Enhancing Women’s Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) 1614999473, 9781614999478

Table of contents :
Title Page
Editorial Note
Foreword: NATO Efforts to Counter Terrorism and Support the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda
Contents
An Overview of Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)
International and National Frameworks for Women, Peace and Security (WPS)
Roles of Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) in Tunisia
International and National Frameworks for Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in Spain: Beyond Words
Spanish Government's Policies on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE): A View on the Role of Familiar Environments
Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE): Do Radical and Non-Democratic Ideas Matter?
Women and Violent Extremism: Past and Future Face of Terrorism
Women's Roles in Spain's Terrorist Phenomenon
The Roles of Women in South Asian Salafi Organizations
Women and Women's Organizations in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)
Counter-Messaging for Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East and North Africa: Using a Gender Lens
Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism: The Example of MotherSchools in Macedonia from Philosophy to Practice
Subject Index
Author Index

Citation preview

ENHANCING WOMEN’S ROLES IN PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (P/CVE)

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springer.com http://www.iospress.nl

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 144 ISSN 1874-6276 (print) ISSN 1879-8268 (online)

Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media IOS Press IOS Press

Enhancing Women’s Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)

Edited by

Sara Zeiger Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism

Rogelio Alonso Universidad Rey Juan Carlos

José Herrera Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (FAES, the Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis)

and

Lilah El Sayed Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism

Amsterdam • Berlin • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Enhancing Women’s Roles in International Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Efforts Madrid, Spain March 2018

© 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-61499-946-1 (print) ISBN 978-1-61499-947-8 (online) Library of Congress Control Number: 2019930987 Publisher IOS Press BV Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] For book sales in the USA and Canada: IOS Press, Inc. 6751 Tepper Drive Clifton, VA 20124 USA Tel.: +1 703 830 6300 Fax: +1 703 830 2300 [email protected]

LEGAL NOTICE The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

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Editorial Note The essays in this edited volume are the opinions of the authors, and do not represent the views of Hedayah, Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (FAES) or NATO. The editors chose to standardize non-English words and names of terrorist groups (e.g. “Daesh” for “the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/the Levant” and “Al Qaeda”) across the chapters for consistency.

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Foreword: NATO Efforts to Counter Terrorism and Support the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda Elena BEGANUa and Breda BUNIČ b a Counter Terrorism Officer, NATO b Senior Advisor to Secretary General Special Representative (SGSR for WPS), NATO Abstract. The Alliance’s contribution to the global approach to Counter Terrorism was set out at the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago. This article describes its subsequent evolution and makes reference to NATO’s current role in the international community’s fight against terrorism. Particular attention is given to the intimately related field of Women, Peace and Security and the way that gender considerations have now been mainstreamed throughout NATO’s counter terrorism approach and beyond. Some practical examples of relevant NATO activities are given. Keywords. NATO, counter terrorism, women, peace and security

1. Introduction This edited volume and the Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) hosted by Hedayah and the Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (the Foundation for the Analysis and Social Studies, FAES) on “Enhancing Women’s Roles in International Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Efforts” contribute to two of NATO’s strategic objectives. First, they support co-operation as part of international efforts to meet the security challenges of counter-terrorism through the investigation of human factors and best practices. Second, they contribute to enhancing awareness of security developments in human and social aspects of security. Therefore, both enhance NATO’s efforts, in the sphere of counter-terrorism, and in relation to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. To put the contribution in context, it is important to outline NATO’s key efforts to counter terrorism and to support the WPS agenda internationally. As NATO Allies stated in 2014, “Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity as a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion and is a challenge that the international community must tackle together” [1]. Allies recognize that the primary responsibility to defend citizens and territory against terrorist attacks lies with individual states but that International Organizations have a complementary and nonduplicative role to play. The United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (General Assembly A/RES/60/288), a unique global approach to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism, has underpinned the international counter terrorism effort since 2006 [2]. NATO, as a political-military Alliance, contributes its

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unique strengths primarily under the second and third pillars of the strategy, namely preventing and combating terrorism and building states’ capacity. Also, while not directly part of its mandate, NATO acknowledges the importance of work related to foreign terrorist fighters and to preventing terrorism through countering violent extremism (CVE) and considers it relevant to its own contribution to the international community’s fight against terrorism. NATO Allies’ and Partners’ promote the role of WPS within the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolutions as an integral part of NATO’s wider policy objective of enhancing security and stability. It is also key to international efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism.

2. NATO’s Evolving Contribution to the Fight against Terrorism Although terrorism was recognized as a relevant threat in NATO’s Strategic Concept in 1991, it was only after the attacks against the United States in September 2001, that NATO addressed it through a more structured and focused approach. As an external attack on an Ally, 9/11 gave rise to NATO’s first, and to date only, invocation of its collective defense mechanism – Article 5 of the founding Washington Treaty. In 2011, the global threat environment demanded that NATO reconsider its contribution and employ a more comprehensive approach. Building on the institutional transformation within NATO in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, a review of NATO’s approach to Counter Terrorism conducted in 2012 identified NATO’s added value and specific roles in the global counter terrorism approach. The 2012 Counter Terrorism Policy Guidelines recognized Counter Terrorism as an integral part of NATO’s three core tasks [3]. The Alliance was directed to address three pillars: Awareness of the threat (through intelligence exchange, political consultations etc.); Capabilities (to ensure NATO action remains possible despite the terrorist threat); and Engagement with partner nations and other international organizations (to ensure a cohesive international approach). This 2012 CT political guidance was translated into military implications for the fight against terrorism. The Military Concept for Counter-Terrorism (MC0472/1) recognized that “terrorism poses one of the most immediate threats to the Alliance and its Members...” [4]. The Military Concept defines counter-terrorism as “all preventive, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property against terrorist threats and/or acts, to respond to terrorist acts” [5]. It builds extensively on the three key principles outlined in NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines and reaffirms NATO’s commitment, with a specific focus on the military Counter Terrorism contribution. Given the evolution of the threat and the changed security environment, in May 2017 Heads of State and Government endorsed an ambitious and detailed Action Plan to enhance NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism. This Action Plan was intended to strengthen and expand NATO’s contribution to the broader international fight against terrorism. It covers the areas of awareness and assessment, preparedness and responsiveness, capability development, cooperation and capacity building for partners, and support to operations. It serves as an important aspect of efforts to project stability and contributes to the Alliance’s approach to deterrence and defense. Within this Action Plan, NATO recognized the need to better understand the impact of gender in order to be able to prevent and respond more efficiently to violent extremism and terrorism. The Alliance has therefore committed to study the impact of gender in the

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context of security and counter-terrorism as well as to mainstream gender issues more widely. Adequate support for the Alliance’s WPS agenda is essential, as is its inclusion in existing NATO strategies, over and above those related to counter terrorism. Recent years have seen an unexpected rise in women’s involvement in terrorism, an activity which traditionally, had been considered as male-dominated. Daesh and other terrorist groups integrate gender into their messaging and social governance system and use the gender perspective as a strategic and operational tool. To date, too little attention has been paid to the lack of female participation in the fight against terrorism, despite a recognized, urgent requirement for a way to dissuade or deter vulnerable women and girls from joining terrorist movements. The WPS agenda recognizes the vital role women play in contemporary security challenges, and terrorism is no exception. The adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2242 at the 15th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, addressed women’s role in countering violent extremism and terrorism. At that meeting, the (now former) NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow pledged to the UN Security Council that NATO would finance research on the role of gender in countering and preventing violent extremism: The world is changing rapidly. We face a rising tide of violent extremism and terrorism. And it will be women, once again, who are most at risk. It is therefore essential that women be involved at every stage, and every level, of our operations and missions… NATO is doing a lot. But, we need to do more, especially when it comes to promoting equal participation within NATO itself. We need to increase active and meaningful participation of women. To this end, we pledge…to finance gender-sensitive research aimed at identifying drivers of radicalization and violent extremism, and to develop targeted and evidence-based responses, including the empowerment of women to safeguard communities [6]. Since then, NATO has made good this pledge by contributing to efforts to better understand the role of women in preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism and continuously underlining the importance of the gender perspective. The implementation of the WPS agenda represents an important policy priority for NATO Allies and Partners across all areas of work. Importantly, the three pillars of NATO’s Counter Terrorism Policy Guidelines - Awareness, Capabilities and Engagement - are now reflected in the Women, Peace and Security agenda. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Awareness of the terrorist threat today and tomorrow includes gender analysis and early warning indicators. Capabilities to counter terrorism effectively include gender expertise and improved gender balance, as well as awareness of the threat that women can pose to security. Engagement with partner countries and other International Organizations includes commitment and strengthened efforts to integrate WPS in their daily agenda. Figure 1. Gender as part of NATO CT Policy Guidelines.

NATO Allies and Partners are made aware of the differing impact of terrorism and violent extremism on women, men, girls and boys, including in the context of health, education and participation in public life. Women and girls are known to be directly

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targeted by extremist groups and there is deep concern that acts of sexual and genderbased violence (SGBV) [7] are a deliberate part of the ideology and strategic objectives of certain terrorist groups. SGBV is recognized as a method of terrorism/war, and is used as an operational tactic by terrorist groups. It can further contribute to the power of such groups through drawing in finances and recruits and through the destruction of communities. SGBV’s link to human trafficking and violent extremism is recognized in Security Council Resolution 2331 [8]. Whilst women can play a key role in preventing violent extremism that leads to terrorism, many also facilitate acts of terrorism, willingly support terrorist groups and perform terrorist acts. NATO recognizes that terrorism and violent extremism are gendered activities that usually exploit rigid stereotypes about gender roles and that, importantly, women’s political participation can help counter acts of terror and violence.

3. Examples of NATO’s Practical Engagement The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPS) has long supported the Women, Peace and Security agenda. As a response to female migration to Daesh, and in addition to the ARW mentioned in this volume, SPS funded an ARW led by experts from Morocco and the United States on the “Prevention of recruitment of women to Daesh and other terror groups.” The goals of the workshop were to raise awareness about the issue and develop practical, concrete measures to help prevent women and girls from travelling to join terrorist groups as well as to conduct an evidence based review of reasons for women joining Daesh. It also looked at how to respond to the tactics used by Daesh in the recruitment of women and how to neutralize and counteract its messages. NATO has initiated gender-sensitive research aimed at identifying drivers of radicalization and violent extremism, and developing targeted and evidence-based responses. NATO offers a wide range of training and education opportunities specific to the field of counter terrorism, including training on “Gender in Terrorism Education” which is provided to both Allies and Partners. NATO can draw on a wide network of educational assets, including the NATO School in Oberammergau and more than 20 Centres of Excellence - one of which, in Ankara, Turkey, specifically addresses Allies’ and Partners’ Defence Against Terrorism. The 2017 Action Plan on NATO’s enhanced role in the international community’s fight against terrorism specifies that ongoing and future efforts should seek to include a gender dimension to promote their long-term sustainability and ensure they do not have an adverse impact on women and girls.

4. Conclusion NATO’s approach to the fight against terrorism has evolved since it was first set out in 2012. It will continue to do so in order to adapt to changing aspects of terrorism and violent extremism which have a much wider impact. The role of women is one such aspect. NATO is committed to the WPS agenda, and makes a connected effort to mainstream the role of gender including into the NATO’s Counter Terrorism approach. Recognizing that the WPS agenda is much more complex than just protecting women from armed conflict, NATO is determined to contribute to changing the discourse. The application of the “gender lens” has already made a difference in operational contexts.

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Women make unique and valuable contributions to various aspects of countering terrorism, including through analysis, fieldwork and policy development. Their participation in the wider fight against terrorism and violent extremism is essential and NATO will continue to encourage Allies and Partners to engage more systematically on issues of gender and counter terrorism. Through NATO’s SPS Programme, NATO can contribute to evidence-based research to identify how women can be empowered to enhance the fight against terrorism and to identify opportunities for substantive, meaningful female roles across a wide spectrum of counter terrorism activities. The fight against terrorism requires a whole of society approach in which women’s participation is essential. Greater social and economic empowerment will fuel improved involvement.

References and Endnotes [1] [2] [3] [4]

[5] [6]

[7]

[8]

NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, September 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/ official_texts_112964.htm. United Nations General Assembly, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/288. Cooperative security, collective defence, crisis management. North Atlantic Military Committee, Final Decision on Military Concept for Counter-Terrorism MC 0472/1, 2016, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160817_160106mc0472-1-final.pdf. Ibid. United Nations Security Council Open Debate on the High-Level Review of UNSCR 1325 – Women, Peace and Security, Remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow, 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_123768.htm. NATO defined SGBV in its Military guidelines on the prevention of, and response to, conflict related sexual and gender-based violence “Any sexual and/or gender-based violence against an individual or group of individuals, used or commissioned in relation to a crisis or an armed conflict.” United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2242, 2015, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/wp-content/uploads/s_res_2242.pdf.

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Contents Editorial Note Foreword: NATO Efforts to Counter Terrorism and Support the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda Elena Beganu and Breda Bunič An Overview of Women’s Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) Sara Zeiger and Rogelio Alonso International and National Frameworks for Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Sara Zeiger

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Roles of Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) in Tunisia Neila Feki

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International and National Frameworks for Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in Spain: Beyond Words Blanca Palacián De Inza

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Spanish Government’s Policies on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE): A View on the Role of Familiar Environments María Eugenia Hernández

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Enhancing Women’s Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE): Do Radical and Non-Democratic Ideas Matter? Rogelio Alonso

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Women and Violent Extremism: Past and Future Face of Terrorism Mia Bloom

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Women’s Roles in Spain’s Terrorist Phenomenon Luis M. Toro

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The Roles of Women in South Asian Salafi Organizations Eva Borreguero

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Women and Women’s Organizations in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) Seran De Leede

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Counter-Messaging for Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East and North Africa: Using a Gender Lens Lilah Elsayed

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Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism: The Example of MotherSchools in Macedonia from Philosophy to Practice Edit Schlaffer, Laura Kropiunigg and Rafael Kropiunigg

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Subject Index

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Author Index

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Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-1

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An Overview of Women’s Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) a

Sara ZEIGERa, Rogelio ALONSOb Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism b Universidad Rey Juan Carlos

Abstract. This chapter introduces the topic: the intersection between the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 regarding women, peace and security and countering violent extremism (CVE). The chapter also summarizes the contents of a workshop on “Enhancing Women’s Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism” that was hosted by Hedayah and Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (the Foundation for the Analysis and Social Studies, FAES) in March 2018 in Madrid, Spain. The workshop aimed to develop a further research base for incorporating a gender lens into peace and security efforts, with the perspective of looking across the full spectrum of counter-terrorism, to include prevention. Keywords. Women, peace, security, preventing violent extremism, PVE, countering violent extremism, CVE, counter-terrorism, CT, WPS, Resolution 1325.

1. Introduction The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on the role of women, peace and security in October 2000 highlighted the role that women can play in preventing and resolving conflicts, including terrorism. It calls for the protection of women and girls from gender-based violence. Subsequent resolutions have enhanced and further articulated the role that women can play in peace and security internationally. Notably, UNSCR 2242 (2015) calls for improved implementation of the WPS agenda amongst UN actors. Moreover, the United Nations has recently adopted the UN Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism in January 2016. This plan emphasizes the role that the WPS agenda can play in developing more comprehensive preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programs and policies. This was particularly emphasized with reference to violation of women’s basic rights, the inclusion of women as key actors in national action plans (NAPs), supporting women’s civil society organizations that work on P/CVE, the role of gender equality and empowering women in P/CVE, capacitybuilding for women’s organizations for P/CVE and a number of other recommendations. However, at the policy and program level, the WPS agenda and P/CVE efforts are not always coordinated or integrated. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its partners have identified UNSCR 1325 implementation as one of their priorities, and are doing so in a number of ways, including developing indicators to evaluate

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UNSCR 1325 and mapping how women are included in armed forces and security organizations worldwide. As such, NATO has a strong role to play in leading the research, policy and programming efforts related to the implementation of the WPS agenda. Nonetheless, to date, there has been less of a focus on the integration of this WPS agenda with CT and P/CVE efforts within NATO as well as NATO countries and partners. In order to address this research gap, Hedayah and Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (the Foundation for the Analysis and Social Studies, FAES), together with Universidad Rey Juan Carlos (URJC), hosted an Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on the roles of women in international efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism in Madrid, Spain, from 19 to 21 March 2018. The workshop was sponsored by the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. The workshop built on the good practices and recommendations developed out of a Hedayah policy brief on the role of women in CVE efforts in support of the Madrid +10 Global Policy Dialogue to Stop Violent Extremism initiative by the Club de Madrid [1], and a recent publication by Hedayah and the Global Center on Cooperative Security that reviews international programs integrating women and CVE efforts [2]. The ARW also built on Hedayah’s experience designing and implementing National CVE Strategies and National Action Plans [3]. In addition, the URJC and FAES had also conducted important research on some of the issues related to the ARW. In the last decade, projects sponsored by the European Commission and the Minerva program of the US Department of Defense, among other institutions, laid the ground for this NATO seminar because of their focus on women, peace and security. It was also of relevance the experience acquired by URJC in the assessment of the Spanish National plan against radicalization. The geographical scope of the ARW had a special focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). NATO countries and partners in the Middle East include Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE, and in North Africa include Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. There was also a secondary focus on NATO countries and partners such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, UK, and US — all of which have an interest in implementing WPS more broadly, but also in the MENA region. As the location of the ARW was in Madrid, there was also a practical focus on the Spanish context and experience with respect to women, peace and security as well as CVE. For Spain, a European liberal democracy affected by violent extremism, it is of key relevance the implementation of the WPS agenda. In particular, the geopolitical situation of Spain, being located close to North Africa, also makes this implementation of great importance to the region. A successful implementation will provide great benefit to the country but also to others in neighboring areas affected by the deficits that make this WPS agenda so relevant. 1.1 Goals and Objectives of the Workshop This workshop aimed to meet NATO’s strategic objectives, including: x To facilitate co-operation on issues of common interest, including international efforts to meet emerging security challenges of counter-terrorism by investigating human factors in the defense against terrorism, as well as best practices in response to terrorism; and x To enhance awareness of security developments for human and social aspects of security related to NATO’s strategic objectives.

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In accordance with the above goals, the objectives of the workshop were to: x Facilitate enhanced understanding and shared good practice of the role of women in countering violent extremism efforts amongst NATO countries and NATO partners; x Facilitate enhanced understanding and shared good practice of the role women play in peace and security efforts; x Align and coordinate common goals between counter-terrorism efforts and women, peace and security (WPS) agenda when related to P/CVE; and x Identify roles of NATO, NATO countries and NATO partners in facilitating efforts at the regional, national and local levels for women’s involvement in P/CVE.

2. Research on Women, Peace, Security and P/CVE In order to generate a body of knowledge on the subject of women, peace and security as related to countering violent extremism, the speakers of the workshop were asked to submit an essay to reflect the research and policy recommendations in their presentations. The essays submitted in this volume are the opinions of the authors, and do not represent the views of Hedayah, FAES or NATO. A summary of the essays that comprise this edited volume is as follows. 2.1. International and National Contexts: Women, Peace, Security and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) The chapter by Sara Zeiger on “International and National Frameworks for Women, Peace and Security (WPS)” summarizes the different initiatives undertaken by international organizations in addressing the topic of women, peace and security related to UNSCR 1325. Zeiger analyzes which countries within the scope of the workshop had national action plans or strategies specifically dedicated to addressing WPS. She also looks at the Global Gender Gap Index and the Global Women, Peace and Security Index for each of those countries, to give an assessment of how WPS is being implemented in NATO countries and by NATO partners. Finally, she provides three case studies (Australia, Canada and Jordan) with respect to their national action plans and strategies to address the topic. Using Tunisia as a case study, Neila Feki summarizes the National Strategy for Countering Extremism and Terrorism from the perspective of gender in the chapter titled “Roles of Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) in Tunisia.” Her essay reviews first the legal and institutional frameworks for women in P/CVE before summarizing how women are mentioned or included in the National Strategy. It concludes with a summary of how the WPS component of the National Strategy is being implemented through a particular strategic objective and includes some recommendations for further consideration. In the chapter titled “International and National Frameworks for Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in Spain: Beyond Words,” Blanca Palacián de Inza reviews the initiatives taken by the Spanish government to implement UNSCR 1325 through military training in initiatives abroad. After outlining the Spanish framework and a general review of the initiatives the Government of Spain has been conducting internationally, Palacián de Inza also summarizes in detail a training program on gender for military personnel prior to deployment. This training program, which is a Bilateral Spanish-Dutch Initiative,

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revealed significant cognitive changes by participants in their perception of gender after the training was conducted. María Eugenia Hernández outlines the Spanish domestic perspective on CVE in her chapter titled “Spanish Government’s Policies on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE): A View on the Role of Familiar Environments.” She gives examples of how different sectors can contribute to CVE initiatives through a number of different Spanish government policies and programmatic examples on CVE. 2.2. Women and Radicalization to Violent Extremism Rogelio Alonso’s chapter titled “Enhancing Women’s Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE): Do Radical and Non-democratic Ideas Matter?” investigates the role of ideology in the radicalization process, particularly with respect to women. In this regard, Alonso provides some academic and intellectual frameworks for how radicalization can be approached from a cognitive perspective, in order to “set the stage” for some of the later chapters. Coming from the perspective of a Western democracy, he questions how non-democratic ideas are related to radicalization, drawing on ideological examples from a number of different categories of violent extremism and terrorism. In “Women and Violent Extremism: Past and Future Face of Terrorism,” Mia Bloom gives an overview of women’s participation in international terrorist groups. Drawing on examples from Asia, Europe and the Middle East, Bloom undermines the argument that women play passive roles in violent extremism, or that women are always the “victim” of violent extremism, and instead highlights the various ways in which women can participate in violent extremism and terrorism. Through evidence, she provides examples where women can play both logistical and violent roles in terrorist activity. In addition, she provides a nuanced explanation as to how women, when coerced, have complex roles to play in violent extremism and terrorism that often exploit their sexuality and femininity to achieve terrorist aims. Moreover, Bloom also gives examples of how female suicide bombing is utilized as a tactical approach for several terrorist groups. Luis M. Toro’s chapter “Women’s Roles in Spain’s Terrorist Phenomenon” gives an overview of the narratives that have attracted Western and European women to join Daesh in Iraq and Syria. After highlighting some of the main narratives, such as promises of equality, promise of adventure, state-building, employment and motherhood, Toro gives examples of females that have been accused of attempting to join or joining Daesh from the Spanish context. Drawing on his experience in the Guardia Civil, Toro is able to provide case studies for how women from a Western context might be radicalized to join a terrorist group. The chapter titled “The Role of Women in South Asian Salafi Organizations” by Eva Borreguero provides an overview of the role women play in three Salafi organizations in India and Pakistan. The essay seeks to identify reasons why women participate in Salafi organizations, including ones that are affiliated with violent extremism. The essay categorizes their participation into “subsidiary leadership” and “deferential activism”, and provides case studies for both examples of participation. The essay concludes with some recommendations for preventing violent extremism, specifically suggesting that women’s empowerment alone is not sufficient for undermining radical ideologies, because many of the women interviewed by the author felt empowered in their own ways by participating in those groups.

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2.3. Women, Peace and CVE Seran de Leede’s chapter on “Women and Women’s Organizations in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)” gives an overview of some of the initiatives conducted by women’s groups that contribute to CVE. In this context, de Leede underlines the core differences between work being done on women’s empowerment and women’s rights, and the work being done by women for CVE purposes. She also discusses how targeted campaigns against violent extremism need to take into consideration a gendered perspective, given some of the difference between men and women in how they are radicalized. The chapter “Counter-Messaging for Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East and North Africa: Using a Gender Lens,” by Lilah ElSayed, highlights several international and national-level organizations that are conducting counter-messaging in the Middle East and North Africa. Drawing upon a dataset of counter-narratives contained in Hedayah’s Counter-Narrative Library, ElSayed also provides specific examples of counter-messaging campaigns that take on a gender lens (from Middle Eastern countries) and explains how these campaigns may contribute to reducing violent extremism. In “Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism: The Example of MotherSchools in Macedonia from Philosophy to Practice,” Edit Schlaffer, Laura Kropiunigg and Rafael Kropiunigg provide a case study of how women are integrated into CVE efforts. Their essay outlines their MotherSchools program in Macedonia, designed by Women without Borders. The program trains women (mothers) with competencies that can aide in reducing violent extremism in their communities, including parenting and communication skills. The program is founded on the premise that women as mothers can act as the first line of defense with respect to radicalization. The essay examines some of the key lessons learned from the Macedonia program, and highlights the main concerns of the mothers there in their CVE approaches and efforts.

3. Recommendations for Integration of UNSCR 1325 into CT and CVE Efforts In addition to the presentations that constituted the essays in this volume, the discussions at the ARW also resulted in a number of recommendations that are useful to NATO, NATO countries and NATO partners. These recommendations were reviewed by the participants of the ARW, and thus can be considered a reflection of the expertise that was represented during the workshop. 3.1. General Recommendations In a general sense, there are a few principles to take into consideration regarding integrating women into peace and security efforts across different sectors. These principles include the need to: x Protect against stereotyping women and instrumentalization of women in P/CVE efforts; x Ensure men also take the lead on gender just as much as women; x Integrate gender perspectives into mainstream discussions on peace and security (not just about women);

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Ensure appropriate resources are allocated towards WPS and gender issues in budgets; Recognize that there is a relationship between domestic violence and radicalization—that domestic violence can contribute to the radicalization process of women and men; Recognize the different roles that women can play in terrorism and counter-terrorism, including as actors in terrorist groups; victims of terrorism; supporters of terrorist ideas; active players in their communities against terrorism; passive or active influencers in their families.

3.2. Recommendations for NATO and International Bodies For NATO and other international bodies such as the United Nations and the European Union, policymakers should: x Ensure that women’s voices are incorporated into national and regional strategies against violent extremism; x Ensure that the promotion of respect towards human rights is a key element in CVE efforts; x Consider the role of female victims due to their abilities to tell powerful stories and make change at the community level; x Encourage all NATO countries and NATO partners to develop NAPs in WPS and/or ensuring the WPS points are incorporated into other elements of strategies and plans; x Ensuring NATO moves from the theoretical and structural frameworks to actionoriented implementation of WPS resolutions and good practices; x Provide support and training to national governments of NATO countries and partners to raise awareness of 1325 and its principles as well as women’s issues (participation, gender-based violence); x Provide support and training to civil society of NATO countries and partners to raise awareness and skills related to 1325 and women’s issues. 3.3. Recommendations for Military and Security Organizations Specifically, with regards to military and security organizations, including those embedded within NATO, its members, partners and allies, security agencies should: x Recognize that gender roles in security forces are necessary for operational effectiveness at all stages (planning, execution, evaluation, strategy); x Integrate counter-terrorism and CVE topics in gender training for operational staff (including NATO, and also military partners); x Ensure training takes place on gender and security at the beginning of entry to military, not in pre-deployment phase (too late); x Ensure training on domestic violence, human trafficking, sexual violence and violent extremism are embedded in training for counter-terrorism operations and officials; 3.4. Recommendations for Analyzing Women’s Involvement in Terrorism As part of any security strategy or intelligence organization, it is important to evaluate the role of men and women in terrorist organizations. In this regard, a careful analysis of women’s role in terrorist organizations should:

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x x

x

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Recognize the nuanced role of women in terrorist organizations, and designing interventions that look at gender-specific drivers of radicalization and recruitment; Ensure that the female perpetrator is not “sensationalized” in the media and communications about her. Terrorist organizations are recognizing that female perpetrators draw higher media attention and focusing too much on the female perpetrator may have unintended consequences that support terrorist groups’ aims; Avoid the assumption that signs of increased religiosity are automatically connected to signs of radicalization. For example, outward signs of piousness (e.g. wearing a headscarf, changing the way of dress) are sometimes assumed as indicators of radicalization.

3.5. Recommendations for the Criminal Justice and Legal Sector NATO countries and partners should consider the following recommendations for the criminal justice and legal sector: x Embed gender dynamics and role of women in all political and public-sector legislation and policy, not just on women in P/CVE; x Encourage NATO countries and partners to adopt legal frameworks that recognize gender differences in returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), especially female returnees or female family members of returnees/fighters; x Gender-specific challenges include marriage, divorce, children and child’s rights— especially when social arrangements have taken place within the context of a foreign conflict, or under Daesh rule (for example); x Encourage NATO countries and partners to enhance legal frameworks for operating in the space of prevention. 3.6. Recommendations for Disengagement, Rehabilitation and Reintegration When it comes to disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs for foreign terrorist fighters and prisoners, practitioners should: x Ensure women are embedded in strategies for disengagement, de-radicalization and reintegration positioned in positions of authority that can also be trusted. This may be the case where returnees or prisoners trust females more than males, especially in moments of vulnerability. Here, it is important that the female prison guard or psychologist (for example) is still seen as an authority figure to ensure a proper reintegration; x Incorporate where possible female relatives into disengagement, de-radicalization and reintegration programs for returning FTFs and terrorist prisoners; x Ensure that roles of gender in different cultural contexts are taken into consideration when evaluating interventions. 3.7. Recommendations for Women and Community-Based Programs for CVE Finally, when it comes to involving women in community-based CVE programs, practitioners and program designers should: x Prioritize meetings among women from same country and women in different countries to share good practices and lessons learned on how to engage in peace and security issues;

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x x x x x x x

x

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Investigate the role of women in early detection and early signs of radicalization and prevention once detecting those signs; Take into consideration the realities of the community, and the knowledge generated at the local level for CVE efforts; Recognize the role of culture and identity in building resilient communities and increasing human security—and recognize the role that women can play in reenforcing cultural values; Incorporate, where possible, religious leaders (including female religious leaders) in efforts to increase human security in NATO countries and NATO partners; Recognize that the role of women in P/CVE and CT is related to the role that women play in their communities in societies, including participating in public spaces, politics, education, and other related areas; Involve women’s organizations, where possible, in efforts for CT and P/CVE because many of the underlying ideals they are fighting (for example, inequality) are also narratives and ideals of violent extremists; Recognize that emphasizing women’s rights in the framework of “Western feminism” can be perceived in some contexts as an imposed “foreign” agenda and potentially counter-productive to locally-based efforts to increase women’s participation in society; Recognize that the involvement of women’s organizations in CT and P/CVE can pose a risk to that organization in terms of their security and/or credibility in the local community, and be sensitive to using appropriate terminology.

4. Conclusion Taking into consideration this body of literature on women, peace and security and its intersections with P/CVE efforts, it can be seen that some progress has been made in the past 18 years to implement UNSCR 1325. At the same time, there are still many ways in which the important subject of gendered approaches to peace and security is not being considered. Collectively, the international community — including NATO, its partners and its allies — can do much better at ensuring that the lessons learned are applied, and the recommendations are achieved. It will take dedicated efforts of both men and women involved in the security field for true implementation of UNSCR 1325 to take place, but in the meantime, it is important to acknowledge the achievements to date and the promise of more implementation to come in the future. References and Endnotes [1]

[2]

[3]

Zeiger, S., Policy and Program Recommendations: Role of Women in Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism, Hedayah, Abu Dhabi, 2015, http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File44201683657.pdf. Fink, N., Zeiger, S. and Bhulai, R, A Man’s World: Exploring the Role of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Hedayah and the Global Center on Cooperative Security, Abu Dhabi, 2016, http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-44201684919.pdf. Hedayah, Guidelines and Good Practices: Developing National P/CVE Strategies and Action Plans, Hedayah, Abu Dhabi, September 2016, http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File1792016192156.pdf.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.

Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-9

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International and National Frameworks for Women, Peace and Security (WPS) a

Sara ZEIGERa Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism

Abstract. Since the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, there have been a number of frameworks, policies, initiatives and programs that have focused on addressing women, peace and security issues. This essay looks at the international context of WPS in the framework of how the implementation of 1325 relates to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). In addition, this essay gives an overview of the National Action Plans of 29 countries and evaluates them in comparison with two key indicators: the Global Gender Gap Index and the Global Women, Peace & Security Index. Finally, this essay concludes with three case studies of the National Action Plans and indicates areas of overlap with relevant efforts for better inclusion of women in CVE. Keywords. Women, peace, security, CVE, national action plan, Resolution 1325, Australia, Canada, Jordan, Middle East, North Africa, Europe, international organizations.

1. Introduction In the 18+ years since the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), several advancements have been made with respect to the implementation of the resolution and related to the role of women in peace and security efforts. On the one hand, international organizations and national governments have adopted standards for implementing women, peace and security (WPS) initiatives and activities, to include national action plans being developed for many countries. At the same time, there is still much work that is needed in this field, as the WPS agenda in the security sector is not always taken as seriously as other Security Council Resolutions. However, in the context of an increased attention on what is called “countering violent extremism” (CVE) [1], there are more debates, research and programs specifically on what role women can and do play in prevention of radicalization leading to violent extremism [2]. In this context, the purpose of this essay is to take stock of international and national initiatives for implementing UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions by evaluating both international and national frameworks with relation to efforts for CVE. In other words, it is not a review of the frameworks and initiatives for the WPS agenda as such, but this essay examines the most relevant initiatives through the lens of their relationship to CVE activities. It begins with an overview of key international bodies and their frameworks, to include the UN, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union, and the European Union (EU). Next, this essay provides an overview of national action plans for WPS internationally and analyzes those plans in comparison to two key indicators: the Global Gender Gap Index [3] and the Global Women, Peace and Security Index [4]. Finally, it

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concludes with three case studies (Australia, Canada and Jordan) of national action plans that are relevant to the improvements of the WPS agenda in relation to CVE activities and programs. The geographical scope of the essay is in alignment with the key identified NATO countries and partners for the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) that was hosted in Madrid, Spain, by the Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (FAES) and Hedayah in March 2017. The scope of that workshop had a special focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). NATO countries and partners in the Middle East include Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE; in North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia are included. There is a secondary focus on NATO countries and partners that have an interest in assisting implementation of WPS efforts in the MENA region, to include Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the US.

2. International Frameworks for Women, Peace and Security Several international organizations have developed frameworks on women, peace and security related to CVE. These include resolutions, good practice documents, calls to action, policy and action plans, structural mechanisms within institutions and research reports. The outputs and frameworks for several main international organizations on WPS are summarized below. 2.1. United Nations UNSCR 1325 (2000) serves as the foundational document for the WPS agenda internationally [5]. This resolution noted for the first time the inclusive participation of women in conflict, peace negotiations and security institutions as an international good practice. It also noted the disproportional effects of insecure environments on women and girls, and raised the need for protection against sexual and gender-based violence. The Resolution noted the need to prevent violence against women, especially in conflicts, and enhance accountability under both national and international legal mechanisms to ensure this protection. UNSCR 1325 also called for mainstreaming a gender perspective to all UN peace and conflict operations worldwide. Additional Resolutions also had implications for the future of the WPS agenda. While a detailed analytical review of all of the relevant Resolutions is outside the scope of this essay, there are several key milestones that are worth mentioning in the context of WPS and CVE. UNSCR 2122 (2013) addressed women’s empowerment, access to justice, documentation of human rights violations and civil society engagement as a critical component to enhancing peace and security efforts. Moreover, this resolution requested additional briefings for the Security Council on the implementation of the WPS agenda, raising the international attention and accountability on this subject [6]. UNSCR 2242 (2015) connected the WPS framework with the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. This was also the first time a Resolution mentioned “countering violent extremism” within the framework of gender, meaning naturally creating an overlap between the work being done for national frameworks for WPS as well as national frameworks and action plans for preventing violent extremism (PVE) [7].

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Finally, the Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security that took place on 27 October 2017 provided an opportunity for the international community to “take stock” of the WPS efforts since UNSCR 1325. The Open Debate focused on two major themes: 1) women’s participation in crisis prevention and maintaining international peace and security; and 2) sexual and gender-based violence in conflict. The Open Debate reported on many key achievements that had taken place since 1325, including: the implementation of WPS in a global context, with markers of success in all areas; 2) national-level implementation and the development of National Action Plans (NAPs) or WPS-related elements of existing policies and strategies for peace and security; 3) gender-specific training and sexual exploitation training for peacekeepers within the UN; and 4) better kept gender-disaggregated data internationally [8]. 2.2. Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) approaches the WPS resolutions through their work on developing a framework document titled Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism [9]. This document was a collaboration between the GCTF and the OSCE, and was based on the recommendations of two expert workshops hosted in Istanbul in May 2014 and in Vienna in October 2014 [10]. The work of the GCTF on this subject complements the Resolutions of the United Nations because it operationalizes and produces more tangible examples of how the WPS resolutions can be carried out within the framework of CVE. For example, Good Practice 4 promotes the protection of “human rights of women and girls, including their equality, nondiscrimination, and equal participation, and ensure that CVE efforts do not stereotype or instrumentalize, women and girls” [11]. At the same time, the Good Practices document overcomes one underlying stereotype that women and girls are merely “victims” of terrorism. Instead, it recognizes that women and girls can sometimes be actively involved in terrorism, and outlines ways in which CVE efforts should take a gendered perspective to radicalization, particularly with respect to counter-narratives. Finally, this framework outlines specific ways in which women can be involved in both peace and security efforts through the lens of CVE. Various approaches are covered in this framework, including women’s role in interventions through the family unit, how girls’ education relates to CVE, and how women’s participation in the security sector can help build community relations and trust. 2.3. NATO NATO implements the WPS resolutions and frameworks through four main areas: 1) responding to the “call to action” through its operations and missions; 2) an internal policy and action plan; 3) through structural approaches and mechanisms; and 4) by promoting gender diversity within its employees. The first area refers to NATO’s core operations, and according to its website, NATO actively “seeks to incorporate gender perspectives within the analysis, planning, execution and evaluation of its operations and missions” [12]. For example, NATO has supported Jordan in integrating women into their armed services through a Trust Fund project [13]. In terms of its internal policy, while a “Strategic Concept” was devised in 2010 and revised in 2014, the formal NATO policy was not fully approved until 2017. Structurally, NATO has a number of initiatives in place that support the implementation of the WPS resolutions. First of all, NATO has a Special Representative

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for Women, Peace and Security, that is the high-level focal point leading on NATO’s WPS work. Second, there is a WPS task force at headquarters to help coordinate all staff on the WPS resolution implementation. In addition, there is also a NATO office on Gender Perspectives, an advisory body for the Military Committee of NATO, and gender advisors placed throughout NATO’s command structure. Finally, in terms of internal promotion of diversity, as a security organization, NATO has a women’s Professional Network Mentoring Program, encouraging female staff to “promote a common corporate culture and give training, development and mentoring opportunities to women” [14]. 2.4. Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) The OSCE’s approach to women, peace and security begins with the OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality (2004), which is the organization’s central policy on ensuring equal treatment of women internally [15]. This document also serves as a foundational document for how OSCE views the integration of women into peace and security efforts, primarily because of its leadership role internationally as an international organization focused on security. By promoting equality between women and men in OSCE’s operations and field missions, as well as in its activities and program, OSCE has set the international standards for organizations in the field. Further to this document, the Ljubljana Ministerial Decision No. 14 (2005) recognized the “importance of women’s full and equal participation in all phases of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation” [16]. Programmatically, OSCE initiated a toolkit on Gender and Security Sector Reform, with a specific tool titled “Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions in Security Sector Reform” in 2009 [17]. This toolkit aims to assist member states in implementing reforms across the defense, police, transitional justice and peacekeeping sectors with a lens sensitive to gender and gender differences. After this toolkit, the OSCE also began a program focused on “Women in Terrorist Radicalization,” which included two expert workshop discussions on women’s involvement in terrorism and in CVE that took place throughout 2012. The results of this program contributed to the previously-mentioned GCTF framework document on the subject. Finally, based on lessons learned from a National Action Plans academy in September 2017, the OSCE also released a guidebook for “Results-Oriented National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security” in order to provide good practices and lessons learned for those countries developing NAPs for WPS [18]. 2.5. African Union Although the African Union does not have a formal action plan, they initiated their implementation of the WPS resolutions through the Gender, Peace and Security Program (2015-2020). The program includes a special focus on the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Somalia [19]. Recently there has also been a high-level delegation to Nigeria for a stronger focus on gender equality, but the programmatic elements of that engagement are still in process [20]. However, the program itself mostly focuses on women as victims of violence and sexual violence in conflict settings and does not address in a systematic way the participation of women in conflict, nor the participation of women in counter terrorism (CT) or CVE efforts.

