Epicurus: An Introduction to His Practical Ethics and Politics [Paperback ed.] 3796540066, 9783796540066

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AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS PRACTICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS

This new introduction to Epicurus’ practical ethics and politics provides an overview of Epicurus’ attitudes towards political, religious and cultural traditions. Emphasising Epicurus’ claim that philosophy is an art of living that helps people to achieve individual happiness, the book pays special attention to Epicurus’ understanding of philosophy as caring for one's own soul. It ex­plains how this Epicurean self-care is connected to caring for others since a happy life requires security that can almost only be found in a commu­nity. Epicurus’ practical ethics includes a special appreciation of friendship and a conception of ‘politics’ which focuses on caring for the souls of others. It thus stands firmly in the Socratic tradition. This understanding of practical ethics contributed significantly to the fact that, despite many hostilities, at least practical ethical aspects of Epicurus’ teachings were still discussed in the Greco-Roman Empire and sometimes even appreciated by early Christian philosophers.

EPICURUS

MICHAEL ERLER studied Classical Philology and Philosophy in Cologne and London ( University College ). He is Professor of Classical Philo­­logy at the Julius-­ Maximilians-University Würzburg. His research focuses on Greek literature, Greek and Roman philosophy ( Platonism, Epicureanism ) and the relation be­t­ween ancient literature and philosophy. He is editor of scientific book series and author of numerous mono­graphs and essays on Plato, Epicurus, Roman phi­ losophy and ancient literature. He was president of the International Plato Society, the Mommsen Society and the Society for Ancient Philosophy.

MICHAEL ERLER

EPICURUS

EPICURUS 

AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS PRACTICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS

MICHAEL ERLER www.schwabeverlag.ch

Michael Erler

Epicurus An Introduction to his Practical Ethics and Politics

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Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2020 Schwabe Verlag, Schwabe Verlagsgruppe AG, Basel, Schweiz This work is protected by copyright. No part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or translated, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Cover illustration: Raphael, The School of Athens, © Alamy Cover design: icona basel gmbh, Basel Graphic design: icona basel gmbh, Basel Typesetting: 3w+p, Rimpar Print: CPI books GmbH, Leck Printed in Germany ISBN Print 978-3-7965-4006-6 ISBN eBook (PDF) 978-3-7965-4020-2 DOI 10.24894/978-3-7965-4020-2 The ebook has identical page numbers to the print edition (first printing) and supports full-text search. Furthermore, the table of contents is linked to the headings. [email protected] www.schwabeverlag.ch

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Chapter 1: Epicurus’ Wise Man: Practical Ethics as philosophia medicans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

1.

Epicurus in the Vatican . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

2.

Epicurus’ Teachings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Negative Tenets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Positive Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19 19 20

3.

Epicurus’ philosophia medicans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

4.

Epicurean Self-Deification: Timaeus as a Background . . . . . . . . . .

28

5.

Ethical Value and Lack of Value in Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

6.

Friendship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

Chapter 2: Epicurus’ Garden: Cult and Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

1.

The Epicurean contubernium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

2.

Texts and Epicurean Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

3.

Memorial Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

4.

Epicurean memento mori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Boscoreale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Philodemus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42 42 45

5.

Epicurus, Fear of Death and Unlimited Desire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

6.

Plato’s Dialogue Phaedo: A Memorial Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Socrates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49 50

6

Contents

6.2

Phaedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

7.

Epicurus on memoria and Lament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

8.

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

Chapter 3: Epicurean ‘True Politics’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

1.

Epicurus and Socratic ‘Politics’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

2.

Epicurean Politics and its Aim: True Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 From the Inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61 61 62

3.

Socrates, the True Politician: Gorgias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

4.

Aristotle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

5.

Philodemus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

6.

Diogenes of Oenoanda: An Epicurean Politician . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

7.

Plutarch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

Chapter 4: Theologia medicans. Epicurus’ Transformation of Traditional Religious Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

1.

Epicurean theologia medicans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

2.

Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

3.

Remoteness of the Gods and their Cult . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

4.

Recommendation of Cult (De pietate) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

5.

Prayer and Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

6.

Lucretius’ Hymn to Venus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

7.

Epicurean Prayer, Exercise and Soliloquy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

Chapter 5: Interpretatio medicans: Epicurus, Poetry, and Epicurean Orthodoxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

1.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Contents

2.

Epicurus and Education (paideia) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

3.

Philodemus, an Educated Epicurean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

4.

Epicurus’ Use of Poetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

5.

Lucretius’ Poetry as a Servant to Philosophy: ancilla philosophiae 109

6.

In the Service of paideia: How it was used and to what End . . . . . 112

7.

Two Methods: epilogismos and aphorme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

8.

Lucretius, De amore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

9.

Lucretius, The Plague . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

10.

Conclusion: Orthodoxy and Innovation, again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Chapter 6: Epicureanism in the Roman Republic and in the Christian Imperium Romanum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

1.

Innovation and Orthodoxy: Epicurean Practical Philosophy and Roman mores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

2.

Epicurean Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

3.

Telemachus’ Travels and Critique of Travelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 3.1 Telemachy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 3.2 Philodemus’ Critique of Travelling (De morte) . . . . . . . . . . 136

4.

Adaption and utile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

5.

Convergences with and Divergences from the Christians . . . . . . . 139

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

7

Preface

This small book contains six lectures that I delivered at Renmin University, Beijing, in June 2017. I had the pleasure and honour to be invited to deliver this set of lectures as part of a programme of master lectures on ancient philosophy, which had been established as a biannual series in 2010. This was my first visit to the People’s Republic of China. I am most grateful for having had the honour and opportunity of sharing my thought on Epicureanism, and also on Plato and Platonism, with scholars and students of Renmin University, as well as with other audiences at other Chinese universities, including Beijing University and Sichuan University, Chengdou. I am most grateful for the inspiring discussions and for the generous hospitality of the university and my colleagues there. Certain aspects of Epicurean practical philosophy were chosen as the topic of my talks; I drafted the lectures for that occasion, but I have been working on the topic of Epicurean practical ethics, its political aspects and influence on other schools and traditions such as the Platonist tradition in imperial times, already for a long time. So I was delighted to have the chance to address in this ‘introduction’ problems and questions which seem to be of interest to me as a philologist as well as a reader who is interested in literary and philosophical aspects of Epicurean texts. The lively discussions that followed the lectures in Beijing proved an immense interest in questions of Epicurean practical ethics and the ‘art of living’ proposed by the Epicureans in general. The answers and pieces of advice offered by the Epicureans proved to be not only of historical interest but were regarded as inspiring and sometimes even helpful for today’s problems. In fact, in Epicurus’ times (the 3rd and 2nd century BC) the focus of philosophical interest had indeed shifted away from metaphysical speculation towards considerations concerning the individual and the happiness (eudai-

10

Preface

monia) of the individual, a development which was caused not least by the challenges of that time. Among these were the geographical opening to the East and colonisation in the form of city foundations, culturally close contacts of the Greeks with the New World and its traditions, social and economic changes in the living world, and, politically, new forms of government. All this diminished the significance of the old institution of the polis, led to a new kind of individualism, to concern for one’s own self and reticence concerning political commitment. Thus the tendency towards a world culture at that time was accompanied by a predilection for small literary forms, the progressing globalisation was answered with individualism and an increased search for orientation. Some of these aspects, like the problems created by ‘globalisation’, might seem familiar to modern readers, who today may well perceive the world as difficult to manage and frightening due to political and social changes; modern readers too may try to design their own lives and may therefore be looking for standards and ways to overcome irritations in order to live a balanced life and gain happiness. Whoever promises happiness must offer means to defeat these phenomena. The sales success of popular treatises on life assistance and the art of living signal a certain need for orientation. In this context, modern philosophers increasingly remember antiquity and those concepts of “self-care” (Pierre Hadot, Michel Foucault), which emerged above all in the period described. Epicurus in particular, who founded his school in a garden (kepos) in Athens towards the end of the 3rd century BC, is profiting from this renaissance as well. As a representative of a special way of life and a teacher of an ‘art of living’ he won many followers already in antiquity – especially in times of crisis – and some think that his teachings can be helpful again even today. Epicurus and the Epicureans indeed promised to help to lead a happy life (ars vitae) and to form a special attitude inspired by their teachings, which seems to be necessary if one wishes to lead a good life without inner disturbances. They proposed to offer help in order to increase the capacity to help oneself, and methods and material for the acquisition of a disposition that allows to correct wrong attitudes and to cultivate basic correct ones. The Epicurean philosopher is characterised not only by his knowledge of philosophical doctrine and philosophical discourse but also by his ability to make the learned teachings the maxim of practical action in every possible sit-

Preface

uation. In order to achieve security and happiness one should try to overcome fear and anxiety. Epicurus therefore offers means to achieve the ability to heal oneself from disturbing fear in an irritating situation. The remedy consists in the Epicurean doctrine and its basic convictions: “One need not fear God, one should not face death with suspicious fear, the good is easy to obtain, but the bad is easy to bear”. Epicurus not only offers recipes for the liberation from fear, but also welcomes everyone as a patient. Young and old alike are invited to be instructed by the master. This, too, distinguishes Epicurus from many ancient colleagues and has made an impression even on those who strongly reject basic tenets of his teachings like the denial of the immortality of the soul, of the providence of the gods, or his thesis that all men are striving for pleasure. Yet despite all polemics, even Epicurus’ enemies often accepted that his life in some respects was paradigmatic. Exercise, application, consultation or habituation of knowledge therefore play an important role for the Epicureans. Breviaries, collections of sentences, catechisms or handbooks offer Epicurean teaching in an easily comprehensible and memorable form, combined with methodical instructions for its application in daily life. Epicurus’ practical philosophy as an offer of an ‘art of living’ is propagated, explained, and illustrated by a variety of writings, including scientific treatises such as Epicurus’ main work De natura, but also the use of other types of texts such as the diatribe, memorial treatises on the life and death of school members, letters to friends and communities around the world, compendia or epitomai (short summaries), or collections of sentences with simple and plausible guidelines on how to shape a happy life and how to attain it. These latter kinds of text recommend the memorising of easily comprehensible basic sentences rather than confront the reader with complex philosophical theories and controversies. This can be explained with Epicurus’ view on knowledge transfer. Like Plato, Epicurus repeatedly demands a rethinking of philosophical foundations which forms a component of his art of living. Unlike Plato, however, he is not concerned with an independent search for truth, but with memorising doctrines. The texts are thus a means and an essential element of the practical philosophy propagated by Epicurus, and his offer of techniques for the application of this teaching to the adver-

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sities of daily life made his philosophy attractive for many in antiquity and for some even today. Unlike the modern hedonist Dorian Gray, who poisons himself by reading a book, the Epicureans experienced edification as liberation from the “plague of ignorance” (Diogenes). Reading became part of the techniques of “self-care” (Michel Foucault) that Epicureans offered to support the search for pleasure and happiness. Philosophia medicans became philologia medicans. Of course, it does not follow from this that Epicurus and the Epicureans did not strive to establish a theoretical basis for this offer. They rather developed an epistemological, ontological, and ethical framework for their practical advice as shown, for instance, by Epicurus’ main treatise De natura. It should, however, be noted that this basis, e. g. atomism or empiricism, always includes ethical intentions, for example, the intention to explain why irritating phenomena are not irritating at all, as the Roman Epicurean poet Lucretius demonstrates. Epicurus’ world view thus does not remain purely theoretical, but leads to the formation of a special way of life and thus becomes practical. Theoretical and practical philosophy are closely connected after all. In a way, Epicurus regarded the world as a textbook for the cultivation of the self. Theoretical contemplation became part of the therapeutic programme that Epicurus offered as an aid to orientation. Only those who know how to deal with accidental inconveniences or natural violence will overcome the “fear of the child in us” (Lucretius). Then one gains that distanced attitude that makes the viewer stand above things and feel pleasure. Still, people who direct all their activity towards themselves and transform everything into self-care expose themselves to the suspicion that they are practising a pure cult of the ego, propagating modern dandyism. But that is not exactly what Epicurus is about, as the lectures collected in this volume try to show. By no means is an Epicurean alone enough to gain pleasure and happiness for himself. He needs food and connection to the world of his fellow men, he needs friendship. Self-confidence and security require an environment that is conducive to one’s own happiness. This may initially consist of a small circle of garden comrades. But the Epicureans see the world as a common home. With his inscription at the town hall, Diogenes of Oenoanda wanted to reach as many people as possible in order to heal them from ignorance. The goal for the Epicureans, as later for John Stewart Mill, was the

Preface

greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number. Then, so they hoped, one would be on the way to an ideal society: social life without laws, nay, without state, on the basis of well-understood self-interest will not only enable Epicureans, but all people to live a life like a God on earth. Epicurus’ much quoted call to political abstinence – ‘live in secret’ – the cultivation of the self he propagated, the utilitarian basis of his philosophy – all this should not obscure the philanthropic character of his teaching. It seems paradoxical: Epicurus’ utilitarian doctrine demands orientation towards fellow human beings and promotes social development. This view fits well with more recent theories from behavioural research that put genetically-determined egoism into context with social developments. A free expression of one’s problems, the examination of one’s conscience, the confession of guilt towards friends are recommended. Many things seem modern, make one think of confession and therapeutic counselling. It is not, however, about the forgiveness of sins, but about the ability to analyse oneself, which is at the beginning of every improvement and every healing process. Because of this far-reaching influence of Epicurean practical ethics, I further develop some aspects of Epicurean practical ethics in this book, which might be called philosophia medicans because it offers a kind of medicine to free people from fear and anguish. To do so, I will focus first (ch. 1) on the Epicurean ideal of the wise man, then (ch. 2) on Epicurus’ school, the Garden or kepos, and on how the ideal of the self-perfection of one’s mortal self and caring for others go together. I then also ask (ch. 3) what it means that the Epicurean wise man should shun politics and argue that a newly-found fragment of an Epicurean inscription will help to better understand that Epicurus’ advice to avoid politics concerns traditional politics only and recommends a new understanding of what politics really should mean. I wish to argue that this new kind of ‘philosophical’ politics, which the Epicureans favour to be applied in any community, should be seen in the Platonic-Socratic tradition and reflects what Plato’s Socrates had to say in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias. I further discuss (ch. 4) the fact that Epicurus, although he has been accused of atheism, accepted the existence of gods and traditional religious features, while transforming them into what could be called theologia medicans and integrating them into his practical ethics or philosophia medicans. Next (ch. 5), I try to defend the Epicureans against the accusation of apaideusia, i. e. a neglect of

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traditional education, and discuss the relation of so-called Epicurean orthodoxy and innovation in this matter. Finally (ch. 6), I track down elements of Epicurean practical ethics in the Roman context and late antiquity, and discuss how Epicurean teachings were adapted to new Roman and even Christian contexts down to late antiquity and the Renaissance. The main thesis is that Epicurean practical ethics are indeed relevant for good living in community, that they were of great importance in antiquity, and might be of interest even today. They can be interpreted and perhaps better understood as a kind of response to philosophical predecessors – especially to Plato. I would like to thank Marion Schneider, who helped me with the composition of the English version of the lectures; Francois Renaud who spent some time in Würzburg on a Humboldt grant working with me on Plato, discussed with me many topics that I treated in the lectures and gave good advice for improving the English version; Vincenzo Damiani, who helped with formatting the manuscript, and Konstantin Heil, who kindly checked the notes for me. All of them were of great help to me, for which I am grateful.

Chapter 1: Epicurus’ Wise Man: Practical Ethics as philosophia medicans

1. Epicurus in the Vatican The famous School of Athens painted by Raphael on a wall of one of the Catholic Pope’s private rooms in the Vatican has become an icon of western European culture.1 In this painting, Raphael assembles famous ancient philosophers; among these 58 philosophers one recognises Plato, Aristotle, Heraclitus, Diogenes and many others. Raphael presents them as doing what philosophers like to do best: discussing, teaching, reading, writing, and – sometimes – listening to each other. That is to say, Raphael, as the great Renaissance writer Vasari recognised,2 characterises the philosophers by illustrating their different ways of philosophical communication. In doing so, Raphael seems to follow a rule formulated by Lorenzo Valla in his treatise De voluptate, according to which the communication of a philosopher should match the character of the person and of the teachings he stands for.3 From this it follows that focusing on the different ways of communication each person employs tells the viewer something about the philosopher, who he is, how he practises philosophy and what his philosophical message is. This makes it easier to identify the philosophers depicted by Raphael. In most cases, this identification is quite easy.4 But if you look for the philosopher our

Cf. ERLER 2000: 273–294; MOST 1996. Cf. KRANZ 1996: 51. The importance of the way of communication was stressed by BURCKHARDT 1959: 273 f.; for the rule of Decorum of Audience see HANKINS 1991: 330 f.; ERLER 2000: 276; MOST 1999. 3 Cf. DE PANIZZA LORCH 1970; ERLER 2004a: 7–19. 4 Cf. ERLER 2000: 280. 1 2

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Chapter 1: Epicurus’ Wise Man: Practical Ethics as philosophia medicans

lectures are interested in – Epicurus – things are different: Epicurus, the Athenian philosopher who lived in the late 4th and 3rd centuries at the beginning of the so-called Hellenistic age (341–270 BC), who founded a school in Athens5 and marked the beginning of a very important and interesting, though highly controversial philosophical movement which lasted for over 500 years up until imperial times.6 Although many attempts have been made to discover him in the painting, Epicurus seems hard to identify. To the best of my knowledge, no suggestion has been accepted as being fully persuasive so far. I suggest taking the cue from what Epicurus himself tells us about philosophy and philosophical communication in one of his letters to Menoeceus. What Epicurus has to say at the beginning of this letter7 explains exactly the peculiarity of the composition of the small group to our left, standing around a column. There are good reasons to argue that the members of this group must be Epicureans and that one of them, who is wearing a wreath of ivy and pointing to a page of a book in front of him, might be Epicurus.8 The other persons who pay attention to him – I think – are his followers. Now, the composition of this group strikes me as intriguing, because each of the four individuals is of a different age and obviously represents a different phase in man’s life – a baby, a very young man, a man in his best years, and an old man. A composition such as this cannot be observed in any other of the groups painted by Raphael. As far as I can see, this peculiarity has not yet been utilised in the discussion about the identity of the group, but – as I shall argue – it is the cue for identifying it as a group of Epicureans and the man wearing the wreath of ivy as Epicurus, because the composition of the group consisting of four people with each of them representing a phase of human life, recalls, and obviously is meant to recall, the beginning of a most popular writing of Epicurus, the letter to his friend Menoeceus, which is preserved by Diogenes Laertius and had been translated into Latin in Raphael’s times. This letter begins as follows:

5 6 7 8

Cf. CLAY 2009. Cf. SEDLEY 2009; ERLER 2009a. Cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 122. Cf. ERLER 2000: 286–289.

1. Epicurus in the Vatican

Epicurus to Menoeceus, greeting. Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search thereof when he is grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it.9

In this letter, Epicurus obviously wishes to encourage the reader to philosophise in order to become happy; in fact, the letter is a ‘protrepticus’ for Epicurean philosophy,10 i. e. he wishes to encourage the young to study philosophy. In order to do so, Epicurus takes a stand in an ongoing and lively debate about the place of philosophy in life and such questions as whether one should do philosophy at all, and if so, when and for how long – only if you are a young man or woman as a kind of ‘mental practise’, or rather later in one’s life, or should one do philosophy during one’s whole life? Some philosophers or sophists argued that one should practise philosophy only to prepare oneself for life in young age – as, for instance, Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, or the orator Isocrates request;11 for they were convinced that otherwise students of philosophy would become unfit for public life and would be a waste of time. According to Callicles, this is proven by Socrates himself, who obviously was not fit to defend himself in court and did not know the way to the agora.12 Others argue that one should rather practise philosophy later in life when grown-up; first one should be educated in gymnastics, mathematics, and other disciplines.13 Philosophising when you are very young, philosophising when you are grown-up, philosophy all your life: these positions were held and defended when Epicurus wrote the Letter to Menoeceus, in

9 10 11 12 13

Epicur. Ep. Men. 121 f. (trans. HICKS 1950). Cf. HESSLER 2014: 31–33. Cf. Pl. Grg. 484c; Isoc. Antid. 261–268; Panath. 28. Cf. Pl. Tht. 173cd. Cf. Pl. R. 485bff., 497e–498c.

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Chapter 1: Epicurus’ Wise Man: Practical Ethics as philosophia medicans

which Epicurus propagates that one should philosophise throughout one’s life, because everyone wishes to be happy at every moment of their life. Seen against this background, Raphael’s composition of the group at the column gains a sharper profile: it obviously illustrates what Epicurus propagates: Philosophy is useful for everyone at any age. When reading the painting against the background of the Letter to Menoeceus it becomes clear: The group at the column should represent Epicureans, and the middle-aged, fat and sleek man with good keeping14 and wearing a garland of ivy while pointing to the book in front of them, is Epicurus. In fact, we gain some interesting information from Sidonius Apollinaris (who was born about 430 AD and died in 489 AD), an important author, poet, diplomat and bishop from fifthcentury Gaul. He wrote a large number of letters which were available in Raphael’s time. From these we learn that Epicurus was depicted that way in antiquity. In one of his letters, Sidonius says: You do not burn with envy at the thought of those paintings all over the gymnasia of the Areopagus and in the prytanea showing Speusippus with his head bowed forward, Aratus with his head bent back, Zenon with knitted brow, Epicurus with unwrinkled skin, Diogenes with long beard, Socrates with trailing hair, Aristotle with out-thrust arm.15

‘Epicurus with unwrinkled skin’: This reminds us of one of Horace’s famous dictums about Epicurus, the fat and sleek man with good keeping;16 but Sidonius is talking about a painting he has seen. Now, it cannot be proven that Raphael refers to these paintings – but he might have known Sidonius’ letters which were printed at his time.17 This seems to make it very plausible that the group standing around a column represents Epicureans and that Raphael wanted to give Epicurus a place in his painting.

Cf. Hor. Epist. 1.4.15. Sid. Apol. Ep. 9.9.14: neque te satis hoc aemulari, quod per gymnasia pingantur Areopagitica vel prytanea curva cervice Speusippus Aratus panda, Zenon fronte contracta Epicurus cute distenta, Diogenes barba comante Socrates coma cadente, Aristoteles brachio exerto. (trans. ANDERSON 1965). 16 Cf. Hor. Epist. 1.4.15. 17 ERLER 2000: 290 Anm. 59.

14 15

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2. Epicurus’ Teachings 2.1 Negative Tenets

If the identification as suggested above seems persuasive and if we have to reckon with Epicurus amongst the philosophers in the School of Athens, another problem arises. For one might wonder why Epicurus should appear as one of the famous philosophers in a painting on the wall of a private room of the Pope. After all, the main teachings of Epicurus mostly contradict what Christians believed.18 For Epicurus propagated that pleasure is the goal all human beings19 are striving for; that the summit of pleasure is the absence of pain (the so-called katastematike hedone), and that this pleasure, although it cannot be increased once pain has been removed, can still be embellished and therefore is called kinetike hedone (varietas); that the world is composed of atoms and void and is not created by God. In addition, Epicurus believed that gods exist but do not care for men; that the soul is mortal; that all goods which are necessary for a good life are available; and that it is better to shun political involvement; to name just the most famous tenets of his teaching.20 One therefore wonders: Why should Raphael decide to confront Christian viewers, and even the Pope, with a philosopher who was regarded by some of the Church Fathers as the mouthpiece of the homo carnalis, i. e. the slave of carnal desires, and whose philosophical teachings were unacceptable to the Christians?21 For the Christians, of course, defended their belief in the providence of God, the creation of the world by a creator, the immortality of the soul, the importance of virtue, and not the pursuit of pleasure at all costs to gain real happiness.

Cf. ERLER 2009: 46–64, esp. 60 ff.; ERLER 2018a. Cf. Aug. Util. cred. 10. 20 For a collection of testimonies on Epicurean epistemology, physics and ethics cf. LONG/SEDLEY 1987; GERSON/INWOOD 1994; ERLER/SCHOFIELD 1999a; WARREN 2009; ERLER 2010. 21 Cf. Aug. Serm. 348.3. 18

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2.2 Positive Aspects

Raphael’s decision to give Epicurus a place in the Vatican will become more understandable if one remembers that even in Platonist and Christian circles, some aspects of Epicureanism were appreciated. Despite fundamental disagreements, Platonists and Christians acknowledged the inner coherence of Epicurus’ philosophical system. In particular, Epicurus’ ability to offer practical advice for a good and happy life made Epicureans and their teachings attractive in Epicurus’ time, but also later in Roman and in Christian contexts.22 Epicurean practical ethics were well considered by people belonging to different philosophical or religious camps – such as Platonism or Christianity – not least because Epicurus’ life was regarded as an example and proof of the fact that it was possible to live well according to his teachings and to gain happiness, quietness of mind, and pleasure. Epicurus’ practical ethics, his offer of a range of techniques for a life accompanied by the principles of reason, were appreciated even when his materialistic physics and theology were rejected sharply. Clearly, a dimidiatus Epicurus (“Epicurus cut in half”) – i. e. Epicurean teachings reduced to practical ethics, lending a hand and assisting in the practical management of life and the acquisition of knowledge – played an important role in the survival of Epicurean teaching in antiquity, when Platonists and Christians dominated the scene.23 In fact, Epicurean practical ethics played an important and sometimes underestimated role, occasionally without being recognised as such in the curricula of Platonist and Christian education. Epicurus’ practical ethics – or rather elements of it – sometimes were accepted by the Platonists or Christians, although striving for the transcendent realm of truth, to prepare the wouldbe philosopher’s disposition in order to become a true philosopher: which means that Epicureanism functioned as a sort of praeparatio philosophica. This aspect remained of importance even during the Middle Ages: For sure, Dante, the great poet of the Divina Commedia banned the Epicureans to the

22 23

Cf. SCHMID 1962; ERLER 2009a, 60–64. Cf. LONG 1986: 300–316; MITSIS 1988; Epicurean practical ethics: ERLER 2016a.

3. Epicurus’ philosophia medicans

10th circle of the inferno. But in his work entitled Il Convivio,24 he nevertheless allows Epicureans, in the company of Peripatetics and Stoics, to prepare for the path to truth, although he denied that Epicurus would succeed in reaching the truth at the end. But interestingly, Dante appreciated Epicurus’ path to truth and accepted some elements of Epicurus’ practical ethics. Because of this far-reaching influence of Epicurean practical ethics, I wish to develop some aspects of Epicurean practical ethics, which might be called philosophia medicans because it offers medicine to free people from fear and anguish. The main thesis is that Epicurean practical ethics were of great importance in antiquity and might be of interest even today. Epicurus’ practical ethics can be interpreted and perhaps better understood as a kind of response to philosophical predecessors – especially to Plato. If one considers Epicurean teachings, one could say that in most fields Epicurus’ positions are quite contrary to what Plato taught but they always seem to be developed with an eye on Platonic positions. This, I argue, is the case especially with Epicurean practical ethics. It is of great interest therefore to understand how Epicureans handled teachings and concepts taken from Plato’s dialectic and theology, transforming and integrating them into their own teachings.

3. Epicurus’ philosophia medicans So let us now turn to Epicurean practical ethics. Let us ask ourselves what their purpose is and why Epicurean philosophy might be called philosophia medicans.25 Let us first remind ourselves of the fact that Epicurus, like Plato and many others, claimed that the aim of every action of men is the good life, happiness or eudaimonia.26 According to Epicurus, the aim of all actions is pleasure, which he regards as an indispensable ingredient of the good life. Pleasure is the good everybody is striving for. To prove this, Epicurus alludes to observations which every person can make about themselves and others: all humans by nature strive after pleasure. Epicurus thinks that the observa-

24 25 26

Cf. DANTE, Convivio III 14, 15. Cf. GIGANTE 1975. Cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 135.

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tion that pleasure is the highest good is self-evident.27 Some of Epicurus’ followers obviously tried to find an argumentative basis for this thesis – called the ‘cradle argument’28 – according to which animals find satisfaction in pleasure as soon as they are born, and are upset by pain.29 Thus Epicurus and his successors point to every human being’s experience from earliest childhood and by nature, that of striving for pleasure as something good and of avoiding pain as something bad. By pleasure (hedone) Epicurus means the absence of pain (aponia) in the body and of disturbance in the soul (ataraxia).30 This basic assumption, that pleasure equals the absence of physical and mental pain, has indeed been advocated by Epicurus repeatedly. For instance, in the Letter to Menoeceus, he expressed it in the following image: He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; […] When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure.31

Precisely this equation of freedom from pain and pleasure has earned Epicurus much criticism.32 It has to be admitted that Epicurus’ hypothesis of pleasure as summum bonum, taken simply as the negation of a sensation, is not unproblematic philosophically. If pleasure and pain are contradictory opposites, then they will be mutually exclusive and there will have to be something neutral. To designate the neutral state between them as the highest pleasure then creates a problem. For, according to Epicurus, every perception is accompanied by either pleasure or pain. Now, if one feels neither pain nor pleasure, then this will mean that one no longer experiences any sensation at all. On the other hand, we do have indications that Epicurus’ proposition according to which freedom from pain is to be identified with

27 28 29 30 31 32

Cf. ERLER/SCHOFIELD 1999a; Cic. Fin. 2.31–32. Cf. BRUNSCHWIG 1986: 126–128. Cic. Fin. 1.30 ff. Cf. ERLER 2015a. Epicur. Ep. Men. 128 (trans. HICKS 1950). On contrasting the notion of Epicurus with that of the Cyrenaics, see D.L. 2.87.

3. Epicurus’ philosophia medicans

pleasure, stands in a tradition that is located outside the philosophical sphere.33 In Book IX34 of the Republic, Socrates intends to demonstrate how far the happiness of the just person exceeds the happiness of the unjust. In one of the arguments he offers for this hypothesis, Socrates refers to something he says he has heard from “wise men”, namely that the pleasure of wise men is the only true and pure pleasure. During the discussion of this thesis it turns out that many people’s supposition that calmness and freedom from pain is pleasure is mistaken. For the moment, the argument against equating pleasure with freedom from pain is of less interest than the fact that according to Socrates there are people who think that freedom from pain should be equated with pleasure. It is striking that this view, which Socrates deems to be quite widespread, is reminiscent of Epicurus’ position. In the Republic and again in the Philebus,35 Socrates refers to the identification of pleasure with freedom from pain as an evidently popular position to take, which, while he regards it as a mistake, has to be allowed to appeal to an existing sensation. While Socrates thinks that it would be incorrect here to speak of pleasure, he does not deny that the case involves a real feeling, which he calls joy. Here we need to remind ourselves of the observation that, in spite of its contrary assessment, Socrates’ position resembles Epicurus’ hypothesis as well as his strategy for its justification in a quite remarkable manner. Therefore the question arises of what sort of popular opinion Plato had in mind when he made his Socrates address it. Now, it is indeed in the realm of poetry that we find what we are looking for. For in the literary genres of epic, lyric and drama we can also find hedonistic positions – or at least what could be understood as such. First of all, I would mention the way of life of the Phaeacians as described in the Odyssey, which was considered an example of pleasureoriented positions not only by the Roman poet Horace, but also by the Epicurean Philodemus.36 Above all, however, we should turn to drama. For it is here that we find what Dodds37 has called a popular, religious hedonism. In Cf. ERLER 2015a: 310. Cf. Pl. R. 583b; 585a; ERLER 2015b: 92–95. 35 Cf. Pl. R. 584a; Phil 43d; 44a; FREDE 1997: 265 ff. 36 See Hor. Ep. 1.2.27–31; as to Epicureans and the Phaeacians, Epicur. fr. 229 Us.; the Phaeacians play a role in Philodemus, De bono rege secundum Homerum fr. 19 Dorandi. 37 Cf. DODDS 1944: 122. 33 34

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the Bacchae of Euripides from the year 404, where the god Dionysus has to contend with the rather puritanically minded Pentheus, Dionysus preaches a kind of hedonistic world view including a carpe diem attitude.38 It is remarkable how often it is suggested in that play that pleasure is to be understood mostly as freedom from pain precisely in the context of this evidently popular hedonism. Euripides’ Dionysus is by no means the only example of this attitude. This becomes clear from a glance, for instance, at Euripides’ play Hecuba, staged some twenty years earlier. Hecuba formulates a humble goal in life: “That man has the purest happiness who day in, day out meets no calamity”.39 The expression ‘who meets no calamity’ (mê lupoumenoi) recalls the position held by other interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues. Combined with the reference to daily life it is also reminiscent of Epicurus’ suggestion to enjoy every day (carpe diem). Finally, in Euripides’ Heracles40 we find the prescription that one should live by the day and try to avoid pain, for in painlessness would lie happiness and pleasure. All this seems to indicate that in popular opinion avoiding pain in everyday life is associated with pleasure and happiness. This seems to be part of folk morality and widespread, and is recognised as such in the philosophical discourse. To appeal to popular opinions is an important characteristic of Epicurus’ philosophy. Epicurus’ recourse to the popular conception of pleasure as freedom from pain is by no means an isolated matter in his philosophy. For instance, his much criticised claim about the mortality of the soul – as opposed to Socrates’ claim to its immortality – was widespread and popular at that time, as funeral inscriptions show and Socrates points out in the Republic when he remarks that his notion of immortality would seem odd to the crowd. Epicurus’ theology, which denies that the gods do care for men, also draws on a contemporary mood that can be found in 5th century drama.41 In all these cases, Epicurus appeals to popular notions for essential elements of his doctrine. It also becomes clear, however, that Epicurus does not simply adopt these elements, but transforms and radicalises them. What

38 39 40 41

Cf. E. Ba. 424–6. Cf. E. Hec. 627 f.; COLLARD 1991. Cf. E. HF 503–5. Cf. Pl. R. 608d.

