Equality by Design: The Grand Experiment in Destratification in Socialist Hungary 9780804765220

Citation preview

Equality by Design The Grand Experiment in Destratification in Socialist Hungary

Equality by Design The Grand Experiment in Destratification in Socialist Hungary

Szonja Szelenyi in collaboration with Karen Aschaffenburg, Mariko Lin Chang, and Winifred Poster

Stanford University Press S T A N F 0 R D ,

C A L I F 0 R N I A

1998

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 1998 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University Printed in the United States of America CIP

data are at the end of the book

For

Max and Dashiel

Preface

The history of modern and postmodern stratification can be read, in large part, as a history of egalitarian projects; some of these appear to have stalled, while others are still under way. Although classical sociological theory has long sought to understand (or promote) such projects, there has been relatively little empirical research that directly addresses the viability and consequences of modern efforts to reduce class- or gender-based inequality. We seek to fill such a gap and thus provide new evidence on some of the most pressing sociological questions of our time. Our main objective is to analyze the "grand experiment" with socialism and postsocialism in light of core sociological debates about the evolution of modern class systems and the circulation of elites, managers, and workers within such systems. Up to now, the area studies literature has examined such distributional transformations in only the broadest of terms, while the sociological literature on the logic of industrialism and postindustrialism has focused disproportionately on the capitalist case and thereby failed to appreciate that this presumed "logic" was in fact highly contingent. In this sociological literature, scholars conventionally distinguish between (:r) a social democratic trajectory driven by expansion of the state-sponsored service sector, (2) a low-wage trajectory in which unemployment is averted by reducing wages and expanding the manual unskilled sector, and (3) a classic postindustrial trajectory in which much of the expansion occurs at the top of the class structure. We will emphasize here that none of these conventional models adequately describes central European class transformation, which instead proves to have a characteristically "socialist face." This is not to suggest that such transformation can be interpreted as purely egalitarian. To the contrary, we will show that the professionalmanagerial sector expanded dramatically during the secondary stages of socialism, even more so than either the most extreme critics of socialism (e.g., Djilas) or the most ardent apologists for postindustrialism (e.g., D. Bell 1976) had anticipated. In accounting, then, for the relatively long run that socialism enjoyed, one has to bear in mind the important legitimizing effects

viii

Preface

of providing a substantial sector of the population with the well-known perquisites of New Class membership. We will further suggest that these distributional transformations worked to obscure the failure of class-based quotas and other egalitarian reform. Indeed, because the expansion of the professional-managerial sector created many vacancies at the top of the class structure, there was much opportunity for upward mobility despite an almost eerie constancy over the last half century in relative mobility chances. Although some commentators have improperly attributed such structurally induced mobility to counterselective practices and related egalitarian reform, the log-linear and log-multiplicative models that we use throughout our analyses will reveal that relative mobility chances in fact remained largely unchanged. The great achievement of socialism was not, therefore, to alter therules of mobility, but rather to increase the size of both the working class and the New Class, thereby creating many New Class "slots" to be filled and many workers to fill them. We shall also suggest that while counterselective reform was largely unsuccessful in reducing class-based inequality, allocative rules pertaining to gender were comparatively malleable. The so-called second revolution within central Europe effectively equalized male and female outcomes with respect to educational attainment, labor force participation, and occupations. This result is all the more striking because class-based reform was fundamental to the socialist agenda, whereas gender egalitarianism was conveniently seized upon to provide ideological underpinnings for a full-employment economy. In explaining the resistance of class-based stratification to state-sponsored reform, it is no doubt relevant that socioeconomic inequalities are reproduced within families, while gender-based inequalities are not similarly undergirded by kinship interests. When families are faced with radical egalitarianism in the form of quotas and counterselection, one cannot expect them simply to cede their countervailing interests in reproduction, no matter how committed to the socialist project they may be. We shall therefore be revisiting the age-old antinomy between the family and the socialist enterprise that Engels, among others, identified. This book began to take shape as a chapter that I was invited to contribute to a comparative study of educational opportunities in thirteen countries. I was asked to extend the now-classic statement on educational inequalities by Simkus and Andorka (:r982) and thus return to old debates about the effects

Preface

ix

of class-based quotas on socioeconomic attainment in Hungary. I am grateful to Yossi Shavit and Peter Blossfeld for giving me the opportunity to contribute to their book and, in so doing, rekindling my interest in what might be termed state-sponsored destratification. The research reported here was funded by the Joint Committee on Eastern Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, a Title VIII Postdoctoral Research Fellowship through the Hoover Institute, a National Academy of Education Spencer Fellowship, and a William and Flora Hewlett Faculty Grant in International Studies, as well as by several faculty fellowships (Annenberg and McNamara) and a generous research account from the Dean's Faculty Research Fund at Stanford University. A National Science Foundation grant awarded to Ivan Szelt!nyi, Donald Treiman, and me funded the original collection of the data that are used in Chapter 7· Since the beginning of my project, Stanford University has provided me with a work environment that, for all its political strife and tumultuousness, has nonetheless been intellectually challenging. Among my colleagues here, I am indebted to Cecilia Ridgeway, Dick Scott, Mikk Titma, Nancy Tuma, and Buzz Zelditch for taking time out of their busy schedules and providing me with useful feedback on various parts of this manuscript. I am, moreover, especially grateful to Jerry Herting for methodological advice that proved on many occasions to be invaluable. Many of my students at Stanford have helped me in the preparation of this manuscript. Karen Aschaffenburg was my research assistant when the Shavit-Blossfeld team asked me to write the chapter on educational inequalities in Hungary. She assisted in unraveling the many mysteries of the :1983 Hungarian Social Mobility and Life History Survey and in writing several sections of Chapter 2. Winnie Poster joined the project when it was already in its book phase and contributed to Chapter 5. In addition to reviewing some of the relevant literature on gender stratification, she also read the entire manuscript and provided me with comments that, in several instances, saved me from embarrassing mistakes. Mariko Lin Chang, who served as my research assistant during the production of Chapter 6, implemented with great skill the logit and multinomiallogit analyses based on the 1993 Hungarian Elite Survey. Karen, Winnie, and Mariko are listed as coauthors of these separate chapters, but their work actually spills into many other parts of the manuscript. For this reason, and in the interest of consistency, after

x

I

Preface

this preface I use the first-person plural throughout the book. This should not, however, be taken as committing the coauthors of specific chapters to the views expressed in chapters of which I am the sole author. Although my research assistants were especially involved in the production of the manuscript, several other graduate students at Stanford have helped me as well. Henry Anaya assisted in assembling the literature review for Chapter 6; Mark Royal reviewed the comparative literature on elite mobility and circulation; Kim Weeden kindly provided much methodological expertise; and Nancy Weinberg carefully researched for me the literature on ethnic minorities in Hungary. Very special thanks go to my undergraduate students as well-Sunrise Hart, Adam Miller, Sarah Porter, and Elisabeth Spilman-who provided me with comments and reactions that were more helpful than they likely appreciate. And I am especially grateful to Angela Booker for introducing me to Stanford Sierra Camp, where David, Max, and I spent a delightful time vacationing with Stanford alumni in the summer of :1995. I completed a new section of the book (Chapter 4) at the camp and received valuable comments from the alumni when I presented Chapter 6 to them in the weekly faculty lecture. Since the beginning of my research, I have greatly benefited from the encouragement and critical advice of friends and colleagues who have commented on various parts of this book. I am especially grateful to Michael Burawoy, Bob Hauser, Mike Hout, Michael Kennedy, Andy Walder, and Erik Wright for their careful guidance and enthusiastic support at different stages of my project. I am also indebted to Rudolf Andorka, Eva Fodor, Janos Ladanyi, Tamas Kolosi, Peter Robert, and Janos Tfmar for reading and commenting upon portions of the manuscript. It is too often the case that, in the course of manuscript review and production, an author's editor becomes an adversary. Nothing could be further from the truth in the present case. As the manuscript review process unfolded at Stanford University Press, my editor, Muriel Bell, proved to be not merely a truly superior editor, but also a mentor, trusted friend, and confidant. I am most grateful for her assistance and advice. It must be conceded that books of this nature come about not only through institutional and disciplinary support, but also because family and friends make sacrifices of various kinds. Many such sacrifices might be rehearsed here, but given that this book emphasizes the role of friends and family in subverting admission quotas, I would be remiss in failing to note

Preface

xi

that my first sociology professor, Riaz Hassan, collaborated with my mother to admit me to a sociology program at Flinders University that, at the time, was so popular that students were selected by lottery. As argued here, socialism is rife with family-sponsored subversion of various kinds, but this personal example reminds us that such subversion is endemic to all modern bureaucratic systems, socialist or otherwise. Needless to say, my friends and family have supported me in other ways as well. While I worked on this project, my father provided not merely fatherly encouragement but also expert advice, while my mother-in-law moved in with us to assist with child care while I was completing the first draft. As we all know, the most precious commodity of an academic is time, and I am accordingly grateful to Stacey Vierra, our nanny, for providing me with just that by taking my first son, Max, on daily outings and adventures. I am also thankful that my second son, Dashiel, kindly and patiently delayed his entry into this world until the final manuscript was in place. Finally, in the course of my writing this manuscript, David Grusky has been my most treasured colleague, advocate, and critic. He has, of course, read the manuscript more times than he wished and fewer times than I would have preferred. Szonja Szelenyi

Contents

1

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

2

Schooling for Socialism with Karen E. Aschaffenburg

21

3

The Class Structure of Classless Hungary

42

4

Family Origins, Collective Property, and the State: Trends in lntergenerational Class Mobility

59

5

Quotas and Careers: Trends in Intragenerational Class Mobility with Winifred R. Poster

78

6

Where Have All the Cadres Gone? The Fate of the Old Elite in Post-Communist Hungary with Mariko Lin Chang

99

7

Farewell to a Socialist Experiment

122

Appendix A: University Application Forms Appendix B: The 1983 Hungarian Social Mobility and Life History Survey Appendix C: Mapping of the 1983 Hungarian Standard Occupational Classification System into Class Categories Appendix D: Class Mobility Tables

135 141

187

Notes Bibliography Index

199 213 243

1

145

Tables

2.1 2.2

2.3 2.4 3·1 3·2 3·3 4·1 4·2 4-3 4·4

4·5 5·1 5·2

Descriptive Summary of Variables Used in the Analysis of Hungarian Educational Opportunities Effect of Social Background on Highest Year of Schooling Completed: Hungarian Men and Women Born Between 1911 and 1960 Effect of Social Background on Educational Transitions: Hungarian Men Born Between 1911 and 1960 Effect of Social Background on Educational Transitions: Hungarian Women Born Between 1911 and 1960 Distribution of Class Positions in First Job and at Age 30 by Respondent's Year of Birth Distribution of Class Positions in Hungary in 1983: All Respondents Aged 25 to 64 Gender Differences in Distribution of Class Positions in First Job and at Age 30 by Respondent's Year of Birth Selected Models Applied to 9 x 9 Intergenerational Mobility Classifications in Four Hungarian Birth Cohorts, Men Only Selected Models Applied to 9 x 9 Intergenerational Mobility Classifications in Four Hungarian Birth Cohorts, Women Only A Decomposition of Trends in Hungarian Intergenerational Mobility Under Model II*, by Gender Maximum-Likelihood Scaling of Class Categories (Row and Column Effects) Under Model II* for Four Hungarian Birth Cohorts, by Gender (Intergenerational Tables) Class Persistence Parameters Under Model II* for Four Hungarian Birth Cohorts, by Gender (Intergenerational Tables) Selected Models Applied to 9 x 9 Work-Life Mobility Classifications in Four Hungarian Birth Cohorts, Men Only Selected Models Applied to 9 x 9 Work-Life Mobility Classifications in Four Hungarian Birth Cohorts, Women Only

27

36 38 39 50 50 54 67 68 69

71 74 87 88

Tables A Decomposition of Trends in Hungarian Work-Life Mobility Under Model II*, by Gender Scaling of Class Categories (Row and Maximum-Likelihood 5·4 Column Effects) Under Model II* for Four Hungarian Birth Cohorts, by Gender (lntragenerational Tables) 5·5 Class Persistence Parameters Under Model II* for Four Hungarian Birth Cohorts, by Gender (Intragenerational Tables) 6.1. Selected Examples of Nomenklatura Positions in Hungary 6.2 Description of Variables Used in the Analysis of Hungarian Elite Mobility 6.) Demographic Characteristics of the Hungarian Nomenklatura Elite in 1.988 6.4 Family Origins of the Hungarian Nomenklatura Elite in 1.988 6.5 Educational Background of the Hungarian Nomenklatura Elite in 1.988 6.6 Political Characteristics of the Hungarian Nomenklatura Elite in 1.988 Networks of the Hungarian Nomenklatura Elite in 1.988 Social 6.7 6.8 Intragenerational Mobility Among the 1.988 Hungarian Nomenklatura Elite of Elite Membership in Post-Communist Determinants 6.9 Hungary 6.1.0 Determinants of Surviving in Particular Elite Positions in Post-Communist Hungary

I

XV

5·3

88

90 94 108

1.1.0 1.1.2 113 113 1.1.4 114 115 117 119

Figures

:1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3·1 3·2 3·3 3·4 3·5 3·6 4·1 4·2 4-3

Active Earners in Hungary, by Industrial Branch Distribution of Active Earners in Hungary Between the Ages of 15 and 54, by Gender Percentage of Working-Class Children Among First-Year Students at the Karl Marx University of Economics, 1949-84 The Hungarian Educational System Mean Number of Years of Schooling Completed by Hungarians, by Gender and Birth Cohort Percentage of Hungarians Completing Primary School, by Gender and Birth Cohort Percentage of Hungarian Primary School Graduates Attending Secondary School, by Gender and Birth Cohort Percentage of Hungarian Secondary School Students Completing Secondary School, by Gender and Birth Cohort Percentage of Hungarian Secondary School Graduates Attending Tertiary School, by Gender and Birth Cohort Percentage of Hungarian Tertiary School Students Completing Tertiary School, by Gender and Birth Cohort Distribution of Class Positions in First Job Distribution of Class Positions at Age 30 Distribution of Class Positions in First Job, Men Only Distribution of Class Positions in First Job, Women Only Distribution of Class Positions at Age 30, Men Only Distribution of Class Positions at Age 30, Women Only Inflow Rates into Hungarian Managerial Class for Men, by Birth Cohort (Intergenerational Tables) Inflow Rates into Hungarian Managerial Class for Women, by Birth Cohort (Intergenerational Tables) Outflow Rates from Hungarian Small Proprietor Class for Men, by Birth Cohort (Intergenerational Tables)

