England and Spain in the Early Modern Era: Royal Love, Diplomacy, Trade and Naval Relations, 1604–25 9781784531171, 9781350133440, 9781350133433

Table of contents :
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication Page
Contents
Illustrations
Preface
Acknowledgements
Spellings and conventions
Abbreviations
Introduction: Rethinking Spanish diplomacy with early Stuart England
Chapter 1 The English crossroads: The debates and dilemmas of the Spanish foreign policy
Chapter 2 Spanish diplomatic finances in Jacobean Great Britain (1603–25)
Chapter 3 War and trade: The Spanish embassy in England – lighthouse and fortress
Conclusion: Habsburgs and Stuarts – seduction as diplomacy, love as marriage, heartbreak as war
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

ii 

England and Spain in the Early Modern Era Royal Love, Diplomacy, Trade and Naval Relations, 1604–25 Óscar Alfredo Ruiz Fernández

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2020 Copyright © Óscar Ruiz Fernández, 2020 Óscar Ruiz Fernández has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. Cover design by Tjaša Krivec Cover image: Fishing for Souls, Adriaen Pietersz van de Venne, 1614 (Rijksmuseum) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-7845-3117-1 ePDF: 978-1-3501-3343-3 eBook: 978-1-3501-3342-6 Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.



For my wife Andreea, my daughter Samara, my mother María Angeles, my father Alfredo and my sister Marta

vi

Contents List of illustrations Preface to the English edition (2020) Acknowledgements Spellings and conventions List of abbreviations Introduction: Rethinking Spanish diplomacy with early Stuart England

viii x xii xiii xiv 1

1

The English crossroads: The debates and dilemmas of the Spanish foreign policy 11

2

Spanish diplomatic finances in Jacobean Great Britain (1603–25) 59

3

War and trade: The Spanish embassy in England – lighthouse and fortress 121

Conclusion: Habsburgs and Stuarts – seduction as diplomacy, love as marriage, heartbreak as war Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Notes Bibliography Index

169 175 181 183 246 266

Illustrations Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8 Appendix 1.1 Appendix 1.2 Appendix 1.3 Appendix 1.4 Appendix 1.5 Appendix 1.6

The Somerset House Conference, Unknown Artist, 1604. National Portrait Gallery, London, UK  26 Philippus IV on Horseback, Hispa Rex. Biblioteca Histórica de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid [BH MED 3191]  55 De Impedimentis Magnorum Auxiliorum in Morborum curatione lib. III. Biblioteca Histórica de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid [BH MED 3191]  56 Spanish embassy items of expenditure (1603–25)  70 Spanish embassy secret expenses (1603–25)  87 People aided by Don Pedro de Zúñigain in England (1605–10)  95 People aided by Don Carlos Coloma in England (1622–4)  95 Annual budget of pensions paid by the Spanish embassy at the English court (1603–25)  102 Portrait of Phillip III, King of Spain, Peter de Jode II, ca. 1650. Metropolitan Museum, New York, USA  175 Portrait of James VI, King of Scotland, Peter de Jode I, 1603. Metropolitan Museum, New York, USA  176 Portrait of Charles I, King of England, Daneil Mijtens, 1629. Metropolitan Museum, New York, USA  177 Portrait of Phillip IV, King of Spain, Diego Velázquez, 1624. Metropolitan Museum, New York, USA  178 Portrait of Don Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares, Diego Velázquez and/or Juan Bautista Martínez del Mazo, 1635. Metropolitan Museum, New York, USA  179 Portrait of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, Willem Jacobsz, 1626. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, the Netherlands  180

Tables Table 1 Spanish Diplomats to James I Stuart (1603–25)  21 Table 2 Total Revenues of the Spanish Embassy Treasure in England (1603–25)  63 Table 3 Monthly Expenses of the Spanish Embassy Treasure in England (1603–25) 64 Table 4 Ports of England and Scotland (Relates to Map 1)  82

 Illustrations ix Table 5 Ports of Ireland (Relates to Map 1)  83 Table 6 Inland Places of England (Relates to Map 1)  83 Table 7 Code Names  101 Table 8 Members of the King’s and Queen’s Household and Money Received from the Constable of Castile (August 1604)  108

Map Map 1 England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland (relates to Tables 4, 5, 6)  84

Preface In 1614, the Dutch Protestant painter Adriaen Pietersz van de Venne finished what would be one of his most famous works, the painting Fishing for Souls. The picture was an allegory of the religious division of the Netherlands between Protestants and Catholics. A river (presumably the Scheldt) divided the two banks of both religions (the most fertile and luminous was the Protestant side; besides that, their fishing was more abundant in ‘souls’). In the water, several boats with Protestant preachers and Catholic clergymen were ‘fishing’ followers for their respective religions (and political parties). Undoubtedly, this painting represented better than any other the Confessional Europe (1555–1648) and the religious and political conflicts of the time. The men and women who ruled Western Europe in 1614 were presented in one way or the other in the painting of Van de Venne (Spain, France, England, Holland, Germany and Italy). On the Reform shore, the Protestant princes of Europe could be seen portrayed: Mauritius and Frederick Henry of Nassau (the Dutch princes), Louis XIII of France, his mother Queen Maria de Medici (the French were Catholics but supported the Dutch against the Habsburgs), James I Stuart of England, Frederick of Palatinate (son-in-law of James) and perhaps also Princess Elizabeth Stuart (both had married in London in February 1613). On the Catholic side, we could clearly see Pope Paul V being carried in the papal chair under the canopy by his cardinals, the sovereigns of the Spanish Netherlands, archdukes Isabella Clara Eugenia and Albert VII of Austria (in black costume and with the Golden Fleece chain clearly visible on his chest), accompanied by the emperor Matthias of Habsburg. Phillip III (and Spain as the main Catholic power) is not physically present in the painting, but his presence is felt. The archdukes represented him not only politically but also visually, since the physical appearance of the Archduke Albert could also be that of the Spanish king. (They are like two peas in a pod.) In 1614 Western Europe enjoyed an unstable peace, reflected in Van de Venne’s painting. There were three major international treaties and two lucky deaths linking Spain to France, England and the Dutch Republic – the Peace of Vervins (1598), that of London (1604), the Truce of Antwerp (1609), the assassination of Henry IV of Bourbon (1610) and the death of the Prince of Wales, Henry Frederick Stuart (1612). The two fortuitous deaths ensured and reaffirmed for Spain peace with France and with England by eliminating two princes who threatened the stability of the Spanish system in Europe woven by Philip III and Lerma through diplomacy in the near future. Ravaillac’s dagger led to the marriage alliance between the Bourbons and the Spanish Habsburgs in 1615. Typhoid fever led Henry’s brother, Charles, to Anglo–Spanish marriage in 1623 (although it ended up failing). In 1620, Don Juan de Vera and Zúñiga, Count of La Roca, published a book titled El Embaxador in Seville. It was the first written treatise on what should be the perfect

 Preface xi model of ambassador of the time. It was the first manual on diplomacy in Baroque Europe. The book mentioned two Spanish ambassadors in England during the reign of Phillip III: Don Alonso de Velasco (Count of La Revilla) and Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña (Count of Gondomar).1 The first diplomatic had served in James’s court almost until Van de Venne finished his painting (between the years 1610 and 1613). The second was still on his office when the treatise was published in Spain, and he would be ambassador for at least another two years (1620–2). Two of the main ideas held in the treatise were that the perfect ambassador had to be a kind of “matchmaker” between the two princes he served (to preserve and increase love and friendship between them) and of a “master of seduction for his king”, in the sense of trying to convince and attract for the service of his master the largest possible number of people in the foreign court in which he served as ambassador.2 In Van De Venne’s painting, two banks of a religious and political river appeared, Protestants and Catholics, England and Spain. The Spanish ambassadors to England became boatmen and fishermen (in the likeness of the preachers and clergymen of the picture) between the years 1603 and 1625, boatmen because they linked both banks and fishermen because they always tried to attract to the Catholic shore as many ‘souls’ as possible for the service of Philip III.

Acknowledgements I would like to pay special thankfulness and appreciation to Enrique García Hernán, Phillip Williams and Ángel Alloza Aparicio. Their advice and encouragement for my work proved to be very important for researching the complex history of the Anglo– Spanish relations during the Baroque Era. I also want to show my respects to Ramón Maruri Villanueva, for his moral support. He is a living example of integrity and wisdom. I would like to pay my regards to Pat Fitzgerald for her proofreading of my manuscript for the English language version. Finally, I would like to express my special gratitude to my editors, Joanne Godfrey, Tom Stottor and Rhodri Mogford for their advice and support in publishing this book.

Spellings and conventions Dates: dates are given using the Gregorian calendar (New Style, ten days ahead of England) except where otherwise stated as using the Julian calendar or Old Style. Pope Gregory XIII promulgated a new calendar on 24 February 1581. England used the Julian calendar (Old Style) until September 1752. Names of people: these appear either as they are shown in the Spanish documents or in the original language version. Names of states and territories: ‘Spain’ refers to Spanish territories except Portugal. ‘Great Britain’ refers to ‘England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland together’ (‘England’ refers to that country only, ‘Scotland’ refers to Scotland only, ‘Wales’ refers to Wales only and ‘Ireland’ refers to Ireland only). The Netherlands are also referred to as the Dutch Republic, Holland or Zeeland. The German Empire is also referred to as Germany. Titles of nobility and honours: kings, ministers and ambassadors are referred to in two ways, either by their first name or by their title. For example, Diego Sarmiento/Count of Gondomar, James/King of England, Philip III/King of Spain, Charles Stuart/Prince of Wales, George Villiers/Duke of Buckingham. Coinage: currencies referred to are Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and English. 1 Spanish real: 34 maravedíes; 1 ducat: 11 reales or 375 maravedíes; 1 escudo: from 11.76 reales or 400 maravedíes (until 1609) to 12.94 reales or 440 maravedíes (from 1609). It is equal to 1 Portuguese cruzado; 1 guilder: 4 reales or 20 pattards; 5 pattards: 1 real; 10 gross: 1 real (Flemish and Dutch money of account); 1 pound sterling: 40 Spanish reales, or 20 shillings, or 240 deniers.

Abbreviations ADA Archivo de la Casa de los duques de Alba. Madrid. AGS Archivo General de Simancas. Valladolid Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas Estado Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas AHN Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid and Toledo) AMS Archivo Medina Sidonia (Sanlucar de Barrameda) BL British Library (London) BNM Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid) BPM Biblioteca del Palacio Real (Madrid)

Introduction: Rethinking Spanish diplomacy with early Stuart England

Charles I, Buckingham and Spain Just two weeks before the departure of the great Anglo–Dutch fleet to attack Cadiz, the young Charles I reportedly declared to the Swedish ambassador that ‘by the grace of God, I will carry on the war [with Spain] if I risk my crown. I will have reason of the Spaniards and will set matters straight again.’1 Certainly, both the king and his favourite, the Duke of Buckingham, had bet heavily on the war against Spain after the failure of the marriage alliance with Spain in 1623 (the so-called Spanish Match). After having turned towards the alliance with Holland and France in 1624-5 and arranged to marry the French princess Henrietta Maria (married by proxy in Paris on 11 May 1625, and in England at Canterbury, Kent, on 13 June), Charles was ready to inaugurate his reign with a great victory against the traditional English enemy, becoming the champion of Protestantism in Europe, and would gather the full support of his countrymen around him. Charles’s father, James I, had never wanted the war with Spain, which would have signalled the failure of his foreign policy given that he had opened his rule with the signing of the Peace of London in 1604 and had been a European arbitrator between Catholics and Protestants.2 During the final two years of his reign, he had expressed this in many ways, despite the failure of the Spanish Match and the pressures of the most bellicose faction of the English parliament, Prince Charles and Buckingham. In June 1624 an English confidante had informed the Spanish ambassadors that James had accused Charles and Buckingham of ‘making every effort to turn the King of Spain and me irreconcilable through a war … but your wish will not come true during my days on the throne of England’.3 During that ‘black spring’ of 1624, during at least three secret audiences with Spanish envoys, James had reaffirmed his will to not declare war on Spain and to attempt the restitution of his son-in-law Frederick of Palatinate with the aid and support of Phillip IV.4 In addition, he protected the Spanish ambassadors in London from the fury of the local population – well aware that were they hounded out of the city, his own envoys in Madrid might be expelled, thus forcing the rupture between the two crowns.5 For the Spanish side, after the breakdown of the marriage negotiations of 1623, peace with England – at all costs – was the goal. Charles’s and Buckingham’s provocations in London were diplomatically ignored, although in reality all of Madrid seemed certain that war with England was inevitable.6 The Peace of 1604 had been the most important of Philip III’s achievements – with the aid of his favourite, the

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England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

Duke of Lerma. That agreement had allowed Spain, since 1618, to focus squarely on the resumption of the War of Flanders (1621) and the Thirty Years’ War, including deposing James’s son-in-law as the king of Bohemia and leader of Protestant Germany without lifting a finger from London.7 The Spanish military progress against the Dutch by sea and land (in Europe, America and Asia) and the stopping of the Protestants in Germany could not be understood without English passivity and neutrality.8 There was therefore no reason for Philip IV to declare war on England.9 Unsurprisingly, the day before Charles’s bellicose statement to the Swedish ambassador, two envoys of Philip IV, the Flemish Jacques Bruneau and the Englishman Henry Taylor, had warned him that the preparations of the English fleet in Plymouth represented an enormous threat to the peace with Spain. Any hostile actions by this armada against other Spanish ships or territories would be interpreted as an act of war by Phillip IV.10 An English naval attack was anticipated by the Spanish Council of State from at least January 1625, and places such as Málaga, Cadiz, Lisbon, the Canary Islands or Terceira Island were considered as targets of the potential incursion.11 But this time, unlike in 1588, it would be the English who would take the first step towards war, while the Spaniards would remain on the defensive, leaving diplomatic channels open until the last moment. By contrast, all English diplomats had withdrawn from Brussels and Madrid. The ambassador to Brussels (Sir William Trumbull) had left his post in 1625 by the order of Charles, and the extraordinary ambassador Sir Richard Weston had done the same in 1623. The ambassadors in Madrid likewise: Sir John Digby (Count of Bristol) had returned to England at the beginning of May 1624, while Sir Walter Aston had left at the beginning of 1625. The Spanish diplomatic presence in London at least allowed Phillip IV to monitor those English naval preparations and to send timely information to Spain. Jacques Bruneau, the Spanish minister resident in London, maintained a permanent vigilance over the English fleet, and his reports to Madrid allowed the Spanish government to be prepared when the storm arrived. The result of the Anglo–Dutch naval expedition is well known.12 The contemporary sources agreed that the preparations in Plymouth were a disaster. The 15,000 soldiers and sailors were unpaid, the ships poorly provisioned and armed and the commanding officers were chosen and appointed more for Buckingham’s convenience and as a result of favouritism than for their military skills and suitability for naval command. Corruption and chaos had destroyed the expedition before it had even set sail.13 Even the timing of the attack was poorly chosen. The two previous victorious English assaults on Cadiz (that of Drake in 1587 and that of Essex in 1596) had taken place during the spring and summer.14 The English attack would take place in the autumn, risking the Atlantic storms that begin to arrive at the Iberian Peninsula at that time of year, something that the English feared and the Spaniards desired.15 The leaders of the expedition (Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount of Wimbledon, as admiral, Robert Devereaux, 3rd Earl of Essex, as vice admiral and Sir William Feilding, Count of Denbigh as rear admiral) were unable to take Cadiz for the tenacious Spanish defence and the lack of coordination with the fifteen Dutch ships of William of Nassau. After a week of fighting and with part of the troops disembarked completely drunk, on 7 November Cecil decided to retire the fleet.16 First the fleet went to the coasts of southern Portugal (hoping to intercept the Spanish fleet of the

 Introduction 3 Indies) and then back to England (26 November) due to bad weather conditions and the poor situation of the crews, ships and supplies. During the return journey, many men died and the boats were scattered by storms or sank. The remainder of the fleet went on to different English and Irish ports in December 1625. It was a disaster of colossal magnitude. Besides being a very unfortunate expedition, this disaster was also ironic. In the first place, because Buckingham had obtained for Cecil the new title of viscount of Wimbledon at the beginning of October 1625, just before he left for Spain as commander of the fleet.17 Anticipating success in advance was a foolish game if that success failed to materialize. Second, because in this expedition Vice Admiral Essex, the son of the second Earl of Essex, the famous Elizabethan conqueror of the same port in 1596, could only match or lose with respect to his father’s achievements. Third, Buckingham, the royal favourite, not only retained for himself the title of ‘generalissimo’ of the armada, but also had Rubens paint him in 1625 as a victorious dominator of the sea and the waves.18 His assassination in August 1628 perhaps prevented another revolt in England before the subsequent and successive military and naval disasters in Germany (battle of Dessau, 1626, in which Ernst of Mansfield failed to recover the Palatinate) and against France (in 1627 and 1628 in La Rochelle). The outcome of his tenure as prime minister during the reign of Charles I could not be more disastrous for England: he neither recovered the Palatinate, nor took Cadiz, nor retained La Rochelle. As for Charles, due to his rapprochement with Spain and Catholicism, and his passivity before the fight of the German Protestants against the Habsburg emperor, his rights to the throne were protested by the English population.19 Elizabeth Stuart (his sister) and her husband Frederick of the Palatinate, both known as the ‘Winter Queen’ and ‘King of Bohemia’, champions of Protestantism, became the ideal candidates for the English throne in the eyes of all who opposed to the policy of appeasement of James I and his heir.20 Charles’s Spanish adventure in 1623 was described as ‘one specific to knights-errant’ by both James and a Spanish ambassador.21 There was nothing innocent about that comparison. If the Prince of Wales was first compared to the famous knight Amadís of Gaul due to his journey in search of his beloved Spanish princess, by failing he became Don Quixote de la Mancha, a reckless and foolish knight.22 It is easy to imagine that the visit was considered impulsive and irresponsible.23 In London, James’s jester, Archibald Armstrong, joked about the success or failure of the Prince’s journey, betting on who would be the most foolish, James or Philip IV.24 In 1625, a crucial year for the Stuart dynasty for so many reasons, William Camden published his ‘Annales. The True and Royal History of the famous Empresse Elizabeth’.25 The work, dedicated to James, is actually the distorting mirror of his reign (as it was his son Henry, model Protestant Prince).26 The idea of being Elizabeth’s successor on the throne was absurd. The queen was glorified as the enemy of Spain and of the pope, protector of the Netherlands and a good friend of France. Indeed the frontispiece of the book commemorates her main victories against the Spanish: the capture of Cadiz in 1596 (by Essex and Nottingham), of Puerto Rico in 1598 (by Northumberland), of the coasts of southern Spain, the defeat of the Spanish fleet in 1588 and the campaigns of Drake in America, as well as his circumnavigation of the world (1567–96). On the

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contrary, by 1621, with the political tensions of the Thirty Years’ War rising at the boiling point in England, some English people ‘wish Q. Elizabeth were alive againe’.27 Since 1623, everything seemed to imply that Charles Stuart wanted to follow the footsteps of Elizabeth I, and not those of his father. Perhaps Charles wanted to match the enormous expectations of his elder brother, the late-lamented Henry (who died in 1612). However, the military and naval disasters of the years 1625–9 were not a solid basis upon which to build a glorious reign to rival that of Elizabeth. What victories would be commemorated on Charles’s frontispiece? Cadiz, La Rochelle, the Palatinate or Madrid? As for the Spanish government, just two weeks after the retreat of the English from Cadiz, Phillip IV wrote to his ambassador in Germany informing him of everything that had happened related to the English affairs.28 The king regretted that Charles had embarked upon war with Spain without mediating any rupture of the peace by Spain and without any public statement or written complaint by any English ambassador. Apparently, Charles had justified to Jacques Bruneau and Henry Taylor the sending of the fleet in order to defend and recover the Palatinate for his brother-in-law, assuring them that when Spanish troops (led by Ambrosio Spinola) had occupied the Lower Palatinate in 1620, his father had not taken it as a declaration of war by Spain against England. The news of the return to England of the decimated fleet and the failure at Cadiz arrived in Madrid through the reports and letters of the Spanish government at Brussels and the Spanish embassy in Paris.29 From Holland and France, news had arrived in early January 1626 that ‘fifty destroyed vessels had returned to English ports’, while others had been dispersed by a storm. However, military and defensive preparations would continue in Spain as the government was receiving constant news and reports about the political situation in England through Flanders and France mainly. The monumental fiasco of the Cadiz fleet may not yet have been fully appreciated historically speaking.30 It was not so much about the loss of so many crewmen or ships, but about a loss of prestige, something that would take many years to be repaired. The damage to England’s international reputation as a Protestant leading power in Europe was enormous.31 The damage caused to the kingdom’s self-esteem and its political structures (king, royal favourite, government and parliament) would leave the country paralysed in terms of foreign political action as a great European power (power, representation and exercise) at least until the times of Oliver Cromwell. This Jacobean paralysis between 1625 and 1649 took England back to the century of her continental power collapse (1453–1558).32 Charles wanted to inaugurate his reign with a great victory that would link him not to the achievements of his father, but to those of Elizabeth I. He wanted to return to the exploits of Drake, Nottingham and Essex against the old foe of Protestantism and England: Catholic Spain and its figurehead, the Pope. He also wanted to cover everything that happened until 1623, as well as his trip to Madrid, to look for a Spanish and Catholic wife. Cadiz finished with all that. The failure at La Rochelle only declared the necessity of the withdrawal, the respite signed with France (1629) and Spain (1630). Not only that, the ‘prodigal son’, after learning an important lesson in foreign policy, returned to his father’s political guidelines.33

 Introduction 5 In England, public reactions to the disaster were various. Criticism focused on Buckingham. Although there was no official investigation by the government and no one was held accountable for the naval disaster, this did not prevent parliament’s initiative (against the will of the king). The House of Commons accused Buckingham of treason and of having Catholic sympathies (namely for the Charles’s marriages with Catholic princesses), and it tried to execute an impeachment against him, prompting the dissolution of the parliament by the king in June 1626.34 To criticize the king without losing their heads, the people in England criticized his favourite. Pamphlets were also circulated in England comparing Buckingham with Sejanus (which left Charles in the role of Tiberius, an unpopular roman emperor), or interpreting the inexplicable loyalty and friendship between them as evidence of a homosexual affair.35 Regarding the public lamentations, one of the most common that could be heard throughout London, ‘There were now no more Drakes in England, all were hens.’36 During the parliament meetings, its members were even more explicit, claiming ‘that England had lost political credibility with foreign kings and the sovereignty and power over the Strait and English Channel’.37 In short, England had lost its international repute and its power at sea. It was a political and national crisis, accompanied by a gloomy look back at a supposed ‘golden age’ that the frontispiece of Elizabeth I was publicizing. After the triangular contacts made in the first place by the Flemish painter Peter Paul Rubens between London, Brussels and Madrid, Phillip IV in 1630 finally sent Don Carlos Coloma to negotiate a new treaty in London. As for the English, Charles I did the same by sending Sir Francis Cottington to Madrid. On 15 November 1630, Philip IV swore the terms of the peace at the royal chapel in Madrid, which were basically the same pledged by his father in 1605.38 Peace was agreed upon by both sovereigns. Philip IV and Olivares could focus on his war against the Dutch, the German Protestants and the one that would have to come with France, while Charles would do so in the government of his own crown, much discussed by the previous parliaments and the Puritans. Nothing had been gained in that useless war. The courtly imagery of those years clarified many things regarding Spain and England. In 1625, Rubens portrayed Buckingham as a great admiral of England. The favourite was the man of the hour, the guide of his young master. After four years of military disasters, it was necessary to bless the peace that Charles signed with Spain. In 1629–30 Rubens painted a work in London entitled Minerva protects Pax from Mars (‘Peace and War’).39 It would take another twenty-five years and require a terrible civil war and Charles’s execution to see England facing Spain again in the battlefield. But that is another story.

A challenge for the Spanish diplomacy This book offers a new and original approach to studying the relations between Spain and Great Britain during the first quarter of the seventeenth century through the activity of the Spanish ambassadors living in London. It is a study combining both micro- and macro-historical perspectives. The period comprises the years of peace

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England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

between both crowns from the peace of London (in August 1604) to its abrupt end with the English attack on Cadiz (in November 1625). The advent of the seventeenth century witnessed great and profound changes in the governments of Spain and England. Phillip II died in 1598 leaving the kingdom in deep crisis. His son Phillip III and his favourite, the Duke of Lerma, were determined to offer a respite to the Spanish monarchy after fifty years of continuous war against its foes in Europe and all around the globe (America, Africa and Asia). Elizabeth I died without an heir in 1603, so the English throne fell to the Scottish dynasty of the Stuarts, a foreign royal family, with James I as the head. He was also in favour of ending two decades of wars with Spain. It was thus a happy coincidence that Phillip III and James I came to the throne of their respective states within a five-year period and that they shared common political and foreign policy interests. This work is based on huge number of unpublished documents from both Spanish and English archives. The documents belonged to the numerous ambassadors that passed through London between 1603 and 1625, from the Count of Villamediana to Jacques Bruneau. The famous Count of Gondomar, Spanish ambassador in England and personal friend of James between 1613 and 1622, is analysed as one more piece of the Spanish diplomatic machinery. His colleagues, less known but with very important roles too, are also analysed in depth. This book is a global study of these individuals during the reign of James, as well as of Spanish diplomacy in the England of the Stuarts as a whole. This book is also a ‘micro-history’ research. Throughout these pages, the readers could find the personal stories of less known figures of the period such as Spanish couriers (who travelled between England and Spain during the twenty years), British and Spanish soldiers (who fought in Flanders and Germany), Spanish officers under blockade in English or Scottish ports, Catholic and Protestant merchants who financially supported (in secret or publicly) the Spaniards at Great Britain, Spanish and Portuguese shipwrecked survivors coming from the West and East Indies, pirates hung from the gallows in England (or beheaded) and others deeply repentant and wishing to serve their king, British aristocrats fighting for Spain, Catholic monks and priests risking their necks in England, Scotland or Ireland and British confidents and spies, bowing at their Jacobean masters at day, reporting the Spaniards at night. The galaxy around the Spanish ambassadors to James Stuart was huge, complex, dynamic and sometimes ambivalent. There were planets getting closer or getting away from the centre of this galaxy (the ‘Spanish sun’, golden, warming and welcoming), depending on the general situation of the Jacobean universe.40 This study explores the Spanish diplomatic activity in Great Britain during the reign of James I. The Spanish diplomatic effort was an extraordinary undertaking, both inside and outside the Jacobean dominions, and it covered all kinds of issues: political, social, economic, military and religious. In Great Britain, the embassy created a network of contacts in England, Scotland and Ireland, including between the royal family and the members of the lower classes of British society. The activity of the Spanish embassy in London covered the entire globe, because the Spanish empire (now combined with the Portuguese) had possessions in Europe, Africa, America and Asia. Reports and news from all over the world arrived daily at the ambassador’s table.

 Introduction 7 This book reveals the goals of the Spanish diplomacy with the Stuart dynasty throughout the years 1603–25. A neutral England meant many important things for Spain: the end of English assistance and support to the enemies of Phillip III and his son (Dutch rebels, German Protestants); the opening of the English Channel and the sea route between Spain–England–Flanders–North Sea and the Baltic Sea; reduced pressure on British Catholicism; increased control and vigilance over English, Dutch and French maritime expansion in America, Africa and Asia; and finally, the return of the lucrative Spanish–English trade (English manufactures for Spanish silver and overseas products). Peace between both crowns would mean Spain could occupy positions on both sides of the English Channel and the North Sea (England and Flanders). This work demonstrates the important influence Spanish diplomacy exerted over politics in James I’s London and the Stuarts international politics. It can be said that the Stuarts, as a ruling dynasty, courted the friendship and solid links with the Spanish Habsburgs. (The marriage proposals made as early as 1603 by Queen Anne of Denmark certainly proved this.) Perhaps this partially explains the deep disappointment on the English side over the failure of the ‘Spanish match’ in 1623. With both dynasties courting each other for two decades, sending gifts and sharing common projects, it was inevitable that when the marriage failed to materialize, a great rift would emerge (including a political rupture). The English court followed the wishes of its rulers as a permanent struggle for the favours, mercies and honours granted by the Stuarts and their favourites according to each context (Cecil, Somerset and Buckingham). Many ministers, members of the court and the Privy Council ended up offering their friendship and behaving in a neutral and even non-hostile manner towards Spanish diplomats (not only to them) in exchange for rewards (either in the form of gifts, pensions or cash payments). The complaints of the Spanish ambassadors were constant regarding the greed of the English, as was news of Phillip III’s angry outbursts from Spain. The different parliaments gathered during the reign of James discussed the foreign policy of England a great deal, and especially the relationship with Spain. The first parliament (1604–10) was almost blown up by Guy Fawkes and his accomplices (in the session of 5 November 1605).41 In London, Spain was immediately seen as being behind the Catholic conspiracy against James, as members of the public made it known outside the home of Don Pedro de Zúñiga. The diplomat was to attend the same parliamentary session, and both he and Phillip III made clear their joy at discovering the conspiracy. As for the third and fourth parliaments (1621 and 1624, respectively), they were dominated by tensions stirred up by international politics.42 In both of them the parliamentary opposition to the marriage alliance with Catholic Spain and the demand for a firmer position in defence of Protestantism (against British Catholics and against Catholic powers in Europe) was clear, all with the Thirty Years’ War (since 1618) and the defeat of Frederick of the Palatinate in the background (1620). During the parliamentary sessions, James defended his power and authority to lead the international policy of the kingdom, sending an indirect message to Spain. Only he (and presumably his heir Charles) sought friendship with Spain before the bellicose hostility of the English parliaments. The king refused to break with Spain in 1621 for the Palatinate affair and

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again in 1624, still resisting the greater pressure from the parliament, his son and his favourite after the fiasco of the visit to Spain. As for the English Catholic minority, the Spanish embassy was a benchmark. It channelled the entrance of religious Catholic missions to the interior of England, Scotland and Ireland, as well as the departure of Catholics and clergymen to Flanders, Spain or Rome. In addition, constant Catholic celebrations were held in the chapel of the embassy, which ​​ enjoyed diplomatic immunity, although this entailed numerous problems with the English authorities. During the peace negotiations between both sides in the years 1603–4, the red lines of each kings were clearly drawn. On the English side, it was the official tolerance of Catholicism. On the Spanish side, it was the access to its overseas domains. None of these lines were crossed. Spain would not renounce such an important peace with James to protect the situation of the Catholics. This was one of the causes of the Gunpowder Plot, a suicidal and desperate attack against the new rulers in the absence of Spanish support for English Catholics. The Spanish diplomats worked intensively from London to control and limit the English, Dutch and French maritime expansion overseas, as well as to stop the piracy that beset Spanish and Portuguese ships and trade. The Treaty of 1604 did not really refer to any territories outside of Europe. What this agreement did was to prevent English intrusions into Spanish territories with the support of the English crown. This book has two main objectives. First, to offer a new vision of the political relations and common projects that were proposed between the England of the early Stuarts (James, Charles) and the Spain of Phillip III and Phillip IV in the context of the power struggles and the political religious and economic context of the first quarter of seventeenthcentury Europe. It is an historical study of the early Stuarts (seen through the prism of Spanish diplomacy in England) and a study of the history of Spanish diplomacy in England (throughout the reign of the early Stuarts). Second, it emphasizes the extent and intensity of the political actions deployed by the Spanish diplomats based in London, both internally (England, Scotland, Ireland) and abroad (Europe, America, Africa, Asia).

Historians on early Stuart England and the Spanish Habsburgs Speaking of the Spanish diplomacy in the days of James means dealing with the Count of Gondomar, a famous character on both the Spanish side and the English side. His friendship with James helped him in no small measure in his task of defending Spanish interests in England. One of his most important successes was the imprisonment and execution of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1618. For all these reasons, he concentrated over him all the English hate on Spain (for example, see the contemporary literary works of Thomas Middleton or Thomas Scott). In Spain, Gondomar’s greatest political triumph was the journey of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham to Madrid in the spring of 1623, during which he acted as James’s principal guide. Later on, he also would bear a certain responsibility for the fiasco with England. He would die in 1626, witnessing the rupture between the two countries.

 Introduction 9 Gondomar was only one of the ten ambassadors sent to England between 1603 and 1625. However, he was the one who played the greatest role and thus has gained the most attention from historians, for example, Lyon (1910), Fernández de Bethencourt y Ramírez de Villa-Urrutia (1913), Sánchez Cantón (1935), Ch. H. Carter (1964), Castroviejo y Fernández de Córdoba (1967), Tobío Fernández (1974, 1984, 1987), García Oro (1997), Sanz Camañes (2005), Durán-Loriga (2006) and Trevor J. Dadson (2007). In addition to the works of these authors there are works by scholars of Spanish diplomacy in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, and especially with regard to Stuart England. I refer more specifically to the already classic studies of Carter and Mattingly on European diplomacy in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries (and especially the Habsburgs) or the works of Loomie. Current works include those of Paul Allen (who analyses global Spanish diplomacy in the peace with France in 1598, with England in 1604 and with Holland in 1609); Sanz Camañes, Redworth, García Hernán and Pérez Tostado (focusing on diplomacy with England and Ireland); Cabeza Rodríguez and Dandelet (regarding the Spanish embassy in Rome); Vázquez de Prada (with France) and Esteban Estríngana, García García and Echevarría Bacigalupe (with Flanders). In other respects, many Anglo–Saxon historians have devoted themselves to the study of the early Stuarts in England in the last thirty years: regarding the international politics, Alexander Samson, Irving Anthony Thompson, Thomas Cogswell, Simon Adams, Howard Tomlinson, Malcom Smuts and David Worthington; on the English court and corruption, Linda Levy Peck, Clare McManus and Roger Lockyer; and on political culture and parliamentary life, Michael C. Questier, Kevin Sharpe, Peter Lake, Alastair Bellany and Barry Coward. These works banish the nineteenth-century idea that the corruption and decadence of the Stuarts’s court was a consequence of foreign influence, particularly of the Spanish ambassadors (as is claimed by Samuel J. Gardiner) or of James’s lack of competence in dealing with foreign policy (as D. Hume argues).43 With regard to the artistic exchanges between the English and Spanish courts, I am indebted to the monographs of Elliott and Brown, Gustav Ungerer and Anne Cruz and to the collective work directed by José Luis Colomer (in particular the work of María Cruz de Carlos on the Constable of Castile). As for the relationship between Spanish diplomacy and trade, naval warfare and overseas maritime expansion, the works of Alloza Aparicio, Gelabert, Lucena Salmoral and Allen are good overviews. Sluiter (with respect to the Dutch) and Hussey and Andrews (with respect to the English) analyse the consequences of European diplomacy of the early seventeenth century in Spanish domains in America. Regarding the war at sea, the studies of Thompson, Parker, Stradling, Goodman, Hutchington and Alcalá-Zamora and Queipo de Llano are indispensable for showing the naval Spanish combats against the English and Dutch during the first half of the seventeenth century (naval war in which they were partially successful).

The book The current study is divided into three chapters. The first chapter analyses the main diplomatic issues between England and Spain 1603–25, from the perspective of the

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England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

Council of State in Spain (at Valladolid and Madrid), and the Spanish embassy in London. There are two crucial periods for this peaceful age of relations: 1603–5 and 1623–5. The first period (1603–5) witnessed diplomatic negotiations for the Treaty of London (August 1604). During the negotiations, the Spanish envoys did not demand public tolerance for English Catholics as a condition in order to obtain peace. On the part of the English, James agreed that English ships would not enter Spanish domains in America, Africa and the Far East – or at least, they entered at their own risk without royal permission – and he agreed that England would not aid Holland in its war against Spain. The Catholic-inspired Gunpowder Plot of November 1605 horrified Philip III and Don Pedro de Zúñiga, who expressed his joy and relief at the failure of the plot. The second crucial period (1623–5) was the main period of diplomatic relations between England and Spain. It began with the Prince of Wales’ journey to Spain in March 1623 and ended with the English attack against Cadiz in November 1625. The failure of the Prince’s marriage, the political alliance with Spain against Holland and France, the affair of the Palatinate, occupied by Spanish armies and the English access to Spanish empire, all provoked a shift in English diplomacy. From the autumn of 1623, Charles and Buckingham tried a different policy: marriage to a French princess, the forging of an alliance with Holland and war against Spain. Only James’s refusal to go to war with Spain could keep the peace, until his death in March 1625. The second chapter looks at the embassy accounts of 1603–25 and analyses the extent of the king’s wealth, who sent money to England (Flemish, Italian and Portuguese bankers and merchants), who spent the money (the Spanish ambassadors), who received it in Great Britain (spies, aristocrats, merchants, seamen, captains, soldiers, pirates, priests) and its reasons and purposes (the fight against piracy, the protection of Catholicism and economic, naval and military espionage). The king’s money was the centre wheel that moved the Spanish embassy and was essential for diplomacy. Finally, the third chapter describes the activities of the Spanish embassy concerning two issues: the Dutch problem – war and trade in Europe and the rest of the world – and the extension of Spanish and English world trade. The war between Spain and Holland entailed English neutrality not only in the waters of the Channel and North Sea but also in the ports and along the coast of England. There were many naval clashes in these areas between Spanish and Dutch ships, and the English authorities were under pressure from both sides. With regard to world trade, Spanish ambassadors were making complaints about English, French and Dutch privateers and pirates who came to England with plunder (cargoes, crews) taken from Spanish and Portuguese ships (gold, silver, pearls, sugar, jewels, spices, etc.). They were also watching over the business enterprises and merchant ships of English and Dutch Indian trade companies, as well as the English colonies of Virginia, Bermuda and Guiana. It is true that piracy was very difficult to defeat in the seventeenth century, but Spanish embassy’s pressure on English pirates caused them to beat a hasty retreat to other territories.

1

The English crossroads: The debates and dilemmas of the Spanish foreign policy

New monarchs, newcomers, old friends and royal favourites Monarchs and newcomers The seventeenth century brought changes to the European political scenario that was unimaginable only fifty years earlier. The 1550s had witnessed key events for the European future: the abdication of Emperor Charles V and the ascension to the throne of his son Philip II (16 January 1556), that of Elizabeth I Tudor (15 January 1559), the peace of Cateau–Cambresis (2–3 April 1559) and the appointment of William of Orange as Stadthoulder of the provinces of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht (1559). By 1598 everything had changed in Europe. Spain found itself fighting simultaneously against the Dutch rebels from 1568, against England (from 1585) and intervening in France since 1589 (against Henry IV). For political reasons, English, Dutch and French challenged the Spanish political hegemony in Europe. For religious reasons, Protestantism was fighting Spanish Catholicism. And for economic purposes, Dutch and English were undermining the ultramarine Spanish–Portuguese empires, whose overseas monopoly was agreed since 1494 by the Treaty of Tordesillas between Portugal and Spain (and blessed by the pope). During 1598–1609, new leading figures appeared on the European scene. Phillip III, James I, Henry IV, Archduke Albert of Austria, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and the three great diplomatic agreements of that decade.1 Spain entered into diplomatic negotiations to emerge from the conflict with France (Treaty of Vervins, in 1598), with England (1604) and with the Dutch rebels (Truce of 1609). These main peace treaties were part of the European efforts to finish the general bloodshed of the second part of the sixteenth century, including around thirteen diplomatic agreements involving all the main European powers at that time.2 In addition, the sovereignty of the Catholic and Spanish Netherlands was transferred to the archdukes Albert and Isabella in 1598 by Phillip II. In this way, an autonomous Flanders became another partner between the great European powers, tempering and taking the initiative in international politics (until 1621). As for France, this kingdom emerged as a great power that needed time to recover its strength after the bloody wars of religion. Henry IV gave France this respite until 1610. The French crown needed time until 1635 to challenge Spain as a great continental power.

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From the late sixteenth century, the French, the English and the Dutch wanted their share of the overseas expansion, and this was presented bluntly at the negotiating table in 1598, 1604 and 1609. Spain was not in a position to accept such demands, so it was decided not to mention them at all in the treaties. At least it was achieved that these overseas clashes would not be casus belli in Europe. Spain would have to use its warships and guns to stop the overseas expansion of the newcomers. Commercial and financial capitalism began to work in England and the Netherlands (and also to arm itself with trading companies). The age of piracy and privateering of the second half of the sixteenth century would be replaced now by the era of overseas maritime companies. The captain of fortune was replaced by the merchant. In 1600, the French sent two ships to Asia to explore and trade.3 In that year, the East India Company was founded in England.4 In 1602 the Dutch trading company followed, although the first Dutch expedition to Asia took place in 1595, successfully returning by 1597.5 In 1609, the Bank of Amsterdam was created. None of these three institutions can be explained without the overseas expansion of these powers at the expense of Spain and (especially) Portugal. The weakness of the Portuguese empire in Asia explains not only the treaty between Spain and the Dutch as a simple temporary truce in 1609 but also the failure of the Spanish–Dutch diplomatic negotiations in order to turn the truce into a permanent diplomatic treaty; it also explains that in 1621 the war against the Netherlands was resumed by the Spaniards.6 From 1614 onwards, the Dutch East India company was on the offensive again in Asia. There were heavy combats in Philippines in 1614 and again in 1617, but the Spanish resisted successfully.7 A worse fate was to befall Malacca, a Portuguese post.8 Portugal (and its empire) was breaking a hole in the Spanish overseas defence system. Regarding Spanish America, the Dutch refused to abandon their commercial expansion in Asia, and the resumption of the war led them to found in 1621 the trading company of the West Indies in order to attack the Spanish domains in America. In spite of the Truce of 1609, the Dutch did not stop sending expeditions to America and the Caribbean Sea, exploiting the sea salt of the Venezuelan coasts since 1599, competing with the Portuguese for the Guinean slave trade with America or attacking Trinidad island (1613), the coasts of Chile and Peru in 1615 through the Strait of Magellan, or the establishments in the zone of the Amazon River.9 As for the salt, apparently the Dutch stopped their incursions on the Caribbean area from 1606 due to the powerful Spanish naval counterattacks. They resumed again in 1621, with the end of the truce.10

Peace with the Stuarts, Spanish luck In 1622, the English Catholic adventurer Sir Anthony Sherley sent a treatise on international policy to the Count-Duke of Olivares, prime minister of Philip IV. The work ‘Peso político de todo el mundo’ was a geopolitical study of the rivals of the Spanish monarchy and how Spain should be governed in order to continue its global hegemony.11 Sherley wrote that Spain should pray to God for a long life of James, as with him on the English throne, no threat could come from England. Four months before Sherley finished his book, James told the Spanish ambassador that Phillip IV

 The English Crossroads 13 should wish very much the Stuarts a long and healthy life, since without them, England would be a great rival for Spain.12 Apparently, the apostle ‘Santiago’, saint of Spain, was reincarnated as the British ‘Santiago’, James (Stuart).13 The conquest of Ostend (20 September 1604), the offensive of Ambrogio Spinola in Flanders during the years 1605–6, the ceasefire of 1607 and the Truce of 1609 with the Dutch rebels could not be understood without the peace with England in 1604. The influence of this war on the negotiations between the Spaniards and the English is clear. The Spanish defeat of Nieuwpoort (2 July 1600) strengthened the English position in Boulogne, which in the end came to the break. In August 1604, the Constable of Castile wrote to Philip III that the negotiations in London had to be hurried so that no bad events in the Flanders (Spanish defeats) would harden the English position.14 During the years 1603–7, the Spanish reputation in Europe improved with respect to the situation back in 1598. On 18 January 1606, Johann van Oldenbarnevelt (Land’s Advocate of Holland) wrote a letter to the Dutch ambassador in Paris (Van Aerssen) showing the difficult situation of the Netherlands by the international agreements of 1598 and 1604. In July and August 1607 the Dutch delegates had declared in London that they could not continue the war against Spain without the English support.15 There is a parallelism between the years 1603–7 and 1621–5 regarding the displaying of the Spanish might in Northern Europe. In both periods there was peace with England, which allowed Spain to focus on fighting the Dutch. There were notable partial military successes in Europe (and other parts of the world), but finally financial problems and exhaustion led to the end of the offensive. The bankruptcies of the Spanish royal finances in 1607 and 1627 were the consequence and the brake of such Spanish advances.

The hangman and the road to war in Europe However everything positive the general peace brought to Europe, between the years 1618 and 1621, the public executions of three famous and powerful personages shook up the public opinion in the continent. These deaths shaped the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War and the conflict in Flanders. It looked like the hangman paved the path of war in Western Europe after two decades of unstable and difficult peaceful political relations between the main powers.16 The convicts who stepped up to the gallows were one Anglican, one Calvinist and one Catholic. Sir Walter Raleigh (an Elizabethan aristocrat, a captain of fortune, someone misplaced in the Stuart Court) was beheaded in London on 29 October 1618; Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (Land’s Advocate of Holland, leader of the diplomatic dealings with Spain) suffered the same fate in The Hague on 13 May 1619; finally, Don Rodrigo Calderón, Count of Oliva (Lerma’s favourite, royal secretary of Phillip III), got his throat cut at the Plaza Mayor, in Madrid, on 21 October 1621. These political deaths in England, the Dutch Republic and Spain linked to one another. The last words of Oldenbarnevelt, Raleigh and Calderón to the executioner at the scaffold showed the different attitudes of their countries towards the storm that was about to break up all over Europe by 1618. Oldenbarnevelt wanted a quick execution.17 Raleigh wanted to make clear to everybody that he did not have any fear before the

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England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

axe.18 As for Calderón, he was not a traitor and he would face the knife of the hangman with God’s name in his mouth.19 For the English, the problem was fear. A reluctant James refused to get England involved in the Thirty Years’ War or the Palatinate conflict, not to mention that he was in the middle of the dealings for the Spanish Match. In England, the supporters of the war against Spain and a more firm position regarding German Protestants and the Dutch destabilized James’s last years. They even proposed his daughter Elizabeth and his son-in-law Frederick as James’s successors on the throne, stepping over the Prince of Wales (at least until 1623). It was the same people who accused the Spaniards of being scared of the powerful England by 1603 and, therefore, begging for peace signed in 1604. From 1618 onwards, James would be considered a ‘coward’ and ‘subjected’ by them too.20 For the Dutch, the key point by 1619 was speed. Fourteen years earlier, the Spanish were in a hurry to finish the diplomatic dealings before any defeat against the Dutch could make the English demands tougher.21 After Oldenbarnevelt’s execution, it was a matter of time, fast time, until 1621 that the war would break up again, as both sides were not ready for making concessions.22 Since 1621, the Dutch hurried to put pressure on James to be involved in their fight against the Spaniards, with the excuse of the Palatinate and the war in Germany. Their armies, fleets and fisheries were suffering greatly under the big offensive of the Spanish tercios, galleons and Flemish privateers. Finally, for the Spaniards, it was the firm determination of fighting their enemies to the last man from 1621 onwards, in Flanders, Germany and wherever, with God on their side. This forty-year determination would get exhausted only with the Treaty of Westphalia–Munster (1648) and Pyreness (1659), leaving Spain ruined and drained of soldiers, ships and military resources. The beheading of Raleigh showed to Spain that James would fulfil the commitments of the Peace of 1604, meaning in practice that Phillip III could have free hands to deal with the Dutch and against the German Protestants (including Frederick of Palatinate, James’s son-in-law).23 The death of Oldenbarnevelt was the end of the idea of the renewal of the Twelve Years’ Truce, as he was his main supporter in the Dutch government. The execution of Don Rodrigo Calderón represented the bloody final curtain of Lerma’s regime, as the Duke could escape his fate by becoming cardinal of the Catholic Church, showing Phillip IV’s total commitment to war.24

Peace and reputation or vice versa? Neither Philip III nor anyone in the Spanish State Council thought that the Treaty of 1604 was not beneficial, necessary and, with reputation for Spain, very different than the Treaty of Vervins in 1598.25 The most important criticisms would come as the years went by. In January 1608, influenced by the news arrived from Flanders, the Patriarch Archbishop of Valencia Juan de Ribera wrote to Philip III criticizing the dealings with both the Dutch and the English.26 The Scottish colonel Sir William Semple was another of those who opposed these agreements from the beginning.27 In 1616, Gondomar would criticize severely the way of negotiating in 1604 by the Spaniards, as the English

 The English Crossroads 15 thought that peace was very convenient for Spain and too much Spanish money had been wasted.28 The idea of greater firmness against the foes of Spain in Europe (English, French and Dutch) would be repeated very often in the following years, in both London and Madrid.29 In the years 1623–5, ambassadors such as Coloma and Hinojosa would make similar proposals, supported by Cardinal de la Cueva from Brussels.30 In Spain, royal ministers such as the Marquis of Montesclaros or the aforementioned Sir William Semple, Dr Fray Juan Roco de Campofrío or Pedro Mantuano would regret the few benefits that peace with England had brought to Spain, especially with regard to the Spanish domains in America and Asia.31 These opinions were the result of the very different moment. The Twelve Years’ Truce of 1609 had been considered dishonourable by many members of the Spanish government. Philip III had written on 29 January 1609 to the Marquis de Guadaleste (his ambassador in Brussels) that the truce, in such poor conditions, was the least worst option, and war could be always an option from 1621 onwards. Ten years later (on 7 April 1619), Don Baltasar de Zúñiga would make a similar statement regarding the dilemma of whether to renew the truce or not. In the summer of 1621 the Marquis of Villafranca would directly accuse Archduke Albert and Ambrogio Spinola of being the architects of this dishonourable agreement. The Duke of the Infantado would take the same approach as Zúñiga on the renewal of the truce.32 The regime of Lerma was beginning to be criticized from within both for its general corruption and the blows on the international Spanish reputation. In addition, the English and Dutch economic vigour during the years of peace (with their commercial success in the East Indies and the Pacific Ocean) did not help much to change the perspective on the Lerma’s foreign policy.33 In this particular case, if the peace with England had encouraged the Spaniards to sign the Twelve Years’ Truce, the negative impact of the agreement with the Dutch would eventually affect the assessment of the peace with the English, which by 1620 was no longer considered as positive as it had been in 1604.34 The political faction led by Don Baltasar de Zúñiga inside the Spanish government considered certain diplomatic agreements a real shame for the Spanish reputation (Twelve Years’ Truce of 1609, the peace of Asti of 1615 and 1617). Zúñiga wanted to reinforce the military and political position of Spain in Europe.35 Criticizing the restoration of peaceful relations with England meant to attack the political achievements of Lerma, although in this case by 1604 the agreement was considered a great diplomatic success. However, neither Phillip III nor his son broke with the English on their own, nor did their prime ministers Lerma, Uceda, Zúñiga or Olivares.36 It is understandable that the first Spanish ambassador to James in 1622, replacing Gondomar, was Don Carlos Coloma. He was an experienced military man who had fought in Flanders for decades. This meant that the naval and military activity of the Spanish embassy in England was to be enhanced in the resumption of the war against the Dutch by sea and by land. Both Zúñiga and Olivares faced marriage negotiations with the Stuarts with the idea that if the English did not accept very specific conditions (the free exercise of

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Catholicism in England, the conversion to Catholicism of the Prince of Wales), such deals had to be delayed and diverted, pleasing the English, but always avoiding war. The maintenance of the peace with England was essential in 1621 in order to win the war against the Dutch.37 During the years 1623–5, against the messages advising greater firmness and even the breaking with England sent by their own Spanish ambassadors, Madrid opted for being prudent and sly. The Infanta Isabella, governor of the Spanish Low Countries by then, showed great fatigue before the English provocations in January 1625 and the lack of response from her nephew, Philip IV.38 Olivares considered that, with the resumption of the war against the Dutch, it would have been suicidal to fight with England at the same time, during 1585–1603.39 English neutrality, as proved during the years 1603–7, was a necessary condition to obtain significant military advances in Europe. King James’s refusal to intervene in favour of his son-in-law Frederick of the Palatinate gave way to Spanish intervention in Germany.40 The results so favourable to the imperial cause (the victory of White Mountain, the occupation of Upper and Lower Palatinate, the exile of Frederick and his wife Elizabeth Stuart to The Hague) scared James as much as the rest of European Protestants. In England, he was pressured by the public opinion and the Parliament of 1621 to intervene in Germany, but he preferred to opt for the Spanish marriage alliance to solve the German mess.41 By 1623, Sir Francis Cottington had shown to the Spanish ambassador the many letters that James had received from Frederick, the Dutch and the German Protestants asking for English support and military aid. James’s choice was Spain.42

The royal favourites James held a masked ball at the royal palace on Sunday, 15 May 1622.43 He had invited the two Spanish ambassadors who were in London at the time, Gondomar and his replacement, Coloma. He personally amused them during the whole party. At the end of the evening, the king entered his private rooms on the arm of both ambassadors, who supported him on each side because the gout prevented him from walking.44 The scene described above is pure irony. On the one hand, England was resting on Spain. The Stuarts were supported by the Habsburgs. On the other hand, Habsburgs were leaning on England (if Phillip III wanted to gain some respite, the Stuarts showed themselves a firm shoulder). By that year, the climax of relations between the two countries was closed. It was less than a year before the trip of the Prince of Wales to Madrid. James was of a peculiar character. He was a member of a Scottish royal dynasty alien to many of the English traditions. He was baptized as Catholic, although later on he became a Protestant prince.45 He was a foreign king on the throne of England. He had not had any military conflicts with Spain. Scotland, despite being a predominantly Protestant (Presbyterian) kingdom, did not in any way threaten Spanish hegemony in Europe or overseas. He had written a poem entitled ‘The Lepanto of James the Sixth’ (probably written in 1585, published for the first time in 1591), glorifying the Christian triumph against the Turks led by the Spanish prince Don John.46 Nevertheless, many

 The English Crossroads 17 Protestants in Scotland understood the text as the celebration of a Catholic triumph, reason for which the king was forced to make very clear in the introduction of the poem when being published that he defended the Protestantism. Upon his arrival in England, the poem was published again (1603), and at the public entrance of the new royal family in London in March 1604 there were allusions to it.47 Greeting the new king’s poems and making his intellectual facet known in England were the most obvious causes. Ambassador Villamediana saw the parade and the allusion to the poem. He could only interpret it as another gesture of James’s distension towards Spain, since independent of the opinions about it, or the approaches to it (as a Protestant text or not), the subject of the poem was a Christian victory (and mainly a Spanish one) against the Turks (non-Christians) in defence of European Christianity, just the idea that James most defended.48 Sir Robert Cecil, Secretary of State, became the English prime minister and the person who introduced the Stuarts in the English court. James had to create new complicities and new patronage networks and supports in England and also abroad. The sovereign in the early modern European states was the source of benefits, honours, gifts, favours and presents (the royal distributive justice). And for all these, James needed political stability (internal and external) and a lot of money.49 The new monarchs of Spain and England came to power within a period of five years (1598, 1603). They represented radical changes with their past predecessors. And in both cases, the power of Spain in Europe was the key to this change. Philip III would stop the military machine that had been working since 1568 against England, France and the Dutch because it had exhausted the Spanish resources. In the case of James, twenty years of wars had also drained the English royal finances. But peace was also his personal conviction. He desired to stitch religious wounds in Europe.50 The Spanish power in Europe and the English attitude towards it would be an important factor in the power struggles at the English court. The strong men of the Stuart’s regime during James’s reign were Sir Robert Cecil (1603–12), Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton (1612–14), Robert Carr, Earl of Somerset (1614–16) and George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham (1616–25). Sir Robert Cecil had led the English foreign policy at least since 1602. Although in principle hostile to Spain and very distrustful, he was gradually softening his points of view since 1606, in the conviction that England should be a wedge between France, the Netherlands and Spain, with its own independence in foreign policy and without linking to anyone.51 The favourites of James counted on a pension paid by the Spanish embassy,​​ although not all of them bothered to collect it as they were already very rich (Somerset, Buckingham), and in others it aroused an excessive greed (Cecil).52 Northampton and Somerset belonged to the court faction supporting peaceful relations with Spain, agreeing certain tolerance towards Catholicism (the Howard’s faction).53 Buckingham, on the contrary, was brought to power by the court faction that wanted a firmer defence of Protestantism, the most anti-Spanish royal ministers (led by George Abbot, the archbishop of Canterbury or the Earl of Pembroke).54 However, Buckingham built his own political position as James’s favourite at the court and did not stand out as a raging anti-Spaniard. He followed the political direction

18

England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

of James, and therefore he established a very good relationship with Gondomar.55 Without the support of the favourite, Charles’s trip to Madrid in 1623 would not have been possible, because it was also done without James’s consent. Only after 1623 did Buckingham turn to clearly anti-Spanish positions. Regarding Spain, it was necessary to change the foreign policy towards the defence of the overseas empire and the Mediterranean Sea (Italy, the Turks, the Berber pirates).56 The peace signed by Spain in 1604 (with England), in 1609 (with the Dutch) and in 1615 (with Savoy) served the Spanish ‘hawk’ faction at the court (led by Don Baltasar de Zúñiga since 1617) to attack the regime of Lerma, accusing him of corruption and paralysis in Spain and cowardice in Europe.57 James was sexually attracted by good looking young courtiers and those with excellent manners.58 This had happened at least with Lennox in 1580, with Somerset in 1607 and with Buckingham in 1614.59 In Spain the sexual inclination of the king of England was also known since 1603. Zúñiga, on his return to Spain (1610), was spreading all over Madrid that James was ‘a queer’ and Queen Anne of Denmark was ‘a whore’.60 Worst of all was that both the English ambassador in Spain (Sir John Digby) and James had learned of everything. Gondomar could not believe those insults, not because of the alleged James’s homosexuality, but because of the fact that Zúñiga insulted the sacred royalty.61 In 1618 (and again in 1620 and 1621), criticizing the reluctant English foreign policy, a Protestant lecturer and preacher denounced this ‘effeminate age’ and ‘effeminate wantonnesse’ brought by the peace in England.62 Thomas Scott, in his work Vox Populi, also wrote that the English minds got ‘effeminated by peace and luxury’, incapable of fighting a war against their enemies (Spain).63 Obviously, it was James who brought this ‘effeminate’ peace to England, as he was also considered by many effeminate, coward and too soft with the enemies of the kingdom and the true religion.64 The personal relationship between Buckingham and Charles Stuart, in principle, did not imply any homosexual connotation, although it was suggested in anonymous pamphlets after 1625, as it was previously done with James (Buckingham was called ‘Ganymede’ in several pamphlets, the lover of Zeus-James).65 However, it seemed more like a relationship of a very strong friendship and camaraderie, almost a paternal relationship, in that Buckingham acted as a guide and protector of the young prince (he was eight years older than Charles).66 The trip to Madrid certainly contributed greatly to the strengthening of that friendship. The pressure that the Spaniards put on Charles for his conversion to Catholicism found strong opposition in Buckingham, who acted as the ‘big brother’, becoming an annoying figure at the Spanish court.67 After the failure of the marriage, Phillip IV sent to its ambassadors in England a list of accusations against Buckingham, making him responsible for the big failure by his unacceptable conduct at the Spanish court.68 These allegations showed the extreme intimacy of the relationship between the prince and the favourite and the liberties the Duke took with Charles, something that other documentary sources had confirmed and that scandalized the Spaniards.69 It does not seem to imply any type of homosexual relationship, but rather an intimate friendship that included sexual adventures with all kinds of women.

 The English Crossroads 19 As for the Spaniards, there was no homosexual link between Lerma and Phillip III, let alone coaxing the pious king with sexual orgies. Lerma’s propaganda programme intended to present him as a kind of ‘twin brother’ of the monarch, his alter ego, his equal. This explains, for example, the portraits of both figures by the royal painter Juan Pantoja de la Cruz (1602, 1606) or the statues presented at the public entrance of Queen Margarita in October 1599.70 In 1612, Felipe III supported the power of Lerma with the signature delegation decree, making Lerma’s signature as worth as the king’s in government documents.71 Olivares’s government was different from the one of Lerma. The favourite of Philip IV never wanted to present himself as the king’s soulmate, but as his best and most faithful servant.72 Although Olivares was never accused of maintaining a sexual relationship with the young king Philip, he was implicated of using witchcraft to keep his master under his rule and introduce him to a wild sexual career.73 In any case, these kinds of accusations mixing witchcraft and the status of royal favourite were also made against Buckingham.74 The relationship between Buckingham and Charles I Stuart was most similar to that of Olivares and Phillip IV, as well as by age and political position. This is how the confrontation between both royal favourites in Madrid in 1623 is better understood. If each one was the best friend, protector and guide of their young master, there was nothing more than a clash when the diplomatic negotiations reached a stalemate in Madrid. At the Spanish court, Buckingham became the main obstacle of Olivares’s manoeuvers.75 The English favourite would detest Olivares until the end of his days; he never could restrain himself to show it before foreign ambassadors.76

Peace and reputation (1603–5) The last decade of Philip II’s reign witnessed the simultaneous war against England, France and Holland, bringing many Spanish defeats and humiliations.77 By 1598, solutions were adopted. Spain was forced into a political, financial and military respite. The cession of the Low Countries to the archdukes Albert and Isabella of Austria (6 May 1598) and the Treaty of Vervins with France (2 May 1598) were political decisions of the old king. Vervins was considered a humiliation by Phillip III and Lerma and an unbeatable beginning of the French recovery as a threatening power of the Spanish system in Europe. However, peace was a tool widely used by Spanish diplomacy. In 1598 France was separated from its English and Dutch allies. In 1604 the Dutch were completely isolated. In 1626 peace was made with France (Treaty of Monzón) and in 1630 with England (encircling the Dutch again). In 1648 the final peace was reached in Flanders, leaving France alone. The economic crisis, the epidemics (the Spanish plague of 1596–1602), the famines, the material exhaustion (royal bankruptcy of 1596) and the collapse of the national morale led in the years 1591–2 to the protests in Spain (repression of Ávila).78 In addition, the Spanish Cortes showed Phillip II their growing weariness due to the European wars that were draining the kingdom.79 In Brussels, the government of the

20

England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

archdukes was the first to establish diplomatic contact with the English, leading the initiative for the peace talks in 1603 and 1607–9.80 After the failure of negotiations at Boulogne in France (during May–July 1600) and the Spanish attack on Ireland at Kinsale (between September 1601 and January 1602), only the death of Queen Elizabeth I provided the final opportunity to negotiate peace between both countries.81 Followed by intense debates at the Spanish Council of State, listening to the views and opinions of the English Catholics and diplomatic envoys to England, the Spanish government decided on negotiation.82 The Spanish government (Lerma) concluded that any amount of money to be paid would always be below the cost of continuing the war against the English. With the peace with England, Spain would gain international reputation and benefits for English Catholics, contrasting it with the Peace of Vervins with France, which had represented so many losses for Spain.83 Incidentally, before leaving for England, both Lerma and Don Pedro de Franqueza (Spanish royal secretary) had told Villamediana several times that were peace with England obtained, even if bought with millions of ducats, it would always be much cheaper for the Spanish treasure than a costly war (Table 1).84

Buying peace with Jacobean England? By 1603, Spain wanted to offer to the English the huge profits of the free trade in their European dominions in exchange for peace. In short, they wanted to return to the political and diplomatic situation that had been there before 1585, as well as demanding new English assurances regarding the Indies and privateering. Political and diplomatic moves around James were undertaken ​​at high speed during 1603. France, Holland, Venice and Savoy did not want England to accept peace, so there was no time to lose for Spanish diplomacy.85 The first concrete steps were made by Archduke Albert, who showed increased interest in peace with England; he had been defeated by the Dutch in the Battle of Nieuwpoort (July 1600), and his troops had been besieging Ostend from 5 July 1601. He sent a personal envoy, Nicolás Scorza, to Scotland in March 1603, to discover James’s intentions towards Spain and, after finding him well disposed, it was decided to dispatch a Flemish ambassador, the Count of Arenberg.86 Serious discussions in the Spanish Council of State did not begin until July 1603, when reports began to arrive from Brussels, supplied by Arenberg, Dr Robert Taylor and Villamediana. In that month the Council of State came to several conclusions.87 Any hypothetical rebellion of Catholics in England would not be supported by Spain.88 Then, peace and freedom of conscience for English Catholics, strongly supported by Pope Clement VIII, would be negotiated with the English.89 ‘Buying’ peace at a reasonable price (between 200,000 and 600,000 ducats, around £150,000) would be accepted as the primary means of negotiation. Under no circumstances should the Spanish crown agree to the English demand for free trade with the Indies, even if it meant ending the peace talks. Finally, a Spanish high-ranking minister, Don Juan Fernández de Velasco, Constable of Castile, would be sent to Flanders to oversee the whole business, partly because of

Embassy

Extraordinary

Extraordinary

Ordinary

Extraordinary

Extraordinary

Ordinary

Ordinary

Secretary

Diplomats

Juan de Tassis y Acuña, Count of Villamediana

Juan Fernández de Velasco, Constable of Castile

Don Pedro de Zúñiga, Marquis of Floresdávila

Don Juan de Mendoza, Marquis of San Germán

Don Fernando Girón, Knight of Malta and Field Master

Don Alonso de Velasco, Count of Revilla

Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Count of Gondomar

Julián Sánchez de Ulloa

July/1618–March/1620

May/1613–July/1618

January/1610–August/1613

December/1608–February/1609

April 1606–June 1606

June 1605–December 1610

October 1603–December 1604

March 1603–November 1605

Date

Table 1  Spanish Diplomats to James I Stuart (1603–25)

(Continued)

Frederick of Palatinate and Elizabeth Stuart King and Queen of Bohemia November 1619 Dead of Anne of Denmark March 1619 Duke of Lerma resigned October 1618

Dead of Earl of Northampton, June 1614 Downfall of Ear of Somerset 1615 Duke of Buckingham raise to power 1616 Thirty Years’ War May 1618

Dead of Sir Robert Cecil, May 1612 Dead of Henry Stuart, Prince of Wales, November 1612 Murder of Henry IV of France, May 1610 Marriage of Elizabeth Stuart to Frederick of Palatinate February 1613

Twelve Years’ Truce April 1609

Powder Plot, November 1605

Powder Plot, November 1605 Twelve Years’ Truce April 1609 Murder of King Henry IV of France, May 1610

Peace of London, August 1604

Peace of London, August 1604

Europe

Extraordinary

Extraordinary

Extraordinary

Minister Resident September/1624–December/1625 English threats against Spain Dead of James I Stuart March 1625 England attacked Cadiz November 1625

Don Juan de Mendoza, Marquis of San Germán and Hinojosa

Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Viscount of Corzana

Jacques Bruneau

September/1623–February/1624

June/1623–June/1624

May/1622–September/1624

Return of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham to England September–October 1623

Journey to Madrid of Prince of Wales and Buckingham Failure of the marriage alliance between Spain and England December 1623

Journey to Madrid of Prince of Wales and Buckingham Failure of the marriage alliance between Spain and England December 1623

Frederick of Palatinate and Elizabeth Stuart deposed Battle of White Mountain November 1622 80 Years’ War (Spain vs. the Dutch) April 1621 Dead of Phillip III March 1621 Spanish Military Palatinate Campaign August 1621– September 1622

Don Carlos Coloma, Marquis of Espinar

March/1620–June/1622

Ordinary

Europe

Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Count of Gondomar

Date

Embassy

Diplomats

Table 1  Continued

 The English Crossroads 23 Villamediana’s inexperience, partly because the Constable was a great rival of Lerma at the Spanish court and partly because of the tremendous distrust of archduke’s ministers (especially Jean Richardot, the head of the Flemish Council of State). These Flemish ministers showed what the Spanish considered ‘an excessive desire for peace’ with England. They were willing to accept proposals that the Spaniards considered unacceptable, such as English free trade with the Indies, which was proposed by Jean de Richardot in Brussels. The Spanish government had serious doubts about the capacity and skills of Villamediana to lead the negotiations to a successful conclusion. The ambassador himself had asked for the assistance of at least two more ministers because he found himself unable to manage the whole business alone and because he did not trust archduke’s people.90 It was necessary and vital to appoint a negotiating team and a leader with a greater political weight.91 However, at the beginning it was not clear who was to be appointed head of the group of the Spanish commissioners. Villamediana had suggested his uncle Don Juan Bautista de Tassis (ambassador in Paris between 1598 and 1603).92 At the Spanish Council of State other names such as Don Baltasar de Zúñiga (ambassador in Flanders from 1599 to 1603 and since 1603 in France) or Don Fernando Carrillo (councillor of Castile and expert in laws and finances in Flanders) were taken into consideration.93 Both Zúñiga and Carrillo were burned out. The English did not accept them after the Boulogne fiasco.94 The Constable was a heavyweight figure of the Spanish court and among the nobility:95 member of the Spanish Council of State, the Council of War, president of the Council of Italy and Governor of Milan. He was not an ally of Lerma nor was he linked to him.96 In fact, the Constable was involved in a plot against Lerma’s political position as royal favourite in the second part of 1603.97 The Count of Miranda, the Marchioness of Valle and the Marquis of San Germán and Hinojosa (future ambassador to England) participated too, using Queen Margaret’s hate for Lerma as a weapon against him. However, Miranda, Constable and San Germán were not arrested as they were ‘too big’ fishes at the Spanish government. Lerma used other ways to make them pay for their treason. Lerma and the Constable were rivals at the Council of State, at least as far as regarding Lerma’s foreign policy.98 The Constable was a ‘hawk’ in politics, a supporter of the firm and aggressive foreign policy against the enemies of Spain.99 He had arrogantly replied to the letters of Pope Clement VIII advocating peace with England, he openly distrusted the archduke’s Flemish ministers and he declared that he expected nothing good from the friendship with a heretic monarch such as James.100 Years later, he openly opposed the sign of the truce with the Dutch rebels, against Lerma’s policy again.101 His position of antagonism to the royal favourite transcended the Spanish borders. It appeared in the introduction of the book The Generall Historie of Spayne, written by the French historian Louis de Mayerne, but translated to English by Edward Grimston. The English translator invented a theatre play represented in Valladolid whose main characters were Phillip III, Lerma and his counterpoint, the Constable. In the play, Lerma was assassinated by the people of Valladolid because of his tyranny over the Spanish people and his bad government of Spain.102

24

England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

Constable’s election did not lack political ability. Lerma sent a figure of great political weight and strength to negotiate with the English, which could not but satisfy James’s vanity, who was not vetoed by previous frustrated deals.103 Besides, it was a clear message to the English: there would be no concessions regarding the Spanish Indies. In fact, the appointment was a poisoned chalice. Apart from involving the Constable in a long diplomatic mission of great importance that he might not welcome with joy (in fact, it was humiliating to him), he was forced to defend Lerma’s foreign policy.104 In this way, if he succeeded, so did Lerma. If he failed, he could always be blamed for the diplomatic fiasco. The Constable would have to work hard to gain the confidence and kinship of James, that heretic prince whom he despised so much. In any case, the Constable was a fortunate choice. One of the greatest concerns of Spanish diplomacy was the political views defended by the Flemish ministers. It was in Flanders’s interest to sign the peace with the English much more than for Spain. The Spanish Low Countries had been suffering since 1568 with continuous wars against the Dutch rebels, the English and the French. In addition, their cities had suffered sieges and looting, their economy had been severely damaged and the northern part of the country had been separated and, with it, the Protestant population had flown. The Flemish ‘excessive desire for peace’ was used by the English to press for their demands. The Spaniards did not even trust Archduke Albert, let alone his ministers in Brussels, city considered to be full of English spies.105

Villamediana and the Constable The first dispatch sent by Philip III to Villamediana, once he arrived in Brussels, was dated 23 August 1603.106 He was ordered to use the money sent with skill and liberality, handing out cash and pensions among the most powerful ministers of James. Villamediana had to convince James that the new alliance with Spain would be very convenient for him and for England. Spain would offer its armies and fleets to recover Calais (in French hands) for England, and the English would gain substantial profits from free trade with Spanish domains in Europe. At the same time, in Valladolid the Constable was elected head of the diplomatic mission.107 The negotiating powers granted and his diplomatic instructions, dated 1 October 1603, repeated the points raised in the Spanish Council of State: freedom of conscience for the Catholics; the end of English support for the Dutch rebels and free trade with European possessions of the Spain, with the express prohibition of sailing to the East and West Indies.108 The first meeting of the Council of State on Villamediana’s dispatches was on 8 November 1603.109 The meeting decided that Villamediana should stand against the English demands (at least at first) for free English trade with the Indies and the dismantling of the English Catholic seminars. As for the demand for freedom of conscience for the Catholics, the ministers, recognizing the difficulty of meeting the demand, advised Villamediana to use his skills as a diplomat. Finally, the pacifist policy held by James gave them hope for successfully completing the negotiations. Pending the arrival of the Constable in Flanders (January 1604), Villamediana’s task would be to prepare the ground in the English court, buying support from British courtiers and

 The English Crossroads 25 creating a favourable faction against the ambassadors of France, Holland and Venice, who were working for the opposite.110 After his arrival to Flanders, the Constable hit his fist on the table, strengthening the Spanish position and relegating the Flemish envoys to a secondary position in the negotiation with the English.111 The man was a tough negotiator; arguing matters such as James’s desire to hold the negotiations in London and not on neutral ground, or ordering the Spanish commission to let the English diplomats begin to speak at the negotiating table, as beggars do.112 Between January and May 1604, the Constable devoted himself to prepare the opening of diplomatic negotiations with the English. He ordered the arrival of the Italian senator Alessandro Rovida from Milan as a legal expert, oversaw the diplomatic steps taken by Villamediana and Rovida in England and made massive purchases of jewellery to distribute at the English court.113 In the following months, despite English resistance regarding the return of Zeeland ports of Vlissingen, Ramecken and Brill (where the English had garrisons to secure the return of the English subsidies to war), or the issue of freedom of conscience for the Catholics, the negotiations were advancing on the key points: free trade between the two kingdoms (excluding the Indies) and the end of the English support of the Dutch against the Spanish armies. James I therefore welcomed the Constable and Villamediana.114 On 15 August 1604, the Constable crossed the English Channel to conclude the treaty in London, which was much celebrated at the English court.115 The Spanish had not obtained either freedom of conscience for Catholics or the return of Brill, Ramecken and Vlissingen, nor did the English win free trade with the Indies. However, without any doubt, turning Great Britain into neutral territory for Spanish interests was a strategic and comprehensive win. In this sense, Paul C. Allen is right, as the Spanish benefited more than the English from the 1604 Treaty of London regarding military strategy, while the English had succeeded in business matters, which reflect the particular interests of each of the countries, respectively.116 By way of conclusion, the Constable wrote to Phillip III on his way to Spain that ‘this peace [of 1604] was for the English the real door through the trust, communication and business with Spain’.117 One year later, and on the other side of the Spanish empire, the Jesuit Father Luis de Valdivia had proposed the Spanish government to change completely the political and military strategy against the Araucan natives of Chile, rebels against Phillip III.118 In his speech, Valdivia supported the advantages of offering the rebels the ‘leisures of the peace with the Spanish crown in order to finish their rebellions’.119 James I would be very surprised to find out that, in the end, the Spanish government used with him the same ways that they used with the Chilean Araucans.

The letters and the painting There is a famous painting of the Treaty of London (28 August 1604): The Somerset House Conference (Figure 1). The disposition of the English and Spanish commissioners

26

England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

Figure 1  The Somerset House Conference, Unknown Artist, 1604. National Portrait Gallery, London, UK. at the table follows a strict order of precedence and importance (from the window to the front). As for the English side, there were Thomas Sackville (leader of delegation, Earl of Dorset), Charles Howard (Earl of Nottingham), Charles Blount (Earl of Devonshire), Henry Howard (Earl of Northampton) and Robert Cecil (Earl of Salisbury). As for the Spanish side, the commissioners were the Constable of Castile, the Count of Villamediana, Alessandro Robida, Charles de Ligne (Count of Arenberg), Jean Richardot and Louis Verreyken. The leader of the Spanish commissioners was the Constable (and after him, Villamediana and Robida). Actually, it looks like Villamediana is pointing at the Constable with a finger of his right hand, as though trying to tell the audience who is in charge on that side of the table. The Constable did not attend any of the meetings pleading ill-health. He wanted to supervise and lead the whole business from Flanders (Spanish soil), and only crossed the English Channel when the deal was finished, on Sunday, 15 August 1604.120 The unknown author of the picture managed perfectly to capture the atmosphere of the moment around the negotiating table between May and July 1604: in a luxury setting, eleven delegates of England, Spain and Flanders (great aristocrats, ministers, soldiers, jurists, privateers, admirals, diplomats), namely three royal favourites (Sir Robert Cecil, the Constable of Castile – although this man was only the archenemy of Lerma, his main opponent – and Jean Richardot), three princes (James I, Phillip III, Albert of Austria), two dynasties (Stuart and Habsburg) and two empires (the English one in the making, the Spanish one established). The delegates were chosen with great success by both sovereigns, and each of them symbolized a different thing at the negotiating table. From the English side, the Earl of Dorset represented the finances of the English crown and the profits that the English economy would obtain from the peace (he was Lord Treasurer). The Earl of Nottingham was the English naval power that had caused so much damage to Spain

 The English Crossroads 27 (he was Lord High Admiral, the stick policy). The Earl of Devonshire showed Ireland as an incontestable English domain (he was Lord Deputy of Ireland). The Earl of Northampton symbolized the British Crypto-Catholicism, the Hispanophilia and the desire for a return to friendly political and diplomatic relations (he was Lord Warden of Cinque Ports, the maritime trade, the carrot policy). Finally, Sir Robert Cecil was in charge of the new English government under James I (as first Secretary of State), that is, the English policy towards Spain. On the other side of the table, the commissioners of the Spanish empire were seated (Spanish, Italian, and Flemish). Villamediana represented the diplomacy, the government and the power of Spain, the Constable’s shadow (the Constable symbolized Spanish rule over Italy and Flanders). The fact that the Constable appeared in the painting without having sat at the table was the recognition that he was always there (one way or the other). The Milanese Senator Robida was the expert on law and the papal bulls on which the Spanish overseas empire was based and on whose dominions the English wanted free access on the treaty. The Flemish delegates symbolized the loyal Low Countries. There was the Spanish army, the fleet of Flemish privateers, a political, naval and military blade pointed at the Dutch, English and French necks. Flanders was a Catholic spiritual reservoir against the Northern Europe heresy. Among the Flemish representatives, Arenberg represented the diplomacy towards England, while Richardot and Verreyken represented Archduke Albert’s government. Whether the artist was English, Flemish or Spanish, the painting has a direct relationship with two documents written by the Constable to Villamediana five days before the beginning of the official talks. Villamediana was the head of the Spanish group on English soil, and he only responded to the Constable. The two letters of the Constable ordered in detail how the negotiations between the members of the Spanish and the English delegation had to be, that is, exactly the scene of Somerset House Conference.121 One of the orders that the Constable gave with more insistence was that the Flemish and the Spaniards were very united. At the table, they all had to sit on the same side. They even had to hear a Mass of the Holy Spirit together every day before meeting with the English. Obviously, they wanted to show a solid team with the same interests in front of the English demands. Senator Robida became the spokesman for the Spanish team, and he also would be in charge of all the papers and minutes of that group. Because of his importance, he would act constantly under the orders of Villamediana, staying at his house and being introduced at the English court by him. The language of the negotiations would be Latin (relegating French language), in which Robida was an expert. On the Spanish side of the table, the order of preference was perfectly established by the Constable, following the wishes of Phillip III and Archduke Albert of Austria. After Villamediana, it was Robida, and after him, Arenberg and the rest of the Flemish ministers. There would be no presidential chair as the head of the table, as Villamediana had suggested himself. The idea of letting both delegations sit together was considered nonsense by the Constable. On the English side, things were more complex. The order of precedence and importance at the negotiating table (as reflected in the painting) does not correspond

28

England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

to the amounts that the Spanish diplomats distributed in gifts and money to the English commissioners. It is the attention paid by the Spanish diplomacy at the English court, translated into money and gifts, which indicates the political weight carried by each of the English delegates for the Spaniards. In fact, if the picture were painted according to the importance of the English ministers for Spain, the resulting image would be very different. Beginning with the window and towards the front (from a greater to smaller sums of money paid), they would be placed in the following order: Henry Howard (Earl of Northampton), Sir Robert Cecil (Earl of Salisbury), Charles Blount (Earl of Devonshire, the only one that would remain in the middle, without changing seat), Charles Howard (Earl of Nottingham) and Thomas Sackville (Earl of Dorset). At the conference table, considering the importance of the English delegates, the priorities for Spain were Catholicism–Hispanophilia, James’s policy towards Spain, Ireland, English naval power and trade. The English stand for the finances-trade with Spain, the English naval power, Ireland, the Crypto-Catholicism and James’s policy towards Spain.

The evaluation of the peace between Spain and England Between the years 1603 and 1607 Spain’s international reputation in Europe improved significantly (the conquest of Ostend on 20 September 1604; Spinola’s offensive in Flanders during 1604–6). This was realized and recognized by the Dutch in 1606 and 1607, as the war with Spain was going very badly.122 In a sense, there was a parallel between what happened during 1603–7 and 1621–25. In both periods Spain was at peace with England, which allowed Spain to focus on fighting the Dutch at Breda (1625), and the German Protestants (Battle of White Mountain in 1620), giving Spain military occupation of the Rhenish Palatinate.123 There were significant partial successes in Europe and elsewhere, but in the end the financial problems and exhaustion led to the end of the offensive (bankruptcies in 1607 and 1627).124 As for peace with England, every royal councillor at the Spanish Council of State considered that treaty beneficial, necessary and reputable, very different to that of 1598 with France, although not everyone in Spain agreed with this opinion (for instance, the merchant Jeroni Pujades, from Barcelona).125 James and Queen Anne seemed especially pleased with the peace. James wanted the European role of peacemaker in the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, and this treaty of 1604 was certainly a decisive step in that direction. On this point, Villamediana commented in November 1603 about James’s infatuation with such a role.126 The assassination of Henry IV of France in May 1610 removed a powerful rival for him, and after that he was hailed as the champion of and benchmark for European Protestants. The queen was excited about the possibility that Henry, Prince of Wales, would marry the Spanish Infanta Anne.127 English opponents in London argued against the agreement in 1604, insisting that Spain was the major enemy power of Protestants in Europe and, once recovered after some years of peace, would attack again.128 Meanwhile, Sir Robert Cecil, though hostile to Spain and very distrustful at the beginning, was gradually softening his stance in the belief that Stuart England should be a wedge between France, the Dutch and Spain, with

 The English Crossroads 29 its own autonomy in foreign policy without being linked to any power of Europe.129 Furthermore, none of the many European ambassadors sent to England throughout 1603 – twelve ambassadors (five Dutch, four French and three Venetian) – managed to divert James I’s plans for foreign policy regarding Spain.130 While England became a neutral kingdom, many British ministers were to become very rich with bribes and pensions distributed by Spanish, Dutch or French diplomats. The English population in general was another matter, not only with regard to the Protestant clergy or groups of sea captains and merchants who became rich from privateering and piracy during the years of war (1585–1603).131 The report of Constable’s mission, detailing the various ceremonies, gifts and honours exchanged at the English court, was a suspiciously brief reference to the reception of the peace by the common people, omitting reference to what would have been easy to describe, any enthusiasm from the people of London.132 The Dutch ambassador to England, Noel de Caron, was more explicit about this public reaction. Noticing the permission given for Spain to raise troops for the army of Flanders on English soil, he wrote that no legal enactment [allowing Spaniards’ recruitment] was received in London with more coolness or better to say, with more sadness. No mortal demonstrated in word or deed the least satisfaction but on the contrary, people openly shouted ‘God save our good neighbours, the States of Holland and Zeeland, and grant them victory’.133

In any case, being asked to consider as friends and confederates all those who had been fighting since 1585, who had wanted to invade England in 1588, causing trauma in the population that arose from time to time (with occasional bouts of collective hysteria and panic), and who were mortal enemies of religion was a very difficult pill to swallow.134 Episodes of popular outbreaks against Catholics and Spain happened in the following years: in 1605–6 (due to the uncovering of the Gunpowder Plot and the Neuce and Franchesi Plot – a so-called conspiracy against Holland involving one Irish member of the Spanish embassy in London, John Ball, who was arrested by the English government); in 1618–21 (for the Thirty Years’ Wars’ events in Europe); and finally, during 1623–5 (the Spanish Match of the Prince of Wales and the agreement of Rhenish Palatinate).

The age of the peace talks (1603–4) Christendom needs universal peace The instructions given to Villamediana dated 29 April 1603 contained thirty-eight points.135 Despite this list, essentially Villamediana was ordered to ascertain whether James was ready for peace, what his intentions were about Catholics in general and how he had been received in England.136 Villamediana was the first Spanish ambassador to set foot in England since 1584.

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Villamediana arrived in Flanders on 18 June 1603.137 Once in Brussels, he had several secret meetings with Flemish ministers, Catholic British military officers and spies, such as Sir William Stanley, Colonel Hugh Owen, the Jesuit William Baldwin and Robert Spiller. One result of these meetings was the making of a list of James’s counsellors and ministers and the means by which Villamediana could gain their support for the peace.138 Another was a series of reports on England. The main conclusions of all these documents were that English court was very poor and the English and Scottish ministers who surrounded James were very greedy and hungry for money. The English ministers who supported the war claimed that naval warfare was the basis of Elizabethan England’s prosperity, but according to Villamediana, if Spain opened trade and commerce with England, peace talks could succeed. About the Secretary of State, Sir Robert Cecil, Villamediana said that he would open the negotiations with Spain in exchange for money. Finally, the point of religion was very difficult, but he was hopeful that Spain might have an honourable peace.139 Regarding the Catholic tolerance in England, on 6 July 1603 Villamediana reported that an ​​ offer was made to him through a confidant. The proposal came from the English Privy Council (particularly, Cecil and Northampton) and was presented by the Countess of Suffolk, Lady Catherine Howard.140 In exchange for 500,000 ducats paid by the Spaniards, freedom of conscience could be obtained.141 Villamediana made many objections to such a sum, especially because there were other points in the negotiation that might cost money (for instance, the return of Vlissingen, Ramecken and Brill). He also deplored the way they were negotiating with both Arenberg and Dr Robert Taylor.142 However, the quantity was actually a reference. Philip III sent 400,000 ducats to the Constable and 100,000 ducats more to Villamediana. This amount, enormous, matched the expenses of the English Jacobean royal household (around 100,000 pounds per year in 1603).143 On 13 July 1603 the ambassador reported one of the main English demands: free access to the Indies.144 On 29 July, Villamediana arrived at Antwerp.145 He organized his trip to England, receiving 100,000 ducats from the merchant Francesco Serra. Later, he returned to Brussels, where he went to the Flemish coast on 18 August. On Saturday, 30 August, he reached Gravelines, and on 1 September, at 7.00 a.m., he embarked on a huge English galleon, arriving at Dover in twelve hours.146 It would be two weeks until Villamediana wrote his first letter from England to Philip III.147 Because of the presence of the Plague, the ambassador travelled through different parts of the English southeast (Dover, Sittingbourne, Greenwich, Kingston upon Thames, Staines, Windsor, etc.) to Oxford.148 However, the death of a Villamediana’s servant caused the delay of his first audience of James, because the spread of the Plague was feared. He was ordered to go to Southampton to stay pending the arrangement of the appointment, in Winchester.149 The first audience would finally be on 5 October, Sunday, at 3.00 p.m. It was a turning point.150 Led by Lord Charles Howard, the Earl of Suffolk, and other courtiers, Villamediana entered a large room, in which waited the king, the queen, great lords and the members of the Privy Council.151 He found a much more favourable attitude towards peace than he had expected.152 As for the English terms, there was nothing really new: free trade

 The English Crossroads 31 to the Indies in return for paying for the rights; the dismantling of the Catholic English seminaries and cessation of Inquisition visits to the English merchant ships in Spain.153 However, as suggested by Philip III, there was plenty of room for negotiation with the English.154 While he was waiting for the arrival of the Constable, Villamediana spent the next months wisely, exercising the office of ambassador at the English court.155 He created a network of informers and supporters through secret contacts with Suffolk, Cecil, Northampton and other royal ministers, gaining the favour of Queen Anne and her ladies-in-waiting. He also provided all kind of information about England’s situation (royal finances, conspiracies against James, parliamentary ceremonies). From January 1604 Villamediana began corresponding with the Constable, who arrived in Flanders at that time to supervise the talks.156 Diplomatic steps began moving officially at the beginning of Spring 1604, as James and the English court made public entry into London on 25 March. Three days before, Villamediana had sent two dispatches to the Constable. He informed him of the English refusal to negotiate in Flanders, demanding the meetings to be held in London.157 He also listed seven state councillors among the commissioners to be chosen for the negotiations, most of whom were inclined to favour peace with Spain. On the list were Lord Charles Howard, the Earl of Devonshire, Sir Robert Cecil, the Earl of Northampton, the Earl of Dorset, Lord Kinloss and the Chancellor George Home. According to Villamediana, Cecil and Howard were not in favour of peace, while the rest were as inclined towards peace as was their king. Devonshire was with Cecil. In addition, Queen Anne was very friendly to Spain. The official meetings took place during June and July 1604, and Villamediana played a central role as the head of the Spanish–Flemish delegation, while Constable followed the whole process from Bergues Saint Vinox.158 As Villamediana had anticipated, the negotiations progressed quickly.159 Regarding the Dutch rebellion, Spain guaranteed the help and assistance of James. That assistance did not mean that the Dutch government stopped recruiting men for its armies in Great Britain, but that it would all be a private matter. In addition, Spain could do the same, as England would be a neutral kingdom. With regard to commercial relations, trade was restored between England and Spain.160 There was no express clause prohibiting trade with the Indies, but it was understood that the English commissioners agreed at the negotiating table a declaration that British subjects were ordered not to travel to the Spanish Indies, and if they did, it would be at their own risk of the Spanish punishment. It was not until 16 July that agreement was reached on this point.161 The English rejected an express prohibition on the grounds that none of the previous treaties between England and Spain contained the point. James undertook not to punish his subjects for travelling to the Spanish Indies, leaving the matter to their free will and choice. Although to Villamediana this was insufficient, the Constable accepted it as the lesser evil.162 The Spaniards offered 30,000 ducats for an English royal proclamation warning that no vassal of the king of England would trade with, sail or pass any ship to steal or undertake any kind of hostility or otherwise for any reason go to the East or West Indies. However, in April 1605 Philip III reported the failure of his initiative to his new

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ambassador to England, Don Pedro de Zúñiga, as there would be no express English prohibition.163 In the long view, Constable’s opinion proved the most reasonable and feasible, since it offered a way for Spanish repression of English penetration into the Indies (particularly the Caribbean area), until the time of Oliver Cromwell. In fact, Cromwell basically justified the declaration of war on Spain in 1655 with a list of repressive acts on the English since 1604.164 On the sensitive issue of Catholicism, given the English resistance and the risk of an irreconcilable disagreement, the Constable and Villamediana preferred not to insist on the matter. Later, both ambassadors would be unsuccessfully involved in plans for twenty-one years of tolerance in exchange for paying fines for English recusants.165 Catholics would have to settle for the benevolence of James (if any) and the protection of the Spanish embassy. Philip III congratulated the Constable on the achievement of peace, as well as ordering Villamediana in October 1604 to strive to improve the cause of Catholics in England.166 From Bordeaux, during his trip back to Spain, the Constable wrote that diplomacy and peace were the best ways to help the Catholics of England.167

God, wisdom and intelligence In early February 1604, from Flanders, the Constable appeared very pessimistic about the development of the negotiations for peace in view of two of the English claims: first, the marriage between Henry Stuart, Prince of Wales, and Spanish Infanta, with the Spanish Low Countries as a dowry; and second, the English demand for free trade with the Indies.168 The main issue for the Constable was the English stubbornness in the point of the free trade with the Indies.169 He had been ordered to obtain express prohibition of English navigation to the Indies.170 However, there was no such clause in any of them, since at those times neither England nor France has posed a serious threat to Spanish overseas possessions. The Constable confessed that it was almost impossible to prohibit English navigation overseas, adding that the treaties with England of 1506, 1515, 1520, 1542 and 1546 did not have clauses about navigation, which left them able to navigate and trade with all Spanish kingdoms and dominions.171 Therefore, he suggested doing what was done before, punishing English subjects who dared to go to the Indies.172 Again in mid-July, Philip III would insist that an explicit clause against English Indies navigation would be necessary.173 As expected by the Spanish diplomats, the English deputies flatly refused, justifying their refusal by citing previous treaties.174 In mid-May the Constable issued final documents to start the talks formally: first, the documents granting power of negotiation for Villamediana and senator Rovida; and second, documents giving them instructions on the main points to be negotiated.175 The third document dealt with issues such as where they would be met (Somerset House), courtesies and precedence, points such as the marriage of the Prince of Wales, recruitment for the Spanish army of Flanders or gifts and pension to be distributed among the British courtiers.176 The fourth and last document was a letter informing Philip III about the formal start of the business.177

 The English Crossroads 33 The Constable wanted to be present in London when the treaty oath ceremony was about to be taken by James in the Royal Chapel. Indeed, on 16 August he arrived at Dover to finish settling the peace, taking the oath before James and distributing numerous gifts and pensions.178 On 12 September he was back at Gravelines, on the Flemish coast, receiving the wishes of Philip III and the approval of the Spanish State Council.179 After passing through Paris on 12 October, he arrived in Valladolid on 11 December. He was taken immediately before Phillip III and Lerma to report his entire mission in England. The mission was successfully completed.180

Passions facing reasons (1623–5) Coloma’s perplexity and astonishment was considerable twenty-four hours after the departure of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham to Madrid. The trip, organized in secret, was made with the knowledge of the former ambassador Gondomar, back to Spain. James, upon learning of his son’s plans, reacted in two ways: with tears for his son and reserving friendly smiles and joy for the Coloma. In Madrid there was a good deal of disbelief. The Earl of Bristol, the English ambassador, truly believed that Charles was about to become Catholic before marrying the Spanish Infanta, sharing his convictions with Philip IV and probably even with Gondomar. The final result of the royal trip of 1623 to Spain was the failure of the Spanish Match and the return of the Prince and Buckingham, both harbouring a great desire for vengeance. The next two years were a succession of English provocations aimed at a break with Spain, while James tried to shore up the peace with his refusal to declare war. The Parliament of 1624 assured the rejection of the Spanish alliance and the agreement of the Palatinate, giving a diplomatic shift to the Dutch and France.

