceive or understand a concept; that this leads to a transition i n which the original concept dissolves into its Opposite; that this result is reflectively taken together w i t h its starting p o i n t ; and that this

synthesis, carefully understood, unfolds a network of terms and In other words relations that are integrated into a unity. understanding has generated a new concept. I trust that it is clear from what I have already said that these stages of the logical operation are in fact described in the various books of the logic: dialectical transition is explored i n the doctrine of being; reflective synthesis and integration in the doctrine of essence; understanding’s precision i n the doctrine of conceiving. On the o n e level, t h e n , the logic as a whole self reflectively describes the structure o f its constituent transitions. B u t what, then, i s happening i n the doctrine o f the c o n c e p t ? H e r e , instead o f describing a process, we are trying to conceive it: to determine its particular constituents. This w i l l

involve identifying the terms and the relations as independent determinations and thinking through the way they function within an integrated unity. What Hegel is claiming i n the first part o f the "Doctrine

of the Concept" is that the structures of formal logic are not simply arbitrary; but that when they are set in context—that i s , when each one is both understood in its own terms and taken

12See

Zimmerli’a paper, " I n Hegel’s Logic 3 Logic?" in Hegel and his Critics

(Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).

JOHN BURBIDGE

182

together with the dialectical transitions that result from that understanding—they define the constituent stages of logical reasoning. Conceiving,

of

course,

is

understanding;

judgement

explores the many forms of transition—becoming, reflection, necessity and conceiving; syllogism reflectively identifies the constituents of the whole process—the transitions of the classical syllogism; the syntheses of induction and analogy; and the particularizing determinations of conjunction, modus ponens

disjunction.”

These structures are the formal pattern of what i n fact occurs within the logical and philosophical moves. But they can only be appropriated if they are seen to be the efforts to understand t h e processes a l r e a d y described—to conceive w h a t has

emerged—to take what is present in its totality and define its determinations. We h a v e , t h e n , found a n answer for J o b ’ s q u e s t i o n : W he re is the place o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g ? Its destructive capacity ensures

that it is not to be found in the land of the living; its abstract formalism means that man k n o w e t h n o t the price thereof. B u t , as Job suggests, the place o f understanding is where wisdom w i l l

be found. 4

Trent U n i v e r s i t y

131 have left t h i s paragraph as read a t t h e conference. However, while reflecting o n H o u l g a t e ’ s commentary, I s a w t h a t I h a d been forcing t h e material i n t o t h e w r o n g Procrustean b e d ; for I h a d b e e n s t i l l beguiled by t h e order outlined in the Encyclopaedia. I n my reply t o H o u l g a t e , t h e n , I presented an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t b e t t e r fi t s w h a t i s a c t u a l l y going o n i n t h e discussion of

formal logic. T h e process of particularizing passes over from a universal concept t o a singular. This is a simple becoming, a move of dialectical reason. I t is j u d g e m e n t t h a t s p e c u l a t i v e l y h o l d s opposites t o g e t h e r , s t a r t i n g from s i n g u l a r and abstract universal i n t h e p o s i t i v e j u d g e m e n t , and c u l m i n a t i n g w i t h ” b o t h / a n d " and " e i t h e r / o r " i n t h e d i s j u n c t i v e j u d g e m e n t . T h e d i s c u s s i o n of t h e modal

judgements introduces t h e need t o conceive necessity.

Finally, t h e syllogism

understands o r conceives t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h e l o g i c , and t h a t c u l m i n a t e s i n t h e disjunctive syllogism. There t h e major premise i s t h e s p e c u l a t i v e s y n t h e s i s ; and t h e inference i s a d i a l e c t i c a l process o f p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g t h a t universal i n t o a s i n g u l a r . T h e act of conceiving-of understanding—is here fully understood. This rereading needs t o be a p p l i e d t o H e g e l ’ s d i s c u s s i o n of l o g i c t h r o u g h o u t t h i s s e c t i o n . I s u s p e c t i t will i l l u m i n a t e some previously dense passages.

“See 19g, 28:12f.

A Reply t o John Burbidge by Stephen Houlgate

A s Professor Burbidge points out at the beginning of his lucid and highly stimulating paper, "understanding has a bad press a m o n g s t

Hegelians." ( 1 7 1 )

His p a p e r thus s e r v e s as a

welcome reminder that understanding in fact has a central and very positive role to play in Hegel’s dialectical logic. Early o n in his paper Professor Burbidge raises the question: "Where in the larger logic does Hegel discuss the role of understanding?", (172) and the answer he gives to this question is to m y mind undoubtedly correct. Hegel discusses understanding i n chapter o n e o f the s e c t i o n o n s u b j e c t i v i t y , the d o c t r i n e o f the c o n c e p t ,

where understanding is called ‘the faculty of concepts’. (Logik I I I , 3 2 ; 6 0 0 ) H e g e l ’ s discussion o f understanding

might perhaps

b e thought to extend into the chapters o n judgment and syllogistic reason, too, since he thinks of these forms of thought as products of understanding—as ein Verstc'indiges—at least i n so far as they stand "under the form of the abstract determinacy of the concept." (Logik III, 32; 600) However, Hegel makes it clear that judgment and syllogistic reason go beyond understanding p r o p e r , s o B u r b i d g e is r i g h t to locate H e g e l ’ s d i s c u s s i o n o f understanding i n t h e c h a p t e r o n th e c o n c e p t o n l y . O ne m i g h t

also have thought that Hegel’s discusion of understanding is to be found i n chapter two of the Logic of Reflection, on the determinations o f r e f l e c t i o n . H o w e v e r , i n that c h a p t e r H e g e l o n l y deals w i t h the principles g o v e r n i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , s u c h as the p r i n c i p l e o f i d e n t i t y , n o t w i t h understanding i t s e l f as a

mode of self -determining thought. That, as Professor Burbidge shows, is only discussed in the chapter o n the concept. Professor Burbidge is also correct, i n my view, in claiming that u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a n i n t e g r a l , positive m o m e n t o f s p e c u l a t i v e r e a s o n , i n d e e d that i t is " t h e m o t i v e p o w e r o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l

thinking." (172) This is made clear i n §§ 7 9 - 8 2 of the 1830 Encyclopaedia. There Hegel maintains t h a t the d i a l e c t i c a l d i s s o l u t i o n a n d speculative u n i f i c a t i o n Of c o n c e p t u a l o p p o s i t e s i s n o t to b e a c h i e v e d b y b r i n g i n g i n a n a n t i d o t e to t h e f i x i t y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t , as Professor B u r b i d g e says o n p a g e 1 7 6 , b y

following understanding through consistently to its limits. Thought

must

be

open

to

the

dialectical

and

speculative

transformation of its concepts if i t is to progess beyond understanding and become fully rational, b u t that progress beyond understanding is made necessary by the determining activity of understanding itself. Understanding thus generates

183

STEPHEN HOULGATE

184

concepts

which

dissolve themselves

into

their

opposites

and

which are not subverted b y some other faculty of thought. I n contrast to Kant, therefore, Hegel does n o t distinguish

between two faculties of thought—understanding and reason. Rather, he points to one activity of thinking and shows that this activity can be more o r less self -conscious. Thought can understand

its concepts to be fixed i n their meaning and to be

clearly distinguished from their opposites, or it can come to recognise that these concepts actually collapse dialectically into their opposites when understood properly. A s Hegel says i n the Preface to the Phenomenology, therefore, consciousness proceeds

"through understanding to rational knowledge," (Phdn., 15-16; 8 ) for the simple reason that "understanding, too, is a becoming, and as this becoming it is rationality." (Phdn., 40; 34) Yet, despite my agreement with Professor Burbidge o n these points, I have strong doubts about his claim that understanding for Hegel represents the highest achievement of thought. (176) As we have just seen, Burbidge shows that understanding leads beyond itself to dialectical and speculative reason. However, he goes o n to claim that thought is in fact l i k e a rotating triangle o r , rather, a "lumping wheel" ( 1 7 8 ) which

takes us from understanding, through dialectic and speculative reason,

back

to the determinacy

o f understanding

again,

as

understanding clarifies the moments of speculative thinking through which we have just passed. Since the end of each "rotation" involves understanding fixing and determining the "wholes o f speculation," a n e w process o f conceptual d e t e r m i n a -

tion, dissolution and unification is set i n motion, a n d , i n this way, Burbidge believes, the activity of thought carries on indefinitely. In fact, therefore, none of the three moments of thought can really claim to represent the end or goal of thinking for Burbidge, not even understanding. But i t should be noted

that the process of thought is unending for Burbidge precisely because, in his view, it is to the determinacy of understanding (and its disjunctive j u d g m e n t s ) that we always ultimately return.

But is this claim tenable? Burbidge writes that "since the method

is the l u m p y , b u m p y

triangular

wheel, i t will involve

both dialectic and speculation. Transitions are essential, and comprehensive wholes are essential. But this can be acknowledged only because understanding can isolate and fix each of them,

and

hold

them

together

in a disjunction....And

that

disjunctive judgment is the culminating stage o f the effort to couple the contradictory terms of conceptual thought—universal

A Reply to John Burbidge

185

and singular—in a single perspective." (180) But does not Hegel claim i n § 79 of the Encyclopaedia that if we think the three moments of thought through understanding as "separate from each other" (abgesondert auseinandergehalten), we are not thinking o f them as they are in truth? Surely, therefore, we should n o t be thinking o f the stages o f understanding, dialectic

and speculative reason as held together in a verstc'indig dis j u n c t i o n , that is as held together as separate, b u t rather as moments

o f one speculative development. And if that is the case, then thought

does n o t culminate

i n understanding

and thus g o o n

setting up and dissolving conceptual determinations indefinitely, as Professor Burbidge seems to claim, b u t culminates rather in a definitive grasp by speculative reason of the unified movement of thought through its three stages, and of the results generated b y that movement. Reason marks the highest achievement of t h o u g h t , therefore,

b y bringing thought to full and definitive

self -awareness, that is by clearly and determinately articulating the fluidity o f thought that the understanding

can n e v e r grasp.