3. Epicurus’ philosophia medicans

some bemoan, the remoteness from the gods, he turns – as we shall see in another lecture – into an element of a positive world view.42 What many dread, that death is the end of everything, he turns into an element of his pain therapy. This is equally valid for his hypothesis that freedom from pain is pleasure. What is deemed problematic in the light of pure logic follows from common opinion and is accepted as a consequence of Epicurus’ epistemological premises. It becomes the cornerstone of the way of life he propagates. For Epicurus is convinced, as he says at the end of the Letter to Menoeceus as well, that whoever obeys his advice day and night will achieve freedom of pain with regard to the body, i. e. aponia, and freedom of pain with regard to the mind, i. e. ataraxia. In short, they will be happy.43 Happiness is feasible! That is Epicurus’ message, which might sound strange to many because of our different understanding of ‘happiness’. It is important to keep in mind that Greek eudaimonia (or happiness) has a meaning which differs from our modern understanding of happiness. For ‘happiness’ today is commonly regarded as a subjective mood, a feeling that can change from day to day and can be influenced by new situations. For the ancient Greeks, however, eudaimonia, which is usually translated by ‘happiness’ but which rather should be translated by something like ‘human flourishing’, was not an emotional state, but rather about whether a human being had attained virtue and excellence, achieved his aims, and truly made the most of his life. This understanding is well illustrated by Herodotus in his Histories where he tells the story of Solon making an important point about human happiness in a conversation with Croesus: Any human life according to him is filled with change, so that a person’s happiness cannot be evaluated as ‘happy’ properly until he or she has died.44 This remark follows from the understanding of happiness as a fulfilled life, which is the reason why Epicurus – and Plato for instance – can claim that he offered doctrines helping to become happy by helping to live a good and happy life. Only if eudaimonia is understood in terms of ‘fulfilled life’ does it really make sense to say, as Epicurus does, that one can teach someone to become happy. Now, Epicurus

42 43 44

Cf. ERLER 2011. Cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 135. Cf. Hdt. 1.29–33.

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not only claims to know that man can be free of pain and live a happy life – he also knows how to achieve this goal. In order to become eudaimon, Epicurus says, one has to get rid of everything which might disturb the quietness of our minds. That is, one has to clean one’s heart, because “unless the mind is purged, what battles and perils must then find their way into us against our will”, as the Roman Epicurean poet and philosopher Lucretius, who lived in the first century BC, states in his poem “On the nature of things” (De rerum natura) – and he adds to it: He therefore, who has vanquished all these and cast them forth from the mind by words, not by swords, will it not be proper that he be held worthy to be counted in the number of the gods?45

That is to say, Epicurus thought he knew that happiness is achievable by man and how it can be achieved. For instance, if one believes that a rich man could offer more pleasures than a poor man has to give, he argues that, although pleasure is the goal, not every pleasure is worth pursuing. One rather has to make use of a rational calculus, as he says in his Letter to Menoeceus,46 where he suggests that, although every pleasure is something good, not every pleasure is worth to be chosen and that therefore measurement, calculus and rational thinking are needed.47 This is why those who presuppose that according to Epicurus life should be an unbroken succession of drinking bouts and enjoyment of delicacies are wrong. Rather sober reasoning (nephon logismos) that provides a happy life48 and self-sufficiency49 are a kind of medicine for the soul. The Platonist Porphyry, who lived in the 4th century AD, quotes with approval the Epicurean aphorism, reminiscent of a Pythagorean teaching saying:

45 46 47 48 49

Lucr. 5.43 ff. (trans. ROUSE 2006). Cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 129–130; ERLER/SCHOFIELD 1999a: 661 f. Cf. WOOLF 2009: 165–167. Cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 132. Cf. Epicur. Sent. Vat. 77.

3. Epicurus’ philosophia medicans

Empty is the argument of the philosopher by which no human disease is healed; for just as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not drive out bodily diseases, so there is no benefit in philosophy if it does not drive out the disease of the soul.50

To heal someone’s soul is the goal of Epicurean philosophy.51 The Roman poet Horace illustrates well what is meant by the Epicureans’ exhortation ‘to philosophise well’. In the poem Iter Brundisinum (Journey to Brindisi) Horace describes what happened to him when he arrived in a city called Gnatia.52 In this little city he was confronted with a phenomenon intended to impress and irritate him: the inhabitants wanted to persuade him that there was such a thing as incense melting without fire. Horace refused to be irritated at all. He reminds himself of a basic tenet of Epicurean teaching quoting a verse by Lucretius De rerum natura: that everything can be explained rationally, that there are no gods interfering with the world’s affairs and creating miracles, that death is not to be feared and that all human needs for a good life are provided by nature, that therefore there is no need to be afraid of such things. That is the thrust of Epicurus’ position. This little episode illustrates how Epicurus’ philosophy operates: It should be applied like a medicine which helps to free one from the diseases of ignorance and fear, and provide pleasure and ataraxia to the soul. That is why the basic tenets of Epicurean teachings are called pharmaka – medicine (the four main doctrines of Epicureanism are known as tetrapharmakos, ‘four-part medicine’), which teaches us that gods present no fears, death no worries, and that, while the good is readily attainable, evil is short-lived and hence endurable. Philosophical instruction, therefore, was regarded as an aid for managing one’s life. Philosophical theory must be turned into philosophical practice. Philosophy thus is understood as a therapy for the soul, important parts of which are physiology, logic, and epistemology. To make philosophical instruction applicable at any time and in any situation, it has to be assimilated and become a part of the person. The teachings have to be dyed, so to speak, within the individual to enable them to apply them in any difficult situation. Epicurus uses the metaphor of ‘dyeing’ in the positive sense,

50 51 52

Epicur. fr. 221 Us. = Porph. Sent. 31 (trans. GERSON/INWOOD 1994). Cf. Epicur. Sent. Vat. 54. Hor. Sat. 1.5.97–104.

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employed by Plato in a derogatory sense, as a purely mechanical leaning.53 Thus in general, Epicurus encourages exercise and repetition; he promises that he who meditates these precepts day and night will never be disturbed, “but will live as a god among men”.54

4. Epicurean Self-Deification: Timaeus as a Background ‘To live like a god among men’ as the result of Epicurean practical philosophy or self-cultivation: Epicurus’ promise of becoming like a god55 might come as a surprise, because, as we recall, Epicurean gods live a life detached from human existence, and because the concept of ‘becoming like god’, as far as it is possible, stands for the goal of Plato’s ethics. It plays a major part in the Platonic tradition as the ideal of ‘likeness to god’, which was derived from the Platonic dialogues and became a key formula of the middle Platonists from the first century BC onward.56 In the Republic, Plato’s Socrates answers the question ‘How shall I live’ with the famous advice to live by focusing on the true self and by removing all mortal additions to it.57 It remained the distinctive Platonic definition of the telos ever after. In fact, for Plato and the Academics assimilation to god means to embody the moral and intellectual ideal as far as it is possible for man. Aristotle and the Peripatetics stress the contemplative way of life while the Stoics point to the fulfilment of moral duties and obedience to virtue.58 Interestingly, in one passage of his book Adversus mathematicos, the sceptic Sextus Empiricus invites us to compare this Platonic concept with the Epicurean one:

53 54 55 56

Cf. Pl. R. 430a–c; ERLER 2012a: 348 f.; ERLER 2018b. Cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 135. Cf. ERLER 2002; for Plato and Aristotle cf. SEDLEY 1997. Cf. Pl. Tht. 176b; R. 500c–501b; 613ab; Lg. 716cd; Ti. 90cd; MERKI 1952; PASSMORE

1975. 57 58

Cf. Pl. R. 611b–d. Cf. Cic. ND 2.153; Zeno Stoic. SVF 1, 179 f.: ARNIM 1964: 45 f.

4. Epicurean Self-Deification: Timaeus as a Background

… according to them (sc. the Epicureans) happiness (eudaimonia) was a divine (daimonia) and godly nature, and the word ‘happy’ (eudaimon) was applied to someone who had his deity (daimon) disposed well (eu).59

Sextus here plays with the Greek word eudaimonia in the literal sense of being ‘guided by a good daemon’. This refers back to a famous passage in the Timaeus, where Plato uses the etymology of eudaimonia when he speaks about the man who concentrates on developing his intellect, i. e. the immortal part of his soul: and because he is always devoutly cherishing the divine part and maintaining the guardian genius that dwells with him in good estate, he must needs be happy above all.60

Plato’s etymological play on the Greek word for happiness: eu-daimonia in the Timaeus describes the perfected immortal self. Now, Sextus’ argument presupposes that the Epicureans took over the etymology and used it to characterise the perfected mortal self they are striving for. And Plato gives them the reason to do so, because in the very same passage of the Timaeus we quoted above, Plato speculates about an alternative interpretation which he declines but regards as a realistic alternative or second option. For Plato has Timaeus speculate that there might be those who chose not to cultivate their immortal soul but their mortal self. For they have devoted their lives to the appetites or to competition, which belong to the mortal part of the soul. To quote Plato again: Now if a man is engrossed in appetites and ambitions and spends all his pains upon these, all his thoughts must needs be mortal and, so far as that is possible, he cannot fall short of becoming mortal altogether, since he has nourished the growth of his mortality.61

In short, these people make the mortal part of the soul their true self and try to make it as perfect as possible. To quote Timaeus’ words later in the dia-

59 60 61

S. E. M. 9.43–47 = 23 F 3 L.-S. (trans. LONG/SEDLEY 1987a). Pl. Ti. 90c (trans. CORNFORD 1937). Pl. Ti. 90b (trans. CORNFORD 1937).

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logue “they try to make the mortal race as perfect as possible and they tried to set even the baser part of us on the right path in this way”.62 This second option mentioned but not recommended by Plato matches exactly the Epicurean conception: for according to Plato these people were focusing on the mortal part of their souls and were trying to make this mortal self as perfect as possible. Obviously, Sextus is right: the Epicureans transferred to their mortal selves what Plato had applied to the immortal self of men, namely cultivating this self so as to become like a god: homoiosis toi theoi: Lucretius at the beginning of the 5th book of his poem De rerum natura confirms this observation when he praises Epicurus as a god: deus ille fuit, deus.63 This sounds like Plato, but a little word makes all the difference, fuit ‘was’. For Epicurus, of course, has not become a Platonic deus immortalis, but rather a deus mortalis, as the word fuit (‘was’) indicates. By these words, Lucretius indicates that Epicurus had succeeded in cultivating himself and had made his mortal self perfect by – as we also learn from Lucretius – listening to nature and interpreting it rightly, by controlling his emotions, by using measure and limits as criteria, and by approaching the gods with a pure soul without projecting false opinions onto them, that is by practising philosophia medicans on himself.64 In fact, Epicurus was regarded as a god by his followers. Similarities and differences between the Epicurean and the Platonic concept of deification are thus undeniable and were recognised later, for instance, by the Christian Clemens Alexandrinus, who borrowed Epicurus’ words from his Letter to Menoeceus when promising that he who will exercise philosophy and Christian faith will “live as a god among men” (hos theos), changing the Epicurean deus mortalis into a truly divine man through his immortal soul.65 This passage by Clemens is revealing, because here as elsewhere a close reading of Epicurean teachings indicates that Platonic ingredients are often recognisable in Epicurus’ doctrines, especially in his practical ethics. For instance, the idea of describing philosophy as medicine Cf. Pl. Ti. 91d. Lucr. 5.8. 64 Epicurus as deus mortalis cf. Lucr. 3.1042; 4.7 f.; Plato, of course, had more to offer: thanks to the immortal part of the soul, man can become godlike already during his lifetime: cf. Pl. R. 500b–d; ERLER 2002a: 167 ff. 65 Cf. Clem.Al. Strom. 4.155.2–4. 62

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in Epicurus is not new. Plato too described philosophy as a kind of medicine as well. Plato’s Socrates regards philosophy as a kind of philosophia medicans and can be regarded a predecessor of Epicurus66 in this respect as well.

5. Ethical Value and Lack of Value in Nature The Epicureans recommended listening to nature,67 for they were convinced that observing and analysing nature forms part of the self-cultivation of the Epicurean wise man. This raises the much discussed question: how do atomistic physics or physiologia, i. e. the teaching on nature, and ethics as the two halves of Epicurus’ teachings, fit together? Is there something like an atomistic ethics of pleasure? In fact, there seems to be no passage in Epicurus, the Epicureans or Lucretius where hedonism is explained by referring to the atomistic basis of human existence. Rather pleasure and pain are described as accidents of atomic movement. Epicurus does not argue that there is an atomistic basis for pleasure. Since, according to the Epicureans, nature itself is non-normative, even purposeless, one wonders, how to ground a meaningful life on natural science. Some see two conflicting theories at work here.68 I shall not go into detail here, but I shall argue that there is no dichotomy between process and value in Epicurean thought. I agree that according to the Epicureans pleasure and untroubled memory are crucial for happiness, but it also is true that immediate experience is not required for one to be troubled or free of trouble. Epicureans rather can derive pleasure from science. For according to them, happiness rests on the right and rational understanding of natural processes.69 This explanation is possible because man is part of nature and its natural processes. Now, nature and its processes themselves are without value, but being bound by natural laws they can be explained rationally and as such create value for men, because the explanation helps to live a trouble-free and therefore happy life. In other words,

66 67 68 69

Cf. Pl. R. 401c; Grg. 478aff. Cf. Lucr. 5.9 ff. Cf. LONG 1974: 64. Cf. D.L. 10.78 = Epicur. Sent. 12.

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although nature is valueless, that does not mean that nature cannot have value relative to the understanding of human beings and the aim they are striving for. Humans might take pleasure in sunsets which in themselves are meaningless,70 but do mean something to certain people. It is not celestial motion but the ignorance of causes (ignoratio causarum) which creates wrong opinions about the celestial motions as well as fear and unhappiness. It is knowledge of the true cause (vera ratio) of an event which makes the avoidance of superstition possible.71 For the laws of nature, which can be analysed rationally, make it possible to avoid mental troubles and help in the attainment of pleasure. From this it follows that Epicurean nature does not act itself, but provides material for human beings to act upon and to cultivate their mortal self on. Of course, one might refer to Lucretius, who speaks of a Venus genetrix in the hymn at the beginning of his poem De rerum natura or who uses the word create (creare) in the context of atomism.72 But the Greek expression for ‘nature’ (physis) as a nomen agens is quite unusual in Epicurean texts.73 There is no demiurgic power in Epicurean physics. Despite its atomistic basis, though, nature gives man the possibility to act. Here the famous – or to some infamous – theory of atomic swerve comes in, which, however, is not mentioned in Epicurus’ work, but discussed by Lucretius.74 It was widely talked about and derided in antiquity and modern times, but also praised as the first part of a theory of free will. According to Epicurean physics, atoms normally move down in straight lines, in which case they would never meet and combine into atomic structures. But observation teaches us that atomic structures do exist. Hence atoms must meet and so there must be something like a swerve. Lucretius argues that if atoms did not swerve, free volition could not exist. But it is obviously true that bodily movements do follow decisions and desires of the mind. It is also true that without free volition praise and blame of good or bad decisions would not be appropriate or make any sense at all.75 Even the Epicurean ideal of self-deification presup70 71 72 73 74 75

Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.41. Cf. Lucr. 5.1211. Cf. Lucr. 1.1–629; 2.1117; cf. ERLER 2017: 57 f. Cf. CLAY 1998: 88; SEDLEY 1998: 25 f. Cf. Lucr. 2.251–259; O’KEEFE 2009:143 ff. Cf. Lucr. 2.261–283; SMITH 1992: 239 ff; Diog.Oen. fr. 54.

6. Friendship

poses the existence of free volition and atomic swerve. Thus, although being meaningless and without value, nature contributes to creating value in man. That is why Lucretius speaks of the majesty of nature.76 Consequently, an inherent dichotomy between meaningless physics and ethics does not seem to exist within Epicurean philosophy.

6. Friendship Epicurean philosophy strives for self-cultivation and self-deification.77 This is proposed by Epicurus, who himself achieved this goal and therefore should be emulated and imitated. The question then arises: What does that mean in terms of social behaviour, friendship,78 and generally for a life in a community inhabited by Epicureans? If in fact self-cultivation is the aim, does this not presuppose and suggest an egoistic attitude which might not leave room even for empathy, friendship, or teaching about helping others to achieve happiness as well? Does self-cultivation not prevent people from practising social skills or promoting political engagement? Small wonder, one should surmise, that Epicurus recommends to live unnoticed and avoid being involved in the business of community life. From that perspective, the foundation of the Epicurean school, the garden – outside the city – becomes emblematic. On the other hand, as is well known, friendship is regarded by the Epicureans as fundamental for their lives. This is confirmed, for instance, by letters which Epicurus wrote to his friends all over the world and of which many fragments have been preserved. In fact, the Epicureans regarded friendship as the most important means to gaining happiness. To quote a saying by Epicurus: Of all the things wisdom prepares for the blessedness of life as a whole, much the greatest is the passion of friendship.79

76 77 78 79

Cf. Lucr. 5.1 f. Cf. NÉMETH 2017. Cf. ESSLER 2012; BROWN 2009; ERLER 2016a: 74–77. Epicur. Sent. 27 (trans. HICKS 1972).

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The reason for this high regard for friendship is that according to Epicurus friendship and empathy are essential to provide security, which for Epicureans is the condicio sine qua non of happiness (eudaimonia) and ataraxia.80 As they saw, the benefit of friendship not only is that of a friend being willing to help, “to sit with one when one is ill and to provide aid when one is in prison or in poverty”; friendship is even more important because it provides the confidence that a friend will help if necessary.81 Knowing that a friend will be there and will have empathy suffices to remove disturbances caused by the fear of what might happen in the future. The mere possibility of helping and the expectation that there will be help makes friendship most useful for achieving tranquillity of the mind and eudaimonia.82 But does it not follow from this that friendship is motivated by self-interest and egoism only? The Christian writer Lactantius seems to be right83 when he claims that according to Epicurus no one loves anybody else except for his or her own sake (dixit Epicurus neminem esse qui alterum diligat nisi sua causa). If friendship is an important condition for providing security and ataraxia, one has to consider how one can achieve friendship. Now, as we learn from Aristotle, if true friendship is to exist, one must feel the same way towards the friend as he does towards himself. And as Aristotle puts it in the Nicomachean Ethics: … we are told that we ought to wish our friend well for his own sake (ekeinou heneka).84

He also claims that loving (to philein) someone entails wishing good things (or what one believes to be good things) for that person’s sake and not one’s own. To quote Aristotle again: A friend (philos) is one who both loves and is loved in return, and those who think their relationship is of this character consider themselves friends.85

80 81 82 83 84 85

Cf. Epicur. Sent. 7; 13; 14; Cic. Fin. 1.66 f.; on this see SCHOFIELD 1999: 748–756. Cf. Sen. Ep. 9.8; Epicur. fr. 175 Us.; Sent. Vat. 34. Cf. Epicur. Sent. 27; 28; Cic. Fin. 1.68. Cf. Lact. Inst. 3.17.42. Arist. EN 1155b31 f. (trans. RACKHAM 1975). FREESE 1947: 193; cf. Arist. Rh. 1380b35–1381a2.

6. Friendship

Now, if according to the Epicureans, friends are necessary to provide ataraxia and happiness, and if friendship can be achieved only if one loves and treats someone as oneself, a paradoxical situation arises: the Epicurean egoistic desire of security can only be fulfilled if one acts altruistically, i. e. if we treat someone well as an end in itself in order to make him or her a friend. This paradoxical situation again is not new with the Epicureans: As others86 have argued, Aristotle stresses the role of altruism for achieving friendship and benevolence. This role was not universally assumed at that time, and his main target was probably Plato. For with his argument that striving for virtue and the good is the ultimate motive for any action and that this contributes decisively to self-cultivation and self-deification, Plato too exposed himself to the charge of egoism. Indeed, those arguments set the scene – or so I believe – for Epicurus’ approach and explain why Epicurus propagates self-cultivation and at the same time appreciates friendship as something which is intrinsically choice-worthy, very much like Aristotle does.87 It has been discussed at great length why Epicurus even suggests that it might be good to die or to suffer pain for a friend,88 which seems to imply the altruistic aspect of friendship. Now, evidently Epicurus does not regard this as a contradiction. He not only recognises that altruistic friendship is the basis for friendship understood in a utilitarian sense, as a means to achieving ataraxia and happiness. He also had to accept that in this case altruism as the condition to achieve friendship is included in his utilitarian conception. Self-interest and altruism go hand in hand in a way, despite – or rather because – of the defence of the ideal of self-deification. It is important to take this into account in order to understand better why and how Epicureans would love to cultivate themselves and to live together in a philosophical community, and why they would accept and even get involved in traditional societies despite their reservations towards politics. These are some of the topics that I am going to discuss in the next chapters.

86 87 88

Cf. KONSTAN 2000. Cf. Epicur. Sent. Vat. 23. Cf. D.L. 10.120b.

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1. The Epicurean contubernium In the first chapter, we discussed the importance of practical philosophy as part of Epicurean philosophy. Now the focus will be on the community of philosophers which Epicurus created where he taught, and where he was worshipped as an Epicurean hero who succeeded in cultivating his mortal self and was considered a deus mortalis: the Kepos or ‘garden’. Testimonies concerning the veneration of Epicurus within the Kepos and remarks by Cicero and Seneca affirm that the divine man was regarded as the role model at which moral emulation should be directed.89 The Epicureans received the advice: “Do everything as if Epicurus were watching you”.90 In his last will, Epicurus expressed the wish that cultic activities which he had initiated in the garden should be perpetuated after his death, one of them being the celebration of Epicurus’ birthday every January.91 Because Epicurus wished to protect people from fear of the gods or of death and wanted to lead them to a happy life by endowing them with an enlightened attitude, he was described as a saviour of mankind. We already stressed the fact that this kind of selfcultivation practised by Epicurus by no means excluded friendship and caring for others. Lucretius hints at that observation in his poem when he praises Epicurus as a mortal god, who first discovered that reasoned plan of life, which is now called Wisdom, who by his skill brought life out of these tempestuous billows and that deep darkness.92

89 90 91 92

Cf. Sen. Ep. 25.4–7; cf. CLAY 1998. Cf. Epicur. fr. 211 Us. Cf. D.L. 10.18; see ch. 1. Lucr. 5.9–12 (trans. ROUSE 2006).

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This can and should be read as an elogium for Epicurus as someone who successfully became a saviour of himself – when taking the word vita as meaning ‘his own life’; but the word ‘life’ also might be understood in a general sense – meaning that Epicurus is said to have saved the lives of others rather than his own life. In my opinion, the ambiguity of the word ‘life’ here is deliberate and programmatic.93 For it confirms that Epicurean philosophia medicans, although focusing on one’s own self, takes into account the needs of others as well. We have seen that the concept of Epicurean friendship respects the interests of others and even requires looking after the wellbeing of others – not least in order to profit from them in terms of one’s own security. This is well formulated by Diogenes of Oenoanda in Lycia (now modern Turkey) who, in the second century AD, set up a monumental inscription in his home town of about 80 meters length and explaining Epicurus’ teachings. Diogenes considered it “a responsibility of a good man to give benevolent (philanthropos) assistance to the utmost of one’s ability to those, who are well constituted”. For Diogenes is convinced that friendship includes treating others well. And that is why Epicurus could be called a saviour.94 Friendship indeed was the fundament of the Epicurean community which Epicurus founded when he came to Athens in 307/6 BC and bought a garden outside Athens.95 Some call it a school, but maybe one should rather follow Seneca who called it a contubernium,96 which stands for a ‘shared tent’, i. e. for a ‘shared life’. In fact, we do not know how much scientific or historical research was conducted in Epicurus’ philosophical community, like, for instance, in Plato’s Academy or in Aristotle’s Peripatos. The group around Epicurus was more like a ‘philosophical family’, including his brothers, women, children, slaves, and people whom Epicurus regarded as friends (philoi). Now, this contubernium was soon to be called the ‘Garden’ and was regarded by its enemies as a retreat for people who focused on the demands

93 94 95 96

Cf. GALE 1994: 79. Cf. Diog.Oen. fr. 2 III 1 Smith; fr. 72 III 13 Smith (SMITH 1993). See map in LONG/SEDLEY 1987: 4. Cf. Sen. Ep. 6.6.

1. The Epicurean contubernium

of their bodies only. Seneca tells us about an inscription at the entrance of the garden saying: Stranger, you’ll be wise to stay here: here pleasure is the supreme good.97

This inscription was most probably an invention of Seneca and was meant to rival the inscription at the entrance to Plato’s Academy which welcomed guests saying “Let no one unversed in geometry enter here”. In reality, Epicurus’ garden was by no means a “Garden of Delights” (hortus deliciarum) or something like the Abbaye de Thélème of Rabelais, but rather a place where friends assembled to practise philosophy and to strive for ataraxia by oral philosophical discussion, by reading and writing texts, and by cultivating their mortal selves. In doing so, they always had the deus mortalis Epicurus before their eyes as proof of their belief that they had a real chance to achieve the ideal status they were longing for. Epicurus’ followers believed that in order to be successful one should emulate the master, study only his writings and those of his most important pupils, and obey his rules, i. e. control one’s affections, using measure and limits as a criterion, and approach the gods in a proper way “with clean soul and without projecting wrong opinions”, as Epicurus and Lucretius want it.98 In what follows, I wish to focus on the second piece of advice formulated by Lucretius – the purifying of one’s heart, controlling one’s emotions like grief caused by death.99 I will focus on the emotion of grief because it tells us something about the Epicurean vision of death and how Epicureans handle emotions in general. Furthermore, it explains why a special genre of writing – the memorial or commemorative writings – took pride of place in the community life of the Epicureans. I shall suggest that we keep in mind Plato’s dialogue Phaedo while discussing the Epicurean methods of controlling emotions. For – as I shall argue – seen against this background, some elements of Epicurean practical philosophy can be highlighted.100

97 98 99 100

Sen. Ep. 21.10 (trans. BARKER 1932); cf. CLAY 2009. Cf. Lucr. 5.43–54; Epicur. Epist. Men. 124. Cf. ERLER 2002a: 169–175. Cf. ERLER 2011b; ERLER 2016b.

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2. Texts and Epicurean Community Let us start then with the texts: In their contubernium, the Epicureans practised philosophy in oral conversations and by writing and reading books – as Raphael illustrated so well. Epicurus composed scholarly treatises like his opus magnum De rerum natura,101 but he also used different genres like letters, epitomai or sententiae in order to make it easier for his followers to memorise the basics of his teachings.102 In the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus recommends to “exercise thyself in these and kindred precepts day and night, both by thyself and with him who is like unto thee”.103 The preserved writings include the famous Letter to Herodotus, a compendium of Epicurean physics, and the Letter to Menoeceus, a protrepticus which was meant to encourage people to philosophise, but also to preserve in the memory enough of the principal doctrines, to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important points,104

as Epicurus says in his Letter to Herodotus. To help the readers help themselves when confronted with problems in life, this is what Epicurean philosophia medicans is about and what should be supported by reading Epicurean texts105 in order to be free of pain and fear. Epicurean writings were regarded as a kind of medicine – or more precisely a prescription – to be applied in specified doses. It is for this reason – or so I think – that letters played an important role in Epicurean pedagogy, because letters allowed Epicurus to focus on specific problems of the addressees and to suggest philosophical solutions adapted to the situation the addressees find themselves in. These letters were encyclical,106 which means that they circulated among the friends of Epicurus. But they were also published as a whole, since we have fragments of collections of letters. Epicurus obviously wanted them to be read by both

101 102 103 104 105 106

Cf. ERLER, 1994: 48 ff. For De natura see the new edition of book 2 by LEONE 2012. Cf. CLAY 2009: 18–22. Epicur. Ep. Men. 135 (trans. HICKS 1950). Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 35 (trans. HICKS 1950). Cf. Cic. Fin. 2.20. Cf. CLAY 2009: 18–20; ARRIGHETTI 2013: 317–322.

3. Memorial Literature

the individual addressee and other members of the Epicurean community.107 In fact, these letters helped to constitute a community among those Epicureans who lived outside Athens.

3. Memorial Literature Letters and other writings form part of Epicurus’ pedagogy, which also was characterised by emulation and imitation of Epicurean heroes like Epicurus himself and his most prominent disciples or leaders (kathegemones) like Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus who – as was believed – succeeded in cultivating their mortal selves in a most perfect way. Since the emulation of paradigmatic Epicurean life and death was regarded as an important help to achieve ataraxia and happiness, the remembrance of the life and death of Epicurus himself and others of the Epicurean ‘family’ became part of the social life in the contubernium. Commemorative literature therefore played a prominent role.108 Many fragments of texts are preserved which commemorate the lives, the sufferings, and the death not only of Epicurus, but also of other prominent members of the contubernium. Epicurus wrote a memorial on the life and death of his brother; fragments of memorials by other Epicureans are preserved as well. Yet, it rightly has been observed that these commemorative writings were less a ‘viewing’ of the Epicurean dead, but rather a display of their lives and, most importantly, of their sufferings and their dying. Plutarch, a Platonist and prolific writer in the 1st and 2nd century AD, though a fierce anti-Epicurean, seems to have appreciated this procedure well.109 In view of these texts, one could speak of a replacement of lamentation by memory (anti goou mneme) – memory instead of lamentation.110 These texts most probably were read to the members of the contubernium when the memory of prominent Epicureans was celebrated. They belong to the tradition of consolatory literature111 (or even of biography).

107 108 109 110 111

Cf. Epicur. fr. 59 Arrighetti. Cf. ERLER 2011b. Cf. Plu. Non posse 1103a. Cf. CLAY 2001: 64. Cf. KASSEL 1958.

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The Epicurean memorial texts mourn the dead Epicurean heroes, but also remind the reader of how these Epicurean heroes reacted when they and their Epicurean philosophy were tested during life and when they were dying. Epicurean memorial treatises therefore invite those who listen to them to imitate and emulate the paradigm of Epicurus provided by these texts, because the Epicureans believed that to put before one’s eyes the sufferings and the deaths of Epicurean philosophers functions as a pedagogical device. Epicurus transformed the traditional genre of commemorative literature into an element of philosophical education. In what follows, I wish to discuss this transformation and the role emotions played in it.

