Environmental Policy in North America: Approaches, Capacity, and the Management of Transboundary Issues 9781442693784

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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN NORTH AMERICA

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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN NORTH AMERICA APPROACHES, CAPACITY, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY ISSUES Robert G. Healy Debora L. VanNijnatten Marcela López-Vallejo

Copyright © University of Toronto Press Incorporated 2014 Higher Education Division www.utppublishing.com All rights reserved. The use of any part of this publication reproduced, transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or stored in a retrieval system, without prior written consent of the publisher—or in the case of photocopying, a licence from Access Copyright (Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency), One Yonge Street, Suite 1900, Toronto, Ontario M5E 1E5—is an infringement of the copyright law. library and archives canada cataloguing in publication data Healy, Robert G., author Environmental policy in north America : approaches, capacity, and the management of transboundary issues / Robert G. Healy, Debora L. VanNijnatten, Marcela López-Vallejo. Includes bibliographical references and index. Issued in print and electronic formats. ISBN 978-1-4426-0774-3 (bound).—ISBN 978-1-4426-0179-6 (pbk.). — ISBN 978-1-4426-9377-7 (epub). —ISBN 978-1-4426-9378-4 (pdf) 1. Environmental policy—North America. 2. Environmental management—North America. 3. Environmental policy—Case studies. 4. Environmental management—Case studies. I. VanNijnatten, Debora, 1967– , author II. López-Vallejo, Marcela, 1973– , author III. Title. GE170.H42 2014

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Contents List of Illustrations..................................................................................vii Acknowledgments................................................................................... ix A Note on Sources of Data...................................................................... xi Introduction: Maps of the Continent............................................................. 1 PART 1 Chapter 1 Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities................................................................................ 13 Chapter 2 Transboundary Environmental Governance in North America: Bridging Differences?...................................... 47 PART 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7

Case Study: Biodiversity and Protected Areas........................... 79 Case Study: The “Smog” Problem.......................................... 109 Case Study: Greenhouse Gas Reduction................................. 129 Case Study: Genetically Modified Crops................................ 157 Conclusions: The Future of Transboundary Environmental Management in North America...................... 175

References............................................................................................ 187 Index.................................................................................................... 209

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Illustrations Maps Map 0.1 Map 0.2 Map 1.1 Map 1.2 Map 4.1

CEC Layered Map.................................................................... 3 Primary Trade Routes in North America................................... 4 Geologic Basins with Potential Production of Oil and Gas from Shale........................................................... 18 Mexican Oilfields.................................................................... 20 Air Pollution Corridors in North America............................ 111

Figures Figure 1.1 Distribution of Reporting Facilities in North America (2006)............................................................ 27 Figure 1.2 PROFEPA’s Budget 2000–8 (constant pesos for 2008)............ 40 Figure 4.1 Monitoring Systems by State (2009)..................................... 119 Figure 4.2 Ozone Concentrations in the Border Region (2001–5).......... 123 Figure 4.3 Particulate Matter Concentrations in the Border Region (2001–7)............................................................................... 124 Figure 5.1 Arctic Sea Ice (1979–2012)................................................... 133 Figure 5.2 Status of State Climate Action Plans and Inventories in Mexico............................................................................. 140 Tables Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 1.4 Table 1.5 Table 2.1

Economic Statistics................................................................. 21 Human Development and Demographics................................ 24 Environmental Data for Canada, the United States, and Mexico............................................................................. 26 Financial Resources................................................................ 40 Human and Knowledge Resources.......................................... 42 Major Canada-US Environmental Agreements and Institutions.............................................................................. 52

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Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3

Major US-Mexico Environmental Agreements and Institutions.............................................................................. 53 Top 20 State-Province Pairs by Number of Environmental Linkages......................................................... 68 Top State-State Pairs by Number of Environmental Linkages (2005)...................................................................... 69 Number of Species by Country............................................... 81 Number of Critically Endangered, Endangered, and Vulnerable Species in Each Major Group of Organisms.......... 82 Protected Areas (IUCN Categories I–VI)................................. 90

Acknowledgments

THE AUTHORS WISH TO acknowledge three groups of people who made distinctive, and often vital, contributions to this book. First are those who helped us envision North America as more than three important and distinctive countries, but also as a continent linked by shared environments and rapidly developing demographic and economic ties. Prof. Healy wishes to recognize the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies and the Center for Canadian Studies at Duke University, which supported a long-standing interest in Mexico and piqued a new one in Canada. Particularly important was a program that allowed him to teach for a semester at El Colegio de México and for another semester at McGill University. Prof. VanNijnatten acknowledges and thanks her colleagues in North American Studies and Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier University, who have provided teaching and research space for her work on the role that environmental cooperation plays in North American integration. She also wishes to thank Fulbright Canada for giving her the opportunity to spend a term at Duke University as a Visiting Fulbright Chair in Canadian Studies, during which the idea for this book was originally conceived. Prof. López-Vallejo wishes to acknowledge the support of her colleagues at the School of International Relations, part of the Department of Social Sciences, as well

xAcknowledgments

as those at the Department of Research of Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla. The second group that deserves mention is the scholars who read all or part of the manuscript or who put on lectures and conferences from which we drew. These include Stephen Kelly at Duke University, Blanca Torres at El Colegio de México, Ron Mader of Oaxaca, Stephen Clarkson at the University of Toronto, Neil Craik at the University of Waterloo, Isidro Morales at Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Isabel Studer at the Global Institute for Sustainability at Tec de Monterrey, and María Eugenia Ibarrarán at Universidad Iberoamericana Puebla. And we benefited greatly from the three anonymous reviews of the first draft of the manuscript. A third group that deserves recognition is those who gave us moral support during the preparation of the manuscript. Prof. Healy wishes to thank his wife, Kay Edgar, and the many graduate students at Duke who tolerated his frequent use of case examples from Canada and Mexico in various classes. Prof. VanNijnatten is indebted to husband Gerry Boychuk, who provided support in so many ways in order that work on the manuscript could take place. She has also drawn inspiration and energy from successive cohorts of students in her North American Integration course. Prof. López-Vallejo thanks many of her students for their interesting and fresh comments on several topics of relevance to the book. An important member of the “moral support” group is Anne Brackenbury of University of Toronto Press, who believed in our initial vision for this book, then patiently accepted our long gestation process. Finally, we are so pleased to have had Kari Mai Williams work with us on editing and formatting the manuscript—not once, but twice. Her attention to detail, her North American Studies background, and her knowledge of Spanish made her a perfect fit for this project. Durham, North Carolina Waterloo, Ontario Ciudad de Puebla, Puebla

A Note on Sources of Data

IN CITING DATA in the text of this book, we have deliberately refrained from exact citations, and have instead listed the general source or agency from which the data were obtained, for example, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. These days, most government data is retrieved from the originating agency’s website rather than from a monthly, quarterly, or yearly publication. We have found that links to the precise location where data may be found go quickly out of date. Instead, we cite the general source and offer the following guide to where important economic and environmental data may be found. A search on the agency’s web page will generally take one to the location of the specific information that is sought. For all three countries, an excellent overview of the organization of the administrative system and the economy, along with basic socio-economic data, are the country studies found in the CIA World Factbook at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook. The World Bank publishes thousands of time series on social and economic indicators at http://data.worldbank.org, including data on income distribution and poverty. Another measure of poverty, the Human Development Index, is calculated annually by the United Nations and can be found at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics. Another UN agency, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, has both worldwide and country data on educational attainment,

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A Note on Sources of Data

expenditures on research and education, literacy, innovation, and cultural institutions. See www.uis.unesco.org/ScienceTechnology/Pages/default.aspx. For statistics of all sorts that enable comparisons to all other countries in the world, we recommend the World Bank Data Catalog at data.worldbank. org/country. The best source of environmental statistics for North America and for the world (along with some socio-economic data) is the World Resources Report, published annually by the World Resources Institute (WRI), a US NGO, at www.wri.org/project/world-resources-report, and data in WRI’s online Earth Trends Data Bank. Another convenient source of world data is the OECD Factbook at www.oecd.org/publications/factbook, published annually by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. A very useful data compendium for the US, issued annually, is the Statistical Abstract of the US at www.census.gov/compendia/statab. Historical data are also available. Although this report contains a wealth of agricultural data, detailed information on crop production, inputs, exports, and land use may be obtained from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA)’s National Agricultural Statistics Service at www.nass.usda.gov. Data on population size and characteristics, incomes by state and province, and production by branch of the economy may be found on the websites of the US Census Bureau, Statistics Canada, and Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) (National Institute of Statistics and Geography). Detailed financial and trade data, often published monthly, may be found in publications and on the websites of each nation’s central bank—Banco de México, Federal Reserve Bank, and Bank of Canada. The official list of endangered and threatened species can be obtained from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature at www.iucnredlist.org, while data on ecosystems and a detailed list of the world’s many types of protected areas is maintained by the World Conservation Monitoring Centre at www.unep-wcmc.org/datasets-tools—reports_15.html. For environmental indicators, particularly for pollution and toxic substances, a good place to start is the three national environmental agencies, each of which issues statistical overviews. For Canada, this is Environment Canada at www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=54E48F41-1. For the United States, consult the “Data Finder” at the Environmental Protection Agency, www. epa.gov/data. For Mexico, look for the main website of Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT) (Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources), http://semarnat.­gob.mx/Pages/Inicio.aspx, which has data from the national environmental agency as well as links to data sets in forestry, water, and biodiversity. The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), located in Montreal, does not publish original monthly or yearly data of its own. But it has commissioned a number of special studies which sometimes offer data that are difficult or impossible to find elsewhere. For example, it has published a compilation of land cover data for North America, as well as a list of the electric power plants that are the largest CO2 emitters. A unique resource is its annual publication Taking Stock, which brings together pollutant release data for individual sources in each country at www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID= 751&SiteNodeID=1119. Extensive and in some cases daily data on snow and ice cover in the polar regions can be found at the National Snow and Ice Data Center, http://nsidc. org/arcticseaicenews.

Introduction

Maps of the Continent

IN THINKING ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL management in North America—the geographic space that comprises Canada, the United States, and Mexico—we have found it useful to consider two continental maps. One has the usual political borders of nations, states, and provinces. The other does not. The borderless map calls attention to some major physical features shared by adjoining countries, and sometimes by all three. Dominant is the great western cordillera of the Canadian Rockies, the American Rockies, and the Sierra Madre. Also obvious are the Great Lakes, enormous reservoirs of freshwater and the sites of many of the continent’s historic industrial cities. The borderless map makes it easier to see the logic of long-distance wildlife migrations, among them the path of monarch butterflies from the eastern United States and Canada to winter roosts in Central Mexico, the routes of songbirds from the tropics of southern Mexico to vast breeding territories in the north, even the path through the cold Pacific Ocean taken by gray whales from breeding grounds in Baja California to feeding areas off the Aleutians. Without borders, it is easy to see how ecotypes are defined both by latitude and altitude, so that ascending a thousand feet up a slope can be equivalent to a northward move of several hundred miles. The borderless map also emphasizes the scale and diversity of North America, which stretches from true tropics in southern Mexico to treeless Arctic in Canada and Alaska. The other continental map with its familiar political borders tells another kind of truth about the continent’s environment. Between Mexico and the United States is “La Línea,” a fenced and patrolled “line” that defines a much broader region, “La Frontera” (the border). Although a defended border, it has for centuries been a porous one, crossed by people, by goods, by air and water, and by important cultural influences. Between the United States and Canada is what is often called “the longest undefended border in the world.” This border separates two sovereign countries, both of whom guard their political distinctiveness and policy autonomy jealously. Below the national level are Mexican

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estados (states), which are less autonomous than American states, and those in turn are less autonomous than Canadian provinces. Moreover, at a finer level are thousands of municipios, counties, municipalities, boroughs, and townships; and each of these local units makes decisions about land-use planning, roads, water and sewer service, and waste disposal that have important impacts on the local environment and that cumulatively can affect much larger areas. All of these jurisdictions play key roles in environmental management on the continent. Both the political map and the borderless map are accurate descriptions of the North American continent. Official boundaries mark the points where domestic environmental laws and policies lose their effect and transboundary cooperation is necessary. The borderless map illustrates how readily these boundaries are ignored by flows of air, water, wildlife, and pollutants. Together, the maps summarize the challenge to environmental policy-making in North America—namely, that environmental problems in North America are overwhelmingly transboundary in nature, while the management regimes are primarily domestic. How, then, can we coordinate the environmental actions taken by the continent’s many governments and also support their efforts at home—for these tasks are intricately linked.

THE TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE IN NORTH AMERICA One of the most recent projects of the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), created by the three governments alongside the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, has been to construct a North American Atlas. The Atlas harmonizes “geographic information across North America’s political boundaries to depict significant environmental issues at a continental scale” (CEC 2012a, 2). The Atlas provides interactive map layers—each featuring foundational data on such aspects as irrigation patterns, biodiversity threats, forest cover, population density and growth, and location of industrial facilities—all superimposed onto a map of infrastructure and physical features, and intended to highlight the extent of interconnectivity on the continent. The Atlas project is clearly aimed at creating a regional perspective on environmental issues, and it follows on the heels of an earlier attempt by the CEC to describe the most significant environmental challenges facing continental policy-makers, including threats to our shared air and atmosphere, our water bodies, and our ecosystems (CEC 2012a). The report makes a solid case that an “astounding” number of complex transboundary environmental challenges should be on the three countries’ political agendas, and that addressing them effectively will require concerted and coordinated efforts. Of the issues highlighted by the CEC, we address three in this book: ground-level ozone, threats to biodiversity, and climate change. What the Atlas perhaps does not convey as clearly as the physical realities of shared environmental features is the dynamic economic basis for environmental interactions within North America. Taken together, the three North American countries have the world’s second-largest economy (surpassed only recently by the ever-expanding European Union). In the 1980s and 1990s, two major trade agreements, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and the trilateral

Level II: Major River Basins Arctic Ocean Seaboard

Fraser River

Mackenzie River

Columbia River

Atlantic Ocean Seaboard

Colorado River

St. Lawrence River

Great Basin

Gulf of Mexico Seaboard

Caribbean Sea Seaboard

Mississippi River System Rio Grande

Foreign Areas

Level III: Mississippi Sub-Basins

El Salado

Arkansas/Red River

Hudson Bay Seaboard

Mississippi River (trunk)

Nelson River

Missouri River

Pacific Ocean Seaboard

Ohio River

Yukon River

0 250 500

1,000 km

MAP 0.1 An example of a CEC map from their interactive North American Atlas project, showing the transboundary nature of environmental challenges.

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VANCOUVER

WINNIPEG

KC

KANSAS CITY

OKLAHOMA CITY

DALLAS

AUSTIN

LAREDO MONTERREY SALTILLO

GUDALAJARA

MANZANILLO

SAN LUIS POTOSI

MEXICO DF

MAP 0.2 Mid-continent Route in North America. Although the largest trade flows are between Canada and the US in southern Ontario and between Mexico and the US immediately along the border, exchanges of goods link locations and corridors deep inside each nation. This diagram shows the mid-continent trade corridor, whick links Winnipeg and western Canada through the US to Mexico.

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1994), radically tightened the relationship among these countries, based on a dramatic opening of markets but also enhanced flows of capital and labor, as well as the creation of several new institutions. The implementation of NAFTA encouraged an image of North America as a borderless region, one where the integration of different economic sectors was deepening rapidly and where this integration seemed destined to spill over into ever more arenas of policy and regulatory activity. The link between increased levels of trade and environmental degradation has been much studied, and there are certainly concerns about NAFTA’s negative “externalities” in terms of levels of pollution and impacts on physical systems. Yet we also need to recognize that, as the integration of markets proceeds apace, this has resulted in the creation of new pathways for environmental degradation. North Americans are encountering a different breed of “transboundary” environmental problem, one which finds its source not primarily in the physical realities of sharing airways, ecosystems, and water bodies but in the transaction of goods across borders. For example, the movement of agricultural commodities among countries in North America has meant that domestic agriculture cannot be insulated from a continent-wide system of food production and

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consumption. In the case of genetically modified crops, a subject we also explore in this book, the “de-bordered” infrastructure which has sprung up to facilitate cross-border production and trade is also the conduit for “contamination” by non-indigenous cultivars imported into the country. Similarly, the enormous continental trade in energy links oil production in Alaska, tar sands in Alberta, refineries in Louisiana, hydraulic fracturing for natural gas in North Dakota, and offshore drilling platforms off Campeche—and this complex of market interactions is linked to a wide range of environmental impacts.

SIMPLE STEREOTYPES AND COMPLEX REALITIES IN DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY If the environmental problems we must address in North America are significantly transboundary in nature, whether due to physical environmental conditions or by means of market linkages, the primary responsibility for managing these problems is not. Instead, environmental management is parceled out to domestic governments at multiple levels all across North America—national, subnational, and local. Any work examining environmental policy in the three North American nations must struggle against some widely held stereotypes. In the popular mind, Canada is a “clean” country, with abundant natural resources and progressive policies. Only Canada could be the emblematic source of a widely marketed brand of bottled water called “Clearly Canadian.” The stereotype of the United States is as a wealthy, sprawling nation where environmental problems are addressed only after repeated political battles between heroic local environmental groups and well-funded industrial giants. An emblem of the United States might be a highway packed with huge, fuel-guzzling sport-utility vehicles, seen to be the result of a government that refuses to restrict consumer choice and bends to the wishes of industry lobbyists. The stereotype of Mexico is as a country where pollution is pervasive and the environment is of little concern to either the government or the public. Many people have a mental picture of a smog-cloaked Mexico City, where the air is not only so polluted that it injures the lungs, but its germ-laden dust can cause gastrointestinal disease. Because of these stereotypes, it was widely feared that NAFTA would cause the most polluting industries to move to Mexico—some people believe that this actually has occurred. This book will show that the true situation in each country is not well represented in each stereotype. Canada has many pristine forests and waters, yet it also has pollution-belching smelters, large-scale clear-cutting of virgin timber, lakes and rivers with severe toxic pollution, and poorly regulated and overexploited fisheries. The tar sands mining district of northern Alberta is one of the largest areas of severely contaminated land and water in all of North America. Most Canadians live in big cities, and on some summer days Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver have palls of air pollution that would rival the big cities of the United States and Mexico. In the United States, dozens of environmental groups have their own Washington lobbyists, and there is a huge and often quite effective regulatory bureaucracy. Industry has stoutly resisted some environmental reforms, but others have become standard practice. Vehicles are indeed numerous and often large, but federal laws have significantly reduced emissions per mile, and further reductions have been mandated by the federal and state administrations. And in Mexico, national environmental laws cover nearly all types of pollution, environmental problems tend to get

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extensive media coverage, and there are some nongovernmental groups, many at the local level, that promote sustainable use of natural resources and fight damaging projects. In fact, Mexico has the willingness to vigorously address an environmental problem if it is perceived as sufficiently serious. Although NAFTA has created some environmental problems, these do not include Mexico providing a regulation-free haven for pollution-intensive industries. The domestic environmental problem most emblematic of Mexico in pre-NAFTA days, air pollution in the Mexico City metropolitan area, has been aggressively confronted with the forced movement of heavy industry out of the city, the removal of lead from gasoline, subway and bus improvements, mandatory vehicle inspections, and the “day without a car” program. This goes well beyond anything done in the United States and Canada for pollution in a single city. We could, of course, come up with other examples that support the stereotypes. However, this would not help us to understand a landscape of environmental policy difference that is much more complex—and more interesting. The three countries of North America clearly differ in terms of their environmental management approaches and policies; even those readers unfamiliar with the details of North American environmental policy would instinctively know this to be the case. More specifically, the evidence presented in this book highlights differences across the domestic environmental management regimes in terms of legislative coverage, enforcement approach, and willingness to experiment. These differences have emerged out of unique conditions in each country relating to land-use practices, economic and ecological conditions, sociocultural dynamics, and policy-making frameworks, as we demonstrate in chapter 1. Furthermore, we argue that the particularities across and within the three countries express themselves in levels of environmental management capacity. (For brevity, we will refer to this as “environmental capacity.”) Environmental capacity is the ability to propose, plan, choose a course of action, implement, and evaluate an effective policy. Capacity development in the area of the environment has been defined by the OECD as “the ability of individuals, groups, organizations and institutions to devise and implement solutions to environmental issues as part of a wider effort to achieve sustainable development” (OECD 1995, 12). A key component of this definition is “a wider effort to achieve sustainable development”; the focus here is not on individual, isolated environmental policy actions, but rather on the sustained application of financial, human, knowledge, and organizational resources to a broad agenda designed to meld environmental, economic, and social imperatives. Understanding exactly how domestic environmental management regimes in North America differ is critical, given that these regimes confront each other— and must interact with each other—across international boundaries.

THE BOOK’S AIMS AND ARGUMENTS This book provides a focused examination of, first, how the three countries differ in their environmental management approaches and levels of environmental management capacity; and, second, how these differences are addressed or mediated by North American transboundary environmental governance mechanisms. We argue that transboundary cooperation has a critical role to

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play in both improving the coordination of domestic efforts across borders, but also in supporting governments at home as they go about their environmental management responsibilities. We draw the link here between coordinating action across borders and supporting domestic efforts at home quite deliberately—for each makes the other possible. In this vein, we identify three critical functions for transboundary governance mechanisms that we believe are necessary for bridging national policy differences and promoting policy capacity: (1) creating comprehensive and stable cross-boundary networks; (2) promoting mutual learning and the generation and exchange of important environmental information; and (3) facilitating the provision of resources necessary to create and maintain environmental management capacity. We train our analytical lens on the effectiveness of “sites” of transboundary environmental governance in North America in performing these functions. “Governance” has come to be understood as the ability to wield and coordinate resources from public and private actors, generally in a more informal manner than “government” and with the participation of a wider range of actors. Environmental governance, more specifically, seeks to “determine and act on goals and priorities related to the management of natural resources” (IUCN 2013) within institutional arrangements that are often transboundary and frequently informal (Bulkeley 2009). Locating and scrutinizing these sites of environmental governance in North America helps us to understand how and to what extent the different environmental management approaches and levels of environmental capacity that we find on the continent can be mediated and overcome, and how continental policy cooperation might be facilitated. We then explore the ability of North American bilateral, trilateral, and crossborder regional transboundary governance mechanisms to undertake these three functions in each of four cases: protection of biodiversity, ground-level ozone (“smog”), greenhouse gas reduction, and genetically modified crops. These cases were selected partly to illustrate a range of issues, but mainly to highlight distinct stages of the development of both national policy and transboundary interaction. Two of the chapters (protection of biodiversity and ground-level ozone/smog) are more “traditional” environmental issues for which there is an established record of policy adoption and implementation in all three countries. There is also, with these two cases, substantial experience with transboundary collaboration, which can be not only described but also evaluated. Indeed, for major aspects of biodiversity protection—such as the regulation of hunting and establishment of protected areas—the three countries of North America have interacted for almost a century. Here, we would expect a higher level of effectiveness in terms of the functions we have set out for transboundary environmental governance. The third case, policy on greenhouse gas reduction and climate change, is one which, to some considerable extent, is linked to the previous two issues. Here, however, domestic policies have been much discussed but relatively little has been formally adopted. While the complex of issues relating to climate change seems to urgently require a continental policy regime (or at the very least close coordination of national policies), transboundary approaches are no more settled than the approaches of the individual countries. The final case (regulation of genetically modified crops) is, as discussed above, a newer type of issue, one which has sprung out of the dynamics associated with highly integrated markets and for which there have been at

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least 10 years of national policy-making. Transboundary collaboration on this issue, however, is decidedly underdeveloped, and an investigation of interactions across borders in this case shows that we have not yet come to terms with the implications of linked markets for the environment. Even the way in which the problem is defined in Mexico (protection of indigenous crops) is quite different from its definition in the United States or Canada (purity of food supply). On the basis of the case studies, we provide recommendations in our conclusions with respect to where transboundary mechanisms might be further developed to undertake the three functions that are necessary for environmental issue management.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK After this introduction, the book’s first chapter undertakes three tasks. First, it compares the land-use practices as well as the economic and ecological situation in the three countries, examines sociocultural values and activism, and provides an overview of how environmental policy is made in each country. Second, the chapter describes the environmental management approaches in Canada, the United States, and Mexico, and shows how these approaches have been shaped by the distinct economic, sociocultural, and political factors described earlier. Finally, the chapter examines levels of environmental capacity in the three countries. The second chapter analyzes the present state of transboundary environmental governance in North America—at the bilateral, trilateral, and cross-border regional (subnational) levels. It explores, in a general fashion, the potential of major sites of transboundary environmental governance at each level to perform the three functions we have identified as critical. Here, we note the inability of any one level of environmental governance to achieve much individually, and the surprising complementarity of governance at the three different levels when operating jointly. This chapter is particularly helpful in setting out the framework for transboundary environmental governance in North America. The book then turns to the four case studies, each the subject of a chapter. Together, as noted above, these case studies provide a range of issues for considering how transboundary governance may bring about coordination among domestic approaches, as well as how it may support the governments in their environmental protection efforts at home. Given the extent of problems and the varying levels of capacity across governments, we are very interested in how transboundary mechanisms can mediate—even ameliorate—these differences such that individual countries, and the continent as a whole, can benefit. In the final chapter, we make a strong case for a more truly “North American” approach to environmental management. When NAFTA was signed, and over the subsequent decade, environmental issues were prominent in highlevel government communications among all three countries. For example, when newly elected President George W. Bush made a February 2001 visit to Mexico, the joint declaration he issued with President Fox stated that “we attach the utmost importance to issues affecting the quality of life along our common border.” The statement also called for joining with Canada in a “North American approach to the important issue of energy resources” and urged “new cooperation in science, technology, and the environment” (Presidencia-México

introduction9

2001). The prospects for enhanced and effective environmental cooperation seemed high. However, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, changed American political calculations drastically, as homeland security and control of borders took priority. Thereafter, the start of a worldwide economic crisis in late 2007 became a further reason to push the environment off the top-level agenda. The deteriorating security and governance situation associated with the drug war in Mexico is an additional burden on both issue prominence and environmental management capacity. Yet we believe that more extensive and deeper interactions among the three countries are inevitable. The economic, political, security, and environmental forces that were operating before September 11 have not disappeared, and the linkages among them have become more obvious. To highlight just one set of connections, the emergence of continental markets for energy, fueled by expanding demand across the continent (particularly urban consumer areas in Mexico) and new sources of supply (such as Canada’s oil sands), is inextricably linked to regulatory and security cooperation and involves myriad environmental considerations and calculations. Although the “North American project” is not at the top of bilateral or trilateral policy agendas, the imperatives which underlie and link different forms of transboundary cooperation are here to stay. Only if we adopt a regional perspective can three distinct societies start erasing the political and institutional barriers which fragment the continent’s ecosystems and limit a consolidation of capacities to address environmental problems. The North American environmental project, then, speaks to an eventual transition in our mental picture and in management approaches from the familiar map that emphasizes political boundaries to the borderless environmental map.

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Chapter 1

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT approaches and capacities develop within a specific national context, characterized by unique land-use and natural resource regimes, economic conditions, and ecological conditions, as well as sociocultural values and levels of activism. Domestic policy-making processes also tend to be quite distinct, given the ways in which institutional frameworks present opportunities or obstacles to political actors. All of these combine to shape the way that countries manage their environmental responsibilities. This chapter undertakes three tasks. First, we will compare these national contexts, highlighting dissimilarities—and the implications of these—across the three countries. Then, we will describe the most significant similarities and differences among Canada, the United States, and Mexico in terms of the approaches each takes to environmental management. Finally, we will examine the extent to which each has developed a capacity for making and implementing environmental policy. The goal here is to draw into clearer focus the landscape of difference with respect to environmental policy in North America. In this way, we might better understand the challenges that transboundary environmental governance must overcome in terms of coordinating action across borders and supporting domestic action at home.

THE CONTEXT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY As we argued in the introduction, differences across Canada, the United States, and Mexico in terms of their environmental management approaches and levels of environmental capacity have emerged out of unique conditions in each country. More specifically, the differences between countries are striking in terms of land-use and resource management regimes, and also economic conditions,

14

Environmental Policy in North America

notably between the United States and Canada on the one hand and Mexico on the other. These structural conditions lie at the root of the varying severity and patterning of environmental problems—though the problems themselves might be common across all three countries. They also engender unique incentives in each country that are expressed in varying management arrangements, but also asymmetrical resources available for management activities. Moreover, distinctive political institutions and dynamics create quite different opportunities for pro- and anti-environment interests in the policy-making process, which influence the kind of policies that result. On the other hand, the three countries share a rather contradictory “relationship” to environment management; while their citizens exhibit relatively high levels of concern for the environment, natural resource extraction—particularly oil and gas development—is deeply woven into the economic and political fabric of all three countries. In addition, while the ecological situation in each country is unique, there appears to be a solid basis for common action on specific issues, such as air and water pollution. In other words, the problems are recognized and the concern is present, thus creating the basis for shared dialogue. However, each country comes to the table with somewhat different perspectives on how to approach problems, a different set of stakeholders that must be taken into account, and, perhaps most significantly, asymmetrical resources that may be brought to bear on environmental problems.

Land Use and Natural Resource Management: Ownership and Stakeholders All three North American countries have relatively generous endowments of land and natural resources, though a great deal is subject to severe constraints of climate, slope, and water availability. But there are significant differences among the three countries in patterns of land ownership as well as the structure of land and resource management. These differences have major implications for how land and resources are used for economic and other purposes, and for “who” does the managing. In Canada, almost 90 per cent of lands are “crown lands,” owned and managed by the federal government (41 per cent—mostly in the territories of the Far North) or provincial governments (48 per cent). Agricultural and urban land is mainly private, while forests are generally on provincial crown land. Much of the better crown forest land is under long-term lease to private timber companies. Canada has long had one of the world’s largest stocks of old-growth softwood, which is in great demand for both lumber and paper, and Canada is a major producer and exporter of wood products. There has been continuing opposition by environmentalists to large-scale penetration of logging roads into remote areas of crown lands and logging of old-growth trees, some of them behemoths hundreds of years old. Canada’s agriculture is concentrated in the southern part of the country, particularly in the Prairie provinces, which produce and export large quantities of wheat and canola (an oilseed crop). If we consider cropland, Canada has a generous 1.40 ha/capita, the United States 0.6 ha/capita, and Mexico only 0.2 ha/capita (2008 data from World Bank). Yet, although very important regionally, primary agricultural production (i.e., not including food transport, retailing, or processing) accounts for only 1.7 per cent of Canada’s GDP and

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities15

1.9 per cent of employment (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2011). Land under cultivation has stagnated in recent years, although demand for oilseed exports and the production of biofuels from corn and soya has stimulated new investment. In the United States, virtually all of the land west of the Appalachian Mountains was at one time owned by the federal government (“public do­­ main”). Throughout the nineteenth century, land was sold or was given away to promote schools, canals, railroads, and other developmental uses. Today, remaining federal lands account for 29 per cent of the country’s land area (21 per cent outside of Alaska). Because settlement moved from east to west, most of the current federal lands are west of the Rockies. For example, federal agencies own less than 1 per cent of New York State, but 84 per cent of Nevada, and 45 per cent of California. Very little of the federal land is agricultural, but there are extensive federal holdings of forests, scenic and recreational areas, and mineral-rich lands. Major controversies over management of federal lands during the 1970s led to the development of elaborate planning processes, with significant provision for public input. These exercises, however, have done little to quiet controversy about how federal lands are managed. Agricultural and urban land in the United States is almost entirely in private hands. In most time periods, agriculture has suffered from overproduction, and expensive federal programs have supported commodity prices. In the last two decades, about 10 per cent of US cropland has been placed in a subsidized “conservation reserve,” a progressive, though expensive, program that has reduced erosion and created new wildlife habitats. However, the very recent boom in crop-based biofuels, especially ethanol derived from corn, has caused cropland to start to expand again. Mexico has an unusual type of rural land tenure called the “ejido.” A product of land reform after the 1910 Revolution and a notable part of Mexico’s Constitution of 1917, the ejido provides for farm and forest land to be owned collectively, but (in most cases) cultivated by individual families. There are about 31,518 ejidos, covering a little more than half of the country’s total arable land area (INEGI 2009) and about the same proportion of its cultivated land. Most emphasize crop production on parcels managed by each member family, though some are devoted to wood production or grazing. In 1992, Mexico’s constitution was amended to permit ejidatarios (those who live on ejidos) to gain private ownership of individual parcels, but to date most have been reluctant to do so (Haenn 2006). More than one decade later, only 5.3 per cent of the ejidos had acquired full ownership of their lands, indicating that there was little incentive to make the proposed transition (Galeana 2005). Most of the remaining cultivated land is privately owned, often in very large parcels, while the national government owns deserts, mountains, and a great deal of forest land, some of it in protected areas (see chapter 3). There are also lands under the control of “comunidades,” or recognized indigenous communities, which are managed according to traditional local practices different from both ejidos and federal prerogatives. The ejido system also presents serious management issues for Mexico’s forests. Ejidos have often granted timber concessions to private firms, which extract wood in ways that are very damaging to the quality of residual forests. In many species-rich tropical zones, slash-and-burn agriculture is still practiced by small farmers, often harming both wildlife and soils (Campos et al. 2007).

16

Environmental Policy in North America

The North American countries also differ greatly in their treatment of subsurface resources. All three have world-class endowments of fossil fuels and of many valuable minerals, including coal, iron, copper, gold, silver, and uranium. In Mexico, Article 27 of the Constitution states that all energy and mineral resources belong to the nation, and that this ownership is “inalienable.” For minerals, the government may grant mining concessions to private firms, but exploitation of petroleum and solid, liquid, or gaseous hydrocarbons can be done only by the government itself. There is controversy over whether to allow private investment in some of the activities undertaken by the state-owned oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). In the United States, fuels and minerals belong to the landowner and may be exploited privately, though they are subject to various regulations, most of them imposed by state governments. However, a significant amount of unexploited resources, including oil and gas, coal and oil shale, and geothermal resources, underlie federal lands. Their extraction is subject to a complex set of laws—“prospecting” for non-fuel minerals is still allowed on many federal lands, with the possibility of private establishment of a claim. For fossil fuels, however, exploitation is through leases, which are put out to competitive bid at the government’s discretion. A significant amount of oil and gas production currently takes place on offshore federal lands. In the fiscal year 2011, the federal government received $6.5 billion in royalties and bonus payments for extraction of its offshore oil and gas. In Canada, most subsurface fuels and minerals belong to the provincial governments—except in the northern territories, where the federal government maintains ownership. Exploitation of these resources, however, is generally done by private companies, which pay taxes or royalties to the provinces or, in the case of the northern territories, to the federal government. Complicated federalprovincial royalty-sharing agreements exist for oil and gas developments off the coasts of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. A moratorium on oil and gas development off the west coast of British Columbia has been in place for some time. There can be no doubt that energy production is critical to understanding the North American environmental policy picture. The United States, Canada, and Mexico ranked third, sixth, and seventh respectively among all countries in oil production, and first, fourth, and fifteenth in natural gas production in 2011 (data from CIA World Factbook). Notably, Canada ranks second only to Saudi Arabia in its proven reserves of oil; however, most of it is locked in “oil sands” or “tar sands” in the province of Alberta. It cannot be pumped by conventional means, but must be strip-mined and heated to release the oil, or the oil must be melted from the sandy matrix by underground injection of steam. Tar sands oil production in Alberta was 1.31 million barrels per day in 2008 and is expected to increase to 3 million barrels per day in 2018 (Alberta Energy 2013). With most of the production exported to the United States, the tar sands are economical to process at world oil prices of about $60 per barrel or above, and they represent North America’s best alternative for reducing its huge imports of liquid fuels, used mostly for cars and trucks. But the strip-mining can create land that is almost impossible to reclaim, while the underground method is associated with high water use and potential pollution of aquifers and even major rivers with toxic substances (compare Canadian Association of Oil Producers 2008 and Nikforuk 2010). Both methods involve significant releases

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities17

of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, essentially nullifying all of Canada’s emission reductions in other sectors. There has also been great controversy over the potential construction of a pipeline from Alberta to US refineries in Texas (known as Keystone XL) and/or a pipeline to the British Columbia coast, through which oil could be exported to Asia (known as the Northern Gateway). In the United States, despite considerable new offshore development in the Gulf of Mexico and new supply from Alaska, crude oil production peaked in 1970 at 9.6 million barrels per day, and has since declined to 5.512 million per day in 2010 (United States Energy Information Administration 2011). Despite worries about oil spills, heightened after the 2010 British Petroleum spill in the Gulf of Mexico, there appears to be considerable political support for new coastal exploration outside the Gulf of Mexico, and perhaps even in the Arctic. Canada has already begun to move in this direction and is initiating the regulation and licensing of offshore oil and gas in the Arctic. “Canada is on the verge of approving the first deepwater oil and gas drilling in its Arctic waters.…” (Porta and Bankes 2011). The industry was poised for more drilling in new offshore fields in the American part of the Gulf of Mexico, but the huge BP spill in April 2010 has caused a pullback, probably only temporarily. It is also worth noting that, in the United States, natural gas production is at an all-time high, and proven resources are actually expanding. There have been major recent discoveries of gas at extreme depths in Texas, Louisiana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and several other parts of the country, as well as technological developments in drilling that have made it economical to produce gas from small pockets and from “tight” rock formations. The growth of natural gas production in western states has caused conflicts with ranchers and other residents, mainly because of the high density at which the new wells are drilled. Extraction of gas from very deep formations, often 10,000 feet down or more, is done by hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), in which a mixture of liquid chemicals is injected under extreme pressure, creating rock crevices through which gas can pass. This technique has greatly expanded potential gas (and perhaps oil) production, but has created environmental controversies over migration of methane and fracking fluid into the water table, handling of chemicals, and even the possibility that rock fracturing could cause earthquakes (see ProPublica 2012). Deposits suitable for hydraulic fracturing have also been found in almost every province in Canada (Patterson 2010) and there are also some in Mexico. (See Map 1.1.) The Bakken Basin, currently a major producer, straddles the US-Canada border. Mexico is a world-class oil producer, with most wells either offshore or onshore in the southern Gulf region. It currently supplies 1.3 million barrels per day to the United States, or a bit more than 10 per cent of US consumption (United States Energy Information Administration 2011), placing Mexico as the second supplier after Canada in 2010, followed by Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Mexico has been facing significant problems with its oil industry; production from what used to be its largest field, an offshore field called Cantarell, has started to decline. However, the field of Ku-Maloob-Zaap in the Gulf of Mexico has been compensating for Cantarell’s decrease, producing 839 thousand barrels a day since 2010 (SENER 2012). This field was ranked second after Cantarell up until 2008, but has since become the number one producer

Lower Besa River Montney

North American shale plays

Muskwa-Otter Park, Evie-Klua

(as of May 2011)

MuskwaOtter Park

Doig Phosphate

Colo rado Grou p

Bakken ***

Niobr ara* Cody

Heath**

Mont erey

Antrim

Niobr ara*

Devonian (Ohio)

Mancos

Exce lloMulky

Herm osa

Le wis

Horton Bluff

Frederick Brook

Gamm on

Mowry

Hilliard - Ba xterManco s -Niobra ra

Mont ereyTemb lor

Utica

PierreNiobrara

Avalo n

Woodford Bend

Barnett

Barnett Woo dford

New Albany

Fayetteville

Chattanoog a

FloydNeal

Conasauga

Marce llus Utica

Current shale plays Stacked plays Shallowest / youngest Intermediate depth / age Deepest / oldest

Tuscaloosa

Eagle Ford, La Casita

Eagle Ford

HaynesvilleBossier

* Mixed shale & chalk play ** Mixed shale & limestone play *** Mixed shale & tight dolostonesiltstone-sandstone play

Prospective shale plays

Eagle Ford, Tithonian Pimienta

Basins Pimienta, Tamaulipas

Miles Maltrata

MAP 1.1 Geologic Basins with Potential Production of Oil and Gas from Shale SOURCE: US Energy Information Administration, 2011.

0

200

400

600

800

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities19

in Mexico, representing 33 per cent of the oil production in the country. It is expected to produce at this rate for the next 15 years (SENER 2012a). During 2011 and 2012, however, additional oil fields were discovered (see Map 1.2); some are in deep waters (such as the Supremus 1 and Trion 1 oilfields), while others are almost on the surface (such as the Knibe 1, Tsimin, May, and Kab oilfields). Other fields have been found inland (such as Navegante 1), and these are easier to exploit. These reserves will complement the more than 1,400 million barrels of proven reserves for the country, and will reach a 100 per cent oil restitution rate by 2013 (SENER 2012a). The United States is the world’s second-largest producer of coal, exceeded only by China. Canada produces some coal and Mexico produces very little (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010). Historically, US coal mining was of two principal types: surface mining in the Midwest and West, and underground mining in the Appalachian Mountain states (West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky). In the last decade or so, Appalachian mining has given more emphasis to a technique called “mountaintop removal,” in which huge amounts of earth are moved to provide surface access to deposits that in earlier days would have been shaft mined. This is very controversial because of impacts on land forms, water quality, and drainage patterns. Coal is used primarily to generate electricity in all three North American countries: it accounts for 49 per cent of electricity generation in the United States, 17 per cent in Canada, and only 8 per cent in Mexico, where oil and natural gas are the principal fuels (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010). Cheap natural gas, the result of the controversial “fracking” technique, promises to offer an alternative fuel, reducing CO2 and mercury emissions and limiting the land disturbance caused by coal mining. The above discussion highlights the dissimilar arrangements across the land management and resource development regimes in the three North American countries. At a fundamental level, the ways in which people, the natural environment, and economies interact differ across the three countries, creating distinct complexions of political actors and management arrangements. “Sustainable development” and environmental management is likely to be seen through somewhat different lenses, depending on the nation in question. However, the critical role of fossil fuel and other natural resource development is a shared feature of North American economic and political life; all three countries place a high priority on resource extraction, which has serious implications for environmental policy on the continent.

Economic Conditions: Development and Commitment Another critical difference among the North American countries is the level and structure of their respective economies. No comparison of the three countries would be complete without noting the “development gap” that exists between Canada and the United States on the one hand, and Mexico on the other (Clarkson 2008; Fukuyama 2008; Morales 2008). The Mexican economy is simply not as well developed as those of the United States and Canada, and this has a direct impact not only on the resources available for environmental protection but also the priority that may be placed on environmental protection vs. other goals, such as social development. Moreover, the global recession of 2007–11 placed additional pressures on the Mexican economy, and has served to reduce environmental budgets in all three countries.

Production Basins Oil and associated gas Non-associated gas

Burgos Sabinas Aguas profundas Plataforma de Yucatán

Tampico

Recursos prospectivos

mmmbpce

Sabinas Burgos Tampico-Misantla Veracruz Southeast Gulf of Mexico (deep water) Yucatán Platform

0.4 2.9 2.5 1.6 20.1 26.5 0.5

Total

54.6

Misantla

Veracruz

Cuencas del Sureste

MAP 1.2 Mexican Oilfields SOURCE: Secretaría de Energía 2012. Prospectiva de Petróleo Crudo 2012–2026. Mexico City: Secretaría de Energía.

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities21

In thinking about the overall nature of the three economies, Table 1.1 provides some general indicators of comparison. The United States economy is, of course, far larger than either the Canadian or Mexican economies. However, all three countries are among the world’s largest in terms of total GDP, with the United States ranking first, Canada ranking ninth, and Mexico ranking fourteenth (2012 data from International Monetary Fund). The structure of the three economies is broadly similar; in 2010, the service sector accounted for the largest portion of economic activity across the three countries (71.5 per cent in Canada, 63.5 per cent in Mexico, and 76.8 per cent in the United States), followed by the industrial sector (26.3 per cent in Canada, 32.6 per cent in Mexico, and 22.1 per cent in the United States). The agricultural sector, as a share of GDP, is quite small in all three countries, though somewhat more significant in Mexico. On a world scale, Canada is a natural resource powerhouse, with mining products (including fossil fuels) making up 31 per cent of its exports. Mexico follows at 17 per cent and the United States with 10 per cent (2010 data from World Trade Organization). The data also show that

TABLE 1.1 Economic Statistics CANADA

UNITED STATES

MEXICO

Gross national income per capita, Atlas method, USD

2009

$41,950

$47,200

$13,900

Total GDP (purchasing power parity, USD trillions)

2010

$1.33

$14.66

$1.567

GDP % real growth

2008

0.7

1.4

2.0

GDP % real growth

2010

3.1

2.8

5.5

% unemployment

2010 Est.

8

9.6

5.4 (under-employment may be as high as 25%)

Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)

2009

29

11

28

Value added in agriculture (% of GDP)

2006

2

1

4

Value added in industry (% of GDP)

2006

32

22

35

Value added in services (% of GDP)

2006

67

77

61

High-tech exports (% of manf. exports)

2010

14

20

17

% exports mining products, incl. fuels

2010

31

10

17

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (USD billions)

2010

23.6

236.2

18.7

SOURCE: World Bank; CIA World Factbook.

22

Environmental Policy in North America

all three countries are large exporters, Canada and Mexico in particular. These two are also very dependent on the US market; for both Canada and Mexico, approximately three-fourths of exports in 2010 were destined for the United States. By comparison, the United States’ largest export partners were China (19.5 per cent), Canada (14.2 per cent), and Mexico (11.8 per cent). For our purposes, it is important to note the significance of commodities— particularly from the oil and gas sector—for the Canadian and Mexican economies, and for government revenues. In 2010, Canada exported $90 billion worth of energy products (almost all oil and gas), of which 98.4 per cent went to the United States (Natural Resources Canada 2013). Moreover, in 2011, the industry paid $21 billion into the coffers of the federal and provincial governments. For Mexico, the oil sector generated 14 per cent of export earnings in 2010 and 32 per cent of total government revenues (United States Department of State 2011); similar to Canada, almost all of its energy exports went to the United States. These aggregate numbers do not tell us as much as we need to know about Mexico’s troubled economic history. Robert Pastor, a close observer of North American integration, notes that “Mexicans who expected NAFTA to lift their country to a first-world economy were disappointed” (Pastor et al. 2005). In the 1990s, Mexico undertook significant economic reforms, reducing its tariffs, dismantling price subsidies, initiating privatization of some parts of state enterprise, focusing on manufacturing-for-export, and, in 1993, signing NAFTA, a comprehensive free trade treaty with Canada and the United States. Exports grew, tripling between 1990 and 2004 (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 2004), and by 2001 Mexico was the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in Latin America. (Currently, Mexico is the second-highest recipient of FDI in Latin America, after Brazil.) However, the income gap, which Pastor sees as the primary indicator of the development gap, did not show the expected gains. While it narrowed over the first decade after NAFTA, it was actually wider by the mid-2000s than it was in 1980. In fact, looking over the whole post-NAFTA period (1994–2010), Mexico has been unable to “catch up.” In 1994, the country’s per capita GDP was 18.1 per cent that of the United States and 24 per cent that of Canada; in 2010, Mexico’s per capita GDP was 19.3 per cent that of the United States and 19.7 per cent that of Canada. (By contrast, over the same period, Brazil was able to raise its per capita GDP from only 13 per cent that of the United States to 23 per cent [2011 data from World Bank]). Differences in the legal minimum wage are enlightening when describing the income gap across the continent. The United States’ federal minimum wage, set by the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, is $7.25 USD per hour, with state minimums as high as $9.19 USD (State of Washington). In his 2013 State of the Union speech, President Obama proposed a federal minimum of $9.00 USD. In Canada, the minimum wage, set by the provinces, varies from $8.75 CDN to $10.25 CDN per hour.1 In Mexico, however, the minimum is less than $5 USD per day (eight hours).2 There is also a notable regional aspect to Mexico’s development performance, with considerable variation across the states depending on the indicators used. In 2009, more than half of the states had not performed well over the previous three years. Only four states (Distrito Federal, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, and Estado de Mexico) were above the national average (INEGI 2011b). It is interesting

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities23

to note that the traditional assumption that the northern states have stronger economies than states in the southern region—because they are closer to the United States—is simply not true anymore. Mexico’s greatest areas of growth are its major urban areas—Mexico City, Estado de Mexico, Guadalajara, and Monterrey (INEGI 2011b). Regional variations are also notable in the United States and Canada, though in Canada they are somewhat disguised by aggressive national policies to direct government revenues to distressed regions. Until 2008, the official unemployment rates were quite low and had been stable in all three countries. Yet the official Mexican unemployment rate grossly understated the actual situation; government figures put it at a mere 3.6 per cent for April 2007. Mexico distinguishes between unemployment, subemployment, and informal employment, with this last category accounting for an alarming 28 per cent for 2011 (INEGI 2011b). The decline in agricultural employment post-NAFTA greatly contributed to joblessness in the country; Jeffrey Faux (2008) argued in 2008 that 2 million family farmers had been driven off their land. Since the onset of the 2008–9 economic crisis, unemployment rates have risen in all three countries; the estimated unemployment rate in 2010 was 9.6 per cent in the United States, 8 per cent in Canada, and (officially) 5.4 per cent in Mexico (see Table 1.1). Given this picture of incomes and employment, the human development statistics for Mexico are perhaps not surprising. According to World Bank estimates, over 45 per cent of the Mexican population was living in moderate poverty in 2005. For extreme poverty, the total was 18 per cent, with the figure rising to over 30 per cent in rural areas. According to the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL 2011), income poverty increased over 2008–10—from 44.5 per cent to 46.2 per cent of the total population in the country. Within all three countries, of course, there is tremendous variation in earnings—across industries, levels of education, geographic locations, and genders—that are masked by overall statistics. The Gini Index (Table 1.2), which measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country,3 shows that there is a greater gap between the rich and poor in Mexico (and the United States) than in Canada. The United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI), which provides a broader definition of well-being by calculating a normalized measure of life expectancy, literacy rates, educational enrolment, and GDP per capita, also shows the gap between Mexico and its northern neighbors.4 Canada and the United States are both in the top 10 in the world; Mexico is only 56th. As is suggested by the different economic situations at the regional level in Mexico, there are also significant regional variations in HDI across the country; the level in the Federal District is about the same as for the Czech Republic, while that in Chiapas is similar to (pre-war) Syria. Mexico’s average HDI is climbing only slowly, and the regional variations have not changed much over time (UNDP 2007). The relative development challenges of each North American country are of course linked to the ability of its government to raise revenue to undertake its policy responsibilities. The Canadian government’s tax revenues, at 38.2 per cent of GDP, are above the world average, while those in Mexico (22.5 per cent) and the United States (14.7 per cent) are well below it (2011 data from CIA World Factbook). A significant economic weakness for Mexico arises from its reliance on oil revenues extracted from the state-owned national petroleum

24

Environmental Policy in North America

TABLE 1.2 Human Development and Demographics CANADA

UNITED STATES

MEXICO

Population (mil)

2011 (July)

34

313.2

113.7

Population growth (%)

2011 (est.)

0.79

0.96

1.1

32.1 (2005)

45 (2007)

51.7 (2008)

Gini Index Life expectancy at birth (years)

2011

81

78

76

Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)

2011

4.92

6.06

17.29

Total fertility rate (# born/woman)

2011

1.58

2.06

2.29

Human Development Index (rank in world)

2011

0.888 (8th)

0.902 (4th)

0.750 (56th)

% urban

2011

80

81

76

SOURCE: United Nations Human Development Index; CIA World Factbook; World Bank.

company, PEMEX, as discussed above. Moreover, it has been estimated that Mexico has a tax evasion rate as high as 70 per cent among professionals and small businesses, and 40 per cent among larger businesses, which reinforces government reliance on oil revenues (Wall 2007). All three countries were hit hard by the global recession that started in late 2007. Mexico suffered a “perfect storm” of falling prices for oil, reduced remittances from Mexicans working in the United States, and dramatically reduced export demand from the United States, especially for automobile parts. The change in GDP for 2009 was −2.3 per cent for Canada, −2.9 per cent for the United States, and fully −6.2 per cent for Mexico5 (Villarreal 2010; INEGI 2011a). However, in the long, slow recovery from the recession, Mexico (+3.9 per cent for GDP in 2011) and Canada (+2.3 per cent) have fared rather better than the United States (+1.7 per cent), with both of the smaller countries getting the benefit of higher oil and mineral prices (data from The Economist Intelligence Unit). Although all three countries ran government budget deficits, the shortfall in the United States (−8.7 per cent of GDP in 2011) was far greater than in Canada (−4 per cent) or Mexico (−2.9 per cent). One should not underestimate the impact of the fiscal crisis in the two northern countries. In the United States, huge budget deficits, low economic growth, and daunting liability for future Social Security and Medicare/ Medicaid payments have polarized the country between those who want to cut expenditures and those who want to raise taxes. Canada is not in nearly the same desperate financial shape as the United States or Mexico. However, the country is running both a budget deficit and a trade deficit at a time when its economy is one of the strongest in the world, largely due to oil and gas production activities. The net effect of the economic forces described above is that all three countries are struggling to increase national economic growth, and all three face a

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities25

struggle to maintain even current levels of government investment and public service provision. The situation is, of course, far more critical in Mexico, which faces development challenges. Further, the significant role that the oil and gas industry plays in the Canadian and Mexican economies both creates a vulnerability to unstable world commodity markets and also dampens the commitment of government officials to environmental protection and sustainable resource management. In the United States, this dynamic is playing itself out in “jobs vs. environment” or “environment vs. energy independence” debates, issues which many thought had been resolved decades ago.

Ecological Conditions: Problems and Priorities While we emphasized the transboundary nature of environmental problems on the continent in the introduction, each country also has its own pattern and severity of environmental degradation. This can affect how each builds up its environmental capacity and, conceivably, the relative priority placed on specific environmental problems—even though the problems themselves might be common to all three countries. Overall, as Table 1.3 shows, the environmental footprint of Canada and the United States is heavier than Mexico’s; this is evident from the data for CO2 emissions, energy and electricity consumption, use of passenger cars, and municipal waste generation. However, Mexico, with a denser population and a lower grade of sanitation and industrial infrastructure due to underdevelopment, faces a wide array of more acute environmental problems, including air and water pollution, water scarcity, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity. Canada faces air and water quality problems that are less severe, but it has failed—spectacularly in some cases (e.g., fisheries and timber)—to manage its natural resources sustainably. The United States, paradoxically, seems to struggle with severe pollution problems and yet has achieved considerable success in addressing specific air and water pollutants. One attempt to quantify environmental quality at a point in time, using consistent criteria, is the “Environmental Performance Index,” prepared by a joint team from Yale and Columbia universities (see Yale University 2009). The index uses 25 measures, which it combines into general metrics of “Environmental Health” and “Ecosystem Vitality.” On the Environmental Health metric, scores (out of 100) for Canada (92.77) and the United States (88.3) placed them in the upper echelon of countries in the world; Mexico’s score (76.63) was considerably lower, largely due to the impact of air pollution and disease. However, on the Ecosystem Vitality metric, which gives heavy emphasis to carbon dioxide generation, 2010 scores for Canada (40.1) and the United States (38.65) were considerably lower—and represent a huge drop from 2009. For Canada, additional weaknesses were fisheries management, air pollution, and climate change. The United States, for its part, scored low on climate change and air pollution, but also on biodiversity and habitat. Mexico’s score was actually somewhat higher (58.06) than its northern neighbors, though still lower than 2009, mainly on the basis of air and water pollution, as well as biodiversity and habitat loss. The environmental data surveyed in Table 1.3 provides some indication of the environmental outlook for the three countries. Certainly, progress has been made in managing the environment in all three countries (e.g., declines in air pollutants), yet much remains to be done. Air and water pollution are in many

26

Environmental Policy in North America

areas still above safe standards, biodiversity declines have been reduced but not halted, toxic chemicals still circulate in ecosystems and are found in human bodies, and global warming has barely been addressed. Indeed, greenhouse gas emissions have risen substantially in all three countries, despite concerns that climate change will exacerbate many environmental problems. Moreover, a critical problem facing Mexico and also the United States is the available quantity of freshwater resources; both have less water resources and are using them more quickly than Canada. A major problem in all three countries is the release of toxic chemicals into the environment. These can come from factories, from coal-fired electric power plants (mainly mercury), and from agricultural pesticides. The North American countries have banned several of the most dangerous substances, including TABLE 1.3 Environmental Data for Canada, the United States, and Mexico YEAR

CANADA

UNITED STATES

MEXICO

Population density (inhabitants/km )

2010

3.4

32

55

CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)

2007

2

CO2 emissions (% change 1990–2000)

16.9

19.4

4.3

+22

+18

+24

Energy use per capita (kg of oil equiv.)