Before the end of the Science of Logic, of course, the result o f a particular logical transition“ w i l l be the recognition o f the process whereby the unity o f opposing determinations

emerges and the further determination of that unity by understanding. Indeed, even at the end of the Logic, where we are brought to the thought o f the absolute Idea, we are called u p o n

to think both the development of the Idea to full self -articulation and the further determination of the Idea as nature and Geist. We w i l l n o t finally be able to dwell w i t h the m o v e m e n t o f t h o u g h t without m o v i n g o n to further determinations o f the

understanding, therefore, until the end of the whole system of s p e c u l a t i v e philosophy has been reached. A t that p o i n t we w i l l , o f c o u r s e , be able to make practical j u d g m e n t s a b o u t the world i n the light o f our philosophical comprehension; h o w e v e r , c o n t r a r y to what Professor Burbidge seems to believe, there will be no need for understanding to move us o n again to n e w concepts o f t h o u g h t . S o , as w e l l as b e i n g able to e n g a g e i n

practical activity i n the world, we will also be able to move freely with, and find rest i n , the self-contained movement of phi1050phical thought, i n the same way as we are able to move

freely with, and dwell with, the self -contained movement of a piece of music o r a drama.

My second point of disagreement with Professor Burbidge concerns

his claim

that

the "stages of

the logical operation

are...described in the various books of the logic: dialectical transition is explored in the doctrine of being; reflective

STEPHEN HOULGATE

186

synthesis and integration i n the doctrine of essence; understanding’s precision in the doctrine of conceiving." (181) In my opinion, Hegel does not deal with a n y of these three moments o f thought i n their fully developed

logic.

f C ' m until the s u b j e c t i v e

Understanding, as Professor Burbidge has correctly

pointed o u t , is treated i n the c h a p t e r o n the c o n c e p t .

Reason,

however, contrary to what Professor Burbidge implies, is not treated i n the logic o f essence under the c o n c e p t o f reflection, b u t is discussed i n its formal mode i n the chapter o n the

syllogism and in its speculative mode i n the section o n the Idea. A n d dialectic, again contrary to what Professor Burbidge claims, is not thematised i n t h e pages o n b e c o m i n g , b u t is considered i n the chapter o n the a b s o l u t e Idea as a m o m e n t o f speculative

reason. Understanding,

d ialectic

an d

reason

are

all mode s

of

conceptual self -determination and can only be treated properly when the Logic reaches the point at which thought becomes explicitly self -determining, not before. That point is reached i n the subjective logic. What is discussed in earlier sections of the L o g i c a r e thus n o t u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,

d i a l e c t i c , and r e a s o n , as

explicit forms of self -determining thought, b u t merely categories and reflexive determinations which, like the category of becoming, exhibit a dialectical structure, o r which, like the concept of identity, constitute the concepts employed by understanding, o r which, like the concepts of the absolute o r of s u b s t a n c e , are a t m o s t implicitly s p e c u l a t i v e and rational. Professor B u r b i d g e ’ s a t t e m p t to distribute the three sides o f t h o u g h t amongst the three books o f the Logic thus s e e m s to m e

to be misguided and to provide no warrant for his belief that understanding represents the highest achievement of thought.

Indeed within the subjective logic it is surely evident that reason represents the culmination of thinking, not understanding. The movement of thought within the third book of the Logic is clearly from understanding to reason, not back to understanding again. Overall in the book we move from the concept to the Idea, and within the section o n subjectivity i n particular we move from the concept to the s y l l o g i s m , w h i c h is the formal o r

verstc’indig mode of reason o r the rational form of understandi n g , d e p e n d i n g o n h o w one looks a t i t .

It appears, therefore—and this is m y third point of d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h Professor B u r b i d g e ’ s paper—that for H e g e l i t

is reason that is fully self —referential and which can comprehend the other two moments of thought, not understanding as

A Reply to John Burbidge

187

B u r b i d g e claims. ( 1 8 0 - 1 8 1 ) Indeed the fact that understanding

cannot become fully self-referential is shown b y a passage which is cited b y Burbidge h i m s e l f o n page 1 7 6 .

That passage

states that "it is not the fault of the understanding if no progress is made beyond this point. It is a subjective impotence of reason which adopts these determinatenesses in their f ixity, and which is unable to bring them back to their unity." (Logik III, 42; 611) Does this not suggest that understanding cannot be faulted for sticking with the fixed determinations which i t posits because it cannot be expected to understand how to go beyond them, whereas reason can be faulted if it does not bring fixed determinations back to their unity because rational thinking essentially consists in recognising that and how understanding leads beyond itself? If it is a correct interpretation of what Hegel means to say that reason consists in understanding’s going beyond itself, then it is in becoming rational and speculative, not just in understanding, that thought becomes fully selfreferential

and self-comprehending

and thus becomes able to

grasp the unity of the three moments of thought.

One important consequence of this is that understanding cannot grasp its own implicitly rational character. Understanding is the source of conceptual generality; however, at the same time, it cannot leave its concepts abstractly general, but must determine them b y marking off their particular limits vis-a-vis other concepts.

Understanding

thus itself moves the c onc e pt

from generality to individuality, and indeed gives rise to the determinacy of judgment. However, understanding does not realise that the determinate conceptual distinctions w hic h i t makes undermine themselves dialectically despite the best efforts o f understanding i t s e l f to preserve those distinctions. U n d e r s t a n d i n g , therefore, cannot grasp that the concepts which it generates and determines are i n fact self-determining and self-

moving, that is that the concept is i n itself something dialectical and rational, "etwas Verniinftiges." (Logik I I I , 1 7 3 ; 7 5 5 ) A n d i t is unable to grasp this even though the activity o f understanding is what makes the c o n cep t determine itself i n the firs t p l a c e . I n this s e n s e , understanding fails to comprehend the process

whereby it transforms itself into reason. A n d , of course, it must fail to comprehend that process because i t has to let go of its own limited perspective in order to effect that transformation and become rational.

M y fourth and final point of disagreement with Professor Burbidge concerns h i s interpretation

o f the transition from the

logic to the philosophy of nature in Hegel’s system. Burbidge

STEPHEN HOULGATE

188

claims that it is the "process of full articulation—of bringing all the features to consciousness—which ends b y admitting that thought is itself finite, and needs to surrender—to externality—an admission that opens u p the possibility o f the transition from logic to its antithesis, nature." ( 1 7 7 ) A n d Burbidge understands

the goal of thought to be the recognition of its own finitude because he thinks that the highest achievement of thought is the understanding "which actually brings about the destruction of what has been achieved." (176) However, if one considers the goal of thought to be speculative

reason dwelling i n the presence o f the movement

and results of its own development, and not to be the restless, endless process o f determination and destruction, then what is achieved at the e n d o f the L o g i c appears to be somewhat

different from what Burbidge claims. I n my view, thought at the end of the Logic comes to consciousness of its o w n infinite rationality or Idea, not just of its finitude. Thought does not, therefore, surrender to externality, surrender to another, b u t rather freely determines itself to be other than itself. Thought opens itself u p , discloses itself, releases itself—"sick... frei entld'flt" (Logik III, 253; 843)—as other than itself, because i t knows that its infinity lies i n being w i t h itself i n otherness. I t is n o t , therefore, thought’s understanding o f its limits o r its

finitude that marks the transition to nature. It is thought’s rational recognition of its infinite freedom to be itself in being o t h e r than itself that provides the transition to nature.

Indeed,

i t is only because thought has that infinite sense of freedom and openness in itself that it can let otherness be.

To recapitulate, therefore: I agree with Professor Burbidge o n the importance of understanding for speculative reason. I also accept that thought must recognise its o w n limits if i t is to develop as Hegel suggests.

However,

I see the recognition

by

thought of the limits of understanding as a stage o n the path to the infinite freedom o f reason to be bei sich im Anderen, not as the highest achievement o f thought. I accept that Hegel

recognises that his own achievement in the Logic can be improved upon in certain respects; however I do not agree with Professor Burbidge that speculative reason yields no "last w o r d , "

that "the only true method will see to i t that another word will emerge." (180) In m y view, Hegel’s philosophy claims to have largely perfected the language of thought, to have presented in their proper speculative form all the fundamental words and concepts that philosophical t h o u g h t requires now o r will require

in the future.

There will, of course, be new situations which

A Reply to John Burbidge

we must

learn

189

to deal with in the words and

concepts

that

philosophy clarifies for us. To that extent, the language of thought will constantly need to be refined in the light of new experiences.

We will also have to teach philosophy

to speak

many more languages than German. However, we will not have to develop new fundamental

concepts to deal with the world we

encounter. That, at least, is Hegel’s claim. claim that I believe he should be judged. DePaul University

A n d it is by that

Hegel a n d t h e Problem of t h e Differentia Halper

by Edward

I t is a minor scandal that, with the extensive treatment the works o f Aristotle have r e c e i v e d , particularly o f late, virtually

nothing has been said of a blatant and devastating difficulty with his account o f the c a t e g o r i e s . The p r o b l e m i s the status o f the differentia. I t is a problem that I think Hegel recognized a n d resolved o r at least thought h e r e s o l v e d , and i n this p a p e r

I will explore what I take to be his solution and some of its ramifications. I. First I need to e xp lain the p r o b l e m .