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The African Union also has a Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security that was appointed in 2014. This Special Envoy has the mandate to “push the agenda and raise the voices of women and girls that are affected by conflicts” [21]. Although the AU has this Special Envoy, it has not to date focused on CT or CVE efforts, but mainly addressed the ways in which women and girls are victims of violence and conflict. It should also be noted that according to a recent report by the African Union, 19 AU Member States have adopted a National Action Plan for WPS [22]. However, none of the African countries in the context of this essay have a NAP (Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia), although Tunisia is in its final drafting stages. In addition, three regional mechanisms have adopted Regional Action Plans for WPS; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) developed the Dakar Declaration and the ECOWAS Plan of Action for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 & 1820 in West Africa; [23] the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) supported Running with the Baton!: Regional Action Plan for Implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) [24]; and the East African Community developed the Regional Implementation Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2015 – 2019 [25]. 2.6. European Union The EU implements UNSCR 1325 through various mechanisms within the European External Action Services (EEAS). In terms of personnel, the EEAS has a Principal Advisor on Gender and on UNSCR 1325, who is responsible for ensuring “exchanges and coordination of the EU with other international, regional and national actors on policy and action related to gender and UNSCR 1325” [26]. The EEAS also has an EU informal Task Force that convenes EU officials from the European Commission and EU member states to share information and good practices on UNSCR 1325.

3. National Action Plans for Women, Peace and Security In order to provide an overview of the National Action Plans for the countries in the scope of this essay, research was conducted on the existence of a NAP for Women Peace and Security. In addition, to provide an assessment of how NAPs relate to the implementation of Resolution 1325, the countries were analyzed with respect to two key indicators: the Global Gender Gap Index and the Global Women, Peace and Security Index. The Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) [27] was developed by the World Economic Forum and is a measure of the magnitude of gender-based disparities and a way to track the progress of those disparities over time, starting in 2006 [28]. Overall, the Global GGI encompasses four main components with respect to women’s participation in society through: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. The Global GGI was chosen as one particular measure for this essay: because three of the four components directly relate to women’s involvement in peace and security efforts (economic opportunity, education and political empowerment). Taking into consideration all of these factors (and also weighted by proportion of population that are female), the countries included in the index are given a ranking in order, with 1 being the lowest gender gap and 144 being the highest.

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The Global Women, Peace and Security Index (Global WPS Index) was developed by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in order to better articulate how countries are achieving WPS milestones. The Index takes into account 11 indicators around three dimensions: inclusion (economic, social and political); justice (laws and discrimination); and security (family, community and society). It was developed with the specific intention of evaluating implementation of UNSCR 1325 as well as in relation to the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda [29]. It also takes into consideration personal security, which attempts to capture elements related to intimate partner violence and women’s perceptions of safety. 3.1. Analysis of National Action Plans for Women, Peace and Security Table 1 gives an overview of the countries in the scope of the NATO ARW and this essay in terms of the existence and timeline of their NAPs for WPS as well as the two indicators described previously. The numbers in the table indicate the ranking of the Global GGI (1 being the least gender gap) and the Global WPS Index (1 being the most compliant). With the exception of Italy and Jordan, all of the countries that have a NAP for WPS are in the top 35% of the rankings for the Global GGI for 2017, and all of the countries that do not have a NAP are in the bottom 20% of the rankings for the Global GGI. Jordan is in the bottom 20% of the rankings for 2017, but it should be noted that its NAP was only approved in December 2017, and as such it has yet to be seen the effects of the release of the NAP. Of the countries that do not have a NAP, it is important to point out that Tunisia has the highest ranking—and that notably its NAP for WPS in is final drafting and approval stages. This may also have to do with recent political and economic reform for women in the country after the Arab Spring. Notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the second highest rated out of the current selection of the non-NAP countries. In the Global WPS Index, with the exception of Italy and Jordan again, all of the countries with a NAP for WPS are in the top 15% of the rankings. It should be noted that three of the countries without a NAP for WPS are still within the top 30% of the rankings: Greece, Malta and the UAE. The UAE stands out with respect to its other Middle Eastern neighbors, with a ranking of 42 overall. According to the 2017 report, this is due to high education reforms, high achievements of women in the labor force, and recent appointment of females in political leadership positions. Indeed, the UAE is also a strong proponent of the WPS agenda within the UN, outwardly supporting the implementation of USCR 1325 and sponsoring events that look at women’s leadership in peace and security efforts [30]. It is noted in the 2017 report, however, that some of the legal mechanisms, for example on domestic violence and sexual assault, are the main reasons why the ranking is not higher for this country [31]. Still, the UAE has initiated several programs to address these legal challenges, for example through domestic violence awareness programs supported by the Dubai Foundation for Women and Children, and it would be expected that its Global WPS ranking will rise in the coming 5 years. With the exception of Bahrain and Qatar, all of the remaining countries without a NAP fall within the bottom 50% of the Global WPS Index rankings. Tunisia and Jordan, the two countries with a NAP in progress or recently approved, are ranked 93 and 110, respectively.

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Table 1. National Action Plans for Women, Peace and Security Country

Australia Algeria Bahrain Canada Egypt Denmark France Germany Greece Italy Iraq Jordan Kuwait Malta Mauritania Morocco The Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Qatar Sweden Switzerland Spain Tunisia Turkey United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States

National Action Plan Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No* No No

Year(s) Adopted

Yes

2006, 2012, 2014,2018 2010, 2016

Yes

2012 2010, 2017 2005, 2008, 2014 2010, 2015 2012, 2017 2010, 2014, 2016 2017 2007, 2012, 2016 2015 2006, 2011, 2015 2009, 2014 2006, 2009, 2016 2007, 2010, 2013 2007, 2017 (2018) -

Global GGI Rank 2017 [32] 35 127 126 16 134 14 11 12 78 82 N/A 135 129 93 132 136 32 9 2 33 130 5 21 24 117 131 120

Global WPS Index Rank 2017 [33] 17 123 63 22 138 12 21 12 40 32 147 110 83 31 136 113 7 18 2 20 64 7 3 5 93 105 42

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49

22

*Tunisia’s NAP was adopted in May 2018 and is subject to approval by the Cabinet. The full NAP was not publicly available at the time of submission for this publication [34].

Given this analysis, it can be said that having a National Action Plan for WPS strongly correlates with a significantly higher ranking in both the Global GGI and the Global WPS Index. As such, it is recommended that NATO work with its countries and partners to encourage the development of NAPs for WPS and aide in the implementation of those NAPs in order to support a lessening of the gender gap overall, as well as better implementation of UNSCR 1325.

4. Case Studies: National Action Plans for Women, Peace and Security The final section of this essay will present three case studies of a NAP for WPS and relevant programs that relate to that NAP that have implications on CVE efforts nationally and internationally. The three case studies chosen for this section are Australia, Canada and Jordan.

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4.1. Australia The first case study analyzed is in the Australian context, through the Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, with the mandate of 2012-2018 and that was recently extended to 2019 [35]. Australia’s Global GGI ranking is 35, and Global WPS Index ranking is 17. Australia’s National Action Plan revolves around five key pillars: Prevention, Participation, Protection, Relief & Recovery, and Normative frameworks. There are several examples of how the Australian Government is implementing the NAP through various domestic and international agencies that also have a relationship to CVE efforts. For example, in support of the UNSCR 1325, the Australian CivilMilitary Centre, UN Women, the Australian Office for Women, and the Australian Federal Police supported a video titled “Side by Side: Women, Peace and Security,” which aimed to raise awareness among peacekeeping missions of different elements of the WPS implementation [36]. The video is accompanied by a toolkit for predeployment personnel from military, police, and humanitarian missions that underlines the key considerations and milestones from a practical level for those being deployed to international missions [37]. Furthermore, under the Australian Federal Police’s Pacific Police Development Program, there is a Pacific Island Chiefs of Police Women’s Advisory Network that aims to link senior female police officers from the Pacific Region, promoting the inclusion of more women in security agencies worldwide. Additionally, under the national government’s “Living Safe Together” grant mechanism, and in alignment with their NAP for WPS, several women’s organizations have received funding to support localized CVE efforts [38]. Within international funding mechanisms, the Australasian government has also prioritized the subject of women and girls in their CVE efforts. For example, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) lists the disproportionate effects of violent extremism on women and girls, particularly through limiting their participation in education, and prioritizes their CVE activities that may address these effects [39]. With a strong ranking in both the Global GGI and the Global WPS Index, and evidence of domestic and international programs that advance the WPS resolutions, it can be said that Australia is a leader in the implementation of UNSCR 1325, also in the context of women in CVE efforts. 4.2. Canada The second case study is the Canadian context, through their “National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022” [40]. Canada’s GGI ranking is 16, and Global WPS Index ranking is 22. The strategies revolve around several key pillars, especially in promoting gender equality, empowerment of women and girls, respect for the rights of women and girls, and the inclusion of women in society. Notably, the Canadians also focus on domestic violence and sexually-based violence through the recent “It’s Time: Canada’s Strategy to Prevent and Address Gender-Based Violence” [41]. Several national agencies are involved with the implementation of these two plans. For example, domestically, Public Safety Canada is committed to implementing the WPS plan through the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, a center dedicated to drawing on local efforts to assess domestic terrorism and violence threats, as well as to address them through the strengths of the local communities [42]. The Status of Women Canada has dedicated annually $16 million to establish a Gender-

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Based Violence Knowledge Centre to collect data and research on gender-based violence [43]. Global Affairs Canada is involved internationally for the implementation of the NAP, including through consulates and embassies abroad. Two of the thematic priorities for their Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), a grant program with an annual budget of around $15 million, are “empowering women and girls and promoting gender equality,” and “promoting peace and security” [44]. Moreover, their Anti-Crime and Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Programs (ACCBP/CTCBP), which are responsible for coordinating Canada’s international policies on CT, CVE and international/transnational criminal activity, have recently integrated gender components into the training curricula with specific targets by 2022. For example, as one of their priorities is to mainstream WPS and gender into CT policy and diplomacy, the ACCBP/CTCBP programs plan to appoint gender focal points to be responsible for WPS implementation, and to increase the gender-based analysis (GBA). There is also a joint effort by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Public Safety Canada, and Global Affairs Canada to manage the integration of WPS efforts into the International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations (IPP) Program, by incorporating WPS training into pre-deployment requirements, ensuring that the IPP selection process actively recruits and selects women, and ensuring that Canadian instructors take part in the UN All-Female Pre-Selection Assistance and Assessment Teams in a number of African countries [45]. Similar to Australia, Canada can be taken as a good example of how NAPs for WPS have been systematically integrated into policies and programming across domestic and international agencies. 4.3. Jordan The third case study is to analyze the efforts by Jordan, whose NAP for WPS was approved in December 2017, so the effects of its implementation have yet to be seen [46]. Jordan’s Global GGI ranking is 135, and its Global WPS Index ranking is 110. The main pillars of Jordan’s NAP include: meaningful participation of women in security sector and peace operations; meaningful participation of women in preventing radicalization and violent extremism; ensuring gender-sensitive humanitarian services accessible to Jordanian refugees; and fostering a community culture that recognizes the gender needs in peace and security [47]. Notably, the Jordanian NAP is also intentionally consistent and coordinated with several national frameworks and strategies in the Jordanian context, including: Comprehensive National Human Rights Plan (2016-2025), the National Strategy for Jordanian Women (2013-2017), Jordan’s Vision 2025, and the Jordanian Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis (2016-2018) [48]. The Jordanian case study is important because it provides a good example of strategic planning and ensuring the elements of the plan take into consideration perspectives from multiple sectors, including civil society. In preparation for the NAP, the Jordanian government also hosted a National Dialogue on UNSCR 1325 and commissioned a research study, together with UN Women, on the role of women and violent radicalization in Jordan [49]. The National Dialogue, which occurred in 2016, helped to identify potential priorities for the NAP on WPS from the perspective of 250 stakeholders, to include government officials, police, military, academics, tribal leaders, religious leaders and non-governmental organizations [50]. The research commissioned on women and radicalization in Jordan also revealed a number of key perceptions of the community when it came to female radicalization, notably that the Jordanian public felt

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that women were more susceptible to radicalization processes than men and would be more likely to participate in passive or logistical roles (rather than violence) [51]. The National Dialogue and research helped to identify Jordan-specific elements to include in the NAP, such as a heavy emphasis on ensuring the refugee camps incorporated a gender perspective when it came to women’s involvement in peace and security missions and programs. While the effects of the NAP are yet to be seen in terms of the Global GGI ranking and the Global WPS ranking, it would be expected that Jordan will rise through the ranking system in the next 5 years as it successfully begins implementing the NAP set in place in December 2017.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations Through the analysis in this essay, it is clear that there are examples of international and national plans, strategies and programs that have been addressing the WPS resolutions under the United Nations for the past 18+ years, and there have been many milestones and achievements in the implementation of these plans, strategies and programs. Through an analysis of the NAPs of the countries and case studies, it is evident that the publication of a NAP is one important step along the way of better implementation of the WPS resolutions related to 1325. At the same time, the NAP itself is only the beginning—countries that wish to be successful at closing the gap between men and women in peace and security efforts need to pay close attention to ensuring the NAP is carried out both domestically and internationally. As such, a number of recommendations are important for consideration for NATO countries and partners when it comes to implementing 1325 and related resolutions that are outlined in more detail below: x Ensuring that, as a starting point, all NATO countries and partners have a comprehensive NAP for WPS that takes into consideration other related national frameworks and the national context of each country; x Ensuring the implementation of WPS policies and action plans, where they exist; or, where they do not exist, ensuring the implementation of programs related to WPS and CVE; x Embedding indicators for tracking and assessing WPS in the policies and programs of all relevant agencies within the government (to include nationally and internationally focused agencies); x Designing training programs for counter-terrorism, CVE, security and peacekeeping operations with language that take into consideration a gender lens; x Commissioning research on peace, security and CVE to include language that reflects a gender lens, x Incorporating a gender lens into international policies for security, counterterrorism, CVE and peacekeeping operations; x Ensuring the presence of proper legal mechanism and after-care for domestic and sexually-based violence cases.

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References and Endnotes [1]

[2]

[3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12] [13] [14] [15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19] [20]

For the purposes of this essay, CVE is defined as the efforts to reduce or prevent individuals from partaking in terrorist activity through non-coercive means by addressing the underlying drivers of radicalization (push and pull factors) and designing interventions to counter those factors at the individual or community level. CVE also includes disengagement, de-radicalization and reintegration programs of former terrorists or formerly radicalized individuals. See, for example, N.C. Fink, R.B. Bhulai, & S. Zeiger, A Man’s World?: Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Hedayah, Abu Dhabi, 2016, http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-44201684919.pdf; I. Idris & A. Abdelaziz, Women and Countering Violent Extremism, GSDRC Report, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HDR_1408.pdf ; d’Estaing, S.G., Engaging women in countering violent extremism: avoiding instrumentalisation and furthering agency, Gender and Development, 25 (2017), 103-118. Global Gender Gap Report 2017, World Economic Forum, Online, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2017 . Global Women, Peace and Security Index, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace & Security and PRIO, Online, 2017, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/the-index/. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1325, United Nations, Online, 2000, https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2122, United Nations, Online, 2013, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2122. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2242, United Nations, Online, 2015, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2242. Security Council Open Debate on Women Peace and Security, October 2017, Peace Women, Online, 2017, https://www.peacewomen.org/security-council/security-council-open-debate-women-peace-andsecurity-october-2017. Global Counterterrorism Forum, Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, GCTF, Online, 2015, https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/A/GCTFGood-Practices-on-Women-and-CVE.pdf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Global Counterterrorism Forum adopts good practices prepared by the OSCE on women and countering violent extremism, OSCE, Online, 2015, https://www.osce.org/secretariat/186226. Global Counterterrorism Forum, Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, GCTF, Online, 2015, https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/A/GCTFGood-Practices-on-Women-and-CVE.pdf,, page 4. Women, Peace and Security, NATO, Online, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_91091.htm#. NATO supports Jordanian Armed Forces to implement UNSCR 1325, NATO, Online, 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_124982.htm?selectedLocale=en. Women, Peace and Security, NATO, Online, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_91091.htm#. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Decision No. 14/04 2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality, OSCE, Online, 2004, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), https://www.osce.org/mc/23295?download=true. Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), Decision No. 14/05, Women in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation, OSCE, Online, 2005, https://www.osce.org/mc/17450?download=true. M. Bastik & D. deTorres, Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Resolution in Security Sector Reform, OSCE ODIHR, UN INSTRAW, and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Online, 2010, https://www.osce.org/odihr/75269?download=true. A. Muehlenbeck, Designing Inclusive Strategies for Sustainable Security: Results-Oriented National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security, OSCE and Inclusive Security, Online, 2016, https://www.osce.org/secretariat/294731?download=true. African Union Peace and Security, Programme on Women, Gender, Peace and Security, African Union, Online, 2016, 1 http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/80-women-gender-peace-and-security-1#car. African Union, African Union Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security in Joint UN-AU HighLevel Solidarity Mission to Nigeria and The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), African Union, Online, 2017, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170905/african-union-special-envoy-women-peace-andsecurity-joint-un-au-high-level.

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[21] African Union Commission, Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa, African Union, Online, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/pubs/2016womenpeacesecurityauc.pdf. [22] Ibid. [23] ECOWAS and United Nations Office for West Africa, The Dakar Declaration & ECOWAS Plan of Action for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 in West Africa, ECOWAS & UNOWA, Dakar 2010, http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/dakar_declaration_0.pdf [24] B. Musumba, Running with the Baton! Regional Action Plan for Implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008), InterGovernmental Authority on Developmant (IGAD), Djibouti, 2013, http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Regional%20Action%20Plan%20IGAD.pdf. [25] East African Community, Regional Implementation Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2015 – 2019, East African Community, Arusha, 2015, http://www.eassi.org/home/files/mydocs/final-report-on-the-eac-regional-implementation-fr.pdf. [26] European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, UNSCR 1325 and Gender Mainstreaming in the EU, EPLO, Online, http://eplo.org/activities/policy-work/gender-peace-security-2/gender-mainstreaming-eu/. [27] Global Gender Gap Report 2017, World Economic Forum, Online, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2017. [28] World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap Report 2017, World Economic Forum, Online, 2017, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf. [29] J. Klugman, Women Peace and Security Index 2017/18, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, Washington, D.C., 2017, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/WPSIndex-Report-2017-18.pdf. [30] See, for example, recent remarks by HE Lana Nusseibeh, Ambassador and PR of the UAE to the UN, with reference to the 2018 review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism.ctitf/files/20180312_UAE Amb_statement_CSW_Event.pdf. [31] J. Klugman, Women Peace and Security Index 2017/18, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, Washington, D.C., 2017, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/WPSIndex-Report-2017-18.pdf. [32] The Global Gender Gap Index is out of a total of 144 countries. [33] The Global Women Peace and Security Index is out of a total of 153 countries. [34] Peace Women, National Action Plan: Tunisia, Peace Women, Online, 2018, https://www.peacewomen.org/action-plan/national-action-plan-tunisia. [35] Australian Government, Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018, Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Online, 2012, https://www.pmc.gov.au/office-women/international-forums/australian-national-action-plan-womenpeace-and-security-2012-2018. [36] UN Women, Side by Side- Women, Peace and Security, UN Women, Online, YouTube, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2Br8DCRxME. [37] Australian Government, Side by Side: Women, Peace and Security, Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Online, 2014, https://www.pmc.gov.au/resource-centre/officewomen/side-side-women-peace-and-security. [38] C. Barker, Update on Australian Government measures to counter violent extremism: a quick guide, Parliament of Australia, 2017, Online, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/5461291/upload_binary/5461291.pdf. [39] Australian Government, Development Approaches to Countering Violent Extremism, Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, N. D., Online, https://dfat.gov.au/aboutus/publications/Documents/development-approaches-countering-violent-extremism.pdf. [40] Government of Canada, Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022- The implementation plans, Government of Canada, 2017, Online, http://international.gc.ca/worldmonde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_sexes/cnap_ip-pi_pnac17-22.aspx?lang=eng. [41] Government of Canada, Strategy to Prevent and Address Gender-Based Violence, Government of Canada, 2017, Online, https://swc-cfc.gc.ca/violence/strategy-strategie/index-en.html. [42] Government of Canada, Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022- The implementation plans, Government of Canada, 2017, Online, http://international.gc.ca/worldmonde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_sexes/cnap_ip-pi_pnac17-22.aspx?lang=eng. [43] Government of Canada, Setting the Stage for a Federal Strategy Against Gender-Based Violence, N.D., Online, https://swc-cfc.gc.ca/violence/strategy-strategie/principle-principe-en.html.

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[44] Government of Canada, Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022- The implementation plans, Government of Canada, 2017, Online, http://international.gc.ca/worldmonde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_sexes/cnap_ip-pi_pnac17-22.aspx?lang=eng. [45] Ibid. [46] S. Tabazah, Jordan endorses action plan for implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women’s rights-SIGI, Jordan Times, Amman, 2017, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-endorses-action-planimplementation-unscr-1325-women%E2%80%99s-rights-%E2%80%94-sigi. [47] The Jordanian National Commission for Women, Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for the Implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2018-2021, the Jordanian National Commission for Women and UN Women, 2018, http://www2.unwomen.org//media/field%20office%20jordan/images/publications/2018/jonap%2020182021%20unscr%201325.pdf?la=en&vs=5624. [48] Ibid. [49] The summary of the National Dialogue can be found here: http://www2.unwomen.org//media/field%20office%20jordan/attachments/publications/2016/8/en%20un%20women%20and%20jn cw%20-%20wps%20in%20jordan%20a%20resolution%20in%20action%20-%20national%20dialogue %20-%202016.pdf?la=en&vs=1228. The report on “Women and Radicalization in Jordan” can be found here: http://www2.unwomen.org//media/field%20office%20jordan/attachments/publications/2016/7/un%20women%20and%20jncw%20 -%20women%20and%20violent%20radicalization%20in%20jordan%20-%202016.pdf?la=en&vs=140. [50] M. Alderton, A National Dialogue on UNSCR 1325: Women, Peace and Security in Jordan: A Resolution in Action, The Jordanian National Commission for Women and UN Women, Online, http://www2.unwomen.org//media/field%20office%20jordan/attachments/publications/2016/8/en%20un%20women%20and%20jn cw%20-%20wps%20in%20jordan%20a%20resolution%20in%20action%20-%20national%20dialogue %20-%202016.pdf?la=en&vs=1228. [51] M. Alderton, Women and Violent Radicalization in Jordan, The Jordanian National Commission for Women and UN Women, Online, http://www2.unwomen.org//media/field%20office%20jordan/attachments/publications/2016/7/un%20women%20and%20jncw%20 -%20women%20and%20violent%20radicalization%20in%20jordan%20-%202016.pdf?la=en&vs=140.

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Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-22

Roles of Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) in Tunisia a

Neila FEKIa National Counter-Terrorism Commission (Tunisia)

Abstract. This essay provides a case study for the roles that women play in preventing and countering violent extremism, drawing from the Tunisian context. It begins with a review of the legal and institutional frameworks related to women in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) in Tunisia. It also summarizes the role of women in the National Strategy to Counter Extremism and Terrorism as outlined through strategic objective 4. It concludes with some recommendations for the implementation of these legal, institutional and strategic objectives moving forward. Keywords. Tunisia, PVE, CVE, legislation, women, peace, security.

1. Introduction Women are the undisputed pillar of Tunisian society. Throughout the country's history, they have been involved in activism, combativeness and the commitment to changing things for better and securing a better future for the country and for future generations. Moreover, it is the role that they have fully endorsed during the process of democratic transition that Tunisia experienced after the revolution of 14 January 2011, thus helping to hold in check the risk posed by religious fanaticism and terrorism. Since 2011, Tunisia has been confronted with a rise in violent extremism that threatens to undermine public security and affect the country's political, democratic and economic process. Faced with this threat, Tunisia has been quick to respond by strengthening its military security capabilities and by developing its legislative and judicial system, while working to complete this reactive approach with strong prevention efforts focused on the diagnosis of the phenomenon and the treatment of its root causes, with a view to ensuring lasting results to preserve peace and national security. In this context, Tunisian women are called to play a role of first order.

2. Frameworks Relating to the Roles of Women in P/CVE in Tunisia 2.1. Legal and Institutional Framework Tunisia was a pioneer in the enshrinement of women's rights, and shortly after its independence it effectively adopted an array of avant-garde constitutional and legislative texts and established the institutional devices to implement them [1]. After the 2011

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revolution, the constitutional and legislative arsenal regarding women's human rights has been strengthened in a unique way, particularly through the efforts of women's rights advocates organized in a coalition of civil society organizations that have worked on gender equality. They were thus able to play an important role in the enshrinement of women's rights in the 2014 constitution. Thus, the principles of equality and parity between men and women have been expressly guaranteed by the new constitution of 2014 under Articles 21 and 46 [2]: Article 21: "Citizens are equal in rights and duties, they are equal before the law without any discrimination." Article 46: "The State is committed to protecting the acquired rights of women and ensuring that they are consolidated and promoted. The State guarantees equal opportunities between men and women for access to various responsibilities and in all areas. The State is working to enshrine parity between women and men in elected assemblies. The State is taking the necessary steps to eliminate violence against women." In 2017, an organic law on the elimination of all forms of violence against women was unanimously passed and enacted [3]. It is a major step forward in the fulfillment of article 46 of the constitution. This law, which applies both in times of peace and armed conflict, adopts a comprehensive approach in the fight against violence against women through prevention, as well as the protection and care of women who are victims of violence as well as the prosecution of perpetrators through the following: x Eliminating all forms of violence against women: physical, moral, psychological, economic, political and sexual. x Providing aggravating circumstances for sentences in situations of vulnerability for women and girls or where family ties exist. x Removing the impunity clauses that were inserted in the criminal code by repealing the marriage provision of the abuser and the girl victim of sexual violence who is 13 years of age or older, and that of the withdrawal of the wife who is a victim of physical violence, where these provisions made it possible to stop the prosecution, the trial and the execution of the sentence. x Creating special units in police stations and the National Guard to take care of victims of violence. At the institutional level, several bodies have been set up, as follows: x A Peer Council for Equality and Equal Opportunities between Women and Men was established in 2016 [4]. This council is an advisory body under the supervision of the Presidency of the Government, whose main mission is to integrate a gender perspective into development policies and programs in Tunisia, thus contributing to the consolidation of the balance of society, equal opportunities and, ultimately, sustainable development. The Council has drawn up a national plan for the integration and institutionalization of the gender approach, approved by the Council of Ministers on 21 June 2018. x The national body against human trafficking pursuant to the organic law on the prevention and fight against trafficking in human beings [5]. This text considers that the sexual exploitation of women and children is a form of trafficking, while providing that the victim's consent cannot be a mitigating factor regarding sentences. x The Committee on Equality and Individual Rights, created [6] on the initiative of the Presidency of the Republic to ensure that any discriminatory legislation

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preventing individuals from fully enjoying their individual rights and freedoms is reviewed. 2.2. Strategic Framework for P/CVE The law on “the Fight against Terrorism and the Repression of Money Laundering” [7] provides, in its article 66, for the creation of the National Counter-Terrorism Commission (Commission Nationale de Lutte contre le Terrorisme, CNLCT) as an inter-ministerial structure reporting to the government's president. The Ministry in charge of women is also represented in this Commission, which has a strategic, advisory and analytical role in the prevention of terrorism. It acts as a mechanism for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions related to the fight against terrorism. As part of its missions, the CNLCT has been working since its inception to finalize the national strategy against extremism and terrorism that was approved and adopted by the Higher Security Council in November 2016. This strategy, which extends over 5 years, is structured around 4 fundamental pillars: Prevention Protection - Prosecution - Response. It is conducted within the framework of governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights in a global and multidisciplinary approach involving all public actors and those of the civil society. Prevention as a strategic choice pillar of the country is divided into 19 objectives ranging from the primary level to the tertiary level of prevention. x The primary level aims to prevent the emergence of the terrorist phenomenon and to avoid reproducing the same problem by reinforcing the role of women in the P/CVE, addressing the factors leading to radicalization by promoting a global culture of tolerance and diversity, the encouragement of moderate religious discourse and the establishment of the grounds for inclusive dialogue. The strategy highlights the role of the family and more specifically that of the mother, who is the first one who can notice behavioral changes of her children and protect them from risks. x The secondary level aims to prevent recruitment by terrorist groups by identifying vulnerable people and detecting early signs of behavioral change that can lead to radicalization, for early treatment that can prevent them from acting out. To do this, management and training actions on the elaboration of an alternative discourse are recommended. They are aimed primarily at the people who are in the best position to understand the phenomenon and bring about positive change, such as women, young people, educators, etc. x The tertiary level, in addition to incriminating the recruitment and displacement of people to conflict areas and bringing perpetrators to justice, seeks to ensure the referral to rehabilitation and reintegration programs in their communities to mitigate the degree of threat from these people to those around them and to avoid possible risks of resumption of terrorist activities. The National Strategy to Counter Extremism and Terrorism is supplemented by action plans from the different ministries. The coordination of this process is driven by the CNLCT to ensure the adoption of a uniform methodology and standardized concepts.

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3. Women in the National Strategy to Counter Extremism and Terrorism 3.1. Scope of Strategic Objective 4 (SO4) Reflecting the important role of women as key players in the prevention of violent extremism and the need to equip them and provide them with the means to fully play their role, the National Strategy to Counter Extremism and Terrorism provides in its prevention pillar a strategic objective, which reads as follows: “To strengthen the role of women in the prevention of violent extremism.” The choice to focus on women as key players in P /CVE is grounded on several reasons. First, women represent half of society, so if we address the issue of violent extremism by focusing only on male profiles, this may defeat the efforts of P/CVE by neglecting half of the population. Second, women are influential in the family and especially among young people. As mothers, wives, sisters (etc.), they are often important players in the household and often have influence (positive / negative) in the social hierarchy of families. Hence there is a need to work on strengthening their positive influence on young people in order to strengthen the links between them and their families. Third, women represent the front line and can be a provider of community resilience to violent extremism. Hence the need to develop their skills in order to facilitate their engagement in prevention actions, allowing them in particular to better identify the first signs of behavioral change that can lead to radicalization and have the ability to act before it is too late. Fourth, women can play a multi-faceted role as actors for prevention and intervention in violent extremism. This role is not limited to the phase that precedes radicalization but also extends to the radicalization process itself. Thus, for the specific case of radicalized individual who have left the country to travel to conflict zones, mothers generally stay in contact and can convince their son to return. The role of women is also fundamental during incarceration and post-release to support rehabilitation efforts and facilitate integration into society. Finally, women can be affected by violent extremism in many ways. They can prevent it and fight it, but they can also suffer as victims or vulnerable parties and can even become followers and further promote it by joining terrorist groups and/or providing logistical support. 3.2. Implementation of SO4 As part of the implementation of the Strategic Objective 4 on Strengthening the Role of Women in P/CVE, the Action Plan of the Ministry of Women, Family, Children and the Elderly provides activities that tend to foster this role such as: x Economic empowerment, especially of rural women, supporting them so that they may carry out income-generating activities (1,736 women benefited from government-funded projects). x Economic and social integration through cognitive skills programs. x The fight against school drop-outs among young girls in rural areas. x Specific awareness-raising activities for women and girls to equip them with specific skills in the prevention of violent extremism (furnishing a secure communication space to signal signs of radicalization).

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Social and psychological assistance for women / families that are victims of terrorism.

4. Other Measures Relevant to Strengthening the Role of Women in P/CVE The Ministry of Women's Action Plan implementing the P/CVE Strategic Objective supports and accompanies the “National Strategy for the Economic and Social Empowerment of Women and Girls in Rural Areas 2017-2020” [8], approved by the government in March 2017. This strategy includes the economic and social empowerment of girls and women in rural areas, facilitating their participation in public life and improving their quality of life. It also makes it possible to increase the availability of accurate and up-to-date data on the situation and needs of women in rural areas and to make these data available to stakeholders for the adoption of development plans. The Five-Year Plan for Development 2016-2020 aims to "establish a civilization project based primarily on a new system of values in its various manifestations and dimensions and to consolidate the elements of governance, thought, practice, economic prosperity and social justice in all its components and contents" [9]. In the area of community development, it has emphasized the active participation of women in shaping the desired societal vision, which rejects all forms of extremism and seeks to ensure security, combat the phenomenon of terrorism and support social peace. The third pillar of human development and social inclusion is an important aspect of promoting women's rights and consolidating their achievements. It is also important to emphasize that the implementation of these programs will be in synergy with the national action plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 [10], which has just been finalized, and will be announced soon by Tunisia. This set of measures outlined will strengthen the protection of women and groups with special needs against the threat of recruitment by terrorist groups. Tunisia, like all other countries, is bound by resolution 1325, and thus it strives to build a peace process through the democratic transition it has known since the revolution and its strategic position, threatened by the conflicts taking place in neighboring countries. The legal significance of UNSCR 1325 has prompted many countries around the world to adopt a national action plan to implement its demands, both to prevent armed conflicts and civil wars, to prevent them or to protect people when they occur, and to develop mechanisms to protect women and girls and enhance their participation in decision-making. Although Tunisia does not experience armed conflicts, it works to ensure peace and security during the democratic transition, supporting the importance of mainstreaming gender at all levels to prevent risks.

5. Conclusion Based on the Tunisian experience in fostering the role of women in P/CVE, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, it is important to recognize that discriminatory gender policies can hinder women's participation in the P/CVE efforts. For this reason, the gender dimension must be anchored in a global and permanent way in all sectors and public policies and not be evoked in an occasional and specific way at P/CVE. At the

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same time, attention must be paid to stereotypes, and strategies should avoid the instrumental use of the image of women by putting the action solely on the role of women in fighting against violent extremism, rather than stressing the interaction and complementariness between women and men in the P/CVE efforts. Finally, there is a need to emphasize the role of women in rural and urban areas, strengthening the social belonging and patriotic spirit of family members for the eradication of all forms of recruitment and develop action plans in this regard.

References and Endnotes [1] Decree of 13 August 1956 promulgating the Personal status code, Tunisian Official Journal, 104 (December 28, 1956), p. 1742. [2] The Tunisian Constitution of 2014 was adopted on 26 January 2014 by the Constituent Assembly elected on 23 October 2011. [3] Organic Law No. 2017-58 of 11 August 2017 on the elimination of violence against women, Tunisian Official Journal, 65 (August 15, 2017), p. 2604. [4] Government Decree No. 2016-626 of May 25, 2016, Establishing the Peer Council for Equality and Equivalence of Opportunities between Women and Men. [5] Organic Law No. 2016-61 of August 3, 2016, on the Prevention and fight against trafficking in persons. Tunisian Official Journal, 66 (August 12, 2016), p. 2524. [6] Presidential Decree No. 111, of August 13, 2017. [7] Organic Law No. 2015-26 of August 7, 2015, relating to the fight against terrorism and the repression of money laundering, Tunisian Official Journal, 63 (August 7, 2015), p. 1735. [8] Ministry of Women, Family and Childhood, Note de Présentation de la “Stratégie nationale pour l’autonomisation économique et sociale des femmes et des filles en milieu rural, 2017-2020,” 2017, http://www.femmes.gov.tn/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Presentation_Strategie_FR_2017-2020.pdf. [9] Law No. 2017-28 of 25 April 2017, approving the development plan (2016-2020), Tunisian Official Journal, 34 (April 28, 2017), p. 1550. [10] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000).

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.

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Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-28

International and National Frameworks for Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in Spain: Beyond Words a

Blanca PALACIÁN DE INZAa Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, CESEDEN)

Abstract. With reference to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (WPS), this essay examines a Bilateral Spanish-Dutch Initiative for Gender Training in International Operations and Missions. The initiative intends to raise awareness of gendered approaches to security. The essay also reviews how this initiative fits within the framework of the Spanish National Action Plan (NAP) for WPS and explains how the implementation of the training program may contribute to better operational effectiveness. Keywords. Women, peace, security, WPS, Spain, the Netherlands, Resolution 1325, counter-terrorism, national defense, operations, military.

1. Introduction This article, which follows the structure of the paper given within the scope of the Workshop held in Madrid in March 2018, is intended to bring to light the actions undertaken by Spain in compliance with Resolution 1325. For this purpose, the theoretical framework introducing this work will look at Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council (UNSCR 1325) and the subsequent Plans of Action of the Government of Spain, particularly those with relevant implementation plans internationally, through the lens of gender. Then, given this aforementioned structure, this essay will review some actions undertaken by the government of Spain, paying special attention to its Ministry of Defense. With this in mind, this essay reviews a Bilateral Spanish-Dutch Initiative for Gender Training in International Operations and Missions, which is premised on the idea that training professionals working for peace in Africa on the importance of gender means their actions may be more effective. The initiative was started in 2008 with the participation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense of Spain and the Netherlands. This is in line with UNSCR 1325, which urges the member states to financially, technically and logistically support efforts to raise awareness about gender. This training and the enablement of the armed forces to implement WPS topics have direct impacts on the effectiveness of their work, as in any other profession. For this reason, investing in training is investing in prevention of conflict and violent extremism. In this sense, the Bilateral Spanish-Dutch Initiative for Gender Training in International Operations and Missions is successful in its task of training military, police and civilians in many countries.