8 10 13 24 30 31 32 33 34

35 51 52 55 56 56 57 63 64

65

Figures

4·4 4·5 4·6 4·7

4·8

5·1 5·2 5·3 5·4 5·5 5·6 5-7

5·8

5·9

5.10

7·1

XVII

Outflow Rates from Hungarian Small Proprietor Class for Women, by Birth Cohort (Intergenerational Tables) 66 Changes in Hungarian Class Structure: Scale Values from Unconstrained Model II* for Men (Intergenerational Tables) 72 Changes in Hungarian Class Structure: Scale Values from Unconstrained Model II* for Women (Intergenerational Tables) 73 Changes in Hungarian Class Inheritance: Parameter Estimates from Unconstrained Model II* for Men (Intergenerational Tables) 75 Changes in Hungarian Class Inheritance: Parameter Estimates from Unconstrained Model II* for Women (Intergenerational Tables) 76 Inflow Rates into Hungarian Managerial Class for Men, by Birth Cohort (Intragenerational Tables) 82 Inflow Rates into Hungarian Managerial Class for Women, by Birth Cohort (Intragenerational Tables) 83 Outflow Rates from Hungarian Small Proprietor Class for Men, by Birth Cohort (Intragenerational Tables) 84 Outflow Rates from Hungarian Small Proprietor Class for Women, by Birth Cohort (Intragenerational Tables) 85 Inflow Rates into Hungarian Houseworker Class for Women, by Birth Cohort (Intragenerational Tables) 86 Changes in Hungarian Class Structure: Scale Values from Unconstrained Model II* for Men (Intragenerational Tables) 91 Changes in Hungarian Class Structure: Scale Values from Unconstrained Model II* for Women (Houseworkers Excluded) (Intragenerational Tables) 92 Changes in Hungarian Class Structure: Scale Values from Unconstrained Model II* for Women (Houseworkers Included) (Intragenerational Tables) 93 Changes in Hungarian Class Inheritance: Parameter Estimates from Unconstrained Model II* for Men (Intragenerational Tables) 95 Changes in Hungarian Class Inheritance: Parameter Estimates from Unconstrained Model II* for Women (Intragenerational Tables) 96 Types of Egalitarian Reform in Socialist Hungary 129

Equality by Design The Grand Experiment in Destratification in Socialist Hungary

:1

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

It was just another day in the life of Janos Kadar. The First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the official representative of the Hungarian workers' state left his office in a police-escorted motorcade to make an appearance (pofafiirdo) at a nearby construction site. When he arrived, he exited his black Volga, donned a blue workman's uniform, picked up a shovel, and posed for the customary picture for the Hungarian daily, Nepszabadsag. He answered a few questions from newspaper reporters and then returned to his office in a black suit and tie. On the following morning, Nepszabadsag ran Kadar's picture with a caption intended to convey that socialist leaders were part of, allied with, and committed to the working class. In publishing this picture, was Nepszabadsag merely "painting socialism" (Burawoy :r99:r) as worker-friendly, or was it providing us with a partly realistic picture of socialist class relations ?I As oppositional intellectuals in Eastern Europe and the West so readily note, socialist elites were often heavy-handed in disseminating ideology, yet one ought not assume that such ideology was necessarily bankrupt merely because it was harnessed for legitimating purposes. This issue has been approached from two opposing perspectives, one emphasizing the achievements secured through socialism, and the other expressing disappointment with the class-based inequalities that remained. Among scholars taking the first ("optimistic") view, the unstated presumption is that changes in the structure of inequality reflect not merely the rise of universalism and other apolitical forces, but also the "potentially autonomous" (Skocpol :r979: 29) reforms and interventions of egalitarian state elites (see esp. Szymanski :r977; Zhou, Tuma, and Moen :r996). There is much anecdotal evidence suggesting, for example, that under socialism the elite was wholly reconstituted as a worker-led and worker-dominated class (see Nyiro :r99o). During the :r98os, leading members of the Hungarian

2

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

Socialist Workers' Party started their careers as factory workers or farm laborers (Bela Biszku, Lajos Czinege, Andras Gyenes, Pal Losonczi), as printers or mechanics (Janos Borbandi, Jen6 Fock, Imre Gyori, Rezs6 Nyers, Frigyes Puja), and as painters, stonemasons, or related craft workers (Antal Apro, Gyorgy Aczel, Janos Lukacs). 2 Indeed, while we began this chapter suggesting that Janos Kadar's photo shoot for Nepszabadsag may have had propagandistic elements, one surely cannot question his working-class origins and heritage. A mechanic by training, he had a connection to the proletariat that was legendary in Hungary, with one commentator (Gati 1986: 172) enthusing that "however many books [Kadar] has read ... and however much he had come to be recognized around the world, he continues to identify with the industrial working class and with the cause of socialism." This anecdotal evidence of worker-friendly reforms has by now been supplemented with quantitative evidence suggesting that under socialism inequalities in income decreased (Matthews 1972; Flakierski 1989; Walder 1989), educational opportunities expanded (Simkus and Andorka 1982; Robert 1991; Mateju 1993), and differences in prestige between manual and nonmanual occupations narrowed (Parkin 1971; Giddens 1973; Szalai 1977). The "pessimistic" view, by contrast, minimizes the successes of egalitarian reform and emphasizes the inequalities that persisted. This approach has a natural affinity with classical elite models (e.g., Pareto 1966; Mosca 1939), since the presumption is that history can be read as a succession of selfinterested ruling classes superimposed on a fundamentally static base. Under this formulation, one expects great flux and change at the top of the social system, yet the contours of inequality within the general population are assumed to be rooted in more fundamental structural-functional imperatives that render them impervious to political reform and intervention (Andorka 1990a, b). In some variants of this view, evolutionary changes in the structure of inequality are more fully appreciated, but these are invariably represented as arising from such forces as universalism, modernization, and other equally apolitical processes (see, e.g., Ganzeboom, DeGraaf, and Robert 1990). Although scholars working within this framework may well have been impressed by early egalitarian reforms, they typically argue that the quotas and other counterselective reforms introduced after World War II were often inconsistently applied and, in most circumstances, short-lived (see, e.g., Simkus 1982, 1984; Nee 1989a; Wong and Hauser 1992). The initial attempts to

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

I

3

build an egalitarian socialism were thus overturned by a second stage in socialist development (Kelley and Klein :1986) marked by the crystallization of inequalities and the emergence of new privileges (Ossowski :1963; Nove :1983a). There is considerable research emphasizing such "second stage inequality" in prestige hierarchies (Inkeles :1966; Lin and Xie :1988), social mobility (Connor :1979; Simkus et al. :1990), educational attainment (S. Szelenyi and Aschaffenburg :1993), and monetary and nonmonetary rewards (Walder :1986; Nee :1989a, :199:1). The well-known perquisites of socialist political elites have also called into question the egalitarian nature of socialist states. As many studies have shown, Communist Party functionaries enjoyed definite social, political, and economic advantages: they attended Party schools; shopped at special stores; vacationed at the most desirable holiday resorts; received state-subsidized housing; purchased expensive cars, vacation homes, or meat; and participated frequently in cultural activities (Connor :1979; Whyte and Parish :1984; S. Szelenyi :1987; Lenski :1994). These perquisites led some commentators to conclude that the political sphere was central to the stratification system of socialist societies (Goldthorpe :1966; Bauman :1974; Kennedy and Bialecki :1989), while others have even suggested that the political elite constituted a New Class under socialism (Djilas :1957; Konrad and Szelenyi :1979). 3 There is, then, a long tradition of relevant scholarship, but it is not altogether free of shortcomings. In characterizing this literature, we would note in particular a tendency to rely exclusively on anecdotal evidence, especially when describing inequalities among socialist elites and the putative New Class (e.g., Voslensky :1984). It is further assumed that any evidence of elite perquisites is sufficient to cast doubt on the sincerity or efficacy of egalitarian reform. If only implicitly, scholars thus hold socialist societies to a higher standard than that to which they would hold capitalist societies and assume, correspondingly, that elite inequalities signal a more fundamental unraveling of the broader socialist egalitarian agenda. These difficulties arise partly because socialist societies are too frequently studied without an explicit comparative frame, and the null hypothesis of no "socialism effect" is consequently difficult to quantify. We shall address such problems, albeit only partially, by analyzing random samples of both elites and the general population and by carrying out comparisons across the full scope of presocialist, socialist, and postsocialist history. The principal contribution that we seek to make, however, is to explore

4

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

the implications of rigorously distinguishing the effects of socialist reform on the distribution of inequality from its effects on the underlying rules by which this inequality is allocated. Although the distinction between distribution and allocation is a fundamental one in stratification theorizing, it has not yet adequately informed much of the relevant literature on socialist reform (for relevant exceptions, see Simkus et al. 1990; Wong and Hauser 1992). What must be stressed here is that the socialist agenda involved far more than simply restructuring the distribution of inequality by eliminating some classes and downsizing others. To be sure, such objectives were important ones, and we shall therefore explore in some detail the often unpredictable ways in which they played out (see Chapter 3). The more fundamental and ambitious objective of socialism was, however, to rewrite the very rules by which individuals are allocated into educational and class positions. This objective is ambitious (and some might even say naive) for the simple reason that classes by their very definition bestow on their incumbents differential control over social, cultural, and economic capital; one cannot, therefore, readily restructure the life chances that such classes imply. The more important point, for our present purposes, is that prior scholars have all too often conflated changes in these underlying allocative rules with analytically separable changes in the distribution of educational and class-based inequalities. We shall seek to rigorously tease out these formally distinct effects of socialist reforms (see Chapters 4, 5, and 6). Although this book is principally about class inequalities and changes therein, we cannot possibly do justice to the socialist experiment with egalitarianism without considering also the concomitant revolution in gender relations. Indeed, as we will argue, socialism has generated not one but two revolutions in Hungary. The eradication of the ownership class is well known, but the sociological implications of the sudden and near-universal incorporation of women into the formal economy have not been as widely debated, perhaps in part because the ideological underpinnings of socialism stressed issues of class over those of gender. It must nonetheless be emphasized that both revolutions were egalitarian experiments by design, albeit ones that were implemented in very different ways. Most notably, class egalitarianism was pursued by coupling strong cultural and ideological supports (i.e., propaganda) with weak and arguably naive institutional reforms (i.e., class-based quotas), whereas gender egalitarianism was weakly theorized at the ideological level but deeply institutionalized in ways that al-

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

5

lowed women to better coordinate their productive and reproductive lives (Scott 1978; Schwartz 1979; Molyneux 1981b, 1982). In accounting for such differences, it is surely relevant that the Marxian blueprint emphasized class-based reforms. Yet the functional requisites of early and advanced socialism were such that gender egalitarianism proved in the end to be the more crucial reform (if only by virtue of easing labor shortages). Moreover, socialist elites often represented class-based egalitarianism as dysfunctional (see Lenin 1971 [1919]: 331 on "equality mongering"), and there was accordingly less incentive for far-reaching institutional reform. The secondary theme of this book, then, involves exploring the sociological implications of mixing cultural and institutional reform in differing amounts. The skeptical reader might by now be wondering why one would wish to undertake such an analysis of socialism so soon after its apparent demise. Although we shall also seek to contribute to the now-fashionable literature on the postsocialist transition (see Chapter 6), we think that the unprecedented experiment in destratification that socialism represents is in many ways theoretically more revealing than the more common exercise of restratification that is currently under way in Hungary and other countries in Eastern Europe. This experiment speaks to (1) the possibility of constructing incentive systems that rely on moral rewards and sanctions rather than material ones (see Walder 1986; Lenski 1994), and (2) the viability of reducing class-based differences in life chances without also dismantling the family and thereby eliminating kin-based pressures for intergenerational reproduction (see Engels 1968 [1884]). When destratification movements rise again in new or hybrid forms, these same organizational and institutional dilemmas will perforce remain; we are therefore well advised to exploit and better understand the evidence that now exists on the limits and possibilities of egalitarian reform. We shall next set the stage for our analyses by providing a brief overview of the social context of radical reform in Hungary. In Sorokinian fashion (1964 [1927]), one might represent Hungarian history as formed by successive waves of destratifying and restratifying forces, with each of these stages solving some of the stratificatory "problems" of the past but also engendering new problems that were ultimately addressed through further reform and revolution. We shall thus distinguish between the stages of presocialism, classical socialism, consolidated socialism, reform socialism, and postsocialism.

6

Designing Equality in a Socialist Seti:ing

The Presocialist Era, 1929-48 At the turn of the century, Hungary was a highly traditional and agrarian society, with a little over half of its working population still engaged in agriculturallabor (Kovrig 1970; Koncz 1984a). 4 In this country oflandlord and peasant, agricultural property was principally controlled by the nobility, whereas the masses worked for wages as tenant farmers, landless laborers, or estate servants. As Balogh and Jakab (1986: 8) note, 41.2 percent of the arable land was in the hands of those who owned over 100 cadastral holds, while over three million Hungarians were either landless or owners of less than five cadastral holds. 5 Although the peasants who worked on the large agricultural estates were formally free from serfdom, they nonetheless labored under such deplorable circumstances that this period is conventionally labeled the "second edition of serfdom" in Hungary (Berend and Ranki 1974: 5). 6 Due to the semifeudal nature of the Hungarian social structure, as well as the country's dependence on foreign capital, industrialization progressed at a very slow rate. Fearful of the effects of rapid modernization, small independents were reluctant to expand their operations, and large-scale manufacturing was correspondingly rare? Factory organization did emerge in some industries (e.g., iron production and foodl processing), yet small-scale production dominated the Hungarian industrial landscape well into the twentieth century (Koncz 1984a; Swain 1992). In the early 1940s, industrial development took off under the influence of World War II, but the subsequent war-related destruction was so complete that, by 1949, Hungary's industrial capacity had returned to prewar levels, with fleeing Hungarian fascists (nyilasok) and migrating independents exporting much capital and thus further contributing to the postwar economic devastation (Berend and Ranki 1974; Unger and Szabolcs 1979).8 The social and economic consequences of World War II were obviously enormous. 9 Although these are well-documented in the historical literature, it is still useful to review them here, if only because the Hungarian experiment with socialism cannot possibly be understood without the recognition that it occurred in the context of a war-devastated economy and society. We shall not attempt to undertake here the sterile exercise of isolating the net effects of war and socialism; however, we do wish to emphasize that many features of existing socialism reflected not a generic Marxian blueprint, insofar as one can even be said to exist, as much as the exigencies of social and economic life in a postwar society. For example, the characteristic labor

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

I

7

shortage (and the consequent "forced emancipation" of women) can be partly attributed to intrinsic features of command economies, but one ought not to forget that World War II dramatically thinned the labor force and accordingly set the stage for state labor force policy that had enduring (i.e., path-dependent) implications for the development of socialism. By most accounts, approximately 50o,ooo people perished in war-related battles (Balogh and Jakab 1986: 23), and an estimated 40o,ooo Jews died either locally or in German concentration camps (Kovrig 1970: 53). An additional 90o,ooo men were captured and held as prisoners of war, and many of these did not return to Hungary until the mid-1950s (Seifert 1992: 23). The Hungarian population was further reduced by the massive "migration of peoples" (nepi vtindorltis) that took place after the war. This migration was dominated by those who were persecuted (or feared persecution) in the aftermath of the war and the transition to socialism; for example, virtually all ethnic Germans were expelled from the country, while many of the remaining Jews left for Israel, and the more ardent anti-Communists (e.g., proprietors, old officials, and others) fled Hungary for either economic or ideological reasons (Kovrig 1970: 53; Szanto 1977: 413; Seifert 1992: 24). 10 The characteristic socialist emphasis on heavy-industry development was likewise forged in the context of postwar economic devastation. According to most estimates, war-related property loss in Hungary totaled $4.3 billion (Gella 1989: 174), with the damage to transportation systems being especially severe.U By virtue of seven months of intense warfare on Hungarian soil, a great many roads and bridges were destroyed, and approximately 40 percent of all railway lines were rendered unpassable (Balogh and Jakab 1986: 22; Simons 1991: 39). Moreover, many factories were severely damaged, and agricultural production fell to an all-time low in the years immediately following the war. As with World War I, Hungary thus emerged very much on the loser's side, and the social and economic infrastructure was accordingly in a "state of disarray" (Kovrig 1970: 51). In this obviously fragile context, it is not hard to understand why the transition to a Soviet-style economy was relatively swift and, for the most part, politically unopposed.