I t is this: I t is o n l y

possible to divide all things into categories if we can expound the characteristics of the categories, if, that is, the categories can be characterized and d i s t i n g u i s h e d from each o t h e r . What is supposed to d o t h i s is the differentia o r , i n E n g l i s h , the

difference. A n entity is defined b y giving its genus and its differentia, b u t because Aristotle maintains that each diff erentia falls under only a single genus (and under the genera that include this genus), a definition really requires only the differentia.1

The q u e s t i o n immed iately arises as to w h e t h e r this

differentia belongs to the genus i t differentiates. The answer Aristotle ordinarily gives is no, and the reason is easy to see. I f the differentia

did b e l o n g to the g e n u s , then i t would n o t

explain why the genus differed from other genera nor would i t characterize the instances o f the g e n u s . If X , Y, a n d Z are the instances o f g e n u s A , then X does n o t d is tin g u is h X , Y , and Z from instances o f o t h e r g en era, n o r does i t characterize Y a nd Z . So t h e differentia must n o t belong to the g en us i t different i a t e s . Indeed, the differentia must b e l o n g to s o m e e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t c a t e g o r y . 2 B u t we then face the disastrous prospect that

1See

M e t a p h y s i c s , V I I , 1 2 : especially 1 0 3 8 a 2 5 - 2 6 , and my discussion of t h i s

chapter in One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: The Central Books ( C o l u m b u s , O h i o : O h i o S t a t e University Press, 1 9 8 9 ) 1 1 0 - 1 8 . i s i m p l i c i t at Categories 3 : 1 b 1 6 - 2 4 . 28cc t h e discussion g e n u s ’ s b e i n g predicated

T h e same d o c t r i n e

at Topics V I , 6 : 1 4 4 a 3 6 - b 3 . Aristotle speaks of t h e of t h e differentia; I have i n mind t h e same r e l a t i o n

when I speak of the differentia as included in the genus. The Greek term that is usually rendered as "category“ means literally "predicate."

There

are some passages

where Aristotle

191

may be t h i n k i n g of t h e

EDWARD HALPER

192

that entity b y which A differs from other genera and by which A is what i t i s , that e n t i t y which is what A is most o f a l l , is n o t A . S i n c e , for example, the differentia o f human b e i n g , a

particular type of rationality, seems to be a quality, the nature o f a particular substance, n a m e l y , u s , is not to be a substance, b u t to b e a quality, rationality.

Aristotle must have been aware of the problem because in a peculiar passage in the Categories he denies that the dif f erentia of a particular substance is "in" the substance, as its attributes are; i t is rather "said of" the substance, a characteriza-

tion implying that the differentia belongs to the category of substance (5:3a21-28). Nearly all current scholars dismiss this claim of Aristotle as some sort of slip, for it would undermine the neat distinction o f categorial genera.3 Unfortunately, these scholars do not explain how to avoid the problem: they do not even see the problem.

Perhaps,

part o f this blindness arises

from the unfortunate tendency to read the Categories as a workeither about language o r about the application of language to things. The presumption is that problems at the linguistic level are somehow subjective a n d not ontologically troublesome, but categories as mere predicates, b u t his considered view, expressed clearly in t h e Metaphysics (e.g. 111,3:999a17-23 and V,6:lOl6b31-34) is that the categories are t h e highest genera of beings. 3See,

for example, J . L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and D e lntergretatione

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 85-87. Since "said of‘ is a transitive relation, if t h e differentia is said of a substance, t h e n t h e categorial genus that is said of t h e differentia-the category under which i t falls—must also be said of the substance. If t h e differentia were a q u a l i t y , as Aristotle sometimes says

(Metaphysics, V,l4:1020a33-b1), then quality would be ”said

of“ a substance.

I n t h i s case, substance would be an instance of t h e category of quality, and t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e categories would dissolve. The basis of Aristotle’s division of beings i n t o categories is that each category i s "said 01" only i t s instances. Consequently, Ackrill and most other recent commentators have d e n i e d t h a t Aristotle really thinks t h a t differentiae are "said of" substances.

Ackrill, p . 86, mentions as one source of the error Aristotle’s principle t h a t the differentia suffices to define the substance. He does not realize that this is a solid ground for including t h e differentia i n t h e category of substance. Ackrill claims t h a t Aristotle’s mistake could be remedied by taking t h e differentia t o be

"in" a substance, just as other instances of non-substantial categories.

But

Aristotle denies t h a t something t h a t is " i n ” a substrate can be part of t h a t substrate ( 2 : 1 a 2 4 - 2 6 ) , whereas t h e differentia i s a part of t h e substance because t h e substance cannot be without its differentia. Rational could not be i n man because i t i s part of the species m a n , as w e l l as part of an individual m a n . There are, t h e n , good reasons for Aristotle t o say that differentiae are " s a i d 01" substances. Presumably, Aristotle avoids t h e transitivity problem by denying t h a t they fall under t h e category of q u a l i t y , where they seem to belong, and instead including t h e m somehow i n the categorial genus of substance.

Hegel and the Problem of Differentia

193

Aristotle’s categories are classes o f things based u p o n the natures

of those things. Surely the nature that marks off the category ought to belong to the category, and so Aristotle insists that the differentia

does belong to the category.

The

alternative

to

Aristotle’s solution is worse. If a differentia did not belong to the category it differentiates, the nature of each category would lie in some other category. In placing dif f erentiae within the categories they dif f erentiate, Aristotle broadens the notion of a category to include not only the entities that are properly instances of the categories b u t also the essential characteristics

these have.‘

These t w o ,

instances and characteristics, somehow belong to the same category, b u t they have a different status. We are supposed to be able to recognize qualities in the genus of substance. But if they are i n the genus of substance how could they be qualities? How c o u l d we know them as b o t h ? Despite the advantages this solution has o v e r the alternative, i t is scarcely more intelligible.

The problem undermines the existence of independent categories. A s I s a i d , current

philosophers have not been concerned

with this problem, and my account of i t is a p t to strike some as artificial. I suggest that the reason for this is that most current philosophers have embraced what I shall call o n e - l e v e l d i s t i n c -

tions. When Gilbert Ryle distinguishes "knowing how" from "knowing that" he offers his readers a set of examples.5 Somehow we are supposed to see what h e means from these examples o r , rather, to see how to use the d i s t i n c t i o n . I s uppos e that those who distinguish categories i n this way do not regard the distinction as anything that co u ld be—or s h o u l d be —inte llig i b l e : these are j u s t ways we speak, and i t is impossible to find more than family resemblances among distinct instances o f

knowing that, etc.

But I think there is really an element of

4There

object

i s a parallel broadening of t h e category w h e n Aristotle describes t h e of single science as a single genus (Metaphysics, I V , 2 : 1 0 0 3 b 1 9 ) . More

properly, the object is one genus and what belongs t o it per se (Posterior A n a l y t i c s , 1 : 2 2 ) . B u t t h i s broadening is benign because t h e p e r se attributes the science demonstrates do not belong t o t h e essence of t h e genus.

that

5Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Harper 8: Row, 1949) 2728, 40-41. This is a distinction that could, I think, be drawn quite sharply. Instead, Ryle emphasises the open-ended character of t h e way we recognise

i n s t a n c e s of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n : knowing how apparently involves being “ready t o d e t e c t and correct lapses, t o repeat and improve upon successes, t o profit from the examples of others and so forth."

EDWARD HALPER

194

self -deception here. In recognizing how to make the distinction we do grasp characteristic features. The problem is that these features

have a different

being distinguished.

ontological status from

the entities

What do family members have in c o m -

m o n ? , Wittgenstein once asked.6

N o t the nose, the l i p s , o r hair

color—not anything that we could see. As long as we insist that the common feature be p e r c e p t i b l e , we n e e d to reject universals

and intelligible categories. But we understand the family b y its c o m m o n h e r i t a g e . This is n o t h i n g we can s e e o r p o i n t t o , b u t i t is the way that we graSp what they have i n c o m m o n .

Heritage is an implicit second level that allows us to characterize the first level: it is what all the instances of the family share. Without this second level i t would be impossible to speak o f the

difficulties of finding characteristics possessed in common b y what is marked o u t b y the first level, the family in this case. The reason this case s e e m e d paradoxical to W i t t g e n s t e i n is that

the principle of intelligibility, the second level, does not resemble the items o n the first level. These reflections allow us to see the p r o b l e m o f differentia as a general p r o b l e m w i t h all d is ti nc tions .

the To

distinguish A from B we need another distinction C and D: A differs from B because A is C and B is D . But C and D must be what A and B are, yet they must also differ from them; they are o n another

level.

Moreover,

s i n c e the i s s u e is the i n t e l -

ligibility of A and B, i t is natural to posit C and D as ideas o r o t h e r intelligible e n t i t i e s , b u t this l e a d s to the problem that what

characterizes A is something of an entirely distinct ontological order, an idea.

The differentia is the principle of intelligibility of a category. The Aristotelian approach to the categories locates this principle of intelligibility in things. That is, C and D belong to the same ontological order as A and B. The dif f e r e n tiae of the categories are instances o f the categories. As I said, the consequences are devastating, b u t there is a certain c o n s i s tency and appeal here because Aristotle tries to include among the categories everything that is. I n contrast, if what I said

about Ryle and Wittgenstein is correct, their C and D are thoughts that are somehow excluded from the things we can usefully talk about. As a result, the thoughts are themselves unintelligible.

6Lud

wig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1971), I, §§ 66-67.

Hegel and the Problem of D if ferentia

195

Exactly the opposite of this latter approach is the Kantian treatment of the categories. Kant characterizes his categories through judgments. They represent the various ways we can combine subject and predicate. Here all the reflections concern the intelligible c o n t e n t . The intuited matter, A and B i n the previous s c h e m e , even though i t comes to b e subsumed u n d e r

an intelligible category, remains unintelligible.

Kant’s criticism of Aristotle is that his derivation of the categories is unsystematic, a deficiency Kant aimed to remedy by deriving the categories from the logical functions of j u d g ment.

I f we ask Kant, What really characterizes each category?,

i t seems to me that his answer is not ultimately better than that o f many

current

philosophers.