A marvellous day for Spain Between 1603 and 1605, the Spaniards had tried not only to settle peace with England but also to establish a deeper alliance, which was rejected by the Privy Council, claiming that James was at peace with everyone in Europe and that such an alliance with the Spanish empire would not be desirable for the rest of Europe.181 The negotiations conducted in 1623 were the most serious step in that direction.182 In 1623 this alliance involved three key issues: first, in matters of religion, tolerance of Catholicism;183 second, in political matters, the English involvement against the enemies of Spain (particularly the Dutch rebels). During 1622–3 the Spanish ambassadors in London, Brussels, and Vienna repeatedly insisted that the Dutch could only be overcome by sea with the help of England. James, who knew of this Spanish dilemma, used it to urge Philip IV regarding the Spanish Match.184 Third, it was greater security for the Indies, preventing and diverting aggressive English expansion overseas, leading to the preparation of the outline of a treaty submitted in October 1623, in which astonishing concessions were made to the English on both the East and West Indies.

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James was not at his best in the years 1620–3. Since 1618 he had been under a lot of pressure from his subjects to intervene in the Thirty Years’ War. In October 1622 Coloma wrote about the James’s growing distrust regarding his vassals, underlining his fears of Dutch support to his son-in-law Frederick V and his daughter Elizabeth Stuart as an alternative to the Stuart throne against Charles.185 He was accused of cowardice for not taking up the sword in defence of Protestantism and their own family. In the streets of London it was said that James was not the real father of his children, and it would be much better if Frederick and his wife were the real successors to the throne, and not Prince Charles, who was too favourable to Spain. What is more, in 1619 Dutch pamphlets were circulating in London streets ridiculing James as a poor fool with empty pockets, on horseback, armed with a spear, running after a hare. Coloma wrote that both the king and the prince have received many letters from Maurice of Orange, Frederick V, Elizabeth Stuart and Ernst von Mansfeld, asking for help against the Catholics and mercy for his poor children and grandchildren. Furthermore, during these years Buckingham had also become extremely unpopular in England and was seen as a traitor because of his Hispanophilia.186 The constant deficit of the English royal finances forced James to summon parliament in November 1621 to pay the English garrisons of the Rhineland, who were isolated, unable to survive and at the mercy of the troops of the Catholic League.187 However, these parliamentary meetings ended with confrontation that led to parliament’s dissolution and the imprisonment of Sir Edward Coke and Sir Robert Phillips, two members who were among the most belligerent against Spain.188 Finally, the crisis suffered by the English trade during the 1620s, which made access to the Spanish Indies an ideal economic solution, should not be neglected.189 During negotiations of 1603–5, it was proposed by the English that the Spanish Low Countries could be a dowry for a possible marriage between Prince Henry and the Spanish Infanta, whose heir could also rule over England.190 The idea itself was not new. It had arisen at the time of the marriage between Philip II of Spain and Queen Mary Tudor.191 Since 1621, the Dutch government suggested the transfer of sovereignty to both the Prince of Wales and Frederick V Palatine in exchange for English support against Spain.192 However, the dowry agreed in 1623 would not be Flanders but 2 million ducats, which was very important for James’s exhausted pockets.193 Another crucial point was trade with America and Asia. Between 1603 and 1605 it had been a source of friction during the peace negotiations.194 The anti-Spanish policy followed by Charles from 1623 had been largely due to the frustration of the English desire to participate in the rich Spanish Silver Indies, after the failure of the Spanish Match . Until 1621, Spain’s main issue was the Portuguese overseas empire. In the East Indies, English and Dutch trade companies impounded Portuguese cargoes, ships and factories, taking over the trade of spices. In Brazil, sugar-laden ships were the targets. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Council of Portugal pressed the Spanish Council of State concerning the renewal of the Twelve Years’ Truce with the Dutch. With the Peace of 1604, Spain attempted to secure the Caribbean area, which it saw as key to the West Indies.195 The English and the Dutch did not push too far on the West Indies against Spanish territories at the beginning of the seventeenth century. For

 The English Crossroads 35 a few years it seemed that Sir Walter Raleigh’s idea, in his History of the World (1614), of coexistence and sharing the trading world between the Spanish and English was coming to pass. Johan van Oldenbarnevelt had thwarted the creation of a Dutch company for the West Indies to preserve the truce with Spain. In the case of the English, Spanish repression focused on expeditions into Guiana, Brazil and the Amazon River. (The case of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1618 is paradigmatic.) However, the Dutch did not stop the expeditions, as they attacked the coasts of Chile and Peru in 1615 through the Strait of Magellan, and the establishment of factories in the Amazon area196. With respect to the English, from 1618 certain anti-Spanish aristocratic groups began funding settlement activities and piracy in the West Indies as the Amazon Company, established in 1619.197 During the negotiations of 1623, both Philip IV and Charles showed the desire to reach an agreement on the question of the Indies. Phillip IV enthusiastically supported the English Prince in everything, except matters of religion.198 It is not plausible that Philip came to promise free trade with the Indies for English merchants, but it is the case that the Spanish tried to do everything possible to conclude a closer alliance between these two countries, which had been sought since 1603.199 However, this apparently broken promise was one of the accusations presented by Buckingham to the parliament on 24 February 1624: ‘His Majesty [Phillip IV] had said the Prince of Wales [in Madrid] that if they were friends, His Majesty would divide the world between the two of them.’200 Buckingham, after hearing the promises of Olivares regarding this, thought ironically that ‘the Spanish prime minister did us a great favour, for in their conceits they [the Spaniards] have already swallowed the world’.201 As a result of the failure of these promises, the English tried to establish a trading company for America, as did the Dutch in 1621. First presented during the Parliament of 1621, and later (with more interest as England was at war with Spain) in 1625 and again in 1626, the project was discussed with Charles. However, the project failed due to the opposition of the parliament against Buckingham.202 Philip IV was also aware of the importance of this new alliance. In 1619 Sir Anthony Sherley praised the convenience of an Anglo–Spanish marriage, focusing on English power at sea to stop the Dutch.203 Cardinal De La Cueva, Spanish ambassador to Brussels, insisted on the same ideas.204 Sir William Semple wrote a report eleven days after the arrival in Madrid of the Prince of Wales.205 He advised that if Charles became Catholic and married the Spanish Infanta, Philip could divide the Indies with him. Semple, surely impressed by the arrival of the prince, emphasized a closer union with England, including the question of the Indies.206 The new alliance was discussed by a council made up of four ministers: Don Agustín Messia, the Marquis of Montesclaros, Don Fernando Girón and Gondomar.207 The written draft on the alliance was sent to the Spanish Council of State in October 1623, as additions and changes to certain clauses of the peace treaty of 1604. Philip IV ordered this document to be presented to the English ambassador, the Earl of Bristol.208 Subsequently, English denunciation of the Anglo–Spanish marriage and the truce in the Palatinate halted the project of a new alliance. However, Buckingham demonstrated its importance in England when he revealed it during parliamentary sessions in March

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1624 as evidence of malicious Spanish intentions.209 Months later, this revelation would be one of the charges against Buckingham presented by Hinojosa and Coloma: Revealing in the parliamentary sessions that secret treaties existed between Your Majesty [James I] and the King of Spain related to the Netherlands that Your Majesty wanted to keep secret and that were only known by My Lord [Philip IV] and the Count-Duke of Olivares.210

Apart from some pending points between the two crowns (new trade privileges and taxes and the English trade with Barbary), the new treaty of alliance of 1623 centred, as in 1604, on two interlinked clauses: the East and West Indies trade and the Dutch problem.211 As for the Dutch issues, previous conversations in England between Buckingham, Digby and Gondomar between 1620 and 1622 were mentioned.212 Again, the possibility of Flanders as the Anglo–Spanish marriage dowry was presented. This time, however, Spain would only cede the provinces of Holland and Zeeland, while the rest remain under Spanish sovereignty.213 Years later, in January 1631, Olivares and Sir Francis Cottington signed a secret treaty against Holland in exchange for which Stuart England would receive 100,000 ducats a month and the transfer of Zeeland. England’s internal problems and Spanish military setbacks would preclude the practical expression of this alliance.214 The most significant developments were on trade with the Indies. Spanish treaties with France (1598), England (1604) and the Dutch (1609) were a second division of the world after that made ​​with Portugal in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. Spanish power tried to adjust the limits of the Spanish and Portuguese empires to the expansion of emerging Atlantic powers. Spain refused to grant them free trade with the Indies, leaving the situation that, outside of European seas, there would be no peace. The English, Dutch and French would sail at their own risk, but peace in Europe would not be affected. The new alliance appeared to be a ‘new Tordesillas’. In the West Indies, the novelty was that Philip IV was ready to accept de iure English settlements of Virginia and the Bermuda, that is, giving political and diplomatic cover, although controlled, to English and access to the West Indies. With respect to the East Indies, the council of Portugal was pressing the Spanish Council of State to close down English expansion in Asia at all cost.215 However, Philip IV’s ministers rejected such a demand because of the military inability to prohibit access to non-Portuguese territories in the East Indies, given the weakness of the Portuguese empire and the powerful English expansion in Asia around 1623. Instead of a military and naval confrontation with the English, a number of concessions to them were proposed. In Asian ports between Malacca and the Persian Gulf (called North India), English trading posts would be respected and English ships would be allowed to access Portuguese factories. The English government would be asked to assist in the recovery of Hormuz, which had been taken from the Portuguese by the Persians and English in May 1622. After that, Philip IV could accept English merchants at Hormuz too. Spain offered an alliance and confederation with the English to expel the Dutch from those Asian territories and share their trade and factories. Finally, in the area between

 The English Crossroads 37 Malacca and the Philippines (called South India), in exchange for English naval and military assistance against the Dutch, Spain would grant the English trading company two factories to ply their trade, allowing them access to the rest of the Spanish and Portuguese territories there. All these concessions proved, first of all, that the bill for the new alliance with England would fall mainly on Portugal and the East Indies. It is clear, therefore, that Spain tried to divert English expansion into the East Indies to protect their own domains, mainly in the West Indies.216 Second, and for the first time since 1492, this new treaty would allow, explicitly and under certain Spanish control, English expansion in both Indies, in exchange for assistance against the Dutch, who were the greatest threat to Spain’s possessions and ocean routes since the end of the sixteenth century. Politically and diplomatically speaking, this represented Spanish recognition of the futility of the Treaty of Tordesillas and the papal bulls of Alexander VI.217

No war with England Charles left Madrid on 9 September 1623. Thus ended a visit to Spain where he had tried to hasten his marriage and achieve a deeper alliance with the Habsburgs, surpassing the agreement of 1604. Despite almost six months of tough political and religious negotiations, nothing was obtained. Olivares and other Spanish ministers were suspicious of English intentions, placing the blame on Buckingham, a point of view shared by the Earl of Bristol. No wonder an extraordinary ambassador, Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, was appointed to accompany the English entourage to the port of Santander and back to England. Officially, his duty was to accompany the prince and Buckingham and to congratulate James.218 Unofficially, his task was to ascertain the true intentions of his companions and, with much discretion and secrecy, to procure information to report back on England’s intentions219. Either way, Charles, on embarking at Santander, sent an expresses courier to the Earl of Bristol suspending his marriage.220 Officially the agreement was not broken by Spanish government until December 1623.221 James hardly could resist the pressure from Charles and Buckingham. His poor health seems to have affected his activity and the business of governing. According to his physician in 1623, Sir Theodore Mayerne, the fifty-seven-year-old king had the physical condition of a very elderly person and was suffering from senility and episodes of depression, renal colic, bronchitis, gout (which prevented him from walking unassisted), episodes of diarrhoea, haemorrhoids and difficulty chewing from the lack of teeth.222 With both the marriage treaty and the truce of the Palatinate failing and rejected, the Spanish option was abandoned.223 In response, seven Spanish councillors of state insisted that it was not appropriate under any circumstances for Phillip IV to go to war with England.224 The convenience of not breaking off relations with James, or at least not being the first to do so thus acting as the aggressor, would be the dominant position in the Spanish Council of State until 1625. At the time, the European context was very complex, involved in the Thirty Years’ War and the resumption of conflict in Flanders. Between the years 1620 and 1623,

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Spanish troops had participated in the battles of White Mountain (November 1620, Bohemia), Fleurus (August 1622, Spanish Netherlands), the conquest of Rhenish Palatinate (August 1620), Jülich (February 1622, Germany) and the siege of Bergen op Zoom (October 1622, Holland).225 After these advances, the army of Flanders headed off to winter quarters, waiting for the result of diplomatic negotiations taking place in Madrid and London during 1623. Hopes were based on the fact that an Anglo–Spanish agreement would force the Dutch to give up. The failure pushed back the war. In July 1624, Ambrogio Spinola, the Genovese military leader of the Army of Flanders, began the siege of Breda.226 The change of English foreign policy began at the end of 1623, with the return of Charles and Buckingham. The English parliament summoned in February 1624 marked the demise of the alliance with Spain, rejecting both the agreement on the Palatinate (April 1623) and the marriage agreement (July 1623).227 If war did not break out, it was only because of the opposition of James.228 The prince, Buckingham and the majority of Parliament wanted the war.229 Subsequently, English diplomacy was moving in that direction. On 5 June 1624, England and Holland signed a defensive alliance that was implicitly directed against Philip IV and the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand II.230 In the spring of 1625 the creation of the League of Avignon and the twenty-seven articles of the marriage agreement between England and Louis XIII of France took place; on 2 August, the Treaty of The Hague was signed for the formation of the combined Anglo–Dutch fleet and on 17 September a military alliance with the Dutch at Southampton was agreed. On 9 December 1625, England, in open war with Spain, signed the Treaty of The Hague with Denmark and Holland.231

Holding up Between September 1623 and April 1625, the Spanish Council of State discussed several ideas that shaped the political and diplomatic response to the English hostility. They were the perfect example of what had been learned in foreign policy from the Spanish disasters of 1588–98. First of all, Buckingham, the prince’s favourite, was accused of being primarily responsible for the failure of the Spanish Match.232 A report on Buckingham’s public and private behaviour at the Spanish court was sent to England.233 Besides, the council saw no reason or cause for England to declare war on Spain, and Spanish ministers were convinced that trade with Spanish territories in Europe was very profitable for English merchants.234 It was a well-established opinion in Spain that, while James was on the throne, peace would prevail, not to mention the limited English military and financial resources available to wage a war.235 Spain maintained great diplomatic efforts to avoid war with Stuart England, both with the English ambassador Sir Walter Aston in Madrid and with James I in London. It was essential not to leave the diplomatic post in London vacant, which explains the number of ambassadors sent to England during the years 1623, 1624 and 1625.236 Besides, in the event of a war, Spain would have to establish alliances with other Catholic states in Europe. There were emerging plans to establish an alliance with the papacy, the king of Poland, the Holy Roman Emperor, the Duke of Bavaria and other

 The English Crossroads 39 Italian princes. As a grandiose plan, Olivares proposed a marriage alliance between Princess Henrietta Maria of France and the Spanish Infante Don Carlos, brother of Philip IV, so the France and Spain could fight against England together, with the pope’s blessing. Any kind of English attack or aggression against Spanish territories would mean the outbreak of war for Spain. Once declared, the immediate result would be the confiscation of British properties, vessels and goods on Spanish territories. The embargo would be decreed by Philip IV in the Spanish city of Monzón on 19 March 1626, but in late November 1625, Don Fadrique de Toledo, returning from Brazil, confiscated eight English ships in the Port of Málaga. In Flanders, Spanish authorities started the embargo in December 1625. On the other hand, the equivalent English embargo would be decreed on 3 January 1626.237 The next steps were to be discussed carefully by the Spanish Council of State, and the idea to prepare an attack on Ireland was put forward.238 The death of James on 6 April 1625 changed all plans. Earlier that year Philip IV had ordered Gondomar to head for England to restore diplomatic relations with Charles.239 However, Philip IV had instructed his new ambassador that if the death of the English monarch were to occur while he was on the way, Gondomar should halt his trip to England for further instructions.240 Once the death of James was known, Gondomar was ordered to travel to France to congratulate the French kings on the marriage of the Princess Marie Henriquette; Don Iñigo Vélez de Guevara, VIII Count of Oñate and Villamediana were ordered to travel to London to offer Philip IV’s condolences on the death of the English monarch.241 In a letter to Philip IV of 30 April 1625 Gondomar himself had expressed his lack of confidence and distrust about the success of his mission after hearing the news of the death of his old friend, King James.242 In the end neither of these two Spanish ambassadors crossed the English Channel. It was only Gondomar, already on his way to England, then diverted to Paris, Brussels and Antwerp who, from Flanders, recognized the political situation in England, although by then war was imminent and numerous English preparations were being made in Plymouth for a fleet. Philip IV ordered Gondomar to communicate from Brussels with his confidantes and friends at the English court to propose an agreement with Charles I.243 Gondomar sent his English secretary Henry Taylor to attend a meeting with Charles and Buckingham. Taylor and Jacques Bruneau, the minister resident, assured the English pair that Philip IV would consider the entry of the English fleet currently at Plymouth into Spanish waters a declaration of war.244 They were not listened: the Anglo–Dutch fleet sailed from Plymouth with over 100 ships in early October 1625 and sailed to Cadiz to try to take the port and the Indies fleets, ending the enterprise with a disastrous retreat.245 During the debates held in the Spanish Council of State, the possibility of an open naval confrontation by Spanish twenty galleys and Don Fadrique de Toledo’s galleons against the English fleet was proposed.246 However, Olivares’s caution triumphed, as he opposed the idea of facing the English at sea, even if the result was a Spanish victory.247 In other words, the strategy of defender overcame the strategy of the aggressor. Circumstances would prove this correct. From 1625 Stuart England would lose much of its great reputation as a naval European power after the failed attack on Cadiz and the rest of it in the disastrous expeditions to La Rochelle in 1627 and 1628.

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England’s withdrawal from the Thirty Years’ War following the diplomatic agreements with France in 1629 and with Spain in 1630 would leave it in a secondary role in European conflicts until the era of Oliver Cromwell.248 Moreover, the damage to the British economy with the end of trade with Spain and Flemish privateers’ attacks on British trade resulting from the war from 1625 did not help its recovery from the economic crisis of 1621–5.249 Jacques Bruneau, Philip IV’s minister resident in London by 1625, was kept constantly informed of English fleet’s preparations. He paid a first-class spy to go to Plymouth for forty-two days to spy on the English fleet there.250 Meanwhile, Gondomar (from Flanders) remained attentive to the English preparations. In late September 1625 a courier from Gondomar reached Madrid warning of the departure of the Anglo– Dutch fleet from Plymouth.251 Regarding the exact destination of the English attack, the news sent by the Spanish embassy from England pointed to a predictable set of objectives. The port of Cadiz had been one of these targets since at least January 1625.252 The parallels with the situation in 1588 are clear. This time, however, the English played the part of Philip II of Spain, and Philip IV of Spain that of Elizabeth I. There was a European kingdom expecting a naval attack by another; there was an enormous fleet ready, this time in Plymouth and not Lisbon, and the existence of a huge amount of news around the continent about the fleet and its possible targets in Europe. The Spanish response, like that of the English in 1588, was to prepare its defence, not risking open battle. Spain had learned the lesson of the Armadas sent against England in 1588 and 1601. Spanish victory meant the success of the cautious strategy towards England that Olivares had defended at the Spanish Council of State during 1624 and 1625.253

Matters Spanish ambassadors must conceal in England Between September 1623 and December 1625 Philip IV sent to England five diplomats: four extraordinary ambassadors and one minister resident (excluding the Flemish agent, Juan Bautista Van Male). From September to December 1623, four ambassadors remained in London.254 Until June 1624 (Hinojosa) and October 1624 (Coloma) remained at the English court despite an anti-Spanish atmosphere not experienced since 1584, when Don Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, was expelled from England after his involvement in Francis Throckmorton’s plot against Elizabeth I was revealed.255 However, this time public opinion about Spain was made even worse by the hostility of the Stuart heir and his favourite. Both Charles and Buckingham gathered around them the most militant faction against Spain, gaining the support of the majority of parliament and all those who wanted to return to the alliance with the Dutch and the Protestantism. In short, they wanted to restore Elizabethan foreign policy, with its many triumphs and England’s good reputation rather than continue James’s age of pacifism and reluctantly. The poor health of the old monarch in contrast to the youth, vitality and momentum of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham were the perfect backdrop for this political play.256

 The English Crossroads 41 In response, the Spanish ambassadors were instructed by Madrid to discredit Buckingham to make him lose royal affection. These movements actually caused a worsening of the political situation between both governments, as James denounced the unworthy behaviour of the Spanish ambassadors at his court, undermining the usual diplomatic channels. The Stuart government restated and hardened its approach on the case of the Palatinate and the Spanish Match. In November 1623, the Earl of Bristol and Sir Walter Aston, English ambassadors in Madrid, demanded restitution of the Palatinate to Frederick V, while in England James exerted pressure by ordering the return of his ambassador, the Earl of Bristol, from Madrid and appointing a committee of twelve councillors in order to resolve political issues with Spain.257 Four before the betrothal at the Spanish court, scheduled for 11 December 1623, the two English ambassadors presented an ultimatum to Philip IV in order to settle the Palatinate issue in Germany in favour of Frederick V.258 It was really an excuse to disrupt the project of the marriage alliance with Spain.259 In Coloma’s opinion, this unstable political situation in England could even endanger the Stuart monarchy if James I opposed the aggressive desire of both his son and his favourite. The latter’s idea would cause a diplomatic incident between England and Spain a few months later.260

The ‘black spring’ Coloma and Hinojosa both understood the reason behind the summoning of the English parliament as a response to the financial needs of James I in order to deal with the new diplomatic Stuart movements in Europe, after the failure of the Spanish agreement.261 The English crown’s anti-Spanish sentiment would start to gain a hold during the English parliamentary sessions in the spring of 1624, having its final and practical conclusion with the war in 1625.262 One of the first consequences of the English enmity for the Spanish ambassadors was that they began to be isolated.263 According to Hinojosa, Buckingham had ordered the surveillance of their residence, threatening all who dared to pay them a visit.264 The natural result of this isolation was the weakening of the Spanish faction at court and also the increased difficulty of getting information.265 Another was the hardening of persecution of British Catholics, as can be understood from the royal proclamation against Catholic clergy in Ireland dated 31 January 1624.266 A third consequence was a change in English foreign policy towards the former enemies of Spain, the Netherlands, France, Venice and Savoy. In December 1623 the Dutch and Venetians requested that England join them in an international league, while France sent a captain of the royal guard to begin diplomatic contacts for the marriage between Prince Charles and Princess Henrietta Maria, sister of King Louis XIII.267 However, during the months before the summoning of the English parliament, Hinojosa and Coloma made clear three main ideas regarding the relation with England. First of all, Spain had to avoid war with England at almost any cost.268 Second, there were serious divisions within the English Privy Council and among members of parliament regarding war with Spain. The Earl of Bristol, Sir John Digby and James were strongly opposed to war, contrary to Charles’s view. Buckingham, Secretary of State Sir Edward

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Conway and the Earl of Carlisle supported a bellicose stance, while others, like the Earl of Lennox, the Earl of Arundel, Sir Richard Weston, Earl of Middlesex and Secretary of State Sir George Calvert, rejected war.269 Some members of parliament considered the risk of conflict and its consequences potentially fatally damaging to English trade with Spanish domains, in exchange for such an uncertain business as restitution of the Palatinate by military means, as well as meaning that England would depend on France, Venice and Savoy for its foreign policy actions in Europe.270 Finally, they hardly recommended securing the friendship and support of the English state councillors towards peace with Spain.271 Thus, in the spring of 1624 there was barely concealed disagreement at the English court between two groups – the faction led by Buckingham, with the support of Charles Stuart, members of parliament and other courtiers very hostile to Spain and a faction opposed to the outbreak of war and the excessive power of the king’s favourite. Enemies of Buckingham, such as Bristol, Arundel, Calvert or the Lord Treasurer, Middlesex, found themselves politically ostracized, indicted or imprisoned.272 The Spanish embassy gave political and financial support to those who opposed Buckingham’s faction, as ordered from Madrid by Philip IV and Olivares.273 James’s opening speech to parliament made things clear from the beginning, since it directly addressed the Spanish marriage and question of the Palatinate.274 He let Prince Charles and Buckingham lead the parliamentary debates.275 Parliament of 1624 was acting as the mouthpiece for English anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic sentiment that seemed to have lain dormant since the dissolution of the previous parliament in December 1621. Hinojosa, Coloma and Juan Bautista Van Male, together with Spanish royal envoy Father Diego de la Fuente, suffered the wrath of the English population and provocation, from March to June of 1624. As for what happened in the parliamentary sessions during March 1624, several points were clarified in the reports of the ambassadors. In his speech to parliament, Buckingham had accused Philip III and his son of disloyally deceiving England with the marriage negotiations, mainly to prevent James from recovering the Rhenish Palatinate by military force. In addition, Philip IV was accused of preparing another armada to invade England.276 In the House of Commons, the debates centred on the Infanta’s dowry and her dubious quality and high blood – ‘as false as the promises of Spain’.277 England had no more enemies than the Spaniards and the English Catholics, and they should have assisted the Dutch and recovered the Rhenish Palatinate by force.278 The House of the Lords, meanwhile, was voted to break the treaties with Spain.279 Parliament had three final requests: the dissolution of treaties with Spain; the implementation of proclamations against Jesuits and priests and generally against all Popish recusants and the protection of the Anglican Church from any diplomatic agreement signed with other European states.280 James’s answer was, first, to vindicate his pacifist foreign policy as Rex Pacificus. Second, he proposed the recovery of the Rhenish Palatinate by peaceful means. Finally, he pointed out to parliament that war with Spain would mean the reduction of the royal treasury and finances and the destruction of the English commerce.281 After the royal statement, Van Male, Coloma and Hinojosa could only express their relief.282 As for the alliance with the Dutch Republic, the three ambassadors arrived on 7 March 1624.283 The Dutch offer was to pay half of an army to be sent to Flanders

 The English Crossroads 43 against Spain, or the same agreement for a combined Anglo–Dutch fleet against the Iberian coast.284 Nevertheless, James’s will checked the temptation to declare war, which eventually exasperated the Dutch.285 Regarding dealings with France, diplomatic contacts were started in February 1624 by sending Henry Rich (Lord Kensington, the future Earl of Holland) to begin marriage negotiations. In May, James Hay (Earl of Carlisle) and the Duke of Buckingham himself were sent, followed in September by Sir George Goring; prenuptial agreements were signed in Paris on 20 March 1625. At that time, an envoy of Louis XIII had travelled to London to express the French wish that Princess Henrietta Maria become Charles’s wife. A monk sent by Queen Marie de Medici also had dealings with Buckingham about this project.286 The climate of persecution against the Spanish ambassadors in London distorted much of the diplomatic communication between the two countries, as their personal and political situation affected all parties’ judgement on the general circumstances of Anglo–Spanish diplomatic relations. During two audiences with James, Archdeacon Don Francisco de Carondelet, Coloma’s chaplain, had said, with concern, that both ambassadors feared for their lives due to the insults and threats received on the streets of London.287 In desperation, Hinojosa and Coloma wrote to the Spanish government, begging to take them out of England.288 James’s assurances were apparently not enough to prevent the fury of the English population, encouraged by parliament, Charles and Buckingham.289 Therefore, on 28 March, English authorities issued a royal proclamation for the protection of foreign ambassadors, proclamation in fact decreed specifically for the defence of the Spanish embassy.290 As for the English ambassadors in Spain, the Earl of Bristol returned to England in early May 1624 and Sir Walter Aston in early April 1625, while the English embassy was in the charge of the Chargé d’Affaires until December 1625.291 The confrontation between the ambassadors and Buckingham reached a peak after his speech at parliament on 5 March. Two days later, Coloma and Hinojosa went to complain to James in an audience at which the royal favourite was present.292 In that moment, reproaches and accusations flew between the duke and the Spanish ambassadors.293 Finally, Buckingham directly accused the Spanish ambassadors of conspiring against him, to which they responded him that he was opposing the marriage alliance with Spain with the support of the Puritans and the archbishop of Canterbury. James ended the discussion by assuring them that he did not wish war against Spain under any circumstances.294 On 2 April 1624, Tuesday of Holy Week, James accepted a donation provided by the English parliament of 396,000 sterling pounds. This huge sum was granted of the condition that both treaties with Spain (marriage and truce in Rhenish Palatinate) were broken and, in particular, that the money would be used to fortify the coasts of Ireland, strengthen the royal fleet and assist the Dutch in their war with Spain.295 However, the king retained the freedom of action to declare war and lead diplomacy.296 The wisdom with which James accepted the money contrasted with the burst of enthusiasm by the people of London; as Hinojosa reported, ‘this place was full of joy with fireworks and fires’. Apparently, Londoners believed that war had already broken out by throwing stones at Hinojosa’s house, and crowds gathered on the streets in front of the Spanish embassy insulting and cursing Spain.297

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Pressure on the ambassadors was at its worst at that time. Even if James totally rejected these popular demonstrations on the streets of London, Hinojosa and Coloma wrote to Madrid that Stuart England would join with France, the Dutch, Savoy and Venice against Spain, expecting the outbreak in twenty days.298 In fact, they were willing to leave England without James’s royal licence, which would provoke the declaration of war. Fortunately, the situation in London eased after a few days.299 At a royal audience on 8 April, James made his desire for universal peace clear to Hinojosa and Coloma; Coloma added that ‘this king really and truly wants to settle the issue of the Rhenish–Palatine by diplomatic treaty, and he apologises for the celebrations and fireworks on the streets’.300 Both ambassadors confirmed that after the English breaking of the treaties and the acceptance of parliament’s sum, the king’s will for peace was maintained. This was the time to try to fight Buckingham’s favour in James’s eyes through stronger and greater accusations. Apart from the ambassadors two other figures played their role in this plan to discredit Buckingham’s primacy at the English court. One was the Flemish archdeacon Don Francisco de Carondelet, who had three audiences with James between March and April 1624. During the first two audiences, he presented several complaints about the incendiary relationship between the ambassadors and the prime minister. The third, on 11 April, had a quite different tone. It was at this audience that Buckingham was accused of plotting a conspiracy against James, supported the earls of Oxford and Southampton, with the consent of the prince.301 James seemed distressed, promising a thorough investigation of the alleged conspiracy. If it was true, Buckingham would pay with his head.302 The other figure was Father Diego de la Fuente, an envoy sent by Philip IV in order to calm down the situation at the English court. James viewed his arrival with much hope.303 The Spanish ambassadors asked James to send a captain with a passport to go to Calais to pick up Father Diego, since the passage of the English Channel was heavily guarded by Dutch ships.304 Their fears were confirmed as on the roads of Picardy an armed group of men attacked Father Diego, taking all his papers, documents and letters.305 Finally arriving in London on 3 April, he had his first public audience with the king on 9 April.306 However, it was not until 13 April that Father Diego had the first secret audience with the king.307 He presented James with the inconveniences of a war, exhorting peace, encouraging the king to dissolve the English parliament as he had done before, in 1614 and 1621. Finally, Father Diego again made a veiled accusation against Buckingham. Suspicions of a conspiracy put forward by the Spanish embassy had taken effect on James’s spirits, since the charge of treason hinged on three essential points: first, the king’s fear of plots, from which he had suffered in 1603, 1605 and 1606 and during his turbulent reign in Scotland, and his great sense of royal authority; second, the strong position of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham as heads of the Protestant party at court; third, the idea circulating in the English court about the retirement of the old king, given his poor health and lack of resolve over the Catholic offensive in Europe.308 Whatever Spanish ambassadors thought about the real power of the king at that time, it is true that James had shown himself to be the only obstacle to war between Spain and England.309

 The English Crossroads 45 James ordered the members of his Privy Council to take an oath confirming that they would not be involved in any conspiracy against him.310 From the Spanish side, between mid-April and mid-May, ambassadors continued to put pressure on the king. Both Father Diego de la Fuente and Hinojosa reminded James about his favourite’s despicable conduct while in Madrid and during parliamentary sessions.311 Two consequences followed. Buckingham fell ill in early May 1624, depressed by the lack of support from James and the pressure put on him from parliamentary sessions, preparation of the royal English fleet and diplomatic talks with the Dutch, the French and Venetians.312 The second consequence was the subsequent political breakdown that occurred between the king and the Spanish ambassadors. The purpose of the charge of conspiracy against Buckingham was to undermine his status with the support of his enemies at the English court, but the problem was that he had the prince’s full support. When Buckingham denied all the charges and called for an official investigation, Charles took those accusations as if they were against him. When James asked for more details of the alleged plot, Hinojosa’s and Coloma’s silence left them exposed. Both ambassadors had provided the prince and Buckingham with the perfect opportunity to poison the relationship between the monarch and the Spanish diplomats.313 As a result, the king tried to not grant more audiences to the Spanish ambassadors. Indeed, at a meeting of the Privy Council on 27 May, the paper with the charges against Buckingham was discussed by the councillors. Some said Hinojosa and Coloma deserved public execution; others that they should be expelled from England with shame; a third group defended the conduct of both diplomats, as they did not accuse the prince but his favourite.314 However, James refused to show his serious disappointment and anger with the ambassadors, as this would be de facto a declaration of war.315 The royal response to the ambassadors was sent on 13 June by the royal secretaries Sir Edward Conway and Sir Francis Cottington. Hinojosa, who on 4 May had received permission to return to Spain by Philip IV, would not receive an official farewell from the king nor other usual privileges of gifts, an official escort to Dover or a royal galleon to cross the English Channel.316 As for Coloma, he would not be expelled from the country, but he would not be granted royal audiences by the king, although he would be allowed to negotiate affairs of state with ministers of the government.317

The last chance Between October 1624 and December 1625 the Flemish minister resident Jacques Bruneau was in charge of Spanish embassy affairs, after the departure of Hinojosa and Coloma from England. Bruneau, also assisted by the Flemish agent Juan Bautista Van Male, was another of those figures born in the Spanish Low Countries who worked faithfully for the Spanish crown in royal administration and diplomacy.318 Like other figures, such as Gabriel de Roy, Pedro Van Roose or Juan Bautista Van Male, Bruneau was among the large Spanish–Flemish political and military lobby.319 However, his diplomatic activity in England can be described as discreet and lowranking, since he was really acting as the embassy chargé d’affaires, awaiting the return of Gondomar to the post.320 His low profile was necessary for three reasons: first, as

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minister resident, Bruneau had a lower diplomatic rank.321 His diplomatic job was provisional in England, awaiting the arrival of an ordinary ambassador.322 Second, the embassy’s budget was small, which meant, consequently, that his diplomatic activity was also reduced.323 Finally, he took on the role during a time of a precarious diplomatic situation between Philip IV and James I. Meanwhile, Gondomar had orders from Philip IV and Olivares to offer more alternatives to resolve the situation of the Rhenish Palatinate with the help of the Spanish armies.324 However, the death of King James on 6 April 1625 put an end to all these plans for Anglo–Spanish friendship. Now, Gondomar did not cross the English Channel ‘having ceased with his death [King James I] the occasion of your embassy’.325 As Olivares wrote to Gondomar, Having made every effort possible with softness and dissimulation with that king [Charles I Stuart] with no result at all, I do not dare to say that the war will not break with England, but by not sending Your Lordship to the King of England right now, we are showing him that we do not have fear of his armies, but only our love, friendship and good correspondence we had for his father [James I].326

In late June 1625, Philip IV ordered Gondomar to speed up his passage to Flanders. The Spanish government was aware of the English fleet prepared in Plymouth, and it was hoped that Gondomar would settle at Brussels, and from there, ‘may be able to communicate with your confidants at the English court’ to offer a new agreement to King Charles.327 This order had a second meaning, putting Bruneau under the direct authority of Gondomar’s orders, to provide all possible support and assistance to Gondomar’s envoy, his English secretary, Henry Taylor. In March, Taylor had been at the English court to contact Buckingham and Charles, showing the Spanish desire for peace despite the failure of 1623, and to guarantee two points: ensuring peace in Christendom and the restitution of the Rhenish Palatinate to Frederick V.328 In August, Taylor had returned to England to present several Spanish proposals to King Charles, but everybody was sceptical about these diplomatic efforts at the English court.329 In Madrid these attempts were not well understood because it was viewed as a fruitless gesture which would adversely affect Spain’s reputation in front of a kingdom openly preparing to attack Spain. The royal Secretary of State Andrés Losada was clearly sceptical and Olivares hoped ironically for peace, while Philip IV directly expressed irritation ‘about the matter of sending your secretary Enrique ​​Teller [Henry Taylor] to England, I would be more satisfied if you would have not done it’.330 In September 1625, when at Plymouth the English and Dutch fleets were getting ready to sail for the Spanish coast, Jacques Bruneau and Henry Taylor had an audience to present three warnings to King Charles. First, in accord with clause 10 of the Peace of 1604, it was mandatory to inform and request a royal licence if more than six or eight warships were to approach or enter Spanish or English shores and seas. Second, if the Anglo–Dutch Armada was to sail to Spanish coasts and waters, it would be considered a declaration of war by the Spanish government. Third, an alliance between England and the Dutch contravened the peace with Spain. The king’s response could not have been more dismissive: the fleet at Plymouth was being organized to support Frederick

 The English Crossroads 47 V, and, in any case, he knew what was best for his kingdom.331 There was nothing to be done diplomatically: Gondomar ordered his secretary Taylor to return to Flanders.332

Theatre plays go unpunished From the return of the Prince and Buckingham to England (October 1623) until the naval English attack on Cadiz (November 1625), those in favour of breaking the war with Spain relied on the Spaniards to respond to their provocations at the parliament, at the English court and against the Spanish ambassadors in London. By doing so, it would be the evil Catholic Spain to declare war in the first place (as it happened in 1588). Consequently, the majority of the English population would galvanize around the successor of the old king James, Charles and his favourite (Buckingham), forgetting the dealings with the Spaniards and the trip to Madrid looking for the Spanish wife. However, it is clear that they did not expect the actions of the cool heads at the Spanish government, starting with the prime minister, Olivares and the young king Phillip. A good example of that is the episode of the play A Game at Chess. Thomas Middleton, the famous English playwright (1580–1627), could not have picked a better moment to present his play A Game at Chess. Sir Henry Herbert granted it a licence in June 1624. It was first performed on 6 August and had an incredible success, remaining at the theatre for nine consecutive days.333 As a good playwright, Middleton captured the anti-Spanish popular atmosphere, by writing a play that not only represented the struggle between good (England, Protestant forces, white characters) and evil (Spain and Catholicism and black characters – Gondomar being satirized as the Black Knight) but also criticized King James’s passivity (the white king) against the action of the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Buckingham (‘White Knight’ and ‘White Duke’) against the black enemies of England. Its success and its subject could not be ignored by Coloma, who wrote Olivares on 20 August about Middleton’s play.334 His complaints to the English ministers (King James was not in London at the time) caused royal prohibition of the performance335. According to Coloma, on 29 August, the author and the actors had been called before the Privy Council in order to give an explanation and for the council to veto the play. However, the ambassador’s complaints only led to greater success for Middleton’s play at the English court because of the publicity, and subsequently it was printed to be sent to Holland as a gift for Elizabeth Stuart, the Princess Palatine.336 On 19 September an inquiry was made at the Spanish Council of State about allegations of Coloma about Middleton’s play.337 The ambassador’s reaction to the play was severely criticized by several councillors, who argued that Coloma should have ignored such provocations from the common people of London, and even less sent a letter to King James complaining and threatening, as Coloma’s main duty was maintaining peace and friendly relations with King James despite English provocation. That is, as ambassador, Coloma had failed in prudence and dissimulation, two key points in European diplomacy and politics at that time. However, not all the members of the Spanish government criticized Coloma. From Brussels, the Infanta Isabella backed the ambassador’s actions at the English court.338 On the other side, King Philip IV ordered both Bruneau and Coloma to not become involved in these minor matters of comedians and theatre.339

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A new Trojan War? Black Trojans and white Greeks Stuart England, the Black Legend and Spain During the second half of the sixteenth century the kingdom of England, under the reign of Elizabeth I, had emerged as the new champion of Protestantism in Europe. To this was added the reputation gained by its maritime achievements, especially in the war with Philip II. The failure of the Spanish Armada in 1588 and the subsequent English victories in the war against Spain had created an atmosphere of self-confidence among the late Elizabethans, especially the generation of the followers of the Earl of Essex.340 This mentality was also fuelled by the ‘black legend’ of Spain and other religious and political conflicts such as the Eighty Years’ War in Flanders and the French civil wars, which goes some way to explain the chauvinism felt by many English aristocrats, ministers and the common people of England in the years of peace with Spain after 1604.341 The basic logic behind this late Elizabethan chauvinism was that Spain was a poor, barren and miserable country, with the Indies alone to sustain its European wars and global empire. In addition to many English, peace with England was the best medicine for Spanish recovery and encouragement, so when England wished, it could defeat the Spaniards at any time, crushing them forever. In fact, in some English literary works, the Spaniards and the Irish were presented as similar race, closed to the Moors, Jews or Gypsies, as both people were enemies, primitive, savage and religiously separated.342 It may be possible that this English mentality towards Spaniards as culturally inferior people would come from the Spanish way of thinking of the Indians of the New World in the first place.343 If the Spanish ideas on colonization of America somehow influenced the English expansion in Ireland during Elizabethan times (including the consideration of the Irish as inferior race), in the context of the war and hostilities between England and Spain since the 1580s, these hate and contempt moved against the Spanish too. After all, Irish and Spanish were both Catholics and allies against England, so they would be considered savage and uncivilized as the Indians of the New World. Actually, even for the Irish, those who joined Cromwell’s government (England) in the 1650s were closed to races such as Turks, Jews, Moors and Negroes.344 The great reception of the Spanish literature during the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries in England helped to support this image. The Life of Lazarillo de Tormes and of His Fortunes and Adversities (1554) was translated into English in 1576. The Rogue and The Life of Guzman de Alfarache (1599 and 1604) was translated in 1622. Cervantes’s Novelas Ejemplares (1590–1612) inspired several English dramas during the Jacobean period, and Don Quixote (1605, 1615) was available in the English market in 1612 and 1620.345 Many of these literary works focused vividly on the Spanish social underground, the picaresque, the criminality, the poverty, the working classes, the Catholic Church and the political elite corruption, the converted Jews, the Moors and the Gypsies. In short, Spain was a tough and poor country, with its population being amalgam of different races, religions, languages and cultures, dominated by clerks, rogues, poor peasants or fools (like Don Quixote), and based only on the treasures of the Indies. For instance, in the first part of Don Quixote, translated by Thomas Shelton

 The English Crossroads 49 in 1612, there were at least 146 references to the Moors, and 7 to the Gypsies involving the adventures of the famous knight of La Mancha. Gondomar had understood all these ideas in English minds very well, blaming previous Spanish ambassadors, especially Villamediana and the Constable.346 Gondomar himself and Father Diego de la Fuente also blamed Spanish historians for giving its enemies strong arguments against the crown.347 Historians such as Bartolome Leonardo de Argensola (for the East Indies) or Bartolomé de las Casas (for the West Indies) were accused of disgracing the good name of Spain, offering examples of the treason, cruelty and violence of the Spanish conquests. Those in England who opposed the Spanish marriage sustained the idea that the Spanish empire grew through marriages and alliances with the kings of other nations. At their English eyes, England was the next target.348 Bartolome Leonardo de Argensola’s book was a direct consequence of the Spanish recapture of Tidore and Ternate from the Dutch by Don Pedro de Acuña in 1606, governor of Philippines.349 The Dutch had expelled the Portuguese from Amboina, Ternate and Tidore in 1605, and Spain was forced to come to assistance with 3,000 soldiers and 33 ships.350 The main idea of Argensola’s work was glorified Spanish power in Asia and the short and relatively costless military campaign necessary against the enemies of Spain.351 This was precisely Lerma’s foreign policy since 1598, diplomatic agreements and limited defensive wars against the enemies of Spain in Europe and the Spanish empire overseas. Gondomar and De la Fuente’s negative opinions on Argensola’s book were not only for disgracing the Spanish international image but also for defending Lerma’s appeasement with the Dutch (and the English). By 1619, with Lerma retiring from the head of the Spanish government, it was clear that the Spanish international position was changing towards greater political firmness and military deployment in Flanders, Germany and Italy. This controversy with Argensola’s image of Spanish empire in the Far East presented another conclusion. If the sixteenth century was the century of America, as the West Indies became a focus of discoveries, colonizations, commerce and wars between the European states, the seventeenth century would be the one of Asia. Once the European rivals of Spain (the English, Dutch and French) had challenged the Spanish power in America and had divided the spoils among them, Asia became the next target, the new theatre of operations, conflicts and wars. Portugal was a very vulnerable power as the Netherlands began to show from 1598 onwards, little after the English. As sharks going mad on smelling blood, the English and the Dutch attacked the weakest prey, combining piracy and trade in spices. The zenith of the English reputation would be in 1596, with the sack of Cadiz. After that, this Elizabethan self-confidence would gradually fade following the accession to the throne of James, with key milestones such as the 1604 peace with Spain, the death of Prince Henry Stuart in 1612, the trial and execution of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1618, the English refusal of a military intervention in Germany between 1618 and 1622 and the Prince of Wales’ trip to Madrid in 1623. Examples of a more nostalgic look at Elizabethan times are provided by playwrights such as Thomas Heywood and William Rowley in Fortune by Land and Sea (1607–9) and Heywood’s A true Relation, of the

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Lives and Deaths of Two Most Famous English Pyrats, Purser, and Clinton who Lived in the Reigne of Queene Elizabeth. Together with the Particular Actions of their Takings, and Undertakings with Other Pleasant Passages which Hapned Before their Surprizall Worth the Observing. In both works the English privateers were praised for their loyalty to England and Queen Elizabeth. By contrast, the anonymous The Lives, Apprehensions, Arraignments and Executions of the 19 Late Pyrates (1610) set out to establish the fate of those captains who had failed to accommodate to the new Stuart England (those ‘masterless men’ to whom the new Jacobean government was struggling to control after the end of the Elizabethan golden age of piracy and privateering).352 Their destination for many was the scaffold, while the cleverest would be integrated into Jacobean society as merchants or royal ministers in the service of the Stuart dynasty. Among the latter were captains Richard Gifford, Sir Henry Mainwaring and Sir John Pennington.353 In this sense, the nostalgic look to England’s Golden Age as the seventeenth century progressed (as opposed to the times of Stuarts, since there was peace with Spain and no more room for privateering and piracy but for trading companies) was similar to that in Spain with the times of Philip II compared to those of Philip III. The slow recovery of the Elizabethan spirit in England and the rise of the ‘Reputacionista’ movement in Spain, with the development of a new powerful foreign policy by Spain since 1618, would be comparable and almost parallel. Regarding English decline, Sir Anthony Sherley, English minister in the service of Spain, in his ‘Peso político de todo el mundo’, published in November 1622 and dedicated to Prime Minister Olivares, blamed King James for making England politically tamed and militarily diminished, hoping that Almighty God would keep James many years on the throne of England to ensure Spain’s optimal security in Europe.354 Many at the English court saw King James’s pacifist policy towards Spain as the principal cause of the loss of England’s international reputation.355 Peace would allow Spain to recover from the wars, to return to the offensive against the Dutch, letting Philip III impose his political and military hegemony on Europe and Catholicism on Protestant kingdoms. These ideas had been publicized a great deal in England during the years of peace negotiations in 1603 and 1605.356 In 1604 the Spanish envoys to England were accused of entertaining King James with sweet words so England would not help the Dutch during the siege of Ostend, on the Flemish coast.357 Similar documents and pamphlets essentially concluded that Spain and her English confidants had undermined England politically and militarily and at the sea. Shortly after arriving in England on 6 September 1613, the new ambassador Gondomar wrote to Philip III that things are in England very different at the sea than Queen Elizabeth’s age because then everybody was privateers, and now there are only merchants sailing to Spain. … The English galleons are rotting at the ports. … The crewmen are lost. … At least we have picked up this fruit from the peace with England.358

In October 1623, a report by English diplomat Sir Francis Cottington claimed that the Spaniards earned more with the diplomacy and treaties in Europe than with wars and

 The English Crossroads 51 armies. Father De la Fuente and Gondomar wrote the same English believes regarding the peace of Spain.359 Between 1623 and 1625 English fever against Spain would raise again, a late Elizabethan flash before the fiasco of the Anglo–Dutch fleet at Cadiz in the autumn of 1625. The best epitaph for the era of the English history that ended with the naval disaster of 1625 was the saying that could be heard everywhere on the streets of London – ‘there are now no more Drakes in England, all are hens’.360 In 1627, Captain Richard Gifford had presented several proposals for a general reform of the English Royal Navy, bringing to mind that in Queen Elizabeth’s time the nobility and the merchants had devoted much effort to naval affairs and maritime expeditions, but in the Stuart period there were no such men or such desire to serve and engage in maritime trade. In addition, there was information to corroborate the evident decline of the English navy during the Stuarts: not only Buckingham’s inefficient administration of naval affairs but also the restriction of shipbuilding because of the lack of wood. Gifford returned to evoking Elizabethan times to criticize Jacobean England, citing the defeats of 1625 and 1627 and the loss of national prestige and international reputation. In Spain at this time similar ideas were held by Olivares and the Spanish government in relation to expanding naval power and promoting Spanish trade against the English and Dutch dominance over commerce with Europe and the East Indies.361 The English failures in taking La Rochelle in 1627 and 1628 were another nail in the coffin of England’s reputation. England’s loss of its role as main European champion against the Habsburgs – a role retaken by Denmark, Sweden and finally France from 1635 until 1659 – was recognized at the English court. In 1628, King Charles I and Buckingham ordered Sir Francis Cottington to travel to Spain to start peace negotiations. He replied that his diplomatic mission might be a failure: Spain having been so provoked by us and when we will be making the proposition at a time when our international reputation was so reduced by recent enterprises we understood in France [and before the loss of the armada in Cadiz in 1625], and when Spain has such good communication with France [had signed in 1626 treaty of Monzón].362

The diplomatic agreements of 1629 and 1630 with Louis XIII and Philip IV attested to the return of Stuart England to a passive role in Europe, focusing on its internal problems. It would not be until the 1650s, after the civil war, that Oliver Cromwell somewhat slowly recovered this Elizabethan spirit, with the return to a policy of aggressive overseas expansion and puritanical religious belligerence.363

Trojans and Greeks, English and Spaniards The Trojan War and Homeric mythology were often used by writers and poets of Europe in the Renaissance and baroque.364 But they were not alone. A young visionary in Madrid have a premonitory dream in late September 1588. She dreamed that the war between Philip II and Elizabeth I was a second Trojan War, with the Spaniards as the new Trojans,

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and the enemies of Spain – the Dutch, English, French and Moors – as the Greeks.365 The fact is that Spanish authorities took such comparisons seriously, and young Lucrecia de León ended up being prosecuted and convicted by the Spanish Inquisition. But she was not alone in such comparisons at the Spanish court. By 1611, Duke of Lerma’s favourite, Don Rodrigo Calderón, received an anonymous memorial regarding his future political career, by then in serious danger. In the paper, the Spanish court, Madrid, was compared with a ‘burning Troy’, from where he should escape.366 Just two decades later, that dream would come true, as two figures fundamental for the future of Anglo–Spanish relations were identified with two characters in the story of Troy. On the one side was Frederick V, Elector Palatine; on the other, Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, Prime Minister de facto of Spain during the last years of King Philip III and the early years of Philip IV. The former was compared with the Trojan Hector, the latter with the Greek Ulysses. On the occasion of the royal marriage between Frederick of Palatinate and Elizabeth Stuart (King James’s daughter) in 1613, a stage play, The Hector of Germany or the Palsgrave Prime Elector, was performed in London. Regarding the Spanish political figure, it was the chronicler and royal secretary Antonio de Herrera who compared Don Baltasar to mythological characters.367 Frederick of the Palatinate was the symbol of the union between the English people and the Protestant Germans as their new Protestant hero in Europe, replacing the deceased Prince Henry Stuart, who died in 1612.368 Regarding Don Baltasar, it was said that ‘as Homer told of Odysseus, that this man will be most prudent counsellor, who had done political business with many nations’.369 Don Baltasar, as the new Odysseus, seemed an ideal guide for the young king Philip IV to Ithaca, an optimal political paradise where the Dutch would be defeated, England and France would politically be held by Spain and triumphant Catholicism prevail in Germany. Apparently, during the second decade of the seventeenth century, Protestant England was in need of a heroe (Hector), whereas Catholic Spain was looking for a wise guide (Odysseus), both kingdoms in search of their ‘Golden Age’ (Elizabethan era, Charles VPhillip II’s times). Both European personages had in the second decade of the seventeenth century a great responsibility for the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War: Frederick V, by accepting the crown of Bohemia, offered by Protestant rebels, and by helping turn the Bohemian Revolt of 1618 into a general European war, against the advice of his father-in-law, King James; Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, by persuading King Philip III of Spain of the need to intervene militarily in Germany in support of his imperial Habsburgs cousins by 1617. During 1619–23, the royal couple of Frederick V Palatine and Elizabeth Stuart, known as the ‘Winter King and Queen’ of Bohemia, were seen in England as the ideal candidates to the English throne because of their staunch defence of Protestantism over Catholicism in the Holy Roman Empire. English public opinion glorified Elizabeth Stuart by comparing her with the Tudor Queen Elizabeth I as a symbol of a triumphant England against Catholic Spain and papacy. The approval by the general public amounted to implied criticism of the international policy led by King James and his heir. In August 1619, Father Diego de la Fuente wrote that ‘King James does not consent to Frederick V Palatine being called king by any at the English court’, ordering the requisition of numerous pamphlets from Holland in which Frederick was drawn as

 The English Crossroads 53 crowned king of Bohemia.370 By 1622, Gondomar had commented that the Dutch threatened to send Elector Palatine, his wife and children to England from their exile in The Hague: ‘This threat frightened King James a great deal; he ordered the guarding of the ports and coasts of England in case of their arrival.’371 However, the Palatine was defeated in 1620 at the Battle of White Mountain (8 November 1620), and his brief reign over Bohemia did not give him the aspiration to maintain the leading role of Protestant champion in Germany. Between 1623 and 1625, Frederick would be replaced as leader of Protestantism by the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Buckingham, and from 1626, this role would be taken over by Christian IV of Denmark and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.372 Meanwhile, Don Baltasar died in October 1622, just eighteen months into the reign of Philip IV. Olivares, his nephew, replaced him as prime minister of Spain. Other English and Spanish characters in government between 1623 and 1625 resembled their classical counterparts, as had happened with Frederick Palatine (‘Hector of Germany’) and Don Baltasar de Zúñiga (‘Odysseus of Spain’). The Duke of Buckingham and Charles Stuart played in their days the ‘English Patroclus’ and ‘Achilles’ in some panegyrics.373 Charles became the English Achilles, stereotypical of miles gloriosus, the boasting soldier, a famous character from ancient Greek and Roman theatre plays, representing a proud, angry and arrogant knight, dominated by his passions. It was an image that would last in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the character ‘Rodomonte’, the universal symbol of the Spanish soldier.374 The royal favourite played Patroclus, Achilles’s favourite, his companion at arms and friend, enslaved to Achilles’s passions and will of power, Buckingham being the best example as a man, knight, courtesan and comrade: ‘Two King’s delight … the courtier’s star, the kingdom’s eye’.375 There is an obvious parallel between the intimate relationship of Achilles and Patroclus and the English satirical pamphlets circulating at the English court and denouncing the corrupt and irrational love that existed between Charles Stuart and the Duke of Buckingham, an indirect reference to homosexuality (as it happened before with King James).376 And there are more similarities: to defend Achilles’s honour, Patroclus fought against Hector and was killed by him in combat. At the Spanish court, Buckingham–Patroclus became the champion of Charles–Achilles against the treacherous Spaniards-Trojans, who wanted him to surrender his Protestant Faith and his kingdom to Spain. Before his association with Patroclus, Buckingham sought to identify himself with another great warrior and military leader of the ancient history, Scipio.377 By the end of 1620, the royal favourite commissioned the painter Anthony Van Dyck to paint The Continence of Scipio, with many links to the career of Buckingham in those days. The year before, in 1619, Buckingham was appointed for Lord High Admiral of England. King James himself wrote some poems in Latin, associating his favourite with the seagod Neptune. In his Spanish campaigns against the Carthaginians, Scipio had led his fleet to conquest the city port of New Carthage (Cartago Nova, Cartagena, Spain), with the aid of Neptune. The identification of Buckingham with Neptune, Scipio and Patroclus against the enemies of England was more than evident by 1625.

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The famous Flemish diplomat and artist Peter Paul Rubens painted two portraits of him between the years 1625 and 1627 to glorify the English favourite: Minerva and Mercury conduct the Duke of Buckingham to the Temple of Virtue, The Apotheosis of the Duke Buckingham and an equestrian portrait as Lord High Admiral of England.378 It is important to remember these three identifications of Buckingham: as Patroclus, fighting for his friend Achilles; as Neptune, ruling the sea and as Scipio, conquering the Spanish city of New Carthage.379 And his foes, associated with Spain.380 The Spaniards as Trojans and Cadiz as the city of New Carthage (identified with Neptune and Scipio) or with Troy. However, neither of these images, which predicted and glorified Buckingham’s fame and success in politics and war, corresponded to a reality full of defeats and failures between 1625 and 1628 (the naval expedition against Cadiz, Ile de Ré and La Rochelle). King James could resemble King Priam, the old Trojan king, lover of peace, whose physical weakness had made him give up the defence of the city to his son Hector, his heir. Like the Trojan king, James was already prematurely aged in 1623–5, eager to maintain peace with Spain and Europe, but whose desires clashed with those who de facto held political leadership in England, his son and his favourite. Olivares would take the place of his uncle Don Baltasar de Zúñiga as the Spanish Ulysses, although Olivares would be identified with Atlas from the 1630s, a period in which this mythological character fit perfectly with the evolution of a tottering monarchy, weakened by the two crises that had faced so far.381 One crisis occurred between 1623 and 1625, and included English hostility to Spain, European alliances against Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor, which concluded in the annus mirabilis of 1625; the second one took place between 1627 and 1632 with first bankruptcy of Spanish royal finances, the illness of King Philip IV, the War of the Mantuan Succession, the capture by the Dutch of the Flota de Nueva España in Matanzas bay, Cuba, the betrayal of Count Van den Bergh in the Spanish Low Countries and the Dutch offensive against the Spanish posts of Hertogenbosch, Maastricht and Limburg.382 Don Baltasar seemed to be perfectly replaced by his talented nephew as the new Ulysses of the Spain, a prudent, cautious guide for the kingdom, a master of his own passions who dominated government only by cunning and raison d’état.383 The best example of this is the portrait painted by the royal Spanish court painter Diego Velázquez in the autumn of 1625, after Olivares’s administrative triumphs against Anglo–Dutch fleet at Cadiz, the storming of the Dutch city of Breda, the recapture of Bahia (Brazil) and the relief of Genoa.384 Olivares appeared as the perfect statesman ready to lead the Spain with the baton of command and defend her with the sword.385 King Philip IV resembled Hector, the Trojan protector hero. The king had been compared to classic heroes since he was born, when he was identified with Hercules, a Renaissance symbol of strength and virtue, as his great-grandfather, Emperor Charles V, was in his time.386 In addition, Hercules had helped the titan Atlas to hold up the celestial sphere, which was a perfect comparison with King Philip IV and his favourite Olivares.387 In any case, Hector was the classic stereotype of the pious knight model linked to the Miles Christi, or Soldiers of Christ, whose main virtues were courage, loyalty, generosity, moderation and restraint, prudence, mastery of passions and lack of pride.388

 The English Crossroads 55 Between 1624 and 1625 Velázquez had painted an equestrian portrait of the young king (now lost), which exemplifies this identification.389 Further studies have found an interesting image by the French artist Juan Courbes, printed in a book written by Antonio Ponce de Santa Cruz, royal physician of Philip IV, and entitled De impedimentis magnorum auxiliorum. The first edition of the book was published in 1629. It was dedicated to Philip IV and included Courbes’s print. According to the papal envoy Sacchetti, the king appeared as Caesar.390 Others compared the king with Alexander the Great (Figures 2 and 3).391

Figure 2  Philippus IV on Horseback, Hispa Rex. Biblioteca Histórica de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid [BH MED 3191].

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Figure 3  De Impedimentis Magnorum Auxiliorum in Morborum curatione lib. III. Biblioteca Histórica de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid [BH MED 3191]. Courbes showed the young king Philip IV as a military leader on horseback, at the head of Spanish armies, as had another Velázquez’s portrait of the 1630s. Philip IV appears with the horse rearing, a symbolic position of the dominion and the control over the state, wearing full armour and carrying a baton and the red sash of Spanish fieldmaster. In the background is a battle scene, a camp and a town, which could symbolize the liberation of Genoa from the French, the retaking of San Salvador de Bahia from the Dutch or the capture of the Dutch town of Breda, all military victories in 1625. Velázquez’s work retakes the tradition of the great equestrian paintings of Titian of the Emperor Charles V, sharing space with the equestrian portrait of Charles V

 The English Crossroads 57 at Muhlberg in the Hall of the Mirrors of the Alcázar in Madrid, the Spanish royal palace. By the time the portrait was painted, Europe was again involved in two main conflicts, the Eighty Years’ War (1568–1609/1621–48) and the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48). Spain was at war with the Dutch Republic, its armies were fighting in Germany against the Protestants and it was threatened by Stuart England (Charles I) and France (Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu). It was an ideal moment to show Philip IV as a young and victorious Christian emperor who fought against the enemies of the Catholic faith, Protestants and Turks and the enemies of Spain. There is a Latin motto on Courbes’s print explaining the image: Imperium sine fine asserta parabit fides; assero et imperium, non mihi, sed fidei (‘The affirmed [Catholic] faith prepared a worldwide empire [Spain]; [I] vindicate the empire and the power, not for me but for the faith’). The phrase is taken partially from Book I, verses 278– 82 of Virgil’s Aeneid, although Christianized. If in the pagan version the empire is granted by Jupiter to the Romans, now the empire without end is granted by God to the Spaniards. ‘Dicetque Romanos, de suo nomine His pono metas nec rerum nec tempora; dedi imperium sine fine’ (‘And I shall call Romans, after his own name, to them I set limits neither in fortunes nor in time, I have given [them] empire without end’).392 This paragraph of Virgil’s Aeneid clarifies the meaning of the equestrian portrait of Philip IV as a victorious general and emperor. The king was not shown as a conqueror; he was a Christian knight defending Spain and Catholicism. He was not an aggressor; he was not a new Achilles, but a Hector, a symbol of mercy, who defended his homeland against his enemies, English heretics and Dutch rebels. The Aeneid became a fundamental source of the symbolism of the Spanish Habsburgs. It associated Spanish kings with Greco–Roman mythology, such as the Golden Fleece, and heroes such as Hercules, Apollo and Hector, with the Roman emperors like Julius Caesar and Augustus and with a worldwide empire of dimensions comparable only to the Roman. The portrait of King Philip IV is one example. The other was a bronze statue, the work of the Italian sculptor Pompeo Leoni, made between the years 1550–1. The work Emperor Charles V Restraining Fury portrays the monarch as a classic hero, victor and pacifier. The sculpture is full of references to Rome, and it is inspired by a verse from The Aeneid: ‘Sedens super saeva arma’ (Book I, verses 294–6). The paragraph explains the time when Aeneas pacified the region of Latium by enclosing the Fury in the temple of Jano and declaring peace according to the prophecy of Jupiter:393 ‘Claudentur impius Furor intus, sedens super saeva arma, et vinctus centum aenis nodis port tergum’ (‘Shall be closed unholy Rage within, sitting over cruel arms and bound with a hundred brazen knots [chains] behind [his] back’).394 The links of this equestrian image of Philip IV to the bronze statue and the portrait of his grandfather, Emperor Charles V, are evident and part of the iconographic propaganda plan designed by the royal favourite and the Spanish prime minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares.395 Both Spanish sovereigns, Charles V and Philip IV, are represented as victorious generals in battle facing the enemies of God and the Spain, who were the same. These portraits were painted during the Spanish wars of 1547 and

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1625 against the same enemies: German Protestants, Dutch rebels, English heretics, perfidious French and Turkish infidels. In addition, the two paintings shared the same space in the halls of the Alcázar: the Hall of Mirrors: by 1628 Velázquez’s painting would be replaced by another, Rubens’s equestrian portrait of Philip IV, to be hung next to the portrait of Charles V. Finally, the Spanish Infanta Maria, Philip IV’s sister, could take the role of Helen of Troy. Not only were both princesses, blonde and having a passive role in the conflict they were also offered a justification for the outbreak of the war.The English CrossroadsEngland and Spain in the Early Modern Era

2

Spanish diplomatic finances in Jacobean Great Britain (1603–25)

The king’s blood: Money is the mainstay of peace with England The price of modern diplomacy and war During the first quarter of the seventeenth century, at the meetings of the Spanish Council of State, the last years of the war with Elizabethan England would be always remembered with fear, for military and financial reasons.1 By comparison, the total amount sent by the Spanish treasury to the different ambassadors in Stuart England during the period 1603–25 accounts for around 1,338,850 ducats;2 that is, keeping peaceful political relations with James I cost the Spanish crown around 62,000 ducats a year during the first quarter of the seventeenth century. To understand and place those numbers in their historical context, in what follows amounts spent in the years 1603–25 will be clarified.3 Between 1603 and 1625, diplomatic relations with Jacobean England cost the Spanish crown as much as five months of total war in Flanders (300,000 ducats per month).4 The same amount equalled the building of 150 galleons for the fleet of Flanders, or maintaining a Flemish fleet of 20 ships for 75 months (196,000 ducats plus 20,000 ducats a month for maintenance and supplies).5 That amount was equal to the building and equipping of 100 galleons of the Spanish royal fleet at around 15,000 ducats per galleon.6 Finally, the cost of the embassy in London was six times less than the total bill for the great Armada disaster of 1588.7 With regard to military and naval expenses, the cost of peaceful relations with Jacobean England was not too burdensome for the Spanish crown. Philip III wrote to the Constable of Castile, who was on his way to England, that he would receive 200,000 ducats, warning him that ‘no part of this amount of money goes to the army of Flanders or anything else other than the diplomatic business with England’.8 As an ambassador to England, Gondomar was not particularly in favour of wasting his master’s money on pensions and gifts at the English court, as he thought it would be preferable to invest these funds in the Spanish royal fleet.9 He might not be the diplomat who spent the most money on pensions and gifts at James’s court. As he wrote to Philip III, the French and the Dutch ambassadors at the English court spent

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80,000 ducats and 250,000 a year, respectively, on bribes and gifts, which far exceeded the 62,000 ducats that was the average amount available to him. This money ended up, obviously, in the pockets of the English courtiers (the Countess of Suffok, for instance).10 However, part of the embassy’s expenses was directly related to the Spanish armies and armadas; in fact, it could not be otherwise. As an extension of Spain in England, the ambassador was involved in all the crucial issues for his king, and warfare was a vital activity.11 As for comparing the costs of the Spanish embassy to England with those of Spanish embassies to other European territories during the same period (France, Holy Roman Empire, Italy and Flanders), it must be noted that the money sent by the king depended not only on the availability of funds, which were usually limited, but also on other factors. One of these factors was the rank of the person in charge of the embassy. Count De la Roca wrote that an ambassador should always be an aristocrat, as ‘he owes much to his blood, always brings the obligation to serve his King, and keep him away from treason’.12 The Spanish secretaries of the embassy and ministers resident (not aristocrats) were paid less than the Spanish ambassadors. For instance, Julián Sánchez de Ulloa, secretary of the embassy, was paid 4,500 reales per month (409 ducats), while Jacques Bruneau, minister resident, received around 11,000 reales (1,000 ducats).13 The average monthly amount available for Spanish ambassadors to England for diplomatic expenses from 1603 to 1625 was nearly 50,000 reales (4,545 ducats).14 The salary received by the ambassadors and other members of the embassy was very unequal. Extraordinary ambassadors had the highest and most variable annual salaries. The Constable of Castile was given 36,000 ducats (1603–4), while Marquis De La Hinojosa received 18,000 ducats (1622–3). With regard to ordinary ambassadors, the salary was 6,000 ducats per year; a minister resident received half of this amount (3,000 ducats) and a secretary of the embassy 300 ducats.15 Another point to consider was whether the embassy was permanent or not. Extraordinary ambassadors were usually provided with much more funds for their diplomatic missions than ordinary ambassadors (permanent missions). De La Roca explained that this situation was because ‘extraordinary ambassadors sent abroad have shorter diplomatic missions (in time) than their ordinary fellows’.16 However, on the contrary, the key question was not duration – there were Spanish extraordinary ambassadors to England on missions lasting up to thirty months – but the greater political and social prestige, dignity and authority of extraordinary diplomatic missions, which were automatically reflected in the financial support of the Spanish crown. Between 1603 and 1625 the Spanish crown provided six extraordinary ambassadors to England with just over 7,500,000 reales.17 Excluding funds provided to the minister resident, Jacques Bruneau, Spanish ordinary ambassadors received 6,877,455.50 reales (625,223 ducats); if the funding for Jacques Bruneau is included the amount rises to 7,042,834.50 reales (640,257 ducats). As a result, extraordinary ambassadors disposed of 86,342.87 reales per month for diplomatic expenses (7,849 ducats) in England, while ordinary ones enjoyed 30,634.54 reales (2,784 ducats), although if the budget for Jacques Bruneau and Julián Sánchez de Ulloa is included, the monthly sum drops to 29,406.40 reales (2,673 ducats).

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 61 The situation was similar in the other major Spanish embassies through Europe, as well as regarding other foreign ambassadors to Spanish court. Gondomar had written that Sir John Digby, Earl of Bristol, had received around 100,000 ducats from King James for his extraordinary embassy to Spain in 1622.18 Bristol received £6 per day from the English crown (around 240 reales, 22 ducats), while Sir Charles Cornwallis (ordinary English ambassador to Spain) and Sir Francis Cottington (Minister Resident) received significantly less (£2 and £1 per day, respectively: 80 and 40 reales, 8 and 4 ducats).19 The last factor was the political and diplomatic importance of the Spanish embassies in Europe. The most important were in Rome, Paris, London, Brussels, Venice and Vienna. Members of the most important and the most capable noble Spanish families were sent as ambassadors.20 In the same way, these diplomats were also better endowed financially by the king due to the high cost of living and conducting business in those places, usually the largest and hence most expensive cities in Europe. Other embassies, such as Genoa, Savoy and other Italian principalities, such as Parma, Urbino, Tuscany, and Modena, were considered minor.21 In the first quarter of the seventeenth century each of the major embassies possessed an annual average budget of 500,000 reales (around 50,000 ducats) for diplomatic expenses.22 As for the less politically important Spanish embassies, the average amount per year provided for each of them reached 55,000 reales (around 5,000 ducats).23

Money and diplomacy in Jacobean England Since 1603, the Spanish ambassadors to England would be involved in other, very different conflicts. Sometimes they were implicit, secret and devious ones. Others were explicit and bloody, whose victims were soldiers of Spain, Dutch sailors or British pirates and courtiers. The embassy was involved in a ‘war of the wealthy people’, as Spanish ambassador Coloma would define his diplomatic work in England between 1622 and 1624.24 In his description of the ideal image of an ambassador, De La Roca noted the importance of money in diplomacy. It was crucial to motivate both foreign ministers and courtiers by demonstrating the prestige, wealth and power with brilliance, liberality and waste. Twenty years later, Spanish diplomat Don Diego Saavedra Fajardo criticized the Spanish baroque diplomacy system based on the purchase of international friendships and alliances with gifts and gold, a kind of foreign policy that seemed, up to 1643, to be only achieved at the cost of the ruin of Spain.25 When Philip III chose to spare no expenses in the negotiations with England, it was because Spanish military victory was thought impossible due to the lack of Spanish resources around 1603. Moreover, the majority opinion at the Spanish court was that buying peace from the Stuarts was not, after all, a disgrace for Spanish political prestige internationally.26 It was a widespread perception among Spanish diplomats that the Jacobean court was a territory in which diplomacy would accomplish nothing without money in order to create allegiances, make good friends and settle political and diplomatic business.27 Bribing was one of the key points, as for a kingdom with

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such a hostile population to Spain, such as England, the majority of friendships at the English court would be won by gold, pensions, gifts and honours.28 Shortly after his arrival to Brussels, Villamediana wrote to Philip III that English Catholics had offered him a proposition. This plan consisted of the payment of 500,000 ducats in bribes among Scottish and English royal ministers in order to allow freedom of conscience and peace for Catholics. The proposal had originated in the Privy Council and was supported by Lady Catherine Howard, Countess of Suffolk.29 The Spanish ambassador believed that for such amount of money he should also demand from the English the Zeeland forts of Brill, Vlissingen and Ramecken, which were guarded by English garrisons at that time.30 The Constable and Villamediana found the English proposal acceptable as, given the greed and arrogance of the English courtiers, it could be feasible.31 The fact is that, whether they liked it or not, the plan found a favourable reception at the Spanish court. In July 1603, Lerma firmly supported at the Council of State the idea of supplying 600,000 ducats for the disposal of the ambassadors to England. The final amount approved was not far off: 500,000 ducats (100,000 for Villamediana, 400,000 for the Constable).32 By comparison, during 1630 and 1631 Coloma spent less than 40,000 ducats to negotiate and complete the ensuing peace treaty with England.

The first Stuart auction (1603–4) The auction of the Royal Collection of King Charles I Stuart, beheaded on 30 January 1649, became very famous in Europe for the quantity and quality of objects and works of art that the English parliament offered for sale. Both Philip IV of Spain and his prime minister, Don Luis De Haro, took the opportunity and ordered Ambassador Don Alonso de Cárdenas to acquire the best works, which he did (one of the best purchases of art of all time: paintings of Titian, Correggio, Tintoretto, Raphael and Van Dyck). Nearly fifty years before, between April 1603 and August 1604, a genuine English foreign policy auction had developed at the English court. Spanish diplomats had fought for peace, having had in hand 6 million reales to distribute among the greedy members of the English court. Dutch, French, Venetians or Savoyards would do the same to renew the military conflict between England and Spain. In the midst of this ‘war of the wealthy people’, courtiers, royal ministers and lords and ladies at the English court took the opportunity to fill their pockets with money offered by both sides.33 Table 2 shows three defined periods during the years 1603–25. The first period, 1603– 10, shows a moment of higher revenue incomes for the Spanish embassy, ​​including an initial sub-period from 1603 to 1605, the years of the diplomatic negotiations in London.34 The second, the years 1610–20, shows a gradual decrease in the funding for the Spanish embassy; the second decade of the seventeenth century enjoyed an uneasy peace in Northern Europe. Finally, the period 1620–5 was marked by Spanish intervention in the Thirty Years’ War, the resumption of the war in Flanders and the rise to power at the Spanish court of Don Baltasar de Zúñiga as prime minister. These

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 63 Table 2  Total Revenues of the Spanish Embassy Treasure in England (1603–25) Years 1598–1603 1603–5 1605–8 1608–10 1610–13 1613–16 1616–18 1618–20 1620–2 1622–4 1625

Reales 0,00 6,000,000 1,416,520 2,012,500 1,339,311 725,987 450,195.5 295,507.5 841,192 822,453 1,265,379

events boosted Spain’s military and diplomatic activity in Europe and, with regard to Stuart England, resulted in the return of Gondomar as ambassador.35 The years 1623–5 witnessed intense diplomatic negotiations between Spain and England on the marriage alliance, resulting in more funds for the embassy. The two periods defined above, linked with the finances of the Spanish embassy in England, largely coincide with the two phases of Phillip III’s foreign policy with Northern Europe: the years 1598–1609 was the ‘pacification’, and 1609–18 was the ‘quietude’. However, in the Mediterranean area Spain got involved in military conflicts in Italy and against the Barbary pirates and Turks (let alone the clashes in the Indies with the Dutch, the English and the French).36 It seems clear that after 1609, the attention of the European powers focused on the Mediterranean area. The Western pirates turned their attention to the Italian, Barbary and Turkish ports in order to escape the pressure from the Stuarts, the Spaniards and even the Dutch government. Spanish ambassadors to England recruited British captains to serve Phillip III in the Spanish Italian domains. As for England, James sent a fleet to the Mediterranean with the purpose of fighting the Barbary pirates in 1620. Seven years before, at his daughter’s wedding, among the three-day celebrations, it was a sea battle performed on the Thames (13 February 1613): an English armada attacked Algiers and liberated the Christian slaves held there.37 By 1613, it was clear that the common enemy of the Christianity was the Turks and Barbary pirates, as Spain, France, England and the Dutch Republic were at peace. The revival of the activity of the Spanish embassy in England after 1620 coincided with the impetus given to other embassies such as Rome (Cardinal Gaspar de Borja and the Dukes of Albuquerque and Pastrana, during 1618–23), Paris (Marquis de Mirabel, 1618), Brussels (Marquis of Bedmar, 1618) and the Holy Roman Empire with the 5th Count of Oñate (since 1617).38 From 1618 until 1621, almost everyone in the European political circles of power seemed to believe that Spain and its influence could

England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

64

be recovered only if it opted for a more active military policy in European conflicts in defence of Catholicism and Spanish power.39

The king’s heart: Finances and the tentacles of the embassy Spain being a political body, the king was its head, the bankers its heart, money its life blood and royal ministers, diplomats, armies and fleets its muscles (Table 3).40 This distinguishes several stages in the evolution of diplomatic expenditure. The years 1603–10 was a period of big spending, especially 1603–5, when the sum reached 140,000 reales per month (more than 12,000 ducats), which coincides with the negotiation of peace and the conflict in Flanders. Later on, from 1610 to 1620, there was a gradual decrease in diplomatic expenses. From 1620 until 1625, expenses increased again. With regard to the efforts of the Spanish crown to send money – the fuel of diplomacy – to the Spanish embassy in England, it was a task that involved the collaboration of Flemish and Portuguese merchants, as well as Genoese bankers.

The age of the million (1603–5) Philip III put 500,000 ducats into the hands of the Constable and Villamediana, a colossal figure, never enjoyed by any other Spanish ambassador to England in the period.41 At the English court, the Spanish envoys’ opulence and liberality would be remembered during the following years, and their successors would complain bitterly of their comparative poverty.42 Gondomar attributed the excessive generosity of the Constable and Villamediana during 1603–5 to the need to convince the English that Spain sincerely sought peace in exchange for money. Although Spanish diplomacy had achieved much, Gondomar’s view in 1616 reflected the progressive change of mentality among certain groups of the inner circles of Spanish government about the benefits Table 3  Monthly Expenses of the Spanish Embassy Treasure in England (1603–25) Years 1598–1603 1603–5 1605–10 1610–13 1613–18 1618–20 1620–2 1622–4 1625

Reales 0 139,534.88 54,841.65 22,700.17 25,468.103 4,420.35 29,506.38 29,430.242 13,584.93

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 65 of a pacifist foreign policy regarding European affairs.43 His successor, Don Carlos Coloma, agreed with him.44 With respect to Villamediana, he was provided 1,440,000 reales in two payments by the banker Jerome Serra. On the one hand, 100,000 ducats (1,100,000 reales) paid in Valladolid on 14 July 1603. Villamediana received the money in Antwerp (Flanders) from the hands of the agent Francesco Serra. The second instalment was paid by a money order from the Constable (Arras, 8 October 1604), in bills of exchange from Antwerp on Juan Francisco Soprani and Felipe Bernardi, Genoese merchants resident in London. Villamediana received 30,000 ducats in total (300,000 reales). With regard to delivering the money to England, the cost of currency exchange and transportation from Antwerp to London reached 107,307 reales.45 There were several reasons for those 10,000 ducats in expenses.46 First, many bankers did not want to risk their money by sending it from Antwerp to London, because at the time England was undergoing the plague. Then there was the fact that the money had to follow the ambassador’s itinerary through English cities, towns and villages. The risk was high, so it was necessary to provide an escort, and the insurance rate was 2 per cent. Villamediana had to change some money into gold pieces to distribute at the English court (265,460 reales, 24,132 ducats). Finally, the exchange rate was higher in England than in Flanders.47 Jerome and Francesco Serra belonged to the group of so-called old Genoese bankers.48 Their agent in Antwerp, Francesco Serra, in turn controlled a financial network in England that had provided credit to Villamediana from the beginning. In the middle of August 1603 the ambassador received 8,000 ducats (727 ducats) in Brussels sent by Francesco Serra from Antwerp, just before he left for England. After his arrival at Dover on 1 September, from Gravelines, he received another sum of 48,000 reales (4,364 ducats) in gold from the hands of Francisco Rizzo, another merchant. Through this network connected to Antwerp, Villamediana could count on money being available wherever it was needed, Brussels, Dover, London, Southampton, Salisbury, Oxford, Richmond or Winchester. Regarding the Constable, he was provided with by far the greatest sum of money for diplomatic expenses of the time, at least, during the reigns of Philip III and IV. The importance of his mission was that it was expected to open peace negotiations not only with England but also with the Dutch rebels. In his case, it was the Genoese banker Octavio Centurion who provided 400,000 ducats (4,800,000 reales) in two bills of exchange of 200,000 ducats to his brother Vicencio Centurion, resident in Flanders, dated in Valladolid, 2 November 1603 and 1 August 1604.49 As with Villamediana, Francesco Serra had a crucial role, as he was the merchant who managed the payments of the Constable in Flanders, France, Italy and England. In Flanders, Serra worked with the Constable’s treasurer, Jeronimo Ordoñez, and Lucchese merchants Ferrante and Miguel Balbani, who issued bills of exchange for 1,000 ducats (11,000 reales) in Milan for the Milanese senator Alessandro Rovida’s travelling expenses. In France, Serra used his agents in Paris, Marco Antonio Lusardo and Fomeli (both Genoese), to make payments to the Spanish ambassador Don Baltasar de Zúñiga. In England, Serra worked again with the treasurer of the ambassador

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(Ordoñez), the Lucchese merchants Antonio Balbani and Bernardo Massei, and the Genoese merchants Juan Francisco Soprani and Felipe Bernardi (in England the Constable enjoyed a credit of 147,000 ducats, 1,617,000 reales).50

Doing very well in England (1605–10) Don Pedro de Zúñiga was in charge of the Spanish embassy to England during a turbulent period in which the Gunpowder Plot took place, as well as the beginning of the vital peace negotiations with the Dutch. (The hostilities in Flanders were suspended from 13 March 1607.) During his five years of diplomatic service the ambassador received 3,430,930 reales (311,902 ducats), a monthly average of 54,000 reales (4,909 ducats), not to be surpassed until 1625, with Gondomar’s third embassy to England at 137,500 reales per month (12,500 ducats).51 Among the agents of the major bankers serving the Spanish crown in England such as Serra, Soprani, Bernardi, Massei or Balbani, some were Italian Protestant families who had settled there from the mid-sixteenth century. Balbani, Massei, Calandrini and Burlamacchi fled Lucca in the 1560s to Geneva and Lyon, and from there they continued their commercial activities in Hamburg, Frankfurt, Nuremberg, Antwerp, Amsterdam and London. They were bankers of Philip II of Spain and Henry IV of Bourbon and worked with the famous Spanish merchant Simon Ruiz. Felipe Burlamacchi and Juan Calandrini were both important financiers in London, notorious Calvinists and remarkable figures in the finances of the English crown and England in general: Burlamacchi was naturalized English by an Act of Parliament on 19 March 1624.52 These men were great supporters of the Spanish embassy for over twenty years, either through loans or by working in trade. In turn, they had other businesses involving attacks on Spanish empire, either in Europe or overseas, such as investments in English and Dutch trading companies overseas, and had also funded the Dutch army since 1618.53 In any case, all these families were united by their membership in the nattione italiana in London, through their European and worldwide commercial and business ties and because many of them were Protestants. Meanwhile, Spanish ambassadors, for instance, Gondomar, regretted the numerous debts to such heretic merchants as Burlamacchi, but they recognized that they could do nothing without him and that it was imperative to get money in London. For the first time, the English ambassador in Spain appeared to be financing the Spanish embassy in London, avoiding the use of bankers and their networks. This method was repeated several times in those years. Basically, the English diplomat in Madrid was paid in Spanish currency by the Spanish treasury in return for the same amount he was responsible for paying to his Spanish counterpart in London in English currency. Sir Charles Cornwallis was the first English ordinary ambassador in Spain under Philip III, and he was in office from April 1605 to September 1609. He received 20,000 reales (1,818 ducats) in Madrid at the hands of Garci Mazo de la Vega, the Spanish General Treasurer.54 Zúñiga received the same amount in London.