Classical Socialism, 1949-55 Following the lead of its Eastern European neighbors, the National Assembly adopted in 1949 the Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic, wherein the Hungarian state was pronounced to be "the state of the workers

8

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

Percentage

80 ----Agriculture

70

-------- Industry •·•··•···•··· Other

60

50

,"------ ...····· ~-

40 30

/

····· 20 -~~

.....

/

/

/

....············

---

, ..... ......······················-·~,{~---·····

.,., .... ~---- .... _,..,., .... """

~------------"

10

1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

Figure 1.1. Active earners in Hungary, by industrial branch. Sources: Andorka and Harcsa 199ob: 91; Central Statistical Office 1990: 19. and the working peasants" such that "all power belonged to the working people" (Balogh and Jakab 1986: 95; see also Seifert 1992: 44-45). In the course of the subsequent nationalization project, large estates were broken up, agriculture was collectivized, and major industrial enterprises became state-owned. 12 As a consequence, virtuallly all economic activity was centrally coordinated by the state, and market forces played little or no role in the allocation of resources. The Communist Party further sought to dominate political culture with a unitary ideo1ogy and to assume all executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The transition to a modern economy was hastened by substantial investment in labor-intensive industries and by the transfer of labor from agriculture to manufacturing. As shown in Figure 1.1, industrial employment comprised only 16.1 percent of all active earners in 1900 and remained at this low level through World War II, but then increased substantially as the postwar period unfolded, leveling off at roughly 40 percent in the 198os. The oft-

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

J

9

cited irony of this trajectory is that the so-called proletarian revolution (proletar forradalom) in Hungary took place in an essentially peasant setting. Much as in Soviet Russia, therefore, it was socialism that gave birth to the industrial proletariat rather than vice versa (see Connor 1991: 26). In examining the stratificatory features of the immediate postwar years, scholars all too frequently forget that the transition to socialism not only generated a sizable industrial proletariat, but also drew a large number of women into the labor force and thus led to historic changes in the composition of the proletariat. Indeed, the demand for industrial labor in this period was so great that the male labor supply was quickly exhausted, and a statesponsored campaign to recruit women into the labor force commenced. 13 This is not to suggest, of course, that women's entry into the workforce began with socialist industrialization. The first wave of female labor force participation in fact occurred with the onset of industrialization in the 189os, when textile, food, and tobacco factories began to recruit women in large numbers (see Koncz 1984a). By the turn of the century, women were finding jobs in the trade, service, and health industries, especially in their administrative and clerical sectors. Due to the expansion of educational opportunities during this period, women also entered select professions, such as nursing, midwifery, and teaching (see Koncz 1984b). However, the most fundamental changes did not take place until the end of World War II, when the transition to a socialist economy greatly increased the level of female labor force participation. It was also during this period that women were redefined as legal equals to men under the electoral law of 1945 (Corrin 1992a). The progressive incorporation of women into the paid labor force is illustrated in Figure 1.2. As shown here, the percentage of economically active women took off during the 1950s, rising from 34-6 percent in 1949 to 70.8 percent in 1980. This level of economic integration is similar to that observed in other Eastern European countries (Lapidus 1977, 1981; Peers 1985), but it is well above that reported for Western democratic regimes (see, e.g., Vianella and Siemienska 1990; Duggan 1992; Einhorn 1993).l4 Although it is difficult to establish post facto whether the massive integration of women into the socialist economy was due principally to economic factors or ideological ones, it should be emphasized that under either formulation the state was deeply involved in redesigning gender relations. 15 If, then, the "forced emancipation" of women was an important component of the destratification project, it was nonetheless class-based reform

10

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

Percentage

100 90 80 70 60

,,, ....

50 40

,

..

,,,, ,, ,, ,,,,

---------------------------

.

,,,,' ,,,,

Men

30

-------- Women

20

10

Q-L-,-----------.-----------.-----------.-----------.-1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

Figure 1.2. Distribution of active earners in Hungary between the ages of 15 and 54, by gender. Source: Central Statistical Office 1990: 23.

that constituted the centerpiece of socialism. The egalitarian policies that one typically associates with the socialist blueprint were aggressively pursued in the immediate postwar years in Hungary (Simkus 1982). These policies had four features. First, large estates were broken up and land was distributed among agricultural workers, thus, ironically, increasing the number of small proprietors (Swain 1985: 195; Andorka 1980). 16 In 1945, for example, over 6oo~ooo peasants were given dwarf landholdings of five holds for purposes of farming (Donath 1976: 423; Seifert 1992: 28), while another 35o,ooo people were given yet smaller plots of land for building their own homes (Nemes 1973: 57). Over the next decade, however, the state gradually reclaimed these lands and established large-scale agricultural cooperatives in the countryside (Benda 1983: 1042)Y Partly by persuasion and partly by more forcible methods, small landholders were encouraged to relinquish their independence and enter the cooperatives. The latter methods have long attracted scholarly censure in the West:

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

I

11

All of us who spent time in the villages as professional or amateur ethnographers collected stories about the abuses of power: the peasant who was ordered to stand in his heavy winter coat beside the overheated stove in the town hall and was asked every hour if he was ready to sign; the teacher-kolhoz organizer who soon became known for his strange habit of pushing his pencil-the symbol of his profession-up a man's nose, toward his brain, while he lectured him about the social and economic advantages of collective farms. (I. Szelenyi 1988: 150)

Whatever the methods, the socialist project thus significantly reduced, but never completely eliminated, the class category of small independents (Vasary 1990: 170). 18 The second notable feature of the class-based destratification experiment was the establishment of counterselective quotas in educational and occupational recruitment. By giving preference to working-class and peasant children, these quotas were devised to equalize life chances across the class structure and, more importantly, to legitimate the political elite as workerdominated and -controlled. The most radical reforms could be found in the educational system. 19 During the 1950s, for example, the quotas specified that half of all students admitted to secondary schools and tertiary institutes must have working-class or peasant backgrounds (5. Szelenyi and Aschaffenburg 1993). This policy was implemented by requiring every school to establish a special admission committee (felveteli bizottsag) whose main task was to assess both the academic and the social credentials of all applicants. 20 As we shall see, the process by which members of such committees evaluated students has direct relevance for our conclusions, and it is accordingly useful to review this process here in some detail. In the case of universities, admission decisions were based on extensive evidence and documentation, but the official university application form (torzslap) was clearly crucial.Z1 We have reproduced in Figure A.1 an example of this form for the Karl Marx University of Economics in Budapest (Marx Karoly Kozgazdasagtudomanyi Egyetem) during the early 195os. 22 In section 34 of this document, applicants were asked to report the occupation (foglalkozasa) of their father (apja) and mother (anyja), the name (munkahelye) and address (cime) of the company for which they worked, and the amount of their personal property (vagyon) and monthly income (havi jovedelme). These data pertained to parental standing not merely at the point of application, but also in 1938, before the changes wrought by World War II and the socialist transformation. Finally, applicants were required to reveal whether their parents received property

1.2

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

during the land redistribution program in 1.945 (section 35), whether they were currently members of an agricultural cooperative (section 36), and whether they ever employed anyone in their business or on their farm (section 38). 23 Following the directives of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Kozponti Bizottsag, or KB), members of the admission committee were then required to sort applicants into three main categories: workers, intellectuals, and th~~ so-called x-class (ikszesek). The committee was further instructed to favor working-class children, to recruit only a modest number of intellectuals, and to exclude from admission all descendants of the x-class. 24 Although KB admission policy changed over time, the central directives in 1.952 are representative of those applied during the period of classical socialism (see Ladanyi 1.994: 46-48). These directives can be summarized as follows. 1.. The category of workers included children of blue-collar employees as well as routine nonmanual workers in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors of the economy. In addition, surprisingly, this category contained children of so-called working peasants (dolgoz6 parasztok), defined as independent producers with one or two employees and a limited amount of land (up to one hold). 25 The children of communist cadres (kiemelt kdderek) were also classified as workers, since in these cases the KB only considered their fathers' original occupations (which were, indeed, usually of a bluecollar sort), not their current managerial or leadership roles within the socialist economy. 26 2. The category of intellectuals included all those applicants whose fathers had completed tertiary education or were employed by the state as artists, writers, or journalistsY 3· The x-class included children of the former landowning aristocracy, owners of major plants and factories, owners of apartment houses, and in-' dependently wealthy individuals, as well as managers, political leaders, policemen, and military officers of the ancien regime. This class also served as a residual designation for all those who were politically suspect under socialism. 28

How effective were these directives? The prevailing view, based on published data released by university officials, is that they had their intended effect (see Ladanyi 1.994). As Figure 1.. 3 shows, the proportion of working-class

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

I

1. 3

Percentage 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

1949

1952

1955

1958

1961

1964

1967

1970

1973

1976

1979

1982

Figure 1..3. Percentage of working-class children among first-year students at the Karl Marx University of Economics, 1.949-84. Source: Ladanyi 1.994: 43·

children in the total population of first-year students at the Karl Marx University was at or above the mandatory level of 50 percent during the quota years (from 1.949 to 1.960), but declined thereafter. We would suggest, however, that all such "optimistic" conclusions have been prematurely reached. Indeed, Figure 1..3 is potentially misleading because it does not take into account distributional changes in the population at large, nor does it address the possibility that members of the x-class misrepresented their standing or even returned to school after the quotas were removed (Ladanyi 1.987: 33). It is no less problematic to assume that admission rates at the Karl Marx University were necessarily representative of rates at other institutions that were less prominent and hence played less important legitimating roles. In the following chapters, we will examine more closely the impact of the quota system on mobility opportunities in Hungary, but for now these data make it clear that, at least on the face of it, the quotas may have had their intended effects. The implication here is that, during the classical stage of socialism, membership in the working class and political loyalty to the Communist Party were arguably more important for mobility chances than were

14

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

the usual forms of cultural capital, such as educational credentials. 29 As is conventionally argued, workers with sound political credentials were promoted quickly through the social hierarchy, while formal educational credentials secured in the presocialist period were tainted and were accordingly a hindrance to individual mobility. 30 The third feature of the socialist destratification project was the deliberate embourgeoisement of the working class (Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bachofer, and Platt 1969).31 .Whereas the counterselective policies that we have just examined were designed to increase rates of individual mobility out of the working class, the embourgeoisement project might be represented as a consolation prize of collective upward mobility offered to those who remained in the working class. This project proceeded in largely cultural terms, with the so-called glorification of manual labor (Parkin 1969: 356-6o; Treiman 1977: 144-45) showing up in socialist realist art, in official pronouncements and proclamations, in national holidays celebrating workers, and in state efforts to legitimate socialist elites by virtue of their working-class heritage. The Stakhanovite movement, which might be regarded as the socialist version of Taylorism, also appealed to the dignity of craft labor and exhorted workers to uphold that dignity through renewed political enthusiasm and productivity. 32 The fourth, and final, feature of the Hungarian destratification was a rising rate of structural mobility as agricultural workers were shifted into heavy industry (Szabady 1977b; Andorka 1980), full-employment policies were unveiled (Benda 1983: 1050), and women were encouraged to enter the formal labor force (Rueschemeyer and Szelenyi 1989). The last policy, in particular, was fostered by the state-supported expansion of child-care facilities, the socialization of many domestic responsibilities, and the introduction of a series of progressive family policies.33 For example, working women in Hungary were entitled to twenty weeks of fully paid maternity leave, extra paid holidays to care for their families, and several days of leave to nurse ailing children. Moreover, with the introduction of the child-care grant (GYES, or Gyerek Eltartasi Segely), women were allowed to retain their positions at work and return to them (or similar ones) at the completion of their nurturing years (Szabady 1977a; Barta, Klinger, Miltenyi, and Vukovich 1985).34 In addition to these benefits, families with children were provided with a monthly "family allowance" and a variety of state-supported services, such as highly subsidized pediatric care, free education, discount

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

15

rates on medicine, and low-cost child care (Ferge 1976, 1978, 1979). Although some of these programs were not introduced until relatively late in the socialist period, they were nonetheless consistent with the egalitarian agenda of classical (i.e., early) socialism.

Consolidated Socialism, 1_956-67 The classical stage of socialism ended abruptly with the 1956 revolution. Although the regime and its dissidents have offered diametrically opposing interpretations of this uprising, its proximate social consequences are beyond dispute. It is well known, for example, that 2, 700 people died in the street fighting that was generated by the revolution, 2o,ooo were seriously injured (Feher and Heller 1989: 202), and tens of thousands were affected by the harsh retaliatory policies (megtorlas) of the postrevolutionary government. Moreover, nearly 400 people were executed, 35,000 were subjected to police investigation, 22,000 were sentenced to prison, and another 13,000 were interned between 1957 and 1958 (Seifert 1992: 64; Lomax 1989: uo21).35 For our present purposes, however, it is especially important to note that during this period of revolution and retaliation 1o,ooo workers were expelled from their jobs and another 2oo,ooo emigrated to Austria, Australia, and the United States (Feher and Heller 1989: 202; Seifert 1992: 64). The latter departures, forced or otherwise, clearly created vacancies at the top of the class structure, but in the absence of representative surveys one cannot readily estimate the class distribution of those who exited the system and hence the extent and direction of the consequent structural mobility. The period that followed is often referred to as "consolidated socialism" (Simkus 1984: 795) because of the political compromises that Janos Kadar, the newly appointed leader of the Communist Party, was obliged to make. The post-1956 era thus constitutes that "second stage" of socialist development in which social inequalities allegedly solidified and the cleavage between the Party elite and the masses crystallized (Ossowski 1963; Kelley and Klein 1986; S. Szelenyi 1987). It was during this period, for example, that class-based quotas in educational recruitment were eliminated. Beginning in 1961, admissions to secondary and tertiary institutions were no longer determined by considerations of social class, but by "the preparedness, suitability, and moral attitude of the candidates" (Balogh and Jakab 1986: 194). Moreover, while political considerations continued to play an important role

1.6

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

in the selection of socialist leaders, educational credentials were now also putatively taken into account. The dramatic nature of these changes is illustrated by the revised application form for the Karl Marx University during the mid-1.970s (see Figure A.2). In part II, candidates were still asked to describe the class positions (jelenlegi foglalkozasa) of their fathers and mothers, but this information was elicited in much less detail than it had been, and it played a significantly weaker role in admission decisions. The overall evaluation of the candidate at the end of the application form (see section headed "az Iskolaztatasi Bizottsag velemenye") focuses exclusively on scholarly potential and refers neither to class characteristics nor to political credentials. 36 By the mid-1.96os, economic conditions in Hungary had also begun to change, with the classically favored policy of heavy-industry development approaching its limits because of labor shortages. In the early socialist period, such labor-intensive development was fueled by drawing on women, former agricultural laborers, and the unemployed; all of these labor sources were largely exhausted by the mid-1.96os. This development likely reduced the amount of structurally induced mobility and also provided an important impetus for the economic reforms that followed.