2008

7,411

7,075

1,578

Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)

2008

17,061

13,654

1,942

Fossil fuel energy consumption (% total)

2008

74.8

84.3

89.0

Contribution of renewables to primary energy supply (% total)

2008

16.5

10.9

9.6

Passenger cars per 1,000 people

2008

399

451

181

Municipal waste (kg per capita)

2007

400

760

350

Renewable freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters)

2007

86,426

9,344

3,745

Water withdrawals (% of gross annual availability)

2004

1.5

15.5

19

Sulfur oxides (kg per capita)

–

44 (2009)

34 (2008)

..

Sulfur oxides (% change 1990–early 2000s)

–

−22

−20

..

Nitrogen oxides (kg per capita)

–

64 (2009)

49 (2008)

12 (2008)

Nitrogen oxides (% change 1990–early 2000s)

–

−6

+5

+18

PM10 (micrograms per cubic meter)

2008

15

33

19

Fish species, threatened

2010

32

177

150

Plant species (higher), threatened

2010

2

245

255

SOURCE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Factbook 2010; The World Bank 2011; Environment Canada; United States Environmental Protection Agency.

Industrial Facilities Reporting Pollutants in 2006 0 250 500

FIGURE 1.1 Distribution of Reporting Facilities in North America (2006) SOURCE: Commission for Environmental Cooperation 2011, 7.

1,000 km

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Environmental Policy in North America

polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and DDT. Yet even these substances are still present in the environment as a result of past use. The North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation has been monitoring toxic pollutants across North America for over a decade; its 2011 Taking Stock report—the thirteenth in the CEC’s series on pollutant releases and transfers from industrial facilities in North America—uses 2006 data for Canada, the United States, and Mexico. One of the findings of the study is that just two of the 256 pollutants released to surface waters made up 90 per cent of the total volume: nitrate compounds and ammonia.

Values and Activism: Seeing Eye to Eye? Sociocultural values shape the way in which the environment and sustainable development are conceptualized, and can also influence the degree to which environmental protection is a national priority. Across countries, such factors shape the prospects for agreement on priorities and approach; here, one can reasonably argue that there is a common well of environmental concern that might undergird dialogue across borders and engender activism. The strength of the organized environmental movement, however, varies considerably across the continent. Environmental concern on the part of Canadians, Americans, and Mexicans has certainly been a feature of the post-NAFTA period, which may act to create a common popular push for action. Looking region-wide, in the mid-1990s Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basañez (1996) found a high level of concern about environmental degradation and support for transboundary cooperation on the part of citizens of the three North American countries to address this degradation. Using the 1991 World Values Survey data, the authors showed that, when asked whether they would support integration if “it meant that we could deal more effectively with environmental issues,” clear majorities in all three countries answered “Yes” (Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basañez 1996, 145–6). Fifteen years later, the 2005 World Values Survey data showed considerable similarity in the level of environmental concern and commitment to government action on the part of citizens in the three countries. The percentage of respondents who thought that the “government should reduce environmental pollution” was over 60 per cent for all three countries. When asked to compare “protecting the environment” with “economic growth and creating jobs,” respondents in all three countries preferred the former. The percentage choosing “protecting the environment” was somewhat higher in Canada (68 per cent) and Mexico (58 per cent) than in the United States (52 per cent). Mexicans (and, to some extent, Americans) seem to place a higher priority on “first tier” problems such as water and air pollution, as well as waste. With regard to specific problems “in your community,” poor water quality was termed “very serious” by 39 per cent of Mexican respondents, 38 per cent of US respondents, and 28 per cent of Canadian respondents. Poor sewage and sanitation was noted as “very serious” by 47 per cent in Mexico, 34 per cent in the United States, and 23 per cent in Canada. Poor air quality was noted by 39 per cent in the United States, 35 per cent in Mexico, and 28 per cent in Canada. Interestingly, when asked to rate the seriousness of several world, rather than local, environmental problems, Mexicans also showed the highest

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities29

level of concern. For example, loss of plant or animal species or biodiversity was identified as very serious by 77 per cent of Mexicans, 54 per cent of Canadians, and only 46 per cent of Americans. Despite these respectable levels of concern across environmental problems, however, only 6 per cent of the respondents in each country were active members of environmental organizations—a disappointing statistic in light of the number and seriousness of environmental problems on the continent. And this common statistic masks significant differences across the three countries in terms of the strength of organized environmental movements; it is strongest in the United States, weaker in Canada, and weakest in Mexico. The national environmental movement in the United States is the oldest among the three countries, dating back to the late nineteenth century and the creation of groups concerned with wildlife, water and forest conservation, and national parks. Starting in the late 1960s, there was a surge of activism, and many of the environmental groups simultaneously increased local activism through hundreds of local chapters (e.g., Sierra Club and National Wildlife Federation) and built large professional staffs, mainly in Washington, DC, that could track national issues and participate with considerable sophistication and political skill in policy debates. Newer organizations, such as the Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council, started to use the courts as a way of establishing rights of public participation and holding government agencies responsible for their interpretation and enforcement of environmental laws. Many of the national groups have international interests and capabilities, and they can participate knowledgeably in debates on such issues as international trade and global climate change. In addition to these actors, environmental think tanks also take active part in national and regional policy debates, including the Pew Institute and the Earth Institute. There are a large number of “land trusts” that buy or hold easements on land with important ecological or recreational values. Further, thousands of ad hoc local groups are very important participants in the land-use regulatory process, an area in which most decisions are local and where citizen participation is an expected, and often very effective, part of decision-making. Most US groups have carefully avoided links to political parties, although they often endorse particular candidates for public office at all levels of government. During the Ronald Reagan administration (1981–9), his government, and many of its business supporters, tried to weaken environmental regulations by promoting a “regulation kills jobs” agenda. This was successfully fended off by environmental groups and never gained much traction with the public. The deep job losses of 2007 onward, particularly in manufacturing, have revived this issue, and this time environmental advocates have not been very effective in persuading the public that a future economy based on alternative energy, reduction of CO2 emissions, and a continued high level of regulation can create (rather than destroy) jobs and augment industrial competitiveness. US environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council, are actively involved in some Canadian issues, partic­ ularly proposed pipelines that would bring oil from Alberta’s tar sands to US Gulf Coast refineries (Keystone XL) and to West Coast ports (Northern Gateway).

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Environmental Policy in North America

Canada’s environmental movement has followed a similar trajectory to its counterpart in the United States, moving from a focus on conservationism in the early twentieth century to a more radical critique of postwar consumerism and pollution, to the current internationalist focus on climate change and energy choices (Paehlke 2009). Yet Canada’s environmental groups became an active player in the political process later than in the United States, and they have never been as strong. Further, they are more “federalized”—in other words, organizations at the provincial level are frequently stronger and more active than national ones. The more high-profile organizations in terms of engagement in national policy-making are Greenpeace, the David Suzuki Foundation, the Sierra Club of Canada, and the Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development. Other important national groups, usually with local affiliates, are the Canadian Nature Federation, the Canadian Wildlife Federation, and the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society. Canada’s provincial environmental groups have been particularly active in issues of acid deposition, cutting of old-growth forests, fisheries, and management of the Great Lakes. In addition, native bands (known as First Nations) have frequently mobilized around environmental issues affecting them, such as persistent chemicals found in fish and game, the building of hydropower dams that flood parts of their territories, or the impacts of climate change in the Arctic. Canada has a national green party that has put up candidates in the last four federal elections in all 308 ridings. While the vote share of the Green Party of Canada increased from 4.5 per cent in 2006 to 6.8 per cent in the October 2008 election, support fell to 4 per cent in the 2011 election. However, the party did manage to elect a member of parliament in 2011. There are provincial green parties in seven provinces, the most successful in British Columbia, where its candidates garnered 9 per cent of the vote, though no seats, in the 2005 provincial elections. Mexico has had a large number of nongovernmental environmental advocacy groups since the mid-1970s at both the national and local levels. Often, they have sprung up because of a specific development proposal. There have been few stable groups with a comprehensive national policy agenda or “a common project” (Hipple 2001). Mexico has had great difficulty creating significant national membership groups like the Sierra Club in the United States or the Canadian Wildlife Federation. The Grupo de los Cien (Group of One Hundred), a loose organization of prominent artists and intellectuals, has undertaken periodic environmental campaigns since 1984, but its activities are episodic and its influence limited to publicity and moral appeals. Since 2000, civil society in Mexico has become more active, contesting commercial schemes that do not adequately address environmental concerns, such as the Frente de Pueblos en Defensa de la Tierra y el Agua (People’s Front in Defense of Earth and Water). Many groups tend to be based in rural areas and integrate economic, social, and cultural rights into their claims. The 1980s marked the golden age of Mexican environmental activism (Aranda 2009); for example, the movement helped to formulate the Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y Protección Ambiente (General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection) in 1988. In 1985, the First Meeting of Environmental Groups took place, gathering together more than 130 advocacy groups with the aim of setting out an environmental advocacy agenda. Among the most important topics was the disorganized growth of the city, the

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities31

lack of green spaces, the protection of biodiversity, and protest against nuclear energy in Laguna Verde (Aranda 2009). In general, these advocacy groups were not proactive, but reactive to threats to the environment (Velázquez 2007). They also worked with the World Wildlife Fund and the Nature Conservancy to invest significant amounts of money into Mexican programs. These international NGOs have introduced ideas, through their branches in Mexico, to create natural reserves, for example. Some environmental groups have been supported by the Mexican gov­­ ernment, such as the Movimiento Ecologista Mexicano (Mexican Ecological Movement) and the Alianza Ecologista Nacional (Ecological National Alliance), which was the basis for the Partido Verde Ecologista Mexicano (Green and Ecological Mexican Party), founded in 1986. This party has been dominated by a single politically minded family and has been involved in electoral and other scandals. Although it has an elaborate pro-environment platform, many observers believe its agenda is more political than truly environmental.6 Thanks to several alliances with the main political parties, in the last legislature (2006–12) this party had six seats in the Mexican Senate and 21 in the Chamber of Deputies. Overall, public opinion does not appear to pose an obstacle to environmental action at home or on the border in any of the three countries, although we would hesitate to say that environmental concern would always win out over natural resource extraction; indeed, it probably would not. Further, the varying levels of environmental activism may represent something of an Achilles heel for North American environmental policy.

The Political Scene: Obstacles and Opportunities To some extent, we can relate the differences in environmental activism in Canada, the United States, and Mexico to their distinctive political institutions and dynamics, for these political frameworks create varying incentives for political mobilization. One might argue that the Canadian and Mexican systems present rather more obstacles than opportunities for pro-environment interests, given the rather closed nature of policy-making. The US policy-making system is relatively more open, although obstacles present themselves in having multiple channels for participation, which also act as veto points. It is useful here to provide some basic institutional information on the three countries. All three countries have federal systems, with 10 provinces and three territories in Canada; 31 states and a federal capital district in Mexico; and 50 states and a capital district in the United States. All three can be considered democratic, with fair elections and orderly exchanges of power.7 However, various interest groups, both ideologically based and representatives of economic interests, spend large amounts of money to influence public opinion. Canada has a parliamentary system, while Mexico and the United States separately elect the president and the legislature. Large bureaucratic agencies, often with highly specialized staff, implement laws passed by the legislature and signed by the president or prime minister, in many cases with day-to-day decisions taken by state or provincial agencies. Courts play a quite different role in each country. In the United States, they rule not only on the constitutionality of laws, but also on details of how administrative agencies interpret legislative directions. As a result, industry and environmental groups often regard courts as just another stage of policy

32

Environmental Policy in North America

struggles, and the resulting delays mean it can be years, even decades, before legislative goals are implemented. Mexico’s legal system is based on a very complete set of civil laws and codes, which leave little ground for interpretation by the Supreme Court or local courts. An important element of the Mexican system is the “amparo,” a writ or injunction issued by a court to defend citizens from the abuse of authority. Unfortunately, this instrument has itself been abused, employed by violators to avoid the application of certain environmental laws. Canada has a full set of constitutional and administrative courts but, contrary to the United States, these courts have been loath to challenge political and agency decision-making. Moreover, the rules of standing are quite restrictive, which greatly limits the ability of environmental groups to challenge government decisions. Environmental policy-making in Canada is neither open nor participatory. Indeed, the Canadian environmental policy regime is, to a considerable degree, the result of an interconnecting set of compromises most often reached behind closed doors, between the federal government and the provinces, between the heads of environmental and other agencies with economic portfolios (e.g., industry, natural resources) at the level of the cabinet, and between the economic interests aligned with these various actors. For nongovernmental (e.g., environmental) groups, gaining access to these decision-making arenas is quite difficult. First, Canada is the most decentralized federation in the world, and its weak federal government is forced to bargain with muscular provinces on environmental matters. From a constitutional and legal perspective, while the Canadian federal government has the power to protect human health and address transborder pollution, the provinces possess the jurisdictional levers to actually regulate most point sources of pollution, as well as “species and spaces” and natural resources within their borders. Moreover, the political dynamics of federalism, infused as it is with concerns about Quebec nationalism and province-building in other regions, encourages the federal government to tread lightly in environment-related areas, such as energy development, where provinces have jurisdiction—and often conflicting interests. Extensive consultation is necessary, and in the area of the environment this consultation most often takes place in an intergovernmental forum, the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME), where provinces and the federal government negotiate “Canada-wide standards” as equals—but where environmental groups are not generally afforded access. Second, given the dominance of the governing party over both branches of government in a parliamentary system, policy discussions within the federal government (and, indeed, within each of the provincial governments) typically take place in cabinet and at the highest levels of the bureaucracy, rather than in parliament. Environmental policy can become the subject of interdepartmental squabbling when various departments have jurisdiction and are struggling to achieve often conflicting goals, and such conflict is typically played out at the highest levels in cabinet committees. Senior-level bureaucratic and political officials control policy-making, including whatever opportunities there may be for consultation with nongovernmental interests. Further, recourse to the judicial system to challenge government regulatory decisions is limited. If we look south of the border, we see a very different environmental policymaking dynamic, one that is in some ways more participatory—though it does

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities33

not clearly present a level playing field for various political interests. First, the US power system is fragmented, with the president, both houses of congress, and the courts all having a significant role to play in decision-making. The US environmental policy-making process is thus conflict-ridden and painstaking, requiring that proponents build multiple, overlapping coalitions in Congress that encompass industry interests as well as environmentalists, different state interests, and executive as well as legislative interests. Moreover, this coalitionbuilding must be replicated in House and Senate subcommittees and committees, as well as before full votes, with the executive seeking to use its influence at every point in the process. To take but one example, efforts to amend the “Clean Air Act,” originally passed in 1970, spanned almost a decade (1982–90). Because actors participating in the process do not trust one another, debates are hard-edged, very public, and technical, with all sides trying to show that their positions are based on science. They must, however, work together to achieve anything, as vetoes blocking legislative action are sprinkled liberally throughout the system. Recourse to the courts to settle issues—in particular, to test new mandates, as noted above—is common. The result is rather messy; there are more opportunities for environmental groups to make their case, but they must compete with well-heeled business groups. Second, the national government plays a more significant role in environmental policy-making than is the case in Canada. The US Congress may impose environmental mandates on the states in most areas of environmental protection. These mandates are then implemented by federal agencies, primarily the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). There is no intergovernmental mechanism whereby states bargain with the federal government on environmental standards. Instead, district and state representatives in the House and Senate respectively keep an eye on the needs of their local constituencies during the lawmaking process. On the implementation and enforcement side, regional offices of the EPA serve as the primary point of contact for states certified to undertake the administration of federal programs, and their role is one of watchdog, but also facilitator. States receive considerable support from the EPA, particularly with respect to capacity-building. The Mexican system is quite different yet again; until recently it had been highly centralized, with the result that the policy-making process has been quite closed and not particularly transparent. Despite the fact that Mexico borrowed the most important tenets of the “separation-of-powers” presidential system from the American Constitution, the dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) over the executive and legislative branches of government at national and subnational levels (from its establishment in 1929 through to the late 1990s) subverted any constructive operation of checks and balances, and this led to a situation of strong executive control. There was no real degree of involvement by societal interests, given the closed nature of the system under one-party dominance; instead, society was regrouped into specific sectors, which found their political expression in very strong, centralized, and hierarchical unions—peasants, workers, teachers, and other popular groups—that supported the PRI in a “clientelist” manner, whereby the unions traded favors for votes. Since the PRI controlled politics and policy-making, environmental policy initiative (or the lack thereof) rested at the very top levels, and the dynamics of environmental policy-making in Mexico were thus best

34

Environmental Policy in North America

examined through the lens of various presidential sexenios (six-year terms). Over the course of the Echeverria (1970–6), Lopez Portillo (1976–82), de la Madrid (1982–8), and Salinas (1988–94) administrations, there were some moderate improvements to the national environmental regime. States traditionally played little role, controlled as they were by the dominant party and restricted in terms of policy scope. Environmental groups were effectively shut out of environ­mental policy-making. It was the inertia of the Río de Janeiro Conference in 1992, and the NAFTA debate in the early 1990s, that kick-started serious consideration in Mexico under the Ernesto Zedillo regime of how to place environmental concerns alongside economic priorities. During his electoral campaign in 1994, Zedillo announced 10 goals for environmental protection, and one of his first acts in office was to create a new environmental agency with enhanced authority over water, forests, and fisheries (Stoub 1995). In 1996, the environmental protection law originally drafted in 1988 was reformed to become more comprehensive, reinforcing environmental institutions such as the Procuraduría Federal para la Protección al Ambiente (Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection, or PROFEPA), created in 1992. This law also provided the basis for institutionbuilding in Mexico and for regulatory action, as represented by Normas Oficiales Mexicanas (NOMs) (Mexican Official Environmental Standards). Mexico now has a broad framework of environmental legislation that adopts a regulatory approach, much as in the American environmental protection regime, although there has been a distinct reluctance to enforce regulations on large and small industries or on state-controlled organizations like PEMEX. In the current context, further environmental policy progress depends on the ability of the federal and state governments to increase revenue for public programming. Over time, then, the process has become somewhat more professionalized and more open. First, since the end of one-party rule in 2000, checks and balances have begun to operate in Congress, and environmental debates have become more hard-edged and public. Second, successive amendments to the Mexican constitution have expanded the role of the states in environmental protection, and they have enacted legislation to support federal action in an increasing range of environmental areas (Hogenboom 1998). Third, non­ governmental interests have been able to play a more significant role in political and bureaucratic policy-making (see Diez 2008).

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT APPROACHES IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO How, then, have these distinctive national contexts shaped the environmental management approaches of the three countries? Viewed from afar, Canada, the United States, and Mexico seem to have employed broadly similar approaches to addressing environmental policy problems. As Weidner and Jänicke (2002, vi) argue, this is not surprising, as there has been a “worldwide convergence in the basic pattern of environmental policy.” All three countries set up national agencies to encourage conservation of forests and to create a system of national parks in the late nineteenth century. Much later, beginning in the late 1960s in the United States and the early 1970s in Canada, these two countries began to build pollution control regimes that relied on command-and-control regulation,

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities35

whereby polluters are required to meet targets for emissions to specific media (air, water, soil) and, in many cases, the use of certain types of equipment to reduce emissions is specified. More often than not, Canadian legislation addressing pollution came a few years after the American (VanNijnatten 1999). In the case of Mexico, the creation of a full-fledged regulatory regime came almost two decades later, initiated in the late 1980s to early 1990s. Yet the pollution control regimes in the three countries also exhibit unique features that can be linked to individualized contexts. The American policy process is quite rigorous, resulting in detailed statutes that (if passed) spell out enforceable action to be taken by agencies, states, and industries, and that are closely monitored by Congress, the executive branch as well as a professionalized environmental movement. Institutionalized distrust in the American political system is beneficial in terms of “requiring” other actors in the system to take action. The resulting environmental management regime in the United States is, perhaps not surprisingly, regarded as the “archetype” of the command-and-control model of pollution control, relying on laws and regulations implemented through enforcement and compliance mechanisms. The United States system has been, as a review by the OECD (2006, 122) states, “very effective” in terms of reducing point-source pollution to specific media. A comprehensive set of environmental laws—the OECD lists fully 67 pieces of legislation that address pollution to various media as well as natural resource management and different forms of pollution prevention—provides a national framework for environmental protection, under which detailed regulations to guide public and private behavior are promulgated (OECD 2006, 148–9). These regulations are enforced by stiff civil and criminal penalties; the United States has an impressive record in terms of enforcement (OECD 2006, 147). The federal government has delegated responsibility to states for many aspects of environmental protection, including permitting, inspecting, and monitoring environmental conditions via Performance Partnership Agreements that are accompanied by federal grants. States have some leeway to adapt instruments to suit local conditions, and in some cases they have even moved out ahead of the federal government in areas such as climate change and mercury pollution reduction with innovative policy initiatives. However, federal leadership is assumed (and advocated) by most actors in the system. In the Canadian case, as we would expect, the national framework of environmental legislation is considerably lighter; the OECD (2004, 119–20) lists 10 major environment-related laws. As described earlier in this chapter, it is actually the provinces that play the primary role in regulating environmental behavior; each province has its own version of a broader environmental protection act that sets out the general parameters for the establishment and enforcement of regulations regarding emissions to air, water, and land, as well as the management of waste. The provinces also control natural resources within their borders. The federal government plays more of a residual role, although it does possess powers with regards to protecting fisheries and thus addressing water pollution (Fisheries Act 1985), managing toxic substances (the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 1999), safeguarding plants and animals that cross borders (e.g., the Migratory Birds Convention Act), and protecting endangered species (Species at Risk Act 2003). Where pollution crosses borders, as in the transboundary transport of air and water pollutants, the federal government can also play a significant role.

36

Environmental Policy in North America

Enforcement regimes at both levels of government are in place, but the approach taken is geared more toward encouraging compliance; litigation and the imposition of penalties are rarer than in the American system. This stems from the discretion built into legislation in Canada, as noted above, and also from the closer relations between the regulated industry and governments, particularly at the provincial level. Considerably more intergovernmental coordination is required, and a Canada-wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization was signed in 1998 to bring somewhat more uniformity to the system, since provincial regulations can and do vary. In contrast to the US system, federal environmental policy engagement is often discouraged by provinces and the regulated industry. In Mexico, the environmental regulatory system is in some ways at an earlier stage of development relative to the United States and Canada. In other respects, however, Mexico’s system is quite advanced. Mexico’s administrative and fiscal structure has traditionally been highly centralized, and efforts to establish an environmental protection regime have reflected this tendency. The 1988 General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA) regulates air, sea, and freshwater quality, hazardous waste and protected areas, and also environmental impact assessment of new projects. LGEEPA has subsequently undergone reforms, the most important being those undertaken in 1996, after NAFTA was enacted. This updated version of LGEEPA was intended to expand its reach to other areas of pollution control, and it has also been supplemented by new laws dealing with, for example, wildlife protection. Unlike the Canadian and American regimes, there are no national legal provisions governing solid waste (which comes under municipal competence). With regard to contaminated sites, the requirements for “Territorial Ordering and Planning of Land Use” delegate authority to lower levels of government. There have also been sustained efforts to devolve some responsibility for environmental protection to the states, and to encourage them to develop competency in this area. Since the amendments to LGEEPA, the states are now tasked with regulatory responsibilities relating to stationary and mobile air pollution sources, administration of subnational and local protected areas (with the national agency, PROFEPA, responsible for enforcement and compliance), regulation of waste, monitoring compliance with Mexican Official Standards (NOMs), and some permitting of activities so as to minimize environmental impacts. As a result, all 32 state governments have now created their own ­environmental legal regimes, though they vary greatly in terms of sophistication. Interestingly, the Mexican system appears to have moved from the American to the less confrontational Canadian model of enforcement, though Mexican states do not possess the same level of autonomy. During the early 1990s, in a bid to show its commitment to environmental protection, Mexican officials attempted to emulate the more stringent American approach to enforcement and compliance, measuring its performance according to the number of industries closed or penalized. By the early 2000s, however, a more cooperative approach had been adopted—one designed to “encourage” industries to move into compliance through the use of state-assisted environmental audits. In recent years, there has been discussion and debate within the North American environmental policy community about moving away from command-and-control regimes that, some argue, have become too costly for both government and the private sector, and seem ill-suited to the more complex

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities37

task of addressing non-point-source pollution from many diffuse, heterogeneous sources, such as agricultural runoff. Advocates of “next-generation” or “secondgeneration” environmental policies argue that policies need to be results-based (focusing on performance rather than complex systems of oversight); employ market-based instruments as a more effective (and potentially less costly) way to incent behavioral change; involve private-sector and nongovernmental actors in carrying out the tasks of environmental governance; and take a “place-based” or ecosystem approach to maintaining and improving environmental quality (Knopman and Fleschner 1999). The United States appears to be more open, certainly relative to Canada, to regulatory and policy innovation, at both national and state levels of government. A higher priority has been placed in the United States on setting targets and employing more flexible means of achieving them; these include entering into partnerships with nongovernmental actors and industries to adopt more innovative means of protecting the environment, economic instruments such as tradable permit systems and cost-benefit analysis, and voluntary initiatives to go “beyond compliance.” Considerable thinking has also gone into how to integrate ecosystem approaches into a regulatory system that is primarily single-media in approach—dealing separately with pollution to air vs. water, etc.—and there has been some experimentation, especially at the state level (Rabe 2002). Some success has also been achieved in focusing compliance and enforcement activities on those economic sectors or types of activities—particularly small- and medium-sized business—that are known to be more problematic, in a more cooperative manner. The command-and-control imprint remains heavy, however, and litigation is still the option of choice for many actors in the system that want to force or delay environmental action. The move to next-generation policies has been quite limited in Canada (VanNijnatten and Boardman 2009). Given that the approach to regulation and enforcement is more cooperative, flexible, and discretionary, governments have been more apt—especially in the context of budget-cutting—to use voluntary initiatives and self-regulation. There has been relatively little serious experimentation with the whole suite of place- and performance-based innovations, which require that governments adopt a more active role. This is particularly the case where the federal government wished to act in areas of provincial jurisdiction. The experience with voluntary initiatives has not been a success, however, as most had inadequate safeguards and monitoring in place (VanNijnatten and Boardman 2009). There has also been a generalized reluctance in Canada, both within governments and the private sector, to experiment with economic instruments or cost-benefit analysis (Winfield 2009). The environmental management regime in Mexico shows some openness to next-generation approaches, certainly as much as Canada, and perhaps more so. The Mexican policy framework is guided by a Programa Nacional de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (PNMARN) (National Environmental and Natural Resources Program), updated every six years and incorporated in the National Development Plan. The PNMARN sets out a series of objectives to guide policy planning and implementation across the federal bureaucracy and across economic sectors, and it increasingly reflects an intent to move toward more integrated ecosystem management (OECD 2003, 126). As Enrique Provencio (2004) notes, changes in national policy toward the environment have been apparent in focus (sustainable development as complement for protection

38

Environmental Policy in North America

of the environment), orientation (toward a more integrated approach), sectorization (from urban to social spheres), and organization (creation of firmer institutional framework). In addition, the above-mentioned reforms to LGEEPA were undertaken in 1996 to introduce ecosystem thinking into pollution control; for example, an integrated Single Environmental License was introduced, under which companies can now use a “one-stop” window to apply for all environmental permits at once. Further, environmental standards, rather than being based on uniform emission and discharge limits, are evolving toward a focus on the assimilative capacity of the receiving environment (OECD 2003, 145). In addition, the main environmental federal ministry, Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, or SEMARNAT), now has a mentoring system, whereby larger companies help smaller companies to put in place environmental management systems based on ISO 14001 standards, and various self-regulation programs have been established. Across North America, then, environmental management approaches exhibit certain differences in legislative coverage, proclivities toward enforcement, and willingness to experiment. These differences are not, however, so great as to block cooperation across borders; to use a linguistic analogy, the three countries speak basically the same policy “language,” though they perhaps use varying regional “dialects.” Instead, the primary challenge here is to ensure that each partner understands the ways in which the approaches differ and is open to recognizing that different policies and processes put in place in individual countries may serve very similar functions. The more serious concern, as discussed in the next section, is asymmetries across countries in terms of the resources available to actually implement the environmental management regimes that have been put in place.

ENVIRONMENTAL CAPACITY IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO There are certainly challenges associated with Mexico’s environmental policy performance relative to Canada and the United States, though the country has made considerable strides over the past two decades. In many cases, Mexico has not been an environmental policy laggard at all, and, in fact, there are examples of the country being a pioneer—such as in the area of climate change policy. Achim Steiner, the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General in 2008, noted that “Mexico is at the cross-roads of the Green Economy politically, physically and practically. Firstly, it still has many challenges, from high air pollution in cities and dependence on fossil fuels to land degradation and the need to fight poverty. But Mexico is also emerging as one among a group of developing economies who are bringing much needed leadership” (UNEP 2008). Indeed, as we discuss above, Mexico has environmental standards and policies that look quite similar on paper to those of the United States and Canada in an increasing range of regulatory areas. Yet for key environmental indicators, such as those relating to air and water quality as well as compliance, conditions have worsened (Germanwatch and CAN Europe 2012). Why is this? For that matter, we might also ask why Canada is not doing better in terms of its environmental policy performance,

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities39

given its economic and social conditions. To be sure, the presence or absence of the political will to pursue, over the long term, sustainable development provides an explanation for insufficient action. Political will can be drained away by the kind of contextual factors described earlier in this chapter—market-driven pressures to compete in export markets, a reliance on natural resource exploitation for economic growth, and the lack of a strong environmental movement or closed policy processes dominated by agencies and/or regional governments closely tied to business interests. Yet the answer also lies in the different levels of environmental capacity possessed by the three countries. In an immediate sense, environmental capacity is concerned with closing what Howlett (2001) has referred to as the “implementation gap.” Policy objectives, even if they are set out in strong legislation, may founder on an inability to implement these objectives. We can think of environmental capacity as consisting of the different resources—financial, human, knowledge, and organizational—needed to close the implementation gap. Financial resources refer to the direct material support for ongoing environmental protection activities; at the most basic level, programs require adequate funding. In terms of human resources, there is a need for people with appropriate technical, research, and administrative skills, while knowledge resources involve access to the data necessary for medium- and longer-term planning and monitoring. Furthermore, strong organizations that can articulate a long-term vision, formulate sound policies, design implementation programs, and then manage and monitor these programs are critical to environmental policy success. Finally, it is worth noting that a country’s overall capacity for environmental protection also depends on capacity development outside of government, in nongovernmental organizations, universities, think tanks, and the private sector. It would be difficult to argue that sufficient financial or material resources are provided for environmental protection in any of the three countries; the most recent OECD Environmental Performance Reviews for each country provide some revealing comparisons. Certainly, Mexican federal authorities have been criticized for failing to provide sufficient resources for their environmental regime; although spending on the environment grew over the course of the 1990s in Mexico, by the mid-2000s it remained disproportionately small in relation to GDP (0.6 per cent in 2004), the scale of problems, and other OECD countries. It has been noted, for example, that despite a steady increase in enforcement responsibilities, the budget for the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection (PROFEPA)—which performs environmental enforcement functions—has declined (OECD 2003, 128). As shown in Figure 1.2 below, PROFEPA’s budget was cut dramatically from 2000–8. This speaks to the low priority that the environment has had over the past decade or so. The federal budget for fiscal year 2010–11 has increased monies for PROFEPA slightly, by 5.4 per cent, and SEMARNAT’s budget was also increased by 6.4 per cent (Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas [Centre for the Study of Public Finance] 2011). Also on the lower side relative to other OECD countries was Canada at 1.1 per cent in 2004, down from 1.2 per cent of GDP over 1994–7 (OECD 2004, 112). Indeed, the national environment agency, Environment Canada, suffered from serious budget cuts in the 1990s (losing 40 per cent of its budget and one-quarter of its staff) and is currently undergoing yet another round of very deep cuts. The agency’s full-time staff is forecast to decrease from 6,860 in fiscal

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FIGURE 1.2 PROFEPA’s Budget 2000–8 (constant pesos for 2008) 14,000,000 12,000,000 10,000,000 8,000,000 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

SOURCE: Escobar and Chávez 2011.

TABLE 1.4 Financial Resources CANADA

UNITED STATES

MEXICO

Public-sector pollution abatement and control expenditures (PACE) (% of GDP)

2004

1.1

1.6

0.7

Lead environmental agency appropriations (USD)

FY2011

$1.22 billion

$8.7 billion

$430 million

Lead environmental agency employment

FY2011

8,860

17,359

2012

SOURCE: US EPA; Environment Canada 2011; Chamber of Deputies of Congress (Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión) 2010; SEMARNAT Quinto Informe de Labores 2011.

year 2010–11 to 5,762 in 2013–14, while the budget will decrease from $1.06 billion in 2010–11 to $820 million in 2013–14 (Environment Canada 2011). The provinces have also undertaken various rounds of budget cuts over the past two decades, with some cutting as much as 40–60 per cent. Some budgets have recovered, others have not, and serious gaps remain. The United States is the behemoth in terms of environmental agency staffing; as of fiscal year 2011, the EPA had 17,359 full-time employees at its national headquarters and 10 regional offices. The Bush administration undertook some cuts to the EPA, although the impact was much lighter than in Canada; EPA staffing levels have declined only slightly since the early 1990s (US EPA 2011a). In Mexico, it is also important to note that the implementation of environmental objectives is stymied by the huge investments required to modernize the thousands of small- and medium-sized firms for which compliance with environmental standards is technically and financially infeasible (Gallagher 2003). The capacity of business firms to take environmental initiatives or even to comply with laws is generally lower in Mexico, and one of the important sources of pressure on companies is competitiveness, especially due to dynamics

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities41

associated with NAFTA. Certainly, the larger transnational firms based in Mexico—such as General Electric, Volkswagen, Nissan, or DuPont—have undertaken “environmentally friendly” technological changes. By comparison, small- and medium-sized companies have much smaller budgets for making such changes. Even so, some small- and medium-sized companies have received ISO or Social Responsibility certification. In addition, one of the most important achievements has been to establish environmental units in state-owned companies such as PEMEX. With regard to human resources, Mexico is also at a disadvantage, both in terms of training appropriate personnel and keeping them. Although educational enrolment (primary, secondary, tertiary) is increasing across the country, Mexico underperforms at all levels relative to other upper-middle-income countries, and even many low-income countries (Robinson, Morley, and Diaz-Bonilla 2005). This is particularly marked with respect to the tertiary (post-secondary) level (see Table 1.5), although governments are attempting to direct more public funding here. Beyond enrolment, the quality of Mexican education appears to be poor. Mexican pupils consistently rank low (e.g., behind Turkey and Greece) in OECD assessments of math and science skills across 37 countries (see OECD PISA Online). By way of comparison, Canada ranks in the top 10, the United States in the top 20. In Mexico, public universities are overcrowded and underfunded, though there has been a rapid increase in high-quality private institutions for those who can afford them. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Mexico lags behind the United States and Canada in terms of post-secondary (tertiary) educational attainment and, relatedly, the number of researchers engaged in research and development in the country. A further concern for Mexico is the “brain drain”; in 2008, it was estimated that 14,000 of the 19,000 Mexicans with doctorates live in the United States, according to the International Organization for Migration and the office of Mexico’s undersecretary of education (Corchado 2008). It has also been estimated that 79 per cent of all science students that the Mexican government funds to study in the United States never return to work in Mexico (The Economist, 2007). In Canada and Mexico, unlike the United States, the federal government is the most significant player in funding and generating policy and technological research, while the private sector has been less engaged. This means that the generation of research within the country is more vulnerable to government budget cuts, which has been a serious issue in both countries. Certainly, the 2007 data on total government spending on research and development (the most recent available) in Canada and Mexico show that they lag behind the United States in this regard (Table 1.5). In Canada, the gap has developed despite significant investments in research and science from the late 1990s through to 2005, and it is worsening given more recent cuts to science and research by the Harper administration. A report by the Science, Technology, and Innovation Council of Canada showed that, while the country scores high on educational tests, as noted above, Canada is lagging in terms of federal and business investment in research, and in the ability of leading researchers to gain international recognition (Church 2009). Mexico, in light of its centralization of research funds under the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, or CONACYT (National Council of Science and Technology), and its own lack of funds to promote environment-related research, has increasingly turned to international organizations for aid; in early February of 2008, for example, the European Union and Mexico created a

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TABLE 1.5 Human and Knowledge Resources YEAR

CANADA

UNITED STATES

MEXICO

Combined primary, secondary, tertiary gross enrolment rate (%)

2005

99.2

93.3

75.6

Tertiary enrolment (%)*

2007

60

72.6

20.7

School life expectancy, primary to tertiary**

2008

17

16

14

Total spending on education (% of GDP)

2007

4.8

5.5

4.8

Researchers in R&D (per million people)

2006

4,260

4,663

341

R&D expenditure, public and private (% of GDP)

2007

1.9

2.72

0.37

SOURCE: World Bank; CIA World Factbook; United Nations Educational, Science and Cultural Organization. * Tertiary enrolment is the sum of all tertiary-level students enrolled at the start of the school year, expressed as a percentage of the midyear population in the five-year age group after the official secondary school leaving age. ** Years of education that a child of school-entering age would receive over a lifetime if school enrollment rates stay the same as today.

new fund to promote scientific knowledge transfer and joint research projects focusing, among other things, on climate change and preserving the environment (Barba 2008). The fund is to support “the formation of human capital” in recognition of Mexico’s difficulties in keeping its PhDs at home. In their cross-national comparison of environmental capacity-building, Weidner and Jänicke (2002, 9) note that “environmental knowledge and the conditions under which it is generated, distributed, interpreted and applied … are of utmost importance.” In all three countries, national governments play a key role in generating and managing data on such things as pollution levels, wildlife, and biological diversity, as well as water quality and quantity, although levels of commitment to this task have varied over time. The United States Council on Environmental Quality used to provide regular reports summarizing the country’s progress toward environmental policy goals (under the terms of the 1969 National Environmental Protection Act), but this was discontinued in the mid-1990s. Canada, for its part, has not generally done a good job of maintaining uniform databases with environmental information; State of the Environment reporting was discontinued as a result of budget cuts in 1996, leaving a serious knowledge gap. Instead, there have been reports on particular ecosystems (e.g., Great Lakes, Boreal Shield) or pollution issues (e.g., forest health and municipal wastewater effluent), but no data across media that could be compared year by year. As of 2007, under the “Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators Initiative,” an integrated data set built around a group of core environmental values—clean air, clean water, greenhouse gas emissions, and biodiversity—is made available annually. These data are intended to feed into the federal government’s Sustainable Development Strategy that is now mandatory under Canada’s new Federal Sustainable Development Act (2008).

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities43

In Mexico, the National Environment and Natural Resources Program clarifies the kinds of data needed to set the broader direction of policy and planning across the federal government, and a wide variety of environmental information is now provided by SEMARNAT and the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). In fact, SEMARNAT produces a National State of the Environment Report every two or three years. The first report was issued in 1986 by the Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecología (SEDUE) (Secretary of Urban Development and Ecology). In general, these reports present statistics about population, ecosystems, water, soil, biodiversity, atmosphere, and waste. The last report was issued in 2009, along with a statistical compendium for environmental indicators created in 2008. Nothing like this exists in Canada or the United States. Further, a “National Environmental Indicators System” is under construction in Mexico. Environmental capacity is also a function of organizational capabilities. In fact, Weidner and Jänicke (2002, 12) argue that “the longterm process of capacity development usually begins with the institutionalization of the new policy area” in the form of an environmental agency. This new institution will need to develop strategies, create implementation mechanisms, and then engage in continuous assessment and monitoring of performance (Ohiorhenuan and Wunker 1995, 7). In the United States, many federal agencies (e.g., the departments of the interior, energy, agriculture, transportation, and commerce) have a role to play in environmental protection and natural resource management, although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a specific mandate to provide independent review of all major federal actions that affect the natural environment. Some coordination is provided by the Office of the Federal Executive. Under the terms of the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act, all federal agencies are required to take environmental concerns into consideration, although the OECD (2006, 129) argues that the work of various agencies with respect to sustainable development is horizontally fragmented. However, the heavy imprint of federal regulation and oversight of state implementation ensures a considerable amount of coordination between federal and state environmental policy efforts. In Canada, Environment Canada is intended as the lead agency for the environment, but key responsibilities rest with agencies such as Natural Resources Canada (e.g., climate change and energy), Health Canada (regulating to protect human health, as in the case of air pollution), Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (e.g., pesticides regulation), and Industry Canada (e.g., industry pollution prevention initiatives). There have been various efforts to bring about some horizontal coordination across agencies, as with climate change policy, but inter-agency competition has long been a key feature of federal environmental policy in Canada (VanNijnatten and Macdonald 2003). This horizontal fragmentation is replicated in every province; all provinces have lead environmental and natural resource ministries which must work with industry, transportation, and other agencies to make and implement environmental policies. The sophistication of provincial environmental agencies varies greatly in terms of both overall budgets and full-time personnel (VanNijnatten 2002). In Mexico, SEMARNAT oversees air, water, and waste management, as well as nature conservation and forestry through several agencies that operate under its institutional umbrella, such as the Comisión Nacional del Agua (CONAGUA) (Water Commission), the Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua (IMTA)

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(Mexican Institute for Water Research), and the Comisión Nacional Forestal (CONAFOR) (National Forestry Commission). Also under the auspices of SEMARNAT, the Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático (INECC) (National Institute for Ecology and Climate Change) has the primary responsibility for setting technical environmental standards and emission limits for fixed and mobile sources, and PROFEPA enforces environmental legislation on industrial activities and natural resource management. There are also various interministerial commissions that seek to coordinate the activities of SEMARNAT and such ministries as health, energy, and economy in terms of standard and policy-setting. Given the recent attempts to decentralize environmental protection responsibilities to the states, emphasis has been placed on the regional offices of federal agencies and also on the creation of state environmental agencies. However, state organizational capacity has been impeded by continuing confusion about the distribution of environmental competency across levels of government, and by the very limited ability of states to raise revenue. They are thus reliant on federal transfers, which vary from year to year and, as discussed above, are vulnerable to broader economic trends. Finally, environmental capacity can be greatly aided by capacity-building outside the organs of government specifically charged with environmental matters. For example, awareness of environmental impacts can cause agricultural extension agents to counsel farmers on safe use of pesticides and how to water livestock without contaminating streams. National and local highway departments can avoid disposal of waste materials in wetlands. Of course, these matters may be the subject of environmental regulations, but adoption of good environmental practices as part of the ordinary business of all areas of government is even better. The same is true of business firms themselves; a culture of sensitivity to the environment can avoid many problems before regulation comes into play, and indeed, some argue that it is a proactive attempt on the part of firms to avoid regulation (Lyon and Maxwell 2004). Further, environmental capacity depends on the willingness and ability of journalists to report on resource and environmental topics, and on the knowledge and commitment of citizens. It is also strongly influenced by the size and sophistication of what Levy (1996) calls “the third sector,” the private research centers and foundations that track environmental problems and selectively put them on the political agenda. Clearly, then, across all measures of environmental capacity—financial, human, knowledge, and organizational—Mexico comes up short. And we must add to this considerable deficit by drawing attention to a special factor affecting Mexico’s environmental management capacity—the ongoing war on drug cartels. These groups have been powerful in Mexico for decades, but their visible activities were limited to border cities and to a few drug-growing regions in remote parts of Sinaloa, Guerrero, and Durango. Immediately after taking office in late 2006, Mexican president Felipe Calderón sent a large contingent of federal troops to his native state of Michoacán with the objective of destroying one of the established cartels. Over the next five years, a formerly stable situation has turned into a virtual war, with new cartels challenging old ones, widespread assassinations of public officials and even soldiers, and repeated acts of violence affecting large numbers of cartel members and a significant number of innocent people. The death toll between 2006 and 2011 is estimated by the government to be more than 47,000. The relevance of the drug war to environmental management has been to destabilize local and state governments

Environmental Management Approaches and Capacities45

and to make broad areas of the countryside too dangerous to work in for either environmental officials or environmentalists. The former head of Mexico’s Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN) (Center for Investigation and National Security), Jorge Carillo Olea, went so far as to say that “the state has lost territorial control, and therefore governability, over roughly 50 percent of the country” (Rodríguez Marín 2013). When the government does not “govern,” it can scarcely be expected to manage the environment. Relatedly, observers of Mexico’s government and polity frequently use the word “corruption” to describe the manner in which government operates. This is not a precise concept, but one that is very relevant in determining environmental management capacity. It can measure (or be a proxy for) such relevant variables as the ability of firms to bribe inspectors or to evade prosecution, and the ability of citizens to obtain and publish information on the environment. It is also relevant to budgetary concerns; for example, corruption can mean that a water project or a protected area would cost more than it would in a situation of low corruption. At a more local level, it could determine whether payments for the environmental services of a community-owned forest are fairly distributed among local land users or are intercepted to line the pockets of local strongmen.8 However corruption is measured, Canada and the United States rank near (but by no means at) the “less corrupt” end of the spectrum, while Mexico ranks in the “more corrupt” zone. For example, in a 2011 ranking by Transparency International, which depends on extensive surveys of “perceived corruption,” Canada ranks number 10 of 178 countries (lower rank indicates less corrupt), the United States ranks 24, and Mexico ranks 100 (Transparency International 2011). These relative rankings have been more or less stable for the 10 years the index has been calculated.

CONCLUSIONS In this chapter, we have seen that environmental management approaches in Canada, the United States, and Mexico, as well as their environmental capacities, have been shaped by distinctive national contexts. There are significant differences across the three countries in terms of land-use and natural resource management regimes, the severity of ecological problems, levels of environmental activism, and the degree to which policy-making is open to environmental interests. There is also a critical “development gap” between Canada and the United States on the one hand and Mexico on the other. This means that the three countries come to the transboundary table with different problem perspectives, with different interests they need to take into account, and with pockets that are variously lined—Mexico’s are decidedly lighter. Yet, the three countries are probably in fundamental agreement about needing to address basic pollution problems in such a way that economic growth in natural-resource-based economies can continue (to the chagrin of many environmental interests). Moreover, environmental management approaches in the three countries—although they exhibit certain differences in terms of legislative coverage, proclivities toward enforcement, and willingness to experiment—are not insurmountable. In considering the landscape of difference with respect to environmental policy in North America, then, the terrain is hilly rather than mountainous. One would expect that good communication

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Environmental Policy in North America

systems across borders, along with proper information, could help to ensure mutual understanding of these differences. The more serious concern is asymmetries across countries in terms of the capacity to actually implement the environmental management regimes that have been put in place. To add yet another statistic to our evidence, the Global Integrity Report (Global Integrity 2011) compares 34 countries with respect to the “implementation gap”—mentioned earlier (with reference to Howlett 2001) but defined by GIR as the difference between the strength of a country’s legal framework and its actual application. According to that measure, the United States is the strongest of the three North American nations (legal framework = 90; implementation = 79; gap = 12). Canada follows at a considerable distance with a strong regime but insufficient application (legal framework = 90; implementation = 61; gap = 29). Mexico, with a weaker regime, also faces a serious gap (legal framework = 83; implementation = 52; gap = 31).9 In the next chapter, we explore the role transboundary mechanisms can play in bridging these differences.

Notes 1 At the time of writing, the Canadian and American dollars were at par. 2 These figures assume an exchange rate of the 2010 average of $1 USD : $12.63 MXN (Canadian Provincial Statistics Departments; United States Bureau of Labor Statistics; Sistema de Administración Tributaria/Federal Tax Administration 2011). 3 The more nearly equal a country’s income distribution, the closer its Lorenz curve to the 45-degree line and the lower its Gini Index, e.g., a Scandinavian country with an index of 25. For further explanation, see: http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/ WorldStats/CIA-Distribution-of-family-income-Gini.html 4 The HDI transforms a raw variable into a unit-free index between 0 and 1 (which allows multiple indices to be added together). For more information see: http://hdr. undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/ 5 GDP at prices of 2003. 6 This perception was validated when, in 2010, the Partido Verde could not get recognition by the Green European Party (a coalition of 36 green parties in Europe), largely due to its weak environmental agenda and position on the death penalty. 7 Of the three countries, Mexico is the only one that is still consolidating its democratic system. There have been strong critiques of the fairness of the electoral process, for example. 8 For a detailed report on how corruption can affect the water sector, see Transparency International (2008). 9 Canada’s rather large gap is related to a perception that elected officials and the judiciary have conflicts of interest, and some deficiencies in the public availability of information from the government.

Chapter 2

Transboundary Environmental Governance in North America: Bridging Differences?

THE “IDEA” OF A TRILATERAL approach to North America’s environmental issues has a very long history, even if these early efforts did not yield concrete results. In 1895, after two trinational meetings on shared water resources, Canada and Mexico asked the United States to join them in a tripartite commission to adjudicate rights on “streams of an international character.” The US State Department quashed the idea, cautious about letting the United States be an equal partner with its neighbors (Kiy and Wirth 1998). In 1909, US President Theodore Roosevelt, urged on by his chief forester, Gifford Pinchot, convened a “North American Conference on the Conservation of Natural Resources.” Mexico’s own forestry pioneer, Miguel Ángel de Quevedo, was a Mexican delegate (Simonian 1995; Wakild 2009). In his invitation to Canada’s governorgeneral, Roosevelt wrote, “it is evident that natural resources are not limited to the boundary lines which separate nations, and that the need for conserving them on this continent is as wide as the area upon which they reside” (Pinchot 1947, 361). The conference produced a document that comprehensively addressed water, forests, land, minerals, and public health. It also called for each country to set up a permanent National Conservation Commission. Months later, the incoming President Taft killed the plan, and Mexican interest in conservation was soon to be cut off by the decade of revolution that started in 1910 (Pinchot 1947; Wakild 2009). Bilateral environmental cooperation, by contrast, has a long track record of activity. The Canada-US International Joint Commission (IJC), an influential body managing the Great Lakes and other waters on the northern US border, has roots in a 1909 agreement. The US-Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) is even older, with antecedents in an 1889 treaty.

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Environmental Policy in North America

These two commissions are the foundation blocks of rather varied cooperative structures on each border and, in recent decades, they have been joined by a wide array of bilateral mechanisms that aim to address issues as diverse as air quality, fisheries management, migratory wildlife, toxics, waste, protected areas management, and, most recently, climate change. The 1990s brought renewed attempts at environmental trilateralism, with the signing of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and a new institution—the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)—to encourage continent-wide collaboration on and tracking of environmental policy activities. This new trilateral institution was a response to fears from environmentalists that closer trade and investment ties would encourage polluting industries to move where regulation was perceived to be most lax, namely Mexico. This decade also saw the buildup of increasingly dense subnational and cross-border regional organizational linkages along the Canada-US border, and to a somewhat lesser extent the US-Mexico border. This chapter provides an introduction to the major sites of transboundary environmental governance in North America now in place at the bilateral, trilateral, and subnational levels. What we are interested in here is the potential for these governance mechanisms to coordinate collaborative efforts across borders as well as support domestic environmental management efforts. As we established in chapter 1, the environmental management approaches of Canada, the United States, and Mexico exhibit differences in legislative coverage, proclivities toward enforcement, and willingness to experiment. Also apparent are the asymmetries across countries in terms of environmental management capacity; here, Mexico requires considerable support, but Canada also shows certain weaknesses. The first section of this chapter describes in more detail the three functions that we believe are necessary for bridging these differences in approach and promoting policy capacity, and for which cross-border cooperation can be helpful, even essential. These functions are: (1) creating comprehensive and stable trans-boundary networks; (2) promoting mutual learning and the generation and exchange of environmental information; and (3) facilitating the provision of resources for environmental capacity. The following sections then discuss these functions in detail with reference to environmental governance mechanisms at the three levels. What we find is that, while the trans­boundary network infrastructure in North America does facilitate reasonably good and often longer-term communication across borders, as well as information exchange, policy learning, and mutual understanding, the support for capacity-building is uneven, variable, and insufficient.

THE KEY FUNCTIONS OF EFFECTIVE TRANSBOUNDARY GOVERNANCE The introduction to this book introduced the concept of “governance” in environmental decision-making and implementation, and noted the shift from formal, top-down modes of interaction to more informal, nonhierarchical arrangements. This shift has entailed the creation of new “sites” of governance where people and interest groups from both the public and private sectors interact, outside the formal institutions of government and often across borders. As Anne-Marie Slaughter (2005) has pointed out, since there are policy problems—environmental

Transboundary Environmental Governance in North America49

degradation among them—that individual governments cannot fix by themselves due to spillover effects, there is a need for governance mechanisms that can operate across borders. As a result, Slaughter (2005, 184) argues, policy actors are “networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations.”

Building Sustainable Networks But which policy actors, exactly, are networking? How do transboundary networks operate as new sites of governance? The international relations literature shows that there are several kinds of transboundary networks, and these can differ markedly in terms of the relative roles of government actors vs. civil society groups and private-sector interests. Some networks are described as “transgovernmental” (Keohane and Nye 1974); they are dominated by government agency officials who form close relationships with their counterparts in neighboring jurisdictions and, through continuing communication, work together on common programming. These networks exert influence over their members primarily through the operation of “soft” power; they have no ability to force members to do anything but, rather, operate through deliberation and persuasion (Zaring 2005; Slaughter and Hale 2011). The idea is that agency officials will spend time developing shared understandings of collective problems, co-develop regulatory solutions, and then—because they exercise statutory or regulatory authority at home—implement the decisions collectively arrived at. Slaughter (2005) has shown that transgovernmental networks, focusing on specific international problems, continue to proliferate across borders. In this model, civil society and market actors may be involved in network deliberations, but they tend to play a secondary role. Other analysts, however, stress that networks link institutions and actors across multiple levels of social organization, providing new roles for private actors—from transnational environmental groups and other NGOs to major corporations and their lobbying arms (Rosenau 1992; Lipschutz 1996; Mathews 1997). Mathews (1997, 52), in particular, has argued that new information technologies have disrupted existing power hierarchies and expanded the reach of civil society across borders. In particular, these private actors work to convert problems to “issues” using powerful techniques of publicity and information transfer (Ascher, Steelman, and Healy 2010; Wapner 1996). Environmental policy analysts have long made the case that nongovernmental civil society interests have much to contribute to problem-solving, and that processes that are more open and deliberative will yield better policy choices and outcomes (see, for example, Diduck 2004). In North America, networks in the environmental policy area most often resemble the transgovernmental model. This is not to say that NGO- or marketdominated networks do not exist—and we point to some examples in the case studies that follow. But it has been national governments (acting bilaterally or trilaterally) as well as subnational governments (state, provincial, and municipal) that have put in place most of the cooperative mechanisms we discuss in this book. Diplomacy by elected and appointed officials as well as the energy imparted by environmental NGOs and by research institutions are both important in terms of providing “lift” for environmental policy interactions across borders. However, network collaboration tends to be directed and maintained

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by government agency officials. This explains our focus below on the bilateral, trilateral, and subnational/cross-border regional “levels” of governance. Certainly, one must adopt a multi-level perspective if the goal is to build a broader constituency base. Network-building in North America is made challenging by the complexity of the continental environment, which consists of multiple overlapping environments. Most problems are not merely local or regional or national or continental in nature, but may have local and regional and national and continental aspects. Moreover, as explained in chapter 1, policy-making powers are held not only by national governments, but also by subnational jurisdictions—states, provinces, local governments, and regional governments. These latter not only make policy but also have crucial roles in policy implementation. Given that governance occurs at all these levels simultaneously, “effective management of the environment and natural resources requires integration between the various governance arrangements” (Betsill 2005). Thus, a strategic linking of efforts is necessary across multiple “spatial­institutional levels.”