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 67

No debts left in England Between 1610 and 1618 there were two Spanish ordinary ambassadors in England, Don Alonso de Velasco and Gondomar. In the case of Velasco, Gondomar was ordered by Philip III to pay all his debts as well as his ambassador’s salary of 88,094 reales (around 8,000 ducts).55 Apparently, Velasco had considerable debts. He owed Burlamacchi 20,000 ducats at the time of his departure in August 1613, as he had been borrowing money from him since at least the spring of 1612.56 Meanwhile, Gondomar would bitterly regret the situation in London, as there was nothing left out of the 12,000 ducats he had brought with him. From August 1613 he was already borrowing money from the same banker who had hounded Velasco.57 The Spanish embassy in England by the time of Velasco was financed by a large group of Portuguese merchants. According to the records, fifty-four bills of exchange were drawn up by twenty-eight different people from Lisbon between December 1608 and May 1610, receivable in Antwerp: 495,990 reales (around 45,000 ducats). Out of twenty-eight names, one is that of an officer of the Portuguese Conseiho da Fazenda, and the other twenty-seven correspond to merchants, of whom sixteen were of Portuguese origin and eleven were of Flemish, Dutch and German origin. The Portuguese issued sixteen bills of exchange worth 235,479.70 reales (21,407 ducats). The Conseiho da Fazenda bill of exchanges was worth 71,507 reales (6,500 ducats), and the eleven foreign merchants bill of exchanges, 303,119.26 reales (27,556 ducats).58 Regarding the Portuguese merchants resident in Lisbon and Antwerp, the family names that appear on the documents are known for their Jewish origins: Cardoso, Evora, Vaz, Vega, Saravia, Colonel, Argomedo, Teixeira, Garces, Godinez, Mendez Paiba, Home Lopez and Rodriguez.59 All of them were notorious members of the Portuguese converted community (New Christians), with strong family and business ties among them and with other Jewish families at the European level (Lisbon, Oporto, Madrid, Brussels, London, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Cologne, Venice) and worldwide (trade with the East Indies, Brazil, Africa). In addition, many of them had problems with the Portuguese Inquisition and ended up either processed or forced into exile to Flanders, Holland, England, Germany and Italy.60 As for money provided to Gondomar, he took with him 12,000 ducats in cash for his embassy expenses in the summer of 1613. Gondomar also took possession of the extra money sent by the Spanish crown to his embassy (75,507.50 reales, 6,864 ducats, left from the years 1615–17).61 In the summer of 1614, he earned 65,987 reales at a public auction of a stolen Portuguese cargo of pepper taken from some English pirates. In addition, in 1614 Gondomar obtained money from the merchant Felipe Burlamacchi. Regarding the money sent by bills of exchange, they were issued from Madrid by the assientists such as Nicolao Balbi, Carlo Strata and Vicenzo Squarzafigo, to be paid in Antwerp through Paulo and Damian Bustanci and in London through Filipo Burlamacchi and Juan Calandrini.62 Finally, Gondomar received money from both English extraordinary ambassadors, Sir William Cecil (Baron of Roos) and Sir John Digby (Earl of Bristol), in exchange for reimbursement of these sums in Madrid.63 Roos paid him 72,000 reales (6,545 ducats)

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in 1616; Digby paid 50,000 reales (4,545 ducats) in 1613 and 148,000 reales (13,454 ducats) in 1617.64 Sir Thomas Coteels, a banker of Flemish origin, also participated in loans to Gondomar, at ​​ least after 1616.65 Since 1618, when Gondomar left England, Coteels continued to act as financial agent for the secretary Julián Sánchez de Ulloa and Father Diego de la Fuente (Gondomar’s chaplain), who were acting as Chargés d’Affaires to the Spanish embassy in London.66 Other figures can be mentioned for their connections with the funding of the embassy, such as Antonio Da Costa, Portuguese merchant, who acted as a kind of agent for Gondomar’s different businesses. In 1614 he had provided Gondomar with 4,000 ducats, and in 1617 he received 900 reales (82 ducats) from the ambassador in respect of the interest on certain loans borrowed in 1616. Additionally, he was in charge of more delicate matters, such as collecting information regarding the English colony in Virginia. Therefore, at the request of Gondomar, Philip III granted him the habit of Knight of Christ.67 Gondomar could also count on the Portuguese Francisco Pinto de Brito, a merchant of Jewish origins. In December 1617 Gondomar ordered him to buy a diamond for Baron Walder, the eldest son of the Earl of Suffolk.68

All the Spanish gold to England (1620–5) The absence of Gondomar in England between July 1618 and March 1620 damaged the Spanish cause and interests. Carelessness in the payment of pensions and the consequent weakening of the Hispanophile faction at the English court was one of the most obvious consequences. Money sent from Spain was markedly reduced: only 88,407 reales (8,037 ducats) in almost two years for the embassy.69 The Council of State discussed the issue of the Spanish office to England, to consider either sending another ambassador or ordering Gondomar’s immediate return.70 However, Gondomar unsuccessfully resisted his government’s wishes, arguing that the political situation in England in 1620 was far worse for Spanish interests than that in 1618.71 Madrid rightly sensed that a strong man at the office in London was vital in order to deal the areas of friction with James I: the conflict in Germany, the question of the Palatinate and the Anglo–Spanish marriage. The following years (especially 1623–5) would prove fundamental for Anglo– Spanish relations, as had been the period 1603–5. During that time, Spain sent five different diplomats to London, a clear indication of the intensification of diplomatic negotiations. By comparison, between 1603 and 1620, Spain had sent six ambassadors to England. The strengthening of Spanish diplomacy with Stuart England after 1620 can be seen not only from the number of ambassadors sent but also by a significant increase in the payments to them. The money in cash was what was left over from the years 1618–20, when Gondomar was in Spain. As for the bankers Strata and Imbrea, they sent bills of exchange to Antwerp for their agents established there (Vicencio Imbrea, Juan Francisco Strata and Diego Diaz Mendivil). These agents had orders to place the money in England wherever Gondomar wished.72 Finally, in London, Gondomar received 220,000 reales (20,000 ducats) from Sir John Digby in exchange

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 69 for an equal sum of money that he would receive in Madrid on the occasion of his diplomatic mission as extraordinary ambassador.73 As for Coloma’s and Hinojosa’s mission to England, Coloma took responsibility for the money of both diplomats.74 The Italian bankers Pablo and Augustin Justiniani sent bills of exchange to their agents in Antwerp (Nivio Maria Imbrea, Lorenzo Magioli, Vicencio Lozana and the brothers Paulo and Damian Bustanci), to place the money following Coloma’s orders.75 Peter Rycaut was an important Flemish merchant in Antwerp and the Londonbased partner of Filipo Burlamacchi. Rycaut collaborated not only by financing the Spanish embassy but also by undertaking other secret activities, such as the purchase of artillery and galleons on account of both Spanish ambassadors. Coloma also received money in London from Sir Robert Semer, Earl of Bristol’s agent, against King Philip’s orders.76 Coloma received money from four more sources: the Royal Mint of Toledo paid him in cash before travelling to England; the Council of Portugal (in order to buy fifty pieces of artillery for the Portuguese fleet).77 Hinojosa lent 6,100 reales (554 ducats) from his personal fortune to Coloma before his return to Spain in June 1623.78 And finally, the Flemish government paid for the expenses incurred by the embassy assisting Irish infantry companies and Flemish galleons at the British ports. Tomás Mendieta, paymaster of the army of Flanders, and Vicente de Anciondo, inspector of the Flemish fleet, provided these sums.79 Although Hinojosa did not receive money from the king of Spain, he took with him numerous items to distribute among the English court. According to the records, these included silver and gold pieces worth 22,000 ducats and diamond jewellery, chains, gold buttons, clothing, linens and 200 pairs of amber gloves worth another 22,000 ducats. Another Spanish diplomat, Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, took a similar amount of jewellery to England in the autumn of 1623, in addition to 100,000 reales in cash (9,090 ducats).80 After the departure from England of Hurtado de Mendoza (December 1623), Hinojosa (early July 1624) and Coloma (September 1624), Philip IV sent Jacques Bruneau to England, as minister resident. Removing all the ambassadors and sending a lower-ranking diplomat was a way to respond to the provocations of the Prince of Wales, Buckingham and the English parliament.81 From Madrid, the banker Lelio Imbrea sent bills of exchange to Antwerp for his brother Nivio Maria to supply funds to Bruneau. In London, the minister resident borrowed money from several businessmen, including a Flemish merchant, who could have been Peter Rycaut. From Flanders, both the Secretary of State Pedro de San Juan and Gondomar, then the new Spanish ambassador to England, were giving financial support for Bruneau’s expenses at the English court.82 The crucial importance of Gondomar’s third embassy to England, since the spring of 1625, was also shown by the large sum of money he received – 50,000 ducats before leaving Madrid and 50,000 ducats more in bills of exchange payable in Antwerp. He received a total amount of 100,000 ducats, the largest amount received by any ambassador to England since the days of Zúñiga (1605–10).83 This was due to the nature of the mission with which he was entrusted: to recreate a faction at the English

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court in favour of maintaining peace with Spain, to which the new government was very hostile and paying informers and spies as well as support and friendships.84

The king’s sword: The Spanish ambassadors to England The Spanish embassy expenditure could be divided into a number of items (see Figure 3): interest and exchange rate payments, postage expenses and couriers, salaries of embassy personnel, office maintenance costs and secret expenses. The last item will be analysed as follows: banquets, masquerade balls, gifts and pensions; charity gifts; assistance for Spanish military and seamen; Christmas, New Year and anniversary gifts, royal funerals and other court ceremonies (Figure 4). Due to his threefold nature, an ambassador was obliged to spend his time largely at the English court, as an envoy of the king of Spain, as a Catholic and as a member of the Spanish aristocracy85. As server of the king, one of his duties was to be involved in distributive justice, the rewarding of services and actions in favour of the king of Spain or Spanish best interests. As a Catholic, the Spanish ambassador should do charity work and defend Catholicism, especially in a Protestant kingdom as England. As a Spanish aristocrat, he represented his social class in England, surrounded by his peers at the English court.

Postage expenses and couriers of the embassy Despite being an essential service for diplomacy, the magnitude of the costs of the couriers ranked third in the finances of the Spanish embassy.86 In particular, these expenses accounted for 5 per cent of the total expenditure between 1603 and 1625. As for the destination of the numerous letters sent from the embassy, two places are highlighted, Spain and Flanders, while territories like France, Italy, Germany or Scotland appeared in smaller percentages. Spain and Flanders represented 78 per cent of the destinations on the map. However, Flanders is the most prominent territory, not

Figure 4  Spanish embassy items of expenditure (1603–25).

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 71 only because of its vital position in Northern European but also because in Flanders there were many interests for the Spanish embassy in England. Moreover, the fact that much of the correspondence was to be sent to Flanders and in turn forwarded to the Spanish court or to other Spanish domains in Europe must not be neglected. Among the characters mentioned in the various items of expenditure are Leonardo de Tassis (postmaster of Flanders), Carlos de Tassis (postmaster of Antwerp), Juan Bautista Roelants (also postmaster of Antwerp) and Matheo Cuester (Matthew de Quester), postmaster of England for foreign services.87 Regarding other European countries, France represents almost 16 per cent, while the correspondence with Scotland or Italian and German territories represents 5.66 per cent. The Scottish case is particularly noteworthy. Correspondence sent to Scotland appears during the time of Ambassador Coloma (1622–4), who took efforts to assist two Flemish galleons who, after heavy fight with a Dutch squadron of ships, took refuge in the Scottish ports of Aberdeen and Leith in 1622. Both ways, and in general, the correspondence with these places was based on the presence of the Spanish king’s ministers – ambassadors, governors and viceroys. For instance, Gondomar corresponded with Spanish ministers in Rome, Naples, Sicily, Milan, Genoa, Venice, Germany, France and Flanders.88 Travel costs varied according to the number of posts, the distances involved and the kind of person taking the deliveries (a courier on foot or on horseback, embassy staff, an ordinary courier or an extraordinary courier). A courier on foot received about half the salary as one on horseback. An extraordinary courier would be paid twice as much as an ordinary courier. In addition, the person carrying the letters was not always a courier. According to the documents from the embassy, different characters of Spanish, Italian, Irish or Flemish origin are cited. Among them were Ribas de Ribalta – the oldest courier of the embassy – Sergeant Cornelius, Juan Osjart, Pedro de Madariaga, Antonio Martin Aguilar (killed travelling through France), Pedro Lobo, Pedro Buc, Antonio Godino, Pedro Brisart, Parmesano, Alfonso Lezcano, Esteban Ricart, Matheo Croyson, Zachariah, George Marchant, Carlos Lauwens Nicolas Gibets and Joan of Clereque. Other couriers were aristocrats and officers, such as Don Luis Guzman, John Ball, Diego de Cea, Captain Francisco; embassy staff members such as Antonio de Nort – language secretary of the embassy – Francis Fuller, Andres Ferrer and Juan del Castillo – servants – Richard Berry, Tomás Ramírez – secretary of Gondomar – the archdeacon Don Francisco Carondelet, Father Diego de la Fuente and Antonio de Schyn. In general, the ambassadors paid the couriers on horseback between 12 and 24 reales every post (1 and 2 ducats): Villamediana paid 20 reales (almost 2 ducats), Don Pedro de Zúñiga 22 reales (around 2 ducats) and Jacques Bruneau between 12 and 24 reales (1 and 2 ducats).89 The postage and couriers of the Spanish embassy in England were not a mere instrument for transporting all kind of documents and news. Postage was a crucial part of the Spanish diplomacy around Europe. It was also a symbol of the extension of the Spanish crown, a projection of its power across the continent. The couriers at the service of Spain reflect the territorial composition of the Spanish empire and its global interests. The couriers of the Spanish crown faced tough trips, sharp weather conditions, poor roads and risks to their lives. The episodes of murdering or assaulting Spanish couriers

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may have happened not only because they were foreigners travelling through England or France (European rival states of Spain) carrying money, valuables or important documents but also precisely because they were officers of the Spanish crown. As for the couriers at the service of the Spanish embassy, one of them stood out from the numerous names that appear on the documents – Ribas de Ribalta, courier on horseback between Spain and England. He is the only courier that appeared to carry correspondence regularly from 1603 until his death in 1624. In addition, he was the only Spanish courier expressly mentioned in the accounts of the various ambassadors as a member of the embassy. Besides, he was well known by Phillip III and IV. The documents show interesting facts about his life and career, such as salary, debts, family, travels and so on, since three of his sons would also be embassy couriers. Finally, he was a complex and intriguing figure at the service of Spanish diplomacy with England. Ribas de Ribalta was courier on horseback in the service of Spain from the mid1580s until his death in December 1624.90 In 1603 Villamediana took Ribas into his service as royal courier serving in England: in October 1603, the ambassador wrote to Philip III that he had ordered Ribalta to embark at Southampton for France.91 From then on Ribalta served continuously as courier on horseback until his death. Thanks to his hard work and efficiency, he obtained careers as couriers at the Spanish embassy for three of his sons, Pedro, Nicolas and Alberto: the eldest, Pedro, worked as embassy courier from 1612; Nicolas did the same from at least 1616;92 Alberto from the years 1622–3.93 Owing to this dynasty of Ribalta couriers, the father was called Ribas ‘the Older’ by the members of the Spanish government.94 Ribalta received 15 ducats per month paid by the Spanish embassy from 1605, although in 1604 he had received 1,000 reales (91 ducats) from the Constable as reward for his services with Villamediana.95 At first, Philip III had instructed his salary to be paid at the expense of the treasury of the Spanish garrison at Antwerp, but Ribalta asked to be paid by the Spanish embassy in London.96 After mid-1618 he received 19 ducats per month, which was increased to 21 ducats in 1621 and to 22 ducats between the years 1622 and 1624.97 However, as did the ambassadors themselves, he had numerous problems in collecting his wages. Neither his salaries nor travel allowances were paid promptly. In the summer of 1614 Ribalta asked Philip III to be paid one ducat per day while waiting at the court for letters in response. The king ordered Gondomar to pay Ribalta 10 reales per day, as had been customary in the time of Ambassador Zúñiga. That year he was paid 1,400 reales for 140 days awaiting orders during three trips to Madrid from London, between September 1613 and May 1614.98 However, late payments were constant; delays of a year and even more occurred between 1613 and 1623. In November 1617 Gondomar wrote to Philip III that he owed Ribalta 1,500 ducats. In 1620 a desperate Ribalta begged the ambassador to pay the seven months’ salary he was owed. Coloma calculated by July 1623 that the crown’s total debts to Ribalta were 10,000 reales.99 At the end of 1624, Ribalta, old and sick, handed over his post as courier to his youngest son Nicolas, who also became responsible for the settlement of the debts owed to his father.100 It was not until a year after his death that his widow and his son began to collect what Bruneau owed to Ribalta. Bruneau paid them 2,000 reales out of 8,055 reales owed to Ribalta up to the day of his death on 31 December 1624.

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 73 According to historical sources, Ribalta was a popular figure for those in the Spanish government who had to deal with the business of the Spanish embassy. In the correspondence, anecdotes and comments always appear when Ribalta was courier.101 According to Gondomar and Coloma in London, the royal secretary Pedro de San Juan from Flanders or Juan de Ciriza or Don Diego de Ibarra in Madrid, Ribalta was a talkative character who, because of his constant travelling through England, Flanders, France and Spain, had thousands of stories to tell. Precisely because of his many trips and years of service, he became an important and not insignificant source of first-hand news and information for all those who wanted to be knowledgeable about England and other European political issues. This part of Ribalta’s job shows another attribute of the Spanish embassy couriers. They were cultural brokers too, agents at the service of the cultural exchange between Spain and England. Furthermore, Ribalta’s job was not only royal courier for the embassy. His work also involved other tasks: either accompanying important people from Spain, such as the De la Hinojosa in the spring of 1623, or welcoming new diplomats to London, as is the case of Coloma in May 1622.102 As courier on horseback, Ribalta was efficient and enterprising. In the spring of 1618 he presented a plan to Gondomar to reduce the costs of mailing between London, Brussels and Antwerp.103 He helped his sons to become embassy couriers on horseback,​​ and his twenty years in a dangerous job demonstrate his competence and the risks involved; in the spring of 1605 a Spanish courier named Aguilar, en route between Valladolid and London, was killed, while in March 1624, Father Diego de la Fuente was robbed on his way to England in the French region of Picardy.104 The only incident involving Ribalta took place in September 1622. On a trip from London to Madrid, he was assaulted and robbed 100 km away from La Rochelle and taken prisoner, to be sent to this Huguenot port.105 The governor of La Rochelle, Benjamin de Rohan, Duke of Soubise, sent Ribalta’s dispatches to James. Nevertheless, Ribalta was released after being imprisoned for two weeks in La Rochelle – during his captivity there he even managed to undertake some spying and wrote a report about the port.106

Salaries of the embassy personnel Embassy personnel salaries were effectively 20 per cent of the total expenses. Most of that were the salaries and allowances of the ambassadors. The remaining payments were for the staff of the embassy. There were huge differences in salaries and allowances paid by the Spanish crown. From the list of heads in charge of the Spanish embassy, the ​​ biggest beneficiaries were by far the Constable and Villamediana, in service in the years 1603–5. The amount paid to Gondomar was spread over ten years of service, 1614–24. In terms of quantities (except for the above two cases, amounting to between 14,000 and 50,000 ducats), the usual amount granted as allowances was 10,000 ducats, as was the cases for Gondomar, Zúñiga and Velasco. Finally, one group received much less allowances: Velasco, Coloma, Bruneau and Sánchez de Ulloa. Ambassador Velasco received 10,000 ducats at the beginning of his

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period of office. The financial hardship in which he found himself in England led to his secretary, Father Agustín Pérez, begging Gondomar for some money in order to pay his huge debts in England and for his trip back to Spain.107 Meanwhile, Coloma received 5,200 ducats to be paid by the treasury of the army of Flanders.108 After that, Philip IV granted him 4,000 ducats as reward for his work with the Spanish Match.109 As for the other two diplomats, Bruneau received 2,000 ducats in allowances (by comparison, in 1615 Sir Francis Cottington, English diplomat to Spain, had received 4,834 reales).110 Meanwhile, Sánchez de Ulloa was granted with 1,000 ducats on July 1620, an amount similar to that paid to Villamediana’s secretary Pedro Jimenez, who received 700 ducats as allowances. However, this payment was delayed for years.111 The Spanish crown also rewarded the good services of the ambassadors with various appointments and noble titles. Don Juan de Tassis became Count of Villamediana in July 1603; Don Pedro de Zúñiga became Marquis of Floresdávila on 11 April 1612; Don Alonso de Velasco became Count of La Revilla in 1618; Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña was made Count of Gondomar on 11 April 1617; Don Carlos Coloma Saa became Marquis of El Espinar on 16 October 1627 and Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza was made Viscount of La Corzana before 1629 and Count from August 1639. However, financial rewards took their place in the king’s distributive justice.112 The Constable of Castile, for instance, was granted a lifetime annuity of 12,000 ducats to be paid equally by the royal treasuries of Naples (4,000), Sicily (4,000) and Milan (4,000).113 His widow was granted an annuity of 8,000 ducats to be paid in Naples (4,000) and Milan (4,000).114 After his return to Spain, Philip III showed his satisfaction with the Constable’s diplomatic service by granting him a privilege of 8,000 ducats to be paid in Cremona or any other part of the state of Milan for himself and his successors in perpetuity.115 As for Don Pedro de Zúñiga, on his appointment as ambassador he was granted the military command of Bienvenida (Badajoz, Order of Santiago), which had an income of 100 ducats. In 1609 he was granted the command of Corral de Almaguer and then the manor of Castillejo, Villarrubia, Cisla and La Aldehuela.116 The fact that in several cases the ambassadors maintained, at the same time, their ambassadorial salaries along with other wages was important. Velasco, nephew of the Constable, accompanied his uncle on his mission to Flanders and England in the years 1603–4. Therefore, Philip III gave the post of General Overseer of the Galleys of Spain and Italy to Don Juan Maldonado Barnuevo, but Velasco kept a yearly salary of 2,000 ducats.117 Velasco enjoyed that income until he was appointed ambassador to England. Thereafter, the Spanish Council of Finances refused to continue paying this salary as he was receiving a salary as ambassador. However, he obtained assurance from his king that his salary would be paid to his younger son, Don Alonso, who served in the embassy with him.118 On his return from England, Velasco would demand a post in the Council of Finances or the Council of War.119 Another example was Gondomar. When he was appointed ordinary ambassador to England, he asked to continue enjoying his salary of member of the Council of Finances, as this had been the case for other royal ministers sent on diplomatic missions.120

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 75 Meanwhile, Coloma kept his salary of 436 ducats per month as governor of the castle of Cambray.121 Despite this, after receiving his accounts, the Spanish Council of State demanded more restraint in the expenses of the embassy.122 The links between the crown and the ambassadors, from the financial point of view, revolved around the key figure of the system, the king, as a source of favours, honours and rewards. However, the internal structure of the embassy, ​​with its entire staff, repeated the previous pyramid structure. The ambassador (representative of the king and an aristocrat himself) was at the apex, and the other members were located stepwise to the base. A complex network was well established, with the embassies of Spain being its representatives abroad and, in turn, each embassy being a miniature version of the monarchy: the ambassador the head, money the life blood, and the embassy staff, pensioners, confidants and servants its arms.

Structure of the embassy Among the embassy officers, the most prominent were the secretaries of the embassy.​​ Theoretically they were in charge of all the bureaucracy, and the second in the house after the ambassador. Between 1603 and 1625, people like Pedro Jimenez, Fermin Lopez de Mendizorroz, Lope Sedeño, Agustin Perez (who had been secretary at the embassy in Venice in the years 1603–7), Tomás Ramírez, Julián Sánchez de Ulloa, Captain Pablo Font, Francisco Happart and Antonio de Sehin kept this post.123 The salary was usually 25 ducats per month, although there were exceptions. The secretary of the Constable, Fermin Lopez de Mendizorroz, earned 50 ducats per month; Captain Pablo Font, embassy secretary under Coloma, received 20 ducats and Francisco Happart received 220 ducats for fifteen months of service.124 Under them could be found the secretaries of languages, in charge of correspondence in French, English, Italian, Latin and Flemish. Men like Dr Robert Taylor, Francis Fowler, Antonio de Nort, Cristobal Bandenoven, Cosme de Villaviciosa and Francisco Sehelen held the post. Antonio de Nort, Cristobal Bandenoven and Francisco Sehelen were Flemish; Francis Fowler came from an English Catholic family; Dr Robert Taylor, brother of Fowler, was an exiled English Catholic and Cosme de Villaviciosa was son of Spanish–Flemish parents. The salary for these secretaries over the period would be around 200 ducats per year.125 In addition, there was a group called business agents or lawyers of the Spanish embassy. They were experts in law and matters of trade and finance, and they worked on loans, documents for the Privy Council and the High Admiralty Court, lawsuits, garnishments of ship cargoes, piracy business, recruitment of English regiments for the army of Flanders and so on. These people were figures such as Dr Robert Taylor, Dr Alberico Gentili, Juan Bautista Van Male or the businessman Filipo Bernardi. Dr Robert Taylor (Doctor of Law from Douai University, 1602), as well as acting as secretary of languages, was a diplomat for Archduke Albert in England, holding secret talks with leading British ministers between 1603 and 1604, for which he received a reward of 10,000 reales from the Constable. Until his death in 1609 he acted as secretary of the embassy.126 Dr Gentili was another case, more remarkable. He was a very famous

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Italian jurist, exiled for his Protestantism, and a law professor at the University of Oxford. Possibly the best lawyer in England, from 1605 onwards he worked for the Spanish embassy.127 After his death, his brother Scipione, Professor of Law at Altdorf University, published a collection of cases in which Gentili had worked in as a lawyer for the embassy: Hispanicae Advocationis Libri Duo published in 1613, dedicated to the ambassador Zúñiga.128 Their salaries ranged between 250 and 700 ducats a year, but they received rewards based on their duties – Taylor earned between 200 and 500 reales for each. Taylor’s salary was 500 ducats a year, increased to 700 ducats from 1 April 1606 due to his success in bringing back the soldiers of the Tercio of Don Pedro Sarmiento to Flanders, who were refugees in Dover. Gentili earned 250 ducats a year.129 Van Male was the agent of the archduke in England, and Filipo Bernardi was a businessman who lent money to the ambassadors and also worked for them as an agent and solicitor.130 Many Protestants worked and fought for the Spanish embassy in England, even if it was assumed as a paradox, a palpable contradiction. The Spanish diplomats found themselves fighting for the Catholic Faith against the heresy with the support of heretics. Gentili was not the only case of Protestants working for the Spaniards in England. The case of the Italian bankers Filipo Burlamacchi and Giovanni Calandrini and that of the Portuguese ‘New Christians’ bankers (of Jewish origins) are also to be noted. These merchants were well aware of their importance for the finances of the Spanish diplomacy in England (and therefore, for the Spanish diplomatic action in the north of Europe). Through Burlamacchi’s hands had passed almost 115,000 ducats in order to fuel the Spanish diplomatic machine since 1605.131 In 1614, there was a conflict between Gondomar and Burlamacchi due to certain loans and payments to be made in London and Madrid.132 The banker knew what point to strike. Gondomar wrote to Phillip III on October 1614 that Burlamacchi complained bitterly against him in public and at the Royal Exchange: ‘He [Burlamacchi] has said that he is very sorry to provide me [Gondomar] financial assistance with such huge amounts of money, not only for the risks, but also because I [Gondomar] have used that money to attack his religion [Calvinism].’133 Finally come officers or assistants working in the offices of the Spanish embassy, in charge of the huge amount of documents in various languages produced by the daily activity of the ambassadors.134 These officers’ salaries were paid by the ambassador rather than by the king. During Coloma’s office there were three people in charge of the office.135 The average monthly payment for this group was around 129 reales.136 Paper, feathers, ink, wafers, thread, knives, stamps, coal, candles and various other items accounted for the expenses of the office.137 In this regard, Jacques Bruneau wrote that every ambassador paid 50 reales per month for the office, but he was paying 40 reales as he was not ambassador but minister resident. The average monthly expenses for the embassy office were around 40 reales under Zúñiga, around 57 reales under Gondomar and around 50 reales during Coloma’s office. Only during the embassies held by Villamediana and the Constable of Castile were these monthly amounts comparatively higher: 87 reales and 143 reales, respectively.

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 77

Other members of the embassy staff Other members of the embassy staff were a very heterogeneous set of people from different backgrounds and functions, who received a salary paid by the embassy. However, their work for the embassy was not a properly bureaucratic one. Among them could be found assistants, servants, clergy and others. In principle, it should be clear that because of the diffuse and secretive nature of their functions (intelligence, for example), not all of them appeared in the embassy accounts. In fact, some ambassadors, for instance, Villamediana, included them in the secret expenses item without any more detail.138 Among the embassy assistants of the Spanish embassy there are two prominent figures. One is the Milanese senator Alessandro Rovida, jurist and lawyer, and the Constable’s replacement during the negotiations with the English in 1604. Rovida met the Constable when he was governor of Milan between 1592 and 1600 and then between 1610 and 1602, playing an important role during the diplomatic negotiations.139 Rovida fulfilled his task brilliantly, first as an expert in law on the Spanish side and second as a spokesman for the Spanish group of commissioners.140 After the peace treaty was achieved in London, the senator embarked at Dover on Friday, 10 September for Paris. Together with the Spanish ambassador Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, he went to negotiate a trade agreement between Spain, France and Flanders.141 According to the accounts of the Constable, for his mission in England and France from January to October 1604, Senator Rovida received a total of 47,269.80 reales (4,297 ducats), along with a jewel valued at 4,980 reales (453 ducats).142 The other figure was a Spanish aristocrat, Don Blasco de Aragón, of the ducal house of Cardona.143 He was an important nobleman, assistant of the Constable and member of the circle of the Duke of Lerma. He accompanied the Constable on his mission to England. He worked as a courier, carrying dispatches to Philip III and Lerma to keep them informed about the status of the diplomatic negotiations with the English. In fact, it was he who carried the final version of the peace to Valladolid in September 1604.144 Later, due to his remarkable diplomatic experience in England, he would be responsible for welcoming Lord Howard, High Admiral of England, and his entourage, from La Corunna to Valladolid on 26 April 1605.145 Don Blasco also appeared among the witnesses to the oath ceremony of peace taken by Philip III.146 He received a total of 56,010 reales (5,092 ducats) as allowances for his numerous trips between Spain, England, Flanders and France between February and November 1604. In addition, he was granted 67,798 reales as a reward. In total, Don Blasco was granted with 123,808 reales (11,000 ducats). Both Don Blasco de Aragón and Senator Rovida were the best paid embassy assistants between 1603 and 1625. Both were crucial figures during the negotiations of peace with England, which explains the amounts paid to them, similar to the Spanish pensions paid to the major English aristocrats during those years. The sum of money granted to Don Blasco and senator Rovida reached 171,077.80 reales (15,552 ducats). Several members of the clergy appeared in the embassy accounts as chaplains, confessors or assistants for the Catholics of Great Britain.147 One such was Father Juan de San Agustin. He was an assistant and confessor of Don Pedro de Zúñiga and was

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paid 12,290 reales (1,117 ducats). Later on, he appears as censor of the works of Don Francisco de Quevedo (Vida de Santo Tomás de Villanueva, 1620) and as the author of a report on the marriage of the Spanish Infanta to the Prince of Wales. Some years later, Father Juan de San Agustin was appointed confessor of the Cardinal–Infante Don Ferdinand of Austria, brother of Phillip IV, and accompanied him to Brussels when the young Spanish prince was governor of Flanders.148 The most important clerk in the service of the Spanish embassy in England during the period was Father Diego de la Fuente. A Dominican friar of the convent of San Benito in Valladolid and Gondomar’s confessor, he was a chaplain of the embassy and undertook important diplomatic missions between the years 1613 and 1624.149 According to the records, Father Diego received a salary of 20 ducats per month, supplemented by occasional allowances for his numerous trips around England and Europe.150 Finally, there is the case of Father Simon Stock, a Discalced Carmelite, to whom Bruneau provided several gifts worth 140 reales (13 ducats). This friar had a very interesting life. Enjoying a long life (1576–1652) and coming from an English Catholic family, his real name was Thomas Doughty. He was a theology student between 1606 and 1610 at the English College of Rome, entering the Carmelite Order in Brussels around 1613. From 1615 he was a Catholic missionary in England. In October 1620 Stock became chaplain and confessor of Gondomar, Coloma and Jacques Bruneau, replacing Father Diego de la Fuente. His work at the embassy allowed him to establish contacts with important members of the Jacobean court, including the Secretary of State Sir George Calvert (later Lord Baltimore), who apparently converted to Catholicism. Stock was involved in a project for Lord Baltimore, founding an English colony called Avalon in Newfoundland (now Canada) for Catholic and Protestant settlers.151 As for sextons and chaplains of the embassy, some of them appeared in the accounts as receiving a salary, although this did not always happen. There is no mention of a salary for the chaplains of Villamediana, the Constable (Don Fabio Maestri), Zúñiga or Velasco (Bartolomé Tellez). One of the chaplains of Gondomar, Simon Ariza, had a pension of 100 ducats a year; this amount was supplemented on one occasion with a gift of 600 reales for his work with the English Catholics. Coloma was accompanied to England by Francisco de Carondelet (Archdeacon of Cambrai), who served him as one of the chaplains of the embassy and as a diplomat. (He was Coloma’s own Father De la Fuente.) At the end of his career, Carondelet was​​ rewarded with a gem valued at 2,000 reales (182 ducats) and a post in the Abbey of Saint Bertin in Flanders. As for other chaplains, an Englishman ​​ Father Juan Hidalgo (Thomas Wentworth) and the Discalced Carmelite friar Father Simon Stock both received 120 reales per month (12 ducats). Father Juan Hidalgo was granted 760 reales (69 ducats) as a reward by Gondomar in 1622. In late 1625, Bruneau gave him 240 reales as an allowance to leave for Flanders because of the persecution of English Catholics that came with the breakdown of relations between the two crowns. Bruneau gave Simon Stock several gifts worth 140 reales (13 ducats).152 Thus, the amount paid to chaplains of the embassy was between 90 and 120 reales a month (8–11 ducats).153

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 79 The sextons received lower wages, around 30 reales a month (3 ducats). In general, all these figures were a group of clergy from different backgrounds (Spanish, Flemish, French or English) who were responsible, in the chapel of the house of the ambassador, for administering the sacraments, comforting Catholics, taking religious vows, waiving irregularities, taking confessions, absolving sins and celebrating two daily public masses and other celebrations of the Catholic calendar.154 In short, they tried to be the main reference point for Catholicism in England, surpassing other Catholic embassies in devotion.155 Regarding other figures who received some form of wages from the ambassador, they were also a heterogeneous group both by their social status (soldiers, knights, servants, merchants, officers) and by their geographical origin (Spanish, English, Scottish, Irish). First, people whose employment was as servants, such as the three servants of Doña Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza.156 She herself received 300 reales a month (27 ducats) from the embassy after 1605. From 21 March 1613 her pension was increased to 500 reales a month (45 ducats) up to her death in January 1614.157 Diego Lemettier, Ana Primiser (Anne Primiser) and María Snow (Mary Snow), her three servants, received gifts worth of 45–60 reales (4–5 ducats). This continued after Doña Luisa’s death in January 1614 until the end of December 1625, when Jacques Bruneau left England.158 Catherine Bentley, great-granddaughter of Thomas More, received a pension of 100 ducats a year between 1614 and 1617.159 This was also the case for an Irish lady named Catherine Fitzgerald, a member of the house of the Earls of Desmond, who received 300 reales a month between late 1605 and 1607.160 Finally, the case of Henry Barber, an English Catholic who worked as doorkeeper at the Spanish ambassador’s house. He had served since the days of Ambassador Villamediana (1603).161 For his services he received 60 reales per month (5 ducats) paid until Jacques Bruneau left England.162 Several assistants were Irish or English: John Ball, Gaspar Grant, John Bath and Richard Berry were Irish, while Henry Taylor was English. John Ball worked for Ambassador Zúñiga, but he had worked in the service of Spain since the 1580s and had apparently served in the entourage of the Constable of Castile in 1604. His salary was 36 ducats a month, and he was paid from mid-December 1604 to late 1607.163 His main activity was to assist the ambassador, acting as interpreter, among other things. However, he was involved in the strange ‘Newce and Franceschi plot’ in the summer of 1606, an attempt to take Sluys, Vlissingen and Bergen-op-Zoom into Dutch hands.164 All this ended in a huge scandal for both Zúñiga, who refused to surrender Ball to the English authorities (meaning Ball was arrested in the ambassador’s house), and Archduke Albert and Philip III. Zúñiga apologized to Sir Robert Cecil, expressing total ignorance of the whole thing and adding that Ball was incompetent and had not given him good service.165 The records reflect his many trips carrying dispatches around England to such places as the coastal areas of English Channel, Oxford and Chelsea, or to Flanders and Spain, bringing dispatches with details of the conspiracy of November 1605, for which he was paid 5,886 reales (535 ducats).166 Gaspar Grant served Spain from the early 1590s. According to a report presented to the Spanish Council of State, he was serving in Galicia as inspector and interpreter of

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foreign vessels and merchants.167 He contacted Gondomar there, whom he accompanied to England in 1613, serving as his assistant until the end of 1618, when Grant returned to Spain. At the embassy, Grant was responsible for many activities, including making allegations against pirates to the English authorities and carrying dispatches and letters to King James, British ministers and other important courtiers.168 His wages were 20 ducats per month, paid first in Bayona (Galicia) and then at the Spanish embassy. Henry Taylor was the son of Dr Robert Taylor. He was an assistant of Gondomar, librarian at San Benito el Viejo (Valladolid), acting as interpreter and assistant in his second mission to England. At his third embassy, ​​Taylor became secretary of languages and was sent to England in August 1625 to ascertain Charles’s intentions towards Spain and the possibility of avoiding war. His mission ended in failure at the English court and Taylor had to return to Flanders.169 Gondomar paid him at different times a total amount of 3,500 reales between March 1620 and the end of May 1622 (318 ducats), as he did to Taylor’s mother, Mary, widow of Dr Taylor. She was granted 3,000 reales (273 ducats).170 There are several historical sources regarding the Irish knight John Bath. Originally from Drumcondra (Dublin), although of English origins, he composed laudatory poems in Latin dedicated to the works of Juan Mendez de Vasconcelos (Liga deshecha por la expulsion de los Moriscos de los reynos de España) and Lorenzo Ramirez de Prado (Pentekontarkos), both published in 1612.171 Moreover, he was quoted in Miguel de Cervantes’s Viaje al Parnaso (ch. IV, pp. 424–6), where the writer related the prodigious memory of that Irish gentleman.172 He arrived in Madrid in 1609 to accompany Henry O’Donnell, living as another Irish exile until he killed Earl Donald Cam O’Sullivan of Bearhaven in a street duel in July 1618.173 Before that, Philip III had granted him a pension of 40 ducats per month at the Spanish court. Later on, he returned to England to serve at the embassy with Coloma. Hinojosa held him in high esteem, describing him as a good gentleman, a reliable confidant, a Catholic and willing to serve Philip IV in Ireland in the case of a war with England.174 However, the Spanish court distrusted him, and apparently with good reason, because Bath was really a spy for England.175 Nevertheless, the embassy paid him a salary of 40 ducats per month for ten months in 1624. With the outbreak of the war in the autumn of 1625, Bath continued serving the English crown and looking after his lands in Ireland with no apparent problems.176 The Englishman Richard Berry is a figure widely studied by historians.177 He was recommended to the Duke of Lerma by the Jesuit Joseph Creswell and became an assistant of Gondomar after 1613 in London. However, neither Lerma nor Gondomar particularly trusted him because of his friendship with the English ambassador Sir John Digby.178 Therefore, the ambassador would not give him more important tasks for the embassy rather than serving as courier, interpreter or assistant.179 Gondomar tried to keep him away from the most secret business of the embassy, ​​trying unsuccessfully to make him leave for Naples, where Berry was granted a pension of 30 ducats per month and 200 ducats as allowances.180 It was not until his second embassy in England that Gondomar employed him on more important business.181 This is confirmed by his successor, Coloma, when referring to Richard Berry as the ‘secretary of the embassy’ (Berry was an important collaborator of Julián Sánchez de Ulloa).182 The last payment

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 81 made to Berry was 60 ducats for May–July 1623, paid by Jacques Bruneau between October 1624 and December 1625 to clear the salary arrears of Don Carlos Coloma.183 Thus, Berry was in the pay of the embassy for almost a decade. Last but not least, four important figures appear in the accounts of the Spanish ambassadors. First, there is the Walloon officer Jorge Henin. He had been a spy in the court of Muley Zaydan in Morocco during the first decade of the seventeenth century, watching the contact between Berber pirates, the English, the Dutch and the Moors.184 Later on, in 1618, 1620 and 1621, he prepared commercial projects for the Spanish government, but without much success.185 Finally, Phillip III sent Henin to England in the hope that Gondomar would make him diplomat to Denmark to encourage economic war against the Dutch from there.186 For this, he was paid a salary of 40 ducats per month for the duration of his mission and 300 ducats more as allowances. Arriving in London on 25 April 1621, Gondomar showed little interest in Henin’s projects and proposals.187 Soon Henin began to blame Gondomar for this. Apparently, Henin tried to establish contact with the imperial ambassador, the Count of Schwartzemberg, to submit their plans, as well as the Spanish ambassador in Brussels.188 Following the departure of Gondomar, Coloma faced the problem of Henin’s remaining in London. He kept him busy working as an interpreter because of his knowledge of languages ​​ (Henin appeared as another secretary of languages).189 Therefore, he continued to receive his salary until October 1622, when he begged to be given licence to return to Madrid and try to get a post there as minister resident to Denmark.190 Coloma paid 2,664 reales for the debts he left in London.191 By November 1622 Henin was no longer in England. The Spanish Council of State ordered payment of his salary arrears and nothing more, as his proposals were pointless and fruitless.192 Two Spanish officers were paid by the ambassadors. One was Vicente de Anciondo, overseer and accountant of the fleet of Flanders. In 1607 Philip III sent him on a mission to England.193 For this, he was paid a salary of 3 ducats per day by the Spanish embassy from 8 April until the end of his mission: in total, Anciondo received 5,380 reales, as he was paid up to 13 September 1607.194 His mission was supervising the construction of twenty-two warships in England by a Flemish merchant Geremías Valamens, who was resident in England.195 The importance of the mission was remarkable: twenty-two equipped warships, with artillery and fully experienced crews, the cost of which was 197,484.80 ducats. Anciondo’s salary of 90 ducats per month was one of the highest paid by the embassy between 1603 and 1625.196 The other officer was Pablo Font, a captain of the Spanish fleet in the galleys of Portugal. In July 1623, Coloma’s private secretary died, so the ambassador wrote to Madrid asking for another officer to take over the post. Font had already served with him as secretary when he was Viceroy of Mallorca (1612–7), and then with Don Alonso Portocarrero, Marquis of Villanueva del Fresno, general of the galleys of Portugal from 1621.197 This officer, a man of loyalty and intelligence, had obtained a grant from Philip IV just months before: his salary was increased from 15 to 20 ducats per month, and he became personal assistant to Don Fadrique de Toledo, the commander of the Spanish Sea fleet.198 Coloma’s proposal was accepted, and Captain Font travelled to England. In September 1623, Font was already working in the office of the embassy.199 He served in the embassy a year, until September 1624, when Coloma left England.200

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Finally, there is the case of the Scottish Catholic merchant William Laing. Born in the town of Aberdeen, this merchant became famous as he assisted with money, weapons and supplies (between late 1622 and mid-1623), two galleons of the fleet of Flanders who took refuge in the Scottish ports of Leith and Aberdeen. The adventure, which would be presented later on in this book, ended with the imprisonment and exile of Laing. At the same time, thanks to Coloma, Philip IV made him his agent in Scotland. Lang received a salary of 40 ducats per month between March 1623 and June 1625, at which time he left England to settle in Flanders.201

Private expenditure of the Spanish ambassadors Private expenditure represents the lowest percentage of the four items of the total embassy expenses, at an average of 3 per cent from 1603 to 1625. It includes office expenses, chapel maintenance or several trips around England. First of all, travel expenses around England, Scotland or Ireland: ambassadors or the embassy staff often travelled around Britain for meetings with King James and Privy Council ministers, or to deal with issues related to the daily life of an embassy (such as dispatches and letters, audiences, commissions, receptions, masquerades and various kinds of meetings). These trips were made on horseback, by carriage or by boat. The number of British ports shown on the records is quite remarkable. The Spanish embassy had among its tasks the surveillance of the British coasts due to the constant threat of piracy on the Spanish sea routes, the essential importance of the British neutral ports for the war against the Dutch and the obvious desire to have better knowledge of the ports and the English fleet.202 Twenty-five British ports are cited on the records, mostly in southern England, along the coast from Bristol to London, in the counties of Somerset, Devon, Cornwall, Dorset, Hampshire, Kent, Essex and Middlesex (Table 4).203 In Scotland the records show visits to Edinburgh, Leith, Prenstonpans and Aberdeen, while in Ireland, five ports are mentioned, Table 4  Ports of England and Scotland Barmouth Bristol Falmouth Dartmouth Isle of Wight Portsmouth

1 3 5 7 9 11

Rochester Greenwich Ipswich Edinburg–Leith–Prestonpans

13 15 17 19

Newport Ilfracombe Plymouth Weymouth Southampton Dover– Kingsdown–Sandwich– Margate Tilbury–Gravesend London Newcastle Aberdeen

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 83 Table 5  Ports of Ireland Dublin Kinsale Berehaven

1 3 5

Waterford Castlehaven Londonderry

2 4 6

Table 6  Inland Places of England Richmond

A

Staines Windsor Salisbury Woodstock Theobalds Cambridge Canterbury Sittingbourne Henley-on-Thames

C E G I K M Ñ P R

Hampton Court–Kingston Upon Thames–Chelsea Oatlands Winchester Oxford Coventry Royston New Market Chichester Rochester Maidenhead

B D F H J L N O Q S

Dublin, Waterford, Kinsale, Castlehaven and Berehaven, besides other Irish ports not specified on the sources (Table 5). With regard to inland areas, there were the king’s residences at Hampton Court, Windsor, Theobalds and New Market, Cambridge and Oxford universities, and the seat of the Primate of England, the archbishop of Canterbury (Table 6).204 The Downs is the name of a large cove for ships, a strategic location between the Straits of Dover and the Thames estuary. Ships waited there to navigate on the English Channel or towards London. There were numerous conflicts in this area between Dutch and Spanish warships, as well as great naval battles, such as that of 1639. Finally, the expense item of chapel maintenance was also important. The ambassador’s Catholic chapel was, theoretically, the only place in England, besides other Catholic embassy chapels, where the Catholic liturgy could be celebrated legally.205 The chapel was truly the heart of the house of the Spanish ambassador, as that place defined the rest of the embassy. Spaniards were Catholics, and being diplomats in a Protestant kingdom such as England, this characteristic became more obvious and crucial (as for the Protestant English ambassadors to Spain). At present, the heart of the embassies is the bunker of the building (a space to protect people, documents, communications, valuables and money). Regarding seventeenth-century diplomacy, the heart of the embassy was the chapel (where the true Faith and God behind the kingdom were protected).

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Map 1 England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland. Many Catholics, both English and people from other countries, attended the masses and other Catholic ceremonies daily. In the case of the Spanish ambassador’s chapel, attendance was considerable and daily. Velasco himself witnessed how Queen Anne had received communion in his chapel, a gesture that had a great impact not only on the prestige of the Spanish ambassador but also on the Spanish chapel as the meeting point for British Catholics. Meanwhile, Coloma stated that during the celebration of Corpus Christi in 1622 and many Catholic ladies had attended the ceremony at the chapel – he counted twelve carriages in the yard – while by Easter of 1623 4,000

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 85 communions had been given and a total of 15,000 conversions occurred.206 This huge Catholic activity around the Spanish embassy chapel inevitably led to clashes with the English authorities. In the days of Ambassador Zúñiga, Catholic processions were held in the gardens of his house and were attended by many Catholics, so many that it caused a public scandal. At Easter 1607, 600 Catholics attended the ceremonies. There were so many that the ambassador advised them to leave the house by the garden gates and not by the main door of his house. Therefore, there were numerous arrests at the gates of the embassy, which ​​ did not happen in the case of the houses of the Venetian and French ambassadors, in the same street. On one occasion several English sheriffs arrested sixteen Catholic people coming out of a mass at the Spanish chapel, causing fifty others to take refuge in the ambassador’s house until Zúñiga’s complaints made the sheriffs withdraw from the vicinity of his house. Velasco was warned by the Privy Council that his house would be searched in order to arrest the Catholic refugees. The ambassador’s house was often surrounded by officers of the archbishop of Canterbury (poursuivants) and of the Sheriff of London (bailiffs), resulting in armed incidents such as one on Christmas Eve of 1611. According to King James, thanks to the Spanish example, these incidents spread to other Catholic embassies. At Christmas of 1622, the Prince of Wales even allowed three Catholic musicians to sing at the Christmas mass of the Coloma’s chapel, in spite of the scandal.207 Although the records give little detail in reference to the embassy chapel, the Constable’s accounts did describe the ornaments that he took to England in 1604 for his chapel. These ornaments were bought in Brussels, costing a total of 8,609.05 reales (783 ducats). Later on, the Constable spent another 100,000 reales in Flanders for his chapel (9,092 ducats).208 Ornaments such as crimson fabrics, gold and silver objects – jewels, basins, cruets, monstrances, lamps, boxes, censers, candlesticks and so on – silk, velvet, a crucifix made of bronze and ebony, an altar, pillows, towels, ribbons, veils, hosts box and a small chest were bought. The overall impression about the Spanish embassy chapel is of a small but very luxurious place, suitable for a great Catholic aristocrat on a diplomatic mission. The ambassador’s chapel was no longer a place for meditation and prayer, a place for a dialogue between the soul and God. It instead became a place of exaltation of the Catholic liturgy and doctrine, a space for Spanish propaganda, according to the times of the Confessionalization in Europe (1555–1648). The chapel was meant to impress its visitors, Catholics, Protestants, British, Spaniards and other foreigners, to exalt Catholicism, to reach hearts and souls through the senses in order to convince and convert to the true faith.209 Regarding the ceremonies of the Catholic calendar celebrated in the chapel, Our Lady of Candelaria, Lent, Easter, Corpus Christi, Assumption of Our Lady, All Saints’ Day and Christmas are repeatedly mentioned. The regular monthly expense for the chapel ranged between 17 and 35 reales (1.5–3 ducats), for wax, wine and hosts, although during liturgical celebrations, chapel expenses soared. For example, on 2 February 1623, during the day of Our Lady of Candelaria, 185 reales (17 ducats) were spent on the chapel. During Easter, the ambassador ordered the building of a

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monument of wood and gold worth 400 reales (36 ducats), besides spending another 240 reales (22 ducats). In 1624, the celebration of Lent and Easter cost 784 reales (71 ducats). The Corpus Christi ceremony in June cost between 300 and 600 reales (27–55 ducats).210 The Assumption of Our Lady in 1624 was celebrated with new ornaments for the chapel paid for by Don Carlos Coloma. They cost 4,000 reales (364 ducats) and the crimson, velvet and white satin fabrics and the silver and gold were so luxurious that the ambassador wanted to take them with him to the church of Cambrai. In November 1624, the All Saints’ Day ceremony cost around 100 reales (9 ducats). Finally, there was the miscellaneous expenses item. Under this item are included payments for bureaucratic procedures and other extraordinary expenses. Regarding bureaucratic expenses, before the Privy Council or the court of the High Admiralty, there were such things as obtaining passports for couriers and obtaining warrants, as well as other payments to people such as royal officers, lawyers and embassy staff.211 These expenses involved the fight against piracy: ships arrived at British ports with cargoes or vessels belonging to subjects of Spain. Other payments involved efforts such as the reporting to the English authorities of books, plays and pamphlets that are insulting to or are mocking Spain or Catholicism, or even just the private business of the Spanish ambassadors. For instance, in 1618 Father Diego de la Fuente denounced an English bookseller on the grounds of a book insulting Spain and the Papacy. In 1622 Ambassador Gondomar sent to Philip IV the famous work Cancillería Hispánica, whose author was a councillor of Count Frederick of the Palatinate, husband of King James’s daughter, and one of the Protestant German leaders at the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War.212 As for the private expenses item, the Constable used 100,000 reales (9,091 ducats) for jewellery, clothing and silver for his trip to England. Villamediana received from the Constable some gems and pearls worth 43,200 reales (3,927 ducats), plus 4,000 reales (364 ducats) for his servants. Gondomar paid 24,002 reales (2182 ducats) for white silver and gold-plated silver to be used at the banquets in his house. Coloma paid 400 reales (36 ducats) for clothes for two of his chaplains in 1623.213 Celebrations, festivities and mourning ceremonies were also important opportunities to show the Spanish ambassadors’ liberality. Villamediana spent 60,000 reales (5,455 ducats) on receiving news of the birth of the future Philip IV on 8 April 1605. The Constable spent 800 reales (73 ducats) in fireworks in order to celebrate peace with England, and Ambassador Coloma 1,762 reales (160 ducats) on wine, beers and fireworks to celebrate the return of the Prince of Wales to England and the birth of the Spanish Infanta Margarita Maria Catalina in October 1623. As for funerals, Gondomar spent 10,870 reales (988 ducats) on mourning the death of Philip III on 31 March 1621, and Jacques Bruneau 2113.66 reales (192 ducats) on expenses following the death of James in April 1625. By way of comparison, Sir John Digby spent 12,000 reales (1,091 ducats) in September 1614 on mourning the death of Queen Margaret of Austria and Prince Henry Stuart; Sir Francis Cottington paid 4,000 reales (364 ducats) in June 1619 on mourning the death of Queen Anne of Denmark and Sir Walter Aston spent 6,000 reales (545 ducats) on mourning Philip III.214

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 87 During other court celebrations, Villamediana rented several windows in Southampton from which to watch the public entry of King James and Queen Anne on 30 October 1603. Don Pedro de Zúñiga paid 300 reales (27 ducats) to watch from other windows the public entry of the King of Denmark in London on 9 August 1606, and in February 1624 Coloma did the same for the procession for the opening of the English parliament.215 Finally, there were orders from the Spanish court to ambassadors for particular purchases and even the purchase of weapons to protect the house of the ambassadors. Don Pedro de Zúñiga bought some Irish greyhounds dogs worth 2,173 reales (198 ducats) for Philip III; he had asked for them in May 1607 and the dogs were taken to Spain in December 1607. In 1612, Zúñiga acquired two English crows for 480 reales (44 ducats), a gift for Phillip III. In 1624 Jacques Bruneau bought 3,000 pieces of gold fabric worth 3,000 reales (273 ducats) and another 1,000 pieces of silver fabric worth 12,749 reales (1,159 ducats) in England for the Spanish Queen Elizabeth of France. With regard to weapons for the house, in October 1623 and again in the spring of 1624 Coloma spent a total of 1,268 reales (115 ducats) on buying bullets, pikes, more than a 100 lb of powder, fuse and twenty-four muskets to defend his house from the angry population of London, because of the menacing crowds that stood outside his house throwing stones and cursing the Spanish. This street rioting began in 1623 due to the arrival of a Spanish Fadrique de Toledo’s naval squadron in the English Channel, which was seen from the Cornish coast. In 1624, riots began because of the public atmosphere in London against Spain created by the English parliament after the return of Prince of Wales from Spain (Figure 5).216

Figure 5  Spanish embassy secret expenses (1603–25).

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England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

Secret expenses A French book of 1466 advised that any king should spend on espionage 30 per cent of his income. During the critical years of 1584–7, Queen Elizabeth spent £11,000 (44,000 ducats) on espionage per year, which was around 5 per cent of the English crown’s income. The Spanish embassy used 91 per cent of its secret expenditure item on espionage, which accounted for 63.7 per cent of the total expenses of the embassy and an equal amount of the total revenue.217

Alms and charity As representatives of the Catholic Spanish Crown, charity was a very important mandatory expense for the Spanish ambassadors. First of all, charity to the poor was an obligation for Catholics. Second, it was their personal duty as ambassadors, representing the most Catholic, rich and powerful prince in Europe, and as members of the Spanish nobility.218 The reputation of their master, the honour of the aristocrat, Catholic identity and the post of ambassador went hand-in-hand when it came to managing the embassy’s secret expenses.

Who were the recipients of charity? First, they were Catholic clergy. On financial assistance to the members of the Catholic Church alone the Spanish embassy spent a minimum of 55.65 per cent of the charity expenditure between 1603 and 1625. During the period, priests and monks passed through the house of the Spanish ambassadors, as did archbishops and bishops representing regular and secular clergy such as Augustinian, Trinidadians, Franciscans, Jesuits, Dominicans, Capuchins, Carthusian or the Order of St John of God friars.219 This turned the embassy into a centre for English Catholicism, as the embassy constantly transported clergy in and out of Great Britain, despite raids by the British authorities and the pressures and complaints of the bishop of London and the archbishop of Canterbury. Spanish ambassadors assisted the clergy in their pastoral missions in Great Britain. In 1620 Gondomar financed a Catholic mission to Scotland to the tune of 10,000 reales (9,091 ducats). Between 1622 and 1624 Coloma paid 988 reales (90 ducats) to various priests and monks on their way to their pastoral missions. The ambassadors also helped clergy to escape to Flanders, Spain or other cities such as Paris, Rome, Jerusalem and Danzig: Zúñiga spent 4,897 reales on this (445 ducats), Gondomar at least 63,000 reales (5,727 ducats), Coloma 1,027 reales (93 ducats) and Bruneau 330 reales (30 ducats).220 The causes of their leaving varied. They could be exiled priests from England after being released from prison or simply after being threatened by the English government. Zúñiga was accompanied by six priests on his return to Spain in 1610, and as many again in 1612; Gondomar left England with as many as seventy Catholic priests in 1618.221 They could be aberrant clerks who wanted reconciliation with the Catholic Church: Gondomar reconciled the archbishop of Spalato, Coloma reconciled Franciscan and Trinitarian monks and Bruneau did the same with a

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 89 Carthusian friar. Finally, they could be on a pilgrimage or on study trips to Catholic countries, for instance at the Catholic seminars of Douai and Saint Omer, in Flanders.222 Lastly, the ambassadors provided financial support by giving alms to friars in prison and to the poor. The Constable gave about 4,000 reales (364 ducats) to some Jesuits in 1604. Zúñiga spent 5,422 reales (493 ducats) on them, while Gondomar spent at least 26,000 reales (2,384 ducats). Coloma and Bruneau paid just around 232 and 400 reales, respectively (21-36 ducats). The second group was Catholics, accounting for 44.35 per cent of charity expenditure. This group was a varied group of English, Irish, Scottish, Flemish, Italian and Spanish people from diverse social backgrounds – royal ministers, ladies of the nobility, merchants or just simple poor people who had been imprisoned. Every Catholic in Great Britain knew that he or she could find shelter in the house of the Spanish ambassador in London. This work was perfectly logical, and it helped to strengthen the ties between the Catholic British community and the king of Spain, which resulted in British soldiers working for the Spanish armies and fleets, confidants, collaborators and supporters of all kinds. And, incidentally, making this English support a major concern for the Jacobean crown.223 Spanish ambassadors paid for these people’s trips to Catholic Europe. There were study trips to Catholic schools and seminars at Douai and Saint Omer (Flanders) and Valladolid (Spain), and Catholic women went to Flanders to take the holy vows and became nuns. Ambassadors specially emphasized their concerns about Spaniards who came to England for no reason who were at risk of condemning their Catholic souls. A commonplace in politics at the time was the idea that contact with heresy caused religious infection of the soul, because it resembled the plague,224 hence the rejection by the Spanish crown of the English proposal to move the English cloth trade from Zeeland (Middleburgh, the Netherlands) to Antwerp (Flanders) in the time of Archduke Albert, or the problems caused by the interpretation of chapter 26 of the Peace of 1604 regarding the tolerance of English Protestants merchants in Spain.225 This concern was exactly the same for the English authorities, hence the fierce persecution of Catholic clergy as propagandists of Catholicism, a forbidden religion, in Great Britain.226 In any case, this concern about uncontrolled Spaniards who came to England was more than justified for the ambassadors: there was a real risk of Protestant Spaniards returning to Spain and introducing heresy (and political treason) there. Hence, they were paid to go back to Spain or Flanders as soon as possible by the ambassadors. Among the recipients of charity were members of the nobility, converted Catholic British ministers and Catholic poor people, imprisoned or sick. The aristocracy included people like Ana de Carvajal y Mendoza, Lady Catherine Fitzgerald and Lady Catherine Bentley. Gondomar informed in 1613 that in the manors of many great English lords there was a Protestant minister openly preaching, as well as a Catholic priest hidden for the spiritual needs of the lord or lady of the house.227 In 1623, Coloma wrote to the Papal Nuncio in Flanders looking for financial support to increase Catholic conversions among English royal ministers; Coloma had already witnessed the conversion of eight ministers. Another example was the case of the Genoese merchant Filipo Bernadi, who was financially aided by the Spanish embassy during

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England and Spain in the Early Modern Era

1622–5 as he had apparently fallen into poverty. Bernadi was a financier who worked for many years for the Spanish ambassadors in London.228 Finally, the house of the ambassador also represented a Catholic shelter, and not just a Catholic chapel with diplomatic immunity. Many Catholics went there in search of safety when the hostile anti-Catholic atmosphere grew in London, subject to the vagaries of the political relationship between England and Spain during those years. In the spring of 1624, a group of priests and Catholic knights took shelter in the house of the ambassador until the dissolution of the English parliament. Some of them had been elected as Members of Parliament but had refused to take the Oath of Supremacy.229

Gifts and donations These two concepts included gifts distributed by the ambassadors at the English court on special occasions such as Christmas celebrations, public entrances of the monarchs and treaty oath ceremonies.230 Villamediana wrote to Philip III that it was customary in England that every Christmas the nobility of the realm offered gifts to the king and that he would do the same on Philip’s behalf.231 The beneficiaries were the servants of the royal households of James I, Queen Anne and the Prince of Wales. However, in this expenditure item is included the small payments made by the ambassadors to the servants of the great British lords – Lord Charles Howard, the Duke of Lennox, the Earl of Worcester, Sir William Monson, the Earls of Northampton and Southampton and so on – and other royal ministers, including the Postmaster of London Matthew Quester and magistrates of Canterbury, Portsmouth, Dover, Gravesend and London, as well as other foreign ambassadors in England (for example, the French ambassadors, the Count of Vaudemont and Prince Francis II of Lorraine). Specifically, recipients of these gifts from the Spanish ambassadors were royal musicians – trumpeters, drummers, buglers, and fife players – hunters, cooks, doctors, pharmacists, sergeants-at-arms, couriers, porters, royal guards, boatmen, jesters, waiters, butlers, coachmen, forests rangers, footmen and chaplains, in other words, people who occupied the base of the hierarchy in the service of the royal household or of British aristocratic families. Because of this, they were very helpful to the Spanish ambassadors at the English court. Their sympathy towards Spain, or at least their neutrality, was to be secured or, better, gained, since many other diplomats, such as the ambassadors of France, the Netherlands, Venice and Savoy, were willing to do the same. There were big differences among the payments to these people at the English court. First of all, it was according to the importance of the celebration. The largest payments were made on the occasion of the celebration of peace in 1604, when 49,756 reales (4,523 ducats) were distributed by the Constable and 33,610.50 reales (3,055 ducats) by Villamediana; the marriage settlement between the Prince of Wales and the Spanish Infanta in July 1623, when 54,000 reales (4,909 ducats) was given by Coloma and Hinojosa; and on the occasion of the visit of King Christian IV of Denmark in July 1615, when Gondomar spent 5,674.50 reales (516 ducats).232 The gifts given at Christmas, Epiphany and other occasions were much less in terms of money.

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 91 Second, it depended on the social and political importance of the British aristocrats involved. The servants of the royal family received the largest amounts of money. After them came the servants of the Privy Council, the High Admiralty, and the great lords – the Duke of Lennox, Earl of Suffolk, Earl of Northampton, Earl of Worcester, Lord Howard and Earl of Vaudemont. Finally, the officers of the municipal judges were at the end of the payment list. On the occasion of the arrival of ambassador Zúñiga to England, groups of trumpeters and drummers welcomed him. The royal musicians received 70 reales (6 ducats) from him, the musicians of the Privy Council 44 reales (4 ducats) and the musicians at the castle of Portsmouth 24 reales (2 ducats). On 26 July 1605 a group of royal sergeants-at-arms and trumpeters honoured the ambassador and received 200 reales (18 ducats). On 30 July the prince’s trumpeters did the same, receiving 88 reales (8 ducats). As a New Year gift, in 1606 Zúñiga paid 80 reales (7 ducats) to the royal trumpeters, 80 reales (7 ducats) to the trumpeters of the Privy Council and another 80 reales (7 ducats) to those of the High Admiralty. Duke of Lennox’s trumpeters received 40 reales (8 ducats). At New Year 1607, an amount of 80 reales (7 ducats) was distributed among Queen Anne’s royal trumpeters and 50 reales (5 ducats) among those of the City Hall of London. In 1609, 80 reales (7 ducats) were paid to the royal trumpeters of the Queen and 60 reales (5 ducats) to the prince’s trumpeters. In May 1622 Coloma gave 150 reales (14 ducats) to the royal trumpeters and 120 reales (11 ducats) to the royal drummers, followed by 120 reales (11 ducats) to the prince’s trumpeters and 80 reales (7 ducats) to the prince’s drummers. To the Privy Council trumpeters he paid 100 reales (9 ducats), and 60 reales (5 ducats) to the drummers. Forty reales (4 ducats) were paid to the City Hall of London musicians. In June 1622, Coloma paid 400 reales (36 ducats) to the royal servant who brought a deer that had been hunted by James I. When he was given another deer, hunted by the Prince of Wales, Coloma gave 200 reales (18 ducats), exactly half the money given for the deer killed by the king, as the second deer was hunted by the James’s heir. When the Earl of Suffolk sent a third deer, his servant received 120 reales (11 ducats) by the ambassador, almost half of the amount given for the prince’s deer. At Christmas 1622, the ambassador gave 200 reales (18 ducats) to the royal porters and 100 reales (9 ducats) to the porters of the Privy Council. Third, gifts depended on the status of the servant at the English court. For instance, the queen’s physician and pharmacist received 1,200 and 600 reales (109 and 55 ducats), respectively, from the Constable. A servant of Lord Howard received 300 reales (27 ducats). Boatmen, forest rangers and royal hunters were presented with amounts between 200 and 450 reales (18–41 ducats). Generally, porters received more than musicians, probably because, by reason of their function, they were ideal people to become confidants. And finally, since musicians, trumpeters, drummers and fife players were a symbol of royalty and high social status in Renaissance Europe, they were presented with more gifts and money than any other musician. Footmen, servants of the royal household and cooks were also given gifts of money. Every Christmas, the royal guards received 1,000 reales (92 ducats) to be distributed among them, plus other amounts on special occasions; for example Zúñiga paid for drinks – probably beer – for them

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on 11 January 1606; Coloma and Hinojosa presented a considerable amount of money to the royal guards after the marriage settlement on July 1623.233 English court jesters offer an interesting example. Payments for court jesters are cited on the accounts of Spanish ambassadors since the summer of 1612. While few of their names appear on the records, there is a famous one: Archibald (Archie) Armstrong, fool of kings James and Charles I (in service between the years 1603 and 1638). From Scotland, he was brought to London by James in 1603 as his best court jester.234 Twenty years later, Archie accompanied Prince Charles on his trip to Madrid in 1623, and wrote a letter to King James, dated 28 April 1623, describing the Spanish court. He wrote how well he was being treated and about the great esteem and attention paid to him by Philip IV and the Infanta, in addition to the long time he spent with them, rather than the prince himself and his knights. Philip IV’s fondness resulted in gifts: a suit and a gold chain for the beloved English jester.235 In addition, Philip IV’s affection continued after Armstrong’s return to England. While payments to English jesters were isolated cases – Coloma gave 132 reales (12 ducats) to one court jester while staying at Windsor palace between 15 and 17 August 1622 – from January 1624 things changed. From that date, Philip IV ordered Coloma to make monthly payments of 400 reales (36 ducats) to an English jester, probably Archibald Armstrong, who had been looked on with such affection in Madrid. Between January and September 1624, the jester was paid 2,480 reales (225 ducats) by the Spanish embassy.236 After the departure of Ambassador Coloma, Jacques Bruneau gave a gold piece worth 40 reales (4 ducats) to an English fool of the king. It is easy to assume that this jester was Archie Armstrong. By comparison, a jester of Queen Anne of Denmark called Tom Derry received a monthly salary of 67.23 reales (6 ducats) in 1611 and 1612. Armstrong received 400 reales (36 ducats) a month from the Spanish crown ten years later. Finally, the gifts depended on the political status of the Spanish diplomats. Extraordinary ambassadors presented amounts of money at the Jacobean court well above those given by ordinary ambassadors and resident ministers. Villamediana spent 33,610.50 reales (3,055 ducats) in gifts and donations during his office and the Constable, 49,756 reales (4,523 ducats), and this amount was paid only at the English court. The latter presented 22,620 reales (2,056 ducats) to be shared among the servants of Archduke Albert at Brussels and distributed another 24,914.7 reales (2,265 ducats) at the French court. Between the courts of Brussels, London and Paris, the Constable distributed a total of 97,290.70 reales (almost 9,000 ducats). Coloma spent 68,560 reales (6,232 ducats), 54,000 of which (4,909 ducats) were presented on the day of the marriage settlement. Ordinary ambassadors spent far less: Zúñiga presented 11,624 reales (1,057 ducats), Gondomar 22,858.50 reales ((2,078 ducats) and Bruneau just 1,353 reales (123 ducats). In addition, Bruneau admitted in his dispatches that the gifts and donations presented by him were smaller and less valuable than those of the ambassadors.

Assistance for soldiers, military officers and seamen The Spanish embassy worked as a valve, regulating the comings and goings of people to Great Britain. This was also the case for other groups such as soldiers, sailors and officers

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 93 who passed through the country. One of the crucial missions of the ambassadors was to aid these people, who formed the Spanish armies and fleets. The strategic position of Great Britain in relation to the Dutch, Flemish and French coasts, as well as her role as guardian of the English Channel, monitoring ships bound between northern and southern Europe and the sea passage to the West and East Indies, made this passage of people constant and numerous. Regarding soldiers and military officers, one of the Spanish embassy’s concerns was to facilitate the recruitment of men for the army of Flanders, and, at the same time, the obstruction of the Dutch levies in the Great Britain by all possible means.237 Villamediana and the Constable bribed an English captain, Sir Thomas Studder, who fought with the Dutch army, to switch sides in 1604, although in 1616 he returned to the service of Count Maurice of Nassau. In the following years, other English, Scottish and Irish aristocrats would volunteer to serve in the army of Flanders. The Treaty of 1604 tried unsuccessfully to put an end to Dutch recruitment in England. One of the first things Villamediana did in England after his arrival was demand the cessation of the Dutch levies in Scotland. The English government refused it as England was a neutral kingdom and had no quarrel with the Dutch.238 A year later, the Constable requested James’s permission to recruit 3,000 men for the army of Flanders, offering at the same time 300,000 reales (27,273 ducats) in exchange for an edict forbidding British people to serve under the colours of the Dutch. The proposal was made by the Countess of Suffolk, with the knowledge of the Secretary of State, Sir Robert Cecil. The money was spent in return for a royal proclamation on 1 March 1605 forbidding the English to serve as privateers for other monarchs. Philip III ordered Zúñiga to obtain agreement on a ban on the British serving Dutch army, by offering them twenty days to return from Holland, if they were there. On the day the Constable was heading to Dover to return to Flanders, he saw in Gravesend several ships carrying British recruits to Holland. His complaints led the English authorities to stop the shipment of people, although once he left for Flanders, the shipment continued. This event certainly strengthened the idea among Spanish diplomats after August 1604 that an English royal proclamation prohibiting such recruitment was essential in order to stop the situation. The money order of 300,000 reales was issued at Arras on 8 October 1604.239 While the Spaniards were able to recruit an English regiment under Lord Thomas Arundel and another Irish regiment led by Henry O’Neill, the numbers were not very important because of the difficulties brought by the English authorities and the ceasefire declared in Flanders from April 1607.240 According to the Venetian ambassador, the levies in Great Britain for the Spanish armies progressed slowly because of the blockade of the English Channel by Dutch warships and because of James’s displeasure with the idea of his subjects serving Spain. The Earl of Arundel had to leave for Flanders in a private ship as James expressly forbade the transportation of British officers or troops to Flanders in royal warships. Nevertheless, an incident in the autumn of 1605 involving 2,000 Irish recruits for Flanders made James issue a royal proclamation prohibiting new levies for the Spanish armies in Ireland.241 With the resumption of war with the Dutch in April 1621, the Spanish war machine’s need for men for the army of Flanders reactivated the recruitment. Three tercios would

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be raised: an English regiment under Baron Vaux, a Scottish regiment under the Earl of Argyll and an Irish regiment under the Earl of Tyrone. In this way, between 1623 and 1625 the British contingent in Flanders would reach 4,000 men, although the reluctance of the British authorities and the opposition of the majority of the English population continued.242 Another noticeable aspect was the support that the Spanish ambassadors offered to the soldiers passing through England, either to Ireland and Scotland or to Flanders. The embassy was a place of refuge and assistance. The ambassadors paid up to 50 reales (5 ducats) to each soldier for their travel expenses. Among the officers, Spanish diplomats made much higher payments: to an ensign, 44 reales (4 ducats) and to Irish and Spanish sergeants, between 20 and 100 reales (2–9 ducats). Regarding the payments, the key military rank figure was the captain. Captains were essential for the recruitment and for forming the Spanish tercios – they were the basis of Spanish army officers.243 Therefore, they received much more money from the ambassadors not only to recruit volunteers for the Spanish regiments but also to maintain and send military infantry companies to Flanders. Zúñiga paid 20,460 reales (1,860 ducats) during 1605 and 1606 to soldiers and military officers.244 Coloma gave 9,440 reales (858 ducats) to four captains with their companies, a total of 720 soldiers, in order to travel to Flanders between 1622 and 1623.245 On the other hand, the records mentioned the Spanish troops and warships arrival at ports and along the coast of Great Britain, looking for shelter following maritime accidents during storms or naval battles with the Dutch fleet. The English neutrality after 1604 turned the British ports (especially in England and Scotland) into strong strategic points for the Spanish galleons. This was a constant source of diplomatic conflict, and sometimes armed incidents, between England, Spain and the Netherlands, at least until the naval Battle of The Downs (21 October 1639), when the Spanish naval power was crushed by the Dutch fleet of Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp.246 There were five remarkable episodes in which Spanish galleons reached British ports. The first one occurred between July and December 1605, when several Scottish ships carrying a tercio of Fieldmaster Pedro Sarmiento took refuge in Port of Dover. The second was in March 1616, when the San Alberto, commanded by Don Diego Brochero, took refuge in Plymouth due to a storm at the sea. A similar episode occurred in the following year when a caravel commanded by Captain Don Diego Iñiguez of Anderica arrived at Plymouth without gear and provisions. The fourth episode concerned two galleons of the Flemish fleet sheltering in the Scottish ports of Leith and Aberdeen between June 1622 and August 1623. Finally, from May to July 1624, four galleons of Flanders, commanded by Fieldmaster Don Luis de Oliveira, took refuge in Port of Dover.247 Spanish ambassador also provided financial support to the widows and orphans of those British men who lost their lives serving Spain. For instance, Zúñiga paid some money to the families of the Scottish seamen who died in the combats of 1605 between the troops of the Spanish tercio of Pedro Sarmiento and the Dutch warships.248 Gondomar informed Phillip III by 1614 that he was doing these payments almost daily.249 In his second embassy, he paid 3,000 reales (272.72 ducats) to Mary Taylor, widow of Dr Robert Taylor, and his brother Francis Fuller, who were the secretaries of languages of the Spanish embassy since 1603.250

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 95 Excluding soldiers and military officers, the other large group helped by the ambassadors were the crewmen, seafarers and merchants who arrived at British ports after being victims, excepting the storms at the sea, of piracy and privateering by the Dutch, English, Rochelle’s, Berber pirates and privateers. This assistance from the ambassadors was explained as having been given not only to offer protection to the vassals of the king of Spain but also to avoid their staying in England any longer than necessary, and potentially changing their faith, or harming the military, political, religious or economic interests of Spain (for instance by guiding ships to the Spanish West Indies).251 The data provided by the embassy accounts offers a picture of the situation of maritime trade during the first quarter of the seventeenth century. Specifically, there are clear data between 1605 and 1610 and from 1622 to 1624 (Figures 6 and 7). The figures are almost identical. The picture provided is twofold. On the one hand, there is evidence that the 1609–21 Twelve Years’ Truce between Spain and the Netherlands served neither to cut off Dutch maritime trade and expansion overseas

Figure 6  People aided by Don Pedro de Zúñigain in England (1605–10).

Figure 7  People aided by Don Carlos Coloma in England (1622–4).

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(the East Indies, Pacific ocean and Brazil) nor to recover Spanish–Portuguese economic vitality. This was one of the keys to understanding the non-renewal of the truce with the Dutch in 1621, and the intensity of the political debates in the Spanish Council of State during the years before 1621.252 Furthermore, the weakness of the Portuguese empire represented a hindrance to Spain, economically, politically and militarily. Both graphs show the effects of the activities of the Dutch and English trading companies, founded in 1602 and 1600, respectively, on the Portuguese trading empire. Until the early 1620s Portuguese overseas territories were facing Dutch and English intrusion and trade maritime expansion, while the Spanish West Indies territories were better defended, and by diverting the English threat with the Peace of 1604, only having to face the intrusion of the Dutch West Indies Company after 1621. Finally, the ambassadors also provided all kinds of support for a heterogeneous group of people: aristocrats, military officers, spies, confidants and military engineers. They served the Spanish crown in the army and navy and engaged in espionage and bureaucracy.253 In conclusion, the strategic importance of the British neutral ports and coasts turned the Spanish embassy in London into a fundamental pillar of support in Northern Europe for the Spanish armies and fleets, given that Flemish coasts and ports were on the other side of the English Channel. In addition, the assistance offered by the Spanish ambassadors to England was essential, especially for the Portuguese ships and merchants coming from Asia and Brazil.

Pensions, gifts, celebrations and banquets This expenditure item is the biggest and most important among the secret embassy expenses, making up 91 per cent of the total secret expenses. These expenses include pensions for the privy councillors of king and royal ministers, money in cash, banquets, celebrations of all kinds and luxury gifts such as Spanish pure-bred horses, jewels, gems, gloves, amber and so on.254 Money played a key role as the mainstay of modern diplomacy, in the historical context of the gifts exchanged between the Renaissance and baroque European elites.255 In the case of the European aristocracy, donations and gifts were an obligation to sustain its social standing and reputation, as well as its economic strength. The honour justified its belonging to the privileged estate of the nobility. The formation and maintenance of the entourage and patronage networks were cause and consequence of that aristocrat reputation. It was exactly the same in the case of the European monarchs. The king of Spain spent enormous amounts of money through his ambassadors in England to defend and hold his political, military and economic reputation and interests, as well as to create and maintain influential and information networks in Great Britain. These patronage networks were not static, but dynamic and permeable groups. They were like a train propelled by Spanish gold. With more fuel, the train travelled faster to the destination ordered by the king. The biggest expenses were incurred between 1603 and 1605, the years of peace negotiations. Then the peak of the Anglo–Spanish political friendship would occur

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 97 in two periods: around 1618 and from 1622 to 1623. The first period ended with the public execution of Sir Walter Raleigh in London due to Gondomar’s influence with James, and it was a clear depiction of his great influence at the Jacobean court. The second period concluded with the trip to Madrid of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham. However, when there were fewer Spanish ducats to be distributed, there was an increasing risk that the Spanish train would stop, and thus so would English support for Spanish interests in Great Britain. This was what actually happened during the turbulent years 1624–5. The arrival of Minister Resident Jacques Bruneau was the diplomatic translation of Spanish political displeasure with James before the rejection of the marriage alliance by the English parliament in 1624. In addition, Bruneau brought with him little money to be spent and distributed. When the Spanish Council of State tried to make a new start in Anglo–Spanish political relations in order to avoid war, in 1625 the Spanish crown chose Gondomar for the mission, with 100,000 ducats in his pocket. Therefore, the ambassador’s liberality in terms of expending money was one of the principal ways of measuring the political, military and economic reputation of the monarch behind that diplomat. The expenses incurred by the ambassador were crucial for the making of treaties, diplomatic agreements and settlements, all of which were an expression of excellent and friendly diplomatic relations between kingdoms and princes, for the grandeur and apparatus of the celebrations and ceremonies organized by him on occasions such as military victories, royal births and funerals or in matters of precedence among the ambassadors at the Jacobean court.

Pensioners, confidants, lukewarm and neutral courtiers During the years 1603–4, neither Philip III, the Council of State, nor the Spanish ambassadors, Villamediana or the Constable, doubted that the distribution of pensions among the great lords of Great Britain would be fruitless for defending the Spanish interests at the Jacobean court.256 The distribution of huge amounts of money by the ambassadors was a common practice of European diplomacy in the Renaissance and baroque Europe, and it was especially important to Spanish diplomacy, as it had the biggest network of embassies through Europe. This had been happening at least since the time of Emperor Charles V. One of his first ambassadors to England, Eustace Chapuys, wrote about the tremendous venality of the court of Henry VIII. Any business undertaken required the giving of gifts to the English councillors and royal ministers. As a matter of fact, Cardinal Wolsey received pensions from Emperor Charles V’s ambassadors.257 King Philip II’s pensions were also paid and given by his ambassadors. From the time of the Duke of Feria in 1558, the Spanish ambassadors’ correspondence to England showed these payments allocated to royal ministers and great lords at the Elizabethan court.258 Charles de Ligne, Count of Arenberg, was the first Hispanic diplomat to arrive in England since 1584 (sent by Archduke Albert).259 His correspondence made clear that both the French and the Dutch diplomats were distributing money and promises of gifts among the British lords and councillors to prevent the achievement of peace with

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Spain. The three Dutch diplomats had distributed almost 110,000 ducats, and both French and Venetians envoys had done just the same.260 The Spanish Council of State engaged in intense debate on matters in England, and some ministers believed the best way to ensure a good peace agreement was to ensure a lot of money reached the English court. However, the payments would not be in cash but paid as annual pensions. The basic premise was that for Spain, praiseworthy actions at the English court would precede rewards. Finally, Philip III instructed his ambassadors that the diplomatic talks with the English would be sustained by huge amounts of money and promises of rewards and pensions.261 This meant that, in addition to pensions, enormous sums of money in cash and luxurious gifts would be presented and distributed. And this was the course of action of the Spanish diplomats in England until 1625. Pensions were assigned to great British lords and royal ministers (although many delays before they were paid), despite the growing scepticism shown by Villamediana and the Constable, as well as by the Spanish Council of State and Philip III himself, who changed his opinion with time in favour of rewarding or directly purchasing positive actions for Spanish interests at the English court.262 The message was clear: both Spanish ambassadors and the Spanish government believed that pensions were a necessary evil for the success of Spanish diplomacy (see Table 8 for the Spanish pensions paid at the English court below).263 The truth is that the assignment of Spanish pensions to British lords and royal ministers was a decision taken by Philip III and the Spanish Council of State during 1603–4 based on reports written by Arenberg, Villamediana and the Constable on the tremendous corruption and venality that existed at the Jacobean court, which had become a bonfire of vanities ready to swallow the entire Spanish treasury, as was done with Dutch, French, Venetian and Florentine money. Sir Robert Cecil, as the royal favourite and First Secretary of State of James, was the first English minister to receive a substantial Spanish pension of 6,000 ducats annually. However, this pension did not change his opinion in favour of Spain because he was never a Hispanophile. Despite this, the Spanish government recognized eventually that Cecil had at least negotiated clearly and that he had not threatened the peace with Spain with impossible demands. Villamediana therefore recommended a pension for him. Regarding the payment of pensions, some considerations should be noted. First, the ambassadors never paid on time, and they accumulated irregularities and delays of up to six to eight years. Second, pensions alternated with other payments made as rewards (jewels, gems, furniture, gloves and cash). Finally, some aristocrats were only nominally pensioners, as they either left political positions at the English court that made them important to the Spanish embassy and refused the pension or were absent from the court and their pensions were cancelled (or those who simply died). However, at least in theory, they were on the lists of pensioners, whether or not they received the amounts. On the Spanish records these people appeared with their code names, along with other courtiers who received nothing from the Spanish embassy but were mentioned on the diplomatic correspondence under nicknames, s​​ o there might be some confusion over the exact number of pensioners paid by the Spanish government in Great Britain.