Reform Socialism, 1968-89 In the late 1.96os, centrally managed economies began to exhibit multiple signs of internal strain, as evidenced by frequent bottlenecks in the production process (Bauer 1.978; Nove 1.983), chronic shortages of consumer items (Kornai 1. 986b ), and informal organizational strategies involving bribing, hoarding, and local networking (Berliner 1.98;; Stark 1.986). By way of response, Yugoslavia introduced a new economic program that combined freemarket principles with self-management; its principal features involved the relaxation of central planning, the tying of wages to market signals, and the liberalization of foreign trade (Sire 1.979). Hungary introduced its own version of market socialism in 1.968 (Hare, Radice, and Swain 1.981.), and China followed suit in the late 1.970s with related economic reforms (Nee 1.989a). The economic problems of the 1.970s were addressed through a· set of reforms that constituted the so-called Kadarization of Hungary. The political side of Kadarization was succinctly summarized by Kadar's famous motto "aki nines elleniink az veliink" ("who is not against us, is with us"). 37 After

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

I

17

years of repression and social confrontation, Kadar and his allies in the Communist Party adopted a policy of concessions toward formerly disaffected workers and intellectuals, with the rationale that "what a convinced person is able to do for a good cause cannot be done by command, by briefing, and least of all by threats" (quoted in Gati 1986: 161-62). Rather than following the confrontational path of the Polish leadership (see Harman 1988; Ost 1990; Kennedy 1991), Kadar accordingly entered into a "dual compromise" with both the working class and intellectuals. The working class was allowed to supplement its income by participating in a "second economy" in which agricultural produce from family plots could be sold on the market (Donath 1977, 1982; Gabor 1979; Gabor and Galasi 1985). This reform proved to be so successful that, as of 1982, factory workers were also permitted to work for entrepreneurs who "rented" state-owned factories for use outside of regular working hours (Stark 1986; Burawoy 1985; Burawoy and Lukacs 1992). The best estimate suggests that approximately two-thirds of all Hungarian families in 1980 earned at least some of their income from the second economy (Galasi and Sziraczki 1985). In hopes of appeasing intellectuals, Kadar also reaffirmed his commitment to meritbased selection in schools and in the labor force, and political credentials were therefore altogether abandoned as a means of vetting appointments to leadership positions. Indeed, those appointed to higher-level positions were no longer required to join the Communist Party, nor even express absolute loyalty to all principles of Marxism-Leninism (seeS. Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Kovach 1995). If intellectuals were willing to make quite limited gestures of loyalty, they would be amply compensated with much income, autonomy, and decision-making power. The introduction of the second economy in Hungary altered the stratification system in two important ways. First, it created a dual stratification order by supplementing the old bureaucratic system with opportunities for upward mobility within the emerging market economy, thereby re-creating the petty bourgeois class that had earlier been dismantled. 38 Second, it affected patterns of gender stratification insofar as men were its principal beneficiaries (see Orszigethy 1986). In the nonagricultural sector, most of the opportunities for second-economy employment were available in upperechelon professional and craft occupations, where women were vastly underrepresented (see Stark 1986; Kiirti 1991). Moreover, women were in practice excluded from most "enterprise business work partnerships" (vallalati

:18

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

gazdasagi munkakozossegek, or VGMs) because these operated after regular work hours, when women were of course obligated to return to their families. The second economy thus created a new form of "shop-floor masculinity" (Willis :198:1) that marginalized wom{m by excluding them from emerging opportunities. Although the foregoing discussion suggests that reform socialism had restratifying effects within both class and gender systems, it should again be emphasized that such conclusions are based largely on weak anecdotal evidence and should be subjected to more rigorous analysis.

Postsocialism, 1989-Present Day The quasi-market policies described above were implemented in the spirit of reform, but in the end they sowed the seeds of truly revolutionary change. At the bottom of the class structure, workers found that an increasingly large share of their total income was generated through VGMs and other second-economy ventures, and their commitment to collective enterprises accordingly weakened. Moreover, the technocratic intelligentsia at the top of the class structure was, by virtue of Kadarization, no longer vetted for politicalloyalty; this class therefore mobilized in the :198os to overturn some of the more fundamental features of the socialist experiment (e.g., collective ownership). The old bureaucratic class was initially able to stave off such change, but with the "gentle revolution" of :1989 the new technocracy won out and immediately established the legal framework for spontaneous privatization and management buyouts. At the same time, the political system was reinvented as a new multiparty democracy, and the economy was to be re-formed on purely market principles. These changes will no doubt restructure the stratification order in fundamental ways. In the immediate post-transition period, party credentials were completely devalued, so much so that membership in the Communist Party now constituted a handicap rather than an asset. Moreover, whereas intellectuals under socialism were merely on the road to class power (Konrad and Szelenyi :1979), in the post-Communist era they have assumed leadership positions in both the political and the economic sectors. The apparent objective of their rule is, however, to pass economic power over to entrepreneurs while establishing themselves as the new middle class. It is clearly too early in the transition to characterize in any detail its strat-

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

19

ificatory implications for the general population. There is nonetheless some anecdotal evidence suggesting that, despite the relatively slow growth of a contemporary bourgeoisie, income inequality is now gradually increasing and returning to its presocialist levels (Garton Ash 1990; Kornai 1995). We also know that unemployment has increased and that women have exited disproportionately from the labor force (Central Statistical Office 1990; Cockburn 1991; Dolling 1991; Kligman 1994). This exodus of women might be interpreted, in part, as a backlash against their "forced emancipation" under socialism (Kligman 1991; Wolchik 1991; Heinen 1992), but it is no doubt also relevant that the occupational sectors within which they were concentrated (e.g., service, clerical) have not fared well in the post-transition period. 39

Organization of This Book The preceding excursus into Hungarian history suggests a Hungarian joke that was making the rounds at the very beginning of the (last) transition: the answer to the question "What is socialism?" was given as "The longest and most painful road from capitalism to capitalism" (Garton Ash 1990: 294). The purpose of this book is to explore the implications of this long road for patterns of stratification and mobility among both the general population and the elite. The above discussion, which is admittedly conventional in its representation of Hungarian history, indicates that the literature on socialist egalitarianism is rich in assumptions, hypotheses, and anecdotal evidence. The chapters that follow will provide a more solid evidentiary foundation for this literature. We shall begin in Chapter 2 by examining long-term trends in educational attainment, since it is here that egalitarian efforts in the form of quotas and related counterselective practices were largely focused. In Chap- · ter 3, we will consider the effects of socialism on class distributions, addressing such issues as the changing size of the New Class, the dynamics by which full employment was achieved and women were integrated into the formal economy, and the fall and rise of small independents in response to everchanging reform and counterreform agendas. Chapters 4 and 5 will explore whether quotas and counterselective policies produced a more fluid and open mobility regime. We shall examine here the extent of class formation, the location and patterning of interclass cleavages, and the underlying densities

20

Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting

of class inheritance and persistence. The focus shifts in Chapter 6 to the composition of the socialist and postsocialist ruling class and the processes by which this class has been transformed and renewed in transitional periods. We shall conclude in Chapter 7 by speculating on the implications of our results for the viability of radical egalitarian change in the modern and postmodern social context.

2

Schooling for Socialism with Karen E. Aschaffenburg

The great bulk of comparative research on educational attainment has considered advanced capitalist contexts rather than socialist ones (but see Ishida, Muller, and Ridge :1995). This is unfortunate, if only because state socialist economies provide an ideal testing ground for assessing the extent to which educational systems can be manipulated by radical political intervention. Indeed, while socialist egalitarianism of the Hungarian variety had far-reaching aspirations, most of the practical reform focused on the educational system. 1 It is thus altogether fitting to lead off our analyses by examining the effects of such reform on the life chances of women and working-class children. The Hungarian reform program was conveniently simple in both formulation and application. Beginning in :1949, all fees for schooling were abolished, and a system of scholarships was established to assist children from working-class and peasant families (Connor :1979; Benda :1983; Central Statistical Office :1985). A network of student dormitories was also organized for rural youth, and state-subsidized student canteens were built for needy children (Ferge :1979; Bencedy :1982; Simkus andAndorka :1982). Although these developments were important, the most radical feature of the Hungarian educational reform was a quota system that required secondary schools and tertiary institutions to favor the admission of less-advantaged children (see Simkus :198:1b; Simkus and Andorka :1982). 2 It is true that administrative controls were relaxed within a decade, and the program was abandoned altogether in the early :1970s (see Simkus and Andorka :1982). For our present purposes, however, what is significant about these class-based admission quotas is not that they were finally abolished, but rather that they determined the allocation of educational opportunities for a period of twenty years. These reforms suggest that Hungarian elites made a good-faith effort to reduce the intergenerational transmission of social inequalities. Whether these policies produced their intended result remains unclear, however, in spite of considerable research. Not surprisingly, perhaps, official reports painted a favorable picture of educational opportunities (e.g., Bencedy :1982;

22

Schooling for Socialism

Central Statistical Office 1985; Inkei, Koncz, and Pocze 1988). These reports tended to emphasize the comprehensive nature of the educational reforms, but they made little effort to assess their effects in any rigorous way. This optimism was echoed in some of the academic literature. For example, Ferge (1979) praised the postwar changes in the educational system for their success in abolishing elitism and selectivity in schools, while Gazso (1978: 252) applauded them for having moved "tens of thousands of children of manual workers to the ranks of the intellectual professionals." But the most convincing (and certainly most rigorous) support for this position appeared as late as 1982, when Simkus and Andorka found that the transition to socialism had resulted in a decline in the effects of social background on educational attainment. On the basis of these landmark results, Simkus and Andorka argued for the effectiveness of "administrative control over the process of social selection as a means of substantially reducing socioeconomic inequalities in the allocation of schooling" (p. 740). This last study has served as the starting point for nearly all subsequent research on educational opportunities in Hungary (see esp. Robert and Szanto199o; Robert 1991). 3 What has not been sufficiently appreciated, however, is that several scholars have reported results that appear to contradict the Simkus-Andorka orthodoxy. For instance, some scholars have shown that social background has continued to strongly determine ability and performance in Hungarian schools (Ferge 1972; Ferge 1980; Gazso 1984; Erdelyi 1987a; Andorka and Harcsa 1990a), while others have found that it is closely tied to the rank, quality, or status of the schools that children attend (Ferge 1972; Csako and Lisko 1982; Ladanyi and Csanadi 1983; Gazso 1984). The overall picture that emerges from these studies is unclear, thus motivating us to reexamine the evidence firsthand. Using a nationally representative sample and a continuation-ratio model of educational attainment, this chapter will examine long-term changes in the effects of social background on educational outcomes. We shall begin by describing the structure of the Hungarian educational system. The sections that follow will then review contemporary theories of change in educational opportunity and the data, methods, and results of our research.

The Hungarian Educational System In the presocialist era, Hungarian schools were highly selective and openly class-based. Students were required to complete only four years of elemen-

Schooling for Socialism

23

tary education; 4 the main hurdle of social selection occurred at age ten. At this point, a student could (1) enter the labor force and acquire an unskilled manual job, (2) remain at a "folk school" (nepiskola) for an additional two years and qualify for an industrial apprenticeship, (3) spend four years at a "bourgeois school" (polgari iskola) and obtain a lower white-collar occupation, or (4) enter an eight-year grammar school (gimnazium) and either advance to university education or join the ranks of the social elite immediately upon high school graduation. 5 As in most Eastern European systems, schooling beyond the elementary level was not free, and class differentials therefore played an important role in early educational decisions. 6 For working-class and peasant children, the usual combination of economic and cultural forces dramatically lowered aspirations for schooling, and the tenth birthday thus typically signaled the end of schooling and the beginning of formal employment (Morris 1950; Grant 1969; Gabor 1977; Timar 1990). This was, in fact, a common outcome for children of many backgrounds; indeed, a full three-quarters of all children at this age either entered the labor force directly or chose to complete two more years of education (Andorka and Simkus 1983), while only 18 percent of the graduating ten-year-olds elected to go to a bourgeois school (Ferge 1979; Simkus and Andorka 1982; Andorka and Simkus 1983). The remaining 7 percent who entered grammar school were nearly always descendants of the social elite (Ferge 1979; Simkus and Andorka 1982; Andorka and Simkus 1983)_7 This system of education determined life chances in Hungary until1949, when the socialist government came into power and an ambitious experiment in destratification commenced (Lenski 1978). 8 We have described earlier (see Chapter 1) some of the policies that the state introduced to reduce class-based differences in life chances. In addition to such efforts, it should be stressed that the state also nationalized private and church-run schools (Bencedy 1982; Robert and Szanto 1990), lengthened the period of compulsory education (Simkus and Andorka 1982; Inkei, Koncz, and Pocze 1988), restructured the curriculum of secondary schools (Ferge 1979; Csako and Lisko 1982), and established evening schools for adult workers (Central Statistical Office 1985; Erdelyi 1987d). The educational system that emerged out of these reforms is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Children under socialism were required to complete eight years of elementary education, 9 after which they could (1) enter the labor force, (2) continue their education for two more years, (3) complete three years of

Schooling for Socialism

24

Lower Grade

Higher Grade

\1 edium Grade 15 16

HI

,.• ~ +

I 18

19 ZO 21 22 23 :•

I

.~ge

·~~tttt

A

[D-{1}-[] K.inderganc;n

EI;

certificate oi final examination of educuion

0

certificate of skilled worlcers' final examination

e :s

entrance examination

~ training of different length

B

A university, college of universitY rank

B

college

C

higher institution

Higher grade tmninates·everywherc with a state aam: physicians, deatisu. lawyen are automatically awarded with the title of university doctor

Kinderganea Teachers' Traiaiag ltmitutes

Figure 2.:r. The Hungarian educational system. Source: Bencedy :r982: n.

apprentice training in a vocational school (szakmunkaskt?pzo), (4) attend a technical secondary school (szakkozipiskola) for four years, or (5) proceed to an academic grammar school (gimnazium) for four years. Because high school diplomas were granted only by the last two institutions, those who wished to attend a university (egyetem) were obliged to enroll in one of them to qualify for admission. 10 The length of postsecondary education has varied

Schooling for Socialism

25

considerably over the past fifty years, with colleges demanding two to three years of training and universities requiring up to seven years.

Theories of Change in Educational Attainment The above discussion makes it clear that the transition to socialism was coupled with a massive reorganization of the Hungarian educational system. The question that remains is whether these structural reforms altered the underlying parameters of educational opportunity. The conventional answers to this question are nothing if not diverse. At one end of the continuum, one finds theories that regard industrialization as the generative force underlying the evolution of educational opportunities, while ignoring or, at best, downplaying the effects of state-based political reform (Moore 1963; Treiman 1970; Parsons 1977). Although some theorists claim that industrialization produces an endogenous growth in universalistic values and a corresponding decline in basic ascriptive processes, others link the evolution of educational opportunities to the pressure on nation-states to emulate the United States and its egalitarian institutions (Inkeles and Smith 1974; Ramirez and Meyer 1980; Ramirez and Boli 1987). The latter approach is typically marketed as a sharp contrast to the functionalism of Moore (1963) and others, yet both versions of modernization theory yield similar predictions about the contours of long-term trend. In contrast, other theories imply that educational inequalities remain intact despite radical social change. The best-known rendition of this approach was advanced by Sorokin over sixty years ago. In his now-classic treatise, Sorokin suggested that the extent of inequality fluctuates in trendless fashion, given that the forces of egalitarianism are invariably counteracted by those of stratification (Sorokin 1964 [1927]: 152-200). Whereas Sorokin emphasized the tension between these two forces, reproduction theorists (e.g., Jencks 1972; Boudon 1974; Bourdieu 1977) focus exclusively on the forces of stratification as expressed in the potential for intergenerational closure. Under either approach, however, a unilinear trend toward increasing equality is rendered unlikely, since it is assumed that putative reforms will ultimately be converted by members of the old elite into new forms of privilege. We might conclude, finally, with New Class theories, which assume that educational opportunities decrease as societies enter postindustrialism (Trot-

26

Schoolingfor Socialism

sky 1972 [1937]; Djilas 1957; Cliff 1974; Bell1976; Bahro 1978; Gouldner 1979; Konrad and Szelenyi 1979). In at least some of these theories, the educational system is assumed to become the principal mechanism of allocating positions of privilege, and the elite perforce has a growing interest in monopolizing the available educational slots. The end result, therefore, is a tightening in the linkage between class and education. If cultural capital is indeed the new medium of exchange, a story of this kind would also imply that parental education rather than wealth is the principal source of educational advantage (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). Although the foregoing theories are all pitched at an abstract level, perhaps excessively so, they nonetheless are useful in identifying the larger orienting framework within which prior scholars of Hungarian education have worked. For example, most critics of Hungarian educational inequality have adopted the rhetoric of either New Class or reproduction theory. By contrast, most of the optimistic theorists have either accepted modernization theory in its original unadulterated form or have advanced a modified version in which socialism is the driving force behind the rise of "substantive" universalism, which is contrasted to the purely formal universalism that characterizes advanced capitalism. We shall return to these more abstract formulations of educational change in the concluding section of this chapter. It should suffice, at this point, to stress that scholars on the left and right alike can invoke much theory in seeking to undergird their preferred interpretations of the socialist experiment.