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2. Women and Gender Among the many concepts “in vogue” today we can highlight gender and empowerment. Both concepts are almost immediately associated with women; for most people, talking about gender is tantamount to talking about women. However, gender of course encompasses more than just concerns of “women,” and the same is true of “empowerment.” So, what are we talking about when we refer to gender? Gender has to do with social beliefs about the functions, behaviors and activities that a man or a woman must have, that is, what society considers pertains to the former and the latter. Obviously, these are not universal conceptions, because what is expected of a woman or a man in one country or another, in a rural environment or in an urban environment, is not the same. Nor is there a stable pattern over time: what was considered to be the acceptable behavior of a man or a woman is not the same today as two generations ago. Gender, therefore, is a dynamic social concept and is not universal. Along these lines, when it is said that we have to approach a certain topic with a gender perspective, what is clear is that we must take into account that society is formed by men, women, boys and girls and that they have different biological and socio-cultural characteristics and different needs. They are different from each other, but each construct of gender also varies across cultures. While seemingly obvious and easy to apply, in reality the construct of “gender” as an analytical lens is quite complex. For example, when embarking on a process of disarmament of combatant groups in a particular region of the Democratic Republic of Congo, it must be borne in mind that in these groups there may be men and women, boys and girls. Going deeper into this example, in this hypothetical disarmament project it will be necessary to take into account that if there are women in this group, it is possible that some of them may have suffered sexual violence. It is also possible that some men may have also suffered or even exercised such violence. In this case we must not lose sight of the different needs of women and men, since it may occur that in this social context women suffer social rejection and it is more difficult for them to be reintegrated in their communities. In short, no policy or action will be effective if the specific context and social expectations for each gender and their different needs and problems are not taken into account. If all people have gender, why is it common to think that women and gender are two synonymous words? Because the different functions and behaviors that have been allocated, learned and apprehended may generate gender inequalities and, generally, it can be said that these inequalities affect women and girls more forcefully. That is why many actions aimed at alleviating these inequalities focus on the empowerment and improvement of the conditions of females.

3. Resolution 1325 (2000) of the United Nations Security Council Before referring to the Spanish-Dutch Initiative, we must mention the most relevant aspects of UNSCR 1325, which recognizes that armed conflicts have a disproportionate impact on children and women. The Resolution suggests that Members were:

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B. Palacián De Inza / International and National Frameworks for WPS in Spain: Beyond Words

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation [1]. But in addition to recognizing that it is essential to protect women and girls, it also points out the need to strengthen their presence as protagonists in the construction of peace by: Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decisionmaking with regard to conflict prevention and resolution [2]… UNSCR 2242, which was promoted by the United Kingdom and Spain and adopted unanimously in October 2015 at a meeting of the Security Council, intends to move UNSCR 1325 forward. It mentions women’s participation in international peace missions, in peace negotiations or in the processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, among others, and suggests that these actions clearly increase the effectiveness of missions and operations.

4. National Action Plan for Spain Following that, a growing number of governments are developing National Action Plans for implementation of this resolution and mainstreaming a gender perspective into training for military personnel, especially those sent to peacekeeping missions, and/or into their development aid packages to post conflict countries. Some governments are also instructing senior representatives to address gender issues, encourage women's representation and reach out to women in conflict and post-conflict zones. These national plans have two strong commitments: gender equality in the security sector institutions and gender perspective in operations. In the following lines we are going to see the Spanish national action plans and also examples related with these two commitments which are closely connected with training. Spain was the 4th NATO country to develop a NAP for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, and it has recently given birth to its second NAP. This plan, although revisable, aims to be current from 2017-2023. The first plan was born in 2007. Why a second plan? Well, many things have changed. As stated, we live in a liquid modernity where the rapidly changing order undermines all notions of durability. Among these changes there were two important ones that are necessary to stress: the growing interest to focus on women in terrorism and counter-terrorism; and the change of the international perspective on gender. There are four pillars related to UNSCR 1325 that are taken into consideration of the Spanish NAP: prevention, protection, participation and promotion. Without forgetting the pillar of protection, women are no longer seen only as victims, but also as agents for change. For the international community, participation is now the focal point without disregarding the other three pillars. In this regard, participation is well promoted through training: inside the armed forces and also in the international sphere. The main objectives of the second Spanish Action Plan are to:

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x

Integrate the gender perspective in conflict prevention, management and resolution and the consolidation of peace. x Accomplish significant participation of women in the decision-making processes in relation to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. x Guarantee the protection and respect of women's and girls’ human rights in conflict and post-conflict situations. x Introduce effectively the gender perspective in the definition of concrete measures of repair and recovery of the victims of conflicts. The main actions to be taken are to: x Promote the participation of women in peace missions. x Promote the gender perspective in all peace-building activities. x Ensure the specific training of personnel participating in peace operations on equality and on the different aspects of resolution 1325, as well as the promotion of its knowledge. x Protect the human rights of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict zones. x Promote the empowerment and participation of women in the processes of negotiation and implementation of peace agreements. x Incorporate the principle of equal treatment and opportunities between women and men in the planning and execution of activities for the DDR and the RSS, as well as the specialized training in this respect of all the personnel that participate in these processes.

5. Actions Undertaken in Spain Now, to implement this plan, there are a series of actions already being undertaken in Spain. First, Spain’s armed forces are comprised of 12.6% women. This number, although susceptible of being increased, is one of the highest among NATO allies. It should be noted that in the 17 missions that have been carried out by Spain, more than 3000 members of the military and the Guardia Civil have participated. Although more than 12% of military are women (a high percentage compared to the NATO country average), less than 2% of the military in international missions are women. On this point, the participation of the Spanish Guardia Civil could be improved. Second, the Military Observatory for Equality was created in 2005, and works to support and oversee gender integration in the Armed Forces. On this point, there is permanent coordination between the General Staff (GENAD) and the Military Observatory for Equality. There are also training courses for Gender Advisors of the Spanish Armed Forces (Army Training Command, Granada), and pre-deployment gender training is mandatory. Third, Spain also prioritizes participation in international organizations’ (NATO; EU; Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE); UN; Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL)) seminars, meetings and workshops to exchange best practices of Gender Equality in the Military. In addition, there is bilateral Cooperation with third countries to exchange best practices of Gender Equality in the Military: Chile, Western Balkans countries (Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, FYROM, Montenegro), Jordan, United Kingdom and Georgia. In alignment with international cooperation, it should also be pointed out that on July 27th, 2016, the Spanish Ministry of Defense was appointed by the European Union Military

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B. Palacián De Inza / International and National Frameworks for WPS in Spain: Beyond Words

Committee as EU Gender Training Military Discipline Leader. Gender is one of the 24 Disciplines defined by the EUMC to be developed in order to provide capacity building to all military personnel involved in Missions and Operations. This means Spain has the duty and responsibility of ensuring a gender perspective in its capacity building for the military operations within the EU framework. Finally, Spain has a Bilateral Spanish-Dutch Initiative “Gender in Operations,” created in 2011. Four ministries are involved (Ministries of Defense and Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Spain and the Netherlands). The aim is to improve the gender capacity in middle management military and civilian personnel to be deployed to UN, NATO, EU, OSCE and AU missions and operations. It is this Spanish-Dutch Initiative that will be reviewed further in this essay as an example of the implementation of the Spanish NAP on WPS. 5.1. Bilateral Spanish-Dutch Initiative The Spanish-Dutch Initiative comprises of several training courses as described: 1. European course “A Comprehensive Approach to Gender in Operations,” aimed at civilians and military personnel who will participate in international missions and operations (EU, UN, AU). The European Security and Defense College (ESDC), under whose axis the course is developed, recognized and approved it in 2012. There are two annual editions, one in Spain and the other in Holland, having trained to date about 600 students in its twelve editions, from more than 40 countries. 2. Course on “Gender in Operations,” subsidized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands on the occasion of Mexico's participation in international missions. The first edition was held in October 2015 in Mexico, entirely in Spanish, for personnel who were to be deployed in these operations. 3. African Course “Gender to Support Peace Operations. A Comprehensive Approach.” This takes place in Nairobi, Kenya at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC). Among the courses organized by this initiative, with the participation of civilians and the military, the focus will be on the one that takes place twice a year in Nairobi, Kenya. It involves the military, police and civilians -men and women- from Kenya itself but also from other countries in the region that are likely to be deployed in UN or AU missions. It is co-financed by the governments of Spain and the Netherlands and the North American command for Africa (AFRICOM). To date, in the 9 editions of this course that have been held, some 300 participants from 26 African countries have been trained to act as ambassadors of gender in the missions sponsored by the United Nations in which they subsequently participate. The participation of the relevant countries is displayed further in Table 1. Table 1. Number of Participants in Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Program [3] Countries included in GPOI BENIN BURKINA FASO BURUNDI CAMEROON

OCT 13

JAN 14

OCT 14

APR 15

FEB 16

OCT 16

JAN 17

OCT 17

MAR 18

TOT AL

0 2

0 4

3 4

5 5

2 0

5 5

4 0

0 5

0 0

19 25

4 0

5 0

4 0

4 0

0 0

0 0

0 2

0 0

0 2

17 4

B. Palacián De Inza / International and National Frameworks for WPS in Spain: Beyond Words

IVORY COAST DJIBUTI ETHIOPIA GABON GHANA GUINEA KENYA MALAWI MALI MOROCCO MAURITANIA NIGER NIGERIA RWANDA SENEGAL SIERRA LEONE SOUTH AFRICA SUDAN TANZANIA TOGO UGANDA ZAMBIA TOTAL: 25

33

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0 0 0 3 0 10 2 0 0

2 0 0 2 0 3 2 3 0

2 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 0

0 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 0

1 0 0 2 5 6 2 0 0

2 0 1 2 2 6 2 0 0

0 0 0 3 3 2 2 0 0

0 0 0 3 4 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0

7 0 1 23 14 35 15 3 0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

0 2 0 0 0

2 1 0 0 0

0 0 2 2 0

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 2 0 2

0 0 2 2 3

0 0 0 1 5

2 0 5 2 3

2 5 2 2 5

6 8 13 9 18

3

4

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

9

0 2

0 0

1 3

0 2

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

1 7

0 0 0 29

0 9 0 37

3 2 0 33

0 3 2 27

4 4 0 30

3 4 0 39

4 5 0 31

4 3 4

4 0 0

22 30 6 296

The contents of these courses are very comprehensive: concepts, gender in SSR and DDR, gender in local mediation, sexual violence and protection of civilians, and the comprehensive approach in missions. The results of the trainings have shown some impact and influence on the participants. The trainees showed a true interest in learning that the focus of their work should consider that the population is divided into genders that have different problems and needs in their daily lives, but especially during armed conflicts. The Kenyan commander, Sheila Chepkorir, expressed that at the end of the course held in February 2017, her intention from that moment on was to integrate the concepts learned not only in the future peacekeeping mission in which she would participate, but also in her daily work for her army promoting recruitment with greater balance between men and women, and with the same opportunities for both genders. In the same vein, commander Amoussou Coffi Ananou of the Air Force of Togo valued the knowledge acquired from a gender perspective on conflict prevention, mediation and reconciliation; sexual violence related to conflicts and the protection of civilians. Attending this course has helped him to assess the capacities of women in the different jobs related to peace that, added to those of men, are the most effective way to undertake any task. In this respect, the gender perspective in security and conflict has been shown to have some effects on military operations. No action can be successful if part of the population is neglected. Tasks such as intelligence, disarmament and demobilization, deradicalization, the protection of civilians and the construction of a lasting peace, just to name a few, inevitably need this perspective to achieve maximum effectiveness.

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These courses, besides being indispensable for a better and more complete work for peace, serve as examples of actions that contribute to the visibility of the effort that the Government of Spain makes in international security cooperation in the fields of prevention and resolution of conflicts as well as the promotion of gender in peace and security. The future for work in peace is through collaboration guided by excellence in training and the exchange of experiences. The Spanish-Dutch Initiative is in conversations with regional institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean to evaluate the possibility of providing the same training in this region. Undoubtedly, it is an exportable and fruitful action and its results are palpable in as much as, just one month after the end of the course, 10% of the participants were already deployed in an international mission of the United Nations and applying the acquired knowledge. At the time of this publication, two more courses will have taken place (Madrid, June 2018; Nairobi, October 2018), and an additional program is being planned for Ghana in 2019.

6. Conclusion There is still a lot of work to be done to achieve effective equality in the Armed Forces and to implement the gender perspective in operations, but steps are being taken with firmness and hope. Spain is doing its job with the conviction that there is still much room for improvement, in the belief that gender equality is essential for peace and that the development of societies step by step must be done this way. No matter how arduous the task may seem, efforts must not be spared, on the contrary, they must be redoubled by relying on collaboration with other nations and institutions in the conviction that there can be no other road than this one.

References and Endnotes United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1325, United Nations, Online, 2000, https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement. [2] Ibid. [3] GPOI: “Global Peace Operations Initiative” Program, funded by the American Department of State through the Department of Defense, in this case US AFRICOM. [1]

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.

Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-35

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Spanish Government’s Policies on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE): A View on the Role of Familiar Environments María Eugenia HERNÁNDEZ

Abstract. The threats of terrorism and radicalization have become more complex and multifaceted, and it is necessary to focus on the elements that influence the radicalization process to prevent this phenomenon. Education, family and the increasing use of information and communication technologies play a key role. This essay summarizes the Spanish Government’s policies on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Keywords. Information and communication technologies, radicalization, justice, human rights, incitement to hatred, hate speech, code of conduct, terrorists acting alone, radicalism, extremism, prevention strategies, role of women.

1.

Introduction

The fight against radicalization and violent extremism involves a multi-stakeholder approach; state institutions, civil society organizations, educators, families and society at large need to be involved, because common synergies are essential for promoting a greater tolerance and empathy for others in the efforts to reduce violent extremism. Even though the world today is becoming increasingly interconnected, this does not mean that individuals and society truly live together respectfully. At present, information, technology and knowledge are more available than ever before, but are not always leveraged appropriately to prevent conflicts and to give everyone the possibility to learn how to live in harmony in a world that is safe. Moreover, the role of women in preventing and countering violent extremism is becoming increasingly important. This essay reviews some of the key international policies related to countering violent extremism in the age of the Internet. It also examines the strategies utilized by Spain to counter violent extremism, including highlighting the role of women in these strategies.

2.

Countering Narratives of Violent Extremism

In this new globalized and turbulent context, a key message of respect for differences of sex, race, language, religion and culture should be emphasized in order to promote two key principles: (1) universal respect for justice and (2) human rights. As the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity states: “In our increasingly diversified

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societies it is essential to ensure a harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities as well as their willingness to live together. Policies for integration and participation of all citizens are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of civil society and peace” [1]. The spread of hate speech, radicalism and violent extremism are not new phenomena. However, the use of new and emerging information and communication technologies (ICT) spreads messages faster than before, which presents a core challenge for societies. Effective strategies against these messages will require attacking them in their roots through a coordinated and joint action of all sectors involved, e.g. police and probation services, local authorities, social services, education and health professionals and civil society organizations (CSOs). In the international context, several initiatives have been undertaken to eliminate these messages which ultimately may be the starting point for terrorist acts that threaten our societies. For example, the UN Security Council Resolution 2322 of 12 December 2016 on International Judicial Cooperation on Terrorism sponsored by Spain underlines the need for the States to counter the extremist propaganda and the incitement to hatred on Internet and on social networks even through the message development that effectively refutes the rhetoric of hatred and radicalization [2]. In a similar vein, the UN Security Council Resolution 2354 of 24 May 2017 on the Implementation of a Comprehensive International Framework to fight against terrorist narratives also takes this approach by emphasizing the importance of the role the mass media, the civil and religious society, the business community and educational institutions play to foster dialogue and improve understanding, to encourage peaceful coexistence and tolerance and to promote an environment that will not favor the incitement to terrorism, as well as the initiatives to refute terrorist arguments [3]. This resolution also indicates that the States should consider the possibility to support the efforts aimed at raising public awareness in rebuttal of any terrorist arguments through the education system and media, even through education programs specifically designed to prevent young people from accepting terrorist arguments. In alignment with the abovementioned UNSCRs, Google and YouTube have sponsored an initiative titled “Against Hatred and Radicalism, #WE ARE MORE.” This initiative, which constitutes an example of collaboration between civil society and the state, gathers two key parts in the fight against hate speech. On the one hand, its target audiences are young people, whose personalities are developing. On the other hand, in order to reach the target audiences, the campaign involves two principal actors in the development of such personality: school educators and “YouTubers” chosen for this campaign or social movement. These “YouTubers” are people involved in the fight against racism, xenophobia and radicalization who can be credible messengers, can set good examples and, through their channels and content, can tackle difficult social problems. Also, at a regional level, the European Commission urges its member States to eliminate the hatred messages disseminated online. Preventing radicalization is an essential part of the fight against terrorism and, on the other hand, the hate speech on the network is a type of cybercrime. In this case, cybercrime together with terrorism constitutes one of the priorities on the European Security Agenda. Hate speech seeks to destroy plurality and diversity breaking normal coexistence and it means a direct attack to freedom, dignity and personal rights and ultimately, a breach of higher values on which the democratic rule of law is founded.

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It should be highlighted that the dissemination of the illegal incitement of hate speech online not only adversely affects groups or individuals targeted by such incitement, but it also has a detrimental effect on those who defend freedom, tolerance and non-discrimination in our open societies and acts as a deterrent to democratic discourse on online platforms. For this reason, on May 2016, the most important information and communication technology (ICT) companies [4] signed a code of conduct with the European Commission by which they undertake to continue their efforts to deal with the illicit incitement of hate speech online. The Spanish Ministry of Justice, at the request of the European Commissioner for Justice, has designated a contact point in order to monitor the Code of Conduct [5]. After one year, the results of the second monitoring exercise, which involved a large sample of organizations located in 24 EU countries, show that significant progress has been made by the social media platforms participating in the Code of Conduct. They improved both their efficiency and speed in assessing notifications. IT companies have also strengthened their reporting systems to make it easier for users to report illegal hate speech. For example, they have also trained their staff and increased cooperation with civil society. By implementing the Code of Conduct, the IT companies have strengthened and widened their networks of trusted flaggers throughout Europe. Regarding notifications, a total of 2,575 were submitted to the IT companies taking part in the Code of Conduct. This represents a fourfold increase compared to the first monitoring exercise in December 2016. The geographical coverage of the exercise substantially increased: 31 civil society organizations and three (3) national authorities, located in 24 EU countries, sent notifications relating to hate speech deemed illegal to the IT companies during a period of 7 weeks, (20 March to 5 May 2017). As regards to the content removed, 1,522 of the notifications (59.1 %) led to the removal of the notified content, while in 1,053 cases (40.9 %) the content remained online. In 51.4 % of cases IT companies assessed notifications in less than 24 hours, in 20.7 % in less than 48 hours, in 14.7 % in less than a week and in 13.2 % it took more than a week. The European Commission highlights that the society in general and the organizations of civil society, in particular, play a crucial role in preventing the dissemination of hateful content online and offline on the network through the development of messages that might counter it and by promoting the non-discrimination, tolerance and respect, including through the creation of raising awareness campaigns. Hence the importance of YouTube’s initiative, described above, that gathers this company’s main commitment with the society as a whole and with adolescents in particular. Spain and particularly the Ministry of Justice, is firmly committed to the fight against radicalization and against hate speech either in personal relationships or through the online dissemination. In this sense, Spain has ratified the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime [6] concerning the criminalization of acts of a racial and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. This Protocol assumes that computer systems offer an unprecedented means for facilitating the freedom of expression and the communication among all people but, at the same time, recognizes the existence of a risk of these computer systems being abused or misused in order to disseminate racist, xenophobic and/or hateful messages in the end. The Ministry of Justice has also promoted the incorporation of provisions of the Additional Protocol in Spanish national laws, which has put the legislative power in the forefront of the fight against the hate speech, seeds of radicalization that can lead to violent extremism and, in any case, to terrorism. Likewise, the Ministry of Justice is

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strongly involved in the work carried out by the Council of Europe on the fight against terrorism. At present, Spain is one of the twelve countries that have actively taken part in the drafting of the European Council Recommendation on Terrorists Acting Alone addressing the necessity of Member States to adopt new strategies for the prevention of radicalization that might lead individuals to commit terrorism crimes. One of the aspects regulated in this Recommendation is the need to promote social cohesion and inclusive education including the suitability for the implementation of raising awareness campaigns by the States which should involve, for this effect, information and communication technology companies. The active involvement of the private sector in the fight against radicalization that could lead to terrorism acts is vital.

3.

The Role of Women as Counter-Extremism Agents

The role of women in extremism is historically not an unknown phenomenon, but over the last few years it has gained increased attention not least in relation to the recruitment of women for terrorist purposes. Today, it has become more accepted that women do not only act as the support for extremist ideologies and groups, but also can play a major role in the recruitment and execution of terrorist attacks. At the same time, there is also a recognized role for how women can act as agents of positive change in preventing extremism. In this regard, assumptions about the normative assumptions of women as passive figures when it comes to radicalization and extremism are on the decline. In many terrorist attacks, someone from the social environment of the attackers recognized a disturbing change in their behavior prior to the attack being committed. For example, in a very recent judgement [7], Spanish Courts noted that the parents of a young woman who was being indoctrinated and planned to travel abroad to join a terrorist cell actually reported their suspicions to the local police. The parents were concerned that their daughter had been affectionately associated with a woman who was a radicalized Muslim, and that their daughter had expressed desire to “die for Allah.” Sometimes, a close relative or friend may be aware of some of the plans for a terrorist attack. In these cases, women can play a potential role both in intervening before an individual carries out a terrorist attack, or in encouraging the attack. Occasionally, close siblings, being those who know their friends and family better, also know what may have motivated them to join a radical group and what motivates them. Very often those siblings or friends may seek help or advice on what to do, despite their mixed feelings about betraying a loved one. Family members also have the legitimacy to propose alternatives and provide other solutions. But, for that very reason, they need help and strong support from their networks. In this regard, establishing appropriate preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programs incorporating a nuanced role for women in the Spanish context could empower families and communities to cope with the attraction of violent extremism. They should reach the guardians: family members, specially mothers, and close friends. Among close family relatives, mothers are the fundamental guardians. Many of the mothers who have lost their children after joining a terrorist group had noticed that something changed in them, but mostly they were alone and without any outside aid. On the other side, women are certainly among the most vulnerable groups currently affected by terrorism and violent extremism. As we have seen recently in the media and reports related to Daesh, women are being sexually abused and sold as sex slaves by extremist groups. Whilst women are victims to terrorism, they have the potential to be

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key players in counterterrorism efforts, with the propensity to make a crucial impact through detection of early signs of radicalization and intervening before individuals grow violent. By empowering women, here today and into the future, the international community will have agents everywhere supporting peace, tolerance and understanding. Since Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, we have witnessed greater determination to engage women in peace and security efforts. We must build on those efforts and integrate a gender perspective into P/CVE policy design. It is necessary that gender experts are included at the very outset of the process. Governments must help build women’s capacity on all levels - local, national, regional and international. Providing capacity building training to civil society organizations of civil society organizations and especially women’s organizations is crucial in order to have a more tailored, nuanced and effective outcome. Women and girls are impacted by rising extremism differently than men and boys. They are often the first victims of violent attacks, their rights and mobility, as well as economic capacities is compromised even more than their male counterparts. But, they also play a vital role in preventing the spread of extremist ideologies and activities. As community leaders and as mothers, wives, sisters and daughters in family settings and professionals, they shape the values of community members. In this context, states should establish innovative programs which prioritize women’s leadership and participation within local communities to reverse the growing threat of extremism through improved social cohesion and economic empowerment. Recent efforts by the international community and the Spanish Government have shown the need for improved mechanisms to enable dialogue between governments and civil society actors for addressing early warning signs of extremism. For example, the Strong Cities Network is a good example has lately held a seminar on “Preventing Violent Extremism: Women’s roles and gender perspectives” [8]. The cities of Málaga as well as Fuenlabrada are two Spanish cities belonging to the Strong Cities Network. This seminar highlighted that law enforcement and governments often focus on responding only to the terrorist acts and fail to address intolerance as a root cause of radicalization. Women are also a potential bearer of peaceful messages in communities. The aim is to empower women with the hope that by empowering them it will change the dynamics of their communities, and lead to the promotion of peace and tolerant messages. “Because women are not just victims or perpetrators of violent extremism. Many have been and continue to be on the frontlines of prevention efforts” [9]. Women have been engaged in conflict prevention work at the grassroots for decades and that these experiences hold critical lessons for the design and implementation of preventing violent extremism initiatives. However, these women rarely have access to the decision-making rooms where policies are developed, and these women should come from all backgrounds and experiences. The Council of Europe’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2018-2022) [10], to which the Spanish Ministry of Justice has actively contributed, considers that adequately understanding and dealing with the gender and children dimensions of terrorism remains a continued priority. In this regard, the Strategy foresees as a core activity the organization of an international conference on the Roles of Women and Children in Terrorism, which will examine how gender and child-sensitive considerations may influence the formulation and implementation of adequate and effective prevention strategies, criminal justice measures, disengagement and social reintegration programs.

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As another example, UN Women’s regional program on PVE takes a four-track approach: working with governments to ensure that national and regional counterterrorism policies and strategies are informed by women’s experiences; developing research on the gender implications of extremism; expanding women’s economic resilience; and increasing their leadership and participation in preventing the spread of violent extremism within their communities, for instance, by building their capacity for identifying early warning signs and promoting their engagement with new and traditional media to build effective counter narratives to extremism. In alignment with some of the abovementioned frameworks, the Spanish National Strategic Plan to Counter Radicalisation (2015) establishes a unique national structure, coordinated by the National Group to Combat Violent Radicalization, under the Ministry of Home Affairs and which comprises various ministerial departments, the National Intelligence Centre, the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces, as well as other institutions, bodies and associations. This group coordinates with those located in each municipality. This strategic plan, which will be globally revised by autumn 2018, takes UN programs as a reference in its implementation and will consider the convenience of focusing on a gender approach in its updated version.

4.

Conclusion

In relation to violent extremism, there are many roles of women. Women are educators, campaigners, financers, brides, logistic arrangers — with each group of women, we have a different approach. Women connect their children to society, community and family, and their commitment is for life. When countering violent extremism, all-of-society approaches, as well as public-private-partnerships are extremely important. All of these factors should be taken into consideration when designing appropriate policy-level responses to violent extremism and, through this essay, it was illustrated that these aspects were taken into account through EU policies and with relation to the Spanish Government’s National Plans.

References and Endnotes [1] UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO, Paris, 2001, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. [2] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2322, 12 December 2016, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/document/sres23222016-strengthening-of-police-to-police-cooperationdesignation-of-central-authorities-for-mutual-legal-assistance-and-extradition-and-transfer-of-terrorismrelated-requests-electronica/. [3] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2354, 24 May 2107, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/document/s-res2354-2017-countering-terrorist-narratives/. [4] European Commission, Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, European Commission, Brussels, 31 May 2016, https://edri.org/files/privatisedenf/euhatespeechcodeofconduct_20160531.pdf. [5] Jourová, V., Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online: One year after, Fact Sheet, European Commission, Brussels, June 2017, http://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUK Ewjk4fOZvt7dAhUtYUKHYzDCCwQFjAAegQICRAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fnews room%2Fdocument.cfm%3Fdoc_id%3D45032&usg=AOvVaw2Tz3kBtfH6gdB5jX4C3-8q.

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[6] Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, Reference ETS No.189, Council of Europe, Stratsbourg, 2003, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/treaty/189. [7] Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Pena, 15/2018, 11 May 2018, http://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjsyqSDwN7d AhXDL8AKHdYVAQgQFjAAegQICRAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.poderjudicial.es%2Fstfls%2 FAUDIENCIA%2520NACIONAL%2FJURISPRUDENCIA%2FAN%2520Penal%252011%2520ma yo%25202018.pdf&usg=AOvVaw37ThaLuqBxu312eb5CeP19. [8] Preventing Violent Extremism: Women’s roles and gender perspectives, Strong Cities Network Global Summit, Melbourne, Monash University, July 2018, https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/Jacqui-True-Presentation.pdf. [9] UN Women Asia and the Pacific, Preventing Violent Extremism, Online, http://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/focus-areas/peace-and-security/preventing-violent-extremism. [10] Council of Europe, Council of Europe Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2018-2022), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016808afc96.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.

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Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-42

Enhancing Women’s Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE): Do Radical and Non-Democratic Ideas Matter? a

Rogelio ALONSO a Universidad Rey Juan Carlos

Abstract. This chapter poses the following research questions: a) what should exactly be prevented and countered when referring to the role of women in countering violent extremism? b) should preventing and countering extremism apply only to violent acts or should it address also what some authors have termed cognitive radicalization? Consequently, the article puts forward the following hypotheses: a) ideology plays a key role in the radicalization process of individuals who take their radical beliefs to the next level by embracing violence; b) enhancing women’s role in countering violent extremism requires addressing and confronting the radical and non-democratic ideas present at the root of violent extremism Keywords. Prevention, extremism, violence, ideology, cognitive radicalization, radical ideas, non-democratic ideas.

1. Introduction When it comes to analyzing how to strengthen the role of women in the prevention of violent extremism and in the response to this phenomenon, the consideration of certain variables such as those proposed in this chapter is fundamental. Despite the growing interest in the role of women in preventing and responding to violent extremism [1], some matters related to these processes have received less attention. Hence, this chapter reflects on some of these issues by raising the following research questions: What must exactly be prevented and to what must be responded when considering the role of women and violent extremism? Even assuming that not all extremists materialise their radical discourse in violent acts, must the prevention of violent extremism and the response to it include what some authors have defined as “cognitive radicalization”? [2] At what stage must the prevention and response to violent extremism be initiated? The way these questions are responded to will necessarily influence the kind of policies and initiatives required to strengthen the role of women in this area, as it will determine the stage at which such an important intervention must be undertaken, as well as the way that must be adopted to do so. Several authors in this volume have correctly qualified that not all radicals are violent extremists; nonetheless they call attention to the fact that radicalization is a process whereby “individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme

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views” [3]. In their opinion, “to be a radical is to reject the status quo, but not necessarily in a violent or even problematic manner. Some radicals conduct, support, or encourage terrorism, whilst many others do no such thing, and actively and often effectively agitate against it” [4]. Without doubt, radical beliefs are not always “synonymous” with violent action [5], although one can also not ignore that violent extremism is usually preceded by ideological radicalism complemented by various other factors leading to terrorist “mobilization.” This mobilization has been defined as “the process by which radicalized individuals move from an extremist intent to preparatory steps to engage in terrorist activity such as an attack, travel for extremist purposes or facilitating the terrorist activity of someone else” [6]. Such “mobilization,” therefore, may imply changes in behaviour, although not always in beliefs, which, until that moment, might have been upheld without developing into explicitly violent behaviour. Consequently, radicalization and violent extremism, although differentiated on occasions, are closely inter-related and almost always bound by an ideology that justifies and condones violence as a means to impose a system of radical ideas. As David Cameron, former United Kingdom Primer Minister, pointed out in 2011, “as evidence emerges about the backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were initially influenced by what some have called ‘non-violent extremists;’ then, they have taken those radical beliefs to the next level by embracing violence” [7]. These are the parameters for an analysis such as the one proposed here: an analysis from the perspective of a European liberal democracy like Spain with a political and legal framework that necessarily constrains and determines the approach with respect to the object of study. In addition, from this perspective, differences also arise with respect to other contexts with different political systems which are not subject to analysis in this chapter. Spain is precisely a country in which diverse expressions of violent extremism have made themselves felt in recent decades since the arrival of democracy in 1978. Radicalization related to Islam is not the only extremist manifestation that has brought about violent actions in Spain in recent years, but rather another ideology that, just like radical nationalism or extreme right-wing and left-wing movements, has degenerated into violence. For this reason, all these ideologies are taken into consideration in the following pages.

2. Radical and Non-Democratic Ideologies The first Spanish Security Strategy presented in 2011 considered radical and nondemocratic ideologies as risk-increasing factors related to radicalization and terrorism. In a succinct reference to these, the Strategy indicated that “there is a risk that extremist ideologies may impose themselves on societies frustrated by the powerlessness of their States, their elites and the international community to respond to their basic needs” [8]. It went on to say that these extremist ideologies “may give rise to internal social conflicts and the proliferation of violent groups and violent action” and even “might spread in our society” [9]. The Strategy continued claiming that “the complexity of global society places even more emphasis on the radicalization of loyalties and reactions concerning religious, national, ethnic or cultural identities, both inside and outside our borders” [10]. The generic allusions to this matter contained in the Strategy omitted any greater specificity with respect to the conceptualisation and delimitation of these radical and non-democratic ideologies considered potentially to affect the security of Spain. In

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chapter four of the Strategy, however, it dealt with the analysis of the threats and risks faced by the Spanish society, listing the following ones: armed conflict, terrorism, organised crime, economic and financial insecurity, energy vulnerability, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats, uncontrolled migratory flows, emergencies and catastrophes. Previously, in its chapter three, the Strategy had alluded to risk-increasing factors that stimulated the propagation and transformation of risks and threats. For this reason, following the definition of radical non-democratic ideologies as riskincreasing factors, it was reasonable to link their potential for transformation and propagation fundamentally with one of the threats: terrorism. Although radical nondemocratic ideologies may affect other risks and a variety of threats, the inter-connection between them and terrorism is evident. In this sense, the Spanish Security Strategy, when succinctly setting out the strategic lines against the terrorist threat, emphasised the need for “prevention, by acting on the different factors that increase the threat level and involving all of the population, particularly those collectives exposed to the penetration of terrorist ideals” [11]. A certain causal relationship can, in consequence, be observed between the previously mentioned risk-increasing factors and the threat of terrorism. Nonetheless, the most recent version of the National Security Strategy, presented in 2017, avoided dealing with these risk-increasing factors to which so much importance had previously been given, although it still maintained that: “Radicalization and violent extremism and the attraction and indoctrination of individuals for terrorist purposes are part, moreover, of the threats that have taken on greater prominence in recent years. Not only because of the ideologies underlying them, but also because they constitute the stage prior to the individuals immersed in these processes becoming ultimately linked to terrorist groups and organizations” [12]. In other words, certain ideologies are fundamental for the emergence and propagation of violent extremism. These ideologies, whether nationalistic, radically religious, anarchist, supremacist or xenophobic, for example, share certain characteristic elements that offer the possibility to build and strengthen individual identities with the totalising identity-based complement of a wider ideological community. All of them favour attitudes that might lead certain individuals to adopt violent methods in order to impose their vision on society if a series of political, social, economic and cultural conditions were to come about. The presence in European society of groups sharing radical ideologies such as those that have inspired numerous recent terrorist acts makes it essential to evaluate the possibility that there is a seed for violence fed by nondemocratic idea systems requiring prevention strategies. If we ignore this possibility, we might fail to identify correctly the stage at which the intervention of both men and women must begin in order to forestall violent extremism.

3. Political and Religious Ideologies: What Are They? Ideologies provide frameworks in which to establish diagnoses and prognoses about the problems faced by citizens and societies [13]. Therefore, ideologies fulfil a relevant function: the provision of frameworks with which to interpret how society works, how it should be organised, and how individuals should interact within it. Such a name requires an action programme through which the ideals making up the ideology become translated into reality. Over the centuries, different systems of ideas have tried to organise the political and social structures of our societies from a variety of postulates such as those

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developed by liberalism, conservatism, socialism, communism, nationalism, fascism, anarchism, environmentalism, feminism, religious fundamentalism, or democracy. All these ideologies seek to influence political life by providing the foundations on which to assume and develop the principles and values with which individuals face their day-to-day activities. Ideologies offer one-sided programmes considered to be consistent from one perspective but, nonetheless, potentially also seen as contrary to the interests of another group. It is therefore complex to distinguish between the pertinence of each and every idea put forward by ideologies; their suitability often implies competition with other sets of ideas [14]. Despite this competition, the validity of ideologies will be determined by their greater or lesser democratic nature, as well as by the adaptation between their aims and the resources used within certain parameters that, in the case of Spain, are fundamentally established in the Constitution. Although, from the standpoint of Aristotelian ethics, extremism might be considered as the antithesis of moderation and balance between reason and virtue, such a referential text as that indicated also provides a status quo in which to discern those sets of ideas that exceed it. This frame of reference allows extremism to be identified with the rejection of the ground rules and the basic norms governing the operation of a political community. The radical nature of certain ideologies will be determined by the attitude maintained by the individuals towards the current political system, the kinds of procedure for political action they propose in order to achieve their goals, and the nature of the demands making up their ideological programme. In this sense, the Spanish Constitution reflects major indicators among its articles to enable the discrimination of the democratic category of ideologies. Thus, in section 1.1, the Constitution indicates that “Spain is hereby established as a social and democratic State, subject to the rule of law, which advocates freedom, justice, equality and political pluralism as the highest values of its legal system” [15]. Furthermore, in section 14, it indicates that “Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance” [16]. Later, in section 15, it adds that “Everyone has the right to life and to physical and moral integrity, and under no circumstances may be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment” [17]. In addition, in section 16, it states that: “Freedom of ideology, religion and worship is guaranteed, to individuals and communities with no other restriction on their expression than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law” [18]. Therefore, the democratic principle assumes democracy as an ideology that enshrines freedom, justice, equality, pluralism and the recognition of the rights of all citizens, regardless of their wealth, gender, ideology, religion or beliefs; in other words, without any discrimination. Underlying this recognition is the acceptance of certain democratic minimums implying respect for basic human rights, revealing a series of criteria determining when democratic limits are transgressed. As Truyol Serra has written, “saying that there are ‘human rights’ or ‘rights of man’ in the historical and spiritual context that we share is equivalent to affirming that there are fundamental rights that individuals hold through the fact that they are human beings, through their very nature and dignity; these rights are inherent and, far from being granted by a political society, are to be guaranteed and enshrined by it” [19]. In the cases where ideologies are considered democratic, the influence people strive to achieve through them, in the final analysis, is intended to provide order and stability. However, this pursued equilibrium is occasionally altered when certain ideologies are

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simply constructed on the basis of radical ideas. In such circumstances, some of these radical ideologies will exceed the limits enabling them to be included within a democratic sphere and they must therefore be considered as non-democratic ideologies. The degree of radicalism of certain ideologies does not necessarily place them in a non-democratic dimension [20], although it is true that certain radical ideologies tend to move towards that area when they ignore the checks and balances inherent to democracy. Ideologies are not negative in themselves [21]. However, when ideologies are based on absolute ideals that transcend certain moral limits, the ideals may become dangerous and may even be anti-democratic. In Del Águila’s words: “And what they do for us occasionally costs us dear. The amount we have paid for their supremacy during, let us say, the last hundred years is hair-raising. History corroborates this: violence, mass murders, total wars, ethnic cleansing, mass exterminations, concentration camps…” [22]. In consequence, radical ideologies are particularly useful for those individuals who need to justify moral, social and political transgressions. Such behaviours require frameworks that justify them. Hence, they originate in rigid ideological elements that are maintained dogmatically. It is about belief systems that marginalise other democratic ideologies and, nonetheless, facilitate the mobilization and manipulation of the masses [23]. In fact, as Giovanni Sartori has underlined, “we are concerned with and worry about ideologies particularly because we are worried about the power of man over man, and how entire nations and populations can be mobilised by a Messiah with high levels of fanaticism” [24]. Fanaticism based on identity is precisely a common feature of two of the ideologies that have given rise to expressions of violent extremism in Europe, namely Islamism and nationalism. Both develop an exaggerated perception of the central subject of identity around which each of these ideologies is built, therefore minimising the relevance of what is different, i.e. the other. Such an excessive valuation of the “point of view of our people” conveniently constructed around certain ideologies leads to the relativisation or even ignoring of any contrary position and, in some cases, even the suffering and injustices that “the others” have been subjected to [25]. The most extreme consequence of that logic leads to the use of certain ideals as a justification for radical and even violent behaviour that, in the absence of an ideology, would make no sense for those individuals embracing them and proposing them. The reflections of Amin Maalouf illustrate this dimension: “It is easy to imagine how human beings can be driven to the most extreme behaviours: when they feel that “others” constitute a threat for their ethnic group, their religion, or their nation, anything and everything they can do to drive away that threat is perfectly legitimate; even when it comes to slaughter, they are convinced it is a necessary measure to preserve the lives of their own. As everyone around them shares that same conviction, the perpetrators of the slaughter are generally not troubled by issues of conscience and are surprised when they are described as criminals” [26]. Therefore, as can be inferred from what has been set out above, radical and nondemocratic ideologies can be distinguished by proposing a scheme of relationships between individuals based on inequality, the supremacy of a part of the community, and on the absence of respect towards the rights of “others”, i.e. those citizens who do not share the same belief system. These shortcomings are reflected on occasions in an attempt to undervalue and cancel out the rights of minorities, although radical and nondemocratic ideologies may also aim at challenging a majority ideology whose legitimacy is accepted by most of society. In fact, both radical and non-democratic nationalism and

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Islamism appeal to that subordination of the majority to the minority as the driving force for their proposed actions. It is also appropriate not to ignore that it is often only a minority that comprehensively adheres to the postulates of a particular ideology. Attempts to spread any ideology clash with the reality that reveals how “only the most ardent militant members adhere to it totally without reserve, as opposed to a majority participating in the ideology in the only partial and fragmented way” [27]. Such a relationship between “the tribe and the mass” [28] reveals the existence of multiple identities, as well as poles of attraction that encourage the evolution of such identities depending on their exposure to various ideologies. Verifying such circumstances enables us to analyse the role of radical non-democratic ideologies as risk-increasing factors from a realistic perspective, assuming that the number of their followers tends to be limited. Despite this minority nature, however, we cannot ignore that impact may become qualitatively superior and, consequently, significant for European democratic societies such as Spain, where they to prosper without the required restraint.