Fostering Mutual Understanding and Learning Networks do not bind their members as formal government institutions do; rather, they create informal rule systems that exert pressure on participants to follow through on any agreements made. Critical to these informal systems is the development of mutual understanding among participants on the basis of shared information. As Haas (1992) explains, information is a vital resource, and networks can provide efficient communication and information processing. Keck and Sikkink (1999) argue that information exchange is at the core of a network. At a basic level, priority-setting and policy dialogue will be difficult unless there is agreement on the nature of an environmental problem and the best means of addressing it. This requires agreement among diverse parties on relevant and reliable data and information. For some environmental problems, little is known about sources and impacts, or about the types of instruments that might prove best in terms of source reduction or remediation. In these cases, more basic data-gathering and modeling needs to be carried out. In other cases, various data sets or models may exist, but they may not be complete or compatible for the North American context. In other words, they may “stop” at national borders despite the fact that environmental problems do not, or they may be expressed using different criteria or units of measurement—for example, ozone levels averaged over eight-hour periods versus the maximum level over 24 hours. Thus, continued progress in data collection and data compatibility among the three countries is necessary in order for the discussion to be conducted based on shared information. Furthermore, because environmental policy is often interrelated with broader concerns, such as economic growth, social justice (i.e., differential impacts on the poor and the disenfranchised), and community health, some of the required information may go well beyond what is normally considered “environmental.” For example, the reasons for gathering information about the adequacy of water supply and sewerage in the fast-growing cities of the Mexico-US border pertain to human welfare and the needs of business and industry, as well as to ecological balance. As noted above, stakeholder and local knowledge can

Transboundary Environmental Governance in North America51

be a critical resource for environmental policy-making (Steelman 2001). For example, input from First Nations in several parts of Canada has been very useful in formulating resource management strategies at both the federal and provincial levels. Another important aspect of fostering mutual understanding with respect to problem-solving is the sharing of “best practices” among participants. Transboundary approaches to environmental problems offer many opportunities for sharing “lessons learned.” Differences in economic level and in government structures and practices should encourage policy actors to understand that there is more than one way to address a given problem, and that their own country’s approach may not be superior. Here, too, stakeholder and bureaucratic knowledge and experience can be especially valuable. The object here, of course, is to encourage policy learning, or what Kemp and Weehuizen (2005) refer to as a conscious “change in thinking” about a problem and its associated policy. The learning may consist of a modest change (i.e., understanding how the use of a particular policy instrument might be improved to achieve set goals) or it may result in a rethink of existing approaches (i.e., seeing things through a different evaluative viewpoint) (Kemp and Weehuizen 2005, 10). Out of information exchange, dialogue, and debate, and the learning process that accompanies these activities, it is hoped that a consensus will emerge to guide action by participants in the network. In some cases, an “epistemic community” may be formed, “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992, 3). Epistemic communities can be a significant force for transboundary cooperation, given that members of an epistemic community may have influential connections to national administrations or international institutions (Haas 2000).

Resource Provision Even where there is a consensus on what should be done to address an environmental problem, implementation may be hindered by resource and capacity inequalities across policy actors and institutions. Given the varying levels of environmental capacity within North America, as discussed in chapter 1, making sure that adequate resources are available to support the initiatives being undertaken is challenging. In many ways, this is the real test of the strength and likely durability of the network, because resources need to come from domestic coffers—there is, quite simply, no international “budget” in North America for environmental cooperation. Resources to support transboundary environmental cooperation, as well as the implementation at the domestic level of any agreements reached, may come in the tangible form of domestic (likely agency) budgetary outlays for such things as training workshops, technical support, technology transfer, or equipment, and to pay for implementing collaborative projects, such as reducing hazardous waste or building sewage treatment plants. Alternatively, resources may involve in-kind contributions from participating agencies, including personnel time, technical support, or even travel funding so that policy actors from different jurisdictions can meet and learn from each other. Resources need to be targeted to those institutions and actors most in need, but this

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is difficult in operational (i.e., appropriations and budgetary processes) and political terms. The following sections discuss more broadly the potential of arrangements at the bilateral, trilateral, and subnational/regional cross-border levels to carry out these three functions associated with effective transboundary environmental governance in North America. Here, we aim to provide an indication of the facility of environmental networks in North America to link key policy actors and institutions across the distinctive national contexts in ways that maximize shared knowledge and mutual understanding, enhance policy learning, and increase resources to support environmental management.

BILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE In terms of North American environmental cooperation, bilateralism has the longest track record. Since the Canada-US Boundary Waters Treaty was signed in 1909, numerous agreements dealing with such issues as water quality in the Great Lakes, transboundary air quality, protected areas, fisheries management on both coasts, and migratory waterfowl have significantly expanded the Canada-US bilateral environmental relationship (see Table 2.1). This relationship, apart from a few high-profile disputes over issues such as acid rain and the

TABLE 2.1 Major Canada-US Environmental Agreements and Institutions ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS

RELATED INSTITUTION(S)

1909 Boundary Waters Treaty

International Joint Commission

1918 Migratory Bird Treaty

Inter-agency

1932 Glacier-Waterton Lakes National Park Agreement

Agency cooperation. Area later designated as International Peace Park and Biosphere Reserve

1956 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries

Great Lakes Fisheries Commission

1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty

International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission

1986 Agreement Concerning Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste

No bilateral institution (US EPA/ Environment Canada)

1987 Great Lakes Water Quality Protocol (update of 1972 and 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements)

International Joint Commission, the Binational Executive Committee, Great Lakes Water Quality Board

1991 Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement

Canada-United States Air Quality Committee

1997 Great Lakes Binational Toxics Strategy

International Joint Commission, the Binational Executive Committee, Great Lakes Water Quality Board

1999 Agreement for Cooperation in the Boreal Ecosystem Atmosphere

No bilateral institution (National Aeronautics and Space Administration/ Natural Resources Canada)

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Devil’s Lake water diversion,1 has been relatively effective in addressing many environmental threats with a minimum of international conflict. Canada-US cooperation on specific forms of transboundary air pollution, for example, has been quite productive (VanNijnatten 2003). As well, some progress has been made in coordinated efforts to clean up toxic “hot spots” in both the United States and Canadian sectors of the Great Lakes (Shear et al. 2003). TABLE 2.2 Major US-Mexico Environmental Agreements and Institutions ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS

RELATED INSTITUTION(S)

1889 International Border Convention

International Boundary and Water Commission

1936 Migratory Bird Treaty Act (Mexico becomes party to Canada-US Agreement)

Inter-agency

1944 Water Utilization Treaty

International Boundary and Water Commission

1983 Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (“La Paz Agreement”)

International Boundary and Water Commission

–1985 Annex I (pursuant to La Paz Agreement). Regarding the Environment along the Inland International Boundary by Discharges of Hazardous Waste

Inter-agency

–1985 Annex II. Agreement on Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Environment along the Inland International Boundary by Discharges of Hazardous Substances

Inter-agency

–1986 Annex III. Agreement on Cooperation Regarding the Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances

Inter-agency

–1987 Annex IV. Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Transboundary Air Pollution Caused by Copper Smelters along Their Common Border

Inter-agency

–1989 (amended 1997) Annex V. Agreement of Cooperation Regarding International Transport of Urban Air Pollution

Inter-agency

–1992 Border Environmental Plan

Committees, workgroups

–1996 Border XXI

Committees, workgroups

–2002 Border 2012

Regional workgroups, border-wide workgroups, policy forums

–2012 Border 2020

Regional workgroups, border-wide workgroups, policy forums

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Bilateral environmental cooperation on the US-Mexico border has been more difficult due to the severity of problems, the marked socioeconomic and technical asymmetry between the two countries, and the troubled history of bilateral relations more generally. Here too, however, a full set of mechanisms has developed to encourage collaborative environmental action—from the International Boundary and Water Commission, established in 1889 and given expanded responsibilities in 1944, to more recent mechanisms such as the NAFTA-related Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADBank). Besides these two NAFTA institutions, there are committees and workgroups formed under the Integrated Border Environmental Plan (1990–5), the Border XXI program (1995–2000), Border 2012 (2002–12), and, most recently, Border 2020 (2012–20). In terms of our functions for transboundary environmental mechanisms, bilateral environmental interactions on both borders are characterized by relatively close working relationships among governmental officials that encourage dialogue and network-building. Weaknesses in the Canada-US case are, we believe, the lack (except perhaps around the Great Lakes) of an overarching framework for environmental management on the shared border (such as exists on the southern border) and the rather closed, issue-specific networks centering on agency and diplomatic actors. A considerable degree of “ad hoc-ery” characterizes these relations, and they are vulnerable to diplomatic sensitivities. On the US-Mexico border, interactions—including those with civil society—are more institutionalized, primarily through the Border 2012 and now Border 2020 programs. But a higher level of border tension has at times clouded relations among governments and with stakeholder groups. Bilateral institutions and processes on both borders have had considerable success in scoping out the nature and extent of environmental problems through joint data-gathering, transboundary modeling, and even basic research; as a result, a high degree of consensus exists with regard to most environmental problems. Resources are a serious problem on both borders, however, and this is linked to the vulnerability of border environmental budgets to changing political and economic priorities. It is also not clear whether resources are targeted to areas most in need of capacity-building.

Bilateral Communication and Network-Building As noted above, the Canada-US bilateral environmental relationship is characterized by interactions that are primarily transgovernmental in nature, whereby the real work of cooperation is done at the inter-agency level to address specific problems as they arise, often quite successfully. Transgovernmentalism can work very well in particular issue areas and with regard to specific pollutants, where a group of officials within complementary agencies may work together on the same file, often for many years. In the Great Lakes, for example, Canadian and American officials have collaborated on various iterations of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, from the first version, which directed binational attention to the problem of phosphorous over-enrichment, to the 1978 amendments, which highlighted the need for toxic substance regulations, to the 1987 protocol, which focused on ecosystem health through the collaborative Remedial Action Plans and Lakewide Management Plans. This cooperation has continued through to the recent review of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. Similarly, for air quality, officials representing the two governments

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on the Air Quality Committee, established under the 1991 Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement, have worked to reduce successive air pollutants in border areas—SO2 (under the acid rain provisions of the agreement), then NOx (under the 2000 Ozone Annex), and now particulate matter (the two countries are each taking additional action to reduce PM2.5). The downside of transgovernmentalism on the northern border, however, is a fragmentation of effort. Given the specialization of expertise within agencies and the dominance of these specialized agencies/personnel in transboundary cooperation, cross-cutting linkages necessary for broader communication and network-building are not generally well established. Linkages across levels of government vary considerably, though they are better in the US context, where the relationship between federal and state agencies is tighter, primarily because they have shared responsibility for implementing the major national air and water quality laws. However, horizontal linkages between government, the private sector, and civil society groups are limited and ad hoc, given the closed nature of inter-agency relations and diplomacy. The IJC, given its prominence and long track record, is an exception and has firmer linkages vertically across governments and with both the research community and environmental NGOs. Other institutions like the Pacific Salmon Commission or the Canada-US Air Quality Committee are considerably narrower in their representation and the degree to which they have linkages across levels of government and outward into the nongovernmental realm. This fragmenting tendency is heightened by the distinctive diplomatic tensions associated with bilateral engagement on particular issues, such as the diversion of excess water from Devil’s Lake in North Dakota into a tributary of the Red River that is shared with Canada, initially without consultation about the possible transfer into Canada of invasive aquatic species. In addition, because cooperative mechanisms are issue- as well as mediaspecific, there is no overarching framework for addressing environmental and sustainability concerns on the Canada-US border. For example, although the IJC has made important progress in cleaning up toxic “hot spots” in the waters of the Great Lakes, it is only peripherally involved in the projects being implemented by the Canada-US Air Quality Committee, despite their similar geographic focus and despite the fact that airborne deposition is a leading source of pollution in the Great Lakes. In other issue areas, a plethora of binational mechanisms engage in discrete environmental tasks with little contact among one another or explicit recognition that problems are generally cross-media in nature. On the US-Mexico border, transgovernmental ties also anchor cooperation. Even before NAFTA, the United States created the Good Neighbor Environmental Board in 1992 as an official advisory committee concerned with border environmental problems. Composed of delegates from eight US federal agencies, as well as representatives of state, local, and tribal governments, businesses, academics, and NGOs, it submits annual reports to the president as well as specific letters on matters such as how to minimize the environmental impacts of the border fence and the benefits of renewable energy development in the border regions. Although there is no formal Mexican representation on the body itself, the board interacts with Mexican counterparts, sharing ideas about proposed projects among diverse actors. Border 2012, a comprehensive program of binational network-building managed by the EPA and SEMARNAT over 2002–12, endeavored to bring a

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wide range of previously disparate environmental management efforts under one framework. It established three types of coordinating bodies—regional workgroups (for California-Baja California, Arizona-Sonora, New MexicoTexas-Chihuahua, and Texas-Coahuila-Nuevo Leon-Tamaulipas), border-wide workgroups focusing on broad topics (e.g., cooperative enforcement and compliance), and policy forums centered on categories of environmental problems (e.g., air, water, and waste). Besides the two national agencies, state and local governments played significant roles in Border 2012, as they did in earlier versions of the same program. Border 2012 was a unique attempt to bring about cooperation between governments but also between the governmental and nongovernmental spheres. It placed great emphasis on a cross-border regional approach to programming. Participation by civil society, environmental groups, and indigenous peoples on both sides of the border was expressly encouraged (US EPA 2010). Issues and projects were to be identified and implemented at the local level, and meetings were to be as inclusive as possible. The main mechanisms for involvement were the Task Forces, which included representation from local communities; relevant local, state, federal, and tribal governments; binational organizations; and nongovernmental and community-based organizations. Meetings held under the auspices of Border 2012 were also to be as inclusive as possible and open to the public. Certainly, there have been challenges. For example, while the US federal government became more enthusiastic over time about promoting local participation, Mexico is much more centralized in a political and budgetary sense, and it was not clear whether and how state and local governments south of the border could actively shape border environmental decision-making. Further, it took some time to work out the lines of communication and responsibility between the federal bureaucracies and the workgroups and task forces; it was long assumed that federal officials would take advice from these lower-level deliberations, but there was no formal mechanism for ensuring that this was the case. It has also been difficult to ensure that local groups and communities have the capacity to participate fully. Finally, diplomatic sensitivities are at work on this border, perhaps even more than on the northern border, and this has sometimes made interactions difficult. Border 2020, the successor to Border 2012 under the La Paz Agreement, builds on the regional, bottom-up approach of Border 2012 and maintains the same organizational structure. Priorities are to be set with attention to the particular needs of a geographic area, region, or community, and there is to be even more emphasis on communication with local communities (EPA 2012b). Two-year action plans are intended to provide more flexibility to ensure that programming responds to changing local and resource needs.

Fostering Mutual Understanding and Learning at the Bilateral Level With respect to the gathering and coordination of data as well as transboundary modeling, bilateral institutions have certainly been beneficial along both borders. If the aim here is to ensure that there is appropriate data and information for promoting mutual understanding and generating consensus on priorities and policy choices (if not exactly a harmonization of specific requirements),

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bilateral institutions and activities have in many realms provided much-needed support. On the northern border, the International Joint Commission (IJC) serves as an umbrella for linking a wide array of efforts across and outside governments to monitor and track water quality and quantity in the Great Lakes region. Information is generated through various channels, including those directly associated with the IJC, such as the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board and the Great Lakes Water Quality Board. There are also other governmental bodies, such as the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission and the Great Lakes Environmental Research Laboratory (in the United States); and there are nongovernmental efforts, such as the Great Lakes Research Consortium (a coalition of colleges and universities in New York and Ontario) and the United States Sea Grant network of centers and institutes. Indeed, there is such a wide array of research efforts ongoing in different locations that it is difficult to track them. It is also unclear whether these efforts are effectively coordinated, although the IJC’s 2007 report to the national governments in support of the review and re­negotiation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (completed in 2012) was an attempt to summarize the state of information on regional ecosystems. The Remedial Action Plans, prepared for 43 of the most highly polluted parts of the Great Lakes (26 in the United States, 17 in Canada, and 5 in joint waters), have been undertaken with an almost unprecedented amount of interaction between scientists, government officials, and a wide range of stakeholders, generating information that would be unavailable from scientists working alone. This kind of process would be far more difficult along the US-Mexico border, reflecting deficiencies in local environmental capacity on both sides. The IJC also plays a critical role in disseminating information through its biennial reports, its public consultation processes, and other meeting minutes. Air quality cooperation on the Canada-US border is more focused. Early cooperative attempts by Environment Canada and the US EPA to model transboundary air flows in the northeastern portions of the continent, particularly for sulfur dioxides and nitrous oxides, were undertaken in the 1990s under the terms of the Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement. More recently, under the Canada-United States Border Air Quality Strategy, the two governments have initiated smaller projects tracking transboundary pollution in particular “hot spots” along the border, such as Windsor–Detroit (Ontario–Michigan) and Puget Sound–Georgia Basin (Washington State–British Columbia). These research efforts have been based on “in-kind” support provided by participating agencies on both sides of the border—donating personnel time, equipment (even planes!), and data sources. The result is a more complete picture of air pollutant flows in these areas. It should be noted, however, that all information resulting from joint efforts is generally vetted by national officials before it is released to the public; political oversight is thus present, though not usually heavy-handed. It is important to point out that there is also a small but energetic group of nongovernmental “policy entrepreneurs” at work along the northern border, carefully examining the available data and trying to turn environmental problems into issues that can become fodder for policy-making.2 In the United States and Canada, the role of policy entrepreneur is often taken up by national environmental organizations such as the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, Environmental Defense (United States), the Pembina Institute, the David Suzuki Foundation, Pollution Probe, or the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society

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(Canada). Recent collaborations among Canadian and American environmental groups have resulted, for example, in detailed examinations of the carbon footprint of Alberta’s tar sands production and investigations of the environmental impact of oil and natural gas pipeline development through Canada and into the United States. On the Mexico-US border, the attempt to gather and disseminate environmental information under Border 2012 is—not surprisingly, given the program’s broad scope—quite ambitious. In support of the priority areas of water, air, land, environmental public health, emergency preparedness and response, and cooperative enforcement and compliance, the US EPA and SEMARNAT enlisted numerous partners both inside and outside government to help develop environmental indicators and performance measures. Based on these indicators, extensive State of the Border Region reports were released in 2005 and 2010, with Progress Reports along the way (US EPA and SEMARNAT 2005, 2010). These reports have generated critical data for future decision-making. Among the most prominent policy entrepreneurs seeking to deepen knowledge of environmental conditions along the southern border are university researchers, notably from such institutions as the University of California, San Diego; El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (College of the Northern Border); the Instituto Tecnológico de Ciudad Juárez (Technological Institute of Ciudad Juarez); the University of Arizona; and the University of Texas, El Paso. These researchers frequently work collaboratively with colleagues in their own countries and also collaborate across the border. There is even a formal collaboration of five American and five Mexican universities (the Southwest Consortium for Environmental Research and Policy, or SCERP) based in San Diego. University and other researchers make their work policy-relevant both by publishing results in regional newspapers and by having meetings and conferences that generate press coverage and are attended by policy-makers.

Bilateral Resource Provision Clearly, the resources needed to support bilateral environmental cooperation on both borders, but especially on the southern border, are great. As noted in chapter 1, environmental capacity is more limited in Mexico, but considerable support is required at the local levels on both sides of the border. However, domestic agency budgetary constraints greatly limit what can be done. Under the Border 2012 Program, for example, stakeholders could apply for US competitive grants to fund environmental projects, especially those that focus on capacity-building, in the border region. In 2004, whereas $4.7 million worth of project proposals were submitted for the California/Baja California and Arizona/Sonora regions alone, there was only $1.2 million available for distribution (Zorc 2004). Under Border 2020, funding for the priorities identified by the regional workgroups is to come from a wide variety of sources, including different “envelopes” in the EPA and SEMARNAT, the North American Development Bank, the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission, the US Agency for International Development, state governments on both sides of the border, and even some private organizations. But the prospect of large cuts in federal discretionary spending might mean that some of the agency “envelopes” will be slim, or even empty. The key problem is that environmental agencies, which provide most of the in-kind and tangible support for transboundary programs, have been subject to

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continuing budget cuts over the decades, as discussed in chapter 1. In Canada, Environment Canada lost almost one-third of its budget and one-quarter of its staff in the “program review” exercise of the mid-1990s and never really regained these lost resources; more recently, the Harper administration has undertaken deep cuts to domestic programs as part of a commitment to reduce the public debt load. In the United States, EPA programs have undergone cuts as a result of successive administrations’ attempts to address sizable budget deficits, fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and undertake “homeland security,” though these have not been as critical as in Canada. Significantly, cuts have tended to encourage a retreat by agencies to their core regulatory responsibilities, while funding for transboundary projects seems less imperative. In addition, the dominant role of the United States in providing resources—again, especially on the southern border—makes these budget cuts even more critical. In the Mexican case, although environmental spending has been increasing since 2001 (SEMARNAT 2009), some offices and agencies have suffered cuts, as in the case of the environmental enforcement agency PROFEPA, mentioned in chapter 1. Further, bilateral environmental institutions and initiatives along the two borders have been susceptible to the changing policy and thus financial priorities of governments. With the increased focus on domestic and border security, for example, all three countries have seen the transfer of federal monies to associated programs and technology (e.g., security infrastructure along the borders and capacity-building). For example, the number of US Border Patrol agents rose from 4,287 in 1994, when NAFTA went into effect, to 21,444 in 2011 (United States Border Patrol 2011). In 1994 there were only 306 agents on the northern US border—this jumped to 2,237 by 2011; on the southwestern border, agent staffing rose from 3,747 to 18,506. This increased vigilance did not come cheaply—the budget for the Border Patrol alone was $3.5 billion in 2011, not to mention the National Guard and other assets devoted to the borders (United States Border Patrol 2011). Securing the borders may have encouraged binational cooperation, but not the kind of cooperation that would benefit the environmental agenda. An important source of funding for addressing shared pollution on the US-Mexico border is the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC). The BECC was set up under a NAFTA side agreement to develop and certify “environmental infrastructure projects that incorporate innovative sustainability and public participation concepts” (BECC 2010). It works in an area 100 kilometers wide in the United States and 300 kilometers wide in Mexico. Once it develops projects, they are eligible for loans from the North American Development Bank (NADBank), supplemented by aid from state, federal, and local governments. Between 1995 and 2007, the commission certified 164 projects, with a total construction cost of $2.8 billion. About equally divided between Mexico and the United States, most projects were for water, wastewater, and water conservation (BECC 2010). The 2010 BECC Year-inReview report (BECC 2010, 5) noted that, “as of December 31, 2010, there were 45 projects in BECC’s project development pipeline, with an estimated cost of approximately USD $905 million. Of these, 24 were in the United States and 21 in Mexico; 38 were related to water and wastewater, 3 to solid waste (SW), and 4 to air quality (AQ).” While Ibáñez Hernández (2008), in a detailed study of the BECC and the NADBank, praises them as part of a “nested, but incremental, buildup of border environmental governance,” he also concludes that “regardless

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of having spent unprecedented amounts of money along the border, the impacts [on needed environmental infrastructure] are still considered minor.”

TRILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE Under the NAAEC environmental side agreement to NAFTA, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) has a mandate “to promote trinational cooperation for sustainable development, conservation, and environmental protection” through the provision of “tangible services, in the form of activities and outputs” (Mumme and Duncan 1996, 203). Kirton (1997, 459) explains that “NAFTA and NAAEC promised to transform a hitherto almost exclusively bilateral relationship into a new trilateral community, by making many issues, processes, and institutions into a new trilateral structure.” The CEC has indeed had a high level of success in facilitating the creation of linkages between levels of government, and between government officials and stakeholder groups with respect to specific environmental problems. In fact, this has probably been its greatest contribution to environmental governance in North America, followed closely by its ability to gather and publicize data on environmental issues and impacts. The impressive amount of information on environmental degradation in North America generated by the CEC has helped to raise the profile of environmental problems and to provide critical information for environmental NGOs. The North American Atlas exercise, described in the introduction, is only one recent example. As with bilateral institutions, however, a lack of resources (and political support) is a continuing problem, which limits the extent to which the CEC can realize its objectives, particularly with regard to capacity-building in Mexico.

Trilateral Communication and Network-Building The CEC is the key trilateral network-building institution in North America. To understand how it works, one must first understand that the CEC is one arm of a three-pronged structure created under the NAFTA environmental agreement (NAAEC). First, the NAAEC created the “Council,” composed of the highest (cabinet-level) environmental authorities from the three countries, as the governing body that oversees the work of the CEC. In addition, a Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) composed of 15 citizens (five from each country) advises the Council on any matter within the scope of the NAAEC and serves as a source of information for the CEC. The CEC, as the third institution, thus operates closely with political officials and the nongovernmental community. In all of its activities, the CEC aims to bring government officials, scientific and technical experts, as well as civil society interests together so they may gain a common understanding of specific environmental problems and share best practices with respect to taking action on these problems. In its 2004 evaluation of the CEC, the Ten-Year Assessment and Review Committee stated that the CEC’s most notable accomplishment “may be the creation of a trilateral North American community joining the governments and the public” (CEC 2004b). Indeed, there can be no doubt that the CEC has increased the number and range of contacts among government officials at different levels and their various stakeholder groups. Kirton (1997, 473) noted early on with respect to the CEC

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that, although the organization’s autonomous political impact was limited by its lack of formal policy advisory responsibilities, it was nevertheless able to exert influence through “the broader support base and epistemic community it is fostering through the many expert groups, study teams, and consultations it has created.” North American Regional Action Plans (NARAPs) for selected persistent and toxic chemicals are a good example of the way in which the CEC builds trilateral networks for environmental management. Existing NARAPs focus on reducing the use and release of each of a set of “big bad” chemicals, such as lindane, dioxins and furans, PCBs, mercury, and DDT, most of which are very long-lived in the environment and tend to disperse widely. Many of these chemicals are banned or regulated (but often in very different ways) in each of the three North American countries. Each action plan is the result of an extensive consensus-building process, which begins with a trilateral, collaborative evaluation of the threats posed by a candidate pollutant and then results in a “Decision Document” outlining recommendations regarding the possible need for action (CEC 2005). As the draft plan for lindane, released for public comment in 2005 (CEC 2005), noted: “The Parties enlisted and received input through a regional task force, from various experts and representatives of indigenous peoples, children’s health interests, environmental organizations, and industry.… Public meetings were held to solicit additional input and to enlist the aid of experts in toxicology, atmospheric transport, epidemiology, wildlife concerns and indigenous/tribal issues. Prior to its approval, this plan will have undergone extensive national public and private stakeholder review.” Each NARAP thus creates a “toxics community,” which can share information and best practices, provide support for domestic implementation actions, and exert peer pressure on participants to adhere to the agreed-upon action plans. In another example, the CEC has facilitated the emergence of a continental network across the governmental, industrial, environmental, and academic sectors in Canada, Mexico, and the United States to support the development of North American pollutant release and transfer registries (PRTRs). The primary focus was to help put in place such a registry in Mexico. A PRTR is an environmental database or inventory of potentially harmful releases (generally from point sources such as factories) to air, water, and soil, often including wastes transferred for treatment and disposal from the site of their production. Data are provided by the facility to government and the public, who can then track the generation, release, and fate of various pollutants over time. The US Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) was the first toxics registry introduced into North America in 1986, with the Canadian National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI) introduced some years later, in 1992. The CEC made the development of a PRTR in Mexico a priority, used its newly created continental policy network, hosted regular meetings, and, after years of collaboration and discussion of the Canadian and American experiences, made public the first national inventory in Mexico, focusing on air emissions, in 2007. The most unusual feature of the CEC is its “Citizen Submission Process.” Created under Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC, the process (described below) provides “a means by which anyone living in any of the three countries of North America may bring the facts to light concerning the enforcement of environmental legislation on the books of any of the three countries” (CEC

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2002). It encourages a broad range of interests, particularly NGOs, to take part in environmental deliberations, although some would argue that it lends (perhaps by necessity) a more confrontational tone to discussions of the environmental activities of North American governments. The process is arguably the most important substantive part of the side agreement, and represented a compromise short of enforcing environmental laws through trade sanctions3 but strong enough to secure key support for NAFTA from most of the important US national environmental groups. It allows individual citizens (in practice, usually environmental organizations) to bring before the CEC charges that a national government is failing to enforce one of its own environmental laws. The government must respond to the charge, after which the Council, consisting of the head of each country’s environmental agency (as explained at the beginning of this section), decides whether a “Factual Record” should be developed by the CEC. After receiving the Factual Record and viewing comments by both the complainant and the accused government, the Council may decide by a two-thirds vote whether to make the entire record public. The Council cannot act independently to seek trade sanctions against members who fail to enforce environmental laws, but there is a procedure that allows national governments to take action through an arbitration panel if the environmental infraction leads to unfair trade practices. The CEC has been quite strict about when it will forward a citizen complaint to the Council. Among the requirements are that the complainant be harmed by lack of enforcement of the environmental law and that all appropriate national remedies have been exhausted. Between 1995 and 2012, 82 submissions were received, with 18 factual records released and 11 files still active (2012 data from CEC). Of the submissions, 41 were complaints about enforcement of environmental laws in Mexico, 31 in Canada, and 10 in the United States. Of the 18 factual records released, eight dealt with Mexico, nine with Canada, and one with the United States. The cases have dealt with a remarkable range of issues: charges of logging hurting fish in Ontario and hog farms polluting air and water in Quebec; pollution from an abandoned lead smelter in Tijuana and illegal construction of a cruise ship dock in Cozumel; impacts of logging on migratory birds in the United States; and mercury emissions from US power plants.4 The role of the citizen submission process in supporting (or, in some cases, pushing) domestic environmental efforts is mixed at best. In one notable case, Mexico was inadequately regulating logging activities at the expense of impoverished Raramuri indigenous people, who live in the steep canyons of Durango state in northern Mexico.5 The 234-page Factual Record contains some damning evidence of failure to enforce laws, to monitor compliance, and to work with communities. However, the Mexican government contended that it was prosecuting individual cases of violations of its laws, but was hampered by lack of resources for monitoring and enforcement, due in part to the remoteness of the area. In other cases, such as charges against Canada and the United States related to the impacts of logging on birds in violation of national laws meant to implement migratory bird treaties, the CEC began to produce broad analyses of the violations—only to come up against opposition from national governments who (successfully) argued that the factual record be narrowed to specific cases in which national law was alleged to be violated. It has become clear that the submission process can do little to compel the countries to improve their

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regulatory and enforcement activities, yet it does have the function of “bringing facts to light” about issues that tend to get little attention.

Fostering Mutual Understanding and Learning at the Trilateral Level The CEC contributes to knowledge creation and policy learning in four ways: it builds its own continental databases for pollution levels and impacts; it supports data- and information-gathering for its own projects; it undertakes research on topics that it considers pertinent to fostering environmental sustainability in North America; and it provides a means by which individual citizens and groups can access critical information about the environmental enforcement activities of their governments. First, with respect to building databases, the CEC has put together an impressive array of information, comparing, for example, environmental legislation and policies in the three countries, certification schemes for green goods and services (e.g., renewable electricity production), and transboundary environmental agreements in North America. In its most high-profile project, the CEC initiated a Taking Stock series, which reports annually on comparative Canadian and American—and now Mexican—pollutant releases and transfers. The Taking Stock database makes use of a NAFTA-inspired reform of economic statistics, accomplished by a task force from the three countries’ statistical offices, which created the North American Industry Classification System. This standardized the definition of various industries across each country and enabled researchers and interest groups to understand much more precisely how various types of firms were responding to NAFTA or other forces. But it also has great usefulness for environmental policy-making and enforcement. Once the location of a particular industry is known, it is possible to infer a great deal about emissions, water demand, and solid and toxic waste generation. Second, the CEC provides support for its own ongoing projects, which often involve reconciling different comparative databases or summarizing/reviewing the state of scientific understanding with respect to particular environmental problems. For example, the CEC has published several overviews and fact sheets on toxic chemicals such as lindane and mercury, which were used in its North American Regional Action Plan (NARAP) process. In 2002, as the release of genetically modified corn, already widely used in the United States and Canada, became a major political issue in Mexico (see chapter 6), the CEC commissioned background papers, convened a public conference, involved a prestigious scientific review panel, and, in 2004, published a 50-page summary report. Third, Article 13 of the NAAEC allows the CEC Secretariat to prepare a research report for the Council on any matter within the scope of its annual work program. For example, it has paid particular attention over the years to the problem of air pollution in North America. An early, high-profile study in the 1990s focused on transboundary flows of air pollutants. The study highlighted the controversial role of electric power plants in the generation of emissions, associated human health impacts, the decline of government funding for tracking and reducing pollutants, and the need for collaborative action (CEC 1997). This study was influential in Canada-US discussions of the Ozone Annex to the Canada-US Air Quality Agreement (VanNijnatten 2003) and encouraged further study of air pollution on the US-Mexico border. The CEC then

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undertook to study the environmental effects of rapid changes in the electricity systems of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, namely the opening of electricity markets to competition. This study again highlighted the role of the electricity sector in terms of air emissions and alerted governments to the large number of power projects being planned near international borders that were likely to affect the well-being of the public and the environment in neighboring countries (CEC 2002). As part of its work on the environmental impacts of the electricity sector, the CEC has also conducted research into the possibility of establishing a multi-pollutant emissions trading regime within North America (Russell 2002). All of this activity has served to set out an agenda for addressing air emissions in North America, particularly from power plants, and to highlight the need for common goals. The final role, “bringing facts to light,” is the essence of the CEC’s Citizen Submission Process, as discussed above. Although there is considerable debate as regards the usefulness of the Citizen Submission Process in changing government policy in a particular case, the reports generated when the CEC orders a factual record prepared provide individuals and groups with access to information they would not otherwise have about the environmental policy activities of their governments. For example, the Raramuri logging case, mentioned above, may help persuade the Mexican government to pay more attention to the rights of indigenous people, whose very existence has often been ignored by Mexican policy-makers. Also, it helped pull together a case for the indigenous communities that, at some point, could be presented in national courts with the legitimacy granted by the trilateral commission. Even Wilson (2003), who was very negative about the CEC performance in the US and Canadian cases on the effects of logging on birds, noted that environmental organizations can still use the process to highlight issues not easily pursued in other political forums and gain access to information they would not otherwise have.

Trilateral Resource Provision Despite the impressive array of projects and tasks undertaken by the CEC, its work has been hampered by a severe lack of resources. The budget provided to the Secretariat by the three national governments is decidedly meager, and there is a continued reluctance to increase that budget. While the US government had initially preferred a total annual budget for the CEC of $15 million USD, Canada, at the time undergoing radical budget cuts to its environment and natural resource agencies, agreed to a $9 million USD budget for the CEC, with each partner contributing a third of this total. Mexico, given its dire fiscal situation in the mid-1990s, would doubtless have preferred to contribute far less than its $3 million USD share. To make matters worse, as is noted in the 2004 report of the Ten-Year Review and Assessment Committee to the CEC, given that “the CEC’s budget has not changed since 1994, its real value has declined by almost 20 per cent.” Even compared to the modest resources provided by the infrastructure planning and funding BECC and NADBank, the CEC’s budget, in light of the considerable environmental capacity problem in Mexico, is certainly problematic. As Gallagher notes, “[t]he CEC is largely ill-equipped to help solve Mexico’s significant environmental problems because it lacks the resources to counter these problems. By its very nature, an institution with an annual budget of

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$9 million can hardly make a dent in a series of problems that costs the Mexican economy over $40 billion annually” (Gallagher 2003, 125). The NAAEC appears to demand equal effort on the part of all three countries, with no special treatment for the partner that has more limited human, technical, and financial resources (Torres 2002). Capacity-building is “implicit in the achievement of most of the NAAEC’s objectives” and, indeed, it became a formal goal of the CEC’s work program in 1998 (CEC 2004b). As implied in some of the examples above, CEC program managers run seminars, workshops, and exchanges to promote technical training, develop methodologies, tools, and databases to support policy formulation, and fund community-based projects in the three countries. For some time, these activities received modest support through the CEC’s North American Fund for Environmental Cooperation (NAFEC), which was highly valued by Mexican government officials,6 and through its Fund for Pollution Prevention. However, due to a lack of resources, the CEC was forced to eliminate the NAFEC completely in 2004, and its ability to bring officials from the three countries together has also been affected. The resource crunch has encouraged the CEC to focus on addressing discrete problems that are firmly within the CEC’s mandate and that have a high likelihood of success. It is also very likely that the CEC’s budgetary problems are linked to a lack of political support. The NAAEC and CEC bear the scars of their highly political origins. The NAAEC was the price Canada and Mexico had to pay for US congressional approval of NAFTA, and they sought to limit both their own commitments under the agreement as well as the CEC’s powers. Certainly, from its signing, the agreement “continue[d] to color environmental relations among the three countries” (Torres 2002).7 Often viewed with suspicion by national and agency officials in all three countries, any attempts by the CEC Secretariat to be ambitious in its undertakings or, some would argue, even to fulfill the basic requirements of its mandate have been met with resistance. Indeed, the autonomy of the Secretariat has been constrained at numerous points by the involvement of national political leaders in the Secretariat’s program operations (Kirton 1997). Carlsen and Salazar put it more bluntly: “the [CEC’s] three-party governing council appears to have made the success of the [CEC] a relatively low priority. This lack of commitment limits the [CEC’s] authority, its decisionmaking power, and its political leverage as well as diminishes its profile in each of the three countries” (2002, 224–5).

A Note on the SPP and Leaders’ Summits In this discussion of environmental trilateralism, it is important to mention the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), in operation over 2005–8. The SPP came into existence primarily due to Canadian and Mexican concerns about the US restrictions on border crossing after the September 11, 2001, attacks. However, the SPP also undertook a “quality of life” agenda, which included a commitment to “joint stewardship of the environment.” Among other activities, the three governments took very initial steps to link the continental energy and climate change agendas by jointly pursuing opportunities for lowercarbon technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within North America. Over 2005–8, these attempts ranged from “nuts and bolts” initiatives such as harmonizing energy efficiency standards to broader proposals for constructing a joint vision of biofuels for transportation by 2020. In addition, an agreement

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on the exchange of information for clean energy was signed by the three leaders. Annual meetings of the Mexican and US presidents and the Canadian prime minister set out the agenda for the year and provided an impetus for programming. The programming was implemented, however, through transgovernmental channels; committees of officials from complementary national agencies met regularly to plan and monitor projects. This process was quite closed, occasionally involving business but not civil society groups, and thus engendered considerable criticism. Due to its unpopularity, the “Security and Prosperity” nomenclature was set aside by political and bureaucratic officials and, after the election of President Obama, governments changed the name of the meetings to “the Leaders’ Summits.” The summits continued to feature annual discussions among the three leaders, during which a common agenda for trilateral cooperation was set out/updated. At the 2009 Leaders’ Summit, for example, the three governments agreed to undertake further cooperation in the area of energy and climate technologies, primarily through the pre-existing North American Energy Working Group. The three governments also requested that the CEC prepare materials outlining options for continental climate policy cooperation. However, there were no Leaders’ Summits in 2010 or 2011, and some analysts wondered whether they had been discontinued entirely. Instead, diplomatic and policy energy appeared to be channeled into bilateral interactions, as discussed above, in just about all policy areas, including the environment. In early 2012, however, the three leaders did meet, suggesting that a limited trilateral agenda was ongoing.

SUBNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE North American networks have also been built “from the bottom up.” There can be no doubt that Canadian provinces and American states are key environmental policy actors. Whether because of political, financial, or (in the Canadian case) constitutional constraints on federal actors, the focus shifted over the course of the 1990s to American states and Canadian provincial governments, whose capacity to address environmental challenges had grown considerably. Canadian provinces already control the most important constitutional and policy levers to address environmental protection and natural resource matters, as discussed in chapter 1, while the involvement of US states in environmental protection activities has increased significantly, to the point where they are the primary implementers and enforcers of nationally set pollution standards. Studies have demonstrated a willingness on the part of states, and to a lesser extent on the part of provinces, to undertake innovations in environmental policy approaches and instruments (see, for example, Rabe 2002; VanNijnatten 2006). The Mexican states, as constituent units in a highly centralized federation, have much less power and autonomy. However, they have begun to play a more significant role in the Mexican environmental protection regime in recent years, both as a result of recent federal constitutional and legislative changes and the manner in which transboundary cooperation is taking place (Environmental Law Institute 1996). As explained in chapter 1, the foundational General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA) now allows for the delegation of environmental powers to state governments, and all 32

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have enacted their own comprehensive ecology laws. An example of this is the variety of climate action plans that states are starting to develop (see chapter 5), most of them with either advisory functions or funding coming from bilateral cooperation with US states or associations. While states are still in the process of implementing these laws (and resources are scarce), in general there has been an upward trajectory in terms of subnational involvement in environmental policy. At the same time that Canadian provinces, as well as American and Mexican states, have been gaining more policy latitude within their respective intergovernmental contexts, they have been interacting more frequently with one another across international borders. A succession of studies found that not only were state-province and state-state environmental agreements becoming more numerous, they were also more formalized and increasingly multilateral or regional in orientation, as well as more ambitious in terms of the projects undertaken (Sánchez-Rodríguez et al. 1998; VanNijnatten 2006). Indeed, since about the mid-1990s, subnational governments, with US states often taking the lead, have often been the primary locus of environmental policy initiatives and innovations to address transboundary problems. If subnational governments are increasingly working together with their cross-border regional partners to address environmental problems, what are the prospects for effective transboundary governance at this level? With regard to the conditions laid out earlier in the chapter, subnational governance shows considerable promise in terms of facilitating communication and network-building. However, knowledge creation at the subnational level is weaker and heavily reliant on technical and informational aid from other partners, particularly federal agencies. And, as with national bilateralism and trilateralism, subnational environmental governance is under-resourced. Interestingly, however, collaboration at the cross-border regional level has attracted attention and resources from bilateral and trilateral organizations and actors, which has aided in policy learning and capacity-building across subnational jurisdictions. In addition, at this subnational level, there appears to be a high level of awareness of the policy and capacity needs of local Mexican jurisdictions.

Subnational Communication and Network-Building Subnational cooperation is quite similar in nature to cooperation at the bilateral level in that it is transgovernmental—dominated by executive actors and involving communication and cooperation among officials in related departments of all participating governments. These interactions are typically initiated at annual conferences of political leaders (premiers, governors); conference resolutions then provide direction to committees of senior-level officials invested with management responsibilities, after which mid-level officials are assigned project-specific tasks. Between meetings, further deliberation and communication is carried out electronically. But to what extent do these interactions provide sustainable networks among those within “regional” boundaries—especially regions that make sense in terms of the scope of pollution problems or of ecosystems? Empirical studies (VanNijnatten 2006, 2009) have traced the formal imprint of cross-border environmental governance by analyzing state-province and state-state environmental “linkages” that support transboundary networks. On the Canada-US border (see Table 2.3 below), this research has suggested the presence of three

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“cross-border regions” that build upon distinct core clusters of subnational jurisdictions—the Pacific Northwest (encompassing British Columbia, Alberta, Washington State, Idaho, Oregon, and Montana), the Great Lakes-Heartland (which includes Ontario, Minnesota, Michigan, New York, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania), and the New England/Maritime area (including Quebec and the four Maritime provinces as well as Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut). These core clusters can radiate influence outward to draw in other states and provinces on the periphery for particular purposes. The New England/Maritime region has a smaller number of agreements and institutions, but these are largely multilateral, involving most or all members of the region. The Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG/ECP)8 as well as the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment9 account for much of the cross-border activity in the region. As one of the oldest cross-border regional mechanisms, the NEG/ECP, established in 1976, has devoted considerable attention to environment and sustainable development issues. The NEG/ECP’s member governments have formulated a series of action plans to reduce air pollutants, mercury, and, most recently, greenhouse gases. In the Great Lakes-Heartland region, there are numerous mechanisms incorporating all Great Lakes jurisdictions—notably the International Joint Commission—but also a host of bilateral agreements between Ontario and its neighbors. The Great Lakes states and provinces, working through the Great Lakes Commission and the annual Conference of Great Lakes Governors and

TABLE 2.3 Top 20 State-Province Pairs by Number of Environmental Linkages (increase in linkages* since 1980) PAIR

TOTAL

PAIR

TOTAL

BC-WA

22 (450%)

QC-VT

12 (100%)

ON-MI

17 (240%)

NB-ME

12 (100%)

ON-MN

16 (220%)

AB-MT

11 (175%)

QC-NY

15 (276%)

AB-ID

11 (267%)

ON-NY

13 (160%)

QC-PA

11 (267%)

ON-WI

13 (225%)

ON-IN

11 (120%)

ON-OH

13 (160%)

ON-IL

11 (120%)

BC-ID

13 (225%)

AB-WA

11 (267%)

ON-PA

13 (117%)

BC-MT

11 (267%)

BC-OR

13 (225%)

BC-CA

11 (175%)

SOURCE: VanNijnatten 2006. *The term “linkage” includes mechanisms setting forth procedures and conditions for regularized interactions in a formalized manner by means of jointly signed documentation, incorporation of interactions into jurisdictional operating procedures and budgets, or the establishment of identifiable institutions attached to resources and personnel. We can think of networks as being supported by transboundary linkages.

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Premiers, have at times moved ahead of the two federal governments in protecting freshwater in the Great Lakes. The Pacific Northwest is also active in terms of subnational network-building. The very close British Columbia-Washington relationship lies at its core, institutionalized in the BC-Washington Environmental Cooperation Council and its various task forces. For example, the BC-Washington Coastal and Ocean Task Force provides a mechanism to collaborate on activities that protect and restore coastal and marine habitats in Puget Sound, the Georgia Basin, and the outer coasts of Washington and British Columbia. There are also multilateral mechanisms dealing with natural resource management, including water and forests. Perhaps the highest-profile multilateral mechanism in the region is the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), whose members include Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington as well as the Canadian provinces and territories of British Columbia, Alberta, and the Yukon. PNWER has working groups on various issues, including environment, sustainable development, and alternative energy, which involve government officials and members of the private sector. On the US-Mexico border, subnational and cross-border regional networks are at an earlier stage of development. With only two exceptions, all environmental linkages between American and Mexican states have been put in place since 1995. It is notable that environmental linkages represent 90 per cent of the total linkages between US and Mexican states, showing the importance that governments along this border attach to environmental cooperation. In addition, Table 2.4 indicates particular strength in terms of connections along the western end of the border. Bilateral interactions have until recently dominated US-Mexico cross-border environmental cooperation. California and Baja California Norte is perhaps the most dynamic pair in terms of the number and variety of environmental linkages. The two states share issue-specific linkages, especially with regard to transborder air and water pollution, while also interacting to promote a broader sustainable development agenda through the Border Environmental Program and the Memorandum of Understanding for the Purpose of Promoting Sustainable Development. Arizona and Sonora are also quite active; in addition to point-source-specific and technical linkages, the Arizona-Mexico Commission attempts to broaden cooperation between the respective state environmental agencies, harmonize compliance, and monitor activities, and it undertakes joint pollution reduction projects. New Mexico appears to be the least active in TABLE 2.4 Top State-State Pairs by Number of Environmental Linkages (2005) PAIR

TOTAL

CA-BCN

8

AZ-Son.

6

NM-Chih.

2

TX-Chih.

2

TX-Coah.

2

TX-NL

2

TX-Tamps.

2

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terms of environmental linkages with its neighbors, preferring instead to take part in multilateral activities with other states (see below). For its part, Texas shares a bilateral strategic environmental plan with each of its three neighboring Mexican states—Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. These plans oversee a variety of joint initiatives. For example, the Texas-Nuevo León Strategic Environmental Plan (Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 2005, i) is a “multi-year planning and action document” designed to provide a “framework for cooperation between the environmental agencies of the two states and to outline an action plan of activities and projects designed to address common environmental issues faced by both entities.” The plan focuses on four main environmental issues: air quality, water supply, water quality and treatment, and waste management. Environmental multilateralism is also becoming increasingly popular on the southern border. At one point, the Border Governors’ Conference, which includes the governors of states on both sides of the border and which has not traditionally been active on environmental issues, adopted a more expansive view of its responsibilities via Environment and Energy “Worktables.” In particular, the conference focused on promoting renewable energy, addressing air emissions from vehicles, and promoting sustainable water systems in the border area. In addition, the Border Legislative Conference (2006), which encourages dialogue among border state legislators via twice-yearly meetings, addresses such issues as solid waste, wastewater management, renewable energy, and, more generally, sustainable development in the border region. Moreover, the Western Governors Association (WGA) sponsored “Ten State Retreat” meetings of the environmental directors and secretaries from all border states over 2003–7 to identify priorities for joint action (California EPA 2007). The retreats do not seem to be ongoing, perhaps because the WGA’s agenda is now completely dominated by environmental issues: every one of the WGA’s nine collaborative initiatives is linked to sustainability and environmental protection. Also interesting in this respect is the tri-state Chihuahua-New Mexico-Texas Strategic Environmental Plan, which adopts a cross-border regional approach to environmental management on the border. Supporting collaboration, then, are mechanisms that vary greatly along and between the borders. In general, however, those along the northern border tend to have more elaborate organizations that operate permanent committee systems, though they may not be well staffed. The Gulf of Maine Council and PNWER are the best examples of well-articulated transboundary networks with sophisticated committee and administrative systems. In many cases, crossborder regional organizations will appoint one jurisdiction to take the lead on management responsibilities for a period, after which a different participating government will take its turn. On the southern border, cross-border interactions are less institutionalized. While multilateral organizations like the WGA and the Border Governors’ Conference have permanent committee systems (generally co-chaired by US and Mexican jurisdictions) as well as some basic administrative support, bilateral interactions, such as those between Arizona and Sonora, rely on interpersonal communication. For obvious resource-related reasons, US-Mexico cross-border regional cooperation often relies on the leadership and resources of US agencies and officials. An important aspect of subnational environmental governance is its ability to integrate activities from higher to lower levels of governance. In the

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Canada-US case, states and provinces themselves set out the terms of federal participation in cross-border activities, and federal agencies have formal “observer status” on committees; for example, federal officials sit on committees of both the NEG/ECP and the Gulf of Maine Council. In the Great Lakes, the federal presence is stronger given the presence of the International Joint Commission and various bilateral organizations. Local governments are also increasingly brought into collaborative activities; the Gulf of Maine Council, for example, has a long history of collaborating with local and regional governments, and in the Pacific Northwest, collaboration with regional governments, such as the Greater Vancouver Regional District, is fairly routine. On the US-Mexico border, federal participation and coordination is very visible. This has its roots in the constitutional and resource position of subnational jurisdictions (especially Mexican states), the strong environmental regulatory role of the US EPA, the programming reach of Border 2012, and the presence of bilateral organizations—such as the BECC and NADBank, which have no counterparts in the northern border region. Another question concerning networks is whether subnational and crossborder regional initiatives involve relevant stakeholders “outside” of government. Given the dominance of state officials in transboundary activities, one might expect the same kind of situation one sees at the bilateral level, i.e., a rather closed process of deliberation. This difficulty is not as marked at the subnational level, however. The Gulf of Maine Council, for example, notes that “we organize conferences and workshops; … raise public awareness about the Gulf; and connect people, organizations, and information” (Gulf of Maine Council, 2013). In fact, representatives of NGOs sit on the central council and also serve on its more than a dozen committees, although they are far outnumbered by government officials. The NEG/ECP interacts frequently with nongovernment policy experts. In the Pacific Northwest there is a tendency to seek interactions with the private sector over those with civic groups. Great Lakes organizations often have very close relationships with civic and environmental organizations, as well as the policy and technical communities. In the US-Mexico case, there are also attempts to work with local groups in state-state interactions, though perhaps not as much through border-wide organizations, such as the WGA and Border Governors’ Conference. We can also see that subnational networks are themselves becoming “networked.” For example, states and provinces along the West Coast have undertaken a collaborative program to reduce diesel engine emissions. Originating with various distinct initiatives across the British Columbia-Washington border as well as in California, the program grew into what is now known as the “West Coast Collaborative.” It targets sources of diesel pollution bombarding the region, including long-haul trucks, cargo ships, and farm and construction equipment. The collaborative, involving subnational governments from California to Alaska, is supported by the US and Canadian national governments, with some projects being integrated into Border 2020 programming.

Fostering Mutual Understanding and Learning at the Subnational Level The above discussion indicates that the number and scope of cross-border regional projects is increasing. However, these interactions are reliant to a

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considerable extent on basic data and technical support from higher levels of government and agencies. To offer but one example, the Environment Committee of the Arizona-Mexico Commission turned to the BECC and NADBank for technical assistance in their attempt to identify implementation opportunities for greenhouse gas emissions reduction projects in the shared border region. In another example, the NEG/ECP’s 1998 Mercury Action Plan, which outlines a variety of point-source reduction and pollution prevention initiatives to be taken by participating states and provinces, was supported by US EPA and CEC research. While in the American case national databases support state initiatives, the relationship between Canadian provinces/Mexican states and their respective national governments is less clear and support is more sporadic. However, subnational interactions are a very useful mechanism for disseminating information and best practices. The Climate Registry, for example, is a nonprofit organization that establishes consistent, transparent standards for businesses and governments to calculate, verify, and publicly report their carbon footprints. The registry was an initiative of the American states but now incorporates Canadian provinces and Mexican states. Similarly, the research base and strategy underlying the NEG/ECP’s Mercury Action Plan has been transmitted to the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, an intergovernmental body including all provinces, and has been integrated into the council’s own mercury-reduction programming.

Subnational Resource Provision Resources are a problem for almost all subnational and cross-border regional activities. All jurisdictions share a key vulnerability in being reliant on departmental or executive branch funds for ongoing management activities and specific projects. A chronic problem is that for the executive entities providing funding dollars, the priorities of fulfilling domestic mandates take precedence over transborder projects—particularly in the United States, where there is active legislative oversight. More ominously, US state budgets have fallen precipitously since the onset of the 2008 economic crisis. Being reliant on executive-level funding also renders cross-border regional initiatives susceptible to changes in government in one or more jurisdictions and, potentially, a corresponding lessening of political support and resources for regional projects. The majority of project-specific funding is sought from American and Canadian federal departments. For example, while the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality and the Comisión de Ecología y Desarrollo Sustentable del Estado de Sonora (Commission for Ecology and Sustainable Development of the State of Sonora) have undertaken to promote projects to pilot green transportation routes in Arizona and Sonora, under the auspices of the Comisión Arizona-Sonora, funding is coming from the US federal government. Similarly, the Georgia Basin-Puget Sound International Air Quality Management Strategy, a smog-reduction initiative on the British Columbia-Washington border, relied on Environment Canada support. Yet such funding is generally temporary in nature, which can be an obstacle to medium- and long-term planning. Similarly, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, the economic stimulus program in the United States, provided a large (but clearly one-time) pool of funds for “green” projects. There is a need for funding to support travel and in-person interactions—and funds for this activity are highly variable.