4. Epicurean memento mori 4.1 Boscoreale

“Death should be looked in the face by young and old alike”.112 This remark made by Seneca in one of his letters sounds very Epicurean. It reacts to a statement according to which it is frightening to be looking death in the face, to which – I am sure – many of us today would subscribe. For we would say that to put before one’s eye the suffering and death of friends time and again would cause depression rather than help to master one’s own life. We would rather prefer to suppress the notion of death which – we think – is alien to us and not a part of our life. Although, mourning the dead, of course is common to all men in different cultural contexts,113 we rather would refuse to be reminded every day of the finite natura of our life. Obviously, the Epicureans, as the Greeks and Romans in general, thought otherwise. The advice to always be aware of death – the memento mori – therefore was a widespread motive,114 and was especially practised in Epicurean contexts.

112 113 114

Cf. Sen. Ep. 12.6. Cf. ASSMANN/TRAUZETTEL 2002. Cf. BALTES 1999; for the Epicureanism: CLAY 2001: 55–74.

4. Epicurean memento mori

Fig. 1:

Paris Louvre inv. Bj 1923. Image source: SCHEFOLD 1997: 300 ff.

A nice example of this, which, I think, is relevant for our topic, is provided by a cup found in Boscoreale, a small city close to Pompeii in Italy (fig. 1).115 The cup depicts the two philosophers Epicurus and Zeno as skeletons engaging in

The copies can be dated to the Claudian era and were modeled after originals from about 250 BC. 115

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a dialogue. On the left, we see the Stoic Zeno, standing stiffly with his philosopher’s staff in his left hand, his wallet hanging from his neck, with his right hand extended; in indignation and scorn, he points his index finger at Epicurus, who, paying no heed to him, is taking a piece of a huge cake lying on the top of a small round table. Beside Epicurus, an eager pig with snout and left foreleg uplifted is demanding its share of the cake. Above the cake, we read the inscription: to telos hedone, ‘the goal of life is pleasure’. Epicurus here is associated with a pig, obviously in order to parody the principal Epicurean view that the goal of life is pleasure. This will remind us of a famous line by the Roman poet Horace in an epistle to Albius Tibullus: Treat every day that dawns for you as the last. The hour that’s unhoped for will be welcome when it comes. When you want to smile then visit me: sleek, and fat I’m a hog, well cared-for, one of Epicurus’ herd.116

Of course, these lines make fun of Epicurus’ thesis that all that men are striving for is pleasure, with pleasure here being understood as pleasure which only concerns the stomach. That is why Epicurus reaches for a piece of cake before him on the table. Of course, this is a parody of what Epicurus really meant, for he defined pleasure as a counterbalance to pain, which has to be guided by reason (phronesis), as Epicurus himself stresses in the Letter to Menoeceus: It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love […] which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance […]. Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence.117

The cup with its presentation of Epicurus as a skeleton therefore illustrates the Epicurean position of carpe diem – seize the day.118

116 117 118

Hor. Ep. 1.4.16 KLINE (accessed 10. April 2019), slightly modified by KONSTAN 2012. Epicur. Ep. Men. 132 (trans. HICKS 1950). Cf. Hor. Carm. 1.11.8.

4. Epicurean memento mori

4.2 Philodemus

Now, besides being entertaining, this cup is of interest for us because its message combines two aspects: the carpe diem motive – i. e. “Enjoy life while you can, for tomorrow is uncertain” – and the memento mori motive: The skeletons of course remind us that we all will die. That means: The cup, which might have been used at a drinking party, puts before our eyes the mortality of man – just like the memorials of prominent Epicureans in the contubernium do. This is exactly what the Epicurean writer Philodemus,119 who lived in the first century BC in Italy and was an adviser to Lucius Piso Caesoninus (c. 100 BC – 43 BC), a Roman statesman and the father-in-law of Julius Caesar, strongly recommends us to do in his treatise De morte (On Death): to always be aware of one’s own mortality and of death being a condition for living a happy life.120 Philodemus even suggests that the sensible man […] for the rest (of his life) goes about laid out for burial, and he profits by one day (as he would) by eternity.121

According to Philodemus, it is foolish to be caught unawares when death comes, as something unexpected and incredible.122

It is foolish because, as Philodemus says, we all reside in an unfortified city in relation to death.123

To go about in life laid out for burial (entetafiasmenos peripatei)124 – this impressive metaphor describes well what Epicureans thought about how to handle death: To be aware of it any time in life and to put before one’s eyes

119 120 121 122 123 124

For Philodemus see ERLER 1994: 289–362. Cf. HENRY 2009: 86 ff. Phld. De morte, col. 38, 18 Henry (trans. HENRY 2009). Phld. De morte, col. 37, 18 Henry (trans. HENRY 2009). Phld. De morte, col. 37, 27 Henry (trans. HENRY 2009). Cf. ERLER 2011c.

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death and mortality of man.125 According to the Epicureans, it is a good thing to walk about like a dead man laid out for burial. That is why it pays to put before one’s eyes what happened to men and how they behaved in difficult situations or even when facing death. For – to quote Lucretius: … it is more useful to scrutinize a man in danger […] and to discern in adversity what manner of man he is: for only then are the words of truth drawn up from the very heart, the mask is torn off, the reality remains.126

Now, this is exactly what the memorials or commemorative texts and their presentations in the contubernium are there for: To remind one of how leading Epicureans behaved when facing death, obeying the advice of Epicurean philosophy, and how that affected their lives and made them happy by fighting the great obstacle to human eudaimonia: the fear of death,127 and by showing that this fight can be won.

5. Epicurus, Fear of Death and Unlimited Desire Now, let us pause for a moment and see what we have. We realised that in the garden the commemorative literature played an important role. We saw that Epicurus transformed a tradition and used it as part of his philosophia medicans which reminds us of the decisive importance to remember that death is nothing to us. I now shall proceed and try to show why this is the case. I shall argue that this approach helps not only to get rid of the fear of death but also to control the emotions involved when one is confronted with the suffering and death of others. So let us first see why, according to the Epicureans, fear of death is to be avoided. It is fear of death which – according to Epicurus – causes what Epicurus calls an unlimited desire, which cannot be fulfilled.128 No human can avoid death. The only thing they can avoid is the fear of death. Nevertheless, many people try to avoid dying: For they think that by becoming famous or powerful they could avoid the fear of

125 126 127 128

Cf. TSOUNA 2007; TSOUNA 2003. Lucr. 3.55–58 (trans. ROUSE 2006). Cf. WARREN 2006; ERLER 2011b. Cf. Epicur. Sent. Vat. 7; Lucr. 3.59 ff.; Lucr. 3.1017 ff.

5. Epicurus, Fear of Death and Unlimited Desire

death, by activities of various kinds, by political ambition or criminal acts which result in human vices like avarice or blind lust of distinction, as Lucretius describes in De rerum natura. To quote him: Moreover, avarice and the blind lust of distinction, which drive wretched men to transgress the bounds of law […], these sores of life in no small degree, are fed by the fear of death.129

The Epicureans were convinced: Avoidance of vices on the one hand and being a busybody all the time on the other, depends very much on the right judgement about desires in general and especially on identifying unlimited desires which cannot be fulfilled. It is obvious that this desire and its consequence, which Lucretius describes so vividly, only can be shunned by a right understanding of what death really is, as Epicurus himself puts it in the Letter to Menoeceus: Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality,130

i. e. by taking away an unlimited desire which causes pain and vice. That is why we should remind ourselves day and night that death is nothing to us. Now, the question might arise: How is it possible to explain that death does not mean anything to us? Here Epicurean physics and epistemology come into play. Epicurus’ belief that death is nothing to us and nothing to be afraid of can be explained by referring to his physics or physiologia. Since, according to Epicurus, we live in a material world, in which everything is composed of atoms and void, the same must be true of the soul. Epicurus argues that the soul is corporeal, because it is able to interact with the body. Now, if this is so, the soul being corporeal cannot survive the body’s death, for it is a body itself and every body dissolves.131 Secondly, since every perception is sensual and depends on our bodily existence, it follows that after

129 130 131

Lucr. 3.59–64 (trans. ROUSE 2006). Epicur. Ep. Men. 124 (trans. HICKS 1950). Cf. Lucr. 3.417–440.

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the dissolution of our body and the soul nothing can be perceived anymore, just as was the case before we were born.132 If dead people lack sensation, they will not feel happy nor will they suffer pain, as Epicurus says in his second Kyria Doxa: Death is nothing to us: for the body when it has been resolved into its elements has no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us.133

Because of this lack of sensation, it is wrong for one to worry about one’s remains. It therefore is irrational to fear or to mourn death or dead people, and it is rational to regard death as something which does not mean anything to us and a life properly lived as a practice for death.134 It rather is rational to think that death is nothing to be afraid of and to realise that death is part of our life and to live life properly, i. e. by taking away the fear of death which causes pain and the vices of avarice or the blind lust of distinction. When Epicurus135 recommends to us to always be aware of death this means to focus on life in an optimistic mood. This is why Epicurus calls life an “exercise of death” and this is why it makes sense to always be confronted with death, i. e. “to walk about like a dead man laid out for burial” and to listen to memorial texts like the famous letter written by Epicurus on his deathbed to Idomeneus. To quote him: On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.136

The letter or rather the behaviour of Epicurus, which it describes, has impressed many readers over the centuries – Epicurus’ enemy Cicero even

132 133 134 135 136

Cf. the ‘symmetry argument’: Lucr. 3. 832–42. Epicur. Sent. Vat. 2 (trans. HICKS 1950). Cf. Lucr. 3.870–893; Epicur. Ep. Men. 124. Cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 123. D.L. 10.22 (trans. HICKS 1950); cf. Cic. Fin. 2.96.

6. Plato’s Dialogue Phaedo: A Memorial Text

translated this letter into Latin. In any case, memorial texts like this letter demonstrate well how the doctrine ‘death is nothing to us’ might help to counterbalance the pain in the face of death and contribute to the happiness of the dying person – i. e. Epicurus – and the reader of this letter. It helps to explain why worshipping dead people and mourning them makes sense in the Epicurean context. Pleasure is combined with sadness or pain. This is what Epicureans expected when they remembered the dead and read memorial texts. For they accepted that even wise men137 could feel grief or anger as something which is natural. Now it is interesting that here again, the Epicurean position gains a sharper profile if seen against the Platonic background, which I therefore shall turn to for a moment.

6. Plato’s Dialogue Phaedo: A Memorial Text Epicurus, of course, is not the only one who defines life as a practice for death: Epicurus’ statement in the Letter to Menoeceus reminds one of Plato’s Socrates in the Phaedo,138 where he calls philosophy a preparation for death (melete tou thanatou). Yet Socrates differs from Epicurus in that he takes death to be a departure of the soul from the body, whereas for an Epicurean death is the end of life. But both Socrates and Epicurus agree that in some sense dying well is the proper culmination of a good life and, in addition, can contribute to the well-being of others during their lifetime as well, if it serves as an example to be imitated by their followers. Plato’s dialogue Phaedo139 is interesting regarding the Epicurean culture of memorial literature and its function even in another respect. For the Phaedo is a commemorative text itself.140 And even more importantly, it discusses and illustrates how commemorative texts should influence the reader. I argue that the function of such texts in the Epicurean tradition and the emotions involved gain a sharper profile if seen against the Platonic background. So let us turn to Plato’s

137 138 139 140

Cf. Plu. Non posse 1101ab=fr. 120 Us.; cf. ERLER 2011b. Cf. Pl. Phd. 64aff. Cf. BLÖSSNER 2001. Cf. ERLER 2011b: 177 ff.

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dialogue Phaedo for a moment. For this dialogue illustrates and explains how Socrates behaved when facing death. Socrates’ partners realise that Socrates seems to be happy even in this desperate situation of facing the death penalty and understand that Socrates is happy because he believes that death is nothing to be afraid of. Phaedo’s last words in this dialogue suggest that Socrates’ philosophical arguments and his behaviour (which follows from them) should be kept in mind. Such, Echekrates, was the end of our friend – the best man of his time, in our opinion, that we had ever come across, and in general the wisest, and the most just.141

Like Epicurus in his Letter to Idomeneus and in other memorial texts, Socrates in the Phaedo is presented as a paradigm for living a philosophically good life even in the face of death. The Phaedo, it seems, anticipates the role of the commemorative text in the Epicurean contubernium. The dialogue also – and perhaps even more interestingly, I think, – illustrates and analyses a variety of emotions that are involved in that situation. For Plato implicitly offers two options about how to handle emotions which arise if one is confronted with death. One option is illustrated by Socrates, the other by Phaedo, who is present during Socrates’ last day and is an observer of the scene. I shall argue that both options will help to understand better how commemorative texts like the Epicurean ones could serve as elements of a philosophia medicans to control one’s emotions. 6.1 Socrates

First, let us turn to Socrates himself. Just to remind us: In the Phaedo, Socrates becomes the prime example and proof for the fact that and how a human being can carry the burden of his or her fate even under the worst of circumstances and be confident, virtuous and even happy in the face of death. In this respect, the Phaedo anticipates Epicurean memorial texts. According to Plato, one basic condition for a good life is the greatest possible freedom from affects like fear of death even in extreme situations, because fear of

141

Pl. Phd. 118 (trans. BLUCK 1955).

6. Plato’s Dialogue Phaedo: A Memorial Text

death leads to distrust in the logos, wrong assessments of circumstances with errors as a consequence, and therefore unhappiness. In order to be absolutely free, Socrates wants to eliminate the fear of death by proving the immortality of the soul. In fact, Socrates distinguishes himself by his heroic self-control and almost provocative freedom from affects.142 He remains calm and keeps his composure when he finally receives and drinks the cup of poison. Furthermore, Socrates stays untouched and consoles his friends when they seem to be overwhelmed by sorrow. Socrates sends away his wife, his children, and other members of his family after they started mourning loudly. Socrates’ behaviour illustrates a lack of emotion and becomes an exemplum for a truly philosophical life that is orientated towards virtue only and somewhat suppresses or even gets rid of negative emotions.143 That is: While anticipating the ideal of the Stoics, Socrates proves to be a happy man also in the last hours of his life. 6.2 Phaedo

The dialogue Phaedo also illustrates a different way of handling emotions in view of the tragic scene of Socrates’ death. The character of Phaedo144 is especially interesting, because he states that, while looking at Socrates, he did not feel pity nor any similar emotion. Moreover, he expresses his amazement at this fact. Nevertheless, he apparently knows why Socrates reacted that way. He recognised that Socrates was happy and expected to be happy also in the afterlife (58e). Socrates’ discussion of the immortality of the soul taught Phaedo that death need not be feared and does not constitute an evil for Socrates, and that this is the reason why he was happy. Of course, Phaedo also feels sorrow during the philosophical discussion and he has mixed feelings. However, this has an understandable reason, because Phaedo feels that he is about to lose a true friend. That is why he cannot hold back his tears (117d). So, unlike Socrates, Phaedo is prone to experience affects. Yet he is positively influenced in his behaviour by the appearance of the Socratic emo-

142 143 144

Cf. HALLIWELL 2002: 112 ff.; ERLER 2008a: 28 ff. Cf. Pl. Phd. 59c–60a; 115c–116a; 116b–117c. Cf. HALLIWELL 2002: 112 ff.

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tionless hero. Phaedo analyses the reasons for sorrow and their assessment contributes to a controlled dealing with his emotions, just as Socrates’ arguments do.145 It is worth noting that Phaedo’s handling of emotions, as illustrated in the dialogue Phaedo, converges with directives that we can infer from a passage in the Republic in which Socrates discusses how “decent” men, as he calls them (epieikeis),146 handle emotions like anger or sorrow. It is stated that custom and law demand not to be angry or annoyed in times of misfortune, but to keep one’s calm. At the same time, it is taken into account that affects like grief can suddenly beset human beings and that this is not assessed as being something negative under certain circumstances. Socrates demands that one should not quarrel with misfortune and fate (aganaktein), because one does not know whether the cause of the affect is good or bad. In addition, Socrates warns us that one should not take human affairs too seriously and especially points to the fact that excessive grief obstructs a rational analysis of a given situation (bouleuesthai) and prevents one from being able to adapt rationally to that particular situation. In turn, Socrates wishes instead of stumbling like children, clapping one’s hands to the stricken spot and wasting the time in wailing, ever to accustom the soul to devote itself at once to the curing of the hurt and the raising up of what has fallen, banishing threnody by therapy.147

Therefore three things are recommended for a correct analysis of any given situation, if emotions like grief are felt: One should locate any stroke of fate within the greater context of human existence, then rationally analyse what has happened, and finally repeatedly practise this procedure for the purpose of healing and recovery. It is worth noting that Socrates neither denies that human beings can be the victims of affects, nor sees this fact negatively, nor does he recommend to suppress affects completely. Rather, he gives advice on how to deal with one’s emotions rationally. Socrates explicitly concedes that a “decent man” can

145 146 147

Cf. ERLER 2008a: 31–34. Cf. Pl. R. 603e. Pl. R. 604c–d (trans. SHOREY 1970).

7. Epicurus on memoria and Lament

experience emotions, e. g. sorrow, if he loses a dear member of his family. “Decent men” then are a group of people who are susceptible to affects, but can control their affects if they meet certain requirements. They need to analyse the causes of any given emotion and they need to be ready to adapt to the circumstances. Socrates’ suggestions are interesting for us for two reasons. First, his advice on how to handle emotions like anger or sorrow reads like a handbook for the interpretation of Phaedo’s behaviour as described in the eponymous dialogue. For when Phaedo watches how Socrates behaves in his last hours and when he dies, Phaedo proves to be able to deal with his emotions, not because he thinks that death is something bad in itself, but because he realises that he is about to lose a friend. Phaedo obviously does not fight against these emotions as Socrates does in a different context in the Phaedo in order to get rid of them, but he rather accepts their existence as given, but wishes to control them. Phaedo obviously is following Socrates’ advice given in the Republic to control emotions by reason, moderation, habituation, practice, and analysis of the given circumstances.

7. Epicurus on memoria and Lament But there is more to it: As we saw, the reader of the Phaedo is offered a choice between two options that he could emulate: Either he might decide to imitate the figure of Socrates, who succeeds in getting rid of all emotions and who is tough on his family and his friends. Most readers will opt for this option, just because it is Plato’s proto-philosopher Socrates, as obviously the Stoics did, whose idea of apatheia is anticipated by Socrates in the Phaedo. But there might be other readers who will side with Phaedo and imitate him. They will accept the emotions as given, yet will struggle to gain control over them in exactly the way advised by Socrates in the Republic. Now Richard Sorabji148 has reminded us that the advice given by Plato’s Socrates in the Republic for handling well emotions like grief indeed played a role in the context of philosophical therapy after Plato in different schools.149 But Sor-

148 149

Cf. SORABJI 2000: 213; see for relation with Plato: ERLER 2011d. Cf. (Ps.‐)Plu. Cons. ad Apoll. 112e; Pl. R. 603e–604d.

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abji did not take into account the Epicureans. Yet the prescriptions given by Socrates in the Republic and illustrated by the behaviour of Phaedo exactly describe the way prescribed by the Epicureans of treating emotions in the context of their philosophia medicans. For they did not strive to get rid of emotions, but rather to find a balance between emotions like pain and joy. Epicurus speaks of the “curious pleasure that is mingled with tears”150 when he recalled his brother Neocles’ last words. This balance of emotions like sorrow and joy very much reminds one of what Phaedo experienced when he observed Socrates’ last hours of life and his death in the Phaedo. It becomes clear: The Epicureans did not side with the emotionless Socrates and apatheia, but with Phaedo in accepting emotions as something natural and human, but which have to be controlled by reason. To accept and to control one’s affections in the right way: this is what Epicurus practised himself and what is expected from others who wish to bring their mortal self to perfection. According to the Epicureans, emotions belong to human nature as first traces (vestigia), which cannot be “plucked out by the roots”, as Lucretius teaches us in the third book of his poem De rerum natura.151 Consequently, the Epicureans disagreed with those who would not accept emotions like sorrow and tears on the occasion of the death of friends, as we learn from a letter from Epicurus to Phyrson, which is paraphrased by Plutarch: The Epicureans disagree with those who would do away with grief and tears and lamentation at the death of friends, and say that an absence of grief that renders us totally insensible stems from another greater evil: hardness or a passion for notoriety so inordinate as to be insane. Hence they say that it is better to be moved somewhat and to grieve and to melt into tears and so with all the maudlin sentiment they feel and put on paper, getting themselves the name of being soft-hearted and affectionate characters.152

Elsewhere in Plutarch we read, “the memory of a dead friend [for Epicureans] is pleasant on every count”.153 Indeed, one might wonder, why an Epicurean should feel sorrow in the case of the death of a friend at all, since they 150 151 152 153

Plu. Non posse 1097ef (trans. EINARSON/DE LACY 1986); cf. Sen. Ep. 99.25. Cf. Lucr. 3.310; 3.320 f. Plu. Non posse 1101ab=fr. 120 Us. (trans. EINARSON/DE LACY 1986). Plu. Non posse 1105e (trans. EINARSON/DE LACY 1986).

7. Epicurus on memoria and Lament

will be persuaded that death is the end of everything and nothing can be experienced after death. Exactly this question is posed by Lucretius: we may well ask, if all ends in sleep and quiet rest, what bitterness there is in it so great that one could pine with everlasting sorrow?154

Indeed, just like Phaedo in Plato’s eponymous dialogue, the Epicureans did not feel grief so much over the dead person as over the loss of a friend. Epicurus acknowledged that the sorrow one feels when someone has died rather concerns the person who remains, because he or she feels the pain of separation. That is: The one who commemorates – not the object of it – is the true addressee of the therapy that is involved in commemorating a dead person.155 The pleasure that arises from mourning and remembering balances the pain created by the death of a friend. That means that the recommendation to read memorial literature and to confront oneself with the sorrow caused by the loss of a friend is based on an Epicurean calculus, namely that the pleasure which is created by this is greater than the pain which goes with it.156 Seen from this perspective, it makes sense to worship and commemorate dead Epicurean heroes. For sure, Epicurus’ opponents criticised that to read memorial literature and to celebrate and to mourn an Epicurean hero would contradict the Epicurean doctrine according to which a dead person could not be pleased by worship or commemoration, because his or her death means the end of all sensations. Yet, there is no contradiction: For according to Epicurus, it is not the dead hero who benefits from commemoration and veneration, but the one who commemorates and worships who is the true addressee of the commemoration and who benefits from it.157 As Plato illustrates in the Phaedo and Epicurus argues in his Letter to Phyrson: The benefit of commemorating a dead friend, for instance, might consist in controlling one’s own emotions. Commemoration or worshipping thus

154 155 156 157

Lucr. 3.909 ff. (trans. ROUSE 2006). Cf. Epicur. Sent. Vat. 32. For the hedonistic calculus cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 132; ERLER/SCHOFIELD 1999a: 651 ff. Cf. Epicur. Sent. Vat. 32.

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helps the worshipper to cultivate his or her mortal self. It therefore becomes part of the Epicurean philosophia medicans. For one aim of Epicurean education is to reform the character of Epicurean followers by emotional change and theoretical inquiry.

8. Conclusions The Epicurean contubernium or garden was a place for cultivating the mortal self with the help of oral teaching and philosophical texts. We decided to focus on Epicurus’ advice – as formulated by Lucretius – to know how to control one’s emotions.158 We suggested that, and also in what manner, commemorating and emulating dead philosophical heroes played an important role in this context. Of course, this practice, which is borrowed from religious contexts, is only one tool which helps to support the control of emotions. What is also needed is a philosophical analysis. Since Epicurus presupposed “that the measure is to be discovered in nature and can be recognised by men”, rational observation and analysis of nature – i. e. theoria or physiologia (study of nature) – transmit the knowledge of limit and measure, which enables us to deal with affection properly.159 Which proves that theoria of nature – i. e. physiologia – and moral praxis in Epicureanism are closely connected. Theoria of nature provides the means that have to be used in moral action. Both physiologia, i. e. physics, and practical ethics helped Epicurus to become a ‘deus mortalis’ and will support anybody who strives to emulate him in becoming an Epicurean sage. In order to achieve this aim, exercises are needed and practised in the Garden, as Epicurus recommends. In this chapter, I wanted to focus on a perhaps less expected aspect of Epicurean philosophia medicans: the role which memorial literature played in the context of Epicurean education. For memorial literature is closely connected with the traditional hero cult of the Greek polis and was practised not only in political contexts – but also by poets as early as the 6th century BC, for instance by the poet Archilochus.160 Obviously, Epicurus accepted this

158 159 160

Cf. Lucr. 5.43 ff. Cf. Epicur. Sent. 15. Cf. CLAY 2004.

8. Conclusions

important religious element of the polis culture, which might come as a surprise in view of Epicurus’ general critique of traditional religion. But we recognised that Epicurus does not simply assume this tradition but adapted and transformed it according to his philosophy: For Epicurus argued that traditional worship remains relevant philosophically, if it is realised that the true addressee of worship or commemorating is the one who commemorates or worships. We have seen that, under this condition, the tradition of commemoration and hero cult become elements of Epicurean practical philosophy in that they help, for instance, to control one’s emotions. In this sense, the dead Epicurus as hero and important leader of the Epicurean tradition proves to be a saviour of mankind not by acting, but by helping others to act and by stimulating them to emulate and imitate him.161 As the Epicurean Atticus says in Cicero’s De finibus: I am not at liberty to forget Epicurus, even if I want to, since we Epicureans have his image not only in our paintings, but also on our cups and rings.162

In fact, we do have rings and busts of Epicurus and we do have rings depicting the Epicurean Metrodorus. That is why the cult of the Epicurean heroes and the reading of commemorative texts form part of the Epicurean philosophia medicans and pedagogy as well as Epicurean friendship, as we read in the fragment of a letter by Epicurus, which Philodemus quotes. In this text, Epicurus records an invitation to an Epicurean feast: … as concerns those who experience turmoil and difficulty in their conceptions of natures that are best and most blessed. [But Epicurus says] that he invites these very people to join in a feast […]. In doing this [he says], they will not be engaged in gathering the masses […]; rather, in practicing what is congenial to their nature, they will remember all those who are well disposed to us so that they can join on their blessed day (?) in making sacred offerings that are fitting […].163

Cf. Sen. Ep. 25.5: sic fac inquit omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus. Cf. Cic. Fin. 5.1.3. 163 Phld. PHerc. 1232 fr. 8, col. 1 (trans. CLAY 1998: 81 f.; Test. 16); cf. TEPEDINO 1988: 225–232. 161

162

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Remembering others who are well disposed: Memoria culture and reading memorial texts support Epicurean philosophy, which strives for cultivating the mortal self, which in turn goes hand in hand with helping others to cultivate their own mortal selves. For Epicureans, egoism and altruism are not an exclusive, but rather an inclusive disjunction. The Epicurean institution of the contubernium and its pedagogical programme stand for this idea. Again we have seen that Epicurus makes use of traditional concepts, turning them into elements of his philosophia medicans.

Chapter 3: Epicurean ‘True Politics’

1. Epicurus and Socratic ‘Politics’ In this chapter, I wish to pose the question whether, and if so, how an Epicurean would accept to live in a community like the Greek polis. At first sight, the answer to this question might seem clear. It is common knowledge, or so it seems, that Epicurus refused to get involved in politics at all. Epicurus advised his followers to disengage from the public and to “abstain from politics”, as we read in a fragment of Epicurus’ important, though lost ethical work On Lives (De vitis).164 We also learn from Plutarch that, according to Epicurus, Epicureans should withdraw from the ‘many’ and ‘live unnoticed’ – and indeed, the expression lathe biosas has become a kind of hallmark of Epicureanism,165 but also a target of many attacks by Epicurus’ adversaries. So the right answer to the question whether or not Epicureans wished to get involved in public affairs and the community seems to be negative. In what follows, I would like to try to question what appears to be the common understanding of the Epicurean position. I shall argue that Epicureans – although trying to keep out of the everyday affairs of politics in the traditional sense of the word, nevertheless were well prepared to be involved in society and to practise politics in a different sense of the word. For by ‘practising politics’ the Epicureans did not mean dealing with the political institutions of the community. Rather, Epicurean politics aimed at improving the mental disposition of their fellow citizens in order to help them live a happy life. I shall argue that Epicureans regarded their philosophy as a politi-

164 165

Cf. D.L. 10.119 = fr. 8 Us.; for Epicurean material, see ERLER 1994. Cf. Epicur. Sent. 14; fr. 551 Us.; see ROSKAM 2007.

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cal activity in itself, and I shall suggest to call this kind of activity ‘Socratic politics’, since it very much reminds us of the kind of philosophical activity which Socrates practises in Plato’s dialogues and calls ‘true’ politics in the Gorgias,166 in contrast to traditional politics, and indicating that he is talking about his own philosophical pragma, i. e. his epimeleia tes psyches or ‘caring for the souls’ of his partners and of his fellow citizens167 in order to provide them with the security they had declared to be the main goal of doing politics. Thus it will be argued that the Epicureans distinguished between two different ways of practising politics and had in mind two different concepts of security – the traditional social security provided by the polis and a security provided by ‘true – i. e. Epicurean – politics’, which does not require traditional institutions or protection by city walls. I shall try to show that in this respect Epicurus’ understanding follows the Socratic tradition.168 In the second part of this lecture, I shall introduce to you a monumental inscription, which the Epicurean Diogenes put up in Oenoanda, a small town in Asia minor, in the second century AD. The inscription propagates the basic tenets of Epicurus’ teachings, and, as I shall argue, is a manifestation of Epicurean–Socratic ‘true politics’, as far as its intention is concerned. In addition, I shall try to show that a recently discovered fragment of this inscription confirms the observation that the Epicureans indeed favoured the concept of an ideal community, which resembles Plato’s ideal city Kallipolis169 as presented in the Republic, in so far as both communities are managed by ‘Socratic’ true politics rather than traditional politics and that in both poleis traditional political institutions and written laws are of minor relevance. This is a new and important aspect for the Epicurean tradition, which often is thought of as legalist by modern interpreters as far as their conception of justice is concerned. I shall argue that this is not true in an absolute sense, just as it is not true for Platonism.

Cf. Pl. Grg. 521d. Cf. Pl. Ap. 29e; 30b; 39d. 168 Cf. ERLER 2008b: 39–54. 169 For the ‘ethical’ interpretation of the Republic cf. e. g. ANNAS 1981 as opposed to the ‘political’ one cf. e. g. VEGETTI 2013. For this discussion see also FERRARI 2007 and ERLER 2007: 202–215. 166 167

2. Epicurean Politics and its Aim: True Security

2. Epicurean Politics and its Aim: True Security 2.1 Social Security

So let us first reconsider the Epicurean view on the meaning of politics. In order to understand why Epicurus recommends to live unnoticed and to keep out of politics, we should ask ourselves what is meant by ‘politics’ when Epicureans warns us not to get involved. In order to do so, one has to keep in mind that the underlying motivation for Epicurus’ political thinking and his major criterion for judging politics is the question whether a certain kind of politics is able to provide security, tranquillity, and confidence for its people: This trias is the core of the Epicurean motivation for any political consideration. For sure, the Epicureans recognise the fact that one needs to try to create social security for human beings.170 This is what Epicurus expects from traditional politics and this is why Epicureans were well prepared to get involved in politics – but only if necessary, as we read in Seneca’s treatise De otio171 and realise in the final crisis of the Roman republic. For at that time, Roman Epicureans indeed decided not to “stay out of politics”, if I may remind you, for instance, of Cassius, who in about 48 BC converted to Epicureanism and despite or, perhaps, just because of this fact, joined the Academic Brutus in fomenting the conspiracy against Caesar in 44 BC.172 So he and many others who we know of did not wish to disengage from political affairs at all costs – or at least, if they thought it to be unavoidable. We learn from a passage by the Epicurean Colotes and quoted by Plutarch in his treatise Adversus Colotem that “The men who appointed laws and usages and established the government of cities by kings and magistrates brought human life into a state of great security and peace and delivered it from turmoil”. 173 From this it seems to become clear that Colotes praises lawgivers and law-governed communities because of the protection they provide against any threats to life and because of the social security they offer. It is because of statements like these that Epicureans often are regarded as legal-

170 171 172 173

Cf. Epicur. KD 6; KD 7. Cf. Sen. dial. 8.3.2. Cf. SEDLEY 2009: 44. Plu. Adv. Col. 1124d (trans. EINARSON/DE LACY 1986).