Data and Methods In tracing the evolution of educational opportunities in Hungary, we will draw on the Social Mobility and Life History (SMLH) Survey, which was conducted by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office in the fall of 1983 (Harcsa and Kulcsar 1983; see Appendix lB for more details on the survey). The SMLH has several advantages for our purposes. First, it ascertains not only rich and extensive educational histories, but also a wide range of parental socioeconomic variables. Second, it is sufficiently large (N = 32,301) to withstand relatively detailed disaggregation by birth cohort, thus making it possible for us to trace out long-term trends in educational attainment. After the sample is restricted to respondents who were born between 1911 and 1960, a total of 24,829 individuals become available, with n,8oo men and

Schooling for Socialism TABLE

27

2.1

Descriptive Summary of Variables Used in the Analysis of Hungarian Educational Opportunities Men (N=ll,SOO)

Women (N=l3,029)

Variable

Mean

S.d.

Mean

S.d.

Years of schooling Educational transitionsb Completed primary Attended secondary Completed secondary Attended tertiary Completed tertiary Birth cohorts

9.404•

3.228

8.533

3.250

0.770 0.707 0.981 0.219 0.905

0.421 0.455 0.137 0.414 0.294

0.639 0.593 0.956 0.211 0.825

0.480 0.491 0.206 0.408 0.380

0.123 0.201 0.199 0.236 0.240

0.328 0.401 0.400 0.425 0.427

0.147 0.218 0.196 0.218 0.221

0.354 0.413 0.397 0.413 0.415

5.985 33.754 0.051

3.646 11.140 0.220

5.985 33.858 0.047

3.657 11.430 0.212

1911-20 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 Social background' Father's education Father's occupation Father's labor force status

See text for a full description of all the variables. 'Unless otherwise indicated, missing observations were not included in the calculation of these (weighted)

NOTES:

means. b Sample sizes vary for educational transitions. In calculating these means, only those who had completed the prior transition were included. 'Father's education is measured in terms of years of schooling; occupation is indexed by Treiman's (1977) Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale; and labor force status is coded 1 for parents who were out of the labor force, and o otherwise.

13,029 women having nonmissing values on all variables.l 1 The requisite descriptive statistics for this sample are presented in Table 2.1. As indicated in Table 2.1, we shall carry out our analyses with two measures of educational attainment. The first one, years of schooling, indicates the highest grade of education that respondents had completed by 1983. 12 The means for this variable (9.4 years for men, 8.5 years for women) are similar to those observed in other central European countries (Central Statistical Office 1985; Heyns and Bialecki 1993; Mateju 1993), but well below those reported for the United States (Hauser 1970; Hauser and Featherman 1976), France (Garnier and Hout 1976), and Japan (Treiman and Yamaguchi 1993). Our second measure was constructed from two variables in the survey: the different types of schools that respondents attended throughout their educational careers, and the highest grades of schooling that they completed at each of these institutions. On the basis of this information, we have identified five transitions in the Hungarian educational system: (1) comple-

28

Schooling for Socialism

tion of primary education, (2) entry into-secondary school, (3) completion of secondary education, (4) entry into a tertiary institution, and (5) completion of tertiary educationY The results in Table 2.1 show that the overwhelming majority of both men (77 percent) and women (64 percent) finished primary education, Of those who completed this first transition, almost threequarters of all men and over half of all women entered secondary school. Although over 90 percent of those who entered secondary school completed it, only one-fifth of the graduates subsequently attended tertiary school. Table 2.1 next lists the five birth cohorts that will be analyzed here. These cohorts cover fifty years of Hungarian history, with each representing a distinctive period in the evolution of the educational system. The first group of respondents (born between 19:1:1 and 1920) completed their schooling prior to the socialist takeover in 1949, and their educational careers were therefore shaped by the highly selective class-based system that dominated the prewar years. While members of the second cohort (1921-30) were also principally schooled under the old regim~~, the small number who attended tertiary institutions would likely have completed their education under the leadership of Stalinist elites. The remaining cohorts capture successive stages in the development of the socialist regime, In the third cohort (1931-40), the modal respondent completed elementary school in 1949, which was precisely when the educational system was overhauled and democratized at the secondary and tertiary levels. This cohort was the first, then, to encounter the socialist educational system and was therefore the most likely to have been influenced by egalitarian reforms. By contrast, members of the fourth cohort (1941-50) came of age during the "second stage" of socialist development, when many of the egalitarian policies had been phased out (e.g., S. Szelenyi 1987) and new inequalities had presumably emerged (Ossowski 1963; Bauman 1974; Nove 1983a; I. Szelenyi 1983). If New Class theorists are correct in suggesting that reproduction strategies flourished under advanced socialism, then one would expect this cohort to exhibit signs of such rigidification. The last cohort (1951-60) experienced the "third stage" of socialist development (S. Szelenyi 1988). Indeed, members of this group no longer had the opportunity to benefit from the quota system, but instead faced new barriers to educational opportunity that were presumably unleashed by the reintroduction of the market system (Kolosi 1986). By describing cohort-specific changes in the distribution of educational

Schooling for Socialism

29

opportunities, it will therefore be possible to make inferences about trends in Hungarian educational allocation over the past forty years. The usual limitations of cohort analyses nonetheless apply (see Ryder 1965; Glenn 1977; Duncan 1978).14 First, it must be conceded that the groups analyzed here do not represent true birth cohorts, but merely their "present-day survivors" (Goldthorpe 1980: 68). In relying on cross-sectional surveys, we perforce exclude all those individuals who died or emigrated before 1983, thus raising the possibility that the survivors are unrepresentative of the original cohort.15 The extent of such bias cannot be easily estimated because the necessary statistics on mortality and migration are not available. We will likewise be unable to distinguish between age, period, and cohort interpretations of change (Ryder 1965). The potentially confounding effects of life-cycle differences can be removed by tracing members of each cohort back to the time when they entered or completed each level of schooling. In proceeding in this way, one cannot, however, address the distinction between cohort and period interpretations of change, and both of these interpretations will therefore be offered throughout our analyses. The final, and more practical, problem that emerges is that our survey is not large enough for us to carry out analyses with the narrowly defined cohorts that might be ideal. At the same time, the broader cohorts adopted here correspond in approximate fashion to the stages of socialism that we seek to distinguish, even when one considers the noise introduced by intracohort variability in the amount of education attained and consequent differences in age of entry into the labor force. This noise is not so great as to substantially weaken the correspondence between birth cohorts and periods of socialism. We would add in this regard that the cohorts deployed here are identical to those used by Simkus and Andorka (1982) in their pathbreaking study. There is, then, strong precedent for our analytic strategy. The last three entries in Table 2.1 list our measures of social background. Our models include measures of father's education, father's occupation as indexed by the Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (Treiman 1977),16 and father's labor force status. The last variable was rendered necessary by virtue of the missing values for father's occupation. That is, because fathers who were out of the labor force were assigned the mean prestige score of fathers in the labor force, we were required to control for father's labor force status in all of our modelsY The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. We begin by

Schooling for Socialism

30

examining intercohort differences in the distribution of schooling, charting long-term trends in (1) the average years of schooling and (2) the rates of completion of the five transitions identified above. We next use multivariate models to examine changes in the allocation of schooling over time. If only for purposes of establishing a baseline, we regress completed years of schooling on our conventional measures of social background (e.g., Duncan 196?; Sewell and Shah 1967; Garnier and Hout 1976; Hauser and Featherman 1976). We then use logistic regression models to examine variations in the effect of social background on school continuation decisions at the five transition points identified above (e.g., Mare 1980, 1981, 1993; Shavit and Blossfeld 1993).

Temporal Changes in Educational Distributions Figure 2.2 presents our first set of results on cross-cohort variation in the average amount of schooling completed by men and women. The trend lines Years 11

10

9

8

7

----Men -------- Women

6

1911

1916

1921

1926

1931

1936

1941

1946

1951

1956

Figure 2.2. Mean number of years of schooling completed by Hungarians, by gender and birth cohort.

Schooling for Socialism

31

Percentage 100

--------

90

80 70

60 50

40 30

----Men

20

-------- Women

10

1911

1916

1921

1926

1931

1936

1941

1946

1951

1956

Figure 2-3. Percentage of Hungarians completing primary school, by gender and birth cohort.

graphed here and in Figures 2.3-2.7 are based on five-year centered moving averages for one-year birth cohorts. The horizontal axis represents the birth year of the respondents, and the vertical axis pertains to the mean number of years of schooling completed by each birth cohort. Although several trends are worthy of attention here, the most striking one is the massive increase in the average level of schooling completed by respondents who were born between 1911 and 1945. By implication, the initial expansion of mass education predated the transition to socialism, and one cannot, therefore, regard socialist reform as the sole source of change in educational opportunities. At the same time, the expansion of educational opportunities clearly continued under the socialist regime, thus implying that a net "socialism effect" cannot be ruled out. The second transformation revealed here is the convergence in mean levels of schooling completed by men and women. This convergence began among those who were born during the 1930s, with the driving force in this early period perhaps being the wartime demand for educated women (e.g., Koncz 1984b; Szalai 1991).

Schooling for Socialism

32

Women's labor force participation continued to grow in the postwar period (S. Szelenyi 1988; Rueschemeyer and Szelenyi 1989), and the associated postwar educational expansion consequently comes as no surprise.l8 As indicated in Figure 2.3, the substantial increase in the percentage of those who completed primary school also preceded the transition to socialism, and the gender gap in completion rates likewise began to decline in cohorts that completed their education prior to World War II. These findings underscore our earlier conclusion that socialist reforms, on their own, could not have generated the observed expansion in educational opportunities. We cannot, however, disconfirm the fallback claim that socialist policies provided a final push that served to close the gender gap altogether. 19 The trend line for secondary school attendance (see Figure 2.4) requires a more complex explanation. In this case, the gender gap has remained relatively unchanged over the last fifty years, and absolute rates of entry for both genders dramatically declined among those born between 1911 and 1935. 20 The U-shaped pattern that we observe here was produced, in large Percentage 100 90

80 70

60 50 40

30

----Men 20

----- --· Women 10

1911

1916

1921

1926

1931

1986

1941

1946

1951

1956

Figure 2.4. Percentage of Hungarian primary school graduates attending secondary school, by gender and birth cohort.

Schooling for Socialism

33

Percentage 100 90

80 70 60 50 40 30

----Men

20

-------- Women

10

1911

1916

1921

1926

1931

1936

1941

1946

1951

1956

Figure 2.5. Percentage of Hungarian secondary school students completing secondary school, by gender and birth cohort.

part, by the rapid expansion of primary education during the prewar years (see Figure2.3). Because this growth in the pool of potential candidates for further schooling took place without a corresponding commitment to expanding secondary education, the percentage of primary school graduates who attended secondary school declined over the years. The time series reverses itself only after the point at which the commitment to mass education extended to the secondary level and more schools were built to satisfy the new demand. In the face of such variation in the percentage of students who commenced secondary education, it is striking that the percentage of those who completed it remained much the same. As indicated in Figure 2.5, 85 to 95 percent of both men and women who began secondary education over the past fifty years completed it, thus suggesting that the main barrier to secondary education is at the institutional gateway. Once entry is obtained, completion is almost guaranteed. The trend line for tertiary school attendance reveals somewhat more vari-

Schooling for Socialism

34

Percentage 100

90

80 70

60

----Men

50

-------- Women

40 30 20

10

1911

1916

1921

1926

1931

1936

1941

1946

1951

1956

Figure 2.6. Percentage of Hungarian secondary school graduates attending tertiary school, by gender and birth cohort.

ation. As indicated in Figure 2.6, there is a distinct downturn in the male trend line, with the main impetus perhaps being the appearance of lucrative manual jobs in the second economy (e.g., Andorka, Harcsa, and Kulcsar 1986). 21 The greater stability of the female trend line is consistent with this interpretation, since these second-economy positions were not available to women and therefore could not be expected to draw them off in the same fashion (e.g., Rueschemeyer and Szelenyi 1989). Although there is far more fluctuation in completion rates (see Figure 2.7), this variability is largely trendless variety and is likely attributable to the relatively small samples involved, especially among the birth cohorts that predated the rise of tertiary schooling.

Have Social Background Effects Attenuated? We shall consider next the processes by which these distributional changes were generated. The coefficients in Table 2.2 pertain to the main and interaction effects of social background on the highest year of schooling completed

Schooling for Socialism

35

by men and women. Each column reports the results of a regression that was estimated from the SMLH, while each row represents a variable from that regression. We might begin by noting that, as expected, the effects of father's education and occupation are strong and significant for both men and women in the baseline cohort. However, whereas such effects have remained largely stable across cohorts in the United States (Hauser and Featherman 1976; Mare 1981) and most other countries (see Shavit and Blossfeld 1993), we find evidence of attenuation in the Hungarian data that is consistent with the argument that socialist reforms successfully equalized educational opportunities. Within the male population, the effects of father's education decline in nearly monotonic fashion, while those of father's occupation are significantly weakened only for students attending school during the first (and most radical) stage of socialism. Among women, there is some evidence of a corresponding attenuation in the effects of father's occupation, but not in the effects of father's education. Percentage 100 90 80

I

I I

I I I

I

r-'

70

I 1 I I I I I I I II

60

~

50 40 30

----Men 20

-------- Women 10

1911

1916

1921

1926

1931

1936

1941

1946

1951

1956

Figure 2.7. Percentage of Hungarian tertiary school students completing tertiary school, by gender and birth cohort.