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 99 That is what happened when ambassador to Spain Sir John Digby deciphered the list of code names used by Gondomar in 1613. He wrongly thought that the people on the list were in fact all pensioners of the Spanish embassy, so he concluded that, as the royal family was also on the list, the Stuarts also received pensions from the Spanish embassy.264 The list that Digby deciphered was the list of code names used in the diplomatic correspondence of the Spanish embassy with its government in Madrid, Brussels and other Spanish embassies. It was not a list of pensioners. In fact, there are lists of pensioners, and the Stuarts were never on them. Those conclusions are misleading about the role of the Spanish pensions at the English court and the importance of Spanish diplomacy towards the Stuart monarchy. For instance, historian Samuel Gardiner used these ideas to highlight the importance of Spanish gold to encourage corruption and the decline of the Stuart monarchy during the first part of the seventeenth century.265 After the achievement of peace in 1604, the Spanish pensions were less useful at the English court as there was no longer any pressure on diplomatic negotiations. From 1606 onwards, donations and gifts were presented based on specific actions in favour of Spanish interests.266 For instance, Buckingham was also offered a pension from the embassy, but he rejected it, as his good relationship with Gondomar was based more to his king’s Hispanophilia than to the 6,000 ducats per year.267 In addition, the pensions caused the Spanish ambassadors frequent headaches. Villamediana and the Constable had warned Philip III and Zúñiga about the greedy Countess of Suffolk, Lady Catherine Howard. In July 1609 an incident with the countess regarding certain presents made Zúñiga specifically recommend that Philip III should no longer pay pensions to Sir Robert Cecil and Suffolk. Cecil’s and Suffolk’s greed for money and gifts was the main reason why Zúñiga advised to not assign any more Spanish pensions at the Jacobean court from 1606 onwards.268 Thus the new ambassador Velasco was ordered not to do so, excepting the Earl of Northampton because of his good will and services to Spain.269 A year and a half later, Philip III would show his growing scepticism about the practical results of Spanish pensions at the English court. Following the execution of a priest named Father Juan Roberto, Philip III wrote to Velasco that the English pensioners at the court should know of his displeasure at this execution, informing James about the matter. Philip III hoped that he would make them understand that the pensions paid to them were useless if they could not avoid such things from happening.270 Velasco confirmed these ideas by complaining about the worthlessness of the confidences shared with him by Cecil, Suffolk and Northampton.271 Meanwhile, Gondomar took more than a year to report to Philip III about the greed of some of the pensioners, the first of which was ‘Roldan’ (Countess of Suffolk).272 The effect of the Spanish pensions at the English court is clear, as they fed the vanity and greed in some aristocrats who received them (Cecil and Suffolk), while others simply rejected them or did not bother to collect them because they were already very wealthy, such as Buckingham, Nottingham, Arundel and Somerset. In addition, some of the pensioners met the expectations of the Spanish ambassadors in terms of defending and helping Spanish interests and others did not. The influence of the Countess of Suffolk in the affairs of government of Sir Robert Cecil was limited

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and, in any case, this influence did not justify the amounts received in cash and gifts from Spain. Her pension was probably paid because of the political and social status of her husband, the Earl of Suffolk, and because, as the alleged mistress of Cecil, she could harm Spanish interests if she was not pleased. As for the first lady-in-waiting of the royal household of Queen Anne, Lady Jane Drummond (from 1603 until 1617 in queen’s service), her pension also brought poor results because the queen’s influence on the government of England was very limited.273 All this explains the distrust of Spanish ambassadors, who saw the pensions as a necessary but very costly expense for political and diplomatic needs but meagre in practical results. It is not easy to discover who is who among the pensioners, especially since Spanish diplomats used code names in their correspondence. One of the main issues is that the Spaniards switched the code names between the pensioners from time to time.274 However, there are lists of them and details in the documents that let to find out who were behind many of these code names (Table 7). A relevant example was the Earl of Arundel.275 According to Gondomar, Arundel had showed great affection in the service of Spain, so the ambassador promised him a good pension while verifying his conduct towards Spanish interests.276 Upon the death of the Earl of Northampton, and being Arundel’s legal heir, he had not claimed the annual pension that Northampton received.277 Arundel had performed good service for Spain. In 1605 he was colonel of an English regiment in the army of Flanders, and in 1622 he volunteered to command of another regiment, offering to take the Dutch town of Vlissingen for Spain. The following year, Arundel assisted Coloma with the embargoes on English ships who were stealing Portuguese shipments from the Indies. Philip IV therefore ordered Coloma to reward him. Arundel and the ambassador agreed that the best way to do that was with a single payment, rather than assigning an annual pension. Therefore, Arundel received a gem worth 1,000 ducats.278 Only when things became unpleasant for Spain after the return of Charles Stuart to England (in October 1623) was the Spanish embassy forced to assign new pensions to ensure confidences at the highest levels of the English court.279 Spanish records confusingly distinguish between pensioners and confidants.280 Theoretically the former were senior members of the English court such as members of the Privy Council, Secretaries of State and officials of the High Court of Admiralty and holders of offices in the royal households, who received annual amounts as pensions. The second group were those who received gifts and money once in return for services defending Spanish interests. However, all pensioners were themselves confidants of the embassy as they also received gifts and money regularly, but not all the confidants were pensioners at the same time – in fact, pensioners were a minority. Furthermore, the way in which the Spanish ambassadors defined them might be misleading. A confidant was a close friend to whom important secrets were trusted, and many of these aristocrats and ministers – some of them were avowed enemies of Spain – were paid by the embassy not for being trusted with state secrets but simply not to harm the interests of Spain from their positions of power at the English court.281 Doubts about the results of the financial efforts made by the embassy came usually from the conduct of the pensioners, not due to the confidants. And even despite the distrust, the Spanish ambassadors never stopped paying the assigned pensions; it is

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 101 Table 7  Code Names Name Sir Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury

Post

Secretary of State, member of the Privy Council, Lord Privy Seal, Lord High Treasurer, ‘favourite’ of King James Robert Carr, Earl Secretary of State, of Somerset member of the Privy Council, Lord Chamberlain, Lord Privy Seal, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, ‘favourite’ of King James George Villiers, Master of the Horse, Duke of Lord High Admiral of Buckingham England, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, member of the Privy Council, ‘favourite’ of King James Katherine Howard, Lady-in-waiting to Countess of Queen Anne of Suffolk Denmark, Queen’s favourite, intimate friend of Sir Robert Cecil Henry Howard, Member of the Privy Earl of Council, Lord Warden Northampton of the Cinque Ports, Lord Privy Seal, First Lord of the Treasury Sir Thomas Lake Secretary of State, member of the Privy Council Sir William Admiral of the Narrow Monson Seas Lady Jane Drummond, Countess of Roxburghe

Code name/years

Annual pension

Beltenebros (1604–12)

6,000 ducats

Apolo (1617–19)

6,000 ducats

Tiberio (1622–4)

6,000 ducats

Roldán (1604, 1614), Príamo (1614–15, 1617–19), Amadís (1622–4)

4,000 ducats

Cid (1604–14)

4,000 ducats

Alejandro (1617–19), Florián (1622–4)

2,000 ducats

Amadís? (1613–14); 1,000 Sócrates (1614–19); ducats, Esplandián 1,500 (1619–23) ducats Lady of the Queen’s Rugero? (1613–14); 1,500 ducats Bedchamber, ‘favourite’ Florián (1614–15, of the queen 1617–19); Oriana (1622–4)

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Figure 8  Annual budget of pensions paid by the Spanish embassy at the English court (1603–25). easy to think that it was because both groups, pensioners and confidants, were the fundamental pillars on which the secret activities of the Spanish embassy rested in Great Britain. The group of pensioners were heads of the government of the English crown and the English court, important aristocrats who surrounded the Stuarts. The confidants were not only members of the English government and the circle of the royal family but also from other social groups in England, royal officials of any rank, merchants, captains, soldiers, Catholics, foreigners or young nobles. For example, the Earl of Arundel was a member of the Privy Council and did not enjoy a pension paid from Spain, nor did George Calvert, Secretary of State (Figure 8). 1604–5: this is the time of the granting of the Spanish pensions, which was conducted by the Constable of Castile, the Count of Villamediana and the senator Alejandro Rovida. The distribution of pensions began from 24 July 1604.282 At least ten pensions were awarded to the following British ministers: the five English commissioners during the peace negotiations – Sir Robert Cecil, the Earl of Nottingham, the Earl of Dorset, the Earl of Devonshire and the Earl of Northampton – the Countess of Suffolk, the Scottish aristocrats Kinloss and Dunbar, Vice Admiral William Monson and the first lady-in-waiting (Lady of the Bedchamber) of the queen’s household, Lady Jane Drummond.283 Among them all, the amounts paid to Sir Robert Cecil stood out, as he was the royal favourite of James I, and received 6,000 ducats a year. The rest of the group received 4,000, 2,000, 1,500 and 1,000 ducats per year. The total amount reached 32,500 ducats per year. 1605–11: during these years several names disappeared from the list of pensioners. The Earl of Nottingham lost interest in his pension, Devonshire died in April 1606, Dorset in 1608 and Kinloss in 1611. As for Dunbar, his pension was

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 103 cancelled due to his frequent trips to Scotland and his loss of influence at the English court and with the English government. The total amount of the pensions was 18,500 ducats per year. 1612–14: Sir Robert Cecil died in May 1612 and the Earl of Northampton in June 1614. In addition, Philip III forbade Gondomar from finding new confidants who might be eligible as new pensioners of the embassy. Philip III’s decision was probably taken because of the power vacuum at the English government left by the death of Sir Robert Cecil, the royal favourite. That caused a power struggle between the English courtly factions who wished to take over his office, including the Earl of Northampton, who was also a pensioner of Spain. During these years the total amount spent by the embassy was 11,000 ducats per year.284 1615–23: in these years, new pensions were awarded to the new royal favourite, the Earl of Somerset, his successor Buckingham and Sir Thomas Lake, Secretary of State from 1616 to 1619. The pensions of Somerset and Buckingham, as King James’s favourites, reached 6,000 ducats per year, the same amount that had been paid to Sir Robert Cecil. In this period the Spanish embassy spent 21,000 ducats per year. 1624–5: this period has witnessed the gradual deterioration of Anglo–Spanish relations. Parliament of 1624 denounced the Spanish marriage treaty and the diplomatic settlement in the Palatinate (Germany). Coloma and Hinojosa wrote to Madrid constantly asking King Philip IV to allow them to return to Spain, as war between Spain and England seemed likely to break out at any moment. In these years it was hard to find confidants, but the ambassadors recruited three ministers, with one of them being a member of the Privy Council. The three pensioners would receive a total amount of 10,000 ducats a year and would engage in secret correspondence with the Spanish government of Brussels.285 As Hinojosa said, the three confidants were so fearful that even after they agreed their pensions, they asked for their safety to be guaranteed by the Spanish government and to be taken to Flanders if their activities at the English court were discovered. By comparison, the pensions paid by the Spanish embassy in Rome for the cardinals at the Papal court ranged between 1,000 and 16,000 ducats a year, with total amounts between 20,000 and 60,000 ducats per year, as the Spanish ambassadors had up to twenty-three cardinals on their list of pensioners.286 As for pensions paid by the Spanish embassy in Brussels, they were awarded to the great Flemish lords at the time of Don Baltasar de Zúñiga (1599–1603), and ranged between 600 and 3,000 ducats a year.287 In this sense, the embassy in Rome led the group, with larger and more numerous pensions, followed by the embassy in London, whose pensions accounted for approximately half of the total amount paid in Rome, and finally Brussels, whose pensions were a third of those paid in England. As for the group of confidants, it was a large and very diverse group of people of different national origins (including English, Scottish, Irish, Flemish, Spanish, Italian, French); social background (including aristocrats, merchants, soldiers, sailors) and

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religion (Catholic and Protestant). After 1603 the Spanish ambassadors followed Philip III’s orders to be generous with money and awarding pensions.288 Among the group whose sympathy and support Spanish ambassadors wanted to win were, in the first place, the members of the new royal family. The Stuarts were at the apex of Great Britain; they were one of the fundamental factors of all Spanish foreign policy towards Northern Europe.289 From the Stuarts down, the Spanish diplomats rewarded the members of the English court on merit, for services favourable to Spanish interests, and on their social and court hierarchy, as well as on their proximity to James’s favour – a sort of parallel distributive justice granted by Phillip III to the English.290 Their friendship and benevolence favoured Spanish interests in Great Britain and, by extension, all the territories where Spain had domain or interests. Leading examples were the public execution of Sir Walter Raleigh, accused of piracy (the personal friendship between James and Gondomar was crucial), the information provided by the Prince of Wales in Madrid about the taking of the Portuguese post of Hormuz by the Persians and English and the secret instructions of Ernst von Mansfeld’s army, shown to Jacques Bruneau by James.291 When Sir John Digby, the English ambassador in Madrid, discovered and deciphered in 1613 the list of code names used by the Spanish embassy, he was astonished to find on the list the name of his master (King James’s code names on Spanish diplomatic correspondence were Leandro and, later on, Trajan).292 Although James did not receive any pension from the Spanish embassy, as previously explained, he received other gifts, either directly from the Spanish court or presented by the Spanish ambassadors, as did Queen Anne (code name Homer) and the Prince of Wales (code name Petrarca and later on Teodosio). Shortly after his arriving in England Villamediana started discussions with the Spanish Council of State on the matter of what gifts could be presented to the Stuarts.293 Regarding Queen Anne, he considered her poor in terms of luxurious lifestyle in comparison to Queen Margaret of Austria, so she would greatly appreciate gifts such as jewels, gems or cash.294 He also recommended that his masters could maintain correspondence with the British royal family as did other European princes, such as the kings of France, the Archdukes of Flanders, and the dukes of Florence. The ambassador also asked to be sent portraits of Philip III, Queen Margaret, and the Infanta Anne, as well as between thirty and forty medals of Philip III to present at the English court. Finally, for James, Villamediana recommended a gift of Spanish horses, as he and the whole English court were very fond of them. As for the portraits and medals requested, the Spanish Council of State decided to consult with Philip III about the demand, as the Stuarts were Protestants, and England was a heretic kingdom.295 As for the horses and harnesses, prudence forced them to postpone the shipment until the conclusion of the peace negotiations. With the arrival of the Constable to England in August 1604, the Stuarts would be presented the first great consignment of gifts from Spain.296 The luxurious purchases of gifts and jewels made by the Constable during his three weeks in England have been well studied by historians such as Gustav Ungerer and Maria Cruz de Carlos from the perspective of art collecting and exchange of gifts between European courts.297 According to the accounts of the Constable, James received gifts worth 12,437.65 ducats consisting of a gold box and a glass of diamonds

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 105 and rubies. Queen Anne was even luckier. She received seven jewels worth 19,077.05 ducats, plus two pearls presented by Villamediana five months earlier.298 The Prince of Wales (Henry Stuart) also benefited from Spanish generosity. He received a box of gold and a Spanish horse with golden trappings, along with rich and precious stones worth 4,000 ducats.299 In conclusion, the royal households of the king and queen of England, respectively, received gifts and presents worth 9,327.70 ducats in one case and 11,406.40 ducats in the other, including James’s and Diane’s gifts and the presents for other members of them. Finally, the king’s cousin, Lady Arabella Stuart, also received from the Constable a gift of seventy-six gold buttons and diamonds worth 4,752 ducats. Although her position at the English court had no influence of any kind, she had been the centre of attention and political conspiracies as an aspirant to the throne of England before the proclamation of James as new king.300 The Spanish records show that Queen Anne particularly attracted the attention of the Constable. As a Catholic Queen of England and a strong supporter of peace with Spain, she was in favour of a future marriage between the Prince of Wales and the Infanta Anne. In addition, during the courtly celebrations of the peace, she had a leading role and presented valuable gifts to the Constable.301 Ten months after the stay of the Constable at the English court, the extraordinary embassy to Spain of Lord Charles Howard, High Admiral of England and Earl of Nottingham (from April to June 1605), involved two important key points. For the Spanish court, it represented a unique chance to show the new direction of Spain under its young king Philip III, and his royal favourite the Duke of Lerma (peace with England, the birth of Prince Philip IV). As for the English side, it was the time to restore some balance regarding the Spanish generosity shown in London.302 Lord Howard was chosen for this extraordinary mission for being a heavyweight figure of the English court, a high-ranking minister, member of the Privy Council of the king and one of the negotiators of the peace on the English side. Besides, he was High Admiral, and he was the leader of the fight against the Spanish Armada of 1588 and the Cadiz expedition of 1596, an obvious reminder of the Spanish defeats before England.303 It is even plausible that one of the reasons for the arrival of the English expedition to La Corunna (instead of Santander, an easier and shorter way to go to Valladolid) was another reminder of the English sea power, as La Corunna was attacked by Sir Francis Drake in 1589. Anyway, the question remained unclear.304 At the Spanish court (Valladolid in those days), the royal equerry of James, on 3 June, Sir Thomas Knowles presented six horses richly caparisoned, two crossbows and four muskets luxuriously decorated and a pair of hunting greyhounds to the Spanish monarchs. In addition, the next day, Lord Howard presented a jewel of great value to Queen Margaret on behalf of Anne of Denmark, the queen of England.305 On the Spanish side, preparations for the visit had been under way since December 1604.306 Villamediana had announced to Phillip III the trip for the ratification of the peace in a dispatch in early December, noting the importance of the diplomatic visit and how splendidly the English diplomatic mission should be treated as an issue of international reputation and foreign policy.307 The Spanish Council of State discussed and agreed the importance of a magnificent reception for the English mission of

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around 600 people, if not more, making one thing clear: the gifts should correspond to the greatness of the king of Spain.308 In other words, what was at stake again, as it had been before at the English court, was to triumph over the English in generosity, courtesy, magnificence and hospitality.309 The Constable noted that the worth of the gifts he received in London reached 30,000 ducats, and these presents were not given to all his entourage, but only to the five members of the Spanish commission who negotiated the peace: Villamediana, Rovida, Arenberg, Verreyken and himself.310 The value of what he himself had given to James, Queen Anne and the Prince of Wales came to 35,552.35 ducats. Some of the many written reports of those days set the amount spent at the Spanish court down in black and white. According to two of them, the value of gifts given to Lord Howard and his wife, two sons and two nephews reached 55,000 ducats, and included jewels, pearls, horses, gloves, leather, amber and other presents.311 In addition, 23,461 ducats worth of donations were also distributed to his entourage.312 Finally, gifts were presented to the Stuarts; for James, presents of horses, jewels and cash in silver coins worth 94,800 ducats; for Queen Anne, various jewels, portraits and other gifts worth 16,300 ducats. The total value of what was presented to the Stuarts by Philip III reached 111,100 ducats. It is clear that the Spanish side again triumphed in this royal gift competition: the value of everything given to both Lord Howard and the Stuarts reached 189,761 ducats.313 The written reports of those days show that all the presents given were meticulously designed for political and state purposes. There were four presents from Philip III, which corresponded exactly to what was given by Lord Howard at the Spanish court in Valladolid and at the English court by the kings of England in London. The first was a gold ring with a diamond, worth 4,000 ducats, given to Howard by Philip III on his leaving day, similar to that presented by James in London to the Constable, which was worth 5,000 ducats.314 Second, a box of miniature portraits of the king and queen of Spain with diamonds, valued at 6,000 ducats, a gift for Queen Anne, analogous to the case of miniature portraits of James and Anne, surrounded by ninety diamonds and given by Queen Anne to the Constable.315 Third, the portraits of Philip III, Queen Margaret and the Infanta Anne painted by Juan Pantoja de la Cruz. These portraits were delivered by the ambassador Don Juan de Mendoza, Marquis of San Germán, and they matched other portraits of Queen Anne and Henry Stuart, Prince of Wales, donated by the queen to the Constable in 1604. Finally, six Spanish horses richly caparisoned presented by Philip III to James and brought to England in the summer of 1605 by Ambassador Zúñiga, similar to the group of six horses given to the Spanish Habsburgs by Lord Howard in the spring of 1605. After the exchanges of all these great gifts between Spanish and English courts during 1604–5, the gifts given by the Spanish embassy in England the following year were not so rich and valuable, as both kingdoms entered years of diplomatic normality. In the case of the assignment of Spanish pensions at the English court, the years 1603–4 were the top of the Spanish diplomatic expenses, in order to consolidate the newfound friendship between Spain and England after almost twenty years of war (1585–1604). During the subsequent years, the gifts presented to the English royal family were minor and more occasional. Gondomar wrote in his first embassy accounts that he

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 107 had bought a ewer and a washbasin for James, although finally they went to Lady Jane Drummond.316 A few years later, in 1618, he would give leather gloves and amber to Queen Anne, worth 2,200 reales. During Gondomar’s absence from England, the Spanish government ordered the presentation of a large number of presents to James and the Prince of Wales, consisting of ten horses, four camels, fourteen dogs, a kite, portraits of Philip III and his family, crossbows, muskets and furniture. However, they had still not been delivered by the time of Gondomar’s return to England in the spring of 1620, so the English ministers asked him for them.317 Finally, on his returning to Spain in June 1622, Gondomar sent gifts to James and Charles Stuart of wine, food and cologne worth 3,800 reales. His successor, Coloma, continued the same practices. His accounts show a single gift between 1622 and 1624, a horse richly caparisoned for the Prince of Wales.318 The gift exchange was intense again in 1623, during the visit to Spain of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham. But this happened in Madrid, not in England, as had happened during 1603–5.319 In addition, the rapid deterioration of Spanish–English relations following the failure of the Spanish Match prevented the spiralling of giftgiving between the two courts with the journey to England of the Infanta. The severance of friendly diplomatic relations also caused the two Spanish ambassadors, Coloma and Hinojosa, to leave England in 1624, almost as Don Bernardino de Mendoza had done forty years earlier, in 1584. In this way, there was no likelihood of gift exchanges as had occurred with the Constable in the summer of 1604.320 Between late August and early September 1604, Constable distributed a great deal of gifts for the quantities and value of them and for the social and political importance of the people who received them (Table 8). As for the five British commissioners who negotiated the peace, in addition to the sums of money mentioned above, the annual pensions and other gifts from the Spanish embassy during the whole period should also be taken into account.321 Among the Scots were James I’s Scottish favourites such as George Home, First Earl of Dunbar (1556–1611) and Sir John Ramsay, First Earl of Holderness (1580–1626).322 As for Sir William Monson, he was admiral and politically targeted by Spanish diplomacy because of his important office in the English navy, controlling the English Channel.323 The ladies-in-waiting also received numerous gifts of jewels and cash. Among them, the group of the ladies-in-waiting of Queen Anne played a prominent role (ladies of the Bedchamber). As well as the queen, her ladies-in-waiting benefited from Spanish generosity, not forgetting that Sir George Carew was Queen Anne’s vice-chamberlain and he was also given donations of cash for queen’s private secretary, her personal physician and her apothecary.324 Besides, by winning the good will and friendship of these ladies-in-waiting for the Spanish cause, the diplomats hoped to build the same links with their aristocratic families. The Countess of Suffolk was the greatest beneficiary of Spanish largesse.325 Receiving the Spanish pension awarded to her husband, the Earl of Suffolk, she was on the list of pensioners until 1622, receiving large amounts of gifts and cash from the Spanish embassy until that date. Their greed and arrogance eventually annoyed the ambassadors Zúñiga and Velasco.326 She received over 365,000 reales (36,500 ducats): 165,000 reales (15,000 ducats) in various jewels, and 200,000 reales (18,181.81 ducats)

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Table 8  Members of the King’s and Queen’s Household and Money Received from the Constable of Castile (August 1604) Name

Ducats

Origin

Political offices

Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton

13,327.27

English

Sir Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury

9,788.18

English

Charles Blount, Earl of Devonshire

7,272.72

English

Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham

5,179.68

English

Thomas Sackville, Earl of Dorset

5,136.36

English

4,200

Scottish

3,481.81

Scottish

Edward Wotton, Baron Wotton

2,781.81

English

Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland Sir William Monson Henry Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke Edward Bruce, Lord Kinloss Sir James Lindsay Edward Somerset, Earl of Worcester Robert Radclyffe, Earl of Sussex

2,618.18

English

Commissioner for the peace, Privy Counsellor, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports Commissioner for the peace, Privy Counsellor, Secretary of State, Lord Privy Seal Commissioner for the peace, Privy Counsellor, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland Commissioner for the peace, Privy Counsellor, Lord High Admiral, Lord Steward Commissioner for the peace, Privy Counsellor, Lord High Treasurer Privy Counsellor, Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Lieutenant of Surrey, Gentleman of the Chamber to James I Privy Counsellor, Comptroller of the household Privy Counsellor

2,509.09 2,181.81

English English

1,818.18

English

1,818.18

Scottish

1,818.18 1,8118.18

Scottish English

1,440.43

English

George Home, Earl of Dunbar John Ramsay, Earl of Holderness

Admiral of the Narrow Seas Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire

Privy Counsellor, Master of the Rolls Privy Counsellor, Master of the Horse

(Continued)

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 109 Sir Lewes Lewknor Sir Thomas Lake

1,363.63 1,130.90

English English

George Carew, Earl of Totnes Thomas Erskine, Earl of Kellie Lady Katherine Howard, Countess of Suffolk Lady Jane (Drummond)Ker, Countess of Roxburghe Lady Lucy Russell, Countess of Bedford Lady Elizabeth Sidney, daughter of Sir Robert Sidney, Earl of Leicester, Chamberlain of the Queen Lady Margaret Howard, Countess of Nottingham Lady Anne Hay, Countess of Winton, daughter of Francis Hay, Earl of Erroll Lady Frances Howard, Countess of Hertford Lady Penelope Blount, Countess of Devonshire Lady Elizabeth de Vere, Countess of Derby Lady Audrey Walsingham, wife of Sir Thomas Walsingham Maid of the Bedchamber Lady Susan de Vere, Countess of Montgomery

1,090.90

English

1,018.18

Scottish

Master of the Ceremonies Secretary of the Latin Tongue, Keeper of the Records Vice-Chamberlain to the Queen, Receiver General Captain of the Royal Guard

33,213.92

English

Lady of the Bedchamber

2,830.54

Scottish

Lady of the Bedchamber

1,963.63

English

Lady of the Bedchamber

1,822,72

English

Lady of the Bedchamber

1,818.18

English

Lady-in-waiting

1,448.72

Scottish

Lady-in-waiting

1,200

English

Lady-in-waiting

1,090.90

English

Lady-in-waiting

836.36

English

Lady-in-waiting

636.36

English

Lady-in-waiting, Mistress of the Robes

283.63 174.54

English

Lady-in-waiting

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in cash. There were no such large differences in the value of the gifts given by the Constable in the summer of 1604 to the other ladies-in-waiting of Queen Anne. Some of them benefited from other presents offered at the English court by Villamediana and other ambassadors (the French ambassador for example), who wanted to influence the English foreign policy through the queen.327 Among the naval officers, there were Admiral Monson and Vice Admiral Sir Robert Mansfell. Admiral Monson was most favoured by James, and that position in the royal favour explained why he received a Spanish pension of 1,500 ducats a year from 1604 and 24,000 reales (2,181.81 ducats) from the Constable. Monson appeared on the Spanish records as transporting the ambassadors in his galleons when crossing the English Channel to England. In 1614 he led a naval expedition to the Scottish and Irish coasts to eliminate piracy that was taking place from ports in those areas.328 That year he would receive just 4,000 reales (363.63 ducats) from the embassy for particular services to Phillip III, which could be precisely related to this expedition against British piracy. Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Mansfell received 3,600 reales (327.27 ducats) from the Constable in 1604, and he benefited from other gifts and cash from Spanish diplomats until 1625.329 Sir Lewes Lewkenor, court Master of Ceremonies, was another of these important personalities at the Jacobean court (he held this from 1603 until his death in 1627). He was Catholic; he had fought in the army of Flanders on the Spanish side, as had one of his sons after 1621, and he was fluent in Spanish.330 The Constable gave him 15,000 reales (1,363.63 ducats), while before and after 1604 he was widely honoured by the Spaniards. Between 1603 and 1625 he received a minimum amount of 30,415 reales (2,765 ducats), equivalent to four years’ salary as Master of Ceremonies, £200 per year (727.27 ducats). The Spanish ambassadors did not esteem Sir John Herbert, second English Secretary of State (1600–17), highly as he was under the influence and control of Sir Robert Cecil.331 He visited Zúñiga on the occasion of the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot on behalf of the Privy Council to give him assurances that he would not be attacked by the angry and threatening mob who appeared outside his house in London.332 Thus, he received from the ambassador a gold chain worth 600 reales (54.54 ducats). Sir Charles Cornwallis, first English ordinary ambassador to Spain (1605–9) after the Elizabethan wars, had several dealings with Gondomar about the interception of the Spanish diplomatic correspondence. However, the information Cornwallis provided was useless, and apparently his only wish was to obtain cash and gifts at the expense of the Spanish ambassador; Cornwallis asked for an annual pension of 3,000 ducats plus 6,000 ducats in cash.333 However, he got something in return for his secrets, as he received 5,500 reales (500 ducats) in cash and a gem worth 500 reales (45.45 ducats). Sir Francis Cottington was a key figure in political and diplomatic relations between Spain and Jacobean England in the first half of the seventeenth century. He was a diplomat in Spain, a royal minister at the English court and a supporter of peace between Spain and England. He received 5,500 reales (500 ducats) from Gondomar to unmask the interception of his diplomatic correspondence during his office in London.334 In 1624 Cottington provided reserved and confidential information

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 111 to Hinojosa in London on another alleged confidant at the service of the English ambassador Sir Walter Aston in Madrid: this spy was a page of the royal secretary Martin Arostegui.335 However, Cottington’s crucial role occurred during 1622–4, when, shortly after his appointment as secretary of the Prince of Wales, he was caught as a secret confidant of the Spanish ambassadors, under the code name El Incognito.336 In return for 500 reales (45.45 ducats) per month – possibly awarded just as a sign of appreciation from the Spanish government – he transmitted reports on all sorts of political and diplomatic issues to Coloma and Hinojosa, concerning the Indies, the English parliament, Holland, the Palatinate and the English court. In fact, in the spring and summer of 1624, Cottington became the main Spanish confidant in London. During 1624 and 1625 he was an indirect political link between James and the Spanish ambassadors. As James did not wish to start war with Spain, he resisted the pressure for war coming from the English parliament, the Prince of Wales and Buckingham. Cottington was the person to reassure James about his position in Spain and was the key figure to negotiate the Palatinate question after the failure of the Spanish Match of 1623 and the preservation of peace with Spain. Sir Theophilus Howard, Baron Howard of Walden, was the eldest son of the Earl of Suffolk, receiving from the hands of Gondomar a jewel of diamonds worth 14,200 reales on 20 December 1617. When Dutch diplomats to England offered an annual pension of £2,000 (8,000 ducats) to the Earls of Suffolk, Howard apparently convinced them not to accept it, informing Gondomar of the whole business and mediating between the Spanish ambassador and his parents to refuse it.337 The reason of the case was, mainly, the huge delay in the payment of the pension for the Countess of Suffolk (she was receiving it since 1604). By the end of 1617, Gondomar owed her 10,000 ducats (two and half years of pension), almost the same amount of money offered by the Dutch at the same time.338 According to Gondomar, Sir Theophilus was his confident, and he was given nothing in return for his services to Spain.339 That is why, after the mediation with his parents, Gondomar presented him the diamonds (never before). Gondomar committed himself to pay their pension, and the Suffolks ‘have weakened a little [about the prospects of 8,000 ducats], but they finally refused the Dutch pension’.340 Gondomar paid to the Countess 4,000 ducats (in 1618) and 10,909.09 ducats (between the years 1620 and 1622).341 However, the delays continued: by the summer of 1623, the Spanish embassy still owed the Countess 16,000 ducats of her pension.342 There would not be more payments. Sir George Villiers (Duke of Buckingham), as the royal favourite of James and a key personality at the English court since 1616, was granted a pension from the Spanish embassy, but refused it. However, Gondomar presented him with some gifts of amber, leather gloves and a diamond worth 23,000 reales. Other courtly personalities were Sir James Hamilton (second Marquis of Hamilton) who received a diamond worth 24,000 reales from Gondomar on his farewell to England in May 1622. Sir Ludovic Stewart (second Duke of Lennox) was given a diamond by the Spanish embassy worth 21,500 reales on the same occasion.343 Sir George Calvert, Secretary of State (1619–25), pro-Catholic and supporter of peace with Spain, received a diamond worth 6,600 reales from Gondomar and a tapestry worth 20,000 reales from Ambassador Coloma. Endymion Porter, Gentleman of the

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Royal Chamber, benefited from several pieces of silver (2,785 reales) from Gondomar. Finally, Matthew de Quester, Postmaster of London, received a glass worth 400 reales from Coloma in June 1623. The Spanish ambassadors’ dealings with the ladies at the English court also played a crucial role in relations with English aristocracy. It was obvious that gifts and entertainment were provided by the Constable to the ladies-in-waiting (ladies of the Bedchamber) of the queen in 1604.344 Shortly after arriving to England, Villamediana gave gloves, amber and other gifts to the sister of Admiral Sir William Monson and other ladies at the English court.345 Ladies such as the Countess of Suffolk and Jane Drummond continued to receive gifts and presents from the Spanish embassy year after year.346 Over the years, the changes in power relations at the English court would bring new members of the British aristocracy to the stage, and with each new great lord, his wives and sisters. The Countess of Arundel, Lady Aletheia Talbot, was the subject of the attention of ambassadors Gondomar and Coloma. Between 1620 and 1623 she received several gifts, including silver saltshakers, worth 4,349 reales. A special case was Anne Cornwallis, second Countess of Argyll, niece of Sir Charles Cornwallis (first English ambassador to Phillip III) and a Catholic lady.347 She ran away to Flanders with her husband and children in 1618 (in reality, they travelled to Flanders with James’s permission, declaring that they wanted to take the curative waters at Spa). After that the Spanish Council of State agreed to grant her a yearly pension of 6,000 ducats, which corresponded to that of her husband (Archibald Campbell, and 3,000 ducats of pension if she would be widowed). In addition to this, another 6,000 ducats for the Earl of Argyll to cover the travel allowances (to go back to Flanders as he was at the Spanish court when granted the pension) and a 2,000 ducats jewel.348 Campbell was a very important Scottish aristocrat, who converted to Catholicism by 1618349. After that, he surrendered his states on his elder son, Archibald, and escaped to Flanders; he was welcomed by Archduke Albert and Marquis Ambrogio Spinola, the head of the Spanish army. He offered his services to Phillip III, and he went to Spain that year to introduce himself and to present his demands.350 In 1619 he wrote a letter to Phillip III with his personal life and assuring his wish to serve Spain after his conversion to Catholicism.351 Finally, in 1622, he was appointed coronel of the Scottish regiment in the Spanish army of Flanders, as the war against the Dutch broke out again in 1621 and more troops were needed in the Spanish Low Countries. Between the years 1617 and 1619, Gondomar played a very important role in the conversion and recruitment for Spanish service of the Earl of Argyll, through his wife, in spite of King James’s annoyance352 Actually, the huge pension granted to him was his idea, and it was reflected in a document signed by the ambassador. Gondomar’s word counted at the Spanish Council of State and for Phillip III353. Argyll case was a big one for the relations between Spain and England and for different reasons all together. First, for James it was a personal matter.354 Archibald Campbell was a great figure among the Scottish nobility.355 He was Steward of the king, Lord Justice General (Lord Chief Justice) and Privy Counsellor. He fought against the Catholic rebels (Battle of Glenlivet, 1594) and expelled them from Kintyre and the island of Jura (area between Scotland and Ireland). Besides, the king was godfather of his second child, whose name was James in his honour.

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 113 Second, Argyll became clearly a big political case. As one of the heads of the Scottish aristocracy, he went to serve another master. As a Scottish man, he chose to fight for Spain. As a Presbyterian (Protestant), he became a Catholic, a papist. He turned into a traitor against his king, his kingdom and his ‘faith’. Above all (and probably this was the most important reason), he set a big precedent, an example of changing loyalties and religion in Great Britain (not the only case anyway). It is not a secret that James disliked much of the service of his subjects in the Spanish armies and fleets.356 When James knew of Argyll’s escape and conversion, he tried everything to make him return to England.357 There were promises of lands and money and major threats too (probably by Sir William Turnbull and Sir James Hay, viscount of Doncaster, both English diplomats in Flanders by that time). As Argyll did not surrender, he was asked to send to England his second son, James, or at least go to serve the French armies, not the Spanish (but the stubborn Scottish count refused too). In Scotland (Edinburgh) he was declared traitor and rebel in February 1619, and in England he suffered the confiscation of his lands. However, by 1620 his relations with James seemed to improve much, as Argyll crossed to England from Flanders for short visits. By 1621 his sentence was reversed.358 In the autumn of 1623 his second son, James, was sent to England with the Spanish ambassador Don Diego Messía. The Spanish ambassadors were ordered to supervise his Catholic education and guarantee for him the lordship of Kintyre. However, James did not intend to let him having a Catholic education.359 For Spain, Argyll was a double-edged sword: on one side, Gondomar and the Spanish government thought very high of him, as being an important Scottish aristocrat, as an example for others to serve the king of Spain and on the other side as a real headache for James (as Argyll was a declared traitor and rebel, exiled in the Spanish Low Countries).360 Argyll received a pension similar to the ones of Sir Robert Cecil, the Earl of Somerset or Buckingham. A huge amount of money, a small treasure, perhaps not so worth it. Phillip III feared that Argyll’s case could worsen the political and diplomatic relations with James when the situation in Germany was getting complicated and a possible Spanish military intervention was in the air.361 At least, at the beginning, the Spaniards managed the whole business with care, wisely, in secret. The following years demonstrated that Argyll was a very expensive honoured guest, with an ambivalent relation with James, and much fruitless for Spain. While in Flanders, Argyll assured the prospects for the future under the wing of Jacobean dynasty for his sons, Archibald Campbell (Earl of Argyll) and James Campbell (Lord of Kintyre), while he was at the service of Spain with an excellent source of funds. However, another Scottish exile at the service of Spain, Sir William Semple, wrote a letter to Phillip IV in 1622 pointing the nonsense of the case. According to him, Argyll was ‘a loser, without states and money … somebody with nothing to lose at the service of Spain and a pension to gain … a low life person … pursued by his creditors in England and Scotland … a fake Catholic … supported only by the English Jesuits in Flanders because of his English wife’.362 Other ladies at the English court mentioned on the records were the wives of the successive James’s favourites: Lady Frances Howard (wife of the Earl of Somerset), Lady Katherine Manners (wife of Buckingham) and Lady Katherine’s mother, Lady

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Cecilia Tufton (Countess of Rutland).363 All of them enjoyed gifts and entertainment from Gondomar, especially the last two, who were Catholic. Between 1620 and 1622 he spent 18,650 reales (1,695.45 ducats) on gifts of leather, gloves, amber, cologne, boxes and so on, for these courtly ladies. As far as is known, the Countess of Arundel, the Countess of Argyll and the Countess of Rutland travelled to Flanders with all the comforts imaginable that might be provided by Gondomar and Coloma.364 Finally, by contrast, Jacques Bruneau, enjoying a much smaller budget for embassy expenses than his predecessor at the office, gave only one present to an English lady: a pair of gloves and a pair of socks to the daughter of Sir Lewes Lewkenor, the English Master of Ceremonies.

Plans for the royal household of the Catholic Queen of England Although the Spanish Match was a big failure, there were plans made by the Spaniards in 1623 regarding the creation of the household of the Spanish Infanta at the English court. Of course, the idea was a Catholic household involving Spaniards and British Catholics or sympathizers.365 As for the Spanish side, the Flemish archdeacon Francisco de Carondelet, chaplain of Coloma, was thought as senior chaplain of the Infanta, and Juan Coloma (son of Don Pedro Coloma, Lord of Bobadilla, Baron of Bornhem and cousin of ambassador Coloma) as one of the junior chaplains (the other post of junior chaplain was for an English priest). Other members of the household proposed were Sir John Roper (III Baron of Teynham), Thomas Somerset (Master of the Horse of Queen Anne, I viscount Somerset), Thomas Darcy (Earl Rivers and viscount of Colchester), Sir Lewes Lewknor (Master of Ceremonies) and Edward Vaux (4th Baron Vaux of Harrowden). As for the ladies-in-waiting, the chosen ones were one of the daughters of Anthony–Maria Browne (2nd Viscount Montagu), perhaps Lady Mary Browne; as Lady of the Bedchamber, Lady Henrietta Stewart (marchioness of Huntly).

Working for Spain Other British subjects who did not belong to the English court also benefited from Spanish diplomatic largesse. Among them were soldiers, officers and crewmen. It was a custom throughout the entire period that the different Spanish ambassadors on their way to London pass out money or jewels among the crews of English ships in which they travelled.366 These trips took as their point of departure or arrival ports like La Corunna, Gondomar, Santander, Calais, Gravelines, Portsmouth, Plymouth or The Downs. The amounts referred to range from 480 to 10,000 reales (43.63 to 909.09 ducats), split between the crewmen of one ship, sometimes in a naval squadron of four.367 Regarding jewels, it was customary to present gold chains worth from 1,000 to 3,000 reales (90.90 to 272.72 ducats). Of course, shipmasters, sea captains and officers received much more than the rest of the crew (sailors, pages, gunners, soldiers). The captain of a galleon could receive up to 10,000 reales (909.09 ducats) as a one-off gift.368 The crew had to settle for less. For example, Coloma gave 1,050 reales (95.45 ducats) to the whole crew of an English galleon on his way to Dover on 5 May 1622, while their captain received a gold chain worth 1,600 reales (145.45 ducats).369 A decade

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 115 earlier, Zúñiga had done something similar, presenting 2,000 reales (181.81 ducats) to Admiral Monson, sharing 500 reales (45.45 ducats) with the crew of his galleon. The captains and crews of these ships were often the first British officers to come into contact with the Spaniards of their way to England, so it was very convenient to create the impression of the wealth and generosity of the king of Spain among them. Furthermore, the implications of these contacts with the members of the English Royal Navy should not be ignored. Attracting the attention of these naval experts for a future and profitable career at the service of the armies and fleets of Spain as mercenaries was also vital. For the development of the diplomatic and political activity of the Spanish embassy, the ambassadors must have had contacts at the highest levels of the British royal administration. The secretaries of state Sir Robert Cecil, Sir Thomas Lake and Sir George Calvert received a lot of money and gifts from the embassy. They often provided information of importance to the ambassadors and copies of letters and dispatches that belonged to the English government, and in general they could accelerate any bureaucratic process.370 There were also English public servants who passed to the ambassadors files and documents from the English public records, as that officer who copied some treaties in French being made for the king of France (for this service, that office was paid 1,200 reales (109.09 ducats)) or Digby’s embassy accounts.371 Other courtiers and aristocrats received cash and gifts too. During the diplomatic mission of the Constable, three English gentlemen received a total of 15,758 reales (1,432.54 ducats) from him. Two of them received gifts for carrying a message and a letter for him, and the third one to welcome and to serve the Spanish ambassador as an interpreter (gold chains and cash). Later on, the Constable gave to a Lord Howard’s servant 300 reales (27.27 ducats) and another 1,360 reales (123.63 ducats) to a personal secretary of Sir Robert Cecil. A year earlier, Villamediana had shared 3,000 reales (272.72 ducats) with some English officers in Oxford for no other reason than to show the largesse of Phillip III. Meanwhile, Bruneau gave a pair of gloves (20 reales, almost 2 ducats) to a gentleman of the Duke of Pembroke (Ludovic Stewart), to get messages from the royal palace. Those aristocrats and servants close to the English royal family were a key objective for the Spanish ambassadors (the king, the queen and the prince). For example, in 1614 Gondomar paid 27,000 reales (2,454.54 ducats) to two important personalities who were close to Petrarca (Prince of Wales) and Homero (Queen Anne). During his second embassy, Gondomar would pay 29,700 reales (2700 ducats) to several confidants at the service of Teodosio (Prince of Wales). In total, Gondomar paid, between 1614 and 1622, 88,537 reales to informers and members of the English royal House. Coloma gave 1,800 reales (163.63 ducats) to a gentleman, who announced him the arrival of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham to England on 16 October 1623. Other British courtiers and royal officers would be the eyes and ears of the Spanish ambassadors in the meetings of the English parliament, as in the spring of 1624. During that dangerous season in London, neither Hinojosa nor Coloma would dare to go on the streets due to the anti-Spanish political environment (not to mention attending the meetings of the English parliament). Four people, members of the English court, were

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devoted to transmit daily the resolutions of the parliament, as well as sending copies of all the parliamentary proceedings. These informers were paid 16,880 reales (1,534.54 ducats) for their work at the service of the Spanish ambassadors (Buckingham found out and offered a reward for discovering them).372 There were several high-ranking personalities at the English court whose names were cited on the Spanish records between 1622 and 1625. (They are not published in traditional lists of Villamediana, Zúñiga or Gondomar.) One of the main confidants was El Incognito (Sir Francis Cottington), personal secretary of the Prince of Wales since April 1622.373 Cottington sent numerous reports to Coloma, Hinojosa and Bruneau on all sorts of English issues (parliamentary resolutions, English state business, diplomatic dealings with the ambassadors of Holland, France or Venice, information on English trade and the Dutch East Indies, etc.). These reports were then forwarded secretly to Brussels and Madrid. Cottington was working for the embassy from December 1622 to November 1624, receiving almost 1,000 ducats.374 Other informers of the embassy in those final years were (in their code names) Constans in fide, Pánfilo, Primo del caminante and El Mohíno. These four confidants were paid by Jacques Bruneau, respectively, 4022.58 (365.68 ducats), 480 (43.63 ducats), 400 (36.36 ducats) and 3,049 reales (277.18 ducats). As it could be noticed, these code names were completely different than those from the lists of the years 1604, 1613, 1617 and 1622, which were characters like Príamo, Amadís, Sócrates, Teodosio, Homero, Tiberio, Alejandro and Trajano.375 There were groups of British people related to espionage and propaganda and in general involved in supporting the Spanish cause in Europe. In Brussels (Summer 1603), Villamediana surrounded himself by a group of British officers and aristocrats to learn about the political situation in England before crossing the English Channel. These personalities were, among others, the Englishman Robert Spiller, soldiers such as Sir William Stanley and Hugh Owen and the Jesuit Father William Baldwin.376 The following year, the Constable would do something similar. His records showed payments in Brussels to two English spies of 3,134 reales (284.90 ducats). One of them, whose name was Matheo Brigat, worked with the personal jeweller of the Constable, Bartolome Marquesi, advising him on the large purchases of jewels to be made in Flanders to be presented at the English court. For this service, both received a total of 7,334 reales (666.72 ducats) in jewels and cash. The Spaniards paid amounts between 200 and 1,000 reales (18.18 and 90.90 ducats) to keep a network of spies around Great Britain. Peter Peckwell, Roldán, William Randall, Robert Greet, Robidan Jarte (Robin Hart?), Francisco González and others whose names are not mentioned explicitly watched over and guarded the British and Dutch coasts and seaports. William Randall has an interesting story behind him. He was a Catholic merchant from Dartmouth, had travelled around Europe and was an expert in naval affairs. He lived in Flanders and was married in Dunkirk. According to the English government, the Duke of Parma, the Duke of Pastrana, Sir William Stanley and Hugh Owen met him in his house in Dunkirk to prepare certain plans against English trade in Europe during the years of the Anglo–Spanish war (1585–1604). Along with an Irishman,

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 117 he was intended to burn English ships in French ports such as Dieppe, Rouen and Chatham. Later he travelled to Spain with the intention of obtaining a pension from Phillip II, without success. However, he accepted the mission to bring to Scotland certain religious and Catholic books to encourage the Catholic missions there. A storm damaged his ship, which took refuge in Plymouth. Randall, after being arrested by the English government, ended up in the Gatehouse Prison in London in 1595. His wife asked numerous times for his release, supported by important English merchants. The English government wanted to exchange him for ten English prisoners or the payment of £10,000 (36,363.63 ducats), which speaks to his political importance. He was declared a ‘great traitor’ by the English, who accused him of wanting to burn Queen Elizabeth I’s ships, moving priests to England and encouraging and recruiting English sailors for the fleets of the king of Spain. These accusations were more than enough to send him to the scaffold to be executed for high treason. However, he survived. For his services to Spain, the embassy to England granted him around 1,400 reales (127.27 ducats) between 1606 and 1609.377

Agents of the Spanish diplomacy Other men would serve the Spanish ambassadors away from the coasts and ports of Northern Europe. Some were code breakers (passing official documents to the embassy), while others wrote favourably of Spain (denouncing those who worked against Spanish interests). For instance, Robert Phillips deciphered and handed over to Gondomar stolen diplomatic correspondence from the Count de Oñate, the Spanish ambassador to Germany. Gondomar paid him 1,200 reales (109.09 ducats) on 25 October 1620; in the summer of 1624, another English code breaker would be paid 1,000 reales (90.90 ducats) for deciphering the stolen correspondence of the courier to Italy. In November 1622 Coloma paid 1,000 reales (90.90 ducats) to Jacques Maxfeld, Scottish and Catholic historian, in gratitude for writing in favour of Spain and the royal house of the Habsburgs; in 1623 Maxfeld went into exile in Flanders. The following month, Coloma rewarded an Englishman with 88 reales (8 ducats) for informing him about a bookseller who was selling books insulting Spain.378 Finally, there was a large group of foreigners mentioned explicitly in the records at the service of the Spanish diplomacy in England. First, there were members of staff of other European embassies to England, such as Denmark, France or Venice. In the Danish case, Gondomar presented several gifts worth 7,250 reales (659,09 ducats) to Sir Sinclair Andrews, the Danish ambassador to England, in the summer of 1614. As for the French and Venetian embassies, Gondomar apparently hired some French men who kept him informed about the secrets and diplomatic business of the French ambassador.379 Between 1614 and 1622 he paid these French informers at least 17,172 reales (1,561.09 ducats). Among other foreigners at the English court, the records mention the French knight Françoise Verton, Seigneur de la Foret, who was passing the Venetian ambassador in London’s secret correspondence to Gondomar. Verton received a monthly pension of 200 reales (18.18 ducats) from Gondomar, and between 1614 and 1622 he received at least 11,422 reales (1,038.36 ducats).380

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Other Flemish and Genoese confidants are cited on the records on the same basis, including watching British ports and keeping the secret diplomatic correspondence of the embassy. On 31 July 1625, Bruneau paid 200 reales (18.18 ducats) to his Flemish agent Paulo Moreau to go to the port of Weymouth to welcome the arrival of a ship from Spain. There were Italians, such as Marco Antonio Lusardo (from Genoa), the aristocrat Benedicto Sehoto and the merchant Filipo Bernadi, all of whom worked at the service of Bruneau in the Spanish embassy to England’s last year of the existence.

Banquets, court celebrations and hospitality Spanish diplomats also offered the splendid hospitality of their homes in the form of banquets, receptions, parties and housing. The Spanish hospitality in England meant the hospitality of their own master, as the ambassadors were his symbol and the representatives. These events (creating a meeting place between Spain and the English courtiers), as well as parties, masquerades and other court ceremonies, played an essential role in the creation and maintenance of their networks of support and confidants in Great Britain, whether British or foreigners. Ultimately, that home was a place with political, social, economical and symbolical meaning, a place to see and be seen, know and make known, at the English court. The importance of banquets as essential ceremonies in European court life is well known. They are events to impress, to delight and to honour the guests.381 They were moments of relaxation and a great pleasure for the senses. In this respect, Hurtado de Mendoza published a report of his embassy to England, with an illustration on the cover of the banquet held in his honour on 18 November 1623 by James and the Prince of Wales.382 During the peace negotiations of 1603–4, there were also numerous banquets, held by the Spanish ambassadors, British nobility and the royal Stuart family. The great importance of such events was clear to Villamediana on December 1603. He wrote that the Venetian diplomats were holding banquets in honour of almost everybody, and he was forced to hold a large banquet in honour of King James (actually, he called these banquets niñerías, ‘childishness’).383 In this sense, these events became instruments to demonstrate the power and reputation of Spain, as well as strengthening ties between the two crowns, as happened at the banquet held by the Stuarts on 5 January, 1604, with Villamediana.384 On 29 August 1604, at the royal banquet for the ratification of the peace in Whitehall, James shared with the Constable six oranges and a melon, saying that they were fruits transplanted in England, a symbol of renewed friendship and a future marriage alliance between the two countries.385 Almost twenty years later, when the marriage negotiations were at their peak (the Spanish Match, 1623), the banquets also gave the opportunity to reinforce those diplomatic talks. On 15 August 1622, Coloma was invited to a royal banquet at Windsor Castle. He was the centre of attention and honoured by James during the whole ceremony. These court celebrations with banquets were thus so necessary to the English that the renewed friendship between both kingdoms could be at risk if they were not held properly. Villamediana warned of the risk in December 1604. Talking about the English

 Spanish Diplomatic Finances 119 embassy of Lord Howard to Spain, the Spanish ambassador advised against Spanish court etiquette, as Spanish monarchs ate alone and separated from the court, which could be taken as an insult by the English ambassador (as in London, Villamediana and the Constable feasted at the royal table with King James).386 However, the Council of State opposed Villamediana’s recommendation on the grounds that in Spain it was not customary to have ambassadors at the royal table and, furthermore, Lord Howard was a heretic. In any case, they recommended, firstly, compensating the absence of Lord Howard at the Spanish royal table by giving him luxurious presents and honouring him, and secondly that Philip III could invite him to a light snack at some time.387 In any case, Villamediana met completely the expectations of the English court regarding banquets, parties and celebrations. He spent over 15,000 ducats on these events. The first banquet was held in honour of the Earl of Pembroke and his entourage in Winchester (in gratitude for having welcomed him at his first public audience with King James on 5 October 1603). Villamediana spent 22.3 per cent of the total secret expenses of his office on this kind of event, meaning 13.21 per cent of the total expenditure of his diplomatic mission to England and 10.88 per cent of the total budget were provided to him by the Spanish treasury. Almost a quarter of his secret expenses was spent on banquets, confirming the importance of such court events in the context of crucial peace negotiations and the creation of a network of British people favourable to Spain. Villamediana spent more money not only on these court ceremonies than his successors in the office in absolute terms (his budget was bigger) but also in relative terms than them, both regarding the total secret expenses, total expenses and the budget of the office to England. The reason for this huge financial effort lay in his role as one of the principal negotiators of the peace with England in 1604, working handin-hand with the Constable. It was a necessity for Spanish diplomacy to find support and create a friendly atmosphere towards Spain at the English court in those decisive moments. His successors at the embassy to England continued offering banquets and court celebrations, but to a lesser extent. In this, as elsewhere, 1603–5 witnessed huge disbursements never made later. Three groups of guests could be clearly distinguished at these events. The first group was the great British lords; the second, English aristocratic ladies (many of them wives, sisters and daughters of the main high-ranking families). Finally, the last was other European diplomats from France, Italian states, the Holy Roman Empire, Denmark and Poland. Regarding the reasons for celebrating, apart from those held in honour of King James’s ministers, diplomats and other courtiers, there were those days related to the Catholic calendar. There were celebrations such as Easter, Christmas, Epiphany, Candelaria day or Catholic baptisms of children of British aristocratic families.388 Thus, banquets offered at the home of Spanish ambassadors also became an instrument for the promotion and encouragement of the Catholicism among the English elite. Finally, in terms of housing and providing shelter, the Spanish ambassadors paid for some foreign diplomats when the occasion demanded. Between the months of March and April 1623 Coloma housed the imperial ambassador Ferdinand Von Boyschott

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(sent by the Infanta Isabella to negotiate a truce at the Rhenish Palatinate). Coloma spent 3,000 ducats, including housing Boyschott and his entourage.389 As for Hinojosa, in the autumn of 1623 he spent more than 10,000 ducats to accommodate Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza and Don Diego Messía, both Spanish envoys sent on behalf of Philip IV and the Infanta Isabella, respectively. They arrived in England to celebrate and congratulate James on the safe return of the Prince of Wales and to examine the political situation in England after the Spanish Match.390

3

War and trade: The Spanish embassy in England – lighthouse and fortress

Stuart England and the Spanish–Dutch war The war against the Dutch rebels was a double conflict for Spain during the years 1568–1609 and 1621–48. They stood as the example of political rebellion turned into resistance against the Spanish power in seventeenth-century Europe. It stood overseas maritime expansion in competition with Spanish and Portuguese empires, especially through the East Indies. In both cases, the peace with England was a crucial point: the end of English support brought obvious benefits to the Spanish military offensive against the Dutch by land and sea. As for the Indies, the Spanish crown now had posts on both sides of the English Channel to observe and attack Dutch ships and fleets. Joint action could thus be taken against trade and fisheries, the basis of the Dutch economy, from Flanders and from the Spanish embassy in London.1 The best example of this political and military coordination was Coloma, fieldmaster of the Spanish army of Flanders, a supporter of naval warfare and ambassador to England during the years of 1622–4.2 He was a perfect combination of soldier, in Flanders, and ambassador, in England.

British ports and Spanish galleons Article 10 of the 1604 treaty established freedom for ships of both kingdoms to enter the ports of the other, to shelter from the dangers of storms or to re-provision the ships.3 Re-provisioning included merchant and war vessels, but in the case of the latter, if there were more than six or eight warships, express permission of the sovereign, James I for British ports or Philip III for Spanish ones, was needed. The restored English neutrality in Europe brought out the contradictions between the re-establishing of the friendship between England and Spain and the declared enmity of the majority of the English Protestant population, who viewed it with disgust as they helped to fight their traditional Dutch allies against the Catholic Spanish power.4 There were several episodes of Spanish warships arriving at the British coasts. The events that occurred in each of them showed the uncertainty of the friendship with the English regarding the welcoming of the Spanish crews and the war against the Dutch. Between 1600 and 1605 several naval battles took place between Flemish and

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Dutch ships off the coast and British ports: in August 1600; in December 1604 and in November and December 1605. Later on, in March 1616, a galleon named San Alberto, under the command of Admiral Don Diego de Brochero, had to take refuge in Plymouth; in January 1617, a caravel, under the command of Captain Diego Íñiguez de Anderica, arrived at Plymouth without gear and provisions of any kind. Between 1622 and 1623 two Flemish galleons of the fleet of Flanders took refuge in Scotland. Finally, in June 1625 came the incident of the galleon Santa Clara, whose crew and officers, about sixty men, were captured by the English authorities in Dover.5 After the Spanish crown signed the peace with England in 1604 the only solution left to the Dutch was to watch over the English Channel to prevent the transportation of Spanish troops to Flanders from England or the Iberian Peninsula ports.6 With the interception of English transport ships throughout the spring of 1605, Villamediana’s protests at the English court had been futile, since James declared that peace with Spain only forced him to persuade the Dutch, not to block the English Channel, avoiding the military force or threats. In addition, the Spanish proposal to transport recruits for the Spanish army in Flanders on English royal ships was rejected by the English government without hesitation.7

Dover, 1605 During the spring of 1605 the first serious test of the recently renewed Spanish– English friendship took place in the English Channel. A group of eight English and Scottish vessels were hired to transport 1,200 Spanish, Irish and Italian soldiers and officers, belonging to the tercio of the fieldmaster Don Pedro Sarmiento, from Lisbon to Dunkirk.8 They were intercepted by a Dutch squadron near Port of Dover on 14 June, and a violent battle began in which four English ships were burned and sunk.9 Survivors of the four ships took refuge in Dover, where they were bombed and shelled by the Dutch from the entrance of the port. Only the intervention of the artillery of the castle of Dover prevented the destruction of the refugee ships.10 The dilemma now was what is to become of the 600 soldiers stationed and waiting at Dover. On 16 July, Sarmiento wrote to Philip III informing him of his numerous problems due to the lack of support from the English authorities.11 Apparently, Sarmiento did not receive any assistance whatsoever from the local authorities for his troops. Calling for housing for his soldiers, he had been offered, on one occasion, three different places, and on another to take them to Canterbury. In both cases the fieldmaster refused the offer. Philip III ordered letters to be written to James, Ambassador Lord Howard, Zúñiga and Villamediana requesting permission to embark all the soldiers on English royal ships for safe passage to Flanders. As for the Spanish ambassadors, they did everything possible to help the soldiers during their stay in Dover. Between July and December 1605 Zúñiga spent 223,083 reales (20,280.27 ducats) in military aid to Sarmiento’s soldiers, who were in a very difficult situation.12 The assistance materialized in cash payments to military officers of the tercio by the Genoese merchants Juan Francisco Soprani and Filipo Bernardi, made in secret in various places or in Dover. Regarding the weapons of the regiment (muskets, guns, pikes, halberds), on 10 July 1609 Zúñiga paid 100 reales (90.90 ducats)

 War and Trade 123 to obtain orders from the English Privy Council for the mayor of Dover in order to deliver them. These weapons remained in Dover, under the care of the local authorities, after 1605. On 23 July 1609, 980 reales (89.09 ducats) were paid to the mayor of Dover for the deposit of these weapons, and another 150 reales (13.63 ducats) were given to Francis Fowler, Secretary of Languages at ​​ the Spanish embassy, to go to Dover to deliver everything to Spanish ensign Padilla, who was sent by Marquis Ambrosio Spinola, captain general of the Spanish army in Flanders. As for the passage of the soldiers, it soon turned into a diplomatic mess between England, Spain and Holland. The Spanish request that the troops sail to Flanders using English royal ships met with insurmountable opposition from the majority of English Privy Council members, who argued that this was a violation of English neutrality.13 In addition, the Dutch ambassador, Noel Caron, argued that allowing this free passage under English protection was a declaration of open hostility against Holland, and that if Dutch ships found soldiers of Spanish army aboard English ships they would attack and sink them without hesitation. James’s final response to the matter was to admonish the Spanish ambassadors for using British ships to transport Spanish troops to Flanders knowing that he wanted to remain neutral.14 It was clear to the Spaniards that there was nothing to be expected from the English authorities, so the only possible solution would be to wait and try to move the soldiers under the guise of civil passengers and merchants on the merchant ships that crossed the English Channel constantly, although this meant spending huge amounts of money for the embassy.15 Despite Villamediana’s indignation and his insistence during the months of August and September 1605, James did not change his mind, so the soldiers continued to wait in Dover for a safe passage to Flanders. At the end of December 1605, they were able to cross the English Channel to Flanders in small boats, under the cover of the long winter nights and bad weather.16 It was Dr Robert Taylor who made this passage to Flanders possible for the troops sheltered in Dover. He presented an alternative not involving the neutral English government in the passage, so the soldiers could escape from Dover not using British merchant boats (as James denounced) and at their own risk, without any protection of James’s warships or other Spanish ones, and at the expense of the Dutch attacks or the storms.17

Scotland, 1622–3 Between June 1622 and August 1623, two Flemish galleons, San Ambrosio and Nuestra Señora de Begoña, took refuge in the Scottish ports of Leith and Aberdeen after heavy fighting with Dutch warships. The first mention of this matter appears in a letter from Coloma to Philip IV dated 16 June 1622. Two ships from the Spanish naval base of Ostend had been involved in several battles with the Dutch, and had sunk fifteen merchant ships loaded with wheat, cod and wood from the Baltic Sea.18 On 30 June, James was informed by the governor of the village of Leith.19 In September, James granted Coloma a licence to send ammunition and supplies to the galleons, San Ambrosio, commanded by Peter Van Nooren in Leith, and Nuestra Señora de Begoña, commanded by Antonio Rotaeche in Aberdeen, both blocked by six Dutch warships each.20 It was in January 1623 that the mention of William Laing appeared

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for the first time in the letters of Coloma. Laing was a Scottish Catholic merchant from Aberdeen who, at his own expense and risking his life, had travelled to London to charter a vessel in order to aid both galleons with provisions, money, artillery and sailors. The Dutch and Scots Puritans had put a price on his head, and 100 portraits of him were distributed in an attempt to assassinate Laing. By his actions in favour of the Spaniards, the Scottish merchant had lost his businesses in Scotland, fearing for his life and the life of his family. Philip IV appointed Laing as Spanish agent in Scotland, and ordered him to work with Coloma to help the two galleons leave Scotland.21 Throughout the spring of 1623, assistance to these galleons became more and more difficult. In Edinburgh, the Protestant preachers and the majority of the local Scottish population sympathized with the Dutch, opposing the provision of any aid to the galleons in Leith and Aberdeen. The Scottish authorities were slow to follow James’s orders, or simply ignored them. For this reason Coloma repeatedly complained of the hostility the Scots showed. Laing was even imprisoned there, and only a warrant signed by James succeeded in freeing him, thanks to Coloma’s efforts.22 Leith held a symbolic value to the Protestant Scottish. During the conflict between the Catholic regent Mary de Guise (with the support of France) and John Knox, leader of the Scottish reformation (backed by Elizabeth I), Leith was under English siege during March-May of 1560, having a French garrison inside. There were numerous and ferocious combats between them around Leith, and everything concluded with the Treaty of Edinburgh (or Leith) on 5 July 1560, signed by the Scottish Protestants, Elizabeth I and Francis II of France. The diplomatic agreement guaranteed the withdrawal of the French troops, the triumph of the Reformation in Scotland and (for Elizabeth) a Protestant Scotland without any foreign interference.23 It is kind of ironic that it would be Leith where Scotland became a Protestant kingdom, the port where one of the Spanish galleons arrived to take refuge. There, the Spaniards would have to face the Dutch warships blockading the port and the local Protestant population, who, according to the Spanish military officer Juan de Sagastizabal, hated them with all their souls.24 This time, as in 1560, there was foreign Catholic soldiers (Spanish instead of French) in Leith being under siege by a Protestant army (the Dutch instead of English). In May 1623, a plot was devised in Aberdeen by some English sailors to burn one of the galleons, Nuestra Señora de Begoña.25 Faced with all these difficulties, Coloma finally obtained James’s agreement to send two of his royal ships to escort the galleons out of the respective Scottish ports and confront all the Dutch warships which tried to prevent it.26 Unfortunately, although the conspiracy in Aberdeen was aborted, the burning of the San Ambrosio in the port of Leith was not prevented.27 Coloma protested vociferously at the English court about the second plot in Scotland, especially when it was carried out in spite of the express royal protection granted to both ships by James in his own ports. The king gathered the Privy Council, promising to punish the culprits severely and assist the other galleon, with the help of two English warships, to leave for the Flemish port of Mardick.28 As for the cost of the military aid to the galleons, the expenses during fourteen months reached 136,344 reales (around 13,634.4 ducats). Finally, on 11 July, the two

 War and Trade 125 English royal warships and the Flemish galleon to Mardick left The Downs, after sailing from Aberdeen.29 In August 1623 Coloma informed Philip IV of the odyssey of the surviving galleon. Despite the English escort, the galleon was attacked by the Dutch and had to take refuge again in the ports of The Downs and Gravesend, from where they left with their escort on 25 August towards the port of Mardick, where it arrived without further problems.30

Dover, 1624 During the months of May–July 1624, the Spanish embassy became involved in providing military assistance to another Spanish naval squadron. Four Flemish galleons took refuge in Dover after several battles with Dutch ships: the embassy spent 8,323 reales on their aid. On 19 May, six galleons, under the command of the Portuguese fieldmaster, Don Diego Luis de Oliveira left Mardick for San Sebastián.31 One of them ran aground on the sands of the Flemish coast, and the other five ships faced and fought twenty Dutch warships. After eighteen hours of combat, one of the galleons sank, and the rest took refuge in The Downs. On 20 May, Oliveira sent Sergeant Ausias Rodríguez to inform Hinojosa and Coloma of the galleons’ difficult situation, requesting gunpowder, bullets and English protection to return to Mardick.32 The ambassadors informed the English Secretary of State, Sir Edward Conway, and they addressed a letter to James requesting his royal protection for the galleons.33 The answer from the English government was that both galleons would be given by the Dutch two tides of advantage in order to sail for Flemish ports, or English royal ships would escort them, as had happened with the Flemish galleon in Scotland. The course of events was already similar to previous cases, as the English put up obstacles and numerous difficulties for the relief of the Spanish galleons. Hinojosa wrote to Philip IV that during the sessions of the parliament, the English authorities would not risk openly assisting the ships, as James feared both the Puritans and the court faction led by the Prince of Wales and Buckingham.34 In addition, the ambassador recounted all the treacherous manoeuvres that the English royal ministers were employing to hinder the supply of the galleons: denying permission to secure the military aid, seizing the gunpowder shipments for the ships, retaining the military supplies sent from Dunkirk and warning the local English merchants against selling provisions to the Spaniards.35 As the situation of the galleons had not progressed by the end of June, the Spanish ambassadors simply tried to bribe Secretary Conway, offering him 12,000 ducats.36 Apparently, the cause of the delays in the assistance from the English government was the Prince of Wales. In spite of James’s express order, Conway delayed it until 24 June, by order of the royal heir.37 Once the order was obtained, Hinojosa prepared the departure of the galleons from England.38 However, at the beginning of July, fieldmaster Oliveira left the galleons and crossed the English Channel, along with Hinojosa, to go first to Flanders and next to Spain.39 Meanwhile, the departure of the galleons continued to be delayed.40 In Madrid, Spanish admiral Don Fadrique de Toledo had been consulted on his possible trip to The Downs to rescue the galleons, which he had opposed.41 At the

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end of July matters seemed clear: Van Male, the Flemish diplomat in England, wrote that the galleons had received the anchors sent from Dunkirk, and the arrival of the ammunition order from James was expected in hours.42 On 28 July he sent twenty-four barrels of gunpowder and lead for musket bullets to Dover, hoping that the galleons could sail after being so well equipped at the first opportunity.43 In addition, Philip IV ordered the presentation of a formal diplomatic complaint to the English ambassador in Madrid, Sir Walter Aston.44 Aston replied that peace did not force his master to assist Spanish galleons anchored at British ports, to which royal Secretary Andrés de Prada replied that, although it was true, ‘it was a matter of courtesy and good correspondence between the two crowns’.45 This was the key to the matter, whether military assistance was voluntary or compulsory: the English government demonstrated when there was occasion that they preferred to be mere spectators to the hostility between the Dutch and Spanish on British shores. A month later, the galleons’ situation was desperate, as the warships were still blockaded and the English governors of the towns around Dover had also prohibited supplying the Spaniards.46 Finally, Philip IV ordered the galleons to sail at once for Mardick or any other Spanish post. At the same time, Aston was to be warned that if the galleons were lost due to the English passivity, in Spain it would be possible to order, by means of reprisal, an embargo on English cargoes and vessels. Taking advantage of four days of stormy weather, the galleons forced their way through the Dutch blockade. On the voyage the galleons confronted the Dutch warships, and during the battle, the Spanish flagship was blown up with the Dutch one. The other three galleons arrived safely in port.47

Ships and cannons From 1604, Jacobean England became a sizeable marketplace for Spain. Unfortunately, along with the permanent problem of scarcity of raw materials, neither Spain nor its dominions produced enough cannons, ships or other manufactured goods to supply its armies and the fleets, which were spread, thought the world, in Europe, Asia, America and Africa.48 For this reason, the dominions of the Stuarts were an ideal place for these purchases, since the transport of military supplies to Spanish military and naval operations in such places as Flanders, the Rhine valley, the ‘Spanish Road’ and the north coast of Spain were easy. England produced great amounts of good quality artillery, gunpowder and ships, and was also a potential source for sailors and pilots to navigate the English Channel, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.49 The royal licence granted by James was always necessary for the exporting of artillery, weapons and powder from England. Besides this, it always depended on his good will to get the licence, even against the acts of the English parliament forbidding this kind of exports.50 Within the context of the bilateral relations between both the crowns, the acquisition of weapons, ships or artillery by the Spanish diplomats turned into an English instrument of political and diplomatic pressure on Spain (as well as the situation of the British Catholics, real ‘hostages’ of the ups and downs in the Anglo– Spanish relations since 1603).51

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English artillery Regarding the demand for English artillery, either for the Spanish fleet of the Atlantic Ocean or for the fleet of Flanders, since 1618 the Spanish ambassadors began the purchasing of artillery pieces. This was in full agreement with the Spanish political– military offensive in Europe after that year.52 Two periods can be distinguished. During the first, 1618–22, the viceroy of Portugal (Count of Salinas and Alenquer) and the governor of Porto (Diogo Lopes de Sousa, Count of Miranda) asked Gondomar to purchase 100 pieces of naval artillery (Portugal had great difficulty in meeting its artillery needs).53 The ambassador obtained a royal licence at the time of his departure from England in July 1618, although the acquisition did not take effect until two years later, when Alenquer wrote to the ambassador, who was again in London, to grant permission for another 100 artillery pieces, besides the 100 pieces already requested.54 At the end of 1620 or the beginning of 1621, the first 100 artillery pieces were sent to Lisbon, costing 14,000 ducats, which were provided by the Flemish merchant Peter Rycaut.55 In September 1620 Philip III ordered Gondomar to keep the royal licence for purchasing 100 artillery pieces as the iron artillery was in much less demand by the warships. This was due to the fact that bronze artillery was ideal for ships and naval warfare, as it is a stronger metal, is resistant to corrosion and weighs less. However, the problem was the high costs of bronze. Copper and tin were much less abundant than iron and more expensive. In addition there was much demand for copper for other purposes, such as monetary and industrial applications. The huge European demand for artillery between the middle of the sixteenth century and the mid-seventeenth century added to the shortage in Europe and the subsequent raising of prices.56 The second period corresponds to the years 1622–4. In March 1623, Olivares, Philip IV’s prime minister, had ordered Coloma to purchase forty artillery pieces of bronze and cast-iron artillery for the Spanish fleets.57 Two months later, the Spanish government of Flanders ordered another 100 pieces of artillery for the Flemish fleet.58 However, Coloma ran into James’s repeated refusals, excusing himself on the grounds of parliament’s opposition to the purchasing of weapons to Spain.59 He even proposed to pay twice the price for the royal artillery purchasing licence, but it was all in vain, since the Prince of Wales and Buckingham were opposed to any lenience granted in favour of the Spaniards.60 Finally, the Privy Council refused to sell the artillery, although the ambassadors knew that more than 400 guns had been sold to the Dutch for their fleets;61 8,000 ducats sent from the Portuguese government for English artillery were used by the Spaniards to pay three important confidants at the English court, an expense considered much more useful in terms of defending Spanish interests, as the political and diplomatic atmosphere in London had turned hostile towards them.62 The facts demonstrated, firstly, that the English artillery sent by Gondomar to Portugal was exceptional, perhaps explained by his personal influence and friendship with James, who also was very favourable to the marriage negotiations with the Spanish crown at that time. Second, the absence of Gondomar from the embassy in England and the failure of the marriage alliance of 1623 brought an inevitable worsening of

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Anglo–Spanish relations, which resulted in gestures of ill will on both sides. Third, in practice, English neutrality favoured the Dutch more than the Spanish armies in the context of the Eighty Years’ War – for instance, the purchase of 400 pieces of artillery for Holland and the refusal of 100 pieces for Portugal. Fourth, the kingdom of Portugal was militarily a problem for the defence of the Spanish empire as a whole. The need for artillery demonstrated the Portuguese inability to face the defence and maintenance of its own overseas empire from English and Dutch attacks, which then weighed increasingly heavily on Spanish shoulders.63 For example, the English artillery’s request in 1623 had been due to the lack of naval artillery for Portuguese warships to be sent to India and Ormuz (a Portuguese post in the Persian Gulf taken by English and Persians that year).64 During a meeting of the Spanish Council of State, a report from Portugal was discussed: at that time the Portuguese crown could count on only 151 pieces of artillery for armies and fleets.65

British ships for Spanish armadas The Spanish crown suffered from a chronic shortage of vessels to meet its great commercial and warlike global needs. To this problem was added the conviction of Northern European superiority in naval construction as opposed to the Peninsular, since both Dutch and English were considered the ‘lords of the Sea’.66 As a result, the Spanish ambassadors were in an excellent position to acquire ships made there for the Spanish armadas.67 In 1607 Zúñiga received an order from Philip III to supervise and assist Vicente de Anciondo, a royal officer from Flanders, who would travel to England between April and September of that year for the acquisition of twenty-two ships, with the help of a Flemish merchant, Geremías Valamens, resident in England and born in Antwerp.68 The reason for this operation was the decision of the Spanish government to purchase lighter and more manoeuvrable warships, which could fight the Dutch ships.69 The previous experiences of defeats against the Dutch and the English in the Atlantic Ocean, the English Channel and the North Sea were crucial to change the Spanish mentality regarding the types of warships more suitable for the combats at sea.70 The innovative English design of warship from the 1580s, called ‘race-built’, was a formidable opponent for the Spanish fleet of 1588 and on, a lesson to be learnt by the Spaniards.71 Admiral Don Diego Brochero’s suggestion to Philip III to build fifteen warships of not more than 200 tons, and the mediation of Sir Anthony Sherley in contract with Geremías Valamens explained the whole business. The consulta of the Spanish Council of State is dated 30 December 1606, and the contract with Valamens was signed on March 1607.72 Among the characteristics of the warships, the fundamental point was that they had to be built according to the dimensions of the English warships: four ships of 400 tons, six of 320, eight of 240, two of 200 and two cutters (pataches) of 70.73 The total weight was 5,980 tons, for which the Spanish crown would pay 220 reales per ton (131,560 ducats in total).74 In addition, the warships had to be perfectly equipped for sea navigation. With regard to artillery and gunpowder, these were paid separately. The 400-ton ships had to

 War and Trade 129 carry twenty-six pieces of artillery; those of 320 tons, twenty-four pieces; those of 240 tons, twenty pieces; those of 200 tons, twenty pieces; and the two cutters (pataches), eight pieces each. In total, 480 pieces of cast-iron English artillery, at a final price of 64,684.80 ducats, were purchased. Lastly came ammunition and weapons, out of which 1,240 ducats were just to pay for gunpowder. The total sum of the whole business was at least 197,484.80 ducats. The whole operation had to be carried out with great secrecy and caution in London by Anciondo, Valamens and the Spanish ambassador, as it was necessary to visit and report on some of the English royal ships in the River Thames.75 Other remarkable case was the purchase of a 500-ton vessel in 1622. In November, Coloma wrote to Olivares on the existence of a warship on the River Thames called El Tigre (The Tiger). Apparently it was immobilized by debts; it had thirty pieces of castiron artillery, and all its rigging could be bought for 14,000 ducats.76 Coloma insisted to Olivares and Philip IV on his plan to purchase the ship. It was an excellent vessel for the war in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean, and it could serve as a model for building other warships, since its design was superior to that of Portuguese ships sailing to the East Indies.77 The ship had been visited and examined by Coloma, Van Male, the merchant Peter Rycaut and an expert in artillery. Rycaut had offered to acquire it and equip it in two months, and to pay half the cost of the ship (the total price was about 15,000 ducats) to facilitate the acquisition. The Spanish crown had to pay 7,500 ducats initially, and later another 7,500 ducats owed to Rycaut. The ship would be chartered by Rycaut on behalf of his company, including eighty sailors, sent to Lisbon with some cargo to join the Spanish fleet of the Atlantic Ocean led by Don Fadrique de Toledo.78 In March, and again in April 1623, Philip IV insisted that the purchase of the vessel would be made in the greatest of secrecy, and it would be sent to Lisbon (arriving there at the end of May) with forty cast-iron guns, double sails, 100 sailors (with the largest number of them being gunners) and all possible supplies (tar, gunpowder, bullets, rigging, rope, lead).79 In July 1623, Hinojosa, a newcomer to London, examined the vessel and was satisfied with its purchase, although not at the price that Coloma had negotiated. Finally, by the middle of that month, the price was arranged: £2,500 (10,000 ducats). With what was left of the money (5,000 ducats), tar, bullets and gunpowder would be obtained, and sailors, gunners and two gun manufacturers would be hired for the Spanish fleet at Lisbon.80 However, there were obstacles until the end in order to send the ship fully equipped to Portugal. According to Hinojosa, in Lisbon, it was common knowledge that The Tiger was bought by Rycaut for the Spanish royal fleet. What is worse, it was some English seamen from Lisbon who brought the news to London. The merchant panicked so much that he refused the whole business because he feared the possible reprisals in England. Instead he proposed to the Spanish ambassadors to send the ship via Alicante first, and after that take a cargo to Portugal, so The Tiger could be at Lisbon by March 1624. The ambassadors were forced to accept Rycaut’s plan, as they did not want to risk the whole operation.81 Finally, the work of the Spanish diplomats regarding the rescue of the spoils of the galleons sunk off the British coasts must be emphasized. The example of what happened with the Flemish galleon San Ambrosio in Leith was an outstanding one – after its burning, the guns and other parts of the ship were rescued. Another was that of

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the galleon San Joseph, which had been lost near the Isle of Wight on the English coast in mid-October 1622.82 The galleon was sunk three miles off the coast, but its artillery and other equipment could be rescued. Coloma and Van Male had found an expert merchant who offered to rescue the spoils in exchange for taking half of everything and then reselling it to the Spanish ambassadors. The delays and other difficulties in obtaining the royal licences from the English authorities meant that rescue works did not begin until June 1623.83 Another case was the galleon of Don Diego Luis de Oliveira, which sank in The Downs in October 1624, fighting a Dutch warship in the English Channel. Despite the claims of Bruneau and Van Male, the Spanish galleon’s artillery was not returned. James put the whole matter into Buckingham’s hands in order to rescue and guard the artillery pieces in the Tower of London.84

British seamen in the service of the Spanish crown The Spanish crown was also in great need of crewmen and sailors, especially gunners, who were crucial to naval ranged combats.85 The ambassadors had the task of recruiting all kinds of naval experts for the Spanish armadas. The English had the reputation of being, along with the Dutch, the best in the world.86 In 1607, one of Philip III’s orders to Valamens, Zúñiga and Anciondo was to bring to Lisbon, with the warships, as many gunners as possible for the fleet.87 From 1621 onwards the resumption of the war against the Dutch also brought the recruitment of the British gunners to the fleet of Flanders, although it was opposed by the English authorities, who were under pressure from diplomatic complaints from the Dutch ambassador.88 In order to avoid obstacles in England, everything was undertaken with secrecy and caution, on behalf of merchants, and they were hiring as many gunners as possible for their service.89 As in the case of the galleon The Tiger, the Spaniards would try to hire around seventy or eighty gunners for Lisbon with the ship.90 However, from the autumn of 1623, the recruitment of sailors became more and more difficult in England.91 Other naval experts were also essential. Among them were masters of artillery ensembles and manufacturers. They were craftsmen making carriages and the wedge that served to put the warships’ cannons at the required angle to fire.92 There was no shortage of good artillery masters in England, so the ambassadors were also looking for them. In February 1617, Gondomar demanded two experts of this kind for the Spanish fleet.93 In October of that year, the ambassador informed Madrid that he had found two Englishmen to be sent to Lisbon: William Crader (thirty-six years old), who had a great deal of experience in the English Royal Navy and the English East India Company, and Thomas Verwood (forty-four years old), who was not as experienced as Crader.94 The first one received a salary of 400 reales (36.36 ducats) per month, while Verwood received 80 reales (7.27 ducats) a month. In June 1623 the same request would be made to Coloma for sending two experts on naval artillery. Both of them would be sent on the warship The Tiger, along with a great number of British gunners.95 As far as seafaring was concerned, England was a very important source of naval crews.96 Pilots were also essential for Spain, especially for oceanic navigation and

 War and Trade 131 through the English Channel, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, zones of strong tides and sand.97 Gondomar insisted this idea in 1616.98 The contracting of British sailors for the Spanish fleets was by two means: either recruiting the crews for the ships that were acquired in England or arrived at their coasts or directly by the ambassadors. As for the first, 22 ships were purchased in 1607, 100 sailors and gunners for the galleon The Tiger in 1623 and 46 English sailors sent by Coloma to Scotland to reinforce the greatly reduced crews of the refugee Flemish galleons.99 With regard to the direct recruitment of English seamen, it was a question of sending them to the fleet of Flanders.100 In mid-October 1622, Coloma and Van Male reported how, despite the opposition of the English authorities, they had managed to send nearly 200 English seamen – gunners and sailors – to Flanders.101 Coloma repeatedly insisted on the usefulness of English sailors, because of their expertise, for the Spanish fleets.102 British sea captains also offered their services to Spain, usually through the embassy. In the years before 1621, the peace that Spain maintained in Europe with the major powers of the North (England, France and Holland) made the embassy focus on hiring sea captains and officers for the Spanish fleets in the Mediterranean.103 English captains, previously involved in piracy or privateering during the late Elizabethan years against Spanish and Portuguese ships and cargoes, had used their skills to fight against Turks, Moors and other pirates: such were the cases of Captains Richard Tristan and Richard Gifford104. From 1621 onwards, privateering was given impetus against Dutch trade, either from the Flemish coasts or from the Cantabrian ones.105 In April of that year the Spanish Council of War proposed to Philip IV that letters of marque were granted. On 27 October, a Basque navy supplier, Martín de Valencegui, reported to the Spanish Council of War how the Dutch had started smuggling into Spain from the French ports of Bayonne, Saint-Jean-de-Luz and Bordeaux. He asked for letters of marque to fight them, which was approved on 13 November.106 The direct consequence of this approval was the first ordinance of privateering during the reign of Philip IV, dated 24 December 1621, then completed with two additions of 27 August 1623 and 12 September 1624.107 The Dutch also encouraged the privateering against Spain. In March 1622, Gondomar reported that the Dutch ambassador was distributing letters of marque in England, advising that the same should be done for Spain.108 Philip IV ordered his ambassadors to complain to James against these letters of marque, but he did not allow his diplomats to distribute them at the English court. The reason was to ensure their direct control by the Spanish crown.109 In any case, Coloma’s protests did not have much effect on the English authorities. A year and a half later, Hurtado de Mendoza announced that two English ships stationed in Dover were going to attack Spanish and Portuguese ships, cargoes and crews with permission and letters of marque granted by Maurice of Nassau, Stadtholder of the Dutch government.110 The Flemish diplomat Van Male reported that Frederick V of Palatinate, son-in-law of James and exiled in Holland, also gave his own letters of marque to English and Dutch captains.111

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In Brussels, Infanta Isabella was aware of the importance of privateering against the Dutch, so she agreed that letters of marque would be distributed in Flanders, although she feared that crewmen, sea captains and sailors of the fleet of Flanders would become privateers too.112 In support of these points of view, Hinojosa was convinced that by reinforcing and increasing the fleet of Flanders, Dutch trade and fishing industry would both be destroyed.113 The ambassador was entirely correct about English fears: in the English parliament of 1624 letters of marque were demanded to attack vessels and vassals of Flanders for the damage they were causing to the trade between England and Holland.114 There are cases of British aristocrats who offered themselves to serve in the armies of Spain: Sir Robert Gordon, a Scottish Catholic, Lord of Lochinver (in the Scottish Highlands) and Gentleman of the King’s Bedchamber.115 In November 1622 he offered the recruitment of 1,000 Scots and 500 sailors to serve Philip IV, with a 400-ton vessel and a cutter (patache). He asked for the command of the troops he raised, that their salaries be paid by the Spaniards and that they would not be expected to fight in the future against King James in any way. As guarantee of his offer, he would send his eldest son to Spain to be raised as a Catholic.116 Coloma supported the proposal, although the Spanish government did not accept it, as relations with England worsened after October 1623.117 Another Scottish Catholic aristocrat was Sir Daniel McDonnell. He offered to embark all the men necessary for the defence of the two Flemish galleons that took refuge in Leith and Aberdeen in the summer of 1622.118 Coloma had promised him that he would be given the rank of infantry captain in Flanders to serve in the Spanish armies, which the Infanta Isabella confirmed from Brussels.119 Finally, a great English aristocrat for the Spanish cause was Henry Howard, Earl of Arundel, colonel of the first English regiment recruited for the army of Flanders in 1605. In 1622, when Gondomar began to look for officers to recruit British regiments for the army of Flanders, Arundel again offered himself.120 However, his ardent bellicose enthusiasm led him to propose to a sceptical ambassador a plan to take Vlissingen, a Dutch small port, for Spain.121 The ambassador obviously thought that the project was nonsense and that Arundel’s intentions were to obtain money or presents from Philip IV rather than fight for him. The truth is that in the New Year of 1623, Coloma gave Arundel’s wife, Lady Aletheia Talbot, several silver saltpans worth 1,349 reales (122.63 ducats), for her husband’s services to Spain.

Military equipment and naval supplies During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, military Spanish power was heavily dependent on naval supplies and military equipment imported from the Baltic and Scandinavian areas: wood, hemp, cables, pitch, tar and lead.122 As for the twenty-two ships of the Flemish merchant Valamens in 1607, they were ordered to bring with them 600 quintals of lead.123 In addition, each vessel was to be fully equipped with two sets of new sails, rigging, made with Russian hemp from Lubeck, Danzig and Stettin, five cables and six anchors to dock.124

 War and Trade 133 With regard to the galleon The Tiger, it was clear that the Spaniards wanted to take advantage of its purchase in London in order to transport as many naval supplies as possible to Lisbon, as supplies were one-third cheaper there than in Portugal. The galleon had to be loaded with rigging, tar, gunpowder, cables and lead.125 Finally, the ambassadors made direct purchases of wood. In March 1623, Philip IV ordered Coloma to purchase masts and transport them to Lisbon.126 The Flemish envoy Van Male wrote a report on the business on 6 April 1623.127 First, he recognized that it was difficult to find merchant ships in England to transport the masts, so it was always necessary to use Dutch or the Hanseatic ships.128 Van Male could only see two ways: either make contract with an English merchant to buy a ship in order to transport the masts or buy the masts directly in the Port of Danzig and bring them on Hanseatic ships.129 The main problem was not purchasing the masts in England, but their transportation to Portugal.130

British piracy and sea trade The second clause of the Peace Treaty of 1604 was dedicated precisely to the matter of the piracy and robbery, forbidding officially the English privateering since 24 April 1603.131 Thus, one of the instructions constantly repeated by the Spanish kings to their ambassadors was the repression and punishment of the sea piracy against the Spanish empire.132

Fighting piracy: The first decade (1603–13) After the first month on the English throne, James made known that all hostile acts against Spanish vessels and cargoes, after 24 April 1603 (O.S.), would be considered piracy (since the English letters of marque expired with the death of Queen Elizabeth I). The cessation of hostilities between England and Spain was officially decreed on 23 June and then on 30 September.133 In addition, orders were given at the beginning of April that no English ships were authorized to go to the Spanish West Indies.134 These gestures of goodwill towards Spain represented two things: on the one hand, they showed the desire of the new king to recompose the peaceful relations with Phillip III; on the other hand, they offered Villamediana the necessary legal basis (once he set foot on England) to fight against all those James’s subjects who were considered pirates according to the new Jacobean proclamations.135 While Philip III ordered the end of the privateering activity against the English, in line with James’s proclamations, his ambassador began to work on tackling the problem of the pirates arriving at British ports and along the coast.136 Almost two months after his arrival, Ambassador Villamediana received complaints from a Spanish merchant attacked on the island of Hispaniola, whose ship, part of the crew and cargo were taken to the port of Dartmouth by pirates. This case was promptly put before Sir Julius Caesar, judge of the English Admiralty Court.137 During the same month, the

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ambassador worked on another case involving piracy, an assaulted Portuguese vessel, whose crew awaited the resolution of the case and were in great need in England.138 As for the British authorities’ attitude, the involvement of English society in privateering since Elizabethan times seemed to complicate the whole matter.139 Villamediana was very well informed that, for example, Lord Howard, High Admiral of England, was opposed to peace with Spain as he had made large profits from the war and the seizing of cargoes from Spanish vessels. Lord Howard was receiving 10 per cent of everything taken, and during some years he had earned at least 100,000 ducats in that way.140 However, the ambassador believed that his efforts in this regard would bear fruit, as they were supported by James’s favourable and conciliatory attitude, although Villamediana had no hope for the return of the Spanish cargoes taken before the death of Queen Elizabeth I.141 Villamediana succeeded, in 1604 and then on 1 March and on 8 July 1605, in having James issue three royal proclamations against piracy, with the second one expressly prohibiting any form of English cooperation with piracy and privateering in other countries, which was directed especially at the numerous Englishmen operating from Zeeland and other Dutch ports.142 In any case, since August 1604, Villamediana and his successors realized that the delays and slow progress of the lawsuits brought before the High Court of the Admiralty would be the least of the problems to be resolved for the restitution of stolen Spanish cargoes and properties. The pirates took advantage of the lack of progress by the High Court to sell the cargoes, or presented successive appeals and changes of jurisdiction (Common Law) to carry the lawsuits on endlessly.143 The problem of piracy did not end with the Peace of 1604.144 The English would not voluntarily renounce the exercise of an activity (maritime expansion overseas and trade) that brought them economic gains and national reputation.145 The difficulties of the diplomatic talks on the point of free trade with the East and West Indies are a good reflection of this point: the only acceptable solution for both sides was to leave things as they were in the diplomatic treaties of the sixteenth century, that is, not to mention them at all, ignoring the problematic issue. The Spanish authorities would have to repel all the British intruders into the Spanish and Portuguese Indies – after 1604, pirates to all intents and purposes – on whom they could lay hands. In England, the embassy would be the police officer, the sheriff. Zúñiga’s records clearly showed the effort made in this regard. Four months after his arrival, he warned the Spanish Council of State of the numerous pirates operating along the English coast, with apparent impunity, a situation that would not change much in the following years.146 In fact, an old pirate like Sir Henry Mainwaring, author of Discourse of Pirates (1618), claimed that piracy had multiplied tenfold during James’s times with respect to the Elizabethan period, although it might have been a consequence of the peace with Spain, since April 1603 Elizabethan privateers turned into Jacobean pirates.147 This explained Spanish resolve concerning control of English coasts and ports in order to condemn these robberies and assaults. At the same time, Spanish ambassadors continued to pressure James to tighten English policy against piracy with more edicts and royal proclamations.148

 War and Trade 135 The Discourse of Mainwaring, a treatise presented and dedicated to James (‘To my most Gracious Sovereign, that represents the King of Heaven, whose mercy is above all his work’) is the introduction letter into the Jacobean court of a pirate who wanted to be a royal servant, a naval expert, after getting a full pardon (‘Your Majesty’s new Creature’).149 In its five chapters, the book describes the origins of the piracy, the practices, the whereabouts (Italy, Barbary, Mediterranean sea, Ireland, Newfoundland) and how to fight them by 1618. James’s will to destroy the pirates was clear, not only for the piracy itself but also because a pirate was a kind of rebel to the legitimate power of the sovereign, an outlaw and outsider. In this regard, James and Phillip III found some common ground. If one of the pillars of the Peace of 1604 between both monarchs was precisely the promotion of the maritime trade between England and Spain, the pirates became the common enemies. Mainwaring even mentioned that the Count of Gondomar wanted to recruit him to serve Spain, idea that the captain refused as he wished only to fight for England and James. Perhaps Mainwaring was being honest about giving up a pirate life, but after a royal pardon, he would do just the same for James I than for Phillip III. Finally, Mainwaring’s Discourse shows to the readers that, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, it was a real effort from the European states to recruit pirates to turn them into a kind of merchants, naval experts or royal ministers for peaceful times without general wars (and integrate them in the legitimate society and economy, the law, the government). According to Mainwaring, he was offered full pardon, money and honours from at least King Phillip III of Spain (through the Duke of Medina Sidonia, Juan de Silva Count of Portoalegre and Count of Gondomar), the Duke of Savoy, the Duke of Florence, the Duke of Guise and the Dey of Tunis (Yusuf Dey). And he mentioned the same for other pirates (Peter Easton, Peter Peeters and John Ward). In one of the last biographies of Elizabeth I of England, she is called ‘The Pirate Queen’, with the intention of emphasizing the importance of the piracy and privateering during this reign.150 If thinking on James I Stuart, given his strong refusal for the Elizabethan captains, he may hold another nickname, perhaps ‘The Merchant King’ or ‘The Company King’. In the fight against piracy, the Spanish embassy put a large group of people with legal and commercial training to work, as well as others dedicated to surveillance and espionage. Between 1605 and 1610, apart from the number of imprisoned pirates (Wilson, Webster, captains Daniel, Lamot, Cristobal Haguer and Lemox), several ships were embargoed in different ports of England (London, Portsmouth and Weymouth) and Ireland. One remarkable case was that of Manning and Exton. Gerson Manning was a rich merchant settled in Middelburg (Holland), who invested in privateering activities with Dutch letters of marque. One of his ships, The Dragon, commanded by Captain John Exton, attacked and seized a Portuguese merchant ship loaded with sugar from Brazil. Due to problems in the distribution of the booty, eight crewmen signed a formal accusation against Manning in the Dutch port of Vlissingen, sending it to Zúñiga in exchange for a royal pardon from King James. Zúñiga spent 340 reales between May and September 1607 dealing with the case: on the investigation – an agent was sent by

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the embassy to Zeeland – getting witnesses (five people) and arresting Manning and Captain Exton.151 The principal lawyers working for the embassy were two exiles, one Catholic and one Protestant, one in Flanders and the other in England: law experts such as Dr Robert Taylor and Dr Alberico Gentili. Taylor’s salary reached 500 ducats a year, raised to 700 ducats in 1606. Gentili’s salary was 250 ducats annually.152 In addition to these two names, there were other experts such as Dr Steve Ward, Dr Richard Trevor (judge of the Admiralty), the prosecutors Ireland and Streel or the notary Pulfort.153 As experts in international trade, finances and maritime business in England, there were figures such as Italian merchants Juan Francisco Soprani, Filipo Bernardi and Filipo Burlamacchi, Robert Greet, language secretary Francis Fowler, Juan Bautista Van Male and British people such as Peter Peckwell, Roldan, John Radin and William Randall.154 These people warned about pirates, the arrival of stolen ships and cargoes to British coast and ports, and they researched all kinds of information for the Spanish ambassadors that might be of interest on the English, Irish and Dutch coasts. Finally, there were expenses related to bringing the piracy cases to the High Court of the Admiralty, the examination of the case, the seizure of vessels and cargoes, the detention and imprisonment of the suspects and payment of witnesses for the accusations. This section includes payments to court judges (Sir Julius Caesar, Richard Trevor), secretaries, notaries and sheriffs. There are also the payments of the fees for the imprisonment of the suspects in the Gatehouse Prison in London and money destined for the witnesses.155 The action of the justice for pirates arriving at British ports faced many problems, although the Treaty of 1604 gave all the legal and diplomatic responsibility to the Spanish embassy. To avoid prosecution, the pirates took their booty to lesser-known English and Irish ports, but even so the men of the embassy managed to trace them.156 However, disputes arose when the vessels and cargoes stolen were bought by English individuals, thereby becoming lawful property, when the assaults were justified as retaliation for some other property embargoed in Spain or when the pirates were Dutch, a country at war with Spain, which did not even recognize its sovereignty (the Dutch considered themselves privateers, not pirates).157 This booty was taken to neutral British ports, so that legal dispute in the courts by the Spanish embassy as well as by the Dutch diplomat Noel de Caron was ensured. Several Zealand ports, such as Vlissingen, Brill, Ramecken, Middleburgh, Schiedam or Rotterdam, became a refuge for English privateers.158 In addition, to complicate the situation even more, the privateers’ ship was often Dutch, but with English crewmen, the sea captains were English but acting with Dutch letters of marque, or they came from ports of Barbary (e.g. Algiers, Tunisia, Salé, Maamora), Saboy (e.g. Nice, Villefranche-sur-mer), France (e.g. Le Havre, La Rochelle, Saint-Malo, Dieppe) or even Denmark.159 The book written by Alberico Gentili, Hispanicae Advocationis libri duo (1613), presented the legal disputes in the Admiralty High Court cases brought by the embassy,​​ focusing its attention on the problem of English neutrality in the war between Spain and the Netherlands.160 This led to legal approaches of the cases that exceeded that of simple piracy (cases of private individuals’ property) or turning into public law (a legal dispute of international law between two states at war).

