Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles 0367141108, 9780367141103

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Information
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of contents
Contributors
Acknowledgments
Introductory Note
References
Part I The Nature of Epistemic Duty
1 Epistemic Duty, Justified Belief, and Voluntary Control
Deontological vs. Non-Deontological Justification
Unconstrained Evidentialism
The Infinity Problem
The Epistemic Felicity Problem
Moderate Evidentialism and Doxastic Omission
Practical Interest Permissivism
The Argument from Suspension
The Pandora’s Box Argument
The Unjustified Belief Argument
Commensurability Permissivism
Evidentialism, Commensurability, and Supervenience
Teleology and Epistemic Rationality
Evidentialism and Epistemic Duty
Deontological vs. Non-Deontological Justification
Justification and Epistemic Blame
Belief and Intentionality
Belief and Voluntary Control
Alston’s Test of Voluntary Control
Conclusion
Notes
References
2 Believing Badly: Doxastic Duties Are Not Epistemic Duties
Introduction
1. Violations of Epistemic Duties without Believing Badly
2. Believing Badly without Violation of “Epistemic Duties”
3. Believing Badly When “Epistemic Duties” are Violated
4. Objections
4.1 Not All Duties are Moral Duties
4.2 Not All Blame is Moral Blame
Notes
References
3 Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity
Introduction
1. Evaluations and Prescriptions
2. The English “Ought”
3. The Evasive Strategy
4. Evasion and Normative Reasons
Conclusion
Notes
References
4 Epistemic Tension and Epistemic Duty: A Rossian Account
What Should I Not Believe?
Example: Walzer on Naked Soldiers
Epistemic Tension and How to Deal with it
Assumptions
Implications
Rossian Obligation
Rossian Justification
Taking Stock
Excursion: A Familiar Deficiency in Quantitative Act Utilitarianism
Notes
References
5 Intellectual Responsibility and the Scope of the Will
1. The Range of Intellectual Responsibilities
2. Are Beliefs Acts of Intellect?
3. Responsibility as Presupposing a Kind of Alternative Possibility
4. The Scope of the Will
5. Dimensions of Doxastic Self-Control
6. Intellectual Virtue and Doxastic Self-Control
Evidential Concern
Reflective Equilibrium
Grounds Sensitivity
Interpersonal Comparison
Justificational Proportionality
7. Intellectual Virtue as a Basis for Responding to Rational Disagreement
Dialectical Moderation
Intellectual Humility
Tolerance
Notes
References
6 We are Like American Robins
Preliminaries
1. What Kinds of Duties?
2. Standards
3. Normativism
4. Our Rational Nature
5. Biologizing the Epistemic
5.1 Proper Function One: The Production of True Beliefs
5.2 Proper Function Two: The Production of Useful Beliefs
6. Inference to the Best Explanation
6.1. Transparency
6.2. Negative Epistemic Appraisal
6.3. Excuse-Making
6.4. Authority of Logic
7. Parsimony
8. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
Notes
References
Part II Epistemic Duties of Individuals
7 Bound by the Evidence
1. Introduction
2. Not All Propositions
3. Duty to Reflect
4. No Duty to Inquire
5. Objection 1: Aim of Belief Supports Duty to Inquire
6. Objection 2: Duty to Reflect is a Duty to Inquire
7. Conclusion
Notes
References
8 Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias
1. Introduction
2. Implicit Bias
3. Epistemic Duties
4. An Epistemic Duty to Eradicate Implicit Bias
5. Control over Implicit Bias
6. Conclusion
Notes
References
9 Robust Justification
1. Evidentialism
2. Evidentialism and Irresponsibility
3. A Problem
4. The Solution: Robust Justification
5. The Value of Robust Justification
6. Conclusion
Notes
References
10 Ought to Believe vs. Ought to Reflect
1. Introduction
2. Indirect Doxastic Control vs. Doxastic Influence
2.1. First Objection
Objection
Reply
2.2. Second Objection
3. S has a Duty to Believe that p Only if S has a Duty to Reflect on Whether p
4. Obligations to Reflect on Whether p Always Undercut Obligations to Believe that p.
Contradiction
5. Conclusion and Why This Matters
Notes
References
11 Wisdom, Open-Mindedness, and Epistemic Duty
1. Introduction
2. Wisdom
2.1. Understanding and Wisdom
2.2. Evidence and Wisdom
2.3. Cognitive Excellence and Wisdom
3. Open-Mindedness
4. Epistemic Duty
5. Peer Disagreement
6. Conclusion
Notes
References
12 On What We Should Believe (and When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should Not Believe)
Introduction
1. What is Justification?
2. An Argument Against Externalist Epistemic Norms
3. What Shouldpro We Believe?
Conclusion
Notes
References
13 The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought
1. The Evidential Ought: Instrumentalism vs. Intrinsicalism
2. Intrinsic and Instrumental Rightness
3. Intrinsic Rightness Transfers from Actions to Purposes
Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: No Transfer of Rightness
4. Conclusion
Notes
References
Part III Social Epistemic Duties
14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief
1. Introduction
2. Background: The Stagnating Field of Fundamentalism Studies
3. What is a Fundamentalist Belief?
4. The Wrongness of Fundamentalist Beliefs
5. Excuses for Fundamentalist Belief
6. Conclusion
Notes
References
15 Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief
Introduction
1. The Basics of Trust
2. Some Problems about Attitude Liability Assumptions and a Solution
3. The Attitude of Trust
4. Reasons for Trusting, Reasons from Trust
5. Trust as a Source of Epistemic, But Non-Evidential, Reasons for Belief
6. Conclusion
Notes
References
16 When the Personal Becomes Political: How do We Fulfil Our Epistemic Duties Relative to the Use of Autobiographical ...
1. The Many Roles of Stories
2. APS Stories in Public Debates
3. APS Stories in the Brexit Debate
3.1. Methodology
3.2. Some Examples of APS Stories For and Against EU Immigration
4. Fulfilling Epistemic Duties in Debate Participation
5. Conclusion
Notes
References
17 Dialectical Responsibility and Regress Skepticism
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Notes
References
18 Epistemic Duties Regarding Others
1. The Doxastic Thesis
2. The Intrapersonal Thesis
3. Epistemic Duties Regarding Others
4. Conclusion
Notes
References
Index

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