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ists by ancient as well as by modern interpreters. But, as we shall see shortly, this judgement is at least one-sided. 2.2 From the Inside

According to the Epicureans, it is not enough to provide social security, that is against external danger. For sure, traditional politics might be helpful in order to protect us against enemies and to secure physical integrity, in so far as it provides us with social security and therefore might mitigate the fear of external enemies. But traditional politics is regarded as a dangerous business and based on a wrong view of how security is to be attained. In Kyria Doxa 7, we read: Some men have sought to become famous and renowned, thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against their fellow-men. If, then, the life of such persons really was secure, they attained natural good; if, however, it was insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature’s own promptings they originally sought.174

The Epicureans were convinced of the fact that there exists a form of uneasiness or insecurity which stems from inside of man and cannot be fought by building walls or by creating laws or a good government. For even if walls and castles and laws protect our bodies from the fear of death, the fear of the gods and irritations, which result from misunderstanding how the world works and from wrong judgement of traditional values like wealth or power, remain inside. And these misunderstandings cause irritation and insecurity, which often result in misbehaviour and aggressiveness towards others. That is to say, insecurity and uneasiness within man are caused by a lack of knowledge and wrong understanding of what death means, what the gods do, or how natural phenomena are to be understood. According to the Epicureans, it therefore is of greater importance to achieve security in the sense of tranquillity of mind. For according to them, this kind of security alone guarantees true happiness.

174

Ep. Sent. Vat. 7 (trans. HICKS 1950).

2. Epicurean Politics and its Aim: True Security

Thus, for the Epicureans there are two kinds of insecurity and two methods of providing security: First, external insecurity, which can be fought by traditional politics, and secondly, insecurity stemming from within, and which must be erased by complete clarification of the real causes of phenomena. For it is impossible to remedy fear of the phenomena, the gods, or death, if one does not understand how the world functions, as Epicurus states: “It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance if a person did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell us (mythos). Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures”.175 From this follows, to quote Epicurus again: There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow humans, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.176

Only then, a tranquil state of mind, the ataraxia, can be guaranteed – namely by explaining why death is nothing to us, that the gods do not care about us and therefore are not to be feared, and that phenomena should not irritate us because everything can be explained without any teleological intention. That is to say, since there are two causes for feeling insecure: one from outside of men, one from inside, there also have to be two kinds of politics: one that tries to provide social security with respect to men by dealing with social affairs, institutions and government, which is called traditional politics; and another kind of politics, which is able to explain how the world functions, why death is nothing to us, why the gods are not to be feared and that all goods that are necessary for a good life are readily available – in short: what is needed is the Epicurean physiologia. Lack of knowledge and fear often are the causes for breaking the rules and for other forms of misbehaviour, as the Epicurean poet Lucretius writes in his poem De rerum natura:

Epicur. Sent. 12 (trans. HICKS 1950). Epicur. Sent. 13 (trans. HICKS 1950); for the Epicurean concept of security see SCHOFIELD 1999: 748–756.

175

176

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that for fear of death men are seized by hatred of life and of seeing the light, so that with sorrowing heart they device their own death, forgetting that this fear is the fountain of their cares: it induces one man to violate honour, another to break the bonds of friendship, and in a word to overthrow all natural feeling.177

Therefore, freeing one’s mind from these kinds of fear by means of physiologia is of much greater importance than achieving security. From this follows that the Epicurean ban on politics only concerns traditional politics, but not true or rather philosophical politics, i. e. the Epicurean philosophia medicans, which, in fact or at least according to the Epicureans, does a better service to the souls of people and in doing so, to communities and poleis.178 It is not by chance that Epicurus was called the saviour of mankind and the city, because he tries to save the souls of the city, not its institutions.179 Epicurus is the true politician and Epicurean physiologia or philosophy is true politics: this might seem strange to us – or at least a utopian programme; but it is interesting to see that Epicurus was neither alone nor the first to recommend this kind of approach. In fact, as I shall suggest, he picks up what Plato’s Socrates recommends in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias. And in the Apology, Socrates even calls himself the saviour of the city.180

3. Socrates, the True Politician: Gorgias So let us turn to Plato’s dialogue Gorgias for a moment and see what Socrates tells us there about politics and what he calls ‘true politicians’. Although Socrates discusses different topics with different partners in the Gorgias, he focuses on the question how to live a happy life.181 In the dispute with Callicles, the question concerning the correct mode of life comes to a head over whether one should choose to become a ‘politician or philosopher’. Callicles defends the political life while Socrates repre-

177 178

Lucr. 3.79–84 (trans. ROUSE 2006). Cf. GIGANTE 1975; for therapeutic aspects of Epicurean philosophy, see NUSSBAUM

1994. 179 180 181

Cf. ERLER 2009a: 52–54; for the cult of Epicurus, cf. CLAY 1986. Cf. Apol. 31a. See also 23b; 31b. Cf. Pl. Grg. 472c.

3. Socrates, the True Politician: Gorgias

sents the philosophical side. Traditional ‘political life’ stands for a lifestyle, which, according to Callicles, is oriented around common sense. It deals with the institution of the polis and orients itself towards the enforcement of one’s own interests. Socrates confronts this understanding of politics with what he calls “true politics”, the aim of which, in contrast to traditional politics, is to help others to become better and to be happy. To improve other people’s souls is the goal of Socrates’ question-and-answer game, which leads people to perplexity (aporia), but also to awareness of the fact that they are dependent upon mere illusions.182 For Socrates, it turns out, the topic of the discussion of whether to do ‘philosophy or politics’ does not involve mutually exclusive alternatives. For Socrates, to do politics means to do philosophy because politics as he understands it should be concerned with creating order in the soul of the citizens and in society as the source of justice and therefore of individual and civic happiness. The goal of true politics, which does not regard philosophy and politics as incompatible, is the conversion of men and the restoration of order in their soul. The leading representative of this lifestyle is Socrates as he says himself: I think I am one of few, not to say the only one, in Athens who attempts the true art of statesmanship, and the only man of the present time who manages affairs of state.183

A true politician, such as Socrates – it seems – is not concerned with power and with institutions, but rather with creating the conditions in individuals that will allow them to interact with the powerful, that is institutions and other people, in a correct manner. For real power consists in what is actually good for one’s own soul and having the capacity to implement this knowledge. People like Pericles, Cimon, or other well-known celebrities do not represent the politicians who serve Athens well, but it is Socrates, the philosopher, who claims to serve the Athenians best. For Socrates is not interested in dealing with political institutions. Instead, he cares for the souls of his fellow citizens (epimeleia tês psychês), an approach which therefore could be

182 183

Cf. Pl. R. 515d. Pl. Grg. 521d (trans. BURY et al. 2001); cf. Plat. Grg. 486e; 487a.

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called philosophia medicans since it tries to free people from misconceptions by refuting them. Socrates is the true politician because he cares for the souls of his fellow citizens: This might seem bizarre to some modern interpreters. However, one should not forget that to the ancients the word polis does not necessarily entail the aspect of territory or institution as the modern concept of state does. Polis rather means community of people as individuals. This is why Socrates calls his philosophical pragma ‘true politics’ and this is why in Plato’s Republic, where Plato talks about true politics and develops his ideal polis, Kallipolis, laws play only a minor role. In the Republic, Socrates has much to say concerning the human soul, but much less concerning laws and next to nothing about political institutions. Although laws exist in Kallipolis,184 these laws often stand for unwritten rules only, which should be supervised by the philosopher-ruler. In the Republic Socrates regards them as helpful, but inflexible and therefore as a second-best solution. A life without rules is described in the Politicus in the context of a myth.185 It is only in Magnesia, the second-best option of a state described in the Laws, that institutions and laws really matter.186 This notion of polis forms the background to Socrates’ discussions on traditional elements of political concepts just as much as rhetorical or ethical concepts like shame, benevolence, or punishment. From Socrates’ perspective of therapeutic – i. e. philosophical – ‘politics’ these traditional political concepts need to be transformed and integrated into Plato’s understanding of philosophy: Traditional rhetoric as an art of defence changes into an art of therapeutic accusation which is meant to cure the souls of others from error, which is illustrated by Socrates in the Apology; punishment also becomes part of Socratic therapy, insofar as it aims at the improvement of his dialogue partners.187

Cf. Pl. R. 380c; 421a; 424c; 502b. Cf. Pl. R. 425cd; Pl. Plt. 271e. 186 Cf. Pl. Lg. 739a; see MORROW 1960; SCHÖPSDAU 1994; id. 2003; id. 2011; on the relation between Plato’s Republic and the Laws, cf. SCHÖPSDAU 1994: 126–131; LAKS 2000. 187 Cf. Pl. Grg. 525b. 184

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4. Aristotle Now it is striking that this transformation of elements of traditional political concepts and their integration into the philosophical discourse as ‘true politics’ is not just something that was proposed by Plato and then died with him. Rather, Socratic ‘true politics’ created a tradition, which began with Aristotle: For in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that there are two kinds of politics: first, traditional politics,188 which is motivated by personal ambition, and, secondly, what he calls ‘true politics’ and a ‘true politician’, who strives to make his fellow citizens ‘good or better’ concerning their soul. This is, of course, exactly what Plato’s Socrates stands for. “Also, the true statesman seems to be one” – or so Aristotle says – “who has made a special study of goodness, since his aim is to make the citizens good and law-abiding men”.189 It is obvious that Aristotle’s differentiation between traditional and true politics, which is intended to educate and improve the souls of the citizens, picks up what Socrates has to say about ‘true politician and true politics’ in the Gorgias, where Socrates also argued that the educational intention of ‘true politics’ only can be turned into practice within a small circle of students and in case one avoids traditional politics.190

5. Philodemus As the example of Aristotle shows, Socrates’ transformation of politics into philosophical ‘true politics’ actually was the starting point of a tradition and as such reads like a blueprint for what we heard about the Epicurean ‘true politics’, the intention of which is to provide ‘true security’ within man. This becomes clear if we have a look at the treatise On frank criticism written by the Epicurean Philodemus in the 1st century BC; it is an epitome (a condensed account) of lectures given in Athens by his teacher Zeno, which Phil-

188 189 190

Cf. Arist. EN 1095b22 ff. Arist. EN 1102a8 ff. (trans. RACKHAM 1947); cf. Arist. EN 1124b28 ff. Cf. Pl. Grg. 485d; see SCHÜTRUMPF 1991: 78.

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odemus attended.191 This treatise illustrates well how Epicurean ‘true politics’ works as an educational programme in a small circle of applicants instead of large crowds in the polis. For instance, it discusses how the political concept of parrhesia, or ‘freedom of speech’, was used in the Epicurean school as a means to disseminate Epicurean doctrines.192 For that reason, Philodemus demands edification, admonition and correction of the disciples, advocates openness and rejects concealment, strives for trust and wishes to avoid distrust. For according to Philodemus, the aim of Epicurean education, of which parrhesia forms a basic element, is to reform the character of the disciple by emotional change and theoretical inquiry. Philodemus offers rules for a philosophical discourse which will prove useful and therapeutic for his follower’s soul. Just as Socrates does in the dialogue Phaedrus (and as is practised in all other dialogues), the Epicurean Philodemus teaches us that the application of educational elements, like encouragement or criticism, should be adjusted to the disposition of the addressee. It seems obvious to me that the political concepts of parrhesia, elenchus or rhetoric, which were transformed by Socrates into elements of his philosophical ‘true politics’, were used by the Epicureans in the context of their own ‘true politics’ in order to create ‘true security’, which – according to the Epicureans and Socrates – traditional politics cannot provide. From that I conclude that the Epicurean dichotomy between traditional and ‘true’ politics goes back to Plato’s Socrates and may have been conveyed to Epicurus by Aristotle or by reading the Gorgias himself.

6. Diogenes of Oenoanda: An Epicurean Politician Epicurus as a Socratic politician and benefactor to the community: this is the model that was emulated by Diogenes who lived in the second century AD in Oenoanda, a small town in Lycia near the river Xanthus, not very far from today’s Antalya in Turkey. Diogenes had a monumental Epicurean inscrip-

191

Cf. OLIVIERI 1914; KONSTAN 1998; cf. BONNER 1933; cf. GLAD 1996: 33 f. and FOU2001. Cf. ERLER 2011e.

CAULT 192

6. Diogenes of Oenoanda: An Epicurean Politician

tion193 erected in a public place, the Stoa. This inscription is of great interest for our discussion on what Epicurean true politics means.194 For Diogenes informs us that he published the inscription as a manifestation of his beneficence (euergesia) and as an example of what could be called ‘true politics’ in his local hometown. The inscription also tells us something about the role of true politics in an ideal society and its relation to its laws, which comes close to what we learn from Plato’s Republic. It proves that, like Plato, the Epicureans were by no means legalists in the sense that philosophical enemies like Plutarch and modern interpreters want to portray them. According to the inscription, the Epicureans rather proposed a kind of political utopia, which – as they claim – would function in many ways without laws and would be based on the practice of true politics – very much like Plato’s ideal state, Kallipolis. So let us hear the reasons why Diogenes decided to have this inscription written on a wall in Oenoanda: Having already reached the sunset of my life [and] being almost on the verge of departure [from] the world on account of old age … I decided, … to help now those who are well-constituted. Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six … were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But since … the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, … and, [moreover], since it is right to help [also] generations to come … and since, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here – now, since the remedies in written form reach a larger number of people, I decided to use this stoa to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation, medicines, which we ourselves have put [fully] to the test.195

Cf. SMITH 1993; cf. esp. fr. 3 I 4 ff. Smith; SMITH 2003; New fragment in: HAMMER2014; discussion of fragments in: GÜREMEN/HAMMERSTAEDT/MOREL 2017. For what follows, see also ERLER 2017: 59–65. 194 About the importance of the inscription, cf. SMITH 2017: xi–xvii; about the research in Oenoanda: BACHMANN 2017; concerning the inscription: HAMMERSTAEDT 2017. 195 Diog.Oen. fr. 3 II 7 ff. Smith. All translations are taken from SMITH 1993 if not indicated otherwise; in this case modified by HAMMERSTAEDT/SMITH 2014.

193

STAEDT/SMITH

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These sentences make it clear: Diogenes thinks that most people are afflicted with the pestilence of false opinion about the true nature of things,196 i. e. by fear of the gods, of death, and generally fear of all that is foreign to them. By putting up the inscription, Diogenes wishes to be a benefactor to his fellow citizens, but also to mankind as a whole: Education through enlightenment in order to offer a medicine for the plague of ignorance: that is what the inscription promises to its reader. Since 1883, 299 fragments of this inscription have been discovered and deciphered, and more is to come. By now, we can infer that the inscription was over 80 metres long, that the overall height of the sections of the text was 3.5 metres, and that only 30 % of it has been found so far.197 Along with the papyri from Herculaneum, the inscription is one of the most important sources for later Epicurean philosophy and enriches the corpus of Epicurean writings with new testimonies, hitherto unknown letters of Epicurus, new aphorisms of the school’s founder and, not least, with extensive discussions of Epicurean teachings by Diogenes himself, about whom we only know what is derived from this inscription. The text consists of seven horizontal rows of script with numerous sections, which are arranged one above the other. At the bottom there is an epitome of Epicurean ethics (Fr. 28–61 Smith) in which Diogenes deals with the benefits of virtue and pleasure. Above that (II) there is a section on Epicurean physics (Fr. 1–27 Smith) with reflections on atomic theory, epistemology and theology, astronomy, and the origins of civilisation; and above that again, writings by Diogenes and Epicurus (Fr. 97–116 Smith). Both these latter sections are inscribed with smaller letters than the other sections and are positioned at the reader’s eye level. Below the section on ethics, there is a line in larger letters with maxims from Epicurus’ main teachings and other aphorisms. In this way, they form for the reader, not only optically but also in terms of content, a fundament and, as it were, a legitimation of Diogenes’ Epicurean treatises. Above the section on physics there is a section (III) consisting of two letters written by Diogenes to his friends Antipater (Fr. 62–67 Smith) and Dionysius (Fr. 68–74 or 75 Smith), and some aphor-

196 197

Cf. fr. 3 IV 4 ff. Smith. For information about new discoveries, see HAMMERSTAEDT/SMITH 2014.

6. Diogenes of Oenoanda: An Epicurean Politician

isms. Above that (IV) follows a section with some texts by Epicurus and Diogenes (Fr. 119–136 Smith). The final section at the top of the inscription consists of three rows, each set above the other (V–VII), with a treatment of the problems of aging (De senectute, Fr. 137–179 Smith), a critical discourse on the so-called drawbacks of old age, such as idleness, illness, loss of enjoyment, and approaching death. As we have already noticed, Diogenes addresses his inscription to openminded novices in Epicurean philosophy.198 Like Epicurus, Diogenes sees philosophy as a vademecum for his fellow citizens and for passers-by from all over the world, seeing himself as a cosmopolitan. With his inscription, Diogenes seeks to offer his readers an aid and a remedy for living their lives and to help them help themselves. This didactic intention is emphasised by the design of the inscription as that of an open papyrus roll. Each section is written in columns, with strict rules of syllabification. This is a way of offering to the reader, in a public place, something akin to an open book with an exposition of Epicurean doctrines. Now, the very public display of the text may be seen as conflicting with Epicurus’ maxim that Epicureans are to live a reclusive life (lathe biosas). But Diogenes himself, by implication, clarifies his position in relation to this maxim by describing his observations as a particular kind of politics,199 which sees itself as a therapy for the souls of his fellow citizens and not as normal politics. For he says: In this way, [citizens,] even though I am not engaging in public affairs (prattein), I say these things through the inscription just as if I were taking action, and in an endeavour to prove that what benefits our nature, namely freedom from disturbance, is identical for one and all.200

Obviously, Diogenes is just doing what we expect an Epicurean to do: to put politics into practice – this is what prattesthai means – but he does not mean traditional politics, but ‘true politics’, namely educating the reader by teaching them Epicurean physics and ethics – in short, Diogenes is practis-

198 199 200

Cf. fr. 3 III 4 f. Smith. Cf. fr. 3 I 5 ff. Smith. Fr. 3 I 3 ff. Smith.

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ing the philosophia medicans, which might help the reader to be healed from the disease of ignorance.201 In doing so, Diogenes proves that he not only has a profound knowledge of Epicurean teachings, but also is familiar with other philosophers. He explicitly mentions Plato and Socrates several times. Mostly, of course, Diogenes is critical of them. But there is one passage where – as I shall argue – Diogenes’ Epicurean teaching comes quite close to what Plato has to say about the role laws should play in an ideal community. The passage belongs to the ensemble of some fragments (NF 167 + NF 126 + NF 127 + Fr. 20 + NF 182), which appropriately have been called a “Theological Physics sequence”.202 In this passage, Diogenes speaks about those who will be just only because they are able to think correctly, i. e. just because they are Epicurean wise men. This fragment not only helps to understand better a dispute between Epicureans and Platonists about the ideal community and the importance of laws in it, as for instance Plutarch describes it in his treatise Adversus Colotem. I shall argue that Diogenes’ statement about the Epicurean wise man should be taken into account when discussing what the Epicureans thought about how men should live together in an ideal community which functions well without laws just because of the fact that Socratic Epicurean ‘true politics’ is practised there, and that this should be understood as an Epicurean response to Plato’s concept of the ideal city, that is to say as an Epicurean Kallipolis. Just a short reminder of the passage: The overall argument of the fragment203 is to show that Epicurean gods do not harm human beings by living a remote life without interfering with humans, punishing the bad or rewarding the good, because – or so Diogenes is convinced – the fear of the gods does not influence humans towards a just life. In order to prove this, Diogenes distinguishes three groups of humans: a) Those who are bad and unjust. These people would not care about the gods anyway, and even less Cf. fr. 3 I 5 ff. Smith: prattein; for this use of prattein as being active in politics cf. SMITH 1993: 438. Although Epicurus recommends not to take part in public affairs (D.L. 10.119), Diogenes did so by teaching how to live the right (i. e. Epicurean) life; ROSKAM 2007: 132–144; ERLER 2008b: 52. 202 See HAMMERSTAEDT/SMITH 2014: 263–270. 203 Diog.Oen. Theol. Physics Sequence III 3–IV 5= NF 167 III + NF 126 I HAMMERSTAEDT/SMITH. 201

7. Plutarch

would they be afraid of Plato’s underworld judges;204 b) the ordinary people, who are just only because of their fear of the laws and of the penalties imposed; and c) those wise people, who do not need gods and laws in order to live a righteous life: for they are able to think correctly in contrast to ordinary people, who are righteous on account of the laws only. But, as for the others, I declare that those of them who grasp arguments based on nature are not righteous on account of the gods, but on account of their having a correct view of the nature of desires and pains (IV) and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures).205

The last category is the most interesting for us because Diogenes obviously considers the possibility of man being able to be just because of right, i. e. Epicurean thinking. This – it seems to me – is an important statement since it seems to contradict the opinion often held in modern and ancient times that Epicureans are legalists, a view which is also presupposed by ancient critics like Plutarch in his anti-Epicurean polemics in Adversus Colotem and especially in a passage at the end of the treatise.

7. Plutarch Let us therefore turn to Plutarch for a moment. At the end of his Adversus Colotem, Plutarch criticises Colotes for praising those who established law in societies because they provided human life with security and tranquillity of mind: The men who appointed laws and usages and established the government of cities by kings and magistrates brought human life into a state of great security and peace and delivered it from turmoil. But if anyone takes all this away we shall live a life of brutes.206

204 205 206

I follow Hammerstaedt’s understanding of the passage (HAMMERSTAEDT 2006: 21). Diog.Oen. Theol. Physics Sequence III 7–IV 5 (trans. HAMMERSTAEDT/SMITH 2014). Plu. Adv. Col. 1124d (trans. EINARSON/DE LACY 1986).

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Plutarch argues, however, that a happy life that is guaranteed only by obedience to laws as a guide to a good and just life is unworthy of a true philosopher. According to him, the Epicureans would live like beasts if there were no laws to deter them from this way of life, because they always pursue pleasure and wish to gratify every desire. For if someone takes away the laws, but leaves us with the teachings of Parmenides, Socrates, Heracleitus and Plato, we shall be very far from devouring one another and living a life of wild beasts.207

Plutarch, on the other hand, is convinced that true philosophers like Parmenides, Socrates, Heraclitus or Plato have no need of laws to deter people from being unjust or living like beasts. Plato’s followers will live a just life because they live according to Platonic philosophy. Plutarch of course agrees that Plato wrote important books on the philosophy of laws. The philosophy itself, however, that he implanted in his pupils, was much more important and admirable.208 Now, when reading Plato’s Republic, one cannot but agree with Plutarch. In the Republic, Plato aims at showing that justice is an intrinsic good. Therefore, Plato argues, nobody will do wrong, even if he or she is able to do wrong without being detected, because doing wrong would do harm to one’s own soul.209 Plato is convinced that it is possible to live according to his teachings and that this will make people feel secure and happy. This is why written laws and traditional political institutions are of less importance in Plato’s ideal city Kallipolis. Of course, Plato admits, this ideal community based on philosophy is a utopian place, but a utopia that could conceivably come about as an object of prayer (euche).210 Since Plato is well aware of the fact, though, that the majority is not strong enough to justly live according to his philosophy, he offers the concept of a community – Magnesia – that is based on rules and laws which have to be accepted by all members of the community.

207 208 209 210

Plu. Adv. Col, 1124de (trans. EINARSON/DE LACY 1986). Cf. Plu. Adv. Col. 1126c. Cf. the story of the ring of Gyges in Pl. R. 359cff. Cf. Pl. R. 450d.

7. Plutarch

Now, let us come back to what Plutarch has to say about Colotes’ argument, according to which laws are necessary to prevent people from devouring each other like beasts, and have a look at it in the light of Diogenes’ statement about the Epicurean wise man. At first sight, Colotes’ statement seems to defend a strong legalist position. Modern commentators even feel reminded of what Glaucon says in Plato’s Republic, for there he argues, playing the devil’s advocate, that it is good to commit injustice, if one is strong enough to do so. Since human nature always wants more (pleonexia), it is natural to live out one’s aggression and simply commit injustice whenever it seems helpful – especially if one has a great chance of not being detected.211 This is the reason why laws are necessary to protect us against suffering injustice from people who are stronger than we are. However, laws should not prevent us from doing injustice if we are able to. Now, despite some similarities, there is an important difference between Diogenes’ statement and that of Glaucon in the Republic, which should not be overlooked. According to Epicurus, human beings are not aggressive by nature and do not strive for power and pleonexia, as Glaucon claims, but they long for security and happiness.212 Otherwise, the cradle argument, which – as we have seen in an earlier chapter – tries to prove that the argument according to which all humans by nature strive for hedone, i. e. pleasure, would not be valid. Of course, Epicureans recognise the necessity of laws. But as Diogenes’ statement shows, for Epicureans they are the secondbest solution when one wishes to create a society of people who feel “secure” and happy.213 As we read in Diogenes and in other Epicurean texts, laws are necessary when speaking about common people’s motivation and how to deter them from injustice. This is the option Colotes obviously is addressing, but, as we learn from Diogenes, there is an even better option or possibility: namely that of people acting according to Epicurean philosophy, guided by their phronesis alone. This is what Diogenes says and this is what is already hinted at in Kyria Doxa 13:

211 212 213

Cf. Pl. R. 358e–362c; 612b. Cf. Ep. Sent. 6. 7. 40; see VAN DER WAERDT 1987; MITSIS 1988: 81 ff. Cf. Epicur. Sent 31–33; Cic. Fin. 1.50–54.

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There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-men, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.214

Obviously, what Epicurus wants to say here is that laws cannot protect us against the fear from inside, which is caused by ignorance concerning disturbing phenomena like, for instance, death or pain. For the Epicureans were convinced: When one does something wrong, one never will be sure that this criminal act will not be detected. This uncertainty creates a kind of insecurity from inside, which can only be avoided if you realise by rational calculation – phronesis – that it is not good to do something wrong. Only reason, that is, can protect us from unhappiness. This is also true when one is confronted with adverse phenomena, such as death or pain. In these cases as well, rational thinking is needed. In that case, true security can only be provided by Epicurean physiologia: It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe but lived in dread of what the legends tells us. Hence, without the study of nature [physiologia] there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures.215

For even if human life is protected by walls and institutions and laws, humans will be afraid of irritating phenomena, such as death or pain, if they are not able to understand what the phenomena that concern human beings, like pain or death, really mean. At this point, Epicurean physiologia is needed to protect us. As we learn from the Epicurean Hermarchus:216 If all humans recognised the benefit that results from justice, laws would not be needed. As we have argued in the first part of the lecture, the Epicureans are convinced that it is possible and necessary to live according to their philosophy in order to be secure and happy. A society based on laws, we now learn from Diogenes, is a second-best solution – as far as ordinary people are concerned. This is what Diogenes’ statement implies and this is important for three reasons.

214 215 216

Epicur. Sent. 13 (transl. HICKS 1950). Ep. Sent. 12 (transl. HICKS 1950). Cf. Hermarchus fr. 34.8.4 Longo Auricchio.

7. Plutarch

First, it is now clear that the Epicureans are not strict legalists. They only accept a legalist position with regard to common people, just as Plato does. For I would like to remind ourselves of the fact that Plato as well propagates an ideal city, Kallipolis, which is governed by Socratic true politics and where laws are not needed precisely because of this true politics, which can provide people with a happy life. However, Plato, too, is aware that for common people laws are necessary. For them he created Magnesia, where laws are the foundation of social life. We now realise that Epicurus as well is propagating a social utopia, an Epicurean Kallipolis, so to speak, where – as Diogenes puts it in Fr. 56 Smith – “fortifications are not needed and all humans are happy”.217 That is to say, with regard to their political utopias both Plato and Epicurus are not legalists. For sure, Epicurus does not believe that justice is something intrinsically good or should be chosen for its own sake,218 as Plato does. The Epicureans rather accept justice because of its consequences, a position which Plato ridicules in the Republic. And of course, their respective conceptions of what philosophy is are worlds apart. Yet these differences should not prevent us from realising that both agree on the fact that the kind of philosophy they defend would allow everyone to live a happy and secure life in a community where laws are not needed. Second, Diogenes teaches us something about Plutarch’s argumentative strategy. For obviously the latter’s polemic against Colotes only works because he leaves out the Kallipolis option. For only then can he turn Epicureans into legalists and criticise them as such. Diogenes’ statement on the Epicurean wise man should warn us not to isolate the quotation of Colotes from its context and turn Epicureans into legalists, as Plutarch does and modern interpreters want them to be. Rather, Diogenes teaches us once again that, despite grave differences, Epicureans sometimes are more closely related to Plato than Platonic polemics want us to see. Diogenes’ fragment not only throws light on an element of Epicurean political thinking. It indeed helps us to understand better the strategy of argumentation which Plutarch pursues, and which has misled some modern interpreters by suggesting that Epicureans are legalists. In fact, Epicurus – like Plato – is a utopian anti-legalist.

217 218

Cf. LONG 1986: 300–316. Cf. Epicur. Sent. 31; 33.

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This brings me to my third and last point and back to the beginning of this chapter: Just like the utopian Kallipolis, as it is described in Plato’s Republic, the Epicurean lawless utopia is based on the philosophical knowledge of the wise men and a practice of politics which Socrates calls ‘true politics’. We have seen that the postulate to practise true politics instead of traditional politics goes back to Plato, was accepted by Aristotle, and forms the background to what Epicurus and the Epicureans have to say about politics. We have also seen that even in imperial times the Epicurean Diogenes not only accepted this tradition, but also illustrated it by putting up his inscription as a document which illustrates what is meant by practising ‘true Socratic-Epicurean politics’.

Chapter 4: Theologia medicans. Epicurus’ Transformation of Traditional Religious Practice

1. Epicurean theologia medicans The universe of Epicurus is materialistic and functions in a mechanical way, which excludes any need for a divine power or craftsmanship.219 Epicurean ethics are based on a conception of human nature that also can do without any reference to a divine standard or value for action. On the other hand, Epicurean philosophy does include the existence of gods and elements of traditional religion.220 For Epicurus realised that every human in a way believes in the existence of gods or a god. Since beliefs based on universal consent are of great relevance in his epistemology, Epicurus concludes from this consensus omnium and the basic understanding (prolepsis) of the gods as blessed and immortal beings that the existence of gods has to be accepted and requires one to “believe that God is a living thing immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of mankind”.221 For it was believed that feelings of anger or trouble, or belief in the providence of the gods are signs of a certain weakness which was regarded as inconsistent with the blessedness of the gods.222 This position creates many difficulties and, consequently, has been attacked by many critics and as often as, for instance, Epicurus’ thesis that the soul of man is mortal or that all men are striving for pleasure. Epicurus’

219 220 221 222

Cf. MOREL 2009. Cf. WARREN 2009: 238–242. Epicur. Ep. Men. 123 (trans. HICKS 1950). Cf. Epicur. Sent. 1.

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theology has been criticised mostly for two reasons: Interpreters had problems, for instance, to accept the existence of gods in a materialistic context, and, even more, to call these gods blessed and imperishable. One wondered how imperishability can be guaranteed in an atomistic system. A second aspect of Epicurean theology was considered even more provocative, namely Epicurus’ claim that the gods do exist but live a remote life in what is called intermundia, i. e. spaces between the worlds, do not interfere with the world that we live in, and do not care for us. This, of course, contradicts essential characteristics of traditional Homeric religion. In Homer’s universe, the gods love to do what Epicurus would not accept: to interfere with human affairs in many ways – think of Zeus, who often meets with young human ladies who, afterwards, will give birth to children like Heracles or Theseus. Homer’s epic, early lyric and drama have a lot of stories to tell about such liaisons between gods and human women and their offspring. In Homeric religion, the chance of getting into contact with a god is the fundament of any religious cult, which in fact has been called by Plato a ‘commerce or business’ (Euthyphro) – or a do ut des business.223 That is, according to this conception you pray or sacrifice to a god with the expectation and hope to receive a response and help in return. For these reasons, Epicurus necessarily had to be accused of destroying traditional religion with the opinions he was propagating. What made it worse was that Epicurus not only welcomed the remoteness of the gods, but nevertheless encouraged his followers to take part in traditional religious rituals, since, according to him, taking part in such rituals could be of use for living a good life.224 Of course, one wonders what kind of help Epicurus could possibly have meant to expect from gods who, according to him, refuse to interfere with men. Small wonder that Epicurus’ theology was regarded as incoherent – to say the least – and considered a sign of Epicurus’ lack of faith in his own theological conception. How could it make sense – Epicurus’ adversaries asked – to pray to gods from whom there is no chance of getting any response, let alone of receiving help in difficult situations? Epicurus was

223 224

Cf. Pl. Euthphr. 14e. Cf. OBBINK 1996: 10–12.