4. Radicalization Processes through Non-Democratic Ideologies In order to evaluate the effect that radical non-democratic ideologies may have on the transformation and propagation of one of the threats and risks to security such as terrorism, it is necessary to define what we understand by the process of radicalization. Furthermore, for analytical purposes, it is appropriate to differentiate between cognitive radicalization and violent radicalization, although both appear to be closely linked [29]. Generally speaking,, violent radicalization has received more attention as its manifestations and consequences have been interpreted as being more serious with respect to those derived from cognitive radicalization. This overlooked the fact that cognitive radicalization preceded violent radicalization, although the former did not always necessarily lead to the latter. Individuals interested in reproducing radical ideologies strive to establish what could be defined as “cognitive structuring” in order to underpin the transgressions that the assumption of their ideologies leads them to. This “cognitive structuring” is also vital to maintain group cohesion and so favour the consolidation and reproduction of radical non-democratic ideologies requiring such reinforcement [30]. In fact, the consideration of radical non-democratic ideologies as risk-increasing factors implicitly assumes the relevance that these cognitive processes may have in the phenomena of violent radicalization potentially driven by ideals of this kind. In other words, cognitive radicalization constitutes a prior status in an evolutionary process that might degenerate into support for, justification, and commission of violent and, therefore, non-democratic acts. Consequently, it is appropriate to examine the definition, characterisation and nature of radicalization processes in order to assess how radical non-democratic ideologies may influence them. These two variables, degree of radicalness and non-democratic character, must be kept in mind when defining radicalization as the phenomenon whereby certain individuals adopt opinions, standpoints and ideas that may lead them to support, justify, condone and/or commit acts of violence. Violence emerges as the definitive distinctive criterion when differentiating democratic radical ideologies from others that are not democratic because, as has already been indicated, not all radical postures fall outside democracy although they may occasionally come close to exceeding that limit. In this

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respect, the approach adopted by the Canadian authorities is enlightening when it comes to the limiting of each of these types of radicalness. In their view “a radical is a person who wishes to effect fundamental political, economic or social change, or change from the ground up,” so “radical thinking is not necessarily problematic,” for “radical views only become a problem when they are used to promote or condone violence or other forms of extremist behaviour, including terrorism” [31]. It must be emphasised that radical thinking is not necessarily problematic in and of itself, but rather a normal manifestation in democratic systems that only becomes a security risk when it resorts to postulates leading to a justification of violence and antidemocratic behaviour [32]. For decades, terrorist violence has been a constant threat for various liberal democracies, including that in Spain. Since the end of the 1960s, there have been several terrorist groups that have used violence in Western societies in order to impose nationalistic political goals, as well as aspirations assigned to far-left or farright ideologies. Nonetheless, despite the frequent insistence on the need to study the causes of violence, and the verification of the relationship between certain ideologies and the aetiology of violent conflict, such important factors have often not been seen adequately reflected in government initiatives to combat these phenomena. As indicated by the European Commission, radical non-democratic ideologies share certain characteristics, whether “of nationalist, anarchist, separatist, far-left or far-right,” or derived from “an excessive interpretation of Islam” [33]. The long-running terrorist campaigns that have taken place in Europe since the 1960s confirm the existence of radicalization processes stimulated by radical non-democratic ideologies that have acted as the catalysts for different manifestations of violence. These precedents make it pertinent to conduct an appropriate assessment of past experience in order to avoid ideologies of that type aggravating other security risks and threats in the present or in the future. A useful lesson has emerged from this experience by considering that, despite the concern that threats and risks must logically rise among political elites and society, the reproduction of non-democratic radical ideals does not represent a majority phenomenon in European liberal democracies similar to Spain. This verification seeks to place an appropriate framework for analysis around a problem whose scope must, however, not be underestimated but rather valued in its proper proportions. Once more, emphasis must be placed on the preventive nature of European security strategies, from which it is necessary to advance responses to those factors that, if not appropriately dealt with, could potentially transform into propagators of such risks and threats as terrorism. Therefore, this prevention-based inspiration justifies the need to deal with radicalization processes with the power to generate negative consequences and that, even where affecting only a minority, could have repercussions for numerous players in society. Another useful lesson that can be drawn from the retrospective analysis of radical non-democratic ideologies lies in considering the radicalization process in which these ideas are assumed as a phenomenon comprising several different stages. In fact, the assumption and reproduction of radical non-democratic ideologies implies a personal evolution that leads individuals to go through a number of stages as a consequence of their exposure to a variety of influences as summarised below. The evolutionary dynamic in which the individual is engaged when approaching a radical ideology may conclude in different ways, since not everybody will end up assuming extremist, violent ideologies in their entirety. Once more, emphasis must be placed on the fact that identification with radical ideologies does not obligatorily lead to participation in violent activities. There are different stages and degrees through which radicalization progresses and these will

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determine the final outcome and, therefore, the level of the individual’s adherence to the radical, non-democratic ideology. The degree of adherence to the radical, non-democratic ideology will be determined by the greater or lesser level of depth achieved by the individual in question in the radicalization process. In some cases, individuals will evolve to extreme levels of radical must and exceed democratic limits, whereas others may stagnate in their commitment to radical goals and fall short, however, of supporting the violent means that would place them on the other side of such limits. Even in those cases where radicalization may lead to an absolute adherence to non-democratic goals and methods, it is also possible to encounter nuanced attitudes. Thus, certain individuals may become committed to particular non-democratic goals and methods while rejecting others deemed excessive, even from their own radical perspective. Consequently, radicalization implies a progressive advance towards levels of empathy with extremist radical ideals. The time that this process lasts, as well as its intensity in view of the desires of the parties in charge of managing it and the vulnerability of the subject capable of being radicalised, will constrain the ultimate outcome of the individual immersed in this radicalization. This factor illustrates the importance certain charismatic figures take on when spreading radical ideals and facilitating the adherence of other individuals. Among these, of course, women are references in decisive socialisation settings such as families and in education. The influence of certain variables and agents will therefore determine the evolution of a process that may be interrupted at times. It must be underlined that the process can potentially be neutralised by preventing its most dramatic materialisation, such as that implied by the adoption of violent behaviour and, in the final instance, full engagement in terrorist activities. Since radicalization constitutes a transition in which individuals alter their behaviour, moving along a path as and when they are exposed to certain factors, it will be particularly relevant to detect early indicators of that process in order to counteract it and even reverse it. Thus, the successful deactivation of the radicalization process may forestall the degeneration of that process by preventing the radical from accepting the most extreme postulates of the extremist, non-democratic ideology. Anticipation is, therefore, the goal an effective security strategy must strive for in order to prevent the degeneration of radical ideals into other non-democratic ones. In consequence, when we insist on the need to strengthen the role of women in the response to violent extremism and in the early detection of such behaviour, we must necessarily deal with one of its possible indicators: ideological radicalization.

5. Ideologies as a Key Factor in the Process towards Violent Extremism “Collective identity, as a component of the culture of a human group, defines the group’s we, differentiates it from its they, articulates its community or social cohesion mechanisms and organises the group materials producing a sense of belonging, loyalty and social control” [34]. As can be inferred from the analysis provided in the preceding pages, ideologies play a fundamental role in the construction and consolidation of collective identities. Individuals need sets of ideas that define their relationship with the collective in terms of the coherence described at the beginning of these lines. Ideologies such as nationalism, Islamism, or far-left or far-right radicalism provide a rhetorical tool for the development of narratives which, in their most extreme versions, can even justify the subversion of democratic order. The contents of these ideologies vary, although they

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fulfil very similar functions [35]. All of these, in their most radical manifestations, provide interpretative frameworks in which the opposition to democratic values constitutes an essential component. In short, for adepts of radical ideologies, “they have to be able to present themselves as convincing guardians of orthodoxy” [36], something they achieve through ideals that established framework for the self-justification of certain behaviours verging on or exceeding democratic limits. Ideologies act as a kind of agglutinating element by offering a common denominator, a link joining individuals with heterogeneous socio-economic, political and cultural profiles. Versus the variegated characterisation of the individuals sharing ideologies, their very ideologies become the link joining them together. In this way, ideologies become the axis through which it is possible to exert the indoctrination through which some individuals end up embracing radical and non-democratic ideals. This is how some radical ideologies contribute to the consolidation of nondemocratic ideas and attitudes, by providing feedback to a subculture that reaffirms absolutist convictions and even fanaticised behaviours such as those at the root of terrorism. These ideological expressions facilitate “the deformation of thought” frequently afflicting radicals [37]. The “egocentric bias” [38] that radicalism may lead to (and which identifies one’s own extreme postulates as the only ones valid) feeds into a confrontation with others. For this reason, it is not strange the radical ideologies favour the development of primary or dichotomic thought, insofar as reality is presented in absolute terms that eliminate the need for reflection, i.e. selectively reducing information to a few categories, exaggerating certain characteristics while minimising or ignoring others that might present in a less distorted way [39]. This dynamic facilitates the mistaken attributions of blame and liability that are so common in radical and non-democratic ideologies. These contribute to the existence of the so-called “fundamental attribution error” whereby the others, the rest of the world, tend to be blamed for unpleasant circumstances, simplifying reality at the same time as generating a conflict with those identified in this way and, therefore, as a source of problems [40]. This has generated a logic that has been extensively studied in the area of social psychology in the case of mobilization and manipulation through the reproduction of radical ideologies: “Masses hardly distinguish between the subjective and the objective. They accept as real the images reproduced in their heads, even though they often bear very little relation to the observed facts. Anyone who can offer them dreams becomes their leader; anyone who tries to destroy them is always their victim” [41]. The doctrinal contents of radical non-democratic ideologies provide reinforcements with which to confirm the incentives attracting individuals. In the case of their most extreme versions, they also offer a self-justifying rhetoric of purely criminal actions lacking any social support among society in general and in the particular reference community. By affecting the value systems and beliefs of individuals, ideologies are capable of being manipulated and exploited. The potential for ideologies to become an effective radicalization tool to the point of non-democratic actions is expressed in the illustrative testimony of an outstanding head of the British intelligence services when he described “ideology” as “the most powerful weapon terrorists have” [42]. As Schmid has put it, “terrorists do not fight primarily for physical territory but for mental space” [43], ideology thus being of great importance in such a fight. In other words, certain ideologies have a wide potential to become vectors contributing to the reproduction and consolidation of radical non-democratic ideals. For this purpose, they require the convergence of conflictive political and social contexts that generate grievances, giving rise to opportunistic structures in which to develop a stronger

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consolidation of radical ideas through socialisation in an anti-democratic sub-culture. The ideological component, therefore, represents a necessary but not sufficient factor for the process of radicalization in non-democratic ideals to become more established among radicals. In a scenario of opportunity and vulnerability, ideological frameworks that include or border on extremism such as those with which certain individuals interpret their daily realities are strengthened by certain socialisation processes. It must be borne in mind that the acceptance of radical non-democratic ideologies does not usually have a single trigger but is rather a combination of multiple facilitating contributing factors. The factors leading certain individuals to feel attracted towards radical ideologies offering them rewards or satisfactions of different kinds include historical contexts and traditions of radicalism and violence; the reality or perception of victimisation, injustice, repression, and political, social, or economic estrangement; feelings or experience of discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, race, or religion; frustration; hatred; revenge; or solidarity with affronts that generate identification by extension or assimilation. Nor must we exaggerate the influence of radical non-democratic ideologies when it comes to triggering allegiance, as some individuals are on occasion more influenced by structural proximity, availability or affective interaction with other members of the group whose ideas they share [44]. On numerous occasions, social networks of family relations and friendships have facilitated their attraction to and closer dealings with the surroundings of the ideological group. Socialisation in hatred and the sub—culture of violence dominating the processes for adopting radical non-democratic ideologies is thus channelled through the establishment and development of ties with friends and family, and also by submitting to the guidance of leaders charged with identifying places and settings in which to engage in ideological proselytism. Ideologies reinforce the process that has been termed “transformative radicalization”, strengthening “precursors of radicalization” such as alienation, search for belonging, purpose, self-fulfilment, revenge, and others like the rejection of political, social and cultural codes that can play a key role in the re-assessment of an individual’s attitude. Consequently, “rather than simply compel an individual to participate in violence, precursors influence the individual’s context of living in ways that make them susceptible to new experiences, perspectives and beliefs” [45]. These precursors can have particular influence on vulnerable immigrant communities like Muslim communities whose members are exposed to conflicting dichotomies defined by their background, tradition and their new environments and values. Conflicting sentiments of belonging and recognition of individual identity with regard to the collective lie at the heart of these dualities that in turn facilitate the breeding ground for the implementation of certain ideologies [46]. Contexts like these may facilitate adverse relationships among immigrants and their host societies or the state, leading to antisocial behaviours or a kind of segregation that has been referred to as “apartism” [47]. The members of these communities, defined by distinct traditions and cultural background, may feel attracted towards a new collective identity, occasionally resorting to ideologies that are exaggerated in their forms, dogmatic in their statements, and belligerent in their proposals [48]. This process of ideological affirmation and engagement may strengthen the ties between individuals and their reference community in the host society. In parallel with these stronger ties, the links among individuals not yet fully integrated into the host society are weakened and this even makes them feel, on occasions, they are outsiders and foreigners [49]. Hence the need to confront those ideologies helping to strengthen identities that can emerge as obstacles for the peaceful

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and efficient integration of those communities particularly vulnerable to radical nondemocratic ideals with which to interpret their situation.

6. Conclusions Bearing in mind that radicalism is inherent to any democratic society and not necessarily illegal, nor inevitably violent, providing that certain very precise limits are respected, radical manifestations of political and religious ideologies must be deemed acceptable in democratic societies. However, we cannot ignore the considerable and dangerous potential of certain radical ideologies to degenerate into violent and non-democratic extremisms in view of the characteristics of their contents, sometimes very close to the justification and legitimation of behaviours that exceed the values enshrined by democracy. Some ideologies may stimulate risks and threats if their slide into more radical and even non-democratic positions is not suitably detected and neutralised. It is therefore necessary to stress the pertinence of developing early indicators of such an evolution in the radicalization of ideologies that are apparently within the bounds of democracy, but that may be contributing to the deterioration of social co-existence and the framework of rights and obligations defined, in Spain, by the Constitution. Radical non-democratic ideologies foster the transformation of risks into security threats, hence the requirement to interrupt this transition before it becomes any deeper and its neutralisation is rendered more difficult. Therefore, while security threats are fundamentally defined by non-democratic ideologies that foster violence, we must also bear in mind that, at their roots, they may have extremist ideals that occasionally form part of the democratic framework before exceeding its bounds. Some of the ideologies that undertake this regression have done so as a consequence of what Abdelwahab Meddeb has called “the disease of Islam” [50], using a description that is not exclusively limited to Islamism but also to other ideologies such as nationalism and far-right and far-left extremism. As indicated above, fundamental differences can be seen in these ideologies. Nonetheless, in the most radical versions of Islamism or nationalism and far-right or farleft extremisms, xenophobic, supremacist and racist ideas based on hatred of the other have the same function, namely to provide a self-justifying framework for the brutal social and moral transgressions proposed at times by such ideologies. Ideology is the component that enables the moral inhibitors developed by humankind to be switched off by providing a certain rationale for the macabre crimes that may be perpetrated and justified by those adopting radical non-democratic ideals. The most radical expressions of ideologies such as nationalism, Islamism or rightwing and left-wing extremism contribute to political and religious fanaticism by demolishing the inhibition that halts aggression. The moral conscience that generates a sense of blame and empathy with other human beings is what prevents such brutalities at those committed by terrorists after a defective politicisation has confirmed in them the suitability of using violence to pursue political goals in the name of an ideology. This is why they resort to ideological frameworks and psychosocial mechanisms identical to those used by terrorists of different ideologies to rationalise their barbaric actions in order to try to imbue them with legitimacy. This kind of “disease”, using Meddeb’s description in the wide sense, is what encourages the ideological degeneration of ideals that in a

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“healthy” context would respect the constraints established by democracy in order to define their legality and legitimacy. The prevention of this kind of “disease” requires actions in different areas, including police actions, that are never simple in view of the thin line that sometimes separates behaviours considered democratic and others deemed non-democratic. This is why it is absolutely essential to apply the legislation on hate crimes whenever possible and necessary, but also on any crimes implying discrimination for ideological reasons or any statements promoting certain extremist acts. The reform of the Spanish Criminal Code in 2010 and 2015, with the introduction of the dissemination of terrorist ideologies for the perpetration of attacks as a specific crime, provides the legal framework in which to prosecute “the dissemination of extreme Islamic ideology” or “the furtherance by the accused of an attempt to disseminate radical fundamentalist religious ideology of extreme Islamism,” as reflected in several judgements by Spain’s Supreme Court [51]. Responses to violent extremism must combat both the violence and the ideologies that make that violence possible and justify it. No easy task. In consequence, any intervention in such a sensitive area cannot be limited to the fundamental strengthening of certain democratic values and the necessary reproduction of counter-narratives by non-radical players in order to delegitimise extremist ideologies. Of course, cultural and social actions are also required in order to strengthen a culture of democratic values enabling the neutralisation of the sub-culture of hatred and violence on which radical non-democratic ideals are constructed. Versus the socialisation any radical subculture that is creating frameworks justifying violence and nondemocratic behaviour, we must oppose mechanisms facilitating socialisation in totally antagonistic values that therefore restrain hatred and fanaticism. The solidity of these democratic values, among other factors, is what determines whether or not, in societies where radical non-democratic ideologies emerge, these remain generally circumscribed to minority groups. It is such a democratic culture that ensures that any expressions of violence in the name of an ideology generally lack any majority support or sympathy and therefore represent exceptional actions that do not become widespread. The generalised trend has been to differentiate cognitive radicalization from violent radicalization, focusing on the latter by assuming that this stage is the truly dangerous one. Sometimes the first of these stages is underestimated as it is an early indicator of a process that may give rise to violent radicalization later as in the case of extremists who have ultimately perpetrated violent terrorist actions. We must therefore design tools that enable us to detect and confront cognitive radicalization and engage in a complex but crucial battle of ideas that will determine people’s wills. Both Spain’s Constitution and the European Union have perfectly defined the limits that radical ideologies must never exceed. In its communication to the European Parliament on the factors contributing to violent radicalization, the Commission states: The European Union rejects violence and hatred and will never tolerate racism or xenophobia in any form or against any religion or ethnic group. As stated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Union is founded on the indivisible and universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, and is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It is important to maintain an essential balance between the different fundamental rights in this area, especially between, on the one hand, the right to life and, on the other, the right to freedom of expression and privacy. Europe must continue to defend human rights and the rule of law and reject any form of relativism with regard to fundamental rights.

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Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious violations of fundamental rights and any argument that aims to justify certain violent practices as a manifestation of diversity must be rejected without reservation [52]. In a continent like Europe that has suffered totalitarianisms and terrorisms fuelled by destructive radical non-democratic ideologies, it must be remembered that democracy demands a certain tolerance that must also be protected so as not to exceed necessary limits. Any abuse of such tolerance must therefore be avoided in order to foster the proper integration of individuals who must also be required to adhere to a set of shared laws and values. This is the context in which the role of women in the face of violent extremism in European liberal democracies is inscribed.

References and Endnotes [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5]

[6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]

[21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27]

See, for example, N. C. Fink, S. Zeiger and R. Bhulai, A Man’s World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. L. Vidino, “Countering radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe”, USIP Special Report 262, November 2010. J. Bartlett and C. Miller, “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization”, p. 2, Terrorism and Political Violence, 24 (2012), 1-21. Ibid. J. Khalil, “Radical Beliefs and Violent Actions Are Not Synonymous: How to Place the Key Disjuncture Between Attitudes and Behaviors at the Heart of Our Research into Political Violence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 37:2 (2014), 198–211. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Mobilization to Violence (Terrorism) Research. Key Findings, Intelligence Assessment Branch, 5, 2018. David Cameron’s speech at Munich Security Conference, 05/02/2011. Estrategia Española de Seguridad. Una responsabilidad de todos (Spanish Security Strategy. A responsibility of all), Government of Spain, p. 33. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. p. 48. Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 2017 (2017 National Security Strategy), Cabinet Office, Government of Spain, p. 59. J. Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements, New York, Basic books, 1973; R. Wesley, “Combating Terrorism through a Counter Framing Strategy,” CTC Sentinel 1(2) (January 2008), pp. 10–12. R. Eccleshall, V. Geoghegan, R. Jay and R. Wilford, Political ideologies. An introduction, London: Routledge, p. 27, 1992. Constitución Española (Spanish Constitution), Madrid, Civitas, p. 13, 1989. Ibid, p. 16. Ibid. Ibid. A. Truyol, Los derechos humanos. Declaraciones y convenios internacionales (Human Rights. International Declarations and Conventions), Madrid, Tecnos, p. 11, 1982. “Radical democracy” is also a legitimate aspiration of some authors who identify that model with greater democratic depth. Fernando Vallespín considers Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the champion of that model of “radical democracy” by proposing a direct and fully participatory democracy for the citizenry. F. Vallespín, “El discurso de la democracia radical” (The discourse of radical democracy), in R. del Águila and F. Vallespín, La democracia en sus textos (Democracy in its texts). Madrid, Alianza, p. 157, 2001. R. del Águila, Crítica de las ideologías. El peligro de los ideales (Critique of ideologies. The danger of ideals), Madrid, Taurus, p. 13, 2008. Ibid. G. Sartori, Elementos de teoría política (Elements of political theory), Madrid, Alianza, pp. 133-137, 1999. Ibid, p. 137. A. Maalouf, Identidades asesinas (Murderous identities), Madrid, Alianza, pp. 43-44, 1999. Ibid., pp. 44-45. J. M. Vallés, Ciencia Política. Una introducción (Polítical Science. An introduction), Barcelona, Ariel, p. 278, 2004.

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[28] M. Maffesoli, El tiempo de las tribus (The time for tribes), Barcelona, Icaria, 1990. [29] L. Vidino, “Countering radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe”, op.cit. [30] A. Bandura, “Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities”, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3: 3, (1999), 193-209; D. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995; “The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice”, M. Crenshaw in R. Walter (ed.), Origins of Terrorism. Psychologies, ideologies, states of mind. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-24, 1998. [31] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization. A guide for the perplexed. June 2009. National Security Criminal Investigations, p. 1. [32] Radicalization Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism. A concise Report prepared by the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalization. Submitted to the European Commission on 15 May 2008. [33] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalization, Brussels, 21/09/2005, COM (2005) 313 final, Commission of the European Communities, p. 2. [34] F. Llera, “Las identidades” (Identities), p. 671, in M. Jiménez de Parga and F. Vallespín (ed.), La Política (Politics), Vol. II of S. del Campo and J. F. Tezanos (co-ordinators), España en el siglo XXI (Twenetyfirst century Spain), Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, pp. 671-700, 2008. [35] On the role played by ideologies and their functions, see A. Trethewey, S. R. Corman, and B. Goodall, 14/09/2009, Report 0902, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University; and The Change Institute, The beliefs, ideologies and narratives. A study carried out by the Change Institute for the European Commission (Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security), Studies into violent radicalization, Lot 2, February 2008. [36] S. Bruce, Fundamentalismo (Fundamentalism), Madrid, Alianza, p. 132, 2003. [37] A. T. Beck, Prisioneros del odio. Las bases de la ira, la hostilidad y la violencia (Prisoners of hatred. The bases for anger, hostility and violence), Madrid: Paidós, pp. 126-127, 2003. [38] Ibid. [39] Ibid., pp. 127-128. [40] Ibid., 138. [41] G. Le Bon quoted in Beck (2003), op.cit., p. 229. [42] D. Omand, “Countering International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy”, Survival, 47: 4 (2005-2006), 107-116. [43] A. Schmid, “Towards joint political strategies for de-legitimising the use of terrorism”, p. 262, in Countering terrorism through international cooperation, ISPAC (International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme), Proceedings of the International Conference on “Countering terrorism through enhanced international cooperation”, Courmayeur, Mont Blanc, Italy, 22-24 September 2000, pp. 260-273. [44] D. A. Snow, L. A. Zurcher, and S. Ekland-Olson, “Social networks and social movements: a microstructural approach to differential recruitment”, in American Sociological Review, 45, (1980), 787801. [45] A. Wilner and C.J. Dubouloz, p. 423, “Transformative radicalization: Applying Learning Theory to Islamist Radicalization”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 34, (2011), 418-438. [46] P. Waldmann, “Radicalization in the diaspora: why Muslims in the West attack their host countries”, Working Paper 9/2010, 15/03/2010. [47] J. Gest, Apart. Alienated and engaged Muslims in the West, London, Hurst & Company, 2010. [48] A. Planet, “Islam e inmigración: elementos para un análisis y propuestas de gestión” (Islam and immigration: elements for an analysis and management proposals), Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Foro de Inmigración (Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, Immigration Forum), 01/09/2008. [49] Ibid. [50] Bernard-Henri Lévy, “Francia, Toulouse, el islam” (France, Toulouse, Islam), El País, 01/04/2012. [51] “Análisis de las últimas resoluciones judiciales sobre difusión del ideario yihadista como delito” (Analysis of the latest judicial rulings on the diseemination of jihadist ideas as a crime), María Ponte, 19/05/2012, Grupo de Estudios de Seguridad Internacional (International Security Study Group), http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/gesi/es/contenido/analisis-de-las-ultimas-resoluciones-judicialessobre-difusion-del-ideario-yihadista-como. [52] European Union, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 21/09/2005, COM 313 (2005).

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Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-56

Women and Violent Extremism: Past and Future Face of Terrorism a

Mia BLOOM a Georgia State University

Abstract. Women are playing an increasingly significant role in terrorism. As men are increasingly targeted by security personnel using female operatives provides terrorist organizations with a ‘win-win’ scenario; if security forces avoid invasively searching women for fear of outraging the local conservative population [based on social norms of women’s modesty and the honor code], women are the ideal stealth weapon. If security personnel are too aggressive in searching women, they aid terrorist recruitment by outraging the men in that society and providing the terrorists with propaganda that ‘our women’ are being violated. In most conflicts, women remain an untapped resource. Recruiting women allows terrorist organizations to access an additional 50% of the population. Female attacks generate greater media attention than those conducted by men. This is especially relevant where media attention is one of the terrorists’ main objectives. Although women’s involvement in terrorist and extremist activities is not a recent development, their presence as front-line activists, propagandists, and recruiters is increasing around the globe. [1]. Keywords. Women and Terrorism, Female Suicide Bombers, Martyr, Narodnya Volya, Irish Republican Army, IRA, Daesh, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP.

1. Introduction Under what conditions do women participate in terrorism? Do they volunteer or are they coerced? Do terrorist groups resort to using women because men are less effective or because of battlefield losses? Finally, is using women on the front lines a sign of strength or weakness? The classic problem in analyzing women’s roles in terrorist movements has been the plethora of stereotypes perpetuated by the media and the public that frame women as “pawns” or “victims.” Women’s agency in terrorism and violent extremism has traditionally been viewed through a patriarchal lens. After an attack by a female operative, terrorism experts, psychologists, and political analysts frequently engage in developing a so-called “psychological autopsy,” examining where the perpetrator grew up, where she went to school, and what went wrong to make her turn to violence. A common assumption is that she must be depressed, crazy, suicidal, or psychopathic, and, overwhelmingly, that a man that made her do it. This denies any agency for the woman and denudes her motivations of any political content. Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry challenged the masculine narratives depicting women as “mothers, monsters or whores” [2]. Their research insisted that by limiting our understanding of women’s agency to one of the three pre-existing narratives, research on women and terrorism discounted women as willing participants in terrorist movements.

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Female violence, typically seen as an aberrant and unnatural occurrence, becomes one way in which women might contribute to the good of the nation or their people. According to Clara Beyler, speaking about Palestinian militant groups, “Women [were] rarely involved in the higher echelons of the decision-making process of these groups. Women may volunteer, or…women might be coerced to conduct a murderous strike, but the patriarchal hierarchy that rules Palestinian society and its terrorist groups ultimately dictates the woman’s role” [3]. And, though we no longer exclusively believe men coerce women into terrorism (some exceptions, like the Nigerian Chibok girls apply), the men in these women’s lives play a crucial role in mobilizing them. According to Galvin, “Some women are recruited into terrorist organizations by boyfriends. A significant feature that may characterize the involvement of the female terrorist is the ‘male or female lover/female accomplice ... scenario’” [4]. Nevertheless, it is misleading to assume that all women are merely pawns without any political motivation of their own. In fact, one of the most reliable predictors of a women’s involvement in terrorism is her relationship to a former or current terrorist in that movement – making it a family affair. This essay reviews a number of different ways in which women have been involved in terrorism—drawing on both historical and current examples. After giving an overview of women’s historical participation in violent extremism, this essay will examine the phenomenon of female suicide bombers, drawing on lessons from Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. Second, women’s roles in Al Qaeda are examined. Third, the essay investigates the portrayal of women in social media for recruitment purposes. Finally, it examines critically the narrative of women characterized as “victims” of a terrorist group, and reviews women’s participation in Daesh (or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria).

2. Women as Terrorists We can track the changes in women’s roles in terrorist organizations from the 1950s until today. For example, the “exploding womb” (whereby women pretended to be pregnant to disguise an improvised device) replaced the “revolutionary womb” (whereby women were expected to birth the next generation), as more and more women have become suicide bombers. It is important to remember that women’s involvement in political violence is not a recent phenomenon. The 1970s witnessed the emergence of women as important protagonists in the conflicts across the world. Recent years have witnessed suicide attacks perpetrated by female suicide bombers. This growing trend of female bombers has the general public and counterterrorism specialists concerned because of the implication that women will be key players in future terrorist attacks [5]. While women have been most often seen as the victims of terror, they have played vital roles as perpetrators [6]. Women have been among the first to join terrorist movements and in fact, the very first person tried in a court of law for terrorism was Vera Zasulich, an anarchist for Narodnya Volya, the People’s Will, in Russia [7]. In 1878, Zasulich proudly proclaimed that she was not a murderer but rather: “I am a terrorist” at her trial for the attempted assassination of Governor Trepov in St. Petersburg [8]. After Zasulich was found not guilty, and carried away on the shoulders of the crowd, several other prominent female anarchists were tried for terror related plots. For example, the women of Narodnaya Volya participated in several high-profile operations including Sofia Perovskaya and Vera Figner, who were involved in one of the Anarchists’ last operations, the assassination of the Czar [9].

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Throughout the 20th century, women have also been active—at multiple levels from planning operations to disseminating propaganda—in the many ethno-nationalist conflicts that have spawned terrorist organizations as well as in far-left political movements in Europe. In Germany, the Baader-Meinhoff Gang’s ideological leader Ulrike Meinhof, after whom the group was partly named, was a key organizer. Here women formed the bulk of the ‘behind the scenes’ support networks for the groups, maintaining safe houses, ferrying weapons, but also engaged in occasional front-line activities such as bank robberies and driving getaway cars (notably, Astrid Proll). In Spain, women comprised around 17% of ETA, the Basque separatist party, and often joined as broader family units. According to Carrie Hamilton, although men dominated the leadership of the organization throughout its first decade, a small number of women joined the movement in the 1960s [10]. Some took up arms and engaged in front line activities. In 2009, ETA appointed a woman, Iratxe Sorzabal Diaz as its new leader. Four other women joined Ms. Diaz as leaders of the organization the following August. In Northern Ireland, women constituted a crucial part of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Most of the women provided much needed support for the men of the group. The women of Belfast and Derry became the not-so-secret weapons of the PIRA—raising the alarm by banging garbage-can lids when British soldiers approached, shielding fugitive gunmen when squads of troops swooped into the Catholic ghettos or personally planting bombs. Over time, women became more and more involved in front line activities and in violence; women began carrying weapons and taking part in armed encounters against British soldiers. Some women even went on “Active Service,” meaning that they took on more activist roles and engaged in front line activities beginning in the 1970s [11]. Some of the PIRA’s most dangerous operatives were female. In 1973 the Price sisters made headlines when they received life sentences for the March London Bomb attacks that killed one person and seriously injured 216 [12]. The following year Judith Ward was arrested for bombing the M62 highway, which had caused many civilian casualties, and Roisin McLaughlin was wanted in connection with luring three British soldiers to their deaths. Nearly three hundred Republican women were taken into custody. Armagh jail, where the women were housed, bulged at the seams with female political prisoners. One of the female leaders of the organization, Maire Drumm was quoted as saying, “for every woman they put in Armagh jail, there would be fifty more” [13]. In Armagh jail, several women joined Bobby Sands in the hunger strike of 1980, and the women likewise engaged in a parallel “no wash protest”—refusing to change their clothes or bathe in hopes of reinstating their special status as political prisoners (rather than as mere criminals), just like the men. According to the PIRA chief, Seán Mac Stíofáin, one of the most accurate snipers in the Belfast brigade was a teenage girl, while another young woman was their best expert on booby traps. In interviews with the women of the PIRA, they said that they rarely felt any kind of sexual discrimination or second-class status [14]. Mairead Farrell, the female Commanding Officer (CO) in Armagh recalled that she was treated as an equal to men, as were other women in the PIRA. She is quoted as saying, “you got doing what the lads did, but it depended to what extent you were committed, not measured by what sex you were” [15]. The attitude was that women could do anything the men could. Looking at the political gender balance today, many of those same women have traded in weapons for ballot boxes and are politically elected representatives in Stormont, Northern Ireland’s Parliament.

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Notably, after the early-1980s, women virtually disappeared from analyses of the PIRA. To echo feminist critiques, “nothing could be further from the truth than...claims that in contemporary intra-state ‘low intensity’ wars women stayed [sic] away from combat roles were not the case” [16]. Even archived news material collected daily about the PIRA ceased to include coverage of women after 1988 [17].

3. Female Suicide Bombers In terms of active roles in terrorism, there are several cases in which women have been utilized as suicide bombers to support the cause. Commensurate to women’s involvement described in the previous section, in the case of Palestine, women fulfilled both supportive and operational roles. The majority acted in support roles, but a handful engaged in front-line activities such as hijackings and planting ordinance. Perhaps the most famous Palestinian woman engaged in terrorism was Leila Khaled who became a “poster child” for Palestinian militancy in the 1970s after she engaged in several highprofile hijackings against Israeli targets for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Another well-known militant, Dalal Mughrabi, a member of Fatah, proved to be a source of inspiration when she organized a deadly roadside attack in March 1978 in which thirty-seven Israelis lost their lives [18]. These women helped inspire an entire generation of young women in the refugee camps to follow in their footsteps. Poems, songs and stories were written about Khaled in over a dozen languages and a public square, soccer tournament, youth center, and a girl’s summer camp have all been named after Mughrabi, despite the fact that she did not have the best reputation until she led the commando raid and was able to change the way in which she was remembered by her community [19]. Notably, beginning in 1985, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) sent six female suicide bombers—both Muslim and Christian—to kill Israeli soldiers, transforming themselves into living and thinking “human bombs” [20]. Suicide terrorism evolved into the preferred tactic by Hizbullah against Israeli, American and French targets beginning in 1983. The Lebanese SSNP (described above) used women in ways that differed from how they used men (normally sent to ram car bombs to attack stationary targets). The SSNP’s innovation was to use a person-born improvised explosive device (PBIED), rather than one hidden in the vehicle [21]. The tactical logic behind this decision was that the PBIED could go undetected, and that the individual could make last-minute adjustments. While groups affiliated with a religious ideology found theological precedents to justify an act of suicide that was forbidden by all of monotheistic religions, secular groups had no such qualms against weaponizing suicide for a cause. The secular groups were early adopters of using women for the task. In 1985, the SSNP sent 16-year old Sana’a Mehaidli to a checkpoint to blow up several Israelis border guards [22]. The women of the SSNP created the template for other women to become involved in terrorist attacks. The women of the SSNP did not take a backstage role to men and certainly, other militant women around the globe took notice. The fact that the SSNP included Muslim and Christian women was significant because at this time, suicide terror was exclusively seen as a part of the Shi’a Muslim tradition based on attacks in Lebanon and Kuwait. The Shi’a faith had a long tradition of martyrdom and the sanctification of sacrifice, which provided a pathway for convincing their operatives to sacrifice themselves for the cause.