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Clearly, national governments have played a more significant role in providing a framework for facilitating and supporting environmental action on the southern border than on the northern one, particularly with regard to basic program support. However, it is important to note that the decentralized, regional approach of Border 2012 was instituted in response to sustained criticism of the “top-down” approach of the previous Border XXI. US-Mexico border states have undertaken a variety of specific joint projects, though many of them, initiated at the subnational level, receive support from federal as well as state agencies and are included under the Border 2012 umbrella. It should also be noted that cross-border regional efforts are in some cases supported with private or nongovernmental funds. Land protection organizations such as Ducks Unlimited and the Nature Conservancy have been very active in wildlands protection on both sides of the US-Mexico border. Increasingly, they are seeing their individual preserves as part of a continent-wide system. Charitable foundations have also become involved. The Ford Foundation, which has had an office in Mexico City since 1962, has a Sustainable Development program, which “supports the development of natural resource policies and programs that give poor … communities more control over these resources and a stronger voice in decision making on land use and development” (Ford Foundation 2013). Another conservation funder, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, had in the past done little in Mexico and had not included the Baja California coast in its important West Coast fisheries work. However, late in 2011 it announced a $2.3 million grant to monitor Mexican deforestation, linked to participation in a multi-donor global change initiative. The US-Mexico Border Philanthropy Partnership, started in 2002 and seeded by 11 US foundations and corporations and one Mexican foundation, has created a network of 22 local community foundations along both sides of the border. The partnership seeks to improve the quality of life of the poor, including concerns of environment and environmental justice. Among the projects thus far have been flood relief in Ciudad Juarez, a proposed “Las Californias Binational Conservation Initiative” to create a buffer of natural lands in the San Diego-Tijuana-Tecate triangle, and several health-related activities that include drinking-water quality. Even more important, the partnership has been offering training in fundraising and creating a culture of philanthropy, an attitude much less developed in Mexico than it has been historically in the United States and Canada.10

CONCLUSIONS Getting a clear picture of how the differentiated, fragmented system of transboundary environmental cooperative institutions in North America operates, and drawing conclusions as to the effectiveness of its networks, may seem like an exercise in “trying to see the forest for the trees.” However, stepping back and thinking about how transboundary institutions operate, both independently and together, is critical to understanding whether the cooperation taking place across borders can work to bridge and perhaps even ameliorate the differences identified in the introduction. At the start of this chapter we noted that most of North America’s environmental problems “are not merely local or regional or national or continental in

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nature, but may have local and regional and national and continental aspects.” So the fact that during the past decade pressing issues such as terrorism and economic turmoil have diverted the attention of national politicians and diplomats away from environmental problems does not mean that transboundary environmental cooperation stopped. In the absence of sweeping continent-wide attacks on environmental problems, there has been a flourishing of activity on other scales, particularly at the subnational level. Meanwhile, the bilateral and trilateral institutions originally set up in the 1990s have continued to function, often to good effect, though too often underfunded. Taken together, the transboundary network infrastructure in North America does provide for good communication systems across borders to facilitate information exchange, mutual understanding, and policy learning. Bilateral environmental interactions, relying as they do on national environmental agency capacity, show particular strength in terms of putting in place the tools for diagnosing environmental problems—that is, through joint data gathering, modeling and research, and building mutual understanding among environmental officials across countries. Especially critical to this function are the impressive capabilities of the US EPA. The trilateral CEC is also an important aid in this regard, with its work on harmonizing data, building comparative databases, and undertaking focused research on particular, continent-wide environmental problems. There are two key vulnerabilities with networks in North America, however. First, networks are primarily transgovernmental and do not provide enough access for NGOs and private actors. In particular, formal bilateral institutions tend to be more exclusionary and closed, focused as they are on specialized bureaucratic cooperation. There are certainly exceptions here. Both the IJC and the Border 2020 structures provide broader-based networks that draw in various public, private, academic, and activist interests. Border 2012 (and now 2020), in particular, may prove to be something of a model in linking environmental activities both across spatial levels and across communities of interest. For its part, the trilateral CEC can perform this linking function reasonably well, though perhaps in a quieter fashion, through its basic structure and the collaborative manner in which it carries out its mandate. Subnational and cross-border regional mechanisms also provide a focal point or avenue for bringing together governments and interests outside of government into deliberations. This also explains why, although subnational governance is not strong in terms of information creation, it is a good means by which information can be disseminated. The second key vulnerability is the lack of sufficient resources across the system of networks. All governance levels find resource acquisition and application difficult, although it is most difficult for subnational actors, for the CEC, and for Mexican authorities. State and local governments, which have developed many points of interaction, have limited resources of their own and cannot depend on national government for needed subventions for policy support, much less the building of needed environmental infrastructure. What this highlights is the continued reliance of actors at all levels of environmental governance in North America on national funding—and particularly US national agency funding. While the relationship on the northern border is somewhat more equal (though the United States does contribute more than Canada in terms of tangible funds and in-kind resources), the relationship on the southern border is profoundly asymmetrical in this respect. Thus, cuts to the US EPA and other agencies that fund transboundary environmental undertakings have a critical impact—and on the US-Mexico border, a “double” impact.

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This leads us back to a particular challenge we noted both in the introduction and earlier in this chapter—how to get environmental problems onto national agendas, and particularly the US national agenda, at a time when economic, political, and security crises have crowded the environment off those agendas. The paradox we are left with is this: in terms of carrying out the actual work of cooperation—constructing networks for collaboration, creating and disseminating information to support joint action, and building capacity for implementation—subnational and cross-border regional environmental infrastructure (and we would include here the decentralized regional approach of Border 2020) seems to provide a very useful approach. The CEC also appears to be important in this regard, providing a light but visible tri­ lateral framework for thinking about environmental problems at a continental scale. It is the bilateral level of governance, however, that has relatively more resources and capacity that might be used for transboundary environmental initiatives—yet this level seems least able to bring interests and stakeholders outside government together, or least able to ensure that the environment is at the forefront of political attention.

Notes 1 The lake is in North Dakota, but there are potential impacts to Minnesota and Manitoba. 2 For an extended discussion of how this works, and of the role of information generally in making environmental policy, see Ascher, Steelman, and Healy (2010). 3 Measures for imposing trade sanctions on Mexico in the event of non-compliance with environmental laws were included in the NAAEC, but given the political delicacy of employing such sanctions, they have never been used. Canada refused to have such measures apply to their environmental legislation. 4 For the politics of the side agreement, see Torres (2009). 5 Case SEM 00–006, filed in 2000, Factual Record published in 2006. 6 Ibid., 42. 7 As Torres (2002) argues, particularly offensive to Mexico was the provision in the NAAEC for the possibility of trade sanction mechanisms in the event of noncompliance with domestic environmental laws. 8 The NEG/ECP’s members include Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland. 9 The Gulf of Maine Council’s members include Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. 10 This statement does not imply that Mexicans are not generous. However, in Mexico (and in smaller communities on the United States side of the border), giving has tended historically to be person-to-person or oriented to very local ends, such as building a church or school. This could be supported and enhanced by the development of community foundations both in mobilizing resources and in dealing with larger-scale problems, including environmental problems. One long-standing philanthropic difference between Mexico and the United States (and to a lesser degree Canada) has been the failure of extremely wealthy Mexicans to set up formal institutions comparable to, for example, the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. Such foundations have been major supporters of environmental NGOs as well as research. There is evidence that this is changing in Mexico, however. See Centro Mexicano para la Filantropía (2013).

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Chapter 3

Case Study: Biodiversity and Protected Areas

THE PROTECTION OF WILDLIFE from hunting and habitat loss is among the oldest environmental issues that have been confronted by the three North American countries. Recognition of the problems and national policies to deal with them date back 100 years or more in each country. Moreover, there are several examples of longstanding transboundary cooperation in this area, both binational and trinational. Given the long track record of both domestic policy activity and also coordinated efforts across borders, we might expect to see stable and broad-based networks that can facilitate information sharing and policy learning, as well as provide more tangible forms of support for domestic environmental efforts. This case study offers a long-term perspective on the policies adopted and implemented in each of the three countries. National biodiversity policy approaches—in particular, the regulation of hunting and the establishment of protected areas—are broadly similar, especially across Canada and the United States. However, these broad similarities in approach are nested within distinctive contexts, characterized by differences in land use and resource management regimes as well as in who is responsible for biodiversity policies within the three federal systems. As ecological science has matured, and as understanding of the issues has deepened among scientists and policy-makers, the perception of the problem in all three countries has changed from “species extinction” to “wildlife management” to “protection of biodiversity.” This has drawn attention to the rather significant gaps in domestic policies and their implementation, but it has also emphasized the imperative for the coordination of efforts across borders. In this chapter, we show how continental cooperative activities—including the exchange of ideas through transnational networks, the creation of shared bodies of policy-relevant knowledge and information, and, in some cases, direct bilateral and multilateral action—have facilitated a shift in perspectives on

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biodiversity and helped all three countries to understand where policy gaps lie as well as how to make preparations to address important emerging issues. Where transboundary environmental mechanisms have faltered, however, is in the provision of resources to increase environmental management capacity, particularly in Mexico.

NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE BIODIVERSITY PROBLEM Because it experienced long periods of geographic isolation from Eurasia starting about 30 million years ago, and even on and off from South America for millions of years at a time, North America developed a mix of flora and fauna quite different from the rest of the world.1 European settlement of North America brought enormous and exceptionally swift changes that affected the continent’s biota: massive die-offs of the indigenous human population (and their distinctive use of land and animals);2 the hunting of native birds and large animals to extinction or near extinction; and the conversion of enormous areas from native plant cover to crops, grazing, and, more recently, widespread roads, towns, and cities. Perhaps the single most important impact was through what has been called “the Columbian Exchange.”3 This involved the introduction into the Americas of plants and animals native to other parts of the world. Among the most important were domesticated grazing animals, including the horse, mule, cow, sheep, goat, pig, and chicken (the latter two were usually let loose to find their own food), and new crops, including wheat, barley, and sugarcane. Crops were also moved from one part of the New World to another—Mexican corn to eastern Canada and the United States Midwest, South American tobacco varieties to Virginia and the Carolinas, and Peruvian potatoes to Maine and Prince Edward Island. Some introductions were not even for economic purposes. For example, English settlers brought in familiar songbirds, including one notable project in the late 1800s to introduce all the birds mentioned in Shakespeare, giving us, among others, the European house sparrow and the starling. Even the bees changed; Europeans brought in Italian bees, which were far more prolific honey producers than the small, stingless bees used by the Aztecs and other peoples of Mexico. Unsurprisingly, the impact of all these changes on the native biota was catastrophic. The cumulative number of extinctions, or great reductions in the range where various native animals were found, is simply unknown. It is perhaps most useful to point to some of the most notable examples. In the United States, the most numerous of all birds, the passenger pigeon, became totally extinct in 1914, primarily because of the huge numbers harvested by commercial hunters using firearms. Mexico came close to losing two of its most emblematic species, the jaguar and the Resplendent Quetzal. In Canada, some species of seal and walrus, easy prey for sailors with firearms, became extinct. Only by retreating into the great unroaded forests of the north did Canada’s animal emblems, the beaver and the moose, survive and later return in the twentieth century to repopulate much of their original range. On the Great Plains of the United States and central Canada, the buffalo, which once numbered in the tens of millions, were reduced to tiny remnants. National borders had little importance in these systems of exploitation until the middle of the nineteenth century. The beaver hunters followed animal populations

Case Study: Biodiversity and Protected Areas 81

up rivers in the United States and Canada; American sealers had no hesitation in killing animals on islands that belonged to Mexico or Canada. In the 1840s, as a result of the Mexican-American War, Mexico gave up California, Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, and on the northern border, a peace treaty set the 49th parallel as the boundary between Washington/Oregon and what would become British Columbia. Only slowly was national sovereignty imposed on species and ecosystems that continued to straddle borders or cross them during migration. At present, within North America, Canada is the largest country in geographic extent, followed by the United States and Mexico. But in terms of the number of distinct species each contains, whether plants, animals, or even insects, the order is reversed: Mexico is the biodiversity powerhouse, then the United States, then Canada. Table 3.1 shows the number of species by country in total, and, even more dramatically, when adjusted for country size. Why such differences? Without getting into the complexities of landscape ecology, it is sufficient to note that large parts of Mexico lie within the tropics, whereas Canada has no tropical area and the United States has very small amounts (in South Florida and Hawaii). Speciation tends to be particularly high in the tropics. Moreover, Mexico’s tropical area is itself diverse, including both dry and wet zones, areas bordering both the Pacific and the Caribbean, and altitudinal gradients that range from sea level to more than a score of mountains with elevations of over 10,000 feet. This provides a diversity of habitats, as well as areas that are, or have been, isolated from one another—ideal conditions for creating and maintaining new species.4 Many species cross borders of two, or occasionally all three, countries. Scores of species of songbirds, hawks, eagles, and waterfowl breed in the north and migrate seasonally to the southern United States or to Mexico. The “California” gray whale breeds in lagoons in Baja California, then summers in the North Pacific—much to the delight of whale watchers. Wide-ranging browsers and

TABLE 3.1 Number of Species by Country MAMMALS

TOTAL # OF SPECIES

SPECIES / LAND AREA

Canada

211

21

United States

468

49

Mexico

544

277

Canada

472

47

United States

888

92

Mexico

1,026

522

Birds

Vascular Plants Canada

3,270

327

United States

19,473

2,022

Mexico

26,071

13,274

SOURCE: World Resources Institute; EarthTrends Data Bank.

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TABLE 3.2 Number of Critically Endangered, Endangered, and Vulnerable Species in Each Major Group of Organisms OTHER INVERMAMMALS BIRDS REPTILES AMPHIBIANS FISH* MOLLUSKS* TEBRATES* PLANTS TOTAL

Canada 11

16

5

1

36

United 36 States

78

37

56

Mexico 101

61

95

211

5

10

2

86

236 301

265

270

1,279

154 6

84

361

1,073

Please note that for fish, mollusks, other invertebrates and plants there are still many species in these groups which occur in the countries listed in the table above which have not yet been assessed for the IUCN Red List and therefore their status is not known. Therefore the figures for these groups should be interpreted simply as the number of species known to be threatened of those species assessed to date, and not as the overall total number of threatened species for each group in the country concerned. Mammals, birds, reptiles, and amphibians have been comprehensively assessed and the numbers above are an accurate reflection of the numbers of globally threatened species in these groups found in the above countries. SOURCE: Data taken from IUCN Red List of Threatened Species version 2013.1 Summary Statistics Table 5 (see http://www.iucnredlist.org/documents/summarystatistics/2013_1_RL_Stats_Table_5.pdf)

carnivores, including animals such as elk, bison, and mountain lions, cross borders in their search for food and mates. Several species were once much more widespread across the continent than at present, and efforts to reintroduce some of them—the Mexican wolf and the black-tailed prairie dog are among the most prominent—would be aided greatly by easy passage across borders and the collaboration of management agencies on each side. The bestknown border crosser is the monarch butterfly (Danaus plexippus), a beautiful insect that spends spring and summer feeding on milkweed in the eastern United States and Canada, then migrates in the fall to enormous roosting colonies that cover selected oyamel pine trees in the mountains of the Mexican states of Michoacán and Estado de México. One of the most amazing characteristics of the monarch is that the generation that migrates to Mexico may be the fourth or fifth from the one that left. The monarch has become a symbol of NAFTA and the environment, and in many ways, an emblem of NAFTA generally. As Table 3.2 indicates, all three countries have cause for concern about species that might disappear from a large part of their range or even go extinct. If one looks only at mammals and birds (which are most comprehensively studied from the standpoint of both occurrence and endangerment), the rate of endangerment is 28/683 in Canada, 111/1356 in the United States, and 154/1570 in Mexico.5 Some fairly recent losses have involved species that should impress even the non-specialist: the imperial woodpecker, largest woodpecker in the world, has not been definitely observed in its habitat in the mountains of western Mexico for more than two decades, and the ivory-billed woodpecker, largest and most dramatic woodpecker in the United States, was last definitely observed in a Louisiana swamp in 1944. Despite strong efforts at protection, extinctions continue. Just since 1980, for example, the United States has lost the dusky seaside sparrow, the Bachman’s warbler, and the Columbia Basin pygmy rabbit. Canada has lost the Vancouver Island wolverine.

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BIODIVERSITY POLICY IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO Unlike our other cases—control of ground-level ozone, climate change, and agricultural use of genetically modified crops—policies relevant to biodiversity have a very long history in all three countries.6 Two great policy interventions, begun in the late nineteenth century and continuing to the present, have protected biodiversity from many, but by no means all, of the major threats, and have produced notable recoveries for at least some important species. One policy was control over hunting, fishing, and trapping. This was done first through prohibition of market hunting and other destructive practices, then through sportsman-oriented controls known as “wildlife management,” and still later expanded to include a wider variety of organisms under the rubric of “listing and protection of endangered and threatened species.” The second great policy intervention was the designation and management of protected areas. These two interventions intersect in complex ways, some of them still being discovered by scientists and environmental managers.

National Perspectives on Biodiversity Policy In each country, distinctive contextual factors have molded policy approaches: the extensive federal lands in the United States and a willingness to purchase more when needed; the dominance of the provinces in Canada and the land and wildlife claims of its First Nations; and the needs of millions of poor farmers in Mexico and its unique ejido system of land tenure (introduced in chapter 1). There are also important similarities. Each nation faces the challenge of creating a system of protected areas that truly represents and protects its biodiversity in a situation where the system has been built up over many decades, through a series of incremental decisions. The resulting set of hundreds of protected areas may in some cases be redundant, in others inadequate. There is also the chronic issue of land management, including adequate funding, dealing with tourism, and co-existing with people who live near or (especially in Mexico) inside protected area boundaries. The fact that habitats often span international borders and wildlife migrates over them presents an important challenge for managers. As outlined below, this has led to a long history of binational and trinational cooperation. Recent emphasis by ecologists on the need to manage systems at an extremely large scale, as well as the shifts of suitable habitats as a consequence of climate change, is creating the need for new forms of collaboration and has also motivated the involvement of NGOs. Today, the three North American countries have publics that have been exposed to the wonders of biodiversity, and human threats to it, primarily through magazines and television. National Geographic magazine, which very frequently covers biodiversity, has a monthly circulation of 4.35 million copies in the United States and 354,000 in Canada. A version printed and edited in Mexico since 1997, National Geographic en Español, has a circulation of 40,000. A Mexican firm publishes México Desconocido (Unknown Mexico), a well-edited and beautifully illustrated magazine on nature and nature-oriented travel in Mexico with a circulation of 75,000 copies and 300,000 readers per month (Iasa Comunicación 2012). It also publishes numerous guidebooks in magazine format that are found on newsstands all over the country. Animals or

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birds have served as national symbols for all three countries and have appeared on coins and currency: the Mexican eagle and rattlesnake; the bald eagle and the bison in the United States; and the beaver and the Northern loon in Canada. All three countries have had multiple releases of postage stamps featuring wildlife of all types, sometimes specifically identified as endangered. Only seldom does Mexico commemorate a specific protected area on a postage stamp, Canada somewhat more, and the United States most often of all. We noted in chapter 1 that one of the only available international polls of public attitudes found that loss of plant or animal species or biodiversity was identified as very serious by 77 per cent of Mexicans, 54 per cent of Canadians, and 46 per cent of Americans. All of the above pieces of evidence are consistent with our own observation that the general public in all three countries has a vague, but definite, desire to protect biodiversity, and a belief that biodiversity is endangered by human activities. But this does not make biodiversity a political issue. All three countries have a cadre of committed, well-trained biologists constantly noting threats to various species and ecosystems and urging action. However, the “knowledge entrepreneurs,”7 particularly organized national environmental NGOs, are strongest in the United States, then Canada, and less in Mexico. The current focus of policy-makers on economic and security issues means that drawing much attention to biodiversity will be difficult. However, unprecedented movements of habitats seem to be occurring as a consequence of climate change, and this issue could easily come to the fore in any of the countries—as well as internationally—as part of climate change and energy policy debates.

Policy Choices: Control of Hunting and Listing of Endangered Species In the United States, sporadic and usually ill-enforced attempts at regulating hunting were made throughout the nineteenth century by states and localities that had noted the disappearance of once-common species such as the white-tailed deer and many songbirds (Trefethen 1975). These experiences did establish the principle, held to the present day, that wildlife management— including the issuance of licenses, the establishment of hunting seasons, and programs for the restocking of game animals—is mainly the responsibility of state governments. In support of state efforts, and aided by public revulsion over widespread market hunting of birds for meat and plumes, the federal government passed the Lacey Act in 1900, which prohibited interstate traffic in wildlife killed in contravention of state law. In 1913, the Weeks-McLean Act gave the federal government a direct regulatory role over migratory waterfowl (reinforced by a subsequent treaty with Canada), and the 1934 Duck Stamp Act required waterfowl hunters to buy a federal stamp (beautifully designed; each annual version is purchased by collectors as well as hunters) to affix to their state hunting license. In general, hunting is today well controlled in the United States, with good adherence to license requirements and bag limits as well as vigorous state enforcement. Many species that had at one time become rare or even extinct over large parts of their range because of uncontrolled hunting or trapping, including the white-tailed deer, black bear, beaver, and turkey, have made vigorous comebacks. Regulations seem to be well accepted by hunters as being in their own best interest, and there is widespread hunter support for public and

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private programs for habitat restoration. In fact, some ecologists complain that “wildlife management” has been so successful that it has encouraged excess populations of popular hunted species, to the detriment of more subtle ecological functions. The 1973 Endangered Species Act gave the US federal government authority to list specific “threatened or endangered” species, including animals, plants, invertebrates, and fish, and provided hefty fines for harming them. “Harm” included not only hunting these species, but also “taking” them by destroying nests, spawning grounds, and other important habitat types. Currently, there are 1,370 listed species that have all or part of their occurrence in the United States. There are several listed species for which the United States shares habitats with Mexico, Canada, or both. Perhaps the best known is the whooping crane, a huge bird that breeds primarily in Wood Buffalo National Park in northern Canada and overwinters in the Aransas National Wildlife Refuge in coastal Texas. There are only about 380 whooping cranes in the wild, with a slow and somewhat erratic climb from the two dozen counted in 1941 (United States Fish and Wildlife Service 2012). Other species of concern include the gray whale, sea turtle, black-tailed prairie dog, ocelot, grizzly bear, and Mexican wolf. As of the time of this writing, the United States Endangered Species Act remains on the books but has not been officially reauthorized.8 Mexico has both federal and state laws regulating hunting seasons, required licenses, and bag limits. Although Article 10 of the Constitution of 1917 established a personal right to possess weapons, amendments put in place after the civil unrest of 1968 create significant regulations (and severe penalties) for the ownership or importation of guns larger than .22 caliber. Limited exceptions are made for hunting clubs. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to regulate opportunistic or subsistence use of wildlife, particularly iguanas, agoutis, edible birds, and sea turtle eggs, by rural communities. There is also widespread poaching of commercially valuable species, some of them endangered, such as parrots and several species of cactus. Despite the need for foreign hunters to secure expensive licenses and comply with strict regulations on importing their guns, in recent years SEMARNAT has granted permits for commercializing hunting activity in a “sustainable” manner. These permits are granted when a private owner of land which contains endangered species commits to conserve them in situ (i.e., in their own habitat). These areas are called Unidad de Manejo Ambiental, or UMAs (Environmental Management Units). These UMAs have become a significant business due to the fact that they allow different formats for guided and very expensive hunts of managed game animals, including doves, mountain sheep, ocellated turkeys, and mule deer.9 Many of the units contain both protected species (for which a hunting permit might be obtained) and endangered species (which must be protected). Most of this activity is concentrated on huge private ranches and government land in the northern states and is marketed to affluent US hunters. Recent drug-related violence throughout this area has cut significantly into this activity, however. Institutionally, in Mexico, SEMARNAT addresses biodiversity under the terms of the General Law on Wildlife Conservation. This law defines conservation as the protection and management of species of wildlife and their ecosystems. To implement conservation, the federal government uses several agencies, such as the INECC, the PROFEPA, the CONAFOR, and the Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (CONAMP) (National Commission for Natural Protected Areas).10 These agencies are in turn coordinated by the Comisión

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Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso de la Biodiversidad (the National Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity), or CONABIO. CONABIO is an interministerial entity, chaired by the President of the Republic; it ­consists of the heads of the Secretaries of Environment, Agriculture, Health, Social Development, Education, Tourism, Economy, Energy, Foreign Service, and Treasury. CONABIO is also staffed with professional biologists, ecologists, and specialists in geographic information systems (GIS) and bioinformatics. It has produced comprehensive lists of species, identified degrees of endangerment, and mapped areas needed for their protection and recovery. Although both the United States and Canada have similar expertise, only Mexico has created a single, centralized entity to coordinate regulatory efforts on biodiversity. Hunting and fishing are also well controlled in Canada. In a system very similar to that in the United States, basic licenses are issued by the provinces, with the federal government regulating endangered species and migratory birds. There have been several controversies over the rights of First Nations people to ignore bag limits or even to kill highly endangered species, such as the bowhead whale (Canadian Circumpolar Institute 2004). Similar issues have arisen in the United States—for salmon in the Pacific Northwest, for example—but the issue is given greater salience in Canada by the large amount of land and water where First Nations people hunt and fish, and the number of people dependent on extractive use for a major part of their livelihood. Many Canadian environmentalists had long complained that Canada lacked federal legislation comparable to the US Endangered Species Act of 1973. Finally, in 2002, Parliament passed the Species at Risk Act (SARA), which divides national responsibility for species protection among Parks Canada, Environment Canada, and (for marine species) Fisheries and Oceans Canada, but leaves a great deal of authority in the hands of the provinces. Indeed, given provincial jurisdiction over natural resources and lands within their borders, as discussed in chapter 1, the federal government needed to ensure that its approach was constitutionally defensible. A committee of government and nongovernment experts identifies candidate species (Government of Canada 2009), which may then be added to a national list of protected species. A novel feature of this process is the requirement for explicit consideration of “community knowledge,” including “Aboriginal traditional knowledge.” After a public comment period, final listing decisions are made by the Minister of the Environment and the “Governor-inCouncil” (with the advice of the Federal Cabinet). The underlying philosophy is that this “separates the scientific assessment process from the listing decision, ensuring that scientists can provide fully independent recommendations and that decisions affecting Canadians are made by elected officials who can be held accountable for those decisions” (Government of Canada 2009, 3). As in the case of the Endangered Species Act in the United States, Canada’s SARA is not only intended to protect the species from direct harm by humans, but also to protect its habitat (“residence”). However, unlike in the United States, habitat protection does not automatically extend to non-federal lands, but must await a finding that provincial governments are not doing an adequate job. The 10 provinces had (and still have) varying legislation dealing with species protection. For example, a 2009 study of the status of Canada’s butterflies reported that only 18 species out of 95 not categorized as “secure” have been listed nationally, but only four provinces—Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba, and New Brunswick—protect butterflies at the provincial level (Hall 2009).

Case Study: Biodiversity and Protected Areas 87

On the positive side, Canada has a greater tendency than either Mexico or the United States to take an “ecosystem approach,” trying to identify and protect areas where multiple species occur, rather than a species-by-species approach. Yet, even after the passage of SARA in 2002, environmentalists remained critical of its administration. In 2009, four leading national organizations issued a “SARA report card,” giving the law implementation grades of “D” for listing and “F” for habitat protection. The organizations charged that the government had a bias against listing marine fish as threatened or endangered. They were also especially critical of what they considered to be a lack of federal response to cases where there is inadequate habitat protection on provincial and private lands (Nature Canada 2009).

Policy Choices: Habitat Protection Even when species have been protected from the dangers of hunting, fishing, or trapping, they are vulnerable to changes in their habitat. Agricultural land clearing, removal of large “den trees,” water pollution, damming of natural water courses, and habitat fragmentation associated with roads and buildings are among the most common habitat threats. Especially vulnerable are organisms that have very specialized habitat requirements—so that small land changes have large habitat impacts—or wide-ranging species that can be injured by habitat fragmentation. The obvious solution to the habitat problem is setting aside protected natural areas. The United States and Canada were world pioneers in creating large “national parks” in the nineteenth century. In fact, the United States is widely credited with inventing the national park when it created the million-acre Yellowstone National Park in 1872, an action that author Wallace Stegner called “the best idea we ever had.”11 Canada quickly followed, establishing Banff National Park in 1885. Today, the United States has 58 national parks totaling 24 million hectares. The largest, Wrangell–St. Elias in Alaska, is itself 3.6 million hectares in size. Canada has 42 national parks and national park reserves with a total area of 29 million hectares, or 3.2 per cent of the national land area. These figures greatly understate the area of “national park–like” reserves in both countries. For example, both countries have extensive systems of state and provincial parks, some of them very large. Woodland Caribou Provincial Park Wilderness in northern Ontario is 460,000 ha/capita in size, while Baxter State Park in Maine is about 100,000 ha/capita of wilderness and is heavily used by recreational hikers and canoeists. The United States also has several nationally administered areas with titles like “national recreation area,” “national reserve,” “national monument,” and “national seashore” that are managed under policies very similar to those governing national parks. The idea of a national park was indeed an inspired one, and it played a key role for more than a century in persuading governments to set aside some of their largest and most significant natural areas (Runte 2010). The idea, however, contained three inherent flaws that have somewhat limited the role these parks can play in the protection of biodiversity. First, national parks have almost everywhere been designated on the basis of their natural beauty—“crown jewels” and “scenic wonders” are terms that were often used to justify them. But natural beauty and the possible presence of a few “charismatic megafauna” (the elk of Yellowstone, for example) does not necessarily translate into overall

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species richness nor degree of threat. One study of US parks calls it an “unsystematic system” (Conservation Foundation 1985). Second, national parks in the United States and Canada were from their inception seen as recreational destinations. In fact, many were created with the active encouragement of railroads. When automobile-based tourism later created great crowds, the mission of managers tended more toward visitor-oriented services, rather than the resource itself. Finally, the national park model involved the removal of local populations, either native American or settler (Healy 2007). This created situations in which land inside the park was firmly protected, but the people outside park boundaries had little stake in the park, causing some resentment. This policy began with Yellowstone, managed for its first several decades by the US army through Shenandoah National Park and the Blue Ridge Parkway in the 1930s, when hundreds of small farmers were evicted and all trace of their occupation erased in the name of making the park “scenic.” Not until the 1960s and 1970s, with the creation of parks in settled areas—such as Cape Cod National Seashore (Massachusetts) or Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area (California)—did the National Park Service start to allow a mixture of public and private land within park boundaries, with use of the private land subject to regulation. Canada’s experience with parks is very similar to that of the United States— designate them based on scenery, rather than biodiversity; encourage tourism, sometimes excessive tourism; and eject indigenous people and settlers (Dearden and Rollins 2002; Healy 2007; Campbell 2011). In the 1970s, these policies were changed in fundamental ways. In 1971, Parks Canada set a goal for new parks, namely, to represent each of Canada’s 39 major ecosystems. Also, a series of court decisions and a parliamentary inquiry (the Berger Commission of 1977) highlighted the fact that First Nations people had moral and legal rights in existing parkland and, more importantly, in much of the land that was being considered for future parks. The result has been several compromises with First Nations, notably the 1993 agreement with the Haida people that provides for “co-management” of the Gwaii Haanas National Park and Marine Reserve, a set of islands off the coast of British Columbia. There have also been agreements that allow wildlife harvesting by First Nations people based on cultural and religious traditions. Mexicans point with justifiable pride to plant and animal reserves that antedate European settlement, including the savin tree (known by the pre-Hispanic name of ahuehuetes) plantations of Aztec emperor Nezahualcoyotl and the zoological and botanical gardens of Moctezuma II. Most of these disappeared with the Spanish conquest. Mexico created its first modern national park in 1917, the Desierto de los Leones, in the mountains outside Mexico City.12 In the mid-1930s, President Lázaro Cárdenas, working with famed forester Miguel Ángel de Quevedo, designated 40 parks (some natural, some historical), which today make up more than three-quarters of Mexico’s national park system (Simonian 1995, 94). Several of these parks contained large portions of ejido land, and no effort was made to eject the owners, usually small farmers. Simonian observes that, “since Mexican law prohibited the buying of communal lands, public officials had to enlist the support of peasants in protecting their resources within national parks. Despite a combination of persuasion and fines, cooperation from the ejidos was not always forthcoming” (1995, 100). Since 1970, nearly all of Mexico’s new protected areas—and several very large

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ones have been decreed—have been based not on the national park model, but on the “world biosphere” model. This concept, developed by UNESCO and supported by many ecologists, calls for protected areas that consist of a strictly protected “core” surrounded by a much larger “buffer,” where human occupation is permitted and agriculture and forestry activities are permitted, but regulated. This approach was the result of assuming for the first time in the country that environmental protection was a function of government, which had to “correct” what humans had depleted (Provencio 2004). National parks and biosphere reserves are by no means the only kinds of protected areas in all three countries. In the United States, for example, there is an extensive system of national wildlife refuges, mostly coastal or inland marshes set aside for migratory waterfowl. The first, Pelican Island, off the east coast of Florida, was set aside in 1903 by an executive order of President Theodore Roosevelt. There are now 586 refuges, covering 95 million acres. Hunting is allowed on many refuges, but there is a pronounced ecological orientation to their management, and many pay special attention to the protection or even the reintroduction of endangered species. Like the national parks, the national wildlife refuges are important places of recreational visitation, hosting 41 million visitors per year as of 2008. The United States and Mexico have important areas managed for study by major universities (e.g., the University of California reserve system, Harvard Forest, and UNAM’s Sierra de Manantlán Reserve). In Canada, most of the forest is owned and managed by provincial governments, with objectives of both timber production and environmental protection. In the United States, hundreds of millions of acres are managed by the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, also with combined production and conservation goals. Environmental capacity for the conservation of habitats in Mexico has also been expressed by the different kinds of protected areas: 41 biosphere reserves, 67 national parks, five natural monuments, eight natural resource protection areas, 35 flora-fauna protection areas, and 18 sanctuaries (CONANP 2013). Alongside Mexico’s protected areas, there is the ecological territorial planning of land use (Territorial Ordering and Planning of Land Use, or TOPLU), which divides territory into areas for production, or sustainable development, as well as environmental rescue, or full species protection. Jurisdiction for this planning—including both marine and terrestrial areas—is divided among the three levels of government (federal, state, and municipal); lower levels have a certain amount of autonomy to decide on conservation priorities and then notify the federal government, which would enact these priorities. Another example of a conservation strategy is the “basin management” approach, which takes into account the protection of water sources from their origins in the mountains to their ultimate outfall at the oceans. In Mexico, all forests, amounting to about 40 per cent of the national area, fall under federal government regulation in theory, though this is subject to corruption, timber theft, and inadequate control of land clearing and wildfires. In the United States, many states regulate forest practices on private land—California is a leader, paying particular attention to the impacts of timber harvest on the quality of streams that flow through the forest. In the early 1970s, scientists and environmental organizations strove toward a goal of protecting 10 per cent of each country’s land area (the average was then about 5 per cent). This goal has now been met, both worldwide and in

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TABLE 3.3 Protected Areas (IUCN Categories I–VI) TERRESTRIAL PROTECTED AREAS (% OF TOTAL LAND AREA)

MARINE PROTECTED AREAS (% OF RELEVANT NATIONAL AREA)

1990

2013

1990

2013

Canada

4.7

7.5

0.6

1.2

United States

12.4

12.4

21.0

28.6

2.2

11.1

1.1

16.7

Mexico

SOURCE: World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC).

North America, with total protected land worldwide now at 12.9 per cent. Table 3.3 shows the growth and extent of protected areas in the three countries. These include only land in categories subject to specific protection, and do not include multiple-use government forests or lands that are merely regulated. Each of our three countries comes close to or exceeds the 10 per cent target called for by international organizations (Canada’s apparent lag in terrestrial areas will be remedied when legal disputes with First Nations bands are settled; it does fall far short in marine protected areas). Unfortunately, more detailed analysis shows a need to “not only measure progress in terms of area protected, but also of ecological and regional representativeness” (UNEP-WCMC 2009, 5). As discussed above, a major issue in all three countries is that the existing system of protected areas does not coincide with the ideal system of areas to protect their biodiversity. Olson et al. (2001) found that of the world’s most important ecosystems, North America had some of the best protected (Sierra Nevada coniferous forest, 82 per cent protected; Hawaii, 76 per cent protected) and the worst (Canadian boreal taiga, 2.6 per cent protected). Scientists and environmental activists in all three countries are continually pointing to these protection gaps. For example, in Canada, Kerr and Cihlar (2004) have identified loss of habitat to agriculture as the greatest threat to biodiversity and conclude that “regions of Canada with many endangered species have virtually no protected area, and land-use conflicts limit the potential for reserve network expansion” (752). Many of these regions are in southern Canada, at or near the border. The governmental response in Canada includes a policy to try to create future national parks based on ecosystems rather than scenic grandeur. In Mexico, CONABIO continues to press for the designation of more scientifically based biosphere reserves and fauna protection areas, often of very large size, and there have been several recent successes. The United States has been a laggard and often adds to its protected area system based on local political pressures, which may or may not conform to national habitat protection needs. In light of these threats to plant and animal species in North America, a great deal of environmental restoration work could usefully be done in all three countries as well as across borders. In the Pacific Northwest of Canada and the United States, millions of acres of old-growth “temperate rainforest” on the west side of the Cascades have been clear-cut logged, and only a handful of species replanted. As this land is brought under a standard industry management regime of a clear cut every 40 to 60 years, it will grow into an ecosystem much less complex than what originally occupied the land. On the more arid eastern side

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of the Cascades, millions of acres of clear-cut land are not even regenerating properly and need to be replanted. In Mexico, a great deal of reforestation could be done, both on land in the northern central forests (e.g., Durango), where temperate forests have been logged, and in the tropical forests of Chiapas, Tabasco, and Oaxaca. Moreover, in many areas of Mexico, land long deforested for campesino farming is no longer needed for growing corn, beans, and other staples, and could be returned to its original mixed-species forest. An alternative approach to land conservation, which has grown very rapidly in the United States since about 1985, is the land trust (sometimes called a land conservancy). These are private, nonprofit entities that protect habitat and other conservation values by buying or accepting donations of private land or “conservation easements,” whereby the land remains private but use is limited to sustainable agriculture or forestry. A national association of land trusts claims that there are 1,700 land trusts with 2 million members, which have protected 39 million acres of land to date (Land Trust Alliance 2010). The land trust movement in Canada is smaller, but rapidly growing (Watkins and Hilts 2001); as of 2010, the Canadian Land Trust Alliance (2010) had 45 member organizations. Most, but not all, are at the provincial level, in contrast to the United States, where most cover only a few counties. In Mexico, the predominance of ejidal land makes the land trust model less applicable, but US organizations Ducks Unlimited and the Nature Conservancy have been very active in the northern part of the country, where huge private ranches are common. In one 2005 project, the Nature Conservancy teamed with Pronatura Noreste, a Mexican NGO, and bought a 26,000-acre ranch in the Janos Valley grasslands in Chihuahua, then in 2009 persuaded the federal and state governments to decree a 1.3 million-acre Janos Biosphere Reserve (Nature Conservancy 2009). In a classic example of how multiple values can be protected, the Janos grasslands not only protect the threatened black-tailed prairie dog and the endangered black-footed ferret, but they are also permanent or seasonal habitat for 222 species of birds. In late 2009, the US National Park Service donated 23 bison from a reserve in South Dakota to the Janos Valley to try to recreate a long-extinct herd (Nature Conservancy 2010). The huge biosphere reserve is 120 miles south of the US-Mexico border and is described as part of a “crossborder” reserve system. Yet the physical walling off of the border would make migration by terrestrial species—such as the bison—impossible. In addition to their creativity in protecting working landscapes, and (through conservation easements) allowing private owners to retain their property, land conservancies have been pioneers in “gap analysis,” or the systematic identification of lands that are: (1) high priority for species or ecosystem protection; and (2) currently unprotected and under threat from some sort of land-use change. A pioneering step was made by the Nature Conservancy in the 1960s, when it encouraged states and counties to undertake ecological inventories that identified lands within their boundaries that were of significant habitat value and that were threatened, usually by development. Many land trusts use these inventories in setting priorities for their conservation programs.

The “Parks and People” Problem Protected areas in all three countries are affected by the “parks and people” problem—a worldwide issue of how park management, and the protection of

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biodiversity, is affected by people who live inside protected areas or on private land nearby. Mexico’s protected areas suffer from the classic overlapping of borders: historical ones where people (mostly indigenous) have inhabited land with important natural values, and more recent administrative ones where land has been designated as a “protected area.” This generates a great problem for communities inside the conservation areas as people try to eke out a livelihood. Moreover, 50 per cent of the population living inside protected areas is very poor (Bezaury-Creel et al. 2009). One of many examples of the parks and people conflict in Mexico is the famed Monarch Butterfly Reserve in Michoacán (Estado de Mexico). Created in 1986 from the land of several ejidos and expanded in 2000, it is managed in the style of a world biosphere reserve. There are three protected core zones totaling 14,000 hectares and two buffer zones totaling 47,000 hectares. Since its establishment, there have been conflicts between ejidos that enjoy the economic benefits of tourism and those that do not, as well as conflicts over illegal timber cutting by outsiders (Chapela y Mendoza and Barkin 1995; Carreon 2004). In 2004, the federal government invested $18 million USD in developing and protecting the reserve, including the installation of video cameras and satellite radios to monitor timber cutting (Carreon 2004). This is an example where environmental rulings leave no choices for people who live in protected areas; if they do not conform to the rules, they can be judged as ecological delinquents. In Canada and the United States, there are far fewer people inside most protected areas, though several US protected areas have had struggles with “inholders” (owners of private parcels within parks) and with privately owned mineral rights. Canada has also had to contend with diverse demands by First Nations people for resource use within its protected areas. Far more important in Canada and (especially) the United States have been relationships with “neighbors” just outside the park. For example, the reintroduction of the gray wolf in Yellowstone and the red wolf in North Carolina has caused controversy with neighboring cattle and sheep raisers as well as deer hunters, who fear predation by wandering wolves. In Yellowstone, there has also been concern that bison within the park could transmit the infectious disease brucellosis to cattle.

The Problem of Resources for Protected Areas A particularly important management factor is having a continuous stream of financial resources—for patrolling, for managing wildlife and other resources, for planning, and (by far the most costly) for providing facilities and services for visitors. In Canada and the United States, these funds have traditionally been provided by government appropriations. But both provincial/state and national governments have in recent years been unable to provide all the money needed for effective management. In Canada, a report by University of Victoria professor David R. Boyd (2002) observes that a “major contributor to the declining ecological integrity of parks and protected areas in Canada is a shortage of funding.” Despite Canadians’ pride in parks, park agencies lack the resources necessary to protect biodiversity. At the federal level, Parks Canada has been extensively downsized since the 1980s. Further cuts to national parks in the 2012–2014 federal budget will, says a major environmental group, “significantly reduce scientific research and monitoring essential to protect our national parks. And provincial spending on parks continues to be well below what is needed,

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leaving them vulnerable to threats from inside and outside their boundaries” (Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society 2012, 1). The US Congress has been fairly generous to the National Park Service (NPS) in the last decade, generally providing operating budget increases that exceed inflation. But the service is also adding new units and is being tasked with more responsibilities, such as doing climate research, managing new units, and financing public-private partnerships, and the recent reappearance of large projected federal budget deficits does not bode well for future years. The 2011 NPS budget proposal was slightly lower than the 2010 budget. Moreover, the NPS faces a multibillion-dollar backlog of deferred maintenance. Fortunately, some federal economic stimulus funds have been directed to park capital projects, and there is considerable enthusiasm for generally sprucing up the parks in anticipation of the 100th anniversary of the agency in 2016. Nearly all of the state governments in the United States are facing severe budget deficits, putting great pressure on their park agencies (Fine 2010). Parks in New York, California, and other states have been reducing staff and hours open, and some have even been closed to visitors. In many states, there has also been a severe reduction or even elimination of state funds used for the purchase of new protected areas. The largest single source of money to buy new protected lands in the United States is the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF), set up in 1965 to receive money from offshore federal oil leases and allocate $900 million annually for land purchase, part for federal agencies and part for grants to the states. Oil lease revenues have grown greatly, but the fund is subject to congressional appropriation, rather than automatically receiving funds. The $900 million level has been reached only twice to date, and the FY 2009 allocation was only $180 million. The Obama administration has pledged to bring the LWCF to full funding by 2014. In Mexico, although there are multiple institutions dedicated to conservancy, national government funding of protected areas is almost nonexistent. Government funding for protected areas must compete with other pressing social needs and low tax revenues, as discussed in chapter 1. The result has been lack of management and serious damage to supposedly protected natural resources. With few exceptions, Mexico’s 55 national parks are truly “paper parks,” with no individual park budget, no on-site staff, and few or no facilities for visitors. Many of the parks are predominantly on ejido lands, or even on privately owned lands. One expert on the Mexican park system, interviewed in 2008, said that many of the new protected areas (i.e., the biosphere reserves) declared in the 1990s “don’t even have a management plan … many years passed by [before they had] a director, forest rangers and some managerial structure and offices” (quoted in Mora-Trejos 2011, 23). An evaluation of a marine park in Veracruz found that although the area was declared as protected in 1992, “in the ensuing 17 years only limited measures have been taken to reduce harvesting within the area” (Arceo and Granados-Barba 2010). Gallina (2012) also contrasts the protected areas in states on the northern tier with those in the southern states. In the North, parcels within protected zones are large and owned by ranchers or investors, whereas most protected land in the South is in small parcels, often part of ejido or other communal lands that are income sources for large numbers of very poor people, and regulation of hunting and timber removal is more difficult.

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With respect to facilities, many parks are listed as lacking them entirely, others as “abandoned.” Of course, there is no entrance fee where there is no staff to collect it. The same is true of most of the newly designated biosphere reserves, though they enjoy some protection because most are large desert or marsh lands, with low population density and little economic incentive to convert land to other uses. The newer biosphere reserves are also paper parks, with neither management budgets nor on-site staff. It is telling that the best guides to Mexico’s national parks and reserves are not government pamphlets and on-the-ground personnel (as in the United States and Canada), but high-quality publications produced by the private firm that publishes México Desconocido, mentioned above. It is clear that Mexico’s environmental management capacity must be brought up to the level of Canada and the United States. Mexico’s efforts in biodiversity protection, despite the work of several well-trained and dedicated scientists, have been hampered by the same structural and resource limits that have hampered its efforts to control pollution, improve municipal water supply, and so on. The protection of biodiversity is highly centralized in the federal government, but the responsible authorities (CONABIO, SEMARNAT) lack the environmental management capacity to fully address this complex problem. The state, local, or nongovernmental actors that might step in to fill gaps lack both legal authority and the environmental capacity to implement more than token programs. Valdez et al. (2006) observe that “the continuous shifting of federal agencies responsible for wildlife management with the concomitant lack of adequate federal funding has not permitted the establishment of a robust wildlife program. In addition, wildlife conservation has been further impacted by a failure to establish landowner incentives, power struggles over user rights, resistance to change and lack of trust and experience in managing Mexico’s wildlife” (270). Ironically, the few parks that do have on-site staff, trails, restrooms, campgrounds, and other facilities for visitors are small, urban parks that, even if well managed, could not protect biodiversity on anything but a very local scale. Most of these, Vargas Márquez (1997) suggests, should be deleted from the national park system and managed by municipalities as urban parks. One Mexican park that does have staffing and user fees is Cozumel Marine Park, off the Caribbean coast. The fee is enforced by requiring divers to wear a paper bracelet indicating that the charge has been paid. This fee replaces a similar charge that had been voluntarily imposed by a coalition of tour operators and used for support of the park. The huge mangrove swamp in the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve, farther down the intensely developed coast south of Cancún, also has on-ground protection, mostly thanks to tour operators and the NGO Amigos de Sian Ka’an/Friends of Sian Ka’an. Mexico does have some natural areas that are managed by ejidos and where admission charges are used to provide facilities. For example, the ejido of San Nicolás Totolapan occupies 2,300 hectares of mountain coniferous forest, edging up to one of the volcanoes that ring Mexico’s capital. Working with an environmental group, the ejido has laced the forest with 150 kilometers of mountain biking trails. The ejido charges small fees for hiking, cycling, and vehicle parking. There are several other ejidal parks elsewhere in Mexico, including an ejido that provides boat tours of the extensive swamps near San Blas, Nayarit.

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A very interesting phenomenon in Mexico is that, while national parks rarely have admission charges or on-site management, the country’s archeological and historical sites have high fees and generally good facilities. A separate agency, the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (INAH) (National Institute for Anthropology and History) supervises 29,000 archeological zones, of which 180 are open to the public. The agency also runs about 100 museums throughout Mexico. It charges relatively high entrance fees, but admission is free to school students during the week and to all Mexican citizens on Sunday (INAH 2011). In Canada and the United States, where governments have traditionally provided enough money for the protection and staffing of their parks, and where park tourism has long been well established, there have in recent years been experiments with greater reliance on fees and even privatization. In theory, this might help correct the low levels of government funding that Searle (2000) called “death by a thousand cuts.” In 1999, Parks Canada became a separate operating agency, reporting to the Minister of Canadian Heritage, but with significant autonomy for budget management and revenue generation (Wright and Rollins 2002, 228). Canada’s 2010 federal stimulus plan gave Parks Canada $140 million USD to upgrade roads, visitor centers, and campgrounds. More generally, however, Mara Kerry, conservation director for the NGO Nature Canada, said of the 2010 budget: “Amidst International Year of Biodiversity, in the lead-up to hosting the G8 and G20, we are disappointed that the budget contained no new funding to protect our biodiversity and to meet our commitments under the Convention on Biological Diversity” (Nature Canada 2010). Indeed, although Canada and the United States have in place all or most of the institutions necessary to manage their biodiversity, they have not funded them adequately. The idea that recreational users—whether hunters, fishers, hikers, or campers—should pay toward the upkeep of resources that they use is a reasonable one. But these users should not be expected to pay for the rather considerable costs of identifying and managing biodiversity, or for protecting it from such fundamental threats as invasive species and climate change. This is new territory for wildlife managers, who are used to obtaining operating funds from hunting and fishing licenses, and park managers, who have (in the United States and Canada, at least) been urged to move toward self-financing through entrance and camping fees. The best parallel, perhaps, is the US Department of Agriculture programs that pay farmers to maintain wetlands rather than cultivate them. Future resources might be raised by a dedicated climate change adjustment fund replenished with taxes on carbon releases or on some specific energy sources (much like the Land and Water Conservation Fund, which paid for the large public land acquisitions of the 1960s and 1970s with revenues from offshore oil leases).13

New Challenges to Biodiversity: Invasive Species, Climate Change, and the Border Fence In terms of protecting species and their habitats, new threats have arisen in areas of biological importance large and small throughout North America: invasive species, climate change, changing land-use patterns, and the securitymotivated “thickening” of international borders, notably the erection by the United States of a high fence on its border with Mexico. Each of these

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problems will undoubtedly require increasing cooperation among the three countries in the future. There have been problems with invasive species for many years (e.g., fire ants and kudzu in the United States South; the spread of “killer bees” over most of Mexico), but greatly increased world movement of goods and people has led to a proliferation of new invasives, many of which are directly competing for habitat niches with native species. Consider, for example, the cactus moth, a South American parasite that attacks the Opuntia (prickly pear) cactus. The moth, detected in Florida in 1989 and in Mexico in 2009, is spreading rapidly in both countries. Opuntia is a widespread ornamental in the United States, but in Mexico its “paddles” are an important food source (CONABIO 2010). The paddles, both fresh and bottled, are also widely available in food stores in the United States in many areas with significant Mexican-American population. Commercial production takes place both in Mexico and in the southwestern United States. The pest has the potential for major infestation in a wide swath from Florida and the Gulf Coast of the United States and most of central and southern Mexico. Both the Mexican and United States governments have moved aggressively and with considerable success to try to eradicate the moth and limit its spread, but these efforts require collaborations between national governments and among individual states. Eradication approaches include interfering with the life cycle of the moth, introduction of parasites to control it, and national and state quarantines to limit its spread. They also involve multiple factors: national agricultural agencies collecting data and performing research, government and nongovernment scientists, federal inspectors on national borders, state agencies enforcing local quarantines, and even individual farmers who look for populations of the pest and report them to authorities. Especially damaging, and especially difficult to eradicate, are invasive freshwater plants and fish. Two exotic tropical water plants, the hyacinth and the hydrilla, have created enormous problems in the southern United States and in Mexico, clogging irrigation canals, interfering with recreational use of lakes and streams, and reducing levels of dissolved oxygen in the water. Lake Chapala, Mexico’s largest lake and part of the water supply to both Guadalajara and Mexico City, has in some years been covered by dense mats of hyacinth, which are poisoned chemically or removed from the shoreline by crews with pitchforks and dump trucks. The zebra mussel, native to Russia, has invaded the Great Lakes, as well as the Hudson, St. Lawrence, and Mississippi Rivers, among others, where it clogs intakes of power plants and municipal water supplies. The Asian carp, a large fish that virtually eliminates many native species, has become a major pest in the Mississippi River system, and is on the verge of colonizing the Great Lakes. An electronic barrier has been placed at the mouth of the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal in a (probably vain) effort to keep this fish out of Lake Michigan. Although these species are expensive and frustrating to control, the experience of the binational Great Lakes Fishery Commission, founded in 1955 in part because of a threatened invasion of sea lampreys, indicates that aggressive and inventive approaches can eventually keep an invasive species to a tolerable level (Great Lakes Fishery Commission 2010). The problem of invasive species, which interacts with climate change, needs to be addressed both within countries and across borders. Collaboration on monitoring the spread of invasives is one

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obvious priority. In the area of control, trailered recreational watercrafts are vectors for the spread of several invasives, and the borders are an obvious locale for inspection and enforcement efforts. Many of the species—the water hyacinth, for example—are already significant problems in more than one country. Joint research and the sharing of experience with alternative control methods would be extremely valuable, particularly since, for many invasives, the only way to develop control techniques is to actually try them in the field. Finally, public education about invasives—why they are important, how to recognize them, where to report them—is a logical candidate for a multi-country approach. Climate change, which we will discuss in detail in chapter 5, is a second new challenge to North America’s biodiversity (Schneider and Root 2002). Although many think of climate change in terms of uniform warming, it can have unpredictable effects on temperature and rainfall patterns, and the percentage change in either can be much higher than the average worldwide rise in temperature. There is considerable evidence that various life-forms have already shifted the limits of their ranges in response to temperature change (for a review of mechanisms, see Klausmeyer et al. 2011). For example, a recent study with a very large observation size found that 18 species of migrating birds in the northeastern United States migrated earlier in response to warming, but some species changed their behavior more than others (Hurlbert and Liang 2012). This result shows how the impact of climate change for organisms living within ecosystems is even more complex than it is for crops. For example, what if one organism is more adaptable than another with which it competes? What if predators or prey shift at differing rates? And while we can observe what has happened thus far, we need elaborate models to look at the future, and these come with a great deal of uncertainty (Barney and DiTomaso 2010). A third new challenge to biodiversity is changing land use and changing patterns of land ownership. Particularly in the western United States, lands long held in large parcels and used only for grazing are now the objects of division into small (20–100-acre) parcels and the construction of second homes or retirement homes in scenic areas. This can mean more fences, complaints about wildlife movement, and demands for fire control that might not be in the long-term interest of biodiversity protection. Proposed energy projects in both Canada and the United States involve not only the implantation of industrial facilities in lands that were formerly “wild,” but also long-distance roads and pipelines that cut across wildlife migration routes. There is also a “thickening” of the borders between countries in North America, undertaken primarily by the United States. The long US-Mexico border fence—exempted by the Bush administration from all environmental laws and reviews—presents a particularly significant barrier to wildlife movement. These barriers stand directly in the way of the tendency—promoted strongly by conservation biologists and environmental groups—to expand the scale at which habitats are managed. For example, in 2009, the Mexican government greatly expanded its protected area for hundreds of miles along the Rio Grande (called Rio Bravo in Mexico) bordering Big Bend NP and other US protected areas, creating the 3.3 million-acre Rio Bravo del Norte Natural Monument. In 2010, talks were being held at both the cabinet secretary and staff level about the possibility of linking Mexico’s new reserve on the Rio Bravo with Big Bend and nearby private lands to create a huge habitat area, one large enough to support carnivores and other wide-ranging species (Glover 2010). But a fence

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separating the United States and Mexican sections of these protected lands would not only undo the increase in the scale of habitat management, but also be a step back even from the present situation. These new challenges often reinforce one another and interact with other factors affecting species and their habitats. For example, a changing climate can weaken key elements of native ecosystems and allow invasives to gain footholds. And the erection of barriers to wildlife movement, whether border fences, highways, or pipelines, is likely to stand in the way of the migration of species and ecosystems into new territories as their old habitats are made untenable by climate change. Old models of “national parks” and “national wildlife refuges” are simply not sufficient to deal with geographically mobile species, pollution threats, and—the ultimate challenge—a changing climate. Private land conservancies and government-private collaborations are needed in all three countries. The task is further compounded by the spread of invasive species, some of which have proven very difficult and expensive to control. Responsibility for invasives, and funding for their control, tends to reside in agriculture-oriented agencies of government, despite the fact that they present a grave threat to natural ecosystems, not just to agricultural crops.