36

Schooling for Socialism TABLE 2.2

Effect of Social Background on Highest Year of Schooling Completed: Hungarian Men and Women Born Between 1911

and 1960 Men

Women

(N=l1,800)

(N=l3,029)

0.421 * (0.024) 0.035* (0.008) 0.252 (0.257) 1.003* (0.335) 2.406* (0.335) 3.116* {0.307) 3.714* (0.306)

0.293* (0.018) 0.033* (0.006) -0.485* (0.214) 1.470* (0.250) 2.026* (0.256) 3.528* (0.233) 4.203* (0.232)

0.025 (0.031) 0.002 (0.031) -0.085* (0.030) -0.164* (0.030)

-0.016 (0.024) 0.103* (0.024) 0.052* (0.023) 0.015 (0.024)

-0.011 (0.010) -0.024* 1931-40 (0.010) 1941-50 -0.007 (0.010) 1951-60 -0.015 (0.010) Father's labor force status by cohort 1921-30 0.545 (0.360) 1931-40 -0.089 (0.361) 1941-50 -0.037 (0.362) -1.116* 1951-60 (0.439) Constant 4.197* (0.658) R-square 0.294

-0.018* (0.007) -0.011 (0.007) -0.007 (0.007) -0.016* (0.007)

Variable Main effects Father's education Father's occupation Father's labor force status Cohort 1921-30 Cohort 1931-40 Cohort 1941-50 Cohort 1951-60 Interaction effects Father's education by cohort 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 Father's occupation by cohort 1921-30

0.743* (0.307) 0.750* (0.312) 0.308 (0.315) 0.526 (0.348) 3.418* (0.192) 0.443

NOTE: Entries are parameter estimates (standard error). The dependent variable in each model is the highest year of schooling completed by the respondent. Estimates with an asterisk are significant at the .05 probability level.

Schooling for Socialism

37

These results would appear to sustain, if only partially, the conventional view that the quota system has reduced socioeconomic inequalities in schooling (Simkus and Andorka 1982: 740). However, it must be borne in mind that regression coefficients can be contaminated by changes in the marginal distribution of schooling. As shown by Mare (1981), the regression coefficients in a standard linear model of schooling are a weighted function of logisticresponse parameters, where the weights depend on the proportion of students who progress through each transition. It follows that the apparent attenuation of background effects that we observe in Table 2.2 may have been generated by the various changes in grade-progression rates charted in Figures 2.3 through 2.7. Indeed, if the effects of social background are weakest for secondary and postsecondary transitions, then standard regression coefficients will necessarily attenuate as the number of students who make these transitions increases over time. We have examined this possibility by fitting logistic-response models to the five educational transitions defined earlier (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4). It is useful to begin our discussion by inspecting the results for men provided in Table 2.3. The coefficients for father's education and occupation follow a similar pattern; namely, for some transitions these coefficients are negligible in size, but for those where they are strong and significant they have either remained stable or increased across birth cohorts. The results for women (see Table 2.4) are more complex, but no possible reading of them could sustain the Simkus-Andorka orthodoxy. 22 To be sure, the effects of father's occupation weaken for the first two transitions, yet this weakening is evident for the 1921-30 cohort and thus predates the socialist reforms. Moreover, the effects of father's education on these early transitions have, if anything, strengthened over time, thereby further undermining the view that socialist reforms equalized life chances and produced a more open educational system. In all subsequent transitions, nearly all of the interactions between origins and cohort are insignificant, and none of the point estimates can be squared with the story of equalization that is so frequently told. This pattern of results is, then, consistent with our earlier suggestion that the regression coefficients of Table 2.2 are contaminated by changes in the marginal distribution of schooling. However, before adopting this interpretation, we must first verify that the socioeconomic effects of father's education and occupation tend to grow progressively weaker for the more advanced transitions. While the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 are partly con-

TABLE

2.3

Effect of Social Background on Educational Transitions: Hungarian Men Born Between 1.91.1 and 1.960 School transition Variable

Main effects Father's education Father's occupation Father's labor force status Cohort 1921-30 Cohort 1931-40 Cohort 1941-50 Cohort 1951-60 Interaction effects Father's education by cohort 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 Father's occupation by cohort 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 Father's labor force status by cohort 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 Constant Likelihood-ratio test statistic (12) Degrees of freedom Sample size

Completed primary

Attended secondary

Completed secondary

Attended tertiary

Completed tertiary

0.229* (0.021) 0.007 (0.007) 0.146 (0.214) 0.756* (0.278) 1.784* (0.310) 1.651 * (0.378) 2.943* (0.46'1)

0.170* (0.036) -0.016 (0.011) -0.027 (0.381) -1.675* (OA53) -1.995* (OA24) -1.435* (0.410) -1.221 * (0.418)

0.006 (0.091) 0.015 (0.038) -1.097 (0.865) 0.049 (1.461) -0.327 (1.459) 1.160 (1.360) 0.459 (1.275)

0.136* (0.035) 0.034* (0.014) 0.838 (0.452) 1.083 (0.547) 1.230 (0.533) -0.102 (0.504) -1.260 (0.517)

-0.044 (0.087) 0.044 (0.039) -1.249 (0.852) 1.442 (1.435) 0.398 (1.401) 1.435 (1.397) 0.747 (1.360)

-0.024 (0.027) 0.066 (0.034) 0.234* (0.050) 0.154* (0.056)

0.071 (0.043) 0.019 (0.040) 0.057 (0.040) 0.018 (0.041)

0.057 (0.118) 0.236 (0.126) 0.000 (0.115) 0.171 (0.102)

-0.046 (0.042) -0.014 (0.041) 0.043 (0.040) 0.092 (0.043)

0.104 (0.113) 0.079 (0.107) 0.060 (0.112) 0.052 (0.114)

0.001 (0.008) -0.005 (0.009) o.m8 (0.012) 0.008 (0.015)

0.021 (0.013) 0.024 (0.013) 0.027* (0.012) 0.038* (0.013)

-0.016 (0.046) -0.030 (0.044) -0.016 (0.043) -0.047 (0.040)

-0.012 (0.016) -0.025 (0.016) -0.015 (0.015) -0.017 (0.015)

-0.057 (0.045) -0.030 (0.045) -0.038 (0.044) -0.041 (0.044)

0.274 (0.288) 0.041 (0.307) 0.495 (0.387) -0.689 (0.466) -1.848* (0.222) 811 11,780 11,800

0.383 (0.471) 0.584 (0.447) 0.296 (0.440) 0.223 (0.503) 0.764* (0.380) 9,434 8,855 8,875

5.829 (6.213) 1.105 (1.176) 4.937 (4.613) 2.109 (1.559) 3.225* (1.198) 1,095 5,979 5,999

-0.274 (0.580) -0.318 (0.567) -0.061 (0.560) 0.024 (0.755) -3.312* (0.465) 5,433 5,859 5,879

2.253 (1.684) 7.340 (10.340) 6.874 (10.430) 7.652 (21.050) 0.899 (1.218) 700 1,130 1,150

NOTE: Entries are parameter estimates (standard error). The dependent variable in each model is the log odds of making the educational transition, given successful completion of the prior one. Estimates with an asterisk are significant at the .05 probability level.

TABLE 2.4 Effect of Social Background on Educational Transitions: Hungarian Women Born Between I9II and I96o

School Transitions Variable Main effects Father's education Father's occupation Father's labor force status Cohort 1921-30 Cohort 1931-40 Cohort 1941-50 Cohort 1951-60 Interaction effects Father's education by cohort 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 Father's occupation by cohort 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 Father's labor force status by cohort 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 Constant Likelihood-ratio test statistic (P) Degrees of freedom Sample size

Completed primary

Attended secondary

Completed secondary

Attended tertiary

Completed tertiary

0.280* (0.021) 0.034* (0.007) -0.023 (0.320) 2.401 * (0.317) 3.992* (0.324) 4.690* (0.389) 5.110* (0.422)

0.275* (0,031) 0.038* (0.009) 0.123 (0.481) 2.565* (0.419) 4.248* (0.416) 4.805* (0.487) 4.750* (0.524)

-0.033 (0.082) 0.024 (0.028) -1.441 (0.785) 0.828 (1.150) 0.091 (1.152) 0.442 (1.087) 0.731 (1.082)

0.294* (0.096) -0.018 (0.023) 1.205 (0.916) 2.644 (1.010) 0.703 (0.985) 1.113 (0.939) 0.829 (0.937)

0.048 (0.539) 0.072 (0.083) 3.626 (9.157) 0.684 (5.289) 3.484 (5.230) 1.472 (5.177) 0.561 (5.171)

-0.090* (0.026) -0.044 (0.029) 0.204 (0.049) 0.157* (0.050)

-0.116* (0.038) -0.079 (0.040) 0.182* (0.061) 0.184* (0.064)

0.061 (0.098) 0.081 (0.096) 0.115 (0.093) 0.109 (0.094)

-0.198 (0.103) -0.181 (0.100) -0.158 (0.098) -0.150 (0.098)

-0.066 (0.549) -0.064 (0.544) 0.001 (0.541) -0.006 (0.541)

-0.023* (0.008) -0.025* (0.008) -0.026* (0.010) -0.025* (0.012)

-0.025* (0.011) -0.030* (0.011) -0.030* (0.012) -0.022* (0.014)

-0.045 (0.032) -0.016 (0.032) -0.020 (0.030) -0.023 (0.030)

0.007 (0.026) 0.058* (0.024) 0.038 (0.023) 0.037 (0.023)

-0.028 (0.089) -0.089 (0.085) -0.070 (0.084) -0.051 (0.084)

0.393 (0.382) 0.258 (0.381) 0.528 (0.442) 0.261 (0.470) -4.627* (0.276) 9,604 13,009 13,029

0.070 (0.583) -0.042 (0.563) -0.094 (0.622) 0.371 (0.666) -4.775* (0.359) 5,808 8,064 8,084

6.390 (5.264) 2.138 (1.273) 1.038 (1.011) 1.517 (1.133) 2.037* (1.002) 1,579 4,487 4,507

-1.651 (1.171) -1.594 (1.091) -1.049 (1.026) 0.704 (0.991) -4.321 * (0.914) 4,047 4,276 4,296

0.974 (13.100) 0.289 (11.900) -3.955 (9.209) -4.532 (9.180) -0.509 (5.154) 748 825 845

NOTE: Entries are parameter estimates (standard error). The dependent variable in each model is the log odds of making the educational transition, given successful completion of the prior one. Estimates with an asterisk are significant at the .05 probability level.

40

Schooling for Socialism

sistent with this representation, the background effects on tertiary attendance are larger than one might have expected. The effects of social background appear, therefore, to operate mainly at the "gateway points" in the educational attainment process. That is, socioeconomic effects on educational completion tend to be weak (except at the primary school level), whereas considerations of class are quite consequential when initial entry into the system is at stake. We rather doubt that a system of this sort was envisioned in the socialist blueprint for educational reform. This chapter has taken on three related questions: Can the changes in Hungarian education be characterized as revolutionary? To what extent, if at all, were socialist reforms implicated in these changes? If a "socialism effect" was indeed at work, was it in the intended direction? We have addressed these questions, at least partially, in the course of presenting and interpreting our results, but it will perhaps be useful to reiterate and expand upon our conclusions here. In asking whether Hungarian education was revolutionized in the last fifty years, one must distinguish between (1) structural changes in the institutions of education, (2) distributional changes in the educational attainment of Hungarians, and (3) allocative changes in the processes by which these educational distributions were reproduced intergenerationally. There can of course be no question but that major institutional experiments were attempted during the socialist period. That is, not only were technical and vocational training expanded to meet the market demand for highly skilled manual workers, but correspondence and evening courses were also established to upgrade adult training, and compensatory programs were further implemented (in the form of scholarships, educational stipends, and classbased quotas) to assist children from working-class and peasant backgrounds in completing their education. Our documentation of these institutional changes has merely been a matter of rehearsing the well known. What has not, however, been sufficiently appreciated is that the major distributional changes in observed educational attainment have been conjoined with an almost eerie stability in the underlying parameters of allocation. Although some commentators have argued that allocative parameters have changed, our logistic-response models make it clear that such conclusions arose principally because conventional regression coefficients are not pure measures of allocative processes. If the effects of changes in the mar-

Schooling for Socialism

41

ginal distribution of education are properly purged, one has to be struck by the fundamental stability in class-based reproduction despite massive reforms, expansion, and reconstruction at the institutional level. Insofar as change was observed, it was typically in the direction of rigidification rather than equalization, thus providing limited support for New Class arguments that imply a resurgence of inequality in the educational system. We can, then, discount a simple "socialism effect" on allocative processes. Can we likewise discount such an effect when considering the long-term trend in the distribution of schooling? What must be emphasized here is that the takeoff in educational attainment preceded, in all cases, the period of socialist reform. This takeoff cannot, therefore, be attributed to socialist reform per se, but such reform may have accelerated the expansion of mass education. This reasoning suggests that a full account would have to invoke both reform effects and conventional modernization theory. Finally, our characterization of educational inequalities in Hungary would be incomplete without comments on the structure of gender stratification as revealed, most notably, by the changing gender gap in attendance and completion rates. What our analyses have chiefly shown is that gender differences in schooling were effectively eliminated at all points of transition save that of secondary school attendance. In accounting for this result, we would emphasize that the principal occupational opportunities for women under socialism could be found at the top (i.e., professional-managerial occupations) and bottom (i.e., laboring occupations) of the class structure, whereas the "middle class" of craft employment remained a largely male enclave. This polarized set of opportunities generated correspondingly polarized patterns of educational change; that is, women had good reason to terminate schooling at the primary or tertiary levels, since the associated credentials could be readily translated into employment (at least more so than secondary school credentials). This line of reasoning implies that trends in educational attainment cannot be understood without taking the changing structure of employment opportunities into account. We shall therefore turn to issues of class structure in the following chapter.

3

The Class Structure of Classless Hungary

In the present state of sociology, research of the most basic sort is too often left undone, while relatively arcane matters are explored all too exhaustively. Contemporary research is particularly patchy regarding the rhythm, timing, and nature of occupational transformation under state socialism. The present chapter will revisit some standing debates on the transformation of industrial and advanced industrial economies more carefully than has heretofore been possible. We shall begin by exploring the socialist experiment with full employment and, in particular, the occupational implications of this experiment. The standard literature on postindustrial economic transformation offers at least three models: (1) a social democratic (esp. Swedish) model in which full employment is secured by a massive expansion of the service sector (e.g., Baumol1967); (2) a low-wage model in which unemployment is averted by a lowering of wages and an expansion of the manual unskilled sector; and (3) a standard postindustrial model in which much of the expansion occurs at the top of the class structure (e.g., Bell1976). The socialist case may well fit into one of these models, but it is also possible that the (stereotypical) socialist emphasis on heavy industry created a disproportionately large craft sector and thus generated a "fourth road" of modern economic transformation. This fourth road might be seen as the structural residue of the well-known ideological glorification of skilled manuallabor (e.g., Parkin 1969; Treiman 1977) that characterized the early, if not mature, stages of socialism. What is unclear is whether such a stereotype indeed held and, if so, to what extent it persisted even in the more advanced stages of industrialism and postindustrial:ism. The second set of issues that we shall explore pertains to the rise of the socalled New Class in Eastern Europe (Djilas 1957; Gouldner 1979; Konrad and Szelenyi 1979). Although it is well established that the old class of capitalists

The Class Structure of Classless Hungary

43

and small proprietors was effectively eliminated early in the socialist experiment, we know rather less about the size and composition of the New Class that came to occupy the social space so suddenly vacated by the old moneyed elite. In a "workers' state," the sheer size of the New Class is a sensitive matter; we shall examine this and other distributional issues in some detail. The size of the managerial sector varies greatly among market economies, with the United States representing the extreme of "managerial society," while countries such as Japan and Germany are by contrast "workerist states" (Gordon 1996: 28). We shall attempt to locate the socialist experiment within this comparative continuum and, furthermore, to chart the contours of New Class growth across the various stages of socialism. We shall examine, finally, how the relative sizes of the managerial-bureaucratic and the professional components of the New Class shifted as socialism evolved. Under Stalinism, the old bureaucratic officialdom sought to dominate and contain the technical intelligentsia, but this increasingly became a rearguard action as the intelligentsia grew ever more important (in functional terms) in running the social and economic apparatus of a centralized economy. The final set of issues that we shall take on pertains to the role of women in effecting the foregoing transformations. Unlike the industrial transformations within market economies, those of socialist societies occurred simultaneously with the wholesale entry of women into the labor force; one might well expect this overlaying of two revolutions to affect the way in which the economic transformations unfolded. It is unlikely, for example, that Hungary has followed the Swedish model, in which women are incorporated disproportionately into the service sector, if only because Hungarian women entered the economy well before such a sector would have been expected to be in ascendance. By this logic, one might instead expect women to be relatively well represented in manual occupations, since they entered the labor force as the heavy-industry development of Hungary was under way. This would be an exceedingly unusual outcome, with Japan providing the only other possible example of substantial female representation in the production sector (see Brinton 1993). The further point that might be made is that the socialist glorification of manual labor was expressed in relatively low wages and benefits for some professional occupations, which were thus rendered (under a standard queuing model) suitable destinations for women.l The overall picture, then, is a bimodal one in which the entry of women drove the expansion of both the New Class and the working class.