 War and Trade 137 Regarding the booty taken by the Dutch privateers, in March 1605 the Venetian ambassador Nicolo Molin referred to the case of a Portuguese vessel taken by a ship with Dutch captain and English crew at The Downs.161 Despite Villamediana’s protests, the captain was acquitted and the English crewmen fled before the trial began. The judges of the Admiralty High Court finally decided that the value of the cargo should not be paid because James was not obliged to return cargoes unless they had been loaded in ports of his domains.162 In January 1606 a similar case was presented involving a Portuguese merchant ship loaded with sugar and coming from Brazil.163 Zúñiga had at first obtained an embargo on the cargo, but the Dutch ambassador Noel Caron reclaimed it as lawful booty taken by the Dutch, at war with Spain, retrieving it from the English authorities. As for the cargoes seized by the English settled in Barbary or by French pirates, two cases can be cited as exemplars.164 In December 1610 a French vessel arrived at the English coast with a Portuguese ship as booty, coming from Brazil, loaded with sugar and leather.165 Don Alonso de Velasco demanded the cargo be seized by the English authorities, and the French ambassador De la Boderie replied that, according to the 1598 Treaty of Vervins, the French sailed to the Indies at their own risk.166 Three months later, the judges of the Admiralty High Court ruled against Velasco in the case of Englishmen who brought a cargo of sugar from Brazil to England. The ambassador assured the court that it was stolen and that the English had brought it from the port of Algiers.167 As his predecessors at the embassy, Velasco made repeated complaints about the High Court Admiralty resolutions.168 Be that as it may, the complaints continued. In January 1612 the ambassador told James that the seas were full of English pirates, his vassals continued to sail to the East Indies and his royal ministers were accomplices and associates in the piracy business.169 The protests of the Spanish ambassadors were simply an expression of their impotence to stop the English maritime expansion, based on a community of interests and profits woven between seamen, merchants, aristocrats and the royal family.170 As a disclaimer, Velasco wrote two documents in July 1612: one addressed to the English Privy Council and another to Philip III. In the document to his master, Velasco explained that since his arrival to England, he had not obtained a favourable court ruling on any of the lawsuits brought before the Admiralty judges, and all in spite of his efforts before the English authorities.171 The other document was a kind of catalogue of grievances.172 Velasco detailed six lawsuits in which he had not obtained any kind of justice, either because the opposing side had appealed or because the cases had to be reconsidered before civil jurisdiction (after a favourable ruling by the Admiralty judges) or by other legal disputes (right of retaliation). Of these six cases, four had delays between two and eight years, and at least in one of them the cargo was divided between the merchants (or privateers/pirates) and the Admiral of England (Lord Howard). The last of them was the summary of the Londoner merchant John Davis, who had taken a Portuguese merchant vessel loaded with sugar and other things, justifying his action as right of reprisal for certain embargoes made on his properties at the Port of Motril (Andalusia) by the Spanish authorities there.173 The first decade of the peace between England and Spain generated, above all, great legal disputes at the English courts on the question of piracy. The complaints of

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the ambassadors (Villamediana, Zúñiga and Velasco) showed that the restitution of the captured ships and cargoes was not easy at all. Corruption of justice, complicity between judges and merchants (or privateers/pirates), successive appeals and legal tricks or the foreign origin of the accused (French, Dutch) complicated the whole process, perpetuating court lawsuits for almost a decade. Moreover, there was always the additional difficulty of the legal problems that English merchants suffered in Spain, which influenced the attitude of the English authorities towards the cases presented by the embassy in London.174

Gondomar’s ambassadorship (1613–22) Gondomar immediately grasped the complexity of the problem of piracy. At the beginning of September 1613 he wrote to the English ambassador Sir John Digby that he did not see any cause for complaint about his master, King James, but he was worried about what he had discovered about the restitution of stolen cargoes taken by pirates to their rightful owners (Spanish and Portuguese subjects).175 In a letter to Philip III at the same time, Gondomar pointed out that English justice administration was full of corrupt judges and royal ministers, including Lord Howard, and they did not fight against English piracy with any enthusiasm or diligence.176 The ambassador wrote repeatedly to Spain explaining the great effort he was making in the repression of piracy in England.177 He related the unacceptable contempt of the English authorities to the popular opinion in England of the Spanish cowardice. To him, the English disinterest on this point – the repression of piracy – had been due to the lack of resolve of his predecessors at the English court. Thanks to the change that he had imposed in the direction of the diplomatic business, the English government was beginning to hang pirates and return stolen shipments and properties to Spanish and Portuguese merchants.178 In Spain, the crown was satisfied with Gondomar’s efforts.179 The most famous case during Gondomar’s age was that of Sir Walter Raleigh’s trip to Guiana in 1618. It was the culmination of the ambassador’s five years of hard work.180 Raleigh’s execution brought together several factors at the English court – King James’s personal guarantee to Gondomar, Raleigh’s own political trajectory, condemned by conspiracy in 1603, the publicity given to the expedition to Guiana and the knowledge acquired in Spain of such a trip. The truth is that for the ambassador, it was one of his greatest political triumphs.181 To the English government (and to King James), it was the perfect case to exemplify the theoretical goodwill with which they had always treated Spain affairs in England, something that Spaniards knew not to be true.182

British merchants and reprisals Gondomar was involved in matters such as the robbery of certain English merchants on Spanish goods and merchant ships.183 These attacks were justified by appealing to the legitimate right of reprisal for economic damages caused by the Spanish authorities against English merchants’ rightful property. The Spanish crown’s debts to English merchants were one reason for these reprisals, which especially involved English textile products for Spanish armies.184

 War and Trade 139 These activities complicated the Spanish embassy’s fight against the piracy, as they merged together all these decisions of Spanish bureaucracy, which was no less corrupt than the English.185 In addition, there was an obvious danger, already exposed by Velasco; if the practice of the reprisals by English merchants was generalized with the acquiescence of the English government, it would make the repression of piracy much more difficult than it already was for Spanish diplomacy at the English court.

Irish, French, Danish and British piracy One of the consequences of the Spanish control over the illicit activities of English ships was the diversion of cargoes and assaulted ships into Irish and French ports, away from Spanish knowledge and involvement at the English court.186 In September 1613, Gondomar received a warning about the return of a sea captain named Samuel Castleton, of the East India Company. He had left in 1611 on a ship called The Pearl, heading towards those territories, and had captured a Portuguese vessel with a cargo of spices, whose value was around 600,000 ducats.187 Castleton had turned towards the Irish coast, to the port of Berehaven, but the ship had sunk off that port. Although the cargo was saved, it would later be claimed by the ambassador.188 The Privy Council ordered that cargo to be collected in warehouses so that Gondomar could discover its weight and inventory. To do this he employed Filipo Bernardi, a merchant who had been in charge of these tasks since Villamediana’s times.189 However, the truth is that the whole business became complicated, as the cargo was very valuable and the East India Company claimed the property.190 Another case was that of Captain Thomas Harte, who was accused by an English merchant called McNyne of the robbery of a Spanish merchant ship.191 The cargo, consisting of twenty-five boxes of sugar, iron of Biscay, gold and silver, was taken to the port of Foy (in Londonderry, Ireland), where it was distributed among the pirate crew. Having received the information from McNyne, the ambassador’s intention was to obtain an order from the High Admiralty to arrest Captain Harte and interrogate him. The case of Captain William Parker of Plymouth was also paradigmatic.192 In 1612 he was mentioned in a letter from Velasco, accusing him of capturing a Portuguese ship from Angola with slaves, a cargo valued at 14,000 ducats.193 In October 1614, at the behest of Gondomar, Lord Howard conducted a series of inquiries into the arrival of stolen Portuguese sugar shipments to Irish ports: Parker is mentioned again.194 Captain Tucker was another pirate arrested to be brought before English justice because of the Spanish allegations.195 Tucker had allegedly attacked the New Spain fleet in 1614, and after the ambassador was informed he alerted the authorities of England, Scotland and Ireland. Indeed, the pirate ship arrived in Ireland, where Tucker and his crew were arrested and the cargo embargoed.196 Locked up in the Gatehouse prison, they confessed that before going to Ireland, they had gone to Denmark to take refuge, but they had been recognized there. The truth is that, in this case, Gondomar obtained the restitution of the merchant ship and the little that remained of the stolen cargo, most of which had been illegally sold by the pirates and the payment of the king’s and the Admiralty’s fees.

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As for French pirates, in 1613 Gondomar had reported the capture of a Spanish ship in the Caribbean.197 The 200-ton merchant ship, carrying a cargo of 200,000 ducats, was captured by two French pirate ships and taken to Port of Le Havre, where its governor considered it good prey, having been captured beyond the equinoctial line, in accordance with the 1598 Treaty of Vervins. Regarding French piracy as a whole, in February 1615 Gondomar sent a clarification report to Philip III.198 As reported by a captain named Simon Saneado, the value of the property and cargoes stolen to Spanish vassals since the peace with France of 1598 had been about 6 million ducats. Moreover, the French ambassador encouraged the governors of the French Atlantic ports to issue letters of marque to attack Spanish ships beyond the equinoctial line.199 These occurrences would happen again in the summer of that year, as Gondomar confirmed that many English privateers were settling in French ports to carry on their plundering with the backing of letters of marque provided by the admiral of France and other governors (for instance, those of Dieppe, Le Havre, Saint-Malo and La Rochelle).200

Other pirates’ cases In June 1614, Gondomar asked Lord Howard to seize the ship Little John of Sandwich, belonging to a Portsmouth captain, who had arrived in London with a cargo of black slaves.201 It was suspected that the cargo had been stolen from a Portuguese vessel belonging to a pair of merchants, Joao Barbosa de Acuña and Gonzalo Montero.202 In February 1615, Gondomar warned Philip III of the arrival of a ship from Barbary, bringing to Holland the ambassador of King Muley Cidan of Morocco, the Jew Samuel Pallache.203 The ship arrived at the port of Plymouth with two captured ships and cargoes of sugar. Pallache’s diplomatic status and immunity, the Dutch political and diplomatic support from the Prince of Orange and the bribery to some English ministers for the distribution of the cargo made the Spanish efforts to prosecute Pallache before the Admiralty useless.204 According to Gondomar himself, twenty boxes of sugar had been left for Admiral Lord Howard as a sign of appreciation. Finally, James consulted Gondomar about the pardon and amnesty of a pirate captain Sir Henry Mainwaring (author of Discourse mentioned above). He had been away from England for years, acting from the Berber port of Maamora and attacking fishing vessels in Newfoundland.205 The fact is that the ambassador wrote to Philip III about his ignorance of this pirate, although his case is a good example of the presence of English pirates in Barbary. By way of conclusion, Gondomar’s diplomatic orders were no different from those of his predecessors with regard to the fight against piracy, nor did he have to face circumstances other than those faced by Villamediana, Zúñiga or Velasco. The slow progress of lawsuits in the Admiralty and civil courts, the corruption of English royal ministers and judges and the ability of pirates themselves to evade justice were nothing new, to his knowledge. However, he recognized that it was only in England that piracy was punished by the government and some of the cargoes and merchant ships captured returned to their rightful owners.206

 War and Trade 141 The pressure created by the Spanish surveillance caused British pirates to head for less well-known ports in England or Ireland, taking refuge in the ports of Holland, France, Savoy, Tuscany, Barbary and even Denmark (and all this was well known by Gondomar). In this sense, other European states benefited and profited from the actions and maritime experience of all those captains and sailors who had been trained during the times of Elizabethan privateering.207

Besieged on three sides Everything began in the same year. Around 1618, the debates began at the Spanish government regarding the Twelve Years’ Truce with the Dutch. By 1618 Don Baltasar de Zúñiga arrived to Madrid to become the most prominent member of the Spanish Council of State, pushing for a very powerful foreign policy towards Europe. In 1618 the Spanish crown began to take into a serious consideration the project of rebuilding the fleet of Flanders in order to challenge the Dutch dominion over the North and Baltic seas.208 In 1618 the Thirty Years’ War broke out in Germany. Four years later the Spanish power in Europe had been increased considerably. In 1622 Phillip IV was at war against the Dutch, with the full support of his Prime Minister Don Baltasar de Zúñiga and his nephew, Count-Duke of Olivares. By 1622, Spanish troops had occupied the Lower Palatinate and defeated the Bohemian Protestant rebels at the Battle of White Mountain (1620). Around 1622, Gondomar left for Spain after his second embassy to James (as he was ill and he wanted to stay at the Spanish court when the Prince of Wales would finally arrive). Finally, Don Carlos Coloma was appointed by Don Baltasar the new ambassador in England.209 The choice was very skilful. Coloma was an excellent and veteran soldier for thirty years in Flanders. He was the author of several treatises on politics and war.210 Spain needed a soldier at the embassy in London with the renewal of the war against the Dutch: a military working from the English side of the Channel with experience to recruit British soldiers for the Spanish armies and good seamen, artillery and military and naval supplies for the fleets.211 Since the years 1621–2, the Netherlands were under siege on three sides: from the Rhine–Palatinate area, from Flanders and from England. This plan worked until 1625, and after that since 1630 again.

Fighting the East India Company Regarding the English East India Company, Coloma considered it plainly and simply ‘a company of thieves in merchants clothing’.212 He always remained attentive to the arrival of ships from the East Indies in search of stolen cargoes and vessels. In July 1622 he reported the arrival in London the previous month of two large, heavily loaded English ships.213 Coloma began to investigate with the help of the Earl of Arundel who obtained from the scribe of one of the vessels a report of the trip to India, soon sent to Phillip IV. In order to delay and obstruct their investigations, the sea captains had tried to disperse the crew so they could not be questioned by the authorities. In order to justify

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their robberies on Portuguese ships, the company had argued that, according to the chapters of the peace treaty of 1604, they could make war on Portuguese and Spanish ships and subjects beyond the equinoctial line.214 This reason, as Coloma pointed out, not only conflicted with the peace treaty of 1604 and an English royal proclamation of 1605 but was also written only in the diplomatic treaties with France (Vervins, 1598) and the Dutch Republic (Twelve Years’ Truce, 1609).215 The English company’s justification was that their navigations were not to territories possessed by the Portuguese in the East Indies, which was false since they not only frequented the same places but also shared the same maritime routes and attacked every Portuguese vessel they found on their way. The key point was that the peace treaties of Spain with France, England and the Dutch Republic during the decade 1598–1609 had begun de facto a global economic war overseas by avoiding the question of the Portuguese and Spanish monopoly of the East and West Indies as an intractable issue for the diplomacy. As for these two English ships, Coloma denounced the constant robberies that his vassals committed in the East Indies.216 James offered to bring about justice by appointing a special commission of judges, although he warned the ambassador of the difficulties involved, as many people in England acquired substantial profits from such overseas trade with the East Indies. There were six appointed judges to examine these robberies: Buckingham, Lionel Cranfield (the Lord High Treasurer), Henry Howard (Earl of Arundel), Secretary of State George Calvert, Sir Julius Caesar and Oliver St John (Viscount of Grandison).217 As a lawyer for the case from the Spanish side Coloma employed Van Male.218 However, Coloma reported that in the summer of 1622, two vessels of the English company, at 600 and 400 tons, were being prepared for the East Indies, whose financial beneficiaries included the Prince of Wales, Buckingham and very many of the king’s councillors.219 The suppression of the English overseas trade with the East Indies sat very badly with the investments that the Stuarts and the English aristocracy were constantly making for their development and expansion. Six months after the appointment of the judges for the robberies in the East Indies, nothing had been examined, to Coloma’s despair.220

Against Dutch privateering As for the Dutch privateers, in the spring of 1622, forced by a storm at sea, a Portuguese vessel captured by the Dutch had to take refuge in the English port of Ilfracombe.221 It was seized by the English authorities; Coloma sent the Genoese merchant Filipo Bernardi to inventory and value the stolen Portuguese cargo.222 The 160-ton vessel had travelled from Brazil to Lisbon, carrying 450 boxes of sugar, 300 quintals of Pernambuco wood, 200 elephant teeth and Spanish silver. However, more than half of the cargo had been taken to Holland. The value of all that remained was 7,000 ducats. During the lawsuit held in the court of the English Admiralty, the Dutch ambassador Noel Caron claimed that as there was war between Spain and the Dutch Republic, the

 War and Trade 143 Portuguese vessel should be considered a lawful capture.223 The lawyer for the Spanish embassy, on the contrary, told the English judges that, ​​ being Dutch rebels to their rightful king, Phillip IV, this rebellion could not be called a ‘fair war’. The court decided that the cargo was to be returned to the Spaniards, as England was country friendly to Spain and its king, although Coloma made Philip IV aware of the bad intentions of the English court.224

La Rochelle Rochalais privateers were another problem for navigation in the English Channel. Since the middle of the sixteenth century La Rochelle had become an important port for corsairs because of its strategic position for European and Atlantic maritime trade. In addition, being the capital of French Protestantism it offered sufficient religious and ideological support. With the autonomy obtained by the 1598 Edict of Nantes, it was transformed into a position similar to that of the Berber ports in the Maghreb (Islamic privateering) or the Flemish ports along the English Channel (Catholic privateering).225 From 1610, the Huguenot leaders of La Rochelle led the Protestant rebellions against the French crown, until its fall in October 1628.226 Hence the Huguenot problem also appeared on the horizon of the Spanish embassy. On one occasion, the Spanish courier Ribas de Ribalta was assaulted, kidnapped and taken to La Rochelle.227 On another occasion, the Spanish embassy aided the numerous crewmen arriving at the British coasts and ports robbed and deprived by Huguenots from La Rochelle.228 An important case occurred in the autumn of 1622. A vessel carrying rich goods and silver bars belonging to Flemish businessmen was attacked in the English Channel and taken to the port of Plymouth to shelter from storms.229 Aware of this, Coloma obtained from the Privy Council an embargo on the ship and its cargo, valued at 400,000 ducats. Nevertheless, although the vessel was guarded by two English warships, the ambassador was informed that large quantities of silver had been taken from it, and that finally the Huguenots had left Plymouth after bribing the two English captains, both of whom received 40,000 ducats.230 After the flight of the Huguenots, Coloma tried to have the English captains arrested, but in vain, since on their return from La Rochelle they did not go to the English court to explain their conduct and no one bothered to pursue them.231 Having returned to England in December 1622, by mid-March 1623 nothing had been done about this case, and Buckingham’s absence – he was in Madrid – was the perfect excuse for it.232 In addition, Coloma found out that this ship had taken 30,000 ducats in smuggled silver from Spain to the Port of Hamburg and the money entered in Holland through this maritime route.233

Hormuz The taking of Hormuz was another milestone in the struggle without quarter that English and Portuguese had carried out in the East Indies since the beginning of the

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seventeenth century. Hormuz was a Portuguese post guarding the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Conquered in 1507 by Alfonso de Albuquerque, it was one of the crucial commercial places of Portuguese trade along the route to India and China, not only because it was a strategic location but also because Hormuz dominated the Persian Gulf and the silk and horse trade. Therefore, it was called ‘the precious stone of the Portuguese ring of India’.234 England was interested in Persia, as demonstrated by the trips of the brothers Anthony and Robert Sherley (1598–1617) or William Baffin for the English East India Company (1617–9).235 Since at least 1617 the Spanish government had ordered Gondomar to secretly obstruct the establishment of trade between England and Persia.236 A report on the voyage of two English ships during the years 1620–2 showed that they had gone to the area of the Persian Gulf and engaged in two naval combats with the squadron of Ruy Freire de Andrade.237 Moreover, in August 1622 Coloma informed Philip IV of the English intention of founding a commercial factory at Cape Jasque, twenty leagues from Hormuz.238 Inevitably, the English presence in that sensitive area could only pose a threat to Portuguese interests.239 In November 1622 Coloma wrote to Madrid repeating the numerous rumours circulating in London about the conquest of Hormuz by Englishmen and Persians.240 The following month the rumour had reached Madrid, where the English ambassador Sir John Digby tried to excuse the English attack, promising that the guilty would be punished just as Sir Walter Raleigh had been in 1618.241 The conquest of Hormuz was to the Spanish ambassador, as it was to other Spanish royal ministers, one more case of English disloyalty.242 In Madrid, Gondomar was responsible for dealing with the Prince of Wales and Buckingham, as a result of which a report was drafted that simply expressed their intention to do everything possible to assist in the restitution of the goods, weapons and ships taken from Hormuz.243 On 31 July 1623, Coloma and Hinojosa received news of the arrival in London of the plunder from Hormuz.244 In particular, a 1,000-ton ship called London carried a cargo valued at £500,000 (around 2 million ducats). Both ambassadors went immediately to see James to demand the embargo of the vessel in order to examine what should be returned to Phillip IV.245 They were told to present their detailed accusations to the Secretary of State, George Calvert.246 As a result, the ambassadors drew up a list of specific accusations against the East India Company.247 In addition to the booty of Hormuz (gold, jewels, precious stones, crockery, cloths and pearls), two Portuguese merchant ships, El Salvador and Todos los Santos, and many Portuguese prisoners had been taken. The practical results of so much Spanish effort were scant, as could be expected from previous experiences. Coloma and Hinojosa despaired at the evident complicity of the English crown with the East India Company, which had led the assault on Hormuz, and the delays in the investigation of the case, intended simply to let it languish. In April 1624 they reported that the East India Company had paid 80,000 ducats to James and Buckingham for their share of the booty of Hormuz and India.248

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Free trade between Spain and Jacobean England English power at sea In England, particularly after the armada of 1588, there was a genuine paranoia in the face of any rumour about Spanish fleets, as they were seen as a potential threat and danger of invasion. There was a sense of mutual mistrust between both kingdoms, based on the Spanish fleets of 1588, 1596, 1597 and 1601 and the English attacks against Lisbon, Galicia or Cadiz, besides the ones against America. In fact, chapter 10 of the 1604 peace treaty was specifically written to manage and control warships and galleons arriving at the ports and coasts of both kingdoms.249 Their numbers were expressly limited to a maximum of six or eight warships and always with the notice and licence of the respective kings. On the Spanish side, the embassy was always attentive to the movements of the English fleet, the meeting of naval squadrons, their objectives and their status. In this sense, it is no coincidence that during the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the two admirals of England, Lord Howard and Buckingham, as well as Admiral Sir William Monson and Vice Admiral Sir Robert Mansfell received pensions and other remarkable presents from the Spaniards. In addition, reports on English naval officers were welcome in Madrid at any time: in 1622 Gondomar succeeded in stripping Henry de Vere, Earl of Oxford, of his post as general of the English Channel fleet, as he was a well-known anti-Spanish figure and a political foe of Buckingham, the royal favourite.250 In March 1618 Gondomar reported on Venetian efforts to purchase warships and ammunition and recruit crewmen and soldiers for their fleets and trade.251 A complete list of vessels, tonnage and the number of soldiers and sailors was sent to Madrid. At the same time, he reported on what he had done to try and prevent it, albeit without much success. Despite the alleged peaceful intentions of the Venetians, this military movement could not be explained without the aggressive policy carried out by the Duke of Osuna in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic at that time (Osuna was the aggressive Spanish viceroy of Sicily and Naples).252 James used to review the royal fleet at the Port of Rochester. In July 1622, Coloma reported on one of these royal visits: there were thirty warships.253 On 9 April 1624, Buckingham was the one to review the fleet, and the same day Coloma sent a complete list of the names, tonnage, crewmen, soldiers and artillery pieces of each of the forty vessels.254 On other occasions, ambassadors reported sudden preparations of naval squadrons, trying to discover their purposes and intentions.255 Between and 1623 and 1625, the notices sent to Madrid multiplied. On the one hand, the prince’s journey in 1623 caused several royal naval squadrons to go to Spain. On the other hand, from the autumn of 1623, the fleets organized in England became a potential threat for the Spanish government. Between February and the summer of 1623, Coloma warned every month of the preparations of suspicious English warships.256 In March, four galleons with the jewels and household of the Prince of Wales would leave for Galicia, while in September

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a royal fleet would leave to pick up Prince Charles, Buckingham and their English entourage to the port of Santander. The news sent since the end of 1623 by Coloma already had a more worrying look, since now the English fleets were getting ready to attack Spanish coasts and ports. In December 1623, Hinojosa reported to Madrid that Vice Admiral Mansell had been ordered to gather seamen and expert naval officers on the Spanish islands and coasts in case war was declared.257 Two months later, the news was that the English were about to send a fleet to burn the Spanish armadas in the Iberian ports.258 In April 1624, the Flemish envoy Van Male sent to Cardinal de la Cueva in Brussels a complete list of the names, crewmen, and tonnage of the twelve galleons that Buckingham was gathering.259 In August Van Male communicated some English plans for the preparation of a fleet of 100 warships.260 The following month, Coloma reported on a fleet of twenty-two warships preparing by order of James in case of an attack by a Spanish fleet.261 In addition, the ambassadors conveyed exactly the threats that were being made during the sessions of the English parliament, many of which concerned joining with the Dutch fleet and attacking Spain, Flanders or seizing the Spanish treasures from America by attacking Azores or Canary Islands.262 Just in case, they thought useful to present plans that would end the English threats: burning all the English warships stationed in the Port of Rochester by a rapid attack of the Flemish frigates. The year 1625 was marked by the preparations of a huge English fleet at Plymouth that would attack Cadiz. Bruneau kept an eye on English naval preparations from the Spanish embassy.263 At the end of January, he reported that the attacking English fleet consisted of eighty-three vessels – twelve royal ships, twenty warships and the rest merchant ships.264 Bruneau sent a spy to Plymouth who sent information on the fleet for forty-two days. The work of the Spanish embassy was essential not only to assist the defensive preparations on Iberian coasts and at ports in Spain and Portugal but also to make the political and military strategy of caution and defence against England.

Trade with the Spanish Low Countries During the negotiations with the English crown, two economic questions were raised regarding relations between Flanders and England: the application of the so-called ‘Gauna royal decree of 30 per cent’ and free trade between both territories, taking into consideration the war between Spain and the Dutch Republic. Juan de Gauna’s decree was a failed Spanish attempt at economic integration of the territories under Spanish sovereignty in Europe, as well as a tool of economic war against the Dutch. It was a 30 per cent tax on the value of the goods and a bond provided by the merchants to ensure that cargoes did not pass through Holland or be transported by Dutch merchant ships to Spanish domains.265 Approved by Philip III on 27 February 1603, it obviously affected English goods imported by Spain and inevitably would be a point to discuss during peace negotiations.266 The consequences of the plan were disastrous for the economy of Flanders. Not only were Flemish exports

 War and Trade 147 hurt by the decree, and other countries apply similar surcharges to Spanish goods (France), but the Dutch commercial monopoly was also actually favoured by the 30 per cent surcharge for the consequent shortage of goods in Spain, as Dutch contraband flourished with the decree.267 The decree was used as a negotiating tool, becoming one of the key points to offer to the English in order to win their goodwill at the negotiating table. On 8 December 1603, an order was sent to Commissar Alonso Curiel, inspector at the Andalusian ports of Sanlúcar de Barrameda and Ayamonte, to allow certain English goods to pass by paying only ordinary taxes, although they were liable to Gauna’s decree.268 This gesture of goodwill would not be understandable without the protests that were presented to Villamediana regarding the prejudice towards English commerce.269 The question was very important, as free trade with the European dominions of Spain was offered as the main bait for the English. Gauna’s decree affected this essential point. However, even in this case, the Spanish wanted to take advantage: in exchange for the royal decree, they demanded that the English break the Dutch blockade of the Flemish ports so Spanish Low Countries could enjoy free trade with England.270 Be that as it may, the Peace of 1604 certified the end of the Gauna decree regarding English importations, without concessions on free trade to Flanders from James. In Andalusia, Commissar Alonso de Curiel was informed on 12 October about the commercial consequences of the peace with England.271 On the same day, in Paris, Ambassador Don Baltasar de Zúñiga and Senator Rovida concluded a commercial agreement abolishing Gauna’s decree regarding French goods in Spain.272 As for the re-establishment of free trade between England and Flanders, it became a permanent Spanish diplomatic vindication. Nicolás Scorza, Archduke Albert’s envoy, and Villamediana devoted themselves to it with zeal, but without success.273 On the other hand, Noel de Caron, the Dutch ambassador, tried his best to sabotage these Spanish efforts, telling James that free trade between England with Flanders would be the ruin of the Dutch economy and therefore enable Spanish economic and political hegemony in the north of Europe and the English Channel.274 The Dutch used more forceful means to maintain the maritime blockade of the English Channel. Their ships, which constantly patrolled the English Channel, forced British ships to return to their ports at cannon point, or simply by seizing merchant vessels and cargoes.275 Maritime communication between England and the Spanish Low Countries was thus cut off for goods as well as soldiers. In the face of this Dutch fait accompli, there was only an appeal to King James by the Spanish ambassadors. As for the English merchant ships, James could not be well disposed towards what was nothing more than an example of the hegemonic Dutch naval power in waters claimed under his sovereignty. However, he would do nothing beyond asking for the end of the maritime blockade – just utter fine words.276 With the resumption of war between Spain and Holland in 1621, both the Dutch blockade of the English Channel and the Spanish protests returned to the attention of the English court.277 However, because of the Anglo–Spanish political activity at that time (the Spanish Match negotiations), James promised effective actions to break the Dutch blockade. Gondomar wrote thus in November 1621, although the

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English promises were never fulfilled.278 He complained to Buckingham about the Dutch blockade and English idleness, and the English excuses were accumulating, to Gondomar’s despair.279 In April 1622 the general of the fleet of the English Channel, Francis de Vere, Earl of Oxford, was dismissed, on grounds of alleged neglect of his military duties.280 At the end of May, during his first public audience, James assured Coloma that by agreeing the marriage alliance with Spain, all pending political issues would be settled at the pleasure of Philip IV.281 During the whole of 1623, Buckingham’s absence from the English court provided the perfect excuse for the English political promises regarding Spanish demands not to materialize, all being a set of demands and counterclaims.282 Spain would have to manage alone with regard to the Dutch problem after 1621. The fleet of Flanders constantly attacked the Dutch trade by breaking the blockade. During the summer of 1622 a Spanish naval squadron was ordered to leave for the English Channel, a demonstration of maritime power to intercept and sink Dutch ships.283 Sighted from the coasts of Cornwall in October, the squadron provoked yet another episode of collective anti-Spanish hysteria in England, although the truth is that it would only engage in combat with four Dutch warships.

Flemish merchants and privateers Spanish diplomacy in England also dealt with all kinds of business related to Flanders, acting in coordination with the different Flemish diplomats (Nicolás Scorza, Fernando de Boyschott and Juan Bautista Van Male). In 1614 Philip III ordered Gondomar to discover the reasons for the increase in the taxes paid for all goods entering and leaving England.284 Three years later, through Gondomar’s mediation, the merchants of Dunkirk made a formal request to the English Privy Council.285 They asked for an end to certain trade restrictions on the export of French wines and sugars to London.286 Also during that year, the ambassador was asked for information on an English decree ordering shipping to or from England exclusively on English merchant vessels.287 During Gondomar’s absence from the embassy (between 1618 and 1620), the secretary Sánchez de Ulloa, Father Diego de la Fuente and Van Male remained attentive to any new occurrences: in the fall of 1618 they reported to Madrid a general embargo carried out for two weeks at English ports, of which they informed the Flemish merchant community.288 In February 1622, the Infanta Isabella asked Gondomar to pay attention to the voyage of four Flemish merchant ships carrying silver and goods from Sanlúcar de Barrameda (Andalusia) to Calais.289 At the end of July, these ships arrived at the English coast.290 Due to the Dutch blockade of the English Channel, they had taken refuge along the English coasts, and the local authorities had ordered the seizure of their cargoes – Spanish silver – in order to mint English money, paying the merchants in bills of exchange in return. Coloma was in charge of procuring the revocation of the embargo, since the silver was to pay the Spanish army of Flanders.291 The ambassadors also intervened in cases related to the Flemish privateers. In October 1622 Coloma was in charge of presenting to the Infanta Isabella the case of

 War and Trade 149 the Scottish merchant, James Murray, whose ship had been attacked in the waters of the English Channel by a Flemish privateer captain named Witibol.292 Murray came from Portugal, and this privateer from Dunkirk captured from him 700 reales and clothing valued at 900 reales.293 The Flemish government ordered that Murray’s seized property be returned. In 1625 Bruneau sought the liberation of the Flemish galleon Santa Clara and its crew, detained in the summer of 1625 when they took refuge in Dover.294 At that time, Flemish privateers were attacking many English merchant ships carrying Dutch goods, supplies, weapons and recruits for the Dutch armies.295

English manufacturing With regard to the promotion of industry and manufacturing in Spain and Flanders, the case of the English proposal to move a textile company settled in Middelburg to Antwerp was remarkable.296 The project circulated between London, Madrid and Brussels for almost ten years, to be finally discarded for political and religious reasons. It offers a perfect example of how the weight of religious and political factors could end up ruining the economic development of a territory.297 In the autumn of 1616 the English merchant Thomas Alberi proposed to the archdukes, through Gondomar’s intermediation, the move of an English trading and textile company from Middelburg to Antwerp.298 The offer was indeed made by James, on account of the Anglo–Dutch rivalry in the cloth trade (Spain imported a lot of textile goods from England and Holland).299 In Brussels, the English ambassador had made the same proposal to the archdukes.300 Although the project had been welcome, the problem arose because of the English demand for free exercise of religion. The return of Gondomar to Spain in 1618 reactivated the project in London and Brussels. The ambassador and Ambrogio Spinola approved the proposal for the textile company, asserting that the English religious demands were no greater than those accorded to English merchants in Flanders, Spain and Portugal.301 In March 1619, Philip III and the Spanish Council of State decided to accept the plan to move the English company to Flanders.302 During 1622 Coloma continued to insist on the project.303 In Spain, Gondomar was ordered in February 1623 to resume negotiations with Sir John Digby involving the company.304 The decision of the Spanish Council of State was to accept the proposal, but it was sent to Brussels and London to be dealt with.305 The Spanish Council washed its hands of the matter. The final decision would be taken between the Spanish embassy and the government of Flanders. As for the English government, the return of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham seemed to hinder the project.306 In November 1623, Coloma finally reported about the formation of a meeting with the English royal ministers and merchants to negotiate the move of the textile company.307 However, the cancellation of the betrothal of the Infanta by the Prince of Wales in December 1623 prompted a fundamental change. It was at this point that the Spanish Council of State refused to continue the talks, although the Infanta Isabella was given room to again negotiate the establishment of English merchants in Antwerp individually.308

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In any case, the final decision on the whole matter was forwarded to the former confessor of Archduke Albert, Father Iñigo de Brizuela, now bishop of Segovia, who had already given his opinion on this project in 1616.309 The bishop, as expected, did not change his mind, showing himself as opposed in 1624 as he had been in 1616. His arguments pivoted on the danger of heresy in a place as sensitive as Flanders, territory surrounded by heretics and enemies of Spain. The project was finally refused, as 1624, with Spain involved in wars against the Dutch Republic, German Protestants and threats by France and England, was not the best moment for such a proposal.

The Mediterranean From 1609 on, once peace was achieved with France, England and the Dutch Republic, Spain turned its attention to the Mediterranean and the Islamic threat from Turks and Berber pirates.310 First the kingdom of France (in the first half of the sixteenth century) and later Elizabethan England and the new Dutch Republic had established political alliances with the Turks and Berbers in the Mediterranean, extending their maritime trade and political influence to an area that Spain considered its own.311 This explains the repeated Spanish attempts to close the passage of English and Dutch fleets through the Strait of Gibraltar, with the Spanish armada de la Guarda del Estrecho and the misgivings provoked by their presence in the Maghreb. Elizabethan England had extended its commerce to the Mediterranean from 1570 onwards. Its trading companies, merchants and ships travelled as far as Constantinople and the Eastern Mediterranean area, arousing the suspicions of the Spanish crown, as it controlled key territories in Italy and North of Africa.312 Although diplomatic contacts with the Turks, the Moroccan sultan and the Berber pirates had been established by Queen Elizabeth I during the war with Spain, after 1604, English interest was focused on securing and protecting its trade, which was threatened by the pirates.313 A letter sent by Philip III to Gondomar in the summer of 1617 warned him that, in the light of the growing Berber threat, English merchants in Spain and Italy had proposed securing their trade by means of a fleet system.314 Three months later, Gondomar was informed in London that the English would propose joining their fleet with the Spanish in order to fight the Berber pirates.315 On his return to England from Madrid, Digby wrote to Gondomar informing him of the details of the proposal and how he had been waiting an official response for two years in Madrid, a sign of Spanish misgivings about the project.316 However, Gondomar agreed with the proposal.317 The Spanish Council of State approved it in March 1619, and the following month a board was appointed to discuss it, consisting of Gondomar, Don Agustín Messia and Diego Brochero.318 While this was taking place in Madrid, in England the secretary of the embassy, Sánchez de Ulloa, presented the Spanish conditions to the English government, although it was estimated that the English squadron could leave for Spain in the spring of 1620.319

 War and Trade 151 In March 1620, Gondomar returned to England with the precise orders to finish the whole business.320 However, the detection of a plan between the English and Dutch to unite their fleets in the Mediterranean created distrust among the Spanish. Philip III wrote to his ambassador, informing him that, in any case, if the English sent their ships, he would accept more than eight warships at any Spanish port, in accordance with the peace treaty.321 The Spanish distrusted English intentions in the Mediterranean as much as the English did Spanish intentions in the English Channel and the North Sea. However, James was determined to send a fleet to the Mediterranean, appointing Vice Admiral Mansfell to take command.322 The English fleet, departed in October, was welcomed in both the ports of Gibraltar and Málaga, where it arrived on 16 November.323 However, the information Gondomar discovered in England and the Spanish Council of State in Spain did not help to quell mistrust.324 Apparently the English fleet did not engage in battle with any Berber pirate ships, and in Algiers an English commercial consul had been appointed.325 For this reason, Philip III ordered Gondomar to request in London the withdrawal of the English fleet from the Spanish coasts. The fleet finally anchored in England on 30 September 1621.326 All this episode showed the divergence of interests between Spain and England in the Mediterranean area. It was not just English trade expansion there: North Africa was a sensitive area for Spain because of its geographical proximity, the presence of Islamic enemies (Berber pirates) and the spirit of crusade that these territories constantly invoked and encouraged at the Spanish court.327 England was oblivious to all these concepts and ideas, and it was easier and cheaper for James to negotiate trade agreements with the Berber cities than to pay soldiers and fleets to fight them. There were clear complicities of many of the British and Irish pirates with the Berbers, and although the Berber threats also involved English trade and coasts, no effort was made to tackle the problem because of lack of means and resources.328 In this sense, the ‘Berber problem’ for England was the Flemish ports and privateers in the English Channel.

English trade with Morocco and Barbary The Spanish ambassadors maintained a vigilant attitude on everything related to the Maghreb.329 As sensitive territories, conflicts and friction with English merchants were almost inevitable. The Spanish embassy was a conveyor belt of English complaints about the mistreatment of their own ships and merchants in Spanish domains. In the autumn of 1618, Secretary Sánchez de Ulloa presented the case of an English vessel with a cargo of tin and lead valued at 20,000 ducats, seized by the Portuguese authorities of Tétouan.330 Another two merchant ships, one English and one Dutch, were accused of selling weapons – European firearms, gunpowder and artillery, which would eventually fall into the hands of the Berber pirates and the Moroccan sultan – to the Moors.331 Further investigation was ordered on the case, and that both vessels were ordered to be returned to their owners. As for the English ship, it was agreed to supply it as the owner was vassal of a royal friend of Spain.332

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A similar case took place in 1622. Philip IV had written to the Portuguese governor of Tangier, Jorge Mascareñas, pointing out that that some English merchants had opened a trading house at Tétouan.333 For this reason, Coloma was order to obstruct this trade, as it would be dangerous for the Spanish interests – they were close to the borders of Spain, and they could assist the Berber pirates.334 In any case, Philip IV clarified the Spanish position with regard to English commerce in the Maghreb in a report dated October 1622, sent to Coloma and Digby.335 The Spanish government was aware that English merchants sold weapons to the Moors and Berbers.336 These actions were contrary to chapters of the peace, and punishment would be demanded at the English court. In compensation for withdrawal from the North of Africa, the English merchants would be allowed to trade in the African posts of Spain (Tangier, Ceuta, Melilla and Oran), but excluding other Berber ports not under Spanish domain. On 15 November 1622, Coloma had an audience at Theobalds Palace with James and the Prince of Wales. Coloma presented the petitions from Philip IV, which were received with fine words from the Stuarts, as usual.337 However, English commerce continued in the Maghreb. One of the points of Gondomar’s diplomatic mission in 1625 would be dealing with this situation in North Africa again.338

Dutch Levant trade The Spanish naval squadron of the Strait of Gibraltar was Spain’s main military tool for the control and repression of contraband and piracy in that area, which was very sensitive as it was a maritime crossroads of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean.339 Dutch merchant fleets arrived every year from the north of Europe to the Mediterranean area fully laden with wheat, rye, wood, fish and manufactured goods.340 Moreover, they were so heavily armed that few warships were needed to escort them to fight the Spanish galleons.341 In spite of Spanish efforts to stand in the way of the Dutch vessels, the squadron of the Strait of Gibraltar was not, at least at the beginning of the seventeenth century, much more successful in doing this than other measures had been (such as the Gauna’s decree or Sherley’s military and economic proposals against them).342 On 25 April 1607, a Dutch merchant fleet returning from Italy defeated a Spanish fleet off Gibraltar.343 Another similar naval clash occurred in June 1618, when another Dutch fleet on its way to Venice crossed the Strait of Gibraltar and defeated ten Spanish warships trying to block their way.344 From the English court, Spanish diplomats insisted on the importance of opposing the Dutch trade of the Mediterranean, blocking it at Gibraltar.345 In addition, they warned that Spanish failures in this task inevitably had an impact on the English image of Spanish naval power.346 On the other hand, the embassy promptly passed on information of the Dutch fleets going to the Levant every year. The strategic geographical position of England, controlling all the maritime traffic between the north and the south of Europe, was well used by the Spaniards. In addition, the Dutch merchant fleets tended to gather at English ports before departing for the Mediterranean. For example, in May 1622, Coloma wrote to Madrid that 120 Dutch vessels had assembled

 War and Trade 153 at the Isle of Wight, laden with wheat, cod and other goods from Northern Europe.347 In April 1623, he announced similar news to Philip IV.348 These reports were soon transmitted to Don Fadrique de Toledo, as well as Don Juan Fajardo, the best naval Spanish admirals of that time, whose victories over the Dutch were a symbol of the military and naval recovery of Spain under Philip IV and Olivares’s government.349

Contraband trade, fisheries and English consuls As for contraband, England was an excellent territory for its pursuit, because of both English involvement and the arrival of Dutch merchant vessels with illegal goods at British ports. With regard to the fisheries, the defence of Spanish whalers was combined with the promotion of Anglo–Dutch rivalry in the business. Finally, in the election of the English commercial consuls, the Spanish crown took the opinion of the Spanish diplomats very seriously. These were English people backed by the Spanish authorities in the most important cities, such as Andalusian ports, who often also acted as spies and diplomats at the service of the Stuart government (for instance, Sir Francis Cottington was English consul at Seville).

Fighting the contraband The Spaniards provided sensitive information and proposed interesting initiatives and projects to curb smuggling as far as possible, while in Spain the Royal Board of Admiralty was created to fight against this huge problem.350 The famous Gauna decree on 27 February 1603 was far from obtaining its main objective, which was to end Dutch contraband in Spanish domains.351 However, the fact is that the Spanish ambassadors collaborated with its enforcement between June 1603 and August 1604. For this purpose, both Aremberg and Villamediana issued many passports for British merchants on their way to Spain, as a guarantee of legality.352 Gondomar, by then corregidor of Valladolid and serving in Galicia, witnessed the arrival in the port of Bayonne of some of those British merchants vessels with passports issued by Villamediana.353 The introduction of counterfeit Spanish silver coins, as well as the output of gold and silver from Spain to France, Italy, England or Holland, was another of the preoccupations of the diplomats.354 In this case, the constant movement of merchant ships from British ports to Spain offered an excellent field of action for currency smuggling.355 Gondomar, as an expert in economic affairs of the Spanish government (he was a member of the Spanish Council of Finances), soon began work on this matter. In 1613 and 1614 he provided reports to Madrid on ships and merchants involved in the introduction of fake silver currency in Spain.356 In 1616 he sent a report on the Dutch manoeuvres to introduce counterfeit coins made of billon through the Spanish ports. In addition, Gondomar received a report from Madrid on the English vessels Amor Verdadero, out of Seville, laden to the brim with contraband goods

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(80,000 ducats, 28 barrels of cochineal and other unregistered goods).357 At the end of that year, he even sent a forged gold doubloon in Amsterdam to be studied at the Madrid Mint, which he repeated again in 1617.358 The following year, in Spain, Gondomar received reports from Van Male in England: a Dutch ship laden with more than 300,000 ducats had arrived in Dunkirk from Spain, and it had been seized immediately by the Flemish authorities.359 Coloma and Hinojosa continued Gondomar’s work with energy and perseverance. In 1623 they reported the arrival of a ship at Plymouth illegally carrying 30,000 ducats from Spain.360 At the end of the year, they obtained royal authorization for a search of a Dutch ship arriving at Dover and destined for Spain.361 That ship carried 240,000 ducats in counterfeit silver currency, hidden in six drawers under tallow candles. In 1624, Coloma wrote that from Dover Dutch vessels were coming to Cadiz and Sanlúcar de Barrameda laden with counterfeit money and coins made of billon.362 On the other hand, Van Male warned that, because of the political escalation in the tension between the Stuarts and Philip IV, the English merchants were sending from Spain to England a great quantity of silver in bars and coins. That silver ended in the Tower of London to be minted.363 In May 1623 Coloma sent a report on an English ship called The Phoenix, anchored at Dover, whose destination was Sanlúcar de Barrameda or Cadiz.364 The captain of the ship was Richard Dof, and his vessel carried a cargo of English goods and Dutch textiles. The owner of the ship, Edward la Zouche, governor of the Cinque Ports, would be compensated for the embargo of the vessel in Spain.365 In December it was discovered that another Dutch ship at Dover was carrying smuggled goods for Spain.366 In the following spring, more Dutch merchant ships left Dover for Spanish ports, according to the reports from the embassy.367 Besides port surveillance, the embassy made concrete proposals against Dutch smuggling. In 1622 Gondomar suggested that the fleet of Flanders should stop and search the English merchant ships at sea to seize all contraband goods, counterfeit currency and manufactured goods.368 His successor would insist on fighting the Dutch and English contraband relentlessly.369 With his colleague Hinojosa, Coloma organized a strong embargo of Dutch vessels in the year 1623 at Portuguese and Andalusian ports.370 They sent a spy named Diego de Castro Cortázar to Holland to obtain precise information about the ships and cargoes travelling to Spain that year under English names and passports.371 Castro Cortázar returned to England in one of those Dutch ships, before leaving for Spain. Hinojosa and Coloma agreed with Olivares that Castro should be given the maximum support: according to the ambassadors themselves, if all the vessels were seized, the Dutch would lose 1.5 million ducats of smuggled goods.372 News of the general embargo came to England in mid-November, when a satisfied Coloma reported it to Olivares.373 Later on, both Coloma and Hinojosa proposed more embargoes to the Spanish government, but this time seizing English ships and cargoes, seen as a breaking point between both kingdoms after the failure of the Spanish Match.374 However, neither Philip IV nor Olivares were willing to take such a political step, which would have meant a declaration of war against England, as Philip II had done with the 1585 general embargo as had been ordered during the time of Elizabeth I.375

 War and Trade 155 Finally, the embassy channelled and tempered the English protests and complaints against some of the measures of a mercantilist nature that Olivares’s government put into practice from 1621. Specifically, the approval on 10 February 1623 of the so-called Pragmática de Reformación, inspired by the ideas of the economic adviser Sáncho de Moncada, which prohibited, under heavy penalties, the importing of textiles, leather and other foreign manufacture goods into Spain.376 Although this royal decree was intended to protect the Castilian textile industry (Toledo was a good example), it was also an instrument to fight smuggling, as ambassador Coloma acknowledged.377 The English government echoed the protests of the merchants and asked the ambassadors to transmit them to Madrid, because Philip IV’s decree violated chapter 10 of the 1604 treaty (if something had essential for the English in agreeing that treaty, it was the free trade with Spain and her European empire).378 As for Sir Walter Aston, he presented the complaints in Madrid before the Spanish Council of State, which finally decided to grant exemptions to English goods and manufactures as a sign of friendship and recognition.379

Fishing industry In the early seventeenth century fishing in the northern seas around Norway, Greenland, Newfoundland and Spitsbergen Island created fierce competition between Biscayan, English, Dutch, French and Danish fishermen.380. The Portuguese fishermen were the first to make voyages to North Atlantic Canada, after the English (first time by 1502, after from 1565), the French from 1504 and the Basques from 1520. From 1580 onwards, the English privateers began the hostilities against the Spanish and Portuguese fishing boats in Canada coast. By the1620s, the Iberians were expelled from those waters.381 The embassy was well informed of this situation, continuously sending reports and encouraging the rivalry between the English and the Dutch fishing industries.382 With regard to whaling and cod fishing, in 1613 Gondomar reported to Philip III that the Biscayan ships had been expelled from the Spitsbergen area by the English and Dutch. He suggested that during 1614, either the Biscayans should join the French fishermen to work together or the English ships and goods should be seized in the Basque ports of Spain, forcing the English crown to come to an agreement with Spain on the matter. As well as the fierce rivalry in those waters, there were the attacks from privateers in the area off Newfoundland.383 In May 1609 King James issued a royal proclamation defending the English fisheries, against the competition and tough rivalry with the Dutch. The embassy reported incidents among them in July 1614 – the sinking of four English whalers – and October 1618 – the capture of another English whaler.384 In addition, an unsuccessful attempt was made to reach an agreement with the English government to share whale fishing with the Biscayan fishermen against the Dutch, as was shown by Gondomar’s talks with the Secretary of State Sir Ralph Winwood.385 Beyond that, Gondomar worked on cases of attacks and captures of Basque fishing vessels, as occurred in 1613, 1615 and 1616 in the seas off Newfoundland, Greenland and Norway.386

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The resumption of war against the Dutch made its fisheries targets for the Spanish warships, as well as its trade.387 With the Dutch fisheries threatened by the fleet of Flanders, an agreement between the English and Spanish would have been a decisive blow. However, Coloma lamented that the Dutch influence at the English court and the huge bribes paid to the royal ministers had made such an alliance impossible.388 It was a wasted opportunity in order to catch the Dutch fisheries in a pincer grip between the Spanish and the English, as the Dutch herring catches declined during the 1620s, due to the attacks of the Flemish privateers, and the herring fishing industry suffered the impact of the lack of salt from the Spanish domains too.389 In 1626 Buckingham attempted to gain agreement from the Dutch, given their herring fisheries in the North Sea, to pay to the king of England 10 per cent of their catches as recognition of English sovereignty over those waters. But these efforts from the English royal favourite were in vain.390

Consulates in Spain Many of the Dutch and English merchants in Spain, impersonating as Scots, Irish or Flemish, also engaged in espionage, activities repeatedly denounced by foreign advisers of the Spanish crown such as Sir William Semple.391 It was understandable that the Spanish crown maintained a vigilant attitude towards these English commercial agents, looking for English, Scottish or Irish Catholics, free from any suspicion, in order to run the merchant communities (consulates) in Spain and Portugal.392 Therefore, the embassy had an important role to play in confirming the candidates proposed by James as commercial consuls.393 Velasco had recommended Francis Cottington in 1611, though not too successfully.394 On the other hand, Gondomar, Father Diego de la Fuente and the secretary Sánchez de Ulloa also dealt with this issue between the years 1616 and 1619, as they did with the official complaints against the misconduct of the English consul of Lisbon, Hugo Lee and the reports on Sir John Stone, his successor.395 This task would continue in 1624, when Gondomar was consulted about the position of Protector Mayor de Extranjeros, a post as head of the community of foreign merchants in Spain, openly rejected by him for reasons similar to the rejection of the foreign consuls: the foreign merchants were smuggling counterfeit currency in Spain (billon coins) and taking silver out of the kingdom, sabotaging the Spanish economy and finances.396

Friendships and enmities in the East Indies The Indies (West and East) were a headache for the Spanish embassy throughout the period. The Peace of 1604 in fact turned the subsequent ambassadors into a sort of ‘sheriffs’, while James retained for himself the role of ‘judge’. The former would investigate crimes, while the latter would devote to judging and punishing. In the East Indies, the Portuguese empire had been rapidly weakened by the joint actions of English and Dutch trading companies since 1598.397 This maritime expansion

 War and Trade 157 at the expense of Portugal inevitably provoked internal tensions between the crowns of Portugal and Spain, since the Spaniards had to provide military and naval support to the Portuguese, and the debates inside the Spanish Council of State on the relations with England and the Dutch were distorted by Portuguese pressures and interests (as in the years 1618–21 and 1623).398 The decision of Spain to go to war with the Dutch in the spring of 1621 owed much to the precarious situation of the Portuguese empire in the East Indies. One of the Spanish demands to the Dutch for the renewal of the Twelve Years’ Truce was to abandon their profitable trade and maritime expansion throughout India and Asia.399 However, it can be seen that the final Spanish decision would have been the same if the Spanish crown had not supported Portuguese weakness. In 1623 Philip IV was willing to make concessions to the English in the East Indies. A year earlier, Don Diego Messía had proposed that if the Dutch accepted the free and public exercise of Catholicism, as well as free navigation through the Scheldt River (thus opening trade with Antwerp), the Dutch could keep their trade routes and commercial posts in India and Asia.400

Intruders in the Spanish empire in India and Asia News about English navigation to Asia began immediately. Barely a month after his arrival on 23 October 1603, Villamediana reported that in London, 4 ships and 800 sailors were being prepared to go to Asia and Sumatra. On their previous trip, they had brought to London a cargo of 18,000 quintals of pepper.401 Moreover, Villamediana made English hostility in those territories clear: they had left various commercial agents in Sumatra in order to sell the Portuguese cargoes they had been capturing in the Strait of Malacca. In the spring of 1604, due to the Constable’s inquiries, the ambassador sent a short but accurate report on the places where the English had their commercial factories overseas.402 Their ships were headed to Sumatra and Bantam (in Java), where they had had factories since 1602. Villamediana also presented a draft planning document to stop the introduction of pepper and other spices in Europe by English and Dutch merchants.403 The Spanish Council of State accepted, with some resignation, that the only effective solution to these threats was to increase the combined naval forces of Portugal and Spain to stop the new intruders.404 The ambassador was also asked to investigate whether the Dutch East India Company was working together with Portuguese merchants (the famous Cristianos Nuevos) or with other merchants who were in turn residing in Spanish domains. While there were Spanish diplomats in London, reports on English merchant ships going to India and Asia continued to be sent to Madrid constantly. All this information depended on the network of confidants and spies available for the embassy: merchants (Filipo Bernardi and Burlamacchi, Juan Francisco Soprani), aristocrats (Northampton, Arundel) and even the Stuarts.405 Between July 1622 and October 1623 the Spanish embassy reported at least twentyeight English merchant ships leaving for or arriving from the East Indies.406 Between January 1621 and February 1623 the embassy announced that sixty-two Portuguese vessels had been captured and sunk in Asia.407 In July 1622 Coloma sent to Madrid a

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detailed account of the voyage and robberies committed by several English ships in the East Indies, travelling between April 1620 and June 1622.408 It had been obtained from the clerk of one of the ships, thanks to the work of the Earl of Arundel. As for the Dutch trading company, it was not beyond Spanish surveillance either.409 In 1615 Gondomar had sent two English aristocrats to Holland to spy on the preparations of Dutch merchants for both Indies.410 That year seven Dutch ships were ready to sail, and three more had been lost on the Cape of Good Hope, while the previous year eight vessels had sailed.411 In 1618 Van Male reported to Gondomar on the arrival in England of two Dutch ships from India with very wealthy cargoes.412 In 1622 a similar case occurred when Coloma tried to seize two Dutch ships arriving at Plymouth with a cargo of 2 million ducats.413 Finally, the ambassadors repeatedly sent reports of English and Dutch voyages, proving for yet again the well-known complicity in the East Indies by attacking Portuguese ships, commercial factories and trade maritime routes.414 In March and July 1622 separate reports of specific attacks on Portuguese merchant ships were sent to Madrid, one dated September 1621 and several dated from April 1620 to June 1622. Subsequently another was sent relating the case of a Portuguese vessel attacked by four English ships in the Cape of Good Hope at the end of 1623.

The English trading company The East India Company, founded by royal decree dated 31 December 1600 (O.S.), would become the principal and most successful English trading company, a symbol of England’s maritime and commercial expansion.415 The Spanish diplomats were perfectly aware of the complicity between the English ruling class (royalty, the high nobility) and the company of the Indies.416 Coloma made this situation very clear to Philip IV.417 The Prince of Wales himself had investments there, in addition to what James received from the company for his trading privileges and monopolies.418 In March 1608 Zúñiga asked James for a ban on a Dutch pamphlet circulating in London, defending the rights of the Dutch (and indirectly English) companies to trade in the East Indies against the Portuguese monopoly.419 In this regard, Velasco had clashed fiercely with James at the English court about the activities of the English company.420 In 1614 Gondomar reported that many English were dying in the East Indies and that a merchant ship had returned with only 14 remaining out of a total of 100 crewmen.421 The following year he warned of the company’s alliances with the Mughal Emperor Jahangir: Sir Thomas Roe was sent to finalize a trade agreement, allowing English commercial settlements in India (with the first of them being Surat).422 In December 1617 (and again in 1620) he sent a report in which he just recognized the great success of the English company.423 Having around thirty merchant ships, trade valued at 4 million ducats and an expansion towards Persia in search of the silk and horses, the company’s maritime expansion inevitably meant the diminution and decline of Spain’s and Portugal’s

 War and Trade 159 commerce in India and Asia.424 However, if the company became very profitable and successful in terms of trading, any action taken against it by the Spanish embassy would be useless. Therefore, Gondomar advised Philip IV to try to persuade the king of Persia refusing permission to the English to trade in their ports. The year 1622 proved successful for the English, with the taking of the Portuguese port of Hormuz, in the Persian Gulf. One of the most obvious consequences of the English and Dutch success in the East Indies was reflected in the pepper trade in Europe.425 According to Gondomar, in 1619 the price of a pound of pepper was 3 reales in London, while in Madrid the price reached 8 reales, as more spices were brought to English ports than to Lisbon in order to supply the Iberian domestic market.426 Although this issue had been well known by the Spanish and Portuguese governments since the beginning of the century, both Philip III and his ambassadors were powerless to take any effective action against these companies, the real destroyers of the Portuguese monopoly of spices.427 As a result of Spanish and Portuguese impotence, Gondomar concluded that the only effective way to stop the English and the Dutch in Asia was simply to increase the money spent on warships, cannons and soldiers.428 Coloma worked unsuccessfully to bring the English company’s seizures and attacks before the judges of the Admiralty court, as had Gondomar.429 During the summer of 1622, he was investigating the robberies committed by two English ships: during their voyage to the East Indies, they had attacked at least five Portuguese ships.430 The manoeuvres of the company to avoid his investigations were the dispersion of the crewmen and sailors, the allegation of a war situation beyond the equinoctial line or the simple complicity with corrupt English authorities. The satisfaction Coloma demanded was merely verbal, such as those received by Coloma and Hinojosa after the capture of the Portuguese post of Hormuz.431 The solution, if any, was to expel the English from the East Indies at cannon point, for which Portugal would have to provide huge military support.432

Commercial leagues of English and Dutch The Spaniards also worked to obstruct any alliance between the English and Dutch trading companies, by encouraging their rivalry and enmity and, finally, by concluding an agreement between the English and Portuguese in order to save the remains of the Portuguese commercial empire. The Spanish government had been informed since at least 1615 of Dutch attempts to join the English company in order to divide the whole East Indies business trade between them.433 As a result, Philip III ordered Gondomar to impede such a commercial alliance, which represented a potentially fatal threat to the Portuguese spice trade.434 In the following years, contacts continued between both trading companies, and by 1619 Van Male informed Gondomar about them in detail.435 At that time, eight Dutch deputies had travelled to England to conclude an agreement. To hinder these negotiations, Van Male had reminded several English royal ministers that this commercial league could not be formed without breaking the peace with Spain. However, the fact is that the Dutch deputies obtained the agreement they were looking

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for in anticipation of a war with Spain in 1621; to facilitate the negotiation process at the English court, they distributed 200,000 ducats in London, much of which went into Buckingham’s pockets. The agreement divided the spice trade market and secured monopoly in their respective countries: the Dutch ceded to the English a third of all the pepper of Moluccas, Banda and Ambon, plus half the pepper of Java to the English company. In addition, a joint defence council was established in Batavia, where the English would be allowed to establish a commercial factory and provide ten warships to a combined fleet for defence.436 Moreover, the signing of this agreement between the two trading companies was one of the main reasons for the Spanish crown to demand the return of Gondomar as ambassador to England.437 However, Gondomar was very pleased to learn that the collaboration between English and Dutch merchants existed only to attack the Portuguese spice trade and little more, since above all they were fierce rival trading companies. The key point in the East Indies spice trade was rivalry between predators. Two of them had allied to attack a weaker third party, but that did not prevent them from fighting each other as well.438 As a result, clashes throughout the period between English and the Dutch were frequent. After the agreement of 1619, new incidents forced the Dutch to seek a new agreement indemnifying the English company. Gondomar reported at the beginning of 1622 that the English demanded 4 million ducats in reparation to their trading company, and the Dutch were bribing all the English royal ministers at the court, looking for another agreement.439 Coloma reported all the Dutch movements during this new negotiation: the final agreement involved 350,000 ducats paid to James and 80,000 ducats to Buckingham.440 However much the English and the Dutch had their occasional clashes in the vast areas of the East Indies, they would never break definitively as their community of mutual interests was much stronger than the ties England maintained with Spain. The English and Dutch had agreed to fight a common religious foe and economic adversary, which in India and Asia were the Spanish and Portuguese. A few months after the agreement, the Dutch sent a joint fleet of twenty-four large warships to expel the Portuguese from the Moluccas and the Spanish from the Philippines.441 The Spaniards tried by all possible means to encourage the commercial rivalry and to conclude a commercial alliance between the English merchants and the Portuguese in the East Indies.442 In fact, the English were the first side to propose such an agreement against the Dutch relentless maritime expansion, as Sir Francis Cottington did in Madrid by 1616.443 The English proposal was brought up again in 1620.444 The reply from Madrid was that negotiations would only be accepted if the English first broke off their 1619 agreement with the Dutch company, a very difficult demand to be met.445 In reality, the Spaniards were deeply distrustful of English intentions. After all, an agreement with England was nothing more than the legitimizing of English maritime expansion into an area of ​​Spanish and Portuguese dominion. In Coloma’s opinion, the English East India Company was nothing more than ‘a company of thieves’. With regard to the agreement between the English and the Portuguese in the East Indies, he hit the nail on the head when he wrote that James would never let it stand as, once the

 War and Trade 161 Dutch were expelled from India and Asia, the Portuguese would do the same with the English.446 In the spring of 1623, on the occasion of the Anglo–Persian attack on Hormuz, Gondomar, together with the Prince of Wales, drafted a document describing the English–Portuguese league project.447 The first proposals had been made during the years 1615–16 to Gondomar, and to Philip III, via Sir John Digby and Sir Francis Cottington (and repeated in 1620), although nothing was done from Spain. Things changed after 1622, when the marriage negotiations brought the possibility of an agreement closer to reality. King James was tired of declaring that, by agreeing to the Spanish Match and the Palatinate question – returning those states of the Rhine to Frederick V of the Palatinate, James’s son-in-law – he would ally with Philip IV against all his enemies and in any place in the world.448 The failure of the marriage alliance also meant that of the commercial alliance in Asia.449

African trading centres Trade in Guinea and other part of sub-Saharan Africa was also a focus of interest. These trading centres were important both for the natural resources such as black slaves, gold, ivory, wax, drugs and allspice obtained from them by the Portuguese merchants and for their geographical position on the maritime route to the East Indies.450 Regarding English trade expeditions to the Gambia River in Senegal, Van Male and Coloma reported on them to Brussels and Madrid in the summer of 1624.451 English and Dutch expeditions to Guinea were also well known by the Spaniards, because of the reports from the ambassadors to England452. By early 1623 Coloma had received information from Cottington about the intentions of a threatening Dutch fleet.453 He feared that they would attack the Portuguese fortress of Sao Jorge Da Mina, as the Dutch already had another castle there for their fleets navigating to the East Indies. As for the island of St Helena, it was an important place for resupplying the vessels and for time off for the crew. The Spanish ambassadors called Philip IV’s attention to the need to fortify the island and to have some warships there to intercept the English and Dutch navigations.454

The vulnerable Portuguese empire The annexation of Portugal and its overseas empire meant that many in the European courts feared the potential Spanish hegemony: the conquest of Portugal was followed by the adventure against Elizabethan England in 1588.455 However, the moment of Spanish imperial pride was very brief. As for the Portuguese crown, from 1588 it became a complication for Philip II and his military forces, as well for his treasury.456 Things were pretty clear for the Spaniards facing the Portuguese problem: first, the expansion of the English and Dutch trading companies in the East Indies.457 Second, as a consequence of this, the decline in Portuguese trade in India was an incontestable fact.

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Cargoes and galleons were increasingly scarce.458 Third, Portugal was suffering from a shortage of men, military resources and naval supplies for the fleets and armies.459 Spain had to take over the defence with its own soldiers and galleons. Portuguese petitions and the orders from the Spanish Council of State were reiterated.460 Hence, the reproaches to the Portuguese government by so many Spanish ministers and officers were constant.461 Finally, there was the suspicion that the Portuguese lacked political loyalty towards Spain and the possibility that they would ally with their enemies to become independent of Spain, which actually happened from 1640.462 A Dutch memorandum defending the creation of a trading company for the West Indies and the attack on Brazil justified the Portuguese enmity towards Spain.463 And in the Spanish Council of State meetings, the alleged treacherous spirit of the Portuguese was also frequently debated.

Weak soldiers for the empire Gondomar was the author of several memoranda in 1616, 1619 and 1620 on the general situation in Jacobean England and the strategy that the Spanish government should take regarding the East Indies.464 Coloma did the same, writing several reports exposing the damage that the Twelve Years’ Truce had done to Spain (1609–21) in terms of economy, trade and international reputation.465 Both supported a hard line against the northern intruders into Spanish and Portuguese territories overseas: more galleons, more soldiers and cannons to deal with them. To the Spanish ambassadors, the constant arrival of ships and cargoes to Great Britain coming from Brazil or India and all the work for their restitution were real headaches.466 They also received orders for the acquisition of ships, artillery, wood or men for the royal fleets, including those of Portugal. As for the assistance of Portuguese vassals, they accounted for 90 per cent of the embassy’s total assistance provided to vassals of the king of Spain (Spanish, Portuguese, Flemish, Italians, Germans, etc.). Zúñiga and Gondomar explained it very clearly to Philip III.467 The embassy not only watched over the lives, wealth and souls of their compatriots but also protected them from the temptations of serving other princes (such as James), or religions (such as Protestantism), or for other treasons (such as guiding navigation to the Indies or working for foreign trading companies). The embassy was also responsible for reporting on the causes of the weakening of Portuguese naval power, the ultimate reason for the massive arrival of sailors and vessels captured in the East Indies or Brazil.468 In the summer of 1622 Coloma wrote that the huge Portuguese vessels from India (named carracas, the equivalent of Spanish galeones) were too large to face the English and Dutch ships, which were much more agile and faster.469 Another problem was the lack of Portuguese soldiers at the fortress and commercial centres throughout the maritime routes of Africa and Asia, for example, in the fort of Sao Jorge Da Mina, in the Gulf of Guinea.470 Finally, there was the incredible lack of protection for Portuguese vessels on voyages, throughout the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, which greatly facilitated

 War and Trade 163 the predatory task of the English and Dutch ships. Gondomar had proposed in 1615 that Portuguese vessels coming from Brazil laden with sugar should be accompanied by warships, as were the Spanish fleets of the West Indies.471 Coloma and Hinojosa made the same proposal between 1622 and 1624, although, as Gondomar said in 1623, the problem was that the Portuguese ships had their courses changed by sea storms, by speeding, or by heading to different ports in Portugal.472 Coloma directly asked the numerous Portuguese sailors taking shelter in their house – 400 between June 1622 and November 1623 – how they came to be captured so easily, to which they replied that the reason was that they did not sail in convoys as did the Spanish fleets.473 Hinojosa would insist on the matter again before returning to Spain. The solution was that the merchant ships were well armed and accompanied by a squadron of galleons.474

Spanish West Indies The West Indies were the other major concern for the embassy to England. They were the cornerstone supporting the whole building of the Spanish empire worldwide, and so every English, and Dutch or French, intrusion on them was cause for great alarm and concern in Madrid. During the diplomatic negotiations of 1603–4, the English finally chose not to insist on the matter as the West Indies were, for the Spanish, as much Spanish territories as was Madrid.475 However, the English commissioners did not abandon their merchants’ exploratory trips and maritime expeditions, but diverted them to North America and the Amazon River area, to Spain’s displeasure.476 Thereafter, Spaniards maintained vigilance over any English movement in those areas

English Virginia Besides the failed establishment of the English colony between 1584 and 1590, it was not until 1606 that effective steps were taken for a second attempt at English colonization of North America, by founding the Virginia Company of London and the Virginia Company of Plymouth in April 1606.477 In May 1607, Captains Newport and Smith finally founded Jamestown, the capital of Virginia.478 In the spring of 1604, Villamediana sent a report on English activities in America to the Constable: in the West Indies, besides privateering, the English were only involved in smuggling at Hispaniola Island.479 The first information on Virginia was provided by Zúñiga, who complained numerous times to James about the English settlement.480 The English response was that these were private maritime expeditions (although among their promoters were Cecil and Prince Henry Stuart) at the risk of the promoters and at the expense of Spanish punishment if caught.481 The lack of royal protection of Virginia led the English settlers to fear a Spanish attack, because of the example set by the carnage already created against the French Huguenots in their settlements in Florida in 1565–6 by Pedro Menéndez de Avilés.

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At the end of 1605 Zúñiga reported that the capture of three English ships in the Caribbean by Don Luis Fajardo had cooled the moods of those in London who wanted to go to Virginia to begin a new life.482 However, the fact is that Philip III did not take any aggressive action against the English colony in Virginia, but ordered his ambassadors to watch carefully over the settlement of North America and, in any case, to try to obstruct its development and success.483 The Spanish inaction can be explained by two main reasons: first, it was because of the lack of financial resources, employed between the years 1594 and 1609 to secure the Caribbean zone, which exhausted the desire of the Spanish crown to claim the monopoly on unoccupied and uninhabited territories in Virginia, Bermuda, Guiana and Lesser Antilles.484 The Spanish reports informed the poor development of the colony, founded in a land of harsh winters, lack of mineral resources (such as gold or silver) and a hostile Indian local population. Hopefully, any settlement would be extinguished without intervention, in which case, why waste military resources and money to destroy an already doomed English settlement? Why poison the new friendship between Philip III and James I, after so much money and efforts spent on diplomacy, for Virginia? Spanish government was right, at least at these first stages of the English colonization. In 1622 the Indians attacked Jamestown. By 1630, these colonies of North America had proved a big failure. The Puritan leader John Winthrop explained the causes the unsuccessful colony of Virginia: the numerous sins of the English colonists, the type of population sent from England (the scum of the kingdom) and the incompetence of the local governments.485 The ambassadors who came after Villamediana continued reporting accurately about Virginia. There are reports of the colony provided by Velasco in 1610 and a diplomatic proposal from Zúñiga in 1612 for the abandonment of Virginia in exchange for the marriage between the Prince of Wales and the Spanish Infanta.486 Gondomar sent his own report in 1613.487 The colony had five forts, with trenches and artillery (more suitable to stop a possible attack by the Spanish than by the indigenous population), and the English settlers were finding it difficult to adapt to the climate, food, the poor fertility of the land and the hostility of the indigenous population.488 The ambassador did not have a very high opinion of the future of the colony, and he reported as much.489 In another dispatch, at the end of 1614, he wrote that the English crown offered royal pardons to common criminals in London provided that embarked on a vessel for Virginia – reminiscent of what had happened in Australia, which had effectively been turned into a penal colony.490 However, little by little, the colony consolidated, and in fact the ambassador would later refer to Virginia and Bermuda as examples of successful settlements and English expansion.491 An example of how English settlements in America interfered in the Spanish maritime routes occurred in 1622, when Gondomar reported how he had to assist the crew and passengers of a Spanish galleon, San Antonio, which had sailed from Cartagena de Indias for Seville and sunk off Bermuda Island.492 The seventy castaways were taken to Plymouth on English ships. Gondomar spent 7,489 reales on their

 War and Trade 165 assistance, and he had discussed with the Earl of Warwick (Henry Rich), the president of the Somers Isles Company, the ownership of the cargo of the sunken Spanish vessel, as it had been seized by the English.493 He also complained to James and Buckingham on the improper behaviour of the English towards the passengers, many of whom were Spanish and Portuguese members of the nobility.494 Coloma would also be attentive towards Virginia, reporting to Philip IV the famous Indian massacre of March 1622, when 347 English settlers were killed. The news was brought to London by a tobacco-laden ship that had arrived in London on 20 July 1622.495 Virginia was one of the political keys of the marriage alliance between the Stuarts and the Habsburgs too. It was reflected in the draft prepared by the Spanish Council of State in October 1623, one month after the Prince of Wales’ departure for England. The document was intended to reinforce the political and matrimonial alliance between the two kingdoms.496 The English response was the same as it had been years before: Virginia was a private colony, and the English government would not do anything to harm it.497

The Caribbean Sea The English and Dutch had been sailing the Caribbean since the mid-sixteenth century without the Spaniards being able to do anything substantial to prevent this maritime incursions.498 The complicity between locals and intruders was well known by the Spanish authorities. Villamediana reported them to the Constable. With regard to the Dutch, the Spanish general embargoes of 1595 and 1598 were the main reason for them to encroach into the Caribbean area to find an essential product for their meat and herring salting industries, their butter and cheese: salt.499 Between the years 1601 and 1606 the Spanish crown made a great effort to stop the smuggling by English and Dutch merchants in the Caribbean area, and this was closely related to Villamediana’s reports and the Peace of 1604.500 In 1601, and then again in 1605, precise orders were given to create the Armada de Barlovento (Windward fleet), which would patrol the Caribbean waters to fight and capture smugglers. In 1603 Philip III ordered the Italian engineer Juan Bautista Antonelli to be sent to visit the salt lake of Punta de Araya (in Venezuela) to where the Dutch salt ships were arriving from 1599, as well as to depopulate the western part of the island of Hispaniola in order to reduce the smuggling, which would be achieved by 1605.501 Finally, since September 1605, Admiral Don Luis Fajardo dedicated himself to cleaning up the Caribbean area of intruders, ​​ capturing twelve Dutch ships, three English vessels and one French ship, until his return to Spain in March 1606. The activity of the ambassadors would be to provide all kinds of information about ships going to the vital area of ​​the Spanish Caribbean. In 1614, five or six English and Dutch vessels were sailing to go to the zone of Nicaragua.502 In 1621, three Zealander ships were preparing to attack Cuba.503 In places such as Punta de Araya, the news was extensive from 1621 because the Dutch were once again banned from access to Portuguese salt.504 Early in 1623 Coloma

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reported that sixty Dutch merchant ships had returned from Araya without a grain of salt because a Spanish garrison with artillery was settled there.505 The military measures taken at the Araya salt lake since 1605 were effective against the Dutch. A few months later, the ambassador learned that a fleet would be sent from Holland to destroy the Spanish fortifications there.506 Therefore, Philip IV ordered the reinforcement of the fortress of Araya, commanded by Captain Don Diego de Arroyo and Daza, with 300 more soldiers, artillery and ammunition sent from Spain.507 The fleet, composed of twelve galleons, two hulks and one cutter, left from Cadiz on 8 September 1623 towards the Caribbean.508 Having arrived at Araya, they reinforced the fortress with more artillery and soldiers to face new Dutch military incursions.509 In 1626 news arrived of successful repulsing of the Dutch attacks.510

The Amazon River and Guiana The area of ​​Guiana and the mouth of the Amazon River attracted the attention of English, Dutch and French merchants and adventurers from the decade of the 1590s. In 1595 Sir Walter Raleigh had led an expedition to search for the famous Eldorado on the Orinoco River.511 Three years later, it would be five Dutch ships heading to that area, a journey that must be understood in the context of the Dutch advance in the Caribbean since 1594, alongside the stabilization in Flanders against the Spaniards. The embassy had, at least since 1614, been reporting on the interest of the Atlantic powers in the Amazon River area.512 The territory was not of great value – in fact, it was sparsely populated – but it was strategically valuable. The presence of these intruders threatened the Spanish Caribbean; by founding permanent settlements such as Virginia or Bermuda and further up the Amazon River they could attempt actions against the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru.513 This explains the famous trip to Guiana made by Raleigh in 1618, which Gondomar made every effort possible to obstruct.514 The expedition was the best excuse that Raleigh could have offered to James for his execution. He had become an annoying figure for James, and he was also convicted of treason after 1603. Two people took advantage of Raleigh’s death. James was able to show that he punished English expeditions to Spanish overseas dominions, which was only partially true. Gondomar took advantage of this case to claim to Madrid his standing as a skilled ambassador to England.515 However, the English persevered in that area.516 In 1619 Father Diego de la Fuente and Sánchez de Ulloa were working to abort the trip of Captain Roger North, organized by the newly founded Amazon Company, which existed only during 1619–23.517 Father Diego talked to the Earl of Arundel, who had investments in the company, to try to hinder the expedition. Faced with the futility of his protests, he expressly requested the return of Gondomar to prevent North’s expedition.518 Although Gondomar could not prevent the trip, at least he obtained North’s temporary arrest upon his return, in January 1621.519 After this entire incident, Gondomar warned Madrid again in 1621 against proposed British and Dutch expeditions to the Amazon River.520 The Spanish Council

 War and Trade 167 of State concluded that the best solution was to populate the coasts and mouths of rivers from Brazil to Guiana.521 However, the Spanish crown ran into the problem of lack of resources to populate and defend more territories. In any case, the resumption of the war with Holland from 1621 and the founding of the Dutch Trading Company of the West Indies thwarted these plans.

Brazil Before 1598, Portuguese merchants established in Amsterdam were progressively taking control over the sugar trade of Brazil. In 1599, and again in 1604, a Dutch fleet had attacked San Salvador de Bahia.522 However, it was not until 1621 that the Dutch began their systematic plans to seize Portuguese Brazil, involving the trading company of the West Indies. The Portuguese vessels laden with Brazilian sugar and captured by the Dutch kept the Spanish ambassadors very busy in England.523 In 1604, the Spanish Council of Indies had proposed in vain to exchange with Portugal Brazil for Philippines, so the Iberian powers could focus exclusively on each of the world spheres: America (the West Indies) for Spain, Asia (the East Indies) for Portugal.524 This could have allowed defending much better both empires reunited under the Spanish Habsburgs, avoiding the draining of military resources from Spain to Portugal, or the arrival of so many Portuguese seamen to the house of the Spanish ambassador in London. However, Phillip III and Lerma decided to maintain the status quo. In 1615 and then during 1622–4, Gondomar, Coloma and Hinojosa warned about the large number of Portuguese vessels coming from Brazil and being assaulted on their way to Portugal.525 In 1615 Gondomar reported French and English voyages made to Brazil during the two previous years. They had gone to cut wood and discovered a natural port between Espírito Santo and Rio de Janeiro, where they could establish an English settlement in order to plant sugar cane and attack Portuguese ships.526 The whole plan had been confessed by two French merchants whom Gondomar had managed to win over for Spain: Julian Duriaos and Adelfo Poidras, from Nantes. In exchange for 6,000 reales and half of the seized English ships, they offered to guide the Portuguese to their settlement in Brazil. In addition, the ambassador had obtained the same result from three Portuguese adventurers who had assisted the French (the Portuguese of Brazil collaborated with the English, French and Dutch smuggling), Gaspar Riveiro, Manuel Doliveira and Juan Gago. Gondomar won over these Portuguese by offering money (2,000 reales), veiled threats and appeals to their patriotism.527 During his last year in office, Gondomar reported about a famous French pirate named Daniel de la Touche, Signour de la Ravardiere.528 In 1604 he had made an exploratory trip through Guiana with Jean Mocquet, and in 1612 he had landed at Maranhao (on the Brazilian coast) where he built a fortress (‘Saint Louis’), which had been attacked by the Portuguese during 1614–15. Later on, he had agreed with the Viceroy of Brazil, Gaspar de Sousa, to surrender the fortress and return to Europe, where he was imprisoned in Lisbon, and then returned to Paris. There, he got a pension

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from the Spanish ambassador (Marquis of Mirabel) in 1618. However, Gondomar found him again in England with the intention of returning to Brazil. At least, he could send him back to France again.

The Dutch West India Company The Dutch company was the greatest threat to the Spanish West Indies as it was conceived by its spiritual architect, Willem Usselincx, a Calvinist Flemish exile from Antwerp: a weapon of economic warfare against Peru, New Spain and Brazil.529 Gondomar made very clear by 1615 that the Dutch were already discussing that company, during the Juliers–Cleves Crisis with Philip III.530 Oldenbarnevelt had frustrated the creation of the Dutch company for the West Indies to preserve the truce with Spain, but with his execution in 1619, the main obstacle for its creation disappeared.531 During the years prior to 1621, the most important Dutch attacks on the West Indies were those of Joris Van Spilsbergen in 1614–15, who went through the Strait of Magellan to attack Peruvian and Chilean coasts, as well as carrying weapons for the Chilean Indians and founding a settlement.532 Philip III was informed of this voyage by his diplomats and confidants in Brussels, London and The Hague.533 The rest was a constant flow of information from London to Spain. In September 1614, Dutch intentions to use a fleet of sixty warships to capture the Spanish fleet of the Indies were reported, of which some were gathering on the Isle of Wight.534 In February 1615, two English spies sent to Holland warned Gondomar against Dutch plans to storm Portobello, Puerto Rico, La Havana and Cartagena de Indias.535 Van Male reported in October 1618 and again in December 1619 of the efforts of a group of Dutch merchants in Amsterdam to send a large fleet of 100 vessels to the West Indies (the seeds of the future trading company).536 From 1621 onwards, the new Dutch trading company West-Indische Compagnie began to appear in the reports and dispatches of the Spanish ambassadors as a serious threat. As proof of Spanish nervousness, Gondomar was instructed to find out if James was involved in that company.537 In this respect, a year later, James told Coloma that the Dutch had proposed him to participate in the new trading company, which he had refused because of his friendship with Spain.538 During 1621–5, the Spanish embassy was in charge of transmitting the Dutch plans for and threats to the Indies, first, by informing about attacks on Cuba (against La Havana, the fortress of El Morro, or Cape San Antonio),539 and second, by sending reports on large Dutch fleets to attack Panama, Peru and Chile through the South Sea.540 Finally, the Dutch company focused on Brazil to take over the sugar trade and establish some trading centres.541 These warnings were provided from the beginning of 1624 by Coloma, who in August 1624 already had news that the Dutch had taken San Salvador de Bahia, showing that his reports to the Spanish government were accurate.