Present Transboundary Cooperation for Biodiversity Protection Transboundary cooperation agreements, and organizations created to implement them, have a surprisingly lengthy history in North America. It has long been recognized that migratory species, especially birds, regularly cross international borders in North America, and protecting them was the basis of some of the earliest joint efforts relevant to biodiversity. Early US-Canada cooperation on species that were migratory and/or taken by hunters or fishers who crossed international boundaries dates back more than a century to such agreements as the Inland Fisheries Treaty of 1908, the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 1911, and the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916 (Dorsey 1998). Also, a US-Mexico treaty on migratory birds was signed in 1936. Two bilateral institutions, set up for reasons other than protecting biodiversity, have nevertheless taken on significant roles in this area. The US-Canada International Joint Commission (IJC) (see chapter 2) has aided biodiversity through its efforts to remediate water quality “hot spots” on the Great Lakes (McGlashen 2009); its work on the impact of transbasin water transfers or levels of instream flow on ecosystems (IJC 2008); and its ability to coordinate groups of scientists and citizens concerned with the lakes (Verwej 2000).14 The IJC contends, however, that the most important threat to Great Lakes biodiversity is introduced marine organisms (IJC 2002). It has taken a leadership role in publicizing the economic impacts of such invaders as the sea lamprey and the zebra mussel, and trying to prevent new introductions via the washing of bilge tanks and other sources. The International Boundary and Water Commission, created by a Mexico-US agreement in 1889, was originally set up to mark and manage river boundaries along the border. Yet it has long been involved with flood control, sanitation, river levels, and salinity in far-reaching watersheds on both sides of the border (see chapter 2). Although it has had to consider wildlife impacts through its need to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act, it has recently taken some additional steps toward

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habitat management, particularly in the meandering, wetland-rich lower Rio Grande. In 2010, the commission awarded a contract to a private company to restore vegetation along a 105-mile river segment from low-quality, non-native salt cedar to a more natural mix. The Commission is also the repository of water quality data for border rivers, which can be very valuable in the management of fish and other aquatic organisms. There are also longstanding ties across borders by agencies concerned with wildlife management. For example, the US Fish and Wildlife Service has a long history of collaboration with both Canada and Mexico. Perhaps the most significant institution here is the Canada/Mexico/US Trilateral Committee for Wildlife and Ecosystem Conservation and Management. The Trilateral Committee was set up in 1996 through a Memorandum of Understanding among the wildlife agencies of the three countries, and it operates through several “working tables” ranging from migratory birds to law enforcement and trade in endangered species (Trilateral Committee for Wildlife and Ecosystem Conservation and Management 2010). In 2010, a major trinational report on the status of migratory birds in North America was released under the auspices of the committee, and it included a continent-wide strategy for their protection (Partners in Flight 2010). A small but surprisingly early step taken to protect boundary-crossing ecosystems was the creation of internationally shared parks and protected areas. One of the world’s first transboundary protected areas—often called a “peace park”—was the collaboration that started in 1932 between Glacier National Park (Montana, United States) and Waterton Lakes National Park (Alberta, Canada). The idea was promoted by rangers in both parks and Rotary clubs on both sides of the border, and was quickly accepted by Congress and Parliament. Today, there are several large reserves that span both sides of one of the borders, with varying degrees of cooperation and physical connectivity. They include the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness (Minnesota)/Quetico Provincial Park (Ontario); Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge (Arizona)/Alto Golfo de California Biosphere Reserve (Sonora); Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument (Arizona)/El Pinacate National Park (Sonora); Big Bend National Park (Texas)/ Canon de Santa Elena Flora and Fauna Protection Reserve (Chihuahua); and Laguna Atascosa National Wildlife Refuge (Texas)/Laguna Madre Flora and Fauna Protected Area (Coahuila). In the last decade or so, there has been increased interest in continent-wide approaches to biodiversity conservation. This has been motivated in part by scientific work that shows that some wide-ranging species need huge, contiguous lands or corridors to maintain genetic vigor. It also responds to a growing fear that climate change could make the current system of protected areas obsolete, and that corridors are needed for species to migrate to more suitable places. An approach that integrates human land use with species and ecosystem protection is sorely needed, as are institutions that could promote and implement such a policy. The multiple-use vision of Lázaro Cárdenas and Miguel Ángel de Quevedo in the 1930s, the localized “natural heritage inventories” first promoted by the Nature Conservancy in the southern United States in the 1960s, as well as the post-1990 advances in remote sensing and landscape ecology, all need to be melded into a “whole-landscape” approach to biodiversity conservation. This approach should be both targeted and flexible, encompass land in both

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public and private ownership, and integrate human use and the protection of important biodiversity values over large swaths of area. This would involve not only some expansion in government protected areas, but also working with private landowners to protect habitat values on their land, including protecting long-distance wildlife corridors. As Kerr and Cihlar put it: “The recovery (or, minimally, the prevention of extinction) of endangered species in Canada under the new Species at Risk Act will be particularly reliant on cooperation with private landowners” (2004, 752). The same is true of the agricultural landscapes in Mexico due to the catastrophic impact of imported corn on small-scale farmers, and in the Great Plains of the United States and Canada because of the low profitability of livestock farming as well as the potential for “energy farms” (wind or solar). On the other hand, the unstable land-use situation in these areas offers potential for vegetation restoration motivated by carbon credits, which could also restore habitat values.

Biodiversity Policy Gaps and the Challenge for Transboundary Institutions Clearly, protecting biodiversity is simultaneously a national problem, a transboundary issue, and a continental dilemma. In the previous sections of this chapter, we recounted the long struggle to protect biodiversity in North America, starting more than a century ago. There have been notable successes—control of hunting in all three countries, identification of and special protection for endangered species, and the creation of complex systems of parks and reserves. Yet we have also identified some major gaps. They include: the fact that the identification of endangered species has been slow and piecemeal, and is still incomplete; inadequate management of protected areas (subject, for example, to the “parks and people” problem) and an overlapping of territorial planning instruments, particularly in Mexico; and a failure to take a continental view of biodiversity, particularly in the face of invasive species, climate change, and the creation of artificial barriers to species movement, not least of which is the hardening of international borders. Underlying all of these shortcomings is a lack of adequate resources, particularly for protected area management. Bilateral and trilateral collaboration can help fill these policy gaps. For many of the problems, they are not substitutes for national action, but they can motivate, inform, and strengthen it. First, the complexity of the biodiversity problem requires cutting-edge science and policies, and each country has ideas it can and should share with the others. For example, Mexico’s CONABIO has done a superior job of systematically identifying resources worthy of protection and investigating how the “biosphere reserve” model might be applied. By contrast, the United States and Canadian protected area systems, built up over more than 100 years, are still based more on beautiful scenery than on systematic inventories. These latter two countries also have taken an incremental approach to designating species worthy of protection. Canada and the United States have in general learned much more about managing protected natural areas than has Mexico—but Mexico has valuable cases, if not necessarily good policies, for studying the “parks and people” problem. The networks and knowledge sharing that are associated with transboundary cooperation would be very helpful to all three countries as they deal not just with the difficult problem of identifying

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and protecting vulnerable species and ecosystems, but also with new challenges of invasive species and climate change. A second benefit of collaboration lies in the fact that protecting biodiversity makes considerable demands on a country’s environmental management capacity. Good management requires planning, monitoring, and enforcement, and responsibilities that extend from the nation state down to ranger stations and fire towers in remote areas. Knowledge is a major component of management capacity, but so is the provision of adequate resources, both financial and human. All three countries are struggling with deep budget cuts and each is considering alternative financial models, from fee collection to involving the private profit and nonprofit sectors in protected area establishment and management. Policy learning is critical here, too. A third benefit of collaboration is that, as already noted above, many problems of species and habitat management transcend national boundaries. Just as scientists and environmental groups have become more aware of the need to manage wide-ranging species and threatened ecosystems at a large geographic scale—i.e., one which crosses national borders—the demands of the national security state have moved swiftly toward a “thickening” of borders. This chapter will therefore conclude with a discussion of how these multiple benefits have been and might be achieved with reference to the three functions we believe are critical to effective transboundary environmental governance: creating stable and comprehensive binational and trinational networks; building and sharing a base of knowledge and information; and addressing the problem of resources, both managerial and financial.

Creating Stable and Comprehensive Networks There are three kinds of transboundary networks relevant to protecting biodiversity and building or consolidating environmental capacity. First, there are transgovernmental networks set up under various treaties, including NAFTA. These have proven to be quite effective in identifying issues and, through the operations of the CEC (see chapter 2), putting pressure on national governments to address some specific problems. Perhaps the most significant trilateral effort is the Canada/ Mexico/US Trilateral Committee for Wildlife and Ecosystem Conservation and Management, introduced above. Another treaty-based network is the one that has grown up around the International Joint Commission’s work with the Great Lakes. As discussed in detail in chapter 2, this network includes not just designated national representatives, but representatives of diverse federal, state, and provincial agencies, local governments, scientists, and citizen groups. This particular network, of course, is much older than NAFTA, and has grown incrementally over more than 100 years of dealing with diverse water management issues. There are also transgovernmental networks that are less formal, i.e., not treaty-based, but rather composed of inter-agency ties, such as those between Parks Canada, the US Fish and Wildlife Service and National Park Service, and CONABIO. As we have noted above, these agencies are increasingly turning their attention to transboundary issues. Over the years, there have been many exchanges of staff, technical conferences, and joint research by bordering countries. Since NAFTA, some of these have taken on a trinational aspect. For example, in 2009, Canada, the United States, and Mexico signed a Memorandum of Understanding concerning “wilderness,” a management approach applied

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to national parks, national forests, wildlife refuges, and other protected land systems in which specific areas are designated to remain roadless and used for the simplest of recreational pursuits, if at all (Loose 2009). However, a major limitation of agency networks, as they exist today, is that they do not reflect the full range of land management approaches. The diversity of types of protected areas, both within and between countries—national parks, national wildlife refuges, provincial parks, biosphere reserves, fauna and flora protection areas—indicates one important obstacle to cooperation, which is the diversity of kinds of management agencies. Each has its own legal and managerial objectives and constraints, and there may be differences in the expertise and interest of its staff. Parks Canada and the US National Park Service manage land for preservation and visitor use. Lands that produce timber and other products are managed by the US Forest Service, the US Bureau of Land Management, and Canadian provincial forest agencies. Here, we see the costs of the more specialized transgovernmental networks characteristic of transboundary environmental cooperation in North America. A more broadly based, multi-agency network could be helpful to Mexico as it struggles to attain sustainable forestry and deal with the “parks and people” problem, and it would also provide a means for Canada and the United States to learn from Mexico’s experience in managing biosphere reserves. In this area, there are also networks composed of biological scientists. Conservation biology is well developed in all three countries. Many Mexicans hold doctorates in biology, ecology, and similar disciplines from universities in both the United States and Canada, and large numbers of US researchers are doing biological studies in Mexico. The leading journal in the field, Conservation Biology, is edited in the United States but is truly international, and its editorial board includes academics from both Canada and Mexico. These interactions have been particularly important in pushing all three countries to list new species as endangered, to designate new protected areas (notably the large new biosphere reserves in Mexico), and to consider the “continental” approach to biodiversity conservation. Indeed, one might describe this network as an “epistemic community”—a term, introduced in chapter 2, that scholars have used to describe a group of experts sharing knowledge about a given policy issue and arriving at a common understanding of problems as well as goals and policy recommendations. We would also note here that, despite the tendency toward transgovernmental networks in North America, there are in this case significant NGO and academic linkages across borders with regard to transboundary species and habitat protection. Organizations such as the Quebec-Labrador Foundation, the Nature Conservancy, and Ducks Unlimited have long worked across international borders. Other organizations have partnered on a sporadic basis. For example, the Nature Conservancy (United States) and the Nature Conservancy of Canada recently collaborated in the acquisition of the eight Wilson Islands in Lake Superior. As well, the Nature Conservancy of Canada is working with Texas A&M University on the genetics of the North American bison population, which has a rather small founder population. Two nongovernmental groups that work at very large scales are the Sky Island Alliance and the Yellowstone to Yukon Initiative. Sky Island, based in Tucson, works to “connect the dots” between high-altitude forested habitats in a huge binational area within the Sonoran and Chihuahuan Deserts, where mountains are separated by river valleys, desert plains, and grasslands.15 They often work closely with governmental land management and wildlife management agencies at all levels.

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Missing from this list of networks is local governments. Collaboration involving Mexican local governments has proven to be very difficult, except perhaps in such obvious areas as water and sewer improvements. Local governments in Mexico are quite weak; until the 1990s, local officials were appointed by higher levels of government and were closely tied to political parties. Even today, they are starved for funds, mayors face mandatory three-year term limits, and there are low expectations that they will provide even basic municipal functions (Swift and Maciel 2010). Moreover, the national government’s war on drug cartels has resulted in the deaths of dozens of mayors and hundreds of law enforcement personnel, many in small towns in the northern border states. City government is obviously distracted, and in some cases mayors cannot even stay in their own hometowns for fear of assassination. Travel by biologists, much less wildlife or pollution regulators, is all but impossible. Another weakness of current networks is that transborder ties among environmental NGOs are relatively weak and overly specialized. For the large and professionalized US NGOs, problems in Mexico and Canada are often part of “international” programs, such as tropical forestry or world fishery management, rather than being integrated into their national programs, such as land and energy, domestic food systems, or transportation. Yet if we are to protect biodiversity on a truly continental scale, in a context of economic integration and large-scale climate change, decisions once considered purely domestic will require consideration of what is simultaneously happening in Canada and Mexico. As we argue in earlier chapters, one cannot separate domestic environmental efforts from transboundary action. In the midst of these difficulties, conservation authorities and NGOs labor on. In 2010, the Commission on Environmental Cooperation announced a collaborative effort among nearly 30 governmental (both national and state) agencies and private entities to form the Regional Alliance for Chihuahuan Desert Grasslands Conservation. This grassland ecosystem is biologically diverse, yet between 50 and 70 per cent has been lost in the last century to grazing, agriculture, invasive species, climate change, and other threats (CEC 2010). Although the focus of this alliance is northern Mexico, Canadian representatives have been included as well, because the Chihuahuan Desert Grasslands is part of the vast North American prairies that stretch across the western central United States and well into Canada.

Fostering Mutual Understanding and Learning Another major benefit of collaboration—and one that is greatly facilitated by strong and diverse networks—is creating an internationally shared base of information. At the simplest level, this consists of information about various species, where they are to be found, their habitat needs, and their degree of endangerment. On a broader level, it means sharing information about best practices for addressing biodiversity in the twenty-first century. Here, transboundary environmental mechanisms on both the binational and trinational levels have played an important role in policy learning, particularly given that NGOs and the academic community have been tied into network efforts. Both the CEC and the Trilateral Committee have published several reports over the years that bring together useful information on the continent’s biodiversity and the challenges it faces. The IJC has done the same with respect to water quality and invasive species, especially in the Great Lakes. And the

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several cases concerned with biodiversity that have been submitted in the CEC’s citizen submission process have elicited the release of large amounts of data, as well as information about how countries are actually administering their environmental laws. However, the overall result is inconsistent, often dated, and uncoordinated. More successful are cooperative ventures like the 2010 Partners in Flight report on North America’s 882 native land bird species, their occurrence, status, threats, and transboundary considerations. Lucid and compelling in its analysis, it also is an invaluable source of data. The report was produced by collaboration between government agency scientists in all three countries, Cornell University bird experts, several NGOs, and input from a wide variety of public and private databases. Notably, the report thanks “the over 100 Mexican ornithologists who contributed to the Mexican assessment of land birds” (Partners in Flight 2010, 49). Another important collaboration to create shared databases includes Mexico’s CONAGUA and IMTA, as well as the University of Texas, and the Mexican Institute for Water Technology, a 300-person government water resources think tank, that have prepared a comprehensive GIS system to track surface and groundwater in a large zone on both sides of the border (Patino Gomez et al. 2008). This will be extremely valuable, not only in managing water supplies, but also in tracking flow levels and wetland areas vital to habitats.

Resource Provision The capacity needs for identifying and protecting biodiversity include knowledge, organizational, human, and financial resources. It is clear that all three countries have put in place management and organizational structures for wildlife and habitat protection, but it might be argued that only in Mexico is there a sufficiently integrative approach, one that brings together the various agencies with mandates in biodiversity planning and implementation. Further, all three countries possess scientific expertise, whether this resides in government or in the university sector, and they have both national and shared databases with critical information. There is no doubt that more is required in this respect with regards to the ongoing tasks of listing and protecting endangered species, as well as basic research on wildlife movements and changes in habitat health/coverage. However, the biggest gap is the financial one. All three countries have failed to devote sufficient resources to supporting critical biodiversity policy functions, and this is perhaps best seen in the management of designated protected areas. In Mexico, the situation can only be described as acute. Improving Mexico’s capacity to manage its wondrous biodiversity is by no means an impossible task. Mexico has many talented ecologists working in both government agencies and universities. Public sentiment in a now-urban nation should be easily mobilized to defend “charismatic” species (and important ecosystems along with them), and most of the needed federal laws are on the books. But, as with so many other aspects of Mexico’s environmental programs, on-the-ground implementation and vigilance are weak. A telling statistic can be found in the membership records of the Wildlife Society, a professional association composed primarily of people who actually administer wildlife regulations and habitat improvement activities (e.g., staff of state, federal, and local agencies). Although the Society describes itself as a trinational organization, it has about 9,000 members from the United States, 434 from Canada,

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and fewer than 15 from Mexico.16 The contrast between the quite high international participation of Mexican biological scientists and the extremely low participation of actual wildlife managers is yet another indicator of Mexico’s limited environmental management capacity in an important and challenging subject area. More funding for on-the-ground managers and encouragement of stronger cross-border ties are sorely needed if capacity is to be improved. Greater exchange of park managers between countries would be a low-cost way to strengthen on-the-ground management in all three countries. Also helpful would be mobilizing NGO activity in species-rich local areas in Mexico and coordinating it with national-level expertise and government authority. This has proven to be a strong model in the United States and, to a lesser degree, in Canada. Foundation funding has paid for a great deal of the work of US NGOs, and more foundation or private involvement in Mexico would be extremely productive, as illustrated by the cases of the botanical garden in Oaxaca City, funded by one of the national Mexican banks, and the botanical garden in San Miguel de Allende, funded and managed by a “Friends” group. The greatest challenges for which international resource sharing would be useful are in the area of “new challenges”—invasive species, climate change, and physical barriers at borders. Additional funding would be helpful, but the amounts are not large given the magnitude of the challenge. What is really needed is for government agencies and policy-makers at all levels to adopt the continent-wide vision that is already found among many conservation biologists and several conservation NGOs, notably the Sky Islands Project and the Yellowstone to Yukon Coalition.

BIODIVERSITY: OBSERVATIONS Identify, protect, manage, and restore. The challenge of biodiversity is a difficult one, both within each country and from a continental perspective. This case highlights the ways in which biodiversity, as an inherently transboundary problem, requires an ever-broader scale of management to account for wildlife movements and shifts in habitat, yet is reliant on the strength of domestic management regimes that regulate at smaller scales. At the same time, given that policy-makers in Canada, the United States, and Mexico have been engaged in biodiversity policy for more than a century and have also undertaken a considerable amount of coordinated action across borders, we might expect to see some success in overcoming differences in national approach and, over time, some redress of capacity asymmetries. Of particular interest here is the role of transboundary environmental mechanisms in achieving these successes. The differences in biodiversity approach among the three countries are certainly not overwhelming. The protection of species and their habitats is addressed using broadly similar policy tools, though classifications and protection designations may differ. In a general sense, there has also been a widening of the geographic vision of necessary habitats for imperiled wildlife among scientists, environmentalists, and some government officials. An important aspect here has been the growing realization of the effects of invasive species and the impacts of climate change on species and their habitats. Transboundary environmental mechanisms have played an important role in this changing perspective. We would argue that work in the CEC, the Trilateral Committee, and other

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forums has supplied critical information for considering biodiversity challenges and helped to highlight where governments need to focus their efforts. However, while transboundary environmental networks might be able to facilitate policy learning with respect to biodiversity challenges, and encourage those engaged in framing biodiversity policy to see these challenges from a continental perspective, in their current form, they have been unable to provide more tangible support for domestic environmental efforts. Transboundary institutions have not, for example, managed to supply wildlife managers to Mexico. Yet part of the reason why transboundary biodiversity networks have not achieved much success in the capacity realm is that many tend to be narrow in their membership and their focus. What are most needed now are stronger and more inclusive networks that include NGOs and local governments. More inclusive networks would allow for the mobilization of public and private support and interest in biodiversity maintenance functions, and help to combine funding for projects from various sources. This would help to link national-level expertise and government authority and existing transborder agency ties with both species-rich local areas and NGO networks.

Notes 1 Flannery (2001) offers a sweeping and highly readable account of how isolation, punctuated by periodic flows of animals—and humans—over Arctic land bridges up until the end of the last Ice Age, about 13,700 years ago, interacted with local evolutionary pressures to produce North America’s characteristic biological endowment. 2 Only recently has the reduction of the indigenous population, and its effects on biota, been given the prominence it deserves (see Mann 2005; Krech 1999; Cronon 1983). 3 Crosby (2003) coined the phrase and popularized the idea, but a very large literature has subsequently been developed. 4 Mexico is one of the seven mega-diverse countries of the world. To see the world ranking by type of organism, see CONABIO (2012). 5 In 2010, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) updated NOM-059, which lists the Mexican endangered species. It is notable that the previous report of 2001 listed only 372 endangered species; the 2010 report includes more than 500 new ones. 6 This chapter will deal with the protection of biodiversity in natural habitats and will not cover the role of zoos and botanical gardens in retaining populations of organisms and occasionally reintroducing them. 7 These are people or organizations that take scientific findings, news of environmental disasters, and other information and selectively package it so that, they hope, it will influence the policy process (see Ascher, Steelman, and Healy 2010). 8 The United States Congress often enacts legislation for only a specific period of time. When those legislative authorities expire, Congressional reauthorization— under which funding of the relevant programs can occur—is required. 9 UMAs have been established since 1997 and can serve as production centers for germoplasm or seed banks, for flora rescuing, or as alternatives to the conservation and reproduction of species, as well as for research and educational purposes. For details of the ongoing projects, see the web page of the Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático (INECC) at. http://www.inecc.gob.mx.

Case Study: Biodiversity and Protected Areas 107 10 For a better understanding of all the areas linked to biodiversity conservation, see the SEMARNAT organizational structure at http://www.semarnat.gob.mx/ conocenos/documents/organigrama.html. 11 An excellent six-part documentary on US national parks by filmmaker Ken Burns is titled National Parks: America’s Best Idea (Burns 2009). 12 In fact, this area of coniferous woodland had been expropriated and set aside by the Republican government in 1876 in order to protect the flow of springs that supplied the city with water. This was a remarkable early recognition of the importance of what are today called “environmental services,” but was not directly related to the “national park” idea. 13 That, at least, was the theory. In fact, monies from the fund did not automatically flow to land acquisition, and levels of acquisition funding were far below revenues coming into the fund. In today’s dire fiscal climate, significant new general funding for biodiversity protection and restoration seems unlikely in any of the three countries. However, it is easier to envision funding as part of a deal for environmentalist support of offshore drilling, wind farms, international gas pipelines, or other kinds of energy development they would generally oppose. 14 Ironically, Verwej contends that the IJC’s open and participatory process has actually made the Great Lakes cleanup more difficult than that of Europe’s Rhine River by giving firms and environmental groups the chance to pursue a culture of confrontation that has been much more characteristic of the United States and Canada than of Europe. 15 See http://www.skyislandalliance.org/explore.htm. 16 Data provided by Michael Hutchins, Executive Director, the Wildlife Society, telephone interview with Robert Healy, October 21, 2010. Hutchins indicated that the society would like to increase membership from Mexico and is considering setting up a separate Mexico chapter (Mexico is now part of the Southwestern Region). He observed that the $69 annual dues—very low for a professional society—may have been one impediment to potential Mexican members.

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Chapter 4

Case Study: The “Smog” Problem

THE AIR QUALITY CASE provides us with an example of a more traditional “brown” environmental issue, a pollution problem that the three governments in North America have been dealing with since the 1960s, both within their own jurisdictions and across shared borders. Like the biodiversity case discussed in chapter 3, there are well-entrenched air quality policy legacies that can be assessed, although they are of more recent vintage. There is also substantial experience with transboundary collaboration on air pollution, given that pollutants are transported across borders to local areas in North America; since domestic governments cannot “force” each other to “turn off the pollution,” cooperation across borders is necessary. As with the biodiversity case, we might expect to find transboundary environmental networks that are well established and inclusive, networks that have a track record of facilitating information sharing, mutual understanding, and policy learning. Yet this case is somewhat unique in that air pollution is a highly complex problem that involves specialized expertise as well as access to sophisticated technology; thus, not only are more tangible forms of capacity support needed, but also technology transfer. This case provides some clear examples of progress in reducing air pollutants and improving air quality within all three countries, though it also underscores the gaps that remain; air pollution stubbornly resists easy solutions, given the range of contributing sources and the interests involved. Significantly, the air quality issue highlights the potential of transboundary networks to put in place key supports for cooperation, and even to address policy gaps in the domestic context. Transboundary mechanisms have fulfilled several critical functions, including helping to keep air pollution on a crowded political agenda in all three countries over several decades; arranging for a sharing of critical resources for knowledge building; bringing scientific organizations and nongovernmental interests into the policy-making process; and encouraging a borderless view of air quality in North America. In this case, we also see some support for air quality policy capacity-building, particularly within Mexico.

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NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM There are numerous air pollutants that combine in different ways to produce environmental and health problems across North America. Here, we focus on “smog,” a term used to describe that smoky, foggy, brownish mixture of air pollutants we can see on the horizon when descending in an airplane into almost any large North American city—Los Angeles, Mexico City, and Toronto are notable culprits. Although the science of air pollution is extremely complex, there is agreement that the primary ingredients of smog are ground-level ozone and fine airborne particles. Ground-level, or tropospheric, ozone (not to be confused with the stratospheric ozone layer some 15–50 kilometers above the earth’s surface, which protects us from cancer-causing ultraviolet radiation) is a colorless and highly irritating gas that forms just above the earth’s surface. It is a secondary pollutant (O3) produced when nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) react with each other in the presence of strong sunlight.1 High ozone levels are caused by the presence of NOx and VOCs, hot temperatures, direct sunlight, and the stagnation of air over several days. Smog incidences thus coincide with warm and sunny weather conditions—which is also why we receive so many more “smog advisories” in the summertime. Where do NOx and VOCs come from? NOx are emitted primarily from the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas) in electricity generation, industry, and automobiles. Coal burning produces the highest levels of NOx per unit of energy produced. VOCs include a diverse class of compounds that also result from fuel combustion as well as from the evaporation of liquid fuels and solvents. Refineries, chemical manufacturers, and dry cleaning and painting operations are sources of VOCs. Another major source is evaporation from gasoline stations, either through spillage or when the gas pump nozzle does not make a tight fit to the automobile’s filler pipe. Airborne particles, or particulate matter (PM), consist of minute solids or liquids in the air, which vary in size and chemical composition (they are measured either as “coarser” particles, called PM 10, or as fine particles measuring less than 2.5 micrometers in diameter, referred to as PM2.5). It is particulate matter that gives smog its color and affects visibility. The main sources of particulates include thermal power plants, vehicle emissions, incineration, and industrial activities, such as mining and quarrying. Other contaminants, such as heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants, may be absorbed into particulates, thereby increasing their toxicity. There does not appear to be any seasonal pattern to particulate concentrations. Smog is a tangible and salient public issue. Not only can we see the smog haze around us, but ground-level ozone and fine particles have serious health and environmental impacts (Brajer, Hall, and Lurmann 2011). When inhaled, ground-level ozone can irritate the respiratory system, reduce lung function, aggravate asthma, and may even damage the lining of the lungs (US EPA 1999). Children are at particular risk, as their respiratory systems are still developing. These impacts are heightened when adults and children exercise outdoors at times of high ozone concentrations; afterwards, lung function may take 24 to 48 hours to return to normal (World Bank Group 1998). Particles, especially fine particles, also pose a serious health risk, as they can become deeply lodged in the lungs, and the respiratory system has no means of expelling them. Ground-level ozone can also have detrimental effects on plants and ecosystems. These effects include interfering with the ability of sensitive plants

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to produce and store food, damaging the leaves of trees and other plants, and reducing forest growth and crop yields. This, in turn, carries economic risk; an MIT study estimated that, if ground-level ozone remains at current levels, by 2100 crop yields will decrease by 40 per cent and the global value of crop production will fall by 10 to 12 per cent (Stauffer 2007). It is also worth noting that air pollution has long been a source of conflict on both the Canada-US and US-Mexico borders, for one simple reason: air quality in local areas within a country will not improve unless all pollutant sources are addressed—yet some pollutants originate outside that local area and are transported in on prevailing winds (see Map 4.1). A report released by the Commission for Environmental Cooperation in the mid-1990s highlighted the extent of the transboundary air pollutant transport problem in North America, namely that ground-level ozone is a regional problem over spatial scales of more than 600 kilometers and time scales of several days (CEC 1997). In particular, the CEC report noted that there were several “ozone transportation corridors” in North America: the East Coast from Washington, DC, to Maine and the southern Canadian Maritime provinces; mid-continent, including the

Arctic airstream

Pacific air wedges

Tropical airstream

MAP 4.1 Air Pollution Corridors in North America SOURCE: Bryson, R.A. and Hare, F.K, 1974. “The Climates of North America,” In R.A. Bryson and F.K. Hare (eds.), World Survey of Climatology: Climates of North America (Vol. 11) Amsterdam: Elsevier. pp. 1–47.

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Lake Michigan, Lake Erie, and Lake Ontario air basins, the industrial areas of the midwestern United States, and the corridor stretching through southern Ontario and along the St. Lawrence River from Windsor, Ontario, to Quebec City; the Gulf Coast region, including much of the Texas and Louisiana coast and adjacent inland areas; and intra- and interbasin transport in southern and central California (CEC 1997, 12). On the US-Mexico border, the dramatic growth of urban areas along the border and the expansion of high-polluting economic activities, alongside elevated levels of poverty in the region and low resources for government action, have contributed to sometimes severe air quality problems. Air pollutant transport is thus a continuing source of cross-border irritation.

AIR QUALITY POLICY IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO All three North American countries have air quality policy regimes that have been developed over several decades, although the Mexican framework was established more recently. These regimes are quite complex, dealing with multiple pollutants—including NOx, PM, and VOCs—that are emitted from a large variety of point and mobile sources. The regimes are also heavily regulatory. They impose limits on the quantity of pollutants in ambient air (with the limits not to be exceeded during a given period in a defined area) and/or on emissions of particular air pollutants from point sources (e.g., industrial facilities, gasoline stations) by means of operating permits that either set limits on emissions or mandate the adoption of particular control technologies. Emissions from mobile sources (e.g., cars, trucks) are regulated through standards for tailpipe emissions or fuel efficiency.

National Perspectives on Air Quality Policy In all three countries, smog has been framed as an environmental issue with considerable human health impacts. In Canada, a series of Health Canada and Environment Canada studies making causal linkages between groundlevel ozone exceedances and health effects appeared in the 1990s (Burnett et al. 1988, Burnett, Brook et al. 1997, Burnett, Cakmak et al. 1997); a summary of this work concluded that “there is no discernible human health threshold for ground-level ozone” (Dann and Summers 1997, 3)—in other words, there is no safe level of ozone for human health. The studies that generated the most media attention and political controversy, however, were those which attempted to put “numbers” to the air quality problem. One Health Canada study suggested that 6 per cent of all respiratory admissions to hospitals in Canada were smog related, that air pollution could be linked to 5,000 premature deaths each year in 11 major Canadian cities, and that all of this accounted for $1 billion in health care costs every year. Underlying the concern about human health impacts was the recognition that the smog problem was getting worse over the 1990s, particularly in central Canada and on the West Coast. Environment Canada’s own research showed that, although levels of air pollutants such as carbon monoxide, SO2 (sulpher dioxide), and airborne particles had declined over the 1990s and into the 2000s, ground-level ozone had increased.

Case Study: The “Smog” Problem113

In the United States, the human health concern has been well documented through both exposure studies and epidemiological investigations. The Clean Air Task Force, a large advocacy organization focused on atmospheric pollution (primarily from coal plants), contends that “ground level ozone sends an estimated 159,000 people in the eastern United States to emergency rooms each summer, triggers 6.2 million asthma attacks, and results in 69,000 hospital admissions”; they also point out that “power plants are responsible for about one-quarter of the NOx emitted in the United States each year” (Clean Air Task Force 2012). In the United States, poor air quality, particularly due to high levels of particulate matter, has also been related to serious health problems in children—and even death. A study conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO) established that “infant mortality in the USA showed an excess perinatal mortality associated with higher PM10 levels. … In infants of normal birth weight, high exposure was associated with respiratory mortality and sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS)” (Bruce, Pérez-Padilla, and Albalak 2000). Brajer, Hall, and Lurmann (2011) estimate that in Southern California alone, attainment of federal standards for ozone and fine particulates would produce around $500 million and more than $21 billion (respectively) in avoided medical and other costs. Mexico has for some time now held the rather dubious distinction of having among the world’s most polluted metropolitan areas—particularly Mexico City. Due to industrial and automobile emissions, air quality in the Mexico City metropolitan area was so bad in 2002 that city ground-level ozone levels failed to meet World Health Organization standards on an estimated 300 out of 365 days of the year (World Bank 2002). During the 1990s, the WHO considered Mexico City to be the most dangerous city in the world for children due to its high air pollution levels. As one report found, during 1993–1995, “excess infant mortality was associated with the level of fine particles in the days before death, with the strongest association observed for the average concentration of fine particles during the period 3 to 5 days previously. … Infant mortality was also associated with the levels of nitrogen dioxide and ozone 3 to 5 days before death” (Loomis et al. 1999). In 2008, the WHO estimated that bad air quality caused 14,743 deaths in the country. Interestingly, however, public opinion research conducted by the International Development Research Centre has shown that residents of Mexico City “recognize that air pollution is harmful to health and is particularly hazardous for children,” but many do not trust the air quality information provided by the government, and they believe the government’s motives in seeking to reduce air pollution are self-serving (Hibler 2003). The manner in which the three countries view the smog problem is quite similar to the acid rain issue, which has occupied policy-makers since the 1970s. Although these two air pollution problems have different sources and impacts, the acid rain experience set the terms of engagement for those who wish to manage transboundary smog in North America. In particular, the outcome of the acid rain experience on the northern border was to establish reciprocal “polluter-victim” relationships, wherein Canadian policy-makers and citizens came to see themselves as the victims of air pollution generated in the midwestern United States and blown across the border (Munton 1997). While the experience served to broaden understanding of the nature of cross-border pollutant pathways, it has also in many cases—and particularly on the Canadian

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side of the border—discouraged pre-emptive action, because it was believed little could be done until “others” cleaned up their act. On the southern border, this dynamic is given a somewhat different flavor by the “development gap.” For example, West Texas in the United States is the recipient of air pollutants emanating from Mexico, but past American efforts to address the sources south of the border—namely, coal-burning power plants—have been perceived as interfering with Mexico’s right to undertake much-needed economic development (VanNijnatten and Lambright 2001, 19–22). Another set of factors shaping air quality policy in Canada is the significant role of the provinces in regulating point sources of air pollution and the dispersal of actual point sources across the country, often in peripheral and economically marginal areas. For example, base metal smelters—located in places such as northern Ontario, Flin Flon, Manitoba, and Labrador City, Newfoundland—are a significant source of both acid rain and smog precursors, but these are regulated by provincial governments that depend on the resource revenues and employment opportunities they provide. Not surprisingly, provincial air emission regulations have varied, sometimes considerably. In the same way, electricity generation plants, a significant source of smog precursors, are under the regulatory jurisdiction of provincial governments. As implied above, addressing ground-level ozone in the United States is part and parcel of the continuing struggle to deal with “the coal problem.” As we also discuss in chapter 5, in the climate change policy case, the US coal-burning power plants—which accounted for 42 per cent of the power generated in the country in 2011 (US Energy Information Administration 2012)—are a major source of the full range of criteria air pollutants, including NOx, SO2, particulate matter, and mercury, as well as carbon dioxide. As of January 2011, there were 1,112 coal-fired power plants in the United States, and of these, only 7.2 per cent were 20 years old or younger—nearly 50 per cent are over 40 years old (Fleming-Mason Energy 2012). This means that the coal-generating infrastructure is relatively old, less efficient, and highly polluting. However, regulatory costs aside, coal is an abundant and relatively cheap fuel source. The United States has the world’s largest coal reserves, and has even been referred to as “the Saudi Arabia of coal” (Heinberg 2008). Further, these coal reserves are at the heart of economies in the states of West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Montana, and congressional representatives from these states have been quite successful at opposing any federal attempts to curtail or penalize the use of coal over the past several decades. For Mexico, air quality policy has been driven since the 1950s by the attempt to deal with severe pollution problems in its largest city. By the 1990s, these air quality problems had spread to other major cities, such as Monterrey, Puebla, Toluca, and Guadalajara. A significant factor in the declining quality of air in metropolitan areas has been the rapid increase in the number of passenger and heavy-duty vehicles, and the attendant increase in emissions of NOx. It has been estimated that vehicles are responsible for about 85 per cent of air pollutants in Mexico (Sánchez 2007; Mejía 2000). As one of the first pollution reduction measures taken, the Mexican government began to reduce the lead content of gasoline in 1986. In 1990, totally unleaded gasoline (Magna Sin) began to be offered, and lead was completely phased out in 1997. This made possible the requirement that new cars have tailpipe catalytic converters, which

Case Study: The “Smog” Problem115

significantly reduced all automotive pollutants. In 1990, the now-famous “Hoy No Circula” program was established in a wide zone around Mexico City; the program restricts residents from driving one day a week and is quite strictly enforced. The effect of this program, however, was that in the long run, people bought an additional car which could be driven on the restricted day; this only increased gasoline consumption and emissions (Eskeland and Feyzioglu 1995). In fact, ozone levels increased dramatically six months after the launching of this program (Bravo et a1. 1987). However, slowly but consistently, major progress has been made in cleaning up the air in the Mexico City metropolitan region, one of the world’s largest centers of population. After reaching a peak value in 1992, both ozone and particulates have trended steadily downward, although the average concentration of ozone is still about twice what is allowed by either Mexican or EPA standards (Molina 2002). Mexico’s national and local governments have spent billions of dollars relocating old, highly polluting industries, such as oil refineries, out of the basin. Improvements were made to transportation infrastructure. Yearly automobile inspections were also required, and as the automobile fleet was slowly replaced, the proportion of cars with working catalytic converters rose. As well, the quality of diesel fuel burned by buses and trucks was improved. The improvement in air quality, however incomplete, must be counted as a great achievement in pollution control.

Policy Choices: Ambient and Point-Source (Stationary) Air Quality Standards The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets standards for ambient air quality that are applicable to every jurisdiction in the country. The 1990 Clean Air Act authorizes the agency to set binding, science-based, national standards (referred to as National Ambient Air Quality Standards, or NAAQSs) limiting the release of “criteria” air pollutants, including PM, O3, SO2, and NOx. The EPA can initiate point-source permitting programs (to limit releases by industrial polluters) and set deadlines for pollution reductions. New Source Performance Standards (NSPSs) ensure that new facilities do not operate in violation of the standards, and a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program works to prevent the deterioration of air quality in regions that are already in compliance with the NAAQSs. The EPA may and does delegate implementation of these standards to states that demonstrate their ability to administer national air quality programs, although state implementation of national air quality standards takes place under the watchful eyes of the EPA and Congress. In terms of transboundary agreements on air quality, Congress has the final “say,” and it takes a particularly dim view of any international actions undertaken outside of an agency’s domestic responsibilities and mandate. Thus, while the EPA may participate in negotiations with other governments on limiting air pollution transport across borders, the agency must be very careful not to stray from its current mandates. Canada, for its part, has generally had a less uniform and less extensive set of mandatory air quality controls in place. Air pollution, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is subject to the vagaries of shared jurisdiction, and both the federal and provincial governments hold important policy levers. The key legislation

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at the federal level in terms of smog reduction is the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (referred to as CEPA 1999). CEPA gives the federal Minister of the Environment several powers that can be exercised on behalf of the environment, including the ability to declare a substance toxic, after which the government must regulate it. Ozone (O3), as well as its precursors NOx, VOCs, and PM, have all been declared toxic (Government of Canada 2003). The federal government can also regulate air emissions where the ministers of the environment and health believe these will contribute to air pollution in another country or result in environmental or health effects. It is the provinces, however, that have established ambient (levels of a pollutant in the air) and point-source air quality standards within their boundaries. The federal government initially set non-binding, science-based guidelines for ambient levels (in the surrounding atmosphere) of criteria air pollutants (ozone, SO2, NOx, and VOCs), known as National Air Quality Objectives (NAQOs). However, provincial governments had the option of adopting these objectives as guidelines, or as legally enforceable standards. The federal government encouraged national action on point sources within intergovernmental decisionmaking forums, such as the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME)—consisting of federal, provincial, and territorial environment ministers (see chapter 1 for more details on the CCME). The CCME did agree on “Canada-wide Standards” (CWS) for PM and ozone in 2000, to be achieved by 2010 (CCME 2000). These standards were not binding, however, and the provinces continued to exercise the power to limit reductions from key point sources, such as power plants and industrial sources. Most recently, in 2012, the national and provincial governments agreed to put in place a new air quality management system, under which more stringent ambient air quality standards for PM2.5 and O3 will be implemented to replace the existing CWS. Clearly, then, although the Canadian federal government has the power to conclude treaties with foreign powers in the air quality arena, it cannot achieve any emission reduction goals without the help of the provinces. In Mexico, two government secretaries have historically addressed the ozone problem: Secretaría de Salud and the SEMARNAT, which includes agencies such as the INECC and PROFEPA, introduced in chapter 1. It is through Mex­ican NOMs 020 to 038 that the country manages O3, SO2, NOx, and PM. In 2002, and again in 2005, there were revisions and additions to the NOMs for ozone and different types of particulate matter (including PM10 and PM2.5). While the establishment of the NOMs is the responsibility of federal environmental and health agencies (SSA, SEMARNAT, and INECC), the operation of monitoring systems and the implementation of NOMs falls under the jurisdiction of the states and municipalities. Needless to say, there needs to be considerable coordination between the federal and state governments to make the air quality policy framework work effectively. The federal government provides budgetary, technological, and other capacity-building support to help states operate the system; it also gathers all the necessary data and information and drafts national reports. Intergovernmental relations can be challenging, however, when subnational governments have different interests than federal officials. For example, there have been clashes between the federal government and the governments of Estado de México (State of Mexico) and Mexico City on air quality issues, particularly in terms of how to control vehicular pollution.

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Policy Choices: Emissions Standards for Mobile Sources In the United States, the formulation and implementation of vehicle emission standards are the preserve of national decision-makers, although California is “grandfathered” under the Clean Air Act and may enact more stringent standards if it so chooses (and it has regularly done so). In 1975, the US federal government instituted the “CAFE” (corporate average fuel economy) standard, which is the sales-weighted average fuel economy, expressed in miles per gallon (mpg), of a manufacturer’s fleet of passenger cars or light trucks (dealt with separately under regulations) for a given model year. The 1975 CAFE standards for light-duty vehicles went unchanged until the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) mandated a modest improvement in the fuel efficiency of cars and light trucks, to begin with the 2011 model year. However, in 2009, the Obama administration announced that it would set national standards for passenger vehicles that would achieve a much more stringent fuel economy standard (35.5 mpg) by 2016. On April 1, 2010, the EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued the new harmonized fuel economy standards for cars and light trucks for model years 2012 through 2016. In November 2011, the EPA announced a further tightening of standards for the model years 2017–25. The Canadian federal government can also regulate fuel content and emission standards for new vehicles and other polluting equipment. The federal government introduced its Company Average Fuel Consumption (CAFC) program for the new passenger vehicle fleet (equivalent to CAFE, but measured in L/100km) in 1976. Legislation was introduced to make the program mandatory in 1982, but the automotive industry agreed to comply voluntarily with the standards and the legislation did not go into effect. Thus, Canada adopted the American approach to vehicle fuel economy early on, and Canadian and American manufacturers have effectively followed the same emission standards. In April 2010, at the same time that the US federal government announced its new standards, the Canadian government unveiled “harmonized” rules, also aimed at achieving a fleet average fuel economy of 15.1 km/L (35.5 mpg) by 2016. Mexico had no national standards mandating vehicle fuel economy targets or tailpipe emission limits in place until very recently. Instead, as part of a “vehicle verification” taxation system, there has been a set of federal guidelines regarding emissions from vehicles; these guidelines vary according to the type of fuel used, i.e., gasoline or diesel. The states then decide whether or not to make the verification obligatory; if so, car emissions are tested using advanced pollution measurement software. In January 2010, however, Mexico’s Secretaría de Energía (SENER) (Secretary of Energy) committed with the Comisíon Nacional para el Uso Eficiente de la Energía (CONUEE) (National Commission for the Efficient Use of Energy) to establishing minimum fuel emission standards for new cars. Early statements indicated that the minimums would be based on setting an average target for new car fleets, as in the American approach (Cortés 2009; ICCT 2010), although there were discussions about differentiating according to “light,” “medium,” and “heavy” categories of cars and trucks (Lliff 2010), which would have built some degree of difference between the Mexican and American/Canadian models. Yet Mexico’s NOMs, released in July 2012, are aligned with the US standards introduced in 2010. One unique challenge of the Mexican context is the large number of used (and high-emitting vehicles) that have been imported into the country, although the government has more recently placed restrictions on such imports.

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The Scientific and Technological Challenge Posed by Air Pollution Clearly, the science of air pollution—comprehending the many ways in which the air we breathe is contaminated by impurities—is highly complex. For example, understanding the sources of pollution requires that those setting air quality regulations can distinguish between pollutants produced naturally and those produced through human activities, between pollutants produced by different industrial and combustion processes, and between contaminants emitted from point sources and those from mobile sources. Policy-makers must also be able to estimate emissions from particular sources of air pollution through the calculation of “emission factors” (e.g., kilograms of particulate emitted per megagram of coal burned). Further, the system needs to be able to understand and account for atmospheric interactions and conditions, such as the manner in which NOx and VOC emissions react in the presence of hot temperatures, direct sunlight, and the stagnation of air over several days to create ground-level ozone. To add to all this complexity, understanding long-range transboundary pollutant transport—to discern how much pollution is generated at home and how much originates abroad—requires mastery of yet another body of knowledge and another set of methodologies. The scientific and technological requirements of air quality policy are immense. The example of air quality monitoring—which is the foundation of any solid regulatory framework for air pollution—highlights the nature of this challenge, particularly for Mexico. Mexico’s monitoring system was inaugurated in 1977, when the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (National Autonomous University of Mexico) created the Atmospheric Sciences Center, which was in charge of studying and reporting air pollutants such as carbon monoxide and O3 (Instituto Nacional de Ecología 2002). However, the monitoring systems did not function as expected in those early years; although the methodology was one recommended by the US EPA, Mexican officials did not have appropriate technological or budgetary support. As a result, data were lost and the stations were abandoned for several years. In the 1980s, air quality again got the attention of policy-makers, and the monitoring system was updated with 25 new stations measuring SO2, CO, PM, O3, and NOx, among others, and a manual network of 16 stations for measuring PM and SO2 (Instituto Nacional de Ecologia 2002). Seven more stations were installed in 1991 in the Mexico City metropolitan area. Currently, the National Monitoring Program operates a network of stations all over the country. But, as discussed above, the federal government is not the only government involved in addressing air quality. Since 2006, monitoring systems have become the responsibility of states, although SEMARNAT does provide some technical support. The stations can be operated by municipal governments or the private sector, and they have also been installed in universities or research institutes. As of 2009, there were 96 stations in the country using different kinds of technologies, as shown in Figure 4.1 (Jiménez 2009). A significant challenge for Mexico is to increase the number of automatic monitoring systems in all major cities. Currently, the majority of the network is operated manually. This manual system is focused on measuring suspended particles and operates according to international criteria from the World Health Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme, and the World Meteorological Organization. The “mobile” network operates in places with

FIGURE 4.1 Monitoring Systems by State (2009) 60

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SOURCE: Jiménez, Erik (2009), Programa Nacional de Monitoreo Atmosférico 2008–2012. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Ecología. http://ambiental.uaslp.mx/docs/PM2.5_ ErickFelipeJimenezQuiroz.pdf (accessed December 2, 2011).

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no coverage. This means that, in some cities, the infrastructure is not permanent, so monitoring needs to be scheduled according to the resources available or special needs. Another technological challenge in the 1990s was the need to shift to more selective technologies to measure VOCs, organic reactive gases, meteorological parameters, and solar radiation (Ramírez 1999). Thus far, however, only minor improvements have been made—except in the case of solar radiation, where 16 stations were added to measure this specifically. At the present time, then, policy-makers must make decisions on the basis of incomplete information, due to the unequal coverage of stations with respect to the type of pollutants measured, the type of technology used, and the nature of the resulting data. Canada is also experiencing difficulties with monitoring, less because of a lack of capacity and more because of changing political priorities and a lack of budgetary resources. As discussed in earlier chapters, the Harper government has committed to reducing agency budgets at the federal level, and Environment Canada is experiencing cuts once again. As a result, the environmental agency has cut back on its monitoring of air pollution, including ground-level ozone and PM; the agency has stated that it has reassigned the scientists previously involved in monitoring to “other priorities,” and some monitoring equipment is simply not being used (McDiarmid 2012). This decision has prompted severe criticism from scientists at US universities as well as NASA.

Air Quality Problems at the Border The US-Mexico border region presents policy-makers with a particularly stubborn air quality problem. The border region, which is defined as the territory situated within 100 kilometers north and south of the border line, contains 25 counties in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas on the American side, and 35 municipalities in Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas on the Mexican side. On the Mexican side, rapid industrial development and population growth in the absence of appropriate environmental infrastructure and pollution control has led to high levels of local air pollution. Pollution is even more concentrated at the 39 points of entry along the border, where cars and commercial trucks can idle for long periods of time (Muñoz et al. 2010). One of the main air quality problems in the border region is high PM concentrations, which emanate from industrial sources, but also unpaved roads on the Mexican side. Ground-level ozone comes from industrial sources, vehicles, and even small, primitive sources, such as brick kilns. As discussed above, both countries have independently promulgated air quality standards, and these standards are quite similar in most cases; this is particularly true for PM2.5 and PM10 standards (Muñoz et al. 2010). Yet measurements show that the severity of violations of ozone and PM10 standards varies along the border; two areas in Baja California/California—Tijuana/San Diego and Mexicali/ Imperial Valley—have been most severely in violation of the ozone standard, and Mexicali/Imperial Valley has had the most severe problem with PM10, followed by the Ciudad Juárez/El Paso region in Chihuahua/Texas. The Nogales/ Nogales area in Sonora/Arizona has a less severe problem with PM and no violations of the ozone standard. The Lower Rio Grande Valley has not violated any of the standards.

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Present Transboundary Air Quality Cooperation The transboundary institutional framework for air quality is quite extensive, reflecting both the well-developed air quality policy regimes in the three countries and recognition of the need for cooperative efforts to address pollutant transport. Consequently, there are many cooperative mechanisms, primarily at the binational and trinational levels, some of which have been in place for decades. As noted above, addressing transboundary smog involves many of the same institutions and actors as acid rain. After the US Clean Air Act was successfully reauthorized in 1990, mandating an impressive range of new emission reduction requirements and new tools to achieve these reductions, Canada-US bilateral activities were kick-started. The Canada-US Air Quality Agreement was signed in 1991, committing both governments to specified SO2 and NOX reductions and putting in place a set of institutions for continued management of border air quality. Under the terms of the agreement, Canada and the United States established a coordinating committee composed of six representatives from each country, known as the Air Quality Committee (AQC), as well as a research and monitoring network. There are also two subcommittees—a more policy-related subcommittee and a science-related subcommittee—that engage in activities to fulfill the ACQ’s mandate. These committees monitor implementation of the specified emission reduction commitments and issue progress reports (VanNijnatten and Lambright 2001, 17). An interesting feature of the agreement was that, although the original focus had been on reducing emissions of those pollutants implicated in the formation of acid rain, the stated objective was to control all types of transboundary air pollution. Very quickly, other air quality issues, including smog, found their way onto the Air Quality Committee’s agenda. In 2000, an “Ozone Annex” was concluded under the terms of the Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement, under which national, provincial, and state governments committed to reducing ozone precursors. While the measures to be taken by governments on both sides of the border were decided in domestic discussions, the Canada-US talks functioned very much as in Putnam’s “two-level game” to push reluctant provincial governments on the Canadian side to take action (VanNijnatten and Lambright 2001). Another recent initiative under the auspices of the agreement is the Canada-US Border Air Quality Strategy, which has targeted specific areas— including the Great Lakes Basin Airshed and the Georgia Basin–Puget Sound Airshed (on the West Coast)—for further research on air pollutant transport and discussions on cooperative management options. On the US-Mexico border, there is also a well-defined institutional framework supporting air quality cooperation. In this case, the United States is often the major recipient of air pollution, and the Americans have been eager to draw the Mexicans into cooperative arrangements for addressing air quality issues. Cooperation on air quality problems has taken place under the 1983 Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (called the La Paz Agreement). The La Paz Agreement, as explained in chapter 2, empowered federal environmental authorities in the United States and Mexico to undertake cooperative initiatives, to be implemented through multi-year binational programs—first the Integrated Border Environmental Plan (1990–95), then the Border XXI program (1995–2000), and then Border

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2012 (2002–12) and now Border 2020 (2012–20). EPA and SEMARNAT serve as national coordinators for these programs, all of which have included joint projects on reducing air pollution and its transport. The first studies on air quality in the Tijuana/Rosarito–San Diego region took place under the Integrated Border Environmental Plan, with a more specific action plan being formulated under the Border XXI Binational Alliance for Air Quality Tijuana–San Diego and the Joint Advisory Committee for the Improvement of Air Quality in the Paso del Norte Air Basin (General Accounting Office 2000). Under Border 2012, the Air Policy Forum facilitated binational air quality planning and management by addressing federal cross-border and border-wide issues and providing for strategic planning of border projects. The major focus has been on ensuring that each country meets its own air quality objectives (US EPA 2012b). There are also various subgroups developing air quality programs in Mexicali–Imperial Valley, the Nogales twin cities area, Agua Prieta–Douglas, Ciudad Juárez–El Paso–Sunland Park, and Laredo-Brownsville. The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation has also attempted to define a role for itself in long-range air pollution, and this is an area where its presence has certainly been felt. In one of its longer-term projects, (Enhancing North American Air Quality Management), the CEC (2009, 1) aims to “provide a more complete North American picture of air quality and air emissions to support decision-making on air quality management.” Its major focus, then, has been to provide support in terms of identifying both the air quality-related information and capacity needs of the three countries. Capacitybuilding in Mexico has been a particular focus, as with Border 2012. Air quality experts and officials have also been interacting via the North American Research Strategy for Tropospheric Ozone (NARSTO). In the mid1990s, US founders enlisted colleagues in Canada and Mexico with the aim of creating a cross-border coalition for research on ground-level ozone.2 In 1994, the founders set up a multi-stakeholder framework whereby government, industry, and NGOs would interact with scientists in carrying out research. NARSTO’s mission was “to coordinate and enhance policy-relevant research” (National Science and Technology Council 2000) through “state-of-the-science” assessments in areas of interest to air quality policy-makers. The organization also facilitates and participates in cooperative research projects at the subnational and cross-border regional level (NARSTO 2012) and functions as an “epistemic community,” in a manner similar to biologists in the biodiversity case (discussed in chapter 3).