He takes his start

from

the

"technical distinctions recognized b y logicians," (A71 /B96) and his categories are read off of these judgments. Aside from examples, the only remarks that Kant has b y way of characterization concern the derivation of the three entries that fall under each of the four main headings. But insofar as these can b e derived from each o t h e r , o r from some o t h e r s c h e m e , the three are n o t independent categories a t a l l . There a r e , the n,

really four Kantian categories, and they are not justified b y anything else. These categories have no differentiae; b u t they are the differentiae of intuited things. The Kantian categories a p p l y to intuition; they are that b y w h i c h we think intuition. Because these categories b e l o n g to t h o u g h t , K a n t faced the enormous p r o b l e m o f j u s t i f y i n g their application to something that is u n t h o u g h t . This p r o b l e m is

tackled in the "Transcendental Deduction" of the First Critique, a n d K a n t ’ s conclusion, that we need thought i n order to have a n i n t u i t i o n , seems to undermine the problem rather than

resolve it. But I will not examine Kant’s reasoning here. Instead, I want to return to m y original question, what is it that characterizes o r differentiates entities within a single category? For Kant the entities are intuitions and the differentiae are The c o n c e p t s o r conCepts o r what he terms "categories." differentiae are supposed to be j u s t what the i n t u i t i o n s a r e , b u t they cannot b e because they belong to a distinct faculty.7 The attempt to differentiate intuitions b y means o f c o n c e p t s m u s t

fail because intuitions and concepts remain ontologically distinct.

70f.

Hegel’s discussion of Kant in the Encyclopedia, especially

§§ 45-46; 73-74.

Egg. (1830),

EDWARD HALPER

196

E v e n i f we know A as a C , we recognize that A is not C and I n speaking o f A , we are that C fails to characterize i t .

conceptualizing i t and thus treating it as something that is thought. Paradoxically, Kant maintains that we need to think through the nature of A to recognize it as something that cannot be thought. Something is terribly wrong with categories that b o t h are what they apply to and cannot b e what they apply t o .

II.

All this serves to motivate and to justify the Hegelian categories, for these categories avoid the problem. A s we saw, the problem of the differentia is the problem of making categorial distinctions intelligible. So long as the principle of intelligibility lies either within, the things o r in some distinct realm, such as thought, the problem will persist. Hegel’s move is to locate both the categories and their differentiae within thought. We can see that this is a kind of response to Kant, for i t eliminates the difficulty posed b y intuitive content that is thought and yet remains unthought. A t the same time, Hegel’s move seems tautological: surely the only way for us to consider categories is through thought; s o a n y category o r distinction that

we recognize must ultimately be a category of thought. Recognizing that all our experience must somehow be thought provides

Hegel

with

an

answer

to

the

most

persistent

of

objections to his Logic, the notion that in recognizing the rationality of all things, Hegel has left o u t something of paramount significance, the o b j e c t i v i t y o f t h i n g s . Any attempts

that we could make to speak of things must treat these things as the objects of o u r thoughts. Even i n insisting that they cannot be known we betray o u r knowledge of them and we recognize their intelligibility.

Hegel’s conception of the categories is the mirror image o f Aristotle’s. While Aristotle’s categories are things that are distinguished by things, Hegel’s are thoughts distinguished by thoughts. That is to say, both recognize the differentia as ontologically of the same order as what it differentiates. Can the Hegelian categories avoid the problem o f the differentia?

There are two features of the Hegelian categories that a l l o w them to avoid t h e p r o b l e m ; b o t h s p r i n g from the character

of thought and could not apply to categories of things. The first is self-reference. The requirement of self-reference is implicit in the recognition that the differentia must belong to

Hegel and the Problem of D i f ferentia

197

the same order as what i t differentiates. Clearly, no self - r e f ere n c e is possible as long as what

falls u n d e r

the categories

belongs to one realm and what makes them intelligible belongs to another.

Nor is there a n y self-reference

possible o n the

Aristotelian scheme because, whether o r not the differentia belongs to the same genus as what i t differentiates, it must be a different sort of thing. The Aristotelian differentia is either an instance o f another category o r i t belongs to the same category but is distinguished from what it differentiates as its quality. In contrast, if the objects in a category are thoughts and if their differentia

is also a thought, then i t is possible for

the differentia to have exactly the character that the objects have.

Exactly how they could be the same will be clearer once we recognize the second feature o f the Hegelian categories, dynamism. Hegel speaks of the categories "unfolding" and of "one category passing over into another." Most readers tend to discount these c l a i m s. Hegel is usually viewed as s i m p l y describing a group o f categories, rejectin g them for various

reasons and himself passing o n to others. How could process lie within the categories? M y contention is that the dynamism of the categories and their self-reference

are consequences o f Hegel’s solution to the

problem of the differentia. L e t us begin with an arbitrary category, A . To make A intelligible we need to say what i t is: we need to give its differentia. This requirement raises the same question we considered before, does the dif f erentia belong to A ? Again, insofar as the differentia is just what A is, i t m u s t b e l o n g to A ; b u t because n o mere instance o f A c o u l d s e r v e to differentiate A from anything e l s e , the differentia cannot belong to A . I t seems as i f we face the same dilemma as before, b u t H e g e l provides a way to skirt the p r o b l e m . The

only thing that could, without contradiction, characterize A and differentiate i t from the others is A itself. What Hegel does is to show that the category does differentiate itself. That is to say, rather than characterize A by C and face the difficulties of sorting out the relation of A and C , Hegel characterizes A b y A . A t first glance this is apt to seem vacuous: surely, A is A . This is a tautology that seems to tell us nothing. But this appearance is mistaken. The Hegelian categories, like the categories o f K a n t , are thought relations. To a p p l y one to itself is no s i m p l e endeavor. I t involves showing that the particular

category is itself an object of the thought relation that it expresses. As I understand the Logic, the argumentation aims

EDWARD HALPER

198

to show for each category that some sort o f self -re1ation holds. These self -re1ations are essential because t h e y differentiate

the categories. They make the categories intelligible, o r as Hegel often puts i t , they express the "truth" of the category. But Hegel’s self-relations avoid the difficulties that beset the Aristotelian categories only b y introducing a further level of complexity. In differentiating his categories, i n finding their truth, Hegel destroys them and they pass over into other categories.

A g a i n , the reason is easy to see i f we bear i n m i n d

our earlier reflections on the problem of the differentia. Aristotle’s problem is that the differentia of a category should belong to both the category it differentiates and another category. Hegel avoids having a differentia that belongs to some other

category

b y self-differentiation,

that

a move

is

possible only because he makes both the category and its But then, showing that the differentia thought relations. category is indeed differentiated, showing that it is characterized by itself, amounts to introducing further thought relations into So differentiation the content o f the category. A n d the cycle repeats itself. transformation.

amounts

I t s e e m s , t h e n , that H e g e l is keenly concerned

to

w i t h the

problem of the differentia and that he advances what amounts to a solution.

Since the differentia

is the principle o f intel-

ligibility of the categories, by speaking of categories of thought, He g el places both category and d i f f erentia o n the same o n t o l o g i cal plane. A s a result, the differentia can belong to the

category. While this seems to avoid the difficulty, the d i f f erentiation o f the category adds new content to i t and so transforms i t into another category. I f all this is r i g h t , the problem o f the d i f f erentia acts as a kind o f engine to produce the dynamic that

we see in the Logic. 111. A l l this is quite abstract, somewhat e m p t y , and drastically

in need of qualification. There is not time here to work out the details—I would need to discuss the entire Logic to make a really c o n v i n c i n g case. L e t merely draw y o u r attention to s o m e

passages where Hegel differentiates his categories: Being is and, t h u s , is nothing

(Logik

I , 6 8 ; 8 2 ) ; "Their vanishing

[that of

being and nothing in becoming], therefore, is the vanishing of becoming o r the vanishing of the vanishing itself ....Becoming as this transition

[ i . e . , as

this b e c o m i n g ]

is determinate

being"

Hegel and the Problem of Differentia

201

differentia, a determination o f the universal, i t contains an additional dimension and i s , thus, another category, particularity.

Ultimately, it is only the absolute whose differentia is just what it is; only the absolute is in and for itself. Thus, the character o f self -relation is transformed as the Logic progresses. Even i n the sphere o f b e i n g , the various modes o f self -relation are diverse. Nevertheless, the "truth" o f

a category in any sphere still adds content that is not contained in the category and so transforms the category into a different one. Hegel arrives at the "truth" of these categories b y making them intelligible, that i s , b y finding

their differentiae.

The

diversity of the modes of self -reference may seem to call into question my treatment of the problem of the differentia, but it really supports my analysis—or it would if I could work o u t the details here—because it shows how an analogous operation is used

to generate

categories

new

thus,

and,

that

the entire

development is rational. I have expounded

the problem o f the differentia

as if i t

were a completely general problem that could somehow apply in all categories, and i n a sense i t is. I n another sense, t h o u g h , the relations developed within each category are unique and arise from the character o f the category itself. I n each category o f

being, Hegel argues for self-relation to effect differentiation, b u t each argument differs and the mode of self -relation differs for each. In essence and notion, self-relation also effects differentiation, but what counts as self -re1ation is vastly different.

This difference

is a s i g n o f progress: to the extent

that self -relation is contained within the category, the category comes closer to the Absolute. Once the differentia of the category reached. Part

is j u s t

of

the

the

itself

category

difficulty

in

this

tracing

ultimate

the

has

problem

of

been

the

differentia through the Logic is that the terms of the problem are transformed; they depend o n the category b e i n g considered. What I have called Hegel’s treatment can at best b e the hollow shell o f h i s position, for i t lacks the recognition o f the necessary

diversity and richness of the development. It is misleading to speak o f Hegel’s response to the problem as i f the problem o f

the differentia were one problem rather than a problem to be faced anew in each category. I t is easy to confuse

my account

exactly the positions Hegel rejects.

o f the problem

with

From Aristotle through

EDWARD HALPER

202

contemporary

philosophers,

t h e d i s c i p l i n e o f l o g i c has b e e n

conceived as a method that is applicable to a wide variety of diverse contents. Logic has been taken to be a canon of reasoning. All valid arguments can, it is supposed, be expressed in logic.

I n contrast, the H e g e l i a n L o g i c i s c o n t e n t d e p e n d e n t .

Its arguments properly apply only to its own categories, and Hegel denies that any universal canon could ever be extracted. For just this reason it is a mistake to accept any account of the problem

o f the differentia

that p u r p o r t s

to a p p l y to all the

categories. Such an account must separate the logic of the differentia from the diverse contents of categories. On the other h a n d , the virtue of the universal account that I have given is that i t shows how Hegel uses the rejection of the distinction between logic and the content of logic, i.e. the distinction between what the category is and the way it is differentiated o r characterized, to solve the problem of the differentia. So, even though my account is universal, and thus inherently inadequate, i t , o r something l i k e i t , m u s t b e c o r r e c t .