Conclusion: Habsburgs and Stuarts – seduction as diplomacy, love as marriage, heartbreak as war

Two of the main English figures of this book met dramatic ends: Buckingham was assassinated in August 1628.1 Twenty-one years later, on 30 January 1649, his master Charles I was beheaded in front of Whitehall Palace. In both cases Spain was in some way involved: in the case of Buckingham, in the war between both crowns between the years 1625 and 1630, a conflict that the king’s favourite had done so much to provoke. As for the king, Cadiz was the first of a succession of English military disasters that would threaten Charles I’s government and his own life two decades later. The foreign policy of Charles (and his father James), which prioritized peaceful relations with Spain and securing its alliance, was one of the reasons for the collision between the crown and the successive English parliaments. Stuart foreign policy was the cause of a quiet protest among much of the population of England against the Prince of Wales (the future Charles I) as successor to the English throne, especially from the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War and the events of Bohemia, culminating in the visit to Spain of 1623. The honeymoon period of the ‘Elizabethan’ Charles with his English subjects would last only two years (1623–5).2 This book has attempted to give a more complete picture of the Spanish diplomacy that developed under the first Stuart monarchs in England.3 Spain’s main concern was that England remained neutral in order to face its European rivals: the Dutch, the French and the German Protestants. In addition to the above, Spain was concerned with promoting tolerance towards British Catholicism and keeping the English trade away from the Spanish overseas possessions, putting an end to the division of the world signed with the kingdom of Portugal in 1494.4 The Spanish crown saw that new diners were coming to the global banquet for the colonial distribution; at least Spain could choose who to have in the next chair (better an Englishman eating some ‘overseas’ dishes than a Dutchman or a Frenchman taking food from all the plates). In a fortunate coincidence, the new Stuart dynasty shared many of those objectives regarding Spain. The Habsburgs and Stuarts, two ruling dynasties, were forced to listen to each other, sharing a number of interests and mutual seduction between them.5 Being Scottish, they had not been involved in wars against Spain. James’s mother, Mary Stuart, was Catholic and she had been executed by Elizabeth I Tudor in 1587. James, still a Protestant, wanted to become the European mediator between Catholics and Protestants. In addition, he needed stability to consolidate his reign and his own dynasty. Peace with Spain was necessary for his plans. As for his wife, Queen Anne of

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Denmark, she was Catholic and also wanted a Spanish princess for her son.6 And the Prince of Wales wanted to marry a princess of a European power. The marriage with the Infanta would have been the culmination of the Peace of 1604 and an appropriate basis for future projects between England and Spain against their rivals: the commercial competitor of England (The Netherlands) and the political foe of Spain (France). When the Spanish Match failed in 1623, the French option remained. In pursuit of its objectives, Spanish diplomacy embarked upon extensive activity in Great Britain. Specifically, the Spanish influence was to be noted on the royal family, at the English court, in the capital (London), as well as in the rest of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland. In addition, the Spanish friendship and reconciliation was promoted with the royal family, the successive royal favourites (Cecil, Somerset and Buckingham) and the members of the government, of the justice, of the Parliament, of the fleet and even of the universities (Cambridge, Oxford). The Spanish ambassadors approached all the English social groups. The targets were royalty, the nobility, the mercantile class, the intellectuals, the popular classes and even the Protestant clergy (as well as the Catholics, of course). Diplomats also participated in all kinds of court ceremonies (except religious ones for their Protestant religious side). They also became the main representatives for British Catholicism. It was a gigantic seduction game with a Protestant country hostile to Spain. This global analysis of Spanish diplomacy has used novel documents belonging to various Spanish ambassadors sent to London between 1603 and 1625. In addition, it has used documentation from the central government of the Spanish monarchy in Madrid (the various councils) and that of other diplomats and officers based in Europe (posted in Brussels, Paris, Vienna, Rome) or overseas (America, Asia, Africa). Finally, the rich documentation emanating from and received by the Spanish embassy in London is analysed. It contained reports and correspondence from all over the world, on all types of subjects regarding the Spanish interests in Great Britain (from the logbook of a ship of the English East India Company, to reports on the royal English fleet, on secret audiences with James, on meetings of the English government and on the parliament and all kinds of notices that had arrived from Europe, America, Africa, Asia, etc.). This book has tried to show how Spanish diplomacy networked. At that time there was no European state encompassing the worldwide possessions that the Spanish Habsburgs enjoyed. Naturally, the Spanish embassies benefited from this situation. Every Spanish officer and Spanish post (whether belonging to the Spanish empire or abroad) had the obligation to not only report all matters to the central government in Madrid but also to correspond with other Spanish officers and diplomats scattered around the world. In this way, there was a centralized and transversal communication, very useful in terms of optimizing information, taking quick decisions and finding solutions without direct consultation with the king. For instance, after the English attack on Cadiz, there was no longer any Spanish diplomatic representation in England. However, Philip IV received not only the written testimony of an English prisoner (which was then printed in Seville) but also reports from France (Paris and Calais), Holland and Flanders (Dunkirk and Brussels, here by two different routes, from the governor and from his own diplomat there).7

 Conclusion 171 This gigantic seduction carried out by the Spanish diplomacy on Stuart England led to the next step on the English side. Since it looked clear that ‘cupboard love’ existed between both dynasties, it would have to be consolidated and made public and legal in the eyes of all European states by the logical formula: a marriage between the young heirs of both crowns.8 After all, the most famous Spanish treatise on diplomacy at that time considered ambassadors as ‘amorous matchmakers’ for sovereigns.9 During the days of wine and roses between both countries, an enthusiastic and loquacious Spanish ambassador used carnal language to describe and encourage this Anglo–Spanish marriage to Buckingham.10 However, the Spanish government had a dilemma: it was not going to allow a wedding between a Spanish Catholic princess and a Protestant prince (heretic) unless Charles converted to Catholicism, and it also wanted at the same time for England to remain a neutral and friendly country. The facts revealed the impossibility of achieving both. Six months of negotiations in Madrid showed Charles and Buckingham the lack of Spanish conviction and the scepticism about the project. The failure of the negotiations of 1623, the end of this ‘cupboard love’, led to heartbreak, hatred, divorce and war in 1625. It was a similar process to a relationship breakdown.11 In the end, Charles I found another candidate in the French princess Henrietta Maria, meaning a radical change of international alliances towards France and Holland (reviving Elizabeth I’s allegiances against Spain). However, things did not go as planned. The war with France broke out in 1626 due to tensions with the Huguenots of La Rochelle, and there was a withdrawal from Holland due to the Cadiz fiasco. The assassination of Buckingham left Charles alone in the kingdom’s governorship and without a lightning rod for his disastrous government from 1625. England and Charles needed respite and time to recover: in 1629 and 1630, peace with France and England put an end to the short ‘Elizabethan’ phase of Charles’s government. He adopted the policy of neutrality of James, although this time with England’s international prestige much affected. Regarding the relationship with Phillip IV, it seemed that if not ‘cupboard love’, it would be at least ‘plain adultery’ between both dynasties. These were the secret treaties signed in the 1630s. Each country would take care of its own affairs without beginning any further grandiose projects together (Spain of its wars in Europe, England of its internal affairs, including a civil war). In the end, when Charles I was defeated and condemned to death, Phillip IV did not lift a finger to save him. Indeed, Spain was quick to recognize the regime of Oliver Cromwell so that England would remain a neutral power (although it would only survive until 1654). Spanish diplomacy with respect to England had three major objectives that can be summarized under three concepts: neutrality, tolerance and control. The neutral England allowed Spain to engage and succeed in more wars against its European foes. It fought against the Dutch (1603–9 and then again throughout 1621–48, understanding that the Twelve Years’ Truce had been partly caused by the end of English assistance to the Dutch since 1604); against Richelieu’s France (1635–59); in Germany, by getting involved in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48); and after 1640, facing the internal wars in Portugal and Catalonia. Could Spain have fought for so long against its European enemies, and also manage to sustain a world empire, without English neutrality until

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the middle of the seventeenth century? The historical facts of the years 1585–1603, with Phillip II’s wars against the Dutch, France and England, proved that it would have been very difficult, if not just impossible. In fact, the Spanish surrender to France only occurred when Cromwell declared war on Philip IV, and the Portuguese separation occurred after the alliance of the Portuguese dynasty of Braganza with the English. The Spanish ambassadors always worked for the tolerance of the English crown towards Catholicism. Despite not having obtained the freedom of conscience from the Stuarts as much in 1604 as in 1630, the target was to improve de facto the situation of the Catholics. The Catholic chapel of the embassy became a place of pilgrimage for British Catholics, organizing all kinds of ceremonies of the liturgical calendar. The embassy acted as an inlet and outlet valve for lay Catholics, nuns and clergymen: as an inlet valve, towards the interior of the different kingdoms of Great Britain; as an outlet valve, towards Flanders, Spain or Italy. In addition, diplomats were always ready to protest against any abuse against Catholics. In general it can be said that English local authorities were much harsher against Catholics than the royal family. (Indeed the queen was Catholic). The problem is that, by obtaining a certain degree of public tolerance de facto, Catholics became ‘hostages’ between Spain and England. Their situation improved or worsened depending on the fluctuating political relations between the two countries. The Stuarts pressured Spain with the situation of the Catholics so that Madrid would accept the marriage alliance. And vice versa. After the failure of the Spanish Match, new anti-Catholic laws were approved in England in retaliation.12 English maritime and commercial expansion overseas were to be watched closely by the Spanish embassy. The Spanish crown already knew that English voyages could not be prevented. It was time to control and divert them. The Treaty of 1604 could not prohibit English shipping overseas either (neither had the Treaty of Vervins in 1598 with the French nor the Twelve Years’ Truce with the Dutch in 1609). Therefore, English maritime expansion received no mention whatsoever in the treaty with Spain, much to the relief of both sides. Actually, it was a Spanish diplomatic achievement for the American empire (the West Indies). Spain made sure that the English expansion was directed towards North America (Virginia), Guiana and islands not populated by Spaniards previously (Bermuda). That is, territories that did not interest the Spanish crown (due to lack of natural resources or population) or for which Spain lacked the material and human resources to colonize. The unwise who ventured into Spanish territories would pay dearly, and the Stuarts would not lift a finger to avert this (Sir Walter Raleigh is the best known example, but certainly not the only one). Asia (the East Indies) was a different story. In the Far East, the Dutch and English commercial companies were crushing the Portuguese commercial empire in India, Japan, China and the Spice Islands. Only the Philippines islands, Spain’s stronghold, seemed to resist. Neither Philip III nor Philip IV were prepared to risk peace with England for something that the Portuguese themselves were unable to protect. The Spanish diplomats were entrusted with guarding and fighting against – in a legal sense at the English court and in the courts of justice – merchant ships of both companies arriving at British ports loaded with goods stolen from Portuguese vessels. Moreover,

 Conclusion 173 in this way, they diverted the most powerful focus of the English commercial expansion towards Asia (Portuguese zone), freeing Spanish America of much of the English shipping. The draft of the new treaty of alliance with England in 1623 was intended to validate de jure what had been done de facto since 1600 by the East India Company. Finally, the relationship between Spain and England in the first quarter of the seventeenth century is worth considering. An analogy can be made with the Spanish deck of cards, which has four suits: oros (‘golden coins’), bastos (‘clubs’), espadas (‘swords’) and copas (‘goblets’).13 Each symbolizes a medieval social class.14 The ‘golden coins’ are the merchants (represented by gold, commerce and industry), the ‘clubs’ are the peasants (agriculture and farming), the ‘swords’ are the nobility (weapons, war and politics) and the ‘goblets’ are the clergymen (Catholic Church). In the treaties of 1604 and 1630 (the latter a literal copy of the previous one), the Spanish were more interested in winning ‘swords’ and ‘goblets’ (wars and Catholicism), while the English preferred the ‘golden coins’ and ‘clubs’ (commerce, industry, agriculture, the economic fruits of peace).15 As an analysis of the different phases of the relationship between Spain and England from 1603 until the English attack on Cadiz (November 1625), four stages could be distinguished. The first between the years 1603 and 1605, the years of the peace negotiation, the gifts, the Spanish waste in the English court (the ‘golden coins’). A second stage was between the years 1605 and 1623, where ‘the goblets’ predominated. Diplomatic relations are restored to normal, banquets and parties are given by the Spanish and English at both courts, but without reaching the previous excesses of spending. A third stage was during the years 1623–5, where all the previous diplomatic work is rapidly undone by the failure of the Spanish Match. James resisted the attempts to break with Spain of the Prince of Wales and Buckingham. The ‘clubs’ prevailed, since there is conflict but not rupture. Clubs could be used to hit, but not to cut (the ‘club’ is a stick too). And a fourth and final stage began with Charles’s succession to the throne in the spring of 1625, when Cadiz was attacked and the war was declared against Phillip IV. Here the ‘swords’ are unsheathed. In this way, Habsburg and Stuart relations passed through ‘golden coins’, ‘goblets’, ‘clubs’ and finally ‘swords’. A work of art at that time exemplifies well this diplomatic card game. In a painting called Cardsharps16 (painted 1594–5), the Italian painter Caravaggio shows two young men playing cards (one of them is a young aristocrat, dressed in black silk) and a third older man who is signalling to his colleague the cards of the young noble. These are two criminals who want to swindle an aristocrat by cheating at cards. In addition, the young cheat has extra cards behind his back and a dagger on his waist. Who is Spanish and who is English? It is hard to say, especially because it is not clear if the young knight is also a cheat (hiding cards or with another dagger), although he does not seem to mind losing money.17 In 1625, both Charles I and Philip IV proclaimed themselves to have been equally deceived by the other side. One for his failed marriage, the nonrestitution of the Palatinate or other broken promises concerning the overseas Spanish trade. The Spanish monarch complained that England had betrayed the Peace of 1604 and the marriage agreement of 1623, having attacked Cadiz treacherously without an official declaration of war.

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In the case of the third character in Caravaggio’s painting (the second cheat), his role in the diplomacy game is clearer. He represents the army of confidants, pensioners and spies who swarmed throughout the English court providing news and confidences to anyone who was willing to pay for them. In addition, in reality, he could also help the young aristocrat if he was paid well against his partner of misdeeds. In Caravaggio’s painting, as in diplomacy, there is not much room for honesty. As this book has tried to make clear, deception, duplicity and the sword were also very present in the diplomatic game that the Habsburgs and Stuarts played in the seventeenth century.

Appendix 1

Appendix 1.1 Portrait of Phillip III, King of Spain, Peter de Jode II, ca. 1650. Metropolitan Museum, New York, USA.

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Appendix 1

Appendix 1.2 Portrait of James VI, King of Scotland, Peter de Jode I, 1603. Metropolitan Museum, New York, USA.

 Appendix 1 177

Appendix 1.3 Portrait of Charles I, King of England, Daneil Mijtens, 1629. Metropolitan Museum, New York, USA.

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Appendix 1.4 Portrait of Phillip IV, King of Spain, Diego Velázquez, 1624. Metropolitan Museum, New York, USA.

 Appendix 1 179

Appendix 1.5 Portrait of Don Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares, Diego Velázquez and/or Juan Bautista Martínez del Mazo, 1635. Metropolitan Museum, New York, USA.

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Appendix 1.6 Portrait of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, Willem Jacobsz, 1626. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Appendix 2 Diplomatic representatives of the Spanish monarchy in Stuart England from 1603 to 1625. Names

Embassy

Date

Juan de Tassis, Count of Villamediana Juan Fernández de Velasco, Constable of Castile Don Pedro de Zúñiga, Marquis of Floresdávila Don Juan de Mendoza, Marquis of San Germán Don Fernando Girón, Knight of Malta and Fieldmaster Don Alonso de Velasco, Count of Revilla Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Count of Gondomar Julián Sánchez de Ulloa Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Count of Gondomar Don Carlos Coloma, Marquis of Espinar and Fieldmaster Don Juan de Mendoza, Marquis of Hinojosa Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Viscount of Corzana Jacques Bruneau

Extraordinary

April/1603–November/1605

Extraordinary

October/1603–December/1604

Ordinary

June/1605–December/1610

Extraordinary

April/1606–June/1606

Extraordinary

December/1608–February/1609

Ordinary

January/1610–August/1613

Ordinary

May/1613–August/1618

Secretary Ordinary

July/1618–March/1620 March/1620–June/1622

Extraordinary

May/1622–September/1624

Extraordinary

June/1623–June/1624

Extraordinary

September/1623–February/1624

Agent

September/1624–December/1625

Fermín López de Mendizorroz Lope Sedeño

Constable of Castile

Don Carlos Coloma, Marquis of Espinar and Fieldmaster Don Juan Mendoza, Marquis of Hinojosa Jacques Bruneau

Francisco Selehen; Cosme de Villaviciosa; Richard Berry; Jorge de Henin Idem Cosme de Villaviciosa; Richard Berry

Antonio de Sehin

Francis Fowler; Cosme de Villaviciosa; Richard Berry; Jorge de Henin; Henry Taylor

Taylor, Fowler, Antonio de Nort, Cristóbal de Van den Hoven Francis Fowler

doctor Robert Taylor; Francis Fowler Idem

Secretaries for Foreign Correspondence

Julián Sánchez de Ulloa, capitán Pablo Font; Francisco Happart Juan López de Cerain

Julián Sánchez de Ulloa; Tomás Ramírez

Licenciado Agustín Pérez

Pedro Jimenez

Count of Villamediana

Don Pedro de Zúñiga, Marquis of Floresdávila Don Alonso de Velasco, Count of Revilla Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Count of Gondomar

Embassy Secretaries

Ambassadors

Personnel of the Spanish embassy in Stuart England from 1603 to 1625.

Idem

Idem

Idem

Maese Pedro

Embassy Cook

Fray Simon Stock; fray Juan Hidalgo

Idem

Fray Diego de la Fuente; Idem fray Simon Stock; fray Juan Hidalgo; licenciado Simón de Ariza Fray Simon Stock; don Idem Francisco de Carondelet; fray Juan Hidalgo   Idem

Fray Juan de San Agustín Fray Bartolomé Téllez

Don Fabio de Maestri

 

Embassy Chaplains

Notes Preface 1 Juan Antonio Vera y Zúñiga, El Embaxador, ‘Discurso Cuarto’ (Seville, 1620). 2 Gondomar was a very good ‘matchmaker’, as he convinced the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Buckingham to travel to Madrid to arrange his marriage with Spanish Infanta Maria; BL, Harl. 1583, (349–50) (September 1622); BP, II/2168, (43) (January 1614).

Introduction: Rethinking Spanish diplomacy with early Stuart England 1 Samuel Gardiner, History of England, 1603-1642, vol. VI (1625-1629) (London, 1896), pp. 6–7. 2 James was very proud of his title ‘Rex Pacificus’ and his emblem ‘Beati Pacifi’. Biblioteca de Palacio Real (hereafter, BP), II/2172 (69 and 104); Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid (hereafter, BNM), Manuscripts (Hereafter, Mss.), 2348 (483–4). 3 My translation; BNM, Mss., 2355 (307–8). 4 The secret audiences took place on three different days: 12 March, 11 and 13 April 1624 with Father Diego de la Fuente and Francisco de Carondelet, archdeacon of Cambrai; BP, II/2172 (65, 102 and 104). 5 BNM, Mss., 2355 (307–8); British Library (Hereafter, BL), Aston Papers, vol. IV, 1625 (64): BP, II/2172 (65). 6 BNM, Mss., 10467 (14–16); Archivo General de Simacas (Hereafter, AGS), Estado, 8780 (74); AGS, Estado, 2516 (84); BNM, Mss., 17659, unnumbered. 7 For more, see Porfirio Sanz Camañes, Los ecos de la armada: España, Inglaterra y la estabilidad del Norte (1585-1660) (Madrid, 2012), p. 317ff. 8 AGS, Estado, 2515 (89). 9 BP, II/2221 (47); BNM, Mss., 18201 (29–31); BL, Egerton Manuscripts (Hereafter, Eg. Mss.), 2052 (213–22). 10 Allen B. Hinds (ed.), Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs Existing in Archives of Venice (London, 1913) (hereafter, CSP Venice), vol. 19 (1625–6). Zuane Pesaro, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. Southampton, 9 September 1625. 11 Archivo Historico Nacional (hereafter AHN), Estado, 740 (240–4, 315–16, 362–7). 12 According to an English prisoner, that fleet had ninety-five ships: ten royal vessels, seventy private boats and fifteen Dutch ships; BL, Additional Manuscripts (hereafter, Add. Mss.), 21439 (15–20). 13 A Spanish report (August 1625) described the English fleet as an ‘armada with her arms broken’ (my translation); BL, Add. Mss., 20848 (223–6).

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Notes

14 Drake entered the Bay of Cadiz on 29 April 1587, while Essex arrived on 30 June 1596; the fleet of 1625 anchored at Cadiz on 1 November of that year. 15 Cardinal De la Cueva, Spanish diplomat at Brussels, wished the worst sea storms for the English fleet in September 1625; Archivo de la Casa de Alba (hereafter ADA), 231, 1; Gardiner, History of England, p. 14. 16 According to a possessed Spanish nun, a demon who used to visit her had tried to help the English in Cadiz, but they were too drunk and were thus defeated; similar remarks about the English were made by another Spanish girl after the 1588 armada; see Richard Kagan, Los sueños de Lucrecia. Política y profecía en la España del siglo XVI (San Sebastián, 1991); Enrique González Duro, Demonios en el convento. El Condeduque de Olivares frente a la Inquisición (Madrid, 2004), 4º chapter, ‘Los demonios en acción’. 17 Gardiner, History of England, pp. 12–13. 18 See https​://ww​w.kim​bella​rt.or​g/col​lecti​on-ob​ject/​eques​trian​-port​rait-​duke-​bucki​ ngham​(accessed 18 March 2018); Gardiner, History of England, p. 10. 19 Charles’s elder brother, Henry Stuart, had died of typhoid fever on 6 November 1612. 20 These internal tensions in England arose in particular during 1618–23, from the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War until the failure of the Spanish Match; BP, II/551 (202–3); II/2108 (103); BNM, Mss., 18434 (72–6); Thomas Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution: English Politics and the Coming of War, 1621-1624 (Cambridge and New York, 1989), p. 95ff.; Tim Harris, Rebellion. Britain’s First Stuart Kings (Oxford, 2014), pp. 212–13. 21 My translation; AGS, Estado, 8790 (3 and 43); 8791 (10). 22 An anonymous Spanish minister described the journey of Charles to Spain as a ‘ridiculous adventure’; the book Amadís of Gaul describes the adventures of this knight in England, Ireland and Scotland; Don Quixote de la Mancha was translated to English by Thomas Shelton in 1612 (the first part) and the whole book in 1620; BL, Sloane Manuscripts, 2545 (1–19). 23 The Spanish ambassador in London wrote that, personally, he could not believe anything of the English promises to Phillip IV in exchange for the marriage with his sister, as they were absolute nonsense; AGS, Estado, 8789 (31). 24 Luis Tobío, Gondomar y los católicos ingleses (Sada, A Coruña, 1987), p. 226. 25 Published by Benjamin Fisher in London. 26 Adrian Tinniswood, Behind the Throne. A Domestic History of the British Royal Household (New York, 2018), chapter 2, ‘Behind the Masque’. 27 Harris, Rebellion, pp. 212–13 and note 84. 28 Archivo Medina Sidonia (Hereafter, AMS), 231, unnumbered. 29 AHN, 739 (401–2); ADA, 1 (97); BNM, 9379 (42–3). 30 For instance, there is not any mention of it in one of the last works regarding British famous defeats; Stephanie Barczewski, Heroic Failure and the British (New Haven and London, 2016), chapter 1, ‘Heroic Failure in Britain Prior to 1850’, pp. 21–58. 31 The championship of the Protestant European powers was taken over from England by Denmark and Sweden in the Thirty Years’ War, until France entered the war in 1635. 32 Richard Harding, ‘Naval Warfare, 1453-1815’, in Jeremy Black (ed.), European Warfare. 1453-1815 (New York, 1999), p. 101. 33 According to the Spanish reports, the English came back to their country ‘with their tail between their legs after Cadiz’ (my translation); the same applies for Charles and his foreign policy between the years 1625 and 1630; BNM, Mss., 9379 (42–3).

 Notes 185 34 The second Parliament of Charles I (26 December 1625–15 June 1626). http:​//www. hist​oryof​parli​ament​onlin​e.org​/volu​me/16​04-16​29/su​rvey/​parli​ament​-1626​; http:​// bcw​-proj​ect.o​rg/ch​urch-​and-s​tate/​the-k​ings-​peace​/king​-char​les-s​econd​-parl​iamen​ t-162​6 (accessed 25 March 2018). 35 Alaistair Bellany, ‘“Rayling Rymes and Vaunting Verse”: Libellous Politics in Early Stuart England, 1603–1628’, in Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake (eds), Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England (London, 1994), pp. 285–310; Antonio Feros, ‘Imágenes de maldad, imágenes de reyes’, in John H. Elliott and Lauren Brockliss (eds), El mundo de los validos (Madrid, 2000), pp. 293–319; Kevin Sharpe, Remapping Early Modern England. The Culture of Seventeenth Century Politics (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 83–4. 36 During James’s reign, it was said in England that there was no more Queen Elizabeth and with Charles, no more Drakes; Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I (Cambridge, 1991), p. 1; Harris, Rebellion, pp. 212–13. 37 BNM, 2358 (132–3). 38 AHN, 2756 (8); BNM, 18400 (128–33). 39 https​://ww​w.nat​ional​galle​ry.or​g.uk/​paint​ings/​peter​-paul​-rube​ns-mi​nerva​-prot​ects-​ pax-f​rom-m​ars-p​eace-​and-w​ar (accessed 20 April 2018). 40 Phillip IV was declared ‘The Planet King’ and ‘Phillip The Great’, during the first brilliant years of his age (1621–7), by courtiers, royal ministers, artists, poets and writers; his motto was ‘Illuminat et Fovea’ (‘Lighting and shining’), linking him with the Sun, the fourth planet of the galaxy (according to Ptolemy); his favourite, Olivares, got as his symbol the Sunflower, the flower bowing to the Sun; Antonio Feros, El duque de Lerma. Realeza y privanza en la España de Felipe III (Madrid, 2002), p. 196; Jonathan Brown and John H. Elliot, A Palace for a King (New Haven, 1980), p. 200. 41 http:​//www​.hist​oryof​parli​ament​onlin​e.org​/volu​me/16​04-16​29/su​rvey/​parli​ament​ -1604​-1610​(accessed 03 April 2018). 42 http:​//www​.hist​oryof​parli​ament​onlin​e.org​/volu​me/16​04-16​29/su​rvey/​parli​ament​ -1621​; http:​//www​.hist​oryof​parli​ament​onlin​e.org​/volu​me/16​04-16​29/su​rvey/​parli​ ament​-1624​(accessed 03 April 2018). 43 The idea of James’s incompetence was also presented by Sir Anthony Weldon, Court and Character of King James (1650).

Chapter 1 1 For the Spanish Phillip III’s foreign policy, see Paul C. Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica (Madrid, 2001); Bernardo José García García, La Pax Hispánica. Política exterior del duque de Lerma (Leuven, 1996); Feros, El duque de Lerma; Antonio Feros and Juan E. Gelabert, España en tiempos del Quijote (Madrid, 2004); Porfirio Sanz Camañes, La Monarquía Hispánica en tiempos del Quijote (Madrid, 2005); Alfredo Alvar Ezquerra, El duque de Lerma. Corrupción y desmoralización en la España del siglo XVII (Madrid, 2010). 2 Bernardo J. García García, ‘Tiempo de paces’, in Tiempo de Paces 1609-2009. La Pax Hispánica y la Tregua de los Doce Años (Madrid, 2009), p. 29. 3 Donald F. Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe: Volume III. A Century to Advance, Book 1 (Chicago, 1993), pp. 93–4.

186

Notes

4 The English interest in the Spice Islands dated back to, at least, the 1530s, thanks to the efforts of the Bristol merchant Roger Barlow; Christine Marie Petto, Mapping and Charting in Early Modern England and France. Power, Patronage and Production (London, 2015), chapter 3, pp. 81–2. 5 By 1620, a Spanish diplomat called these first expeditions to Asia ‘sparks that caused the present fires’; ADA, 142 (8); BNM, Mss., 981 (66–7, 84–7, 209–12); AHN, Estado, 741 (52–7); Manuel Herrero Sanchéz, ‘Las Indias y la Tregua de los Doce Años’, in Tiempo de Paces 1609-2009. La Pax Hispánica y la Tregua de los Doce Años (Madrid, 2009), pp. 200–1; Fernand Braudel, El Mediterráneo y el mundo mediterráneo en tiempos de Felipe II, [1949] (Mexico, 1976), p. 473ff.; Carlo M. Cipolla, La odisea de la plata española (Barcelona, 1999), pp. 91–117. 6 Theodore Rodenburg was the Dutch diplomat in Spain during the years 1611–14, and he was in charge of the dealings with Lerma about making the Truce permanent; also Lerma sent to Flanders the Portuguese friar Martin del Espiritu Santo and Don Rodrigo Calderón in 1612 for the same purposes; Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness and Fall (1477-1806) (Oxford, 1995), p. 390ff. http:​//www​ 2.ual​.es/i​deima​nd/te​odoro​-rode​nburg​-agen​te-ne​erlan​des-c​a-157​8-164​4/ (accessed 18 May 2018); Santiago Martínez Hernández, Rodrigo Calderón. La sombra del valido. Privanza, favor y corrupción en la corte de Felipe III (Madrid, 2009), pp. 160–1; Herrero Sanchéz, ‘Las Indias y la Tregua de los Doce Años’, pp. 193–4, 215–9. 7 Herrero Sanchéz, ‘Las Indias y la Tregua de los Doce Años’, p. 218. 8 Ibid. 9 BNM, Mss., 2347 (90–5); 2348 (233–8); Geoffrey Parker, España y los Países Bajos, 1559-1659 (Madrid, 1986), pp. 52–80; Engel Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry in the Caribbean Area’, The Hispanic American Historical Review 28, no. 2 (May 1948), p. 171ff.; Manuel Lucena Salmoral, Piratas, corsarios, bucaneros y filibusteros (Madrid, 2005), pp. 133–5; Jean Barjot Savant, Historia Mundial de la Marina (Madrid, 1965), pp. 74–9; Herrero Sanchéz, ‘Las Indias y la Tregua de los Doce Años’, pp. 198–200, 222–3. 10 AGS, Estado, 8789 (63 and 73); 8790 (51); BNM, Mss., 2353 (193–4); Sluiter, ‘DutchSpanish Rivalry in the Caribbean Area’, p. 195. 11 BL, Egmont Manuscripts, 1824 (56–67); Ángel Alloza Aparicio, Miguel Ángel De Bunes Ibarra and José Antonio Martínez Torres (eds), Sir Anthony Sherley, Peso de todo el mundo (1622) y Discurso sobre el aumento de esta monarquía (1625) (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 2010). 12 AGS, Estado, 8788 (41). 13 In Spanish language, the English names ‘James’ and ‘Jack’ take the form as ‘Santiago’, ‘Jacobo’ or ‘Jaime’; for instance, on 25 July 1618 (day of Saint James in Spain), Gondomar was celebrated with a banquet organized at the house of the Earl of Arundel, including the presence of the Duke of Buckingham, who was sent by James to guarantee Gondomar the loyalty and friendship of England towards Spain; BP, II/870, unnumbered. 14 Years later, in 1623, the English said that ‘Spaniards win more battles with the diplomatic treaties than with wars’ (my translation); Sir Charles Cornwallis, English ambassador to Spain, wrote in 1605 that the peace with James had allowed the Spaniards to focus on the conflict against the Dutch rebels; AGS, Estado, 841 (9); 842 (162); BP, II/2590 (16); Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 78–81; Irving Anthony A. Thompson, ‘Sir Charles Cornwallis y su Discurso sobre el Estado de

 Notes 187

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34 35

España (1608)’, in Porfirio Sanz Camañes (ed.), La Monarquía Hispánica en Tiempos del Quijote (Madrid, 2005), pp. 65–101. BL, Add. Mss., 14005 (102–77); BL, Eg. Mss., 2080 (254–65). For this unstable European peace, Ronald G. Asch, ‘Warfare in the Age of the Thirty Years War 1618-1648’, in Jeremy Black (ed.), European Warfare. 1453-1815 (New York, 1999), pp. 45–7. John Lothrop Motley, John of Barneveld, Advocate of Holland, with a View of the Primary Causes and Movements of the Thirty Years’ War (New York, 1874), p. 387. Anna Beer, Patriot or Traitor. The Life and Death of Sir Walter Ralegh (London, 2018), chapter 17, ‘The Last Hours of Ralegh’, p. 273ff. José Muñoz Maldonado, conde de Fabraquer, Causas célebres históricas españolas (Madrid, 1858), p. 429. AGS, Estado, 8789 (51). AGS, Estado, 841 (9); 842 (162); BP, II/2590 (16); Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 78–81. Herrero Sanchéz, ‘Las Indias y la Tregua de los Doce Años’, pp. 226–7. BNM, Mss., 9133 (75–8); 18430 (439); BP, II/2160 (57). According to Patrick Williams, after the resignation of Lerma in 1618, the control of the political power at the Spanish court by his son, the Duke of Uceda, was so weak, due to the fights for the power among Uceda, Father Luis de Aliaga (the royal confessor), Don Baltasar de Zúñiga and his nephew Olivares, that it could not be defined as a new royal favourite’s regime; in this respect, the real and symbolic end of Lerma’s regime was the death of King Phillip III (March 1621) and the execution of Don Rodrigo Calderón; Patrick Williams, El Gran Valido. El duque de Lerma, la Corte y el gobierno de Felipe III, 1598-1621 (Valladolid, 2010), chapters 10 and 11; Luis Salas Almela, ‘Realeza, valimiento y poder: en torno a las últimas aportaciones sobre el reinado de Felipe III’, Hispania, Revista Española de Historia LXX, no. 234 (2010), pp. 173–4, and note 15. AGS, Estado, 840 (244); AHN, Estado, 2798 (8). BL, Add. Mss., 14005 (102–77); Eg. Mss., 2080 (254–65). AHN, Estado, 739 (89–94). BL, Add. Mss., 28470 (120–44); BP, II/870, unnumbered. BP, II/870, unnumbered. AGS, Estado, 8777 (44). BL, Eg. Mss., 339 (147–54 and 187–200); AGS, Estado, 2516 (83); BNM, Mss., 2358 (285–9). BNM, Mss., 3015 (153–7); AHN, Osuna, 5 (5); Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, p. 316; John H. Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares. Un hombre de estado en una época de decadencia (Barcelona, 1990), pp. 102–3; Geoffrey Parker, La Gran Estrategia de Felipe II (Madrid, 1998), pp. 469–70. Kenneth R. Andrews, ‘Caribbean Rivalry and the Anglo-Spanish Peace of 1604’, History-The Journal of the Historical Association, Birmingham 59, no. 195 (1974), p. 17, note 70; Feros, El duque de Lerma, pp. 320ff. and 382ff. BNM, Mss., 2349, unnumbered. J. H. Elliot, El Conde-Duque de Olivares. El político en una época de decadencia (Barcelona, 1990), pp. 83–94; Peter Brightwell, ‘The Spanish System and the Twelve Years’ Truce’, English Historical Review no. 89 (1974), pp. 270–92; John H. Elliott, ‘El movimiento reformista en Castilla al advenimiento de Felipe IV’, in Ramón Menéndez Pidal (ed.), La España de Felipe IV, vol. XXV (Madrid, 1982), pp. 333–42.

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36 In 1604, the father of the Count-Duke of Olivares, Don Enrique de Guzmán, had declared during a meeting of the Council of State that the peace with England was something very beneficial to Spain; AHN, Estado, 2798 (8). 37 Although historians such as Feros wrote that Olivares considered the treaties with England and the Netherlands very detrimental to Spain, the documentary sources found show the opposite: Olivares and his uncle Zúñiga thought the peace with England was very useful for Spain; BP, II/2221 (47); BNM, Mss., 18201 (29–31); BL, Eg. Mss., 2052 (213–22); Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, pp. 112–13; Feros, El duque de Lerma, pp. 18–19. 38 ADA, 231 (1). 39 AGS, Estado, 2515 (89); Simon Adams, ‘Spain or Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy’, in Howard Tomlinson (ed.), Before the English Civil War (London, 1983), pp. 79–101. 40 On 18 November 1618 a comet was seen crossing the southern England; the event was linked with numerous calamities, including the war in Germany, the massacre of Protestants in Great Britain, the Spanish match and the change of religion in England or the Prince of Wales’ apostasy; James despised and ignored such prophecies; Harris, Rebellion, pp. 186–7. 41 Ibid., pp. 190–200. 42 BL, Add. Mss., 14015 (75–80); AGS, Estado, 8789 (7); Adams, ‘Spain or Netherlands?’, pp. 79–101; Jean-Frederic Schaub, ‘La Monarquía Hispana en el sistema europeo de estados’, in Antonio Feros and Juan Gelabert (dirs.), España en tiempos del Quijote (Madrid, 2004), pp. 97–128. 43 The masque was The Masque of Augurs, written by Ben Jonson and designed by Iñigo Jones, in which Prince Charles participated and the Stuart foreign policy was praised, while the ‘Spanish Match’ was being negotiated and there were wars in Germany and in Flanders; AGS, Estado, 8788 (6); Sara Pearl, ‘Sounding to Present Occasions: Jonson’s Masques of 1620-25’, in David Lindley (ed.), The Court Masque (Manchester, 1984), pp. 65–7. 44 The physical weakness of James was highlighted by Sir Anthony Seldon in his book Court and Character of King James (1650); through his creepy description of the king, Seldon wanted to ridicule the defeated Stuart dynasty and gain favour with the new ruler of England (Cromwell); Harris, Rebellion, chapter 2, pp. 45–7, and note 1. 45 He was baptized on 17 December 1567 in the chapel of the Stirling castle; Harris, Rebellion, pp. 45, 63–5. 46 Astrid J. Stilma, ‘The Battle of Lepanto. The Introduction of James VI of Scotland to the Dutch’, in Ralph Houlbrooke (ed.), James VI and I. Ideas, Authority and Government (Ashgate, 2006), pp. 9–23; Peter C. Herman, ‘Best of Poets, Best of Kings. King James VI and I and the Scene of Monarchic Verse’, in Daniel Fischlin and Mark Fortier (eds), Essays on the Writings of James VI and I (Detroit, 2002), pp. 61–93. 47 Stilma, ‘The Battle of Lepanto’, pp. 9–23. 48 Villamediana described the parade on 25 March 1604 and the greetings from James and Queen Anne; the Stuart parade was very different than the triumphal procession of Elizabeth I in 1588; AGS, Estado, 841 (27); on James’s ideas of a united Christendom, see William Brown Patterson, King James VI and I and the Reunion of the Christendom (Cambridge, 1997); William Leahy, Elizabethan Triumphal Processions (London, 2016), pp. 74–81, 146.

 Notes 189 49 On the corruption of the Stuart court, see Linda Levy Peck, Court, Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England (London, 1993). 50 Villamediana bitterly complained that King James was convinced that universal peace or war in the world depended on his political decisions; AGS, Estado, 840 (152). 51 Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 158–9; Thomas M. Coakley, ‘Robert Cecil in Power: Elizabethan Politics in Two Reigns’, in Howard S. Reinmuth, Jr. (ed.), Early Stuart Studies (Minneapolis, 1970), pp. 64–94; Albert J. Loomie, ‘Sir Robert Cecil and the Spanish Embassy’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 42 (London, 1969), p. 53ff. 52 AGS, Estado, 2571 (118 and 295); 2585 (33 and 76). 53 Roger Lockyer, Buckingham: The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham (1592-1628) (Longman, 1981), pp. 14–23. 54 Lockyer, The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, pp. 25–36. 55 Ibid., pp. 78–9. 56 AGS, Estado, 840 (108). 57 Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, pp. 83–94. 58 On sex and morale of James’s court, see Joanna Rickman, Love, Lust and License in Early Modern England. Illicit Sex and the Nobility (Ashgate, 2008), p. 69ff.; Harris, Rebellion, pp. 49–50. 59 Lockyer, The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, p. 12; Michael B. Young, King James and the History of Homosexuality (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 29ff. and 135ff.; Rickman, Love, Lust and License, pp. 134–5. 60 My translation; BP, II/2168 (43). 61 It was not the first comment in Spain on James’s quasi-feminine personality; in 1604, the Spanish ambassador described him as timid as a woman; Harris, Rebellion, p. 48 and note 24. 62 Ibid., p. 190 and notes 12 and 13. 63 Ibid., pp. 192–3. 64 These accusations of being too soft and peaceful with the enemies were also made against Phillip III and Lerma, although the Spanish king was never accused of homosexual or effeminate behaviour. 65 Antonio Feros, ‘Imágenes de maldad, imágenes de reyes’, in John H. Elliott and Laurence Brockliss, El mundo de los validos (Madrid, 2000), pp. 293–31; Harris, Rebellion, pp. 191 and 213. 66 Harris, Rebellion, pp. 236–8. 67 Glynn Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta (Madrid, 2004), pp. 144–5. 68 BP, II/I267 (57). 69 Buckingham was accused of an unrestrained lust at the Spanish royal palace, while the duke acted as a matchmaker for the prince; Rickman, Love, Lust and License, p. 135; ADA, 231 (1); Leticia Álvarez Recio, ‘The White House en A Game at Chess: el ataque de Thomas Middleton a la política real’, Atlantis 22, no. 2 (December 2000), pp. 16–17. 70 Feros, El duque de Lerma, pp. 189–99. 71 Ibid., p. 227. 72 On the frontispiece of the books of Father Juan de Robles (Tardes del Alcázar, doctrina para el perfecto vasallo) and the Count De la Roca (El Fernando o Sevilla restaurada), Olivares was represented as the titan Atlas, who carried the heavy Spain on his shoulders; the image of Olivares holding Spain is similar to James being held by the two Spanish ambassadors in 1622; Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares,

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pp. 74–5; John H. Elliot, ‘Conservar el poder: el conde-duque de Olivares’, in John H. Elliott and Laurence Brockliss, El mundo de los validos (Madrid, 2000), pp. 165–79. 73 Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, p. 202; Elliot, ‘Conservar el poder: el conde-duque de Olivarespp’, pp. 165–79; John H. Elliot, ‘Los ministros privados como fenómeno europeo’, in Rafael Benítez Sánchez-Blanco (ed.), España en Europa. Estudios de historia comparada (Valencia, 2003), pp. 93–115; Gregorio Marañón, El Conde-Duque de Olivares. La pasión de mandar (Madrid, 1998 (1936)), pp. 251–78; Fernando Rodríguez de la Flor, Pasiones Frías. Secretos y disimulación en el Barroco Hispánico (Madrid, 2005), pp. 113–22; Robert A. Stradling, Felipe IV y el gobierno de España, 1621-1665 (Madrid, 1989), p. 109. 74 Buckingham’s sorcerer was John Lambe, famous and very hated in England, who died stoned on the streets of London in 1628, year in which his biography was written (A Briefe description of the Notorious life of John Lambe otherwise called Doctor Lambe. Together with his Ignominious Death). In 1634 a theatre play was represented, Dr. Lamb and the Witches; BP, II/2172 (27, 53, 115–16); Karin Amundsen, ‘The Duke’s Devil and Doctor Lambe’s Darling: A Case Study of the Modern Witch in Early Modern England’, Psi Sigma Historical Journal 2 (2004), pp. 29–60; Alastair Bellany, ‘Rayling Rymes and Vaunting Verse: Libellous Politics in Early Stuart England, 1603-1628’, in Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake (eds), Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England (London and New York, 1994), pp. 285–310; Barry Coward, The Stuart Age (London, 1994), pp. 60 and 75–7; Rickman, Love, Lust and License, pp. 191–3; Alastair Bellany, ‘The Murder of John Lambe: crowd violence, court scandal and popular politics in Early Seventeenth-Century England’, Past & Present 2000, no. 1 (August 2008), pp. 37–76. 75 AGS, Estado, 8792 (31). 76 ADA, 219 (1). 77 The historian Geoffrey Parker called Phillip II ‘imprudent king’ for his deep leadership failures; Geoffrey Parker, Imprudent King. A new life of Phillip II (Chicago, 2014). 78 As Mateo Alemán wrote in his novel The Life of Guzmán D’Alfarache (1599–1604), ‘God deliver thee from the Plague, that comes downe from Castile, and from the Famine than comes up from Andaluzia’ (James Mabble’s translation, 1623); Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, ‘Prólogo’ in Ramón Menéndez Pidal (ed.), La crisis del siglo XVII. La población, la economía y la sociedad, tomo XXIII (Madrid, 1989); Manuel Fernández Álvarez, Felipe II y su Tiempo (Madrid, 1998), pp. 614–15; John H. Elliott, ‘La decadencia de España’, in Carlo María Cipolla (ed.), La decadencia económica de los imperios (Madrid, 1985 (1973)), pp. 129–55. 79 Fernández Álvarez, Felipe II y su Tiempo, pp. 614–17; Parker, La Gran Estrategia, pp. 454–55; I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Oposición política y juicio del gobierno en las Cortes de 1592-1598’, Studia Historica, Historia Moderna no. 17 (1997), pp. 37–62. 80 In April 1603, Archduke Albert wrote a letter to Philip III and Lerma saying he sent his envoy, Nicolás Scorza, to Scotland; AGS, Mss., 687 (287–88). 81 Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, 1598–1621, pp. 66–9, 73–4, 80–1, 112–6; García García, La Pax Hispánica. Política exterior del duque de Lerma, p. 37ff.; Sanz Camañes, Los ecos de la armada: España, Inglaterra y la estabilidad del Norte (1585-1660), pp. 199ff. and 239ff.; see Enrique García Hernán, The Battle of Kinsale (Madrid, 2013). 82 Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, p. 145ff.; Bernardo J. García García, ‘Peace with England, from Convenience to Necessity, 1596–1604’, in Anne J. Cruz (ed.), Material

 Notes 191 and Symbolic Circulation between Spain and England, 1554–1604 (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 135–50; Albert J. Loomie, ‘Philip III and the Stuart Succession in England, 1600–1603’, Revue belge de Philologie et d’historie 43, no. 2 (1965), pp. 492–514; Albert J. Loomie, English Polemics at the Spanish Court: Joseph Creswell’s Letter to the Ambassador from England – The English and Spanish Texts of 1606 (New York, 1993), pp. 7–8. 83 AGS, Estado, 840 (150–1); 841 (220–2). 84 AGS, Estado, 841 (108). 85 See the diplomatic instructions for Villamediana; BNM, Mss., 2347 (70–7). 86 Nicolás Scorza and the Flemish Count of Arenberg were not the only Hispanic envoys to be sent to Scotland and England in this period; Doctor Robert Taylor had crossed the English Channel in July 1603 to negotiate in secret with the Countess of Suffolk and other ministers of King James I; AGS, Estado, 840 (213–14). 87 AGS, Estado, 840 (190–92, 220–23, 231). 88 AGS, Estado, 840 (234–35). 89 AGS, Estado, 840 (108). 90 AGS, Estado, 840 (253–4). 91 At Boulogne there were four English delegates and three main Spanish envoys (Don Fernando Carrillo, the marquis of Cerralvo and Don Baltasar de Zúñiga); AGS, Estado, 840 (12–13); BNM, Mss., 6170 (140–7). 92 Juan Bautista de Tassis worked in England with his nephew Villamediana and the Constable during the years 1603–1604; Relación impresa de la Jornada que hizo a Inglaterra el Condestable de Castilla don Juan Fernández de Velasco, el año 1603, al ajuste de las paces con Inglaterra y España (1604). 93 AGS, Estado, 840 (220–2). 94 AGS, Estado, 840 (253–4); Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, 1598-1621, pp. 66–9, 73–4, 80–1, 112–16; García García, La Pax Hispánica. Política exterior del duque de Lerma, pp. 37–9. 95 AHN, Estado, 2798 (5). 96 Alfredo Alvar, El duque de Lerma. Corrupción y desmoralización en la España del siglo XVII, p. 350ff.; Manuel Lomas Cortés, El proceso de expulsión de los moriscos de España (1609-1614) (Valencia, 2011), p. 37. 97 Williams, El Gran Valido, pp. 137–41. 98 Ibid., pp. 140–1. 99 His opinions got always great weight at the Spanish Council of State. Ibid., p. 181. 100 AGS, Estado, 840 (220–3 and 266–7). 101 Alvar, El duque de Lerma, pp. 295–7; José Andrés-Gallego, Historia General de España y América. La Crisis de la Hegemonía Española. Siglo XVII (Madrid, 1991), p. 435. 102 The Constable left unforgettable memories at the Jacobean court due to his extraordinary liberality with money, jewels, gifts and pensions, something that the following Spanish ambassadors would regret; Feros, El duque de Lerma, p. 411. 103 According to the Spanish diplomatic correspondence, the English were very arrogant and vain in their deals with the Spaniards; AGS, Estado, 840 (152 and 181). 104 Williams, El Gran Valido, p. 141. 105 AGS, Estado, 841 (26). 106 He was answering letters from the ambassador of 2 and 13 June and 4 and 6 July 1603, in which the trip to Flanders by land was described.

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107 Relación muy verdadera del recibimiento y fiestas que se le hicieron en Inglaterra a don Juan de Tassis, conde de Villamediana, embajador extraordinario de Su Majestad del Rey don Felipe III nuestro Señor, para el nuevo Rey Jacobo de Inglaterra. Dase cuenta de la embajada y otras cosas muy notables y dignas de saberse. Impresor Bartolomé Gómez (Seville, 1603), and Relación muy verdadera de la Segunda Parte de la Embajada de don Juan de Tassis, conde de Villamediana y embajador de Su Majestad el Rey don Felipe III nuestro Señor, para el nuevo Rey Jacobo de Inglaterra. Dase cuenta de lo que Su Majestad le respondió y los grandes comedimientos que se hicieron. Impresor Bartolomé Gómez (Seville, 1604). 108 AHN, Estado, 2798 (5). 109 AGS, Estado, 840 (240). 110 AGS, Estado, 840, (270). 111 Albert J. Loomie, ‘Toleration and Diplomacy’, American Philosophical SocietyTransactions 53, no. 2 (1963), Philadelphia, p. 30. 112 AGS, Estado, 841 (1); AHN, Estado, 2798 (5). 113 The Constable bought many pieces of jewellery from Spanish, Portuguese and Italian merchants and jewellers in Brussels and Antwerp. 114 AHN, 2798 (5). 115 BNM, Mss., 17477 (208–30). 116 No documents have been found relating to the frustration felt, according to J. H. Elliot, by England and Spain: John H. Elliott, ‘Una relación agitada: España y Gran Bretaña, 1604–1655’, in Jonathan Brown and John H. Elliott (eds), La Almoneda del Siglo. Relaciones artísticas entre España y Gran Bretaña, 1604–1665 (Madrid, 2002), pp. 17–40; in 1615, King James sold the three English posts in Zeland for £200,000; Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 194–5; Sanz Camañes, Los ecos de la armada: España, Inglaterra y la estabilidad del Norte (1585-1660), p. 276ff. 117 My translation; BNM, Mss., 6949 (11526). 118 José Manuel Díaz Blanco, Razón de Estado y Buen Gobierno. La guerra defensiva y el imperialismo español en tiempos de Felipe III (Sevilla, 2010), pp. 168–71, 311–31. 119 Ibid., p. 294. 120 Relación de la Jornada del Excelentísimo Condestable de Castilla a las Paces entre España e Inglaterra que se concluyeron y juraron en Londres por el mes de agosto, año 1604 (Antwerp, 1604). 121 AHN, Estado, 2798 (5); AGS, Estado, 841 (30). 122 Israel, The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806, p. 399ff.; Carlos Seco Serrano, ‘Las relaciones con Flandes’, in Ramón Menéndez Pidal (ed.), La España de Felipe III, vol. 23 (Madrid, 1979), pp. 233–52. 123 Schaub, ‘La Monarquía Hispana en el sistema europeo de estados’, pp. 97–128. 124 See more on the Spanish offensive from 1618 in Europe, Brightwell, ‘The Spanish System and the Twelve Years’ Truce’, pp. 270–92. 125 King James was called by him ‘head of the bad Protestant sect’ (my translation); James Amelang, ‘El mundo mental de Jeroni Pujades’, in Richard L. Kagan and Geoffrey Parker (eds), España, Europa y el Mundo Atlántico. Homenaje a John Elliott (Madrid, 2002), pp. 279–97. 126 AGS, Estado, 840 (152). 127 Proposals regarding this point began as soon as Villamediana arrived England in October 1603; King Philip III’s orders were basically that Villamediana would listen and give hope.

 Notes 193 128 These ideas were very popular due to two English pamphlets written in 1603 by Sir Walter Raleigh and Lord Henry Howard: Discurso sobre una guerra con España y sobre la protección de los Países Bajos and Advertencia de un súbdito leal a su gracioso soberano; CSP Venice (1603–7), Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate, Kingston, 22 October/13 October 1603; AGS, Estado, 840 (148 and 264–65); Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 158–9; I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Sir Charles Cornwallis y su Discurso sobre el Estado de España (1608)’, pp. 65–101. 129 This neutrality was defended by Lord Henry Howard in his pamphlet of 1603; Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 158–9; Coakley, ‘Robert Cecil in Power: Elizabethan Politics in Two Reigns’, pp. 64–94; Loomie, ‘Sir Robert Cecil and the Spanish Embassy’, pp. 30–54, 53ff. 130 AGS, Estado, 840 (108 and 147); BP, II/551 (39–41); Andrews, ‘Caribbean Rivalry and the Anglo-Spanish Peace of 1604’, pp. 1–17. 131 The most important members of these groups were Lord Charles Howard, Lord Thomas Howard and Sir Walter Raleigh (Sir Robert Cecil had businesses in trade with the Indies too, but he did not consider the Spanish refusal of English trade with America as a casus belli); Ibid., pp. 1–17. 132 Relación de la Jornada del Excelentísimo Condestable de Castilla a las Paces entre España e Inglaterra que se concluyeron y juraron en Londres por el mes de agosto, año 1604 (Valladolid, 1604). 133 CSP Venice (1604). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London 18 August/22 September 1604. 134 See William S. Maltby, The Black Legend in England. The Development of Anti-Spanish Sentiment, 1558–1660 [1971] (Durham, NC, 1971); John H. Elliott, ‘De Bry y la imagen europea de América’, in Teodoro Bry (intro.), America: 1590–1634 (Madrid, 1992), pp. 7–13. 135 He was member of an old family in charge of the imperial post during the times of the Emperor Maximilian Habsburg; Tassis was ‘Master of the Posts’ and ‘Gentlemanin-Waiting’ of Phillip III; Feros, El duque de Lerma. Realeza y privanza en la España de Felipe III, p. 92. 136 BNM, Mss., 2347 (70–7). 137 AGS, Estado, 840 (108). 138 AGS, Estado, 840 (118). 139 The renewal of the trade between England and the Spanish domains in Europe was not as profitable for the English merchants as expected due to the rivalry with the Dutch merchants and the Hanseatic League; Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, p. 195, note 75; Ángel Alloza Aparicio, Europa en el mercado español. Mercaderes, represalias y contrabando en el siglo XVII (Salamanca, 2006), p. 35ff. 140 AGS, Estado, 840 (119, 139–40 and 215). 141 AGS, Estado, 840 (119). 142 AGS, Estado, 840 (173). 143 Adrian Tinniswood, Behind the Throne. A Domestic History of the British Royal Household (New York, 2018), chapter 2, ‘Behind the Masque’. 144 AGS, Estado, 840 (153 and 173). 145 BP, II/2137 (100). 146 Relación muy verdadera del recibimiento y fiestas que se le hicieron en Inglaterra a don Juan de Tassis, conde de Villamediana, embajador extraordinario de Su Majestad del

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Rey don Felipe III nuestro Señor, para el nuevo Rey Jacobo de Inglaterra. Dase cuenta de la embajada y otras cosas muy notables y dignas de saberse (Seville, 1603). 147 AGS, Estado, 840 (179). 148 The plague lasted into the autumn and part of the winter of 1603; Villamediana arrived in London in February, 1604; BNM, Mss., 13141 (149–50); AGS, Estado, 841 (27). 149 Relación muy verdadera del recibimiento y fiestas que se le hicieron en Inglaterra a don Juan de Tassis. 150 AGS, Estado, 840 (258). 151 AGS, Estado, 840 (259). 152 AGS, Estado, 840 (181 and 184). 153 AGS, Estado, 840 (139–40 and 188). 154 AGS, Estado, 840 (139–40). 155 AGS, Estado, 840 (258). 156 In Flanders, the constable was very well informed of the situation in England from dispatches of Villamediana, the Archduke Albert and King Philip III; in addition, he was worried about the siege of Ostend and about the payment of 400,000 ducats for his diplomatic mission. 157 CSP Venice (1603–7). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to Doge and Senate, London, 8 April/12 May 1604. 158 BL, Cotton Vespasian CXIII, 69–70; AHN, Estado, 2798 (5); Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, p. 190ff. 159 BP, II/2117 (52). 160 AHN, Estado, 2798 (6); Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 191–2. 161 Andrews, ‘Caribbean Rivalry’, p. 14ff.; for more, see Ronald D. Hussey, ‘America in European Diplomacy 1597–1604’, Revista de Historia de América 41 (1956), pp. 1–30; David B. Quinn, Explorers and Colonies. America, 1500-1625 (London, 1990), pp. 321–41. 162 In the Spanish Council of State, the Treaty of London was welcomed with a great satisfaction; AHN, Estado, 2798 (8). 163 AHN, Estado, 3456 (13). 164 Alloza Aparicio, Europa en el mercado español, pp. 254–5. 165 AGS, Estado, 2863 (9); Loomie, ‘Toleration and Diplomacy. The Religious Issue in Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1603–1605’, pp. 1–60; Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 192–4. 166 AGS, Estado, 840 (244); AHN, Estado, 2798 (5). 167 BNM, Mss., 6949 (115–26). 168 AGS, Estado, 841 (1). 169 He asked a large amount of jewellery, Spanish horses and a huge amount of money for King James, Queen Anne, British ministers and courtiers; AGS, Estado, 841 (10–11 and 13). 170 Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 191–2. 171 Oliver Cromwell, in his declaration of war against Spain, used the same reasons; Alloza Aparicio, Europa en el mercado español, pp. 254–5. 172 AGS, Estado, 840 (264–65). 173 AHN, Estado, 2798 (5). 174 Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 191–2; see also Andrews, ‘Caribbean Rivalry’. 175 AHN, Estado, 2798 (5); BL, Cot. Vesp. CXIII, 69–70. 176 AGS, Estado, 841 (30).

 Notes 195 177 178 179 180 181

AGS, Estado, 841 (29). AGS, Estado, 842 (162). AGS, Estado, 840 (244); BNM, Mss., 1492 (201); AHN, Estado, 2798 (8). Marqués de Villa Urrutia, Ocios diplomáticos (Madrid, 1927), pp. 81–107. AGS, Estado, 841, 20; CSP Venice (1603–7). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 9 June 1604. 182 AGS, Estado, 8790 (43). 183 AGS, Estado, 8788 (60); 8790 (25 and 66). 184 AGS, Estado, 8773 (79); 8780 (74); 8788 (59 and 81); 8792 (15); BL, Adds. Mss., 10236, 107–13. 185 AGS, Estado, 8788 (85); 8789 (51); Michael C. Questier, Stuart Dynastic Policy and Religious Politics, 1621–1625 (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 1–29. 186 BP, II/2160(66); II/551 (204–05); AGS, Estado, 8788 (73); 8789 (7). 187 The cities of Frankenthal, Mannheim and Heidelberg, in the Upper Palatinate region, and troops of the Imperial Catholic league were led by Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly. 188 The English parliament demanded war against Spain in return for subsidies to King James, but he refused it; the convening of the parliament was James’s manoeuvre to show Gondomar and King Philip IV that he would resist parliamentary pressure for war against Spain; Adams, ‘Spain or Netherlands?’ pp. 79–101; Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta. Una boda real frustrada, p. 51ff.; see also Conrad Russell, Unrevolutionary England 1603–1642 (London, 1990). 189 ADA, 219 (1); Alloza Aparicio, pp. 67ff., 149ff. 190 AGS, Estado, 840 (151); 841 (1 and 30). 191 Fernández Álvarez, Felipe II y su tiempo, p. 751. 192 BP, II/2220 (23); AGS, Estado, 8792 (37). 193 AGS, Estado, 8781 (23). 194 The first expression of England’s imperial aspirations took place during the days of Elizabeth I, and her Armada Portrait is the best example; AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered; Alloza Aparicio, Europa en el mercado español, p. 68; John H. Elliott, Imperios del Mundo Atlántico (Madrid, 2006), pp. 55 and 181–2. 195 Andrews, ‘Caribbean Rivalry’, p. 17. 196 Parker, España y los Países Bajos 1559–1659, pp. 81–111. 197 BNM, Mss., 2348 (233–38); Alloza Aparicio, Europa en el mercado español, pp. 67–9; Parker, España y los Países Bajos 1559–1659, pp. 52–80. 198 Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta, p. 140. 199 AGS, Estado, 8791 (45); AHN, Estado, 2756 (2); BP, II/2220 (2); Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta, p. 297ff. 200 The document is a Spanish diplomatic account of the session of the parliament, which happened on 24 February 1624; BP, II/2172 (53 and 61), my translation; on the English sources, Buckingham blamed Olivares for such promises; ‘24 February 1624’ Proceedings in Parliament 1624: The House of Commons, ed. Philip Baker (2015– 18), British History Online http:​//www​.brit​ish-h​istor​y.ac.​uk/no​-seri​es/pr​oceed​ings-​ 1624-​parl (accessed 14 June 2018). 201 Ibid. 202 Harris, Rebellion. Britain’s First Stuart Kings, pp. 248–50. 203 BNM, Mss., 10794 (151–200); Mss., 9408 (100–15). 204 AGS, Estado, 8773 (79). 205 BNM, Mss., 2354 (226–27).

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206 AHN, Estado, 722, unnumbered; BNM, Mss., 2354 (224–25); Mss., 2362 (253–60). 207 BNM, Mss., 18434 (69–72); BL, Add. Mss., 10236 (107–13); BP, II/2167 (54); II/2167 (59–60). 208 AGS, Estado, 8786 (15); 8783 (50). 209 BP, II/2172 (53). 210 ADA, 147 (48); 219 (1); BP, II/2172 (115–66); my translation of the text. 211 BP, II/2220 (53); William D. Phillips, ‘The Frustrated Unity of Atlantic Europe: The Roles of Spain and England’, in Anne J. Cruz, Material and Symbolic Circulation between Spain and England (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 3–13. 212 BP, II/2191 (57 and 73–6); II/2108 (119). 213 BP, II/2167 (75). 214 Elliott, ‘Una relación agitada’, pp. 17–40. 215 In exchange for this, the council of the Portuguese state offered the English merchants a decrease in the price of goods from the East Indies in Lisbon, so they could buy them there and make a large profit; however, the Council of State in Madrid thought this concession not enough for England as the English trade and trading company with the East Indies were very profitable and well developed; this Portuguese attitude was the same during the debates on the truce with the Dutch (1619–21). 216 This had happened before, in 1604 and 1609; the Portuguese crown was less powerful in terms of politics, army and economy than the Crown of Castile. 217 Robert A. Stradling, Europa y el declive de la estructura imperial española 1580–1720 (Madrid, 1983), pp. 98–106. 218 AHN, Estado, 2756 (2); see more, Relación de las Fiestas y Singulares Favores que a Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, señor de La Corzana, embajador extraordinario de Su Majestad el rey católico Nuestro Señor, al Serenísimo Rey de la Gran Bretaña, se le hicieron en la jornada que de España hizo, acompañando al Serenísimo señor Príncipe de Gales a Inglaterra (Madrid, 1624). 219 Rafael Rodríguez-Moñino Soriano, Razón de Estado y dogmatismo religioso en la España del siglo XVII (Barcelona, 1976), pp. 185–203. 220 They left Santander on Thursday, 28 September, and after a trip full of dangers and storms, they arrived at Portsmouth on Sunday, 15 October 1623; ADA, 231 (1); BP, II/2590 (6–7); Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta, pp. 287–9. 221 AGS, Estado, 8783 (35); 8783 (54). 222 Because of James’s poor health, by the end of 1623, Coloma was anticipating his death: this expectation increased Prince Charles’s hopes; after a masked ball at the royal palace on May 1622, James had to be helped by Gondomar and Coloma himself to get back to his chambers; AGS, Estado, 8788 (6); 8790 (66); Archibald L. Goodall, ‘The Health of James the Sixth of Scotland and First of England’, Medical History 1, no. 1 (January 1957), pp. 17–27. 223 BNM, Mss., 10467 (14–16); 17659, unnumbered; AGS, Estado, 8780 (74). 224 The ministers were the Duke of Infantado, Agustín Messía, the Marquis of La Laguna, the Marquis of Aytona, Don Diego de Ibarra, Don Fernando Girón and the Count of Gondomar; BNM, Mss., 17659, unnumbered. 225 Simon Adams and Geoffrey Parker, ‘Europa y la guerra del Palatinado’, in Geoffrey Parker (ed.) La Guerra de los Treinta Años (Madrid, 2003), pp. 55–64, 88; Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, pp. 273, 257; Hugo Hermann, Sitio de Breda rendida a las armas de Phelipe IV [1627], ed. Julio Albi de la Cuesta (Madrid, 2001), p. 67; see more, Geoffrey Parker, Europa en crisis, 1598-1648, [1981](Madrid, 2017).

 Notes 197 226 BP, II/2220 (21). 227 AGS, Estado, 8785 (2 and 12); 8790 (36); BNM, Mss., 10467 (226–28); Questier, Stuart Dynastic Policy and Religious Politics, pp. 72–85. 228 BNM, Mss., 2355 (307–08). 229 BNM, Mss., 10467 (226–28); see more about this question, Thomas Cogswell, ‘England and the Spanish Match’, in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (eds), Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics 1603–1642 (London, 1989), pp. 107–33. 230 BNM, Mss., 2355 (358–65). 231 BL, Add. Mss., 20848 (165–73 and 174–81); BNM, Mss., 2356 (38–39); 2355 (382–83); Questier, Stuart Dynastic Policy and Religious Politics, pp. 104–14; Adams and Parker, ‘Europa y la guerra del Palatinado’, pp. 97–100. 232 BP, II/2167 (57); II/2172 (115–17); II/2220 (24–25). 233 BP, II/2167 (57); BNM, Mss., 17659, unnumbered. 234 Alloza Aparicio, Europa en el mercado español, pp. 149–52; BNM, Mss., 18196 (18–20); Mss., 10467 (24); II/2167 (55). 235 BNM, Mss., 10467 (246–49); II/2172 (87). 236 AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered and (315–16); 3456 (8); AGS, Estado, 2516 (83 and 91); BP, II/1817 (28–31). 237 The trading ban was renewed on 16 May 1628, and on 16 May 1629 Alonso de Cáceres was appointed judge of the High Admiralty for the prosecution of English and Dutch contraband; BP, II/2220 (17); BNM, Mss., 2357 (46–47); 2361 (497–98); CSP Venice (1625–6) Alvise Contarini, Venetian ambassador in Holland, to the Doge and Senate. The Hague, 22 December 1625; ADA, 79 (38); Alloza Aparicio, Europa en el mercado español, pp. 69–70; for English trade with Canary Islands, see also Francisco Fajardo Spínola, ‘Comerciar con el enemigo: Canarias y la guerra contra Inglaterra (1625–1630)’, 1998 Coloquio de Historia Canario-Americana 13 (2000), pp. 1927–44. 238 In August 1624 Coloma sent to Madrid a plan to invade Ireland, written by an Irish captain; BP, II/2220 (2 and 17); AGS, Estado, 2516 (103); AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered; Igor Pérez Tostado, ‘Cañones para Irlanda: estudio del caso de la actividad del grupo de presión irlandés en la Monarquía Católica de Felipe IV’, in Francisco José Aranda Pérez (ed.), La declinación de la Monarquía Hispánica en el siglo XVII (Cuenca, 2004), pp. 283–7. 239 AHN, Estado, 740 (315–16); BP, II/1817 (28–31). 240 BP, II/1817 (35–36). 241 AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered; BP, II/1817 (49). 242 BP, II/1817 (40–41). 243 AHN, Estado, 740 (362–67); BP, II/1817 (67–69). 244 BNM, Mss., 10467 (246–49); Charles Howard Carter, The Secret Diplomacy of the Hasburgs 1598–1625 (New York, 1964), pp. 95–106. 245 BNM, Mss., 2355 (366–67);2356 (287–88); BL, Add. Mss., 21439 (15–20). 246 AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered (243–44 and 539). 247 AHN, Estado, 740 (362–7). 248 The peace negotiations between Spain and England finished in Madrid on 15 November; the French did the same in 1629, but they had been planning these since 1627; BNM, Mss., 2359 (5); Mss., 18400 (128–33). 249 Coward, The Stuart Age. England, 1603–1714, pp. 22–9.

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250 Bruneau sent one spy to Dover to watch the passage to France of 12,000 troops by Count Ernst Von Mansfelt. 251 As reported by the Venetian ambassador; CSP Venice (1625–1626) Lunardo Moro, ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate. Madrid, 20 September 1625. 252 Possible targets to be attacked by the English fleet were Málaga, Lisbon, Canary Islands and the Azores; AHN, Estado, 740 (240–4, 315–16, 362–7); CSP Venice (1625–6). Alvise Contarini, Venetian ambassador in Holland, to the Doge and Senate. The Hague, 21 June 1625 and Zuane Pesaro, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. Southampton, 23 September 1625. 253 Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, p. 280. 254 Don Diego Messía was the ambassador appointed by the Infanta Isabella, while Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, the ambassador appointed by Philip IV, travelled to England with the English fleet from Santander; Hinojosa had already been in England since June 1623 and in Coloma since May 1622; AGS, Estado, 8792 (41). 255 For more on Hinojosa in England, see Relación verdadera de la entrada y recibimiento que hicieron a don Juan de Mendoza, marqués de la Hinojosa, capitán general de la artillería de España, y embajador extraordinario de Inglaterra que al presente está por el rey Nuestro Señor (Lima, 1624); Harris, Rebellion. Britain’s First Stuart Kings, p. 219ff. 256 AGS, Estado, 8792, (56). 257 According to Coloma, this English demand regarding Palatinate came from Buckingham, and it contradicted the suspension of arms for eighteen months to solve the Rhenish Palatinate situation between Spain and England; AGS, Estado, 8792 (52 and 56); BNM, Mss., 10467 (121–2). 258 AGS, Estado, 8792 (67). 259 Ibid. 260 AGS, Estado, 8792 (68). 261 In case England declared war on Spain, Hinojosa proposed that the fleet of Flanders be reinforced in order to attack English trade and fishing vessels; the ambassador also suggested threatening England with the army of Flanders; AGS, Estado, 8792 (68); BNM, Mss., 10467 (148–50 and 161–63). 262 Adams, ‘Spain or Netherlands?’ pp. 79–101. 263 BP, II/2172 (2). 264 BNM, Mss., 10467 (164–7). 265 BNM, Mss., 10467 (169–70). 266 BNM, Mss., 2355 (27–8); 9373 (65–6); ADA, 22 (45); BP, II/2172 (44); ADA, 147 (48); 219 (1). 267 AGS, Estado, 8792 (68); BP, II/2172 (18). 268 BP, II/2172 (12 and 27). 269 In the debates at the English Privy Council on the war with Spain, Buckingham was supported by Prince Charles against Spain, the Earl of Bristol accused Buckingham of being the main cause of the failure of the ‘Spanish Match’, and the Earl of Pembroke was enemy of Spain, as was Henry Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton; BP, II/2172 (1, 8, 21–2); Lockyer, Buckingham, pp. 170–85 and 192–217; Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta, pp. 172 and 212. 270 BP, II/2172 (11); ADA, 219 (1); Alloza Aparicio, Europa en el mercado español, p. 149ff. 271 BP, II/2172 (27). 272 ADA, 219 (1); Lockyer, Buckingham, pp. 170–85 and 192–217.

 Notes 199 273 BP, II/2172 (27 and 44). 274 See Rodríguez de la Flor, Pasiones Frías. Secreto y disimulación en el Barroco Hispánico and Richard L. Kagan, Los sueños de Lucrecia. Política y profecía en la España del siglo XVI; ADA, 182 (71). 275 Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta, pp. 51–67; Brennan Pursell, ‘War or peace? Jacobean politics and the Parliament of 1621’, in Chris R. Kyle (ed.), Parliament, Politics and Elections, 1604–1648 (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 149–78. 276 Buckingham’s speech was made on Tuesday, 5 March 1624; during the speech at the parliament, the royal favourite showed a copy of the letter from Philip IV to Olivares, dated 5 November 1622; BNM, Mss., 10467 (204–8); ADA, 219 (1). 277 BNM, Mss., 10467 (212–14). 278 Ibid. 279 ADA, 219 (1). 280 Ibid. 281 BP, II/2172 (69). 282 ADA, 219 (1); BP, II/2172 (65). 283 Prince Charles wanted an alliance with the Prince of Orange, Maurice of Nassau; according to Van Male, one Dutch envoy was Francis Aerssens, Lord of Sommelsdijk; BNM, Mss., 10467 (209); BP, II/2172 (58); ADA, 219 (1). 284 BNM, Mss., 10467 (216). 285 BNM, Mss., 10467 (215–16); ADA, 97 (1); 59 (8). 286 BP, II/2172 (58). 287 There were threats to burn the house of the Spanish ambassadors in London, who endured insults and abuses, such as being called ‘Spanish dogs’; both ambassadors decided not to leave and entrenched in the house with muskets and pickets; BP, II/2172 (63 and 65). 288 BP, II/2172 (67); BNM, Mss., 10467 (215–16). 289 BP, II/2172 (72). 290 BL, Aston Papers, vol. IV – 1625 (64); ADA, 219 (1). 291 After the failed assault on Cadiz, Philip IV had provided assurances to the secretary of the English embassy, Henry Atye, of his safety while in Spain, as Bruneau was still in London; nevertheless Atye was carefully watched day and night; AHN, Estado, 722, unnumbered. 292 Hinojosa wrote to Philip IV that to avoid war with England, it would be much wiser to ignore the acts and declarations of the English parliament; BNM, Mss., 10467 (204–8); Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta, pp. 63–4. 293 BP, II/2172 (56–60). 294 Buckingham was referring to Doctor Father Juan Roco de Campofrío, who had been the inquisitor of Valladolid, a follower of the Count of Salinas and the Count of Gondomar and president of the Council of Finances between 1621 and 1623; he was the author of a famous book against the ‘Spanish Match’, and his work must have been very well known as Prince Charles and Buckingham knew it; the scandal cost him his post at the Council; at the end of 1624 or the beginning of 1625, Father Juan Roco was appointed bishop of Zamora, in 1627 bishop of Badajoz and in 1632, bishop of Coria; Father Diego de la Fuente denied the allegations against Father Juan in front of James I in April 1624; BL, Eg. Mss., 339 (187–200); BP, II/2172 (91); Trevor J. Dadson, Los moriscos de Villarrubia de los Ojos (siglos XV–XVIII). Historia de una minoría asimilada, expulsada y reintegrada (Madrid, 2007), p. 314, note 66. BL, Harl. 1583, 329–30; BP, II/2172 (63); II/2172 (65).

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295 The official communication of the English refusal of both the marriage and the agreement on the Rhenish Palatinate was presented by Sir Walter Aston to Philip IV on 30 April; BNM, Mss., 10467 (226–28); Mss., 2355 (309–10); ADA, 219 (1); BL, Harl. 1583 (283). 296 ADA, 219 (1); ‘23 March 1624’, in Proceedings in Parliament 1624: The House of Commons, ed. Philip Baker (2015–18), British History Online http:​//www​.brit​ish-h​ istor​y.ac.​uk/no​-seri​es/pr​oceed​ings-​1624-​parl/​mar-2​3 (accessed 15 June 2018). 297 The Marquis of Mirabel, Spanish ambassador to France, thought that these events were the outbreak of the war with England; BP, II/2172 (99); my translation. 298 ADA, 219 (1); BNM, Mss., 10467 (228–32). 299 BP, II/2220, unnumbered. 300 Hinojosa protested against the fireworks and celebrations on the night of parliament’s declaration against the alliance with Spain and the diplomatic agreements; BP, II/2172 (90 and 92–3). 301 BP, II/2172 (102). 302 Carondelet’s speech to James I was long, but the main idea of it was that the king’s position and power in England was threatened by his heir and the royal favourite, as leaders of parliament. 303 James expected support from Philip IV on the issue of the Rhenish Palatinate, as he did not want the Spanish ambassadors to leave England; BP, II/2172 (65 and 100). 304 On 20 March a royal envoy left for Calais with the passport; BNM, Mss., 10467 (217–20); BL, Aston Papers, vol. IV – 1624/1625 (65). 305 BP, II/2172 (85). 306 BP, II/2172 (91). 307 BP, II/2172 (104). 308 The English parliament of 1624 was called the ‘Prince’s Parliament’ by the English population; Conrad Russell, Parliaments and English Politics [1979] (Oxford, 2003), p. 145ff. 309 AGS, Estado, 8792 (68); ADA, 219 (1); BP, II/2172 (64). 310 BNM, Mss., 2355 (317–20); BL, Add. Mss., 20846 (59–62); Lockyer, Buckingham, pp. 192–217. 311 BP, II/2172 (115–17). 312 Lockyer, Buckingham, pp. 192–217; Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, p. 348. 313 The Earl of Bristol, ill and under house arrest, welcomed the Spanish ambassadors hoping James would send Buckingham to the Tower of London to be executed for treason; AGS, Estado, 2516, 50–1; BP, II/2172 (119); ADA, 233 (24). 314 ADA, 233, 24; Antonia Fraser, La conspiración de la Pólvora. Catolicismo y terror en la Europa del siglo XVII (Madrid, 2004) p. 285. 315 BP, II/2172 (120). 316 BNM, Mss., 10467 (295–300). 317 BNM, Mss., 10467 (276–81 and 293–4). 318 Bruneau was born between the years 1569 and 1576 and died in 1634; in 1627 he was appointed secretary of the Finances in Lille, and in 1628 he was sent as Flemish diplomat to Germany and in 1630 to Hungary. 319 Miguel Ángel Echevarría Bacigalupe, Flandes y la Monarquía Hispánica, 1500–1713 (Madrid, 1998), p. 134ff.; Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, p. 94ff.; J.V. Polisensky, The Thirty Years War (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971), p. 172. 320 CSP Venice (1625–6), Zuane Pesaro, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 24 October 1624.

 Notes 201 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329

330 331 332

333

334 335

336 337 338 339 340

BP, II/1817 (91). BP, II/2160 (92). BP, II/1817 (104–5). BP, II/1817 (28–31). BP, II/1817 (49). BP, II/1817 (56–62); my translation. BP, II/1817 (67–9). BP, II/1817 (28–31); AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered; CSP Venice (1625–6), Zuane Pesaro, Venetian ambassador to England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 14 March 1625. The Venetian ambassador did not think that any Spanish diplomatic proposition would be accepted by Buckingham and Charles I; CSP Venice (1625–6), Zuane Pesaro, Venetian ambassador to England, to the Doge and Senate. Oxford, 21 and 26 August 1625. BP, II/1817 (98–101 and 109–10). CSP Venice (1625–6), Zuane Pesaro, Venetian ambassador to England, to the Doge and Senate. Southampton, 9 September 1625. After Gondomar’s death in 1626, Henry Taylor worked for the Spanish ambassador to France, the Marquis of Mirabel; later he would work as diplomat in Flanders, until his death in 1662; BP, II/1817 (115–16); María Luisa López-Vidriero, El libro antiguo español: El libro en Palacio y otros estudios bibliográficos (Salamanca, 1996), p. 191. Coloma reported that the comedy played for twelve days; ADA, 233 (24); Álvarez Recio, ‘The White House en A Game at Chess: El ataque de Thomas Middleton a la política real’, pp. 7–19; Elliott, ‘Una relación agitada’, pp. 17-40; Trevor H. HowardHill, ‘Political Interpretations of Middleton’s “A Game at Chess” (1624)’, The Yearbook of English Studies 21 (1991), pp. 274–85; Stephen Wittek, ‘Middleton’s A Game at Chess and the Making of a Theatrical Public’, SEL Studies in English Literature 1500– 1900 55, no. 2 (2015), pp. 423–46; Thomas Cogswell, ‘Thomas Middleton and the Court, 1624: “A Game at Chess” in Context’, Huntington Library Quarterly 47 (1984), pp. 273–88; Ernesto Oyarbide, ‘Embodying the Portrait of the Perfect Ambassador: The First Count of Gondomar’, in Diana Carrió-Invernizzi (dir), Embajadores culturales. transferencias de lealtades de la diplomacia española de la Edad Moderna (Madrid, 2016), pp. 163–7. Coloma wrote that sometimes there were around 3,000 people per day watching the play at the theatre; ADA, 233 (24). The reasons for banning the play were not the insults themselves to foreign ministers (Olivares or Gondomar, who was not even in England at that time), but the fact that living monarchs were represented at the stage (James, Phillip, Charles, Maria Anna of Spain, Elizabeth Stuart) in the context of confrontation; Trudi Dardy, ‘The Black Knight’s Festival Book? Thomas Middleton’s A Game at Chess’, in Alexander Samson (ed.), The Spanish Match: Prince Charles’s Journey to Madrid, 1623 (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 173–88; Howard-Hill, ‘Political Interpretations of Middleton’s “A Game at Chess” (1624)’, pp. 279–80. ADA, 233 (24). BP, II/2220 (16). ADA, 219 (1). BP, II/2220 (17). The huge failure of the Spanish Armada in 1588 awakened the English national pride of triumph, seen in Shakespeare’s plays such as Richard II or Henry V; José

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Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, La empresa de Inglaterra. La armada invencible: fabulación y realidad (Madrid, 2004), pp. 15–36 and 39ff.; Elliott, ‘Una relación agitada’, pp. 17–40; Adrian Hastings, La construcción de las nacionalidades (Madrid, 2000), pp. 53–89; Robert A. Stradling, ‘¿Leyenda invencible? La herencia cultural del año 1588 y la Historia de España e Inglaterra’, Contrastes: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofía 5 (1990), pp. 7–20; Thompson, ‘Sir Charles Cornwallis’, pp. 65–101. 341 Concerning the ‘Black Legend’ of Spain, see note CXVII; María Elvira Roca Barea, Imperiofobia y la Leyenda Negra. Roma, Rusia, Estados Unidos y el Imperio español (Madrid, 2016), 2º part (chapters 4 and 5); Ricardo García Cárcel, La Leyenda Negra. Historia y Opinión (Madrid, 1992), chapter 1; Barbara Fuchs, Exotic Nation. Maurophilia and the Construction of Early Modern Spain (Philadelphia, 2009), pp. 115–38; Eric Griffin, ‘From Ethos to Ethnos: Hispanazing “the Spaniard” in the Old World and the New’, The New Centennial Review 2, no. 1 (2002), pp. 99–106; ‘Nationalism, the Black Legend and the Revised “Spanish Tragedy”’, English Literary Renaissance vol. 39 (2009), pp. 336–70; ‘Copying “the Anti-Spaniard”: Post-Armada Hispanophobia and English Renaissance Drama’, in Barbara Fuchs and Emily Weissbourd (eds.), Representing Imperial Rivalry in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Toronto, 2015), pp. 191–216. 342 In the English play Lust’s Dominion (1599–1600), the throne of Spain was even taken by a Moorish prince after the death of Phillip II and his heir; as for the Gypsies, Thomas Middleton had presented the play The Spanish Gypsy (1621–1622), inspired by Cervantes’s Novelas Ejemplares; Claire Jowitt, ‘Political Allegory in Late Elizabethan and Early Jacobean “Turk” Plays: “Lust’s Dominion” and “The Turke”’, in Comparative Drama 36, no. ¾ (2002-2003), pp. 415–17; Barbara Fusch, ‘Spanish Lessons: Spenser and the Irish Moriscos’, Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 42, no. 1 (The English Renaissance, 2002), pp. 51–3; Edward M. Wilson, ‘Cervantes and English Literature of the Seventeenth Century’, Bulletin Hispanique 50, no. 1 (1948), pp. 27–52; Harris, Rebellion, pp. 224–6; J. A. G. Ardila (ed.), The Cervantean Heritage: Reception and Influence of Cervantes in Britain (London, 2009); Nicholas P. Canny, Making Ireland British (Oxford, 2001), pp. 42ff., 176–177, 450–1, 573–4. 343 Nicholas P. Canny, ‘The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America’, in David Armitage (ed.), Theories of Empire, 1450-1800 (London and New York, 1998), p. 197ff., note 41. 344 Ibid., pp. 573–4. 345 Ibid. 346 Coloma and Hinojosa learnt the same English views in 1623 and 1624; BNM, Mss., 1492 (270); BP, II/870, unnumbered; II/2172 (100); AGS, Estado, 8791 (29); 8791 (44); 8790 (15); Antonio Cortijo Ocaña and Timothy McGovern, ‘Una higa a los españoles. Un documento inédito de la propaganda anticatólica en Inglaterra de Isabel I (1591)’, Olivar 4, no. 4 (2003), pp. 179–206; John H. Elliott, España y su Mundo, 1500–1700 (Madrid, 2007), pp. 27–50; Maltby, The Black Legend, p. 180. 347 BP, II/551 (99–103); 551 (118–19). 348 Ibid.; Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola published ‘La Conquista de las Molucas’ in 1609; Bartolomé de las Casas his ‘Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias’ in 1552; at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the great European powers (Spain, England, the Netherlands, France) were focusing on the East Indies, so Argensola’s book showed up in the right moment; the sixteenth century was the century of America, and the seventeenth century was one of Asia.

 Notes 203 349 Jose Manuel Díaz Blanco, Razón de Estado y Buen Gobierno. La guerra defensiva y el imperialismo español en tiempos de Felipe III (Sevilla, 2010), pp. 169–70, 311–12. 350 Herrero Sanchéz, ‘Las Indias y la Tregua de los Doce Años’, pp. 203–4. 351 Ibid. 352 Barbara Fuchs, ‘Faithless Empires: Pirates, Renegadoes and the English Nation’, ELH 67, no. 1 (2000), p. 47ff. 353 On the changes of perceptions and attitudes towards English ‘piracy’ between Elizabethan times and Jacobean age, see Claire Jowitt, The Culture of Piracy 15801630: English Literature and Seaborne Crime (Ashgate, 2010), particularly, chapters 2 and 5; ‘Pirates and Politics in John Barclay’s Argenis (1621)’, The Yearbook of English Studies 41, no. 1 (Modern England, 2011), p. 159ff.; Fuchs, Ibid., pp. 45–69; Christopher Harding, ‘“Hostis Humani Generis” - The Pirate as Outlaw in the Early Modern Law of the Sea’, in Claire Jowitt (ed.), Pirates? The Politics of Plunder, 15501650 (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 20–38. 354 Regarding the previous life of Sir Anthony Sherley, see the PhD project presented by Kurosh Meshkat, ‘Sir Anthony Sherley’s Journey to Persia, 1598-1599’ (London, 2013); BL, Eg. Mss., 1824 (56–67); Mark Netzloof, England’s Internal Colonies: Class, Capital and the Literature of Early Modern English Colonialism (Basingstoke, 2003), pp. 62–73. 355 The political courses of James I and Philip III were quite similar: both kings sought wide-ranging peace agreements in Europe and both were criticized for the loss of their kingdoms’ political reputation compared to their predecessors (Elizabeth I and Phillip II); in essence, the idea was that the peace had weakened both kingdoms in the interests of the opponent; in England’s opinion the Peace of 1604 had let Spain recover its armies and finances, while in Spain’s view it had damaged Spanish international trade and political reputation; in Spanish eyes, it had extended and strengthened England’s trade and overseas expansion, while according to the English, it had undermined its armies and international reputation as champion of the Protestants in Flanders and Germany. 356 According to Henry de Vere, Earl of Oxford, after being dismissed as General of the Fleet in the English Channel, he was sent to the Tower of London, at the request of Gondomar, for openly criticizing James’s policy towards Spain; BP, II/2108 (61). 357 AGS, Estado, 841 (9). 358 My translation. 359 BNM, Mss., 3207 (183–7); 9408 (22–42); BP, II/2228 (74); II/2108 (77); II/2590 (16); Juan Durán-Loriga, El embajador y el Rey: el conde de Gondomar y Jacobo I de Inglaterra (Madrid, 2006), p. 79ff. 360 For more on the revival of Drake in seventeenth-century England, see Bruce Wathen, Sir Francis Drake: The Construction of a Hero (Suffolk, 2009), pp. 33–47; Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I (Cambridge, 1991), p. 1. 361 Spanish ambassadors were told many times by the English ministers that the Dutch sea power was superior to the English; BP, II/551 (29–30); II/2108 (50); II/ 2198 (38); AGS, Estado, 8788 (82–3); Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I, p. 1; David Goodman, El poderío naval español. Historia de la armada española del siglo XVII (Barcelona, 2001), p. 105. 362 ADA, 231 (1); my translation. 363 The ‘Western Design’ and the Act of Navigation of 1651 were the new base of the overseas expansion planned by Oliver Cromwell; in a way, it was putting into practice

204

364

365

366 367

368 369 370 371 372 373

374

375 376

Notes the plans made by Prince Charles with Spain regarding sharing the Indies; his plans failed both for diplomacy (1623) and for open war (1625–30); Elliott, Imperios del Mundo Atlántico, p. 183. Hernando de Soto, in his work Emblemas moralizadas (1599) turned the Trojan horse into the symbol of industry (politics and raison d’etat) beating the enemy; in England, William Shakespeare wrote the play Troilus and Cressida in 1602 and Cervantes included some references of Troy in Don Quixote; Rodríguez de la Flor, Pasiones Frías, p. 57, n. 39. The Spanish mystic Lucrecia de León had a dream on 30 September 1588 in which Spain was compared to Troy, with the Spaniards as Trojans and the English, French, Turkish and Moors as Greeks (Ves aquí España vuelta en Troya); Kagan, Los sueños de Lucrecia, pp. 96–7. Santiago Martínez Hernández, Rodrigo Calderón. La sombra del valido. Privanza, favor y corrupción en la corte de Felipe III, p. 158. ADA, 304 (15); Alison Findlay, Illegitimate Power. Bastards in Renaissance Drama (Manchester, 1994), pp. 79–80 and 119–20; Hans Werner, ‘The Hector of Germanie, or the Palsgrave, Prime Elector and Anglo-German Relations in Early Stuart England: The View from the Popular Stage’, in Robert Malcolm Smuts (ed.), The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Popular Culture (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 113–32. Kevin Curran, Marriage, Performance and Politics at the Jacobean Court (Farnham, 2009), p. 89ff.; Roger Lockyer, The Early Stuarts. A Political History of England, 1603–1642 (London, 1999), p. 16. ADA, 304 (15); my translation. BP, II/551 (202–3), my translation. BP, II/2108 (103), my translation. BP, II/551 (202–3); II/2108 (103); BNM, Mss., 18434 (72–6); Thomas Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution: English Politics and the Coming of War, 1621–1624 (Cambridge, 1989), p. 95ff. The English poet Edmund Waller (1605–1687) wrote a poem Of His Majesty’s Receiving the News of the Duke of Buckingham’s Death (1628), in which Buckingham was ‘Patroclus’ (the murdered friend of Achilles), and Charles I, ‘Achilles’ (due to his deep grief for the loss of his most dear friend); the King was linked to Achilles (as well as to Aeneas) in To the King of His Navy and Of the Queen; Elijah Fenton (ed), The Works of Edmund Waller, Esq. (London, 1744); James D. Garrison, Dryden and the Tradition of Panegyric (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 109–11. In 1622 James told Gondomar that sometimes he spoke with bravado, but he was a wise Spaniard; in 1630 a play was published in England, Miles Gloriosus, the Spanish Braggadocio: Or the Humour of the Spaniard, in which all these clichés were presented (this play was published in 1607 in French and Spanish); BP, II/2108 (69); Maltby, The Black Legend, p. 100ff.; Pierre de Bourdeille, Gentilezas y bravuconadas de los españoles (Madrid, 1995). James Shirley (1606–1666), Epitaph on Buckingham. Antonio Feros, ‘Imágenes de maldad, imágenes de reyes’, John H. Elliott and Laurence Brockliss (eds), El mundo de los validos (Madrid, 2000), pp. 293–9; Alastayr Bellany, ‘“Rayling rymes and vaunting verse”: libellous politics in early Stuart England, 1603–1628’, in Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake (eds), Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England (London, 1994), pp. 285–310.

 Notes 205 377 Pamela Gordon, ‘The Duke of Buckingham and Van Dyck’s “Continence of Scipio”’, RACAR: revue d’art canadienne/Canadian Art Review 10, no. 1 (1983), pp. 53–5. 378 Jonathan Brown, ‘Imágenes de maldad, imágenes de reyes: visiones del favorito real y el primer ministro en la literatura política de la Europa Moderna 1580-1650’, in John H. Elliott and Laurence Brockliss (eds), El mundo de los validos (Madrid, 1999), pp. 321–37. 379 Even the episode between Scipio and the Spanish bride, well known through Roman historians such as Polybius and Livy, could be identified with the trip to Spain for the Spanish bride of the Prince of Wales; Polybius, Histories, x, 19; Livy, Roman History, xxvi, 50. 380 In all the identifications of Buckingham as a classic ancient hero, Spaniards were associated to Trojans (Asia) or to Carthaginians (Africa), while the English were the Greeks or the Romans; it is noticeable again how English vision of Spaniards was related to people foreign to Europe; it seemed that the Spaniards, after being considered the new Romans in the sixteenth century, were replaced by the English at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 381 In the books of Father Juan de Robles (Tardes del Alcázar, doctrina para el perfecto vasallo) and Count De la Roca (El Fernando o Sevilla restaurada), Olivares was compared to the Titan Atlas, carrying the heavy weight of Spain, with domains all around the world; Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, pp. 74–5 and ‘Conservar el poder: el conde-duque de Olivares’, in Elliott and Brockliss, El mundo de los validos, pp. 165–79. 382 Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, p. 454ff.; Alicia Esteban Estríngana, Madrid y Bruselas: relaciones de gobierno en la etapa postarchiducal (1621–1634) (Leuven, 2005), p. 150ff. 383 ‘Hallose en él [Don Baltasar] lo que dijo Homero por Ulises, que aquel será prudentísimo consejero, que habrá tratado muchas naciones y costumbres, muchos negocios civiles y pasado muchos trabajos; ADA, 304 (15). 384 Antonio Ripoll Martínez, ‘El conde-duque con una vara en la mano de Velázquez o la praxis olivarista de la Razón de Estado en torno a 1625’, in Angel García Sanz and John H. Elliott (eds), La España del conde duque de Olivares (Valladolid, 1990), pp. 47–78. 385 This painting has much to do with another one painted around 1636 by Velázquez (Prince Baltasar Carlos in the Riding School); Olivares is shown giving Prince Baltasar Carlos horse-riding lessons in front of Philip IV and the queen. 386 This first time Philip IV was compared to the Emperor Charles V was during a masquerade organized in honour of English ambassador, Lord Charles Howard, on 16 June 1605; see Diego Saavedra Fajardo, Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representado en cien empresas, ‘empresa XLIII’, first published in 1640; Jonathan Brown and John H. Elliott, A Palace for a King. The Buen Retiro and the Court of Philip IV (New Haven, 1980), p. 45ff.; Patrick Williams, ‘The duke of Lerma and the birth of the baroque court in Spain: Valladolid, summer 1605’, Studia Historica, Historia Moderna, Universidad de Salamanca, no. 31 (2009), pp. 19–51. 387 Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, pp. 74–5. 388 The Trojan Hector was part of ‘The Nine Worthies’, a group of classic heroes presented during Medieval Ages as archetypes and models of the perfect knight; the list was originally drawn up in 1312 by the French poet Jacques de Longuyon and comprised three Greek and Roman heroes (Hector, Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar), three Jewish heroes (Josua, David and Judas Maccabeus) and three Christian

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heroes (King Arthur, Charlemagne and Godfrey of Bouillon); Erasmus wrote two short books on the perfect Christian knight and prince: A Manual of a Christian Knight (1503) and The Education of a Christian Prince (1515); Francisco Bautista, ‘El motivo de los ‘Nueve de la Fama’ en El Victorial y el poema de Los Votos del Pavón’, Atalaya 11 (April 2009): http://atalaya.revues.org/363 (accessed 29 July 2017). 389 Ana Gómez González, ‘Un Velázquez imaginado. Un grabado ecuestre de Felipe IV en un libro de medicina del siglo de Oro retoma el debate acerca de la reconstrucción de un Velázquez perdido’, Pecia Complutense 2, no. 2 (2005), pp. 9–14. 390 Brown and Elliott, A Palace for a King, pp. 29–30; Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, p. 267. 391 Gómez González, ‘Un Velázquez imaginado’, p. 10. 392 Frederick Holland Dewey (ed.), Virgil’s Aeneid, Books I–VI. The Original Text with a Literal Interlinear Translation (New York, 1917), p. 19. 393 Fernando Checa Cremades, Carlos V y la imagen del héroe en el Renacimiento (Madrid, 2000), p. 21; Los Leoni (1509–1608). Escultores del renacimiento italiano al servicio de la corte de España, exhibition catalogue (Madrid, 1994); Rosario Coppel Aréizaga, Catálogo de la escultura de época moderna: Siglos XVII–XVIII (Madrid, 1998). 394 Dewey, Virgil’s Aeneid, p. 20. 395 For more, see John H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline and Richelieu and Olivares (Cambridge, 1984).