2. Existence

revered as saviour (soter) and Epicureans used religious language in their philosophical texts.225 All this is puzzling and has puzzled interpreters since antiquity up until now. And yet, I suggest that all this makes sense if seen from the Epicurean perspective of the philosophia medicans. I argue that Epicurus accepted elements of traditional religion but adapted and transformed them according to his philosophy so that they became components of his philosophia medicans – that is to say, that traditional theology was transformed into a theologia medicans. This is the reason why Epicurus did not consider the remoteness of the gods as something bad – as common people in his time might – but on the contrary, as something that could be turned into a belief which even helps to live a happy life. I wish to argue that, seen against this Epicurean background, it indeed makes sense to practise traditional religious acts like praying, because the prayer will be transformed from an address to a god into something new, a meditation on a god and his or her existence. The real addressee is not the god, but the praying person themselves.226 I will illustrate this by discussing the famous prayer to Venus at the beginning of Lucretius’ poem De rerum natura and show how this Epicurean prayer was transformed, in Lucretius, into a part of Epicurean theologia medicans and a tool for helping the reader to live a good life. I will end by reminding us that this transformation of the prayer into a meditation was accepted later in a non-Epicurean context and integrated, for instance, in the Platonic philosophical curriculum of late antiquity, from where it started a career which is of importance even today, for instance, in modern psychology.

2. Existence It is agreed upon by most interpreters that the Epicureans believed in the existence of gods and that these gods are considered basic constituents of reality, which means that the Epicureans were not atheists, as was claimed by

225 226

Cf. ERLER 2009b. Cf. ERLER 1997a: 88–92.

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some critics.227 Epicureans rebutted this claim and called atheists crazy people.228 In fact, Epicurus argues that the gods are imperishable, live in spaces between the worlds (metakosmia, intermundia), and are made of fine matter, which is inaccessible to the senses and therefore no more perceptible than atoms and void, but visible to mind and reason. This means that, according to Epicurus, the gods do present themselves as images to our mind.229 These images can be beneficial to us, but also might harm us. To quote Epicurus: First believe that god is a living being immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing, thou shalt not affirm of him aught that is foreign to his immortality or that agrees not with blessedness, but shalt believe about him whatever may uphold both his blessedness and his immortality.230

Of course, there are problems with this Epicurean concept of the divine. One wonders, for instance, how the imperishability of the gods might fit into an atomistic system. For if it is the rule that all conglomerations eventually disperse in order to form new ones, the gods would be an exception to this rule.231 On the other hand, since the times of Homer it was believed that the gods are blessed and immortal. Father Zeus sends out gods who are blessed and immortal.232 So there is a discrepancy between Epicurean physics and traditional religious belief. It is of great importance and based on Epicurean epistemology that one should accept the common sense of the people as something true.233 Since in the passage just quoted above Epicurus says that, according to the common sense of mankind, the gods are imperishable and blessed, both aspects of their existence have to be accepted as essential characteristics of their existence. Therefore, attempts have been made to combine those two views of the Epicureans, their atomistic physics and their theology.

Cf. Posidonius in Cic. ND 1.44.123 = fr. 22a Edelstein/Kidd = fr. 346 Theiler: Epicurus re tollit […] deos; in Hebrew the word for heretic is Epikoros (or Apikoros). 228 Cf. OBBINK 1996: 1–23. 229 Cf. OBBINK 1996: 306 f. 230 Epicur. Ep. Men. 123 (trans. HICKS 1950). 231 Cf. Cic. ND 1.68. 232 Cf. Il. 24.99. 233 Cf. OBBINK 1992; Cic. ND 1.43 ff.; ASMIS 2009. 227

2. Existence

Perhaps it is relevant to recall here the fact that even in Homer’s world the immortality of the gods was not unproblematic. Since most of Homer’s gods were spoken of as ‘born’ – you find many stories about the births of gods in Greek poetry and epic – but all of them were believed to be athanatoi or aei eontes – deathless or eternal. Now a-thanatos might be less of a problem: One can imagine gods to be born and to live ever after. But Homer also called the gods aei eontes – ever existing – and this creates problems and is the reason why the Homeric concept of imperishability was regarded by early philosophers as contradictory and, consequently, became a matter of much discussion.234 Common people, though, did not have many issues with this belief. Thus for Epicurus, who refers to the common opinion as a basis for truth, the question of how imperishability is to be reconciled with an atomistic system may have been less disturbing. Of course, from a philosophical perspective the Epicurean point of view remains problematic. That is why some modern interpreters assume that Epicurus did not truly believe in the existence of the gods. They argue that this ‘realist’ account of the gods was a later invention, while for Epicurus the gods were just thought-constructs made up by human beings.235 This theory – attractive though it might seem at first sight – is not very persuasive. It has been contested for the reason that the supposed notion of projection or idealistic theory contradicts what, for instance, the Epicurean Velleius has to say in Cicero’s De natura deorum where he claims that gods do not consist of flesh and blood, but of quasi corpus – body, so to speak – and quasi sanguis – blood, so to speak.236 It has been argued (and rightly so) that this does not mean that the gods are mere mental images. Nothing in Cicero’s texts supports the idea that the gods are mere confluences of eidola. Even more telling is a recently 234 Cf. Od. 5.7; 8.306; 12.371; 12.377; Hes. Th. 21; 33; 105. Gods are born, cf. Hom. Hymni 4.225 ff.; cf. ERLER 2002b: 84 f.; Xenophanes argued that it is wrong to believe that the gods are born and will die: cf. Xenoph. DK 218 14. 235 Cf. LONG/SEDLEY 1987: 147; for a debate from the “idealist” and “realist” sides see SEDLEY 2011; KONSTAN 2011; O’KEEFE 2010: 155–162 opting for the idealist view; ERLER 1994: 151 f.; and esp. ESSLER 2011a: 344–353 against the idealistic view. 236 Cf. Cic. ND 1.49; see SANDER 2004: 215–218; and ESSLER 2011b (about beneficial effects of the gods by sending images).

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edited text, which depicts the gods dwelling in the intermundia and exhorts its readers to revere interstellar space as the true temple and shrine of the gods.237 The Epicurean texts about the gods consistently present them as living, animate beings with bodies, not as mere ideas. Finally, the Epicureans themselves criticise and reject such ideas about the gods, describing them as mere concepts formed by our minds. The idealistic interpretation thus rather seems to reflect modern Cartesian and Kantian ideas of isolated selfhood or human perception and its possibilities. It is not by chance that the first interpreter who brought up the idea of god as a projection of the human mind in the 19th century was a Kantian.238 That is not to deny the fact that the problem of imperishable gods in an atomistic world remains unsolved philosophically, but – again – one should not forget that the existence of traditional gods, believed to have been born but nevertheless a-thanatoi, was a traditional notion regarded by the Epicureans as evidence of the existence of gods.

3. Remoteness of the Gods and their Cult Not only the imperishable existence of the gods in an atomistic system, but also the observation that they are said to have a blessed and remote existence puzzles interpreters since antiquity. That gods are blessed and live a happy life of course matches what common people learnt from Homer. But what about their remoteness? For, as Epicurus argued, since the gods embody the Epicurean ideal of blessedness and tranquillity, an intervention and interference with human affairs and the world of phenomena is to be excluded. According to Epicurus, this would reduce their blessedness.239 Now, this description of the existence of the gods comes as a surprise, because it contradicts what was commonly believed. In fact, to intervene in human affairs is what traditional Homeric gods do all the time. Let it suffice to recall the wonderful stories Homer has to tell about gods like Zeus, Hera, or Athena, and all the others, who do interfere with human beings. Homer’s epic is full of such stories, as is Greek drama, if you remind yourself of Sophocles’ Aias,

237 238 239

Cf. the new text of Philodemus, On the gods III 8–10: ESSLER 2011a: 246–263. Cf. the Kantian LANGE 1873: 76 f. Cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 123 f.; Lucr. 6.68 ff.

3. Remoteness of the Gods and their Cult

where Athena drives Ajax into madness, or Euripides’ Hippolytus, where Aphrodite and Artemis even quarrel over the influence they have on Hippolytus and his destiny. Involvement of gods in human affairs is exactly what humans expect, sometimes hope for, and often are afraid of. And it is exactly this fundamental characteristic of Greek religion – and literature – that is criticised and refuted by Epicurus, as he makes clear in the first of his Kyriai Doxai. For there he argues that a blessed and eternal being experiences no trouble nor brings trouble upon any other being. Epicurus is convinced that the kind of behaviour of the gods described by Homer or tragedy does not match the blessedness of a god. Epicurus denies that gods might feel anger, could be moved or persuaded by sacrifices or prayer, or might cause trouble for other beings. Epicurean gods therefore are exempt from, for instance, being moved by emotions, because such movement would imply weakness. Obviously, Epicurus evaluates the characteristics which can be ascribed to the gods and which match his conception that a god is blessed. That is why Epicurus excludes the possibility that a god could be the creator of the world240 or would be concerned about what happens with it and its inhabitants. According to Epicurus, no god would have taken the trouble to create such an imperfect product like the world around us. Now, at first sight, Epicurus’ position seems to be revolutionary, new and contradictory to common belief. But it should not be overlooked that here again Epicurus drew on a contemporary mood, as texts from the 5th century onward testify. In Euripides’ tragedies, for instance, questions are raised concerning prayer and cult, just because – as was believed – the gods disregard humans anyway, and we even are confronted with arguments which anticipate the ones used by the Epicureans. To give just one example: To explain why the gods do not care for the world of the phenomena, the Epicureans referred to the great variety – poikilia – of kinds of creatures in the world.241 This variety on the one hand is praised as a characteristic of the world’s beauty and forms a kind of leitmotif in Lucretius’ poem De rerum natura. But it is also used as an

240

‘Nature’ (physis) is rarely used as a nomen agens in Epicurean texts, cf. ERLER 2017:

57 f. Lucretius praises mother earth because of the variety of things in the real world, cf. Lucr. 2.667 f.; varietas indeed is a kind of positive leitmotif in Lucretius’ poem. 241

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argument against those who think that the gods should and could care for everything and everyone in the world. Lucretius here sees a problem, arguing that if you hold fast to these convictions [ i. e. the existence of variety and plurality of the phenomena] nature is seen to be free at once and rid of proud masters [i. e. the gods], herself doing all by herself of her own accord, without the help of the gods.242

So the plurality and beauty of the world becomes a reason for the weakness of the gods. For – or so Lucretius asks – who is strong enough to rule the sum of the immeasurable, who to hold in hand and control the mighty bridle of the unfathomable?243

Exactly this argument for believing in the remoteness of the gods because of their weakness obviously was popular outside philosophy even before Epicurus. For it is already proposed by a figure in a comedy by Menander, the Hellenistic comedy-writer who composed his plays in the second half of the 4th century BC, namely the Epitrepontes or Men at Arbitration. In this play, a figure called Onesimos explains why gods do not have time to care for individuals. I just quote his line of argument because it strongly resembles the way the Epicurean Lucretius argued: Onesimos: Do you think the gods have time To dole out every day to every man His share of good and evil, Smikrines? Smikrines: What do you mean? Onesimos: I’ll make it clear to you: The world contains about a thousand towns, Each one with thirty thousand residents. Can every single man of them be damned? Or guarded by the Gods? Absurd – you’d make

242 243

Lucr. 2.1090 ff. (trans. ROUSE 2006). Lucr. 2.1090 ff. (trans. ROUSE 2006).

3. Remoteness of the Gods and their Cult

Their (i. e. lives) a drudgery. Then don’t (i. e. the gods) Look after us, you’ll ask? They (i. e. ’ve introduced), As each man’s guardian, his character.244

This passage has been called a ‘rigmarole of philosophic ideas popular at the time’245 which indeed were widespread in Menander’s time, but of course distorted comically. And it has been realised that the idea behind it, i. e. that the gods do not concern themselves with human beings because their lives would be laborious, sounds very much Epicurean.246 But it also has been stated that there is nothing Epicurean about the passage at all, because the idea that gods do not care for men and do not listen to their prayers is found in 5th century tragedy as well. So again we observe that Epicureans make use of popular thinking, transform it into a philosophical argument, and integrate it into their philosophy.247 But seen against this background, an important innovation by Epicurus becomes evident: All the passages in which this argument occurs in non-philosophical contexts describe a situation which is deeply deplored by common opinion: According to common belief, the remoteness of the gods is something to be bemoaned. Epicurus obviously picks up this popular argument for demonstrating the indifference of the gods. But he uses it with a different aim, because he does not employ the argument of the variety of the phenomena to explain something which is to be deplored – i. e. the remoteness of the gods – but to justify a situation which human beings should be happy about. Because the remoteness of the gods and their lack of care for every individual is one of the main reasons why human beings should realise that they need not fear the gods, that is to say: Epicurus turns a traditional argument into a therapeutic one in support of an important tenet of his philosophia medicans. For the argument helps to combat anxiety about the gods, which is caused by incorrect beliefs about them, i. e. the belief that gods interfere with men – and which very often causes wrong and misguided behaviour. Let me remind us of one famous example of this kind of wrong behav-

244 245 246 247

Men. Epit. 1084 ff. (trans. ARNOTT 1979). ARNOTT 1979: 512, n. 1. Cf. Cic. ND 1.52. Cf. Epicur. Nat. 14 col. 40, 1–17 Leone (LEONE 1984) and ERLER 2011a: 21 f.

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iour as a consequence of a wrong belief about the gods, which Lucretius offers in the first book of his poem: There he mentions the story of King Agamemnon who could not sail away from Chalkis because Artemis was angry at him and had stopped the wind. She only would change her mind if Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter, Iphigenia. Now, had Agamemnon known, or so Lucretius argues,248 that gods do not control the world, including the winds at Aulis, and that they are not interested in sacrifices at all – that is, if he had known Epicurean teachings, the awful killing of Iphigenia by her father Agamemnon would have been avoided.

4. Recommendation of Cult (De pietate ) But certain problems remain: If it is accepted by the Epicureans that the remoteness of the gods follows from their blessedness and therefore is something good and something to be happy about, why did Epicurus nevertheless recommend to obey the traditional religious laws, to participate in the traditional cult, and to practise traditional rituals like praying, as reported, for instance, by Philodemus in his treatise De pietate, where he refers to Epicurus saying: Furthermore, it will appear that Epicurus loyally observed all the forms of worship and enjoined upon his friends to observe them, not only on account of the laws but for physical reasons as well. For in On Lifecourses he says that to pray is natural for us, not because the gods would be hostile if we did not pray, but in order that, according to the understanding of beings surpassing in power and excellence, we may realize our fulfilments and social conformity with the laws.249

Indeed, numerous kinds of religious practices (including sacrifice, prayer, oaths, adoration or festivals) are regarded by the Epicureans as a natural outgrowth of human cultural history. Still, one wonders: If the gods do not interfere with the world, one rather should think that it does not make sense to address them nor should one expect anything from them nor regard religious practice as useful. Such practice seems incompatible with the Epicur-

248 249

Cf. Lucr. 1.80–101. Phld. Piet. 730–750 Obbink (trans. OBBINK 1996).

4. Recommendation of Cult (De pietate)

ean rejection of divine providence and almost like an insincere parody of religious acts. Consequently, Epicurus’ advice provoked scorn amongst his enemies. He was accused of hypocrisy and opportunism and it was supposed that he only wished to flatter the masses. Ancient and modern interpreters deplored the incoherence of his philosophical system in this matter. For it was attested that Epicureans used to pray to statues.250 Plutarch openly accused the Epicureans of pretence: Thus by the doctrines life and living things are abolished, since the primal elements on their hypothesis are void, impassive, godless, […] how then can they claim to leave room for a thing’s nature, for mind, for a living being? As they do for an oath, for prayer, for sacrifice, for worship: in their manner of speaking, in word, by affirmation, by pretending, by naming things that by their ultimate principles and tenets they abolish.251

It is true: At first sight, Epicurus’ philosophical commitment to the observance of religious forms and his criticism of popular belief in divine providence and in ‘religious trade between god and human’ does appear to be contradictory. Yet, to accuse the Epicureans of self-contradiction presupposes that they favoured a traditional understanding of what cult and prayer means. But this would mean to neglect a development to be observed in religion from the 5th century BC onwards, which somewhat started with the Sophists, was promoted by Plato, and radicalised by Epicurus: the emphasis on the role the worshipper plays within the cult and in general in religious contexts.252 In Hellenistic theology, the focus shifted from the gods as addressees of ritual acts to the worshipper, who was regarded as being able to part or to align himself with a divinity, whether or not that divinity was willing or capable of taking care of individuals. The gods, so to speak, lost their active role but were accepted as normative objectives which exist in order to be emulated. This is true for Plato, but even more so for the Epicureans.253 Both philosophical traditions rationalised traditional religious cult practices with-

250 251 252 253

Cf. OBBINK 1996: 397; Origenes Cels. 7.66 = Epicur. fr. 390 Us. Plu. Adv. Col. 1112c (trans. OBBINK 1996); not in Us. Cf. OBBINK 1996: 9. Cf. ERLER 2002a: 159–181; FAUTH 1973; SCHMID 1951; BALTES 2005.

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out abolishing them and strengthened the autonomy of the acting person. In both cases, this new understanding of cult and religious practice includes a shift of focus from the gods to the worshipper and creates a new understanding of what the aim of religious practices is (like, for instance, a prayer).254 Although the Epicureans attached certain attributes (e. g. remoteness) to their gods, they did not regard this as a devaluation of traditional forms of piety but rather as impetus for a deeper psychological dimension of rituals. We have already pointed to the fact that theology is essential to any presentation of Epicurean philosophy, just like any other component of Epicurus’ philosophy that forms part of his practical ethics. For in order to be free from fear of the gods one has to have the right opinion about the gods, because otherwise men will fall back into superstition, will be full of anxiety and unhappiness. That is why Lucretius can say: Unless you spew all these errors out of your mind, and put far from you thoughts unworthy of the gods and alien to their peace, their holy divinity, impaired by you, will often do you harm; not that the supreme power of the god is open to insult, so that it should in wrath thirst to inflict sharp vengeance, but because you yourself will imagine that they, who are quiet in their placid peace, are rolling great billows of wrath, you will not be able to approach their shrines with placid heart, you will not have the strength to receive with tranquil peace of spirit the images which are carried to men’s minds from their holy bodies.255

That is to say: According to Lucretius and the Epicureans more generally, it pays to worship the gods even if the gods do not respond or care about us – if and only if one approaches the gods with the right opinion about them, i. e. accepting that they do not care. In that case, worship makes sense, because approaching the gods means to reflect upon them, what they really are like, and what kind of relation they have to the world. This reflection – or so the Epicureans thought – will remind the worshipper of the true nature of the gods and of the fact that there is nothing to be afraid of in them. In that case, i. e. when reminding oneself of this, the worshipper will benefit from worCf. ERLER 2001. About the importance of exempla for the Epicureans cf. FRISCHER 1982; ERLER 1998. 255 Lucr. 6.68–78 (trans. ROUSE 2006). 254

4. Recommendation of Cult (De pietate)

shipping the gods in that they will create a good disposition, which helps to live a happy life. This is confirmed by Philodemus, who in De pietate stresses the fact that the mental state of the worshipper is decisive, saying that “every wise man holds pure and holy beliefs about the divine and has understood that this nature is great and august”.256 And that is what according to Philodemus accounts for the Epicurean pious man: For pious is the person who preserves the immortality and consummate blessedness of God together with all the things included by us.257

From these examples it becomes clear: The Epicurean concept of piety focuses on ‘thinking rightly about the gods’, without attributing any kind of care for human affairs to them,258 as others do, such as Plato or Theophrastus. It is not the act of worshipping which the Epicureans think is wrong, but often the motive for it. Piety consists in calm contemplation of the gods as they really are, which in turn contributes to our ataraxia by providing us with an exemplum of perfect tranquillity which itself produces the greatest pleasure.259 Consequently, Lucretius claims that it is not piety at all “to show oneself often with covered head, turning towards a stone, […] but rather to be able to survey all things with tranquil mind”.260 This focus on correct thinking about the gods sometimes was regarded as an innovation due to Epicurus, while in reality it goes back to Plato. In the Laws, Plato too demands of men that they should think rightly about the gods. Here the Athenian stranger thinks it is helpful for a happy life to engage in sacrifice and communion with the gods. He adds immediately that this is the case only if man has a good and clean opinion. Plato stresses the connection between right opinion about the gods and happiness.261 It has

256 257 258 259 260 261

Phld. Piet. 27, 762 ff. Obbink (trans. OBBINK 1996). Phld. Piet. 40, 1138 ff. Obbink (trans. OBBINK 1996). Cf. OBBINK 1996: 486. Cf. Cic. ND 1.49; Lucr. 6.68–79; Epicur. Ep. Men. 123 f. Lucr. 5.1198 ff. (trans. ROUSE 2006). Cf. Pl. Lg. 716de.

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been rightly seen that here a new approach to religious praxis occurs. To quote Morrow: This brief passage contains a profound reinterpretation of familiar practices. […] It is not an exchange of services between men and gods […], but a means of assimilating oneself to the gods one worships by adopting the orderliness that characterizes the divine nature.262

Plato, it is true, connects this behaviour with the expectation of a positive reaction from the gods. But despite some differences, certain components of this theory were adapted by the Epicureans in order to fit their own concept of theologia. Thus, even in this case, the Epicureans adapted their own conception against a Platonic background. It makes sense to practise religious cult despite the remoteness of the gods, if the inner disposition of the person is what counts.263 In both systems, the Platonic and the Epicurean, right opinions are fundamental for friendship with the gods, assimilation to them, and eudaimonia. All that counts is a person’s disposition and opinion about the gods as a means to imitating the gods and achieving ataraxia and happiness. The difference between Plato and Epicurus concerns the kind of help they expect. Plato hopes for help from the gods to cultivate one’s immortal soul, whereas Epicurus is convinced that this help can only be provided by the worshipper. As Epicurus claims in his Letter to Menoeceus: Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good from the hand of the gods.264

As it is evident by now: Traditional cult practice and Epicurean deism are not mutually exclusive. It is therefore not astonishing at all if inscriptions tell us about more than ten priests who served the city cult and at the same time

262 263 264

MORROW 1960: 400. Cf. Epicur. fr. 387 Us. Epicur. Ep. Men. 123 f. (trans. HICKS 1950).

5. Prayer and Transformation

claimed to be Epicureans. It becomes obvious that praying does not simply mean talking to the god, but visualising his nature; the goal is not so much the object of worship as the praying person and his disposition. Traditional cult and Epicurean theology match each other, if the cult practices and the gods are seen from the right – i. e. Epicurean – perspective and if one recognises that the worship of the gods is not beneficial for the gods, but for the worshipper. That is to say: Epicurus accepts traditional cult practice only if it is transformed into an element of his philosophia medicans. In this context, prayer for example remains a legitimate means of worshipping and can fulfil a useful purpose despite the impassable barrier between gods and mortals. Human beings can connect with the gods, if they take god’s existence as a model for moral emulation (homoiosis) for their own behaviour. In doing so, one should beware of the ideas which are alien about the gods, as Lucretius teaches us.

5. Prayer and Transformation Now, the two main characteristics of Epicurus’ theological doctrine, provocative as they might seem, were not new in themselves. Neither the remoteness of the gods nor his postulate to approach the gods with the right attitude were novel. What made the Epicurean approach new and provocative was the combination of both: remoteness of the gods and the positive assessment of ritual acts, which leads to a radical transformation of cult praxis into a therapeutic tool for the benefit of the worshipper. This process of transformation can be well demonstrated by the example of Epicurean prayers or hymns to the gods. Both hymns and prayer were approved of and even recommended by the Epicureans,265 but only on condition that a proper content and right thinking about the gods are strictly observed. For the Epicureans were well aware of the fact that – as life teaches us – traditional prayer mostly would harm men, for men would only ask the gods for help, even at the cost of other men:

265

Cf. Phld. Piet. 737–751 Obbink; OBBINK 1996: 396; 407.

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If God heeded the prayers of men, all men would have long since perished, for they are continually praying many grievous things against one another.266

That is why Philodemus, for instance, suggests topics which he deems suitable for a prayer and prescribes how the gods should be addressed.267 It is the mental disposition of the worshipper which counts and makes a prayer acceptable even for Epicureans. Not service to the gods in itself, but the wrong thinking which goes along with it – for instance the belief that one could persuade the gods to do something – will cause harm to the worshipper. All this, or so I think, amounts to recognising that, according to the Epicureans, praying does not mean ‘talking to the gods’ and ‘trying to persuade them’, but visualising their true nature, i. e. their distant existence without any contact with the world of the humans, and realising that they pose no threat whatsoever. The real addressee of a prayer is the praying person him- or herself. This means that the traditional prayer is transformed into a kind of soliloquy or meditation, with the aim of strengthening one’s own disposition. The gods technically remain the addressees; but the real addressee is the worshipper him- or herself. Epicurus’ statement, according to which ‘worshipping the wise man is a great good for the worshipper’268 applies to the worship of the gods as well. Seen from this perspective, prayers and hymns not only turn into meditations, but now serve the general purpose of Epicurean philosophy: to be a philosophia medicans or therapy for one’s own soul: traditional theology becomes, so to speak, a theologia medicans.

6. Lucretius’ Hymn to Venus This transformation of a traditional hymn into a therapeutic meditation is mirrored and illustrated well by the famous and much discussed hymn to Venus at the beginning of Lucretius’ Epicurean poem About the nature of things (De rerum natura). This work is one of the great achievements of Lat-

266 267 268

Cf. Epicur. fr. 388 Usener; Phld. Piet. 928–945 Obbink; OBBINK 1996: 396. Cf. Phld. Piet. 45, 1281 f. Obbink; OBBINK 1996: 503. Cf. Epicur. Sent. Vat. 32.

6. Lucretius’ Hymn to Venus

in poetry. The poem focuses on Epicurean physics, but also contains important ethical statements. The poem is written in six books, which in turn can be divided into three pairs of books: Books I and II explain how the infinite universe works, that it only consists of atoms and void, and that and how these atoms combine in order to produce the phenomenal world. Book III covers the soul and its mortality, culminating in an eloquent denunciation of the fear of death. Book IV explains cognitive and other vital functions, ending with a diatribe against sexual passion. Finally, Books V and VI seek to demystify the world as a whole by offering a cosmogony – explaining its origin and future destruction, its structure and early human history on a materialistic basis.269 In this poem, Lucretius wishes to persuade the Roman Memmius – who stands for the reader – to abandon the fear of the gods and of death by demonstrating that the soul is mortal and the world is not governed by gods. The poem belongs to the tradition of didactic poetry. It wishes to introduce Memmius, who obviously was a beginner in Epicurean philosophy, and the reader whom Memmius mirrors – into the arcana of Epicurean physiologia and to provide Memmius – and the reader – with teachings which might enable him to live a happy life without fear and irritation. Many passages were meant to strengthen the reader’s soul just as meditative exercises do.270 Indeed, in addition to dogmatic instruction, the reader receives the opportunity to test the knowledge gained through reading the poem. The most interesting passage in this respect perhaps is the beginning of the poem. For it opens with a prayer, which is addressed to Venus. It has been remarked that the hymn to Venus is conventional in structure and content and looks like a traditional hymn to a goddess. But I shall argue that the prayer to Venus could – and should – also be read as a meditation exactly in the sense that prayers are acceptable to Epicurus. Let us turn to the proem of the poem. The goddess Venus is called upon and her power over the world is described. We learn that through Venus every kind of living thing is conceived – and that “from you, O goddess, from you the winds flee away, the

Cf. BAILEY 1947; ROUSE 2006; GALE 2007; KANY-TURPIN 2005. Cf. CLAY 1983; Empedoclean elements are stressed by SEDLEY 1998; for meditative aspects see ERLER 1997a. 269

270

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clouds of heaven from you and your coming; for you the wonder-working earth puts forth sweet flowers, […]”271 The hymn closes with a plea for creative strength for Lucretius’ work and for peace: Since therefore you alone govern the nature of things, since without you nothing comes forth into the shining borders of light, nothing joyous and lovely is made, you I crave as partner in writing the verses, which I essay to fashion on the Nature of Things, for my friend Memmius, whom you, goddess, have willed at all times to excel, endowed with all gifts. Therefore all the more grant to my speech, goddess, an ever-living charm.272

This description of the power of the goddess and the prayer itself have confused interpreters and given rise to much controversy. The greatest problem is its apparent inconsistency with Epicurean doctrine and especially theology, according to which the gods lead a blissful life without contact with man. Why, then, has a goddess been called upon for peace and help and why has she been portrayed as working actively in the world? Does Lucretius, the poet, contradict the Epicurean philosopher here? Is there a rift between the poet and the philosopher Lucretius? Evidently, Lucretius uses known topoi to describe the goddess Venus and her power. This traditional poetic description will be appreciated by any learned reader who, like the addressed reader of the poem, Memmius, is a beginner in philosophy, but well educated in literature. Such an educated reader or lector doctus will have no difficulty in understanding the hymn as a traditional exordium in an educational or didactic poem.273 Yet, puzzlement will arise if the reader already has been introduced at least into some arcana of Epicurean teachings, for instance into Epicurean physics and theology – or has learnt about them by reading the poem itself. Only the instructed reader or lector philosophus, who has perused the poem and has learnt that the world works in a mechanical way, that it consists of void and atoms and that the gods exist, but do not care for men, will be irritated by the proem, because in the poem ‘Venus’ is to be expected to get involved in the affairs of nature and man; to quote again:

271 272 273

Lucr. 1.6–20 (trans. ROUSE 2006). Lucr. 1.21–28 (trans. ROUSE 2006). Cf. VOLK 2002.

6. Lucretius’ Hymn to Venus

for my friend Memmius, whom you, goddess, have willed at all times to excel, endowed with all gifts.274

Only if one is familiar with the basic tenets of Epicurean theology and physics might the existence and the content of the hymn lead to confusion and be regarded as a provocation, but it is also meant as a stimulus for the reader to meditate about the hymn and try to interpret it in the new Epicurean context: Lucretius obviously does not only appeal to the lector doctus who will enjoy the play with literary tradition, but also to the lector philosophus who should discuss the hymn’s content and search for its philosophical essence. We also have to keep in mind that Epicureans like Philodemus did not include the genre of the hymn in his criticism of poetry. He even describes how to compose hymns and the importance of avoiding using wrong names or wrong ideas of the deity.275 Cult and hymn are legitimate means of worship, but they receive a new task since they can fulfil a useful purpose for Epicureans. For Epicureans believed that despite the remoteness of the gods, man can connect with god by taking his existence as a norm for moral emulation (homoiósis).276 It becomes obvious that praying does not simply mean talking to the god anymore but visualising his nature. This has to be kept in mind when asking why and to what end Lucretius begins his poem with a prayer to Venus. In the poem, Lucretius gives clues as to how and why this can be done. Lucretius indicates that we should relate Venus to the basics of Epicurean physics. Venus is closely connected with nature, as is made clear in the second book. We cannot go into detail here. Let it suffice to say that in the course of the poem there are clues for the readers which force them to reassess the themes used in the prayer to Venus and to understand that it all amounts to saying that the goddess Venus of the proem stands for the concept of nature as understood by the Epicureans.277 For instance, when in the second book Lucretius deplores the fact that some believe that the gods made the world for man, he uses vocabulary very much echoing that employed in

274 275 276 277

Lucr. 1.26 f. (trans. ROUSE 2006). Cf. OBBINK 1995: 205. Cf. Epicur. Ep. Men. 135; Lucr. 6.68 ff. Cf. ERLER 1997: 88 f.