The

problem

o f the differentia

and what I take to b e

Hegel’s response to i t point u p the difficulty inherent in any categorial t h i n k i n g .

We can—and do—apply the categories, b u t

when we try to think them individually, as they are in themselves, we are led to other categories. We find ourselves i n the position o f Plato i n his Parmem’des,

a dialogue m u c h admired

by Hegel: everything is related to everything else. What Hegel does is to w o r k through these relations organically and s y s t e matically. What is s i m p l y a p r o b l e m for o t h e r thinkers i s , for

h i m , a dynamic tool. The University of Georgia

Hegel and the Problem of D if ferentia

199

(Logik 1, 93-94; 106)8; "determinate being is a determinate being, a something" (Logik I , 103; 115); "being-for-self is first, immediately, a being—for-self—the One" (Logik I , 144, 151; 157, 1 6 3 ) ; "real discrete

quantity

is thus a quantity,

o r quantum"

(Logik I , 192; 201); "quantum as thus self -reIated...is quantitative ratio" (Logik I , 236; 240); "in this very externality quantum is self-related, is being as quality...this is the truth of quantum, to b e measure"

(Logik

I , 3 2 0 ; 3 2 3 - 2 4 ) ; "Absolute

indifference

[Indifferenz]...[is] determined as indifferent [gleichgultig]....But...it is the very nature of the differences of this unity to sublate themselves, with the result that...its indifference [proves] to be just as much indifferent to itself, to its own indifference, as i t is indifferent to otherness....Being, i n its determining, has thus determined itself to essence" (Logik 1, 381-83; 383-85).

A l l these categories belong to the s p h e r e o f

being. As we can see from these passages, i n this sphere any self —relation immediately sublates a category into another. That is to s a y , the process o f expounding a differentia, the process o f setting forth what a category is and what distinguishes i t from another category, adds n e w content to the category and s o transforms i t into something e l s e . For these c a t e g o r i e s , the

process of differentiating is a failure because what should be the e s s e n c e o f the category turns o u t to be another category.

Yet,

it is this very failure that serves to characterize the categories of being: the categories of being are categories whose essence lies i n another. To p u t this same analysis i n somewhat different

terms, my

claim that Hegel avoids the problem of the differentia by the self-differentiation o f the categories seems to b e false n o t b e c a u s e there is n o s e l f -predication—that there is s h o u l d now be o b v i o u s — b u t because this type o f predication d o e s not succeed

in remaining within the category it differentiates.

But Hegel

recognizes the transformations engendered b y s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n as p a r t o f t h e nature o f the categories o f b e i n g . Consequently,

though self-differentiation transforms a category into a new category, this new category is the "truth" of the original category and t h u s , s o m e h o w , the same.

Once we see t h a t the category

necessarily transforms itself, then we recognize the very transformation as its nature; c o n s e q u e n t l y , self - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , u n d e r s t o o d n o w as a d y n a m i c p r o c e s s , d o e s n o t a l t e r the

category.

8English translations in this paragraph are from A . V . Miller, Hegel’s Science of Logic (London, George Allen 8.: Unwin: 1969).

EDWARD HALPER

200

This recognition of transformation as part of the nature of a category reflects a movement to a new sphere, essence. The categories of essence are distinguished by the relations they have to the contrary in terms of which they are defined: thus, for example, identity is defined through difference (Logik II, 265; 417) and positive through negative.9 In this sphere, the differentia is included in the category it differentiates as its essence. However, this essence contains a reference to its contrary and thus also fails to express the nature of just the category. This reference

to a contrary is eliminated i n the sphere o f

notion, for the categories of notion posit themselves together with their relations to themselves. Describing the development of universal notion into particularity, Hegel makes a claim that characterizes self -differentiation i n the sphere o f notion while indicating the significance o f this process i n the determination

of other categories: I t [the

true,

infinite

universal]

determines

itself

freely; the process by which i t makes itself finite is not a transition, for this occurs only i n the sphere of being; it is creative power as the absolute negativity which relates itself to its o w n s e l f . As such, it differentiates itself internally, an d this is a determin-

ing, because the differentiation is one with the universality.

A c c o r d i n g l y , the universal is a process

in which it posits the differentiae themselves as universal and self-related. They thereby become fixed, isolated differentiae. The isolated subsistence o f the f i n i t e . . . i s , in its truth universality, the form

with which the infinite Notion clothes its differentiae—a form that is, i n fact, o n e o f its own differen-

tiae. (Logik 111, 36-37; 605)10

I n other words, the universal notion differentiates

itself without

passing into o r presupposing another category. Its differentia is just that self-relation that is its own nature. Though the universal notion is differentiated

9For

b y itself, insofar as i t is a

a concise account see E n s . (1830), § 114; 165-66.

10This

"differences.”

i s M i l l e r ’ s translation

with the substitution

of "differentiae"

for his

A Reply t o Edward Halper by Martin Donougho

Professor Halper’s paper presents us with the challenge of linking up Aristotelian beginnings with Hegelian endings. Hegel himself made (or perhaps forged) that link, as we know from the History o f Philosophy. to P l a t o , he says:

I n the course o f comparing Aristotle

What is expressed as actuality, energy, is just this negativity [no more than implicit in the unity o f the Platonic

Idea], activity, active efficacy [tdtige Wirksamkeit]: dividing itself—this being—for-itself—, sublating unity, and positing division [Entzweiung]—no longer being-for-itself b u t being-for-other, hence negativity over against unity. If for Plato the affirmative

principle—the Ide a , as merely

abstractly self-same—is dominant, for Aristotle what is brought into play and emphasized b y him is the moment of negativity; though not as alteration, nor as nothing, b u t as distinguishing, determining [Unterscheiden, Bestimmen].1

To Hegel’s way of seeing things, then, the principle of dif f erentiation or negativity, central to his own thinking, appears already i n Aristotelian e n t e l e c h y . Professor Halper claims i n his p a p e r that Aristotle did ( c o u l d ? ) not p r 0 p e r l y account for s u c h

a principle’s acting i n his system, but that Hegel could and did for h i s . With Aristotle the differentia remained a p r o b l e m , indeed all the more so for n o t being s e e n as such; whereas H e g e l both poses and s u c c e e d s in resolving i t . M y comments o n the p a p e r c o n s i s t o f attempted clarification as m u c h as criticism o f its argument, along with m y o w n s u g g e s t i o n s as to how the problem m i g h t e n t e r into H e g e l ’ s t e x t s . T h e y fall—for no very Hegelian reason—into three p a r t s . F i r s t , b r i e f remarks o n Aristotle and the p r o b l e m o f the

differentia (diaphord); then some points in passing o n the Kantian approach to ordering and articulating the world; and finally, short exegeses of two passages in Hegel’s Logic (i) o n

1Werke:

Vollstandige

Ausgabe

durch

einen

Verein

von

Freunden

des

Verewigten, 18 vols. (Berlin, 1840-47), Geschichte der Philosophie, XIV, 322. I n a footnote Hegel cites Metaphysics, V I I , 1 3 : " e n t e l e c h y d i v i d e s Ichorizeil." Cf. X I V , 3 2 0 : " T h i s principle of individuation, n o t i n t h e s e n s e of a c o n t i n g e n t , merely particular s u b j e c t i v i t y , but of a pure s u b j e c t i v i t y , i s what distiguishes Aristotle."

203

MARTIN DONOUGHO

204

the universal c o n c e p t i n B o o k T h r e e , and ( i i ) o n the way i n which differentiation enters ( o r emerges) i n B o o k One, especial-

ly in the thought of "Etwas" ("something" = hupokeimenon), where what I take to be the problem of differentia is faced head o n , i f n o t r e s o l v e d . 1 . Aristotle:

I claim no special expertise i n A r i s t o t l e , and enter

into this highly contested field only to try and sort out what The problem o f the differentia,

Professor Halper’s text means.

as Halper presents it, seems to me dual. On the one hand, (a) it touches on the status of the dif f erentia within the Aristotelian economy of ideas: whether, that is, the differentia "should be ranked with" the genus, as e.g. is claimed i n the Topics.2 In the passage from the Categories to which o u r attention is drawn (5:3a21), Aristotle writes that, like substance, the differentia is not "in" a subject (hupokeimenon) b u t may be said of (Iegetai)

of it.

Ackrill’s objection3 is that if the differentia (of a

substance) is not itself a secondary substance, i t ought to belong to some other category, when i t would have to be thought as being in substance—exactly what Aristotle here denies.

Yet that is clearly not scandalous, unless we happen to be Aristotelians,

concerned

with

the

internal

economy

of

his

thinking. No, the main objection ( b ) is rather to the manner i n which the differentia is to distinguish one substance from another. I f a distinctive character "belongs to" o r else is an instance of the genus i t differentiates, i t would not suffice to

explain the difference. If on the other hand i t does not belong to the genus it distinguishes, i . e . is different

i n k i n d , the very

nature of the genus—its tode ti—would lie in another sort of category altogether: a quasi-substance, say, or a mere quality (which would nevertheless not be a property in the genus), o r again, a mental idea. I take it, then, that the problem here is o n e o f thinking

difference

b y means

o f the categories,

not

merely of differentiating between the categories themselves. In o t h e r words, how d o the categories a p p l y to the actual world?

Halper p r o m p t l y generalizes the problem: whether o r n o t the distinguishing mark is o f the same order as what i t d i s t i n -

guishes, how can i t be used to explain the difference?

2Topic

s, I , 2 : l O l b , l 8 1 0 1 : " F o r t h e differentia, should be ranked together w i t h t h e genus."

31L.

Clarendon

Ackrill, Aristotle's C a t e cries and Press, 1 9 7 9 ) p . 8 6 .