Chapter 2 1 AGS, Estado, 2516 (84); AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered; I. A. A. Thompson, Guerra y decadencia. Gobierno y administración en la España de los Austrias (1560–1620) (Barcelona, 1981), pp. 85–90 and 112–4. 2 The calculations are made based on the records and accounts of nine Spanish ambassadors to Jacobean England during the years 1603–25. 3 Geoffrey Parker suggested something similar by comparing the Elizabeth I’s expenses on espionage (44,000 ducats per year) with the number of the warships that could be built with that budget (four); see Parker, La Gran Estrategia de Felipe II, p. 368, note 64. 4 Between 13 September 1598 and 20 June 1609, 37,488,565 ducats were sent to Flanders by the Spanish Crown supporting back the Spanish armies; Marqueses de Pidal y de Miraflores and Miguel Salvá Miguel, Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España (hereafter CODOIN), vol. 36 (Madrid, 1860), pp. 506–44. 5 BNM, Mss., 18204 (61–9); see Robert A. Stradling, La armada de Flandes. Política naval española y guerra europea, 1568–1668 (Madrid, 1992), pp. 48–60 and 255. 6 AGS, Estado, 8791 (62, 67 and 70); 8781 (19); 8792 (55); Carla Rahn Phillips, Seis galeones para el rey de España. La defensa imperial a principios del siglo XVII (Madrid, 1991), pp. 125 and 143. 7 Parker, La Gran Estrategia, p. 444ff. 8 AHN, Estado, 2798 (5). 9 AHN, Estado, 737 (318–29); see Porfirio Sanz Camañes, ‘Burocracia, Corte y Diplomacia. El conde de Gondomar, embajador de España’, in Francisco José Aranda

 Notes 207

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35

Pérez (ed.), Letrados, juristas y burócratas en la España Moderna (Cuenca, 2005), pp. 397–434. BP, II/870, unnumbered; II/2185 (29); BNM, Mss., 18430 (36–8). BP, II/870, unnumbered. Juan Antonio Vera y Figueroa, Count De la Roca, El embaxador (Seville, 1620). The average amounts per month for Julián Sánchez de Ulloa and Jacques Bruneau are 4,420,35 reales and 11,025,26 reales, respectively. The average monthly quantity was 48,814,718 reales. BP, II/2160 (20–1); BNM, Mss., 18196 (9–11); AHN, Estado, 737, unnumbered; 533 (25). Vera y Figueroa, El embaxador, ‘Discurso Primero’. The exact amount was 7,684,516 reales. For other Spanish extraordinary ambassadors, see Miguel Ángel Ochoa Brun, Historia de la diplomacia española, vol. 7 (Madrid, 1990–2003); BP, II/2108 (39); ADA, 100 (88); 36 (96). Frederick Devon (ed.), Issues of the Exchequer being Payments Made Out of His Majesty’s Revenue During the Reign of King James I (London, 1836), pp. 41 and 122–3. AGS, Estado, 8771 (1). During the first quarter of the seventeenth century, high-ranking figures such as Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, Oñate, Gondomar, De la Cueva, Mirabel and others held the most important Spanish embassies in Europe. AGS, Estado, 8789 (62); 8791 (50). During the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the annual revenue income of the Spanish embassy in Rome was 408,696,56 reales, the embassy in Brussels was 550,000 reales, that in London was 684,511,96 and in Paris, 366,666,66 reales; see Ochoa Brun, Historia, vols 7 and 8 (Madrid, 2006); ADA, 100 (88); 36 (96); BL, Add. Mss., 10236 (476–7); 14015 (5–43); CODOIN, vol. 36, pp. 545–61; Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda de Felipe IV (Madrid, 1960), p. 3. AGS, Estado, 8791 (50). AGS, Estado, 8792 (58); 8780 (43); 8771 (1); BNM, Mss., 2346 (23–30). AGS, Estado, 2516 (84). AGS, Estado, 840 (220–22). AGS, Estado, 8780 (7); 2516 (83); BP, II/2185 (55); BL, Eg. Mss., 2800 (251–53); Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, Diplomacia y relaciones exteriores en la edad Moderna. De la cristiandad al sistema europeo, 1453–1794 (Madrid, 2011), pp. 21–35. AGS, Estado, 840 (119, 139–40 and 215). AGS, Estado, 841 (17 and 23). AGS, Estado, 840 (220–22). BL, Add. Mss., 28708 (266–71). The chart (figure 1) is based on the records of the Spanish ambassadors. In 1604, the Spanish ambassadors to England received almost the same amount that the Spanish Royal House had received (around 500,000 ducats), and between 1613 and 1618, when Gondomar complained from London about him not receiving money from the king, the Royal House at Madrid suffered a decreasing budget too; Carlos Javier De Carlos Morales, ‘Finance and expenses in Felipe III’s Royal Houses’, Studia Historica, Historia Moderna no. 28 (2006), Universidad de Salamanca, pp. 180–1. BP, II/870, unnumbered.

208

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36 Bernardo García defined these periods as ‘pacificación’ and ‘quietud’ (my translation); Bernardo J. García García, La Pax Hispánica: Política exterior del duque de Lerma (Leuven, 1996), pp. 85–96. 37 James had written a poem about the king of Scotland glorifying the battle of Lepanto and the Spanish victory over the Turks; In Cervantes’s The Great Sultana, The Bagnios of Algiers (appropriated and transformed in English language by 1623) and Don Quixote (‘Captive’s Tale’) there were enormous references to Barbary, the pirates and the issue of the Christian slavery in the Barbary cities; Barbara Fuchs and Aaron J. Ilika, The Bagnios of Algiers and the Great Sultana. Two Plays of Captivity. Miguel de Cervantes (Philadelphia, 2010), ‘Introduction’, pp. IX–XXVII; Adrian Tinniswood, Behind the Throne. A Domestic History of the British Royal Household (New York, 2018), chapter 3, ‘Diplomats and fools’. 38 Antonio Cabeza Rodríguez, ‘El relanzamiento de la diplomacia española en Roma en una Europa en guerra (1618–1623)’, in Carlos José Hernando Sánchez (ed.), Roma y España. Un crisol de la cultura europea en la edad Moderna, 2 vols (Madrid, 2007), pp. 447–70, 447ff. 39 Antonio Feros, El duque de Lerma. Realeza y privanza en la España de Felipe III (Madrid, 2002), p. 452. 40 BNM, Mss., 2351 (521–24); Carmen Iglesias, ‘El gobierno de la Monarquía’, in Felipe Ruiz Martín (ed.), La Monarquía de Felipe II (Madrid, 2003), pp. 455–514, 491. 41 Gondomar called the two years of Spanish diplomacy in London (1603–05) the ‘Age of the Millions’; BNM, Mss., 18430 (36–8); AGS, Contaduría Mayor de cuentas 3ª época, 2610; Estado, 840 (251); 8777 (2); Elena María García Guerra, ‘La moneda de vellón y las Cortes: un instrumento al servicio de la fiscalidad del Estado moderno castellano’, Cuadernos de Historia Moderna 4, no. 21 (1998), pp. 59–101, 71ff.; Juan E. Gelabert, ‘La evolución del gasto de la Monarquía Hispánica entre 1598 y 1650. Asientos de Felipe III y IV’, Studia Historica: Historia Moderna 18 (2009), pp. 265–97, 277ff. 42 BNM, Mss., 18430 (36–8); BL, Add. Mss., 28470 (120–44); BP, II/870, unnumbered; AGS, Estado, 8791 (72); BL, Eg. Mss., 2080 (251–53); BNM, Mss., 10467 (11 and 26–30). 43 BL, Add. Mss., 28470 (120–44). 44 AHN, Estado, 741 (52–7). 45 CODOIN, vol. 36, pp. 509–44. 46 Ibid. 47 The money spoken of by the ambassadors is the golden doble albertín (2 ducats, around 20 reales); the English pound was exchanged for 40 reales. 48 Ramón Carande, El crédito de Castilla en el precio de la política imperial. Discurso de ingreso en la Academia de Historia (Madrid, 1949), pp. 62–7; Carlos Álvarez Nogal, Los banqueros de Felipe IV y los metales preciosos americanos (1621–1665) (Madrid 1997), pp. 62 and 80; Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, pp. 91–154; Felipe Ruiz Martín, ‘El conde-duque de Olivares y las finanzas de la Monarquía Hispánica’, in Angel García Sanz and John H. Elliott (eds), La España del conde duque de Olivares (Valladolid, 1990), pp. 445–94. 49 AHN, 617 (19–20). 50 AHN, 617, unnumbered. 51 AGS, Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas, 2633.

 Notes 209 52 ‘19 March 1624’, in Proceedings in Parliament 1624: The House of Commons, ed. Philip Baker (2015–18), British History Online (http​://ww​w.bri​tish-​histo​ry.ac​.uk/n​o-ser​ies/ procee​dings​-1624​-parl​/mar-​19) (accessed 21 June 2018). 53 Alessandro Antelminelli and Henry Duncan Skrine (eds), The Manuscripts of Henry Duncan Skrine, Esquire, of Claverton Manor, Somerset (London, 1887), p. 91; Kirti N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company, vol. 3, The Emergence of International Business 1200–1800 (London, 1999), pp. 128, 163, 164 and 205; Charles P. Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (London, 1985), p. 43; Andrew Pettegree, Alastair Duke and Gillian Lewis, Calvinism in Europe, 1540–1620 (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 259–67; Peter Ole Grell, Dutch Calvinists in Early Stuart London. The Dutch Church in Austin Friars (1603–1642) (Leiden, 1989), pp. 17, 46, 51, 62, 142, 150, 155, 165–9, 174, 178, 191, 204, 229–30 and ‘The Creation of a Transnational, Calvinist Network and Its Significance for Calvinist Identity and Interaction in Early Modern Europe’, European Review of History 16, no. 5 (October 2009), pp. 619–36; Henry Heller, Anti-Italianism in Sixteenth-Century France (Toronto, 2003), pp. 66–77, 98, 163–4, 201, 211, 225; A. V. Judges, ‘Philip Burlamachi: A Financier of the Thirty Years’ War’, Economica 6 (1926), pp. 285–300; Ruiz Martín, ‘El conde-duque de Olivares’, pp. 445–94; Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, pp. 3–87 and 91–154; Álvaro Castillo Pintado, ‘Mecanismos de base de la hacienda de Felipe IV’, in Ramón Menéndez Pidal (ed.), La España de Felipe IV, vol. 25 (Madrid, 1982), pp. 217–55; Álvarez Nogal, Los banqueros de Felipe IV, p. 79ff.; Javier de Carlos Morales, ‘Gasto y financiación de las casas reales de Felipe III’, Studia Historica: Historia Moderna 28 (2006), pp. 179–209, p. 196. 54 Ana Guerrero Mayllo, ‘La vida cotidiana de los regidores madrileños de la segunda mitad del siglo XVI’, Revista de Historia Moderna 10 (1991), pp. 149–64, 11; Félix Labrador Arroyo, ‘Relación alfabética de los criados de la Casa Real de la reina Margarita de Austria (1599-1611)’, in José Martínez Millán and María Antonieta Visceglia (eds), La monarquía de Felipe III: la casa del rey, vol. 2 (Madrid, 2008), pp. 781–929, 724ff.; Elena María García Guerra, ‘Las acuñaciones de moneda de vellón durante el reinado de Felipe III’, Estudios de Historia Económica 38 (1999), pp. 11–155, 20, 38, 55, 57, 72, 74 and 78. 55 BP, II/2183 (16 and 17). 56 BP, II/2173 (2). 57 BP, II/2168 (5). 58 Jonathan I. Israel, Empires and Entrepots: The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews, 1585–1713 (London, 1990), pp. 355–71; García García, La Pax Hispánica, p. 201. 59 Many historians have studied the Portuguese merchant community and their links with the Spanish crown in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in particular, Jesús Aguado de los Reyes, Juan I. Pulido Serra, José Luis Cortés López, Santiago de Luxán Meléndez, Atilano Domínguez, Bernardo José García García and Alloza Aparicio; among foreign historians are Jonathan I. Israel, James C. Boyajian, David L. Graizbord, Linda A. Newson, Susie Minchin, Antonio José Saraiva, Miriam Bodian, Steven Nadler, Paolo Bernardini, Norman Fiering, Henriette de Bruyn Kops, Herman P. Salomon, Florbela Veiga Frade, Donald F. Lach and Edwin J. Van Kley. 60 Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘La estrategia de la Real Hacienda en la negociación del crédito de los Austrias’, in Antonio M. Bernal (ed.), Dinero, moneda y crédito en la monarquía hispánica: actas del simposio internacional ‘Dinero, moneda y crédito: de la monarquía hispánica a la integración monetaria Europea, Madrid, 4–7 de mayo de 1999 (Madrid,

210

61 62 63

64 65

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

Notes 2000), pp. 439–56, 448ff.; Carmen Sanz Ayán, ‘Los banqueros del Rey y el conde duque de Olivares’, in José Alcalá-Zamora and Queipo de Llano (eds), Felipe IV: El hombre y el reinado (Madrid, 2005), pp. 157–74. BP, II/870 (65–6). An assientist was a shareholder of the Assiento Company, which was involved in the slave trade. Luis Tobío Fernandez, Gondomar y los católicos ingleses (La Coruña, 1987), pp. 105–33; Edmund Lodge (ed.), Illustrations of British History, Biography and Manners in the Reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth and James I, vol. III (London, 1838), pp. 286–90; Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, p. 191; Johanna Rickman, Love, Lust, and License in Early Modern England: Illicit Sex and the Nobility (Aldershot, 2008), p. 82ff.; Aurora Garcia Fernandez and Marta Mateo MartínezBartolomé, Obra reunida de Patricia Shaw, vol. 4, Miscelánea (Oviedo, 2000), pp. 15–43; Katherine O. Acheson, The Memoir of 1603 and The Diary of 1616–1619 by Anne Clifford Hebert, Countess of Pembroke (Toronto, 2006), p. 65ff. BNM, Mss., 18419 (238); BP, II/2180 (10 and 57); II/2168 (2 and 3); II/2228 (82–3). BP, II/2185 (56); María Fusaro, ‘Coping with transition: Greek merchants and shipowners between Venice and England in the late sixteenth century’, in Ina MacCabe Baghdiantz, Gelina Harlaftis and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou (eds), Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks. Four Centuries of History (New York, 2005), pp. 95–124, 107ff. BP, II/2160 (49); II/2160 (78 and 100); II/2108 (81–2). BNM, Mss., 18419 (87); BP, II/1850 (82–4); II/2228 (194); II/2185 (56). Dominic Green, The Double Life of Doctor Lopez: Spies, Shakespeare and the Plot to Poison Elizabeth I (London, 2003), p. 314. BP, II/870, unnumbered. BP, II/2108 (81–2) II/562 (44). BP, II/870, unnumbered; II/562 (141–44). BP, II/2108 (81–2); II/870 (65–6). BP, II/2180 (10 and 57). AGS, Estado (34). BP, II/2172 (9); AGS, Estado, 2516 (130); Dirección General del Tesoro, 581. James Wilson Hyde, The Early History of the Post in Grant and Farm (Charleston, SC, 1894), p. 12ff.; Rhoads Murphey, ‘Merchants, Nations and Free-agency: An Attempt at a Qualitative Characterisation of Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1620–1640’, in Alastair Hamilton, Alexander H. de Groot and Mauritsh Van den Boogert (eds), Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seventeenth to the Early Nineteenth Century (Leiden, 2000), pp. 25–58, 45ff. BP, II/2198 (110–11). BL, Eg. Mss., 335 (209ff.); BNM, Mss., 17659, unnumbered; AGS, Estado, 2516 (130). BP, II/2198 (110–11); AGS, Estado, 2516 (130). BL, Eg. Mss., 335 (209ff.). BP, II/2200 (60); II/2590 (6–7); AHN, Estado, 2756 (2); Antonio Rodríguez Villa, Noticia biográfica y documentos históricos relativos a don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza (Madrid, 1873), pp. I–LIX. AGS, Estado, 2516 (83–4). BP, II/1817 (28–31). BP, II/1817 (39–41); see also María Paz Aguiló, ‘Lujo y religiosidad: el regalo diplomático en el siglo XVII’, in XIII Jornadas Internacionales de Historia del Arte.

 Notes 211

85

86 87 88 89

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112

Arte, Poder y Sociedad en la España de los siglos XV al XX (Madrid, 20–24 de noviembre de 2006), pp. 49–62; José Luis Colomer (ed.), Arte y diplomacia de la Monarquía Hispánica en el siglo XVII (Madrid, 2003), 485pp.; Natalie Zemon Davids, The Gift in Sixteenth Century France (Madison, 2000), 185pp.; Albert J. Loomie, ‘Toleration and Diplomacy’, American Philosophal Society-Transactions 53, no. 2 (1963), Philadelphia, pp. 5–58 and Gustav Ungerer, ‘Juan Pantoja de la Cruz and the Circulation of Gifts between the English and Spanish Courts in 1604/5’, Sederi no. 9 (1998), 78pp. The king of Spain had also a threefold nature: man, Catholic and prince; for more, see Fernando Bouza Álvarez, ‘La Majestad de Felipe II. Construcción del mito real’, in José Martínez Millán (ed.), La Corte de Felipe II (Madrid, 1998), pp. 37–72 and Charles Davis, ‘El tacitismo político español y la metáfora del cuerpo’, in Agustín Redondo (ed.), Le corps comme métaphore dans le Spagne des XVI et XVII siecles (Paris, 1992), pp. 31–41. AGS, Estado, 8788, 55. Association of Friends (ed.), Friends Intelligencer, vol. XXI (Philadelphia, 1865), p. 492–3; Anne Everett Green (ed.), Calendar of State Papers, Domestic: James I (1623–1625) (London, 1859) (hereafter, CSP, Domestic), p. 131. BP, II/870 (65–6). See Valentín Vázquez de Prada, Felipe II y Francia. Política, Religión y Razón de Estado (1559–1598) (Barañaín, 2004); Carlos J. Carnicer and Javier Marcos, Espías de Felipe II. Los servicios secretos del Imperio español (Madrid, 2005), specially ‘La transmisión de la información: el correo’, pp. 191–229; María Montañez Matilla, El correo en la España de los Austrias (Madrid, 1953) and Parker, La Gran Estrategia. The postal routes were full of relays of horses along the roads, where the couriers could rest and have something to eat, sleep and so on. AGS, Estado, 840 (263). BP, II/2183 (14); AHN, Estado, 2349 (258). AGS, Estado, 8781 (45); 8771 (47). AGS, Estado, 8778 (10). The order was dated in London, 3 September 1604. AGS, Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas, 2633; BP, II/2183 (20); AHN, Estado, 2349 (258). BP, II/2541 (55); II/1829 (1); AHN, Estado, 259 (38). AHN, Estado, 2349 (27); BP, II/2228 (82–3). BP, II/2185 (29); II/2159 (192); II/2198 (103); AGS, Estado, 2515 (94); 8783 (27); 8781 (43 and 44). BNM, Mss., 18203 (10–19); AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas 3ª época, 2717 (4). BL, Aston Papers, vol. II, 1621, 281; AGS, Estado, 8773 (91); 8786 (18). AGS, Estado, 8781 (31); 8771 (18). BP, II/2541 (21). AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 2ª época, 42; BP, II/2172 (85). AGS, Estado, 8773 (52 and 56); 8770 (74 and 76); 8771 (32). AGS, Estado, 8771 (47); BP, II/2198 (25). BP, II/2179, 58 (8). AGS, Estado, 8770 (2). BL, Eg. Mss., 318 (163–4); BP, II/2167 (75). AGS, Estado, 2516 (83); Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, p. 203. AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 3ª época, 3522 (19); AHN, Frías, 617 (14). Sanz Camañes, ‘Burocracia, Corte y Diplomacia’, p. 397.

212

Notes

113 AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 3ª época, 3522 (19); AHN, Frías, 617 (14). 114 AHN, Frías, 618 (1–3). 115 BNM, Mss., 1492, unnumbered. 116 AHN, Estado, 3456, unnumbered. 117 AHN, Estado, 722, unnumbered; 259 (279). 118 BP, II/2168 (5); II/2168 (43); AHN, Estado, 741, unnumbered. 119 AHN, Estado, 722, unnumbered; BP, II/2168 (5). 120 Ibid. 121 BL, Add. Mss., 28452 (219–21). 122 AGS, Estado, 2515 (87); 8770 (2). 123 BP, II/2168 (18). 124 Tomás Ramírez, Gondomar’s private secretary, worked as embassy secretary too, although without salary from the Spanish crown; his salary was paid from Gondomar’s personal fortune. 125 Gondomar in fact used the services of Sir Richard Berry as interpreter; he worked for Coloma and Bruneau too; see Albert J. Loomie, ‘Francis Fowler II, English secretary of the Spanish Embassy, 1609–1619’, British Catholic History 12, no. 1 (1973), pp. 70–8; Luis Tobío Fernández, Gondomar y su triunfo sobre Raleigh (La Coruña, 1974), p. 244ff. 126 AHN, Frías, 617 (5–25); AGS, Estado, 840, unnumbered; Fernández, Gondomar y su triunfo, p. 244ff; Francis Edwards, ‘The First Earl of Salisbury Pursuit of Hugh Owen’, Recusant History. A Journal of Research in Post-Reformation Catholic History in the British Isles 26, no. 1 (May 2002), p. 20ff.; Patrick Martin and John Finnis, ‘The identity of Anthony Rivers’, Recusant History: A Journal of Research in Post Reformation Catholic History in the British Isles 26, no. 1 (May 2002), p. 73; Albert J. Loomie, Guy Fawkes in Spain: The Spanish Treason in Spanish Documents (London, 1971), p. 20ff.; Albert J. Loomie, ‘Sir Robert Cecil and the Spanish Embassy’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 42, no. 105 (1969), p. 35ff. 127 Gentili died in June 1608; his work was also cited by Count of De La Roca, the famous Spanish aristocrat who wrote the first treatise on diplomacy, El Embaxador (Seville, 1620), ‘Libro Primero’. 128 There are obvious parallels with Hugo Grotious’ Mare Liberum (a chapter of De Iure Praeade); Grotius wrote this book at the request of the Dutch East India Company, regarding the case of a seizure of a Portuguese vessel in the Straits of Malacca by a Dutch admiral from the Company; Grotius wrote his famous chapter defending the seizure; Gentili’s treatise was based on the cases defended by him against the English High Court of Admiralty, involving the seize of Spanish vessels and cargoes, blockades and attacks on these vessels at the British neutral coasts; both were Protestant lawyers defending the interests at the court of two countries at war; see Gesina Van der Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law (Leiden, 1968); Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Gentili, Grotius and the Extra-European world’, in Harry N. Scheiber (ed.), The Law of the Sea (The Hague, 2000), pp. 39–60; C. H. Alexandrowicz, ‘Freitas Versus Grotius’, in David Armitage (ed.), Theories of Empire, 1450-1800 (London and New York, 1998), p. 239ff. 129 AGS, Estado, 2571 (167); Albert J. Loomie, Spain and the Jacobean Catholics, 1603–1612 (London, 1973), pp. VII–XXVI. 130 BP, II/2228 (82–3); AGS, Estado, 8791 (44). 131 According to the records of Don Pedro de Zúñiga and Gondomar, since 1605 until 1622; the exact amount money is 114,969.17 ducats.

 Notes 213 132 BP, II/2228 (26 and 49); BNM, Mss., 18419, unnumbered. 133 Burlamacchi was the banker of the Spanish diplomats in London for twenty years; BP, II/2228 (22). 134 AGS, Estado, 8771 (27). 135 Ibid. 136 Coloma paid 400 reales to three members of the embassy office for eighteen months of work. 137 In some records these expenses were included in the ‘private expenses’ item. 138 See Villamediana’s records. 139 AGS, Estado, 840 (1 and 220–2); BL, Cotton Vespasian, CXIII, 69–70; AHN, Estado, 2798 (5). 140 Ibid. 141 Relación de la Jornada del Excelentísimo Condestable de Castilla a las Paces entre España e Inglaterra que se concluyeron y juraron en Londres por el mes de agosto, año 1604 (Valladolid, 1604); ADA, 21, unnumbered; AGS, Estado, 841 (244). 142 AHN, Frías, 617 (5–25). 143 Pedro Salazar de Mendoza, Monarquía de España, vol. II (Madrid, 1770), pp. 113–4; Feros, El duque de Lerma, p. 205, note 8. 144 AGS, Estado, 841 (1 and 244). 145 BL, Add. Mss., 10236 (283–315). 146 AHN, Estado, 2798 (9). 147 AHN, Estado, 739 (87–8); BP, II/2219 (8–9); II/2108 (68). 148 Aureliano Fernández-Guerra y Orbe (ed.), Obras de don Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas, vol. 2 (Madrid, 1859), p. XXV; Porfirio Sanz Camañes, Diplomacia hispanoinglesa en el siglo XVII. Razón de Estado y Relaciones de Poder durante la Guerra de los Treinta años, 1618–1648 (Cuenca, 2002), pp. 76–7; Fernando Negredo del Cerro, Los predicadores de Felipe IV. Corte, intrigas y religion en la España del Siglo de Oro (Actas, Madrid, 2006), pp. 210–11. 149 BNM, Mss., 9408 (168–69). 150 BP, II/870 (65–66); II/2108 (81–82). 151 Luca Codignola, The Coldest Harbour of the Land: Simon Stock and Lord Baltimore’s Colony in Newfoundland, 1621–1649 (Quebec, 1988), pp. 6–14 and 51–8. 152 Roberta Anderson, ‘Diplomatic Representatives from the Hapsburg Monarchy to the Court of James VI and I’, in Alexander Samson (ed.), The Spanish Match: Prince Charles’s Journey to Madrid, 1623 (Aldershot, 2006), p. 209–26. 153 Fernández, Gondomar y los católicos ingleses, pp. 54–72. 154 AGS, Estado, 8771 (27); Jacobo Stuart Fitz-James y Falcó Alba (ed.), Correspondencia oficial de don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, vol. 3 (Madrid, 1944), pp. 54ff. 155 AGS, Estado, 8792 (48). 156 See Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza, Escritos autobiográficos (Barcelona, 1966) and Poesías Completas (Badajoz, 1990); Camilo María Abad, misionera española en la Inglaterra del siglo XVII (Santander, 1966); see also Anne J. Cruz, Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza y su conexión jesuita, Asociación Internacional de Hispanistas (AIH), Actas XI, 1992, pp. 97–112; Javier Burrieza Sánchez, ‘Los jesuitas, de las postrimerías a la muerte ejemplar’, Hispania Sacra 61, no. 124 (July–December 2009), pp. 513–44; María J. Pando Canteli, ‘Tentando vados: the martyrdom politics of Luisa Carvajal de Mendoza’, Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies 10, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2010), pp. 117–41; Glyn Redworth, The She-Apostle. The Extraordinary Life and Death of

214

157 158 159

160 161 162 163 164

165 166 167 168 169 170

171

172 173 174

175 176

Notes Luisa de Carvajal (Oxford, 2008); Glyn Redworth and Christopher J. Henstock (eds), Letters of Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza, 2 vols (London, 2012), pp. 308–58. BP, II/2183 (18). AGS, Estado, 8771 (27). Albert J. Loomie, ‘A grandniece of Thomas Moore: Catherine Bentley’, Moreana 29, no. 1 (1971), pp. 13–5; Timothy J. McCann, ‘Catherine Bentley, Great Granddaughter of St Thomas More and her Catholic Connections in Sussex’, Moreana 11, no. 43–4 (1974), pp. 41–5; Fernández, Gondomar y los católicos ingleses, pp. 82–90; Hugh Trevor-Roper, Renaissance Essays (Chicago, 1985), p. 56ff. After July 1607 the Spanish ambassador no longer paid her. AGS, Estado, 8771 (27). AGS, Estado, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 3ª época, 2717 (4). See Condestable and Don Pedro de Zúñiga’s records. M. S. Guiseppi (ed), Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House (hereafter CCP), vol. 18 (1606) (London, 1940). The Earl of Salisbury to Sir Thomas Edmondes, 12 July 1606; ‘Newport News’, William and Mary Quarterly Historical Magazine 9, no. 4 (April 1901), pp. 233–7. CCP, vol. 18, Don Pedro de Zúñiga to Same [the Earl of Salisbury], London, 17 July 1606; Brown, Horatio F., Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice (1603-1607), vol. 10, pp. 324–6 and 329; AGS, Estado, 2585 (55). M. S. Giuseppi and D. McN. Lockie, CCP, vol. 19 (1607) (London, 1965), Don Pedro de Zúñiga, Spanish Ambassador, to John Ball London, 10 May 1607. BL, Add. Mss., 14015 (73–74); BP, II/551 (24); BNM, Mss., 9133 (63–74). Charles H. Carter, The Secret Diplomacy of the Hasburgs 1598–1625 (New York, 1964), pp. 95–106. BP, II/2108 (81–82). Alfredo Alvar, Carlos Alvar and Florencio Sevilla Arroyo (eds), Gran Enciclopedia Cervantina, vol. 2 (Madrid, 2006), p. 1196; Cayetano Alberto de la Barrera Leirado, Poesías de don Francisco de Rioja, corregidas con presencia de sus originales, añadidas e ilustradas con la biografía y la bibliografía del poeta (Madrid, 1867), p. 307. Juan Velázquez de Acevedo, El Fénix de Minerva y arte de memoria (Madrid, 1626), p. 29; Conde Nolegar Giatamor, Asombro elucidado de las ideas o arte de memoria especulativo y práctico (Madrid, 1735), p. 174; Juan Huarte de San Juan, Examen de ingenios para las ciencias (Madrid, 1846), pp. 383–4; Juan E. Hartzenbusch and Cayetano Rosell (eds), Obras completas de Cervantes, vol. 12 (Madrid, 1864), pp. 330–1. AGS, Estado, 2516 (48). BP, II/2172 (76). AGS, Estado, 2516 (48); BP, II/2172 (76); II/2220 (22); Emilio González López, Los políticos gallegos en la corte de España y la convivencia europea (Vigo, 1969), p. 297ff.; see also Hiram Morgan, Un pueblo unido…: The Politics of Philip O’Sullivan Beare (Cork, 2001). AGS, Estado, 2516 (130). William Douglas Hamilton and Sophie Crawford Lomas, Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I (1625-1629), Addenda (London, 1897) (hereafter CSP Domestic), pp. 1–4; John Bruce (ed.), Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, Charles I (1629-1631), vol. 181, undated 1630 (London, 1860), pp. 450–66; Allen B. Hinds, CSP, Venice, 1629-1632, vol. 22 (London, 1919), pp. 15–35.

 Notes 215 177 Albert J. Loomie, ‘Richard Berry: Gondomar’s English Catholic adviser’, Recusant History 11 (1971–1972), pp. 47–60; Fernández, Gondomar y los católicos ingleses, pp. 25–32. 178 BP, II/1850 (68–9). 179 BP, II/2228 (82–3). 180 AGS, Estado, 845 (88); BP, II/2170 (3). 181 BP, II/2108 (68). 182 BP, II/2198 (75–6). 183 AGS, Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas, 2633. 184 Jorge de Henin and Torcuato Pérez de Guzmán Moore, Memorial de Jorge de Henin. Descripción de los reinos de Marruecos (1603–1613) (Rabat, 1997); BNM, Mss., 17645, pp. 121ff.; Mercedes García Arenal and Gerard Wiegers, Un hombre en tres mundos: Samuel Pallache, un judío marroquí en la Europa protestante y en la católica (Madrid, 2006), pp. 116–29. 185 José María Oliva Melgar, ‘La metrópoli sin territorio’, in Carlos Martínez Shaw and José María Oliva Melgar (eds), El sistema atlántico español (siglos XVII–XIX) (Madrid, 2005), pp. 19–74, p. 69, note 95; Israel, Empires and Entrepots, p. 4; Jocelyn N. Hillgarth, The Mirror of Spain, 1500–1700: The Formation of a Myth (Chicago, 2000), pp. 506ff. 186 AHN, Estado, 121 (66); BP, II/2219 (27); II/2108 (81–2). 187 Ibid. 188 AGS, Estado, 8773 (69 and 82). 189 AGS, Estado, 8771 (29); BP, II/2198 (75–6). 190 AGS, Estado, 8788 (91). 191 BP, II/2198 (110–11). 192 AGS, Estado, 8788 (89 and 91); 8773 (82). 193 Barón de Cobos de Belchite, ‘Nobiliario de Deva (Guipúzcoa)’, Hidalguía 5, no. 21 (March–April 1957), pp. 113–29, 210. 194 AHN, Estado, 3456 (1). 195 Ibid.; Maartje Van Gelder, Trading Places. The Netherlandish Merchants in Early Modern Venice (Leiden, 2009), p. 58ff. and 68ff.; Christopher Ebert, Between Empires: Brazilian Sugar in the Early Atlantic Economy, 1550–1630 (Leiden, 2008), p. 123. 196 AHN, Estado, 121 (65 and 66). 197 BP, II/2198 (100–1). 198 Ibid. 199 AHN, Estado, 741 (68–9); 737 (318–29); BP, II/2590 (34). 200 BNM, Mss., 18203 (10–19). 201 AHN, Estado, 800, unnumbered. 202 See Thomas Scott, The Second Part of Vox Populi, or Gondomar Appearing in the Likenes of Matchiauell (London, 1624); BNM, Mss., 13351 (144–5), 10467 (288–91); AGS, Estado, 2516 (130); Juan Durán-Loriga, El embajador y el Rey: el conde de Gondomar y Jacobo I de Inglaterra (Madrid, 2006), p. 322. 203 The English ports are Barmouth, Newport, Bristol, Ilfracombe, Falmouth, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Weymouth, Wight Island, Southampton, Portsmouth, DoverKingsdwon-Sandwich-Magate, Rochester, Tilbury-Gravesend, Greenwich, London, Ipswich and Newcastle. 204 Inland areas are Richmond, Hampton Court-Kingston Upon Thames-Chelsea, Staines, Oatlands, Windsor, Winchester, Salisbury, Oxford, Woodstock,

216

Notes

Northampton, Theobalds, Royston, Cambridge, New Market, Canterbury, Chichester, Sittingbourne, Rochester, Henley-on-Thames and Maidenhead. 205 AGS, Estado, 8788, 6. 206 AGS, Estado, 8790 (36, 66 and 90); 8792 (54); 8788 (29); 8789 (59); Clare McManus, Women on the Renaissance Stage: Anna of Denmark and Female Masquing in the Stuart Court, 1590–1619 (Manchester, 2002), p. 93. 207 See Manuel Fernández Álvarez, Tres embajadores de Felipe II en Inglaterra (Madrid, 1951) and Marqués de Fuensanta del Valle, José Sancho Rayón and Francisco Zabalburu, CODOIN, vol. 87, Madrid, 1886; BNM, Mss., 1492 (270); AGS, Estado, 2586 (19); 8789 (31 and 33); CSP Venice (1603–7), Zorzi Giustinian, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 30 August 1606; Horatio F. Brown, CSP Venice (1610–3), vol. 12 (London, 1905). Marc Antoni Correr, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 21 April 1611; Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 5 January/12 March 1612. 208 AHN, Frías, 617 (5–25). 209 The chapel was the heart of the Spanish embassy, God’s place in a heretic kingdom. 210 AGS, Estado, 8788 (29). 211 Judges, sheriffs, lawyers, solicitors, pursuivants, soldiers and so on. 212 BNM, Mss., 9133 (99–103); BP, II/2108 (61); Simon Adams and Geoffrey Parker, ‘Europa y la guerra del Palatinado’, in Geoffrey Parker (ed.), La Guerra de los Treinta Años (Madrid, 2003), pp. 55–64, 87. 213 BP, II/2220 (69). 214 Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, pp. 169, 244 and 267–8. 215 AGS, Estado, 8783 (33). 216 CSP Venice (1610–3). Marc Antonio Correr, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 26 May 1610; José Manuel Troyano Chicharro, ‘Don Alonso de la Cueva-Benavides y Mendoza-Carrillo, primer marqués de Bedmar: sus biógrafos y el papel que desempeñó en la conjuración de Venecia’, Sumuntán 22 (2005), pp. 77–98. 217 Geoffrey Parker, La Gran Estrategia de Felipe II (Madrid, 1998), pp. 368–9, note 64. 218 See Lawrence Stone, La crisis de la aristocracia, 1558–1641 (Madrid, 1985); José Antonio Maravall, Poder, honor y élites en el siglo XVII (Madrid, 1984) and Adolfo Carrasco Martínez, Sangre, honor y privilegio: La nobleza española bajo los Austrias (Barcelona, 2000). 219 On the Spanish ambassadors’ records, there are references to archbishops from Armenia, Ireland and Greece; the references to priests and monks are very numerous; for more on Jesuits in defence of Spain, see Javier Burrieza Sánchez, ‘La Compañía de Jesús y la defensa de la Monarquía Hispánica’, Hispania Sacra 60, no. 121 (2008), pp. 181–229. 220 See their account records in London noted above. 221 AGS, Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas, 2633; BP, II/870 (65–6). 222 CSP Venice (1610–3), Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 12 September 1612; Enrique Flórez, Clave historial con la que se abre la puerta a la historia eclesiástica y política (Madrid, 1784), pp. 363–4. 223 AGS, Estado, 2516 (83). 224 BL, Eg. Mss., 2080 (254–65); BL, Add. Mss., 14005 (102–17); Add. Mss., 339 (180–6). 225 AHN, Estado, 2798 (5); AHN, Estado, 737 (5); BL, Add. Mss., 14007 (407–10). 226 BP, II/2108 (100).

 Notes 217 227 228 229 230

BP, II/2168 (20). AGS, Estado, 8792 (2); 8790 (36); 8791 (41). BNM, Mss., 10467 (215–16); BP, II/2172 (92–3); ADA, 219 (1); 233 (24). In Spanish, estrena and aguinaldo mean ‘present and gift’; they are mentioned constantly in the records of the embassy. 231 AGS, Estado, 840 (181). 232 AGS, Estado, 8792 (54); 8781 (55); BP, II/2167 (63). 233 Victor Coelho and Keith Polk, ‘Instrumental Music’, in James Haar (ed.), European Music, 1520–1640 (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 527–56, pp. 536f. 234 Besides Armstrong, James I could often enjoy the buffoonery performed by other knights of his court, such as Sir John Finet or George Goring; Tinniswood, Behind the Throne. A Domestic History of the British Royal Household, chapter 3, ‘Diplomats and fools’. 235 John Doran, The History of Court Fools (London, 1858), pp. 189–210. 236 Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta, pp. 157–8. 237 Doran, The History of Court Fools, pp. 189–210. 238 AGS, Estado, 840 (252). 239 CSP Venice (1603–7). Francesco Priuli, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate. Valladolid, 19 February 1604; Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 1 and 22 September 1604; AHN, Estado, 2798 (5); AHN, Frías, 617 (1–4); AGS, Estado, 2863 (9). 240 Geoffrey Parker, El ejército de Flandes y el Camino Español, 1567–1659 (Madrid, 2000), pp. 87–8 and Appendix A; Juan L. Sánchez Martín, ‘Las tropas británicas de la Casa de Austria’, Researching and Dragona 8 (May 1999), pp. 4–21; Ivo Van Loo, ‘For Freedom and Fortune. The Rise of Dutch Privateering in the First Half of the Dutch Revolt, 1568–1609’, in Marco Van der Hoeven (ed.), Exercise of Arms. Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568–1648 (Leiden, 1997), pp. 173–95. 241 CSP Venice (1603–7), Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 27 July 1605/9 November 1605. 242 BP, II/2108 (51); BNM, Mss., 10467 (44, 288–91 and 295–97); AGS, Estado, 8788 (43); 2516 (91); BL, Eg. Mss., 318 (165); Parker, El ejército de Flandes, Appendix A. 243 Julio Albi de la Cuesta, De Pavía a Rocroi. Los Tercios de infantería española en los siglos XVI y XVII (Madrid, 1999), p. 59ff. 244 AGS, Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas, 2633. 245 BP, II/2198 (110–11). 246 See José Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618–1639) (Madrid, 2001), p. 437ff. 247 BP, II/1850 (80–1). 248 BL, Cotton Vespasian, 64, unnumbered. 249 BP, II/2228 (22). 250 BP, II/2108 (81–2). 251 BNM, Mss., 18203 (10–19). 252 Charts based on Zúñiga’s and Coloma’s records. 253 See especially Zúñiga’s and Coloma’s accounts. 254 AGS, Estado, 841 (30). 255 See Natalie Zemon Davis, The Gift in Sixteenth Century France (Madison, WI, 2000) and Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England (New York, 2003).

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256 Specially regarding the Countess of Suffolk, see Albert J. Loomie, ‘Toleration and Diplomacy. The Religious Issue in Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1603–1605’, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 53, no. 2 (1963), p. 32. 257 See Ochoa Brun, Historia de la diplomacia española, vol. V, ‘Emperor Charles V’s ambassadors to England’. 258 CODOIN, vol. 87ff. 259 AGS, Estado, 840 (111). 260 AGS, Estado, 840 (113 and 147). 261 AGS, Estado, 840 (243); 841 (30); BNM, Mss., 17659, unnumbered. 262 AGS, Estado, 2515 (89, 93, 95); 2516 (91); BP, II/2185 (55); II/870 (62). 263 AGS, Estado, 840 (251); AGS, Estado, 8792 (12). 264 Samuel Gardiner, History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War: 1603–1642, vol. 2 (London, 1883–4), pp. 216–58; Carter, The Secret Diplomacy, pp. 120–33; Garret Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy [1955] (New York, 1988), pp. 220–31. 265 Sir Anthony Weldon, in his book Court and Character of King James (1650), defended the idea of the corruption of the Jacobean court by Spanish money. 266 AGS, Estado, 2863 (9). 267 The main English pensioners (James’s favourites) received 6,000 ducats per year from the Spaniards, exactly the same salary of an ordinary Spanish ambassador to England; somehow, the pensioners were considered a kind of ‘acting’ Spanish ambassadors to James; BP, II/2219 (27); Roger Lockyer, Buckingham. The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham 1592–1628 (London, 1981), pp. 78–9. 268 AGS, Estado, 2571 (118 and 295); 2585 (33 and 76); 2587 (34). 269 AGS, Estado, 3456 (6). 270 AGS, Estado, 840 (53). 271 See Loomie, ‘Sir Robert Cecil and the Spanish embassy’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 42, no. 105 (1969), pp. 30–54; BP, II/2183 (6). 272 Marqués de Villa-Urrutia, Ocios Diplomáticos (Madrid, 1927), pp. 23–48; see also Sir Anthony Weldon, Court and Character of King James (London, 1650). 273 Mary F. S. Hervey, The Life, Correspondence and Collections of Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel [1921] (New York, 1969), pp. 1–9 and 112–9. 274 For instance, Beltenebros, Florian, Cid, Amadis or Roldán concealed different English ministers’ real names over the years. 275 BP, II/1829 (15–18). 276 BP, II/2185 (29). 277 BP, II/2108 (51); AGS, Estado, 8788 (118). 278 AGS, Estado, 8781 (2); 2516 (32). 279 BNM, Mss., 10467 (303–5). 280 ‘Pensionados’ and ‘confidentes’ in the Spanish records. 281 This became a problem for the Spanish ambassadors, since they could be paying English ministers not for passing valuable information but simply for being neutral in matters involving Spanish interests at the English court. 282 AGS, Estado, 841,(99). 283 John Phillips Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution, 1603–1688: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge, 1986), p. 429ff. 284 AGS, Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas, 2633; AGS, Estado, 2863 (16); 395, unnumbered. 285 BP, II/2183 (32).

 Notes 219 286 Thomas J. Dandelet, La Roma española (1500–1700) (Barcelona, 2002), pp. 119–22 and 173–6; Antonio Cabeza Rodríguez, ‘El relanzamiento de la diplomacia española en Roma en una Europa en Guerra (1618-1623)’, in Carlos José Hernando Sánchez (ed.), Roma y España. Un crisol de la cultura europea en la edad Moderna, 2 vols. (Madrid, 2007), pp. 447–70; Emilio Barrio Gozalo, ‘La embajada de España ante la corte de Roma en el siglo XVII. Ceremonial y práctica de buen gobierno’, Studia Histórica 31 (2009), pp. 237–73. 287 Alicia Esteban Estríngana, ‘Agregación de territorios e integración de sus élites. Flandes y la Monarquía de Felipe III (1598–1621)’, Studia Historica 32 (2010), pp. 261–304. 288 BNM, Mss., 10467 (288–91 and 303–05). 289 AGS, Estado, 841 (99). 290 AGS, Estado (30). 291 BL, Eg. Mss., 335 (209); AGS, Estado, 2516 (33); Carter, The Secret Diplomacy, pp. 120–33. 292 BNM, Mss., 10467 (297–98); Carter, The Secret Diplomacy, pp. 120–33; Charles H. Carter, ‘Gondomar: Ambassador to James I’, The Historical Journal 7, no. 2 (1964), pp. 189–208. 293 AGS, Estado, 840 (181). 294 Gustav Ungerer, ‘Juan Pantoja de la Cruz and the circulation of gifts between the English and Spanish courts in 1604/5’, Shakespeare Studies 26 (1998), pp. 145–86, 154. 295 Ibid., p. 159ff. 296 AGS, Estado, 841 (30); 840 (245). 297 Ungerer, Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, pp. 145–86; María Cruz de Carlos, ‘El VI Condestable de Castilla, coleccionista e intermediario de encargos reales (1592– 1613)’, in José Luis Colomer (ed.), Arte y diplomacia de la Monarquía Hispánica en el siglo XVII (Madrid, 2003), pp. 247–75, p. 225ff. 298 AGS, Estado, 841 (23). 299 AGS, Estado, 841 (99). 300 AGS, Estado, 840 (138). 301 Ungerer, Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, p. 150ff. 302 See Patrick Williams, ‘The duke of Lerma and the birth of the baroque court in Spain: Valladolid, summer 1605’, in Studia Historica, Historia Moderna, Universidad de Salamanca, nº 31, 2009, pp. 19–51. 303 Ibid., pp. 23–4. 304 Ibid., pp. 31–2. 305 Ibid., p. 155ff. 306 AHN, Estado, 2798 (8). 307 AGS, Estado, 840 (251). 308 AGS, Estado, 840 (250). 309 José Luis Colomer, ‘Los senderos cruzados del Arte y la diplomacia’, in Colomer, Arte y diplomacia, pp. 13–32. 310 AGS, Estado, 840 (250); Ungerer, Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, pp. 145–86; de Carlos, ‘El VI Condestable de Castilla’, p. 253ff. 311 BL, Add. Mss., 10236 (283–315); BL, Eg. Mss., 367 (112–13); Ungerer, Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, pp. 149–50; Williams, ‘El duque de Lerma’, pp. 19–51. 312 BL, Eg. Mss., 367 (112–13). 313 BL, Add. Mss., 10236 (283–315); Ungerer, Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, pp. 152–3.

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314 King James presented the ring to the Constable of Castile on 30 August 1604; Philip III did the same for the High Admiral Lord Howard on 18 June 1605. 315 Queen Anne presented the miniature portraits to the Constable on 4 September 1604; Queen Margarita gave the Spanish portraits, painted by Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, to Lord Howard on 3 June 1605. 316 Allen B. Hinds, CSP Venice (1613–15), vol. 13 (London, 1907), Francesco Morosini, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate. Madrid, 8 April 1614. 317 BP, II/562 (75–76); II/2221 (18). 318 Presented on 5 August 1622. 319 AGS, Estado, 8790 (25); BP, II/2172 (59); Fernando Díaz-Plaja, Historia de España en sus documentos: Siglo XVII (Madrid, 1988), p. 109; John H. Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares. El político en una época de decadencia (Barcelona, 1998), p. 249 and ‘Una relación agitada: España y Gran Bretaña, 1604–1655’, in Jonathan Brown and John H. Elliott (eds), La Almoneda del Siglo. Relaciones artísticas entre España y Gran Bretaña, 1604–1665 (Madrid, 2002), pp. 17–40; Parry Graham, The Golden Age Restored: The Culture of the Stuart Court, 1603–1642 (Manchester, 1981), pp. 137–46; Linda Levy Peck, Consuming Splendor: Society and Culture in Seventeenth Century England (Cambridge, 2005), p. 143; Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta, p. 200ff. 320 AGS, Estado, 8781 (23). 321 Villamediana gave amber, a pair of gloves and other presents to the Earl of Devonshire in Oxford on 13 September 1603; the Spanish ambassador had been in England for barely two weeks. 322 AGS, Estado, 841 (23). 323 Villamediana gave him a golden chain worth 1,000 reales on 31 August 1603 (for taking him across the Channel to Dover). 324 Elizabeth Lane Furdel, The Royal Doctors, 1485–1714: Medical Personnel at the Tudor and Stuart Courts (Rochester, NY, 2001), pp. 98–135; Leslie G. Matthews, ‘London’s immigrant apothecaries, 1600–1800’, Medical History 18, no. 3 (1974), pp. 262–74 and ‘Royal apothecaries of the Tudor period’, Medical History 8, no. 2 (April 1964), pp. 170–80. 325 AGS, Estado, 841 (23 and 26). 326 AHN, Estado, 3456 (6); BP, II/2183 (6). 327 AGS, Estado, 840 (253–7); 841 (23); Edmund K. Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage, vol. 3 (Oxford, 2009), p. 134. 328 Egerton Brydges, Collins Peerage of England: Genealogical, Biographical and Historical, 9 vols (London, 1812), vol. VII, p. 232ff. 329 See Relación de la Jornada del Excelentísimo Condestable de Castilla a las Paces entre España e Inglaterra que se concluyeron y juraron en Londres por el mes de agosto, año 1604; Relación muy verdadera del recibimiento y fiestas que se le hicieron en Inglaterra a don Juan de Tassis, conde de Villamediana, embajador extraordinario de Su Majestad del Rey don Felipe III nuestro Señor, para el nuevo Rey Jacobo de Inglaterra. Dase cuenta de la embajada y otras cosas muy notables y dignas de saberse and Relación muy verdadera de la Segunda Parte de la Embajada de don Juan de Tassis, conde de Villamediana y embajador de Su Majestad el Rey don Felipe III nuestro Señor, para el nuevo Rey Jacobo de Inglaterra. Dase cuenta de lo que Su Majestad le respondió y los grandes comedimientos que se hicieron. 330 Julio César Santoyo, ‘Lewkenor/Lucanor (1555?–1627?): Fragmentos biobibliográficos de un traductor olvidado’, in Santiago González Fernández-Corugedo (ed.), Proceedings of the II Conference of the Spanish Society for English Renaissance

 Notes 221 Studies (SEDERI) (Oviedo, 1992), pp. 261–87, 281ff.; Tinniswood, Behind the Throne. A Domestic History of the British Royal Household, chapter 3, ‘Diplomats and fools’. 331 AGS, Estado, 840 (118). 332 Antonia Fraser, La conspiración de la Pólvora. Catolicismo y terror en la Europa del siglo XVII (Madrid, 2004), p. 232. 333 Fernández, Gondomar y los católicos ingleses, pp. 105–33. 334 Ibid. 335 BNM, Mss., 10467 (297–8). 336 BP, II/2172 (49). 337 BP, II/2185 (55–6). 338 BP, II/2185 (29). 339 Warden’s services were well known in Madrid; Phillip IV ordered Don Carlos Coloma in 1623 to reward him according to his services; AGS, Estado, 8791 (25). 340 My translation; BP, II/2185 (55). 341 BP, II/870 (62); II/2108 (81–2). 342 BP, II/2198 (76). 343 These presents were offered in Greenwich on 7 September 1603; some days before, other gifts were given to the wife of the Viscount of Kent in Canterbury (4 September 1603). 344 Regarding the Spanish diplomacy and the Queen Anna’s household, see Cynthia Fry, ‘Perceptions of Influence. The Catholic Diplomacy of Queen Anna and Her Ladies, 1601-1604’, in Nadine Akkerman and Birgit Houben, The Politics of Female Households. Ladies-in-Waiting across Early Modern Europe (Leiden-Boston, 2014), pp. 267–86; Helen Payne, ‘Aristocratic women. Power, Patronage and Family Networks at the Jacobean Court, 1603-1625’, in James Daybell (ed.), Women and Politics in Early Modern England, 1450-1700 (Routledge, 2004), chapter 10, pp. 164–81. 345 Regarding Lady Drummond, in 1613 Gondomar gave her a luxurious ewer and a vase worth 5,160 reales. 346 BP, II/2108 (81–82). 347 She was a grandchild of Sir Charles Cornwallis, the first English ambassador to Spain of James I Stuart. 348 BP, II/2116 (91); II/2180 (34). 349 David Worthington, Scots in Habsburgh Service, 1618-1648 (Leiden-Boston, 2004), pp. 57–63, 69–72. 350 BP, II/2191 (54); II/870 (105–6). 351 BP, 870 (104–5). 352 In 1617 and in 1618 Phillip III ordered Gondomar to keep Argyll close to Spanish interests; BP, II/1829 (42–3); II/2541 (22–4); II/551 (42–5); 870 (104–5). 353 BP, II/870 (120). 354 BP, II/551 (42–5). 355 BP, 870 (104–5). 356 CSP Venice (1603–7). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 27 July 1605/9 November 1605. 357 BP, 870 (104–5). 358 Worthington, Scots in Habsburgh Service (1618-1648), p. 62. 359 AGS, Estado, 8787 (34 and 39); 8792 (52); 8792 (60). 360 Gondomar showed himself particularly excited about Argyll’s case for Spain; BP, II/870, unnumbered.

222 361 362 363 364 365 366

Notes

BP, II/1829 (42–3); II/2541 (68–9). My Translation; AHN, Estado, 739 (121–2). BP, II/2170 (10). AGS, Estado, 8788 (29). AGS, Estado, 8790 (32); 8792 (4). In these expenses were included gifts given to English soldiers and artillerymen from castles guarding the English coasts and ports. 367 Hinojosa gave £250 to a lucky English sea captain in June 1623. 368 The Constable of Castile shared 1,000 reales among the crewmen of a royal ship in Rochester on 5 September 1604. 369 BP, II/2198 (110–11). 370 See especially Gondomar’s and Coloma’s records. 371 BP, II/2018 (81–2). 372 BP, II/2172 (94–6). 373 Albert J. Loomie, Spain and the Jacobean Catholics, 1613–1624, vol. II (London, 1978), pp. 169–72. 374 Cottington received 9,960 reales from the Spanish embassy for seventeen months. 375 These nicknames were given by the Spanish ambassadors after 1604, suggested by the Earl of Northampton. 376 AGS, Estado, 840 (108, 118, 125–6, 130, 131 and 134). 377 Mary Anne Everett Green (ed.), CSP, Domestic, Elizabeth (1595–1597), vol. CCLI (London, 1869). R. Topcliffe to Lord Keeper. 14 February 1595; J. Cecil to Sir Robert Cecil. Plymouth, 30 December, 1595; Sir Thomas Egerton and F. Bacon to the Privy Council. 3 May 1596. 378 AGS, Estado, 8789 (57). 379 The French ambassadors to England during Gondomar’s office were Samuel Spifame, Siegneur des Buisseaux (1611–15), Gaspard Dauvet, Siegneur des Marets (1615–18) and Tanneguy Le Veneur, Count Tillieres (1619–24); Charles H. Firth and Sophia C. Lomas, Lists of Ambassadors from England to France and from France to England (Oxford, 1906). 380 Allen B. Hinds (ed.), CSP Venice (1615–1617), vol. 14 (London, 1908). Giovanni Battista Lionello, Venetian secretary in England, to the Inquisitors of State. London, 1 July 1616; The Inquisitors of State to Giovanni Battista, Venetian secretary. Venice, 21 July 1616; Giovanni Battista Lionello, Venetian secretary in England, to the Inquisitors of State. London, 5 August/16 September 1616; Joan Thirsk, Alternative Agriculture: A History from the Black Death to the Present Day (Oxford, 1997), p. 124ff. 381 AGS, Estado, 8790 (32); 8771 (26). 382 Relación de las Fiestas y Singulares Favores que a Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, señor de La Corzana, embajador extraordinario de Su Majestad el rey católico Nuestro Señor, al Serenísimo Rey de la Gran Bretaña, se le hicieron en la jornada que de España hizo, acompañando al Serenísimo señor Príncipe de Gales a Inglaterra. Impresor Luis Sánchez (Madrid, 1624). 383 AGS, Estado, 840 (142). 384 See Saavedra Fajardo, Idea de un príncipe político cristiano representado en cien empresas (Monaco, 1640), ‘empresa LXXXI’ (on the English taste for banqueting at the court). 385 Ungerer, Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, p. 149.

 Notes 223 386 AGS, 840 (251); María José del Río Barredo, ‘El ritual en la corte de los Austrias’, in María Luisa Lobato and Bernardo García García (eds), La fiesta cortesana en la época de los Austrias (Valladolid, 2003), pp. 17–34; Antonio Rodríguez Villa, ‘Etiquetas de la Casa de Austria’, Revista Europea no. 87 (24 de octubre de 1875), pp. 651–60. 387 AGS, Estado, 840 (250); 8792 (68); BL, Add. Mss., 10236 (283–315). 388 BP, II/2198 (110–11). 389 BP, II/2172 (25); Boyschoot got involved in the diplomatic incident in 1613, when he angrily refused the invitation of James’s daughter’s wedding, Elizabeth Stuart, as the Spanish ambassador (Don Alonso de Velasco) did not attend, and the ambassadors of France and Venice were invited too; the groom was Frederick of Palatinate, and the wedding celebrations lasted three days (14, 15 and 16 February 1613); Tinniswood, Behind the Throne. A Domestic History of the British Royal Household, chapter 3, ‘Diplomats and fools’. 390 BNM, Mss., 10467 (141); BP, II/2172 (25); Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta, pp. 181–2.

Chapter 3 1 The herring fisheries were considered the ‘golden mountain’ of the Dutch economy from the end of the sixteenth century onwards, employing between 6,000 and 10,000 people, and 500–700 ‘buses’ (fishing boats); Christiaan van Bochove, ‘The “Golden Mountain”: An Economic Analysis of Holland’s Early Modern Herring Fisheries’, in Louis Sicking Darlene Abreu-Ferreira (eds), Beyond the Catch. Fisheries of the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic, 900-1850, vol. 41 (Leiden and Boston, 2009), pp. 209–13. 2 AHN, Estado, 741 (52–7); AGS, Estado, 8792 (68). 3 AHN, Estado, 2798 (6). 4 Chapter 14 of Alberico Gentili’s Hispanicae Advocationis Libri Duo (Hannover, 1613) presented the cases in which Dutch warships attacked and blocked Spanish ships in British ports: ‘Whether the King may rightfully decide that Spaniards who have been roughly handled by the Dutch off a port of the King may sail in safety to Belgium.’ 5 BNM, Mss., 2759 (109–36); BP, II/1829 (42–3). 6 Troops transport by sea between 1600 and 1625 took place in 1601, 1602, 1605, 1611, 1615, 1620 and 1623; BNM, Mss., 17659, unnumbered; Geoffrey Parker, El ejército de Flandes y el Camino Español, 1567–1659 [1985] (Madrid, 2000), p. 324. 7 Horatio F. Brown, CSP Venice, vol. 10 (London, 1900). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 18 May/15 June/27 July 1605; Albert J. Loomie, ‘Sir Robert Cecil and the Spanish Embassy’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 42, no. 105 (1969), pp. 30–54, 32–3. 8 The ships en route to Flanders reached the port of La Corunna, where English ambassador Lord Howard warned of eighty Dutch warships watching over the English Channel; CSP Venice (1603–7). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 29 June 1605. 9 CSP Venice (1603–7). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 18 May 1605; Anzolo Badoer, Venetian ambassador in France, to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 24 May 1605.

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10 Regarding the prisoners of war, the Dutch admiral Haultain ordered pairs of soldiers to be tied and be thrown overboard, while others were sent to Holland, as was the case of two captains and forty soldiers; those cruelties during sea battles were quite common, as Ambassador Coloma reported again in 1623; AGS, Estado, 8792 (46); Loomie, Sir Robert Cecil, pp. 32–3; Paul C. Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, 1598–1621 (Madrid, 2001), pp. 212–13. 11 AGS, Estado, 840 (50). 12 AGS, Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas, 2633. 13 Only a minority of the royal councillors supported the Spanish demand based on the peace treaty clauses of 1604; the Secretary of State, Sir Robert Cecil, refused to take a stand against the Dutch; CSP Venice (1603–7). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 29 June 1605; Loomie, Sir Robert Cecil, pp. 32–3. 14 This was not the only case of hiring foreign ships to transport troops from the Iberian Peninsula to Flanders in order to reinforce the Spanish army there; in September 1615, a fleet of eighteen vessels (four royal ships and fourteen hired ships) commanded by Admiral Don Diego Brochero took forty-two infantry companies from Lisbon to Dunkirk; in 1639, Spanish admiral Don Antonio de Oquendo’s huge fleet included many British transport vessels en route to Flanders through the English Channel; BNM, Mss., 2348 (489–90). 15 CSP Venice (1603–7). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 13 July 1605. 16 In 1625 Mansfeld’s army crossed from Dover to Calais in this way; during the Battle of The Downs (1639), Spanish soldiers transported by Spanish galleons crossed to Flanders in the same way; CSP Venice (1603–7). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 28 September 1605; AHN, Estado, 737 (492–4); José Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618–1639) [1975] (Madrid, 2001), pp. 443–5. 17 AGS, Estado, 841 (141); 2571 (167). 18 In fact, there were three Flemish galleons who intercepted and fought the Dutch convoy; during the tough combat at the sea, two Flemish galleons retreated, while the third, commanded by Jan Jacobsen, fought nine Dutch warships for thirteen hours, before blowing his own ship up, sinking two Dutch warships with him; AGS, Estado, 8788 (20 and 29); Robert A. Stradling, La armada de Flandes. Política naval española y guerra europea, 1568–1668 (Madrid, 1992), pp. 69–77. 19 AGS, Estado, 8788 (29). 20 AGS, Estado, 8788 (69); 8789 (13 and 18); Carla Rahn Phillips, Seis galeones para el rey de España. La defensa imperial a principios del siglo XVII (Madrid, 1991), pp. 83–123. 21 Laing was granted a salary of 40 ducats per month, paid by the Spanish embassy in London; he enjoyed this payment from March 1623 until June 1625, when he left for Flanders, as the political situation in England worsened for collaborators with Spain and he was declared rebel and traitor in Scotland; AGS, Estado, 8789 (9); 8781 (4); AHN, Estado, 800, unnumbered; Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte, pp. 203–4. 22 AGS, Estado, 8789 (68 and 84). 23 Edward M. Spiers, Jeremy Crang and Matthew J. Strickland, A Military History of Scotland (Edinburgh, 2012), pp. 200–3.

 Notes 225 24 Coloma wrote that in England people dislike Spaniards, but in Scotland even the demons were more welcomed than Spanish people; BP, II/2198 (79); AGS, Estado, 8789 (68). 25 AGS, Estado, 8791 (2 and 6). 26 Ibid. 27 AGS, Estado, 8791 (31). 28 AGS, Estado, 8791 (24, 35, 39 and 52); Robert Steele, A Bibliography of Royal Proclamations of the Tudor and Stuarts Sovereigns, 1485-1714 (London, 1910), p. 292, ‘Royal proclamations in Edinburgh, on May 9 1623: For restitution of goods taken from the Dunkirk ship at Leith’. 29 AGS, Estado, 8791 (64); Ibid., ‘Royal proclamation in Edinburgh, on 15 July 1623: Against the Dunkirks and Dutch at Aberdeen’. 30 AGS, Estado, 8782 (28); 8787 (36); 8792 (13, 15 and 30). 31 BNM, Mss., 10467 (274–5); Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, España, pp. 204–5; Stradling, La armada de Flandes, pp. 69–77. 32 BNM, Mss., 10467 (260). 33 BNM, Mss., 10467 (262). 34 BNM, Mss., 10467 (274–5). 35 BNM, Mss., 10467 (276–81). 36 BNM, Mss., 10467 (290–1); ADA, 233 (24). 37 BNM, Mss., 10467 (295–7); AGS, Estado, 2516 (83). 38 ADA, 233 (24). 39 BNM, Mss., 10467 (300); Mss., 18428 (104); AGS, Estado, 2516 (91). 40 ADA, 233 (24). 41 AGS, Estado, 2516 (90). 42 ADA, 219 (1). 43 AGS, Estado, 2516 (84). 44 AGS, Estado, 2516 (93). 45 Ibid. 46 BP, II/2220 (16). 47 The storm took place between 13 and 18 October 1624; BNM, Mss., 2355 (217–18). 48 See José Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, Historia de una empresa siderúrgica española: los altos hornos de Liérganes y La Cavada, 1622–1834 (Santander, 1974); AHN, Estado, 730 (58); 739 (199–200); David Goodman, Poder y penuria. Gobierno, tecnología y ciencia en la España de Felipe II (Madrid, 1990), p. 107ff. 49 BNM, Mss., 9408 (168–9); Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte, pp. 69–71; Altos hornos y poder naval en la España de la edad Moderna (Madrid, 1999), p. 140ff. and La empresa de Inglaterra. La armada invencible: fabulación y realidad (Madrid, 2004), p. 39ff.; David Goodman, El poderío naval español. Historia de la armada española del siglo XVII (Barcelona, 2001), p. 19–61; Julio Sánchez Gómez, De minería, metalurgia y comercio de metales. La minería no férrica en el reino de Castilla, 1450–1610 (Salamanca, 1990), p. 123ff. 50 Coloma wrote that it was granted royal licence to export 100 guns from England, but in return for the payment of customs duty for the same amount as the price of the artillery; in short, they had to pay double price; AGS, Estado, 8791 (40, 47); 8782 (31). 51 Coloma presented this situation to Marquis Spinola, who wanted so much English artillery for the Flemish frigates and the Spanish army of Flanders; Hinojosa found

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out that James granted licence for 200 guns to the Dutch, refusing 100 guns for Portugal; AGS, Estado, 8792 (30); BNM, 10467 (108–11). 52 AHN, Estado, 869 (1–8); Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, España, Flandes, Mar del Norte, pp. 69–71; John H. Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares. El político en una época de decadencia (Barcelona, 1998), pp. 174–5; Goodman, El poderío naval español, pp. 19–61; Pere Molas Rivalta, ‘Instituciones y comercio en la España de Olivares’, Studia Storica 5 (1987), pp. 91–8; Stradling, La armada de Flandes, pp. 41–65. 53 BP, II/2541 (68–69); II/1817 (64–65); Trevor J. Dadson, ‘Portugal, España e Inglaterra a principios del siglo XVII: las maniobras de los Condes de Salinas y Gondomar’, Península: Revista de Estudos Ibéricos 4 (2007), pp. 23–33. 54 BNM, Mss., 9408 (168–9); Mss., 18426 (3–4); BP, II/2170 (121); II/2160 (67); II/2191 (45). 55 Rycaut was not paid very soon; by 1623, the Spanish crown had ordered unsuccessfully the Portuguese authorities to pay him at least twelve times; in 1631 and again in 1636, Rycaut begged to the Spanish diplomats the payment for the artillery; AGS, Estado, 8783 (24 and 27); 2519 (131); 2575, unnumbered. 56 BP, II/2191 (49); Sánchez Gómez, De minería, metalurgia y comercio de metales, p. 123ff. 57 AGS, Estado, 8783 (5). 58 AGS, Estado, 8787 (15 and 35). 59 AGS, Estado, 8787 (21). 60 AGS, Estado, 8792 (31). 61 AGS, Estado, 8792 (108–10); BP, II/2172 (24). 62 AGS, Estado, 2516 (130); BNM, Mss., 10467 (288–91 and 293). 63 In 1624, according to the Spanish Council of State, the Portuguese crown owed 7 million ducats to the Spanish treasury to cover defence expenses (artillery, soldiers, warships); BNM, Mss., 2355 (384–9). 64 AHN, Estado, 739 (154); BL, Eg. Mss., 335 (209ff.); BNM, Mss., 9379 (85–6). 65 BNM, Mss., 17659, unnumbered. 66 Gondomar and Coloma expressed their admiration for English naval expertise in several occasions; AGS, Estado, 8789 (60). 67 Goodman, El poderío naval español, pp. 26, 166ff., 183ff.; Thompson, Guerra y decadencia, pp. 188–205. 68 AHN, Estado, 3456 (1); Rahn Phillips, Seis galeones, pp. 125–41. 69 Goodman, El poderío naval español, p. 174. 70 The first new naval architecture and designs came from Flanders, with the Flemish ‘frigate’, more suitable for the shipping in those waters; Stradling, La Armada de Flandes. Política naval española y guerra europea, 1568-1668, pp. 60–5. 71 This new model of warships were lighter, more manoeuvrable and capable of carrying heavier armament and better guns; Robert Hutchinson, The Spanish Armada (London, 2013), chapters 3 (‘Ramparts of Earth and Manure’), 6 (‘Action this day’) and 10 (‘God be praised for all His Works’). 72 Bernardo J. García García, La Pax Hispánica. Política exterior del duque de Lerma (Leuven, 1996), p. 179; AHN, Estado, 3456 (1). 73 A ‘patache’ was a type of sailing vessel with two masts, very light and shallow, a sort of cross between a brig and a schooner, which was originally a warship, being intended for surveillance and inspection of the coasts and ports; it is also called a cutter.

 Notes 227 74 Out of twenty-two vessels, eighteen were between 320 and 70 tons; they were not considered huge warships, as the big galleons of Spanish and Portuguese fleets could reach 800–1,200 tons. 75 AHN, Estado, 3456 (1). 76 AGS, Estado, 8788 (102). 77 AGS, Estado, 8789 (60); Francisco Fernández-González, ‘The Spanish regulations for shipbuilding (ordenanzas) of the seventeenth century’, Naval History Symposium, US Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, 10–11 September 2009, pp. 5–9; Rahn Phillips, Seis galeones, pp. 41–81. 78 AGS, Estado, 8789 (60 and 71); 8781 (33). 79 AGS, Estado, 8781 (6 and 34); 8790 (65); BNM, Mss., 10467 (68–9). 80 AGS, Estado, 8791 (19, 67 and 70). 81 BNM, Mss., 10467 (68–9). 82 AGS, Estado, 8788 (98); 8770 (83). 83 AGS, Estado, 8791 (41). 84 Allen B. Hinds (ed.), CSP Venice (1623–5), vol. 18 (London, 1912). Zuane Pesaro, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 1 November/6 December 1624. 85 BNM, Mss., 2759 (109–36); Mss., 2361 (493–6); Marqués de Fuensanta del Valle, José Sancho Rayón and Francisco Zabalburu, Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España (hereafter CODOIN), vol. 81 (Madrid, 1883); Duque de MedinaSidonia, de los consejos de Estado y general de Su Majestad, su capitán general del Mar océano y de la costa de Andalucía a Su Majestad. Sanlúcar, 2 June 1607; AlcaláZamora y Queipo de Llano, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte, pp. 69–72; Goodman, El poderío naval español, pp. 258–312. 86 BNM, Mss., 2759 (109–36); Mss., 2356 (19–24); AGS, Estado, 8791 (41). 87 AHN, Estado, 3456 (1). 88 AGS, Estado, 8788 (54 and 84). 89 AGS, Estado, 8781 (1 and 6). 90 BNM, Mss., 10467 (38). 91 AGS, Estado, 8792 (68). 92 AHN, Estado, 3456 (1). 93 BP, II/2107 (11); II/1829 (53 and 63); Dadson, ‘Portugal, España e Inglaterra’. 94 BP, II/2185 (28). 95 AGS, Estado, 8781 (14); 8791 (70); BNM, Mss., 10467 (38). 96 BNM, Mss., 2347 (11); Mss., 2759 (109–36); Mss., 1492 (117–22); Mss., 2989 (1035); Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte, pp. 69–72; Goodman, El poderío naval español, pp. 258–312. 97 BNM, Mss., 2989 (902–3); 2361 (493–6); Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte, p. 51ff. 98 Spain was not the only kingdom to purchase vessels and recruit sailors in England; according to Gondomar, in 1618 Venice hired 12 ships and 1,900 seamen in Holland, plus 7 ships and 950 seamen in England; BL, Add. Mss., 28470 (120–44); BP, II/2185 (90). 99 AGS, Estado, 8789 (83); 8781 (1); BL, Harl. 1583 (309–10). 100 AGS, Estado, 8788 (54). 101 AGS, Estado, 8788 (84 and 105). 102 AGS, Estado, 8790 (65).

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103 The Duke of Osuna, Viceroy of Sicily and Naples, hired the services of French and English privateers against the Turks, Venetians and Barbarian pirates during the years 1613–1617; Luis M. Linde, Don Pedro Girón, duque de Osuna. La hegemonía española en Europa a comienzos del siglo XVII (Madrid, 2005), pp. 164–71; Enrique Otero Lana, Los corsarios españoles durante la decadencia de los Austrias. El corso español del Atlántico peninsular en el siglo XVII (1621–1697) (Madrid, 1999), p. 255ff. 104 On Gifford, see Peter Lamborn Wilson, Pirate Utopias: Moorish, Corsairs and European Renegadoes (New York, 2003), p. 57; Gigliola Pagano De Divitiis, English Merchants in Seventeenth Century Italy (Cambridge, 1997), p. 26ff, 46ff. 105 BNM, Mss., 2353 (228–38); Ramiro Feijoo, Corsarios contra berberiscos. Españoles contra renegados (Barcelona, 2003), pp. 121–34. 106 José Ramón Guevara, ‘El corso en el País Vasco del XVI’, Itsas Memoria. Revista de Estudios Marítimos del País Vasco 5 (2006), pp. 245–78; Otero Lana, Los corsarios españoles, pp. 195–214. 107 ADA, 79 (38, 195–214). 108 BP, II/2108 (35). 109 Coloma protested publicly before King James on 22 July 1622; the distribution of Dutch letters of marque in England infringed two royal proclamations of King James made in 1605: ‘A Proclamation for revocation of Mariners from forreine Services’ (Thetford, 1 March 1605) and ‘A Proclamation, with certain ordinances, to be observed by his Majesty’s subjects toward the King of Spaine’ (Windsor, 8 July 1605); AGS, Estado, 2515 (86); 8770 (20); 8788 (46); Feijoo, Corsarios contra berberiscos, pp. 387ff.; Manuel Lucena Salmoral, Piratas, corsarios, bucaneros y filibusteros (Madrid, 2005), pp. 27–47. 110 AGS, Estado, 8792 (65); BP, II/2220 (17). 111 ADA, 219 (1). 112 AGS, Estado, 8770 (33); Otero Lana, Los corsarios españoles, pp. 195–214. 113 BNM, Mss., 10467 (161–3). 114 BNM, Mss., 10467 (230–2); BP, II/2220 (2). 115 AGS, Estado, 8788 (105); Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte, p. 201 and note 369. 116 AGS, Estado, 8788 (105). 117 Ibid.; AGS, Estado, 8789 (21 and 39). 118 Each galleon had one infantry company, around 100 soldiers; Rahn Phillips, Seis galeones, p. 185ff. 119 AGS, Estado, 8788 (98); 8770 (83, 401). 120 BP, II/2108 (51). 121 BP, II/2108 (79). 122 This is agreed by all the historians of the period; for instance, Cardinal de la Cueva said that lack of forests forced the Dutch to bring wood for their fleets from Norway and countries on the Baltic Sea; ADA, 97 (1). 123 AHN, Estado, 3456 (1). 124 Rahn Phillips, Seis galeones, p. 83ff. 125 Regarding the prices of supplies, military equipment and manufactured goods, they were imported to Spain and were very much expensive on the Iberian Peninsula than in the north of Europe, due to the higher shipping costs, the huge European demand and the price inflation of raw materials and skilled labour; AGS, Estado, 8781 (6); 8790 (65); Rahn Phillips, Seis galeones, pp. 41–81. 126 BL, Eg. Mss., 335 (209).

 Notes 229 127 BP, II/2198 (64–5); AGS, Estado, 8781 (14). 128 For the crucial role of Dutch merchant ships for Spanish trade with Northern Europe, see Juan E. Gelabert, ‘Guerra y coyuntura fiscal: el embargo general de 1598’, IX Congreso de la Asociación española de Historia Económica, Murcia, Department of Modern and Contemporary History, University of Cantabria, September 2008. 129 AGS, Estado, 8781 (14). 130 Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of The Royal Navy 1652–1862 (Annapolis, 1926); Goodman, El poderío naval español, pp. 105–6; Rahn Phillips, Seis galeones, pp. 141–51. 131 AHN, Estado, 2798 (6). 132 AHN, Estado, 3456 (6, 7, 8 and 13). 133 The Jacobean royal proclamations were ‘A Proclamation concerning Warlike ships at Sea’ (23 June 1603) and ‘A Proclamation to represse all Piracies and Depredations upon the Sea’ (30 September 1603); Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, p. 160 and note 37; Douglas R. Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact: The Secret Alliance between History’s Most Notorious Bucaneers and Colonial America (New York, 2009), pp. 29–31; Ivo Van Loo, ‘For freedom and fortune. The Rise of Dutch Privateering in the First Half of the Dutch Revolt, 1568–1609’, in Marco Van der Hoeven (ed.), Exercise of Arms. Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568–1648 (Leiden, 1997), pp. 173–95. 134 CSP Venice (1603–7). Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 9 April 1603. 135 In order to return King James’s favours towards Spain, some English pirates were released by order of Philip III in the summer of 1603; AGS, Estado, 840 (237). 136 The Spanish sea captain Martín de Justiz had to return an English merchant ship that had been taken to San Sebastián; other English vessels taken by Spanish privateers were returned from ports of Spain (Fuenterrabía) and Portugal (Villanova) at that time; BL, Spanish Manuscripts, Biblio Lansdown 152 (50–1); 141 (180 and 260). 137 The Spanish merchant was Matías Pérez, and the cargo included leather, ginger and logs; the pirate was the sea captain Cox; as for Sir Julius Caesar, who was knighted in 1603, he was judge between 1582 and 1606, and subsequently Chancellor of the Exchequer (1606–14) and Master of the Rolls (1614–36); cf. Lamar M. Hill, Bench and Bureaucracy. The Public Career of Sir Julius Caesar, 1580–1636 (Stanford, 1988); BL, Spanish Mss., Biblio Lansdown 152 (368, 376–7). 138 BL, Spanish Mss., 152 (368, 376–7); 139 (82–3). 139 Van Loo, ‘For Freedom and Fortune’. 140 AGS, Estado, 840 (17, 118 and 153); Kenneth R. Andrews, ‘Caribbean Rivalry and the Anglo-Spanish Peace of 1604’, History 59, no. 195 (1974), p. 5ff.; Stone, La crisis de la aristocracia, pp. 179–87. 141 AGS, Estado, 840 (141). 142 This royal proclamation was issued in exchange for 30,000 ducats paid to some of the high-ranking figures at the English court, such as Sir Robert Cecil and the Countess of Suffolk: ‘A Proclamation for the search and apprehension of certaine pirats’ (Westminster, 12 November 1604); ‘A Proclamation for revocation of Mariners from forreine Services’; and ‘A Proclamation, with certain ordinances, to be observed by his Majesty’s subjects toward the King of Spaine’ (Windsor, 8 July 1605); AHN, Estado, 2798 (5); 3456 (13); Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, pp. 29–31; Van Loo, ‘For Freedom and Fortune’. 143 Villamediana wrote that the cases at court could last eight years; he sent thirty-seven complaints related to acts of English privateering to the Privy Council: seventeen

230

144

145 146 147

148 149 150 151 152

153 154 155 156

157 158

159 160

Notes were not answered, five were delayed, five were denied and ten were refused as cases of Dutch privateering; BL, Spanish Mss., Biblio Lansdown 139 (133–4); BP, II/2202 (75); Van Loo ‘For Freedom and Fortune’, pp. 173–95. The English government proposed that the only way to finish the piracy at sea was to have a firm diplomatic agreement between the main maritime powers of the time – Spain, England, France and the Dutch; CSP Venice (1607–10). Marc Antonio Correr, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 18 December 1608. AGS, Estado, 841 (12). AGS, Estado, 843 (31); CSP Venice (1607–10). Marc Antonio Correr, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 18 December 1608. On a list of lost merchant ships from Bristol Book of Trade during 1610–20, out of forty-four cases, twenty-eight ships were taken by pirates; George Mallet, ‘Early Seventeenth Century Piracy and Bristol’, BA dissertation, University of Bristol, 2009, pp. 4–5, 55–6. ‘A Proclamation for the search and apprehension of certaine pirats’ (13 June 1606) and ‘A Proclamation against pirats’ (8 January 1609); Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, pp. 29–31. George Ernst Manwaring and William Gordon Perrin, The Life and Works of Sir Henry Mainwaring, vol. II (London, 1922), pp. 3–52. See Ronald Susan, The Pirate Queen. Queen Elizabeth I, Her Pirate Adventurers and the Dawn of the Empire (New York, 2007). Van Loo, ‘For Freedom and Fortune’, pp. 173–95; John C. Appleby, ‘A Nursery of Pirates: The English Pirate Community in Ireland in the Early Seventeenth Century’, International Journal of Maritime History 2, no. 1 (1990), pp. 1–27. Gentili also wrote a famous work of law dedicated to Ambassador Zúñiga and dealing with cases brought by him to the High Court of the English Admiralty; Hispanicae advocationis libri duo was published in 1613 in Hannover, after his death, by his brother Scipio. See Zúñiga’s records; Douglas Hunter, Half Moon: Henry Hudson and the Voyage that Redrew The Map of the New World (New York, 2009), pp. 270–2. See Zúñiga’s records. AGS, Estado, 2585 (76). For instance, in 1608 the secretary Francis Fowler spent five months in Ireland to recover a Spanish merchant ship taken by pirates; many cargoes of Brazilian sugar were brought to Irish ports, taken from Portuguese ships; CSP Venice (1607–10). Zorzi Giustinian, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 28 November 1608; BP, II/2233 (42). CSP Venice (1610–13). Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 8 February 1613; BP, II/2191 (22); Otero Lana, Los corsarios españoles, pp. 69–95. Between June and December 1604, at least eleven English privateers received letters of marque from the Dutch government; until 1605, 60 per cent of the booty taken to Zeeland was captured by the English; Van Loo ‘For Freedom and Fortune’, pp. 173–95. CODOIN, vol. 81, pp. 259–550; CSP Venice (1613–15). Francesco Morosini to the Doge and Senate. Genoa, 24/31 August 1613. See Alberico Gentili, Hispanicae Advocationis libri duo [1613, 1661] (Washington, 1921).

 Notes 231 161 CSP Venice (1603–7). Nicolo Molin to the Doge and Senate, London, 2 March 1605. 162 See Gentili, Hispanicae Advocationis libri duo, chapters 5 and 14. 163 CSP Venice (1603–07). Nicolo Molin and Zorzio Giustiniani to the Doge and Senate, London, 25 January 1606/20 June 1607. 164 CSP Venice (1607–10). Girolamo Soranzo, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and the Senate, Madrid 31 August 1608. 165 CSP Venice (1610–13). Marc Antonio Correr, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 23 December 1610. 166 BP, II/2233 (39–40). 167 CSP Venice (1610–13). Marc Antonio Correr, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 10 March 1611. 168 CSP Venice (1607–10). Marc Antonio Correr, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 18 December 1608. 169 CSP Venice (1610–13). Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 3 February 1612. 170 AGS, Estado, 8775 (11). 171 BP, II/2202 (80). 172 BP, II/2202 (75); CSP Venice (1610–13). Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 26 July 1612. 173 BP, II/2202 (80). 174 AHN, Estado, 3456, unnumbered; BP, II/2202 (56); II/2228 (177); II/2107 (30); II/1850, unnumbered; II/562 (37 and 87); II/551; II/2160; II/2239 (5); II/2172 (108); II/2220 (6); AGS, Estado, 8788 (99–100); 8792 (3); 2516 (94); BNM, Mss., 10467 (241–2). 175 BP, II/2168 (6). 176 Juan Durán-Loriga, El embajador y el Rey: el conde de Gondomar y Jacobo I de England (Madrid, 2006), p. 79ff. 177 BP, II/2168 (43). 178 BP, II/2168 (50). 179 BP, II/1850 (48–50 and 99–100). 180 See Luis Tobío Fernández, Gondomar y su triunfo sobre Raleigh (La Coruña, 1974). 181 Raleigh’s execution thanks to Gondomar’s action at the English court was well known by English diplomats to Spain, for instance, Sir John Digby; BP, II/562 (34); BNM, Mss., 18430 (39). 182 BNM, Mss., 9133 (75–8). 183 For instance, the merchant John Davis’s reprisals were based on two laws of King Edward III and Henry V of England; BP, II/2233 (52–6); 2202 (71). 184 BP, II/562, 92–3; II/2168 (50); BNM, Mss., 10441 (3–10); María Emelina Martín Acosta, El dinero americano y la política del Imperio (Madrid, 1992), pp. 251, 260 and 264. 185 BNM, Mss., 1492 (270). 186 CSP Venice (1613–15). Antonio Foscarini to the Doge and Senate, London, 9 May 1614. 187 Castleton’s trip became very famous at that time, and its story was published by Samuel Purchas in Purchas His Pilgrimes, 4 vols (London, 1625) under the title A Voyage in 1612 by The Pearl to the East Indies, Wherein Went as Captain Mr Samuel Castleton of London and Captain George Bathurst as Lieutenant; The Narrative Written by John Tatton, Master; in January 1614, Gondomar received the order from the Privy Council to embargo; BP, II/2202 (76–7); William Noel Sainsbury (ed.),

232

188 189 190 191 192

193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203

204 205

206 207

Notes CSP, Colonial Series, East Indies, China, Japan (1513–1616), vol. 1 (Burlington, 2005). Warrant from the Privy Council for a New Admiralty Commission to Discover and Sequester the Pearl, Whitehall, 7 January 1614; Colin Breen and Wes Forsythe, Boats and Shipwrecks of Ireland (Stroud, 2004), p. 112ff.; Robert Kerr and F. A. S. Edin (eds), A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels, Arranged in Systematic Order, vols 10 and 11 (London and Edinburgh, 1824), pp. 464–5; Matthew Dimmock, ‘Faith, Form and Faction: Samuel Purchas’s Purchas His Pilgrimage (1613)’, Renaissance Studies 28, no. 2 (2014), pp. 262–78. BP, II/2202 (78); CSP Venice (1613–15). Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 25 October 1613. BP, II/2202 (55). BP, II/2202 (84). BP, II/2202 (65). Parker was involved in smuggling of pearls from Margarita Island, in the Caribbean in 1601, after capturing a slave boat and attacking a village in Panama; Linda M. Heywood and John K. Thornton, Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles and the Foundation of the Americas, 1585–1660 (Cambridge, 2007), p. 18ff. BP, II/2202 (89). BP, II/2233 (42). BP, II/2228 (193). They were arrested by Admiral Sir William Monson; Tucker’s story was published in Monson’s Sir William Monson’s Naval Tracts, vol. 6, A Story of Two Pirates. BP, II/2233 (39–40); II/2168 (12). BP, II/2228 (89–90). BNM, Mss., 9408 (77–80). BP, II/2228 (150); AHN, Estado, 737 (495). BP, II/2233 (46). BP, II/2233 (47–8). BP, II/2228 (150); Arthur L. Loeb, ‘A History of Dutch Jewry before the Holocaust: Emancipation, Assimilation, Integration?’, in Robert Howell and Jolanda Vanderwal Taylor (eds), History in Dutch Studies (Lanham, MD, 2003), pp. 141–52, 143ff.; Mercedes García Arenal and Gerard Wiegers, Un hombre en tres mundos: Samuel Pallache, un judío marroquí en la Europa protestante y en la católica (Madrid, 2006), pp. 4ff., 154ff., 191ff. Pallache was arrested because Gondomar put pressure on the English government, but he was released after the Dutch ambassador, Noel de Caron, paid bail of 30,000 ducats. Sir Henry Mainwaring was a famous pirate captain during the Jacobean period (1586/7–1653); between 1610 and 1616 he captured ships, with Berber pirates, in the area of Gibraltar and Newfoundland; in 1616 he received a full pardon from King James, and in 1618 he wrote a book on piracy (Discourse of Pirates) and was knighted; later he was appointed ambassador to Venice, joined the Royal Navy and became a member of the English parliament and a vice admiral (1621–2); BP, II/2228 (116); Claire Jowitt, The Culture of Piracy, 1580–1630: English Literature and Seaborne Crime (Farnham, 2010), p. 152ff. BP, II/2228 (193). BL, Biblio Lansdown 139 (50–1); BP, II/2228 (89–90); BNM, Mss., 2353 (228–38); Mallet, ‘Early Seventeenth Century Piracy and Bristol’, pp. 11–6; Kenneth Parker, ‘Reading Barbary in Early Modern England, 1550–1685’, in Matthew Birchwood and

 Notes 233

208

209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227

228 229 230 231 232 233

Matthew Dimmock (eds), Cultural Encounters between East and West, 1453–1699 (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2005), pp. 77–106, 90ff; John C. Appleby, ‘The Problem of Piracy in Ireland, 1570-1630’, in Claire Jowitt (ed.), Pirates? The Politics of Plunder, 1550-1650 (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp. 41–55. The construction of the new fleet would be further supplemented by the creation of the ‘Almirantazgo de los Países Septentrionales’ (Seville, 1624), a trading company for Spain and the Spanish Low Countries; Stradling, La Armada de Flandes. Política naval española y guerra europea, 1568-1668, pp. 48–60; Ángel Alloza Aparicio, ‘La Junta del Almirantazgo y la lucha contra el contrabando, 1625-1643’. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, serie IV, Historia Moderna, 2003, pp. 217–54; Francisco Javier Díaz González, ‘La creación de la Real Junta del Almirantazgo (1624-1628)’, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, seria IV, Historia Moderna 12 (1999), pp. 91–128. AGS, Estado, 8788 (106). La Guerra de los Estados Bajos: desde el año 1588 hasta el de 1599 (1625), Annals of Tacitus (translation into Spanish). AHN, Estado, 741 (52–7). AGS, Estado, 8798 (36). BP, II/2198 (5–6). The English vessels left England on 25 March 1620, and they returned at the end of June 1622; during their sea voyage they fought twice against the Portuguese fleet of Ruy Freire de Andrade and also captured five Portuguese ships; Ibid. ‘A Proclamation, with certain ordinances, to be observed by his Majesty’s subjects toward the King of Spaine’. AGS, Estado, 8788 (4). AGS, Estado, 8788 (50). AGS, Estado, 8788 (114). AGS, Estado, 1156 (59); 8789 (36). In February 1623, Coloma informed Phillip IV that his lawyers were litigating for the stolen cargoes brought to England by three ships from the East Indies, two English and one Dutch; AGs, Estado, 8789 (36, 67). AGS, Estado, 8791 (44). BP, II/2198 (82–3). AGS, Estado, 8791 (44). The English judges proposed giving half of the Portuguese cargo to each of the litigant parties, although Coloma refused it without hesitation; AGS, Estado, 8781 (16); 8792 (35) . BNM, Mss., 9408 (77–80); AGS, Estado, 8770 (7); AHN, Estado, 739 (154). Their leaders were the Duke Henri de Rohan and his brother Benjamin, Duke of Soubise; AGS, Estado, 8773 (12). One similar case: in October 1622, Gondomar asked King James to obtain the orders to release a Spanish knight of the order of Calatrava, Don Diego Castejón, whose English ship was attacked by Rochalais privateers and who was kidnapped; AGS, Estado, 8771 (51). AGS, Estado, 8792 (47). AGS, Estado, 8788 (108). AGS, Estado, 8788 (108 and 113). AGS, Estado, 8788 (118); 8789 (30); 8790 (29). AGS, Estado, 8790 (29). AGS, Estado, 8789 (80); BNM, Mss., 3010 (190–3).