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the hymn to Venus.278 Both passages are related to each other and the later one can be read as a commentary on the former passage, i. e. the hymn. This and other passages explain to the reader how the hymn should be read from an Epicurean perspective. Seen from that point of view, as taught in Lucretius’ poem, the hymn helps to understand how nature works. It serves to visualise, so to speak, the principle of Epicurean physics: Venus is transformed into a symbol of Epicurean nature and reminds one of the aims of Epicurean philosophy: pleasure and ataraxia. That means, the hymn helps to visualise the divine realm. In doing so it functions in a way which Epicureans assigned to hymns or prayers in the philosophical context: they remind the worshipper of what the gods are like and of the fact that they are not to be feared. It encourages the person praying to reflect on how the world functions and it stimulates the reader to reconsider the right attitude towards the divine domain and the world. In doing so, the hymn is no longer an address to a god but turns into a meditation on her and the world, and helps to understand that neither the gods nor the world are something to be afraid of. That is to say, the prayer becomes a meditation and thereby an element of the Epicurean philosophical exercitium of which many other instances are to be discovered throughout the poem De rerum natura. The hymn to Venus at the beginning of De rerum natura should be interpreted as an exercise in meditation for the reader. We do find this use of elements of traditional religion in other philosophical contexts as well. The Stoic Epictetus, for example, regards hymns and prayers as opportunities to strengthen the mental condition of the praying person by visualising the nature of the divine – just as the Epicureans did.279 Let us recall the famous hymn to Zeus written by the Stoic Cleanthes. What Stoics and Epicureans have in common is the change of purpose. The actual addressee is not a god, but the praying person whose disposition has to be strengthened. Thus, Lucretius’ poem and especially its proem illustrate what Epicurus was aiming at: helping the reader to manage his own life by reflecting on what the goddess Venus stands for.

278 279

Cf. GALE 1994: 212. Cf. Epict. Ench. 3.24.102; cf. ERLER 2012a.

7. Epicurean Prayer, Exercise and Soliloquy

7. Epicurean Prayer, Exercise and Soliloquy We have seen that Epicurus transformed traditional religious practice into an element of the Epicurean theologia medicans, which helps the worshipper to cultivate his or her mortal self. A cult practice like the prayer benefits the worshipper as the real object of worship not in spite of but because the gods are distant and do not care for human beings. The supplicants or worshippers have the chance to remind themselves of the fact that the gods indeed remain remote and that this is something good, for it means that there is nothing to fear from the gods. This knowledge – according to Epicurus – contributes to the ataraxia and well-being of men, which means that the prayer does not provide a benefit from the outside. According to the Epicureans, the benefit of a prayer results from praying itself. Thus, an Epicurean prayer only formally addresses a god; in reality, it is transformed into a soliloquy of the praying person with him- or herself. It is turned into a meditation and as such forms part of the philosophical education practised in Epicureanism – as was illustrated and transformed into literature by Lucretius. The prayer as meditation even played a role and was discussed in the curriculum of late Platonism, where the educational aspect of an Epicurean prayer was appreciated as a form of meditation which might help to prepare one’s disposition for doing proper – i. e. Platonic – philosophy. It would be worth following the history of prayer as a meditative – Epicurean – element in late antiquity and beyond.280 In this chapter, I wanted to draw attention to the fact that Epicurus and the Epicureans made use of elements of traditional religion, integrated them into their practical ethics, and turned them into an important element of their theologia medicans.

280

Cf. ERLER 2001; DILLON/TIMOTIN 2016.

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1. Introduction In the last chapter, I referred to the Roman Epicurean poet Lucretius to illustrate the Epicurean method of transforming a religious practice like praying into a meditative element of Epicurean therapeutic ethics. Now I shall turn to the Epicurean poet again. The reason for this is that Lucretius is an Epicurean philosopher and, at the same time, a great Roman poet. The combination of poetry and Epicurean philosophy, for which Lucretius stands, often puzzles interpreters. For they wonder how Lucretius as a follower of Epicurus could possibly justify his use of poetry. After all, his master Epicurus, in whose footsteps he confesses to be walking281 and whom he professes to follow faithfully, appears to have rejected poetry as a means of teaching his doctrine. Indeed, Epicurus was reluctant to accept that poetry, literature, and traditional education (paideia) in general might be useful for achieving happiness in life. To maintain a distance from traditional education like poetry therefore seems to be an ingredient of Epicurean orthodoxy based on the authority of the schoolmaster – Epicurus.282 By choosing poetry as medium to convey Epicurean physiologia, Lucretius does not give the impression of being a follower of Epicurus. To be sure, his poem De rerum natura is deeply inspired by the philosophy of Epicurus, whom Lucretius reveres, as a help to

Cf. Lucr. 3.3 f. Cf. ASMIS 2016; ERLER 1994: 381–490. For the relationship between Lucretius and Epicureanism see BOYANCÉ 1963; CLAY 1983. Useful contributions are GILLESPIE/HARDIE 2007; MONTARESE 2005; SEDLEY 1998; CLAY 2007. 281

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propagate Epicureanism to the Romans;283 but on the other hand, Lucretius uses the powers of poetic expression in an attempt to teach the implicit reader, Memmius, basic tenets of Epicurean philosophy. Epicurus claimed that only prose could guarantee the clarity of diction which was demanded,284 other contemporary Epicureans like Philodemus maintained that prose, not poetry, is the proper medium for philosophical teaching and, consequently, only employed prose treatises to present Epicurean doctrines.285 Small wonder, then, that Lucretius, who tried to be a poet, but remained an Epicurean, was the target of many attacks accusing him of self-contradiction. Some even diagnosed a kind of paranoid attitude and recognised a kind of schizophrenia, a split between Lucretius the poet and Lucretius the Epicurean philosopher. “Whatever in Lucretius is poetry is not philosophical, whatever is philosophical is not poetry”:286 This saying of the English poet Coleridge in a way is typical of modern interpretative approaches to the poem. Stories were told about a Lucretius going mad or even committing suicide because he did not succeed in reconciling the Epicurean and the poet in himself, stories which, of course, have also been debunked as ‘fake news’.287 There did not exist two Lucretii within Lucretius288 who could not be reconciled. But the task of reconciling the poetical form and the Epicurean content of Lucretius’ poem in view of Epicurean orthodoxy still remains a challenge for interpreters, because without any doubt, Epicurus had difficulties accepting traditional paideia and literature as something which might support one’s search for a good and happy life. Of course, many agree that Lucretius’ insistence on clarity (lucidum) as a characteristic of his verse might be read as a response to the Epicurean demand for clarity mentioned above, but now offered in verse289 – while one has to remember that what is obscure about Epicurean philosophy is the basics of Epicurean teachings – void and atoms, with both principles not being open to perception. In addi-

283 284 285 286 287 288 289

Cf. Lucr. 5.6–12. Cf. D.L. 10.13 = Epicur. fr. 54 Us. Cf. D.L. 10.120 = Epicur. fr. 563 Us; ASMIS 1995: 21 f.; ERLER 1994: 289–362. Coleridge in a letter to Wordsworth, cited by SIKES 1936: 4. Cf. ZIEGLER 1936; ERLER 1994: 398. Cf. MARTHA 1896. Cf. ASMIS 2016: 440; CLAY 1983: 107.

2. Epicurus and Education (paideia)

tion, I wish to remind us of the fact that Epicurus himself made use of a mix of paideia, scientific subjects (mathemata), and poetical forms to transmit his teachings. In doing so, he seems to suggest that poetry is subordinate to thought, that is, may play a role in a philosophical context if, and only if it functions as an ancilla philosophiae, ‘a servant to philosophy’. I shall argue that later Epicureans have discussed this problem and applied methods which can explain why and how literature or poetry might function as ancillae philosophiae and that Lucretius applies and illustrates these methods in his poem in order to introduce his pupil, Memmius, to the text as well as the general reader to the arcana of Epicurean physics. After all, Lucretius claimed his way of presenting Epicurean philosophy to be his own innovation when he says that he is walking on “untrodden paths”290 in choosing the poetic medium to convey his philosophy to a Roman reader. But as far as the philosophical content is concerned, he regards himself as a true follower of Epicurus. Now, I do not claim to have solved the problem of ‘Lucretius being an Epicurean poet’, especially since Epicurus decisively refused to use didactic poetry. Still, I wish to suggest that by subordinating poetical tradition to propagating his philosophical message, he is indeed following Epicurus’ practice and that of other Epicureans. Thus, in this respect at least, he remains a true Epicurean. I therefore shall end with some general reflections on the meaning of Lucretius’ approach in terms of Epicurean orthodoxy, a version which often is deplored as radical, fruitless and boring, but which in reality is in many respects less rigid and more flexible than often assumed, and therefore of great interest.

2. Epicurus and Education ( paideia ) So let us begin with Epicurus’ position concerning poetry, literature and other elements of traditional education. According to Epicurus, traditional education (paideia) and especially poetry is not necessary to attain eudaimonia and therefore could be disregarded. Epicurus indeed rejected a curriculum like the one proposed by Plato in the Republic, which includes purged poetry and a rigorous programme of mathematics. Although we do not have a com290

Cf. Lucr. 3.3 f.

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prehensive treatise on poetry written by Epicurus himself, certain fragments make it clear that Epicurus did regard poetry and especially didactic poetry as useless as far as the transmission of philosophical knowledge is concerned. Epicurus also denied that the arts (artes liberales) contribute anything to the achievement of knowledge.291 In an epistle addressed to Apelles, Epicurus seems to be praising the addressee because he has made his way to philosophy without making use of any traditional education (paideia).292 In another letter, Epicurus advised his disciple Pythocles to flee education (paideia) at once: Hoist all sail, my dear boy, and steer clear of all culture.293

Epicurus regarded poetry as being useless in educational contexts: it might entertain but cannot educate the reader philosophically. As far as the critique of poetry is concerned, Epicurus’ position might even remind us of Plato’s critical remarks on traditional, i. e. Homeric, poetry and its role in education. Plato’s critique, however, is even more radical. For according to Plato, poetry was not just useless but even dangerous. Plato warned his readers against the bad influence which Homeric poetry and poetry in general might have on young people, not least because of the stories they tell and their mimetic nature, which invites readers to imitate what is described.294 Yet, although Epicurus seems to side with Plato’s critique of education and poetry, Epicurus’ polemics suggest that he also fights against Plato’s educational curriculum as described and defended in the Republic.295 On the other hand, it is hard to see how radical Epicurus’ critique really is. For one has to keep in mind that his comments on poetry and education are both isolated and at the same time vague, hardly providing us with a poetical theory from which one could hardly develop an orthodoxy. Now, Epicurus’ polemics against poetry in philosophical contexts basically result from his underlying inten-

291 292 293 294 295

Cf. D.L. 10.6. Cf. Epicur. fr. 43 Arr. Epicur. fr. 89 Arr. (trans. HICKS 1950). Cf. Pl. R. 376c–398b; 595a–608b. Cf. FERRARI 1989; HALLIWELL 2002; ERLER 2007: 486–497.

2. Epicurus and Education (paideia)

tion to rational explanations of natural phenomena.296 Epicurus wishes to free the recipients from fear of the gods, despite all the stories told about them by traditional poetry, which, according to Epicurus, were false. Although Epicurus does not deny that such stories and poetry might entertain the reader and produce pleasure,297 it seems safe to say that he did not believe in the traditional educational system based on reading texts such as the poems of Homer and other poets. According to Epicurus, poems like the ones written by Homer would prevent young people from achieving happiness. Epicurus rather strove to replace this tradition with his own philosophy. This position, of course, often was the target of polemical discussions, as is well illustrated for instance in Cicero’s De finibus bonorum et malorum. In this work, he teasingly accuses Torquatus, a confirmed Epicurean and friend of his, for reading history, poetry, and literature – as Romans are used to doing, Cicero claims – since his master, Epicurus, did not allow this on the grounds that in poems one could not find anything but childish delight.298 Cicero argues that the Epicurean position is incompatible with Roman values and attitudes. Torquatus’ reaction to this attack is of interest. For he does not deny at all the fact that he is devoted to literature. He even seems to be aware of the fact that this is not an attitude Epicurus would approve of.299 Rather, he tries to defend his position by reducing traditional education (paideia) to the education of children, and so in the etymological sense of the word paideia. Of course, this is not what Epicurus argued for. But this interpretation of his words shows that Epicureans, at least in Cicero’s time, tried to adapt their position to a context in which traditional paideia was well regarded, although Epicurus himself did not use paideia in a positive sense as far as we know. For they are reinterpreting Epicurus’ words and claiming to clarify their proper meaning, and in doing so, they stand for a less rigid interpretation of the Epicurean position on literature.

296 297 298 299

Cf. MARCOVIC 2008. Cf. ASMIS 1995: 19; 22 ff.; VOLK 2002, 94. Cic. Fin. 1.71 f . Cf. ASMIS 1995: 22 ff.; ERLER 2006: 247 ff.

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3. Philodemus, an Educated Epicurean The reaction of the Roman Epicurean Torquatus shows that it was possible for an Epicurean at that time – i. e. in the 1st century BC – to combine both Epicurean philosophy and traditional education (paideia). This is confirmed by Philodemus, the Epicurean who lived in Rome at that time as an adviser to the Roman nobleman Piso. Philodemus wrote not only philosophical treatises but also poems.300 More than that: In his prose treatises, he often refers to or even quotes poetry to illustrate his philosophical arguments and positions. Treatises such as On the Good King (De bono rege), On Anger (De ira) and On Death (De morte) demonstrate that Philodemus had at his command an expert knowledge of poetry and prose literature. The last of these three treatises suggests that he may even have harboured literary ambitions of his own as a prose writer.301 Be that as it may, each of these treatises illustrates just how useful literature can be if handled appropriately, i. e. if read through the lens of Epicurean philosophy. In each one, Philodemus deals at considerable length with literary material that should help his audience to evaluate behaviour, to draw corresponding conclusions about character, and to corroborate and reinforce their own conceptions by comparison with philosophical – i. e. Epicurean – ones.302 Moreover, Philodemus makes use of literature and poetry in his Epicurean prose treatises in order to illustrate and explain Epicurean theory. Now, what at first glance may seem to be an unorthodox position, does rely, at least to some extent, on Epicurus’ writings as well. For Epicurus himself made use of elements of traditional paideia and poetry to transmit his philosophical message – he indeed used poetry as ancilla philosophiae, as a servant to philosophy.

300 Cf. ERLER 1994: 292–337; RENGAKOS/ZIMMERMANN 2014: 275–278 (poetry); 420– 425; 721–724 (philosophy); 873–876 (rhetoric); LONGO AURICCHIO et al. 2012: 334–359. 301 Cf. DORANDI 1982; FISH 1999: 71–77; FISH 2004. 302 Cf. ERLER 2006: 246–252.

4. Epicurus’ Use of Poetry

4. Epicurus’ Use of Poetry Let us return to Epicurus for a moment. We already have mentioned that, despite polemical passages, it is most difficult to develop an anti-poetic theory out of the few scattered fragments of Epicurus’ texts dealing with poetry. On the other hand, it is interesting to see what Epicurus’ practice is. For it seems that Epicurus made frequent use of elements of traditional education like rhetoric or poetry to transmit his philosophical message. As to rhetoric, it may suffice to refer to his Letter to Menoeceus, a treatise which invites the reader to practise philosophy – a protrepticus to philosophy showing an Epicurus in full command of traditional rhetoric as psychagogic means to transmit his philosophy. The Letter to Menoeceus303 is written in a literary style, avoids the hiatus, and makes use of elaborate periods and rhythm. Even more interesting is the fact that Epicurus often uses the structure and wording of poetic subtexts in order to make his texts more memorable for the reader. In his writings, Epicurus cites poetry such as Theognis in his Letter to Menoeceus.304 He recognises the authority of poets who serve his arguments, for instance Solon in Kyriai Doxai I.305 The most telling examples are provided by Epicurus’ sententiae, which Epicurus wants to be memorised. That is why Epicurus made use of poetry, taking advantage of the poetic form while correcting its content according to his point of view. Epicurus chooses certain expressions along the lines of comic or tragic poets.306 For instance, he adopts a verse by Solon about the sea, which becomes ‘just’ when ‘tranquil’, reformulating it and making it the subtext of his Kyria Doxa 17: The just man enjoys the greatest peace of mind, while the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude.307

In this saying, Epicurus obviously preserves Solon’s language and combines two terms with which the poet had expressed his view on justice. Now, what

303 304 305 306 307

Cf. HESSLER 2014. Cf. Theogn. 425–427; D.L. 10.126. Cf. Solon fr. 12 West and Epicur. KD 1; HICKS 1950. Cf. CLAY 2001: 28 f.; 33. Epicur. Sent. Vat. 17 (trans. HICKS 1950).

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Solon intended as just a description – the sea is the most just of all things when calm – Epicurus turns into a condition: ataraxia – saying that if a man is just, he is like the sea when it is calm, whereas injustice is bad in that it makes the soul turbulent. Epicurus obviously wishes to make his teaching memorable and therefore alters the subtext a bit – reversing cause and effect. Just one more example: Epicurus’ Vatican Saying 9 reads as follows: “Necessity is an evil; but there is no necessity for continuing to live with necessity”.308 Now, Epicurus most probably fashions his saying against determinism (ananke) along the lines of the comic author Susarion, who composed some lines on the necessity of living with women309 which opens with the statement that Women are an evil, but, my fellow citizens, No existence without evil can be found.310

Kakon gynaikes – kakon ananke: Epicurus wishes to confirm and make memorable this message against determinism by reminding the reader of these famous and notorious lines, which argue against the necessity of marriage. From this it becomes clear: While evidence for an orthodox poetic theory is scant and unsupported by any larger theoretical foundation,311 Epicurus’ practice shows that he was well educated and knew how to make use of poetry to support his arguments: obviously, poetry is not condemned in toto by Epicurus; rather, poetry (as well as rhetoric) is accepted as a servant to philosophy, as ancilla philosophiae, not as an integral part of philosophy. Even in the fragment in which Epicurus seems to refute the use of poetry – with his advice to sail away from education – he might refer to a poetic subtext like Homer’s Odyssey and the Sirens.312

Epicur. Sent. Vat. 9 (trans. GEER 1964). ERLER/VON UNGERN –STERNBERG 1987: 254–256. 310 Sousarion fr. 1 Kock = West; Gerardus Johannes Vossius 2.23.4 (trans. BLOEMENDAL 2010). 311 Cf. ASMIS 1995. 312 Cf. MARKOVIC 2008: 45. 308

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5. Lucretius’ Poetry as a Servant to Philosophy: ancilla philosophiae

Poetry as a servant to philosophy: this is what Epicurus welcomes and this is also the way in which Philodemus makes use of poetry in his treatises, as we saw. More than that: This use of paideia or mathemata was discussed in Epicurean circles, as Philodemus tells us in a treatise, where we learn about a group of Epicureans who defended this approach of handling poetry and traditional paideia (mathemata) against other Epicureans who seem to have taken Epicurus’ critical remarks literally.313 We do not know what Epicurus’ position really was, but it is easy to see that both positions, the critical and the more liberal one, can be defended on Epicurean grounds. Philodemus could refer to Epicurus when speaking of literature as a means to achieving happiness, in reading Homer for instance, as he does in De bono rege. Philodemus even explains in his texts why and how poetry indeed can serve as a servant to philosophy in support of philosophical arguments. He regards literature as useful, not as a didactic, but as a psychagogic means.314 This discussion amongst Epicureans in the 1st century BC may form the background of the learned Epicureanism of, for instance, Torquatus – and there are other learned Epicureans we know of from that time – and might explain to some extent why the Epicurean Lucretius decided to propagate Epicurean physiologia in poetical form. In fact, I shall argue that this ‘development’ within Epicureanism sets the scene for the Lucretian use of traditional elements of education like poetry to propagate Epicurean philosophy. I shall also suggest that Lucretius too illustrates methods applied by other Epicureans such as Philodemus, justifying the use of poetical language in a philosophical context.

5. Lucretius’ Poetry as a Servant to Philosophy: ancilla philosophiae So let us turn now to Lucretius and try to understand the very existence of his poem against the background of the debate about the relation between poetry and philosophy within the Epicurean tradition as sketched so far. In fact, or so I suggest, seen in that context, Lucretius’ professed reasons for

313 314

Cf. ANGELI 1988: 50–61. Cf. WIGODSKY 1995: 65–68.

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using poetry to propagate Epicurean teachings can be highlighted. This is true, for instance, of his famous honey cup simile,315 which he specifically uses to explain why he has chosen poetry as a medium for conveying his teachings and how poetic form relates to its philosophical content. To quote Lucretius: but as with children, when physicians try to administer rank wormwood, they first touch the rims about the cups with the sweet yellow fluid of honey, that unthinking childhood be deluded as far as the lips, and meanwhile may drink up the bitter juice of wormwood […] so now do I: since this doctrine commonly seems somewhat harsh to those who have not used it […] I have chosen to set forth my doctrine to you in sweet-speaking Pierian song, and as it were to touch it with the Muses’ delicious honey […].316

The Epicurean philosopher as doctor and philosophical teaching as medicine – this sounds familiar to us as a typically Epicurean approach. But poetry as delusion, deceiving children and persuading them to drink the bitter medicine, is new and describes well what Lucretius is up to. In his poem, he compares people – meaning Memmius and the common reader – who are afraid of natural phenomena, of the gods and of death, to children, who must be taught the Epicurean doctrine in order to get rid of their childish fear.317 One can read this simile as Lucretius’ defence of poetry, turning Plato’s accusation of delusion into something positive as well as an answer to Epicurus’ rejection of poetry as a destructive lure (delear) of myths on the grounds that it deceives the hearer into accepting false tales.318 Lucretius appears to recognise that poetry usually functions as a lure but can and should fulfil the opposite function: his philosophical poetry does not destroy but rather restore his powers.319 For Lucretius stresses that poetry not only can distract the hearer but also attract his attention. His poetry indeed does draw the reader’s attention to the important teachings of Epicurean medicine, which does not embrace traditional myth but rather Epicurean critique of it. In

315 316 317 318 319

Cf. Lucr. 1.936–50; 4.11–25. Lucr. 1.935–947 (trans. ROUSE 2006). Cf. ERLER 2003a. Cf. Epicur. fr. 229 Us. Cf. ASMIS 2016.

5. Lucretius’ Poetry as a Servant to Philosophy: ancilla philosophiae

addition, Lucretius’ poetry offers a rational explanation of how the world around us functions, i. e. physiologia (naturae species ratioque). It also makes abundantly clear that Lucretius does wish to use poetical language and forms, indeed the lure of poetry, as a stimulus, a stimulus for philosophy and rational argument, capable of helping to free the reader from fear. In other words, Lucretius employs poetical forms as a tool for or servant to philosophy (ancilla philosophiae). This is what Lucretius illustrates in presenting the honey simile, and this is what Epicurus practises in his own treatises and sayings. When Lucretius borrows poetic passages from other sources, he acts as a learned poet (poeta doctus) in the manner of a Hellenistic poet playing with references to poetical traditions and thereby trying to introduce innovations. But as an Epicurean philosopher, Lucretius also follows the Epicurean philosophical programme of subordinating literary educational material in favour of philosophical enlightenment: to free men from fear and pain. Thus, when Lucretius claims to be moved by the desire to emulate Epicurus as his philosophical hero,320 he does so in terms of the content of his own philosophical message. But in a way he also follows Epicurus’ practice when using traditional media like poetical language as a ‘servant’ to transmit the philosophical message. That is why Lucretius feels justified in making use of poetical tropes, but, like the honey simile, he subordinates it to helping the reader to swallow the bitter medicine.321 Lucretius takes pride in the novelty of his poetry claiming to be gathering new flowers and stepping grounds hitherto untouched by human foot, carried away by love of the Muses.322 Of course, he is not really the first to write didactic poetry, but he seems to have been the first (primus) to write an Epicurean didactic poem, which, in fact, was not favoured by Epicurus. But we have seen that he was not altogether against it either. In this respect Lucretius’ position might be called unorthodox. But one should not forget that he decided to write an Epicurean poem at a time when the use of elements of traditional education and of literature in order to promote Epicurean teachings was widely discussed among Epicureans.

320 321 322

Cf. Lucr. 3.5–6. Cf. VOLK 2002: 95; Lucr. 1.931–940. Cf. Lucr. 1.925–930.

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Thus one might say: Lucretius’ ‘innovation’ in using paideia and especially poetic language as a means to present philosophical doctrines, i. e. to use it as vehicle or ancilla of philosophy, is by no means novel within the Epicurean tradition. This should warn us against calling Lucretius an unorthodox Epicurean for that reason only. What is new is that he does not use poetical language merely to formulate one or two isolated sentences but that he wrote a whole poem, a didactic poem in the service of philosophy. Thus one should say that Lucretius is indeed primus in that he tests the limits set within the Epicurean tradition with regard to poetry. And we should realise that the Epicurean tradition is more flexible than often claimed.

6. In the Service of paideia: How it was used and to what End So far we have discussed Lucretius’ decision to use poetry as a means to expound Epicurean views in a traditional way. It is innovative only as far as the chosen genre – didactic poetry – is concerned. I now wish to draw our attention to the fact that in his poem Lucretius applies and illustrates methods which help to understand better why the use of literature even in an Epicurean context is justified. For it is helpful that, in addition to dogmatic instruction, in his poem Lucretius offers methodical guidance to the reader on how to make use of texts in order to put them in service of Epicurean philosophy.323 I would like to draw your attention to two methods which, I think, are of great interest for our topic: one method is called epilogismos (calculation) and the other I suggest to call the aphorme (starting point) method. Both methods can help to explain why an Epicurean should and could read prose and poetic literature as tools for philosophical instruction. Philodemus discusses both methods in his treatises, and Lucretius illustrates them in two passages of his poem, as I shall try to show in what follows. I shall refer to the last part of Book IV, where Lucretius discusses the definition and disadvantages of love. I shall argue that this famous diatribe against love is bet-

323

Cf. ERLER 1997a: 88.

7. Two Methods: epilogismos and aphorme

ter understood if one reads it with a view to the epilogismos method. The other passage is at the very end of Book VI, which is also the end of the poem: the famous description of the plague which hit Athens during the Peloponnesian War. This second passage is clearly an interpretation of the famous description of the Athenian plague by the historian Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War. In the finale of Book VI, Lucretius not only analyses men’s behaviour when confronted with disaster (an aspect of the passage often discussed). But it should also be recognised that this passage is an example of the application of the aphorme method in a philosophical context. I shall try to show that in both passages, the one about love and the other about the plague, Lucretius offers the reader the opportunity to test the knowledge gained through reading the poem while demonstrating how, according to him and the Epicureans, paideia might function as an ancilla philosophiae in an Epicurean context.

7. Two Methods: epilogismos and aphorme So let us recall first what Philodemus has to tell us about why reading and interpreting texts can be beneficial. As we have already noted above, Philodemus often refers to passages of poetry in his treatises in order to illustrate his position or to offer examples he is defending or rejecting. He also offers a philosophical explanation and legitimation of why it is useful to do so. The most interesting in these respects are the treatises De bono rege (On the Good King) and De ira (On Anger).324 In the treatise De bono rege, Philodemus wishes to explain, amongst other things, what it means to be a good ruler. Philodemus argues that Homer hates war and strife, and demands that the ruler should try to avoid war and get rid of desire for strife. Although the Homeric hero does not have to avoid war by all means, he nevertheless is – or so Philodemus argues – expected to strive for clemency, just as a father does. Philodemus, it seems, interprets Homer in such a way as to presuppose that the Homeric hero has to behave in a rather un-Homeric manner. According to Philodemus, Homer propagates that rulers should try to avoid

324

Cf. DORANDI 1982.

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war and to get rid of desire for strife.325 This is a remarkable approach in view of what can be read in Homer’s Iliad, which in fact mirrors the agonistic attitude of the heroes as members of an aristocratic society. Philodemus, it seems, defends a moralising reading of Homeric epic.326 Philodemus is obviously reading Homer in search of moral examples of good or bad behaviour. He therefore is trying to identify passages in Homer which he thinks can be used as ‘starting points’ (aphormai) to dwell on, concerning questions about how one behaves morally from an Epicurean point of view. He wishes to ascertain whether the text allows for agreement with his Epicurean convictions. If it does, the text is used to legitimate the Epicurean position; if not, it is criticised along Epicurean lines. And that is just what Philodemus is arguing for at the end of De bono rege concerning ‘starting points’ that the readers may take from Homer’s text for the correction of their own behaviour and their own improvement.327 That is to say, Philodemus obviously identifies what he calls starting points (aphormai) which, he believes, Homer offers to the reader in order to improve his or her wisdom and to live a happy life. Poetry, he argues, contains starting points, which contain ethical precepts helping to distinguish good from bad and therefore are beneficial for the reader. That is to say: Philodemus suggests that poets should be read in order to guide the reader’s soul. The use of starting points as a means to ‘correct’ the reader (epanorthosis) is as such a reader-oriented method allowing to decontextualise passages to interpret them according to one’s own philosophical orientation. This use can be observed in the Epicurean tradition, but in other philosophical schools as well. It seems to me that the expression aphormen labein (to take up starting points) stands for a tradition of philosophical hermeneutics, an interpretatio medicans, which can be traced back to rhetoric too, and is of importance for a better understanding of how the Epicureans made use of literature. Philodemus, for instance, obviously regards literature as a reservoir of material and exempla to explore human behaviour with the aim of evaluating it

325 326 327

Cf. Phld. Hom. col. XXIX, 6 f. Dorandi. Cf. Phld. Hom. col. XLIII, 16 ff.; Col. XXII, 36 f. Dorandi; ERLER 1992: 185 f. Cf. ASMIS 1991: 20; ERLER 2015c: 113–128.

7. Two Methods: epilogismos and aphorme

morally.328 Philodemus’ remark in De bono rege about Telemachus is telling: “Let Telemachos be an exemplum for us”.329 To read books to be educated morally by examples of good behaviour is acceptable for Epicureans. For that kind of reading, say, Homer is not only entertaining but even useful.330 It is here that the second Epicurean method comes into play – the socalled epilogismos. This procedure consists precisely of putting examples before one’s eyes in order to evaluate one’s own behaviour and the emotions accompanying it. In his treatises, Philodemus explains that this so-called epilogismos is a kind of survey of phenomena helping to recognise similarities between them and to draw inferences on that basis. In their works, Lucretius or Philodemus confront us with people who are in love or angry and at the same time describe the sufferings and dangers which follow from these emotions,331 which enables them to assess (epilogizesthai) the nature of true or good nature and the evil nature of emotions like love or anger affecting their behaviour. The similarities of the symptoms and their consequences serve as indicators on the basis of which one can draw inferences about one’s disposition and evaluate the emotion involved. For instance, a person who feels anger must perceive the evils or the good things that accompany this emotion in order to evaluate this emotion, because – as Philodemus argues – the chief cause of the dismissal lies in our perceiving their intensity and the mass of evils they contain and bring along with them.332

Now, just because literature can be regarded as a reservoir of types of emotions and illustrations of the behaviours resulting from those emotions, it can help to evaluate these emotions and, consequently, to live a better life. For, according to Epicurean teaching, any action which is initiated by someone is connected to a visualisation or picture of the object one is striving for.333 As Philodemus seems to imply, it does not matter whether the material used is

328 329 330 331 332 333

Cf. TSOUNA 2007: 204–208; SCHROEDER 2004. Cf. Phld. Hom. col. XXII, 36 Dorandi. Cf. ERLER 2003b; ASMIS 1984: 177 f.; SCHOFIELD 1996. Cf. Phld. Ir. col. IV, 4 ff. Phld. Ir. col. VI, 13–22 (transl. FISH 2004). Cf. Lucr. 4.881–885; cf. FRISCHER 1982: 81 f.