Ryle’s

too, being generic i n character,

De Inter retatione (Oxford:

A Reply to Edward Halper

205

notion o f a "category mistake" simply ignores the problem

by

fiat: it declares merely that we haven’t learned to "play u p , play u p , and play the language-game." Wittgenstein’s "criterion" likewise does not seek to go behind o r beneath the play o f

language. I leave aside the question of whether this is fair to Wittgenstein, though o n one interpretation of "language-game" i t seems reasonable enough, while ignoring the circumstance that Wittgenstein probably would have thought that such "explanation" is j u s t not to b e had i n the first place.

2. Kant: If what is at stake is (as Halper puts it) the "intelligibility" of the categories, then Kant may be seen as stressing this side at the expense of their ontological status. Or to put it another way, transcendental idealism and empirical realism shall—rather like the lion and the lamb—lie down together, in some peaceable kingdom of ends. This tendency to formal abstraction is taken further in some ways by Trendelenburg in his influential "Kategorienlehre,"

which understamds the catego-

ries as mental concepts o r even as "the most general predicates."4

I must admit, though, that I find i t difficult to see how Kant advances or even addresses the problem raised by Halper. Rather, Halper seems to me to show w h y the problem couldn’t My e v e n arise within the terms o f the Kantian project.

puzzlement may have something to do with the distance that lies between Kantian and Aristotelian categories. It is true that the transcendental categories stand for the sole possible ways in which

beings can be determined

as to ( i n Aristotelian

terms)

what they are, how much, how they are, and in relation to what. But the problem Harper mentions—How are the categories to be distinguished from one another?—— seems again one of intellectual economy. Hegel wasn’t alone in complaining of the contingency of the categories’ derivation. But surely the above p r o b l e m o f differentiation

isn’t the main issue here.

The Transcendental Deduction aims only to prove that the pure categories constitute the sole conditions of possibility for objective experience—hence for there being objects—in general. "Categories

are

concepts

which

prescribe

law

a

priori

to

appearances, and therefore to nature, the sum of all appearan— ces" as Kant concludes in the First Critique. (B163) But Kant has not shown that reason (or the understanding) can so

4For

this tendency

see Franz

Brentano,

0 n t h e Several Senses of B e i n g i n

Aristotle, t r . Rolf George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975) C h . V .

MARTIN DONOUGHO

206

prescribe laws to nature, i . e . that nature w i l l o b e y them. A n d the categories we prescribe are transcendental—5c. pure c o n n e c tive—categories, n o t empirical concepts which synthesize and The p r o b l e m o f how to account for distinguish intuitions. difference in o u r categorizing d o e s n ’ t really come u p . A n attempt at c o p i n g w i t h ( b u t n o t explaining) the problem is found, rather, i n the Third Critique, i n its "transThe almost existential cendental deduction" o f j u d g e m e n t .

pathos of this work stems from the realization that nature might not be suited to our faculties and their ordering; that our a priori prescriptions of law to nature might amount to little more than whistling in the dark. We might not in fact be able to synthesize appearances into objective unities (i.e. apply empirical c o n c e p t s ) , o r find e m p i r i c a l regularities and l a w s , o r determine

genera and species in which to cage them. succeed

in ordering

nature,

the differentiae

So far as we do of our

various

entities and classes cannot be explained i n turn: they remain wholly contingent in application. We may indeed speak of "nature giving itself the rule."5 But that is what it is, a mere fagon de parler. 'All it means is that we have applied, for s u b j e c t i v e c o m f o r t , the r e g u l a t i v e I d e a o f nature determining

and categorizing itself. I n the e n d m y remarks may d o no more than underline

what Halper has in mind when he describes Kantian intuitions and categories as "ontologically d i s t i n c t . " S t i l l , I remain puzzled

as to why Kant is brought in at all, unless it is to point up his exemplary failure to raise a crucial problem in o u r thinking a b o u t the w o r l d .

3. Hegel: It is more than just amusing to conceive of Hegel’s L o g i c as a species o f ”Kategorienlehre," that i s , a n a t t e m p t to formulate the p o s s i b l e ways i n w h i c h we may say what s o m e -

thing is, how i t is, how much i t is, and in relation to what. Certainly Hegel thinks of concepts as more than mental o r grammatical entities—as they tend to be for Kant and Trendelenburg—but as having a reality outside the mind (onta kath’auto exo tes dianoias): not as subject, we might say, but equally as substance. While concerned with the intelligibility of the

concept

58cc

(der

Begriff),

he

would

also stress its reality

Critigue of Judgment, t r . Werner S . Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett,

1 9 8 7 ) , "First I n t r o d u c t i o n , " 4 0 3 - 0 4 : " H e n c e j u d g m e n t ’ s o w n principle in: N a t u r e for t h e s a k e of t h e j u d g m e n t , m a k e s t h e universal l a w s specific | a n d | i n t o e m p i r i c a l o n e s I according t o t h e form of a l o g i c a l s y s t e m . "

A Reply to Edward Halper

207

(Realita't). Nevertheless, are we thereby warranted in comparing Hegelian concepts and Aristotelian categories? ( a ) I n a t least o n e respect we s u r e l y a r e , for H e g e l himself

makes the connexion when he offers a sketch of Aristotle’s system in the History of Philosophy. Introducing the Categories and its discussion o f substance, g e n u s , p r o p e r t y , e t c . , Hegel notes that Aristotle is distinguishing here between the u n i v e r s a l ,

the particular (or "what Iegetai") and the individual o r singular

(Einzelne).6 Unfortunately Hegel stops short of commenting on the next term Aristotle brings i n , namely, the differentia.

All the same we can perhaps gauge his views from what h e does have to say a t the beginning o f the Subjective L o g i c . The three determinate concepts (Begriffe) Hegel takes u p are i n one sense n o t determined with respect to o n e another: " O n l y

bare representation [Vorstellung], for which it [distinction?] has isolated

the

process o f

abstraction,

can

fixedly

keep

apart

universal, particular and singular." (Logik III, 50) They are "sides" (Seiten) of universality itself, which is determined as a universal, sc. the determinate o r particular universal, sc. the g e n u s . Here the moment o f particularity may b e identified w i t h the differentia. Yet i t is i m p l i c i t i n the co n cep t not to abstract from the movement o f determining that results i n a d e t e r m i n a tion. Properly s e e n , t h e n , determinacy is here ( i n H e g e l ’ s

words) "total reflexion, double show [der Doppelschein], o n the one hand show outwards, o r reflexion into o t h e r , and o n the o t h e r s h o w inwards, intro-reflexion [Reflexion in sich]." (Logik I I I , 3 5 ) The former m o v e m e n t establishes hierarchies o f genera and s p e c i e s . B u t i t is in the latter that we find the m o m e n t o f

"peculiar and immanent character" serving to individuate and constitute

the genus as a determinacy

not severed

from

the

universal, o r (to phrase it otherwise) not o n this side of a limit o r b a r r i e r . Individuation is from this angle not the p r o d u c t i o n o f higher (and more abstract) genera, b u t points to the c o n c r e t e entities o f L i f e , E g o , Spirit, and A b s o l u t e Idea. The c o n c e p t

(der Begrif f) is termed "creative" precisely because i t determines i t s e l f , d i s t i n g u i s h e s itself, and returns to itself from its disparate form.

I need hardly underline how this accords well with Halper’s thesis that Hegel introduces a certain self -relation o r self -referentiality into the category (though it must be added

6Werke,

XIV, 404.

MARTIN DONOUGHO

208

that self -relation enters here o n l y i n the o b j e c t - language, rather than o n 3 meta- level, where i t would involve a dynamism between successive categories and how they relate to o n e

another).

One can formulate the Hegelian "solution" to the

problem o f differentia

thus: instances and differentiae

are n o t

separate sorts o f entity which we have somehow to recognize as immanent in a given genus, b u t part of an immanent process by which the genus—understood as universal concept—differentiates itself into species and singulars. Now, that hardly explains or justifies Hegel’s putative solution; and I doubt that even a more extended analysis of the text would help much here.

Other places i n the Logic m i g h t

take us further. We could turn to Book Two, for example, to that crucial—but also most dif f icult—introductory section where Hegel thematizes the very terms "intro-reflexion" and "shining into itself“ he will later use i n the passage cited above, as well as terms like "difference" and "essence" clearly bearing o n o u r problem.

The categories o f this second part comprise various

attempts to think relation to other without reducing that otherness to the term positing the relation. B u t , for convenience and familiarity, I propose instead to go back to the b e g i n n i n g

of i t all, that is, to the problem of the beginning, as explicated in Book One. ( b ) We have i t o n the authority o f the great logician K a r l Marx that "Aller Anfang ist s c h w e r . " None is more so than the beginning o f Hegel’s L o g i c . ”Being"—the first determina-

tion—has to

be absolutely indeterminate, unreflected, not

something retrospectively posited o r extrapolated.

How t h e n to

express what i t is, its tode ti? "Being, pure being—without any further determination;" (Logik I , 6 8 ) the dash serves, as i t w e r e ,

to place the subject matter within a frame, to step outside it in o r d e r to determine o r speak a b o u t i t . What is contained w i t h i n

the frame? Nothing; we may categorize it as empty, indeterminate, simple immediacy. But the same may be said of "Nothing": "pure being and pure nothing is 7therefore the same." (Logik I , 69, and note the s i n g u l a r v e r b ) . 7 I t is n o t that each

passes over (u'bergeht) into the other, Hegel goes o n , b u t rather that each determination

(qua determination)

"has gone over"

(fibergegangen ist)—always already, as some would like to p u t it. Yet the truth lies not just in their indiscernibility, but equally

7Cf. N o t e 2 , L o g i k I , 7 7 : " B e i n g and n o t h i n g is one and t h e same.” proposition expresses t h e truth as a s i m p l e result.