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Suicide terrorism spread from Lebanon to Kuwait to South Asia and, in 1987, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), deployed their first suicide bomber [23]. Within four years, women were fully operational. In 1991 Thenmozi Rajaratnam targeted former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Sriperumbudur, when the candidate emerged from his car and began to walk towards the stage. The assassin, more commonly known by her aliases Dhanu or Gayatri [24], held a white garland of flowers. As Gandhi made his way through the crowd, he was garlanded by supporters but when he bent down to receive a white garland of flowers, Dhanu detonated her improvised explosive device killing Gandhi, herself, and the nearby civilians in the crowd [25]. The suicide attack proved so successful, in terms of the publicity it garnered as well as the increased revenue from Tamil diaspora donations (in Canada, Australia and the UK), that the LTTE began using suicide bombers on a regular basis and successfully targeted Presidents, prime ministers, and high-ranking members of the military [26]. Female bombers comprised approximately 1/3 of the LTTE attacks, but tended to cause enormous damage. Between 1985 and 2008, female suicide bombers perpetrated more than 230 attacks [27], about a quarter of all such acts. So why is suicide terrorism attractive for women? Women have become the ideal stealth weapon for many terror groups. For example, in recent years between April 2014 and June 2017, Boko Haram in Nigeria used as many as 244 women (of a total of 434 bombers), constituting 56% of the total [28]. Women are less likely to be searched and were used to strike coalition troops in Iraq and Afghanistan as a result. This alarming tactic garnered substantial media attention and helped recruit more members to the cause. Suicide bombing can also carry a certain social weight that may be attractive for women in different cultural contexts. For instance, in Palestinian controlled areas, suicide bombers are considered heroes within the community. Hundreds (if not thousands) of people attend their funerals and their families receive congratulations rather than condolences from the community. The lives of these martyrs are celebrated and memorialized on posters, street names, public parks and occasionally youth camps to encourage little boys and girls to follow in their footsteps. The glossy pre-mission photos of the bombers that the organizations take, often to brand the attack and prevent rival groups from trying to claim credit, are transformed into 12 x 16 posters that Palestinian children put up on their bedroom walls replacing their previous idols, American musicians or Brazilian football stars. Pictures of the bombers are plastered throughout the West Bank and Gaza to celebrate the groups’ victories. According to some sources, the amount of space a bomber gets on a poster depends on how many Israelis he or she has killed [29]. If the bomber only manages a few casualties, they might have to share their poster space with another bomber or possibly more. Women get the perverse message that they can do far more with their deaths for the cause than they can ever do with their lives. Many Palestinians feel helpless in the face of extreme Israeli counter terrorism measures, alleging that they might die at any moment from aerial bombardment or a stray bullet. Becoming a suicide bomber might in some ways empower the individual to feel that they choose the time and place of their death. For Palestinian women, the desire to demonstrate one’s dedication to the cause reinforces some of the more personal and individual reasons someone might have to mobilize into violence. When failed Palestinian bomber Shefa’a Al-Qudsi was asked whether she would discourage her daughter Diana from following in her footsteps and becoming a martyr, she said that she would “teach Diana that education is the most important thing in life. But since the children can be shot coming home from school the best and the brightest of our children

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become martyrs, whether or not they want to be. So, if Dina wanted to do this, Shefa’a would not stop her” [30]. Joshua Goldstein argued that men and women have the same capacity for violence as gender and culture were nothing more than constructions of society [31]. While Goldstein argued that violence was not natural to either men or women, culture had apparently equated violence with masculinity, ignoring women’s involvement in violence during war or as agents of terrorism. Some existing scholarship has posited that different things might motivate men and women. However, the reality of involvement is more complex. The notion that women are equal to men in the execution of violent jihad has become popular among violent extremist ideologues from both the Sunni and Shi’a traditions, providing a potential avenue for women to express national, religious, or individual identities. Sayyid Hussein Fadlallah, the former leader of Hizbullah, stated that jihad is not obligatory for women [32], yet Fadlallah expressed no reservations about martyrdom operations carried out by women. In his view Islam permitted women to fight in a defensive war and suggested that martyrdom operations by women might be necessary [33]. According to the leading Sunni religious authorities at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, jihad is not obligatory for women but may be imposed under three conditions [34]: if the enemy invades Muslim lands it becomes obligatory for everyone, both male and female to fight for the Cause; if Muslim leaders call upon the whole Ummah to perform jihad; or if Muslim leaders appoint women to do certain tasks such as monitoring the enemy, laying mines etc. Under such conditions women may feel obligated to carry out the duty entrusted to them [35].

4. Women and Al Qaeda Women’s active participation in Al Qaeda has been limited, although it could be argued that the practical limitations that restrict women’s movements in Muslim societies pose challenges men do not have to face in perpetrating attacks [36]. Still, there are scholars that have justified women’s participation in terrorism—including suicide bombing—in the context of Al Qaeda. For example, Sheikh Yusuf al Qadarawi, Dean of Islamic Studies at the University of Qatar, has endorsed female suicide bombers throughout the Islamic world in his religious rulings (fatawa). Some scholars trace this legitimation of female suicide bombers to Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian co-founder of Al Qaeda, who discussed women’s obligation to carry out jihad years before any juridical rulings existed and well before Al Qaeda softened to the idea of female recruits [37]. Azzam issued a fatwa in 1979, which stated that women (and children) are required to participate in jihad as an individual obligation to defend “Muslim lands.” Despite Azzam’s support, Al Qaeda’s core leadership did little to encourage female participation on the battlefield, focusing instead on women’s roles as fundraisers and supporters of the mujahideen (those engaged in jihad) [38]. The majority of Al Qaeda’s members are men, and its power base is decidedly masculine. Beyond the core of the organization is an amorphous movement with loosely connected offshoot organizations in countries all over the world and with sympathizers who do not always engage in violence. Al Qaeda is often described as a patriarchal organization that excludes women. Yet the reality of female participation in Al Qaeda is also more complicated. Women are among its most fervent supporters, and some participate in the affiliate organizations, but

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it is still rare for women to fight on the front lines. Like in ancient times, women “fight” but not in battle [39]. There is an army of female organizers, proselytizers, teachers, translators and fund-raisers, who either enlist with their husbands or succeed those who are jailed or killed. While the core of Al Qaeda refused to formally approve of women’s participation in front line activities, Ayman al Zawahiri acknowledged that women did play in a role in the other areas of the Dar al Harb (House of War) in the global jihad. For example, in Algeria, the “al Qaeda in the Maghreb group” used women in their bombing campaigns. However, women were more likely responsible for medicine, food, and clothes. To a woman who inquired whether she should participate in the Maghreb, Zawahiri responded that while jihad was a universal obligation for both men and women, if by joining the jihad she would have to abandon her children, then she should not do it [40]. For some women wanting to participate in violent jihad, Zawahiri’s response came as a disappointment. More to the point, his comment did not reflect the reality of women’s involvement in Iraq or in other conflicts in which women had played important roles in violent jihad. In the online space, some women pleaded for the right to get involved. One woman lamented, “How many times have I wished I were a man ... When Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri said there are no women in Al Qaeda, he saddened and hurt me,” after allegedly listening to the speech 10 times. “I felt that my heart was about to explode in my chest...I am powerless” [41]. At the same time Ayman al Zawahiri made explicit that there were no women in Qaeda, his wife, Umayma, released a statement explaining that women had a role to play in jihad including as suicide bombers [42]. Moreover, a significant development in women’s participation in the global jihad has been the dissemination of radical ideologies online. The Internet has afforded women like Malika el-Aroud in Belgium the opportunity to participate without compromising their position in society. Articles, communiqués and online chat rooms have offered women the space to express their fanatical support. Similarly, in Italy, Umm Yahya Aysha (Barbara) Farina directed the website and blog, Al Muhajidah Magazine [43]. The October 2001 edition published after 9/11 featured an editorial entitled: “I support the Taliban” and featured a picture of President George Bush with the caption: “Wanted dead or alive, commander of crusade” [44]. Recent criminal cases, for example Colleen La Rose (“Jihad Jane”) and her friend Jamie Ramirez (“Jihad Jamie”), were arrested for plotting to kill Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks for portraying the Prophet Muhammed with the body of a dog. The same artist was the target of a shooter in February 2014, as he survived both the plot by La Rose and the attack against the café in Copenhagen [45]. In this respect, Al Qaeda has understood the attraction of the Internet for women dedicated to their cause, and has created a number of web based social media designed to help women mobilize other women as well as recruit men. Its first foray came in August 2004 with the launch of a web-based magazine called Al Khansa’a, named for the Pre-Islamic female poet and convert who wrote lamentations for her brothers killed in battle [46]. The webzine was published by the “Women’s information office in the Arab Peninsula,” and its contents include articles on women’s appropriate behavior, supporting their male relatives, on terrorist training camps, and even an occasional recipe. Its first issue, with a bright pink cover and gold embossed lettering, appeared in August 2004 with the lead article “Biography of the Female Mujahedeen.” Since Al Khansa’a, the Al Qaeda magaizine Inspire released a 31-page glossy magazine for women called Al Shamikha. Al Shamikha, dubbed the Jihadi Cosmo [47], was issued in March 2011,

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provided guidance for women on how to marry a mujahideen, advised women about jihad etiquette and provided beauty tips [48]. Only a handful of women in Al Qaeda ever actually engaged in violence. Instead the majority of Al Qaeda’s female supporters goaded men to participate and have ensured that male members of the organization remained steadfast and did not defect. Militant women have emerged as part of al Qaeda’s affiliated groups rather than in the core, since many of the core ideologues oppose women’s participation until today. The affiliated organizations have been more practical and flexible when it comes to women’s participation. If using women will succeed where men fail, conservative ideologies have been ignored. Thus, the increased use of female bombers in Palestine, Chechnya, North Africa, and Somalia flouts some Islamic interpretations that women cannot participate in martyrdom operations.

5. Victimhood and Sexual Violence In some circumstances, negative consequences of war and conflict can feed into the radicalization and recruitment processes of women. According to a 2008 report by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, over a hundred women were arrested for terrorist-related activities, seventy of which were tried by the government and jailed. Most, if not all, of the female suicide bombers in Iraq were the relatives of male terrorists. The filial connection is no coincidence. In this respect, it is to be assumed that the terrorist organizations deliberately recruit women that have a brother, father or son already affiliated with one of the groups. In part, this is a vetting process, a way of being assured that the person is not providing information to the other side and can be trusted to complete the mission [49]. The likelihood of a woman changing her mind and not completing an operation that would shame her entire family is a significant social pressure. According to a former U.S. military officer, “more women are being exposed to Jihadi propaganda through the men who bring home videos to watch them. Women are also watching the same indoctrination videos” [50]. Moreover, the women who have lost loved ones find themselves marginalized in society and vulnerable to recruitment. There are over a hundred thousand widows in Iraq because of the war and the sectarian violence amid the various communities. Al Qaeda has succeeded in exploiting women’s tragedy to their advantage, and many of the women are poor and illiterate. Al Qaeda recruiters exploited their poverty, despair, resentment, and eagerness to take revenge against the American troops. The women that joined Al Qaeda were exploited based on three factors: tribal affiliation, financial pressure and revenge for the loss of family members [51]. Sexual violence in conflict also plays a role in why women participate in terrorism. In Chechnya, girls were raped by Russian soldiers at checkpoints, and in Sri Lanka, Tamil women were sexually abused by Sinhalese soldiers. These formerly victimized women “reinvent” themselves, and terrorist groups leverage their shame for their participation in suicide bomber brigades. These women are told that they can restore their honor by killing as many of the enemy’s soldiers as possible. In the case of Iraq, however, foreign soldiers are not necessarily always the source of sexual violence. While there have been a handful of high profile cases of Iraqi women and girls raped by US soldiers at Abu Ghraib, such as the case of Abir al-Janabi, a 14-year old girl who was raped and killed by American soldiers, there have been few cases of rape compared to previous wars [52]. Part of the explanation for this decrease in sexual violence against

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local women is one of access; US soldiers did not encounter local women on a daily basis (Abir al Jenabi was stalked by the soldiers for several weeks and they attacked her in her own home) [53]. Thus, the levels of violence perpetrated by US soldiers in Iraq against Iraqi women were relatively (and thankfully) low, however the targets changed from local women to female American contractors who were sexually abused [54]. With few rapes perpetrated by foreign soldiers, a new and insidious practice emerged, one in which the women were raped by members of their own community in order to create squads of suicide bombers. Initially such allegations by the Iraqi government were assumed to be exaggerations to undermine the popularity of the insurgent Sunni organizations in Iraq. However, in February of 2009, Samira Ahmed Jassim was arrested for arranging the rape of 80 girls over a period of two years to turn them into suicide bombers for Ansar al Sunnah. Of the 80 girls victimized, 28 successfully carried out operations by the time Jassim was arrested by the Iraqi police. Jassim’s admission offers some indication into the growing wave of suicide attacks by women. She confirmed what several military and intelligence officials have contended: that the Iraqi insurgents prey on women in dire social and economic situations suffering from emotional or psychological problems, or abuse [55]. Sexual violence and rape also play a role in Nigeria. Many of Boko Haram’s female suicide bombers have been kidnapped and sexually abused – thus there appears to be a clear connection between gender-based violence and forced recruitment (and mobilization) by the terrorist group. Boko Haram has captured and raped hundreds of women and girls in what relief workers describe as “a deliberate strategy to dominate rural residents and create a new generation of Islamist militants” [56]. Women and girls are given to Boko Haram fighters for “marriage,” a euphemism for the sexual violence that occurs even when unions are cloaked in religious mandates [57].

6. Women in Daesh In the past few years, there has been widespread interest in women and gender-based violence perpetrated by Daesh. The media has been fascinated by the so-called “Jihadi Bride” [58] phenomenon in which women have voluntarily sought to emigrate and join the self-proclaimed Islamic caliphate. During 2014-2017, Daesh punctuated its violent territorial campaign with the systematic abuse of women, and boasted about its activities in its online propaganda. Daesh revived the practice of sexual slavery, war booty and concubinage using an antiquated interpretation of the Islamic distribution of the spoils of war as expounded in Surat al-Anfal (8:41) [59]. Gender-based violence and the exploitation of women were used as incentives for male fighters to join Daesh and remain active participants. To this end, women in the socalled caliphate were fully commoditized and used to recruit, reward, retain male fighters [60] and, ultimately, reproduce. Daesh capitalized on access to women to lure men to their self-proclaimed caliphate: they were potential wives, ranked according to a variety of criteria – age, skin and hair color, country of origin, and breast size – and allocated to men based on a patriarchal system of hierarchy and status [61]. In so doing, women were systematically exploited as a means of staving off Daesh’s declining rate of recruitment and presenting a bulwark against defection, an issue that could, in the medium term, rend the organization apart if not effectively stemmed. Having a wife, a child, and a house were strong incentives not to leave Daesh’s territory [62].

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Before highlighting Daesh’s pragmatism, it serves to compare the group with its affiliate in in Africa, Boko Haram. Despite the group’s pledge of allegiance (bay’ah) in March 2015, the two organizations remain worlds apart in terms of their ideology and strategy. However, when it comes to their treatment of women, there are some striking similarities, principally in terms of institutionalizing gender-based violence and abuse not just as a means of subordinating adversary populations, but for recruitment. In 2014, prior to its bay’ah to al-Baghdadi, UNICEF reported that Boko Haram used women and girls to carry out three-quarters of the attacks in Nigeria [63]. For many years, Boko Haram had primarily employed male suicide bombers to attack public places and government installations but, increasingly, women and young girls (between 7 and 17) have been coerced into targeting civilians at a range of locations, from chicken stalls to cell phone markets [64]. Similar to Boko Haram, behind the veneer of Daesh propaganda (whether it is directed at Arabic-speakers or English speakers), the effort the organization puts into recruiting women is driven by pragmatism. Daesh needs to provide its fighters with wives to boost their morale. It is however seeking to create the next generation (through reproduction) and secure the longevity of the group. When Daesh controlled a significant amount of territory, it set up a welfare system to help settle new families. In addition to being promised a salary and a free house, male foreign fighters were promised a wife and, in some cases, a Yazidi slave girl. By doing this, Daesh was attempting to solve the “marriage crisis” in the Middle East and North Africa region. Thus, male members are not just attracted to Daesh by ideology, but practically as joining the group makes social and economic sense. Evidently, Daesh was aware of this: There are institutions. There are civilians (that ISIS) is in charge of, and wide territories. It must help the immigrants marry. These are the components of a state and it must look after its subjects…Helping fighters marry is a key priority. Aside from the normal stipend, foreign fighters receive $500 when they marry to help them start a family. [One] 28-year-old got a particularly large bonus because his new wife is a doctor and speaks four languages [65].

7. Conclusions With the increasing use of female operatives as suicide bombers and front-line activists by secular and religious groups, terrorist organizations have succeeded in using Western gender stereotypes to their advantage. Female terrorist operatives tend to be deadlier— killing on average four times more people than their male counterparts, have greater propaganda value and create a win-win strategy for terrorist organizations that employ them. If the security services avoid searching women, female operatives have free reign. If security forces search women invasively, it causes massive outrage among the population and potentially garners more recruits for the terrorist organizations. The face of terrorism is changing—and it is now often a woman’s face. No longer can we expect terrorists to look a certain way, or be a certain age or gender. For example, the arrests in the United States of “Jihad Jane” and “Jihad Jamie”—two blue-eyed, blonde-haired women—and the suicide attack in Iraq of Western convert Muriel Degauque, epitomize the increase of women participating in all levels of terrorist organizations. Women are becoming key players. They can even be found in the most seemingly chauvinistic and male-dominated terrorist organizations, like Al Qaeda and Daesh.

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The leaders of terrorist movements make cost-benefit calculations to select tactics, targets, and the operatives that are the most effective. Terrorist organizations use Western gender stereotypes strategically, making women the ultimate “stealth weapon.” By using female operatives, terrorist organizations hope for the opposing government or occupation forces’ overreaction against the women in their society, a sure-fire way to elicit further outrage, anger, and mobilization of yet more recruits. Further, women bombers garner significantly more media attention than their male counterparts (at a rate of eight to one) and their participation may shame the men in their society into action instead of letting women “do their job.” In this respect, we need a more creative and nuanced understanding of women’s involvement in terrorism. In the present conflict, this means a more nuanced understanding of women’s involvement in Daesh, especially the young girls who were victimized. Although people might assume that women’s participation in terrorism, or in any form of political violence, means there is some sort of social equity between men and women, the reality is not the case. When women participate as leaders and ideologues in a terrorist group, it can portend a more equal status of women in that society. However, if the best and the brightest women of a society become suicide bombers, this will eliminate the next generation of female leaders. The conditions that influence female political violence are rarely examined in any great detail beyond simplistic motivational concerns that center on their sexual roles or gender stereotypes. The value of understanding what motivates women and what roles they play inside the terrorist organizations are crucial to a better understanding of how to combat the lure of violent extremism and involvement in violence.

References and Endnotes [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

[10] [11]

[12] [13]

The research is supported in part by the Office of Naval Research “Documenting the Virtual Caliphate” #N00014-16-1-3174. All opinions are exclusively those of the author and do not represent the Department of Defense or the Navy. Sjoberg, L., and Gentry, C., Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics, Zed Books,, New York, 2007. Beyler, C., Using Palestinian Women as Bombs, New York Sun, (2006), https://www.nysun.com/opinion/using-palestinian-women-as-bombs/43574/. Galvin, D.M., The Female Terrorist: A Socio-Psychological Perspective, Behavioral Science and the Law 1 (1983), p. 19–32. Raghavan S.V., and V. Balasubramaniyan, Evolving Role of Women in Terror Groups: Progression or Regression? Journal of International Women’s Studies, 15 (2014), p. 197. Ibid. Siljak, A., Angel of vengeance: The girl who shot the governor of St. Petersburg and sparked the age of assassination, St. Martin’s Macmillan, New York, 2008. Forest, J.F., Criminals and Terrorists: An Introduction to the Special Issue, Terrorism and Political Violence 24 (2012), pp. 171-179. Figner, V., Memories of a Revolutionary, Northern Illinois University Press, CITY, 1991, 233; Smith, H.B., and Caroll, Women’s Political and Social Thought: An Anthology, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2000, p. 310. Hamilton, C., The Gender Politics of Political Violence: Women Armed Activists in ETA, Feminist Review, 86 (2007), pp. 132-148. Hamilton, C., Why do Women Become ETA Terrorists? The Guardian. (2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/6397643/Iratxe-Sorzabal-Diaz-why-dowomen- become-ETA-terrorists.html. Keefe, P.R., Where the Bodies are Buried New Yorker, (2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/03/16/where-the-bodies-are-buried. Bloom, M., Bombshell: Women and Terror, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2011, p. 86.

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[14] Interviews conducted by the author, Belfast, 2009. [15] McGeever, J., The Story of Mairead Farrell, Magill Magazine, (1986), p. 9. [16] Miranda Alison, Women as agents of political violence: Gendering security, Security Dialogue, 35 (2004), p. 452; and Skjelsbæk, I., Sexual violence and war: Mapping out a complex relationship, European Journal of International Relations ECPR 7 (2001), pp. 211–237. [17] Linen Hall ceased to collect materials about female volunteers, author field work, 2009-2010. [18] Kershner, I., Palestinians honor a figure reviled in Israel as a terrorist, New York Times (2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/world/middleeast/12westbank.html. [19] Peteet, J., Gender in Crisis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, p.155. [20] Zedalis, D., Female Suicide Bombers, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2004, p.3. [21] Al Jazeera, Lebanon’s women warriors, Al Jazeera, (2010), https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/general/2010/04/2010413115916795784.html. [22] Zedalis, D., Female Suicide Bombers, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2004, p. 21. [23] The LTTE publication, Kalhaththil (In the Battle Front), July 29, 1999 lists all the successful suicide attacks carried out by the LTTE between 1987 and 1995. [24] Bloom, M., Ethnic conflict, state terror and suicide bombing in Sri Lanka, Civil Wars, 6 (2003), pp. 5484. [25] Reap the Whirlwind, the Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training, (2015), https://adst.org/2015/05/reap-the-whirlwind-the-assassination-of-rajiv-gandhi/. [26] Bloom, M., Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, Columbia University Press, New York, 2005. [27] Romano, T., Why the Boston Marathon Bombers Could have been Women, Dame Magazine, (2013), http://www.damemagazine.com/2013/04/29/why-boston-marathon-bombers-could-have-been-women. [28] Warner, J. and Matfess,H., Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational and demographic Characteristics of Boko Haram’s Suicide Operations, Combatting Terrorism Center (CTC), West Point, 2017, p.29, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf. [29] Bloom, M., Bombshell: Women and Terror, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2011, op.cit, p.119. [30] Miller, J., Bomb Under the Abaya, Policy Review, (2007), http://www.hoover.org/research/bomb-underabaya. [31] Goldstein, J. S., War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003. [32] “Martyr Operations: A means of Jihad,” Bayynat, the website of the religious authority, Sayyid Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, http://english.bayynat.org.lb/news/martyr.htm. [33] Cook, D., Women Fighting in Jihad? Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28 (2006), p.375, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100500180212. [34] Islam on-Line, ask a Scholar, Dr. ‘Abdel Fattah Idrees, professor of Comparative Jurisprudence, Al Azhar University, “Muslim Women Participating in Jihad.” http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-EnglishAsk_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503544310. [35] Lahoud, N., The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis Exclusion of Women from Jihad, Terrorism and Political Violence, 26 (2014), pp. 780-802, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2013.772511. [36] Al-Qaradawi, Y., Advisory Opinion of the Brand about the Participation of Women in Martyrdom Operations, Accessed May 2011, http://www.palestineinfo.info/arabic/fatawa/alamaliyat/qaradawi1.htm. [37] Miller, J., The Bomb Under the Abaya, Policy Review, (2007), https://www.hoover.org/research/bombunder-abaya. [38] Azzam, A., cited by Lahoud, N. “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women From Jihad, Terrorism and Political Violence,” 26:5, (2014) pp. 780802, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2013.772511 [39] Bloom, M., In Defence of Honor: Women and Terrorist Recruitment On the Internet, Journal of Postcolonial Cultures and Societies, 4 (2013), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mia_Bloom/publication/318569759_Special_Issue_Journal_of_Po stcolonial_Cultures_and_Societies_In_Defense_of_Honor_Women_and_Terrorist_Recruitment_on_the _Internet_1/links/5970ab82aca272a59f76c939/Special-Issue-Journal-of-Postcolonial-Cultures-andSocieties-In-Defense-of-Honor-Women-and-Terrorist-Recruitment-on-the-Internet-1.pdf. [40] Women Plead with Al Qaeda to join Jihad, The Telegraph, June 1, 2008 cited in Bombshell, op.cit. p.209. [41] Associated Press, Al Qaeda to Muslim Extremist Women: Stay Home, Raise Kids, Fox News, (2008), https://www.foxnews.com/story/al-qaeda-to-muslim-extremist-women-stay-home-raise-kids.

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[42] Hassan, U., To Muslim Women after the Uprisings, 2012, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/umaymah-al-e1ba93awc481hirc4ab-22to-the-muslimwomen-after-the-revolutions22-en.pdf. [43] Milanese Wife Converts to Islam for Love, November 14, 2003 La Stampa, http://archivio.lastampa.it/LaStampaArchivio/main/History/tmpl_viewObj.jsp?objid=4841320. [44] Al Muhajidah Magazine (Arabic), October 2001. Cited in Bombshell, op.cit. p. 201 [45] CNN, Artist wanted by al Qaeda: There is no way out, CNN, (2015), http://www.cnn.com/videos/us/2015/02/17/ac-intv-lars-vilks-artist-al-qaeda-most-wanted-list.cnn. [46] Al Khansa’a, Poetess of Courage and Pride, Arab News, (2011), http://www.islamweb.net/en/article/167309/. [47] Huffpost, Al-Shamikha, Al Qaeda Women’s Magazine, Launches: Report, Huffpost, (2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/14/al-shamikha-al-qaeda-womens-magazine_n_835572.html see also Julius Cavendish Al-Qa’ida glossy advises women to cover up and marry a martyr, (2011). http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/alqaida-glossy-advises-women-to-cover-up-and- marrya-martyr-2240992.html. [48] Daily Mail Reporter, Glossy ‘Jihad Cosmo’ Combines Beauty Tips with Suicide Bombing Advice, Mail Online, (2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1365806/Glossy-Jihad-Cosmo-combinesbeauty-tips-suicide-bombing-advice.html. [49] Bloom, M. and Horgan, J., Brussels Terrorist Brothers: Why Does Jihad Run in the Family?, Daily Beast, (2016), https://www.thedailybeast.com/brussels-terrorist-brothers-why-does-jihad-run-in-the-family. [50] Ali, F., Rising Female Bombers in Iraq: an Alarming Trend, The RAND Blog, (2008), https://www.rand.org/blog/2008/07/dressed-to-kill-why-the-number-of-female-suicide-bombers.html. [51] Raghavan, S. V. and Balasubramaniyan, V., Evolving Role of Women in Terror Groups: Progression or Regression? Journal of International Women’s Studies, 15 (2014), pp.197-211, http://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1761&context=jiws. [52] McGowan Mellor, G., The Death of Abeer in Iraq: What We Know Now, Huffington Post, (2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gail-mcgowan-mellor/the-death-of-abeer-in-ira_b_205603.html. [53] Von Zilbauer, P., 3rd US Soldiers sentenced for Rape and Murder in Iraq, New York Times, (2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/world/americas/05iht-soldier.1.6986906.html. [54] Several Halliburton Employees claimed to have been raped by US Soldiers (e.g., Jaime Lee Jones). Also, many of the returning soldiers have returned with post-traumatic stress, which has resulted in an upsurge of domestic violence, suicide, and killing their spouses upon their return. The 4th Infantry’s Second Battalion (the ‘Lethal Warriors’) have had eight members accused of murder or attempted murder since 2007. One soldier from the company, Robert Marko Hull upon his return from Iraq raped and slit the throat of a 19-year-old learning disabled woman. See McGirk, T., The Hell of PTSD, Time Magazine (2009), pp.41-43. [55] Myers, S. L., Iraq Arrests Woman Tied to Bombings, New York Times, (2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/world/middleeast/04iraq.html; See also Mail Foreign Service, Iraqi Woman Recruited Army of Female Suicide Bombers by Having Them Raped...Then Told Them Martyrdom Was the Only Way to Escape the Shame, Mail Online, (2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1134976/Iraqi-woman-recruited-army-female-suicidebombers-having-raped--told-martyrdom-way-escape-shame.html. [56] Nossiter, A., Boko Haram Militants Raped Hundreds of Female Captives in Nigeria, New York Times, (2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/world/africa/boko-haram-militants-raped-hundreds-offemale-captives-in-nigeria.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1. [57] Human Rights Watch, Those Terrible Weeks in their Camp, Human Rights Watch, (2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/10/27/those-terrible-weeks-their-camp/boko-haram-violence-againstwomen-and-girls. [58] Maura Conway, 'At Risk' or 'A Risk': The Portrayal of 'Jihadi' Brides in the UK Press; paper presented at the University College Cork, Ireland, March 2015. [59] “Anything you obtain of war booty - then indeed, for Allah is one fifth of it and for the Messenger and for [his] near relatives and the orphans, the needy, and the [stranded] traveller.” Having concubines is related to several things: First, if an Islamic state exists. Second, if the Islamic state makes offers for other territories to join Islam or enter into treaties with them. Third, if those territories refuse offers of peace, or if they announce war. Fourth, during the time of war, both sides capture prisoners that are exchanged mutually, then there's no concubines. Fifth, if the prisoners have no possibility of being exchanged and they are kept under the conquered army, then the following things happen: Either they are killed or put in prison where they are humiliated to death or the females are used as concubines. “When the army of the Prophet (PBUH) defeated the army of the kuffar, they would claim the spoils and valuables of the enemy as well as rape their women. An individual who was raping a non-Muslim woman taken captive in the war asked the Prophet (PBUH) if it was necessary for him to withdraw prior to ejaculating. The

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[60] [61]

[62] [63] [64]

[65]

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Prophet (PBUH), did not stop that individual from this act, but instead told him not to be concerned of a potential pregnancy. The Prophet (PBUH) proceeded to say that should the woman become pregnant [as a result of his failure to withdraw prior to ejaculating], then the birth of the child would have been in order with the will and desire of Allah.” Most ancient societies had some form of concubinage in which masters had female slaves. According to the Bible, Solomon had seven hundred wives and three hundred concubines (1 Kings 11:3). Concubinage (al-sirr) in Islam was a marriage (nikah) between a free man and his female slave. Concubinage, from the root sirr meaning secret, is marriage because it is kept hidden… The concubine is the servant girl adopted by the master with whom she is intimate. Source: Lisan Al-Arab 7/167. Bloom, M., Frontline: The predatory nature of ISIS’s recruitment of Western women, Soundcloud, (2014), https://soundcloud.com/frontlinepbs/isis-panel-mia-bloom-on-women. Al-Lami, M., Martyrs Wanted: ISIS' Devastating Defector Problem, National Interest, (2015), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/martyrs-wanted-isis-devastating-defector-problem12330?page=2. Conversation between Hani al-Siba’i and ISIS fighter on Telegram, https://justpaste.it/obw9. UNICEF, Northeast Nigeria: Alarming spike in suicide attacks involving women and girls – UNICEF, UNICEF, (2015), http://www.unicef.org/media/media_82047.html. Nzwilli, F., As Nigeria prepares to install new president, female suicide bombings spike, Religion News Service, (2015), http://www.religionnews.com/2015/05/27/nigeria-prepares-install-new-presidentfemale-suicide-bombings-spike/. The Associated Press, For an ISIS fighter, a paid honeymoon in Syria's Raqqa, Al Arabiya, (2015), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2015/05/27/For-an-ISIS-fighter-a-paid-honeymoonin-caliphate-s-heart.html.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.

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Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-70

Women’s Roles in Spain's Terrorist Phenomenon a

Luis M. TORO a Senior Intelligence Analyst, Guardia Civil

Abstract. The so-called “armed jihad” has been traditionally understood as an activity reserved for men, who were the ones sacrificing their lives, if needed, as martyrs for the cause of Allah. However, contemporary Islamist terrorism has been introducing constant updates depending on the circumstances and the operational needs, showing a greater increase in the involvement of women in the “armed jihad.” In this regard, over the last 15 years, women have even been used in suicide operations, especially in Russia and Iraq, where terrorists exploited the role of women precisely because they were a rare and surprising element when perpetrating an attack. This essay investigates the role of women in terrorist activity, specifically those involved in Daesh from the context of Spain in relation to the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon. Keywords. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS, Daesh, women, perpetrators, terrorism, jihad, Al Qaeda, Guardia Civil, Spain, involvement, foreign terrorist fighter, FTF.

1. Introduction Since the beginning of the armed revolution in Syria in 2011, there is an unprecedented number of individuals who, motivated by various reasons, decided to travel to this region in order to take part in the armed conflict against the regime of the President Bashar alAssad. This reality resulted in several thousand foreign fighters, and was first exploited by the terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra [1] to recruit new militants. These foreign fighters were not only an important source of human resources in the war scenario, but also useful to expand the networks of the organizations supporting their cause beyond the Middle East in the future. With the arrival of the Islamic State in Iraq (or Al Qaeda in Iraq) on Syrian soil on April 2013 under the new name of “Islamic State in Iraq and Levant” (Daesh [2]), the shift of loyalty towards jihadist groups at the expense of most moderate factions (proWestern) was almost absolute. Along these lines, the predominance of Daesh over the rest of the armed groups also caused a change in loyalties of many of the foreign fighters. This was the case of hundreds of foreign volunteers, who were fighting with Jabhat alNusrah and ended up joining Daesh, especially in 2013, together with their wives and children. In this context, and with reference to female involvement in the “armed jihad,” this research paper shows the role of women in the current terrorist phenomenon, providing examples of counterterrorism operations in Spain performed by the Civil Guard, where women have been involved in and consequently convicted for their activities.

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2. Calls upon the Muslims from Abroad to Carry Out the Hijra [3] In 2014, a series of changes became noticeable in Daesh politics regarding the propaganda addressed to Muslims abroad. During its first year of existence (since April 2013), it faced, on the one hand, the troops of the Syrian regime in the fronts of Aleppo (north) and Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor (east) and, on the other hand, the rebel groups inimical to their presence (Jabhat al-Nusrah, Ahrar al-Sham and Free Syrian Army, among others). The organization had to cope with the expulsion of the organization Al Qaeda at the beginning of February 2014, and one of its first needs as an organization was to survive in the battlefield and absorb as many foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) as possible from abroad. Therefore, its first messages to the outside world were addressed to foreigners so that they would join its ranks. From March 2014 onwards, the organization was dedicated to consolidating the areas under its control establishing a state system parallel to the Syrian government. This enabled the organization to launch an offensive against the provinces from the north of Iraq at the beginning of June 2014, which meant that it virtually gained absolute control over half the north of the country in less than a month. Once the territories in Syria and Iraq were secured, Daesh announced the establishment of a self-proclaimed caliphate in the territory of the “Sham” [4] on 29 June 2014, appointing as leader of the organization Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was proclaimed the new caliph. Later, the priorities of the organization, which controlled a huge extension of land from Aleppo (west of Syria) to the Iraqi province Diyala (north), were changed, and repopulating the caliphate with Muslim families educated under the umbrella of Daesh had become of utmost importance. The “colonization” of the caliphate was of such importance for Daesh that the selfappointed caliph, al-Baghdadi, in his first speech [5] expressly mentioned the obligation of all Muslims to carry out the hijra (migration) towards the caliphate. For Daesh followers, his message was important not only because he was the central figure of the terrorist organization, but because of his status as the caliph in his organization, his precepts were unquestionable before his followers. His words referred to the hijra are intended to be a guideline for all Muslims, including men, women and children. It is also worth noting that, since the establishment of Daesh (2013), the public appearances and messages of al-Baghdadi to the militants and the rest of the Muslims were unprecedented. After the proclamation of the caliphate, messages to the ummah on the occasion of Ramadan, and a video of a sermon in the Great Mosque of Mosul (Iraq) were distributed on the same dates. Given that al-Baghdadi’s speeches to his followers are scarce, each word pronounced by the caliph acting as amir ul muminin (emir of the believers) had to be given the utmost consideration due to the potential impact that they have on the supporters for Daesh both inside and outside the caliphate. This is why official propaganda is riddled with calls for hijra, which means physically migrating to the so-called Islamic State. By doing so, it is claimed that women and men are fulfilling their religious duty. The deed of migration is portrayed as an obligation for all pious Muslims in both Dabiq magazine and the official statements of Daesh. In an article written by Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, women are portrayed as the “twin halves” of men when it comes to the subject of migration. There is no difference between sexes regarding the duty of hijra. Al- Muhajirah writes: “This ruling of hijra is an obligation upon women just as it is upon men” [6]. It is, according to Daesh rhetoric, impossible to live as a pious and righteous Muslim in Western countries because they are filled with sin and good Muslims are “polluted” by values that go against the will of God. Official propaganda puts much effort into

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communicating a sense of belonging for all Muslims living in Daesh-held territories. Likewise, the caliphate is portrayed as a safe haven for both men and women and it does not discriminate based on the color of the skin, ethnicity or nationality. Each and every individual that ascribes to having a Muslim identity is welcome to enter this community. However, at the same time, the Muslim identity in the self-proclaimed caliphate is Sunni, and there are many examples of Daesh propaganda that negate the acceptance of nonSunnis. Still, the female writer Umm Sumayyah underlines that the diversity of Muslims within the territories controlled by Daesh does not splinter the organization rather it unifies it in the spirit of religion. 2.1. Hijra Narratives Aimed at Western Women Nevertheless, and despite these actions, the role of women in jihad in Daesh has been focused on supporting the mujahid (warrior), as it was described in a letter addressed to women, wives of the mujahideen, written by Umaima Hassan, who was the wife of the Al Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The letter was entitled “To the Muslim Women after the uprisings” [7] and was disseminated in June 2012 at the height of the Arab Spring. In the context of the female involvement in jihad, some sources have referred to a concept called jihad al-nikah (jihad by marriage), according to which a woman can marry a mujahid for a short period of time (even just few hours) so that the woman can satisfy the man’s sexual needs without overstepping the legal limits of Islamic law. In this context, Daesh’s promises of equality together with pointing out political discord in Muslim societies aim at creating a sense of belonging and unity amongst an otherwise large, diverse and geographically dispersed group of people. Belonging is an important and necessary ingredient when building a new nation and attracting new citizens. Those who feel discriminated against in Western communities because of their race, skin color or religion are offered a homeland where all Muslims are treated equally. The promise of adventure in joining Daesh is often portrayed through vivid recounts of the journeys made by women who wanted to migrate to Daesh territories. Official propaganda at length discusses the courageous women who can be found among all individuals migrating to Syria and Iraq. This becomes clear in an article published in Dabiq, where the author, Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, speaks on behalf of all the women she has met, who made her way to the so-called caliphate, and depicts their journeys as a life changing experience filled with joy and also adventure. Thus, the promise of adventure is quite straightforward: the new land is depicted as a paradise of roughness and challenges awaiting only the brave “sisters.” This interpretation of paradise on earth, including tough challenges and hardship, is somewhat different from the conventional one. Adventure is a part of the full Daesh-experience, including the journey to paradise. Moreover, Daesh official propaganda has a recurring theme, the idea of violence. Pictures of dead and mutilated people are paired with texts that justify acts of violence and killings. The undertaking jihad, defined as an armed struggle for the cause of religion, is often framed as an obligatory deed for all pious and righteous Muslims. Women in the West wearing outwardly religious clothing such as hijab [8] or burqa [9] are particularly vulnerable to discrimination. This enables Daesh to prey on the grievances of the situation, arguing that it is impossible for Muslim women to live a pious life in the Western context and exploiting the discrimination they may face. Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah suggests to women potentially joining Daesh that remaining Western countries is a sinful deed.