Air Quality Policy Gaps and the Challenge for Transboundary Institutions Clearly, there are well-developed regulatory frameworks governing air pollution—and specifically ground-level ozone—in all three countries. Although there may be some differences in terms of how control measures are expressed, North America is, in a general sense, at an advanced stage of air quality management, especially when compared with other cases examined in this book, particularly climate change and genetically modified crops. Yet despite these policy frameworks and the substantial resources that have gone into implementing them, all three countries continue to have problems

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meeting their own air quality standards. Mexico faces the most significant challenges in this respect. The most recent comprehensive report by SEMARNAT notes that, while pollution resulting from CO, SO2, and NO2 decreased over 1997–2005 in the nine most-polluted cities of the country, there was a dramatic increase in ground-level ozone and PM (Zuk et al. 2007). The highest levels of O3 were registered in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey, metropolitan areas with high populations and high concentrations of industrial activities. But Mexico is not the only country experiencing problems. In the United States, national average ozone levels declined in the 1980s, leveled off in the 1990s, and then declined again after 2002. Yet in a recent study of air quality across the country, the EPA concludes that “approximately 124 million people lived in counties that exceeded one or more national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) in 2010” (US EPA 2011b)—and ground-level ozone continues to be the most significant air quality problem. This is also the case for Canada; in Ontario, which experiences the worst air quality in the country, groundlevel ozone concentrations continue to exceed the provincial one-hour ambient air quality criterion (AAQC) across the province (Ontario Ministry of the Environment 2010). Further, the domestic policy gaps that result in poor air quality within countries also contribute to air quality problems in their neighbors’ backyards and in border areas, particularly the US-Mexico border. Border 2012’s measurements have shown that in the five bilateral regions under its administration, ozone and PM concentrations often surpass the minimum standard, as presented in the following figures.

FIGURE 4.2 Ozone Concentrations in the Border Region (2001–5)

ppm

0.10

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0.06 2001

2002

Mexicali/Imperial Valley Tijuana/San Diego Standard

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Ciudad Juarez/El Paso Nogales/Nogales Lower Rio Grande Valley

*Average of 4th highest value over three years SOURCE: EPA 2011; Air Quality Systems.

2005

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FIGURE 4.3 Particulate Matter Concentrations in the Border Region (2001–7) 300

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Ciudad Juárez/El Paso Nogales/Nogales Valle Bajo del Río Bravo

SOURCE: EPA 2011; Air Quality Systems.

Ground-level ozone and PM do seem particularly difficult to address; even as emissions of other criteria air pollutants, such as SO2, have trended downward, ozone and PM levels have not improved to the same extent. The policy gaps in the air quality case, then, appear to be more general in nature—standards are not yet stringent enough to achieve good air quality in many areas of the continent, the full range of emission sources is not yet being fully targeted, and additional technological tools are needed to monitor air pollutant interactions, promote better understanding of pollutant transport, and provide additional emission reduction options. Ground-level ozone is a long-term pollution problem that must remain a high priority on political agendas. In addition, a significant aspect of the air quality problem, particularly as it relates to southern areas of the continent, is the lower levels of capacity in the regulatory system in Mexico, especially in terms of technological support for the development and maintenance of the regulatory regime.

Creating Stable and Comprehensive Networks As we established above, air pollution has long been perceived as a transboundary environmental problem necessitating cooperation across borders, and there is a full array of transboundary networks to support such cooperation. These networks are primarily transgovernmental, resting on relationships among officials from air quality and related agencies in the three countries. A defining feature of the networks in this case is their formality; on both borders, bilateral environmental agreements—the Canada-US Air Quality Agreement and the La

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Paz Agreement—provide formal institutionalization along with an obligation to report on progress. As a result, there are stable platforms for building reciprocal relationships and longer-term cooperation across the range of air quality issues. The CEC, which is also involved in air pollution, is a similar type of network; although it is an international organization, it functions as a transgovernmental network (Craik 2013). Where these particular networks vary is in the degree to which they include actors from other levels of government and from outside of government under their transgovernmental umbrellas. Arrangements under the Canada-US Air Quality Agreement promote a rather closed set of arrangements focusing mainly on federal officials. Depending on the issue, provincial representatives may be included, but this is not formally required. Neither do nongovernmental interests have a permanent role in cooperative endeavors. On the southern border, by contrast, both subnational and local governments and also societal and private groups can participate in the various cooperative mechanisms established under Border 2012—task forces, border-wide workgroups, and policy forums. The CEC has also played a critical role in bringing scientific organizations and nongovernmental interests into discussions on air pollutant transport. There are also other types of networks active in the air quality arena. The presence of NARSTO in continental air quality policy deliberations highlights not only the linkages among scientific communities across the three countries, but also the overlapping nature of networks. For example, NARSTO holds an annual conference, which rotates among the three member countries and is attended by both scientists and air quality officials in the three countries—many of whom are active in the AQC and the CEC.

Fostering Mutual Understanding and Learning The transgovernmental and epistemic networks that are active in the air quality arena have been quite successful in broadening the knowledge base on air pollutant transport and building a consensus for undertaking cooperative action. The CEC, for example, has played a critical role in highlighting the state of science on pollutant transport. In the mid-1990s, it initiated a study into the nature, extent, and significance of the pathways by which air pollutants travel to, from, and within North America. The study involved the Expert Advisory Panel on Continental Pollutant Pathways, a group of over 30 North American air quality experts, which produced a “general consensus” report of the sources, pathways, and effects of air pollution in North America. The CEC also enlisted the aid of a consultative group of interested stakeholders, a policy group of air quality policy-makers from all over North America, and the Advisory Groups of the CEC Air Monitoring and Modeling Project. Released in 1997, the report stated that long-range, persistent air pollutants pose significant threats to human health and the environment on a continental level, and that pollution prevention, achieved through cross-border cooperation, is the best strategy for reducing deleterious effects. The CEC coordinated another report released the same year. The result of a collaborative effort by the CEC, the Eastern Canada Transboundary Smog Issue Group (ECTSIG), and the Northeastern States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM), it aimed to assess the scientific methods being used

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to quantify transboundary transport between the northeastern United States and eastern Canada. The report added to the available weight of evidence showing the existence of transboundary transport and concluded that continuing, crossborder scientific effort was needed. In addition, NARSTO conducted an “Ozone Assessment” in the late 1990s, which reviewed advances in the chemical, physical, and meteorological science of ground-level ozone. The assessment was considered “state of the art” and spawned considerable cross-border cooperation among the scientific and policy communities in the three countries. Significantly, the assessment confirmed that concentrated NOx sources in the industrial Midwest create a permanent reservoir of elevated ozone levels, and that wind flow moves this pollution from the US Midwest to the northeast region (Miller et al. 1997). These research and information-gathering efforts, among many others, have served to encourage a “borderless” view of air quality policy in North America.

Resource Provision As in our other cases, all three countries find it difficult to procure adequate resources to support domestic air quality policy efforts. And air quality budgets, which generally reside within central environmental agencies, are vulnerable to the cuts that target these agencies; this vulnerability is currently on display in Canada. Mexico is also at considerable risk, given its broad capacity and resource shortfalls. The transboundary networks discussed here do not, for the most part, provide monies directly to air quality regimes in any country. Instead, they engage in capacity-building efforts through “in-kind” contributions and technology transfers. In the case of Mexico, there are diverse examples where cooperation has developed technical capacity and contributed financial resources to address air quality problems. Since the 1990s, capacity-building has been at the core of binational cooperation between the United States and Mexico. In 1997, atmospheric scientists from the Los Alamos, Pacific Northwest, and Argonne national laboratories, along with the Environmental Technology Laboratory at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, took part in a US-Mexico field study aimed at gathering data on air flow inside the Mexico City metropolitan area. The scientists used the data to develop advanced computer models that predicted air pollution in Mexico City, as well as US cities including Los Angeles and Denver. More recently, the US Air Pollution Technical Information Center (APTIC) and the Border 2012 Program helped develop inventories and manuals with specific technical information to support Mexican state decision-making (Gobierno de Baja California 2000). The municipal level has also benefited from this cooperation. In addition, the city of Mexicali receives support from APTIC, along with an advisory group from the California Air Resources Board (the state’s clean air agency), in supervising the monitoring network of the city (Muñoz, Quintero, and Pumfrey 2010). Apart from science and technology, capacity also means funding, especially for Mexico. Again, the Mexican states on the border with the United States have received aid. An example of this can be found in the cooperative arrangements between Tijuana/Rosarito and San Diego. In 2000, the two cities established a cross-border program to improve air quality. This program was supported

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by the Border 2012 Program and included the participation of the nongovernmental organization Border Project for Environmental Education (Proyecto Fronterizo de Educación Ambiental). This collaboration helped to design an emissions inventory for the whole atmospheric basin. Technical support and funding for the project came from the Western Governors’ Association, the California Air Resources Board, and the Environmental Protection Agency (Gobierno de Baja California 2000). It should be noted that US state governments have also benefited from Border 2012 programming. For example, Region 9 of the EPA (which includes the states of California, Arizona, Nevada, and Hawaii, as well as the Pacific Islands), with the collaboration of environmental offices in California and the Border 2012 Air Policy Forum, had monitoring stations installed in San Diego (and other cities in Region 9) (Gobierno de Baja California 2000).

SMOG POLICY: OBSERVATIONS As the CEC (1997, vii) notes, “acting alone, no one nation of North America will be able to protect adequately its domestic environment or its citizens from pollutants transported along continental pathways. While pollutants are not constrained by political boundaries, programs to reduce them often are, and domestic decisions continue to be made with little reference to their implications for all of North America.” Canada, the United States, and Mexico have put considerable effort into developing comprehensive air pollution management regimes and acquiring relevant scientific and technical expertise. There are certainly some differences in national policies across the three countries; Mexican point-source and ambient standards are not as stringent as those in the United States, nor as stringent as the WHO recommends, and the country needs to finish getting vehicle fuel efficiency standards in place. Further, Mexico faces some real capacity challenges, such as monitoring systems, that will need to be addressed over the medium term. Yet international cooperation on air pollutant transport—through the creation and maintenance of solid networks based on treaty obligations; expanding and disseminating air quality science through knowledge communities that span the governmental and expert communities; and building regulatory and technical capacity in Mexico—has gone some distance toward addressing these challenges. In the smog case, transboundary environmental mechanisms have made significant contributions to addressing air pollution levels within countries as well as air pollution that moves across borders. Bilateral institutions, such as the Air Quality Committee and the Air Policy Forum under Border 2012, have engaged governments in commitments to reduce pollution levels and also participated in technical capacity-building. In fact, one might argue that transboundary cooperation has been the most important tool for developing and disseminating technology for the monitoring and measurement of pollutants. As in our other cases, there has been relatively little trinational cooperation on air pollution in North America; instead, the CEC and NARSTO have played an agenda-setting role, keeping air quality problems at the forefront through knowledge building and dissemination, while also supporting the creation and maintenance of epistemic communities.

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Notes 1 It should be noted here that some research indicates that NOx plays an ambiguous role in the formation of ozone as, in some cases, increased levels of NOx may actually decrease ozone levels (Toronto Life 1997). 2 The US agencies driving NARSTO included the DOE, the NOAA, and the EPA. For Canada, Environment Canada has taken the lead. From Mexico, the Environment Institute and the Petroleum Institute, both governmental organizations, take part in NARSTO.

Chapter 5

Case Study: Greenhouse Gas Reduction

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY provides a different kind of case from biodiversity or air pollution—that is, an environmental problem that has been much discussed in all three countries but for which there is much less targeted national or multinational policy. Even more than “green” conservation challenges or “brown” pollution problems, climate change policy involves very high levels of scientific uncertainty, requires comprehensive public and private action, and demands sustained political mobilization—over the course of decades. Climate change is also, more than the other cases examined in this book, a global problem. International diplomacy and debates must frame the overall approach to the problem, and actions by individual nations are needed to implement most policies. But, as this chapter will argue, there is also a rationale for considering both the problem and policy responses on a continental scale. As we will explain, the impacts of climate change, from effects on natural systems to agricultural production to urban and rural water supply, will ignore national borders. And important policy approaches, from energy production choices to trade patterns to migration controls, can be accomplished much more effectively and at far lower cost if the entire continent, rather than individual nations, is the locus of action. But for North America, how these continental considerations play out will be deeply rooted in political, economic, and environmental realities. This case examines the dynamics that have shaped the domestic approaches of Canada, the United States, and Mexico on climate change, as well as efforts to coordinate these domestic strategies across borders. Our analysis shows that while all governance levels in North America have put in place specific policies relevant to greenhouse gas reduction, the three climate policy regimes are incomplete, patchy, and differently directed. Both Canada and the United States are undertaking a variety of discrete initiatives, ranging from tracking and regulating major emission sources to support (tepid, in Canada’s case) for

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renewable energies and energy efficiency. In neither country are these initiatives linked to an integrated policy regime with clear goals, although the United States has certainly made more serious attempts to adopt national legislation. Mexico’s regime is, by contrast, more comprehensive, ambitious, and integrated, though it places greater focus on reducing emissions from deforestation, land use, and agriculture. A major challenge here is the lack of resources to implement key planks of the country’s climate policy plan. Undermining the policy initiatives at all levels of governance is the very real concern about the health of national and world economies, accompanied by the lack of a broader constituency that might be counted on to press for climate policy action despite current economic conditions. While there are some transboundary networks in place to support climate policy cooperation across borders, these are certainly not as robust as in the air quality case. They rest on informal agreements and ad hoc inter-agency consultation, and are aimed at discrete, narrow pieces of the climate policy challenge. This is perhaps not surprising given that there is no overall agreement in North America on how to address climate change and no broad constituency supporting action. There exists the possibility of creating a more sustainable and effective system of climate and energy policy networks through the bilateral “clean energy” initiatives, through subnational cooperative initiatives, and using the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, though this potential is thus far unrealized.

NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE PROBLEM The evolving scientific consensus on climatic change has been clearly expressed in the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (see IPCC 2007); the preponderance of evidence indicates that an increase in the global temperature is occurring due to the buildup of atmospheric gases—water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone—emitted both naturally and as a result of human activities. Incoming solar radiation passes through the earth’s atmosphere, but outgoing thermal radiation is locked in by these atmospheric gases, chief among them carbon dioxide produced by burning fossil fuels or clearing vegetated land. Solar radiation is thus trapped by the atmosphere, creating a warming effect. While the science on impacts is uncertain, global-scale environmental change, including the melting of the polar ice caps, the disruption of climatic patterns, widespread loss of plant and animal species, water scarcity, and changes in food production are anticipated (Schmidt and Wolfe 2009). Individually, the North American countries have a direct relationship to climate change as major producers of greenhouse gases. The United States was, in fact, the largest emitter of CO2 in the world until 2006, when it was overtaken by China (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2008). In 2009, total US greenhouse gas emissions were 6,633 million metric tons CO2 equivalent (Mt CO2e, or “megatons”). US emissions increased a total of 11 per cent over the 1990 to 2010 period. Although there was a significant dip (6.1 per cent) in 2008–9 due to the recession, emissions resumed their march upward over 2009–10 (US EPA 2012a). The comparable emissions figure for Canada

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in 2009 was 690 megatons of carbon dioxide equivalent. Canada’s total also decreased by approximately 6 per cent (42 Mt) from the 2008 level of 732 Mt, although its total emissions increased more than twice as much as the United States over the 1990 to 2010 period (Environment Canada 2012). For Mexico, 2009 total emissions were 750 Mt CO2e, with an increase of 9.5 per cent over 2006 levels (SEMARNAT 2009a). At root, climate change is a global rather than regional problem, both in terms of causes and the policy responses needed to deal with it. The environmental and economic processes involved are broad in scale; if the world as a whole does not act, even the strongest policies by Canada, Mexico, or the United States, or all three acting in concert, cannot deal with it successfully. The international negotiations leading up to and taking place during successive United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conferences of the Parties—the most recent in Doha, Qatar, in late 2012 (COP18)—have placed pressure on all countries, including Canada, the United States, and Mexico, to spell out their climate change policies in more detail, including emission targets and implementation measures. Interestingly, the dynamics underlying these international negotiations have not had a particularly North American flavor. Although there has been some informal coordination of Canadian and American positions behind the scenes, the three countries have not formally negotiated as a bloc. Any international commitments by the Obama administration were made contingent on congressional support—not forthcoming to this point. Moreover, the Mexican government’s decision to be the first developing country to adopt an “aspirational” reduction target and to take a leadership role in the development of a “Green Climate Fund” for supporting mitigation and adaptation projects in developing countries appeared aimed at an international, rather than continental, audience. Only the Harper government in Canada has made harmonizing its climate policy with that of the United States an explicit foreign policy goal—though mostly for domestic political reasons, as discussed below. This was very clear when, during the 2011 Durban Conference, Canada officially withdrew from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which the United States had long refused to accept. In what ways, then, can we regard climate change as a case of North American environmental policy? We believe that, while domestic politics and international negotiations may be determining the specific greenhouse gas reduction targets of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, the implementation of these targets is very likely to involve significant levels of regional cooperation. There are numerous factors arguing in favor of such regional cooperation. First, the economies of the three North American states are highly integrated through NAFTA, raising competitiveness concerns both within North America and relative to worldwide trading partners (Craik, Studer, and VanNijnatten 2013). Certainly, the desire of the Harper government to maintain policy parity with the United States is explicitly based on concerns about the impacts of differing policies on the trade relationship. Relatedly, there is an emerging agreement across significant political interests in all three countries that emissions trading regimes and other market-based instruments may be the best way to encourage carbon emission reductions. This has also spawned some thinking (particularly across the Canada-US border) about how to link different types of markets across jurisdictions so as to minimize total costs.

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The structure of energy relationships within North America is also key in terms of explaining why climate change policy cooperation on the continent is likely to intensify. At first blush, collaboration among the three countries in the energy field would not seem to be easy, given that some of the most important entities on the production side differ fundamentally from country to country, as well as across sub-regions within countries, as discussed in chapter 1. Most obviously, thousands of private companies are dominant in oil and gas production in Canada and the United States, while in Mexico, there is only the government monopoly, PEMEX. However, energy trade with continental neighbors is critical to all three countries. These energy relationships rely on a system of pipelines and power lines that criss-cross borders, almost as if they were not there. Add to these resource realities the fact that fossil fuel and non-conventional oil production and burning accounts for the lion’s share of greenhouse gases in all three countries, and it is clear that efforts to reduce the carbon footprint in any jurisdiction in the region will of necessity require transboundary cooperation. In an obvious example of such interlinkage, how can the United States encourage more imports of emissions-intense tar sands oil from Canada—as it has done in order to increase its own energy security—at the same time that it seeks to attain greenhouse gas emission reduction targets? One factor that has not yet played a significant role in shaping climate policy responses in North America, but seems poised to in the near future, is the actual experience of impacts on continental environmental and economic systems due to climatic change. For example, much of the East and Gulf Coasts of the continent is the site of large cities or bordered by beachside recreational houses and hotels. These are very vulnerable to hurricanes and accompanying storm surges, and even a small increase in hurricane occurrence or intensity could do immense damage to lives and property. The damage caused to New Orleans by Katrina (2005), to Galveston by Ike (2008), and to New York City by Sandy (2012) showed that cities could suffer billions in property damage and a major loss of life. Repeated episodes of this sort of event would move climate change much higher on national agendas. Another possible focus of climate-related damage is water scarcity. Although growing seasons may be extended in the wheat belt in the northern central United States and in Saskatchewan, this has always been an area where rainfall is marginal. Climate-related drought, or insect infestations, could severely affect production of a crop that is one of both nations’ principal agricultural exports. Similarly, 2011 was the most devastating drought in 70 years in Mexico, affecting 40 per cent of the country’s territory (Torres 2011). With so much water shared across borders, a scarcity of water resources will force cooperation. Further, climate change, which tends to have its greatest impact in the highlatitude zones, could greatly reduce ice cover in the Arctic and change “North” America. Sea ice extent at the end of the summer melt season in 2012 was the lowest in 33 years of satellite measurement (see Figure 5.1, National Snow and Ice Data Center). The six lowest seasonal minimum ice extents in the 33-year record have all occurred between 2007 and 2012. This could—and the effect seems to be occurring already—open the Northwest Passage to regular shipping. This would not only create the possibility for new ports for Canada, but it would also become easier to explore onshore and offshore for petroleum and minerals. Traversing the Northwest Passage is still difficult and infrequent, but if it remains open every summer, it might create the possibility of moving

Case Study: Greenhouse Gas Reduction 133 FIGURE 5.1 Arctic Sea Ice (1979–2012)

12 National Snow and Ice Data Center, Boulder CO

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minerals and fuels (many yet to be discovered) in reinforced-hull ships from the Far North to world markets. This is likely to ignite conflict between Canada and the United States over the extent to rights to territorial waters. At the same time, however, these developments have highlighted the speed at which climate change is occurring, the very real impacts on inhabitants and ecosystems in the North, and the critical need for cooperation in terms of understanding and adapting to these impacts. Climate change, then, represents an emerging challenge to cooperation among the North American partners, and very likely the most far-reaching; it will require that governments on the continent think much more seriously about their myriad interactions, on everything from energy linkages and technology application, to pollution control and tracking, to water and resource management, to the organization of transboundary markets, and to wildlife and biodiversity administration. The cost of not cooperating—both globally and regionally—will most certainly be high.

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO Because of the sheer breadth of policies relevant to climate change, we will highlight only the major features of governance landscapes, showing where the greatest similarities and differences lie in terms of general approaches. We do not address climate adaptation policy, but rather focus on CO2 reduction. As with our other cases, we are particularly interested in uncovering the extent of

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difference in domestic approaches and capacity, and reflecting on the possibility that transboundary cooperation may help ameliorate these differences.

National Perspectives on Climate Change Policy All three countries have had great difficulty putting in place comprehensive regimes that link energy and climate policy objectives; Mexico is the only one that appears to have overcome the barriers, at least to some extent. The high rate of failure stems in part from the way in which the climate change issue is viewed. For all three countries, the central role of fossil fuels in economic and political life, as discussed in earlier chapters, creates a huge obstacle to putting in place bold climate strategies. In Canada and even more so in Mexico, oil revenues are critical; Mexico’s oil not only supplies significant export revenues, but also provides a significant share of the national government budget, obtained through taxes on the national petroleum company, PEMEX. Yet variations among the countries in terms of policy and regulatory legacies, legal and institutional structures, economic conditions, and resource dependency have resulted in differences in the way climate change policy is “packaged” in each country. In the United States, debates about the future mix of energy sources constitute the “meat” of climate change policy-making. Carbon emissions per British thermal unit, or BTU (as well as other greenhouse gases, such as methane), vary greatly between coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, and the various renewables. Coal use results in higher amounts of carbon dioxide per unit of energy than oil or natural gas. However, due to its relatively low cost and abundance, coal is the largest domestically produced source of energy in the United States, and it is used to generate approximately half the electricity consumed in the country (US Energy Information Administration 2011). Historically, the national approach to emission reductions has been to focus on reducing emissions of one pollutant at a time: first sulfur dioxides, then nitrous oxides, then greenhouse gases. Given this narrow regulatory approach, opponents of controls on a specific pollutant are easily mobilized and they can press their case in various arenas—the two houses (and committees) of Congress, the administration and executive agencies (particularly the US Environmental Protection Agency), and the states. Now that the focus has turned to greenhouse gases, there are pitched battles among various political actors with entrenched interests, especially proponents of coal, oil, and natural gas. For example, the states of West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Montana, which depend on coal extraction and use, have many avenues through which to oppose federal attempts to curtail or penalize its use. In a country whose environmental policy approach, as we note in chapter 1, is highly regulatory, climate policy has been drawn into the ongoing conflicts regarding what fuel will be favored and who will regulate emissions, on which sources, and how stringently. For Canada, climate change policy brings to the fore political conflicts within the country between federal authorities and very powerful provincial governments regarding natural resources development. Energy, as noted above, is one of Canada’s major industries and primary exports, but different parts of the country produce different forms of energy, which themselves vary in their impact on carbon emissions. Tar sands oil production in Alberta, for example, is already the single largest contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions

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growth in Canada.1 There is also significant production of natural gas (not zero carbon, but better than coal) in Alberta, and potential gas opportunities in British Columbia, offshore in Atlantic Canada, and in the Northwest Territories. Meanwhile, hydro-electric power production—low in CO2 emissions—is concentrated in provinces like Quebec and Manitoba; Quebec, in particular, is a large exporter of low-carbon hydro-electricity. Industrialized Ontario benefits from a large nuclear program and from manufacturing wind turbines and other equipment for alternative energy. Not surprisingly, then, successive federal governments have found it difficult—indeed, thus far impossible—to fashion a national approach that can placate these distinctive provincial interests. Alberta and Saskatchewan, as major oil-producing jurisdictions, have been staunchly opposed to, and have successfully blocked, a national CO2 mitigation regime, while Quebec, Manitoba, and British Columbia have (at times) been more favorably disposed. In large part, this also explains why Canadian governments have been so clear about their intention to emulate US policy; given the significance of the US export market to all provinces, it is politically and economically convenient for the federal government to sidestep more serious attempts to reach a national, cohesive climate policy—which puts in place a fair burden-sharing agreement (see Macdonald et al. 2013)—and simply adopt as a central tenet of its climate policy the need to harmonize with the United States. In Mexico, climate change mitigation is seen both as a matter of capacity development and as linked to other environmental problems. As discussed in chapter 1, Mexico’s path to industrialization has occurred more recently, and its level of development lags behind that of the United States and Canada. It is clear that, despite having new specialized institutions (described below) and hosting a successful COP16, Mexico’s emissions reduction program is dependent upon financial support from developed states, particularly the United States and countries in Europe. Mexico was an early supporter of Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and it has been one of the principal architects of the emerging global climate financing mechanism, the Green Climate Fund, which is intended to support mitigation and adaptation programs in developing countries. Both the CDM and the Green Climate Fund are seen as critical in terms of bringing foreign investment into both the public and private sectors in Mexico. Also, Mexican policy-makers, perhaps more so than their colleagues to the north, see climate change through the lens of other, more immediate ecological challenges. For example, despite several laws and regulations that have been passed to reduce the over-exploitation and degradation of forests, deforestation in Mexico continues. In 2002, Mexico had the second-highest rate of deforestation in the world after Brazil (Miles 2002), although this rate has decreased more recently (FAO 2010, 239). Perhaps not surprisingly, then, Mexico has shown considerable interest in alternative types of climate programming, such as the so-called Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) option, which provides financial compensation for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Water scarcity is also a critical issue for Mexico; many regions of the country do not have regular access to clean water, and water sources are rapidly disappearing or becoming degraded. It is anticipated that climate change, with its attendant impacts on temperatures and weather, will greatly exacerbate this trend.

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Climate Policy Choices: The Lack of National Targets and Comprehensive Plans Observers often point to the Canadian decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and the American decision not to as evidence of significant climate change policy differences between the two countries. Over the past decade, however, Canadian and American policy goals have actually been quite similar: a focus on reducing emissions intensity rather than capping emissions and, at the same time, increasing domestic oil and gas exploration and supply rather than fully prioritizing alternative energies. At successive G8, Asia-Pacific Partnership, and UNFCCC meetings over 2006–8, the Canadian and American positions were more complementary than not in terms of their moderate, intensity-based approach to greenhouse gas reductions. Canada’s formal abandonment of its Kyoto goal in early 2007 only solidified this complementarity. One of the most significant UNFCCC meetings was COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, which resulted in an interim agreement designed to shape national policy responses. Under the accord, Annex 1 parties (developed countries, including Canada and the United States) were asked to submit and implement economy-wide emission targets beginning in early 2010, while Non-Annex 1 parties (developing countries, including Mexico) were asked to submit a list of mitigation measures that they intended to implement. The United States administration set a modest goal of a 17 per cent emissions reduction by 2020 (from base year 2005), although this has not yet been included in any legislation (UNFCCC 2010a). In the pathway set forth in legislation which passed the House but not the Senate, policy-makers had envisioned a 30 per cent reduction in 2025 and a 42 per cent reduction in 2030, in line with the goal to reduce emissions 83 per cent by 2050. Canada has also set a 17 per cent emissions reduction goal by 2020 (from base year 2005), specifically noting that its target would be aligned with the final economy-wide emissions target of the United States. Thus, climate change policy goals in Canada and the United States would effectively be the same if actually enacted; as Canada’s environment minister has declared: “Harmonization is absolutely crucial for Canada—and for the US” (Prentice 2009). For its part, Mexico adopted its Special Climate Change Program, which includes mitigation actions across relevant economic sectors designed to achieve a reduction of 30 per cent in its GHG emissions relative to the business-as-usual scenario by 2020. In none of the three countries are the goals set out by the administration binding in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. Canada and the United States also lack comprehensive and cohesive implementation strategies. The United States has no national legislation requiring action to reduce greenhouse gases, even though the focus of much of the climate policy effort in the United States has been to get legislative action; multiple bills mandating greenhouse gas reductions have been introduced in Congress, some even making it to a floor vote. In June 2009, four months after President Obama called on Congress to send him legislation that places a market-based cap on carbon pollution, the American Clean Energy and Security Act (almost 1,500 pages long!) passed the House of Representatives by a narrow margin. However, a Senate version, introduced by Senator John Kerry (D-MA), was never voted on, and the bill quickly died.

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Instead, the administration has proceeded with a more piecemeal approach. First, it has attempted to support renewables and energy efficiency—for example, through an injection of funds under the 2009 American Recovery and Investment Act; one estimate by the Pembina Institute calculated that, in comparing budget allocations to renewable energy in the United States and Canada, the United States outspent Canada by a factor of almost 14 to 1 (Pembina Institute 2009). President Obama’s State of the Union address in early 2013 indicated that renewables and efficiency continued to be a priority. Second, American policy-makers are also working toward establishing a regulatory regime for CO2 by placing controls on stationary and mobile sources (i.e., automobiles, coal-fired plants, etc.) one at a time and under authorities established by the Clean Air Act of 1990.2 Congressional support on any potentially more comprehensive package of initiatives would be extremely difficult to attain, particularly given Republican control of the House and that party’s antipathy toward climate and environmental initiatives. While Canada has attempted at various points over the past two decades to develop a national strategy, it has achieved minimal success. Over the course of the late 1990s through to 2006, successive federal Liberal governments relied almost exclusively on non-regulatory instruments—voluntarism, support for low-emission technologies and renewable energy—to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions (VanNijnatten and Macdonald 2003). As it became clear that these approaches were not delivering emissions reductions, in 2003–4, the Liberal government undertook large-scale negotiations with various industry sectors, such as oil and gas and automotive, purportedly in an attempt to set up broad “covenants” with these industries, under which they would agree to achieve sector-wide reduction targets. This large final-emitter system never materialized, however. With the election of a Conservative Harper government in early 2006, climate programs were initially dismantled, signaling the new government’s strong opposition to the international (or indeed any) climate mitigation regime. However, as climate policy debates became more hard-edged and ambitious in the United States, with multiple bills mandating greenhouse gas reductions being debated in Congress (and some threatening to impose trade measures on energy-intensive imports from foreign countries, including Canada), the Harper government did take action. In May 2007, the government released Turning the Corner, a very modest package of policy initiatives which focused on achieving a reduction in the emissions intensity (rather than an overall reduction in emissions) of various industry sectors through a mixture of phased-in regulations and emissions trading. The plan also provided for the development of a mandatory fuel efficiency standard for automobiles, measures to reduce emissions from other transportation sectors, and new energy efficiency performance standards for manufactured goods. In late 2008, after the election in the United States of the more environmentally activist Democratic administration, the Harper government indicated that it would drop intensity-based targets in favor of an economy-wide reduction in emissions, and the government reiterated its interest in a bilateral emissions trading system. While there has been little progress in terms of an emissions trading system, other policy planks are gradually emerging in line with actions taken in the United States. In April 2010, Minister of the Environment Jim Prentice announced new fuel efficiency standards for automobiles and light trucks

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manufactured in 2012–16, and new GHG tailpipe standards. The Canadian standards are equivalent to those adopted by the United States. In late 2012, Ottawa announced that it would match a proposal from the US EPA requiring that, by 2025, cars and light trucks be 50 per cent more fuel efficient and emit half as much greenhouse gases as current models. Canada has also moved to regulate emissions from coal-fired power plants by phasing them out or requiring fuel-switching; the final regulations were released in the fall of 2012. The Harper government continues to argue that most of the policies in its plan—particularly the establishment of a national target and an emissions trading regime to implement an eventual target, but also other policy measures, such as fuel economy and efficiency standards—are dependent upon US policy choices. By contrast, Mexico does have a National Climate Change Strategy, which represents a more serious attempt to link climate policy with other major economic and environmental policy goals. In 2000, Mexico ratified the Kyoto Protocol; as a Non-Annex party, it had no reduction commitments, but was ­obligated to report its national GHG emissions every two years. Some years later, in 2007, under the new administration of Felipe Calderón (the former energy minister), the Comisión Intersecretarial para el Cambio Climático (Interministerial Commission on Climate Change) released a National Climate Change Strategy identifying specific measures for mitigation and estimating their potential for emissions reductions (Government of Mexico 2010). The strategy put priority items under one of two program umbrellas: a Green Agenda, outlining what needs to be done to conserve carbon in forest ecosystems and reduce GHG emissions from land use, forestry, and agriculture; and a Gray Agenda, concerning opportunities for future energy development which, besides reducing GHG emissions, would allow for a more sustainable, efficient, and competitive energy supply. Among other things, Mexico’s strategy aimed to increase renewable energy production and energy efficiency, as well as the planting of forests, to reduce the country’s greenhouse gas emissions by 110 million tons by the year 2020 (Government of Mexico 2010). During the next four years, several initiatives were introduced in Congress by different parties and by the president. These initiatives included amendments to LGEEPA, creating a framework for climate change policy and sustainable development, and an institute for climate change to undertake relevant research. Then, in June 2012, the Ley General de Cambio Climático (General Law on Climate Change) was enacted by the president, after being approved by both chambers of Congress.3 This law is more comprehensive than anything in the United States or Canada, as it reorganizes several areas of public administration (e.g., energy, health, environment, forests, water, development, transportation, etc.); establishes a clear national policy focused on mitigation, adaptation, and vulnerability; and puts in place specific instruments and institutions to support implementation measures. Under the law, Mexico is committed to transitioning to a sustainable and competitive economy based on low-carbon fuels, and to “separating emissions from growth” (Cámara de Senadores 2011a). The law also aims to link GHG mitigation policies with state and municipal development plans, and to focus on capacity-building by linking climate-related institutions at all levels of government through a National System for Climate Change. Anchoring this national system is the new Instituto Nacional de Ecología (INECC) (National Institute for Ecology and Climate Change), under the jurisdiction of INE, which will act as a neural center for policy research, funding, and compliance. The law also mandates the creation

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of the National Emissions Registry, under the authority of PROFEPA, to which citizens, companies, and government agencies would report their emissions (Cámara de Senadores 2011b).

Climate Policy Choices: Subnational Variation The lack of economy-wide targets, coherent intersector approaches, and cohesive national implementation schemes for reaching emissions reduction targets has contributed to fragmented, uneven, and potentially conflicting mitigation regimes in Canada and the United States. In Mexico, the national climate strategy is more comprehensively formulated, but implementation is incomplete. In the face of these scattered and/or incomplete responses by national governments, subnational governments have put in place a wide variety of different policies—some of which have been quite ambitious and innovative. But the great diversity across subnational jurisdictions poses its own challenge in terms of fashioning a more collaborative continental response. In Mexico, it should be noted that the new General Law for Climate Change clarifies the competencies of the federal and subnational governments. For example, federal agencies are responsible for administering the Special Program on Climate Change as well as the National Strategy, and to regulate funding, although this has to be done in coordination with state and municipal governments. The federal government will also administer and regulate any emissions trading programs, as well as inventories and registries. States and municipalities may administer funding and implement the Special Program and the National Strategy via specific agreements with the federal government (Cámara de Senadores 2011a). The General Law presents some legal challenges for subnational governments, however. As discussed below, some states had already passed local climate laws and action plans, and potential conflicts will need to be resolved, likely through the courts. In terms of concrete policy choices, there is great diversity in subnational emission reduction targets. To use the Canadian example, at the time of writing, the province of Ontario has a goal of 15 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020; Quebec has a goal of 20 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020; British Columbia has a plan that will reduce its emissions 33 per cent below 2007 levels by 2020; and Alberta has a plan that will let emissions rise until 2020, at which time they are scheduled to decrease to 14 per cent below the province’s 2005 levels by 2050. There is just as much variety among US state climate policies (Center for Energy and Climate Solutions 2012). The first statewide program in the country to mandate an economy-wide emissions cap with enforceable penalties was the 2006 Global Warming Solutions Act, AB 32, in California; emissions were capped at 1990 levels by 2020. In 2008, Connecticut’s governor signed into law House Bill 5600, which sets a statewide GHG emissions reduction target of 10 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020. In another example, Maryland passed the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Act of 2009, which sets a GHG emission reduction target of 25 per cent below 2006 levels by 2020. However, at least 25 states have no target at all (Center for Energy and Climate Solutions 2012). In Mexico, some states already have their own climate action plans with specific goals, though these are largely aspirational. The first states to draft these plans were Veracruz, Mexico City, and some of the northern states; the majority of them received technical and financial aid from the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC/COCEF). An interesting example is the case of Mexico City, which in 2008 introduced a Climate Action Program that had

FIGURE 5.2 Status of State Climate Action Plans and Inventories in Mexico 112°

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SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Ecología 2012.

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Indicator for States State Climate Action Plan (PEACC) being planned

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an emission reduction goal of 12 per cent by 2012. The overall goal was to be realized through reductions in specific sectors; transportation would account for 42 per cent of the overall reduction, waste management for 35 per cent, and the water and energy sectors for 12 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México 2008, 34). As of 2011, the city had achieved 82 per cent of its original goal—a reduction of 5.7 thousand Mt CO2e (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México 2011, 42–46). The result, not surprisingly, is a patchwork of subnational climate change policies within countries and across the continent, directed at different ends and employing different means. Some jurisdictions have favored emissions trading and other market mechanisms; for example, British Columbia and Quebec have instituted carbon tax measures. In the British Columbia case, the tax is economy-wide, the only such regime on the continent. A group of states in the northeastern United States has put in place a carbon emissions trading program covering the power sector, known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Although in Mexico there are no subnational carbon markets in place, some states (especially the northern ones) are participating as observers in cross-border regional initiatives with American states and Canadian provinces that are exploring such initiatives. Baja California, for example, was an observer in the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), discussed below. In addition, Nuevo Leon’s Climate Action Plan (drafted in 2005) established a mitigation regime whereby the state would need to participate in “voluntary” emissions markets and calculate into its reductions what it calls “payments for environmental services.” This instrument allows private owners (individual or communitarian) to be paid by the federal government to conserve forests (or other ecosystems) that otherwise would be used for production. Some subnational jurisdictions have leaned toward regulatory action aimed at reducing emissions from large point sources. California, Minnesota, and Washington have mandated GHG Environmental Performance Standards for the electricity sector, while California, New Jersey, and Washington have GHG Performance Standards for automobiles. Wisconsin, West Virginia, and California also have mandatory GHG reporting in their states. Among Canadian provinces, Nova Scotia was the first to regulate the power sector; the provincial government set caps on any facility emitting more than 10,000 tons of CO2 equivalent per year. Alberta, under its Specified Gas Emitters Regulation of 2008, mandates that existing facilities emitting more than 100,000 tons of greenhouse gases per year have to cap their intensity at 12 per cent below the average for 2003–5. In 2009, Ontario amended its Environmental Protection Act to allow greenhouse gas emissions to be regulated and laid the groundwork for a cap-and-trade system. As of 2010, any facility emitting more than 25,000 tons of CO2 equivalent has to report its emissions annually, although there are no limits on these emissions as of yet. Ontario is also committed to “turning off” its coal-fired power plants. Mexican states have also adopted innovative measures. In the case of Chiapas, the state formulated its Climate Action Program in 2011 with the goal of developing specific strategies for mitigation and adaptation by 2015. The sector that contributes most to the state’s GHG count is land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF), at 57 per cent. The Chiapas Climate Action Plan thus links directly to the REDD mechanisms being promoted in international discussions (Gobierno de Chiapas 2011). Another interesting case is the state of

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Tabasco in the Gulf of Mexico, where the majority of PEMEX’s oil activity is situated. The most important emitters in Tabasco are land-use change (31.7 per cent) and energy (22.8 per cent). This state issued its Climate Action Plan in 2011 and established that the main mechanism would be to expand the natural areas under protection. The reactivation of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor project is a fundamental part of this strategy (Gobierno de Tabasco 2011). Moreover, many subnational jurisdictions have major initiatives in place to foster renewable energy technology and energy efficiency, while others have done relatively little in this regard. Nova Scotia, for example, aims to get 25 per cent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2015, while Ontario’s Green Energy Act in 2009, which set the course for the province’s transition to cleaner sources of energy and greater energy efficiency, came with financial incentives for the development of wind, solar, and biomass power generation projects. At least 28 US states have Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPFs), under which electric utilities and other retail electric providers must supply a specified minimum amount of customer load with electricity from eligible renewable energy sources—but there is tremendous variety among RPFs. Looking across the three countries, the policy groups Germanwatch and Climate Action Network Europe (CAN Europe) publish an annual Climate Change Performance Index, which scores countries on their greenhouse gas emissions and policy. In its 2012 scoring, Mexico ranked 10th out of 58 countries surveyed; to put this achievement in perspective, the United States ranked 49th, while Canada ranked 51st (Germanwatch and CAN Europe 2012).4 The report noted that Mexico, along with China, Korea, and South Africa, received the best policy evaluations; Mexico was also explicitly rewarded for the excellent COP16 Presidency in Cancún.

Lack of Broader Constituency Support The result of climate change policy activity in North America, then, is a patchwork of policies that directly and indirectly attempt to address greenhouse gas emissions, particularly CO2. Underlying many of these policy choices, as Barry Rabe (2013) argues, is the desire to use these new instruments in such a way that local economic and political interests benefit, rather than fashioning policy responses using a longer-term (or regional!) environmental perspective. This policy parochialism has only grown more pronounced as budgets become tighter, and program expenses for which benefits are not immediately visible are vulnerable. Further, the most ambitious policy initiatives, such as those undertaken at the national level in Mexico, will require considerable “staying power” to get everything implemented. What these realities underscore is the need to mobilize broader constituencies for action, something which we have emphasized throughout this book. Unfortunately, the track record of the United States and Canada has been quite sketchy in this regard. Successive Canadian federal governments have been criticized for negotiating almost exclusively with large industries on GHG emission reduction initiatives. Some of the most vocal critics of national climate policy have been the Pembina Institute, the David Suzuki Foundation, and the Climate Action Network. These groups have criticized the Harper government’s “pro-tar sands” approach, its acceptance of the modest mitigation standards being promoted by energy companies, and the decision to withdraw from Kyoto.

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Another target for criticism by NGOs has been the refusal of Harper’s government to accept the European Commission’s planned Fuel Quality Directive, which assigns carbon emissions values to different fuel sources to promote lower-carbon fuels. As the Climate Action Network states, “oil from the tar sands was assigned a higher carbon emissions value because of the intense extraction process, so the Canadian government has been fighting the Directive in order to protect the tar sands” (Climate Action Network Canada 2012; Pembina Institute 2012). Other critiques are directed at the federal commitment to developing nuclear sources, and continuing to support the development of unconventional fuels, such as shale gas. By its very nature, the US political system puts up considerable roadblocks to those who want to undertake more comprehensive policy action. The early attempts by the Obama administration to encourage comprehensive action on climate change received considerable support from the environmental community; many were hopeful that congressional debates over 2007–9 would yield national legislation. As the opposition to climate policy activism has grown within Congress and at the state level, and the prospects for legislation dimmed, the environmental community has encountered more difficulty in supporting the administration’s efforts. For many groups, their primary tactic has become—once again—to press for action in the courts, in particular to support the efforts of climate policy innovators like California. The problem with this approach, however, is that the environmental community’s efforts are fragmented across a great variety of discrete initiatives undertaken by specific governments. This makes it difficult to articulate, and advocate for, a comprehensive climate change strategy. Mexico has more generally been criticized for its top-down mode of policymaking, which has traditionally centered on executive actors and the private sector rather than mobilizing a broader constituency for action, including legislators, subnational governments, and NGOs (Carvalho 2009). However, the process of negotiation leading to the General Law on Climate Change was intended to be quite open to societal interests. There was, for example, consultation with universities and NGOs, and proposals emanating from the opposition parties were also discussed in Congress. Broader societal participation occurred through the venue of an advisory committee focusing on the Mexican epistemic community addressing climate change. There are several institutes and associations in Mexico that have been pressuring the government to raise climate change standards and implement the Kyoto Protocol. Among these are the Centro Mario Molina (Mario Molina Center), the Programa de Investigación en Cambio Climático of UNAM (Program of Climate Change Research of UNAM), Greenpeace Mexico, the Centro de Estudios sobre Derecho Ambiental Mexicano (Center of Studies on Mexican Environmental Law, or CEDAM), the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental (Mexican Environmental Law Center, or CEMDA), and the Centro de Transporte Sustentable (Center of Sustainable Transportation). As well as universities and research institutes, NGOs were instrumental in pushing the climate legislation in the Mexican Congress. In the end, the General Law on Climate Change received the support of almost all climate NGOs in the country. In contrast, some members of the business community have been openly doubtful that implementation of the law can be done in a manner that preserves Mexico’s economic competitiveness. As noted by the leader of the Mexican Chamber of Iron and Steel, “today, the United States, China, Europe, Russia and Brazil, all great economies, generate

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80 per cent of the GHG worldwide and do not comply with their emissionsreduction commitments to avoid sacrificing the well-being of their population” (Carriles 2012).

Lack of Resources In a theme that runs across the cases discussed in this book, climate policy suffers from an acute lack of resources for supporting initiatives being contemplated or implemented. Certainly, the concrete support needed to make the broad-scale changes necessary in each society and economy is breathtaking. In Mexico, the situation is extremely serious. Mexico’s target under the Copenhagen Accord was offered with the provision that adequate financial and technological support from developed countries be made available. In this respect, in 2010, the 16th Conference of the Parties in Cancún, Mexico, devoted considerable attention to mobilizing “fast-start” funding for supporting initiatives in developing countries to the tune of $30 billion, with longer-term funding of $100 billion per year through to 2020 (UNFCCC 2010). There are simply nowhere near the resources needed to implement the initiatives already committed to by various governments in Mexico. For example, in the Energy Reform of 2008, incentives for renewables were mandated, but not given any significant financial support. The same applies to national initiatives on climate change; a series of institutions for addressing specific climate-related tasks are to be put in place, yet it is not clear where the budget will come from. In addition, states and municipalities will need to look for complementary resources to achieve their responsibilities under the national goals. Further, a process of capacity-building is to be initiated under a new institution, the National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (INECC), but this body will presumably have to raise funds from international and domestic sources. The lack of resources is clearly not just a Mexican problem, however. A report from the Institute for Policy Studies (2008) argued that, “despite growing recognition in the Pentagon and the intelligence community that global warming poses serious national security threats to the United States, Washington is spending 88 dollars on the military for every dollar it spends this year on climaterelated programmes.” Yet the recent budgetary difficulties in the United States, at both the federal and state levels, mean that many climate policy initiatives have been put on hold. The “Great Recession” that started in 2007 caused “the largest collapse in state revenues on record” (McNichol et al. 2012). Since bottoming out in 2010, revenues have begun to grow again, but states are still far from fully recovered; for fiscal year 2013, 29 states have projected or addressed shortfalls totaling $47 billion (McNichol et al. 2012). At the federal level, executive and legislative leaders have had to deal with both a “debt-ceiling crisis,” whereby insufficient revenue existed to fund programs, and sequestration, under which across-the-board cuts are automatically administered to federal programs. In Canada, the economic situation has not been as dire, but governments have also had to deal with higher debts than was the case a few years ago. In early 2011, it was reported that the Harper government was planning a $222 million, or 20 per cent, reduction in spending at Environment Canada, including a $141 million cut to climate change and clean air initiatives (Council of Canadians 2011). Harper’s 2012 national budget was indeed disappointing for climate policy advocates. Funding for the ecoENERGY energy efficiency program, as well as renewable energy programming, was not renewed; instead,

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there will be greater support for oil and gas development alongside deep cuts to Environment Canada. Many of the provinces are in a surplus situation, but big climate policy players, like Ontario with its large manufacturing sector, must now deal with a higher debt load, which has forced a large-scale re-evaluation of program spending. In such a context, ambitious green energy initiatives have fallen by the wayside.

Present Transboundary Cooperation for Climate Change As with the other cases discussed in this book, cooperation on climate policy has occurred at the bilateral, trilateral, and subnational levels of governance— although in this case, the most significant efforts over the past decade have been taking place at the subnational level. More recently, however, bilateral and trilateral cooperation has accelerated somewhat. There are also different forms of collaboration developing among environmental groups that operate on both sides of international borders. Overall, however, the transboundary framework is ad hoc, informal, and piecemeal. Chapter 2 argued that nation-to-nation interaction on the Canada-US and US-Mexico borders has resulted in important program anchors for cooperative bilateral environmental policy frameworks, particularly with respect to air and water quality. In terms of climate change policy, however, bilateral cooperation has been much slower to develop. Prior to the election of the Obama administration in the United States, there was very little in the way of formal Canada-US agreements on climate change. The first was a 2002 “Joint Statement between the Canadian and American governments to expand and intensify bilateral efforts to address climate change,” which provided an umbrella under which information sharing and project cooperation could take place with regard to climate change science and research as well as energy technologies, including carbon sequestration and “clean” coal. On the southern border, limited and ad hoc cooperative efforts were also undertaken in the area of clean energy technology, as well as capacity-building programs through the US Agency for International Development’s Global Climate Change program and the US Country Studies program. In 2003, the United States and Mexico pledged to strengthen bilateral cooperation on climate change, creating a Bilateral Working Group on Climate Change. Likewise, Canada and Mexico signed a joint statement on climate change cooperation during an international climate meeting in December 2005 (Government of Canada 2005). In 2008, after the election of President Obama (and a Democratic House and Senate), bilateral climate policy cooperation picked up speed. President Obama and Prime Minister Harper announced a “Clean Energy Dialogue” charged with expanding clean energy research and development, developing and deploying clean energy technology, and building a more efficient electricity grid based on clean and renewable sources. A series of working groups were put in place to formulate action plans in each of these areas. Shortly thereafter, the United States and Mexico created a Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change, similarly focused on renewable energy and energy efficiency, but also on adaptation, market mechanisms, forestry and land use, green jobs, low-carbon energy technology development, and capacity-building (The White House 2009). Looking “upward” to the trilateral level, the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), surprisingly, has been only peripherally involved in climate policy through its research work and stakeholder

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discussions on the relationship between energy choices, particularly in the electricity sector and air emissions (see, for example, CEC 2011). In 1995, the CEC Council did adopt a Statement of Intent to Cooperate on Climate Change and Joint Implementation, but the project outcomes were limited (Craik and DiMento 2009). For the most part, there has been only passing and incidental reference to climate change within CEC ministerial statements and communiqués in the past 10 years, and the organization has steered away from initiatives focusing directly and explicitly on climate change. As discussed in chapter 2, one might assume that there has been political opposition within the council, on the part of at least some of the parties, to involving the CEC in climate change policy. Yet a softening of this attitude seems to have occurred. At the 2008 North American Leaders’ Summit, the Joint Leaders’ Statement included a lengthy reference to the need for regional climate change cooperation, “including, but not limited to, advancing innovative and suitable clean energy technologies, building the capacity to adopt and deploy them, and developing appropriate financial and technical instruments” (The White House 2008). Then, at the Leaders’ Summit in 2009, the three countries released the North American Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change and Clean Energy. The declaration is a surprisingly ambitious political statement that outlines a shared vision for a “low-carbon North America.” The declaration commits the three national governments to cooperating across a broad range of initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including developing low-carbon growth plans, strengthening financial instruments to support mitigation, building capacity and infrastructure to facilitate future cooperation in emissions trading systems, developing clean energy technologies, reducing transportation emissions, and aligning energy efficiency standards (Office of the Prime Minister 2009). This commitment has been integrated into the CEC’s 2010–15 Strategic Plan, which recognizes that “incremental trilateral collaboration, consistent with national circumstances and capacities” is important in terms of “supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy” (CEC 2010). Among its projects for 2011–12, the parties have agreed to “work towards aligning domestic standards, regulations, and policies.” The two strategic objectives for the CEC are: 1) the improved comparability of emissions data, methodologies, and inventories among the three North American partners; and 2) the engagement of experts and strengthened information sharing in the areas of climate change and the low-carbon economy. To some extent, the 2009 declaration and the CEC’s work builds on deliberations that have been underway in the North American Energy Working Group, the trilateral organization created in 2001 by energy ministers in the three countries. The Working Group’s mandate is to strengthen North America’s energy markets and energy infrastructure, increase reliable energy supplies for the region’s needs and development, and promote energy efficiency, conservation, and technologies. In recent years, the Working Group has put some effort into energy efficiency standards, biofuels, and other clean(er) energy technologies. Perhaps most interesting, however, has been the climate policy role played by subnational governments on the continent. Chapter 2 chronicled the increasingly innovative and cooperative environmental policy roles adopted by US states, Canadian provinces, and Mexican states. In terms of what is going across borders with respect to climate policy in North America, it is clearly at the

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subnational level where activity has been the most ambitious, varied, and intense (Rabe 2013; VanNijnatten 2009). There have been multilateral clusters of crossborder initiatives—including the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers’ 2001 Climate Change Action Plan, the Pacific Northwest agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 33 per cent by 2020 through a range of cooperative transportation and clean energy actions, and the Arizona-Sonora Regional Climate Change Initiative. There were also three subnational emissions trading regimes in various stages of completion and contemplation, although only the northeastern states’ Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is still operating. The American-Canadian Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA) is officially dead, and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) effectively stalled. It is also important to note the nongovernmental transboundary initiatives that are underway with respect to climate change issues. For example, the biodiversity protection initiatives of such groups as Partners in Flight, Ducks Unlimited, and the Sky Island Alliance, mentioned in chapter 3, are highly sensitive to climate change, and consideration for related problems has been incorporated into their long-range plans and many habitat protection projects. There are many—though mostly small—reforestation projects now being undertaken in Mexico with financial and other support by US NGOs, aimed at providing wildlife habitat, improving water quality, and supporting carbon sequestration. Similarly, there is considerable collaboration between Canadian and American NGOs in protecting boreal forests (which occur in both Canada and Alaska); much of the funding for such projects comes from large US foundations, such as the Pew Charitable Trust (2010). From an initial focus on biodiversity, there is also now much discussion of boreal forests’ important role in carbon sequestration.

Climate Policy and the Challenge for Transboundary Institutions As argued above, it is very likely that domestic emission reduction goals— should they emerge—will be set by national authorities in the United States and Canada, given the parochial political and economic drivers currently in play. Mexico has already taken the critical step of setting its reduction targets in national legislation. In the end, one might expect that Canada and the United States will end up with similar emission reduction goals. In any event, formal transboundary coordination is unlikely to play a role in this goal-setting process. Indeed, in their path-breaking 2009 Leaders’ Summit Declaration, the three leaders referred to setting “our own” mid-term and long-term emissions reduction goals (Office of the Prime Minister 2009). However, given the current context of austerity, it is unlikely that any goal-setting whatsoever will occur. Instead, it is at the level of implementation that a linking of policy regimes is more likely—and more promising. But the existing policy regimes are inadequate and contain considerable gaps. These gaps, which are themselves interrelated, include: 1) a lack of sustained attention to the interconnections between energy policy and climate policy, and the need to combine them in a comprehensive climate policy regime; 2) differences in terms of preferred approaches and policy instruments across countries and across governance levels, with the result that a patchwork of policies now exists across the continent; 3) a lack of fully

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comparable emissions inventories and methodologies across industry sectors to support integrated policy-making; 4) a lack of resources for supporting policy planning and implementation, especially in Mexico, but also in Canada and the United States; and 5) inadequate links between nongovernmental and governmental projects in the area of climate and a failure to harness the considerable knowledge and resources of NGOs. We would argue that cooperation across the subnational, bilateral, and trilateral governance arenas is critical in terms of plugging these gaps and ameliorating the policy differences that exist across the three countries. Transboundary cooperation has the potential to support both climate policy efforts within countries and those projects already underway across borders in North America. To be successful, domestic policy choices need to be informed by and take account of existing trade relationships, energy connections, and technological advances—all of which are continental in scope. Cooperation across borders can also contribute critical resources to domestic policy planning; it is clear that the resource and capacity-building needs are great, particularly in Mexico. Further, in light of the three leaders’ commitment to begin coordinating their climate policy approaches, there is a need for stable mechanisms for sharing experiences to address the current unevenness of policy effort and diversity of approaches across the continent. The reigning consensus on the need to link carbon markets and coordinate the myriad policies directly and indirectly associated with them requires that horizontal and vertical networks be built that bring together policy actors operating in the distinctive national contexts. To date, emissions trading schemes have not been put in place at the national level in any of the three countries, although there has been some discussion about and research on how such markets would function. Instead, it is at the subnational level that the most progress has been made in terms of establishing and linking carbon markets across borders—although these initiatives have been imperiled by financial and political constraints, particularly in US states. As well, the presence of varying subnational regimes presents additional problems in terms of policy fragmentation. As Selin and VanDeveer note, “if North American GHG emissions are to be reduced efficiently and effectively across public and private sector entities across the continent, with the fewest trade distortions and other economic consequences possible, federal authorities in all three countries will need to realize and act on these shared interests” (2009, 1). Given the complexities associated with achieving CO2 reductions, especially through multi-sector carbon trading, a range of shared data sources, information, and methodologies is critical.