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drawn from real life or from literature.334 The visualisation of right or wrong behaviour of heroes, for instance in Homer, helps the reader to clarify the quality of his or her own emotions as illustrated in the text and his or her actual emotion as well. That is one reason why Epicureans deem literature useful even in the study of philosophy. It is a method which was practised by other authors in different philosophical contexts as well. Plutarch’s moral treatises, for instance,335 offer quite a lot of examples and reflections about how to make use of this method and to what end.

8. Lucretius, De amore Now, let us pause for a moment and recapitulate: We have identified two methods which the Epicureans – not only Philodemus – applied to reading poetical or prose texts written by others: the aphorme method, which allows to select passages and interpret them along the lines of the Epicurean interpreter with a view to philosophical well-being, and the epilogismos, which allows the reader to make judgments about, for instance, emotions by analysing the effects these have on one’s behaviour. As I claimed earlier, both methods help to understand better two passages in Lucretius’ poem De rerum natura, the diatribe against love at the end of Book IV and the famous description of the Athenian plague at the end of Book VI. Let us focus on the diatribe against love in Book IV of De rerum natura first;336 in this diatribe Lucretius describes the passion of love and tells the reader why, in his view, traditional love as sexual desire often is not helpful for gaining true pleasure (voluptas) in the sense of Epicurus. He discusses the question of how to deal with love and how to tell false – i. e. unnatural – from true – i. e. natural – love. Lucretius interprets love as a projection of an erroneous judgment on a person, and he claims that here the root of human error and unhappiness is to be discovered. Lucretius is teaching us how to free ourselves from the distorting addition of fanciful opinions about love,

334 335 336

Cf. ASMIS 1984: 203 f. Cf. Plu. De gar. 511; ERLER 2013; INGENKAMP 1971. Cf. Lucr. 4.1037–1057; 1058–1287; BROWN 1987: 60 ff.; 180 ff.; KENNEY 2007.

8. Lucretius, De amore

which amount to what could be called romantic love. Lucretius assumes that the revelation of the real nature of love will conduce to rational behaviour and peace of mind. It is striking that the very structure of this much discussed passage reflects the epilogismos method.337 Small wonder, one should think, since what Lucretius does in this passage is to define the emotion of ‘love’ as something negative by drawing attention to its consequences. And he describes these consequences by making use of different literary sources such as Greek comedy or Greek love epigrams as subtexts. The depreciation of love forms part of the main theme of Book IV, namely how to deal with images and how to evaluate them correctly. Images do play an essential role in the act of loving, but they are also responsible for wrongly assuming that, for instance, you could romantically become one with the loved person. The attack on the passion of love falls into two halves. First, love is reduced to its physical dimension338 and, quite strictly, to a mechanical process. The depiction of love and its reduction to physical processes ends with the remark: “This is our Venus; from this also comes love’s name”.339 According to Lucretius, Venus stands for nothing but sexual desire. This physiological analysis of love serves as a basis for the second part of the discussion of love, where Lucretius criticises faulty evaluations of love, describes consequences of this mistaken evaluation, and gives advice on how to deal with this passion. Now, it is interesting to see that the whole passage about love illustrates the Epicurean method of epilogismos, because the rather sketchy definition of love, reducing love to physical processes,340 is the basis for an appropriate evaluation of that affect, which is meant to help to reject wrong ideas concerning the ‘passion of love’.341 In doing so, it helps to avoid irritations and wrong behaviour resulting from misunderstanding. For next to the definition of love, a second part follows, in which Lucretius criticises love by describing the consequences following from a wrong understanding

337 338 339 340 341

Cf. ERLER 1997a: 85 f. Cf. Lucr. 4.1037 ff. Lucr. 4.1058: haec Venus est nobis; hinc autemst nomen amoris (trans. ROUSE 2006). Cf. Lucr. 4.1037–1057. Cf. Lucr. 4.1073–1120.

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of what love really is. According to Lucretius, wrong behaviour, illusions and misfortune do not stem from the emotion of love itself, but from a wrong – i. e. romantic – understanding of this emotion. Now, of course, the purpose of this passage and the method applied in it – i. e. the epilogismos – is not simply a definition. Both the outlining account and the description of the consequences have a therapeutic purpose: the correct understanding of amor. It also becomes obvious that Lucretius often makes use of Greek and Roman texts, namely from Greek comedy, Greek and Roman elegy, from satire and the diatribe tradition, from Theocritus or Catullus in order to collect material for examples of wrong behaviour.342 That is so say: Lucretius draws on Greek and Roman literature to subordinate it to a philosophical aim. He applies here the method of epilogismos. In doing so, Lucretius proves to be a poet who has a vast command of literature, but also a philosopher who, like Philodemus, is able to make use of Epicurean methods like the epilogismos in order to disqualify the emotion of love on the ground that it makes ataraxia impossible.

9. Lucretius, The Plague We have seen that the method of epilogismos helps to understand why Epicureans are eager to use poetry as a reservoir of exempla and experiences for philosophical purposes. The ‘aphorme method’, which explains how and to what end one should read poetry and literature in general, is – or so I shall argue – illustrated by the famous description of the plague343 at the end of the poem De rerum natura. This passage has often been discussed.344 I only wish to add a footnote, which concerns the method applied. ‘The plague’ is one of the passages in his poem where Lucretius clearly refers to a certain subtext, in this case a prose text, Thucydides’ description of the plague in Athens in the second book of his History of the Peloponnesian War,345 which

342 343 344 345

Cf. BROWN 1987: 180. Cf. Lucr. 6.1138–1286. Cf. ERLER 1994: 429; GALE 1994: 112 f.; 225 ff. Cf. Th. 2.47–54.

9. Lucretius, The Plague

was well known to the Romans as well. The actual purpose of the passage in Lucretius’ poem is disclosed only by a close analysis and comparison of both texts. If one compares both texts, one realises that Lucretius interprets Thucydides by picking up ‘starting points’ which he supposed would prompt the reader to develop philosophical reflections based on Epicurean doctrines. In short, Lucretius applied the very approach we found in Philodemus’ reading of Homer as it becomes manifest when analysing his treatise De bono rege. Without being able to go into greater detail here, I would like to suggest that Lucretius’ depiction of the plague constitutes an example of Epicurean moral reading of a classic text.346 To the readers, who will have been fully instructed in Epicurean philosophy at the end of the poem, it also gives the chance to test their philosophical knowledge. For they are requested – so to speak – to understand that Lucretius interpreted the Thucydidean subtext about the plague along Epicurean lines and that this is not just a literary ‘game’, but a philosophical test of whether the reader is able to apply the Epicurean teachings, which he or she has acquired, even in a dangerous situation. Lucretius describes the plague347 and its impact on human behaviour in the event of persons having a wrong, i. e. un-Epicurean, opinion about what death is, that is, if they believe that death does mean anything to them and is to be avoided by all means. If one compares the Thucydidean and the Lucretian descriptions, it becomes clear that in De rerum natura the description of the plague emphasises the emotions, while in Thucydides the description appears to be ‘objective’ and seems to be written almost with a clinical distance.348 That is, Lucretius is not so much interested in the terrible disaster itself as in human behaviour in the face of it.349 When, for example, Thucydides speaks of people quarrelling in front of their relatives’ funeral pyres or of losing their fear of god and neglecting the rites – in short, when he speaks of the collapse of civilisation, he sums it all up under the expression ‘result of fear of death’, which has shown its effect

346 347 348 349

Cf. ERLER 1997: 82 ff. Cf. Lucr. 6.1138 ff. Cf. COMMAGER 1971. Cf. ERLER 1997: 84.

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on human behaviour. Thucydides pursues a didactic strategy, too.350 By describing the symptoms of the plague, he intends the reader to take precautionary measures for similar cases in the future. In Lucretius, however, the focus is not so much on the medical phenomenon as on human behaviour in the face of that phenomenon. It is not about defeating a disease but about educating the reader by visualisation of human behaviour in view of the disaster.351 Human beings have to change their behaviour when confronted with the inexorable. This is what Epicurus demands repeatedly. In short, Lucretius demonstrates what makes reading a classic beneficial for contemporary Epicureanism: to make use of starting points or passages in the text which he reads along the lines of Epicurean doctrines and intentions.352 Lucretius himself read and wants us to read Thucydides’ passage about the plague for moral instruction, just as Philodemus read Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, as his treatise De bone rege shows.

10. Conclusion: Orthodoxy and Innovation, again So let us come to a conclusion: We have tried to show that traditional education (paideia) did play a role in the Epicurean tradition despite Epicurus’ scepticism. Of course, there are fragments which seem to signal that Epicurus might see an antinomy between paideia or poetry and philosophy. For instance, Epicurus was said to have avoided citations from prose as well as from poetry in his writings. But whoever reads his Letter to Menoeceus, Kyriai Doxai or Vatican Sayings will recognise that this is just not true. There are many examples of quotations and allusions that not only recognise the wisdom of poets, but also show his intention to use, transform and integrate it into his writings. Epicurus’ own practice suggests that it is too extreme to call the relation between Epicurean philosophy and paideia an antinomy. We also have seen that the Epicureans applied a method which explains why they thought it useful to read literary texts in prose and poetry as illustrations of good or bad behaviour (the epilogismos) and that they practised a method

350 351 352

Cf. RECHENAUER 1991: 226 ff. Cf. ERLER 2003b: 158–162; cf. Th. 2.49.7 f. and Lucr. 6.1208–1212. Cf. ERLER 2015c.

10. Conclusion: Orthodoxy and Innovation, again

of interpreting texts (the aphorme method) in order to free other readers from irritation, i. e. they practised an interpretatio medicans as part of their philosophia medicans. I finally tried to argue that Lucretius illustrates and applies both methods in his poems. One therefore should at least hesitate to call Lucretius an unorthodox Epicurean just because he composed poetry. He might be unorthodox for his choice of writing a didactic poem. But his unorthodoxy does not mean that he does not observe traditional elements like, for instance, the subordination of poetry to philosophy, which Epicurus himself practised. To call Lucretius an unorthodox Epicurean therefore might be an oversimplification. For, again, Epicurean orthodoxy seems to regard as acceptable to include a certain flexibility, leaving room for innovations, which are legitimate as long as they can be explained by what Epicurus said or what he practised.353 There is a balance between the tradition of ‘orthodox’ teachings and innovation in the sense that the Epicureans adapted to new Roman contexts, where paideia was of great importance, or that they creatively reacted to philosophical challenges from competing schools. Within the Epicurean tradition, a propensity arose to make distinctions that can be characterised as innovative, albeit a kind of innovation that is firmly rooted in the Epicurean doctrinal system and which can be understood in effect as the development of an Epicurean potential. This flexibility allowed Epicureanism to survive in different and not friendly contexts like the Roman or even the Christian world. This I am going to show in the last chapter.

353

Cf. ERLER 2011a: 22–26; ERLER 1992: 171–200.

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1. Innovation and Orthodoxy: Epicurean Practical Philosophy and Roman mores “But for my own part, it was Greek to me”.354 Servilius Casca’s reaction in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar when he learns that Cicero had said something in Greek while Caesar was offered a crown, describes well the feelings of many Romans when they were confronted with the teachings of the Epicurean tradition in the first century BC. In fact, most of the Romans understood this philosophical school as a kind of a provocation.355 Small wonder, one should say. For the main teachings of this school – that the gods do not care for men, that the soul is mortal, atomistic physics in general, the doctrine that pleasure is all that men are looking for, that paideia is merely a means to gain happiness – all this does not seem to fit well into the Roman world view and the values Romans cherished most. The words with which the father of the poet Horace addressed his promising young son show – at least at first sight – that philosophy did play a minor role in the Roman context. According to Horace’s Satire 1, his father told him: The philosopher may tell you the reasons what is better to be avoided, and what to be pursued. It is sufficient for me, if I can preserve the morality traditional from my forefathers [traditum ab antiquis morem], and keep your life and reputation inviolate, so long as you stand in need of a guardian: As soon as age shall have strength-

Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, 376 f. Cf. ERLER 2012b; MOMIGLIANO 1941; FERRARY 1988; ERLER 1994: 363–380; MALITZ 2012; ERLER 1994: 289–343; RAWSON 1985.

354 355

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ened your limbs and mind, you will swim without cork. In this manner he formed me, as yet a boy: and whether he ordered me to do any particular thing, You have an authority, boy, for doing this; then he instanced some one out of the select magistrates.356

The words ‘preserve the traditional morality from my forefathers [Traditum ab antiquis morem servare] as servant of tradition [ancilla traditi moris] as it were’ describe well the role the Romans attributed to philosophy.357 The Romans were obviously less interested in metaphysics and in the search for truth. They rather hoped for useful advice and help in life, as Cicero says in the Tusculan Disputations: O philosophy, thou guide of life, o thou explorer of virtue and expeller of vice! Without thee what could have become not only of me but of the life of man altogether?358

What all the Romans hoped for – basically – was – or so it seems – good advice in practical ethics, i. e. to learn how to live well. In fact, the Romans seemed to expect from philosophy the confirmation of what they already knew: that the basic rules that had been handed down to them by tradition – the mores – really would provide a successful life and therefore should be the moral guide of every Roman. This is exactly the reason why the Roman Seneca praises a group of intellectuals – the Sextii – as true Roman philosophers on the grounds that they were doing philosophy in Greek words but following Roman traditions.359 This statement indeed confirms what the Romans thought philosophers should do: discuss ethical problems and search for truth along the lines of Roman mores in order to perhaps explain and understand better what tradition teaches a Roman patriot. In Cicero’s De natura deorum, the pontifex maximus Cotta argues from the perspective of an academic sceptic.360 When accused of self-contradiction, he hastens to concede that in the end he, of course, would follow the authority of religious

356 357 358 359 360

Hor. Sat. 1.4.115 ff. (trans. SMART 1836). Cf. ERLER 1997b: 539. Cic. Tusc. 5.5 (trans. KING 1960). Cf. Sen. epist. 59.7: Graecis verbis, Romanis moribus philosophantem. Cf. Cic. ND 3.5.

1. Innovation and Orthodoxy: Epicurean Practical Philosophy and Roman mores

tradition and not the results of philosophical argumentations. Cotta obviously had no problem with being both a sceptic philosopher and a Roman priest. Interestingly, we also know of other priests who at the same time belonged to the Epicurean tradition. It seems that the philosophical orientation did not matter as long as the official rules were obeyed. This might be one reason why – as we learn from many sources – Epicureanism cropped up in a variety of Roman contexts in the first century BC361 and why it was of some influence in the upper class of Roman society at that time, as, for instance, the dialogues of the Greek writer Plutarch show, who describes conversations of important Roman figures of the 1st and 2nd century AD.362 This observation disproves as groundless the common notion that Epicurus was successful only with the lower classes of Roman society because of his teachings’ apparent populist appeal to human weakness. Epicurus’ teachings reached the ruling classes of the early Principate just as well as they had done so already with the upper society of the Republic. One reason, and not the least for this, lies in the fact that Epicurus’ teachings could be tapped according to one’s own need and the way one has planned one’s own life without having to commit oneself to a whole philosophical system. This attitude, already put into practice to some extent by Cicero and Horace, and later by the Christians or Platonists of the imperial era, supported the circulation of Epicurean thought and left its traces in some surprising contexts. What also contributed to this dissemination was the fact that Epicurus’ own way of life had lent authenticity to his teachings, in particular to his ethics, and impressed followers and opponents alike. Epicurus’ practical ethics, the range of techniques he had to offer for a life ruled by the principles of reason, were appreciated even by those who sharply rejected his materialistic physics and theology. Clearly, the Epicurean understanding of philosophy as a therapy (philosophia medicans), assisting in the practical management of life and the acquisition of knowledge, suited the Romans’ practical understanding of philosophy. Cicero and Horace, for instance, did expect help from philosophy for a good life. Cicero praises Socrates because “Socrates

361 362

Cf. SEDLEY 2009: 29–45. Cf. ERLER 2009a: 50 f.; ROSKAM 2007.

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[…] was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens and set her in the cities of men, also into their homes and compel her to ask questions about life and morality, and things good and evil”.363 Horace’s letter to Lollius shows that Horace read poetry and philosophical books for the same reason – in order to look for philosophical advice: While you, great Lollius, declaim at Rome, I at Praeneste have perused over again the writer of the Trojan war; who teaches more clearly, and better than Chrysippus and Crantor, what is honorable, what shameful, what profitable, what not so. If nothing hinders you, hear why I have thus concluded.364

Texts of poets and of philosophers obviously were read not only to entertain the recipient, but also – and more importantly – to serve the readers’ recreation.365 Poets provide the readers with a disposition that enables them to handle difficult situations in life. That, of course, matches exactly what the Epicureans and their doctrine offered and what their writings were trying to achieve. Thus it is fitting and of great interest that Philodemus, the Epicurean writer who served as a teacher to Piso Caesoninus in Herculaneum in the 1st century BC, in his writings obviously focuses on questions of practical ethics and not on Epicurean fundamentals like physics. After all – as we learn from Cicero – physics or natural philosophy (physiologia) is not what Romans at that time were mainly interested in.366 For it has to be admitted that Lucretius’ De rerum natura was not so much a success in antiquity for its wonderful verses than rather for its philosophical content. On the other hand, it has to be said that, despite all the discrepancies between Epicurean teachings and Roman tradition or mores, one can observe that in some respects Epicurean teachings seem to try to adapt to the Roman context. This might come as a surprise because most handbooks on Epicurus tell us that the Epicurean tradition is characterised by dogmatism and orthodoxy. According to ancient – and modern – interpreters, the Epicureans

363 364 365 366

KING 1960: 435; cf. Cic. Tusc. 5.10. Hor. Ep. 1.2.1–10 (trans. SMART 1872). Cf. Hor. Ep. 1.1.36 f. Cf. SEDLEY 2005: 63–68.

1. Innovation and Orthodoxy: Epicurean Practical Philosophy and Roman mores

lean on canonical texts and are loyal to their teachers and especially to their master Epicurus – let it suffice to recall the cult of Epicurus – and of other authorities in the Garden, like Metrodorus, Hermarchus and Polyaenus, the so-called ‘great men’ (hoi andres).367 It is true, of course, that the Epicureans were striving for continuity and orthodoxy and always traced their opinions back to the founding text. According to Seneca, all Epicureans say the same.368 Philodemus considered that contradicting the authority of Epicurean texts was parricide369 and the later Platonist Numenius370 described the Epicurean tradition as a state (politeia) without stasis, i. e. without revolution. But as we have already seen, the description of Epicureanism as following a rigid orthodox tradition is a modern – and ancient – prejudice. We already pointed to the use of literature and paideia and to the way in which a later Epicurean like Philodemus laid his focus on practical ethics.371 We also learn that later Epicureans recognised the importance of geometry. It seems to me that the focus the Epicureans put on ethical problems in the 1st century BC and their emphasis on practical aspects, that is the reduction of Epicurean teachings to an Epicurus dimidiatus (“Epicurus cut in half”) did help Epicurean teaching to become part of the philosophical tradition accepted by many people in Rome, to influence literature, including Christian writers, and to retain its significance as a stepping-stone and mental preparation for philosophical instruction in the curriculum of the Neoplatonists (praeparatio philosophica).372 In fact, recent research has pointed to the fact that there existed dissident Epicureans and that differences and even innovations can be observed within the Epicurean tradition.373 There are even parallels between the Platonic and the Epicurean tradition with regard to both innovation and conservativism in the interpretation of the works of the two founding fathers. In Cf. ERLER 1994: 126–170. Cf. Sen. epist. 33.4: Apud istos quidquid Hemarchus dixit, quidquid Metrodorus, ad unum refertur; cf. ERLER 1992. 369 Cf. Phld. Rh. 1, col. 7, 18–28 Longo Auricchio. 370 Cf. Numenios fr. 24, 22 ff. des Places. 371 Cf. ch. 5. 372 Cf. ERLER 1999b; for Plotinus cf. LONGO/TAORMINA 2016; O’MEARA 1999. 373 Cf. ANGELI 1988: 82 ff. 367 368

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the Platonic tradition, for instance, an innovative figure like Plotinus374 denies any inclination to originality. He sees himself as a mere exegete of Plato. Like Philodemus, the most important Platonist of imperial times, Plotinus, is convinced that the desire to bring forth something utterly new and idiosyncratic (kainotomein) constitutes a ‘mortal sin’. Instead, he is concerned with demonstrating that both his own outlook and that of Plato are in agreement with each other, and to refer to everything that could be regarded by others as new or original with regard to Plato’s doctrines. Any Epicurean could have said something similar. Like the Platonists’ tendency of referring back to Plato (anagein) whenever they wished to propose views of their own, the later Epicurean practice described by Seneca as referre ad unum should not be understood in purely negative terms. Genuinely original contributions are permissible if they are in accord with the master’s doctrine.375 In this last chapter, we shall discuss further examples of this kind of development or adaption within Epicurean teaching, which, I think, was not only supportive of the integration of Epicureans into the world of Roman thinking, but also contributed to the survival of Epicurean teachings well beyond antiquity. One of the examples concerns the Epicurean view on oeconomia and wealth and how it should be used; the other concerns the question of how intellectual improvement and mental progress (prokope) can be achieved. I shall refer to Philodemus’ treatise De bono rege (On the Good King), where he interprets Homer’s Odyssey and especially Telemachus’ search for his father as an educational journey. In connection with his remarks on travelling in De morte, I shall suggest, Philodemus’ interpretation contributes to an ongoing debate in Rome about the right understanding of educational travelling. Finally, I will discuss how Epicurus was seen by some Christian authors like Augustine, and shall – as an outlook – point to the positive role Epicurus’ ethics, as well as his physics, began to play in the Renaissance. These developments may have been caused by philosophical controversies with other Hellenistic schools, especially Stoicism. I suggest however that aspects of intercultural exchanges and the Epicureans’ wish to adapt to new cultural contexts, such as the Roman or the Christian and Pla-

374 375

Cf. Plot. 5.3.17.19–20 Henry-Schwyzer. Cf. ERLER 1993: 296.

2. Epicurean Economics

tonist tradition, which dominated later imperial times, should be taken into account as well.

2. Epicurean Economics Let us begin with our first example, which concerns the Epicurean opinion about wealth and economy and whether it is of importance to achieve a good life.376 Again, Philodemus is helpful, since he deals with this problem in a treatise called De oeconomia or On Household Economics. This treatise, which is preserved on papyri and was edited many years ago,377 offers Philodemus’ view on wealth and focuses on the sources of income in the context of an Epicurean economic theory.378 Philodemus is concerned with the problem as to how one could live the life of a wise man. He considers a great range of occupations which might be suitable for a person who wishes to lead a philosophical life according to Epicurean teachings. The treatise On Economics presupposes that the Epicureans were integrated into the daily lives of the members of a community. It offers a survey of the relationship of an Epicurean with the society he lives in, it examines basic doctrines of Epicurean economics and natural wealth, as well as Philodemus’ own contribution to Epicurean household economics. The basic question is how one can combine the need to earn a living with the option of living as an Epicurean. Epicureans accept natural and limited wealth, which, according to Epicurus, is easy to obtain.379 Much of what Philodemus has to say in the treatise seems to be influenced by the Epicurean Metrodorus.380 In the discussion about sources of income, however, Philodemus indicates that he is speaking in his own voice, which is of great interest for our purpose.381 This third section of the treatise not only assesses Philodemus’ contribution in On Household Economics, but

376 377 378 379 380 381

Cf. ASMIS 2004; BALCH 2004; TSOUNA 1996; LAURENTI 1973. Cf. JENSEN 1906; LAURENTI 1973: 13–185; ERLER 1994: 319 f. Cf. ASMIS 2004: 164. Epicur. Sent. 15. Cf. ASMIS 2004: 149–161. Cf. ERLER 2012b: 81.

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also shows that Philodemus exercises freedom in interpreting the Epicurean position in accordance with a new perspective. Philodemus revises Epicurean economics so that it may suit the circumstances of Roman aristocrats. Of course, Philodemus writes in a long tradition of philosophical investigation in that field. The historical Socrates, for instance, seems to have focused on the moral aspects of household management. Others, like Xenophon, Aristotle or Ps.-Theophrastus seek to combine good moral advice that is consistent with their philosophical principles.382 This aim is shared by Philodemus, who did not privilege the household as a basis for social life. But even within the Epicurean philosophical tradition, Philodemus departed from Epicurus and, perhaps, Metrodorus, too, despite his assurance that he is following them in some respects that are of interest for us. Philodemus’ position towards wealth is more positive. For according to Philodemus, being wealthy is preferable to being poor. E. Asmis explains that Philodemus favours a well-limited wealth, whereas Epicurus offers consolation for poverty.383 This might be regarded as a polemic against the cynic position,384 but it also helps to be accepted by wealthy Roman aristocrats like Piso, who hosted Philodemus. Now, Philodemus is sceptical about making money in different fields like warfare, horsemanship or mining. He also thinks it is not helpful to make money as a working farmer, but – as Philodemus hastens to add – “using other workers if one is a landowner, is appropriate for the good man”.385 This is interesting, since Xenophon had made Socrates say that the life of a farmer is the best life, regardless of whether he works the land himself or has others do this for him; the gentleman farmer, as Socrates says later, supervises others and has time to spend at the agora.386 Philodemus dismisses the life of the working farmer and favours the leisure of a gentleman farmer because he is free from work and from politics. According to Phil-

382 383 384 385 386

Cf. ZOEPFFEL 2006 (with extensive bibliography). Cf. ASMIS 2004: 150; 164. Cf. Epicur. Sent. 15; Sent. Vat. 44; NATALI 1995: 110. TSOUNA 2012: 63; cf. Phld. Oec. col. 23, 7–11 Jensen. Cf. X. Oec. 6.9; ASMIS 2004: 172.

2. Epicurean Economics

odemus, the life of a gentleman farmer is delightful, a leisurely retreat with friends. That is to say: Philodemus offers the reader a ranking of different ways of life, and here the gentleman farmer is only the second-best option. Pride of place takes the philosopher – unsurprisingly, one should think – who imparts words of truth to others who are then grateful. To quote Philodemus again: The first and noblest thing is to receive back thankful gifts with all reverence in return for philosophical discourses shared with men capable of understanding them, as happened to Epicurus.387

Now, although Philodemus believes that the best way of life is that of the philosopher who shares it with others and whose income consists in gratuities for imparting words of truth to other men, he wishes to combine the life of the philosopher and of the farmer, if and only if the latter is guided by a philosopher, is open for philosophy and provides a refuge for people who have the leisure to share the pleasure of philosophy. Obviously, Philodemus envisions a life in which philosophers such as himself share the leisure of Roman landowners. Here for the first time – as far as I and Asmis can see – the occupation of a philosopher is explicitly put in first place as a source of income, which Philodemus euphemistically calls gratitude.388 According to him, the philosopher is living his life not in trying to gain power but in sharing his thoughts with others. Thus, Philodemus solves the dilemma of the Epicurean philosopher, who on the one hand should not engage in business matters, but on the other hand must earn his living somehow, by combining earning a living with doing philosophy. Philodemus’ special emphasis on the lives of the philosopher and of the landowner might be regarded as a reaction to discussions like the one reported by Cicero in De officiis,389 where a catalogue of occupations is evaluated as well and where it is concluded that of all things from which one can gain profit nothing is better than farming. Interpreters have suggested that this conclusion might have been stimulated

387 388 389

Phld. Oec. 23, 23 ff. Jensen (trans. TSOUNA 2012: 65). Cf. ASMIS 2004: 171. Cf. Cic. Off. 1.150 f.; DYCK 1996: 331 ff.

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by Panaetius, whose Stoicism was more moderate and had influenced the Romans greatly; he accepted for instance the value of external goods, of making money, and of the life of a gentleman farmer.390 All this might be true. But it should also be taken into account that Philodemus’ ranking of lives and his combination of the life of the philosopher with that of the gentleman farmer is relevant to Roman society in general and to Philodemus’ personal circumstances in particular. For we know that he was living in the house of his rich friend Piso Caesoninus, enjoying his villa and hosting in turn Epicurean friends. Philodemus’ emphasis on special aspects of practical ethics can be understood as an example of adapting Epicurus’ teachings to the Roman context. It sends a message to the Roman upper class: Philodemus invites them to open their estates to philosophy. And this is exactly what Cicero describes in the settings of his dialogues. Seen in that context, the importance of Philodemus’ emphasis on positive aspects of wealth and on how a philosopher and a gentleman farmer might live together is highlighted. His arguments might be regarded as a response to Stoic positions and a contribution to the philosophical debate of his time. Nevertheless – as I would like to suggest – they also provide a philosophical legitimation for the way of life preferred by members of the Roman upper class – to enjoy leisure as a gentleman farmer and to enrich this life by welcoming philosophical – i. e. Epicurean – discourse. Thus, Philodemus’ defence might be regarded as an example of what philosophy should be in a Roman context, as Horace’s father sees it: an ancilla traditi moris (a servant to tradition).

3. Telemachus’ Travels and Critique of Travelling Another example of a development which could be interpreted as adaptation, or more precisely as critical reaction combined with adaption of Epicurean teaching to the Roman context, is to be found in two of Philodemus’ writings: De bono rege secundum Homerum (The Good Ruler according to Homer), where Philodemus uses the Epicurean concept of progress (prokope) to interpret Homer’s Telemachy, and De morte (On Death), where he discusses the contribution of travelling to happiness. I shall argue that the Epicurean 390

Cf. BRUNT 1973.

3. Telemachus’ Travels and Critique of Travelling

concept of moral progress as illustrated by Telemachus’ educational journey in Homer not only helps to understand better some aspects of Lucretius’ poem but also contributes, in combination with the critique of travelling in De morte, to an ongoing debate in Rome about educational travelling, which, according to the Epicureans, should provide a disposition for living a happy life. 3.1 Telemachy

So let us turn to these two treatises for a moment. Thanks to Jeff Fish’s new reading of a passage in Philodemus’ De bono rege,391 we gain new insights into Philodemus’ praise of the educational value of Telemachus’ journey to Sparta in search of his father (Odyssey Book 4). Just remind yourselves of the fact that in the Odyssey Homer not only recalls the story of Odysseus’ journey to his home on Ithaca twenty years after the Trojan War began. At the beginning of the Odyssey, there is an account of what happened in Ithaca during his absence; it tells the famous story of Penelope, the suitors vying for Penelope’s hand in marriage, and of young Telemachus, who wishes to search for his father and leaves Ithaca for a journey. According to the fragments of De bono rege, Philodemus interprets the Telemachy as an educational journey, which testifies to the moral and intellectual progress of the young man. Philodemus suggests that while travelling, Telemachus experiences a kind of development. If he had stayed at home, Philodemus argues, Telemachus would have remained as “one who has neither seen nor heard of many things and has had no experience of free speech between equals, and in many respects is uneducated”.392 According to Philodemus, Telemachus does not undergo any kind of conversion or change of character during his educational journey; but he gains knowledge about himself and learns from what happens during his travels by solving problems. Both capacities help him to cope with the difficult situation at home.

391 392

Cf. FISH 1999: 71–77; FISH 2004. Phld. col. 23, 14–19 Fish (trans. FISH 1999).

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Philodemus’ interpretation of the Telemachy is remarkable for several reasons. Firstly, it testifies to an interpretation, which, until the reading of the papyrus by Jeff Fish, had only been known thanks to a scholion referring to the Platonic philosopher Porphyry in late antiquity.393 Secondly, Philodemus evidently regards both Telemachus and Odysseus as Epicurean prokoptontes, i. e. as human beings who enjoy moral and intellectual progress.394 The Epicureans indeed believed in the possibility of moral improvement during which one can fashion oneself after the example of good people and is guided by Epicurean teachings. In one of his epistles, Seneca explains that three types of Epicurean prokoptontes are to be distinguished.395 Some very gifted young people (proficientes), who make progress on their own; others are slower and need help; yet others are in need not only of guidance, but also of someone who forces them to become good. This practice of moral improvement – as we learn from the Epicureans – is brought into a system of therapeutic techniques of moral progress. It forms an important part in Epicurean ethical thinking and leads to becoming an Epicurean wise man, who, according to Epicurus (as we have seen in an earlier lecture), can still be affected by emotions, which he is able to deal with properly though.396 Thus, according to Philodemus’ interpretation, Telemachus’ journey is transformed into a metaphor for the education and the educational progress of a young man. Educational progress is expected also of Memmius and of any reader of Lucretius’ poem De rerum natura. This poem describes the instruction of Memmius by a teacher – i. e. Lucretius – as well as the journey of a pupil, i. e. Memmius, towards (Epicurean) knowledge. Memmius’ educational journey is connected to the journey of Epicurus who marched far beyond the boundaries of the world, as Lucretius describes it.397 At first sight, Lucretius’ metaphoric journey language evokes the metaphor of the path of song, which is traditionally used by poets like Homer or Pindar.398 In fact, the motive of 393 394 395 396 397 398

Cf. Scholia in Homeri Odysseam 1.93.284; see FISH 2004: 131. For the concept of progress, see ROSKAM 2005: 2 ff. Cf. Sen. epist. 52.2–5. Cf. D.L. 10.117. Cf. Lucr. 1.1–30. Cf. VOGT 2002: 20–26.