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In this sense, women promised an important role in Daesh’s ambition of building a state. They are presented with multiple possibilities to contribute to the Daesh community. One of the most prominent promises is that of employment where women are offered the possibility to become doctors, nurses or teachers in a newly created state. For example, in an article describing the welfare system of Daesh, a writer explains the merits of studying at a new medical school just opened in Raqqa. After describing that half of the student body is comprised of highly motivated and achieving women [10], the Dabiq article then invites future female medical teachers who are looking for a stimulating job opportunity. Dabiq also explains that women who wish to engage in religious studies can do so in the safe haven of the so-called Islamic State. Daesh provides courses in the subject of “Shariah sciences” clarifying that it is a woman’s obligation, just as it is a man’s, to acquire knowledge about the surrounding world and the Islamic faith [11]. Therefore, by migrating to Daesh-held territories, women can make a real difference, pursue opportunities, and receive everything they need.

3. Specific Roles of Women in Daesh There are several ways in which women, especially Western women, play significant roles in Daesh in Syria once they travel there. As previously mentioned, the promise of marriage appears quite often in the Daesh propaganda, where women have a key role in supporting their husbands [12]. For unmarried women, Daesh argues that fighters dedicated to their cause are the most suitable husbands. In this case, Daesh is attracting single women to make the hijra partially to find a suitable marriage companion [13]. According to Daesh ideology, it is important to live within the boundaries of marriage and respect the will of the husband. Although, as a general rule, divorce is not normally an option for women, official propaganda openly encourages women living with men, who do not follow Daesh’s strict interpretation of Islam, to abandon them [14]. For the woman with a husband who does not live in accordance with Islam, as interpreted by Daesh, hijra can present new possibilities. Official propaganda promises great rewards to those who leave behind their “infidel” spouses in their home countries and migrate to territories controlled by Daesh [15]. Moreover, women who lose their husbands to war are encouraged to remarry after a period of mourning and waiting period according to Muslim law. Official propaganda warns widowed women from returning to their countries of origin. Daesh reminds female readers in Dabiq that their rewards will be proportionate to their suffering [16]. Along with job opportunities and marriage, a third and equally important state building task ascribed to women is that of motherhood: women are seen as key figures in nursing the next generation of fighters. These are often called “lion cubs” and the survival of the state depends on their existence. Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah highlights the importance of motherhood in an article published in Dabiq in 2015 [17]. Providing a good upbringing for the children in Daesh, in accordance with the organization’s interpretation of the religion rather than that of secularism and infidelity, is considered a key role for mothers, and Daesh promises to help mothers in this venture [18]. An article published in Dabiq emphasizes another priority that is more suitable for women, explaining that the “weapons” of women are good behavior and knowledge, elements that are useful to carry out another type of jihad related to religious studies. However, in an article about the San Bernardino attacks in California (USA) in December 2015, Daesh praises the perpetrators who were both husband and wife [11].

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At the same time, it is well known that Daesh has at least two female brigades (AlKhansa’a and Umm al-Rayan), units only comprised of women who are in charge of conducting policing tasks (to ensure women’s morality in public spaces) and body searches to women (in checkpoints and home searches). Moreover, the Al-Khansa’a brigade, which has a media wing online, published a manifesto in January 2015 about the role of women within Daesh describing jihad as one of the obligations of women: …the woman can travel to serve the community in a number of situations, being the most important one the jihad, if the enemy is attacking [their] country, and the men are not enough to protect it, and the imams give a fatwa for it, as the blessed women of Iraq and Chechnya did [19]. 3.1. Role of Women after the Collapse of the Caliphate According to the available information, since 2011, around 30,000 – 40,000 individuals would have travelled to Syria and Iraq, amongst which, besides the so-called Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF), there is also a large number of women and minors. On the other hand, the progressive collapse of the caliphate due to the counter-terrorist activity conducted against Daesh, which has been noticeable last year specifically in the military harassment and the loss of its strongholds in Raqqa and Mosul in Syria and Iraq respectively, has also meant the return of many foreign fighters to their country of origin. As such, Daesh has needed to change its strategy for fighting. In this regard, in the issue 100 of the magazine Al-Naba, published in Arabic on 5 October 2017, Daesh states that Muslim women can assume a more active participation in jihad, and go to battle together with male mujahideen, sacrificing themselves for the cause, if needed: Today, in the context of this war against the Islamic State, and with all that is experienced of hardship and pain, it is mandatory for the Muslim women to fulfill their duty from all aspects in supporting the mujahideen in this battle by preparing themselves as mujahidat in the cause of Allah, and readying to sacrifice themselves to defend religion of Allah the most High and Mighty, and also by inciting their husbands and their sons to battle, thus simulating the mujahidat women of the first generation [20]. The author of the article also mentions as an example of the above one female warrior named “Umm Omara” Nusaibah Bint Ka’ab, who in the year 625 participated in the Battle of Uhud. She stood out for her bravery and willingness to fight against enemies of men.

4. Case Studies: Radicalization of Women in Spain The next section outlines several case studies from the Spanish context of women who traveled or attempted to travel to Syria and Iraq to join Daesh. The case studies are based on arrest records and news available in open sources and are important because they reflect how the propaganda specifically aimed to women influenced them in terms of participation in terrorist activities. In some cases, the names have been redacted to protect the identities and the sources.

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4.1. Operation ENDOR Two Spanish women of Daesh, F.A.L. and A.A.L., both married with foreign terrorist fighters, were arrested by the Guardia Civil when they arrived at the Madrid-Barajas airport coming from Istanbul (Turkey). The operation took place on July 11, 2017. The investigation, which was led by the Central Examining Court nº1 and the Prosecutors’ Office of the Audiencia Nacional (Spanish National High Court), allowed the arrest of these two women, who were accused of belonging to a terrorist organization and who were handed over to the above-mentioned courts. According to statements of detainees, who had an International Arrest Warrant from the Guardia Civil, they had stayed in the Daesh-held territory more than two years. Besides, their profiles in social networks showed that they were married to Moroccan fighters who had participated in mass murders according to the information provided by the Spanish authorities Following the investigations, in March 2014, A.A.L. left Spain to get to Syria, where she got married to a Moroccan fighter named Mohamed Hamdouch, known as Kokito de Castillejos (Castillejos’s beheader). During his wedding, Hamdouch gave his wife as dowry an explosive belt. The couple had one child, who was considered the first Spanish child born in the so-called caliphate. In April 2014, F.A.L. and her son moved to Syria to meet with her husband, a Daesh member named Mourad Kadi. At the end of 2015, it is known that both mujahideen have probably died. After these facts, A.A.L. got married with another Moroccan mujahid and she got pregnant once again. In a context of extreme brutality and living voluntarily under the conditions established by the terrorist group Daesh, the level of indoctrination in the religious extremism sphere made these two persons a potential threat for the national security of Spain. Moreover, their links with very active members of the organization makes them key elements to use them as “facilitators” for the terrorist organization in Spain. 4.2. Operation PASARELA This case study can be linked to online radicalizations and recruitment. S.Y. was radicalized “very quickly” through her contacts in social media networks guided by religious leaders influencing radicalization and violence akin to or who belong to Daesh. The representative from the public ministry has explained that S.Y. used her alias Umm Mohamed to get in touch, between March and November 2014, with members of Daesh in Syria and Turkey. S.Y. travelled from Barcelona to Istanbul on 16 December 2014. Before that, she withdrew 4,500 Euros from two different bank accounts: one of them from Morocco on her behalf, and the other one in Spain on behalf of her son. However, she could not enter Syria. The treatment that S.Y. received when she arrived in Turkey has not been considered “usual” by the Spanish Guardia Civil; in the Turkish capital, she was given a mobile phone and no documentation was kept by the smugglers. According to the statements, during her arrest, S.Y. got in touch with a border chief who, on several occasions, assured her that they were “pressuring” to get her out of jail. Two phone devices and a tablet with 32 documents related to her indoctrination process and propaganda files were seized from her. The analysis of these documents has demonstrated high-level relationships that the accused woman managed to establish using social media networks. Amongst her contacts, it is worth highlighting Alhan AlNadar, known as the poetess of Daesh for being one of the major individuals responsible

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for disseminating Daesh’s messages amongst women. It is also worth mentioning that S.Y. was in contact with Sanaa al-Karam, a Syrian woman – akin to the Al-Nusra Front at the beginning and who, later on, became active in Daesh – who had been in charge of the recruitment of women for three years. S.Y., finally arrested on 23 December 2014 in Turkey when she tried to travel with her son of three years of age to Syria in order to join Daesh. S.Y. accepted five years imprisonment, which was four less than the ones asked by the prosecutor during his provisional conclusions, 15 years’ disqualification and 10 years on probation due to belonging to a terrorist organization. In May 2018, she committed suicide while she was in prison. 4.3. Operation ENDOR On Saturday 5 September 2015, the city of Gandía (Valencia) was front-page news in Spain. R.E.A., a Moroccan young woman of just 18 years of age was arrested in the city accused of recruiting for Daesh. The image of the detainee, totally covered by a black burqa and exiting her house located in the Street Abad Sola, was one of the images that became popular on that day at a national level. The arrest provoked great responses between the neighbors of the young woman, who assured police that she was “very polite” and they did not believe she was associated with terrorism. R.E.A. was condemned to 5 years imprisonment on the crimes of cooperation with a terrorist organization, to include the dissemination of photos and videos of propaganda from Daesh using her profile in social networks, calling for participating in what she called jihad and sharing Daesh’s ideology with comments such as “die of rage, there’s no God but Allah, Islamic State in Iraq and Sham”, “our target is the Islamic State of the Caliphate and the capital of Jerusalem”, or “Isn’t it time to carry out the jihad? Passivity for how long?” In other publications, the accused confirms that she belonged to Daesh, and she even boasted of being part of the organization and stated that “she wanted to go to do the jihad.” According to official wiretaps, the detainee even spoke with people to try to move to Syria: “I will find an excuse and I will go there.” The Supreme Court sentenced R.E.A. to 5 years. The evidence against her proved she was the one responsible for the social media profile, and that with her messages she showed that she was trying to encourage Daesh’s cause of promoting violence and hijra to the so-called caliphate. 4.4. Operation JULIETA S.F.A, a 21-year old Moroccan woman, was arrested in Palamós (Gerona) in October 2017. After being self-radicalized, she was accused of carrying out recruitment tasks and sending new recruits to the conflict zone. Consequently, she was condemned to 2 years imprisonment and expulsion from Spain after reaching an agreement in accordance with Prosecutor’s Office. This case can be also a good example of recruitment through online social media networks and messaging applications. She had a long-distance romantic relationship with a radical individual who lived in the United States (he was arrested by the FBI for the same charges as her in June 2016). She was planning to travel to Syria with him to join Daesh ranks. She was also part of a network formed by women keeping in touch with them using WhatsApp groups. All of them were affiliated to Daesh, and their activities were detected by the international intelligence services two years prior due to her intense

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work in Daesh support networks and the recruitment of women within that terrorist organization. 4.5. Operation ULBAH M.C.M., 22 years old, was arrested at the airport of Madrid. She did not speak any Arabic and she had with her a Spanish Qur’an. She told the authorities that she was travelling to Turkey as a tourist, but they did not believe her. The young woman “knew what she had to say and what she had to do.” Her behavior was quite normal in terms of individuals who were recruited to join Daesh. She converted to Islam at the end of 2014 and was willing to join Daesh, although she did not show signs of radicalization at home, where she lived with her mother and three brothers. Her neighbors observed that she changed the “gothic” clothing for the hijab in a few months, but no one suspected that she would embark on the most radical journey after contacting Daesh members on the internet.

5. Conclusions The integration of women in the so-called caliphate, declared by Daesh, aims at the reIslamization of a new Muslim society using young couples and their children educated in accordance with the values and principles of the terrorist group. Moreover, the promise of marriage made to these women is part of the project of a “utopian state” offered by Daesh to its followers and members, to which it tries to satisfy in terms of salary, housing and a couple to start a family. Daesh’s vision may be more attractive for young people without a clear future or suffering conditions of employment and social marginalization in Europe because, besides the traditional promise of a better life in Paradise (after the death), they are offered the possibility of counting with an earthly full life starting from zero in a socalled purely “Islamic State.” In contrast to the lives they leave behind, Daesh propaganda shows a perfect life full of meaning, possibilities, honor and adventure for the women who live in the so-called caliphate. Here, women are being called to assume a more active role where they have the possibility of contributing to the society in different ways than in their home countries. Even though the women who participate in violence are not condemned by Daesh, the use of violence, in principle, is not a main task for the female migrants in Daesh-held territories. Initially, the main narratives used by Daesh to attract and recruit women are to fulfill their religious duties and being builders of the state. In the second aspect, women can help build the state through work and study, but also through marriage and motherhood. Women can also experience a sense of adventure through being partnered with a mujahid, setting up a strong motivation that attracts women so that they migrate to Daesh territory. However, the progressive collapse of their caliphate has motivated a change of rhetoric in Daesh, which is recently calling women to take a more active part in the jihad. This calling addressed to all Muslim women worldwide has enabled the organization to have a justification to act violently not only in Syria and Iraq but also in their origin countries.

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References and Endnotes [1] It appeared in February 2012 and it was recognized in April 2013 by the leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman alZawahiri, as its branch in Syria. [2] Arab acronym: “Al-Dawla al-Islamiyah fi al-Irak wa al-Sham.”Al-Muhajirah, U. M., Dabiq (2015), p.33. [3] Hijra: a term with a strong Islamic connotation similar to the Hegira made by the Prophet of the Mecca to Medina, which in the extremist interpretation would imply the self-segregation of the rest of the communities considered as ungodly. [4] Historic territory for the Muslims, which is made up of the following regions: Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Israel-Palestine. [5] Daesh, Dabiq (2015), p.26 [6] Daesh, A message to the mujahideen and the Muslims of the Ummah during the month of Ramadan, Al Hayat Media Center, 2 July 2014. [7] Disseminated in English by the media branch of al-Qaeda “Fursan Al-Balagh Media.” [8] Daesh, Dabiq, (2015), p.44. [9] A veil which usually covers the head and chest [10] An enveloping outer garment which covers the body, head/hair and the face; it is worn by women in some countries for both religious and cultural reasons. [11] Daesh, Dabiq, (2015), p.50. [12] Daesh, Dabiq, (2015), p.35. [13] Daesh, Dabiq, (2015), p.47. [14] Daesh, Dabiq, (2015), p.45. [15] Daesh, Dabiq, (2015), pp.36-37. [16] Sumayyah, U., Dabiq, (2015), p.44. [17] Daesh, Dabiq, (2015), p.45. [18] Daesh, Dabiq, (2015), p.24. [19] @_Khansa_Media, Women in the Islamic State, Twitter, (2015). [20] Daesh, Al Naba, (2017).

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.

Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-79

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The Roles of Women in South Asian Salafi Organizations a

Eva BORREGUERO a Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Abstract. The paper first provides an overview of the role women play in three Salafi organizations in South Asia. It identifies two main typologies in their activism, labeled as “subsidiary leadership” and “deferential activism.” It then proceeds to describe how women join Salafi organizations, how some of them engage in a process of radicalization and what are the differences with similar processes in males. Keywords. Salafi organizations, women. Radicalization, Tabligh Jamaat. Islamic movement, Pakistan, violent extremism.

1. Introduction How do women join Salafi movements? [1] What roles do they play within the Salafi organizations? [2] Among those who experience a process of violent radicalization, is it a different process from that of men? This paper will address these questions as well as the ways in which women participate in radicalization processes. The results, recommendations and conclusions of this paper are based on informal exchanges, observations and formal interviews held with a wide spectrum of women involved in Salafi movements in South Asia. Their activism ranged from peaceful religious proselytism to active participation in supporting armed jihad in the Kashmir conflict. The interviews were taken primarily while conducting different research projects in India and Pakistan during 2004-2006 and 2013-2015, as well as other interviews held in October 2007. The research focusses on members from three main Salafi groups: 1) Tablighi Jamaat, a movement that originated with a Sufi-minded approach [3] that in some cases has been suspected of leading to radicalization, and in other cases has been suspected of providing an “indirect line to terrorism” [4]; 2) Deobandi from the Jamia Hafsa girl’s madrasa attached to the Lal Masjid in Pakistan, that has been accused by Pakistani authorities of being openly pro-Taliban, and an organization supporting armed jihad against the Indian state in the region of Kashmir; and 3) the head of an organization supporting armed jihad against the Indian state in the region of Kashmir (India), that will for the purposes of this essay remain nameless because the interactions with this group are part of research that has not yet been published. This research is relevant because it defies two commonly held beliefs on Salafi groups the role of women within them. First, it is generally assumed that Salafi organizations are necessarily linked to violent extremism. Yet, as Quintan Wiktorowicz points out, within the spectrum of Salafi groups there is a wide range of approaches related to politics and violence. The term can accommodate “such diverse figures as

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Osama bin Laden or the Mufti of Saudi Arabia” [5]. Such divergence is represented in distinct groups such as the quietist and yet dynamic Tabligh versus the so-called jihadist supporting Deobandi branch of the Jamia Hafsa madrasa. As such, this essay includes examples from both violent and non-violent Salafi groups in India and Pakistan in order to undermine that assumption that Salafism is always linked to violence. Second, it is usually understood that women’s roles in Salafi networks are generally subordinate to and/or passive towards male figures. While that was the case with several of the women interviewed, in many others it was not the case, leading us to dismiss this common assumption. The paper first describes the roles played by women in different kind of Salafi groups, along two types of women’s approach to Salafi activism. An assertive attitude designated as “subsidiary leadership” and a more traditional role of subordination labeled as “deferential activism.” Second, it exposes factors that lead women to joining Salafi organizations, and, in some cases to radicalization. Finally, it draws overall conclusions in terms of what might be appropriate prevention strategies for women in South Asia, especially those participating in violent groups.

2. Roles Played by Women 2.1. Subsidiary Leadership Among the female interviewees, a certain number of them exhibited several common personality traits that fit into the category of a “leader” within the organization. They had developed communications skills, maintained an articulated discourse and kept strong personal convictions and notions of justice and injustices. They would assume responsibilities on their own, they oversaw tasks of command or management and they exercised influence in their peer group. They also were involved in reinforcing the ideology of the group. They were not so much producers of new thoughts or ideas, but rather conveyed the group’s ideas through education and training of other members. For example, these women could manage a madrasa (Islamic school) for girls, teach at higher education centers, or oversee the female wing within an organization. Nevertheless, their activities were subordinated within the organizational structure, headed by male figures. For the purposes of this essay, this type of leadership exhibited by these women will be referred to as subsidiary leadership. On one hand, these women exerted a leadership role, took decisions and enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. But, they did so in a subsidiary way; as their activism supplemented or reinforced those of the main organization, they were out of the vertex of decision making, and their activism was constricted by the limits of stablished tradition within the boundaries of a “male dominated hierarchy.” Several, more detailed case studies of subsidiary leadership exhibited by these women are described below. The first case study is that of a prominent female activist in the movement for Kashmir’s separation from India. The region has been in conflict for more than three decades, with more than 44,000 fatalities in terrorist violence from 1988 to 2018 [6]. This woman was a founding leader and head of Kashmir’s biggest network of women supporting armed struggle, or in her own words “jihad against the Indian state.” Her activities included giving speeches in mosques (usually a male domain) inciting to the Kashmir youth to engage in violent jihad, organizing stone-pelting rallies against Indian troops, and launching several campaigns in the Valley of Kashmir compelling women to

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wear a burqa. A woman with higher education, she exercised a very high level of leadership, which was acknowledged among male fighters who sought her advice. Because of her support for violence in the independence movement, she served multiple years in jail. As her pro-activist behavior led to prominence among men, it also posed a challenge in her social milieu. The Kashmiri Muslim society, being largely traditional, was not at ease with this kind of activism, which questions conservative gender stereotypes. She contested the criticism by claiming to fight for “Islamic feminism.” Despite this unusual demeanor, this woman acted in a normative frame based on Salafi precepts on women’s roles, a normative that limited the scope of her activism by setting some restrictions on her behavior. For example, she would not engage personally in combat nor expose her face in public and overall, a code or etiquette was established that compelled working in a way that was segregated from men. The second case was that of women in charge of the Jamia Hafsa, an all-girls madrasa operating in Lal Masjid, the central mosque of Islamabad that was under siege by the Pakistani army in 2007 because of its links with Islamist militants. This woman was married to the mufti in charge of the whole complex. The madrasa contained a school for girls in the first and second stage of education, and also provided higher education and training to become a muftiyya, a female Muslim law specialist. It also incorporated a Darul Ifta or service of legal advice for Muslim women. The interviewee, along with the muftiyya and teachers, followed the Deoband tradition, which originated in India during the 19th century at the Islamic seminar Darul Uloom. Over time, it has reversed the emphasis on rational studies in favor of an emphasis on hadith [7]. The Deobandi school is one of Pakistan’s largest and most influential Sunni revivalist movements, and with a pervasive network of activists, it has spread its influence through a network of schools madaris that bloomed during the war in Afghanistan. In this case, as in the previous, this woman was outspoken and resolute, had an articulated vision, expressed her vision in a persuasive manner and was highly motivated. Also, as the head of the girl’s madrasa, she took initiatives within her domain. Regarding the position of muftiyya, it should be noted that this is a practice that challenges conservative assumptions on male monopoly on religious authority. The position of mufti has been historically reserved for men, and it is only recently that women have been incorporated into this field. Such is the case of Turkey, where the state sponsors female preachers. As M. Hassan has explained, serving as a mufti or as a preacher “ranks much higher than serving as an imam in the hierarchy of religious personnel” [8]. It is somewhat less common that in a Salafi environment for the role of muftiyya to take root. Previously, and during several years, these muftiyya from Jamia Hafsa had studied Islamic jurisprudence, had passed the required mandatory examinations, and had obtained a certification for their studies. In their practice, they attended Muslim women’s consultation on social and religious matters that included issues related to family affairs, business, work, etc. After hearing from the concerned parties, they would debate among themselves, write a fatwa (authoritative legal and/or religious opinion) and then pass it to a male authority (mufti) who would in turn supervise it, correct it if necessary, and sign it, since women are not allowed to issue fatwa themselves. In these movements, the role of subsidiary leadership allowed females a degree of autonomy within the boundaries of a strict gender segregated activism. Mostly, but not exclusively, it was exerted through work in the field of education, women’s wings or jurisprudence. But, as in the cases of many Islamist militant movements, the manifestations of subsidiary leadership conformed to the principle that “women’s roles

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should be ‘complementary’ to those of men rather than ‘equal’ to them” [9]. This feature of complementarity resulted in segregation as a social norm, but also allowed women a wider margin of involvement in social, religious and political matters, opening a window of opportunity for performing a leadership that in some cases contested traditional views on gender roles in Salafism. In no case did the interviewees express a feeling of gender marginalization or complain about imbalance in power relations. On the contrary, there was a situational awareness of being empowered by their activism. Theirs was a personal choice, consciously taken in response to distinct aspects of their society. In some ways, their activism was also a form of liberalization that allowed them to play an active role to support their cause. This leadership role contains apparently mutually exclusive principles—that is, this leadership role contains certain features that by principle should not coexist because of their antagonistic nature: empowerment and disempowerment. This is part of the paradoxical and ambivalent nature of this role. On one hand the Salafi organizations offered these women something novel—religious and political activism—breaking with conservative approaches that rely on gender stereotypes according to which there is an “essentialist” nature of a woman that confines her to the private realm of the home, child bearing and the family. On the other hand, this activism is coupled with strict gender and cultural constrains that place women in a secondary position to men within this Salafi group. 2.2. Deferential Activism: Among the Tabligh The other typology of participation among women in Salafi movements was that of profound subordination to male members, more specifically towards the husband or the father. In this sense, the involvement of women in these organizations was framed primarily in relation to men, fully dependent on them for their activism or as facilitators and supporters of male activism. This trend was particularly common among women in the Tabligh, the largest Islamic proselytizing movement in the world (and notably also non-violent). Women in the Tabligh operated within the confinement of women’s groups. Their activities involved: x Gathering to pray, read, and comment on Tabligh literature from the founding fathers, such as the Fazail e Amal, a core book in the Tabligh curriculum that elaborates on the ahadith. These congregations were attended only by females, sometimes many them, and would take place on a regular basis on Friday. They would also listen to the lectures (bayan) given by a male in a separated room and transmitted by a loudspeaker. x Travelling with a male member of the family to preach the Tabligh teachings, usually with the woman’s husband, father or brother. They would travel in separate units, together with other women, with different norms and responsibilities. Men were lodged in local Deobandi mosques, and women stayed at the homes of other Muslims or in the women’s quarters at the headquarters of the organization, the markaz. Inside the mosque, the men would explain that the women were accompanying them, and available to their wives if they were willing to attend their gatherings. These journeys took place within the country or abroad.

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Assuming the responsibilities of the home. Giving their husbands moral support according to the belief that a woman’s best task is performed from within the confines of her home, where she can serve both as a mother and a wife. Beyond this, as expressed by a Tabligh woman, because of the particularities of her gender, a woman must follow three rules that bind her behavior. These rules were: x Wear abaya, hijab and niqab (full covering) in public. x Do not engage in “loose conversation” with a man, except for those included in the notion of mahrum (unmarriageable kin): father, brother, husband, nephews, grandfather. x Do not disrupt the home environment with a woman having a job outside the home, as the most significant roles a woman can have in her life is that of wife, mother, sister and daughter. This type of activity required a specific code of rules or etiquette that included strict segregation. Mostly relegated to the private sphere of the home, women could only meet outside the home in spaces available to women, and only if wearing the burqa and black gloves when going outside. Overall, women remained invisible to the public eye. This concealment was also extended to the inner realm of Tabligh women, who also maintained veiling among themselves in female-only gatherings. This is in stark contrast with men activities, which were carried out in the public domain. Men go for ghast (meditation) and engage in proselytism in the neighborhoods. They manage the jamaat and take decisions. Men are empowered by their capacity to preach in mosques, an activity traditionally reserved for senior positions. Therefore, they enjoy a significant projection and visibility. In the case of the Tabligh, females adopt a passive role and have an elevated level of dependency towards the males, who control their movements and choices. It can be telling by the fact that when traveling for jamaat, they do not carry money with them, nor would they go out for shopping. Instead, they will cook in their quarters, previously they would have delivered their husband a list with the needed ingredients, and the husbands would go to the market and then bring back the products to the women’s quarter. If a woman wants to take an initiative that is out of her routine, like talking to a foreigner academic, she shall ask first the male of the family, and if he considers it necessary, he will take consultation to the mushwara (gathering for mutual consultation). In their gatherings for reading the Tabligh curricula, it is the male who select the texts they would comment. As with other Salafi women, professional activities are not well regarded if it implies getting in touch with men. An exception was made for those who developed skills and professions related to women, for example in the field of education or health. Tablighi female activism differs significantly from subsidiary leadership, as it lacks opportunities for the development of a leadership profile or for performing with a degree of autonomy. However, for these women, this subordinate role had a great significance, and it was not seen as a limitation to their aspirations. These women did not complain about a lack of freedom, or about remaining outside the scope of decision-making. Instead, many of them also declared that they felt empowered by their spiritual role. They shared with their male peers a great concern about the fact that “… the faith, iman, was weakened. Muslims are so focused on dunya (worldly affairs) that they had to be reminded all the time that each and everything is for Allah.” By engaging in the Tabligh, they met their aspirations to “to preach how to make strong our iman (faith) in Allah.” The experience of being active in propagating the faith followed the views of the Tabligh founder, Ilyas, a strong proponent of reinforcing the role of women in the transmission of religious values through education.

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In addition, the significance of their activism was further justified by the compensatory rewards promised to them in the afterlife. They firmly believed that their sacrifices and deprivations would be generously rewarded; in the words of one interviewee, “when in heaven there would be an exhibition of beautiful women, and if your husband expresses the liking of one of them, you can change the aspect of your face and become as the one he likes.”

3. Factors Leading to Joining Salafi Organizations and/or Radicalization In terms of how and why women join Salafi groups and how those engaged in groups that support violent activism radicalize, there is not one single explanatory factor, but a multiplicity of them. Among the interviewees, there were several aspects that contributed to both processes, such as the influence of family members or firsthand experiences at an individual level. This essay does not suggest that joining a Salafi group necessarily leads to radicalization, but it does attempt to articulate some common factors that may lead women in particular to joining a Salafi organization — either violent or non-violent. 3.1. Influence of a Spouse In terms of joining a Salafi group, there were specific factors that applied distinctly to males and females. In South Asia, where the social milieu is more restrictive for women than for men, there were certain situations that applied to men but did not for women, such as meeting a charismatic person, an encounter with recruiters or in general taking part of a group of social processes. On the contrary, there was one specific situation that applied only to women, that is the influence played by the spouse in joining an organization. In the case of the Tabligh, all the female interviewees entered the movement through the influence of a male member of the family, the husband or the father, more often the husband. It could be that the husband started travelling to give dawah (charity) with the Tabligh, and at a certain point, the wife joined. It could also be that the father was involved in the Tabligh, and the woman married an individual belonging to the social group. This gender influence was not reciprocated from a male’s perspective. None of the male interviewees admitted joining the movement because of the influence of the wife or another female figure. 3.2. Identity Crisis Women, as well as men, can experience an episode of identity crisis that operates at the level of individual personality, and this may lead to joining a Salafi group. From an individual perspective, it could refer to situations where there was a feeling of lack of meaning in their lives or to periods of uncertainty. From a broader perspective, it could relate to feelings about the Muslim collective identity and its relationship with the nonMuslim world, be it Western societies, Indian (Hindu), or both. In these cases, women expressed concern for what they perceived as the hegemonic and meaningless values of prevailing Western or Hindu culture, and they found an exit to this existential crisis in messages of Salafi organizations. In this case, the “diagnosis” and solutions of these Salafi movements provided them with a level of certainty amidst confusion [10],

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confidence at moments of weakness and meaning to a life that seemed unable to fit with increasing presence of secular values. 3.3. Perceived Injustice One factor that contributed specifically to radicalization among women was that of perceived suffering and humiliation of Muslims around the world, whether by real causes or because of what has been described as “imagined humiliation” or “humiliation by proxy” [11]. The impression the Muslim community worldwide was suffering because of Western policies (national or foreign) or Indian (Hindu) policies was a source of frustration and resentment. Regardless of whether these women experienced the suffering first-hand or not, it contributed to the “us versus them” narrative. Here identity, perceived injustice and ideology were narrowly intertwined; the understanding of the self and the perception of injustice were strongly influenced by the religious ideology of Salafi groups. In this respect, the understanding of the deprivation of Muslims was elaborated on through a narrative that represented a conflict between victims and perpetrators—Muslims as victims and Western and Indian governments as perpetrators—and that reproduced situations of collective deprivation that were not directly experienced (by the Salafi women) and/or took place in other parts of the world. On this matter, it is appropriate to recall an episode at the madrasa of Jamia Hafsa, in Pakistan. In this episode, it was the end of the school semester, and they were celebrating with songs and plays performed on a stage installed in the main courtyard where the girls performed their daily namaaz (prayer). All the students from different levels were seated around with their teachers. Initially they were performing dialogues that taught the need to obey and not to lie to the parents. After a while, a girl stepped into the podium, and started singing with a microphone. It was a song that told about the suffering of Muslims in Bosnia, Kashmir, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan… at the hands of non-Muslims. The song called for help to Muslims from the world to liberate their brothers. The song continued by telling the story of a girl that witnesses how nonMuslims assassinated her family: she cried, expressed fear, felt alone, and asked for help to be saved from non-Muslims. Afterwards, the head of the madrasa explained that the ummah (community of believers) is like a body, if a tooth aches, the whole body is suffering. For them it was a priority to bring awareness about this issue of the suffering of Muslims in conflict, to which they devoted 80% of their energy and efforts. This anecdote also underscores the role of education in prompting, but also potentially in preventing, radicalization narratives.

4. Conclusion: Prevention Strategies for Women in South Asia The processes by which women join Salafi groups share certain characteristics with those of their male counterparts. But, they also have specific traits applicable to only women. This paper has explored common and differentiating aspects in these processes. It is often assumed that, because of the conservative nature of Salafi organizations, women adopt passive or subordinate roles, but this is not necessarily the case. While from an institutional point of view, women do occupy a secondary place within the organizational hierarchy, this does not prevent them to assume certain responsibilities that provide them with autonomy and a sense of empowerment. Likewise, it has been observed that

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Salafism offers a broad spectrum of types of activism, with different approaches to political activism and the use of violence. Finally, these differences can be seen in the narratives and worldviews of the Salafi groups. The centrality of women as agents of social change is commonly acknowledged. Human rights organizations and NGOs working in development projects argue that the empowerment of women brings positive changes not only for the individual, but also for broader society [12]. Equally, women’s access to secular and religious education has been considered an effective measure to counter violent extremist narratives. In line with these premises, social actors and public institutions have taken measures to develop and improve women’s education, to improve women’s literacy, to address the dropout rates of girls in schools, and to remove other obstacles in women and girls attaining access to education. Salafi groups, as we have seen, also focus on the role women play in advancing their causes by means of education and proselytizing activities. Precisely because of the axial job that women have as transmitters of values—passing their perspectives to their children and other family members—women can contribute to either encouraging or discouraging radical narratives. To this end, it is important to point out that the education and integration of women in the public life is not sufficient; there is a need to examine the type of education and curriculum. In other words, education and women’s empowerment need to also be framed with values of tolerance and coexistence with diversity. In the research cited, many of the interviewed women had received a higher education and felt empowered and fulfilled in their activism. Some were even active in the political sphere. Nevertheless, they held sectarian and antagonistic views toward different interpretations of Islam (such as Shi’a, Barelvi, Ahmadi), or towards other groups (Hindus and Westerners). This evidence contradicts the view that amplifying women’s voices and outweighing gender balances might necessarily lead to diminishing radical approaches and radical ideologies. While expanding access for women and girls to secular and mainstream religious education can improve their socio-economic conditions and reduce the gender gap, an aim naturally commendable, it is not enough to reduce the ideological drivers of radicalization. In this respect, a curriculum that undermines dichotomies and the narratives of “us vs. them” is essential. This curriculum must consist of values of tolerance, diversity and inclusion. Some steps have already been taken in the direction of implementing religious and cultural diversity in the schools as a preventive tool against violent extremism. In Pakistan, schools such as the Qadims Lumier School and College in Peshawar have created a “peace education” curriculum that teaches about diverse cultures and religions while endorsing values of compassion and tolerance. An education efficient in combating extremist positions should be based on three pillars or dimensions: first, it should be a formal education that enables individuals to become economically autonomous; second, it would develop critical thinking skills; and third, it should be an education in values that allow diversity of cultures in an inclusive legal framework by promoting common civic values and plurality in religious interpretations.

References and Endnotes [1]

This paper refers to the term of Salafism as defined by the scholar Quintan Wiktorowicz, a diverse community of Islamic groups “that share a puritanical approach to religion” (Wiktorowicz, 207), yet they

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can diverge on issues such as contemporary politics, modes of activism and jihad. Some of these groups might engage in peaceful activism, others in violent jihadism. Yet, they have in common an understanding of religion that comprehends the terms Salafism and that implies rejecting religious innovation, “strictly replicating the model of the Prophet Muhammad” (Wiktorowicz, 207), adhering strictly to the concept of tawhid (the oneness of God)”, and rejecting any approach from a rationalist perspective to the Qur’an and the Hadith, and following the guidance of the Prophet Companions (the salaf). See Wiktorowicz, Q., Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006), 207–239. [2] Wiktorowicz, Q., Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006), pp. 207– 239. [3] Reetz, D., Islam in the Public Sphere, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006, p. 129. [4] Stratfor (2008), Tablighi Jamaat: An Indirect Line to Terrrorism. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tablighi-jamaat-indirect-line-terrorism. [5] Wiktorowicz, Q., Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006), 207– 239. [6] South Asia Terrorism Portal, Data sheets Jammu & Kashmir, http://www.satp.org/Datasheets.aspx?countries=india&states=jammukashmir. [7] Metcalf, B.D., Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982, p. 100. [8] Hassan, M., Women preaching for the secular state: official female preachers (Bayan Vaizler) in contemporary Turkey, Int. J. Middle East Stud., 43 (2011), pp. 451–473. [9] Zakaria, R. Women and Islamic Militancy. Dissent, (Winter 2015), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/why-women-choose-isis-islamic-militancy. [10] Hogg, M. A., Meehan, C., & Farquharson, J., The solace of radicalism: Self-uncertainty and group identification in the face of threat, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(6) (2010), 1061-1066. [11] Dalgaard-Nielsen, A., Studying Violent Radicalization In Europe II. The Potential Contribution of SocioPsychological and Psychological Approaches, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS Working Paper, 3, (2008), http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/56379/WP08_3_Studying_Violent_Radicalization_In_Europe_II_The_Poten tial_Contribution_of_Sociopsychological_and_Psychological_Approaches.pdf. [12] CARE, the international humanitarian organization fighting global poverty for almost seven decades, believes that "when you empower a girl or a woman, she becomes a catalyst for positive change whose success benefits everyone around her." See https://www.care.org/work/womens-empowerment/whywomen-girls https://www.care.org/work/womens-empowerment/why-women-girls.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.