Creating Stable and Comprehensive Networks Clearly, a range of cooperative networks in North America for climate and energy policy cooperation already exist. The critical question, however, is whether these networks can support the kind of stable, long-term interactions that are necessary to support a comprehensive and multi-pronged continental climate regime. By its very nature, climate change policy requires a broader understanding of the interactions between different economic sectors, energy choices, and government policies, as well as integrative approaches to governing these interactions. Most critically, transboundary mechanisms that can keep alive the climate change issue and build support for climate policy action both

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within and outside of government are needed, especially given the current context of hostility toward environmental activism. To some extent, the strategy that is most likely to bear fruit will be one which continually attempts to marry climate change to energy policy and planning. Prior to the more recent engagement by national governments, the most promising channels for transboundary cooperation were at the subnational, cross-border regional level. For almost a decade now, American states and Canadian provinces, and to a more limited extent Mexican states, have been attempting to address the climate change challenge. The New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (the NEG/ECP, comprising the six New England states and five easternmost provinces) were the first off the mark with their 2001 Climate Change Action Plan. The plan outlined a series of initiatives that should be taken by participating jurisdictions, ranging from the establishment of a regional standardized emissions inventory to energy conservation measures, and to emissions reduction proposals for the electricity and transportation sectors. The plan also provided for the consideration of a regional emissions trading scheme. To implement the plan, a network was put in place combining, for the first time, the work of the Northeast International Committee on Energy and the Committee on the Environment, which had previously operated separately under the auspices of the NEG/ECP. Federal and state agencies, universities, science organizations, private-sector actors, and NGOs (mainly through the New England Climate Coalition) were also linked into the network (Selin and VanDeveer 2009), which was thus both horizontally and vertically integrative. Yet implementation of the plan has been spotty, particularly on the Canadian side. This is not surprising given the nature of the NEG/ECP as a more “aspirational,” loosely structured organization that cannot compel compliance. It has been less stable in the transboundary sense of holding jurisdictions across the international border together, yet stronger on the American side in terms of holding the state members together. Indeed, while an emissions trading scheme focused on the electricity/utility sector and only on CO2—the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or RGGI—has materialized, it only involves American states. Despite the economic downturn, and the defection of one participating state, RGGI has managed to continue operations (Rabe 2013). Until recently, it seemed that the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) had gone furthest in aspirational terms, setting out a cross-border plan for participating states and provinces to collectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The initiative required that the partners set an overall regional goal to reduce emissions, develop a market-based, multi-sector mechanism to help achieve that goal, and participate in a cross-border greenhouse gas registry. In September 2008, the WCI released an outline for the implementation of its “cap-and-trade” proposal, with the first phase of this plan to be implemented in 2012. The WCI is more comprehensive than the RGGI, covering the largest sources of emissions from each state and province, including those from electricity generation, industry, transportation, and residential and commercial fuel use, as well as all six greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol (WCI 2010). It was also inclusive, originally involving seven western US states and four provinces, with other jurisdictions (including Mexican states) participating as observers. However, the WCI has proven to be less stable than the RGGI; by November 2011, the majority of the jurisdictions had withdrawn from the initiative, and the

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starting date of the first auction has been postponed indefinitely (Rabe 2013). The only entities participating at the present time are California, British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec—and it is unclear how committed the provinces are, given the lack of new policy initiatives to support their participation in the WCI (Rabe 2013). This network, then, has not shown itself to be sustainable, even in the short term. After the RGGI and the WCI were underway, the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA) was established by six Midwestern states and the province of Manitoba in 2009. In a promising start, an advisory group appointed by the MGGRA leaders called for the creation of a regional Midwestern emissions trading system—though only if the preferred alternative of linked national trading schemes did not materialize. In fact, the MGGRA proved to be even weaker than its subnational counterparts and it has been quite short lived; in the fall of 2011, the MGGRA was abandoned by its participants. Subnational regional leaders had always been clear about their desire for consistency across jurisdictions in terms of the design of emissions trading regimes. In May 2010, the three regional climate initiatives—the RGGI, the MGGRA, and the WCI—joined in a cooperative effort to explore potential collaboration among the three regional programs. They released a joint white paper on designing consistent “offset” rules across the various emissions trading programs, such that participating jurisdictions “move closer to uniformity among their own programs” with the aim of “inform[ing] future federal programs in the United States and Canada” (Three-Regions Offsets Working Group 2010). However, as the subnational cap-and-trade networks have become ever more wobbly—and, in the case of the MGGRA, have collapsed—these initial tentacles of cooperation are likely to curl up and close off if they do not build the necessary institutional capacity to transcend political change. However, the message is clear: due to the lack of national policies, transregional climate change multilateral cooperation became an area on which subnational entities have been building with relative success. In contrast, bilateral subnational initiatives—such as the Quebec–New York cross-border corridor, the North America Project 2050 between California and Quebec to link their cap-and-trade programs, and the Beaufort Sea/Arctic project to address climate change and aboriginal issues—have been more stable. On the southern border, environmental cooperation has also sprung up via transboundary and bilateral mechanisms between neighboring states, such as Sonora and Arizona. The Regional Initiative for Climate Change of ArizonaSonora was established in 2005 with the goal of creating green, productive, and safe corridors (Comisión Arizona-Sonora 2005). At least partly as a result of this joint initiative, Sonora’s Climate Action Plan was developed. This cooperation also made use of financial mechanisms for advancing environmental initiatives, such as renewable energy projects and energy efficiency harmonization (Comisión Arizona-Sonora 2012). Certainly, until about 2010, it seemed that subnational networks for climate change were moving toward more comprehensive policies and bringing an increasing number of jurisdictions under cross-border regional and horizontal umbrellas. These networks served to encourage concrete discussion about how to link policies and markets across borders and across the environmental and energy realms. Considerable progress was made in terms of putting the necessary infrastructure in place to support transboundary regimes. These networks

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had also increasingly included interests and actors outside of government, particularly as discussions about the design of emissions trading regimes became more detailed. However, they were always limited in their ability to ensure compliance and consistent effort across jurisdictions. Indeed, much effort was expended on pressuring national governments to put in place uniform, consistent policies to ensure a level playing field and create the kind of stability in the regime that subnational organizations are unable to provide. In the end, these multilateral-subnational networks have been incapable of sustaining the linkages among participants, with the possible exception of the RGGI (which is not truly transboundary in terms of participants). For their part, national governments have been moving only slowly in terms of establishing transboundary climate change frameworks. Bilateral initiatives have not tended to be particularly comprehensive or inclusive. Given the climate policy “reluctance” on the part of both the United States and Canada before Obama, joint efforts focused on politically acceptable, modest programming, such as the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships Program, established under the terms of the Canada-US Joint Statement in 2002. Such initiatives have been very much in line with the tendencies described in chapter 2, with discrete bilateral projects being lodged in specific government agencies and little linking across initiatives. For example, the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships Program is clearly a US Department of Energy program, focused on determining the most suitable technologies, regulations, and infrastructure needs for carbon capture and sequestration in different regions of the United States and Canada. This more specialized approach may work well when the problem is more defined, but it inhibits the broader communication and network-building necessary for a problem as large and complex as climate change. The bilateral partnerships put in place more recently—the United StatesCanada Clean Energy Dialogue and the US-Mexico Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change—might be regarded as somewhat more ambitious attempts at climate and energy policy collaboration. They, too, are limited in important ways, however. First, both focus primarily on clean energy technology development and application, while the thornier issues associated with actual emissions reduction and mitigation are sidelined. There is no “International Joint Commission for Climate Change.” For that matter, Border 2012 has little to say about the climate issue. Second, neither bilateral framework is particularly inclusive, hewing to the established pattern of closed inter-agency interaction; other levels of government and interests outside of government play only a very limited role in these higher-level collaborations. Interestingly, when the US government suggested that the Canada-US and US-Mexico bilateral processes be trilateralized, to bring more cohesion to cooperative structures, the Canadian government rejected the suggestion, as its preference was to work with the Americans only. The CEC offers perhaps a more promising venue for regional cooperation, as it already has a good track record in terms of creating and maintaining networks for policy cooperation across borders, networks that include both governmental and nongovernmental players. Although it has not done much with regard to climate change policy per se, it has worked in many related areas—emissions inventories and tracking, linking energy choices with pollution mitigation, policy harmonization, and mutual recognition schemes and

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capacity-building. More recently, it appears to be playing a role in pursuing the “low-carbon economy” desired by the North American leaders, although so far only with respect to information sharing and creating comparable data, methodologies, and inventories across the countries as discussed below. This is an institution which is clearly sustainable, but it remains to be seen whether it can play a leadership role in continental climate change strategies.

Fostering Mutual Understanding and Learning The knowledge and information requirements of climate change policy are many and varied, yet one of the most basic requirements of continental climate policy cooperation (though not an easy one to meet) is the creation of shared data sources, methodologies, and emissions inventories. Policy-makers need to know who is emitting and how much before support and infrastructure can be built for common action. While a process for reporting national-level emissions exists under the UNFCCC, the accounting and reporting of emissions at the corporate and sector level must be done within countries. This is a task for which North American transboundary mechanisms seem quite well suited, although additional integration needs to occur. As with network-building, creating shared information bases to support collaborative action has been done primarily from the “bottom up.” One of the primary tasks of the NEG/ECP Climate Action Plan after 2001 was to create a regional GHG inventory. The Northeastern States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) undertook to build a Regional Greenhouse Gas Inventory to support its own program and other regional initiatives. Also in 2001, California assumed a similar task by creating the Climate Action Registry, a nonprofit voluntary mechanism for recording and reporting GHG emissions. The registry was intended to aid companies and organizations in establishing GHG emissions baselines against which any future emission reduction requirements might be applied. The incentive to participate, and ensure that early emission reduction actions are verified, stems from new regulations passed in California to regulate GHG emissions. The final version of “Essential Requirements for Mandatory Reporting” from the WCI’s reporting committee includes jurisdictional reporting rules, reporting tools, and a regional emissions database. The Climate Registry, a nonprofit organization governed by US and Mexican states, Canadian provinces, and native sovereign nations, has emerged alongside these various other subnational efforts (particularly California’s program). The Climate Registry establishes consistent, transparent standards throughout North America for businesses and governments to calculate, verify, and publicly report their carbon footprints in a single, unified registry. It is designed as a common data infrastructure for both voluntary and mandatory reporting. At its January 2009 meeting, the Climate Registry’s board of directors unanimously endorsed a policy calling on federal governments to consult with the registry when establishing mandatory reporting programs (Resolution 01.14.09–4) (Climate Registry, 2009). Indeed, on January 1, 2010, the US Environmental Protection Agency, for the first time, required large emitters of heat-trapping emissions to begin collecting GHG data under a new reporting system. This new program covers approximately 85 per cent of the nation’s GHG emissions and applies to roughly 10,000 facilities. Canada and Mexico both have reporting systems

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in place, but they are more modest, apply to a narrower range of emitters, and kick in at higher emission levels. Clearly, further integration of the various schemes now in place, or being put in place, needs to occur. The 2009 North American Leaders’ Declaration notes that “we will develop comparable approaches to measuring, reporting, and verifying emissions reductions, including cooperating in implementing facility-level greenhouse gas reporting throughout the region.” The existing cooperative mechanisms for emissions inventories will provide a good platform for further integration. It is also clear that the CEC, which was instrumental in the creation of uniform toxic-emission tracking and reporting methodologies and infrastructure across Canada, the United States, and Mexico, can play a critical role here. Indeed, the CEC now has among its projects for 2010–15 “the improved comparability of emissions data, methodologies and inventories among the Three North American Partners” (CEC 2012b). Interestingly, one of the most important functions performed by the CEC has been to offer platforms for getting information and best practices directly to Mexican states. This has been achieved, for example, by linking the commission’s educational platform to diverse universities, such as the National Autonomous University (UNAM) or the Technological Institute of Monterrey (ITESM).5 These universities, along with SEMARNAT-INE, have served to create strong links between Mexican society, business, local governments, and the CEC.

Resource Provision The resource needs for uniform and comprehensive climate policy-making are significant, yet there are two resource gaps in particular that stand out. The first gap is the obvious need for capacity-building and funding for Mexico, and the second relates to the mismatch between the potential role of the CEC in critical areas of continental cooperation and its meager budget. There can be little doubt that much of Mexico’s National Climate Change Strategy was designed with international financing opportunities in mind, and perceptions of the availability of external financing have driven domestic political support for implementation (see Demerse and Guzmán 2013). When Mexico was making its ratification decision, the size of the CDM was estimated at $2–4 billion USD, and it was expected not only that the United States would be the main purchaser of emissions, but that it would also look to its southern neighbor for CDM opportunities (Demerse and Guzmán 2013). Not surprisingly, then, when Mexico created a national climate change office, it was intended to function as a CDM project approval authority (Pulver 2006, 4). With the United States pull-out from Kyoto in early 2001, expectations for the size of the CDM collapsed and Mexican climate policy ambition lessened. Kyoto ratification by the European Union raised CDM prospects again and, by 2009, Mexico had 118 registered CDM projects (in such areas as wind generation and methane sequestration); this constituted 7 per cent of all CDM projects worldwide (SEMARNAT 2009b, 22). More recently, with the prospect of a Green Climate Fund on the horizon, Mexico continues to position itself for international funding—and much is needed to implement the National Climate Change Strategy and to support Mexican participation in climate collaborations. Mexican jurisdictions have signed several agreements with respect to climate change cooperation, but

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clearly lack the funds and requisite tools to meaningfully participate. The North American Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change and Energy underscores the importance of “developing and strengthening financial instruments to support mitigation and adaptation actions” and notes that the leaders “will consider other views presented for scaling-up financing from both public and private sources” (Office of the Prime Minister 2009). There are as yet no concrete proposals on the table concerning how to fund and disperse capacity-building resources to Mexico. Neither have existing instruments been used to further North American ties. For example, despite committing to deepen cooperation on “the Clean Development Mechanism, adaptation, technology development and deployment opportunities” (Government of Canada 2005) under the terms of the 2005 Canada-Mexico Joint Statement on Climate Change Cooperation, Canada has not invested in a single project in Mexico. It is worth noting here that a considerable portion of the work on northern state climate action plans and their inventories was the result of fund­ing and design support provided through the Commission for Environmental Cooperation using US EPA methodologies and with the advice of the INE. In fact, over the past decade, the commission had been involved in the design of technical reports that track the emission performance of the northern Mexican states. For example, the CEC (as well as the Western Governors’ Association and the EPA) funded and helped publish the “Inventory of Emissions of the Northern Border States” (SEMARNAT 1999), in which the states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas presented their first GHG inventories. It is worth noting that the EPA and the Western Governors’ Association participated in this report. Moreover, the support that the CEC, through the Border Economic Cooperation Commission (BECC), gives to Mexican jurisdictions has been constant. As part of a new project, “Climate Change and Low Carbon Economies,” the commission, alongside SEMARNAT and other institutions, has continued to support inventory designs for Mexican states by organizing workshops to integrate registries for the National Emissions Inventory Report through technical aid (Commission for Environmental Cooperation 2012b).

GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION: OBSERVATIONS An inescapable conclusion from the discussion in this chapter is that national governments must bring climate change to the forefront of the policy agenda and provide more support and resources for addressing it. Thus far, however, action taken in Canada and the United States has been narrow and piecemeal; both countries have adopted a gradualist regulatory approach targeting emissions in individual sectors, while providing some (limited, in Canada) support for green energy. Mexico’s National Climate Change Strategy is much broader in scope, providing an institutional and policy umbrella for a suite of initiatives to be taken across all sectors of the economy and society. Rather than move aggressively toward a regulatory approach, however, Mexico’s primary focus has been on achieving reductions from the “green” sector—land use, forestry, and agriculture. It is not so much that the three countries have very different policies, but rather that they emphasize different policies within a shared toolbox. This is not surprising, as this chapter shows that the three countries see the climate

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change challenge in somewhat different terms given the unique complexion of political interests and incentives, economic priorities, and development situations in each jurisdiction. Unfortunately, as of mid-2013, the prospects for a ramping-up of national engagement seemed significantly lower than just a few years earlier. With the collapse of the American financial system, the ensuing recession (which initially hit Americans and Mexicans harder than Canadians), and other policy problems using up the Obama administration’s available political capital, American climate policy-making has slowed considerably. The Canadian government seems, if anything, to be heading ever more strongly toward a future based on fossil fuel development, and climate policy has been de-emphasized. Further, efforts to address the spiraling national debt have wiped away most policy ambitions. For its part, Mexico has a new administration in place and it is not clear whether there will be a strong push to realize the goals of the National Climate Change Strategy. To put it mildly, conditions are not ripe for an ambitious, continentwide climate change policy. Nonetheless, the international push for countries to take on emission reduction targets and to report on their progress continues under the international regime, if by fits and starts. Debates about the role of various energy sources in the future global economy—oil, coal, gas, and cleaner options—as well as about the role of energy efficiency in reducing demand are also ongoing. Meanwhile, according to research carried out at the Mauna Loa Observatory, atmospheric CO2 continues to grow, from 369 parts per million (ppm) in 2000, to 380 in 2005, to 392 in 2011. Even the worldwide economic crisis slowed the increase only slightly. Climate change is not going away, and pressures to act will only increase. And these pressures will feed the efforts of those in Canada, the United States, and Mexico who are proponents of climate change action. Further, the success of any implementation measures under consideration will to a considerable extent depend on transboundary measures that match the existing integration of markets and energy systems. To date, transboundary cooperation has focused on very basic elements of climate policy, most notably in the building and exchange of tools and protocols for greenhouse gas inventories, as well as scoping out opportunities for renewable energy development and application. Energy efficiency has also been the focus of some cross-border initiatives. These efforts seem to be primarily bilateral and ad hoc, supported by a light inter-agency infrastructure. Their sustainability is highly uncertain. The “clean energy” cooperative frameworks on both borders may offer a broader and longer-term network for considering a wider range of climate policy options and their relationship to energy planning, but it is simply not clear whether governments have the political will to use them for anything other than discrete projects that are politically uncontroversial. The subnational cooperative schemes that have been undertaken bear special mention. While initiatives such as the RGGI, the WCI, and the MGGRA have proved to be fairly unstable, at least the first two have put foundational blocks in place for performing trial-and-error experiments in climate policy. They have created channels for information sharing, for the consideration of new and ambitious policy options, and for best practices. They have also encouraged (if not directly supported) some limited capacity-building as participating governments attempted to put emissions verification systems, among other infrastructures, in place. It may be that some of the experiences at the subnational level

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will influence the design of national proposals; certainly, the market approach that has characterized subnational transboundary cooperation has demonstrated the wide range of “the possible” in terms of climate policy. The role of the CEC will be critical to any emerging continental climate policy architecture. The commission has in the past and on other issues demonstrated an ability to create networks that are at once vertically and horizontally integrative, and to create spaces where governments at various levels, as well as societal and private-sector interests, can weigh in on common problems. On the climate issue, it has been slow to get involved and has instead “tinkered” at the margins, largely for political reasons. Nevertheless, the CEC has already demonstrated considerable competence in conducting research on and promoting understanding of the climate-energy nexus, in supporting the development of emissions inventories, and in promoting other forms of capacity-building in Mexico. The commission is a logical focus for information creation and dissemination, for the sharing of best practices, and for capacity-building—however, it is not clear how much support the three governments are willing to give the CEC to pursue deeper cooperation. A North American climate change agenda has been set out in the 2009 Leaders’ Summit Declaration on Climate Change and Clean Energy. It is a blueprint—endorsed by all three governments—for how to move toward a more cohesive and integrative climate regime on the continent. The discussion in this chapter shows that several cooperative networks and mechanisms that already exist—including the CEC—might be used to implement aspects of this blueprint.

Notes 1 In 2000, the tar sands oil industry released 23.3 Mt of GHG emissions (3 per cent of Canada’s total); by 2015, tar sands GHG emissions are expected to rise to between 57 and 97 Mt. Between 1990 and 2008, the oil and gas sector alone was responsible for almost 40 per cent of the increase in national greenhouse gas emissions (Environment Canada 2009). 2 In 2009, the EPA Administrator declared carbon dioxide to be an air pollutant and issued an “endangerment finding”; both of these are now serving as the legal basis for regulatory action. 3 After the president enacts the law, it is published in the Official Diary of the Federation (Diario Oficial de la Federación). It will enter into force 90 days after its publication. 4 The report, in a sign of its dissatisfaction with the pace of global policy-making, left ranks 1–3 vacant, so that Mexico would rank 13th rather than 10th. We think the value of such a report is in its relative ranking, so we have moved all countries up 3 places. 5 The leading institution that has been working closely with the CEC at the UNAM has been the Centro de la Atmósfera (Atmosphere Center) and, for the ITESM, the Centro de Diálogo y Análisis sobre América del Norte (Center for the Analysis and Dialogue on North America).

Chapter 6

Case Study: Genetically Modified Crops

IN THE INTRODUCTION, we pointed out the border-crossing nature of so many environmental problems in North America. Our first three case s­ tudies—threats to biodiversity, air pollution, and climate change—then explored how we might fit our policy responses to interconnected physical environments; for example, our shared atmosphere, waterways, and major ecosystems. In this chapter, we deal with a different breed of “transboundary environmental problem,”one which is driven not so much by physical proximity as by the integration of markets and the movement of goods across borders: the case of genetically modified agricultural crops (“GM crops”). In this case, a debordered infrastructure put in place to facilitate cross-border production and trade is also the conduit by which GM seeds (and the crops grown from them) move between countries, with impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems that are ill-understood and inadequately regulated. The case of GM crops, which roughly spans from 1992 to the present, gives us a chance to examine both national and transnational responses in North America to a novel environmental challenge. The story is by no means at an end, but unlike climate change, discussed in the previous chapter, policy decisions have been made and regulatory regimes created and implemented. In this case, policies across the countries, and particularly between the United States and Canada on the one hand and Mexico on the other, differ quite substantially. These differences reflect the unique economic and legal structures and social values across the three countries. As it has become clear that economic and regulatory decisions made in one country can have economic and/or environmental consequences in the other countries, the need for transboundary coordination and collaboration has also become clear. Other than the CEC, however, there do not exist any stable networks that might facilitate information sharing, mutual understanding, and policy learning. Each of the actors involved sees the

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problems or opportunities associated with GM crops through a narrow lens that does not admit of an integrated reality.

NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE GM CROP ISSUE All three North American nations have important agricultural sectors. Land in agricultural production amounts to 7 per cent of national land area in Canada, 44 per cent in the United States, and 53 per cent in Mexico. Employment in agriculture as a percent of total employment is 2.4 per cent in Canada and the United States and 13.1 per cent in Mexico. Agricultural products are an important part of world trade for all three countries, but patterns of world trade differ significantly from patterns of trade within North America. The United States and Canada are world-class, even dominant, exporters of unprocessed grains—corn and soybean for the United States, canola (an oilseed) for Canada, and wheat for both countries. It may be surprising to most readers that agricultural exports are less important in Mexico (6.3 per cent of total exports) than in Canada (13.4 per cent) or the United States (11.2 per cent). This primarily reflects the enormous exports to the entire world market by the large, highly efficient producers of bulk grains in the United States Midwest and the Canadian Prairie provinces. But within North America, trade is more diverse. Mexico and Canada are two of the United States’ three leading trading partners in agricultural products, both as sources of products and as markets. Trade does involve unprocessed grain (especially from the United States to Mexico), but it also includes seeds, winter fruits and vegetables (mostly from Mexico), processed foods, and meat. (One of the authors recently bought raw hamburger marked as “sourced from the United States, Mexico, or Canada.”) Soybean meal and corn from the United States has aided a burgeoning industrial chicken-raising industry in Mexico, and there is significant trinational trade in beer and wine. Before Mexico dropped import barriers in anticipation of NAFTA, a box of cornflakes purchased in Mexico would be made in Mexico (though probably by a US company). Today, it is likely to come from the United States or Canada. On the other side, Mexican food specialties, now sold in most United States and Canadian supermarkets, are likely to be sourced in Mexico. Corn is an important crop in the United States, but it is of overwhelming importance in Mexican agriculture and in the Mexican diet. Corn makes up half the area of land devoted to crops and 40 per cent of the agricultural labor force (Nadal and Wise 2004). Worldwide, only 21 per cent of corn is consumed directly by humans—the bulk is used to feed chickens, hogs, and cattle. But in Mexico, which has the second-highest per capita corn consumption in the world, 68 per cent is consumed directly, much of it in the form of the ubiquitous tortilla (Nadal and Wise 2004). Shortly after passage of NAFTA, Mexico unilaterally opened its market to bulk corn imports. This was intended to move labor out of low-return occupations on small farms into wage labor in maquiladoras and the other manufacturing opportunities that the treaty made available. In practice, this did not happen. Large numbers of Mexican farmers kept their small rain-fed plots for family consumption or local trade, and supported them by having one or more family members work in the maquiladoras or cross the border to work illegally in the

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United States. The remittances made low-return agriculture possible. Mexico, it is now said, is a country that imports corn and exports men (Johnson 2011). It would be unfair and inaccurate to describe GM crops as a “problem.” They were developed to help farmers increase production, to reduce pest problems, and may even be one of society’s best tools for rapidly adapting agriculture to the effects of climate change. However, these novel crops present several challenges, ranging from unintended ecological modifications to contamination both of organic crops and of the gene pool of traditional local crop varieties, to potentially favoring large-scale farmers over small-scale, resource-limited farmers. Winston (2002) contends that both the GM crop industry and its opponents have adopted public relations strategies that overwhelm the public with simplistic and slanted information on these issues. “Industry has tried to link reassuring lab-coated scientists emphasizing progress with traditional family values. The opposition has consistently nipped at the heels of industry harping on the feat of unknown consequences” (Winston 2002, 17). Industry has often staked a claim for GM crops in “feeding the world,” while opponents have tended to question the safety for consumers of foods with GM ingredients (Pringle 2003).1 Thus far, the most widely used GM crops have one or both of the following characteristics: (1) they incorporate genetic material that makes them undamaged by a broad-spectrum herbicide, such as Roundup. (Roundup is a Monsanto-owned trademark. The generic name for the chemical is glyphosate.) This allows the field to be sprayed with a highly effective weed killer, without the damage to the crop that would occur if the plant had not been a GM variety. (2) The plant is modified to produce a natural insecticide, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt for short). Presently available on the market are Roundup-resistant corn, soybean, alfalfa, rapeseed (canola), and sugar beet; crops with the Bt gene are cotton and corn. A variety of GM vegetable varieties are close to commercialization, but the only one grown to a significant degree in North America is zucchini squash, on about 5,000 acres in the United States. Since their general introduction in the 1990s, GM crops have spread rapidly. According to the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, in 2010 the United States had 147 million acres in GM crops, including more than 80 per cent of its corn, cotton, and soybean. This made it, by far, the country with the largest GM acreage worldwide, though countries such as Brazil and Argentina approach the United States in percentage penetration of GM varieties. Canada has 20 million acres, including most of its canola, corn, soybean, and sugar beet. By contrast, in 2010 Mexico planted just 128,000 acres of biotech cotton and 29,000 acres of Roundup-resistant soybean. This was down very slightly from 2009. However, under a newly permissive regulatory structure, introduced in 2009, there were 20 experimental field trials of GM corn in five states in northern and north central Mexico (ISAAA 2010). In 2009, Switzerland-based seed and chemical company Syngenta released a sweet corn variety containing the Bt gene and in 2011, Seminis, a Monsanto subsidiary, introduced two varieties of sweet corn with both Roundup resistance and the Bt gene (American Vegetable Grower 2011). This poses a whole new set of issues, because sweet corn is consumed directly by humans rather than being (mainly) fed to animals, as was the case with the varieties previously affected by GM technologies.

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Economic Issues A very important aspect of agricultural biotechnology is whether it is adapted to the agronomic conditions of the place where it is applied and to the practices of farmers. Glyphosate-resistant and Bt crops have been especially popular with US and Canadian farmers because they reduce the number of times per year that a field must be sprayed with herbicide or insecticides. This not only saves on chemical cost but significantly reduces labor needs, a key variable when labor is expensive and many farmers are trying to manage hundreds or even thousands of acres by themselves or with a single “hand.” But local conditions can greatly change profitability (for an international review, see Quaim 2009). For example, Traxler and Godoy-Avila (2004) found that adoption of cotton incorporating the Bt gene (which protects against the pink bollworm) by farmers in the Mexican states of Durango and Coahuila increased farmer income by $295 per hectare, a combination of less pesticide use and higher yield. However, the bollworm is not the major cotton pest in much of Mexico, making Bt cotton of much less value. With regard to the practices of farmers, a crop that is genetically engineered to be pest resistant can save commercial-sector farmers money by reducing pesticide use and can reduce environmental and worker-safety risks. Farmers who use little or no pesticide can benefit even more, however, if the pest-resistant crop moves them from a condition of high pest losses (the no-spray condition) to substantial pest control (the GM condition) (see Quaim and Zilberman 2003). GM varieties with drought or pest resistance can also make it profitable to grow cotton and other crops in places where their cultivation had previously been uneconomic (USDA 2011). This finding means that GM crops can have complex economic effects on farmers of different scales, locations, and technological levels. For example, Bt seeds would have little advantage for a farmer without a major pest problem, an advantage in both production cost and environmental impact for a farmer who sprayed heavily or who had a major weed problem, and an economic advantage for a farmer (e.g., a small holder in Mexico) who had pest problems but could not afford to spray.

Weed and Insect Resistance Widespread use of GM crops has the potential to speed the evolution of weeds and pests resistant to the GMO mechanism deployed against them. The United States National Research Council (2010, 3) observed that the overwhelming success of Roundup-resistant (“Roundup Ready” [RR]) crops has pushed other herbicides out of the market, meaning that Roundup is sprayed on more acres. Since 1996, 10 weed species have developed Roundup resistance in the United States, compared with seven in areas of the world where RR crops are not common. Moreover, communities of weeds less susceptible to Roundup have been found in sprayed fields (USNRC 2010, 3–4). The effectiveness of the Bt gene (actually, of certain toxic compounds expressed by the gene) has tempted farmers to plant corn or soybean in the same fields every year rather than rotating them. Crop rotation had prevented corn pests or soybean pests from becoming dominant. Moreover, farmers have been required by the EPA to set aside a small part of their acreage as a non-GM “trap crop” so that Bt-susceptible insects will continue to dominate, rather

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than leaving a niche for the resistant ones. This acreage has been reduced to as little as 5 per cent (Kilman 2011). Given the huge acreage planted, insect resistance to Bt has been low (USNRC 2010, 7). But very recent reports from Iowa indicate populations of the very damaging Western corn rootworm have evolved that are resistant to at least one of the toxins created by the Bt gene (Gassmann et al. 2011). This pattern of resistance development, provided it continues at a slow and steady pace (which is not at all guaranteed), may actually be a good thing, because it means that the farming community would have “in reserve” the herbicides and insecticides pushed out by Roundup and Bt. These could be quite quickly mobilized if significant resistance evolved.

Impact on Non-Target Organisms An important issue with crops that have pesticides “built in” to their genomes (at the moment all use Bacillus thurengiensis, though other alternatives are under study) is whether the pesticide will kill not only the target pest, but also beneficial insects such as pollinators or insects that themselves prey on pests. The conclusion that can be drawn from most of the studies done thus far is that crops expressing Bt can reduce beneficial insects, but many survive, and the reduction is less than occurs with conventional pesticide spraying (Wolfenbarger et al. 2008). Complicating matters is the fact that farmers often combine Bt-enhanced crops with spraying, targeting pests not susceptible to Bt. There is lively debate among scientists not only about what the scores of studies done thus far actually show, but also about the most appropriate way to analyze them. It is also noted that Bt is a narrow-spectrum insecticide, so that plants with genes expressing broader-spectrum chemicals or more potent ones might have much larger effects (Shelton et al. 2009). The high stakes in this debate are illustrated by a controversy that received significant media attention in 1999 (for a detailed account of the incident see Pringle 2003, 121–40). A young Cornell University entomologist fed milkweed leaves he had coated with pollen from Bt corn to monarch butterfly larvae. The results were disastrous. Within days, half were dead and the rest seriously underweight. Despite being warned by a senior colleague that the next step should be a field study, the entomologist quickly published a brief report on the work in the journal Nature (Losey et al. 1999). The study instantly became a sensation in both scientific and general media, and a potent weapon in the hands of various groups that sought to ban GM crops. The monarch, a common butterfly, easily recognized, and, because of its trinational migration, the very symbol of NAFTA, was a very sympathetic and convincing victim. The controversy raised a major problem for the GM seed industry, as the initial five-year registration of Bt corn with the EPA was about to expire. The US Department of Agriculture quickly commissioned a series of studies, including field studies. They found that corn pollen affected milkweed only very close to corn fields, that it was easily washed off by rain, and that the time when monarch caterpillars were most active did not coincide with peak corn pollen production. The agency concluded that “the risk to the monarch butterfly by Bt corn pollen is negligible” (USDA ARS 2013). The registration of Bt corn was renewed just in time for the 2002 planting season.

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“Genetic Pollution” of Other Crops and Cultivars Another policy issue is whether GM crops might, in the normal course of pollen production, transfer genes to other, non-target crops. This issue plays out quite differently in Mexico than in Canada and the United States. In Mexico, the worry is that GM crops, especially corn, will “pollute” the gene pool of diverse local varieties. Since Mexico is generally believed to be the original center of domestication of corn, it has hundreds of native varieties with a wide range of color, taste, and agronomic properties. In Canada and the United States there is more concern about impacts on crops grown and marketed as organic—a premium-price marketing category where GM cultivars are not permitted—or crops destined to be marketed in Europe or other places where GM foods are prohibited. In the United States and Canada, much of the early legal action was not in the form of “illegal trespass” claims against drifting GM pollen, but claims (some successful) by GM seed companies that some farmers were using their genetic material without paying royalties.2 More recently, cases in which organic farmers received damages when pesticides sprayed on nearby non-organic farms drifted onto their pesticide-free fields have given them new hope of prevailing in damage suits (Foodfacts 2011). On the other hand, a case involving possible gene migration from GM alfalfa raised the hopes of organic producers, then dashed them (Stokstad 2011). In 2005, the USDA approved a “Roundup Ready” alfalfa variety. Organic growers and environmentalists sued, claiming the agency had not reviewed the potential economic impact of gene migration. Alfalfa is a particularly sensitive crop for organic farmers, as it is primarily used as an animal feed. If an organic dairy producer were to feed animals hay containing GM alfalfa, his milk production could be found not to meet the organic standard.3 Moreover, alfalfa differs from corn and soybean in that most non-GM fields are not sprayed with herbicide. A “Roundup Ready” variety would thus lead to more spraying, though presumably also to greater production. A US district federal court banned further planting of the new variety, but in 2010 the Supreme Court lifted the ban, pending completion of a full Environmental Impact Statement by the USDA. In January 2011, the Secretary of Agriculture lifted all government restrictions on GM alfalfa, stating that the agreements between the seed seller and farmers, which provided for buffer zones between GM fields and organic fields, were adequate to prevent gene flow (Stokstad 2011). The USDA promised more studies; the opponents considered more lawsuits. Organic farmers in Canada have also had little success in blocking GM crops. In Saskatchewan, organic canola farmers sought, between 2002 and 2008, to get claims of cross-contamination from nearby GM canola fields certified as a class action. The courts ruled against them, leaving the more difficult option of individual farmer suits for damages (Organic Agriculture Protection Board 2008). It is in Mexico where the “genetic pollution” issue has the most significant impacts, affects the most producers, and mobilizes the strongest emotions. In Mexico, farmers grow both yellow corn (often with commercial seeds, mostly intended for animal feed) and “white” corn (usually with local seeds, mostly for human consumption in the form of tortillas). “White” is a misnomer, as the local seeds can be white, red, blue, black, or even a combination of several colors on a single ear. Yellow corn tends to be grown by larger-scale farmers, often using irrigation. “White” corn is typically grown by the poorest farmers on the smallest non-irrigated farms, producing either for family consumption

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or local retail markets. They often use practices little changed (except for the “modern” use of draft animals for plowing!) since Aztec and Mayan times. The genetics of this native corn—the technical term is “landrace”—is the product of both Mexico’s role as an evolutionary center of the corn plant and of selective breeding by farmers. This selection, and the sale or gift of seeds to other farmers, is thousands of years old, but continues to the present day. Maintenance of a reservoir of non-GM landraces can be accomplished either by storing seeds in “seed banks” (refrigerated and protected repositories of seeds, which must be occasionally planted to ensure viability) and in farmer-cultivated fields. Ideally, both strategies should be pursued simultaneously. Preservation of landraces has two extremely important and quite distinct functions. First, genes from diverse crop varieties, or even from close relatives, can be used to protect crops from insect and pest outbreaks, or even to offset the impacts of climate change. For example, plants can be bred to allow adjustment to climate change by being more resistant to heat or cold or more able to resist drought or irrigation with saline waters. Nevo and Chen (2010) discovered that genetic diversity found in wild relatives of wheat and barley could be used to make these important crops more tolerant to drought. Second, the landrace genes are an essential tool of genetic engineering, which moves gene sequences from one species to another rather than creating new ones. Gressel (2008) argues that to take full advantage of the benefits of genetic modification of crops, scientists must look not just to the range of existing varieties of the quite small number of crops currently used for food but to the full range of plant biodiversity. For example, Zhang et al. (2001) have found that genetic engineering could raise the salt tolerance of canola (an important source of cooking oil) without decreasing yields. Seals and Zietz (2009) argue that because GM varieties have been created for low-stress conditions of fertile/fertilized soils and effective pest control, cross-breeding with native corn could also reduce the resistance of the native varieties to environmental stressors such as drought, soil degradation, climate change, and pest infestation. In addition to its well-recognized role as the center of origin for corn, Mexico is also a center of evolution and domestication of the world’s most commonly planted variety of cotton (gossypium hirsutum) (CONABIO 2011). Although only small quantities of native cotton are now grown, the diverse local gene pool could easily be affected by the current rapid increase in GM varieties. Mexico is also a center of either biological origin or historic seed selection for several other important plants, including beans, squash, and pine trees. GM research and testing is being done for these and many other plants of economic value, but seeds have yet to have wide commercial distribution. GM pine trees pose special problems, as the pollen has been shown to be capable of being blown by the wind hundreds of miles from the plantation site (Burdon and Libby 2006).

GM CROP POLICY IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO All three countries now have a policy regime in place for dealing with GM crops. The approaches of Canada and the United States can be described as “decentralized and permissive” while Mexico’s is “centralized and restrictive.”

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None of the regimes seems to us adequate to the task of dealing with either current GM varietals or the many new ones that loom in the near future.

National Perspectives on GM Crop Policy When GM crops were first being developed in the late 1980s, the three nations were faced with the problem of how (and whether) to regulate a rapidly changing technology that raised issues of: food safety and consumer acceptance; impacts of changing pesticide use and biologically incorporated pesticides on target and non-target organisms; the “escape” of new gene combinations into the environment and related policy on genetic experimentation; as well as the widespread release of the product through commercial channels. The sudden introduction of GM crops, the powerful companies behind them, and the enthusiasm of farmers about their possibilities initially overwhelmed regulatory structures in all three North American countries. Canada and the United States quickly declared the new crops “substantially equivalent” to ones produced by conventional breeding and allowed widespread planting of corn, soybean, and cotton before research had been done that could pinpoint major problems. They also adopted multi-agency regulatory systems, with agronomic issues separated from ecological issues and food safety issues. Moreover, they did not require labeling of GM ingredients in food products and these have become ubiquitous. Consumers who do not want such ingredients must buy “organic” foods. The United States was first to act. It never passed comprehensive GMO legislation, but rather adapted existing laws and institutions to handle the new technology: the Food and Drug Administration regulates food safety, including issues of labeling; the Environmental Protection Agency oversees crops into which pesticides are incorporated; and the Department of Agriculture considers whether the new crop might, by itself, or through further genetic interchange, become a troublesome weed. There is some coordination of these agencies under a 1986 agreement called the Co-ordinated Framework for Regulation (CFR) of Biotechnology. Canada also takes a multi-agency approach to regulation, and GM crops are evaluated by Environment Canada, Health Canada, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. The review process is triggered by the introduction of a “novel food,” which could be of GM origin or the product of traditional crop breeding. Several organizations have objected to both the process and the crops improved under it, notably a coalition called the Canadian Biotechnology Action Network. Canadian provinces also have the authority to regulate GMOs in both production and consumption. Only Quebec has exercised this authority, and this province has essentially followed the federal law (Schwandt 2009). As early as 2001, about one-quarter of Quebec’s production of potatoes, corn, soy, and colza (similar to rapeseed) was derived from GM sources. Quebec also imports large amounts of GM products from the United States, destined for both human and animal consumption (Schwandt 2009). For a long time, Mexico simply banned the planting of GM crops. Recently, it has adopted a centralized approach to their evaluation and (thus far limited) approval. The movement toward an approval process was aided by a 2007 report from the Mexican Academy of Sciences that was generally favorable toward GM crops. It said that “to date there is no evidence that the negative

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impact [of the use of biotechnology] is greater than the benefits” but that decisions should be made “case by case and on the basis of scientific evidence” (Academia Mexicana de Ciencias 2007, 9). Under the Ley de Bioseguridad de Organismos Genéticamente Modificados (Law on Biosecurity of Genetically Modified Organisms or LBOGM), passed by the Legislature in 2005 and implemented in 2008, responsibility for GM crops is given primarily to the Secretariat of Agriculture, but with some jurisdiction by SEMARNAT in the area of forest plants and endangered plants. The governmental response is subject to the advice of CIBIOGEM, the Intersectorial Commission on the Biosecurity of Genetically Modified Organisms. The regulatory regime is primarily directed toward experimental plantings. Mexico also ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2003, a global agreement on property rights in native plants that was not supported by either the United States or Canada. Among other provisions, the protocol requires advance notification if a GM food product is to be sent from one country to another. It has been argued that “one reason for Mexico to ratify was to give domestic policy-makers the option to withstand NAFTA and global trade imperatives through reference to their global biosafety rights and obligations, should it become necessary to do so” (Falkner and Gupta 2009, 122). Mexico later weakened the potential applicability of the protocol to North American food trade by signing a side agreement with Canada and the United States specifying that food trade need not consider GM content so long as it was below 5 per cent of the shipment. Greatly complicating Mexico’s policy regime is that Mexican farmers have avoided the ban on GM seeds for planting by importing GM corn for consumption, then planting the unground kernels.

Policy Choices: Labeling of GM Crop Seeds and Foods In addition to regulations specifying whether, and under what conditions, GM crops can be planted, a major issue is labeling. The labeling debate has conflated two issues, much to the detriment, we believe, of good policy. The first is the labeling of GM seeds so that farmers and home growers can decide whether or not to plant them. In most cases, GM seeds can be distinguished only by terms such as “Roundup Ready.” The second, and much more difficult, issue is the labeling of foods containing GM ingredients. In the United States, the FDA has decided not to require labeling of foods containing GM ingredients, arguing that the GM-derived product is “substantially equivalent” to a non-GM-derived product. However, regulations on labeling foods as organic, promulgated in 2000, would provide those who wanted a GM-free product a way to obtain it. The “Truth in Labeling Coalition,” an NGO representing diverse consumer, producer, and health groups, has been pressing, thus far without success, for mandatory labeling (Truth in Labeling Coalition 2011). Because so much of the United States corn and soybean crop is of GM origin, guaranteeing non-GM origin would be very difficult, except for organic crops. The situation in Canada is similar—government refusal to use GM labeling, except for organic foods, and continued lobbying by some organizations that would like to see such labels required (Greenpeace Canada 2011). Mexico generally does not allow GM seeds, but also does not have labeling for domestic or imported foods with GM ingredients.

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“Playing Catch-Up”: Industry Innovation and Regulatory Science All three North American countries face the common problem of “playing catch-up” with the constant creative innovation by industry, much of it guarded as commercial secrets until the plant is ready to be released on the market. GM technology is rapidly evolving. Kuzma and Kokotovich (2011) report on new ways of moving very small pieces of genetic material that may allow better targeting of desired traits—and may fall outside existing regulatory regimes. And the large seed firms are moving beyond the major field crops into fruits and vegetables—and even animals and trees. In coming years, seed companies seem likely to incorporate multiple new traits into GM plants (“triple and quadruple stacking”). Thus far, plants with Roundup (glyphosate) herbicide resistance and those that incorporate the Bt (natural insecticide) gene have proved benign, both in terms of product safety and the “jumping” of introduced genes into other plants. The speedup of technological change in the seed industry, however, creates many more introductions of novel genes and combinations of genes into the environment. A robust regulatory system must try to keep pace with new developments, analyze impacts on both human health and the environment, and update the policy regime when needed. There is little evidence that the current regulatory system is able ex ante to prevent harm.

Present Transboundary Cooperation on GM Crops Although both the GM seeds and the crops grown from them have very high current and potential roles in “border crossing” in North America, there has been little transboundary cooperation on environmental aspects. Each country has its own national regulatory regime, and in each case that regime is preoccupied by national pro- and anti-GM demands, as well as the constant application for approval of new crop varieties. In 2004, the Commission on Environmental Cooperation released an informative document on the possible impacts of GM corn on biodiversity in Mexico (CEC 2004a), but follow-up was left to Mexican national authorities. In January 2009, the commission received a submission (SEM 09–001) charging that corn producers in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua were growing experimental fields of GM corn in violation of Mexican law. The petition noted that there were 23 varieties of native corn in Chihuahua and claimed that there was at least one instance of genetic interchange. After receiving a response from the Mexican government, the CEC decided in December 2010 not to require preparation of a detailed “factual record” on the matter on the basis that the field trials were being regulated under Mexico’s 2005 Law on the Biosecurity of Genetically Modified Organisms (LBOGM). The Mexican government made the interesting argument that, although some of the purposes of its LBOGM were environmental, the law itself was not environmental legislation and thus its application was not subject to appeal to the CEC. This is discouraging since the Mexican government’s commercial interest in raising agricultural productivity clearly trumped its environmental commitments under both national law and the international Convention on Biodiversity. It is also discouraging that the commission agreed with Mexico’s argument and dismissed the case. Another unfortunate aspect of how this case was treated

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is that significant parts of the material provided by the government to the CEC were classified as trade secrets, and hence not open to public inspection. In fact, there already exists a trilateral institution that could add monitoring of the ecological impacts of GM crops to its portfolio. This is the Canada/ Mexico/US Trilateral Committee for Wildlife and Ecosystem Conservation and Management (discussed in detail in chapter 3), set up in 1995 to help wildlife management agencies coordinate work on endangered species. It has, over time, added consideration of invasive species to its portfolio, and it mentions climate change among its interests [though it has paid only a small amount of attention to this topic]. Despite its mandate to “contribute to conserving the ecological integrity of key ecosystems in North America,” it has yet to consider GM crops as a potentially major force in ecosystem change.

GM Policy Gaps and the Challenge for Transboundary Institutions The GM crop issue represents a case in which all three North American countries have selected and implemented their own regulatory regime—a multiagency regime in Canada and the United States, a single-agency regime in Mexico. The regulations in Canada and the United States are quite permissive, especially when compared with those, for example, in the European community. Mexico, by contrast, has to date banned most GM crops, but it is currently debating their introduction. The American and Canadian approaches involve multiple agencies not because of a considered choice, but because their governments have simply taken a hands-off approach to an expanding industry. Consider, for example, the following statement by a US food safety group: Congress has yet to pass a single law intended to manage [GMOs] responsibly. On the federal level, eight agencies attempt to regulate biotechnology using 12 different statutes or laws that were written long before genetically engineered food, animals, and insects became a reality. The result has been a regulatory tangle [and] existing laws are grossly manipulated to manage threats they were never intended to regulate. (Center for Food Safety 2011)

Mexico has the most centralized system for dealing with GM crops and the most careful approach; except for experimental plantings, GM corn is still banned. However, its 2005 Biosafety Law, and its recent permitting of large-scale field experiments in the northern states, seem to indicate that approval of GM crops for general use is imminent. If this results in significant introduction of GM traits into native corn varieties, it could not only injure millions of small-scale (and often very poor) producers, but it could also reduce the Mexican campesino’s vital role in in situ preservation of the biodiversity on which the world’s corn breeding programs depend. In a letter to the editor of a scientific journal, five members of the staff of CONABIO— including Dr. José Sarukhán Kermez, its longtime director and former rector of UNAM—wrote that comprehensive studies undertaken under the 2005 Biosecurity Law have found that native corn varieties cultivated by farmers are both more numerous and more geographically widespread than had been

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assumed. They argue that even more study is required before GM corn varieties are licensed for widespread use (Acevedo et al. 2011). Mexico has also failed to close a gaping hole in its regulatory system. Since the liberalization of trade with the United States in the mid-1990s, Mexico has allowed large quantities of GM feed corn (and some corn destined for human consumption) to be imported from the United States Although this is meant for consumption, not for planting, it is inevitable that some has found its way into Mexican fields.4 A case could be made for regulatory harmonization throughout North America, but an equally good case could be made for preserving national differences in approach. Arguing in favor of harmonization is the fact that the same multinational seed companies operate in all three countries, and there is a significant (but asymmetric) trade in crops. In all three countries, the regulators are struggling with what to do about new cultivars and how to protect organic crops from contamination. Supporting the preservation of national differences is the strong desire in Mexico to protect traditional crop varieties (especially, but not limited to, corn) and the small, seed-saving farmers that produce them. Barkin (2006) suggests a future where these farmers, if protected from seed contamination by GM crops, tap domestic and foreign markets to receive premium prices for their unique crops; Seals and Zietz (2009) suggest that cash subsidies may be needed to keep farmers from migrating off the land. They call it “the price to be paid for maintaining biodiversity” (17). They add that, “since Mexico, the US, and the world at large reap the benefits of continued Mexican biodiversity, it appears sensible to pay for the subsidies from an international fund rather than from the budget of a single country” (17). Much less has been written about cotton than about corn, but Mexico is also a center of cotton evolution, and some Mexican cotton varieties, which can have natural colors, are also increasingly raised for specialized, higher-priced markets. The same is true for vegetables, which are raised by millions of smallscale farmers but are also important export crops. In addition, Mexico has real opportunities to produce organic crops, both for domestic consumption and for export, an activity that might make at least some of its small farms economically viable. A recent report claims that Mexico now has 128,000 organic farmers growing 37 different crops, and they’ve had a recent growth of about 30 per cent per year. Moreover, the largest concentrations of organic farmers are in Chiapas and Oaxaca, where most farmers are poor and from indigenous groups (this reflects the fact that the largest single organic crop at present is coffee, though others are growing rapidly) (Pro Mexico 2009). Another argument for not trying to subject all three countries to a uniform regulatory regime is the fact that the single-agency approach taken by Mexico (like its approach to biodiversity) has much to recommend it. Unlike the United States and Canada, its GM regulatory system is not cobbled together from several agencies, each concerned with a different set of problems, but is comprehensive, transparent, and science based. Recognizing these national differences, it may be that each country should take its own path, but also that trinational cooperation should be used to support national efforts. The current trade regime often undercuts national policy. For example, there is no required labeling of GM seeds (and foods, such as kernel corn that can be used as seeds). Ideally, a standard metric could be adopted, much as has been done with hazardous chemicals. In this way, farmers

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could tell at a glance such information as exactly what trait(s) have been inserted in the plant and how far its pollen is likely to travel. To reduce the mixing of varieties, a simple dye could be used to distinguish GM from non-GM seeds, just as was once done with leaded and unleaded gasoline.

Creating Stable and Comprehensive Networks In the case of GM crops, there are at least four potential kinds of players in transboundary and continental “networks”: the multinational seed companies and those selling (and advertising) ancillary inputs; large farming firms, who may have operations in one country or more than one; the regulatory agencies; and the NGOs concerned with GM crop issues. None of these are well structured to deal effectively with GM issues across borders. The seed industry is at once highly concentrated and somewhat fragmented. Three large multinationals, Monsanto (United States), DuPont (“Pioneer Seeds,” United States), and Syngenta (Switzerland), control nearly half the world seed market. But the top 10 companies account for only 67 per cent of seed sales, leaving room for many local and specialized operations (GM Watch 2007). The large companies sell not only seeds but also a variety of herbicides and pesticides. They also have licensing agreements with chemical producers such as Dow Chemical and even agreements among themselves (e.g., between Syngenta and DuPont). In the United States, concentration varies by crop—three firms dominate corn, one (different) firm supplies most cotton seed, soybean is fairly fragmented, and wheat is grown mainly from farmer-saved seed and seed sold by universities. Small biotech companies and public universities develop products, which then are acquired or licensed to the large companies with their large marketing infrastructure. Mergers, spinoffs, and reorganizations seem to happen almost yearly, as companies try to maximize the combination of seeds and chemicals they can sell to farmers. In this complex economic landscape, a given regulation can benefit one company and hurt another, leading to great instability in “what the industry wants.” Large farming firms can operate on one side of the border or on both. For example, a firm in Mexico growing cotton is concerned about the GM opportunities available to it in Sinaloa, but also about what its competitors in Arizona or Arkansas are able to plant. Many of the large firms operating in Mexico grow fruit and vegetable crops, which have barely been touched by the GM revolution, but for which scores of new varieties are very close to coming on the market. And many large US and Canadian producers of corn, soybean, and canola want to sell their product on the Mexican market, but have no interest in producing there. As we have seen, GM crops (and the chemical systems that go along with them) are regulated in each of the three North American countries by a variety of bodies—including regulators of consumer safety, chemical application, worker protection, and environmental protection. Each country also has policies on agricultural exports and imports, and agencies that promote— and sometimes subsidize—crop sales. All of these bodies tend to be parts of national or international regimes and do not have any specific North American structure.5 The last network component is the NGOs. These have a variety of goals (from protection of biodiversity to keeping GM crops out of foodstuffs) and are organized at either national levels or international levels, rarely trinationally.

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Most of these potential network participants have access to scientists, but use them to advance their own agendas. Scientists work for the seed companies, the regulatory agencies, the associations of farmers—either crop by crop, such as the American Soybean Association, or representing a variety of producers, such as Mexico’s Consejo Nacional Agropecuario (National Agricultural Council)—and the NGOs. The various groups are quite ready to publicize scientific findings (such as “Bt corn kills monarch butterflies”) when they fit their agenda and to ignore them when they do not (Pringle 2003). The net result is that there are many players, but little in the way of regular communication and negotiation that could be called a “stable network.”