The

A Reply to Edward Halper

209

in their being not the same, their being absolutely distinct. It is t e m p t i n g ,

then,

to say that

difference that is simply there.

we "take

u p " o r "assume" a

Such a state of distinctness

however is (as the second note puts i t ) o n l y m e a n t (nur gemeint,

Logik I , 79): we cannot say what we nevertheless mean. How then

to articulate

what

w e mean ,

categorize

the difference

which is always emerging but which can never be expressed? "Dasein" ("determinate being") constitutes an initial attempt, in its successive guises as a determinate Dasein, and as "quality,” o r the immediate unity of (affirmative) reality and (privative) negation. Now, Aristotle associated the differentia with form; and it was i n relation to "figure" that Spinoza observed that "determinatio est negatio."8 Determinacy may thus be seen as negation, as privation. Hegel carries this suggestion further with the determination

”Etwas" ("somewhat"), which is discussed

alongside its negation (so. "other") under the general rubric of "the finite." I would dwell o n this section for several reasons. (1) "Etwas" seems to me equivalent to the Aristotelian "hupokei— menon," o r that of which things are said and i n which properties i n h e r e . ( 2 ) The dialectic o f constitution (Beschaffenheit) and limit (Grenze) makes q u i t e e x p l i c i t the basic aporia o f d i f f e r e n -

tiation: for the defining limit at once belongs to and yet is outside the thing.9 And (3) it corresponds to "the thing and its properties" as analyzed in the Phenomenology in a section whose Kantian-Leibnizian thematics may be traced through the subsequent attempt to establish individuation

dynamically,

viz.

as force and its expression, then as law and its formulation, u p to the reductio o f "the inverted world" and its bizarre a t t e m p t to articulate p u r e difference without t e r m s .

Can s o m e t h i n g be determined as what i t is b y its intrinsic

8Hegel

negation,

is cites S p i n o z a , and in t h e first edition correctly: ”Determination ( D e t e r m i n a t i o est n e g a t i o ) , said S p i n o z a ; — a proposition of universal

importance." (Logik I (1812), 76) 9.,This

dialectic already occurs in the Jena Logic: " t h e limit is thereby the

totality o r true reality, w h i c h , [when] compared w i t h i t s concept, contains its dialectic as w e l l , because t h e concept sublates itself therein i n such a manner

that i t has become

its own contrary.”

(Jenaer Systementwfirfe IIII Logik,

G e s a m m . W e r k e , V I I , 6 ; English t r . , The J e n a System l 1 8 0 4 - 0 5 ) : Logic and M e t a p h y s i c s , e d s . J o h n Burbidge and George d i Giovanni (Kingston and Montréal: M c G i l l - Q u e e n s , 1 9 8 6 ) 8 ) Hegel’s terms i n fact remain fairly c o n s t a n t through t h e several versions of his Logic, though t h e order of their disposition varies w i d e l y . loPhen.,

Chs. 2-3. The problem that " t h e inverted world“ addresses

t o t h i n k pure difference

without identity.

is how

MARTIN DONOUGHO

210

by

characteristics,

relations,

internal

or must

be

i t always

referred to something else? A thing is what i t is, and not another thing; b u t should the rider be considered part of what i t is?

Can something

b e determined/determine

itself "in sick

selbst" (as Hegel puts it) as purely self -same? Or is its "other" one o f its defining features? A g a i n , this problem is n o t posed ab extra, as i f from s o m e god’s e y e - v i e w that would enable u s

to consider both somewhat and other as determinate objects over and against such a privileged subject: it has to do with saying what is meant by speaking of a determinate "somewhat" in the first p l a c e .

N o w , it is a central insight of Hegel’s that the " b e ing—for-self" of a self -sufficient entity is also necessarily to be thought as its "being-for-other"; o r to rephrase, that totality o r the infinite must i n its movement comprise both unity and distinction.

In

the

Jena

Logic

such

a

relation

is termed

"differente Beziehung"—and the solecism alerts us to the conceptual discomfort of thinking a relation that both actively differentiates and is p as s iv ely differentiated, that posits ( b u t t h e r e b y annuls) distinction and at the same time presupposes

it.11 The difficulty comes to a head when otherness is characterized not simply as privative o r that which is (passively) excluded,

b u t as s e l f - r e l a t i n g ,

as " o t h e r to its o t h e r . "

This

astonishing formulation (which Dieter Henrich thematized as "autonomous

n e g a t i o n " and made

th e "operation-rule"

o f the

whole Logic)12 captures the paradox i n Hegel’s attempt to mediate

the two immediacies

o f existent determinateness

and

11See J e n a e r Systementwllr‘fe, L o g i k , G e s a m m . W e r k e , V I I , 4 4 : T h e J e n a S y s t e m , 4 7 , where i t i s translated as "differentiated c o n n e c t i o n . " I t occurs u n d e r

the rubric of "causal relation” (Verhfiltnis), t h a t is, force and its expression. A t h i n g i s w h a t i t i s , w e might s a y , o n l y by working o n and being worked o n by another t h i n g . T h e differentia must be t a k e n dynamically.

Jacques

Derrida

early

picked

u p o n t h e peculiarity

of t h i s expression

and

appealed t o i t in articulating his own notion of ”différance," or that which can never be totalised o r terminally determined b u t must always defer i t s meaning. H e cites a usage i n t h e l a t e r N a t u r p h i l o s o p h i e o n time and t h e present. ( S e e

Gesamm. Werke, VII, 194-95) B u t the earlier use in relation t o force is equally relevant, especially given h i s reliance o n t h e H e g e l i a n figure of "soliciting” forces.

See "Difference" (1968), in Margins of Philosophy, t r . Alan Bass University Press, 1982) 1 - 2 7 , at 13-14.

(Chicago:

12.See

especially his ”Formen d e r Negation in Hegels Logik,” in HegelJ a h r b u c h , e d . W.R. Beyer (Koln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1975) 245-56; and "Hegels Grundoperation. Eine Einleitung in die ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’,” in E Idealismus und seine Gegenwart. Festschrift fur Werner Marx Gebilrtstag, e d s . G u z z o n i e t a l . ( H a m b u r g : M e i n e r , 1 9 7 6 ) 2 0 8 - 3 0 .

sum

65.

A Reply t o Edward Halper

211

formal determining.

For myself I doubt whether Hegel can even now be taken to have explained the unity of these two immediacies. He does not, that is, manage to account for how the absolute Idea is to comprehend,

i n some deeper self -relation,

the two aspects o f

self -relating and exclusive negation (or rather excluded negatedness). Hegel is certainly ingenious i n showing how successive determinations

repeatedly

take

account

of

otherness

and

difference, i.e. determine themselves rather than presuppose determination ab extra. We might accordingly call differentia-

tion the "dialectical motor" of suggests. external

"the

entire Logic, as Halper

But isn’t transition (Ubergehen) always in turn the fate

o f such

determinations,

escapes thematizing capture? and centrally addressed

the factor

that always

Hegel may well have identified

the problem o f the differentia,

and he

may have made it the "dynamic tool" of his procedure. But as to whether he has thereby resolved the p r o b l e m , neither he nor

Professor Halper has succeeded in convincing m e .

The University of South Carolina

INDEX Absolute, 7 - 9 , 1 1 , 1 3 , 1 6 , 7 9 -

b e i n g , 5 - 1 0 , 1 3 , 1 8 , 20ff, 4 0 ,

80, 8 2 , 1 1 3 - 1 4 , 1 1 5 - 1 7 , 1 2 1 23, 124-26, 134, 1 3 5 136,138-139, 148, 15960, 166, 186, 201; Idea, 5 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 4511, 50n, 63, 64, 6 9 70, 82, 179, 185-186, 207;

42, 6 2 - 6 4 , 7 8 - 7 9 , 81, 8 3 - 8 9 , 9 3 - 9 4 , 96, 99-100, 101-03, 108, 110-11, 146-48, 1 6 1 66, 172, 181, 185, 198, 204 b e i n g - f o r - a n o t h e r , 10

Relation, 136

abstract, 59ff

Being-for-self, 100, 1984

Ackrill, J . L . , 192m, 204

being-in-itself, 10

actuality, 112, 118, 123ff, l 4 0 f f , 144

Belaval, Y., 136n

1 0 - 1 2 , 1511,

Bernoulli, J . , 24n antinomies, 1, 3-4, 129, 135

Biard, J., 137n a ppearance, 6 5 , 1 0 1 - 0 2 , 1 1 5 ,

117, 133, 148-49

Biasutti, F . , 132n

A r i s t o t l e , 1 8 , 2 0 , 2311, 8 8 93, 96, 129, 137, 187-201, 205

Bole, T . J . , 149n

Arnould, A., 24n

Brentano,

attribute(s), 113, 116ff, 149

Brown, L., 127n

Baillie, J . B . , 61, 6111, 70-72, 74, 8 2

B u r b i d g e , J . , 1 6 n , 9911, 1 3 6 n , 156n

Bardili, C . G . , 128

Burke, K., 157n

becoming, 6-9, 20, 22,40, 81, 88, 89-92, 97, 162, 165-66, 173, 198

Buvat, D., 137n

Bradley, F.H., 73, 80

Chisholm, R.M., lOln

beginning

(of

the

Biibner, R . , 9 n , 1211

F., 205n

Chierighin, F . , 132n

Cicero, 24n

Logic),

2 8 f f , 40, 43, 47, 55, 61, 63, 79, 81, 83, 86, 87, 89, 1 6 6 67, 172, 207

cognition, 3 3 , 3 5 , 3 9 , 4 7 , 6 9 , 132

213

214 159, 162-63, 171-72, 17677, 184-86

closure, 168

Collingwood, R.G., 78, 78n difference, 104-06, 107-09,

concept (Begri f f), 11-13, 6065, 69, 72-74, 79-81, 83, 89, 1 4 7 , 1 6 7 , 174, 1 7 8 , 1 8 3 , 185, 204, 205-208 concrete, 59ff, 117, 172 consciousness, 33-35,

114-18, 121-23, 204, 208 differentia, 191-202, 2 0 3 04, 207-08 di Giovanni, G., 16n, 106n, 127n, l36n, 146, 146n