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Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-88

Women and Women’s Organizations in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) Seran DE LEEDE

Abstract. This essay explores how women’s organisations contribute to countering and preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) and what concerns exist when linking women’s initiatives to the security agenda. It explores the different ways in which women and women’s organisations have contributed to CVE/PVE efforts and discusses the nexus between improving women’s rights and countering and preventing violent extremism. This essay draws on academic literature, reports on the issue and interviews with practitioners working in the field. Keywords. Women, women’s organizations, peace, security, women’s rights, radicalisation, violent extremism, CVE, PVE.

1. Introduction Countering the rise of violent Islamic extremist groups such as Daesh is one of the top priorities on the international security agenda. While a military response is deemed critical in pushing back violent extremist groups on the short term, it is recognized that preventing the rise of such groups in the long term requires a broader approach. Violent extremism, defined here as the willingness of non-state actors to use violence to further beliefs of a political, social or ideological nature [1], is understood as a highly complex, multi-layered and clustered phenomenon that cannot be tackled by one country or sector. International cooperation on different levels and between various fields such as development, civil society and security are increasingly recognized as indispensable in effectively curbing violent extremism on the long term. This essay explores how women’s organizations contribute to countering and preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) and what concerns exist when linking women’s initiatives to the security agenda. It explores the different ways in which women and women’s organizations have contributed to CVE/PVE efforts and discusses the nexus between improving women’s rights and countering and preventing violent extremism. This essay draws on academic literature, reports on the issue and interviews with practitioners working in the field.

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2. Women and CVE/PVE efforts 2.1. Definition of Terms Violent extremism is a highly complex, multi-layered and clustered phenomenon. While there are no set drivers or factors that ultimately lead to outbursts of violent extremism, it is recognized that economic, political and social marginalization as well as geopolitical factors can contribute to feelings of estrangement and anger that can feed into violent extremism. The United Nations recognizes several conditions as conducive to the spread of violent extremism, including but not limited to situations where human rights are violated and where good governance is ignored [2]. Also, prolonged unresolved conflicts, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion and socioeconomic marginalization are considered conditions conducive to violent extremism [3]. Because of this complex nature of violent extremism, short-term security or military measures—while critical in preventing imminent attacks—are insufficient in curbing and preventing violent extremism in the long term. Hence, in order to prevent outbursts of violent extremism in the long term, a broader approach where conditions deemed conducive to the rise of violent extremism are tackled is indispensable. Therefore, the global counterterrorist response includes a softer, non-coercive approach, so-called Countering or Preventing Violent Extremism (CVE/PVE). Generally, CVE/PVE programs aim to address conditions deemed conducive to violent extremism, to counter the narrative of violent extremists, to address existing grievances and to engage communities into making individuals more resilient to recruitment by violent extremists [4]. 2.2. Challenges The role of women and women’s organizations in this wider approach and the question whether women’s organizations should link their efforts to the security agenda is part of an on-going international discussion. Critics point out the risks for women’s organizations when linking their efforts to the security agenda. They argue that including women’s organizations in CVE/PVE efforts can put such organizations at risk, as it can make them a legitimate target in the eyes of violent extremist groups who might retaliate against them. Also, there is cause for concern that only those objectives that serve the security agenda will be used instrumentally, without a broader commitment to other objectives such as gender equality, autonomy and discrimination against women and to the risk that women’s empowerment could become a tool to curb violent extremism instead of an objective in itself, which could open up the possibility of women’s rights being bartered away for short-term security gains [5]. In addition, labelling the initiatives of women’s organizations as CVE/PVE might have the unintended consequence of classifying their constituency as being vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists and so potentially alienating them [6]. Furthermore, in certain contexts, the relationship of trust between women’s groups and local communities may be compromised if their programming is believed to be serving an externally imposed (Western) security agenda [7]. Female empowerment is

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often (inaccurately) associated with secularism and Western values. In Afghanistan for instance, improving women’s rights was framed as a core target in the “War on Terror.” This had the inadvertent consequence of marginalizing already existing initiatives on gender issues within communities. Opponents aligned these initiatives with foreign projects and attacked them under the guise of protecting tradition and culture [8]. Critical voices also point out that CVE/PVE programs that focus on the role of women as mothers may inadvertently reinforce gender-stereotypes. Typically, such programs work from the assumption that women, as mothers, are ideally situated to both recognize early warning signs of radicalization and to transfer ideals of inclusion to the next generation. While these programs can be effective, through a gender lens, this emphasis on women as mothers is problematic, as stereotyping women primarily as mothers is a setback for gender equality and goes against the very core objective of many women’s rights organizations. It confines women’s role to that of concerned family member, suggests women are a homogenous group and reinforces the assumption that women are inherently more peaceful than men [9]. 2.3. Opportunities These are all valid concerns that need to be considered when including women’s initiatives in CVE/PVE efforts. However, involving women’s organizations and adding a female perspective can optimize the effectiveness of such efforts for various reasons. First of all, women can be affected by violent extremism and war in gender-specific ways. Therefore, they can bring different perspectives to discussions about security [10]. In addition, women’s organizations, like most civil society organizations (CSOs), typically have close ties to their communities and can operate in areas where state-control is limited. They are often well aware of what lives in their communities, what the grievances are, if and in what form CVE/PVE-related programs could work and how to best implement them. This alone makes CSOs including women’s organizations key partners in developing effective CVE/PVE programs [11]. Also, CSOs including women’s initiatives often address the very same conditions and situations that are increasingly being recognized as those conducive to the spread of violent extremism, including (but not limited to) those where human rights are violated, where good governance is being ignored and where socio-economic marginalization occurs. By addressing these conditions, activities of women’s organizations, whether or not by design, overlap with, or complement, the CVE/PVE agenda [12]. Furthermore, women have historically been successful in community-based peacebuilding and local mediation efforts. In Colombia for example, women mediated on a local level between their communities and armed groups to release hostages [13]. The Syrian-based Badael Foundation reports that, also in Syria, women, particularly older women from the community, have historically been known to be negotiating with armed groups to resolve conflicts [14]. Their experiences, contacts and position can contribute to optimizing CVE/PVE efforts.

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2.4. Improving Women’s Rights Improving women’s rights can potentially have a positive impact on preventing violent extremism. While there is no hard evidence that improving women’s rights can successfully curb outburst of violent extremism, explorative studies argue there is a relation between the improvement of women’s rights and gender equality to circumstances favorable to CVE/PVE such as economic development and political diversity [15]. They argue educating girls boosts development, as educated women generally have fewer children, provide better nutrition, health and education to their families and generate more income than women with little or no schooling. Also, women are according to these studies, more likely to reinvest money into the family [16]. In addition, women who work have a chance of gaining financial independence, which potentially gives them a stronger voice in family situations and in society as a whole [17]. In addition, stable societies are generally more resilient to violent extremism [18]. A culture of tolerance and inclusion is not possible if women’s rights are structurally violated and if women are excluded from participating in society. Morocco recognizes the potential of women in CVE and has specifically included women in its counterterrorism efforts, focusing for example on women’s critical role in the family and the community. In order to empower women in the family structure, the country passed several legal revisions in 2004, allowing women the right to request a divorce, to receive financial support after a divorce, to obtain custody of children, to inherit money and to be considered equals to their husbands in their home. Despite some criticism of the implementation, these legal reforms provide a basis for empowering women socially and economically and demonstrate how empowering women can be a strategy in fighting violent extremism [19]. 2.5. Good Practices of Women in CVE and PVE Efforts Women’s organizations have been contributing to CVE/PVE efforts in various ways. They have launched programs that raise awareness of the risks of violent extremism in their communities, including child recruitment. These programs have focused on tolerance, positive conception of the other and building inclusive societies by organizing inter-ethnic projects. In northern Syria, women’s organizations focused on civil peace and co-existence among the region’s diverse population. For example, at the Spring Festival Project (hosted from 2013 to 2015), women activists used art to enhance the concepts of coexistence and reconciliation among the many different ethnic and religious groups in the Al-Jazira region [20]. In addition, female religious leaders have been working to counter the discourse of violent extremists. They expand awareness of Islam and its many interpretations, disentangling practices that condone violence and the subservience of women from religion. In addition, they help raise awareness of universal human rights and encourage and provide opportunities for intra- and interfaith dialogue and discussion as a means of promoting tolerance, understanding and reconciliation between communities. Women in Morocco, for example, have been certified as female Imams (preachers) known as

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mourchidate since 2005, and have been charged with promoting religious moderation and tolerance with the objective of curbing violent extremism [21]. Also, community-based, bottom-up women’s organizations are easily approachable for community-members who can, for various reasons, be hesitant of talking to the authorities about radicalization and violent extremism. Such organizations can form a crucial bridge between communities and government institutions. The Dutch organization Steunpunt Sabr [22] developed the Oumnia Works initiative, that reaches out to women in the community and raises awareness of the risks of radicalization. One of the objectives of the initiative is to bring communities and governments together [23].

3. Conclusions Because of the complex nature of violent extremism, short-term security or military measures—critical in preventing imminent attacks—are insufficient in curbing and preventing violent extremism in the long term. Therefore, in order to prevent outbursts of violent extremism in the long term, a broader approach where conditions deemed conducive to the rise of violent extremism are tackled is indispensable. CSOs including those who work on improving women’s rights generally address exactly such issues. As protecting women’s rights and efforts aimed at including women in participating in all levels of society are imperative in building a culture of tolerance and inclusion, the agenda of women’s organizations, whether or not by design, overlaps with or complements the CVE/PVE agenda. However, there is cause for concern when linking women’s initiatives to the security agenda. It may increase the risk of being targeted by violent extremist groups and the level of trust with local communities may be compromised if their programming is believed to be serving an externally imposed security agenda. In addition, there is a chance that only those objectives that serve the security agenda may be used instrumentally, without a broader commitment to other objectives such as discrimination against women and to the risk that women’s empowerment could become a tool to counter violent extremism instead of an objective in itself. Furthermore, including women and women’s initiatives may reinforce gender-stereotypes, as women are often framed as mothers or concerned family-members. This strengthens stereotypes and underlying assumptions that women are a homogenous group and that women are inherently more peaceful than men. Furthermore, despite of perspectives and experiences women’s organizations can bring forward, they are often minimized or categorized as ‘women’s issues’ and disconnected from clear peace and security related debates and decisions [24]. This not only patronizes women, but also undermines women’s efforts to curb violent extremism. Moving past such gender-stereotypes and considering women as active participants in curbing violent extremism, are a prerequisite to fully engage women in countering and preventing violent extremism. 3.1. Recommendations for CVE/PVE The preceding discussion leads to the following recommendations and considerations:

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x x

x

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Extend women’s involvement in CVE/PVE efforts to capacities including policyshapers, educators, interventionists, community-members and activists; Involve women’s organizations in the development of effective CVE/PVE genderspecific programming. They have the experience to assess the risks of their engagement in CVE/PVE efforts and they know best what programs will work within their communities, what will be regarded as serving an externally imposed security agenda and what will be seen as serving the needs of the community; Recognize (local) women’s organizations as fully-fledged partners in CVE/PVE efforts and recognize ongoing local efforts in curbing violent extremism.

References and Endnotes [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5]

[6] [7]

[8]

[9] [10] [11] [12] [13]

[14] [15]

Based on: Nasser-Eddine, M., Garnham, B., Agostino, K. and Caluya, G., Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review, Australian Government, Department of Defence - Defence, Science and Technology Organisation, March 2011, p. 9. United Nations General Assembly, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, Report of the SecretaryGeneral A/70/674, 24 December 2015. United Nations General Assembly, The United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy A/RES/60/288, 20 September 2006. Sewall, S., Why Counterterrorism needs countering violent extremism (CVE), US Department of State, New York, 22 September 2015. See for example: De Leede, S., Haupfleisch, R., Korolkova, K., and Natter, M., Radicalisation and violent extremism – focus on women: how women become radicalized and how to empower them to prevent radicalization, Committee on women’s rights and gender equality, European Parliament, December 2017; Geuskens, I., Van Broekhoven, L., Tomasović, C. B., and Begum, A. A., Counterterrorism measures and their effects on the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, Women Peacemakers Program, Human Security Collective, Ecumenical Women’s Initiative, Women in Governance, 2015; Aoláin, F.N., Counter-Terrorism Committee: Addressing the Role of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Just Security, 17 (September 2015); Huckerby, J., The Complexities of Women, Peace, Security and Countering Violent Extremism, Just Security, 24 (September 2015). Kessels E., and Nemr, C., Countering violent extremism and development assistance: identifying synergies and opportunities, Global Center on Cooperative Security, February 2016. Fink, N. C., Baarakat, R., and Shetret, L., The roles of women in terrorism, conflict and violent extremism, lessons for the United Nations and international actors, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, April 2013, pp. 5-6. United Nations General Assembly, Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Note by the Secretary-General A/64/211, 3 August 2009; De Leede, S., Afghan women and the Taliban, an explorative assessment, ICCT, April 2014. De Leede et al. (2017), Radicalisation and violent extremism – focus on women. Haynie, J.G., and Oudraat, C.J., Women, Gender and Terrorism: Policies and Programming, Women in International Security, Women in International Security, Policy Brief, January 2017. De Leede et al. (2017), Radicalisation and violent extremism – focus on women, p. 39. De Leede et al. (2017), Radicalisation and violent extremism – focus on women, p. 33. United Nations Women Peace and Security Section, Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the peace, A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, 2015, p. 46. Ghazzawi, R., Mohammad, A., and Ramadan, O., ‘Peacebuilding defines our future now’ a study of women’s peace activism in Syria, Badael Foundation, Kvinna till Kvinna, 2015, p. 26-27. See for example: Coleman, I., The payoff from women's rights, Foreign Affairs, (May-June 2004); Couture, K.L., A gendered approach to countering violent extremism, lessons learned from women in peacebuilding and conflict prevention applied successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco, Center for 21st

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[16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22]

[23] [24]

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century security and intelligence Brookings Foreign Policy, July 2014; Cantone, A., Woman up! Promoting women’s rights in Saudi Arabia to counter violent extremism, Institute for Gulf Affairs, July 2015. Coleman, The payoff from women's rights; Cantone, Woman up!, p. 7. Couture, A gendered approach to countering violent extremism, p. 23. Kessels and Nemr, Countering violent extremism and development assistance, p. 3; Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2015. Couture, A gendered approach to countering violent extremism, p. 28-30. Ghazzawi, Mohammad and Ramadan, Peacebuilding defines our future now, p. 29. Couture, A gendered approach to countering violent extremism, p. x. Steunpunt Sabr is a Dutch non-profit organisation that focuses on supporting women and their families in need of care for social and psychological problems. In response to the radicalisation of many young men and women, Steunpunt Sabr developed, together with mothers and experts in the fields of psychology and theology, a radicalization awareness program. Interview by the author with Karima Sahla on 16 October 2017. ICAN, Extremism as mainstream: implications for women, development and security in the MENA/Asia region, International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN), Spring 2014, p. 11.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.

Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-95

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Counter-Messaging for Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East and North Africa: Using a Gender Lens a

Lilah ELSAYEDa Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism Abstract. Since the UN Secretary-General presented the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism [1] to the UN General Assembly on its seventieth session, 15 January 2016, all member states were urged to include efforts on strategic communications, the Internet and social media in their Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) strategies. This essay gives a preliminary overview of the gender perspective integrated in the international organizations (Middle East and North Africa (MENA)-based), national and government-led efforts in alternative and counter-messaging for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). In addition, this essay will discuss case studies of counter-narrative initiatives from five countries: Egypt, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Morocco, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in detail. Finally, this essay concludes with a list of recommendations on better inclusion of the role of women in alternative and counter-narrative efforts in MENA region. Keywords. Alternative narrative, counter-narratives, counter-messaging, women, gender, PVE, CVE, Egypt, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, KSA, Tunisia, Morocco, United Arab Emirates, UAE, Middle East, North Africa, Middle East and North Africa, MENA, international organizations, inter-governmental organizations.

1. Introduction National governments, regional bodies and international organizations struggle to counter the messages and ideologies of violent extremists and include as part of their strategic communications under the umbrella of counter-terrorism. In the United Nations (UN) context, the adoption of the General Assembly’s resolution A/70/L.41 included an appeal for more “concerted action” towards a comprehensive PVE approach to include strategic communications, and counter-messages on the Internet and social media [2]. This UN resolution complements the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism [3]. In addition to the efforts of the United Nations, other international institutions and organizations such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), Hedayah and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have also focused efforts on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) [4]. Over the past few years, the work of such organizations has diverted some attention to strategic communications for refuting violent extremism and terrorism. Strategic communications efforts may vary, to include government messaging centers and “hubs”, some of which may support community organizations and individuals in developing and disseminating alternative and counter-narrative campaigns, both online and offline. Some of these messaging centers have dedicated websites available in multiple

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languages and presence on social media platforms, to provide alternative and countermessaging to violent extremist narratives. These websites also share research findings, good practices and toolkits, among others, that focus on developing alternative and counter-narrative campaigns. When it comes to the topic of gender, the subject in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region can be controversial when there is a culture that sometimes emphasizes a certain interpretation of the prophetic tradition or hadith describing Muslim women as “mentally and religiously deficient” [5]. This interpretation does not draw attention to the fact that some of the very first scholars and preachers to teach about Islam were women. Contextually, issues that women face within the region are not given enough attention, and gender is not often considered in P/CVE efforts in the region. This paper, which illuminates women’s role in counter-messaging for P/CVE in MENA, is therefore critical. Daesh has recruited a number of female fighters, as well as wives and sisters of fighters who may be lured by their husbands/to-be husbands and/or brothers to join the ranks of Daesh and help build its so-called caliphate. By some estimates, females in Daesh amounted to 13% of the overall recruits [6]. According to the Egyptian Fatwa Institution Dar al-Iftaa’, 60% of fatawa (religious opinions) issued by Daesh that are focused on women declare an obligatory participation in committing terrorist attacks and fighting under the allegiance to Daesh. This is especially the case with a significant number of male Daesh members killed and a decrease in male recruits since 2017. Daesh religious-based narrative through fatawa targeted at women uses religiously influential words to describe them, for example “chaste”, “heaven’s princesses”, “crowned queens” and so-called “jihadi brides” exploiting religion to convince women that “pressing the blow-up button is their way to heaven” [7]. Evidence of the effectiveness of these narratives is manifested in suicidal attacks perpetrated by women such as the recent one in Tunisia’s capital committed by a 30-year-old woman on 29 October 2018 [8]. In this context, gender-based counter-narratives using messengers of female preachers and/or experts can play a central role as credible messengers in providing alternative and counter-narratives. Examples tackled in this paper will focus on alternative and counternarrative campaigns from a gendered lens to include campaigns using voices of victims and survivors from women, such as Yazidi girls, and stories from disillusioned returning female foreign fighters and many others who escaped Daesh. For the purpose of this paper, NATO is chosen as an example for an organization that exerts efforts of strategic communications to include “alternative” and “counternarratives.” In this regard, on 04 April 2009, the Heads of States and Governments participating in the NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit and its Declaration [9] stated that: …it is increasingly important that the Alliance communicates in an appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive manner on its evolving roles, objectives, and missions. Strategic communications are an integral part of our efforts to achieve the Alliance's political and military objectives [10]. In alignment with the above, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (Riga StratCom) in Riga, Latvia, established in January 2014 [11] and the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE DAT) in Ankara, Turkey [12], set up in December 2003, both address strategic communications against terrorism and violent extremism [13]. The counter-messaging efforts of the two centers of excellence are varied and multifaceted and involving multiple institutions including conducting courses, seminars, conferences and workshops throughout the year in addition to publishing books, reports and analyses. Some of these activities and publications focus

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on violent extremist rhetoric and narratives of violent extremist individuals and leaders from men and women, and counter-narratives, and social media content and technology to counter-terrorism [14]. It should also be noted that in alignment with the perspectives in this paper, NATO has been committed to the issue of gender through the adoption and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions particularly, 1325, and its contributions to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This paper will outline a number of international organizations’ and government-led initiatives in counter-messaging through the gender lens in relation to efforts for P/CVE. This paper utilizes a database of open-source counter-narratives that is available on Hedayah’s Counter-Narrative Library (www.cn-library.com) [15], and draws upon a collection of counter-narratives that was collated for the MENA region. The Library is a tool for practitioners and a living e-source of information and good practices about the international, regional and national counter-messages. On the one hand, this paper does not seek to analyze the effectiveness of these counter-messages on the target audience, but on the other hand, it points out the existence of a gendered lens to counter-narratives for the MENA region. This paper will provide a preliminary assessment through focusing on case studies from five countries: Egypt, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Morocco, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates. A summary of the counter-narratives from MENA in the Counter-Narrative Library are detailed in Figure 1. For the purpose of this essay and the focus of case studies from five countries from MENA region, the highest contributions for alternative and counternarratives from MENA region are developed in Egypt and KSA. The counter-narratives are originally generated in Arabic and French, sometimes in English. However, it should be noted that due to the fact that Arabic is the predominant language in the MENA region, alternative and counter-narratives produced in Arabic can have the potential of resonating better with the Arabic-speaking target audience from the region, as Arabic is a source for not only their native tongue but also their culture and traditions. Additionally, Arabic alternative and counter-narratives could be viewed as more organic and contextualized especially when using religious texts from Qur’anic verses or the teachings of the prophet. Country of Origin Egypt Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) Morocco Tunisia United Arab Emirates

Number of Items in MENA Counter-Narrative Collection 14 14 2 7 3

Total

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Figure 1: Number of Counter-Narratives by Country in Hedayah’s Counter-Narrative Library for MENA

Given the above-mentioned background information, the following sections underline initiatives of alternative and counter-messaging from MENA based international organizations as well as national and government/semi-government-led organizations.

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2. International Organizations (IOs) Efforts in Alternative and CounterMessaging This section will shed light on a number of counter-messaging initiatives taken by international organizations based in the MENA region. These initiatives included creating dedicated hubs for providing alternative and counter-messaging to violent extremist narratives. These hubs not only share articles, research and seminar findings, good practices and toolkits, among others, that focus on developing alternative and counter-narrative campaigns in general, but also have examples of utilizing the voices of women in particular. The main activities of dedicated platforms and hubs for two international organizations are discussed in detail below. 2.1. Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): Sawt Al- Hikma (Voice of Wisdom) The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) [16] has launched the Center for Dialogue, Peace and Understanding (CDPU) or Sawt Al-Hikma (The Voice of Wisdom) as a counter-messaging platform dedicated to delegitimizing extremist discourse on social media and the Internet [17]. It was critical to include the gendered lens into counter-messaging to address issues related to women that did not previously receive enough focus. As part of its efforts to promote the inclusion of women to its countermessaging efforts, CDPU has been involving female Muslim preachers and/or experts in a number of multimedia, graphics and animation clips that aim at correcting the concepts used by terrorist groups in justifying their actions. These videos discuss issues of interest not only to the Arab and Islamic worlds, but also to all Muslims everywhere. Notably, Muslim women within MENA region are more likely to engage with and communicate with other women; cultural sensitivities and barriers sometimes limit their ability or desire to interact with male figures. Therefore, female preachers and/or experts can play a central role as credible messengers in providing alternative and counter-narratives. Shenaz Buglawala, an expert who has led extensive research into Islamophobia in the British media, serves as an example of a female messenger present in one of CDPU campaigns, #RTPTalks. Buglawala can be a potentially effective and credible messenger for other women from the MENA region because, as previously mentioned, female messengers are more highly regarded by a female audience. Although she does not directly address issues related to femininity or masculinity, the topics discussed by Buglawala deal with the particular issues of refuting extremists’ claims. For example, “Terrorism and the Abuse of Sacred Text” addresses the theological principles and tenants of Islam that are leveraged and abused by terrorist groups. 2.2. Etidal (Moderation) Etidal (Moderation) [18] is the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology recently launched during the Islamic American Summit in May 2017 and based in Riyadh, KSA. Etidal, in collaboration with governments and organizations, seeks to refute the exclusion discourse of groups like Daesh and consolidate the concepts of moderation and coexistence in MENA societies. Etidal took the lead of multiple alternative and counternarrative campaigns via its social media platforms: Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.

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Etidal’s campaigns have involved substantial participation of women and girls to convey the message in its video campaigns, whether in English or in Arabic. A clear example of is campaign titled “Peace is in overcoming injustice” and it delivers a core message of how the stories of suffering can turn into a peace prize through “#NobelPrize.” A key messenger for this campaign is Nadia Murad, a Yazidi woman from the northern Iraqi town of Sinjar, who was held as a sex slave by Daesh, as she told CNN in an interview last year. In 2016, at age 23, she was made a UN goodwill ambassador for the dignity of survivors of human trafficking. In 2018, she was awarded the Nobel Prize for her efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict. This message highlights how tables can be turned and the influence of terrorism on women and girls as well as exposes gender-based violence (e.g. sexual violence and rape) can backfire into the face of terrorism.

3. Country-Based Case Studies: Government/ Semi-Government-led Efforts in Alternative and Counter-Messaging As already mentioned earlier, women are more likely to engage with and communicate with other women; cultural sensitivities and barriers sometimes limit their ability or desire to interact with male figures. The following section will briefly sketch examples of alternative and counter-messages seeking to incorporate gender perspectives from five different countries from the MENA region. The case studies are from Egypt, KSA Morocco, Tunisia and the UAE. 3.1. Egypt: Al Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism The first case study sheds light on the efforts exerted by the government of Egypt through the analysis of the activities of Al Azhar Al Sharif, the oldest seat of Islamic learning and the highest Islamic Authority in Egypt. In addition to being a religious entity, Al Azhar also multi-disciplinary university. Under the guidance of Al Azhar, the Al Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism [19] hosts a website that offers a collation of materials that refute the ideology of violent extremist groups, including Daesh and Al Qaeda. From the perspective of Islamic scholars at Al Azhar, it provides counterarguments on some of the misconceptions claimed by terrorist groups. It also contains suggestions for providing replies for religious arguments used by terrorist groups that promote violence such as labeling non-Muslims as kuffar (disbelievers), identity-based killing and pledging loyalty to specific groups. There are several examples of how the Observatory is amplifying the voices of women in its continuous efforts for narratives and counter-narratives against violent extremism. For example, it supported five Arabic awareness-raising campaigns and hashtags addressing women. First, “Anti Malikah” (You are a Queen) seeks to highlight the role of women and reaffirm their high standing in Islam [20]. Second, “Law kona fi zaman al nubowah” (What if were living in the Prophet’s time) featured stories of women that played a prominent role in the Islamic history [21]. Third, “Hunna” (Feminine “They”) [22] and fourth, “Enjazatuha tulhemoni” (Her achievements inspire me) [23] both offer inspirational alternative narratives through featuring profiles of successful women in a broad range of fields. Finally, a campaign titled “Refqan bil Qawareer” (Be gently with women) emphasizes one of the prophetic teachings on granting women a lenient treatment [24]. These examples of raising awareness campaigns targeting women

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mainly consisted of animated sketches telling the stories of women that aim at not only debunking campaigns against the Islamic culture, particularly with regard to the allegedly inferior status of women vis-à-vis men in the Islamic societies, but also promoting a culture of respect and appreciation of a religious character, using sacred texts and taking us back to the time of prophet Mohammed for women in Egypt. 3.2. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Assakina Campaign Assakina [25], which means “Tranquility” in Arabic, is an online website, offered in Arabic, English, Russian and Turkish, dedicated for providing content that discusses issues such as jihad, political violence and radicalization. Assakina is a voluntary campaign that is supported by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs of Saudi Arabia and focuses mainly on collaborating with Islamic scholars to engage with individuals seeking religious knowledge. Assakina has assumed a leading role in counter-narrative efforts through its own programs and activities as well as through supporting external initiatives. For example, Assakina, through its Arabic publications and open discussions, challenges, exposes and refutes about extremist ideologies so the authentic image of Islam can be faithfully represented and championed. This can also occur through one-to-one interventions for individuals. Assakina has an online multi-media database of religious guidance to answer questions on Islamic belief. This database consists of more than 40,000 digital, audio and video materials for users primarily in Saudi Arabia [26]. In its efforts to disrupt the terrorist propaganda and facilitate discussions, Assakina’s website houses a section on “women’s extremism” [27]. This section contains various articles reporting and analyzing the cases from female members of Al Qaeda and Daesh not only Saudis but also female Foreign Terrorist Fighters. The articles included in this section of the website discuss topics such as “Baytuk is Al Qaeda’s Latest Female Publications”; “The Most Notorious French Female Daesh Fighter”; “Female Violent Extremists in Morocco” and “Saudi Women Joining Terrorist Cells”. There are also a series of short documentaries highlighting the stories of female fighters while highlighting how families were affected by violent extremism in order to raise awareness against falling as easy prey to radicalization and recruitment. Moreover, Assakina has supported a unique initiative titled “Creative Minds for Social Good” to help credible voices, mostly from female university students and mothers, to become capable of developing compelling content that resonates with local audiences. These campaigns aim at countering violent extremist messages online through promoting the values of tolerance, multiculturalism, interfaith, inter-religious dialogue, inclusiveness and identity. The campaigns targeted cities that were sources of terrorist groups’ recruitment through 1-3-minute video campaigns that contest the narratives of terrorist groups in the online space. This particular initiative aimed at encouraging and enabling locally-based credible female voices, particularly mothers, to message against violent extremism online. It is a series of short videos reflecting on experiences of Saudi females, targeting parents and mothers in particular. For example, one of these video campaigns portrayed a mother who was ignorantly instilling the principles of discrimination on race, ancestry, and sect on her son. As the video progressed, she changed her views by promoting the values of respect for others regardless of ethnicity, ancestor or family/tribe.

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3.3. Morocco 3.3.1. Al Rabita Al Muhammedyya of Ulamas (Muslim Scholars) The Rabita is a public-welfare council of religious scholars established by a royal decree in February 2006. Al Rabita has dedicated a website in Arabic that works on promoting religious awareness and identity of the Moroccan society deconstructing violent extremist narratives through 15 affiliated centers. The Rabita’s website offers also a digital library that has many publications that focus on deconstructing extremist narratives and particularly Daesh. One of these centers is dedicated only for Muslim women titled “Center of Studies and Research on Women’s Issues in Islam” [28], and its website (www.annisae.ma). This center addresses matters pertaining to Moroccan women and girls such as and controversial of topics related to femininity in Islam through publications, seminars, lectures and targeting female audience. It also worth highlighting that among the seven operational units of the Rabita, there is “Deconstructing Extremist Narratives.” Furthermore, the Rabita oversees “Ra’eedat Al Rabita Al Muhammedeyya” (Female Pioneers of Al Rabita Al Muhammedyya). Notably, these initiatives have two dimensions: first, the offline one through face-to-face engagement with female scholars, preachers and experts and secondly, its dissemination online through women’s online magazines such as “Al Rouya” or the “Vision” which features a powerful alternative narrative promoting Moroccan female actors from all categories of the society while keeping a religious nature. These magazines provide a criticism on the authenticity of weak and enforced prophetic traditions or hadith on women that may had an impact on the allegedly lesser status of women. These two dimensions of alternative and countermessaging targeting women can provide a multiplier effect. 3.3.2. Al Morchadate Program Reviving the role of women preachers and scholars in shaping the civilization of nations, the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Morocco is taking the lead not only in providing religious training to male religious leaders/clerics but also female ones in its innovative program “Al Morchadate” that graduate 150 clerics every year (100 male and 50 female). In addition to assuming its religious role, such as providing lessons on different topics related to Islamic culture and sciences and preaching in mosques, this program also aims to promote values of cohesion in Moroccan society that help protect mothers and girls against the narratives of radical groups such as Daesh. The role of women preachers within the region, whether official or voluntarily, can be prominent in communicating their message and answer questions of girls in segregated schools and universities, mothers and female members within their communities. 3.4. Tunisia: Creators for Life This section will underline the efforts by Tunisia and particularly whose Ministry of Cultural Affairs has embraced multiple positive and alternative narrative initiatives. The following case study can set a good example of government efforts; the national program “Mubd’eon men ajl al hayah/Créateurs…Pour la vie” (Creators for Life) [29] that resulted in significant participation of women in as promoting the core message of this specific initiative’s activities through music, theatrical performances, dancing, cinema and arts exhibitions. The aim of this cultural program is to prevent radicalization and violent extremism through arts activities. Indeed, female artists can be role models for

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younger generations and have the potential of transforming their ideas from violence to non-violence. Notably, this program is consistent and well-coordinated in several Tunisian cities such as Kelibia, Sousse, Jendouba and Alraqab. This campaign aimed at fostering a culture of peace and tolerance through various arts activities, particularly theatre performances. 3.5. United Arab Emirates (UAE) After reviewing efforts from KSA that focused on two dimensions: first regional and secondly, national, this case study brings another experience from the Gulf. The UAE has initiated many influential partnerships to counter the rhetoric of terrorists. These partnerships have included the establishment of the “Sawab Centre,” a direct countermessaging platform, and the launch of the “Emirati Scholars Development Program” that aims to demonstrate the peaceful nature of the Islamic religion. 3.5.1. Sawab Center Sawab Center is a joint initiative by the governments of the UAE and the United States of America, established in 2015, that seeks to contribute to the Working Group on Strategic Communications set up by the Global Coalition against Daesh in order to expose Daesh’s true nature. The Center does so by highlighting its brutality, poor governance, deteriorating infrastructure and low –quality municipality services with the aim of deconstructing the “Utopian Caliphate” narrative. Sawab is a hub that uses different social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube to address the propaganda used by Daesh. Two of Sawab’s campaigns have involved a gendered approach: “#HerAchievementsInspireMe” and “#DaeshDeniesHerDignity.” In the first campaign, #HerAchievementsInspireMe, the campaign celebrated International Women’s Day through highlighting examples of excellence and leadership from women in the region. This campaign featured stories of women who played a prominent role in Islamic history as well as offering inspirational profiles of women whose dedication, skills and innovation has led them to succeed in a broad range of sectors including business, science, politics, arts and others. It is worth noting that this specific campaign was a follow-on campaign to one of Sawab’s first campaigns that aimed to counter Daesh propaganda by exposing the reality of the group’s treatment of women. The second campaign, “#DaeshDeniesHerDignity,” which was released on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, featured five animated sketches telling the stories of women who had been severely impacted by Daesh. Mainly the stories drew from the slave market in Iraq, where women and girls from minorities, such as Yazidis or Christians, were sold as sexual slaves. This message highlights the impact of terrorism on women and girls as well as exposes gender-based violence (e.g. sexual violence and rape). This campaign used also stories of a mother immigrant to a Daesh-controlled area; a young foreign girl seduced by the romanticism of living in a Daesh-controlled area; a local Syrian/Iraqi girl forced to hide from Daesh; and a woman who was able to escape from Daesh-controlled territory. 3.5.2. Emirati Scholars Development Program A three-year Academic program that was launched in 2016 with a class of 19 young Emirati men and women to be trained to become Islamic scholars, ulama. In addition to

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the scholars’ role in fostering the spread of the noble Islamic teachings and values of tolerance, peace and justice and humanitarian values calling for fraternity, this program also aims at maintaining the spiritual security of the Emirati society, countering the highly charged violent extremist narratives to include factional and sectarian narratives. As mentioned earlier, Muslim women within the region are more likely to engage with and communicate with other women; cultural sensitivities and barriers sometimes limit their ability or desire to interact with male figures. Therefore, female preachers and/or experts can play a central role as credible messengers in providing alternative and counter-narratives.

4. Conclusion This paper provided concrete examples of how international organizations and government/semi-government-led efforts have used a gender perspective to countermessages, or amplified voices of women, in their broader efforts in P/CVE. In some cases, within the narratives sketched throughout the document, women were the “face” or the messenger. In other cases, the counter-narratives highlighted a variety of issues pertaining to women in the region, for example, empowering women and emphasizing their role within religion, culture and heritage. While the effectiveness of these narratives at reducing violent extremism has yet to be seen, at very least these narratives have put women out there as role models for other women in their communities in MENA.

References and Endnotes [1] United Nations General Assembly, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674. [2] United Nations General Assembly, The United Nations General Assembly: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly,12 February 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/254. [3] Ibid. [4] For more information about NATO’s WPS Agenda, see: https://www.nato.int/. [5] Imam Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Book Number 1, Hadith Number 86. [6] AbdulRahman, W., Daesh “Fatwas” Obligates Women to Participate in Committing Terrorist Operations, 2018, https://bit.ly/2DkjHy1. [7] Ibid. [8] El Sirgany, S., and Mackintosh, E., 9 Injured When Woman Blows Herself Up in Tunisia’s Capital, CNN Wire (2018), https://www.waaytv.com/content/national/498898391.html. [9] For more information about NATO StratCom Center of Excellence, see: https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-strategic-communications [10] NATO’s Strasbourg, Kehl Summit strengthens Translatntic Link and Looks at NATO’s Future Challenges, 2009, https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2009/0904-summit/index.html. [11] NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (Riga StratCom). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596829/IPOL_STU(2017)596829_EN.pdf [12] See Center of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, www.coedat.nato.int. [13] file:///C:/Users/Lilah.E/Downloads/Strategic_Communication_in_Counter_Terro%20(1).pdf [14] NATO’s Post-2014 Strategic Narrative, 2014, https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/WP1319-Report.pdf. [15] Hedayah launched its Counter-Narrative Library (www.cn-library.com) in October 2016. The Library is a comprehensive portal where governments, practitioners and civil society organizations (CSOs) can access content, how-to guides, toolkits and good practices to counter the narratives of all forms of violent extremism. The Library is a username and password-protected portal includes more than 550 items

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[16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29]

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varying from videos, movies, TV shows, cartoons, books, websites, magazines, blogs, social media campaigns, articles and many others that can be found online or uploaded as files from 16 different languages. For more information about the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): The Collective Voice of The Muslim World, see: https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en. For more information about Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s Sawt Al-Hikma (The Voice of Wisdom), see: http://www.oic-cdpu.org/. For more information about the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology (Etidal), see: https://etidal.org/en/eng/. For more information about Al-Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism, see http://www.azhar.eg/observer-en/. Alazhar Observer, Anti Malika (You are a Queen), Twitter (2017), https://bit.ly/2qR241n Alazhar Observer, Law kona fi zaman al nubowah (What if were living in the Prophet’s time), Twitter (2017), https://bit.ly/2qR241n. Alazhar Observer, Hunna (Feminine “They”), Twitter (2017), https://bit.ly/2qR241n. Alazhar Observer, Enjazatuha tulhemoni (Her achievements inspire me), Facebook (2017), https://bit.ly/2PUNwvA. Alazhar Observer, Refqan bil Qawareer (Be gently with women), Twitter (2017), https://bit.ly/2zNBvhw. For more information about “Assakina Campaign” (Tranquility Campaign), see: http://en.assakina.com. For more information about “Center of Studies and Research on Women’s Issues in Islam”, see: http://www.annisae.ma/. Initiative of Creators for Life in Jandooba and Raqaab Cities, MAYFOOTEKCHAY.TV (2015), https://bit.ly/2T9K8M1. Jamal, A., The Modern Preacher,” A New Emirati Weapon to Combat Terrorism, Al Emiraat Al Yoom (2016), https://bit.ly/2DBFWQU. Emirati Scholars Development Program, Twitter (2016), https://bit.ly/2z5HzSK.