234

Notes

234 Marqués de Fuensanta del Valle and José Sancho Rayón, CODOIN, vol. 61 (Madrid, 1875), Memorias de Matías Novoa. 235 BP, II/2165 (107); BNM, Mss., 2352 (147–8); see George Manwaring, The Three Brothers, or the Travels and Adventures of Sir Anthony, Sir Robert and Sir Thomas Sherley in Persia, Russia, Turkey, Spain, etc. with Portraits (London, 1825); Ewards Denison Ross, Sir Anthony Sherley and his Persian Adventure (London, 2005), pp. 91–175; Clements R. Markham, The Voyages of William Baffin, 1612–1622 (Bremen, 2010), pp. I–LIX. 236 BP, II/1829 (98–99); II/2541 (19–20). 237 In January 1619, Andrade was appointed general of the Sea of Hormuz, Persia and Arabia; James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580–1640 (Baltimore, MD, 1993), p. 185ff. 238 AGS, Estado, 8788 (59). 239 As an example of these combats in East India, see Relación cierta y verdadera de la feliz victoria y prósperos sucesos que en la India oriental han conseguido los portugueses contra armadas muy poderosas de Holanda y Persia este año de 1624. Hecha en Goa, 27 de marzo de 1624 (Madrid, 1625). 240 Hormuz was taken on 3 May 1622; the Portuguese retreated to the fortress of Mascate; Ibid. AGS, Estado, 8788 (108). 241 BNM, Mss., 18430 (39). 242 AGS, Estado, 8771 (63); 8789 (36). 243 AGS, Estado, 2516 (33). 244 AGS, Estado, 8790 (42); 8792 (1); BNM, Mss., 10467 (37–8). 245 The letter from the ambassadors was dated 17 August 1623 (Julian calendar). 246 The letter from King James was dated 22 August (Julian calendar). 247 BP, II/2200 (33, 36); BNM, Mss., 10467 (59–60 and 66). 248 In January 1624, Philip IV was informed by his ambassadors that Buckingham was in charge of the examination of the Hormuz attack, but nothing was being done; Hinojosa wrote that the East India Company earned at least 800,000 ducats from Hormuz, out of which James and Buckingham received 80,000 ducats; one of these payments made up part of the accusations against the royal favourite during his impeachment by the English parliament in 1626; BNM, Mss., 10467 (164–7, 234–7); BP, II/2172 (94–6); see Samuel R. Gardiner, Documents Illustrating the Impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham in 1626 (London, 1889). 249 AHN, Estado, 2798 (6). 250 The Earl of Oxford (1593–1625) publicly refused the Spanish Match; he served with the English armies in the Rhenish Palatinate in 1620; BP, II/2170 (74–6). 251 The reports were sent in 1617 and 1618; Venice dealt first with Holland and then with England; Venice hired 9 ships, 560 crewmen and 490 soldiers (from England) and 12 ships, 900 crewmen and 1000 soldiers (from the Dutch); BP, II/1829 (15–18, 26–7); II/2185 (72 and 90); II/2541 (2–3). 252 Linde, Don Pedro Girón, pp. 125–203. 253 AGS, Estado, 8788 (39). 254 BP, II/2172 (92–93). 255 AGS, Estado, 2515 (95); 8788 (84); BP, II/2198 (10). 256 AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered; AGS, Estado, 8790 (13, 15, 47, 52 and 62); 8791 (44 and 65); 8792 (17). 257 BNM, Mss., 10467 (151). 258 BNM, Mss., 10467 (191–2).

 Notes 235 259 260 261 262 263 264 265

266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289

290 291 292 293 294

ADA, 219 (1); BNM, Mss., 10467 (246–9, 270–3, 288–91). ADA, 219 (1). BP, II/2220, unnumbered. BP, II/2172 (61 and 94–6); BNM, Mss., 10467 (234). AHN, Estado, 740 (243–4). AHN, Estado, 740 (240–1). Ángel Alloza Aparicio, ‘El comercio francés en España y Portugal. La represalia de 1635’, in Carlos Martínez Shaw and José María Oliva Melgar (eds), El sistema atlántico español: siglos XVII–XIX (Madrid, 2005), pp. 127–62; Braudel, El Mediterráneo y el mundo mediterráneo en tiempos de Felipe II, p. 473ff.; Echevarría Bacigalupe, Flandes y la Monarquía Hispánica, pp. 174–82. BNM, Mss., 2347 (61–5). AHN, Estado, 3456, unnumbered; BNM, Mss., 7549 (484–5, 505–6); Mss., 2759 (109–36); Mss., 1492 (288); BP, II/2205 (72). BNM, Mss., 7549 (466–7). AGS, Estado, 840 (262); 841 (9 and 20). AHN, Estado, 2798 (5). BNM, Mss., 7549 (500–1). ADA, 21 (2). AGS, Estado, 840 (147). AGS, Estado, 841 (7–8); Oscar Gelderblom, ‘The Political Economy of Foreign Trade in England and the Dutch Republic (1550–1650)’, seminar held at the Department of Economic History and Institutions, Carlos III University, Madrid, April 2004. AGS, Estado, 841 (9); AHN, Estado, 2798 (5). The maritime Dutch blockade of the English Channel ended in the summer of 1607 with the ceasefire between Spain and Holland; AHN, Estado, 3456 (13); CODOIN, vol. 81, pp. 259–550; Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, pp. 256–64. BP, II/2170 (41). James promised to send 12 galleons to the English Channel to end the Dutch blockade; AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered. BP, II/2198 (121); II/2108 (116); II/2108 (59); AGS, Estado, 8788 (52). BP, II/2108 (20, 28, 50, 74); II/2170 (74). AGS, Estado, 8788 (19 and 60). AGS, Estado, 2515 (89). AGS, Estado, 8770 (39). AHN, Estado, 2349 (11). BP, II/2202 (70). BP, II/2202 (70). BP, II/1829 (97). BP, II/551 (27–28); II/2160 (57). BP, II/2170 (41); Carlos Álvarez Nogal, ‘La formación de un mercado europeo de la plata: mecanismos y costes de transporte en España’, 8th Congress of the Spanish Association of Economic History, Carlos III University, Santiago de Compostela, Madrid, 2005, pp. 2–8. BP, II/2198 (10); AGS, Estado, 8788 (52). AGS, Estado, 8770 (38 and 62); 8787 (3 and 13). AGS, Estado, 8788 (99). AGS, Estado, 8788 (100). AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered; BL, Harl. 1583 (368–69).

236

Notes

295 Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, p. 75 and note 28; Stradling, La armada de Flandes, pp. 25–40. 296 The project was very interesting for the Flemish industry, as Holland was the new industrial centre of Europe; Francisco Chacón Jiménez, ‘El artesanado y la economía urbana durante el siglo XVII’, in Ramón Menéndez Pidal (ed.), Historia de España, vol. 23, La crisis del siglo XVII: La población, la economía y la sociedad (Madrid, 1989), pp. 238–325. 297 Echevarría Bacigalupe, Flandes y la Monarquía Hispánica, p. 215ff. 298 BP, II/2540 (82 and 88–91). 299 This English company settled in Antwerp until the middle of the sixteenth century; BP, II/1829 (15–18 and 26–7). 300 BP, II/2189 (47–9). 301 BP, II/870, unnumbered. 302 The project was defended by Sir Francis Cottington in a meeting at the Spanish court; BP, II/562, 71–4. 303 AGS, Estado, 8788 (16 and 27); 2515 (92); 8770 (45). 304 AGS, Estado, 2516 (2). 305 AGS, Estado, 8781 (7–9); 2516 (9). 306 AGS, Estado, 8792 (31 and 43). 307 Ibid. (48). 308 BL, Add. Mss., 14007 (405–06). 309 Brizuela was an expert on trade and political matters of Flanders and Holland; between 1625 and 1628 he was in charge of the battle against Dutch contraband; BL, Add. Mss.,. 14007 (407–10). 310 Elliott, España y su Mundo, 1500–1700, pp. 151–77; Feros, El duque de Lerma, pp. 351–72; García García, La Pax Hispánica. Política exterior del duque de Lerma, pp. 74ff., 99ff.; I.A.A. Thompson, ‘La guerra y el soldado’, in Antonio Feros and Juan Gelabert (eds), España en tiempos del Quijote (Madrid, 2004), pp. 159–95; Manuel Peña, ‘La búsqueda de la paz y el remedio general’, in Ricardo García Cárcel (ed.), Historia de España. Siglos XVI y XVII. La España de los Austrias (Madrid, 2003), pp. 269–86; Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, ‘¿Monarquía Católica o Hispánica?: La encrucijada de la política norteafricana entre Lepanto (1571) y el proyecto de la jornada real de Argel (1618)’, in Porfirio Sanz Camañes (ed.), La Monarquía Hispánica en tiempos del Quijote (Madrid, 2005), pp. 593–613. 311 AGS, Estado, 2515 (95); BP, II/2108 (84); BNM, Mss., 2759 (203–26); ADA, 96 (25); Vicente Palacio Atard, ‘Carlos V y el Turco’, in Manuel Fernández Álvarez (ed.), El Imperio de Carlos V (Madrid, 2001), pp. 101–12. 312 The Levant Company was founded in 1581, and in 1592 this company merged with the Venice Company; there were English commercial agents in Constantinople, Algiers, Malta and Genoa; Braudel, El Mediterráneo y el mundo mediterráneo en tiempos de Felipe II, pp. 473ff. 313 ADA, 231 (1). 314 BP, II/1829 (60–1). 315 BP, II/2185 (4); II/1829 (82–7); II/2107 (54); II/2541 (54); BNM, Mss., 9408 (77–80); García García, La Pax Hispánica, pp. 175–6. 316 BP, II/870, unnumbered. 317 Ibid. 318 Both sides would offer twenty warships; BP, II/562 (71–4); II/2108 (9); BNM, Mss., 13351 (48).

 Notes 237 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341

342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350

BP, II/562 (81); II/2170 (101). BP, II/2191 (20); II/870, unnumbered. BP, II/870 (35); Redworth, El Príncipe y la Infanta. Una boda real frustrada, p. 37. BL, Harleian Papers 1583 (345–46); Mss., 18426 (11–12); BP, II/2191 (52); II/2221 (21–2). BP, II/2191 (61–3). BNM, Mss., 2349, unnumbered. BP, II/2191 (86). BP, II/2191 (92 and 100); II/2221 (41 and 47); BL, Harl. 1583 (331–2); Aston Papers, vol. II, 1621 (245). Carlos Seco Serrano, ‘Españoles, berberiscos, persas y turcos en los comienzos del siglo XVII’, in Ramón Menéndez Pidal (ed.), La España de Felipe III, vo. 23 (Madrid, 1979), pp. 389–415. AGS, Estado, 2516 (91); ADA, 219 (1); 97 (1); Jowitt, The Culture of Piracy, p. 157; Mallet, ‘Early Seventeenth Century Piracy and Bristol’, pp. 55–6. BP, II/2221 (47); AGS, Estado, 8788 (26). BP, II/551 (31–2); BNM, Mss., 13351 (44). BP, II/562 (87). CODOIN, vol. 61, pp. 259–550. AGS, Estado, 8770 (19); 8771 (41–2). Ibid., 8788 (60). BP, II/2219 (38); AGS, Estado, 8770 (80); 8781 (2). CSP Venice (1610–1613), Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 14 July 1611; AHN, Estado, 741 (52–7). AGS, Estado, 8788 (110); 8790 (29). BP, II/1817 (28–31). CODOIN, vol. 81, pp. 259–550. Vicente Montojo Montojo, ‘El comercio de Levante durante el valimiento del conde duque de Olivares (1622–1643)’, Revista de Historia Moderna 24 (2006), pp. 459–86. ADA, 96 (25); Adri P. van Vliet, ‘Foundation, Organization and Effects on the Dutch Navy 1568–1648’, in Marco Van der Hoeven (ed.), Exercise of Arms: Warfare in the Netherlands 1568–1648 (Leiden, 1997), pp. 153–72; Braudel, El Mediterráneo y el mundo mediterráneo en tiempos de Felipe II, p. 473ff. Sherley proposed to heavily fortify Algeciras Bay on the European side and Perejil Island on the African side; AHN, Estado, 738 (277–88); BNM, Mss., 9373 (199–202). CODOIN, vol. 81, p. 259ff.; Van Vliet, ‘Foundation, Organization and Effects’. BNM, Mss., 9408 (77–80). AGS, Estado, 2515 (90); 8789 (21 and 39). BP, II/2185 (72); II/870, unnumbered; AGS, Estado, 8788 (54). AGS, Estado, 8788 (19 and 98). AGS, Estado, 8790 (51). Don Fadrique defeated the Dutch in 1621, Fajardo on 6 October 1622; AGS, Estado, 2515 (89); AHN, Osuna, 198 (38); AHN, Estado, 869 (1–8); BNM, Mss., 2353 (45–6); Mss., 18193 (198–9). Alloza Aparicio, ‘La junta del Almirantazgo y la lucha contra el contrabando, 1625–1643’, pp. 217–54; Díaz González, ‘La creación de la Real Junta del Almirantazgo (1624–1628)’, pp. 91–128; Díaz González, ‘Los miembros de la real junta del Almirantazgo (1625–1643)’, Historia, Instituciones, Documentos 26 (1999), pp. 193–209.

238 351 352 353 354

Notes

AGS, Estado, 841 (9). AGS, Estado, 840 (141 and 262); BNM, Mss., 7549 (505–6). BP, II/2239 (55, 78–9). BP, II/2160 (66 and 92); Braudel, El Mediterráneo y el mundo mediterráneo en tiempos de Felipe II, p. 473ff.; Ricardo Calle Saiz, ‘La Hacienda pública en España. El pensamiento financiero durante la época mercantilista: Luís Ortiz y Martín González de Cellorigo’, Revista de Economía Política 70 (September/December 1975), pp. 35–53. 355 CSP Venice (1607–1610), Girolamo Soranzo, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate. Madrid, 12 October 1609; Felipe Ruiz Martín, ‘El problema del vellón: su incidencia en la distinta evolución económica de Castilla y de la Corona de Aragón en el siglo XVII’, Manuscrits 15 (1997), pp. 97–104. 356 BP, II/2183 (32); II/1850 (13). 357 BP, II/2540 (38–44); II/2107 (30). 358 BP, II/1829 (19–20 and 53). 359 BP, II/2160 (55–6). 360 AGS, Estado, 8789 (80). 361 BNM, Mss., 10467 (151). 362 BP, II/2172 (67). 363 BP, II/2220 (16); BNM, Mss., 10467 (215–16); ADA, 219 (1). 364 AGS, Estado, 8791 (4). 365 The ‘Cinque Ports’ were Hastings, Sandwich, Dover, New Romney, and Hythe (with Rye replacing New Romney after the latter became silted up as a result of a storm and Winchelsea attached to Hastings). 366 BNM, Mss., 10467 (151). 367 BP, II/2172 (67). 368 BP, II/2108 (121). 369 BP, II/2219 (23–4). 370 Israel, Empires and Entrepots, pp. 15–7. 371 AGS, Estado, 8789 (80); BNM, Mss., 10467 (24–5). 372 BNM, Mss., 10467 (37–8 and 54); AGS, Estado, 8792 (13 and 48). 373 AGS, Estado, 8792 (58). 374 BP, II/2228 (74); II/2185 (143); II/7562 (34); BNM, Mss., 10467 (215–16). 375 BP, II/2220 (16). 376 John Lynch, Historia de Espana, vol. 5, Edad Moderna: Crisis y recuperación, 1598–1808 (Barcelona, 2005), pp. 199–200. 377 AGS, Estado, 8788 (124). 378 BP, II/2198 (105–06); BNM, Mss., 10467 (24). 379 BP, II/2167 (55). 380 By 1605, the Dutch fishing industry employed 57,300 sailors and 5,800 ships; in 1616 Gondomar reported that the Dutch and English had expelled the Spanish from whaling waters and the Portuguese from fishing herring and codfish areas; BNM, Mss., 2759 (109–36); BL, Add. Mss.,. 28470 (120–44); José Antonio Azpiazu, ‘Los balleneros vascos en Cantabria, Asturias y Galicia’, Itsas Memoria, Revista de Estudios Marítimos del País Vasco 3 (2000), pp. 77–97; Caroline Ménard, ‘La Pesca gallega en Terranova, siglos XVI–XVII’, PhD thesis, University of Santiago de Compostela, 2007, pp. 295–303. 381 Peter Pope, ‘Transformation of the maritime cultural landscape of Atlantic Canada by Migratory European Fishermen, 1500-1800’, in Louis Sicking and Darlene

 Notes 239 Abreu-Ferreira (eds), Beyond the Catch. Fisheries of the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic, 900-1850, vol. 41 (Leiden and Boston, 2009), pp. 124–32. 382 See Luis Tobío Fernández, A intervencion de Gondomar nos problemas internacionais da pesca (Sada, 1984). 383 CSP Venice (1613–1615), Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 25 October 1613; BP, II/2228 (74 and 116); II/2199 (11); Ménard, ‘La Pesca gallega en Terranova’, p. 301 and note 990. 384 ‘A Proclamation touching Fishing’ (Westminster, 6 May 1609); BP, II/2168 (49, 120, 130, 149); II/2185 (89); II/2160 (55–6 and 66); BNM, Mss., 3101 (279–94); Bradin T. Cormack, A Power to Do Justice: Jurisdiction, English Literature and the Rise of Common Law, 1609–1625 (Chicago, 2007), p. 262. 385 BP, II/2202 (79); II/1850 (27–9); II/2228 (120); II/2540 (31–4); II/1829 (28–33); II/2185, 89. 386 II/2540 (1–4 and 38–44); II/1850 (89–91); II/2202 (79). 387 AHN, Estado, 741 (52–7); AGS, Estado, 8773 (8 and 27); Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, p. 91, note 7; Stradling, La armada de Flandes, pp. 34–9. 388 AGS, Estado, 8789 (49); BNM, Mss., 3101 (269–78). 389 van Bochove, The “Golden Mountain”, pp. 212–13; Louis Sicking and Adri P. Van Vliet, ‘“Our Triumph of Holland”. War, Violence and the Herring Fishery of the Low Countries, c. 1400-1650’, in Louis Sicking and Darlene Abreu-Ferreira (eds), Beyond the Catch. Fisheries of the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic, 900-1850, vol. 41 (Leiden and Boston, 2009), pp. 355–62. 390 ADA, 97 (1). 391 For instance, the English consul at Lisbon, Hugo Lee (1608–16) was accused of espionage for the English East India Company; BNM, Mss., 2759 (109–36); BP, II/2167 (51); Geoffrey Parker, La Gran Estrategia de Felipe II (Madrid, 1998), p. 353ff; Albert J. Loomie, ‘Sir William Semple and Bristol’s Andalucian Trade, 1597–1598’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 42 (1969), pp. 177–87. 392 AGS, Estado, 1743, unnumbered; AHN, Estado, 2798 (14). 393 BP, II/2183 (3). 394 Albert J. Loomie, ‘Thomas James: the English Consul of Andalucia (1556-ca. 1613)’, British Catholic History 11, no. 4 (1972), pp. 165–78, 173. 395 BP, II/2540 (76); II/1829 (42–43); II/551 (167 and 213–15); II/870, unnumbered; II/2167 (51). 396 AHN, Estado, 869 (34); Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, pp. 186–7. 397 ADA, 142 (8); BNM, Mss., 981 (66–7, 84–7, 209–12); Braudel, El Mediterráneo y el mundo mediterráneo en timpos de Felipe II, p. 473ff.; Cipolla, La odisea de la plata española, pp. 91–117. 398 Elliott, El conde-duque de Olivares, pp. 89–94; BNM, Mss., 3015 (153–7); Mss., 2351 (1–4). 399 ADA, 84 (60); AHN, Estado, 738 (177–99); AHN, Osuna, 5 (5). 400 AHN, Estado, 738 (177–99); 738 (193–298); 739 (149). 401 AGS, Estado, 840 (246). 402 AGS, Estado, 841 (12). 403 ADA, 142 (11); BNM, Mss., 3015 (223–30); Rafael Valladares, Castilla y Portugal en Asia (1580–1680). Declive imperial y adaptación (Leuven, 2001), pp. 47–51. 404 AGS, Estado, 840 (245); 2515 (96). 405 BP, II/2228 (80–81); AGS, Estado, 2516 (33). 406 See Coloma and Hinojosa’s diplomatic dispatches.

240

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407 AGS, Estado, 8789 (36 and 56). 408 BP, II/2198 (5–6); for a similar account of a voyage to Asia, see Relación impresa de los servicios de don Juan de Boischot, continuados por don Fernando de Boischot su hijo, y por don Francisco de Boischot, su nieto, conde de Erps, en los Estados de Flandes. 409 BNM, Mss., 2989 (668–9). 410 BP, II/2228 (80–81 and 175); II/1850 (27–9). 411 BP, II/2228 (19). 412 BP, II/2160 (55–6). 413 BP, II/2108 (122). 414 AGS, Estado, 8773 (24); BP, II/2198 (5–6); II/2172 (57). 415 The first governor of the English East India Company was Sir Thomas Smythe; other English trading companies founded from the middle of the sixteenth century were the Muscovy Company (1555), the Levant Company (1581), the Virginia Company of London and Virginia Company of Plymouth (April 1606), the Somers Islands Company (1615) and the Amazon Company (1619); BL, Add., 28470 (120–44); Giovanni Arrighi and J. Silver Beverly (eds), Caos y orden en el sistema-mundo moderno (Madrid, 2001), p. 114ff.; Oscar Gelderblom, ‘The Organization of Long-distance Trade in England and the Dutch Republic (1550– 1650)’, in Oscar Gelderblom (ed.), The Political Economy of the Dutch Republic: Taxation, Government, Finance, c. 1500–1800 (Farnham, 2009), pp. 6–12; Walter E. Minchinton, ‘Chartered Companies and Limited Liability’, in Tony Orhnial (ed.), Limited Liability and The Corporation (London, 1982), pp. 137–60. 416 BP, II/2185 (40); Stone, La crisis de la aristocracia, pp. 179–89. 417 AGS, Estado, 8789 (36). 418 AGS, Estado, 8788 (59). 419 The pamphlet had the same ideas as those of Hugo Grotius in his works De Indis (1604–5) and Mare Liberum (1609); CSP Venice (1607–1610), Zorzi Giustinian, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 27 March 1608; Martine Julia Ittersum, ‘Preparing Mare Liberum for the Press: Hugo Grotius’s Rewriting of Chapter 12 of De Iure Praedae in November-December 1608’, in Hans W. Blom (ed.), Property, Piracy and Punishment: Hugo Grotius on War and Booty in the Iure Praedae Concepts and Contexts (Leiden, 2009), pp. 246–80; Francisco Javier Díaz González, ‘Las bases jurídicas de la expansión holandesa en América y Asia: Hugo Grocio y su Mare Liberum’, Estudios de Historia económica y social de América 13 (1996), pp. 243–52. 420 CSP Venice (1607–10), Zorzi Giustinian, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 6 March 1608; ibid. (1610–3), Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 3 February 1612. 421 CSP Venice (1613–15), Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 4 January 1614; BP, II/2228 (19). 422 BP, II/2228 (73); BL, Add. Mss., 28470 (120–44). 423 BP, II/2185 (40); II/870, unnumbered. 424 AGS, Estado, 2516 (33). 425 BP, II/870, unnumbered. 426 BP, II/870, unnumbered; Valladares, Castilla y Portugal en Asia, p. 48. 427 ADA, 142 (11); AGS, Estado, 841 (12). 428 BP, II/870, unnumbered. 429 BP, II/870, unnumbered; II/2191 (29).

 Notes 241 430 431 432 433 434 435 436

437 438

439

440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450

451 452 453

BP, II/2198 (5–6); AGS, Estado, 8788 (32); 8770 (30 and 51). BNM, Mss., 10467 (164–7). AGS, Estado, 840 (245); 8788 (59); 2516 (33). BNM, Mss., 18430 (36–38); BP, II/1850 (48–50 and 65–7). Gondomar reported the failure of the negotiations during the autumn of 1615, although the contacts went on in the following decade; BP, II/1850 (102–4). BP, II/2160 (66 and 80). The agreement was sent to Madrid by secretary Julián Sánchez de Ulloa; BP, II/551 (156–7); II/870, unnumbered; Femme S. Gaastra, ‘War, Competition and Collaboration: Relations between the English and Dutch East India Company in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, in Huw V. Bowen, Margarette Lincoln and Nigel Rigby (eds), The Worlds of the East India Company (Martlesham, 2003), pp. 49–53. BP, II/562 (141–4). There was a merciless economic war in the East Indies: a battle for limited natural resources, particularly spices, silk and horses and closed markets in Europe and the American colonies; in 1619, Sir Thomas Dale became involved in a naval battle against several Dutch vessels in Java; the general governor of Batavia, Jan Pietersz Coen, fiercely refused any agreement, leading inevitably to conflict with the English, as in the massacre of Amboina in February 1623; Gaastra, ‘War, competition and collaboration’, p. 52. Gondomar wrote that at the end of 1621 the Dutch had 400,000 ducats to spend at the English court to conclude another agreement in the East Indies; in the spring of 1622, James was offered 200,000 ducats to support it; AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered; BP, II/2108 (28, 48, 119 and 122). AGS, Estado, 8788 (124); 8789 (49, 55 and 124); 2516, 84; BP, II/2198 (104). BL, Add. Mss., 28470 (120–44); AGS, Estado, 8788 (124); 8791 (34). ADA, 219 (1). BP, II/2540 (56–9); AGS, Estado, 2516 (10). BP, II/870, unnumbered. BP, II/2221 (17). AGS, Estado, 8788 (63). AGS, Estado, 2516, 33. AGS, Estado, 8770 (44); 8788 (59 and 63). BP, II/2167 (54 and 59–60). The Dutch merchants began to trade in that area from 1592 to 1593; the fortress of Sao Jorge Da Mina was founded in 1482 by the Portuguese; Braudel, El Mediterráneo y el mundo mediterráneo en tiempos de Felipe II, p. 473ff.; David Northrup, ‘The Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic World’, in Peter C. Mancall (ed.), The Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550–1624 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007), pp. 170–94; Engel Sluiter, ‘DutchSpanish Rivalry in the Caribbean Area, 1594–1609’, pp. 165–96, 170. There were two trading English missions to Gambia river, in 1618 and in 1620; the second one achieved some success, and the merchants asked the parliament to grant a trading company; BNM, Mss., 6949 (173–7); ADA, 219 (1); AGS, Estado, 2516 (91). See more on the Spanish efforts in sub-Saharan Africa, José Luis Cortés López, ‘Felipe II, III y IV, reyes de Angola y protectores del reino del Congo’, Studia Histórica. Historia Moderna 9 (1991), pp. 223–46. AGS, Estado, 8791 (37).

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454 BP, II/2228 (19); II/2198 (5–6). 455 BNM, Mss., 2202. 456 Richard L. Kagan, Los sueños de Lucrecia. Política y profecía en la España del siglo XVI [1991] (San Sebastián, 2004), pp. 23–4; Parker, La Gran Estrategia, pp. 444–5. 457 BNM, Mss., 981 (66–7). 458 BNM, Mss., 2346 (298); BP, II/2239 (76); ADA, 117 (164). 459 BNM, Mss., 2347 (11); AHN, Estado, 739 (154); Mss., 9379 (83–4). 460 BNM, Mss., 981 (84–7); AGS, 840 (245); AHN, Estado, 739 (154). 461 ADA, 142 (32); BNM, 17659, unnumbered; BP, II/2220 (9). 462 Jean F. Schaub, ‘Conflictos y alteraciones en Portugal en la época de la unión de las dos coronas: marcos de interpretación’, in José I. Fortea and Juan E. Gelabert (eds), Ciudades en conflicto (siglos XVI–XVIII) (Valladolid, 2008), pp. 397–409. 463 BNM, Mss., 3015 (217–22); 2356 (289–392); 2362 (87–9); ADA, 96 (25). 464 BL, Add. Mss., 28470 (120–44); BP, II/870, unnumbered. 465 BNM, Mss., 3015 (153–7); 2351 (1–4); AHN, Osuna, 5 (5); AHN, Estado, 741 (52–7); AGS, Estado, 8788 (59). 466 BP, II/2168 (14). 467 AGS, Estado, 2585 (76); BP, II/2228 (104–5). 468 AGS, Estado, 8789 (67). 469 AGS, Estado, 8788 (59); 8790 (42); 8789 (60); BP, II/2185 (40); ADA, 96 (25); Braudel, El Mediterráneo y el mundo mediterráneo en timpos de Felipe II, p. 29ff.; Rahn Phillips, Seis galeones, pp. 41–81. 470 AGS, Estado, 8791 (37). 471 BP, II/2228 (116); II/1850 (82–4 and 99–100). 472 AGS, Estado, 2516 (50–1). 473 AGS, Estado, 8792 (47). 474 BNM, Mss., 10467 (298–300); BP, II/2220 (10). 475 BNM, II/2220 (10). 476 Andrews, ‘Caribbean rivalry’, p. 17. 477 Elliott, Imperios del Mundo Atlántico, pp. 36–7; Joseph Hall, ‘Between Old and New World: Oconee Valley Residents and the Spanish Southeast, 1540–1621’, in Peter C. Mancall (ed.), The Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550–1624 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007), pp. 66–97. 478 Elliott, Imperios del Mundo Atlántico, p. 27 and 33–4. 479 AGS, Estado, 841 (12). 480 See more, Irene A. Wright, ‘Spanish Policy Toward Virginia, 1606-1612. Jamestown, Ecija and John Clarke of the Mayflower’, The American Historical Review 25, no. 3 (April 1920), pp. 448–79. 481 AHN, Estado, 3456 (6); CSP Venice (1607–1610). Marc Antonio Correr, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 27 February/26 March/10 September 1609. 482 Elliott, Imperios del Mundo Atlántico, pp. 38–9; Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry’, p. 196, note 114. 483 AHN, Estado, 3456 (6 and 7); AGS, Estado, 840 (53); BNM, Mss., 2348 (13–18 and 469–73); BP, II/2183 (3 and 5); CSP Venice (1610–1613). Piero Priuli, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate, Madrid, 22 September/15 October 1612. 484 Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry’, pp. 195–96.

 Notes 243 485 Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, ‘Las justificaciones hispánicas de los peregrinos (circa 1620) y puritanos (circa 1630) para colonizar América’, in Francisco Castilla Urbano (ed.), Discursos legitimadores de la conquista y colonización de América (Alcalá de Henares, 2014), pp. 21-31. 486 CSP Venice (1610–163). Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate. London, 2 August/9 August 1612. 487 BP, II/2168 (13). 488 Gondomar showed more concern about Bermuda, a more fertile land and from where the English warships could attack the Spanish fleets on the Caribbean; in 1607, 104 settlers arrived in Virginia; nine months later only thirty-eight were still alive. 489 Durán-Loriga, El embajador y el Rey, p. 79ff. 490 BP, II/2228 (20); Elliott, Imperios del Mundo Atlántico, p. 99. 491 BP, II/870, unnumbered. 492 BP, II/2108 (119); AGS, Estado, 8791 (50). 493 BP, II/2108 (120). 494 BP, II/2108 (116, 120–1). 495 AGS, Estado, 8788 (46); Goodman, El poderío naval español, p. 105; Elliott, Imperios del Mundo Atlántico, pp. 151–8. 496 BP, II/2167 (59–60). 497 CSP Venice (1610–1613). Piero Priuli, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate. Madrid, 22 September/15 October 1612. 498 The English from the 1560s (Hawkins and Drake), the Dutch from 1572 and after 1594; AGS, Estado, 841 (12); Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry’, p. 171ff. 499 A huge salt lake, at Araya End, off the Venezuelan coast; AGS, Estado, 2516 (35); Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry’, p. 171ff. 500 Ibid., p. 184ff. 501 A royal Spanish decree ordered the hanging of all the privateers and pirates arrested beyond the Canaries on 6 July 1605; Philip II’s embargoes against the Dutch shut off their access to the Portuguese salt of Setubal and Cape Verde, forcing them to go to Araya after 1599; BNM, Mss., 2347 (90–5); Lucena Salmoral, Piratas, pp. 133–5; Jean Barjot Savant, Historia Mundial de la Marina (Madrid, 1965), pp. 74–9. 502 BL, Venezuelan Arbitration Transcripts, vol. VII – 1612/18 (142–3); BNM, 2989 (793–5). 503 AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered; AGS, Estado, 8791 (4). 504 Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry’, p. 195. 505 Two Dutch attacks were repulsed on Araya salt lake: one on 30 November 1622 and another on 13 January 1623; AGS, Estado, 8789 (63 and 73); 8790 (51); BNM, Mss., 2353 (193–4); see more, Relación impresa de las victorias que don Diego de Arroyo y Daza, gobernador y capitán general de la provincia de Cumana, tuvo en la gran salina de Araya el 30 de noviembre de 1622 y el 13 de enero de 1623 contra 104 navíos holandeses. 506 AGS, Estado, 8790 (63 and 74); 8791 (4). 507 AGS, Estado, 2516 (36). 508 BNM, Mss., 2354 (9–11). 509 BNM, Mss., 9405 (42–7); Mss., 3010 (62–3). 510 ADA, 112 (28). 511 Sir Walter Raleigh, Discoverie of the Large, Rich and Beautiful Empire of Guiana (1596); Sluiter, ‘Dutch-Spanish Rivalry’, p. 172ff.

244

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512 BL, Venezuelan Arbitration Transcripts, vol. VII– 1612/18 (142–3); BNM, Mss., 2989 (793–5); Darcy Ribeiro, Carlos de Araújo Moreira and Gisele de Araújo Moreira, La fundación de Brasil: testimonios, 1500–1700 (Caracas, 1992), pp. 490–3; Anthony Smith, Explorers of the Amazon (Chicago, 1990), p. 140ff. 513 BNM, Mss., 18717 (138–53). 514 BL, Add. Mss., 14015 (50–67); BNM, Mss., 9133 (75–8). 515 BP, II/870, unnumbered. 516 Ángel Alloza Aparicio, Europa en el mercado español. Mercaderes, represalias y contrabando en el siglo XVII (Salamanca, 2006), pp. 68–9. 517 North was one of the captains with Raleigh in 1618; BP, II/551 (156–7). 518 BP, II/551 (204–5). 519 Burt Franklin (ed.), British Royal Proclamations Relating to America, 1603–1783 (New York, 1911), pp. 21–3; BP, II/2191 (29 and 41); BNM, Mss., 18421 (58); Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550–1653 (London, 1993), p. 125ff.; Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People without History [1982] (Berkeley, CA, 1997), p. 122. 520 BP, II/2221 (56–7). 521 AHN, Estado, 739 (32). 522 Herrero Sanchéz, ‘Las Indias y la Tregua de los Doce Años’, pp. 199–200. 523 BP, II/2228 (116). 524 Herrero Sanchéz, ‘Las Indias y la Tregua de los Doce Años’, p. 204. 525 BNM, Mss., 10467 (298–300). 526 BP, II/2228 (89–90 and 97–9); II/1850 (48–50). 527 BP, II/2228 (104–5). 528 BP, II/2108 (47); Luis Suárez Fernández, ‘España frente a Francia en tiempos de Felipe IV: la embajada del marqués de Mirabel’, Boletín de la Real Academia de Historia 202, no. 3 (2005), pp. 431–3. 529 BP, II/2515 (95); AGS, Estado, 8788 (72); Pieter Emmer, The Dutch in the Atlantic Economy 1580–1880 (Abingdon, 1998), pp. 65–90. 530 BP, II/2228 (80–1). 531 Parker, España y los Países Bajos, 1559-1659, pp. 52–80. 532 BNM, Mss., 2348 (529–30); Lucena Salmoral, Piratas, pp. 131–7; Parker, España y los Países Bajos 1559–1659, pp. 81–111; Antoni Picazo Muntaner, ‘El comercio y la cartografía del mar del Sur: consecuencias en España y América’, Anales del Museo de América 11 (2003), pp. 227–36. 533 BNM, Mss., 2989 (790–1); Mss., 2348 (233–8). 534 BP, II/2228 (3). 535 BP, II/2228 (80–1); II/1850, 27–9. 536 BP, II/2160 (55–6 and 103); II/2191 (33); BNM, Mss., 18421 (106). 537 BP, II/2225 (60). 538 AGS, Estado, 2515, (95); 8770 (52); 8788 (72). 539 AHN, Estado, 740, unnumbered; BP, II/2198, 56. 540 AGS, Estado, 8789 (49, 51 and 54); 8790 (74); 8791 (25); BP, II/2198 (56 and 75–6). 541 BP, II/2172 (21–2 and 24); ADA, 233 (24).

 Notes 245

Conclusion: Habsburgs and Stuarts – seduction as diplomacy, love as marriage, heartbreak as war 1 His assassin was an officer called John Fenton. 2 In mid-October 1623, Charles and Buckingham disembarked at Portsmouth; in December 1625 the rest of the fleet arrived at British ports, and the parliament of that year was dissolved. 3 This includes the entire reign of James (1603–1625) and the beginning of Charles’s reign (1625). 4 The Treaty of Tordesillas (7 June 1494); the journey of Sir Walter Raleigh to a zone populated by the Spanish (Guiana) cost him his head in 1618, sharing the destiny of many others like him; the English colonization of North America (Virginia) was only watched by the Spanish diplomats in London. 5 James once said to a Spanish ambassador that Spain was very lucky the Stuarts were on the throne of England, instead of Frederick of Palatinate or the English Puritans (as actually happened with Oliver Cromwell in the years 1649–58); AGS, Estado, 8788, (41). 6 The idea of a marriage between Henry Stuart and Spanish Infanta Ana was presented to the first Spanish ambassador to England, the Count of Villamediana, as early as 1603. 7 ADA, 97, (1); BNM, Mss., 9379, (42-43); Mss., 2356, (287–8); AHN, 739, (401–2); BL, Add. Mss., 21439, (15–20). 8 Ambassador Coloma said about the friendly relations between Spain and England that the ‘English love is like the donkey’s love, full of bites and kicks’ (my translation); AGS, Estado, 8789, (37 and 56). 9 Vera y Figueroa, Juan Antonio; El Embaxador, Sevilla, 1620, ‘Discurso Primero’. 10 Gondomar wrote to Buckingham that ‘it was time for Prince of Wales to ride Spain [sexually]’ (my translation); BL, Harl 1583, (349–50). 11 https​://ww​w.psy​cholo​gytod​ay.co​m/us/​blog/​insid​e-out​/2013​09/th​e-5-s​tages​-grie​ving-​ the-e​nd-re​latio​nship​; (accessed 24 April 2018). 12 BNM, Mss., 2355, (27–8); Mss., 9373, (65–6); ADA, 1, (219). 13 Diplomacy has much in common with a card game, as various authors writing about seventeenth-century diplomacy have noted, such as Count De la Roca or the Prince Caraffa; as for the diplomatic relations between England and Spain, a Spanish ambassador in London used verses written on the back of cards to explain them in 1623; Juan Antonio de Vera y Figueroa, El embaxador (Seville, 1620), 2º speech, pp. 115 and 150, 4º speech, pp. 83–4; Carlos María Caraffa, El embaxador político christiano(Palermo, 1691), pp. 100 and 221. 14 Antoine Court de Gébelin; Monde primitif, analysé et comparé avec le monde moderne, vol. 8, p. 379. 15 Paul C. Allen has written that during the diplomatic talks of 1603–4, the Spanish had been more interested in the military and strategic aspects of the peace with England, while the English were more concerned with trading issues; Allen, Felipe III y la Pax Hispánica, 1598–1621, pp. 194–5. 16 https​://ww​w.kim​bella​rt.or​g/col​lecti​on-ob​ject/​cards​harps​; (accessed 1 May 2018). 17 See Andrew Graham-Dixon, Caravaggio, Una vida sagrada y profana (Madrid, 2017), ‘gitanas y tahúres y una celada para un cardenal’.

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Index Note: Page numbers in italics and bold denote figures and tables, respectively. Acuña, Diego Sarmiento de see Count of Gondomar Acuña, Joao Barbosa de  140 Acuña, Pedro de  49 Adams, Simon  9 Adolphus, Gustavus  53 Aerssens, Francis (Lord of Sommelsdijk)  199 n.283 African trading centres  161 Aguilar, Antonio Martin  71, 73 Alberi, Thomas  149 Albert of Austria, Archduke  11, 15, 19, 20, 27, 112, 150, 190 n.80 Albuquerque, Duke of  63 Albuquerque, Alfonso de  144 Alenquer, Count of  127 Alexander VI, Pope  37 Allen, Paul C.  9, 25, 259 n.15 Almirantazgo de los Países Septentrionales  233 n.208 Amadís of Gaul  3, 184 n.22 Amazon Company  35 Amazon River  166–7 Amor Verdadero  153 Anciondo, Vicente de  69, 81, 128 Anderica, Diego Íñiguez de  94, 122 Andrade, Ruy Freire de  144, 233 n.214, 234 n.237 Andrews, Kenneth R.  9 Andrews, Sir Sinclair  117 Anglican Church, protection of  42 Anglo–Dutch fleet, at Cadiz  1, 2–3, 38–40, 43, 51 Anne, Queen  18, 28, 31, 104, 169–70, 220 n.315 gifts to  107 Anne, Spanish Infanta  28 Antonelli, Juan Bautista  165

Aparicio, Alloza  9 Aragón, Blasco de  77 Araucan natives of Chile  25 Araya fortress  166 Araya salt lake  243 n.499, 243 n.505 Aremberg, Count of  20 Argensola, Bartolome Leonardo de  49 Argyll, Countess of  114 Ariza, Simon  78 Armada de Barlovento (Windward fleet)  165 Armada Portrait  195 n.194 Armstrong, Archibald (Archie)  3, 92 Arostegui, Martin  111 Arroyo, Diego de  166 artillery ensembles and manufacturers, masters of  130 Arundel, Countess of (Lady Aletheia Talbot)  112, 114, 132 Arundel, Lord Thomas  42, 93 Asia  49, 157–8, 172 overseas expansion  12 ports  36 Assiento Company  210 n.62 assistants, in Spanish embassy  76, 79–80 Aston, Sir Walter  2, 38, 41, 43, 111, 126, 155, 200 n.295 Atye, Henry  199 n.291 Avilés, Pedro Menéndez de  163 Bacigalupe, Echevarría  9 Balbani, Antonio  66 Balbani, Miguel  65, 66 Balbi, Nicolao  67 Baldwin, Father William  30, 116 Ball, John  29, 71, 79 Bandenoven, Cristobal  75 Bank of Amsterdam  12

 Index 267 bankruptcies of the Spanish royal finances  13 banquets  96–7, 118–20 guests at  119 Barbary pirates  63 Barber, Henry  79 Barlow, Roger  186 n.4 Bath, John  79, 80 Bedchamber, Lady of  102, 114 Bedmar, Marquis of  63 Bellany, Alastair  9 Bentley, Lady Catherine  79, 89 Berbers  150 Bermuda  164, 243 n.488 Bernadi, Filipo  65, 66, 75, 76, 89, 118, 122, 136, 139 Berry, Richard  71, 79, 80–1 Berry, Sir Richard  212 n.125 bills of exchange  65, 67, 68–9, 148 Biscayans  155 ‘black legend’ of Spain  193, 202 n.341 black spring  41–5 Blount, Charles (Earl of Devonshire)  26, 27, 31, 102 Boderie, De la  137 Borja, Gaspar de  63 Boyschott, Ferdinand Von  119–20, 223 n.389 Brazil  34, 167–8 Breda, siege of  38 bribes  29, 60, 61–2, 93, 125, 143, 160 Brigat, Matheo  116 Brisart, Pedro  71 Bristol, Earl of  200 n.313 Bristol Book of Trade  230 n.147 British ports, and Spanish galleons  82, 94, 121–2 Dover (1605)  122–3 Dover (1624)  125–6 Scotland (1622–3)  123–5 British seamen, in Spanish crown service  130–2 British ships, for Spanish armadas  128–30 Brito, Francisco Pinto de  68 Brizuela, Father Iñigo de  150, 236 n.309 Brochero, Diego de  94, 122, 128, 150 Brown, Horatio F.  9 Browne, Lady Mary  114

Bruneau, Jacques  2, 4, 39, 40, 45–6, 60, 69, 76, 97, 104, 114, 116, 118, 200 n.318 and English fleet preparation at Plymouth  146 gifts to courtiers and aristocrats  115 salary of  74 Bruneau, Jacques  198 n.250 Brussels embassy  63 Buc, Pedro  71 Buckingham, Duke of  1, 3, 17, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 51, 53, 103, 111, 142, 145, 156, 189 n.69, 199 n.276 accusation against Philip II and his son  42 accusation on Philip IV  42 and ambassadors, confrontation between  43 assassination of  169, 171 criticism on  5 equestrian portrait as Lord High Admiral of England  54 Hispanophilia  34 identifications of  205 n.380 illness  45 portrait of  180 primacy at the English court, plan to discredit  44–5 and Spanish Match failure  38 and Stuart  18 buffoonery  217 n.234 Burlamacchi, Felipe  66, 67 Burlamacchi, Filipo  66, 67, 69, 76, 136 and Gondomar, conflict between  76 business agents, of Spanish embassy  75 Bustanci, Paulo and Damian  67, 69 Cáceres, Alonso de  197 n.237 Cadiz  2–3, 4, 39 Caesar, Sir Julius  133, 142, 229 n.137 Calandrini, Giovanni  76 Calandrini, Juan  66, 67 Calderón, Rodrigo (Count of Oliva)  13, 14, 52, 186 n.6 Calvert, Sir George  42, 111, 142, 144 gifts to  115 Camañes, Sanz  9 Camden, William  3

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Index

Campbell, Archibald (Earl of Argyll)  94, 112–14, 113 Campbell, James (Lord of Kintyre)  113 Campofrío, Father Juan Roco de  15, 199 n.294 cannons  126 Cantón, Sánchez  9 capitalism  12 captains gifts for  114–15 payments for  94 Caravaggio’s painting  173–4 Cárdenas, Alonso de  62 Cardsharps (painting)  173–4 Carew, Sir George  107 Caribbean Sea  165–6 Carlos, Maria Cruz de  104 Carón, Noel de  29, 123, 136, 137, 142, 147 Carondelet, Francisco de (Archdeacon of Cambrai)  43, 44, 71, 78, 114, 200 n.302 Carr, Robert  17 Carrillo, Fernando  23 Carter, Ch. H.  9 Casas, Bartolomé de las  49 Castejón, Diego  233 n.227 Castillo, Juan del  71 Castleton, Samuel  139 Castleton’s trip  231–2 n.187 Castro Cortázar, Diego de  154 Cateau–Cambresis, peace of  11 Catholicism  8, 32, 172 financial support for conversions  89 tolerance in England  30, 33, 172 Catholics charity to  89 outbreaks against  29 Cea, Diego de  71 ceasefire of 1607  13 Cecil, Sir Edward (Viscount of Wimbledon)  2–3 Cecil, Sir Robert (Earl of Salisbury)  17, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 93, 98, 99, 102, 224 n.13 gifts to  115 pension  99 Cecil, Sir William (Baron of Roos)  67 celebrations  96–7 Centurion, Octavio  65

Centurion, Vicencio  65 Cervantes, Miguel de (Don Quixote)  204 n.364 Novelas Ejemplares  48 Viaje al Parnaso  80 Chapuys, Eustace  97 Chargé d’Affaires  43 charity  88–90 Charles I, King of England  1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 51, 53, 169, 199 n.238 beheading of  169 and the Duke of Buckingham  18, 53 foreign policy  169, 184 n.33 marriage with Maria  1, 41 portrait of  177 reign of  259 n.3 Spanish adventure in 1623  3 succession to the throne  173 trade with Indies  35 trip to Madrid  49 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor  11, 54 portrait of  56 Christendom  29–32 Christian IV of Denmark  53 ‘Cinque Ports’  238 n.365 Clement VIII, Pope  20, 23 code breakers  117 code names  101 Cogswell, Thomas  9 Coke, Sir Edward  34 Coloma, Carlos (Marquis of El Espinar)  5, 15, 33–4, 36, 41–5, 65, 69, 71, 74, 103, 107, 111, 121, 124, 129, 130, 197 n.238, 228 n.109, 259 n.8 account of English ships’ voyage and robberies in East Indies  158 aided people by  95 allegation about Middleton’s play  47 appointment as ambassador  141 charges against Buckingham  36, 41, 45 on East India Company  141 on embassies  61 life threats in London  43–4, 115 mission to England  69 money responsibility  69, 92

 Index 269 money sources  69 opinion on English East India Company  160 proposal for Portuguese vessels  163 report on Hormuz  144, 159 report on Plymouth  154 report on royal fleet  145 report on The Phoenix  154 report on Virginia  165 reports from Cottington  116 at royal banquet  118 on rumours about Hormuz  144 salary of  74–5 ship purchase  129 on the usefulness of English sailors  131 use of funds  62 warning about Portuguese vessels coming from Brazil  163, 167 work on counterfeit coins  154 Coloma, Juan  114 Colomer, José Luis  9 Commercial leagues of English and Dutch  159–61 commercial relations  31 confidants  100–2, 103, 116, 118 Constable of Castile expenditures and gifts  30, 66, 76, 85, 86, 89–92, 104–6, 110, 112, 115, 116 and James I  118, 119 on pension  97, 102 report on English activities in America  163, 165 reward for  72 and Rovida  77 and Villamediana  31 warning about greedy Countess of Suffolk  99 Constable of Castile (Juan Fernández de Velasco)  9, 13, 20, 23–7, 32, 49, 59, 62, 64, 93, 99, 158, 191 n.102, 192 n.113, 194 n.156, 222 n.368 complaints about the High Court Admiralty  137 completion of mission  33 documents on English navigation  32 financial rewards  74 fund for diplomatic expenses  65 gifts distribution by  107

gifts to courtiers and aristocrats  115 money received from  108–9 salary of  60, 73–4 Constans in fide  116 The Continence of Scipio  53 contraband  153–5 conversions, charity to clergy  88–9 Conway, Sir Edward  41–2, 45, 125 Córdoba, Castroviejo y Fernández de  9 Cornelius, Sergeant  71 Cornwallis, Anne (second Countess of Argyll)  112 Cornwallis, Sir Charles  61, 66, 110 Coteels, Sir Thomas  68 Cottington, Sir Francis  5, 16, 45, 50, 51, 110–11, 116, 156, 160, 161, 222 n.374, 236 n.302 funeral expenses  86 salary of  61, 74 secret treaty against Holland  36 Council of Portugal  69 Council of State in Spain  10 counterfeit Spanish silver coins  153 Count of Denbigh see Sir William Feilding Courbes, Juan  55 courier characters of  71 couriers on horseback  71 extraordinary courier  71 travel costs  71 court celebrations  118–20 expenses  87 guests at  119 courtiers and aristocrats, gifts to  115 Coward, Barry  9 Cox, Captain  229 n.137 Crader, William  130 Cranfield, Lionel (the Lord High Treasurer)  142 Cromwell, Oliver  4, 32, 40, 51, 171, 172, 194 n.171, 203–4 n.363 Croyson, Matheo  71 Cruz, Anne  9 Cruz, Juan Pantoja de la  19, 106 Cueva, De la  15, 35, 184 n.15 Curiel, Alonso de  147 currency exchange and transportation, cost of  65 currency smuggling  153

270 Da Costa, Antonio  68 Dadson, Trevor J.  9 Dandelet, Thomas J.  9 Darcy, Thomas (Earl Rivers and viscount of Colchester)  114 Davis, John  137, 231 n.183 Daza  166 De Haro, Luis  62 De impedimentis magnorum auxiliorum  55, 56 Denmark  7, 18, 21, 38, 51, 53, 81, 86, 87, 90, 92, 101, 105, 117, 119, 136, 139, 141, 170, 184 n.31 Dessau, battle of  3 Devereaux, Robert (3rd Earl of Essex)  2 Digby, Sir John (Earl of Bristol)  2, 18, 33, 35, 37, 41, 42, 43, 61, 67, 68, 99, 104, 144 diplomatic expenditure, evolution of  64–5 dissolution of treaties  42 distributive justice  17, 74, 104 Dof, Richard  154 donation see gifts and donations Don Quixote de la Mancha  3, 48, 184 n.22. See Cervantes, Miguel de The Downs  83 The Dragon  135 Drake, Sir Francis  105, 184 n.14 revival of  203 n.360 Drummond, Lady Jane  100, 102, 112 Dunbar, First Earl of  102, 107 Durán-Loriga, Juan  9 Duriaos, Julian  167 Dutch East India company  12, 157 Dutch issues  10–11, 36 Dutch Levant trade  152–3 Dutch privateers  142–3 booty taken by  137 Dutch rebellion  10–11, 31 Dutch Republic  14, 19, 41 alliance with Spain  42–3 blockade of English Channel  147, 235 n.276 capitalism in  12 fishing industry  156, 238 n.380 merchants  193 n.139, 241 n.450 overseas expansion  12

Index sea power  203 n.361 under siege on three sides  141 Dutch trading company  158 Dutch West India Company  168 East India Company  141–2, 158, 160, 173, 240 n.415 East Indies  36 economic war in  241 n.438 Eighty Years’ War  48, 57 Elizabethan England  150 Elizabeth I, Queen of England  3, 4, 6, 11, 48, 124, 150, 169, 195 n.194 chauvinism  48 death of  20 and piracy  135 Elliott, John H.  9 embargoes  39, 100, 106, 135, 136, 137, 148, 154, 165 Emperor Charles V Restraining Fury (bronze statue)  57 England  6, 11 America, trade with  34–5 artillery  127–8 Asia, trade with  34 capitalism in  12 Catholicism, tolerance towards  17 demand for free trade with the Indies  23, 30, 32 demand for trade with the Indies  36 and Flanders, re-establishment of free trade between  147 and fleet preparation in Plymouth  46 foreign policy auction  62 and Holland, defensive alliance  38 inland places of  83, 215–16 n.204 international reputation  4, 5, 49, 50–1 involvement against enemies of Spain  33 isolation of Spanish ambassadors  41 and La Rochelle failures  51 and Louis XIII of France, marriage agreement between  38 mentality towards Spaniards as culturally inferior people  48 military and naval disasters (1625–9)  4 Morocco and Barbary, trade with  151–2

 Index 271 neutrality  16, 29, 31, 94, 171–2 overseas expansions  12 Parliament of 1604–10  7 Parliament of 1621  7 Parliament of 1624 (Prince’s Parliament)  7, 42, 200 n.308 and piracy  203 n.353 ports  82 power at sea  5, 145–6 public lamentations  5 public opinion in  40, 52 refusal of a military intervention in Germany  49 royal proclamation for the protection of foreign ambassadors  43 settlements in America and Spanish maritime routes  164 and Spain–Holland war  10 vessels purchase and sailors recruitment in  227 n.98 withdrawal from the Thirty Years’ War  40 English and Dutch voyages, reports of  158 English Catholic minority  8 English court  7, 30 payments for jesters  92 English–Dutch merchants collaboration, targeting Portuguese spice trade  160 English High Court of Admiralty  100, 134, 136–8, 212 n.128 English manufacturing  149–50 English merchants, sale of weapons to Moors and Berbers  152 English national pride of triumph  201–2 n.340 English pensioners  218 n.267 English pirates  229 n.135 English ports  215 n.203 English privateers  50 English Privy Council  30 on war with Spain  198 n.269 English Royal Navy, proposals for reform of  51 English trading companies  158–9, 240 n.415 Essex, Earl of  3, 184 n.14 Estríngana, Esteban  9

Exton, John  135 extraordinary ambassadors  2, 37, 60, 67, 69, 92 extraordinary expenses  86 Fajardo, Diego Saavedra  61 Fajardo, Juan  153 Fajardo, Luis  164, 165 Fawkes, Guy  7 Fazenda, Conseiho da  67 Feilding, Sir William  2 Fenton, John  245 n.1 Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor  38 Feria, Duke of  97 Fernández, Tobío  9 Ferrante (Lucchese merchant)  65 Ferrer, Andres  71 fishing industry  153, 155–6, 223 n.1 Fitzgerald, Lady Catherine  79, 89 Flanders  11, 14, 27, 70 as the Anglo–Spanish marriage dowry  36 attack on Dutch trade  148 conflict in  13, 37 delegates  27 economy, impact of Gauna’s decree on  146 fleet rebuilding  141 ‘frigate’  226 n.70 galleons of  122 government of  69 merchants  148 privateers  148–9 recruitment of men for the army of  32, 75, 93–4 Flemish Count of Aremberg  191 n.86 Fleurus, battle of  38 Fomeli  65 Font, Pablo  75, 81 Fortune by Land and Sea (play)  49 Fowler, Francis  75, 123, 136, 230 n.156 France  1, 3, 4, 20, 41, 43, 65, 72, 115, 184 n.31 civil wars  48 correspondence sent to  71 diplomacy  119, 124, 141–2 overseas expansions  12 and piracy  139, 140 and Spain  11, 19, 36, 39, 171–2

272

Index

Francisco, Captain  71 Francis II of France  124 Franqueza, Pedro de  20 Frederick V of the Palatinate  1, 3, 16, 34, 41, 52 defeat of  7 and Elizabeth Stuart  52 as leader of Protestantism  53 free trade  20, 24 with the East and West Indies, diplomatic talks on  134 friars in prison, alms to  89 Fuente, Father Diego de la  42, 44, 49, 51, 52, 68, 71, 73, 78, 166 Fuller, Francis  71, 94 A Game at Chess (play)  47, 201 n.333, 201 n.334, 201 n.335 García García, Bernardo J.  9, 208 n.36 García Hernán, Enrique  9 Gardiner, Samuel  99 Gauna, Juan de, decree of  146–7, 153 Gelabert, Juan E.  9 Genoese bankers  65 Gentili, Alberico  75, 76, 136, 212 n.127, 230 n.152 Hispanicae Advocationis libri duo  136 German Protestants  3, 5, 7, 14, 28, 52, 53, 57–8, 86, 150, 169 Germany  3, 14, 49, 52, 71 correspondence sent to  71 and England  49 Palatinate issue  41, 68, 103 and Spain  16, 117 Thirty Years’ War  141, 171 Gibets, Carlos Lauwens Nicolas  71 Gifford, Richard  50, 51, 131 gifts and donations  90–2, 96–7, 98, 99 based on celebration importance  90 based on political status of the Spanish diplomats  92 based on servant status  91–2 based on social and political importance  90 Christmas gifts  90 for royal musicians  90 Girón, Fernando  35

goblets  173 Godino, Antonio  71 Gondomar, Count of  8–9, 14, 16, 18, 33, 35, 39, 40, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53, 61, 64, 67, 68, 69, 74, 160, 186 n.13 ambassadorship (1613–22)  138 and Argyll’s case for Spain  221 n.360 asking Lord Howard for Little John of Sandwich seizure  140 Berber pirates  150 and Burlamacchi, conflict between  76 drafting of English–Portuguese league project  161 and Earl of Argyll  112 embassy expenses  67 gifts to courtiers and aristocrats  115 idea of contracting of British sailors  131 information on trade restrictions  148 investigation of robberies committed by English ships  159 involvement in robbery  138 proposal on Portuguese vessels  163 report on English Virginia  164 salary of  73, 74 and Spanish diplomacy in London  208 n.41 suggestion for Dutch smuggling  154 talks with Winwood  155 use of funds  59 work on counterfeit coins  153 González, Francisco  116 Goodman, David  9 Gordon, Sir Robert  132 Goring, Sir George  43 Grant, Gaspar  79–80 Great Britain  6 Act of Navigation of 1651  203–4 n.363 aristocrats  6 economic crisis of 1621–5  40 merchants and reprisals  138–9 neutrality  25 Greet, Robert  116, 136 Grimston, Edward  23 Grotius, Hugo  212 n.218, 240 n.419 Guadaleste, Marquis de  15 Guevara, Iñigo Vélez de  39

 Index 273 Guiana  166–7 Guise, Mary de  124 Gunpowder Plot  8, 10, 29 Guzmán, Enrique de  188 n.36 Guzman, Luis  71 Habsburgs  16, 51 and Stuarts  169 Hamilton, Sir James (second Marquis of Hamilton)  111 Hanseatic League  193 n.139 Happart, Francisco  75 Harte, Thomas  139 Haultain (Dutch admiral)  224 n.10 Hay, James (Earl of Carlisle)  42, 43 The Hector of Germany or the Palsgrave Prime Elector (play)  52 Henin, Jorge  81 Henry, Prince of Wales  4, 28, 34 Henry IV of France  11 assassination of  28 Henry VIII of England  97 Herbert, Sir Henry  47 Herbert, Sir John  110 Herrera, Antonio de  52 Heywood, Thomas  49 Hidalgo, Father Juan (Thomas Wentworth)  78 Hinojosa, Marquis De La  15, 23, 40, 42, 73, 103, 107, 111, 125, 146, 198 n.254, 198 n.261, 199 n.291, 200 n.300, 222 n.367 artillery purchase  129 on Bath  80 charges against Buckingham  36, 41, 45 life threats in London  43–4, 115 mission to England  69 money responsibility  69, 92, 120 report on Hormuz  144, 159 report on Plymouth  154 reports from Cottington  116 salary of  60 view on increasing Flemish fleet  132 warning about Portuguese vessels coming from Brazil  163, 167 work on counterfeit coins  154 Hispanicae Advocationis Libri Duo  76 Holderness, First Earl of  107

Holland  1, 20, 25, 36, 93, 143, 153, 170, 171 and England  10, 38, 116, 132, 141, 158, 168 and Spain  10, 19, 36, 147, 166–7 Holy Roman Empire  38, 52, 63 Home, George  31, 107 Hormuz  143–4, 234 n.240 examination of attack on  234 n.248 hospitality  118–20 housing, spending on  119 Howard, Charles (Earl of Nottingham)  26, 102 Howard, Henry (Earl of Arundel)  42, 100, 102, 132, 141, 142, 166 Howard, Henry (Earl of Northampton)  17, 26, 27, 31, 102 Howard, Lady Frances  113 Howard, Lord Charles (Earl of Suffolk)  30, 31, 105–7, 119, 134, 139, 145, 193 n.131, 205 n.386 Howard, Lord Thomas  193 n.131 Howard, Sir Theophilus (Baron Howard of Walden)  111 Huguenots  143, 163 Hussey, Ronald D.  9 Hutchinson, Robert  9 Imbrea, Lelio  68, 69 Imbrea, Nivio Maria  69 Imbrea, Vicencio  68 El Incognito (Sir Francis Cottington)  116 India  157, 160 Indies (West and East)  20, 33, 156 Infantado, Duke of  15 Infanta Isabella  16, 47, 132, 148 Infanta’s dowry  42 Ireland  6, 41, 48, 80, 82, 84, 93–4 and piracy  136, 139, 141 ports  83 Isabella, Archduke  19 Italian Protestant families, as bankers  66 Italy  71 Jacobean England, money and diplomacy in  20–5, 61–2 Jacobean royal proclamations  229 n.133 Jahangir, Mughal Emperor  158

274

Index

James I  1–2, 6, 7, 11, 12–13, 17, 28, 34, 38, 183 n.2(Intro), 186 n.13, 188 n.40, 188 n.44, 189 n.50 acceptance of donation provided by the English parliament  43 and Count of Gondomar  8–9 death of  6, 39 desire for universal peace  44 and Dutch blockade  235 n.278 financial needs of  41 gift to Constable of Castile  220 n.314 homosexuality  18 illness  37, 196 n.222 incompetence  185 n.43 ‘The Lepanto of James the Sixth’ (poem)  16 opposition to war  38, 41, 42, 195 n.188 pacifist foreign policy  42 pacifist policy towards Spain  50 and Palatinate conflict  14 poems  16, 53, 208 n.37 reign of  185 n.36, 259 n.3 royal licence for purchasing  126–7 and the Spanish ambassadors, political breakdown  45 and Thirty Year’s War  14 James VI, King of Scotland, portrait of  176 Jesuits, proclamations against  42 Jimenez, Pedro  74–5 Joan of Clereque  71 Juan Fernández de Velasco see Constable of Castile Justiniani, Pablo and Agustin  69 Justiz, Martín de  229 n.136 Kinloss (Scottish aristocrat)  102 Kinloss, Lord  31 Knowles, Sir Thomas  105 Knox, John  124

La Rochelle  3, 4, 143 battles (1627 and 1628)  3 lawyers, of Spanish embassy  75 League of Avignon  38 Lee, Hugo  156 legal disputes  100, 134, 136–8, 212 n.128 Lemettier, Diego  79 Lennox, Earl of  42 León, Lucrecia de  52, 204 n.365 Leoni, Pompeo  57 Lerma, Duke of  2, 6, 18, 20, 24, 49, 52, 62, 186 n.6, 189 n.64 end of regime of  187 n.24 and Phillip III  19 regime of  15 letters of marque  131–2, 133, 135, 136, 140, 228 n.109 Levant Company  236 n.312 Lewknor, Sir Lewes (Master of Ceremonies)  110, 114 Bruneau’s gift to daughter of  114 Lezcano, Alfonso  71 The Life of Guzmán D’Alfarache  190 n.78 The Life of Lazarillo de Tormes and of His Fortunes and Adversities  48 Ligne, Charles de (Count of Aremberg)  26, 27, 30, 97 The Lives, Apprehensions, Arraignments and Executions of the 19 Late Pyrates  50 Livy, Titus  205 n.379 Llano, Queipo de  9 Lobo, Pedro  71 Lockyer, Roger  9 London (ship)  144 Loomie, Albert J.  9 Losada, Andrés  46 Louis XIII, King of France  43, 51 Lozana, Vicencio  69 Lusardo, Marco Antonio  65, 118 Lyon , Francis Hamilton  9

ladies-in-waiting, gifts to  107 Laing, William  82, 123, 224 n.21 Lake, Peter  9 Lake, Sir Thomas  103 gifts to  115 Lambe, John  190 n.74 La Roca, Count De  60

McDonnell, Sir Daniel  132 McManus, Clare  9 Madariaga, Pedro de  71 Magioli, Lorenzo  69 Mainwaring, Sir Henry  50, 140, 232 n.205 Discourse of Pirates  134–5 Malacca  12, 36–7

 Index 275 Manners, Lady Katherine  113 Manning, Gerson  135 Mansell, Vice Admiral  146 Mansfeld, Ernst von  34, 104 Mansfell, Sir Robert Vice Admiral  110, 145, 151 Mansfelt, Count Ernst Von  198 n.250 Mansfield, Ernst of  3 Mantuano, Pedro  15 Marchant, George  71 Marchioness of Valle  23 Mare Liberum  212 n.218 Margaret, Queen of Austria  23, 104 Margarita, Queen  220 n.315 Maria, Henrietta  1, 171 Maria, Nivio  69 Maria, Princess Henrietta  43, 58 and Carlos, proposed marriage alliance between  39 Marie de Medici, Queen of France  43 maritime trade  27, 51, 95, 135, 150 Marquesi, Bartolome  116 marriage alliance  32 breakdown of  1 funds for  63 Mary Tudor, Queen of England  34 Mascareñas, Jorge  152 The Masque of Augurs  188 n.43 Massei, Bernardo  66 Matheo Cuester  71 Mattingly, Garret  9 Maxfeld, Jacques  117 Mayerne, Louis de, The Generall Historie of Spayne  23 Mayerne, Sir Theodore  37 Mediterranean area  63, 150 Spain involvement in military conflicts  63 Mendieta, Tomás  69 Mendivil, Diego Diaz  68 Mendizorroz, Fermin Lopez de  75 Mendoza, Ana de Carvajal y  89 Mendoza, Bernardino de  40 Mendoza, Diego Hurtado de (Viscount of La Corzana and Count)  37, 69, 74, 120, 198 n.254 Mendoza, Doña Luisa de Carvajal y  79 Mendoza, Hurtado de  118, 131 Messia, Agustín  35, 150

Messía, Diego  113, 120, 157, 198 n.254 Middlesex, Earl of  42 Middleton, Thomas  47 Miles Gloriosus, the Spanish Braggadocio: Or the Humour of the Spaniard  204 n.374 military equipment and naval supplies  132–3, 228 n.125 military officers, assistance for  92–6 Minerva and Mercury conduct the Duke of Buckingham to the Temple of Virtue, The Apotheosis of the Duke Buckingham  54 Mirabel, Marquis de  63, 200 n.297 Miranda, Count of  23 El Mohíno  116 Molin, Nicolo  137 Moncada, Sáncho de  155 Monson, Sir William  102, 107, 110, 145 Montero, Gonzalo  140 Montesclaros, Marquis of  15, 35 Moors  48–9, 52, 81, 131, 151, 152 Moreau, Paulo  118 Murray, James  149 mythological characters, comparisons with  51–8 Nassau, Maurice of  131 nattione italiana  66 naval crews  130 gifts to  114–15 naval officers, gifts to  110 the Netherlands see Dutch Republic; Holland; Zeeland Neuce and Franchesi Plot  29 new alliance  24, 35–6, 37 Nieuwpoort, Battle of  20 Nort, Antonio de  71, 75 North, Roger  166 North Africa  151 North India  36 Novelas Ejemplares  48. See Cervantes, Miguel de Nuestra Señora de Begoña galleon  123–5 officers, in Spanish embassy  76, 81–2 Of His Majesty’s Receiving the News of the Duke of Buckingham’s Death  204 n.373

276 Oldenbarnevelt, Johan van  11, 13, 14, 35, 168 Olivares, Count-Duke of  5, 12, 15, 16, 19, 36, 37, 39, 40, 46, 47, 50, 53, 54, 127, 129, 141, 155, 179, 188 n.37, 189 n.72, 205 n.381 Oliveira, Diego Luis de  94, 125, 130 Oñate, 5th Count of  63 Oñate, 8th Count of  39 O’Neill, Henry  93 Orange, Maurice of  34 ordinary ambassadors  67 Ordoñez, Jeronimo  65 Oro, García  9 Osjart, Juan  71 Ostend  13 Osuna, Duke of  145 overseas maritime companies  12 Owen, Hugh  30, 116 Oxford, Earl of  234 n.250 Palatinate  3, 14 Pallache, Samuel  140, 232 n.204 Pánfilo  116 Paris embassy  63 Parker, Geoffrey  206 n.3 Parker, William  9, 139 smuggling of pearls  232 n.192 Parma, Duke of  116 Parmesano (courier)  71 Pastrana, Duke of  63, 116 patache  226 n.73 peace in exchange for money  20–5, 30, 64 Peace Treaty of 1604 (London)  1–2, 8, 10, 14, 25, 34, 49, 93, 118, 121, 133, 136, 156, 194 n.162 The Somerset House Conference  25–8 Peck, Linda Levy  9 Peckwell, Peter  116, 136 Pennington, Sir John  50 pensioners code names for  100 and confidants, distinguish between  100–2, 218 n.280 pensions, paid by the Spanish embassy  96–7, 98 during 1604–5  102 during 1605–11  102–3

Index during 1612–14  103 during 1615–23  103 during 1624–5  103 annual budget paid at the English court  102 in Brussels  103 in Rome  103 pepper trade  159 Pérez, Father Agustín  74, 75 Pérez, Matías  229 n.137 Persia  144 ‘Peso político de todo el mundo’  12, 50 Philip II, King of Spain  6, 11, 19, 34, 190 n.77 embargoes  243 n.501 Philip III, King of Spain  1–2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 17, 19, 27, 30, 31, 32, 50, 59, 61, 189 n.64 gift to Lord Howard  220 n.314 and Lerma  19 and pensions  99 portrait of  175 on Twelve Years’ Truce of 1609  15 Philip IV, King of Spain and Portugal  1, 2, 4, 5, 12, 14, 16, 38, 51, 54, 55, 57, 62, 141, 170, 185 n.40, 199 n.291 accusations against Buckingham  18 concessions to the English in the East Indies  157 and de iure English settlements of Virginia and the Bermuda  36 and Olivares  19 portrait of  55, 56, 57, 178 trade with Indies  35 Philippines  12 Phillip III  19 Phillips, Sir Robert  34, 117 pilots  130 piracy  10, 12, 150 curbing of  230 n.144 fighting in the first decade (1603–13)  133–8 Plymouth  46–7, 146 English fleet  2–3, 40 Poidras, Adelfo  167 political friendship, Anglo-Spanish relations  97 Polybius  205 n.379

 Index 277 poor, financial aid to  89–90 Porter, Endymion  111–12 Portugal  12, 49 artillery needs  127 concession to English merchants  196 n.215 and Spain  11 spice trade, and English–Dutch merchants collaboration  160 Portuguese empire  36, 161–2, 172 and joint actions of English and Dutch trading companies  156 overseas  34 weak soldiers for  162–3 Portuguese merchants  67 and Spanish crown  209 n.59 postage and couriers challenges  71 and diplomacy  71 postal routes  211 n.90 Prada, Andrés de  126 Prada, Vázquez de  9 Pragmática de Reformación  155 priests, proclamations against  42 Primiser, Ana (Anne Primiser)  79 Primo del caminante  116 Prince Baltasar Carlos in the Riding School (painting)  205 n.385 Prince of Wales see Charles I, King of England privateering  12, 20, 29, 131–2, 243 n.501 complaints about  10 Dutch privateers  95, 137, 142–3 English privateers  50, 133, 134–5, 136, 140, 141, 155, 230 n.158 Flemish privateers  14, 27, 148–9, 151, 156 Rochalais privateers  143 private expenditure of the Spanish ambassadors  82–7 Privy Council  7, 30, 33, 41, 45, 47, 75, 82, 85–6, 91, 100–5, 110, 123–4, 127, 137, 139, 143, 148 Protestantism  1, 3, 7, 48 Pujades, Jeroni  28 Quester, Matthew de  71, 112 Questier, Michael C.  9

Radin, John  136 Raleigh, Sir Walter  8, 13, 14, 97, 138, 144, 166, 193 n.128, 193 n.131, 259 n.4 expedition to Guiana  166 History of the World  35 public execution of  104 trial and execution of  49, 231 n.181 Ramírez, Tomás  71, 75, 212 n.124 Ramsay, Sir John  107 Randall, William  116–17, 136 Redworth, Glynn  9 re-provisioning  121 ‘Reputacionista’ movement  50 Rhenish Palatinate  38, 42, 46, 198 n.257, 200 n.303 agreement of  29 Ribalta, Ribas de  72–3, 143 Ribera, Juan de  14 Ricart, Esteban  71 Rich, Henry (Earl of Warwick)  165 Rich, Henry (Lord Kensington, the future Earl of Holland)  43 Richardot, Jean de  23, 26, 27 Rizzo, Francisco  65 Roberto, Father Juan  99 Robida, Alessandro  25, 26, 27, 65, 77, 147 Robidan Jarte  116 Robles, Juan de  189 n.72 Roca, Count De la  189 n.72 on image of an ambassador  61 Rochalais privateers  143 Rodenburg, Theodore  186 n.6 Rodríguez, Ausias  125 Rodríguez, Cabeza  9 Roe, Sir Thomas  158 Roelants, Juan Bautista  71 The Rogue and The Life of Guzman de Alfarache  48 Rohan, Benjamin de (Duke of Soubise)  73 Roldán see Countess of Suffolk Rome embassy  63 Roper, Sir John (III Baron of Teynham)  114 Rotaeche, Antonio  123 Rowley, William  49 Royal Board of Admiralty  153

278

Index

Royal Mint of Toledo  69 Rubens, Peter Paul  5, 54, 58 Minerva protects Pax from Mars (‘Peace and War’)  5 portrait of Buckingham  5 Ruiz, Simon  66 Rutland, Countess of  114 Rycaut, Peter  69, 127, 129, 226 n.55 Sackville, Thomas (Earl of Dorset)  26, 31, 102 Sagastizabal, Juan de  124 St John, Oliver (Viscount of Grandison)  142 salaries of the embassy personnel  73–5 of lawyers  76 of officers and assistants  76 of secretaries of the embassy  75 of servants  79 Salinas and Alenquer, Count of  127 Salmoral, Lucena  9 El Salvador  144 Samson, Alexander  9 San Agustin, Father Juan de  77 San Alberto galleon  94, 122 San Ambrosio galleon  123–5, 129 Saneado, Simon  140 San Germán, Marquis of  23 San Joseph galleon  130 San Juan, Pedro de  69 Santa Clara galleon  122, 149 Santa Cruz, Antonio Ponce de  55 Santo, Martin del Espiritu  186 n.6 Sarmiento, Pedro  94, 122 Savoy  10, 18, 20, 41, 42, 44, 90, 141 Schyn, Antonio de  71 Scorza, Nicolás  20, 147, 190 n.80, 191 n.86 Scotland  6, 82, 84 catholic missions in  8, 16–17, 88, 117 correspondence sent to  71 demand for cessation of the Dutch levies in  93 Flemish galleons taking refuge in  122, 123–5 ports  82 Scott, Thomas, Vox Populi  18

sea captains and officers, hiring of  131 seamen, assistance for  92–6 Sedeño, Lope  75 Sehelen, Francisco  75 Sehin, Antonio de  75 Sehoto, Benedicto  118 Semer, Sir Robert  69 Semple, Sir William  14, 15, 35, 113, 156 Serra, Francesco  30, 65–6 Serra, Jerome  65, 66 Shakespeare, William, Troilus and Cressida  204 n.364 Sharpe, Kevin  9 Shelton, Thomas  48 Sherley, Sir Anthony  12, 35, 50, 128, 203 n.354, 237 n.342 Peso político de todo el mundo  12, 50 Sluiter, Engel  9 Smuts, Malcom  9 Smythe, Sir Thomas  240 n.415 Snow, María (Mary Snow)  79 soldiers, assistance for  92–6 Somerset, Earl of  17, 103 Somerset, Thomas (Master of the Horse of Queen Anne, I viscount Somerset)  114 The Somerset House Conference  25 Soprani, Juan Francisco  65, 66, 122, 136 Soto, Hernando de  204 n.364 Sousa, Diogo Lopes de (Count of Miranda)  127 Sousa, Gaspar de  167 South India  37 Spain  4 bankruptcies in 1607 and 1627  28 ‘black legend’ of  48 consulates in  156 diplomacy agents  117–18 diplomatic efforts to avoid war with Stuart England  38 diplomatic negotiations  11 distrust on English intentions in the Mediterranean  151 economic challenges  11 and England, evaluation of the peace between  28–9

 Index 279 English maritime and commercial expansion overseas, control of  171–2 fight with German Protestants  28 focus on fighting the Dutch at Breda  28 foreign policy  18 hiring foreign ships to transport troops  224 n.14 and Holland, war between  10, 147 intervention in the Thirty Years’ War  62 military and naval expenses  59 in Northern Europe  13 peace, buying of  20–5 political challenges  11 and Portugal  11 refusal to grant England free trade with the Indies  36 religious challenges  11 reputation  13, 14–16, 20 royal decree  243 n.501 stopping of overseas expansion of newcomers  12 surveillance of the British coasts  82 treasury  59 Spanish ambassadors  7, 170 dealings with the ladies at English court  112 discreditation of Buckingham  41 house represented as Catholic shelter  90 pass out of money/jewels among English ships’ crews  114 payments to  68 persecution against, in London  43 private expenditure of  82–7 Spanish America  12 Spanish Armada, failure of  48 Spanish Council of Indies  167 Spanish Council of State  20, 194 n.162 Spanish court, comparisons at  52 Spanish diplomats  2, 6, 170 to James I Stuart (1603–25)  21 opposition to Dutch trade of the Mediterranean  152 rescue of spoils of the galleons sunk off the British coasts  129 Spanish–Dutch diplomatic negotiations, failure of  12

Spanish embassies  6, 207 n.21 age of the million (1603–5)  64–6 annual revenue incomes  207 n.23 assistants  77–78 chaplains  78 clergies  77–8 debts  67–8 decrease in the funding for  62 finances and tentacles  64–70 higher revenue incomes for  62 minor embassies  61 money management in England (1620–5)  68–70 performance in England (1605–10)  66 proposals against Dutch smuggling  154 secretaries of the embassy  75 sextons  78, 79 staff  77–9 structure of  75–6 treasure revenues  63 Spanish embassy expenditure  60, 70 bureaucratic expenses  86 of chapel maintenance  83–6 court celebration expenses  87 extraordinary expenses  86 funeral expenses  86 items of expenditure (1603–25)  70 miscellaneous expenses  86 postage expenses and couriers  70–3 purchases expenses  87 secret expenses  87, 88, 119 travel expenses  82 treasure expenses (1603–25)  64 written reports of  106 Spanish Habsburgs  7 Spanish horses, Philip II gift to James  106 Spanish Infanta  28, 34, 58 Spanish literature  48 Spanish Low Countries  24, 34 trade with  146–8 Spanish Match  1, 7, 14, 29, 33, 170, 173 Spanish tercio  14, 93–4, 122 Spice Islands  186 n.4 spice trade market  160 Spiller, Robert  30, 116 Spilsbergen, Joris Van  168

280

Index

Spinola, Marquis Ambrogio [Ambrosio]  13, 15, 38, 112, 123, 149, 225–6 n.51 Squarzafigo, Vicenzo  67 Stanley, Sir William  30, 116 Stewart, Lady Henrietta  114 Stewart, Sir Ludovic (second Duke of Lennox)  111 Stirling castle, chapel of  188 n.45 Stock, Father Simon  78 stolen cargoes, and litigation  233 n.220 Stone, Sir John  156 Stradling, Robert A.  9 Strait of Gibraltar, squadron of  152 Strata, Carlo  67, 68 Strata, Juan Francisco  68 Stuart, Elizabeth, the Princess Palatine  3, 34, 47 Stuart, Lady Arabella  105 Stuart, Mary  169 Stuart, Prince Henry  184 n.19 death of  49 Stuart auction (1603–4)  62–4 Stuart court, corruption of  189 n.49 Stuart England  3, 6, 16, 39, 41 decline of the English navy during  51 disastrous expeditions to La Rochelle  39 and the Spanish–Dutch war  121–2 Stuart parade  188 n.48 Studder, Sir Thomas  93 Suffolk, Countess of (Lady Catherine Howard)  30, 62, 93, 99, 102, 107, 112, 136 delay in pension payment for  111 pension  99 Sweden  184 n.31 Tassis, Carlos de  71 Tassis, Juan Bautista de  23, 193 n.135 Tassis, Juan de see Villamediana, Count of Tassis, Leonardo de  71 Taylor, Henry  2, 4, 39, 46, 79, 80, 201 n.332 Taylor, Mary  94 Taylor, Robert  20, 30, 75–6, 123, 136, 191 n.86 textile company  149

Thirty Years’ War  2, 4, 7, 13, 14, 29, 34, 37, 52, 57, 141, 184 n.20, 184 n.31 Thompson, Irving Anthony  9 Throckmorton, Francis  40 El Tigre (The Tiger)  129, 133 Todos los Santos  144 Toledo, Fadrique de  39, 125, 129, 153, 237 n.349 Tomlinson, Howard  9 Tostado, Pérez  9 To the King of His Navy and Of the Queen  204 n.373 Touche, Daniel de la  167 Treaty of Edinburgh (or Leith)  124 Treaty of London see Peace Treaty of 1604 (London) Treaty of Monzón  19 Treaty of Pyreness  14 Treaty of The Hague  38 Treaty of Tordesillas  11, 36, 37, 259 n.4 Treaty of Vervins  14, 19, 137, 140 Treaty of Westphalia–Munster  14 Trevor, Richard  136 Tristan, Richard  131 Trojan War  51 Tromp, Maarten Harpertszoon  94 A true Relation, of the Lives and Deaths of Two Most Famous English Pyrats, Purse, and Clinton who Lived in the Reigne of Queene Elizabeth  49–50 Trumbull, Sir William  2 Tserclaes, Johann (Count of Tilly)  195 n.187 Tucker, Captain  139 Tufton, Lady Cecilia  114 Turks  63, 150 Twelve Years’ Truce of 1609  12, 13, 15, 34, 141 Tyrone, Earl of  94 Uceda, Duke of  187 n.24 Ulloa, Julián Sánchez de  60, 68, 74, 75, 148, 150, 151, 166 Ungerer, Gustav  9, 104 Usselincx, Willem  168 Valamens, Geremías  81, 128, 132 Valdivia, Father Luis de  25 Valencegui, Martín de  131

 Index 281 Van Dyck, Anthony  53 Van Male, Juan Bautista  42, 45, 75, 76, 126, 129, 130, 131, 133, 136, 142, 148, 154 report on masts purchase and transport  133 report on royal fleet  146 Van Nooren, Peter  123 Vaux, Edward (4th Baron Vaux of Harrowden)  94, 114 Vega, Garci Mazo de la  66 Velasco, Alonso de (Count of La Revilla)  67, 74, 137 Velázquez, Diego  54, 55, 56 Venetians  41, 145 Venice  20, 25, 41, 61, 75, 90, 116, 117, 152, 234 n.251 Vere, Francis de (Earl of Oxford)  148 Vere, Henry de (Earl of Oxford)  145, 203 n.356 Verreyken, Louis  26, 27 Verton, Françoise  117 Verwood, Thomas  130 Villafranca, Marquis of  15 Villamediana, Count of  6, 17, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 39, 49, 62, 64, 74, 105, 188 n.48, 189 n.50, 192 n.127, 194 n.148 on banquets  118 on Catholic tolerance in England  30 and complaints  229–30 n.143 correspondence with Constable  27, 31 first audience of  30 and Francesco Serra  65–6 gifts to courtiers and aristocrats  115 gifts to officers and aristocrats  116 instructions given to  29 on Lord Howard  134 official meetings  31 and piracy  134 presents of  220 n.321 recommendations for gifts  104 report on English activities in America  163, 165 report on English navigation to Asia  157 salary of  73 secret meetings in Flanders  30

spending on court ceremonies  119 warning about greedy Countess of Suffolk  99 Villa-Urrutia, Fernández de Bethencourt y Ramírez de  9 Villaviciosa, Cosme de  75 Villiers, Sir George see Duke of Buckingham Virgil’s Aeneid  57 Virginia Company of London  163 Virginia Company of Plymouth  163 Waller, Edmund  204 n.373 Ward, Steve  136 Warden’s services  221 n.339 War of Flanders  2 ‘war of the wealthy people’  62 Weldon, Sir Anthony  218 n.265 Western pirates  63 West Indies  12, 34, 36, 49, 163 Caribbean  165–6 and English Virginia  163–5 West-Indische Compagnie  168 Weston, Sir Richard  2, 42 White Mountain, battle of  28, 38, 53, 141 William of Nassau  2 William of Orange  11 Winthrop, John  164 Winwood, Sir Ralph  155 Wolsey, Cardinal  97 Worthington, David  9 Zachariah  71 Zamora, Alcalá 9 Zeeland  11, 25, 36, 62, 134, 136, 230 n.158 see also Dutch Republic Zouche, Edward la  154 Zúñiga, Baltasar de  15, 18, 23, 32, 53, 62, 65, 103, 141, 147, 164, 188 n.37 and Anciondo  128 military aid to Sarmiento’s soldiers  122 reports on piracy  134 salary of  66, 73 Zúñiga, Pedro de (Marquis of Floresdávila)  7, 10, 66, 74 aided people by  95 financial rewards  74

282