3511,

36-41, 43, 46-47, 6 2 - 6 3 , 67, 8 7 , 105, 184

Doz, A., l37n

Diising, K . , 131n content, 40, 45ff, 5 0 - 5 3 , 5 5 56, 62, 6 8 - 6 9 , 73, 81, 83, 153-54, 159 contingency,

133,

137ff,

145ff, 150, 205 contradiction, 4, 6, 106-10, 117, 148, 174

Erdmann, J.E., 141 14ln

essence, 10, 82, 99-102, 11316, 118-19, 123, 126, 134n, 137-39, 141-42, 146, 167, 173-74, 186, 199, 208 existence, 18, 22, 91-98, 115, 137-38 '

Dahlstrom, D., 174n

faith, 68 d’Alembert, J . l e G . , 2 2

feeling, 68 Danto, A., 101n Dasein, 1 8 , 2 2 , 9 1 , 9 8 , 1 0 6 , 209-10

Fichte, J.G., 129n

94-96,

101n,

Davidson, D., 35n

Findlay, J . , 72-73, 7311, 171, l 7 1 n , 174, 175

degree, 80

F l a y , J . , 8 5 , 8611, l 6 1 n

Descartes, R., 34, 94

Fleischmann, E., l36n

determinacy, 38-41, 43, 56, 167, 178, 183-84, 187

force, 116, 133, 134n

de Vries, S., 113n

form, 40, 46ff, 50-53, 55, 56, 8 3 , 93, 95m, 149, 207

dialectic(al), 3-4, 154-156,

foundation(alism),

46,

49,

215

Index

53-54, 56, 104-05 Holderlin, F., 130, 130n

freedom, 97, 188

holism, 49

Frege, G . , 20 Houlgate, S., 177n, 182n Gadamer, H.-G., 6n, 8, 87, 87m, 9 1

H u m e , D . , 103m

Geraets, T . , 89n

1, 11

ground, 115, 147, 174

idea(s), 78, 81;

Giacin, M., 132n

transcendental, 3-4

Good, F.A., l39n

Grier, P., l71n

identity, 6, 67, 72-73, 83, 105-10, 115-16, 121ff, 147, 162, 200

Gueroult, M., 119, ll9n

Il’in, I . A . , 6 l n

Guerriere, D . , 8 5 , 8 5 n , 8 8

i m m a n e n c y , 4O

Guzzoni, U., 106n Hale, S.C., 59n, 60n

immediacy, 42, 42n, 68, 878 8 , 9 9 - 1 0 1 , 1 0 2 - 0 5 , 117, 146, 148-50

H a r r i s , E . E . , 68m, l 4 0 n , 1 7 1 , 171n, 174, 177n,

56, 98, 107-10

Harris, W.T., 136n

intuition, 68, 83

Hartmann, K., l3n, 146n

irony, 157ff

Hegel, Carl, 141, 141n

Jaeschke, W., 127n

Heidegger, M., 8, 143n

Janke, W., l29n

H e n r i c h , D . , 2711, 2 9 , 3 1 , 40ff, 1 0 3 n , 1 3 6 n , 2 1 0

Job, 182, 182n

indeterminacy, 5, 35, 38, 54-

Johnstone, H.W., 155n Heraclitus, 89-91

Kainz, H . , 127n Hibben, J.G., 66, 66n, 67n

Hoffmann, T.S., 137n

Kant, 1., 1 - 3 , 6 , 9 , l l , 1619, 94-96, 98, 101m, 128m,

216 128-133,135,142,184,19598, 205-06 Kein, 0.,

Loux, M., 60n

Lucas, H.-C., l4ln

129n

127n, 136n,

Kevergan, J . - F . , 137n Lukacs, 136n Kierkegaard, S . , 5 5 , 55:1, 1 6 9 M a i m o n , S . , 128

Kimmerle, H . , 132n M a k e r , W . , 3411

K l i n e , G . , 6 1 , 6111, 1 2 0 n

Manville, A., 9n Kling, J.-F., 137n Marcuse, H . , 1 3 6 n

Kojeve, A., 179 Marx, K., 155n, 208

Kriiger, L., 128n McTaggart,

J.McT.E.,

73,

136n

Lacroix, A., 137n

mediation, 39-42, 42n, 43,

Lagrange, J. L., 19

67, 86-88, 148

Lakebrink, B . , 140n metaphor, 157 Lasson, G., 9n

metaphysics, 1, 4-7, 9, 94, 94m, 9 5 , 1 1 3 , 1 4 6 , 1 5 4

Lauth, R., 129n Leibniz, G. W., 21, 10m, 113n, 135

24m,

m e t h o d , 4 5 , 45m, 46—47, 5 0 , 53-55, 56, 83, 153, 172, 17778

Leonard, A., 99n, 140n Miller, A . V . , l l 4 n

L e w i s , B . , 5911

modal(ity), 135-36, l 3 9 f f , 148ff

Locke, John, 78 l o g i c , d i a l e c t i c a l , 5 1 , 179;

formal,

51-52,

153,

Mode(s), 116ff

174,

1-2; general, 182n; s p e c u l a t i v e , l , 4 , 1 2 , 24; transcendental, 1-2, 4, 51-

Mueller, G . , 1 5 7 n

52

Mure, G . R . G . , 6 2 , 6211, 9 9 n , 136n

Longuenesse, B. 137n

N e c e s s i t y , 131 - 3 2 ,

135-37,

217

Index

l46ff, 150 possibility, 1 3 3 , 1 3 5 , 137, negation, 10, 13, 20, 31, 40, 42, 45, 50-51, 53, 73, 86-87, 89, 101, 107-08, 113, 12026, 150ff 159ff, 163, 166

139-40, 142, 151ff pre-Socratics, 1 5 4

presupposition(less), 28ff, 39 Newton, 1., 1 9 Rameil, U., 141n Nietzsche, F . , 1 6 9

Reason (Vernunft),

7, 9, l6,

17, 33, 43, 54, 64, 82, 17181, 183-89, 2-05

Noel, G., 136n

Nothing, 5 - 8 , 20, 40, 63, 81, 85-91, 97, 114, 162-63, 208 Nuchelmans, G., 60n

object, 2 , 12, 14, 32, 35, 37, 38-39, 41, 47, 83, 130, 147, 205

Redlich, A., 106n

Reflection, 95, 99-100, lOlff, 110, 114-18, 121, 146ff, 150, 173, 183, 186 Reich, K., 128n

o n t o l o g i c a l di f f e r e nc e , 6

Reinhold, K., 128

Opposition, 107

rhetoric, 153, 156

Parmenides, 67, 162

Riesinger, P., 103n, 109n

P a scal, B . , 2 4 n

Ripke, W., 129n

phenomenon, 101

Rosen, M., 27n

Phenomenology, 30-34, 36-

Rosen, S., 16n, 179

40, 42n, 43, 47, 63, 72, 79, 86, 132, 172-73, 179-80, 209

Rosenkranz, K . , 1 3 0 n , l 3 4 n ,

141, 141n Pinkard, T., 10, 10n, lln, 13n

Ryle, G . , 193, l93n, 204

Pippin, 12., 147n

Sartre, J . - P . , 97

Plato, 6 7 , 9 2 , 1 1 0 , 1 5 5 , 1 5 5 n ,

scepticism, l, 86, 101, 102,

167, 167n, 202, 203

103n, 113n

Poggeler, 0 . , 139n, 146n

130n, 133n,

Schelling, F .W.J . , 129n

218 S c h l e g e l , F r . von, 1 5 7 n

201

Schneider, H., 130n, l35n,

Understanding (Verstand), 1 , 6 - 8 , 17, 19, 68, 80, 82, 86, 87, 89, 133, 153—54, 159-60, 162-63, 167, 171-182, 183189

139n Schulze, G.E., 128

self, 106

validity, 154, 157, 159 self-consciousness, 73, 75

11, 63,

Self-development, 48, 53, 56,

Variety, 107-08 Verra, V., 127n

6 0 - 6 3 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 77 Wallace, W., 99n

Shelton, L., 59n Webb, C.W., 7n

Show (Schein), 99-101, 1020 4 , 110, 114-15, 173

W e l l e k , R . , 15711

Socrates, 1 6 0

Westphal, M., 171, l71n

S o m e t h i n g (Etwas), 2 0 4 , 209

White, Haydn, 157n

Spinoza, B., 113,115ff, 132, 135, 142, 209, 209n

Winfield, R.D., 51n, 55n

Spirit, 70, 72, 83, 132, 172, 179, 207

Wittgenstein, L., 194. l94n, 205

Yamane, T., 137n Stanguennec, A., 129n

Zimmerli, W., 181, 18ln Steinbock, A., 127n subject, 12, 14, 33, 35, 83, 105, 130

substance, 113, 116ff, 131137, 142, 186, 204, 206 Taylor, A.E., 120n

Trendelenburg, F., 205-206 truth, 47, 55, 65, 72, 79, 96,

100, 114-15, 165, 185, 199,

ESSAYS IN HEBEl’S lDGIS George di Giovanni. editor This book, covering all aspecrs of Hegel's logic, raises fundamental issues as well as particular problems of interpretation. It discusses whether a speculative logic is possible at all and whether Hegelian logic requires a metalogic or whether it can and ought to make an absolute beginning. It examines, conceptually and historically, the being-nothing dialecric, the relation of errence to thaw (Scbein). and Hegel’s treatment of the modal categories. It proposes radically different views of the role of the 'understanding' in Hegelian logic and a radically different view of the necessity underlying it. The book concludes with the argument that Hegel's dialeCtical logic can cope with a problem that Aristorle's could not. Etta]: on Hegel ’: Logic provides a welcome introducrion to those

intereSted i n t h i s central peice o f Hegel's system, and it

poses the question of whether, and how, the logic provides a closure to the system. In different ways, and with different degrees of explicitness, the book deals precisely with this issue. George di Giovanni is Professor of Philosophy at McGill University. He co-translated Between Kant and Hegel: Text: in tbe Development of Port-Kantian Idealirm, also published by SUNY Press.

State University of New York Press ISBN 0-7914-0292-4

ll

II

80791 402924

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