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Enhancing Women's Roles in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) S. Zeiger et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2019 © 2019 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-947-8-105

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Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism: The Example of MotherSchools in Macedonia from Philosophy to Practice Edit SCHLAFFERa, Laura KROPIUNIGGa, and Rafael KROPIUNIGGa a Women without Borders

Abstract. Mothers present a missing link in preventing the spread of violent extremism. Their unparalleled physical and emotional proximity make them witnesses of every stage in their child’s development. While mothers thus have the potential to intervene if necessary, they often lack the essential knowledge and selfconfidence to recognize and address the early warning signs of radicalization in their sons and daughters. In response, Women without Borders (WwB) developed and designed the pioneering “MotherSchools: Parenting for Peace” Model. When put into practice, this proven approach positions concerned and affected mothers as the first line of defense against extremism in at-risk communities around the globe. MotherSchools programs have equipped mothers with the necessary competence and confidence to translate their unique potential into action across twelve countries to date. Using their agency as a unifying feature and employing the MotherSchools in Macedonia as a good practice case study, this paper advocates the wider inclusion of mothers in community-based counter-extremism strategies. In an effort to normalize the notion of mothers as indispensable security allies, we propose the adoption of a new term: Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism (MPVE). Keywords. Preventing Violent Extremism, PVE, Countering Violent Extremism, CVE, P/CVE, Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism, VERLT, Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism, MPVE, extremism, Women without Borders, WwB, Sisters Against Violent Extremism network, SAVE network, MotherSchools, Skopje, Albanian community, Macedonia, Western Balkans, mothers, female leadership, female empowerment, capacity building, community resilience, grassroots, local-level, prevention, early warning signs, radicalization, security, terrorism, counter-terrorism, family dynamics, local grievances, push and pull factors, drivers, soft power, hard power, women, gender.

1. Introduction: Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism (MPVE) While acts of terrorism repeatedly bring to the fore complex questions of “why” and “how” young people are radicalized, attempts at profiling extremists and terrorist groups have fallen short of viable universal explanations. Scholarship on the subject increasingly acknowledges the limits of global profiles that purport to depict “the ordinary terrorist” and now generally arrives at a common conclusion: the sources and appeals of extremism vary over time and space, tend to transcend socio-economic and political factors impacting on an individual, and overwhelmingly originate from and develop out of local, context-specific circumstance [1]. Considerations of and responses to radicalization in particular should thus study and reflect how the process emerges at the individual level and progresses to affect the local, national, and global levels. Yet in the problem’s

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transition and spread from the micro to the macro, there is one preventative, universal agent whose potential and agency overwhelmingly has been overlooked: the mother. Although local law enforcement plays an important role, violent extremism, as an expression of emotional vulnerability in the lives of adolescents and young adults, is inherently beyond its scope. Mothers, on the other hand, are witnesses of every stage in their child’s development. Their unparalleled physical and emotional proximity to their children gives them the opportunity to recognize the manifestation of early warning signs of radicalization in their sons and daughters. Being ideally situated in their homes and communities, they are unassuming yet central shapers of the social and psychological landscape that defines the realities of new generations. Mothers are least likely to count the hours; they invest as much time as is necessary when it comes to the wellbeing and security of their children. Despite their unique potential, often they lack the essential awareness, knowledge, and self-confidence to intervene in the process of radicalization. Yet mothers who are sensitized to their own capacity can play a significant role in the security arena. They can for instance be the first to identify and address signs of distress like anger, anxiety, and withdrawal [2]. This is especially important in affected communities—where the taboo topic of radicalization and resulting stigmas tend to further isolate them—as mothers’ influence within the lives of their children can be misappropriated by extremist groups. To invest in building up the preventative capacity of mothers is to embed them as buffers between radical influences and vulnerable youth. And equipping mothers to intervene in their homes and communities helps to preclude the need for more counterterrorism responses. Largely overlooked and underestimated, mothers only recently have begun to be considered viable allies in the development of a new global security architecture [3]. Women without Borders (WwB) has long recognized their preventative potential to confront and counteract extremism by strategically positioning and empowering these natural change-makers in their families, neighborhoods, and communities through its pioneering “MotherSchools: Parenting for Peace” Model. In putting research into practice by combining theory and grassroots-level fieldwork, our Model has managed to go beyond merely reclaiming the recruiters’ tools; MotherSchools have been strengthening resilience from the bottom up in at-risk communities across twelve countries since 2010. MotherSchools is a unique community-based program that starts at the home front by identifying, unlocking, and activating the potential of mothers to safeguard their children and strengthen community resilience. As popular strategies like counter-narrative approaches disseminated over the internet repeatedly have fallen short of catching up with recruitment tactics, this proven and global approach has emerged as a recognized good practice that has contributed to rethinking and reshaping P/CVE policy worldwide. Using the agency of mothers as a unifying feature, employing the MotherSchools Model as a good practice, and drawing on its continued successes in Macedonia, this article advocates the wider inclusion of concerned and affected mothers in communitybased counter-extremism strategies. In an effort to normalize the notion of mothers as indispensable security allies, we propose the adoption of a new term: Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism (MPVE).

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2. The Parenting for Peace Philosophy in the Making Of course, parents can make mistakes, and usually that comes from a lack of knowledge or a lack of work—not paying enough attention to their children. The parents should be parents for twenty-four hours a day. But also, they should know how to keep them comfortable without pressuring them. But it should not only be the mother, but also the father who is raising the child. The family should have sort of a triangular shape, between mother, father, and child (MotherSchools Participant, Macedonia). Women without Borders has since its inception in 2001 focused on the glaring absence of women from the cast list of agents in communities affected by or vulnerable to violent extremism. In response to the growing global threat of radicalization, WwB created the world’s first female PVE platform: the Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) network. For over a decade, WwB has been sensitizing this hitherto neglected group to their roles and responsibilities in building community resilience from the ground up. While addressing extremism is a priority among the range of distinct but interrelated WwB capacity building projects, this approach reflects our broader, longstanding governing philosophy: translating research into action and empowering women to move from victimhood towards agency. A heightened institutional focus on the role of women in PVE stems in large part from a number of insights that WwB gained in the wake of the 26/11 siege on Mumbai in 2008. Following the attacks, we observed a troubling trend. When the Indian authorities responded to the attacks by moving the issue of violent extremism to the top of its national agenda, women did not figure prominently in India’s new security strategies. The emphasis rested instead on traditionally patriarchal projections of hard power. Displays of military strength at the annual commemoration ceremonies were not only symptomatic of this trend; they also were paradoxical in that the police force had been underequipped and ill prepared for the siege. In highlighting perceived threats and cultivating a heightened sense of ‘the other’, measures of this kind tend to divert attention away from the root causes and often prove counterproductive to reconciliation efforts. While any viable national P/CVE strategy cannot do away with hard power, its effectiveness depends on enlisting security allies at all levels of society. In the case of 26/11 in particular, we found that while the media continued to sensationalize the atrocities and concentrate ever more on the suspects and culprits, survivors and victims were being increasingly overlooked and side-lined [4]. Many struggled to develop the necessary political clout to secure government aid, legal support, and psychological counselling. Widows, for instance, were left to their own devices and often did not receive financial support or medical assistance after the death of their husbands. Despite being the most visible contemporary witnesses of violent extremism at the time, the survivors were still missing a safe space where motivational narratives challenging the toxic ideologies of hate could be advanced. We responded to the growing marginalization process of the Mumbai attacks’ genuine victims by launching the “Witness of History” project and embedding it in the SAVE network. To counteract this climate of isolation, WwB sought to empower individuals whose voices had not yet found a platform: the wives, sisters, daughters, and mothers of police officers who defended the city during the three-day-long siege. We conducted a series of oral history video interviews with individuals connected to the events, including witnesses, survivors, family members of victims, and those who had resisted or countered recruitment efforts in their communities. By documenting the voices of these

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women and providing the public with “alternative narratives”, the project sought to fill the void that had been left by the media’s perpetrator-centric depiction of the events, and thus worked to close the gap that often makes adolescents in at-risk communities, who are in search of structure and direction, more susceptible to the methods of recruiters. The projects that came to fruition through our SAVE network since 2008 reinforced our understanding that mothers had for too long been excluded from prevention strategies. In an effort to grasp why mothers did not figure prominently and to explore the notion of MPVE, WwB conducted an in-depth research study entitled “Can mothers challenge extremism?” in 2013 [5]. WwB conceptualized and developed the “MotherSchools: Parenting for Peace” Model following a study probing 1023 mothers’ attitudes towards, perceptions of, and experiences with radicalization and violent extremism in their families and communities in Pakistan, Palestine, Israel, Nigeria, and Northern Ireland. We found that although mothers are best suited and situated to recognize and react to early warning signs of radicalization due to their place at the heart of the family, often they lack the appropriate space, structures, and training to develop the necessary competence and confidence to assume their prevention role. WwB has been leading the effort to bring mothers in at-risk communities out of isolation through the philosophy that underpins the pioneering and proven “MotherSchools: Parenting for Peace” Model. When put into practice, this global MPVE program creates a trusted space for affected and concerned mothers to tap into and develop their potential, and to thus effect change at the home front. Only in building up and merging competence (conceptual awareness, knowledge, skills, tools) with confidence (empowerment, self-confidence, trust) can mothers break down the silence and overcome the stigma surrounding radicalization to translate learnings into action in their families and communities.

3. MotherSchools in Practice 3.1. The Macedonian Context In the Western Balkans, messages of religious militancy have resonated profoundly with vulnerable youth populations and gained considerable traction in isolated communities over the past decade. Countries with high concentrations of Albanian-speaking adolescents and young adults have been particularly susceptible to radicalization. As evidenced by more recent waves of radicalization, violent extremist groups have taken advantage of evolving voids in and pressures on identities that have been and continue to be shaped by struggles with the lingering legacies of violent conflict and a history of shifting geopolitical circumstance [6]. Macedonia has experienced numerous waves of radicalization that can be traced back to the disintegration of Yugoslav Communism in the region. The personal journeys of many MotherSchools participants in Skopje reveal how widespread and formative the first wave of indoctrination proved: When Yugoslavia fell apart, it left a space. Before, religion was forbidden in Communism. You couldn’t be as religious as you wanted to be. It is a common thing that happens: my parents were not that religious; we were more religious. … [M]e and my sister were just searching … When it fell apart we had an awakening. A lot of students went to Arab countries and came back. The old clerics were not in fashion anymore. They wanted Islam but to be more traditional. It was daring. Most of the

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youth wanted something new. … I liked it for a little bit. It gave me structure. We were idealistic, we were naïve, we were going to change the world, we were trying to get people to revert. When the awakening came, we said, “Come on, you have to pray, go to mosque”. We were trying to inspire anyone who would listen; the older ones were harder to get on board [7]. In contrast to previous manifestations of indoctrination, the argument that violent extremism is an essentially external and imported phenomenon can no longer be sustained. While structural deficits in Macedonian families and communities have endured, recruiters increasingly have adapted their tactics to address context-specific grievances. Macedonia boasts one of Europe’s highest per capita rate of individuals who left to fight in Iraq and Syria. Recruiters have immersed themselves in and paid particular attention to its complex social-political makeup to effectively target and radicalize vulnerable youth [8]. Mothers in Macedonia, as a MotherSchools Teacher explained, “are very concerned and worried about their children, because every mother had a person or some people who also have experience with young or older people who went to Syria, and most of them are dead.” Yet the issue has continued to evolve. The recent influx of returnees threatens to introduce new toxic ideologies, exacerbate the issue in already affected areas, and bring violent extremism into other communities across the region [9]. Throughout the MotherSchools Macedonia project, WwB consistently collected qualitative data to develop a deeper understanding of the socio-political situation and context-specific factors impacting on degrees of radicalization in Skopje, including: semi-structured exit and entry interviews with project participants (as part of the project’s monitoring plan); local stakeholder discussions; and weekly project management calls over the course of one year. In this section, we will discuss our insights into radicalization dynamics in Skopje. The findings presented here are based on our conversations with all project participants; mothers, teachers, and note-takers. This data was categorized through codes for qualitative data analysis, and the findings that emerged were analyzed in order to generate a series of refined theories. The following two sections draw on the MotherSchools report to expand on the most prevalent responses from MotherSchools interviewees with respect to perceptions of radicalization dynamics and the perceived impact of the program. The final report, based on all data collected from the program’s rigorous monitoring and evaluation process, has been used to: advance our knowledge of context-specific radicalization dynamics over time; further hone our understanding of why and how mothers present the missing link in prevention strategies in vulnerable and affected communities; and ensure that MotherSchools continue to positively impact P/CVE policy and programming [10]. 3.2. Insights Mostly here, but maybe with all teenagers, parents don’t respect the adolescent. The mothers don’t evolve their parenting style. Parents don’t think that the adolescent has anything smart to say, so it makes the adolescent subjected even more to that kind of influence. Another problem is that mothers do not have a lot of self-worth and self-confidence because here is a traditional chauvinistic country. MotherSchools is the only program about prevention; I haven’t seen others. We have some youth who has gone to ISIS. Some are there now; some come back (MotherSchools Teacher, Macedonia).

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Insight I: The fear of potential marginalization and the stigma associated with confronting the pervasive issue of extremism renders it a taboo topic that is shrouded in secrecy. From the outset, an analysis of local radicalization dynamics made clear that mothers view extremism as a prevalent issue that nevertheless remains a taboo topic in the community, and even within most families. A fear of retaliation, as it emerged, not only keeps locals from speaking out; it also discourages them from even considering joining other programs that seek to address the issue of extremism. As one teacher put it, “In the first round [of two rounds of MotherSchools] mothers had a lot of concerns, and even I myself was scared—not only for myself, but also for the mothers. Would they tell anybody? What if anybody finds out? Would we be safe?” The sensitive nature of the problem is accentuated by a deeply engrained culture of silence surrounding taboo topics in general, since in the “Albanian community there is a rule that you cannot speak about problems that the community has.” While a sense of shame and fear of potential repercussions keep many from speaking out, all of the mothers recognize the importance of breaking the silence and overcoming the stigma that affected mothers tend to face. The silence nevertheless has kept hidden a curiosity and desire to understand the issue: “It’s a taboo, and everyone wants to know those signs; but they are not able to … they don’t know where they can get information from and how to recognize the signs in their children.” Insight II: Few participants put their trust in religious authorities, mistrust among friends and neighbors is widespread, and most mothers lack a degree of trust in themselves. Mothers view religious institutions with a high degree of suspicion; some cited examples like that of a secondary school that convened Qur’an lessons (“I was scared about my children participating since we do not know where the influences come from”), and others worry about the nature of religious leaders (“people have no trust in the imams—the biggest fear comes from where the rituals come from, because we do not know which imams can recruit people”). The interviews also hint at a common atmosphere of distrust that transcends the public realm. Radicalization and extremism are difficult to detect under a recruiter’s guise of “normalcy”: “The fear is in us—in our friends, in our neighbors—because you do not know who can influence you. Maybe they look like you, but they could have hidden motives …. [Recruiters] are completely like us: they don’t wear the traditional robes, but they have the ideologies.” Most surprisingly, some mothers expressed a lack of trust in themselves: “Sometimes we are too exhausted …. And someone can try to make us feel better, and, by doing that, influence us. In our society they are in a big number, and you do not know … their motives. You do not know why someone is talking to you …. There are a lot of question marks in life in Skopje.” Insight III: The general consensus is that: radicalization is relatively common; mothers can identify specific extremist recruiters and their stomping grounds; and converts to Islam are especially vulnerable. The majority of interviewees perceive the issue to be relatively advanced, with one purporting that “every family in [her community in] Skopje is facing one case of radicalization,” and that few are spared “the fear that maybe something can happen.” Yet, not all mothers are naïve to the covert tactics of recruiters and the places where they convene. In many cases, they even claim to be able to identify specific extremist recruiters: “People know the special mosques and preachers where radical ideologies are being communicated.” Parents make an effort to keep their children away from such places (“when they hear that someone from the family gathers in that specific coffee space or mosque, they try to advise them”). They are inclined to view converts as the most likely candidates for recruitment. Those who themselves converted tend to have first-hand experiences with preying recruiters. “We as converts,”

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one mother explained, “get more attention from the different [radical] Islamic organizations. They all wanted us to be part of their activities, so we have to be more careful since we don’t have a Muslim family to explain the differences to us.” A number of interviewees also knew converts who had been approached by extremist individuals (“I knew a convert …. When he converted, the radicals approached him immediately”). Insight IV: Interviewees contend that feelings of alienation and purposelessness are chief in attracting individuals to radicalization but can be addressed through appropriate family structures. A child’s increasing self-isolation points to the absence of self-fulfillment, which in turn makes radical groups more alluring. As most mothers agree, a lack of purpose among adolescents and young adults typically is fueled by specific socio-economic factors. Often a lack of jobs and an excess of free time creates a void that makes them feel empty inside: “they have to feel something, to find a purpose, so these people come to them and give them a purpose and will say to them, ‘if you go there and fight, we will take care of your family, and, even if you die, we will take care of your family here,’ so they think, ‘I’m not useful for anything here in my country, so at least I’ll go there and be useful for something and die in a holy war.’” Yet mothers are also convinced that certain family structures can counteract feelings of isolation and hopelessness (“I think that there are many factors of radicalization, and I used to think that the main is the global issues, but now I see that the most important [issue] is what you take [away] from home, and that the home and family can really influence this. Every person that is going into radicalization is missing something. Maybe he is missing the environment or the family or the friends”). That the actual process of radicalization varies from family to family suggests that approaches geared towards re-building structures in concerned or affected families need to take into account a number of identifiable variables: “Every mother is concerned about this because you do not know who will be affected. There is no pattern. Because it has no pattern, a kid from intellectual or kid from more basic background could be more affected.” Complexities and variables notwithstanding, in the broadest possible terms this means that while some children seek the structure and rules that hitherto they had been lacking at home, others seek a sense of liberation in extremism due to the authoritarian parenting style and often violent experiences that they have had to endure. 3.3. Impact The MotherSchools was a program in which I found myself. When I was working with my children I was basing my decision on what is wrong, right, good. But in MotherSchools I found a place where I got acknowledgment for what I did. So, in this it has been a space where I found myself, my place. I regard this as a place where women can find their confidence, truly acknowledge their skills, and build upon their skills—not only working with their own children but also with children of neighbors or in their community. I recommend the program to everyone I know. First you are building confidence in yourself as a mother and learning from other mothers. At the end of the day, every mother has her own method; it’s her instinct. It’s a way for the mother to go outside of the house, not to be stuck between four walls, and to be aware of what is going on in her community. And to be able to act if I notice something going on with my child (MotherSchools Participant, Macedonia). Challenges notwithstanding, the community’s initial, traditionally-conservative response to the MotherSchools program gradually gave way to a growing identification with its

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Parenting for Peace philosophy. “With the MotherSchools,” as one Teacher illuminated, “it is easier for a mother to go, because she can explain to her husband and relatives [that the program [is] about parenting. It would be difficult to say: ‘I am learning about extremist behavior.’ She would be stopped.” In building the necessary foundation for community trust, WwB was not only able to acquire otherwise closely guarded insights, but also to apply these insights in order to contextualize the MotherSchools Curriculum, establish a baseline to work from, and ultimately record impact over time. The Curriculum employs developmental psychology, self-confidence training, and theoretical sessions to define radicalization and prevention at the individual, family, and community levels. The aessions allow mothers to re-visit, re-evaluate, and re-shape their notion of parenting by learning about the psychological dynamics and stages of childhood and adolescence. In refining their communication skills in the family, the program equips mothers to react to early warning signs of grievances that can lead to radicalization. Mothers also learn how to introduce and develop alternative narratives that foster a positive youth culture and strengthen resilience. In so doing, MotherSchools empower women to demonstrate leadership and promote family and community tolerance, forgiveness, and cohesion. The Curriculum guides participants through a process of gradual awareness-building in three successive stages: starting with the self, moving on to the family and community, and finally arriving at the individual’s role in security. Sessions include exercises that facilitate dialogue, information exchanges, and critical reflection using context-based techniques that apply to the participants’ daily lives. Sessions are monitored, evaluated, and analyzed through a rigorous process to document changing dynamics and ensure the program’s effectiveness. The following section offers glimpses into the impact of MotherSchools Macedonia from the perspectives of the participants, teachers, and notetakers. Impact I. Created a secure space where mothers developed trust, opened up, and joined together to build support networks and structures. MotherSchools in Macedonia aimed to provide mothers with a space—safe from marginalization by the community and prosecution by law enforcement—to overcome the stigma surrounding radicalization, and to unlock their potential as our new security allies in the burgeoning MPVE realm. The opportunity to convene with other concerned or affected mothers was in and of itself a new concept to all who joined: “I know that in my society it is difficult to talk about your problems even with friends, because you know that one day your story may circulate in the community. But in the MotherSchools, you could talk about it; the atmosphere was so familiar and so safe.” This free forum and exchange of experiences allowed the mothers to build on each other’s strengths. Those who initially felt less confident to open up were inspired by the courage of some of their peers: Some mothers were eager—couldn’t wait to share their stories. When the reserved ones saw them expressing themselves without holding back and [saw] Teachers listening carefully without judging, that gave them courage. They saw it’s not something terrible; when some mother shared an even scarier story, they would think, “If she can talk, why can’t I talk? (MotherSchools Participant, Macedonia). They worked together to develop strategies to address challenges that most would otherwise have to contend with alone, thus countering the isolation to which many had become accustomed. One of the teachers equated the process of “expressing their struggles” with “healing.” Over the course of the program, the participants increasingly “felt secure to talk in the MotherSchools about radicalization.” All of the teachers were

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“surprised that mothers who did not know each other were comfortable to express themselves in front of others they didn’t know.” They witnessed how the participants “were really trying to share personal stories” and afterwards “are more prepared to talk about taboo topics.” The mothers spoke at length about how the MotherSchools helped them to build relationships based on trust and mutual understanding. “And now,” in the words of a participant, “I know that if I cannot personally address the problem, I can call [name of Teacher] and I know that it will be treated in a confidential way.” In short, many felt that “the group became like a family” and the MotherSchools doubled as a “support group.” Impact II. Advanced mothers’ understanding of the early warning signs, deepened their sense of responsibility to safeguard their children, and empowered them to break their silence and discuss extremism at home. All participants were more confident that they now better understood how manifestations of radicalization could be traced and detected before intervention and prevention strategies lose their effectiveness. Yet the program went beyond lessons on and discussions of how recruiters identify and target an individual’s vulnerabilities by offering a false sense of belonging. Participants were guided through the process of developing a deeper sensitivity to behavioral changes. This helped to equip them with the skills required to act before recruiters have the chance to attune to and capitalize on common or context-specific grievances. They came to gain a deep appreciation for their potential to render manipulative methods ineffective in the most critical, early phases. Participants expressed a heightened sense of responsibility, noting that every “mother should be aware of what is going on in the life of her child—if her child is under pressure, the mother should be able to recognize this pressure and act on it’, and that no child should have to “hide from the mother if something is going on in their life.” When adequately supported, as the participants found, mothers hold the potential to identify and respond to the early warning signs of radicalization exhibited by their daughters and sons, or by others to whom they are connected in their communities. This new knowledge and confidence to speak about extremism convinced many to broach the subject at home for the first time: “I know how to raise issues around radicalization. I don’t just say, ‘You don’t go there, you don’t do this.’ I talk with them about certain cases”; “Now I can talk more about extremism, since I know how to speak about it. Before that I was stopped by fear and chose to say nothing”; “Now I am opening up topics [that] I have never opened up at home; now I know what my kids are thinking about, things we never talked about before”; “Through what I learned in the MotherSchools, I’ve liberated my children to talk with me about any issues, so they don’t need to look somewhere else.” Impact III. Developed participants’ skills to form closer bonds with their children and built up their confidence to reassume their rightful role in the home. The program heightened the mothers’ awareness of their unique access and emotional proximity to their children. “It helped us,” as a mother explained, “to see that there is a time for the children when the main point in their life is their mother. And she can see the problems that the children have, and she sees what they are missing—whether it is emotional or in school—until they are teenagers. The mothers need to make a good structure at home; a refuge for the children.” They grew their confidence over time, and to thus increasingly realized that a unique connection to their children permits them to reassert their rightful role, most notably by investing time, listening, building trust, developing empathy, and providing an emotional anchor. Teachers found that the sessions’ practical components made conceptual teachings more accessible: “I learned a lot from that exercise about empathetic listening. I was always searching for the best way

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of listening; I read several books and I never got it. But that exercise will always be with me—I have used it in the two groups, and it was very good, very practical, and very simple.” Listening appeared to resonate with teachers on the one hand (“Listening without judging and critiquing, that’s how they will get the most out of the child— without interrogating them, as most of them did before”), and mothers on the other hand (“What I have learned is to listen to the kids without interruption, and I realized that the most important information comes out after the point where I would have interrupted them”). Impact IV. Provided the conceptual and practical training for mothers to adjust their parenting style and family structure to suit the needs of their respective sons and daughters. An entirely new concept to most participants was that adolescents go through various stages and behavioral changes to which mothers need to adapt their parenting style. One of the teachers remarked that the participants “didn’t know this happens in stages like it does, and that the mother not performing her task in any [given] stage makes the child more sensitive to the process of radicalization. So, the thing that was revealing for them is that they also play a part in that process.” The mothers recounted how they had reflected on their authoritarian—or in some cases overly lenient—style and amended it to ensure that they did not run the risk of alienating their children. “Before, because I was so authoritative, my child could never talk about taboos,” a former MotherSchools participant explained. “Before I attended MotherSchools,” as another participant noted, “I thought I had to be very authoritative with the kids … Now I have an ear for my children. For example, I don’t treat my fifteen-year-old as a little kid.” The understanding of the necessity to adapt to the specific needs of their children made the mothers reassess their previous approaches, which they soon put into practice in their homes: “I was always firm with my children but without explaining, so they would not listen. Now I explain in detail and try to convince them”; “When my child was aggressive, I responded with aggression. Now I learned that the solution is to stay calm”; “Now I am determined to spend time with my children … be engaged … join activities. I know I must be present”; “Now I do stuff the children like for fun, so they will not see me as trying to control them too much”; “I don’t want them to be afraid of me; I understand they need affection as much as discipline.” Impact V. Provided the participants with the necessary self-confidence to move beyond the trusted MotherSchools space to bring the learnings into their communities. As evidenced by the initiatives of mothers in their neighborhoods and extended families, the program succeeded in transcending the private realm and acquired a public character. A number of mothers shared the sentiment that parenting and activism go hand-in-hand: “The MotherSchools is not only about being active at home, but also about being active in the community”; “I realized we have things to do even outside the home—we should be more involved in the community.” The vast majority on their own accord brought the Parenting for Peace philosophy deeper into their homes and neighborhoods: “we shared also our enthusiasm and learnings with our families and close relatives … and with other mothers who could not attend the MotherSchools.” While some had even recognized changes in their own approaches to parenting and levels of confidence ahead of their graduation (“I realized that I became more self-confident even before the session on self-confidence started”), many of the mothers’ children alerted them to and positively reinforced this noticeable shift: “After finishing the MotherSchools, my kids, when they play with other kids, they say, ‘My mother attended MotherSchools—she knows a lot of things.’”

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Impact VI. The MotherSchools Graduation Ceremony acted as a culmination and point of departure for participants, enabling them to assume a public role and become authority figures on Parenting for Peace in their community. This event presented the mothers as change makers to community members from all sectors of society and provided many with the opportunity to speak for the first time publicly about the issue of extremism. Mothers expressed how they “feel more confident now after finishing the school” and how “by talking and recommending it, I have influence in the community.” As graduates, the mothers felt they had the qualification to act and function as an authority figure on the subject: “I feel more confident, and when they don’t take me seriously, I say I have been to school for this.” The Ceremony also functioned as an outreach opportunity to engage and connect program participants, their family members, and other community stakeholders. Despite an initial degree of skepticism regarding its value (“I thought, ‘Do you really need it—will it not be enough to get classes and practice?’”), the teachers took note of the improved self-confidence of the mothers: For example, one of the mothers she has a problem at home—her husband is violent, he uses religion for his benefit. At first, she felt scared that there were so many people. But in the Ceremony, she felt more encouraged, and she took a photo and pasted it on Facebook. She was so scared. They feel they can be more assertive (MothersSchools Participant, Macedonia). To some degree, the mothers experienced an awakening to their public role: “Something that is personal to me …. it was that women can play a role in security. That was big … it was something maybe I didn't think of a lot before the training. Or, maybe if I did, I thought of women as politicians, as activists—but not regular mothers.”

4. Conclusion Mothers from the first groups were spreading the good word of the MotherSchools about the atmosphere, the teaching, the safe space, so the mothers from the second group had an understanding of what to expect. It is easier to join something when you can take someone’s good word …. They felt secure to talk in the MotherSchools about radicalization, but from here they shared their enthusiasm to share their learnings with their families and their close relatives. In the Sessions, they often came back and told us what they shared with their friends and family, and how they shared the Sessions with the mothers who could not attend the MotherSchools (MotherSchools Teacher, Macedonia). Graduates of the MotherSchools program, now equipped with the necessary competence and confidence, go on to disseminate their knowledge and share their experiences with other concerned and affected mothers and community members. The MotherSchools’ impact and philosophy have proven to resonate with the broad spectrum of stakeholders in at-risk communities where the program has been realized. Regardless of the PVE efforts put out and the impact made by organizations and their local implementing partners on the ground, one central question must in all cases be raised: how can impact be sustained? Here, two essential challenges arise. First, no program can—or indeed should—be rolled out without a view to securing local ownership, ensuring selfsufficiency beyond the program’s lifespan, and updating social services to make future growth and lasting social change likely and feasible. Second, organizations cannot—or

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indeed should not—continue to be disregarded to the extent to which they are at present. To quote a recent contribution on the matter, which also bears mention of the MotherSchools and a number of other initiatives, major international organizations “too often ignore the grassroots actors” [11]. In the context of the MotherSchools Model, WwB has since 2015 addressed the first of these challenges through its followǦup program: the MotherCircles. This program, now in its second phase in Macedonia, enables former teachers and participants to bring the “Parenting for Peace” philosophy, lessons, and experience deeper into their respective communities. During weekly sessions with mothers, each “Leader” (former teacher) works with and mentors two “Buddies” (typically former participants). Buddies in turn become Leaders, mobilize new mothers and Buddies, and the cycle of exponential growth recommences. Deepening the experience in communities where MPVE efforts are already having a visible impact is imperative to uprooting violent extremism. Yet the threat of extremism is not contained or confined to one city or country, but rather it is transnational in nature. To prevent further spillover, a regional approach is necessary. What unites at-risk and affected communities across the Western Balkans, for instance, is a receptivity and awareness of the immediate need for preventative action through civil society efforts on the part of the authorities. On a regional level, the Western Balkan countries do not only share the problem of penetration by inter-connected extremist networks, but also recognize their co-dependence and co-responsibility in containing the threat and immunizing their communities. The issue of ensuring sustained growth leads us to the second of our challenges: it is only when organizations with a proven and tested approach receive adequate support in the long run that truly lasting social change can be achieved. Owing to our extensive experience in implementing MotherSchools around the globe, we appreciate the transformative power of normalizing the idea of mothers as agents of change at the community and local level, and in the policy arena. Yet the demand for expansion to other at-risk communities requires a deeper recognition by policy shapers of effective grassroots efforts and the decided commitment of donors. In the absence of longer-term investment strategies, prevention initiatives will never reach their full potential. Funders and international organizations must resist the increasingly common urge to make support contingent on effecting immediate local ownership. This both is unrealistic and can be counterproductive. Any and all communities require time to fully accept, contextualize, and embrace prevention models. Equipping local stakeholders with the essential structures, tools, and skills requires in-depth training and trust on all ends. At this critical moment in time, with extremism continuing to take root in new communities across regions like the Western Balkans, we cannot afford to overlook mothers as security allies. The MotherSchools, recognized as a good practice by UNESCO and the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), provides direction and a possible avenue for policy shapers and leading international organizations. As the case study of Macedonia has demonstrated, mothers embody an important yet comparatively underappreciated dimension in efforts to build a more comprehensive and enduring security architecture. They will always be the first school in the lives of their children, but they also have the potential to be the first line of defense in at-risk communities, the world over. As a first step towards more fully acknowledging their unique potential, we propose the adoption of the term Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism (MPVE).

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References and Endnotes [1]

For a discussion on the limits of scholarly frameworks that lay claim to being universally applicable, see Edit Schlaffer and Ulrich Kropiunigg, ‘Can mothers challenge extremism? Mothers’ perceptions and attitudes of radicalization and violent extremism’ (unpublished research report, Women without Borders, 2013): 2—5. Also see Bart Schuurman and Max Taylor, ‘Reconsidering Radicalization: Fanaticism and the Link Between Ideas and Violence’, Perspectives on Terrorism 12/1 (2018): 3-22. [2] Please refer to the ‘MotherSchools in practice’ section of this paper and Women without Borders’ research study findings presented in Edit Schaffler and Ulrich Kropiunigg, ‘Mothers Against Terror’, Concordiam: Journal of European Security and Defense 6/4 (December 2015): 18-25; ibid., 'A New Security Architecture: Women Included!’, in Naureen C. Fink, Sara Zeiger, and Rafia Bhulai (eds.), A Man's World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism (Abu Dhabi: Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016): 54—75. [3] Camilla Turner, ‘Mothers play “critical role” in steering children away from extremism, says head of MI6’, in The Daily Telegraph, 7 May 2018. [4] An analysis of the impact of portrayals of terrorists by governments and the media is included in Colin J. Beck and Emily Miner, ‘Who Gets Designated a Terrorist and Why?’, Social Forces 91/3 (2013): 837—872. [5] For the full report, see Edit Schlaffer and Ulrich Kropiunigg, ‘Can mothers challenge extremism? Mothers’ perceptions and attitudes of radicalization and violent extremism’ (unpublished research report, Women without Borders, 2013). [6] Karin Dyrstad, ‘After Ethnic Civil War: Ethno-nationalism in the Western Balkans’, Journal of Peace Research 49/6 (2012): 817—831. [7] MotherSchools Teacher, anonymous interview with WwB staff members, Skopje, Macedonia, 2017. [8] For a comprehensive overview, see Kaltrina Selimi and Filip Stojkovski, ‘Assessment of Macedonia’s Efforts in Countering Violent Extremism, View from Civil Society’ (Analytica Think Tank report, 2016); ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2016’, US Bureau of Terrorism, US Department of State, July 2017, accessed 20 May 2018, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/. [9] An excellent analysis is included in Georgia Holmer and Adrian Shtuni, ‘Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative’ (United States Institute of Peace special report, March 2017): 1—16. [10] The quotes contained in the following sections are taken from some fifty anonymous interviews with MotherSchools Macedonia Participants, Teachers, and Notetakers; all interviews were conducted by Women without Borders staff members in Skopje between 2017 and 2018. [11] Eric Rosand, ‘Where is civil society in the U.N.’s counterterrorism efforts?’, Brookings Institution, 15 May 2018, accessed 25 May 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2018/05/15/where-is-civil-society-in-the-u-n-s-counterterrorism-efforts/.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication.

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Subject Index Al Qaeda 70 Albanian community 105 alternative narrative 95 Australia 9 Canada 9 capacity building 105 code of conduct 35 cognitive radicalization 42 community resilience 105 counter-messaging 95 counter-narratives 95 counter-terrorism (CT) 1, 28, 105 countering violent extremism (CVE) 1, 9, 22, 88, 95, 105 Daesh 56, 70 drivers 105 early warning signs 105 Egypt 95 Europe 9 extremism 35, 42, 105 family dynamics 105 female empowerment 105 female leadership 105 female suicide bombers 56 foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) 70 gender 95, 105 grassroots 105 Guardia Civil 70 hard power 105 hate speech 35 human rights 35 ideology 42 incitement to hatred 35 information and communication technologies 35 inter-governmental organizations 95 international organizations 9, 95 involvement 70 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 56 Islamic movement 79 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 56, 70 jihad 70

Jordan 9 justice 35 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) 95 legislation 22 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 56 local grievances 105 local-level 105 Macedonia 105 martyr 56 Middle East 9, 95 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 95 military 28 Morocco 95 mothers 105 Mothers Preventing Violent Extremism (MPVE) 105 MotherSchools 105 Narodnya Volya 56 national action plan 9 national defense 28 Netherlands 28 non-democratic ideas 42 North Africa 9, 95 operations 28 Pakistan 79 peace 1, 9, 22, 28, 88 perpetrators 70 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 56 preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) 105 preventing violent extremism (PVE) 1, 22, 88, 95, 105 prevention 42, 105 prevention strategies 35 push and pull factors 105 radical ideas 42 radicalisation 88 radicalism 35 radicalization 35, 79, 105 resolution 1325 1, 9, 28

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Salafi organizations 79 security 1, 9, 22, 28, 88, 105 Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) network 105 Skopje 105 soft power 105 Spain 28, 70 Tabligh Jamaat 79 terrorism 70, 105 terrorists acting alone 35 Tunisia 22, 95 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 95 violence 42 violent extremism 79, 88

Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism (VERLT) 105 Western Balkans 105 women 1, 9, 22, 28, 70, 79, 88, 95, 105 women and terrorism 56 Women without Borders (WwB) 105 women, peace and security (WPS) 1, 28 women, role of 35 women’s organizations 88 women’s rights 88

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Author Index Alonso, R. Beganu, E. Bloom, M. Borreguero, E. Bunič, B. De Leede, S. Elsayed, L. Feki, N.

1, 42 vii 56 79 vii 88 95 22

Hernández, M.E. Kropiunigg, L. Kropiunigg, R. Palacián De Inza, B. Schlaffer, E. Toro, L.M. Zeiger, S.

35 105 105 28 105 70 1, 9

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