3. Telemachus’ Travels and Critique of Travelling

the poet who is wandering through ‘pathless places’, as Lucretius puts it,399 is pervasive throughout De rerum natura. But the metaphor should also be interpreted in the light of the educational journey, as presented in Philodemus’ reading of the Odyssey. Indeed, the journey motive not only refers to poetry, but also to the learning process of the implicit student, Memmius. It anticipates the process which, hopefully, the reader will undergo. Although we learn from Cicero and others that physics is not what Romans are interested in and although Philodemus acknowledges this lack of interest by focusing on problems of practical ethics in his treatises, Lucretius obviously chose to do otherwise. He teaches Epicurean physics; yet, he teaches Epicurean physics not as an end in itself, but as part of an Epicurean philosophia medicans, which is meant to destroy fear and to provide an attitude of serenity, which is characterised by an Epicurean catchword: mitte mirari.400 In fact, Lucretius discusses physiologia by combining contents of Epicurean teachings with illustrations and explanations that might help the addressee in the text, Memmius, and the reader401 to make use of physiologia as material for meditation and to turn the acquired knowledge into maxims for practical actions in any situation. Lucretius as poeta doctus uses literary elements and the achievements of traditional education to propagate his philosophical message and to offer exercises in order to turn philosophical instruction into an aid for managing one’s life.402 Likewise, he wants to offer starting points, which invite Memmius and the reader to think about Epicurean teachings and to take decisions in certain situations by applying Epicurean principles. Memmius and the reader are regarded as an Epicurean proficiens, physiologia as part of practical philosophy, literary tradition is put to use as part of Epicurean philosophia medicans. I suggest that here again it is worthwhile to interpret characteristics of Lucretius’ poem as an attempt to combine Epicurean philosophy and Roman tradition. The Epicurean concept of a prokopton who learns by gaining knowledge and experience and who is trained to be able to control his emotions is of

399 400 401 402

Cf. Lucr. 1.926 f. Cf. Lucr. 6.489; 6.608; 6.655; CLAY 1983: 260. Cf. CLAY 1983: 212 ff. Cf. ERLER 1997a: 79–92.

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interest in many ways: It is a hermeneutical means for Philodemus to interpret the Telemachy, it sends a message to the Stoics, rivalling their concept of education and moral progress, but also offers a hermeneutical means for reading Lucretius’ poem and for understanding better what happens to the Roman Memmius in that poem, whom Lucretius wishes to introduce into Epicurean physiology. But, as we shall argue, it also contributes to an ongoing discussion among Romans about whether travelling contributes to human happiness. 3.2 Philodemus’ Critique of Travelling (De morte )

This becomes clear if we turn to the other treatise by Philodemus mentioned above, De morte (On Death).403 In this treatise, Philodemus talks about travelling.404 Of course, Philodemus’ focus on the educational aspect of Telmachus’ journey does not do full justice to what Homer is telling us. However, his interpretation becomes clearer with regard to a passage in the treatise where Philodemus doubts its usefulness. Philodemus suggests – very much as Seneca later – that touring other countries is less important for moral progress than for securing a good inner disposition, which allows us to go “about laid out for burial”,405 a metaphor which I have mentioned in an earlier lecture and which suggests that it is wise to be always aware of the fact that death is near but is nothing to us. For all men live “in an unfortified city in relation to death”.406 According to Philodemus, some people react to the fact that death often comes unexpectedly when travelling a lot, “touring Greece and the accessible parts of the non-Greek world”,407 as common people do, but also philosophers who spend many years in Athens, eager for knowledge. However, this behaviour is wrong and does not help, as Philodemus claims. What really helps – or so Philodemus suggests – is not to tour Greece and the

403 404 405 406 407

Cf. HENRY 2009. Cf. Phld. Mort. col. 38, 10–25 Henry. Phld. Mort. col. 38, 16–18 Henry (trans. HENRY 2009). Phld. Mort. col. 37, 27 Henry (trans. HENRY 2009). Phld. Mort. col. 38, 8–10 Henry (trans. HENRY 2009).

3. Telemachus’ Travels and Critique of Travelling

non-Greek world, but to secure what is sufficient for a happy life, to achieve a good inner disposition and to be constantly aware that death is near.408 That is to say – everyone should become an ‘Epicurean traveller’ (or prokopton) like Telemachus during his educational journey. The two passages about travelling, in De morte and in De bono rege, do not contradict each other. Philodemus welcomes travelling if it contributes to a good disposition, i. e. as long as it stands for an Epicurean prokope. This Epicurean reinterpretation and re-evaluation of travelling is interesting in view of an ongoing discussion, to which Seneca and others testify, about the use of travelling for education and the good life.409 He insists that touring Greece and the non-Greek world is, in itself, unimportant. What counts is to secure a good inner disposition, to which travelling in the sense of an educational process contributes. Seneca410 admits that travelling can help to gain a balanced mood. But at the same time, he does not think it makes sense to undertake one journey after another. Rather, he agrees with the analysis of Lucretius when he argues that travelling mostly means to flee from oneself out of fear of death.411 Lucretius and Seneca, in different ways, suggest that it is wise to abstain from the traditional way of travelling; people should strengthen their moral disposition by embarking on a truly educational journey as prokoptontes. So all these authors comment on what was common practice for the jeunesse dorée of the Roman nobility of that time. For travelling to visit famous places in Greece was obligatory for young promising Romans: they crossed the sea only to get acquainted with different countries and customs as Cicero explains in De re publica. Philodemus’ interpretation of Telemachus as an Epicurean educational ‘traveller’ and his critique of travelling in De morte is better understood when seen in this larger context.

408 409 410 411

Cf. ERLER 2011c: 139–142. Cf. Sen. epist. 28. Cf. Sen. dial. 8.5. Cf. Lucr. 3.1053–1075; 3.58–98.

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4. Adaption and utile The discussion about Epicurean oeconomia, education and travelling somehow confirms what we observed about paideia and theology in the earlier chapters. They shed doubt on the assumption that the Epicurean tradition was rigid and orthodox, unchangeable, and therefore tedious to study over the centuries. Epicurus’ claim to originality does not conflict with openness to other viewpoints, and that strict adherence to Epicurus’ doctrinal system precludes neither flexibility nor individual emphases among his followers.412 A passage from Philodemus’ On Household Management (Oeconomicus) offers confirmation. There Philodemus writes: But if we have conceded that some of the propositions advanced by Xenophon and Theophrastus [sc. about household management] are not unworthy of consideration for philosophers too, we must then add them (to our own discussion), as we are more ashamed of dismissing something useful than of borrowing it from others.413

As we have seen, the Epicurean tradition rather proves to be flexible. It is able to react to challenges of philosophical rival schools and is adaptable to different cultural contexts and specific situations, which of course had to be taken into account even by the Epicureans of the first generation after Epicurus, who wished to establish Epicurean teachings as a tradition, and then by their followers, who strove for establishing Epicureanism in a Roman context. I suggest that one always should reckon with the possibility that attempts were made and can be observed of adapting Epicurean teachings to new cultural traditions and environments. Time and again one can recognise that, although sticking to the essentials of their epistemology, physics or theology, the Epicureans proved to be flexible enough in adapting, first to Roman mores and then to new challenges posed by the Christian faith and later Platonic philosophy, especially in practical ethics. This flexibility helped Epicurean teachings survive more than 500 years and it explains why sometimes new aspects were stressed, like the higher estimation of paideia or

412 413

Cf. ERLER 2011a: 22–28. Phld. Oec. col. 27, 12 ff. Jensen (trans. FORTENBAUGH 1992).

5. Convergences with and Divergences from the Christians

moral progress as a commentary on what Romans loved to do, travelling. If one wishes to understand the development within the Epicurean tradition, one should – or so I suggest – take into account not only philosophical reasons per se, but also the need for acculturation. For acculturation contributed to the survival of the Epicurean tradition as well, despite all the theoretical objections it faced and the need to adapt to new cultural contexts.

5. Convergences with and Divergences from the Christians This process of adaption and reception of Epicurean teachings in different contexts could and should be studied through the centuries, which of course cannot be done here. Epicureanism was even able to adapt to the Christian or Neo-Platonic contexts dominating cultural life in imperial times.414 Although it is undeniable that Epicurus’ teachings finally receded into the background with the rise of Neo-Platonism in Late Antiquity and that Augustine asserted in a letter in AD 410 that Stoics and Epicureans would no longer play any part in the schools of rhetoric,415 we can observe that Epicurus’ teachings nevertheless left their mark even then.416 The Neo-Platonists proved their great aptitude for integration even when it came to Epicureanism. To be sure, Epicureanism no longer was the subject of lively debates among Late Antique Platonists. But even then the two strands in the reception of Epicurus which were characteristic for the reception of Epicurean teachings during the early Principate can still be observed: the rejection of fundamental Epicurean doctrines, and a positive appreciation of practical elements of Epicurean ethics – the Epicurus dimidiatus, so to speak. This is also true even in the Christian context. For sure, Epicurus is mostly a target in Christian polemics, and some of the Church Fathers regarded him as an atheist who questioned the world order and providence. On the other hand, Epicureans and Christians were joint allies where resistance to false prophets

Cf. LONGO/TAORMINA 2016; for later philosopher cf. O’MEARA 1999; the testimonies are collected by USENER 1887, reprinted Cambridge 2010. 415 Cf. Aug. Epist. 118.21. 416 Cf. ERLER 2009a: 50 f.; ERLER 2018a: 197–211; 242–249. 414

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and crooked oracles was needed, as in the case of Alexander of Abonoteichus, about whom we read in the writings of Lucian. Not by chance, Alexander’s demand ‘Out with the Christians!’ was complemented by the cry of his followers ‘Out with the Epicureans!’417 Christians and Epicureans were linked to each other by their aversion to pagan superstition although guided by different reasons: The Epicureans were driven by their battle against all forms of religious enthusiasm, while the Christians were led by their conviction that they alone had access to the true faith and the blessed state in the next world. A further instance of convergences, albeit again with different motivations, lay in the fact that Christians and Epicureans alike offered an alternative way of life within their communities, with a view to happiness in this world and the blessed state in the next, respectively. Both groups exposed themselves to the reproach of refusing to engage in public life and the community. In addition, Epicurus as a person was held in positive esteem by the Christians because of the self-restraint allegedly characteristic of his way of life. Some elements of Epicurean doctrine were even occasionally found to be acceptable. The comparison of Epicurean memoirs with the role that the Acts of the Apostles or the saints’ Vitae played in early Christianity provides some interesting results. Despite all the differences, it is often possible to find Epicurean dogmas in the Church Fathers as a starting point for their own deliberations, though without their provenance being acknowledged. In this connection, Augustine is particularly interesting. Epicurus’ teachings are the main target of Augustine’s critique of ancient philosophy. The principal reproach is that Epicurus turns virtues into slaves of carnal desire.418 Other criticisms are directed at Epicurus’ materialism and theology. The main source of Augustine’s knowledge of Epicurus is Cicero, above all De natura deorum, Tusculanae Disputationes and De finibus. He was familiar with Lucretius, as is shown by allusions, expressions of approval, or examples cited. All this at least shows that Epicurus’ teachings belonged to the educational canon, even if they constituted typical examples of a world view to which revelation was denied. Still, Augustine’s attitude remained ambivalent for a long time. He was impressed, like others before him, by

417 418

Cf. Luc. Alex. 17; 25; 28; 61; cf. CLAY 1992. Cf. Aug. Util. cred. 10; Civ. 5.20; Serm. 348.3.

5. Convergences with and Divergences from the Christians

Epicurus’ ethics and his way of life. He even concedes that Epicurus can help in correctly apprehending and dealing with the problems of real life. Augustine himself confesses his initial affinity with Epicurean ideas. After his detachment from the Manichaeans and before his turning to Platonism, Epicurus’ teachings apparently also played a role in his search for theological certainty. Only his own faith about the immortality of the soul had kept him from handing over the palm of victory to Epicurus as he himself says: And I discussed with my friends, Alypius and Nebridius, the nature of good and evil, maintaining that, in my judgement, Epicurus would have carried off the palm if I had not believed what Epicurus would not believe: that after the death there remains a life for the soul, and places of recompense.419

While of course opposing Epicurus’ conviction that the soul is mortal, Augustine finds Epicurus’ hedonism truly attractive, although this – as he concedes – might create fear about possible punishment in the afterlife. He even considers – albeit hypothetically – the possibility of combining both philosophical positions, Epicurus’ hedonism and the Christian belief in the immortality of the soul. For Augustine says explicitly – to quote him again: Suppose we are immortal and live in the enjoyment of perpetual bodily pleasures, and that without any fear of losing – why, then, should we not be fully happy, or why should we search for anything else?420

Later, however, Augustine called this hypothesis an error421 and on many occasions he criticises Epicurus’ teachings, as many other Christians in Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages. But let us conclude our journey following the Epicurean tradition down the centuries. At the beginning of the Renaissance, the combination of Epicurus’ hedonism and Christian belief in the immortality of the soul, which was suggested by Augustine as a hypothesis, was accepted and defended seriously by the great philosopher and philologist Lorenzo Valla in his book De vero falsoque bono or On the True and False Good, which has been called the

419 420 421

Aug. Conf. 6.16 (trans. OUTLER 1960). Aug. Conf. 6.16 (trans. OUTLER 1960). Cf. ERLER 2002c. For the context cf. SCHMID 1962.

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programmatic text of pre-modern hedonism. Valla not only defends this combination, but also brings into play the Christian dogma of resurrection of the body to justify it in a surprising way.422 For he argues that the resurrection of the body (and the hedonistic aspects which go with it – perpetua corporis voluptas –) kind of guarantees and justifies hedonism in human life and the promise of pleasure in the afterlife. In Valla’s work, Augustine’s thought experiment about Epicurean pleasure and the immortal soul becomes the justification for the positive view of the world around us, which is one dominant and characteristic aspect of the Renaissance. Again it can be observed: although the main tenets of Epicurean philosophy, materialism, deism, and mortality of the soul, are rejected, the practical ethics of Epicureanism, the dimidiatus Epicurus (“Epicurus cut in half”) is still appreciated. This ambivalent, by no means altogether negative evaluation of Epicurus found not only in pagan and Christian Late Antiquity, but also throughout the Middle Ages can be observed in Petrarch, Boccaccio and Dante. The latter reveres – as we have also seen at the beginning of this book – Epicurus, the practitioner of practical ethics, in the Convivio.423 This appreciation of the Epicurus dimidiatus – the Epicurus of practical ethics – even seems to justify (as we already pointed out at the beginning of this book) that Epicurus occurs in a painting on the wall of one of the rooms of the Vatican – Raphael’s School of Athens. Only when the Renaissance ended did Epicurus’ practical ethics lose ground and were replaced by a growing interest in Epicurean physics, materialism and atomism in the 17th century. At that time, the Epicurean Lucretius was read not only as a poet, but as an expert in physics, atomism and cosmology. The focus now shifted to the Epicurus physiologus.424 Small wonder, one might say, because we now have reached the age of Copernicus and its discoveries in natural sciences, so that now Epicurean physiologia begins to play an important role. This change of interest is of great importance and has to be taken into account when one tries to understand why Epicureanism gained in importance in the centuries that were to come. However, this has to be kept in mind: one major reason why

422 423 424

Cf. Lorenzo Valla 3.24.5, p. 126, 5 Lorch; cf. ERLER 2004b. Cf. Dante, Convivio III 6, 11 ff.; Inferno X, 13 ff. Cf. WILSON 2009; WILSON 2008; ERLER 2009c.

5. Convergences with and Divergences from the Christians

Epicureanism survived in antiquity and beyond, until the time of Copernicus, was – as I have argued in this book – that the Epicureans themselves focused less on physiologia itself than on problems of practical ethics, being the first to propagate what is called a dimidiatus Epicurus. This Epicurus was often appreciated even in hostile Platonic or Christian contexts – as Raphael’s painting in the Vatican shows. This was one of the theses that I wished to defend in this book.

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Name Index

Agamemnon 88 Ajax 85 Alexander of Abonoteichus 140 Alypius 141 Antipater 70 Apelles 104 Aphrodite 85 Aratus 18 Archilochus 56 Aristoteles 18 Artemis 85, 88 Athena 84 f. Atticus, T. Pomponius 57 Augustine 128, 139–142 Boccaccio, Giovanni 142 Brutus, M. Iunius 61 Caesar, C. Iulius 45, 61, 123 Callicles 17, 64 f. Casca, P. Servilius Longus 123 Cassius, C. Longinus 61 Catullus, C. Valerius 118 Chrysippus 126 Cicero, M. Tullius 37, 48, 57, 83, 105, 123–126, 131 f., 135, 137, 140 Cimon 65 Cleanthes 98 Clemens of Alexandria 30 Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 102

Colotes 61, 73, 75, 77 Copernicus, Nicolaus 142 f. Cotta, C. Aurelius 124 f. Crantor 126 Croesus 25 Dante Alighieri 20 f., 142 Diogenes (the Cynic) 15, 18 Diogenes Laertius 16 Diogenes of Oenoanda 12, 38, 68–73, 75–78 Dionysius 70 Dionysus 24 Echekrates 50 Epictetus 98 Epicurus 9–13, 15–28, 30–35, 37–44, 46–50, 53–61, 63 f., 68, 70–72, 75– 95, 98 f., 101–111, 116, 120 f., 125– 132, 134, 138–143 Euripides 24, 85 Glaucon

75

Hecuba 24 Hera 84 Heracles 24, 80 Heraclitus 15, 74 Hermarchus 41, 76, 127 Herodotus 25, 40

160

Name Index

Hippolytus 85 Homer 80, 82–85, 105, 108 f., 113–116, 119 f., 128, 132–134, 136 Horatius (Horace), Q. Flaccus 18, 23, 27, 44, 123, 125 f., 132 Idomeneus 48, 50 Iphigenia 88 Isocrates 17 Lactantius, L. Caecilius Firmianus 34 Lollius, M. 126 Lucian 140 Lucretius, T. Caro 12, 26 f., 30–33, 37, 39, 46 f., 54–56, 63, 81, 85 f., 88, 90 f., 93–99, 101–103, 109–113, 115–121, 126, 133–137, 140, 142 Memmius, C. 95–97, 102 f., 110, 134– 136 Menander 86 f. Menoeceus 16–18, 22, 25 f., 30, 40, 44, 47, 49, 107, 120 Metrodorus 41, 48, 57, 127, 129 f. Mill, John Stewart 12 Nebridius 141 Numenius 127 Odysseus 133 f. Onesimos 86 Panaetius 132 Parmenides 74 Penelope 133 Pentheus 24 Pericles 65 Petrarch, Francesco 142 Phaedo 39, 49–55

Philodemus 23, 45, 57, 67 f., 84, 88, 91, 94, 97, 102, 106, 109, 112–116, 118– 120, 126–138 Phyrson 54 f. Pindar 134 Piso, L. Calpurnius Caesoninus 45, 106, 126, 130, 132 Plato 9, 11, 13–15, 17, 21, 23–25, 28– 31, 35, 38 f., 49 f., 53, 55, 60, 64, 66– 69, 72–75, 77 f., 80, 89, 91 f., 103 f., 110, 128 Plotinus 127 f. Plutarch 41, 54, 59, 61, 69, 72–75, 77, 89, 116, 125 Polyaenus 41, 127 Porphyry 26, 134 Posidonius 82 Pythocles 104 Rabelais, François 39 Raphael 15 f., 18–20, 40, 142 f. Seneca, L. Annaeus 37–39, 42, 61, 124, 127 f., 134, 136 f. Sextus Empiricus 28–30 Shakespeare, William 123 Sidonius Apollinaris 18 Smikrines 86 Socrates 13, 17 f., 23 f., 28, 31, 49–54, 60, 64–68, 72, 74, 78, 125, 130 Solon 25, 107 f. Speusippus 18 Susario 108 Telemachus 115, 128, 132–134, 137 Theocritus 118 Theognis 107 Theophrastus 91, 138 – Ps.-Theophrastus 130

Name Index

Theseus 80 Thucydides 113, 118–120 Tibullus, Albius 44 Timaeus 28 f. Torquatus, L. Manlius 105 f., 109 Valla, Lorenzo 15, 141 f. Vasari, Giorgio 15 Velleius, C. 83 Venus 32, 81, 94–98, 117

Wordsworth, William

102

Xenophanes 83 Xenophon 130, 138 Zeno of Citium 18, 28, 43 f. Zeno of Sidon 67 Zeus 80, 82, 84, 98

161

Subject Index

Adaption 128, 132, 138 f. Address 9, 23, 69, 71, 81, 88, 98 f. Admonition 68 Altruism 35, 58 Anger 49, 52 f., 79, 85, 106, 113, 115 Aphorme 112–114, 116, 118, 121 Aponia 22, 25 Arts 104 Ataraxia 22, 25, 27, 34 f., 39, 41, 98, 108, 118 Atom 19, 32, 47, 82, 95 f., 102 – Atomistic ethics 31 Authenticity 125 Authority 101, 107, 124, 127 Body

22, 25, 47–49, 83, 142

Caring for soul (epimeleia tes psyches) 60, 64–66 Christianity 20, 140 City 10, 27, 33, 43, 45, 60, 64, 72, 74, 77, 92, 136 Communication 15 f. Community 13 f., 33, 35, 37–41, 59 f., 66, 68, 72, 74, 77, 129, 140 Contemplation 12, 91 Contubernium 37 f., 40 f., 45 f., 50, 56, 58 Correction 68, 114 Cradle argument 22, 75

Cult 12, 37, 56 f., 64, 80, 85, 88–90, 92 f., 97, 99, 127 Cultivation 12 f., 28, 31, 33, 35, 37 Customs 137 Death 11, 25, 27, 37, 39, 41 f., 45–51, 53–55, 62–64, 70 f., 73, 76, 95, 106, 110, 119, 132, 136 f., 141 Desire 19, 32, 35, 46 f., 73 f., 111, 113 f., 116 f., 128, 140 Dialogue 13, 24, 28, 30, 39, 44, 49–53, 55, 60, 64, 66, 68, 125, 132 Diatribe 11, 95, 112, 116, 118 Doctrine 10 f., 13, 24 f., 27, 30, 40, 49, 55, 68, 71, 89, 93, 96, 101 f., 110, 112, 119 f., 123, 126, 128 f., 139 f. Economics 129 f. Edification 12, 68 Education 14, 20, 42, 56, 68, 70, 99, 101, 103–109, 111, 120, 134–138 Egoism 13, 33–35, 58 Emotion 30, 39, 42, 46, 49–57, 85, 115– 119, 134 f. Emulation 37, 41, 93, 97 Epilogismos 112 f., 115–118, 120 Epitome 67, 70 Ethics 19, 28, 31, 33 f., 70 f., 79, 101, 125, 128, 139, 141

164

Subject Index

– Practical ethics 9, 13–15, 20 f., 30, 56, 90, 99, 124–127, 132, 135, 138, 142 f. Exercise 11, 17, 28, 30, 40, 48, 56, 95, 98 f., 130, 135 Existence 13, 28, 31, 33, 47, 52 f., 79–84, 86, 93 f., 97, 108 f.

Intermundia 80, 82, 84 Interpretatio medicans 101, 114, 121 Interpreters 60, 62, 66, 69, 77, 80 f., 83 f., 89, 96, 101 f., 126, 131 Irritation 10, 62, 95, 117, 121 Justice

Farmer 130–132 Fear 11–13, 17, 21 f., 27, 32, 34, 37, 40, 46–48, 50 f., 62–64, 70, 72 f., 76, 87, 90, 95, 99, 105, 110 f., 119, 135, 137, 141 Four-part-medicine (tetrapharmakos) 27 Freedom of speech (parrhesia) 68 Friendship 12, 33–35, 37 f., 57, 64, 92 Garden 10, 12 f., 33, 37–39, 46, 56, 127 God 11, 13, 19, 24, 28, 30, 37, 79–82, 84 f., 89–91, 93 f., 97–99, 119 Gods 11, 13, 19, 24–28, 30, 37, 39, 62 f., 70, 72 f., 79–99, 105, 110, 123 Happiness (eudaimonia) 9–13, 17, 19– 21, 23–26, 29, 31, 33–35, 41, 46, 49, 62, 65, 75, 91 f., 101, 102, 103, 109, 123, 132, 136, 140 Homoiosis 30, 93 Hymn 32, 93–98 Images 82 f., 90, 117 Imitation 41 Innovation 14, 87, 91, 103, 111 f., 120 f., 123, 127 Inscription 12 f., 24, 38 f., 44, 60, 69–71, 78, 92 Institution 10, 58–60, 63–66, 74, 76 Instruction 11, 27, 95, 112, 120, 127, 134 f.

60, 65, 74, 76 f., 107, 136

Kallipolis 66, 69, 72, 74, 77 f. Kepos 10, 13, 37 Knowledge 10 f., 16, 20, 32, 56, 59, 62 f., 65, 72, 78, 95, 99, 104, 106, 113, 119, 125, 133–136, 140 Lament 53 Law 13, 31 f., 45, 47, 52, 60–62, 66 f., 69, 72–77, 88 Letter 11, 16–18, 22, 25 f., 30, 33, 40–42, 44, 47–50, 54 f., 57, 70, 92, 102, 104, 107, 120, 126, 139 Literature 41 f., 46, 49, 55 f., 85, 96, 99, 101–103, 105 f., 109, 111 f., 114–116, 118, 127 Love 34 f., 44, 69, 80, 111–113, 115–118 Lust 47 f. Medicine 13, 21, 26 f., 30 f., 40, 69 f., 110 f. Meditation 81, 94 f., 98 f., 135 Memoria 53, 58 Mortality 24, 29, 45–47, 95, 142 Opinion 23–25, 30, 32, 38 f., 50, 70, 73, 80, 83, 87, 90–92, 116, 119, 127, 129 Orthodoxy 14, 101–104, 120 f., 123, 126 f. Pagan 140, 142

Subject Index

Paideia 101–106, 109, 112 f., 120 f., 123, 127, 138 Pain 19, 22–26, 29, 31, 35, 40, 44, 47–49, 54 f., 73, 76, 111 – Absence of pain 19, 22 Pedagogy 40–42, 57 f. Phenomenon 27, 120 Philosophia medicans 12 f., 15, 21, 30 f., 38, 40, 46, 50, 54, 56–58, 121, 125, 135 Philosophy 9, 11–13, 15–18, 21, 24, 27 f., 30 f., 33, 37, 39 f., 42, 46, 48 f., 57–59, 64–66, 70 f., 74–77, 79, 81, 86 f., 90, 94–96, 98 f., 101–109, 111 f., 116, 119–121, 123–126, 131 f., 135, 138, 140, 142 Phronesis 44, 75 f. Physiologia 31, 47, 56, 76, 101, 109, 111, 126, 135, 142 f. Piety 90 f. Pleasure (hedone) 9, 11 f., 19–27, 31 f., 39, 44, 49, 54 f., 63, 70, 73–76, 79, 91, 98, 105, 116, 123, 131, 141 f. – katastematike 19 – kinetike 19 Pleonexia 75 Poem 26 f., 30, 32, 37, 54, 63, 81, 85, 88, 94–98, 101–103, 105 f., 109–113, 116, 118 f., 121, 133–136 Poetry 23, 83, 95, 97, 101–114, 118, 120 f., 126, 135 Politics 13, 35, 59–69, 71 f., 77 f., 130 Power 32, 62, 65, 69, 75, 79, 88, 90, 95 f., 102, 110, 131 Praeparatio philosophica 20, 127 Pragma 66 Prayer 74, 81, 85, 87–90, 93–99 Prokoptontes 134, 137 Prose 102, 106, 112, 116, 118, 120 Protrepticus 17, 40, 107

Reader 9–11, 17, 40, 42, 48 f., 53, 70–72, 81, 84, 95–98, 102–105, 107 f., 110– 114, 116, 119–121, 126, 131, 134 f. Religion 57, 79–81, 85, 89, 98 f. Remoteness 25, 80 f., 84, 86–88, 90, 92 f., 97 Rhetoric 66, 68, 106–108, 114, 139 Ritual 80, 88–90, 93 Rules 39, 63, 66, 68, 71, 74, 124 f. Saviour 37 f., 57, 64, 81 School 9–11, 13, 15 f., 19, 33, 38, 53, 68, 70, 114, 121, 123, 128, 138 f., 142 Science 31, 142 Security 11 f., 34 f., 38, 60–64, 67 f., 73, 75 f. Self-deification 32 f., 35 Sensation 22 f., 48, 55 Servant to philosophy (ancilla philosophiae) 103, 106, 108 f., 111–113 Society, social 10, 13, 33, 41, 59–63, 65, 69, 75–77, 88, 114, 125, 129 f., 132 Tenets 11, 19, 27, 60, 89, 97, 102, 142 Theologia medicans 13, 79, 99 Theoria 56 Tranquillity 22, 34, 61 f., 73, 84, 91 Transformation 42, 67, 79, 81, 93 f. Travel 132 f. Utopia 64, 69, 74, 77 f. Variety 11, 50, 85–87, 125 Visualisation 93 f., 97 f., 115 f., 120 Wise man 13, 15, 31, 72, 75, 77, 91, 94, 129, 134 Worship 55, 57, 88–90, 92–94, 97, 99

165

Schwabe Verlag’s signet was Johannes Petri’s printer’s mark. His printing workshop was established in Basel in 1488 and was the origin of today’s Schwabe Verlag. The signet refers back to the beginnings of the printing press, and originated in the entourage of Hans Holbein. It illustrates a verse of Jeremiah 23:29: ‘Is not my word like fire, says the Lord, and like a hammer that breaks a rock in pieces?’

AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS PRACTICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS

This new introduction to Epicurus’ practical ethics and politics provides an overview of Epicurus’ attitudes towards political, religious and cultural traditions. Emphasising Epicurus’ claim that philosophy is an art of living that helps people to achieve individual happiness, the book pays special attention to Epicurus’ understanding of philosophy as caring for one's own soul. It ex­plains how this Epicurean self-care is connected to caring for others since a happy life requires security that can almost only be found in a commu­nity. Epicurus’ practical ethics includes a special appreciation of friendship and a conception of ‘politics’ which focuses on caring for the souls of others. It thus stands firmly in the Socratic tradition. This understanding of practical ethics contributed significantly to the fact that, despite many hostilities, at least practical ethical aspects of Epicurus’ teachings were still discussed in the Greco-Roman Empire and sometimes even appreciated by early Christian philosophers.

EPICURUS

MICHAEL ERLER studied Classical Philology and Philosophy in Cologne and London ( University College ). He is Professor of Classical Philo­­logy at the Julius-­ Maximilians-University Würzburg. His research focuses on Greek literature, Greek and Roman philosophy ( Platonism, Epicureanism ) and the relation be­t­ween ancient literature and philosophy. He is editor of scientific book series and author of numerous mono­graphs and essays on Plato, Epicurus, Roman phi­ losophy and ancient literature. He was president of the International Plato Society, the Mommsen Society and the Society for Ancient Philosophy.

MICHAEL ERLER

EPICURUS

EPICURUS 

AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS PRACTICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS

MICHAEL ERLER www.schwabeverlag.ch