44

The Class Structure of Classless Hungary

The Class Scheme We have devised a ten-category class scheme for the purpose of investigating such issues. 2 Although it is closely related to some existing class schemes (e.g., Wright 1979; Goldthorpe 1980, 1987; Borocz :1989), we have introduced various revisions and elaborations that make it possible to capture the distinctive features of socialist, presocialist, and postsocialist economies. The full mapping of occupations into class categories is given in Appendix C. We shall review this classification in some detail, since it will be deployed throughout the analyses that follow. The category of managers and bureaucrats includes salaried managers, high-grade administrators, and bureaucratic officials in both government and large-scale economic organizations. The incumbents of this class typically exercise much authority: they devise and coordinate national policy, direct and control collective property, and run the machinery of the state (Staar 197:1; Beck 1973; Lane 1976). As in Western democratic regimes (e.g., Mills :1956; Domhoff 1979; Goldthorpe 1982), these managers also enjoy comparatively high incomes, have access to a wide variety of in-kind benefits, and have many opportunities for occupational mobility throughout their careers (Connor 1979; I. Szelenyi 1976, 1983). This concentration of authority and privilege is of course inconsistent with the egalitarian rhetoric of socialist states, so much so that some commentators have identified managers and bureaucrats as a New Class (see Trotsky 1972 [1937]; Djilas 1957; Cliff 1974). Professionals include those members of the technical intelligentsia (e.g., scientists, engineers, higher-grade technicians), professionals (e.g., doctors, lawyers, teachers), and "free-floating" intellectuals (e.g., artists, actors, writers) who are not self-employed. The incumbents of this category have similar educational backgrounds, high levels of income, opportunities for occupational mobility, and much autonomy (I. Szelenyi :1982; Kennedy and Bialecki 1989; Kennedy 1991, :1992). Unlike those at the top of the social hierarchy in socialist states (i.e., managers and bureaucrats), professionals do not formulate or even implement national policy. However, they do control critical technical knowledge and circulate in and out of command positions; these factors suggest that they might be regarded as part of the socialist ruling class (see, e.g., Bahro 1978; Gouldner 1979; Konnid and Szelenyi 1979). We nonetheless identify them as a separate category because the

The Class Structure of Classless Hungary

45

distinction between the bureaucratic officialdom and the technical intelligentsia is a critical one. 3 We shall use the label routine nonmanual workers to refer to secretaries, clerical workers, low-grade administrators, and the like. While routine nonmanuals have far less authority than managers and bureaucrats, they are well integrated into the bureaucratic structure of organizations and typically serve as gatekeepers to those in positions of power and authority. They are also more likely to supervise the work of others than are semiskilled or unskilled manual workers. From the point of view of laborers, routine nonmanual workers are often the most proximate source of supervision and therefore represent the lowest reaches of the command structure (e.g., Buraway and Lukacs 1992). While working as a laborer in a Hungarian factory, Haraszti (1978: 75) observed that "the clerk who works in the foremen's office doesn't earn a lot of money, because she is a clerk and because she is a woman. But she can send for me, pass on orders from the chief, do me favors, or discriminate against me." Quite aside from the authority that they sometimes exercise, routine nonmanual workers also command higher prestige than do manual workers (Lane 1976). 4 The category of small proprietors includes small employers, farmers, shopkeepers, independent artisans, and self-employed professionals. Although this class category was effectively eliminated with the initial nationalization of private property, it was far from empty in either the presocialist or the reform-socialist stage in Hungarian history. 5 Despite their overall subordination to the dynamics of the command economy, small proprietors in Hungary have managed to retain considerable autonomy and hence freedom from supervisory control and bureaucratic regulations (Gabor and Galasi 1978, 1985; I. Szelenyi 1988). At the same time, the economic world of small proprietors has been volatile, since they are subjected to the inconsistently applied reprivatization strategies of the socialist state (I. Szelenyi 1989; Nee and Lian 1994). However, when small proprietors are permitted to operate, they tend to enjoy high levels of income and have a positively privileged lifestyle (see Nee 1989a, 1991). In light of what we now know about the postCommunist transformation of the Hungarian economy, we might also note that small proprietors who began their entrepreneurial activities under the socialist regime were well positioned to establish themselves as yet another new ruling class in the post-Communist period (see Hankiss 1990; Szalai 199oa; Staniszkis 1991b; S. Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Kovach 1995).

46

The Class Structure of Classless Hungary

We have put supervisors, foremen,' inspectors, and policemen into the category of supervisors. Unlike managers, the incumbents of this class category do not make national policy, nor do they even formulate policy at the organizational level. Their task is primarily to ensure that individuals behave in accordance with the rules and regulations set by others. They are typically involved in the direct supervision of workers; that is, they may examine and check the product of their subordinates' labor, and they may also police the off-work behavior of individuals (e.g., Haraszti 1978). Although this type of supervisory labor provides little power or prestige in market societies, it carries somewhat more of both in a highly centralized polity that lacks a system of checks on the use and abuse of proximate power. 6 On the whole, supervisors have less favorable economic circumstances than managers and bureaucrats, but their jobs are relatively well paid and their opportunities for upward mobility are reasonably high (Utasi 1984; S. Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Kovach 1995). The craft workers category comprises skilled manual wage-workers in all branches of industry as well as in agriculture. Under the Hungarian variant of socialism, members of this class category could not form independent trade unions, but they nonetheless constituted an aristocracy of labor by virtue of their control over scarce skills (Burawoy 1978, 1979, 1985). Indeed, because of their formal training and highly specialized skills, craft workers are relatively free from interference from supervisors and have far more autonomy than unskilled manual workers. They also have greater job security, higher levels of income, and more bargaining power with socialist management (Lane 1976; Stark 1989b).? The service workers category includes child-care workers, waiters, cooks, janitors, kitchen hands, and the like. The distinguishing feature of this class is that the tasks its members perform are quite similar (at least in terms of their content) to the reproductive tasks of houseworkers. In fact, one might claim that service workers and houseworkers perform identical tasks, but whereas the former are paid in wages, the latter are rewarded in kind. Although members of this class category cannot be readily distinguished from laborers on the basis of income, they do command higher status and are considered to be part of the nonmanual working class in Eastern Europe (Yanowitch 1986). We have defined the laborer category (munkasok, munkasosztaly) to include unskilled and semiskilled manual workers in all branches of industry

The Class Structure of Classless Hungary

47

as well as in agriculture. As in Western capitalist regimes, members of this category under socialism are dispossessed of control over the labor process, have no authority over the labor of others, and have minimal input into major workplace decisions (Volgyes 1981). While there was much wage leveling under socialism (especially in the first stage of socialist development), laborers are nonetheless found at the bottom of the socialist income hierarchy, and their opportunities for career mobility are restricted (Lane 1976; Connor 1991). The category of unpaid family workers comprehends helping hands on farms and unpaid assistants in family businesses. Like small proprietors, unpaid family workers are engaged in small-scale production for sale on the market. However, their work is usually performed at their homes, and they are by definition unpaid. This category of labor has historically been quite small; consequently, one should bear in mind that estimates pertaining to its incumbents are likely to be imprecise (see esp. Chapters 4 and 5). The category of houseworkers comprises full-time housewives and househusbands, including those who are temporarily on maternity or paternity leave from their usual occupations. 8 Although the daily activities of houseworkers are far less visible and certainly more isolated than those of the formally employed, they are nonetheless functionally important for the production and reproduction of labor power in the formal economy. Houseworkers often perform their work in varying socioeconomic and status contexts, yet their broadly similar work conditions and their functionally equival:nt position in the division of labor provide the basis for aggregating them into a single class category. While Western stratification researchers do not typically identify houseworkers as such a category, one cannot hope to understand the implications of socialism without appreciating its grand objective of integrating men and women into the formal economy and thus freeing a large segment of the population from the "barbarously unproductive, petty, nerve-racking, stultifying and crushing drudgery" (Lenin 1974 [1919]: 66) of full-time housewifery. The socialist revolution should be understood, then, as a two-pronged effort to eliminate not merely capitalists but housewives as well (seeS. Szelenyi 1992b, 1994). The claim on which this chapter rests is that the foregoing classification is equally appropriate for studying Hungarian society before, during, and after the socialist transformation. Comparability is never, of course, achieved cost-free. Like many other comparative sociologists, we have had to contend

48

The Class Structure of Classless Hungary

with a double-edged sword: our objective was to make comparison possible by identifying fundamental structural similarities across all periods of Hungarian history, without sacrificing the distinctive features of any period. The approach that we have taken is to emphasize similarities of function as a minimalist basis for comparability. It is obvious, for example, that there are differences between capitalist (i.e., presocialist) and socialist managers, even if our class model disregards them. The directors of socialist firms are more tightly controlled by central management (Markus 1983); moreover, they are guided by different budget constraints (Kornai 1986b), and they operate under a different logic of redistribution (Konrad and Szelenyi 1979). The important point, however, is that socialist and capitalist managers perform identical functions in the division of labor. By virtue of this, they also command roughly equivalent amounts of authority at the workplace, and they enjoy comparable levels of income and prestige relative to other occupational categories. 9 We shall nonetheless predicate our comparisons on first-order functional similarities rather than second-order similarities in authority, income, or prestige. Indeed, in interpreting some of the over-time variation in mobility and exchange (see Chapters 4 and 5), we shall sometimes argue that changes in the authority, income, or prestige of the underlying categories are implicated, but the categories themselves remain unchanged.

Data and Methods The data used in this chapter again come from the 1983 Hungarian Social Mobility and Life History Survey described in Chapter 2 and Appendix B. The SMLH is ideally suited for the analysis of long-term trends in class inequality because it is large (N = 32,30:[), because it contains high-quality and detailed occupational data, and because respondents who are self-employed or are houseworkers can be readily identified. Although we have used the Hungarian census in related analyses (see Rueschemeyer and Szelenyi 1989), the census is less useful for the present chapter because it does not consistently identify self-employment and housework. In opting for the SMLH, we will again have to rely on a birth cohort approach to analyzing trends, with all the ambiguities and complications that this entails (see Ryder 1965; Glenn 1977.; Duncan 1978). 10 We shall proceed by examining the class position of respondents when they first entered the labor force and when they were individually 30 years of age. We will further

The Class Structure of Classless Hungary

I

49

restrict our sample to respondents born between 191.1 and 1950, because the number who were born after 1950 and also had reached 30 years of age by 1983 was not sufficiently large. We shall also examine the contours of the entire Hungarian labor force (i.e., all respondents between 25 and 64 years of age) at a single point in time (i.e., 1983). As in the previous chapter, the successive birth cohorts that we analyze here cover nearly a half century of Hungarian history, with each representing a distinctive stage in the development of the Hungarian economy and a distinctive era of employment opportunities. The first group of respondents, born between 1911 and 1920, reached adulthood prior to the socialist takeover in 1949 and advanced to mature careers under the leadership of Stalinist political elites. Early in their work history, members of this cohort endured the last throes of World War II, the turbulence of agricultural collectivization, and the effects of the extensive economic growth that accompanied the socialization of the Hungarian economy (Andorka 1976a; Simkus 1981b, 1984). By contrast, respondents in the cohort born between 1921 and 1930 entered the labor force under a Stalinist regime, and they therefore experienced their midcareer mobility in the context of a politically quite moderate post-Stalinist government (Simkus 1984). The third cohort, born between 1931 and 1940, first entered the labor market in the years surrounding the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and secured their midlife class positions during the "second stage" of socialist development, in which inequalities crystallized and new privileges emerged (Ossowski 1963; Nove 1983a). When members of this cohort were 30 years of age, socialist societies such as Hungary were characterized by substantial inequalities in status and prestige (Inkeles 1966), mobility chances (Connor 1979; Simkus 1984; Wong and Hauser 1992), opportunities for schooling (S. Szelenyi and Aschaffenburg 1993), and monetary and nonmonetary rewards (I. Szelenyi 1976; Walder 1986). The fourth cohort, born between 1941 and 1950, had entered the labor force by the 1970s and attained midcareer positions after the second economy was resuscitated and informal market opportunities were accordingly available. 11

The Transformation of the Hungarian Class Structure Bearing the foregoing definitions and caveats in mind, we can now examine the changing class distributions of our four Hungarian birth cohorts. 12 Table 3.1 first shows the class positions of our respondents when they initially

TABLE 3.1

Distribution of Class Positions in First job and at Age 30 by Respondent's Year of Birth Respondent's year of birth Class category

Class position in first job (1) Managers and bureaucrats (2) Professionals (3) Routine nonmanual workers (4) Small proprietors (5) Supervisors (6) Craft workers (7) Service workers (8) Laborers (9) Unpaid family workers (10) Houseworkers Class position at age 30 (1) Managers and bureaucrats (2) Professionals (3) Routine nonmanual workers (4) Small proprietors (5) Supervisors (6) Craft workers (7) Service workers (8) Laborers (9) Unpaid family workers (10) Houseworkers

1911-20 (N=3,076)

1921-30 (N=4,940)

1931-40 (N=4,872)

1941-50 (N=5,578)

0.9% 2.8 5.7 18.8 2.3 12.2 12.3 37.2 0.7 7.1

1.5% 3.6 6.2 18.0 3.3 11.5 9.4 42.3 1.0 3.3

2.0% 6.7 9.5 12.8 3.8 12.7 4.8 46.1 0.2 1.5

2.4% 8.7 12.3 2.1 5.1 21.0 5.7 42.1 0.0 0.5

2.4% 3.5 5.5 17.6 2.7 10.6 5.9 30.1 0.5 21.4

4.5% 5.2 7.9 10.9 3.9 10.9 4.8 35.6 0.3 15.9

4.4% 8.7 10.0 1.4 4.7 13.1 4.0 44.8 0.0 8.8

6.2% 11.8 14.3 0.3 6.7 17.0 4.6 35.6 0.0 3.5

NOTE: Percentages may not sum correctly because of rounding error. All calculations shown in this table are based on the sum of weighted counts from male and female tables that are presented in Appendix C.