Fostering Mutual Understanding and Learning The relatively well-developed agricultural research establishments in all three North American countries, which include scientists from seed companies, government agencies, and universities, are likely to identify problems arising in the field quite soon after a new cultivar is released. Unfortunately, problematic genetic material may already be widespread in the environment by the time such studies are completed, published, and replicated. Agricultural and environmental scientists in Canada, Mexico, and the United States have good communication channels, based partly on the use of many of the same scientific journals, partly on the fact that universities have had a long tradition of doing agricultural fieldwork in countries other than their own. New discoveries move quickly about the circuit. Mexico is particularly strong in conservation biology, with world-class research groups at CONABIO, UNAM, and INECC. The United States, with its long tradition of agricultural research, both within the federal government and at the “land grant” universities, is dominant in agronomic research, which occasionally includes environmental impacts. These research efforts apply, however, only to publicly available cultivars and studies that are in the public domain. In the area of GM crops, a great deal of research is done by the seed companies or by gene companies allied to them, and most of this work is considered a “trade secret.” Even the regulatory agencies are enjoined to keep this information private when considering the approval of new GM cultivars, meaning that much important information never reaches the public sphere. This inhibits the formation of an epistemic community formulated on the basis of the environmental implications of GM crops. One of the most important safeguards in dealing with possible problems from GM crops is maintenance of a reservoir of non-GM landraces. Ideally, these should be represented both in protected seed banks (refrigerated and protected repositories of seeds, which must be occasionally planted to ensure viability) and in farmer-cultivated fields. On a world scale, there are several excellent seed banks. The US Department of Agriculture maintains a large collection of seeds of agronomically valuable plants in a vault in Ft. Collins, Colorado. There are also government collections of specific kinds of seeds, such as the USDA Soybean Germplasm Collection at the University of Illinois, which has more than 20,000 soybean strains. Canada uses a multi-nodal approach called the Canadian Plant Germplasm System. Mexico has a world-class collection of corn and wheat seeds at the Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (International Center for the Improvement of Corn and Wheat)

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(CIMMYT), just outside Mexico City. A more general seed collection is kept at the Botanic Garden of the National Autonomous University, but it has been long underfunded. The most comprehensive seed bank in the world is on the remote Norwegian arctic island of Spitsbergen, where a consortium with major contributions from Bill Gates, Syngenta, the Rockefeller Foundation, and others has constructed an underground vault in frozen ground for storing samples of crops from around the world. The project officially opened in 2008, so the collection is far from complete, but the intended scope is very ambitious. Another way of “saving” seeds is to make sure they are planted by farmers. For fruits and vegetables, there are several for-profit and non-profit entities in the United States and Canada (e.g., the “Seed and Plant Sanctuary for Canada” and the “Seed Savers Exchange” in the United States) that sell “heirloom” seed varieties to hobbyists and to small growers who sell produce at farmers’ markets. Since these seeds are actually planted, in a variety of climatic settings, they could offer valuable information (particularly on the possibility of adaptation) in the face of climate change. There are some “seed savers” in Mexico, and many Mexican varieties are sold in the United States and elsewhere, but in none of the countries—particularly not in Mexico—is there a really comprehensive effort directed to anything other than the major field crops. This is unfortunate, as Mexico is, for example, a center of biodiversity for the tomato, avocado, bean, and several other common fruits and vegetables. There is even less attention paid to preservation of wild relatives of crops, despite the possibility that these could offer genes useful for genetic insertion to make crops more water efficient or blight resistant. All of the efforts mentioned above are promising. However, trinational action could be extremely useful in maintaining a continent-wide database on the characteristics of crop and non-crop plants, particularly their response to heat and water stress when planted. For example, what is the traditional range of a given plant, and how is its survival and productivity affected when it is at the limits of its normal range, or even beyond them? This information could be invaluable for understanding the possible effects of climate change and in identifying gene sequences that could be transferred to important economic crops, either by breeding or genetic engineering. Another important area for scientific collaboration is research on the movement of plant genes in the environment as well as the effects, if any, of GM foods on consumers. The problem is not that scientists are not interested in these topics, but that the GM crop industry itself, and the research effort that lies behind it, is changing so rapidly. This is especially true as firms start to introduce GM vegetables into their portfolio, in addition to the current small number of field crops (corn, soybean, cotton, canola), and as they go beyond making crops “Roundup Ready” and containing the Bt gene. Already, seed companies are starting to release “double-stack” and “triple-stack” varieties that have multiple agronomic advantages based on multiple gene manipulations. The permutations are so great, and the pace of both research and release is so rapid, that scientists studying impacts will necessarily struggle to keep up.

Resource Provision The information needs facing each of the North American countries are quite similar. In part, this is due to the fact that the origin of the issue—the GM

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seeds—is identical across the continent. Each country may have somewhat different goals—such as the perceived importance of landrace varieties or the lobbying power of organic producers—but the underlying scientific mechanisms are the same. As well, this need for information is taking place in an environment of severe fiscal restraint. Agricultural research is a tempting target for budget-cutters; after all, the agricultural sector has performed well in recent years, even as the overall economy has cratered and manufacturing has endured wrenching structural changes. In the United States, scientific research actually benefited substantially from the 2008 economic stimulus package, but there seems little likelihood of a new infusion of money for the National Science Foundation and other research agencies. Both Canada and the United States are facing strong anti-regulatory movements, which will have an impact regardless of who wins national elections. Two variables seem relevant to the financing of future work on the impacts of GM crops. First is the possibility of a major reduction in crop productivity associated with widespread changes in rainfall patterns (whether or not it is a product of global climate change). This would clearly become a major national and international policy issue and would cause a rapid (but belated) increase in government investment in research. Second is the possibility that one or more major foundations could become interested in this issue.

GM CROPS: OBSERVATIONS GM crops are not inherently a good thing or a bad one. On the positive side, they can reduce grower costs and in many cases reduce the amount of chemicals used, either by introducing resistance genes or allowing spraying with glyphosate (Roundup), an especially effective herbicide. Moreover, the GM technology may be necessary to help important crops adjust to changes in temperature or rainfall patterns that could occur as a result of global climate change. On the other hand, the potential for environmental impacts is real; for example, GM gene sequences must be kept from “escaping” into natural ecosystems, into organic farm fields, or into the genome of traditional landrace crops. Governmental responses to the rapidly expanding planting of GM crops, a technology being diffused primarily by large multinational seed companies, can be characterized as having gone through an initial completed phase in each North American country. However, serious gaps in the regulatory regime exist, primarily because the technology itself has rapidly evolved and continues to do so. Certainly, we see different policy priorities across countries in North America. In the United States and Canada, the desirability of lower costs and potentially less herbicide use must be traded off against the needs of organic farmers and the existence of export markets that will or will not accept GM foodstuffs. In Mexico, the issue of protecting landraces of corn, cotton, and other native crops comes to the fore, as well as the interests of small, seed-saving farmers. Thus, Mexico has chosen to control GM crop production to a much greater degree than its northern neighbors. A common regulatory regime does not seem likely, or even desirable. What is remarkable about this case is that, despite the clear environmental implications associated with GM crops, they are not even seen as an “environmental” problem for most actors in the system. Mexico’s assertion in the

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Chihuahua transgenic corn case—the assertion that its 2005 Law on Biosecurity was not “environmental” and hence not subject to the CEC citizen submission process—seems to place commercial concerns over environmental ones rather than trying to balance the two. Protecting organic crops from the pollen of GM ones and maintaining the genetic purity of traditional landraces seem to us to be matters of biodiversity very similar to protecting endangered species, and they should be given close consideration in the removal of intercountry trade barriers guaranteed by the NAFTA agreement. The links between trade and the environment are well established, but the case of GM crops shows that we have not yet come to terms with NAFTA’s negative externalities. Many cases like this exist—for example, the production and export of toxic waste—and we will have to be able, in a governance sense, to think beyond the “traditional” boundaries of what constitutes our transboundary environment. Not surprisingly, transboundary cooperation on this issue is nascent at best. While the CEC did become involved in investigating GM contamination of crops in Mexico, its role was circumscribed to that specific case. The governmental and scientific communities are so fragmented, primarily by commercial interests, and technological change is so rapid and unpredictable, that even the basic transboundary governance functions of information exchange and policy learning remain unfulfilled. Transboundary cooperation could play a role in facilitating research on the ecological impacts of GM traits, and the best ways to avoid in-the-field mixing of GM traits with organic crops and landraces; in the improvement of national seed banks; and in creating a standard labeling system for GM seeds. Yet it is simply not clear what governance mechanisms might take on these tasks, given the relative absence of sustainable networks in this area.

Notes 1 The “feeding the world” argument is deeply contested because most US and Canadian grain exports go to middle-income countries (where they are often used in animal feedlot operations) and only a tiny proportion take the form of food aid. 2 The case of Percy Schmeiser, Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34, a Saskatchewan farmer accused by Monsanto of “saving” and replanting GM canola seeds, reached the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court upheld the patent infringement despite Schmeiser’s claim that the GM plants in his fields were accidental introductions. 3 The United States organic standards allow small amounts of non-organic content, so a small amount of GM alfalfa in hay may be permitted. 4 Virtually all commercial corn seed—GM or not—is “hybrid.” This is a breeding technique that produces a high-yielding seed for planting, but also one that produces a crop whose seeds are inferior without additional crossbreeding. Thus, farmers buying commercial seed have to purchase new seeds every year, rather than saving seed from the previous year’s crop, as is the practice with traditional Mexican farmers. Since GM seeds are hybrids, one can only get good results by taking the GM feed corn, then crossbreeding for one or more generations. This is illegal in terms of intellectual property, but it is not particularly difficult to do. 5 An exception is the import and export of crops, which is specifically governed by NAFTA and the US-Canada trade treaty.

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Chapter 7

Conclusions: The Future of Transboundary Environmental Management in North America IN THE INTRODUCTION to this book, we encouraged the reader to juxtapose two continental maps. The borderless map highlights the major physical features of the continent and draws attention to what is shared by Canada, the United States, and Mexico, such as mountain ranges, rivers, and water bodies. We can overlay onto these physical features the many other things we share: forest cover; desert ecosystems; wildlife habitats and migration corridors; patterns of airflow; population centers and transportation routes; as well as infrastructure and industrial hubs. To this multi-faceted, transboundary reality we could add another overlay—market interactions which channel production, goods, and even people along newly forged pathways of economic exchange. All of these combine to create a host of environmental interactions and problems that are by their very nature unbounded. The second map, which focuses on political territory, emphasizes just the opposite—the ways in which national and subnational jurisdictional borders cut through mountains, waterways, and airways. These lines on the North American map produce real impacts on the ground—bisecting habitats, blocking flows of wildlife, and creating economic, demographic, and pollution choke points. Political borders are the frontiers of domestic and international security, and of national identity. Right now, they are also sites of contestation, where some (mostly Americans) want borders “thicker,” while others (Canadians and Mexicans) want them to be more permeable. The 2011 US–Canada “Beyond the Border” agreement and the 2010 US-Mexico “New Border Vision” are only the most recent manifestations of this tug-of-war. The emphasis on security obscures the fact that political borders not only mark the boundaries of sovereign territory, they are also the meeting points of distinct legal and policy regimes which have as their purpose the management of “parcels” of our shared environmental reality.

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A primary challenge to North American environmental management, then, no matter what the issue, is that the actions of the continent’s many governments have to be coordinated in such a way that we can achieve what the borderless map would suggest—a “North American” perspective which encourages a regional, shared view of our environmental future. What most concerned NAFTA negotiators and nongovernmental groups in 1994—that “dirty” industry would move to places with the lowest standards or the most lax enforcement—proved to be a non-issue. Instead, the real environmental problems are much broader, concerned with the complex interactions among economic, ecological, and political functions. For example, since 1994, conservation biologists have increasingly argued that the protection of endangered species requires not a collection of small, independent reserves, but the management of entire landscapes—landscapes which run across two borders, and sometimes three. Moreover, regional airsheds continue to be a source of concern to those who are “downwind” from their neighbors and who experience the health and environmental impacts of air pollution. Genetically modified crops have come to dominate US and Canadian agriculture, presenting problems to their own organic producers but also threatening the genetic source areas of important crops far afield in Mexico, which has not yet permitted their use. And looming in the background is the yet-to-be-properly-addressed issue of climate change, to which North America as a whole is a significant contributor, but also the recipient of major shared impacts—on crop production, wildlife habitats, water supply, flood and hurricane risks, and even the opening up of the Arctic. The first step in adopting a regional perspective involves understanding the ways in which domestic environmental management approaches differ across the continent. North American governments do not come to the table with exactly the same perspectives, legal regimes, or policy tools for environmental management—and yet they must interact with one another. Second, we must recognize that governments do not possess the same capacity to engage in environmental problem-solving and implementation. In a transboundary context, the role of environmental capacity is doubly important, for domestic governments must have the financial, human, knowledge, and organizational resources to pursue sustainable development in their own country but also to implement the transboundary agreements to which they are party. What we are interested in, then, is the extent of difference across North American governments in terms of environmental management approaches and capacity levels, and how these differences might be reconciled or ameliorated. Transboundary governance mechanisms have a critical role to play here. We would argue, on the basis of the investigation in this book, that a reconciliation of sorts across environmental management regimes is underway, though the evidence in this book suggests that it is proceeding in fits and starts. Hundreds of sites of transboundary governance, at the trilateral, bilateral, and subnational levels, are engaged in joint efforts to understand and address specific environmental problems. Nongovernmental and private organizations have also, in some cases, recognized common cause across borders. These interactions have helped to put in place a dense web of connection—but it is patchy and uneven. Moreover, our cases show that transboundary environmental governance in North America has been considerably more successful in reconciling differences in environmental management approaches than in ameliorating capacity differences. An underlying theme, running throughout the book, is the critical role that

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binational or trinational cooperation could play, in particular, in augmenting environmental management capacity within countries.

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT APPROACHES AND CAPACITY IN NORTH AMERICA: DEGREES OF DIFFERENCE In examining environmental management approaches and capacity in North America, we have looked at differences among countries both in general (chapter 1) and in four illustrative case studies (chapters 3–6). In chapter 1, we showed how each nation’s environmental management approach emerges out of a complex mix of economic and ecological conditions, land use and natural resource regimes, social engagement and opinion, and the design of political and regulatory institutions. On some of these attributes—such as public opinion—we note that the differences are relatively small. On others—such as levels of economic development, land-use regimes, and federal-subnational relations—they are quite considerable. While the public in all three countries seem to exhibit similar levels of concern about the environment—leavened by a reserve of support for resource extraction—each country comes to the transboundary table with somewhat different perspectives on how to administer environmental problems, a different set of stakeholders that need to be taken into account, and asymmetrical public (and private) resources available for environmental protection. Interestingly, though, these distinctive national contexts have not resulted in wildly different environmental management regimes. In fact, the regimes look broadly similar in terms of their command-and-control approach to regulating “environmentally unfriendly” activity, although they do exhibit differences in terms of the breadth and depth of their legislative regimes for environmental degradation, in their orientations toward enforcement, and in their willingness to pursue and incorporate environmental policy innovations. As is clear from at least three of our four cases, the differences across the three countries in terms of environmental management approaches do not seem insurmountable; we have characterized the landscape of difference in this respect as “hilly rather than mountainous.” Even in the fourth case, GM crops, the regulatory approaches between Canada/US and Mexico seem likely to converge in the future. Instead, as we demonstrate throughout this book, the most profound differences among the countries are associated with environmental management capacity. This relates to disparities in the resources available to address environmental problems, but also in the amount and quality of human, knowledge, and organizational capacities. In general, Canada and the United States have relatively high levels of environmental capacity—if they choose to support and employ it—while Mexico has much less. We chose our cases to compare policy experiences across issues which were at distinct stages of development in terms of both national policy and transboundary cooperation. In two of the cases, namely protection of biodiversity and management of air pollution in border airsheds, policies have been adopted and implemented in all three countries, and we are able to track and compare national approaches and capacities. In the case of climate change, the existence of the problem is well recognized and various policies have been proposed and debated, but fewer have actually been adopted. In this case, we are left to infer

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national approaches from the limited action that has been taken, and to reflect on the implications of more ambitious action for capacity requirements. In the case of genetically modified crops, policy choices have been made in Canada and the United States, but Mexico’s regime seems to be in a state of flux, hampered by a lack of scientific and technical understanding of the transborder and trade implications that GM crops pose for the country. More specifically, biodiversity protection involves both control of the “taking” of endangered species and protection of habitats. All three countries have regulated hunting for nearly a century, and all three have identified species as rare and endangered and given them special protection. All three countries have strong policies in both areas, but Canada and the United States are generally far ahead of Mexico in enforcing regulations in the field. Mexico, which has adopted the “biosphere reserve” approach to habitat conservation, may actually have the best theoretical approach, but the country lacks basic environmental management capacity over both public and private lands. The ground-level ozone/smog case highlights different aspects of environmental policy within the three countries. The air pollution regime in all three countries is quite well developed and similar, with standards covering the same set of pollutants and regulatory regimes to encourage both stationary and mobile emission sources to comply with these standards. Each country has also developed critical supports, including monitoring capabilities as well as scientific and technical knowledge for control instruments. If we had to identify gaps in the domestic policy regimes in this case, it would be the lower level of technical capacity in Mexico (e.g., monitoring); the need to further tighten standards on point and mobile sources in all three countries, given continuing air quality problems (particularly with smog); and, relatedly, the need for increased attention to linkages between energy choices and air emissions. As for the case of climate change, here we have an environmental issue where only Mexico has put in place a comprehensive national regime. Mexico’s framework foresees a mitigation strategy, shifting its energy sources, using its natural resource base to reduce emissions, and mobilizing public and private resources to support all of these. However, it is clear that Mexico does not possess the necessary resources to implement all of these commitments. By contrast, Canada and the United States, with superior resources, have proceeded in a piecemeal fashion—with some (in the case of Canada, very minimal) regulation on emission sources, some (in the case of Canada, very minimal) attention to alternative energies, and some support for scientific research. Subnational governments in all three countries have pushed the agenda, going ahead with action plans and pilot projects on such policy instruments as emissions trading—but the resources available to them limit what can be done. The case of genetically modified crops is the only case that shows Mexico taking a policy direction quite different from that of the United States and Canada. The latter two countries were among the first in the world to allow widespread use of cultivars with genes that either make them resistant to specific pesticides or to many insects. Both countries regulate new introductions using a multi-agency approach, and they have taken the general position that the product produced by the GM plant is “substantially identical” to that produced by a non-GM plant, so that no product-level regulation, or even labeling, is needed. (Most European countries have been far more conservative.) Mexico,

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by contrast, has taken a single-agency regulatory approach. It has also, at least to date, banned GM corn, mainly out of fear that modified varieties could mix genetic material with its native, and exceptionally diverse, corn cultivars; the country only allows the use of GM crops for research. In spite of these efforts, there have been cases where GM crops have been found in regular fields, which indicates implementation failures on the ground. Looking across our four cases, the United States has the most well-established and well-developed legislative and regulatory framework; even in the climate case, where attempts to put in place a national law on climate change have been unsuccessful, existing legislative competencies under the extensive Clean Air Act have been used to initiate an emissions reduction program. In Canada, the national legislative framework is light, primarily because environmental protection is in most cases a matter of provincial jurisdiction. This creates considerable difficulty in the biodiversity, smog, and climate cases, where a national approach relies to a great extent on (often varying) provincial legislation and policies. The GM crop case is the only one where the Canadian federal government has been the dominant policy-maker. In Mexico, the legislative framework relating to environmental matters is more recent, but now quite broad; indeed, in all of our cases, Mexico possesses a firm legislative basis for taking action. This may surprise some readers who (erroneously) assume that Mexico’s environmental protection regime lacks both breadth and depth. Where we find the greatest differences among the three countries is where policy goals must be turned into tangible programs for implementation. In the United States and Canada, environmental and national resource management agencies, despite their flaws, are able to turn vague legislative guidance into specific standards and policies, and to work with other levels of government to put them into effect. Mexico possesses a strong legal framework in three of four areas (GM crops being the exception), but is uniformly less able to construct and maintain an environmental management and regulatory regime. In this respect, a particular weakness for Mexico is enforcing compliance with environmental protection requirements. For example, in the case of biodiversity regulation, Mexico is part of the international regime and has created different instruments to accomplish conservation goals. However, corruption and the institutional weakness of the enforcement agency, PROFEPA, do not help these efforts, nor does an almost total lack of staffing and infrastructure for the country’s extensive system of protected areas. Certainly, a shortage of funding underlies all manner of capacity shortcomings. For example, in spite of successfully hosting COP16 and promptly delivering all national communications to the UNFCCC, Mexico needs to wait for the international Green Climate Fund to start disbursing monies to move forward with its ambitious climate change programming. It would be a serious error, however, to lapse into stereotype and paint Mexico as uniformly deficient in environmental management and the United States as superior, perhaps with Canada in an intermediate position. In fact, Mexico has done several things quite well: attention to peri-urban forests and watersheds early in the twentieth century; heroic efforts to clean up the air in the Mexico City basin starting in the 1980s; and efforts to systematically identify and protect areas of high biodiversity using the “biosphere reserve” model. Canada, for its part, has only reluctantly (and after the United States) placed

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controls on large sources of criteria air and greenhouse gas emissions. It has provided only limited protection for endangered species, and it has appeared simply unwilling to address the clear conflicts between its environmental policy goals and support for tar sands development. Anyone who asserts that Mexico lacks either the will or the ability to protect its environment should ponder the fact that Mexico has banned GM crops, while Canada and the United States have not only permitted them, but have to a large extent let the seed industry take the lead. On the whole, Mexico’s environmental management capacity is weaker as compared with that of its two richer neighbors, although there are specific areas where the United States, and especially Canada, also exhibit weaknesses—and have appeared unwilling to address them. We would also note that the capacity gap is multi-faceted. In our examination of environmental policy more generally and across the four case studies, we have been struck by the fact that in some cases, particularly climate change and air quality, it is subnational and local governments that have taken the initiative on environmental problems. However, this is not generally where the strongest environmental capacity lies; subnational governments are often weaker in terms of the technical, organizational, and financial resources that they can bring to bear on addressing environmental degradation. This is particularly true in Mexico, where the national government has long dominated those beneath it, and it is only quite recently that efforts have been made to augment local environmental policy regimes and management capacity. Environmental capacity—and also political will—differ across states in the United States and across provinces in Canada as well. Not only is the capacity gap complicated by disparities across countries and across levels of government, it also differs across policy areas and issues. So, for example, while Mexico has developed considerable expertise with respect to biodiversity and air pollution, it has a feebler organizational and technical basis for policy management in the areas of GMOs and climate change. To some extent, these differences reflect the length of time that countries have had to address particular problems, but they are also a function of underlying structural deficiencies. Moreover, they may reflect the strength of civil society institutions; Mexico does not lack for spontaneous local groups that arise in response to a specific environmental problem, but it does not have the kind of national, professional, and well-funded lobbying groups that are present in the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canadian contexts.

BORDERS AND TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION We argue in this book that transboundary cooperation has a critical role to play in both improving the coordination of domestic efforts across borders as well as supporting governments at home as they go about their environmental management responsibilities. More specifically, we identify three critical functions for transboundary governance mechanisms that are necessary to bridge differences in national environmental management approaches and promote environmental capacity across countries, levels of government, and policy issues, namely: (1) creating comprehensive and stable cross-boundary networks; (2) promoting mutual learning and the generation and exchange of important environmental information; and (3) facilitating the provision of resources necessary to create

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and maintain environmental management capacity. Underlying all of these is the need to get “the environment” back onto binational and trinational policy agendas; without the requisite broad-based political support, it will be very difficult to initiate and sustain the actions that are being taken. Our working hypothesis in the introduction was that we expected to find a higher level of effectiveness in the biodiversity and air pollution cases in terms of the three functions, given that, in both of these cases, there is a wellestablished policy regime and also substantial experience with transboundary cooperation. This appears to have been borne out. We would argue that biodiversity is the environmental issue most integrated into the regional agenda, including cooperation under wildlife management treaties and joint management of transboundary protected areas. Continental cooperative activities have facilitated a shift in perspectives on biodiversity, which has helped all three countries to understand where policy gaps lie and how to make preparations to address important emerging issues. In addition, transboundary cooperation on air pollution has occurred at all governance levels, with institutions active trilaterally, bilaterally, and subnationally—although bilateral cooperation has been strongest. Cooperation across borders has served to fill a number of these gaps—by helping to keep air pollution on crowded political agendas in all three countries, by highlighting how energy choices affect air quality, by bringing together scientists to build a more complete view of air quality management in North America, and by supporting technical capacity-building in Mexico. In the climate change case, there is relatively little coordination across borders. Certainly, the capacity needs—across countries (especially in Mexico), across policy sectors, and across levels of government—are immense. And transboundary institutions have not done enough to plug these gaps; they are themselves hamstrung by a lack of focus and political will. National governments in the United States and Canada, because their climate policy regimes are in a state of flux, have sprinkled resources around to various programs without a unifying purpose. Transboundary cooperation reflects this state of affairs, with various, smaller Memoranda-of-Understanding and ad hoc cooperative initiatives designed to encourage technology sharing and application. Significant here, however, is the role of subnational governments in all three countries in both experimenting with different kinds of climate policy tools and extending this experimentation across borders. At the regional and transboundary levels, very little cooperation has been put into place with regard to GM crops. In 2004, the CEC published a useful set of papers on the biodiversity of corn in Mexico and possible impacts of GM crops, followed by a summary paper. However, it had little direct effect on policy, since the authority to regulate such crops lay elsewhere. Seed banks of landrace crops are kept by Mexico, the United States, and (at the international level) in Svalbard, Norway, and there is doubtless some exchange of information among them. Civil society has been mobilized against GM crops. Unfortunately, the debate has often brought more heat than light to the issue, which is intertwined with hot-button issues such as the safety of the food supply and the role of multinational seed companies. In the discussion which follows, we explore the case study findings with regard to each of the three functions of transboundary environmental governance in more detail.

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Creating Stable and Comprehensive Networks In chapter 2, we posed the question: which policy actors are networking across borders? Three of our four cases (excluding GM crops) show that transboundary networks in North America are overwhelmingly transgovernmental. In each of these cases, the primary mode of cooperation is inter-agency communication, which can be framed by a treaty (e.g., as is primarily the case with respect to air pollution and some aspects of biodiversity) or through an MOU (e.g., as in the climate case, and other aspects of biodiversity). This is not to say that other types of networks do not exist; the biodiversity case, in particular, shows nongovernmental cross-border activity. Even here, however, NGO transborder ties are quite weak. Each case also provides evidence of involvement by experts who have successfully reached across borders to build policy-relevant knowledge; these epistemic communities are particularly strong in the ground-level ozone/smog case, but they are apparent in the climate change and biodiversity cases as well. It is worth noting that these experts often work for governments, suggesting the existence of overlapping networks. Moreover, in all cases excepting GM crops, there is evidence of transboundary cooperation taking place across levels—bilateral, trilateral, and subnational. However, different governance levels seem suited to particular, but varying, tasks. Certainly, bilateral cooperation is strongest in terms of resources, political “heft,” and institutionalization. This is not surprising, given where the greatest resources (if not necessarily regulatory jurisdiction) for environmental protection lie. However, this cooperation is generally focused and issue-specific; on the Canada–US border, there is no body that seeks a comprehensive view of environmental cooperation. On the southern border, Border 2012 (and now Border 2020) does take a broader view, but its activities are somewhat hampered by the fact that the full range of agencies are not involved in planning. The trilateral CEC has been more successful at “soft” cooperation functions: getting issues on government agendas, facilitating knowledge creation and dissemination, and building policy communities. In two of our cases, specifically air pollution and biodiversity, the CEC has been able to foster thinking about broad-scale interactions—such as the relationship between electricity generation and air quality, or how a borderless view of ecosystems might change biodiversity planning. Interestingly, in the climate change case, the CEC has been unable to gain traction, given that national governments have been reluctant to allow it to undertake programming in this area. Subnational networks are particularly adept at bringing together a range of governmental and nongovernmental actors; this was certainly the case in terms of climate change. However, subnational networks in many areas tend to be quite weak, vulnerable as they are to changing political leadership. We believe that the prominence of transgovernmental networks is, more generally, both a strength and a weakness in terms of environmental network sustainability in North America. Linkages among bureaucratic officials can provide stability for shared projects, if they encourage longer-term connections—and concrete support—across agencies. Yet transgovernmental networks require domestic willingness to support transboundary interactions through various means, both in-kind and tangible; this support is by no means assured in the current economic climate. In all of our case studies, we point to instances where budget cuts to domestic agencies are imperiling cooperative initiatives.

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Another criticism that is consistently made of transgovernmental networks in general, and those in North America in particular, is that they are too closed and limited in their approach (Macdonald and Ayres 2012). A transnational network will have “staying power” if it can put sustainable advocacy coalitions in place—coalitions that are more broad-based and, in a manner similar to that described in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), share a set of common beliefs and interests. We would argue that forging a uniquely “North American” constituency for action and building support for action across borders must involve a wider range of environmental advocates than a pure transgovernmental model would suppose. This is critical given that a fundamental obstacle to dealing with North America’s environmental problems, as highlighted in the introduction and chapter 1, is that governments at all levels are currently preoccupied with economic downturn, greatly reduced budgets, and concerns over border security. It is no coincidence, we believe, that the case study with the highest degree of effectiveness in terms of forging a North American perspective on environmental management—namely biodiversity—also featured a broader range of governmental and nongovernmental actors.

Fostering Mutual Understanding and Learning Across our four case studies (even in the GM crop case), we have seen the ways that transboundary cooperation at the bilateral and trilateral levels has contributed to knowledge generation and dissemination, thereby fostering mutual understanding and policy learning. In terms of basic science to support environmental policy decisions, and technological development for policy instrumentation, national governments provide the lion’s share of resources. It is national government (along with some university) scientists who establish monitoring systems for air quality, who compile data on endangered species and spaces, who construct inventories for carbon emissions, and who research and collect crop landraces. However, national officials do not, in the first instance, adopt a borderless view when considering the implications of their science. Trilateral networks, and particularly the Commission on Environmental Cooperation, do perform this function. One of the most important contributions of the CEC to continental environmental policy has been the collection and publication of data on the three countries, in a comparable format. For example, the industrial categories widely used for collecting economic data are now uniform, and the CEC has linked these to the development of uniform emission inventories in the three countries. Thus, one can easily see, for example, which industries and jurisdictions have improved over time in terms of emissions to air, water, and land, and which have worsened. In the smog case, CEC studies were important for furthering understanding about the nature of transboundary air pollutant transport. Both the CEC and the Trilateral Committee have published several reports on the challenges facing continental biodiversity. In addition, it was the CEC which facilitated the greater scientific insight into contamination of Mexican crops by GM varieties. We believe that the CEC has a critical and continuing role to play in highlighting environmental issues and pushing national agenda-setting, both by developing comparable and integrated data sources and by bringing governmental and nongovernmental interests together to pursue regional sustainability. There is also a great deal of academic work—some paid for by government, some by universities—that illuminates North American environmental issues or

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trains people to deal with them. For example, large numbers of Mexican students study conservation science in the United States and Mexico, and Canadian and American students and faculty members use Mexico’s diverse environments and seriously polluted areas as the locus for their research. This is an area that deserves greater support from binational and trinational bodies.

Resource Provision Some aspects of environmental policy, such as taking inventories of endangered species, are not very expensive. Others, such as regulation of the release of toxic substances or the use of genetically modified crops, require small amounts of government resources, but may place large costs on the private sector. Still others, such as the construction of sewage treatment plants, require very large public expenditures. Unfortunately, the slow recovery from worldwide economic recession since 2008 and widespread concern about the cumulative budget deficits built up since then have made most governments reluctant to raise their spending, particularly for new initiatives.1 This affects all levels of government. Since transgovernmental cooperation rests on inter-agency communication and joint policy initiatives, it is those agencies, particularly national agencies, that bear the costs of that cooperation—and these funds are minor and, in many cases, shrinking. It is clear from our cases that transboundary institutions— except in rare cases, such as the BECC—are simply not in the business of underwriting significant environmental protection and infrastructure costs. Our cases show, however, that transgovernmental institutions have great potential to facilitate and contribute to capacity-building. Bilateral cooperation, particularly on the US-Mexico border and often involving multiple agencies and institutions, has resulted in targeted support for aspects of Mexico’s environmental management regime. In addition, the CEC has built policy and program-relevant knowledge in a host of environmental areas, including emissions monitoring and inventories, biodiversity planning, and toxics management. There are many other initiatives ongoing which are operating quietly, behind the scenes, to support environmental policy implementation at the domestic level, particularly in Mexico. Emissions inventory design and air quality monitoring techniques are just two examples we have noted. We believe that it is critical to increase funding for capacity building in our own and in neighboring countries—for the strength of domestic regimes will determine our success in addressing the many transboundary environmental issues that we face on this continent. National agencies have a key role to play in underwriting such activities. This need is going to become particularly critical in the future as we address emerging transboundary challenges such as control of invasive species and adaptation to climate change.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS The general conclusion of this book can be summed up by saying that what we have now is not a functioning continental environmental management system, but many institutional building blocks and a reservoir of good will. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation did not revolutionize environmental policy coordination among the three North American nations, but it did strengthen collaborations and networks across the continent on a host

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of issues. In many cases, such as management of wildlife, protected areas, air pollution, and shared water bodies, the collaborations went back many decades at the bilateral level. Further, a host of post-NAFTA cross-border regional and local collaborations have strengthened cooperation on almost all environmental topics. The challenge for the future will be to apply this unsystematic framework to the still-unresolved problems of pollution and biodiversity, and also to two enormous environmental challenges lurking just over the horizon: creating a continental energy supply that can take into account environmental concerns; and the need to adjust food production, water management, and biodiversity conservation to major changes that are likely to occur in the continent’s climate. This framework needs to be broadened beyond the governmental realm to integrate other knowledge and stakeholder communities into open dialogue on how we might tackle our shared environmental problems—and push our governments to act. We also need to focus much more strongly on building capacity at the domestic—especially subnational—level, since this is often where innovative and creative energies lie. The “environmental entanglements” we have described in this book—those among bureaucratic agencies, but also the more informal linkages ranging from joint investments in border cleanup projects to trade in environmental technologies and personal ties among citizens and scientists—are keeping environmental policy simmering slowly on the back burner in North America, awaiting the time that it can be placed front and center.

Note 1 In 2012, national level budget deficits were −3.5 per cent of GDP in Canada, −2.4 per cent in Mexico, and −7.6 per cent in the United States (The Economist).

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INDEX

activism. See environmental movement agencies. See organizational capabilities agriculture. See also GM crops Canada, 14 – 15 Mexico, 15 organic, 162 seed banks, 170 – 171 three countries compared, 158 – 159 transboundary impacts, 4 – 5 United States, 15 air pollution. See also smog and air quality acid rain, 113 ambient air quality, 115 – 116 CEC and, 63 – 64, 111 – 112 corridors, 111 – 112 health impacts, 112 – 113 point-source air quality, 115 – 116 scientific and technological challenges, 118 – 120 transboundary conflicts, 111 – 112 Arctic sea ice extent, 132 – 133 bilateral transboundary governance for biodiversity, 100 – 101 Canada–USA, 52 – 53, 54 – 55, 57 – 58 critical functions of transboundary governance, 54 – 60 cross-boundary networks and communication, 54 – 56, 182 GHG reduction and climate change, 145, 149 – 151

major agreements, 52 – 53 mutual learning and exchange of information, 56 – 58 overview, 47 – 48, 52, 74 resources for environmental capacity, 58 – 60, 184 transgovernmental networks, 54 – 55, 74 USA-Mexico, 53 – 54, 55 – 56, 58, 59 – 60 biodiversity bilateral transboundary governance, 100 – 101 Canada, 86 – 88, 90 – 91, 92 – 93, 95, 98 – 99 capacity, 94, 104 – 105, 178 collaboration, 79, 98 – 104, 181 critical functions of transboundary governance, 101 – 105, 181 cross-boundary networks and communication, 101 – 103 financial resources, 92 – 95, 104 – 105 gaps and challenges in policy, 100 – 101 long-term interventions, 83, 87 – 88 Mexico, 85 – 86, 88 – 92, 93 – 95, 98 – 99, 104 – 105 mutual learning and exchange of information, 103 – 104 new threats, 95 – 98 overview, 79 resources for environmental capacity, 94, 104 – 105 scope of the problem, 80 – 82

210Index three countries compared, 83 – 84, 178 trilateral transboundary governance, 99, 100 – 101 United States, 84 – 85, 87 – 88, 89 – 91, 92 – 93, 95, 98 – 99 Border 2012 and Border 2020, 55 – 56, 58, 122, 126 – 127 Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), 59 – 60 borders of North America border fence Mexico-United States, 97 – 98 border security, 59 borderless map of North America, 1 – 2, 175 – 176 description, 1 – 2 environmental management challenges, 2 – 5, 176, 185 political map of North America, 1 – 2, 175 transboundary collaboration, 180 – 184 budgets. See financial resources Canada. See also provinces and territories; three countries compared agriculture, 14 – 15 bilateral governance, 52 – 53, 54 – 55, 57 – 58 biodiversity, 86 – 88, 90 – 91, 92 – 93, 95, 98 – 99 capacity, 39 – 40, 41, 42, 43 energy production, 16 – 17 environmental activism, 30 environmental management, 35 – 36, 37 GHG reduction and climate change, 130 – 131, 134 – 135, 136, 137 – 138, 139, 141 – 143, 144 – 145, 149 – 150, 151 GM crops, 162, 164 land use and natural resources management, 14 – 15, 16 legislation and regulations, 35 – 36, 37 logging and forest products, 14 policy and policy-making, 32, 35 – 36, 38 – 39, 66 smog and air quality, 57, 112, 114, 115 – 116, 117, 120, 121, 123 subsurface resources, 16 Canada-US Air Quality Agreement, 121 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (1988), 2 capacity. See also resources for environmental capacity biodiversity, 94, 104 – 105, 178 Canada, 39 – 40, 41, 42, 43 data management, 42 – 43 definition and concept, 6, 39 federal environmental agencies, 39 – 40, 43 – 44 functions of governance for, 7

GHG reduction and climate change, 178, 181 GM crops, 178 – 179 Mexico, 39, 40 – 42, 43 – 45, 94 non-environmental organs, 44 resources involved, 39, 51 – 52 smog and air quality, 178 subnational level, 180 three countries compared, 38 – 45, 46, 177 – 180 United States, 40 charitable organizations, funding, 73 “Citizen Submission Process” of CEC, 61 – 62, 64 civil society groups. See nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) climate change. See also greenhouse gas reduction and climate change threat to biodiversity, 97 Climate Registry, 152 – 153 CO2 reduction. See greenhouse gas reduction and climate change collaboration. See also mutual learning and sharing of information best practices, sharing of, 51 bilateral level, 54 – 56, 182 biodiversity, 101 – 103 CEC and, 60 – 63, 182 description, 49 – 50 for biodiversity issues, 79, 98 – 104, 181 GHG reduction and climate change, 130. 131 – 132, 133, 145 – 152, 155 – 156, 181 GM crops, 166 – 167, 169-70. 173, 181; importance, 7 – 8 smog and air quality, 109, 121 – 122, 124 – 125, 126 – 127, 181 subnational level, 67 – 71, 182 transboundary issues and borders, 8 – 9, 180 – 184 trilateral level, 60 – 63, 182 vulnerabilities, 74 Columbian exchange, 80 Comisión Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso de la Biodiversidad (CONABIO), 85 – 86 command-and-control model, 35, 36 – 37 Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) air pollution, 63 – 64, 111 – 112, 122, 125 Atlas of North America, 2 “Citizen Submission Process,” 61 – 62, 64 creation, 48 cross-boundary networks and communication, 60 – 63, 182 GHG reduction and climate change, 145 – 146, 151 – 152, 153, 156

Index211 GM crops, 166 mutual learning and exchange of information, 63 – 64, 183 resources for environmental capacity, 64 – 65 role and mandate, 60, 182 communication. See cross-boundary networks and communication conservation biology, 102 cooperation. See collaboration corn and GM crops, 158 – 159, 162 – 163, 166 courts of law, 31 – 32 critical functions of transboundary governance. See also cross-boundary networks and communication; mutual learning and exchange of information; resources for environmental capacity bilateral level, 54 – 60 biodiversity, 101 – 105, 181 description, 7, 48 – 52, 181 – 182 GHG reduction and climate change, 148 – 154, 181 GM crops, 169 – 172 smog and air quality, 124 – 127 subnational level, 67 – 73 transboundary collaboration, 182 – 184 trilateral level, 60 – 65 cross-boundary networks and communication. See collaboration data management. See also mutual learning and exchange of information for biodiversity, 103 – 104 capacity and, 42 – 43 CEC and, 63 registries and inventories, 61, 152 – 153 ecological conditions, three countries compared, 25 – 28 economy. See also financial resources GM crops and, 160 on maps of North America, 175 regional variations, 22 – 23 three countries compared, 19 – 25 education, three countries compared, 41 ejidos, 15 endangered species, listing, 84 – 87 Endangered Species Act (USA, 1973), 85 energy production and use Canada, 16 – 17 coal, 19, 114, 134 in economy, 22 GHG reduction and climate change, 134 – 135 Mexico, 17 – 19, 20 natural gas production, United States, 17

oil sands, 16 – 17 shale plays, 18 three countries compared, 16 – 19 United States, 17, 19 Environment Canada, 39 – 40, 43, 59 environmental agencies. See organizational capabilities environmental capacity. See capacity environmental concern, three countries compared, 28 – 29 environmental governance. See also transboundary governance description, 7, 48 – 49 environmental management. See management (environmental) environmental movement Canada, 30 Mexico, 30 – 31 three countries compared, 28 – 31 United States, 29 Environmental Performance Index, 25 environmental policy. See policy (environmental) environmental policy-making. See policymaking (environmental) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 33, 40, 43, 59, 115 epistemic communities, 51 estados. See states (Mexico) federal systems, 31, 32 financial resources. See also resources for environmental capacity for biodiversity issues, 92 – 95, 104 – 105 of CEC, 64 – 65 collaboration, 184 GHG reduction and climate change, 153 – 154 national funding, 74, 184 protected areas, 92 – 95 smog and air quality, 126 – 127 in subnational governance, 72 – 73, 74 three countries compared, 39 – 40, 59 First Nations, 86, 88 fiscal crisis, 24 – 25 forests, 89 fuel efficiency standards for vehicles, 117 funding. See financial resources gas production. See energy production and use General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA) (Mexico, 2008), 36, 66 – 67 General Law on Wildlife Conservation (Mexico), 85 – 86 Gini Index, 23 – 24

212Index GM crops Canada, 162, 164 capacity, 178 – 179 CEC and, 166 characteristics, 159 collaboration, 166 – 167, 173, 181 critical functions of transboundary governance, 169 – 172 cross-boundary networks and communication, 169 – 170 economic issues, 160 evolution of technology, 166 gaps and challenges, 167 – 169 genetic pollution, 162 – 163, 170 – 171 labeling, 165 legislation and regulations, 164 – 165, 167 – 168, 169 Mexico, 162 – 163, 164 – 165, 166 – 168, 172 – 173 mutual learning and exchange of information, 170 – 171 non-target organisms, 161 organic agriculture and GM crops, 162, 168 resistance of weeds and insects, 160 – 161 resources for environmental capacity, 171 – 172 scope of the problem, 158 – 163 three countries compared, 157, 163 – 165, 168, 178 – 179 trilateral transboundary governance, 167 United States, 162, 164, 167 governance, definition, 7 Great Lakes, bilateral governance, 52 – 53, 54 – 55, 57 Great Lakes-Heartland region, 68 – 69 greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction and climate change bilateral transboundary governance, 145, 149 – 151 Canada, 130 – 131, 134 – 135, 136, 137 – 138, 139, 141 – 143, 144 – 145, 149 – 150, 151 capacity, 178, 181 CEC and, 145 – 146, 151 – 152, 153, 156 challenges, 147 – 148 collaboration, 131 – 132, 133, 145 – 148, 155 – 156, 181 constituency support, 142 – 144 critical functions of transboundary governance, 148 – 154, 181 cross-boundary networks and communication, 130, 148 – 152 energy production, 134 – 135 impacts in North America, 132 – 133 legislation and regulations, 136 – 137, 138 Mexico, 131, 135, 138 – 142, 143 – 144, 153 – 154

mutual learning and exchange of information, 152 – 153 national targets and plans, 136 – 139 overview, 129 – 130 policy in North America, 133 – 144, 147 – 148 resources for environmental capacity, 144 – 145, 153 – 154 scope of the problem, 130 – 133 subnational level, 139 – 142, 146 – 147, 149 – 151 three countries compared, 129 – 130, 133 – 135, 145 – 148, 154 – 156, 178 trilateral transboundary governance, 145 – 146 United States, 130 – 131, 134, 136 – 137, 139, 141, 143, 144, 149 – 150, 151 ground-level ozone, 110 – 111, 114, 123 – 124. See also smog and air quality habitat protection, 87 – 91 Health Canada, 112 Human Development Index (HDI), 23 – 24 human resources, three countries compared, 41 – 42 hunting, 79, 83, 84 – 87 implementation gap, 39, 46 income, three countries compared, 22 – 23 information. See data management; mutual learning and exchange of information International Boundary and Water Commission, 98 – 99 International Joint Commission (IJC), 57, 98 invasive species, 95 – 97 La Paz Agreement, 53, 121 – 122 land trusts, 90 land use and natural resources management Canada, 14 – 15, 16 Mexico, 15 – 16, 17 – 19, 89 as threat to biodiversity, 97 three countries compared, 14 – 19 United States, 15, 16, 17, 19, 29 landraces, 163, 170 Leaders’ Summits, 66, 146 learning. See mutual learning and exchange of information legislation and regulations Canada, 35 – 36, 37 courts of law, 31 – 32 GHG reduction and climate change, 136 – 137, 138 GM crops, 164 – 165, 167 – 168, 169 hunting and biodiversity, 83 – 85 Mexico, 36, 37 – 38 three countries compared, 178 – 179 United States, 35, 37

Index213 lindane, 61 local government, 71, 103. See also subnational transboundary governance logging and forest products, Canada, 14 management (environmental) Canada, 35 – 36, 37 capacity (See capacity) challenges related to borders, 2 – 5, 176, 185 differences in approaches, 176 – 180 as domestic issue, 5 future of, 175 – 177, 185 Mexico, 36, 37 – 38 three countries compared, 34 – 38, 177 – 180, 184 – 185 United States, 35, 37 maps of North America, 1 – 2, 175 – 176 Mexico. See also states (Mexico); three countries compared agriculture, 15 bilateral governance, 53 – 54, 55 – 56, 58, 59 – 60 biodiversity, 85 – 86, 88 – 92, 93 – 95, 98 – 99, 104 – 105 capacity, 39, 40 – 42, 43 – 45, 94 corruption, 45 economic development, 22 energy production, 17 – 19, 20 environmental management, 36, 37 – 38 environmental movement, 30 – 31 GHG reduction and climate change, 131, 135, 138 – 142, 143 – 144, 153 – 154 GM crops, 162 – 163, 164 – 165, 166 – 168, 172 – 173 land use and natural resources management, 15 – 16, 17 – 19, 89 legislation and regulations, 36, 37 – 38 policy and policy-making, 33 – 34, 38, 66 – 67 smog and air quality, 113, 114 – 115, 116, 118 – 120, 121 – 122, 123 – 124, 126 – 127 subsurface resources, 16 war on drugs, 44 – 45 willingness to address environmental problems, 6 Mexico City, air pollution and smog, 6, 113 mobile sources and air quality, 117, 138 monarch butterfly, 82, 92, 161 Monarch Butterfly Reserve, 92 multilateral transboundary governance, 67 mutual learning and exchange of information bilateral level, 56 – 58 biodiversity, 103 – 104 CEC and, 63 – 64, 183 description, 50 – 51

GHG reduction and climate change, 152 – 153 GM crops, 170 – 171 importance, 7 “lessons learned,” sharing of, 51 smog and air quality, 125 – 126 subnational level, 71 – 72 transboundary collaboration, 183 – 184 trilateral level, 63 – 64, 183 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) (1994), 4 – 5 National Geographic, 83 – 84 National Park Service (NPS), 93 national parks. See protected areas natural resources management. See land use and natural resources management networks. See cross-boundary networks and communication New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (the NEG/ECP), 149 New England/Maritime region, 68 nitrogen oxides (NOx), 110 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in biodiversity issues, 102, 103 funding in subnational governance, 73 GHG reduction and climate change, 142 – 143, 147 in networks, 49 North America. See also three countries compared economy and free trade, 2 – 4 maps and physical features, 1 – 2, 175 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), 48, 60, 65 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1994), 4 – 5 North American Regional Action Plans (NARAPs), 61 North American Research Strategy for Tropospheric Ozone (NARSTO), 122, 125, 126 oil. See energy production and use organizational capabilities for biodiversity issues, 102 three countries compared, 43 – 44, 58 – 59, 184 ozone and ground-level ozone, 110 – 111, 114, 123 – 124. See also smog and air quality parks. See protected areas Parks Canada, 95 policy (environmental). See also policymaking (environmental) Canada, 38 – 39

214Index implementation (See capacity) Mexico, 38 problem-solving through (See management [environmental]) three countries compared, 5 – 6 policy entrepreneurs, 57 – 58 policy-making (environmental) Canada, 32, 35 – 36, 66 Mexico, 33 – 34, 66 – 67 three countries compared, 31 – 34 United States, 32 – 33, 66 politics and institutions, three countries compared, 31 – 34 pollutant release and transfer registries (PRTRs), 61 pollution control regimes. See management (environmental) private sector, 49, 73 protected areas biodiversity, 83 biosphere reserves, 89 history and policy, 87 – 91 overlapping with people areas, 91 – 92 resources for, 92 – 95 threats to, 97 – 98 transboundary agreements, 99 provinces and territories environmental activism, 30 environmental agencies, 43 in environmental policy-making, 32, 35 – 36, 66 GHG reduction and climate change, 134 – 135, 139, 141 – 142, 149 – 150 linkages with USA states, 67 – 69, 70 – 71 natural resources, 16 smog and air quality, 114, 116 at subnational level, 66 – 67 recession, 24 – 25 regions. See subnational transboundary governance regulations. See legislation and regulations research and research funds, 41 – 42, 63, 102 resources for environmental capacity bilateral level, 58 – 60, 184 biodiversity, 104 – 105 CEC and, 64 – 65 description, 51 – 52 GHG reduction and climate change, 144 – 145, 153 – 154 GM crops, 171 – 172 importance, 7 smog and air quality, 126 – 127 subnational level, 72 – 73 transboundary collaboration, 184 trilateral level, 64 – 65, 184 vulnerabilities, 74

scientific research. See research and research funds Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT), 43 – 44, 59, 85 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), 65 – 66 September 11, 2001, 9 smog and air quality air quality policy, 115 – 116, 117, 122 – 127 Canada, 57, 112, 114, 115 – 116, 117, 120, 121, 123 capacity, 178 CEC and, 122, 125 critical functions of transboundary governance, 124 – 127 cross-boundary networks and communication, 109, 124 – 125 health and, 112 – 113 Mexico, 113, 114 – 115, 116, 118 – 120, 121 – 122, 123 – 124, 126 – 127 monitoring and measurement, 118 – 120 mutual learning and exchange of information, 125 – 126 resources for environmental capacity, 126 – 127 scope of the problem, 110 – 112 three countries compared, 112 – 115, 127, 178 transboundary collaboration, 109, 121 – 122, 124 – 125, 126 – 127, 181 United States, 57, 113, 114, 115, 117, 120 – 122, 123 – 124, 126 – 127 vehicle emissions, 117, 138 sociall values and activism, 28 – 31 species, numbers and population decline, 81 – 82 Species at Risk Act (SARA) (Canada, 2002), 86 – 87 states (Mexico) at bilateral level, 56 capacity, 44 economy, 22 – 23 GHG reduction and climate change, 139 – 142 legislation and regulation, 22 – 23 linkages with USA states, 69 – 71 policy-making, 33 – 34, 66 – 67 protected areas and, 94 smog and air quality, 116, 118 – 119 at subnational level, 66 – 67 states (United States) at bilateral level, 56 GHG reduction and climate change, 139, 141, 149 – 150 hunting management, 84 linkages with Canadian provinces, 67 – 69, 70 – 71

Index215 linkages with Mexican states, 69 – 71 policy-making, 33, 66 smog and air quality, 115, 127 at subnational level, 66 – 67 stereotypes, three countries compared, 5 – 6 subnational transboundary governance capacity, 180 collaborative activities, 70 – 71 critical functions of transboundary governance, 67 – 73 cross-boundary networks and communication, 67 – 71, 182 economic variations, 22 – 23 external actors, 71 funding, 72 – 73, 74 GHG reduction and climate change, 139 – 142, 146 – 147, 149 – 151 mechanisms and institutions, 70 multilateral governance, 67 mutual learning and exchange of information, 71 – 72 provinces and territories (Canada), 66 – 69, 70 – 71 resources for environmental capacity, 72 – 73 states (Mexico), 66 – 67, 69 – 71, 72 – 73 states (USA), 66 – 71, 72 – 73 three countries compared, 66 – 67 subsurface resources, 16 Taking Stock series and database (CEC), 63 territorial planning of land use, 89 territories, Canadian. See provinces and territories three countries compared agriculture, 158 – 159 biodiversity, 83 – 84, 178 capacity, 38 – 45, 46, 177 – 180 ecological situation, 25 – 28 economy, 19 – 25 environmental management, 34 – 38, 176 – 180, 184 – 185 environmental policy, 5 – 6 GHG reduction and climate change, 129 – 130, 133 – 135, 145 – 148, 154 – 156, 178 GM crops, 157, 163 – 165, 168, 178 – 179 land use and natural resources management, 14 – 19 legislation and regulations, 179 policy-making, 31 – 34 smog and air quality, 112 – 115, 127, 178 stereotypes, 5 – 6 subnational governance, 66 – 67 values and activism, 28 – 31 tourism, in protected areas, 88, 89, 95 toxic pollutants release, 26 – 28, 61

transboundary cooperation agreements, 98 transboundary governance bilateral level (See bilateral transboundary governance) collaboration (See collaboration) critical functions (See critical functions of transboundary governance) multilateral, 67 subnational level (See subnational transboundary governance) trilateral level (See trilateral transboundary governance) transboundary issues collaboration, 8 – 9, 180 – 184 domestic environmental management, 5 environmental impacts, 4 – 5 importance, 6 – 7 transgovernmental networks, 49 – 50, 182 – 183, 184. See also cross-boundary networks and communication at bilateral level, 54 – 55, 74 at subnational level, 67 trilateral transboundary governance. See also Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) for biodiversity, 99, 100 – 101 critical functions of transboundary governance, 60 – 65 cross-boundary networks and communication, 60 – 63, 182 GHG reduction and climate change, 145 – 146 GM crops, 167 mutual learning and exchange of information, 63 – 64, 183 overview, 47, 48 resources for environmental capacity, 64 – 65, 184 SPP and leaders’ summits, 65 – 66 United States. See also states (United States); three countries compared agriculture, 15 bilateral governance, 52 – 56, 57 – 58, 59 – 60 biodiversity, 84 – 85, 87 – 88, 89 – 91, 92 – 93, 95, 98 – 99 capacity, 40 energy production, 17, 19 environmental management, 35, 37 environmental movement, 29 GHG reduction and climate change, 130 – 131, 134, 136 – 137, 139, 141, 143, 144, 149 – 150, 151 GM crops, 162, 164, 167 land use and natural resources management, 15, 16, 17, 19, 29 legislation and regulations, 35, 37

216Index policy-making, 32 – 33, 66 smog and air quality, 57, 113, 114, 115, 117, 120 – 122, 123 – 124, 126 – 127 subsurface resources, 16 values, three countries compared, 28 – 29 volatile organic compounds (VOCs), 110 Western Climate Initiative (WCI), 149 – 150

“whole-landscape” approach to biodiversity, 99 – 100 wildlife management, 83, 84 – 85 wildlife refuges, 89 World Health Organization (WHO), 113 World Values Survey, 28 Zedillo, Ernesto, and regime, 34