TABLE 3.2

Distribution of Class Positions in Hungary in 1983: All Respondents Aged 2 5 to 64 Class position

(1) Managers and bureaucrats (2) Professionals (3) Routine nonmanual workers (4) Small proprietors (5) Supervisors (6) Craft workers (7) Service workers (8) Laborers (9) Unpaid family workers (10) Houseworkers

Pet. (N=15,835)

8.6% 11.5 9.1 2.7 5.2 14.0 8.2 29.9 1.6 9.2

NOTE: Percentages may not sum correctly because of rounding error. All calculations shown in this table are based on weighted

counts.

The Class Structure of Classless Hungary

51

entered the labor force, then their class positions when they were 30 years old. Table 3.2 reports the class positions in 1983 of all respondents between the ages of 25 and 64. The most striking result in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 is the massive decline in the percentage of individuals working in or near the household economy. As shown in Table 3.1, nearly one-quarter of the oldest cohort was occupied in unpaid productive labor at the age of 30, while this was true of less than onetwentieth of the youngest cohorts. There can be no doubt, then, that socialist industrialization succeeded in incorporating a large segment of the informal economy into the formal division of labor. When the same data are graphed (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2), one sees yet more strikingly the gradual incorporation of houseworkers into the formal economy. By 1983, only 9.2 percent of the entire population were classified as houseworkers (see Table 3.2), whereas the percentage of such workers in all market economies is many times higher (seeS. Szelenyi 1992b: 577). The question that then emerges is whether full employment was secured through (1) a Swedish-style expansion of the service sector, (2) an expansion of the low-wage laboring category, (3) a classic postindustrial upgrading of Percentage

60 Birth Cohort

50

•

40

D

1911-1920

~ 1921-1930 1931-1940

§§:l1941-1950 30 20 10

!!J. c

"' 0

j

e

a.

=k = o; Siik = 1 ), while that of complete variability (see line 2) is secured by estimating the model of the above equation in its original unconstrained form. The models in the next two lines impose successive equality constraints on the scale values (line 3) and on both the scale values and the inheritance effects (line 4). The final model of Table 4·3 (line 5) represents the trend line yet more parsimoniously by (1) constraining the holding power of all class categories to change at the same rate, and (2) fitting a corresponding global shift in the overall level of off-diagonal association. The resulting model can be represented as follows: Fiik

= a;kl3ik ek~'-;v;Sk

where k refers to a global association parameter that varies by time but not across the off-diagonal cells of the mobility table, and Sk likewise refers to an inheritance parameter that varies by time but not across class categories. This specification thus requires all of the over-time variability to TABLE 4·3 A Decomposition of Trends in Hungarian Intergenerational Mobility Under Model II*, by Gender

Model

Men 1. (OC)(DC) 2. (OC)(DC)(VC)(PC) 3. (OC)(DC)(V)(PC) 4. (OC)(DC)(V)(P) 5. (OC)(DC)(V)(P)(UC)(GC) Women 1. (OC)(DC) 2. (OC)(DC)(VC)(PC) 3. (OC)(DC)(V)(PC) 4. (OC)(DC)(V)(P) 5. (OC)(DC)(V)(P)(UC)(GC)

L'

df

Lh'/L,'

bic

2,859.7 248.3 286.1 417.3 409.3

256 188 212 239 233

100.0 8.7 10.0 14.6 14.3

542.4 -1,453.4 -1,632.9 -1,746.1 -1,699.8

2,810.1 315.7 406.6 442.1 564.8

256 188 212 239 233

100.0 11.6 14.5 15.7 20.1

478.1 -1,396.8 -1,524.6 -1,735.0 -1,557.7

NOTE: 0 =class position at first job, D =class position at age JO, p =class persistence, v =Model n· row and column effects, C =birth cohort, U =uniform inheritance, G =global row-by-column association. See text for details.

70

Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility

be absorbed in a single set of global shift effects (see Xie 1992; Fukumoto and Grusky 1993). The results of Table 4·3 indicate, not surprisingly, that the model of conditional independence (line 1) can again he rejected. Among the remaining specifications, we find that for both men and women the model of line 4 is preferred under a bic criterion. If, however, an U criterion is adopted, we would in both cases opt for the model of complete variability (line 2). In the present context, our objective is to evaluate various theories of change; we are therefore reluctant to insist on a bic uiterion and, in so doing, foreclose the possibility of uncovering changes that are both significant and substantively of interest. We shall thus carry out the following analyses with the model of line 2. It should be emphasized, however, that there is no evidence here of massive changes of the sort that might have been anticipated given the radical interventionist policies of socialism. This result is consistent with contemporary research suggesting that modern mobility regimes are highly resistant to change (see esp. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993).

Trends in Off-Diagonal Exchange We shall first consider long-term trends in off-diagonal exchange by examining estimates of Sk. Table 4-4 gives the maximum-likelihood scaling of class categories obtained under model2, and Figures 4·5 and 4.6 provide the same results in graphical form. In all of these tables and figures, we have identified the scale values by constraining them to sum to zero within each cohort. Although some scholars would perhaps wish to read something into the fluctuations of Figures 4·5 and 4.6, there is surely nothing here to suggest that socialism has fundamentally altered exchanges between class categories. To be sure, in the case of both men and women, we see some transitory changes in the scale values; we shall comment upon these below. The larger picture that should be emphasized, however, is one of trendless fluctuation (Sorokin 1964 [1927]), thus suggesting that the hie-selected model of "no change" (i.e., model4 of Table 4-3) would not have led us too far astray. The principal evidence of a "socialism effect" is to be found in the sudden deterioration in the position of managers in the period immediately following the transition (i.e., the 1921-30 birth cohort). This result shows up more clearly for men, but it is also evident in attenuated form for women. Thus,

Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility

71.

TABLE 4·4 Maximum-Likelihood Scaling of Class Categories (Row and Column Effects) Under Model W for Four Hungarian Birth Cohorts, by Gender

Respondent's year of birth Class category Men (1) Managers and bureaucrats (2) Professionals (3) Routine nonmanual workers (4) Small proprietors (5) Supervisors (6) Craft workers (7) Service workers (8) Laborers (9) Unpaid family workers Women (1) Managers and bureaucrats (2) Professionals (3) Routine nonmanual workers (4) Small proprietors (5) Supervisors (6) Craft workers (7) Service workers (8) Laborers (9) Unpaid family workers

1911-20

1921-30

1931-40

1941-50

0.5726 0.5887 0.4148 -0.8676 0.5645 -0.2967 -0.4484 -1.2187 0.6908

-0.1241 0.7117 0.6731 -1.1255 -0.0814 -0.1682 -0.0819 -0.8902 1.0865

0.5721 0.4382 0.4687 -0.5577 0.4717 -0.0990 -0.4349 -1.3876 0.5284

0.4774 0.6913 0.8310 -0.9625 0.3886 -0.2407 -0.2147 -0.9640 -0.0066

-0.6097 1.0861 0.6447 -1.0489 0.5977 -0.1840 -1.1024 -1.1014 0.4985

0.3989 0.7998 0.9584 -0.8357 0.6867 -0.3960 -0.6701 -1.0800 0.1381

0.2362 0.4048 0.5841 -0.9672 0.5387 -0.2273 -0.4151 -0.9011 0.7468

0.5068 0.7127 0.4559 -0.8900 0.4684 -0.0565 -0.1522 -0.9524 -0.0928

NOTE: Entries are partially normalized scale values (mean= o) derived from model II* (see Tables 4.1 and 4-2; see text for further details).

insofar as the exchange between the working and managerial classes increased, it did so through a deterioration in the position of managers rather than any improvement in that of workers. Access to the professional class was not similarly eased, no doubt because professional positions were invariably secured through credentials that putatively indexed merit and could not, therefore, be so readily swept aside by purely political (i.e., counterselective) considerations. Moreover, despite the evidence in Figures 4· 5 and 4.6 that managers were proletarianized in the first stages of socialism, these figures are quite clear in revealing the transitory nature of this socialism effect. In the case of men, the privileged position of managers is completely restored once socialism has matured, thus again suggesting that revolutionary ardor cannot be long maintained and that stratifying principles soon reassert themselves (see Kelley and Klein 1.986). The remaining results are yet less supportive of standard stories about the revolutionary effects of socialism. We find, first, no evidence that socialism generated greater parity in the life chances of managers and professionals; to

Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility

72

Scale value

2.0 1.5

:: ·:::~:;;~::::.::~~. . ,:,~;.=; ----..,,.,....,......._

0.0-r----------~~~~~~--r------------+---------~~

-0.5

-----........:::-----____,..,. ---............

-1.0

,..,.,.'*""" ...,.....,.,..,.,.

~...........

-1.5

-.....

............

-= -

.........................

-- - --

--

............ .,.-- .,--.--- ~

-2.0 - + - - - - - - - - , . - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - . , 1911-1920

1921-1930

1931-1940

1941-1950

- - Managers and bureaucrats

---- • Professionals

---Small proprietors

• • • • Supervisors

-

-

-

.......... Unpaid family workers

-

Service workers

-

Laborens

·-··-·· Routine non manual workers -

Craft workers

Figure 4·5· Changes in Hungarian class structure: scale values from unconstrained model II* for men (intergenerational tables). be sure, our results show that exchanges between these two class categories have always been quite frequent, but there is nothing here to suggest a convergence in their mobility chances over the last forty years. There is no evidence, then, that the life chances of New Class members have become increasingly similar over this period and that the New Class has therefore attained the unity that some scholars (e.g., Gouldner 1979) had anticipated. Along similar lines, we find no support for the claim that the socialist regime discriminated against the "ideologically suspect" children of small proprietors (cf. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993: 152), nor do we observe a decrease in the general attractiveness of this class over the period covered here (cf. Andorka 1988b). What our results show, to the contrary, is that socialism was ineffective in altering the occupational opportunities of those who origi-

Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility

73

nated in the old moneyed class. In spite of conventional anticapitalist rhetoric in Hungary, the life chances of small proprietors and their children remained stable under the socialist regime. The conclusions that we can put forward here are, therefore, of a principally negative sort. This is not to gainsay our prior conclusion that children of the working class were well represented in the Hungarian elite (see Figure 4.1). However, this outcome was largely generated by structural changes in the marginal distribution of class categories, not by the application of classbased quotas that improved the life chances of workers. By implication, the proletarian origins of the Hungarian New Class reflected the simple fact that, in a rapidly expanding command economy, such a Class cannot itself spawn enough replacements to fill the empty places at the top of the comScale value

2.0

1.5

1.0

··-··.-~=.~~.:~:::.~~c·~:·~~-;~=~~·::·~~-·~. ..... .. . .:;.;:~~~~::~::::.ow:::::-.:.:::.:.----

0.5

·············································-·············· o.o+--------+-------+------:::...;d

--- ---- --- --- --------~-.::.------------.=..--....:-=:=.:-:..= . . . . . . .------...=.--= --:::=-----,__.--

·0.5

·1.0

·1.5 ·2.0 - + - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - r - - - - - - - - - - , 1911·1920

1931-1940

1921-1930

1941-1950

- - Managers and bureaucrats

---- • Professionals

- - - Small proprietors

• • • • Supervisors

-

-

-

·••·••···· Unpaid family workers

-

Service workers

-

Laborers

·-··-·· Routine nonmanual workers -

Craft workers

Figure 4.6. Changes in Hungarian class structure: scale values from unconstrained model II* for women (intergenerational tables).

74

Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility

mand structure. There was no alternative, then, but to draw upon children of the working class. The overall conclusion that emerges here is not just that class-based quotas failed to operate as intended, but also that the transition to socialism failed more generally to narrow the gap between manual and nonmanual workers. Although the glorified worker with hammer in hand was a characteristic image of the socialist regime, our results indicate that this upgrading in the status of the working class was confined mainly to the cultural sphere.

Trends in Class Inheritance The results presented so far raise serious doubts about the overall success of political interventions in shaping the structure of occupational opportunities in Hungary. However, before passing final judgment on such matters, we should turn to long-term trends in class inheritance. Towards this end, Table 4·5 lists the class persistence parameters obtained under model II* for TABLE 4·5 Class Persistence Parameters Under Model II* for Four Hungarian Birth Cohorts, by Gender

Respondent's year of birth

1911-20

1921-30

1931-40

1941-50

(1) Managers and bureaucrats (2) Professionals (3) Routine nonmanual workers (4) Small proprietors (5) Supervisors (6) Craft workers (7) Service workers (8) Laborers (9) Unpaid family workers

1.1432 1.6737 0.8880 3.0802 1.4449 1.2246 1.6729 -0.1996 1.1642

2.0567 1.9918 -0.2579 2.1688 2.1972 0.7319 0.3807 0.5561 8.3262

-1.2620 1.5961 -0.0473 3.0498 -0.6662 0.7756 2.1668 -1.3263 -2.7137

0.3617 0.7961 -0.8598 2.1181 -0.3775 0.4558 1.2992 -0.4086 3.8682

Women (1) Managers and bureaucrats (2) Professionals (3) Routine nonmanual workers (4) Small proprietors (5) Supervisors (6) Craft workers (7) Service workers (8) Laborers (9) Unpaid family workers

-0.0110 0.5364 0.4808 2.4083 -8.2722 0.8845 -0.0522 0.0329 -4.4794

0.1979 0.7896 -0.5477 2.4992 -0.3998 0.7366 0.4005 -0.1641 10.6322

-8.8533 1.1743 -0.2672 2.0736 0.4389 0.4343 -0.7776 0.0659 2.3510

0.6067 0.6729 0.2685 2.1576 0.0736 0.6645 0.4197 -0.2052 5.3074

Class category Men

NOTE: The class persistence parameters are deviations from th'~ aggregate of off-diagonal cells. Entries are in logarithmic form and were derived from model n• in Tables 4-1 and 4.2. See text for further details.

Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility

75

Parameter estimate

12 Birth Cohort

10

•

1911-1920

~ 1921-1930

8

6

D 1931-1940

4

~ 1941-1950

2 o-r~r¥~~LL~~~rP~~~~~~~~~~~+-~~+-~~

-2 -4

-6

-8

-10-r-----.-----.-----.------r-----.-----.-----.-----.-----. !!! 'iii~

E-

cn.~

0.

e

0.

-~ "':::>

0.

en

Figure 4·7· Changes in Hungarian class inheritance: parameter estimates from unconstrained model II* for men (intergenerational tables).

both men and women, while Figures 4· 7 and 4-8 present the same results in graphical form. In inspecting these results, we again see some fluctuation and change, but none that is clearly consistent with conventional expectations. For example, while we hypothesized earlier that counterselective practices in the labor market would reduce the amount of intergenerational class inheritance among workers, Figures 4·7 and 4.8 suggest that, for the most part, these practices have not had their intended effect. To be sure, there is some evidence of declining inheritance among male craft workers and service workers, but the change is quite small in the former case and transitory in the latter. Within the laboring class, the densities of inheritance are extremely weak throughout our period of study; one cannot, therefore, attribute such openness to socialism per se. We can conclude, then, that none of the class categories that is reasonably identified as belonging to the manual sector (e.g., craft workers, service workers, laborers) has opened up in dramatic fashion with the transition to socialism. The story is much the same regarding small proprietors. For both men

76

Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility

Parameter estimate

12 Birth Cohort

10

•

1911-1920

8

§

1921-1930

6

D 1931-1940

4

~ 1941-1950

2

-2

-4

-6 -8

!!J.

=en

~

=~

0

U).~

.!!l

(.)~

"'